Citation
A Social history of Ouro Prêto

Material Information

Title:
A Social history of Ouro Prêto stresses of dynamic urbanization in colonial Brazil, 1695-1726
Creator:
Ramos, Donald, 1942-
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
1972
Language:
English
Physical Description:
xvii, 446 leaves. : illus. ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Baptism ( jstor )
Councils ( jstor )
Gold mining ( jstor )
Governors ( jstor )
Militia ( jstor )
Mining ( jstor )
Parishes ( jstor )
Slavery ( jstor )
Taxes ( jstor )
Towns ( jstor )
Dissertations, Academic -- History -- UF ( lcsh )
History -- Ouro Prêto (Minas Gerais, Brazil) ( lcsh )
History thesis Ph. D ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 433-445.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
Copyright [name of dissertation author]. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Resource Identifier:
022918577 ( AlephBibNum )
14179646 ( OCLC )
ADB3723 ( NOTIS )

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Full Text















A SOCIAL HISTORY OF OURO PRETO: STRESSES OF
DYNAMIC URBANIZATION Ill COLONIAL BRAZIL,
1695-1726





By



DONALD RAMOS


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE
COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY


UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1972


+Illlll'll















Copyright by
Donald Ramos
1972













To My Father

Francisco Nascimento Ramos

In Grateful Memory













PREFACE


Ouro Preto is today a small city of fewer than 20,000

people about 100 kilometers southeast of Belo Horizonte,

the capital of the state of Minas Gerais. It is a town

only beginning to recover from over a century of isolation

and economic underdevelopment. While the eighteenth century

was an era of economic and cultural dynamism, the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries saw economic retardation.

Fortunately for the present, past residents of Ouro Preto

lacked the wealth to destroy the monuments of the golden

age in Minas Gerais. Now these monuments -- the churches,

houses, works of art, and rambling streets -- attract tour-

ists from all over Brazil and from many parts of the world.

Because of its importance during the eighteenth

century, Vila Rica, as Ouro Preto was called during the

colonial era, has been examined by Brazilian historians.

But almost without exception these writers have focused

either upon dramatic events like the Wars of the Emboabas,

the 1720 riots, and the Inconfidencia Mineira of 1789, or

upon the baroque art which flourished during the age of

gold. Thus, writers have tended to fix their attention

upon the events which took place in the town and to treat

these as examples of nativism during the colonial era.







Throughout these studies the town and its residents are

barely perceptible. Because the spotlight has been on

the dramatic, the organization and structure of the town

has remained in the shadows.

The colonial history of Vila Rica can be divided into

three distinct periods. The first covers the years between

1.695, when gold was discovered, and 1726, and is charac-

terized by a rapid expansion in gold production. The

second covers the years 1727 to 17h4, and is marked by

relative stability in the production of gold in the im-

mediate area of Vila Rica. The third period extends from

1745 to the end of the colonial era, and is one of decreas-

ing gold production.

This study concentrates on the epoch of economic

boom. It is during this period that the seeds of the artis-

tic and intellectual developments of the second half of

the eighteenth-century were planted. This is the period

when law and order was established among the turbulent

miners who flocked into the mining district. My primary

consideration in examining these three decades is to pre-

sent a multifaceted view of a society in the process of

formation. Rather than present a static situation, the

emphasis is on change--on the dynamic manner in which

this colonial society evolved.

To some extent, especially regarding the Wars of the

Emboabas, material familiar to specialists is reexamined.

Time and space are devoted to such topics in order that they







may be placed into a larger frame of reference; the em-

phasis is not on the events themselves, but on their

effects upon the society then developing.

I have sought to concentrate upon the analysis of

local political institutions, social organization, and

urbanization, and to emphasize the processes by which these

evolved. This approach provides an opportunity to use

Vila Rica as a case study of a colonial town, and is es-

pecially illuminating because of the rapidity with which

the transition was made from an uninhabited region to a

major town and capital of the most populated and richest

captaincy in Brazil.

In terms of political development, the case of Vila

Rica reaffirms the importance of town councils in the ad-

ministration of law and the maintenance of order. This

study, however, goes beyond the town council to examine

all components of a highly complex system of local gov-

ernment including the justices of the peace and the fiscal

officers. The case by Vila Rica refutes the assumption

that by 1700 royal government had crushed municipal power.

In the mining district the Portuguese crown was willing to

grant extensive powers to local interests in exchange for

stability and its corollary, increased gold production.

The process by which the crown sought to regain control

from local interests is a major theme of this study.

My analysis of the development of Vila Rica is

focused on the forces that shaped the urban pattern which

vi







evolved. While gold was the most important factor in

determining the location of the town, and the general form

that the urban area would assume, other factors such as

commerce, the main square, major roads, and the construc-

tion of public buildings played significant roles in this

process.

The society that evolved in and immediately around

Vila Rica is discussed at length in this study, which is

especially concerned with the composition of each level of

society and the extent of mobility between groups. Far-

ticular attention is devoted to slaves and freedmen. While

there was extensive social mobility during part of this

period, the process of social rigidification also began at

this time, with the effects being felt most by some ccm-

ponents of the middle group and by the slaves. Baptismal

and marriage kinship relationships, Isy brotherhoods, and

the militia are examined as manifestations of these pro-

cesses.

The sources used in the reconstruction of this col-

onial environment include the records of the town council

of Vila Rica; the records of baptisms, marriages, and burials;

lay brotherhood records; wills; and the records of the

governor's office and the treasury. These sources, some

of which have not been used systematically before, form

a mosaic: each provides a piece to the total picture.

This is particularly true in the matter of social organi-

zation.


vii







The research for this study was conducted in Brazil

under a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program

grant, without which it could not have been done. I would

be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the assistance and

friendship extended to me by the Director of the Arquivo

Publico Mineiro, Dr. Joao Gomes Teixeira; the Archbishop

of Mariana, Dom Oscar de Oliveira; and the Director of the

Museu da Inconfidencia, Dr. Orlandino Seites Fernandes.

Among many other Brazilians who aided my research, Srs.

Helio Gravati and Manuel de Paiva Junicr must be singled

out; Sr Gravati for both his friendship and bibliographical

assistance and Sr. Manuel for sharing his love for Ouro

Prsto and his knowledge of local church history and docu-

mentation. I have received advice and assistance from

many North Americans at various stages of my research, but

particularly from Dr. Neill !acaulay of the University of

Florida who has been unstinting of his time and knowledge.

To these gentlemen and to others unnamed goes my sincerest

appreciation.


vii i














TABLE OF CONTENTS


Preface . . . . . . . . . .

List of Tables . . . . . . . .

List of Figures . . . . . . . .

Key to Abbreviations. . . . . . .

Abstract . . . . . . . . .

Part I The F.rl!y Years: Gold and Royal
Indecision. . . . . . .. .

Chapter 1 The Years of Frustration and
Success . . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 2 The Years of 'Euhoria and
Distress . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 3 The Gold Rush . . . .
Hotes . . . . . . . .
Chapter C-old: Techniques and Taxes. .
Notes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 5 Administration: The Period of
Uncertainty . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .

Part II Rebellion and Reaction: The Imposition
of Royal Control, 1706-1711 .. ..

Chapter 6 Confrontation . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 7 The Wars of the Emboabas. .
Not es . . . . . . . .
Chapter 8 The Aftermath . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .

Part III The Vessel and Its Contents .

Chapter 9 The Incorporation of Vila
Rica . . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 10 Urban Development of Vila
Rica . . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .


iv

xii

xiii

xiv


xv


1


1
12

15
33
36
49
53
67

69
81


82

82
91
93
106
109
125

129


129
136

138
155







Chapter


Notes
Chapter 12


Chaptc-r 13

Dl tes
Chapter 1l4

i o. t e L
Chapter 15

llotes
Caotes

Chaptc r 17


Sot es
Chapter 13

Ic.tes
Chapter 19
Notes


Social Organization Before
1726: The Potentates . .

Social Organization: The
Middle Sector . . . .

The Slave: Distribution and
Origins . .

The Slave: His Threat to
Society . . . . .

The Slave: Living and Worki
Conditions . . . . .

The Freedman . . . .

Social Organization: Com-
padresco Relationships and
marriage Patterns ..

The Irmandades and Social
Differentiation . . .

The Militia . . . .
. . . . . . . .


Part IV Local Government


Chapter 20 Structure of the Municipal
Council . .
otes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 21 The Municipal Council: Selec-
tion of Members . . . .
otes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 22 The Functions of the Munici-
pal Council . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 23 The Municipal Council:
Income . . . . . .
HIotes . . . . . . . .
Chapter 2h The Apparatus of Local
Government . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .

Part V The End of the Age Of Potentates . .

Chapter 25 Political Conflict in an
Evolving Society . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .


158
172

175
187

189
200

203
213

216
223
226
238


242
255

258
271
275
292

296


296
308

311
322

324
342

3L5
358

362
381


384


384
402







Chapter 26 The Uprising of 1720 . . .
Notes . . . . . . . .

Glossary . . . . . . . . . .

Bibliography. . . . . . . . . .

Biographical Sketch . . . . . . .


405
428

431

433

446













LIST OF TABLES


Page


Table 1 Royal Income . . . . . . .65

Table 2 Origin of Slaves in Vila Rica . 195

Table 3 Homens Bons: 1711 . . . ... .316-317

Table 4 Royal Fifth Totals by Parish ... . 390


xii














LIST OF FIGURES

Vila Rica and Major Outlying Settlements.......... 19


xiii












KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS


ACAM..........Arquivo da Curia do Arcebispado de Mariana

AIMP ..........Arquivo de Irmandade das Merces e Perddes

AISFAD........Arquivo da Irmandade de SAo Francisco de
Ant5nio Dias

ANSRAC.........Arquivo da Irmand2de de Nossa Senhora do
Rosario do Alto da Cruz

APAD..........Arquivo Parochial de Ant3nio Dias

APHANOP....... Arcuivo do Patrimznio Hist6rico e Artistico
National in Ourc Prito

APM........... Arquivo PGblico ::ineiro

APOP..........Arquivo Parochial de Ouro Prito

CMOP..........Camara Municipal de Ouro Prito Collection of
the Arquivo Ciclico Mineiro

DF............Delegacia Fiscal Collection of the Arquivo
PGblico Mineiro

DFA...........Delegacia Fiscal Avulso Collection of the
Arquivo PGblico Miineiro

SG............Secretiria do G0verno Collection of the
Arquivo PGblico Mineiro


SHORT TITLES


Anais da Biblioteca Uacional...Anaic da Biblioteca Nacional
do Rio de Janeiro

Documents Hist6ricos...Documentos Hist6ricos da Biblioteca
Iacional do Rio de Janeiro


xiv







Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the
Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial
ilfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosoph

A SOCIAL HISTORY OF OURO PRETO: STRESSES CF
DYNAMIC URBANIZATION IN COLONIAL BRAZIL,
1695-1726

by

Donald Ramos

December, 1972

Chairman: Neill Webster Macaulay
Major Department: History

Major gold deposits were discovered in Minas Gerais

in 1695 after almost one hundred and fifty years of futile

searching. This led to a gold rush of u'jor proportions;

within fifteen years there were over thirty thousand

people gainfully employed in mining and ancillary indus-

tries. One consequence of this gold rush was very rapid

urbanization in several areas. Foremost among these was

Vila Rica which became the capital of the captaincy and

later, as Ouro Preto, the capital of the province of Minas

Gerais.

While gold mining was the initial reason for the

settlement, very quickly Vila Rica's location astride

major roads allowed commerce to develop into the element

which differentiated it from other Mineiro towns. While

commerce was very important to the local economy, mer-

chants were not able to transform this economic power

directly into political power. The boom atmosphere, how-

ever, did make it easy for merchants to enter mining or


xv







farming and thereby gain entry into the elite.

While Vila Rica exhibits many of the attributes of

a traditional society, a substantial middle sector did

evolve. Composed of groups with widely divergent goals

and interests, this amorphorous sector was united by the

fact that many of its members were white and, very often,

Portuguese-born. An important component of this sector

was the artisan. Unlike in Portugal and some of the

coastal areas of Brazil the guild organization was not a

spontaneous reaction to existing conditions but the forced

creation of the town council. In Vila Rica many of its

social functions were assumed by lay brotlerhoods. One

of the avenues of social mobility into the middle sector

for nonwhites and women was through ownership of shops.

Vertical mobility from this group into the upper class

occurred with decreasing frequency during this period.

The bottom rung of society was composed of freedmen

and slaves. Similarities in status are seen as resulting

from the relative personal freedom granted to domestic

slaves in an urban setting compounded by the frequency

of manumission. The examination of slave origins reveals

the predominance of Bantu over Mina slaves. The reaction

of the slave to bondage was not one of docile acquiescence.

Quilombos proliferated in the immediate area of Vila Rica.

While runaway slaves maintained active commerce with Vila

Rica, they were able to seriously hamper communication be-

tween it and the other towns.







Lay brotherhoods, the militia, and kinship relation-

ships are examined as aspects of this social organization.

The physical organization of Vila Rica is seen as due to

the location of gold deposits, major roads, the town

square, and the construction of public buildings. These

factors had shaped the town's urban pattern by 1720.

Parallel to the evolution of social groupings in the

mining district was the campaign of the royal government

to establish-its jurisdiction over the disorderly miners.

This process extends from the early piecemeal efforts in

the 1690's through the 1720 urban riots from which the

royal government emerged victorious. The Wars of the

Emboabas are seen as one aspect of this process and as a

key step in the structuring of society. The composition,

functions, and income sources cf the town council are

examined in detail as are other representatives of Iccal

government such as fiscal officers and justices of the

peace.

This study relies heavily on unpublished documents

from the Arquivo Publico Mineiro and the archives of local

parishes, brotherhoods, the Archbishopric of Mariana, and

the Servigo do Patrimonio Hist6rico e Artistico Nacional.


xvii












PART I
THE EARLY YEARS: GOLD AND ROYAL INDECISION

Chapter 1
The Years of Frustration and Success



The dream of gold, silver and precious stones spurred

Portuguese settlement of Brazil. From the arrival of Tome

de Sousa at Salvador, Bahia, in 1549, numerous attempts

were made to find these riches--efforts which were stimu-

lated by the success of the Spanish in Nueva Granada and

especially in Upper Peru at Potosl. Pero de Magalhaes de

Gandavo in 1576 noted the existence of gold and, undoubt-

edly repeating rumors that he had heard, referred to a

"large lake in the interior where [the Indians] swear that

there are many settlements, whose residents (as is common
1
knowledge) have great stores of gold and precious stones."

Gandavo was repeating the legend of Vupabussu, the richest

place in the world, where each newly elected king was

covered with gold dust and dunked into the water until all

the gold dust had been washed off and left as an offering
2
to the gods. This legend is the same as that of El Dorado

which stimulated Spanish conquerors and English adventurers

alike. A second myth, which quickly became the dominant

one among the Portuguese, was that of Sabarabussu, a

resplendent mountain, the fabulous deposit of silver some-





2

3
where in the interior of Brazil. It was believed that

the great silver deposits of Potosi extended into Portu-
4
guese territory. All that was needed vas careful explor-

ation in Brazil at the latitude of Potosi to find for

Portugal riches equal to those of Spain.

The fact that planning for Expeditions began in 1551,

only two years after the arrival of Tome de Sousa, is evi-

dence of the interest which these legends excited. After

two years of organizing and planning, Francisco Bruza de

Spinosa, a Spaniard in the pay of Portugal, left P3rto

Serguro and, following the Eio Jequitinhonha, reached the

area of present-day Serrc and Diamantina. This attempt

to find mineral wealth was foiled by the rough terrain and
5
bad weather. Spinosa was followed in 1568 by Martins

Carvalho, who penetrated almost 1300 kilometers into the

interior to reach the same region. Carvalho, unlike
6
Spinosa, did find some gold nuggets. Orville Derby,

geologist and historian, bestows on Carvalho's expedition

the honor of having made the first discovery of gold in
7
Minas Gerais. After eight months of trekking through

the wilderness, the Carvalho expedition arrived in PSrto

Seguro--but without the gold nuggets, which were lost

when a canoe overturned.

While in practical terms the Carvalho expedition was

a failure, the stories concerning the gold which was found

stimulated other explorers. During the final three decades

of the century four major expeditions were dispatched to








find the riches whose existence few doubted but whose

precise location was unknown. The first of these left

PSrto Seguro in 1573 under the leadership of Sebastiao

Fernandes Tourinho. Several years later another, under

Antonio Dias Adorno, began its trek into the unknown. Both

expeditions probably stayed north of the Rio Doce.

Tourinho, however, did reach the Serro area and returned

with what he mistakenly believed to be emeralds and

sapphires. During the next decade further efforts were

made by Joao Coelho de Sousa and his brother, the chron-

icler Gabriel Soares de Sousa, who died while following

the route previously taken by his brother.

The next major entry into Minas Gerais was made by

Marcos de Azeredo who also followed basically the route

of Tourinho. Azeredo reached the area which he believed

to be that of the mythical Sabarabussu and returned with

what appeared to be emeralds but died before revealing the

location of his discovery. Thus all efforts from the

captaincies of P6rto Seguro and Bahia to find and exploit

deposits of gold, silver or precious stones were futile.

Meanwhile, expeditions from the captaincy of Sao

Vicente had achieved some success in the search for gold.

Bras Cubas, after leading an unsuccessful three-hundred-

league trek in 1560-1562, discovered gold on a second ex-

pedition which covered only thirty leagues, from its point
8
of departure, Santos. Between 1570 and 1584 a bandeira

(expedition), headed by the German Heliodoro Eobanus dis-





4


covered gold at Iguape (in southern Sao Paulo), Paranagua
9
and Curitiba (both in what is now the state of Parana).

These discoveries soon were being worked by men from the

captaincy of Sao Vicente. Before the end of the century

several minor deposits had been discovered near Sao Paulo,

such as the one at Jaragua.

In 1601, a bandeira under Andr6 de Lego left S5o Paulo
10
accompanied by one Dutch and two German mining experts.

This bandeira, one of the earliest to enter Minas Gerais

from Sao Paulo, reached the area of present-day Pitangui,
11
believed by Lego to be the location of Sabarabussu. After

this expedition failed to uncover any mineral wealth,

official interest in the search abated. This diminution

of interest was due to the frustration of having searched

in vain, the Spanish domination of Portugal, and the efforts

of Portugal to regain her independence. Until Spain

recognized Portugal's independence in 1668, Portuguese

energies were turned inward. The crown was in a precarious

position, and its efforts were limited to offering only in-

centives such as greater benefits to discoverers of

precious metals or stones.

These incentives did have some effect and a number of

bandeiras were sent into the hinterland by the Sao Paulo

camara (municipal council) in the 1670's. One of these
12
was led by Francisco de Camargo, who was instructed to

look for gold, silver and precious stones. He left in

1672, but the results of his expedition are unknown. Among









the others that got underway at about the same time, one

stands out because of its relation to the discovery of

gold in Minas Gerais and because of the information avail-

able concerning its passage through the hinterland. This
13
was the bandeira of Ferngo Dias Pais. Accompanied by

his son-in-law, Manuel de Borba Gato, his son, Garcia

Rodrigues Pais, and a large number of Paulistas and

Indians, Pais left Sao Paulo in July, 1674 on a journey

which would last seven years. The bandeira proceeded

slowly, planting crops in a number of places in order to

have supplies for the return journey. It reached an area

believed to be that of Sabarabussu but mass desertions

and sickness forced it to turn tack after a few stones

which were believed to be emeralds were found. On the

way back, Pais died at Sumidouro, one of the sites where
14
crops had been planted.

While the Pais bandeira was in Minas Gerais, the

crown sent a Spaniard trained at Potosi, Rodrigo de Castelo

Branco, to Brazil as Administrator of Mines. After a

short stay in Bahia he was ordered to the south, and he

dispatched various expeditions to examine the strikes

previously made in Sao Paulo and Parana. Then he set out

to follow the trail of Pais' bandeira. Castelo Branco

left Sao Paulo in March, 1681, and on June 26 met Garcia

Rodrigues Pais, who gave him the "emeralds" that had been

found. After dispatching the stones to Sao Paulo, Castelo

Branco continued on to Sumidouro, where he met Borba Gato and








remnants of the bandeira. After a quarrel over Castelo

Branco's right to appropriate supplies, Castelo Branco

was killed -- whether by Borba Gato or his slaves is

unknown. What is clear is that after this event Borba Gato
15
was forced to flee. He was to remain in the unsettled

and virtually unknown backlands of Minas Gerais from 1682

to 1699. It is believed that he spent much of this time
16
in Roga Grande near what is now the town of Sabara.

Apparently he maintained intermittent contact with his

family in SKo Paulo, but his activities during these years

constitute one of the mysteries surrounding the discovery

of gold in Minas Gerais. That such a prominent member of

an elite P.aulista family found it necessary to spend seven-

teen years in the hinterland to avoid being arrested seems

implausible. More probably they were spent in search of

emeralds and silver.

By 1690 the major routes into Minas Gerais from Bahia,

Espirito Santo, and Smo Paulo were well known. Gold already

had been discovered and was being mined in several areas of

the present states of SEo Paulo and ParanA. Of these the

most significant were Paranagua and Cananeia. All were

surface deposits and, while a smelter and perhaps a mint

had been established in Sao Paulo by 1650, the quantity of

gold extracted was quite small. In the years 1672-1678,

the quinto, or royal tax on mineral resources (usually con-

sidered to be twenty percent but which actually fluctuated,

at times dropping to twelve percent), collected from








17
Paranagua and Canan6ia amounted to a mere two kilos.1

In 1690, Pedro II ordered the Governor Antonio Lufs

Gongalves da Camara Coutinho to stimulate the Paulistas'

desire for gold and the honors which went with its dis-

covery. These instructions were issued again to the new

governor of Rio de Janeiro, Antonio Pais de Sande, in 1693.1

The incentives offered to adventurers were attractive and

soon a number of expeditions entered Minas Gerais. Whereas

most earlier expeditions had been primarily after Indian

slaves and only secondarily after precious metals and

stones, the priorities now were reversed.

The name of the discoverer of gold in Minas Cerais

as well as the date of the discovery are still the subject

of debate. There are major divergences in the versions of

Andr6 Joao Antonil (pseudonym for the Jesuit Jodo AntSnio

Andreoni); Dento Fernandes de Furtado de Mendonga, son of

Colonel Salvador Furtado de Mendonga, a participant in the

early discoveries; and Jogo Rabelo Perdigao, the secretary

of Governor Artur de Sa e Menezes. The opinion of Antonil,

the first writer to publish a description of the discoveries,

cannot be ignored because of his reliance upon eyewitnesses.

According to Antonil, gold was discovered in the Ouro PrEto

Stream by a mulatto member of a slave-hunting expedition.

This discovery was made accidentally while the mulatto was

getting water. The stones, which were not identified as

gold, were sold and changed hands several times until they

reached Governor Menezes, who immediately realized what




8


they were. Antonil states that these events occurred in
19
the last three years of the seventeenth century.

Antonil's account is difficult to accept. The mulatto,

Antonil asserts, had had experience in the gold fields of

Paranagua and Curitiba, yet he couldn't identify the stones

as being gold. It is also hard to believe that unidenti-

fied stones could be sold from person to person without

being recognized. Furthermore, who would buy a stone of

no apparent value? It is difficult to believe that the

stones would not be taken to someone acquainted with mining

or goldsmithing for appraisal. Support for Antonil's

version concerning the date of the discovery is provided

by a Portuguese immigrant who had arrived in Rio de

Janeiro in 1692. In his report prepared about 1750 Ouvidor

of Ouro Preto, this anonymous writer states that "5 or 6

years later [1697 or 16983 news spread that the Paulistas

had discovered great quantities of gold in an area called

Cataguazes but that it was hard [bravo] gold (which is
20
called mulatto gold -- black gold)." No details of the

discovery are provided.

Another version,presented half a century after the

events by Bento de Furtado de Mendonga, attributes the

first major gold strike to Ant8nio Rodrigues de Arzao, who

around 1693 left the captaincy of S3o Paulo on a slave-

hunting expedition. Reaching an area in Minas Gerais whose

topography was similar to that of the mining areas of Slo

Paulo, with which he was familiar, ArzAo, according to









Mendonga, made several panning tests and retrieved about

three oitavas of gold (an oitava is 3.586 grams or little

less than a dram). Before more gold:could be collected,

the account continues, ArzAo and his followers were forced

to leave the area because of the lack of supplies and

increasing Indian pressure. Arzgo went to Espirito Santo

where he gave local officials the three oitavas and tried

unsuccessfully to recruit men to form a new bandeira.

Failing in this, he departed for Sao Paulo, arriving so ill

that he died soon thereafter. But before dying,Arzao

related his adventures to his brother-in-law Bartholomeu

Bueno de Siqueira, who set out in 1697. Siqueira discovered

gold near one of the sites where his bandeira had stopped

to plant crops. A small settlement was established there

and given the name Itaverava. This, Mendonga claims, was

the first settlement founded in Minas Gerais. After

uncovering more extensive deposits in the area, Siqueira

advised his family and friends to join him. The narrator's

father, Colonel Salvador Fernandes de Mendonga, accompanied

by Captain Manuel Garcia Velho, supposedly headed the first

group to take Siqueira's advice. Upon their arrival in

Itaverava, Mendonga traded a musket for the small quantity

of gold already extracted. This gold, in turn, was traded

for two Indian slaves to Garcia Velho, from whom it was

obtained by Carlos Pedroso de Silveira, who took it to

Rio de Janeiro where he, the account concludes, was well
21
rewarded for handing the gold over to Governor Menezes.








This version, however, is subjected to damaging

criticism by Francisco de Assis Carvalho Franco. The most

fascinating evidence brought to light by Franco is the fact

that Siqueira rather than Arzio died in 1695. Arzio sur-

vived at least until 1720 and apparently had no part in

the exploitation of the Minas gold strikes. Furthermore,
22
Arzao received no reward for his supposed discovery.

Siqueira's death invalidates Mendonga's dating of the

Siqueira bandeira, which probably started out in 1694 as

related by the anonymous writer of the "Descobrimento de
23
Minas Gerais."

The most convincing of the three versions is that of

Jose Rabelo Perdigao. Writing in 1733, Perdig.o attributed

the initial discovery to a Duarte Lope (Antonil's mulatto?)

about 1693 along the Rio Guarapiranga. This led to the

organization of a bandeira under Bartolomeu Bueno de

Siqueira, accompanied by his nephew Manuel de Camargo, and

the latter's son, Sebastiao de Camargo. This bandeira

reached the area later called Itaverava where gold was

discovered. Continuing to press forward, Siqueira was
24
killed by Indians. Since this bandeira probably had been

financed by Carlos Pedroso de Silveira, it is not surprising

that part of the gold was delivered to him and that he

immediately took it to the acting governor, Sebastiao de

Castro Caldas (who assumed this post on February 4, 1695).

Caldas notified the king in a letter dated March 1, 1695

and sent some of the gold as proof.


*'*':*








Thus both Mendonga and Perdigao agree that the effec-

tive discovery was made by Bartolomeu Bueno de Siqueira

and that it was near Itaverava. They disagree as to the

date of the discovery. The documents published by Franco,

substantiating his contention that Bueno died in 1695 and

the fact that Caldas advised the king of the strike in

March 1695, lend strong support to the Perdigao version.

While it is clear that Bueno deserves credit for

making the first effective strike -- effective in the sense

that it mobilized the attention of royal officials and

started the first Brazilian gold rush -- it is equally

clear that other bandeirantes earlier had found gold in

Micas Gerais. Among these early pioneers was the parish

priest of Taubate, Padre Joao de Faria, who in 1693 or
25
1694 reported the discovery of gold in the "campos gerais."

It is also possible that Manuel de Borba Cato found some

gold deposits during his many years of living in the back-

lands. But neither of these discoveries had the dramatic

impact of those made by Siqueira.













Notes


1. Pero Mlagalhaes de Gandavo, Hist6ria da provfncia
Sancta Cruz o que vulgarmente chamamos Brasil (1576;
facsimile ed., Hew York: The Cortes Society, 1922), fols.
9v-10.

2. Sergio Buarque de Holanda, Visao do paraiso, Brasil-
iana, vol. 333, 2nd ed. (Sio Paulo: Companhia Editora
flacicnal, 1969), pp. 34-6h.

3. The Portuguese in Angola were motivated similarly by
the desire to find a "silver mountain." David Birmingham,
Trade and Conflict in Angola, the Mbundu and Their
Neighbors Under the Influence of the Portuguese, 1483-1790
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 29.

h. This was due to the belief that the formation of
silver was the result of the sun's heat. Sebastiio Cardoso
da Sampaio, in a report of November, 1692 explaining the
failure to discover precious metals in Brazil, asserts
that Brazilians were optimistic about finding these because
The Brazilian sertio...bordered on the
Kingdom of Peru and the mountains of
Tabiana and Sabarabussu [being] at the
same height and parallel as the cele-
brated mountain of Potosi which is the
inexhaustible source of silver which
has flooded all the four corners of the
world. It is felt that since the pro-
duction of all metals is the result of
heat and the activity of the sun those
mountains are under the same influence by
the equality of height and parallel.
[Report of Sebastiao Cardoso de Sampaio,
22 November, 1692 in Anais da Biblioteca lIacional
39, (1917)-, p. 201.3

5. Orville A. Derby, "Os primeiros descobrimentos de
ouro em Minas Gerais," Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e
Geographico de Sao Paulo 5 (1899-1900): 240-241.

6. Ibid., pp. 242-248.

7. Ibid., p. 248.








8. Basilio de Magalhaes, Expansao geogr5phica do Brasil
colonial, Brasiliana, vol. 45 (Sao Paulo: Companbia
Editora Nacional, 1935), Pp. 78-80.

9. Ibid., pp. 80-82.

10. Magalhaes, Expansao geographica, p. 87, maintains
that there were two Dutchmen and one German.

11. Derby, "Os primeiros descobrimentos," pp. 258-259.

12. Magalhaes, Expansao geogriphica, p. 100, refers to
Fernando de Camargo.

13. Manoel S. Cardozo, "The Last Adventure of Fernao Dias
Pais (1674-16811," Hisnanic American Historical Review
4 (November, 1946): h67-479, provides a detailed examin-
ation of this expedition.

14. Edelweiss Teixeira, "Roga Grande e o povoamento do
Rio das Velhas," Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geogra-
fico de Minas Gerais 2 (1946): 116. Teixeira locates
Sumidouro north of Lagoa Santa.

15. CBento Fernandes Furtado de Mendongal] oticias dos
primeiros descobridores das primeiras minas de ouro per-
tencentes a estas Minas Gerais-pessoas mais assinaladas
neste empregos e dos mais memoraveis acontecidos desdos
seus principios, Colasam das noticias dos pr. os desco-
brimen.os das Minas na America, que fes o Dr. Caetano
da Costa Matoso sendo ouvidor g.al do Ouro Preto, de
q. tomou posse em Fevr.o de 1749, Biblioteca Municipal de
Sao Paulo, fols. 21v-22v.

16. Teixeira, "Roga Grande," pp. 114-117.

17. Afonso de E. Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras,
11 vols. (Sio Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1948),
9:20.

18. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

19. Andre Joao Antonil (pseud.of Joao Antonio Andreoni),
Cultura e onulencia do Brasil, Roteiros do Brasil, vol. 2
(Smo Paulo: Companhia Editora liacional, 1967), pp. 258-
260. This work was originally published in 1711.

20. Protesto que no que nesta escrita falar nao he
minha vontade, C6dice Costa Matoso, fol. 64.

21. Mendonga, "Noticias dos primeiros descobridores,"
fols. 7-9.








22. Francisco de Assis Carvalho Franco, Dicionario de
bandeirantes e sertanistas do Brasil: seculos XVI-XVII-
XVIII (Sao Paulo: Comissao do IV Centen5rio da Cidade de
Sao Paulo, 1954), pp. 36-38 and 384-385.

23. "Descobrimento de Minas Gerais E18073," Revista do
Institute Hist6rico e Geogr6fico Brasileiro 29 (1866): 6.

24. Jos6 Rabelo Perdigao, "Noticia terceira prftica que dA
ao R. Pe. Diogo Soares o mestre do campo Jos6 Rabelo
Perdigdo. S8bre os primeiros descobrimentos das Minas
Gerais do Ouro." Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geogr6fico
Brasileiro 69 (1908): 278.

25. Bento Correa de Sousa Coutinho to JoAo de Lencastre,
29 July 1694, Documentos Hist6ricos 9 (1929): 2?4.














Chapter 2
The Years of Euphoria and Distress



News of the first strikes spread quickly. Called the

"Mines of Taubate" by some people and the "General Mines of

Cataguazes" by others, the area soon attracted a large

number of adventurers. The strikes initiated a ten-year

period in which discovery of new gold fields followed dis-

covery in a seemingly endless procession. The euphoria

generated by these strikes was hardly dampened by two

tragic famines that occurred during this period.

Siqueira's bandeira had been joined by another under

the leadership of Miguel Garcia de Almeida e Cunha. After

reaching Itaverava, the latter expedition separated from

that of Siqueira and went its own way. Garcia found gold

in a stream later called the Gualacho do Sul, north of the

Morro de Itatiaia. There the rivalry which existed barely

beneath the surface between the residents of the town of

Sao Paulo and those of Taubate erupted into open hostility

as the residents of Sio Paulo in Cunha's bandeira refused

to allow those of Taubate to work the strike around the

mountain. The Taubatinos thus rebuffed, formed a bandeira

under the leadership of Manuel Garcia Velho "and with such

good fortune that shortly they discovered the celebrated
1
and rich Egold fields of] Ouro Preto." This event, like

15





16


so many others of this early period, cannot be dated pre-
2
cisely, but probably occurred in 1695 or early 1696.

The rivalries between the bandeirantes of Sao Paulo

town and those from other towns of the captaincy of Sgo

Vicente were important during the early years of the mining

district. The use and abuse of the word "Paulista" has

led some to confuse the residents of the town of Sao Paulo

with those of other towns and has led others to assume the

predominance of the former in the discovery of gold and

in the early settlement of Minas Gerais. The roles of

men from such towns as Taubat6, Mogi das Cruzes, Smo

Sebastiao, Guaratingueta, and Sorocaba have too often been

overlooked. Next to Sgo Paulo the most important contribu-

tor to the discovery and settlement of Minas Gerais was

Taubate. Lumped together as "Paulistas" by contemporaries

from other captaincies, the residents of these towns of

STo Vicente feuded among themselves. These feuds stimulated

the discovery of new gold deposits.

Garcia Velho's discovery brought an influx of adven-

turers to the area of the Ouro Preto stream. The strike

was divided into claims of three bragas (one bra;a is

2.2 meters) each along the stream bed. A settlement

quickly formed near the strike in a heavily wooded area

nestled in a narrow valley surrounded on three sides by

formidable mountains cut by streams and, often, deep gorges.

Because of the relatively large number of people attracted

to the area, and the conflicts which arose over claims, a



lillllllllliiii











organized to find a new mining site. Crossing the Morro

de Santa Quiteria (one of those at whose base the original

strike was made) Oliveira found gold either along the
3
Sobreira Stream or, less probably, the Rio Funil. The

settlement which sprang up at the site of this strike was

named Antonio Dias in honor of the leader of the bandeira.

The situation within these mining camps and the re-

sulting spin-off of new bandeiras is aptly described by

Perdigao: "as those who had more arms and more followers

always received the best claims in these settlements, the
4
dissatisfied would form new bandeiras." Besides the

atmosphere of injustice created by the total absence of

royal officials, an important factor in this process,

unmentioned by Perdigao, was the incentives for new dis-

coveries embodied in the mining code. The code then in

effect, which had been enacted in 1603 and amended in 1618,

provided that the discoverer would receive two claims

(datas): the first eighty by forty varas (a vara was equal
5
to 1.10 meters), and the second sixty by thirty. But to

be a "new" strike, it had to be at least half a league

from any established one.

Manuel Garcia Velho had acted under these various

pressures as had Ant8nio Dias. A third was Padre Joao de

Faria Fialho, a native of the town of Sao Sebastiio. Padre

Faria had come to the Mines of Taubate as chaplain of one

of the taubatino bandeiras. It is uncertain whether Padre








Faria departed from Antonio Dias or from Ouro Freto, but,

in any case, he discovered gold east of the settlement of

Ant8nio Dias, just beyond the Morro de Santa Efigenia (also

called Alto da Cruz). The settlement which was founded

there was called Padre Faria.

A fourth strike was made at approximately the same

time, in the area of Tripui, by AntSnio Rodrigues de

Medeircs, a native of SAo Paulo town. The name "Tripui" is

derived from Medeiros' nickname which in the Tupi language
6
used by the bandeirantes meant "agile." This settlement

was never as large as any of the other three and it is

probable that the gold there was only alluvial and quickly

exhausted. This area soon was given over to pasturage for

the cattle brought in to feed the residents of the mining

camps.

By 1696 there existed four settlements each separated

from the others by dense woods and each located along a

gold-laden stream. Thus the geographical limits of what

would become the town of Vila Rica until the 1740's were

established: Tripui to the west and Padre Faria to the

east, connected by a trail which ran through Ouro Pr@to

and AntSnio Dias.

Other gold strikes soon were made in areas near these

four settlements. Francisco Bueno da Silva, cousin of

Bartolomeu Bueno de Siqueira, probably during 1698

"climbEed] the mountain, called today the Morro de Vila

Rica..., mother and source from which flows these rich






























a,;


a_
-J


V


cil
4-)












0
C-
-4











-4
d
2 h

*^3
05


T3




0}


I0
aL


...... . ...... .. ...., ll









streams already discovered, and turning westward...dis-

covered the stream called Ouro Bueno and then3 that of

Rio das Pedras [both] with gold of extremely good quality.

Inviting his paulista friends and family they worked the

little that they could, leaving the richest [part]."7

Bento Fernandes describes an event which, if exagger-

ated, still conveys an idea of the fabulous wealth being

uncovered and the atmosphere of euphoria of those fort-

unate enough to have "arms" and "followers" to ensure their

obtaining the best claims. According to Fernandes, while

Silva and Jose de Camargo Pimentel, his partner, were

working their joint claim, they were approached by a woman

beggar with her child. Pimentel, whose turn it was to

watch the gold collected by slaves, gave the woman a hand-

ful of gold. Reproached by Silva that half of the gold

was his, Pimentel reached back into the pouch and withdrew

another handful of gold. This, representing Silva's equal
8
contribution, was given to the woman. Stories such as

this spread through Brazil and then Europe. Imaginations

were fired with images of mountains of gold, and the rush

was on.

Silva, on his way to Ouro Bueno and Rio das Pedras,

unknowingly had crossed the richest gold bearing area in

the region -- and perhaps the richest of all Minas Gerais.

This was the Morro de Vila Rica, or as it was later vari-

ously called, the liorro de Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes,

the Morro de AntSnio Dias, and the Morro da Queimada (Burnt-







9
over Mountain). Gold finally was found on the mountain

in 1700 by Tomes Lopes de Camargo, a relative of Jose de
10
Camargo Pimentel.

The following year, 1701, Bento Fernandes was sent by

his father in search of gold. His bandeira found gold

along the Funil River, below its junctures with the various

gold-laden streams mentioned above. The settlement which

he founded there blossomed and faded in the course of a

few years; it was called Nossa Senhora do Bom Sucesso (Our

Lady of Good Fortune).

There were a number of other settlements which would

come within the municipal jurisdiction of Vila Rica and

would play important roles in the history of the munici-

pality. If reliable data is scanty for the early years

of Ouro Preto, it is even more so for these satellite

settlements. Two, Itatiaia and Ouro Branco (the names in

Tupi and Portuguese, both refer to the light color of the

gold mined there), probably were founded very early. Manuel

Garcia Velho and his bandeira crossed this area in skirting

the Morro de Itatiaia in 1695. Sebastiao da Rocha Pita

gives 1698 as the date of the founding of Itatiaia without
11
giving the name of the discoverer. While Rocha Pita is

not completely reliable in his treatment of Minas Gerais,

the date he gives can be taken as an indication that

Itatiaia was known relatively early. It is located about

thirteen kilometers to the southwest of Curo Preto. Ouro

Branco, like Itatiaia, was along the path of the early








bandeirantes who approached Ouro Preto, Ant8nio Dias, and

Padre Faria, from Itaverava. In referring to the general

area of Itatiaia and Ouro Branco, Antonil states: "I do

not speak of the Morro de Itatiaia..., eight days of easy

travel until lunch [this was the normal Paulista travelling

day: from sun-up to lunch, after which pasture was found

for the animals, camp set up and food obtained and prepared

for supper and breakfast for the following morning.],

because the paulistas do not pay attention to it because
12
they have others of purer gold and of much more value."

Ouro Branco is eighteen kilometers southwest of Ouro Prgto.

Congonhas, twenty-three kilometers to the southwest,

was the westernmost settlement within the future municipal

jurisdiction of Vila Rica. The absence of reliable infor-

mation prevents any definite dating, but indications are

that Congonhas was founded quite early. The earliest

documented date is found in a sesmaria (land grant) made

to Captain Domingos Martins Pacheco in 1711 which gives
13
Congonhas as his residence since 1704. One contemporary

reported that Congonhas was the site of one of the very
14
first gold strikes in Minas. This settlement was built

around a major gold strike and was fortunate in having

good pasture and farm land in the vicinty. Late in the

eighteenth century it became a religious center of great

importance.

Northwest of Ouro Preto, three settlements were

founded which played significant roles in the history of








the municipality of Vila Rica. Sao Bartolomeu, about

eight kilometers north-northwest of Ouro Preto, was

founded by Dionisio da Costa, a native of Santos, Sgo

Vicente. Five kilometers west of Sao Bartolomeu, another

settlement, Santo Antonio do Campo (later Casa Branca) was

founded. No documentation can be found concerning the

identity of its founder or the approximate date of its

founding. The parish records for this settlement begin in

1716, so the event probably occurred long before this date.

Three kilometers southwest of Casa Branca and twelve kilo-

meters from Ouro Preto lay the settlement of Nossa Senhora

de Nazareth dos Campos de Minas, or Cachoeira do Campo

as it came to be called. The fact that by 1709 it had

been raised to parish level indicates an early and intense

settlement. From a death certificate dated November 22,

1714, it is clear that one of Cachoeira's first settlers,
15
if not the first, was Manuel de Melo.

These three settlements, due to their similar loca-

tions, evolved in an analagous fashion. While the area had

some gold deposits, these soon were exhausted and the Sao

Bartolomeu-Casa Branca-Cachoeira region was transformed

into an agricultural and pastoral producer of great impor-

tance to the urban marketDlace created in the settlements

of Ouro Pr:to, AntSnio Dias, and Padre Faria.

Itaubira do Campo (present-day Itabirito), the most

distant from Ouro Prgto of the early settlements which

would come within the jurisdiction of Vila Rica, probably








was established during the closing years of the seven-
16
teenth century. Located about thirty kilometers north-

vest of Ouro Preto, Itaubira was to become a major settle-

ment and continue to produce sold sfter many other areas

had ceased production. The gold mine of Cata Branca, near

Itaubira, was worked on a large scale until a mining disaster

in the nineteenth century stopped production.

These are the major settlements which would be under

the jurisdiction of the town council of Vila Rica during

the eighteenth century. Besides being politically subor-

dinated to Vila Rica, all were involved to varying degrees

in a symbiotic relationship with the urban core. Congonhas,

perhaps due to its Droximitv to the settlements in the Rio

das Mortes region, was least involved; Sho Bartolomeu and

Cachoeira were the most because of their role as food

producers. There were, in addition, many hamlets which

will be discussed only when they take an active part in

this story.

While this settlement process was under way, other,

highly significant discoveries were being made. One of

the most significant was that of the gold-laden Ribeirao do

Carmo by Captain Jogo Lopes de Lima, a native of Sao Paulo

town. Because of the rivalry between the mining towns of

Carmo (now Mariana) and Vila Rica, and the confusion over

which was founded first, the exact date of neither is beyond

dispute. But there exist two documents which can establish

the order of discovery. The first is a letter, written









anonymously and included in the C6dice Costa Matoso, which

states that the discovery of gold at Carmo occurred during
17
the period when the area of Padre Faris was being worked.

Perdigao, after discussing Lima's bandeira states that

"the gold of that new stream Cthe BiberAo do Carmo] was

considered better than that of Ouro Preto, which was

brittle and splintered when hit by a hammer, so much so

that it was judged useless, to the point of being sold in

Sao Paulo at the rate to twelve vintens (one vintem is

worth 20 reis] per oitava, causing that settlement COuro
18
Pretol to be abandoned three times as I witnessed."

What today is a fifteen minute automobile ride between

Ouro Preto and Mariana, then required three days of dif-
19
ficult travel. This difficulty is evident in the name

of a mountain which had to be traversed in the vicinty of

Carmo--Mata Cavalos or Horse Killer. Besides the problems

created by the mountains, travel was impeded by the very
20
dense forest which separated the two settlements.

Other important discoveries soon were made in the

vicinity of Carmo. The Paulista Bento Rodrigues, crossing

the Morro de Vila Rica, found an exceptionally rich area

which was named after him. Antonil notes that this strike

yielded "in little more than five bragas of land, five
21
arr5bas [one arr8ba is equal to 14.75 kilos] of gold."

Jose de Camargo Pimentel, who had accompanied Francisco

da Silva Bueno in the founding of Ouro'Bueno, in 1701 made

a strike which soon evolved into a sizable settlement








called Camargos. Captain Salvador de Faria Albernaz,

pushing beyond the strikes of Rodrigues and Pimentel, made

a major gold strike around which the settlement of Infici-
23
onado quickly grew. This was followed in 1702 by Domingos
24
Borges' discovery of gold in the area called Catas Atlas.

In the same year, Ant8nio Bueno, continuing in a north-

westerly direction, found gold where the settlements of
25
Brumado and Santa Barbara would be established. Ant8nio

Pereira Dias, about the same time, made a rich strike just

to the north of Carmo, which soon became known by this ad-
26
venturer's name. All of these settlements would.fall

within the jurisdiction of the town of Carmo.

The process of settlement around Carmo was very similar

to that of the region of Ouro PrEto. With the exception of

Antonio Pereira, these settlements were founded in the same

leap-frogging manner and, undoubtedly, for the same reasons:

conflicts and claim jumping within the new settlements

forced out some and left others dissatisfied to move, while

the mining code provided incentives to go elsewhere. Each

group of settlements was composed of an administrative,

relatively highly urbanized center,and a number of satellite

settlements whose political dependence upon the center was

complete, but whose socio-economic dependence varied with

size and distance, and the proximity of larger settlements

or towns within the political sphere of other jurisdictions.

Prior to 1708 there were four other strikes in Minas

Gerais that resulted in the establishment of major settle-









ments. The first of these is Sabara. Contrary to legend,

it does not appear that the gold of Sabara was discovered

by Borba Gato during his seventeen year exile. While he

became one of Sabara's leading citizens, there is no evi-

dence that he claimed credit for the discovery of its rich

gold fields. Instead these honors were claimed by the

Paulista Garcia Rodrigues Pais in a letter dated May 1,
27
1697.

The discovery of the nearby gold fields of Caete

is likewise disputed. Bento Fernandes gives the credit to

Sargento-mor Leonardo nardes, a paulista, while Antonil
28
credits a Bahian, Captain Luis do Couto. Given the ex-

tent of Bahian penetration into this part of Minas Gerais

prior to 1690, Antonil's account is more likely to be

correct. While the Paulista made many forays into Minas,

their expeditions, searching for slaves or precious metals

and stones, were constantly on the move. No permanent

settlements were made until gold had been discovered.

Penetration from Bahia was less spectacular but more system-

atic. The primary interest of the Bahians was the use of

the land along the Rio Sao Francisco for grazing cattle.

By 1663, in fact, Bahian penetration in the form of the

landholdings of Antonio Guedes de Brito covered 160 leagues

along the Rio Sao Francisco as far as its juncture with the
29
Rio das Velhas. Anyone proceeding up the Rio das Velhas

to its source would pass through the immediate vicinity of

Caete and Sabara. This strike was a magnificent one. As








early as 1697 it was reported that there were 4,000 people
30
in the Caete area.

The last two major gold fields to be discovered were

on the fringe of the central mining district composed of

Sabara, Caete, Vila Rica, and Carmo. AntSnio Soares dis-

covered gold to the north of Sabara and the settlement

which grew around this strike was called Serro do Frio. The
31
exact date of this strike is not known. The last area is

far to the south of the core mining district. Known as

the Rio das Mortes, this area was traversed by all the

bandeiras on their way into Minas, as well as by the later

migrants from Rio de Janeiro. One of those who took ad-

vantage of this traffic was Tome Portes del-Rei. Portes

operated an inn and catered to this traffic for several

years until he discovered that he was living near one of

the richest gold deposits in Minas Gerais--that of So
32
JoEo del Rei.

These settlements and their satellites were to provide

most of the gold extracted from Minas Gerais. But they were

not established without difficulty. Their residents

suffered severe hardships in the early period, particularly

in regard to the provisioning of foodstuffs. The number

of adventurers in the mining district at this time must

have been relatively small, as indicated by Perdigao's

statement that Ouro Preto was abandoned three times.

Certainly this is easy to understand, since the population

that provided the impetus for the discovery phase was








itself very small. On the eve of the gold cycle a report

of Portugal's Overseas Council (Conselho Ultramarino), re-

ported that "the town of Sao Paulo itself and, seven more

towns surrounding it have twenty thousand householders

Evizinhos]."33 So Paulo's first census in 1765 gave the

population of the parish as 3,838 with 1,515 of these re-
31
siding in the urban core. More vague information comes

from a traveler who passed through Sao Paulo in 1717; he

reported the existence of only four hundred houses in the

town itself, as many people lived in the rural areas.3

With such a small population base, Sao Paulo and the other

towns of the captaincy of Sao Vicente could explore, uh-

cover gold, and exploit alluvial deposits, but could not

populate all the mining region. This could be done only

by outside elements, the so-called forasteiros: Bahians,

Pernambucans, natives of Rio de Janeiro, and, above all,

the rein6is (those born in Portugal). When the news spread

that gold had been found, the rush began. The crops

planted by "Paulistas", the term the forasteiros applied

indiscriminately to the men from Sao Vicente, and the avail-

able game which had satisfied their needs were inadequate

to meet those of the forasteiros who quickly outnumbered the

Paulistas. The result was famine.

The first major famine occurred in 1698-1699. While

gold had been found in 1695-1696, the rush apparently did

not begin until several years later, perhaps because too

often in the past rumors of major deposits of emeralds,








diamonds, silver, and gold had proven to be false. One

man, who states that the news reached Rio de Janeiro in

1698 or 1699, wanted to set out for the Mines of Cataguazes

immediately but did not because of the shortage of food

along the way. Others were not so prudent. The journey

was long: forty difficult days from Rio de Janeiro and

about sixty from Sao Paulo. "Many died of hunger without

recourse, and there were those who killed their companions
36
in order to take a grain of corn from them." This food

shortage caused prices to soar. The cautious adventurer

arrived in Carmo in time to suffer the effects of the
37
famine; he notes some of the prices paid at that time.

1 alqueire (about 14 quarts) of corn grain...20 oitavas
1 alqueire of beans ..........................30 oitavas
1 small plate of salt........................ 8 oitavas
1 chicken..................................... 12 oitavas
1 little dog or cat .......................... 32 oitavas

This anonymous adventurer thus provides not only an indi-

cation of the cost of living but some hints of the dietary

preferences of the early settlers.

Carmo, where initially most of the gold came from the

stream, was almost completely abandoned at this time.

This was due to a combination of circumstances: the dif-

ficulty of mining operations because of the depth of the

water, its low temperature, and its rapid current, as well

as the shortage of food. Of those who left, some returned

to Sgo Paulo with their gold, but many others went to

areas which had more game on which to subsist while they

awaited the harvest. In this process of abandoning estab-









lished diggings new discoveries were made.

The harvest in 1699 of crops planted the previous

year saved many from death. In the meantime mining oper-

ations had been stopped. According to Governor Menezes:

':without doubt a great quantity Cof gold]
would have been produced if the mines had
been worked this year, which was not possi-
ble because of the famine which they suf-
fered. Necessity reached such a point that
they ate the most unclean animals and
lacking Ceven] these to sustain life, they
ran into the woods with their slaves to
live on the fruits of the forest which
they found. 36

This famine, the effects of which appear to have been

felt strongest around Carmo, was followed in 1700-1701 by

another which endangered the settlements of Ouro Preto,

Antonio Dias, and Padre Faria. Viceroy Joao de Lencastre

in September, 1700 noted "that because of the lack of

foodstuffs many miners had left for areas where game

abounded to have something to feed their people, and

others went home to return in March for the crop they had

left planted, as well as for the cattle, that they had
39
ordered from Bahia and Pernambuco." As a result of this

famine many people departed from the settlements; Ouro

Bueno, for example, was abandoned completely. Gold was

discovered in areas where game was more plentiful; Camargos

was but one of these. The historian Diogo de Vasconcelos

attributes the discovery of Congonhas do Campo, Sao Barto-

lomeu, Cachoeira do Campo, and Casa Branca to this process.

The famine also resulted in changes in the ownership








of mining claims. Many of those who were forced to flee

lost their claims to those who stayed or to those who

arrived before the original owners returned. To the normal

friction which such actions created, a new dimension was

added by the arrival in large numbers of non-Paulistas,

who were able to take advantage of the situation while the

Paulistas were away. Furthermore such claim jumping was

legal since the claims were considered abandoned. It is

said that Tonm de Camargo Pimentel lost his claim to a

rich mining area on the Morro de Vila Rica to the Portu-

guese-born Pascoal da Silva Guimarges in precisely this
41
way. There is no way to determine how large a turnover

in ownership occurred, but if it could occur to Pimentel --

a member of an elite Paulista family who was, in addition,

a royal official -- it probably happened to many others.

During the second famine prices soared even higher

than in the first one. Bento Fernandes gives the price of

one alqueire of corn as 30-40 oitavas and one of beans as
42
70 oitavas. The already exhorbitant prices charged for

corn and beans in 1698 had doubled. It is no wonder that

men were forced to abandon their mining claims. Once

again only a timely harvest and the arrival of cattle from

the north saved the miners from total disaster.














Notes


1. Perdigao, "Iloticia terceira pratica," p. 278. Taunay,
Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 112 gives Miguel as the
name of the discoverer rather than Manuel.

2. Traditionally the founding of Ouro Preto is celebrated
on June 24 on the presumption that on that date in 1696
Antonio Dias de Oliveira and Padre Jo&o de Faria Fialho
first sighted the area where Ouro Preto would be estab-
lished. This presumption is based on the belief that the
discoverers founded a chapel in honor of the occasion and
that the chapel was named Saint John the Baptist. Since
the birth of Saint John is celebrated on June 24, the
traditional view continues, that must have been the date
of the discovery.
Repeated by authors such as Augusto de Lima Junior A
capitania das Minas Gerais, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro:
Livraria Zelio Valverde, 1943), p. 62, this legend has
become so accepted that recently a plaque commemorating
the founding was placed near the chapel of Saint John.
This certainty is not justified. Apparently no documents
concerning this chapel exist. It cannot be shown that the
chapel was built in 1696, that it was built in commemora-
tion of the discovery of the region where Ouro Preto would
be established, or even that it was the first chapel built
in the region. Even the use of the chapel itself as a
document by examining its architecture and manner of con-
struction is foiled since it was rebuilt around the middle
of the eighteenth century. We are left with a story which
may be true but for which no substantiating evidence can
be found.

3. Perdigao, "Noticia terceira pratica," p. 278 and
Mendonga, "Ioticias dos primeiros descobridores," fol. 9v.

h. Perdigao, "Noticia terceira pratica," p. 279.

5. Diogo de Vasconcellos, Hist6ria antiga de Minas Gerais
(Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Ilacional, 1948), 1, pp. 193-194.

6. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 88.

7. Mendonga, Notfcias dos primeiros descobridores, fols.
10-10v and Antonil, Cultura e opulencia, p. 259.







8. Mendonca, Ilotrcias dos primeiros descobridores, fol.
10v.

9. These names refer to the same mountain.

10. Mendonga, "Uot.ci as dos primeiros descobridores," fols.
12v-13.

11. Sebastilo da Rcclia Pita, Hist6ria da America portu-
guesa, 3rd ed. (Bahia: Imprensa Oficial da Bahia, 1950),
p. 307.

12. Antonil, Cultura e opul encia, p. 260.

13. Sesmaria of Domingou Martins Pacheco, Revista do
Arquivo Publico liiinciro, 10 (1904): 973.

14. Rellaggo do principio descuberto das Minas gerais, e
os sucessos de alguas couzas Mais memoraveis que sucederao
de seu principio te o t'-mpo que as veyo Covernar o Exmo.
S. Dom Eraz da Silveirs, C6dice Costa Matoso, fol. 30.

15. Vasconcelos, Hi .t6ria antiga, 2, p. 66 and Padre
Henriques de Figueiredo Lemos, "Hlongographia da freguezia
da Cachoeira do Campo," Revista dc Arquivo Publico Mineiro
13 (1908). 81.

16. Rocha Pita, Hist ria da America Portuguesa, p. 307.

17. Esta Ribeirao do Carmo hoje Cide M(aria)na, C6dice
Costa Matosc, fol. 67v.

18. Perdig'o, "Ioticia terceira pratica," p. 279.

19. Antonil, Culture e opul ncia, p. 259.

20. Esta Ribeirao do Carmo, fol. 68.

21. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia, p. 261.

22. Mendonga, Iloticias dos primeiros descobridores, fol.
llv.

23. Ibid., fol. 13.

24. Ibid. Also Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9,
p. 117 refers to Domingos Borges da Silva.

25. Mendonga, Hoticias dos primeiros descobridores, fol. 14.

26. Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 363.








27. Taunay,, HistGSria geral das bandeiras, 9, pp. 84 &
146. Edcl;-.'e r Tcixeira, "Roga Grande e o povoamento do
Rio das Velhas," pp. 114-121 deals with Borba Gato's resi-
dence during lii; years in the hinterland.

28. Taurnay, Hist6ria .eral das bandeiras, 9, p. 126 and
Antonil, Cultitra e opluJlncia, pp. 260-261.

29. Saloim.o de Vasconcellos, "D vagag6es em torno da
descoberta do ouro nas Minas Gerais," Revista do Instituto
Hist6rico c Georri'fico de Hinas Gerais 9 (1962): 153.

30. Artur de Sa e Menezes to Pedro 11, 12 June, 1697 in
Manuel Cardozo, "The Guerra dos Emboabas, Civil War in
Minas Gcrais, 1708-1709," Hispanic American Historical
Review 13, ho. 3 (August, 1942): 472.

31. Tauunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 126.

32. Ibid., p. 125.

33. Report of Overseas Council, 6 June, 1674 in Anais da
Biblioteca I tciona] 39 (1921): 132-133.

34. Gilberto Leite de Barros, A cidade e o planalto, 2
vols. (Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1967), p. 164

35. "Diario da jornada, que fes o Ex.mo Senhor Dom Pedro
desde o Rio de Janeiro ath6 a Cid.e de Sao Paulo, e desta
athe as Minas anno de 1717," Revista do Servigo do
Patrim6nio Hist6rico e Artistico lNacional 3 (1939): 304.

36. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros descobridores, fol. 11.

37. Protesto que no, fol. 64.

38. Menezes to Pedro II, 20 May, 1698 in Mafalda P.
Zemella, O abast2-cirnento da capitania das Minas Gerais
no s6culo XVIII, University of Sao Paulo, Faculdade de
Filosofia, Ci6ncias e Letras. Bull. 118 (SHo Paulo:
University of SRo Paulo, 1951): .219.

39. Jo0o de Lencastre to Menezes, May 14, 1701 in Docu-
mentos HistSricos 11 (1929): 283.

40. Vasconcellos, Hist6ria antiga, 1, pp. 214-215.

41. Ibid., p. 216.

42. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros descobridores, fol. 11.














Chapter 3
The Gold Rush



After 1696 news of the gold strikes spread rapidly

through Brazil, Portugal, and the rest of Europe. Gold

began to flow out of Minas Gerais in quantities that, while

limited, were sufficient to prove that the strikes were

real. Soon thousands of people were flooding into the

mining district to make their fortunes. A contemporary of

this gold rush reported:

Each year many Portuguese and foreigners
come in the fleets to go to the mines.
From the cities, towns, suburbs, and back-
lands of Brazil go whites, pardos, blacks,
and Indians whom the Paulistas employ.
The mixture includes people from all walks
of life: men and women, young and old,
poor and rich, nobles and plebeians, laymen
and clerics, and religious of all institu-
tions, many of whom do not have monasteries
or houses in Brazil.1

Antonil calculates that by 1710 thirty thousand people
2
were actively employed in Minas. Since this estimate in-

cluded only those actively engaged in mining, Antonil's

figure is only a partial one. This is confirmed by other

observers. One put the population of the mining district
3
at fifty thousand in 1705. The exact size of the popula-

tion during the early years cannot be determined, but

these estimates give a general notion of the dimensions of

the gold rush.








The highest concentration of people was in the area

around Ouro Preto and Carmo. This is the region which,

during these early years, was called General Mines (Minas

Gerais) in recognition of the many mining operations in

the area. The entire mining district was called, inter-

changeably, Mines of Sao Paulo, Mines of Taubate, Mines

of Cataguazes, or Mines of Gold (Minas de Ouro). The last

gradually predominated over the other names and became the

official name for the mining district in 1709. Minas

Gerais did not become the official name of the entire dis-

trict until 1720 when it became a separate captaincy.

In the region of Minas Gerais lies a geological fault

which runs from Santa Barbara to Carmo and then to Ouro

Preto and Velozo (two kilometers northwest of the parish

church of Ouro Preto). Along this crescent-shaped fault,

which opened the ground at a number of places allowing

easier access to the subsurface gold deposits, were many

of the settlements of the early period. This crescent was

to be the major gold-producing and population center of

the mining district throughout the eighteenth century.

Despite the disastrous famines of 1698-1699 and 1700-

1701, the settlements of the region were increasing so

rapidly that residents believed that all the land between

Ouro Preto and Carmo was occupied. Frei Agostinho de Santa

Maria, writing around 1723, felt that the two centers soon

would join to form a single urbanized area -- at a time

when it still took many hours of arduous travel to reach








Carmo from Ouro Preto.

The gold rush was spurred by tales of the fabulous

wealth of this area -- tales which come from too many

sources to be disbelieved entirely. Pedro Taques mentions

one stream from which three arrobas were removed in one
5
month and another which yielded one arroba. Antonil

refers to a single gold nugget weighing over 150 oitavas

(almost one and a half pounds troy) and another of 95 (al-

most one pound troy). The Paulistas defined a "good"

stream as one which yielded two oitavas of gold in each
6
panning. Two oitavas was the daily wage of a skilled

artisan.

The early adventurers, who streamed into the mining

district in quest of this gold, came by three routes. The

first began in Sdo Paulo and passed through the following

places: Nossa Senhora da Penha, Mogi, Laranjeira, Jacarei,

Taubate, Pindamonhangaba, Guiratingueta, Morro de Mantigue-

ira, Rio Verde, Boa Vista, Ubai, Ingai, Rio Grande, Rio

das Mortes, the farms of Garcia Rodrigues Pais, and the

Morro de Itatiaia. At this last point, about ten kilo-

meters southwest of Ouro Preto, the route forked: one

branch went to Sabara and the other to Ouro Preto, both

of which could be reached after about two months of
7
travel. The journey from Rio de Janeiro was more hazardous,

as it necessitated sailing from Rio to Parati -- a short

voyage made perilous by the periodic appearance of corsairs

and pirates. From Parati, the travelers went overland to









Taubate, where he took the Sao Paulo road. In an emer-

gency the trip from Rio to Ouro Preto could be made in

thirty days, but the average traveler took at least
8
forty.

The third route was, in many ways, the most important

and, to the crown, the most troublesome. Free of the

difficult mountains and numerous streams which made the

other two routes so difficult, the Bahia road was the

easiest of the three. Leaving Salvador, the traveler

went by Cachoeira, Santo Antonio, and then Tranqueira. At

Tranqueira the road split, one branch going through Mathias

Cardoso, Barra do Rio das Velhas and then Borba, near

Sabara, and the other passing near the source of the Rio

Guararutibe. The second branch was about fifty leagues
9
shorter than the first. Along this route came the cattle

which saved the miners from starvation during the early

famines and which, for many years, provided them with much

of their sustenance.

The same characteristics which made this road so

attractive to travelers created problems for the crown.

The road led from the older established sugar-producing

areas of Brazil -- areas which were in a state of decadence

brought on by a decline in sugar prices and sales despite

a temporary improvement in the sugar market in the 1690's.

Some royal officials felt that the gold rush threatened

the agricultural sector which they considered more impor-

tant for the long-range interests of Portugal than the








transitory exploitation of the gold deposits. These offi-

cials were able to impose their point of view until the

Wars of the Emboabas. The sugar-producing regions, chiefly

Bahia and Pernambuco, had surplus population and surplus

capital. Governor Menezes at first forbade the migration

of people essential to the production of sugar, Brazil's

major export. On March 19, 1700, he prohibited the master

workmen of the sugar mills from going to the Minas de Ouro

without licenses. One week later he forbade the taking

of slaves from sugar or manioc producing fazendas (planta-
10
tions) to the mining district. These restrictions were

repeated various times, without much effect, in hopes of

sustaining the sugar industry of the Northeast. Comple-

menting this policy was one of prohibiting sugar processing

in the mining district. Each part of the colony was

assumed to have a specific contribution to make -- the

Northeast would produce sugar and Minas would provide gold.

As the terrain traversed by the Bahia road presented

few major obstacles, the number of trails proliferated --

primarily benefiting smugglers. An anonymous writer in-

formed the king in 1706 that "so much gold comes to the

city of Bahia that one cannot count the arrobas except in

quintais [one quintal is four arrobas] which goes to all

the kingdom and the foreigners also are able to take it
11
freely without paying the quinto." The threat to royal

revenues posed by the Bahia road was obvious to Pedro II,

who, as early as 1698 tried to stimulate cattle raising in








12
southern lin.. 12 Had this effort succeeded, the Bahia

trails could have been closed without the fear of another

famine; but the, failed, and each effort to close these

routes cat.:rd .u'h repercussions that they were immediately

reop-:ned.

Each road to Minas presented a serious inconvenience.

The Dahii: route could easily be abused by tax evaders while

the sea portion of the Rio road was hazardous. The road

from S o Paul, w\s very difficult to use, and it began

in an arca which produced relatively little which could

be marketed in the mining district, except for Indian

slaves and some cattle and mules. These problems led some

royal officials to propose the opening of a new road from

Rio to the gold fields. Governor Menezes felt that the

proposed road would shorten the journey and make the

markets of Fio and the mining district accessible to the

cattle lands of southern Minas, which, he felt, were com-

parable to those of Buenos Aires. Pedro II approved the

project "as a means of alleviating the famine and as an
,, 13
aid in the discovery of Sabarabussu. Thus the decision

to authorize work on the road was based on a combination

of important factors.1

The work on the new route began in 1699. As was the

practice the work was one not by the state but by a

private party. Garcia Rodrigues Pais volunteered to open

the "Caminho Novo" (levw Road), as it was to be called

during the eighteenth century. The Caminho Uovo was diffi-










cult to build and use because of the mountains it traversed.

It was constructed almost in a straight line from Rio to

Minas Gerais, passing through Simao Pereira, Mathias

Barboza, Julz de Fora and Borda do Campo. At Borda do

Campo, the Caminho Novo split, with one branch going to

Rio das Mortes and the other to the Ouro Preto-Carmo region

by way of Congonhas and Itatiaia. Travel time from Rio
15
to these areas was cut to ten to twelve days. For his

services, Garcia Rodrigues Pais was rewarded with several

sesmarias, (land grants) along the route and, in 1702, was

granted a royal post -- probably to revitalize his flagging

fortunes since the project had proved so expensive that
16
outside help had been required to complete it.

All of the roads to Minas were little more than trails.

Jos6 Vieira Couto, later in the century, described them in

the following manner:

They are made with the greatest negligence
possible, or better said, nothing has been
done to them other than cut the woods,
remove some rocks, and here and there
level the right of way. Great and super-
fluous bypasses can be seen at each step;
it takes, sometimes, all day to cover 17
three or four leagues in a straight line.

It was over these roads that the luxuries and many of the

necessities of life flowed from the outside world to the

booming mine district. Because of the extensive traffic

on this road, it soon was lined by inns and farms catering

to the needs of the travelers.

This road had great impact on the development of the









southern part of Brazil. It made Rio de Janeiro the gate-

way to Minas. Previously goods had to be transshipped

from Rio to Parati, from whence they went overland to the

mining district via Taubate; a logical step would have

been the elimination of Rio as entrep5t for Minas and the

shipment of goods directly to Parati. Another possibility,

about which there had been some speculation, was the desig-

nation of a port in Espirito Santo as the sole gateway to

Minas. The construction of the Caminho Novo precluded

these possibilities. Rio's position and future development

thus owes much to the opening of this road.

The road also stimulated migration to the mining dis-

trict by making the trip faster. The first place to

suffer significant loss of population was Rio de Janeiro.

Governor Alvaro da Silveira e Albuquerque, lamented in

1703, the year following the completion of the Caminho

Novo, that: "everyday I find myself more alone, Cwithout]

soldiers as well as residents.... The excessive rate

with which they flee to the mines gives us the impression
18
that soon we shall wind up without anyone." News re-

ceived in Rio indicated that Bahia was in much the same

situation; migration from that captaincy was reported to

be proceeding at such a rate "that shortly that land will
19
be depopulated." Nevertheless, in much of the North-

east there was a surplus population which could be better

utilized elsewhere.

While the immediate effects of the gold rush on Rio de





44


Janeiro and Bahia were bad, they were disastrous in Sao

Paulo where there were no people to spare. With a largely

self-sufficient economy whose only significant marketable

product was slaves, Sao Paulo could ill afford any sizeable
20
drain of men or wealth.

So many men went to the gold fields that the Sao

Paulo camara often lacked a quorum; periods of five and
21
six months passed without sessions. Goods were diverted

to the mining district where they fetched higher prices,

resulting in a scarcity of goods in Sao Paulo. When the

camara met it usually discussed ways of controlling the

spiraling cost of these goods. While some men who went

to the gold fields returned, many remained there.

This migration from Sao Paulo also had an effect upon

the Indian population. So many Indians were sent to the

gold fields as mine laborers that the S8o Paulo labor pool

quickly became depleted. In conformation with royal decrees

against the enslavement of Indians, Menezes, on his first

visit to Sao Paulo, ordered that those already in Minas be
22
returned. In 1705, the Sao Paulo camara prohibited the

practice of renting slaves to serve as bearers for people
23
going to Minas. These efforts failed and the use of

Indians in Ouro Preto continued on a small scale throughout

the century.

The influx of Bahians, Pernambucans, fluminenses

(residents of Rio de Janeiro) and Portuguese aroused the

ire of the Paulistas. The royal grants that the Paulistas


iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii








had received led them to believe that they had an exclusive

right to exploit their discoveries. The crown initially

was willing to back their claims, due to lack of knowledge

of the extent of the gold fields and the desire to limit

migration from sugar producing areas. But the crown's

support had little effect. The effort to restrict migra-

tion by requiring passports was easily circumvented. Even

the efforts to bar foreigners from the gold fields, to
24
prevent the spread of news of the strikes, failed.

Easier to enforce, at least in theory, were the edicts

of the crown prohibiting the entrance of monks into the

region without specific authorization. Numerous were the

decrees to this effect, and admonitions concerning their

enforcement often appeared in the instructions given to

the governors. The monks and clerics without positions

were considered underminers of royal authority. The promi-

nent role played by clerics in the Guerras dos Embcabas

and in the 1720 uprising indicate that the fears of the

crown were not unreasonable. Because they were beyond

the jurisdiction of secular authorities, the monks were

active smugglers. Hollow statues of saints standing

today in the churches of Minas bear testimony to this

illicit trade. Once in Minas, the clerics would refuse to

pay taxes unless ordered to do so by ecclesiastical author-

ities -- a process complicated by the fact that until 1745

the seat of the bishopric was in Rio de Janeiro. There

were many cases of arrest and deportation of clerics, but








this did not daunt others from coming to seek their for-

tunes.

The royal policy of limiting the entry of black slaves

was detrimental to the rapid expansion of the early mining

operations. It was felt by some royal officials that the

mass entry of slaves would drain the sugar fazendas of

their labor force and drive up the price of those slaves

who remained in the cane-growing area. This problem did

not materialize while the Paulistas relied on Indians as

their prime labor source, but this supply was limited and

inadequate to meet the demands of the rapidly expanding

mining operations. The scarcity of these workers, com-

bined with the inability to adapt to mining, and the strong

opposition of both the SEo Paulo camara and royal officials,

forced the Paulistas and the other miners to turn to the
25
African slave.

This shift also was motivated by the belief that

African slaves, especially those from the Gold Coast

(present-day Ghana), were acquainted with mining tech-
26
niques. Indeed, some writers have attributed the intro-

duction of the bateia, the mining pan, to slaves from
27
Africa. The Portuguese, who had been purchasing gold

from Africa since the fifteenth century, assumed that all

slaves from the Costa da Mina (the West African coast
28
between Capes Mount and Lopo Gongalves) knew how to mine.

The crown resorted to the imposition of quotas on the

number of slaves that could be imported into the mining









district. Initially entry was limited to two hundred

slaves, a number that was inadequate to supply the demands

of mine operators. In 1701 Pedro II decreed the distri-

bution of eight thousand slaves in Brazil with priority

for purchase going to the sugar producers and other agri-

culturalists. Miners, however, were able to circumvent

the edict. In 1703 Alvaro da Silveira e Albuquerque recom-

mended a shift in priorities so that eight percent of all

slaves imported into Brazil would be sent to the mines and

the remainder distributed among agriculturalists. This

suggestion was disregarded by the royal advisors who were
29
still intent on aiding the sugar producers. The position

taken by these advisors is understandable: the true ex-

tent of the gold deposits was not known and the sugar in-

dustry had entered a period of expansion after many years

of decadence. The King's counselors could not know that

the sugar market shortly would again collapse and that

gold production would reach unimagined proportions by 1750.

The most that the crcwn would do was increase the quota of

slaves destined for the mining district to two hundred
30
and thirty in 1706.

These restrictions on the importation of African

slaves worked no great hardships on the miners during the

early years. So long as the gold deposits were alluvial,

a miner could get by without a large number of slaves. An

increase in the number of slaves increased the surface

area which would be panned, but the area of a claim was





48


restricted by the mining code. During this period there

were no subsurface mines, so large concentrations of

slaves were not needed. Bento Fernandes noted that the

owner of twenty or thirty slaves was considered to be
31
extremely rich. Thus there was a gold rush of major

proportions in the period before 1706. At least thirty

thousand people left their homes to seek their fortunes

in the gold fields--despite the opposition of the royal

officials who felt that this migration endangered the

sugar industry. The efforts of the crown to stop this

migration failed because of the shortage of royal offi-

cials in a position to act, and because of the connivance

of many of those who were in such a position. The mining

industry, stimulated by this influx of people, expanded

rapidly.













Notes


1. Antonil, Cultura e opulincia, p. 264.

2. Ibid.

3. Felipe de Barros Pereira to king, 7 September, 1705
in Cardozo, "The Guerra dos Erboabas," p. 472.

4. Frey Agostinho de Santa Maria, Santuario Mariano e
historica das imagens milagrosas de lossa Senhora, e das
milagrosamente apparecidas oue se venerao em todo o Bispado
do Rio de Janeiro e Mina e em todas as ilhas do occano &
das milagrosamente aDnarecidas, em graca dos uregadores &
dos devotos da mesma Senhora, 10 vols.(Lisbon: Antonio
Pedrozo Galrao, 1723), 10:233.

5. Pedro de Taques to Joao de Lencastre, 20 March, 1700
in Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 252.

6. Antonil, Cultura e opulncia, pp. 261-262.

7. Ibid., pp. 284-287.

8. Ibid., pp. 287-288.

9. Ibid., pp. 291-292.

10. Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 249.

11. Manoel Cardozo, "Alguns subsidies para a hist6ria da
cobranga do quinto na capitania de Minas Gerais at6 1735,"
Primciro Congresso da Expans&o Portuguesa no Mundo (Lisbon:
Ministerio das Col6nias, 1937),p.259.

12. Pedro II to Alvaro de Silveira e Albuquerque, 7 May,
1703-in Zemella, 0 abastecimento, p.235.

13. Taques, Informagao, pp. 146-147.

14. The crown was not content with Pais' promise to com-
plete the road. Captain Felix Madeira e Gusmho, a knight
of the royal household, was ordered to open a road through
Santo Antonio (probably Santa Ant8nio de Guaratingueta)
"to the gold mines and the plains since there was no








certainty about the road of Garcia Rodrigues." The work
was to be done with the collaboration of Gusmao's son,
sargento-mor Felix de GusmAo Mendonga e Bueno. It took
forty men and two months to open a trail and explore the
hinterland as far as the edge of the plains near the settle-
ment called Ressaca. The father and son reported the route
good, with only the Rio Paraiba being a problem. The order
to begin the work of expanding the exploratory trail into
a road was revoked on August 25, 1704 by Governor Albuquerque
after receiving word that the Caminho Novo had been opened.
Order of Governor Albuquerque, 25 August, 1704 in Anais da
Biblioteca Nacional 39, p.304.

15. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia, pp. 288-290.

16. Royal Edict, 19 April, 1702 in C6d. 2(SG), fol. 157.

17. Jose Vieira Couto, "Mem6ria sobre a capitania de Minas
Gerais, seu territ6rio, clima e produces metalicos;
s8bre a necessidade de se restabelecer e animar a mineragao
decadente do Brasil; sSbre o commercio e exportagao dos
metaes e interesses regios," Revista do Instituto Hist6rico
e Geografico Brasileiro 11(1871): 322.

18. Alvaro da Silveira to Governor-General, 27 May, 1703
in Zemella, O abastecimento, pp. 39-L0.

19. Ibid., p. 40.

20. In another sense, the entire population might be con-
sidered excess in the eyes of many royal officials. Pro-
ducing no marketable crop and with increasing shipments of
African slaves undermining the market for the less produc-
tive and illegal Indian slaves, the Paulistas could
abandon their homes and move to the gold fields without
damaging the royal interests. In fact, by their migrating
to Minas these interests were furthered by the increase in
gold production.

21. Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 312.

22. The Indians in Sao Paulo were described by Governor
Menezes in 1700 as living in "the status of slaves." He
claimed to have acted immediately to restore them to their
villages citing as an example one Indian village which
through the efforts of royal officials had grown in size
from ninety residents to 1,22h. Menezes to Pedro II, 5 May,
1700 in Anais da Eiblioteca Nacional 39, p. 269.


23. Zemella, 0 abastecimento, p.. 313-314.








2h. Without question there were foreigners who were able
to remain in the mining district despite the various orders
issued from Lisbon barring their continued presence.
Various examples can be cited. Dr. Luis Comes Ferreira
reported that, in 171 he performed an autopsy with
"Licenciado Jobo da Rosa, Ungaro da IIago." Luis Gomes
Ferreira, Erario mineral dividido em doze tratados (Lisbon:
Por Miguel Rodrigues, Impressor do Senhor Patriarcha,
1735), 41. In 1737 the Vila Rica council registered a
surgeon's commission papers for AntSnio Labedrienne, a
native Frenchman. Registry of Commission, 6 January, 1737
in C6d. 32 (CMOP), fols. 90-134v. Similarly, David
Martins, a soldier, was also a Frenchman. Will of David
Martins, 18 February, 1721 in C6d. 333, Ho. 7013
(ASPHANOP). Mariana Ferreira da Silva also claimed in her
last testament that she was a native of France. Will of
Mariana Ferreira da Silva, 14 February, 1761 in Registry
of Burials, (APAD), C6d. 1, fols. 377-378.

25. The Overseas Council, however, was determined that
Indians be used as a major labor source. In rejecting a
plea from the Sao Paulo municipal council for increased
slave quotas the Council recommended that any deficiency
in the number of slaves be made up from the Indian popu-
lation of SBo Paulo. Mauricio Goulart, Escravidao no
Brasil: das orizens i extinceu do trafico, 2nd ed. (Sao
Paulo: Livraria Martins Edit6ra, 1950), p. 125.

26. Edison Carneiro, "0 negro em Minas Gerais," Segundo
semingrio de estudos mineiros (Belo Horizonte: Univer-
sidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 1956?): 13.

27. Paul Ferrand, L'or a Minas Gerais, 2 vols. (Belo
Horizonte:Imprensa Official, 1913),1,p.28.

28. Carneiro, "0 negro em Minas Gerais," p. 13.

29. Alvaro de Silveira de Albuquerque to king, 11 May,
1703, in Anais da Biblioteca Iacional do Rio de Janeiro
39, p. 285. The Overseas Council responded to this letter
by noting that if the law was not enforced "all the State
of Brazil would be destroyed, lacking slaves for the cul-
tivation of its fruits and the work of the sugar mills due
to the certainty of the greater price which these would
bring in the southern captaincies." One counsellor recom-
mended that the quota be raised to three hundred slaves.
This was approved by the king on October 11, 1704. Con-
sulta of the Overseas Council, 10 September, 1703, in
Documentos Hist6ricos 93, pp. 157-158. The increase ap-
parently did not go into effect as the Overseas Council on
January 7, 1704 reminded the king that the matter was
still unsettled. Consulta of the Overseas Council, 7 Jan-
uary, 1704, in Documentos Hist6ricos 93, p. 163.





52


30. Goulart, Escravidao africana no Brasil, p. 125. Both
Edison Carneiro and Isiais Golgher feel that the quota was
raised to three hundred. The opinions rendered by the
Overseas Council do not justify such a claim. Carneiro,
"0 negro em Minas Gerais," p. 11. Also Isiais Golgher,
"O negro em Minas Gerais," Revista Brasileira de Estudos
Politicos 18 (January, 1965): 335.

31. Bento Fernandes Furtado de Mendonga, "Ioticias dos
primeiros descobridores," in "Documentos ineditos, preciosos
da Biblioteca Publica Municipal de Sao Paulo," Revista
do Institute Hist6rico e Geogrifico de Sgo Paulo 44, 1st
Part (19h8): 355.














Chapter 4
Gold: Techniques and Taxes



The techniques for extracting gold during this early

period were extremely primitive. This was due to the lack

of trained mining engineers and to the fact that there

were numerous surface deposits which could be exploited

without sophisticated methods. Machinery, when used, was

rudimentary. Many of the miners apparently were content

to retire after scratching the surface of the gold deposits

- to settle down with instant wealth either in the mining

district, on the coast, or, more commonly, in Portugal.

Much of the early gold was found in transported or

sorted placer deposits. These deposits had resulted from

the action of the water carrying gold-bearing rocks from

veins in the mountains. The water action released the

gold particles from the rocks and then mixed them with the

stream gravel. Because of the peculiarities of the current

the gold could be concentrated in specific places or ir-
1
regularly deposited.

The easiest transported placer deposits to discover

and mine were the creek players where the gold particles

were mixed with gravel within two or three feet of the
2
surface of the streambed. The processes by which gold

was extracted from streams were called servigos dos veios.

53





54


The first of these processes employed in the mining district

was panning. This was by far the easiest mining method

and was used by the early bandeirantes who panned with

gamelas (wooden plates normally used for preparing and

serving food). These quickly were replaced by bateias

made of either wood or tin. The technique was simple:

dirt and water were placed in the conically shaped bateia,

which was then rotated so that the lighter sand or soil

grains were sloshed out of the bateia with the water,

leaving the heavier gold particles. This technique was

used by itself and was also the final step in all the

methods employed during this period.

Where the stream or river was particularly deep, or

the current very rapid, special techniques had to be de-

veloped for extracting the paydirt. In some places wooden

walls were built in the water to provide support for the

slaves who would drive to the bottom to get sand which
3
was then brought to the surface to be panned. An alter-

native method involved collecting the gold-hearing sand

from a boat using a long pole wfth a metal point for digging
4
and a small bag for scooping up the sand for panning.

These techniques could be applied only to the recently-

deposited gold which was within a few inches of the surface

of the gravel. There were vastly larger quantities of

gold to be found beneath the surface of the stream beds.

One of the methods developed to exploit these deposits was

to dam the stream and force the water into a run-off canal,




EE: EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE









allowing the miners to work the bypassed stream bed. When

physical conditions precluded the digging of drainage

canals another method was employed. This involved building

three walls jutting out from the shore and enclosing the

area to be worked. The water then was removed and the re-
5
maining silt panned.

Because water-tight wooden walls were difficult

to construct, water had to be removed almost constantly.

At first this was done using slave labor. Later, the

water wheel, or rosirio, was used, increasing the efficien-

cy of the process by replacing slaves carrying buckets with

a machine. Claudio Manuel da Costa, the poet and alleged

participant in the 1789 Inconfidencia Mineira, attributes

the invention of the rosario to a priest popularly known
6
as Bonina Suave about 1716. Some evidence points to

another person as the inventor of the rosario: Manuel da

Silva Rosa was granted a militia commission in 1719 for
7
his invention of a machine "to take gold out of rivers."

The development of this machine cost 1500 oitavas and four

months of labor. Unfortunately, nothing further is known

about the machine or the date of its development. By 1719

Rosa's invention was commonly employed in the rivers of

the mining district, suggesting that it was the rosario

or water wheel. The extent to which this machine was being

utilized and the termination of a two-year monopoly of its

use indicate that it was developed some time before 1719.

The monopoly plus the award of a militia commission also








attest to the desire of the crown to encourage technologi-

cal advances.

Mining by divert in, streams represents a different

level of mining development from the rudimentary techniques

of panning or diving. Ownership of large numbers of

slaves or joint operations by miners who pooled their slave

and capital resources were needed. While this type of

mining probably was used in Ouro Preto, Ant5nio Dias, and

Padre Faria, there are no physical remains of the dams

and walls, like those that can be seen today in Mariana.

There the wooden pilings stand like skeletons, and the

various streambeds which the RiberAo do Carmo was forced

into creating are still there.

Having worked the creek players, it was only natural

that the miners explore the stream banks. These bench

players were formed by the action of waters and actually

had been creek players before the streambed shifted. The

simplest method of exploiting these deposits was surface,

or open-pit, mining. The miners would probe for gold by

digging a hole, either cubical or conical; a hole in which

gold was found would be enlarged as the size of the strike

warranted. Some of these excavations, called catas, were

very large. Paul Ferrand, whose study of gold mining in

Minas Gerais remains the classic in its field, mentions some
8
which were fifteen meters deep. This method was dangerous

because of the possibility of cave-ins, and could be used

only during the dry season. If a cata was to be exploited








a second year, much of the initial excavating had to be

repeated. This method was primitive, but it reached pre-

viously untapped deposits.

Antonil, writing in 1710, does not refer to any

other mining processes. While other methods may have

been employed, these were the only ones widely used. They

manifest a low level of mining expertise, a deficiency

aggravated by the acute shortage of trained mining tech-

nicians. To remedy this situation the crown attempted

to contract Spaniards trained at the silver mines of

Upper Peru or at the gold mines of Nueva Granada. One

of those contracted was Castelo Branco, whose adventures

have been mentioned. Governor Menezes tried to enlist

others in Buenos Aires, going so far as to send agents

there. After this recruiting effort failed, Menezes

notified the king that "that was my only chance Cas3 a

miner could not come from Portugal. The men of Sgo Paulo

desperately want a Etrained] miner since they have no
9
knowledge of stones Esic]." Pedro II, however, did find

in Portugal a trained mining engineer, Ant8nio Borges de

Faria, whom he sent with three apprentices in response to
10
Menezes' appeal. Nothing is known of the success of

this mission, although it appears that it was unable to

effect any real changes in the techniques used by the

miners. No effort was made to establish the one thing

which could have produced significant reforms in mining--

a mining school. Such an institution would not be estab-








lished until the nineteenth century, long after the ex-

haustion of most of the gold deposits.

During these early years, gold mining policies were

based upon three different mining codes. The first was

enacted in 1603 and amended in 1618. The second code was

instituted by Governor Menezes in 1700. While it was in

effect for only two years, this was a crucial time for

the evolution of the mining industry in Minas Gerais. The

third policy was decreed by the king on April 19, 1702

and remained in effect throughout the eighteenth century.

The changes in the provisions of each are indicative

of the changing needs of the mining industry at the time of

enactment. Under the first code, which was intended to

encourage exploration, a discoverer received one claim

of forty by twenty bragasand another of thirty by fifteen.

The 1700 code also allowed two claims but their size was

determined by the number of slaves at the disposal of

the miner. The rate was two and a half square bragas per

slave, but there was a maximum of thirty square bragas per

claimant. Those so poor as to have no slaves were awarded

five square bragas. Thus the generosity of the first code ,

enacted when few gold strikes had been made, was re-

placed by a more realistic provision which based the size

of the award upon the capacity of the person to exploit

it. Also the size of the claims were reduced in order to

accommodate more people. Where many miners were involved

in a single strike, the diggings could be divided up and









parceled out by palmos (one palmo is roughly .22 meters).

The provisions of the 1700 code were continued in the 1702

code, except for the omission of the five-braga grant

to those who did not have slaves. Probably it was assumed

that anyone so poor as to have no slaves could not be ex-

pected to effectively exploit the claim and, thus, would

not produce enough revenue for the royal treasury.

The codes also reflect the development of the bureau-

cracy that was created to control the mining district.

The first code provided for the posts of collector of the

royal fifth (quinto), a secretary, and a treasurer to

govern the mining district. Thus administrative functions

were considered fiscal in nature. By 1700 it was realized

that the situation required an administrative officer as

well as tax officials. In that year the first guarda-mor,

administrator of mining, was named for the mining district.

The guarda-mor had the power to distribute claims and to

exercise police powers to arrest lawbreakers. After

guardas-mores were appointed for the major mining areas,

it was found that the territorial jurisdiction of these

officials was still too large and they were authorized to
11
name assistants. One claim at each strike was the pay-

ment for the guarda-mor's services.

The 1702 code reflects a more complex administrative

system. Besides the guarda-mor, provision was made for a

superintendent who became the administrative head of the

mining district and was responsible to the governor in Rio








de Janeiro. The superintendent was to be chosen from

among "the most important and richest people" in the dis-

trict. Aside from being collector of the quinto, the

superintendent had extensive civil and criminal powers.

His functions included those exercised in the established

captaincies by the district magistrate (ouvidor), and by

the royal judge who presided over some municipal councils

(the Iuiz de fora). In addition, provision was made for

a constable (meirinho) and a secretary. All these offi-

cials were strictly prohibited from being directly or

indirectly involved in mining activities. They were paid

a fee by the miners for their services. The codes of 1700

and, especially, that of 1702 reflect the realization

that law and order had to be imposed upon the unruly miners

before taxes could be collected.

All three codes contained extraordinary provisions.

The first code protected any miner from arrest and exempted

his property, including slaves, from confiscation for debt.

This provision does not reappear in the 1700 code but was

re-enacted in modified form in 1702. The 1700 code

granted another form of privilege to the miners by pro-

viding protection from arrest (homizio) for any crime

except less majesty. As the mining district became an

area of asylum which was highly prejudicial to the royal

prerogative, this provision was not repeated in the third

code.

The 1702 code was more than a simple set of rules








governing mining; it was a statute for the general govern-

ment of the mining district. Its provisions were aimed

at stopping smuggling and repeated several edicts limiting

migration to the mines. Furthermore, all persons consid-

ered "useless" were to be expelled. No definition of

"useless" was provided, that being left, presumably, to

the interpretation of local officials. Similarly, all

goldsmiths were to be expelled. Crown policy toward the

goldsmiths was very inconsistent, as they were alternately

expelled and allowed to return and practice their trade.

The goldsmiths were accused both of involvement in smug-

gling and of transforming gold dust into objects on which

the quinto was not paid. Concern over taxes and revenue

is indicated in the 1702 code by the careful delineation

of the way in which the quinto was to be paid. It could

be remitted directly to the superintendent or paid out-

side the mining district. In the latter case the miner

received a registration card authorizing him to transport

his gold to a mint either in Brazil or in Portugal and

pay the royal fifth there. A copy was maintained by the

superintendent's secretary to assure that payment was

made. 13

These provisions, plus those giving the superintendent

civil and criminal jurisdiction, made this mining code a

statute for the government of the mining district. While

the later creation of a more complex administrative bureau -

cracy obliterated the superintendent's functions, and








Limited those of the guardas-mores, most of the provisions

of the code were operative throughout the eighteenth

century.

The gold extracted during these early years was not

a great source of revenue for the crown. This period was

one of uncertainty and experimentation as indicated by the

changes in the mining codes and in the organization of the

bureaucracy. There were so few royal officials in the

district that implementation of the tax and anti-smuggling

laws was impossible. In an effort to overcome this de-

ficiency the crown turned to the manipulation of monetary

policies. By 1695 smelters, where a miner could pay his

quinto, existed in four places, Taubate (after 1704 in

Parati), Sao Paulo (after 1704 in Santos), Iguape, and

Paranagua. Smelters transformed gold dust and nuggets

into gold bars. A percentage of the gold turned in,

fluctuating between twelve and twenty percent, was retained

at the smelter for remittal to the royal treasury as the

quinto. The rest, less a smelting fee, was melted into

bars stamped with the weight, purity, and royal seal and

turned over to the miner along with a certificate of pay-

ment of the quinto.

In 1703 a mint was established in Rio de Janeiro that

would pay 1$200 (1,200 reis) for an oitava of unsmelted

gold while the exchange value of the same amount in the

mining district was set at 1 900. It was hoped that the

difference in the value of gold would attract money to the







13
mint in Rio. Since gold circulated freely at a rate of

$800 and 900 (800 and 900 reis), its effects should have

been even greater than anticipated. The fact that the

market value of gold within the mining district was lower

than established by law indicates that royal decrees were

ineffective against the economic reality of a large

supply of gold.

The mint, however, had several drawbacks in operation.

The primary one was the price of gold on the black market:

1$300 to l$400 an oitava. Because it was more profitable

to sell gold on the black market than to sell it to the

government, trade in illicit gold drew away gold which

otherwise would have found its way to the mint. The mint,

in turn, siphoned off much of the gold which would have

been taken to the smelters. Because the quinto was col-

lected on unsmelted gold by the Rio mint, the crown assumed

the cost of the impurities which has been estimated to be
15
five to eight percent of the total. Thus the attempt

to increase revenue derived from the quinto by monetary

manipulation failed.

The quinto, however, was only one of the sources of

income for the royal treasury. During this period the

sale or leasing of mining claims allocated to the king at

each strike raised considerable sums of money. That more

was not raised was due to the opportunity which the guarda-

mor or his assistants had to sell or rent the claims to

friends or relatives at prices lower than their true market








value. As more adventurers arrived such chicanery became

more difficult and competitive bidding raised the prices.

In 1700 Nenezes received an average of 26.4 oitavas for

fourteen claims, but in 1701 he could expect to receive
16
an average of 38.3 oitavas for seven.

A major portion of the revenue for this period was

obtained through the confiscation of property. Much of

this came with the arrest of smugglers along the Bahia

road, due, in many cases, to the efforts of Borba Gato,

who was the guarda-mor for the Rio das Velhas region. A

less important source was the contract for the dirimos,

the tithe on non-mineral production, the collection of

which was sublet by the government. The crown, after de-

ducting its collection fee, remitted the proceeds from the
17
tithe to the church.

The last major source of revenue was the estates of

people who died without wills. This source was particularly

lucrative during this period as nomadic habits together

with violence unhindered by the presence of police resulted

in the deaths of many people without wills and many whose

very identity could not be ascertained.











Year Quinto

1700 940
1701 6064
1702 28
1703 16L8.57
170)1 2926.50
1705 1637.18
1706 4890
1707 2151
1708 1163.18
1709 4546
1710 5691.36
1711 9812.51)


Table 1
Royal Income

Allotments Confiscations Dfzimos Probate

369
3320 695
1442 669
684 6823
572 4708.36 300
447 1640 950 742
90 182 600 3345
2905.54 600 2579


320
745


110
1468


7824.18
2912
3542.11
6085.18


Based on C6d. 5(DF), fols. 7v-8 and C6d. 81(DFA), fols.

8v-13v.

Manoel Cardozo, "The Collection of the Royal Fifth", p.367.



Because of smuggling, these figures are unreliable as

indicators of the total production of gold. Antonil estim-

ates that in the ten years before 1710 over one thousand

arrobas of gold were extracted, of which the crown received
18
only sixteen to twenty arrobas in taxes. Felix Madureira

e Cusmio reported that the 1703 fleet carried two hundred

arrobas and the one of 1705 carried five hundred of

which less than twenty were destined for the royal
19
coffers. There are many estimates but there is no sure

way to calculate even approximately the total amount of

gold produced during this period. It is, however, clear

that the crown was not receiving the twenty percent to

which it was entitled and that the alluvial deposits




66


yielded great quantities of gold at a time when the popu-

lation of the mining district must have been less than

50,000.













Notes


1. Charles J. Lyden, "The Gold Placers of Montana,
Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology, Memoir Ho. 26 (Butte:
Montana School of Mines, 1948), p. 3.

2. Ibid.

3. Mendonga, Notlcias dos primeiros descobridores, fol.
16v.

4. Paul Ferrand, L'or a Minas Gerais, 1, pp. 32-33.

5. Antonil, Cultura e opulincia, pp. 293-294.

6. Claudio Manuel da Costa, "Villa Rica, Poema," Anugrio
do Museu da Inconfidencia U (1955-1957): 165 & 168.

7. Commission of Manuel da Silva Rosa, 2? April, 1719
in C6d. 12(SG), fol. 75.

8. Ferrand, L'or a Minas Gerais, 1, p. 35.

9. Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 151.

10. Ibid., p. 152.

11. Mining Code, 19 April, 1702 in Documentos Hist6ricos
80(1949): 343. The jurisdiction of the assistant guardas-
mores was defined in 1736 as being sixteen square leagues
(quatro leguas em extensgo). Wilhelm Ludvig von Eschvege,
"Pluto Brasiliensis,"ed. Rudolfo Jacob, Collectanea de
scientists extranceiras, 2 vols. (Belo Horizonte. Imprensa
Official, 1930),2, p. 257.

12. Mining Code, of 1603/1618 in Robert Southey, History
of Brazil, 3 vols. (London: Longman, Durst, Rees, Orme
and Brown, 1819), 3, pp. WO-45.

13. Cardozo, "Alguns subsidios, "p. 256. In June, 1700
the municipal council of Rio de Janeiro petitioned the
crown for establishment of a mint in that city. This was
rejected by Pedro IT who instead ordered that a smelter
("casa nara se fundir e quintar o ouro") be opened there.
Consulta of the Overseas Council, 3 November, 1700 in








Documentos Hist6ricos, 93, pp. 98-99. It is unclear if a
smelter was established. This appears unlikely as a mint
began operations in 1703 after a period of indecision as
to the best location for it, which saw it established first
in Salvador then moved to Recife. On September 10, 1703,
the head of the mint reported that the mint had begun ac-
cepting gold February 15, (1703), and coining one week
later. The coins minted had a value of 4$800 and 2$L00.
Consulta of the Overseas Council, 19 January, 170o in
Documentos Hist6ricos, 93, p.165.

14. Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras 9, p. 286.
Taunay's figures are based upon the personal papers of
Padre Guilherme Pompeu de Almeida, "the banker of the
bandeirantes."

15. Manoel Cardozo, "The Collection of the Royal Fifth in
Brazil, 1695-1709," Hispanic American Historical Heview
9, no. 3 (August, 1940): 370-371. Also Cardozo, "Alguns
subsidies," p. 11.

16. Report of Overseas Council Session, 15 November, 1701
in Cardozo, "The Collection of the Royal Fifth," p. 367.

17. C6d.bl (DFA), fol. 45v.

18. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia, pp. 262-263.

19. Cardozo, "The Collection of the Royal Fifth," p. 37h.













Chapter 5
Administration: The Period of Uncertainty



The mining district in 1710, was in utter chaos. The

gold strikes had been made by individuals beyond the reach

of royal authority. The first royal official who had

tried to enter the area, Castelo Branco, had been assassin-

ated. If the crown was to get maximum profit from the dis-

covery of gold, law and order had to be established and

an atmosphere created in which the royal fifth could be

collected.

As soon as news of the strikes was confirmed, the

governor in Rio de Janeiro delegated authority to some of

those involved in the discovery of gold. Carlos Pedroso

da Silveira was named guarda-mor geral (chief supervisor

of mining claims) and Bartoloreu Bueno de Siqueira was

appointed escrivao geral (chief secretary). Pedroso,

however, shortly was nominated for provedor dos quintos

(collector of the royal fifth) of the smelter he was

authorized to establish in Taubate. Pedroso's replacement

as guarda-mor geral was Jose de Camargos Pimentel. These

appointments had been made by the acting governor, Caldas.

Caldas had done little to clarify the situation in

the mining district for the royal officials in Lisbon.

This was left to his successor, Artur de Sa e Menezes.

69








After returning to Rio de Janeiro from his first visit to

Sao Paulo in 1698, 1Mnezes wrote Pedro II and attempted to

dissolve the confusion surrounding the discovery of gold.

Previous information sent to Lisbon had been incomplete

and the authorities in Portugal were uncertain of the ex-

tent of the discoveries, of their location, and of the

actions which Caldas had taken to establish order. Menezes

reported that "the account which Sebastiio de Castro Caldas

gave to Your Majesty of the Mines of Taubate Cactually

refer to] those called Mines of Cataguazes which are more

than one hundred leagues from Taubate. New streams are

continuously being discovered,...and the gold is most ex-
1
cellent." N.enezes then went on to criticize Caldas'

appointments. Pedroso, Mlenezes noted, had been named

provedor of "a smelter without funcionaries." Furthermore,,

he criticized Caldas' appointment of Jose de Camargos

Pimentel as guarda-mor geral, contending that Pimentel was

unworthy of the great responsibility of this office which

was charged with the collection of the money due the king

from the auction of mining claims that, by law, were re-

served for the king. Pimentel was unsuited for this post,

continues Menezes, because of his "bad actions and tyran-

nies" and his penchant for "stealing everything." Pimentel
2
subsequently was removed as supervisor of mining claims

and was given the largely ceremonial post of alcaide-mor

-(high sheriff) of Sao Paulo. His successor as guarda-mor

was the Paulista Garcia Rodrigues, appointed on January
3
13, 1698.









In the early turbulent years of these settlements,

the guarda-mor was the only royal official in an area that

increasingly was realized to be the scene of a major gold

discovery. The royal governor of Rio de Janeiro, who

claimed jurisdiction over the gold fields, did not visit

the area for four years. In the meantime the guarda-mor

was the highest authority in the vicinity of the gold

strikes. His primary responsibility was to ensure the fair

distribution of mining claims--a responsibility he vas to

keep despite the actions of later governors who tried to

exercise this authority. At the same time, the guarda-mor

had some'limited judicial powers for resolving disputes over

claims, and probably over criminal actions. This expansion

of the guarda-mor's powers was a stop-gap response to the

crisis caused by the absence of royal officials. It was

a tentative first step--a sign of the government's uncer-

tainty before an entirely new phenomenon, a major gold

strike in an area distant from established royal authority.

Because one guarda-mor could not cope with all the settle-

ments, assistants were appointed.

More, however,was needed to control the turbulent

miners than the presence of the guardas-mores and the chief

secretary; their judicial and administrative powers were

inadequate to cope with the situation. Moreover, these

officials were hardly disinterested since they themselves

were adventurers in search of gold; they could not be ex-

pected to act impartially. The answer to this absence of





72


disinterested royal officials would seem to be the personal

presence of the governor in the mining district but, since

his chief responsibility was the defense of all of southern

Brazil, the coastal area demanded most of his attention,

as it was susceptible to seaborne attack by buccaneers

and, in the event of war,by hostile European powers.

Only as the magnitude of the strikes became clearer

did the governor realize the necessity of leaving the coast

to journey into the interior. On October 24, 1697, Menezes

set out for Sgo Paulo, returning in February, 1698. In

October, 1698, Menezes again departed for Sao Paulo; he

returned to Rio five months later to prepare for his first

visit to the Mines of Cataguazes. It is with this first

visit of a royal governor to the mining fields that the

administrative history of Minas Gerais really begins.

Menezes would spend all but three months of the re-

maining two years of his term in the mining district.

While in Sao Paulo on his first visit, Menezes had called

Manuel de Borba Gato from his self-imposed exile and

offered him a pardon in exchange for information on new

gold deposits. Thus Menezes' first stop in the mining

district was in the region of Sabara to check on Borba

Gato's success in finding new gold deposits. One unidenti-

fied chronicler called the area of Sabari the most populated

in the gold fields. Borba Gato's success in fulfilling

his promise can be measured in terms of the honors he

received--he was appointed lieutenant general and guarda-mor







5
of the Rio das Velhas area. This appointment established

the first administrative division within the mining dis-

trict. The mining district vas divided into two parts-

the Rio das Velhas area under Borba Gato and the district

of Minas Gerais under Garcia Rodrigues Velho who was
6
succeeded as guarda-mor by Manuel Lopes de Medeiros. The

settlement of Sumidouro was made the point of division

between the two districts.

Because of the crown's long-term interest in finding

gold, the critical shortage of circulating coinage in

Portugal, and the need for revenue to deal with European

problems, it is not surprising that one of Menezes' major

concerns was the establishment of an administrative system

for the collection of taxes. In 1701, he established the

posts of procurator of the royal treasury, secretary of

the royal treasury, secretary of the tax house (escrivKo

da casa dos quintos), treasurer of the tax house, collector

of the royal treasury, and procurator of the crown. This

latter official was the personal agent of the king and

acted as a check upon the other officials. All of these

posts were filled by Paulistas, either native-born or by
7
residence. The appointments, however, were premature,

since these officers could fulfill their responsibilities

only if law and order were imposed upon the miners--a task

for which these posts had not been created.

Menezes also attempted to establish an efficient means

of collecting taxes, other than the royal fifth. He insti-








tuted a number of toll stations (registros), to collect

the royal imposts. Since smuggling already had become a

major problem, Menezes attempted to close the trails that

had been opened to Bahia and Pernambuco, which were the

most difficult to patrol because of the topography of the

land. The absence of difficult, mountainous terrain meant

that new trails were opened easily. Their number made

adequate surveillance impossible.

While trying to get others to pay their taxes, Menezes

decided to make his own fortune. It is said that when he

left the mining district he took with him more than thirty
8
arr8bas of gold. Despite Menezes' zeal in collecting the

royal fifth from others, it is doubtful that he paid

taxes on this gold.

Since the crown had no intention of leaving the mining

camps without centralized leadership, a new administrative

organ was established to fill this vacuum created by the

governor's departure. By royal decree a superintendency

was created and a Portuguese bureaucrat, Dr. Jose Vaz Pinto,

named to fill the position. One of the reasons for the cre-

ation of this post may have been the opening of hostilities

in Europe. Portugal's close ties to England meant that

Portuguese entry into the war of the Spanish Succession

was only a matter of time and circumstance. The governor

was needed on the coast to guard against invasion. A

report of the Overseas Council in 1705, approved by the

Queen Regent, shows that only after serious deliberation








was the governor ordered to remain in Rio-"he Cthe governor

should consider more the defense and conservation of that

city CRio de Janeiro], which is of the foremost importance,

than the conveniences which might accrue from the increase
9
of the quinto." Short term considerations for once, were

subordinated to long-term interests. No governor was to

visit the mining district again until the 1709 visit of

Fernando Martins Mascarenhas e Lencastre.

The superintendent, therefore, was named to super-

vise the mining district while the governor's attention was

directed toward protecting the coast from external attack.

While the superintendent had the responsibility for over-

seeing the collection of taxes, his major responsibility

was to maintain order. As has been noted, this post com-

bined criminal and civil jurisdiction with that of tax

collector and adjudicator of claims disputes. Pinto held

this post until 170h, when problems with a Paulista
10
potentate forced his return to Rio de Janeiro.

Efforts also were made to establish more local admin-

istrative posts, since royal authority existed only in

the presence of the superintendent or guarda-mor and these

officials could not be everywhere at the same time. One of

the first steps taken in this regard had been the earlier

creation of assistant guardas-mores. Under Dr. Pinto, the

first militia (ordenanga) officers were commissioned and

the initial work of organizing the miners into militia

units began. The first militia officer in the area of Ouro









Preto appears to have Felix de Gusmao Mendonga e Buenc, a

native of Rio de Janeiro, who was appointed December 1,
11
1703 to the post of sargento-mor da ordenanga das Minas.

Gusmao took his oath of office in Santos, although he then

went to Ouro Preto where he established his residence. If

militia units were actually organized at that time, no

reference to them has been found.

The first capitao-mor of the district around Ouro

Preto apparently was nominated in 1706. He was Francisco

do Amaral Gurgel, of Rio de Janeiro, whose appointment

appears to have been a reaction to the increasingly tense

situation between the Paulistas and the forasteiros, which

already had erupted into violence and would do so again.

The following year Pedro de Morais Eaposo, a Paulista, was

commissioned capitao-mor of the Rio das Mortes region.

The two capitaes-mores were issued the same standing orders

(regimentos). They were instructed to create a "militia

corps" of crdenanga status and were reminded of the necessi-

ty of defending Rio de Janeiro. Their powers, however,

extended beyond the military realm: they were given judi-

cial and police functions and authorized to collect the
12
royal fifth and supervise the guardas-mores. Thus

military functions were but a part of the duties of the

capitIo-mor. As with so many other Portuguese officials,

there was no clear delineation between functions.

The ten years following the discovery of gold had

been a period of uncertainty and confusion. Numerous








interests were in conflict: the sugar producers of the

Northeast vied with the miners for slaves, capital and

free labor; the need to protect the coast from a possible

foreign attack conflicted with the crown's desire to

divert resources into the mining district to reap the

benefits of increased gold production; and the Paulistas

were arrayed against those who threatened their monopoly of

the mines. The crown had tried to favor the sugar inter-

ests, but the premises on which its decision was based were

false. It had attempted to set up a bureaucracy to collect

taxes in the mining district before it had established

order there. Furthermore, the crown had failed to under-

stand the dimensions of the strikes and the extent of the

gold rush. Its actions were, therefore, piecemeal and

largely ineffective.

While the crown was indecisive in the manner with which

it dealt with the mining district, church officials in

Brazil did not vacillate. The mining district was a rich

territory, eagerly sought by competing ecclesiastical

jurisdictions. Since there were no clear lines of terri-

torial jurisdiction, the area was claimed by both the arch-

diocese of Bahia bishopricc created in 1551, raised to

archbishopric in 1676) and the diocese of Rio de Janeiro

(established in 1681). When the first visitor-general

from Rio de Janeiro arrived in the Rio das Velhas area, he

was informed that the Archbishop of Bahia had sent his own

representative,.who was then in Sgrro do Frio. The








bishop's representative, Baltezar de Godoi, thereupon

threatened his counterpart and competitor with excom-
13
munication and carried the day. While this conflict

continued for many years, the results were generally favor-

able to the Rio bishopric. The ecclesiastical territorial

boundaries, however, were never to coincide with the poli-

tical ones, as several parishes of northeastern Minas

remained under the jurisdiction of the Bahia See.

Other visitations were made periodically to examine

the state of the mining district. In 1701 Canon Manuel da

Costa Escobar made a general visitation which apparently
14
was unfinished at the time of his death. Two years

after Canon Escobar set out, Canon Gaspar Ribeiro Pereira

was dispatched to oversee the inauguration of new churches

in the mining district and to attempt to resolve the juris-
15
dictional dispute with the Bahian archbishopric. Un-

fortunately no record was found of the activities of these

visitors, although, if later inspections are any indication,

they probably raised the ire of the miners by seeming more

interested in levying fines than in guiding the souls of

the people of the district.

Before parishes were established in the mining dis-

trict, the church established a temporary system which

suited the settlement pattern characteristic of the early

years. The system, showing great flexibility, was estab-

lished by the Bishop of Rio de Janeiro, Frei Francisco de

Smo Jer6nimo. Governor Alvaro da Silveira e Albuquerque,





79


responding to a royal inquiry concerning the number of

clerics in the gold fields reported that:

he [Bishop SAo Jer6nimol proposed to send
sufficient priests so that divided among
the [mining camps] an adequate distance
apart, they should raise their portable
altars and administer the sacraments to
their [inhabitants, treating them] as
Parishoners,...and the inhabitants...[were
to] contribute to the just maintenance of
these priests and when some [priests]
moved from one stream to another they should
tear down the altars.16

Thus the transitory nature of the early mining camps led

to a reaction on the part of the church which gave the

local priests flexibility to deal with the nomadic nature

of the miners.

The precise date that parishes were established is

unknown, but by 1705 the settlement of Ouro Preto had been

elevated to this status, with Father Francisco de Castro

as the parish priest. The first references to the parish

of Ant8nio Dias are from 1707 and show that the parish

priest was Father Marcelo Pinto Ribeiro. Undoubtedly

these two settlements were selected as the seats of their

respective parishes because they were the largest and most

important in their districts--districts created by geo-

graphic features, particularly the Morro de Santa Quiteria

which separated the two settlements and channeled their

growth outward, away from the mountain.

These two parishes met along a line which bisected

the Morro de Santa Quiteria. The Ouro Prato parish in-

cluded the settlements of Ouro Preto, Caquende, Cabegas,








the Arraial dos Paulistas, Passadez, and Tripuf. The

parish of Art6nio Dias included Antonio Dias, the Arraial

dos Paulistas, Padre Faria, the settlements on the Morro de

Vila Rica, and Eom Sucesso. This division was one of the

factors which conditioned urban development and institu-

tionalized the competition between the two areas, thereby

fueling a conflict which has lasted to the present day.

Of the other settlements which would fall within the

jurisdiction of the municipality of Ouro Preto, only one,

Cachoeira do Campo, was raised to a parish during this
17
period. This elevation is indicative of the rapid

growth of this area, which, despite insignificant gold

deposits, was expanding due to its extensive pasture lands

and fertile fields. It also perhaps foreshadows a later

development when many miners with large-scale operations

on the Morro de Vila Rica purchased lands in Cachoeira

in order to directly supply foodstuffs for their slaves.

Thus, by 1707, three parishes in the area of Ouro

Prgto had been created to minister to the religious needs

of the settlers who were flocking into the region to make

their fortunes. Ecclesiastical organization had proceeded

further than civil organization by the outbreak of the

Guerra dos Emboabas. Whereas the crown could not decide

on the means by which to govern the mining district, the

ecclesiastical officials showed no such indecision. Priests

quickly were dispatched to the area and regular parishs

established in the major settlements.













Iotes


1. Menezes to Pedro II, 29 April, 1698 in Franco, Dic-
cionario de bandeirantes, p. 297.

2. Ibid.

3. Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras, 9, p. 235.

4. Relagao das antiguidades das Minas, C6dice Costa
Matoso, fol. 47.

5. S. Suannes, Os emboabas (Sao Paulo: Edit8ra Brasil-
iense, 1962), p. 57.

6. Ibid.

7. Suannes, Os emboabas, p. 55.

8. Mendonga, Ioticias dos primeiros descobridores, fol.26.

9. Report of the Overseas Council, 27 January, 1705 in
Manuel Cardozo, "The Brazilian Gold Rush," The Americas
3(October, 1946): 154.

10. Relag.o das antiguidades, fol. 47v.

11. Suannes, Os emboabas, p. 17.

12. Vasconcellos,Hist6ria antiga, 2, p. 34 and Suannes, Os
emboabas, pp. 36-37.

13. Relaggo das antiguidades, fol. 47v.

14. Raimundo Trindade, Arquidiocese de Mariana: subsfdios
para sua hist6ria, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Belo Horizonte:
Imprensa Oficial, 1953), 1, pp. 56-57.

15. Ibid., p. 57.

16. Albuquerque to Pedro II, 8 February, 1702 in Silvio
Gabriel Diniz, "Primeiras freguezias nas M.inas Gerais,"
Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geogr5fico de Minas Gerais
8(1961): 175-176.

17. Trindade, Arquidiocese de Mariana, pp. 67-69.














PART II
REBELLIOTJ AND REACTION: THE IMPOSITION
OF ROYAL CONTROL, 1706 1711

Chapter 6
Confrontation



The most dramatic development of the first decadecof

the eighteenth century was the War of the Emboabas. Often

cited as an early manifestation of nationalism, a precursor

of independence, it was a relatively bloodless war in-

volving a mixture of issues, none of which can be called

nationalist, either incipient or full-blown. The ramifica-

tion of this limited fighting, however, were extensive.

The major conflict was between two general concepts

as to how the gold fields should be exploited--two posi-

tions which may be called "open" and "closed." The

"closed" position was that taken by the Paulistas who, when

faced by a common enemy, forgot their own differences and

previous squabbling and united to confront the enemy. Their

view was stated on April 16, 1700, by the S6o Paulo muni-

cipal council in the following terms:

[We] petition the Captain-General Artur de
Sa e Menezes, Governor of the fortress
of Rio de Janeiro and the rest of the
Division that the lands of the territory
of Minas Gerais das Cataguazes as well
as the plains, with arable lands, by right
belong to the Paulistas in that they
own them by grants of His Majesty,...




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PAGE 1

A SOCIAL HISTORY OF OURO PRETO : STRESSES OF DYNAMIC URBANIZATION IK COLONIAL BRAZIL, 1695-1726 By DONALD RAMOS A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1972

PAGE 2

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 3 1262 08666 409

PAGE 3

Copyright by Donald Ramos 1972

PAGE 4

To My Father Francisco Nascimento Ramos In Grateful Memory

PAGE 5

PREFACE Ouro Preto is today a small city of fewer than 20,000 people about 100 kilometers southeast of Belo Horizonte, the capital of the state of Minas Gerais. It is a town only beginning to recover from over a century of isolation and economic underdevelopment. While the eighteenth century was an era of economic and cultural dynamism, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw economic retardation. Fortunately for the present, past residents of Ouro Preto lacked the wealth to destroy the monuments of the golden age in Minas Gerais. Now these monuments -the churches, houses, works of art, and rambling streets -attract tourists from all over Brazil and from many parts of the world. Because of its importance during the eighteenth century, Vila Rica, as Ouro Preto was called during the colonial era, has been examined by Brazilian historians. But almost without exception these writers have focused either upon dramatic events like the Wars of the Emboabas , the 1720 riots, and the Inconf idencia Mineira of 1789, or upon the baroque art which flourished during the age of gold. Thus, writers have tended to fix their attention upon the events which took place in the town and to treat these as examples of nativism during the colonial era. iv

PAGE 6

Throughout these studies the town and its residents are barely perceptihle. Because the spotlight has heen on the dramatic, the organization and structure of the town has remained in the shadows . The colonial history of Vila Rica can he divided into three distinct periods. The first covers the years between 1.695» when gold was discovered, and I726, and is characterized by a rapid expansion in gold production. The second covers the years 1727 to 17^^, and is marked by relative stability in the production of gold in the immediate area of Vila Rica. The third period extends from 17^5 to the end of the colonial era, and is one of decreasing gold production. This study concentrates on the epoch of economic boom. It is during this period that the seeds of the artistic and intellectual developments of the second half of the eighteenth-century were planted. This is the period when law and order was established among the turbulent miners who flocked into the mining district. My primary consideration in examining these three decades is to present a multifaceted view of a society in the process of formation. Rather than present a static situation, the emphasis is on change--on the dynamic manner in which this colonial society evolved. To some extent, especially regarding the Wars of the Emboabas , material familiar to specialists is reexamined. Time and space are devoted to such topics in order that they

PAGE 7

may be placed into a larger frane of reference; the emphasis is not on the events themselves, but on their effects upon the society then developing. . I have sought to concentrate upon the analysis of local political institutions, social organization, and urbanization, and to emphasize the processes by which these evolved. This approach provides an opportunity to useVila Rica as a case study of a colonial town, and is especially illuminating because of the rapidity with which the transition was made from an uninhabited region to a major town and capital of the most populated and richest captaincy in Brazil. In terms of political development, the case of Vila Rica reaffirms the importance of town councils in the administration of law and the maintenance of order. This study, however, goes beyond the town council to examine all components of a highly complex system of local government including the justices of the peace and the fiscal officers. The case by Vila Rica refutes the assumption that by IJOO royal government had crushed municipal power. In the .mining district the Portuguese crown was willing to grant extensive powers to local interests in exchange for stability and its corollary, increased gold production. The process by which the crown sought to regain control from local interests is a major theme of this study. My analysis of the development of Vila Rica is focused on the forces that shaped the urban pattern which vi

PAGE 8

evolved.While gold was the most important factor in determining the location of the town, and the general fo?m that the urban area would assume, other factors such as commerce, the main square, major roads, and the construction of public buildings played significant roles in this proces s . The society that evolved in and immediately around Vila Rica is discussed at length in this study, which is especially concerned with the composition of each level of society and the extent of mobility between groups . Particular attention is devoted to slaves and .freedmen. While there was extensive social mobility during part of this period, the process of social rigi di f ic at ion also began at this time, with the effects being felt most by some components of the middle group and by the slaves. Baptismal and marriage kinship relationships, lay brotherhoods, and the militia are examined as manifestations of these process es . The sources used in the reconstruction of this colonial environment include the records of the town council of Vila Rica; the records of baptisms, marriages, and burials; lay brotherhood records ; wills ; and the records of the governor's office and the treasury. These sources, some of which have not been used systematically before, form a mosaic: each provides a piece to the total picture. This is particularly true in the matter of social organization . vii

PAGE 9

The research for this study was conducted in Brazil under a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program grant, without which it could not have been done. I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the assistance and friendship extended to me by the Director of the Arquivo Publico Mineiro, Dr. Joao Gomes Teixeira; the Archbishop of Mariana, Dom Oscar de Oliveira; and the Director of the Museu da Inconf idencia , Dr. Orlandino Seites Fernandes. Among many other Brazilians who aided my research, Srs. Helio Gravata and Manuel de Paiva Junior must be singled out; Sr Gravata for both his friendship and bibliographical assistance and Sr. Manuel for sharing his love for Ouro Preto and his knowledge of local church history and documentation. I have received advice and assistance from many North Americans at various stages of my research, but particularly from Dr. Neill Macaulay of the University of Florida who has been unstinting of his time and knowledge. To these gentlemen and to others unnamed goes my sincerest appreciation. Vlll

PAGE 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface iv List of Tables xii List of Figures *...... xiii Key to Abbreviations xiv Abstract xv Part I The Early Years: Gold ani Royal Indecision 1 Chapter 1 The Years of Frustration and Success 1 Notes 12 Chapter 2 The Years of Euphoria and Distress. ..." 15 Notes 33 Chapter 3 The Gold Rush 36 Notes k9 Chapter h. Gold: Techniques and Taxes. ... 53 Notes 67 Chapter 5 Administration: The Period of Uncertainty 69 Notes 8l Part II Rebellion and Reaction: The Imposition of Royal Control, 1706-1711 82 Chapter 6 Confrontation 82 Notes 91 Chapter 7 The Wars of the Emboabas. ... 93 Notes 106 Chapter 8 The Aftermath 109 Notes 125 P-art III The Vessel and Its Contents 129 Chapter 9 The Incorporation of Vila Rica 129 Notes 136 Chapter 10 Urban Development of Vila Rica * 138 Notes 155 ix

PAGE 11

Chapter 11 Social Organization Before 1726: The Potentates .... Notes Chapter 12 Social Organization: The Middle Sector llotes Chapter 13 The Slave: Distribution and Origins Notes Chapter ik The Slave: His Threat to Society Notes Chapter 15 The Slave: Living and Working Conditions Notes Chapter 16 The Freedman Notes Cliapter IT Social Organization: Compadresco Relationships and Marriage Patterns Notes Chapter I8 The Irmandades and Social Differentiation Notes Chapter 19 The Militia Notes Part IV Local Government Chapter 20 Structure of the Municipal Council Notes Chapter 21 The Municipal Council: Selection of Members Notes Chapter 22 The Functions of the Municipal Council Notes Chapter 23 The Municipal Council: Income Notes Chapter 2k The Apparatus of Local Government Notes Part V The End of the Age Of Potentates . . . Chapter 25 Political Conflict in an Evolving Society Notes 158 172 175^ 187 189 200 203 213 216 223 226 238 2lt2 255 258 271 275 292 296 296 308 311 322 32U 31+2 358 362 381 38U 381+ U02

PAGE 12

Chapter 26 The Uprising of 1720 ^03 Notes ^28 Glossary ^^Sl Bihliography U33 Biographical Sketch kk6 XX

PAGE 13

LIST OF TABLES Page Table 1 Royal Income'. 65 Table 2 Origin of Slaves in Vila Rica .... 195 Table 3 Homsns Bens : 1711 316-31? Table k Royal Fifth Totals by Parish 390 Xll

PAGE 14

LIST OF FIGURES Vila Rica and Major Outlying Settlements 19 Xlll

PAGE 15

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS ACAM Arq.uivo da Curia do Arceljispado de Mariana AIMP Arq.uivo da Irman.dade das Merces e PerdSes AISFAD Arquivo da Irmandade de Sao Francisco de Antonio Dias AHoRAC Arquivo da Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Rosario do Alto da Cruz APAD Arquivo Parochial de Antonio Dias APHANOP Arquivo do Patrinonio Historico e Artistico Nacional in Ouro Freto APM Arquivo Publico Mineiro APOP Arquivo Parochial de Ouro Preto CMOP Camara Municipal de Ouro Preto Collection of the Arquivo Publico Mineiro DF Delegacia Fiscal Collection of the Arquivo Publico Mineiro DFA Delegacia Fiscal Avulso Collection of the Arquivo Publico Mineiro SG Secretaria do Governo Collection of the Arquivo Publico Mineiro SHORT TITLES Anais da Biblioteca Nacional ... Anai s da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro Documentos Historicos . . . Documentos Historicos da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de -Janeiro XIV

PAGE 16

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the ' Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial alfillment of the Req.uirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosopti A SOCIAL HISTORY OF OURO PRETO : STRESSES OF DYNAMIC URBANIZATION IN COLONIAL BRAZIL, 1695-1726 by i Donald Ramos December, 1972 I i Chairman: Neill Webster Macaulay j Major Department: History Major gold deposits were discovered in Minas Gerais in 1695 after almost one hundred and fifty years of futile j searching. This led to a gold rush of raajor proportions; ' I within fifteen years there were over thirty thousand people gainfully employed in mining and ancillary industries. One conseq.uence of this gold rush was very rapid , urbanization in several areas. Foremost a.mong these was I J Vila Rica which became the capital of the captaincy and j I later, as Ouro Preto, the capital of the province of Minas , i Gerais . While gold mining was the initial reason for the ] settlement, very quickly Vila Rica's location astride I major roads allowed commerce to develope into the element i i which differentiated it from other Mineiro towns. While :, commerce was very important to the local economy, ner' chants were not able to transform this economic power ' directly into political power. The boom atmosphere, howj ever, did make it easy for merchants to enter mining or i XV !

PAGE 17

farming and thereby gain entry into the elite. While Vila Rica exhibits many of the attributes of a traditional society, a substantial middle sector did evolve. Composed of groups with widely divergent goals and interests, this aniorphorous sector was united by the fact that many of its members were white and, very often, Portuguese-born. An important component of this sector was the artisan. Unlike in Portugal and some of the coastal areas of Brazil the guild organization was not a spontaneous reaction to existing conditions but the forced creation of the town council. In Vila Rica many of its social functions were assumed by lay brotherhoods. One of the avenues of social mobility into the middle sector for nonwhites and women was through ownership of shops. Vertical mobility from this group into the upper class occurred with decreasing frequency during this period. The bottom rung of society was composed of freedmen and slaves. Similarities in status are seen as resulting from the relative personal freedom granted to domestic slaves in an urban setting compounded by the frequency of manumission. The examination of slave origins reveals the predominance of Bantu over Mina slaves. The reaction of the slave to bondage was not one of docile acquiescence. Quilombos proliferated in the immediate area of Vila Rica. While runaway slaves maintained active commerce with Vila Rica, they were able to seriously hamper communication between it and the other towns . XVI

PAGE 18

Lay 'brotherhoods, the militia, and kinship relationships are examined as aspects of this social organization. The physical organization of Vila Rica is seen as due to the location of gold deposits, major roads, the town sq.uare, and the construction of public buildings. These factors had shaped the town's urban pattern by 1720. Parallel to the evolution of social groupings in the mining district was the campaign of the royal government to establish ' its jurisdiction over the disorderly miners. This process extends from the early piecemeal efforts in the 1690's through the 1720 urban riots from which the royal government emerged victorious. The Wars of the Emboabas are seen as one aspect of this process and as a key step in the structuring of society. The composition, functions, and income sources cf the town council are examined in detail as are other representatives of local government such as fiscal officers and Justices of the peace . This study relies heavily on unpublished documents from the Arquivo Publico Mineiro and the archives of local parishes, brotherhoods, the Archbishopric of Mariana, and the Servigo do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional. XVil

PAGE 19

PART I THE EARLY YEARS: GOLD AND ROYAL INDECISION Chapter 1 The Years of Frustration and Success The dream of gold, silver and precious stones spurred Portuguese settlement of Brazil. From the arrival of Tome de Sousa at Salvador, Bahia, in 15^9, numerous attempts were made to find these ri ches --efforts which were stimulated by the success of the Spanish in Nueva Granada and especially in Upper Peru at Potosi. Pero de Magalhaes de Gandavo in 157° noted the existence of gold and, undoubtedly repeating rumors that he had heard, referred to a "large lake in the interior where Cthe Indians!) swear that there are many settlements, whose residents (as is common 1 knowledge) have great stores of gold and precious stones." Gandavo was repeating the legend of Vupabussu, the richest place in the world, where each newly elected king was covered with gold dust and dunked into the water until all the gold dust had been washed off and left as an offering 2 to the gods. This legend is the same as that of El Dorado vhich stimulated Spanish conquerers and English adventurers alike. A second myth, which quickly became the dominant one among the Portuguese, was that of Sabarabussu, a resplendent mountain, the fabulous deposit of silver some-

PAGE 20

where in the interior of Brazil. It was believed that the great silver deposits of Potosi extended into Portuk guese territory. All that was needed was careful exploration in Brazil at the latitude of Potosi to find for Portugal riches equal to those of Spain. The fact that planning for expeditions began in 1551, only two years after the arrival of Tome de Sousa, is evidence of the interest which these legends excited. After two years of organizing and planning, Francisco Bruza de Spinosa, a Spaniard in the pay of Portugal, left Porto Serguro and, following the Rio Jequitinhonha , reached the area of present-day Serro and Diamantina. This attempt to find mineral wealth was foiled by the rough terrain and 5 bad weather. Spinosa was followed in I568 by Martins Carvalho, who penetrated almost 1300 kilometers into the interior to reach the same region. Carvalho, unlike 6 Spinosa, did find some gold nuggets. Orville Derby, geologist and historian, bestows on Carvalho's expedition the honor of having made the first discovery of gold in T Minas Gerais. After eight months of trekking through the wilderness, the Carvalho expedition arrived in Porto Seguro — but without the gold nuggets, which were lost when a canoe overturned. While in practical terms the Carvalho expedition was a failure, the stories concerning the gold which was found stimulated other explorers . During the final three decades of the century four major expeditions were dispatched to

PAGE 21

find the riches whose existence few doubted but whose precise location was unknown. The first of these left Porto Seguro in 1573 under the leadership of Sebastiao Fernandes Tourinho. Several years later another, under Antonio Dias Adorno , began its trek into the unknown. Both expeditions probably stayed north of the Rio Doce. Tourinho, however, did reach the Serro area and returned with what he mistakenly believed to be emeralds and sapphires. During the next decade further efforts were made by Joao Coelho de Sousa and his brother, the chronicler Gabriel Soares de Sousa, who died while following the route previously taken by his brother. The next major entry into Minas Gerais was made by Marcos de Azeredo who also followed basically the route of Tourinho. Azeredo reached the area which he believed to be that of the mythical Sabarabussu and returned with what appeared to be emeralds but died before revealing the location of his discovery. Thus all efforts from the captaincies of Porto Seguro and Bahia to find and exploit deposits of gold, silver or precious stones were futile. Meanwhile, expeditions from the captaincy of Sao Vicente had achieved some success in the search for gold. Bras Cubas , after leading an unsuccessful three-hundredleague trek in I56O-I562, discovered gold on a second expedition which covered only thirty leagues, from its point Of departure, Santos. Between 1570 and I58U a bandeira (expedition), headed by the German Heliodoro Eobanus dis-

PAGE 22

covered gold at Iguape (in southern S§,o Paulo), Paranagua 9 and CuritilDa (both in what is now the state of Parana). These discoveries soon were being worked by men from the captaincy of Sao Vicente. Before the end of the century several minor deposits had been discovered near Sao Paulo, such as the one at Jaragui. In 1601, a bandeira under Andre de Leao left Sao Paulo 10 accompanied by one Dutch and two German mining experts. This bandeira, one of the earliest to enter Minas Gerais from Sao Paulo, reached the area of present-day Pitangui , 11 believed by Leao to be the location of Sabarabussu. After this expedition failed to uncover any mineral wealth, official interest in the search abated. This diminution of interest was due to the frustration of having searched in vain, the Spanish domination of Portugal, and the efforts of Portugal to regain her independence. Until Spain recognized Portugal's independence in I668, Portuguese energies were turned inward. The crown was in a precarious position, and its efforts were limited to offering only incentives such as greater benefits to discoverers of precious metals or stones. These incentives did have some effect and a number of bandeiras were sent into the hinterland by the Sao Paulo camara (municipal council) in the l670's. One of these 12 was led by Francisco de Camargo, who was instructed to look for gold, silver and precious stones. He left in 1672, but the results of his expedition are unknown. Among

PAGE 23

the others that got underway at about the same time, one stands out because of its relation to the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais and because of the information available concerning its passage through the hinterland. This 13 vas the bandeira of Fernao Dias Pais. Accompanied by his son-in-law, Manuel de Borba Gato , his son, Garcia Rodrigues Pais, and a large number of Paulistas and Indians, Pais left Sao Paulo in July, iSjk on a journey which would last seven years. The bandeira proceeded slowly, planting crops in a number of places in order to have supplies for the return journey. It reached an area believed to be that of Sabarabussu but mass desertions and sickness forced it to turn back after a few stones which were believed to be emeralds were found. On the way back. Pais died at Sumidouro, one of the sites where lU crops had been planted. While the Pais bandeira was in Minas Gerais, the crown sent a Spaniard trained at Potosi, Rodrigo de Castelo Branco, to Brazil as Administrator of Mines. After a short stay in Bahia he was ordered to the south, and he dispatched various expeditions to examine the strikes previously made in Sao Paulo and Parana. Then he set out to follow the trail of Pais' bandeira. Castelo Branco left Sao Paulo in March, I68I, and on June 26 met Garcia Rodrigues Pais, who gave him the "emeralds" that had been found. After dispatching the stones to Sao Paulo, Castelo Branco continued on to Sumidouro, where he met Borba Gato and

PAGE 24

remnants of the bandeira. After a quarrel over Castelo Branco's right to appropriate supplies, Castelo Branco was killed -whether by Borba Gato or his slaves is unknown. What is clear is that after this event Borba Gato 15 was forced to flee. He was to remain in the unsettled and virtually unknown backlands of Minas Gerais from l682 to 1699. It is believed that he spent much of this time 16 in Roja Grande near what is now the town of Sahara. Apparently he maintained intermittent contact with his family in Sao Paulo, but his activities during these years constitute one of the mysteries surrounding the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais. That such a prominent member of an elite Paulista family found it necessary to spend seventeen years in the hinterland to avoid being arrested seems implausible. More probably they were spent in search of emeralds and silver. By 1690 the major routes into Minas Gerais from Bahia, Espirito Santo, and Sao Paulo were well known. Gold already had been discovered and was being mined in several areas of the present states of Sao Paulo and Parana. Of these the most significant were Paranagua and Cananeia. All were surface deposits and, while a smelter and perhaps a mint had been established in Sao Paulo by 165O, the quantity of gold extracted was quite small. In the years l672-l678j the quinto , or royal tax on mineral resources (usually considered to be twenty percent but which actually fluctuated, at times dropping to twelve percent) , collected from

PAGE 25

^ 17 Paranagua and Cananeia amounted to a mere two kilos , In 1690, Pedro II ordered the Governor Antonio Luis Gongalves da Camara Coutinho to stimulate the Paulistas' desire for gold and the honors which went with its discovery. These instructions were issued again to the new governor of Rio de Janeiro, Antonio Pais de Sande , in l693. The incentives offered to adventurers were attractive and soon a number of expeditions entered Minas Gerais. Whereas most earlier expeditions had been primarily after Indian slaves and only secondarily after precious metals and stones, the priorities now were reversed. The name of the discoverer of gold in Minas Gerais as well as the date of the discovery are still the subject of debate. There are major divergences in the versions of Andre Joao Antonil (pseudonym for the Jesuit Joao Antonio Andreoni ) ; Bento Fernandes de Furtado de Mendonga, son of Colonel Salvador Furtado de Mendonga, a participant in the early discoveries; and Joao Rabelo Perdigao, the secretary of Governor Artur de Sa e Menezes. The opinion of Antonil, the first writer to publish a description of the discoveries, cannot be ignored because of his reliance upon eyewitnesses. According to Antonil, gold was discovered in the Ouro Preto Stream by a mulatto member of a slave-hunting expedition. This discovery was made accidentally while the mulatto was getting water. The stones, which were not identified as gold, were sold and changed hands several times until they reached Governor Menezes, who immediately realized what

PAGE 26

8 they were. Antonil states that these events occurred in 19 the last three years of the seventeenth century. Antonil's account is difficult to accept. The mulatto, Antonil asserts, had had experience in the gold fields of Paranagua and Curitiba, yet he couldn't identify the stones as being gold. It is also hard to believe that unidentified stones could be sold from person to person without being recognized. Furthermore, who would buy a stone of no apparent value? It is difficult to believe that the stones would not be taken to someone acq.uainted with mining or goldsmithing for appraisal. Support for Antonil's version concerning the date of the discovery is provided by a Portuguese immigrant who had arrived in Rio de Janeiro in I692. In his report prepared about 1750 Ouvidor of Ouro Preto , this anonymous writer states that "5 or 6 years later CI69T or I69SII news spread that the Paulistas had discovered great quantities of gold in an area called Cataguazes but that it was hard C bravo U gold (which is 20 called mulatto gold — black gold)." No details of the discovery are provided. Another version, present ed half a century after the events by Bento de Furtado de Mendonga, attributes the first major gold strike to Antonio Rodrigues de Arzao, who around 1693 left the captaincy of Sao Paulo on a slavehunting expedition. Reaching an area in Minas Gerais whose topography was similar to that of the mining areas of Sao Paulo, with which he was familiar, Arzao, according to

PAGE 27

Mendonga, made several panning tests and retrieved about three oitavas of gold (an oitava is 3.586 grams or little less than a dram). Before more gold could be collected, the account continues, Arzao and his followers were forced to leave the area because of the lack of supplies and increasing Indian pressure. ArzSo went to Espirito Santo where he gave local officials the three oitavas and tried unsuccessfully to recruit men to form a new bandeira. Failing in this, he departed for Sao Paulo, arriving so ill that he died soon thereafter. But before dying, Arzao related his adventures to his brother-in-law Bartholomeu Bueno de SicLueira, who set out in l697. Siq.ueira discovered gold near one of the sites where his bandeira had stopped to plant crops. A small settlement was established there and given the name Itaverava. This, Mendonga claims, was the first settlement founded in Minas Gerais. After uncovering more extensive deposits in the area, Siqueira advised his family and friends to Join him. The narrator's father. Colonel Salvador Fernandes de Mendonga, accompanied by Captain Manuel Garcia Velho, supposedly headed the first group to take Siqueira's advice. Upon their arrival in Itaverava, Mendonga traded a musket for the small quantity of gold already extracted. This gold, in turn, was traded for two Indian slaves to Garcia Velho, from whom it was obtained by Carlos Pedroso de Silveira, who took it to Rio de Janeiro where he, the account concludes, was well 21 rewarded for handing the gold over to Governor Menezes.

PAGE 28

10 ; This version, however, is suhjected to damaging . criticism hy Francisco de Assis Carvalho Franco. The most .' fascinating evidence brought to light "by Franco is the fact ^ that Siq^ueira rather than Arzao died in l695. Arzao sur, vived at least until 1720 and apparently had no part in ' j the exploitation of the Minas gold strikes. Furthermore, ; 22 j Arzao received no reward for his supposed discovery. j Siqueira's death invalidates Mendonga's dating of the j j Siq^ueira bandeira, which probably started out in l69^ as i related by the anonymous writer of the "Descobrimento de 23 I Minas Gerais . " The most convincing of the three versions is that of j Jose Rabelo Perdigao. Writing in 1733, Perdigao attributed the initial discovery to a Duarte Lope (Antonil's mulatto?) i about 1693 along the Rio Guarapiranga . This led to the j 1 organization of a bandeira under Bartolomeu Bueno de ! Siqueira, accompanied by his nephew Manuel de Camargo, and the latter's son, Sebastiao de Camargo. This bandeira I i ] reached the area later called Itaverava where gold was discovered. Continuing to press forward, Siqueira was ' 2U ! killed by Indians. Since this bandeira probably had been I I financed by Carlos Pedroso de Silveira, it is not surprising i that part of the gold was delivered to him and that he | immediately took it to the acting governor, Sebastiao de Castro Caldas (who assumed this post on February U , l695). Caldas notified the king in a letter dated March 1, 1695 ', 1 and sent some of the gold as proof. •: 1 -"(

PAGE 29

11 Thu3 both Mendonga and Perdigao agree that the effective discovery was made by Bartolomeu Bueno de Siqueira and that it was near Itaverava. They disagree as to the date of the discovery. The documents published by Franco, substantiating his contention that Bueno died in l695 and the fact that Caldas advised the king of the strike in March 1695 > lend strong support to the Perdigao version. While it is clear that Bueno deserves credit for making the first effective strike -effective in the sense that it mobilized the attention of royal officials and started the first Brazilian gold rush -it is equally clear that other bandeirantes earlier had found gold in Minas Gerais. Among these early pioneers was the parish priest of Taubate , Padre Joao de Faria, who in l693 or 169^* reported the discovery of gold in the "campos gerais." It is also possible that Manuel de Borba Gato found some gold deposits during his many years of living in the backlands. But neither of these discoveries had the dramatic impact of those made by Siqueira. 25

PAGE 30

Notes 1. Pero Magalhaes de Gandavo , Historia da provincia Sancta Cruz o que vulgarmente chamamos Brasil (1576; facsimile ed.. New York: The Cortes Society, 1922), fols. 9v-10. 2. Sergio Buarque de Holanda, Visao do paraiso , Brasiliana, vol, 333, 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, I969), pp. 3k-6k . 3. The Portuguese in Angola were motivated similarly by the desire to find a "silver mountain." David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola, the Mbundu and Their Neighbors Under the Influence of the Portuguese, 1U83-1T90 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I966), p. 29. k. This was due to the belief that the formation of silver was the result of the sun's heat. Sebastiao Cardoso da Sampaio, in a report of November, I692 explaining the failure to discover precious metals in Brazil, asserts that Brazilians were optimistic about finding these because The Brazilian sertao . . .bordered on the Kingdom of Peru and the mountains of Tabiana and Sabarabussu CbeingD at the same height and parallel as the celebrated mountain of Potosi which is the inexhaustible source of silver which has flooded all the four corners of the world. It is felt that since the production of all metals is the result of heat and the activity of the sun those mountains are under the same influence by the equality of height and parallel. CReport of Sebastiao Cardoso de Sampaio, 22 November, I692 in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional 39, (i91T); p. 201.1 5. Orville A. Derby, "Os primeiros des cobrimentos de euro em Minas Gerais," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geographico de Sao Paulo 5 (l899-1900): 2i+0-2i+l. 6. Ibid. , pp. 2ii2-2i+8. 7. Ibid. , p. 2ii8. 12

PAGE 31

13 8. Basilio de Magalhaes, Expansao geographica do Brasil colonial , Brasiliana, vol. i+5 (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1935), pp. 78-80. 9. Ibid., pp. 80-82. 10. Magalhaes, Expansao geographica , p. 87, maintains that there were two Dutchmen and one German. 11. Derby, "Os primeiros descobrimentos , " pp. 258-259. 12. Magalhaes, Expansao geographica , p. 100, refers to Fernando de Camargo. 13. Manoel S. Cardozo, "The Last Adventure of Fernao Dias Pais (l67i+-l68l } , " Hispanic American Historical Review k (November, 19^+6): l;67-479, provides a detailed examination of this expedition. 1^. Edelweiss Teixeira, Rio das Velhas," Revista Roga Grande e o povoamento do do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Minas Gerais 2 (19^+6): II6. Teixeira locates Sumidouro north of Lagoa Santa. 15CBento Fernandes Furtado de MendongaD Noticias dos primeiros descobridores das primeiras minas de ouro pertencentes a estas Minas Gerais-pessoas mais assinaladas neste empregos e dos mais memoraveis acontecidos desdos seus principios, Colasam das noticias dos pr. os descobrimen.os das Minas na America, que fes o Dr. Caetano da Costa Matoso sendo ouvidor g . al do Ouro Preto, de q. tomou posse em Fevr.o de 17^+9, Biblioteca Municipal de Sao Paulo, f ols . 21v-22v. 16. Teixeira, "Roga Grande," pp. lllt-117. 17. Afonso de E. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 11 vols. (Sao Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 191*8) 9:20. 18. Ibid. , pp. 20-21. 19. Andre Joao Antonil (pseud. of Joao Antonio Andreoni ) , Cultur a e opulencia do Brasil , Roteiros do Brasil, vol. 2 (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1967), pp. 258260. This work was originally published in I711. 20. Protest© que no que nesta escrita falar nao he minha vontade, Codice Costa Matoso, fol. 6k. 21. Mendonga, "Noticias dos primeiros descobridores," fols. 7-9.

PAGE 32

lu Francisco de Assis Carvalho Franco, Dicionario de rantes e sertanistas do Brasil: seculos XVI-XVII22. bandeirantes e _, XVIII (Sao Paulo: Comissao do IV Centenario Sao Paulo, 195^+), pp. 36-38 and 38U-385. 23. "Descobrimento de Minas Gerais ClSOTD," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 29 ( 1866 ) : 67 2k. Jose Rabelo Perdigao, "Noticia terceira pratica q.ue da ao R. Pe. Diogo Soares o mestre do campo Jose Rabelo Perdigao. Sobre os primeiros descobrimentos das Minas Gerais do Ouro." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 69 (1908): 278. 25Bento Correa de Sousa Coutinho to Joao de Lencastre, 29 July 169^, Documentos Historicos 9 (1929): 2?U.

PAGE 33

Chapter 2 The Years of Euphoria and Distress News of the first strikes spread quickly. Called the "Mines of Taubate" by some people and the "General Mines of Cataguazes" hy others, the area soon attracted a large number of adventurers. The strikes initiated a ten-year period in vhich discovery of new gold fields followed discovery in a seemingly endless procession. The euphoria generated by these strikes was hardly dampened by two tragic fam5.nes that occurred during this period. Siq.ueira's bandeira had been joined by another under the leadership of Miguel Garcia de Almeida e Cunha. After reaching Itaverava, the latter expedition separated from that of Siqueira and went its own way. Garcia found gold in a stream later called the Gualacho do Sul, north of the Morro de Itatiaia. There the rivalry which existed barely beneath the surface between the residents of the town of Sao Paulo and those of Taubate erupted into open hostility as the residents of Sao Paulo in Cunha's bandeira refused to allow those of Taubate to work the strike around the mountain. The Taubatinos thus rebuffed, formed a bandeira under the leadership of Manuel Garcia Velho "and with such good fortune that shortly they discovered the celebrated 1 and rich Cgold fields ofl Ouro Preto." This event, like 15

PAGE 34

16 so many others of this early period, cannot "be dated pre2 cisely, but probably occurred in l695 or early I696 . The rivalries between the bandeirantes of Sao Paulo town and those from other towns of the captaincy of Sao Vicente were important during the early years of the mining district. The use and abuse of the word "Paulista" has led some to confuse the residents of the town of Sao Paulo with those of other towns and has led others to assume the predominance of the former in the discovery of gold and in the early settlement of Minas Gerais. The roles of men from such towns as Taubate, Mogi das Cruzes , Sao Sebastiao, Guaratingueta , and Sorocaba have too often been overlooked. Next to Sao Paulo the most important contributor to the discovery and settlement of Minas Gerais was Taubate. Lumped together as "Paulistas" by contemporaries from other captaincies, the residents of these towns of Sao Vicente feuded among themselves. These feuds stimulated the discovery of new gold deposits. Garcia Velho ' s discovery brought an influx of adventurers to the area of the Ouro Preto stream. The strike was divided into claims of three bragas (one braga is 2.2 meters) each along the stream bed. A settlement quickly formed near the strike in a heavily wooded area nestled in a narrow valley surrounded on three sides by formidable mountains cut by streams and, often, deep gorges. Because of the relatively large number of people attracted to the area, and the conflicts which arose over claims, a

PAGE 35

17 bandeira under Antonio Dias de Oliveira, a taubatino, was organized to find a new mining site. Crossing the Morro de Santa Quiteria (one of those at whose base the original strike was made) Oliveira found gold either along the 3 Sobreira Stream or, less probably, the Rio Funil. The settlement which sprang up at the site of this strike was named Antonio Dias in honor of the leader of the bandeira. The situation within these mining camps and the resulting spin-off of new bandeiras is aptly described by Perdigao: "as those who had more arms and more followers always received the best claims in these settlements, the dissatisfied would form new bandeiras." Besides the atmosphere of injustice created by the total absence of royal officials, an important factor in this process, unmentioned by Perdigao, was the incentives for new discoveries embodied in the mining code. The code then in effect, which had been enacted in l603 and amended in 1618, provided that the discoverer would receive two claims (datas): the first eighty by forty varas (a vara was equal 5 to 1.10 meters), and the second sixty by thirty. But to be a "new" strike, it had to be at least half a league from any established one. Manuel Garcia Velho had acted under these various pressures as had Antonio Dias. A third was Padre Joao de Faria Fialho, a native of the town of SSo Sebastiao. Padre Faria had come to the Mines of Taubate as chaplain of one of the taubatino bandeiras. It is uncertain whether Padre

PAGE 36

18 Faria departed from Antonio Dias or from Ouro Preto, but, in any case, he discovered gold east of the settlement of Antonio Dias, just beyond the Morro de Santa Efigenia (also called Alto da Cruz). The settlement which was founded there was called Padre Faria. A fourth strike was made at approximately the same time, in the area of Tripui , by Antonio Rodrigues de Medeircs, a native of Sao Paulo town. The name "Tripui" is derived from Medeiros' nickname which in the Tupi language 6 used by the bandeirantes meant "agile." This settlement was never as large as any of the other three and it is probable that the gold there was only alluvial and quickly exhausted. This area soon was given over to pasturage for the cattle brought in to feed the residents of the mining camps. By 1696 there existed four settlements each separated from the others by dense woods and each located along a gold-laden stream. Thus the geographical limits of what would become the town of Vila Rica until the 17^0's were established: Tripui to the west and Padre Faria to the east, connected by a trail which ran through Ouro Preto and Antonio Dias. Other gold strikes soon were made in areas near these four settlements. Francisco Bueno da Silva, cousin of' Bartolomeu Bueno de Siq_ueira, probably during I698 "climbCedD the mountain, called today the Morro de Vila Rica..., mother and source from which flows these rich

PAGE 37

l/t s I

PAGE 38

20 streams already discovered, and turning westward ... discovered the stream called Ouro Bueno and Cthenll that of Rio das Pedras CbothU with gold of extremely good quality. Inviting his paulista friends and family they worked the little that they could, leaving the richest CpartH." Bento Fernandes describes an event which, if exaggerated, still conveys an idea of the fabulous wealth being uncovered and the atmosphere of euphoria of those fortunate enough to have "arms" and "followers" to ensure their obtaining the best claims. According to Fernandes, while Silva and Jose de Camargo Pimentel, his partner, were working their joint claim, they were approached by a woman beggar with her child. Pimentel, whose turn it was to watch the gold collected by slaves, gave the woman a handful of gold. Reproached by Silva that half of the gold was his, Pimentel reached back into the pouch and withdrew another handful of gold. This, representing Silva's equal o contribution, was given to the woman. Stories such as this spread through Brazil and then Europe. Imaginations were fired with images of mountains of gold, and the rush was on. Silva, on his way to Ouro Bueno and Rio das Pedras, unknowingly had crossed the richest gold bearing area in the region -and perhaps the richest of all Minas Gerais. This was the Morro de Vila Rica, or as it was later variously called, the Morro de Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes, the Morro de Antonio Dias, and the Morro da Queimada (Burnt-

PAGE 39

21 over Mountain). Gold finally was found on the mountain in 1700 by Tomas Lopes de Camargo, a relative of Jose de 10 Camargo Pimentel. The following year, IJOl, Bento Fernandes was sent by his father in search of gold. His bandeira found gold along the Funil River, below its junctures with the various gold-laden streams mentioned above. The settlement which he founded there blossomed and faded in the course of a few years; it was called Nossa Senhora do Bom Sucesso (Our Lady of Good Fortune). There were a number of other settlements which would come within the municipal jurisdiction of Vila Rica and would play important roles in the history of the municipality. If reliable data is scanty for the early years of Ouro Preto, it is even more so for these satellite settlements. Two, Itatiaia and Ouro Branco (the names in Tupi and Portuguese, both refer to the light color of the gold mined there), probably were founded very early. Manuel Garcia Velho and his bandeira crossed this area in skirting the Morro de Itatiaia in 1695Sebastiao da Rocha Pita gives 1698 as the date of the founding of Itatiaia without 11 giving the name of the discoverer. While Rocha Pita is not completely reliable in his treatment of Minas Gerais, the date he gives can be taken as an indication that Itatiaia was known relatively early. It is located about thirteen kilometers to the southwest of Ouro Preto. Ouro Branco, like Itatiaia, was along the path of the early

PAGE 40

22 "bandeirantes who approached Ouro Preto, Antonio Bias, and Padre Faria, from Itaverava. In referring to the general area of Itatiaia and Ouro Branco , Antonil states: "I do not speak of the Morro de Itatiaia..., eight days of easy travel until lunch Cthis was the normal Paulista travelling day: from sun-up to lunch, after which pasture was found for the animals , camp set up and food obtained and prepared for supper and breakfast for the following morning.], because the paulistas do not pay attention to it because 12 they have others of purer gold and of much more value." Ouro Branco is eighteen kilometers southwest of Ouro Preto. Congonhas , twenty-three kilometers to the southwest, was the westernmost settlement within the future municipal jurisdiction of Vila Rica. The absence of reliable information prevents any definite dating, but indications are that Congonhas was founded quite early. The earliest documented date is found in a sesmaria (land grant) made to Captain Domingos Martins Pacheco in ITU which gives 13 Congonhas as his residence since ITOlt. One contemporary reported that Congonhas was the site of one of the very Ik first gold strikes in Minas. This settlement was built around a major gold strike and was fortunate in having good pasture and farm land in the vicinty. Late in the eighteenth century it became a religious center of great importance. Northwest of Ouro Preto, three settlements were founded which played significant roles in the history of

PAGE 41

23 the municipality of Vila Rica. SSo Bartolomeu, about eight kilometers north-northwest of Ouro Preto , was founded by Dionisio da Costa, a native of Santos, Sao Vicente. Five kilometers west of Sao Bartolomeu, another settlement, Santo Antonio do Campo (later Casa Branca) was founded. No documentation can be found concerning the identity of its founder or the approximate date of its founding. The parish records for this settlement begin in 1716, so the event probably occurred long before this date. Three kilometers southwest of Casa Branca and twelve kilometers from Ouro Preto lay the settlement of Nossa Senhora de Nazareth dos Campos de Minas, or Cachoeira do Campo as it came to be called. The fact that by 1709 it had been raised to parish level indicates an early and intense settlement. From a death certificate dated November 22, I71I+, it is clear that one of Cachoeira's first settlers, 15 if not the first, was Manuel de Melo. These three settlements, due to their similar locations, evolved in an analagous fashion. While the area had some gold deposits, these soon were exhausted and the Sao Bartolomeu-Casa Branca-Cachoeira region was transformed into an agricultural and pastoral producer of great importance to the urban marketplace created in the settlements of Ouro Preto, Antonio Dias , and Padre Faria. Itaubira do Campo (present-day Itabirito), the most distant from Ouro Preto of the early settlements which would come within the jurisdiction of Vila Rica, probably

PAGE 42

2k was established during the closing years of the sevens 16 teenth century. Located about thirty kilometers northwest of Ouro Preto, Itaubira was to become a major settlement and continue to produce cold pfter many other areas had ceased production. The gold mine of Cata Branca, near Itaubira, was worked on a large scale until a mining disaster in the nineteenth century stopped production. These are the major settlements which would be under the .-Jurisdiction of the town council of Vila Rica during the eighteenth century. Besides being politically subordinated to Vila Rica, all were involved to varying degrees in a svmbiotic relationship with the urban core. Congonhas , perhaps due to its proximitv to the settlements in the Rio das Mortes region, was least involved; Sao Bartolomeu and Cachoeira were the most because of their role as food producers. There were, in addition, many hamlets which will be discussed only when they take an active part in this story. While this settlement process was under way, other, highly significant discoveries were being made. One of the most significant was that of the gold-laden Ribeirao do Carmo by Captain Joao Lopes de Lima, a native of Sao Paulo town. Because of the rivalry between the mining towns of Carmo (now Mariana) and Vila Rica, and the confusion over which was founded first, the exact date of neither is beyond dispute. But there exist two documents which can establish the order of discovery. The first is a letter, written

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25 anonymously and included in the Codice Costa Matoso, which states that the discovery of gold at Carmo occurred during 17 the period when the area of Padre Faris was being worked. Perdigao, after discussing Lima's bandeira states that "the gold of that new stream Cthe Biberao do CarmoD was considered better than that of Ouro Preto, which was brittle and splintered when hit by a hammer, so much so that it was judged useless, to the point of being sold in Sao Paulo at the rate to twelve vint ens (one vintem is worth 20 reisD per oitava, causing that settlement COuro 18 PretoD to be abandoned three times as I witnessed." What today is a fifteen minute automobile ride between Ouro Preto and Mariana, then required three days of dif19 ficult travel. This difficulty is evident in the name of a mountain which had to be traversed in the vicinty of Carmo — Mata Cavalos or Horse Killer. Besides the problems created by the mountains , travel was impeded by the very 20 dense forest which separated the two settlements. Other important discoveries soon were made in the vicinity of Carmo. The Paulista Bento Rodrigues , crossing the Morro de Vila Rica, found an exceptionally rich area which was named after him. Antonil notes that this strike yielded "in little more than five bragas of land, five 21 arrobas Cone arroba is equal to lU.75 kilosH of gold." Jose de Camargo Pimentel, who had accompanied Francisco da Silva Bueno in the founding of Ouro Bueno , in IJOl made a strike which soon evolved into a sizable settlement

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26 22 called Camargos. Captain Salvador de Faria Albernaz, pushing beyond the strikes of Rodrigues and Pimentel, made a major gold strike around which the settlement of Infici23 onado quickly grew. This was followed in 1702 by Domingos 2U Borges ' discovery of gold in the area called Catas Atlas. In the same year, Antonio Bueno , continuing in a northwesterly direction, found gold where the settlements of 25 Brumado and Santa Barbara would be established. Antonio Pereira Dias, about the same time, made a rich strike just to the north of Carmo , which soon became known by this ad26 venturer's name. All of these settlements would fall within the jurisdiction of the town of Carmo. The process of settlement around Carmo was very similar to that of the region of Ouro Preto. With the exception of Antonio Pereira, these settlements were founded in the same leap-frogging manner and, undoubtedly, for the same reasons: conflicts and claim Jumping within the new settlements forced out some and left others dissatisfied to move, while the mining code provided incentives to go elsewhere. Each group of settlements was coinposed of an administrative, relatively highly urbanized center^ and a number of satellite settlements whose political dependence upon the center was complete, but whose socio-economic dependence varied with size and distance, and the proximity of larger settlements or towns within the political sphere of other Jurisdictions. Prior to 1708 there were four other strikes in Minas Gerais that resulted in the establishment of major settle-

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2T ments. The first of these is Sahara. Contrary to legend, it does not appear that the gold of Sahara was discovered hy Borha Gato during his seventeen year exile. While he hecame one of Sahara's leading citizens, there is no evidence that he claimed credit for the discovery of its rich gold fields. Instead these honors were claimed hy the Paulista Garcia Rodrigues Pais in a letter dated May 1, 27 1697. The discovery of the nearhy gold fields of Caete is likewise disputed. Bento Fernandes gives the credit to Sargento-mor Leonardo Nardes , a paulista, while Antonil 28 credits a Bahian, Captain Luis do Couto. Given the extent of Bahian penetration into this part of Minas Gerais prior to I69O , Antonil's account is more likely to be correct. While the Paulista made many forays into Minas, their expeditions, searching for slaves or precious metals and stones, were constantly on the move. No permanent settlements were made until gold had heen discovered. Penetration from Bahia was less spectacular hut more systematic. The primary interest of the Bahians was the use of the land along the Rio Sao Francisco for grazing cattle. By 1663, in fact, Bahian penetration in the form of the landholdings of Antonio Guedes de Brito covered 16O leagues along the Rio Sao Francisco as far as its juncture with the 29 Rio das Velhas . Anyone proceeding up the Rio das Velhas to its source would pass through the immediate vicinity of Caete and Sahara. This strike was a magnificent one. As

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28 early as l69T it was reported that there vere 1|,000 people 30 in the Caete area. The last tvo major gold fields to be discovered were on the fringe of the central mining district composed of Sahara, Caete, Vila Rica, and Carmo . Antonio Scares discovered gold to the north of Sahara and the settlement which grew around this strike was called Serro do Frio. The 31 exact date of this strike is not known. The last area is far to the south of the core mining district. Known as the Rio das Mortes , this area was traversed hy all the handeiras on their way into Minas , as well as hy the later migrants from Rio de Janeiro. One of those who took advantage of this traffic was Tome Fortes dei-Rei. Fortes operated an inn and catered to this traffic for several years until he discovered that he was living near one of the richest gold deposits in Minas Gerais--that of Sao 32 Joao " del Rei . These settlements and their satellites were to provide most of the gold extracted from Minas Gerais. But they were not established without difficulty. Their residents suffered severe hardships in the early period, particularly in regard to the provisioning of foodstuffs. The number of adventurers in the mining district at this time must have been relatively small, as indicated by Perdigao's statement that Ouro Freto was abondoned three times. Certainly this is easy to understand, since the population that provided the impetus for the discovery phase was

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29 itself very small. On the eve of the gold cycle a report of Portugal's Overseas Council (Conselho Ultramarino ) , reported that "the town of Sao Paulo itself and, seven more ers towns surrounding it have twenty thousand household 3 3 C vizinhos 1 . " Sao Paulo's first census in IT65 gave the population of the parish as 3,838 with 1,515 of these residing in the urban core. More vague information comes from a traveler who passed through Sao Paulo in 1717; he reported the existence of only four hundred houses in the town itself, as many people lived in the rural areas . ^^ With such a small population base, Sao Paulo and the other towns of the captaincy of Sao Vicente could explore, uncover gold, and exploit alluvial deposits, but could not populate all the mining region. This could be done only by outside elements, the so-called forasteiros : Bahians , Pernambucans, natives of Rio de Janeiro, and, above all, the reinois (those born in Portugal). When the news spread that gold had been found, the rush began. The crops planted by "Paulistas", the term the forasteiros applied indiscriminately to the men from Sao Vicente, and the available game which had satisfied their needs were inadequate to meet those of the forasteiros who quickly outnumbered the Paulistas. The result was famine. The first major famine occurred in I698-I699. While gold had been found in I695-I696, the rush apparently did not begin until several years later, perhaps because too often in the past rumors of major deposits of emeralds.

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30 diamonds, silver, and gold had proven to be false. One man, who states that the news reached Rio de Janeiro in 1698 or 1699, wanted to set out for the Mines of Cataguazes immediately but did not because of the shortage of food along the way. Others were not so prudent. The journey was long: forty difficult days from Rio de Janeiro and about sixty from Sao Paulo. "Many died of hunger without recourse, and there were those who killed their companions 36 in order to take a grain of corn from them." This food shortage caused prices to soar. The cautious adventurer arrived in Carmo in time to suffer the effects of the 37 famine; he notes some of the prices paid at that time. 1 alqueire (about lU quarts) of corn grain... 20 oitavas 1 alqueire of beans 30 oitavas 1 small plate of salt 8 oitavas 1 chicken 12 oitavas 1 little dog or cat 32 oitavas This anonymous adventurer thus provides not only an indication of the cost of living but some hints of the dietary preferences of the early settlers. Carmo, where initially most of the gold came from the stream, was almost completely abandoned at this time. This was due to a combination of circumstances : the difficulty of mining operations because of the depth of the water, its low temperature, and its rapid current, as well as the shortage of food. Of those who left, some returned to Sao Paulo with their gold, but many others went to areas which had more game on which to subsist while they awaited the harvest. In this process of abandoning estab-

PAGE 49

31 lished diggings nev discoveries were made. The harvest in l699 of crops planted the previous year saved many from death. In the meantime mining operations had been stopped. According to Governor Menezes: "without doubt a great quantity Cof gold! would have been produced if the mines had been worked this year, which was not possible because of the famine which they suffered. Necessity reached such a point that they ate the most unclean animals and lacking Ceven] these to sustain life, they ran into the woods with their slaves to live on the fruits of the forest which they found. 30 This famine, the effects of which appear to have been felt strongest around Carmo , was followed in ITOO-lTOl by another which endangered the settlements of Ouro Preto, Antonio Dias, and Padre Faria. Viceroy Joao de Lencastre in September, 1700 noted "that because of the lack of foodstuffs many miners had left for areas where game abounded to have something to feed their people, and others went home to return in March for the crop they had left planted, as well as for the cattle, that they had 39 ordered from Bahia and Pernambuco." As a result of this famine many people departed from the settlements ; Ouro Bueno , for example, was abandoned completely. Gold was discovered in areas where game was more plentiful; Camargos was but one of these. The historian Diogo de Vasconcelos attributes the discovery of Congonhas do Campo , Sao Barto1*0 lomeu, Cachoeira do Campo, and Casa Branca to this process. The famine also resulted in changes in the ownership

PAGE 50

32 of mining claims. Many of those who were forced to flee lost their claims to those who stayed or to those who arrived before the original owners returned. To the normal friction which such actions created, a new dimension was added by the arrival in large numbers of non-^aulistas , who were able to take advantage of the situation while the Paulistas were away. Furthermore such claim jumping was legal since the claims were considered abandoned. It is said that Tome de Camargo Pimentel lost his claim to a rich mining area on the Morro de Vila Rica to the Portuguese-born Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes in precisely this Ul way. There is no way to determine how large a turnover in ownership occurred, but if it could occur to Pimentel -a member of an elite Paulista family who was, in addition, a royal official — it probably happened to many others. During the second famine prices soared even higher than in the first one. Bento Fernandes gives the price of one alqueire of corn as 30-UO oitavas and one of beans as 70 oitavas. The already exhorbitant prices charged for corn and beans in 1698 had doubled. It is no wonder that men were forced to abandon their mining claims. Once again only a timely harvest and the arrival of cattle from the north saved the miners from total disaster.

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Notes 1. Perdigao, "Noticia terceira pratica," p. 278. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9 •> V112 gives Miguel as the name of the discoverer rather than Manuel. 2. Traditionally the founding of Ouro Preto is celebrated on June 2U on the presumption that on that date in I696 Antonio Dias de Oliveira and Padre Joao de Faria Fialho first sighted the area where Ouro Preto would be established. This presumption is based on the belief that the discoverers founded a chapel in honor of the occasion and that the chapel was named Saint John the Baptist. Since the birth of Saint John is celebrated on June 2h , the traditional view continues, that must have been the date of the discovery. Repeated by authors such as Augusto de Lima Junior A capitania das Minas Gerais , 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Zelio Valverde, 19^3), p. 62, this legend has become so accepted that recently a plaque commemorating the founding was placed near the chapel of Saint John. This certainty is not justified. Apparently no documents concerning this chapel exist. It cannot be shown that the chapel was built in I696, that it was built in commemoration of the discovery of the region where Ouro Preto would be established, or even that it was the first chapel built in the region. Even the use of the chapel itself as a document by examining its architecture and manner of construction is foiled since it was rebuilt around the middle of the eighteenth century. We are left with a story which may be true but for which no substantiating evidence can be found. 3. Perdigao, "Noticia terceira pratica," p. 278 and Mendonga, "Noticias dos primeiros descobridores , " fol. 9v . k. Perdigao, "Noticia terceira pratica," p. 279. 5. Diogo de Vasconcellos , Historia antiga de Minas Gerais (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 19^8), 1, pp. 193-19^. 6. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p. 88. 7. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros descobridores, fols. 10-lOv and Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , p. 259. 33

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3k 8. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros descobri dores , fol. lOv. 9. These namec refer to the same mountain. 10. Mendonga, "Notncias dos primeiros des cobridores , " f ols . 12V-13. 11. Sebastiao da Roc ha Pita, Historia da America portuguesa , 3rd ed. (Bahia: Imprensa Oficial da Bahia, 1950), p. 307. 12. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , p. 260. 13. Sesmaria of Domingos Martins Pacheco, Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro , 10 (190!+): 973. Ik. Rellagao do principio descuberto das Minas gerais, e OS sucessos de alguas couzas Mais memoraveis que sucederao de seu principio te o tempo que as veyo Governar o Exmo. S. Dom Braz da Silveira, Codice Costa Matoso, fol, 30. 15^ Vasconcelos, Historia antiga , 2, p. 66 and Padre Henriques de Figueiredo Lemos , "Mongographi a da freguezia da Cachoeira do Campo," Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro 13 (1908) : Qk. 16. Rocha Pita, Historia da America Portuguesa , p. 30717. Esta Ribeirao do Carrao hoje Cide M(aria)na, Codice Costa Matoso, fol. 67v. 18. Perdigao, "Noticia terceira pratica," p. 27919. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , p. 259. 20. Esta Ribeirao do Carrao, fol. 68. 21. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , p. 26l. 22. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros des cobri dores , fol. llv. 23. Ibid . , fol .13. 2k. Ibi d . Also Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9> p. 117 refers to Domingos Borges da Silva. 25. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros des cobridores , fol. ik 26. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9j P363.

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35 27. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, pp • 8^4 & lh6. Edelveiss Toixeira, "Roga Grande e o povoamento do Rio das Velhas," pp. llU-121 deals with Borba Gate's residence during his years in the hinterland. 28. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p. 126 and Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , pp. 260-26l. 29. Saloiriao de Vas concellos , "Di vagagoes em torno da descoberta do ouro nas Minas Gerais," Revista. do Institute Historico e Geografico de Minas Gerais 9 ( 19^2 ) : 153 . 30. Artur de Sa e Menezes to Pedro II, 12 June, I69T in Manuel Cardozo, "The Guerra dos Emboabas , Civil War in Minas Gerais, 1708-1709," Hispanic American Historical Review 13, no. 3 (August, 19^+2): i+72. 31. Taunay, Historja geral das bandeiras , 9> p. 126. 32. Ibj d. , p. 12 5. 33. Report of Overseas Council, 6 June, 167^ in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional 39 (l92l): 132-133. 3^. Gilberto Leite de Barros , A cidade e o planalto , 2 vols. (Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, I967), p. I6U . 35. "Diario da Jornada, que fes o Ex. mo Senhor Dom Pedro desde o Rio de Janeiro athe a Cid.e de Sao Paulo, e desta athe as Minas anno de 1717," Revista do Servigo do Patrimonio HistorJco e Artistico Nacional 3 ( 19 39): 3 1+ . 36. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros des c obri dores , fol. 11 37. Protesto que no, fol. 6h . 38. Menezes to Pedro II, 20 May, I698 in Mafalda P. Zemella, abas t ecimento da capitania das Minas Gerais no seculo XVIII , University of Sao Paulo, Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciencias e Letras. Bull. II8 (Sao Paulo: University of Sao Paulo, I951): .219. 39. Joao de Lencastre to Menezes, May lU , 1701 in Docu mentos Historicos 11 (1929): 283. kO . Vasconcellos , Hi s toria antiga , 1, pp. 21U-215. ill. Ibid . , p. 216. 1+2. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros descobridores , fol. 11

PAGE 54

Chapter 3 The Gold Rush After 1696 news of the gold strikes spread rapidly through Brazil, Portugal, and the rest of Europe. Gold "began to flow out of Minas Gerais in quantities that, while limited, were sufficient to prove that the strikes were real. Soon thousands of people were flooding into the mining district to make their fortunes. A contemporary of this gold rush reported: Each year many Portuguese and foreigners come in the fleets to go to the mines . From the cities, towns, suburbs, and backlands of Brazil go whites, pardos , blacks, and Indians whom the Paulistas employ. The mixture includes people from all walks of life: men and women, yOung and old, poor and rich, nobles and plebeians, laymen and clerics , and religious of all institutions , many of whom do not have monasteries or houses in Brazil. ^ Antonil calculates that by I7IO thirty thousand people 2 were actively employed in Minas. Since this estimate included only those actively engaged in mining, Antonil's figure is only a partial one. This is confirmed by other observers. One put the population of the mining district 3 at fifty thousand in ITO5. The exact size of the population during the early years cannot be determined, but these estimates give a general notion of the dimensions of the gold rush . 36

PAGE 55

37 The highest concentration of people vas in the area around Ouro Preto and Carmo. This is the region which, during these early years, was called General Mines (Minas Gerais) in recognition of the many mining operations in the area. The entire mining district was called, interchangeably. Mines of Sao Paulo, Mines of Taubate, Mines of Cataguazes , or Mines of Gold ( Minas de Ouro ) . The last gradually predominated over the other names and became the official name for the mining district in 1709Minas Gerais did not become the official name of the entire district until 1720 when it became a separate captaincy. In the region of Minas Gerais lies a geological fault which runs from Santa Barbara to Carmo and then to Ouro Preto and Velozo (two kilometers northwest of the pariah church of Ouro Preto). Along this crescent-shaped fault, which opened the ground at a number of places allowing easier access to the subsurface gold deposits, were many of the settlements of the early period. This crescent was to be the major gold-producing and population center of the mining district throughout the eighteenth century. Despite the disastrous famines of I698-I699 and 17001701, the settlements of the region were increasing so rapidly that residents believed that all the land between Ouro Freto and Carmo was occupied. Frei Agostinho de Santa Maria, writing around 1723, felt that the two centers soon would join to form a single urbanized area -at a time when it still took many hours of arduous travel to reach

PAGE 56

38 k Carmo from Ouro Preto. The gold rush was spurred by tales of the fabulous wealth of this area -tales which come from too manysources to be disbelieved entirely. Pedro Taques mentions one stream from which three arrobas were removed in one 5 month and another which yielded one arroba. Antonil refers to a single gold nugget weighing over 150 oitavas (almost one and a half pounds troy) and another of 95 (almost one pound troy). The Paulistas defined a "good" stream as one which yielded two oitavas of gold in each 6 panning. Two oitavas was the daily wage of a skilled artisan. The early adventurers , who streamed into the mining district in quest of this gold, came by three routes. The first began in Sao Paulo and passed through the following places: Nossa Senhora da Penha, Mogi , Laranjeira, Jacarei, Taubate, Pindamonhangaba , Guiratingueta , Morro de Mantigueira, Rio Verde, Boa Vista, Ubai , Ingai , Rio Grande, Rio das Mortes , the farms of Garcia Rodrigues Pais, and the Morro de Itatiaia. At this last point, about ten kilometers southwest of Ouro Preto, the route forked: one branch went to Sahara and the other to Ouro Preto, both of which could be reached after about two months of 7 travel. The journey from Rio de Janeiro was more hazardous, as it necessitated sailing from Rio to Parati -a short voyage made perilous by the periodic appearance of corsairs and pirates. From Parati, the travelers went overland to

PAGE 57

39 Taubate, where he took the Sao Paulo road. In an emergency the trip from Rio to Ouro Preto could be made in thirty days, but the average traveler took at least 8 forty. The third route was, in many ways, the most important and, to the crown, the most troublesome. Free of the difficult mountains and numerous streams which made the other two routes so difficult, the Bahia road was the easiest of the three. Leaving Salvador, the traveler went by Cachoeira, Santo Antonio, and then Tranqueira. At Tranqueira the road split, one branch going through Mathias Cardoso, Barra do Rio das Velhas and then Borba, near Sahara, and the other passing near the source of the Rio Guararutibe. The second branch was about fifty leagues 9 shorter than the first. Along this route came the cattle which saved the miners from starvation during the early famines and which, for many years, provided them with much of their sustenance. The same characteristics which made this road so attractive to travelers created problems for the crown. The road led from the older established sugar-producing areas of Brazil -areas which were in a state of decadence brought on by a decline in sugar prices and sales despite a temporary improvement in the sugar market in the l690's. Some royal officials felt that the gold rush threatened the agricultural sector which they considered more important for the long-range interests of Portugal than the

PAGE 58

transitory exploitation of the gold deposits. These officials were ahle to impose their point of viev until the Wars of the Emboabas. The sugar-producing regions, chiefly Bahia and Pernambuco, had surplus population and surplus capital. Governor Menezes at first forbade the migration of people essential to the production of sugar, Brazil's major export. On March 19» 1700, he prohibited the master workmen of the sugar mills from going to the Minas de Ouro without licenses. One week later he forbade the taking of slaves from sugar or manioc producing f azendas (planta10 tions) to the mining district. These restrictions were repeated various times, without much effect, in hopes of sustaining the sugar industry of the Northeast. Complementing this policy was one of prohibiting sugar processing in the mining district. Each part of the colony was assumed to have a specific contribution to make -the Northeast would produce sugar and Minas would provide gold. As the terrain traversed by the Bahia road presented few major obstacles, the number of trails proliferated — primarily benefiting smugglers. An anonymous writer informed the king in ITO6 that "so much gold comes to the city of Bahia that one cannot count the arrobas except in quintals Cone quintal is four arrobasD which goes to all the kingdom and the foreigners also are able to take it 11 freely without paying the quinto." The threat to royal revenues posed by the Bahia road was obvious to Pedro II, who, as early as I698 tried to stimulate cattle raising in

PAGE 59

Ijl 12 southern Min;-:.s. Had this effort succeeded, the Bahia trails could have been closed without the fear of another famine; but they failed, and each effort to close these routes caured such repercussions that they were immediately reopened. Each road to Minas presented a serious inconvenience. The Bahia route could easily be abused by tax evaders while the sea portion of the Rio road was hazardous. The road from SSo Pa,ulo, was very difficult to use, and it began in an area which produced relatively little which could be niar}..etcd in the mining district, except for Indian slaves and some cattle and mules. These problems led some royal officials to propose the opening of a new road from Rio to the gold fields. Governor Menezes felt that the proposed road would shorten the journey and make the markets of Fio and the mining district accessible to the cattle lands of soutliern Minas, which, he felt, were comparable to those of Buenos Aires. Pedro II approved the project "as a means of alleviating the famine and as an aid in the discovery of Sabarabussu. ..13 Thus the decision to authorize work on the road was based on a combination li* of important factors. The work on the new route began in l699 • As was the practice the work was one not by the state but by a private party. Garcia Rodrigues Pais volunteered to open the "Caminho Novo" (New Road), as it was to be called during the eighteenth century. The Caminho Novo was diffi-

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k2 cult to tuild and use "because of the mountains it traversed. It was constructed almost in a straight line from Rio to Minas Gerais, passing through Simao Pereira, Mathias Barhoza, Juiz de Fora and Borda do Campo. At Borda do Campo , the Caminho Novo split, vith one hranch going to Rio das Mortes and the other to the Quro Preto-Carmo region by vay of Congonhas and Itatiaia. Travel time from Rio 15 to these areas was cut to ten to twelve days. For his services, Garcia Rodrigues Pais was rewarded with several sesmarias , (land grants) along the route and, in 1702, was granted a royal post -probahly to revitalize his flagging fortunes since the project had proved so expensive that 16 outside help had been required to complete it. All of the roads to Minas were little more than trails Jose Vieira Couto, later in the century, described them in the following manner: They are made with the greatest negligence possible, or better said, nothing has been done to them other than cut the woods , remove some rocks, and here and there level the right of way. Great and superfluous bypasses can be seen at each step; it takes , sometimes , all day to cover IT three or four leagues in a straight line. It was over these roads that the luxuries and many of the necessities of life flowed from the outside world to the booming mine district. Because of the extensive traffic on this road, it soon was lined by inns and farms catering to the needs of the travelers. This road had great impact on the development of the

PAGE 61

43 southern part of Brazil. It made Rio de Janeiro the gateway to Minas. Previously goods had to he transshipped from Rio to Parati, from whence they went overland to the mining district via Taubate ; a logical step would have been the elimination of Rio as entrepot for Minas and the shipment of goods directly to Parati. Another possibility, about which there had been some speculation, was the designation of a port in Espirito Santo as the sole gateway to Minas. The construction of the Caminho Novo precluded these possibilities. Rio's position and future development thus owes much to the opening of this road. The road also stimulated migration to the mining district by making the trip faster. The first place to suffer significant loss of population was Rio de Janeiro. Governor Alvaro da Silveira e Albuquerque, lamented in 1703, the year following the completion of the Caminho Novo, that: "everyday I find myself more alone, CwithoutD soldiers as well as residents.... The excessive rate with which they flee to the mines gives us the impression 18 that soon we shall wind up without anyone." News received in Rio indicated that Bahia was in much the same situation; migration from that captaincy was reported to be proceeding at such a rate "that shortly that land will 19 be depopulated." Nevertheless, in much of the Northeast there was a surplus population which could be better utilized elsewhere. While the immediate effects of the gold rush on Rio de

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kk Janeiro and Bahia were bad, they were disastrous in Sao Paulo where there were no people to spare. With a largelyself-sufficient economy whose only significant marketable product was slaves, Sao Paulo could ill afford any sizeable 20 drain of men or wealth. So many men went to the gold fields that the Sao Paulo camara often lacked a q.uorum; periods of five and 21 six months passed without sessions. Goods were diverted to the mining district where they fetched higher prices, resulting in a scarcity of goods in Sao Paulo. When the camara met it usually discussed ways of controlling the spiraling cost of these goods. While some men who went to the gold fields returned, many remained there. This migration from Sao Paulo also had an effect upon the Indian population. So many Indians were sent to the gold fields as mine laborers that the Sao Paulo labor pool quickly became depleted. In conformation with royal decrees against the enslavement of Indians, Menezes , on his first visit to Sao Paulo, ordered that those already in Minas be 22 returned. In 1705, the Sao Paulo camara prohibited the practice of renting slaves to serve as bearers for people 23 going to Minas. These efforts failed and the use of Indians in Ouro Preto continued on a small scale throughout the century. The influx of Bahians , Pernambucans , fluminenses (residents of Rio de Janeiro) and Portuguese aroused the ire of the Paulistas. The royal grants that the Paulistas

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k5 had received led them to believe that they had an exclusive right to exploit their discoveries. The crown initially was willing to back their claims, due to lack of knowledge of the extent of the gold fields and the desire to limit migration from sugar producing areas. But the crown's support had little effect. The effort to restrict migration by reciuiring passports was easily circumvented. Even the efforts to bar foreigners from the gold fields, to 2k prevent the spread of news of the strikes, failed. Easier to enforce, at least in theory, were the edicts of the crown prohibiting the entrance of monks into the region without specific authorization. Numerous were the decrees to this effect, and admonitions concerning their enforcement often appeared in the instructions given to the governors. The monks and clerics without positions were considered underminers of royal authority. The prominent role played by clerics in the Guerras dos Embcabas and in the 1720 uprising indicate that the fears of the crown were not unreasonable. Because they were beyond the Jurisdiction of secular authorities, the monks were active smugglers. Hollow statues of saints standing today in the churches of Minas bear testimony to this illicit trade. Once in Minas, the clerics would refuse to pay taxes unless ordered to do so by ecclesiastical authorities — a process complicated by the fact that until 17U5 the seat of the bishopric was in Rio de Janeiro. There were many cases of arrest and deportation of clerics, but

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•46 this did not daunt others from coming to seek their fortunes. The royal policy of limiting the entry of hlack slaves was detrimental to the rapid expansion of the early mining operations. It was felt by some royal officials that the mass entry of slaves would drain the sugar fazendas of their labor force and drive up the price of those slaves who remained in the cane-growing area. This problem did not materialize while the Paulistas relied on Indians as their prime labor source, but this supply was limited and inadeq^uate to meet the demands of the rapidly expanding mining operations. The scarcity of these workers, combined with the inability to adapt to mining, and the strong opposition of both the Sao Paulc camara and royal officials, forced the Paulistas and the other miners to turn to the 25 African slave. This shift also was motivated by the belief that African slaves, especially those from the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) , were acquainted with mining tech26 niq_ues. Indeed, some writers have attributed the introduction of the bateia , the mining pan, to slaves from 27 Africa. The Portuguese, who had been purchasing gold from Africa since the fifteenth century, assumed that all slaves from the Costa da Mina (the West African coast 28 between Capes Mount and Lopo Gongalves) knew how to mine. The crown resorted to the imposition of quotas on the number of slaves that could be imported into the mining

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J»7 district. Initially entry was limited to two hundred slaves , a number that was inadequate to supply the demands of mine operators. In 1701 Pedro II decreed the distribution of eight thousand slaves in Brazil with priority for purchase going to the sugar producers and other agriculturalists. Miners, however, were able to circumvent the edict. In 1703 Alvaro da Silveira e Albuquerque recommended a shift in priorities so that eight percent of all slaves imported into Brazil would be sent to the mines and the remainder distributed among agriculturalists. This suggestion was disregarded by the royal advisors who were 29 still intent on aiding the sugar producers. The position taken by these advisors is understandable: the true extent of the gold deposits was not known and the sugar industry had entered a period of expansion after many years of decadence. The King's counselors could not know that the sugar market shortly would again collapse and that gold production would reach unimagined proportions by 1750. The most that the crown would do was increase the quota of slaves destined for the mining district to two hundred 30 and thirty in 1706. These restrictions on the importation of African slaves worked no great hardships on the miners during the early years. So long as the gold deposits were alluvial, a miner could gex by without a large number of slaves. An increase in the number of slaves increased the surface area which would be panned, but the area of a claim was

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US restricted ty the mining code. During this period there were no subsurface mines, so large concentrations of slaves were not needed. Bento Fernandes noted that the owner of twenty or thirty slaves was considered to be 31 extremely rich. Thus there was a gold rush of major proportions in the period before ITO6. At least thirty thousand peoj'le left their homes to seek their fortunes in the gold f ields--despite the opposition of the royal offici3,l3 who felt that this migration endangered the sugar industry. The efforts of the crown to stop this migration failed because of the shortage of royal officials in a position to ace, and because of the connivance of many of those who were in such a position. The mining industry, stimulated by this influx of people, expanded rapidly .

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Notes 1. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , p. 26k, 2. Ibid. 3. Felipe de Barros Pereira to king, 7 September, 1705 in Cardozo, "The Guerra dos Emboabas," p. 1+72. h. Frey Agostinho de Santa Maria, Santuario Mariano e historica das imagens milagrosas de Nossa Senhora, e das milagros ament e apparecidas que se venerao em todo o Bispado do Rio de Ja.neiro e Mina e em toda s as ilhas do ocea no & das mi 1 agros ament e apparecidas, em dos devotos da mesma Senhora , 10 v Pedrozo GalrSo, 1723), 10:233. p;raca dos pregadores & ols. (Lisbon: Antonio 5. Pedro de Taques to Joao de Lencastre, 20 March, 1700 in Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p. 252. 6. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , pp. 261-262. 7. Ibid. , pp. 281t-287. 8. Ibid. , pp. 287-288. Ibid. , pp. 291-292 10, Taunay ," Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p. 2k9. 11. Manoel Cardozo, "Alguns subsidies para a historia da cobranga do quinto na capitania de Minas Gerais ate 1735 »" Primeiro Congresso da Expansao Portuguesa no Mundo (Lisbon Ministerio das Colonias, 1937)jP.259. 12. Pedro II to Alvaro de Silveira e Albuquerque, 7 May, 1703 in Zemella, abastecimento , p. 235. 13. Taques, Inf ormagao , pp. IU6-IU7. lU. The crown vas not content with Pais' promise to complete the road. Captain Felix Madeira e Gusmao , a knight of the royal household, was ordered to open a road through Santo Antonio (probably Santa Antonio de Guaratingueta ) "to the gold mines and the plains since there was no 1+9

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50 certainty about the road of Garcia Rodrigues." The work vas to be done with the collaboration of Gusmao's son, sargento-mor Felix de Gusmao Mendonga e Bueno. It took forty men and two months to open a trail and explore the hinterland as far as the edge of the plains near the settlement called Ressaca. The father and son reported the route good, with only the Rio Paraiba being a problem. The order to begin the work of expanding the exploratory trail into a road was revoked on August 25, 170^ by Governor Albuquerque after receiving word that the Caminho Novo had been opened. Order of Governor Albuquerque, 25 August, ITOU in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional 39, p.30U. 15. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , pp. 288-290. 16. Royal Edict, 19 April, 1T02 in Cod. 2(SG), f ol . 157. 17. Jose Vieira Couto, "Memoria sobre a capitania de Minas Gerais , seu territorio, clima e producgSes metalicos; sobre a necessidade de se restabelecer e animar a mineragao decadente do Brasil; sobre o commercio e exportagao dos metaes e interesses regios," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro ll(l87l) : 322. 18. Alvaro da Silveira to Governor-General, 27 May, 1703 in Zemella, abast ecimento , pp. 39-^0. 19. Ibid. , p. UO . 20. In another sense, the entire population might be considered excess in the eyes of many royal officials. Producing no marketable crop and with increasing shipments of African slaves undermining the market for the less productive and illegal Indian slaves, the Paulistas could abandon their homes and move to the gold fields without damaging the royal interests. In fact, by their migrating to Minas these interests were furthered by the increase in gold production. 21. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p. 312. 22. The Indians in Sao Paulo were described by Governor Menezes in 1700 as living in "the status of slaves." He claimed to have acted immediately to restore them to their villages citing as an example one Indian village which through the efforts of royal officials had grown in size from ninety residents to 1,22U. Menezes to Pedro II, 5 May, 1700 in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional 39, P269. 23. Zemella, abastecimento , p.. 313-31^.

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51 2k. Without question there were foreigners vho were able to remain in the mining district despite the various orders issued from Lisbon barring their continued presence. Various examples can be cited. Dr. Luis Gomes Ferreira reported that, in 171^, he performed an autopsy vith "Licenciado Joao da Rosa, Ungaro da Nagao." Luis Gomes Ferreira, Erario mineral dividido em doze tratados (Lisbon: For Miguel Rodrigues , Impressor do Senhor Patriarcha, 1735), ^1. In 1737 the Vila Rica council registered a surgeon's commission papers for Antonio Labedrienne, a native Frenchman. Registry of Commission, 6 January, 1737 in Cod. 32 (CMOP), fols . 90-13i+v. Similarly, David "Martins, a soldier, was also a Frenchman. Will of David Martins, 18 February, 1721 in Cod. 333, No. 7013 (ASPHANOP). Mariana Ferreira da Silva also claimed in her last testament that she was a native of France. V7ill of Mariana Ferreira da Silva, lU February, I761 in Registry of Burials, (APAD), Cod. 1, fols. 377-378. 25. The Overseas Council, however, was determined that Indians be used as a major labor source. In rejecting a plea from the Sao Paulo municipal council for increased slave quotas the Council recommended that any deficiency in the number of slaves be made up from the Indian population of Sao Paulo. Mauricio Goulart , Escravidao no Brasil: das origens a extinc^o do trafico , 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1950), p. 125. 26. Edison Carneiro, "O negro em Minas Gerais," Segundo seminario de estudos mineiros (Belo Horizonte: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, I956?): 13. 27. Paul Ferrand, L 'or a Minas Gerais , 2 vols. (Belo Horizonte ^Imprensa Official, 1913) , 1 , p . 28 . 28. Carneiro, "O negro em Minas Gerais," p. 13. 29. Alvaro de Silveira de Albuquerque to king, 11 May, 1703, in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro 39 > p. 285. The Overseas Council responded to this letter by noting that if the law was not enforced "all the State of Brazil would be destroyed, lacking slaves for the cultivation of its fruits and the work of the sugar mills due to the certainty of the greater price which these would bring in the southern captaincies." One counsellor recommended that the quota be raised to three hundred slaves. This was approved by the king on October 11, 170i+. Consulta of the Overseas Council, 10 September, 1703, in Document OS Historicos 93, pp. 157-158. The increase apparently did not go into effect as the Overseas Council on January 7, 170U reminded the king that the matter was still unsettled. Consulta of the Overseas Council, 7 January, I70U, in Documentos Historicos 93, p. I63.

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52 30. Goulart , Escravidao africana no Erasil , p. 125. Both Edison Carneiro and Isiais Golgher feel that the quota was raised to three hundred. The opinions rendered by the Overseas Council do not justify such a claim. Carneiro, "O negro em Minas Gerais," p. 11. Also Isiais Golgher, "O negro em Minas Gerais," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos 18 (January, I965): 335. 31. Bento Fernandes Furtado de Mendonga, "Noticias dos primeiros descobridores , " in "Documentos ineditos , preciosos da Biblioteca Publica Municipal de Sao Paulo," Revi sta do Institute Historico e Geografico de Sao Paulo iiU, 1st Part (19H8): 355.

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Chapter h Gold: Techniques and Taxes The techniq.ues for extracting gold during this early period were extremely primitive. This was due to the lack of trained mining engineers and to the fact that there were numerous surface deposits which could be exploited without sophisticated methods. Machinery, when used, was rudimentary. Many of the miners apparently were content to retire after scratching the surface of the gold deposits to settle down with instant wealth either in the mining district, on the coast, or, more commonly, in Portugal. Much of the early gold was found in transported or sorted placer deposits. These deposits had resulted from the action of the water carrying gold-hearing rocks from veins in the mountains . The water action released the gold particles from the rocks and then mixed them with the stream gravel. Because of the peculiarities of the current the gold could be concentrated in specific places or ir1 regularly deposited. The easiest transported placer deposits to discover and mine were the creek placers where the gold particles were mixed with gravel within two or three feet of the 2 surface of the streambed. The processes by which gold was extracted from streams were called servigos dos veios . 53

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5h The first of these processes employed in the mining district was panning. This was by far the easiest mining method and was used by the early bandeirantes who panned with gamelas (wooden plates normally used for preparing and serving food). These quickly were replaced by bateias made of either wood or tin. The technique was simple: dirt and water were placed in the conically shaped bateia, which was then rotated so that the lighter sand or soil grains were sloshed out of the bateia with the water, leaving the heavier gold particles. This technique was used by itself and was also the final step in all the methods employed during this period. Where the stream or river was particularly deep, or the current very rapid, special techniques had to be developed for extracting the paydirt. In some places wooden walls were built in the water to provide support for the slaves who would drive to the bottom to get sand which 3 was then brought to the surface to be panned. An alternative method involved collecting the gold-bearing sand from a boat using a long pole wfth a metal point for digging h and a small bag for scooping up the sand for panning. These techniques could be applied only to the recentlydeposited gold which was within a few inches of the surface of the gravel. There were vastly larger quantities of gold to be found beneath the surface of the stream beds. One of the methods developed to exploit these deposits was to dam the stream and force the water into a run-off canal.

PAGE 73

55 allowing the miners to vork the bypassed stream bed. When physical conditions preci-ided the digging of drainage canals another method vas employed. This involved building three walls jutting out from the shore and enclosing the area to be worked. The water then was removed and the re5 maining silt panned. Because water-tight wooden walls were difficult to construct, water had to be removed almost constantly. At first this was done using slave labor. Later, the water wheel, or rosfirio, was used, increasing the efficiency of the process by replacing slaves carrying buckets with a machine. Claudio Manuel da Costa, the poet and alleged participant in the I7S9 Inconf idenci a Mineira, attributes the invention of the rosario to a priest popularly known 6 as Bonina Suave about I716. Some evidence points to another person as the inventor of the rosario: Manuel da Silva Rosa was granted a militia commission in 1719 for 7 his invention of a machine "to take gold out of rivers." The development of this machine cost 15OO oitavas and four months of labor. Unfortunately, nothing further is known about the machine or the date of its development. By 1719 Rosa's invention was commonly employed in the rivers of the mining district, suggesting that it was the rosario or water wheel. The extent to which this machine was being utilized and the termination of a two-year monopoly of its use indicate that it was developed some tine before 1719The monopoly plus the award of a militia commission also

PAGE 74

56 attest to the desire of the crown to encourage technological advances . Mining by diverting streams represents a different level of mining development from the rudimentary techniq.ues of panning or diving. Ownership of large numbers of slaves or joint operations by miners who pooled their slave and capital resources were needed. While this type of mining probably was used in Ouro Preto, Antonio Dias , and Padre Faria, there are no physical remains of the dams and walls, like those that can be seen today in Mariana. There the wooden pilings stand like skeletons , and the various streambeds which the Riberao do Carmo was forced into creating are still there. Having worked the creek placers, it was only natural that the miners explore the stream banks. These bench placers were formed by the action of waters and actually had been creek placers before the streambed shifted. The simplest method of exploiting these deposits was surface, or open-pit, mining. The miners would probe for gold by digging a hole, either cubical or conical; a hole in which gold was found would be enlarged as the size of the strike warranted. Some of these excavations, called catas , were very large. Paul Ferrand, whose study of gold mining in Minas Gerais remains the classic in its field, mentions some 8 which were fifteen meters deep. This method was dangerous because of the possibility of cave-ins, and could be used only during the dry season. If a cata was to be exploited

PAGE 75

57 a second year, much of the initial excavating had to he repeated. This method vas primitive, but it reached previously untapped deposits. Antonil, writing in 1710, does not refer to any other mining processes. While other methods may have been employed, these vere the only ones widely used. They manifest a low level of mining expertise, a deficiency aggravated by the acute shortage of trained mining technicians. To remedy this situation the crown attempted to contract Spaniards trained at the silver mines of Upper Peru or at the gold mines of Nueva Granada. One of those contracted was Castelo Branco , whose adventures have been mentioned. Governor Menezes tried to enlist others in Buenos Aires , going so far as to send agents there. After this recruiting effort failed, Menezes notified the king that "that was my only chance CasD a miner could not come from Portugal. The men of Sao Paulo desperately want a CtrainedH miner since they have no 9 knowledge of stones Csic]." Pedro II, however, did find in Portugal a trained mining engineer, Antonio Borges de Faria, whom he sent with three apprentices in response to 10 Menezes' appeal. Nothing is known of the success of this mission, although it appears that it was unable to effect any real changes in the techniques used by the miners. No effort was made to establish the one thing which could have produced significant reforms in mining-a mining school. Such an institution would not be estab-

PAGE 76

5'8 lished until the nineteenth centuryj long after the exhaustion of most of the gold deposits. During these early years, gold mining policies were based upon three different mining codes. The first was enacted in l603 and amended in I618. The second code was instituted by Governor Menezes in I7OO. While it was in effect for only two years, this was a crucial time for the evolution of the mining industry in Minas Gerais. The third policy was decreed by the king on April 19, 1702 and remained in effect throughout the eighteenth century. The changes in the provisions of each are indicative of the changing needs of the mining industry at the time of enactment. Under the first code, which was intended to encourage exploration, a discoverer received one claim of forty by twenty bragagand another of thirty by fifteen. The 1700 code also allowed two claims but their size was determined by the number of slaves at the disposal of the miner. The rate was two and a half sq.uare brajas per slave, but there was a maximum of thirty square bragas per claimant. Those so poor as to have no slaves were awarded five square bragas. Thus the generosity of the first code , enacted when few gold strikes had been made, was replaced by a more realistic provision which based the size of the award upon the capacity of the person to exploit it. Also the size of the claims were reduced in order to accomodate more people. Where many miners were involved in a single strike, the diggings could be divided up and

PAGE 77

59 parceled out by palmos (one palmo is roughly .22 meters). The provisions of the IJOO code were continued in the 1702 code, except for the omission of the five-braga grant to those vho did not have slaves. Probably it was assumed that anyone so poor as to have no slaves could not be expected to effectively exploit the claim and, thus, would not produce enough revenue for the royal treasury. The codes also reflect the development of the bureaucracy that was created to control the mining district. The first code provided for the posts of collector of the royal fifth (q.uinto), a secretary, and a treasurer to govern the mining district. Thus administrative functions were considered fiscal in nature. By 1700 it was realized that the situation required an administrative officer as well as tax officials. In that year the first guarda-mor , administrator of mining, was named for the mining district. The guarda-mor had the power to distribute claims and to exercise police powers to arrest lawbreakers. After guardas-mores were appointed for the major mining areas, it was found that the territorial jurisdiction of these officials was still too large and they were authorized to 11 name assistants. One claim at each strike was the payment for the guarda-mor's services. The 1702 code reflects a more complex administrative system. Besides the guarda-mor, provision was made for a superintendent who became the administrative head of the mining district and was responsible to the governor in Rio

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60 de Janeiro. The superintendent vas to "be chosen from among "the most important and richest people" in the district. Aside from being collector of the quinto , the superintendent had extensive civil and criminal powers. His functions included those exercised in the established captaincies by the district magistrate ( ouvidor ) , and by the royal judge who presided over some municipal councils (the jui z de f ora ) . In addition, provision was made for a constable ( mei rinho ) and a secretary. All these officials were strictly prohibited from being directly or indirectly involved in mining activities. They were paid a fee by the miners for their services. The codes of IJOO and, especially, that of 1702 reflect the realization that law and order had to be imposed upon the unruly miners "before taxes could be collected. All three codes contained extraordinary provisions. The first code protected any miner from arrest and exempted his property, including slaves, from confiscation for debt. This provision does not reappear in the 1700 code but was re-enacted in modified form, in 1702. The 1700 code granted another form of privilege to the m.iners by providing protection from arrest ( homi zio ) for any crime except less majesty. As the mining district became an area of asylum which was highly prejudicial to the royal prerogative, this provision was not repeated in the third code . The 1702 code was more than a simple set of rules

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61 governing mining; it vas a statute for the general government of the mining district. Its provisions were aimed at stopping smuggling and repeated several edicts limiting migration to the mines. Furthermore, all persons considered "useless" were to be expelled. No definition of "useless" was provided, that heing left, presumably, to the interpretation of local officials. Similarly, all goldsmiths were to be expelled. Crown policy toward the goldsmiths was very inconsistent, as they were alternately expelled and allowed to return and practice their trade. The goldsmiths were accused both of involvement in smuggling and of transforming gold dust into objects on which the quinto was not paid. Concern over taxes and revenue is indicated in the 1702 code by the careful delineation of the way in which the quinto was to be paid. It could be remitted directly to the superintendent or paid outside the mining district. In the latter case the miner received a registration card authorizing him to transport his gold to a mint either in Brazil or in Portugal and pay the royal fifth there, A copy was maintained by the superintendent's secretary to' assure that payment was made. ^ These provisions, plus those giving the superintendent civil and criminal jurisdiction, made this mining code a statute for the government of the mining district. While the later creation of a more complex administrative bureau cracy obliterated the superintendent's functions, and

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62 imited those of the guardas-mores , most of the provisions of the code were operative throughout the eighteenth century. The gold extracted during these early years was not a great source of revenue for the crown. This period was one of uncertainty and experimentation as indicated by the changes in the mining codes and in the organization of the bureaucracy. There were so few royal officials in the district that implementation of the tax and anti-smuggling laws was impossible. In an effort to overcome this deficiency the crown turned to the manipulation of monetary policies. By l695 smelters, where a miner could pay his quinto, existed in four places, Taubate (after I70J4 in Parati), Sao Paulo (after ITOU in Santos), Iguape , and Paranagua. Smelters transformed gold dust and nuggets into gold bars. A percentage of the gold turned in, fluctuating between twelve and twenty percent, was retained at the smelter for remittal to the royal treasury as the q_uinto. The rest, less a smelting fee, was melted into bars stamped with the weight, purity, and royal seal and turned over to the miner along with a certificate of payment of the quinto. In ITO3 a mint was established in Rio de Janeiro that would pay 1$200 (1,200 reis) for an oitava of unsmelted gold while the exchange value of the same amount in the mining district was set at 1 $300. It was hoped that the difference in the value of gold would attract money to the

PAGE 81

63 13 mint in Rio, Since gold circulated freely at a rate of $800 and S»00 ( 800 and 900 reis), its effects should have been even greater than anticipated. The fact that the market value of gold within the mining district was lover than established by law indicates that royal decrees were ineffective against the economic reality of a large supply of gold. The mint, however, had several drawbacks in operation. The primary one was the price of gold on the black market: 1$300 to 1$U00 an oitava. Because it was more profitable to sell gold on the black market than to sell it to the government, trade in illicit gold drew away gold which otherwise would have found its way to the mint. The mint, in turn, siphoned off much of the gold which would have been taken to the smelters. Because the q^uinto was collected on unsmelted gold by the Rio mint , the crown assumed the cost of the impurities which has been estimated to be .five to eight percent of the total. Thus the attempt to increase revenue derived from the quinto by monetary manipulation failed. The quinto, however, was only one of the sources of income for the royal treasury. During this period the sale or leasing of mining claims allocated to the king at each strike raised considerable sums of money. That more was not raised was due to the opportunity which the guardamor or his assistants had to sell or rent the claims to friends or relatives at prices lower than their true market

PAGE 82

6k value. As more adventurers arrived such chicanery became more difficult and competitive bidding raised the prices. In 1700 Menezes received an average of 26. h oitavas for fourteen claims, but in IJOl he could expect to receive an average of 38.3 oitavas for seven. A major portion of the revenue for this period was obtained through the confiscation of property. Much of this came with the arrest of smugglers along the Bahia road, due, in many cases, to the efforts of Borba Gato , vho was the guarda-mor for the Rio das Velhas region. A less important source was the contract for the di zimos , the tithe on non-mineral production, the collection of which was sublet by the government. The crown, after deducting its collection fee, remitted the proceeds from the tithe to the church. The last major source of revenue was the estates of people who died without wills. This source was particularly lucrative during this period as nomadic habits together with violence unhindered by the presence of police resulted in the deaths of many people without wills and many whose very identity could not be ascertained.

PAGE 83

Table 1 Royal Income Year Quinto Allotments Confiscations Dizimos Probate 1700

PAGE 84

es yielded great quantities of gold at a time vhen the population of the mining district must have been less than 50,000.

PAGE 85

Notes 1. Charles JLyden ,. " The Gold Placers of Montana , Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology, Memoir No. 26 (Butte: Montana School of Mines, 19^8), p. 3. 2. Ibid. 3. Mendonja, Notlcias dos primeiros descobri dores , fol. I6v. k. Paul Ferrand, L'or a Minas Gerais , 1, pp. 32-33. 5. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , pp. 293-29^. 6. Claudio Manuel da Costa, "Villa Rica, Poema," Anuario do Museu da Ir.conf i denci a k (1955-1957): l6U & l68. 7. Commission of Manuel da Silva Rosa, 2? April, 1719 in Cod. 12(SG) , fol. 758. Ferrand, L'or a Minas Gerais , 1, p. 359. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p. 151. 10. Ibid. , p. 152. 11. Mining Code, 19 April, 1702 in Document os Historicos 80(19^9): 3'4-3. The jurisdiction of the assistant guardasmores was defined in 1736 as being sixteen square leagues ( quatro leguas em extensao ). V/ilhelm Ludwig von Eschwege, "Pluto Bras iliens is ,"ed . Rudolfo Jacob, Collectanea de scientistas extrangeiras , 2 vols. (Belo Horizon te. Imp r ens a Oficial, 1930), 2, p. 25712. Mining Code, of I603/1618 in Robert Southey, History of Brazil , 3 vols. (London: Longman, Durst, Rees , Orme and Brown, 1819)^ 3, pp. hO-k^ , 13. Cardozo, "Alguns subsidios , "p. 256. In June, 1700 the municipal council of Rio de Janeiro petitioned the • crown for establishment of a mint in that city. This was rejected by Pedro II who instead ordered that a smelter ( "casa para se fundir e quintar o ouro" ) be opened there. Consulta of the Overseas Council, 3 November, 1700 in 67

PAGE 86

58 Docunentos Historicos , 93, pp. 98-99. It is unclear if a smelter was established. This appears unlikely as a mint began operations in 1703 after a period of indecision as to the best location for it, vhich saw it established first in Salvador then moved to Recife. On September 10, 1703, the head of the mint reported that the mint had begun accepting gold February 15, (1703), and coining one week later. The coins minted had a value of U$800 and 2$U00. Consulta of the Overseas Council, 19 January, 170^+ in Documentos Historicos , 93, p.l65. lU. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras 9, p. 286. Taunay's figures are based upon the personal papers of Padre Guilherme Pompeu de Almeida, "the banker of the bandeir antes ." 15. Manbel Cardozo, "The Collection of the Royal Fifth in Brazil, 1695-1709," Hispanic American Historical Review 9, no. 3 (August, 19^0): 370-371. Also Cardozo, "Alguns subsidies," p. 11. 16. Report of Overseas Council Session, 15 November, 1701 in Cardozo, "The Collection of the Royal Fifth," p. 367. 17. Cod.ai (DFA), fol. 45v. 18. Antonil, Cultura e opulencia , pp. 262-263. 19. Cardozo, "The Collection of the Royal Fifth," p. 37^.

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Chapter 5 Administration: The Period of Uncertainty The mining district in ITlOj was in utter chaos. The gold strikes had been made "by individuals beyond the reach of royal authority. The first royal official who had tried to enter the area, Castelo Branco, had been assassinated. If the crown was to get raaximum profit from the discovery of gold, law and order had to be established and an atmosphere created in which the royal fifth could be collected. As soon as news of the strikes was confirmed, the governor in Rio de Janeiro delegated authority to some of those involved in the discovery of gold. Carlos Pedroso da Silveira was named guarda-mor geral (chief superviser of mining claims) and Bartolomeu Bueno de Siqueira was appointed escrivao geral (chief secretary). Pedroso, however, shortly was nominated for provedor dos quintos (collector of the royal fifth) of the smelter he was authorized to establish in Taubate. Pedroso's replacement as guarda-mor geral was Jose de Camargos Pimentel. These appointments had been made by the acting governor, Caldas. Caldas had done little to clarify the situation in the mining district for the royal officials in Lisbon. This was left to his successor, Artur de Sa e Menezes. 69

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70 After returning to Rio de Janeiro from his first visit to Sao Paulo in I698, Menezes wrote Pedro II and attempted to dissolve the confusion surrounding the discovery of gold. Previous iniornation sent to Lisbon had been incomplete and the authorities in Portugal were uncertain of the extent of the discoveries, of their location, and of the actions which Caldas had taken to establish order. Menezes reported that "the account which Sebastiao de Castro Caldas gave to Your Majesty of the Mines of Taubate Cactually refer toll those called Mines of Cataguazes which are more than one hundred leagues from Taubate. New streams are continuously being di s covered ,... and the gold is most ex1 cellent." Menezes then went on to criticize Caldas' appointments. Pedroso, Menezes noted, had been named provedor of "a smelter without f uncionaries . " Furthermore,, he criticized Caldas' appointment of Jose de Camargos Pimentel as guarda-iaor geral, contending that Pimentel was unworthy of the great responsibility of this office which was charged with the collection of the money due the king from the auction of mining claims that, by law, were reserved for the king. Pimentel was unsuited for this post, continues Menezes, because of his "bad actions and tyrannies" and his penchant for "stealing everything." Pimentel 2 subs eq_uently was removed as supervisor of mining claims and was given the largely ceremonial post of alcai de-mor •/(high sheriff) of Sao Paulo. His successor as guarda-mor was the Paulista Garcia Rodrigues, appointed on January 3 13, 1698.

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71 In the early turbulent years of these settlements, the guarda-mor was the only royal official in an area that increasingly was realized to be the scene of a major gold discovery. The royal governor of Rio de Janeiro, who claimed jurisdiction over the gold fields, did not visit the area for four years. In the meantime the guarda-mor was the highest authority in the vicinity of the gold strikes. His primary responsibility was to ensure the fair distribution of mining claims--a responsibility he was to keep despite the actions of later governors who tried to exercise this authority. At the same time, the guarda-mor had some' limited judicial powers for resolving disputes over claims, and probably over criminal actions. This expansion of the guarda-mor's powers was a stop-gap response to the crisis caused by the absence of royal officials. It was a tentative first step--a sign of the government's uncertainty before an entirely new phenomenon, a major gold strike in an area distant from established royal authority. Because one guarda-mor could not cope with all the settlements, assistants were appointed. More, however, was needed to control the turbulent miners than the presence of the guardas-mores and the chief secretary; their judicial and administrative powers were inadequate to cope with the situation. Moreover, these officials were hardly disinterested since they themselves were adventurers in search of gold; they could not be expected to act impartially. The answer to this absence of

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72 disinterested royal officials vould seem to be the personal presence of the governor in the mining district hut, since his chief responsibility vas the defense of all of southern Brazil, the coastal area demanded most of his attention, as it was susceptible to seaborne attack by buccaneers and, in the event of war, by hostile European powers. Only as the magnitude of the strikes became clearer did the governor realize the necessity of leaving the coast to Journey into the interior. On October 2U, I69I , Menezes set out for Sao Paulo, returning in February, I698. In October, I698, Menezes again departed for Sao Paulo; he returned to Rio five months later to prepare for his first visit to the Mines of Cataguazes. It is with this first visit of a royal governor to the mining fields that the administrative history of Minas Gerais really begins. Menezes would spend all but three months of the remaining two years of his term in the mining district. While in Sao Paulo on his first visit, Menezes had called Manuel de Borba Gato from his self-imposed exile and offered him a pardon in exchange for information on new gold deposits. Thus Menezes' first stop in the mining district was in the region of Sahara to check on Borba Gato's success in finding new gold deposits. One unidentified chronicler called the area of Sahara the most populated k in the gold fields. Borba Gato's success in fulfilling his promise can be measured in terms of the honors he received--he was appointed lieutenant general and guarda-mor

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73 of the Rio das Velhas area. This appointment established the first administrative division within the mining district. The mining district vas divided into two partsthe Rio das Velhas area under Borba Gato and the district of Minas Gerais under Garcia Rodrigues Velho who was 6 succeeded as guarda-mor by Manuel Lopes de Medeiros. The settlement of Sumidouro was made the point of division between the two districts. Because of the crown's long-term interest in finding gold, the critical shortage of circulating coinage in Portugal, and the need for revenue to deal with European problems, it is not surprising that one of Menezes' major concerns was the establishment of an administrative system for the collection of taxes. In 1701, he established the posts of procurator of the royal treasury, secretary of the royal treasury, secretary of the tax house ( es cr i vao da casa dos quintos ), treasurer of the tax house, collector of the royal treasury, and procurator of the crown. This latter official was the personal agent of the king and acted as a check upon the other officials. All of these posts were filled by Paulistas, either native-born or by 7 residence. The appointments, however, were premature, since these officers could fulfill their responsibilities only if law and order were imposed upon the miners — a task for which these posts had not been created. Menezes also attempted to establish an efficient means of collecting taxes, other than the royal fifth. He insti-

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7h tuted a number of toll stations ( registros ) , to collect the royal imposts. Since smuggling already had become a major problem, Menezes attempted to close the trails that had been opened to Bahia and Pernambuco, vhich were the most difficult to patrol because of the topography of the land. The absence of difficult, mountainous terrain meant that new trails were opened easily. Their number made adeq.uate surveillance impossible. While trying to get others to pay their taxes, Menezes decided to make his own fortune. It is said that when he left the mining district he took with him more than thirty 8 arrobas of gold. Despite Menezes' zeal in collecting the royal fifth from others, it is doubtful that he paid taxes on this gold. Since the crown had no intention of leaving the mining camps without centralized leadership, a new administrative organ was established to fill this vacuum created by the governor's departure. By royal decree a superintendency was created and a Portuguese bureaucrat. Dr. Jose Vaz Pinto, named to fill the position. One of the reasons for the creation of this post may have been the opening of hostilities in Europe. Portugal's close ties to England meant that Portuguese entry into the war of the Spanish Succession was only a matter of time and circumstance. The governor was needed on the coast to guard against invasion. A report of the Overseas Council in 1705, approved by the Queen Regent, shows that only after serious deliberation

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T5 vas the governor ordered to remain in Rio-"he Cthe governorH should consider more the defense and conservation of that city CRio ds JaneiroU, vhich is of the foremost importance, than the conveniences which might accrue from the increase 9 of the quinto." Short term considerations for once, were subordinated to long-term interests. No governor was to visit the mining district again until the 1709 visit of Fernando Martins Mascarenhas e Lencastre. Tne superintendent, therefore, was named to supervise the mining district while the governor's attention was directed toward protecting the coast from external attack. * While the superintendent had the responsibility for overseeing the collection of taxes, his major responsibility was to maintain order. As has been noted, this post combined criminal and civil jurisdiction with that of tax collector and adjudicator of claims disputes. Pinto held this post until 170U, when problems with a Paulista 10 potentate forced his return to Rio de Janeiro. Efforts also were made to establish more local administrative posts , since royal authority existed only in the presence of the superintendent or guarda-mor and these officals could not be everywhere at the same time. One of the first steps taken in this regard had been the earlier creation of assistant guardas-mores . Under Dr. Pinto, the first militia ( ordenanga ) officers were commissioned and the initial work of organizing the miners into militia units began. The first militia officer in the area o'f Ouro

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76 11 Preto appears to have Felix de Gusmao Mendonga e Bueno , a native of Rio de Janeiro, who was appointed December 1, 1703 to the post of sargento-mor da ordenanga das Minas . Gusmao took his oath of office in Santos , although he then went to Ouro Preto where he established his residence. If militia units were actually organized at that time, no reference to them has been found. The first capitao-mor of the district around Ouro Preto apparently was nominated in 1706. He was Francisco do Amaral Gurgel , of Rio de Janeiro, whose appointment appears to have been a reaction to the increasingly tense situation between the Paulistas and the forasteiros , which already had erupted into violence and would do so again. The following year Pedro de Morals Raposo, a Paulista, was commissioned capitao-mor of the Rio das Mortes region. The two capit aes-mores were issued the same standing orders ( regimentos ) . They were instructed to create a "militia corps" of crdenanga status and were reminded of the necessity of defending Rio de Janeiro. Their powers, however, extended beyond the military realm: they were given judicial and police functions and authorized to collect the 12 royal fifth and supervise the guardas-mores . Thus military functions were but a part of the duties of the capitao-mor. As with so many other Portuguese officials, there was no clear delineation between functions. The ten years following the discovery of gold had been a period of uncertainty and confusion. Numerous

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77 interests were in conflict: the sugar producers of the Northeast vied with the miners for slaves, capital and free labor; the need to protect the coast from a possible foreign attack conflicted with the crovrn's desire to divert resources into the mining district to reap the benefits of increased gold production; and the Paulistas were arrayed against those vho threatened their monopoly of the mines. The crovn had tried to favor the sugar interests, but the premises on vhich its decision was based were false. It had attempted to set up a bureacracy to collect taxes in the mining district before it had established order there. Furthermore, the crown had failed to understand the dimensions of the strikes and the extent of the gold rush. Its actions were, therefore, piecemeal and largely ineffective. While the crown was indecisive in the manner with which it dealt with the mining district, church officials in Brazil did not vacillate. The mining district was a rich territory, eagerly sought by cpmpeting ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Since there were no clear lines of territorial jurisdiction, the area was claimed by both the archdiocese of Bahia (bishopric created in 1551, raised to archbishopric in I676) and the diocese of Rio de Janeiro (established in I68I). When the first visitor-general from Rio de Janeiro arrived in the Rio das Velhas area, he was informed that the Archbishop of Bahia had sent his own representative, who was then in Serro do Frio, The

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78 bishop's representative, Baltezar de Godoi , thereupon threatened his counterpart and competitor with excom13 munication and carried the day. While this conflict continued for many years , the results were generally favorable to the Rio bishopric. The ecclesiastical territorial boundaries, however, were never to coincide with the political ones, as several parishes of northeastern Minas remained under the jurisdiction of the Bahia See. Other visitations were made periodically to examine the state of the mining district. In 1701 Canon Manuel da Costa Escobar made a general visitation which apparently 11+ was unfinished at the time of his death. Two years after Canon Escobar set out. Canon Caspar Ribeiro Pereira was dispatched to oversee the inauguration of new churches in the mining district and to attempt to resolve the jux-is15 dictional dispute with the Bahian archbishopric. Unfortunately no record was found of the activities of these visitors, although, if later inspections are any indication, they probably raised the ire of the miners by seeming more interested in levying fines than in guiding the souls of the people of the district. Before parishes were established in the mining district, the church established a temporary system which suited the settlement pattern characteristic of the early years. The system, showing great flexibility, was established by the Bishop of Rio de Janeiro, Frei Francisco de Sao Jeronimo. Governor Alvaro da Silveira e Albuq_uerq_ue ,

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79 responding to a royal inquiry concerning the number of clerics in the gold fields reported that: he [Bishop Sao Jeronimoll proposed to send sufficient priests so that divided among the Cmining carapsD an adeq_uate distance apart, they should raise their portable altars and administer the sacraments to their C inhabitants , treating theml as Parishoners , . . . and the inhabit ants ... Cwere toD contribute co the just maintenance of these priests and when some Cpriestsl moved from one stream to another they should tear down the altars. 1° Thus the transitory nature of the early mining camps led to a reaction on the part of the church which gave the local priests flexibility to deal with the nomadic nature of the miners . The precise date that parishes were established is unknown, but by 1705 the settlement of Ouro Preto had been elevated to this status, with Father Francisco de Castro as the parish priest. The first references to the parish of Antonio Dias are from 1707 and show that the parish priest was Father Marcelo Pinto Ribeiro. Undoubtedly these two settlements were selected as the seats of their respective parishes because they were the largest and most important in their districts — districts created by geographic features, particularly the Morro de Santa Quiteria which . separated the two settlements and channeled their growth outward, away from the mountain. These two parishes met along a line which bisected the Morro de Santa Quiteria. The Ouro Preto parish included the settlements of Ouro Preto, Caq.uende, Cabejas ,

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80 the Arraial dos Paulistas, Passadez, and Tripui. The parish of Antonio Dias included Antonio Dias , the Arraial dos Paulistas, Padre Faria, the settlements on the Morro de Vila Rica, and Bom Sucesso. This division vas one of the factors which conditioned urban development and institutionalized the competition between the two areas, thereby fueling a conflict which has lasted to the present day. Of the other settlements which would fall within the Jurisdiction of the municipality of Ouro Preto, only one, Cachoeira do Campo, was raised to a parish during this 17 period. This elevation is indicative of the rapid growth of this area, which, despite insignificant gold deposits, was expanding due to its extensive pasture lands and fertile fields. It also perhaps foreshadows a later development when many miners with large-scale operations on the Morro de Vila Rica purchased lands in Cachoeira in order to directly supply foodstuffs for their slaves. Thus, by I70T, three parishes in the area of Ouro Preto had been created to minister to the religious needs of the settlers who were flocking into the region to make their fortunes. Ecclesiastical organization had proceeded further than civil organization by the outbreak of the Guerra dos Emboabas . Whereas the crown could not decide on the means by which to govern the mining district, the ecclesiastical officials showed no such indecision. Priests q.uickly were dispatched to the area and regular parishs established in the major settlements.

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Notes 1. Menezes to Pedro II, 29 April, 1698 in Franco, Diccionario de bandei rantes , p. 2972. Ibid. 3. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p. 235. k. Relagao das antiguidades das Minas, Codice Costa Matoso, fol. UT. 5. S. Suannes , Os emboabas (Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, I962) , p. 576. Ibid. 7. Suannes, Os emboabas , p. 558. Mendonga, Noticias dos primeiros descobridores , fol. 26. 9. Report of the Overseas Council, 27 January, 1705 in Manuel Cardozo, "The Brazilian Gold Rush," The Americas 3(0ctober, 19^+6): 15^. 10. Relagao das antiguidades, fol. h'Jv. 11. Suannes, Os emboabas , p. 17. 12. Vasconcellos , Historia antiga , 2, p. 3^ and Suannes, Os emboabas , pp. 36-37. 13. Relagao das antiguidades, fol. kfY . Ik. Raimundo Trindade, Arquidiocese de Mariana: subsfdios para sua historia , 2nd ed. , 2 vols. (Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Oficial, 1953), 1> pp. 56-57. 15. Ibid. , p. 57. 16. Albuq.uerq^ue to Pedro II, 8 February, 1702 in Silvio Gabriel Diniz, "Primeiras freguezias nas Minas Gerais," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Minas Gerais^ 8(1961) : 175-176. 17. Trindade, Arquidiocese de Mariana , pp. 67-69. 81

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PART II REBELLION AND REACTION: THE IMPOSITION OF ROYAL CONTROL, ITO6 1711 Chapter 6 Confrontation The most dramatic development of the first decade of the eighteenth century vas the War of the Emboabas. Often cited as an early manifestation of nationalism, a precursor of independence, it was a relatively bloodless var involving a mixture of issues, none of which can be called nationalist, either incipient or full-blown. The ramification of this limited fighting, however, were extensive. The major conflict was between two general concepts as to how the gold fields should be exploi ted--two positions which may be called "open" and "closed." The "closed" position was that taken by the Paulistas who, when faced by a common enemy, forgot their own differences and previous squabbling and united to confront the enemy. Their view was stated on April I6 , 1700, by the Sao Paulo municipal council in the following terms: CWeD petition the Captain-General Artur de Sa e Menezes , Governor of the fortress of Rio de Janeiro and the rest of the Division that the lands of the territory of Minas Gerais das Cataguazes as well as the plains , with arable lands , by right belong to the Paulistas in that they own them by grants of His Majesty,... 82

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since it was they who conquered the said lands and are the discoverers of the gold mines which they presently work.... They did this at the cost of their lives and fortunes, without expense to the royal treasury and it would be unjust to grant the said lands to the residents of Rio de Janeiro who never took part in the conquests nor in the discovery. The Paulistas felt that the l69^ grant of concessions made by the king had given them exclusive rights to the regions recently discovered. This belief had been confirmed in various ways by royal authorities. Free access to the mining district had been curtailed by closing some roads and prohibiting the opening of new ones. Numerous were the orders issued either by the king or the governor implementing these decrees. It was felt that a proliferation of settlers would make tax evasion and smuggling easy. To control migration the passport system was employed. Laws were enacted to prevent some occupational groups and classes from entering the mining district. However, neither laws nor the understaffed royal authorities were able to stop the flow of adventurers into the area, as its population reached 30,000 to 50,000. Because of their role as discoverers and first exploiters of the gold deposits, the Paulistas were in firm control of most, if not all, of the settlements. Even Caete which had been founded by Bahians, had fallen under Paulista control. De facto control by the Paulistas was given royal blessing through their appointments to royal posts . Governor Meneses ' appointments for the Rio das Velhas area in

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81+ April, 1701, are typical. Of the four officials named, two were Paulistas and another was a Portuguese who had lived 2 in Sao Paulo for many years. The place of birth of the fourth is unknown. The significant aspect of these nominations is that the district of Rio das Velhas was the earliest inundated by people who were not Paulistas. Thus the Forasteiros , as the Paulistas referred to everyone not from Sao Vicente captaincy, were excluded from political control in an area where they were numerically strongest. Moreover, with Paulistas holding the posts of guarda-mor, preference in the distribution of claims would go to their compatriots. Paulista hegemony was buttressed by the absence of disinterested high royal officials. This power induced a haughty attitude on the part of the Paulistas, who looked down on outsiders as inferior. Jose Alvares de Oliveira, a Portuguese-born resident of Rio das Mortes, was a witness to many of these snubs. When gold was discovered in the Rio das Mortes region, the best claims went to the Paulistas and it was only with 3 difficulty that the outsiders-or emboabas , as they were also called-were able to set up a settlement of their own. More shattering was the general attitude of the Paulistas-k "valuing the life of an emboaba as much as that of a dog." Emboabas were referred to in the second person singular 5 "vos" "as though they were slaves or inferiors." This treatment of the emboabas was one of the main causes of the fighting. Beyond its immediate effects.

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05 it contributed to the growth of a non-mining, commercial interest. The increasing population in general, and in the more urbanized centers in particular, taxed food resources. Even after the famines food was in such demand that the orders closing the Bahia road had to be rescinded to allow cattle to enter the region of the mines. Beyond the necessities of life, gold production created a market for luxury goods among those who had struck it rich. An idea of the nature of this trade can be gleaned from an examination of the goods carried by a single smuggler arrested 6 in ITOo near Caete. 2 barrels of Brazilian sugar-cane brandy 1 barrel of gun powder 2 arrobas of lead 1 sack of sugar 1 bolt t. peis a ) of cotton cloth 2 barrels of Portugues salt 2 sacks of Brazilian salt 1 sack of Portuguese salt 1 chest of pork 3 horns of honey i saddle ( sella da gineta ) 6 pairs of boots ( bor zeguinhos ) 12 oitavas of gold dust 1 moleque (young slave) The possessions of another smuggler arrested at the same time included: 2 pair damask shoes 2 pairs of trousers 5 caps from Galicia t) pairs of leather shoes (local; h 1/2 dozen knives from Flanders 1 iron bar (tool) from Flanders 3 prepared goat skins 3 bridles 1 chest of Russian leather with 11 hats k used ordinary quality hats 30 woolen coats ( vestia ) 11 woolen capes k cloth capes 3 capes of goatskin ( camelao ) 52 pairs of socks 3 pairs of short boots 38 pairs of shoes 1 horn of honey 1 old saddle and bridle 3 slaves

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86 Of particular importance are the references to goods from Galicia, Russia, and Flanders and the vast quantities of items of clothing which indicate the absence of hone industry, manifesting an early reliance on outside suppliers. This importation on a large and continuously expanding scale points to the existence of a significant commercial interest — vhich was mainly in the hands of Portuguesetorn immigrants. Besides Paulista domination of the mining district , other factors helped create this differentiation of labor roles. Inexperienced in prospecting and totally lacking in frontier know-how, the Portuguese immigrant had to work secondary gold deposits or find another occupation. The average immigrant did not come directly to the mines but spent a number of years on the coast working, often in commerce or as an artisan. These became the professions they followed once in Minas. Because of this experience and even more important, the contacts established, the immigrant with the small capital he had accumulated was far better equiped to be a businessman than was the Paulista, After acquiring sufficient wealth through business, the immigrant would move into the more prestigious position of large-scale miner and f azendeir o (large-scale landowner). ' Although ownership of a fazenda was indispensable to the big miner, it was not the independent source of prestige it was in the Northeast. It was, at the most, a contributing factor.

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87 There are numerous examples of this upward mobility. The tvo most often mentioned are Manuel Nunes Viana and Pascoal da Silva Guin araes . Born in Portugal in the cities of Viana and Guimaraes , respectively, both were living in Brazil at the time of the gold strikes and both went to Minas within ten years of the discoveries. Viana had become rich by parlaying the capital acquired as a cashier and, later, merchant into a vast fortune in cattle and gold. Guimar3.es had moved from cashier to travelling merchant to gold miner and land-holder. A third example was Henrique Lopes de Araujo, leading citizen of Vila Rica from 17^0 until his death in 1733. Araujo had gone from tavern keeper to rich mine owner. Another example indicates the ability of some Portuguese to take advantage of good commercial situations. The construction of the Caminho Novo was completed in 1Y02 by a group of Paulistas under Garcia Rodrigues Pais. These men had been content to accept land along the route as payment for their work. Two Portuguese-born merchants, Jose da Silva Rijo and Simao Pereira da Rocha acted to exploit this sh'orter route by utilizing it to establish a complex trading network involving large capital invest7 ments. To these people open access to the mining district and the expansion of its population were necessities. A confrontation with the Paulistas, with their concept of exclusive control, appeared unavoidable, since both sides 8 seemed incapable of compromising.

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88 The em'boaba position was best stated "by one of their leaders, Bento do Amaral Coutinho, a native of Rio de Janeiro and a member of a noble family from Braga and Viana, Portugal. His views were presented to Governor Menezes in a letter dated January l6, 1709 from "Arraial Ouro Preto." Amaral emphasized the provocations of the Paulistas and described the actions of the forasteiros as defensive. The depth of the conflict was indicated by his use of such emotion-laden terms as "our settlements" "oppressed" and "liberty." Amaral recognized the actions of the forasteiros as rebellion, but rebellion against the tyranny of the Paulistas and not against the king -tyranny, he implied that the king would not tolerate if he but knew the truth. The goal of the emboabas , was liberty-not from the Crown but from the Paulistas. Amaral swore allegiance to the king but, at the same time promised to 9 continue defending the emboaba cause. Predictably, the crown vacillated when faced with this polarization of views. Unsure of the extent of the strikes, the crown initially tended to back the Paulistas. Certainly the royal officials in Rio de Janeiro were less concerned with the rights allegedly promised the Paulistas than they were with other considerations. Viceroy Joao de Lencastre expressed many of these concerns in a letter written in 1701. Lencastre felt that the size of the population had to be limited in order to avoid revolts, or to facilitate their suppression if they occurred. Furthermore, freedom

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89 of access would increase gold production causing the disruption of the Brazilian economy. Unlimited migration, Lencastre argued would hurt the sugar and tobacco industries of the Northeast by drawing away many slaves and increasing the prices of the others. Lencastre suggested several methods to restrict access, such as using passports and limiting their issuance to "virtuous men with some capital, businessmen, merchants, or their agents." He also wanted to confine transit to a single road from Espirito Santo which would become the sole port for the mining area. Many of these views were shared by the Paulistas . By ITOU, the crown's position had been modified in accordance with the recommendations of Superintendent Jose Vaz Pinto. Pinto's main argument was that while controls should be retained on immigration, they alone were not sufficient to stop the influx of adventurers. He urged that incentives to the Paulistas be rescinded, since they encouraged new discoveries to the detriment of the full exploitation of those already found. Pinto favored more intensive working of a few sites as opposed to the Paulista practice of extracting the easiest alluvial gold and leaving the subsoil untouched. These suggestions were approved by the Overseas Council. The adoption of these measures indicates that the fact that the Paulistas and the crown had previously held the same views was a coincidence — they had arrived at these positions under the

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90 pressures of different motives. Thus, while the policy of limiting migration was to continue, the Paulistas stood to lose their privileges. Had Pinto's recommendations "been put into effect the 169^ concessions would have been revoked, For reasons which are unclear they were not , and Pinto himself was forced to leave Minas after a conflict with some Paulistas.

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Notes 1. Minutes of Sao Paulo Camara Session, l6 April, IJOO in Suannes , Os emboabas , pp. ^-5. 2. Id id., p. 55. 3. The derivation of this word has been the subject of much debate over the years — a debate summarized by Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, pp • ^+75-^78 and Afonso A. de Freitas , "Emboaba,' Kevista do Arquivo Municipal (sao Paulo) 1 (June, 193^+)" 35-Hl. There are two main points of view. One, espoused by Ayres de Casal, J. de Sousa Azevedo Pizarro, and Francisco A. de Varnhagen, holds that the word "emboaba" comes from the Tupi-Guarani expression for a bird whose legs were covered with feathers only as far as the knee joint. It was applied to the Portuguese because of the high boots which they wore with their trousers tucked in at the knee. The second opinion held by Antonio Joaquim de Macedo Soares , Teodoro Sampaio , and others, is that the word is Tupi-Guarani for "stranger" or "foreigner." They point out that a bird fitting the above description does not exist in Minas Gerais. Freitas takes a different position, arguing that the word comes from the Angolese "camboa", meaning "dog." This view is interesting in that it shifts the emphasis from the Tupi spoken by the Paulistas to an African dialect. No matter what its derivation, the word was used during the early eighteenth century as the pejorative synonym for " f or as tei ros . " k. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, pp^+82, 4861+07. 5. Padre Manuel da Fonseca, "Levant amento em Minas Gerais, " Revista do Institute Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 3 U8Ul): 262. 6. Inventory of Confiscated goods, 5 December, 1706 in "Documentos do Arquivo da Casa dos Contos (Minas Gerais)," Anais da Biblioteca Nacional 65 (19U3): ^5-^+7. 7. Augusto de Lima Junior, Vila Rica do Ouro Preto : sintese historica e descritiva (Belo Horizonte: Private edition, 1957) , P6U. 91

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92 a. It is interesting that Isaias Golgher had turned this dichotomy into a feudalism-capitalism conflict with the Pauiistas representing the feudal side and the Portuguese entrepreuneurs being the capitalists. Isaias Golgher, Guerra dos Emboahas : a primeira guerra civil nas Americas (Belo Horizonte: Editora Itatiaia, 1956), pp. 28-299. Bento do Amaral Coutinho to Governor Mascarenhas, l6 January 1T09 in Golgher, Guerra dos Emboabas , pp. 121-130. 10. Joao de Lencastre to ? 12 January, 1701 in Virginia Rau and Maria Fernanda Gomes da Silva (eds), Os manuscritos do Arquivo da Casa de Cadaval respeitantes ao Brasil , 2 vols. (Coimbra: Coimbra University, 1958), 2,14-l6. It must be noted that Lencastre was convinced that the mass production of gold would serve to flood the money markets of Brazil. Only the curtailment of migration could prevent this disaster, according to Lencastre. The appropriate section of the governor's communication is paraphrased by Rau and Silva: It is also worthy of consideration that, with free access to the mines, there will come to pass that there will be more gold in Brazil than is convenient, such that it will not be worth more than silver, which would be highly prejudicial. All this would be remedied CbyD limiting entry to the mines . 11. Consulta of Overseas Counsel, 26 September, ITOU in Documentos Historicos 93 U9^l): 1«1.

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Chapter 7 The Wars of the Emboabas While the opposing positions held by the emboabas and the Paulistas provided the ideological underpining and created the atmosphere for the outbreak of violence during the first decade of the eighteenth century, immediate causes sparked the conflagration. One of the most important of these was the effort by some forasteiros to monopolize essential food items. Monopolies of meat were among the first to be established as royal officials auctioned contracts which entitled the contractor to be the exclusive provider of meat for a given period. There had been no Paulista objections when Francisco do Amaral Gurgel , a native of Rio de Janeiro, had held the meat contract from 1701 to 1706 , but the situation became tense when a Portuguese-born monk, Friar Francisco de Menezes, moved to grab monopoly control of tobacco and then meat. Since there was no tobacco contract. Friar Menezes had to corner the market by buying all the tobacco that entered the mining district. The bitterness which this aroused among the Paulistas is evident in Bento Fernandas ' statement that the Portuguese "being more fit for business vanted to invent contracts on various commodities to more quickly and with less work gratify themselves com93

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94 pletely...as did one clergyman CFriar Francisco de MenesesD who with his associate ... invested three arrobas Cof goldD in tobacco which they purchased wholesale before the 1 tobacco entered Minas." Whereas the normal price of a vara (one vara is 1.1 meters) of tobacco was one or two oitavas , the friar was able to sell a vara of tobacco for four and five oitavas. Tobacco was an important commodity because of the great quantities used by Negro and Indian slaves . After this successful venture, Friar Menezes shifted his attention to the supply of meat products in cooperation with two other friars and Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes. Menezes' designs were foiled by the opposition of the Paulistas , on whom the frustrated friar promised to wreak 2 vengence. Friar Menezes ' machinations along with minor provocations probably were the spark that set off the first "War of the Emboabas." Writers such as Isaias 3 Golgher have noted Antonil's passing reference to the construction of a fort in the Rio das Mortes region "during k the first uprising" but have failed to find substantiating documentation of this incident. This is provided by Bento do Amaral Coutinho. Also I am forced to tell yuur Honor Cthe governorll that during the first rebellion of this People, Domingos da Silva Monteiro, a Paulista by birth and residence, was elected Cabo e Mestre do Campo Ccommanding officer of a regiment sized unitD Cbecausel] it seemed safer to be under his protection. It appears that he who is not loyal to his King cannot be loyal to his People since

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95 he was one of those who resisted the implementation of the meat contract in Minas by violent means, gathering with others of his point of view. 5 Monteiro had been selected by the residents of Ouro Preto in the hope of avoiding bloodshed in that region -a vain hope since Monteiro led the Paulistas in armed opposition to Meneses . It appears certain that where previous writers have seen but one outbreak of fighting, there actually occurred two. The first was in I706 or I707, and was precipitated, at least in the area of Ouro Preto, by the efforts of Friar Menezes to win the meat contract. While less violent and less widespread than that of ITO8-ITO9 , it was real enough to force the building of a fort near present-day Sao Joao del Rei , the appointment of the first capitaes6 mores in Minas , and the election of a Paulista by the people of Ouro Pret o--Pauli st as and emboabas alike--as mestre do campo. The second and better-known conflict erupted in ITO8 after a number of provocations by both sides. The haughty attitude of the Paulistas has already been noted. They would enter an emboaba settlement "heavily armed with their chief at the front, shoeless, white cotton drawers tied at the knee, sword drawn, bandolier fastened, pistol in belt, knife slung on chest, carbine in hand, CwearingH either a floppy-brimmed hat or a cap pulled down like a mask. To the sound of drum and bugle they would shout: 'Death to

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96 T the Emboabas . ' " This form of harassment probably vas not uncommon . Often the incidents were more serious. One such incident occurred in Rio das Mortes during June, 1707 when two Paulistas were killed after they provoked a quarrel with some emboabas . While both sides took up arms, no 8 further fighting took place. The following year a more serious incident occurred in Caete. It was precipitated by a silly quarrel over a musket which an emboaba had borrowed from a Paulista and lost. The Paulista refused to accept payment of the value of the musket, demanding the return of the musket. The emboaba turned for support to Manuel Nunes Viana, who offered the Paulista any gun from his large supply. The Paulista refused and turned for support to Jeronimo Pedroso de Barros , an early settler in the region and, with his brother Valentim, one of the two most important Paulistas in the region after Manuel de Borba Gato, a royal appointee who supposedly was above 9 petty squabbling. When the disagreement could not be resolved the emboabas fortified themselves in a house in Caete. While these events were transpiring, an emboaba was killed by a Paulista between Caete and Kabara. The emboabas of that area feeling threatened, left their settlement and joined Viana in Caete. Reinforced, Viana's men sallied forth to confront the Paulistas. At this critical junction Manuel de Borba Gato intervened and prevented the two parties from joining battle. At the same

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97 time, Borba Gato ordered Viana to return to his properties on the Rio Sao Francisco. The Paulistas, however, lacked the strength to enforce this banishment order. After rumors began to spread that the Paulistas were preparing to massacre them in Caete the emboabas acted. They captured the settlement of Caete forcing many Paulistas to flee. Of these, many went to Sahara, which became a seemingly well-fortified Paulista stronghold. Once in control at Caete the emboabas enacted ordinances prohibiting Paulistas from entering emboaba settlements at night and limiting the size of the bodyguard 10 of Paulista potentates to two men. Having established control over the Caete district, Viana and his troops moved against Sahara, about ten kilometers to the west. Sahara fell after a well-executed flanking maneuver, but this emboaba success brought the victors problems. A rift developed within the emboaba camp between the Portuguese-born and the Brazilians over how to treat the defeated Paulistas; the Bahians including Luis do Couto and other Brazilians abandoned the Portuguese Viana who wanted to deal leniently with the Paulistas, The two camps were further split by Viana's attempt to 11 revive the meat contract in the district of Sahara. In the meantime the situation around Ouro Preto had become increasingly tense as first rumors of the emboaba successes reached the area and then refugees from the dis-

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98 trict of the Rio das Velhas appeared. Soon there were rumors of a Paulista plot to massacre the emboabas of Ouro Preto in retaliation for Viana's actions. Those vere believed by many emboabas , including Bento do Amaral Coutinho who attached importance to the feeling that the Paulistas would try to seize complete control of Ouro Preto rather than seek to recapture the Rio das Velhas 12 area where the forasteiros were firmly entrenched. The rumors were substantiated when some, letters' which referred to the plot allegedly were captured and their contents divulged. The forasteiros of Ouro Preto, Antonio Dias, and Cachoeira, armed themselves and chose a captain to lead them in this crisis. But the state of alert did not prevent the Paulistas from burning nine storehouses ( ranches de mercadorias ) belonging to Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes. Among the goods lost in the fire were sixteen arrcJbas of gun powder. The emboabas turned to Viana for 13 assistance . Upon receiving the appeal from the emboabas of Ouro Preto, Viana and a sizeable force set out from Sahara. The road to Ouro Preto ran through Cachoeira do Campo, which is where the Paulistas of Ouro Preto decided to defend themselves. The two forces met and engaged in a battle Ik in which the emboabas were victorious. This victory gave the emboabas control of the vital region around Ouro Preto. It also gave them the security necessary to take the dramatic step of selecting Manuel

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99 Nunes Viana as "governor" of the mining district. Viana was selected by six electors chosen by the troops gathered 15 in Cachoeira. The rest of the emboaba government vas then named by Viana: Guimaraes (Portuguese) as General Superintendent of Minas Gerais do Ouro Preto and Mestre do Campo ; Antonio Francisco da Silva (Portuguese) as brigadier; Sebastiao Carlos Leite (Portuguese) and Domingos Fernandes Pinto (Portuguese) as mestres do campo; Bento do Amaral Coutinho (Rio de Janeiro) as sargento-mor ; Antonio Pinto de Magalhaes (Portuguese), Bras Fernandes Rola (origin unknown), Domingos Mendes (origin unknown), Mathias Barboza da Silva (Portuguese) and Tomas Ribeiro Corso (origin unknown) as captains. These men joined the previously appointed mestres do campo, Friar Menezes 16 (Portuguese) and Manuel Rodrigues Scares (Portuguese). Clearly the leadership of the movement was in the hands of the Portuguese. Besides making these appointments, Viana created two tergos of militia troops, one for Ouro Preto, IT Antonio Dias, and Padre Faria, and another for Carmo. Viana then acted to remove possible foci of Paulista resistance. Captain Domingos da Silva Monteiro, treasurer of mining claims ( tesoureiro das datas minerals ) and the popularly elected leader of Ouro Preto, and Sub-Lieutenant ( Alf eres ) Bartolomeu Bueno Feio, assistant guarda-mor, were arrested and taken to Sahara. An eyewitness noted that their arrests had the effect of "leaving all others 18 CPaulistasl timid and others left for SCaol Paulo."

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100 Viana vas now the de facto chief of the core of the mining district. The nominal authority, the royal governor in Rio de Janeiro, Fernando de Mascarenhas de Lencastre, vas too far away to exercise control and the local authorities, the guardas -mores , had been neutralized or chased away and replaced by emboabas loyal to Viana. Viana then acted to extend his authority to the Rio das Mortes district where the emboabas were more scattered and thus unable to unite against the Paulistas. Troops were dispatched to expel the Paulistas. These, on hearing of the arrival of the emboabas, split up into small guerrilla-type units called mangas . One of these units, of 19 approximately fifty men was trapped in a wooded area by a force of two hundred men under Bento do Amaral Coutinho. After a fierce battle, the Paulistas surrended to the emboabas, receiving a promise that their lives would be spared. After the surrender, Coutinho went back on his 20 word and on his orders the Paulistas were massacred. The royal officials, in general, supported the cause of the Paulistas. As had been noted, the aims of the royal government and those of the Paulistas were similar although the motivation behind them was entirely different. Governor Mascarenhas, upon deciding to go to the scene of hostilities, sent a letter to the king describing the situation. In it Mascarenhas wholeheartedly took the side of the Paulistas. He noted the promises made to the Paulistas, the smuggling and other illicit activities of

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101 ^he forasteiros and the damage they had done to the royal treasury. He then announced his intention of going to the mining district, explaining that "l am going to calm these conflicts, to insure the execution of the royal laws concerning the collection of Your Majesty's taxes, to arrest the criminals Cvho are] the leaders of the uprisings when possible CandD preserve the Paulistas in Minas , as they made the discoveries and only they are capable of continuing and expanding then.... I am determined to expel those who entered by the Bahian backlands against 21 Royal orders . " Yet despite Mascarenhas' stated support of the Paulistas, his actions upon arriving at the settlement of Rio das Mortes , present-day Sao Joao del Rei , were rather impartial. He asked both sides to sellect three representatives who, it was hoped, would meet and iron out the differences which existed between the parties in conflict. This board was established and for a short while served to maintain the peace in the Rio das Mortes district and 22 keep its residents loyal to the governor. The emboaba representatives were Juliao Rangel de Sousa Coutinho, Jose Matol, and Jose Alvares de Oliveira, while the Paulistas selected Jose Pires de Almeida and Jose Moreira da Silva, The name of the third Paulista is not known. In the same spirit of compromise, Mascarenhas created some militia units whose command was to be divided equally between Paulistas and emboabas . Disenchanted with the 23

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102 governor who supposedly had come to support then against the usurpations of the emhoabas , the Paulistas refused to accept the posts vhich vere offered them. The stand of the Paulistas, accusing Mascarenhas of favoritism for his failure to arrest or expel the emhoabas as he had promised, 'forced Mascarenhas to drop his impartial pose and take a pro-Paulista stance. Once his pro-Paulista proclivities vere revealed, Mascarenhas made no effort to mask them. He granted a large number of sesmarias to Paulistas and nom24 inated Paulistas to key posts in Rio das Mortes . Mascarenhas' actions seemingly confirmed the opinion of many emboabas that not only vas he sympathetic to the Paulistas, but that he vas bringing chains vith him to use on those emboabas involved in the uprising. The angry emboabas claimed that they vere defending royal authority against the usurpations of the Paulistas vho were defrauding the royal treasury by smuggling gold and not paying the royal fifth. Viana decided to oppose the entry of the governor into the territory under emboaba control. Receiving good intelligence concerning the movements of the governor and the few companies of troops which accompanied him, Viana prepared to surprise his adversary. Arising one morning after camping near Congonhas , Mascarenhas found six thousand emboabas lined up in battle array before him — all chanting "Long Live Our Governor, Manuel Nunes Vianal Death to Fernando Martins Mascarenhas if he 25 does not return to Rio." The frightened governor, after

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103 several meetings with the "emboaba leaders , agreed to return to Rio. He vas given three days to prepare for his return; he needed but two. At approximately the time that Mascarenhas was returning to Rio de Janeiro after his dismal failure, his successor was disembarking after the long voyage from Portugal. The new governor, Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho was a more capable official than his predecessor. He was born in Portugal in 1655 but had spent some of his early years in Maranhao, where his father had served as governor. He himself served as governor of Grao Para and Maranhao, posts which gave him the political experience so obviously lacking in his predecessor. Within five weeks of his arrival in Rio de Janeiro, Albuquerque 2b was on his way to Minas. Journeying with a small group of soldiers — no more than a dozen--he was able to travel quickly and unobtrusively. He managed to enter Caete without attracting notice. There he confronted Viana, who accepted exile to his fazendas on the Rio Sao Francisco. Viana thus submitted to a governor accompanied by twelve soldiers, after having expelled another who had come with two entire companies, Viana submitted because the situation had changed radically. The major change had occurred in the camp of the emboabas. They had gone to war to expel the Paulistas -a goal largely fulfilled by the time Albuquerque arrived. Furthermore, the new gover-

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104 nor, later a Paulista supporter, was much more politic than Mascarenhas in his actions, refusing to attach himself openly to the defeated and disgraced Paulistas. With the threat of the Paulistas removed for the moment, the emboabas had occasion to enjoy the spoils of war. They had. fought for and acquired the mining claims held by their adversaries. Clearly, this entailed numerous injustices. Some Paulistas, who were not involved directly in the conflict were arrested and deprived of their holdings for purely selfish reasons. Since the emboabas had won control of the claims there was no longer any reason to continue fighting or to oppose royal control. Furthermore, whereas a case in defense of the earlier actions of the emboabas could be made, albeit weakly, opposition to a governor who was prepared to pardon all but Viana and Gurgel could not be easily justified. Ess entially ,t he emboabas had won everything they sought ; there was no need to jeopardize this victory by continued opposition to a new governor. One of the first actions taken by Albuquerque was to divide the mining district into six superintendencies , three of which were to be headed by Paulistas and three by emboabas. The six superintendencies were: Rio das Mortes under Borba Gato (Sao Paulo), Caete under Sebastiao Pereira de Aguilar (Bahiaj, Rio das Mortes under Pedro de Morais Raposo (Sao Paulo ), Carmo under Jose Kabelo Perdigao (Portugal), Serro do Frio under Lourengo Carlos de

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105 Mascarenhas e Araujo (Sao Paulo?;, and Ouro Preto under 27 Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes (Portugal). Albuquerque thus complied with his instructions which were to distribute posts equally, giving the Paulistas control of the areas where they were strongest. At the same time Albuquerque also confirmed many of the appointments of emboabas to militia and civil posts which had been made by "governor" Viana. While Albuquerque was attempting to restore order to the mining district, the townspeople of Sao Paulo were preparing a counterattack to regain control of the mines. Albuquerque tried, without success, to restrain the Paulistas. An army of two thousand Paulistas moved on Rio das Mortes where it was stopped by the entrenched emboabas , who had been warned by Albuquerque of the imminent attack. The Paulistas were forced to retreat by the approach of a relief column of 1,300 dispatched from the Ouro Preto 28 area . The "war" was over. It had lasted less than one year and few pitched battles had been fought , but the conflict had tremendous repercussions in the development of the mining district — repercussions far out of proportion to 29 the armed struggle.

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Notes 1. Mendonsa, Noticias dos primeiros des cobridores , fol.28 2. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, pp. k96-h9^ . 3. Golgher, Guerra dos emboa bas , p. 6k, k. Antonil, Cultura e opulencla , p. 290. 5. Bento do Amaral Coutinho to Governor Mascarenhas , l6 January, 1709 in Golgher, Guerra dos Emboabas, pp. 128129. 6. Suannes , Os emboabas , p. 36. 7. Jose Alvares de Oliveira, "Historia do distrito do Rio das Mortes," in Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p. hB-J. 8. Francisco de Assis Carvalho Franco, "Paulistas e Emboabas-'primeiros povoadores de Minas-Manuel Nunes Vianagoverno paci f icador , " Annais do IV Congresso de Historia Naciopal (Rio de Janeiro: Departmento de Imprensa Nacional, 1950) : 3, pps. 82-83. 9. Ibid. , pp. 82-85. 10. Ibid. , pp. 85-86. 11. Charles R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil: l695 1750 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 196h), p. 76. 12. Amaral felt that the Paulistas would strike at Ouro Preto because the emboabas were in the majority in the Rio das Velhas region. Amaral implied that the Paulistas were in the majority in Ouro Preto--a view which fails to explain Vhy they were so easily dislodged from that district. 13. Bento do Amaral Coutinho to Governor Mascarenhas, I6 January, I709 in Golgher, Guerra dos Emboabas , p. 12l+. lit. Protesto que no que, fol. 65v. Also Suannes, Os emboabas ,pp . 152-153. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, pp. 5^2-5^+5 expresses doubt that such a battle occurred, focusing his criticism upon the romanticized description given by Diogo de Vas concellos , Historia antiga . It seems 106

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107 unlikely, however, that the entrenched Paulistas would have refused to give battle to the approaching emboabas . 15. Mendonga in Taunay , "Documentos ineditos, preciosos da Biblioteca Publico Municipal de Sao Paulo," Revista do Institute Historico e Geografico de Sao Paulo kk{ 191+8^ ' 3 56 16. Suannes , Os emboabas , p. I60,; Franco, Diccionario de bandeirantes e sertanistas , passim; Franco, "Guerra dos Emboabas, pp. 119-158. IT, Manuel Cardozo, "The Guerra dos Emboabas," p. UT9 contends that these were the first militia units created in the mining district. As we have seen, the first units were created at least as early as I706 and perhaps earlier. 18. Rellagao fol. 32. do principio descuberto destas Minas Gerais, 19. Taunay, Hist5ria geral das bandeiras , 9, p552. 20. Suannes, Os emboabas , p. 1«0. Golgher, Guerra dos Emboabas ,p p . 13^-136 argues that the massacre did not occur and the legend was a later development conceived purely for propaganda purposes . 21. Mascarenhas to Joao V, 12 February, 1709 in Golgher, Guerra dos emboabas , pp. lOT-H^. 22. Petition of Miguel Rangel de Sousa Coutinho, no date but appended to a consulta of the Overseas Counsel of 30 August, 17Ub in Anais daBiblioteca Nacional 50 (1938): pp. lU-15. as. 2k. fol, Ibid. , and Suannes, Os emboabas , p. 2l6. Rellagao do principio descuberto destas Minas Gerais, 32. Also Suannes, Os emboabas , p. 223. 25. Golgher, Guerra dos Emboabas , pp. 160-161 26. Albuquerque acted before receiving orders from Lisbon. During the months of August and November, 1709, the Overseas Council met several times to discuss the situation. The consensus of the Council was that the newly appointed governor should journey to the mining district and without using force restore royal authority. This Albuquerque did before being ordered to act. CConsulta of Overseas Council, August 3 and 12, and November 23, 1709 in Documentos Historicos 93, pp. 2U2-2U3, 2U5-250, and 256:. 27. Franco, "Guerra dos Emboabas," passim.

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108 28. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9j p. ^7129. The "best treatments in English of the war itself are those hy Manoel • Cajrdozo , "The Guerra dos Emhoabas , Civil War in Minas Gerais, 1TO8-1709-," ' Hispanic American Historical Reviev 22, no.3(August, 19^2): U70-i+92 , and Charles R. Boxer's chapter "Paulistas and Emhoabas," in The Golden Age of Brazil , pp. 6l-83. Neither provides as satisfactory a treatment of the effects of the war as they do of the war. There is no really satisfactory treatment in Portuguese; altho although Isaias Golgher's Guerra dos Emboabas: a primeira guerra civil nas Americas is a provocative study, it contains some errors of interpretation. Golgher takes a pro-emboaba position, seeing them as embodying capitalist concepts and outlooks. Suannes , Os emboabas , comes down hard on the Paulista side. Franco, "Guerra dos Emboabas," is a good survey of the steps leading to the war and the fighting itself. Franco's style is descriptive and he avoids taking sides .

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Chapter 8 The Aftermath The Paulistas were defeated and their efforts to dominate the mining district thwarted. Their claim to privilege had been rebuffed by the overwhelming numbers of emboabas who had entered the region. At the same time, the victory of the emboabas spelled the end of many of the exclusivist policies of the crown. It is incorrect to attribute each step of the government's reversal of policy to the war. Some of these actions had been discussed before the crown learned of the outbreak of fighting and some had been enacted in restricted form. It is proper to state, however, that most of these steps were taken in reaction to the tensions and minor outbreaks of fighting that occurred before December 1708 and pointed to the need for a I'adical change in policy. The war q.uickened the pace of these changes and, in many cases, led to substantial reforms. Among the modifications considered most needed, and demanded from numerous quarters, was an increase in the quota of slaves allowed to enter the mining district. The original limitation, if maintained and enforced, would have prevented the expansion of the mining industry. On March 2I+, ITO9, before news of the outbreak of the war could 109

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110 have arrived in Lisbon, Joao V rescinded the restrictions 1 on the slave trade between Minas and Rio de Janeiro. This edict was a response to the various petitions for open access to the mining district which had been sent to the 2 crown by slave trading interests. The effects of this order were limited, however, as Bahia and not Rio de Janeiro was the major source of slaves employed in Minas 3 at this time . The Overseas Council met in February, 1710 to discuss the wisdom of maintaining restrictions on the shipment of slaves to Minas from areas other than Rio de Janeiro. The Council decided that "this freedom to send slaves to the mines for sale includes not only Rio de Janeiro but the k other captaincies of the State of Brazil." Exception was ma de to slaves used on sugar plantations, who could be sent to the mines only if intractable -and then replace5 ments had to be purchased. This recommendation, approved on November 10, was issued as a royal order February 27, 6 1711, thus ending the restrictive trade policies two 7 years after the defeat of the Paulistas. Besides the appeals of interested groups and the pressure exerted by the emboaba victory, there were other reasons for the crown's reversal in policy. The crown stood to profit directly from the taxes levied on every 8 slave entering Minas and from the increase in the royal fifth resulting from the expansion of gold production. In 1697, the cost of a slave in Africa was 9^$ 000 , with the

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Ill selling price in Brazil being l60$000. By ITI8, the selling price had climbed to 300$000 despite the great increase in the supply of slaves. This price, it should be noted was the price on the coast -certainly it was higher in the interior. The aftermath of the war also witnessed the first effort to institutionalize the collection of taxes. Before 1709 the quinto had been collected, when it was, by local guardas-mores and superintendents or at the smelters and mints on the coast. Governor Albuquerque upon his arrival in Sao Paulo town met with agents of all the councils of the captaincy of Sao Paulo and the local elites and held an assembly ( junta ) . It was decided to collect the quinto by a levy on mining pans ( batei as ) . This was, in reality, a tax on slaves. Furthermore, taxes were imposed on goods entering the region. Albuquerque then left for Minas where another junta was held in Carmo. All the superintendents, capi taes-mores , guardas-mores, procurators of the treasury, and representatives of the people (the method of selection is not specified) were in attendance. Because of the conflict, the Junta met first in the camp of the Paulistas, Carmo, and then in the camp of the emboabas , Ouro Preto. The quinto vas set at about eight oitavas per bateia and the import tax at four oitavas on each load of dry goods ( f azenda seca ) two on food stuffs ( fazenda molhada ) , four on Negro slaves, six on mulatto slaves, and one on cattle. This

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112 tax structure was approved by the king on November 11, 9 1711. The general tax on merchandise signaled the crown's shift from prohibition to regulation. The lifting of the limitations on trade was a victory for those commercial interests advocating an "open-access" policy. The victory of the emboabas ended the " exclus i vi s t" position position of the Paulistas regarding access to mining claims. Many Paulistas abandoned their claims in order to save their lives. Others were arrested or otherwise forced to vacate their diggings without real justification. The arrest, for example, of Domingos da Silva Monteiro, who had extensive claims in the area near those of Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes , certainly raises questions as to the motives of the emboabas. Isaias Golgher, the j.iinei^° historian argues that this shift in mine possession was a natural result of the conflict between the "feudal" Paulistas and "capitalist" emboabas during a period of stress caused by a change in the means of production from simple stream panning to the 10 more complex subsurface exploitation. This approach, while enticing, fails to explain why the Paulistas could not have modified their mining techniques to fit the new requirements. In fact, they should have been in an excellent position to do so, in view of their ownership of slaves and their accumulation of capital through exploitation of the alluvial deposits. The new system involved not a change in the means but rather in the scope of pro-

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113 duction. Only the war prevented the Paulistas from expanding their operations. With the exhaustion of the surface deposits they vould have had no choice but to turn to subsurface mining. Had the Paulistas been willing to compromise their extreme position, they would have retained their control over the source of wealth — the gold deposits. The intransigence of the Paulistas resulted in a radical shift in the ownership of the mines around Ouro Preto. Despite the efforts of the crown to restore the Paulistas to their lost gold claims, the Paulistas preferred to seek out new gold fields far from the victorious emboabas than face the litigation which their return would have precipitated. The new owners had their positions confirmed by Governor Albuquerque in I7II. An eyewitness described the event: To this ... place Cthe newly designated square] gathered the people, petitioning the governor Cto grantJ the neighboring mountains for the prospecting of their slaves, and this did the same governor grant, ordering the guardas-mores not to give claims on the said mountains, nor to divide the area, and whoever wanted to work the claims , got ownership through possession and it became his to mine and to sell. 11 The chaos reigning in the mining district before I7II had shown the fragility of royal control. Steps were soon taken to establish this control upon firmer foundations. The first action was the creation of a magistracy ( ouvidoria ) for the district of Ouro Preto in February, 1709. The first ouvidor appointed was Dr. Manuel da Costa

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114 de Amorim, vho was given both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In civil matters there vas no appeal from his decision in cases involving less than 100$000. He could exile nobles ( f i dalgos ) from, the county for two years and artisans for five. Over slaves his direct powers excluded only death. Death could be decreed without appeal by several ouvidores and the governor meeting jointly. Death sentences to free men could also be decreed but these were subject to automatic appeal to the High Court in Bahia. In addition, the ouvidor was responsible for issuing letters of security ( cartas de seguranga ), which were something like writs of habeas corpus. The significance of the ouvidor, however, is due not so much to his role as magistrate, but rather to the administrative functions which gradually accrued to that office. These primarily involved the ouvidores' powers to supervise the activities of the municipal council and thereby curtail independent action. While much of this expansion of powers occurred after 1720, it should be noted here that one of the few administrative powers initially granted the ouvidor was that of authorizing the special property tax, the f inta . The finta was the fairest of colonial taxes , since it was based on the value of 12 property . The creation of the ouvidoria was one response to a desperate situation. Others were needed if effective control over the area was to be achieved, a fact that was

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115 acknowledged in discussions within the Overseas Councils. 13 Of these, the most important occurred in July, 1709, just five months after the appointment of Amorim as ouvidor of Ouro Preto and even before he could assume his new post. The Oversea Council was, therefore assuming that the creation of the ouvidoria would not resolve the problems of governing the mining district. Six separate opinions were presented at the Council session about which some general observations can be made. A recurring theme was the responsibility of the king for providing good government : The good administration of justice and political government of the great number of people who live in Minas . , . Carel the objects of all communities C republicas D and the principal obligation of princes, this being the reason for which they were constituted by God and by the people. The need for a centralized government located in the mining district was recognized, although there was a difference of opinion as to its structure. Two counsellors proposed an integrated program calling for the creation of a triumvirate composed of a bishop, to found parishes and consecrate churches; a military officer, to establish a militia system; and a High-Court magistrate ( desembarga 15 dor ) to administer justice. Towns were to be founded and a tax system instituted. Three counsellors favored the appointment of a single governor. The five counsellors agreed that the mining district should be an independent captaincy and three of the counsellors emphasized the

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116 raising of some settlements to the level of towns and the creation of a militia system. The militia officers particularly the capitaes-mores , were seen primarily as administrators of justice. They were to exercise judicial powers so that the swift administration of justice would serve as a deterent to would-be lawbreakers. Furthermore, considerable attention was devoted to the problem of collecting taxes. General agreement was reached on several points. A mint should be established in Salvador as most of the gold leaving Minas went to the captaincy of Bahia for shipment overseas. To facilitate collection of the royal fifth smelters were to be created in the principal settlements of Minas or on the main roads. These would accept gold dust and make gold bars which would become the circulating medium. All gold dust found outside Minas would be illegal and thus subject to confiscation. There was also agreement that the collection of the tithe should be farmed out, since "all the sources of royal income ( rendas ) bring in more if they are contracted. The opinion of counsellor Jose de Freitas Serrao contained a view concerning the economic role which the mining district was to play within the Portuguese empire which would be repeated often to justify royal efforts to prevent diversification of the economy of the region. This commodity CtobaccoD will not be grown to a great extent in Minas since gold mining is so profitable that it vill not give way for another Ceconomic lb

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117 activity!) this crop should be prohibited because it will be harmful to the Rio de Janeiro monopoly ... and it is convenient that there be commodities which will extract gold from Minas . ' By 1709, there was no longer any confusion among the counsellors over the importance of the gold fields. Two counsellors dealt with the problem of coastal defense. The protection of the coast was no longer seen as contending with the exploitation of the mining district for the attention of the governor. The coastal cities were now described as "the ports of the mines" and as such 18 their defenses were to be improved. The decision to improve coastal defenses was made on the assumption that "the mines are considered in Europe, and not without 19 reason, to be the richest ever seen." This optimistic VI ew w as widely held despite the fact that the royal income already derived from gold production hardly covered 20 royal expenses in the mining district. While these ideas, were recognized as valid, several of them unanimously by the five counsellors, no formal recommendation was made to the king, since the president of the Council felt that most of them would req.uire large fiscal expenditures. He made only three recommendations; the creation of magistracies ( comarcas ) , the commissioning of capitaes-mores in the mining district and the estab21 lishment of a mint in Salvador. This report of the Overseas Council is important

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118 because it shovs that the royal advisors were avare of the intolerable situation existing in the mining district and vere attempting to discover vays of dealing vith the problems besetting that area. Furthermore various proposals made by the counsellors soon vere enacted. The arrival of news of the outbreak of the War of the Emboabas served as a catalyst to the adoption of policies previously considered inappropriate. An immediate necessity was the establishment of a royal captaincy for the mining district. It was no longer considered feasible to have the mining district governed as though it were Just another part of southern Brazil. The creation of a royal captaincy of Sao Paulo and Minas de Ouro was effected only after more lengthy debates in the Overseas Council and the expropriation of the donatary of Sao Vicente in 1709The statement of the Marquis of Marialva indicates the consistency of the Council's response to the difficulties in Minas. Marialva wanted the creation of a separate captaincy for the mining district with a governor named for an unlimited period of service. The governor would be accompanied by three magistrates, one to act as ,iui z de f ora while the others provided quick summary justice with appeals strictly forbidden, Furthermore, Marialva felt, an infantry regiment with Paulista officers was needed to provide security and to bind the quick-to-revolt Paulistas to the crown. As a further buttress of order, the marquis recommended the

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119 creation of a bishopric in the new royal captaincy and he suggested that smelters be established and all gold except 22 in bars be prohibited from circulation. This advice was accepted by the king. On November 3, 1709 the removal from the Jurisdiction of the Captain General of Rio de Janeiro of Sao Paulo and Minas do Ouro , as the Mines of Cataguazes would be called from I709 to 1720, was effected. Six days later, instructions were issued to Albuquerque who had been transferred to the post of governor of the new captaincy. He was ordered to "found some settlements so the people who live in Minas CcanD live under law and order." Moreover he was to expel all superfluous clerics, collect the quinto, establish a smelter, create an infantry regiment of four to five hundred troops "naming all the officers but the colonel." He was ordered to "nominate equally Paulistas and Portuguese according to their merits for the said posts, as also for 23 the government of the settlements which you establish." The crown for the first time was acting to put the administration of the gold-bearing region on a sound footing. While Albuquerque was not able to carry out all these instructions immediately due to the tensions left by the war, he was able to take several vital steps toward the establishment of royal authority. Certainly the most important of these was the incorporation of towns. According to Portuguese tradition, the town was the basis of local government and rights. A settlement could be elevated

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120 to town status only by a governor's decree followed by royal approval. While the latter was usually perfunctory in Brazil, occasions did occur when a governor was criticized by the king for establishing a town without express instructions to do so. The incorporation of a town was an important matter because in many ways it was an inf ringrnent of royal prerogative and brought into play an array of rights and prerogatives dating from the medieva,! past. Albuquerque established three towns at this time: Nossa Senhora do Carmo de Albuquerque (April 8, 1T11)^ Vila Rica do Nossa Senhora do Pillar e Albuquerque (July 8, ITH) and Vila Real de Nossa Senhora da Conceigao do Sabara (July 17, 1711). It was anticipated that these municipalities would strengthen royal control, but a conflict over authority between the town council and the king's officials soon erupted and was not resolved until 1720 and, in some ways, continued until the mid-1730's. The militia system was established for the first time on a large scale in the mining district after 1711^ As an institution, the militia was a very effective means of binding people to the crown, serving as a visible form of allegiance. While potentially a threat to the regular army, which it outnumbered almost everywhere in Brazil, this threat never materialized. Although occasionally individual officers conspired against the government, the full weight of the militia never followed these officers in a stand against the king. The years immediately after

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121 1711 saw the precipitous creation of a very large number of militia units and the even more precipitous commissioning of officers. The Wars of the Emboabas had radically altered the social structure. Before ITO9 effective political control had been in the hands of the Paulistas , although there were a few exceptions. Some of these were extremely wealthy men who transferred their economic and social status into political power. A good example of this is Francisco do Amaral Gurgel , who had parlayed gold mining, meat monopolies, and fazendas into a fortune reported by Antonil as fifty arrobas of gold. The son of Colonel Jose Nunes do Amaral, he served as sargento-mor and then capitao-mor of the Ouro Preto militia prior to I709. In other cases, authority was wielded by natives of Portugal, but these men had immigrated early and were, to all intents, Brazilians. In any event, these were exceptions: most of the power in Minas prior to 1709 was in the hands 2k of Paulistas . Indications are that of the Paulistas who had founded the settlements around Ouro Preto and then had gone to Cachoeira do Campo to defend themselves against the emboabas, few were able to return to their homes. The number of Paulistas who appear in the parish records of Vila Rica during the course of the century are few indeed. It appears that many of these Paulistas went to the region of Congonhas do Campo. This shift in population occurred despite the royal order of May 30, 1711, restoring all

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122 25 property taken from the Paulistas during the war. To circumvent the mining code, which abrogated all claims abandoned for over forty days, this royal order declared 26 void all seizures of mines abandoned under duress. Rather than accept this offer which would almost certainly have resulted in protracted litigation, the Paulistas generally preferred to explore virgin regions. As a result of this certrifugal action, the area around Pitangui was settled and quickly became a Paulista stronghold. This process was noted by Governor Albuquerque in September, 1T13: The residents of CSao PauloD seeing that the Portuguese in the recent uprisings had thrown them CPaulistasI] violently from Minas , and stolen the property which they had there, reached the decision to look for other serfSes to continue their discoveries and, reaching the place called Pitangui or Para, they began to find some gold there. With the abandonment of the settlements by Paulistas in large numbers , control fell to the emboabas . While the leadership of the emboabas was largely Portuguese, it must be reiterated that among the emboabas were some Brazilians. While some of these became disenchanted with Viana, none switched sides and joined the Paulistas. An idea of the composition of the emboaba leadership can be gleaned from Francisco de Assis Carvalho Franco's compilation of 28 biographies of key people involved in the war. Of the twenty-eight emboabas listed whose place of birth is known, fifteen were born in Portugal. Of the others, six were

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123 from Rio de Janeiro, six from Bahia and one was a turncoat Paulista. The Portuguese dominated the emboaba camp and were the major beneficiaries of the var . It is from the ranks of the emboabas that the new elite was drawn. The war also served as a catalyst for urbanization, although it is impossible to determine whether this was solely a short-term effect or if its influence continued after the termination of the war. Because of the fear Of reprisals, people on both sides tended to move from the outlying areas into the more heavily urbanized settlements which afforded more protection. New arrivals remained in the urban areas for the same reasons. This process, helped by the frequent availability of gold within or very near the urban center, must have lasted at least from 1706 to 1711. Besides increasing the size of the urban population this process must have been a boon to service industries, such as those provided by the artisans, and thereby probably accelerated the urbanization process. The war thus had a number of effects which make it a watershed in the history of Minas Gerais in general and Vila Rica in particular. On the whole, these effects were favorable to an increase in the control over the goldproducing areas by the crown. For the first time, a complex Portuguese bureaucracy was installed to govern a region which hitherto had been tenuously controlled by a governor based in Rio de Janeiro and a very limited number of officials chosen mostly from among the local elite.

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12i+ The victory of the emboabas also effected a complete change in the social structure of some areas, notably Ouro Preto and Antonio Dias. The war, therefore, was far more important in the history of Minas Gerais than has been assumed by writers who concentrate on its alleged "nationalistic" overtones. These, it should be noted, have been overemphasized by writers looking for the progenitors of Brazilian independence. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Paulistas were fighting to maintain their hold upon the gold fields, their socio-economic positions, and for nothing more. Furthermore, as often as not they were fighting Bahians and Pernambucans and Fluminenses (residents of Rio de Janeiro) rather than Portuguese. The stand of the Paulistas can better be understood as a regionalist manifestation.

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Notes Taunay, Historia geral das 'bandeiras, 9, p299 2, Among th de Lisboa wh Brotherhood, of commerce . roles played speaking wor shared socio an organizat Salvador in Trade (15^8ese was one from the Junta dos Homens de Negocio ich was composed of brothers of the Holy Spirit The Junta can best be described as a chamber This example serves to illustrate one of the by the lay brotherhoods in the PortugueseId, serving as a focus for individuals who -economic and racial affinities. Interestingly, ion similar to the Junta was established in 1720. Pierre Verger, Bahia and the West Coast 1851) (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 196U), p p. 11. There was no comparable organization in Vila Rica. 3. Goulart, Escravidao africana no Brasil, p. 1^+9While reliable figures are not available for a comparison, the dimension of the Bahia trade can be seen from the fact that 276 ships left Bahia with tobacco for Africa in the years from 1697 to 1710. In the previous sixteen years ninety-two ships set sail for Africa from Bahia. Verger, Bahia and the West Coast Trade , p. 11. k. Consulta of the Overseas Council, 6 February, I7IO in Document OS Historicos 93, p. 263. 5. Ibid, 26k 6. Royal Order, 27 February, 1711 in Isaias Golgher, "O negro e a mineragao em Minas Gerais," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos I8 ( January , I965 : 150. 7. Both Afonso de E. Taunay, "Subsidios para a historia do trafico africano no Brasil colonial," Anais do Terceiro Congresso de Historia Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 19^1) 3:622-623 and Golgher, "O negro," pp.lU9-150 accept this order as the key one officially opening the slave trade of the mining district. 8. The taxes levied upon slaves varied as new taxes were added periodically. Goulart, Escravidao africana no Brasil , pp. 19ii-197 provides a good description of the tax structure The following taxes were levied on Angolese slaves: 125

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126 direitos velhos ...dependent on q.uality and destination of slave direitos novos . . . . 3 $100 (created 169^ or I651) preferencias 2 $000 (created iGQk) imposto novo 1 $200 (created 1721) Slaves from the Costa da Mina had other costs to hear, such as a levy for the maintenance of the fort of Ajuda. These taxes were imposed upon the slaves prior to their arrival in Brazil. Once in Brazil there were other levies to pay. These included: 1709... 12 vintens for a license to enter Minas 1710... U$ 800 on entering Minas 17lU...H$800 paid on slaves entering Minas from Bahia 1720...1$000 on slaves entering Rio de Janeiro to defray costs of providing naval protection 1725...9$000 on slaves leaving Bahia for Minas by sea U$ 500 on slaves leaving Bahia for Minas by land Situations necessitating extraordinary expenditures by the crown affected the cost of slaves. Thus the collection of a dowry for the Portuguese princess in the 1720's forced the levying of a special tax of 2 $000 on slaves. In reaction to the earthq.uake of 1755 which devastated Lisbon, a tax of U $800 was imposed on each slave entering Minas Gerais , and in 1757 one of 2$ 500 was added to slaves entering Bahia. The imposition of these taxes piecemeal created a legislative jumble. To eliminate the confusion, a royal edict created a single tax of 8$700 on slaves arriving in Brazil . 9. Jose Joao Teixeira Coelho, "instrucgao para o governo da capitania de Minas Gerais (178O)," Revista do Institute Historico e Geografico Brasileira , 15 (I852): 323-327 and Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, p6l3. 10. Golgher, Guerra dos emboabas , pp. 62-63. 11. Rellagao das antigui dades , fol. hSv . 12. Regimento do Ouvidor de Sao Paulo, 1700, in Codice Costa Matoso, f ols . 135-139.

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127 it certainly was well informed as to the tensions which led to the fighting. This can be seen in the statement of the Counsellor Antonio Rodrigues da Costa: It cannot be expected that the prince can obtain taxes or any advantage from a confused multitude of people without law, without order, without obedience, without fear of magistrates, without dread of punishment and without hope of reward but rather disobedience and insanity. CConsulta of Overseas Council. 17 July, 1709 in Docu mentos Historicos , 93, p. 221.] ih . Consulta of Antonio Rodrigues da Costa, 17 July, 1709 in Documentos Historicos , 93, p. 221. 15. Antonio Rodrigues da Costa went into detail concerning the location of the towns : Every effort should be made to found these towns and settlements in healthy locations near rivers and good water, fertile lands and a short distance from the principal gold-bearing streams because these should -precisely the factors which should determine the location of the towns. Clbid., p. 223.1 be 16. Consulta of Jose Documentos Historicos de Freitas Serrao, 17 July, 1709 in 93, p. 237. 17 Ibid. 18. Ibid. , p. 235. 19. Consulta of Antonio Rodrigues da Costa, 17 July, 1709 in Documentos Historicos , 93, p. 219. 20. Consulta of Joao Telles da Silva, 17 July, I709 in Doc um entos Historicos , 93, p. 229. 21. Consulta of the President of the Overseas Council, 17 July, 1709 in Documentos Historicos , 93, p. 2^1. 22. Consulta of the Marq_uis of Marialva, 3 November, 1709 in Rau and Silva, eds,, Os manuscritos do Arquivo da Casa de Cadaval respectantes ao Brasil , 2, pp. 62-63. 23. Instructions, 9 November, I709 in Cod. 2(SG), fols. 1-k and Jose Pedro Xavier da Veiga, Ephemerides nineiras , I66U-I897 , ^ vols. (Ouro Preto: Imprensa Official do Estado de Minas Gerais , I897) k : p, I7I.

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128 2U. Unfortunately, the parish records are of little help in showing that power switched hands as a result of the war since only two baptisms were registered for the prewar period. This is insufficient evidence upon which to compare the pre-war and post war periods. Interestingly enough, however, both baptisms resulted from the illicit relations of Ventura Ferreira Vivas, a very rich and influential person, and Joanna Thereza. The padrinhos , or godparents, selected for the first baptism were SargentoMor Domingos da Silva Monteiro and Captain Bartolomeu Bueno Feio both of whom were arrested and deposed from their posts by the emboabas . The second baptism on July 30, 1709 introduces a new cast--Captain Manuel de Almeida Costa and Captain Bras Fernandes Rosa or Rola. The birthplace of the former is unknown, the latter, however, was an emboaba who served as Viana's representative to Albuquerque. Vivas apparently knew how to use the godparent relationship to his advantage. The implication that the emboabas had replaced the Paulistas as the influential men in the community is clear. It is also interesting to note that despite canon law, two male godparents were utilized in both cases. In the following year, 1710, five baptisms were registered. Of the seven males involved as godfathers, four were identified as Portuguese-born. More demonstrative of the flight of Paulistas from the region is the fact that of the thirty-three registered deaths of nonslaves for the period to 1720 in Antonio Dias, twenty-two were Portuguese-born, seven were Brazilian (but not Paulista) and nine were unidentified. Registry of Baptism of Joao , son of Ventura Fernandes Vivas, 3 July, 1707 in Registry of Baptisms ( APAD ) , fol. 1 and of Jose, son of same, 30 July, 1709, Ibid., fol. 2. Taunay, Historia geral das bandeiras , 9, pp. 557 S: 56O, lists Bras Fernandes Rosa's name as Bras Fernandes Rola. It appears that they are one and the same man. 25. Suannes , Os emboabas , p. 3^9. 26. Diogo de Vasconcellos , Historia antiga , 2, p. II6. 27. Antonio de Albuquerque, 1 September, 1713 in Silvio Gabriel Diniz, Pesquisando a historia de Pitangui (Belo Horizonte: n.p.^ I965 ) , p . 11 . 28. Franco, "Guerra dos Emboabas," pp. 119-158.

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PART III THE VESSEL AND ITS CONTENTS Chapter 9 The Incorporation of Vila Rica To the royal officials in Lisbon, the Wars of the Emboabas clearly demonstrated the lack of royal control over the mining area. Governor Albuquerque was ordered to establish royal authority over the district. The incorporation as a tovn of the settlements around Ouro Preto was to be an important step toward accomplishing this. The municipal system was the keystone of Portuguese administration and from it emanated the first level of judicial, executive and legislative organization. But more important, for the residents of Minas do Ouro and for the crown, was the role of the municipal council as a bulwark against disorders. Both the discussions within the Overseas Council and the instructions issued to Albuquerque on November 3, 1709 J reflect the emphasis placed on this function. Even before the outbreak of fighting in 1708, Garcia Rodrigues Pais had advised the king that without the creation of both camaras and ouvidores to administer the area and provide 1 Justice there would be neither peace nor development. The sequence of incorporation was Carmo, Vila Rica, and then Sahara. The documents provide no explanation for 129

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130 this particular sequence. Some J indie at ion as to the relative size of the nev municipalities can he ohtained from slave lists prepared for tax purposes. The first of those p,vailahle is for the year I716 and shovs that the municipality of Carmo had 638U slaves while that of Vila Rica had 6271. The disparity between the two increased thereafter. The figures for the entire mining district are as 3 follows : Carmo Vila Rica Sahara Sao Joao del Rei Sao Jose del Rei Caete . Serro Fitangui Total 1716 1717 1718 6,83i+ 10,971+ 10,937 6,271 7,110 7,708 U,905 5,712 5,771 3,051 2,282 2,216 1,393 1,32^ 3,8i+8 U,3i+7 i+,U78 3,000 2,096 2,090 283 U15 1719 9,812 7,653 U,902 1,868 l,l8li i+,051 1,671 359 27,090 3U,197 3^1,939 31,500 This disparity between Carmo and Vila Rica was not a temporary situation as is evident from the tax rolls of 1735 which show that Carmo had 26,892 slaves while Vila Rica h had only 20,863. But included within each total were all the slaves of the entire municipality and not simply those of the central urban area. The areas of the municipalities of Vila Rica and Carmo were of uneven size. That of Vila Rica included the outlying settlements of Itaubira, Cachoeira, Congonhas , Ouro Branco , Casa Branca, Itatiaia, Sao Bartolomeu and Catas Altas de Noruega. The municipal limits of Carmo included Antonio Pereira, Bento Rodrigues, Camargos , Inf iccionado , Catas Altas, Passagem, Furquim, Sao Caetano, Sao Sebastiao, Barra Longa, Brumado , Sumidouro,

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131 and Guararpiranga, in an area at least three times larger than that of Vila Rica. Because of the number and importance of these settlements it seems very probable that the town or urban core of Carmo had a smaller population than 5 that of Vila Rica. Why then begin with Carmo? An anonymous writer provided a fanciful explanation of this problem, CAlbuquerqueD resided first in SCaoD AntConiHo de Casa Branca in the plains [after leaving Sahara: and then entered the settlement of Ouro Preto and he elevated it to Vila Rica and then Che did the sameD to the town of Ribeirao C do Carmo3 . But the municipal councilmen of Vila Rica failed to raise a Pelourinho and those of Ribeirao put theirs up first and for that reason it became the oldest town . This explanation, while picturesq.ue , is improbable. The pelourinho was the column decorated with symbols which was erected in the main sq^uare as a symbol of incorporation as a town. It was not a precondition for this status but a visible proof of its having been conferred. The writer was presenting an explanation often offered by inhabitants of Vila Rica, as to why the smaller Carmo had precedence at formal processions and juntas. A more plausible explanation takes into account the situation existing after the Wars of the Emboabas . Vila Rica and Sahara had both been dominated by emboabas while Carmo had remained a Paulista stronghold. The royal officials generally had supported the Paulistas and condemned the emboabas, who were considered lawbreakers, as can be seen by the emboabas' need for a royal pardon, which was

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132 issued in 1709Carmo, as the major settlement in Paulista hands, was the logical place to begin establishing an equilibrium between the victorious emboabas and the defeated Paulistas. This view is supported by the convening in Carmo of the first junta held on Mineiro soil. As the first incorporated town Carmo gained prestige and was the de facto capital of the captaincy until 1720. One month after the incorporation of Carmo, the settlements of Ouro Preto and Antonio Dias were joined in a municipality. In the proclamation of July 8, 1711 Governor Albuquerque declared his decision "to create from this settlement CMinas Gerais do Ouro PretoD a town so that its residents and those of all the district can live regulated 8 by and subject to the laws of Justice." He acknowledged the poor geographical location of the settlement but noted the large quantities of gold which had been obtained already from the region and the promise of continued riches. He then went on to acknowledge Vila Rica as "the principal part of Minas , through which CpassedH the commerce and 9 merchandise which are sent to many other places." The principal men of the region who witnessed this act agreed "that from this said Settlement COuro PretoD together with that of AntEoniUo Dias should be founded a town since it was the most convenient site found by the People for 10 Commerce." It is significant that commerce rather than gold was emphasized by the local elite

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133 The newly incorporated town was given the name "Vila Rica de Nossa Senhora do Pilar e Albuq.uerq.ue." Besides the governor, twenty-three of the principal men of the region signed the proclaniation. King Joao V ratified the incorporation but deleted the immodest reference to the governor in the name. The twenty-three signatories immediately turned to the selection of a municipal council. The voting, in accordance with Portuguese custom, was indirect. First, voters chose six men as electors: Colonel Antonio Francisco da Silva, Mestre do Campo Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes , Felix de Gusmao Mendonga e Bueno , Fernando da Fonseca e Sa, Manuel de Figueire do Magalhaes , and Manuel de Almeida Costa. These men, in turn, selected the first council. The two municipal judges ( jiiizes ordinarios ) were Colonel Jose Gomes de Mello and Fernando da Fonseca e Sa, the three councilmen ( vereadores ) were Manuel de Figeueiredo Magalhaes, Felix de Gusmao Mendonga e Bueno, and Antonio de Faria Pimentel; the procurator or solicitor ( procurador ) 11 was Manuel de Almeida Costa. Thus the six electors chose four of their number to occupy council posts. The following day, July 9, they were sworn in. With the creation of the camaras , effective political divisions within the captaincy were created for the first time. Previous divisions had been created to facilitate the adjudication of mining claims by the guarda-mor, but little was effected in the way of establishing law and

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order. The appointment of the first ouvidores in 1709 implied the division of the mining district into administrative judicial districts ( comarcas ) , "but it does not appear that the ouvidores took their posts until 17IO or 1711. The municipalities thus provided the first effective jurisdictional division of Minas do Ouro. The council was established in the largest settlement in the municipality. The area under its jurisdiction vas knovn as the termo . Within the termo land grants were made by the governor, after seeking the opinion of the 12 camara and local officials. An area of one square league centered on the pelourinho in the main square was set aside as the land grant ( sesmaria ) of the camara. Parts of this land were parcelled out by the council to individuals and then taxed to provide municipal income. The grant of the sesmaria was the basis of the authority of the town council to give or sell plots of land and to establish a building code. The sesmaria was inalienable and theoretically only the use of the land could be "sold": land upon which no improvements had been made or which was abandoned reverted to the direct control of the council. Owners of plots had to pay a fixed annual property tax: only houses built before the incorporation and government and religious properties were exempt from taxation. There was within the camara's sesmaria an area called the rocio , land open to all — the equivalent of the common land of England and parts of the United States. In Vila Rica this

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135 vas land on which anyone could cut wood or pasture his animals. Gold strikes could be worked here, but such use of rocio land was temporary and contingent upon the miner's power to hold the land. Thus within the sesmaria of the town there were three catagories of property: that owned by the church, the lay brotherhoods, and the government; land common to all; and land whose use had been granted to individuals. Only the latter paid taxes. The entire pattern of small landholding was contingent upon the incorporation of towns. Land outside the municipal sesmaria was granted, by the governor, only to individuals. The incorporation of Vila Rica sixteen years after the discovery of gold in the Ouro Preto Stream brought to an end the early, chaotic period of the history of the region and opened a new phase. This new period was characterized by the effort to establish order out of chaos through the imposition of a governmental bureaucracy and by the development of Vila Rica into an urban center with a complex social organization.

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Notes 1. Garcia Rodrigues Pais to Joao V, l8 January, IJOS in Suannes , Os emboabas , p. 38. 2. Cod. ll(SG), fols. 2T5v. 3. Ibid., fols. 2T5v, 280v and 288. k. Mappa dos Negros , Codice Costa Matoso, fols. I8I-I87 5. An reporte it was tion fi was ref notions the fir " D e s c r i das Min politi c His tori anonymo d that C "the mos gures ar erring t of the st town gao geog as Gerai o e das CO e Ge us write armo ' s p t popula e cited o the mu day to e incorpor raphi ca , s : Seu rendas r ograf i CO r, in the late recedence was ted place." N and it is prob nicipality or xplain why Vil ated in the mi historica e p descobrimento , eaes , (1781) ," do Brasil vol eighteenth century due to the fact that o sources or populaable that this writer repeating some of the a Rica had not been ni ng district, olitica da capitania es tado civil, Revista do Institute . 71, Part 1(1908) : 133 6. Relagao do principio, fol. 32v. 7. An exception to this was c da Costa who, when faced with c sponsibility for the fighting, Paulistas were at fault. He ba perience of the past which show high-handed and exhibited littl and were "everyday committing a killing with impunity." This, the Portuguese-born emboabas "a the influence of laws and judge return .. .which they cannot do i cations." Consulta of Antonio August , 1709 in Documentos Hist ounsellor Antonio Rodrigues onflicting claims over redecided that probably the sed his opinion on the exed that the Paulistas were e respect for royal justice trocious violences and Costa felt , was not true of ccustomed to living under s and many having plans to f deeply involved in alterRodrigues da Costa, 12 oricos, 93, pp. 2U8-2U9. 8. Proclamation, 8 July, 1711 in Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro 2, Part 1 ( January-March , l897): 8*+. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 136

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137 11. Report of Election, 8 July, 1711 in Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro 2, Part 1 (January-March , I897) : 85! 12. Sesmarias were granted with the provision that they not infringe upon the rights of third parties and since each council automatically was granted a one-square league sesmaria, the governor obviously could not make grants within this region. Less clear is the position of the peripheral settlements which were in the termo but not, as a rule within the sesmaria of the camara. Individual sesmarias could not be granted in places which were already settled. The problem of land tenure in colonial and imperial Minas Gerais is so confused as to merit a detailed study. Were the settlements founded after I7II, such as Santa Rita and Lavras Novas, established in places where no sesmaria had been granted, or where no effective control was held by the sesmeiro, or could the land be expropriated to establish a settlement? The answer could help explain the settlement pattern of the mining district. Minutes of Council Session, 23 April, 1732 in Cod. 28 (CMOP), fol. 26. The penalty recommended by the procurator for the takeover of common land was put at one thousand oitavas and three months in jail. This was an extraordinarily stiff penalty indicating the seriousness with which the council viewed the danger of infringement upon common land by powerful individuals.

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Chapter 10 The Urban Development of Vila Rica The impression which Vila Rica made on nevcomers attracted by the promise of quick riches is reflected in the words of Francisco Tavares de Brito, who visited the town before 1720. Among mountains of immense heights which limit the view in all directions , a town was f ounded ... prouder and more opulent than all Cthe otherU towns both because of the coming and going of merchants and by the richness of its mines, chiefly CthoseD of the Morro de Tapanhuacanga CVila RicaU along whose base the town stretches and rests. This Mountain is a Potosi of gold but because of the lack of rain in the summer it does not enrich all who mine.-'While Tavares de Brito does not provide a detailed description of the town, an idea of much of what he must 2 have seen can be derived from other sources. Almost certainly he entered Vila Rica along the main road through the settlement of Tripui and along the stream of the same name — a route flanked by fields filled with grazing cattle and hills whose lower slopes were cultivated. As the traveler neared the town the valley floor between the mountains became increasingly narrower and, finally, disappeared. The traveler then began a long, but not too strenuous, climb through a thinly populated area. The houses were built of daub and wattle with thatched 138

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139 roofs and surrounded by land, partly cultivated and partially turned over to the rummaging of pigs and chickens. These farms were called ranches . The settlements were known as Passadez and Cahegas. At a highpoint, called the Alto das Cabegas, the visitor was rewarded with a view of the parish of Ouro Preto and, beyond it, the Morro de Santa Quiteria, which served as both a backdrop for the parish church and a screen blocking from view the parish of Antonio Dias. The way from the Alto das Cabegas was downhill -gentle at first and then steeper. Just outside the more extensively built-up core of Ouro Preto the road forked. The left branch led past the simple church dedicated to Nossa Senhora do Rosario and then by the site where the church of Sao Jose would soon be built. The two church sites were in a small settlement called Caquende, which had grown only slightly between 1711 and 1720. To the north of Caquenda was a very rich mining area. To reach it, the traveler first descended the gentle hill to the gold-ladden Caq_uende Stream, which was fed by two brooks flowing from the mountains, and which paralleled the road from the settlement of Tripui . Called Tripui outside of Vila Rica, this stream was given the name Caquende as it neared the settlement of that name. Beyond the stream were the mountains which were to be the major source of gold in the region. This gold-rich area was known by various names . During the eighteenth century the most

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ll+O common vere Agua Limpa for the region now known as Velloso and the Morro de Ramos, or the Morro De Agrellos , 3 for the area more recently known as the Corrego de Xavier. The mining camps which developed around these gold strikes were never very large, as powerful men, most notably Antonio Ramos dos Reis, were able to control major portions of the gold field and keep other miners out. The easiest way to reach the more densely populated part of Vila Rica was to return to the fork in the road. The traveler then descended--keeping in mind the oftrepeated Portuguese saying that "downhill all the saints help" — into the region known as the "bottom of Ouro Preto ( fundo do Ouro Preto ). Aptly named, there was no lower area in the parish; to leave in any direction meant to climb. The settlement of Ouro Preto was fan-shaped with all its main streets meeting at the parish church. Dedicated to Nossa Senhora do Pilar, this church predated the incorporation of the town. It was built facing Tripui ; therefore it looked toward the most heavily populated part of the parish. The road a traveler would be expected to follow formed one extremity of the fan. Its center was the street now called Rua Rodrigo Bretas . It seems clear that this area was already heavily populated by ITll. Few land grants were made for new construction in this area in the years 1711-1720, and those that were issued note the existence of adjoining proper-

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lUl ties. The other extremity was the street called Rua Direita. Now officially divided into three parts, Ruas Pilar, Parana, and Count of Bobadela, the traditional name is still employed by older residents. This street probably existed prior to 1711 as a trail, but it seems that not until after the incorporation of Vila Rica did people begin to build houses along it. There are numerous references to "the new road which goes from Ouro Preto to the 5 pelhourinho" or "the new road which goes from Ouro Preto 6 to Antonio Dias" or "the new street which goes from Ouro 7 Preto to the city hall." From 1712 to 17l6 thirty land grants were made along this street. That this was an unsettled area in the second decade of the eighteenth century is confirmed by the documented fact that only two of these grants note previously bestowed property. Listing the owners of adjoining properties was a routine practice and failure to do so is an indication that no grants had been made in the area. While the settlement of Ouro Preto as a whole was large and rapidly expanding, it must have presented a strange scene to the visitor. The streets tended to a follow a straight line between points with apparent disregard for the difficult terrain. Thus, for example, the main road between Ouro Preto and Antonio Dias went directly over the mountain instead of skirting it. The size of land grants, from 1 1/2 to three bragas as a rule, indicate that building was contiguous at least in the more

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lU2 heavily settled area. At the same time, the whole area was given a rural flavor "by the use of thatched roofs and 8 the presence of the ranchos. There was another settlement in the parish of Ouro Preto . Called the Arraial dos Paulistas , its precise location has not been determined and its existence is seldom noted. By 1713, this small but apparently densely populated settlement. had reached its maximum size. It was absorbed very early by the rapidly expanding settlement of Ouro Preto. Several land grants refer to it as "the ara-y-al CsicD known as dos Paulistas in the ward ( bairro ) 9 of Ouro Preto." It is possible that this small settlement was located above the parish church and included the area from the church of Sao Jose to the Ouro Preto 10 Stream . The traveler wishing to see the rest of Vila Rica was faced with the arduous task of climbing the Morro de Santa Quiteria, then heavily wooded. The traveler on his way to Antonio Dias crossed the town square and descended-a task almost as difficult as the ascent due to the steep incline of the street. Half way down, the road parted, with one branch going to the lightly settled area called, then as now, the Barra, and the other leading to the parish church of Antonio Dias. Following the latter route the traveler was confronted with another decision as the road forked again with the left branch almost immediately being joined by another street. The first two of these streets

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11+3 led to the parish church. The third branched off to the left and led to the settlement of the Arraial dos Paulistas of Antonio Dias. This street was originally called the Rua da Fonte but gradually became knovn as the Rua dos Paulistas. Beginning below the town square, the Arraial dos Paulistas was strung out along the mountainside, terminating above the square. This was a relatively densely populated area with at least sixty houses in 1720. Returning to the parish church of Antonio Dias, the traveler would find himself in the heart of an urbanized area. As in Ouro Preto, the parish church was a stone's throw from the reason for the settlement's existence — a gold-ladden stream. The church faced this stream variously known as the Rio dos Paulistas, Rio Antonio Dias, or Rio Funil. While asthetic considerations perhaps determined that the church would be constructed facing downhill, its position serves as a reminder that urbanis tically Antonio Dias was connected not to Ouro Preto, but to those areas located further east. The configuration of this settlement was essentially linear. It was composed of four major streets: Ruas Direita (also called a Rua de Cima), Cadeia, Ponte (also called Rua de Baixo), and Paz. Land grants for the road leading from the square to the first fork in the road were not made until IJl^, indicating that the area nearest the square was unsettled. The two streets beginning at the second fork, Direita and Ponte Streets, ran parallel to

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11+4 each other for a short distance before joining once again. The parish church, dedicated to Nossa Senhora da Conceigao, 11 was located in the area hetveen these tvo streets. This area was well populated although the presence of ranchos must have given it a rustic appearance. The Antonio Dias Stream was a bountiful source of alluvial gold and many houses could be found along its banks. This watercourse was fed by a number of brooks which had their origin in the mountain which rose from its northern bank. The base of the mountain already was settled by a number of people, the most prominent of whom was Antonio Lopes de Araujo. On the banks of this stream Araujo had built and donated to the government a luxurious home presently called the Old Palace ( Palacio Velho ) , which served as the residence of the governors for a short time. After crossing to the eastern bank of this stream via the Antonio Dias Bridge, the traveler would proceed along one of the steepest streets in Vila Rica. This street, linking the settlements of Antonio Dias and Padre Faria, crossed the hill known as Alto da Cruz and later Santa Efigenia. After I718 many houses were built along this road, quite a few of which were located at the top of the hill. Their development was due to a unique stiuation in Vila Rica. Most of the other settlements had evolved in response to the existence of gold nearby. This one developed because a church was built at the top of the hill. The exact date of the construction of this church.

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Ih5 Nossa Senhora do Rosario, cannot be determined from the few surviving records of its lay brotherhood. The indications are that construction began before 1720. A residential area sprang up first around the church and then along the road.. Continuing east along this road down the Ladeira de Santa Efigenia the traveler would soon arrive at the settlement of Padre Faria. This was one of the first settlements in the region and the church of Padre Faria was one of the earliest built -although no documentation has yet been found concerning this church and its brotherhood. The date of its construction is usually set at 1T01-1T03. Of the settlements in the municipality. Padre Faria was the third largest, rivalling at times Antonio Dias in population and importance. For reasons as yet unexplained, but probably linked to new gold strikes. Padre Faria was once again expanding in 1719-1720 after a period of relative 12 stagnation lasting from 1712 to 1717. The settlement of Padre Faria had evolved chaotically around various gold-bearing streams which converged within its confines and then flowed into the Rio Funil near the settlement of Bom Succeso. More so than in the other settlements, the houses were built along the streams and the base of the mountain in a haphazard fashion. From here the traveler could continue along the partially paved and certainly well-marked road, passing through the area where the settlement of Taq.uaral would be founded in the 1730's

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lk6 and, after a trip of atout eleven kilometers, arrive in Ribeirao do Carmo. The square of Vila Rica, briefly mentioned above, is worthy of more attention because of its influence in creating the urban pattern of that town. The sq.uare played a very important role as the hub of the town and its unifying agent. Because of its importance and the paucity of documentation, it has been the subject of much debate. The date it was laid out, its precise location, and that of the town hall are the major q^uestions around which the debate revolves . Silvio de Vas concellos , the only author who has examined systematically the urban growth of colonial Mineiro towns, de-emphasizes the role of the square in Vila Rica, assuming that its creation, with the massive governor's palace and town hall, was dictated by an already existing 13 urban pattern. This view cannot be substantiated from the documents and is based on a misunderstanding as to the location of several key public buildings. While the existence in 1716 of the square itself is documented by lU Vasconcellos , he feels that its role in the urbanization process was neglible because the urban pattern was already 15 s et . The early councils met in a private dwelling in Ouro Preto, probably in one of the few houses in Vila Rica with a tiled roof. The decision to construct a building especially for the council was made in June, 1712 and the contract

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iUt 16 approved on June 22. The location for the town hall was chosen by the governor. A witness to this event later wrote that "where the praca is today there was CthenD dense woods. By trails which had been made through it, the governor with the council went to order the. location of the pelourinhoj marking the place where the Chapel of Santa Rita is today C1750Ii for the town hall, whose con17 struction was to begin immediately." This ceremony must have occured late in June or during July, as the first reference to the pelourinho in municipal deed records was 18 made on August U, 1712. Thus, in 1712 the decision already had been made to erect the town hall in a wooded area on Morro de Santa Quiteria. The urban land grants made during 1712 and 1713 refer to the trails which connected the two parish churches as the "new road which goes to the pelourinho" or as "the new road which goes from 19 Ouro Preto to Antonio Dias." While some houses probably could be found along these trails, the construction of the town hall on the Morro de Santa Quiteria served as a magnate drawing people toward it. This process was particularly evident on the Ouro Preto side of the sq_uare where the number of land grants issued jumped from four in 1712 to eleven in 1713 and thirteen in 1714. The records for 1715-1717 are incomplete, but those for I718 show that eleven grants were made. On the average, perhaps eleven grants were made annually from 1713 to 1719. The fact that the number of grants jumped

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1U8 dramatically with the beginning of vork on the tovn hall illustrates the importance of the sq^uare which traditionally faced that public building. It is probable that that astute official. Governor Albuquerc[ue , selected the location because it was a "neutral" position, equidistant from both settlements and also symbolic of their relatively 20 equal size in terms of population and wealth. The municipal book of deeds soon noted the presence of the town hall. Of the thirteen grants issued for property along this road in 1T1^» eight referred to "the new 21 street which goes from Ouro Preto to the town hall." It is during this year that the first direct reference to 22 the square is made. Two years later the council decided to erect a fountain in the square. Joao Pinto Rebelo was selected as the contractor for the project. The sum allocated for this fountain — one thousand oitavas — is in23 dicative of its projected grand scale. The establishment of the town hall in an area of virgin woods, crossed only by trails connecting the two major settlements, was, therefore, not determined by the urban growth pattern of Vila Rica; it was rather a brilliant move by Governor Albuquerque which fostered growth toward the center. It also served to tie together the two urban centers which were developing away from each other. This is a particularly important consideration in regard to Antonio Bias. The initial settlement pattern of that place can best be described as polar. To the west

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149 of the Ladeira de Santa Erigenia vas the settlement of Antonio Dias; to the east that of Padre Faria. Initially they were roughly equal in size. It appears that Antonio Dias was gradually growing eastward toward Padre Faria, a process that was accelerated by the building of the church of Nossa Senhora do Rosario on the Ladeira de Santa Efigenia. Establishing the town square on the Morro de Santa Quiteria served to counterbalance this eastward expansion . Polar development is not evident in the parish of Ouro Preto, where none of the secondary settlements were able to develope into competing centers. Caquende and Arraial dos Paulistas both were absorbed quickly by the expanding core of Ouro Preto. Passadez, Cabegas, and Tripui were an even smaller threat because of the lack of gold in these areas and their distance from Ouro Preto. In the absence of another center to attract growth, some building already had begun on the Morro de Santa Quiteria behind the church of Nossa Senhora do Pilar. The square accelerated this process. The urbanization process in Vila Rica was fostered by five interrelated elements. The first was gold. The settlements of Padre Faria, both Arriais dos Paulistas, Ouro Preto, Antonio Dias, and Caquende were located near the reason for their exis tence--the major gold sources. The second element was the church. Of the settlements which maintained a separate identity during the eighteenth

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150 century, each was located around a church. Those which 2k were ahsorbed quickly did not have churches; the urban expansion on the Ladeira de Santa Efigenia following the construction of Nossa Senhora do Ros^rio church offers a good example of this process. The third element was the town square and its impact on urhan development. These three reasons have heen discussed already and need no further comment. But there are two other elements which deserve more attention. One of these was especially important in the settlements of Cabegas and Passadez. This was the road connecting Vila Rica with Sahara and the other towns of Minas Gerais. Both settlements were small due to the lack of significant gold deposits and both evolved in linear fashion, with two rows of houses on 25 either side of the road. The role of commerce in the development of Vila Rica, the fifth element, already has been noted in passing: of the early town charters, only that of Vila Rica emphasizes the extent and importance of commerce as a reason for incorporation. This is confirmed by the early tax records which if they err do so on the side of understatement. The tax lists of 1715 show that the parish of Ouro Preto had forty-two stores and shops and that of Antonio Bias had 26 sixty-one. Clearly these represented an important factor in the growth of Vila Rica. Vila Rica's development as a commercial center was due both to its vast gold deposits, which sustained a substantial internal market, and to its

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151 location on the main trade routes of Minas Gerais. The settlements on the Morro de Vila Rica provide a good example of the urbanizing effects of commerce. Of these mining camps, Ouro Podre was one of the largest, with twenty-five commercial establishments catering to rowdy miners. On the opposite side of the mountain stood the mining camp of Ouro Bueno, with its twenty-one 28 establishments, and just beyond it was Rio das Pedras 29 with nine. An undefined area called the Morro de Antonio Dias, probably the area near Ouro Podre later called Ouro 30 Fino, had three stores. Of these mountain settlements at least two, Ouro Podre and Ouro Bueno, had reached sizeable proportions. These mining camps could have continued to grow and form urban centers, drawing men and capital away from the valley settlements where gold was mainly alluvial and quickly exhausted. Because of this possibility these camps constituted a threat to the urban growth of Vila Rica . As early as 1713 the council had taken steps to meet this threat. Stores and shops had been prohibited in these mining camps. The 1713 council had been frank in recognizing that its motivation was to prevent the diminution of the importance of the valley settlements and its 31 business community. Later councils were not so candid, contending that their actions were due to the fact that these shops sold large quantities of aguardente (sugar-cane brandy) to slaves who used stolen gold or their daily

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152 earnings to purchase this liquid escape from the harsh realities of their existence. This prohibition was not enforced as licenses were "being issued within two years; the problem of these commercial establishments doing business continued to plague Vila Rica. It served as the pretext for the draconian council decision of January, ITI8 ordering "that the stores located in Ouro Fino, Corrego Seco, Ouro Podre, Rio das Pedras, and Ouro Bueno close and come establish 32 themselves in this town." Popular outrage prevented the enforcement of this order. Even the governor's support of the council was to no avail and it was not until after the riots of 1720 had been suppressed that the ordinance was enforced. This ordinance ended the possibility of the development of a new pole of urban growth and it reaffirmed the position of the valley settlements as suppliers of the food and other articles needed by the residents of the mountain. Thus, the mining camps were prevented from becoming true urban centers. Forced to remain mere mining camps, these areas collapsed when the gold played out. Furthermore, the ordinance re-inforced the centripetal pattern of the valley settlements. In so doing the goals of the 1713 council were achieved. The tax records also provide some information about several of the other settlements within the county of Vila Rica. By far the most prominent of these was Sao Bartolo-

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153 meu. Nestled in a beautiful valley with fertile lands and adequate water, it became the breadbasket of Vila Rica. It is interesting that there were more taxpayers listed for Sao !6artolomeu than for either Ouro Preto or Antonio Dias. But there was no urban core here; this was a rural area whose economy was being exploited by the miners and businessmen of Vila Rica. The rural nature of Sao Bartolomeu is confirmed by the relatively few wage earners and artisans and the large number of farmers who appear on its tax rolls. Whereas Ouro Preto had twenty-four licensed artisans and Antonio Dias twenty, Sao Bartolomeu had but five. Furthermore, only five stores were listed for Sao Bartolomeu. While it was primarily a farming area, the existence of minor gold deposits is indicated by the listing of seven tax paying miners; there were probably other miners among the large number of people whose incomes were listed as deriving from slaves (twentyeight) or whose income sources were unlisted (fifty-five). Sao Bartolomeu was not the only area which supplied Vila Rica with foodstuffs. Others were Capao da Forna, Caohoeira do Campo , and Campo da Fazenda de Olanna, all west of Vila Rica. There were, in addition, many farms scattered to the west and northwest of Vila Rica, where the mountains become less rugged. The entire region was dotted with small villages. Thus the municipality of Vila Rica was composed of an urban core divided into three poles of growth: Ouro Preto, 33

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15li Antonio Dias , and Padre Faria. Immediately beyond this area were the mining camps nn the Morro de Vila Rica and the partially rural settlements along the main road. Still further beyond these vere the rural areas which, despite the presence of some gold deposits, were primarily devoted to suppling the urban core and the mining camps with foodstuffs. Despite the extensive area devoted to agriculture and ranching, it does not appear that these areas produced adequate quantities to fully satisfy the local demand. Many of the goods necessary for life had to be transported to Vila Rica from Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Pernambuco, or even from Portugal.

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Notes 1. Francisco Tavares de Brito, "itinerario geografico de Rio de Janeiro ate as Minas do Ouro," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileirg 230 (March-June, I956): 438. This work was originally publishea in Seville, Spain in 1732. Orville Derby feels that the Itinerario Geo grafico was written between 1715 and I718. Derby published this work, without identifing its author, in the Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Sao Paulo 2(18961897): 197-219. 2. The most important of these is the Livro de Foros , Cod. 1 (CMOP) containing the record of land grants issued from 1711 to 1720. The list of foros (land grants) was published in abreviated form by Salomao de Vas concellos , Os primeiros aforamentos e os primeiros ranchos de Ouro Preto," Revista do Servigo do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional . 5 (19I+I): 2^40-257. Because of its abreviated form the list omits valuable information. 3. When the highway from Belo Horizonte to Ouro Preto was constructed a number of years ago, the corrego was filled and the iron bridge that spanned it was removed and sold. The gorge, which old-timers still remember, apparently was quite deep, having been the scene of suicides more than once. Among the present generation of Ouropretanos the area has no distinctive name nor is there any general realization that there had ever been a gorge there. U. Cod. 1 (CMOP). 5. Land grant of Tome Ferreira da Cruz, 22 November, T712 in Cod. 1 (CMOP), fol. 30v. 6. Land Grant of Bento Cabral de Sa, 10 October, 1713 in Cod. 1 (CMOP) , fol. 37V. 7. Land grant of Joao Thome, 19 June, 17li+ in Cod. 1 (CMOP), fol. 1+5. 8. An anonymous contemporary no+ed: "Beyond the bridge of Ouro Preto where today there is a metal working ( cal deireiro ) shop there was th^ onlv houpie with a tiled roof which existed in this town." Rellagao das ant igui dades , fol. U9. 155

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1712 in C3d. 1 (CMOP), fols? I?v and'sv. ^ "" ^ "'^ ' 1 ^ m-i_ . 156 12. This fo; JJ^^i^^ ^t^ ll^l^; -..e. or lan. grants issue. pp. 111-112. florizonte. Imprl^^^ToHTiirrigeS) , 1^Ibid., p. 111. 15. Council Proceedings, 22 June 171? -in "a + Municipal de Vila Rica " AnJ. !' i-J ^^^^ "^^ Camara £i°-le_Janeiro '9 (1936 ) -^^rtf-^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^ resolved"T^~^ke a citv hall^I' r, ! council members announcement be .l^Tll tSfpr:' '"'Ihf • °''^^^' '^^ uity involved here since tL^ . ""^ ^^ ^°^^ ambigthe act of brin^IL th^ . ^^ ^^""^"^ ^°^1^ ^^^^^ to phraseology used sL^^t'"^^^'"^ "^ ^°^ bidding. The is unvar?!ited! '° xndxcate that this interpretation l6.^^Council Proceedings, 22 June, 1T12 in "Atas da Camara, tt 17. Relj Cao das antiguidades, fol. kg. 19. Land Grant to Manuel RibpiT-n oo r, ^ v 1 (CMQP) r^i o^ -laiiuex nioeiro, 29 October, 1712 in CoH 20, This may also have been s-

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157 Lourival Gomes Machado , Barroco Mineiro (Sao Paulo: Editora Perspective, I969): pp. II8-II9. 21. For a good example see the land grant given to Joao Thome, 19 June, 171^+ in Cod. 1 (CMOP), fol. kkv . 22. Land Grant to Nazario Carvalho de Azevedo, ? September, nik in Cod. 1 (CMOP), fol.l+9v. 23. Council Proceedings, 29 February, 1716 in Cod. U(CMOP), fol. ITOv. 2l|. This is not to establish the causal relationship of "no church therefore no growth," but rather to state the reverse. The absence of a church showed the frailty of the settlement and therefore its sus cept abi lity to absorption by more dynamic urban areas. However, as the case of Alto da Cruz shows, the presence of a church could encourage urban growth. 25. Thus the presence of this well-travelled road served as a stimulus and conditioner of urban growth in this outlaying area. 26. Licenses issued in 1715 in Cod. 2 (CMOP), f ols . 2U33v, 2v-12v, and 20-22v. 27. Licenses issued in 1715 in Cod. 2 (CMOP), f ols . I1I-I+5. 28. Licenses issued in 1715 in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fols . ikvI8v. 29. Licenses issued in 1715 in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fols. UO-i+l. 30. Licenses issued in 1715 in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fols. 13liiv. 31. Council Proceedings, 1 April, I713 in "Atas da Camara," p. 266. 32. Council Proceedings, k May, I718 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. 51. 33. Licenses issued in 1715 in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fols. U659v.

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Chapter 11 Social Organization Before 1726: The Potentates The society which evolved in the mining district was distinctive from that of Sao Paulo or of the Northeast. It was essentially an urban society in which upward mobility was relatively easy during the period prior to 1720. Social status was largely a factor of wealth--a rich man soon obtained the trappings of status, such as a militia commission, appointment by the king to one of the military orders, and a sesmaria. But wealth was a precondition and not the sole factor. Men like Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes have been cited as examples of people who despite humble beginnings were able to achieve positions of wealth and high social status. The Wars of the Emboabas played an extremely important role in the formation of this elite. The removal of the ruling Paulistas created a vacuum to be filled by others. Wealth was the crucial element of status. During the years of economic expansion, not only was wealth important for moving into the upper strata of society it was essen1 tial to remaining in those lofty social levels. This relationship between wealth and social standing is indicated in the tax rolls. For the period prior to 1720 the 158

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159 only source of data on relative economic status is the rolls prepared for the royal fifth in 1T15-1T16. The tax rates are very difficult to determine since 1715 was a year of political turmoil over methods of taxation. 'The royal officials wanted a fixed ten-oitava tax on bateias , really a head tax on slaves, while the miners wanted to continue contributing to a fixed sum, thirty arrobas , collected for the entire mining region. From the instructions which the Vila Rica council issued to its tax assessors it is clear that the council proceeded on the assumption that it was responsible for collecting a fixed sum six arrobas, 2l+ pounds, and seventy-two 2 oitavas. Unfortunately, the details of the individual assessments are not available. The significant thing, however, is that the levies were based on capital. This is apparent from the report of a junta held in 171^ to divide the thirty arrobas among the comarcas. The comarcas were to collect from their inhabitants "according to the 3 capital ( cabedal ) which each possesses," with the exception of shops and stores which were to be taxed equally. It was up to the tax assessors to determine the wealth of the residents of his district. The assessers were to be the most prominent men in each district; it was assumed that such men would have no need to lie about their or anyone else's economic status. This may be debated, but what is most pertinent to the utilization of this data for the purpose at hand is the fact that the tax was on

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i6o wealth measured in terms of money, stores, shops and slaves. Taxes were not levied directly on income as such. Thus this tax roll gives an indicator of the relative economic standing of individuals and as such is very valuable. The relationship can be studied best by examining the members of the town council and the fiscal of f icers--the representatives of the^ ruling elite. The first council about which relatively complete information was found was that of 1T19. Of the six members, information on five was obtained from the tax rolls. The judges were Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Antunes Collago, about whom no information is available, and Mestre do Campo Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes , who is well known. The most prominent resident of Vila Rica, Guimaraes in 1715, paid royal fifth taxes of ninety oitavas on his mines on the Morro de of Vila Rica and thirty-four more on his farm in k Sao Bartolomeu. The councillors were Sargento-mor Manuel de Sousa Cerq^ueira, Captain Antonio Ramos dos Reis, and Sargento-mor Bento Felix da Cunha. Residing in Antonio Dias , Cerqueira was a miner who paid eighty oitavas in 5 taxes in 1715Ramos, on his way to becoming the most powerful man in Vila Rica, paid seventy-three for his 6 mines. Cunha paid fourteen for his mines in Rio das 7 Pedras and was a very prominent resident of that area. The procurator was Captain Antonio da Costa Gouveia, who was also a miner and lived in Quro Podre. Gouveia paid 8 forty-three oitavas in 1715. Thus of these five men, four

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l6l paid taxes far exceeding the average of eighteen oitavas paid by all taxpayers in the parish of Antonio Dias, and the fifth, who may have had other properties which do not appear on this roll, paid slightly less than the average. It is significant that all five of these men were mine owners. While one also owned a considerable amount of land, this property seems to have been used to support his mining operations — to raise food for his labor force of three hundred slaves. But while wealth was important in determining status, it served merely as a prerequisite: to join the elite one had to be rich, but being rich was not enough. Examples of wealthy men who failed to gain access to the upper strata of society are plentiful. When the average tax payer in Antonio Dias was paying eighteen oitavas, people 9 such as Francisco de Rodrigues paid forty-five, Manuel 10 11 Rebello, fifty-seven, and Manuel Lopes eighty-eight. In Ouro Preto, men such as Manuel Goncalves , forty six 12 13 oitavas, Manuel Tavares Fereira, forty-three, Domingos Ik 15 Carvalho , fifty, Mathias Barbosa da Silva, seventy, 16 and JoS'o Abares or Alvares , ninety, all paid taxes far above the parish average of eighteen. The taxes paid by these men indicate substantial wealth but yet none was able to Join the homens da governansa--the pinnacle of society. The situation of Henrique Lopes do Araujo aptly demonstrates this phenomenon. Araujo was one of the richest men in Vila Rica and rose to become the capitao-mor of the

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162 district. But Araujo apparently never made it into the governansa--never did he serve as an fiscal officer or sit IT on the council. While his high militia position might have excused him, he should have served in these posts before being appointed capitao-mor. Furthermore other capitaes-mores , such as Domingos Correa Gomes in 1729, served on the council and as capitao-mor concurrently. Thus Araujo presents the strange spectacle of being an extremely rich man serving in the highest milita post in the region but never serving on the governing body of 18 Vila Rica. There are several possible explanations for this. First, his background vas a negative factor. Besides having the surmountable handicap of being of the same humble Portuguese ancestry as Guimaraes , he had the additional misfortune of being an exposto — a child abandoned by his parents and raised by others. This may have left the purity of his blood in doubt. Yet it does appear 19 that mulattoes served on the council. Furthermore, he probably was married while in Portugal and it is interesting that the death register of his wife Ana Maria does not accord her the honorific title " dona " due the lady of the 20 capitao-mor. This ommission could be accidental, but this is unlikely. It seems that, for reasons that are unclear, she was not regarded as a member of the upper class. Then there is the fact that Araujo built a house especially for Governor Pedro de Almeida, the Count of Assumar, to spend a few days upon his arrival in Minas Gerais. This

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163 extravagant gesture apparently was made in order to gain favor with the official. Indications are that Araujo's wealth could carry him to the highest militia post but not into the governanga. The homens da governanga constituted a pinnacle of colonial society. They were few, since only those who served on the council or as fiscal officers could be considered homens da governanga. Theoretically eighteen men a year could gain access to this inner circle. But in practice the number was much smaller, as those who had served as fiscal officers afterwards went on to serve on the council, and after 1730 the members of the council were required to serve as fiscal officers after their term of office was completed. Below the homens da governanga stood a larger group: the homens bons . These men normally formed the body from w?iich the homens da governanga were chosen, although entry into the latter could be effected by direct appointment to a council or fiscal officer post. Election to one of these posts made the person a homen da governanga and automatically an homen boju. Put another way, all homens da governanga were homens bons but not all homens bons were homens da governanga. Illustrative of this is a dramatic meeting held in 1721 to discuss the ramifications of the 1720 riots. So important was this meeting that the "nobility" ( nobreza ) as well as "the greater part of the ... People" were called by the town council to attend. The minutes of the meeting were signed by the "principal people" who were

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I6h 21 present. Fourty-four homens "bons signed the document. Of these, twenty-four, or more than half, were homens da governanga. Theoretically the membership of both groups could coincide exactly, but in practice this probably never occured, although after 1730, when the social lines became increasingly rigid, the tendency was for the two groups to be almost identical. The homens bons comprised a body whose composition was well defined and well known. Council edicts for a meeting of all homens bons resulted in the gathering of certain people -the elite. How the homens bons were selected is unclear. It may be that the council itself was responsible for chosing new members of this group, since it acted only upon the call of the council and, the council could, and did, eject people from it for failure to fulfill their responsibilities. The upper strata of society was not composed solely of the membership of these two groups, which included only the elite, the ruling class of Vila Rica, Many others had the prerequistes to enter this body. This larger group included such people as the sons of the elite, rich fazendeiros, large-scale miners, militia captains of white units and members of the unit of nobles. These formed the pool from which the homens bons and, in some cases, the homens da governanga were chosen. Here again the criteria for entrance were wealth, Portuguese family background, and local social status, most often evidenced by a militia commission and a land grant.

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165 One of the major criteria for exclusion from entry into the upper level of society seems to have been racial. Blacks were excluded. The captain of the militia unit composed of freed blacks, Caspar Dias, was not, for example, a member of the upper class; despite his wealth and militia commission he can not be considered a member of the upper strata. Mulattoes, on the other hand, were not excluded, although those accepted may have been lighter in color than those left outside. The presence of mulattoes in the upper levels of colonial society can be shown 22 only by indirect means. The assumption of the presence of non-whites among the homens da governanga rests upon a 1726 royal edict forbidding mulattoes from sitting on the council any longer since there were enough whites to fulfill this responsibility. Mulattoes to the fourth degree were excluded from holding council posts as was anyone who was neither the husband of a white woman nor 23 the widower of one. Clearly mulattoes had served on councils in Minas Gerais , the captaincy to which the order specifically pertains, and in sufficient numbers to force the crown to act. It is probable that they served on the Vila Rica council. If so, the upper strata was not solely white, as it has been generally assumed, but mostly white with some mulattoes. While the presence of mulattoes among the homens da governanga can only be presumed, it is clear that some mulattoes had risen to the position of justice of the peace

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166 ( juiz de vintena ). Because of the difficulty of communication between the seat of the municipality and the peripheral areas within the jurisdiction of the town council, justices of the peace were elected by the council to administer these peripheral areas. The functions of the juiz de vintena will be discussed in detail below. They were prominent men in their parishes, presumed able to enforce the law within their jurisdictions. In 17^8, the ouvidor, Jose Antonio de Oliveira Machado reported that the council had been selecting mulattoes for this post contrary to the law. It is not known how long the council had been naming mulattoes asjustices of the peace. It is possible that Machado acted when they began being appointed in such numbers that this violation of the law could no longer be ignored. It is also possible that Machado was a zealous royal official who was offended by even a few such appointments. In any case, Machado immediately ordered the council to select white men for this judicial position when these were q^ualified whites in the parish. The ouvidor further threatened to nullify all future unwarranted appointments of mulattoes . Besides mulattoes, others who later would have been excluded from the upper levels of society were able to gain entry. Manuel Vicente Neves, for example, was a 25 scribe and also a militia captain — a combination not found after 1720. An even more remarkable case is that

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167 of Antonio Coresma, a tailor and also a militia sub-lieu26 tenant ( alf eres ) . Coresma's is the only documented case of an artisan who made even junior officer status, although there may have "been others. These two cases point 'to the fluidity of the system; it is probable that there are numerous cases of a similar nature. An examination of the sources of income claimed by the elite for tax purposes is illuminating. Of the men vho served either on the council or as fiscal officers prior to 1721, fifty appear in the tax records of I7161719. Of these representatives of the homens da governanga, twenty-one were owners of r o g a s and s i t i os . While the terms conjure images of small farms, in reality the rogas and sitos could be more properly termed f azendas , since they often were measured in sq^uare leagues. Of this group of men seventeen were listed as owners of slaves. These seventeen paid an average tax of almost fifty-eight oitavas , on both their slaves and land. They were levied three times the average of eighteen paid by all the taxpayers in 1716 as their share of the royal fifth tax. Two of these landowners also possessed mines. The four who were listed as landowners but not slave-owners appear to be exceptional cases. Three were merely mentioned with no elaboration and the fourth. Captain of Cavalry Leonel da Gama Belles , was taxed only a minimum of four oitavas for 27 his roQa . In thirteen cases, the tax rolls list only the owner-

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168 ship of slaves as the "basis of taxation. It is probable that these were employed in gold mining, although this is not mentioned in the public records. Since the records do not indicate the ownership of land in these cases, it is likely that the slaves were employed in the common gold fields. The average tax paid by the men in this category, about thirty-nine oitavas , far exceeded the average for the region. The lowest tax paid was a mere eight oitavas, 28 while the largest was one hundred and fourteen. 29 In only seven cases was mining mentioned. This figure is surprisingly low. The average tax paid by these men was sixty-nine oitavas--a figure almost four times the average . Of the remaining nine men, information is lacking for six, except for the amount of tax they paid, which 30 was above average in each case. The remaining three represent deviant cases. One, Miguel de Andrade Ferreira, served as council secretary prior to being accepted among 31 the homens da governanga. The second. Lieutenant General Felix Gusmao de Mendonga e Bueno , was taxed for owning and operating a tile-making establishment ( olari a ) as well 32 as for owning an undisclosed number of slaves. Joao Teixeira de Sousa, the third man, is the only one of the fifty whose ownership of a store can be documented. Further33 more, Sousa almost certainly was a mulatto. Thus forty-one of the forty-four men for whom detailed tax information is available derived their income either

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169 from farming or mining. Only tvo men were directly involved in manufacturing or commerce. Contrary to what might have been anticipated, businessmen played an insignificant role in the administration of local government prior to 1720. The homens da governanga shared a number of characteristics, status symbols and that are important in analyzing this stratum. Among these was the acquisition of large land holdings. An examination of the land grants issued in ITU reveals that many were awarded to men who would later enter the ranks of the ruling elite. Ten such cases were encountered. For the most part the grants were made in the region of Sao Bartolomeu, Cachoeira, and 3k Itaubira. While some were small, measured in bragas, most were substantial. The largest, which was issued to Captain of Cavalry Leonel da Goma Belles, covered more 35 than six Portuguese square leagues. That the elite quickly obtained sesmarias is not surprising. For some, agricultural and pasture lands were used to raise food for their slaves who labored in the gold fields. Thus Captain Pedro da Rocha Gandavo was awarded a land grant "because he had a great many slaves" who pre36 sumably were employed in mining. Others probably saw land as a sound commercial investment of their money and slaves. Because the soil in Vila Rica was very poor and incapable of supporting the town's urban population, and

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170 many miners vere not inclined to grow their own crops, these fazendas could "be profitable. It seems clear that holding a sesmaria was an attractive goal for members of the elite who had made their fortunes in gold mining, whether they wanted to retire to the land to live as country gentlemen or to try to harness the farm land to their various economic interests. What is significant is that, according to the tax rolls of I716-ITI9, more homens da governanga had their income sources listed as "rogas" or "sitios" than mining. This remains true even when those men who earned money from the direct exploitation of slaves are included among the miners . The fifty homens da governanga also typify another characteristic of the elite — the importance they gave to militia commissions. At least twenty-seven of them, probably more, held militia or regular army commissions prior to 1720, while others certainly received commissions after that date. The essential point is that the militia commission served as a means of externalizing status and of institutionalizing the informal authority and power which this status conferred upon any member of the elite. These men played an important role in the life of Vila Rica. They were accorded places of distinction during all public functions. They had the prestigious responsibility of carrying the insiginia of the town and the torches during religious processions. So important were

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171 these functions and so much significance was attached to participating in them that normally four or five shifts were selected to ensure that most of the homens tons had an opportunity to bask in the admiration of their fellow townspeople . Besides ceremonial functions, the homens bons had very real power. They served as electors. From their ranks, and from that of the upper strata in general, came the men chosen as judges, councillors, procurators, and fiscal officers. When the town council confronted a difficult decision or situation and needed assistance or support, the homens bons were called to an open session. This had the function of spreading the responsibility for the decision among a wider group of people. Effective political control of Vila Rica rested in the hands of these men .

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Notes 1. An example of what could happen to someone who lost his fortune is provided by Frutuozo Barbosa Barreiros, Barreiros lost his post as company commander after losing his fortune and going deeply into debt. Commission of Luis Teixeira de Figueiredo, 20 January, 1730 in Cod. 7 (CMOP),fol. 8Uv. 2. Council Session, 23 November, 1715 in "Atas da Camara," p. 385. 3. Report of Junta, 6 January ,. 17li+ in "Atas da Camara," pp. 293-29^+. U. Tax entry for Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes , Cod. 2 (CMOP), fols. 13 and 55v. 5. Tax entry for Manuel de Sousa Serq^ueira, Cod. 2(CM0P), fol. 12v. 6. Tax entry for Antonio Ramos dos Reis, Cod. 2 (CMOP), fols. Ik. 7. Tax entry for Bento Felix da Cunha, Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. i+l. 8. Tax entry for Antonio da Costa Gouveia, Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. kh. 9. Tax entry for Francisco de Rodrigues , Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 8. 10. Tax entry for Manuel Rebello, Cod. 2 ( CMOP ) , fol, lOv. 11. Tax entry for Manuel Lopes, Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 5v. It is possible that Manuel Lopes and Manuel Martins Lopes, who served as almotacel in 1712 and procurator in 1715 5 are one and the same person, but this seems improbable. Normally when a name appearing in colonial documents is incomplete it is the last name which is missing. 12. Tax entry for Manuel Gonsalves, Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 32v. Gonsalves was a carperter by trade. 13. Tax entry for Manuel Tavares Pereira, Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 25. 172

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173 lU. Tax entry for Domingos Carvalho , Cod. 2 (CMOP), f ol . 32. Domingos owned a store as well as slaves. 15. Tax entry for Matias Barbosa (da Silva), Cod. 2 (CMOP), 26v. This may be the founder of the town of the sane name located along the road from Rio de Janeiro to Vila Rica. 16. Tax entry for Joao Abares , Cod. 2 (CMOP), f ol . 2Tv. IT. The council minutes for 1T28-1T29 are missing, but from the codices of council letters and commissions a list of the council members and fiscal officers can be compiled. Araujo's name does not appear on these lists. 18. It is possible that election as capitao-raor provided automatic entry into the governanga and that, for personal reasons, Araujo did not wish to serve on the council. It does appear, however, that someone with Araujo's ambition would have wanted to serve on the most powerful organ of local government . 19. Infra., pp . 165-I66. 20. Registry of Death of Ana Maria, 26 November , ^1728 in Registery of Burial, No. 1, Parish Archive of Antonio Dias, fol. IV. 21. Council Proceedings, I6 August, 1721 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fols. 125-125V. 22. Documents do not relate the color of the skin of their writers and seldom do they refer to the color of important people, perhaps indicating the tendency to identify color with class: if it is assumed that important people could only be white, anyone who became successful also became white in the process. The birth records which provide irrefutable evidence for later years are of no help for this early period, as the oldest anyone born in Vila Rica could in in 1720 was twenty-five. 23. Royal order, 27 January, 1726 in Cod. 3 (SG), fol. 29v. 2k. Report of Inspection, 7 December, 17^8 in Cod. 22 (CMOP), fol. lOU. 25. Tax entry for Manuel Vicente Neves in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 30. 26. Tax entry for Antonio Coresma in Cod. 2 ( CMOP ) , fol. 3v. 27. Tax entry for Leonel da Gama Belles in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 36.

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17^* 28. Tax entry for Francisco de Almeida Brito and Captain Manuel da Silva Martins in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fols.28v and 39. 29. Included among these seven is Sargent o-mayor Arcangelo da Silva Vieira "que pesse couro." Since Vieira's place of residence is the gold mining district on the Mountain of Vila Rica — a area vhere cattle were not raised — I have assumed that the scribe made an error in writing Tax entry for Vieira in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. li+v. "ouro." 30. Thome de Andrade Freire, resident of Sao Bartolomeu, 86 oitavas ; Mestre do Campo Ventura Ferreira Vivas, resident of Antonio Dias, 36 oitavas; Manuel Ferreira Agrellos , resident of Ouro Podre, 23 oitavas; Captain Luis de Almeida, resident of Padre Faria, 7 oitavas; Captain Belchior Nogueira, resident of Antonio Dias, lU oitavas; and Antonio Alvares Machado, resident of Ouro Podre, I8 oitavas. Tax entries in Cod. 2 (CMOP), f ols . 50v, 7, hkv , 22v , 7v, and i^5. 31. Tax entry for Miguel de Andrade Ferreira in Ibid., fol. 12. 32. Tax entry for Lieutenant General Felix G^smao de Mendonga e Bueno in Ibid, , fol. 36v. 33. Tax entry for Joao Teixeira de Sousa in Ibid., I5. There is some uncertainty surrounding Sousa's race. Sousa's brother resided with him and the brother is listed as a "pardo." Since the reference is to his "brother," not "half-brother," and they were close enough to each other to live together, it must be assumed that they were, in fact, brothers and that Sousa was also a pardo. BU. That of Domingos Rodrigues Raposo measured five hundred bragas in width. Land grant issued I6 April, I7II in Cod. 7 (SG) , fol. 90v. 35' Land grant made to Captain of Cavallry Leonel da Gama Belles, 19 March, I7II in Ibid., fol. 80v. 36. Land grant made to Captain Pedro da Rocha Gandavo , 23 May, 1711 in Ibid., fol. 103.

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Chapter 12 Social Orp;ani zation : The Middle Sector Prior to 1720 the middle elements of the societycomprised the most fluid of the social groupings. It was relatively easy to enter this group, which was composed, for the most part, of miners, store owners, a virtual army of local office holders, and artisans. Others, such as paid employees, like cashiers and free-born mine foremen, and real estate developers, also could be included in this group, although during this period they comprised only a miniscule part of colonial society. So long as wealth was the prerequisite for upward mobility and wealth was a matter of a lucky gold strike, mobility upward was relatively easy for a person who was white, or nearly so. As it became increasingly difficult to make major strikes, as alluvial deposits were exhausted and more extensive capital investment in slaves and equipment was required to extract gold, then mobility became more difficult . The middle stratum of society was largely an urban phenomenon--only in urbanized areas do these people appear in such numbers as to constitute an influential segment of the population. This stratum is particularly difficult to study be175

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176 cause of the fluid nature of the social structure. Ironically the easiest component to define--the local office holder, such as the sheriff, doorman, meirinho, scribe, or secretary--is also the least mobile. These office-holders constituted a second-echelon from which mobility was lateral or downward. Movement from these positions into the ruling elite was rare. A scribe was a scribe and seldom moved up the ladder of power. Even the council secretary, who worked closely with the council members, was essentially of another world. Although many were named by the King from among his Portuguese-born subjects, only once during this period did a secretary gain entry into the governan^a. A large part of this stratum was made up of artisans, or oficios mecanicQs . While artisans could be found in rural settings, artisans in large numbers could be found only in urban centers. More importantly, guild organiza2 tion was impossible outside the urban center. The guild system existed in the towns of Minas, although not with 3 the same intricate organization and power as in Portugal, Not until 1713 did the council begin to organize the guilds. The decision, it seems, was made when it became apparent that there were enough artisans residing in Vila Rica to justify such action. The council "decided that it was convenient to name judges of the trades which existed in this town CandU that they prepare regulations which must be given to all the artisans with the prices

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177 that they must charge for the work they perforin." Judges were selected for the guilds of blacksmiths, carpenters, tailors, and shoemakers. These judges were not only responsible for preparing the regulations but also for ensuring compliance by the artisans. Equally important, the judges of the craft guilds were responsible for examining all who wished to exercise their craft within the jurisdiction of the council. Persons who had been examined elsewhere and retained their certificates were exempted from this examination if the council accepted the documents as valid. The judges also were required to protect the monopoly exercise of their crafts by insuring that no one outside of the guilds performed these occupations. There was opposition on the part of the artisans to the standardization of prices, as the prevalent philosophy of the day favored setting maximum and not minimum price limits. Thus any standardization would impose a ceiling on prices and limit profits since the economic boom during this period allowed the artisan to benefit more if no maximum prices were established. The craft judges as the representatives of their guilds prepared regulations in February, 1713 only under great pressure by the town council. In requiring this, the council showed its determination to regulate prices, citing the "great damage to the residents Cdone byj the very high prices which the 5 artisans of all the crafts charge for the work they do."

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178 All the artisans were required to abide by the codes and have them in full view of the customers. At least some of the artisans refused to obey the council; in April the council ordered the metalworkers, cobblers, and tailors 6 to pick up their codes within eight days. Thus after pressuring the artisans to prepare the regulations, the council had difficulty ensuring that individual artisans r complied with them. The following year, 171^, the council continued having trouble with the artisans. Because the judges served terms of one year, the initial difficulties involved the election of craft judges. On January 27, the council called for a meeting of all artisans "to elect Judges of the various occupations by majority vote according to the 7 statutes." The council was particularly concerned about the need for the judges to re-examine the regulations and make whatever changes were needed. Moreover, the licenses of the artisans and their regulations had to be re-certified semi-annually. The elections were scheduled for the twenty-ninth, with those who failed to attend being subject to arrest and payment of a fine. The elections, however, were not held until February 3 after the release of "many artisans from jail." This indicates the resistance by the artisans to the creation of the guilds and the imposition of the price and quality controls implicit in these craft organizations. It is probable that the artisans objected to

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179 controls which vould keep prices below the rates they could command on the open market. Their opposition was unsuccessful as the council was able to force the selection 8 of judges for the same four crafts. But the elections did not go smoothly as is attested by the arrest of a 9 blacksmith, Lucas Fernandes , for arrogant behavior. With the election of the judges the craft labor codes once again could be certified. Difficulties with the guilds were not limited to the first few years after the incorporation of Vila Rica. Even after the council's constant pressure had forced the craftsmen to select judges and accept regimentation in the form of price regulations, there was continued opposition to the full implementation of the guild system. As late as 1725, the council had to report that many people were working as stonemasons and carpenters without having been examined by judges of those guilds. The judges did not act to stop these violations of guild monopoly control; they had in fact, willingly allowed this to happen because of friendship for the unapproved artisans. The council had to act to maintain the monopolies of the stonemason 10 and carpenter guilds. Little is known about the men who served as judges of craft guilds during these formative years before 1720. No judge served two consecutive terms. One man, Domingos Gongalves, served three terms as judge of the blacksmiths, 11 in 171^, 1716 and I718. Four other men served two terms:

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180 Manuel Ferreira da Fonseca, judge of carpenters in I716 and 1718; Manuel C-onsalves (Gomes) of the tailors in ITI6 and 1719; and Antonio Coresma of the blacksmiths in 1713 12 and 1715Inexplicably, the blacksmiths showed a greater tendency to re-elect their judges. Of those judges for whom tax information is available, all paid higher taxes than the average for their craft. In some cases, their royal fifth payments were comparable to those paid by miners. Thus Manuel Gongalves Bega, judge of carpenters in 171^ » paid thirty-four oitavas; Manuel de Freitas paid thirty-two, as did Manuel Gongalves , judge of tailors, in I716 and 1719; and Jose Rodrigues de Souza, 13 judge of shoemakers, in 1715 paid thirty. While these were sums comparable to those paid by some members of the upper strata, these men were not able to bridge the chasm between the artisan class and the elite. One man, Antonio Coresma, did move upward, to the post of alferes, but his case is exceptional. There is no evidence that any other person at this time was able to do likewise. The compadresco , or godparent relationship, .does not seem to have been an important factor among the artisans at this time; this may be due to the social situation in which the number of white women must have been small and the men not always ready to acknowledge responsibility for children resulting from illicit sexual relations with their slaves. While several of the judges were selected as godfathers, very few were directly linked with other artisans.

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I8l There is not enough evidence available to generalize concerning the racial composition of the artisans. Only two certificates of examination exist for the period prior to 1720. The more interesting of the two was issued in Lisbon to a man born in Obidos. This leather craftsman ( selei ro ) had his certificate issued in 171*+ and "registered Ik in our brotherhood of Nossa Senhora da Conceigao." This « is an example of a brotherhood whose membership was composed of artisans. This Portuguese system of social differentiation through the lay brotherhoods was used widely in Minas Gerais. While some artisans were slaves, f reedmen, or mulattoes , it is unlikely that many were accepted for membership in the guilds , if later developments are any indication of pre-1720 conditions. The tax rolls for I715-I716 contain only seven artisans who fit this description. In all seven cases the artisans were freedmen of which three each were blacks and mulattoes. The race of the seventh was not listed. Five of these freedmen 15 were tailors and two carpenters. It would seem that the remaining artisans were viewed by the tax assessers as being free-born whites. It is highly probable that the vast majority of the master craftsmen were born in Portugal. It is probable, also, that rich fazendeiros or mine owners trained a few slaves in the crafts for their own use. Under these conditions there would be no problems with the guild members. The merchants were perhaps the most mobile group

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182 vithin the middle sector. If few artisans or office-holders can be pointed out as examples of upward mobility, many can be chosen from among the commercial community. By 1720 this community was large and still expanding to supply the growing economy. In 1715 there were one hundred and three stores and shops in Vila Rica itself. Four years later, there were two hundred and forty-four in the te'Vmo of Vila Rica. This economic boom continued -by 1733 there were two hundred and seventy-three business establishments in Vila Rica and well over three hundred and 16 fifty in the municipality. The type of establishments included in these totals varied and not all the owners belong in the middle spectrum. Store owners, almost without exception, should be placed into this category. The store, ( lo j a ) , was a large establishment normally selling durable merchandise ( f azenda s eca ) such as cloth, candles, and tools. Such an enterprise often required a large capital investment. Fifty-four establishments in 1715 were in this category. Because the richest of these store owners also had slaves or other forms of capital, it is impossible to determine how much of their income was derived solely from the stores. This category includes men such as Manuel de Sousa Freitas who paid seventy-two 17 oitavas for his stores and slaves and Domingos Carvalho 18 who paid fifty oitavas. As the average tax paid by the sixteen men whose only income was derived from their stores was 11.5 oitavas, it seems probable that the mining

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183 activities of these two men accounted for a large portion of thci r taxes . As in the case of Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes , it is probable that commerce provided the springboard for these men to enter mining. At least three men were identified as having achieved elite status by this route: Alferes Jose Pires Viana, owner of a cloth store and slaves, who 19 became almotacel in 1722, Alferes Jose da Silva, owner 20 of a store and slaves, who was chosen almotacel in 1732 and Joao Teixeira de Sousa, also the owner of a store, 21 almotacel in 1720 and vereador in 1725. Other men, such as Captain Joao Ferreira who paid eighty oitavas in taxes, were probably members of the upper strata, but for unknown reasons were unable to move into the homens da govcrnanga. The shop ( venda ) was another kind of business. Amply stocked with foodstuffs and aguardente , it normally also carried some durable goods. Vila Rica had forty-four 22 establishments of this type in I716. Less capital investment was required to open a shop than to open a store. Many of these catered to slaves. Probably because the capital investment required was limited, this was the path upward used by many ex-slaves and blacks. By 1715 the process had begun. While no storeowner was listed as a black or freedmen, five shopowners were. Another shop was owned by a mulatto. One freedman, Pedro Nunes , was comparatively well-off, paying thirty-six oitavas on his shop, pottery and tile making establishment, 23 and slaves .

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I8i+ From the same tax rolls it is apparent that the shops offered a means of livlihood for still another group: women. Five women were listed as shopowners and three as co-owners, there were no female storeowners. Thus the small capital outlay needed to open a liquor shop, for example, made it possible for members of the lower strata to move up a level in the social hierarchy. This process becomes more pronounced after 1720. For example, in 173^ two hundred and fifty-three licenses for shops were issued. Of these one hundred and forty-nine were issued to women and eighty-two to slaves. At the same time not a single license for a store was granted to 21; a woman or slave. It is possible that the capital for the shops came from whites who did not wish to be associated with business enterprises. This is perhaps truer for those licenses who were slaves since, as a rule, the bondsmen (required for all businesses) were the owners of the slaves. There is, unfortunately, no way to substantiate the suggestion that some licenses. ^ perhaps because of a social stigma related to selling to slaves and mulattoes , were fronting for others — except to note the difficulty for a woman or slave to accumulate even the small capital needed to open a shop. It is significent that the average tax paid by those shopkeepers and store owners who were taxed solely on their businesses was almost identi cal--9 • 8 oitavas for shopowners and 10.2 for storeowners. All indications are that the

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185 taxes were based on capital investment despite the law which set a fixed and equal rate on both shops and stores. But whereas the typical shopowner was taxed on little beyond his shop, the average storeowner was generally wealthier and had more extensive outside interests. Thus the average shopowner paid 13.6 oitavas and the storeowner 20.6 and over 37 /q of "the shopowners paid less than r ten oitavas, compared to only 20°/ of the shopowners. An interesting phenomenon was the appearance of urban land speculators and developers. These men would obtain a larger than average land grant from the council, build houses and then sell these properties separately. As early as I7I8, Joao do Couto Correia had obtained a grant of land with a frontage of fifty bragas. V/ithin six months he sold three two-and-a-half -braga lots, each with 25 a house. The price that was charged, two hundred and eighty oitavas, was not much more than that paid for a top quality slave. Lourengo Mendes Coelho was involved in similar activities. Coelho obtained six bragas along the Rua dos Paulistas in Antonio Dias and soon had sold three plots of two bragas each. It is, however, unclear whether he built houses on the plots or merely sold them 26 as unimproved urban lots. These early real estate developers were, during this period, clearly exceptional, but their appearance is indicative of the urban nature of Vila Rica.

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186 Thus the middle sector, during the period before 1720, was a rather amorphorous grouping into which entry was gained by anyone having the requisite ecnnomic status. Movement from this level to the elite occurred after I7II, but to such a limited extent that it is necessary to conclude that those who made the transformation were exceptions. It is unfortunate that so few records exist for the pre-1711 period. It seems plausible that among those emboabas who quickly filled the socio-political vacuum left by the defeated and exiled Paulistas were many men, like Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes and Henrique de Araujo Lopes, from this stratum of society. Store owners, tavern keepers, and artisans were thus given a chance to form the basis of a new elite, but after this, vertical mobility became increasingly more difficult.

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Notes 1. This exception was Miguel de Andrade Ferreira as noted on page 168. 2. Tvo studies of guilds have been published in the Revista do Servigo do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional : Raimundo Trindade, ' Ourives de Minas Gerais noB seculos XVIII e XIX, "12 (1953); 109-1^+9 and Salomao de Vas concellos , "Oficios mecanicos em Vila Rica durante o seculo XVIII," h (19^0): 331-360. While Vasconcellos includes a very "brief introduction, both studies are primarilylistsofcraftsmen. 3. For an examination of the political activities of the guilds in Portugal see Harry Bernstein. "The Lisbon Juiz do Povo and the Independence of Brazil, 1750-1822: An Essay on Luso-Brazilian Populism," in Henry H. Keith and S.F. Edwards, ( eds . ) , Conflict S: Continuity in Brazilia n Soci ety , (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1969) , pp. 191-226 and the "Commentary" of George E. Carl, Ibid. , pp. 227-230. k. Council Proceedings, 1^4 January, 1713 in "Atas da Camara," p. 258. 5. Council Proceedings, 13 February, 1713 in "Atas da Camara," p. 261, 6. Council Proceedings, 1 April, 1713 in Ibid., p. 266. 7. Council Proceedings, 27 January, 171U in Ibid., p. 302, 8. Council Proceedings, 3 February, 171^ in Ibid., p. 306, 9. Ibid. , p. 307. 10. Council Ordinance, 20 January, 1725 in Cod. 6 (CMOP), fol. 52v. 11. Election of Judges, 6 February, I71U in Ibid., p. 306; 12 January, 1716 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. 12; and 22 January, 1718 in Cod. k (CMOP), fol. UOv. 187

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188 12. Election of Judges, 22 January, 1T18 in Cod. h (CMOP), fol. kOv; 11 January, 1719 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. T2v; ik January, 1713 in "Atas da Camara," p. 285; and 26 January, 1715 and 25 February, 1715 in Ibid. , pp. 36l and 365. 13. Tax entries for Manuel Gongalves Bega, Manuel de Freitas , Manuel de Gon^alves, and Jose Rodrigues de Sousa in Cod. 2 (CMOP) , f ols . ik . Certificate of Examination issued to Manuel da Costa, Ik December, 171^ in Cod. 17 (CMOP), fol. 5v. 15. Tax data obtained from Cod. 2 (CMOP), f ols , lUv, l6v, and 2Uv. < 16. Proclamation of Governor, August 2, I718 C17193 in Diogo de Vas concellos , Historia Antiga, 2, p. 2ii0. Vasconcellos ' dating of this document is incorrect since it contains data for 1719. Data for 1733 obtained from Cod. 33 (CMOP) , passim. 17. Tax entry of Manuel de Sousa Freitas in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. kv. 18. Tax entry of Domingos Carvalho in Ibid. , fol. 32. 19. Council Proceedings, 3 October (?), 1722 in Cod. 13, fol. 56v and Tax entry in Cod. 2 ( CMOP ) , fol. 56v. 20. Council Proceedings, 1 March, 1732 in Cod. 28 (CMOP), fol. 21v. and tax entry, in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 2921. Tax entry for Joao Teixeira de Sousa in Ibid., fol. 15. 22. The remaining five men were engaged in unspecified activities, perhaps acting as commercial agents for firms in Rio or Salvador. 23. Tax entry for Pedro Nunes in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 72k. Cod. 31 (CMOP), passim. 25. Registry of Land Grants, Cod. 1 (CMOP), fol. 8. 26. Ibid. , fol. 98.

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Chapter 13 The Slave: Distribution and Orierins The bottom rung of society was composed largely of the masses of slaves brought to work in the gold fields. By 1716 the t^rmo of Vila Rica had 6,721 slaves, the majority of whom were concentrated in the immediate area of Vila Rica. In the same year, Minas Gerais as a whole had approximately 28,000 slaves. It was these black slaves who performed the manual work so despised by the Portuguese. Royal officials often commented on this attitude. Viceroy Luis Vahia Monteiro reported, for example, that it is certain that the mines can not be worked without Negroes, both because they work harder and because the whites and Portuguese even if raised with a how in their hands, once putting their feet on Brazilian soil, do not want work. A conservative estimate of the total population of the termo of Vila Rica in I716 would be approximately ten thousand. This should be viewed as a minimum figure. It is possible that there were that many people in the urban center of 3 Vila Rica alone. After 1716, the slave population began to grow more quickly as seen by the figures presented by Mauricio Goulart , which indicate that an average of 2,2^+0 slaves left Rio de Janeiro for Minas Gerais annually between 1715 and 1721, with the average increasing to 2,3l6 from 1721 to 1727. 189

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190 The slave population of the urban area of Vila Rica in 1721 vas 3315. The average number of slaves per slaveowner 5 was 5.22. The three major components of Vila Rica, Antonio Dias , Padre Faria, and Ouro Preto, exhibit significant differences in the average number of slaves per slave holder. Padre Faria had the highest absolute number of slaves, 1251, and the highest average, 6 . i+ 5 • This confirms the conclusion reached above that this area was undergoing a resurgence in mining. The fewest number of slaves, both absolutely and proportionally, was to be found in Ouro Preto. That parish had 1001 slaves divided among 235 owners for an average of i+.^+l. Of the 235 slave holders, 221 owned ten or fewer slaves and only three owned more than twenty-six. This can be seen as confirmation that most of the alluvial deposits in the area had been exhausted and that those areas being exploited were on the Morro de Ramos and these were in the hands of a few men. The bairro of Antonio Dias occuppied an intermediary position between Ouro Preto and Padre Faria. Slightly more slaves, 1063 to 1001, were reported for this bairro than for Ouro Preto, and the average number of slaves was also slightly larger, 5-11 "to U.i+1. This would indicate that, like Ouro Preto, mining was no longer a significant factor in the economic life of Antonio Dias, although probably more major operations were still functioning there than in Ouro Preto.

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191 It is understandable that the major mining camps had a significantly higher average, 8.6U, than did the more urban bairros in the valley. Of the three camps, Ouro Bueno was the smallest, reporting only I87 slaves with an average of 6.1+5 per slave holder. This mining camp had passed its hour of glory. However, the other two, Ouro Podre and Ouro Fino, were still booming as is illustrated by the high averages, 8.66 for Ouro Fino and 9-5^ for Ouro Podre. With 8^*9 slaves being reported for Ouro Fino and 658 for Ouro Podre, these mining camps had a combined slave population which exceeded that of any single bairro of Vila Ri ca. These data suggest that the number of slaves per slave holder is a means of determining the state of mining in specific regions. A low average occurs when the majority of people own no slaves and most of those who own slaves have only a few. These are probably employed as laborers, artisans' helpers, prospectors, porters, or for more specialized tasks. A higher average probably means that there is significant mining. There was no use for large numbers of slaves other than in mining. The farms which existed in the region of Vila Rica were newly established and were adjuncts to mining in that they were used to supply food for the slaves. Often the same slaves served both in the mines and, in the dry season or during holidays, in the fields.

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192 This interpretation of the significance of the average of slaves per slaves holder is "borne out by analysis of the slaveowning class. In those areas known to he producing gold in significant quantities the number of slaveowners with more than ten slaves was much greater than that in regions known to be agricultural. Thus 27% of the slave owners of Ouro Fino owned more than ten slaves; the figure for Ouro Podre was 25 % , Ouro Bueno, 57 % , *" Itatiaia, 20%, and Itaubira 29 %• On the other hand, in the cattle and farming ai'eas of Cachoeira, Congonhas , Casa Branca (some mining), and Sao Bartolomeu, those owners who had more than ten slaves comprised, respectively, 12%, 13%, 18 %, and l6 % of the total number of owners. In this respect, the three bairros of Vila Rica conform more closely with the nonmining areas. This would seem to be due to their urban nature which utilized large numbers of slaves as domestic workers, porters, and artisans' helpers. The total slave population of the termo of Vila Rica in 1722 was 12,6U8 of which only 26% was to be found within the urban limits of Vila Rica. This population represents 61% of the slave population of the termo in 1725 and 68 % 6 of 17^9This very rapid expansion of the slave population within two decades of the first major waves of migrants serves to illustrate the dramatic nature of the gold rush. The slave population of Vila Rica before 1720 may be examined more closely through the records compiled for collecting the royal fifth. As these records were main-

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193 tained by the council and used to levy taxes on a per capita bas'is, it must be assumed that some slaves were hidden from the tax appraisers. These records shov the great imbalance in the sexes which resulted from the headlong dash into the gold fields during the twenty-five years after l695. Of the 512 slaves owned by 111 individuals listed in the earliest records available (1716), 7 ninety-five percent, U88, were males. This shortage of slave women illustrates what must have been the normal situation during the period of rapid economic expansion, when mine labor was needed immediately. The gap between the sexes would begin to close only after 1720 with the evolution of a more stable society. This development is confirmed by the first complete census taken in Vila Rica, that of iSoU. This census lists l6U0 slaves as residing within the urban confines of Vila Rica or owned by residents of that town temporarily living outside of it. Of these, 901, i5h.97o), were males 8 and 739, (^5-1%), were female. Census figures available for 1815 and encompassing the entire f&rmo of Vila Rica show an even finer balance. In that year, I831 slaves were reported, of which 929 (50.7%), were listed as males 9 and 912 (i+9.3%), as females. The slaves imported into Vila Rica during the period before 1720 came principally from two areas, the Bight of Benin and the region of Congo-Angola. The difficulty of tracing some of the names used by the Portuguese and the

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19*+ habit of referring not to the slave's place of birth but rather to the point from which he was shipped complicate the task of determining precise origins and necessitates the use of broader geographical areas. Analysis of the I716 slave sample of 512 yields some intriguing results. Foremost among these is the very 10 small number of slaves born in Brazil, 3.7%The scarr city of Brazilian-born slaves can be partially explained by the absence of female slaves and by the short time span between the year the tax roll was prepared and the begining of the influx of miners and slaves into the region. Eq_ually important, however, were the factors which prevented the sugar planters and tobacco growers of the Northeast from sending their native-born slaves to the mining district. Among these was the viceregal ban on dispatching cri oulo (native born black) slaves to Minas unless they 11 were intractable.

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195 Table 2 Origin of Slaves in Vila Rica 1716-1718 Bight of Benin Mina I76 Nago 1 Arda 1 West Central Africa Benguela 97 Angola 2;1 Congo 57 Luango I7 Mongolho 21 Qui Q ama 1 Bamba 2 Southeastern Africa Mozambique 314 Eastern Africa Coirana 2 Senegambia Cabo Verde. I3 Brazilian Crioulo 13 Mulatto 5 Cabrinho 1 Unidentified Moleque Chara Sao Thome Gongella , Sera Costa Pimentura, Cobrana Mons aos io Lodaro Camba Catt abrain Gabarir Nogoma None Listed.... 6 k 2 h 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 I80U 31 1 hk 171 10 225 h6 3ii Rebola .... 3 Casssange . . 2 Cabunda .... 6 None Listed

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196 This edict vould have had little effect unless it had been to the advantage of the planters. Clearly, nativeborn slaves were more valuable and therefore among the last to be sold. They would have been acclimatized and already would have absorbed Portuguese language and culture. 12 Despite the reputation enjoyed by Mina slaves, slaves from the Bight of Benin accounted for only 35 % of the total in the 1T16 sample. Bantu slaves from the CongoAngola region were more numerous, representing about i+O of the total. This is remarkable since the miners believed that Mina slaves had a knack for finding gold and Mina 13 women were considered to be very attractive physically. It is not probable that the percentage of Mina slaves found in Vila Rica or even in Minas Gerais increased after lTl6. Two events conspired to prevent this increase. The first was a change in the tribal balance of power in the area of present-day Dahomey. The first three decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the expansion of the state of Dahomey culminating in the seizure of the coastal areas during the 1720's. Having conquered the points of contact between slave buyers and sellers, the king of 14 Dahomey acted to stop the export of slaves. While the order could not be enforced completely, it appears that there was a sharp decline in slave exports from this re15 gion. The second factor was the decision of the Portuguese government to encourage the importation of Angola slaves into the mining region "since it is clear that they

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197 are more trustful, more subservient and obedient than the Mina slaves whose courage could lead them to enter into 16 some plan to oppose the whites. These actions had an effect upon the slave trade which can be noted in two ways. In 1T38 the Overseas Council in its discussions of the slave trade, and particularly the draining of slaves from Bahia to Minas r Gerais, reported that slaves ships sailing from the Costa de Mina represented less than half of earlier numbers and 17 that the commerce itself was in a state of confusion. By 180)+ the Mina slave represented only 5.3% of all the slaves found in Antonio Dias and 12% of these who were 18 born in Africa, One may speculate on the possibilities that the attraction of the Portuguese for the Mina had an effect in determining who would be freed from servitude. Of the twenty-six freedmen and freedwomen whose wills were examined, twenty-one identified themselves as being from the Costa da Mina. Of the others, one each was Angolese, Fao , and Coura; another was born in Portugal, and the last one 19 in Rio de Janeiro. Clearly this is a small sample, but the results indicate that Mina slaves were freed in a proportion much larger than their presence in the slave population would seem to warrant. The Congo-Angola slaves comprised a much larger group than the Mina slaves. The percentage of Congo-Angola born slaves declined somewhat during the eighteenth century.

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198 from 39 % in l804 to i+o % in I716. But among foreign-born 20 slaves the proportion of Bantu slaves rose to 83%. It appears that as the century progressed the Portuguese tended to make fever differentiations among the origins of the slaves. In I716, thirty-one types of slaves were identified, of which twenty-seven represented African groups. In I80J4 sixteen differentiations were made with only eleven African groups being named. The most dramatic change which occurred after I716 in the composition of the slave population was the increase in the number of native-born slaves, crioulos . From a mere 3.7 % in I716, the percentage of native-born 21 slaves had risen to 53% by I80U. It is impossible to date precisely the beginning of the upswing in the number of Brazilian-born slaves but it seems probable that this was a phenomenon of the second half of the eighteenth century. As late as 1736 the Governor of Minas Gerais 22 complained that there were too few births of crioulos. This increase was due probably to the more settled atmosphere existing in Vila Rica by the end of the eighteenth century which encouraged the importation of relatively more female slaves and made family life more conducive. . Furthermore the economic boom in the North and Northeast drained away male slaves and helped establish a greater balance between males and females . Besides those places of origin already noted, two others deserve some mention. In the tax records for I718

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199 are found two surprises -Cosme of India and Ignacio 23 China. Thus among the numerous African and Indian slaves, were two Asian slaves. It is probable that these men were taken off ships sailing from the Far East to Portugal at Salvador and then sold in the mining district. Despite royal edicts to the contrary, it seems certain that Indians were used as slaves although in progressively smaller numbers during the eighteenth century. The initial attraction for the Paulista bandeiras, the Indians of Minas Gerais, were quickly decimated or forced further into the backlands where they stoutly resisted the efforts of the Portuguese to defeat them. In some cases , they even cooperated with runaway slaves to prevent the recapture of the latter.

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Notes 1. Order of Count of Assumar, 2 August, ITI8 in Vasconcellos , Historia antiga , 2, p. 2l+0. 2. Luis Vahia Monteiro to Joao V, 5 July, I726 in Docu mentos Historicos 9^ , p . 2 9 . 3. This estimate is based on the figures contained in Ibid U. Mauricio Goulart , Escravidao africana no Brasil: Das origens a extingao do trafico (2nd ed. Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1950). 5. Cod. 11 (CMOP), passim. This codice is the tax roll prepared for the collection of the royal fifth during the year ending July 22, 1722. The 3315 slaves were owned by 635 people. This tax roll is the source of the data presented in the following pages and summarized below. Summary of 1T21-1T22 Royal Fifth Tax Roll total total distribution of district slaves stores slaves ave. 0-10 1 1-25 2 6-50 511^ Ouro Preto 1001 IO8 221 11 3 \ .\\ Antonio Dias IO63 99 I8U 1? U 1 5. 11 Padre Faria 1251 72 161 25 8 6.1+5 N.S. da Soledade dos Congonhas 227 3 25 9 6.68 Cargolizo 150 10 5 10 9-38 Ouro Bueno I87 23 29 10 6.U5 Ouro Fino 8U9 72 23 3 8.66 Itaubira 902 6 70 17 9 1 9.29 Rio das Pedras/ Ouro Podre 658 52 13 2 2 9-5^+ Ouro Branco U33 5 56 8 2 6.56 Sao Bartolomeu 1295 19 159 20 10 6 . 80 Cachoeira 1003 6 I67 21 10 5-31 Itatiaia 906 12 102 23 3 7-08 Cersa 85 7^00 7-73 S . Antonio do Campo 751 U IOI+ 20 U 5:-87 Bocaina i+68 12 9^+ 5 10 ii.68 Congonhas U22 1+70 9 10 5-28 This does not include the 250 sla-ves owned by an unspecified number of clerics. 200

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201 6. Boxer, T he Golden Age of Brazil , 3^1-3^6 and Mappa dos Negros , Codice Ccsta Matoso, 181-18T. 7. Cod. 8 (CMOP), passim. 8. Herculano Gomes Mathias (ed.), Un rece n seament o na c apitania de Minas Geris: Vila Rica-l30U '[Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 1969), passim. 9. Mappa da populagao do termo de Villa Rica, l8l5 in Magos de Mappas , Arquivo Publico Mineiro. 10. Nineteen slaves listed as crioulo, mulatto and catrinho. Cod. 8 (CMOP), passim. » 11. Order of 27 March, 171^ cited in Viceregal Order, 17 August, 1715 in Docunentos Historicos , 70, pp. 228-231. 12. This is attested to by Zemella, Abas te cimento , p. 203. 13. Luis Vahia Monteiro to Joao V, 5 July, 1726 in Docu mentos Historicos, 9^, PP29-30. This is particularly interesting in light of Piere Verger's study of the slave trade to Bahia in vhich he concludes that the seventeenth century was the heyday of the Angola trade and the first three decades of the eighteenth that of the Mina slave. Verger, Bahia and the Vfest Coast Trade , p. 3. This is not confirmed in the Vila Rica samples which show the opposite of what could be expected. lU. Basil Davidson and F.K, Buah , The Growth of African Civilisation: A History of West Africa, IOOQ-I8OO , 2nd ed. rev. (London, Longmans, I969), p227. 15. Basil Davidson, Black Mother: The Years of the African Slave Trade (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961 ),p,2i+0 . Mauricio Goulart, Escravidao no Brasil , p. 212 presents evidence substantiating the decline in annual imports of Mina slaves into Salvador between 17^1 and I765. 16. Consulta of the Overseas Council, I8 September, 1728 in Documentos Historicos , 9^» pp.28-29« 17. Consulta of Wenceslau Pereira da Silva, 12 February, 1738 in Taunay, Trafico africano , p. 605. 18. Mathias, Um recenseamento na capitania de Minas Gerais , pp. 3-62. 19. These wills were found in two sources: the Arquivo do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional located in the Casa da Baroneza, Ouro Preto, and Registry of Deaths (APAD), Vols. 1-3.

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20 2 20. Aires da Mata Machado Filho, preserves some folk songs from a small to-wn near Diamantina which he contends is populated by descendents of calhambolas (runaway slaves). These songs, vi s sungos , contain traces of Nago and Bantu words and traditions. Aires da Mata Machado Filho, negro e o garimpo em Minas Gerais , 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilizagao Brasileira, I96U), pp. 6^*86. 21. Based on 305 slaves of a sample of 577. 22. Gomes Freire de Andrade to Acting Governor, 6 June, 1736 in Cod. 55 (SG), fol. 32l+. 23. Slave List prepared for tax purposes, I718 in Cod, 22 (DF), fols. 70v and lOlv.

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Chapter lU The Slave: His Threat to Society The threat posed by the increasingly large black population was never far from the minds of the local officials: slave labor exacted a price in terms of vigilance and the loss of peace of mind. Racial harmony did not exist in colonial Minas Gerais. What did exist was a multilevel form of conflict. On one level the conflict was in the open and active, taking the form of moc arabos or quilombos (communities of 1 runaway slaves), or slave insurrections. On another level it was active but less visible, taking the form of thefts of gold, tools, and other things to trade for aguardente , or to be hoarded to purchase freedom. Slave resistance included not only these essentially aggressive actions, but also the more passive forms of suicide or intentional maiming. Institutionally it took the form of black brotherhoods and their efforts to establish their equality with their white counterparts. If before 1727 the conflict was muted and less open than after that date, this was due to the mentality formed by a booming economy and the relatively low slave to master ratio of the early years, which tended to make the master-slave relationship more personal. 203

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20h Problems vith the slaves began early. In l699 Pedro II warned Governor Menezes of the dangers posed by runaway slaves "who look for convenient sites on some mountain where they gather and leave to commit CtheirD sad 2 excesses." By 1711 » capitaes do mato (bush captains), were being named "to search' for and arrest the many slaves who in CMinas GeraisD have escaped to mocambos that they 3 form in the sertao." By ITI8-I719 the activities of the runaways had become more significant; rather than withdrawing from the populated areas the calhambolas , as the runaways were called, went on the offensive. The Governor, Count of Assumar, reported that the "gangs of twenty and thirty and forty armed slaves" who were attacking farms on the outskirts of towns were having such an effect "that upon immediate and firm action depended the conservation or k ruination of this land." Apparently the major threat posed by the slaves during this period was the projected uprising of 1719. Assumar found evidence of this plot in Ouro Preto, Sao Bartolomeu, Forquim (t^rmo of Carmo) and Rio das Mortes. The coordinated uprising alledgedly was set for a religious holiday when the whites would be congregated in churches. Internal conflict among the slaves over leadership apparently led to disaffection and betrayal. Despite evidence to the contrary, the ouvidor of Rio das Mortes refused to believe that an insurrection was being planned and attribu-

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205 ted the unrest in his jurisdiction to the harsh treatment of the slaves by some individuals and to personal conflicts among the masters. Assumar reiterated the danger signals noting "it is only Your Honor Cvho isD of such difficult faith that seeing in Ouro Preto such clear indications of the uprising of the Negroes and even greater ones in Forquim, wish to persuade yourself that it can not happen in Rio das Mortes vhere the number of Negroes is greater C in proport ion toll whites than in other parts and where they live with more license because they are per5 mitted to carry arms against my orders." Whether or not an insurrection was planned is impossible to determine, as all the documentation emanates from the white officialdom. It appears, however, that this was more than the normal jitters of a slave-holding society. The reaction was particularly violent: widespread arrests and some executions occured. After being warned, local officials called out the militia and arrested some of the alledged leaders. Some of these, sent under arrest to Vila Rica, were called "Kings and Princes" in the correspondence of the period. Perhaps an indication that the slaves were conspiring with their brethren in quilombos can be found in Assumar's order that a quilombo in Sao Bartolomeu be destroyed. Assumar felt that a dangerous situation had developed because the masters had been too lenient on their slaves, noting that "even in peace and in calm if they are not treated with rigor, we will end up 6 in these labyrinths."

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206 The response of the Portuguese officials to the dangers inherent in the increasing slave population varied in accordance with the multiple nature of the threat. The tovn council attempted to institute a policy of controlling weapons. Storeowners were forbidden to sell any weapons to mulattoes , Negroes, or Carijos (Indians), slave or T freed. Despite repeated orders to the same effect, this ordinance was not enforced. As late as 1756, this failure was cited in a royal order which imposed the harsh sentence of ten years as a galley slave and one hundred lashes or ten consecutive days for anyone found guilty of this 8 offense. The bar to enforcing these orders was that maintaining slave bodyguards was considered to be a sta.tus symbol . Action was also taken to prevent slaves from gathering together. In 1721, for example, the council ordered the destruction of a number of ranchos on the Rua Paz which 9 were reported to serve as meeting places for slaves. As the slave population increased so did the problem. By 1735 the situation had reached such proportions that the residents of Antonio Dias and Padre Faria complained bitterly of the large number of slaves who frequented the Rua Direita and the newly opened Rua Argel (Algiers Street) . "so called because of the robberies and insults which are 10 commited on it." The danger had become so great, complained the petitioners , that over one hundred shops had /been forced to close communication to the Morro de Vila Rica

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207 had been interdicted, and the noise kept the area's 11 decent folk avake. Despite these efforts, the problem escalated dramatically after 1721. In 1735, a junta of homens bons proposed a wide ranging program to deal with the threat. All slaves outside the company of their masters were to be given a note by the latter, valid for periods not exceeding thirty days. The note would serve as a pass and any unaccompanied slave without one was subject to arrest. Second, each parish was to select and maintain a bush captain and soldiers. Third, runaways caught in quilombos of seven or more people were to be punished by having a hand cut off and being required to report all future activities to local officials. Finally, the sale of arms 12 was again forbidden to "Negro, mulatto or mestigo." Provision was made to allow the use of the finta among the 13 residents of each parish to support the bush captain. The slaveowner was responsible for treating his slaves humanely. Clearly this was unenforceable in a society where political power was in the hands of slaveowners. What is surprising is that anything at all was done to protect the slaves. Both the civil and ecclesiastical sectors of government were involved in this work. The municipal judge was often called upon to investigate crimes committed by or to slaves. The church also took an active role in trying to protect the slave in temporal as well as spiritual matters as

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208 can "be seen from the records of the visitations made into the parishes by clerics commissioned by the Bishop of Rio de Janeiro. This, however, should be viewed as an aspect of the church's policy of protecting the morality of the community rather than simply as an effort to improve the lot of slaves as an oppressed class. The church intervened because of its position as the watchdog over the morals of all the citizens. Minor punishments were levied on slave owners who were guilty of having illict 11+ sexual relations with slave women. The majority of the women involved in affairs brought to the attention of the inspectators were slaves or exslaves. For example, the visitation to Itatiaia in 1733 resulted in sixteen men and women being found guilty of cohabition. Of the women, eight were ex-slaves, five were slaves and three freeborn. Only one white woman was con15 victed. The number of freedwomen involved is an indication of their weak social and economic position. The church also sought to protect the sanctity of holidays by punishing slaveowners who worked their slaves on those 16 days. Slaves caught mining on those days were to have 17 their tools and gold confiscated. More often, however, the response of the political leaders of the captaincy was to increase the repression in response to the multiple nature of the threat. Assumar believed that rigorous punishment would serve as a deterrent. In 17l8, he noted with approval the

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209 salutory efforts of the Code Noir in "Messissipy and 18 Luiziana." In 1719, he suggested that the Achilles tendon of all runaways be cut and the value of the slave paid to the ovner by the other residents of the parish. This he felt, was the only way to avoid another Palmares (the troublesome quilombo federation in Pernambuco eliminated a quarter of a century earlier). According to Assumar this was a possibility because of "the various Liberties which the Negroes have in this Government Cas opposed tol the other parts of America, it being certain that it is no true slavery in which they live today. With more 19 reason it can be called licentious liberty." Assumar 's brutal proposal mercifully was not approved by the king. When the proposal to maim valuable property did not receive royal approval, Assumar acted within his authority by ordering that all slaves who ran away from their masters and were subsequently caught could be tried by an ouvidor. If at least two witnesses could be found, the slaves were to be executed. Their heads then were to be cut off and placed at the entrance to the nearest settlement as a reminder to other slaves of the retribu20 tion awaiting them if they attempted to escape. Efforts were made to mobilize the church in the drive to control the slaves. This was done in four ways. First, all slaves born in Africa were to be baptized there or immediately upon arrival in the New World. Those born in captivity were to be baptised like any new-born child.

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210 This vas required in the Ordena9 cTes and reinforced "by an 21 edict issued in 1719. Besides receiving the sacrament of haptism, the slave was to be taught the Catholic religion. This was another way of keeping the slave in his subservient position. Assumar, aware of the importance of religious instruction in this process felt that the Portuguese were not fulfilling their responsibility. This was due, in part, to the lack of time; "the masters make Cthe slavesl work all week and many who mine reserve Sundays and holy days to send their Negroes to carry food supplies from their 22 farms, so that no weekday is wasted." This failure was also explained by the language barrier. "Since the majority Lot the slavesl already come as adults from Angola and the Costa da Mina they learn only with difficulty to speak the Portuguese Language and the parish priests do not speak the Languages of Angola and the Costa da Mina." Since few miners were overly concerned with the spiritual welfare of their charges, Assumar again tried to use coercion. He ordered the parish priests to prepare lists of all the slaves within their parishes to ensure that each had been baptised and instructed in the faith. The lists were to be sent to the ouvidores so that those derelict in 23 their duties as spiritual overseers of their slaves would 2k be punished "with all rigor". The governor also tried to control the kinship relationships among slaves in such a way as to maintain stability

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211 Slave marriages were not uncommon and served to establish family cohessiveness . Even extra-legal unions accomplished this end. But the slave family as an institution had a tenuous existence at best because of the prerogatives of the master . The compradresco relationship was a means of filling this void. In the parishes of Antonio Dias and Ouro Preto many of the godfathers and godmothers selected during this period vere slaves. Assumar viewed this with disapproval feeling that this established an unnatural hierarchy among the slaves since godchildren would naturally respect and obey their godparents. This, Assuir.ar believed would result in the diversion of the slaves' daily earnings from their owners to their godparents. Worse still, the godparents had a moral position which they could use to aid the escape of their charges or to plot rebellion. To prevent this, Assumar required that godparents acquired either by reason of baptism or marriage (which established a weaker form of compadresco bond) be white. The report of the parish priest of Sahara that it was more convenient if the godparents were of the same tribe is indicative of 26 the reception accorded Assumar's order. The parish priests of Vila Rica also ignored this edict and slaves continued to use the compadresco relationship as a key element of the social structure of slave society. The best indication of the limited impact on the governor's edict can be seen in the minor change in the status of the god-

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212 parents after 1719. To 1719, 57-9% of all godparents selected in the parish of Antonio Bias vere free-born. From 1719 to 1726, the proportion increased only slightly 27 to 6U. 5% . The last means "by which the church vas mobilized to control the slaves vas through the black lay brotherhoods, These organizations, which shall be discussed below, were founded soon after their white counterparts and served to institutionalize the conflict between oppressor and oppressed. Essentially the conflict was transferred from the level of life and death to one of ostentation and prestige .

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Notes 1. Generally in Minas Gerais the term quilombo was used almost exclusively. Mocambo , which in the Northeast was one group of runaways within a larger entity, was used rarely. By royal definition a quilombo was a settlement of over five escaped slaves in an otherwise deserted area although it appears that this was raised to seven in 1735 See fn. 12 below. 2. Royal Order, 2k September, l699 in Cod. 1 (SG) fol. 126. 3. Commission of Francisco Goncalves Leca, 25 Februarv 1711 in Cod. 7 (SG) , fol. 73. h. Count of Assumar to Joao V, 13 July, 1718 in Cod. h (SG), fol. 555. 5. Ap Count of Assumar to Ouvidor of Rio das Mortes, k ril, 1719 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 121v. 6. Ibid. 7. Council ordinance, 3 February, 171^* in "Atas da Camara," pp. 307-308. 8. Royal Order, 2k January, I756 in Cod. 6k (CMOP) fols. 26U-265. 9. Count of Assumar to Council, 2 February, I721 in Cod. 6 (CMOP) , fols . 21+V-25. J2Vo^^'^^^^°''' undated (May, I7I43) in Cod. 1^9 (CMOP), fols 6o-68v . 11 Ibid. 12. Junta Report, 30 January, 1735 in Cod. 28 (CMOP), fols. 153-157V. 13. Council to Manuel da Costa Pontes, Marcos de Sousa, Alferes Jose Nobre dos Santos, 15 March, 1735 in Cod. 3k (CMOP), fol. 18. The council was complaining of the delays in the collection of the finta in the districts where 213

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214 these men were the officials who had "been delegated the responsibility for ensuring that the tax was collected. Governor Gomes Freire de Andrade advised the councils in an order issued in 17^1 that Joao V had authorized the council, if strapped financially, to collect up to three hundred oitavas by the finta. ik . This sometimes meant that clerics were convicted along with laymen. Father Felipe Teixeira Pinto of the parish of Conceicao de Giruoca, for example, was found guilty of having a black female slave within his house thereby creating great scandal. He was also condemned for going to a dance with a mulatta. Sentence of Father Felipe Teixeira Pinto, 27 March, 1730 in Cod. 11 (CABM), fol. 20. 15. Report of Visitation, 1733 in Cod. lU (CABM),fols. kh passim. 16 . Ecclesiastical Order issued by D. Frey Joao da Cruz, 17 February, 17^5 in Cod. 9 (CABM), fol, 151v. 17. See for example the charges brought against Joao Ferreira and Joao Miguel, 1733 in Cod. lU (CABM), fols. 126 and hOv. 18. Count of Assumar to Joao V, 13 July, I718 in Cod. It (SG) , fols. 555-557. 19. Count of Assumar to Ouvidor of Rio das Mortes , 21 November, 1719 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 170. 20. Order of Count of Assumar, 21 November, 1719 in Cod. 6 (CMOP), fols. l6v-17. 21. Agostinho Marques Perdigao Malheiros, A esc ravi dao _ no Brasil: ensaio hi s tori coj uri di c o-soci al , 2 vols. (Sao Paulo: Edigoes Cultura , I96U ) : 1 , p. 71. 22. Count of Assumar to Joao V, h October, 1719 in Cod. k (SG), fols. 713-71^. 23. Ibid. 2l|. Count of Assumar to all parish priests, 23 September, 1719 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. 151-151v. 25. Count of Assumar to Parish priests of Vila Rica, Sahara, and Mariana, 26 November, 1719 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. I7IV-I72. 26. Count of Assumar to parish priest of Sahara, 26 December, 1719 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. l8i+.

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215 27. Of the 202 godparents selected from 1709 to 1719, 117 were freeborn, 78 slaves, and 7 freedmen. From 1719 to 1726 there were 200 godparents chosen: ;93 freeborn, 89 slaves, and 17 freedmen. Data compiled from Registry of Baptisms, vol. 1(APAD), passim.

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Chapter 15 The Slave: Living and Working Conditions Working conditions among the slaves created numerous medical problems. The best testimony as to the state of health of the slave population in Minas Gerais is that of Luis Gomes Ferreira, a Portuguese doctor who published a medical handbook in. 1735 after living in Minas Gerais for 1 over twenty-five years. Ferreira saw work and living habits as being the major cause of sickness among slaves. Some of the blacks live in water, (such as the miners who work in the declivities and the fissures of the earth) others like moles mine under the surface of the earth--some to a depth of fifty, eighty, and over one hundred palmos C22 meters^; other CworkI] in subteranean roads much longer, often reaching six and seven hundred Cpalraos-' vhere they work, eat and many times sleep. 2 One of the greatest killers was lung disease ( pont ado 3 pluri t ica ) from which "died numberless slaves." The symptoms were poor apetite, vomiting, bloated stomach and stomach pain. Apparently the commonly used cures were as dangerous as the sickness. Ferreira reported that the usual treatment, bleeding slaves, giving them cordials or purgatives without vomit inducers, usually resulted in their death. His remedy was to force the patient to sweat, and give him large quantities of liquids to increase k blood circulation. 216

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217 Another debilitating illness reported by Ferreira vere foot disorders. This was caused by the slaves constant presence in water or mud, exacerbated by the failure to use shoes. These problems afflicted all miners, not just slaves . Ferreira attributed them to small insects which burroughed their way into the soles of the feet 5 "like ants do in the ground." In some cases, arms and hands were similarly afflicted. Great pain resulted from this affliction and slaves often had difficulty walking or even standing. Ferreira noted that it was difficult to treat because the slaveowners refused to relieve the laborers from their duties. His remedy was to induce vomiting and then to burn the area of the hole and induce 6 scabing . Similar difficulties were reportedly encountered among slaves who had been punished. After being whipped the slaves were often put into irons and returned to work. Seldom was care given to treat the wounds. Ferreira notes that many slaves died from this lack of attention since often gangrene set in or the wounds were attacked by flies •7 ( moscas varejeiras ) causing infections. Another affliction which seems to have seriously beset the slaves was venereal disease. Known as esquen tamento or gonorrheas its extent can not be determined "because of the lack of evidence. Ferreira's remedy was to have the patient ingest as much liquid as possible in order to cleanse the circulatory system. Ferreira assures

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218 the reader of the efficacy of this treatment since he had 8 used it often on patients with success. The slaves' lot was complicated by the harshness of working conditions. Not only did the slave work in very himid areas but he worked extremely long hours. During the dry winter season many mining operations had to cease due to the lack of water, thus when spring and the rains arrived the slaveowner wanted to get the maximum labor out of his slaves. Ferreira reports that commonly slaves did not eat supper until after midnight and that like most meals this one was probably poorly cooked as it was made in large quantities and served cold. Because of the poor preparation of the food, its availability in large quantity, and the fact that after eating the slave went to sleep, 9 poor indigestion was a constant problem. The slave diet, however, was not simply hard to digest, it was nutritionally inadequate since it was primarily corn. Breakfast was the leftovers from the previous day's supper. It was primarily cold angu , the basis of the slaves' diet. Angu is similar in appearance to a coarse corn gruel; its only ingredients are f uba (coarsely ground corn), and water. The Paulista custom of adding no salt was followed. Lunch was simply toasted corn meal. Dinner was angu with black beans and a portion of salt. The final meal, often after midnight, was angu and beans again. Water was the only drink served with these meals and too often the water came from the gold 10 workings and was thus full of sediment.

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219 Constant work in water affected the nervous system of some slaves. Ferreira reports an illness called cangalha or camba which afflicted only slaves from the Costa da Mina. The symptoms included convulsions and an inability to control motor reflexes. Ferreira's only remedies were to put the slave to work on a job which did not require 11 him to work in water or sell him out of the captaincy. *. For those slaves unfortunate enough to labor in subsurface mines, the dangers were compounded. These were caused not only by humid and stiffling air, and constant standing in water, but also to the dangerous fumes emanating from the earth through which the slaves were burrowing. An anonymous writer in 17^0 reported that "in these holes many Negroes died suffocated with the smell of 12 metals." The absence of mining engineers also meant that mines were poorly built and the threat of cave-ins ever present . While the doctor was often called to treat diseases and illness, he was also expected to treat the side affects of the institution of slavery. Apparently one of the most common of these was eating clay or earth. Ferreira's treatment for this suicidal compulsion was to force the slave to drink water mixed with dirt from a cemetary. This was intended to be so repugnent that future efforts 13 to eat clay would cause extensive vomiting. Efforts to treat the maladies afflicting the slaves were complicated by the characteristics of slavery. Not

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220 only were there wide differences in the clothing, housing, and food provided by the slave owners, but their attitudes also varied tremendously. Ferreira laments that too few masters really cared about their slaves as people. Many slaves died because their masters failed to take a personal interest in them when ill; thus they lost the will Ik to live. Without the confidence which the master could impart to his slave, the latter would refuse to struggle against his illness and refuse to eat. Death soon followed Furthermore, when the slave was given medical attention, too often it was that administered by a poorly trained practicioner who relied on bleeding as the chief remedy. The almost automatic reflex to resort to bleeding was soundly criticized by Ferreira, who felt that this further weakened the patient when what was needed usually was to 15 conserve and build up his strength. Given these living and working conditions, the mortality rate of slaves was high, although precisely by what 16 it was has been the subject of great debate. A very rough estimate may be made for the parish of Antonio Dias. The total slave population of the termo of Vila Rica in 17^5 was 20,l68. If the proportion between the slave population of the urban core of Vila Rica and the rural area remained as it had been in 1722, 26% , then there were approximately 52UU slaves in the town. Of these, about half, 2122, probably resided in Antonio Dias. If these assumptions are basically correct, then the mortality rate

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221 among slaves in 17^+5 was 82 per 1000. Put another way, 8.2% of the slaves in the parish died annually. The average life span of a slave then would be about twelve IT years. It should be noted that these figures on the mortality rate are probably too high. It seems probable that by 17^+5 there were more slaves in Antonio Dias than the figure utilized indicates. If so, then the death rate 18 vould be lower and the life span proportionally longer. More appalling than the general death rate is the mortality rate of slave infants. Lack of proper medical care, poor living conditions, and inadequate food, and the lack of motivation on the part of the slave mothers, combined to produce a ratio of infant deaths to slaves "baptised which was very high. It seems probable that in those cases where infant deaths were recorded, these infants had not been baptised. For the earliest period when adequate figures are available, the 17^0's and 1750's, the infant mortality rate varied from 29% (l75l) to hk% (17^5 and 1752). More commonly the percentage ranged from 29 19 to 35%. Despite the rigors of slavery and the constant effort of the Portuguese to substitute their culture for that of the African, there is evidence that some African cultural traits were not eradicated. Foremost among these were music and dance. Dances of African origin, called batuques , were the scandal of Minas Gerais as they were of other parts of Brazil. They were considered lewd and provoca-

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222 20 tive. The first bishop to visit Minas Gerais, D. Antonio de Guadalupe, noted in 1726 that some slaves, especially those from the Costa da Mina "retain some traces 21 of their paganism." Gathering in the evening the slaves sang and played instruments in homage to the dead. During religious festivals the slaves chose kings and q^ueens to 22 reign for one year. This same organization appears in the black brotherhoods and among the calhambolas .

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Notes 1. Luis Gomes Ferreira, Erario mineral dividido em doz tratados (Lisbon: Por Miguel Rodrigues, Impressor do Senhor Patriarcha, 1735). From Ferreira's vork can be gleaned information for a short biographical sketch. A selfproclaimed Old Christian, Ferreira was born in Minho, Portugal. He made two trips to Brazil. The date of the first is unknown although he was in Salvador in ITO7. He *" must have returned to Portugal in that year, as in I708 he once again sailed to Salvador via the Madeira Islands. He came to Brazil in I708 as a licensed surgeon. Immediately upon landing, he set out on the sertao road to Minas Gerais. It appears that the period before 172i+ was spent in Sahara and Carmo. In 172i+ he moved to Padre Faria and the following year to Ouro Preto. By 1729 he was living near Itacolumi Mountain where he was operating a small gold mine. He wrote the Erario mineral to correct misconceptions about treating illnesses in Brazil. Since no medical books he knew of specifically discussed Minas Gerais, or even Brazil, he felt that medical practioners used remedies which were not suitable to the climate of Minas Gerais and the habits of its people. While he sometimes cites Hippocrates, Galen, and Curvo , Ferreira felt that "reason and experience were the two columns on which medicine and surgery were based." (Proemio) Given a conflict between the two, more faith was to be put on experience than on reason. If some of his remedies for medical problems sound outlandish today, it would be remembered that he was careful to note those which he had personally employed in treating patients and which, therefore, he could recommend based on his experience. 2. 3. k, 5. 6. 7. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. p. 1. pp. 2-5 p. 3U8 p. 359, p . b . 223

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8. Ibid., p. 108. The recommended liq^uid was composed of egg yolks, white sugar, and white wine. p. 338. 9. Ibid. , p. 12 . 224 de 10. This description of the slave diet was by Jose Antonio Mendes , a certified surgeon, who practiced in several hospitals of Minas Gerais. Mendes prepared a medical manual for people who lived far away from professional medical advice. Jose Antonio Mendes, Governo mineiros mui necessario para os que vivem' distantes de p rofessores seis, oito, dez, e mais legoas , padecendo por esta cauza os seus domes ti cos e esc raves ( Lisbon : Fla officina de Antonio Rodrigues Galhardo, ITTO), pp. 68-69. 11. Ferreira, Erario mineral , pp. 36O-36I. 12. Quoted in Lima Junior, Vila Rica, p. 28. 13. Ibid. , p. 158. Ik. Ibid., p. 31-32. 15. Ibid. , pp. 2li & 53. 16. See Goulart , Escravidao africana , pp. l62-l6i+. 17. Not the seven years reported by Simonsen. Roberto C. Simonsen, Historia economica do Brasil (ISOO-I820 ). 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, I969), p. 13^. Simonsen's estimate was contested by Mauricio Goulart, Escravidao africana , pp. l62-l6k whose argument is based upon estimates of annual production of slaves. Goulart feels that a productive life span of fifteen to tventy years was necessary to make slave labor profitable. 18. Perhaps this would bring the annual death rate down to the h reported by one perceptive commentator of the situation in Minas Gerais during the late colonial period. John Mawe , "Viagens ao interior do Brasil part i cularment e aos districtos do ouro e do diamante, em I809-I8IO," ed. and trans. Rudolf o Jacob, Collectanea de scientlstas ext range! ros , 2 vols. (Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Official, 1922), 1, p. 231This work was originally published in l822. The figures used in these computations do not include infant deaths. 19. Data compiled from the registries of baptisms and burials of the parish of Antonio Dias. 20. Report of Visitation, 15 March, 175^ in Cod. 73(DF), fols. 8-8v.

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225 21. Quoted in Vasconcellos , Historia do bispado de Ma riana. p. 31. ~~ 22. Order of Count of Assumar, 20 May, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG) , fol. 288v.

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Chapter l6 The Freedman If the threat of slave rebellions affected the residents of Vila Rica, that posed by the increasingly large number of freedmen was also being recognized. Freedom was gained in a number of ways. The practice of freeing slaves for service or for some unusually important deed, such as locating a new strike or an unusually large nugget, was followed although with undetermined frequency. Often slaves were freed upon the death of their owner. This practice appears to change after the middle of the century when such unconditional manumissions were practically replaced by contractual agreements whereby the slave was required to pay the equivalent of his value over a period of three to five years. This process called coartaQao , was used infrequently before 17^0. The phenomenon of its increased use is probably linked to the economic reality of a downturn in the economy of Vila Rica after 17^^. Once the slave was given his certificate of coartagao, he was free to travel wherever he wished. Any children born to a coartada woman were considered to be 1 slaves and their freedom also had to be purchased. The slave, having paid for his freedom, had no guarantee that he would receive his certificate of liberty. 226

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227 For example, a slaveholder noted that despite the fact that his slave had paid the final installment on her contract and that of her children, "l had not issued her letter of liherty because I feared that she would go 2 away taking her children." In other cases, the slave was granted his freedom by the slaveholder. But even in these cases manumission often was conditional upon continued service with the , 3 family of the deceased, or was subject to coartagao. Freeing slaves via the last will and testament was seen by some as guaranteeing favor in the sight of God. Thus one person freed two slaves "since God always takes unto Himself he who is charitable. . .he who does good deeds is k good." It would appear that the slaves freed in this manner were house slaves. This is understandable since only these slaves came into close contact with the slaveholders. In the urban setting of Vila Rica, with its relatively low master-slave ratio, more manumissions probably occurred than in the plantation society of the Northeast. Another category of slave often freed was the children of house slaves. While the question of parentage was perhaps sometimes involved, a more likely explanation of this phenomenon 5 is the influence of sentiment. Manumission also was obtained through the intercession of the brotherhoods of blacks and mulattoes. Unfortunately, the absence of brotherhood records prevents a determina-

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228 tion of the extent of this activity. This is particularly true for the first half of the eighteenth century. In 1T8U, the Brotherhood of Merces e Perdoes approved a petition of an enslaved memher who asked that his freedom be purchased. The hrotherhood agreed, despite its fiscal 6 insolvency. The transition from unconditional manumission to coartagao is illustrated by the will of one Joao de Melo Fernandes , dated July 1756. Noting that he owned four slaves, "who because of the services which they have performed for me as well as for their [advanced!] age," Fernandes wrote, "beside the ills they suffer and considering that sold at auction or privately they would be of little or no value, I do order that they be coartado at a price of thirty-two oitavas for two years for the benefit of T ray credi tors . " The single most important form of manumission before 1730 was at baj'tism. In the years from 1715 to 1728 twenty-seven percent of all children of slave women who were baptised in the parish of Antonio Dias were freed at baptism. In some years the percentages were as high as f i f ty per c ent . Governor Assumar took steps to deal with this development. Action was presumed to be needed because of the commonly held negative perception of the character of the 9 freedman. Assumar felt that there was a danger of "this

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229 land being populated by freed blacks who, like brutes, do not maintain the good order of the community. In a short time this land could fall into the hands of the said 10 blacks." He saw the freedman as a threat rather than as a stabilizing force. In this he shared the sentiments of his contemporaries. It is significant that edicts against the carrying of arms always include blacks and mulattoes , both slave and freed. ^ Assumar mistakenly felt that once free of the chains of slavery the freedman would seek to aid those remaining in bondage. He failed to perceive that freedman looked forward not backward. For those freed as adults, liberty was, in effect, a reward for having assimilated the goals of the Portuguese. Their success or failure was measured in terms of the dominant culture. Once freed, many exslaves quickly purchased their own slaves, despite the fact 11 that this was against the law. while it cannot be determined whether or not they treated their charges better than whites slaveowners, it is doubtful that they did. In an effort to limit the manumission of slaves, Assumar ordered that no Negro be freed without his master 12 first submitting a request to the governor for approval. In reality, Assumar's orders had little effect. Freeing some slaves was beneficial to the white ruling class. As long as freedom was a legal possibility, the majority of slaves would have something to look forward to. The

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230 flimsy hope that freedom could iDe gained by serving one's master well or saving one's earnings was a major factor in maintaining the status quo. This avenue of advancement served as an escape value for relieving the internal tensions of a slaveO'wi^i i^g society. During the years "before 1750, the number of freedmen in Vila Rica was not large. The largest number of freedmen to be registered in Vila Rica during the years for which good information is available, 1735-17^9, was in 1735The total was 3l6; there were sixty-six slaves for 13 each freedman. From 1735 to 17^1 the absolute number of freedman decreased to 172 (second mat i culat i on ) and the slave /freedman ratio rose to 12U.8. This trend suggests that there were more freedmen prior to 1735. This decrease could be attributed to the sharp drop in the incidence of manumissions at baptisms after 1728. The decrease in the visability of freedman (references to them by contemporaries become increasingly rare) may explain the increase in racial tensions, both institutionalized and non institutionalized. The activity of the calhambolos around Vila Rica reached dangerous proportions during the period from 173^ to 1750. Perhaps more significant is the racial conflict which erupted during the 1730's: white brothers were ejected from the previously integrated brotherhood of Nossa Senhora do Rosario, and new brotherhoods were formed with memberships sharply deliniated along racial lines.

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231 Those slaves living in an urban setting had more liberty of movement than those in the rural areas. This is confirmed by the extensive difficulties the authorities had in controlling the activities of slaves and the need to require each slave to have a pass written by his master. The practice of coartagao also served to expand the mobility of the slave. Unless restricts were put in the note, the slave under this arrangement was free to go wherever he wished. Not all of the slaves who lived on the property of the master slept in the communal slave quarters ( s en 11+ zalas . ) Some owners provided individual huts for their slaves. One of these owners reported that his slaves "had their pigs, chickens, and... pots in which they cook in 15 their ranches." In other cases, the senzala was located in the cellar of the owner's home. Assumar and his contemporaries were justified in lumping slaves and freedmen together for purposes of legislation. It appears than in the context of urban Vila Rica there was little difference between these categories. 16 Urban slaves often worked for wages; as washer women, midwives, cooks, or bakers if women, and as artisans, barbers, porters, etc., if men. They were required to give a fixed sum to their owners ; the remainder was theirs to squander on aguardente , to buy food, or to hoard to purchase their letters of manumission. Some slaves were not required to reside in the home of their owner and

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232 often were able to marry nonslaves. There are even cases IT on record of man marrying their own slaves. Slaves were allowed to own property houses, shops, even other slaves. It is not unusual to encounter licenses 18 for shops issued to slaves. Similarly, the ownership of slaves by slaves, while unusual, was not rare even though against the law. Thus one writer noted in his will, "that I have a slave bv the name of Francisco Landano Velho who 19 owns a slave named Caetano, for whom he was paid already." Part of the difficulty confronting the freedman was the absence of economic opportunity. Until the ITSO's the military, artisan, and bureaucratic classes were closed to the freedman. For many, legal freedom had little practi20 cal effect; with no alternatives available the freedman continued to occupy his former position. Unfortunately information on the occupations of the residents of Vila Rica is not available for the period under consideration. It was not until 1T6U that the first real occupational listing was made to include all taxpayers. From it can be determined the composition of the freedman work force. Seventy-two freedmen appear in this census. Of these, thirty-five were artisans. In fact, by IfGh, freedmen 21 made up one quarter of all artisans. This may have been the result of policy decisions made by the royal administrators to encourage freedmen to become artisans in hope that this would turn them into honest and productive mem22 bers of the community. The next largest number of

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233 freedmen were miners and laborers. The remainder were surgeons, shopowners , and those living off the income 23 derived from their slaves, houses, or wealth. Of the one hundred and thirteen freedwomen, only thirty-five were listed as "working" and fifty as living "from their industry" ( de sua agencia --thus implying the lack of 2k regular work ) . Because only taxpayers were listed in the l^jGh roll, ' only a partial view of the freedmen is obtained. To get the true picture, the first complete census, that of 180^4, must be used. In that year, long after the artisan positions had been opened to freedman, 52% of the freedman and women were listed as agregados , that is, they lived in someone else's home where they occupied a position on the periphery of family life. Those included in this 52% had no occupation listed and can be presumed to have performed menial tasks and domestic service. This total would have been larger still had it included those agregados who listed some occupation. Many of these were prospectors-an indication of their marginal nature. By l8oU a larger percentage of freedmen, ^2% , were artisans or apprentices than in 1T6T. But only 10% were salaried employees and a mere k % owned shops. Of the freedwomen, 21% were ambulatory sellers of foodstuffs, "Jy 25 were shopowners, and 6 % were washerwomen. Thus, as late as l80U the majority of freedmen and women performed menial tasks with the only breakthroughs into the mainstream of

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the economic system teing made by the freedmen who succeeded in becoming artisans. But the latter were exceptional, as more subjective evidence confirms. Black freedom meant little to the white man who, in describing the location of his house, stated that it was adjacent "to that of my Negress named 26 Maria Freedwoman." It must have meant little to Captain Jose de Faria Pereira who admited "ha.vllingll four illegitimate children. CTheyl are the pardo children of a negress 27 of mine who is free." Freedom probably meant little to those freedmen who were agregados or to those listed as s ervant s . For the freedman there was always the fear that he could be enslaved. It can not be said for certain that this occurred, as there is no positive evidence of it. But like so many of the basic mechanisms at work in this colonial society, stock must be put in circumstantial evidence. The Vila Rica council reported to the king "the number of those who are freed and who lose their liberty 28 is infinite." The possibility was real enough for freedmen to petition the governor for protection. Thus, for example, the petition of one Joao Freedman was rewarded with a certificate from the governor ordering that because Joao had purchased his freedom legally no officers 29 of the militia or justice could interfere with him. The liberty of the freedman was subject to constant scrutiny. He had to be able to prove at all times that

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235 he had been legally freed. The municipal judges and ouvidores were authorized to arrest any freedman ahout whose legal status there was any shadow of a doubt. They were to keep these freedmen in jail until their true status 30 had been determined. In this atmosphere the burden of proof fell upon the freedman. For the infant who was freed at baptism, liberty meant little. His mother was still a slave and the child ' probably was raised in the manner he would have been were he still enslaved. Until the child was old enough to strike out on his own, the master was able to obtain some menial labor from him. Little wonder that slave owners, on occassion, failed to legalize the child's status. Thus one Salvador Rodrigues noted in his will that for the manumission of this female slave her godfather paid half a pound of gold... about seven years ago, and until now I have not issued her certificate of freedom despite her having served me until Cthis the! hour of my death.-' The certificate was to be issued after Rodrigues' death. It is possible that children freed at baptism were, under some conditions , to be taken away from the property of the master. This perhaps was meant to ensure that the master did not spend money on feeding and clothing a person who would leave before his productive capacity could be exploited by the master. It also might have served to remove a child from particularly degrading circumstances. The extent to which this was practiced has not yet been

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236 determined. That it occurred is substantiated by provisions found in some wills. For example, in a vill prepared in 1T61, a dying -woman related that upon the birth of a certain slave she accepted thirty-two oitavas instead of the predetermined forty on the condition that the child be taken away. This condition was not fulfilled 32 and the owner insisted upon payment in full. Because of the dichotomy in Mineiro society of slave and free segments, the freedman occupied a very precarious position. Legally he was neither. In practice, however, popular sentiment tended to identify him with the enslaved part of the population. Even after 1720 when his opportunity for mobility had been extended as far as the artisan class and shopkeeping, there was a ceiling on the freedman ' s ability to climb. In the intense competition with the freeborn, the freedman was at a disadvantage. For many, freedom meant simply the end of the master's legal responsibility and, as the century progressed, the number of slaves receiving their liberty after the end of their productive lives increased. It is in the light of this situation that the quality of life of the freedman should be studied. The process of coartagao was resorted to increasingly as a means of balancing the two extremes of the master's desire to reward faithful service and his fear of losing a valuable investment. The slave who entered into this contractual arrangement probably was in the most productive period of

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237 his life. He then spent three to five years purchasing his freedom. Upon winning his manumission, the freedman vas probably beyond his most productive years. The slave who was freed gratis by his master normally was a domestic slave who had served long and loyally. Thus, once the process of manumission at baptism became exceptional, the typical freedman was older and therefore less valuable and less productive. This can be seen from the wills of freedmen. Of the fourteen who were married, only two had children through marriage ; the remainder had no legal 33 offspring. Other freemen had natural children presumably while they were still enslaved. Thus the fact that manumission often came late in life had a significant effect on the quality of family life. The freedman was not able fully to exploit his new freedom, and the options available to him were limited. Observers commented on the status of the freedman. A Brazilian commentator in I8OT noted that those who had been, or whose parents had been, slaves lived by begging 3i+ and stealing. Seven years earlier, another noted that "marriages and, more importantly, concubinage with black and mulatto women had made three fourths of the masses of people ( povo de gente ) freedman, without good habits, and 35 with the insane opinion that freedmen would not work." Seventy years earlier, Luis Gomes Ferreira succintly noted "that blacks are worse off, for the most part, if they are 36 freedmen than if they are slaves."

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Notes 1. Will of Joee Fernandes de Abreu, freed black, l8 May, 1759 in Registry of Burials (APAD), vol. 3, fols. 379-380. "The children which Cthe slave woman being coartadaD bears between the date of the certificate of coartagao and the issuance of the certificate of freedom will not be exempted from enslavement. If she wishes to free them, paying their just value and price she is not to be impeded. " 2. Will of Jose Rodrigues Sampaio, 7 May, 17^5 in Registry of Burials ( APAD ) , vol. 2, fols. 65-65v. 3. Will of Jose Fernandes de Abreu, freed black, 18 May, 1759 in Registry of Burials (APAD), vol. 3, fol. 379v. A case where these situations were bombined is that of Antonio Joao Torres'. In his will, 'j^orres lists among his possessions one slave, coartado at 3^+0^000. Of this slave's five children four ha.d already been freed unconditionally but the fifth was to be manumited only after serving Torres until his death. VJill of Antonio Joao Torres, 29 July, 17^7 in Cod. 307, No. 6582 (APHANOP). Another example is that of Joana Machado de Azevedo who had entered into a contractual arrangement with her slave who would be allowed to purchase her freedom over a three year period. In her will, Joana Machado de Azevedo gave her slave the opportunity to serve the family thereby gaining the money to purchase her freedom. Will of Joana Machado de Azevedo, 3 November, 1773 in Cod. 1+1+2, No. 9292 (APHANOP). 1+ . Will of Captain Domingos Francisco dos Reis, 27 April, 1756 in Registry of Burials (APAD), vol. 3, fol, 296. 5. Will of Captain Antonio Perreira Vilanova, 1 August, 17^9 in Registry of Burials (APAD), vols. 3, fol. 277Vilanova freed those mulattoes which were born in his house. Since at the same time he willed to his slave Francisca a gold mine, 200 $000, and seven slaves, it is not too presumptuous to suggest that the mulattoes he was freeing were his own offspring. 6. Brotherhood Council Session, ik March, I78I+ in Cod. 11 (AIMP), fol. 73v. •238

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239 7. Will of Joao de Melo Fernandes , 15 July, 1756 in Registry of Deaths ( APAD ) , vol. 3, f ols . 297-297v. 8. For example in 17l6. 9. The town council noted in a report to the king that "Negroes and freed Negroes in this land,.. are of no value to the community or to Your Majesty." Council to Joao V, undated but sent by 1719 fleet in Cod. 19 (CMOP), fol. 3. 10. Order of Count of Assumar, 21 November, 1719 in Cod. 11 (SG) , fol, 283. 11. Order of Count of Assumar, 21 November, 1719 In Ccd. 11 (SG), fols. 282v-283v. 12. Order of Count of Assumar, 21 November, 1719 in Cod, 6 (CMOP) , fol. 17. 13. Mappa dos Negros , Codice Costa Matoso, fol. I8I-I87. ik . These had thatched roofs in comparison to the master's home which had tiled roofs. Search Order, 27 July, I786 in "Documentos do Arquivo da Casa dos Contos (Minas Gerais)," Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro 65 ( 1 9 '•* 3 ) : 218. — ^ 15. Will of Captain Antonio Pereira Villanova, 1 August, 171*9 in Registry of Burials ( APAD ) , vol. 3, fols. 277. 16. A council report to Joao V in 17^12 noted that during the administration of Governor Braz Baltezarde da Silveira daily wages of a slave averaged h 1/2 oitavas and that thirty years later this had dropped to 2-k vintens (one oitava 75 vintens). Council to Joao V, undated but sent by 17^2 fleet in Cod. 1+9 (CMOP), fol. kh . 17. An interesting parallel to this development is the experience of Jose Gomes Vieira, a freed black who "was once a slave of Luis Caspar who sold me to my wife Fili ciana Vieira Gomes who issued my letter of manumission Will of Jose Gomes Vieira, 13 August, 1753 in Registry of Burials (APAD) , vol. 3 , fols. 226v-227. Vieira thus owed his freedom to his wife, who may have been free-born. ti 18. See licenses of Francisco, slave of Sargento-mor Antonio Dias Leme , 15 January, 1715 in Cod, I8 (CMOP), fol. 68 and Lourenga Josefa, slave of Father Bernardo Madureira, 22 January, 1715 in Cod, I8 (CMOP), fol, 69.

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2i+0 19. Will of Captain Antonio Pereira Vilanova, 1 August, 17^9 in Registry of Burials (APAD), fol. 3, fol.277. The Lista dos Moradores das Cabesceiras de Santa Barbara acima also contains an example of this. Avulso Mago No. 173 (aPM), undated but probably 1733. Assumar in his order of 21 November, 1719 noted that slaves could not own slaves. For this order see Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 283283v. 20. One of the few concrete effects it had was to entitle the slave to add a surname. Thus Teresa, slave of Antonio da Silva, became Teresa dos Santos, freedwoman, and Tomas , slave of Maria Carvalho, became Tomas da Cruz, freedman in Cod. 3 (ANSRAC), fol. 73v and Cod. 2 (ANSRAC), fol. 9v. It should be noted that the names selected were not those of the masters involved. 21. There were 367 artisans of which eighty-eight were freedmen. Information on occupations for 1764 was obtained from the tax rolls prepared for the collection of the special penalty tax levied because revenue collected for the royal fifth had not reached the one hundred arrobas agreed upon by a Mineiro junta and royal officials. Penalty Tax Roll, 176i+ in Cod. «2 (CMOP), fols. I6-8I. 22. Royal Order, 2k November, 173^+ in Cod. 3 (SG;, fol. 87v. 23. Penalty Tax Roll, 176^+ in Cod. 82 (CMOP), fols. I6-6I pas sim . 24. Ibid. 25. Um rec ens eament o na capitania de Minas Gerais , pp. 63113. These figures are based upon a sample of the residents of Vila Rica encompassing the bairro of Ouro Preto. 26. Will of Joao Kodrigues Chaves, 3 March, 1753 in Registry of Burials (APAD), vol. 2, fol. 2l5. 27. Will of Captain Jose de Faria Pereira, 5 June, 1752 in Registry of Burials CAPAD), vol. 3, fol. 292. 28. Council to Joao V, undated but sent by' 17^2 fleet in Cod. kg (CMOPJ , fol. i+2v. 29. Order of Count of Assumar, 2 October, 1716 in Cod. 9 ^SG), fol. U8. 30. Royal Order, 11 May, 1757 in Cod. 3 (SG), fol. 89. 31. Will of Salvador Rodrigues , 5 May, I76O in Registry of Burials ( APAD J , vol. 3, fols. 363-363v,

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2Ul 32. Will of Mariana Registry of Burials Ferreira da Silva, 8 March, I76I in (APAD) , vol. 3, fol. 378. 33. From wills examined in APHANOP : Cod. i+60 , Nos . 9737, 9750, 975H (1761-1762), Cod. 316, No. 6735 (1765), Registry of Burials (APAD), Vol, 2, fols. 7^v (l7i^6), 8I (1750), 221 (1751), 230 (1753), and Registry of Burials (APAD), vol. 3, fols. 226v (1753), 2U8v (1755), 379 (1759), 395v (1762) , and U02 (1758) . 3^ . Anonymous, "Descrigao dos sertoes de Mines, despovoagao, suas causas e meios de os fazer florentes," Revi sta do Instituto Historico e Geogr afic o Brasileiro 2 5 (I862): 192. 35. Nelson Omega, A cidade colonial , Brasileiros, vol. 110 (Rio de Janeiro: Olympio Editora, 196l),p. 192. Colegao Documento Livraria Jose 36 Ferreira, Erario mineral , p. 2l+3.

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Chapter 17 Social Organi zat ion: Compadres CO Relationships and Marriage Patterns One of the most important elements of the social organization of this period is the compadresco or godparent relationship. Frequently cited by writers in discussing colonial Brazilian society, it has less often been examined systematically through parish records. This relationship can be seen as a social cement linking the various levels of colonial society, and as a mechanism of potential social mobility. The parish records of Antonio Dias are available for part of the period under study and provide an insight into the compadresco mechanism . 1 From 1707 to 1726, 1+7 male and 36 female free-born children were baptised. Of these, kS were legitimate births -a surprising figure, almost 52%, considering the usual assumptions concerning the lack of family life during this early period. The tendency was to choose one male and one female to serve as godparents or to select only one male. Ten cases of two male godparents were registered. Seven of these cases involved one or two godparents from the upper social strata. Two of the fathers accounting for five children were themselves 2U2

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2it3 members of the elite. A good example of the process of binding together members of the elite through the compadresco relationship is provided by Ventura Ferreira Vivas, a homen da governanga, who had served as almotacel in 1711 and 1715, procurator in 1712 and municipal judge in 171^. Vivas' use of compadresco during the C-uerras dos Emboabas to protect his position has been noted already. In 1712 and then again in 1715 children born to Vivas and his mistress vere baptised. For the daughter Anna, born in 1712, Vivas chose as godparents Pascoal da Silva 2 Guimaraes and Manuel de Almeida Costa. Both men had been electors in 1711 and Costa was a councillor at the time of the baptism, having served as procurator the previous year. For the baptism of his son Pedro, in 17^5, Vivas selected Manuel Martins Lopes and Belchior Nogueira. Like Guimaraes and Costa, these men were militia officers. Furthermore, Lopes had served as almotacel in 1712 and was sei'ving as procurator in 1715Nogueira had been an almotacel in 1713. This is a clear example of the godparent relationship being used to bind together the elite. In two of the other cases selection of upper stratum godparents was clearly an effort for lower class parents to tie their children to people who would be in a position to materially aid both the child and the parents, who also became linked to the godparent. Of the remaining three cases little can be said. One, and probably two, of the children were mulatto, but on the fathers and god-

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2it4 fathers no information upon which to draw any conclusions could be obtained. In a significant number of instances, twenty-nine, only one godparent was chosen. Seventeen of these involved legitimate births. For reasons that are not clear, the selection of a single male godfather took on special significance only after 1719Before 1719) only one such case occurs. Between 1719 and 1726, except for 1720, the selection of a single godparent was com.mon. In twelve of the cases, the godfather was of the upper class. On two occasions a governor \ra.s selected as the godfather; on another his military aid was chosen. The ouvidor was named once and the provedor of the treasury twice. Four other godfathers were homens da governanga. One man. Dr. Tome de Sousa Coutinho, exemplifies the use of the compadresco to establish social status. During these years Coutinho had three children; each was given a single godparent. The three godfathers selected were Governor Lourengo de Almeida, Ouvidor Joao Pacheco Pereira, and • k provedor Antonio Belquer del Rio. That this relationship was an avenue for establishing, rather than simply maintaining, social position is evident from the fact that none of the ten fathers in this group were members of the elite, although some, such as Coutinho and Gabriel Fernandes Aleixo, were members of the upper elements of society. Coutinho's wife was the only woman in this group with the honorific title "dona' re-

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2li5 fleeting her husband's importance. Only three of the twelve children were illigitimate . One baptism is noteworthy because the single godparent 5 selected was a godmother. The father of the child being baptised was a homen de governanga. This was a highly unusual selection, perhaps reflecting the godmother's social position. Of the remaining eleven cases of single godparents, insufficient information was found upon which to base any conclusions. There were forty-two cases where a male and female were chosen as godparents. In twenty-four cases one or both of the godparents selected were members of the upper elements of society. Of these, only nine cases (four different sets of parents) involved parents who were on the same social level as the godparents selected. In the other fifteen cases compadresco was employed to improve the situation of the parents -the selection was vertical, not horizontal. Often these categories overlapped. Among those who used the compadresco relationship first to improve and then to maintain their social position was Domingos Francisco de Oliveira. As a result of his serving as vereador in I'Jlh and municipal judge in 1723 and 1725, Oliveira was a homen da governanga. Oliveira and his wife had six children baptised during the period from 1710 to 1T22. Two of the baptisms occurred prior to Oliveira's entry into the governanga. In both cases, the godparents

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2ke were Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes and his wife, D. Isabel da 6 Costa. One of the children was named Pascoal, presumably in deference to the godfather. Of the four children born in 1716, ITI8, 1720, and 1722, Isabel da Costa was godmother to two. The four godfathers were members' of the elite: Antonio Francisco da Silva, Sargento-mor Manuel de Sousa Serqueira, Manuel Alvares de Oliveira, and Provedor 7 Antonio Belquer del Rio. Thus the compadresco was useful both for establishing ties with the elite and then for solidifying social status. The selection of D. Isabel da Costa four times while her husband served only twice could mean that she was a generous and able godmother. D. Isabel da Costa also served as godmother to three 8 children clearly born to lower class families. Compadresco, by tying together the members of the upper stratum served as a stabilizing factor limiting in-group antagonisms. By linking people of different social levels it served to bind together the society and may have aided social mobility. In the ten cases of children identifiably born to upper class parents, nine of them involved the selection of social peers as godparents. Thus, for example, the mulatto son of Captain Antonio de Miranda and his black mistress was fortunate to have Capitao-mor Henrique Lopes 9 de Araujo as his godfather. Two rich gold miners thus were joined at the baptism font. Of these ten children, only two were illegitimate. Of these two cases, elite

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2^7 godparents were chosen for one but not for the other. This difference in attitude may have been due to the acceptance by the father of formal responsibility for one child and his refusal to do so for the other. For the non-elite, free segment of the populace little information exists. The little that does points to the selection of godparents at the same social level as the parents. Several examples can be cited. The godfather of Maria, the daughter of Francisco Nogueiro, a shopovner, 10 and his wife was Manuel Lopes, a butcher. In the two cases of children born of a freed woman and an enslaved father, the godparents were either slave or freed rather 11 than free born. While these three cases admitedly comprise a very small sample, it nevertheless seems significant that the godparents were all of the same social level as the parents . There were eighty-six cases of children born of slave mothers and freed at baptism. Of these, thirteen were the product of illicit sexual affairs between a man and his slave. Clearly the sense of responsibility of the father was a significant factor in the emancipation of these children. The predominant characteristic of the compadresco relationships of those children who were freed was the selection of godparents who were free. In seventyseven cases the godparent or godparents chosen were free. In six other cases the godfather was free-born while the godmother was either enslaved or a freedwomen. Stated

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2kQ differently, of the 133 godparents involved, fully 127 were free born. Three others were f o rros (freedmen) and only eight were slaves. That the selection of free godparents was a key to manumission becomes obvious when the slave baptisms are examined. Whereas ninety-two percent of the godparents of manumited children were free, only sixty-one percent of those not freed were. More illuminating, however, is the fact that whereas for eighty-nine percent of the freed children the godparent or both godparents were free, the same was true for only fifty-two percent of slave childrenforty-eight percent of the cases involved either one or two slave or freed godparents. There was another difference between the godparents of those slave infants who were freed and those who were not. Those who were freed usually had only male godparent s--s ixty-three percent had no godmothers. Only thirteen percent of those not freed were not given godmothers. The reasons for this pattern are difficult to ascertain. It is possible that parents in the process of selecting a godfather were aware when the latter intended to free his godchild and, content with this, failed to name a godmother. The composition by sex of those children who were freed is also illuminating. Despite the fact that fiftytwo of every hundred baptisms were of males, only fortythree percent of those freed were males. This could be

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2h9 interpreted to mean that, perhaps for economic reasons, a disproportionately large number of less valuable female slaves were freed. But viewed in another way these figures become less significant. Twenty percent of all males born to slave women during this period were freed as opposed to twenty-six percent of all females. Given the small sample, the six percent difference is not large enough to warrant generalizations, although the evidence indicates a propensity to free females. Also worthy of note is the predominance of males acting as godparents. Seventy-seven percent of those chosen as godparents of children freed at baptism were males. For godparents of free born children, the figure is sixty-nine percent with the figure decreasing slightly to sixty-five percent for slave children. This shows the propensity to seek male godparents often to the exclusion of godmothers. This must have been viewed as an advantage to the child and to his family. This is particularly true for those who subsequently were freed. It must be noted that the practice of selecting two males as godparents occurred despite the objections of the 12 church hierarchy. If the bishopric of Rio de Janeiro through the various inspectors dispatched to Minas had little success in ending this practice, the civil authorities were just as unsuccessful in imposing the changes it wished to make. Governor Assumar, as was noted above, attempted to stop slaves from selecting other slaves as

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250 the godparents of their children. This practice was not stopped by Assumar's edicts. But compadresco kinship vas not established only by baptism; it was also created by marriage. That this relationship existed is evident from the entry made concerning one of the earliest marriages on record in the parish of 13 Ouro Preto. After listing the bride and groom the parlU ish priest went on to note that godparents were present. It seems probable that the compadresco relationship through marriage during this period was much weaker than that established by baptism. This is due to the newness of the Mineiro society. The ties of baptism kinship were multilevel in that they linked godparents to godchild, godparents to the child's natural parents, and godparent 15 to godparent. The same could not be done by marriage kinship since the parents of the people being married resided on the coast or in Portugal. Not enough time had elapsed for children born in Minas Gerais to have reached marriageable age in appreciable numbers. In fact, of the twenty-five people being married whose origins are listed not a single one was born in Minas Gerais. Thus the kinship ties were limited to princ ipals --godparents and godparent-godparent. As with kinship by baptism, the injunction to name one godfather and one godmother was seldom honored. Of the fifty-four marriages for which the names of the god-

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251 parents are given, thirty-seven, or 68%, involved only male godparents. While normally tvo godparents were chosen, the selection of three was not uncommon. On several 16 occassions four were named. The kinship ties established through marriage tended to be vertical in nature. Of the thirty-two cases about which some conclusions can be made, in only one case were all of the godparents on the same level as the couples being married. In this one case all four people involved IT were slaves. In the other fifteen cases where the principals were either black, mulatto, mameluco, or Indian, not one of the thirty-eight godparents was identified with these races. In the remaining sixteen, the vertical nature of the relationship is established by the social status of the godparents. In each case, at least one of the godparents was of a higher status than the principals. For example, the godparents of Francisco Pereira Cazado and Marcelina de Azevedo, who were married in 1719, were Sargento-mor Bento Felix da Cunha, Sargentomor Manuel Dias de Menezes, and Captain Manuel de Matos l8 Fragozo. Besides the status implicit in the militia commissions, both Cunha and Menezes were homens da governanga . It is clear that when a couple had a choice of marriage godparents they chose people of a higher social position than theirs. This seems natural since it offered the opportunity of establishing links to the elite. For

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252 the godparents if offerred the chance to further augment the personal! s tic bonds which institutionalized their status and allowed this status to be transformed into power . These records also are useful for comprehending the social system. They point to the various tendencies within the Mineiro society, foremost of which was that marriage often occurred within like racial groups but in a significant number of cases matrimonial union crossed racial lines. Thus, of the nineteen cases where one of the marriage partners was black, the other was black in ten of them. Of the others , five partners were mulatto and one was Indian. The remaining three are particularly significant in that they apparently involve the marriage of blacks with individuals accepted by parish priests as 19 white. In one case the bride was a slave and in another the groom was black, and perhaps still a slave, and the woman accepted as white. There were seven weddings involving slaves. In only one of these were both principals slaves. In four cases the husband was a slave while the bride was a freedwoman. This reinforces the conclusions stated above concerning the absence of a distinct dividing line between slave and freedman. In the remaining two instances, slave women married freemen: one of the grooms being an Indian and 21 the other white. 20

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253 While on ten occassions black women married black 22 men, on five others the brides married mulattoes. This shows the tendency of women to marry men whose skins were as light or lighter than theirs. This tendency may be seen also in the cases of two mulatto women who married 23 white men and one black woman who d: d the same. There was only one recorded instance of a woman marrying a man 2k of darker skin. This same pattern is evident in marriages involving Portuguese-born women. Only three women are identified as being Portuguese immigrants, emphasizing the relative absence of Portuguese women in the mining district during the first quarter of the eighteenth century. In each of 25 the three cases the groom was also Portuguese-born. Because of this absence of Portuguese-born women, Brazilian-born women had an opportunity to marry a husband from the "old country." This was considered more prestigeous than marrying a Brazilian. Full information is available on seven marriages involving Brazilian women. 26 In five of these, the husband was Portuguese. On only 27 two occasions did Brazilian women marry Brazilian males. Significantly, not a single native of Sao Paulo is identified as being one of the principals during this period. Clearly, in the unsettled atmosphere of the Vila Rica during the first quarter of the eighteenth century, marriage served as a vehicle of vertical mobility for a significant portion of those involved. In the thirty-four

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25^ cases on vhich information exists to draw preliminary conclusions, thirteen involved upward mobility on the part of the brides. In nine instances, this mobility was relatively slight, being in-group: Brazilian born women wedding Portuguese men, black women marrying mulattoes, 28 and one case of a black woman marrying an Indian. But in four of these, the distance between the principals was significant: white men taking black or mulatto spouses.

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Notes 1. The data utilized in this chapter come primarily from the Registry of Baptisms, ( APAD ) vols. 1 and 2, It is significant that all births, free as well as slave, were registered in the same "books. The years 1707-1726 constitute a distinct period because of the characteristics peculiar to it. Among the most significant of these is the slave emancipation rate. Thus, while the period under study can be divided politically into two segments, 1695-1711 and 1711-1720, socially the years I707-I726 form a single meaningful unit. Unfortunately, no information exists upon which to make any statement concerning the pre-1707 period. 2. Baptism of Ana, I6 August, 1712 in Registry of Baptisms (APAD), vol. 1, fol. 5v. 3. Baptism of Pedro, 15 June, 1715 in Registry of Baptisms (APAD), vol.1, fol. 31v. k. Baptisms of Bento, 13 February, 1726, Barbara, 7 January, 1725 and Maria, 30 July, 1723 in Registry of Baptisms (APAD), vol.1, fols. 69, 60, and 555. Baptism of Francisco, 1 January, 172^1 in Ibid., fol. 56. 6. Baptisms of Jose and Pascoal, 8 December, 1710 and 22 March, 1713 in Ibid., fols. 3 and 15v. 7. Baptisms of Maria, Ignacio, Joao and Manuel, 15 July, 1716, 3 July, 1718, 10 July, 1720 and 1 January, 1722 in Ibid., fols. 32v, 36, U2v, and i+9v. 8. Baptisms of Quiteria, Isabel, and Agostinho, 13 March, 1718, 26 July, 1719 and September, 1719 in Ibid., fols. 35, 39, and 7^+^. 9. Baptism of Antonio, 2 October, I7I8 in Ibid., fol. 37. 10. Baptism of Maria Branca, 6 February, 1715 in Ibid., fol. 27. 11. Baptisms of Cristina and Antonia, 2 May, 1723 and 27 June, 1723 in Ibid., fols. 5^+ and 5iiv. 255

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256 12 . Baptisterio , e ceremonial dos Sacramentos da Sancta Madre Igre.ja Romana, emendado , e acrescentado em muitas cousas nesta ultima impressao conforme o Cathecismo & Ritual Romano (Coimbra: Officina de Luis Seco Ferreira, 1730). 13. There are no records _ Antonio Dias prior to 1728 have been utilized in the p Registry of Baptisms, Marri vol . 1 . vol. 1 1^. Marriage of Domingos and Josefa, 12 November, 1713 in Ibid., f ol . 6lv. The phrase employed is " foram padrinhos ." 15. That this was taken seriously can be seen from the fact that godparents of the same child were not allowed to marry one another since a spiritual bond had been created . 1$ . For example, the marriage of Ventura Ferreira de Queiros and Maria de Jesus da Silva, 2k May, 1723 in Registry of Baptisms, Marriages, and Burials (APOP), fol. 72 and that of Antonio Gomes dos Santos and Micaela dos Reis, 7 July, 1723 in Ibid., fol. 72, IT. Marriage of Domingos and Josefa, 12 November, 1713 in Ibid., fol. 6lv. l8. Marriage of Francisco Pereira Cazado and Marcelina de Azevedo, 21 September, 1719 in Ibid., fol. 68v. 19Marriages of Manuel Rodrigues, Cape Verdean black, and Susana Andrada, Joaquim Paes dos Prazeres and Maria da Costa Franca, freed black, and Manuel de Figueiredo and Faustina de Barros , slave of Pedro de Barros , 12 November, 171^, 2U January, 172it and 1 August, 1725 in Ibid., fols. 62v, 73v, and 7720. Marriages of Pedro Guine, slave, and Maria, freed black, Ilario Alvares , slave, and Teresa da Costa, freed black, Antonio Barbosa, slave, and Antonia Barbosa, freed black, and Antonio Nunes , slave, and Josefa Maria, freed black, 8 October, 1715, 30 December, 1726, 23 February, 1726, and 13 November, 1726 in Ibid., fols. 65v, 79v, 77v, and 77V-79. 21. Marriages of Miguel Correa, Carijo, and Ignacia de Sousa, criouia slave, and Manuel de Figueiredo and Faustina de Barros, slave, 2 April, 1723 and 1 August, 1725 in Ibid., fols. 71 and 77.

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257 22. Marriages of Pascoal Rodrigues , pardo , and Ana Bezarra, freed black, Antonio da Cunha, pardo, and Meliciana do Espirito Santo, freeborn black, Francisco de Oliveii-a, pardo, and Maria da Conceigao, freed black, 12 April, 1716, 17 April, 1719, 19 February, 1719, 20 February, 172li, and l8 April, 1725 in Ibid., fols. 66v , 67V-68, 67v, Ih, and 76v. 23. Marriages of Jose da Silva Aragao and Maria Borges , parda, Luis da Silva Sousa and Ignes Carneira de Brito, parda, and Manuel de Figueiredo and Faustina de Barros, slave, 20 July, 1722, 29 February, 172l» , and 1 August, 1725 in Ibid., fols. 70v, 7I+, and 77. 2l|. Marriage of Manuel Rodrigues, Cape Verdean black, and Susana Andrada, 12 November, 17li| in Ibid., fol. 62v. 25. Marriages of Manuel Gomes Pereira and Ignes Francisca da Silva, Manuel de Sousa and Leonor Jacinta dos Ramos, and Antonio Lopes de Matos and Francisca da Conceigao Catharina Fernandes , 26 September, I718, 5 August, 172i|, and 11 March, 1725 in Ibid., fols. 65, 75, and 76. .xxtigwa ui rrancisco Perreira Cazado and de Azevedo and Bento da Silva and Lourenga Batis ;mber, I719 and 8 October, n2h in Ibid., Cazado and Marcelina " ' "'" ^ t a Bay on , fols . 21 September , 68v and 75v. 28. Marriage of Miguel Correa, Carijo, and Ignacia de Sousa, black slave, 2 April, 1723 in Ibid., fol. 71.

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Chapter 18 The Irmandades and Social Differentiation One of the mechanisms created to solidify the societal bonds was the lay brotherhood, or Irmandade . The brotherhoods in Vila Rica were a manifestation of the institutionalization of class conflict. The links between members of social groups were made firmer through the formation of these organizations. These lay organizations were of great importance in Portugal and on the coast of Brazil, but perhaps no where did they play such an important role as in Minas Gerais. Elsewhere the brotherhoods were in competition with or subservient to the religious orders. In Minas Gerais the orders were systematically and successfully prohibited from establishing monastaries or convents, to avoid the creation of strong focii of opposition to the crown. Thus, to the brotherhoods fell the responsibility of church construction and organizing religious festivities. As elsewhere, the individual brotherhoods came to represent certain groups. During the period before 1720 the Santissimo Sacramento Brotherhoods came to represent the upper strata, while those of Rosario represented the blacks. The Santissimo Sacramento was usually the first brotherhood to be established. 258

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259 The creation of these brotherhoods was a manifestation of the increasing ri gi di f i cat ion of the social structure. Before 1712 all social levels had been content to worship together. Conceivably this was a response to the unsettled atmosphere of the boom tovn of Vila Rica. After that date there was a proliferation of brotherhoods representing specific groups. The foundation of these brotherhoods indicates that a process of social differentiation had begun. The first brotherhoods, whose existence can be documented, were composed of white men. These were the Brotherhoods of Santissimo Sacramento, One v^as founded in each of the parish churches of Ouro Preto and Antonio Dias in 1712 and 1717, respectively. Indications are that these represented the elite. While few of the records of the brotherhoods in Antonio Dias parish are extant today, a number of those from Ouro Preto are, and these provide an insight into the role of the brotherhood. The only available statute for the Santissimo Sacramento Brotherhood is not the original but the second one, which dates from 1738. No entry requirements are specified although the nature of the brotherhood is clear from the provision that a wife of a brother could join if she was "free from contaminated blood (s endo izenta da inflecta 2 nagao ) . Furthermore, it was this brotherhood which had contributed most to the construction of the parish church — so much, in fact, that it was given the main altar, even

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26o though the Santissimo Sacramento was not the patron of the church. Besides the two brotherhoods of Santissimo Sacramento there were at least nine other brotherhoods in existence in Vila Rica prior to 1720. This total exceeds by three the number of brotherhoods assumed to have existed by the 3 foremost student of this question, Fritz Teixeira Salles. With the exception of the two black brotherhoods, relatively little is known of the others. The two about which least is known were composed of mixed bloods. One of these was Nossa Senhora do Parto which was established first in the settlement of Bom Sucesso and then moved to the chapel of Padre Faria when the population of that settlement began to decrease. According to tradition this brotherhood while in Bom Sucesso was to have been composed of mamelucos (the offspring of white and Indian parents). The other was that of Nossa Senhora do Conceicao dos Pardos . The only reference to this irmandade is made by Father Agostinho de Santa Maria who refers to the 5 pardos as "sinfully impure." These two brotherhoods led emphemeral and, probably, short-lived existences. The remaining five were more successful. Two of these were the brotherhoods named after the partron saints of the two parish churches--Nos sa Senhora da Conceigao and Nossa Senhora do Pilar. Both of these certainly shared with the Brotherhoods of Santissimo Sacramento the responsibility for building the parish churches. It is

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261 ironic that so little is known of the composition of these corporations. Certainly that of Nossa Senhora da 6 Conceigao was composed of whites and the same was probably true of that of Pilar. Another brotherhood vrhose membership was primarily white was Bom Jesus dos Passos. The founding of this or7 ganization was approved in 1715Included within it were many members of the elite and these consistently held positions of leadership. This is verified by the election lists of the ruling board for 1738-1739, the first year for which records exist. In that year the head of the brotherhood was a sargento-mor and nine of twentyfour members of the council had titles indicating their 8 high social status. In 17^^1-17^2, the head of the brotherhood was the governor; both the secretary and procurator were capi t aes-mor es ; and sixteen of eighteen council members had militia commissions and another was 9 a priest. Clearly this brotherhood drew its leaders from the elite. The absence of any non-white board members is suggestive that these people were not allowed to join the brotherhood. The composition of the remaining two brotherhoods is not known. The Brotherhood of Nossa Senhora das Almas was founded in 1713 with membership opened to "everyone 10 who wished to be a brother." Who in fact joined is not known. The Brotherhood of Santa Quit^ria is enshrouded in the same mystery as that of Nossa Senhora do Parto.

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262 Its end is known -it allowed its chapel to be taken over by the newly-formed elitist Brotherhood of Nossa Senhora do Carmo near the middle of the century. Its beginnings are unknown as is its composition, although it is known that it existed as early as 1720, when the town 11 council awarded it land. The existence of mulatto brotherhoods can be ascertained only for the period beginning in 1725. This time lag is an indication of the lack of strength of the mulattoes, attributable undoubtedly to their few numbers. While many mulattoes migrated from other parts of Brazil, they must have represented a small minority of the population in the mining district until the 1720's. By that time, the inevitable consequences of race mixing must have begun to be felt as the number of locally born mulattoes increased rapidly. Frei Santa Maria refers to the brotherhood of Nossa Senhora da Conceigao of Ouro Preto as having been established in the parish church of Ouro Preto in 1712 by 12 pardos (mulattos). In reaction to the activities of the black brotherhood, which had been recently established, the pardos built their own side altar "which they made as 13 whites and not as pardos." This wealthy brotherhood began having problems when it voted to accept whites who, as they increased in numbers, took over control and prolit hibited the further entry of pardos. There is no record of the existence of this brotherhood in the parish of

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263 Ouro Preto, which is not to discredit Santa Marta since records of several brotherhoods known to have existed 15 have disappeared without a trace. The black brotherhoods were founded as a reaction to the exclusivist policy of the white brotherhoods. '^ Because they were prevented from joining these social and charitable organizations, the blacks were authorized to form their ov^n brotherhoods. The first one was Nossa 16 Senhora do Ros£rio of Ouro Preto founded in 1715Upon its establishment it was allowed to erect a chapel in Caquende , which Frei Santa Maria describes as being "not of little grandeur because they LblacksD also had noble IT pride, decorating it richly." Santa Maria relates that an effort to build a new church got as far as ac18 quiring the land before the idea was given up. This brotherhood was open to "every person black or white, of 19 one or other sex, freed or slave, of any nation." Whether or not intentionally, this statute is so written as to exclude mulattoes. A king and queen were to be 20 chosen annually, "both black from any nation CtribeD." Furthermore two judges, male and female, and a procurator-either freed or slave as long as black — were to be chosen. The treasurer and the secretary were required to be white. Presumably this was due to the need for literate men and, in the case of the treasurer, for someone with ample financial resources to pay the expenses of the brotherhood while awaiting the receipt of dues. It is interesting to

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261+ note that the black brotherhoods did not adopt the same segregationist policies of their white counterparts. This may have been a mechanism by which the white establishment assured itself of some role in determining the policy of the black brotherhoods. The temper of the times can be seen in the admonition that the judges of the brotherhood were "not obligated... to go get them Cthe king and queenD at home, and even less receive them at the door of the church, to avoid disturbances. This could be done, however, if good communion exists among everyone; CthenH they can go get them at home, if they so wish, and accompany them to the church, but in a way that it does not serve as a provocation ( de 21 estorvo ) . " Four years later, Nossa Senhora do Rosario of Antonio Dias was founded. The original statutes do not exist, having disappeared before 1731+, "rotted and eaten by insects with all the other books and papers of the said brotherhood," as reported the Sacristao of the Church 22 of Nossa Senhora da Conceigao. Those which do exist were prepared around 173^+, although royal acceptance was delayed until January 27, 1785, for unknown reasons. As with its sister brotherhood, the judges and procurator were black and the treasurer and secretary white, although a black could become treasurer if he were rich. The statutes of this brotherhood note the conflict between the brotherhood and the parish authorities which

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265 must have been common in colonial Minas Gerais, Because the parish did not contribute to the construction of the church, the brotherhood contended that it was not subordinate to tlie parish priest but rather temporally to the ouvidor and spiritually to the bishop of Rio de Janeiro, The lay officers of the brotherhood, presumably supported by their chaplains, took the occasion to note that "experience has shown the continuous disorders which the 23 parish priests comiait in benefit of their interest." Membership in the brotherhood was open to all Roman Catholics. One of the few papers concerning this brotherhood dating from the eighteenth century is the title page of a codex which has long since disappeared. The title page reads as follows: "This Book is for Registering the V/hite Brothers of this Brotherhood of Nossa Senhora do Rosario of the Blacks of Alto do PCadrle Faria in Order to Participate in the Jubilee and the Many Favors and Indulgences that His Holiness was pleased to Concede to All the People Vfho Were Brothers of this Brotherhood." It is dated September 13, 1T3T. This page is of importance in that it reinforces the tenor of the statute of the black brotherhoods : whites were admitted but kept separate and away from major policy-making positions. It is interesting to note that there is no provision in the statutes for a king and queen in this brotherhood, due perhaps to the fact that in 1719 the Count of Assumar objected firmly to the annual naming of king and q_ueen slaves . 2k

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266 One of the incentives given to the hrotherhood of Nossa Senhora do Rosario was the grant of indulgences. That this vas of some importance can be seen from the title page of the registry book cited above. These indulgences were granted in 16T9 by Pope Innocent XI. This grant assigned to specific acts, such as saying the rosary or taking part in a procession, a particular period of grace. For example, attending mass on July 2 after confession and communion entitled a brother to seven years of 25 salvation. The concern for ensuring salvation after death was an important aspect of the appeal of the church, and should not be overlooked. Men who thought nothing of illicit sexual activities often had private chapels and chaplains and belonged to a number of brotherhoods. While the brotherhoods satisfied a social need in that they permitted the grouping of members of similar segments of society, the brotherhoods also satisfied some of the more mundane wants of the eighteenth century man. In an age when the state did not assume responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, other institutions had to perform this function. In Portugal the guilds had fulfilled much of this role, but in Minas Gerais the guild system, as was shown above, was weak. These responsibilities fell upon the brotherhoods. Primary among these was that of providing assistance in time of need. Some brotherhoods were organized in such a way so as to ensure that members who were ill were

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267 visited, and received help with medical expenses if that 26 was necessary. Receipts to doctors can sometimes be found among brotherhood financial ledgers. A good example was the payment of ten and a half oitavas to one Antonio Rabello da Silva, made by the Brotherhood of Nossa Senhora do Rosario of Ouro Preto "for attending a crioulo and 27 medicines for the said crdoulo." Upon the death of the member, his wife, or minor child, the brotherhood assuraed the responsibility of providing the funeral. The brothers would leave the church as a group to go to the home of the deceased to convey his body in the brotherhood's pall to its final resting place, which normally was a crypt within the church reserved for t}ie members of that brotherhood. In this traditional society where status was so important it should not be surprising that there was a hierarchy among the available crypts, with priority going to those who had served on the governing boards. The brotherhoods also guaranteed that a fixed number of masses would be said in honor of the deceased. So important was this aspect of the role of the brotherhoods that all the brotherhoods had provisions by which people who were critically ill could join with little of the normal formalities upon the payment of a fixed sum. This figure sometimes was extraordinarily large, such as the one hundred twenty oitavas needed to join the Santissimo 28 Sacramento Brotherhood under these conditions. More

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268 often, the figure was considerably smaller. It was also possible to have a brotherhood accompany the funeral procession of a non-member by paying a fev oitavas. This is an indication of the importance attributed to the appearance of a brotherhood in a funeral procession. In wills it was not uncommon to find instructions to the executor that he is to petition a particular brotherhood to accept him "for the love of God as a member permitting me to receive the holy cloak, ...and to be accompanied to the 29 grave." This writer, in conversations with various older residents of Ouro Preto, was told of funerals of members of the family in which the appearance of brotherhoods was treated as a symbol of status--this is an age in which the role of the brotherhood has been greatly diminished, when many more alternative forms of status exist than in the l8th century. The brotherhoods also had responsibilities to the living. Normally the statutes contained provisions whereby members who had fallen on hard times would be given assistance. For example, the Santissimo Sacramento Brotherhood promised: "in the event a brother ... reached the state of poverty... to help with the means available, examining 30 the just cause for not being able to earn a living." A brother who had been imprisoned could expect to receive aid 31 from his brotherhood. It appears that the brotherhoods, if in good financial condition, also served to fill the void caused by the absence of banks. There is evidence that

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269 some of the lay brotherhoods adopted the practice of 32 loaning money at interest. It is also clear that the brotherhoods contributed much to the texture of life of eighteenth century Vila Rica. Their participation in religious processions--each brotherhood with its distinctive clothing — certainly must have contributed to the impression made by these ceremonies on the people. To this can be added the funeral processions when individual brotherhoods accompanied a departed brother by torch light. The absence of street lighting and the hilly nature of the town conspired to lend to these torchlight processions the appearance of glow worms inching their way across the landscape. Besides these functions some brotherhoods, such as Nossa Senhora do Rosario of Ouro Preto, had obligated themselves to walk the streets of the parish several days a week praying "for the greater honor of Our Lady and to exhort 33 the residents." The belief that the brotherhood could serve to influence the morality of the parishioners can be seen through the example of the Brotherhood of Nossa Senhora do Rosario of Antonio Dias. The statutes of this brotherhood straightforwardly acknowledge that a person could be expelled for "dissolute conduct" which reflected unfavorably on the brotherhood, as well as for more mundane 34 reasons such as failure to pay the annual dues. The absence of records makes an examination of the implemen-

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270 tation of this threat impossible. The mere threat, however, is a statement of one of the goals of the organizers of the brotherhood. The funds to support the activities of the brotherhoods came from various sources. The most obvious is the membership fees paid on entry and then annually thereafter. Other sums came from non members who wanted to be accompanied by the brotherhood during funeral processions. More significantly, the brotherhoods were able to rely on donations and rents paid on houses owned by them. Furthermore , the town council normally donated sizeable tracts of urban land to the brotherhoods. For example, by 1736 the Brotherhood of Santissimo Sacramento owned three parcels of land with a total frontage of ij39 35 bragos. This is significant when it is realized that most grants were under five bragas in frontage. The brotherhood was then free to exploit as best it could this property. If a brotherhood owned slaves, these very often were rented out to bring in additional revenues.

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Notes 1. Silvio de Vasconcellos has attempted to examine the development of society in the mining towns by studying the brotherhoods. Basically Vasconcellos' position is that during the pre-lTH period only chapels existed so that everyone worshipped together. This, Vasconcellos feels, is a manifestation of the "democratic" nature of early Mineiro society. With the creation of the brotherhoods there is a rigi di f i cat ion of classes. Initially each brotherhood established a side altar in the parish church. Then as social pressures began to increase, many of these left the parish churches to build their own chapels. Sylvio de Vasconcellos, Vila Rica. Formagao e desenvol vimento-resid^ncias (Rio de Janeiro: Institute Nacional do Livro, 1956), p. 66 and Mineiridade: ensaio de carac teri zagao (Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Oficial, I968), pp. 27-28, 63-69, and IUI-I50. Vasconcellos argues that prior to 1711 there were no social classes and after that date society became increasingly more stratified with the bourgeoisie dominating. It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that, even within the framework of Vasconcellos' definitions, prior to 1711 there were at least two classes--the masters and the slaves. Despite the dramatic transformation in the ruling class resulting from the Wars of the Emboabas , the basic structure remained unchanged. Furthermore , to define the dominant class as being bourgeois without defining this much maligned and eulogized social class makes the question difficult to debate. It does seem, however, that if the bourgeoisie is defined in terms of capitalist orientation with members of this group seeing themselves as unique and important, then Vasconcellos' position is indefensible. Merchants were not particularly proud of their status and were only too willing to become miners and landowners. Their ideal pattern was that of the upper class. 2. Compromisso da Irmandade do S.mo Sacramento sita na Matriz de N.S. do Pilar do Ouro Preto (APOP), 1738, fol. 22. It is fascinating to note that these words were lined through at an unknown date, indicating perhaps the need to integrate the membership at a later date. 271

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272 3. Fritz Teixeira Salles, Associasoes religiosas no ciclo do ouro , Estudos 1 (Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, I963), p. 32. U. Diogo de Vas concellos , "As obras de arte," Bi -Cen terario de Ouro Preto : 1711-1911' Memoria historica (Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Official, n.d.), p. 1395. Frei Santa Maria, Santuario Mariano , p. 2^1. 6. I"bid. , p. 2I+3. 7. Cod. 2 (AINSPOP), fol. 58. 8. Roll of Brotherhood Officers, 1738-1739 in Cod. of Elections (AINSPOP), fol. 100. 9. Ibid., 17^+1-17^2, fol. 102. 10. Comprorai ss o da Irmandade de Kossa Senhora das Almas (APOP), fol. 3v. It appears probable that this is the same brotherhood identified by Salles as that of SSo Miguel e Almas founded in 1725Salles, Associagoes religiosas , p. 36. In the statutes, important events are scheduled for Saint Michael's Day. Among these, for example, are the election of new officers and major festivals. 11. Council Proceedings, 10 April, 1720 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. lOBv. 12. Frei Santa Maria, Santuario Mariano , p. 2^*1. 13. Ibid. , p. 2Ul-2lt3. Ik. Ibid. 15. There is furthermore a legend that the Brotherhood of Bom Successo vas composed primarily of mamelucos (offspring of Indian and white parents). 16. Frei Santa Maria dates the founding as 1711. It is possible that the brotherhood was organized then but its establishment not approved until 1715. Santa Maris was not an eyewitness to the events he describes. Never having visited Minas Gerais, he based his work upon the reports of people recently returned from the mining district. He is generally discriminating in the things he accepts and he refused to discuss developments in some Minas settlements because he did not completely trust some of his sources. 17. Frei Santa Maria, Santuario Mariano, p.2U0.

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273 18. Ibid. 19. Compromisso da Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Ros^rio dos Pretos na sua capela filial da matriz de Nossa Senhora do Pilar de Vila Rica-Anno de lT15-sin o qual foi erecta, in Francisco Antonio Lopes, "Camara e cadeia de Vila Rica," Anuario do Museu da Inconf i denci a 1 (1952): 187. This work is basically Os palacios de Ouro Preto (Belo Horizbnte: 20. Ibid. , p. 188. 21. Ibid. 22. Compromisso da Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Rosario do Alto da Cruz (APAD), undated, fols. l6-l6v. 23. Ibid., paragraph II4. 2i|. Located among miscellaneous papers in the Archive of the Parish of Antonio Dias. 25 . Breve recopilacara e sumraario das gragas e i ndulgenci as , concedidas aos confrades da Virgem Mossa Senhora do R o s a r j "o ( Lisbon : Na Of f icina de Antonio Pedrozo Galrao, 1721). A copy of this document was found in the Avulso Section of the Arquivo Publico Mineiro. 26. For example the Brotherhood of Merces e Perdoes voted on November 20, 1759 to provide assistance to the judge of the brotherhood since he had spent so much of his own money for the betterment of the brotherhood. Cod. 11 (AIMPAD), fol. l6v. 27. Register of Expenditures of N.S. do Rosario de Ouro Preto (APOP) . 28. Compromisso da Irmandade do Santissimo Sacramento, Cod. 17 (APOP), fol. 23. This phrase was crossed out at a later, and unknown, date. 29. Will of Manuel Pereira, 19 February, I76I in Registry of Burials (APAD), vol. 3, fol. 37530. Compromisso da Irmandade do Santissimo Sacramento, fol. 25. 31. Compromisso da Irmandade de Nossa Senhora das Almas, Chapter 22.

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27*4 32. Register of Expenditures, 20 February, 1758 in Cod. 77 (AISFAD), fol. 3v. The brotherhood agreed to loan 1,000$000 and 3,000 cruzados for one year at the "legal" interest rate of 6 l/U percent. 33. Royal Edict, 20 November, 1752 in Cod. k (ABM), fol. 81|. 3^. Compromisso da Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Rosario, fol. 10. 35. Council Edict, 27 June, 1736 in Cod. 32 ( CMOP ) , fols. 28v-29v.

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Chapter 19 The Militia While the brotherhoods were an institutionalized manifestation of social jjosition, they were not alone in fulfilling this role. The militia system became an extremely important reflection of the social system, despite royal efforts to prevent this. The colonists wanted the militia organization to mirror social reality, with its polarized class sti-ucture at the extremes and a predominantly white middle group serving to tie the society together. They insisted that militia units be racially homogeneous. The crown preferred heterogeneous units, that is, units composed of all races and classes. It was not until 1728 that action was taken to integrate the ordenanga units. In that year, the governor was ordered to racially integrate these units. The excuse for the action was the appointment of an officer to an ordenanga unit composed of mulattoes and freed blacks. The appointment was nullified on the basis that segregated units were dangerous --mulattoes and freed blacks were to be distributed among white units "to become more sub1 servient and obedient." This specific enunciation of a policy of integrating ordenanga units was followed three years later by an order of a general nature forbidding 2 segregated units in Minas Gerais. 275

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2T6 These orders had no effect. If segregated units represented, to officials siting in Lisbon, a threat to law and order in the mining district, integrated ones represented a threat to the social order in the view of the miners. It is a measure of the power of local interests 3 that the colonists' point of view won out. The militia system had heen instituted before the municipal structure was established although not much is known of its organization. A royal letter of 1710 referring to the disbanding of a miners' militia unit notes that the men were absorbed by the tergo or regiment of Mestre k do Campo Gregorio de Castro e Moraes . A further indication is that, when on September 11, 1711 news re&.ched Minas of an attack on Rio de Janeiro by the French raider Rene Duquay-Trouin , within one week a force of six thousand men ten tergos and one cavalry regiment were on the move to Rio. One of these tergos was created as a 5 result of the crisis. The others must have been already formed. While no proof exists, it is probable that the first units were formally created by the 1706 nomination of capitaes mores for Ouro Preto and Rio das Mortes after the first Guerra dos Emboabas . It was not however, until the incorporation of Vila Rica that the militia system was fully articulated. The militia was divided into two distinct types of units, auxiliares and ordenangas with the former being what would be termed today the ready reserve. Supposedly better

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277 trained, the auxiliares during most of this period had officers who vere of a slightly higher social standing than those of the honie guard, the ordenangas. The auxiliares were organized with a mestre-de-c ampo as commander and a s argen to-mor as his assistant. In 171^+ the tergo of the termo of Vila Rica was composed of at least fourteen ccnipa.nies based on geographic and racial divisions. Eleven of these were established on a geographic basis, such as the units of Antonio Dias and Congonhas . It is probable that these units were made up of whites. Another two units were composed of mulattoes and one of bastards and free blacks. In the same year, the ordenangas vrere divided into eighteen units , all under the command of a capitao-mor and a sargento-mor . It appears that subordinate districts also had sargentos-raores , perhaps to provide unified leadership of several units. P"or example, in 1717 Domingues Rodrigues Neves was named "sargento-mor das orden6 angas de Itaubira", This use of district s argentos -mores may explain the appearance of the title "sargento mayor" which could refer to the second highest official in the termo. There were twelve ordenanga units established on a geographic basis. These were almost certainly made up of whites, with five units being drawn from the urban area. One unit was composed of free blacks and bastards of low social status. At the other end of the racial and status spectrum, there was a unit filled with nobles

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278 and retirees from active military service. This latter unit was of regiment size embracing the entire comarca. There were, in addition, six special ordenanga units. One of these was composed solely of forasteiros. Forasteiros were defined as business men who were not residing in the area on a permanent basis but rather visiting it on business. Thus the word had retained the meaning it had during the Wars of the Emboabas . To be a forasteiro was to be an outsider. To prevent confusion in the event of an emergency, visiting merchants then in the area were to join this unit. The commission granted to the first commanding officer of this unit, Manuel Antunes de Lemos , cites conflicts among unit commanding officers over these merchants as the reason for creating T the unit. Besides this unit of forasteiros there were units for local merchants. These units were under the 8 control of a sargento-mor . The fact that several units existed is indicative of the number of merchants operating in the termo of Vila Rica. Still another ordenanga unit was composed of miners. This unit had an ephemeral existence having been created by Governor Mascarenhas and 9 disbanded by his successor. A special ordenang§, unit was composed of all the men in the district responsible for capturing runaway slaves. The first commanding officer whose commission was found, Joao de Barros Pereira, was himself a capitao de mato , bush captain, and it seems probable that having a bush

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279 10 captain as commander was the usual procedure. This officer vas called capitao-mor das entradas and all runaways captured while he was in the area were to be turned over to him. The final ordenanja unit was of cavalry and was commanded by a colonel. While technically part of the ordenansas, this was a regiment-sized unit with companies throughout the comarca. Command of this unit was an important status symbol. Of the sixteen officers of the auxiliares in IJll^ (fourteen unit commanders plus the mestre do campo and sargento-rnor) five were homens da governanga. When the mulatto and black units are excluded, this means that five of thirteen officers were members of the elite. In the ordenan^as, four of nineteen officers were homens da governanga, or four of eighteen when the black unit is excluded. In 1718, a total of thirty-three appointments were made of commanding officers for company-sized units and above. Of these, twenty-two involved individuals who were entering the militia officer class for the first time. Of these, two already were homens da governanja and six would be within seven years. The six were divided 12 equally between the ordenangas and the auxiliares. The indication is that a militia commission was a means of entering the elite and only more rarely was it a reward for someone already within the elite.

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280 Service in the militia was required until old age or illness made continued service impossible » A^'te^ the initial appointment a person served in numerous posts before and after achieving elite status. Once in, there was only a vague path of advancement during this early period when there was an astounding turnover rate in officers. If a person's first appointment were as an ordenanga alferes , he would probably eventually be promoted to captain of the same unit, as was Manuel Rodrigues Pereira on April 28, 1717The vacancy was created when Pereira's superior was promoted to captain of an auxiliar 13 company. From aujiiliar captain, advancement meant promotion to sargento-mor of ordenanjas. This was the Ik path taken by Antonio Martins Lega. From this position the path was open to command of the cavalry regiment, sargento-mor or mestre do campo of auxiliares, or capitaomor of ordenangas. This was the ideal pattern. Appointment to the post of colonel of cavalry represented a promotion perhaps because of the command possibilities and the glamour that romantics ascribed to the cavalry. Sebastiao Carlos Leitao had served as sargento15 mor for three years when he was chosen cavalry colonel. Below the rank of colonel, vacancies usually were filled by lower ranking cavalry officers, so that when the post of lieutenant-colonel was vacated, a cavalry company 16 commander would be selected to fill the position. But exceptions to this ideal were very common during

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281 the pre-1720 period. Often steps were skipped and detours made to higher posts, hut in relatively insignificant areas. In this respect, the career of Faustino Rebelo Barbosa is perhaps typical. He reached the post of mestre do campo of the termo of Carmo after serving as alferes and sargento-mor of ordenangas, sargento-mor of auxiliares, lieutenant colonel of cavalry and mestre do campo of an 17 area of lesser importance, Itamhe. Particularly common was the jump from ca.ptain of ordenangas to sargento-mor of ordenangas. Manuel de Sousa is merely one of many examples which could be 18 cited. Promotions from alferes of ordenangas to captain of auxiliares also occupied often enough to deserve mention . The appointment orders give various reasons for advancement and provide insights into the hidden history of Vila Rica and Mi nas Gerais in general. Obviously loyal service was the crucial factor in getting a promotion. Pedro da Rocha Gandavo had all of the "right" prerequisites. He had led the emboaba party which lifted the siege of Sao Joao del Rei during the Wars of the Emboabas. In I7II, he had joined the army led by Governor Albuquerque which went to the defense of Rio de Janeiro when the city was captured by Duquay-Trouin . When the residents of Carmo rose against Ouvidor Amorim, Gandavo was on the side of Amorim and the king. During juntas he had defended the royal position. Furthermore, he had

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282 21 19 served as juiz ordinario , vereador and almotacel. Clearly his creditent i als were impeccable. Antonio Martins Lena's promotion order noted his support of the king at the 1715 junta and his service as collector of the quintos. His action in destroying a quilombo was 20 particularly emphasized. Still another example is Manuel Gomes da Silva. His appointment to sargento-mor of cavalry in 1717 noted his service as vereador, acting ouvidor and quinto collector. Furthermore the order notes ''that he is one of the richest people in Minas." Clearly these were men already in the elite. The most common types of service mentioned during this period were collecting the qu into and assistance in the relief of Rio de Janeiro. The first reflected social status because the collector was supposed to be the most influential man in the area because only the richest could be expected to be honest about preparing the tax rolls. The second was evidence of a desire to sacrifice one's personal interests in defending the king's domain from foreign intruders. In the years immediately after I72O5 a person's activities during that turbulent year was the crucial deciding factor. Service to the king was also measured in other ways. Among these was the development of new mining techniques. Thus Manuel da Silva Rosa's development of "a machine to 22 take gold out of the river," won him a militia commission,

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283 During this period both types of militia performed basically the same types of functions. Local defense was of greatest concern to the royal officials in Lisbon. 23 The ordenangas , according to Caio Prado Junior, could not leave the immediate area of the unit's jurisdiction. Prado's description is not applicable to pre-Pombali ne Brazil. For example, Albuquerque's relief army of ten 21+ terjos included six of ordenangas. In practice the question of geographical restrictions was a mute one. If there was an emergency, as occurred in ITU, all available troops were dispatched. This was an exceptional situation and there were few other occasions to send troops out of the captaincy, although the central location of Minas Gerais meant that it was in a position to provide 25 aid to the major coastal population centers. It would seem that in purely military terms both types were equally unprepared. This occurred despite the fact that a number of company commanders as well as higher officers had seen prior military service. Among these were men like Francisco Viegas Barbosa who had served a number of years in Sacramento in the Banda 26 Oriental, and Joao Carvalho de Oliveira who had served 27 in Maranhao . On the other hand, the office of capitao-mor of ordenangas had an administrative function which set these militia units off from the auxiliares. In this respect, it must be remembered that the nomination of the capitaes-

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28ii mores of Ouro Preto and Sao Joao del Rei in I706 was an effort to furnish an official who would provide law and order and control the region. The officials of the ordenan^a living in the h an lets where judicial officials ventured but once a year shared control over the administration of justice with the justices of the peace. In this regard the appointment order of Manuel da Silva Guimaraes as captain of the ordenan^a unit for the district of Rio das Pedras is illuminating: Due to the existence in Minas of some districts with a large number of residents, where the capitaes-mores and officials of the towns in whose termos these are found can neither live there nor execute my orders because of their distance [from the towns!,... it Cis] very necessary that in the said districts there be capitaes-mores both for the better regulation of their residents as for the better execution of His Majesty's business, and Cthat thesell...be chosen from among the richest men of the same districts. Selection of these officers was made by the town council together with the capitao-mor. A list of three names was submitted to the governor for his choice of one. Thus two conflicting levels of bureaucracy were involved in the appointment process. As the appointment order q_uoted above indicates, the governor issued orders to ordenanga officers. The council did also. Thus not only were both jurisdictions involved in the selection process, but both also exercised a supervisory function. This conflict in Vila Rica was muted by the presence of a

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285 forceful capitao-mor, Antonio Ramos dos Reis, who held this 29 office for half a century. There was no such overlapping jurisdiction between governor and council over the use of the auxiliares. In this regard, the council had little power. Thus, when the council wished to use the officers and noncommissioned officers of the auxiliares to help collect taxes in 17li+, it first had to petition the governor for his permission. mv,30 This was granted only for the noncommissioned officers. The governor maintained firm control over the auxiliar units . The high social status attached to a militia commission for both the officer and his wife led to abuses. The number of posts began to mushroom during the term of office of governor Antonio de Albuquerque and, to a much greater extent, under Bras Baltezar da Silveira. This process led to a stinging rebuke of Governor Silveira by the king in 1715. Silveira was criticized for "creating various ordenanja posts such as Brigadiers, Barracks Masters, Governors of Comarcas, and Mestre do Campo General never used, nor seen in Brazil, and much less in 31 the Region Cof Minas GeraisD." Silveira was ordered to submit a list of posts existing when he took office and those existing at the time he prepared the lists. This was done and the lists dispatched to Lisbon where the royal officials were shocked. Their reaction was partially justified. According to his

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286 lists, Silveira had made over two hundred and seventyappointments ranging from captain to brigadier in one year and a half. Many of these were merely honorary, and others were for command positions where no enlisted troops were available. So dismaying was the report of the governor that the Overseas Council was ordered to examine the situation. It was the opinion of the Duke of Cadaval that the number was excessive and the excess posts should be abolished. He recommended the creation of I'egiraents of one thousand men composed of companies of one hundred men, each having a captain, alf eres , two sergeants and two corporals. The ordenangas would include all men capable of bearing arms and the creation of new companies would be encouraged to allow the selec32 tion of more officers. Cadaval's ideas were accepted to a large degree by the king, as is evident from the royal order issued shortly after the meeting of the Overseas Council. The order noted the danger that these excessive appointments posed to the administration of the colony. They resulted in the "disturbing of the good administration of justice, in the multiplication of privileges which serve no more than to disturb the administration of Justice and damage the community: Cthis occursU because the men in order to sustain the appearance commensurate to their Posts go into debt, and many times quit the occupations they 33 have." Each comarca was reduced to one regiment with

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287 the normal complement of officers. All other officers lost their commissions. Six years later, royal officials were still complaining of the problems caused by Mineiros who viewed a militia commission as a mark of high social status. These officials complained that the prestige of these posts was being eroded by the selection of "unqualified 3h people whose nobility and prestige is not known." This order does not appear to have had any effect on the selection of militia officers. The order to remove these excess officers, however, did prove to be a source of problems in Vila Rica. As shall be seen below, men who attached so much social importance to a militia commission would not easily be convinced to accept the revocation of their appointments. The insistence of the crown on this very thing was one of the factors which led to the 1720 riots in Vila Rica. One of the means used by royal officials to maintain a firm control over the militia was the court-martial jurisdiction. This authority encompassed both active army and militia personnel. The court-martial jurisdiction was in the hands of the ouvidor who served concurrently as auditor-general. The involvement of the ouvidor further confused the question of who controlled the militia. The governor and the council were vying for supervisory control and yet neither had court-martial jurisdiction, that is, the power to punish for disobe-

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288 dience. Thus to prosecute militia officers, the ouvidores had to "become involved. Often the ouvidor had to be prodded into exercising this power. For example. Governor Assumar advised the Ouvidor of Rio dos Velhas in 1719 that "the Audi tores -General , should and mus t . . . Cpros ecut e H the militia officers vhen they commit some crime as defined 35 in the militia regulations." At the same time, Assumar warned against breaking the chain of command by dealing directly with a lower grade person. In this way the governor tried to ensure that the ouvidor's involvement was limited to judicial matters. Until 1719» the defense of Minas Gerais against enemies, imagined or real, was in the hands of the militia. A few army officers and enlisted men had accompanied each of the governors into Minas but there vas no regular army unit there. The military staff of the governor was composed of a handful of officers. The most important of these was a lieutenant-general or as the full title went "Tenente de Mestre do Campo General." The commission issued to Felix de Azevedo Carneiro e Cunha narrowly de36 fined this duty as " di st r ibut C i ngD orders." But the lieutenant general was more than that: he was the military right-hand of the governor. Usually having long military experience in Europe, the lieutenant-general became a trouble-shooter sent to deal with extraordinary 37 situations. Thus when conflict broke out in Pitangui

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289 in 1719 over the collection of taxes, the lieutenantgeneral was dispatched to deal with it. But regular army troops were a necessity for the maintenance of royal control in the turbulent mining district. Even a small number of trained men often could face down much large numbers of poorly trained militia men. This was the major reason for the dispatch of i-oyal troops into Minas in 1719. The dragoons were not dispatched to deal with foreign enemies, but rather to guard the governor, protect and convey gold shipments, and to "reply to some insults or uprisings which some powerful 38 people make . " The first company of dragoons arrived in December of 1719VJhile salaries were paid out of the royal treasury, the council of "Vila Rica had to provide billeting. Soon a second company was sent. Even though the size of each company was raised from thirty to sixty troops later 39 in 1719, this was clearly inadequate to provide securUO ity for the entire captaincy. Every effort was made to fill vacancies from among the residents of the settlements where the troops vrere quartered. But Assumar gave orders that no "son of America" was to be allowed to 111 join. Presumably this was Assumar's way of ensuring the loyalty of his troops. It is interesting to note again the great gulf between orders and their enforcement the earliest troop roster available, that for 1721, shows that among the sixty-two enlisted men was a native of

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290 U2 Vila Rica and a Frenchman. This native Vilaricano, Antonio Louren^o is the first person known to have been born in that tovn. The introduction of the regular army gave the governors more control in the captaincy. Besides their obvious role in maintaining peace, these units provided the governors with a disinterested source of information. The army officers were given secret instructions "to report everything which happens ... not only in regard to the militia but also anything political or concerning the governing of the people." Assumar realized that the presence of regular army troops vjould antagonize the easily excited miners. He therefore instituted a very tough code governing the actions of these army units. Troops were to take only bed, light, water, wood, and salt when quartered with civilians. Failure to comply with the law resulted in dismissal if the guilty party was an officer and " tres tratos de pol e (Ro ldana) " for enlisted men. This was a type of corporal punishment involving an apparatus to lift the person off the groiuid and then drop him. Stealing was punishable by death. The commanding officer was responsible for the behavior of his troops during marches. Cutting fruit trees or shooting chickens earned the guilty person one tour on the roldana. In distant outposts, troops were required to assist judicial officers. If a prisoner escaped military control, then those who allowed

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291 the escape were subject to arrest and trial; if found guilty the penalty was dismissal for officers and the roldana or death for enlisted men. Only strict rules and even stricter enforcement could maintain military discipline in the powder keg which Minas do Ouro was before 1720. By the time the riots began in Vila Rica in 1720, the basic military organization had been sot up. The numerically superior militia was divided into auxiliares and ordenangas , which in turn were divided racially and then further subdivided into special units based upon status, occupation, or function. As a balance to the locally controlled militia, regular army units had been introduced. But the riots broke out before these units could be brought to full strength and their organization effectively set up. The militia and regular army units were viewed by royal officials as a means of establishing law and order and maintaining the security of the mining district. But they were not the only institutions created to fulfill this mission. The town council and the apparatus of local government played an important role in performing this function.

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notes 1. Royal Order, 2? Januai-y, I728 in Cod. 3 (SG), fol. 5v. 2. Royal Order, 13 January, 1731 in Cod. 3 (SG), fol. 6. 3. Troops List, 1775 in Cod. 211 (SG), fol, 75v. h. Ibid. 5. Albuquerque to Joao V, 26 Hoveruber, I7II in Veiga, Ephemerides Mineiras , ^4 , p . 2 62. 6. Appointment order of Domingos Rodrigues Neves, 8 March, 17IT in Cod. 9(SG), fol. 202. 7. Appointment order of Manuel Antunes de Lemos , 12 April, 1711 in Cod. 7 (SG), fols. 86-87. 8. Appointment order of Francisco de Oliveira da Costa, 20 January, 1715 in Cod. 9 (SG), fol. I68. 9. Joao V to Governor Mascarenhas, 10 October, I7IO in Cod. 3 (SG) , fol. iv. 10. Appointment order of Joao de Bari-os Pereira, 12 January, 171^ in Cod. 9 (CG), fol. 77v. 11. Included in thiis figure is Francisco da Costa de Oliveira, which probably is an error and should be Francisco da Costa de Oliveira. I have assumed that this is the s am e person. 12. These figures were arrived at by comparing appointment orders found in Cod. 12 (SG) and the homens bons found in "Atas da Camara," Cod. h (CMOP), and Cod. 13 (CMOP). 13. Appointment order of Manuel Rodrigues Pereira, 28 April, 1717 in Cod. 9 (SG), fol. 226v. 1^. Appointment order of Antonio Martins Lega, 27 January, 1718 in Cod. 12 (SG), fols. 31-31v. 15. Appointment order of Sebastiao Carlos Leitao, I8 February, I718 in Cod. 12 (SG), fol. 33v. 292

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293 l6. Appointment order of Joao Pinto da Silva, 28 February, ITI8 in Cod. 12 (SG), fol. 3h . IT. Appointment order of Faustino Rebello Barbosa, I9 January, 1720 in Cod. 2 (SG), fols. 53v-5U. 18. Appointment order of Manuel de Sousa Serqueira, 30 April 30, ITI8 in Cod. I8 (SG), fol. i+3v. 19. Appointment order of Pedro da Rocha Gandavo, I8 February, ITI6 in Cod. 9 (SG), fols. I96-I96V. 20. Appointment order of Antonio Martins Lega, 27 January, 1718 in Cod. 12 (SG), fols.31-31v. 21. Appointment order of Manuel Gomes da Silva, 31 May, 1717 in Cod. 9 (SG), fol. 2U7v. 22. Appointment order of Manuel da Silva Rosa, 20 April, 1719 in Cod. 12 (SG), fol. 7523. Prado Junior, Formagaodo Brasil, pp. 308-311. 2k. Albuquerque to Joao V, 26 November, I7II in Veiga, Ephemerides mineiras , h, p. 262. Albuquerque noted that he left for Rio de Janeiro "vith about six thousand men of the best and most splendid people which the said Minas had, both forasteiros and Paulistas, formed in ten tergos , three CofD auxiliares, and six CofD ordenanga, and the paid tergo created for the occassion of picked soldiers and officers capable of s ervi ce , . . . and with fortunes CsufficientD for the expense of similar marches as well as one more regiment of good cavalry." 25. This view of the defense clearly enunciated in the ins Antonio de Noronha on January The captaincy of Mi in the center of th therefore serves as Rio de Janeiro. It obligation of the f aid the latter with in the event that t Viceroy and Captain of Brazil. CInstru Noronha, 2k January Ephemerides mineira role of MInas Gerais was tructions issued to Governo: 2k. 177S. .is found ch of which 2k, 1775. nas Gerais... is found e others, each of whi_.. a barricade, especially is the indispensable irst CMinas GeraisD to all available forces, his is ordered by the General of the State ctions to Antonio de , 1775 in Veiga, s_, 2, p. 308D. 26. Appointment order of Francisco Viegas Barbosa, 3 February, 1715 in Cod. 9 (SG), fols. 170-170v.

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29^ 27Appointment order of Joao Carvalho de Oliveira, k August, 1718 in Cod. 12 (SG), fol. 6lv. 28. Appointment order of Manuel da Silva Guimaraes, 13 March, 1719 in Cod. 12 (SG), fol.. 7^. The standing orders issued the ordenanga cavalry officers is illu" trative. Responsibilities that are mentioned includ 29. By royal order of January 2^;, 1703, the term of office of the capitao-mor was three years followed by resi denci a or investigation into the actions of the officeholder. Royal order. Cod. 3 (SG), fol. 38. It an indication of Ramos' domination over the town that was removed from office only by death. is he 30. Council Proceedings, 11 and lU April, 171^ in "Atas da Camara," pp. 320-321. 31. Royal order, 15 January, 1715 in Cod. 3 (SG), fol. 38. 32. Consulta of Duke of Cadaval, 13 April, 1719, Document llo. 315 in Rau and Silva, Os manuscritos , 1, p. 227. 33. Royal order, 25 April, 1719 in Cod. 3 (SG), fol. 38. Also see in this connection the royal order, same date, in Cod. 5 (SG), fol. 58. 3^. Overseas Council to Lourengo de Almeida, 9 July, 1725 in Cod. 20 (SG), fol. 11335. Assumar to Ouvidor of Rio das Velhas 22 December, 1719 in Cod, 11 (SG), fol. l82v. 36. Commission of Felix de Azevedo Carneiro e Cunha, 6 April, 1713 in Cod. 7 (CMOP), f ols . 20v-21. 37. Commission of Joao Ferreira Tavares , 10 December, 1717 in Cod. 12 (SG), fol. 23v. 38. Royal order, I8 January, 1719 in Augusto de Lima Junior, Vila Rica do Ouro Preto. Sintese historica e descritiva (Belo Horizonte: Author's Edition, 1957), p. 87. 39. Royal order, 25 February, 1719 in Cod. 3 (SG), fol 32.

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295 UO. In 1729 a third company was created to patrol the northern areas of the captaincy fronting Bahia. hi. Count of Assumar to Lieutenant Jose de Morais, 29 April, 1720 in Cod. 20 (SG), fol. 22i+v. U2, Cod. 38 (DF), passim. The geographical distribution of the troops is typical, I believe, of the general pattern of migration. The major centers were the northern regions of Douro, Minho, and Tras os Montes which supplied kOZ of the troops, and the Estremadura area around Lisbon with 30 %. The interior areas of Beii'a Alta, Beira Baixa, Alto and Baixo Alentejo, and Algarve together supplied only 13%. i*3. Count of Assumar to Lieutenant Jose de Morais, 29 April, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. 22Uv-225. ^ii. Assumar's Orders to the regular army troops, 25 November, 1719 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. 281+-28J+V.

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PART IV LOCAL GOVERNMENT Chapter 20 Structure of the Municipal Council The powers of the camara were extensive and its role in the Portuguese administrative system so great that a detailed examination of its internal structure is warranted Each of the three component posts of the council were, in many ways, antithetical to the others. Essentially this was due to the Portuguese concept of administrative checks and "balances even at the most basic level. Functional jurisdictions vrere seldom clear, and the distinction betvreen administration and judiciary often blurred. The municipal judge had judicial functions, but the councilmen could order him to arrest a criminal or open hearings into a crime; and the entire camara served as the appelate court for decisions from the fiscal officer (almotacel) and the justices of the peace ( juizes de V i n t e n a ) . The procurator was a force potentially capable of stymieing the combined action of the judges and councilmen. Thus each post served as a check against the others . One of the two municipal judges was the chairman of the council. As chairman, his role in the legislative 296

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2 97 processes of the camara was limited. He presided over the meetings and cast the tie-breaking vote on those 1 occassions when the council was divided evenly. Until the early lT30's the older judge usually served as chairman; then provision vas made for the alternation of the ' 2 tvo judges on a monthly basis. The chairman assumed the title of "President" or "President of the Senate." The municipal judge occupied an intermediate position in the judicial hierarchy of the capitancy. He had authority over both civil and criminal cases; he could adjudicate disputes between private citizens as well as sit in judgement in cases where a public offense had been committed. His jurisdiction included cases involving one mil reis or less in moveable property and four hundred mil reis in nonmoveable property with only a summ-ary trial. Cases involving larger values were heard by the municipal judge subject to appeal to the ouvidor. Subordinate to the municipal judge were the fiscal judges and the justices of the peace: above him was the ouvidor or third-level magistrate, chief judicial and administrative officer of the comarca. The spatial jurisdiction of the municipal judge was the entire termo; a judge was required to make a circuit through the township once during his period of service. This requirement created some hardships due to the poor roads and the harsh topography of the area. The camara complained of the great

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298 expenses which one of the municipal judges incurs going on the annual circuit to investigate more than twenty cases with the expenditure of two or three days of travel and not finding the guilty ones because almost all run to the backlands as soon as they commit the crimes. 5 The camara went on to describe the great difficulties which this created since, without the guilty party to pay the costs, the judge had to bear them himself from his pay ( propinas ) . Among these costs were those incurred by the two assistants, the investigator and the 6 secretary, that he was required to have. While on circuit, the judge was not interested only in investigating crimes, but also in examining the performance of local T officials and surveying the local situation in general. During the early years of the town, the municipal judge also served as the judge of orphans. As such he was responsible for ensuring that orphans received good treatment and that their property was not squandered — the latter being an obligation too often disregarded. In 17l8, the governor appointed a judge of orphans for Vila Rica for the first time, apparently taking advantage of the confusion surrounding the status of the camara due to extensive litigation. The council of 1719 criticized this diminution of the judge's prepogative, noting that if previous judges committed errors or crimes they should be punished but that jurisdiction in orphans' matters 8 should not be taken from the municipal judge. At the 9 same time, the council also protested to the governor. The protests were to no avail.

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299 One of the responsibilities of the municipal judge could have created a great hardship for the man occupying that post. This was the requirement that the judge patrol the tovn in the evening. Again the lav and reality were at odds as the judge often failed to leave the comfort of his home to brave the harsh climate and steep hills of Vila Rica. Ouvidor Jose AntCnio de Oliveira Machado reacted forcefully to this commission: "l order that the municipal judges, each during his month Cas president], conduct the nightly patrols C r o n d ^ . s 3 which he is obligated 10 to do by Lav." This was particularly hard for those judges who lived outside Vila Rica. Besides patrolling the tovn, the judges had other duties related to the maintenance of lav and order. BasicaJ.ly these involved the functional control of the local police--both criminal and fiscal. The constable ( alcaide ) and the fiscal officer vere responsible to the municipal judge. The fiscal officer had first instance jurisdiction in those matters vithin his purview involving sums of up to six hundred milreis; those involving more 11 than that amount were heard by the municipal judge. There were some severe limitations upon the prerogatives of these judges. Certainly one of the most significant was the requirement that a university graduate ( letrado ) be present during civil trials. This could not be enforced during the years before 1720 because of the acute shortage of university graduates in the mining district. It was not until the IT^O's that this requirement

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300 was enforced. By 17^5 the ouvidor had taken a firm stand: "l am informed that the municipal judges of this town, not being ClavryersH act by themselves upon civil cases and CimposeD fines, pronouncing in the investigations and charges without a letrado as assistant CandD without the signatures of letrado assistants which is 12 against the law." A month later criminal cases were decreed to be within the purview of this law. It appears that serving as the assistant was one of the duties of the municipal lawyer (sindico), an official appointed and paid by the camara. The municipal lawyer was mentioned in town records as early as 1717 but his service vras confined assisting in "the defense of Lthe 13 camara'sD cases." A second limitation upon the powers of the municipal judges came from within the council itself. The councillors had the power to instruct the judges to arrest and try anyone. For example, in 1738 when the contractor of the taxes on weights and measures fell behind on his payments to the council, the councillors "agreed to petition the municipal judge to order the arrest of [the contractor J ... for not satisfying what he had obligated himself to do in Cadequate] t ime . . . E andD the municipal lU judge ordered him arrested." While couched in the formal language used in the minutes of the council, the "petition" of the councillors was, in effect, an order.

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301 In this same year, 1738, there occurred an incident which illustrates the ambiguity of the lines of jurisdiction between the no n -judicial functions of the municipal judges and the normal functions of the councillors. On June 21, the vereadores criticized the municipal judge for not naming a new jailer. After the selection of various jailers who proved unsatisfactory, a heated debate ensued and "the said vereadores and procuradores CsicD of the sane Senate were petitioned by the municipal judge. Cavalry Captain Francisco da Silva Rebelo, on behalf of the king that they nominate immediately a j ailer , . . . and immediately by the said vereadores it was said that they would call ujjon the underwriter of the jail CcontractD to 15 choose a jailer capable of serving." The responsibility for acting in this situation vras passed from councillors to judge and then back. There was still another limitation on the powers of the judge. Because of his judicial functions the municipal, judge was, in a vaguely defined way, under the jurisdiction of the ouvidor and the governor. These officials could, and did, issue orders to the judge, particularly to force the investigations of crimes which perhaps the judge was inclined to overlook. For example. Governor Assumar ordered the municipal judge, Manuel Gomes da Silva, to investigate some riots of slaves in Itaubira, while at the same time forcing Silva to act by ordering his military aid to arrest the instigator of the distur-

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302 16 tances. This ensured the action of the judge who, for personal reasons, might not have indicted the disturber of the peace. The governor's insistence that the judge act when ordered was one of the sparks which ignited the 1720 uprising in Vila Rica. The power of the municipal judge was more a reflection of the personal power and prestige of the individual involved and the spatial distance from higher authority than of statutory powers of the office. The anonymously written "Discurso historico e politico sohre a soblevacao q^ue nas Minas houve no ano de 1720" provides an excellent 17 example. Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes was elected municipal judge Christmas Day, I718. While in office, he passed sentence upon one Silvestre Coutinho, evicting him from his share of a gold strike. This share was then purchased from Coutinho's partner "by Guimaraes. This in itself was probably not an unusual occurrance. Countinho sought out the governor's assistant and enlisted his support, but despite the intervention of Governor Assumar, 18 Guimaraes retained possession of the mine. In this confrontation, the most powerful man in Vila Rica was able to disobey the governor — a stand probably made easier by the governor's residence in Carmo. The councillors had a wide range of powers. These were defined by the civil code, the Ordenagoes , as being the responsibility for the "Regulation of the land and the works of the Council and of all that they can know

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303 and comprehend so that the land and its inhabitants can 19 live veil." The councillors therefore, it would seem, were givenmost non-judicial functions of the camara. It is difficult to determine whether or not practice conformed to the law. Each action recorded in the Livros de Acordaos and Vereangas (Minutes of Council Sessions) "begins with the third-person plural acordarao , they agreed, and the minutes of the proceedings are signed by all those present. While the role of the procurador is relatively easily discernible from the minutes, internal evidence to substantiate the division of powers between councilmen and judges is more difficult to locate. But the little internal evidence which exists does substantiate the coincidence of law and reality. First, on the various occasions when the councillors ordered the municipal judge to act, indications are that the latter took no active role in the voting. Second, the wording of council minutes and petitions to the council offer more positive evidence, from which several examples can be cited. When some residents of Padre Faria petitioned to have a street repaved because "it was ruined CandD incapable of being used unless the vereadores of this Senate order it repaired" they addressed themselves 20 to the vereadores and not to the camara as a whole. On one occassion, the councillors ordered the municipal judge to investigate possible fraud in the court of the fiscal. officers who were nominally under the authority of the

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30if 21 judges. Finally, the fact that the presiding municipal judge had the tie-breaking vote indicates that normally he did not vote. Regular voting was confined to the vereadores and the procurador. At the same time it should be noted that, in typical Portuguese administrative style, things were not exactly what they seemed to be. While the municipal judge might not be able to vote, the councillors and procurator had to depend on him to carry out their orders — which he could be slow in doing if he disagreed with them. Moreover, his presence and participation in the deliberations certainly had their effect upon the other members. Normally of high social status, the judges must have had an impact upon the deliberations of the council. The judge's ultimate weapon, of course, was his refusal to call the camara into session. The most controversial official on the municipal council was the procurator. As the descendent of the people's respresentative on the medieval Portuguese camara, the procurator played an important role in the working of the council. Elected along with the other 22 members the procurator acted principally as the defender of the corporate rights and property of the town and 2 3 the people . The procurator served as a link between the people and the council. Petitions, the standard means by which a person communicated his needs to the council, had to be

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305 channeled through him. Efforts to bypass the procurator "brought an immediate reaction. Any member of the council could protest a decision of that body. This disassociated the protestor from a decision he opposed. Nevertheless, the majority carried the day, and the minority was expected not only to accept this but to sign the decision and thus give the impression that the decision was unanimous. The act of pi'otest meant that the protester's name appeared not because he favored the decision but because of the rule requiring unanimity. Thus if the decision was later declared illegal and the council punished, the protestor was not subject to this punishment which was usually pecuniary. There are examples of councillors and even judges who were not acting as presidents protesting, but the majority of these actions involved the procurator acting in the capacity of protector of the patrimony and the people. Beyond protesting and appealing to royal officials for support, the procurator had other weapons at his disposal. One was the simple refusal to release funds for a use to which he was opposed. While not employed during 25 the pre-1720 period it was a potential weapon. The second weapon in the procurator's arsenal was weaker and effective only in certain circumstances. This was his refusal to sign appointment orders. Since it appears that the procurator's signature was required for an appointment to be effective, this could have made the

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306 procurator the most important member of the camara. That this did. not occur is testimony to the delicate balance which existed vithiii the camara. The need vas for the signature of a procurator, hut not necessarily of the one in office. All the council had to do was find someone who had held the post previously and who agreed with the proposed appointment. Thus when Manuel Rodrigues de Almeida refused to sign the appointment order of a new urban street aligner, the council turned to the procur26 ator of the previous year who signed the order. The procurator effectively could act in this manner only in a situation wherein he had popular support strong enough to intimidate those exprocurators available. Otherwise the act of refusing to sign was simply a slightly stronger form of protesting. This loop-hole limited the independence of the procurator. But the ultimate constraint upon the activities of the procurator was the possibility of removal from office. This, however, seldom occurred in eighteenthcentury Vila Rica. This was due primarily to the fact that while the protests and refusals to expend funds or sign orders were irritating to the other officers of the camara, they were not sufficient cause for punishment. Removal from office required constant disobedience to the will of the council or dereliction of duty. The council functioned only because of the good sense of its members. The balance which existed could be easily

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307 upset by the intransigence of any official. That this seldom occurred was due to the fact that the members of the council represented the same socio-economic group and thus had the same interests to defend. When the balance was tipped it was usually the doing of the procurator acting as the protector of the commonwealth and the patrimony of the council.

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Notes 1. A long debate vithin the council was decided on June 20, lTi^2 by the municipal judge: "since the votes were tied Con a question ofD religious processions the municipal judge broke the tie." Council Proceedings, 20 June, 17^(2 in Cod. k2 (CMOP), f ol . lllv. This is one of the few examples where the judge's involvement is reflected in the minutes of the council sessions. 2. Alternation was tried as early as 1712. The chairmanship of the 1712 council was divided the first two months, then alternated monthly during the next five months. The judge who served as chairman in July held that post in August. In September the post was shared. November had but one session and October and December none. Presumably the alternating was done for the convenience of the two individuals involved. The following year the oldest judge resumed his functions as sole chairman. Council sessions, "Atas da Caraara," pp. 199-391. 3. The municipal council was referred to indiscriminantly as the Senado, the camara, and the Senado da Camara. The use of the term senado was unwarranted since this was supposed to be reserved for councils of cities. However there was no effort to stop the municipal council of Vila Rica from using the title. k. Edmundo Zenha, municipio no Brasil: 1^32-1700 (Sao Paulo: Instituto Progresso Editorial, 19^8?), p. 575. Council to Joao V, 7 May, 1751 in Cod. 50 ( CMOP ) , fol. 50v. 6. Ibid. 7. Council Proceedings, I6 May, 17^^ in Cod. 50 (CMOP), fol. 90v, The council members "agreed to write a letter to the municipal judge Captain Luis de Figueiredo Leitao, who is in Cachoeira investigating a case, advising him to examine the actions of the justice of the peace of the parish of Cachoeira." 8. Council to Joao V, undated but sent by 1719 fleet, in Cod. 19 (CMOP), fol. 2v. 308

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309 9. Council Proceedings, 13 May, 1719 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. 85. 10. Auto de Correisao, 3 April, 17^+5 in Cod. 22, (CMOP), f ols . 96-96V. 11. Zenha, muni cipi o , p. 58. 12. Auto de Correigao, 3.April, 17^+5 Cod. 22 (CMOP), fols. 96-96V. 13. Appointment Order, 20 October, I718 in Cod. 13, fol. 6lv. li». Council Proceedings, I8 October, 1738 in Cod. 39, fol. 65Ednundo Zenha in his study of local government confuses the judicial function of the councillors. While they can order the arrest of a person, they do not participate in the trial of those arrested. Furthermore, Zenha over simplifies the judicial functions of the camara. Only the judges had first instance jurisdiction vhile the councillors acting as part of the vhole council had appellate jurisdiction over cases originally tried in the fiscal courts and by the justices of the peace. 15. Council Proceedings, 21 June, 1738 in Cod. 39 (CMOP), fol. 1+5. 16. Count of Assumar to Manuel Gomes da Silva and to Lieutenant General Manuel da Costa Fragoso, 12 October, 1718 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 6I. 17. This work was written e Count of Assumar, or by an o While it is clearly a defens the 1720 uprising and is bia extent of the plot and of th presented to the continuatio description of the steps lea firmed in many respects by o the incident described here the individual involved. Th "Discurso historico" is in t Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais manus cript . ither by the g fficial subord e of Assumar ' s sed in its des e imminent dan n of royal aut ding to the up ther s ources . is not out of e original man he Arquivo Pub and reference V e r n o inate actio cripti ger wh hori ty rising Furth charac us c rip 1 i c o M s are r , the to li i m . ns during on of the i ch it , the are conermore ter for t of the ineiro , to thi s 18, "Discurso historico", fols. 29v-30 Ordenagoes , Livro I, Titulo LXVI in Joao Caraillo de Oliveira Torres, Historia de Minas Gerais , 5 vols. (Belo 19 Hori zone 2U3. Difusao Pan-Americana do Livro, n.d.) I, 2^42-

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310 20. Petition, July, 1733 in Avulso Mago, No. 173, APM. 21. Council Proceedings, 18 June, 1738 in Cod. 39 (CMOP), f ols . U3V-1+1+V. 22. Torres, Hi stori a de Minas Gerais , vol.1 , p. 250 states that the procurator was selected by popular election. Torres appears to be confusing the procurator with his counterpart, the procurator or solicitor of the people ( procurador do povo ), who was an official elected by all interested people to deal with a specific problem. The procurator was elected in the same manner as the other members of the council. 23. Zenha, muni cipl o , pp. 6-69, in his quest for proof to substantiate his be3.ief in the democratic character of the council, sees the procurator as the defender of individual rights. This, at least in Vila Rica, does not appear to have been the case. The procurator was concerned with corporate rather than individual rights. 2k. This rule of unamiiiiity also means that splits in the council over issues which were not crucial were covered up with no record of squabbles or voting differences being kept . 25. Thus in I'jhS the procurator Guimaraes opposed the use of council funds for fighting quilombos . Despite the demands and threats of the councillors he remained steadfast. The councillors accused him of "impeding by this means the ConlyJI solution required by such a great evil." Even after the ouvidor approved the expenditure, thus removing any doubt concerning the legality of the decision, the procurator remained adamant. The councillors could do no more than make Guimaraes responsible for whatever damages resulted from his refusal to release council funds. Council Proceedings, 13 and 26 October,. 17^+8 in Cod. 52 (CMOP), fols. 202 and 207-207v. 26. Council Proceedings, l6 December, 17^1 in Cod. k2 (CMOP), fol. 60.

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Chapter 21 The Municipal Council: Selection of Members The selection of people to fill the six seats on the municipal council of Vila Rica was a process established in elaborate detail by lavs and custom. The councilmen vere chosen in elections, but those eligible to vote and, therefore, to serve on the council represented a miniscule percentage of the total population of the municipality. Council members served for one year vith three complete councils being selected every third year. This has led to some confusion over the council members' term of 1 office. The statute requiring triennial elections was observed in Vila Rica only during the early period. Annual elections soon became the rule. This violation of the law was acknowledged by the municipal council in 1735 during the ouvidor's annual inspection ( correi gao ) . The council defended its action by citing "the unstable 2 residence of the inhabitants." No action was taken by the ouvidor and the violation was ignored. Council members were prohibited from succeeding themselves. But movement from one post to another was not uncommon. An example is provided by Manuel de Figueiredo Mascarenhas who served as the senior counci2lor in 1711 and then as the senior municipal judge the following year. 311

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31: While elections were triennial the procedures utilized vere often bizarre in their details. Held normally about December 8, the elections were indirect with the elite (homens bons) first selecting electors who, in turn, chose the council members. The electors chose six men for the post of judge, nine for councillor and three for procurator. It was the responsibility of the ouvidor to take these names and from them form three councils. When the election was complete the names were placed in balls, ( pelouros ) , probably of leather "sewn and sealed with 3 five drops of laquer." The pelouros, each containing the names of the members of three complete councils to maintain secracy, were placed then in a safe until the time of the formal announcement — normally between December 26 and 28 at which time "the safe locked with three keys of which the municipal judge... had one, the senior councillor had another Candl the procurator the other... Cwas opened andl a boy six years old more or less was called Candl instructed to take one of the pelouros from k a sack." Then the membership of the new council was announced. Despite the role played by the ouvidor in the arrangement of the councils, neither that official nor the governor normally were able to interfere directly in the election process. One of the few occassions when a governor intervened occurred in I718 when the ouvidor, Manuel Mosqueira da Rosa, could not attend the election, osten-

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313 sably because of illness. The election was accompanied by such scandal and disturbance that the governor was forced to step in, ordering Lieutenant General Joao Ferreira Tavares to Vila Rica until the completion of the selection "to observe as a disinterested person." This dispatch of "a disinterested person" initiated a long period of litigation concerning the election and the intervention . There was one real weapon which the royal authorities could use against "independent" electors. This was the authority of the ouvidor to issue the carta de usan9a . or authorization given to elected officials to assume their posts. While this requirement specifically refers only to the municipal judges, cartas de crenga e con firmayao, literally letters of loyalty and confirmation, 6 were required of all the members. 7 Service was mandatory for all those elected. Excuses were seldom accepted. The 'power to decide on the validity of an excuse was held by the ouvidor. Particularly when elections were triennial there was the chance that a man selected for a council post had died or had moved to another town before his service began. Men were excused because of old age or because of the need to conduct business in distant places. The ouvidor had to ascertain whether the absence was an effort to avoid serving on the council or had occurred by coincidence. When the ouvidor decided that a legitimate vacancy

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3li+ did exist, he called a special election ( eleigao d.e barrete ) . This election was direct, with all the h omens bons present voting, and freedom of choice was protected zealously. Judges elected in this manner were called juizes de barrete and councilmen, vereadores de barrete , distinguishing them from to those regularly elected who were called juizes or vereadores da vara. This process is illustrated by the actions of the lame-duck council which met on January 1, I716 with the homens bons in order to open the letters of acknowledgement sent by the men chosen to serve on the new council. Only four letters were received as two of the men selected were absent from the region. Of the four still residing in the area, two asked to be excused from serving. The excuses were submitted immediately to the ouvidor for his decision. The ouvidor accepted one of the excuses and ordered that a special election be held 8 to select two judges and one councillor. The number of men entitled to vote had grown slightly since IJH when twenty-three homens bons had selected the first electors. In the direct elections for juiz de barrete in I716, the winner received thirty votes. The 9 numbers received by the losers are not given. But the increase was relatively small. Elections in which more than fifty voters exercised their prorogative were not common--f i f ty out of a total population by 1720 of ten to twenty thousand, of which probably four to eight thousand

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315 were free. The voters came from the entire termo although obviuusly those residing in Vila Rica itself were more likely to vote . The h on ens bons or electors vere a well-defined body of men. In general, they were the richest and most prominent men in the region. Because they constituted the body from which council members and fiscal officers were drawn, they had to be free of the impediments which could preclude a person from serving. The list of the homens bons in I'fll offer an insight into the structure of the 10 ruling elite during the early years in Vila Rica.

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316 H C— H o •H CO a 7i O +J C cd O -P O CQ H H w 0) a xs •H H o (U o nJ H -P •H pq o -p o 01 H w 05 ;^ o Ph f-1 Jh Jh tn 0) 0) (L) C 6 t> > ^ OJ O nd C O •H a > O K cci o 00 Ch 0) »-3 H to -p u o vo 1-1 H u o on H H (D O 03 •P O fi H < O •H O o

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317

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318 Fourteen of the tventy-three homens bons went on to enter the governanga, which was the pinnacle of the social hierarchy, composed of men who served either on the council or as fiscal officers. Eleven, at least, held militia commissions. Of the five men whose birthplace is known only one was a Paulista. The homens bons formed a recognizable corporate body. While they appear often in the colonial documents, only a few of these documents are helpful in sketching the characteristics of this body. One of these few was the inspection ( correi gao ) of March 29, 1T3T which took the council to task for failing to have the "homens bons da governanga" in attendence when it decided that two men were unfit to enter "the governanga" . The ouvidor revoked the decision and authorized their entrance, thereby 11 entitling them to hold public office. Thus the elite had a recognized constiuency with established procedures for entrance . Withdrawal from this body was effected in several ways. A person elected to office who failed to serve could be expelled from the inner circle. In 1724, for example, the council agreed that the fiscal officer who had been elected, Bento Correia de Melo excused himself by leaving for Ribeirao a Baxo CsicD after receiving Call letter to take office ...despite being warned to attend this session today for which reason they elected Domingos Francisco de Oliveira as fiscal officer....

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319 Also they determined that because Bento Correia de Melo did not accept the staff of the fiscal officer for the above Reasons he will not be employed any more in the governanga of the Republic of this Town. 12 Departure from this select group without prejudice was possible only by retirement or death. As an example of the former, one of Vila Rica's leading citizens. Colonel Manuel Ferreira Agrelles requested a certificate of retirement and exemption from all public employment "on the basis of his age, seventy, and having served four 13 times as municipal judge and once as councillor. He thereupon withdrew from the small group of men who actively ruled the tovrn. Besides the general qualifications contained in the Ordenagoes two special ones were proposed to control entry into the council. The first was signed on March 22, 1721 after the quelling of the riots which had rocked Vila Rica. By this order, Joao V ordered that "the principal people" were to be strongly encouraged to marry and asked for the governor's recommendation as to whether "it would be convenient to order that only those Cwho wereD married could enter into the ruling bodies of the Ik council of the towns." The king expressed reservations concerning the sufficiency of married men who could meet the prerequisites for entry into the ruling elite. While the governors response is unknown, this initiative was one of the means by which the crown hoped to pacify the tur-

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320 bulent miners, not only of Vila Rica but of all Minas Gerais. It was felt that the propensity to quarrel and revolt vas related to the absence of family life, due to the predominantly male migration into the gold fields. Marriage vould force the miners to put down roots. The second effort was aimed at another group, entirely. During the early years of the municipal, life of Minas do Ouro the great social mobility of the miners and the fluid situation which had resulted had provided an a.tmosphere conducive to the entry of some non-whites into the ruling elite. These were probably mulattoes of light skin tones whose wealth served as a whitening device. On January 29, 1726, the crown moved to reaffirm the law permitting only whites to rule. In part, this law, whose social significance already has been discussed, stated that : Since a large part of the families Cin MinasD...are of clean birth it is fair that only the people who had this quality should be elected to serve as councillors and join the ruling elit e . . . . CW hileD the lack of capable people made it initially necessary to tolerate the admission of mulattoes to the exercise of those offices, today this reason has ceased CandU it becomes improper that they be occupied by people in which occurs such a blemish. These efforts were only partially successful. Their significance lies more in the intentions of the crown than in the results they wrought. They reveal an intention to progressively purge and thereby define more narrowly the

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321 elite. It must be noted that these limitations were not universally accepted by even the white elite which often resisted efforts to racially define its composition.

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Notes 1. Torres, Historia de Minas Gerais , 1: p. 2i+9 states that the term of office was three years. Torres apparently is confusing the frequency of election with the term of office. By statute elections were held every three years but three entire councils were chosen at the same time when this method was employed. 2. Inspection Report, 8 July, 1735 in Cod. 22, (CMOP), fol. 60. 3. Council Proceedings, 1 January, 1713 in"Atas da CamaraV p. 255. h. Council Proceedings, 28 November, 1713 in"Atas da Camara'J pp. 285-286. 5. Count of Assumar to Manuel Mosqueira da Rosa, 26 December, 17l8 in Cod. 11 (CMOP), fol. 93v. 6. Council Proceedings, ik January, 17l6 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. 10. The first judges had had this requirement waived for the initial appointment because of the unavailability of an ouvidor. 7. There were exceptions to this rule as some individuals had been granted special exemptions from serving even if selected but it was generally known who had these. It is very rare to encounter someone claiming exemption on the basis of privilege during this period. 8. Council Proceedings, 1, k and 11 January, 17l6 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fols. U-10. 9. Council Proceedings, 11 January, 17l6 in Cod. (CMOP), fol. 10. 10. This information was compiled from the following sources: Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro 2, Part 1 (January-March, l897): "Atas da Camara," Cod. h (CMOP), Cod. 8 (CMOP), Cod. 13 (CMOP)and Franco, Dicionario de bandeirantes e sertanistas . 11. Inspection Report, 29 March, 1737 in Cod. 22 (CMOP), fols. 66v-67. 322

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323 12. Council Proceedings, 25 February, 172U in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol.STv. 13. Council Proceedings, November, 1752 in Cod. 63 (CMOP), fols. 72V-T3. lU. King to Count of Assumar, 22 March, 1721 in Cod. 23 (SG), fol. 6 also cited in Sylvio de Vasconcellos, Vi la Rica , p . 62 . 15. Joao V to Lourengo de Almeida, 29 January, 1726 in Cod. 5 (SG), fols. 115-115V.

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Chapter 22 The Functions of the Municipal Council The council had a very vide range of responsibilities most of vhich dealt with local matters. During the first twenty five years after the incorporation of Vila Rica the power of the council to act on local issues went unchallenged. Only when the ouvidor was able to enforce his authority to pass judgement on the legality of the expenditures of the council vxas the latitude of the council limited. This did not occur until the fourth decade of the eighteenth century, although the process was begun immediately after the suppression of the 1720 urban 1 riots . One of the major problems facing the council of Vila Rica was the regulation of commerce. Because of the location of the town, crops could be grown only with difficulty; the numerous hills on which the town was built required extensive terracing and the soil was generally poor. While among the first urban land grants were some for gardens, the residents of the town with its ferrous soil certainly could not grow enough crops to make the community self-sufficient. Food stuffs had to come from those regions outside the urban area where the mountains were less steep and 32k

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325 the soil more fertile. There were three areas in the municipality suitable for this. The first was the area around Sao Bartolomeu, which had a large number of farms in I715-I7IT. While some of these were major holdings, such as that of Antonio Martins Lega which measured half 2 a square league the majority of the properties in the area were of smaller size. The second major region was the long valley between Tripui and Cachoeira, which became an important producer of cattle for the Vila Rica market. The third area was to the north and west of Cachoeira. Called the campo , or plain, it became a provider of cattle and food crops. It is in this area that early efforts were made to produce sugar cane. In 1711 a sesmaria was given to Antonio de Araujo dos Santos "a married man and resident of Kinas with his family, who had lived ten years on a farm along the Velhas River in a place called the Curralinho Clittle corral! on which he had built a sugar mill to make sugar five years ago [:i706j which was 3 the first to be built in Minas." The crops grown were the staples of the Mineiro's diet then as now. These were corn, manioc, and beans. Corn was by far the most important. Governor Assumar noted in a letter to Joao V that "l saw with my own eyes that there is no distance in excess of half a league in this Captaincy where one does not find cultivated those foodstuffs which here are common such as corn and manioc." The mineiros' favorite alcoholic drink also then as now

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326 was aguarente or cacha ga distilled from sugar cape juice. This production was an important factor in the internal trade of Minas. Assumar noted the large number of merchants travelling the roads in convoys of up to sixty horses. He estimated that more than nine thousand 5 pack animals were travelling the trails of Minas. Much of the corn was ground and then roasted to make corn meal for the slaves. By I71I4 grinding mills could 6 be found within the urban limits of Vila Rica. Various efforts were made to control the quality of the corn meal and to ensure its availability to the residents of the urban core. The regulation of commerce in meat was also of great concern to the council and many ordinances were enacted prior to 1720 in an effort to ensure a constant supply of meat. The council's involvement was precipitated by a meat shortage in 1712, caused by the refusal of cattlemen to bring their herds into Vila Rica to be slaughtered. The council reacted by prohibiting local ranchers from selling or transporting their cattle outside the municipality of Vila Rica. Anyone doing so was subject to having all his cattle confiscated. Cattle were to be T brought into town on Fridays and Saturdays "as customary." This ordinance did not have the desired effect and in January, 1713 a penalty of thirty days in jail was added to the threat of confiscation and the sale of live cattle within the municipality was prohibited to force the cattle-

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10 327 8 men to slaughter their cattle. In the same year the council, in consultation with Ouvidor Amorim and Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes , enacted a one-quarter oitava tax on 9 each head slaughtered in the district of Vila Rica. In return the council obligated itself to construct corrals. This was not done, however, until 1T18 when the contract was let for the construction of corrals and a building 11 for butchering and selling beef. To provide meat on a more regular basis cattle were ordered brought into town on Saturdays and Tuesdays for butchering. At the same time, the council changed its attitude toward the system of providing meat. The monopoly meat contract, which had played such a prominent role in igniting the VJars of the Emboabas , was again seen as the best means for guaranteeing the supply of meat. All those involved in the meat business were called to a session and the contract put up for sale. The contractor had to provide ample meat during an entire year or suffer 12 severe penalties. This restrictive policy was unworkable due to the size of the market, and, the following year, 1715} the council returned to the policy of decreeing ceiling prices and allowing competition among the merchants. The meeting of the council with the meat merchants, who together effected this change in policy, established several conditions: maximum prices were set at twenty pounds for one oitava, and a quarter of a steer for three oitavas; the butchers were to be licensed and

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328 13 the weights used had to he examined semi-annually. Three years later it was decided to provide fresh meat daily and the ceiling price was lowered to twenty-four 11+ pounds per oitava with licenses renewable monthly. It was hoped that doing away with the meat monopoly would ensure that prices were the lowest possible. Thus the council had become involved intimately with the problem of providing large quantities of beef. The policy of the council had switched from minimum intervention--the regulation of the number of merchants involved--to return to a monopoly system and then, finally, to maximum involvement through the issuance of licenses to ensure that prices were low. Furthermore, the number of those licenses issued was limited to guarantee a minimum of competition in any given district. Besides providing for an ample supply of food, the council was responsible for regulating its quality. Once again meat was a particular problem. Normally cattle were brought in from the major northern centers, such as Bahia, through Sahara, Curral del Rei (presently-day Belo Horizonte), and Contagem (the present-day industrial park area of Belo Horizonte), and then on to Vila Rica where the animals were slaughtered upon arrival. No time was spent fattening the animals before butchering. To improve the quality of the meat, the council required at 15 least one week pasturage in Cachoeira. Moreover, animals brought into town toibe slaughtered had to be put

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329 16 out to pasture if they were not killed immediately. This apparently did not have the desired effect since in 1?^+^ Ouvidor Caetano Furtado de Mendonga specifically noted that animals awaiting slaughter were kept in the corrals without food or water, thereby prejudicing the quality of the meat. He forbade this procedure and re17 quired pasturage after two days of waiting. Pork was another important element in the diet of the Vilaricano. Pigs roamed the streets of early Vila Rica in much the same way the visitor finds them in the small isolated towns around Vila Rica today. One of the routine ordinances enacted year after year by the council prohibited pigs from being permitted to roam the streets freely. Because pork needs to be refrigerated, salted, or eaten immediately to prevent spoilage, its supply was a problem due to the lack of refrigeration and the high cost of salt. The council therefore reacted strongly to the practice of butchering the pigs outside of town and transporting the meat to Vila Rica for sale. As often as not the meat arrived spoiled so that white men refused to purchase it and the meat was sold cheaply to Negroes who became sick. To prevent this the introduction of un18 salted pork was prohibited. The council was also concerned about the quality of other products. The sale of fresh corn ( milho verde ) was prohibited as prejudicial to the health of slaves, al19 though no explanation was given for this. Similarly

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330 the sale of corn meal vas prohibited for a time because 20 it was not being roasted adequately. Problems also were encountered with the roasting procedures for flour 21 of benzoin ( ben j oim ) and its sale was prohibited. Bread had, such a crucial place in the diet of the residents of Vila Rica that its price was closely regulated by the council. Whereas the fiscal officers determined the prices of most items, those of bread and corn were set annually by the council, which normally kept the price stable and instead manipulated the weight of the loaf. Perhaps due to the unavailability of sufficient quantities of wheat, corn meal was mixed with wheat flour in making bread until 17^2 when this practice was pro22 hibited. Beyond controlling the availability and quality of the foods eaten by Vilaricanos, the council acted to regulate the stores and shops which sold these items. This regulation of businesses proved to be an important factor in the growth of Vila Rica. Several of the mountain mining camps, especially Ouro Bueno, seemed to be evolving rapidly into major settlements; until the council prohibited businesses in these settlements. Thus urban growth was channeled into the area of the three original settlements. The members of the council which initiated this policy was aware of its implications.

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331 They agreed to forbid that there be in the district of this town, within a distance of one league, stores of dry goods or wet goods or any shop of any kind because of the damage which occurs to the settlement of this town and the diminution of the Crate ofD increase among the merchants of the town and the miners. -^ One month was given to close the business establishments under threat of arrest and imprisonment for thirty days and a fine of sixteen oitavas. Several exceptions were made, such as along the road to Carrao because of the extensive transit of travelers along that road. In 171^ further action was taken to curb commercial growth outside the central settlements. First taverns and restaurants ( cuzinhas das lavras ) were prohibited, followed shortly by shops which sold "any perishable item 21+ or liquors." This was aimed specifically at the settlements on the mountain. That these ordinances were not enforced can be seen from the report which Ouvidor Manuel Mosqueira da Rosa issued during his inspection in I716. Rosa forbade all shops in the areas of the mines and ordered that all ranchos obtain licenses to remain on the mountain since it was feared that these acted as clandes25 tine shops . Areas closer to the urban center also were subject to these restrictions. Shops were prohibited in the area of Corrego Seco in 1719This area near Caquende was one of extensive mining operations. The prohibition was decreed by the governor who ordered those shops still 26 standing after fifteen days be put to the torch.

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332 Enacting ordinances vas one thing, enforcing them another. The I718 council acknowledged the difficulty of enforcing the prohibition on shops near mining sites, noting that the edicts were enforced only on the poor; the rich went untouched. The council members felt that "the Law should be equal for all, distributing justice without exception, to the important as well as the little 27 man." Since it felt powerless to act against the magnates of the outlying areas, this council admitted defeat and rescinded the previous or dinances , and licenses were 28 again issued for businesses in the mining districts. This strange admission of weakness and the invitation to businessmen to return to the mining districts and open their shops lasted only a short time. The 1719 council reinstated these edicts although there is no evidence 29 that anything was done to enforce them. This reversal in policy probably was due to pressure exerted by the Count of Assumar, whose determination to close these establishments was one of the causes of the 1720 uprising. Various orders were issued to close stores and shops outside the urban perimeter but within the sesmaria of the town. But whereas the council of 1713 had stated its reasons honestly, each of the other councils used the rationale that these establishments were dens of iniquity preying upon the gullibility and natural dishonesty of the slaves. That they were dens of iniquity need not

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333 be doubted, but there was more involved than a desire to protect the miners. Without commerce a mining community could not expand and evolve to a new level of development: once the gold deposits were disipated the settlement disappeared. Bom Successo is an excellent example of this. The residents of Bom Successo pulled up stakes and moved to Padre Faria when the gold played out because there was no other economic base. But both Antonio Dias and Ouro Preto continued to grow even after the quantity of gold produced began to decline. One of the major reasons for this continued growth was that each settlement had a thriving business community. Ouro Preto and Antonio Dias grew because each had evolved to a second leve] of development-no longer mere mining camps, both had become commercial centers. If less gold was panned from the streams of Vila Rica, the gold ripped from the Morro de Vila Rica and spent in the stores, shops and taverns of the urban core, amply made up for this decline. Once the mountain settlements vere prohibited from establishing their own commercial base they were doomed to total dependence on the already developed area. Despite the fact that the quantity of gold taken from the Morro de Vila Rica probably was much greater than that extracted from the valley, the areas of Ouro Podre, Ouro Fino and Ouro Bueno remained more mining camps, doomed to disappear when the gold played out. The council also played an important role in regulat-

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33i+ ing guilds. The organization and the role of the guilds has already been discussed. However, some general comments as to the relationship between the council and the guilds are appropriate here. The guilds of Vila Rica were dominated by the municipal council. The election of guild officers was conducted under the auspices of the council which issued commissions to the winners and administered their oaths of office. At times, in fact, the council had to cajole the artisans into showing up for elections. Furthermore, guild pay scales were established by the council, apparently in conjunction with guild officers. Each artisan had to be approved by the council before he could practice his craft within the guild corporation, but even then he was required to obtain yearly licenses to practice his trade. Those men who applied for memberrship without having been tested previously were examined by the judges of the guild who issued a letter of examination ( carta de exame ). But the decision of the guild judges had to be approved by the council in order to have legal force. Even the ceremonial functions of the guilds were controlled by the council which could, and did, order its members to participate in various functions. Clearly the guilds in Vila Rica were controlled tightly. The weakness of the guild system was counterbalanced by the emergence of the lay brotherhood, which in took over some of the functions which the guild traditionally had in Portugal.

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335 Another major responsibility of the council was to provide for municipal improvements. There vere always public work projects underway, such as the paving of 30 streets which was an annual affair. Constant repairs vere needed not only because the work was poorly donemany times contractors did substandard work-but also because slaves looking for gold would remove the stones or break them. Carts carrying stones, other building materials, food, or other goods also wreaked havoc with the streets. Bridges were another civic improvement of great importance in this region cut by numerous streams and creeks. In the urban area bridges, like roads, were usually built by the council, although sometimes secondary bridges of wood would be built by the residents in the immediate area who would profit most by their construction. On occasion still another means of building bridges or roads was employed. This was the sponsoring of the work by an organization such as a lay brotherhood. It was through the intercession of the "black brotherhood" of Nossa Senhora do Rosario of Ouro Preto that the upper road connecting the chapel of Nossa Senhora do Rosario 31 to the parish church was built. Other work such as the construction of retaining walls to prevent landslides was sponsored by the brotherhoods. Outside the urban area the bridges were built by the local residents under the direction of the justices of the peace of the local militia commanders. The council

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336 usually acted after petitions from the people focused its attention on a problem area. Typically the contract for the repair work was put out for "bids several months after the council was made aware of the need and only after a personal inspection was made by the procurator or the entire council , Also of great importance was the furnishing of water for public and private use. Fountains were built in all the settled areas at great expense due to the need to pipe water from its source. If there was a surplus of water available for any fountain, the council would authorize people along the path of the pipes to divert some of the water for their own use. Vila Rica was, and is, famed for both the abundance and purity of its water. As with the supply of food, the council not only acted to ensure an adequate supply but a].so to maintain its purity. Innumerable times the council admonished a resident to repair the broken water pipes on his property which allowed impurities to get into the water. Similarly people were ordered to find ways of dumping human wastes which would not pollute the water. Apparently much of the pollution was caused by the people who insisted on washing themselves and their clothes in the public fountains. An annual council ordinance prohibited washing in these tanks. Horses drank from these same tanks, presumably in competition with the many people who obtained their drinking water there. The overflow from

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337 these tanks was then piped into private homes for consumption . The special geological features of the region in which Vila Rica was built necessitated costly work to make the area safe. To prevent slippage, mountainsides had to be buttressed. Many of the huge walls built to accomplish this in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can be seen today. Marvelously well constructed, they still accomplish their purpose and are but one example of the way in which the settlers dealt with a harsh 32 physical setting. Besides providing for fountains, retaining walls, streets and bridges, the council took an active hand in urban planning. This involved ensuring that the houses were aligned correctly, the streets reasonably straight and largos (small squares) and the larger pragas , were planned. Constructions which protruded too far into the street, such as stairs, were ordered demolished; alleys which became obstructed or had been closed by someone for their own use, were opened; unauthorized building of fences and extensions on houses similarly were ordered demolished. Furthermore, through its power to issue urban land grants, the council controlled, in a very 1/ general way, overall urbanization patterns. It also had the authority to grant building permits--a power which it used extensively as a means of influencing urban growth.

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338 Public -works accounted for a large part of the council's expenses. Unfortunately, information concerning the first ten years of the council's existence is unavailable due to the loss of the budget reports. But for the period after 1721 reliable budgetary information is available. In 1722, sixteen percent of the council's expenditures were for public works; by 1755, the percentage was forty-five. If the money expended on evaluations and repairs for damage to private homes which resulted from public cons truct inn , and the purchase of homes to make way for new construction, is included, the figure 33 reaches fifty-six per cent. This is extraordinary but illustrative of the attention devoted to this aspect of the council's general responsibility. Religious and secular festivals and ceremonies also accounted for a portion of the council's expenses. Vfhereas normally money devoted to religious festivals did not exceed ten per cent of the total, the occurrance of a secular festival made expenses skyrocket. These festivals were held upon the arrival of a new governor or bishop, the birth or death of a member of the immediate royal family, or the coronation of a new monarch. In 1721, the arrival of the e;overnor sent the festival percentage of 3i+ the budget up to twenty percent. The council financed these activities and also actively participated in them. Processions were held on major religious and civic holidays. The council always

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339 marched in a body — each member with his insignia of office held high, preceeded by the standard of the council, Other standards vere carried by selected homens bons, often in rotation, so that the lists of men chosen to carry them serves as a roster of the homens bons. At the same time the council members were accorded courtesies due their position. A priest met them at the door of the church and on their departure bade them farewell. Both ceremonies were accompanied by the ringing of bells in accordance with tradition. During high masses the church had to provide incense to burn if the council vas in attendance. During festivals the council occupied 35 a box immediately to the right of that of the governor. These and other symbols of prestige were extremely important in an age when status was manifested by outward appearance . One of the more intriguing responsibilities of the council derived from its special position of being located in the capital of the captaincy, especially after 1720. As such it claimed to have the power to register the letters of appointment or commissions of "Justice, mili36 tary, treasury officials or any other posts." It also registered the appointment of the governor and of the ouvidor and these officials took office in the pressence of the council, taking the oath administered by the senior municipal judge. While the council never refused > to register the orders concerning these two officials, such a possibility existed.

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3^+0 Because of Vila Rica's position as t?ie capital, the senior municipal judge of the council vas the successor to the ouvidor when the latter died or was impeded from serving for other reasons. When a Juiz de fora was established in Carmo in 1728 this official, as a royal appointee, replaced the municipal judge as the ouvidor's successor. However, the Vila Rica council continued to play a key role in the process of succession "because it decided when the post was vaca,nt. One of the council's major responsibilities was that of maintaining law and order. Various officials subordinate to the council were involved in this role. The primary one was the sheriff ( alcaide , ) who was chosen by the council. Assisting him was a secretary and investigators or constables, ( meirinhos ) who apparently also 37 helped patrol the streets. The sheriff was under the operational control of the municipal judge. The militia also assisted in maintaining law and order. Besides taking an active role in catching runaway slaves, militia officers also performed normal police functions. This usually occurred in the outlying settlements where not even a rudimentary police force existed. These officials, however, were unable to cope with the violence-prone miners and the poorly supervised slaves who turned to drink to alleviate their suffering. A police force was needed. In 1720 the members of the council "agreed to order the preparation of a list of all the

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3U people of this town in order to elect twelve men in each bairro, that is, Ouro Preto, Antonio Dias and Padre Faria, to walk patrol every night through this said town to calm 38 any disturbance that occurred, The following day. August 8, two men from each of the areas were named cor39 porals ( cabos ) of the patrols. This organization formed the basis of the police force of colonial Vila Ri ca. The municipal council thus had a wide range of responsibilities, from law enforcement to establishing and maintaining prices and quality standards on food and water. If some of its decisions reflected a conflict of interest this should be seen in light of an age which did not share today's abhorence of such action. When the members of the ruling body were drawn from such a small group of men, impartiality was impossible. V/hat is surprising is that so often these men were able to rise above pettiness to legislate for the good of the entire comnunity roads were indeed built over mountainous terrain, good and ample water provided, prices on essential foodstuffs kept low, and lawbreakers punished. Most important, law and order was established: after 1720 no significant outbreak of violence was to occur.

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Notes 1. The process began simply enough when Lourengo de Almeida ordered the town council 'to turn over their financial records to the saperi nt ende.nt of the smelter for, inspection. The council apparently refused and had to be ordered to comply "numerous times." The reason given for Almeida's action was the council's "lack of care" in maintaining the records. Lourengo de Almeida to Council, 1 September, 1722 in Cod. 17 (SG), fol. 122. 2. Land Grant made to Antonio Martins Lega, 11 August, 1711 in Cod. 7 (SG), fol. 129v. 3. Land Grant made to Antonio de Araujo dos Santos, l6 January, 1711 in Revista do Arouivo Publico Mineiro 2 . (1897) , p. 262. h. Assumar to Joao V, 15 July, 1718 in Cod. k (SG), fols. 52W. 5. Ibid. , fols. 52ii-527. 6. Land Grant made to Gongalo Rodrigues, Council Proceedings, 9 May, 171^ in "Atas da Camara," p. 325. 7. Council Ordinance, 3 September, 1712 in "Atas da Camara," p.2l+8. 8. Council Ordinance, 21 January and 1 April, 1713 in "Atas da Camara," pp.259 and 266. 9This tax vas called the " meia pataca " tax since one quarter of an oitava equalled half a pataca. 10. Council Proceedings, 27 April, 1713 in "Atas da Camara," pp. 267-268. 11. Council Proceedings, 17 September. I718 in Cod. 17 (CMOP) , fol. 59v. 12. Council Proceedings, 27 January and 8 February, 171^ in "Atas da Camara," pp. 320 and 309-310. 13. Council Proceedings, 25 February, 1715 in "Atas da Camara," p. 366. 3^12

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(CMOPr?:is/;;?:!:W?^^' '' '^^^^^^y> ^TIS in cod. 13 fois.'ss^ssi.^'"'"""''' '' October, 1742 in Cod. kg (CMOP), foi. 82v?''' P^°---^ings, 7 April, I7I.2 in Cod. k2 (CMOP), Report of Inspection, h May, I7H in Cod. 22 (CMOP), 17. fol 18, alive'^to V^^r^'^R'^^'^^^^^^ required that pigs be brought ii L^.'^/ .\1 'r^.'°^"^^\7 — ^^-Ss, 11 June, 1?23 J?M0P)r?o1' °^^^"--' ^6 February, 17^3 in Cod. ^9 20. fol. 190 Council Ordinance, I; October, 1733 in Cod. 6 (CMOP). 21. fol. 131. Council Ordinance, 8 January, 1738 in Cod. 32 (CMOP), ?CMOP)°''?ol'" °^'^^^^^;^^^' 27 January, 17I.2 in Cod. kS incll: 13 (CMO?) J--J^%P — edings, 3 February, 1725 couuri\^t ^^^^^^'^ ^°^' 113 gives a good example of the council s concern for the quality of wheat br^ad. cl;araTp'%66?^^^''^^^' ' ^^^^^ ' ^^^^ in "Atas da d^CaL°r::"^p:°2;;.%T' '' ^"' '' '^"^^^^' '''' '^ "^^(CM0P)!''?ol.°6v''''''''''°"' ^^ November, 1716 in C6d. 1; 26 Assumar to Council of Vila Rica, 26 April 171q .n Avulso Mago, No. I88, APM . April, I719 m (CMOpJrfoi' °y'^"^^ = ^' 7 September, 1718 in Cod. 6 28. Ibid.

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3ltU 29. Council Proceedings, 15 July, 1719 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. 90. 30. A typical decision to pave is that of November 8, 1738 "They Cthe council membersH, finding it in the public good, agreed to put out for bids the paving Cof the roadH which goes from the bridge of the Rua Nova to the chapel of Sao Jose." Council Proceedings, 8 November, 1738 in Cod. 39 (CMOP), fol. 69v. 31. Petition of the board of the brotherhood of Nossa Senhora do Rosario, 26 February, 1735 in Cod. 32 (CMOP), fol. 36-36V. 33. In 1722, 766 oitavas were expended for public works out of a total of U,786. Cod. 12 (CMOP), f ols . 8-10. The 1755 figures are 3:897$30U of a total of 8:6lU$201. Expenses on repairs and expropriations totalled an additional 917$000. Cod. 51 (CMOP). 3^+. Of a total of U233 1/2 oitavas spent during 1721, 896 1/2 was spent on ceremonies. Cod, 12 (CMOP), fols. 2-5. 35. "Descobriment o de Minas Gerais," pp. 33-3^. 36. Vila Rica Council to Joao V, h September, 173^ in Cod. 9 (CMOP) , fol. kh. 37. Nelson de Senna, "Origem da cidade; installagao da municipali dade , " Bi-Centenario de Ouro Preto, 1711-1911 (Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Oficial, n.d.), p. 5. 38. Council Proceedings, 7 August, 1720 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. 119. 39. Council Proceedings, 8 August, 1720 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fol. 119v.

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Chapter 23 The Municipal Council: Income The municipal council occupied a prominent position within the Portuguese administrative system. In part this can be explained by the power of the council to impose and collect taxes and its freedom to spend the sums collected in the manner it saw fit. During the decade after the incorporation of Vila Rica in IJll, the fiscal independence of the council went unchallenged and it was not until 17^1 that this power was completely curtailed. This fiscal freedom allowed the council to challenge politically this power of the royal governor. During the years immediately after the incorporation of Vila Rica the council's most lucrative source of income was the contract on the jail. The jail was built and owned by the council but the jailer and guards were not paid from public funds. Instead, they purchased the right to run the jail on an annual basis. The contractor received his profit from the fees paid by the prisoners and by owners of slaves who had been incarcerated. The fees were paid on a daily basis. Those paid by slave owners were particularly lucrative and slaves could not be released until complete payment had been made. 3U5

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3^+6 While the jail contract was lucrative, it was also a constant source of problems. Often the contractor did not serve as the jailer but hired someone to serve in that post. The fact that the jail was a profit-making enterprise led to all sorts of chicanery and unsavory conduct. The jail itself was a major hazard: built of daub-andwaddle ( pau-a-pi que ) it was relatively susceptible to jail breaks. Because of the danger and financial loss involved there often was a rapid turnover of jailers and it became increasingly difficult to find people willing and capable 1 of serving. While initially important the income obtained from the contract for running the jail came to be an insignificant part of the total income picture of the council. In 1721, the jail contract accounted for one 2 quarter of the council's income. The profits which could be earned by the contractor decreased as the society passed from the boom stage to one of relative stability; the council was less willing to accept illegal activity on the part of the jailer, thus limiting the contractor's profit . A second profitable tax was that levied upon the cattle brought into town for butchering. A tax of one half pataca, or l60 reis, was levied on each animal. The tax, apparently, was instituted in 1712 after a conference of cattle ranchers, merchants, citizens of Vila Rica^ and 3 the council. The early efforts of the council to impose it are discussed above. This was not a fee for butcher-

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3^7 ing but simply a tax imposed on each animal brought within the town limits for butchering at any one of the privately-owned slaught eryards . Like many other colonial taxes, the "meia-pataca" was farmed out for collection. The contractor was responsible for enforcing the rules passed by the council concerning the points of entry of the cattle being brought in for slaughter, the days of butchering, the quality of the meat, and the collection of the tax. For the convenience of the contractor, all cattle had to enter Vila Rica by way of Tripui . Anyone could obtain a license to bring cattle into town and those butchered for home 5 use were not taxed. Apparently because of the low profit margins, it was not always possible to find someone willing to make an acceptable offer for this contract. When there was no satisfactory bid, as occurred in 1713, for example, the 6 tax was collected by the town officials. This practice was not encouraged; collection by private parties was preferable to that by government agencies because the former represented a "safer" method of collection in that the total was predetermined and payment guaranteed. This tax provided on a regular basis a significant portion of the council's revenue throughout the period under consideration. In 1721, it represented fifteen per cent of the total collected. In 17^3 the percentage had increased to twenty-five, only to return to previous levels

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348 "by 1753 when it made up thirteen per cent of the council's 7 income . Next in importance among the sources of municipal income was the fee charged for the inspection of weights and measures called the calibration tax ( af eri gap ) . It also was farmed out to the highest bidder. So important was this fee, both as a revenue source and as a means of maintaining standardized weights and measures, that it was the first topic of business discussed by the Vila 8 Rica council in 1711. It was based on the requirement that each person who sold goods to the public had to use specified weights and measures and that these had to be verified semiannually to protect the public from unscrupulous businessmen. In a town such as Vila Rica, where commerce was an important part of the economy, this was 9 a vital function. During the course of the eighteenth century it was found that the size of various weights and measures had to be decreased as the quantities they marked often were so great as to be beyond the means of the increasingly numerous urban poor. The lack of adequate measuring instruments put the poor at a disadvantage. In 1713, for example, there were numerous complaints that the vara (l.l meters) was too large a measure for general use. In this case, as in others, the council authorized the 10 use of smaller sizes. In this manner the council fulfilled its responsibility for ensuring that the weights

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3k9 and measures in use were appropriate to the needs of the populace . The contractor paid a fixed sum to the council and then tried to make a profit basing his prices upon the standards set by the council. Some men like the 1712 contractor used unscrupulous means to make a profit. This contractor disregarded the fee scale established by the coulcil and charged exhorbitant sums — for which he went unpunished as the council reacted only by enacting guide11 lines for dealing with future violators. The income brought in by the tax on weights and measures comprised an increasingly significant portion of the council's revenues. Whereas in 1721 this tax accounted for only about ten per cent for the total income, by 17^9 the contribution from this tax source had risen to over 12 forty-two per cent. Another important source of revenue for the council was the tax on urban properties. Urban land was granted by the council which had the power to tax this property. The tax was half an oitava for every braga (2.2 meters) of frontage. It was collected normally by the town council, although on occassion it was farmed out. The official entrusted with the responsibility of collecting this tax 13 was the port ei ro . The porteiro, literally doorman, had a number of duties such as auctioning contracts and collecting taxes which make the literal translation of his title inappropriate .

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350 This tax was especially difficult to collect. This was particularly true during the years immediately after 1711 because it took some time to set up the bureaucratic collection machinery. Furthermore, the collection was complicated by the presence of squatters on common land and by tax evasion. The minutes of the council are filled with comments similar to that of the 1712 council which noted with dismay that "many people who construct Ranchos in this town do so without the permission of the Senate." To stop this tax evasion, the council imposed stiff penalties, including the demolition of the unlicensed con15 struction at the owner's expense. The incidence of tax evasion within the town was brought under control gradually. The technique used was to require that all property owners present proof of ownership to town officials so that a record could be maintained and updated and then following this up with periodic house-to-house inspections. Thus the council had a fairly accurate idea of the number of houses in the town; the problem, was determing ownership. Legally, all sales of property within the town had to have prior 16 council approval. However, despite the periodic inspections, the council regularly encountered problems in enforcing this requirement. Not all property was taxed. The law contained a loophold whereby all houses existing prior to the incorporation of Vila Rica were exempted. This provision of lU

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351 the lav was brought to the attention of the council in a forceful manner by Father Luis Barbosa de Araujo, serving IT as "solicitor of the residents and people of Vila Rica," Father Araujo acted not because the council was unaware of the law but rather because the council had urged all the people, even those who were exempt, to pay the tax as 18 a means of helping the town become financially solvent. This solicitor of the people succeeded in forcing the council to give up this fanciful hope. The council took this occassion to enact guidelines for the imposition of the tax on preITU properties in the event of additions to existing structures or their reconstruction after being abandoned. These guidelines were accepted by the 19 people's solicitor in the name of his "constituents." This loophold was especially important prior to 1T20 because of the high proportion of houses built before ITU then exi s t i ng . The income realized from this tax varied greatly over the years. In general, it comprised an increasingly larger share of the council's revenues. In 1T21 only five percent of the council's income was derived from it whereas in 1T53 the figure had risen to twenty-five per20 cent. This was an unusually large proportion, resulting apparently from the fact that taxes from the previous three years still were being collected. The delays in collecting taxes could explain why property tax revenue was so meager in some years and so lucrative in others.

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352 Besides these revenue sources, the council had others from which minor sums were obtained. Among these were the fines imposed by the municipal judges and the council as a whole for breaking local ordinances. The money obtained from the court of the municipal judge ( ordinari a ) is one example of such secondary revenue. Another was the fines collected during council inspections for such violations as illegal building, improper water piping, or blocking alleys. The sums collected in this manner were never large. For example, on August 3, 1712 three people were fined sixteen oitavas each for making structural changes to their houses without authoriza21 ti on . One of the fairest forms of colonial taxation was xhe special tax, the f i nta . It was assessed in proportion to the wealth of the payer. The requirement that the ouvidor authorize the levying of the finta was ignored during the period before 1719, perhaps because of the political turmoil which diverted the attention of the royal officials. The finta was first levied in 1712 when money was needed to construct streets. Collectors were chosen for Ouro Preto, Antonio Dias, the Morro de Vila Rica, Padre Faria, and Corrego Seco. The tax was to be extracted "with gentleness, each Cpaying U according to 22 his capacity." The finta invariably was a one-time tax: "This finta is enacted for this time only because the Senate is without income to cover expenses Candl does

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353 23 not serve as an example for the future." However, a newsource of taxation once found is not easily discarded. The following year, 1713, another finta was enacted for 2k the paving of streets. Others were levied in the following years as needed. This tax represented a threat to royal control. Whereas the other revenue sources were capable only of slow expansion, the finta offered the council an opportunity to become financially solvent and politically independent of the local royal officials. The inelasticity of normal revenue sources is evident from the fact that in 1721 council income was 8:79^$500 a figure which exceeded the council's average annual income in the 17'+0's 25 and 1750's. This danger was realized by the royal officials at the eleventh hour and their efforts to regain control over the finta was one of the steps leading to the 1720 Vila Rica uprising. To understand the mechanism of local government one needs to be familiar not only with the sources of council income but also with the manner in which these revenues were expended. How the council spent the money at its 26 disposal is a good indication of its priorities. An examination of council expenditures reveals the duality of council objectives; on the one hand, the emphasis upon conspicuous consumption and, on the other, the desire to expand the physical resources of the town while maintaining essential services. Faced with a conflict between the

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35h need to spend money for ceremonies and special boniises and for public works, charities, and law and order, the council routinely favored the former category. Normally the major expenses were for propinas , or bonuses and public works. Propinas were voted by the council to its membership, to the ouvidor, and, in smaller sums, to the treasurer, secretary, and the secretary of the Overseas Council in Lisbon. Propinas were of two varieties: annual and extraordinary. During the earliest period for which there are expenditure reports, propinas represented a minor proportion of total expenses. In 1721, for example, only eight percent of the budget was 27 devoted to propinas and in 1723 only fourteen percent. By 17^3, these special bonuses amounted to forty-eight 28 percent of total expenditures. Expenses for public works, on the other hand, underwent major fluctuations both in absolute terms and in proportion to total expenditures. It represented the most flexible budgetary item. Examples of this flexibility abound. In 1721 less than one percent of expenses was for public works; two years later the proportion was 29 51.6%. Expenditures for public ceremonies during extraordinary times made a significant impact on council finances. Under normal conditions this responsibility was met by an outlay of less than 10% . Included within this figure were payments for sermons, music, bullfights, in-

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355 cense, candles, special furnishings and decorations, masses, and the maintenance of the Chapel of Santa Rita which served the civil prisoners. The question left unanswered concerns the general nature of the council: What was the role of the camara? Caio Prado Junior presents a dismal picture of the powers of the Sao Paulo camara; totally dominated by the juiz de fora and subjected to the constant meddling of the governor, the council by the l8th century had entered a 30 period of stagnation. This wa.s not true for all of Brazil. In Minas Gerais, where royal authority was strong and ceaselessly trying to expand. The council resisted-sometimes successfully, though ultimately unsuccessfully. This is not to say that the council conceived of itself as a bulwark against the enhancement of royal authority. It did not. But the defense of its own power and local interests brought it into confrontation with royal officials. Writers such as Edmundo Zenha refer to the decadence of the council by the beginning of the eighteenth century, but that is precisely the time that the councils of Minas Gerais were being established with extensive powers. This initial power was due to the power vacuum which existed in the mining districts. The first municipal judges of Vila Rica hurriedly were ordered by the governor to assume their posts with written instructions which extended to them powers not granted in the Ordenaco^s . and which

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356 vent far beyond those exercised by the royally appointed 31 superintendent. It would take three decades for the royal officials to substantially whittle down these powers — a task made difficult by the constant opposition of the councils. Certainly during the period covered by this study the councils remained a strong instrument for the defense of local prerogatives and interests against the encroachment of royal fiat. 32 Some writers such as Diogo de Vas concellos , Daniel 33 3h de Carvalho, and Joao Camilo de Oliveira Torres defend the council as a democratic counterpoise to the despotism of the royal authorities. Almost a cliche among Mineiro historians are the constant references to the physical location of the governor's palace on the square facing the municipal council building. This interpretation assumes too much. That the term "democratic" is even used must be due to a misunderstanding either of the meaning of the word or of the council. The council was elected by a small group of voters, the homens bons , who seldom numbered over fifty. The men they selected came from within their own ranks or were men of elite social standing whose selection gave them entry into this select inner circle . The council itself did not conceive of itself as the defender of popular rights in opposition to the extension of the powers of the governor or of the ouvidor. In fact, the council of Vila Rica petitioned various times

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357 for the appointment of a juiz de fora in place of the municipal judges, in effect, placing prestige before the 35 maintenance of independence of action. If it fought at times to retain its prerogatives this was not because it saw itself as representing the people but because it behaved as any administrative organ would when its jurisdiction is endangered. On those occasions when the council opened its sessions to enlist wider support, it did not call the "people" but the homens bons . Far from a democratic element, the council was a tool of the elite wlio used it in defense of their own interests. When their interests and those of the population at large coincided, then those of the community were served. But seldom did the council sacrifice the interests of the groups it represented for the good of the "people".

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Notes 1,.. Cf. Diogo de Vasconcellos, Historia media de 'Mi'rias Gerais (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 19^+8 ) ,pp . 95-96 . Vasconcellos describes the post as one of the most lucrative and important positions available, apparently not realizing that the contractor often hired someone to serve as the jailer 2. Council Receipts for 1722 in Cod. 12 (CMOP), f ol . 6v. By 17^5 it represented only slightly more than two percent of the total council income and in 1753 four percent. There are several reasons for this decrease. First, council income had increased so that even if the money paid by the contractor had remained fixed it would have represented a smaller portion of the total. This explanation alone is inadequate; in fact, the payments also decreased absolutely. Council Expenditures, 17^5 in Cod. 51 (CMOP), f ols . 2Q-h6 . 3. Council Proceedings, l8 January, 1712 in "Atas da Camara," p. 221. h. Regulations Governing the Tax on Cattle, 11 January, 1738 in Cod. 32 (CMOP), f ols . 126v-127v and 2 January, 17^2 in Cod. i+9 (CMOP), f ols . l8-l8v. 5. Council Proceedings, 1 March, 171^ in "Atas da Camara," pp. 315-318. 6. Council Proceedings, 3 June, 1713 in "Atas da Camara," p. 270. 7. Council Income, 1721 in Cod. 12 ( CMOP ) , fol. 5v ; 17^3 in Cod. 51 (CMOP), fold. Iff; and 1753 in Cod. 51 (CMOP) , l8Uff . 8. Council Proceedings, 21 July, I7II in "Atas da Camara," p. 207. 9. The Regimento do Aferidor, 21 July, 1711 in "Atas da Camara," p. 208 gives an insight into the wide range of weights and measures used: 358

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359 Items : Balance of over 1/2 pound 1 Balance with weights from 1/k to 1/8 grams for black female venders.. Iron weights from 1 to 8 pounds 1 Half or quarter alqueire (36.27 liters) Plate to measure salt Set of measures Vara (l.l meters) Covado (0.66 meters) Measures for liquids, 1, 1/2 and 1/k (a medj da is 2.662 liters) Fees : 1/2 oitavas 1/2 oitava oit ava 1/2 1/h 1/2 1/h 1/h oitava oitava oitava oitava oitava 1/2 oitava 10. Counc Camara ,^' p 11. Counc Camara," p 1 Proceedings, 7 January, 1713 in "Atas da 257. 1 Proceedings, 25 June, 1712 in "Atas da 238. 12. Council 17^9 in Cod. tax on weight the general b to play an in of Vila Rica important rol the early yea number of bus early 1750's, It seems sign the decline i perhaps , that pression was Income, 1721 in Cod. 12 ( CMOP 51 (CMOP), fols. 102ff. The s and measures provides some usiness climate of Vila Rica, creasingly important role in and the town came to play an e in the economic life of Min rs after the incorporation of inesses in Vila Rica increase after which there was a rapi ificant that a revenue decrea n the number of bus iness es-an the tax collectors were awar at hand. ) , f ol . 5v and income from the indication of Business came the economy increasi ngly as Gerai s . From the town , the d until the d decline, se preceeded i ndicat ion , e that a de13. Council Proceedings, 19 April, 1713 in "Atas da Camara," p. 267. ik . Council Proceedings, 5 March, 1712 in "Atas da Camara," p. 230. 15. Ibid. 16. Council Proceedings, 9 February, 1715 in "Atas da Camara," p. 363. 17It is significant that a priest was chosen to represent the people in defense of the privileges granted to the early settlers. How Father Araujo was chosen is not explained although it is noted that the selection was duly registered with the notary public.

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JDU 18. Council Proceedings, 30 June, 1712 in "Atas da Camara," p. 23919. Council Proceedings, 13 July, 1712 in "Atas da Camara," p. 2^2. 20. Council Income, 1721 in Cod. 12 (CMOP), fol. 2ff and 1753 in Cod. 51 (CMOP), fols. l8Uff. The four income .sources mentioned accounted for less than 60%of the total income of the council. Most of the remainder came from surpluses from previous years and money owed the council from 1720 contracts. 21. Council Proceedings, 3 August, 1712 in "Atas da Camara," pp. 2ii3-2Hii. 22. Council Proceedings, 7 May, 1712 in "Atas da Camara," pp. 232-233. 23. Ihid. 2k. Council Proceedings, 28 January, 1713 in "Atas da Camara," p. 260. 25. Council income for 1721 was reported to be 5863 oitavas which at the prevalent rate of exchange of 1$ 500 was equal to 8:79l+§5ob. Council income, 1721 in Cod. 12 (CMOP), fol. 5v. 26. The council budgets used for this analysis were those for the following years: 1721, 1722, 1723, 17^3, 17^(5, 17i*7, 17^9, 1751, 1753, 1755, and 1757. 27. Council expenditures, 1721 in Cod. 12 (CMOP), fols. 3-5 and 1723 in Cod. 12 (CMOP), fols. 19-21. 28. Council expenditures, 17^3 in Cod. 51 (CMOP), fols. Iff. 29. Council expenditures, 1721 in Cod. 12 (CMOP), fols 3-5 and 1723 in Ibid., fols. 19-21. 30. Caio Prado Junior , Formag ao do Brasil cont emporaneo : colonia , 7th ed. (Sao Paulo: Editora Bras iliens e , I963 ) pp. 3li+-3l6. 31. Order of Antonio de Albuquerque, 10 July,1711 in Cod. 7 (SG) , fols . 120-120V. 32. Diogo de Vas concellos , Historia antiga ,2, pp. 137-138. 33. Daniel de Carvalho , "Formagao historica das Minas G e r a i s , " Primeiro seminario de estud os mineiros ( B e 1 o Horizonte: Imprensa Oficial, 1957)j p.23.

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361 3^. Oliveira Torres, Historia de Minas Gerais , 1, pp. 2UI-257. The title of this chapter "Democracy in Minas Gerais" is indicative of the author's sentiments. 35. Council to Joao V, 15 March, 1730 in Cod. 9 (CMOP), fol. 25. The council argued that as the largest town in the mining district in terms of commerce, it had the largest judicial work load. The council felt that the load was far beyond the capacity of the municipal judges to handle and therefore asked that a juiz de fora be named. Coincidently nine days later a royal order was issued authorizing a juiz de fora for Carmo. None was authorized for Vila Rica since the ouvidor resided in the town. Royal Order, 2U March, 1730 in Cod. 7 (CMOP), fol. 97.

PAGE 380

Chapter 2i+ The Apparatiis of Local Government The establishment of the municipal council was the first major step in creating a bureaucratic organization in the mining district. But the council was only one part of a complex system. Local government was complicated by the vagueness of jurisdictional lines between functions and the Lusitanian penchant for establishing checks and balances which often created confusion over responsibility and made a mockery of lines of control. The council was responsible for selecting a number of officials and supervising their activities as well as those of other officials who had been chosen by the governor or the king. Because of the large number of officials at the local level and changes in political organization, it often becomes difficult to distinguish among these officials and to examine each separately. A case in point is the sheriff and his secretary, who were nominated by the council until 1725. In that year, the king declared that the council had no authority to select either the sheriff or his secretary. The royal order as it pertained to the sheriff, was ignored, despite pressure 1 from the governor, and soon forgotten. Exactly when the power of selecting the secretary was surrendered by the 362

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363 council is unclear, but even after the secretary came to be appointed by the governor, the council retained its supervisory role over the secretary's activities. The council continued to select the sheriff. This is but one of a number of examples which could be cited to show the conflict between the law and reality and to point out the difficulty of studying each individual position. The fiscal officer was one of the most important of the local officials. In the selection of these officers the council exercised a wide latitude of independence and brooked no outside interference by the governor or by any other royal official. Service as a fiscal officer vas considered training for later service on the council itself, and selection was tantamount to initiation into the homens da governanga and thus into the homens bons. Two fiscal officers were elected by the council for concurrent service lasting two months. Most of those whose residence is known lived in the town of Vila Rica, although many may have owned properties outside town. Entry into the elite by this route was considerably easier than through direct appointment to the council, since twelve fiscal officers were chosen annually as opposed to only six councilmen. Entry into the council via the post of almotacel became the normal path of upward mobility. The fiscal officer s responsibilities centered on the fixing of certain prices and the enforcement of these and those set by the town council. While this was the

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361; primary responsibility of the fiscal officer, he had a number of other duties related to the regulation of the marketplace. He was to prevent anyone from monopolizing any foodstuff since that vould force prices upward. The fiscal officers were charged with ferreting out users of illegal weights and measures and shopkeepers who refused to sell their goods in small quantities. Clandestine shops were to be closed and legal action taken against the proprietors. The fiscal officers also were responsible for ensuring that the q^uality of foodstuffs met the 2 standards set by the council. These officials also had a number of duties which were only indirectly related to the regulation of the marketplace. They were to arrest people who aided runaway slaves. The council ban on black vendors in the mining areas was enforced by the fiscal officers as were the council edicts prohibiting the opening of shops in 3 thes e areas . The fiscal officers also had a number of duties relating to land ownership and building in Vila Rica. They had the power to take legal action against squatters and people who moved the sesmaria markers to give the impression that their property was outside the municipal land grant. They were also charged with acting against those who built houses, made additions to houses, or k built gardens without council authorization.

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365 Besides the administrative function of establishing prices and the police function of ensuring compliance with regulations, the fiscal officer also had judicial powers, since he was authorized to try people who violated the ordinances of the council or the regulations of the fiscal office. His court, the almotacari a , provided only meager revenue for the council since the almotacel received a large percentage of the fines collected. The fiscal officer was required to police not only the town but also the entire municipality. Periodically he had to leave the comforts of Vila Rica and make a circuit through the countryside. The fiscal officer had the assistance of a group of officials who, while responsible to him, were appointed by the governor or, more rarely, by the king. These included the secretary of the alraotacaria who was responsitle for keeping a record of the proceedings of the court and providing some administrative continuity in a court where judges changed every two months. The fines levied by the court were collected by the constable of the almotacaria ( meirinho da almotacari a ) who also had the power to arrest those who refused to pay. In medieval Portugal, the meirinho had exercised judicial powers, but in the eighteenth century he seems to have performed only the functions of a constable andbailiff. The merinho was assisted "by a secretary.

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366 Like all holders of renumerati ve offices, the meirinho was required to pay certain taxes. Initially all paid only the "nev" tax, ( novo direito ), equal to ten percent of the established value of the office. The value vas "based on an estimate of the income derived from the post. In 1722 by royal edict the tax of the third part ( tereceira parte ) vras created and the estimated income of all offices were raised by the ouvidor, within whose purview the establishment of values fell. Thus, in ITlU , the secretary of the merinho paid 8$000 in taxes on an estimated value of 80$000. In 1722, the value was raised to 300$000 and the tax skyrocketed to 100$000 for the one third tax, plus 30$ 000 for the "new" tax. Having paid these taxes, plus some additional administrative fees for the preparation and issuance of the appointment papers, the office holder was subject to no more taxes. To collect the "new" tax a treasurer was nominated on Janu5 ary 20, 171^ by the governor but it appears that once the administrative bureaucracy of the royal treasury was established it assumed this responsibility. The office holder's salary came from fees for specific functions such as filling out administrative forms. These fees were controlled by regulations which set the price of each service. Thus in the May l'J2k regulation the merinho's secretary received one tostao (lOO reis) for each case handled, two tostaos for each case involving litigation between two people, fifty reis for each charge

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367 on which a person was found guilty, and two tostaos when 6 absolved of guilt. What the almotaceis represented in terms of status within the town, the justices of the peace represented in the countryside. Juiz de vintena, translated literally as "judge of twenty" refers to the provision that all settlements with twenty or more houses have a Judge. The first reference to this official in the records of T the Vila Rica council occurred in 1712. There was no further reference until 17l6 when the council acted to select justices of the peace for the settlement of Padre Faria, an event of particular significance. Since these officials usually were appointed for parishes outside of town in areas where the municipal judge was unable to maintain close scrutiny, the selection of justices for Padre Faria is indicative of the isolation of Padre Faria from the other settlements which made up Vila Rica — an isolation imposed by geographic considerations and which existed until the settlements expanded and fused together (even today an automobile trip from Antonio Dias to Padre Faris is a difficult one.) This selection indicates that Padre Faria was not considered to be an integral part of the town and confirms the view that the omission of any reference to it by Governor Albuquerque in his 1711 order incorporating Vila Rica was intentional — only Antonio Dias and Ouro Preto were considered to be within the limits of the newly formed town.

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368 Until the growth of the area of Alto da Crus after 1719, Padre Faria was outside the settled core area. The method "by which these justices were selected is significant. Normally justices were appointed directly by the council. But on August 21, I716 the council called upon the common people ( pessoas do povo ) , of Padre Faria to choose two justices of the peace "in order to avoid in this way the confusion and unrest which is occuring 8 in that settlement." The voting was conducted in secret. 9 The justices were empowered to "rule and govern." They were responsible for maintaining law and order and had authority to arrest malfactors. They had judicial authority to fine up to 2 1/2 oitavas without appeal in 10 acts of conscience ( acgoes da alma ). The justice had a constable and a secretary to assist him. Beyond the mention in 1712 of the justices of Itatiaia there are no such references to the other peripheral settlements prior to 1720. This lapse is probably due to the selectivity of the documents which remain from the early years since after 1720 there are numerous references to the justices of the peace in Ouro Branco, Casa 11 Branca, Cachoeira, Itatiaia, and Sao Bartolomeu. Like the fiscal officer, the justice of the peace was a representative of the upper strata of society. But the precise relationship between the men selected as justices and the homens bons , which included both the fiscal officers and council members, is difficult to de-

PAGE 387

369 termine. Indications, however, point to the existence of a rural elite which, perhaps out of personal inclination, did not participate actively in municipal affairs. Few served as fiscal officers and fewer as councilmen. This, if confirmed, would disprove the accepted view that the rural elite controlled urban political life and conversely would point to the existence of a powerful urban elite . The council also chose a number of other officials. Perhaps the most important of these were the militia officers. Those of the ordenanga were chosen by the council in consultation with the capi t ao -mor , who in turn was chosen by the governor from a list of three names submitted by the council. When the quinto was being paid by the eq_uivalent of a head tax on slaves and each council was required to pay a predetermined quantity, the council was responsible for the collection within its jurisdiction. The council then apportioned the tax among the inhabitants of the municipality and selected tax collectors--normally from among the richest residents of a tax district. Other officials such as the municipal lawyer, the municipal medical officer (the power of appointment to this post fluctuated between the council and the king), the porteiro , the street aligner ( arruador ) , the librarian (the guarda-li vros ) , the procurator of lawsuits, the treasurer of the orphans, and the appraiser and divider of the property of orphans , (avaliador e

PAGE 388

370 partidor dos orfaos ), vere chosen directly "by the council. While there is some difficulty in determing the functional channels of respons ihili ty , apparently the council exercised operational control over all but the last two-these vere under the control of the judge of orphans. This group of local officeholders was complemented "by a larger numher appointed by the governor or, on occasion, by the king. Among these, the council secretary ( escri vao ) , was the most important. This lucrative post, like others in this group, was purchased during the period under examination. Men like Hieronimo de Castro e Sousa were appointed by the king to the post directly from their native Portugal. The case of Sousa is illuminating in that he was residing at the court at the time of his appointment but already had some business interests in 12 Minas Gerais which needed his personal attention. Thus by purchasing the post he gained a lucrative position in precisely the area where he had personal business to transact. He could then chose to serve in the post or farm it out to someone else for a good price. It was not uncommon for such posts to be farmed out. In some cases it was done as an investment with the work being done by an employee. More often the proprietor personally served in the post. The death of the proprietor also provided an opportunity to farm out the post by the bondsmen or 13 underwriters of the proprietor. The selling of this post often resulted in the selection of a complete stranger

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371 to a position intimately involved in the activities of the council, and was a cause of friction. The council several times fought to have a secretary's commission revoked because of incompetency or incompatability , but vithout success. The only other post to vhich royal appointment was a common occurrance was the notary public ( tabeliao de publico, judicial e notas ). This official was, in fact, more than that title implies. He was a combination notary public, registrar of deeds and other documents, and court bailiff. He prepared and filed legal actions, attested to the validity of documents and signatures, and kept a copy of each document he prepared such as wills and civil actions . Vila Rica had two notaries during the period prior to 1720. After that date the volume of work in a society in which litigation was very common necessitated the creation of a third notary public. While many of these officials were named by the governor, a surprisingly large number came with appointments from Portugal, indicating the lucrative nature of these positions. Thus Carlos de Abreu, an escrivao das execugoes in his native Braga, Portugal, applied to fill a vacancy in Vila Rica as soon Ik as he was informed by his father that one existed. Appointment to such a post also was a means of rewarding loyal service to the king. This appears to have been the

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372 motivation behind the appointment of Joao de Melo Fernando in 171T. Fernando vas rewarded for his good service as a 15 military officer. The usual term of office of the notary vas either six months or one year, with the latter occurring usually when the appointment authority was the king. A grave concern in colonial Vila Rica was the problem of orphans and minors. Given the uncertainty of the times and the presumably short life span, children were orphaned at a rate which cannot be estimated but which was certainly high. Administrative officers, judges of orphans, were appointed to care for these orphans and to protect their property. These posts were considered lucrative prizes and often were held by members of the elite. This particular post was coveted because the judge could use the property belonging to the orphans, which often ran into sizeable fortunes, as if it were his own. Besides "protecting" the property of the orphans , the judge was responsible for caring for their welfare, either directly or by having a tutor appointed as a guardian. It appears that the judge of orphans also had power over minor children left fatherless. Interesting is the number of wills of husbands which contain the explicit statement that the wife is capable of being named tutor of underaged children. Presumably this prevented the interference of the judge of orphans. The judge took responsibility of all property bequeathed to orphan minors and in general

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373 was responsible for them until the age of majority was 16 reached. To assist the judge of orphans a secretary was appointed. Unfortunately insufficient data is available to determine the social level of the secretary, although there is evidence that he was also an homera bom. Beside these officials involved in the administration of the affairs of orphans there was also the appraiser and divider of the property of the orphans, ( avaliador e -partidor dos or faos ) , who performed the functions so clearly des17 cribed by his title. Because of the character of the early colonization of Minas C-erais, the posts concerned with the properties of the deceased were very lucrative and, consequently, very much in demand. Even more than the judge of orphans, the officials who administered the property of the deceased created major problems. Many gold-hungry men came to seek their fortunes unencumbered by families, and the fluid life of the miner left little opportunity for writing wills. Many died without wills and many more died without relatives in the mining district. The official responsible for assuming control over the properties of the men who died in either of these situations was the Provedor of the Properties of the Deceased and Absent, Chapels and Residues. There is no evidence to indicate who served in this post before 1711, but with the appointment of the ouvidor its functions were performed by

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31h this royal appointee. These were not an integral part of the ouvidor's duties, as can be seen from the fact that one commission vas issued for the post of ouvidor and 18 another for provedor. The major problem created by this situation was the opportunity for fraud which it provided. As early as 1713 the obstreperous Ouvidor Amorim was engaged in conflict over his powers. In a very clear-cut case of a man who died with a valid will, Amorim refused to hand over the man's possessions to the wife of the deceased, claiming that he needed authorization from the Judgeship of India and Mina (Juizo de India e Mina). The intervention of the governor was required to force the ouvidor to hand over the inheritance to the wife, and even then a bond had to be posed by the wife to protect the ouvidor in the eventuality that the Judgeship of India and Mina ruled 19 against the governor. The situation did not improve despite the constant appeals of the town council to the king for relief from the arbitrary actions of the provedor. Not all the blame lay with the provedor, however. Because the provedor was occupied with his duties as the ouvidor, day-to-day operations were in the hands of a secondary officer, the treasurer of the property of the deceased. The lucrative nature of this post is indicated by its evaluation for tax purposes. In 1T22 it was appraised at 600$000--a figure surpassed only by that of the ouvidor's personal

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375 secretary (vho vas not the same as the provedor's secre20 tary) which was set at T50$000. The appointment of the treasurer was made annually by the king. The activities of the treasurer often brought him into conflict with the town council. The council vented its displeasure by accusing the treasurer of arbitrary actions. A council letter to the king in 1723 is typical. It cited a number of cases of such actions on the part of the treasurer, one of which gives an idea of the atmosphere of the period and the power of the treasurer. The case involved one Hieronomo Antunes Vasques, who prior to dying had sold almost all his properties to one Antonio dos Reis. Vasques' will was probated by the municipal judge but the treasurer arbitrarily annuled it. He then prohibited Vasques' burial and the saying of masses until the will's beneficary paid six hundred oitavas . Because Reis could not pay immediately he was arrested and kept in 21 prison until the sum was paid. The protests of the council against the arbitrary action of the treasurer brought commi s s erati on but only slowly was effective action taken by the king. The crown finally acted in 1733 to curb the abuses of these officials. The royal order issued in December cited as its justification not the numerous protests of the councils but rather the petitions of businessmen. These resulted from the inability of some businessmen to collect debts from estates which had fallen into the hands of the

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376 provedoria . This royal order prohibited the involvement of these officials in cases where a will existed, or where no will existed but next of kin resided near by. In these cases the responsibility of preparing the inventories of the estate and paying the debts of the deceased fell to the municipal judge. Most important the power to annul 22 a will was specifically entrusted to the municipal judge. Because of the sensitive nature of the work of the provedor dos auzentes, no interference from other officials, not even the governor, was allowed. This independence was zealously guarded and was one of the reasons for the extent of the frauds practiced. There was no effective system of accountability. In 1728 this independence was put to a crucial test. Upon the death of a parish priest, another priest attempted to take possession of the most valuable slave woman owned by the deceased. This action was opposed by the treasurer, despite threats of excommunication. The treasurer held firm and his ac23 tion was upheld by the king. While the provedor could count on royal support to meet direct challenges to his authority, he could not always surmount the many small hurdles thrown up by the people he was supposedly protecting. There was the problem of receiving news of a death in time to stop the pilferage of the deceased's property or the escape of his slaves. The reaction of the people to the fraudulent behavior of the officials of the provedoria was simply to avoid brineine the case to their attention.

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377 It is fitting that this discussion of the lower bureaucratic officials close with an examination of the ouvidor. Directly beneath the governor in authority, the ouvidor, or magistrate, occupied a very ambiguous position. This is particularly true in Vila Rica after 1720 because of the immediate presence of the governor. This ambiguity was partially the result of the lack of specific instructions. The general standing orders which the ouvidores in Minas Gerais were required to obey and enforce were those first issued to the ouvidor of Rio de Janeiro 2it in 1669. To these had, of course, accrued a large number of specific orders. As a judge, the ouvidor had original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases involvin; sums up to a modest two hundred reis. This meant that in regions where a council existed, conflict between the jurisdictions of the ouvidor and the municipal judge could be expected. In practice, due to overlapping jurisdiction it appears that the appellate power of the ouvidor over the decisions of the municipal judge, the heavy workload of the ouvidor, and the petty nature of many of the cases resulted in the hearing of the majority of the lesser cases by the municipal judge. The ouvidor together with the governor and the Provedor of the Treasury ( Provedor da Fazenda) formed a court which could impose the death sentence on Indians, slaves, and poor whites. This court could exile nobles for six years--any harsher sentence resulted in automatic appeal to the High Court in Bahia.

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378 By himself the ouvidor could impose a maximum sentence of five years exile on a nobleman. He had court-martial jurisdiction over the regular army troops within his jurisdiction. All judicial officers required his authorization before they could assume their posts. He also was empowered to issue cartas de seguro , letters of security, a 2 5 kind of habeas corpus. These were the responsibilities as established by the regulation of I669 . Under this code the ouvidor was primarily a judge. In reality the ouvidor in Minas Gerais was much more that this. New responsibilities were added, in some cases, by the king; in others, the archaic nature of the code of 1669 allowed the ouvidor to expand his powers. Two of the functions he acquired by royal fiat was that of provedor of the dead and absent and auditor general, as has been noted. Another acquired power was that of pro26 vedor dos quintos , official responsible for the collection of the tax on minerals. A junta composed of royal and ecclesiatical officials and representatives of the town councils decided what the tax would be and how it would be apportioned among the councils, which nominated the actual collectors. The ouvidor's function was to prod the councils to make the collections on time. To assist him the ouvidor was authorized several aides. These included a secretary, who was the best-paid local official in Vila Rica, a general constable with his secretary, an investigator ( inqueredor ) , a narrator.

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379 ( contador ) , vho described the criiaes for which persons were tried, and a doorman. The posts of inqueredor and contador often were held by the same man. These officials were directly responsible to the ouvidor. The ouvidor's fiscal responsibilities ended with the change in tax collecting methods. Overall supervision of royal income was then assigned to officials of the royal treasury. The local head of this administrative organ was the Provedor da Fazenda, who was named by the king. Assisting him was his secretary, a constable and his secretary, and a librarian or custodian of books. These latter posts were created between 171^ and 1722, probably after 1720 when a drastic overhaul in the tax system was effected. In addition to these functionaries of the Fazenda Real there was the Procurator of the Crown and Treasury (Procurador da Coroa e Fazenda) , the king's personal representative who served as a check on the treasury officials. With the establishment of the smelter, first attempted in 1720 but not effected until 1722, a new echelon of officials was created. The need to staff the smelter led to the creation of at least thirty-one new posts, with the Intendent of the Smelter being the officer in 27 charge. Most of these officials were chosen by the king although a few were named by the governor. The presence of all these officials, plus others such as the military officers of the governor's staff, point

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380 to one of the reasons for Vila Rica's blossoming into a major urban center. It was the administrative hub of Minas Gerais, especially after 1720. These local officials provided the basis for the formation of an officeholding class — a class whose mobility into the homens bons was made increasingly more difficult. That these officials were not vertically mobile can be inferred from the long period that many served in the same or comparable posts. Because of this long service this group represented a core of trained personnel not easily replaced. While the administrative complex which evolved in Vila Rica was a critical factor in the urbanization of that town, it was not the initiator of this growth; gold was. But other towns, Carmo and Sahara, for example, were the sites of fabulous gold strikes. Vila Rica's evolution into an administrative center was one of the factors which made it different from these towns. Another was Vila Rica's position as the commercial center of Minas Gerais. An examination of eighteenth century maps shows Vila Rica as the hub of the trade routes. For goods entering Minas from Rio the shortest and best routes to Carmo and the settlements subordinate to it, Sahara, Caete , Serro and Tijuco, all passed either through Vila Rica or very close to it. Similarly, cattle and other goods coming from Bahia or Pernambuco were funnelled through or very near Vila Rica on their way southward.

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Notes 1. Royal Orders, 22 November, 1725 and 2i+ October, 1726 in Cod. 7 (CMOP), fols. 37-38. 2. Reg (CMOP) , a list o 1. 2. 3. k. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

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382 1. People who sell items of consumption on the mountain • 2. Squatters on council lands. 3. People who move sesmaria markers to make it appear that their property is outside the town sesmaria . k. People who construct houses or establish gardens without council permission, 5. Butchers who sell meat without weighing it. 6. People who sell spoiled meat. 7. People who sell flour which is poorly toasted. 8. Venders who do not have verified weights and measures . Regimento dos Almotaceis, 23 May, 1739 in Cod. 32 (CMOP), fols. 208v-209v. 3. Ibid. k. Ibid. 5. Appointment Order, 20 January, 17l'+ in Cod. 9 (SG), fols. 80v-8l. 6. Regimento, 13 May, 172U in Cod. 1 (SG), fol. U7v. 7. Council Proceedings, 12 May, 1712 in "Atas da Camara," p. 236. 8. Council Proceedings, 21 August, 17l6 in Cod. h (CMOP), fol. 3. 9. Council Proceedings, 29 January, 29 January, 17l8 in Cod. h ( CMOP ) , fol, i+lv. The Portuguese expression is " reger e governar . " 10. Regimento do Jui z de Vintena, 3 February, I718 in Cod. k (CMOP) , fol. U2. 11. Many of the letters and instructions which were found were not in the bound council files but rather in the collection of loose documents, avulsos . Most of these are from the post 1733 period probably because of the ease of misplacing loose documents. Furthermore, while the minutes of council sessions are available for the immediate post I7II period, the correspondence is not complete . 12. Appointment Order, 27 February, 1720 in Cod. 3 (SG), fol. 255v.

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13. All renumerati ve posts and all contracts necessitated the nomination of bondsmen (fiadores) to guarantee the satisfactory performance of the stipulated duties. 383 Ik fol. 61 Appointment Order, 10 April, 1723 in Cod. 1? (SG), 15. Appointment Order, February, 1717 in Cod. 2 (SG), fol. 3kY. 16. A. Tavares de Lyra, Organisagao politica e adminis trativa do Brasil , Brasiliana, vol. 202 (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 19^1), pp. 38-39. 17. Regimento do Partidor dos Orf aos , 13 May, 172^4 in Cod, 1 (SG), fol. U6. 18. See, for example, the Appointment Orders of Joao Pacheco Pereira, 9 and 11 June, 1723 in Cod. 7 (CMOP), fols. 32-33. 19. Petition of Tomas Pinto Ribeiro, undated, 1713 in Cod. 9 (SG), fols. 13-13V. 20. Avaliajao, 1722 in Cod. 8l (DF), fol. 50. 21. Council to Joao V, 23 December, 1723 in Cod. 9 (CMOP), fols. 8-8v. 22. Royal Order, 3 December, 1733, Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro 17 (1913): 205-206. 23. Royal Provisao, 21 February, 1729 in Cod. 7 (CMOP), fols. 73-73V. 2U. Regimento da Ouv.a Geral da Cidade do R.o de Janeiro e Repartigao do Sul no Estado do Brasil por Sua Mag.de ao Dr. Joao de Abreo e Silva, Codice Costa Mattoso, fols. k^2-k3k. 25 26 Ibid, Jose Joao Teixeira Coelho, " Inst rue gao para o governo da capitania de Minas Gerais, 362. 27. Rellagao dos escravos dos officiaes destas casas da fundigao e moeda, no date but probably 1733, Mago Avulso, No. 173, APM.

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PART V THE END OF THE AGE OF POTENTATES Chapter 25 Political Conflict in an Evolving Society The years before 1720 were ones of great political stress as the crown attempted to impose its control upon the recently created councils, while the latter were seeking to expand their powers. Royal officials in the mining district confronted the. locally selected town councils in a conflict which could have but one end. This confrontation lasted from 1711 to 1720, although aftershocks could be heard well into the 1730's. The first area of conflict, predictably enough, concerned taxes. One of the methods employed by the crown to get unified action on questions of taxation from the councils was a representative assembly, or ,i unta . The problems encountered by Governor Albuquerque when he called the first junta held on Mineiro soil have been related already. Even a decision on a matter so simple as where to hold the junta created friction and necessitated the confocation of two juntas--one in Carmo and the other in Ouro Preto. This was one of the battles in a protracted conflict between the two towns for predominance in the 1 captaincy . 381^

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385 While Governor Al'buquerq.ue was having trouble getting his tax proposals accepted by the feuding councils, the first ouvidor was having more serious problems. Ouvidor Manuel da Costa de Amorim had became involved in a jurisdictional dispute over water sources indi spcns ible for mining a particular area in Carmo. Words soon led to bullets and the fighting got out of hand. An eyewitness noted that "many Magnates" in Vila Rica came to the defense of Amorim, and the disgruntled miners in Carmo 2 quickly backed down. In marked contrast with its later actions, the council of Vila Rica acted responsibly in this situation. Feeling that the disorders had to be quelled before they spread, it ordered Mestre do Campo Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes to prepare his tergo and the homens bons in the event further action was needed to quell the disturbances in Carmo. At the same time it selected homens bons Captain Manuel de Figueiredo Mascarenhas and Dr. Jose Rodrigues de Abreu to go to Carmo and negotiate a settlement with the rioters. This delegation was successful in opening negotiations and two days later the entire Carmo council came to Vila Rica and the conflict was 3 resolved. This incident shows the town council of Vila Rica acting on the side of the royally appointed ouvidor. In a situation which did not involve directly its own interests it chose to act to maintain stability. When its interests

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386 were at stake, however, the council tended to act less responsibly as can be seen most clearly in the conflict over taxation. The councils steadfastly refused to compromise on this issue and it was not until late 1713 that Governor Albuquerque was able to get an agreement on the collection of the royal fifth. This called for the levy of a tax of ten oitavas per mining pan, which meant, in 1 effect, a ten-oitava tax on every slave engaged in mining. This agreement was never implemented, due to the opposition of the councils and of the rich miners. The situation worsened during the terms of office of Albuquerque's successor. Bras Baltesar da Silveira, who took over that office in August, 1713. One of his primary responsibilities was to get the councils to agree to a supplemental tax as royal revenues had not kept pace with the spiraling expenses for the huge bureaucracy which had been established in the mining district. A junta was held in January, 171^ to discuss this problem. It was agreed that the Mineiros would pay thirty arrobas of gold with each person paying "according to the wealth that each possessed, collected by the counc ils . . . wi th the condition that the CimportH tax stations Cset up in 17103 be abol5 ished wherever they be found." Free circulation of gold dust was to be allowed. The councils took this occasion 6 to note "the miserable state of the mines'.' This was the first in a long litany repeated so often and so loudly that when it became true it was not believed. Signifi-

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387 cantly this proposal for a fixed sura was made ty the town representatives only after private discussions, showing an ability to work together for common goals. The implementation of this agreement necessitated the convocation of another junta. Until this time the territorial demarcations of the comarcas had not been defined. The manner in which the new tax was to be collected required that this be done immediately. In the process of establishing the comarca boundaries, the dividing line between the towns of Vila Rica and Carmo was also made more precise. The eastern limits of Vila Rica were fixed as the Mato Dentro road which went from Carmo through Catas Altas to Pericicaba. The western and northern boundaries were the Congonhas Stream as far as 7 Casa Branca and the highest peak to the north of Itaubira. The demarcation was not complete having omitted reference to the sparsely populated area to the southwest of Vila Rica. This agreement divided the Comarca of Ouro Preto between the towns of Vila Rica and Carmo: Vila Rica controlling the western portion and Carmo the eastern and 8 geographically larger part. With the boundaries established, the distribution of the thirty-arroba tax burden among the towns was made. Vila Rica was assigned six arrobas . To prepare the tax rolls, the council turned to the church, the only institution which had demographic information. The parish priests were instructed to send lists of their parishioners

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388 to the council, which vould give them to six men chosen from each parish to decide on the tax rates. Another group was then selected to make the collection. The tax was to be one and three q^uarter oitavas per hateia or slave. Deficits were to he made up by the tax on imports collected at the tax posts. These were to be administered by the council. This tax was levied at a rate of one and a half oitavas for dry goods, half an oitava for wet goods, and one oitava per cow. Perhaps because of the private interests of the men who carried out this agreement no tax was imposed on in-coming slaves , the mainstay of the mining industry. Governor Silveira, however, had reservations about the agreement. He still wanted a direct and fixed tax on slaves , despite the opposition of the councils and particularly that of Vila Rica. Silveira's position was that the agreement with the councils should eschew a fixed sum, instituting, instead, a tax per slave. In both cases, a tax was levied on slaves, but with a fixed total the tax per slave would decrease as the captaincy grew. Under Silveira's plan the total tax collected would increase with the development of the mining district. In March 1715» as the new tax was to go into effect, Silveira called a junta in the hope of achieving a last minute reversal in the tax policy. Silveira later described what happened: "l presented the orders of the King, and in four Juntas held in the church Calmest certainly Our

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389 Lady of PilarH everyone protested against the payment by bateias, rising three times in a tone of rebellion. Not having troops to subjugate them I left them, in order that 9 this government not end in my hands." The councils had won but their victory was shortlived. Silveira, aware of the futility of confronting the united councils, astutely played upon each council's fear of acting alone. First he avoided calling a junta which would bring the councils together from their isolated locations. Second, he sent trusted men to win support among key sectors of the populace in the towns. Lastly, in a master stroke, he simply advised each council that the others were siding with the king and that it alone vas in opposition. This broke the back of the opposition. After their separate agreement to his proposals, Silveira called a junta for Vila Rica. This junta enacted the very thing that iia.d created such a squabble in 1713--the head tax on slaves. Furthermore, the import tax was extended to include a two-oitava 10 tax on slaves. The reaction of the people was immediate. The residents of a settlement near the newly established town of Caete rebelled, quickly followed by residents of Caefe itself. Silveira rushed to Sahara where he was almost captured by a mob from Caefe which screamed "Long Live the People." Silveira was forced to suspend the tax on bateias for the council of Sahara. After his return to Vila Rica, which had remained quiet, news of the

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390 victory of the residents of Caete spread, creating unrest. Silveira then ordered the collection by bateias suspended in the entire captaincy. He was determined to 11 avoid a civil war. The quinto was collected finally at the discretion of the councils. The totals, by parish, give a general idea as to the relative sizes of the settlements com12 prising the termo of Vila Rica. Table k Royal Fifth Totals By Parish Parish Oitavas Antonio Dias 5200 Ouro Preto i+l+8i+ Cachoeira 3886 Sao Bartolomeu 3789 Itatiaia 1032 Congonhas 687 Itabira 65U Ouro Branco 639 Source: Tax Records, 1715 in Cod. 2 (CMOP), fol. 97. Silveira immediately advised Viceroy Marques de Angeja of the situation. Angeja in turn notified the Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Diogo de Mendonga Corte-Real , of developments in the mining district. The Governor of Rio de Janeiro was advised to set up tax posts to collect 13 duties on imports as a means of raising revenue. Complicating Silveira's relations with the councils of the comarca of Ouro Preto was the activities of Ouvidor Amorim, whose successor was daily awaited but who did not arrive until 1715Amorim was a vindictive and arbitrary man. Experiencing personal differences with a militia captain from Carmo , he used the powers of his office to

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391 have the cian illegally arrested. Actions such as this ran the risk of ruining Governor Silveira's policy of achieving a modus vivendi with the councils. Silveira reacted immediately to this incident by ordering the release of the captain. Amorim was reproached sarcastically for "your zeal in aDDarently wishing to mask your Ik hatred with the formalities of justice." Silveira's policy of controlling the ouvidor and making overtures to the councils was largely successful. By 1716 the tensions had subsided sufficiently for the governor to call still another junta into session in Vila Rica to deal with the question of the fiscal organization of the captaincy. Meeting in July the representatives of the councils accepted the royal order continuing the payment of thirty arrc^has for another year, hut they added the condition that gold be allowed to circulate freely within Minas and to be carried outside Minas to a 15 mint. The junta also re-established the tax posts on the major roads to prevent smuggling and to collect new import duties. These duties were established as one oitava per head on either cows or cattle , one and a half for dry goods, one half on "wet" goods (foodstuffs), and two on slaves. A tax was also levied on stores and shops. The councils took the occasion of the junta to give vent to their accumulated jealousy toward the many priests who had poured into Minas. The immunity which the clerics enjoyed was most irritating to the councilmen. The

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392 councils had no power to tax these representives of the church, even though many were involved in secular pursuits. The councils had to be content with asking the governor to order the parish priests to prepare lists of the secular property owned by clerics and hope that the bishop of Rio de Janeiro would order them to pay taxes on it. Another source of irritation was the exhorbitant fees charged by the clerics. The municipal representives complained that fees commonly were as high as an oitava for a communion and half an oitava for a confession; they asked that the price be lowered to four vintens for each. These representatives also asked that special inspectors be sent to deal with the deplorable moral state of the priests as "the visitors [ecclesiastical officials making tours to maintain religious orthodoxy!) who were sent to correct public sins Cof the priestsD did not succeed. They asked that the king every three years send a visitor general of the order of Saint Peter, university-trained, and of exemplary conscience and virtue Cand aD native-born 16 Portuguese to visit them, and correct them." Besides attacking clerical abuses, the representatives of the councils turned their self-righteous wrath upon the civil judiciary. They complained about the long delays in judicial proceedings and obtained Silveira's agreement that the ouvidors would meet every four months in one of the capitals of the three comarcas to constitute 17 a judicial junta in order to expedite proceedings.

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393 Before this extremely fruitful junta could have a salutary effect in further calming the populace, Amorim's replacement, Manuel Mosqueira da Rosa, initiated a conflict which was to last four years. Rosa proved to be every bit as arbitrary as his predecessor and, perhaps, more ambitious. The difficulties began over the annual election for the council which was to serve in 1717The election itself became a test of strength between the council of 1716 and the ouvidor. Rosa wanted the election conducted without the presence of the council and sent two orders to this effect. The councilmen argued that it was within their prerogative to attend as homens da govern18 anga. It appears that no elections were held as litigation began. The council, on December 29, voted to continue in power until the case had been decided by the High Court of Bahia. The conflict and the litigation continued into I718. Apparently there were no elections for the 1718 council, although special elections were held to replace individual council members who resigned, but at least one member of the 1716 council, Joao Pinto da Silva, was still serving as councillor in I718. Rosa reacted to the council's determined opposition by distorting the issues involved. He convinced the new 19 Governor, D. Pedro de Almeida, Count of Assumar, that the council was making a grab for power by refusing to allow elections. The conflict was thereby elevated from

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39i* a question of the right of the council and the homens bons to choose council members without interference to the illusionary one of the council demanding powers it never had before. Assumar accepted Rosa's version of the conflict, perhaps because it served as a vehicle to limit the independence of the council. Assumar dispatched one of the judges to Sao Joao del Rei with orders not to return until called. The other judge was sent to Rio de Janeiro, to convey a cleric wanted by the law there, with the same instructions. One vereador was sent to Sahara, the procurator to Serro do Frio, and the secretary was 20 arrested for illegal activities. Governor Assumar defended his actions in a letter to the king. He admitted that he had ordered the expulsion of the judge Manuel Dias de Menezes , the arrests of the secretary, Miguel de Andrade Ferreira, and the sindic, Antonio de Brito Liria (noting his record of notorious activities in Recife), and "the punishment of those who were his companions in the machinations." He justified his actions by accusing the council of "trying in the beginning of my administration to make my government difficult." Assumar credits his resolute action for the 21 tranq^uilty then being enjoyed. How the municipal government functioned during these two years is not made clear either by the governor or by the council records , which are almost completely silent about this conflict. What can be said was that Rosa

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395 clearly won. The two judges, Sargento-mor Manuel Bias de Meneses and Sargento-mor Francisco Viegas Barboza, the procurator. Lieutenant Jose Luis Sol, and the vereadores Captain Domingos de Araujo Dantas , Joao Pinto da Silva and Captain Manuel Gomes da Silva do not reappear again in the records as office holders. Furthermore, the king, while admitting Rosa's excesses, hacked this representative of the crown solely because he was a royal appointee. Rather than fight back, the council, according to the king, should have acquiesced and then entered into liti22 gation . The election for the 1719 council was a potential keg of dynamite. Rosa, perhaps under pressure from Assumar, or because he felt the elections were certain to return his supporters, did not attend the election, claiming 23 illness. Assumar also took the precaution of sending Lieutenant-General Joao Ferreira Tavares to supervise the 2k election and, in general, to oversee the situation. The election was held without incident. As if Rosa's meddling in local politics was not enough to bring the turbulent miners to the exploding point, the ouvidor went one step further: he tried to institute a contract for the supply of meat. This was the same contract which had served to spark the V7ars of the Emboabas. Efforts in 1712 to institute the meat mon25 opoly in Sahara had led to a protracted feud. Rosa's effort in Vila Rica resulted in a mob surrounding his house

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396 and forcing him to desist in his efforts at least for 26 the moment. Immediately after this fiasco, Rosa's successor, Martinho Vieira, arrived in November of ITI8 and Rosa took up gold mining in Itatiaia. Not one to work peacefully and unnoticed, Rosa shortly was to emerge once again into the spotlight. One of the factors which played an important part in the squabbling of this period was "the mob." It was the mob-an outraged populace congregated in the streetswhich had thwarted Rosa's plans for a meat monopoly contract. But this was not the only appearance of the mob before 1T20. In June 171? , the procurator Jose Luis Sol called for action against the mob which had marched through the streets of Vila Rica yelling "Long Live the 27 People." Unfortunately, the causes behind this demonstration are not given and there is no mention of Rosa. This reference is the first one alluding to the mob in Vila Rica. Later events were to show the terrible power which had been formed. It is possible that Sol was referring to the beginning of a storm of opposition by the people to the newly appointed parish priest of Ouro Preto , Father Lucas Ribeiro Riba. Father Riba's unpopularity appears to stem from his abrasive, aggressive, and arbitrary personality. Initially Assumar stoutly defended Father Riba, threatening to exile to Africa for ten years anyone who opposed the

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397 priest. But Father Riba's own defense took the form of "rigorous orders and excommunications" and Assumar was forced to advise the over-zealous priest that only more moderate actions vould forestall violent reaction hy the 28 people. By late October, Assumar was referring to Father Riba's "bad conduct" and warning the visitor-general of his activities. Assumar also released all ecclesiastical prisoners from the public jail, stating that "l do not wish to receive in His Majesty's jail prisoners of ecclesiastical courts, especially those who with such in29 justice as this are vexed." Despite the conflicts then underway over the elections and the Ouro Preto parish priest the town councils were able to meet and deal harir.oni ous ly with fiscal matters. Juntas were held in July and August of ITIT to deal with the taxation question. After minimal debate, the junta voted to continue the tax system then in effect. The most significant aspect of this junta was not its legislation, but rather its composition. In addition to the regular membership, " procuradores do povo " , peoples' solicitors, were elected by all free males. The two procuradores do povo chosen--one from the town and the other from the countryside ( o campo )--were selected to attend the August junta. Both of the men elected were members of the homens da governanga: Sargento-mor Antonio Martins 30 Lega and Lieutenant Luis Scares.

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39ti The procurador, or juiz, do povo , was an extremelyimportant official in Portugal, where he was the head of 31 the confederation of guilds known as the "Twenty-Four." The procurador do povo in Minas never had the power of his Portuguese counterpart. Furthermore, in Minas he was not connected with the guilds. Nevertheless, the existence of this official there is an indication that in special cases the representatives of the people had a right to be heard. The first significant change in the tax system occurred in 1718 as the councils began to work together. The junta was preceeded by a meeting of the councils' representatives, who were able to agree on a program and thus present a united front to the governor. After several days of debate a compromise was reached: the councils won the reduction of the royal fifth to twenty-five arrS'bas , but collection of the import tax was switched 32 from council to royal control. This was an important concession; for five arr^Jbas the councils alienated forever their right to collect import taxes. This Junta also defined the manner in which the royal fifth was to be collected. The post of Provedor dos Quintos was created. These tax collectors were to be selected by the governor from among three names submitted by the councils. Each slaveowner had to present himself before the provedor, take an oath, and report the number of slaves he owned. Slaves not reported were subject to

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399 confiscation and new purchases of slaves were to be reported within ten days . Removal from the rolls was permitted only because of death, escape, or sale, and corroborating evidence had to be submitted. Excluded from taxation were the very young, the aged, the chronically 33 infirm, house slaves, and those working in shops. Stores and shops were taxed as were imports generally. With the creation of the provedores dos quintos, the institutionalization of tax collecting advanced a giant step. Royal officials in Lisbon, however, were not satisfied with the tax system. They felt these modifications to be of limited im.portance, since it was the basic system which needed revision. What was noted by the authorities in Lisbon was the ease of smuggling and the massive quantities of gold being kept for personal or religious use, or as a hedge against inflation and taxes. The solution envisioned by these officials was the method used on the coast — smelters and mints. Once decided upon, the edict was phrased in benevolent terms, stating the Crown's wish "to avoid the oppression which the residents, principally the poorest, of Minas experience through the inequality and excess with which they are taxed for their contribution to the total arrobas of 31* gold." One or more smelters were to be established in the mining district at royal expense to melt down all gold into bars, at which time the royal fifth would be collected No gold was permitted to leave Minas without the quinto

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400 having first been paid on it. Gold dust was permitted as a circulating medium in Minas at a rate of ten tostoes , or one milreis (l$000), per oitava. Gold bars, after taxes, were allowed to circulate at 1$ UOO per oitava. Penalties for breaking this law included the loss of the gold and ten years exile. Ouvidores were ordered to make continuous investigations to ensure compliance with the law. 35 This royal order was presented to a junta on June 20, 1719. It was presented not as a subject for debate, but as an accomplished fact. The junta was told that its role was to discuss ways of implementing the order. Assumar had learned a lesson from the previous junta; by limiting debate to methods of implementation the basic decision was untouchable. Despite this, however, the junta was able to exert enough pressure on Assumar to win the temporary suspension of the implementation of the order for one year. The councils took the position that there was no time to act, since the new system was to go into effect within forty-five days or the people would be paying double taxation. The junta decided that the smelters would be located in the capitals of the three comarcas , Vila Rica, Sahara, and Sao Joao del Rei and in the town of Serro do Frio (Principe) because of the latter's dis36 tance from Sahara. Assumar accepted the delay, feeling that he could surmount any difficulties which might arise, although he

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ItOl was not really anticipating any, "And as with some labor on my part I have predisposed the peoples of this government to embrace the resolutions of His Majesty which Cwas aD most difficult thing among so many rebellious people, I do not have much doubt about erecting immedi37 ately the Smelter." Assumar's confidence and brave words soon disappeared, as his expectations were trampled into the dust by the mobs of Vila Rica. The rioting began in 1720 as the year's reprieve was ending and the new tax system was to go into effect.

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Notes 1. The "battle was von ty Carmo because of its position as the first town founded in Minas . Royal Order, 21 February, 1729 in Cod. 7 (CMOP), fol. 76. To the consternation of the Vilaricanos, thestandard of Carmo always preceded that of their town. 2. Entrei em Villa Rica, fol. 36. 3. Council Proceedings, 20 and 22 June, I713 in "Atas da Camara," pp. 272-273. h. Di ogo de Vasconcellos , Historia media , p. 68. 5. Council Proceeding; Camara," pp. 293-29^. 6 January, 171^t in "Atas da Ibid, 29I+. 7. Junta Report, 6 April, 171^ in Veiga, Ephemerides mi heir as , 2, pp. 22-23. 8. It is important to note that despite the assumption of some writers, e.g. , Augusto de Lima Junior, A capitania das Minas Gerais , p. 92, that the comarcas were created in 171^5 all that was done was to fix the boundaries of already existing comarcas. The exact date of their creation is not clear, but the nomination of Amorim as ouvidor in 1709 indicates that this occurred in or before that year. Furthermore, the junta report does not use the word "create" or "found", using instead "division" ( repart igao ) . 9. Silveira to Viceroy Marques de Angija, 23 March, 1715, Document No. 201 in Rau and Silva, , Os manuscritos , 1, pp. 132-133. 10. Silveira to Viceroy Marquis of Angija, 20 May, 1715, Document No. 203 in Rau and Silva, Os manus critos , l,p.l3^. U02

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1403 11. Silveira to Joao V, 26 June, 1715 in Veiga, Epliemerides mlneiras , 2, pp. i+3^-^3T. Diogo de Vas cone ellos , Histori a antip:a , 2, pp. 183-185, incorrectly refers to Albuquerque's actions in creating the conditions leading up to the revolt and in subduing the people. Silveira had assumed his post on August 31, 1713. 12. The total is 20337 oitavas and not 20371 as determined by the scribe. 13. Angeja to Diogo de Mendonga Corte-Real, 1 July , 1715, Docuaient No. 211 in Rau and Silva, Os manus cr it os , 2 , p.lU2. Ik. Silveira to Ouvidor Manuel da Costa de Amorim, 30 December, 171^ in Cod. 9(SG), fol. 38. 15. Junta Report, 22 July, 17l6, Document No. 2Uo in Rau and Silva,' Os manus critos , 2, p. 178. 16. Report, 22 July, 17l6, Document No, 2Ul in Rau and Silva, Os manuscritos , 2, pp. 179-l80. 17 Ibid, 18. Council Proceedings, 21 December, I716 in Cod. 1+(CM0P), fols. 9-9v. 19Almeida, or more properly the Count of Assumar, vas appointed governor on March 3, 1717 "but he did not actually arrive to assume his new duties until December of the year. Rosa was replaced in November, I718, so that the events described must have occurred between December, 1717 and November, I7I8. 20. 21. 762. 22. fol. Entrei em Vila Rica, fols. 38-38v. Assumar to Joao V, 20 June, I718 in Cod. U(SG), pp. 76IJoao V to council, 21 January, 1719 in Cod. 7(CM0P), 8. 23. Assumar to Rosa, 23 December, I718 in Cod. 6(CM0P), fol. lOv. 2U. Assumar to C?l, 26 December, I718 in Cod. 6(CM0P), fol. 11. 25. Entrei em Vila Rica, fol. 39 26. Ibid.

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kok 27. Council Proceedings, T June, 1717 in Cod. h (CMOP), fol.22. 28. Assumar to Father Lucas Ribeiro Riba, 12 September, 1718, in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. k9v . Assumar justified his interference on the grounds that "anything, even ecclesiastical CmattersD, which can disturb the public tranquility I should be, and am, obligated to prevent." 29. Assumar to Father Riba, 25 October, 1718 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 61+v. 30. Council Proceedings, 16 and 28 July, 1717 in Cod. k (CMOP) , fols. 25-26V. 31. Cf Harry Bernstein, "The Lisbon Juiz do Povo . " 32. Diogo de Vaaconcellos ,' Historia Anfiga , 2, p. 220. 33. Regimento dos Provedores do Quinto, k March, I718 in Cod. 2 (SG), fols. 106-108. 3^*. Royal Law, 11 February, 1719 in "Documentos a que referem as instrucgoes dadas ao visconde de Barbacena, publicadas em o n. 21 da Revist a , " Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro , 6, No. 21 (July iSUU); 206-207. 35. Ibid. A four month tax-free period was established for the expenditure of all untaxed gold. 36. Assumar to Bartolomeu de Sousa Mexia, 20 June, 1719 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. 137-139. 37. Assumar to Count of Ericeira, 5 June, 1719 in Charles R. Boxer (ed.), "Quatro cartas ineditas de dom Pedro de .' Almeida, Conde de Assumar e Governador de Minas Gerais (1718-1721)" Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro, Anais do Congresso Comemorativa do Bicentenario da Trans ferencia da Sede do Governo do Brasil (n.p.: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, I967): ^j I67.

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Chapter 26 The Uprising of 1T20 The culmination of the 1710-1720 decade of conflict and confusion vas the 1720 riots in Vila Rica. The causes of this outburst were varied, ranging from the broad problem of the collection of the royal fifth to the vagaries of personal ambition. But essentially it was a question of whether private individuals, made rich by gold, could successfully confront royal authority. Prior to 1720 men such as Barba Gato, Manuel Nunes Viana, and Domingos Rodrigues do Prado, among others, had succeeded in undermining royal authority. The uprising of 1720 was the last time this would happen in Minas Gerais during the eighteenth century. One of the major reasons for the outbreak was the confusion concerning the method by which the quinto was to be collected. The opposition of the miners to the creation of the smelters had won them only a year's respite, and this may have been due as much to the difficulties of setting up the smelters as to this confrontation. Even though the first smelter to be set up in Minas was given priority over all others in Brazil there were numerous delays. The equipment for the smelter came largely from the cannibali zation of the smelters in SalvaU05

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ho6 dor and Rio de Janeiro. A siiperintendent of the smelter, Eugenio Freire de Andrade, was appointed, but his journey from Salvador to Vila Rica via Rio de Janeiro was marred by the escape of his Indian carriers, who abandoned the smelter equipment along the Caminho Novo. Despite the delay in making the smelter operational, legislation covering its functions was enacted. The new smelter was to accept gold dust and transform it into bars, each having stamped upon it its weight, purity, and the year it was minted. While gold dust was permitted to circulate at a value of ten tostoes (l$000) per oitava,, its export from the captaincy was punishable by ten years 1 exile in India and the loss of all properties. One month after the issuance of this order, the crown issued a second ordering the construction of a mint to make coins of moeda , half moeda, and quarter moeda denominations. Since these would be of lesser value than the bars, and therefore could serve for small transactions, gold dust 2 was to be prohibited as a circulating medium. This expedient was aimed at ensuring that all gold would be delivered to the smelters or to the mint; it was a further blow to the mining interests. The delay in implementing this order, and the fear of the miners that the smelter would make impossible their further evasion of the royal fifth, had immediate effects. According to Governor Assumar, many people abandoned the mining district after settling their accounts. Taking

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U07 their slaves, they went to the coastal port. So manypeople left that almost four thousand slaves and over one hundred shops had to be removed from the tax rolls of the mining district. The erosion of the tax base caused by the flight of so many people resulted in increased taxes on those who remained. The tax on slaves rose from 2 3/^ to 3 l/n oitavas , and that on shops from 10 to 12 3 oitavas . The delays and the fear of the new tax collecting also raised havoc with commerce. The slave trade with the coast, in particular, was prejudiced by this situation; the entry of new slaves into the region stopped for a time. Other branches of commerce were similarly hit because of the customary procedure of selling goods on one year credit. If the smelter were set up during the year, then the debtors would be required to pay their debts with inflated money. Not only were imports curtailed for this reason but Mineiro merchants were pressured by their creditors who attempted to collect their debts before the value of money became inflated. While fear of the smelter and mint was the single most important factor in creating the preconditions necessary for the uprising, there were others. Important among these was the importance of credit in the economic life of the mining district. The ease with which debts were contracted was seen as a principal cause of the unrest in the area. Slaves were bought on time, with pay-

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1*08 ments often spread over a fev years, in the hope that the slave would generate the capital for his ovn purchase through gold mining. When this failed, the slave was sold at public auction, hut at ridiculously low prices. To end this practice, a system was instituted by which the value of the slave was determined by disinterested parties. If the bids did not reach the predetermined value, the creditor had to accept the slave at that k .value. But this did not resolve the primary problem which was the ease of obtaining credit and the prevalence of miners who were in debt. The leader of the 1720 uprising, Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes , according to Assumar's successor, was heavily in debt: "so many were his debts, that his possessions barely sufficed to pay them; for this reason his creditors began to subpoena him; and seeing himself lost, all his energies were turned to 5 plotting against the ouvidor and the governor." The threat of status deprivation also played a role in creating an explosive atmosphere. The efforts of royal officials to limit the number of commissioned officers in the militia were described above. Several edicts 6 were issued in 1720 implementing the new policy. This policy constituted a real threat because a militia commission was one avenue of entry into the elite. Also, while militia commissions were being cut back, the first regular army units were arriving from Portugal, presenting

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It09 visual proof of the determination of the royal government to get its way. Still another cause for the rioting was the governor's determination to eradicate the remaining shops on the Morro de Vila Rica, particularly those in Ouro Podre, where Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes lived. The council had attempted to accomplish this in ITI8 but stopped because of its inability to enforce the law against the resistance of strong local interests. The cudgel was then picked up by Assumar,who issued several orders to this effect in 7 1720. The anonymous author of the "Discurso historico" suggests that this effort had deeper ramifications than meet the eye. According to this writer — who may have been the governor or, more likely, a close associate — Guimaraes had control of the mountain and allowed only those shops to open that belonged to him or to trusted friends. These became havens for the slaves from Antonio Dias and Padre Faria, who exchanged gold for aguardente and other goods. According to this biased source, Assumar intervened because the council did nothing more than issue ordinances. The council could go no further, since 8 Guimaraes was the law on the mountain. If the Vilarican elite felt that its economic and social position was being threatened by the developments of 1719 and 1720, it could also see that its political position was erroding. During the years prior to 1720 the crown sought to gain undisputed control over the mining

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district. The council, which was created initially as an ally in the establishment of lav and order, soon "became a competitor for power. One of the critical actions taken "by the governor to' limit the authority of the council was to ban the levying of the finta. The finta had been levied by the council for specific public work projects. In 1720 Assumar moved against the camara's use of this tax, arguing for the first time that by custom it belonged to the royal prerogative and, therefore, the governor's 9 authorization was needed before it could be levied. This undermined the council's chances for fiscal independence, since all other revenue sources were fixed, precluding increases sufficient to meet rising expenses. Furthermore, Assumar was aware of the ambiguity in the relationship between levels of government. As he realized, no regulations had been issued specifically to governors of the mining district. In the absence of specific instructions, Assumar defined his powers rather broadly. Thus when something as superficially simple as the council's decision to begin building a new town hall and jail was made, the governor intervened arguing that the council could do with less luxurious quarters than 10 those being planned. The council found itself facing an astute governor who saw the absence of detailed instructions as a chance to curtail the power of the camara. Assumar interferred in the affairs of the council in other ways. Complaining of the poor administration of

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illl justice, he accused the municipal judges of failing in their duty by not investigating some crimes committed in Sao Bartolomeu. Moreover, he reproached the council for its failure to act on his orders for an attack upon the 11 quilombo of Palmitos. While the elite of Vila Rica was under the most pressure, Assumar was atta.cking not only their positions. In fact, the general nature of Assumar's policy is illustrated by his ordering tlie arrest of the capitao-mor of Serro because of the extreme i;ower that 12 official wielded. While Assumar was working to establish his supremacy, his efforts were being undermined by the very official who should have supported him the most. Martinho Vieira, the Ouvidor of Ouro Preto, was a headstrong, arbitrary official. In a situation which called for moderation and the careful selection of goals Vieira acted in a high-handed fashion. For this he was admonished by 13 Assumar on several occasions. Vieira ignored these admonitions in the same manner that he would ignore Assumar's warnings about a possible uprising. Thus the intemperance of this royal official was a direct cause of the uprising. Assumar consistently blamed him for the revolt, although Assumar probably was aware that the real causes were deeper and were, in fact, directly related to Assumar's policies. Prior to the outbreak Assumar had reason to feel that, despite Martinho Vieira, his policies were having

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Ul2 the desired effect. He had finally resolved the problem posed by the Paulista residents of Pitangui, who refused to pay taxes. The departure of the local leader, Domingos Rodrigues do Prado , to Sao Paulo had given Assumar his chance. He appointed a trusted man as capitao-mor and encouraged Portuguese to settle in Pitangui. When Prado returned and expelled Assumar' s appointee, the newly arrived dragoons were sent to Pitangui where they defeated 15 the numerically superior Paulistas. Thus a major obstacle to Assumar's policy was removed. Yet as Assumar himself noted, the discussions among the Mineiros concerning the smelters were heated ( muito 16 em quente ) . In fact, open conflict over this issue had erupted along the Rio Sao Francisco. But this was a minor problem since it involved a peripheral area. The major confrontation was to occur in Vila Rica. It errupted on the night of June 28, 1720. It did not, however, catch Assumar by surprise. As early as February, 1720 Assumar warned Martinho Vieira that there was evidence that an uprising was being planned. This evidence apparently included reports of people being contracted and encouraged to betray the crown, as well as reports that money was being collected to bribe the regular army troops. Assumar's reaction to these reports was to order the arrest of all excess priests, thereby re17 moving one source of discord.

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iH3 By April, the activities of the plotters were beccminf more serious. In that month one of the leading conspirators, Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes , tried to bribe one of the members of Assumar's entourage to leave the governor unguarded. In return for his betrayal of the governor, he vould receive one arroba of gold. This bribe attempt was reported to Assumar, who chose to take no action at that time. Shortly after this incident, which had occurred at a party for the governor's wife, seditious leaflets began 18 appearing . The main conspirators were Guimaraes, the ex-ouvidor Mosqueira Rosa, and Sebastiaoda Veiga, a rich, ambitious man who probably saw himself as another Nunes Viana--a man chosen by the people to lead them. Allied with the three were Joao da Silva Guimaraes, the son of the mestre do-campo and the municipal judge of 1720 and also Rosa's son. Father Vicente de Botelho, and Father Francisco de Monte Alverne, who were probably the object of Assumar's effort to expell quarrelsome clerics. The leadership of the plot was composed of some of the most important men in Vila Rica. The details of their plot provides a clue as to the motives of these men. Following the pattern of the uprising in Vila Rica during the Wars of the Emboabas , the first stage involved an urban riot. Masked men, probably white, leading bands of thirty to forty slaves each would seal off a street. Then the people would be awakened; if

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klk they failed to open their doors, these were "broken down. The people would he exhorted to join the uprising amidst 19 yells of "Long live the people-or die," Three days before June 28, when the first riot occurred, Assumar was warned of the danger by Joao da Silva Guimaraes . This raises the question of Guimaraes ' motivation. The plotters later would stoutly maintain that they were loyal subjects of the king being forced to participate in the rebellion by the headless mob. By warning the governor, Guimaraes was preparing the foundation for this explanation. He risked nothing since it was clear that Assumar knew that something was in the wind. Furthermore, Guimaraes did not reveal the date for the uprising. Moreover, since one of the objects of the conspirators was to eject the governor from the captaincy, this was good psychological warfare. Assumar immediately warned Martinho Vieira of the danger, only to see the latter be so impolitic as to insult Guimaraes. Vieira did nothing else. It seems clear that the canny Assumar was giving the plotters all the rope they needed to literally hang themselves. The mob descended from the stronghold of the Guimaraes family in Ouro Podre at 11:00 PM on the night of the 28th. It marched upon the home of the ouvidor who, having been warned of the mob's approach just before it arrived, escaped by hiding in the woods of the Morro de Santa Quit^ria. Vieira's home was ransacked, a servant

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Ul5 stabbed, and his official documents destroyed, After searching for Vieira without success, the mob marched on the council building. There a university graduate vas 20 summoned to prepare the demands of the "people." These demands dealt almost exclusively with economic issues, many of which had little relationship to the people in the mob but which meant a great deal to those pulling the strings. The first, and most important item was the abolition of the smelters, which would have been a boon to the major gold miners. Other clauses dealt with lowering the costs of business licenses, verifying weights and measures, the fees of a number of bureaucratic officials, and the penalties levied for minor offenses. Another set of demands dealt with slavery: the taxes on slaves were to be lowered; anyone hiding slaves from the tax collectors, and thereby increasing the share paid by others, would lose all his slaves; and all slaves were to be evaluated before they were auctioned. Still another group of demands dealt with tax relief: these included having regular army troops pay for their board, req_uiring the council to pay for street paving from its regular income, and requiring the tithe collectors to pay their fair share of the e c cles s ias t ic al tax. Still other demands would have led to the payment of the import tax only after the goods arrived at their destination and not during the trip, so that proceeds from their sale could be used to. pay the taxes. Licensing of shops was

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ifi6 to be done annually rather than monthly. A call was made for fairer judicial proceedings at lover prices. Finally, 21 a general pardon was demanded. Clearly these vere not revolutionary aims. Without exception they merely called for ameliorating the tax system and moderating the arbitrariness of the judicial system. Fev of the demands would have greatly benefited the common people; most would have helped the merchants and large-scale miners. The conservative nature of these demands is in sharp contrast to the later statements of the governor, whose description of the uprising became increasingly more radical as he got further removed from it. None of the demands was political in nature; no effort to establish a government in opposition to the royally-appointed governor can be detected in these demands . A messenger was sent with these demands to the governor, then residing in Carmo. Assumar immediately ordered all the dragoons to Carmo. His actions during the uprising were dictated largely by the time needed to gather these troops. As the same time, seven soldiers, of those on hand, were sent to Vila Rica to save the hiding Martinho Vieira and bring him to Carmo. The rebels frantically tried to rally support in the other comarcas , but whatever support was forthcoming was solely in terms of sympathy — no material help was provided. Failing to get outside support, the rebels sent

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kn three representatives to discuss the situation vith the governor: municipal judge Sargento-mor Antonio Martins Lesa, Jose Peixoto da Silva, and Jose Ribeiro Dias. Lega had been named procurador do povo and Silva juiz do povo, indicating that the institution of the peoples ' representative still had some vitality. They urged that Assumar personally go to Vila Kica and grant a general pardon. However, Assumar vas warned in private that this was a trap to capture him. After meeting with his advisors, Assumar agreed to grant a pardon, conditional upon royal approval. This the procurators refused to accept. Assumar then decided to attempt to win the support of the Vilaricanos. Father Jose" Mascarenhos, one of Assumar's two Jesuit advisors, was sent to talk to the people. In a further step to win over the people, Assumar ordered his military aide to carry the news of the pardon to Vila Rica. The aide, Joao Tavares , was refused entry into town as the council insisted that pardon had to be issued directly by the governor in order to be valid. Faced with the intransigence of the council and the need to wait for all the regular army units to gather, Assumar was forced to make concessions. First, he suspended the opening of the smelter for one year and announced that the importation taxes on the Rio and Bahia roads would be suspended as soon as the smelter went into operation. He also hinted that privileges would be given 22 to those councils that proved their loyalty.

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I;l8 While vinning time during this crisis by making these concessions, Assumar also dealt directly with the conspirators. He was probably seeking information about their intentions. First Sebastiao da Veiga Cabral and then Rosa were summoned to visit the governor, but both refused, Rosa claiming his appearance in public would only arouse the adulation of the people who would proclaim him ouvidor. Rosa was finally persuaded to go to the governor's palace. He demanded two positions — Provedor da Fazenda and Provedor dos Auzentes in return for his support; no agreement was reached. Veiga then appeared and attempted to convince Assumar to run away. When Veiga repiorted that he had been given the option of accepting the peoples' nomination as governor or death, Assumar mockingly advised him to accept the post and use the 23 position to restore peace. On the morning of July 2, the mob again streamed down off the mountain. The goal this time was Carmo. The mob numbered from 1,500 to 2,000--an extremely large number indicative of the size which Vila Rica had attained. Along with the mob went the town council--all the while proclaiming it was coerced into going. Apparently there was in the mob a small radical group, whose aim was to kill the governor if he refused to accede to the demands of the Vilaricanos. Assumar moved to stop the mob from reaching Carmo. First he tried to get the people of the settlement of

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iil9 Passagem, located on the road to Carmo, to stop the mob, but the effort failed vhen the people Joined the rebels. Then he ordered the council and elite of Carmo to block the road, temporarally stopping the advance, although the hotter heads in the mob had to be prevented by their comrades from forcing their way into Carmo. Shortly after this confrontation, Assumar reversed his policy. He decided to address the mob, which then was allowed, to enter the town. Assumar realized that a long speach would force the mob to spend the night in Carmo, offering an unusual opportunity for further mayhem, so he simply accepted their demands and issued a general pardon. Assumar's quick capitulation was due, in part, to the presence of the mob and the lack of an armed force which would be relied on; but it was due also to his realization that the council and people of Carmo, his only supporters, were sympathetic to some of the demands of the conspirators, especially that for stopping the smelter from opening. Assumar's quick acceptance of the demands of the Vilaricanos and their apparent victory led to the dispersion of the mob. After the mob broke up, rumors began to spread--rumors that all the residents of Vila Rica were to be punished by paying the entire royal fifth, and then others that Vieira was going to concuct an investigation of the rioting. If these rumors were started in the hope of keeping the situation tense, they failed.

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1+20 Assumar met each with deft explanations that the tax vould "be paid by all and that he was ordering the senior judge of Vila Rica to assume the ouvidor's post. During the breathing spell which these actions won him in Vila Rica Assumar moved against the peripheral area of Mato Dentro de Serro do Frio, where taxes had not been collected in years due to the opposition of Antonio Soares Ferreira, "who there made the Law." This show of strength was meant to serve as an example of the governor's power and induce the Vilaricanos to moderate their demands . This was but one aspect of Assumar's public change in attitude. On July T and then again on July 10 he had issued pardons, and on the latter date he further had 25 promised that Martinho Vieira would leave the comarca. On July 13, however, his decision to go on the offensive was reflected by an order authorizing the killing of masked men and establishing a hundred-oitava reward for the death of any masked man. Responding to this activity, the conspirators renewed their efforts to convince Assumar of the untenability of his position. Again Assumar was Visited by Veiga, who urged the governor to leave the captaincy, and again Assumar put him off by asking for more time. After Veiga departed. Father Monte Alverne arrived with a plan to organize the people of Itaubira, Cachoeira, and Sao

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1^21 Bartolomeu in support of Assumar. This offer vras rejected as Assumar feared that its acceptance would allow the conspirators to openly organize more people. Shortly after this meeting, the governor learned that preparations were underway for an attack upon Carmo that evening. Assumar decided to act before the attack. He ordered troops to arrest Veiga, who was immediately sent to Rio de Janeiro. Then thirty troops were sent to arrest Guimaraes , Monte Alverne, Rosa, and Botelho--a task which was quickly accomplished as no one expected Assumar to act so forcefully. These arrests stopped the projected attack on Carmo but provoked serious rioting. That evening the rioting was worse than ever, buildings were burned and people were harangued to free the victims of the governor's duplicity. Even the parish church was invaded by the mob in search of informers. The rioting was all the excuse Assumar needed to move into Vila Rica with the dragoons, supported by some Vilaricanos, among whom the most prominent was Antonio Ramos dos Reis . Steps were then taken to burn Guimaraes' massive house and properties as well as those of other plotters. While popular legend and some historians portray in chilling terms the burning of the entire mining 26 settlement the truth is that only selected houses were put to the torch and local militia officers were present to point out those belonging to the conspirators. Even though the fire got out of hand, due to rioting slaves,

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it22 and other dwellings were burnt, only a part of the mining camp of Ouro Podre was razed. The writer of the Discurso histori c o is emphatic that the heroic efforts of a dragoon 27 captain prevented the further spreading of the fire. Having forestalled a violent reaction in Vila Rica, Assumar once again turned his attention to the outlying settlements. The conspirators hoped to win the support of the residents of the settlements of Cachoeira, Casa Branca and Itatiaia. Felipe dos Santos, Tome Afonso Pereira, Jose Carlos, and Theodozio da Silva were dispatched hy the conspirators to harargue the people of the peripheral areas. But Santos and Pereira were quickly arrested and the settlements were not mobilized on the side of the conspirators. Assumar, knowing that his actions could renew civil war in Minas Gerais, acted summarily. While most of the prisoners were sent to Rio de Janeiro, one remained to move into the partheon of Brazilian martyrs. This was 28 Felipe dos Santos who was executed on the same day he was brought to Vila Rica. His quartered body was then dragged through the streets of town as a ghastly reminder of the fate awaiting those who opposed the crown — those, that is, who were poor. Assumar had no authority to condemn a white man to death without a meeting of the ouvidores. His excuse was that he could not risk calling ouvidores from others comarcas during this period of crisis, when the true extent of the plot was not known.

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U23 He did not attempt to obtain written decisions which would not have unduly delayed any executions. Assumar would long try to justify his actions and erase the stigma left by his arrest of the ringleaders after he had granted them pardons. One of the ways he attempted to do this was by magnifying the extent of the plot. Assumar's correspondence shows a descriptive escalation of the threat posed by the uprising and of Santos' position among the conspirators. On July lU, Assumar wrote that the plot was aimed at expelling all 29 royal authorities and thus avoiding the payment of taxes. On August 2, Assumar reported that the goal of the con30 spirators was the establishment of a republic. By the end of August, Assumar was adding details like the fact that the republic would have a ruling junta of twenty-four and that the real goal of the plotters was to capture Rio 31 de Janeiro and open the port to free trade. These embellishments were not the result of new discoveries but rather part of the effort to justify actions which, while necessary, were contrary to law. The uprising of 1720 had been crushed and three of the leading men in Minas arrested. The age of giants was over. After 1720, men such as Antonio Ramos dos Reis continued to reach positions of great power, but their power was based on royal support and not due to their opposition to royal policies. While Antonio Ramos dos Reis probably became richer than Guimaraes had been, he

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I;2l| is perceived as a faithful bureaucrat whereas Guimaraes appears as an independent power who misjudged the capacity and tanacity of his royal ad'/ersary. Assumar was aware that The freedom, unlimited by law, with which the potentates live in this land is one of the greatest dangers, if not the primary one. This Cclimatel favorCsH liberty and depravity. Applying only the means provided for in the Ordenagoes of the Kingdom C i s H too beneign for such perversity; it would not be possible to conserve the peace, where everyone achieves with arms in their hands all that they op wish. -' Only when power was made contingent upon royal approval could law and order be established. Not only was the power of the potentates suppressed, but inroads were made on the independence of Vila Rica's council. The council had played an ambiguous role in the conflict, consistently claiming that it was being coerced. Once the main conspirators had been arrested, the council members fell over themselves in their haste to show their loyalty to the governor. Special masses and sermons were said in celebration of the resolute action saving the town from the anarchy which threatened 33 its destruction. On August IT, 1720 the council officially and publicly acknowledged the error of its ways and, taking the hint from Assumar, agreed to build the mint at its expense as a tangible means of showing its loyalty. The money for this construction was to come from the sum allocated for building a new town hall plus

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it25 revenue to be raised from a tax on slaves. This decision was ratified by the homens bons as each tried to prove his loyalty by supporting the very thing that thirty days 3k previously they had opposed. Assumar initially wanted the mint built in Cachoeira. This was part of an interesting strategic concept which he envisioned. He wished to move the capital as well as the mint to Cachoeira. In his view this settlement was ideally located, being in the center of the mining district and with good land to support the many people which the mint would attract. But most important was its central location astride the major roads. This was Assumar's chief interest, since political control could be more easily maintained from this central position. Apparently he was only dissuaded from implementing this plan by the fear that if the mint were built in Cachoeira the town council would refuse to pay the expenses. Therefore, Assumar decided to build in Vila Rica a combination mint, palace, and fort. He appealed to the governor of Rio de Jaaeiro for six artillery pieces to use to defend 35 this building, which would have the form of a fort. Nor did the uprising deflect Assumar's thrust to clear the Morro de Vila Rica of the shops. In fact, initially Assumar overreacted and unrealist ically tried to remove all the whites from the mountain, calling it "more dens of wild beasts than domiciles of men." The council opposed Assumar's policy, arguing that whites were needed

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i+26 to control the slaves. The council did accept, however, the eradication of all the shops on the mountain; onlymeat markets vere permitted there because distances prohibited the making of daily trips dovn to Ouro Preto or Antonio Dias. The governor retaliated for the council's show of independence by decreeing no members of the 1721 council could be related either by blood or compadresco 36 to those of 1720, The uprising also had a great effect on the organization of the captaincy. The V/ars of the Emboabas had led to the creation of the Captaincy of Sao Paulo and Minas do Ouro. The uprising of 1720 led to the creation of the 37 separate Captaincy of Minas Gerais. In practical terms, the creation of the separate captaincy was a logical step. Assumar had spent almost his term of office in Minas, since that turbulent area demanded the constant presence of a governor. Each time Assumar attempted to visit Sao Paulo, the councils would bombard him with appeals urging him to stay in Minas to give personal attention to the affairs of the mining region. Assumar also made the critical decision to move his residence from Carmo to Vila Rica, which thereupon became the true administrative capital of Minas. Before this the governors took their oath of office in Vila Rica, but resided in Carmo. This shift was due probably as much to the governor's need to be close to the main troublespot and nearer the geographical center of the mining

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427 district, as it vas to an appreciation of Vila Rica's size and commercial importance. The establishment of royal authority was complete by 1720. The goal of the royal governors since l695 was finally achieved. The effects of the victory of the eraboabas in 1709 was erased by the defeat of Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes and his cohorts in 1720. Much of the credit for this dramatic change must be given to the Count of Assumar. His resolute actions, and arbitrariness, set the stage for almost seventy years of peace in the cowarca of Ouro Preto.

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Notes 1. Lopes, Palacios de Vila Rica , pp. 1+9-50. 2. Ibid. , p. 51. 3. Count of Assumar to Bartolomeu de Sousa Mexia, 1 June, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), f ols . 2k3-2h3Y. h. Royal Order, 26 March, 1721 in Cod. l6 (SG), fol. 85v. Also appears in Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro 5, i:i900D p. 216, 5. Louren^o de Almeida to C ? D, l6 September, 1721 in Feudo Carvalho, Ernentario da historia de Minas; Felipe dos Santos Freire na sedigao de Vila Rica-1720 (Belo Horizonte: EdiQoes Hi st 5ri cos ,1930 ?), p. 15. 6. Assumar Order, 30 April, 1720 in Carvalho, Ernentario , p, kg and Royal Order, l6 November, 1720 in Cod. 18 (SG), fol. 5^. T. Assumar to Council, 6 May, 1720 and 2i+ June, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. 230 and 2l+0. 8. Discurso Historico, fols. 26v-28. An element suggestive of the broader implications of the uprising is the fact that Manuel Dias de Menezes, who had been one of the municipal judges sent out of Vila Rica in I718 by Assumar, was arrested in the home of Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes. This might indicate that the 1720 uprising was related to the conflict between the council and the royal authorities which had raged from I716 to I718. 9. Assumar to Council, 6 May, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 229v. 10. Assumar to Joao V, 25 April, 1720 in Cod. k (SG), fols. 782-783. 11. Assumar to Municipal Judge of Vila Rica, 29 February, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 206v. 12. Assumar to Colonel Jose Borges Pinto and Council of Principe, k May, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. 227v-228. 1*28

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k29 13. Assumar to Vieira, 25 and 2? June, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG) , fols. 2U0 and 2i+2. lU. Assumar to Viceroy Vasco Fernandes Cesar de Menezes, 13 January, 1721 in Cod. 13 (SG), f ol . 15. 15. Assumar to Bartolomeu de Sousa Mexia, 9 February, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 200-201v. 16. Assumar to Bartolomeu de Sousa Mexia, 1 June, 1720 in Rau and Silva, Os manuscri tcs , 2,' pp. 269-270. 17. Assumar to Martinho Vieira, 26 February, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), fol. 205. 18. Discurso Historico, fol. 60v. Perplexingly these leaflets vere written in Latin, and so poorly written as to defy translation. The text is as follows: Conversus Joannes ResDexit Petrun, Petrus autem exibit foras , e Hebit a more . 19. Ibid., fols. UU-Uliv. 20. Assumar to Publico Mineiro, PP 3 July, 1720 in Revista do Arquivo 221-222. 21 , Copi a do q . Gn. 1 D. Pedro de Almeida. Codice Costa Matoso, fols. a somewhat altered form in antig a, 2, pp. 3^5-3^9. povo das Minas amotinado pedio as Sr. Portugal, Conde de Assumar, 157-157V. It also appears in Diogo Vas concellos , Historia 22. Discurso Historico, fols. 61+V-75. 23. Ibid., fols. 99v, lOlv, and 108v. 2k. Ibid., fols. 1U9-I5I. 25. Pardon Decree, 10 July, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. 29O-29OV. 26. Cf. Charles R. Boxer, "Some Considerations on Portuguese Colonial Historiography," Proceedings of the Inter nationa.l Colloquium on Lus o-Brazili an Studies ( Nashville ; The Vanderbilt University Press, 1953), p. 175. Boxer holds Assumar "responsible for the destruction of a large part of the old Villa Rica (Ouro Preto) on the Morro da Queimada , . , . " What was destroyed was merely a part of one of the mining camps, Ouro Podre, which was never known as Vila Rica. Sales, Vila Rica do Pilar , p. 8U. Sales refers to the destruction of the entire bairro in particularly emotional terms.

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i+30 27. Discurso historico, f ols . 138v-liiOv . Those not involved in the conspiracy were allowed to return to their homes in Ouro Podre. 28. Felipe dos Santos was born August 11, IJOl in Cascais , Portugal. Certificate of Baptism in Carvalho, Ementario , pp. 162-163. His place in history as well as that of the entire uprising has been greatly mininterpreted . For example, Augusto de Lima Junior, Vila Rica , p. 91, describes Santos as an "unfortunate preacher of the Republic and defender of the interests of the people whose claim to being the first man in the Americas to proclaim the doctrine of the Republic and to deny to the Monarchy the right to rule has been verified before the tribunal of History." It must be noted that Santos' personal views 3,re unknown and republican ideas played absolutely no part in the planning stage of the uprising; nor did the conspirators show any inclination toward the establishment of an independent state. These concepts are attributed to the conspirators by Assumar only long after the event in an effort to justify his own immoderate action. 29. Assumar to : ? 1 , ik July, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG) , fols. 29O-29OV, 30. Assumar to Governor of Bahia, 2 August, 1729 in Cod. 11 (SG), fols. 2U9V-25OV. 31. Assumar to Governor of Rio de Janeiro, 30 August, 1720 in Cod. 11 (SG), f ol . 25932. Assumar to Diogo de Mendonga and Bartoloraeu de Sousa Mexia, 1^+ December, 1720 in Cod. 13 (SG), fols. 11-12. 33. Council Proceedings, 16 August, 1720 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fols. 12i+-12Uv. 3U. Council Proceedings, 17 August, 1720 in Cod. 13 (CMOP), fols. 130-131. 35. Assumar to Joao V, 30 August, 1720 in Cod. k (SG), fols. 891-89^+. 36. Assumar to Council, 22 July, 1720 in Carvalho, Ementario , p. 200 and Assumar to Council, 23 July, 20 August, and 7 November, 1720 in Cod. 6 (CMOP), fols. 25v, 25, and 2k. 37. Royal Order, 2 December, 1720 in Veiga, Ephemerides m ineiras , h, pp. 288-289.

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GLOSSARY ALMOTACEL , fiscal officer selected "by the tovn council, AUXILIARES , militia units, ready reserve. BANDEIRA, expeditions dispatched from Sao Vicente in search of Indians, precious stones and metals. BANDEIRANTE, member of a bandeira. CAMARA , tovn council. CAPITAO DO MATO , bush captain employed in capturing runaway s laves . CAPITAO-MOR, commanding officer of ordenanga regiment vith administrative powers. COMARCA, administrative and judicial district presided over by an ouvidor. EMBOABA, derisive name given by Paulistas to residents of other areas of Brazil and of Portugal. FAZENDA, large estate. FAZENDEIRO, owner of a large estate. FORASTEIRO , synonym for emboaba, also used to describe travelling merchants. FORRO, freedman. GUARDA-MOR , official responsible for distributing mining claims, preventing smuggling, and maintaining law and order. HOMEM BOM, member of the upper class. HOMEM DA GOVERNANQA, member of the ruling class, having served either on the town • counci 1 or as fiscal officer. JUIZ DE FORA, royally appointed judge presiding over a town council . i+31

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1(32 JUIZ DE VINTENA, justice of the peace appointed by the town council . JUIZ ORDIWARIO , municipal judge, elected by the homens bons for one year term. MESTRE DO CAMPO , commanding officer of the regiment of auxiliares . ORDENANQA, militia units, home guard. OUVIDOR, royal magistrate. OUVIDORIA, court of the royal magistrate. PARDO , mulatto. PROCURADOR, procurator, member of town council elected by homens bons . PROPINAS , bonuses granted to members of the town council. QUINTO , royal fifth tax on mineral production. QUILOMBO , group of at least five runaway slaves. REGIMENTO, standing orders. REGISTRO, toll stations. SARGENTO-MOR , second in command of auxiliares and ordenanjas . SESMARIA, land grant. TER50 , military unit of regiment size. TERMO , jurisdiction of town council. VEREADOR, town councillor elected by homens bons.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Manuscript Materials The Arquivo da Curia do Arcebispado de Mariana The Arq_uivo da Curia possesses a very large manuscript collection with extensive holdings for the eighteenth century. Among the manuscripts consulted vith the processes submitted by applicants for admission to the local seminary, petitions for authorization to marry, brotherhood records, records of religious inspections, and correspondence concerning church business. Most of this materia], deals with the post-17^8 period although many contain valuable information for analyzing the pre-1726 years. The Arquivo da Irmandade de Merces e Perdoes One of the few brotherhoods in the parish of Antonio Dias to have preserved its records, Merces e Perdoes is also one of the few brotherhoods whose history and conflicts can be traced through its records. The Arquivo do Museu da Inconf i denci a in Ouro Preto The Museu is in the process of purchasing codices dating from the early part of the eighteenth century and those which were available were consulted. The most valuable of these are the records kept by the notary publics. The Museu also has a collection of private papers belonging to an eighteenth-century businessman. The Arquivo do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional in Ouro Preto Located in the Casa da Baronesa on the main square, this archive contains an excellent collection of eighteenth-century wills and inventories which should be used in conjunction with those wills which appear in the parish registers of burials. This archive is very well organized and the documents are indexed. The Arquivo Parochial de Antonio Dias This archive, located in the parish house, is particularly rich in regard to records of baptisms and burials. Records of baptisms are available for the period after 1710 although there are a few for the pre-1710 years . Records of burials begin in 1713. Marriage records are not available until 1727. This archive is notably lacking in documentation relating to brotherhoods although some, belonging to Nossa Senhora do Rosario, are now under the care of the parish U33

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H JH priest. The records of the 'brotherhood of Sao Francisco de Assis, one of the most important brotherhoods in Vila Rica, are also under the caie of the parish priest although still housed in the church of Sao Francisco. These were not utilized in the preparation of thii hcod vas not founded until I'J^i^. study because the brotherThe Arquivo Parochial de Ouro Preto This archive is very rich in its holdings of parish records. Records of baptisms, marriages, and burials are almost complete for the poEt-]T12 period. It also has a larger collection of brotherhood records than the archive of its sister parish, Antonio Dias. Among the documents available are those of the brotherhoods of Nossa Senhora do Tergo, Bom Jesus (los Pa^sos, Nossa Senhora do Rosario, Santissimo Sacramento, Nosna Senhora do Pilar, Sao Miguel e Almas, and Santo Antonio. The Arquivo Publico Mineiro Located in the state capital, BeD.o Horizonte, the Arquivo Publico Mineiro is one of the richest archival sources of colonial documentation in Brazil. The major collections utilized in this study were the Camara Municipal de Ouro Preto, the Secretaria do GcTverno, the Delegacia Fiscal, and the Delegacia Fiscal Avulso. Extensive use was made of the large number of unorganized and uncatalogued individual documents referred to as a v u 1 s o s . Costa Matoso, Caetano. "Colasam das noticias dos pr.os descobr imen . OS das Minas na America, que fes o Dr. Caetano da Costa Matoso sendo ouvidor g.al do Ouro Preto, de q. tomou posse em Fevr . o de 17^9." This collection of documents is extremely important because it includes accounts of the early history of the mining district written, in many cases, by people who participated in the events they describe. The original of the Codice Costa Matoso belongs to the Biblioteca Municipal de Sao Paulo. I utilized a microfilm copy owned by the Arquivo Publico Mineiro. Published Documents Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro, I876 to date). Boxer, C.R.,ed. "Quatro cartas ineditas de dom Pedro de Almeida, Conde de Assumar e Governador de Minas Gerais (ITI8-I72I)," In Anais d o Congresso Comemorativo do Bicentenario da Trans f e renci a da Sede do Governo do Brasil , edited by the Instituto Historico e Geografico Erasileiro, vol. U, pp. 16I-I72. N.p.: Depart am ento de Imprensa Nacional, I967.

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k35 Documentos Historicos da Biblioteca rTacional do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro, 1928 to date). Mathias , Herculano Gomes, ed. A colegao da Casa dos Contos de Ouro Preto ( documentos avulsos). Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, I966. . Um recenseamento na capitania de Minas Gerais: Vila Rica 180^4 . Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, I969. Rau, Virginia and Maria Fernanda Gomes da Silva, eds . Os manuscritos do Arquivo da Casa de Cadaval respeitantes ao "b r a s i 1 . 2 vols. Coimbra: Coimbra University, 1955-1958. Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro (25 vols., Belo Horizonte, 1896-1938). Revi sta do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro ( Rio de Janeiro, I838 to date). Taunay, Afonso de E. "Documentos ineditos , preciosos da Biblioteca Publica Municipal de Sao Paulo (Colesao Felix P a c h e c o ) ." " Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Sao Paulo hk , 1st part (19^8): 353-391. . "Documentos ineditos sobre as primeiras descobertas do ouro em Minas Gerais." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Sao Paulo kk , 1st part (19^8): 321-352. Veiga, Jose Pedro Xavier da. Ephemerides minei ras ,l66U-l89T . k vols. Ouro Preto: Imprensa Official do Estado de Minas Gerais, 1897Coeval or Near Contemporaneous Works Antonil, Andre Joao Cpseud. of Joao Antonio AndreoniH. Cultura e opulencia do Brasil . 1711. Reprint. Roteiros do Brasil, vol. 2. Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1967. Au reo throno episcopal, collocado nas Minas do Ouro . 17^+9. Facsimilie edition. In Residues s ei s c ent i s t as em Minas, Affonso Arinos, 2, pp. 335-592. Belo Horizonte: Centro de Estudos Mineiras, I967. Baptisterio, e ceremonial dos Sacramentos da Sancta Madre Igre.ja, emendado, e acrescentado em muitas cousas nesta ultima impressao conforme o Cathecismo & Ritual Romano. Coimbra: Officina de Luis Seco Ferreira, 1730. Breve recopilacam e summario das gragas e indulsenci as , concedidas aos confrades da Virgem Kossa Senhora do Rosario . Lisbon: Na Officina de Antonio Pedrozo Galrao, 1721.

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k36 Brito, Francisco Tavares de . "itinerario geografico de Rio de Janeiro ate as Minas do Ouro . " Re vista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 230 (March-June, I956) ii28-l+l+l. Coelho, Jose Joao Teixeira. "istruc^ao para o governo da capitania de Minas Gerais ( IT80 ) . " Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 15 ( I852 ) : 25T-i+78 . Costa, Claudio Manuel da. Museu da Inconf i dene i a "Vila Rica, Poem a." Anuario do h (1955-1957) : 113-197. CCouto, Jose Vieira.D " Consi deragoes sobre as duas classes importantes de povoadores da capitania de Minas Gerais." Re vista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 2 5 11862): lt21-i+29. Couto, Jose Vieira. "Memoria sobre as minas da capitania de Minas Gerai s C I8OI D . " Revista do Arguivo Publico Mineiro 10 (1905): 63-166. . Memoria sobre a capitania de Minas Gerais, seu territorio, clima, e produc^oes metalicas: sobre a necessidade de se restabelecer e animar a minerajao decadente do Brasil; sobre o commercio e exportagao dos metaes e interesses regios." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 11 (187I): 289-336. "Descobrimento de Minas Gerais Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 2U (1862): 5-11^. Descripgao dos sertoes de Minas, despovoagao, suas causas e meios de os fazer florentes." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 25 (1862) : U30-i+35. ' Descrigao geographica, topographica , historica e politica da capitania das Minas Gerais: seu descobrimento, estado civil, politico e das rendas reaes [II78ID . " Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 71 , part 1 (1908) : 117-197. "Diario da Jornada, que fes o Ex. mo Senhor Dom Pedro desde o Rio de Janeiro athe a Cid.e de Sao Paulo e desta athe as Minas anno de 1717." Revista do Servigo do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional 3 (1939): 283-29^. Eschwege, Wilhelm Ludwig von. "Pluto Bras ili ens is . " In Collectanea de scientistas extrangeiros , edited and translated by Rudolfo Jacob. vol. 2. Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Official, 1930. Ferreira, Luis Gomes. trat ados . Lisbon: Senhor Patriarcha, Erario mineral dividido em doze Por Miguel Rodrigues , Impressor do 1735.

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^37 Fonseca, Padre Manuel da. "Levantamento em Minas Gerais." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 3 (l8i+l): 261-281. Gandavo, Pero Magalhaes de . Histor'i'a 'da 'p'r'oVin'cra Sancta Cruz a que vulgai'ament e chamamos Brasil . 1576. Facsimilie edition. Nev York: The Cortes Society, 1922. Leme , Pedro Taques de Almeida Paes. Informagao sobre as Minas de S. Paulo. A expulsao dos Jesuitas do Collegio de S. Paulo 1772 Reprint. Sao Paulo: Editora Companhia Melhorament os de Sao Paulo, n.d. No"bi li archi a Paulistana historica e genealogica . Biblioteca Historica Paulista, vol. k. 3 vols. Sao Paulo: Comissao do IV centenario da Cidade de Sao Paulo, 195h. Machado, Simao Ferreira. Triunfo euchari s ti co . 173^+. Facsimilie edition. In Residuos s ei s c enti s tas em Minas , Affonso Arinos , 1, pp. 131-283. Belo Horizonte: Centro de Estudos Mineiros, I967. Mawe , John. "Viagens ao interior do Brasil part i cularment e aos districtos do ouro e do diamante, em I809-I8IO." In Collectanea de scientistas ext rangei ros , edited and translated by Rudolfo Jacob. vol. 1. Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Official, 1930 necessario para e ndes , Jose Antonio. Governo de mineiros mui necessario OS que vivem distantes de professores seis, oito, dez, mais legoas , padecendo por esta cauza os seus domestic escravos . Lisbon: Na Officina de Antonio Rodria-ues Galhardo, 1770. .0 Rodrigues CMiranda, Joao Cardoso de . 1 Prodigiosa lagoa descuberta nas Congohhas das Minas do Sahara, que tem curado a varias pessoas dos achaques que nesta relagao se expoem . 17^9. Reprint. Biblioteca Luso-Bras i lei ra de Historia de Medicina, vol. 1. Coimbra: Coimbra University, 1925Nova e curiosa relajao de hum abuso emendado , ou evidencias de razao; expostas a favor dos homens pretos em hum dialogo entre hum letrado, e hum mineiro." In Anais do Congresso Comemorativo do Bicentenario da Trans ferencia da Sede do Governo do Brasil, edited by the Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro, vol. 3, pp. 171-186. Lisbon: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, I967. Perdigao, Jose Rabelo. "Noticia terceira pratica que da ao R. Pe . Diogo Scares o mestre do campo Jose Rabelo Perdigao Sobre os primeiros descobriment os das Minas do Ouro." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico Brasileiro 69 (1908): 275-281.

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1*38 Pizarro e Araujo, Jose de Sousa Azevedo. Meiii6rias historica l do, Rio de Janeiro. Biblioteca Popular Brasileira, vol. J. 10 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, igkG. CRocha, Jose Joaquim da.l "Memoria historica da capitania de Minas Gerais 2 (1897): J^25-51T. Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro Rocha Pita, Sebastiao da. Historia da America Portugue sa 1730. Reprint. Bahia: Imprensa Oficial da Bahia, 1950. Santa Maria, Frey Agostinho de. S antuario Mariano e hlstor ico das imagens milagrosas de Nossa Senhora, e das EllS,£Il°^amente apparecidas que se venerao em todo o BJF.pado do Rio de Janeiro e Mina em oceano todas as il has do das milagrosamente apparecidas, em graga dos £I^g^ "-dores &^ d os devotos da mesma Senhora . 10 vols Lisbon: Antonio Pedrozo Galrao, 1707^1723. Southey, Robert. ' History of Braz il . 3 vols. London: man. Durst, Rees , Orme , and Brown, I8IO-I819. Vandelli, Domingos. "Sobre as minas do ouro do Brazil." An ais da Biblioteca Nacional 20 (I898): 266-278. LongOther Works Alper, Edward A. The East Africa Slave Trade Association of Tanzania, no. 3"^ Nairobi : Publishing House, I967, Historical East Africa Barros, Gilberto Leite de. A cidade e o planalto Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, I967. 2 vols Bernstein, Harry. "The Lisbon Juiz do Povo and the Independence of Brazil, 1750-1822: An Essay on Lus o-Brazilian Populism." In Conflict & Continuity in Brazilian Society, edited by Henry H. Keith and S.F. Edwards, pp. 191-226. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1969. Birmingham, David. Trade and Conflict in Angola, the Mbundu _and Their Nei ghbors Under the Influence of the Portugue se IV83-I79O . Oxford: Clarendon Press , I966. ' Boxer, C.R. The University of California Press, I96U Golden Age of Brazil: 1695-1750 . Berkeley Some Consideration on Portuguese Colonial Historiography." In Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Luso-Braz i li an Studies, pp. 169-180. Nashville: The Vanderbilt University Press, 1953.

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h39 Cardozo, Manoel. "Alguns subsidies para a hlstoria da cobranga do quinto na capitania de Minas Gerais ate 1735." In Primeiro Con/^resso da Expansao Portuguesa no Mundo . pp. 2U6-29I. Lisbon: Ministerio das Colonias, 1937. • "The Brazilian Gold Rush." The Americas 3 (October, 291+6): 137-l60. -^^ The Collection of the Royal Fifth in Brazil, l6951709." Hispanic American Historical Review 20 no. 3 (August, 191^0): 359-379. "The Guerra dos Emboabas , Civil War in Minas G erais , 1708-1709." Hispanic American Historical Reviev 22, no. 3 (August, 191*2): Ii70-lt92 "The Last Adventure of Fernao Dias Pais ( I67I+-I68I ) . " Hispanic American Historical Reviev k (November 191+6)li67hl9. . y 1 Carneiro^ Edison. "O negro em Minas Gerais." In Segundo seminar io de estudos mineiros ,pp. 5-22, Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, n.d. Carrato, Jose Ferreira. Igre.la, iluminismo e escolas mineira s coloniais . Brasiliana, vol. 331*. Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, I968. • As Minas Gerais e os primordios do Caraca . Brasiliana, Vol. 317Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1963. Carvalho, Daniel de . "Formagao historica das Minas Gerais." In Primeiro seminario de estudos mineiros . pp. 7-30. Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1957. Carvalho, Feu de. Ementario da historia de Minas; Felipe dos gantos Freire na sedJQao de Vila Riea-1720 . Belo Horizonte: Edigoes Historicos, 1930?. Curtin, Philip A. The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census . Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, I969. Davidson, Basil. Black Mother: The Years of the African Slave Trade_. Boston: Little, Brovn and Company, I96I. and F.K. Buah. The Grovth of Af ri can Ci vi li s at i nn • A History of West Africa, IOOO-I8OO . 2nd ed. rev. London Longmans , I969 . Derby, Orville A, "Os primeiros des cobrimentos de ouro em Minas Gerais." Revista do Institute Historico e Geografico de Sao Paulo 5 (l899-1900): 2liO-279.

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1*1*0 Diniz, Silvio Gabriel. Pesquisando a historia de Fitangui . Belo Horizonte: n.p. , I965. '. . ...."Primeiras freguezias nas Minas Gerais." Revista • do Institute Historio e Geografico de Minas Geyais 8 (1961): 1T3-1B3. Dornas Filho, Joao. "O ouro das Gerais." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos 2 ( July , 1958 ) : l68-TFB~^ ouro das Gerais e a civilizagao da capitania Brasiliana, vol. 293. Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1957. Ferrand, Paul, L'or a Minas Gerais 2 vols Belo Horizonte Imprensa Official, 1913, Franco, Francisco de Assis Carvalho. Di ci onario de bandeirantes e sertanistas do Bras il: seculos XVI-XVIIXVIII . Sao Paulo : Comissao do IV Centenario da Cidade de Sao Paulo, 195^. . "Paulistas e Emboabas -priraeiros povoadores de MinasManuel Nunes Viana-governo paci f i cador . " In Anais do IV Congresso de Historia Nacional ., vol. 3, pp. 63-168. Rio de Janeiro: DeiDartamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1950. Freitas , Afonso A. de "Emboaba. " Revista do Arquivo Municipal (Sao Paulo) l(june, 193^): 35-^1 Fyfe, Christopher. "West African Trade, A.D. IOOO-I8OO." In A Th ousand Years of West African History , edited by J.F. Ade Ajaye and Ian Epsie, pp.233-2i4T. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1967. Golgher, Isaias. Guerra dos Emboabas : a primeira guerra civil nas Americas. Belo Horizonte: Editora Itatiaia, 19 56 . ' "Impli cajoes sociologicas da capitagao: algumas Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos observagoes. lU(july, 1962): 155-158. . "0 negro e a mineragao em Minas Gerais." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos l8(January, I965): 133-150. Goulart , Mauricio. Escravidao africana no Brasil: das origens a extingao do trafico . 2nd ed. Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1950. Griffith, S.V. Alluvial Prospecting and Mining . 2nd ed. rev. Oxford: Pergamon Press , I96O .

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kkl Holanda, Sergio Buarque de . Visao do Paraiso. Brasiliana, vol. 333. 2nd ed. Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1969. Horta, Cid Rebelo. "Familias governamentais de Minas Gerais." In Segundo seminario de estiidos mineirp^ , pp. I+3-91. Belo Horizonte: Univers i dade de Minas Gerais, n.d. Lange, Francisco Curt. "As dangas coletivas publicas no periodo colonial brasileiro e as dangas das corporagoes de oficios em Minas Gerais." BaT-roco 1(1969): 15-62. "La musica em Vila Rica (Minas Gerais, Siglo XVIII.)" Separata de la Revista Musical Chilena 102-10 3(1967-1968) Lemos, Padre Affonso Henriques de Figueiredo. "Monographia da freguezia da Cachoeira do Campo." Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro 13(l908): 77-111. Lima Junior ,Augus to de . A capitania das Minas Gerais . 2nd ed, Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Zelio Valverde, 19^+3. Cronica militar . Belo Horizonte: Private edition. i960, "Mineiros e paulistas de origem judaica." Revist; do Institute Historico e Geografico de Minas Gerais 5 (1958): 1I+5-I5U. . As primeiras vilas do ouro . Belo Horizonte: Private edition, I962 . ' Vila Rica do Ouro Preto: sintese historica e descritiva. Belo Horizonte: Private edition, 1957. Lopes, Francisco Antonii 'Camara e cadeia de Vila Rica." Anuario do Museu da Inconf i dene i a 1 (1952): 103-251. • Os palacios de Vila Rica . Belo Horizonte: n.P-j 1955 Lyden, Charles J. The Gold Placers of Montana . Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology, Memoir No. 26. Butte: Montana School of Mines, I9U8. Lyra, A. Tavares de . Organisagao politica e adminis trat i va do Brasil. B rasiliana, vol, 202. Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, I9UI. Macedo, Jorge de . A situagao economica no tempo de Pombalalguns aspectos. Porto: Livraria Portugalia, 1951. Machado, Lourival Gomes. "O barroco em Minas Gerais." In Primeiro seminario de estudos mineiros, pp. U5-57. Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1957.

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kk2 Machado , Lourlval Gomes. Bar'roco Mineiro . Sao Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, I969. Machado Filho, Aires de Mata. "O folclore em Minas Gerais." In Segundo seminario de estud'os mrneiros , pp. 209-22U. Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, n.d. • negro e o garimpo em Minas Gerais. 2nd e d . Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilizagao Brasileira, 196h. Magalhaes , Basilio de. Expansao geogra"Dhic'a do Brasil colonial . Brasiliana, vol. i+ 5 . Sao Paulo: Coiapanhia Editora Nacional, 1935. Malheiros , Agostinho Marques Perdigao. ' A 'e'scravidao no Brasil: e'n's'aio' historico-.iuridi co-social. 2 vols. Sao Paulo: Edigoes Cultura, I96U. Menezes , Furtado de. Clero mineiro . 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Renato Americano, 1933-1936. Morals, Geraldo Dutra de . Historia de Conce i gao do Mato Dent ro . Biblioteca Mineira de Cultura, vol.. 2.k . Belo Horizonte: n.p., 19^2. Murdock, George Peter. Africa: Its Peoples and Their Cultural Stock . New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959Oliveira , Oscar de . Os dizimos ecles ias t i cos do Brasil nos periodos da colonia e do imperio . Estudos, vol. 3. Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, 196k. Omega, Nelso. A cidade colonial. Colegao Documentos Brasileiros, "Vol. 110. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio Editora, I96I. Paula, Floriano Peixoto de. "Vilas de Minas Gerais no periodo colonial." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Poll tic OS 19 (July, 1965): 2T5-28U. Pinto, Moreira. "Ouro Preto." Revista do Arquivo Publico Mineiro ll(l906) : 691-71^. Prado Junior, Caio. Formagao do Brasil contemporaneo : colonia, Tth ed. Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, I963. ________ Historia economica do Brasil . 9th ed. Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1965. Ramos, Arthur. "As culturas negras do Brasil." Revista do Arquivo Municipal de Sao Paulo 25 (1936): lli+-128. Reis Filho, Nestor Goulart . Evolugao urhana do Brasil: l$0a-1720 . Sao Paulo: Livraria Pioneira Editora, I968.

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1+1+3 Rezende, Oswaldo. GenealoRJa de t radl cionaj s fainilias de Minas . Sao Paulo: Enpresa Grafica da Revista dos Tribunals , 1969 • Rodney, Walter. West Africa and' the Atlantic Slave Trade . Historical Association of Tanzania, no. 2. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, I969. Ryder, A.F.C. "Portuguese and Dutch in West Africa Before 1800." In A Thousand Years of West African His tory , edited by J.F. Ade Ajayi and Ian Epsie, pp. 212-231. Ibadan : Ibadan University Press, 1967. Salles , Fritz Teixeira. Associagaes religiosas no ciclo doouro. Estudos , vol. 1. Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, I963. Vila Rica do Pilar: um roteiro de Ouro Preto. Belo Horizonte: Editora Itatiaia Ltd.^ 1965^ Senna, Nelson de . "Origem da cidade; installasao da muni cipali dade . " Bi -Cent enar i o de Ouro Preto ,1711-1911 • Belo Horizonte: Imp/^ensa Oficial, n.d. Simonsen, Roberto C. Historia economica do Brasil (l^OO1820 ) . 2nd ed. Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1969. Sousa, Washington A. Peluso de . "A estrutura s ocio-economi ca do ciclo de ouro." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos 19(July, 1965): 193-222. Suannes , S. Os emboabas . Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1962. Taunay, Afonso de A. "Um cimelio de Felix Pacheco." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Minas Gerais 3 {191+8): 1+3-1+5. . Historia geral das bandeiras paulistas. 11 vols. Sao Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1921+-1950. "Subsidios para a historia do trafico africana no Brasil colonial." In Anais do Terceiro Congresso de Historia Nacional , vol. 3, pp. 5I8-676. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, I9I+I. Teixeira, Edelweiss. "Roga Grande e o povoamento de Rio das Velhas." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Minas Gerais 2(191+6): 111+-121.

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kkk Torres, Joao Camillo de Oliveira. Historia de Minas Gerais . 5 vols. Belo Horizonte: Difusao Pan-Americana do Livro, n . d . Trindade, Raimundo, Arquidiocese de Mariana:' subsidios para sua historia . 2nd ed. 2 vols. Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Official, 1953. _________ "igreja das Merces de Ouro Preto documentos do seu arquivo. " Revista do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico NacJonal lU(l959): l6l-282. ______ "A igreja de Sao Jose, em Ouro Preto." Revista do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional 13(1956): 109-215. . "Ourives de Minas Gerais nos seculos XVIII e XIX," Revista do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional 12 (1953): 109-1^+9. ' Sao Francisco de Assis de Ouro Preto . Publicagoes da Diretoria do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional. no. 17. Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio de Educacjao e Saude, 1951. Vasconcellos, Diogo de. Historia antiga de Minas Gerais . 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 19^8'_ \ . ' Historia do bispado de Marianna . Biblioteca Mineira de Cultura. Belo Horizonte: Edigoes Apollo, 1935Historia media de Minas Gerais. Rio de Janeiro Imprensa Nacional, 19^8. "As obras de arte." Bi-Centenari o de Ouro Preto: I7II-I9II. Memoria historica . Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Official, n.d. Vasconcellos, Salomao de . "Na ampulheta da historia mineira." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Minas • Gerais 5(1958): 137-1^^. "Como nasceu Ouro Preto sua formagao cadastral desde 1712." Revista do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional 12(1953) : 171-232. ."Divagagoes em torno da descoberta do ouro nas Minas Gerais." Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico de Minas Gerais 9(l962): 153-162. ."Oficios mecanicos em Vila Rica durante o seculo XVIil." Revista do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional 1+(19^0): 33I-36Q.

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kk5 Vasconcellos , Salomao de . . "Origem e f undagao do Sabara." Revista do Institute Historico e Geopiraf i co de Minas Gerais 2(19^*6): IY8-I88. "Os primeiros aforamentos e os primeiros ranches de Ouro Pi-eto. " Kevista do Patrimonio Historico e Artistico Nacional 5(l9^l): 2^0-257Vasconcellos, Sylvio de . "Formagao urbana do arraial do Tejuco." R evista do Patrimonio' Historico e Artistico rracional 1^4(1959) : 121-13^^. Minei ri da'de :' ensaio de c ar'ac't eri zagao .' B e 1 o Horizonte: Imprensa Oficial, I968 Vila Rica. Formagao e des en volvimento-res i dene ias Rio de Janeiro: Institute Nacional do Livro, 1956 Verger, Pierre. Bahia and the West Coast Trade ( 15'^9-l851 ) . Ibadan(?): Ibadan University Press, 196^+. Vianna, Kelio. "A economia mineira no seculo XVIII." In P rimeiro serainario de estudos mineiros , pp. 79-87Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Hinas Gerais, 1957Willems, Emilio. "Social Differentiation in Colonial Brazil." Comparative Studies in Society and History 12(january, 1970) : 31-^4 9. Zemella, Mafalda P. abas t ecimento da capitania das Minas Gerais no seculo XVIII . University of Sao Paulo, Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciencias e Letras, Bull. II8. Sao Paulo: University of Sao Pauloi 1951Zenha, Edmundo. municipio no Brasil: 1532-17QO. Sao Paulo: Institute Progresso Editorial, 19^8(?).

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BIOGi'.AFIlICAL SKETCH Donald. Ramos was "born July 12, Massachusetts. The son of Francisco Maria Conceigao Ramos, he vas raised and attended public schools in New B attended the University of Massachus Laude in 196h with Honors in History Mr. Ramos served as a personnel offi Army. Upon completion of his active attended the University of Floi'ida. 1966-1967 he held a NDEA Title VI Fe 1968 a University of Florida Fellows 1969 a Teaching Assist an tship. In 1 awarded a Foreign Area Fellowship to in Brazil for his dissertation. Und grant Mr. Ramos was a.ble to spend se Brazil, returning in February, 1971Instructor of History at The Clevela September, 1971He is married to t Rivard and they have one child, Moni 19^2 in New Bedford, Nascimento Ramos and in a bilingual home edford. Mr. Ramos etts , graduating Cum From 196^4 to I966 cer in the United States duty commitment , he During the academic year llowship; during I967ip; and during I968969, Mr. Ramos was conduct field research er the auspices of this venteen months in Mr. Ramos was appointed nd State University in he former Patricia Eva ca Elizabeth Ramos. 1+U6

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Neill W. Macaulay, Chai Associate Professor of I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. (l„.
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