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The crisis in Lebanon

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Title:
The crisis in Lebanon a test of consociational theory
Creator:
Chalouhi, Robert George, 1949-
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
1978
Language:
English
Physical Description:
xi, 275 leaves : ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Muslims ( jstor )
Political conflict ( jstor )
Political elites ( jstor )
Political ideologies ( jstor )
Political organizations ( jstor )
Political parties ( jstor )
Political power ( jstor )
Political representation ( jstor )
Political systems ( jstor )
Politicians ( jstor )
Cultural pluralism ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF ( lcsh )
History -- Lebanon ( lcsh )
Political Science thesis Ph. D ( lcsh )
Politics and government -- Lebanon ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 263-273.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Robert G. Chalouhi.

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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Copyright [name of dissertation author]. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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AAL1340 ( NOTIS )

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THE CRISIS IN LEBANON:
A TEST OF CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY










BY

ROBERT G. CHALOUHI


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY



UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


1978























Copyright 1978

by


Robert G. Chalouhi
















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


I would like to express my thanks to the members

of my committee, especially to my adviser, Dr. Keith

Legg, to whom I am deeply indebted for his invaluable

assistance and guidance. This work is dedicated to my

parents, brother, sister and families for continued

encouragement and support and great confidence in me;

to my parents-in-law for their kindness and concern;

and especially to my wife Janie for her patient and

skillful typing of this manuscript and for her much-

needed energy and enthusiasm.

















TABLE OF CONTENTS


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . .

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION . . . . . .


Page

iii

vii

ix


Applicability of the Model . .
Problems of System Change . .
Assumption of Subcultural
Isolation and Uniformity. . .
The Consociational Model Applied
to Lebanon . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . .


. 5
. 8

. . 11

. . 12
. . 22


CHAPTER II: THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSOCIATIONALISM:
LEBANON IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. . 25

The Phoenicians . . . . . .. 27
The Birth of Islam. . . . . .. 29
The Crusaders . . . . . ... 31
The Ottoman Empire. . . . . .. 33
Bashir II and the Role of External
Powers. ............... . 38
The Qaim Maqamiya . . . . . .. 41
The Mutasarrifiyah:Confessional
Representation Institutionalized. ... . 46
The French Mandate, 1918-1943: The
Consolidation of Consociational
Principles. . . . . . . .. 52
Notes . . . . . . . . .. 63

CHAPTER III: THE OPERATION OF THE LEBANESE
POLITICAL SYSTEM. . . . . .. 72


Confessionalism and Proportionality:
Nominal Actors and Formal Rules .. ..
The National Pact . . . . . .
The Formal Institutions . . . . .
Political Clientelism: "Real" Actors
and Informal Rules . . . . .
The Politics of Preferment and
Patronage . . . . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . . .










CHAPTER IV: CONSOCIATIONALISM PUT TO THE TEST:
LEBANON IN THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES. . 98

Elite Disunity . . . . . . .. 99
The "Rosewater" Revolution of 1952 ... . 99
President Chamoun and the the Crisis
of 1958. ... . . . . . . . 104
Policy Causes and Consequences . . .. 109
The Crisis Proper: No Victor, No
Vanquished . . . . . . . .. 118
Shihab: 1958-1964 . . . . . .. 126
External and Internal Issues in the
1958 Crisis. . . . . . . . .. 130
Violation of Consociational Principles . 134
Notes. . . . . . . . . .. 140

CHAPTER V: BREAKDOWN OF CONSOCIATIONAL PRINCIPLES--
THE INTERNAL FACTOR. . . . . .. 146

Social Mobilization. . . . . . .. 148
Uneven Economic Development. . . . .. 151
The Principle of Proportionality . . .. 158
The Lebanese Economy . . . . . .. 163
Planning and the Governmental Role ... . 173
Notes. .. . . . . . . . . 183

CHAPTER VI: THE EXTERNAL FACTOR -- THE PALESTINIANS 187

Emergence of the Palestinian Resistance. .. 192
The 1969 Clashes . . . . . . .. 197
The Christian Response . . . . .. 202
Slide toward Civil War . . . . .. 205
Notes. . . . . . . . . ... 214

CHAPTER VII: THE 1975-76 CIVIL WAR. . . . .. 220

Notes. . . . . . . . . ... 231

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION. . . . . . . .. 233

Revision of the Consociational Model . .. 242
Social Mobilization. .. . . . . 243
The Elite Cartel . . . . . .. 245
The Palestinian Dimension. . . . .. 249
Notes. . . . . . . . . .. 252

APPENDIX A: The Cairo Agreement . . . . .. 253

APPENDIX B: Composition of Opposing Forces in
Lebanese Civil War, 1975-76 . . .. 255










APPENDIX C: Lebanese Political Parties . . . .. 257

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . ... .. . 263

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .................. 275
















LIST OF TABLES


Table Page

I DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL BY SECT AND REGION . . 47

II CENSUS OF LEBANESE POPULATION TAKEN IN 1932. . 59

III NUMBER OF DEPUTIES WHO SERVED IN PARLIAMENTS
FIVE OR MORE TIMES: 1926-1972 . . . . .. 75

IV PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP OF PARTIES IN
LEBANON: 1951-1972 . . . . . . .. 78

V ESTIMATED POPULATION OF LEBANON IN 1956 . . 80

VI DISTRICTS AND SECTARIAN DISTRIBUTION SINCE 1960 84

VII DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BY SECTS:
1947-1972 . . . . . . . . ... . 85

VIII SECTARIAN PATTERNS OF CABINET STRUCTURES:
1943-1961 . . . . . . . . ... . 86

IX DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS IN NEW PARLIAMENT . .129

X SEATS WON BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1960. ... .130

XI SELECTED INDICATORS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
IN LEBANON. . . . . . . . . .. .149

XII SOCIAL MOBILIZATION BY REGION IN LEBANON. ... .150

XIII INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1959 . . . . . .. 153

XIV INCOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SECTS. . . . .. .153

XV DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE OF BUSINESSMEN IN EACH
SECTOR BY CITIZENSHIP AND BY RELIGION . . .. .155

XVI EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF WIFE AND HUSBAND, FAMILY
INCOME, AND HUSBANDS'S OCCUPATION BY RELIGIOUS
GROUP: LEBANON, 1971 . . . . . .. 156










XVII DIFFERENCES IN FERTILITY RATE WITH REGARD TO
AFFILIATION: LEBANON, 1971 . . . . .. 160

XVIII NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN AND NUMBER OF
LIVING CHILDREN PER 1,000 MARRIED WOMEN BY
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND WIFE'S AGE:
LEBANON, 1971 . . . . . . . .. 161

XIX ORIGINS OF NET NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1950-1966. . 166

XX TRADE AND FINANCE SECTORS AS % OF NET NATIONAL
PRODUCT 1954-1966 . . . . . . .. 167

XXI NATIONAL INCOME 1950 AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
1972 BY SECTOR. . . . . . . . .. 169

XXII PERCENTAGE GROWTH OF SECTORS BETWEEN 1950
AND 1972. . . . . . . ... : .... 170

XXIII DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACTIVE LABOUR FORCE BY
SECTOR. . . . . . . . . ... . 175

XXV GENERAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES OF LEBANON,
1964-1967 . . . . . . . . ... 178


viii








Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


THE CRISIS IN LEBANON:
A TEST OF CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY

by


Robert G. Chalouhi

December, 1978

Chairman: Keith R. Legg
Major Department: Political Science

This dissertation focuses on the Lebanese political

system, which prior to the destructive civil war of 1975-76,

represented one of the few examples of a culturally divided,

developing country that was able, for a period, to maintain

a stable system of representative democracy. To study the

nature of democracy in Lebanon, we used a framework provided

by Arend Lijphart and his elaboration of the concept of

Consociational democracy. This allowed us to examine to a

more accurate degree the relationship between the country's

political culture, social structure and political stability.

Consociational democracy is essentially rule by an "elite

cartel," where cooperation by the elite is able to circum-

vent the culturally and politically fragmented society and

thus maintain stability. Lebanon exhibits a complex

"balance of power" system among traditional, autonomous

groups in which religion represents the major line of

division, allied closely with strong regional, client and

family group affiliations or loyalties. Religion and









politics are inextricably intertwined. It is the purpose

of this study to discuss the operation of the Lebanese

political system under this broad theme and in the process

to suggest the underlying causes for the breakdown of the

system.

The introduction takes a look at the extent of

applicability of Lebanon to the consociational system,

surveying the literature on the subject and highlighting

the shortcomings of the model. Chapter II examines the

beginnings of the consociational system by surveying

Lebanon in historical perspective. The next chapter looks

at the operation of consociational democracy in independent

Lebanon, which includes the formal institutions of the state

and the all-important but less evident operation of the

extensive patron-client network based on religious and

family rivalries. The internal and external factors

which weakened the structure in the fifties, with a

specific focus on the crisis of 1958, are the concern of the

next section. This conflict represented the beginning of

the end for a stable consociational system in Lebanon. The

next two chapters focus on the two major factors responsible

for the ultimate collapse of the system. First, the internal

cause involved a breakdown of elite unity, where

changes could not be peacefully made to redress Moslem

grievances involving preponderant Christian economic and

political power. The external factor is the role of the

Palestinians in Lebanon, who helped polarize the population









and add to the existing socio-economic cleavage. The final

chapter presents conclusions derived from the study.

The paper finds that the system could not cope, through

peaceful means, with this combination of internal and

external factors. The introduction of a new actor, wielding

great influence on the system, upset the confessional

balance. This was allied with a dissatisfied internal

element, linked to the process of a change in the nature of

the clientelist system.

The study concludes that consociational theory

proved inadequate in predicting and explaining the interaction

of internal and external pressures. More attention should

be focused on the conditions under which internal conflicts

are exacerbated by external factors, as happened in the

case of Lebanon. The measure of intensity of certain

cleavages should be given more attention, as well as to the

factors producing them. In this instance, the issue of

support for the Palestinians sharply divided the two communities.

The lesser privileged Moslem elements whom modernization

had not benefitted as much as it had the Christians were

able to use the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon as a tool

with which to attempt to overturn a system characterized by

a Christian dominance of the elite, plus a Christian

dominance of the resources of the state, which was largely

a result of the role played by the clientelist network in

Lebanon.














CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION


The relationship between political culture (defined

as the attitudes, beliefs, values and political orientations

of a people) and social structure on the one hand and the

nature of the political system on the other is a highly

relevant one for political scientists. One of the more

interesting aspects of this subject is the relationship

between a heterogeneous political culture (fragmented along

racial, linguistic, regional or religious lines) and the

prospects for a viable, stable democratic system.

Many theorists assume that a democracy cannot operate

in a society characterized by strong subcultural divisions,

but rather that stability requires a homogeneous political

culture where cross-cutting cleavages exist to moderate

conflict.2 The continued co-existence of plural societies

and democracy in a number of states around the world

negates this generally-held contention. The degree of

stability varies from the democratic models exemplified by

the Anglo-American models to the more conflictual democratic

systems found in, say, Italy and France. Lebanon is one

country that prior to the 1975-76 civil was displayed an

interesting example of democracy in a plural society.









Gabriel Almond follows the traditionalist classification

of democratic states into the Anglo-American system

(a homogeneous, secular political and a differentiated role

structure) on the one hand, and the Continental European

(fragmented political culture with distinct subsystems of

roles) on the other. However, the universe of real

democratic systems was larger. Consequently a new

category, which included the Scandinavian and Low countries

(vaguely described as a combination of the first two) was

established. This category, which includes stable multi-

party systems, was not elaborated upon.3 In a later work

the Scandinavian, Low countries and Switzerland were

classified as "Stable democracies," again with little

elaboration.4 These political systems, which exhibit

mutually-reinforcing cleavages, received little attention,

bearing in mind that considerable diversity exists within

the category. One group within this category has been

termed "deviant cases" by Arend Lijphart who identified them

as "Consociational Democracies," defined as "democracies

with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward

immobilism and instability which are deliberately turned into

more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures."5

As examples, he cites Switzerland, the Benelux countries,

Lebanon and Colombia. The Consociational model, as Daalder

points out, increases our ability to better understand

different forms of democratic rule, adding that social

divisions need not imply that political conflicts will result.6









Lijphart's model for a stable, culturally and politically

fragmented democracy rests largely on his argument that

mutually-reinforcing cleavages do not necessarily produce

instability. Rather, he maintains that cross-cutting

cleavages are not a necessity as long as there is cooperation

at the elite level. The other conditions favorable to

consociational democracy, in addition to the distinct lines

of cleavage between subcultures, are a balance of power

among the subcultures, popular acceptance of coalition

government, the existence of external threats and moderate

nationalism. The latter is particularly important, as it

is contrary to the generally accepted belief that

development requires a transfer of loyalties from the local

to the national level. Milton Esman argues that there is

no need or desire to overcome local loyalties, arguing

"there is no reason to deny moral legitimacy to plural

states."8

In an elaboration of his model, derived mainly from his
9
work on the Netherlands, Lijphart argues that isolation

and self-containment of the groups can be conducive to

democracy. The system remains stable because the political

elites are consciously aware of the need to circumvent the

divided society by cooperation at the elite level. Rather

than compete with each other they must form an "elite

cartel" in order to successfully regulate the political

process. The emphasis is on the ability of the elite to

maintain stability. Consociational democracy, which is









basically rule by the elite cartel, requires:


(1) That the elites have the ability to
accommodate the divergent interests and
demands of the subcultures.

(2) This requires that they have the
ability to transcend cleavages and to
join in a common effort with the elites
of rival subcultures.

(3) This in turn depends on their
commitment to the maintenance of the
system and to the improvement of its
cohesion and stability.

(4) Finally, all of the above
requirements are based on the assumption
that the elites understand the perils
of political fragmentation. 0


The theory, then, proceeds from the contention that

culturally divided societies and stable democratic systems

are not necessarily incompatible; that democracy is not the

exclusive preserve of countries that exhibit homogeneous

political cultures. It is a rather different form of

democracy, differing from the classic examples of the Anglo-

American models. While both types essentially provide for

rule by consent of the governed and with accountability of

the governors, the consociational model has certain features

that distinguish it from the mainstream of western democratic

systems. In a consociational system, security must be

guaranteed for each subculture by allowing it a share in the

governing process.









Proportional representation, and not majority rule,

becomes the norm, and coalition governments, in which

no one group can dominate become a necessity.1 Mutual

vetoes and concurrent majorities go hand in hand with

the arrangement whereby governmental power is curtailed

in order for the subgroups to autonomously handle their own

affairs. Though, ideologically, groups may remain

intransigent, political bargaining takes place in an

atmosphere of toleration, moderation, compromise and prag-

matism. Interests are carefully adjusted between groups

mainly through structured bargaining processes by the

leaders. Because of the strong strain of ideology,issues,

in order to be resolved to every group's satisfaction,

have to be depoliticized or discussed in less ideological,

and more technical, terms.

In sum, underlying the stability of such systems is a

fundamental consensus on the most basic aspects of the

structure, where the desire to preserve the system is found

among all subgroups. Boundaries exist within which the

groups may defend and promote their interests in a peaceful

manner.


Applicability of the Model

The assumption exists that democracies cannot operate

in culturally divided societies of the developing world.

How relevant is this Western-based consociational model for

non-Western countries? Communal attachments as religion,










region, kinship and language, what Geertz calls "primordial

ties"l2 are seen as impediments to the effective functioning

of a stable democracy, and the argument is made that states

have to achieve a degree of homogeneity before a democratic

system can work. Western states are not completely

homogeneous; however, many continental European democracies

exhibit fragmented political cultures.

While democracy along the Anglo-American model may not

be fully relevant for developing states, a specific form of

democracy--the consociational model--may be one method of

overcoming the deep cleavages characteristic of these systems.

Though the divisions are deeper and wider than those in

the Western democracies, the gaps can be bridged if the

countries satisfy certain conditions. Where communal or

segmental isolation exists, and little contact takes place

between the segments, agreement on the structure of the state

can be made by the segments' leaders.

Van Den Berghe cites several conditions necessary for

consociational democracy, which include basic agreements on

the essential values, agreement on the structure of the

government, acceptance of pluralism, that is, of cultural and

regional autonomy, where a monopoly over the means of violence

does not exist.13 The model will be suitable especially

where a balance of power exists between autonomous segments,

and where there has been some history of elite (coalescent)

decision-making.









Size also appears to be a favorable factor in the

functioning of consociational democracies. Frequent

interaction leads to accommodation and good will.14

Smallness also involves a fear of larger neighbors and this

supposedly leads to more elite solidarity. This is effective

where the danger is seen by all groups, and not by just one

or more segments. A plural society, then, will find the

consociational model the most viable in view of the deep

cleavages present in the society. Unity will be achieved and

the likelihood of violence decreased if the problem of

primordial loyalties is overcome.15

Kuper expounds on two models of democratic pluralism,

neither of which really apply to our study of Lebanon. The

"equilibrium" model he defines as "a dispersion of power

between groups which are bound together by cross-cutting

loyalties and by common values," presupposes a rather

homogeneous society.16 The "conflict" model states the

necessity for domination of society by a minority group.17

In answer to the question of whether of how applicable the

consociational model, developed for the small West European

democracies, is for an understanding of the prospects for

stable democracy in culturally divided, developing countries,

we may quote Lijphart:







8

For many of the plural societies of the
non-Western world. . the realistic
choice is not between the British
normative model of democracy and the
consociational model, but between
consociational democracy and no democracy
at all.18


The consociational model, in short, may be applicable

to different countries in various degrees, and it is our

purpose to explain Lebanon's system and its demise with the

aid of consociational theory and in the process to identify

extra variables that may serve to strengthen the theory's

explanatory potential and applicability, helping to over-

come some of its limitations. One important aspect of this

model which we must address ourselves to is the problem of

system change. How well does this model accommodate change?


Problems of System Change

One of the drawbacks of the model is the detrimental

effects brought about by modernization, or more specifically

social mobilization. Competition for scarce resources leads

to the emergence of new values. Different rates of

mobilization, moreover, engender conflict by making

cleavages more reinforcing. Melson and Wolpe show that

modernization in Nigeria led to more conflicts plus the

emergence of new groups. The groups' communal identity

becomes the basis for their advancement. They "perceive

their competitive world through a communal prism."9

Conflict arises when certain groups are not able to acquire

desired values as wealth, power and status. As Dew puts it,









" . with the system's capabilities perceived as static,

the increased satisfaction of one group implies an increased

dissatisfaction for the other groups) with a heightened

sense of relative deprivation and an increased prospect

for political conflict."20

Social mobilization leads to a greater awareness of

communal identity, generating conflict over distribution

of resources, which can lead then to an uneven communal

distribution of the society's wealth. Where opportunities

exist for advancing or sharing in values without encroaching

on the rewards of another group, the likelihood of conflict

will be decreased. Where one group does not advance as

rapidly as another, a sense of deprivation sets in. In

brief, different rates of mobilization lead to a more

apparent division among the communities, a growing of

socio-political cleavages which can lead to conflict.

Because of the question of wealth and redistribution, it

becomes a conflict of class. Where communal and class

cleavages coincide, the changes for conflict and polarization

increase. The reasons for the differences, Melson and Wolpe

point out, include the nature of Western contact, environ-

mental opportunities, and variations in cultural dispositions.21

The ability to successfully overcome these problems

of modernization is one major weakness of this democratic

model. The attitude of the elite is important in this regard.

Where elites do not have a common perception of








the distribution of rewards in a society, conflict among

members of the elite may set in. Demands for a change in the

methods of allocation arise after the resources of groups and

their leaders change over time, again due to political

or economic changes. But, as Esman points out, "the

conflict management perspective has an inevitable bias

toward conservatism and system maintenance, toward the orderly

and peaceful continuity of a conflict-ridden or violence-

prone political system."22 A serious problem with

structured elite predominance is its conservative bias, "where

elite predominance tends to freeze the social status quo

and to limit policy options for economic growth,distribution

and participation."23 Priority is given to stability and

peaceful relations between the society's communities.

Agreement on objectives and values of the system

becomes difficult. Apter argues that what he calls a

"consociation" is subject to "immobilism because of

the need to find agreement on common action before action

itself is possible. Hence, it is given to crisis, fission
24
and recombination as part of its natural history."24 It

is a static system that does not easily accommodate change.

The modernization process, it appears, leads to a

rejection of regulatory practices by non-elites, or as

Nordlinger contends . the continuing impact of modernization

upon the non-elite detracts from the possibility of

regulatory outcomes."25 The consociational system is,

therefore, of a rather static character. Lorwin argues









that "segmented pluralism" is breaking down in the Nether-

lands because of youth unhappiness with the ideological

blocs and with the compromises of the system.26 Dutter

takes issue with this contention, maintaining that

consociational democracy in the Netherlands is not changing

to a homogeneous political culture, as Lijphart asserts,

and he further questions whether the growth of secular

blocs will continue.27


Assumption of Subcultural Isolation and Uniformity

In his discussion of the relation between the

communities and the elite, Lijphart essentially neglects

the possibility of linkage between the two, as was the

case in Lebanon. Though the communities are more or less

isolated or segmented, links between members of the elites

and members of the different communities existed through the

patronage network.

Besides having contacts with each other, the members

of the ruling elite have contact with regional leaders or

notables. These coalitions may be with members of other

religions, and not necessarily with members of the same

community. The President and the other members of the

elite, in short, serve their political interests and those

of their clients by cooperating with notables from other

communities. This creates an arena where different sub-

elite coalitions are important.










While legitimacy of the elite in the Netherlands is

legal-rational, in Lebanon it is more of a quid pro quo,

traditional legitimacy. Problems of recruitment are also

related to the nature, and legitimacy, of the elite.

In Lebanon bargaining takes place among notables,with the

individual's name and family figuring importantly. A

member of the ruling elite is usually able to recruit a

member of his family, or even allies of his region, into

the elite structure.

In sum, the picture is not one of complete isolation

of the elite from the blocs. Rather, contacts are main-

tained between members of the elite, plus they with

leaders of the different communities. The continual

bargaining that takes place between the elites and the

"sub-elites" is a central aspect of Lebanese politics.

Our purpose at this stage is to establish first whether

Lebanon falls into Almond's third category, or more

specifically, into Lijphart's consociational model.


The Consociational Model applied to Lebanon

Lebanon is a small country (4,000 square miles,

3 million people) which, since independence in 1943,

exhibited a stable formula of pluralism and democracy.

Under Ottoman rule, an autonomous Lebanese province was

administered along confessional lines, with Christians

constituting the majority of the inhabitants. Following

World War I, Lebanon became a French Mandate. The French









added more areas, forming a Greater Lebanon and in the

process increasing the Moslem population. The French

emphasized the traditional practice of a system based on

proportional representation based on religious and regional

divisions. In essence, the country exhibits a complex

balance of power system among traditional autonomous

groups in which religion represents the major line of

division, allied closely with strong regional, client

and family group affiliations or loyalties. Religion and

politics are inextricably intertwined.

Did Lebanon ever fit the Consociational model?

Lijphart lists what he calls the "rules of the game"

necessary for accommodation between the subcultures28

and it will be our task to apply these propositions to

Lebanon as it existed before the crisis, note any deviations

which will allow us to suggest modifications and short-

comings of the model. A comparison with consociationalism

in the Netherlands will hopefully highlight the operation

of the model in Lebanon and allow us to discuss the

deviations, and thus modifications of the model.


(1) The Business of Politics: Politics should be seen as a

type of business (rather than a type of game) in which the

elite are oriented toward the maintaining of stability.

Lijphart notes this is in keeping with the Netherlands'

tradition as a merchant state, which, incidentally, applies

also to Lebanon. While Lebanon sustained many minor crises









(37 governments in the first twenty years of independence)

major conflicts have been avoided due to the skillful

bargaining procedures and practices of the country's

politicians. There was a deliberate effort by the elite

to stabilize the system as it was apparent that the

alternative to this arrangement was intergroup strife.

No agreements could be made unless all groups approved

(mutual vote), with decisions often being made by granting

concessions to dissatisfied groups. In this way the

distribution of "values" could be allocated on an

objective basis. As we shall see in more detail later,

the Lebanese government, until the sixties, interfered

very little in the economy, until increased modernization29

led to demands for an increased governmental role. Still,

Lebanon's pluralistic society did not prove to be an

obstacle to development. Due largely to the work-oriented

nature of the elite, the country was able to make great

strides in economic development, giving Lebanon one of the

highest per capital rates in the Middle East.


(2) The Agreement to Disagree: This implies respect and

toleration for ideological and political differences.

Major decisions had to be compromises, with concessions being

made to opposing blocs. The concept of concurrent majority,

rather than majority rule, was practiced. This rule can

only be applied to issues that are not pressing, but when

issues of importance cannot be resolved they are usually

"frozen," as was Dutch disagreement over the Colonial









question in 1951. In Lebanon, the second decade of

independence saw the emergence of several issues upon which

the elites could not agree, and these in essence were left

unresolved. The divisive issues included development and

fortification of the South, strengthening of the army,

social justice and the Palestinian question.


(3) Summit Diplomacy: The politics of accommodation

presuppose rule by the elite. The more pressing and crucial

an issue, the more likely it is that it will be resolved

at the highest level. This entails elite cooperation

on the fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy.

The Dutch "compromise" of 1917 is a good example, where the

Socialists obtained their demand for universal suffrage,

while the Catholics and Protestants received state aid

for education,while the Liberals were satisfied by the

introduction of proportional representation. The Lebanese

elite was able to keep conflict within manageable proportions,

able to solve the Presidential crisis of 1952, but divided

in 1958. The latter two cases highlight the role of the

external factor and as we shall see in more detail politics

in Lebanon could not be viewed in isolation from events

outside its borders. Because of the Christian political

orientation toward the West and the Moslems toward the Arab

world, issues of Middle East politics have tended to divide

the populace. Internally, increased modernization led to

conflict, and lessened the elite's ability to solve emerging

problems.









(4) Depoliticization: Sensitive issues are neutralized by

presenting them to the blocs in a non-political form,

helping in the process to justify compromises made. One

method used in depoliticization is the use of legal and

constitutional principles. The principle was not fully

effective in Lebanon. Issues concerned with the Arab-

Israeli conflict were not so easily depoliticized; nor

was the question of social justice or distribution of

resources. This latter issue became increasingly imbued

with political overtones and consequently became a bone

of contention between the two communities. That is,

as social mobilization proceeded, it became increasingly

difficult to keep issues depoliticized.


(5) Secrecy: In order to be able to put aside religious and

ideological differences and successfully arrive at

compromises, and in general to practice pragmatism, bloc

leaders have to practice accommodation in secret,away from

the scrutiny of the public. This applies well in Lebanon

where, after heated elections in which popular interest is

high, bargaining takes place in secret. Approval by the

population of government by the elite cartel favors a

consociational democracy, and this has been the case in

Lebanon. Compromises by the elites are largely dependent

on the allegiance and support of the non-elites.


(6) The Government's Right to Govern: The government

(or Cabinet) has to be allowed a large degree of independence,

in view of the fact that it alone has the right to govern.









Lebanon's institutional structure allows the Cabinet the

preeminent role in policy-making. A popularly-elected

Parliament elects a President who names a Prime Minister

who then forms a Cabinet which has to win Parliament's

vote of confidence. The President, who is himself head of

a family, client and regional group, is often the balancer

in the balance of power. The government for the most

part was the medium whereby the competing interests of the

various groups could be adjusted. Membership in the

Cabinet was a means of preserving a group's security and

interests. Parliament as such was not a check on the

Cabinet, but rather a forum where issues and facts could be

aired and discussed after the Cabinet had made the decisions.

(7) Proportionality: Sectarian considerations have been

the basis for Lebanon's political life in that power is

distributed among the country's religious sects, resulting in

a system where diverse interests are tolerated and accommodated.

The unique form of confessionalism produced a democratic

state in which all traditional groups were allowed a share

in governing the country. This opportunity for participation

by all groups imparted legitimacy to the institutions of

the state.

The system is based on the National Pact of 1943

which in effect recognized the division of the country into

religious communities. The Pact allocated administrative

posts to the various communities in proportion to their

numerical strength. A census taken in 1932 revealed the









Christians to be in a slight majority and thus were given

six seats in Parliament for every five Moslem seats. No

one sect constituted more than 30% of the population. In

this sense it was similar to the classic balance of power

system in which no one participant could gain hegemony

or predominance.

On the Christian side, the Maronite Catholics comprised

29% of the population, and being the largest single sect,

were allowed the top executive post, the Presidency. Other

Christian groups include the Greek-Orthodox (9%), Greek-

Catholic (6%), and smaller Christian denominations (7%).

On the Moslem side the Sunni represented 22% of the population

and accordingly were given the second position, the

Premiership. The other Moslem group, and third overall

largest, the Shiites (20%) were given the post of Speaker

of the House. The Druze (an off-shoot of the Moslems)

represented the remaining 7%.

We return, then, to the question of how applicable the

model is for a study of Lebanon. Did Lebanon ever fit the

model? Certainly, prior to the crisis of 1958 the model,

by and large, did apply to Lebanon. Lebanese consociationalism

gradually began to weaken in the sixties and seventies,

leading to the collapse of the Lebanese political system in

1975-76. The reasons for the failure of the consociational

model in Lebanon are a central concern of this paper and will

be discussed fully in subsequent chpaters. Essentially,

socio-economic modernization in Lebanon had resulted in









a greater share of wealth accruing to the Christians of

Lebanon, by and large, while the poorer elements of the

population were for the most part Moslems. In addition,

population changes had, it was widely believed, resulted in

the Moslems now constituting a majority and in the process

demands were made for a change in the apportionment of

political power, which since 1943 was based on a fixed ratio

favoring the Christians.

Demands for a reorganization of Lebanon's political

and economic structure were resisted by the more privileged

Christian elements. Added to this "internal" cause of the

breakdown was the "external" factor,namely the role of the

Palestinian guerrillas. The presence of the Palestinians in

Lebanon, and more specifically the question of their freedom

of action, divided the population with the conservative

Christian elements staunchly opposing their presence in

Lebanon. The Palestinians fought alongside the Moslems in

order to safeguard their position in Lebanon, while the

Moslems fought for a change in Lebanon's political and

economic structure. The Christians fought to maintain the

privileges they had attained in Lebanon and to weaken,

destroy, or bring the Palestinian movement under control,thus

removing what they perceived as a threat to Lebanon.

This paper, then, will be concerned with an under-

standing of how Lebanon's experiment in consociational

democracy failed, with a violent breakdown of the political

system. The paper will begin with a historical overview









of the country focusing specifically on the evolution or

development of the consociational system. We will then

move to a focus on the operation of consociational principles

in Lebanon, showing the relation of these principles to

religion, the family and more importantly to the patron-

client network that has historically been a part of

Lebanese politics. Chapter III deals with the crisis of

1958, when the first cracks in the consociational structure

began to appear. This section will include a survey of

the interplay of internal and external factors and a

discussion of the deviation from consociational principles.

The next two chapters take a closer look at the basic causes

for the collapse. The first discusses the internal problems--

which in essence is a discussion of the violation of the

principles of consociationalism. We will attempt to

indicate whether and to what extent changes have arisen

between the two communities, which led to a call for a

change in the "rules of the game". Then a look at the

external cause will be in order. This entails a tracing

of the rise of the Palestinians as a factor in domestic

politics, and their influence on the system will be shown.

Since the first mainfestation of hostility between

the state and the Palestinians erupted in 1969, the focus

will be on this confrontation. The following section

focuses on the 1975-76 civil war itself while, finally, the

last chapter will be an analytical summary of the breakdown of






21


the Lebanese system in relation to the consociational

model. Hopefully, this section will tie together the

main themes of the paper and concentrate on the theoretical

aspects of the discussion.















Notes


1. The term "stability" in this context refers to a situation
resulting from a system's ability to continually solve
new, emerging problems and to respond effectively to
demands made upon it by groups of the society. Where
channels exist for the articulation of demands and where
conflict is successfully resolved the polity will
maintain stability. "Legitimacy", an important under-
pinning of stability, implies the acceptance of the
political structure and its institutions by all groups.
A successful regulation of political conflict is a plus
for a state's political "performance". The term
"democracy" refers to the opportunity for representation
and participation in decision-making by all groups,
which includes political competition, rule by consent
of the governed and the assurance of basic civil liberties
to all.

2. Where social cleavages coincide (mutually-reinforcing)
divisions among the population are deep and likely to
produce conflict, while overlapping lines of social
cleavage (cross-cutting) produce numerous affiliations
by an individual and moderation is likely to result,
with little change of polarization and thus conflict.

3. Gabriel Almond,"Comparative Political System," Journal
of Politics (August, 1956), pp. 392-394. A secular
political culture is"rational-calculating,bargaining
and experimental.. ."The role structure is organized,
bureaucratized with stability in the function of the
roles and a dispersion of power throughout the system.

4. Gabriel Almond,"Political Systems and Political Change,"
American Behavioral Scientist (June, 1963), p. 10.

5. Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems,"
Comparitive Political Studies (April, 1968), p. 20.

6. Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme,"
World Politics (July, 1974), p. 609.

7. Lijphart, op. cit., p. 29.

8. Milton Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict,"
Public Policy (Winter, 1973), p. 77. The concept of
"pluralism" as used here has more a "sociological"









basis than a "political" one. It is concerned mainly
with the relationship between social structure and
political behavior where different power centers
exist--different elites--as a result of subcultural
divisions in a stable democracy. Pluralism is defined
by Kuper as "societies characterized by certain conditions
of cultural diversity and social cleavage in whatever
way these conditions of social and cultural pluralism
arise from the contact of different peoples and
cultures within a single society." Leo Kuper,
"Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in
Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 7.

9. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accomodation (Berkeley:
University of California, 1968).

10. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World
Politics (January, 1969), p. 216. Also on elites
see Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided
Countries (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs,
1972), pp. 54-72.

11. Jurg Steinger argues that proportionality results in
the citizens lacking the means to articulate their
dissatisfaction, and this lowers the "learning
capacity of the system" in that there is little
communication between elites and citizens. "Principles
of Majority and Proportionality," British Journal of
Political Science (January, 1971), p. 68.

12. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: New States,"
in Clifford Geetz, ed., Old Societies and New States
(New York: Free Press, 1963),p. 109.

13. Pierre Van Den Berghe, "Pluralism and the Polity:
A Theoretical Explanation," in Kuper, op. cit.,
pp. 76-78.

14. Jurg Steiner, op. cit., p. 65.

15. Eric Nordlinger, op. cit., pp. 36-39.

16. Kuper, op. cit., p. 3.

17. Ibid., p. 12.

18. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1977), p. 238.

19. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the
Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective,"
American Political Science Review (December, 1970),
p. 1115.









20. Edward Dew, "Testing Elite Perceptions of Deprivation
and Satisfaction in a Culturally Plural Society,"
Comparative Politics (January, 1971), p. 273.

21. Melson and Wolpe, op. cit., p. 1115.

22. Milton Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict,"
Public Policy (Winter, 1973), p. 50.

23. Ibid., p. 74.

24. David Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study
in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), p. 24.

25. Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 112.

26. Val Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism," Comparative Politics
(January, 1971), p. 159.

27. Lee Dutter, "The Netherlands as a Plural Society,"
Comparative Political Studies (January, 1978),
p. 567.

28. Lijphart, Politics of Accommodation,op. cit., pp. 122-138.

29. Modernization in this case refers more to socio-economic
development than political development. As we shall see
later Lebanon has developed while maintaining its
traditional patterns of life. But Lebanon does not
rank highly on indicators of political development,
whose aspects include "a high level of institutionalized
mass participation, typically through the election
process and the party system, high government administrative
capabilities, indicative of a response to demands
engendered by social mobilization, and flexible
complex, autonomous and coherent political institutions."
The indicators of political development include:
voting participation (non-communist secular party vote),
central government expenditures as percentage of GNP,
executive stability index, deaths from domestic group
violence per million inhabitants, and the Cutright
political development index. In sum, socio-economic
modernization is ahead of political development in
Lebanon. See Michael Hudson, "A Case of Political
Underdevelopment," Journal of Politics (November, 1967),
pp. 827-832. Also Samuel Huntington, "Political
Development and Political Decay," World Politics
(April, 1965), pp. 386-405.














CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSOCIATIONALISM:
LEBANON IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE


The origins of the problems that have plagued modern

day Lebanon are deeply embedded in the country's history. An

appreciation and a clearer understanding of these problems

can be made by reference to the political, economic and social

forces which have shaped the structure and form of twentieth

century Lebanon, characterized by a unique brand of confess-

ionalism.1 Moreover, a study of the evolution of the country's

confessional system will enable us to focus more clearly on

the background to the emergence of a consociational democracy

in Lebanon, as well the nature and extent of conflict

exhibited by the system. As we shall see, the birth of

confessionalism was due to both internal and external factors,

perhaps more so to the latter, in view of the fact that other

countries had such a profound influence on the development

of the country.

Lebanon has had a highly complex history which is today

reflected in its widely diverse religious and social mosaic.

The number and variety of conquerors that have passed through

Lebanon and which have left their own distinct imprints and

influences have helped mold a country which today has not

differed significantly in terms of both its strategic and









commercial importance. Indeed, twentieth century Lebanon

performed functions which it did throughout history, acting as

an East-West bridge, a center for trade, and an arena in which

rivalries of numerous nations were contested. Many authors

have echoed this theme in their works, and the following by

a noted Lebanese historian perhaps best illustrates this idea:


Clearly Lebanon can vie with any other
land of comparable size not only in the
value of events enacted on its stage but
in their meaningfulness in terms of world
values and in importance. It is one of
those lands that could be described as
microscopic in size but macroscopic in
importance.2


Lebanon's geography has played an integral part in

shaping its history. Situated on the Eastern Mediterranean,

it extends about 130 miles along the coast, and averages 35

miles in width. Its area of 4000 square miles thus makes it

smaller than the state of Connecticut. The coastal strip

merges into a mountain range which is separated by another,

parallel, range (the anti-Lebanon range) by the fertile

Bekaa valley. It is the snow-covered mountain peaks that give

Lebanon its name.

Because of this rough mountainous terrain, Lebanon was

never completely controlled by an invading army, but rather

managed, throughout its history, to maintain its own distinct

characteristics and identity: "They learnt from their

conquerors trades and industries; they adopted some of their

myths; they certainly acquired a few of their administrative










measures, but generally speaking they kept their own

personality."3 The social make-up and political nature of

twentieth century Lebanon were determined largely by the role

played by Mount Lebanon4 or the "Mountain". This area

became a place of refuge for religious minorities, and it is

perhaps this factor more than any other that gave Lebanon its

unique characteristics, allowing for the creation later of

a most unusual type of consociational democracy. This section

of the paper will deal with a survey of historical Lebanon,

focusing on the forces that helped shape Lebanon's political

system as it emerged in the twentieth century. This brief

account will include Lebanon's early history, proceed

through the Islamic and Ottoman periods, and end in the period

of the French Mandate, which culminated in independence for

Lebanon in 1943.


The Phoenicians

Around 4000 B.C. a group of Semitic tribes moved into

the Levant5 from the Persian Gulf area. This people,

subsequently known as Canaanites, settled with a group of

Aegeans who were driven from Greece by invaders around the

year 3000 B.C.6 The race of Phoenicians which emerged lived

in thickly wooded areas and excelled in trade, art, metallurgy

and textile industries, and in navigation.

Taking advantage of their strategic location, and since the

mountains posed an obstacle to effective opportunities in the

East, the Phoenicians proved to be intelligent traders and

found much prosperity in these endeavors. By the ninth







28

century they had established a flourishing empire in the

Mediterranean area, setting up colonies of which the most

famous was Carthage. The Phoenician cities, which collectively

never consisted of more than a loose organization of city-

states, traded with the Pharoahs of Egypt, selling them

cedarwood, used to build their boats and temples, plus

wine, olive oil and white gum, used for the Egyptian practice

of mummification. Byblos (later Jubeil) established itself

as the leading city in terms of trade and overall influence.

The Phoenicians' invention of the alphabet boosted their

trading opportunities by improving communications.7

The Phoenicians' activities, however, were interrupted

by frequent invasions. Following several decades of Hyksos

rule, the Eighteenth Dynasty under the Amenhoteps8 ruled

the area until it was conquered by the Hittites, who, after

several military campaigns with the Egyptians, finally

allowed Ramses to retain control over the Phoenician coast.

It was in the following 400 years (1279-879) that Phoenicia

established its colonies and became prosperous. Assyrian

rule (875-608) was followed by the Babylonians (608-536)

whole ruled under Nebuchadnezzar until the Persians managed to

attain a firm grip on the area (531-333).10

Unlike the previous periods, during which numerous revolts

took place, relations between the Persians and Phoenicians

were cordial, even though the area for the first time came under

a highly centralized administration. The Greco-Roman period

was ushered in when Alexander the Great defeated the Persians









at the Battle of Issus in 333B.C. The Phoenicians were

receptive to Greek civilization and soon the Greek language

became widely spoken.

Upon Alexander's death internal squabbling among his

senior generals led to a division of the area and the Seleucids

moved in and ruled the area for over a century. It was under

Roman rule, which began in 64 B.C. under Pompey, that

Phoenicia attained new fame. Berytus (Beirut) achieved great

intellectual heights, becoming a noted center of learning

for the Roman empire and boasting the prestigious Roman

School of Law, while IIeliopolis (Baalbek) also stood out with

its fine temples.11

In the beginning of the fourth century Christianity became

the recognized religion of the Levant. Toward the end of

this century the Roman empire split up into a Roman Western

part and a Byzantine Eastern part, with Constantinople as its

capital.12 The empire was further weakened by both

internal dissensions and war with the Persians, laying it

open to attack by new invaders from the Arabian Peninsula,

carrying with them new religious teachings which they were

intent on spreading to the entire area.


The Birth of Islam

Preaching a religious war (Jihad) and . sanctified by

the consciousness that they were the chosen vehicles of a new

and final divine revelation,"3 the Arab invaders encountered

and defeated the Byzantine armies at the Battle of Yarmuk

in 636. Islam spread quickly, reaching Spain and Morocco









in the West and central Asia in the East. The reasons were

varied. Besides the lack of a clear demarcation line between

it and the Monotheistic religions, "the few and precise

basic demands of Islam, the simplicity of the cult, and the

prestige attaching to it, would attract numerous converts.

Furthermore, adherence to Islam promised relief in taxation

and entry into the governing elite."14

Lebanon came under the rule of the Damascus-centered

Ummayad Dynasty from 660 to 750, and from 750-1258 it lived

under the repressive rule of the Baghdad-based Abbasid

Dynasty. Arabic became the predominant language, Islam the

predominant religion. It was in this period that the

Lebanese mountains provided a sanctuary for many fleeing

Christians. From this time on Lebanon became increasingly

recognized as a place of refuge for different minority groups

of the area, and in the process sowing the seeds of the /

present day confessional state. Opposition to the new rule

came not only from the Christians, but from other groups who

for one reason or another found it in their interests to resist

incorporation into the Islamic empire. Religious minorities

as the Christians and the Jews were ruled as Millets, distinct

communities that were subject to a different tax system, and

who were excluded from military service. In addition they were

not to bear arms, intermarry with Moslems, but could continue

to live under their own customs and retain freedom of worship.16

The main religious communities to settle in the Mountain

in this period were the Maronites17 and the Druze,18 who were

labelled as heretics by the new rulers. Though Islam and the







31

Arabic language moved at a slow pace into the Mountain, by

the ninth and tenth centuries, Arab tribes started settling

near Beirut, in the the process chipping away at Lebanon's

Christian character. Despite this Arab influence Aramaic,

and a derivative Syriac, continued to be spoken in the Maronite

areas until about the seventeenth century.

In the tenth and early eleventh centuries, numerous

emirates and principalities began to appear, the relations
19
between which were based on mutual distrust and suspicion.9

This was to facilitate the military campaigns of the Crusaders

in the eleventh century.


The Crusaders

In 1095 Pope Urban II initiated the first of eight

European expeditions aimed at wresting the Holy Land from the

Moslems.20 By 1124 most of Lebanon was in Crusader hands.

They had established feudal states in Tripoli, Edessa, Antioch

and a central one in Jerusalem; most of the Crusader rulers
21
were French. The initial successes of the Crusaders were

dampened by internal rivalries, which led to a division of

Lebanon into different areas making it easier for Moslem armies

to regain some lost land. More Crusader campaigns accomplished

little. With Saladin leading the Moslem armies to further

victories over the Crusaders, Europe sent a new Crusade under

Frederick Barbarossa, Philip Augustus and Richard I, Coeur

de Lion. This campaign managed to win control of the coast,

with the Moslems controlling the interior. The Islamic empire







32

lost its unity following Saladin's death, and the Europeans

seized the opportunity to win back lands lost to the Arab

leader, only to finally be driven out of the area by the

Mamluks of Egypt, led by Baybars. The last Crusader

fortress fell in 1291.22

The Crusader period signalled the beginning of a long

friendship between France and the Maronites of Lebanon. The

Maronites had welcomed the Crusaders and had cooperated fully

with them in their military campaigns. While the Maronites

proved to be eager recipients of Western ideas, similarly

France's interest in the area and its Catholic inhabitants

grew and was to continue through the next several centuries.

The Mamluk period (1282-1516), described as "a time of

decay and unrest,"23 was characterized partly by several
24
revolts by Maronites, Druze and Shiites,4 which were put down

with much brutality. The Mamluks harbored much ill-feeling

toward the Maronites, dating from the Crusader conquests, and

this they quickly demonstrated by attacking and decimating

Maronite towns and villages, killing thousands and forcing

thousands more to flee.25 The Druze also suffered considerably

under the Mamluks, and together with the Maronites sought

refuge in the mountains of Lebanon, where they settled with

their co-religionists. There the two communities lived

peacefully side by side, and through their deft manuverings,

managed to obtain concessions concerning autonomous rule.









Despite the repressive nature of Mamluk rule, and the

accompanying wars, famine and plagues, contacts were maintained

between the area and Europe. Trade and commercial ties were

established, and Lebanon especially experienced increasing

prosperity plus an increasing intellectual activity. This

ended with the appearance of the Ottoman Turks, who established

an empire which was to last approximately 400 years, from

1516 until the First World War.


The Ottoman Empire

Having consolidated his power in the area, Ottoman Sultan

Selim I chose to leave the notables of Lebanon in power, both

Christian and Moslem, demanding only token payments in return.

He designated certain areas were to be administered by

notable Lebanese families whose duties included collection of

taxes, providing soldiers and acting as arbitrators in dis-

putes. This practice continued after him, and until the

middle of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans ruled

Lebanon through two prominent families, the Maans and the

Shihabs. The autonomy of the local leaders, the system of

lordship and the population were three elements of Lebanese

society that were present at the beginning of Ottoman rule.26

The Maans, Druze by faith, were led first by Fakhr Al

Din I followed by the more colorful and controversial

Fakhr Al Din II, who ruled from 1585 to 1635. He ended the

feuds that had gone on under his predecessor and sought to

integrate the whole of Lebanon, plus parts of Palestine,27









into a more independent area, under his leadership. Very

flexible on religious matters, he established close cooperation

between the Druze and the Maronites.28 In addition he set about

economically developing the country, making significant

strides in agriculture and trade.

Fakhr Al Din's ambition for total autonomy led him to

enter into agreements with the Duke of Tuscany, directed

against the Ottomans. He fled to Tuscany, however, upon

hearing the Ottomans were intent on sending an army against

him. Five years later, in 1618, he received amnesty from

the Ottoman government and returned to Lebanon.29 No sooner

had he returned, however, than he set about rebuilding his

army, this time into a more efficient, 40,000 man force,

which proceeded to defeat the Ottoman troops sent against

him. Rather than seek revenge, the Sultan of Constantinople,

involved in fighting in Persia and Anatolia at the time,

accepted the fait accompli and conferred upon Fakhr Al Din

the title of Sultan of the Continent.3

Fakhr Al Din now sought closer ties with Italy,

establishing diplomatic relations with the Dukes of Tuscany

and Florence, and brought over Italian engineers and agri-

culturists to help further develop the country. These

measures were short-lived however, as the new Sultan Murad IV

moved against him in a final attempt to end the complete

autonomy of Lebanon under Fakr Al Din.31 The Lebanese leader

was exiled to Istanbul where he was put to death in 1635.









With the absence of a strong leader, the country

returned to internal feuds and general restlessness. The

Porte appointed Ali Alam-Al-Din as governor. However,

a nephew of Fakhr Al Din, the Amir Mulhim aspired to the

position of leader, which he finally won after much struggle.

His son Ahmad continued to rule until 1697, when he died

leaving no children. For the whole of the next century

another family was to dominate the area, the Shihabs, under

whom a large measure of autonomy continued for the region.

As Hitti describes it:


The Shihabis ruled Lebanon through an
intricate system of feudal hierarchy of
prices and shayks. Like their predecessors
they followed the principle of hereditary
succession and home rule, exercising even
the power of life and death on their
subjects.32

Allowed to elect a leader from among themselves, the

local chiefs chose Bashir Al Shihabi I, under whom Lebanon

remained relatively calm. Heydar succeeded Bashir I as

governor until 1732, after conflicts with the Porte, when

he abdicated to allow his son Mulhim to assume power. An

ailing Mulhim, in turn, abdicated in 1754 leaving his brothers

Mansur and Ahmad to contest the vacant seat. Finally, Mulhim's

son Yusuf became governor in 1770.3

Yusuf's power was challenged by Ahmad Al Jazzar,

governor of Sidon and later Damascus, who had won the goodwill

of the Porte for his help in putting down a local revolt on

Sidon by Zahir Al Umar. Jazzar incited members of Yusuf's









family against him, and also encouraged Druze families,

as the Jumblatts and the Yazbakis, to oppose the emir Yusif,

all in an effort to increase his control over the Lebanese

emirate. Taking advantage of the resulting strife, Jazzar

moved against Yusuf, who was then forced to abdicate.

Jazzar appointed in his place Bashir Shihab, a cousin of

Yusif's, who was to dominate Lebanese affairs until 1841.3

Throughout the eighteenth century Maronite peasants

had moved south, occupying areas vacated by a large number

of Druze who had moved to Jabal Druze near Damascus. As

mentioned above, the Druze community had weakened somewhat,

owing partly to divisions within the ranks of the Druze

nobility, and the rise in Maronite influence. Maronites

worked in the Shuf with Druzes who, mindful of the need for

laborers, encouraged this trend. Soon the Maronites

became part of the feudal system.35

Also at this time a close relationship was developing

between the Maronite Patriarch and the House of Shihab.

The Maronite church had minimal influence in the early

period of the Ottoman empire although relations with Europe

underscored the importance the Vatican and other Western

countries attached to relations with the Maronites.

Relations with the Vatican began to strengthen after Pope

Gregory III sent the Jesuit Monk Eliana Batista to the Levant

in 1578. This was followed by the establishment of a college

in Rome for the education of Maronite36 clerics. The Maronites

thus came to contribute significantly to the growth of






37

intellectual achievements in Lebanon, and it is suggested that

it was in the seventeenth century that Lebanon's distinct

identity emerged.37 Toward the end of the eighteenth century

the Maronite Church had established itself as the largest

and most wealthy organization in Ht.Lebanon, much to the

dismay of the previously prominent Khazen family who could

do little to prevent the Church slipping from their influence

and closer to the Shihabs.

The clergy were instrumental in arousing a feeling of

nationalism among the Maronites, who now sought a separate

Maronite entity, in a period in which communal loyalties

appeared to be growing stronger. Their newly-acquired

wealth and power, plus their education, gave them leadership

qualities, aiding in the growth of the Church's religious
38
and social influence.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, then, certain

tendencies appeared which served ultimately to disrupt

relations between communities living in the Mountain. These

were:


the spread of the Maronite peasantry
southwards, the increase in the power of
their hierarchy, the gradual transfer of
Shihabi favour from Druzes to Maronites
and the growth in influence of the great
Druze families, Jumblatt and Bellama 39













Bashir II and the Role of External Powers

When Al Jazzar joined the Ottomans in successfully

resisting Napolean's siege of Acre, Bashir remained neutral

although both, especially the French leader, had sought his
40
help.40 In spite of this, however, Napolean did receive

support from the Maronites, who did not attempt to hide their

joy at seeing the Europeans reappear in the Levant. The

Druzes on this occasion became apprehensive, and began to see

the quarrel as a religious conflict. They began increasingly

to ambush Maronite convoys taking supplies to Napoleon's
41
forces.41

Jazzar died in 1804 leaving Bashir to rule the area

unopposed. Bashir set out to consolidate his rule under a

centralized government, and to realize his reforms he

encroached upon some hereditary privileges of certain feudal

families and imposed heavy taxation, both of which caused some

unrest. He contributed to later strife by reducing the

power of Druze leaders and emphasing the distinction between

the sects, both aimed at securing his own position.

Nonetheless, Lebanon under Bashir continued as a refuge for

minorities, and in general experienced a strong system of law

and order. Indeed, Mt. Lebanon in this period has been

described as "an oasis of order amid the chaos."42

In the last decade of Bashir's rule, Egyptian ruler

Mohammad Ali occupied Syria. Bashir aided this conquest, much

to the indignation of the Druze, which led to an increase in









religious tension and an embittering of Maronite-Druze

relations. This episode led to the Lebanese situation

becoming the focus of international concern for the first

time.

The period of occupation lasted from 1831-40 and the area

was administered by Ibraham Pasha, Ali's son. Bashir's

motive in aiding the Egyptians lay in his desire to strengthen

his own position at home, especially against a perceived

threat to his power from the Druze Jumblatts.43 Druze

resentment grew deeper with Ali's plans to establish full

political and social equality between the two communities,

compounded by the imposition of burdens including higher taxes,

forced labor, and a program of mandatory military service.44

Bashir assisted Ali in suppressing Druze uprisings, even

to the point, albeit reluctantly, of providing conscripts

from among the Druze. Christians were exempt from conscription,

partly because of Bashir's resistance to the plan and partly

because of the role played by European consuls in pressuring
45
Ali to leave the Christians alone.4

The cooperation between the Egyptian ruler and Bashir did

not last however. It became clear that Ali was set upon

disarming and conscripting the Christians, as well as the Druze.

In an attempt to rid the country of Egyptian rule, insurrections

broke out with both Maronites and Druze allying themselves

against Ali's army. In this they were aided by the Ottomans

and the British, as well as other European powers, who had no

interest in seeing the Empire collapse. Thus, seizing the chance,







40
the Ottomans, aided by British, Russian and Austrian troops,46

succeeded in defeating Ali's army and forcing Bashir into

exile.47

The united stand of Lebanon's religious communities

during the campaign to oust Ali proved to be short-lived, and

soon started to erode, with the Turks and to a lesser extent

the British doing much to encourage this split.48 Druze

discontent was of course rooted in Bashir's collusion with

Ali in putting down their revolts, and in the subsequent

exiling of prominent Druze chiefs. Thus, with the fabric

beginning to fall apart, numerous feuds arose or were revived.

The following two decades saw a period of great unrest which

culminated in the bloodshed of 1860.

The Ottomans worked to keep the situation tense, in the

hope of demonstrating that direct Ottoman control was the

only solution for the troubled Lebanese province. They

received some rather unexpected assistance in the person of

Bashir III, whom they had nominated and who proved to be a

weak ruler. Religious tensions continued to grow under

Bashir III, who had little of the competence or could

command the allegiance of his subjects as well as his

predecessor. He was unsympathetic to Druze demands that he

return their lands and former privileges.

In October, 1841, Bashir III found himself under siege by

Druze notables and their followers after they had invited by

him to discuss pressing tax issues. Maronite-Druze fighting

ensued, with the Ottomans, in seeking revenge against France









for support of Mohammad Ali's occupation of Syria, openly

aiding the Druze against the Christians. The Druze also

received support from the Greek-Orthodox, who resented Maronite

strength, and who were also urged on by the Russian Consul.49

European consuls pressured the Ottomans to end the

fighting. Bashir was deposed in January, 1841, and exiled

to Constantinople and with him went the end of the Shihabi

era. Umar Pasha was the Porte's choice for direct rule which,

after only three months, proved unable to contain the unrest,

which had claimed about 300 lives.


The Qaim Maqamiya

At the suggestion of Austrian Chancellor Metternich,

Lebanon was divided into two administrative districts, the

qaim maqamiyah, each headed by a qa'im maqam (Lt. governor or

administrative deputy), a Christian in the North and a

Druze in the South. The Beirut-Damascus road was to be the

dividing line between the two areas. The mixed districts

in both caused problems, and consequently wakils (agents)

of both faiths were appointed for each district, with

responsibility to the qa'im maqam of his own religion.50

The significance of this arrangement was that, since

allegiance was to one's religious community, a confessional

structure was introduced for the first time, which went

beyond the Millet system considerably. The Turks were not

confident of its success. It is suggested, moreover, that it

was again an effort on their part to show the European










powers the futility of indirect Ottoman rule.51 Indeed,

the division served only to exacerbate religious tensions,

and hostilities again erupted in 1845, with the Turks again

aiding the Druze, resulting in many Christian deaths.

The Porte, again reacting to European pressure dispatched

Foreign Minister Shakib Effendi to the area to investigate

the situation first-hand. Upon his recommendation a

majlis (council) was added to the existing administration,

more specifically to each qa'im maqam. The Council was to

consist of 12 members representing the religious sects.

Besides serving the qa'im maqam the Council would decide on

tax questions, as well as certain judicial cases. The power

of traditional families was severely curtailed under this

arrangement; thus, both Christian and Druze leaders opposed

it. In addition to signalling the erosion of their power,

it also meant the weakening of the feudal system in Lebanon.

In sum, the Church's influence was seen in its weakening

of the Christian aristocracy, attaining the loyalty of the

peasants, and in general weakening the institution of

feudalism. The ideals of freedom and equality which the

Church espoused contributed to the peasant uprisings and which

in turn led to an increase in power for the already wealthy

and influential church. The 1845 conflict "started as a

politico-economic struggle between a dying feudal system and

an aggressive Church bureaucracy supported by a rising

peasantry along sectarian lines.52 Rivalry between feudal

families also took on religious overtones in the mid-

nineteenth century.







43
The feudal system of Mount Lebanon in the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries was, along with the Maronite Church,

a political force shaping the nature of modern Lebanon. The

feudal (Iqta) system persists today in the patronage network.

The feudal families ran their own districts (muqata'as) and were

given a large amount of autonomy by the Sultan. Loyalty was

not really of a religious nature, but more a personal loyalty

to the families (muqatijis) and their amir, as the feudal

leader's district compromised different religious groups.

Patronage existed here, with protection accorded to the

family's followers, the support of whom was necessary for the

muqatijis' power. There was little coercion involved in this

relationship. Elsewhere in the empire, this type of

relationship was not common.

In addition to the religious diversity of these villages,

the patronage network was strengthened by the nature of these

communities. Isolated and tightly-knit communities, these

villages sought protection from central authority and other

villages. Loyalty to the family and religion was matched by

loyalty to the village. Under the Maans and Shihabis conflicts

among the feudal families were common.












The Troubled "Inter-War" Years

Lebanon lived relatively quietly under this system

until the disturbances of 1860, with the Ottomans working

to make the area more subservient to the Porte. In the

53
interim years, however, the Maronite community in the

North was internally troubled. The conflict involved the

powerful Khazin family, the Church and the Maronite peasants,

who opposed the excessive taxes levied on them, demanding that
54
some of the reforms instituted by Ibraham Pasha be continued.5

Supported by the Maronite clergy, who in the 1840's

"exhibited an unparalleled zeal towards independence from the

Porte,"55 the peasants revolted against their feudal chiefs

in 1858. Led by Taniyus Shaheen, by 1859 they had seized the

land and had set up a peasant republic in the Kisrawan

region, further complicating the relations between the

communities.5 "By 1858 the Lebanese question had become so

involved that scarcely an incident took place which did not have

repercussions in the Chanceries of Europe, particularly

London and Paris."57

What was essentially a social conflict soon spread and

assumed a religious nature. The success of the peasants in the

North was an encouraging sign to other peasants, especially

those living in the mixed Druze districts of the South.

Maronite and Druze peasants in the South rose against their

Druze Lords, but soon the Druze peasants, ever suspicious of

Maronite intentions, began to side with their lords against the










Maronites. The Druze had in fact waited for an opportune

moment to strike at the Maronites, and in early 1860 they

discussed with the Ottomans military measures to be taken
58
against the Maronites. The Ottomans wanted, for their

part, to stem the Maronite drive for independence.

The fighting which broke out resulted in "a massacre of

the Maronites almost unparalleled in its brutality and the
59
zeal with which it was conducted." Four weeks of fighting

left 15,000 Christians dead, plus 100,000 refugees. The

Christians looked to outside powers as their only salvation

(a stand they were to take a century later in both the 1958

and 1975-76 crises). With the collusion of the Ottomans, the

Moslems of Damascus fell upon the Christians, killing over

5,000 in one day. Ultimately 25,000 were killed in Damascus,

including the American and Dutch consuls 60-more reason to

involve the major powers. In all, over 300 villages, 500

churches, 40 monasteries and 30 schools were destroyed.61

The European powers reacted with shock. They agreed to

send 12,000 troops, but France, under Napoleon III, on its

own initiative sent 7,000 troops. Fuad Pasha, Ottoman Foreign

Minister, had, in anticipation of foreign intervention, set

about apprehending and executing many of the perpetrators

of the massacres, including the governor of Damascus, and

providing relief funds for Christians.62








46

After eight months of intense discussions with the

European powers (France, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia)

a statute was signed on June 9, 1861, known as the Reglement

Organique, "the first truly organic law of the Lebanon."63

The Statute stipulated that Mt. Lebanon was to be an autonomous

part of the Ottoman empire. The entity, known as the

Mutasarrifiyah, was to be administered by a non-Lebanese

Christian, approved by both the Porte and the Great Powers.

Thus, with the Mutasarrifiyah a new era began in Lebanese

politics. Under this new arrangement Lebanon was to

experience peace and stability until the outbreak of World

War One.


The Mutasarrifiyah--Confessional Representation Institutionalized

The Statute established something which was to affect

Lebanese politics for the next century, and this was the

consolidation of the principle of confessional apportionment

of seats in the governmental institutions. As in the case of

the later Covenant of 1943, this provided for a type of checks

and balances system, in which no one community gained

predominance. The Mutasarrifiyah covered essentially what is

present day Mt. Lebanon. It excluded Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon

and the fertile Bekaa valley.

A code of 17 articles was established stipulating the

manner in which the new system was to be administered. The

Mutasarrif (governor or administrator) was to be the direct

representative of the Porte, though he maintained wide-ranging










powers. A Majlis Idarah (the Central Administrative

Council) was set up, consisting of 12 members, two from each
64
sect. This was later changed in 1864, giving seats in the

Majlis according to community size. These representatives

were to be chosen by the leaders of each religious community,

and they came to consist of 4 Maronites, 3 Druze, 2 Greek-

Orthodox, 1 Greek-Catholic, 1 Shiite and 1 Sunni, as

indicated by Table I.65


TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL BY SECT AND REGION


SECT


Greek Greek
Region Maronite Orthodox Catholic Sunni Shia


Druze Total


Kisrawan 1 1
Batroun 1 1
Jazzin 1 1 1 3
Matn 1 1 1 1 4
Shuf 1 1
Koura 1 1
Zahle 1 1


Total 4 2 1 1 1 3 12


SOURCE: Abdo I. Baaklini, Legislative and Political
Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1976), p.49.









The Council, which assisted the Mutasarrif in the

administration of Mt. Lebanon, further institutionalized

the principle of proportional religious representation for

the area. The Council had power over taxes, local government,
66
works projects and land tenure. The Mutasarrif acted

through the Council, as did the different religious factions

in an attempt to increase their power. The Council, it is

important to note, claimed to represent all the Lebanese

people, acting "in many respects as the first truly elected

representative body for the Lebanese people."67

The Council trained administrators allowed for political

change and institutionalized political conflict. It allowed

the feudal aristocracy to engage in business activities, such as

trade, commerce and industry. A degree of tolerance and

cooperation grew between the feudal aristocracy and the new

educated elements who formed a growing middle class.

Economic and religious cleavages were seen as part of Lebanese

life. This open religious, political and economic structure

remained until independence. Competition was within

sects, while a candidate for office needed the support of

different sects leading to moderation and compromise. The

electoral process, in essence, remained the same, with some

minor modifications, in independent Lebanon. It may be said

that the origin of Lebanon's institutions lay with the

Qaim Maqamiya and the Mutasarrifiyah, which made possible

representation for all groups.










In addition the area was sub-divided into 7 districts,

each headed by a qa'im maqam, who was drawn from the largest

community. The Reglement abolished the feudal system and its

privileges, therefore, proclaiming full equality for all.

Lebanon was given its own police force, assured of the

non-interference of Ottoman troops, no military service or

taxes for the Porte.

The Mutasarrifiyah thus contributed directly to the

establishment of confessional representation in Lebanon.

Religious differences were institutionalized making the sects

more conscious of the differences separating them. Religion,

in short, became the basis for the relationship between

individuals and their representatives in the government.

Increased communal loyalty resulted among the peasants,

who were now organized by the Church. This occurred especially

among the Maronites of Mount Lebanon where the Church was

instrumental in cultivating a religious loyalty. The Church,

though, was unhappy that a non-Lebanese rather than a Maronite

headed the new system. In addition it was dissatisfied that

Maronite representation was not commensurate with its numerical

strength. Its influence on the new administration, also, was

minimal since the feudal families were able to maintain their

power through this new vehicle.

Feudalism, however, did not die but rather assumed new

forms. Urban and rural leaders, who formed common bonds of

cooperation, continued to dispense favors from their new









positions in the Mutasarrifiyah, a system moreover that

accorded citizens equal rights, and which signalled the growth

of the concept of confessional representation in the

institutions of the state. In essence the Mutasarrifiyah

gave Lebanon an internationally recognized identity, and gave

the Maronites specifically a political identity and sense of

communal loyalty.

The Reglement, described as a "multifarious dialectic

of rival diplomatic pressures and aims,"68 led to the

appointment of Daud Pasha as the first, and perhaps the most

competent, of seven administrators. He had been a compromise

candidate. Britain had opposed France's demands for a

Maronite candidate, fearing increased French influence in the

area. France did, however, support the administration of

Duad Pasha, hoping both to preserve the autonomy of the Empire

and to show Lebanon as an example for other minorities.

The only opposition to the Mutasarrifiyah came from a

number of Maronites, led by Yusaf Bey Karam, who was active in

protecting Christian areas in the 1860 fighting, and who now

apparently hoped to become governor. Karam, who "represented

the Maronite nationalism of the Northern Lebanese in its

strongest temper"69 was defeated by the forces of the Pasha,

aided by Ottoman troops, and was exiled in 1861 to Egypt. He

returned in 1866, and again was exiled, this time to Italy where

he died in 1889. The Maronites after this ceased to strongly

resist the new Mutasarrifiyah.









Although a supporter of the administration, France registered

its displeasure with Daud, declaring it did not look favorably

on the "spilling of Christian blood."70 European powers in

general took a more active interest in the area after the

establishment of the Mutasarrifiyah. Numerous Jesuit schools

opened, the most famous of which is today the French

St. Joseph University, plus a number of American schools,

particularly the Syrian Protestant Mission, which later became

the American University of Beirut. The Lebanese Christians

embraced these Western overtures more so than did any other

group.

The French were most active in setting up hospitals and

schools in the Mountain, resulting in the spread of the

French language and helping establish a literacy level

unmatched anywhere in the Empire. The Christians, especially

the Maronites, became superior in education, having "none

of the Moslems' religious or political reservations "71

began to develop a strong sense of Lebanese identity. The

Maronites took pride in their friendship and the Papacy.

As Spagnolo explains, they were:

S. imbued with a feeling of cultural
superiority of Christians over non-
Christians . their conviction was not so
much the product of a religious fever, as
of the sophistication of its religious
education. . clergy had also imbied some
of the feeling of contempt towards things
non-Christian which was prevalent in the
Western world.72

This education led to the Maronites being the source a

literary revival that spread to the entire Arabic-speaking

world.









Mt. Lebanon also began to develop agriculturally and

economically. More trade with Europe and large remittances

sent back to relatives by a growing number of mainly Maronite

emigrants helped development considerably. Material

achievements soon equalled the intellectual heights attained.

Perhaps Ilitti's analysis best sums it up:


Despite general incompetence on the part
of its governors, reduction in its area
loss of access to the sea and deprivation
of fertile maritime and inland plains,
Mt. Lebanon--thanks to the resourcefulness,
energy and adaptability of its people--
enjoyed a period of cultural flourish and
economic prosperity and achieved a state
of security and stability unattained by any
Ottoman province, European or Asian.74


The French Mandate, 1918-1943:
The Consolidation of Consociational Principles

With the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottomans,

allied with the Central Powers, imposed direct rule over

Lebanon, abolishing the Mutasarrifiyah. The ruler of Lebanon

in this period, Jamal Pasha, imposed restrictions on assembly,

and the press, tolerated no political expression, and

general imposed dictatorial rule. He discriminated

against the people of the area, especially in the

distribution of food, which led to widespread famine and

disease, leaving over 100,000 dead by the end of the war.

Christians were ill-treated for their alleged sympathy for

the Allies, and Moslems for activities associated with

Arab nationalist groups. In 1916 the Turks executed a

number of Lebanese, including the Mayor of Beirut, for








53

alleged subversive activities.7

During the war, the British High Commissioner of Egypt

Sir Henry MacMahon had promised Sharif Husayn, Protector

of the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina, independence for

the Arabs in return for their help against the Turks. This

arrangement was complicated by the Sykes-Picot agreement

of 1916 which stated that Britain and France would divide

the area into spheres of influence, with Britain taking

Iraq and Transjordan, and France assuming control over

Lebanon and Syria.77 Palestine was to be put under

international administration and complicating the issue

was the Balfour Declaration, which stated Britain's desire to

establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Despite misunderstandings with the British over the

future status of Lebanon, Sharif Husayn began the revolt

against the Turks in 1916. With the defeat of Turkey in

1918, the time had now come for France to pick up some of

the pieces of the Ottoman empire. It was the aim of the

French to maintain and extend their influence in Lebanon which,

as noted above, had long been established. To do this

they had to put an end to Arab ambitions in Syria, and this

they did by forcefully removing the Arab government

established in Damascus by Faysel, Sharif Iusayn's son.

In an effort to determine the wishes of the people of

the area concerning their future, President Wilson supported

the King-Crane commission sent to the Middle East to

investigate and recommend a course of action. Its









recommendation that Lebanon continue to be an autonomous

part of a larger Syria fell on deaf ears, as France and

Britain did not support the Commission.78 The issue was

taken up by the leaders of the Allied Powers in San Remo

on April 20, 1920. The Treaty of Sevres which followed

on August 10 gave Lebanon to France, while Turkey disclaimed

any of the territory of the former empire.7 The Mandate

was subsequently approved by the League of Nations in

September 1923. France's position in Lebanon was not strongly

disputed by any allied power. Its claim for special right

there, its great influence among the Christians, and the

need to maintain the safety of the Suez Canal all were

recognized as legitimate concerns for the French.80

After World War I the Central Administrative Council

called for a larger, independent Lebanon with a democratic

government with rights for all minorities. The French

abolished the Council on the pretext that some of its

members favored a Greater Syria, and until 1922 the French

ruled with an advisory council of 17 members, drawn from

all sects. In 1922 a Representative Council was formed and

dissolved in 1925. A new Council was formed in 1926 and

this succeeded in adopting a constitution, which called for

the establishment of a legislature made up of both a Senate

and Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was to have 16

members, seven appointed by the President and the rest

elected for six year terms while the Deputies were to

serve a four year term. Both Iouses were to elect a









President who was to choose a Prime Minister. The Senate

was abolished the following year while more powers were

given to the President.

The legislature combined all the country's groups and

gave the new state a constitution. It became a forum for

the calls for independence, and led to the growth of a

feeling of accommodation and cooperation. The legislature,

with its various sects, spoke with one voice in demanding

and achieving the country's independence.

The first French High Commissioner in Beirut, General

Henri Gouraud, announced in 1920 the creation of Greater

Lebanon, adding to the Mutasarrifiyah the areas taken away

in 1861, former areas once ruled by the Ma'ans and Shihabs.

With the addition of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and the

Bekaa Lebanon lost its religious harmony and homogeneity.

With the new areas came a large Moslem population, which was

the "price" the French and Maronites were willing to pay for

an economically viable state.81

The Christians, mainly Maronites, had worked for the

addition of the other areas, and in the process had become

only a slight majority in a state that now had numerous

disgruntled Moslems. The Maronite Patriarch had been

assured by GeorgesClemenceau in Paris that the enlarged

Lebanese state would become independent.82 France desired a

state where Maronites would be dominant, and its afore-

mentioned ties with the Maronites would be strengthened and

lead to an entrenching of France in the Middle East. As one








author sees it:


France enlarged Lebanon to include
enough Christians to justify setting
up a separate government, but also a
sufficient number of Moslems to assure
the need for continued French protection
of their political hegemony.83


The Moslems, for their part, were unhappy with the new

arrangement and demanded to be included in a greater Syria.

This sentiment was strongest among the Sunnis, and this was to

remain their "favourite theme"84 in the next two decades.

The Shiites, with few co-religionists in Syria, were not

unhappy with their inclusion in the new Lebanese state.

Similarly the Druze, now outnumbered by the Moslems, were not

opposed to the French plan, as they feared becoming part of

a Syrian state that would be overwhelmingly Sunni.85 The

Greek-Orthodox opted for union with Syria rather than life

under Maronite influence.

The allegiance to the new state was strongest among

Maronites, who saw it as their own creation and themselves as

having played the central role in Lebanon's history. "Various

spokesmen for the Lebanese nationalism professed its origins

to lie in Lebanon's Phoenician culture, which they considered

separate and distinct from Moslem Arab culture."86 The

French, in an effort to prevent the growth of a strong Arab

nat-onalism, highlighted the distinction between the Moslem

sects. This distinction was so much clearer, though, between

the two major communities. In the words of one author:










Since for Moslems and Christians alike
consciousness of belonging to a religious
community was the basis of political and
social obligation, both were very
conscious of not belong to other
communities, and the sense of distinctive-
ness led easily to suspicion and dislike.87


To allay Moslem fears that the new state had a

"mainly Christian atmosphere,"88 the French made religion

the basis for participation in the state, establishing a

system of confessional representation that was to take root

and grow during the remainder of the French Mandate.

Despite the alleged "irritating"89 attitude and

behavior of the French in Lebanon, the Lebanese administration

(similar to France's own) grew steadily in the next two

decades. Schools were built, a modern network of roads took

shape, the economy grew, aided considerably by improvements

in communication, agriculture and health.

On May 24, 1926, a Constitution was proclaimed and

Lebanon was made a Republic, amid vociferous protests from

the Moslems who had no desire to discuss a Lebanese con-

stitution,90 especially one that recognized the country's

religious divisions, and one which had more of a Christian

than a Moslem base. The Constitution was approved by the

Lebanese Representative Council (elected in July, 1925),

which thereupon became the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament).

The Chamber elected Charles Debbas the first President of the

Republic,91 whose powers included appointment of a Cabinet.

The Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature of 30








58
members, 15 to be elected and 15 to be nominated. After the

first elections in 1929 the apportionment of seats was:

Maronites 15, Sunnis 11, Shiites 8, Greek-Orthodox 6,

Druze 3, Greek-Catholic 3, Armenian Catholic 1, Armenian
92
Orthodox 1.

With regard to the planned confessional system of

Lebanon, Article 95 of the Constitution specifies equal,

that is proportional, apportionment of public posts to the

sects, but not specifying exact ratios. The article

states partly that ". . for the sake of justice and concord,

the communities shall be equitably represented in public

employment and in the Ministry. .93

The mid-twenties also saw a period of unrest among the

Druze. The rebellion which erupted in Syria in 1925

spread to Lebanon the following year, where Moslems began

isolated attacks on Christian villages, leading to an

increase in religious tension. Following bombardment of

Damascus, the French were able to quell the revolt, and by

the end of 1927 the rebellion had completely dissipated.94

Developments in the thirties were also affected by two

prominent politicians, Emile Edde and Bishara El Khoury.

Both Maronites, they were the dominant political figures of

this period. Edde strongly supported the French presence

in Lebanon, asserting Lebanon's independence was contingent

upon it, while Khoury felt the French would only prevent

closer cooperation between Moslems and Christians, which he

felt was needed to give the new state much-needed stability.95










It was the intense competition between these two leaders

which led to the suspension of the Constitution in 1932,

the year in which the first population census was taken

(Table II).


TABLE II

CENSUS OF LEBANESE POPULATION TAKEN IN 1932


Sunnis ........................175,925
Shiites.......................154,208
Druzes .. .................. ......53,047
Maronites ..................... 226,378
Greek-Orthodox..................76,522
Greek-Catholics................. 45,999
Armenian Orthodox..............25,462
Armenian Catholics..............5,694
Protestants .....................6,712
Jews ............................3,518


SOURCE: Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London:
Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 121.


Since the Chamber could not decide between Khouri and Edde,

the suggestion was made that Sheikh Mohammad El Jisr, a

Moslem notable from Tripoli, be nominated. The French High

Commissioner stepped in and suspended the Constitution,

rather than allow the Presidency to go to a Moslem. Debbas

was succeeded by Iabib Assad, a Maronite, in 1934, and in

1936 Edde was elected and stayed in power until the

Constitution was again suspended in 1939 with the beginning

of the Second World War.96










Though the Sunnis were quite numerous it was felt that they,b'

the early 1930s, were still not fully assimilated. As one

French newspaper commented, "A Lebanon quite intoxicated

with Arabism and where 45 percent of Lebanon declined to be
97
Lebanese, is not a viable Lebanon." Isolated clashes

again broke out between Maronites and Sunnis with the

announcement of a French-Lebanese Treaty in 1936. This

provided for Lebanese independence within three years,with

France retaining control over defense and foreign affairs

until 1961.98 The Maronites were happy with the Treaty while

the Sunnis saw it as finally precluding any union with Syria.

The Treaty was never ratified by the French Parliament,

which led to some resentment among Maronite ranks.

Independence for Lebanon took a back seat when World

War Two broke out. The French abrogated the 1936 Treaty and

again suspended the Constitution, dismissing the Cabinet.99

The British and Free French mounted an offensive against the

newly-installed Vichy administration and on June 8, 1941,

General Catroux declared Lebanon and Syria independent.100

Alfred Naccache was appointed President until such time that

elections could be held. The results of the subsequent

elections in the summer of 1943 were a blow to the French,

as Bishara El Khoury's Constitutional Bloc emerged the

winners over Edde's more pro-French National Bloc. Meanwhile,

state services were gradually being turned over to the

Lebanese.






61

Khouri immediately set about amending the Constitution,

removing clauses pertaining to French rights and announcing

the end of the Mandate. Parliament passed these amendments,

and immediately the French Delegate Jean Helleu responded by
101
arresting and imprisoning the President and his Cabinet.

Helleu's action served to unite Christians and Moslems in a

nation-wide strike. American and British pressure finally

led to their release on November 22, eleven days after they

were imprisoned, and this day has since been celebrated as

Lebanon's day of Independence.

By the end of 1944 Lebanon had taken over all of the

services previously provided by the French, with one notable

exception. The Troupes Speciales were Lebanese soldiers

trained and officered by the French, and which were later to

form the backbone of the Lebanese army. The French held on

to these for the next two years. Although De Gaulle continued

to hold out for rights in military and foreign affairs, France

finally transferred the Troupes Speciales to the Lebanese and

by December 31, 1946 the final French soldier was evacuated.

In 1943 an agreement came into being between President

Khoury and his Sunni Prime Minister, which became known as

the National Pact or Covenant (Al Mithaq Al Watani). This
102
unwritten agreement stipulated that Lebanon was to maintain

its independence from both the West and the Arab World.

Christians were not to seek protection from the Christian West

and the Moslems were not to seek union with other Moslem Arab

states. Public offices were to be distributed according to






62


the numerical strength of the communities. The agreement

stated that, accordingly, the President was always to be a

Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of

the House a Shiite. Parliamentary seats were to follow a

six to five ratio (always a multiple of eleven). The first

post-independence Parliament gave Christians 30 seats and

Moslems 25.

This arrangement was put to the test a number of times

in Lebanon's post-war years, and it is these crises with

which we will be concerned in the following chapters.
















Notes


1. Confessionalism refers to the system whereby representation
or participation in a state's political process is
accorded to the society's religious sects in proportion
to their numberical strength.

2. Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: MacMillan
and Co, Ltd, 1957), p. 4.

3. Nicola A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), pp. 27-8.

4. Mount Lebanon is the historical area inhabited primarily
by Maronites, which existed as an autonomous area under
the Ottoman rulers until World War I when France added
other areas to the Mountain creating the state of
Greater Lebanon.

5. The Eastern Mediterranean region.

6. Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford
University Press, 1954-T, p. 15.

7. The alphabet was transferred to the Greeks around 800 B.C.,
who developed it further. See Hitti, op. cit.,
pp. 122-123.

8. Hitti, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

9. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

10. Ibid., pp. 143-151.

11. Philip Hitti, A Short History of the Near East
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co, Inc.,1966), p. 71.

12. Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 211.

13. P.M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1966 p. 10.

14. Ibid., p. 11.

15. Hourani, op. cit., p. 21.










16. Moslems do not consider Christians to be by their nature
"inferior". Rather they are seen as having gone
"astray", accepting Christ as God Incarnate, and not
as simply a prophet, as the Moslems do. Moslems in
turn see Mohammed as the final prophet. Since
Christians and Jews are "People of the Book", believing
in one God, the scriptures and a Day of Judgement, they
are viewed with toleration. See Hourani, Ibid., pp. 59-62.

17. The Maronites were originally farmers from the Orontes
valley and the area around Antioch. Fleeing the Jacobists,
Byzantines and the Moslems, they moved into the North
Lebanon mountains where they settled permanently and
formed a feeling of nationalism or at least separateness.
The name is taken from St. Maroun (their patron saint),
an ascetic monk who lived in the fourth century. They
were previously Monothelites, that is, they believed
Christ had two natures but one will. Due mainly to
Crusader influence, they became a Uniate church in 1180.
They continue to use the Syriac liturgy, the traditional
language of the Eastern Church, and the clergy are
allowed to marry. The spiritual Head is the Patriarch
of Antioch and All the East, who is elected by local
Bishops and confirmed by the Pope. They comprise the
single largest sect in Lebanon today. See Hitti,
Lebanon in History, op. cit., pp. 247-249 and Iliya
Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society:
Lebanon 1711-1845 Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 196) pp. 18-23.

18. The Druze (sing. and pl.) are an offshoot of Orthodox
Islam. They were originally followers of the Fatimid
Caliph Al Hakim (Egyptian ruler, 996-1021), who claimed
divine origin and final incarnation. The claim is that
God's will is known to only a few, more specifically
ten men, through whom God became man, the most perfect
being Al Hakim. Monotheistic and Monogamous, the Druze
take their name from Mohammed Al Darazi, one of the
main founders of the sect. They are a tightly knit
community and comprise about 7 seven per cent of Lebanon's
population. See Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit.,
pp. 23-24 and Kamal Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. xviii.

19. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 31.

20. Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit. p. 282.

21. Hourani, op. cit., p. 23.









22. Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., pp. 301-309.

23. Hourani, op. cit., p. 23.

24. Islam split into the Sunni and Shiite branches after the
death of Mohammad in 632. The supporters of All, the
Prophet's son-in-law, lost the succession to a line of
Caliphs whom the Sunnis recognize as the true successors
to Mohammad. The Shiites believe the succession was
passed to a line of Imamas, Ali being the first of
twelve, all of whom they believe had divine revelation.
The Shiites are the most impoverished and least advanced
community in Lebanon. The Sunnis are the majority in
the Arab world, and they consider themselves adherents
to the original orthodox Islam. The four schools of
Sunni Islam are the Maliki, Hambali, Shafii, and the Hanafi.
See Hourani, Ibid., p. 122 and Albert Hourani,
Minorities in the Arab World (London: Oxford University
Press, 1947), pp. 6-7.

25. Thousands of Maronites fled to Cyprus, establishing the
only Maronite community outside Lebanon existing to the
present time.

26. Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a
Political Society," in Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics
in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley and Sons, In., 1966)
p. 214.

27. In this light he is seen as having created "the Greater
Lebanon for the first time." Robin Fedden, Syria and
Lebanon (London: John Murray, 1965), p. 214.

28. He went so far as to support the building of churches
and encourage European Missionaries. Holt, op. cit.,
p. 120

29. Ibid., pp. 116-117.

30. A title given to powerful clan leaders.

31. Ibid., pp. 118-119.

32. Hitti, Short History of the Near East, op. cit.,
p. 222. The Shihabis were addressed by the princely
title of 'Emir'.










33. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, op. cit., p. 12.
In 1756 Mulhim's sons converted to Christianity, with
their father's approval. The rule of Yusuf Shihab
signalled the beginning of the decline of Druze political
dominance, and the growth of Maronite power, hitherto
relatively weak. Thus, it is not uncommon to find both
Moslem and Christian Shihabs in Lebanon, the most
prominent of the latter group being Fuad Shihab,
Lebanon's President from 1958-64.

34. Holt, op. cit., p. 123 and Salibi, op. cit., p. 16.

35. Iliya Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration
in the Middle East," International Journal of Middle
East Studies (July, 1972T,p. 313.

36. Harik, Politics and change in a traditional society,
op. cit., p. 96 In an indication of the value placed
on close relations with the Maronites, Pope Leo X had
described the Lebanese Catholics as "roses among thorns".
Ibid., p. 133. Also LouisXIV in 1649 extended protection
to the Maronites and had French representatives treat
them "with all possible charity and gentleness". See
text of proclamation in J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East
and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary
Record (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 28.

37. Albert Hourani, "Lebanon from Feudalism to Modern State,"
Middle Eastern Studies (April, 1966), p. 256. This
article is a review of Kamal Salibi's book, The Modern
History of Lebanon.

38. For a rather detailed history of the Maronite Church,
see Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society,
op, cit., pp. 74-126 plus Iliya Harik, "The Maronite
Church and Political change in Lebanon", in Binder,
op. cit., pp. 31-55, for the period of the Shihabi
Emirate, 1697-1842.

39. Albert Hourani, A Vision of History (Beirut: Khayats,
1961), p. 42.

40. Holt, op. cit., p. 232

41. Salibi, op. cit., p. 21.

42. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 27.

43. Kamal Jumblatt, who led the Palestinian-Lebanese
Leftist alliance in the civil war, is a direct descendant
of this family.










44. Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., pp. 421-423.
The Egyptian viceroy had demanded Syria from the Ottomans
in return for his aid in fighting the Greek war of
independence and the Wahhabis of Arabia. It is suggested
that he wanted Syria to act as a buffer zone between
his center of power in the Nile valley and the Ottoman
possessions of Anatolia. Holt, op. cit., p. 184.

45. Salibi, op. cit., p. 31. France had consistently
supported the Ottoman empire, so as both to maintain
an ally in this region, and to consolidate and expand
their trade links with the area. In spite of this,
France supported Ali's conquest of Syria "as many
Frenchmen came to regard (Ali) as the spiritual
successor of Bonaparte in Egypt." Ibid., p. 32.

46. Part of the reasons for support outside powers gave to
different communities was probably the hope that they
could divide the area between themselves if and when
the empire collapsed. Russia wanted to continue her
role as protector of the Greek-Orthodox, which she
claimed was implicit in the treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynarja
(1774). Holt, op. cit., p. 238. Also for a discussion
of how Russia sought tofurthur her political interests
in the Levant through its ecclesiastical policy, see
T.G. Stavrou, "Russian interest in the Levant, 1843-48,"
Middle East Journal (Winter-Spring, 1963), pp. 91-103.
Britain, for its part, sought to establish ties with the
Druze. See W.R. Polk (ed.), "The British connections
with the Druzes," Middle East Journal (Winter-Spring, 1963),
154-156. Austria hoped to replace France as protector
of the Maronites, something which never materialized.
See also Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 24-8.

47. Hitti, Short History of the Near East, op. cit., p. 224.

48. Fedden, op. cit., p. 219.

49. Salibi, op. cit., p. 51. This resentment continues
today, as it is mainly the Greek-Orthodox that support
leftist parties, as the Social Natonalist Party which
espouses a pan-Arab secular state. This party is
anathema to the more right-wing parties, especially the
mainly Maronite Phalange. The Greek-Orthodox are
adherents of the Orthodox Eastern Church, who split
with the Western Church in the eleventh century. They
reject Papal supremacy. The Patriarch of Antioch, whose
seat is in Damascus, is the spiritual leader. The
liturgy used is Arabic.

50. Holt, op. cit., p. 259.









51. Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., p. 435.

52. Abdo Baaklini, Legislative and Political Development:
Lebanon, 1842-1972 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976)
p. 45.

53. Throughout these conflict-ridden years fearful Maronites
sought stronger ties with France, while Britain, which
had signed an alliance with the Druze in 1842, began
establishing Protestant missions. Opposition to thses
missions by the Maronites soured their relations with
the British, as the Druze opened their doors wider to
the British missions. The Maronites displayed their
affinity for the French by raising French flags on
Church buildings. Salibi, op. cit., p. 58 and
Antoine Abraham, "Lebanese communal relations," The
Muslim World (April, 1977), p. 92.

54. Meo, op. cit., p. 16

55. Abraham, op. cit., p. 91.

56. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 32.

57. Salibi, op. cit., p. 77.

58. Holt, op. cit., p. 240.

59. Abraham, op. cit., p. 97.

60. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, The History of the Ottoman
Empire and Modern Turkey (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1977), p. 143.

61. Ibid. For more details on the fighting, see Salibi,
op. cit., pp. 90-105.

62. Britain in 1861 had intervened on behalf of a number of
Druze that had been sentenced to death. Hourani,
"Lebanon from Feudalism to Modern State," op. cit., p. 258.

63. C.G. Hess and H.L. Bodman, "Confessionalism and Feudality
in Lebanese Politics," The Middle East Journal (Winter,
1954), p. 13.

64. For the full text of the Reglement Organique, see
Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 346-49.

65. Hess and Bodman, op. cit., p. 14. The number of signatories
to the statutes of 1861 and 1864 rose to 7 when Italy
joined in 1867.


66. Baaklini, op. cit., p. 50.









67. Ibid., p. 51.

68. John P. Spagnolo, "Mount Lebanon, France and Daud Pasha:
A study of some aspects of political habituation,"
International Journal of Middle East Studies (April,
1971), p. 148.

69. Harik, Politics and change in a traditional society,
op. cit., p. 151.

70. Spagnolo, op. cit., p. 156.

71. Salibi, op. cit., p. 142.

72. Spagnolo, "Constitutional change in Mt. Lebanon,
1861-1864," Middle East Studies (January, 1971), p. 38.

73. Ibid., p. 26.

74. Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., p. 447.

75. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 46.

76. George Haddad, Fifty Years of Modern Syria and Lebanon
(Beirut: Dar Al Hayat, 1950), pp. 48-49.

77. Holt, op. cit., pp. 264-266.

78. Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 87-92.

79. Ibid., p. 109.

80. See text of Mandate in Helen Davis, Constitutions,
electoral laws treaties of states in the Near and
Middle East (Durham: Duke University Press, 1947),
pp. 162-170.

81. France had in fact indicated it was in Lebanon to
protect the interests of the Maronites. Salibi,
op. cit., p. 163.

82. Pierre Rondot, "Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism,"
Journal of Contemporary History (July, 1968), p. 40.

83. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963Y, p. 322.

84. Meo, op. cit., p. 56.

85. George Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politcs: A Concise
History (New York: F.A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), p. 117.









86. Meo, op. cit., p. 70.

87. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 63.

88. Ibid., p. 184.

89. Ziadeh, op. cit., pp. 50-51. Also, Longrigg, who was
himself a British official in Iraq at the time, writes
that the French regarded the area as its own, with no
visible intention displayed that it was intent on
guiding Lebanon to independence. Longrigg, op. cit.,
p. 110. Also Peretz, op. cit., p. 323.

90. Rondot, op. cit., p. 41.

91. Although the Greek-Orthodox were not the dominant
community, they were given the Presidency to allay
their fears of being overshadowed by the Maronites.
Also it sought to reassure the Moslems that Lebanon
was not simply a homeland for the Maronites. However,
since no Sunni would serve as Prime Minister,
Maronites substituted.

92. Longrigg, op. cit., p. 102. A constitutional amendment
subsequently abolished the Senate in 1937 and specified
Parliament to consist of two-thirds and one-third
nominated.

93. Full text in Davis, op. cit., pp. 170-185.

94. For a detailed account, see Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 154-169.

95. Salibi, op. cit., p. 175. Edde had publicly declared
that Lebanon was a "Christian island in a Muslim sea",
emphasising its Western culture dating back to the
Phoenicians. Edde had formed the National Bloc in
1934, and Khoury the Constitutional Bloc. Lebanon's
political parties will be discussed in more detail in the
next chapter.

96. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 53.

97. L'Orient of 5-6 September, 1931, quoted in Rondot,
op. cit., p. 45.

98. Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., p. 492.

99. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 230.

100. General Catroux's full Declaration is in Davis, op. cit.,
pp. 201-202.






71


101. Haddad, op. cit., p. 93. Two ministers, Habib Abu
Shahla (Orthodox) and Majid Arslan (Druze) escaped and
set up a government.

102. Meo, op. cit., pp. 82-83.














CHAPTER III

THE OPERATION OF THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM


We now turn to a discussion of the nature of the

Lebanese political system, with a specific focus on its

confessional character, and the concept of proportionality

which underlay it. Linked to this will be a survey of

clientelism, an integral part of traditional Lebanese

politics, and its relation to the country's consociational

system. In essence, we are looking here at the "rules of the

game", as applied to Lebanon in the post-independence period.

The main characteristics of the system, on which we will

expound below, are summarized by Hudson:


(1) A particularistic "mosaic" society;
(2) an authoritarian and hierarchical
family structure; (3) religious
institutions that are politically
influential; (4) power dispersed in
religious sect, regional grouping,
economic pressure groups, and ideologically
oriented political movements; (5) foreign
influence in politics. . (6) a cult of
leadership, historically the result of
feudalism which has produced parties of
notables, each with a local clientele. .


Confessionalism and Proportionality:
Nominal Actors and Formal Rules

In general terms, the major actors in the Lebanese

political system are the sects or religious groups, and more

specifically the major families within each community. Religion,









of course, represents the major cleavage in Lebanon. Hourani

writes:


The primary divisions inside the Near
East are, as they have been for a
thousand years, religious: whether a
man is Moslem, Christian, or Jew, and
which branch of the Moslem,Christian,
or Jewish community he belongs to.2


Recruitment, family competition and the nature of the

clientage system are directly related to the role played by

religion in Lebanon. Religion as part of the state goes back

to the Mutasarrifiyah. Loyalties to the religious community

increased after the religious strife of 1860, to the extent

that today religion permeates every aspect of the individual's

life. Religion determines his political and social

orientations. As Khalaf puts it, "religious sentiments,

particularly after the decline in feudalism, came to assume

a more intense role in maintaining identity and communal

solidarity."3

The division between the two communities is compounded

by divisions within each community where keen rivalry and

competition are evident, and by regional and family divisions

which serve to exacerbate the religious cleavages. As a

result, the country consists of many "nations", separate

groups that feel solidarity, share common values and a common

history. A strong Lebanese identity is lacking, except

perhaps for the Maronites who feel the strongest attachment

to the Lebanese state, identified albeit in Maronite terms.









Shils speaks of the "...incivility of many members of the

elite, the members of the great families, the zuama who

dominate and speak for the primordial and religious

communities."4

Within the religious groups, then, the central actors

are the traditionally prominent religious families. In

essence, political power is still based on traditional

family influence. Certain families are associated with

specific regions and religions, as the Maronite Shihabs and

Khourys of Mount Lebanon, the Jumblatts of the Shouf,

Karamis of Tripoli, Salams and Yafis of Beirut and the

Franjiehs of Zghorta. By being born into a politically

prominent family, it is highly likely that that power will

be passed on. "Over the entire span of 50 years of

parliamentary life, only 359 deputies representing 210

families, have won parliamentary seats. This amounts to not

more than eight percent of the total number of families in

Lebanon." Of the 359, over 300 have inherited their seat.

Table III reflects this trend.










TABLE III

NUMBER OF DEPUTIES WHO SERVED IN
PARLIAMENTS FIVE OR MORE TIMES: 1926-1972


No. of times in Parliament No. of Deputies


14 1
12 1
11 1
8 1
7 8
6 14
5 16


SOURCE: Baaklini, op. cit., p. 172.


Lebanon's families have helped shape its history. It may be

recalled that the prominent feudal families of the Mutasarrifiyah

were well represented in the administration of the Reglement

Organique following the abolition of feudalism. During
6
Daud Pasha's rule 16 feudal leaders were given top posts

and this continued into this century. Because of the

personal factor, politics in Lobanon is to a great extent

competition between and within religious sects. Alliances

between families, whenever they took place, were often made

more out of a desire to oppose a certain leader, than out of

ideological or programmatic considerations. In addition,

elections are seen as mainly a contest or a continuance of

conflict between families, with ideology rarely playing a

part.










The influence of the family and religion on the

political nature of the country cannot be underestimated.

As one writer observes, ". the vigor with which the religious

and familial bases of organization continue to affect

political conduct and coalesce political sentiment remains

singularly evident." In sum, the family is important for

an understanding of the political process, partly because of

its role as the main socializing agent--it being the central

social unit--and partly because it represents a means through

which the individual attains political power, and thus

perpetuating that family's prominence. It has traditionally

been an important aspect of the social and political order.

It is again closely connected to a discussion of the

recruitment pattern and the overall patron-client network.

Closely linked to the religious actors are the country's

political parties, which are in essence no more than

groupings led by the leaders of prominent religious

families. Lebanon's political parties do not fall into

any recognizable category. They are parties based on

religion, and the country "offers a very typical and most

complicated example of this." They are similar to Western

parties in that they seek to exercise political power and

share in the decision-making process, but beyond that there

is little similarity. Apter writes:


.we recognize that political parties
offer political choices. They provide
a peaceful selection of alternative
governments. They offer differences in
views and policy priorities. Through
parties, issues can be identified and
preferences indicated by the electorate.10









Clearly this does not apply well to the Lebanese case. The

nature of the party system in Lebanon cannot be divorced

from the intimate link between politics and the influence of

religion and the family that the country exhibits. Political

parties strengthen confessional ties, reflecting the country's

divided culture. Perhaps the concept of "personalismo" is

appropriate in this context. George Blanksten defines this

as the "tendency of the politically active sectors of the

population to follow or oppose a leader for personal,

individual, and family reasons rather than because of the
,,11
influence of a political idea, party or program.

Political parties in Lebanon have only an indirect

influence on policy-making. No party has ever won a significant

number of seats (Table IV). In 1960, for example, when the

parties increased their efforts to win more parliamentary

seats, several parties between them could muster no more than

a third of the seats.












TABLE IV

PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP OF
PARTIES IN LEBANON: 1951-1972


Party 1951 1957 1960 1964 1968 1972

Syrian Social 1
Nationalist Party

Baath 1

Arab Nasserite
Coalition 1

Dashnak (Armenian
Party) 2 3 4 4 3 2

Najjada 1 1

Progressive Socialist
Party 3 3 6 6 5 4

National Action
Movement 1 1 1

Kataeb 3 1 6 4 9 7

National Bloc 2 4 6 2 5 3

National Liberals Party Nonexistent 4-5 6 8 7

Democratic Socialist
Party 3

Democratic Party 1


Total 10 12 27-8 23 36 30

Total Members
in Chamber 77 66 99 99 99 99

Per cent Members
in political parties 13% 18% 35% 28% 36% 30%


Baaklini, op. cit., p. 181.


SOURCE: Adapted from










The National Pact

The National Pact, agreed upon by the leaders of

Lebanon's two major communities, established confessionalism

as the basis for the new state. The arrangement was a

reflection of the culturally divided society, a modus

vivendi which appeared to be the most viable and practical

one for the newly-independent country. Confessionalism was

to underlie the entire political process, with the rivalry

of the different sects carried out within this framework.

The system is structured in such a way that recognizes

the preponderance of the Christian community. (Table V)

A ratio of six to five, in the Christians' favor, was to

extend to all governmental and administrative posts, as well

as to Parliament. The system was democratic in the sense that

it accorded representation to all minorities, a system in

which participation by the society's subgroups was guaranteed.

The system" . serves as an adjustment mechanism which

brings particularistic elements of society together into a

working relationship without overriding their interests or

submerging their identitities."12 The country's strength

depended on acceptance by all the communities, with stability

resting on the maintenance of a careful balance between the

country's main religious groups,and this has been partly

accomplished through the representative institutions which

are seen as "an essential condition of its stability, not a

lucky by-product."l3












TABLE V

ESTIMATED POPULATION OF LEBANON IN 1956


Maronites 424,000
Sunnis 286,000
Shiites 250,000
Greek Orthodox 149,000
Greek Catholics 91,000
Druze 88,000
Armenian Orthodox 64,000
Armenian Catholics 15,000
Protestants 14,000
Jews 7,000
Syrian Catholics 6,000
Syrian Orthodox 5,000
Latins 4,000
Chaldeans 1,000
Others 7,000


SOURCE: Adapted from Sir Reader Bullard (ed.),
The Middle East: A Political and
Economic Survey (London: Oxford University
Press, 1958), p. 453. The figures are
from the Economic Research Institute of
of the American University of Beirut, and
are based partly on official sources.









The National Pact then, representing Lebanon's politics

of accommodation,was an explicit recognition of the division

of the country into distinct religious groups. As Kerr puts

it, "Lebanese democracy is the distribution of guarantees to

the recognized groups co-existing in the country of the means
14
to defend their minimum interests". The government, it

is important to note, was not meant to play a major role and

pursue long-term goals. Rather, it was meant to reflect the

division of the society and attempt to regulate and resolve

conflict. In times of conflict or crisis, polarization tended

to replace flexibility and compromise with intransigence.

The crises of 1958 and 1975 are clear examples of this.

The Pact implicitly contained guidelines for the nation's

foreign policy as it was felt, with reason, that there would

exist a close connection between foreign and domestic policy.

Any foreign policy decision had to have the approval of the

major groups. Thus, for the economic and political well-being

of the country, and to prevent polarization of the communities,

it was important for Lebanon to maintain friendly relations

with both the Arab world and the West. It has been evident

in the post-war years that disruption of these links, especially

to the Arab states, had had adverse political and economic

effects on the system. Since the frames of reference lie

in the Arab world and the West for the Moslems and Christians

respectively, a delicate balance, or in a word neutrality,

was necessary. Here, as with domestic policy, the government

to be effective had to continually balance the different

interests. Conversely, the government's effectiveness is










a reflection of the cooperation of local leaders and their

willingness to compromise and reach mutually beneficial

agreements. To help us better understand the principles of

consociational democracy outlined by Lijphart, we need to

survey the nature and operation of the country's institutions

and relate them then to the system of patronage in Lebanon.


The Formal Institutions

Officially, the state of Lebanon is a Parliamentary

Republic divided into five provinces or governerates:

the Bekaa, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Beirut and Mount

Lebanon. Lebanon's unicameral legislature allows for

proportional representation of the country's religious communities.

Table VI shows the sectarian distribution of seats according

to sect and district.

The electoral system in Lebanon allots a specific

number of seats for each religious sect. On the list system,

a candidate has to be able to gain the support of voters

from different religious communities.15 Mixed areas lead to

competing lists made up of candidates from the sects who are

represented by seats in that area. This system encourages

cooperation and moderation.









Since electoral success depends on
compromise, the ability to join a list
and, most importantly, the ability to
maneuvre politically without losing
one's political base, candidates in
mixed districts who belong to different
sects find that the best strategy is to6
avoid capitalizing on sectarian issues.


The Parliament

Parliament does not in any real sense constitute

an opposition. In theory, Parliament has the right to

dismiss a cabinet, though it has never done so. The legis-

lature is elected every four years, and it in turn elects

a President by a two-thirds majority for a term of six

years. Parliamentary members attempt to cultivate the good-

will of the President, as they aspire to Cabinet positions

and hope also for support during elections. As a policy-

making body, Parliament is not highly regarded, being seen

as "merely a formal setting for clashes between the

communities"17 and the "redoubt of the traditional past."18

As indicated by Table VII Parliament accords representation

to the country's sects on a ratio of six Christians to

five Moslems, provided for in the National Pact.









TABLE VI

DISTRICTS AND SECTARIAN DISTRIBUTION SINCE 1960


Sect District Sectarian Distribution Total No.
of seats of seats


Purely
Maronite


Purely Shia



Purely Sunni



Purely Greek
Orthodox

Mixed
Christians


Mixed Chris-
tians-Moslems


Kisrawan
Zgharta
Bshari
Batroun

Bint Jbeil
Sour
Nabatiya

Saida
Villages
of Tripoli


Koura


Matn
Jezzin
Beirut First

Saida-Zahrani
Marjayoun
Shuf
Aley
Baabda
Jbeil
Zahle
Rachaya-West
Bekaa
Baalbek-Hermel
Beirut Second
Beirit Third
Tripoli
Akkar


3M,1GO,1AO
2M,1GO
1M,1GO,1GC,1P,1AC,3AO

1SH,1GC
2SH,1GO,1S
3M,2S,2D,1GC
2M,2D,1GO
3M,1D,1SH
2M,1SH
IM,1S,1SHi,1GO,1GO

1S,1SH,1GO
1S,4SII,IM,1GC
4S,1GO
IS,1SH,1Mi
4S,1GO
2S,1M,1GO


SOURCE: Abdo Baaklini, op. cit., p. 146.


M--Maronite; GO--Greek-Orthodox; GC--Greek Catholics;
S--Sunni; SH--Shiite; D--Druze; AO--Armenian Orthodox;
AC--Armenian Catholic; Mi--Minority; P--Protestant













TABLE VII

DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BY SECTS
1947-1972


Sect 1947 1951 1953 1957 1960-72


Christians Maronite 18 23 13 20 30

Greek 6 8 5 7 11
Orthodox

Greek 3 5 3 4 6
Catholic

Armenian 2 3 2 3 4
Orthodox

Minorities 1 3 1 2 3


Moslems Sunni 11 16 9 14 20

Shiite 10 14 8 12 19

Druze 4 5 3 4 6

Total 55 77 44 66 99


SOURCE: Baaklini, op. cit., p. 142














TABLE VIII


SECTARIAN PATTERNS OF


CABINET STRUCTURES: 1943-1961


6 8 9 10 10 10 14 18


1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4


Maronite 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 4


Druze

Greek
Orthodox

Greek
Catholic

Shiite

Armenian
Catholic

Armenian
Orthodox


1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2


1 1 1 2


1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3


No of.
Cabinets 4 11 2 1 2 4 1 1


the Lebanese
(August,1963),


Size of
Cabinet


Sunni


SOURCE: Ralph Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in
Political System", Journal of Politics
p. 504.










The Cabinet

The Cabinet, along with Parliament, is an important

representative body in that it has to reflect both a religious

and regional balance. As Table VIII shows, the size of the

Cabinet varies, depending on circumstances and conditions,

and the particular Premier chosen to form the cabinet.

As can be seen from the table, the Cabinet posts are shared

by the six major sects,with particular ministries going

traditionally to specific sects. The Greek-Orthodox have

usually held the vice-Premiership, the Maronites Education,

Sunnis the Interior, the Druze Defense, and Shiites

Agriculture. The rest alternate--Justice,Public Works,

Finance Health, Economic and Social Affairs. In the

first two decades of independence 35 cabinets were formed,

the majority headed by a handful of Sunnis which included Sami
19
El Solh, Rashid Karami, Abdullah El Yafi and Saeb Salam.

Because of the nature of the Cabinet and its composition,

stalemates arise when agreements cannot be reached, with

immobilism setting in. Kerr notes that "governments are not

made to create public policy, nor to choose between clear-

cut alternatives entailing the triumph of one set of demands

over another, but to reflect and adjust competing interests
,,20
of the various groups. Long-term planning becomes difficult

when policy is not made on a secular, rational basis. In

spite of this, the cabinet has succeeded in bringing about
21
bureaucratic reforms. Overall, though, the diverse nature

of the cabinet leads to particularistic orientations.








88
". .. ministers disregard cabinet harmony and collective

responsibility to appeal to their own confessional, regional,

economic, ideological, or personal interests and followers".22


The Presidency

Lebanon's executive power is vested in the Maronite

President, who is elected by Parliament for a six-year term

(renewable after an interim of six years). The President's

powers are pervasive, not unlike those of the emirs of

historical Lebanon, the Ottoman governors and the more

recent French High Commissioners. The President appoints a

Sunni Prime Minister who forms a cabinet to be approved by

the President. He can also dismiss ministers, dissolve

Parliament, has the power of veto and can rule by decree.23

The President often plays the role of arbitrator, and less of

a partisan role. Since he cannot be immediately re-elected

to the Presidency, he is not subservient to the Chamber and

can act independently of it. The extensive powers given him

by the Constitution give the impression of a very powerful

chief executive. However, approval of policy by the Premier

and Cabinet is necessary, and cooperation with the Chamber

with regard to policy is needed. As arbiter the President

must maintain a confessional balance.


Political Clientelism: "Real" Actors and Informal Rules

Central to an understanding of Lebanese politics and more

specifically the operation and functioning of the state's

institutions is a discussion of patron-client relationships.

These relationships meshed closely with the operation of










governmental institutions in Lebanon. The country's patrons

--the zuama(sg. zaim)--constitute the bulk of the country's

political elite. Patronage has survived the last two

centuries in Lebanon, differing in nature at times due to

changing political and economic circumstances.

The "real" actors are these notables whose authority

is traditional, and who belong to traditionally prominent

families.24 In short, as a political actor the zaim

is central. "Because of his wealth or family prestige and

chiefly because of the traditional patriarchal structure of

Lebanese society, the zaim remains one of the most influential

actors in the political process.25 Hottinger defines this

type of leader thus:


A zaim in the specifically Lebanese and
contemporary sense is a political leader
who possesses the support of a locally
circumscribed community and who
retains this support by fostering the
interests of as many2gs possible from
among his clientele.


With regard to recruitment, factors as family, wealth and

religion are important determinants of political opportunity,

with competition taking place within, rather than between,

the different communities. The electoral system is such

that it aids the continued vigor of the zuama. Consisting of

small electoral units the system allows the zaim much

freedom in maintaining his power and influence over local

communities. Election to Parliament depends to a large extent

on getting on a list headed by a prominent zaim, who in fact




Full Text

PAGE 1

THE CRISIS IN LEBANON: A TEST OF CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY BY ROBERT G. CHALOUHI A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1978

PAGE 2

Copyright 1978 by Robert G. Chalouhi

PAGE 3

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my thanks to the members of my committee, especially to my adviser, Dr. Keith Legg, to whom I am deeply indebted for his invaluable assistance and guidance. This work is dedicated to my parents, brother, sister and families for continued encouragement and support and great confidence in me; to my parents-in-law for their kindness and concern; and especially to my wife Janie for her patient and skillful typing of this manuscript and for her muchneeded energy and enthusiasm.

PAGE 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii LIST OF TABLES vii ABSTRACT ix CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 Applicability of the Model 5 Problems of System Change 8 Assumption of Subcultural Isolation and Uniformity 11 The Consociational Model Applied to Lebanon 12 Notes 22 CHAPTER II THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSOCIATIONALISM: LEBANON IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. . 25 The Phoenicians The Birth of Islam The Crusaders The Ottoman Empire Bashir II and the Role of External Powers The Qaim Maqamiya The Mutasarrif iyah: Confessional Representation Institutionalized. . . The French Mandate, 1918-1943: The Consolidation of Consociational Principles Notes CHAPTER III: THE OPERATION OF THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM Confessionalism and Proportionality: Nominal Actors and Formal Rules . . . The National Pact The Formal Institutions Political Clientelism: "Real" Actors and Informal Rules The Politics of Preferment and Patronage Notes 27 29 31 33 38 41 4 6 52 63 72 72 79 82 92 95

PAGE 5

CHAPTER IV: CONSOCIATIONALISM PUT TO THE TEST: LEBANON IN THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES. . . Elite Disunity The "Rosewater" Revolution of 1952 . . . . President Chamoun and the the Crisis of 1958 Policy Causes and Consequences The Crisis Proper: No Victor, No Vanquished Shihab: 1958-1964 . . . External and Internal Issues in the 1958 Crisis Violation of Consociational Principles . . Notes CHAPTER V: BREAKDOWN OF CONSOCIATIONAL PRINCIPLES-THE INTERNAL FACTOR Social Mobilization Uneven Economic Development The Principle of Proportionality The Lebanese Economy Planning and the Governmental Role .... Notes CHAPTER VI: THE EXTERNAL FACTOR — THE PALESTINIANS Emergence of the Palestinian Resistance. . The 1969 Clashes The Christian Response Slide toward Civil War Notes CHAPTER VII: THE 1975-76 CIVIL WAR Notes CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION Revision of the Consociational Model . . . Social Mobilization The Elite Cartel The Palestinian Dimension Notes APPENDIX A: The Cairo Agreement APPENDIX B: Composition of Opposing Forces in Lebanese Civil War, 1975-76 98 99 99 104 109 118 126 130 134 140 146 148 151 158 163 173 183 187 192 197 202 205 214 220 231 233 242 243 245 249 252 253 255

PAGE 6

APPENDIX C: Lebanese Political Parties 257 BIBLIOGRAPHY 263 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 2 75

PAGE 7

LIST OF TABLES Table Page I DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL BY SECT AND REGION .... 47 II CENSUS OF LEBANESE POPULATION TAKEN IN 1932. . . 59 III NUMBER OF DEPUTIES WHO SERVED IN PARLIAMENTS FIVE OR MORE TIMES: 1926-1972 75 IV PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP OF PARTIES IN LEBANON: 1951-1972 78 V ESTIMATED POPULATION OF LEBANON IN 19 5 6 80 VI DISTRICTS AND SECTARIAN DISTRIBUTION SINCE 1960 . 84 VII DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BY SECTS: 1947-1972 85 VIII SECTARIAN PATTERNS OF CABINET STRUCTURES: 1943-1961 86 IX DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS IN NEW PARLIAMENT .... 129 X SEATS WON BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1960 130 XI SELECTED INDICATORS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN LEBANON 149 XII SOCIAL MOBILIZATION BY REGION IN LEBANON 150 XIII INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1959 153 XIV INCOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SECTS 15 3 XV DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE OF BUSINESSMEN IN EACH SECTOR BY CITIZENSHIP AND BY RELIGION 155 XVI EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF WIFE AND HUSBAND, FAMILY INCOME, AND HUSBANDS ' S OCCUPATION BY RELIGIOUS GROUP: LEBANON, 19 71 156

PAGE 8

XVII DIFFERENCES IN FERTILITY RATE WITH REGARD TO AFFILIATION: LEBANON, 1971 160 XVIII NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN AND NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN PER 1,000 MARRIED WOMEN BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND WIFE'S AGE: LEBANON, 1971 161 XIX ORIGINS OF NET NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1950-1966. . . 166 XX TRADE AND FINANCE SECTORS AS % OF NET NATIONAL PRODUCT 1954-1966 167 XXI NATIONAL INCOME 1950 AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1972 BY SECTOR 169 XXII PERCENTAGE GROWTH OF SECTORS BETWEEN 19 5 AND 19 72 . . . . 170 XXIII DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACTIVE LABOUR FORCE BY SECTOR 175 XXV GENERAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES OF LEBANON, 1964-1967 178

PAGE 9

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE CRISIS IN LEBANON: A TEST OF CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY by Robert G. Chalouhi December, 1978 Chairman: Keith R. Legg Major Department: Political Science This dissertation focuses on the Lebanese political system, which prior to the destructive civil war of 1975-76, represented one of the few examples of a culturally divided, developing country that was able, for a period, to maintain a stable system of representative democracy. To study the nature of democracy in Lebanon, we used a framework provided by Arend Lijphart and his elaboration of the concept of Consociational democracy. This allowed us to examine to a more accurate degree the relationship between the country's political culture, social structure and political stability. Consociational democracy is essentially rule by an "elite cartel," where cooperation by the elite is able to circumvent the culturally and politically fragmented society and thus maintain stability. Lebanon exhibits a complex "balance of power" system among traditional, autonomous groups in which religion represents the major line of division, allied closely with strong regional, client and family group affiliations or loyalties. Religion and

PAGE 10

politics are inextricably intertwined. It is the purpose of this study to discuss the operation of the Lebanese political system under this broad theme and in the process to suggest the underlying causes for the breakdown of the system. The introduction takes a look at the extent of applicability of Lebanon to the consociational system, surveying the literature on the subject and highlighting the shortcomings of the model. Chapter II examines the beginnings of the consociational system by surveying Lebanon in historical perspective. The next chapter looks at the operation of consociational democracy in independent Lebanon, which includes the formal institutions of the state and the all-important but less evident operation of the extensive patron-client network based on religious and family rivalries. The internal and external factors which weakened the structure in the fifties, with a specific focus on the crisis of 1958, are the concern of the next section. This conflict represented the beginning of the end for a stable consociational system in Lebanon. The next two chapters focus on the two major factors responsible for the ultimate collapse of the system. First, the internal cause involved a breakdown of elite unity, where changes could not be peacefully made to redress Moslem grievances involving preponderant Christian economic and political power. The external factor is the role of the Palestinians in Lebanon, who helped polarize the population

PAGE 11

and add to the existing socio-economic cleavage. The final chapter presents conclusions derived from the study. The paper finds that the system could not cope, through peaceful means, with this combination of internal and external factors. The introduction of a new actor, wielding great influence on the system, upset the confessional balance. This was allied with a dissatisfied internal element, linked to the process of a change in the nature of the clientelist system. The study concludes that consociational theory proved inadequate in predicting and explaining the interaction of internal and external pressures. More attention should be focused on the conditions under which internal conflicts are exacerbated by external factors, as happened in the case of Lebanon. The measure of intensity of certain cleavages should be given more attention, as well as to the factors producing them. In this instance, the issue of support for the Palestinians sharply divided the two communities The lesser privileged Moslem elements whom modernization had not benefitted as much as it had the Christians were able to use the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon as a tool with which to attempt to overturn a system characterized by a Christian dominance of the elite, plus a Christian dominance of the resources of the state, which was largely a result of the role played by the clientelist network in Lebanon .

PAGE 12

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The relationship between political culture (defined as the attitudes, beliefs, values and political orientations of a people) and social structure on the one hand and the nature of the political system on the other is a highly relevant one for political scientists. One of the more interesting aspects of this subject is the relationship between a heterogeneous political culture (fragmented along racial, linguistic, regional or religious lines) and the prospects for a viable, stable democratic system. Many theorists assume that a democracy cannot operate in a society characterized by strong subcultural divisions, but rather that stability requires a homogeneous political culture where cross-cutting cleavages exist to moderate conflict. The continued co-existence of plural societies and democracy in a number of states around the world negates this generally-held contention. The degree of stability varies from the democratic models exemplified by the Anglo-American models to the more conflictual democratic systems found in, say, Italy and France. Lebanon is one country that prior to the 1975-76 civil was displayed an interesting example of democracy in a plural society.

PAGE 13

Gabriel Almond follows the traditionalist classification of democratic states into the Anglo-American system (a homogeneous, secular political and a differentiated role structure) on the one hand, and the Continental European (fragmented political culture with distinct subsystems of roles) on the other. However, the universe of real democratic systems was larger. Consequently a new category, which included the Scandinavian and Low countries (vaguely described as a combination of the first two) was established. This category, which includes stable multiparty systems, was not elaborated upon. In a later work the Scandinavian, Low countries and Switzerland were classified as "stable democracies," again with little elaboration. These political systems, which exhibit mutually-reinforcing cleavages, received little attention, bearing in mind that considerable diversity exists within the category. One group within this category has been termed "deviant cases" by Arend Lijphart who identified them as "Consociational Democracies," defined as "democracies with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward immobilism and instability which are deliberately turned into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures." As examples, he cites Switzerland, the Benelux countries, Lebanon and Colombia. The Consociational model, as Daalder points out, increases our ability to better understand different forms of democratic rule, adding that social divisions need not imply that political conflicts will result.

PAGE 14

Lijphart's model for a stable, culturally and politically fragmented democracy rests largely on his argument that mutually-reinforcing cleavages do not necessarily produce instability. Rather, he maintains that cross-cutting cleavages are not a necessity as long as there is cooperation at the elite level. The other conditions favorable to consociational democracy, in addition to the distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures , are a balance of power among the subcultures, popular acceptance of coalition government, the existence of external threats and moderate 7 nationalism. The latter is particularly important, as it is contrary to the generally accepted belief that development requires a transfer of loyalties from the local to the national level. Milton Esman argues that there is no need or desire to overcome local loyalties, arguing "there is no reason to deny moral legitimacy to plural states . In an elaboration of his model, derived mainly from his 9 work on the Netherlands, Lijphart argues that isolation and self-containment of the groups can be conducive to democracy. The system remains stable because the political elites are consciously aware of the need to circumvent the divided society by cooperation at the elite level. Rather than compete with each other they must form an "elite cartel" in order to successfully regulate the political process. The emphasis is on the ability of the elite to maintain stability. Consociational democracy, which is

PAGE 15

basically rule by the elite cartel, requires (1) That the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures . (2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures. (3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. (4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation. The theory, then, proceeds from the contention that culturally divided societies and stable democratic systems are not necessarily incompatible; that democracy is not the exclusive preserve of countries that exhibit homogeneous political cultures. It is a rather different form of democracy, differing from the classic examples of the AngloAmerican models. While both types essentially provide for rule by consent of the governed and with accountability of the governors, the consociational model has certain features that distinguish it from the mainstream of western democratic systems. In a consociational system, security must be guaranteed for each subculture by allowing it a share in the governing process.

PAGE 16

Proportional representation, and not majority rule, becomes the norm, and coalition governments, in which no one group can dominate become a necessity. Mutual vetoes and concurrent majorities go hand in hand with the arrangement whereby governmental power is curtailed in order for the subgroups to autonomously handle their own affairs. Though, ideologically, groups may remain intransigent, political bargaining takes place in an atmosphere of toleration, moderation, compromise and pragmatism. Interests are carefully adjusted between groups mainly through structured bargaining processes by the leaders. Because of the strong strain of ideology , issues , in order to be resolved to every group's satisfaction, have to be depoliticized or discussed in less ideological, and more technical, terms. In sum, underlying the stability of such systems is a fundamental consensus on the most basic aspects of the structure, where the desire to preserve the system is found among all subgroups. Boundaries exist within which the groups may defend and promote their interests in a peaceful manner. Applicability of the Model The assumption exists that democracies cannot operate in culturally divided societies of the developing world. How relevant is this Western-based consociational model for non-Western countries? Communal attachments as religion,

PAGE 17

region, kinship and language, what Geertz calls "primordial „12 ties are seen as impediments to the effective functioning of a stable democracy, and the argument is made that states have to achieve a degree of homogeneity before a democratic system can work. Western states are not completely homogeneous; however, many continental European democracies exhibit fragmented political cultures. While democracy along the Anglo-American model may not be fully relevant for developing states, a specific form of democracy--the consociational model--may be one method of overcoming the deep cleavages characteristic of these systems. Though the divisions are deeper and wider than those in the Western democracies, the gaps can be bridged if the countries satisfy certain conditions. Where communal or segmental isolation exists, and little contact takes place between the segments, agreement on the structure of the state can be made by the segments' leaders. Van Den Berghe cites several conditions necessary for consociational democracy, which include basic agreements on the essential values, agreement on the structure of the government, acceptance of pluralism, that is, of cultural and regional autonomy, where a monopoly over the means of violence 13 does not exist. The model will be suitable especially where a balance of power exists between autonomous segments, and where there has been some history of elite (coalescent) deci si on -making.

PAGE 18

Size also appears to be a favorable factor in the functioning of consociational democracies. Frequent interaction leads to accommodation and good will. Smallness also involves a fear of larger neighbors and this supposedly leads to more elite solidarity. This is effective where the danger is seen by all groups, and not by just one or more segments. A plural society, then, will find the consociational model the most viable in view of the deep cleavages present in the society. Unity will be achieved and the likelihood of violence decreased if the problem of primordial loyalties is overcome. 5 Kuper expounds on two models of democratic pluralism, neither of which really apply to our study of Lebanon. The "equilibrium" model he defines as "a dispersion of power between groups which are bound together by cross-cutting loyalties and by common values/" presupposes a rather homogeneous society. 16 The "conflict" model states the necessity for domination of society by a minority group. 17 In answer to the question of whether of how applicable the consociational model, developed for the small West European democracies, is for an understanding of the prospects for stable democracy in culturally divided, developing countries, we may quote Lijphart:

PAGE 19

For many of the plural societies of the non-Western world. . . the realistic choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all. 18 The consociational model, in short, may be applicable to different countries in various degrees, and it is our purpose to explain Lebanon's system and its demise with the aid of consociational theory and in the process to identify extra variables that may serve to strengthen the theory's explanatory potential and applicability, helping to overcome some of its limitations. One important aspect of this model which we must address ourselves to is the problem of system change. How well does this model accommodate change? Problems of System Change One of the drawbacks of the model is the detrimental effects brought about by modernization, or more specifically social mobilization. Competition for scarce resources leads to the emergence of new values. Different rates of mobilization, moreover, engender conflict by making cleavages more reinforcing. Melson and Wolpe show that modernization in Nigeria led to more conflicts plus the emergence of new groups. The groups' communal identity becomes the basis for their advancement. They "perceive 19 their competitive world through a communal prism." Conflict arises when certain groups are not able to acquire desired values as wealth, power and status. As Dew puts it,

PAGE 20

"... with the system's capabilities perceived as static, the increased satisfaction of one group implies an increased dissatisfaction for the other group (s) with a heightened sense of relative deprivation and an increased prospect 20 for political conflict." Social mobilization leads to a greater awareness of communal identity, generating conflict over distribution of resources, which can lead then to an uneven communal distribution of the society's wealth. Where opportunities exist for advancing or sharing in values without encroaching on the rewards of another group, the likelihood of conflict will be decreased. Where one group does not advance as rapidly as another, a sense of deprivation sets in. In brief, different rates of mobilization lead to a more apparent division among the communities, a growing of socio-political cleavages which can lead to conflict. Because of the question of wealth and redistribution, it becomes a conflict of class. Where communal and class cleavages coincide, the changes for conflict and polarization increase. The reasons for the differences, Melson and Wolpe point out, include the nature of Western contact, environ2 1 mental opportunities, and variations in cultural dispositions. The ability to successfully overcome these problems of modernization is one major weakness of this democratic model. The attitude of the elite is important in this regard. Where elites do not have a common perception of

PAGE 21

10 the distribution of rewards in a society, conflict among members of the elite may set in. Demands for a change in the methods of allocation arise after the resources of groups and their leaders change over time, again due to political or economic changes. But, as Esman points out, "the conflict management perspective has an inevitable bias toward conservatism and system maintenance, toward the orderly and peaceful continuity of a conflict-ridden or violence22 prone political system." A serious problem with structured elite predominance is its conservative bias, "where elite predominance tends to freeze the social status quo and to limit policy options for economic growth, distribution 2 3 and participation." Priority is given to stability and peaceful relations between the society's communities. Agreement on objectives and values of the system becomes difficult. Apter argues that what he calls a "consociation" is subject to "immobilism because of the need to find agreement on common action before action itself is possible. Hence, it is given to crisis, fission 24 and recombination as part of its natural history." It is a static system that does not easily accommodate change. The modernization process, it appears, leads to a rejection of regulatory practices by non-elites, or as Nordlinger contends "... the continuing impact of modernization upon the non-elite detracts from the possibility of regulatory outcomes."" The consociational system is, therefore, of a rather static character. Lorwin argues

PAGE 22

11 that "segmented pluralism" is breaking down in the Netherlands because of youth unhappiness with the ideological blocs and with the compromises of the system. 26 Dutter takes issue with this contention, maintaining that consociational democracy in the Netherlands is not changing to a homogeneous political culture, as Lijphart asserts, and he further questions whether the growth of secular blocs will continue. ' Assumption of Subcultural Isolation _ and Unifor mi ty In his discussion of the relation between the communities and the elite, Lijphart essentially neglects the possibility of linkage between the two, as was the case in Lebanon. Though the communities are more or less isolated or segmented, links between members of the elites and members of the different communities existed through the patronage network. Besides having contacts with each other, the members of the ruling elite have contact with regional leaders or notables. These coalitions may be with members of other religions, and not necessarily with members of the same community. The President and the other members of the elite, in short, serve their political interests and those of their clients by cooperating with notables from other communities. This creates an arena where different subelite coalitions are important.

PAGE 23

12 While legitimacy of the elite in the Netherlands is legal-rational, in Lebanon it is more of a quid pro quo , traditional legitimacy. Problems of recruitment are also related to the nature, and legitimacy, of the elite. In Lebanon bargaining takes place among notables , with the individual's name and family figuring importantly. A member of the ruling elite is usually able to recruit a member of his family, or even allies of his region, into the elite structure. In sum, the picture is not one of complete isolation of the elite from the blocs. Rather, contacts are maintained between members of the elite, plus they with leaders of the different communities. The continual bargaining that takes place between the elites and the "sub-elites" is a central aspect of Lebanese politics. Our purpose at this stage is to establish first whether Lebanon falls into Almond's third category, or more specifically, into Lijphart's consociational model. The Co n sociational Model applied to Lebanon Lebanon is a small country (4,000 square miles, 3 million people) which, since independence in 1943, exhibited a stable formula of pluralism and democracy. Under Ottoman rule, an autonomous Lebanese province was administered along confessional lines, with Christians constituting the majority of the inhabitants. Following World War I, Lebanon became a French Mandate. The French

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13 added more areas, forming a Greater Lebanon and in the process increasing the Moslem population. The French emphasized the traditional practice of a system based on proportional representation based on religious and regional divisions. In essence, the country exhibits a complex balance of power system among traditional autonomous groups in which religion represents the major line of division, allied closely with strong regional, client and family group affiliations or loyalties. Religion and politics are inextricably intertwined. Did Lebanon ever fit the Consociational model? Lijphart lists what he calls the "rules of the game" necessary for accommodation between the subcultures 2 ^ and it will be our task to apply these propositions to Lebanon as it existed before the crisis, note any deviations which will allow us to suggest modifications and shortcomings of the model. A comparison with consociationalism in the Netherlands will hopefully highlight the operation of the model in Lebanon and allow us to discuss the deviations, and thus modifications of the model. (1) The Business of Politics : Politics should be seen as a type of business (rather than a type of game) in which the elite are oriented toward the maintaining of stability. Lijphart notes this is in keeping with the Netherlands' tradition as a merchant state, which, incidentally, applies also to Lebanon. While Lebanon sustained many minor crises

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14 (37 governments in the first twenty years of independence) major conflicts have been avoided due to the skillful bargaining procedures and practices of the country's politicians. There was a deliberate effort by the elite to stabilize the system as it was apparent that the alternative to this arrangement was intergroup strife. No agreements could be made unless all groups approved (mutual vote) , with decisions often being made by granting concessions to dissatisfied groups. In this way the distribution of "values" could be allocated on an objective basis. As we shall see in more detail later, the Lebanese government, until the sixties, interfered very little in the economy, until increased modernization 2 ^ led to demands for an increased governmental role. Still, Lebanon's pluralistic society did not prove to be an obstacle to development. Due largely to the work-oriented nature of the elite, the country was able to make great strides in economic development, giving Lebanon one of the highest per capita rates in the Middle East. (2) The Agreement to Disagree : This implies respect and toleration for ideological and political differences. Major decisions had to be compromises, with concessions being made to opposing blocs. The concept of concurrent majority, rather than majority rule, was practiced. This rule can only be applied to issues that are not pressing, but when issues of importance cannot be resolved they are usually "frozen," as was Dutch disagreement over the Colonial

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question in 1951. In Lebanon, the second decade of independence saw the emergence of several issues upon which the elites could not agree, and these in essence were left unresolved. The divisive issues included development and fortification of the South, strengthening of the army, social justice and the Palestinian question. (3) Summit Diplomacy : The politics of accommodation presuppose rule by the elite. The more pressing and crucial an issue, the more likely it is that it will be resolved at the highest level. This entails elite cooperation on the fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy. The Dutch "compromise" of 1917 is a good example, where the Socialists obtained their demand for universal suffrage, while the Catholics and Protestants received state aid for education , while the Liberals were satisfied by the introduction of proportional representation. The Lebanese elite was able to keep conflict within manageable proportions, able to solve the Presidential crisis of 1952, but divided in 1958. The latter two cases highlight the role of the external factor and as we shall see in more detail politics in Lebanon could not be viewed in isolation from events outside its borders. Because of the Christian political orientation toward the West and the Moslems toward the Arab world, issues of Middle East politics have tended to divide the populace. Internally, increased modernization led to conflict, and lessened the elite's ability to solve emerging problems .

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16 (4) Dcpoliticization : Sensitive issues are neutralized by presenting them to the blocs in a non-political form, helping in the process to justify compromises made. One method used in depoliticizat ion is the use of legal and constitutional principles. The principle was not fully effective in Lebanon. Issues concerned with the ArabIsraeli conflict were not so easily depoliticized ; nor was the question of social justice or distribution of resources. This latter issue became increasingly imbued with political overtones and consequently became a bone of contention between the two communities. That is, as social mobilization proceeded, it became increasingly difficult to keep issues depoliticized. (5) Secrecy : In order to be able to put aside religious and ideological differences and successfully arrive at compromises, and in general to practice pragmatism, bloc leaders have to practice accommodation in secret, away from the scrutiny of the public. This applies well in Lebanon where, after heated elections in which popular interest is high, bargaining takes place in secret. Approval by the population of government by the elite cartel favors a consociational democracy, and this has been the case in Lebanon. Compromises by the elites are largely dependent on the allegiance and support of the non-elites. (6) The_ Government ' s Right to Govern : The government (or Cabinet) has to be allowed a large degree of independence, in view of the fact that it alone has the right to govern.

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17 Lebanon's institutional structure allows the Cabinet the preeminent role in policy-making. A popularly-elected Parliament elects a President who names a Prime Minister who then forms a Cabinet which has to win Parliament's vote of confidence. The President, who is himself head of a family, client and regional group, is often the balancer in the balance of power. The government for the most part was the medium whereby the competing interests of the various groups could be adjusted. Membership in the Cabinet was a means of preserving a group's security and interests. Parliament as such was not a check on the Cabinet, but rather a forum where issues and facts could be aired and discussed after the Cabinet had made the decisions. (7) Proportionality : Sectarian considerations have been the basis for Lebanon's political life in that power is distributed among the country's religious sects, resulting in a system where diverse interests are tolerated and accommodated. The unique form of confessionalism produced a democratic state in which all traditional groups were allowed a share in governing the country. This opportunity for participation by all groups imparted legitimacy to the institutions of the state. The system is based on the National Pact of 1943 which in effect recognized the division of the country into religious communities. The Pact allocated administrative posts to the various communities in proportion to their numerical strength. A census taken in 1932 revealed the

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18 Christians to be in a slight majority and thus were given six seats in Parliament for every five Moslem seats. No one sect consituted more than 30% of the population. In this sense it was similar to the classic balance of power system in which no one participant could gain hegemony or predominance . On the Christian side, the Maronite Catholics comprised 29% of the population, and being the largest single sect, were alloted the top executive post, the Presidency. Other Christian groups include the Greek-Orthodox (9%) , GreekCatholic (6%), and smaller Christian denominations (7%). On the Moslem side the Sunni represented 22% of the population and accordingly were given the second position, the Premiership. The other Moslem group, and third overall largest, the Shiites (20%) were given the post of Speaker of the House. The Druze (an off-shoot of the Moslems) represented the remaining 7% . We return, then, to the question of how applicable the model is for a study of Lebanon. Did Lebanon ever fit the model? Certainly, prior to the crisis of 1958 the model, by and large, did apply to Lebanon. Lebanese consociationalism gradually began to weaken in the sixties and seventies, leading to the collapse of the Lebanese political system in 1975-76. The reasons for the failure of the consociational model in Lebanon are a central concern of this paper and will be discussed fully in subsequent chpaters. Essentially, socio-economic modernization in Lebanon had resulted in

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19 a greater share of wealth accruing to the Christians of Lebanon, by and large, while the poorer elements of the population were for the most part Moslems. In addition, population changes had, it was widely believed, resulted in the Moslems now constituting a majority and in the process demands were made for a change in the apportionment of political power, which since 1943 was based on a fixed ratio favoring the Christians. Demands for a reorganization of Lebanon's political and economic structure were resisted by the more privileged Christian elements. Added to this "internal" cause of the breakdown was the "external" factor , namely the role of the Palestinian guerrillas. The presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon, and more specifically the question of their freedom of action, divided the population with the conservative Christian elements staunchly opposing their presence in Lebanon. The Palestinians fought alongside the Moslems in order to safeguard their position in Lebanon, while the Moslems fought for a change in Lebanon's political and economic structure. The Christians fought to maintain the privileges they had attained in Lebanon and to weaken, destroy, or bring the Palestinian movement under control , thus removing what they perceived as a threat to Lebanon. This paper, then, will be concerned with an understanding of how Lebanon's experiment in consociational democracy failed, with a violent breakdown of the political system. The paper will begin with a historical overview

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20 of the country focusing specifically on the evolution or development of the consociational system. We will then move to a focus on the operation of consociational principles in Lebanon, showing the relation of these principles to religion, the family and more importantly to the patronclient network that has historically been a part of Lebanese politics. Chapter III deals with the crisis of 1958, when the first cracks in the consociational structure began to appear. This section will include a survey of the interplay of internal and external factors and a discussion of the deviation from consociational principles. The next two chapters take a closer look at the basic causes for the collapse. The first discusses the internal problems — which in essence is a discussion of the violation of the principles of consociationalism. We will attempt to indicate whether and to what extent changes have arisen between the two communities, which led to a call for a change in the "rules of the game". Then a look at the external cause will be in order. This entails a tracing of the rise of the Palestinians as a factor in domestic politics, and their influence on the system will be shown. Since the first mainf estation of hostility between the state and the Palestinians erupted in 1969, the focus will be on this confrontation. The following section focuses on the 1975-76 civil war itself while, finally, the last chapter will be an analytical summary of the breakdown of

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21 the Lebanese system in relation to the consociational model. Hopefully, this section will tie together the main themes of the paper and concentrate on the theoretical aspects of the discussion.

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2 2 Notes 1. The term "stability in this context refers to a situation resulting from a system's ability to continually solve new, emerging problems and to respond effectively to demands made upon it by groups of the society. Where channels exist for the articulation of demands and where conflict is successfully resolved the polity will maintain stability. "Legitimacy", an important underpinning of stability, implies the acceptance of the political structure and its institutions by all groups. A successful regulation of political conflict is a plus for a state's politcal "performance". The term "democracy" refers to the opportunity for representation and participation in decision-making by all groups, which includes political competition, rule by consent of the governed and the assurance of basic civil liberties to all. 2. Where social cleavages coincide (mutually-reinforcing) divisions among the population are deep and likely to produce conflict, while overlapping lines of social cleavage (cross-cutting) produce numerous affiliations by an individual and moderation is likely to result, with little change of polarization and thus conflict. 3. Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political System," Journal of Politics (August, 1956), pp. 392-394. A secular 1 political culture is "rat ional-calculati ng, bargaining and experimental. . ."The role structure is organized, bureaucratized with stability in the function of the roles and a dispersion of power throughout the system. 4. Gabriel Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," American Behavioral Scient ist (June, 1963), p. 10. 5. Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparit ive Political Studies (April, 1968), p. 20. 6. Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," World Politics (July, 1974), p. 609. 7. Lijphart, op. cit . , p. 29. 8. Milton Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict," Public Poli cy (Winter, 1973), p. 77. The concept of "pluralism" as used here has more a "sociological"

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2 3 basis than a "political" one. It is concerned mainly with the relationship between social structure and political behavior where different power centers exist--dif ferent elites--as a result of subcultural divisions in a stable democracy. Pluralism is defined by Kuper as "societies characterized by certain conditions of cultural diversity and social cleavage in whatever way these conditions of social and cultural pluralism arise from the contact of different peoples and cultures within a single society." Leo Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith, eds . , Pluralism in Africa , (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 7. 9. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accomodation (Berkeley: University of California, 1968). 10. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics (January, 1969), p. 216. Also on elite's see Eric Nordlinger, Con f lict Regulation in Divided Countries (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, 1972) , pp. 54-72. 11. Jurg Steinger argues that proportionality results in the citizens lacking the means to articulate their dissatisfaction, and this lowers the "learning capacity of the system" in that there is little communication between elites and citizens. "Principles of Majority and Proportionality," Bri tish Journal of Political Science (January, 1971), p. 68. 12. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: New States," in Clifford Geetz , ed., Old Societies and New States , (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 109. 13. Pierre Van Den Berghe, "Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Explanation," in Kuper, op. cit., pp. 76-78. ' 14. Jurg Steiner, op. cit . , p. 65. 15. Eric Nordlinger, op. cit., pp. 36-39. 16. Kuper, op. cit . , p. 3. 17. Ibid. , p. 12 . 18. Arend Lijphart, Democracy i n Plural S ociet ies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 238. 19. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Revi ew , (December, 1970) , p. 1115.

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24 20. Edward Dew, "Testing Elite Perceptions of Deprivation and Satisfaction in a Culturally Plural Society," Comparative Politics (January, 1971), p. 273. 21. Melson and Wolpe , op. cit. , p. 1115. 22. Milton Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict," Public Policy (Winter, 1973), p. 50. 23. Ibid . , p. 74. 24. David Apter, The Poli tical^ Kingdom i£^Ugandaj__A_Study in Bureaucratic Nationalis m (Princeton! Princeton " University Press, 1961), p7 24. 25. Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 112. 26. Val Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism," Compa rative Politics (January, 1971), p. 159. ' ~~ 27. Lee Dutter, "The Netherlands as a Plural Society," Comparative Political Studies (January, 1978), p. 567. 28. Lijphart, Politics of Accommodation , op. cit., pp. 122-138. 29. Modernization in this case refers more to socio-economic development than political development. As we shall see later Lebanon has developed while maintaining its traditional patterns of life. But Lebanon does not rank highly on indicators of political development, whose aspects include "a high level of institutionalized mass participation, typically through the election process and the party system, high government administrative capabilities, indicative of a response to demands engendered by social mobilization, and flexible complex, autonomous and coherent political institutions." The indicators of political development include: voting participation (non-communist secular party vote) , central government expenditures as percentage of GNP , executive stability index, deaths from domestic group violence per million inhabitants, and the Cutright political development index. In sum, socio-economic modernization is ahead of political development in Lebanon. See Michael Hudson, "A Case of Political Underdevelopment," Journal of Poli tics (November, 1967), pp. 827-832. Also Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World _Poli_tics (April, 1965), pp. 386-405. "

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CHAPTER II THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSOCIATIONALISM : LEBANON IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The origins of the problems that have plagued modern day Lebanon are deeply embedded in the country's history. An appreciation and a clearer understanding of these problems can be made by reference to the political, economic and social forces which have shaped the structure and form of twentieth century Lebanon, characterized by a unique brand of confessionalism. Moreover, a study of the evolution of the country's confessional system will enable us to focus more clearly on the background to the emergence of a consociational democracy in Lebanon, as well the nature and extent of conflict exhibited by the system. As we shall see, the birth of confessionalism was due to both internal and external factors, perhaps more so to the latter, in view of the fact that other countries had such a profound influence on the development of the country. Lebanon has had a highly complex history which is today reflected in its widely diverse religious and social mosaic. The number and variety of conquerors that have passed through Lebanon and which have left their own distinct imprints and influences have helped mold a country which today has not differed significantly in terms of both its strategic and 25

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2 6 commercial importance. Indeed, twentieth century Lebanon performed functions which it did throughout history, acting as an East-West bridge, a center for trade, and an arena in which rivalries of numerous nations were contested. Many authors have echoed this theme in their works, and the following by a noted Lebanese historian perhaps best illustrates this idea: Clearly Lebanon can vie with any other land of comparable size not only in the value of events enacted on its stage but in their meaningf ulness in terms of world values and in importance. It is one of those lands that could be described as microscopic in size but macroscopic in importance . 2 Lebanon ' s geography has played an integral part in shaping its history. Situated on the Eastern Mediterranean, it extends about 130 miles along the coast, and averages 35 miles in width. Its area of 4000 square miles thus makes it smaller than the state of Connecticut. The coastal strip merges into a mountain range which is separated by another, parallel, range (the anti-Lebanon range) by the fertile Bekaa valley. It is the snow-covered mountain peaks that give Lebanon its name. Because of this rough mountainous terrain, Lebanon was never completely controlled by an invading army, but rather managed, throughout its history, to maintain its own distinct characteristics and identity: "They learnt from their conquerors trades and industries; they adopted some of their myths; they certainly acquired a few of their administrative

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27 measures, but generally speaking they kept their own 3 personality." The social make-up and political nature of twentieth century Lebanon were determined largely by the role played by Mount Lebanon 4 or the "Mountain". This area became a place of refuge for religious minorities, and it is perhaps this factor more than any other that gave Lebanon its unique characteristics, allowing for the creation later of a most unusual type of consociational democracy. This section of the paper will deal with a survey of historical Lebanon, focusing on the forces that helped shape Lebanon's political system as it emerged in the twentieth century. This brief account will include Lebanon's early history, proceed through the Islamic and Ottoman periods, and end in the period of the French Mandate, which culminated in independence for Lebanon in 1943. The Phoenicians Around 4000 B.C. a group of Semitic tribes moved into the Levant 5 from the Persian Gulf area. This people, subsequently known as Canaanites, settled with a group of Aegeans who were driven from Greece by invaders around the year 3000 B.C. The race of Phoenicians which emerged lived in thickly wooded areas and excelled in trade, art, metallurgy and textile industries, and in navigation. Taking advantage of their strategic location, and since the mountains posed an obstacle to effective opportunities in the East, the Phoenicians proved to be intelligent traders and found much prosperity in these endeavors. By the ninth

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28 century they had established a flourishing empire in the Mediterranean area, setting up colonies of which the most famous was Carthage. The Phoenician cities, which collectively never consisted of more than a loose organization of citystates, traded with the Pharoahs of Egypt, selling them cedarwood, used to build their boats and temples, plus wine, olive oil and white gum, used for the Egyptian practice of mummification. Byblos (later Jubeil) established itself as the leading city in terms of trade and overall influence. The Phoenicians' invention of the alphabet boosted their trading opportunities by improving communications. 7 The Phoenicians' activities, however, were interrupted by frequent invasions. Following several decades of Hyksos rule, the Eighteenth Dynasty under the Amenhoteps 8 ruled the area until it was conquered by the Hittites, who, after several military campaigns with the Egyptians, finally allowed Ramses to retain control over the Phoenician coast. 9 It was in the following 400 years (1279-879) that Phoenicia established its colonies and became prosperous. Assyrian rule (875-608) was followed by the Babylonians (608-536) whole ruled under Nebuchadnezzar until the Persians managed to attain a firm grip on the area (531-333). 10 Unlike the previous periods, during which numerous revolts took place, relations between the Persians and Phoenicians were cordial, even though the area for the first time came under a highly centralized administration. The Greco-Roman period was ushered in when Alexander the Great defeated the Persians

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29 at the Battle of Issus in 333B.C. The Phoenicians were receptive to Greek civilization and soon the Greek language became widely spoken. Upon Alexander's death internal squabbling among his senior generals led to a division of the area and the Seleucids moved in and ruled the area for over a century. It was under Roman rule, which began in 64 B.C. under Pompey, that Phoenicia attained new fame. Berytus (Beirut) achieved great intellectual heights, becoming a noted center of learning for the Roman empire and boasting the prestigious Roman School of Law, while Heliopolis (Baalbek) also stood out with its fine temples. In the beginning of the fourth century Christianity became the recognized religion of the Levant. Toward the end of this century the Roman empire split up into a Roman Western part and a Byzantine Eastern part, with Constantinople as its capital. xz The empire was further weakened by both internal dissensions and war with the Persians, laying it open to attack by new invaders from the Arabian Peninsula, carrying with them new religious teachings which they were intent on spreading to the entire area. The Birth of Islam Preaching a religious war (Jihad) and "... sanctified by the consciousness that they were the chosen vehicles of a new 1 3 and final divine revelation," the Arab invaders encountered and defeated the Byzantine armies at the Battle of Yarmuk in 636. Islam spread quickly, reaching Spain and Morocco

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30 in the West and central Asia in the East. The reasons were varied. Besides the lack of a clear demarcation line between it and the Monotheistic religions, "the few and precise basic demands of Islam, the simplicity of the cult, and the prestige attaching to it, would attract numerous converts. Furthermore, adherence to Islam promised relief in taxation and entry into the governing elite." Lebanon came under the rule of the Damascus-centered Ummayad Dynasty from 660 to 750, and from 750-1258 it lived u,nder the repressive rule of the Baghdad-based Abbasid Dynasty. Arabic became the predominant language, Islam the predominant religion. It was in this period that the Lebanese mountains provided a sanctuary for many fleeing Christians. From this time on Lebanon became increasingly / recognized as a place of refuge for different minority groups of the area, and in the process sowing the seeds of the present day confessional state. Opposition to the new rule came not only from the Christians, but from other groups who for one reason or another found it in their interests to resist incorporation into the Islamic empire. Religious minorities as the Christians and the Jews were ruled as Millets, distinct communities that were subject to a different tax system, and who were excluded from military service. In addition they were not to bear arms, intermarry with Moslems, but could continue to live under their own customs and retain freedom of worship. 16 The main religious communities to settle in the Mountain in this period were the Maronites 17 and the Druze, 18 who were labelled as heretics by the new rulers. Though Islam and the

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31 Arabic language moved at a slow pace into the Mountain, by the ninth and tenth centuries, Arab tribes started settling near Beirut, in the the process chipping away at Lebanon's Christian character. Despite this Arab influence Aramaic, and a derivative Syriac, continued to be spoken in the Maronite areas until about the seventeenth century. In the tenth and early eleventh centuries, numerous emirates and principalities began to appear, the relations between which were based on mutual distrust and suspicion. 19 This was to facilitate the military campaigns of the Crusaders in the eleventh century. The Crusaders In 1095 Pope Urban II initiated the first of eight European expeditions aimed at wresting the Holy Land from the 20 Moslems. By 1124 most of Lebanon was in Crusader hands. They had established feudal states in Tripoli, Edessa, Antioch and a central one in Jerusalem; most of the Crusader rulers 21 were French. The initial successes of the Crusaders were dampened by internal rivalries, which led to a division of Lebanon into different areas making it easier for Moslem armies to regain some lost land. More Crusader campaigns accomplished little. With Saladin leading the Moslem armies to further victories over the Crusaders, Europe sent a new Crusade under Frederick Barbarossa, Philip Augustus and Richard I, Coeur de Lion. This campaign managed to win control of the coast, with the Moslems controlling the interior. The Islamic empire

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32 lost its unity following Saladin's death, and the Europeans seized the opportunity to win back lands lost to the Arab leader, only to finally be driven out of the area by the Mamluks of Egypt, led by Baybars . The last Crusader fortress fell in 1291. 22 The Crusader period signalled the beginning of a long friendship between France and the Maronites of Lebanon. The Maronites had welcomed the Crusaders and had cooperated fully with them in their military campaigns. While the Maronites proved to be eager recipients of Western ideas, similarly France's interest in the area and its Catholic inhabitants grew and was to continue through the next several centuries. The Mamluk period (1282-1516) , described as "a time of 2 3 decay and unrest," was characterized partly by several 24 revolts by Maronites, Druze and Shiites, which were put down with much brutality. The Mamluks harbored much ill-feeling toward the Maronites, dating from the Crusader conquests, and this they quickly demonstrated by attacking and decimating Maronite towns and villages, killing thousands and forcing 25 thousands more to flee. The Druze also suffered considerably under the Mamluks, and together with the Maronites sought refuge in the mountains of Lebanon, where they settled with their co-religionists. There the two communities lived peacefully side by side, and through their deft manuverings, managed to obtain concessions concerning autonomous rule.

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3 3 Despite the repressive nature of Mamluk rule, and the accompanying wars, famine and plagues, contacts were maintained between the area and Europe. Trade and commercial ties were established, and Lebanon especially experienced increasing prosperity plus an increasing intellectual activity. This ended with the appearance of the Ottoman Turks, who established an empire which was to last approximately 400 years, from 1516 until the First World War. The Ottoman Empire Having consolidated his power in the area, Ottoman Sultan Selim I chose to leave the notables of Lebanon in power, both Christian and Moslem, demanding only token payments in return. He designated certain areas were to be administered by notable Lebanese families whose duties included collection of taxes, providing soldiers and acting as arbitrators in disputes. This practice continued after him, and until the middle of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans ruled Lebanon through two prominent families, the Maans and the Shihabs. The autonomy of the local leaders, the system of lordship and the population were three elements of Lebanese society that were present at the beginning of Ottoman rule. 26 The Maans, Druze by faith, were led first by Fakhr Al Din I followed by the more colorful and controversial Fakhr Al Din II, who ruled from 1585 to 1635. He ended the feuds that had gone on under his predecessor and sought to integrate the whole of Lebanon, plus parts of Palestine, 27

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34 into a more independent area, under his leadership. Very flexible on religious matters, he established close cooperation between the Druze and the Maronites. 28 In addition he set about economically developing the country, making significant strides in agriculture and trade. Fakhr Al Din's ambition for total autonomy led him to enter into agreements with the Duke of Tuscany, directed against the Ottomans. He fled to Tuscany, however, upon hearing the Ottomans were intent on sending an army against him. Five years later, in 1618, he received amnesty from the Ottoman government and returned to Lebanon. 29 No sooner had he returned, however, than he set about rebuilding his army, this time into a more efficient, 40,000 man force, which proceeded to defeat the Ottoman troops sent against him. Rather than seek revenge, the Sultan of Constantinople, involved in fighting in Persia and Anatolia at the time, accepted the fait accompli and conferred upon Fakhr Al Din the title of Sultan of the Continent. 30 Fakhr Al Din now sought closer ties with Italy, establishing diplomatic relations with the Dukes of Tuscany and Florence, and brought over Italian engineers and agriculturists to help further develop the country. These measures were short-lived however, as the new Sultan Murad IV moved against him in a final attempt to end the complete autonomy of Lebanon under Fakr Al Din. 31 The Lebanese leader was exiled to Istanbul where he was put to death in 1635.

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35 With the absence of a strong leader, the country returned to internal feuds and general restlessness. The Porte appointed Ali Alam-Al-Din as governor. However, a nephew of Fakhr Al Din, the Amir Mulhim aspired to the position of leader, which he finally won after much struggle. His son Ahmad continued to rule until 1697, when he died leaving no children. For the whole of the next century another family was to dominate the area, the Shihabs, under whom a large measure of autonomy continued for the region. As Hitti describes it: The Shihabis ruled Lebanon through an intricate system of feudal hierarchy of prices and shayks. Like their predecessors they followed the principle of hereditary succession and home rule, exercising even the power of life and death on their subjects . 3 2 Allowed to elect a leader from among themselves, the local chiefs chose Bashir Al Shihabi I, under whom Lebanon remained relatively calm. Heydar succeeded Bashir I as governor until 1732, after conflicts with the Porte, when he abdicated to allow his son Mulhim to assume power. An ailing Mulhim, in turn, abdicated in 1754 leaving his brothers Mansur and Ahmad to contest the vacant seat. Finally, Mulhim' s son Yusuf became governor in 1770. 33 Yusuf's power was challenged by Ahmad Al Jazzar, governor of Sidon and later Damascus, who had won the goodwill of the Porte for his help in putting down a local revolt on Sidon by Zahir Al Umar. Jazzar incited members of Yusuf's

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36 family against him, and also encouraged Druze families, as the Jumblatts and the Yazbakis, to oppose the emir Yusif, all in an effort to increase his control over the Lebanese emirate. Taking advantage of the resulting strife, Jazzar moved against Yusuf, who was then forced to abdicate. Jazzar appointed in his place Bashir Shihab, a cousin of Yusif 's, who was to dominate Lebanese affairs until 1841. 34 Throughout the eighteenth century Maronite peasants had moved south, occupying areas vacated by a large number of Druze who had moved to Jabal Druze near Damascus. As mentioned above, the Druze community had weakened somewhat, owing partly to divisions within the ranks of the Druze nobility, and the rise in Maronite influence. Maronites worked in the Shuf with Druzes who, mindful of the need for laborers, encouraged this trend. Soon the Maronites became part of the feudal system. 35 Also at this time a close relationship was developing between the Maronite Patriarch and the House of Shihab. The Maronite church had minimal influence in the early period of the Ottoman empire although relations with Europe underscored the importance the Vatican and other Western countries attached to relations with the Maronites. Relations with the Vatican began to strengthen after Pope Gregory III sent the Jesuit Monk Eliana Batista to the Levant in 1578. This was followed by the establishment of a college in Rome for the education of Maronite clerics. The Maronite thus came to contribute significantly to the growth of

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3 7 intellectual achievements in Lebanon, and it is suggested that it was in the seventeenth century that Lebanon's distinct 37 identity emerged. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the Maronite Church had established itself as the largest and most wealthy organization in Mt. Lebanon, much to the dismay of the previously prominent Khazen family who could do little to prevent the Church slipping from their influence and closer to the Shihabs. The clergy were instrumental in arousing a feeling of nationalism among the Maronites , who now sought a separate Maronite entity, in a period in which communal loyalties appeared to be growing stronger. Their newly-acquired wealth and power, plus their education, gave them leadership qualities, aiding in the growth of the Church's religious and social influence. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, then, certain tendencies appeared which served ultimately to disrupt relations between communities living in the Mountain. These were : . . . the spread of the Maronite peasantry southwards, the increase in the power of their hierarchy, the gradual transfer of Shihabi favour from Druzes to Maronites and the growth in influence of the great Druze families, Jumblatt and Bellama . . . 39

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Bashir II and the Role of External Powers When Al Jazzar joined the Ottomans in successfully resisting Napolean ' s siege of Acre, Bashir remained neutral although both, especially the French leader, had sought his 40 help. In spite of this, however, Napolean did receive support from the Maronites, who did not attempt to hide their joy at seeing the Europeans reappear in the Levant. The Druzes on this occasion became apprehensive, and began to see the quarrel as a religious conflict. They began increasingly to ambush Maronite convoys taking supplies to Napoleon's * 41 forces . Jazzar died in 1804 leaving Bashir to rule the area unopposed. Bashir set out to consolidate his rule under a centralized government, and to realize his reforms he encroached upon some hereditary privileges of certain feudal families and imposed heavy taxation, both of which caused some unrest. He contributed to later strife by reducing the power of Druze leaders and emphasing the distinction between the sects, both aimed at securing his own position. Nonetheless, Lebanon under Bashir continued as a refuge for minorities, and in general experienced a strong system of law and order. Indeed, Mt . Lebanon in this period has been described as "an oasis of order amid the chaos.' In the last decade of Bashir' s rule, Egyptian ruler Mohammad Ali occupied Syria. Bashir aided this conquest, much to the indignation of the Druze, which led to an increase in

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39 religious tension and an embittering of Maronite-Druze relations. This episode led to the Lebanese situation becoming the focus of international concern for the first time . The period of occupation lasted from 1831-40 and the area was administered by Ibraham Pasha, Ali's son. Bashir's motive in aiding the Egyptians lay in his desire to strengthen his own position at home, especially against a perceived threat to his power from the Druze Jumblatts. 3 Druze resentment grew deeper with Ali's plans to establish full political and social equality between the two communities, compounded by the imposition of burdens including higher taxes, forced labor, and a program of mandatory military service. Bashir assisted Ali in suppressing Druze uprisings, even to the point, albeit reluctantly, of providing conscripts from among the Druze. Christians were exempt from conscription, partly because of Bashir's resistance to the plan and partly because of the role played by European consuls in pressuring 45 All to leave the Christians alone. The cooperation between the Egyptian ruler and Bashir did not last however. It became clear that Ali was set upon disarming and conscripting the Christians, as well as the Druze. In an attempt to rid the country of Egyptian rule, insurrections broke out with both Maronites and Druze allying themselves against Ali's army. In this they were aided by the Ottomans and the British, as well as other European powers, who had no interest in seeing the Empire collapse. Thus, seizing the chance,

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40 the Ottomans, aided by British, Russian and Austrian troops, succeeded in defeating Ali's army and forcing Bashir into •i 47 exile . The united stand of Lebanon's religious communities during the campaign to oust Ali proved to be short-lived, and soon started to erode, with the Turks and to a lesser extent 4 8 the British doing much to encourage this split. Druze discontent was of course rooted in Bashir ' s collusion with Ali in putting down their revolts, and in the subsequent exiling of prominent Druze chiefs. Thus, with the fabric beginning to fall apart, numerous feuds arose or were revived. The following two decades saw a period of great unrest which culminated in the bloodshed of 1860. The Ottomans worked to keep the situation tense, in the hope of demonstrating that direct Ottoman control was the only solution for the troubled Lebanese province. They received some rather unexpected assistance in the person of Bashir III, whom they had nominated and who proved to be a weak ruler. Religious tensions continued to grow under Bashir III, who had little of the competence or could command the allegiance of his subjects as well as his predecessor. He was unsympathetic to Druze demands that he return their lands and former privileges. In October, 1841, Bashir III found himself under siege by Druze notables and their followers after they had invited by him to discuss pressing tax issues. Maronite-Druze fighting ensued, with the Ottomans, in seeking revenge against France

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41 for support of Mohammad Ali's occupation of Syria, openly aiding the Druze against the Christians. The Druze also received support from the Greek-Orthodox, who resented Maronite 4 Q strength, and who were also urged on by the Russian Consul. European consuls pressured the Ottomans to end the fighting. Bashir was deposed in January, 1841, and exiled to Constantinople and with him went the end of the Shihabi era. Umar Pasha was the Porte's choice for direct rule which, after only three months, proved unable to contain the unrest, which had claimed about 300 lives. The Qaim Maqamiya At the suggestion of Austrian Chancellor Metternich, Lebanon was divided into two administrative districts, the qaim maqamiyah , each headed by a qa'im maqam (Lt. governor or administrative deputy) , a Christian in the North and a Druze in the South. The Beirut-Damascus road was to be the dividing line between the two areas. The mixed districts in both caused problems, and consequently wakils (agents) of both faiths were appointed for each district, with . . 50 responsibility to the qa ' im maqam of his own religion. The significance of this arrangement was that, since allegiance was to one's religious community, a confessional structure was introduced for the first time, which went beyond the Millet system considerably. The Turks were not confident of its success. It is suggested, moreover, that it was again an effort on their part to show the European

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42 powers the futility of indirect Ottoman rule. Indeed, the division served only to exacerbate religious tensions, and hostilities again erupted in 1845, with the Turks again aiding the Druze, resulting in many Christian deaths. The Porte, again reacting to European pressure dispatched Foreign Minister Shakib Effendi to the area to investigate the situation first-hand. Upon his recommendation a majlis (council) was added to the existing administration, more specifically to each qa ' im maqam . The Council was to consist of 12 members representing the religious sects. Besides serving the qa ' im maqam the Council would decide on tax questions, as well as certain judicial cases. The power of traditional families was severely curtailed under this arrangement; thus, both Christian and Druze leaders opposed it. In addition to signalling the erosion of their power, it also meant the weakening of the feudal system in Lebanon. In sum, the Church's influence was seen in its weakening of the Christian aristocracy, attaining the loyalty of the peasants, and in general weakening the institution of feudalism. The ideals of freedom and equality which the Church espoused contributed to the peasant uprisings and which in turn led to an increase in power for the already wealthy and influential church. The 1845 conflict "started as a politico-economic struggle between a dying feudal system and an aggressive Church bureaucracy supported by a rising 5 2 peasantry along sectarian lines." Rivalry between feudal families also took on religious overtones in the midnineteenth century.

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4 3 The feudal system of Mount Lebanon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was, along with the Maronite Church, a political force shaping the nature of modern Lebanon. The feudal ( Iqta ) system persists today in the patronage network. The feudal families ran their own districts ( muqata 'as ) and were given a large amount of autonomy by the Sultan. Loyalty was not really of a religious nature, but more a personal loyalty to the families ( muqatijis ) and their amir, as the feudal leader's district compromised different religious groups. Patronage existed here, with protection accorded to the family's followers, the support of whom was necessary for the muqatijis' power. There was little coercion involved in this relationship. Elsewhere in the empire, this type of relationship was not common. In addition to the religious diversity of these villages, the patronage network was strengthened by the nature of these communities. Isolated and tightly-knit communities, these villages sought protection from central authority and other villages. Loyalty to the family and religion was matched by loyalty to the village. Under the Maans and Shihabis conflicts among the feudal families were common.

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4 4 The Troubled "Inter-War" Years Lebanon lived relatively quietly under this system until the disturbances of 1860, with the Ottomans working to make the area more subservient to the Porte. In the interim years, however, the Maronite community 53 in the North was internally troubled. The conflict involved the powerful Khazin family, the Church and the Maronite peasants, who opposed the excessive taxes levied on them, demanding that 54 some of the reforms instituted by Ibraham Pasha be continued. Supported by the Maronite clergy, who in the 1840' s "exhibited an unparalleled zeal towards independence from the 55 Porte, the peasants revolted against their feudal chiefs in 1858. Led by Taniyus Shaheen, by 1859 they had seized the land and had set up a peasant republic in the Kisrawan region, furthur complicating the relations between the communities. ' "By 1858 the Lebanese question had become so involved that scarcely an incident took place which did not have repercussions in the Chanceries of Europe, particularly 57 London and Paris." What was essentially a social conflict soon spread and assumed a religious nature. The success of the peasants in the North was an encouraging sign to other peasants, especially those living in the mixed Druze districts of the South. Maronite and Druze peasants in the South rose against their Druze Lords, but soon the Druze peasants, ever suspicious of Maronite intentions, began to side with their lords against the

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4 5 Maronites. The Druze had in fact waited for an opportune moment to strike at the Maronites, and in early 1860 they discussed with the Ottomans military measures to be taken 58 against the Maronites. The Ottomans wanted, for their part, to stem the Maronite drive for independence. The fighting which broke out resulted in "a massacre of the Maronites almost unparalleled in its brutality and the 59 zeal with which it was conducted." Four weeks of fighting left 15,000 Christians dead, plus 100,000 refugees. The Christians looked to outside powers as their only salvation (a stand they were to take a century later in both the 1958 and 1975-76 crises) . With the collusion of the Ottomans, the Moslems of Damascus fell upon the Christians, killing over 5,000 in one day. Ultimately 25,000 were killed in Damascus, including the American and Dutch consuls °^-more reason to involve the major powers. In all, over 300 villages, 500 churches, 40 monasteries and 30 schools were destroyed. The European powers reacted with shock . They agreed to send 12,000 troops, but France, under Napoleon III, on its own initiative sent 7,000 troops. Fuad Pasha, Ottoman Foreign Minister, had, in anticipation of foreign intervention, set about apprehending and executing many of the perpetrators of the massacres, including the governor of Damascus, and providing relief funds for Christians.

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4 6 After eight months of intense discussions with the European powers (France, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia) a statute was signed on June 9, 1861, known as the Reglement Organigue , "the first truly organic law of the Lebanon." 63 The Statute stipulated that Mt. Lebanon was to be an autonomous part of the Ottoman empire. The entity, known as the Mutasarrifiyah , was to be administered by a non-Lebanese Christian, approved by both the Porte and the Great Powers. Thus, with the Mu tasarrif iyah a new era began in Lebanese politics. Under this new arrangement Lebanon was to experience peace and stability until the outbreak of World War One . The Mutasarrifiyah — Confessional Representation Institutionalized The Statute established something which was to affect Lebanese politics for the next century, and this was the consolidation of the principle of confessional apportionment of seats in the governmental institutions. As in the case of the later Covenant of 1943, this provided for a type of checks and balances system, in which no one community gained predominance. The Mutasarrifiyah covered essentially what is present day Mt. Lebanon. It excluded Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and the fertile Bekaa valley. A code of 17 articles was established stipulating the manner in which the new system was to be administered. The Mutasarrif (governor or administrator) was to be the direct representative of the Porte, though he maintained wide-ranging

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47 powers. A Majlis Idarah (the Central Administrative Council) was set up, consisting of 12 members, two from each 64 sect. This was later changed in 1864, giving seats in the Maj_li_s according to community size. These representatives were to be chosen by the leaders of each religious community, and they came to consist of 4 Maronites, 3 Druze, 2 GreekOrthodox, 1 Greek-Catholic, 1 Shiite and 1 Sunni, as indicated by Table I. 65 TABLE I DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL BY SECT AND REGION SECT Greek Greek Region Maronite Orthodox Catholic Sunni Shia Druze Total Kisrawan

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48 The Council, which assisted the Mutasarrif in the administration of Mt . Lebanon, further institutionalized the principle of proportional religious representation for the area. The Council had power over taxes, local government, 66 works projects and land tenure. The Mutasarrif acted through the Council, as did the different religious factions in an attempt to increase their power. The Council, it is important to note, claimed to represent all the Lebanese people, acting "in many respects as the first truly elected representative body for the Lebanese people." The Council trained administrators allowed for political change and institutionalized political conflict. It allowed the feudal aristocracy to engage in business activities, such as trade, commerce and industry. A degree of tolerance and cooperation grew between the feudal aristocracy and the new educated elements who formed a growing middle class . Economic and religious cleavages were seen as part of Lebanese life. This open religious, political and economic structure remained until independence. Competition was within sects, while a candidate for office needed the support of different sects leading to moderation and compromise. The electoral process, in essence, remained the same, with some minor modifications, in independent Lebanon. It may be said that the origin of Lebanon's institutions lay with the Qaim Maqamiya and the Mutasarrif iyah , which made possible representation for all groups.

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4 9 In addition the area was sub-divided into 7 districts, each headed by a qa ' im maqam, who was drawn from the largest community. The Reglement abolished the feudal system and its privileges, therefore, proclaiming full equality for all. Lebanon was given its own police force, assured of the non-interference of Ottoman troops, no military service or taxes for the Porte. The Mutasarrif iyah thus contributed directly to the establishment of confessional representation in Lebanon. Religious differences were institutionalized making the sects more conscious of the differences separating them. Religion, in short, became the basis for the relationship between individuals and their representatives in the government. Increased communal loyalty resulted among the peasants, who were now organized by the Church. This occurred especially among the Maronites of Mount Lebanon where the Church was instrumental in cultivating a religious loyalty. The Church, though, was unhappy that a non-Lebanese rather than a Maronite headed the new system. In addition it was dissatisfied that Maronite representation was not commensurate with its numerical strength. Its influence on the new administration, also, was minimal since the feudal families were able to maintain their power through this new vehicle. Feudalism, however, did not die but rather assumed new forms. Urban and rural leaders, who formed common bonds of cooperation, continued to dispense favors from their new

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50 positions in the Mutasarrif iyah , a system moreover that accorded citizens equal rights, and which signalled the growth of the concept of confessional representation in the institutions of the state. In essence the Mutasarrif iyah gave Lebanon an internationally recognized identity, and gave the Maronites specifically a political identity and sense of communal loyalty. The Reglement , described as a "multifarious dialectic 6 8 of rival diplomatic pressures and aims," led to the appointment of Daud Pasha as the first, and perhaps the most competent, of seven administrators. He had been a compromise candidate. Britain had opposed France's demands for a Maronite candidate, fearing increased French influence in the area. France did, however, support the administraton of Duad Pasha, hoping both to preserve the autonomy of the Empire and to show Lebanon as an example for other minorities. The only opposition to the Mutasar r if iyah came from a number of Maronites, led by Yusaf Bey Karam, who was active in protecting Christian areas in the 1860 fighting, and who now apparently hoped to become governor. Karam, who "represented the Maronite nationalism of the Northern Lebanese in its ,69 strongest temper" was defeated by the forces of the Pasha, aided by Ottoman troops, and was exiled in 1861 to Egypt. Pie returned in 1866, and again was exiled, this time to Italy where he died in 1889. The Maronites after this ceased to strongly resist the new Mutasarrif iyah .

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51 Although a supporter of the administration, France registered its displeasure with Daud, declaring it did not look favorably on the "spilling of Christian blood." 70 European powers in general took a more active interest in the area after the establishment of the Mutasarrif iyah . Numerous Jesuit schools opened, the most famous of which is today the French St. Joseph University, plus a number of American schools, particularly the Syrian Protestant Mission, which later became the American University of Beirut. The Lebanese Christians embraced these Western overtures more so than did any other group. The French were most active in setting up hospitals and schools in the Mountain, resulting in the spread of the French language and helping establish a literacy level unmatched anywhere in the Empire. The Christians, especially the Maronites, became superior in education, having "none of the Moslems' religious or political reservations " 71 began to devlop a strong sense of Lebanese identity. The Maronites took pride in their friendship and the Papacy. As Spagnolo explains, they were: . . . imbued with a feeling of cultural superiority of Christians over nonChristians . . . their conviction was not so much the product of a religious fever, as of the sophistication of its religious education. . . clergy had also imbied some of the feeling of contempt towards tilings non-Christian which was prevalent in the Western world. '2 This education led to the Maronites being the source a literary revival that spread to the entire Arabic-speaking world .

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5 2 Mt. Lebanon also began to develop agriculturally and economically. More trade with Europe and large remittances sent back to relatives by a growing number of mainly Maronite emigrants helped development considerably. Material achievements soon equalled the intellectual heights attained. Perhaps Hitti's analysis best sums it up: Despite general incompetence on the part of its governors, reduction in its area loss of access to the sea and deprivation of fertile maritime and inland plains, Mt. Lebanon--thanks to the resourcefulness, energy and adaptability of its people-enjoyed a period of cultural flourish and economic prosperity and achieved a state of security and stability unattained by any Ottoman province, European or Asian. '' The French Mand a te ,_1918-1943 : The Co nsoli dation of Con s ociational Principles With the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottomans, allied with the Central Powers, imposed direct rule over Lebanon, abolishing the Mutasarrif iyah . The ruler of Lebanon in this period, Jamal Pasha, imposed restrictions on assembly, and the press, tolerated no political expression, and 75 general imposed dictatorial rule. He discriminated against the people of the area, especially in the distribution of food, which led to widespread famine and disease, leaving over 100,000 dead by the end of the war. Christians were ill-treated for their alleged sympathy for the Allies, and Moslems for activities associated with Arab nationalist groups. In 1916 the Turks executed a number of Lebanese, including the Mayor of Beirut, for

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53 alleged subversive activities. During the war, the British High Commissioner of Egypt Sir Henry MacMahon had promised Sharif Husayn, Protector of the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina, independence for the Arabs in return for their help against the Turks. This arrangement was complicated by the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 which stated that Britain and France would divide the area into spheres of influence, with Britain taking Iraq and Trans Jordan, and France assuming control over 77 Lebanon and Syria. Palestine was to be put under international administration and complicating the issue was the Balfour Declaration, which stated Britain's desire to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Despite misunderstandings with the British over the future status of Lebanon, Sharif Husayn began the revolt against the Turks in 1916. With the defeat of Turkey in 1918, the time had now come for France to pick up some of the pieces of the Ottoman empire. It was the aim of the French to maintain and extend their influence in Lebanon which, as noted above, had long been established. To do this they had to put an end to Arab ambitions in Syria, and this they did by forcefully removing the Arab government established in Damascus by Faysel, Sharif Husayn 's son. In an effort to determine the wishes of the people of the area concerning their future, President Wilson supported the King-Crane commission sent to the Middle East to investigate and recommend a course of action. Its

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54 recommendation that Lebanon continue to be an autonomous part of a larger Syria fell on deaf ears, as France and 7 8 Britain did not support the Commission. The issue was taken up by the leaders of the Allied Powers in San Remo on April 20, 1920. The Treaty of Sevres which followed on August 10 gave Lebanon to France, while Turkey disclaimed 7 9 any of the territory of the former empire. The Mandate was subsequently approved by the League of Nations in September 1923. France's position in Lebanon was not strongly disputed by any allied power. Its claim for special right there, its great influence among the Christians, and the need to maintain the safety of the Suez Canal all were recognized as legitimate concerns for the French. After World War I the Central Administrative Council called for a larger, independent Lebanon with a democratic government with rights for all minorities. The French abolished the Council on the pretext that some of its members favored a Greater Syria, and until 1922 the French ruled with an advisory council of 17 members, drawn from all sects. In 1922 a Representative Council was formed and dissolved in 1925. A new Council was formed in 1926 and this succeeded in adopting a constitution, which called for the establishment of a legislature made up of both a Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was to have 16 members, seven appointed by the President and the rest elected for six year terms while the Deputies were to serve a four year term. Both Houses were to elect a

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55 President who was to choose a Prime Minister. The Senate was abolished the following year while more powers were given to the President. The legislature combined all the country's groups and gave the new state a constitution. It became a forum for the calls for independence, and led to the growth of a feeling of accommodation and cooperation. The legislature, with its various sects, spoke with one voice in demanding and achieving the country's independence. The first French High Commissioner in Beirut, General Henri Gouraud, announced in 1920 the creation of Greater Lebanon, adding to the Mutasarrifiyah the areas taken away in 1861, former areas once ruled by the Ma'ans and Shihabs. With the addition of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and the Bekaa Lebanon lost its religious harmony and homogeneity. With the new areas came a large Moslem population, which was the "price" the French and Maronites were willing to pay for Q 1 an economically viable state. The Christians, mainly Maronites, had worked for the addition of the other areas, and in the process had become only a slight majority in a state that now had numerous disgruntled Moslems. The Maronite Patriarch had been assured by Georges Clemenceau in Paris that the enlarged Lebanese state would become independent. France desired a state where Maronites would be dominant, and its aforementioned ties with the Maronites would be strengthened and lead to an entrenching of France in the Middle East. As one

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56 author sees it: France enlarged Lebanon to include enough Christians to justify setting up a separate government, but also a sufficient number of Moslems to assure the need for continued French protection of their political hegemony. 83 The Moslems, for their part, were unhappy with the new arrangement and demanded to be included in a greater Syria. This sentiment was strongest among the Sunnis, and this was to remain their "favourite theme""'* in the next two decades. The Shiites, with few co-religionists in Syria, were not unhappy with their inclusion in the new Lebanese state. Similarly the Druze, now outnumbered by the Moslems, were not opposed to the French plan, as they feared becoming part of o rr a Syrian state that would be overwhelmingly Sunni. ~ The Greek-Orthodox opted for union with Syria rather than life under Maronite influence. The allegiance to the new state was strongest among Maronites, who saw it as their own creation and themselves as having played the central role in Lebanon's history. "Various spokesmen for the Lebanese nationalism professed its origins to lie in Lebanon's Phoenician culture, which they considered separate and distinct from Moslem Arab culture." The French, in an effort to prevent the growth of a strong Arab nationalism, highlighted the distinction between the Moslem sects. This distinction was so much clearer, though, between the two major communities. In the words of one author:

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ma: 57 Since for Moslems and Christians alike consciousness of belonging to a religious community was the basis of political and social obligation, both were very conscious of not belong to other communities, and the sense of distinctiveness led easily to suspicion and dislike. 87 To allay Moslem fears that the new state had a Q Q inly Christian atmosphere," 00 the French made religion the basis for participation in the state, establishing a system of confessional representation that was to take root and grow during the remainder of the French Mandate. p q Despite the alleged "irritating" attitude and behavior of the French in Lebanon, the Lebanese administration (similar to France's own) grew steadily in the next two decades. Schools were built, a modern network of roads took shape, the economy grew, aided considerably by improvements in communication, agriculture and health. On May 24, 1926, a Constitution was proclaimed and Lebanon was made a Republic, amid vociferous protests from the Moslems who had no desire to discuss a Lebanese con90 stitution, especially one that recognized the country's religious divisions, and one which had more of a Christian than a Moslem base. The Constitution was approved by the Lebanese Representative Council (elected in July, 1925), which thereupon became the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) . The Chamber elected Charles Debbas the first President of the 9 1 Republic, whose powers included appointment of a Cabinet. The Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature of 30

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58 members, 15 to be elected and 15 to be nominated. After the first elections in 1929 the apportionment of seats was: Maronites 15, Sunnis 11, Shiites 8, Greek-Orthodox 6, Druze 3, Greek-Catholic 3, Armenian Catholic 1, Armenian 92 Orthodox 1 . With regard to the planned confessional system of Lebanon, Article 95 of the Constitution specifies equal, that is proportional, apportionment of public posts to the sects, but not specifying exact ratios. The article states partly that "... for the sake of justice and concord, the communities shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the Ministry. . . "70 The mid-twenties also saw a period of unrest among the Druze. The rebellion which erupted in Syria in 1925 spread to Lebanon the following year, where Moslems began isolated attacks on Christian villages, leading to an increase in religious tension. Following bombardment of Damascus, the French were able to quell the revolt, and by 94 the end of 1927 the rebellion had completely dissipated. Developments in the thirties were also affected by two prominent politicians, Emile Edde and Bishara El Khoury. Both Maronites, they were the dominant political figures of this period. Edde strongly supported the French presence in Lebanon, asserting Lebanon's independence was contingent upon it, while Khoury felt the French would only prevent closer cooperation between Moslems and Christians, which he 95 felt was needed to give the new state much-needed stability.

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59 It was the intense competition between these two leaders which led to the suspension of the Constitution in 1932, the year in which the first population census was taken (Table II) . TABLE II CENSUS OF LEBANESE POPULATION TAKEN IN 19 32 Sunnis 175,925 Shiites 154, 208 Druzes 5 3,04 7 Maronites 226 ,378 Greek -Orthodox 76,522 Greek-Catholics 45,999 Armenian Orthodox 25,462 Armenian Catholics 5,694 Protestants 6,712 Jews 3, 518 SOURCE: Albert H. Hourani, Sy ria and Le banon (London; Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 121. Since the Chamber could not decide between Khouri and Edde , the suggestion was made that Sheikh Mohammad El Jisr, a Moslem notable from Tripoli, be nominated. The French High Commissioner stepped in and suspended the Constitution, rather than allow the Presidency to go to a Moslem. Debbas was succeeded by Habib Assad, a Maronite, in 1934, and in 19 36 Edde was elected and stayed in power until the Constitution was again suspended in 19 39 with the beginning of the Second World War. 96

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f . Though the Sunnis were quite numerous it was felt that they, by the early 1930s, were still not fully assimilated. As one French newspaper commented, "A Lebanon quite intoxicated with Arabism and where 45 percent of Lebanon declined to be 97 Lebanese, is not a viable Lebanon." Isolated clashes again broke out between Maronites and Sunnis with the announcement of a French-Lebanese Treaty in 1936. This provided for Lebanese independence within three years, with France retaining control over defense and foreign affairs 9 R until 1961. ° The Maronites were happy with the Treaty while the Sunnis saw it as finally precluding any union with Syria. The Treaty was never ratified by the French Parliament, which led to some resentment among Maronite ranks. Independence for Lebanon took a back seat when World War Two broke out. The French abrogated the 19 36 Treaty and again suspended the Constitution, dismissing the Cabinet. The British and Free French mounted an offensive against the newly-installed Vichy administration and on June 8, 1941, General Catroux declared Lebanon and Syria independent. Alfred Naccache was appointed President until such time that elections could be held. The results of the subsequent elections in the summer of 1943 were a blow to the French, as Bishara El Khoury's Constitutional Bloc emerged the winners over Edde ' s more pro-French National Bloc. Meanwhile, state services were gradually being turned over to the Lebanese .

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61 Khouri immediately set about amending the Constitution, removing clauses pertaining to French rights and announcing the end of the Mandate. Parliament passed these amendments, and immediately the French Delegate Jean Helleu responded by arresting and imprisoning the President and his Cabinet. Helleu' s action served to unite Christians and Moslems in a nation-wide strike. American and British pressure finally led to their release on November 22, eleven days after they were imprisoned, and this day has since been celebrated as Lebanon's day of Independence. 3y the end of 1944 Lebanon had taken over all of the services previously provided by the French, with one notable exception. The Troupes Speciales were Lebanese soldiers trained and officered by the French, and which were later to form the backbone of the Lebanese army. The French held on to these for the next two years. Although De Gaulle continued to hold out for rights in military and foreign affairs, France finally transferred the Troupes Speciales to the Lebanese and by December 31, 1946 the final French soldier was evacuated. In 194 3 an agreement came into being between President Khoury and his Sunni Prime Minister, which became known as the National Pact or Covenant ( Al Mithaq Al Watani ) . This 102 unwritten agreement stipulated that Lebanon was to maintain its independence from both the West and the Arab World. Christians were not to seek protection from the Christian West and the Moslems were not to seek union with other Moslem Arab states. Public offices were to be distributed according to

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62 the numerical strength of the communities. The agreement stated that, accordingly, the President was always to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of the House a Shiite. Parliamentary seeits were to follow a six to five ratio (always a multiple of eleven) . The first post-independence Parliament gave Christians 30 seats and Moslems 25. This arrangement was put to the test a number of times in Lebanon's post-war years, and it is these crises with which we will be concerned in the following chapters.

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63 Notes 1. Confessionalism refers to the system whereby representation or participation in a state's political process is accorded to the society's religious sects in proportion to their numberical strength. 2. Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: MacMillan and Co, Ltd, 1957) , p. 4. 3. Nicola A. Ziadeh, S yria and Lebanon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, IncT", 195 7) 7~pp. 27-8. 4. Mount Lebanon is the historical area inhabited primarily by Maronites, which existed as an autonomous area under the Ottoman rulers until World War I when France added other areas to the Mountain creating the state of Greater Lebanon. 5. The Eastern Mediterranean region. 6. Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) , p~. 15~. 7. The alphabet was transferred to the Greeks around 800 B.C., who developed it further. See Hitti, op. cit., pp. 12 2-12 3. '~ """ 8. Hitti, op_. cit . , pp. 77-78. 9 . Ibid. , pp. 88-89 . 10. Ibid . , pp. 143-151. 11. Philip Hitti, A S hort History of the Near E ast (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co, Inc., 1966), p. 71. 12. Hitti, Lebanon in His tory, p. 211. 13. P.M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 15 16-19 22 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1 9~6 6 ) ^ p. 10~ 14. Ibid. , p. 11. 15. Hourani, op. cit., p. 21.

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6 4 16. Moslems do not consider Christians to be by their nature "inferior". Rather they are seen as having gone "astray", accepting Christ as God Incarnate, and not as simply a prophet, as the Moslems do. Moslems in turn see Mohammed as the final prophet. Since Christians and Jews are "People of the Book", believing in one God, the scriptures and a Day of Judgement, they are viewed with toleration. See Hourani, Ibid., pp. 59-62. 17. The Maronites were originally farmers from the Orontes valley and the area around Antioch. Fleeing the Jacobists, Byzantines and the Moslems, they moved into the North Lebanon mountains where they settled permanently and formed a feeling of nationalism or at least separateness . The name is taken from St. Maroun (their patron saint) , an ascetic monk who lived in the fourth century. They were previously Monothelites , that is, they believed Christ had two natures but one will. Due mainly to Crusader influence, they became a Uniate church in 1180. They continue to use the Syriac liturgy, the traditional language of the Eastern Church, and the clergy are allowed to marry. The spiritual Head is the Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, who is elected by local Bishops and confirmed by the Pope. They comprise the single largest sect in Lebanon today. See Hitti , Lebanon in H istory, op. pit. , pp. 247-249 and Iliya Harik, Politi cs and Change in a Tradi tional So ciety: Lebanon 1711-18 45 (Princeton! TFFinceton University Press, IW68) T~pp. 18-23. 18. The Druze (sing, and pi.) are an offshoot of Orthodox Islam. They were originally followers of the Fatimid Caliph Al Hakim (Egyptian ruler, 996-1021), who claimed divine origin and final incarnation. The claim is that God's will is known to only a few, more specifically ten men, through whom God became man, the most perfect being Al Hakim. Monotheistic and Monogamous, the Druze take their name from Mohammed Al Darazi, one of the main founders of the sect. They are a tightly knit community and comprise about 7 seven per cent of Lebanon's population. See Hitti, Lebanon in H i story , op. cit., pp. 23-24 and Kamal Salibi, A Mode rn_ Hi story __of Lebanon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965~n p! xvTTT! ~~ 19. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 31. 20. Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit. p. 282. 21. Hourani, op. cit., p. 23.

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65 22. Hitti, Lebanon_in History , op. cit . , pp. 301-30 9. 23. Hourani, op. cit., p. 23. 24. Islam split into the Sunni and Shiite branches after the death of Mohammad in 6 32. The supporters of Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, lost the succession to a line of Caliphs whom the Sunnis recognize as the true successors to Mohammad. The Shiites believe the succession was passed to a line of Imamas, Ali being the first of twelve, all of whom they believe had divine revelation. The Shiites are the most impoverished and least advanced community in Lebanon. The Sunnis are the majority in the Arab world, and they consider themselves adherents to the original orthodox Islam. The four schools of Sunni Islam are the Maliki, Hambali, Shafii, and the Hanafi See Hourani, Ibid . , p. 122 and Albert Hourani, M inorities in the Arab World (London: Oxford University Press, 1947) , pp. 6-7. 25. Thousands of Maronites fled to Cyprus, establishing the only Maronite community outside Lebanon existing to the present time. 26. Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," in Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley and Sons, In . , 1966) p. 214. 27. In this light he is seen as having created "the Greater Lebanon for the first time." Robin Fedden, Syria and Lebanon (London: John Murray, 1965), p. 214"! 28. He went so far as to support the building of churches and encourage European Missionaries. Holt, op. cit., p. 120 29. Ibid . , pp. 116-117. 30. A title given to powerful clan leaders. 31. Ibid . , pp. 118-119. 32. Hitti, Short History of the Near East , op. cit . , p. 2 22. The Shihabis were addressed by the princely title of 'Emir ' .

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6 33. Salibi, The Modern History o f Lebanon, op. cit. . , p. 12. In 1756 Mulhira's sons converted to Christianity, with their father's approval. The rule of Yusuf Shihab signalled the beginning of the decline of Druze political dominace , and the growth of Maronite power, hitherto relatively weak. Thus, it is not uncommon to find both Moslem and Christian Shihabs in Lebanon, the most prominent of the latter group being Fuad Shihab, Lebanon's President from 1958-64. 34. Holt, op. cit., p. 123 and Salibi, op. cit . 16 35. Iliya Harik , "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," Internationa l Journal of Middle East Studies (July, 1972) ,p. 3137 36. Harik, Politics and change in a traditioanl society, op. cit., p. 96 In an indication of the value placed on~close relations with the Maronites, Pope Leo X had described the Lebanese Catholics as "roses among thorns". Ibid., p. 133. Also LouisXIV in 1649 extended protection to the Maronites and had French representatives treat them "with all possible charity and gentleness". See text of proclamation in J.C. Hurewitz , Th e Middle East and North Africa in World Pol itic s: A Documentary Record (New Haven: Yale"" University Press, 1975), p. 28. 37. Albert Hourani , "Lebanon from Feudalism to Modern State , " M iddle Eastern Studies (April, 1966), p. 256. This article is a review of Kamal Salibi ' s book, The Moder n History of Lebanon . 38. For a rather detailed history of the Maronite Church, see Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Soc iety, op, cit. , pp. 74-126 plus Iliya Harik, "The~Maronite Church and Political change in Lebanon", in Binder, op. cit., pp. 31-55, for the period of the Shihabi Emirate , 1697-1842. 39. Albert Hourani, A Vision of History (Beirut: Khayats , 1961) , p. 42. 40. Holt, op. cit . , p. 232 41. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 21. 42. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit. , p. 27. 43. Kamal Jumblatt, who led the Palestinian-Lebanese Leftist alliance in the civil war, is a direct descendant of this family.

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67 44. Hitti, Lebanon in History , op . cit. , pp. 421-423. The Egyptian viceroy had demandecT~Syria from the Ottomans in return for his aid in fighting the Greek war of independence and the Wahhabis of Arabia. It is suggested that he wanted Syria to act as a buffer zone between his center of power in the Nile valley and the Ottoman possessions of Anatolia. Holt, op. cit. , p. 184. 45. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 31. France had consistently supported the Ottoman empire, so as both to maintain an ally in this region, and to consolidate and expand their trade links with the area. In spite of this, France supported Ali's conquest of Syria "as many Frenchmen came to regard (Ali) as the spiritual successor of Bonaparte in Egypt." Ibid . , p. 32. 46. Part of the reasons for support outside powers gave to different communities was probably the hope that they could divide the area between themselves if and when the empire collapsed. Russia wanted to continue her role as protector of the Greek-Orthodox, which she claimed was implicit in the treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynar ja (1774). Holt, op. cit. , p. 238. Also for a discussion of how Russia sought tofurthur her political interests in the Levant through its ecclesiastical policy, see T.G. Stavrou, "Russian interest in the Levant, 1843-48," Middle East Journ al (Winter-Spring, 1963) , pp. 91-103. Britain, for its part, sought to establish ties with the Druze. See W.R. Polk (ed.), "The British connections with the Druzes," Middle East Journal (Winter-Spring, 1963) 154-156. Austria hoped to replace France as protector of the Maronites, something which never materialized. See also Leila Meo , Lebanon : Imp robable Nation (Bloomington : Indiana University Press^ 1965) , pp. 24-8. 47. Hitti, Short History of the Near East , op . cit . , p. 224. 48. Fedden, op. cit . , p. 219. 49. Salibi, op. cit. , p. 51. This resentment continues today, as it is mainly the Greek-Orthodox that support leftist parties, as the Social Natonalist Party which espouses a pan-Arab secular state. This party is anathema to the more right-wing parties, especially the mainly Maronite Phalange. The Greek-Orthodox are adherents of the Orthodox Eastern Church, who split with the Western Church in the eleventh century. They reject Papal supremacy. The Patriarch of Antioch, whose seat is in Damascus, is the spiritual leader. The liturgy used is Arabic. 50. Holt, op. cit. , p. 259.

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6 8 51. Hitti, Lebanon in History , op. cit . , p. 435. 52. Abdo Baaklini, Legislative and Poli tica.l_Development : Lebanon, 1842-1972 (Durham: Duke University Press, 19 76) p. 45. 53. Throughout these conflict-ridden years fearful Maronites sought stronger ties with France, while Britain, which had signed an alliance with the Druze in 1842, began establishing Protestant missions. Opposition to thses missions by the Maronites soured their relations with the British, as the Druze opened their doors wider to the British missions. The Maronites displayed their affinity for the French by raising French flags on Church buildings. Salibi, op. cit., p. 58 and Antoine Abraham, "Lebanese communal relations," The Muslim World (April, 1977), p. 92. 54. Meo, op. cit. , p. 16 55. Abraham, op. cit., p. 91. 56. Hourani, Syria and Leban on, op. cit., p. 32. 57. Salibi, op. cit., p. 77. 58. Holt, op. cit. , p. 240. 59. Abraham, op. cit., p. 97. 60. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, The History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977) , p. 143. 61. Ibid . For more details on the fighting, see Salibi, op. cit . , pp. 90-105. 62. Britain in 1861 had intervened on behalf of a number of Druze that had been sentenced to death. Hourani, "Lebanon from Feudalism to Modern State," op. cit., p. 258. 63. C.G. Hess and H.L. Bodman , "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," The Mid d le East Journal (Winter, 1954) , p. 13. "~ 64. For the full text of the Reglem en t Organique, see Hurewitz, op. cit . , pp. 346-49. 65. Hess and Bodman, op. cit . , p. 14. The number of signatories to the statutes of 1861 and 1864 rose to 7 when Italy joined in 186 7. 66. Baaklini, op. cit., p. 50.

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69 67. Ibid. , p. 51. 68. John P. Spagnolo, "Mount Lebanon, France and Daud Pasha: A study of some aspects of political habituation," In ternational Journal of Middle East Studies (April, I9"71) , p. 148. ~ ~ ~ — 69. Harik, Politics and change in a traditional soc iety , op. cit . , p. 151 . ' "^ 70. Spagnolo, op. cit . , p. 156. 71. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 142. 72. Spagnolo, "Constitutional change in Mt . Lebanon, 1861-1864," Middle East Studies (January, 1971), p. 38. 73. Ibid . , p. 26 . 74. Hitti, L ebanon in History , op. cit . , p. 447. 75. Ziadeh, op. cit. , p. 46. 76 George Haddad, Fi fty Years of Modern Syria and Lebanon (Beirut: Dar Al Hayat, 1950), pp. 48-4~9. "" 77. Holt, op. cit., pp. 264-266. 78. Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 87-92. 79. Ibid . , p. 109. 80. See text of Mandate in Helen Davis, Constitutions , electoral laws treaties of states _in the Ne ar_and Middle East (Durham": Duke University P re s s 7~T94T) , pp. 162-170. 81. France had in fact indicated it was in Lebanon to protect the interests of the Maronites . Salibi, op. cit . , p. 163. 82. Pierre Rondot, "Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism, Journal of Contemporary History (July, 1968), p. 40. 83. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc~ 19637, p. 32 2. 84. Meo, op. cit . , p. 56. 85. George Kirk, Contempora r y Arab Politcs: A Concise History (New York: F.A. Praeger, Inc., 1961) , p. 117.

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70 86. Meo, op. cib. , p. 70. 87. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon , op. cit., p. 63. 88. Ibid . , p. 184. 89. Ziadeh, op. cit. , pp. 50-51. Also, Longrigg, who was himself a British official in Iraq at the time, writes that the French regarded the area as its own, with no visible intention displayed that it was intent on guiding Lebanon to independence. Longrigg, op. cit., p. 110. Also Peretz, op. cit. , p. 32 3. 90. Rondot, op. cit . , p. 41. 91. Although the Greek-Orthodox were not the dominant community, they were given the Presidency to allay their fears of being overshadowed by the Maronites. Also it sought to reassure the Moslems that Lebanon was not simply a homeland for the Maronites. However, since no Sunni would serve as Prime Minister, Maronites substituted. 92. Longrigg, op. cit . , p. 102. A constitutional amendment subsequently abolished the Senate in 1937 and specified Parliament to consist of two-thirds and one-third nominated. 93. Full text in Davis, op. cit., pp. 170-185. 94 For a detailed account, see Longrigg, op. cit. , pp. 154-169 95. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 175. Edde had publicly declared that Lebanon was a "Christian island in a Muslim' sea", emphasising its Western culture dating back to the Phoenicians. Edde had formed the National Bloc in 19 34, and Khoury the Constitutional Bloc. Lebanon's political parties will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 96. Ziadeh, op. cit. , p. 53. 97. L' Orient of 5-6 September, 1931, quoted in Rondot, op . cit . , p . 45 . 98. Hitti, Lebanon in Histo ry, op. cit . , p. 492. 99. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon , op. cit., p. 230. 100. General Catroux's full Declaration is in Davis, op. cit., pp. 201-202. —

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71 101. Haddad, op. cit . , p. 93. Two ministers, Habib Abu Shahla (Orthodox) and Majid Arslan (Druze) escaped and set up a government. 102. Meo, op. cit. , pp. 82-83

PAGE 83

CHAPTER III THE OPERATION OF THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM We now turn to a discussion of the nature of the Lebanese political system, with a specific focus on its confessional character, and the concept of proportionality which underlay it. Linked to this will be a survey of clientelism, an integral part of traditional Lebanese politics, and its relation to the country's consociational system. In essence, we are looking here at the "rules of the game", as applied to Lebanon in the post-independence period. The main characteristics of the system, on which we will expound below, are summarized by Hudson: (1) A particularistic "mosaic" society; (2) an authoritarian and hierarchical family structure; (3) religious institutions that are politically influential; (4) power dispersed in religious sect, regional grouping, economic pressure groups, and ideologically oriented political movements; (5) foreign influence in politics. . . (6) a cult of leadership, historically the result of feudalism which has produced parties of notables, each with a local clientele. . .) Confessionalism and P rop ortionality : Nominal Actors and Forma"! Ru le's In general terms, the major actors in the Lebanese political system are the sects or religious groups, and more specifically the major families within each community. Religion, 72

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73 of course, represents the major cleavage in Lebanon. Hourani writes : The primary divisions inside the Near East are, as they have been for a thousand years, religious: whether a man is Moslem, Christian, or Jew, and which branch of the Moslem, Christian , or Jewish community he belongs to. 2 Recruitment, family competition and the nature of the clientage system are directly related to the role played by religion in Lebanon. Religion as part of the state goes back to the Mutasarrif iyah . Loyalties to the religious community increased after the religious strife of 1860, to the extent that today religion permeates every aspect of the individual's life. Religion determines his political and social orientations. As Khalaf puts it, "religious sentiments, particularly after the decline in feudalism, came to assume a more intense role in maintaining identity and communal solidarity . "3 The division between the two communities is compounded by divisions within each community where keen rivalry and competition are evident, and by regional and family divisions which serve to exacerbate the religious cleavages. As a result, the country consists of many "nations", separate groups that feel solidarity, share common values and a common history. A strong Lebanese identity is lacking, except perhaps for the Maronites who feel the strongest attachment to the Lebanese state, identified albeit in Maronite terms.

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74 Shils speaks of the "...incivility of many members of the elite, the members of the great families, the zuama who dominate and speak for the primordial and religious communities . "^ Within the religious groups, then, the central actors are the traditionally prominent religious families. In essence, political power is still based on traditional family influence. Certain families are associated with specific regions and religions, as the Maronite Shihabs and Khourys of Mount Lebanon, the Jumblatts of the Shouf, Karamis of Tripoli, Salams and Yafis of Beirut and the Franjiehs of Zghorta. By being born into a politically prominent family, it is highly likely that that power will be passed on. "Over the entire span of 50 years of parliamentary life, only 359 deputies representing 210 families, have won parliamentary seats. This amounts to not more than eight percent of the total number of families in Lebanon." Of the 359, over 300 have inherited their seat. Table III reflects this trend.

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7 5 TABLE III NUMBER OF DEPUTIES WHO SERVED IN PARLIAMENTS FIVE OR MORE TIMES: 19 26-19 72 No. of times in Parliament No. of Deputies 14 1 12 1 11 1 8 1 7 8 6 14 5 16 SOURCE: Baaklini, op_. cit . , p. 172. Lebanon's families have helped shape its history. It may be recalled that the prominent feudal families of the Mutasarrif iyah were well represented in the administration of the Reglement Organique following the abolition of feudalism. During Daud Pasha's rule 16 feudal leaders were given top posts and this continued into this century. Because of the personal factor, politics in Lebanon is to a great extent competition between and within religious sects. Alliances between families, whenever they took place, were often made more out of a desire to oppose a certain leader, than out of ideological or programmatic considerations. In addition, elections are seen as mainly a contest or a continuance of conflict between families, with ideology rarely playing a part .

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7(5 The influence of the family and religion on the political nature of the country cannot be underestimated. As one writer observes, "... the vigor with which the religious and familial bases of organization continue to affect political conduct and coalesce political sentiment remains Q singularly evident." In sum, the family is important for an understanding of the political process, partly because of its role as the main socializing agent--it being the central social unit — and partly because it represents a means through which the individual attains political power, and thus perpetuating that family's prominence. It has traditionally been an important aspect of the social and political order. It is again closely connected to a discussion of the recruitment pattern and the overall patron-client network. Closely linked to the religious actors are the country's political parties, which are in essence no more than groupings led by the leaders of prominent religious families. Lebanon's political parties do not fall into any recognizable category. They are parties based on religion, and the country "offers a very typical and most 9 complicated example of this." They are similar to Western parties in that they seek to exercise political power and share in the decision-making process, but beyond that there is little similarity. Apter writes: . . we recognize that political parties offer political choices. They provide a peaceful selection of alternative governments. They offer differences in views and policy priorities. Through parties, issues can be identified and preferences indicated by the electorate. 10

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7 7 Clearly this does not apply well to the Lebanese case. The nature of the party system in Lebanon cannot be divorced from the intimate link between politics and the influence of religion and the family that the country exhibits. Political parties strengthen confessional ties, reflecting the country's divided culture. Perhaps the concept of "personalismo" is appropriate in this context. George Blanksten defines this as the "tendency of the politically active sectors of the population to follow or oppose a leader for personal, individual, and family reasons rather than because of the influence of a political idea, party or program." Political parties in Lebanon have only an indirect influence on policy-making. No party has ever won a significant number of seats (Table IV) . In 1960, for example, when the parties increased their efforts to win more parliamentary seats, several parties between them could muster no more than a third of the seats.

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TABLE IV PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP OF PARTIES IN LEBANON: 1951-1972 Party Syrian Social Nationalist Party Baath Arab Nasserite Coalition 1951 1957 1 19 6 1964 196 1972 Dashnak (Armenian Party) Naj jada Progressive Socialist Party National Action Movement

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7 9 The National Pact The National Pact, agreed upon by the leaders of Lebanon's two major communities, established confessionalism as the basis for the new state. The arrangement was a reflection of the culturally divided society, a modus vivendi which appeared to be the most viable and practical one for the newly-independent country. Confessionalism was to underlie the entire political process, with the rivalry of the different sects carried out within this framework. The system is structured in such a way that recognizes the preponderance of the Christian community. (Table V) A ratio of six to five, in the Christians' favor, was to extend to all governmental and administrative posts, as well as to Parliament. The system was democratic in the sense that it accorded representation to all minorities, a system in which participation by the society's subgroups was guaranteed. The system" . . . serves as an adjustment mechanism which brings particularistic elements of society together into a working relationship without overriding their interests or 12 submerging their identitities . " The country's strength depended on acceptance by all the communities, with stability resting on the maintenance of a careful balance between the country's main religious groups, and this has been partlyaccomplished through the representative institutions which are seen as "an essential condition of its stability, not a lucky by-product.

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8(i TABLE V ESTIMATED POPULATION OF LEBANON IN 19 56 Maronites 424,000 Sunnis 286,000 Shiites 250,000 Greek Orthodox 149,000 Greek Catholics 91,000 Druze 88,000 Armenian Orthodox 64,000 Armenian Catholics 15,000 Protestants 14,000 Jews 7,0 00 Syrian Catholics 6,000 Syrian Orthodox 5,000 Latins 4,000 Chaldeans 1,000 Others 7,000 SOURCE: Adapted from Sir Reader Bullard (ed.), The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1958) , p. 453. The figures are from the Economic Research Institute of of the American University of Beirut, and are based partly on official sources.

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The National Pact then, representing Lebanon's politics of accommodation, was an explicit recognition of the division of the country into distinct religious groups. As Kerr puts it, "Lebanese democracy is the distribution of guarantees to the recognized groups co-existing in the country of the means 14 to defend their minimum interests". The government, it is important to note, was not meant to play a major role and pursue long-term goals. Rather, it was meant to reflect the division of the society and attempt to regulate and resolve conflict. In times of conflict or crisis, polarization tended to replace flexibility and compromise with intransigence. The crises of 1958 and 1975 are clear examples of this. The Pact implicitly contained guidelines for the nation's foreign policy as it was felt, with reason, that there would exist a close connection between foreign and domestic policy. Any foreign policy decision had to have the approval of the major groups. Thus, for the economic and political well-being of the country, and to prevent polarization of the communities, it was important for Lebanon to maintain friendly relations with both the Arab world and the West. It has been evident in the post-war years that disruption of these links, especially to the Arab states, had had adverse political and economic effects on the system. Since the frames of reference lie in the Arab world and the West for the Moslems and Christians respectively, a delicate balance, or in a word neutrality, was necessary. Here, as with domestic policy, the government to be effective had to continually balance the different interests. Conversely, the government's effectiveness is

PAGE 93

H ' a reflection of the cooperation of local leaders and their willingness to compromise and reach mutually beneficial agreements. To help us better understand the principles of consociational democracy outlined by Lijphart, we need to survey the nature and operation of the country's institutions and relate them then to the system of patronage in Lebanon. The Formal Institutions Officially, the state of Lebanon is a Parliamentary Republic divided into five provinces or governerates : the Bekaa, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Lebanon's unicameral legislature allows for proportional representation of the country's religious communities Table VI shows the sectarian distribution of seats according to sect and district. The electoral system in Lebanon allots a specific number of seats for each religious sect. On the list system, a candidate has to be able to gain the support of voters from different religious communities. Mixed areas lead to competing lists made up of candidates from the sects who are represented by seats in that area. This system encourages cooperation and moderation.

PAGE 94

Since electoral success depends on compromise, the ability to join a list and, most importantly, the ability to maneuvre politically without losing one's political base, candidates in mixed districts who belong to different sects find that the best strategy is to avoid capitalizing on sectarian issues. The Parliament Parliament does not in any real sense constitute an opposition. In theory, Parliament has the right to dismiss a cabinet, though it has never done so. The legislature is elected every four years, and it in turn elects a President by a two-thirds majority for a term of six years. Parliamentary members attempt to cultivate the goodwill of the President, as they aspire to Cabinet positions and hope also for support during elections. As a policymaking body, Parliament is not highly regarded, being seen as "merely a formal setting for clashes between the communities" and the "redoubt of the traditional past." As indicated by Table VII Parliament accords representation to the country's sects on a ratio of six Christians to five Moslems, provided for in the National Pact.

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84 TABLE VI DISTRICTS AND SECTARIAN DISTRIBUTION SINCE 1960 Sect District Sectarian Distribution Total No. . of seats of seats Purely Kisrawan 4M 4 Maronite Zgharta 3M 3 Bshari 2M 2 Batroun 2M 2 Purely Shia Bint Jbeil 2SH 2 Sour 3SH 3 Nabatiya 3SH 3 Purely Sunni Saida IS 1 Villages of Tripoli 2S 2 Purely Greek Orthodox Koura 2GO 2 Mixed

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8<-> TABLE VII DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS BY SECTS 1947-1972 Sect 1947 1951 1953 1957 1960-72 Christians Maronite 18 23 13 20 30 Greek 6 8 5 7 11 Orthodox Greek 3 5 3 4 6 Catholic Armenian 2 3 2 3 4 Orthodox Minorities 13 12 3 Moslems

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TABLE VIII SECTARIAN PATTERNS OF CABINET STRUCTURES: 19 4 3-1961 Size of Cabinet

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The Cabinet The Cabinet, along with Parliament, is an important representative body in that it has to reflect both a religious and regional balance. As Table VIII shows, the size of the Cabinet varies, depending on circumstances and conditions, and the particular Premier chosen to form the cabinet. As can be seen from the table, the Cabinet posts are shared by the six major sects, with particular ministries going traditionally to specific sects. The Greek-Orthodox have usually held the vice-Premiership, the Maronites Education, Sunnis the Interior, the Druze Defense, and Shiites Agriculture. The rest alternate — Justice , Public Works, Finance Health, Economic and Social Af f a"irs . In the first two decades of independence 35 cabinets were formed, the majority headed by a handful of Sunnis which included Sami 19 El Solh, Rashid Karami, Abdullah El Yafi and Saeb Salam. Because of the nature of the Cabinet and its composition, stalemates arise when agreements cannot be reached, with immobilism setting in. Kerr notes that "governments are not made to create public policy, nor to choose between clearcut alternatives entailing the triumph of one set of demands over another, but to reflect and adjust competing interests „20 of the various groups. Long-term planning becomes difficult when policy is not made on a secular, rational basis. In spite of this, the cabinet has succeeded in bringing about 21 bureaucratic reforms. Overall, though, the diverse nature of the cabinet leads to particularistic orientations.

PAGE 99

"... ministers disregard cabinet harmony and collective responsibility to appeal to their own confessional, regional, 22 economic, ideological, or personal interests and followers". The Presidency Lebanon's executive power is vested in the Maronite President, who is elected by Parliament for a six-year term (renewable after an interim of six years) . The President's powers are pervasive, not unlike those of the emirs of historical Lebanon, the Ottoman governors and the more recent French High Commissioners. The President appoints a Sunni Prime Minister who forms a cabinet to be approved by the President. He can also dismiss ministers, dissolve 23 Parliament, has the power of veto and can rule by decree. The President often plays the role of arbitrator, and less of a partisan role. Since he cannot be immediately re-elected to the Presidency, he is not subservient to the Chamber and can act independently of it. The extensive powers given him by the Constitution give the impression of a very powerful chief executive. However, approval of policy by the Premier and Cabinet is necessary, and cooperation with the Chamber with regard to policy is needed. As arbiter the President must maintain a confessional balance. Political Clientelism; "Real" Actors and Informa l Rules Central to an understanding of Lebanese politics and more specifically the operation and functioning of the state's institutions is a discussion of patron-client relationships. These relationships meshed closely with the operation of

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8 9 governmental institutions in Lebanon. The country's patrons — the zuama (sg. zaim ) --constitute the bulk of the country's political elite. Patronage has survived the last two centuries in Lebanon, differing in nature at times due to changing political and economic circumstances . The "real" actors are these notables whose authority is traditional, and who belong to traditionally prominent families. 4 In short, as a political actor the zaim is central. "Because of his wealth or family prestige and chiefly because of the traditional patriarchal structure of Lebanese society, the zaim remains one of the most influential 25 actors in the political process." Hottinger defines this type of leader thus : A zaim in the specifically Lebanese and contemporary sense is a political leader who possesses the support of a locally circumscribed community and who retains this support by fostering the interests of as many„as possible from among his clientele. With regard to recruitment, factors as family, wealth and religion are important determinants of political opportunity, with competition taking place within, rather than between, the different communities. The electoral system is such that it aids the continued vigor of the zuama . Consisting of small electoral units the system allows the zaim much freedom in maintaining his power and influence over local communities. Election to Parliament depends to a large extent on getting on a list headed by a prominent zaim, who in fact

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90 is often paid large sums for the privilege of a place on the ticket. The zaim in turn has the opportunity to include his clients on the list of candidates. It is the major f amilies--and their zuama — who have dominated the Parliament since independence. The political process is highly personalistic, then, because of the continuance of family competition, the family system being part of the clientelist system. In addition to the large, influential families that have endured into this century, new zuama emerged which also operated through the family network. The new "urban" zuama are from areas as law, engineering, business, academia, 2 7 journalism and proprietorship, and these "have built machines that not only exploit individualism, but also 28 encourage its persistence." Their support is mainly personal. Since the need for an intermediary in the cities is not as necessary as it may be for the more rural elements, their importance may be more political than economic. Conflict between Sunni zuama in Beirut is seen largely as competition for the premiership, and toward this end have 29 "developed sophisticated machines to recruit a clientele." Patronage serves to integrate the community in Lebanon, even across religious lines. The survival of patronage in turn is due largely to the persistence of strong primordial ties. It is an integral part of the political system, and has persisted through political, social and economic changes. Certainly it is true in this case that ". . .patron-client ties

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91 have played and continue to play a crucial role in the structuring of social roles along ethnic or class dimensions." 30 The zaim in Lebanon renders political and economic services in return for support and loyalty of his clients. The zaim , who is usually of the same religion as his community, has to be financially secure, making him more influential and credible to his community, and helping him consistently win election to Parliament and possibly a cabinet seat, which in turn reinforces his zaimship . His position as a member of Parliament or of the cabinet, enables him to continue to dispense favors to his followers. Thus, his strength depends more on client support than on his domestic record as such. "In this sense the clients' support is a transactional obligation, rather than a form of moral, 31 ideological loyalty." Loyalty of the followers to a leader is strong, and in some cases fanatical, as the following quite shows, written by supporters of Suleiman Al Ali who appeared on an election ticket headed by the local zaim : We swear by God Almighty, by our honour, and by all that is dear to us, that — having agreed to participate in the battle of legislative elections on the same list-we pledge ourselves, in the case of victory by the grace of God, to follow in the Lebanese Parliament the directives and the policy that will be dictated to us by His Excellency our companion in the struggle, Sulaiman Bey al-Ali el Mara'aby, and to act in a manner to carry out all that he wills. We pledge ourselves to back him in all that he desires, in the Ministry or outside of it, and not to swerve one bit from the attitude he intends to adopt with regard to the authorities as a partisan or as an opponent. If we do not keep our promise and fail to fulfill this oath we recognize ourselves to be unworthy of the human species, and deprived of honour and gratitude. 32

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9 2 A zaim' s followers will take up arms under his command in case of conflict. The 1958 civil war was a prime example of how communities coalesced around their regional leaders. The Politics of Preferment and Patronage Lebanon represents a good example of where "... clientage networks can permeate formal isntitutions . " Members of the executive (Presidency and Cabinet) and Parliament are seen as zuama representing certain families, regions, and religious groupings and serves to undermine the operation of the system. The scramble for cabinet posts and the patronage extended once in power take place at the expense of the enactment of policies that benefit and affect all groups. The system has come under strong criticism as an obstacle to effective political modernization. The President is himself a patron, heads a prominent family and because of his extensive powers has the potential to dispense favors to his clients, which may include his family, village or in a broad sense his and other religious communities. The President, however, should not be a threat to the rights and interests of the country's groups and leaders, as we saw happen in 1952 and 1958. Khoury and Chamoun used their powers to weaken their opponents, while strengthening their supporters. Shihab disliked the country's politicians, but favors were nevertheless dispensed to the regime's clients through Shihab 's Deuxieme Bureau (Army Intelligence). More recently, Franjieh dispensed favors

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93 openly to his supporters. The president needs the support of the zuama , then, in running the country effectively. Chamoun ' s attempt to control the zuama of Parliament through fraudulent elections led to strong inter-sectarian opposition against him. After 1958 the new cabinet became the symbol of reconciliation. As mentioned above, competition for cabinet posts is intense. As well as strengthening the z aim' s position by allowing him to extend his patronage, it represents a means whereby demands made on the state can be channeled through these patrons who act as intermediaries. Issues involving broad aspects of policy are given secondary importance as ministers attempt to gain the maximum benefits possible for clients or regions at large. As Khalaf remarks: Accordingly, Cabinet politics becomes a delicate art of distributing and mangaging patronage. Squabbles over civil service appointment, jurisdictional competition, allocation of public funds — all essentially patronage squabbles-assume more importance than controversies involving issues of national and public policy. 34 The persistence of the zuama is attributable to the services they provide, something other groups have not been able to do, or do as well. The zaim , in short, continues to act as a mediator or intermediary between the citizen and the state. It has been an essential mechanism whereby the individual has been able to obtain satisfaction from the government. As Khalaf describes it:

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94 Since an impersonal and rational system of bureaucracy is still relatively alien to the primordial sentiments rooted in rural regions , the zairo , by reinterpreting some of the formal requirements in a more personal and particularistic manner, tends to soften their impact and ultimately facilitate adjustment to them. -> Having set the stage for the operation of the Lebanese political system, we turn now to a discussion of the problems of the system in the fifties, which involved severe strains being put on the consociational mode of politics, as conflict and polarization among the elites--due to both internal and external factors--led to temporary breakdowns of the politics of accommodation.

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9 5 Notes 1. Michael Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," Comparative _Pol iti cs (January, 1969), P. 2 4 7-48. 2. Albert Hourani , A Vision of Histo ry (Beirut: Khayats, 1961), p. 72. ' 3. Samir Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," Middle Eastern Studies (April, 1968), p. 260. 4. Edward Shils, "The Prospects for Lebanese Civility,'' in Binder, op. cit., p. 2. 5. Samir Khalaf, "Changing Forms of Political Patronage in Lebanon," in E. Gellner and J. Waterbury, Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London : G. Duckworth, 19 77) , p. 19 6 . 6. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon , op. cit., pp. 111-112. 7. Gulick notes that politics in Tripoli, Lebanon's second largest city, is "largely a matter of family rivalries". John Gulick, "Old Values and New Institutions in a Lebanese Arab City," Human O rga n ization (Sping, 1965), p. 52. 3. Victor Ayoub, "Resolution of Conflict in a Lebanese Village," in Binder, op. cit., p. 120. 9. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1954), p. 292. 10. H. Eckstein and D. Apter, Comparat i ve Poli tics: A Reader (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 327. 11. A. Banks and R. Textor, A Cross Polity _ Survey (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 102. 12. Ralph Crow, "Confessionalism, Public Administration and Efficiency in Lebanon," in L. Binder , op. cit. , p. 176. 13. Hudson, op_. cit . , p. 245. 14. Malcolm Kerr, "Political decision making in a Confessional Democracy," in L. Binder, op_. cit. p. 188. 15. Michael Suleiman, "Elections in a Confessional Democracy," Journal of Politics (February , 1967), p. 116. 16. Baaklini, op. cit., p. 149.

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96 17. Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," in Binder, op. cit . , p. 130. 18. Ralph Crow, "Parliament in the Lebanese Political System," in Allan Romberg and Lloyd Musolf (eds.), Legislatures in Developmental Per spective (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), p. 302. 19. Elie Salem, "Cabinet Politics in Lebanon," Middle East Journal (Autumn, 1967), pp. 489-90. Also see pp. 495-497 for more on the Cabinet and Parliament and pp. 497-498 for more on the President and the Cabinet. 20. Rerr, op. cit. , p. 190. 21. Salem, op. cit.., p. 497 22. Michael Suleiman, Political Parti es in__L ebanon (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 51. 23. For more on presidency see Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," in Binder, op. cit.., pp. 135-139. 24. Zuama often closely cooperate with religious leaders who are themselves wealthy and influential. The Maronite Church in Lebanon owns 1 million square meters of land, in addition to 45 institutions. The Maronite Patriarch is one of the most important religious figures and is a central actor in Lebanese political life. L.Z. Yamak, "Party Politics in the Lebanese Political System," in Binder, op. cit. , p. 147. 25. Ibid . , p. 153. 26. Arnold Hottinger, "Zuama in Historical Perspective," in Binder, op. cit., p. 85 27. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Patterns of Politica l Leadershi p: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975) , p. 93. 28. Michael Johnson, "Political bosses and their gangs: zuama and qabadayat in the Sunni Moslem quarter of Beirut," in E. Gellner and J. Waterbury, op. cit., p. 210. "qabadayat" he defines as "neighbourhood strongmen who recruit and police the zaim's clientele." 29. Ibid. 30. Rene Lemarchand, "Clientelism, Class and Ethnicity: The informal Structuring of Community Boundaries," (unpublished manuscript), p. 5.

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9 7 31. Johnson, op. ci t . , p. 210. 32. Samir Khalaf, "Primordial ties and Politics in Lebanon," op_. cit . , p. 255. First printed in the Beirut daily, Al Jarida , September 7, 1953. 33. Keith Legg, Patrons , Clients and Polit icians: New Perspectives on Political Clientel ism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1974T, p. 26. 34. Samir Khalaf, "Changing Forms of Political Patronage in Lebanon," in E. Gellner and J. Waterbury, Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (Duckworth, 1977) . p. 199. 35. Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," op . cit . , p. 259 .

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CHAPTER IV CONSOCIATIONALISM PUT TO THE TEST: LEBANON IN THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES The growing accommodation between the religious communities that was evident during the French Mandate, and helped along by a united stand for independence by all the country's major leaders, blossomed into a full understanding known as the National Pact described above. This represented an arrangement whereby a modicum of stability and ordered relations between the communities could be continued and maintained. This depended to an important extent on Moslem and Christian cooperation on both internal and external issues. As had happened in the past, though, any internal divisions were quickly exacerbated by involvement of interested external powers. Problems from the troubled region plus internal problems--namely conflict among the elite--put the system to the test in the years following independence. This section looks at the nature of elite conflict in this period as it related to patronage and examines the issues brought on by the interplay of internal and external influences on the system.

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99 Elite Disunity Lebanon began its independent life under the leadership of the country's main politicians, Maronite President Bishara Khoury and Sunni Prime Minister Riad Al Solh, both of whom had forged the National Pact and who had developed a close working relationship. Khoury had won out as President over Edde and Chamoun, supported by France and Britain respectively. Soon the country was to suffer two crises, resulting largely from a departure from the spirit of the National Pact. The first crisis was a purely internal affair, while the second was characterized by a complicated intertwining of internal and external factors, subjecting the Pact to its severest test. The "Rosewater^ Revolution of 19 52 Discontent with Khoury ' s administration (1943-1952) began with the Parliamentary elections of 1947, which were widely suspected of being fraudulent. A majority of the members of the new Parliament were indeed governmentbacked candidates and Khoury used this power to his own advantage. The Constitutional provision regarding the non-succession of a President was suspended and Parliament proceeded to elect Khoury to a second term. A disappointed Chamoun, now Minister of the Interior in 1949, resigned from the Cabinet in protest, charging that bribes, patronage and intimidation helped Khoury ' s reelection. Many were alarmed by the ease with which Khoury had ignored the constitution and

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100 2 reelected himself. The issue here was one of essentially competition over scarce resources. The presidency in Lebanon, being the seat of extensive power in the Lebanese administration, is a major purveyor of patronage. Khoury ' s action in helping certain zuama win election to Parliament at the expense of other notables led to a situation where local patrons were left without any ties to the President and thus were excluded from this important source of patronage. Members of Parliamnet attempt to become clients of the President, giving the President even more powers to manipulate patronage. Opposition to Khoury ' s reelection was strongest among those notables that were isolated by the President from this powerful source of patronage. As Khoury entered his second term "pomp and remoteness" surrounded him as his advisers and aides took on more of the responsibilities of governing. It was increasingly felt that power was too concentrated in the President and his entourage, and that Parliament was uninterested in the welfare of the state, but rather members were solely concerned With pursuing their self-interest. The gap between Khoury and his entourage and other Lebanese notables appeared to be growing wider. The elections of 1951 also returned a majority of Deputies supportive of Khoury, leading to stronger charges of nepotism, factionalism and administrative corruption :

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10.1 The worst defect of his system was that each of the political bosses on whom he relied had their own following or clients who expected to be rewarded with places in government service or other favors. Opposition began to grow around Chamoun. The opposition cut across religious and regional lines. It was not a complaint by the Moslem community of underrepresentation as Riad Al Solh was seen as an acceptable representative for that community. It was a general concern about the government's corruption and inefficiency. This, in essence, meant that the opponents of the regime were excluded from power and patronage, and were not receiving their "share" of the resources of the state. The opponents of the Khoury regime soon formed themselves into what was called the Socialist National Front (SNF) , which demanded major reforms in the administration, including attention to growing socio-economic problems. Indirectly, they were calling for a change in the regime which would afford them more power as patrons and receivers of patronage from the presidency. There was a mutual feeling among the members of the SNF that the regime had no intention of remedying any of the ills of the government, although one observer writes :

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102 The President himself considered seriously a programme for reform, but the opposition were not convinced either of the earnestness of the man, or the readiness of the entourage to accomodate any reforms. Circumstances drove the opposition, and they became energetic, vehement and obstinate. However, Khoury ' s position was further weakened when Solh was assassinated in Amman, Jordan, in 1951. His death came at the hands of a member of the Syrian National Party (SNP) in retaliation for the execution of the party's leader Antun Saadeh in 1949, following an abortive coup attempt in Lebanon. This also presented a void in terms of Moslem representation, as there did not appear to be any strong leader to take Solh's place. Khoury appointed Sami Al Solh, a distant relative of the former premier, to form a new government, at a time of increasing tension. Opposition to the regime was expressed through demonstrations and rallies, which began to increase in number. Basically, these expressions of discontent represented the mobilizing by the excluded notables of their followers or clients. Attacks on the President grew in number and intensity, while he found himself unable to organize effective pro-government rallies. On June 5, Jumblatt headed a rally in Beirut which called openly for the President's removal. The furor mounted with the publication of an article in Jumblatt 's newspaper, Al Anba , which headlined: "He was put there by foreigners; let the people remove him." Reproduction of the article

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103 by other papers led to several of them being suspended by the government. Scandals in the government ministries surfaced, adding to the growing disenchantment with the q regime . A rift appeared between the President and his Prime Minister following the resignation of three members of the Cabinet. Solh, in a session of Parliament, suddenly spoke out against Khoury and the abuses of his administration. Denying any responsibility himself, he declared; Men of authority who rule without being responsible, interfere in every affair of the state. They interfere with justice and law. Woe to the judge or official who refuses such request. . . they have impoverished the people and oppressed them. . .Gentlemen! How do you expect us to continue our work in this suffocating atmosphere. . . and how can any reform be carried out before the cause of the trouble is rooted out?^ Saib Salem took over as Prime Minister, amid reports that the opposition was planning a nation-wide strike. He was unable to generate any widespread support, in spite of his attempts at placating the opposition by dismissing a number of officials. ' As the strike gained momentum, Salam also stepped down, advising the President he should resign in the national interest. No Sunni Moslem would cooperate with Khoury in a new Cabinet, except Hussein Oweini who agreed to serve only on a guarantee that the Army would support his government. This was not forthcoming, however. The Maronite Commander of the Army Fuad Shihab 10 replied the army would

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104 maintain order but would not take sides for fear of widespread bloodshed. Finally, as the strike effectively paralyzed the country, Shihab succeeded in persuading Khoury to resign. Shihab agreed to serve as head of state, until Camille Chamoun was elected President by Parliament on 12 September 24. Elite cooperation, in short, broke down as the opposition notables created enough disturbances to force the resignation of an important member of the cartel who was no longer acceptable to the leading zuama of the country, notables who were excluded from the power and patronage structure of the country. The Rosewater Revolution (so-called because of its mild effects) had led to the removal of an unpopular president with virtually no bloodshed. Six years later another crisis revolved around the President, only this time it was a more serious affair involving international powers . For the time being, though, the National Pact — though a little shaken--had emerged intact after 1952. President Chamoun and the Crisis of 1958 Chamoun became President amid expectations that major reforms would be instituted, which in part meant changes in the nature and distribution of patronage. Reforms as envisaged by critics of the operation of the confessional system proved difficult, as most reforms are seen as inimical to the interests of one community or another. Major families, led by influential zuama can use their influence to oppose

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105 major changes. Thus, although attempts were made to initiate reforms in the administration, especially in electoral and judicial areas, sectarian influences continued to dominate. Besides demands for reform, Chamoun had to face the demands for a share of power from the notables of the SNF. Chamoun quickly alienated many of the former comembers of the opposition , especially Jumblatt who was denied any major say in government policy by Chamoun, although Jumblatt had come to expect a major role in the 1 3 new regime. The Chamoun regime attempted to undermine the power of the traditional zuama , and toward this end he announced a new electoral law which created 33 electoral areas as opposed to 5 previously. The purpose was to change the traditional areas of support of local leaders. The reallocation of electoral districts was undertaken under the guise of abolishing political feudalism, and thus allegedly ending previous electoral abuse. Beginning in the elections 14 of July, 1953, the number of deputies was reduced to 44; the elections of 1953 strengthened the President's hand, and his reforms strengthened the President's power. Other changes included the extension of suffrage to women, the abolishment of the practice of secret government expenditures, and a declared intention to improve relations with the Arab world, specifically Syria.

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106 As had happened under Khoury, the elite under Chamoun, due largely to his policies, was again deeply divided. In the Parliamentary elections of 1957 prominent Moslems lost their seats. Salam, Yafi and Jumblatt all failed to be returned to Parliament, while a number of governmentbacked candidates won election. These elections, widely regarded as fraudulent, represented a situation where local patrons were denied ties to the President while other notables, more favorable to the President, now had access to presidential power. The boundaries of the new districts were drawn up in such a way that opponents of Chamoun had to run in areas that had a large presidential backing. In the Shouf, the stronghold of both Chamoun and Jumblatt, gerrymandering resulted in a situation where Jumblatt had to run in an area that now included more Christian supporters of Chamoun. Chamoun ' s actions here were a major contributing cause of the crisis of 1958. Chamoun's foreign policy, as we shall see below, plus his tactics on the domestic level, alienated him from the Moslem community. Moslems felt excluded from power especially since important Moslem leaders--who now in essence were weakened zuama— were defeated in the recent election. The Moslems that were in power the President could control. It was generally felt that Christians, led by Chamoun, had taken on too much power at the expense of the Moslems.

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107 Adding to Moslem alienation was the persistent rumor that Chamoun planned to have the new Parliament amend the constitution, allowing him to serve a second term. Though Chamoun denied the rumor, he did little to reassure his opponents." On one occasion he declared: I wish to leave no one in doubt (on the reelection issue) . If, when the proper time comes, I am not assured of finding a successor who will guarantee the continuation of my policies, I declare here and now that I shall reconsider my position (not to run) . A counter-elite group formed consisting of those notables excluded from power by the President and those, of both religions, who had ties to him but who had been alienated and isolated by his policies. The internal unrest was related to events in the region, and Chamoun ' s reaction to them, as we shall see shortly. In essence, the cleavage or division went from one of patronage to one of religion when Chamoun emphasized the danger to the Maronite community and mobilized the community around him, in large part to help secure his position. Chamoun' s attempt to alter the rule of proportionality, by excluding important notables from power, and increasing the power of the Maronite presidency seen mainly in his attempt to remain in power a second term, led to a breakdown in elite accommodation. Chamoun succeeded by and large in making the conflict a religious one. Though there were a number of Christian notables opposed to Chamoun, their followers, it appeared, remained loyal to the President who

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108 saw the conflict in broader terms involving danger to the Christians of Lebanon from a perceived radical Arab nationalism led by Nasser. In this instance, patronclient ties were not as strong, with varying differences in priorities . Chamoun's support came from conservative Mount Lebanon Maronites and from the business and finance community who had benefitted from Chamoun's policies. In sum, Chamoun appeared to be reducing the avenues of power for nonChristians. He was opposed by zuama who saw themselves, and their clients, being excluded from their share in the power of the state. With the external factor, the conflict developed into one between the country's elite--the zuama — each aided by outside forces. Internally, the Opposition to Chamoun consisted of Moslem notables as Salam, Yafi, Oweini, Adnan Hakim, Rashid Karami . Maronites belonging to the Opposition were mainly those alienated by Chamoun or those who had presidential aspirations as Hamid Franjieh and Fuad Ammoun. Chamoun branded them all traitors and agents of Nasser. A statement issued by 82 Opposition leaders on March 27, 195 1 declared : The signatories . . . call for action to check the present developments which may endanger the unity of Lebanon. They find that the rulers whose duty is to safeguard the unity of Lebanon intend to impair destiny of Lebanon and its independence in the hope of exploiting this to justify their personal policy. The President is still determined to amend the Constitution in order to renew his

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109 term. . . the signatories. . .warn the rulers against the consequence of their excesses. They declare that any attempt to renew the term of the President will justify the people in asserting their will with all the means at their disposal. Besides Prime Minister Solh, Druze notable Majid Arslan supported the government. With regard to the Armenians, the rightist Tashnaks supported Chamoun while the more left-leaning Hentchaks joined the opposition. One notable member of the opposition was the Maronite Patriarch Paul Meouchi, who was to play a prominent role in de-escalating the crisis. His position could be described thus : . . . There was general agreement that the Patriarch's intention was to strengthen the Christian character of the opposition Front and to avoid a possible sectarian war, since on the popular level the Moslems were ranged on the side of the rebels and the Christians on the side of the regime. Policy Causes and Cons equences The conflict among the elite described above involved first opposition on a personal level to the increasingly concentrated power of the President which in effect froze out from the source of resources and patronage traditionally influential zuama. Those in positions of power also felt excluded from effective participation and opposition to Chamoun included both Christian and Moslem notables. His effort or attempt to alter the rule of proportionality by

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110 his plans to perpetuate his power by running for a second term, and thus maintaining the imbalance in power among the elite, led to the extreme measure of turning the conflict into a religious one. While this did serve Chamoun ' s purposes, external events did affect the internal problem, and Chamoun supporters have, in fact, argued that Chamoun 's actions were a response to the perceived threat to Lebanon from Syria and Nasser's Egypt. In this section we shall look at both the internal and external policies which, temporarily at least, ended the more or less stable consociational system that had existed since 1943. Internal Policy Adding to Khoury's political difficulties were the economic problems the country faced following the boom of the war years. Inflation grew at a steady rate compounded 21 by an unemployment force of fifty thousand. Part of the problem stemmed from difficulties with Syria. Under the latest leader brought to power by a coup d'etat in March, 1950 ,Syria decided to cancel the customs union it had had with Lebanon since 1944. The Syrians claimed the low customs barrier was of more benefit to Lebanese businessmen than it was to the Syri£tn economy. Syria insisted on a greater share of customs revenue, suggesting also a full economic union which Lebanese Maronites viewed with alarm 2 2 fearing it could be a prelude to full political union.

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Ill A rupture in relations occurred, and this strengthened Solh's position in the country, with Parliament giving him extraordinary powers to deal with the situation. Despite its troubles, though, Lebanon managed to stand out as a representative democracy with a free market economy in an area increasingly characterized by authoritarian regimes. In the fifties more capital flowed into the country from both the west and unstable neighboring states, adding to the prosperity generated by the free foreign exchange and trade system, the stable Lebanese pound plus few 23 trade restrictions, and laws guaranteeing bank secrecy. Lebanon became a refuge for exiles and a place where all shades of Middle Eastern political philosophies could find expression . The benefits of socio-economic modernization did not accrue equally to all communities. Partly because the state's resources were manipulated by the President, and who gave favor to his own clients to the exclusion of others, Maronites appeared as the wealthiest community. Other grievances surfaced. Moslems were beginning to feel powerless and unhappy with their position as a whole. One case in point was the Moslem demand for educational reform. Most schools in the country were Christian-controlled private institutions. Since they could not bear the financial burdens involved, the Moslems felt discriminated against. They demanded more state education opportunities. Economically and socially, Christians were better off. The most developed areas, Beirut

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112 and Mt. Lebanon, were largely Christian. Charges of corruption were levelled at the regime. The corruption cited here represented an inability of the now less powerful notables to receive from the state as many goods and services as the President was able to dispense to his clients who themselves could better serve their clients. Corruption also referred to the imbalance in representation, which results in less access to the resources of the state. The patronage cleavage described above soon took on a religious base. The divisions were deepened by Chamoun's foreign policies which helped bring about the crisis of 1958 External Environment Following the NATO Treaty of 1949, the Western Powers turned their attention to the Middle East, an area considered highly strategic. The United States had approached Egypt toward the end of 1951 concerning a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) with the U.S., Britain, France and Turkey as members. Egypt declined, insisting the British forces evacuate the Suez Canal Zone. The U.S. supported Egypt's demand, just as it had earlier supported Egypt in its efforts to have the British revise the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 19 36. The resentment at the continued presence of what were seen as colonialist forces continued into the new regime of the Free Officers, which deposed King Farouk in 1952.

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113 The United States, which voiced support for Arab nationalism, still hoped to persuade Egypt to join a Western-sponsored security pact as part of its efforts in the prevailing Cold War. In 1954 the U.S. had also provided Egypt with several million dollars in aid. However, a rift soon appeared between the two countries. The U.S. abandoned plans to aid Egypt in the building of the High Dam at Aswan following signs of closer EgyptianSoviet cooperation, including a major arms deal. The anti-American propaganda began at this stage. The U.S, continuing to be concerned with the containment of Soviet influence, sought to create an alliance of the "Northern Tier" which would include Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. In February, 1954, Turkey and Iraq set up the Baghdad Pact, which Iran joined in April, and the U.K. 2 5 became a member the following year. The U.S. supported the Pact with economic and military aid, though it never became a member possibly to allay any Israeli apprehensions. Egypt also never adhered to the Pact, mainly because it was at odds with the U.K. over the Suez Canal. Egypt's new leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser (who had consolidated his power following Mohammad Najib's removal from the post of Head of State) worked to keep Jordon , Lebanon and Syria from joining the Pact, insisting they remain neutral. The situation crystallized into one where a conservative pro-Western regime in Iraq, led by Nuri El-Said, clashed with Nasser's increasingly anti-Western regime. Each vied for leadership of the Arab world. This split in the Arab

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114 world had strong and far-reaching repercussions on Lebanon. In March 19 55 Nasser succeeded in forming an Arab Collective Security Pact consisting of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. 26 Egypt wanted to see Iraq isolated in the Arab world, something Chamoun would try to prevent as he felt the emergence of Cairo as undisputed leader of the Arab world would lead to greater influence over Lebanese affairs. With some hesitation and reluctance, Lebanon declined membership in the Baghdad Pact, though it was suspected that ? 7 Chamoun favoured the Iraqis. Thus, caught in the pull between Cairo and Baghdad, Lebanon opted for a discreet leaning toward Iraq and a proWestern stand. In April, 1955, Chamoun and Solh visited Turkey and in so doing indicated where the Lebanese government's sympathies lay. The visit came under strong denunciation by the country's Moslems, who saw it as a prelude to joining the Baghdad Pact. 28 Chamoun ' s proWestern orientation clashed with a growing Arab Nationalism, personified by Nasser, and one which had swept the Moslems of Lebanon in its tide.'' Lebanese-Syrian relations were also deteriorating. One reason was that Chamoun refused to extradite wanted members of the Syrian National Party who had assassinated a colonel of the Syrian army. Also Syrian demands for a fuller economic union involving the question of tariffs and customs continued to fall on deaf ears. These, plus Lebanon's

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115 perceived pro-Western stand, increased Syria's hostility of Chamoun. Nasser's popularity, and Lebanon's problems, increased sharply with the Suez crisis of 1956. On July 26, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez canal. While the Egyptian leader's stature sky-rocketed in the Arab world, Britain and France made military preparations to regain control of the canal, which they considered to be a vital, 30 strategic access route to Middle East oil. In the illfated attack, during which Israel also occupied the Sinai Peninsula, Arab sympathy for Nasser grew. Pressure on the invading forces to withdraw came from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, with the latter increasing its influence in the area. The Suez incident^ 1 further polarized the two Lebanese communities. Mainly to avoid isolating Lebanon from the West, Chamoun refused to sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France, leading to the resignation of his Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi and Minister of State Saeb Salam, both prominent Moslem politicians. Chamoun argued that it was not possible for Lebanon to cut ties with the two countries as, Chamoun claimed, Nasser had requested Lebanon's mediation in the dispute: "... how could you cut off diplomatic relations and still intervene with these two 32 nations?" Chamoun asked.

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116 In 1957 two events served to increase Moslem opposition to Chamoun. These were first, the acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine and second, the Parliamentary elections which were allegedly fraudulent. Chamoun appointed Sami Solh as Prime Minister and Charles Malik as Foreign Minister. The latter appointment was in itself a declaration of policy, as Malik was widely regarded as being strongly pro-Western. Increasingly, Chamoun, Solh and Malik became the target of Syrian and Egyptian attacks. Lebanese Moslems looked to Nasser for support and they were in turn urged by the Syrians and Egyptians to rise against Chamoun. "Nasserism", it seemed, "was compelling Lebanon to search its soul, examine its loyalties. . . . " 34 Fears grew among the Christians that Lebanon would become part of a pan-Arab state if Nasser's influence were to grow in Lebanon. The Moslems, especially the sunnis, were especially receptive to calls for Arab unity. Though the Moslems denounced Chamoun 's pro-Western policy as being a deviation from Lebanon's policy of neutrality, they for their part were seeking closer ties with Nasser. Lebanon was placed firmly in the Western camp when Chamoun accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, amid strong Moslem protests. The Doctrine, formulated partly by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, promised aid to any Middle Eastern nation threatened by Communist-backed 35 subversion. It was partly in response to a perception of increased Soviet influence in the area, following the

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117 Suez crisis in which Moscow had firmly backed Egypt, offering to send "volunteers" to fight the invading force. Lebanon was the only country to adhere to the Doctrine. Nasser undoubtedly saw Chamoun's decision as an increase in Western influence and an attempt to isolate him; Syria and Egypt stepped up their press and radio attacks on Chamoun. In 1958, Syria and Egypt announced the merger of their two countries into the United Arab Republic (UAR) . This further polarized the Lebanese, as now Moslems vehemently and violently clamoured for union with the new state, with largely Sunni Tripoli leading the calls. Christians rallied behind Chamoun as the only hope for continued Lebanese independence. For the Moslem, the UAR held high expectations. Moslem notables hoped to improve their situation in Lebanon. In the words of one observer: The voice of the Arabs became the voice from the skies, which in the dreariness and hopelessness of their lives, verbalized their thoughts, dreamt their dreams, and above all spoke to them of hope—hope that the day of their deliverance from poverty, disease, corruption and foreign rule would soon come . J ° Chamoun ignored Syrian leader Quwatli ' s invitation to join the

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118 The Crisis Proper: No Victor, No Vanquishe d While the complete story may never be known, enough information exists to give a fairly accurate picture of the situation prevailing in 1958. Fear of "Nasserism" made Chamoun adopt the Eisenhower Doctrine, while Moslems saw it as a means by which he would attempt to stay in power. The Opposition saw the conflict as purely an internal affair, and that outside powers--Egypt and Syria--were intervening in a just cause. They saw neither the President nor the Prime Minister (whom they charged with "desertion") as representative of the country. Says Beirut Opposition leader Salam: The President tried to convince the foreign press that the problem is not to do with this individual or that. But every Lebanese, whether in the ranks of the opposition or not, knows that the present crisis is indirectly due to one individual, and that the individual is Camille Chamoun. The Kataeb supported the government, as did the Syrian National Party which was opposed to Nasser, as Egypt did not figure in their ideal of a Greater Syria. They also 41 charged the trouble in Lebanon was Communist inspired. This represented the only time the Kataeb and the SNP have found themselves on the same side. They are, and continue to be bitter enemies.

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119 On May 8 , the insurrection was sparked by the assassination of Nassib Matni, a prominent Maronite journalist and persistent critic of Chamoun's administration. The opposition blamed the government for his death and soon guerrilla attacks began in North Lebanon, operating with Soviet weapons, from Syria. U.S. Information Libraries were attacked in Tripoli and Beirut, indicating the Moslems saw the conflict in a broader scope than had been claimed. 2 Five days later Lebanon officially accused Egypt of being behind the unrest in 4 3 Lebanon. Radio broadcasts from the UAR urged the opposition to overthrow Chamoun, some of the broadcasts being "tantamount to incitements to murder."^ The Lebanese Army, meanwhile, would do no more than control the conflict, attempting to play an arbitration role." As the situation worsened, Chamoun and Malik tried to internationalize the conflict, attempting to persuade the Western powers of the seriousness of the situation. ^ Lebanon complained to the Council of the Arab League and then to the United Nations Security Council. In a speech to the Council, Malik declared: The case which we have brought to the attention of the Security Council consists of three claims. The first is that there has been, and there still is, massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic. The second is that this intervention aims at undermining, and does in fact threaten, the independence of

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120 Lebanon. The third is that the situation created by this intervention which threatens the independence of Lebanon is likely, if continued, to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 4 7 And in appealing for international help, said: Every other country in the Middle East has its formal international agreements or connexions whereby it feels more or less safe, except Lebanon. Lebanon alone in the Middle East has no vast, formal, safety-conferring arrangement with other Powers outside the area... Of all countries in the Middle East then, Lebanon primarily depends upon the United Nations for its safety. The Charter is our primary protection. We cannot protect ourselves alone: we are much too small and fragile for that. ° The Iraqi delegate charged that the immediate danger to Middle East nations was Nasser: "the design of... Nasser to dominate the Arab states, or at least to turn (them) 49 into satellites of Egypt by fomenting revolutions. The United Nations, at Sweden's suggestion, decided to send an observer group to the area. The United Nations Observer Force in Lebanon (UNOGIL) monitored only the small government-held areas, as most of the border was controlled by the rebels. The Lebanese government was unhappy with the group's report that only Lebanese were involved, and that no arms were being smuggled in.

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121 The situation came to a head on July 14 when a bloodycoup installed a leftist regime in Iraq, replacing its former 51 pro-Western leaders. This gave rise to alarm in Lebanon, as it was felt Nasser was behind the coup (which Egypt denied) and that Lebanon was the next target. Immediately following the coup, Chamoun requested American assistance. The next day the U.S. landed troops in Lebanon. 52 The coup in Iraq represented the catalyst for the U.S. to invoke the Eisenhower doctrine, to protect and defend what remained of pro-Western regimes. In the Middle East Dulles had earlier given a wider interpretation to the Doctrine, regarding it as covering the preservation of a nation's independence, the "independence of these countries (being) vital to peace and national interest of the United States." 5 -* On the day American Marines landed in Lebanon, Eisenhower told Congress: On July 14, 1958, I received an urgent request from the President of the Republic of Lebanon that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon. President Chamoun stated that without an immediate showing of United States support, the government of Lebanon would be unable to survive. . . I have replied that we would do this and a contingent of United States Marines has now arrived in Lebanon. . .We share with the government of Lebanon the view that (the) events in Iraq demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat without further evidence of support from other friendly nations. No clashes took place between the Lebanese rebels and the American troops. Rather, the Marines proved to be a

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122 moderating influence, and diplomatically the U.S. began a mediatory role. Under-Secretary of State Murphy held talks with the various blocks, with Commander of the Army Shihab emerging as the compromise candidate. Dulles pointed to the election of Shihab as proof that the U.S. never intended to intervene to secure a second term for Chamoun. Tension abated somewhat until a Cabinet was formed under Karami , which was made up of a majority of opposition sympathizers. Alarmed at the composition of the new government, the Kataeb moved to the fore and announced a general strike, signalling a marked increase in sectarian tension. The strike lasted from September 20 to October 14, when a more acceptable Cabinet was formed. The slogan of the new Government— No Victor, No Vanquished--soon took hold and a return to normality followed. The Crisis in Perspectiv e "If I had not accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine in July 1958, Lebanon would have been taken over by Nasser.' Thus did Chamoun attempt to justify his actions with connection to the crisis of 1958. Western analysts also tended to see the conflict in broader, regional terms. Max Lerner writes:

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123 . . . The Lebanese civil war is meaningless unless you see it within the frame of Nasser's thrust toward empire. . . if this force (Nasserism) wins in Lebanon, the chain reaction will reach very far through the Middle East." This is echoed by Walter Lippman who notes that the U.S., by its actions, was in "military opposition to the Arab revolution, and that in the Middle East the alignment is increasingly sharp and spectacular between the Muslim states r o and the Western powers and their client states". Perhaps one of the more unusual aspects of the crisis was the role of the Maronite Patriarch. As mentioned above, his position might have been adopted in order to deemphasize 59 the sectarian overtones of the crisis. Nevertheless, in the process he alienated major Christian groups, including high-ranking clergy. In his rigorous opposition to Chamoun, he sided with non-Christian elements who came to trust and respect him. He appeared to be sympathetic to Arab nationalism, and indeed on Independence day opposition members came to the seat of the Patriarchate, Bkerki, and not to the Presidential Palace to offer respects. Meouchi maintained contacts with Nasser, much to the dismay and alarm of the Christians. Kataeb leader Gemayel, in a newspaper column, hoped the Patriarch would work stronger for Lebanese sovereignty. He admonished the Patriarch to: Deliver a decisive opinion on the attitude of Lebanon with respect to the projects for Arab unity (and this should be done) in order that Bkerki might remain, as it

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12 4 should, the shield of Lebanon, the fortress guarding her destiny, and the banner of her freedom and independence forever . As an individual, the Maronite Patriarch was held in high esteem, personally very influential, heads the largest sect, and is independent of any other group or organization. The Bishop may have been guided by a determined aim to protect the Maronite community by emphasizing the importance of the National Pact and to avoid religious conflict still fresh in many Maronite minds. Meouchi defended his actions, claiming: It hurts me to interfere in politics. I hate politics. But I am Lebanese before I am Patriarch. In addition, I am responsible for a large Lebanese sect. Therefore, I find it my duty to be concerned about everything that affects this (Maronite) sect. 63 Nasser, by inciting Moslems against Chamoun , was as much a cause of the crisis as were Chamoun ' s alleged plans for reelection and his pro-Western policies. The Moslem insurrection may be seen as latent Sunni frustration finally manifesting itself; a discontent with being part of the Lebanese state, especially since Christians came to control the State machinery. Lebanon was perceived then, and later, as a state for the protection of Christians. Moslems continued to hope for a greater Syrian state. Mainly because they were better qualified, Maronites in the administration numbered 50 percent. Charges of

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12! corruption began to focus increasingly on the Maronites. "Moslems and Druze never tired of pointing out that the chief fault in the country's administration was the corruption of the Maronite element unjustly in control." Hudson points out that loyalists were defending the developed areas of Lebanon against the poorer regions controlled by the insurgents. Thus the crisis, he adds, was "rooted in class hostility." Moslem grievances found a focus in Nasser, who in turn had particular aims himself with regard to the perceived anti-Egyptian regime in Lebanon. Egypt's increasing influence in Lebanese affairs was channeled through the system, worsening relations between an already divided populace. Authority had broken down throughout the country, with the population organized around their specific patrons. The crisis was not the result of a single set of factors, but was rather generated by a multiplicity of conflicting forces, all of which emanated from one fundamental causation i.e. the differences in cultural and political orientations that exists among various segments of Lebanese society . The crisis helped define the limits and extent of foreign policy actions, in the process increasing Lebanon's moderation and neutrality. It showed that the Lebanese President". . .rules by consensus , and once he steps outside that limit, he loses his power."

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12i Shihab: 1958-196 4 During General Shihab' s regime, the National Pact again became the basis for the sharing of political power, adapted somewhat to changed conditions. Foreign policy again became neutral, with mild support for Arab policies while remaining above calls for Arab union. The job of unifying the country became a little easier due to the dissipation of Arab nationalistic fervor, especially following the collapse of the UAR in 1961. Lebanese Moslems turned their attention more to Lebanese affairs, and less to Arab politics . Shihab stated the need for reforms. He brought about an equal division of administrative posts , fifty-fifty , agreed upon by all and which in effect was detrimental to administrative efficiency as it served to exclude competent Christians and include not always qualified Moslems. He moved to improve Moslem areas, stating the need for planning. Toward this end, Shihab commissioned a French organization, Institut pour Recherche en vue de Developpement (IRFED) to study to socio-economic conditions of Lebanon. Aware that the key to unity and stability in Lebanon was that the Moslem and Druze communities should feel that the country belonged as much to them as to the Christians, President Shihab took steps to see that more Moslems and Druzes were appointed to government posts. The fifty-fifty allocation of posts between the two communities was applied even at the expense, in certain cases, of decline in standards. *°^

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127 The six to five ratio in the Parliament remained. Though Shihab pursued a non-sectarian policy, administrative inefficiency and factionalism also remained. To restore a feeling of full representation for the Moslems the Prime Minister became stronger in the form of Salam and Karami . Moslems now felt the satisfaction that they now had access to power and the state's resources. Being outside the traditional mold of clan rivalry, Shihab had little tolerance for political manipulation as took place under Khoury and Chamoun, remaining above political rivalries. His Army Intelligence branch ( Deuxieme Bureau ) formed its own patronage network however and favors were dispensed to the clients of the Shihab regime. Because of Shihab, the prestige of the army grew. It was no longer seen as a detached body, ' . 70 as simply a descendant of the Troupes Speciales . The Kataeb was intent on reconciliation with the former Moslem insurgents, while Chamoun 's new National Liberal Party was more hardline, still a loose grouping that was both disillusioned and confused. Initially there was some rivalry between these two Maronite parties, as they now had to vie for support from the same community. The Sunnis , for their part, received a larger proportion of posts for their relatively greater education vis-a-vis the Shiites. Still Lebanon's poorest and least advanced sect,Shiite representation then was still below their desired level. Though their feudal nature stayed the same, the 1958 crisis "had a beneficial political effect on the Shiites, by

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128 awakening them out of their medieval turpor. -"Sunni and Druze support for Shihab grew as a result of their increased power and influence. In summary, Shihab attempted to ameliorate the conditions of the poorer, predominantly Moslem, areas through a vigorous public works program. He emphasized administrative reform, and stressed social justice. Corruption and inefficiency, however, continued in the administration. Little success was registered in his attempt to achieve a fairer distribution 7 7 of resources through increased governmental control. Shihab 's efforts did not sit well with Christians in general. "The determination of Shihab to involve the Moslem Lebanese more closely in political and administrative responsibility appeared to many Christians as uncalled-for concessions, to be made at the expense of Christian prerogatives. . . _»'3 Throughout his term, Christian support for Shihab, remembering his inaction during the civil war, was at best lukewarm. The 1960 Elections Perhaps the most important part of Shihab 's regime were the 1960 elections, which are seen as "marking the true end 74 of the Lebanese crisis." Lebanon's representative institutions were again in operation. The elections represented an attempt to restore harmony between the communities partly by a new Parliament that was considered legitimate and representative. Thus, at the insistence of the former opposition members, elections were held a year early.

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129 Parliament was enlarged to 99 members, meaning more zuama now had access to the institutions of the state, and the country was re-divided into 26 constituencies. ^ Many opposition members won election in a Parliament that brought in 6 7 new members. TABLE IX DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS IN NEW PARLIAMENT M S GO SH GC D Mi AO AC 1 Beirut

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130 TABLE X SEATS WON BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN 19 60 Phalange (Kataeb) 6 National Lib. Party 6 Progressive Soc . Party 5 National Bloc 5 Constitutional Party 4 Najjada 1 Independents 72 SOURCE: Jacob Landau, "Elections in Lebanon", Western Political Quarterly (March, 1961), p. 134. Kerr sums up the mood of the elections: . . . ( they) tended not to produce a confrontation of bitter sectarian partisans but to scatter the forces of each group into localized rivalries. Whatever boasting there was about 195 8 performances, it took place intramurally within each community. Once again it appeared that it was safer to keep natural bedfellows apart, in order to make the necessary combination of strange bedfellows in the new cabinet. External and Internal Issues in the 195 8 Crisis The 1958 crisis, then, involved a combination of both internal and external factors, closely related to each other. Internally several issues served to bring about a breakdown in accomodationist politics. The longfelt feeling of inequality among the Moslems was heightened during the Chamoun administration. The power of Moslem politicians was seen as a clear second to that of the Christians. A true balance of power within the elite did not exist. The powers of the Sunni Prime Minister were felt to be

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131 overshadowed by the powers of the Maronite President. Positions in the administration were seen as not being clearly and fairly apportioned. Moslems protested that Christians both controlled more positions, and that these positions were numerically in the Christians' favor. Thus, overall, the Moslems complained of powerlessness in affecting the affairs of the state. Moslems complained also of lack of educational opportunities. Since most schools were privately-run, and most were of the Christian faith, Moslems felt excluded. Moslems, tending to be of a lower socio-economic status than Christians, could often not afford to send their children to the private schools, whether foreign or native. The demand, then, was for a greater state role in education, and more specifically for more state schools. Increasing socio-economic modernization has, the Moslems charge, developed the Christian areas more so than the Moslem. The increased wealth of the country has gone largely to Beirut and other, mainly Christian areas, plus a small minority of Moslems. These inequalities were accentuated by a growing Moslem awareness of their secondary status, compounded by growing unpopularity with Chamoun and his allegedly corrupt policies, which implied a monopoly on the source of patronage.

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132 Charges of corruption were levelled at Chamoun ' s administration, which included nepotism, illegal business deals, and a violation of justice. In addition, Chamoun attempted through abuse of the electoral system, to curtail the power of both Christian and Moslem zuama , many of whom he had antagonized in his first few years of office. The allegedly fraudulent elections of 1957 convinced many of his enemies that there would be no Moslem cooperation with the presidency until Chamoun was removed. Rumors that Chamoun planned to have himself re-elected further convinced his enemies, especially the Moslem leaders, that the Maronite presidency planned to take on more powers at the Moslems 1 expense. It was clearly a disregard for the "rules of the game" whereby power would be exercised within the elite cartel. The external factors responsible for the breakdown of stability are tied closely to the internal ones. Again, a violation occured in the understanding between members of the elite on Lebanon's relations with the ouside world, which essentially entailed a policy of neutrality toward both the Arab world and the West. Among the factors related to the crisis were Lebanon's relations with Syria and Egypt. Syrian antagonism to the Lebanese regime was rooted in the refusal of Lebanon to enter into a full economic union with the Damascus regime. This issue divided the Lebanese also, with the Maronites opposing any kind of union, while Moslems generally favored it. Chamoun 's visit

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133 to Turkey in 1955 further alienated the Syrians from Chamoun, since relations between Syria and Turkey were at the time strained. In addition, it was suspected that Chamoun ' s sympathies lay with the West and the Baghdad Pact, though this was denied by Chamoun. Thus, Syria saw Chamoun as antagonistic to the Syrian regime, and began to oppose him openly, which led to a division of loyalties in Lebanon. The Suez crisis of 1956 led to a split in the cartel, when the highest ranking Moslems in the government resigned in protest over Chamoun ' s refusal to take a firmer Arab stand and break relations with Britain and France. Egypt's antagonism toward Chamoun was demonstrated during the 1957 election, when it, along with Syria, waged a press and radio attack on Chamoun. Relations with both Egypt and Syria were strained which had an effect on internal politics. Egypt attempted to arouse the Lebanese population against Chamoun . The division of the Arab world into Iraqi and Egyptian camps added to the internal division in Lebanon, with one group . supporting Egypt and the other opposed to it. Arab nationalism, personified by Nasser, divided the Lebanese population and temporarily half the population no longer supported the Lebanese political system. The Christians of Lebanon felt that the creation of the U.A.R. and Lebanese Moslem support for it was a prelude to Lebanon's forced incorporation in it, though Moslem leaders denied there was such an intention. Fear of Nasser and his

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134 perceived plans for Arab unity effectively polarized the Lebanese population along confessional lines. Also on the external scene, the international dimension of the crisis is an important one as the area became caught up in the cold war. Nasser's cooperation with the Soviet Union had ramifications for the other countries of the area, as Lebanon, with the endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, declared itself in the Western camp, and in opposition to Nasser . Violation of Consociational Principles How did Lebanon deviate from the principles of consociationalism? It may be helpful at this stage to look at the extent to which the rules of the game discussed earlier were violated in this first major crisis in Lebanon. While the ouster of Bishara al Khoury was largely an internal affair, resolved peacefully, the 1958 conflict involved both internal and external issues, which combined to shake Lebanon's brand of consociationalism to its foundations. Practically all of the basic tenets of consociationalism were broken. Chamoun attempted to upset the balance of power between the different communities by his fraudulent tactics in the elctions to Parliament, which led to important members of the Moslem community being defeated. This attempt to undercut the power of traditional notables caused resentment early in his regime.

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135 Moslem dissatisfaction with Chamoun increased with the Suez episode of 1956. A major decision—whether or not to cut relations with Britain and France— was not made by the members of the cartel in consultation with one another. The decision not to break relations with the two Western powers was a unilateral decision by the President and did not involve agreement with Moslem leaders. It was a violation of both the principles Agreement to Disagree and Summit Diplomacy. Elite cooperation on the fundamentals of national policy was violated. The issue was, moreover, highly politicized and no effort was made to keep the issue from taking on sectarian ramifications. An issue of this nature could not be easily depoliticized . As social mobilization proceeded issues of Arab politics invariably acted to polarize communities in Lebanon along confessional lines. The element of secrecy cannot operate in such a strongly charged atmosphere. Chamoun' s acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was a decision that was not a result of elite cooperation. It was not an agreement agreed upon by all members of the cartel, nor at the least a compromise. It was a unilateral decision by the strongest member of the elite. The decision to appoint pro-Western Malik as Foreign Minister was a similar decision and which was in effect a disregard for the respect and recognition of political and ideological differences. Thus, the cohesiveness and trust between

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136 members of the elite--essential for the effective operation of the system--was breaking down, as it became evident that Chamoun had no regard for elite cooperation and the need for compromise decisions. The Moslems began to feel powerless to affect the running of the country and consequently looked to Nasser for a solution to the problem. Chamoun 's actions themselves were out of a fear of Nasser and his pan-Arab ambitions, and fear of domination by him led Chamoun to tighten Lebanon's ties with the West. Chamoun ' s identification with the West, through the Western pact, and the Moslems' identification with Nasser and the Arabs was in essence a violation of the spirit of the National Pact upon which Lebanese consociationalism was based. Traditional Christian fears of absorption into an Islamic Arab world led to a deliberate disregard by the Christian elite for any semblance of cooperation with Moslem leaders on these major decisions. Indeed, whether such cooperation was possible given the tense political atmosphere and the involvement of regional and international powers, is difficult to say with certainty. The elite was divided with the leaders appealing to their respective communities for support, and in effect involving the population in the conflict.

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137 Internally, the principle of proportionality was being violated in addition to the above mentioned ones. Moslem dissatisfaction with the distribution of power was heightened with rumors that Chamoun planned to succeed himself. Increased social mobilization had led to realization, also, that opportunities for advancement were greater for Christians This was compounded by the fact that Christian areas had achieved a greater degree of prosperity than had the Moslem ones. The Moslem demand for more power--and social justice--stemmed from a realization that Chamoun was increasing the power of the Christian part of the cartel at the expense of the Moslems. In sum, elite cooperation and accommodation broke down, leading to a situation where the cartel was in disagreement over the allocation of power and resources, which is an important aspect of consociationalism. Deference to rule by elite cartel had disappeared as a now highly politicized populace rallied around their respective leaders. The crisis continued even after a cabinet was finally formed. Since the new government consisted mainly of rebel sympathizers the balance of power had moved too far to the Opposition and the general strike organized by the Kataeb led to a more evenly-balanced coalition. Minority gorups--keeping historical conflicts in mind — look for guarantees of protection from outside powers. In this case, it was also an opportunity for Moslem leaders to attempt to wrest more power from Christians. It was clear

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138 also that outside powers have a great influence on domestic politics in Lebanon. It appeared that Lebanon had to choose sides in a divided Arab world, and which indeed often proved to be the case. A return to neutrality based on the National Pact was a prerequisite for a return to elite cooperation. A return to "politics as usual" necessitated some minor changes or reforms, which essentially consisted of some mild reforms to placate, at least temporarily, Moslem demands for greater influence in the affairs of the state. A 50-50 allocation of administrative posts was agreed upon. Attempts to improve Moslem areas, however, were not completely successful . With Shihab in power, the elite cartel was again unified as Moslems' confidence in the Christian was strong, since he appeared sympathetic to their needs, shown by his efforts at social justice and administrative reform. In addition a strong Moslem Premier now represented the Moslem community. In brief, the elite was again in agreement and a return to stability followed. The 1960 elections allowed for fairer representation for Moslems. Principles as neutrality, respect for disagreements, summit diplomacy, the government's right to govern all returned, depoliticization of issues was not easily accomplished. Elite restraint returned. Both sides had called for foreign intervention, and this perhaps leads us to the contention that a loss of power in the elite cartel by a certain group leads to an attempt to solicit the support of outside powers.

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139 This crisis, in effect, was one from which Lebanon never really recovered. Though a semblance of normality followed, discontent continued while the elite continued to downplay differences and give the appearance of continued agreement. This was changed by changes in the sixties, which included the emergence of radical leftist parties, which challenged the traditional establishment, implying a change in the clientelist system, and the emergence of the Palestinians as a force in Lebanese politics. The major crisis which resulted in 1975 was of such an intensity that Lebanese consociationalism irretrievably broke down.

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140 Notes 1. Chamoun was reportedly promised the Presidency in 1949. In the meantime he was awarded the Ambassadorship to Britain . 2. Michael Hudson, Precarious Republic (New York: Random House, Inc., 19681^ p. 105 3. George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution," The Middle East Journal (Winter, 1953), p. 8. 4. R. Mosseri, "The Struggle in Lebanon," Middle Eastern Affairs (November, 1952), p. 329. In March, 1949, L'Orie nt , a leading (French) daily was shut down for 8 months and its editors jailed for what the government felt were objectionable editorials, which charged the state with authoritarian measures and an inability to govern effectively. 5. Peter Mansfield, The M iddle East: A Political and Economic Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 401. 6. Along with Chamoun, Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt was also a vocal opponent of the Khoury regime. These were joined by the Kataeb (Phalangists ) and the Najjada whose paramilitary activities Khoury tried to restrict, thus further alienating them. They both officially became parties in 1949, as did Jumblatt' s Druze following which became the Progressive Socialist Party. By 1951, then, the Opposition consisted of a diverse grouping including Chamoun, Jumblatt, the Kataeb, the Najjada, the Socialist National Party (formerly Syrian National Party) and Edde ' s National Bloc. 7. Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon , op. cit., p. 117. 8. The deposing of Egypt's King Farouk in 19 52 had ominous overtones for Khoury. Many began to entertain the thought that Khoury should suffer the same fate. Britt, op . cit . , p . 12 . 9. Ziadeh, op. cit . p. 119. 10. In 1943, it was agreed that Maronites would control the sensitive posts of Commander of the Army and the Head of Internal Security. 11. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 122

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14 12. Hudson, op. cit . , p. 107. 13. Jumblatt also demanded Khoury be brought to trial; Chamoun, though, was reluctant to do this. 14. 13 Maronites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Shiites; 5 Greek-Orthodox; 3 Greek-Catholic; 3 Druze; 2 Armenian-Orthodox; and one for minorites. 15. Mosseri, op. cit . , p. 331. Also, to improve the country's image, he ordered the hashish crop be destroyed and wheat planted in its place. The crop was burnt, but the local leaders, ministers included, continued to plant the highly profitable hashish. Ibid . , pp. 333-334. 16. During the crisis of 1952, Chamoun had said that the constitutional amendment "should never be done, lest a precedent of amending the constitution for personal reasons be established." Qubain, op. cit., p. 22. 17. Ephraim Frankel, "The Maronite Patriarch: An Historical View of a Religious Zaim in the 1958 Lebanese Crisis. Part 1," The Muslim World (July, 1976), p. 224. 18. Agwani, op. cit . , p. 41. 19. The Druze had influence and prestige disproportionate to their small seven percent of the population. Besides having a reputation for being fierce, disciplined fighters, they figured prominently in Lebanese history and were often inconsistent in their alliances and political action. Salibi suggests division among the Druze on an issue was always deliberately maintained so as to at least have some Druze "on the winning side". Kamal Salibi, "Lebanon since the Crisis of 1958," The World Today (January, 1961) , p. 36. 20. Meo, op. cit . , p. 172 21. Hudson, ojd. cit . , p. 106. 22. V.II.W. Dowson, "Economic Relations between Lebanon and Syria," Journal of the Royal Cen tral A sian So ciety (October, 1951), ppT^26~ "22 9 . 23. Salibi, op. cit. , p. 197. 24. Qubain, op. cit . , p. 31. 25. Richard Note, "American Policy in the Middle East," Journal of International Affairs (No. 2, 1959) , p. 117. 26. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 273.

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142 27. Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 96. 28. Ziadeh, op. cit . , p. 276. 29. Previously Lebanon had sided with the Arabs in their dispute with Israel and had supported Egypt in its negotiations with the British. For a discussion of the nature of Arab nationalism, see Abdullah al-Alayali, "What is Arab Nationalism?" in Sylvia G. Haim (ed.) , Arab Nationalism: An Antholog y (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 12~0-128. 30. France wanted Nasser removed as he was supplying Algerian rebels with support, while British Prime Minister Anthony Eden saw in Nasser an ambitious Hitler. 31. For the full details on the Suez issue, see A.J. Barker, The Seven Day War . London: Faber Ltd, 1964; A. Beaufre, The Suez Expedition, 1956 . Paris: Editions Brenard Grasset, 1967; W.F. Longgood, Suez Story New York: Greenberg, 1957; J. Pudney, Suez: De Le s seps Canal . London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1968. 32. Meo, op_. cit . , p. 98. 33. Fahim I. Qubain, C risis in Lebanon (Washington: Middle East Institute, 19617, p. 39. 34. Maurice Harari , "The Dynamics of Lebanese Nationalism," Curr ent History (February, 1959), p. 98. 35. Carol Fisher and Fred Krinsky, Mi ddle East in Crisis (Syracuse University Press, 19597^ pp. 62-29 . ' ~"~~ 36. At his own insistence, Nasser become President of the Union. See "President Nasser's address on the EgyptianSyrian Federation," Current History (April, 1958), pp. 240-243. 37. Arnold Hottinger, "Zuama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958, " Middle East Journal (Spring, 1961), p. 133. Sectarian tension was never far from the surface. One illustration: Beirut Monseignour Ziadeh, during a church ceremony, labelled Moslems of Lebanon "intruders", to which Chamoun, present in the congregation, quickly took exception. Michael Hudson, Politica l Cjiajigesin Lebanon , 1 9 4 3 19 6 3 (Unpunished Dissertation, Yale University, 1963), pp. iUf-203. Egyp'; added to the sectarian tension also by giving 100,000 dollars "for the restoration of mosques in Lebanon". In addition, rumors circulated that the Greek-Orthodox Church was cooperating with Soviet intrigues in Lebanon. Frankel, op. cit., p. 245.

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14 3 38. Qubain, op. cit . , p. 40. 39. Opposition leaders went to Damascus to congratulate Nasser and voiced hope that Lebanon would join the union. The number of Lebanese who streamed across the border exceeded 300,000. Ibid . , p. 60 40. Steward, op. cit., p. 48 41. Ibid . , p. 71. 42. R.P. Stebbins, T he United States in World Affairs (Harper and brothers, 1959), "p. 195. 43. Agwani, op. cit. , pp. 65-70. 44. Kamal Salibi, "The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective " The World Today (September, 1958), p. 370. 45. Hottinger, op. cit . , pp. 134-135. Chamoun accused Syria of organizing guerrilla groups in Lebanon. "State Dept. Report: How Nasser helped the Rebels in Lebanon," U.S. News and World Report, July 25, 1958 pp. 7 7-79. " 46. Agwani, op. cit., p. 10.1. 47. Ibid . , p. 124. 48. Ibid. p. 146. 49. Stebbins, op. cit., p. 197. 50 UNOGIL was inaugurated in Beirut by Secretary-General Hammarskjold. Twenty-one countries provided 591 observers, led by General Odd Bull of Norway. 51. The leader of the coup, Abdel Karim Al-Kassim, insisted the coup was not directed from the outside. Nasser, however, termed it a "victory for the Arab people," Stebbins, op. cit. , p. 201. 52. Pressure to intervene came from Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Jordan. Qubain, op. cit. , p. 127. British troops also landed in Jordan. For a first-hand account of the military aspects of the landing, see B. Gen. S.S. Wade, "Operation BLUEBAT , " Marine Corps Gazette (July, 1959), pp. 10-23. ~ 53. Agwani, op. cit. , p. 106.

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144 54. Agwani, op. cit. , p. 228 and p. 230. Nassim Majdalany, a prominent opposition member, accused Chamoun of blaming the UAR "to smooth the way for the physical entry of the Western powers into Lebanon. This is to go back 100 years, to the concept of the foreign protection of Lebanon." Stewart, op. cit. , p. 66. 55. On July 8, Chamoun had declared he would not seek reelection. His Prime Minister denied they ever sought a second term. Ibid . , p. 67. 56. Meo, op. cit . , p. 181. 57. Max Lerner, "American views on Lebanon," Foreign Policy Bulletin (August 15, 1958), p. 180. '"" " "" ----58. Ibid. , p. 181. The conflict was confusing the observer. The uniqueness of the Lebanese political structure and the resulting unique nature of conflict is illustrated in this quote : "One of the strangest civil wars of modern times. . . in it's caution not to provoke the rebels too much, the government grants them liberties that must be almost unheard of in a civil war. Many of the top rebels, for example, are allowed to move out and meet each other to discuss strategy. They talk with each other by telephone from their barricaded homes. They receive news correspondents, hold press conferences and grant interviews." "what the shooting's all about," U .S. News and World Report , July 11, 1958, p. 60. 59. From a legal perspective, Quincy Wright maintains: "The U.S. can justify its intervention in Lebanon on the ground of 'collective self-defense' only if the Lebanon was the victim of 'armed attack' from outside and if the de_ jure government, which requested such aid, was not so pressed internal revolt that it was incapable of representing the state. Neither of these conditions seems to have existed." Quincy Wright, "Editorial Comment: United States intervention in the Lebanon," The American Journal of International Law (Volume 59, 1959) p. 119. • "" ~ 60. Frankel, op. cit . , p. 223. 61 Ephraim Frankel, "The Maronite Patriarch: An Historical View of a Religious Zaim in the 1958 Lebanese Crisis. Part 11," The Muslim World (October, 1976), p. 247. 62 Salibi, "Lebanon since the crisis of 1958," op. cit., p. 35 63. Frankel, op. cit., p. 250

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145 64. Kamal Salibi , "Lebanon under Fuad Shihab. 1958-1964," Middle Eastern Studies (April, 1966), p. 212. 65. Ibid . ,p. 213. It should be recalled, however, that in the early years of Greater Lebanon, Sunnis refused to participate in the new state. Christians then came to control the machinery of government, aided by experience acquired under the Mutasarrif iyah . 66. Hudson, op. cit . , p. 110. 67. Qubain, op. cit . , p. 169. 68. Iliya Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," Intern ational Journal of Middle East Studies (July, 1972), p. 321. 69. Mansfield, op. cit., p. 405. 70. Kamal Salibi, "Lebanon since the crisis of 1958," The World Today (January , 1961) p. 40. 71. Salibi, "Lebanon since the crisis of 1958,'' op. cit., p. 41 72. Salibi, "Lebanon under Fuad Shihab," op. cit., p. 222. 73. Kamal Salibi, C rossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (New York: Caravan Books, 1976), p. 3. 74. Qubain, op. cit . , p. 164. The only conflict was a second abortive coup d'etat by the Syrian National Party in 1961, which was "suppressed so efficiently that Lebanese of all shades of opinion saw it as evidence of the country's stable democracy". Hudson, "Political Changes in Lebanon, 1943-1963," op. cit . , p. 247. 75. The districts often have people from different religions. Thus, candidates have to appeal to members of different faiths for votes, thus encouraging moderation and deemphasizing the role of relgion. 76. Generally, the elections were believed to be honest. Some candidates, though, charged the Dcuxieme B ureau (Army Intelligence newly formed) was irTte r Fe r Xing'. Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, 1960," op. cit . , p. 372. 77. Malcolm Kerr, "The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections," Middle Eastern Affairs (October, 1960), p. 273.

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CHAPTER V BREAKDOWN OF CONSOCIATIONAL PRINCIPLES — THE INTERNAL FACTOR We turn our attention now to the factors responsible for the violent breakdown of the "rules" of consociationalism. The collapse of Lebanon's politics of accommodation is due to two major causes, grouped under internal and external causes. We are concerned in this section with the internal factor, which involves conflict between the two communities over economic wealth and political power. It also involves the emergence of non-traditional leaders and the patronage system upon which they depended for their support. The disparity in economic wealth between the Christian "haves" and the Moslems "have-nots" was paralleled by a perceived imbalance in political power, also predominantly in Christian hands. An analysis of the internal factor will involve a discussion of Lebanon's economic system, and the resulting effects socio-economic modernization had on the relations. We will examine the differences between the communities with regard to economic wealth, and spotlight the nature of the government's role in the economy. Essentially, added to the emerging class differences between the two communities was the growing inability of the patron-client network to solve oustanding problems and to

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147 mediate conflicts. The patron-client network, connected to the state's institutions in a formal sense, became unable to satisfy increasing demands. Newly-urbanized, mainly Moslem, elements were not connected to the clientage system and indeed became part of groups that were not part of the traditional leadership. New leftist groups--lumpenelites — were attempting to break through the hold of the traditional elites. These nonclientelistic elements represented a challenge to the traditional, especially Moslem, leaders who resisted this challenge to their power. The Christian networks, with more resources, was better able to serve its clients than were the Moslem clientage networks. The emerging class differences between the two communities added to the existing social cleavages producing a situation of mutually-reinforcing cleavages where the potential for conflict was high. The catalyst for conflict was provided by the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon whom the Moslems strongly supported and who were to aid the Moslem leftists militarily in the conflict with the Christian groups. The polarization in Lebanese society was intensified, then, by both internal and external factors.

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148 Social Mobilization In order to highlight the importance of the Internal factor we need to look at social mobilization in Lebanon and the uneven economic development engendered by it. The other divisive issue was that of proportionality which essentially entailed changes in the numerical strength of Lebanon's religious communities which, it may be recalled, was one of the factors determining trhe initial allocation of political posts. Table XI summarizes social mobilization for the country as a whole and Tablexiicompares social mobilization according to region. Beirut and Mt. Lebanon, moblilized quicker than the South, North and Bekaa. Since the private schools are mainly Christian, better educational opportunities have been available to Christians. In the last century, it will be recalled, the Christian middle-class was successful in finance and commerce. Throughout the country's history, the different communities displayed varying levels of social and economic development. Historically and today, Mt . Lebanon is more developed.". . . it is true that for historical and circumstantial reasons, some communities have, by and large, participated more than others in the benefits of 2 economic advancement and production." Thus, Christians have been strong in trade and business throughout history. Their Western orientation plus their proficiency with languages helped establish contacts with Europe. Because of their superior education, the Christians also dominate the professions

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149 TABLE XT SELECTED INDICATORS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN LEBANON Population (Millions) 1943-1.02 1975-2.76 Population Density 1943-101 1975-276 (per sg. Km) Population in cities 1943-28.7 1974-39.8 Energy consumption per 1960-520 1975-928 capita (metric tons of coal eguivalent) Production of Electric 1959-267 1975-1,850 Energy (Millions of Kwh) Per capita income (dollars) 1959-362 1970-589 Number of banks 1951-5 1974-80 No. of Physicians 1965-1,700 1973-2,300 Telephones/1,000 Pop. 1948-10.8 1972-77.7 Private vehicles 1965-98 . 7 (th) 1973-220.2 (th.) Newspaper consumption 1951-0.9 1975-2.8 (Kgs. per capita) School Enrollment Primary 1961-278,783 1972-497,723 Secondary 1961-49,770 1972-174,711 University 1959-5,676 1971-44,296 SOURCE: U.N. Statistical Yearbooks; U.N. Demographic Yearboo k s ; uTn. S tud ies on Selected D e velopment Pr oblems in the Middle East . ' ' " " ' ~~ ' Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

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150 TABLE XII SOCIAL MOBILIZATION BY REGION IN LEBANON Persons per Beirut Mt . L ebanon Nth. Leb Sth . Leb Biqa sqkm. 23,034 340 191 T37 47 IRFED Development 2.22 (for both) 1.70 1.75 1.92 Scores Per capita income 803 205 200 151 206 (1957) in dollars Percentage of radio owners 85 85 85 78 91 Percentage of 39 35 27 28 18 TV owners Newspaper Consumption (percentage of total 70 (both) 30 (for the three) circulation) Percentage of readers 68 63 53 45 49 interested in internal politcs Percentage of 18.8 17.4 16.3 13.5 13.2 students in pop. SOURCE: Michael Hudson, Precarious Republic, op. cit., p. 79.

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151 Also most hotel and tourist industries are Christian owned. 3 One of the reasons for this, and for greater development of the Christian areas, are the remittances and investments of the Christian emigrants who have invested heavily in business, industry and schools. Uneven Economic Developmen t Economic modernization in Lebanon has led to uneven development between the two major communities, leading to social, economic and political differences. The economy is believed to have benefitted a small group of traders, merchants and bankers. A class division emerged between the two communities adding to the already deep divisions characterizing the Lebanese society. The class division was essentially between the poorer Moslem elements while the wealthier class was largely Christian. Since the socio-economic and political divisions overlap, the division takes on sectarian overtones. These mutually-reinforcing cleavages were intensified by both internal and external factors. As we shall see below, socio-economic modernization led to an increase in the degree of inequality, which according to Issawi "seems to be a natural concomitant of economic development carried out in a liberal framework. . .""One of the main consequences of this was an increase in religious tension. As social mobilization proceeded, resources were unevenly distributed, in large part because of the inability of the patronclient network to meet increasing demands. These clientage

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152 networks could not serve new urbanites who had moved away from their villages and become part of new economic and social groups which were not part of the traditional network. Moslem elements could not receive satisfaction for their demands, and this led in part to the growth of leftist political gorupings . For Christians who were discontented, emigration often provided a safety valve. The following pages serve to illustrate the extent of socio-economic differences between Lebanon's religious communities, which again is related to the nature of the Lebanese economy which we have surveyed. The Institut International de Recerches et de Formation en vue de developpment (IRFED), commissioned by President Shihab to advise the government on Lebanon's developmental problems, found in part that a very uneven distribution of income between members of the Lebanese society existed, necessitating more intervention by the government in the economy. (XIII) The table shows that close to 50% were "destitute" or "poor".

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153 TABLE XIII INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 19 59 Category

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154 The IRFED study also found that, in I960, half the work force was in agriculture, yet this sector received only 15.8% of the GNP. In addition, workers in the finance sector comprised only 0.44% of the work force, yet made up 6% of the GNP. In a study of Lebanese entrepreneurs, Sayigh found that most business leaders were Christian (Table XV). In finance , trade and services, the overwhelming majority were Christian.". . . trade , finance and services are activities where, generally speaking, the most lucrative opportunities are already seized by people well established in the field."" This was one cause of Moslem resentment. One major reason for the Christian predominance is their higher level of education. Better education and bilingualism have led to better economic opportunities. Table XVI shows both differences in education and occupation according to religion. IRFED found also uneven regional development. The largely Christian areas of Mount Lebanon and Beirut were generally more developed than the other, mainly Moslem, areas. "Highest economic returns .. .have tended to accrue 9 to the Christians of central Lebanon." The study maintained that only 5% of Mt . Lebanon was undeveloped, compared to 46% of the North, 30% of the South and 35% in the East (in terms mainly of health, education and housing). Partly because of the long-established missions there, Mt. Lebanon had the highest literacy level.

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15!

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156 CHAPTER XVI EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF WIFE AND HUSBAND, FAMILY INCOME, AND HUSBAND'S OCCUPATION BY RELIGIOUS GROUP: LEBANON, 19 71. Characteristics Catholic non-Cath. Christian Sunni Shiite Druze Wife's education Average no. yrs comp'ed, percent no schooling Husband's Education Average no. yrs comp'ed. Percent no schooling Professional /Technical Business /Manage rial Clerical Army/Police/Guard Crafts/Operatives Farming Peddlery Labor Other Total 4.4 29% 5.4 15% 6 17 14 9 20 10 18 6 100 5.2 20% 5.! 13' 6 21 13 5 24 8 1 16 7 100 3.3

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157 In essence, then, a disagreement occurred among the elite over the allocation of resources, which it appeared went largely to Christian areas and better served Christian clientage networks. With major differences in patronage among the communities, an imbalance in the distribution of resources resulted in communal strife. As Lemarchand writes : Even more important is the capacity of the machine to strike an adequate balance of patronage along the vertical axis of class stratification and the horizontal dimension of ethnic cleavages. An exceedingly lopsided distribution of spoils on each of these dimensions may bring disaffection, revolt, or ethnic strife . 10 The government--elite cartel-was unable to agree on steps to improve the socio-economic situation of the poorer sectors of society. The zuama were from well-to-do backgrounds, and were not attuned to the problems and needs of the urban and rural poor who now came to be led by leftist elements who were excluded from the elite cartel. These leftist elements challenged the traitional Moslem leaders for leadeship. They were, in essence, nonclientelistic elements who were not connected to the institutions of the state. The elite displayed a decided lack of concern for social justice for the lower class. Dekmejian argues:

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153 Even if the Lebanese elite possessed the will to enact a social welfare program, it could still find it difficult to implement. Indeed, the very nature of Lebanon's decentralized and pluralistic confessional system works against elite effectiveness. . . The system did not allow changes. The government was ill-equipped to deal with demands of new groups who represented elements that had not benefitted from the country's prosperity. The government lacked the infrastructure to effectively implement policy. Political and social change, the problems of socio-economic modernization, were issues that the confessional system could not cope with. A government whose power was always limited was unable to redress the imbalance resulting from development. A closer look at the issue of proportionality and the role of the government is now in order. The Principle of Proportionality The second aspect of the Internal factor consists of changes in the population balance between the two major communities. Since the system was built on the assumption that the Christians were the majority, and thus alloted more political power, a belief that Moslems now constituted a majority introduced an additional source of conflict between Lebanon's sects. In essence, elite conflict grew over the question of sharing of political power. The rule of proportionality—a principle of the consociational system--

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] 5 3 was challenged by leaders of the Moslem community, both traditional and the newly-emergent. No longer was there adherence by all to rule by the traditional elite cartel. An imbalance in the composition of the elite corresponded with an imbalance in the distribution of resources. Demands for more representation were resisted by Christian leaders. Traditional Moslem leaders called for moderate reforms, while the new leftist groups demanded more fundamental changes. Below is a survey of this problem of proportionality. Because of the widespread belief that the Moslems of Lebanon were now a majority, it was argued, mainly by Moslems, that they were entitled to more political power. Studies indicate that, because of the higher Moslem birth rate and a higher rate of Christian emigration, the Moslem community most probably were a majority in Lebanon (See Tables XVII & XVIII) .Based on a survey by the Lebanon Family Planning Association in 1970, Chamie found religion to have an effect on fertility, and these religious differences in fertility appeared to be related to differences in socioeconomic status. The birth rate was higher for the Moslems, who had a lower socio-economic status than the Christians. He finds the "ordering of the relgious groups from high to low fertility was: Shiites, Surmis, Druze and Catholics, 12 and lowest non-Catholic Christians."

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160 TABLE XVII DIFFERENCES IN TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (TFR) AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN (T) AND NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN (L) PER 1,000 MARRIED WOMEN 4 5-4 9 YEARS OLD BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: LEBANON, 1971

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] 61 TABLE XVIII NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN AND NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN PER 1,000 MARRIED WOMEN BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND WTFE-S AGE: LEBANON, 19 71 Wife ' s_ Age Religion 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Number of Children Ever Born per 1,000 Married_Women Catholic

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162 Chamie concludes "these results suggests religion is an important characteristic differentiating fertility behavior, but only at certain socio-economic levels." 13 David Yaukey found a similar correlation between religion and the fertility rate. He finds a high birth rate in the rural areas for both Christians and Moslems (uneducated) for the urban uneducated the birth rate is high for Moslems and low for Christians; among the urban educated it is low for 14 Christians and moderate for Moslems. More specifically, in the city fertility rates for uneducated and educated Christians were 4.14 and 3.14, while for Moslems it was 15 7.35 and 5.56. He advances the argument that "high fertility is advocated as a commitment to the growth of the religious group and the spread of the true faith. Further, the limiting of fertility (or even the thought of limiting fertility) is an expression of lack of faith in the omnipotence of Allah to provide for all of his followers." We have seen that there exist differences between the two communities in terms of economic wealth. This was a major bone of contention between the Christians and Moslems, as was the demand for a change in distribution of political power as a result of population changes. This perceived inequality was one of the major contributing causes of the 1975-1976 war. We now turn to a discussion of the Lebanese economy and the role played by the state in the economy and its efforts at creating a semblance of social justice.

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16 3 Ihe Leba nes e Economy Prior to the war, Lebanon exhibited an economy that was a classic example of laissez-faire capitalism, and despite its small size and lack of natural resources, the country came to have one of the highest percapita incomes in the Middle East, and was generally considered to be more economically advanced than the rest of the Arab world. Lebanon's favorable geographical location has been an important contributing factor to its prosperity. It is an important transit trade center, serving the Arab hinterland; oil pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia traverse the country for the shipping of oil to Europe. The country's scenic beauty and pleasant climate have made tourism a major source of revenue. As we shall see in more detail the economy is essentially built on trade and services, which make up two-thirds of the country's total national product, with industry and agriculture making up the remaining third. In addition, contacts with the outside, historically a strong point for Maronites, and the Lebanese penchant for trade, have helped determine the nature of Lebanon's economic system. Let us now turn to a discussion of the economic structure and attempt to ascertain which groups benefitted from it. Commissioned by the Lebanese government to study the Lebanese economy and offer recommendations for improvement, Belgian economist uttered his now famous line, "I don't know what makes it work. But it seems to do pretty well. 17 I suggest that you leave it alone." Lebanon's entrepot

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164 economy was, in fact, an interesting example of an open, free market system, in that it depended largely on its services sector, an area developed primarily by private enterprise. Economic development in Lebanon, in fact, has been largely the preserve of the private sector. While the government provided security and basic services private enterprise developed the economy. Unlike the majority of developing countries, economic development in Lebanon has not been the result of planned, coordinated government action. Trade, finance, transport and tourism 18 became booming areas after independence. The Lebanese success may be attributed partly to "the edge that the Lebanese enjoyed over other Arabs in education, business sophistication, and external contacts and connections." 19 The economy was characterized by an easy exchange rate (free currency convertibility) free import of gold, confidential banking laws (not unlike Switzerland's system) and an overall healthy balance of payments. Beirut became a banking and commercial center, helping the country attain a growth rate of 8.5% yearly in the GNP . Bank deposits rose from 215 million Lebanese Pounds (mil) in 1950 to 9,106 mil by the end of 1974, with over half the funds belonging to the oil-rich Gulf states. 21 The actual capital inflow from oil-producing countries increased from 14 mil in 1951 to 22 220 mil in 1965. The balance of payments was helped also by large amounts of remittances from the mostly Christian emigrants which rose from 58.4 mil in 1951 to 112 mil in

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16 1966. In 1971 the net capital inflow reached 119 rail. Lebanon's economy was a "lopsided economic structure" with trade and services accounting for a major portion of the country's revenue. (See Tables XIX and XX). Most of the private capital investments go to the services sector and private capital varied between 74% and 86% of total capital formation. As mentioned above, trade has been part of Lebanon's history. Early relations and contacts with Europe, as noted in chapter 1, helped shape the nature of the economy: The predominance of the services sector in the structure of the economy is not an isolated phenomenon, or a matter of accident. It is closely tied, within an intricate system of interaction, with attitudes, human skills, legal framework, institutions, values, and group perception of role in society, as well as with cultural heritage, geographical location and natural endowments . 2 °

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166 TABLE XIX ORIGINS OF NET NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1950-1966 (AT CURRENT FACTOR COST) Net National Agric. Industry Services Product (11 M) Percentage of Net National Product Three Year Moving Averages 1950

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167 TABLE XX TRADE AND FINANCE SECTORS AS % OF NET NATIONAL PRODUCT 1954-1966 '54 '55 '57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62 '64 '66 Trade 29.3 29.6 31.2 27.5 31.8 32.0 32.0 31.4 30.8 30.6 Finance 4.5 5.1 6.0 7.0 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.5 3.4 3.6 Total 33.8 34.7 37.2 34.5 38.1 38.3 38.4 37.9 35.5 34.7 SOURCE: Adapted from Ibid . , p. 199. (the U.S. Dollar is worth approximately 3 Lebanese pounds.)

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168 While two-thirds of Lebanon's national income comes from services, it employs only a third of the labor force, while agriculture and light industry contribute half of the amount services do, employs significantly more than services. (See Table XXI). Industry consists mainly of the production of textiles, cement, chemicals, processed food, furnishing and metal products. Industrialization has not kept up with the fast rate of urbanization, creating a problem of unemployment. Industry suffers from lack of resources and markets. Industry grew only three percent, from 14-191 of Gross Domestic Product from 1964-1973. 28 With this neglect of the good-producing sector, Lebanon has 9 Q had to spend up to 48% of its income on imports. Since urbanization is taking place without proportionate industrialization, there is little contribution to productivity, but a continual demand for services. Diversion of resources is required to cope with urban problems but. . . this diversion will have to be at the expense of desirable investment in industry and agriculture . ^0 Lebanon's exports are mainly agricultural, consisting of fruits and vegetables, plus poultry products. Some have seen this economic structure as inevitable. Khalaf argues Lebanon, being small, has not been able to emphasize agriculture and industry as much as would be desirable. Pie adds "the country. . . should increase her dependence on export markets in order to utilize large scale production and thus compensate for her smallness."

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169 TABLE XXI NATIONAL INCOME 1950 AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 19 7 2 BY SECTOR Sector 1950 lm percent 1972 of Total lm Agriculture, livestock 207 and Fisheries Electricity and Water 3 Industry and Crafts Construction Transport and Communications Housing and Real Estate Finance and Insurance Trade Professional and Other Services Government 72 20.2 631 7.0 477 percent of total 9.9

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170 TABLE XXII PERCENTAGE GROWTH OF SECTORS BETWEEN 1950 AND 1972 (1950=100 Sector Index for 1972 Agriculture, livestock, etc. Electricity and water Industry and crafts Construction Transport and Communications Housing and Real Estate Finance and Insurance Trade Professional and other Services Government Average all sectors 305

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171 TABLE XXIII DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACTIVE LABOUR FORCE BY SECTOR 1959 1970 Sector '000 Percent '000 Percent Agriculture IndustryElectricity and Water Construction Trade and Finance Transport and Communication 16 200

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172 Aly and Nur assert this imbalance is inevitable because of the lack of natural resources. They point out that the country has a percapita hectareage of arable land less than one-third of the average for Europe. Industry, moreover, is costly because of both the lack of resources and the size of the market.^ 2 An economy of this nature is highly vulnerable to external factors beyond the country's control. Regional instability has led to adverse effects on the economy. Since services (especially tourism and finance) are performed for non-Lebanese, good relations must be maintained with Arab countries. Trade is affected by the policies of other countries, for example Syria closing the border several times in the post war period to express dissatisfaction with particular Lebanese policies, most of which involved attitudes toward the Palestinian guerrillas. This, plus excessive dependence on foreign capital investment, have led to a precarious economy. "A society cannot hope to achieve and maintain a high rate of growth predominantly on the basis of a large new inflow 3 3 of capital." The services sector cannot absorb the jobs that industry and agriculture cannot provide. There was insufficient investment in industry to creat enough jobs, the demand for which increased greatly with rapid urbanization.

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173 P lanning and the Governmental Rol e Planning has been difficult in Lebanon. By the very nature of the system, where each group was careful not to allow any one group to dominate Lebanese politics, the role of government has always been limited. By and large, the government had neither the capability nor the desire to intervene in the economy. Moslems, being the less privileged elements, favor planning as a means by which a more equitable distribution of wealth may result, while Christians, having a vested interest in the structure of the economy, have in general opposed any major governmental intervention . The government has, by and large, limited itself to ad hoc projects. It has provided the basic infrastructure for transport and communications, provided public utilities, while promoting trade and services which require relatively little investment and where returns are high. There is no agreement by all groups on ultimate long-term goals, ". . .the attitude of the state is normally one of neutrality and concern for the maintenance of a legal balance that is a reflection of social tradition rather than an influence on them." J In sum, government has not been able to promote economic opportunity. Any sort of planning or organization by the public sector is frowned upon by the business community, who argue it is detrimental to development and a departure from Lebanon's free enterprise system. As Sayigh puts it:

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174 The basic philosophy underlying this orientation was not only the superfluity of government interference in the economic realm, beyond the provision of (some but not all) inf rastructural facilities but the outright danger of such interference.^ In essence, the increasing socio-economic differences between the communities has led to the demand for government intervention to improve the conditions of poorer areas through major developmental plans and projects. Impasses and immobilism are common, due to the confessional and feudal nature of the system where approval of economic plans by all is well nigh difficult to obtain. Development projects have operated under the constraints of conf essionalsim with its attendant personal element. "Confessionalism, pluralism and consensus do not naturally lend themselves to strong central controls no matter how objective or rational these controls . . . planning as an instrument of modernization can only be as effective as the political leaders permit it to be."^ 6 Government was meant to represent a just allocation, not to play a central role, and was usually constrained because of its sensitivity to religious balances and suspicions. Demands were met and services provided through the patronclient network indirectly linked with the governmental machinery. With increased social mobilization, the "debilitation of the clientelist networks" took place:

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J 7' These networks could not in any case meet more numerous and sophisticated demands; and the services they could offer were less readily available to villagers who migrated to the towns or to new economic and social groups which did not fall easily within the traditional relationship. 37 One of the most difficult issues to be contended with is the regressive tax system, the reform of which is opposed by the rich. Table XXIV shows the ratio of taxes to GNP : TABLE XXIV 1965-1973, RATIO OF TAXES TO GNP 19 6 5 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 12.8 11.8 11.3 11.7 11.2 10.7 11.6 11.8 11.9 SOURCE: Makdisi, op. cit., p. 274 A survey of government planning in post-war Lebanon shows the limited involvement of the state in the country's economic affairs. In 1954, the Planning and Development Board, at the request of the government, attempted to draft a development plan. Four years later it said public investment on a large scale was needed, for industry agriculture and social welfare. The conflict of 1958 put an end to these plans. The first ambitious plans for development began with President Shihab following the 1958 crisis. Shihab decided the government had to plan the growth of the economy, in an attempt to bring about some measure of social justice. The

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176 need was for government to play a more active role. Shihab asked IRFED for recommendations for the alleviation of Lebanon's economic problems. IRFED suggested a three billion (Lebanese pounds) five-year plan for 1964-1968. They said the government had to plan, especially for a better infrastructure, and to build agriculture and industry. The agency also called for a more even distribution of income. These suggestions were met with skepticism in some quarters.". . .critics charged that IRFED was a state: within a state and that it was attempting to impose 'Vatican Socialism' on the free economy." 38 To improve governmental administration, Shihab created the Civil Service Commission, the Institute for Administration and development, the Central Inspection Office, the Council for Execution of major projects, the Green Plan, the Central Bank, the Social Rehabilitation Service and the Council for Beirut projects. Shihab favored trained personnel and distrusted the zuama . No real changes, however, occured in the country's economy. More roads were built, water and electricity reached more villages, and irrigation was improved somewhat. The Administration remained corrupt and inefficient. From the outset. . . the plan has been beset by political, juridical and administrative obstacles to the extent that it has been virtually abandoned in favor of the simpler approach of direct allocations of projects to the various parts of the country.^

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177 Planning in this case is no more "than mere public investment". 40 Though sincere in his attempt to initiate major planning in the economy, Shihab encountered obstacles, inherent in the nature of the political system that were difficult to surmount. His successor, the less assertive and less demanding Charles Helou continued to pay lip service to the need for a greater governmental role. Citing the need for more social justice, he stated in 1967 that "it is no longer possible in the second half of the twentieth century for any government to follow a policy of laissez-faire. (The main task of the government) is to establish the infrastructure of development and provide the fundamental conditions needed by the enterprising Lebanese people." 41 His attempts to reform the tax structure, as a step toward this end, proved unsuccessful. As may be seen from Table XXV, expenditure on planning remained minimal in the mid-sixties. Two projects initiated by the government are worth pointing out because of their relatively widespread success. The first was the Litani project, which began in 1957, and was intended to increase electricity output, plus serve irrigation purposes, especially in the more impoverished areas of the South and East. The first stage was complete in 1965 with the opening of the Qar'un dam. It was able to irrigate almost 100,000 acres in these regions, although initially it was used mainly for the generation of 42 electricity.

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171 TABLE XXV GENERAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES OF LEBANON, 1964-1967 (in millions of Lebanese pounds) Actual Accounts Budget Estimates 1964 1965 1966 1967 Branches of Government 3 13.06 18.26 18.07 31.37 Ministry of Defense 76.63 90.08 105.87 128.90 Ministry of Justice 8.91 9.99 9.98 10.98 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12.69 20.04 22.39 27.12 Ministry of the Interior 42.97 43.38 44.80 49.91 Ministry of Finance 18.49 19.53 20.26 22.47 Ministry of Education 59.45 78.67 82.02 97.32 and Fine Arts Ministry of Public Health 13.70 16.59 19.16 24.06 Ministry of Social Welfare 12.70 21.14 18.39 11.87 Ministry of Information 9.68 12.32 10.84 6.59 Ministry of Public Works 143.33 137.83 133.50 121.84 Ministry of Agriculture 15.48 13.51 16.23 16.67 Ministry of National Economy 10.75 6.24 2.09 2.35 Ministry of Planning 2.41 2.25 2.17 2.49 Ministry of Post, Telephone 8.23 9.23 9.23 11.17 and Telegraph Other 24.55 27.11 32.51 67^9_ Total 473.03 526.17 547.66 632.90 a Includes Parliament, Presidency, Prime Minister's Office and other depts . SOURCE: Harvey Smith, et. al, op. cit . , p. 290.

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179 The other project was the Green Plan, started in 1963, and concerned mainly with reforestation and land reclamation. Priority was for the small farmers who increased their income and had their land terraced with government help, mainly with the use of irrigation equipment and the building of wells. Between 1965 and 1970, 12,703 farmers "benefitted from some aspect of the Green Plan's activities." The six-year plan of 1972-1977 stated the need to create more employment plus to attempt a more even distribution of income. Again specific means were not spelled out. More was to be spent on education (20%), public health (6%) and Housing (2%) . 44 The plan would not change the balance in the economy, say Aly and Nur. They reiterate that the sectoral imbalance is inevitable because of lack of resources. Employment would not increase, according to their calculations. They project the ratio of employment to the active population as .56 in 1970 and 1-52 in 1977. 45 This plan, and those before it, do not specify the methods to be used in carrying out the plans. They are not capable of remedying the problem of maldistribution of income. Central planning, it became evident, had no place in a political and economic system of this nature. Public confidence in such projects is, moreover, minimal. As the Smocks write:

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180 Economic planning generally and regional planning particularly have never come to be firmly rooted, and since the end of the Shihab era the concept of the government playing an instrumentalist role in Lebanese economic affairs , particularly in order to promote regional and community parity, has lost much of its popularity. 4 Christian groups in Lebanon have not been totally opposed to increased social justice in Lebanon. The mainly Maronite Kataeb party, for example, argues the need for social programs, but stipulates that this should take place gradually: Central to the (party's) concern has been the way by which meaningful socioeconomic and political change may occur without disrupting the system's dynamic stability. To escape immobilism and instability the party emphasizes the need for incremental change or balanced growth; that is, visible social change achieved within an evolutionary framework free of political excesses, inflated promises, and revolutionary rhetoric. The party felt that national unity, and a growing attachment to Lebanon, could be achieved by overcoming major socioeconomic differences. The party, in fact, in the early sixties pushed for some form of social legislation. It has also suggested a national health insurance program and low48 cost housing. External events have changed the party's attitude somewhat. The emergence of the Palestinians in

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181 Lebanon and the growth also of Lebanese radical groups have led to a hardening of the party's position: Such a trend has forced the Rata ' ib into an essentially dysfunctional defensive posture wherein effort is directed more at maintaining the system at any cost rather than advancing meaningful programs of social reform and political development . We have shown that increased inequality has paralleled economic development in Lebanon. We have seen how the political and religious cleavages have been added to a class cleavage, further widening the gap between the Christian and Moslem communities. It is clear Christians and Christian areas have benefitted most from the Lebanese system and have tended to oppose any major governmental interference, which Moslems have demanded as a means of redistribution. Government, because of the complex confessional system and the constraints on effective action it imposes, is unable to make long-term development projects workable . It was both the disproportionate Christian economic and political power that led the underprivileged elements — led by leftist parties--to force fundamental changes on the Lebanese system. This was resisted by the Christians, not merely to avoid giving up more economic wealth, but seen in a greater scope, to avoid disruption of the status quo upon which their perceived security rested. The leftist elements' desire to change the system was allied with

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182 their desire to align it closer to the Arab world making Lebanon a more active partner in the Arab-Israeli struggle. Their demand for a re-allocation of income and political power cannot be divorced from their orientation toward Israel and the Arab World. We now turn our attention to the external cause of the civil war--the role of the Palestinians in the Lebanese political system. It will be seen that disenchanted Moslem elements found an opportunity to challenge the status quo through their alliance with the Palestinian Resistance in the country. Again, it was not so much Christian unwillingness to give up more power as it was their fear that victory of this leftist alliance would mean an end to Lebanese sovereignty and independence and a loss of their rights and privileges in a leftist-dominated state allied with the Arab world. Indeed, as the war wore on the struggle became one, not so much for who was to get what, but indeed the determination of Lebanon's destiny.

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183 Notes 1. In an interesting assessment of the different religious attitudes to the initiative and enterprise of the individual, Sayigh writes: "Almost twice as large a proportion of Christians as of Moslems carry personal insurance. Whereas members of both faiths believe that the life of man is in the hands of God, the Moslems seem to carry their belief to its logical conclusion and to place more trust in God's will." Sayigh, Entrepreneurs of Lebanon , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962) , p. 92 . 2. C. Rossillion, "Cultural pluralism, Eouality of Treatment and equality of opportunity in Lebanon," Intern ational Labor Review (Sept. 1968), p. 230. Farsoun and CarroTT point out that the Middle Class grew in the interwar years, aided by French investment, with the French favoring the educated, French-speaking Maronites. S. Farsoun and W. Carroll, "The Civil war in Lebanon: Sect, Class, and Imperialism," Monthly Review (June, 19 76), p. 19. """ ' ' '"" 3. Harvey Smith et. al, Area Handbook for Lebanon , Washington: U.S. GovernmentTTrinting" Of f ice , 1974), p. 247. 4. Salem, op. cit . , p. 28-29. 5. Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Political Liberalism in Lebanon," in Politics in Lebanon by L. Binder, op. cit. p. 77. 6. Enver Khoury, The Crisis in the Leban e se Sy stem, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976) , p. 35. 7. Hudson, op. cit., p. 64. 8. Elie Salem, Modernizat ion__wit hout R evol ution: Le bano n's experience (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1973), p . 5 1 . 9. Y. Sayigh, op. cit . , pp. 78-79. 10. Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation Building , " American Political Science Re view, (March, 1972) , p. 86.

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184 11. H.R. Dekmejian, op. cit . , p. 93. 12. Chamie , op. cit . , p. 380. 13. Ibid . , pp. 380, 382. 14. David Yaukey, Fertilit y__Dif ferences in a M oderni zing Country (Princeton: Princeton University Press , ~196T) , p. 43. 15. Ibid . , p. 79. 16. Ibid . , p. 7 17. Quoted in N. Raphaeli, "Development Planning: Lebanon," Western Political Quarterly (Spring, 1967), p. 714. 18. The number of Tourists in 1974 totalled 3,008,391, broken down as follows: Arab Countries .... 892 , 203 Europe 316 ,080 The Americas 143,000 Syria 1,498,131 SOURCE: Europa Publications, The Middle East_and North Africa (London, 1976-77), p. 506. 19. A.Y. Badre , "Economic Development of Lebanon," in Economic Development and populat ion_gr owth in t he M iddle East , by C.A. Cooper and S.S. Alexander (eds) (New York: Elsevier 1972) , p. 167. 20. T.A. Sayigh, "Lebanon," in The_Economies of th e Ar ab World: Development Sin c e 19 4 5~ ~7London : Croom Helm Ltd. , 1978) , p. 283. 21. Ibid. , p. 289 . 22. Badre, op. cit., p. 168. 23. Nadim Khalaf, Econom ic Im plication s of _ the siz e of nations: With special Refer e nce t o Lebanon ( LeTden : E.J. Brill, 1971) , p. 221. 24. Sayigh, op. cit . , p. 298. 25. Khalaf, op. cit., p. 165. 26. Sayigh, op. cit . , p. 303.

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185 27. The Beirut port benefitted from the boycott of Israel. Also the closure of the Suez canal doubled Lebanon's transit trade. Badre , op. cit . , p. 169. Also Lebanon's financial and communications facilities made it an attractive regional base for foreign companies. U.S. companies, for example, numbered 264 by the mid-sixties. M. Hudson, Precarious Repub lic (New York: Random House Inc. , 1968) p. 63. 28. Samir Makdisi, "An appraisal of Lebanon's postwar economic development and a look to the future," The Middle East Journal (Winter/19 77), p. 268. Agriculture, on the other hand, declined from 12% to 9.5' 29. Khalaf, op. cit . , p. 202. 30. United Nations, Studies on Social Develo p ment in the Middle East (New York: 1971), p. 40. 31. Khalaf, op. cit., p. 178. 32. Hamdi Aly and Nabil Abdub-Nur, "An Appraisal of the Six Year Plan of Lebanon (19 72-19 77)," Middle _East Jou rnal (Spring, 1975), p. 160. " "~ " "' " 33. Sayigh, op. cit., p. 309. 34. Rossillion, op. cit . , p. 237. 35. Sayigh, Economies of the Arab World , p. 286. 36. Salem, op. cit., pp. 108, 128. 37. Frank Stoakes, "The Civil War in Lebanon, " The World Today (January, 1976) p. 9. 38. Hudson, Precarious Republic, p. 314. Sayigh 's study of Lebanese Entrepreneurs finds that "over 55% of Moslem respondents but only 35% of Christians believed that central planning and control would help businessmen and promote development." Sayigh, Entr epren eurs of Lebano n, op. cit . , p. 114 . 39. United Nations, Studie s on Selecte d Develo pment Prob lems in the Middle East , 196~9 (New York: 1969), p. 75. 40. Raphaeli, op. cit., p. 726. Makdisi points out that between 1964-1971 public investment expenditure on health, housing and education amounted to less than 8% of the total. Makdisi, op. cit., p. 274.

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186 41. Quoted in Koury, op. cit . , p. 34. Helou's administration was preoccupied by two important events, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the Intra Bank crash of 1966. 42. Hudson, Precarious Republic , p. 321. Also see United Nations, Stud ies on Selected _ Development , 1969, p. 81. 43. Smock and Smock, The Politics of Pluralism (New York: Elsevier 1975), p. 174. ' ~~ 44. Makdisi, op. cit. , p. 274. In 1972, there were 20 government hospitals and 12 3 private ones. 45. Ali and Abdun-Nur, op. cit. , p. 160. 46. Smock and Smock, op. cit . , p. 176. 47. John Entelis, "Reformist Ideology in the Arab World: The Cases of Tunisia and Lebanon," The Review of Politics (October, 1975) , p. 541. 48. Ibid. , p. 543. 49 . Ibid. , p. 546 .

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CHAPTER VI THE EXTERNAL FACTOR — THE PALESTINIANS The other major underlying cause of Lebanon's civil war is what we have termed the external factor, namely the presence in Lebanon of the Palestinian guerrillas and the role they played in Lebanon's internal politics. This discussion will revolve mainly around the first manifestation of armed conflict between the state and the commandos in 1969. The positions of the various Lebanese groups toward the Palestinian commandos crystallized in this period and the issue was to remain a source of tension with Armycommando conflict erupting again in 1973, leading to a final showdown in the 1975-76 war. "The Lebanese Army is the Christian's army, and the Palestinian resistance is the Muslim's army." This statement, made by Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of the leftist coalition in the civil war, indicates the role of the Palestinians in Lebanon and the resultant divisions they helped bring about. As was common throughout the country's history, Lebanon's communities looked to outside powers for protection and support and it appeared that the Palestinians had replaced Nasser's Egypt as the military backbone of Lebanon's Moslems, who had long regarded the Lebanese Army as a Christian institution, unsympathetic--l j ke the Christian population at large--to issues of Arab concern. The Lebanese Moslems ' identification with their co-religionists in the 187

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Arab world received its strongest expression with the support for the Palestinians, both because of their Arab identification and because they represented a potential ally against Christian domination. While Moslems in general, and a small minority of Christians, supported Palestinian activities in Lebanon, their strongest support came from the leftist parties excluded from power. Traditional Moslem leaders' support was genuine, but was contingent on the Palestinians' adherence to certain restrictions on their activities. To maintain support in their communities they continually spoke out in support of the Palestinian "cause", but their enthusiasm was tempered by their desire to prevent any major threat to the system in which they had a stake. Their position that reforms could be made within the system further strengthened the alliance between the militant Moslem groups and the Palestinians. The common underlying ideology between the two groups of the alliance was the determination to end the existence of a Christian-dominated, Western-oriented state in an increasingly nationalistic, Moslem Arab world. The threat to the state and the Christians' privileged positon was more acute now as, unlike Syria and Egypt which threatened the regime from the "outside'' , the fedayeen were a force actually present in the country, who now gave the radical Moslem Lebanese hope for change. Palestinian statements that declared that the road

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18 9 to "Liberation" of Israel passed through Lebanon's Christian towns and cities reinforced the Christians ' long-held belief that the presence of Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon was a threat to them and to Lebanese sovereignty. This chapter will look at the emergence of the Palestinian influence in Lebanon, showing how it adversely affected the relations between the members of the elite cartel, an essential tenet of consociational democracy. The nature of the problem was such that it was difficult to discern a recognizable build up in tension and increasing conflict. We shall look at the 1969 clash, as this represented the first manifestation of armed hostility between the state and the guerrillas. While isolated terrorist incidents did take place prior to the outbreak of hostilities in April 1969, they were not of sufficient scale or intensity to cause general interest, alarm or concern. A survey of the three months before the fighting will help demonstrate the salience of the of the Palestinian issue. (Figure I) . Looking at the Lebanese daily, Th e Daily Star (centrist) in the period prior to April does not actually indicate a series of events leading to a clash. This is especially true for the period after 1969 when attempts were made by the government to "depoliticize" the issue and to de-emphasize the extent of conflict and to continually downplay incidents involving the commandos and the state. A survey of the Daily Star in the months following the

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190 outbreak of fighting (Figure I) the Palestinian-Lebanese crisis was the main front-page story every day for the following four weeks, interrupted only on May 19 for a headline on the important Apollo 10 moonshot. The editorial page was devoted to the story in more than 50% of the issues. In June, when the clashes had tapered off, the issue continued to dominate Lebanese news. The headline for three weeks out of the month was concerned with the Cabinet crisis brought on by the Palestinian question. A closer survey of this crisis will reveal the extent of the effect of the Palestinian presence on Lebanon's political system, and more specifically on the relations between the society's religious communities and their leaders. In a broad sense Lebanon is a "penetrated system". Hanreider states: A political system is penetrated: 1. if its decision-making process regarding the allocation of values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals is strongly affected by external events, and 2. if it can command wide consensus among the relevant elements of the decision-making process in accomodating to these events. The effect of the external environment was to worsen existing divisions in the Lebanese body politic, creating a volatile fusion of internal and external strains on the delicate balance.

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191

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192 We shall see how the Internal and External factors interacted to produce immense strains on the system. In other words, we shall discuss how the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon gave leftist, mainly Moslem, groups the backing and confidence to challenge the Establishment in Lebanon, demanding major changes in the power structure, involving an abolition of the National Pact, over which the Christians, mainly Maronites , would not compromise. The clash was essentially one between radical, outside elites and conservative Christian, and to a lesser extent, Moslem traditional elites. The outcome is further complicated by other outside factors--the intervention by Syria — and the relation of Lebanon's war to the overall Middle Eastern conflict . Emergence of the Palestinian Resist ance From 1948, when the first Palestinian refugees were created from the first Arab-Israeli war, to the early sixties the Palestians in the Diaspora were not politically organized. It was only after the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 that the Palestinians were looked upon by the Arab masses and governments as an additional force to be used in the struggle against Israel. As their popularity increased, the Palestinians themselves became more determined to play an active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in view of the Arab states' continual failure to reach a settlement. In addition, "... their different military

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193 tactics seemed to present a viable alternative to those of the 3 Arab conventional armed forces. After 1967 the Palestinians 4 called openly for an armed struggle against Israel. Lebanon's political stability has been tested by this political awakening among the Palestinians. In general, Moslems have welcomed it while Christians have opposed it. Fatah^ was formed in Gaza in 1955 by Yesir Arafat. This, the largest guerrilla group, came ultimately to dominate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formed in May, 1964, in Jerusalem by the Arab States. The meeting also provided for a Palestinian army to be built (PLA) , to help in the war effort. 6 By 1965 Fatah was staging raids into Israel from Syria and the Gaza strip. Though these were on a small scale they did prompt Israeli retaliation. By the late 1960 's the PLO had formed institutions, as the Palestine National Council and the Executive Committee. The PLO after 1976 "rapidly dropped its former character, which was distinctly pan-Arab, and came into its own as a Palestinian Nationalist movement within the broad context of Arabism, which put forth as its ultimate aim the establishment of a Palestinian national state on the whole territory of what was once Palestine."'' By this time the Palestinians in the Lebanese refugee camps numbered close to a quarter of a million. During Shihab's administration (1958-64) these camps were kept under strict government control. In all they numbered 15, with six centered around

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194 Beirut, two near Tripoli, three each in the Tyre and Sidon areas and one in the Bekaa. Only a small number of Palestinians were given citizenship in Lebanon in the early years, or were able to obtain it through various means. Nonassimilation , obviously, was necessary to prevent an upset in the confessional balance, as the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians were Moslems. By early 1968, the Palestinians were reportedly increasing their guerrilla activities, seeking aid and advice from sources as extreme as the former Algerian rebels. ^ President Nasser announced Egypt was ready to support and arm members of the Palestine Resistance movements . In Lebanon, the Army, and more especially its Intelligence branch the Deuxieme Bu reau , kept a tight watch on Palestinian activities in Lebanon. H A number of commandos were arrested near the border with Israel, suspected of planning armed 12 attacks from Lebanese territory. One Fatah commando' arrested by the Deuxieme Bureau died while in custody causing some ill-feeling between the Palestinians and the Lebanese government. Small, isolated clashes occured 13 between the two sides in the second half of 1968. " In May of 196 8 Lebanon was denying to the United Nations that commandos were carrying out attacks on Israel from Lebanese soil, arguing the attacks came from Palestinians based inside Israel .

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195 At this time the more radical, Marxist-oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) , led by Dr. George Habash (formed in November 1967) was calling for revolution in all the Arab countries as a prerequisite 15 for the liberation of Palestine. Perhaps the beginning of Lebanon's full involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict came with the Israeli raid on Beirut's International Airport on December 28, 1968, in which 13 Lebanese Airliners were destroyed. Israel charged that two Palestinians who had attacked an El Al Israeli plane at Athens airport had departed from Lebanon. The attack was seen as a warning to Lebanon to control the guerrillas. Leftist parties criticized the Army for not moving quickly against the Israelis, while the Christians came to the Army's defense. The popularity of the army waned among the Moslems who argued that the Army should fight Israel and not restrict commando activity, while the Christian leaders argued Lebanon would be safe from Israel by not providing them with an excuse to attack. This is, control of the Palestinians ' activities was the best course for the government to follow. The Kataeb stated that "the hospitality granted to the Palestinians should not be 17 allowed to become a source of calamity for Lebanon." This incident sparked strikes and demonstrations that continued until the end of January. "The alienation normally visable in some university and professional circles was now intensified and channeled into support for the Palestinians'

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196 Lebanon, meanwhile, maintained it was not responsible for Palestinian guerrilla activities outside Lebanon. 1 Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Yafi's Cabinet resigned in the wake of the protests and Rashid Karami was entrusted with the task of forming a Cabinet. The outgoing Premier had supported freedom for the Palestinians, "... thereby (commiting) his successors in the Sunnite leadership in Lebanon to uphold this position, to the serious embarrassment of President Helou, the Army Command, and the whole Christian sector of 20 the Lebanese establishment."" The Christian groups, united in the Tripartite Alliance or Hilf , were 21 concerned about the growth of the Palestinian guerrilla force who, for their part, were able to strengthen their position by exploiting the polarization of opinion between the Christians and Moslems, though Fatah insisted it would not interfere in Lebanese internal affairs. The PFLP, on the other hand, continually stressed that Lebanon's leftist parties, which it helped train and arm, were "the Resistance's main protection against the regime.""^ It became clear, moreover, that Moslems were using the Palestinians as a medium by which they could promote Moslem influence in Lebanon. Kamal Jumblatt, who was emerging as one of the Left's main spokesmen, asserted that the Moslems had to protect "their rears", meaning the Palestinians constituted an armed 23 force which could oppose that of the Christian establishment. This allowed Moslems to demand more concessions from the Maronites. "The presence of non-indigenous Palestinian

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197 guerrillas in Lebanon aggravated all the susceptibilities which had lain dormant since the civil war in 1958. Their activities contributed to the radicalization of the political climate . Christian groups worried about Lebanon's security and the threat to governmental authority posed by the guerrillas. Israeli retaliation hurt the economy, plus the fear was repeatedly voiced that Israel would use the Palestinian 25 attacks as a pretext to occupy the south of Lebanon. With a small 15,000 man army, Lebanon had remained neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict (militarily at least) continued to adhere to the 1949 Armistice Agreement with Israel. The_ 1969 _Clas hes On April 23, 1969, a large pro-Palestinian demonstration clashed with the army leaving several civilians dead. Leftist groups immediately demonstrated in protest at the attitude of the government toward commando activity in Lebanon. A state of emergency was declared and a curfew was imposed on six cities. J Two days later Premier Karami resigned in protest at the Army's actions. In a marathon six-hour Parliamentary session debate on the Commando issue, where he was strongly criticized for not preventing the action, he declared: Let us be honest. There is a group in the country supporting commando activity regardless of the results and another faction opposing this stand. As a result the government cannot take the side of any faction without splitting the country . '

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198 Moslem spiritual leader Sheikh Hassan Khalid had called on Karami to resign unless he could guarantee freedom of action for the fedayeen. Karami ' s resignation precipitated Lebanon's longest constitutional crisis ever. Split over the commando issue, no government was to be formed in the next seven months. On May 9, the day of renewed clashes between the Army and the Palestinian guerrillas in the South, President Helou addressed the nation on the current crisis: Our support for the rights of the brotherly Palestinian people and their just struggle is undertaken and pursued within the framework of what is dictated by our concern, indeed our right and duty, to uphold our own steadfastness which requires that we be frank with ourselves, with our Palestinian brethren and our other Arab brothers. We give our support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people within the framework of ou,r sovereignty and our safety . . . The Maronite and Sunni establishment generally approved of this statement, while Fatah accused the Army of being a "force to protect the security of Zionism," and vowed it would continue to mount attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon. " Since no government could be formed until agreement was reached on the status of the Palestinians in Lebanon, leaders from the two religious groups met on several occasions in an attempt to break the deadlock. The stalemate persisted as the Palestinians continued to insist on freedom of action with the Lebanese warning of the dangerous 30 consequences of such actions. Karami, who agreed to stay

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199 on as caretake Premier, proposed coordination (Tansiq) between the two sides. The Hilf rejected the T ansiq formula saying they would not cooperate as long as the 31 guerrillas remained in Lebanon. The Kataeb charge "subversive" leftist elements with provoking the crisis. Gemayel asserted: The whole problem is clear: it is no longer the actions of the fedayeen; it is our system, our regime , our institutions which are desired under the cover of the Palestinian commandos and the sacred cause of Palestine. * He also accused Syria and Al Saiqa, the guerrilla group it created and controls, of working to undermine Lebanon's 33 sovereignty. As it stood Lebanon's Maronite President and Maronite parties were united in their stand, and the country in effect was being ruled by the Maronite Commander of the Army and the Maronite President, while the Moslems protested the government's attitude toward the Palestinians. The population was becoming effectively polarized as, once again, the country's delicate consensus on Arab issues, in essence its National Pact, was being put to the test. To allow guerrilla activities from Lebanon would invite Israeli retaliation and to restrict them would invite internal unrest. On June 1, President Helou again addressed the nation, reiterating that support for the Palestinian cause "should not be isolated from a realization of the dangers and an awareness of the historical responsibility that we consequently bear."

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00 This was criticized by Moslem leaders as being too one-sided, regarding the President's message as reflecting the viewpoint of only one side of the Lebanese population. Sunni leader Saeb Salam declared that "President Helou did not speak as President of the Republic of Lebanon. . . all Lebanon." He added that Helou' s message "deepened dissension in the country and escalated it by reopening the commando issue in a biased manner. He has sided with one group against another in Lebanon without careful aforethought." Jumblatt joined in the criticism by urging a more active Arab role for Lebanon, and a departure from the country's neutral stand. Meanwhile, Israel continued to claim Lebanon was responsible for the activities of the Palestinians in Lebanon, and its retaliatory raids on the South continued. In the latter part of October more violent clashes erupted between the Fedayeen and the Army.Syria closed its border in protest and began to mass troops, while inside Lebanon several cities and towns went on strike protesting the Army action. The Army, breaking its silence for the first time, accused the Palestinians of starting the fighting. ' The October clash recalled the 1958 crisis when the state lost control over some border areas and the major (Moslem) cities Tripoli, Tyre and Sidon. As in 1958 also, the Christians supported the President against what they perceived to be a threat to the regime. Moslems and their pan-Arab feelings found a focus of support in the Palestinians, whereas it was Nasser in 1958. President Nasser now stepped

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201 in to play a mediating role. What followed from Egypt's mediation was the controversial and much-debated Cairo Agreement of November 2, signed by Lebanese Army commander Bustani and PLO leader Arafat. (See Appendix I) The agreement, which at the time was not made public, stipulated that the Palestinians could control the refugee camps, establish their armed presence in them, could recruit from among the refugees, and could continue their activities in designated areas of the South, which were to remain, nevertheless, under Lebanese sovereignty. They were not to carry weapons in the cities and villages of Lebanon. They were to coordinate their activities with the Lebanese government. For their part, the Palestinians agreed not to 37 interfere in the country's internal affairs. Since the agreement clearly favoured the Palestinians, the Christian leaders were decidedly unhappy with the concessions made by the state. The agreement was to continue as a source of friction and disagreement over the next five years. The 1969 clash, and the causes of it, were to dominate Lebanese politics until the outbreak of the civil war. It was clear the Palestinians were now becoming closely involved with the conflict between Christians and Moslems, between the Right and the Left in Lebanon. By November 25 a new Cabinet had been formed, the first since the outbreak of clashes in April. On December 5, the new government announced:

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20 2 Lebanon . . . concluded with the leaders of the PLO , an agreement in Cairo which took into consideration, at the same time, the duty of preserving the sovereignty and security of the nation on the one hand, and the need for providing the greatest possible support and help for the Palestine Resistance on the other. On the basis of the principle of sovereignty which is indivisible, we say that the authority of the state will always prevail over all parts of the nation and under all circumstances. 38 The Christian Response Religion has been the main factor determining Lebanese attitudes toward the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Our thesis of the linkage of the internal and external factors is shaped largely by the religious factor. As Entelis argues: The result of fusing the internal struggle with the broader and more volatile issue of guerrilla legitimacy in Lebanon worked to further intensify political and ideological cleavages along religiously identifiable ethnosectarian lines. In addition, the fragile Muslim-Christian entente seemed endangered by the linkage of the internal and external crises. 39 The Christian attitude toward the Palestinian issue is represented mainly by the Maronite Phalangist party, which became the undisputed leader for the Christian side in the seventies and in the civil war. ° Its attitude toward Arab affairs is guided by its conception of Lebanon, the Christian position in Lebanon, plus the country's special

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20 3 position in the Arab world. Since the Kataeb's role has been central in Lebanese affairs and has largely determined the Christian response to threats to the regime, it is worth our while to quote at some length from Pierre Gemayel's thoughts on the role of Lebanon and its communities In a memorandum written in 1955, the Kataeb leader declared: Lebanon, small as it is, constitutes an irreducible entity. None can question its tradition of independence. If it were absorbed by a larger neighbor, so great is its capacity for resistance and its faith in its own mission . . . and this mission is incompatible with that which the Arabs aspire generally to realize. . .Lebanon maintains a character to which it remains fiercely attached, because its instinct for survival dictates this to be categorically imperative 41 Also in 1955, in a speech addressed to President Chamoun and in response to Moslem criticism of the predominance of the Christians in the political structure, Gemayel stated: To the Muslims in Lebanon particularly, and to the Arabs in general, we say: You must never forget one thing, and that is that the paramount interest of the nation demands that you never make the Christians suspicious of your aims. Never let them lose the feeling of security and tranquility . . . Christians will rise to defend their interests and those of the Arabs only insofar as they have confidence in you. 42 As long ago as 1949 the Kataeb warned against the harmful long-term effects of the sizable refugee population in Lebanon. Though the party has always officially supported the Palestinian cause, it has qualified this support by

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204 stipulating that Lebanon's security must not suffer as a result. Largely Maronite and centered mainly in Mount Lebanon, the party has advocated a neutral military stand in the Arab-Israeli conflict. "Lebanon's force resides in its military weakness," Gemayel has declared, stressing the guarantees of outside powers. The Kataeb have stated their desire for a neutral Swiss-style Lebanon, 44 whose roots reach back to the Phoenician era. Lebanese Maronites in general welcomed the Jewish state in the 1940s, seeing it as a potential ally against the surrounding Moslem world. 45 The Maronite Archbishop of Beirut in 194 7, Monseigneur Moubarak , maintained that Lebanon was not part of the Arab world. He moreover defended Israel's right to exist, saying Israel and Lebanon's "neighborliness will help safeguard peace in the Middle East and strengthen the position of minorities." 46 His remarks caused a stir, forcing the Maronite Patriarch to exile him to a monastery. Though the Kataeb may have agreed with Moubarak 's view, it has, naturally, officially opposed Israel. Its support for the Palestinian homeland stems mainly from their desire to see them leave Lebanon and have the confessional aspect of Lebanon remain unchanged. The party organ, Al Ama l, responded to a League of Arab states' suggestion in 1953 that the Palestinians be assimilated in the Arab countries by saying "this means that the League has decided that the refugees should forget Palestine and their problems. This is a foolish step and a criminal one."

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205 The Kataeb has looked to Lebanese immigrants and their descendants numbering between three and four million and mainly Christian, for international support during the crises with the Palestinians. The Kataeb was to become more vocal in its criticism of the Palestinians in the tension-filled years of the early seventies. The party's position was paralleled by the smaller National Liberal Party and the National Bloc. The GreekOrthodox community has been more strongly anti-Israel than have the Maronites. One reason for this may be the resentment of Maronite dominance, and the perception of the Moslems as allies, since the Greek-Orthodox do not have any "protectors" as do the Maronites. The Syrian Social National Party, the Kataeb 's bitter enemy, is supported mainly by the Greek-Orthodox who, along with the Kataeb 's Moslem opponents, attack the Maronites for their alleged hegemony and "isolationist" tendencies. Slide Toward Civil War The first armed clash between the Kataeb ' s militia and the Palestinian commandos took place on March 25, 1970 in the Maronite village of Kahhalah. Fighting quickly spread to other areas in Beirut and by the time fighting ended six days later 18 Palestinians and five Phalangists had been killed. Following this incident, Gemayel declared the PLO was "violating the Cairo agreements, discrediting the army and carrying out a subversive plan aimed at leading the

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2 06 country towards Marxism. "^9 As the Presidential election drew near the need for a strong President was voiced to deal with the Palestinian Resistance in the country. Gemayel was one prospect, but lacking support from the Shihabists, he supported Suleiman Franjieh who had joined with Salam and Shiite leader Kamel Assad in an anti-Shihab coalition. Franjieh was known to be strongly opposed to Palestinian activity in Lebanon, and thus received the backing of the Maronite leaders. Franjieh and his new Premier Salam set about removing Shihabists from the Army and administration, and dismantled the Deu xieme Bureau . A Cabinet of "technocrats" was formed, a young, educated group which helped create a mood of optimism in the country. This cabinet, which was to last 18 months, attempted to introduce reforms in the economy, but met with little success. Following the Parliamentary elections of 1972, Salam was to revert to the traditional politicians for his Cabinet. Soon the country began to face new problems including a higher cost of living, student unrest and continued guerrilla activities. Jordan's crackdown on the guerrillas in 1970 exacerbated Lebanon's problem as many Palestinians fighters fled to Lebanon which now became the last country from which they could freely operate. Israel's retaliatory raids number and intensity (especially after the Munich incident) and their raids were driving Southerners, mainly Shiitcs, to the slum areas around Beirut where they lived with Palestinians.

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207 The Imam Mousa Sadr, a jurist who returned to his native Lebanon from Iran, began to champion their cause, to the annoyment of the traditional Shiite leaders. Despite opposition from the Sunnis, he succeeded in 1969 in forming the Shiite Muslim Higher Council, breaking away from the Muslim Higher Council which previously had represented all Moslems . ^ On April 10, 1973, Israeli commandos staged a night raid into Beirut killing three prominent Palestinian leaders in the apartment bulding where they lived. 51 Premier Salam demanded Army Commander Ghanem's resignation for allegedly refusing to deploy the army against the raiding Israeli party. Franjieh refused to dismiss Ghanem, leaving Salam no option but to resign. He charged the President with depriving Moslems of a say in the country's affairs, claiming 52 Maronites had too much power. Demonstrations ensued again attacking the army for its inaction and accusing it of conspiring to liquidate the Palestinian resistance. The army replied it had insufficient time to react to the raid. Franjieh had, since he came to power, attempted to maintain Premiers in office whom he could control, and who were not seen as fully representative by the Moslems. Franjieh appointed Amin Al Hafez Prime Minister, to the lukewarm response of the Moslem community who indeed did not fully support the next three Premiers appointed by Franjieh. Hafez soon had his hands full. Events after the Israeli raid quickly led to another crisis. Oil storage

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208 tanks at the Zahrani terminal in Sidon were blown up, and the army immediately blamed the PLO. Members of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) were arrested at the Beirut airport for attempting to smuggle arms aboard a plane. Four Palestinians carrying explosives outside the U.S. embassy were arrested. The PFLP and the PDFLP then kidnapped two Lebanese soldiers, demanding the release of their four comrads . -* When the ultimatum issued by the Army passed without the soldiers being released, fierce fighting broke out anew between the Army and the guerrillas on May 2. Martial law was declared and Syria again closed the border, sending in Al Saiqa guerrillas to aid the PLO in Lebanon. Aiding the Army were the Kataeb and other militias. Arab pressure to end the fighting resulted in an agreement on May 18 which basically reinforced the provisions of the Cairo Agreement. Gemayel declared the clash resulted from a "lack of discipline among the Palestinians", who were now ii 54 an intolerable occupational army." The Kataeb-PLO committee met several times in May and June to smooth over relations between the two sides. The Kataeb began to stress its military role in the belief that the state could do little to solve the Palestinian problem. The Christian Lebanese "were now more convinced than ever that Lebanon could not be truly sovereign until the last traces of the Palestinian military presence in the country had been 55 eradicated. " Both sides armed themselves for what both believed to be more future conf rontaions .

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209 Amin Al Hafez resigned in June because of pressure from Moslem leaders, who wanted a stronger Sunni Premier and one whom the President could not dominate. Franjieh brought in Taki El Din El Solh who declared his new Cabinet (of 22 members) would work to improve relations with Syria and the Palestinians. His 14 months in office led to a deterioration in law and order. Corruption in the administration, inflation, student strikes and demonstrations, raids and counter-raids in the south continued unabated. The October war of 1973 did not involve Lebanon directly, but had a direct effect on Lebanese politics. A split was now evident in Palestinian ranks with the PLO prepared to accept a political settlement while the " re jectionists" , led by the PFLP ' s Habash, supported by Iraq and Libya, vowed to continue the military struggle. The latter group received support from leftist student groups, and indeed clashes between them and Kataeb students were common on university campuses, especially the American University of Beirut where Palestinian and pro-Palestinian students were especially active. The Palestinian Resistance began to align itself closer to Lebanese radical groups as the Nasserites, Baath Socialists, Communists, and the Syrian Socialist National Party. These leftist parties formed the National Movement, with Jumblatt seen as their head. It attacked the National Pact and called for the elimination of sectarianism. Jumblatt's popularity with the Sunnis worried Salam and Karami who favored reforms within the system, but

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210 had to pay lip service to leftist causes in order to maintain their grassroots support. Sadr continued his attacks on the government for its neglect of the South, and vowed to train and arm Shiites to protect their villages. He started the Movement of the Deprived. Solh resigned in September, 1974, and Franjieh appointed Rashid El Solh a distant cousin of the former premier. The traditional Sunni leaders were displeased, as Solh had close ties with Jumblatt. Karami , Salam and Edde formed an opposition, with the latter having his eye on the presidency. Edde attacked the Franjieh regime constantly while the Kataeb defended the President. (The Hilf had broken up earlier, though Chamoun and Gemayel were still close allies). The two main Christian leaders continued to attack the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, at a time when the Palestinians themselves were becoming restless and worried that a Middle Eastern peace settlement would be made without them. Gemayel, in January, called on the state to exert its authority and put an end to what he termed had become a "state within a 57 state." Premier Solh replied that this was just one party's opinion and would not affect the "solidarity or unity of the Cabinet. " S8 On February 20, Gemayel called for a referendum on the Palestinian issue. He maintained that the Palestinian presence in the South had led to "chaos and anarchy" and again defended Lebanon's military weakness as vital to its 59 safety and existence. In response to this, Jumblatt

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211 suggested a referendum should instead be taken on the Lebanese population to determine who in effect constituted the majority and who the minority. Gemayel continued that Lebanon would be facing a disaster if the situation persisted . The curtain-raiser to the civil war were the Sidon incidents which began on P'ebruary 26. Fishermen of this port city, led by radical elements, demonstrated against the government's decision to grant the Proteine fishing Co. (headed by Chamoun) exclusive fishing rights, arguing this new mechanization of the fishing industry would adversely affect their livelihood. In the five days of rioting that followed, five soldiers and 18 demonstrators were killed. The army was withdrawn and the Governor of the South suspended. The demonstrations and riots reached a greater intensity on March 6 when former Sidon M.P. Maarouf Saad died of wounds received in the February 26 shootings. The army again became the center of controversy, as Moslems demanded the army be brought more under the control of the government, and less under the President. As they continued to demand its reorganization, Rightist groups demonstrated in support of the army while Chamoun and Gemayel insisted there would be no changes made in the army's structure. The army's officer corp was predominantly Christian (62%) with the top echelon mainly Maronite, while rank and file was generally Moslem. The army came increasingly to be seen as an "instrument of Christian power in the

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212 r -t country." The situation remained generally calm until an incident on April 13 which sparked the beginning of an allout war. We have seen, then, how the Palestinian issue — more specifically freedom of action and their very presenceinflicted a continual crisis on Lebanon's confessional system, It polarized the communities and had the country's leaders divided. Christian, mainly Maronite, opposition to the Palestinians arose partly from religious differences, but more from the belief that they constituted a danger to the security and sovereignty of the state. In addition, their common cause with the Lebanese Left which, excluded from effective power, demanded changes in political system, ranging from structural changes to political ones, as a more pro-Arab, and anti-Israel, stand. In short, a demand for an end to Lebanon's Maronite dominance and their alleged "isolationist" tendencies. Traditional Moslem leaders also wanted changes, but none as radical as proposed by the far Left. To maintain their support among their communities they had to present a more or less common front with the leftists. Thus, in the civil war the Lebanese Moslem Left was fighting to overthrow the system, abolish sectarianism and replace Christian dominance. Their Palestinian allies fought to preserve their last free base in the Middle East from which to launch their operations against Israel. The Christian right fought to preserve their own predominance in an independent and sovereign Lebanon, and this meant the

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213 removal of the threat to the state, namely the leftist alliance. The Moslems sought major political and economic changes. In essence, none of these objectives was realized during the civil war. As it turned out, the conflict was linked to the broader aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. When it seemed that the left was about to triumph in Lebanon, Syria intervened for reasons pertaining to its own security and its overall hopes for a peace settlement. Lebanon's external environment was indeed playing a dominating role on the country's politics.

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214 Notes 1. Charles Waterman, "Lebanon's Continuing Crisis," Current History (January , 1978) , p. 19. 2. Wolfram Hanreider, West Germa n Foreig n Pol icy, 19 4 9-1963 (Stanford: Stanford~lTnTversity Press, 1967) , p. 230. Quoted in Enver Khoury, op. cit. , p. 43. 3. Rashid Hamid, "What is the PLO? , " Jour nal of Pal est ine Studies (Summer, 1975), p. 98. """ --•— 4. Michael Hudson, Arab Po litic s: T he_Search_ for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 296. 5. A reverse acronym for the Arabic "Harakat Tahrir Filistin", "the Palestine Liberation Movement.'' 6. One scholar argues that the Arab states formed the PLO for the express purpose of controlling their increased activity. Also". . .certain states hoped that such an organization would serve as a pressure group against one regime or another." Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Altered Realities; The Palestinians since 1967," International Journal (Autumn, 1973), p. 658. " 7. Kamal Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War (New York: Caravan, 1977) , p. 31. 8. The refugees are distributed approximately as follows: Jordon — 1.1 million, West Bank — 716,000, pre-1967 Israel400,000, Gaza — 357,000, Lebanon — 240,000, Syria — 187,000, Kuwait — 147,000, Egypt — 33,000, Saudi Arabia--32 , 000 , Iraq — 16,000, Arab Gulf states — 15,000, Libya — 5,000. Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer, 1974), p. 102. 9. The Daily Star , April 29, 1969, p. 1. 10. The Daily Star , April 11, 1968, p. 1. The terms Guerrillas, Commandos, Resistance and Fedayeen (literally "sacri f icers ") will be used interchangeably throughout the paper. 11. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 10. 12. R. El Rayyes and D. Nahhas, Guer rillas for Pa l est ine (New York: St. Andrew's Press, Inc.), p. 103. 13. Ibid.

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213 14. The Daily Star , May 14, 1968, p. 1. Despite an alleged agreement between the Palestinians and the Lebanese government, the PLO ' s first Chairman Ahmad al Shukairy was reportedly training Palestinians in the Lebanese Shiite village of Kayfun where he lived. He was replaced by Arafat as head of the PLO in February, 1969. 15. For an elaboration of the Palestinian groups' ideologies and objectives see W.B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber and Ann M. Lesch, The Pol itic s o f Palest i nia n_Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 94-112. 16. In this regard see Yehuda Z. Blum, "The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard," America n Journal of International Law (January, 1970) pp. 73-1057~ Also Richard Falk, "The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation," Ame rican J ournal o f International Law(July, 1969), pp. 415-43. 17. Arab World File, "The Lebanese Phalanges: Relations with the Palestine Resistance, 1947-1972) ," September 8, 1976, p. 1. 18. Michael Hudson, "Fedayeen are Forcing Lebanon's Hand," Mideast (February, 1970) , p. 7. 19. Al Hayat , January 1, 1969, p. 1. 20. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 35. 21. Consisting of Pierre Gemayel's Phalangist Party, Camille Chamoun's National Liberal Party, and Raymond Edde ' s National Bloc, who formed a united front for the Parliamentary elections of 196 8. 22. Fuad Jabber, "'The Palestinian Resistance and InterArab Politics," in Quandt et. al, op. cit . , p. 194. 23. Abbas Kelidar and Michael Burrell, "Lebanon: The Collapse of a State , "Conflict Stud ies (August, 1976), P6. 24. Strategic Survey, The Mid dle East (The International Institute for Strategic StudTiTI~ 1976), p. 85. On April 23, Palestinians attacked a Church in Tyre, resulting in Christian protests and demonstrations. This was censored by the media, as it had sectarian overtones .

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216 25. The then Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol, in what was regarded as a hint to the Lebanese, that the water of the Litani river was going to waste. The Lebanese press on various occasions has speculated that Israel had designs on Southern Lebanon. Moshe Dayan also, after the 1967 war, had remarked that Israel now had natural borders on every side but the North. In 1970 Kamal Jumblatt, then Interior Minister, stated: "The (Israeli) design to annex certain territories in the South of our country has always existed... I have seen certain geographic maps published in Israel which encompass all of Lebanon and parts of Syria, up to Alexandrett^ ; in other words, the Syro-Canaan coast of antiquitey," Paul Jureidini and William Hazen, The Palestinian Movement in Politics (lexington books, 1976), p. 61. 26. Daily Star , April 24, 1969, p. 1. 27. Daily Star , April 25, p. 1 28. The Daily Star , May 7, 1969. 29. John Entelis, Pluralism and Party_Trans f ormat i on in Lebanon: Al Kataib, 1936-1 970 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 199. 30. Al Hayat, May 9 and 10, 1969. 31. Salibi writes that on the political level the government strove hard for a settlement since the opposition Hilf was determined to put one of their own in the Presidency, op. cit . , p. 41. As noted previously Shihab desired a larger role for the government, more attention to Moslem areas, and closer ties with the Arabs. This 'Shihabism' was criticized by businessmen, mainly Maronites His power base was the Army, especially the Deuxieme Bureau . Since Shihab was acknowledged to be "the power behind President Helou (1964-19 70) "Shihabism" ended in 1970 when Suleiman Franjieh, the Hilf ' s candidate, narrowly defeated Elias Sarkis for the Presidency. J. Gaspard, "The Mystery of Shihabism how the Lebanon survives," The New Middle East (April, 1969), p. 33. 32. John Entelis, "Palestinian Revolutionism in Lebanese Politics: The Christian Response , " The Muslim Wo rld (October, 1972), p. 341. In an elaboration the author writes: "The current crisis afforded radical elements the opportunity to weaken existing institutional structures in the hope of eliminating basic social and economic inequalities," Ibid., pp. 343-344.

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217 33. Fatah Radio in Cairo called openly for the Lebanese to demonstrate against the Lebanese government's attitude toward the Palestinians. J. Gaspard, "The Critical Power Balance in the Lebanon," T he New Middle E ast (December, 1969), p. 8. """ 34. Daily Sta r, June 1, 1969, p. 1. 35. Daily Star , June 3, 1969, p. 1. 36. In early October the U.S. had reiterated its support for Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity from a threat "from any source". The Christian Right welcomed this support while Leftist parties rejected it. Al Hayat , October 13, 1969, p. 1. Le Monde of October 24 said the Lebanese Army Intelligence discovered a plot between Syria and Lebanese radicals to overthrow the Lebanese regime, three weeks before the latest outbreak of the crisis. The U.S. statement was seen as a result of this. Amnon Kapeliuk, "Lebanon's Hour of Trial," New Outlook (November-December, 1969), p. 11. 37. Rumors accused Bustani of having made the sizable concessions to the Palestinian side to secure Moslem support for his candidacy in the Presidential election. His election would have meant the continuation of Shihabism. Salibi, op. c i t . , p. 43. For full text of agreement, see Appendix A. 38. Daily Star , December 5, 1969, p. 5. After 1969, the Palestinian organizations took over control of the refugee camps from Lebanese army and security forces, who could do little to maintain their authority there. 39. John Entelis, Pluralism an d Par ty Tra nsformation, p. 204. Christians comprise roughly 7% of the Arab world. 40. The Kataeb's 70,000 membership in 1970 is reported to have doubled during the divil war of 1975-76. Arab World File, The Lebanese Phalan ges: ^Doctrine , organization and membership , September 1, 1976, p. 1 41. Pierre Gemayel, "Lebanese Nationalism and its foundations: The Phalangist viewpoint," in T. Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporj^J^j^dJ^e^Eas^t (New York: Praegaer, 1968"), p. 107. 42. Ibid . , p. 113 43. Arab World File, The Leba nese Phala nges , p. 1. 44. R.A. "Lebanon at the Crossroads," Th e World T oday (December, 1969), p. 181.

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218 45. William Haddad, "Christian Arab Attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," The Mu slim World (April, 1977), p. 12 9. 46. Ray Alan, "Lebanon: Israel's Friendliest Neighbor," Commentary (June, 1952), p. 552. Alan quotes a Maronite in a sentiment often articulated in Lebanon mainly by Maronite Christians, and especially after the 1967 war: "For us, Israel is the best thing that could have happened. For, after liquidating first French, then Jewish, then British positions in the Middle East, Moslem fanaticism would have turned its attention to us.' Ibid . , p. 551. 47. Haddad, op. cit., p. 134. 48. Ibid. , p. 136. 49. Arab World File, The Lebanese Phalanges, p. 1. On September 28, 1972 clashes occurred between the Kataeb and Al Saiqa. Meetings between Gemayel and Arafat led to a PLO-Kataeb and Al Saiqa. By this time the Palestinian resistance had strong support in the coastal cities among the Sunnis, Shiites and some Greek -Orthodox. 50. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 63 51. They were Mohammad Najjar, an aide to Arafat, Kamel Nasser, PLO spokesman and Kamel Adwan, PLO executive member. 52. John Bulloch, Death of a country (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977) , p. 72. In this period it was reported that the Christian groups had recruited new members and were arming for what was seen as an eventual showdown with the Palestinians, who, partly to avoid being isolated forged close ties with Lebanon's Nasserites, Progressive Socialist party, Social National Party, the Baathists, Communists etc, which in turn made the Maronite right increasingly wary of the Palestinian presence and activity in Lebanon. 53. El Rayyes and Nahhas, op. cit . , p. 108. 54. Arab World File, The L ebancse_ Pha langes : _ Relati ons with the Palestine Resistance (1973-75), September 15, 1976, no. 543 , p. 1 . 55. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 69 56. Salibi, op. cit., p. 76.

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219 57. Al Nahar , January 25, 1975, p. 3., 58. Al Nahar , January 26, 1975, p. 1. 59. Al Nahar , February 21, 1975, p. 1. 60. Al Nahar , February 22, 1975, p. 2 61. Salibi, op. cit. , p. 97.

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CHAPTER VII THE 1975-76 CIVIL WAR Lebanon's destructive civil war began on April 13, 1975, with a clash between the Phalangist militia and Palestinian commandos, which soon spread and involved other Christian and Moslem groups resulting in 300 casualties in just three days. Premier Solh's Cabinet subsequently resigned, with the outgoing Premier blaming the Kataeb for the troubles, and maintaining Moslems should be given more power, especially in the Army command, or have the National Pact abolished. The Kataeb for their part blamed the government for the troubles saying the country "had more than one government and more than one army." Thus began a severe conflict between members of the elite as cooperation between the country's political leaders slowly began to erode. Kamal Jumblatt, who came to head the alliance of leftist forces, refused to cooperate with any government that included the Kataeb. His personal authority went beyond his own clients, and now had wide-spread Moslem support. Christian groups rallied behind Gemayel and his party; even Moslem leaders did not strongly oppose the Kataeb but could not declare so openly because of growing Moslem support of Jumblatt. For his part, Arafat called on the Arab states to intervene to prevent what he called a plot against the Palestinians. He accused the Kataeb of planning to 2 drive the Palestinian resistance from Lebanon. 220

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2 21 75% frequency of headline and editorial 50' 28.5% H-L 12.9% ed. February 29% H-L 22.5% ed. March 0% H-L 0% ed. April 1-14 Survey of Lebanese daily Al Nahar prior to outbreak of war of 1975-76 , Indicating prominence of Palestinian, or related issues, shown by frequency of headlines and editorials dealing with the issue. Again, the outbreak of the war could not be predicted from the data. FIGURE II

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222 Franjieh's announcement of a military cabinet in May was met with opposition from Moslem leaders who saw the new Cabinet as helping the Kataeb , as Moslem distrust of the army was well established. The Cabinet was forced to resign under pressure. Franjieh reluctantly appointed Karami , after other Sunnis had turned down the offer, and upon taking office he declared "we will always cooperate with our brothers, the Palestinian Moslems now repeated their demands for more representation plus a change in the officer corps. Karami succeeded in forming a "rescue" Cabinet by June 30, excluding both the Phalangists and Jumblatt's PSP. The Interior Minister was Chamoun, who represented the excluded Kataeb, and who reconciled with Karami for the first time since the 1958 conflict. The new government, which showed a determination to restore order, was a conservative group of six veteran politicians . Ceasefires were broken continually in a war that now pitted conservative Christian groups and mainly Moslem leftist forces who were making a major effort to overthrow the Lebanese system, spurred on in the knowledge that it had allies in the Palestinian resistance. The weapons used by both sides included heavy machine-guns, mortars, rocketlaunchers and grenades. At this time Arafat's PLO did not participate as actively as the "re jectionists 1 ' , as the PFLP. One observer sums up the situation thus: „3

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223 The attempt by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt to wrest the leadership of the indigenous Muslim community from the more traditional and conservative politicians and to marshall radical groups, including the Palestine guerrilla movement, to challenge Christian political supremacy served as a catalyst for the ferocious war . . . ^ The new government announced an understanding had been reached between the state and the Palestinians, adding reforms in the Army command would be forthcoming. Heavy fighting between Moslem and Christian towns and villages continued, with some of the worst clashes occuring between Franjieh's and Karami's hometowns. Though the elite showed some semblance of cooperation at the national level, their blocs were in fact at war with each other. The army was deployed, for the first time in the war, to act as a buffer between the two warring Northern towns of Zgharta and Tripoli. This was done only after Moslem agreement, which required that Army Commander Ghanem be replaced, which was done as a gesture of reconciliation to Moslem leaders . ° Following an escalation in the fighting, the government on September 24 announced the formation of a 20-member "National Dialogue Committee" to carry out negotiations between the various sides. It included four Maronites, four Sunnis, four Shiites, three Greek7 Orthodox, two Greek-Catholic, two Druze, and one Armenian. With the knowledge that casualties were alarmingly high, the

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224 Committee quickly agreed on steps to promote security, including the dismantling of barricades, reconstruction of damaged buildings compensation to victims and a closing of the Phalangist and Moslem clandestine radio stations. Gemayel also agreed on the need for constitutional changes, but within Lebanon's present political system. Rumors were rife at this time that the Maronite leaders were working for partition of the country into Christian and Moslem zones. This was in response to Jumblatt's repeated demands for an end to the sectarian system, and an end to alleged Maronite domination. 8 At the Maronite Patriarchate in Bkirki, however, Christian and Moslem leaders met on October 4 and agreed that partition of the country would not be to either side's benefit. Salem and Edde demanded Franjieh's resignation who, along with Chamoun, had very little to do with Karami . Traditional Sunni leaders, not as actively involved in the war, were losing their power and their positions to the radicals. After his return from Saudi Arabia, Salam attacked the "ideological radicalism . . . dangerously 9 infiltrating Muslim Lebanese ranks." Jumblatt continued to reject proposals for reform submitted by Karami as insufficient . Palestinians were drawn more fully into the war with Christian assaults on the refugee camps, motivated partly by a desire to rid the Christian areas of the guerrillas. Again foreign powers were involved. Syria accused the

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225 Christians of planning partition which it said might mean Syrian intervention, to which Israel quickly issued a warning. The U.S. stated it was opposed to both partition and intervention by outside powers. Israel, in fact, gave considerable aid to the Christian forces, and it was reported that Israeli leaders met with Christian Lebanese leaders in Lebanon. 10 Units of the Yarmouk brigade of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) had crossed into Lebanon from Syria to aid the leftist forces. A week after he completed a visit to Syria President Franjieh announced on February 14 a reform program aimed at giving Moslems more political and economic power. It stated the Presidency would remain Maronite, the Premier Sunni and the Speaker Shiite. Parliamentary seats were to be apportioned on a fifty-fifty basis, plus the Prime Minister was to be elected by two-thirds vote of Parliament and no longer by the President. It also provided for the abolition of confessionalism in the lower levels of the civil service, economic reforms, plus changes in the structure of the armed forces. Syria was to guarantee enforcement of the Cairo Agreement by the Palestinians. This so-called Damascus Pact was supported by the Kataeb, the Sunni leaders were non-commital while the radical left rejected it, calling for a secularization of the political system, which in effect would give them a chance for the Presidency. Jumblatt was determined to destroy the sectarian system in Lebanon and was confident he was

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226 close to achieving this. He rejected the Pax Syriana, saying there would be no compromises. "Somebody must win and somebody must lose. We must go ahead to real evolution 12 of the country." Syria now saw Jumblatt as the obstacle to its peace efforts. In March, 19 76 the Lebanese Army began to divide along religious lines. Lt . Ahmad Al Khatib, a Moslem, soon formed the rebel "Lebanese Arab Army" , arguing the army ii • 1 3 was an instrument in the hands of the Christian right." This action further divided the national leaders. The announcement by the Moslem Military commander of Beirut of a "coup" came to nought as Franjieh, supported by Gemayel and Chamoun, refused to resign. Jumblatt' s forces appeared to be gaining the upper hand militarily, and Syria responded by cutting off aid to the left, and blockading Moslem-held ports, for reasons discussed below. On May 8, Parliament chose Elias Sarkis, favored by Syria, to succeed Franjieh as President. Franjieh did not step down until his term expired on September 23. In June, 19 76, Syrian troops moved in force into Lebanon against the leftist alliance. The Christian right now became allied with the Syrians against the alliance of 14 Lebanese Moslems and Palestinians, who saw Syrian intervention as a plot to either liquidate them or at least control the movement as a prelude to a peace settlement.

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227 The Christian-Syrian offensive continued into August, while the PLO announced conscription of all Palestinians between the ages of 18 and 30. The Syrians, with 21,000 men and 90 tanks, evicted the Palestinians from their positions in the mountains North-East of Beirut, and succeeded in reducing the leftist alliance's area of occupation. The offensive continued after Sarkis assumed the Presidency , and continued into October. On October 16, a cease-fire was called for by Saudi Arabia. This, the 56th cease-fire, marked the end of the war. The next day, leaders of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the PLO met in the Saudi capital of Riyadh. By the next day a peace plan was formulated, which called for a 30,000-man Arab peace-keeping force to be under the command of Sarkis. The Palestinians were to adhere to the Cairo Agreement, while the Saudi government was to bankroll the force. The Riyadh agreement was endorsed in Cairo on October 25 by members of the Arab League, excluding Libya and Iraq. Units for the peace-keeping force were to come from North and South Yemen, the United Arab emirates, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the PLO and the bulk from Syria. By late November Syrian troops had effective control of the entire country, except for South Lebanon where Israeli-backed Christian militiamen occupied the border area and continued to skirmish with Palestianian guerrillas.

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2 28 Thus, eighteen months later, the war ended after claiming 60,000 lives, requiring over four billion dollars to rebuild the economy, and leaving the basic causes of the war essentially unresolved. On December 9, Sarkis appointed a new eight-man "technocrat" Cabinet of political neutrals under the premiership of Dr. Salirn Hoss. Sarkis pledged to rebuild the country within Lebanon's traditional democratic framework . It is generally believed that a solution to Lebanon's problems is linked to an overall settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict. It is difficult to divorce it from interArab conflict. "The Lebanese civil war was also an Arab civil war, fought by proxy and aggravated by the bitter divisions in the Arab ranks sparked by the second Sinai disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel in September 1975." Syria's military intervention in Lebanon, on the side of the conservative Christian forces, was linked to its own security and negotiating positon vis-a-vis Israel. A Leftist victory in Lebanon meant a new confrontation state in Lebanon, which might have meant an Israeli preventive attack, especially since the new regime would have allowed full freedom of action for the guerrillas. Any Israeli occupation of the South would have meant Syrian involvement, at a time when Egypt was out of the military confrontation and in fact had become neutralized after the second disengagement agreement. Since Israel would see a Moslem Lebanon as a threat, its intervention would give it a second

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229 Western front against Syria, something Damascus wanted to avoid. Prevention of partition and the "taming" of the Palestinians served Syria in other ways. Thus, it may be argued that Syria desired a peace settlement with Israel, which would involve withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, plus a homeland for the Palestinians. Arafat himself has declared the PLO ' s readiness to accept a state on any land that Israel gives 17 up. These plans involved control of the "re jectionists n which Syria was able to achieve in Lebanon. In the words of one writer, both Egypt and Syria hope the Palestinians are "sufficiently chastened" to move with the other Arab states toward a negotiated settlement based on a homeland for the Palestinian refugees. In short, Syria was intent on peace, and so a radical, re jectionist-led regime in Beirut (supported by Syria's rival, Iraq) would not suit her interests They did not want a change in the status quo, and in fact after the war Syria encouraged moderate politicians to reassert themselves and increase their support among the 19 Moslems in an attempt to isolate the radicals. Syrian intervention to control the radicals and thus prevent partition was aimed partly at preventing the emergence of unrest among Syria's own minorities. Asaad belongs to a minority Islamic group called the Alawites which presently dominates Syrian politics, much to the resentment of the Sunni majority. More importantly, partition of Lebanon into Christian and Moslem states would

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230 have detracted considerably from the PLO ' s aim of a secular, democratic state for all religions in Palestine. Other Arab states also declared their opposition to another religious state in the Middle East.

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231 Notes 1. Al Nahar , April 14, 1975, pp. 1, 4 and April 15, 1975, p. 2. 2. Salibi, op. cit . , p. 105; Ke esing's Contemporar y Archives~(~KCA) , August 18-2T, 1975, p. 27288. 3. "The nine lives of Premier Karami , " Time , June 9, 1975, p. 32. 4. Strategic Survey, op. cit . , p. 85. 5. "The impotence of the old-time Muslim leadership was again shown when Prime Minister Karami, long-time political boss of Tripoli, needed Arafat and (Syrian Foreign Minister) Khaddam to talk to the Leftists who control Tripoli." (mainly Farouk Mokaddem's October . 24 Movement). Stephen Oren , "An Analysis of Lebanese Political Society," Asia n_Af fairs (February, 1976), p. 63. Kelidar and Burrell, op. cit . , p. 12. KCA, June 11, 1976, p. 27766. Salibi, 0£. cit . , p. 124. Salibi, op. cit., p. 143. 9 10 "Israel secretly joins the war in Lebanon," Time , September 1976, p. 30. 11. David Holden, "Lebanon's future in Syria's hands," Middle East International (March, 1976), p. 7. Bulloch, op. cit., pp. 115-116. 12. "The Mystic who goes to War," Time, April 12, 1976, p. 34. 13. Arab World File , The 1975-76 Crisis: Disintegration of the Army, August 18, 1976, p. 1. Moslem and Palestinian fighters number about 25,000. Time , "Freeze for a hot war," p. 34. Rouleau reports the existence of 15 militias numbering 150,000 men possessing over 300,000 weapons. Eric Rouleau, "Lebanon's smouldering civil war," in Atlas World Pr es s Review (November, 1975) , p. 16. Christians received their arms mainly from

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232 Western Europe (Belgium, France, Italy, West Germany and Portugal) and these were financed by Christian businessmen, Maronite Monastic groups and conservative Arab countries. Salibi, op. cit., p. 135. Israel later became a major arms supplier to the Christian side. The Left received its arms from Libya, Iraq, the Soviet Union and Syria. Martin, op. cit. , p. 5. In a display of Moslem solidarity, non-Arabs joined in the conflict on the side of the Left. The daily, Al Amal , published pictures of a dead Somali and Pakistani who had been fighting alongside Jumblatt's forces. The size of the Kataeb's militia is estimated at 12,000-15,000; Chamoun ' s "Tiger" militia 2,000 and the Zgharta Liberation Army, 7,000. 14. Details in Bulloch, pp. 144-157 of Syrian invasion. The U.S. was understood to have pressured Israel not to intervene, having received assurances that the Syrians would not move beyond an Israeli-designated so-called "Red Line", believed to be the Litani River. 15. "Behind the Scenes, a War about Peace," Time, November 8, 1976, p. 51. Kamal Jumblatt" was assassinated by unknown gunmen in March, 19 77. 16. James Markham, "The war that won't go away," New York Times Magazine , October 9, 1977, p. 52. 17. "Reality and a Right to Dream," Time , December 13, 1976, p. 60. 18. E. Mortimer, "1976: Year of the Locust," Middle Ea st International (January, 1977) , p. 11. Also Patrick Seale, op. cit . , p. 19. 19. Mahmound Hussein, "Reflections on the Lebanese Impasse," Monthly Review (November, 1976) , p. 27. Syria has always seen Lebanon as part of Syria and thus as a legitimate field of influence and interest. The two countries are so "close" that no ambassadors were ever exchanged between them, despite demands by the Kataeb on occasion for formal diplomatic relations. At one instance during the war, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam stated that "Lebanon can either stay united or it will have to return to Syria." Younger, op. cit., p. 403.

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CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSION In conclusion, we return to our consociational model and attempt to sum up this discussion by relating the collapse of consociationalism in Lebanon to the main principles of the model. In essence, we are concerned again with the issue of how applicable the model is to a developing nation like Lebanon. How does the model, as defined and elaborated by Lijphart, fall short of full application to our study of Lebanon? We need to look at whether Lijphart ' s "rules" are comprehensive enough to explain and predict the practice of the consociational system in different countries, regardless of level of development and geographical location. This paper has examined the problems encountered by Lebanon under the consociational system and has attempted to explain, within the theoretical guidelines outlined in the introduction, how the system went from a stable, prosperous democracy to a devastated, divided country under Syrian control. In so doing, we looked at the question of whether, or Lc what extent, Lebanon fit the consociational model . Before we examine more closely the extent of the model's applicability to Lebanon, it may helpful to look first at how Lebanese Consociationalism differed from that in Lijphart's Netherlands. Hopefully, this will allow us 233

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234 to better understand the nature and extent of any deviation from the model. Earlier we talked about the relationship between cleavages and democratic regimes. Perhaps the question of cleavages can, to a large extent, highlight the similarities and differences between the two countries, and more specifically their number and intensity. Class and religion represent the major cleavages in Lijphart's Netherlands, the groups being the Catholics, the Calvinist Protestants and the Secular groups. In Lebanon also an understanding of religion and class are important for an understanding of Lebanese consociationalism. There is, however, a major difference. The religious cleavage is deeper and more intense in Lebanon, where essentially there exist two different religions whereas the Netherland's groups are all of the Christian faith. Moreover, the groups are not wholly religious in nature, as is the case in Lebanon. Secular liberals and Socialists provide other blocs in the Netherlands, blocs which are not inherently non-Christian . Of prime importance is the fact that religious and class cleavages cross-cut in the Netherlands--the class cleavage cuts across the Catholic, Calvinist and Secular blocs. Both Calvinists and Catholics belong to both the middle-class and working-class, preventing major polarization, even though both groups maintain their own organizations. In Lebanon, the Christian-Moslem cleavage was a major problem.

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23 5 The religious cleavage, already a major divisive factor, soon approximated a socio-economic cleavage-a class cleavage. One of the problems of applying the model to developing countries is the question of modernization — 2 essentially socio-economic — and its consequences. Increased social mobilization deepened the cleavages in Lebanon by adding to the differences between the two major communities. (Though the Sunnis were better off than the Shiites in the Moslem bloc, this cleavage is minimal compared to the differences between the two groups as a whole. The gap between them became deep and most evident.) Thus, religious and class cleavages coincided in Lebanon, leading to deep hostility and resentment on the part of the generally less-privileged Moslems. Unlike Lebanon, class issues in the Netherlands are resolved within the relinious blocs, since both Catholics and Calvinisms have a heterogeneous class composition. .apid social mcoilization had uneven effects on the two communities leading to socio-economic differences and this ultimately increased conflict by reinforcing the religious cleavage. This type of problem is not faced by the Netherlands where social mobilization is essentially complete. Modernization, essentially socioeconomic, decreases the ability to regulate conflict, and it appears that this problem applies more to developing than developed states.

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236 The management of conflict in Lebanon involved more than the maintaining of a balance. Communal relations are not a static phenomenon; the system must cope with changes that spawn demands and a call for a change in the "rules of the game." It was widely believed that Lebanon's Moslems now comprised a majority, due basically to that group's higher birth rate and to a higher rate of Christian emigration. As a result, demands were made for a change in the system of proportionality. The Netherlands' system is not as rigid, allowing for automatic changes in the power distribution. Proportionality differed in the Netherlands where membership in 150-member Parliament was decided by the percentage of votes received by each party, the party vote being rather stable. Like Lebanon, though, coalition governments are the norm while appointments to public office, including the civil service, is based on the size of the blocs . Part of the reason for the unique nature of the two systems is due to an important extent to their histories, which also helps explain each state's performance with regard to the accommodation of change. National integration was a gradual process in the Netherlands, as independence came when the society was not highly unified. Independent for several centuries, then, the country's institutions grew slowly and adapted successfully to changing conditions. Napoleonic France's occupation of the country served to integrate it more, while assuring equal rights for all

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237 groups. Thus began a tradition of strong elite accommodation , which was more firmly established between 1878 and 1917, during conflicts over state aid to education demanded by the Catholics and Calvinists and opposed by the secularists. This slow evolvement of the Dutch system allowed for changes to be made — changes that did not upset the system. The system was such that mechanisms existed whereby new participants could enter the sytem. For example, the Catholics and lower classes, as they began to mobilize, were given recognition and representation. The Constitutions of 1798 and 1948 gave Catholics selfgovernment and full religious freedom . In the 1880s Catholics became more politically organized and lower classes were accorded political representation with the extension of the franchise in 1887. The first coalition cabinet of Catholics and Calvinists occurred between 1888-91. Thus , accommodation occurred peacefully, allowing for change to take place within the system. Though a tradition of elite accommodation existed in Lebanon to a certain extent, the system was a conscious and deliberate creation. Though the Lebanese province was semi-autonomous, the Ottomans worked to keep the population divided for their own purposes. Also, the composition of the population changed with the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. Elite accommodation , thus , institutionalized, became a relatively new phenomenon. The system as it operated in Lebanon, though, proved less flexible than the Netherlands' system.

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238 Change could not be easily accommodated , as the strains engendered by increased social mobilization worked to undermine the stability of the system. Newly-politicized elements demanded a share in decision-making, which was resisted by the traditional elite for fear of upsetting the system. The question of national loyalty is central here. Both bloc and national loyalty exist in the Netherlands and are not incompatible. This Dutch national feeling dates back to the last century. No such generalizations can be made for Lebanon. It applies only to the Maronites who identify strongly with the Lebanese state, mainly because of their historical attachment to it. Dutch stability is based partly on the overriding concern of all to preserve the system. Though Moslem and Christian leaders agreed to the National Pact of 1943, Moslem adherence to the Lebanese entity was never very strong. The Sunnis, in the inter-war years especially, were not overly attached to the new state , desiring instead union with the largely Sunni Arab world. Opposition to the Mandate power by both sides gave the newly-independent state some measure of unity which was tested several times in the post-war period. Lijphart says the Dutch have a deferential attitude toward their leaders (which he notes has now changed) , with little interest in politics. In Lebanon this interest is high, largely because of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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23 9 Like the Netherlands, there is little social interaction between the communities, although the clientelist network involves interaction of elites from different communities. In both countries, education is largely a community affair, with the majority of Dutch students in private schools, while this applies more to the Christian students in Lebanon. The political parties in both are based on the particular communities. Each bloc is represented by a political party, the exception being the secular parties in the Netherlands, which have a class basis. No parallel exists in Lebanon, where political parties are weakly organized (except perhaps for the Maronite Kataeb party) and are often no more than a guise for a zaim and his clients. The personal factor is important here, since services could be provided by the zaim, who acted as an intermediary between the citizen and the government. While parties, labor unions etc. are important in the Netherlands, Lebanon on the other hand displays an interesting network of patron-client relationships which represent means by which individuals may receive goods and services from the state. The Dutch, on the other hand, see the elite as serving the interests of all, making elite bargaining perhaps a little less restricted.

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240 Finally, the effect of the environment is a major factor affecting the stability of a consociational democracy, and one that has had different effects on Lebanon and the Netherlands. Being in a different setting, the environment has not had an adverse effect of the Netherlands (at least since World War II, which is the period most relevant for a discussion of Lebanon's problems) . External pressures, to the extent that they exist, do not pose a threat to the stability of the smaller West European countries, rather the external environment has served to strengthen Dutch unity. The Netherlands, in short, is not in an unstable environment. Lijphart maintains a consociational democracy's stability is enhanced by its non-involvement in external affairs. Lebanon could not escape this. An unstable Middle East is closely tied to the nature of conflict in Lebanon. Inter-Arab feuds plus the Arab-Israeli conflict have both taken their toll. External factors exacerbated internal conflicts. It was a combination of both internal and external factors that led to the destructive civil war of 1975-76. The presence of several hundred thousand predominantly Moslems Palestinians was a catalyst for conflict. The Netherlands did not have to deal with the disruptive presence of a sizable alien force. In fact, one could argue that external factors facilitated cooperation in the Netherlands, through membership in both NATO and the EEC. How to deal with the Palestinian guerrilla force

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241 was a problem that divided the Lebanese people. Solution of the recent war may well rest on agreement between involved outside powers, as was indeed the case in 1860 and a century later in 1958. There is little allowance in the theory for an analysis of the interaction of internal and external factors. A plural society with communal groups that have different political orientations seems to be highly susceptible to penetration by outside powers. The external factor represents a major addition to consociational theory. How applicable is the consociational model, developed for the small West European democracies, for an understanding of a developing country like Lebanon? As is evident from the preceeding discussion Lebanon does share many of the characteristics of the consociational model. However, the model is not fully adequate for explaining other characteristics unique to Lebanon. From the above application of Lijphart's seven points to Lebanon, plus the comparison with the Netherlands, an important conclusion may be drawn. The consociational model as espoused by Lijphart has a rather static nature. The model as described is not able to accommodate any major changes, and this is particularly evident for Lebanon, and to a certain extent in the Netherlands where Lijphart argues consociationalism has broken down. The theory applies well to a static system, and does not provide for changes on the internal and external scene which affect

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242 the stability of the system, that is, between the relations between the system's subgroups. In short, the consociational model may be applicable to different countries in various degrees and it was our purpose to explain Lebanon's system and its demise with the aid of consociational theory and in the process to help identify extra variables that may serve to strengthen the theory's explanatory potential and applicability, and help to overcome some of its limitations. An examination of Lebanon's problems allow us to look at the extent of deviation from the model, which in turn permits us to illustrate the revision of the model needed to explain the breakdown of consociationalism in Lebanon. Revision of the _Consociational Model One of Lijphart's most important rules, that of proportionality , is integral to an understanding of the internal cause of Lebanon's civil war. As argued above, the concept of proportionality lacks a dynamic element—provision is not made for the changing composition, nature, aims and resources of groups and their elites over time. For the reasons discussed above, Lebanese Moslems demanded a major reorganization of Lebanon's political and economic structure which they alleged had long and unjustifiably favored the Christian half. The allocation of values, in short was biased in favor of a subgroup.

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243 The other factor--the external issue—was the role of the Palestinians in Lebanon. The effect and influence of external forces is not provided for in the theory, and this represents a major revision necessary for explaining Lebanon's system. A closer examination of the nature and problems of the social mobilization and . the elite cartel (which relate to the question of proportionality) and the role of the Palestinians (the influence of the external factor) will allow us to see more clearly how the Lebanese case deviates from the theory of consociationalism. Social Mobilization In the sixties and seventies both external problems and the results of modernization began to put strains on the system, more specifically on the agreement of 1943. The system proved incapable of initiating political and social change. The system perhaps lost its legitimacy , (at least among those excluded from power) which was based partly on its performance and its ability to resolve conflict. The system failed to respond to increasing demands made upon it. In short, the confessional arrangement proved unable to handle the problems resulting from increased modernization. Rapid social mobilization, according to Deutsch, will lead to conflict in culturally divided societies, and Lebanon does not seem to have escaped this problem. Increased social mobilization brings with it uneven development and increasing demands on the state. As disparities in wealth appeared, less privileged groups began to expect more from the

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2 44 government, which was accused of doing little to bring about a change in the distribution of resources. Moslems were now suspected of being the majority faith, and began to demand both more political power and a greater share in the country's prosperity. Influential non-Christian elements, newly-politicized, led the drive for fundamental changes. As noted above, the traditional Moslem leaders demanded these changes, too, lest they lose support in their communities. In sum, modernization added problems to the system. Demands were made on the government to assume a more active role in the development of the country, a government whose power was always limited. More groups became politicized, increasing the number of (counter) elites . Expectations engendered by rapid growth were not met. As Hudson puts it: . . . Social mobilization is disruptive of traditional political relationships: the newly mobilized, politicized masses do not find old patterns of identity and authority relevant, and the process of developing new ones is rarely peaceful and sometimes revolutionary. Furthermore, rapid social mobilization certainly accentuates the importance of equality as a prerequisite norm for political legitimacy . ^

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Social mobilization led to uneven development. Christian areas have developed quicker than the Moslem areas of the Biqa and the South. Though a small Moslem upper class exists, the less privileged elements have in general been the Moslems, especially the Shiites, regarded as the poorest and possibly the largest sect, in a state where Maronites and Sunnis predominate. The Shiites became more politicized and demanding, especially after fleeing South Lebanon and settling in the slums on the outskirts of Beirut with Palestinian refugees . The Arab countries benefitted from Lebanon's role as a tie with the West and an area where opinions could be freely expressed. But the Arab world was a source of great tension. Lebanon was caught up in Arab rivalries and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The newly-politicized Moslem elements in Lebanon became acquainted with Arab nationalism and this was translated mainly into strong support for the Palestinian presence, which served to divide the country's population. In brief, both development and Middle Eastern politics were simultaneously affecting the Lebanese political system. The Elite Ca rtel On the question of elites, Lebanon may be said to have deviated from consociational principles. A growing imbalance in the composition of the elite was one cause of the civil war. Christians resisted demands for more representation for the Moslems, ostensibly for at least as

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2 46 long as the Palestinian problem remained unsolved in Lebanon. Their natural disinclination to give up their accumulated power and privileges, meaning a weakening of the Christian minority, is also a central factor. Moslem demands for changes came largely from newly-emergent elites, representing leftist causes, that opposed the political system in Lebanon. These included the Syrian National Party, the Communist party, the Nasserites and the Baathists. These demanded fundamental changes in Lebanon's political and economic structure , while the traditional Moslem leadership desired more moderate reforms . The elites had attempted to keep the level of tension low. To overcome the "pillarization" , the elites had to bridge the vertical cleavages maintaining contact at the elite level, more than took place at the lower levels. Competition took place within the elite for power and services. Radical counterelites could not be admitted to the establishment for fear of disrupting the country's delicate consensus based on the National Pact. The system worked as long as there was continued adherence to it and support from all groups. Because of their close identification with their respective communities, polarization of elites occurred during crisis periods. Elite cartel members tended to seek outside help whenever they perceived a loss of power. Conflict between the elites, that is, resulted when it became impossible to keep relations within manageable

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247 proportions, as happened in 1952, 195 8, and 19 75. Only when conflict is below a dangerous level can a confessional system maintain itself. Politics in Lebanon may be seen as a sort of zero-sum game where one elite's gain is made at the expense of the others. Power in Lebanon was wielded by the important Lebanese families, operating through a complex web of patron-client relationships, and who have benefitted greatly from Lebanon's prosperity. Most elite members are landowners, and this has been the case for several centuries. Large Lebanese families, who play an important role in the political process, have remained prominent and it is from the zuama that the elite recruits most of its members. The elite recruitment that had taken place was concentrated on the well-to-do. The traditional landed zuama were joined by the urban zuama, members of the newlyemerging entrepreneurial class. Links were forged between the political and economic spheres, with some overlapping between the two. Political parties never made more than a dent in a system where prominent leaders, who had wealth and influence, would prevent others, who had no patronage and who did not identify with the system, from attaining political power. The elite's ability to continue to manage conflict began to decline in the sixties and seventies. President Shihab tried after 1960 to initiate reforms and planning, but with little success due largely to the influence of traditional

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248 leaders and the general immobilist nature of the system. Presidents Helou and Franjieh after him also did little in this regard. Perhaps it should be noted that, by the very nature of the system, effective reforms and planning were rather difficult to bring about. Counterelites grew whose determination and support were fueled by the government's inability to accommodate new demands arising from increased social mobilization and partly due to the influence of external actors. Radical elements found dissatisfied urban elements fertile recruiting grounds. Students began increasingly to accuse the state of being unresponsive and not sufficiently supportive of Arab causes. Elements not connected to the traditonal clientage network sought major changes, economic and political. In 1975 the elites were fighting each other, divided both over the Palestinian question and the question of Maronite political and economic predominance. Maronite Christians found themselves fighting an alliance of radical (mainly Moslem) groups and the Palestinian resistance. The demands made upon the Christian elite ranged from moderate to extreme. Traditional Sunni leaders (as Karami, Salam) were willing to see minor reforms initiated to remedy the imbalance between the two communities. The extremist groups sought a complete change in the political system, including the turning of Lebanon into a Moslem, confrontation state. They challenged the dominance of the traditional leaders, who were slowly losing their base of

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249 support to the radical elements. One of the factors leading to Moslem discontent was the maldistribution of wealth which increased modernization had wrought. The Palestinian Dimension During the civil war, the Lebanese Christian elite declared it would not discuss the redistribution issue with Moslem leaders until the activities of the Palestinians in Lebanon were curbed. The refugee population in Lebanon numbered close to 300,000 and it is estimated the guerrilla force from these ranks numbered about 10,000. This introduces another important factor, the external element, not adequately provided for in the theory. Lebanon's geographical location is paramount to a full understanding of its internal politics. It was this external factor-the well-armed Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon--coupled with Moslem discontent that began to weaken the base of the state. In essence, the Palestinians were a catalyst for the conflict. Predominantly Moslem the Palestinians introduced an upset in the confessional balance. Though they officially remained refugees and no attempt was made to assimilate them, their guerrilla force which operated freely in the country proved to be highly disruptive of Lebanon's domestic politcs in which they became increasingly embroiled.

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2 50 Strongest opposition to the Palestinians came from the Maronite community, which identifies strongly with Lebanon and are extremely nationalistic in this regard. Their desire to preserve the country as an independent entity arises out of a realization that they would become a minority with fewer rights and privileges in a union with the Arab worold, especially in closer ties with Syria which has long seen Lebanon as part of traditional Syria. The Maronites 1 feeling of separateness from the Arab world dates back to the sixth and seventh centuries. Aided at times by the clergy, they managed to maintain some autonomy from the country's various invaders. Stressing their Phoenician roots, they have maintained strong ties with Europe, especially France whom the Christians aided during the period of the Crusades . Consequently, it may be argued that one of the root causes of the civil war was initially resentment and subsequently alarm by the largely conservative Christians at the growing power of the Palestinians and their activities, which the Christians charged led them to act like a "state within a state". Discontent among left-wing groups found an outlet in an alliance with the Palestinian movement. The conservative elements resisted the demand for a greater participation in Lebanese politics by the newlyorganized, leftist elements.

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251 The showdown between Christian militias and the Palestinians turned into a confrontation between the right-wing Christians and the left-wing Moslems who, before the emergence of the Palestinians as an effective fighting force (beginning mainly after the 1967 war), could do little by themselves to force change upon the well-entrenched traditional elite. In sum, the system could not cope, through peaceful means, with this combination of internal and external forces. The introduction of a new actor upset the confessional system. These allied themselves with dissatisfied internal elements, the latter excluded from the patronage network of the system. Consociational theory lacks a better study of the interaction of internal and external conflicts. More attention needs to be focused on the conditions under which internal conflicts are exacerbated by external factors, as happened in the case of Lebanon. Hopefully, this "deviant" case has helped, in some small way, to further develop theory dealing with the prospects for stable, democratic systems in culturally fragmented societies.

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252 Notes 1. Lijphart, in fact, argues that consociationalism has broken down in the Netherlands. Social cleavages are blurred, allegiance to blocs is decreasing, and left-wing groups are not willing to play "accommodationist' politics. (Compromise, proportionality, concurrent majority, etc.). Cleavages are more cross-cutting and he sees this as a danger. He adds the leaders are undecided on the nature and extent of reforms. Perhaps, he overstated the problem somewhat. His argument stems from his belief that mutually-reinforcing cleavages are more conducive to stability than cross-cutting, which he asserts is happening now. The "crises" are apparently not serious enough to collapse the system as happened in Lebanon. Few would venture that the Netherlands today exhibits political instability. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accomo dation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), Chapter X. 2. For more one this point see Esman, op. cit. , pp. 6870. And Nordlinger, op. cit . , pp. 110-116. 3. Karl Deutsch , "Social Mobilization and Political Development/" American Political Science Rev iew (September, 1961), p. 501. 4. Michael Hudson, Arab Politi c s: The Search for Legit imacy (New Haven: Yale~University press"! 1977) , p. 57~

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25 3 APPENDIX A THE CAIRO AGREEMENT: SIGNED BY LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER EMIL BUSTANI AND PALESTINIAN LEADER YESIR ARAFAT, NOVEMBER 3, 1969. Palestinian Existence . The Palestinians were to be reorganized as follows: 1. The right to work, residence, and free movement of Palestinians residing in Lebanon. 2. Formation of local committees of Palestinian residents in these camps through cooperation with the local authorities and within the framework of Lebanon's sovereignty. 3. Establishment of Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) posts within the camps to cooperate with the local committees to insure good relations. These posts will be reponsible for organizing and specifying the existence of arms in the camps within the framework of Lebanon's security and the Palestinian revolution's interest. 4. Palestinians residing in Lebanon shall be allowed to participate in the revolution through the PASC within the principles of Lebanon's sovereignty and safety.

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254 Fedayeen Actions . This was to be facilitated by: 1. Facilitating movement by specifying passage and reconnaissance points along the border. 2. Insuring passage to the Arkoub region. 3. PASC maintenance of the discipline of all members of the organizations so they will not interfere in Lebanese affairs . 4. Establishment of a joint disciplinary system between the PASC and the Lebanese army. 5. Cessation of propaganda campaigns by the two sides. 6. A census of armed struggle elements in Lebanon through the organization's leaders. 7. Appointment of PASC representatives to the Lebanese Army staff to help solve all urgent matters. 8. Study of suitable concentration points along the border, which will be agreed on with the Lebanese army staff. 9. Regulation of the entry, exit and movement of PASC elements . 10. Release of detainees and confiscated arms. 11. Exercise of full powers and responsibilities in all Lebanese regions and under all circumstances by Lebanese civilian and military authorities. SOURCE: Paul Jureidini and William Hazen, The Palestinian Movement in Politics (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976), pp. 68-69.

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255 APPENDIX B COMPOSITION OF OPPOSING FORCES IN LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, 1975-76 1 • Lebanese Leftist Organizations -Progressive Socialist Party (Jumblatt) -Baath Socialist Party (Iraq) (Abd Al Majid Al Rafai) . -Baath Socialist Party (Syria) (Assem Kanzo) . -Syrian Social National Party (Inam Raad) . -Lebanese Communist Party (George Hawi) . -Organization of Communist Action (Mohsen Ibrahim) . -October 24 Movement (Farouk Al Mokaddem) . -Movement of the Deprived (Moussa Al Sadr) . -Lebanese Arab Army (Ahmad Al Khatib) . Nasserites , divided into: -Independent Nasserites (Murabitoun) (Ibrahim Kuleilat) -Corrective Movement (Isam Al Arab) . -Arab Socialist Union (Kamal Yunis) . -Union of National Workers Forces (Kamal Shatila and N. Wakim) . -Popular Nasserist Organization (Mustafa Saad) . 1 • Palestinian Organizations Most were from the 'Rejection Front', which included: -Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (George Habash) . -Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine-General Command (Ahmad Jibril) .

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2 56 -Arab Liberation Front (Abd Al Wahhab Al Kayyali) . -Popular Struggle Front (Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya) . -Popular Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (Nayif Hawatima) . Also : -Al Fatah (Yesir Arafat) -Al Saiqa (Zuhair Mohsen) -Palestine Liberation Army. 3 . Christian (Maronite) Groups -Phalangists (Pierre Gemayel) -National Liberal. Party (Camille Chamoun) -Zgharta Liberation Army (Tony Franjieh). -Maronite Monasteries Organization (Father Charbel Cassis) -Front for the Protection of the Cedars (Dr. Fuad Chemali) -Lebanese Army (Christian) (Col. Antoine Barakat) . -National Bloc (Rayomand Edde ; did not take part) . -Tashnaq (Rightist Armenian Group) . SOURCES: Kamal Salibi, Crossroad to Civil War (New York: Caravan Books, 1976) , pp. 165-166. Enver Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System (Washington: AEI , 1976), pp. 79-80. Keesing's Contemporary Arch i ves , June 11, 1976, p . TTleT.

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257 APPENDIX C LEBANESE POLITICAL PARTIES The Phalangist Party (Kataeb ) . The Kataeb is the only party which resembles a Western party in terms of its organization and structure . The party started as a youth organization in 1936, led by Pierre Gemayel who still heads the party today. By 1947, 2 the party's membership had jumped to 40,000 members. (It officially became a party in 1952) . Today the party boasts over 70,000 members. The party is mainly Maronite in composition, with most of the members coming from the Maronite stronghold of Mt . Lebanon. The rest are drawn form Beirut and the North. It has had representatives in Parliament since 1951. The party supports Lebanon's free enterprise system and Lebanon's territorial integrity. Strongly nationalistic, they stress the non-Arab character of Lebanon (equating Islam and Arab nationalism) . Lebanon is Arab in the sense only that it speaks Arabic. "... relations with the Arab states are therefore to be governed by expdiency, as with other aliens, and expediency dictates eternal distrust. "^ It has consistently opposed any plans for increased Arab unity involving Lebanon. The Kataeb has favored a social security plan, speaking often of the need for social justice. The party maintains a well-trained paramilitary force, which was active in 1951

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258 and in the recent civil war, in which the Kataeb led the forces opposed to the operation of Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon. They are allied with the National Bloc, with whom they formed a "tripartite alliance" in 1967 to counter what they saw as an increasing danger from the Socialist left. 4 National Liberal Party Established in 1958 by ex-President Camille Chamoun , this party has close to 60,000 members, with the base in the Shouf region. It, too, is mainly Maronite and advocates continued Lebanese independence and a free market economy. The party stresses co-operation with the Arab states. National Bloc The National Bloc was formed in 19 32 by Emile Edde who became President in 1936, during the period when he strongly supported the French authorites . It changed from a parliamentary bloc to a political party in 1946. In 1949, his son Raymond took over as leader and continues to this day. Its 15,000 members are mostly Maronite centered in Mt . Lebanon, specifically Byblos, Edde ' s power base. It also supports Lebanon's economic system and political sovereignty. They make a distinction between Lebanon and the Arabs reverting often to an emphasis on the Phoenician origin of the Christians.

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259 Na j jada Like the Kataeb, this party began as a youth organization in 1937. Like the Kataeb also it was meant to instill national sentiments in the young. After independence it became concerned with political issues. Banned for a period, it re-emerged in 1954 under Adnan Al-Hakim who remains its leader today. Its membership is predominantly Sunni Moslem, with its 15,000 members coming mainly from Beirut and the Bekaa. The party appeals to the backward Moslem elements, claiming Moslems are underprivileged in Lebanon and calling for a redress of the claimed injustices. The Najjada (helpers) advocate a stronger Islamic and pro-Arab stand' for Lebanon, arguing Western influence in Lebanon has to be elminated. The party also maintains a militia. The Najjada is the only Moslem party that approximates the Christian parties in terms of organization. Progressive Socialist Party Formed in 1949 by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, the party advocates a socialist state with the eradication of the confessional system. Pro-Arab, its ideology is a mixture of "French socialism, Indian pacifism and Lebanese Druze Q nationalism. . . Jumblatt 's influence has transcended the relatively small size of his party and the Druze sect, consistently championing leftist movements in Lebanon. Jumblatt, in fact, led the Moslem-Palestinian alliance in the recent war. The party is for Lebanese independence

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260 with close co-operation with the Arab states. His 6,000 members are linked to him through their support for him as a zaim, with ideology not actually being an important factor. Syrian Social National Party This "semisecret, pseudofascist , paramilitary cadre g party was founded in 19 32 by Antun Saadeh, becoming a party in 1936. It attempted a coup in 1949 which was aborted and which led to Saadeh' s execution. The party was banned, only to re-emerge in 19 5 8 when Chamoun allowed the party to operate in return for their help in the 1958 crisis. Another coup failed in 1961, and the party was again outlawed. The party advocates a secular state— a larger Syrian state--encompassing Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Kuwait and Cryprus . Its main supporters are the Greek-Orthodox, since the central idea is " . . . the synthesis of the thesis of Phoenician nationalism and the antithesis of Arab nationalism. " The mainly middle class members advocate an elite-led state which would be neither Democratic nor Communistic. Co mmunist Party Formed in 1922, this party was active under one leadership in both Syria and Lebanon until 1944 when it split into two separate parties. Its members come from a cross-section of socio-economic groups with support based mainly in the

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261 cities. They have never held any parliamentary seats, though 1 5 their membership in the mid-fifties was estimated at 10,000. Its party organization is similar to that of other Communist parties, except for their cells which consist of groups of approximately ten members in villages. The party supports Lebanese independence, but opposes sectarianism, denouncing it as exploitative. The basis for their support is described by Suleiman: As positions of leadership and authority in government and society were and remained for a long time the prerogative and the vested interest of zuama, feudal lords, and religious leaders, the new intelligensia found themselves without a role to play. Joining the communist party, in addition to soothing their social conscience, provided them with a definite, purposeful, and satisfying role in society. Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (3aath Party ) . Formed in 1942 by two Syrians, this mainly Moslem party advocates pan-Arabism, calling for radical changes in Lebanon's political and economic system. For the Arab world they advocate a secular state. Numbering no more than a few thousand, they claim to be the true vanguards of Arab nationalism. ^

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262 Notes 1. Frank Stoakes, "The Supervigilantes : The Lebanese Kataeb Party as a builder, surrogate and defender of the State," Middle Eastern Studies (October, 1975), p. 216. 2. Hudson, Precarious Republic (New York: Random House, 1968) , p. 143. 3. Stoakes, op_. cit . , p. 218. 4. John P. Entelis, Pluralism and Pa rty _ Transformation in Lebanon: Al Ka t a'H.b, 1936-1970 (Leiden"! E.J. "Brill, 1974) , pp. 144-45. 5. Suleiman, op_. cit., p. 261. 6. Suleiman, op_. cit., p. 259. 7. Hudson, Precarious Republic , p. 176. 8. Ibid . , p. 183. 9. Ibid . , p. 171. 10. Ibid. , p. 101. 11. Suleiman, op_. cit . , p. 71. 12. Walter Laqueur, Communism and Natio n alism in the Middle East (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961) , p. 277. 13. Suleiman, op_. cit . , p. 77. 14. Hudson, op. cit., p. 199.

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2 71 Qubain, F.I. Crisis in Le banon . Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1961. Raphaeli, N. "Development Planning: Lebanon." Wester n Political Quarterly , XX (Spring, 1967), pp .~714-72~8 . Rayyes, R. and Nahhas , D. Guerrillas for Pal estine. New York: St. Andrew's Press, Inc., 1976. Rondot, Pierre. "Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism." Journal of Contemporary History , III (July, 1968) , pp. 37-51. Rossillion, C. "Cultural Pluralism, Equality of Treatment and Equality of Opportunity in Lebanon." I nternational Labor Review , No. 9 8 . ,' (September , 1968), pp. 225-244. Salem, Elie. "Cabinet Politics in Lebanon." Middle East Journal , XXI (Autumn, 1967) , pp. 488-501. • Modernization Without Revolution : Leban on ' s Experience . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973 Salibi, Kamal. "The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective." World Today , XIV (September, 1958), pp. 369-380. . "Lebanon Since the Crisis of 1958." World Today , XVII, (1961), pp. 32-42. . Modern History of Lebanon . New York: F.A. Praeger, 1965. . "Lebanon under Fuad Chehab : 1958-1964." Middle East Studies , II (1966), pp. 211-226. _. "The Lebanese Identity." Journal of Contemporary History , VI (1971), pp. 76-84. . Crossroads to Civil War . New York: Caravan Books, 1977. Sayigh, T.A. Entrepreneu r s of Lebanon . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. . "Lebanon." in The Economies of the Arab World: Development since 1945 . London: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1978. Sharabi, H.B. Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century . London: D. Van Nostrand Co. , Inc., 1962.

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2 72 Shaw, S.J. and Shaw, E.K. The History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey . New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Smith, Harvey. Area Handbook for Lebanon . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1974. Smock, D. and Smock, A. The Politics of Plura lism: A Comparative Study _ of Lebanon and Ghana . New York: Elsevier, 1975. Spagnolo, John. "Constitutional Change in Mt . Lebanon, 1861-1964." Middle Eastern Studies , VII (January, 1971) , pp. 109-128. . "Mount Lebanon, France and Daud Pasha: A Study of some Aspects of Political Habituation." Inter n ation al Journal of Middle East Studies , II (April, 1971), pp. 148-167. Stavrou, T.G. "Russian Interest in the Levant, 1843-48." Middle East Journal XXVII (Winter-Spring, 1963) , pp. 91-103. Stebbins, R.P. The United States in World Affairs . Harper and Brothers , 1959 . Steiner, Jurg. "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality. British Journal of Political Science . I (January , 19 71) , pp. 63-70. Stewart, Desmond. Turmoil in Beirut . London: Wingate , 1959. Stoakes, Frank. "The Supervigilantes : The Lebanese Kataeb Party as Builder , Surrogate and Defender of the State." Middle Eastern Studies , II (October, 1975), pp. 215-236. . "The Civil War in Lebanon." World To day, XXXII (January, 1976) , pp. 8-17. Suleiman, Michael. "Elections in a Confessional Democracy." Journal of Politics ,. XXIX (February, 1967), pp. 109-128. . P olitical Parties in Lebanon . Ithaca, New York: Cornell University press^~T9 6 7 . . "The Role of Political Parties in a Confessional Democracy: The Lebanese Case." Western_ Poli tical Quarterly , XX (September, 1967) , pp. 683-693. Tannous, Afif. "The Village in the National Life of Lebanon." Middle East Journal , III (April, 1949), pp. 151-164. f

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273 Wade, S.S. "Operation BLUEBAT." Marine Corps Ga zette, (July, 1959), pp. 10-23. ~ ~ ---------Waterman, Charles. "Lebanon's Continuing Crisis." Current History , LV (January, 1978), pp. 19-24. '"" Wright, Quincy. "Editorial Comment: United States Intervention in the Lebanon." The American Jou rnal of Internat ional Law, XXXXIX (1959) , pp. 112-125. Yaukey, David. Fertility Differences in a_ Mode rnizing Country . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961 Ziadeh, Nicola. Syria and Lebanon . New York: F.A. Praeger, Inc., 1957. . "The Lebanese Election, 1960." Midd le East Journal . XIV (Autumn, 1960) , pp. 367-381.

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274 Newspapers, magazines and reference works consulted Arab World File Christian Science Monitor The Daily Star (English Daily, Beirut) Al Play at (Arabic Daily, Beirut) Keesing's Contemporary Archives The Middle East and North Africa ; London: Europa Publications Al Nahar (Arabic Daily, Beirut) Newsweek The New York Times Time United Nations Demographic and Statistical Yearbooks U.S. News and World Report

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Robert George Chalouhi was born in Dar Bichtar, North Lebanon on December 1, 1949. The family moved to Sydney, Australia where he spent the first fifteen years of his life. In 1966, the family moved back to Lebanon where he completed the last two years of high school before going on to the American University of Beirut, where he received both his B.A. and M.A. in Political Science between 1968-1974. He came to the University of Florida in March, 19 75 to pursue a Ph. D. degree. In August, 19 78 he married Janie Kay Saunders of Ormond Beach, Florida. 2 75

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 7// Keith R. Legg, Chairman Professor of Political Science I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. xz=^2^ Rene LenVarchand Professor of Political Science I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. r .fJfi \ 'V'.' 'V I John7'wy Spanier Professor of Political Science I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. XrEonso J. Damico Associate Professor of Political Science

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. A. Harry W. Paul Professor of History This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. December, 1978 Dean, Graduate School

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