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Deliberative and critical ethical questions and their relationship to the value dimension of the decisionmaking process in educational administration

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Title:
Deliberative and critical ethical questions and their relationship to the value dimension of the decisionmaking process in educational administration
Creator:
Shaffer, Edward O. ( Edward Otto ), 1942- ( Dissertant )
Jordan, K. Forbis ( Thesis advisor )
Kinbrough, Ralph E. ( Reviewer )
Lewis, Arthur J. ( Reviewer )
Place of Publication:
Gainesville, Fla.
Publisher:
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
1975
Language:
English
Physical Description:
x, 225 leaves ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Administrator education ( jstor )
Educational administration ( jstor )
Ethics ( jstor )
Existentialism ( jstor )
Happiness ( jstor )
Morality ( jstor )
Pleasure ( jstor )
Professional ethics ( jstor )
Schools ( jstor )
Support personnel ( jstor )
Decision making -- Moral and ethical aspects ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- Educational Administration and Supervision -- UF
Educational Administration and Supervision thesis Ph. D
School management and organization -- Decision making ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Abstract:
The purpose of this study was to develop deliberative and critical ethical questions which could serve as guidelines in the administrative decision making process. A review of the literature related to the value dimension of decision making in educational administration revealed an inadequate concern for ethics as an applied science capable of helping practicing school administrators make morally defensible decisions. In addition, the profession of educational administration was criticized for its lack of a distinctive value framework and its reliance upon published codes to insure ethical valuing by administrators. This study was undertaken to help lessen these problems by the identification of critical ethical questions, value concepts, and decision making methods appropriate to educational administration. The study provided an analysis of four types of ethical valuing— act-teleological , rule-teleological , act-deontological , and rule-deontological— by an explication of selected leading ethical systems of thought. Included in the discussion were the ethical theories of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Immanuel Kant, Aristotle, and leading existentialists. The deliberative and critical ethical questions which related to the administrative decision making process were then examined in relation to identified critical task areas in educational administration. The selected task areas included curriculum and instruction, pupil personnel services, personnel development and administration, finance and fiscal management, and school and community relations. The study also provided a discussion of the importance of developing an ethical framework for both individual administrators and the profession as a body. A scaling of values was suggested as an important task for each administrator in attempting to cope with commonly met problems of school administration. Strategies for developing a hierarchy of values were suggested in the study. In addition, the critical elements for the development of a systematic value framework for the profession were identified. The major value concepts suggested for educational administration included beneficence, dignity and duty, equity, distributive justice, and probity. Moral autonomy was also suggested as important for the development of professionals. The complementary elements deemed as the most logical , consistent, comprehensive, and workable positions for educational administration ethics included libertarianism, act-deontology, and a partial form of situationism. The adoption of these elements in an ethical framework for educational administration would not involve the abandonment of the "easy" ethics now embodied in professional codes, but it would mean that the rules for ethical conduct and decision making would be treated as summative and not constitutive in nature. The most important observation was that administrators have tended to legitimize their ethical decisions by reference to the consideration of predicted consequences of an action. While this is an important consideration in formulating and executing policy decisions, the position neglects the importance of intentions and motives. The assumption of an act-deontological perspective by administrators would, in large measure, help to overcome the weaknesses associated with only viewing the consequences of an action as the criterion for evaluating moral decisions. Implications for the training of professional administrators were stated in the study, and a course in ethical decision making was suggested as a possible method for helping to insure the importance of ethical valuing by the leaders in the profession.
Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1975.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Edward O. Shaffer.

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University of Florida
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Copyright [name of dissertation author]. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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DELIBERATIVE
TO


AniD CRITICAL ETHICAL QUESTIO::S ANUD THEIR RELATI IHIP
THE VALUE DIMENSIO;I OF THE DECISIOtlNAKIING
PROCESS IIN EDUCATIONAL ADMINilISTRATIONI


By

Edward 0. Shaffer


A DISSERTATIOII PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEiGiEE OF DOCTOR OF PHIlLrllrF.J(








UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA






































Copyright by
Edward 0. Shaffer
1975




































TO MY SONS


EDWARD, DAVID, AND PHILIP

















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


The writer would like to express his sincere gratitude to Dr.

K. Forbis Jordan and Dr. Ralph B. Kimbrough for their encouragement

and support of this study. In addition, the writer would like to

acknowledge Dr. Arthur J. Lewis for serving as a member of both his

specialist and doctoral committees. A special note of thanks is given

to Dr. Jordan who served not only as the committee chairman, but also

as a father confessor, boss, critic, expeditor, teacher, and friend.

The writer would also like to acknowledge Mrs. Elaine Buckley for

typing the manuscript and Mr. William Sparkman for his inspiration dur-

ing the writing phase of the study, and he would like to recognize the

Educational Resource Management Specialists group with which he was

associated for their comradeship and competition.

The most special forms of recognition and acknowledgment are

extended to the writer's wife Bonnie for her unfailing support and

love during the periods of separation due to the demands of the course

work and the writing of the dissertation. She not only maintained the

home and care of the children, but held a full-time position as music

teacher in an elementary school in Tampa, while the writer sequestered

himself in Gainesville. Therefore, this study is dedicated to Bonnie

Jean Shaffer for her pioneer spirit and determination, because without

her this study would not exist.




















TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .. .. .. .. .. ... . .. .. . ... iv

ABSTRACT. .. .. .. .. . .. .... .. .. .. .viii

CHAPTER

I INTRODUCTION. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. . 1

The Scope of Ethics. ... ... .. .. .. 1
Ethics and the Decisionmaking Process. .. .. 3

Definitions of Decisionmaking . .. .. 3
Decisionmaking and Moral Valuing. .. .. 5

Bases of Valuing in Educational Administration . 6

Technical Valuing .. ... .. .. .. 7
Political Valuing .. .. . ... .. .. 9
Scientific Valuing. . ... .. .. ... 11
Ethical Valuing . .... .. .. .. .. 12

The Importance of a Philosophic Orientation. .. 14
The Need for a Value Framework in Educational
Administration .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16
The Problem. .. .. .. ... ... .. .. 18

Statement of the Problem. . ... .. .. 18
Delimitations . .... .. .. .. .. 19
Limitations .. ... . .... ... 19
-Justification for the Study ... .. .. 20

Definition of Terms. .. ... .. .. .. .. 29
Procedures .. .. ... .. . ... ... 32
Organization of the Study... .. .. . ... 33

II NORMATIVE ETHICAL SYSTEMS ... .. .. .. .. .. 34

Elements of a Normative Theory . ... .. .. 34

Criteria for Assaying Normative Ethical
Theories. . ... ... .... .. 35
A Typology of Normative Ethics. ... .. 39















Page

Utilitarian Ethics ...; .. . .. ... 44

The Principle of Utility. . .. .. .. .. 44
Pleasures and Pains ... .. . ... .. 46
Actions and Consequences. .. .. ... . 49
Morals and Legislation. .....5
Mill's Corrections of Utilitarianism .. 56
Sunrnary of Utilitarian Ethics . ... .- . 61

Deweyan Ethics .. ... .. .. . .. .. .. 65

Theory of Valuation ..... .. ....65
The Dynamic Force of Habit. ..... ..69
The Place of Impulse in Conduct .. ;. . 72
The Place of Intelligence in Conduct. .. 73
Sumrmary of Deweyan Ethics .. .. .; ... 77

K~antian Ethics . .. .. ..... . ... 80

The Roots of Morality . .. .. ... .. 80
The Concept of Duty .. .. .. .. . 83
A Realm of Ends ... .. ... . .. .. 87
The Nature of Justice .. .. .. ;.. 89
Summary of Kantian Ethics .. ... .. 93

Aristotelian Ethics. .. ... ... .. .. 96

Aristotle's Virtues and Vices .. . ... 96
The Nature of Justice .. .. .. .. .. 101
Responsibility for Decisions and Actions. . 106
Summary of Aristotelian Ethics. .. ... 108

Existentialist Ethics. . .. .. . .. 111

The Meaning of Existentialism .. .. . 111
Existence and Freedom . .. .. .. . .. 113
Freedom, Responsibility, and Guilt. ... .. 116
Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Definitions
of Existence'. .. . .. .; . . .. 120
Source of Moral Values. .. . . .. .. 122
Summary of Existentialist Ethics. .. . .. 126.

III ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS AND ETHICAL DECISIONS.'T .. .. 129

Critical Tasks and Ethical Valuing . .. . 129
Critical Task Areas and Ethical Questions. . .. 131

Curriculum and Instruction. .. .. . .. 131
Pupil Personnel Service . .. .. . 141
Personnel Development and Administration. . 148
Finance and Fiscal Management .. . .. 159
School and Commnunity Relations. . . . 172















Page

Moral Autonomy in an Organizational Setting .. 180

IV DEVELOPING AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK. . ..... .. .. 184

Developing an Integrated Value System .. .. 184

The Nature of Values ... .. .. .. 184
Sources of Ethical Values. .. .. .. .. 188
Strategies for Developing a Scale of Values. 191

Developing a Value Framework for Educational
Administration. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 197

Normative Decisionmaking Methods . .. .. 197
Moral Assessments of Actions and Decisions 201

V SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. .. .. ... .. ... .. 211

Sumpmary . . . . . . . . . . 211
Implications for Professional Training. . ... 213
Conclusions .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 222
Recommendations . .... .. .. .. ... 223

General Recommendations. .. .. .. .. 223
Recommendations for Further Study. . ... 224

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. ... .. .. .. ... .. .. .. 225













Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of
the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DELIBERATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO THE VALUE DIMENSION OF THE
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IN EDUCATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION


by
Edward 0. Shaffer

June, 1975

Chairman: K. Forbis Jordan
Major Department: Educational Administration

The purpose of this study was to develop deliberative and criti-

cal ethical questions which could serve as guidelines in the adminis-

trative decisionmaking process. A review of the literature related to

the value dimension of decisionmaking in educational administration

revealed an inadequate concern for ethics as an applied science capable

of helping practicing school administrators make morally defensible

decisions. In addition, the profession of educational administration

was criticized for its lack of a distinctive value framework and its

reliance upon published codes to insure ethical valuing by administra-

tors. This study was undertaken to help lessen these problems by the

identification of critical ethical questions, value concepts, and

decisionmaking methods appropriate to educational administration.

The study provided an analysis of four types of ethical valuing--

act-teleological, rule-teleological, act-deontological, and rule-

deontological--by an explication of selected leading ethical systems

of thought. Included in the discussion were the ethical theories of


viii














Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Immanuel Kant, Aristotle,

and leading existentialists. The deliberative and critical ethical

questions which related to the administrative decisionmaking process
were then examined in relation to identified critical task areas in

educational administration. The selected task areas included curricu-

lum and instruction, pupil personnel services, personnel development

and administration, finance and fiscal management, and school and com-

munity relations.

The study also provided a discussion of the importance of develop-

ing an ethical framework for both individual administrators and the

profession as a body. A scaling of values was suggested as an import-

ant task for each administrator in attempting to cope with commonly

miet problems of school administration. Strategies for developing a

hierarchy of values were suggested in the study. In addition, the

critical elements for the development of a systematic value framework

for the profession were identified. The major value concepts suggested

for educational administration included beneficence, dignity and

duty, equity, distributive justice, and probity. Moral autonomy was

also suggested as important for the development of professionals.

The complementary elements deemed as the most logical, consistent,

comprehensive, and workable positions for educational administration

ethics included libertarianism, act-deontology, and a partial form

of situationism.

The adoption of these elements in an ethical framework for educa-

tional administration would not involve the abandonment of the "easy"

ethics now embodied in professional codes, but it would mean that the













rules for ethical conduct and decisionmaking would be treated as sum-

mative and not constitutive in nature.

The most important observation was that administrators have tended

to legitimize their ethical decisions by reference to the consideration

of predicted consequences of an action. While this is an important

consideration in formulating and executing policy decisions, the posi-

tion neglects the importance of intentions and motives. The assumption

of an act-deontological perspective by administrators would, in large

measure, help to overcome the weaknesses associated with only viewing

the consequences of an action as the criterion for evaluating moral

decisions. Implications for the training of professional administra-

tors wrere stated in the study, and a course in ethical decisionmaking

was suggested as a possible method for helping to insure the importance

of ethical valuing by the leaders in the profession.
















CHAPTER -I


INTRODUCTION


The Scope of Ethics

Ethics is commonly viewed as the study of human conduct. The

concern is with human behavior which is susceptible to the ascriptives

"right" and "wrong." Lillie has defined ethics as a "science which

judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad, or in

some similar way."1 Higgins has defined ethics as a philosophical

science which "establishes the absolutely necessary forms of free acts

whose realization in practice truly makes us men."2

The study of ethics exists at two levels of thought and under-

standing. Russell outlined one dimension of ethics when he wrote:

The study of ethics is perhaps most commonly con-
ceived as being concerned with the questions "W~hat
sort of actions ought men to perform?" and "What
sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is con-
ceived, that is to say, as dealing with human con-
duct, and as deciding what is virtuous and what
vicious among the kinds of conduct between which,
in practice, people are called upon to choose

.1William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, 3rd ed. (London:
Methuen & Co., 1955, University Paperbacks, 1961), pp. 1-2.

2Thomas J. Higgins, S. J., Basic Ethics (Milwaukee, Wisconsin:
Bruce Publishing, 1968), p. 7.

3Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," in Readings i'n
Ethical Theory, ed. Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers (New York:
Appl eton-Century-Crofts 1970), p. 3.













At this level of thought the subject matter of ethics is interpersonal

behavior. However, ethicists usually do not mean all interpersonal

behavior, but only that which can be described as moral or immoral.

The scope of ethics at the level described by Russell can be termed

normative. At this level ethics seeks to examine assertations about

human conduct which affect the general well-being of another person.

A second dimension of ethics deals with the theoretical constructs

which undergird the normative assertions. The scope of ethics at this

level is concerned with such questions as, "What do we mean by our

ethical terms such as 'good,' 'ought,' 'right,' and so forth?" While

ethics is concerned with assertions about human conduct, it also

investigates those "assertions about that property of things which is

noted by the term 'good,' and the converse property denoted by the

term 'bad.'" According to Fagothery, "current terminology distinguishes

between normative ethics, or the setting up of a code of rules for moral

living, and metaethics, or the critical examination of the concepts,

judgments, and reasoning processes in ethics."5

In summary, the modes of ethical thought occur at two distinct

levels--normative ethics and metaethics. Normative ethics is concerned

with the justification of particular moral judgments. At this level

we seek to justify a particular judgment by appealing to "general norma-

tive principles. Metaethics, on the other hand, goes beyond this level

with its deliberate analysis of those principles which support our

beliefs.


--- -4GUG~,-iJe `Edwifi~-d Moore, 'The Indefinability of Good," in-Readings-.-
in Ethical Theory, ibid., p. 53.

5Austi'n Fagothery, S. J., Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and
Practice, 5th ed. (Saint Louis, Missouri: C. V. Mosby, 1972), p. 5.















Ethics and the Decisionmaking Process

Decisionmaking is often considered to consist of problem solving,

or planning, or organizing, and is sometimes extended to include all

aspects of thinking and acting. However, the literature in educational

and business administration has stressed choice making as the key fea-

ture. Choice may be exercised in a simple situation, as in the selec-

tion of a shirt from a well stocked department store, or it may require

a complicated decision about a situation that involves conflicting

goals and values, as in the collective bargaining process with teacher

organizations. Although the consequences of these decisions are not

of the same magnitude, they do involve selection of the best alterna-

tive among several choices. Thus, selection among alternatives seems

to be the key concept in the term decisionmaking.

Definitions of Decisionmaking

This concept of decisionmaking has been frequently expressed in

the literature on the subject. The philosopher-sociologist Ofstad

stated that "to make a decision means to make a judgment regarding

what one ought to do in a certain situation after having deliberated

on some alternative course of. action."6 Many writers have agreed on

definitions similar to that of Ofstad. Irwin Bross stated: "The

process of selecting one action from a number of alternatives is what

I shall mean by decision."7 Feldman and Kanter suggested that "the

decision problem is that of selecting a path which will move the

----6Harald Ofstad, An Inquiry Into the -Freedom of Decision (Oslo,-
Norway: Norwegian Uni versities Press, 191), 15

7Irwin Bross, Design for Decision (New York: Macmillan, 1953),
p. 1.















system--individual, computer program, or organization--from some initial
state to some terminal state.8

Many writers, however, have not limited their definition of

decisionmaking to a selection or choice among alternatives. Although

they may agree that the "choice step" is the characteristic step in
the decisionmaking process, they have defined decisionmaking in a much

broader sense. Griffiths stated that "decision-making is the process

which one goes through in order to be able to pass judgment and termi-

nate a controversy."' Taylor suggested that "decision making is that

thinking which results in the choice among alternative courses of

action."IO Simon summarized this broader view of decisionmaking when

he considered decisionmaking synonymous with managing: "In treating

decision-making as synonymous with managing, I shall be referring not

merely to the final act of choice among alternatives, but rather to

the whole process of decisions."11 Sayles also referred to a process

when he stated: "Decision making is an organizational process. It is

shaped as much by the pattern of interaction of managers as it is by
.the contemplation and cognitive processes of the individual.nl2 I

this view, :the primary concern of decisionmaking goes beyond the point

8Julian Feldman and Herschel E.~ Kanter, "Organizational Decision
Making," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1965), .pp. 614-15.

9Daniel E. Griffiths, Human Relations in School Administration
(New York: Appl eton-Century-Cro~fts, 1956)T-;l, p.202
10Donald W. Taylor, '!Decision Making and Problem Sol'ving," in
Handbook of Organizations, op. cit., p. 48.
'F1Nerb~ert~:-Simon .New Sc~ience of~ Man~ageqment ~Deci5sionls (New York:
Harper & Row, 1960), p. 1
12Leonard Sayles, Managerial Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1964), p. 207.
















of choice and includes the whole process of the administrator function-

ing in his environment.


Decisionmaking and Moral Valuing

In both the narrow and broad views of the process of decision-

making the critical notion of valuing was implicit. Valuing was con-

sidered an important ingredient in defining and selecting final choices.

In nearly every case of decisionmaking there is usually a relationship

between means and-ends, plans and goals. These means and ends are

always connected to an existing valuing framework of valuing activities.
Therefore, valuation and valuing actions ultimately help to shape the

decisions of organizations and individuals.

Ethics can be viewed as the science of moral values. According to

Kneller ethics "is concerned with providing 'right' values as the basis

for 'right' actions."13 While legal and technical rules can govern

large controllable areas of human conduct, they oftentimes do not pro-

vide an adequate or proper direction in solving moral problems. In the

simple relations of individuals to one another there is a need for
ethical solutions. A moral problem has been defined by Kurtzl4 as hav-

ing to choose between alternative courses of action affecting two or

more people. To solve such problems the administrator needs to be able

to call upon a set of moral rules or guidelines. Moral rules help to

:establish order in our social situations and settings. Kurtz stated

that moral rules "are the most fundamental social rules, and they

- ---- 1 3eor~ge E. -Knel-ler.,J introduction .to .the .Philosophy o~fEducation_,~
2nd ed. (New York: John Wil~ey & :~TSon, 97),.29

14Paul Kurtz, Decision and the Condition of Man (Seattle, Washing-
_ton.:.._University of WashTJington Press, 1965), p. 261















exemplify the demands of reciprocity. Without some such guides, life

as we know if would be virtually impossible."15

Philosophical ethics is a disciplined inquiry into such questions

as: "Is there a moral law which is definitive for human beings in their

choices and decisions?"16 The relationship between decisionmaking and

ethics is direct. The study of ethics can help the administrator to

establish a "moral point of view" when attempting decisions on the

"best thing to do."I7

Bases of Valuing in Educational Administration

This section has adapted four of the five value frameworks iden-

tified by Huebnerl8 for assessing classroom activities and the learn-

ing environment provided by schools. The value frameworks suggested

by Huebner included technical, political, scientific, ethical and
aesthetic forms of valuing. By utilizing these same forms of valuing,

one can also begin to assess the tasks and ongoing activities of the

administrator's world, with the possible exception of aesthetic valuing.

According to Huebner, each of the value bases has its own language of

legitimation and control; and when these languages are translated into

the conceptual understandings of administrators it becomes apparent

that each of the value frameworks serves a critical purpose in

15Ibid., p. 265.

16Robert N. Beck and John B. Orr, Ethical Choice: A Case Study
Approach (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p xvii
1Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics
(New YoFk, `Random House, 1965), pp. 27-50.
180wayne Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field of Study," in Precedents
and Promise in the Curriculum Field, ed. Helen F. Robinson (New York:
Teachers College Press, 196~6).

















administration which should not be neglected by those who hold leader-

ship positions in education.

Technical Valuing

Technical valuing is probably the most dominant form of valuing

in educational administration. In many areas of school management,

particularly in finance, and increasingly in curricular matters, there
is manifested a means-end rationality that approaches an economic model.

End states, end products, or objectives are specified as carefully and

as accurately as possible. The critical second phase calls for these

ends to be stated in performance or behavioral terms. Lucio and

McNeil represented the essence of technical valuing when they stated:

There are signs that we have passed the time
when schools can get by with pious hopes and
high-sounding shibboleths. Supervisors are
beginning (1) to state what schools should
strive for, (2) to determine the capabilities
needed for attaining these objectives, and (3)
to lay concrete plans for their implementa-
tion.ir

Objectives, many believe, need to be operational and tactics and

strategies should be consistent with the performance objectives.

However, some authorities believe that this means-end rationality

assumes that one knows what the most effective means are to achieve

the desired ends. Walton cautioned those who were enamored by this

model, and who would transfer a means-end relationship to the instruc-

tional process when he stated: "Actually, our knowledge of the relations


19Wi111am H. Lucio and John D. McNeil, Supervision: A Synthesis
of Thought and Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 100.
















between means and ends in instruction is very undependable, in spite

of decades of so-called scientific research."20

Within the framework of technical valuing the organization's

costs are carefully scrutinized and-some effort at economy is made.

The control of the inputs of materials and human resources is a major

source of control of this means-end system. Educational administrators,

however, have recognized that they often have little control over the

inputs.

Evaluation, from the point of view of the technical-valuing sys-

tem, may be considered a type of quality control. Unfortunately,

evaluation is usually concerned solely with the product and rarely

does it concern itself with the quality of those activities in the

producing sequences. Feedback from the evaluation of the product is

delivered to the control system, which in turn alters the process if

the end-states are not what they should be. Elaborate models and flow

charts often decorate the administrator's office walls. The primary

language systems of legitimation and control are psychological and

sociological. The ends, o. .';?jectives, are usually identified by a

sociological analysis of the individual or organizational system in

the present or future social order. These ends, or objectives, are

then translated into psychological language--usually in terms of con-

cepts, skills, attitudes, or behaviors. Psychological language is

further used to sanction certain activities which can produce these

defined ends.


20John Walton, "Ethics of the Means: A Consideration of the
Values Involved in Administrative Decisions," in Ethics and the School
Administrator, ed'. Glenn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs (Danville,
Illinois: Interstate Printers & Publishers, 1970), p. 62.















Technical valuing and its economic rationality are necessary in

administrative thought and practices, for problems of scarcity and

of institutional purpose do exist. However, this is but one form of

administrative valuing and to reduce all administrative functions to

this one is to weaken the administrator's -power to pull himself out

of the mysteriously complex phenomena of human life.


Political Valuing

The second form of valuing is that of political valuing. This

category exists because the administrator has a position of power and

control. He influences others directly or through the manipulation

of -resources. Persons in education are in a life-influencing business

and should recognize this central fact. Too often, however, political

thinking and valuing interferes with the central purpose.21 To remain

in a position of power one must seek the support of those in positions

of power to reward or influence his behavior in some way. This often-
times involves those who are termed informal influentials.22 The

administrator's work becomes the vehicle by which people judge -the

worth. of his influence and decide whether he is worthy of their respect,

support, or posi-tive sanctions. For those who operate from a political

valuing framework, educational activity is valued for the support or

respectet that it brings him or his organization. This search for

increased recognition is not inherently bad. An administrator must

.have power~to influence others. There is nothing immoral or evil

.2Robert L. Shannon, Where the Truth Comes Out: Humanistic
Edutht~-~5i on TColuimbus,~0hio E~' Charles E. Merr ill, 1 971 ), p. 7. .. --

22Mlrichael Y. Nunnery and Ralph B. Kimbrough, Politiccs,Power,
Polls and School Elections (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publish-
-i;T"o7-ng,~-191,-p.9
















about political rationality of valuing. Indeed, it is a necessary

attitude if personal influence and organizational responsibility

are to be maximized. Education cannot be separated from the political

activities of a community.

Writing on political valuing, Gregg23 concluded that educational

administrators do indeed live and work in a thoroughly political

environment. School districts are political systems where educational

administrators play a central role .as educational policy makers. Aware-

ness of politics, power, and influence in community decisionmaking

should lead educational administrators to accept the political nature

of the job and the importance of political knowledge and skills. It

should also lead to understanding and developing skills in using com-

munity influentials while still maintaining high professional expertise

as the greatest source of power. Nunnery and Kimbrough suggested that:

School officials must build potential influence
for education. They must understand the political
system and the exercise of political power in
decisionmaking. They must earn respect in that
system through their involvement and eventual
leadership.24

Of course, if power and prestige are sought as ends, rather than as

means for responsible and creative influence, evil and imm~orality may

be produced. Nunnery and Kimbrough cautioned against the use of

Machiavellian expediency and the need for morally-defensible strategies.

They stated: "Political activities that are based on deceit, lies, the

23Russell T. Gregg, "Political Dimensions of Educational Adminis-
tration," in Teachers College Record 67 (November 1956): 118-128.

24Nunnery~and Kimbrough, Politics, Power, Polls and School
Elections, op. cit., p. 3.
















half-truth, appeals to prejudice, and other undemocratic principles

are obviously unsatisfactory."25


Scientific Valuing

The third form of valuing in educational administration is scien-

tific. Scientific activity may be broadly designated as that activity

which produces new knowledge with an empirical basis. Administrators

are always in need of more and better-warranted assertions about edu-

cational activity. The attempt of science has been to produce more

precise knowledge which would tend to reduce error in the operational

management of our schools. The methodologies found in the social and
behavioral sciences also serve as useful models for administrators to

use in problem-solving situations. Educational administrators need

to become more empirical-minded, and they need to know if their admin-

istrative practices can be ~justified based on empirically-based examin-

ations. The discovery of functional relationships between phenomena

and the organization of the.facts which make them meaningful are two

of the chief aims of science.' Rationality is a major virtue in scien-

tific valuing, and it should be important to educational administrators.

Getzels, Lipham, and Campbell claimed that the .right to authority in

educational administration "is not based on a superior sanctified

status or on the manifestation of superior general wisdom or high

moral. character. It is based rather on superior knowledge."26

25Ibid., p. 169.

26Jacob W. Getzels, James M. Lipham, and Roald F. Campbell,
Educati onal -Admi ni strati on as-a Soc ial Proces s -(New -York: -Harper- & --
Row, 1968), p. 134.














Ethical Valuing

Finally, administrative activity may be valued in terms of

ethics-. Ethical valuing uses metaphysical and religious languages

as the primary vehicles for legitimatizing and thinking through of

an administrative activity. Its chief value to administrators is

that it focuses on the importance of decisionmaking and responsibility.

Gregg27 concluded that decisionmaking was one of the primary adminis-
trative processes, and -held that sound decisions were characterized

by purposive and rational behavior. Ostrander and Dethey,28 in a

more direct fashion, recognized the importance of value systems when

decisions were to be made which involved comparative worth among the

alternatives. They also stated that while behavioral science knowledge

could enable the administrator to predict human behavior, it could not
choose the course of action for the administrator:

What it [behavioral science knowledge] clearly does
not do is to guide the decision maker in terms of
desired objectives of the organization. The value
_ --~ system of the decision maker must guide him in
deciding which of several alternative courses of
action has the greatest comparative worth.29

Unfortunately, Ostrander and Dethey did not suggest either that a value

framework or even that perhaps a study of ethical theories could aid

` idmiiinfitra~'tos ini'n ma ki ng better dec isi ons i n those matters i nvol v ing

co~mparativre worth.

27Russell T. Gregg, "The Administrative Process," in Adminis-
trative Behavior in Education, ed. Roald F. Campbell and Rus~ieTT T
Gregg (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 275.

28Raymond H. Ostrander and Ray C. Dethey, A Values Approach to
Edotat-dn~ ionk `PAdmini'istrti'on (New ~iYork-? Am7ler:~ic an oo Cmpay,198
p. 77.
29Ibid., p. 78.















An administrative act is usually an act of influence: one man

-trying- to influence another man. The administrator who operates from

an ethical valuing base is less concerned with the significance of the

administrative act for other ends, or the realization of other values,

but the value of the administrative act per se. Sachs30,discussed this

.aspect of -ethical valuing when he attempted to analyze the quality of

-an act. He judged that quality acts (those which revealed "empathic

insights") would lead -to greater acceptance than whose which could be

labeled as nonquality acts (those which were sympathetic or indifferent

in their intentions). Sachs stated that it was the quality of the act

that "establishes the kinds of decisions that will be made by persons

who are most concerned."31 The main emphasis of Sachs analysis- was

concerned with the major virtue of empathy. The lack of this quality
in administrative acts and decisions led to destructiveness in inter-

personal relationships which were essential to the success of groups

and organizations. The opposite of empathy is indifference, and this

vice is.accompanied by noninvolvement, or at best, a mechanistic ap-

-proach to decisionmaking.32 According to Sachs, an administrator must

examine the quality of his interactions at all times. He stated: "If

either indifference or sympathy shapes his basic perceptions he may be

destructive. If identification and empathy are his premises, the inter-

action will enhance all concerned."3 Awareness of the power to

30Benjamin M. Sachs, Educational Administration: A Behavioral
Approach (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 142-53.
31bid., p. 153.

32Ibid., p. 176.

33'Ibid., p. 153.














influence may lead to hubris, the demonic state of false pride in one's

akinipotence, or it may lead to the humbling recognition that with the

power to influence comes the life giving possibility of being influ-
enced.


The Importance of a Philosophic Orientation

Ethical valuing in administration, and indeed the other forms

of valuing, requires a philosophic orientation among our educational

leaders. They need to have deeper insight and sensitivity to the

complex milieu of events, situations, and problems constantly con-
fronting those involved in the decisionmaking process. Graff et al.34

claimed that .the lack of a philosophical orientation resulted in three

possible alternatives. In the first alternative the administrator

without a philosophic orientation"relinguishes his leadership role,

expends his energies in dealing with the routines of management, and
deludes himself that this is really his chief function."3 The second

alternative suggested by Graff et al. was that the administrator be-

comes a "manipulator of people and builds personal and professional

strength by surrounding, himself wit~h satellites. and yes-men."36

While some may find this alternative attractive, the administrator

who engages in such activity "becomes a- satellite himself for some

strong political figure in the community."3 Most administrators,

however, are not as prone to the first two alternatives as they are

340rin B. Graff, Calvin M. Street, Ralph B. Kimbrough, and Archie
R. Dykes, Philosophic Theory and Practice in Educational Administra-

35Ibid., p. 10.
36Ibid., p. 11.
37Ibid.















to the third form. The administrators in this group who lack philosophic-

mindedness are those who possess self-esteem and personal integrity, but

who find it difficult "to make adequate judgments, to stimulate and

direct the proper development of the schools, to take an intelligent

stand on the important issues of the day, and like matters.n38

The lack of a philosophic orientation is due to a number of reasons,

but the institutions which can make a critical difference are the univer-

sities which are responsible for the professional training programs for

adm in is tra tors. Immegart and Burroughs39 expressed a deep concern for

the lack of training in ethical valuing in the professional preparation

programs for administrators. They stated:
The ethical dimension of the administrative
practice deserves its rightful place along
side of the human, technical, and conceptual
dimensions which are already a part of admin-
istrative training. In the end, it is the
ethic which in large measure determines the
choice in solving the larger problems con-
fronting educational administrators today.40

Smith41 in a study of philosophic-mindedness in educational admin-

istration concluded that school administrators who possessed the attrib-

utes of comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility, exerted a more

positive influence than those who lacked these qualities. Smith argued

that the preparation of school administrators should not be overly

taslk-oriented. It should also include in the curriculum courses which

38Ibid.

3981enn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs, eds., Ethics and
the School Administrator, op. cit., p. 10.
... - 40Ibid. -- -

y 41 Phil ip G. Smith, Phi losophic-Mindedness in Educational Adminis-
tration (Columbus, Ohio: -College of Education, Ohio State University,
196,p. 91.















involve reflective thought conducive towards generating philosophic-

mindedness. He stated:

It is believed that the truly philosophic educa-
tor makes decisions concerning problems of edu-
cation in the light of a relatively systematic
and carefully formulated set of philosophic in-
sights. It is the insights which supply the
basic structure for attacking problems with
comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility.
These insights enable the administrator to view
his particular problems in terms of long-range
goals, the creative generalizations, the funda-
mental4 deas, [and] the wide range of alterna-
tives.

Smith further argued that if educational administrators are to

have a higher degree of these qualities it would be beneficial to

have a course in philosophic-mindedness and its bearing on school

administration.43 This reflective activity would enhance the develop-

ment of a greater dialog about the nature of educational purposes.

Smith quoted a statement of the Educational Policies Commission which

stated:

Every statement of educational purposes...
depends upon the judgment of some person or
group as to what is good and what is bad,
what is true and what is false, what is ugly
and what is beautiful, what is valuable and
what is worthless, in the conduct of human
affairs.44


The Need for a Value Framework in
Educational Administration


Education is a moral concept. It is concerned with standards and

principles of a moral nature which enjoin what ought to be done. It

42Ibid., p. 93.

43Ibid., p. 90.

44Ibid.















endeavors to fit people for something and in so doing it presupposes

either an ideal of a person or alternatively an ideal of a society.45

Inherent in this description of education is the notion of a norm or

set of norms which provide purpose to education. Logically, this

involves a moral view of society and man. However, after reviewing the

literature in educational administration devoted to ethics and making

moral judgments, one cannot help but feel that there is a major weak-

ness in administrative thought and practices. Certainly, there has been

a concern for ethics, but there has been little effort in developing a

systematic value framework for educational administrators. Immegart
and Burroughs noted that other professions have accelerated their

efforts at developing value frameworks.46 They noted particularly

the efforts in the medical profession, the business profession, the

field of public administration, the clergy, the military, and social

science research itself.4

While many professors and scholars in educational administration

have recognized the importance of the value dimension in decision-

making, they have seemingly failed to establish a viable dialog on

the role of ethics in administration of our schools. Graff and Street4

have stressed the importance of establishing an adequate value theory


45T. F. Daveney, "Education--A Moral Concept," in New Essays in
the Philos~ophy of Education, ed. Glenn Langford and D. J. O'Connor
(Lno: Routle~dge & Keagan Paul, 1973), p. 79.

46Gl1enn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs, eds., Ethijcsand the
School Administrator, op. cit., p. 4.

47Ibid.

480rin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value.Frame-
work for Educational Administration," in Administ'rative Behavior 'in
Education, op. cit., pp. 120-52.















as a necessary element in the professionalization of educational

administration. They have urged administrators to examine the major

value theories in order to develop a distinctive value framework for

educational administration. Such avalue framework was judged to be

necessary because "educational administration appears to have greater

responsibility for the cherished human values than do many other kinds

of administration."49

After reviewing a number of critical studies, Graff and Street

stated that an adequate value framework was not sufficiently in evi-

dence in the general practice of educational administration. The intent

of this study was to aid administrators in constructing such a frame-

work.


The Problem


Statement of the Problem

The problem in this study was to develop deliberative and critical

ethical questions which could serve as guidelines in the administra-

tive decisionmaking process. Related problems to be considered were:

1.; To explicate selected normative ethical systems of thought.

.-2.- To examine the functioning of these ethical systems as they

relate to categories of identified critical tasks in educa-

tional administration.

3. To recommend strategies for practicing school administrators

in commonly met problems of right and wrong in educational

_administration.


491bid,, p. 121 .
















4. To state implications for the training of educational admin-

i stra tors .


Delimitations

1~. The normative ethical systems discussed in this study were

selected from classic and contemporary Western philosophies.

The basis of selection involved- the following criteria: (a)

dissim~ilarity in their approaches and rationality to provide

a range of possible views on the subject, and (b) selection

of framers of various -ethical systems of the highest rank to

assure types of ethical theory worthy of serious consideration.

2. The administrative task areas wuere selected from leading text-

books in educational administration. Selected task areas

examined included: (a) curriculum and instruction, (b)

.pupil personnel services, (c) personnel development and admin-

istration, (d) finance and fiscal management, and (e) school

and community relations.


-Limitations

1. The review of the literature was limited to- those sources

available in English.

2. T7he design was dependent upon .the adequacy of information

available as a basis for drawing valid conclusions.

'3. The study lacked the basic elements of control necessary to

produce data directly related to the administrative decision-

making process.

4. The frame of reference for the research was primarily shaped

by the researcher's academic and professional training in















the areas of the social sciences and educational adminis-

tration.


Justification for the Study

In the administration of the nation's schools educators are

constantly making value decisions which affect the welfare of others

and themselves., Unfortunately, the value dimension of decisionmaking

has not been stressed in the training institutions of educational

administration. Administrative and policy decisions are oftentimes

concerned with moral problems which demand the selection of moral

choices. If educational administrators are to make good judgments

they must begin by asking deliberative and critical ethical questions.

This study has attempted to justify that a study of ethics could bene-

fit educational administrators by raising critical questions with

which they may correct some sources of bad judgments.

Educational administration currently enjoys a high degree of

prestige and status in relationship to other professional occupations.

The Watergate scandal and related activities has certainly crippled

public confidence in the legal and political professions. The miasma

created by the Watergate scandal has also prompted investigations of

illegal and unethical activities in public administration agencies at

both the state and national levels. Gross stated that the partici-

pants in the Watergate scandal were able to perpetrate their nonethical

deeds by objectifying "the enemy" into -something less than human. This

tendency combined with an "authority syndrome" was similar to that

displayed by German officers and officials during the Hitler regime.

50Dorothy W. Gross, "Watergate: Implications for Moral Develop-
ment," Childhood Education 50 (October 1973): 54-56.















The testimony of the participants revealed a rationality based on the

belief that their actions were in the interest of security for the

nation's welfare, and that the actions were legal and ethical because

they had been endorsed and sanctioned by higher levels of authority.

Gross stated: "In a significant perversion of the democratic ideal ,

the true patriot was one who followed the leader and kept his mouth
1151
shut."

Two prominent American historians in their analysis of the
Watergate scandal have concluded that educators have a professional

and moral responsibility for the rectification of such nonethical forms

of conduct. Commager52 postulated that an indirect source of the

"new morality" displayed by the participants in the Watergate scandal

was the result of society's educational system. He described public

education today as a "massive exercise in hypocrisy" because schools

teach a set of moral standards which are almost antithetical to those

practiced in society. To lessen the disparity in the value structures

of the society, Commager argued that educators have a moral and pro-

fessional obligation to influence policy decisions through associa-

tional activity. The aims of -such activity should be directed toward:

(1) conservation of natural resources; (2) creation of a just society;

(3) conservation of life; (4) preservation of constitutional freedoms;

-and (5) a restoration of faith in participatory democracy. The result

of such activity would be that educators should serve as society's

conscience by exercising a special moral duty to demand society's

:5Ibid., p. 55.

52Henry Steele Commager, "Watergate and the Schools," Todjg_'j
Education 63 (September October 1974): 20-24.














attention to the dichotomy between its expressed ideals and the

existent realities.

Schlesinger,53 in a similar vein, stated that educators have the

responsibility to combat the corruption of society's moral standards

of conduct. He contended educators should specifically challenge

those who would invoke rationalizations for nonethical forms of con-

duct based on military-bureaucratic jargon. This type of activity

has led not only to the corruption of the language, but also to the

impairment of society's sense of morality.

However, the "new morality" displayed by the participants in the

Watergate scandal, with its emphasis on Machivellian expediency, can

be found in-a large number of organizations and institutions of our

society--including education. The negative public reaction to those

who participated in Watergate could be easily generalized to all those

who hold authority and power in our public agencies.

In his study of chief school administrators Dexheimer54 found

evidenCe that they were prone to more nonethical forms of accommoda-

tion than -to ethical forms in critical situations. Those who responded

to the questionnaire which related to actual and hypothetical situations

chose more nonethical than ethical responses by nearly a two-to-one

margin. Other notable results were:

1. The-age of the respondents was not a critical factor.

2. The humanities majors of undergraduate years had relatively

low (nonethical) scores.

53Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Watergate and the Corruption of
Language," Today's Education 63 (September October 1974): 25-27.

54Roy Dexheimer, "The Ethics of Chief School Administrators: A
Study in Accommodation," paper presented at the 101st meeting of the
American Association of School Administrators, Atlantic City, N.J.,
February 15-19, 1969.














3. Ethical responses were negatively related to career longevity.

4`. Professional' membership ps, rel igious convictions, and graduate

studies were not significant factors.

5. Salary and size of the district were positively related to

ethical responses.5

Dexheimer concluded that ethical standards were internalized personally

and were not affected by public codes. Dexheimer's study adds justifi-

cation for this study of ethics and its role in educational administra-

tion.

Ethical valuing has been referred to as a style of decisionmaking

which reflects the attributes of comprehensivensss, penetration, and

flexibility. In addition, it has been suggested that ethical valuing

is a quality which should govern the other forms of valuing which

exist in educational administration, because the neglect of ethical

valuing in administrative decisionmaking can only increase mistrust

and disenchantment with the value of schooling by the society at large.

The response of educational leaders to the critics of public education

should be tempered by the realization that the quality of the response-

will, in large measure, determine its acceptance or rejection.

If administrators are to meet with success in generating support

for- a system's- goals, they must enjoy a fair amount of credibility

-with client systems served by the system. Where loss of confidence in

organizational and institutional authority exists, it has primarily
resulted from the lack of concern for ethical conduct and decision-

making on.the part .of those who hold leadership positions. Therefore,

to achieve credibility and maintain trust, administrators should dem-

onstrate a commitment to a value framework which recognizes that other

-55Ibid.















sources and rationalities exist for decisions besides those of an

organization. If this line of reasoning is correct, the establish-

ment and maintenance of support for organizational goals can more

fully be achieved when those who govern combine practical wisdom and

intelligence with a philosophical orientation which provokes a deeper

insight into, and a sensitivity for, the complex milieu of events,

situations, and problems which impinge upon a system both internally

and- externally.

A recent lecture by Griffiths56 provides an example of why ethical

valuing is necessary for practicing school administrators. Griffiths

has suggested that the fractionalization of communities along ethnic

lines, the popularization of fundamentalist and mystical religious

cults, the decentralization of political systems, the resurgence of

localism and regionalism, and the manifestation of a phenomenological

perspective have all combined as causal forces in the collapse of a

consensus necessary for administrative decisionmaking. Griffiths

further suggested that the collapse has been precipitated by a wide-

spread feeling of alienation and disenchantment among people with

all. forms of authorityI. He then posed the central problem: "The

issue is what is the emerging role of the administrator, given a

society that does not want to be administered and that values education

less than it did previously," or more specifically, "How does one lead

an organization when its members do not acknowledge its goals?"57 To

56Daniel E. Griffiths, The Collapse of Consensus: Can Adminis-
trators Survive? (Buffalo, New York: Society of Educational Admin-
istrators of Western New York [Sixth Annual George E. Holloway, Jr.,
Lecture Series], 1974).

571bid., p. 5.














Griffiths, a possible solution to the problem would be for "education

to abandon its traditional status as a separate, autonomous branch

of government and consider joining with the regular political struc-
ture."5

The solution offered by Griffiths to the current "crisis" is

inadequate and illogical for administrators. Certainly, educational

administrators need to be involved in the decisionmaking processes of

a given political community, but it is indeed doubtful that the type
of involvement envisaged by Griffiths would enable educators to main-

tain or restore a belief in the efficacy of schooling. He suggested

the development of a "corporate management" concept which would involve

the creation of a management team representative of various governmental

functions such as housing, health, social work, and police services.

The purpose of such a management team would be to "cut down some of
the variation in goals and make possible the setting of objectives that

can be accepted and toward which administrators can work."59 However,

this "solution" fails to recognize the original causes cited by Griffiths

himself for the discontent toward institutional and organizational

authority. It is indeed paradoxical that Griffiths has suggested for

administrators to become more politically involved in established

political frameworks, which are no longer themselves a credible or

viable force in shaping the values and goals of the client systems.

Another argument against such a position as advocated by Griffiths

is that the consensus which Griffiths would hope to reconstruct was

an illusory form of valuing in its original form.


581bid., p. 8.

59Ibid. p. 9.















The important issue which Griffiths failed to confront was the

question which asks why people have become more disenchanted with,

and alienated toward, institutional and organizational forms of

authority. Perhaps, a major part of the answer to this question re-

sides in the apparent lack of ethical valuing forms in administrative

decisionmaking. Until institutions, organizations, and the "king's

men" recognize this condition, the efforts to reconstruct a consensus

will be futile, unproductive, and meaningless gestures reminiscent of

the efforts of some to recreate a social order based on the model of

the Pax Romana.

The arguments of Griffiths were directed toward a return to the

security of the "old ethic" with its collectivized values and goals'.

He stated:

I believe that the schools were a crucial factor
in the growth of America from a trackless wilder-
ness to the greatest nation on the planet Earth.
If the teachers and administrators are of a mind,
they could do it again. .. America must become
once more a country with clear national goals,
with social and moral standards that are incul-
cated in the young by schools, and we must assume
a new stance of international leadership.60

'If the societal~ conditions that Griffiths described are accurate, how

ran he realistically expect a return to "Camelot"? The dynamic and

motivational forces of administrators should not be directed toward

the return of the "old ethic" and its social order, but rather they

should be directed toward the development of inclusive forms of valu-

ing which can more readily accommodate diversity and pluralism.

The answer to Griffiths' question, "can administrators survive?"

can be answered in the affirmative, provided they improve the quality


60Ibid., p. 6.















of administrative decisions by infusing ethical concerns and questions

-during the deliberations of -various alternative solutions Administra-

tors simply cannot afford to cast themselves as an embodiment of a

"Prince" who only concerns himself with the ends sought and cares not

how they are achieved.

The lack of commonly held goals and values was a problem which

disturbed Griffiths,. and it is a critical problem for any practicing

administrator. To overcome this problem and foster a consensus within

an organizational setting, Griffiths proposed that administrators

"shape the reward system so that it benefits those who advance the

school's objectives."61 The implications of this statement can be

construed as basically nonethical in character and intent; and it is

representative of those forms of valuing which have fostered the dis-

enchantment with administrative authority. -Rather than "shape" behav-

ior by establishing a "reward system", administrators should seek to

:promote cooperation and identification with organizational goals through

such processes as identified by Lippitt.62! The basic technique sug-

gested bytLippitt was termed interfacing. Lippitt defined interfacing
as follows:

Interfacing is primarily a process by which human
S" beings confront common areas of Iconcern, engage in
meaningfully related dialogue, actively search for
-solutions to mutual ~probl~ems,-and cope -with these
solutions purposefully. Interfacing may also in-
volve confrontation between human beings and machine
processes or technological systems.63

61.Ibid,.,p. 7.

62Gordon 1. Lippitt Organization Renewal .(New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1969).

63Ibid., p. 2.















The elements identified by Lippitt in the interfacing process

included understanding; communicating in one's own way; lack of

judgmental behavior; establishing trust; minimum effort to control;

preserving autonomy; problem-solving approach; and experimentation,

flexibility, and spontaneity.64 Lippitt also recognized the ethical

implications of attempting "organization renewal" through purposeful

and systemtaic change processes. He indicated that planned change

could be successful provided administrators established ethical

standards of conduct and dec~isionmaking. He stated:

Planned change does have ethical implications
which should be thoroughly considered by the
whole body of practitioners. The moral and
ethical standards that have become involved in
this problem of individual and social responsi-
bility should be the key to the future advance-
ment in both the private and public sectors of
society. The responsibility for establishing
and maintaining high ethical standards rests
heavily upon managers and consultants in all
kinds of organizations.65

Practicing- school administrators, particularly principals and

superintendents, are vested with organizational authority and

responsibility for making and executing policy decisions. Often-

times, they are confronted with having to choose among alternatives

which are all undesirable. In districts with declining revenues and/

or student populations, the decisions as to which programs are to be

reduced in scope, and the problem of reduction in personnel needs are

real problems which do not have easy solutions. The decisionmaking

process related to these problems has to be imbued with major ethical

questions and concerns. The intentions and motives of administrators

64Ibid., pp. 134-35.

65Ibid., p. 180.

















in situations of this nature should reflect a real concern for

-the ethical values that were judged worthy of professional adminis-

trators. To facilitate decisions of this nature. objective guide-

lines need to be established and even-handedly applied in order to

avoid-gross forms of injustice to both programs and personnel. While

the solutions effectuated will not be to the satisfaction of all con-

-cerned, the important point is that they were arrived at by a thorough

consideration of the moral questions involved.

'The current sociopolitical forces in society demand a thorough

consideration of ethical valuing. The study should have practical

:value in assisting those involved in the decisionmaking process.

Good judgment should require more than correct opinions: it should

require that the opinions be on the right subjects. This study has

attempted to improve and systematize practical judgment by determin-

ing whether the right questions were being asked in order to aid

deliberations and make morally defensible policy decisions. The study

has .a~lso attempted to establish foundations of a value framework for

tl' :1 involved in the professional training of educational adminis-

trators.


~Definition of Terms


Every effort has been made to limit the technical jargon of

philosophers to provide for better readability and understanding by

the readers. The technical nature and the personalized use of key

.tenns in .ethics have been discussed in the context of usage. Certain

ethical concepts have been given a glossary-type definition to















facilitate readers' efforts in understanding those terms which, in the

opinion of the author, are not a part of the lexicon of practicing
school administrators.

Categorical Imperative--the law of the pure practical reason which

as a priori (i.e., underived from experience) has the marks of univer-

sality and necessity, thus asserting the autonomy of the rational will

in its freedom from extrinsic matters.

Consequentialism--the determination of actions as right or wrong

in accordance with their tendency to produce desirable or undesirable

consequences.

Casuistry--a strict application of general ethical principles and

rules, which have been externally mandated, to particular cases of

conscience or conduct.

Deontological Ethics--the view of obligation as immediately per-

ceived and therefore independent of any reasons which may be offered

in support of one duty as against another. This form of ethics stresses

an evaluation of the quality of an act rather than its consequences.

Equity--that aspect of justice, related to the-function of the

judge, which seeks to supplement the generality of the laws through

attention to cases which are exceptions to the rule.

Ethical Naturalism--any view of ethics in which the meanings of

moral terms are expressed within the language of an empirical science

such as psychology or sociology.

Ethical Rationalism--the view that moral notions such as "good"

and "right" are adopted by the mind through the apprehensive or

regulative functions of reason. The propositions which embrace such

notions are either self-evident or imposed by reason itself according

to its owrn canons.
















Facticity--the fact that freedom is not able to be free, i.e.,

autonomy of choice is limited by such conditions as a person's place,

past, environment, fellowman, and death. If freedom is defined as

the escape from the given, from fact, then there is a fact of escape

from fact. This is the facticity of freedom.

'Hedonism--the definition of "good" in terms of pleasure or the

pleasant. Distinction is made between pyschological hedonism (the

individual desires only pleasure or the pleasant), ethical hedonism

(t'he individual's good is to be found in pleasures of purity and

duration or in pleasures which correspond with one's capabilities),

and universalistic hedonsim (the individual's good is part of the

total good of the community, which is.the genuine end of all deliberate

action).

Hedonistic Calculus--the estimation of the probable pleasures or

-pains to flow from doing or abstaining from some action, according to

the measures or values of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity,

fecundity, purity, and extent.

Hypothetical Imperative--any imperative or command in morals
wh'ich depends -for its sanction upon the attachment of the will to an

extrinsic purpose; the action commanded is related to such a purpose

-as a means to an end.

Maxim--any subjective interest which is the content of an indi-

;vidual's volition as distinct from its form as universalizable or

nonun~iversalizable. A maxim which is universalizable conforms to

:.the..moral law, and is thus objective.

Phenomenology--the approach to experience in terms of its

structure, i.e., consciousness and its objectives whether real or
















possible or consciousness and its transcendence. As a science of

phenomena, it stresses the careful description of phenomena (things

as they appear or are construed by individuals) in all domains of

experience without regard to traditional epistemological questions

(those which relate to the origin, nature, methods, and limits of

human knowing).

Pure Practical Reaso--the reason in its capacity to provide a

principle or law of conduct which is not conditioned by empirical

matters, as distinct from practical reason in its involvement- with

the empirical.

Teleological Ethics--the view of "good" as the primary notion

-of ethics and of "right" as a derivative notion to be defined as

what is productive of good. This form of ethics stresses an evalua-

tion of the results or consequences of an act rather than its motives.

Utility--the principle of estimation of actions and laws in terms

of their tendency to augment or diminish happiness.

Virtue--the goodness or excellence in all human functions, both

:of thought and of action, in individual conduct and in civic life.

Virtuous ideals are defined by the nature of the ethical system or

-culture involved in their determination.


Procedures


This logical study was conceptual nd valuational in nature, and

took a nonquantitative approach in its procedures.- However, the study

should have suggested areas for empirical-type research studies. In

some respects the study was similar to the procedures used in historical

research. The study involved a description of the research, an























interpretation of the research, and a summary of how the data could

be applied to present and future hypotheses.66


Organization of the Study .

This study consisted of five integral parts. In Chapter I the

literature related to the value dimension of the decisionmaking process

in educational administration was reviewed. Chapter II contains a

review and discussion of selected leading systems of normative ethics,

and Chapter III has related the critical and deliberative questions

found in these systems to identified critical tasks in educational

administration. In Chapter IV selected concepts found in normative

ethical systems have been discussed in relation to problems commonly

met by practicing school administrators. Chapter V contains some

conclusions as to how ethical valuing could more readily relate to

the training of professional educational administrators, and a summary

of the critical and deliberative questions posed by the ethical
theories.


66David J. Fox, The Research Process in Education (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 416.
















CHAPTER II


NORMATIVE ETHICAL SYSTEMS


Elements of a Normative Theory


The purposes of a theory are (1) to synthesize isolated bits of

empirical data into a broader conceptual scheme, (2) to permit the

prediction of the occurrence of phenomena, (3) to act as a guide in

discovering facts, and (4) to establish general laws which govern a

certain field or set of phenomena.l Ethical theories generally con-

sist of first and second level principles, judgments, and rules.

These theories are no different from other scientific theories in

their attempt to coherently, consistently, and completely show the

:relationships which -exist among its various elements. Ethical theories

are concerned with moral principles, moral judgments, and moral rules.

A well-developed ethical theory validates its moral judgments in terms

of the -theory's rules and principles. In turn, its moral principles

justify the moral rules. Moral principles are the most general state-

-ments of judgments and represent the ultimate moral commitment. Moral

rules generally refer to classes of individuals, actions, and situa-

tions; moral judgments are simply statements that a certain action is

-right-or wrong--for-a -specified individual in a concrete situation.

1George J. Mouly, The Science of Educational Research (New York:
American Book Company, 1963), p. 51.
















Normative judgments are singular in the sense that they generally

refer to a single action either contemplated or accomplished by a

particular individual in a specified situation. Some ethical theories

include second-level principles which specify the principles which

take precedence when a conflict exists between principles, and the

rules which take precedence when a conflict is found between the rules.

Figure 1 shows the relationship of the elements found in fully-developed
ethical theories.


SFirst-Level Principles
Rue ------------I Judgments
Second-Level Principles C

Figure 1. Elements of an Ethical Theory


Criteria for Assaying Normative Ethical Theories

Graff and Street2 have identified three major criteria for assay-

ing a normative theory--consistency, comprehensiveness, and workability.
This list should also include the criterion of universalizability be-

cause of its importance in ethical discourses. Some writers have also

included parsimony as a criterion, but it has not been generally recog-

nized as being of major importance in practice. In the first place,

any number of principles may logically be reduced to one principle by
connecting the principles with conjunctions. Secondly, most theories

with one or two principles tend to be so vague that the principle is

inapplicable or the theory is incomplete.

20rin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value Frame-
work for Educational Administration," in Administrative Behavior in
Education, ed. Road F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (New York:
H~arpe & Brothers, 1957), pp. 143-45.















The first criterion was consistency. According to Graff and

'Street, "Values need to be consistent in the internal structure of

a value system, and there also needs to be consistency in choosing

values which most effectively use the facts that are available."3

Consistency is an essential criterion in assaying any theory. In

this respect, ethical -theories do not differ from other scientific

theories. An inconsistent theory--one having contradictory principles

or principles from which a contradiction can be inferred--is simply

not a truly valid theory. One of the major purposes of a theory is

to rationally account for some set of experiences; however, it is

-rare that any theory is entirely consistent. In most cases scien-

:tists and philosophers have operated on the premise that a theory was

not so much true or false as it was useful or useless and that an

inadequate theory was probably better than no theory at all. Gener-

ally, a contradiction calls for some adjustment in a theory rather

than its complete abandonment. Conant has stated that a theory is

never discarded merely because of a few stubborn facts with which it

cannot be reconciled but is "either modified or replaced ~by a better

one, never abandoned with nothing to take its place.4

The second criterion suggested by Graff and Street for assaying

a value theory was comprehensiveness. "One function of a value sys-

tem is to provide a system of values which will be appropriate for
use as the basis for activities in all kinds of life situations.5


3Ibid., p. 144.

.4James. B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven, Connect-
icut: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 170.

5G aff and Street, Administrative Behavior in Education, op.
-cit.,-'~p. j144.














Comprehensiveness is essential in order to provide for a system that

will operate in all observable situations. This criteria is a very

difficult test because it means that a system in order to be a com-

plete theory.must account for all segments of moral behavior. The
criterion of comprehensiveness should be viewed relatively since it

may be impossible for a theory ~to be absolutely complete and to ful-

fill all of the other criteria at the same time. Actually, a theory

is rarely, if ever, complete; as new facts appear--and in most theories

new facts appear endlessly--theories have to undergo some modification.

Comprehensiveness is relative in respect to other theories. If one
of two competing theories is more comprehensive it is more preferable

to~ the less complete theory. Thus, theories can be said to be less

comprehensive only with respect to other theories.

,iThe third criterion was workabil ity. Graff and Street listed
two basic elements involved in this criterion. The first element was

concerned with providing focus and meaning for actions. They stated:

~~~To be workable the pattern must provide direction
for actions; and further, it must be capable of
expansion so as to furnish a set of evaluative~
questions by which the individual may more accu-
:. rately evaluate the appropriateness of his
actions.6

The second major element which the criterion of workability suggested

was that each individual should be able to internalize the value sys-

tem. Graff and Street stated that each individual, and particularly

the administrator, has "a moral obligation to do the things necessary

t~o achieve a usable kind of value structure."7

-'6Ibid., p. 145.

7Ibq;d.















The criteria suggested by Graff and Street--consistency com-

prehensiveness, and workability--represented an attempt on their part

to develop a cyclic pattern, or value system, of integrated human

behavior for use in educational administration. However, they over-

looked a vital criterion usually encompassed in assaying ethical

theories, and it is particularly relevant to those involved in the

enterprise termed education. The criterion is called universalizability

and it refers to the notion that what is right for one individual is

right for anyone else in like circumstances. Thus, if one wishes to

argue that a specific action is right for an individual but wrong for
another, he must exhibit a relevant difference between the two persons

or between the circumstances which surround the situations. According

to Hare,8 moral judgments are not tied to individual people as agents,

but are tied to features of individuals and of their situations. In

a rather colloquial fashion Hare stated:

I am not saying that what is sauce for the goose
is sauce for the gander; for it might conceivably
make a difference to the morality of the act that
it was done by a gander, not a goose; but at least,
what is sauce for the goose must be sauce for any
precisely similar goose in any precisely similar
situation

The problem was in determining what are relevant differences. Certainly,

each individual is different. They have different histories, different

physical characteristics and abilities, different families, and occupy
different spatial locations. Thus, it has been argued, universaliz-

ability is absurd because each person is different from another and the


-- R. M. .Hare, "Language and Mloral Education," in New Es~says in the
Philosophyof Education, ed. Glenn Langford and D. J. O~'Connor(L~ondon:
Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 160.
9Ibid.














circumstances must necessarily be different from each other. Admit-

tedly, differences exist among agents, actions, and circumstances, but

these are not necessarily ethically relevant. Mere differences, in

and of themselves, do not necessarily invalidate normative generaliza-

tions. However, relevant differences are important in that they lead

us to change or modify our normative judgments. A sound normative

theory should make an effort to specify the exact nature of the circum-

stances and of the actions to that generalizations can apply to all

those in a particular class. Normative generalizations apply to all

men doing the specified action in the specified circumstances unless

it can be shown that some ethically relevant differences do indeed-

exist. If ethical judgments are not universalizable they will be of

no practical value.


A Typology of Normative Ethics

The classic work by C. D. Broad,10 Five Types of Ethical Theory,

provided the basic framework for this section. According to Broad,

ethical theories can be divided into two major classes--deontological

and teleological. "Deontological theories hold that there are propo-

sitions of the form: Such and such a kind of action would always be

right (or wrong) in such and such circumstances, no matter what its

consequences might be."11 The emphasis from the deontological per-

spective has been on judging actions on the basis of what type of
action it is--not its results. On the other hand, if we evaluate

actions on the basis of the state of affairs the action produces


10C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge
& Keagan Paul, 1930).

11Ibid., p. 206.















than we assume a teleological perspective. Broad added further clarifi-

cation when he stated: "Teleological theories hold that the rightness

or wrongness of an act is always determined by its tendency to produce

certain consequences which are intrinsically good or bad."12

The distinction between teleological and deontological can be

given more meaning by examining a particular situation sometimes common

to building administrators. An upset teacher brings a student to the

office for willfull misconduct and demands that the principal take

immediate disciplinary action against the student. The principal gives

his solemn promise to suspend the student from school, but he later

realizes that, because of other circumstances, consequences will be

better if the student is not suspended. What would be the advice of

the deontologist and the teleologist in this circumstance? A deontol-

ogist would advise the principal to keep his promise and suspend the

student, since keeping one's promises is the kind of action that ought

to be done. The deontologist would justify this advice by pointing

out the principle that we ought to keep our promises. A teleologist,

on the other hand, would advise us to do that action which would pro-

duce the best effect, and if this meant breaking a promise to do so,

then we should break the promise. In sum, then, the teleologist

evaluates actions and principles on the basis of their effects, while

the deontologist evaluates them as to the kind of action involved.

Philosophers of ethics have also developed a second classificatory

distinction based on the criteria of rule and act.1 These criteria


12Ibid., p. 207.

13Richard T. Garner and Bernard Rosen, Moral Philosophy: A
Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Metaethics (New York:
Macmillan, 16)

















determine whether an action is judged on the basis of that particular

action in those particular circumstances or on the grounds that it is

a member of a particular class of actions. Thus, an act-teleologist

would judge an action on the basis of the effects of that particular

action. The rightness or wrongness of an action is solely a function

of its consequences.14 A rule-teleologist, however, would evaluate an

action on the basis of the effects of having a rule obliging us to do

a whole class of actions in question. In other words, a rule-teleologist

holds that a particular action is right or wrong if it follows or breaks

some rule, and the correctness of the rule is a function of the con-

sequences that follow from the rule's being adopted, accepted, recog-

nized, or followed.15 On the other hand, a rule-deontologist looks to

the nature of the whole class of actions of which a specific action is

a member. The rightness or wrongness of an action or the correctness

of a rule is a function solely of factors other than the consequences

of that action or rule. An act-deontologist, however, evaluates actions

according to the type of specific action it is. In this case the

rightness or wrongness of an action or the correctness of a rule is

a function of many factors, some of which are or may be the consequences

of that action or rule.1

Table I shows the relationships among the criteria that have been

established for classifying nonnative ethical theories.


14Ibid., p. 56.

15Ibid.

16Ibid., p. 83.















TABLE 1


A TYPOLOGY OF ETHICAL THEORIES



Deontological Teleological (Utilitarianism)
(Concerned with Actions) (Concerned with Results)


Justification is by Justification is by
appealing to general appealing to the
considerations. An effects of a rule.
Rule act is right because An act is right because
it is in accordance it is in accordance
with a general rule. with a rule which pro-
duces the greatest good.



Justification is by f Justification is by
appealing to particu- | appealing to the
Act lar considerations. | effects of particular
An act is right because actions. An act is
it has certain character-i right because it leads
istics. to the greatest good.



The remainder of the chapter has been arranged according to the

typology established. It should be noted that teleological theories

are generally divided into two types--egoism and utilitarianism. Ego-

istic ethics are concerned with those values and obligations which pro-

duce the greatest good for an individual. Simply, the view is that the

only obligation or right anyone has is to provide the greatest good

for himself. Not all teleogists hold to this view, for many believe

that there is an obligation to provide good for other persons as well

as for oneself. In that educational administrators are not generally

concerne~adonly for themselves, but for an organization, specific

groups,and other people in general, an example of egoistic ethics has

-not been provided. Of the two teleological theories, utilitarianism

















has been reviewed and discussed because it is more in line with most

administrators' beliefs about obligation.

Jeremy Bentham's form of act-utilitarianism has been reviewed

first because it is basically a simple ethic which stressed the great-

est good for the greatest number. As an example of rule-utilitarianism,

the pragmatism of John Dewey has been reviewed. Dewey's ethic stressed

a denial of intrinsic value and ultimate ends. The deontological

theories selected included the ethics of Immanuel Kant as a representa-

tive of rule-deontological theories and the ethics of Aristotle and

the existentialists as forms of act-deontological systems. Kantian

ethics focused on duty and obligation as well as the rights of indi-

viduals. The Aristotelian system spoke of the nature and function of

man and of the virtues which brought to fulfillment what a man was able

to become. In existentialism, there was the recognition of the moral

situation as centering in the decision of the individual with respect

to the course of his own life and that of others.

The systems of ethics selected do not exhaust all forms of

normative ethical thought, but are only representative of the typology

and the delimitations established. The framers of these various

ethical theories were the originators of ethical thoughts and questions

which are of paramount concern not only to moral philosophers, but

also to policy formulators and executors as well. The sections on

representative ethical systems have been chosen to illustrate that a

critical examination of fundamental moral questions can be beneficial

in formulating and executing administrative decisions by educational

administrators.
















Utilitarian Ethics


The Principle of Utility

The concept of utility in ethical thought can, in large measure,

be attributed to the Scottish philosopher David Hume.17 In his writings

he espoused a theory of value which found its expression in modern

positivism. This positivistic value was reflected in Hume's sentiment

towards the practicality or usefulness of abstract thought. Hume made

the classic statement that:

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or
school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does
it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quan-
tity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?
No. Commnit it then to the flames for it can contain
nothing but sophistry and illusion.18

Hume's major efforts were directed towards the establishment of

universal principles from which all ethical decisions and actions

could be justly derived. However, the science of ethics had to be

founded upon fact and observation resulting from the experimental

method, not through the use of deductive reasoning. For making judg-

ments of censure and approbation in moral matters, Hume invoked the

principle of utility. Those virtues and rules which maintained a

harmonious social network of relations and transactions were judged

to be good, while those matters which were divergent from general

happiness were judged to be bad. It was in this context that Hume

170rin B. Graff, Calvin M. Street, Ralph B. Kimbrough, and Archie
R. Dykes, Philosophic Theory and Practice in Educational Administration
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publish~ing, 1966), pp.14~5-46.

18David Hume, as quoted in Philosophic Theory and Practice in
Educational Administration, ibid.














called upon individuals to adopt a public affection which could help

to establish the happiness of society. Since, to Hume, the origin of

morality resided in the usefulness of those actions which promoted

the interests of mankind and society, he concluded that benevolence

~was the chief social virtue because it communicated pleasure and

happiness for others, and this ultimately benefited each person him-
self.

The principle of utility fostered by Hume was adopted and expanded
in the ethical system of Jeremy Bentham.20 In essence, Bentham merged

the principle of utility with Cesare Beccaria's notion of "the great-

est happiness of the greatest number."21 Bentham's theory of morals,

however, was original in the precise form in which "utilitarianism"

appeared in his writings. Bentham's expansion upon the principle of
utility reflected his interest in the precision with which this prin-

ciple could .be applied as a guide in morals and legislation. Because

Bentham was committed to the reform of law and society, he attempted

to provide the foundations for a theory of legislation by establish-

ing the premise that policies were to be determined by a principle

which could measure the practical end of the greatest happiness for

the greatest number. Such a determinate was the principle of utility.

-19David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
(LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1953; reprinted from
the original edition of-1777), p. 7.

20OJeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles ofMorals
and Legislation (Londn:clareon res, 197; eprntedfro th
revised edition of 1823).

Cesare Beccaria, Treatise on Crimes and Punishments, trans.
Henry Paolucci (Indianapol~is, Ind~fiana: ibealArs res Bobbs-
Merrill,: 1963), p. 8.















If a science of legislation and morals is to be directed toward

the practical end of the greatest happiness, first, a science must

exist by which actions, from which pleasure and pains flowed, could

be judged as to whether they contributed to the end of happiness, or

whether they led to malice and mischievousness. The determinate of

utility was the proper measure, because the initial reason for estab-

lishing policies was simply to ensure pleasure. To Bentham, actions

enjoined by legislation should be grounded in the belief that the

greatest happiness was being preserved and strengthened. He argued

that mankind was governed by two masters--pleasure and pain. Bentham

equated happiness with pleasure. In his introductory comment he
stated:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.
It is for them alone to point out what we ought
to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.
On the one hand the standard of right and wrong,
on the other the chain of causes and effects,
are fastened to their throne. They govern us in
all we do, in all we say, in all we think:
every effort-we can make to throw off our sub-
jection, will serve but to demonstrate and con-
firm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure
their empire: but in reality he will remain
subject to it all the while. The principle of
utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes
it for the foundation of that system, the object
of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by
the hands of reason and of law. Systems which
attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead
of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in
darkness instead of light.22

Pleasures and Pains

...-A policymaker in his capacity as a moralist should know the

value of various pleasures and pains. To determine such value


22Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, op. cit.,
pp. 1-2.
















Bentham identified four critical "elements" that were to be taken

into account when estimating the value of a pleasure or pain:

intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and propinquity or

remoteness. The intensity was just~the strength of the pleasure or

pain, its duration was the length of time it lasted, its certainty

was the probability that it would in fact occur, and its propinquity

or remoteness was the nearness or distance in time of it. (Apparently

a pleasure that would come soon was better than one that was far off,

just as one that was sure to come was--all things being equal--to be

preferred to one that was not.)

In giving a total evaluation of the pleasures for the purpose of

evaluating an action, Bentham held that there were two other character-

istics of the pleasure or pain to be considered: its fecundity and

its purity. Fecundity was defined by Bentham as the chance an action

had of being followed by sensations of the same kind, i.e., pleasure

followed by pleasure and pain followed by pain. Purity was defined as

that element which determined the probability that an action would be

followed by sensations of the opposite kind. These considerations

allowed for the decision of the value of an action insofar as it con-

cerned one person alone. ~However, Bentham added another consideration:

the extent of the pleasure or pain. The element of extent simply

referred to the number of persons who would be affected by an action.

Bentham's calculus for determining the value of an action was stated

as:

Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the
one side, and those of all the pains on the other.
The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure,
will give the good tendency of the act upon the
whole, with respect to the interests of that
















individual person; if on the side 3f pain, the
bad tendency of it upon the whole.

Pleasures and pains were, to Bentham, the result of the action

of certain causes. However, the quantity of the results was not

always proportional to the quantity of the force exerted by a partic-
ular cause. Each person possessed an individual "sensibility" which

biased the amount of pleasure or pain he felt. The situation or con-

ditions in which the person found himself when being subjected to an

exciting cause also had an influence on the degree of sensibility of

the person. The variables which most influenced the sensibility factor
of individuals were: health, strength, endurance, and quantity and

quality of knowledge. Other secondary-level variables which have an

effect on sensibility were: sex, age, rank, education, and climate.24

What was central in Bentham's analysis of morals was the treat-

ment of pleasure as the end and measure of effective actions, and the

treatment of pleasure and pain as the motives or sanctions for pro-

ducing such effective action. An individual acted wisely and properly

only when he acted in a way which was productive of pleasure and free

of pain,. and he was prompter:~to act in this way only through the fact

or expectation of pleasure or pain. The implication was that the

experience or expectation of pleasures and pains was the natural and

-i-nfallible-guide to happiness, and that such experience was also part

of the total balance or imbalance of pleasure and pain which was in

fact happiness or misery. Pleasure as a motive never prompted the

individual to what was against his interest, inasmuch as this interest

23Ibid., p. 31.

24Ibid., pp. 43-69.
















could not really be expressed in terms other than pleasure itself.

Any awareness of an opposition between the individual's good and

pleasure as a principle was traceable by Bentham to confusions con-

cerning pleasures and pains. Bentham simply rejected as mistaken the

view that one may desire an end other than pleasure.25 Table 2

provides a summary of the kinds of pleasures and pains discussed by
Bentham.2


Actions and Consequences

Bentham gave attention to actions in terms of their motives, and

consequences, so far as actions were intentional, i.e., voluntary or

in accordance with the individual's own determination.27 An inten-

tional act was distinguishable from its consequences, although the

intention of an act always embraced considerations of consequences

of some sort. An individual could only be responsible for what he

did and for the consequences which he had before him in committing

an act. The actual consequences of an act depended upon circumstances,

which were never intended by the individual. Circumstances were

strictly objects of the understanding, not of the will; and, with

respect to circumstances, an act was either advised or unadvised. An

individual, however, did jrill- his own free act and, according to his

understanding, its presumed consequences; in this respect his inten-

tion was good or bad. The actual consequences of an act which are

of importance to the legislator were pleasures or pains, as increasing


25Ibid., pp. 8-28.

26Ibid-., pp. 34-42.

27Ibid. pp. 82-83.



















Source Kind of Pleasure Kind of Pain Source


TABLE ~2


BENTHAM'S PLEASURES AND PAINS


Sense Pleasure which results from the
sensory features, such as taste,
smell, touch, hearing, sight,
and sex. Also the satisfaction
of hunger and thirst, and intox-
ication.

Wealth Pleasures which result from the
possession of articles of enjoy-
ment. Pleasure of acquisition.

Skill Pleasure which results from the
application of particular in-
struments for enjoyment and
security .

Amity Pleasures which result from the
spontaneous and gratuitous serv-
ices of others in a friendly
manner.

Good Pleasures which result from the
Reputation esteem and love of others who
hold .a person in honor.


Pains which result from the
sensory features, such as taste,
smell, touch, hearing, and sight.
" Also the pains associated with
hunger and thirst,


The absence of pleasure in its
many forms, which results in pains
of desire, disappointment, and
regret.
Pains which result from unsuccess-
ful endeavors of applying instru-
ments to their uses.


Pains which result from a man's
being on ill terms with others.



Pains whtch result from being in
ill repute, dishonor, or the pains
of the moral sanction.


Sense






Privation




Awkwardness




Enmity



Bad
Reputation
















Source Kind of Pleasure Kind of Pain Source


TABLE 2 -- Continued


Power Pleasures which result from
having the ability to command
the benefit of the services
of others.'

Piety Pleasures which result from
the possession of the good-
will or favor of the Supreme
Being.
Benevolence Pleasures which result from
sympathy and social affections,

Malevolence Pleasures which flow from the
feeling of ill will toward
others, and also the pleasures
of antipathy, and dissocial
affections.


Memory Pleasures which result from
simple recollection and recall
of events.

Imagination Pleasures derived from contempla-
tion of one's present, past, or
future.


Pains which result from a
person being obnoxious to
,n the displeasuge of a Supreme
Being.

Pains associated with goodwill,
sympathy, or the pains of so-
cial affections.

Pains which result from having
an object of displeasure enjoy-
ing some form of pleasure, and
also the pains of ill will,
antipathy, and dissocial affec-
tions.

Pains associated with recalling
previous painful events.


Pains derived from contemplation
of one's present, past, or
future.


Piety



Benevolence



Malevolence






Memory



Imagination










Source Kind of Pleasure Kind of Pain Source


Expectation Pleasures which result from con- Pains which result from the fear Expectation
templation of the future when of impending events. Pains of
accompanied by the sentiment of apprehension.
belief.

Association Pleasures which result from the Pains which result from the con- Association
connection in the mind of plea- nection in the mind of pains
sures with certain objects or with certain objects or incidents.
incidents.

Rel ief Pleasures which result from the
abatement of pain.


TABLE 2 -- Continued
















or diminishing the happiness of the community. In terms of such con-

sequences, the tendency of an act was regarded as beneficent or mis-

chi evous.28

The intention of an act was also termed good or bad with respect

to the motive or motives from which it arose, and the motive of an

intention could be good when the presumed consequences of the same

intention were bad; also, the consequences could be good when the

motive was bad. When Bentham regarded himself as speaking of motives

in a strict way, he denied that they were either good or bad except

in terms of their general tendency to involve good or bad effects.

Rather, the individual's disposition was either good or bad. A dis-

position was beneficent when the tendency of an individual's act was

good and the motive was that of good-will; a mischievous disposition

was the conjunction of a bad tendency of an act and the self-regarding

motive. Thus, it was to the beneficent disposition that the moralist

or legislator must look in seeking to support the good of the com-

munity.29 Bentham clearly stated the consequences of his theory of

action which held that the estimation of action and motive was ultim-

ately determined in terms of good and bad effects as pleasures and

pains in these words:

The only way, it should seem, in which a motive
can with safety and propriety be styled good or
bad, is with reference to its effects in each
individual instance; and principally from the
intention it gives birth to: from which arise
...the most material part of its effects.
A motive is good, when the intention it gives
birth.to is good or bad, according to the


28Ibid., p. 133.

2Ibid., p. 121.















material consequences that are the objects of
it.30


Morals and Legislation

Bentham devoted considerable thought and discussion to the

treatment of the relation of morals to legislation. The relation-

ship of morals and legislation was based on the commonalityl of inter-
est in the happiness of every member of the community. Bentham

defined ethics as "the art of directing men's actions to the produc-

tion of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of

those whose interest is in view."3 Each person was responsible to

"private ethics" which acted as an "art of self-government." Private
ethics were concerned with legislation and administration of conduct

in relation to the embracing rules of prudence (duties to oneself)

and the rules of probity and beneficence (duties to others). Legis-

lation, as the promulgation of external rules, must assist private

ethics in ways which support the happiness of the whole community

and not in ways which subtract from this happiness.32 The sanctions

of legislation, as distinct from those of ethics, would apply least

in matters of prudence; because, popular (moral) sanctions would

operate mainly in these matters. In matters of probity (avoiding

injury to others), legislation could both dissuade and restrain the

individual from harming others, and it could define the character of

the offenses against property and against society itself. In matters

of beneficence (increasing the happiness of others) the major

301bid., p. 120

31Ibid., p. 310.

32Ibid., pp. 312-13.
















jurisdiction belonged to ethics and not legislation. The effects

of laws in this area were limited, but Bentham felt that they should

be extended beyond what custom had dictated. In essence, he felt that

our duties to others, as beneficence, could be legislated so that,

for example,

In cases where the person is in danger, why
should it not be made the duty of every man
to save another from mischief, when it can
be done without prejudicing oneself, as well
as to abstain from bringing it on him.33

This last point, on the function of legislation, captured the

spirit of Benthamism. It was according to Bentham, "the idea pursued

in the body of this work."3 The utilitarianism of Bentham reflected

a concern for the individual members of society, who had equal claims

upon well-being. The recognition of the individual and his interests

constituted the center of moral investigation and the focus of reform.

Each should count for one and none for more than one. If indeed an

individual was to be benefited in his own situation, he must be con-

sulted or at least kept in mind in the calculations of the legislator.

The individual's estimate of pleasures and pains, as guided by his

concern for his own good, was to be matched by the estimates of the

legislator in his efforts to reduce mischief or pain and to increase

pleasure for the greatest number. The contention was that there was

more to human existence than a simple balance of pleasure over pain;

this did not really overturn an approach to social morality in terms

of increasing happiness and diminishing misery. John Stuart Mill


33Ibid., p. 323.

34Ibid.















strongly supported this position in his defense of utilitarian-

ism.35


Mill's Corrections of Utilitarianism

Mill directed his efforts toward the clarification and correc-

tion of what appeared to him to be misunderstandings and trivializa-

tions. The definitional problems and the improper applications of

utilitarian concepts were the result of a shallow understanding of

utilitarianism. Mill argued that utilitarianism was not to be mis-

construed as an ethic which neglected beauty, ornament, or amusement,

and neither was it to be misrepresented as an ethic which fastened

the enjoyment of momentary pleasures and frivolity to the neglect

of more substantive pursuits. Utilitarianism was, to Mill, correct

in its basic premise that pleasure and freedom from pain were the

only things desirable as ends, and that all desirable things were

desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to

the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.36
Wlhat Mill took strong objection to were the things the utilitar-

ian theory included in the ideas of pleasure and pain, and to what

extent this was left an open question. A major concern was whether

pleasures and pains were homogeneous in their intrinsic value,

assuming that the objective elanents were equal, or whether they

were to be judged according to their source of derivation, i.e.,

were pleasures and pains associated with the higher faculties preferable

35John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863). [Reprinted in its
complete .form in Writers on Ethics: Classic and Contemporary, ed.
Joseph Katz, Philip Nochlin, and Robert Stover (Princeton, New Jersey:
D. Van Nostrand, 1962).]

36Ibid., p. 113.















in kind to those of which the animal nature of man was susceptible?

Mill held that the concept of utility was to be considered as a

directive rule of human conduct and, therefore, was concerned with

the cultivation of nobleness of character, even if some form of dis-

satisfaction or pain resulted from the pursuit. Mill stated:

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. An if the
fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion,
it is because they only know their own side
of the question. The other party to the com-
parison knows both sides.37

Apparently, Mill was not only concerned with the quantity of pleasures,

but, also with the quality of individual and societal existence.

Mill, in his recognition of kinds of pleasure in relation to the

fulfillment of distinct human capabilities, meant to say that good,

as good objects, was something different from the experience or

experiences of pleasantness. Then, the basis of Mill's utilitarian-

ism was not simply the fact of pleasure as an experience of whatever

number of individuals or the desiring of pleasantness, but the

desirable and pleasurable in the sense of precise human realizations

which were in the very nature of the case intrinsically satisfying.

Mill's treatment of morality as an order of action involved less

perplexity than his treatment of the nature of good. If the greatest

happiness secured to the greatest number was the end or good of the
community, then "right action" was whatever was conducive to this end.

Mill thought of actions simply as efficient causes which were found

to produce positive goods, such as the enjoyment of art and music,

and the decrease or removal of positive evils, such as poverty and

37Ibid.















disease. Inasmuch as all actions have consequences, Mill (following

Bentham) wanted to stress the responsibility of the moralist to under-

take the determination of the consequences of action as a matter capable

of empirical investigation. This responsibility was in accord with both

intelligence and generosity.

SMill was aware that moral sensibility embraced more than the recog-

nition of the efficacy of action ~which was conducive to general happi-

ness. While right action could only be understood in terms of the good

which it produced, or was believed to have produced, the very disposition

to act for the sake of the good was morally significant. To act from

such a disposition was to act virtuously, even where desirable con-

sequences did not flow from a given act itself. Mill included virtue

as an aggregate of "ingredients of happiness." The virtuous man was

not one who was indifferent to the consequences of his action. Mill

concluded that since right action was always a means to the end of

general happiness, virtue was- never simply a means.
Mill's attention to virtue, or the virtuous disposition, was part

of-a broad concern with the conscientious roots.of right action.

Bentham rested the promotion of the greatest good of the community

upon the somewhat unsure foundation of the purely social motive of-

symp'athy together with the semi-social motives of love of amity and

love of reputation. The efficacy of these motives, to Bentham, was

a function of the bias and quantum of sensibility. It was to this-

sensibility that Mill directly appealed in speaking of the "con-

scientipus feelings of mankind."38 Mill maintained that the moral
feelings were natural but not innate. The faculty consisting of the


38Ibid., p. 126.
















moral feelings was natural in being an outgrowth of human nature,

either in springing up spontaneously or in being brought to develop-

ment by cultivation.39 This faculty was flexible and was capable of

conferring the authority of conscience upon very diverse moral con-

tents. At the very root of the moral faculty was a natural basis of

social sentiment, namely the "social feelings of mankind, the desire

to be in unity with our fellow creatures," through which the feelings

of one individual were more and more identified with the good of

others.40 Thus, the support of the well-being of others was an ex-

pression of a natural want, of an internal force which was independent
of external sanctions, selfish interests, and influences of bad educa-

tion.

The social feelings provided the sanction for the highest require-

ments in the scale of social utility, namely those which come under the

name of justice. Justice was the recognition not simply of duties in

support of general happiness, but also of claims which individuals

have upon one another, and thus upon society. The idea of justice

embraced, accordingly, two things, namely a rule of fairness or reciprocity,

and a sentiment which moves the individual to be just. The sentiment of

justice was the moral, or social, feeling which softens and enlarges the

somewhat primitive desire to retaliate an injury, so as to enable the

individual to act for the interest of society rather than for himself.

and for those with whom he sympathized.41

39Ibid., p. 127.

40Ibid.

41Ibid., p. 140.















In Mill's view, the idea of justice made implicit the whole

intention of the greatest happiness principle, namely to give an

individual his due as the minimum of service to him. Justice was

respecting the personal happiness of another as at least equal to

one's own happiness. This rule recognized the claims of others to

happiness and to all of its means.42 These claims or rights were

but expressions of the fundamental right of the individual to equality

of treatment. For every right a corresponding duty existed, although

some duties, such as generosity and beneficence, did not have corres-

ponding rights, i.e., one individual had no moral claim upon another's

generosity or beneficence.

Although justice was not the whole of morality, the duties re-

lated to rights were "more paramount .. than any others." Equality

with its rights and duties was that "abstract standard of social and

distributive justice" toward which "all institutions, and the efforts

of all virtuous citizens" should be directed. The rights of indivi-

duals were indefeasible, although the exercise of a particular right

could be affected by the demands of "some recognized social expediency."

Equality was the very sense of the principle of utility and of Benthamls

dictum, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one."43

The sentiment o~f justice of which Mill spoke of as resting upon

"the human capacity of enlarged sympathy and the human conception of

intelligent self-interest" was in many respects the sentiment and

spirit of nineteenth-century liberalism. The works which emanated

from this period abound with convictions concerning the capability of

4Ibid.

43Ibid., p. 148.















the individual for self-determination in seeking to achieve a satis-

factory existence and the possibilities open to community in seeking

to support the welfare of its members.

In Mill's defense, the moral philosopher's proper concern was

with the character of individual life and with the excellence which

an individual could achieve in himself while at the same time extend-

ing assistance to others. Society is not, of course, an idealized

unity of thought and purpose, and it is doubtful that Mill or any

utilitarian thought this to be the case. However, while society is

not a substantial unity existing above and beyond the individual man-

bers, the conscious purposes of individuals must always be consulted

and respected in any projection of the good of the community as a

whole. Social reform is not so much a reordering of individuals, as

it has become in collectivist societies, as it is a reordering of the

conditions of personal freedom and fulfillment.


Summary of Utilitarian Ethics
Utilitarianism in Bentham and Mill combined the defense of hedon-

ism with the advocacy of social and political reform. The good was

pleasure or the pleasant because no one ever desired anything but

pleasure. Good was simply what was desired and pleasure alone is

desired, whatever the disguises which appetition might take. Pleasure

could be measured or estimated, as Bentham suggested, by a number of

values of "elements" (such as intensity, duration, fecundity, and

purity), and these values were to be "always kept in view" when

seeking to determine the good or evil tendency of action which yielded

pleasure or pain. At the same time, the recognition of pleasure as



















the good did not favor pleasures of the moment, or pleasures whose

enjoyment by one individual interfere with or detract from the

felicity of others. The calculus of pleasures and pains was governed

by the "greatest happiness principle," according to which each indi-
vidual should count for one in the determination of whether the

tendency of an action augmented or diminished the happiness 'of the

community.

The place of pleasure in the hedonism of Bentham suggested the

general argument that the life of pleasure without knowledge was to

be rejected as the good for man. Mill sought to keep uppermost the

rational or intuitionistt" element in hedonism in contending that dis-

tinctions among pleasures are qualitative as well as quantitative, in

accordance with the sensibility which was bound up with man's higher

faculties. To this sensibility were to be attributed the interests of

the cultivated mind and the moral feelings which supported social

existence and the duties of justice in society. Mill's attention to

the "Imoral sense" brought him into the company of intuitionists who

had maintained that the differences among goods were immediately per-

ceived, and that right was not simply what was conducive to or pro-

ductive of happiness.

The tensions in utilitarianism between hedonism and intuitionism,

with respect to the good, and between consequentialism and intuitionism,

with respect to right action, remained after Mill. These tensions were

to be exhibited in various ways in the writings of later theorists,
















such as Sidgwick,44 Moore,45 and Perry.46 While the dialog among the
utilitarians was interesting, it will not be discussed here, but some

of the views of Moore will be discussed. Opposed to all forms of

hedonistic utilitarianism, Moore insisted upon approaching the basic

ethical issues from the question of the cognition and definability of

"good." Good was a simple quality,.Moore maintained, which was known
or intuited simply as what it was. Any attempt at definition which

represented good as "another thing," as in holding that "good" means

"pleasure," comnntted the "naturalistic fallacy."47 Moore recognized

pleasure as a necessary ingredient of things which were good, but he
.denied that pleasure was what good meant. Of the things which were

good, Moore distinguished chiefly the enjoyment of beautiful objects
and the pleasures of association. He argued, with respect to the pro-

duction of such goods, that action was to be recognized as "good as a

means" or right.48 Moore's version of utilitarianism combined the

definition of "right" in terms of utility with the indefinability of

"good" in order to avoid what he believed to be errors committed by
moral philosophers in the past. Moore's liberation of utilitarianism

from hedonism was in a certain way latent in the thoughts of Mill..

44Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1962), chap. 4.

45George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1929), pp. 59-109.
46Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Va-lue.(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1954), chap. 8.

47Moore, Principia Ethica, op. cit., pp. 9-21.
48George Edward Moore, Ethics (London: Oxford University Press,
1912, reprinted as a Galaxy Book, 1965), pp. 27-49.



















The critical questions developed in utilitarian ethics which

relate to the administrative decisionmaking process include:

1. What are the probable consequences of the alternative

proposals?

2. Which policy alternative would result in the greatest happi-

ness for the greatest number?

3. How would the consequences of the alternative proposals com-

pare in relation to the value elements of intensity, duration,

certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent of

pleasures and pains?

4. Should policy decisionmakers legislate a person's duty

towards helping others, or should the matters of beneficence

be determined by one's "private ethics"?

5. How should an organization foster pleasures and diminish pains

of its members, and thereby contribute to the end happiness?

6. What types of qualitative pleasures are provided for or

encouraged by an organization, as opposed to quantitative

pleasures?

7. What is the factual evidence based upon empirical investiga-

tions for assertions about benefits and disadvantages, pleasures,

and pains?

8. Does the organization and its administration provide for

equality of treatment, or do some individuals count for more
than their fair share?















Deweyan Ethics

Theory of Valuation

The pragmatic ethics of John Dewey49 took as a major concern

the problem of valuing and valuing expressions: they related to all

planned or deliberated human conduct, personal and collective. Value

was, to Dewey, defined as those estimates of worth which were associ-

ated with human activities and relations.50 Dewey strongly objected

to what he termed ejaculatoryy" value expressions which did not state

anything about contexts and feelings. Expressions such as "good,"

"bad," "right," and "wrong" were regarded by Dewey as mere interjec-

tions, because they did not state anything of substance. They were

considered as "phenomena like blushing, smiling, weeping; or as stimuli

to move others in certain ways--much as one says 'Gee' to oxen or 'Whoa'

to a horse."5

Dewey desired a theory of valuation which would provide for the

possibility of developing genuine propositions about the direction of
human affairs. He discounted theories of valuation which (1) denied

that value assertions could not be subjected to experimental tests,

(2) relegated value categories to only the mental field to the exclusion

of the physical area, or (3) found that value expressions were absent

in the physical sciences. The implication of this action was that value

categories were supreme over factual existence.52

49John Dewey, Theory of Vraliation (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1939). [Reprinted in its complete form in Writers of Ethics:
Classic and Contemporary, op. cit., pp. 574-614.]

50Ibid., p. 575.

51Ibid., p. 578.

52Ibid., pp. 575-576.
















The concept of value, as an estimate of human conduct, could only

be found in a contextual setting, according to Dewey. Therefore, it

was important that the context, in which a value question was encount-

ered, be made clear; otherwise, the stated value expressions would be

meaningless. Only with an understanding of the contextual setting

could propositions be assigned a value. Dewey also held that situa-

tions which prompted value expressions developed only when one was

confronted with a desire to avoid an existing situation, and when there

was an attraction towards another possible prospective situation. At

the same time, a "specifiable and testable relation between the latter

(a prospective situation) as an end and certain activities as means

for accomplishing it" should develop.53 Therefore, according to

Dewey, dissatisfaction with one's present condition stimulated the

individual toward making value decisions involving likes and dis-

likes, desires and interests, and means and ends.

Valuational activities, as outlined, were marked by three suc-

cessive circumstances and motives--dissatisfaction with the present

context, attraction to a prospective alternative, and a determination

of means to accomplish the end sought. Valuation, within such a

model, could be analyzed and verified by the observation of behaviors

associated with such circumstances. For example, one could assign

such qualifying adjectives as "slight" and "great" when the amount

of energy expended and the length of time over which a behavior

persisted were observed. In such an instance, it was also possible

to demarcate what was designated by likes and dislikes from things


53Ibid., p. 581.















prefixed by such an ambiguous term as "enjoy."54 Value statements,

or what Dewey termed "propositions of appraisal", should only refer

to a valuation of things with respect to their "serviceability or

usefulness." While this notion concentrated on the valuation of

things as means, Dewey contended such a relational theory of value

inherently involved the evaluation of ends.55

In Dewey's theory of valuation the existential relation described

and defined certain things as good, fit, or proper valuations. The

existential relation in question was that of means-ends or means-

consequences, and the propositions which flowed from such a relation,

to Dewey, could be tested by observation of results actually attained

as compared with those intended. "Prizings" constituted desires and

interests likingss) which could not exist independent of the appraisal

of things (means), but rather were intimately influenced by appraisals.

Thus, while Dewey discriminated between the appraisal of things as

means, and the prizingg" of things as ends, he held that deliberative

activity, which weighed various alternative end states, was always

couched in terms of the conditions which were the means of their

securement. Dewey stated that:

The more overtly and emphatically the valuation
of objects as ends in connected with desire and
interest, the more evident it should be that,
since desire and interest are ineffectual save
as they co-operatively interact with environing
conditions, valuation of desire and interest, as
means correlated with other means, is the sole
condition for value appraisal of objects as
ends .56


54Ibid. pp. 582-83.

55Ibid., p. 587.

~56Ibid., p. 591.















Dewey's pragmatic ethics stressed that valuation took place only

when something was wrong, or when there was "some trouble to be done

away with, some need, lack or privation to be made good, some conflict

of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions."57

This fact in turn proved that the intellectual factor of inquiry was

present. The adequacy with which inquiry was exercised resulted in
the difference in different desires and their correlative ends-in-

view. Dewey stated:

Propositions in which things (acts and materials)
are appraised as means enter necessarily into .
desires and interests that determine end-values.
Hence the importance of the inquiries that result
in.the appraisal of things and means.58

Dewey did not accept any a priori standard for determining the

value of a proposed solution in relation to concrete cases. To Dewey,

a proposed solution either performed the function of resolution of

a problem, as an end-in-view, or it did not. Therefore, Dewey rejected

not only the hedonistic principle of pleasure as the ultimate good,

but all forms of monistic definitions of good. The only valid test of

the existence of a valuation was actual behavior that was subject to

observation. The acceptance or rejection of such behavior was deter-

mined by the examination of the concrete situation in respect to the

conditions that constituted the need or lack, the attainable ends or

outcomes desired formulated as means, and the consequences that

mutually ensued.59 Therefore, the only purpose of a theory` of valua-

tion was to set forth the conditions by which a method of formation


-~571bid;,~ ., p 594.

58Ibid., p. 595.

5Ibid., pp. 606-7.















of desires and interests could be observed in concrete situations.

The concepts of "good" and "right" were defined by Dewey in the

following fashion:

The view that value in the sense of good is inher-
ently connected with that which promotes, furthers,
assists, a course of activity, and that value in
the sense of right: is inherently connected with
that which is needed, required, in the maintenance
of a course of activity.0


The Dynamic Force of Habit

The purpose of ethics, as a philosophical science, was "to state

problems in such forms that action could be courageously and intelli-

gently directed to their solution."61 With this purpose in mind, Dewey
held that one needed to recognize the role that habit, impulse, and

intelligence performed in the determination of human conduct. Habit,

to Dewey, was defined as an acquired predisposition which was projective,

dynamic in quality, and ready for overt manifestation.62 This predis-

position to ways or modes of response dictated the formation of ideas
as well as their execution, and in its overt manifestation, it was not

limited to a particular set of activities, but could take a variety of-

forms. Habits were also viewed by Dewey as acquired social functions

which performed as "working adaptations of personal capacities with

environing forces."63 Thus, Dewey held that-the habits acquired as a

result of the interaction of personal and environmental elements could

60Ibid. p., 609.

.61John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to .Social
Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1922; Random House, The Modern
Library, 1950), p. 12.

62Ibid., p. 4T'.

63Ibid., p. 16.














be expressed as virtues and vices, and they could also be equated with

human will.

A habit, as a special sensitiveness to certain classes of stimuli,

when taken in connection with the continuity of other habits with one

another explained the unity of human character and conduct, motive and

act, and will and deed.64 Dewey's moral theory held that an under-

standing of those active dispositions which make a man do what he does

could result in the prescription of meaningful remedies for undesirable

tendencies. When making moral judgments of character, Dewey cautioned

that one should not make wholesale judgments, but should discriminate

among "the complex of acts and habits into tendencies which were to be

specifically cultivated and condemned."65 A thorough understanding of
the conditions which promoted the development of human character and

a thorough study of the consequences which flowed from their activity'

were essential if there was to be a modification of those factors which

contributed toward the development of undesirable tendencies. Dewey

believed that human character could be changed provided one could change

certain conditions. Dewey stated:

To change the working character or will of another
we have to alter objective conditions which enter
into his habits. Our own schemes of judgment, of
assigning blame and praise, of awarding punishment
and honor, are part of these conditions.6

Morals were defined in Deweyan ethics as customs, folkways, or

established collective habits. Customs constituted the moral standards,


64bid., p. -43.

---65Ibid. p.- 48.

66Ibid., D. 19.
















because they cultivated demands for certain modes of overt behavior.67

An individual acquired morality through the assimilation of the estab-

lished cultural patterns to which he had been subjected. Therefore,

the social groups or associations with which one was involved, and the

degree of one's interactions with such systems nurtured not only one's

moral development, but also one's sense of morality. These interacting

arrangements, in many cases, came into conflict with one another, and,

in this diversity of models, individuality could assert itself to foster

progress. Dewey stated that, because of the present mobility and inter-

minglings of custom, an individual could exercise personal ingenuity

in selecting and rearranging the elements of custom patterns in order

to remake them.68 According to Dewey, this relationship of custom and

morality established standards which were sanctioned by life itself.

The basic question which flowed from this nexus of custom and morality

was how individuals were going to use and be used by these standards,

not whether they were going to be used. Therefore, the significant

problem to be resolved did not involve a choice between moral authority

outside customr and one within it, but between adopting more or less

intelligent and significant customs. Dewey stated:

Reason, moral principles, cannot in any case be
showed behind these affairs, for reason and morality
grow out of them. They are there as part of them.
No one can escape them if he wants to. He cannot
escape the problem of how to engage in life, since
in any case he must engage in it in some way or
other--or else quit and get out.69


-67Ibid., p. 75.

-- 681bid. --- --- --

691bid., p. 81.















The Place of Impulse in Conduct

Impulses were an integral part of Deweyan ethics, because they

represented the raw materials of human nature and conduct. Dewey

viewed impulses as the starting points for the assimilation of knowl-

edge and skill, and as agencies for the transfer of existing social

power into personal ability. In other words, they were the organs of

reorganization and readjustment.70 Impulses were not to be thought of

as secondary and dependent upon formed habits and customs. Instincts

or impulses were, according to Dewey, modified by their interaction

with the environment. Dewey in his discussion on the plasticity of

impulses commented that: "Any impulse may become organized into almost

any disposition according to the way it interacts with surroundings."71

This fact was a central tenet in Dewey's philosophy of education, be-

cause he felt that a "truly humane education consists of an intelligent

direction of native activities in the light of the possibilities and

necessities of the social situation."" Unfortunately, schools have

generally demanded "an impatient premature mechanization of impulsive

activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits of thought and

affection."7

Dewey believed that while some inventive impulses of the young

worked toward accommodation, assimilation, or reproduction, other

impulses worked toward exploration, discovery, and creation. However,

the weight of adult customs strengthened the tendency toward conformity


70Ibid., p. 94.


72Ibid., p. 96.

73Ibid.
















rather than toward ~the development of variation and independence. Dewey,

of course, recognized that not all creative impulses could be woven

into a smooth pattern of habits; but, upon the onslaught of circumstance

and stimuli, "the emotional outbreak and rush of instincts dominating

all activity show how superficial is the modification which a rigid

habit has been able to effect."74 Impulses~ were, therefore, sources

of liberation, and by giving habits pertinence and freshness they could

liberate an individual's potential. Impulses were also intermediaries

of human conduct, because morality was an endeavor to find for the

manifestation of impulse an office of refreshment and renewal. If not

used in such forms impulses could become pathological and barbaric.

Impulsive activities should be treated as opportunities for imagination

and invention, not as ends in themselves. Dewey stated: "Impulse is

needed to arouse thought, incite reflection and enliven belief."75


The Place of Intelligence in Conduct

In Deweyan ethics intelligence was a necessary element in order

to achieve a balance between habit and impulse. This balance of habit

and impulse was requisite for observation, memory, and judgment; habits

by themselves were too organized, insistent, and determinate to indulge

in inquiry or imagination; and impulses taken as themselves were too

chaotic, tumultous, and confused to be able to know what they even

wanted.76 Intellectual activity was a necessary link with the conjoint

operation of habit and impulse, because it engendered experiment and

741bid., p. 101.

75Ibid., pp. 170-71.
76Ibid.. n_177.















deliberation when a person was confronted with a felt difficulty or

problem.

The intellectual activity of deliberation served as an experiment

"in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really

like."77 The purpose of deliberation was, therefore, to make various

combinations of habit and impulse to determine what the resultant

action would be if the various alternatives were put into action. By

this use of imagination and reflection, a person was able to follow out

a course of action without committing final or fatal actions. Delibera-

tion, to Dewey, ceased when a choice or decision was finally arrived at

by the person. Dewey defined the term choice as "simply hitting upon

an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of an

overt action."78 The point of decision was settled upon when the vari-

ous factors in action fitted harmoniously together so that the course

of action chosen would be fully released. To secure reasonable choices

a person should not allow his thoughts to be consumed by a particular

habit or impulse. Proper deliberation should consider a number of

preferences so that all of the facts were properly considered. If

one followed this maxim,Dewey claimed that decisions could be con-

sidered reasonable. He added: "There may be error in result, but it

comes from lack of data not from ineptitude in handling them."79

Dewey rejected hedonistic utilitarian theory which consisted of

calculations on the basis of pleasure and pain or profit and loss

resulting from proposed courses of action. Dewey postulated that

--77Ibid. p.- 190. -

781bid., p. 192.

791bid., p. 194.
















deliberation had its beginning in troubled activity, and contended

that its conclusion in choice of action should be based upon that

which could resolve the problem. He stated:

It [deliberation] no more resembles the casting-
up of accounts of profit and loss, pleasures and
pains, than an actor engaged in drama resembles
a clerk recording debit and credit items in his
ledger.80

The pleasure principle of the utilitarians was too indeterminate,
individualistic, and elusive to lend itself to calculation and

decisionmaking, particularly since future pleasures were being con-

sidered. The problem of deliberation was not to calculate future

happenings but to appraise present proposed actions, and to judge

habits and desires by their tendency to produce certain consequences.

Dewey's pragmatic ethics were present-minded, not based on the calcu-
lation of indeterminate future results. Dewey listed the reflective

qualities that each person should possess when he stated:

The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability
to judge the significance of what we are doing and
to use that judgment in directing what we do, not
by means of direct cultivation of something called
conscience, or reason, or a faculty or moral knowl-
edge, but by fostering those impulses and habits-
which experience has shown to make us sensitive,
generous, imaginative, impartial in receiving the
tendency of our inchoate dawning activities.
Therefore the important thing is the fostering of
those habits and impulses which lead to a broad,
just, sympathetic survey of situations.81l

Impulse and habit were the primary determinants of human conduct,
and reflective intelligence was required for the determination of

foreseeable consequences and direction of activity. Dewey rejected


80Ibid., p. 199.

81Ibid., p. 207.
















the notion of fixed ends and fixed goods. Ends or aims were ways of

defining and deepening present activity, and were established to pro-

vide direction, effectiveness, and significance. Ends were directive

stimuli to present choice and should not be treated as frozen and iso-

lated goals.82 Dewey believed that persons should not fasten upon

some single end or consequence which was desired, or permit that aim

to blot from perception all other considerations, for the decision

would lead not only to narrowness but also perhaps to fanaticism.

Ends, rather, should be viewed as means to the unification and libera-

tion of present conflicting and confused impulses and habits.83 The

doctrine of fixed ends diverted attention from the examination of

consequences and rendered persons careless in their inspection of

existing conditions. The doctrine also neglected the task of intelli-

gence which was to grasp and realize genuine opportunity, based upon

the critical examination of the conditions of the given situation.

Dewey also rejected having fixed general rules, principles, com-

mandments, and laws. Such fixed antecedents of measure were merely

contrivances to avoid the strain of genuine uncertainty and perplexity

found in actual moral situations. However, Dewey did not completely

reject the value of general principles as instruments or tools to be

used in analyzing circumstances and conditions. Generalizations were

to be used as hypotheses for conducting observations or experiments

and for organizing special-facts. Dewey believed that knowledge of

general moral principles was instrumental toward developing the

82Ibid., p. 227.

83Ibid., p. 229.















individualized meaning of situations.84 Moral generalizations based

upon the continuity of habit directed attention to resemblances and
differences in each new case, and therefore economized the effort of

deliberation. Reasonable judgments., to Dewey, were made effective

when those habits and dispositions which lead to impartial foresight

of consequences were developed. As Dewey stated: "Then our judgments

are reasonable; we are then reasonable creatures."85


Summary of ~Deweyan Ethics

The ethics of Dewey stressed the critical role of reflective

intelligence in moral conduct, choice, and self-mak~ing. This vital

disposition encouraged deliberation and controlled impulses and habits
to develop more inclusive aims and execute a course of action in a

reasonable manner. The pattern of reflective thinking envisioned by

Dewey exemplified the problem-solving method of modern experimental
science. A description of the pattern was found in his famous work,

Democracy and Education:86 (1) there was a felt difficulty or problem

recognized; (2) the problem must be clarified and defined; (3) tentative

hypotheses or alternative courses of action need to be formulated; (4)
their consequences and implications must be envisaged and deduced; (5)

the selection of an alternative must be made and acted upon; and, (6)

the consequences which flowed from the selected course of action must

be evaluated to determine whether the desired aims have been fully

achieved.


84Ibid., p. 243.

85Ibid., p. 247.

86John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916;
The Free Press, 1966), pp. 139-63.
















The practice of reflective intelligence and its conclusions were

~to be the basis of all attitudes, beliefs, and actions. Although not

expressed directly, it became clear that Dewey did have a criterion

or standard by which actions were to be approved or disapproved. That

criterion was a teleological utilitarian one: the promotion of the

general welfare or happiness. In his aversion to fixed principles and

final ends, Dewey tried to establish his ethical system between a sub-

jective or atomistic position and a casuist position which operated

from fixed rules and aims. While Dewey's "general welfare" principle

r; ected all casuist and atomistic conceptions of its content, it did

establish a basic standard for the development of a "cautionary direc-

tion."8 Such a standard, to Dewey, "provides a consistent point of

view to be taken in all deliberation, but it.does not pretend to deter-

mine in advance precisely what constitutes the general welfare or

common good."88

By rejecting hedonism, the notion that pleasure was the end or

the chief good, Dewey seemingly defined good as that which was success-

ful in solving a problem. This "doctrine of success" was, however, not

to be treated as an end-in-itself, but was simply a consequence of

sound deliberative achievement. In regards to Dewey's conception of

the good life, he felt that it was a harmonious whole consisting of

good experiences or values. These good experiences were achieved
through intelligent action and were approved after reflection in the

light of full knowledge of their conditions and consequences. By

87John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, 1960), p. 42
88Ibid.
















being achieved and approved, such experiences were enjoyed as "con-

summatory experiences." Therefore, the happy life was one which could

be approved upon an intelligent review which considered it in all its

bearings.

Morals, to Dewey, were the most humane of all subjects, because

they were "ineradicably empirical, not theological nor metaphysical

nor mathematical."8 Since human nature existed and operated in an

environment, the subjects of physics, chemistry, history, statistics,

and even engineering science were part of disciplined moral knowledge,

so far as they enabled persons to understand the conditions and agencies

through which man lived, formed, and executed plans. Moral science did

not distinguish between intellectual and moral virtues or excellences,

but rather it encompassed physical, biological, and historic knowledge

which, when placed in a human context, guided and illuminated the

activities of men.90 The development of a more adequate science of

human nature was a matter of first-rate importance to Dewey. Such a

science could provide for a more informed and intelligent determina-

tion of particular acts. Dewey in his conclusion stated:

We need a permeation of judgments on conduct by
the method and materials of a science of human
nature. Without such enlightenment even the
best-intentioned attempts at moral guidance and
improvement of others often eventuate in trag-
edies of misunderstanding and division.91

The critical questions developed in Deweyan ethics which relate

to the administrative decisionmaking process include:


89Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, op. cit., p. 295.

90Ibid., p. 296.

91Ibid., p. 321.
















1. What is the felt difficulty or problem that has prompted

the need for deliberative activity?

2. Which of the active dispositions of habit and impulse are

in conflict?

3. What will satisfactorily terminate deliberation or relieve

the conflicts and tensions of the situation? Has the

proposed solution taken into consideration all of the

pertinent facts of the situation? Does the proposed solu-

tion anticipate the consequences in the larger environment

as well as the immediate situation?

4. Is the deliberation directed toward future happenings, or

is it concerned with the appraisal of present conditions?

5. Are the desired ends or aims to be viewed as ends-in-

themselves, or as means for resolving present problems?

6. How should a system alter, modify, or change individual. habits

and impulses in an ethical manner so that democratic values

may be accommodated and the intellectual activity of

deliberation increased?


Kantian Ethics


The Roots of Morality

The Kantian ethical system stressed the belief in the dignity

of individual men, and that dignity gave each man an intrinsic worth.

Dignity was viewed as the source of man's innate right to freedom,

legal and political rights, and the belief that all men are equal.

In emphasizing the rights of individuals Kantian ethics opposed

every form of utilitarianism. Legal and moral systems could not be














based on social utility, general happiness, or the common good.

Rather, they should be founded on the rights of individual men.

Any course of action which conflicted with these rights was ipso

facto wrong; and it was wrong regardless of the amount of good which

may have resulted from it. In this sense, Kantian ethics categorically

rejected the principle that the end justifies the means, however good

and worthwhile the end might have been.92 The ends sought were ir-

relevant when one judged an act involving moral variables. An action

was not truly moral unless it was done in the belief and because of

the belief that it was right intrinsically. Whether the action suc-

ceeded in its purposes or not, if it was done with a "good will", it

was morally acceptable. Thus, Immanuel Kant93 established that~ the

only absolute good was "good will." In the first remarks of the

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant phrased his belief in

the absoluteness of good will, and then he continued to give his

reasons why other chief aims were to be discounted and held to the

level of secondary considerations when determining morality. Kant
stated:

Nothing in the world--indeed nothing even beyond
the world--can possibly be conceived which could
be called good without qualification except aod
will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the ote
talents of the mind, however they be named, or
courage, resoluteness, and perserverance as qualities
of temperament, are doubtless in many respects good
and desirable. But they can become extremely bad
and harmful if the will, which is to make use of-


92John Ladd, Introduction to The Metaphysical Elements of Justice
(Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals), by Immanuel Kant (Indianapolis,
Indiana: Library of Liba Ats, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. ix.

9Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans.
with an Arts Press, Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 9.
















these gifts of nature and which in its special
constitution is called character, is not good.
It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power,
riches, honor, even health, general well-being,
and the contentment with one's condition which
is called happiness, made for pride and even
arrogance if there is not a good will to correct
their influence on the mind and on its principles
of action so as to make it universally conformable
to its end. It need hardly be mentioned that the
sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure
and good will, yet enjoying uninterrupted pros-
perity, can never give pleasure to a rational
impartial observer. Thus the good will seems to
constitute the indispensable condition even of
worthiness to be happy.94

Based on the absoluteness of good will as the chief virtue Kant

established the supreme principle of morality. This principle had

to be a formal principle which was valid for rational beings no matter

what their desires or ends, and it could not be an external command

to promote a certain end. The command had to come from.reason, because

"reason's proper function must be to produce a will good in itself and

not one good merely as a means, for to the former reason is absolutely

essential."95 The measure adopted by Kant as one which would "produce

a will good in itself" was duty, "for it is easily decided whether

an action in accord with duty is performed from duty or for some self-

ish purpose."96 Thus, the first proposition of morality offered by

Kant was that "to have moral worth an action must be done from duty."9

His second proposition was that an action performed from duty did not

have its moral worth in the purpose which was to be achieved but in

94Ibid.

95Ibid., p. 12.

96Ibid., p. 13.

97Ibid., p. 16.















the maxim by which it was determined.- The third proposition was that

duty was the necessary element of an action executed from respect for
law. By this statement Kant implied that moral values could consist

only in some conception of the law, and that this conception determined
actions without reference to the expected results. With the rationale

of his second-level principles secured, Kant stated that the supreme

principle of morality was: "Act as though the maxim of your action
were by your-will to become a universal law of nature."98


The Concept of Duty

Duty was a central concept in Kantian ethics, because of its

significance to the determination of desires and actions. To Kant,

duty could only be defined in terms of an objective principle which
constrained the will, i.e., practical reason. The formula for such

a command was termed an imperative, which stated what would be good

to do or to refrain from doing. The purpose of an imperative was to

command the will which "does not always do something simply because

it is presented as a good thing to do."9

Kant divided imperatives into two types. The first type was

termed a hypothetical imperative. According to Kant, these "present

the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving

something else which one desires (or which one may possible desire)."100

The second type of imperative was termed categorical .imperative, and
it was defined as "one which presented an action as of itself

98Ibid., p. 39.

991bid., p. 30.

100Ibid., p. 31.















objectively necessary, without regard to any other end."101 The

latter type of imperative was to Kant best fitted for moral matters.

The reason for this assignment rested on the basic difference between

the two different types of imperatives. In the case of the categorical

imperative knowledge of the ends sought and of the means to these ends

did not determine how the imperative was to be applied. The categori-

cal imperative, unlike the hypothetical, could be applied independently

of any particular desire~ for a particular end. There was only one

categorical imperative and it was: "Act only according to the maxim

by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal

law."0 In Kant's Critique of Practical Reason the formula was put in

a more elaborate fashion:

Ask yourself whether you could regard your pro-
posed action as a possible object ofyourwill
if it were to take place in accordance with a
law of nature in a system of nature of which you
were yourself a part.103

To enhance the concept of duty Kant gave examples of four dif-

ferent types of duties: duties to ourselves, and duties to others as

they exist as perfect duties and imperfect duties. In relation to a

perfect duty to ourselves, Kant discussed the question of suicide. He

held that even though a person believed that the continuance of his

life threatened more evil than satisfaction, the act of self-destruction

contradicted the supreme principle. "One immediately sees a contra-

diction in a system of nature whose law would be to destroy life by

101Ibid.

102Ibid., p. 39.

103Immanuel Kant, quoted in H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative:
A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy, 5th ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1965),
p. 146.















the feeling whose special of-fice* 's to impel the improvement of life."104

In regards to perfect duties to others Kant gave an example of a person

who borrowed money knowing full well that he would not be able to repay

it, but the person still promised to repay in order to obtain the loan.

In this situation Kant asked the question, "How would it be if my

maxim became a universal law?" He answered by stating:

The universality of a law which says that anyone
who believes himself to be in need could promise
what he pleased with the intention of not fulfill-
ing it would make the promise itself and the end
to be accomplished by it impossible; no one would
believe what was promised to him but would only
laugh at any such assertion as vain pretense.105
In the two cases cited, Kant held that the persons were bound by per-

fect duties. In the first case, one should not commit suicide; and,

in the second case, one should repay his debts. Perfect duties did

not admit of any exception, and they obligated the person to perform

a definite act in accordance with duty.

In the final two cases involving duties discussed by Kant,

examples of imperfect duties as they related to oneself and to others
revealed the difference between perfect and imperfect duties. The

third example sketched a scenario in which the person who had a natural

talent and could have become a useful person if he had only cultivated

his talent. However, the person decided to engage in pleasurable

activities rather than to improve his natural gifts. Idleness, indul-

gence, and propagation were preferred to a life devote t~o developing

one's talents. Kant-held that such a person could, sifbly will

104Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit.,
p. 40.
105Ibid.
















that this should become a universal law of nature. "For, as a

rational being, he necessarily wills that all faculties should be

developed, inasmuch as they are given to him for all sorts of pos-

sible purposes."106 In the final scenario Kant was concerned with

imperfect duties as they related to others. In this situation a

person was confronted with the knowledge that while things were

going well for himself, others had to struggle with great hardship.

The person in the case did not recognize his duty to others and

asked, "What concern of mine -is it? Let each one be as happy as

heaven wills, or as he can make himself."' Kant asserted that, if

such a rationality was used for not assisting others in time of need,

the concept of mutual aid would be destroyed. Kant stated that even

though the human race could continue to exist without the benefit of

mutual aid, the person who so willed it would no doubt regret his

actions:

Instances often arise when he would need the love
and sympathy of others, and in which he would have
robbed himself, by such a law of nature springing
dfF~rohs own will, of all hope of the aid he

Imperfect duties bind persons only to the maxim that they ought to

take some form of positive action, but it was left to the discretion-

of each to decide on the extent of the concern either for one's self

or for others. While maxims opposed to imperfect duties could be

conceived, they could not be willed without contradiction. Whereas,

maxims opposed to perfect duties could not even be conceived. A


106Ibid., p. 41.
1071bid.















summary of Kant's various types of duties and obligations is pro-

vided ihffab~le 3.108


TABLE 3


KANT'S TYPOLOGY OF DUTIES


Duties to Oneself


Duties to Others


Respect oneself. Pre- Keep promises. Be. truth-
serve oneself, i.e., do ful, do not lie. Re-
not commit suicide, mu- spect others. Repay
tilate, defile, or stup- debts. Seek to establish
ify oneself. Be truth- a system of positive laws
ful, do not lie. Do and obey them.
not be miserly.



Seek one's own perfec- Promote happiness. Be
tion; natural perfec- grateful. Be sympa-
tion and moral perfec- thetic. Be friendly
tion. Develop one's and socialable. Be be-
natural talents. i nevolent and loving.


Perfect
Duties






Imperfect
Duties


A Realm of Ends

If there was a categorical imperative, it must have enjoined upon

persons objective and absolute ends. -Since these ends must have

absolute worth, they could not be relative ends which persons sought

to produce. The ends must have been rational agents or, for practical

purposes, men. Subjective ends rested upon incentives while objec-

tive ends depended upon "motives valid for every rational being."109


108Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue (Part II of The Meta-
physics of Morals), trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbacks,
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), pp. 45f.

109Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., p. 45.















To establish universal principles there exists an.absolute worth,

and absolute worth resided in man. Kant stated:

Every rational being exists as an end in himself
and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used
by -this or that will. In all his actions, whether
they~ are directed to himself or to other rational
beings, he must always be regarded at the same
time as an end.110

Individuals were to be an object of respect and were not to be treated

as means to subjective ends. The ground for this principle was that,

"rational nature exists as an -end in itself."111 This condition led

Kant to derive a practical imperative which stated: "Act so that you .

treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another,

always as an end and never as a means only.~"112

The concept of each person as a rational agent who must be

regarded as legislating law through the maxims of each will led to

the notion of a realm of ends. Kant defined this concept as:

A whole of all ends in systematic connection, a
whole of all rational beings as ends in themselves
as well as of the particular ends which each may
set for himself. This is a realm of ends which is
possible .. [because] all rational beings stand
under the law that each of them should treat him-
self and all others never merely as means but in
every case as an end in himself.113

The "realm of ends" gave rise to objective commoon laws which should

consider the proper relations of persons to each other.~ Within this

"realm of ends" everything had either a price or a dignity. Whatever

had a price could be replaced by something else or its equivalent.

110Ibid., p. 46.

1111bid., p. 47.

112Ibid.

113Ibid., op. 51-52.















That which was related to general human inclinations and needs had

a market price, while that which was in accord with certain tastes

had an affective price. "But that which constitutes the condition

under which alone something can be an end in itself does not have

mere relative worth, i.e., a price, but an intrinsic worth, i.e.,

dignity."114l Kant believed that morality and humanity alone had

dignity. He stated:
Skill and diligence in work have a market value;
wit, lively imagination, and humor have an affec-
tive price; but fidelity in promises and benevolence
as principle (not from instinct) have Intrinsic

Only through morality could a rational agent become a law-

making member of a "realm of ends" and consequently become an end

in himself. From this Kant concluded that only morality, and humanity,

so far as it was capable of morality, could have dignity or intrinsic

worth. A "realm of ends" could only become an actuality when all

rational agents acted in accordance with the supreme principle and

cooperated in the effort to realize the perfect good, i.e., good
will.IT:6

The Nature of Justice

Kant defined justice as the "aggregate of those conditions under

which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another

in accordance with a universal law of freedom."7 The concept of

114Ibid., p. 53.

115Ibid.

116Paton, The Categorical Imperative, op. cit., pp. 189-92.

11?Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op. cit., p. 34.
















justice was to Kant related more to ethics than jurisprudence. To

apply this morally defined concept of justice Kant established three

conditions for its application. The first condition was when the

relationship of one person to another could exert an influence by their

actions, either directly or indirectly, on each other. The second

condition was that the concept only applied to the relationship of

a person's will to another person's will when benevolence and charity

were involved. The third condition was that the concept of justice

did not take into consideration the content of the will, i.e., the

ends that a person intended to accomplish by means of the object that

he willed. When applying the concept of justice Kant only took into

consideration:

The form of the relationship between the wills
insofar as they are regarded as free, and whether
the action of one of them can be conjoined with
the freedom of the other in accordance with a
universal law.118

The universal principle of justice referred to by Kant was stated as

follows: "Act externally in such a way that the free use of your will

is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal

law."119 The universal law of freedom imposed the condition that an

individual could not be ordered to act from a motive of duty (a

virtuous disposition), but he could be expected to act from a prin-

ciple of "reciprocal freedom" within the range of his public life.120

This principle of "reciprocal freedom" was the one innate right to


118Ibid., p. 34.

119Ibid., p. 35.

120Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, op. cit., p. 38.




Full Text

PAGE 1

DELIBERATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE VALUE DIMENSION OF THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IN EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION By Edward 0. Shaffer A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1975

PAGE 2

Copyright by Edward 0. Shaffer 1975

PAGE 3

TO MY SONS EDWARD, DAVID, AND PHILIP

PAGE 4

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer would like to express his sincere gratitude to Dr. K. Forbis Jordan and Dr. Ralph B. Kimbrough for their encouragement and support of this study. In addition, the writer would like to acknowledge Dr. Arthur J. Lewis for serving as a member of both his specialist and doctoral committees. A special note of thanks is given to Dr. Jordan who served not only as the committee chairman, but also as a father confessor, boss, critic, expeditor, teacher, and friend. The writer would also like to acknowledge Mrs. Elaine Buckley for typing the manuscript and Mr. William Sparkman for his inspiration during the writing phase of the study, and he would like to recognize the Educational Resource Management Specialists group with which he was associated for their comradeship and competition. The most special forms of recognition and acknowledgment are extended to the writer's wife Bonnie for her unfailing support and love during the periods of separation due to the demands of the course work and the writing of the dissertation. She not only maintained the home and care of the children, but held a full-time position as music teacher in an elementary school in Tampa, while the writer sequestered himself in Gainesville. Therefore, this study is dedicated to Bonnie Jean Shaffer for her pioneer spirit and determination, because without her this study would not exist. IV

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ' i v ABSTRACT. viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1 The Scope of Ethics 1 Ethics and the Decisionmaking Process 3 Definitions of Decisionmaking ........ 3 Decisionmaking and Moral Valuing 5 Bases of Valuing in Educational Administration . . 6 Technical Valuing . 7 Political Valuing . . . 9 Scientific Valuing 11 Ethical Valuing 12 The Importance of a Philosophic Orientation. ... 14 The Need for a Value Framework in Educational Administration 16 The Problem 18 Statement of the Problem . 18 Delimitations 19 Limitations 19 Justification for the Study 20 Definition of Terms 29 Procedures 32 Organization of the Study 33 II NORMATIVE ETHICAL SYSTEMS 34 Elements of a Normative Theory 34 Criteria for Assaying Normative Ethical Theories 35 A Typology of Normative Ethics 39

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Page Utilitarian Ethics ........... . . . . . 44 The Principle of Utility. • • • 44 Pleasures and Pains ............ . 46 Actions and Consequences. ........ . . 49 Morals and Legislation. . 54 Mill's Corrections of Utilitarianism 56 Summary of Utilitarian Ethics ........ 61 Deweyan Ethics ... . . . . . . ...' . . . ..'. . . 65 Theory of Valuation 65 The Dynamic Force of Habit 69 The Place of Impulse in Conduct ....... 72 The Place of Intelligence in Conduct. .... 73 Summary of Deweyan Ethics .......... 77 Kantian Ethics . . . ... . . . . . . 80 The Roots of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 The Concept of Duty . . . . . . . .... ... . 83 A Realm of Ends . . . . . . . .87 The Nature of Justice ........ . .. . .' 89 Summary of Kantian Ethics . ....... . . 93 Aristotelian Ethics. . . . . 96 Aristotle's Virtues and Vices . 96 The Nature of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Responsibility for Decisions and Actions. . . 106 Summary of Aristotelian Ethics. . . . . . . . 108 Existentialist Ethics. .............. Ill The Meaning of Existentialism . . . . . . ....'•Ill Existence and Freedom . . . . . ... ... .113 Freedom, Responsibility, and Guilt. . ... . 116 Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Definitions of Existence. . ... . .. . . ..... . . 120 Source of Moral Values. . . ......... 122 Summary of Existentialist Ethics. ... . . .126. Ill ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS AND ETHICAL DECISIONS;^ ... . . 129 Critical Tasks and Ethical Valuing . . . . .'. . . . 129 Critical Task Areas and Ethical Questions. .... 131 Curriculum and Instruction. . ... . . ... 131 Pupil Personnel Services. .... ....... . ... . . 141 Personnel Development and Administration. . .148 Finance and Fiscal Management . . . . . . . . 159 School and Community Relations. . ..... .172 ' VI :-~-

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Page Moral Autonomy in an Organizational Setting ... 180 IV DEVELOPING AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 184 Developing an Integrated Value System 184 The Nature of Values 184 Sources of Ethical Values 188 Strategies for Developing a Scale of Values. 191 Developing a Value Framework for Educational Administration 197 Normative Decisionmaking Methods 197 Moral Assessments of Actions and Decisions . 201 V SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 211 Summary 211 Implications for Professional Training 213 Conclusions 222 . Recommendations 223 General Recommendations 223 Recommendations for Further Study. ..... 224 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 225 vn

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy DELIBERATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE VALUE DIMENSION OF THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IN EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION by Edward 0. Shaffer June, 1975 Chairman: K. Forbis Jordan Major Department: Educational Administration The purpose of this study was to develop deliberative and critical ethical questions which could serve as guidelines in the administrative decisionmaking process. A review of the literature related to the value dimension of decisionmaking in educational administration revealed an inadequate concern for ethics as an applied science capable of helping practicing school administrators make morally defensible decisions. In addition, the profession of educational administration was criticized for its lack of a distinctive value framework and its reliance upon published codes to insure ethical valuing by administrators. This study was undertaken to help lessen these problems by the identification of critical ethical questions, value concepts, and decisionmaking methods appropriate to educational administration. The study provided an analysis of four types of ethical valuing— act-teleological , rule-teleological , act-deontological , and ruledeontological— by an explication of selected leading ethical systems of thought. Included in the discussion were the ethical theories of vm

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Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Immanuel Kant, Aristotle, and leading existentialists. The deliberative and critical ethical questions which related to the administrative decisionmaking process were then examined in relation to identified critical task areas in educational administration. The selected task areas included curriculum and instruction, pupil personnel services, personnel development and administration, finance and fiscal management, and school and community relations. The study also provided a discussion of the importance of developing an ethical framework for both individual administrators and the profession as a body. A scaling of values was suggested as an important task for each administrator in attempting to cope with commonly met problems of school administration. Strategies for developing a hierarchy of values were suggested in the study. In addition, the critical elements for the development of a systematic value framework for the profession were identified. The major value concepts suggested for educational administration included beneficence, dignity and duty, equity, distributive justice, and probity. Moral autonomy was also suggested as important for the development of professionals. The complementary elements deemed as the most logical , consistent, comprehensive, and workable positions for educational administration ethics included libertarianism, act-deontology, and a partial form of situationism. The adoption of these elements in an ethical framework for educational administration would not involve the abandonment of the "easy" ethics now embodied in professional codes, but it would mean that the IX

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rules for ethical conduct and decisionmaking would be treated as summative and not constitutive in nature. The most important observation was that administrators have tended to legitimize their ethical decisions by reference to the consideration of predicted consequences of an action. While this is an important consideration in formulating and executing policy decisions, the position neglects the importance of intentions and motives. The assumption of an act-deontological perspective by administrators would, in large measure, help to overcome the weaknesses associated with only viewing the consequences of an action as the criterion for evaluating moral decisions. Implications for the training of professional administrators were stated in the study, and a course in ethical decisionmaking was suggested as a possible method for helping to insure the importance of ethical valuing by the leaders in the profession.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The Scope of Ethics Ethics is commonly viewed as the study of human conduct. The concern is with human behavior which is susceptible to the ascriptives "right" and "wrong." Lillie has defined ethics as a "science which judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad, or in some similar way." Higgins has defined ethics as a philosophical science which "establishes the absolutely necessary forms of free acts whose realization in practice truly makes us men." The study of ethics exists at two levels of thought and understanding. Russell outlined one dimension of ethics when he v/rote: The study of ethics is perhaps most commonly conceived as being concerned with the questions "What sort of actions ought men to perform?" and "What sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is conceived, that is to say, as dealing with human conduct, and as deciding what is virtuous and what vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice, people are called upon to choose. 3 •^William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics , 3rd ed. (London: Methuen & Co., 1955; University Paperbacks, 1961), pp. 1-2. Thomas J. Higgins, S. J., Basic Ethics (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Bruce Publishing, 1968), p. 7. 3 Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," in Readings in Ethical Theory , ed. Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 3.

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At this level of thought the subject matter of ethics is interpersonal behavior. However, ethicists usually do not mean all interpersonal behavior, but only that which can be described as moral or immoral. The scope of ethics at the level described by Russell can be termed normative. At this level ethics seeks to examine assertations about human conduct which affect the general well -being of another person. A second dimension of ethics deals with the theoretical constructs which undergird the normative assertions. The scope of ethics at this level is concerned with such questions as, "What do we mean by our ethical terms such as 'good,' 'ought,' 'right,' and so forth?" While ethics is concerned with assertions about human conduct, it also investigates those "assertions about that property of things which is noted by the term 'good,' and the converse property denoted by the term 'bad.'" According to Fagothery, "current terminology distinguishes between normative ethics, or the setting up of a code of rules for moral living, and metaethics , or the critical examination of the concepts, judgments, and reasoning processes in ethics." In summary, the modes of ethical thought occur at two distinct levels— normative ethics and metaethics. Normative ethics is concerned with the justification of particular moral judgments. At this level we seek to justify a particular judgment by appealing to 'general normative principles. Metaethics, on the other hand, goes beyond this level with its deliberate analysis of those principles which support our beliefs. — 4 Ge6rge"Tdwar~d~ Moore, T"The Indef inability of Good, ,H in' Readings in Ethical Theory , ibid., p. 53. 5 Austin Fagothery, S. J., Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice, 5th ed. (Saint Louis, Missouri: C. V. Mosby, 1972), p. 5.

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Ethics and the Decisionmaking Process Decisionmaking is often considered to consist of problem solving, or planning, or organizing, and is sometimes extended to include all aspects of thinking and acting. However, the literature in educational and business administration has stressed choice making as the key feature. Choice may be exercised in a simple situation, as in the selection of a shirt from a well stocked department store, or it may require a complicated decision about a situation that involves conflicting goals and values, as in the collective bargaining process with teacher organizations. Although the consequences of these decisions are not of the same magnitude, they do involve selection of the best alternative among several choices. Thus, selection among alternatives seems to be the key concept in the term decisionmaking . Definitions of Decisionmaking This concept of decisionmaking has been frequently expressed in the literature on the subject. The philosopher-sociologist Ofstad stated that "to make a decision means to make a judgment regarding what one ought to do in a certain situation after having deliberated on some alternative course of. action. Many writers have agreed on definitions similar to that of Ofstad. Irwin Bross stated: "The process of selecting one action from a number of alternatives is what I shall mean by decision." Feldman and Kanter suggested that "the decision problem is that of selecting a path which will move the t>Harald -of s t a d, An Inquiry Into the Freedom of Decision (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Universities Press, 1961), p. 15. 'Irwin Bross, Design for Decision (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 1.

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system— individual , computer program, or organization—from some initial o state to some terminal state." Many writers, hov/ever, have not limited their definition of decisionmaking to a selection or choice among alternatives. Although they may agree that the "choice step" is the characteristic step in the decisionmaking process, they have defined decisionmaking in a much broader sense. Griffiths stated that "decision-making is the process which one goes through in order to be able to pass judgment and termi9 nate a controversy." Taylor suggested that "decision making is that thinking which results in the choice among alternative courses of action. "'0 Simon summarized this broader view of decisionmaking when he considered decisionmaking synonymous with managing: "In treating decision-making as synonymous with managing, I shall be referring not merely to the final act of choice among alternatives, but rather to the whole process of decisions." Sayles also referred to a process when he stated: "Decision making is an organizational process. It is shaped as much by the pattern of interaction of managers as it is by -the contemplation and cognitive processes of the individual."' 2 In this view, the primary concern of decisionmaking goes beyond the point o °Julian Feldman and Herschel E. Kanter, "Organizational Decision Making," in Handbook of Organizations , ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 614-15. q .Daniel E. Griffiths, Human Relations in School Administration (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), p. 202. . --.' '°Donald W. Taylor, "Decision Making and Problem Solving," in Handbook of Organizations , op. cit., p. 48. _.„. -Huerbert 'Simon, "" .New Science of Management "Decisions" (New York: Harper & Row, I960), p. 1. '^Leonard Sayles, Managerial Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 207.

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of choice and includes the whole process of the administrator functioning in his environment. Decisionmaking and Moral Valuing In both the narrow and broad views of the process of decisionmaking the critical notion of valuing was implicit. Valuing was considered an important ingredient in defining and selecting final choices. In nearly every case of decisionmaking there is usually a relationship between means and ends, plans and goals. These means and ends are always connected to an existing valuing framework of valuing activities. Therefore, valuation and valuing actions ultimately help to shape the decisions of organizations and individuals. Ethics can be viewed as the science of moral values. According to Kneller ethics "is concerned with providing 'right' values as the basis for 'right' actions." 13 While legal and technical rules can govern large controllable areas of human conduct, they oftentimes do not provide an adequate or proper direction in solving moral problems. In the simple relations of individuals to one another there is a need for ethical solutions. A moral problem has been defined by Kurtz' 4 as having to choose between alternative courses of action affecting two or more people. To solve such problems the administrator needs to be able to call upon a set of moral rules or guidelines. Moral rules help to establish order in our social situations and settings. Kurtz stated that moral rules "are the most fundamental social rules, and they ——^JJGeorqe^-E. -Kneller, Introduction to the Philosophy of Education ,: 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 29. 14 Pau1 Kurtz, Decision and the Condition of Man (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1965), p. 261.

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exemplify the demands of reciprocity. Without some such guides, life as we know if would be virtually impossible." Philosophical ethics is a disciplined inquiry into such questions as: "Is there a moral law which is definitive for human beings in their choices and decisions?" 1 ** The relationship between decisionmaking and ethics is direct. The study of ethics can help the administrator to establish a "moral point of view" when attempting decisions on the "best thing to do." 17 Bases of Valuing in Educational Administration This section has adapted four of the five value frameworks iden1 Q tified by Huebner for assessing classroom activities and the learning environment provided by schools. The value frameworks suggested by Huebner included technical, political, scientific, ethical, and aesthetic forms of valuing. By utilizing these same forms of valuing, one can also begin to assess the tasks and ongoing activities of the administrator's world, with the possible exception of aesthetic valuing. According to Huebner, each of the value bases has its own language of legitimation and control; and when these languages are translated into the conceptual understandings of administrators it becomes apparent that each of the value frameworks serves a critical purpose in 15 Ibid., p. 265. 16 Robert N. Beck and John B. Orr, Ethical Choice: A Case Study Approach (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. xvii. 17 Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (New York': " Random House, 1965), pp. 27-50. 18 Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field of Study," in Precedents and Promise in the Curriculum Field , ed. Helen F. Robinson (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966).

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administration which should not be neglected by those who hold leadership positions in education. Technical Valuing Technical valuing is probably the most dominant form of valuing in educational administration. In many areas of school management, particularly in finance, and increasingly in curricular matters, there is manifested a means-end rationality that approaches an economic model. End states, end products, or objectives are specified as carefully and as accurately as possible. The critical second phase calls for these ends to be stated in performance or behavioral terms. Lucio and McNeil represented the essence of technical valuing when they stated: There are signs that we have passed the time when schools can get by with pious hopes and high-sounding shibboleths. Supervisors are beginning (1) to state what schools should strive for, (2) to determine the capabilities needed for attaining these objectives, and (3) to lay concrete plans for their implementationJ9 Objectives, many believe, need to be operational and tactics and strategies should be consistent with the performance objectives. However, some authorities believe that this means-end rationality assumes that one knows what the most effective means are to achieve the desired ends. Walton cautioned those who were enamored by this model, and who would transfer a means-end relationship to the instructional process when he stated: "Actually, our knowledge of the relations 19 Wflliam H. Lucio and John D. McNeil, Supervision: A Synthesis of Thought and Action (New York: McGraw-Hill , 1969), p. 100.

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8 between means and ends in instruction is very independable, in spite of decades of so-called scientific research. "^ Within the framework of technical valuing the organization's costs are carefully scrutinized and some effort at economy is made. The control of the inputs of materials and human resources is a major source of control of this means-end system. Educational administrators, however, have recognized that they often have little control over the inputs. Evaluation, from the point of view of the technical-valuing system, may be considered a type of quality control. Unfortunately, evaluation is usually concerned solely with the product and rarely does it concern itself with the quality of those activities in the producing sequences. Feedback from the evaluation of the product is delivered to the control system, which in turn alters the process if the end-states are not what they should be. Elaborate models and flow charts often decorate the administrator's office walls. The primary language systems of legitimation and control are psychological and sociological. The ends, or.'^jectives, are usually identified by a sociological analysis of the individual or organizational system in the present or future social order. These ends, or objectives, are then translated into psychological language— usually in terms of concepts, skills, attitudes, or behaviors. Psychological language is further used to sanction certain activities which can produce these defined ends. 20john Walton, "Ethics of the Means: A Consideration of the Values Involved in Administrative Decisions," in Ethics and the School Administrator , ed. Glenn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs (Danville, Illinois: Interstate Printers & Publishers, 1970), p. 62.

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Technical valuing and its economic rationality are necessary in administrative thought and practices, for problems of scarcity and of institutional purpose do exist. However, this is but one form of administrative valuing and to reduce all administrative functions to this one is to weaken the administrator's power to pull himself out of the mysteriously complex phenomena of human life. Political Valuing The second form of valuing is that of political valuing. This category exists because the administrator has a position of power and control. He influences others directly or through the manipulation of resources. Persons in education are in a life-influencing business and should recognize this central fact. Too often, however, political thinking and valuing interferes with the central purpose. 21 To remain in a position of power one must seek the support of those in positions of power to reward or influence his behavior in some way. This oftentimes involves those who are termed informal influential s." The administrator's work becomes the vehicle by which people judge the worth of his influence and decide whether he is worthy of their respect, -support, or positive sanctions. For those who operate from a political valuing framework, educational activity is valued for the support or respect that it brings him or his organization. This search for increased recognition is not inherently bad. An administrator must have power to influence others. There is nothing immoral or evil 21 Robert L. Shannon, Where the Truth Comes Out: Humanistic TducaTibh "( Col umbus ;~0h i o : Charles E . Merr i 11 ,' 1 97 1 ) ~ p . 7 . ~ ;,— ~ — 22 Michael Y. Nunnery and Ralph B. Kimbrough, Politics, Power , Polls and School Elections (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publish-ingrl97T) v p. 9. ~~

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Writing on political valuing, Gregg 10 about political rationality of valuing. Indeed, it is a necessary attitude if personal influence and organizational responsibility are to be maximized. Education cannot be separated from the political activities of a community. -? • concluded that educational administrators do indeed live and work in a thoroughly political environment. School districts are political systems where educational administrators play a central role as educational policymakers. Awareness of politics, power, and influence in community decisionmaking should lead educational administrators to accept the political nature of the job and the importance of political knowledge and skills. It should also lead to understanding and developing skills in using community influentials while still maintaining high professional expertise as the greatest source of power. Nunnery and Kimbrough suggested that: School officials must build potential influence for education. They must understand the political system and the exercise of political power in decisionmaking. They must earn respect in that system through their involvement and eventual leadership. 24 Of course, if power and prestige are sought as ends, rather than as means for responsible and creative influence, evil and immorality may be produced. Nunnery and Kimbrough cautioned against the use of Machiavellian expediency and the need for morally defensible strategies. They stated: "Political activities that are based on deceit, lies, the "Russell T. Gregg, "Political Dimensions of Educational Administration," in Teachers College Record 67 (November 1956) : 118-128. 24 Nunnery and Kimbrough, Politics, Power, Polls and School Elections , op. cit., p. 3.

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11 half-truth, appeals to prejudice, and other undemocratic principles are obviously unsatisfactory." 25 Scientific Valuing The third form of valuing in educational administration is scientific. Scientific activity may be broadly designated as that activity which produces new knowledge with an empirical basis. Administrators are always in need of more and better-warranted assertions about educational activity. The attempt of science has been to produce more precise knowledge which would tend to reduce error in the operational management of our schools. The methodologies found in the social and behavioral sciences also serve as useful models for administrators to use in problem-solving situations. Educational administrators need to become more empirical-minded, and they need to know if their administrative practices can be justified based on empirically-based examinations. The discovery of functional relationships between phenomena and the organization of the facts which make them meaningful are two of the chief aims of science. Rationality is a major virtue in scientific valuing, and it should be important to educational administrators, Getzels, Lipham, and Campbell claimed that the right to authority in educational administration "is not based on a superior sanctified status or on the manifestation of superior general wisdom or high moral character. It is based rather on superior knowledge." 25 Ibid., p. 169. 2 ^Jacob w. Getzels, James M. Lipham, and Roald F. Campbell, €ducationaT--Admini-stration---.aS'--a-Social---Process(New--Y6rk--:: ---Harper--'&Row, 1968), p. 134. ~

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12 Ethical Valuing Finally, administrative activity may be valued in terms of ethics. Ethical valuing uses metaphysical and religious languages as the primary vehicles for legitimatizing and thinking through of an administrative activity. Its chief value to administrators is that it focuses on the importance of decisionmaking and responsibility. ?7 Gregg concluded that decisionmaking was one of the primary administrative processes, and held that sound decisions were characterized by purposive and rational behavior. Ostrander and Dethey, in a more direct fashion, recognized the importance of value systems when decisions were to be made which involved comparative worth among the alternatives. They also stated that while behavioral science knowledge could enable the administrator to predict human behavior, it could not choose the course of action for the administrator: What it [behavioral science knowledge] clearly does not do is to guide the decision maker in terms of desired objectives of the organization. The value system of the decision maker must guide him in deciding which of several alternative courses of action has the greatest comparative worth. 29 Unfortunately, Ostrander and Dethey did not suggest either that a value framework or even that perhaps a study of ethical theories could aid "administrators in making better decisions in those matters involving comparative worth. ^'Russell T. Gregg, "The Administrative Process," in Adminis trative Behavior in Education , ed. Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 275. 28R a y T nond H. Ostrander and Ray C. Dethey, A Values Approach to " Edu^at"K)nal~Admi'n" ist'ra itioh (New York :'" American Book Company ,1 968 ) , p. 77. 29 Ibid., p. 78.

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13 An administrative act is usually an act of influence: one man -trying to influence another man. The administrator who operates from an ethical valuing base is less concerned with the significance of the administrative act for other ends, or the realization of other values, on but the value of the administrative act per se. Sachs ,, discussed this aspect of ethical valuing when he attempted to analyze the quality of an act. He judged that quality acts (those which revealed "empathic insights") would lead to greater acceptance than whose which could be labeled as nonquality acts (those which were sympathetic or indifferent in their intentions). Sachs stated that it was the quality of the act that "establishes the kinds of decisions that will be made by persons who sre most concerned." 3 ' The main emphasis of Sachs analysis was concerned with the major virtue of empathy. The lack of this quality in administrative acts and decisions led to destructiveness in interpersonal relationships which were essential to the success of groups .and organizations. The opposite of empathy is indifference, and this vice is accompanied by noninvolvement, or at best, a mechanistic approach to decisionmaking. According to Sachs, an administrator must examine the quality of his interactions at all times. He stated: "If either indifference or sympathy shapes his basic perceptions he may be destructive. If identification and empathy are his premises, the inter 33 action will enhance all concerned." Awareness of the power to 30 Benjamin M. Sachs, Educational Administration: A Behavioral Approach (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 142-53. ~~ 31 Ibid., p. 153. 32 Ibid. , p. 176. 33 Ibid., p. 153.

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14 influence may lead to hubris, the demonic state of false pride in one's omnipotence/ or it may lead to the humbling recognition that with the power to influence comes the life giving possibility of being influenced. ' The Importance of a Philosophic Orientation Ethical valuing in administration, and indeed the other forms of valuing, requires a philosophic orientation among our educational leaders. They need to have deeper insight and sensitivity to the complex milieu of events, situations, and problems constantly confronting those involved in the decisionmaking process. Graff et al. claimed that the lack of a philosophical orientation resulted in three possible alternatives. In the first alternative the administrator without a philosophic orientation "relinguishes his leadership role, expends his energies in dealing with the routines of management, and deludes himself that this is really his chief function." 35 The second alternative suggested by Graff et al . was that the administrator becomes a "manipulator of people and builds personal and professional strength by surrounding himself with satellites and yes-men." While some may find this alternative attractive, the administrator who engages insuch activity "becomes a satellite himself for some strong political figure in the community." 37 Most administrators, however, are not as prone to the first two alternatives as they are 34 0rin B. Graff, Calvin M. Street, Ralph B. Kimbrough, and Archie R. Dykes, Philosophic Theory and Practice in Educational Administration (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1966), pp. 10-11. 35 Ibid., p. 10. 36 Ibid., p. 11. 37ibid.

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15 to the third form. The administrators in this group who lack philosophicmindedness are those who possess self-esteem and personal integrity, but who find it difficult "to make adequate judgments, to stimulate and direct the proper development of the schools, to take an intelligent stand on the important issues of the day, and like matters." 00 The lack of a philosophic orientation is due to a number of reasons, but the institutions which can make a critical difference are the universities which are responsible for the professional training programs for 39 administrators. Immegart and Burroughs expressed a deep concern for the lack of training in ethical valuing in the professional preparation programs for administrators. They stated: The ethical dimension of the administrative practice deserves its rightful place along side of the human, technical , and conceptual dimensions which are already a part of administrative training. In the end, it is the ethic which in large measure determines the choice in solving the larger problems confronting educational administrators today. 40 Smith 41 in a study of philosophic-mindedness in educational administration concluded that school administrators who possessed the attributes of comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility, exerted a more positive influence than those who lacked these qualities. Smith argued that the preparation of school administrators should not be overly task-oriented. It should also include in the curriculum courses which 38 Ibid. 39 Glenn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs, eds. , Ethics and the School Administrator, op. cit., p. 10. 40 Ibid. X 41 Phi lip 6. Smith, Philosophic-Mindedness in Educational Administration (Columbus, Ohio: College of Education, Ohio State University, 1956), p. 91.

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16 involve reflective thought conducive towards generating philosophicmindedness. He stated: It is believed that the truly philosophic educator makes decisions concerning problems of education in the light of a relatively systematic and carefully formulated set of philosophic insights. It is the insights which supply the basic structure for attacking problems with comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility. These insights enable the administrator to view his particular problems in terms of long-range goals, the creative generalizations, the fundamental ideas, [and] the wide range of alternatives. 2 Smith further argued that if educational administrators are to have a higher degree of these qualities it would be beneficial to have a course in philosophic-mindedness and its bearing on school administration. 43 This reflective activity would enhance the development of a greater dialog about the nature of educational purposes. Smith quoted a statement of the Educational Policies Commission which stated: Every statement of educational purposes . . . depends upon the judgment of some person or group as to what is good and what is bad, what is true and what is false, what is ugly and what is beautiful, what is valuable and what is worthless, in the conduct of human affairs. 44 The Need for a Value Framework in Educational Administration" Education is a moral concept. It is concerned with standards and principles of a moral nature which enjoin what ought to be done. It 42 Ibid., p. 93. 43ibid., p. 90. 44ibid.

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17 endeavors to fit people for something and in so doing it presupposes 45 either an ideal of a person or alternatively an ideal of a society. Inherent in this description of education is the notion of a norm or set of norms which provide purpose to education. Logically, this involves a moral view of society and man. However, after reviewing the literature in educational administration devoted to ethics and making moral judgments, one cannot help but feel that there is a major weakness in administrative thought and practices. Certainly, there has been a concern for ethics, but there has been little effort in developing a systematic value framework for educational administrators. Immegart and Burroughs noted that other professions have accelerated their efforts at developing value frameworks. 46 They noted particularly the efforts in the medical profession, the business profession, the field of public administration, the clergy, the military, and social 47 science research itself. While many professors and scholars in educational administration have recognized the importance of the value dimension in decisionmaking, they have seemingly failed to establish a viable dialog on 48 the role of ethics in administration of our schools. Graff and Street have stressed the importance of establishing an adequate value theory 45 T. F. Daveney, "Education— A Moral Concept," in New Essays in the Philosophy of Education , ed. Glenn Langford and D. J. O'Connor (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1973), p. 79. 46 Glenn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs, eds. , Ethics and the School Administrator , op. cit., p. 4. 47 Ibid. 48 0rin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value Framework for. Educational Administration," in Administrative Behavior: in Education, op. cit., pp. 120-52.

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18 as a necessary element in the professional ization of educational administration. They have urged administrators to examine the major value theories in order to develop a distinctive value framework for educational administration. Such a value framework was judged to be necessary because "educational administration appears to have greater responsibility for the cherished human values than do many other kinds of administration." 49 After reviewing a number of critical studies, Graff and Street stated that an adequate value framework was not sufficiently in evidence in the general practice of educational administration. The intent of this study was to aid administrators in constructing such a framework. •.-'!.". The Problem Statement of the Problem The problem in this study was to develop deliberative and critical ethical questions which could serve as guidelines in the administrative decisionmaking process. Related problems to be considered were: :.•-:; 1.. To explicate selected normative ethical systems of thought. .; 2. To examine the functioning of these ethical systems as they """"""'relate to categories of identified critical tasks in educar ^ tional administration. 3. To recommend strategies for practicing school administrators }: in commonly met problems of right and wrong in educational ^administration. 49ibid., p. 121. ,

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19 4. To state implications for the training of educational administrators. Delimitations 1. The normative ethical systems discussed in this study were selected from classic and contemporary Western philosophies. The basis of selection involved the following criteria: (a) dissimilarity in their approaches and rationality to provide a range of possible views on the subject, and (b) selection of framers of various ethical systems of the highest rank to assure types of ethical theory worthy of serious consideration. 2. The administrative task areas were selected from leading textbooks in educational administration. Selected task areas . examined included: (a) curriculum and instruction, (b) pupil personnel services, (c) personnel development and administration, (d) finance and fiscal management, and (e) school and community relations. Limitations 1. The review of the literature was 1 imited to those sources available in English. 2. The design was dependent upon the adequacy of information available as a basis for drawing valid conclusions. 3. The study lacked the basic elements of control necessary to produce data directly related to the administrative decisionmaking process. 4. The frame of reference for the research was primarily shaped by the researcher's academic and professional training in

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20 the areas of the social sciences and educational administration. Justification for the Study In the administration of the nation's schools educators are constantly making value decisions which affect the welfare of others and themselves^ Unfortunately, the value dimension of decisionmaking has not been stressed in the training institutions of educational administration. Administrative and policy decisions are oftentimes concerned with moral problems which demand the selection of moral choices. If educational administrators are to make good judgments they must begin by asking deliberative and critical ethical questions. This study has attempted to justify that a study of ethics could benefit educational administrators by raising critical questions with which they may correct some sources of bad judgments. Educational administration currently enjoys a high degree of prestige and status in relationship to other professional occupations. The Watergate scandal and related activities has certainly crippled public confidence in the legal and political professions. The miasma created by the Watergate scandal has also prompted investigations of illegal and unethical activities in public administration agencies at both the state and national levels. Gross 50 stated that the participants in the Watergate scandal were able to perpetrate their nonethical deeds by objectifying "the enemy" into something less than human. This tendency combined with an "authority syndrome" was similar to that displayed by German officers and officials during the Hitler regime. 50 Dorothy W. Gross, "Watergate: Implications for Moral Development," Childhood Education 50 (October 1973): 54-56.

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21 The testimony of the participants revealed a rationality based on the belief that their actions were in the interest of security for the nation's welfare, and that the actions were legal and ethical because they had been endorsed and sanctioned by higher levels of authority. Gross stated: "In a significant perversion of the democratic ideal, the true patriot was one who followed the leader and kept his mouth shut." 51 / Two prominent American historians in their analysis of the Watergate scandal have concluded that educators have a professional and moral responsibility for the rectification of such nonethical forms of conduct. Commager 52 postulated that an indirect source of the "new morality" displayed by the participants in the Watergate scandal was the result of society's educational system. He described public education today as a "massive exercise in hypocrisy" because schools teach a set of moral standards which are almost antithetical to those practiced in society. To lessen the disparity in the value structures of the society, Commager argued that educators have a moral and professional obligation to influence policy decisions through associational activity. The aims of such activity should be directed toward: (1) conservation of natural resources; (2) creation of a just society; (3) conservation of life; (4) preservation of constitutional freedoms; and (5) a restoration of faith in participatory democracy. The result of such activity would be that educators should serve as society's conscience by exercising a special moral duty to demand society's 51 Ibid., p. 55. 52 Henry Steele Commager, "Watergate and the Schools," Today's Education 63 (September October 1974): 20-24.

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22 attention to the dichotomy between its expressed ideals and the existent realities. Schlesinger,^ in a similar vein, stated that educators have the responsibility to combat the corruption of society's moral standards of conduct. He contended educators should specifically challenge those who would invoke rationalizations for nonethical forms of conduct based on military-bureaucratic jargon. This type of activity has led not only to the corruption of the language, but also to the impairment of society's sense of morality. However, the "new morality" displayed by the participants in the Watergate scandal, with its emphasis on Machivellian expediency, can be found in a large number of organizations and institutions of our society—including education. The negative public reaction to those who participated in Watergate could be easily generalized to all those who hold authority and power in our public agencies. 54 In his study of chief school administrators Dexheimer found evidence that they were prone to more nonethical forms of accommodation than to ethical forms in critical situations. Those who responded to the questionnaire which related to actual and hypothetical situations chose more nonethical than ethical responses by nearly a two-to-one margin. Other notable results were: 1. The age of the respondents was not a critical factor. 2. The humanities majors' of undergraduate years had relatively low (nonethical) scores. 53 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Watergate and the Corruption of Language," Today's Education 63 (September October 1974): 25-27. 54 Roy Dexheimer, "The Ethics of Chief School Administrators: A Study in Accommodation," paper presented at the 101st meeting of the American Association of School Administrators, Atlantic City, N.J., February 15-19, 1969. .-:--.-—-----..-

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23 3. Ethical responses were negatively related to career longevity. 4. Professional memberships, religious convictions, and graduate studies were not significant factors. 5. Salary and size of the district were positively related to EC ethical responses. Dexheimer concluded that ethical standards were internalized personally and were. not affected by public codes. Dexheimer's study adds justification for this study of ethics and its role in educational administration. Ethical valuing has been referred to as a style of decisionmaking which reflects the attributes of comprehensivensss, penetration, and flexibility. In addition, it has been suggested that ethical valuing is a quality which should govern the other forms of valuing which exist in educational administration, because the neglect of ethical valuing in administrative decisionmaking can only increase mistrust and disenchantment with the value of schooling by the society at large. The response of educational leaders to the critics of public education should be tempered by the realization that the quality of the response will, in large measure, determine its acceptance or rejection. If administrators are to meet with success in generating support for a system's goals, they must enjoy a fair amount of credibility with client systems served by the system. Where loss of confidence in organizational and institutional authority exists, it has primarily resulted from the lack of concern for ethical conduct and decisionmaking on the part of those who hold leadership positions. Therefore, to achieve credibility and maintain trust, administrators should demonstrate a commitment to a value framework which recognizes that other ~ 55 Ibid. • ':.-.-.-...'..._ : _. .-...,.'-. . ...__,...

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24 sources and rationalities exist for decisions besides those of an organization. If this line of reasoning is correct, the establishment and maintenance of support for organizational goals can more fully be achieved when those who govern combine practical wisdom and intelligence with a philosophical orientation which provokes a deeper insight into, and a sensitivity for, the complex milieu of events, situations, and problems which impinge upon a system both internally and externally. A recent lecture by Griffiths56 provides an example of why ethical valuing is necessary for practicing school administrators. Griffiths has suggested that the fractional ization of communities along ethnic lines, the popularization of fundamentalist and mystical religious cults, the decentralization of political systems, the resurgence of localism and regionalism, and the manifestation of a phenomenological perspective have all combined as causal forces in the collapse of a consensus necessary for administrative decisionmaking. Griffiths further suggested that the collapse has been precipitated by a widespread feeling of alienation and disenchantment among people with all forms of authority. He then posed the central problem: "The issue 1 is what is the emerging role of the administrator, given a society that does not want to be administered and that values education less than it did previously," or more specifically, "How does one lead an organization when its members do not acknowledge its goals?" 57 To 56 Daniel E. Griffiths, The Collapse of Consensus: Can Administrators Survive? (Buffalo, New York: Society of Educational Administrators of Western New York [Sixth Annual George E. Holloway, Jr., Lecture Series], 1974). 57lbid., p. 5.

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Griffiths, a possible solution to the problem would be for "education to abandon its traditional status as a separate, autonomous branch of government and consider joining with the regular political structure." 58 The solution offered by Griffiths to the current "crisis" is inadequate and illogical for administrators. Certainly, educational administrators need to be involved in the decisionmaking processes of a given political community, but it is indeed doubtful that the type of involvement envisaged by Griffiths would enable educators to maintain or restore a belief in the efficacy of schooling. He suggested the development of a "corporate management" concept which would involve the creation of a management team representative of various governmental functions such as housing, health, social work, and police services. The purpose of such a management team would be to "cut down some of . the variation in goals and make possible the setting of objectives that can be accepted and toward which administrators can work."" However, this "solution" fails to recognize the original causes cited by Griffiths himself for the discontent toward institutional and organizational authority. It is indeed paradoxical that Griffiths has suggested for administrators to become more politically involved in established political frameworks, which are no longer themselves a credible or viable force in shaping the values and goals of the client systems. Another argument against such a position as advocated by Griffiths is that the consensus which Griffiths would hope to reconstruct was an illusory form of valuing in its original form. 58 Ibid., p. 8. 59 I bid., p. 9.

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26 The important issue which Griffiths failed to confront was the question which asks why people have become more disenchanted with, and alienated toward, institutional and organizational forms of authority. Perhaps, a major part of the answer to this question resides in the apparent lack of ethical valuing forms in administrative decisionmaking. Until institutions, organizations, and the "king's men" recognize this condition, the efforts to reconstruct a consensus will be futile, unproductive, and meaningless gestures reminiscent of the efforts of some to recreate a social order based on the model of the Pax Romana. The arguments of Griffiths were directed toward a return to the security of the "old ethic" with its collectivized values and goals. He stated : I believe that the schools were a crucial factor in the growth of America from a trackless wilderness to the greatest nation on the planet Earth. If the teachers and administrators are of a mind, they could do it again. . . . America must become once more a country with clear national goals, with social and moral standards that are inculcated in the young by schools, and we must assume a new stance of international leadership. 60 If the societal conditions that Griffiths described are accurate, how can he realistically expect a return to "Camelot"? The dynamic and motivational forces of administrators should not be directed toward the return of the "old ethic" and its social order, but rather they should be directed toward the development of inclusive forms of valuing which can more readily accommodate diversity and pluralism. The answer to Griffiths' question, "can administrators survive?" can be answered in the affirmative, provided they improve the quality 60 Ibid., p. 6.

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27 of administrative decisions by infusing ethical concerns and questions during the deliberations of various alternative solutions. Administrators simply cannot afford to cast themselves as an embodiment of a "Prince" who only concerns himself with the ends sought and cares not how they are achieved. The lack of commonly held goals and values was a problem which disturbed Griffiths, and it is a critical problem for any practicing administrator. To overcome this problem and foster a consensus within an organizational setting, Griffiths proposed that administrators "shape the reward system so that it benefits those who advance the school 's objectives." 61 The implications of this statement can be construed as basically nonethical in character and intent; and it is representative of those forms of valuing which have fostered the disenchantment with administrative authority. Rather than "shape" behavior by establishing a "reward system", administrators should seek to :promote cooperation and identification with organizational goals through en such processes as identified by Lippitt. The basic technique suggested by Lippitt was termed interfacing . Lippitt defined interfacing as follows: Interfacing is primarily a process by which human beings confront common areas of concern, engage in meaningfully related dialogue, actively search for solutions to mutual problems, and cope with these solutions purposefully. Interfacing may also involve confrontation between human beings and machine processes or technological systems. 63 61 Ibid., p. 7. 62 Gordon L. Liry-Crofts, 19( 63 Ibid., p. 2. : 62 GordonT. Lippitt /' Organization Renewal (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1969).

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28 The elements identified by Lippitt in the interfacing process included understanding; communicating in one's own way; lack of judgmental behavior; establishing trust; minimum effort to control ; preserving autonomy; problem-solving approach; and experimentation, flexibility, and spontaneity. Lippitt also recognized the ethical implications of attempting "organization renewal" through purposeful and systemtaic change processes. He indicated that planned change could be successful provided administrators established ethical standards of conduct and decisionmaking. He stated: Planned change does have ethical implications which should be thoroughly considered by the whole body of practitioners. The moral and ethical standards that have become involved in this problem of individual and social responsibility should be the key to the future advancement in both the private and public sectors of society. The responsibility for establishing and maintaining high ethical standards rests heavily upon managers and consultants in all kinds of organizations. 65 Practicing school administrators, particularly principals and superintendents, are vested with organizational authority and responsibility for making and executing policy decisions. Oftentimes, they are confronted with having to choose among alternatives which are all undesirable. In districts with declining revenues and/ or student populations, the decisions as to which programs are to be reduced in scope, and the problem of reduction in personnel needs are real problems which do not have easy solutions. The decisionmaking process related to these problems has to be imbued with major ethical questions and concerns. The intentions and motives of administrators 64 Ibid., pp. 134-35. 65 Ibid., p. 180.

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29 in situations of this nature should reflect a real concern for the ethical values that were judged worthy of professional administrators. To facilitate decisions of this nature, objective guidelines need to be established and even-handed! y applied in order to avoid gross forms of injustice to both programs and personnel. While the solutions effectuated will not be to the satisfaction of all concerned, the important point is that they were arrived at by a thorough consideration of the moral questions involved. The current sociopolitical forces in society demand a thorough consideration of ethical valuing. The study should have practical value in assisting those involved in the decisionmaking process. Good judgment should require more than correct opinions: it should require that the opinions be on the right subjects. This study has attempted to improve and systematize practical judgment by determining whether the right questions were being asked in order to aid deliberations and make morally defensible policy decisions. The study hasr.also attempted to establish foundations of a value framework for th6Sfe>fnvolved in the professional training of educational administrators. '.„'..-. Definition of Terms Every effort has been made to limit the technical jargon of philosophers to provide for better readability and understanding by the readers. The technical nature and the personalized use of key terms in ethics have been discussed in the context of usage. Certain ethical concepts have been given a glossary-type definition to

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30 facilitate readers' efforts in understanding those terms which, in the opinion of the author, are not a part of the lexicon of practicing school administrators. Categorical Imperative— the law of the pure practical reason which as a priori (i.e., underived from experience) has the marks of universality and necessity, thus asserting the autonomy of the rational will in its freedom from extrinsic matters. Consequential ism-the determination of actions as right or wrong in accordance with their tendency to produce desirable or undesirable consequences. Casuistry— a strict application of general ethical principles and rules, which have been externally mandated, to particular cases of conscience or conduct. Deontological Ethics— the view of obligation as immediately perceived and therefore independent of any reasons which may be offered in support of one duty as against another. This form of ethics stresses an evaluation of the quality of an act rather than its consequences. Equity— that aspect of justice, related to the function of the judge, which seeks to supplement the generality of the laws through attention to cases which are exceptions to the rule. Ethical Naturalism— any view of ethics in which the meanings of moral terms are expressed within the language of an empirical science such as psychology or sociology. Ethical Rational ism— the view that moral notions such as "good" and "right" are adopted by the mind through the apprehensive or regulative functions of reason. The propositions which embrace such notions are either self-evident or imposed by reason itself according to its own canons.

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31 Facticity— the fact that freedom is not able to be free, i.e., autonomy of choice is limited by such conditions as a person's place, past, environment, fell owman, and death. If freedom is defined as the escape from the given, from fact, then there is a fact of escape from fact. This is the facticity of freedom. Hedonism-the definition of "good" in terms of pleasure or the pleasant. Distinction is made between pyschological hedonism (the individual desires only pleasure or the pleasant) , ethical hedonism (the individual's good is to be found in pleasures of purity and duration or in pleasures which correspond with one's capabilities), and universal i stic hedonsim (the individual's good is part of the total good of the community, which is the genuine end of all deliberate action). Hedonistic Calculus— the estimation of the probable pleasures or pains to flow from doing or abstaining from some action, according to the measures or values of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent. Hypothetical Imperative— any imperative or command in morals which depends for its sanction upon the attachment of the will to an extrinsic purpose; the action commanded is related to such a purpose as a means to an end. Maxim— any subjective interest which is the content of an individual's volition as distinct from its form as universal izable or nonuniversal izable. A maxim which is universal izable conforms to the, moral law and is thus objective. Phenomenol ogy— the approach to experience in terms of its structure, i.e., consciousness and its objectives whether real or

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32 possible or consciousness and its transcendence. As a science of phenomena, it stresses the careful description of phenomena (things as they appear or are construed by individuals) in all domains of experience without regard to traditional epistemological questions (those which relate to the origin, nature, methods, and limits of human knowing). Pure Practical Reason-the reason in its capacity to provide a principle or law of conduct which is not conditioned by empirical matters, as distinct from practical reason in its involvement with the empirical . Teleological Ethics-the view of "good" as the primary notion of ethics and of "right" as a derivative notion to be defined as what is productive of good. This form of ethics stresses an evaluation of the results or consequences of an act rather than its motives. Utility— the principle of estimation of actions and laws in terms •of their tendency to augment or diminish happiness. Virtue-the goodness or excellence in all human functions, both of thought and of action, in individual conduct and in civic life. Virtuous ideals are defined by the nature of the ethical system or culture involved in their determination. Procedures -• This logical study was conceptuaf'and valuational in nature, and took a nonquantitative approach in its procedures. However, the study should have suggested areas for empirical -type research studies. In some respects the study was similar to the procedures used in historical research. The study involved a description of the research, an

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33 interpretation of the research, and a summary of how the data could be applied to present and future hypotheses. Organization of the Study . This study consisted of five integral parts. In Chapter I the literature related to the value dimension of the decisionmaking process in educational administration was reviewed. Chapter II contains a review and discussion of selected leading systems of normative ethics, and Chapter III has related the critical and deliberative questions found in these systems to identified critical tasks in educational administration. In Chapter IV selected concepts found in normative ethical systems have been discussed in relation to problems commonly met by practicing school administrators. Chapter V contains some conclusions as to how ethical valuing could more readily relate to the training of professional educational administrators, and a summary of the critical and deliberative questions posed by the ethical theories. 66 David J. Fox, The Research Process in Education (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 416.

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CHAPTER II NORMATIVE ETHICAL SYSTEMS Elements of a Normative Theory The purposes of a theory are (1 ) to synthesize isolated bits of empirical data into a broader conceptual scheme, (2) to permit the prediction of the occurrence of phenomena, (3) to act as a guide in discovering facts, and (4) to establish general laws which govern a certain field or set of phenomena. Ethical theories generally consist of first and second level principles, judgments, and rules. These theories are no different from other scientific theories in their attempt to coherently, consistently, and completely show the relationships which exist among its various elements. Ethical theories are concerned with moral principles, moral judgments, and moral rules. A well-developed ethical theory validates its moral judgments in terms of the theory's rules and principles. In turn, its moral principles justify the moral rules. Moral principles are the most general statements of judgments and represent the ultimate moral commitment. Moral rules generally refer to classes of individuals, actions, and situations; moral judgments are simply statements that a certain action is Tight or wrong for a specified individual in a concrete situation. ^George J. Mouly, The Science of Educational Research (New York: American Book Company, 1963), p. 51 . 34

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35 Normative judgments are singular in the sense that they generally refer to a single action either contemplated or accomplished by a particular individual in a specified situation. Some ethical theories include second-level principles which specify the principles which take precedence when a conflict exists between principles, and the rules which take precedence when a conflict is found between the rules. Figure 1 shows the relationship of the elements found in fully-developed ethical theories. First-Level Principles Second-Level Principles Rules Judgments Figure 1. Elements of an Ethical Theory Criteria for Assaying Normative Ethical Theories Graff and Street have identified three major criteria for assaying a normative theory—consistency, comprehensiveness, and workability. This list should also include the criterion of universal izability because of its importance in ethical discourses. Some writers have also included parsimony as a criterion, but it has not been generally recognized as being of major importance in practice. In the first place, any number of principles may logically be reduced to one principle by connecting the principles with conjunctions. Secondly, most theories with one or two principles tend to be so vague that the principle is inapplicable or the theory is incomplete. 7 Grin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value Framework for Educational Administration," in Administrative Behavior in Education , ed. Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (New York: " Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 143-45.

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36 The first criterion was consistency . According to Graff and Street, "Values need to be consistent in the internal structure of a value system, and there also needs to be consistency in choosing 3 values which most effectively use the facts that are available." Consistency is an essential criterion in assaying any theory. In this respect, ethical theories do not differ from other scientific theories. An inconsistent theory--one having contradictory principles or principles from which a contradiction can be inferred—is simply not a truly valid theory. One of the major purposes of a theory is to rationally account for some set of experiences; however, it is rare that any theory is entirely consistent. In most cases scientists and philosophers have operated on the premise that a theory was not so much true or false as it was useful or useless and that an inadequate theory was probably better than no theory at all. Generally, a contradiction calls for some adjustment in a theory rather than its complete abandonment. Conant has stated that a theory is never discarded merely because of a few stubborn facts with Which it cannot be reconciled but is "either modified or replaced by a better 4 one, never abandoned with nothing to take its place." The second criterion suggested by Graff and Street for assaying a value theory was comprehensiveness . "One function of a value system is to provide a system of values which will be appropriate for 5 use as the basis for activities in all kinds of life situations." 3 Ibid., p. 144. James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 170. Graff and Street, Administrative Behavior in Education , op. cit. , p-f 144.

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37 Comprehensiveness is essential in order to provide for a system that will operate in all observable situations. This criteria is a very difficult test because it means that a system in order to be a complete theory must account for all segments of moral behavior. The criterion of comprehensiveness should be viewed relatively since it may be impossible for a theory to be absolutely complete and to fulfill all of the other criteria at the same time. Actually, a theory is rarely, if ever, complete; as new facts appear—and in most theories new facts appear endlessly—theories have to undergo some modification. Comprehensiveness is relative in respect to other theories. If one of two competing theories is more comprehensive it is more preferable to the less complete theory. Thus, theories can be said to be less comprehensive only with respect to other theories. The third criterion was workability . Graff and Street listed two basic elements involved in this criterion. The first element was concerned with providing focus and meaning for actions. They stated: To be workable the pattern must provide direction for actions; and further, it must be capable of expansion so as to furnish a set of evaluative questions by which the individual may more accu' ,~ /,:;,, ^ rately evaluate the appropriateness of his actions. 6 The second major element which the criterion of workability suggested was that each individual should be able to internalize the value system. Graff and Street stated that each individual , and particularly the administrator, has "a moral obligation to do the things necessary to achieve a usable kind of value structure." 7 6 Ibid., p. 145. 7 Ibid.

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38 The criteria suggested by Graff and Street— consistency, comprehensiveness, and workability—represented an attempt on their part to develop a cyclic pattern, or value system, of integrated human behavior for use in educational administration. However, they overlooked a vital criterion usually encompassed in assaying ethical theories, and it is particularly relevant to those involved in the enterprise termed education. The criterion is called universal izabil ity and it refers to the notion that what is right for one individual is right for anyone else in like circumstances. Thus, if one wishes to argue that a specific action is right for an individual but wrong for another, he must exhibit a relevant difference between the two persons or between the circumstances which surround the situations. According o to Hare, moral judgments are not tied to individual people as agents, but are tied to features of individuals and of their situations. In a rather colloquial fashion Hare stated: I am not saying that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander; for it might conceivably make a difference to the morality of the act that it was done by a gander, not a goose; but at least, what is sauce for the goose must be sauce for any precisely similar goose in any precisely similar situation. ^ The problem was in determining what are relevant differences. Certainly, each individual is different. They have different histories, different physical characteristics and abilities, different families, and occupy different spatial locations. Thus, it has been argued, universal izabil ity is absurd because each person is different from another and the „ o R.'M. Hare, "Language and Moral Education," in New Essays in the Philosophy of Education , ed. Glenn Langford and D. J. O'Connor (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 160. 9 Ibid.

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39 circumstances must necessarily be different from each other. Admittedly, differences exist among agents, actions, and circumstances, but these are not necessarily ethically relevant. Mere differences, in and of themselves, do not necessarily invalidate normative generalizations. However, relevant differences are important in that they lead us to change or modify our normative judgments. A sound normative theory should make an effort to specify the exact nature of the circumstances and of the actions to that generalizations can apply to all those in a particular class. Normative generalizations apply to all men doing the specified action in the specified circumstances unless it can be shown that some ethically relevant differences do indeedexist. If ethical judgments are not universal izable they will be of no practical value. A Typology of Normative Ethics The classic work by C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory , provided the basic framework for this section. According to Broad, ethical theories can be divided into two major classes-deontological and teleological . "Deontological theories hold that there are propositions of the form: Such and such a kind of action would always be right (or wrong) in such and such circumstances, no matter what its consequences might be."^ The emphasis from the deontological perspective has been on judging actions on the basis of what type of action it is— not its results. On the other hand, if we evaluate actions on the basis of the state of affairs the action produces 10 C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1930). 11 Ibid., p. 206.

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40 than we assume a teleological perspective. Broad added further clarification when he stated: "Teleological theories hold that the rightness or wrongness of an act is always determined by its tendency to produce 12 certain consequences which are intrinsically good or bad." The distinction between teleological and deontological can be given more meaning by examining a particular situation sometimes common to building administrators. An upset teacher brings a student to the office for will full misconduct and demands that the principal take immediate disciplinary action against the student. The principal gives his solemn promise to suspend the student from school, but he later realizes that, because of other circumstances, consequences will be better if the student is not suspended. What would be the advice of the deontologist and the teleologist in this circumstance? A deontologist would advise the principal to keep his promise and suspend the student, since keeping one's promises is the kind of action that ought to be done. The deontologist would justify this advice by pointing out the principle that we ought to keep our promises. A teleologist, on the other hand, would advise us to do that action which would produce the best effect, and if this meant breaking a promise to do so, then we should break the promise. In sum, then, the teleologist evaluates actions and principles on the basis of their effects, while the deontologist evaluates them as to the kind of action involved. Philosophers of ethics have also developed a second classificatory 13 distinction based on the criteria of rule and act. These criteria 12 Ibid., p. 207. ^Richard T. Garner and Bernard Rosen, Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Metaethics (New York : Macmillan, 1967).

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41 determine whether an action is judged on the basis of that particular action in those particular circumstances or on the grounds that it is a member of a particular class of actions. Thus, an act-teleologist would judge an action on the basis of the effects of that particular action. The rightness or wrongness of an action is solely a function of its consequences. A rule-teleologist, however, would evaluate an action on the basis of the effects of having a rule obliging us to do a whole class of actions in question. In other words, a rule-teleologist holds that a particular action is right or wrong if it follows or breaks some rule, and the correctness of the rule is a function of the consequences that follow from the rule's being adopted, accepted, recognized, or followed. On the other hand, a rule-deontologist looks to the nature of the whole class of actions of which a specific action is a member. The rightness or wrongness of an action or the correctness of a rule is a function solely of factors other than the consequences of that action or rule. An act-deontologist, however, evaluates actions according to the type of specific action it is. In this case the rightness or wrongness of an action or the correctness of a rule is a function of many factors, some of which are or may be the consequences of that action or rule. Table 1 shows the relationships among the criteria that have been established for classifying normative ethical theories. 14 Ibid., p. 56. 15 Ibid. 16ibid. , p. 83.

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42 TABLE 1 A TYPOLOGY OF ETHICAL THEORIES Deontological (Concerned with Actions) Teleological (Util itarianism) (Concerned with Results) Rule Act Justification is by appealing to general considerations. An act is right because it is in accordance with a general rule. Justification is by appealing to particular considerations. An act is right because it has certain characteristics. Justification is by appealing to the effects of a rule. An act is right because it is in accordance with a rule which produces the greatest good. Justification is by appealing to the effects of particular actions. An act is right because it leads to the greatest good. The remainder of the chapter has been arranged according to the typology established. It should be noted that teleological theories are generally divided into two types--egoism and utilitarianism. Egoistic ethics are concerned with those values and obligations which produce the greatest good for an individual. Simply, the view is that the only obligation or right anyone has is to provide the greatest good for himself. Not all teleogists hold to this view, for many believe that there is an obligation to provide good for other persons as well as for oneself. In that educational administrators are not generally "concerned only Tor themselves, but for~an organization, specific groups, and other people in general, an example of egoistic ethics has not been provided. Of the two teleological theories, utilitarianism

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43 has been reviewed and discussed because it is more in line with most administrators' beliefs about obligation. Jeremy Bentham's form of act-utilitarianism has been reviewed first because it is basically a simple ethic which stressed the greatest good for the greatest number. As an example of rule-utilitarianism, the pragmatism of John Dewey has been reviewed. Dewey's ethic stressed a denial of intrinsic value and ultimate ends. The deontological theories selected included the ethics of Immanuel Kant as a representative of rule-deontological theories and the ethics of Aristotle and the existentialists as forms of act-deontological systems. Kantian ethics focused on duty and obligation as well as the rights of individuals. The Aristotelian system spoke of the nature and function of man and of the virtues which brought to fulfillment what a man was able to become. In existentialism, there was the recognition of the moral situation as centering in the decision of the individual with respect to the course of his own life and that of others. The systems of ethics selected do not exhaust all forms of normative ethical thought, but are only representative of the typology and the delimitations established. The framers of these various ethical theories were the originators of ethical thoughts and questions which are of paramount concern not only to moral philosophers, but also to policy formulators and executors as well. The sections on representative ethical systems have been chosen to illustrate that a critical examination of fundamental moral questions can be beneficial in formulating and executing administrative decisions by educational administrators.

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44 Utilitarian Ethics The Principle of Utility The concept of utility in ethical thought can, in large measure, be attributed to the Scottish philosopher David Hume.^ i n his writings he espoused a theory of value which found its expression in modern positivism. This positivistic value was reflected in Hume's sentiment towards the practicality or usefulness of abstract thought. Hume made the classic statement that: If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusionJ 8 Hume's major efforts were directed towards the establishment of universal principles from which all ethical decisions and actions could be justly derived. However, the science of ethics had to be founded upon fact and observation resulting from the experimental method, not through the use of deductive reasoning. For making judgments of censure and approbation in moral matters, Hume invoked the principle of utility. Those virtues and rules which maintained a harmonious social network of relations and transactions were judged to be good, while those matters which were divergent from general happiness were judged to be bad. It was in this context that Hume ^Orin B. Graff, Calvin M. Street, Ralph B. Kimbrough, and Archie R. Dykes, Philosophic Theory and Practice in Educational Administration (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1966), pp. 145-46. 18 David Hume, as quoted in Philosophic Theory and Practice in Educational Administration, ibid.

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45 called upon individuals to adopt a public affection which could help to establish the happiness of society. Since, to Hume, the origin of morality resided in the usefulness of those actions which promoted the interests of mankind and society, he concluded that benevolence was the chief social virtue because it communicated pleasure and happiness for others, and this ultimately benefited each person him««"". ; ' ; " The principle of utility fostered by Hume was adopted and expanded 20 in the ethical system of Jeremy Bentham. In essence, Bentham merged the principle of utility with Cesare Beccaria's notion of "the greatPi est happiness of the greatest number.'"" Bentham's theory of morals, however, was original in the precise form in which "utilitarianism" appeared in his writings. Bentham's expansion upon the principle of utility reflected his interest in the precision with which this principle could be applied as a guide in morals and legislation. Because Bentham was committed to the reform of law and society, he attempted to provide the foundations for a theory of legislation by establishing the premise that policies were to be determined by a principle which could measure the practical end of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Such a determinate was the principle of utility. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1953; reprinted from the original edition of 1777), p. 7. ^Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Claredon Press, 1907; reprinted from the revised edition of 1823). 21 Cesare Beccaria, Treatise on Crimes and Punishments , trans. Henry Paolucci (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberal Arts Press, BobbsMerrill,1963), p. 8.

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46 If a science of legislation and morals is to be directed toward the practical end of the greatest happiness, first, a science must exist by which actions, from which pleasure and pains flowed, could be judged as to whether they contributed to the end of happiness, or whether they led to malice and mischievousness. The determinate of utility was the proper measure, because the initial reason for establishing policies was simply to ensure pleasure. To Bentham, actions enjoined by legislation should be grounded in the belief that the greatest happiness was being preserved and strengthened. He argued that mankind was governed by two masters—pleasure and pain. Bentham equated happiness with pleasure. In his introductory comment he stated: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure . It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light. 22 Pleasures and Pains -A policymaker in his capacity as a moralist should know the value of various pleasures and pains. To determine such value 22Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation , op. cit., pp. 1-2.

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47 Bentham identified four critical "elements" that were to be taken into account when estimating the value of a pleasure or pain: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and propinquity or remoteness. The intensity was just the strength of the pleasure or pain, its duration was the length of time it lasted, its certainty was the probability that it would in fact occur, and its propinquity or remoteness was the nearness or distance in time of it. (Apparently a pleasure that would come soon was better than one that was far off, just as one that was sure to come was—all things being equal— to be preferred to one that was not.) In giving a total evaluation of the pleasures for the purpose of evaluating an action, Bentham held that there were two other characteristics of the pleasure or pain to be considered: its fecundity and its purity. Fecundity was defined by Bentham as the chance an action had of being followed by sensations of the same kind, i.e., pleasure followed by pleasure and pain followed by pain. Purity was defined as that element which determined the probability that an action would be followed by sensations of the opposite kind. These considerations allowed for the decision of the value of an action insofar as it concerned one person alone. However, Bentham added another consideration: the extent of the pleasure or pain. The element of extent simply referred to the number of persons who would be affected by an action. Bentham' s calculus for determining the value of an action was stated as: Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that

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48 individual person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole. 23 Pleasures and pains were, to Bentham, the result of the action of certain causes. However, the quantity of the results was not always proportional to the quantity of the force exerted by a particular cause. Each person possessed an individual "sensibility" which biased the amount of pleasure or pain he felt. The situation or conditions in which the person found himself when being subjected to an exciting cause also had an influence on the degree of sensibility of the person. The variables which most influenced the sensibility factor of individuals were: health, strength, endurance, and quantity and quality of knowledge. Other secondary-level variables which have an effect on sensibility were: sex, age, rank, education, and climate. What was central in Bentham' s analysis of morals was the treatment of pleasure as the end and measure of effective actions, and the treatment of pleasure and pain as the motives or sanctions for producing such effective action. An individual acted wisely and properly only when he acted in a way which was productive of pleasure and free of pain, and he was prompted cu act in this way only through the fact or expectation of pleasure or pain. The implication was that the experience or expectation of pleasures and pains was the natural and infallible guide to happiness, and that such experience was also part of the total balance or imbalance of pleasure and pain which was in fact happiness or misery. Pleasure as a motive never prompted the individual to what was against his interest, inasmuch as this interest 23 Ibid., p. 31. 24 Ibid., pp. 43-69.

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49 could not really be expressed in terms other than pleasure itself. Any awareness of an opposition between the individual 's good and pleasure as a principle was traceable by Bentham to confusions concerning pleasures and pains. Bentham simply rejected as mistaken the 25 view that one may desire an end other than pleasure. Table 2 provides a summary of the kinds of pleasures and pains discussed by Bentham. 26 Actions and Consequences Bentham gave attention to actions in terms of their motives, and consequences, so far as actions were intentional, i.e., voluntary or in accordance with the individual's own determination.^ An intentional act was distinguishable from its consequences, although the intention of an act always embraced considerations of consequences of some sort. An individual could only be responsible for what he did and for the consequences which he had before him in committing an act. The actual consequences of an act depended upon circumstances, which were never intended by the individual. Circumstances were strictly objects of the understanding, not of the will; and, with respect to circumstances, an act was either advised or unadvised. An •individual, however, did jwill his own free act and, according to his understanding, its presumed consequences; in this respect his intention was good or bad. The actual consequences of an act which are of importance to the legislator were pleasures or pains, as increasing 25 Ibid., pp. 8-28. 26 Ibid., pp. 34-42. 27 1 bid.,, pp. 82-83.

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53 or diminishing the happiness of the community. In terms of such consequences, the tendency of an act was regarded as beneficent or mischievous.™ The intention of an act was also termed good or bad with respect to the motive or motives from which it arose, and the motive of an intention could be good when the presumed consequences of the same intention were bad; also, the consequences could be good when the motive was bad. When Bentham regarded himself as speaking of motives in a strict way, he denied that they were either good or bad except in terms of their general tendency to involve good or bad effects. Rather, the individual's disposition was either good or bad. A disposition was beneficent when the tendency of an individual 's act was good and the motive was that of good-will; a mischievous disposition was the conjunction of a bad tendency of an act and the self-regarding motive. Thus, it was to the beneficent disposition that the moralist or legislator must look in seeking to support the good of the community. 29 Bentham clearly stated the consequences of his theory of action which held that the estimation of action and motive was ultimately determined in terms of good and bad effects as pleasures and pains in these words: The only way, it should seem, in which a motive can with safety and propriety be styled good or bad, is with reference to its effects in each individual instance; and principally from the intention it gives birth to: from which arise . . . the most material part of its effects. « A motive is good, when the intention it gives birth. to is good or bad, according to the 28 Ibid., p. 133. 29 Ibid., p. 121.

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54 material consequences that are the objects of it. 30 Morals and Legislation Bentham devoted considerable thought and discussion to the treatment of the relation of morals to legislation. The relationship of morals and legislation was based on the commonality of interest in the happiness of every member of the community. Bentham defined ethics as "the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of 31 those whose interest is in view." Each person was responsible to . "private ethics" which acted as an "art of self-government." Private ethics were concerned with legislation and administration of conduct in relation to the embracing rules of prudence (duties to oneself) and the rules of probity and beneficence (duties to others). Legislation, as the promulgation of external rules, must assist private ethics in ways which support the happiness of the whole community and not in ways which subtract from this happiness. 32 The sanctions of legislation, as distinct from those of ethics, would apply least in matters of prudence; because, popular (moral) sanctions would operate mainly in these matters. In matters of probity (avoiding injury to others), legislation could both dissuade and restrain the individual from harming others, and it could define the character of the offenses against property and against society itself. In matters of beneficence (increasing the happiness of others) the major 30 Ibid., p. 120 31 Ibid., p. 310. 32 Ibid., pp. 312-13.

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55 jurisdiction belonged to ethics and not legislation. The effects of laws in this area were limited, but Bentham felt that they should be extended beyond what custom had dictated. In essence, he felt that our duties to others, as beneficence, could be legislated so that, for example, In cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing oneself, as well as to abstain from bringing it on him. 33 This last point, on the function of legislation, captured the spirit of Benthamism. It was according to Bentham, "the idea pursued in the body of this work." The utilitarianism of Bentham reflected a concern for the individual members of society, who had equal claims upon well-being. The recognition of the individual and his interests constituted the center of moral investigation and the focus of reform. Each should count for one and none for more than one. If indeed an individual was to be benefited in his own situation, he must be consulted or at least kept in mind in the calculations of the legislator. The individual's estimate of pleasures and pains, as guided by his concern for his own good, was to be matched by the estimates of the legislator in his efforts to reduce mischief or pain and to increase pleasure for the greatest number. The contention was that there was more to human existence than a simple balance of pleasure over pain; this did not really overturn an approach to social morality in terms of increasing happiness and diminishing misery. John Stuart Mill 33 Ibid., p. 323. 34 Ibid.

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56 strongly supported this position in his defense of utilitarian35 ism. Mill's Corrections of Utilitarianism Mill directed his efforts toward the clarification and correction of what appeared to him to be misunderstandings and trivial izations. The definitional problems and the improper applications of utilitarian concepts were the result of a shallow understanding of utilitarianism. Mill argued that utilitarianism was not to be misconstrued as an ethic which neglected beauty, ornament, or amusement, and neither was it to be misrepresented as an ethic which fastened the enjoyment of momentary pleasures and frivolity to the neglect of more substantive pursuits. Utilitarianism was, to Mill, correct in its basic premise that pleasure and freedom from pain were the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things were desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. What Mill took strong objection to were the things the utilitarian theory included in the ideas of pleasure and pain, and to what extent this was left an open question. A major concern was whether pleasures and pains were homogeneous in their intrinsic value, assuming that the objective elements were equal, or whether they were to be judged according to their source of derivation, i.e., were pleasures and pains associated with the higher faculties preferable 35j hn Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863). [Reprinted in its complete form in Writers on Ethics: Classic and Contemporary , ed. Joseph Katz, Philip Nochlin, and Robert Stover (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1962).] 36 Ibid., p. 113,

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57 in kind to those of which the animal nature of man was susceptible? Mill held that the concept of utility was to be considered as a directive rule of human conduct and, therefore, was concerned with the cultivation of nobleness of character, even if some form of dissatisfaction or pain resulted from the pursuit. Mill stated: It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. An if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. 37 Apparently, Mill was not only concerned with the quantity of pleasures, but also with the quality of individual and societal existence. Mill, in his recognition of kinds of pleasure in relation to the fulfillment of distinct human capabilities, meant to say that good , as good objects, was something different from the experience or experiences of pleasantness. Then, the basis of Mill's utilitarianism was not simply the fact of pleasure as an experience of whatever number of individuals or the desiring of pleasantness, but the desirable and pleasurable in the sense of precise human realizations which were in the very nature of the case intrinsically satisfying. Mill's treatment of morality as an order of action involved less perplexity than his treatment of the nature of good. If the greatest happiness secured to the greatest number was the end or good of the community, then "right action" was whatever was conducive to this end. Mill thought of actions simply as efficient causes which were found to produce positive goods, such as the enjoyment of art and music, and the decrease or removal of positive evils, such as poverty and 37 Ibid.

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58 disease. Inasmuch as all actions have consequences, Mill (following Bentham) wanted to stress the responsibility of the moralist to undertake the determination of the consequences of action as a matter capable of empirical investigation. This responsibility was in accord with both intelligence and generosity. o Mill was aware that moral sensibility embraced more than the recognition of the efficacy of action which was conducive to general happiness. While right action could only be understood in terms of the good which it produced, or was believed to have produced, the very disposition to act for the sake of the good was morally significant. To act from such a disposition was to act virtuously, even where desirable consequences did not flow from a given act itself. Mill included virtue as an aggregate of "ingredients of happiness." The virtuous man was not one who was indifferent to the consequences of his action. Mill concluded that since right action was always a means to the end of general happiness, virtue was never simply a means. Mill's attention to virtue, or the virtuous disposition, was part of a broad concern with the conscientious roots of right action. Bentham rested the promotion of the greatest good of the community upon the somewhat unsure foundation of the purely social motive of sympathy together with the semi-social motives of love of amity and love of reputation. The efficacy of these motives, to Bentham, was a function of the bias and quantum of sensibility. It was to this sensibility that Mill directly appealed in speaking of the "conscientious feelings of mankind." 38 Mill maintained that the moral feelings were natural but not innate. The faculty consisting of the 38 Ibid., p. 126.

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59 moral feelings was natural in being an outgrowth of human nature, either in springing up spontaneously or in being brought to develop39 ment by cultivation. This faculty was flexible and was capable of conferring the authority of conscience upon very diverse moral contents. At the very root of the moral faculty was a natural basis of social sentiment, namely the "social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures," through which the feelings of one individual were more and more identified with the good of others. 40 Thus, the support of the well-being of others was an expression of a natural want, of an internal force which was independent of external sanctions, selfish interests, and influences of bad education. The social feelings provided the sanction for the highest requirements in the scale of social utility, namely those which come under the name of justice . Justice was the recognition not simply of duties in support of general happiness, but also of claims which individuals have upon one another, and thus upon society. The idea of justice embraced, accordingly, two things, namely a rule of fairness or reciprocity, and a sentiment which moves the individual to be just. The sentiment of justice was the moral, or social, feeling which softens and enlarges the somewhat primitive desire to retaliate an injury, so as to enable the individual to act for the interest of society rather than for himself. 41 and for those with whom he sympathized. 39 Ibid., p. 127. 40lbid. 41 Ibid., p. 140.

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60 In Mill's view, the idea of justice made implicit the whole intention of the greatest happiness principle, namely to give an individual his due as the minimum of service to him. Justice was respecting the personal happiness of another as at least equal to one's own happiness. This rule recognized the claims of others to happiness and to all of its means. 42 These claims or rights were but expressions of the fundamental right of the individual to equality of treatment. For every right a corresponding duty existed, although some duties, such as generosity and beneficence, did not have corresponding rights, i.e., one individual had no moral claim upon another's generosity or beneficence. Although justice was not the whole of morality, the duties related to rights were "more paramount . . . than any others." Equality with its rights and duties was that "abstract standard of social and distributive justice" toward which "all institutions, and the efforts of all virtuous citizens" should be directed. The rights of individuals were indefeasible, although the exercise of a particular right could be affected by the demands of "some recognized social expediency." Equality was the very sense of the principle of utility and of Bentham's dictum, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one." The sentiment of justice of which Mill spoke of as resting upon "the human capacity of enlarged sympathy and the human conception of intelligent self-interest" was in many respects the sentiment and spirit of nineteenth-century liberalism. The works which emanated from this period abound with convictions concerning the capability of 42 Ibid. 4 3lbid., p. 148.

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61 the individual for self-determination in seeking to achieve a satisfactory existence and the possibilities open to community in seeking to support the welfare of its members. In Mill's defense, the moral philosopher's proper concern was with the character of individual life and with the excellence which an individual could achieve in himself while at the same time extending assistance to others. Society is not, of course, an idealized unity of thought and purpose, and it is doubtful that Mill or any utilitarian thought this to be the case. However, while society is not a substantial unity existing above and beyond the individual members, the conscious purposes of individuals must always be consulted and respected in any projection of the good of the community as a whole. Social reform is not so much a reordering of individuals, as it has become in collectivist societies, as it is a reordering of the conditions of personal freedom and fulfillment. Summary of Utilitarian Ethics Utilitarianism in Bentham and Mill combined the defense of hedonism with the advocacy of social and political reform. The good was pleasure or the pleasant because no one ever desired anything but pleasure. Good was simply what was desired and pleasure alone is desired, whatever the disguises which appetition might take. Pleasure could be measured or estimated, as Bentham suggested, by a number of values of "elements" (such as intensity, duration, fecundity, and purity), and these values were to be "always kept in view" when seeking to determine the good or evil tendency of action which yielded pleasure or pain. At the same time, the recognition of pleasure as

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62 the good did not favor pleasures of the moment, or pleasures whose enjoyment by one individual interfere with or detract from the felicity of others. The calculus of pleasures and pains was governed by the "greatest happiness principle," according to which each individual should count for one in the determination of whether the tendency of an action augmented or diminished the happiness of the community. The place of pleasure in the hedonism of Bentham suggested the general argument that the life of pleasure without knowledge was to be rejected as the good for man. Mill sought to keep uppermost the rational or "intuitionist" element in hedonism in contending that distinctions among pleasures are qualitative as well as quantitative, in accordance with the sensibility which was bound up with man's higher faculties. To this sensibility were to be attributed the interests of the cultivated mind and the moral feelings which supported social existence and the duties of justice in society. Mill's attention to the "moral sense" brought him into the company of intuitionists who had maintained that the differences among goods were immediately perceived, and that right was not simply what was conducive to or productive of happiness. The tensions in utilitarianism between hedonism and intuitionism, with respect to the good, and between consequential ism and intuitionism, with respect to right action, remained after Mill. These tensions were to be exhibited in various ways in the writings of later theorists,

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63 such as Sidgwick, Moore, ^ and Perry. 4 ° While the dialog among the utilitarians was interesting, it will not be discussed here, but some of the views of Moore will be discussed. Opposed to all forms of hedonistic utilitarianism, Moore insisted upon approaching the basic ethical issues from the question of the cognition and definability of "good." Good was a simple quality, Moore maintained, which was known or intuited simply as what it was. Any attempt at definition which represented good as "another thing," as in holding that "good" means "pleasure," committed the "naturalistic fallacy." Moore recognized pleasure as a necessary ingredient of things which were good, but he denied that pleasure was what good meant. Of the things which were good, Moore distinguished chiefly the enjoyment of beautiful objects and the pleasures of association. He argued, with respect to the production of such goods, that action was to be recognized as "good as a 48 means" or right. Moore's version of utilitarianism combined the definition of "right" in terms of utility with the indef inability of "good" in order to avoid what he believed to be errors committed by moral philosophers in the past. Moore's liberation of utilitarianism from hedonism was in a certain way latent in the thoughts of Mill. 44 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics , 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1962), chap. 4. ^George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1929), pp. 59-109. 46 Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value , (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), chap. 8. ^Moore, Principia Ethica , op. cit. , pp. 9-21 . ^George Edward Moore, Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1912; reprinted as a Galaxy Book, 1965), pp. 27-49.

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64 The critical questions developed in utilitarian ethics which relate to the administrative decisionmaking process include: 1. What are the probable consequences of the alternative proposals? 2. Which policy alternative would result in the greatest happiness for the greatest number? 3. How would the consequences of the alternative proposals compare in relation to the value elements of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent of pleasures and pains? 4. Should policy decisionmakers legislate a person's duty towards helping others, or should the matters of beneficence be determined by one's "private ethics"? 5. How should an organization foster pleasures and diminish pains of its members, and thereby contribute to the end happiness? 6. What types of qualitative pleasures are provided for or encouraged by an organization, as opposed to quantitative pleasures? 7. What is the factual evidence based upon empirical investigations for assertions about benefits and disadvantages, pleasures, and pains? 8. Does the organization and its administration provide for equality of treatment, or do some individuals count for more than their fair share?

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65 Dewey an Ethics Theory of Valuation The pragmatic ethics of John Dewey 49 took as a major concern the problem of valuing and valuing expressions: they related to all planned or deliberated human conduct, personal and collective. Value was, to Dewey, defined as those estimates of worth which were associated with human activities and relations. 50 Dewey strongly objected to what he termed "ejaculatory" value expressions which did not state anything about contexts and feelings. Expressions such as "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong" were regarded by Dewey as mere interjections, because they did not state anything of substance. They were considered as "phenomena like blushing, smiling, weeping; or as stimuli to move others in certain ways—much as one says 'Gee' to oxen or 'Whoa' 51 to a horse." Dewey desired a theory of valuation which would provide for the possibility of developing genuine propositions about the direction of human affairs. He discounted theories of valuation which (1) denied that value assertions could not be subjected to experimental tests, (2) relegated value categories to only the mental field to the exclusion of the physical area, or (3) found that value expressions were absent in the physical sciences. The implication of this action was that value 52 categories were supreme over factual existence. 49 John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939). [Reprinted in its complete form in Writers of Ethics : Classic and Contemporary , op. cit., pp. 574-614.] 50 Ibid., p. 575. 51 Ibid., p. 578. 52 Ibid., pp. 575-576.

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66 The concept of value, as an estimate of human conduct, could only be found in a contextual setting, according to Dewey. Therefore, it was important that the context, in which a value question was encountered, be made clear; otherwise, the stated value expressions would be meaningless. Only with an understanding of the contextual setting could propositions be assigned a value. Dewey also held that situations which prompted value expressions developed only when one was confronted with a desire to avoid an existing situation, and when there was an attraction towards another possible prospective situation. At the same time, a "specifiable and testable relation between the latter (a prospective situation) as an end and certain activities as means for accomplishing it" should develop. Therefore, according to Dewey, dissatisfaction with one's present condition stimulated the individual toward making value decisions involving likes and dislikes, desires and interests, and means and ends. Valuational activities, as outlined, were marked by three successive circumstances and motives— dissatisfaction with the present context, attraction to a prospective alternative, and a determination of means to accomplish the end sought. Valuation, within such a model , could be analyzed and verified by the observation of behaviors associated with such circumstances. For example, one could assign such qualifying adjectives as "slight" and "great" when the amount of energy expended and the length of time over which a behavior persisted were observed. In such an instance, it was also possible to demarcate what was designated by likes and dislikes from things 53 Ibid., p. 581.

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67 prefixed by such an ambiguous term as "enjoy. "54 Value statements, or what Dewey termed "propositions of appraisal", should only refer to a valuation of things with respect to their "serviceability or usefulness." While this notion concentrated on the valuation of things as means, Dewey contended such a relational theory of value inherently involved the evaluation of ends." In Dewey's theory of valuation the existential relation described and defined certain things as good, fit, or proper valuations. The existential relation in question was that of means-ends or meansconsequences, and the propositions which flowed from such a relation, to Dewey, could be tested by observation of results actually attained as compared with those intended. "Prizings" constituted desires and interests (likings) which could not exist independent of the appraisal of things (means), but rather were intimately influenced by appraisals, Thus, while Dewey discriminated between the appraisal of things as means, and the "prizing" of things as ends, he held that deliberative activity, which weighed various alternative end states, was always couched in terms of the conditions which were the means of their securement. Dewey stated that: The more overtly and emphatically the valuation of objects as ends in connected with desire and interest, the more evident it should be that, since desire and interest are ineffectual save as they co-operatively interact with environing conditions, valuation of desire and interest, as means correlated with other means, is the sole condition for value appraisal of objects as ends. 56 54 Ibid., pp. 582-83. 55 Ibid., p. 587. \ . . 56lpid., p. 591.

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68 Dewey's pragmatic ethics stressed that valuation took place only when something was wrong, or when there was "some trouble to be done away with, some need, lack or privation to be made good, some conflict of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions."" This fact in turn proved that the intellectual factor of inquiry was present. The adequacy with which inquiry was exercised resulted in the difference in different desires and their correlative ends-inview. Dewey stated: Propositions in which things (acts and materials) are appraised as means enter necessarily into desires and interests that determine end-values. Hence the importance of the inquiries that result in the appraisal of things and means. 58 Dewey did not accept any a priori standard for determining the value of a proposed solution in relation to concrete cases. To Dewey, a proposed solution either performed the function of resolution of a problem, as an end-in-view, or it did not. Therefore, Dewey rejected not only the hedonistic principle of pleasure as the ultimate good, but all forms of monistic definitions of good. The only valid test of the existence of a valuation was actual behavior that was subject to observation. The acceptance or rejection of such behavior was determined by the examination of the concrete situation in respect to the conditions that constituted the need or lack, the attainable ends or outcomes desired formulated as means, and the consequences that mutually ensued. 5 ^ Therefore, the only purpose of a theory of valuation was to set forth the conditions by which a method of formation 57 Ibid., p. 594." 58 Ibid., p. 595. 59 Ibid., pp. 606-7.

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69 of desires and interests could be observed in concrete situations. The concepts of "good" and "right" were defined by Dewey in the following fashion: The view that value in the sense of good is inherently connected with that which promotes, furthers, assists, a course of activity, and that value in the sense of right is inherently connected with that which is needed, required, in the maintenance of a course of activity. °0 The Dynamic Force of Habit The purpose of ethics, as a philosophical science, was "to state problems in such forms that action could be courageously and intelligently directed to their solution." With this purpose in mind, Dewey held that one needed to recognize the role that habit, impulse, and intelligence performed in the determination of human conduct. Habit , to Dewey, was defined as an acquired predisposition which was projective, dynamic in quality, and ready for overt manifestation. This predisposition to ways or modes of response dictated the formation of ideas as well as their execution, and in its overt manifestation, it was not limited to a particular set of activities, but could take a variety of forms. Habits were also viewed by Dewey as acquired social functions which performed as "working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces."^ 3 Thus, Dewey held that the habits acquired as a result of the interaction of personal and environmental elements could 60 Ibid. , p^609. °'John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1922; Random House, The Modern Library, 1950), p. 12. ....,,..„_ 62 Ibid., p. 41. 63 Ibid., p. 16.

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70 be expressed as virtues and vices, and they could also be equated with human will . A habit, as a special sensitiveness to certain classes of stimuli, when taken in connection with the continuity of other habits with one another explained the unity of human character and conduct, motive and act, and will and deed. 6 ^ Dewey's moral theory held that an under. standing of those active dispositions which make a man do what he does could result in the prescription of meaningful remedies for undesirable tendencies. When making moral judgments of character, Dewey cautioned that one should not make wholesale judgments, but should discriminate among "the complex of acts and habits into tendencies which were to be specifically cultivated and condemned." A thorough understanding of the conditions which promoted the development of human character and a thorough study of the consequences which flowed from their activity were essential if there was to be a modification of those factors which contributed toward the development of undesirable tendencies. Dewey believed that human character could be changed provided one could change certain conditions. Dewey stated: To change the working character or will of another we have to alter objective conditions which enter into his habits. Our own schemes of judgment, of assigning blame and praise, of awarding punishment and honor, are part of these conditions. 66 Morals were defined in Deweyan ethics as customs, folkways, or established collective habits. Customs constituted the moral standards, 64 Ibid.

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71 because they cultivated demands for certain modes of overt behavior. An individual acquired morality through the assimilation of the established cultural patterns to which he had been subjected. Therefore, the social groups or associations with which one was involved, and the degree of one's interactions with such systems nurtured not only one's moral development, but also one's sense of morality. These interacting arrangements, in many cases, came into conflict with one another, and, in this diversity of models, individuality could assert itself to foster progress. Dewey stated that, because of the present mobility and inter minglings of custom, an individual could exercise personal ingenuity in selecting and rearranging the elements of custom patterns in order to remake them. 68 According to Dewey, this relationship of custom and morality established standards which were sanctioned by life itself. The basic question which flowed from this nexus of custom and morality was how individuals were going to use and be used by these standards, not whether they were going to be used. Therefore, the significant problem to be resolved did not involve a choice between moral authority outside custom and one within it, but between adopting more or less intelligent and significant customs. Dewey stated: Reason, moral principles, cannot in any case be showed behind these affairs, for reason and morality grow out of them. They are there as part of them. No one can escape them if he wants to. He cannot escape the problem of how to engage in life, since in any case he must engage in it in some way or other — or else quit and get out. 69 57 Ibid., p. 75. 68ibid. 69'lbld.,' p. 81.

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72 The Place of Impulse in Conduct Impulses were an integral part of Deweyan ethics, because they represented the raw materials of human nature and conduct. Dewey viewed impulses as the starting points for the assimilation of knowledge and skill, and as agencies for the transfer of existing social power into personal ability. In other words, they were the organs of reorganization and readjustment. ?0 Impulses were not to be thought of as secondary and dependent upon formed habits and customs. Instincts or impulses were, according to Dewey, modified by their interaction with the environment. Dewey in his discussion on the plasticity of impulses commented that: "Any impulse may become organized into almost any disposition according to the way it interacts with surroundings. "7' This fact was a central tenet in Dewey's philosophy of education, because he felt that a "truly humane education consists of an intelligent direction of native activities in the light of the possibilities and 72 necessities of the social situation." Unfortunately, schools have generally demanded "an impatient premature mechanization of impulsive activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits of thought and affection." 73 Dewey believed that while some inventive impulses of the young worked toward accommodation, assimilation, or reproduction, other impulses worked toward exploration, discovery, and creation. However, the weight of adult customs strengthened the tendency toward conformity 70ibid. , p. 94. -71 Ib|d; -p— g 5: 7 2lbid., p. 96. 73lbid.

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73 rather than toward the development of variation and independence. Dewey, of course, recognized that not all creative impulses could be woven into a smooth pattern of habits; but, upon the onslaught of circumstance and stimuli, "the emotional outbreak and rush of instincts dominating all activity show how superficial is the modification which a rigid habit has been able to effect."^ Impulses were, therefore, sources of liberation, and by giving habits pertinence and freshness they could liberate an individual's potential. Impulses were also intermediaries of human conduct, because morality was an endeavor to find for the manifestation of impulse an office of refreshment and renewal. If not used in such forms impulses could become pathological and barbaric. Impulsive activities should be treated-' as opportunities for imagination and invention, not as ends in themselves. Dewey stated: "Impulse is needed to arouse thought, incite reflection and enliven belief." The Place of Intelligence in Conduct In Deweyan ethics intelligence was a necessary element in order to achieve a balance between habit and impulse. This balance of habit and impulse was requisite for observation, memory, and judgment; habits by themselves were too organized, insistent, and determinate to indulge in inquiry or imagination; and impulses taken as themselves were too chaotic, tumultous, and confused to be able to know what they even wanted. 76 Intellectual activity was a necessary link with the conjoint operation of habit and impulse, because it engendered experiment and 74 Ibid._, p. 101. 75 Ipid., pp. 170-71. 76 Ibid., p. 177.

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74 deliberation when a person was confronted with a felt difficulty or problem. The intellectual activity of deliberation served as an experiment "in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. "77 The purpose of deliberation was, therefore, to make various combinations of habit and impulse to determine what the resultant action would be if the various alternatives were put into action. By this use of imagination and reflection, a person was able to follow out a course of action without committing final or fatal actions. Deliberation, to Dewey, ceased when a choice or decision was finally arrived at by the person. Dewey defined the term choice as "simply hitting upon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of an overt action." 78 The point of decision was settled upon when the various factors in action fitted harmoniously together so that the course of action chosen would be fully released. To secure reasonable choices a person should not allow his thoughts to be consumed by a particular habit or impulse. Proper deliberation should consider a number of preferences so that all of the facts were properly considered. If one followed this maxim.Dewey claimed that decisions could be considered reasonable. He added: "There may be error in result, but it comes from lack of data not from ineptitude in handling them." Dewey rejected hedonistic utilitarian theory which consisted of calculations on the basis of pleasure and pain or profit and loss resulting from proposed courses of action. Dewey postulated that 77 Ibid., p. 190. 78 Ibid., p. 192. 79ibid., p. 194.

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75 deliberation had its beginning in troubled activity, and contended that its conclusion in choice of action should be based upon that which could resolve the problem. He stated: It [deliberation] no more resembles the castingup of accounts of profit and loss, pleasures and pains, than an actor engaged in drama resembles a clerk recording debit and credit items in his ledger. 80 The pleasure principle of the utilitarians was too indeterminate, individualistic, and elusive to lend itself to calculation and decisionmaking, particularly since future pleasures were being considered. The problem of deliberation was not to calculate future happenings but to appraise present proposed actions, and to judge habits and desires by their tendency to produce certain consequences. Dewey's pragmatic ethics were present-minded, not based on the calculation of indeterminate future results. Dewey listed the reflective qualities that each person should possess when he stated: The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to judge the significance of what we are doing and to use that judgment in directing what we do, not by means of direct cultivation of something called conscience, or reason, or a faculty or moral knowledge, but by fostering those impulses and habits which experience has shown to make us sensitive, generous, imaginative, impartial in preceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activities. ... Therefore the important thing is the fostering of those habits and impulses which lead to a broad, just, sympathetic survey of situations. 81 Impulse and habit were the primary determinants of human conduct, and reflective intelligence was required for the determination of forseeable consequences and direction of activity. Dewey rejected 80 Ibid., p. 199. 81 Ibid., p. 207.

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76 the notion of fixed ends and fixed goods. Ends or aims were ways of defining and deepening present activity, and were established to provide direction, effectiveness, and significance. Ends were directive stimuli to present choice and should not be treated as frozen and isolated goals. Dewey believed that persons should not fasten upon some single end or consequence which was desired, or permit that aim to blot from perception all other considerations, for the decision would lead not only to narrowness but also perhaps to fanaticism. Ends, rather, should be viewed as means to the unification and liberation of present conflicting and confused impulses and habits. The doctrine of fixed ends diverted attention from the examination of consequences and rendered persons careless in their inspection of existing conditions. The doctrine also neglected the task of intelligence which was to grasp and realize genuine opportunity, based upon the critical examination of the conditions of the given situation. Dewey also rejected having fixed general rules, principles, commandments, and laws. Such fixed antecedents of measure were merely contrivances to avoid the strain of genuine uncertainty and perplexity found in actual moral situations. However, Dewey did not completely reject the value of general principles as instruments or tools to be used in analyzing circumstances and conditions. Generalizations were to be used as hypotheses for conducting observations or experiments and for organizing special. facts. Dewey believed that knowledge of general moral principles was instrumental toward developing the 82 Ibid., p. 227. 83lbid., p. 229.

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77 fid individualized meaning of situations. Moral generalizations based upon the continuity of habit directed attention to resemblances and differences in each new case, and therefore economized the effort of deliberation. Reasonable judgments, to Dewey, were made effective when those habits and dispositions which lead to impartial foresight of consequences were developed. As Dewey stated: "Then our judgments are reasonable; we are then reasonable creatures. " 8 ^ Summary of Deweyan Ethics The ethics of Dewey stressed the critical role of reflective intelligence in moral conduct, choice, and self-making. This vital disposition encouraged deliberation and controlled impulses and habits to develop more inclusive aims and execute a course of action in a reasonable manner. The pattern of reflective thinking envisioned by Dewey exemplified the problem-solving method of modern experimental science. A description of the pattern was found in his famous work, Democracy and Education : 86 (1) there was a felt difficulty or problem recognized; (2) the problem must be clarified and defined; (3) tentative hypotheses or alternative courses of action need to be formulated; (4) their consequences and implications must be envisaged and deduced; (5) the selection of an alternative must be made and acted upon; and, (6) the consequences which flowed from the selected course of action must be evaluated to determine whether the desired aims have been fully achieved. 84 Ibid., p. 243. 85 Ibid., p. 247. 86 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916; The Free Press, 1966), pp. 139-63. ~~

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78 The practice of reflective intelligence and its conclusions were to be the basis of all attitudes, beliefs, and actions. Although not expressed directly, it became clear that Dewey did have a criterion or standard by which actions were to be approved or disapproved. That criterion was a teleological utilitarian one: the promotion of the general welfare or happiness. In his aversion to fixed principles and final ends, Dewey tried to establish his ethical system between a subjective or atomistic position and a casuist position which operated from fixed rules and aims. While Dewey's "general welfare" principle refected all casuist and atomistic conceptions of its content, it did establish a basic standard for the development of a "cautionary direction."~' Such a standard, to Dewey, "provides a consistent point of view to be taken in all deliberation, but it does not pretend to determine in advance precisely what constitutes the general welfare or common good."** 8 By rejecting hedonism, the notion that pleasure was the end or the chief good, Dewey seemingly defined good as that which was successful in solving a problem. This "doctrine of success" was, however, not to be treated as an end-in-itself , but was simply a consequence of sound deliberative achievement. In regards to Dewey's conception of the good life, he felt that it was a harmonious whole consisting of good experiences or values. These good experiences were achieved through intelligent action and were approved after reflection in the light of full knowledge of their conditions and consequences. By 87 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p. 142. ~~~ 88 Ibid.

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79 being achieved and approved, such experiences were enjoyed as "consummatory experiences." Therefore, the happy life was one which could be approved upon an intelligent review which considered it in all its bearings. Morals, to Dewey, were the most humane of all subjects, because they were "ineradicably empirical, not theological nor metaphysical 89 nor mathematical." Since human nature existed and operated in an environment, the subjects of physics, chemistry, history, statistics, and even engineering science were part of disciplined moral knowledge, so far as they enabled persons to understand the conditions and agencies through which man lived, formed, and executed plans. Moral science did not distinguish between intellectual and moral virtues or excellences, but rather it encompassed physical, biological, and historic knowledge which, when placed in a human context, guided and illuminated the ... 90 activities of men. The development of a more adequate science of human nature was a matter of first-rate importance to Dewey. Such a science could provide for a more informed and intelligent determination of particular acts. Dewey in his conclusion stated: We need a permeation of judgments on conduct by the method and materials of a science of human nature. Without such enlightenment even the best-intentioned attempts at moral guidance and improvement of others often eventuate in tragedies of misunderstanding and division.^ The critical questions developed in Deweyan ethics which relate to the administrative decisionmaking process include: OQ ^Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct , op. cit., p. 295. 90 Ibid., p. 296. 91 Ibid., p. 321.

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80 1. What is the felt difficulty or problem that has prompted the need for deliberative activity? 2. Which of the active dispositions of habit and impulse are in conflict? 3. What will satisfactorily terminate deliberation or relieve the conflicts and tensions of the situation? Has the proposed solution taken into consideration all of the pertinent facts of the situation? Does the proposed solution anticipate the consequences in the larger environment as well as the immediate situation? 4. Is the deliberation directed toward future happenings, or is it concerned with the appraisal of present conditions? 5. Are the desired ends or aims to be viewed as ends-inthemselves, or as means for resolving present problems? 6. How should a system alter, modify, or change individual habits and impulses in an ethical manner so that democratic values may be accommodated and the intellectual activity of deliberation increased? Kantian Ethics The Roots of Morality The Kantian ethical system stressed the belief in the dignity of individual men, and that dignity gave each man an intrinsic worth. Dignity was viewed as the source of man's innate right to freedom, legal and political rights, and the belief that all men are equal. In emphasizing the rights of individuals Kantian ethics opposed every form of utilitarianism. Legal and moral systems could not be

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81 based on social utility, general happiness, or the common good. Rather, they should be founded on the rights of individual men. Any course of action which conflicted with these rights was ipso facto wrong; and it was wrong regardless of the amount of good which may have resulted from it. In this sense, Kantian ethics categorically rejected the principle that the end justifies the means, however good 92 and worthwhile the end might have been. The ends sought were irrelevant when one judged an act involving moral variables. An action was not truly moral unless it was done in the belief and because of the belief that it was right intrinsically. Whether the action succeeded in its purposes or not, if it was done with a "good will"* it was morally acceptable. Thus, Immanuel Kant^ 3 established that the only absolute good was "good will." In the first remarks of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant phrased his belief in the absoluteness of good will, and then he continued to give his reasons why other chief aims were to be discounted and held to the level of secondary considerations when determining morality. Kant stated: Nothing in the world—indeed nothing even beyond the world--can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they be named, or courage, resoluteness, and perserverance as qualities of temperament, are doubtless in many respects good and desirable. But they can become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use of 92john |_ a dd, Introduction to The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (Part T of The Metaphysics of Morals ), by immanuel Kant (Indianapolis, Indiana: Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. ix. go * Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , trans, with an Introduction by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberal Arts Press, Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 9.

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82 these gifts of nature and which in its special constitution is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, general well-being, and the contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, made for pride and even arrogance if there is not a good will to correct their influence on the mind and on its principles of action so as to make it universally conformable to its end. It need hardly be mentioned that the sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure and good will, yet enjoying uninterrupted prosperity, can never give pleasure to a rational impartial observer. Thus the good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy. 94 Based on the absoluteness of good will as the chief virtue Kant established the supreme principle of morality. This principle had to be a formal principle which was valid for rational beings no matter what their desires or ends, and it could not be an external command to promote a certain end. The command had to come from reason, because "reason's proper function must be to produce a will good in itself and not one good merely as a means, for to the former reason is absolutely essential."' The measure adopted by Kant as one which would "produce a will good in itself" was duty , "for it is easily decided whether an action in accord with duty is performed from duty or for some selfish purpose." 96 Thus, the first proposition of morality offered by Kant was that "to have moral worth an action must be done from duty." His second proposition was that an action performed from duty did not have its moral worth in the purpose which was to be achieved but in 9 4lbid. 95 Ibid., p. '12. 96 Ibid., p. 13. 97 Ibid., p. 16.

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83 the maxim by which it was determined. The third proposition was that duty was the necessary element of an action executed from respect for law. By this statement Kant implied that moral values could consist only in some conception of the law, and that this conception determined actions without reference to the expected results. With the rationale of his second-level principles secured, Kant stated that the supreme principle of morality was: "Act as though the maxim of your action qg were by your will to become a universal law of nature." The Concept of Duty Duty was a central concept in Kantian ethics, because of its significance to the determination of desires and actions. To Kant, duty could only be defined in terms of an objective principle which constrained the will, i.e., practical reason. The formula for such a command was termed an imperative, which stated what would be good to do or to refrain from doing. The purpose of an imperative was to command the will which "does not always do something simply because it is presented as a good thing to do." 9 Kant divided imperatives into two types. The first type was termed a hypothetical imperative . According to Kant, these "present the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving something else which one desires (or which one may possible desire). 00 The second type of imperative was termed categorical imperative , and it was defined as "one which presented an action as of itself 98 Ibid., p. 39. 99ibid., p. 30. 10 0lbid. , p. 31.

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84 objectively necessary, without regard to any other end."^ The latter type of imperative was to Kant best fitted for moral matters. The reason for this assignment rested on the basic difference between the two different types of imperatives. In the case of the categorical imperative knowledge of the ends sought and of the means to these ends did not determine how the imperative was to be applied. The categorical imperative, unlike the hypothetical, could be applied independently of any particular desire for a particular end. There was only one categorical imperative and it was: "Act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal ID? law." u In Kant's Critique of Practical Reason the formula was put in a more elaborate fashion: Ask yourself whether you could regard your proposed action as a possible object of your will if it were to take place in accordance with a law of nature in a system of nature of which you were yourself a part. 103 To enhance the concept of duty Kant gave examples of four different types of duties: duties to ourselves, and duties to others as they exist as perfect duties and imperfect duties. In relation to a perfect duty to ourselves, Kant discussed the question of suicide. He held that even though a person believed that the continuance of his life threatened more evil than satisfaction, the act of self-destruction contradicted the supreme principle. "One immediately sees a contradiction in a system of nature whose law would be to destroy life by K»Ibid. 102 Ibid., p. 39. 103imnianuel Kant, quoted in H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative : A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy , 5th ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1965), p. 146.

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85 the feeling whose special offic:\'s to impel the improvement of life."^ In regards to perfect duties to others Kant gave an example of a person who borrowed money knowing full well that he would not be able to repay it, but the person still promised to repay in order to obtain the loan. In this situation Kant asked the question, "How would it be if my maxim became a universal law?" He answered by stating: The universality of a law which says that anyone who believes himself to be in need could promise what he pleased with the intention of not fulfilling it would make the promise itself and the end to be accomplished by it impossible; no one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any such assertion as vain pretense. 105 In the two cases cited, Kant held that the persons were bound by perfect duties. In the first case, one should not commit suicide; and, in the second case, one should repay his debts. Perfect duties did not admit of any exception, and they obligated the person to perform a definite act in accordance with duty. In the final two cases involving duties discussed by Kant, examples of imperfect duties as they related to oneself and to others revealed the difference between perfect and imperfect duties. The third example sketched a scenario in which the person who had a natural talent and could have become a useful person if he had only cultivated his talent. However, the person decided to engage in pleasurable activities rather than to improve his natural gifts. Idleness, indulgence, and propagation were preferred to a life devot^-Sto developing one's talents. Kant. held that such a person could %4 Jbssibly will 104 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , op. cit., p. 40. 105 Ibid.

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86 that this should become a universal law of nature. "For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that all faculties should be developed, inasmuch as they are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes." 106 In the final scenario Kant was concerned with imperfect duties as they related to others. In this situation a person was confronted with the knowledge that while things were going well for himself, others had to struggle with great hardship. The person in the case did not recognize his duty to others and asked, "What concern of mine -is it? Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself." Kant asserted that, if such a rationality was used for not assisting others in time of need, the concept of mutual aid would be destroyed. Kant stated that even though the human race could continue to exist without the benefit of mutual aid, the person who so willed it would no doubt regret his actions: Instances often arise when he would need the love and sympathy of others, and in which he would have robbed himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he desires. '°' Imperfect duties bind persons only to the maxim that they ought to take some form of positive action, but it was left to the discretion of each to decide on the extent of the concern either for one's self or for others. While maxims opposed to imperfect duties could be conceived, they could not be willed without contradiction. Whereas, maxims opposed to perfect duties could not even be conceived. A 106 Ibid., p. 41 107lbid.

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87 summary of Kant's various types of duties and obligations is provided in Table 3. 108 TABLE 3 KANT'S TYPOLOGY OF DUTIES Duties to Oneself Duties to Others Perfect Duties Imperfect Duties Respect oneself. Preserve oneself, i.e., do not commit suicide, mutilate, defile, or stupify oneself. Be truthful, do not lie. Do not be miserly. Seek one's own perfection; natural perfection and moral perfection. Develop one's natural talents. Keep promises. Be truthful , do not lie. Respect others. Repay debts. Seek to establish a system of positive laws and obey them. Promote happiness. Be grateful . Be sympathetic. Be friendly and social able. Be benevolent and loving. A Realm of Ends If there was a categorical imperative, it must have enjoined upon persons objectiveand absolute ends.. Since these ends must have absolute worth, they could not be relative ends which persons sought to produce. The ends must have been rational agents or, for practical purposes, men. Subjective ends rested upon incentives while objective ends depended upon "motives valid for eyery rational being. "^9 108 Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue (Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals ), trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Tore hbacks, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), pp. 45f. ' 09 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , op. cit., p. 45.

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88 To establish universal principles there exists an absolute worth, and absolute worth resided in man. Kant stated: Every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as an end J 10 Individuals were to be an object of respect and were not to be treated as means to subjective ends. The ground for this principle was that, "rational nature exists as an end in itself." 111 This condition led Kant to derive a practical imperative which stated: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." 112 The concept of each person as a rational agent who must be regarded as legislating law through the maxims of each will led to the notion of a realm of ends . Kant defined this concept as: A whole of all ends in systematic connection, a whole of all rational beings as ends in themselves as well as of the particular ends which each may set for himself. This is a realm of ends which is possible . . . [because] all rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others never merely as means but in every case as an end in himself. 113 The "realm of ends" gave rise to objective common laws which should consider the proper relations of persons to each other. Within this "realm of ends" everything had either a price or a dignity . Whatever had a price could be replaced by something else or its equivalent. 110 Ibid., p. 46. 111 Ibid., p. 47. 112 Ibid. HSibid., pp. 51-52.

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89 That which was related to general human inclinations and needs had a market price , while that which was in accord with certain tastes had an affective price . "But that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself does not have mere relative worth, i.e., a price, but an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity." 114 Kant believed that morality and humanity alone had dignity. He stated: Skill and diligence in work have a market value; wit, lively imagination, and humor have an affective price; but fidelity in promises and benevolence as principle (not from instinct) have intrinsic worth. '15 Only through morality could a rational agent become a lawmaking member of a "realm of ends" and consequently become an end in himself. From this Kant concluded that only morality, and humanity, so far as it was capable of morality, could have dignity or intrinsic worth. A "realm of ends" could only become an actuality when all rational agents acted in accordance with the supreme principle and cooperated in the effort to realize the perfect good, i.e., good will. 116 The Nature of Justice Kant defined justice as the "aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom." 1 ' 7 The concept of 114 Ibid., p. 53. 115 Ibid. ' 116 Paton, The Categorical Imperative , op. cit., pp. 189-92. 117 Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice , op. cit., p. 34.

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90 justice was to Kant related more to ethics than jurisprudence. To apply this morally defined concept of justice Kant established three conditions for its application. The first condition was when the relationship of one person to another could exert an influence by their actions, either directly or indirectly, on each other. The second condition was that the concept only applied to the relationship of a person's will to another person's will when benevolence and charity were involved. The third condition was that the concept of justice did not take into consideration the content of the will, i.e., the ends that a person intended to accomplish by means of the object that he willed. When applying the concept of justice Kant only took into consideration: The form of the relationship between the wills insofar as they are regarded as free, and whether the action of one of them can be conjoined with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law J 18 The universal principle of justice referred to by Kant was stated as follows: "Act externally in such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law. "119 The universal law of freedom imposed the condition that an individual could not be ordered to act from a motive of duty (a virtuous disposition), but he could be expected to act from a principle of "reciprocal freedom" within the range of his public life. 120 This principle of "reciprocal freedom" was the one innate right to . 118 Ibid., p. 34. 119 Ibid., p. 35. 1 20 Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue , op. cit., p. 38.

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91 liberty as "independence from being bound by others to do more than one can also reciprocally bind them to do."' 2 ' From this innate right to liberty, which could not be alienated under civil society, Kant derived three "juridicial attributes" which pertained to every person as claims to full participation in the formulation of the laws by which each was governed. These attributes or claims on each person were stated by Kant as follows: First, the lawful freedom to obey no law other than one to which he has given his consent, second, the civil equality of having among the people no superior over him except another person whom he has just as much of a moral capacity to bind juridically as the other has to bind him; third, the attribute of civil independence that requires that he owe his existence and support, not to the arbitrary will of another person in the society, but rather to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth J 22 Kant's attention to the rationality of public order disposed him at times to stress the obligation on the part of all citizens to respect the law as such. He argued that the criticism of the sovereign power either implied the existence of the very universal law-giving will which such criticism challenged or the criticism involved a contradiction. Concerning the latter of these difficulties, Kant stated: Resistance to the supreme legislation can itself only be unlawful; ... in order for it to be authorized, there would have to be a public law that would permit the resistance. That is, the supreme legislation would have to contain a stipulation that it is not supreme and that in one and the same judgment the people as subjects should be made sovereign over him to whom they are subject; this is self-contradictory. 123 121|
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92 While criticism of law did imply the idea of law as universal governance, it did not imply the precise law or code of law which the present power in the state enforced. There was no contradiction in opposing the law which one was expected to obey, insofar as one opposed the law in its character as unjust and as lacking a rational claim upon obedience and not simply as imposing a personal inconvenience. In resisting an unjust law, the individual or group when acting from moral principle or conscience and not from concern for personal privilege or convenience acknowledged the sovereignty of the lawful, i.e., the sovereignty of a just order which disobedience to existing law subserved. Kant was unconvincing in arguing that an order of justice could not provide for its alteration or correction without undermining its authority and its status as an order . It was precisely this capacity to preserve order while correcting the injustice of prevailing law and practice which is the distinctive character of a democratic state. In his position on resistance to legislative authority, Kant blurred the distinction between the law as it was and the law as it ought to become. Kant did affirm, however, that the just order could not exist without reciprocal freedom and that the just order was an order of equality. The attention that Kant gave to order as a necessary condition of human association did not really mean that any order was just. Kant maintained that there was no real conflict between morality and politics and that the people in a state should act in accordance with the pure principles of right. Political action as such was never its own end, and justice had an objective reality which was prior to any existing legal order. Kant stated:

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93 The (natural) right of men must be held sacred, regardless of how much sacrifice is required of the powers that be. It is impossible to figure out a middle road, such as a pragmatically conditional right, between right and utility. All politics must bend its knee before the (natural) rights of men, but may hope in return to arrive, though slowly, on the level where it may continually shineJ 2 ^ Summary of Kantian Ethics This ethics of Kant affirmed the status of morality as an objective ordering of common experience. Kant began at the point of immediate moral and social awareness, namely the common-sense recognition of duties which were involved in the conduct of human affairs. He stated, in the Foundations , that while happiness was the concern of all men, the moral experience of men suggested "the idea of another and far more worthy purpose for their existence for which, instead of happiness, their reason is properly intended. "I 25 To this purpose the private concerns of individuals must for the most part yield. There was the overriding demand upon the individual to do what was right as a member of a rational community. The notion of "right" was therefore independent of what was efficacious in promoting one's interests, although the recognition of what was right did not require contempt for these interests. A rational being could never ignore what he ought to do as an expression of his freedom as a rational being, i.e., the freedom to resist the influences which prompted him simply to do what is pleasing to do . '^Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace: A Philosophical Sketch , Appendix I, trans. Carl J. Friedrich in The Philosophy of Kant (New York: Modern Library, 1949), p. 469. p. 10 1 2*5 ' Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , op. cit.,

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94 Kant's attention to the good will in its obedience to its own imperative has provoked many protests against and many caricatures l ?fi of his general ethical position. His position might be viewed as entirely in accordance with common sense for inasmuch as actions have consequences, "right" can have meaning only in terms of what was productive of desirable ends or goods. While Kant was respectful of ends, his position opposed any view of morality which separated ends and inclinations apart from the context in order to arrive at right actions as means. If there was to be responsible action with respect to means, it must be through the initiative of the individual in imposing consistency of volition upon himself. Such consistency of volition, which could not arise from self-interest or prudence of any sort, was not at variance with concern for human well-being. Indeed, rational volition was for Kant the only program of action through which human well-being could hope to be promoted. While morality could not be derived from empirical considerations, it was to be applied to empirical matters as the necessary condition of an ordered life and the supreme condition of a happy life. Viewed in this manner, Kantian ethics provided a distinctive modern theory of the moral life which brought together views of the individual as creature of desire and the author of his own actions. As social and political theory, Kantian ethics was the morality of the rational community as an order of reciprocal freedom. This order was not a means to other ends. Kant never suggested that rationality in human relations had survival value or served any other 74-77. H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative, op. cit., pp. 46-55,

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95 convenience. Doubtless, individuals could survive and further their interests reasonably well without respecting one another as. persons. It was, rather, the rational community which deserved to survive and flourish as the virtuous man deserved to be happy. In his attention to the demands of reason in human affairs, Kant continued an old distinction between the life of impulse and the life of reflection, between the motives which lead in society to a contest of strength and wit and the motives which lead to cooperation and peace. In his attention to the claims of individuals as persons, Kant supported the notions of freedom and the rights of man. The critical questions developed in Kantian ethics which relate to the administrative decisionmaking process include: 1. What are those duties and obligations which are incumbent upon individuals and organizations in the conduct of human affairs? 2. Could a person regard his proposed action as a possible object of his will if it was to take place in accordance with a law of nature and in a system of nature of which he himself was a part? 3. Should it be willed that the maxims of individual actions become universal law? 4. What guidelines should regulate an individual's relations with other persons in regard to means and ends? 5. What are the organizational limits in defining and mandating duties and obligations which are to be incumbent upon individuals in the conduct of role-related tasks?

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96 6. What are the governance requirements that an organization or an individual must meet before exercising a directing or restraining influence over persons? 7. Should organizational authority be challenged in moral decisions? What conditions or circumstances should be present before challenging organizational authority? 8. What is the proper role of reason in determining policy decisions? Aristotelian Ethics Aristotle's Virtues and Vices The Aristotelian system of ethics was basically a discussion of virtues and vices. These matters constituted those personal qualities which were praiseworthy and made for a happy social life, or were 1 71 undesirable and led to an evil existence. Aristotle in the first book of his Nichomachean Ethics established the proposition that happiness was the chief good at which all human action aimed. While this is a teleological statement, his ethics are to be considered a form of act-deontology. By using the term happiness Aristotle did not refer to a momentary phenomenon, but rather he defined happiness as TOO a general condition which encompassed the whole of a man's life. Happiness was the ultimate good and it was never a means of obtaining something else. It was always chosen as an end in itself and never for the sake of something else. Aristotle stated: "Happiness is '^Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics , trans, with an Introduction and Notes by Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberal Arts Press, Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 1. ^ 8 Martin Ostwald, Introduction to Nichomachean Ethics , op. cit., p. xxi.

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97 1 ?Q something final and self-sufficient and the end of our actions." To achieve happiness, an individual, according to Aristotle, must have completeness in virtue as well as a complete lifetime. The happy man "will always or to the highest degree both do and contemplate what is in conformity with virtue; he will bear the vicissitudes 1 on of fortune most nobly and with perfect decorum under all circumstances." The happy man could never become miserable for he would never do what was hateful , and he would not be fickle or changeable. In summary, a happy man was "one whose activities are an expression of complete virtue, and who is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not simply at a given moment but to the end of life."' 3 ' Happiness was defined by Aristotle as excellence of human activity, human goodness, in performing particular functions "well and rightly. "' 3 ^ This excellence of human function was a rational activity which, as theoretical wisdom, was performed for its own sake, and as practical wisdom, pervaded the actions and feelings through which the individual expressed himself in personal matters and in relations with others. Accordingly, Aristotle distinguished between two forms of virtue-intellectual and moral, i.e., the virtues of the mind and the virtues of Character. ' 33 This distinction followed the recognition of the two dimensions of human life, namely the rational and the irrational. The virtues of the mind were prior to the virtues of character in the sense '^"Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics , op. cit., p. 16. 130 Ibid., p. 25. 131 Ibid., p. 26. 132ibid. , p. 16. 133 Ibid., p. 32.

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98 that the virtues of character develop through the governance of reason or intellect over those irrational powers which are amenable to direction and discipline. Aristotle claimed that one part of the irrational element "seems to partake of reason; at any rate in a morally strong man it accepts the leadership of reason, and is perhaps more obedient still in a self-controlled and courageous man, since in him everything is in harmony with the voice of reason. " ,on Intellectual virtues, according to Aristotle, resulted chiefly from instruction, while moral virtues were obtained as a result of habits. Aristotle stated: "Virtues are implanted in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature: we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive them, and habit brings this ability to completion and fulfillment." 135 The habituation process began with early childhood and it constantly shaped actions and emotions. Characteristics (virtues) evolved out of activities. In a word, characteristics develop from corresponding activities. For that reason, we must see to it that our activities are of a certain kind, since any variations in them will be reflected in our characteristics. Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or, rather, all the difference. 135 The "certain kind" of activities which deserved attention, according to Aristotle, were those which aimed at the intermediate position between two extremes of vice--excess and deficiency. This median position defined virtue. In the context of emotions and actions, l 34 Ibid. , p. 31. 135 Ibid., p. 33. 136 Ibid., pp. 34-35.

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99 virtue aimed at the mean between excess and deficiency. Referring to the relativeness in defining the mean Aristotle stated: Virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine itJ37 However, not every emotion or action was susceptible to the admission of a mean. There were those emotions or actions which by their very names connoted baseness. Aristotle listed spite, shame! essness, and envy as those emotions which he considered base. Adultery, theft, and murder were actions which were not considered as ever being right. In these matters, Aristotle shifted from a teleological to a ruledeontological position. Moral virtue to Aristotle was not a mere habit but a habit of mind embracing deliberation and choice. Through this "habit of mind" actions and emotions were adopted from a noble motive rather than from expedience. Moral virtue was a fixed disposition which aided correct deliberation enabling an individual to arrive at the right thing to do. Choice was, to Aristotle, a better criterion for measuring or judging character than action. He discriminated the term choice from those of 1 38 appetite, passion, wish, or some form of opinion. Choice resulted from deliberation because it involved reason and thought. The focus of one's deliberations should be about those things which were within one's power and could be realized in action. Deliberation operated in matters whose outcome was unpredictable and in cases in which an indeterminate 137 Ibid., p. 43. 138ibid., p. 58.

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100 element was involved. In a rather striking manner Aristotle outlined the decisionmaking process: We deliberate not about ends but about the means to attain ends: no physician deliberates whether he should cure, no orator whether he should be convincing, no statesman whether he should establish law and order, nor does the expert deliberate about the end of his profession. We take the end for granted, and then consider in what manner and ; by what means it can be realized. If it becomes apparent that there is more than one means by which it can be attained, we look for the easiest and the best; if it can be realized by one means only, we consider in what manner it can be realized by that means, and how that means can be achieved in its turn J 39 The moral virtues described by Aristotle related to intersubjective relationships. More specifically, they included the topics of fear-cowardice, pleasure-pain, giving-taking money, honor-dishonor, ambition, anger, and human relations in speech and action. Table 4 provides a listing of ten virtues and vices described by Aristotle 140 TABLE 4 ARISTOTLE'S VIRTUES AND VICES Deficiency Virtue Excess Cowardice Insensitive Stinginess Niggardliness Small-mindedness Unambitiousness Apathy Self-deprecation Boorishness Quarrelsome Courage Self-control Generosity Magnificence High-mi ndedness Mean (unnamed) Gentleness Truthfulness Witty Friendliness Reckless Self-indulgence Extravagance Gaudiness Vanity Ambition Short-tempered ; Boastful ness Buffoonery Obsequiousness ] 39lbid., p . 6i. 140 Ibid. , pp. 44-48.

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101 The Nature of Justice Aristotle devoted considerable thought to the problem of justice in his Nichomachean Ethics . Justice in society, to Aristotle, rested upon the moral prudence and understanding of the individual who was disposed to act toward others in a lawful or rational way. Man was different from other living creatures because of his capacity to perform noble actions, i.e., "just" actions. By the term just Aristotle referred to what was lawful and fair. Aristotle spoke of justice as perfect virtue because it was practiced toward others and not simply for oneself. Underlying the different forms of justice discussed by Aristotle was the notion that justice served as a regulatory function in the relations between societies, organizations, and individuals. Aristotle differentiated among the various forms of justice. The first form discussed was termed partial justice and it was further subdivided into two types. Distributive justice , a type of partial justice, was concerned with fairness in the distribution of common goods (such as wealth and honors). Justice, in this sense, was considered something "geometrically" proportionate, and injustice was something which violated this proportion. Aristotle stated: "A man who acts unjustly has more than his share of a good, and a man who is treated unjustly has less." 141 Distributive justice, as a "geometrical" proportion involved at least four terms--two persons and two shares of wealth, honor, or some other form of reward. Aristotle raised the basic question in this form of justice when he stated: "Everyone agrees that in distribution the just share must be given on the basis of what one deserves, though not everyone would name the same criterion 141 Ibid., p. 170.

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102 1 4p of deserving." * HC Proportion was, to Aristotle, the proper criterion to be used to insure justice, because "the proportional is median, and the just is proDortional ," 143 "Geometrical" proportion implied that persons existed in a certain definite ratio of superiority and inferiority, and that their shares should stand in the same ratio. The major task in this framework was the establishment of the proper ratio between persons and shares so that by alternation it could be established what the proper share to each person should be. Aristotle stated that if A : B = c : d and by alternation A : c = B : d, then it also follows that one whole (i.e., person plus share) will stand in the same ratio to the other (whole, as person stands to person). ^ 44 The second type of partial justice discussed by Aristotle was concerned with private transactions. These transactions were divided into two parts — voluntary and involuntary. He defined voluntary transactions basically in terms of market place activities; for example, "sale, purchase, lending at interest, giving security, lending without interest, depositing in trust, and letting for hire." Involuntary transactions were more criminal and civil in nature. Examples of involuntary transactions included "theft, adultery, poisoning, procurring, enticement of slaves, assassination, and bearing of false witness. "™° The just in these types of private transactions occupied the median between a gain and a loss, and Aristotle referred to justice in this 142 Ibid., pp. 118-19. 143 Ibid., p. 119. 144 Ibid., p. 117. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid.

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103 area as rectificatory just ice. 1^7 T ne ai m f justice in this form was to restore the equilibrium, i.e., to rectify a wrong that had been done. The task of the judge was to determine the damage and restore the equality between the parties. In this form of justice it made no difference whether a decent man defrauded a bad man, or whether it was a decent or a bad man who committed adultery. The only difference the law considered was that brought about by the damage. Law, in these matters, "treats the parties as equals and asks only whether one has done and the other has suffered wrong, and whether one has done and the other has suffered damage.' To accomplish the task of restoring equality the judge was to use *he concept of an "arithmetical" proportion. This concept established a mean between gain and loss. An "arithmetical" proportion was, to Aristotle, a proportion where the sum of the means was equal to the sum of the extremes. For example, when "A" = a b and "B" = c d, then alternatively a + d = b + c. Consequently, if a loss (x) is incurred by a person (A), and a gain resulted to another (B) as the result of a transaction, then "we must add to the party that has too little that amount by which the median is larger and subtract from the greatest the amount by which the median is smaller." 14 " The second form of justice which was discussed by Aristotle in relation to private transactions was termed reciprocal justice . This form of justice focused on those private transactions found in associations based on the mutual exchange of commodities, goods, and services. 147 Ibid., p. 121. 14 8lbid., p. 122. ^Ibid.

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104 Justice in this area constituted "reciprocity in terms of a proportion 1 en and not in terms of exact equality in return. JU To Aristotle, reciprocal exchange in the right proportion was determined by a diagonal combination of terms between persons and their products or goods. Reciprocal justice assumed that a proportional equality could be established between the goods, and that reciprocity would be effected with the realization of a fair exchange. Currency, to Aristotle, was the proper unit to make goods and service commensurable, for everything could be measured by money. Reciprocity was attained when terms had been equalized, but unfortunately, Aristotle gave no suggestion as to how such equivalencies were to be established. Figure 2 represents wha + Aristotle meant by a diagonal combination of terms. ' !:>l The product (c) of the builder (A) goes to the shoemaker (B), and the product (d) of the shoemaker (B) goes to the builder (A) in this reciprocal exchange. Figure 2. Aristotle's Diagonal Combination of Terms Justice was to Aristotle a sort of mean. It was realized in the same way as the other virtues, in that it was realized in a median amount, but it was distinct from the other virtues. Justice was the 1 50ibid. , p. 124. 1 51 ibid. , p. 125.

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105 perfect virtue because it was a virtue practiced toward others and not simply for oneself. Political justic e, as a distinct form of justice, was found among men who shared a common life so their association might bring them to self-sufficiency, and who were free and equal, either proportionately or arithmetical ly. 2 Within political justice there was a division made between natural justice and conve ntional justic e. Aristotle defined these terms as follows: What is by nature just has the same force everywhere and does not depend on what we regard or do not regard as just. In what is just by convention, on the other hand, it makes originally no difference whether it is fixed one way or another, but it does make a difference once it is fixed. 153 Conventional justice embraced matters which were variable and contingent. These matters might be determined originally in accordance with the convenience of a particular community or state, but once established, they should be viewed as precedents, and therefore adhered to as law. Natural justice, on the other hand, embraced things which were variable but not contingent upon the conventions of men or their laws. It was universal, and was not relative to any particular community or society. However, this form of justice was not immutable, but could change with the times. In relation to the concepts of justice and just acts, Aristotle discussed the importance of e quity and equitable acts . Injustices which derived from the strict adherence to the existing laws could be rectified by law makers and judges. Aristotle realized that the law when applied to a case which fell outside of the "universal formula" 152 Ibid., p. 129. 153 Ibid., p. 131.

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106 had to be rectified by a special decree or enactment in order to adapt to a given situation. To Aristotle an equitable person was one who did not abide rigorously by the written laws because written laws were at times at variance with the general law which was based on nature. He stated that an equitable person "is no stickler for justice in a bad sense, but is satisfied with less than his share even though he has the law on his side."^ Responsibility for Decisions and Actions Voluntariness was a major determinant of justice and injustice in Aristotelian ethics. A man acted unjustly or justly when he performed such acts voluntarily.' Actions which were essentially just actions must be voluntary, while involuntary actions could be just or unjust only incidentally. Involuntary acts were those which resulted from ignorance, or which were not part of the agent's power or performed under constraint. Voluntary acts were performed by choice when they were deliberated in advance; or, they could also have resulted from no previous deliberation. The major difference comes when there was an attempt to determine whether the person was an unjust or wicked person. While injuries which resulted from nond el i berated voluntary actions could be termed unjust, the person who committed such acts could not ipso facto be termed wicked. However, when a man acted from choice (which involved deliberation beforehand) then he could be held wicked if his acts resulted in injury to others. Similarly, a 154 Ibid., p. 142. 155ibid., p. 133.

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107 man was just if he performed just acts by choice, but his action was just only if it was voluntary. 6 Choice was, therefore, the critical variable in assigning responsibility for just and unjust acts in Aristotelian ethics. To Aristotle, choice involved intelligence and thought. He stated: For whoever produces something produces it for an end. The product he makes is not an end in an unqualified sense, but an end only in a particular operation. Only the goal of action is an end in the unqualified sense; for the good life is an end, and desire is directed toward this. Therefore, choice is either intelligence motivated by desire or desire operating through thought and it is as a combination of these two that man is a starting point of action. ' 5 ' Good choice was dependent upon good deliberation. In a rather tautological fashion Aristotle defined good deliberation as that which produced or attained that which was good. However, if one attained the right goal, but not by the right means, it was not the result of good deliberation. Therefore, good deliberation was associated with the process which brought success in relation to the good life. Deliberation was also associated with practical wisdom, because it was the province of practical wisdom to examine what sort of thing contributed to the good life. Aristotle defined practical wisdom as a "truthful rational characteristic of acting in matters involving what is good for man." 158 He further stated that "it is impossible to be good in the full sense of the word without practical wisdom or to be a man of 156 Ibid., p. 135. 157ibid. ... p. 149. 158i D id., p. 154.

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108 practical wisdom without moral excellence or virtue."' 59 Thus, the most characteristic function of a man of practical wisdom was to deliberate well . Practical wisdom implied that the person who possessed it would be understanding and have good sense. Since its concern was with matters of action, practical wisdom was viewed as being intimately involved with politics. Politics was viewed by Aristotle as the master science of the good, because it determined what people were to do and what they were not to do. Those who legislate or make policy decisions should be morally strong individuals possessed of practical wisdom, because practical wisdom insures right reason in moral matters. Summary of Aristotelian Ethics In Aristotelian ethics three solutions were offered to three problems of morality. The first was the problem of determining how judgment in moral matters was to be assessed. The primary point in this problem was the question as to whether morality and justice were to be determined by the will of the stronger, or by another method. Aristotle complained that the idealistic ethics formulated by Plato, with its emphasis on an absolute good, was superfluous and not relevant to empirical moral science. However, his own treatment of moral existence came perilously close to the notion of an absolute good. Aristotle spoke of the nature and function of man and of the virtues which brought to fulfillment what a man was able to become. While the moral virtues consisted in a mean which was relative to the individual, virtue was in all cases distinguishable from vice and there were some actions and emotions, such as adultery and spite, which did 159ibid., p. 172.

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109 not admit of a mean at all. In social relations, political justice for Aristotle was relative to the laws of a given society, but, above this relativity, there were the demands of justice itself. Equity, for example, was a rectification of legal justice "where the law is defective because of its generality."' 60 General justice was simply the whole of virtue practiced for "the advantage of another," as equity was an expression of the moral demand to give a man his due even when the law was not strictly on his side. The second problem for which an answer was offered in Aristotelian ethics was the relation of, moral knowledge to the practice of virtue. Inasmuch as the basic distinction between good and bad involved the bias of value over disvalue or of the salutary over the inimical, there was the question whether it could ever be held that an individual directly takes for himself what is bad. Aristotle held that the taking of what is bad or harmful could never be intentional; even in cases where the taking of what is bad is accompanied by deliberation rather than passion, the choice is always blind. The choice of what is bad or evil, or what is believed to be bad or evil, is simply against human interest, and it is a contradiction to maintain that this sort of choice is made voluntarily "under the conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable. "^ 61 The third problem thoroughly considered in Aristotelian ethics was the relation of the well-being of the individual to the general welfare of the community. There has been a tendency in modern moral 160 lbid., p. 142. 161 Ibid., p. 41.

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110 discussion to separate the good of the individual from the good of society and to think of collective interests as introducing or imposing "norms" of conduct which are other than, and often opposed to, the norms of personal behavior. This has been aggravated by the emergence and dominance of powerful political and social systems which claim a "substantial" existence above and beyond their constituent members. Oftentimes, these systems claim a superior prerogative to impose upon their members duties which may not be balanced by rights. In Aristotelian ethics, the individual was viewed as a political being whose welfare was inseparable from the community and the concern of the community for its members. The political state itself consisted in the activities of citizens in supporting their mutual interests, among which was the political interest in freedom under just laws. In this union of individual and common human good, Aristotelian ethics provided a formula for the realization of individual human capabilities within the scope of political society existing as a natural rather than as an arbitrary order. The critical questions developed in Aristotelian ethics which relate to the administrative decisionmaking process include: 1. What are the undesirable extremes in human dispositions? 2. What mean secures the highest good under the circumstances? 3. What is the relation of moral knowledge to the practice of virtue? 4. What is the relation of the individual to the general welfare of the organization?

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Ill 5. How is morality to be assessed—by strength, by appeal to absolutes, or by critical examination of relative conditions? 6. Did the action which resulted in injury to others result from prior deliberation? Was the injurious act committed by voluntary choice? 7. How is a just proportion to be determined in social and political matters when men share a common life in order that their association might bring them to self-sufficiency, and at the same time, they are considered free and equal in relation to each other? Existentialist Ethics The Meaning of Existentialism Existentialism can best be thought of as a style of philosophizing which takes as its main interest man as "being," who has to become aware gf himself, to become responsible for himself, and to become himself. MacOuarrie^ wrote that it was a style of philosophizing which would lead those who adopted it to very different conclusions about the world and man's life in it. Whereas, some of the existentialist writers expressed an intense form of individualism, other expressed a concern for interpersonal relations. In other matters, such as religion, there was again a division among the existentialists into those who were professed atheists, and others who were classified as theists. One matter to which all existentialists would probably agree is the definition for the role of philosophy provided by Heidegger. l^john MacQuarrie, Existentialism (New York: World Publishing, 1972; Baltimore, Maryland: Penquin Books, 1973), p. 2.

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112 Philosophy is a thinking that breaks the paths and opens the perspectives of the knowledge that sets the norms and hierarchies, of the knowledge in which and by a people fulfills itself historically and culturally, the knowledge that kindles and necessitates all inquiries and thereby threatens all values. 163 However, despite its divergent views, there were some recurring themes in existentialism. A major group of themes included such concepts as freedom, decision, and responsibility; and the dominant concern in these matters was with the individual whose "quest for authentic selfhood focuses on the meaning of personal being." '"^ A second group of recurring themes included such topics as guilt, alienation, dread, despair, and death. These were the tragic elements in human existence which impinged on man's freedom and his quest for authentic personal being. This concern for authentic existence and the attainment of selfhood dominated existentialist writings. Existentialists rejected the notion that society is, and should be, the determinant of each person '-s life. MacQuarrie summarized the existentialists' position when he stated: Man must decide who he will be, and more than this, each individual must decide the question for himself. Each one's existence is his own, characterized by a unique "mineness." There is no universal . pattern of a genuine humanity that can be imposed on all or to which all must conform. Indeed, to impose such a pattern or to demand conformity would mean to destroy the possibility of a genuinely human existence for the persons concerned. They become truly themselves only to the extent that they freely choose themselves. 165 163Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics , trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1959; Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 9. '^MacQuarrie, Existentialism , op. cit., p. 4. 165ibid. , p. 161.

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113 Existentialism , as a term, took its name from the belief in the notion that "existence precedes essence." Sartre^"" championed this belief in the concreteness of existence over the essential ism found in many idealistic philosophies. He clarified what he meant by the statement when he offered the following: What is meant here by saying that existence precedes essence? It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only ] afterwards, defines himself. If man, as an existentialist conceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. . . .Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. Such is the first principle of existentialism J 67 Sartre, and other existentialists, were concerned that if people focused on essences (forms and ideas) that they would lose an essential anthropological perspective. Existentialists, therefore, were aware of the limitations of logic, empiricism, and the theoretical sciences. Jaspers noted in this regard that "a faith in science that has degenerated into superstition is closely akin to humbug. "^8 However, the existentialists were not antiscientific nor antiintellectual , although some of their writings appeared as such. Their main concern was an avoidance of deterministic thought which delimited the existence of man and hence "dehumanized" him. Existence and Freedom The term existence carried a deep meaning to the existentialists. It involved more than a mere statement of fact of "that which is." ^ 66 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 15. ~~~~ ~ 167 Ibid. ^ 8 Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age , trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1957), p. 150.

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114 Chairs exist, trees exist, and animals exist, but they do not share in existence as the existentialists defined the term. In its human meaning it involved potentia , it involved freedom, and it involved selfrelatedness. It was the basis on which the real world is viewed, and the basis on which persons relate to each other. Existence owed its creation to man, because "man is the being who can be conscious of, and therefore responsible for, his existence."^ 69 Heidegger used the term dasein to convey the special meaning for an existent being. Translated it means "being-there-in-the-world. " In general, Heidegger meant man's conscious, historical existence in the world, which was always projected into a there beyond its here. "Being-there (dasein) implies awareness of being." Jaspers viewed existence as a process. He wrote that: Man is always something more than what he knows of himself. He is not what he is simply once and for all, but is a process; he is not merely an extant life, but is, within that life, endowed with possibilities through the freedom he possesses to make of himself what he will by the activities on which he decides J 71 The concept of existence was that man should strive to become a unique individual. Man should not allow himself to become something less than human by being absorbed into the dominion of an "apparatus," "crowd," "collective," "system," or "mass," which was typical of the 169 Rollo May, "Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy," in Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology , ed. Rollo May, Ernest Angel, and Henri Ellenberger (New York: Basic Books, 1958), p. 41. 170 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics , op. cit., p. 24. 171j aS pers, Man in the Modern Age , op. cit., p. 159.

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115 17? era of advanced technology. Kierkegaard stated that the aim of life should be to become a "single one," and this was only possible when a person excluded himself from the "crowd." This recognition of unqiue existence was vital to Kierkegaard and other existentialists. They claimed that too often individuals allowed their perfunctory roles to become the masters of their existence, and, as a result, they become slaves of their functions. If an individual was to avoid the trap of becoming a "functional man" he must step out of the taken-for-qranted attitudes and routines of society. To the existentialist, man has the capacity to shape his unique existence. MacQuarrie stated: "Man is more than the tasks he performs and the roles he plays. He is the unity of a person who expresses himself in all these activities, or perhaps better expressed, makes himself in these activities."' 73 The process of stepping out of the takenfor-granted attitudes and routines of society was termed ecstasy , which simply meant to stand or to step outside. Berger described ecstasy as an act which "transforms one's awareness of society in such a way that giveness becomes possibility."^ The existentialists' mode of thought was directed toward action, because it was through action that existence could attain completeness." Inherent in the concept of existence was the underlying condition of freedom which was extolled by the existentialists. The l 72 S0ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread , 2nd ed., trans, with an Introduction and Notes by Walter Lowrie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Paperback, 1969), p. 97. l' 3 MacQuarrie, Existentialism , op. cit., p. 137. ' 74 Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 136.

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116 Russian existentialist Berdyaev wrote of freedom as being baseless. He stated: "Freedom cannot be derived from being; it is rooted in nothingness, in nonbeing, if we are to use ontological terminology. Freedom is baseless, neither determined by nor born of being. "^5 In the same vein, Sartre stated: "There is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom. " 176 Individuals were, in Sartrean terms, "condemned to freedom. " Freedom, Responsibility, and Guilt If man was free it became incumbent upon him to recognize his freedom and accept responsibility for it. A man who stated that he had no choice when in fact it truly existed, or who denied what he was and affirmed what he was not, was in bad faith . Men were responsible for their actions and decisions, and an attempt to shift the responsibility for actions on to the "system," or to complain about one's condition of life were examples of bad faith. Sartre noted that it was senseless to think of complaining, "since nothing foreign has decided what we feel , what we live, or what we are." 177 Bad faith was an expression of anguish which reflected an individual's attempt to flee from freedom. Sartre stated: In bad faith there is no cynical lie nor knowing preparation for deceitful concepts. But the first act of bad faith is to flee what it can not flee, to flee what it is. The very project of flight reveals to bad faith an inner disintegration in the 175 Nikolai Berdyaev, quoted in Existentialism , op. cit., p. 139. ' 7 °Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions , op. cit. , p. 23. 177 Ibid., p. 53.

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117 heart of being, and it is this disintegration Atfhich bad faith wishes to be. 178 The condition of freedom, and the responsibility for it, meant that man could lose his own being by his choices. If he did not choose the chief virtues of candor and sincerity he was constantly threatened with nonbeing, nothingness. This threat posed a precarious predicament for decisions by individuals. Kierkegaard spoke of his own predicament of decision in these words: What I really lack is to be clear in my mind what I am to do , not what I am to know, except in so far as a certain understanding must precede every action. It is this divine side of man, his inward action, which means everything J 79 This fear of nothingness produced a threat to the center of a man's existence. According to Kierkegaard, this condition would lead to what he termed angst , or dread. He defined dread as "the dizziness of freedom when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and freedom then gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself." 180 Dread, the recognition of freedom and the responsibility for it, brought -forth the awareness that each person acted alone in making a^world out of nothing, and with that awareness came the possibility that it would return to nothingness. Heidegger viewed as dreadful the awareness of one's own death as the inevitable end toward 178j ean _p au i Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomeno logical Ontology , trans, with an Introduction by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 85-86. 179 S0ren Kierkegaard, The Journals of S0ren Kierkegaard , a Selection, ed. and trans, by Alexander Dru (London: Oxford University Press, 1938). 1 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread , op. cit., p. 55.

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118 which freedom projected itself, whereas for Sartre, it was dread of liberty itself. Freedom was dreadful, but to deny it and to seek escape from its responsibility would lead to guilt. Remaining in conformist anonymity (what Heidegger termed das Man ) , and not bringing forth one's self .into being, posited guilt. Guilt, according to May, existed in three ontological forms. The first was related to the forfeiting of one's potentialities. The second form of guilt was related to one's fellow man. It resulted from causing a lack in the existence of another person. Buber was particularly concerned with this form of guilt. He stated: "Original guilt consists in remaining with oneself."' 82 A third form of guilt related to what May termed "separation guilt," and it was concerned with the guilt associated with the separation from nature. This last form of guilt relates to the concept of alienation , which refers to estrangement from one's own being. May contended that none could escape from feeling guilty in some form, because each person participated in it to some degree. He contended, however, that this sense of guilt should "lead to humility ... sharpened sensitivity in relationships with fellow men, and increased creativity in the use of one's potentialities." . 'Marjorie Grene, Introduction to Extentialism , first published as Dreadful Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 51-54. 182Martin Buber, Between Man and Man , with an Introduction by Maurice Friedman and an Afterword by the author on "The History of the Dialogical Principle," trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul , 1947;. New York: MacMillan, 1965), p. 166. 183f^ aVj Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology , op. cit>, p. 55.

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119 Existentialists were concerned with human possibilities, and they recognized that anxiety accompanied the exercise of freedom and that decisions had their negative and tragic aspects. However, the most limiting factor to the existentialists was facticity . This term referred to "awareness of one's own being as a fact that has to be accepted." 184 Facticity was the idea that possibilities occurred only in real situations, i.e., choices always existed and each person was responsible for its existence. Sartre commented that: Facticity consists simply in the fact that I am condemned to be wholly responsible for myself. I am the being which is_ in such a way that in its being its being is in question. . . . The one who realizes in anguish his condition as being thrown into a responsibility which extends to his very abandonment has no longer either remorse or regret or excuse; he is no longer anything but a freedom which perfectly reveals itself and whose being resides in this very revelation. But . . . most of the time we flee anguish in bad faith. 185 Heidegger, like Sartre, used the concept of throwness to explain man's factitious state of being. By this concept Heidegger meant that individuals were thrown into existence and into life's situations . complete with its established parameters. MacQuarrie summarized the concept of facticity when he stated: Human possibilities, therefore, whether we are thinking of the human race as a whole or of individual existents, are always set in a framework of facticity. This framework may vary considerably. In some cases it is a very broad framework, allowing a wide range of choice. In other cases it is so narrow as to be stifling. But it is always there, and it always holds the threat of tragedy and the frustration of possibility. 186 l 84 MacQuarrie, Existentialism , op. cit., p. 148. 185 Sartre, Being and Nothingness , op. cit. , p. 681. 186 MacQuarrie, Existentialism , op. cit-, P149.

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120 Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Definitions of Existence The quest of man was to be directed towards the attainment of an authentic existence, but was this quest to be conducted in relation to others, or was it to be carried out as a "Single One?" Some existentialists (Sartre, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard) would seek only to be individualists, and would avoid meaningful relations with others. Sartre, for example, in his play No Exit , referred to the notion that "Hell is other people." To Sartre, others posed a direct threat to one's freedom. He viewed all relations between himself and others as a battle to the death. In Sartrean terms, either the other (a person) transcended his transcendence, or he in his freedom transcended, and so destroyed the liberty of the other. 187 Heidegger, on the other hand, claimed that a person could enter into solicitous relationships (as concern for others). Solicitude was the term Heidegger employed to describe the relation between one existent self and another. It referred to one man's solicitous help in relation with another man's lack and need of it. Buber, however, pointed out that in this form man still remained within himself, and therefore solicitude was a fraudulent mode of existence. Buber stated: The barriers of his own being are not thereby breached; he makes his assistance, not his self, accessible to the other; nor does he expect any real mutuality, in fact he probably shuns it; he is concerned with the other, but he is not anxious for the other to be concerned with him. 188 In Kierkegaard's writings there was found an avoidance of others in the quest to "become a Single One." Kierkegaard felt that one could only 187 Sartre, Being and Nothingness , op. cit. , pp. 441-526. T 88 Buber, Between Man and Man, op. cit., p. 170.

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121 achieve this state of possibility by disengaging oneself from the "crowd" which he regarded as untruth. To Kierkegaard, the community involved outwardness, a denial of self, and therefore falsity, hypocrisy, and self deceit. There were, however, other existentialists, notably Buber, who did not disdain others with such contempt. Buber fully explored the possibility of interpersonal relationships in his book Between Man and Man . The major concept was the dialogic principle , which involved inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness. It allowed the individual to meet and know the other in his concrete uniqueness and not just as an object to be transcended. The basic relationship was the "I-Thou," which was a subject-subject relationship. Friedman stated that the "I-Thou" relationship was: ... a relationship of openness, directness, mutuality, and presence. . It may be between man and man, but it may also take place with a tree, a cat, a fragment of mica, a work of art--and through all of these with God, the eternal Thou in whom the parallel lines of relations meet. 189 Buber sharply criticized some forms of existentialism as bourgeois individualism, because they sought only the fulfillment of an authentic^ self. To Buber, community was also an important consideration because it was that pattern of relations which people responded to one another in a "dialogic" manner. However, he opposed all forms of collectives because in a collective the power of the reference group and the concept of social location denied the sense of a belonging relationship between self and others. The fulfilled life could only be actualized 189 Maurice Friedman, Introduction to Between Man and Man , op. cit. , p; xiv.

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122 in the "dialogic" mode of subject-subject relations, rather than in relationships exemplified by object-object or even subject-object relations. A person should not respond to others as role players or to stereotyped images, but to whole persons, fellow exi stents; and, in this manner a person could himself become whole, because to Buber, "man can become whole not in virtue of a relation to himself but only in virtue of a relation to another self." 190 Source of Moral Values No matter which stance was assumed, the intrapersonal or the interpersonal, most existentialists agreed that the roots of morality 1 91 192 resided with the individual. However, Nietzche 1 and Camus viewed morality's source in rather distinctive fashions. Nietzche claimed that the source or genealogy of morals did not reside in their utility or instrumental value; instead, they resulted from a "pathos of distance" which has been created among the social classes of societies. Nietzche stated: Now it is plain to me, first of all, that in this theory [utilitarian] the source of the. concept "good" has been sought and established in the wrong place: the judgment "good" did not originate with those to whom "goodness" was shown! Rather it was "the good" themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, lowminded, common and plebian. It was out of this T9°Buber, Between Man and Man , ibid., p. 168. 191 Friedrich Nietzche, On the Genealogy of Morals , trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1967), pp. 25-56. 192 Albert Camus, The Rebel , trans. Anthony Bower with a Foreword by Sir Herbert Reed (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1961), pp. 279-306.

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123 pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for values: what had they to do with utility!l93 In response to the noble man's values there occurred a slave revolt which began when ressentiment itself became creative and gave birth to values which denied the noble mode of valuation. History has been marked by the struggle of these counter forms of valuation, and it has been argued that the interaction of these two forces has shaped our present notions of value J 94 In a somewhat different expression of value theory, Camus found that the morality of freedom and justice depended upon the recognition of the solidarity of mankind, and the recognition of the rights of all men. As a first step in defiance of an absurd world, Camus rejected any appeal to historical absolutism or to abstract principles or formal virtues which placed moral values above the historical force of rebellion. Rebellion, to Camus, was a passionate affirmation, not a resentment, which revealed man's demand for order in the midst of chaos, and unity in the heart of the ephemeral. This spirit of rebellion was particularly acute in those societies which professed a theoretical equality, but concealed great factual inequalities. The history of rebellion was significant, not as the movement of the absolute, but as the setting of protests of individuals against servitude, terror, and falsehood. Thus, for Camus, history, in personal witness rather than impersonal process, provided for universal morality and human 193 Nietzche, On the Genealogy of Morals , op. cit., pp. 27-28. ^William Greenbaum, "America in Search of a New Ideal: An Essay on the Rise of Pluralism," Harvard Educational Review , 44 (August 1974): 411-39.

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124 solidarity the support which could not be given by moral philosophy or religion. Camus stated: At this meridian of thought, the rebel rejects divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men. We shall choose Ithaca, the fruitful land, frugal and audacious thought, lucid action, and the generosity of the man who understands. '95 The individuality of moral values resulted from the fact that every situation in which an individual was involved was concrete and particular, not abstract and universal. Sartre expressed this condition of man when he wrote: Values in actuality are demands which lay claim to a foundation. But this foundation can in no way be being , for every value which would base its ideal nature on its being would thereby cease even to be a value and would realize the heteronomy of my will. Value derives its being from its exigency and not its exigency from its being. . . . It follows that my freedom is the unique foundation of values and that nothing , absolutely nothing, justifies me adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values. 196 In the endeavor to give significance and order to an otherwise meaningless world, values v/ere created by the free acts of human agents. This condition denied the belief in fixed values, codes, and prescriptions. To Nietzche, fixed values and universal principles had died with God, and the efforts of the rationalists and scientists to supplant religious truths with fixed truths based on their logic and empirical methods were efforts in futility and only further denied man's existence. Nietzche stated: I disturbed this sleepiness when I taught: what is good and evil no one knows yet , unless it be 195camus, The Rebel , op. cit. , p. 306. 19%artre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 38.

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125 he who creates. He, however, creates man's goals and gives the earth its meaning and its future. That anything at all is good and evil— that is his creation J 97 Sartre stated that "if values are vague, and if they are always too broad for the concrete and specific case that we are considering, the only thing to do is to trust our instincts." 198 To illustrate his point Sartre recalled an incident when during World War II he was . fighting with the French underground and was approached by a young man who had to make a difficult decision. He described the situation: His father was on bad terms with his mother, and, moreover, was inclined to be a collaborationist; his older brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940, and the young man, with somewhat immature but generous feelings, wanted to avenge him. His mother lived alone with him, very much upset by the half-treason of her husband • and the death of her older son; the boy was her only consolation. The boy was faced with the choice of leaving for England and joining the Free French Forces—that is, leaving his mother behind— or remaining with his mother and helping her to carry on. He was fully aware that the woman lived only for him and that his going-off—and perhaps his death— would plunge' her into despair. Sartre then asked how would the knowledge of the Kantian principle help. Mery well, if I stay with my mother, I'll treat her as an end and not as a means; but by virtue of this very fact, I'm running the risk of treating the people around me who are fighting, as means; and, conversely, if I go to join those who are fighting, I'll be treating them as an end, and, by so. doing that, I run the risk of treating my mother as a means. 199 197 Friedrich Nietzche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , trans, and with a Preface by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), p. 196. l 98 Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions , op. cit. , p. 26. "•"ibid., pp. 24-26.

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126 ! The existentialists' response to the dilemma faced by the young man | would be simply: "You're free--you choose!" i Summary of Existentialist Ethics , ! I Existentialism is more than a contemporary emphasis or vogue in moral discussion, inasmuch as there are brought into sharp focus matters which have been of major concern to moral philosophers from ancient times. In existentialism, there was the recognition of the moral situation as centering in the decision of the individual with respect to the course of his own life and that of others. This was . the view of morality as an expression of the radical thrust of the individual toward the telos of his own image. Consciousness thus embraced the disposition to initiate a career, to take for one's own a certain direction of interest and action. Moral consciousness was an irreducible activity which has its own stamp and its own authenticity. Individual existence was distinctively normative in its bias of preference and choice, however opaque this preference and choice might appear to nonmoral ways of viewing the world. This bias affected all activities which owed their initiation to individual selfdetermination, including the activity of thought itself. Thus, the existentialists gave priority of valuation over analysis and understanding, and priority to resolution over deliberation. Existentialism, simply expressed, was the ethics of selfaffirmation. This affirmation was expressed as subjective inwardness, freedom, and lucidity. Consciousness could not be viewed as a glass which simply mirrored endlessly what was given in awareness. Consciousness has its own being and its own concerns; it has its own

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127 way of asserting itself against the anonymity and vacuity of the world of objects and events. Existentialism was thus the ethical dimension of phenomenology, presenting consciousness under the aspect of the intentional ity of interest or passion. In this respect, existentialism opposed all forms of rationalism and objectivism which appeared to reduce the life of reflection to a neutral account of experience and which did not account for the individual life itself. The existentialists' attention to individual existence and its situation, to individual aspiration in its thrust toward the future, and to memory in its involvement in the past, did not require, as it. would appear, the rejection of analysis and objectivity. The concern for individual existence was not really viewed 'as independent of the contexts and conditions of a situation, because it was recognized that it was in a contextual setting that existence expressed itself, if expressed at all. Thus, the vitality and immediacy of practical matters were not really undermined by what was involved in the activity of understanding because if it was the very life of the individual to choose and act, it was also the life of the individual to know and to discriminate among objects of interest. The existentialists held that an object of interest was no less delectable simply because it became an object of discussion and analysis, provided the discussion was in elucidation of the character of good things. The career of the individual embraced the responsibility of judgment as well as the opportunity and responsibility of choice. This responsibility of* judgment involved knowledge of the varieties of goodness which were recognizable as ends of common aspiration, to be supported by duties of common obligation. It was the relation of commitment and freedom

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,128 to the broad social context, or contexts, in which commitment and freedom must be exercised, which has not always been fully explored by existentialists. The critical questions developed in existentialist ethics which relate to the administrative decisionmaking process include: 1. What is the relation of individual decisions to moral situations? 2. Do the personal motives of the decisionmakers reflect candor and sincerity or are there elements of "bad faith" involved? 3. What should be the relation between organizational structures and the development of individual capacities and possibilities? 4. What is the relation of freedom to responsibility and decisionmaking? 5. What may be accepted as external conditions and what is intolerable because it destroys personal integrity? 6. What meets the needs, fits the capacities, and corresponds to the possibilities of an existent being? What thwarts, destroys, or starves a being in its activities?

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CHAPTER III ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS AND ETHICAL DECISIONS Critical Tasks and Ethical Valuing Educational administration has been divided into critical task areas which reflect specific domains of responsibility and decisionmaking related to management functions required for the operation of schools. Grieder, Pierce, and Jordan' viewed critical tasks as a basis for developing and evaluating competence in the performance of administrative roles. They categorized the task areas as follows: (1) instruction and curriculum development; (2) pupil personnel; (3) communityschool leadership; (4) staff personnel; (5) school plant; (6) organization and structure; (7) school finance and business management; and, (8) school transportation. Miller, Madden, and Kincheloe 2 identified nine tasks in educational organizations which they felt were essential to occur in the schools in order to arrange for the proper education of the students. The task areas identified included: (1) pupil personnel; (2) the program of instruction; (3) staffing a school system; (4) staff relations; (5) auxiliary services; ^Calvin Grieder, Truman M. Pierce, and K. Forbis Jordan, Public School Administration , 3rd ed. (New York: Ronald Press, 19697" p. 106. 2 Van Miller, George R. Madden, and James B. Kincheloe, The Public Administration of American School Systems , 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 105-342. ~ 129

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130 (6) school housing; (7) finance; (8) fiscal management; and (9) measurement and evaluation. Morphet, Johns, and Reller^ in their textbook on educational administration, identified six major tasks associated with the development and administration of programs and services required for the operation of schools. The basic provisions identified included: (1) provisions for learning; (2) personnel development and administration; (3) facilities for education; (4) business administration operations and services; (5) provisions for financing education; and (6) evaluation and accountability. While differences exist in the categorization of the critical tasks, there is still a high degree of consistency in the patterns outlined. The selection of categories for the purpose of relating ethical questions to identified critical tasks contains the following: (1) curriculum and instruction; (2) pupil personnel services; (3) personnel development and administration; (4) finance and fiscal management; and (5) school and community relations. The divergent roles associated with the critical task areas have demanded, for those who are responsible for the activities associated with each, a specific set of administrative skills and abilities. The individuals who hold positions of authority in each of the task areas have usually been trained in the techniques necessary for the accomplishment of such tasks, and as a result, they reflect different modes of intellectual concerns and conceptual skills. Therefore, distinct forms of valuing and philosophical beliefs receive added emphasis, depending ^Edgar L. Morphet, Roe L. Johns, and Theodore L. Reller, Educational Organization and Administration: Concepts, Practices, and Issues , 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall , 1974), pp. 387-559.

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131 upon the nature of the task area. Those working in the area of school and community relations tend to emphasize political valuing, while those administering instructional programs tend to emphasize scientific or conceptual valuing. Technical valuing is reflected by those responsible for finance and fiscal management, and by those involved with facilities and operational services. However, each task area should reflect each form of valuing, and all should be governed by the transcendent form of ethical valuing. The review of selected normative ethical systems revealed that ethics encompasses more than the determination of duty and obligation, virtues and vices, justice and equity, right and wrong, and good and bad. 'Ethics also involves a style of thinking which reflects the attributes of "philosophic-mindedness," as defined by Smith. The attributes listed by Smith included comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility. Certainly, an administrator imbued with these qualities, or virtuous skills, could approach critical decisionmaking situations with strengthened confidence in his ability to choose the best course of action among the viable alternatives. Critical Task Areas and Ethical Questions Curriculum and Instruction The central obligatory function of school systems is to provide instruction through which the purposes, goals, and objectives that been determined may be realized. This critical task involves the creation of optimum learning conditions and opportunities for pupils 4 Philip G. Smith, Philosophic-Mindedness in Educational Administration KColumbus, Ohio: College of Education, Ohio State University, 1956), p. 91.

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132 to accomplish the goals and objectives created by the interaction of personal, organizational, and environmental forces. Administrators, in order to accomplish this task, need to be concerned with developing curricular programs, providing resources for learning, facilitating personnel and counseling services, determining community and pupil needs, planning and executing goals and objectives, and providing special programs for the handicapped, gifted, disadvantaged, and other identifiable groups with special needs. Improving modes of instruction and curricular programs is a basic responsibility of administrators. In this capacity of leadership, administrators should provide the supportive services requisite for a sound educational program and the management and utilization of teaching personnel for the realization of each staff member's potential. The tasks of scheduling andgrouping students and teachers for greater effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of instructional time and space allotments are important administrative duties. Other tasks associated i with the administration of the instructional program include: supervising student activities programs; assuring the adequacy and control of instructional materials, jmedia, and supplies; utilizing community resources; providing for inservice education programs; and creating a stimulating Organizational climate which fosters innovative and challenging ideas. ! Curricular and instructional decisions are ultimately concerned with one's beliefs and philosophy of education in regards to the aims and purposes that education should serve to meet. The naturalistic philosophy of Deweyan ethics, with its emphasis on pragmatic valuation and the standard of the general welfare provides an inclusive

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133 ethical system which deserves the attention of those charged with administering instructional programs. Deweyan ethics did not stress the establishment of some final aim which subordinates all others to itself, but it did stress that general aims are prospective points of view from which to survey the existing conditions and estimate their possibilities. Aims should, therefore, connect directly with present activities, and not with remote fixed and rigid standards divorced from the means by which they are to be reached. Externally imposed aims are "responsible for the emphasis put upon the notion of preparation for a remote future and for rendering the work of both teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish." 5 For aims to be of value they must be translatable into procedures for their accomplishment, and they should reflect the democratic conception of education. . Who is to be taught, what is to be taught, and how is it to be taught . are questions without purpose, unless they are grounded in an adequate conception of educational aims which answer the primary question of "why educate?" The development of a curriculum is dependent upon social conditions and subject matter as sources for educational objectives. The selection of desired outcomes that a school seeks for learners is derived from the values of those choosing the objectives and the sources from which they are drawn. Administrators involved in the process of curriculum development should reflect on the Kantian ethical principles which stressed the best possible realization of humanity as humanity. The philosophical position of Kant defined education as the process by i3ohn Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916; The Free Press, 1966), p. 110.

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134 which man became man by his own voluntary efforts, and that man has to make himself a truly moral, rational, and free being. Those educators who are striving to educate the successors of their society should focus not on the existing state of affairs, but upon making possible a future better humanity. The young should not be educated for the selfish purposes of a government or as instruments for externally imposed motives; rather, the social aims of the educative process should reflect a personal interest in social relationships and control. Program designs, to accomplish the aims and objectives of an educational system or subsystem, should relate directly to the tasks associated with curriculum and instruction. The major objective of instructional designs is the improvement of instruction. To avoid barriers to improvement, an administrator should be critical toward any metaphor about instruction. Macdonald' identified six prevalent myths which lack empirical verification, and design features which stress these metaphors may be based on faulty assumptions. The myths identified by Macdonald included: 1. The myth of learning theory . There is no certain knowledge that all teaching should take place by presenting small increments which are built up by processes of reinforcement even though learning studies suggest that for many tasks learning does occur in this manner. 2. T he myth of human development . It seems highly unlikely that a developmental knowledge, e.g., Gesell's ages and stages, has direct use for instruction. Also, even though infants select a ^Immanuel Kant, Education , trans. Annette Churron (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1960), p. 6. 7 James B. Macdonald, "Myths About Instruction," Educational Leadership 22 (May 1965): 571-76.

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135 balanced diet if given the opportunity of choosing good, there is no assurance that such a fact (if it were a fact) would generalize to self-selection in the instructional process. 3. The myth of the structure of the discipline . Structure is an after-the-fact description of the way knowledge can be organized by mature scholars. It does not necessarily follow that this is the way to organize knowledge in the instructional setting. 4. The myth of modes of inquiry . The attempt to associate one unique mode with each accepted discipline is fraught with difficulty. However, if we admit that modes of inquiry are not inherent in any given discipline, the case for distinct modes of inquiry at all becomes less tenable. 5. The myth of interaction analysis . There is frequent failure to distinguish the difference between interaction frameworks for demanding a little of what is going on in the classroom as opposed to using the frameworks for prescribing what should go in a classroom. Just because there is much teacher talk observed, it does not necessarily follow that there should be more pupil talk. Prehaps even the already high percentage of teacher questioning and confirming should be increased—at least in some learning situations. 6. The myth of rational decision making . This myth assumes that teaching can be viewed as a rational decision-making process. It assumes a means-ends relationship of behavior. Because of the irrational and unconscious aspects of human behavior, we must not put all our faith in the tenet that teaching will in fact occur in a rational manner. The last myth provided by riacdonald is extremely important because it suggests the uniqueness of situations, conditions, and individual behavior. Instructional program designers, intent on the improvement of instruction, usually justify their programmatic decisions in utilitarian terms. The central ethical questions posed by utilitarian ethics serve as criteria for judging the benefit of their designs: "How should an organization foster pleasures and diminish pains of its

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136 members, and thereby contribute to the end happiness?" and, "what types of qualitative pleasures are provided for, or encouraged by, an organization, as opposed to quantitative pleasures?" The underlying assumption is that instruction serves utilitarian purposes. The major purpose of naturalistic utilitarian ethics is to systematically examine alternative courses of action by empirical methods so that rational decisionmaking may be enhanced. It is also a major premise of many instructional program designers that rational decisionmaking can be based on an analysis of the data related to the achievement of specific instructional objectives. In fact, many designers invoke the methodology of utilitarian valuation to judge what is beneficial and what is detrimental. The relationship between the ethical decisionmaking process of Bentham and of that of modernday instructional programmers is remarkable. For example, the management tool of linear programming has been defined as "a mathematical technique for optimizing the overall allocation of resources to various activities where constraints are such that not all activities can be performed optimally." The definition assumes linear behavioral relationships in which the optimal solution maximizes the desirable and minimizes the undesirable. The objectives of linear programming,: and other management analytical tools, are similar to the purposes of the hedonistic calculus of Bentham and other utilitarians, and both assume and express a high degree of faith in objectivity and rationality. 8 Stephen J. Knezevich, Program Budgeting (PPBS): A Resource Allocation Decision System for Education (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing, 1973), p. 327.

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137 Instructioanl planning models do not lend themselves to a complete acceptance of utilitarian concepts and analytic procedures. While the analytical tools provided by a systematic approach to management can be beneficial , administrators should realize that such tools are not designed to make decisions. Decisions are to be made by persons, and analytical procedures are designed only to identify and describe alternatives so that rational choices can be provided the decisionmakers. An over reliance on the inherent positivistic notions sometimes expressed by eager program designers can result in nonethical choices by administrators. To balance utilitarian concepts and valuational procedures, administrators should reflect on the form of ethical valuing as expressed by the existentialists. This form stressed that decisionmakers should take into their designs an account of individual capacities and possibilities. The criterion for judging "good" decisions as employed by the existentialists asked the question: "What meets the needs, fits the capacities, and corresponds to the possibilities of an existent being?", or conversely, "what thwarts, destroys, or starves a being in its activities?" The aim of instruction, which should be reflected in program designs, is the meeting of those capacities which help individual existents in their movement toward the realization of their possibilities for activities beneficial to themselves and others. Lewis and Miel^ have suggested that curriculum and instruction should be designed as an "organic whole" which accommodates future changes in people, technology, and social arrangements. They stated: Arthur J. Lewis and Alice Miel , Su pervision for Improved Instruction: New Challenges, New Responses 'Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1972).

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138 "The central concern should be to create an environment where all useful and necessary components — including valid content — are continuously being ordered into a meaningful whole." The two primary purposes to be served by such a design are the socialization for life in a democratic structure, and the development of individual self-concepts and potentialities. An organic design also rejects linear rationalities and stresses that "... function, form, media, and techniques all evolve together." Apparently, the philosophical rationale for such a design is a unique blend of Deweyan pragmatism combined with the existentialist belief in the affirmation of self. Lewis and Miel indicated that curriculum designers should structure the learning environment in order to accommodate the socialization process. Such a task addresses itself to the Deweyan question: "How should a system (organization or individual) alter, modify, or change individual habits and impulses so that democratic values may be accommodated and the intellectual activity of deliberation increased?" At the same time, the organic design emphasizes the process of individuation which directly relates to the existentialist question: "How should a system (organization or individual) foster 'dialogic' relationships so that individuals may become whole, authentic, fulfilled selves?" To Lewis, and Miel, part of the answers to these critical questions resided in the criteria for a harmonious curriculum design—flexibility, resiliency, and an openness to the future. , Specific management tasks associated with the creation of optimal learning conditions (scheduling, grouping, providing facilities and 10 Ibid., p. 160. 11 Ibid., p. 162.

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139 materials, utilizing community resources, providing inservice training, and creating a stimulating organizational climate) should be conducted in a fashion which reflects a concern by the administrator for equity and fair treatment. The exercise of power and influence in regards to these tasks places the responsibility of what goes on in the classrooms on the administrator. This responsibility should cause an administrator to examine those ideas and values which provide the ingredients that empower and give substance to individual actions and judgments. The conception of a school as a social affair, in which the thinking of all the parties concerned have a legitimate stake and function in determining what life in school should be, challenges the leadership ability of administrators to confront competing ideas and values which shape life in a school. Sarason postulated that the "ultimate fate of ideas and values depends on the principal's conception of himself in relation to the system. "'^ Sarason further argued that: One can realign forces of power, change administrative structures, and increase budgets for materials and new personnel, but the intended effects of all these changes will be drastically diluted by principals whose past experiences and training, interacting with certain personality factors, ill prepares them for the role of educational and intellectual leader.' 3 The leadership function demands practical wisdom as defined by Aristotle. An administrator needs to take cognizance of particulars, possess sympathetic understanding, and deal with matters of action. ' 2 Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), p. 148. 13 Ibid.

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140 the administrator should also be possessed of good sense which is the correct judgment of what is fair or equitable. These qualities tend toward the grasp of ultimate or primary terms and concepts which deal with what is just, noble, and good for man; and it is doing such things that characterizes a man as goodJ^ A man of practical wisdom uses the right means which have been determined after careful deliberation of various alternatives. The desired end, according to Aristotle, was determined by virtue, and practical wisdom directed the actions necessary to achieve the end. The deliberative process envisioned by Aristotle was also directed toward concord and harmony among the agents involved, but it did not demand complete consensus. It did, however, demand action, and a morally strong leader, to Aristotle, did not change his decisions under the influence of emotion and appetite, but only on those occasions when he could be persuaded by argument. In all matters and tasks associated with the domain of curriculum and instruction, the ethical concept of beneficence is perhaps the most vital in terms of which value should govern the decisionmaking of administrators in this critical area. Beneficence has been defined in Benthamite utilitarianism as those duties one has to do good for others. The quality of beneficence can be viewed from two points of . view, and each is important to administrative decisionmaking. The teleological view of the utilitarians and the instrumentalists has stressed that beneficence resided in those actions which promoted or furthered the quality of life for the greatest number. On the other hand, the deontological view expressed by Kantian and Aristotelian ^Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics , trans, with an Introduction and Notes by Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberal Arts Press, Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 167.

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141 ethics have stressed the importance of the individual in matters of beneficence. Educators need to possess both views when making curricular and instructional decisions to insure that a proper balance is maintained between the welfare of the group and the welfare of the individual. Pupil Personnel Services Pupil personnel tasks are associated with such matters as compulsory attendance, census and attendance services, classification and assignment, reporting pupil progress, counseling and guidance, pupil records, student activities and participation, and student discipline. To arrange for the proper education of students, the tasks associated with the listed activities are vital administrative functions that need to be executed with a sense of justice and equity. While moral questions may range in the. degree of importance with the tasks associated with pupil personnel, they certainly have an importance and bearing on the direction of students' lives. The welfare function of pupil personnel work has increased during the last several decades to the point where the school carries an extreme burden of caring for matters formerly associated with family and church duties and concerns. Special services have been provided students which do not directly relate to teaching in the traditional sense. It is not uncommon for an elementary school to have a school nurse, a social worker, a speech therapist, a teacher for the emotionally disturbed, a learning disabilities specialist, a teacher for the '^Miller, Madden, and Kincheloe, The Public Administration of American School Systems , op. cit. , pp. 105-29. 'Hope Jensen Leichter, "Some Perspectives on the Family as Educator," Teachers College Record 76 (December 1974): 175-217.

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142 visually handicapped, a hearing specialist, and a full-time guidance counselor. In addition, the school has other consulting services available, and can refer cases to local social agencies. Secondary schools are staffed with even more specialists whose function is not classroom oriented, including school psychologists, occupational specialists, and specialized counselors. Again, district-level resources, such as attendance officers, are available to individual school centers. The services provided have added to the further bureaucratization of today's schools, because each service requires specialized staff, specific policies and rules, and ministerial requirements. The growth of these services, and the restrictive curricular patterns found in the schools, have combined to the point where some have called for the "deschooling" of society. Illich 17 sharply criticized the pervasive power and influence that schools exercise in relation to individual students. The spectre of monopolistic control achieved by obligatory attendance, certification, and diploma and advancement rituals, has fostered a dialog concerning the proper role of schooling and education in a post-industrial society. Umans 18 has predicted that the future of education will be one where the total community will become the school. She described the process of schooling as a socialization process designed to prepare the next generation for a very different and more complicated world than the one in which we live today, a world often referred to as the technical millenium— "a world in which 17 Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) 18 Shelley Umans, The Management of Education: A Systematic Design for Educational Revolution (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1971).

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143 every individual, in order to survive, will have to develop a high quality of uniqueness in order to 'reach beyond his grasp. '"'^ Umans' "blueprint for the future" was based on the concept of planned change utilizing a systems approach and analytical models which would seem to indicate a structured framework; however, she portrayed a situation where: The school building of today will be just one small "station" of education; children will move from industrial plant to theater to hospital to court to museum to college laboratory to storefront city hall. The agents of education, or teachers, will comprise the artist, the politician, the medical doctor, the researcher, the curator, and the computer. The child will become truly a social being, educated by the organized use of all human resources. zu The implications for administrators of such an educational future, as described by Umans and others, are centered in the questions of control , management, and authority versus humanistic values. Any systematic design for education needs to address itself to the problem of how it can achieve a proper balance between hegemony and human dignity. Pupil personnel tasks often confront moral questions related to the respect for human dignity and individual development. The decisions of administrators can foster either alienation or actualization of today's youth who have an intense and practical concern with their futures. Counseling activities need to be directed toward providing 19 Ibid., p. 27. 20 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 21 Lawrence A. Cremin, The Genius of American Education (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965); and Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970).

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144 the student with diagnostic information concerning his strengths, weaknesses, interests, and abilities so that he can make his own determination as to how he can best employ his faculties. Assigning students to courses of study based on aptitude tests results in the creation of inflexible "track systems" which are inherently unjust to students. Utilitarian justice, as defined by Mill, 22 recognized the claims or rights of individuals to the pursuit of personal happiness, and that these rights could only be curtailed due to "some recognized social expediency." The supervision of the counseling program should also insure that the students are treated equally, because it has been revealed in many cases that inequities exist due to the tendency to type pupils based on their socioeconomic class status, their racial background, their religious heritage, and other factors. The questions posed by the utilitarians which have significance in these matters are: "What is the factual evidence based upon empirical investigations for assertions about benefits and disadvantages which would accrue to an individual who took a certain position or action?" and "Does the organization and its administration provide for _ equality of treatment, or do some individuals count for more than their fair share?" The existentialist ethic would be even more critical of any attempt to fit students into a mold by leading them through a series of developmental tasks. In Buberian terms, the purpose of education should be to enable the teacher to enter into the life of the individual , the unique person who is confronting him and who 22 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863). Reprinted in its complete form in Writers on Ethics: Classic and Contemporary , ed, Joseph Katz, Philip Nochlin, and Robert Stover (Princeton, New Jersey: \ D. Van Nostrand, 1962), p. 143.

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145 stands with him, in the common situation of educating and being educated. ^ A counseling program shoutd-foster opportunities for authentic personal human contacts, and not stereotype students and their capabilities, because such activity can result in mislabeling which can haunt students beyond the intended purpose. 24 To impose a pattern destroys the possibility of a genuinely human existence because an individual is "nothing else but what he makes of himself." The discussion concerning counseling activities relates directly to the concomitant administrative task of maintaining pupil records. Recent court cases and legislation have given individuals the right of access to those public records which involve them personally. Those who have the responsibility for maintaining such records have become concerned as to the determination of who has a rightful claim to such information as contained in students' cumulative records, and under what conditions is access to the records to be granted. Of central importance is the question of the utilitarian value of such documentation. If such records do indeed have utility, then the question becomes, for whom is the utility intended? Student discipline has always been a concern of teachers and administrators. However, the term is usually used in references to matters of policing and punishment, rather than as a positive concept involving training pupils to control their own dispositions and habits. ^Martin Buber, Between Man and Ma n, with an Introduction by Maurice Friedman and an Afterword by the Author on "The History of the Dialogical Principle," trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1947; New York: Macmillan, 1965), Chap. III. ^Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion in t he Clas sroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual Development (New York! Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).

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146 Corporal punishment, detention, suspension, and expulsion are the normal means that administrators employ to insure good "discipline" in schools. Those charged with the responsibility of maintaining student discipline are constantly faced with ethical questions related to justice and equity. The Aristotelian questions concerning the determination of responsibility for actions which result in injury should be asked by those disciplinarians seeking justice in disputational matters: "Did the action which resulted in injury to others result from prior deliberation?" and "Was the injurious act committed by voluntary choice?" Rectif icatory justice, as practiced by disciplinarians who act as judges, seeks to rectify a wrong that has been done by determining the damage and restoring the equality betv/een the parties involved in the dispute. The laws and rules which govern these matters, according to Aristotle, should be applied equally and with consistency to each party and case. Because the school exists in a social setting, each solution should also be examined in relation to not only the individuals involved, but also to the larger environment of the school. Deweyan ethics asked the question: "Does the proposed solution anticipate the consequences in the larger environment as well as the immediate situation?" This is a critical point that disciplinarians should be concerned with when deliberating what the proper punishment for a given wrongful action should be. In all matters of discipline, administrators need to assess conduct by careful examination and due deliberation. The Supreme Court in a recent decision, Goss v. Lopez , stated that:

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147 ... if the disciplinary process were a total 1 accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never unfair. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and no one suggests that it is. Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, frequently act on the reports and advice of others; and the controlling facts and nature of the conduct under chall re often disputed. That risk of error 1s not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done with prohibitive cost or interference with the educational process. 25 In all matters and tasks associated with pupil personnel, the Kantian concepts of duty and dignity should be the central values held when making administrative decisions which relate directly to student welfare practices. It will be recalled that Kantian ethics provided three criteric. to assess duty: first, an action should not reflect a selfish purpose; second, the determination of the action, not its results, must reflect a concern for the morality of one's intentions; and third, one should conduct himself in a manner which reflects a concern for law and customs. Therefore, an administrator who acts and decides according to these criteria attempts to respect, at all times, the dignity and worth of others. Certainly, in one's relations with students, these qualities determine whether or not an administrator is ethical or nonethical in his conduct. Stud rceptive in matters of this nature, and an administrator who does not exhibit these qualities is most likely to be disregarded or held in contempt by the students he is supposed to be serving. 2b United States Supreme Court, Goss v. Lopez, as quoted in Tom Shannon, "The United States Supreme Court and Student Suspensions from School: Was Gos_s v. Lopez the Final Answer?", School Administrator (March 197577 14-15.

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14. Personnel Developm ent and A dmi nistration The general personnel function is to develop and maintain a highly motivated and competent school staff. More specifically, decisions are made in regards to the processes involved in operating plans designed for manpower planning, recruitment, selection, induction, compensation, development, security, association or union relations, and participation of school employees in the organizational structure. Each of these personnel processes can be further subdivided into sequential tasks associated with the intent of the process being considered. 26 When staffing the system an administrator is concerned with the processes of manpower planning, recruitment, selection, and induction. Miller, Madden, and Kincheloe identified three general points which should be considered when staffing a school system. They advocated the preparation of job descriptions for each position to be filled, an assessment of the role's function, and a list of the basic characteristics necessary for the person to possess in order to achieve 71 role compatibility. lhese activities, particularly the latter, can be directly related to those ethical questions concerned with the determination of virtues and vices posed by Aristotle. The clarification of the strengths, weaknesses, needs, and predispositions of the prospective employee are designed to reduce the possibility of role 2 °Morphet, Johns, and Reller, Educational Organization and Administration: Concepts, Practices, and Issu es, op. cit., p. 422^ 2 ' Miller, Madden, and Kincheloe, The Publ ic Administration of American School Systems , op. cit., pp. 179-80.

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149 28 conflict. Getzels, Liphani , and Campbell stated that such activity was designed to insure a congruence betv/een organizational expectations and the individual's cognitive and affective dispositions. Role conflicts are always present in any position; however, it is the responsibility of the personnel administrator to lessen these conflicts so that the organization can achieve its goals and the employees can derive personal satisfaction from the kind of activity required for the achievement of the goals. To achieve this task, many administrators employ personality instruments to detect characteristics of individuals which reveal possible conflict or compatibility. These instruments are similar, in many respects, to the determination of virtues and vices as employed by Aristotle, in that they scale a particular quality in terms of excess and deficiency. The rating process is designed to secure a median disposition which is compatible with the role under consideration. The ethical question is: "What is the mean that secures the highest good attainable under the circumstances?" The highest good to administrators can be translated into the definitions of effectiv eness and efficiency as provided by Barnard. He stated that: Effectiveness relates to the accomplishment of the cooperative purpose, which is social and nonpersonal in character. Efficiency relates to the satisfaction of individual motives, and is personal in character. 30 28jacob W. Getzels, James M. Lipha'", and Roald F. Campbell, Educ ational Administration as a S^cess: Theory, Res earch, Pract'iceT N'ew York: Harper and Row", 196817" pp. 318-47. 29 Chester I. Barnard, The Fu nc tions of the Ex ecutive (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1 964 ) . 30 Ibid., p. 60.

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150 The classification and assignment of staff members should seek to achieve compatibility between role assignments and individual dispositions. The aim should not be entirely directed toward increased effectiveness as envisioned by the scientific management theories of Taylor and Bobbitt. Such conceptions of the personnel function focused mainly on the priority of organizational goals to the point where individual interests were considered secondary. A logical extension of such a position would tend to treat individuals as "interchangeable parts to be put in organizational slots as needed." 00 The ethics of Kant should be recalled in such situations where an organization attempts to impose conditions and commands for individuals to meet certain requirements. Kant's principle of "reciprocal freedom" restores justice to those situations in which there is an attempt to bind others to do more than what would be willed for oneself. Kant also established an important criterion for assessing organizational or individual authority when trying to determine a just and rational order. He held that individuals are entitled to full participation in the formulation of the laws and rules by which each, was governed. The related ethical questions posed by Kant are: "What are the organizational limits in defining and mandating duties and obligations which are to be incumbent upon individuals in the conduct of role-related 31 Frederick W. Taylor, Shop Management (New York: Harper and Row, 1911). op F. Bobbitt, in The Supervision of City Schools , Twelfth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1913). ^Getzels, Lipham, and Campbell, Educational Administration as a Social Process, op. cit. , p, 321.

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151 tasks?" and "What are the governance requirements that an organization or an individual must meet before exercising a directing or restraining influence over persons?" The problem of improving personnel performance is another dimension of the personnel function. The supervisory and administrative activities associated with this area include the processes of appraisal, development, and compensation. The critical tasks associated. with these processes involve questions of organizational and individual responsibility, distributive justice, and beliefs about the nature of man.. •-. The role of the superordinate and the subordinate in relation to the appraisal process is largely determined by the interaction of selective interpersonal perceptions of the conditions and contexts which shape performance expectations. In order to effectively evaluate personnel performance there must be a clear definition of realistic expectations agreed to by both the superordinate and the subordinate. Traditionally, personnel appraisals have been conducted solely by the superordinates. However, within a school setting, administrators should consider the adoption of other evaluatory techniques. Among professional and semiprofessional groups the alternative of peer appraisals of individual performance should be viewed as a viable form of evaluation. The role expectations would be determined by a teaching team, a department, or some other unit which has direct knowledge of the position's requirements and their fulfillment by the individual being evaluated. The imposition of sharply defined production standards for the purpose of assessing accountability of individuals is not appropriate in an instructional setting.

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152 Any appraisal of performance should encompass the notion that different styles and techniques can accomplish the same objectives. Since people differ in their habits and dispositions, it is not proper for an administrator to demand standard means of delivery, particularly in instruction. The major concern of the administrator or superordinate when evaluating performance should be directed toward Dewey's "doctrine of success" which measured performance in terms of the consequences or outcomes of activity. An individual's job performance was successful when the attained results were tested by observation and compared to those which were intended. In other words, it is the function of the superordinate to assess the end results. The ethical question posed by Dewey was: "What is the criterion for determining the value of various means in resolving problems?" However, while the superordinate is concerned with end results, the subordinate should equally be concerned with the quality of the means that are employed to accomplish desired ends. The deontological perspective of Kant and the existentialists stressed the motives, style, and methods directed toward an end result are important considerations. Kant's "realm of ends" suggested that a person should never treat himself or others as a means to accomplish a given end. The existentialists focused upon the individual 's responsibility for his decisions and the nature of "bad faith" for those who attempted to deny this responsibility imposed by freedom. The deontological questions are: "Should it be willed that the maxims of individual actions become universal law?" and "What is the relation of freedom to responsibility and decisionmaking?" Clearly, the evaluation and appraisal of an individual's conduct in performance

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153 of -his role expectations should be concerned with both facets of the judgment process. Personnel appraisals are instrumental parts in the determination of who should be entitled to promotions, awarded merit increases in salary, and terminated or reassigned to a different position. This task is extremely difficult because of the judgmental factor and the possibility of legal action relative to such practices. Merit compensation is certainly an issue which should be deliberated thoroughly before any concrete salary schedule is adopted by a system. A danger in unionization of teachers is that lock-step salary schedules and standard treatment are often demanded by the teacher representatives during collective negotiations. The task of personnel administrators is to devise means which assure that merit is recognized and rewarded in some fashion or another. The Aristotelian value framework assumes that persons exist in a certain ratio of superiority and inferiority. Administrators who have adopted this position find that the major task in this framework is to determine through just appraisal devices the proportion which establishes the proper ratio between persons' abilities so that the same proportion can be applied in determining an equitable distribution among the system's members. Castetter^ has identified seven criteria for the measurement of an equitable compensation policy which could also serve as guides in the development and implementation of such statements. The statements which aimed at making actions consistent and at systematizing the manner in which the organization dealt with compensation included: 34 William B. Castetter, The Personnel Tunction in Educational Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1971 ). " .

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154 1. The compensation structure should be designed to include personnel working in every capacity, regardless of income level or position responsibility. 2. Position guides should be prepared for all positions, professional or noncertificated, in the school system. 3. Income levels for all positions should be competitive, in keeping with the duties and responsibilities of the position, and sufficiently high to attract and retain the caliber of personnel capable of performing the service for which they have been empl oyed . 4. Satisfactory service should be the criterion for advancement in income. 5. Quality of service should be rewarded. 6. Collateral benefits should be an inherent feature of the compensation structure. 7. Noneconomic benefits, or psychic income, in a variety of forms, should be conceived as an integral part of the compensation structure. 35 The last two points suggested by Castetter deserve special comment, because compensation plans, of course, involve more than the salary one receives. Collateral benefits and noneconomic features can help attract, motivate, and maintain quality performance, but they also reflect a genuine concern on the part of the organization for employee welfare and satisfaction. In relation to ethical valuing, the question suggested by Mill is important in developing compensation policies: "What types of qualitative pleasures are provided by a system (organization or individual) for the beneficence of others, as opposed to quantitative pleasures?" Certainly, a just compensation structure, even one which sets economic value on positions and judges the economic 35 Ibid., pp. 126-27.

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155 worth of position holders in an equitable manner, should also include methods to reward staff performance in both economic and noneconomic terms which are appropriate to the merits of the situation and the performance of the individual. Belcher claimed that compensation represented "a transaction between man and organization involving the employment contract. Although the transaction may be variously considered as an economic, psychological, sociological , political , or ethical exchange, it is all of these and more than any one of them." 36 In his description of compensation as an ethical transaction Belcher noted that no absolute, objective, universally accepted standards of equity existed. To overcome this problem and achieve equity, Belcher prescribed that both parties, the organization and the individual, should engage in a bargaining process that would result in a specification of the terms of the transaction. For those situations that were not subject to complete specification, Belcher recommended that equity could be achieved only if both parties were free to change the terms. He stated: "From an ethical perspective, the transaction must be analyzed from both sides. Organizations cannot determine what is equitable for individuals, and vice versa." 37 Important decisions of the services provided by personnel administration to staff members are organizational climate, working conditions, and personnel welfare policies. The procedures usually employed to provide such services include leave arrangements, substitute service, 36 David W. Belcher, Compensation Administration (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall , 1974) , p. 3. 37 Ibid., p. 10.

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1 56 health and medical service, and safe working conditions. Another important service is insuring the security of personnel. This task involves protecting staff members against arbitrary and capricious treatment by establishing pol icies which guarantee fair and equitable treatment of employees in such matters as academic freedom, financial security, and position security. The processes normally established for achieving security in a system include tenure provisions, transfer guidelines, and promotion guidelines. Aristotle recognized that the life of a community (or a school system) should be governed by policies which reflected political justice in both its conventional and natural forms. In its conventional form, justice was determined by the consistency and fairness of its application to specific cases. Policies established for the governance of staff welfare rules and procedures should be adhered to as law. However, policies established which are at variance with justice in its natural form, and therefore resulted in acts of injustice, should be rectified by equitable acts of policymakers to restore the principle of fairness. The critical questions which relate to these matters are: "What is the relation of the individual to the general welfare of the organization?" and "How is morality and justice to be assessed--by strength, by appeal to absolutes, or by critical examination of relative conditions?".. Personnel participation in systemwide decisions has been given increased support and recognition during the last two decades as a result of increased associational activity on the part of teacher organizations, unions, professional associations, and other related groups. \ Participation can result not only in the form of the collective

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157 negotiations process with representative groups, but it should also be fostered through the application of democratic administrative practices. Such practices encourage participation by those who are affected by a course of action or policy position being deliberated. Increasingly, many administrators are adopting the position that groups and individuals have a right to share in the determination of the conditions or plans to be instituted by the system. McGregor and Likert 39 have argued that participation is the answer to most human difficulties in decisionmaking. They argued that if an employee feels he is part of the process of making a decision, he will accept it more readily and be motivated to implement it more effectively. The Imposition of an apparently arbitrary decision, it is claimed, may invite a passive or even a negative reaction. Other administrators and management theorists just as strongly oppose participation in decisionmaking and stress its potential pitfalls. Jaques^O and Sofer^' argued that if the solutions chosen by employees turn out to be inadequate and are ultimately not used, more resistance will result than if the employees had not participated in the first place. In addition, they argued, because an administrator must relinquish some of his own prerogatives and managerial flexibility, further problems may appear, even in other situations. Finally, they 3 8[j OU g] as McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960). Rensis Likert, New Pa tterns of Management (New York: McGrawHill, 1961). ~~ ~ 40 Elliott Jaques, The Changing Culture of the Factory (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1970). ' : ~ : ~ Cyril Sofer, The Organization from Within (New York: Ouadranqle, 1961). — — — —

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158 argued that employee participation in decisionmaking is a timeconsuming, cumbersome, and costly process. In considering the use of participation as a part of the decisionmaking strategy, it is helpful to assess it in terms of the criteria of quality and acceptability. In a decision situation where the quality of the decision is considered to be paramount, participation by employees other than the specialists who determine this quality may be of questionable value. Its worth is particularly questionable if a decision's direct effect on the work group is minor and the factor of acceptability is therefore relatively unimportant. However, if all the alternative courses of action are of equal or similar quality, but employee response is crucial, participation may be a very useful method of securing acceptance of the decision. In critical decision situations, a full assessment of participation for a specific decision process should include a predictive diagnosis of the capability of the particular group or individual to participate in the process. Such a prediction is more likely to be accurate and effective if it is based on an initial, systematic trial of the participative method. The potential rewards of the method make such a trial worth the effort. Potentially, participation can increase employee identification with organizational goals, motivate greater effort toward attaining those goals, and promote cooperation among the members of the participating group. It is a method of choosing a solution worth consideration when acceptability is crucial to implementation. A just organizational system can be identified by those acts and decisions of administrators which reflect a belief in fair and equitable

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159 treatment of staff personnel. Administrators who have been given the responsibility of determining personnel policies and regulations should attempt to establish an ethics of approbation which holds as its central tenet the concept of equity. The selected ethical systems have pointed out that equity can be gained provided the conscious purposes of individuals are consulted and respected in any projection of the good for the organizational system. The theories also recognized that those in positions of authority have a special obligation to rectify apparent wrongs which have been created as a result of the system's actions and decisions. In addition, the concept of equity tends to dispel the notion that administrators, in their execution of personnel policies, can appeal to written policies and regulations as an ethical defense for their actions. Finance and Fiscal Management The widened scope of administrative responsibility and the pressing demands for "accountability" have forced administrators to give considerable attention to improved methods of financing, effective business management operations, and increased productivity of the organization and its subsystems. The tasks associated with this critical area include budgeting, financial accounting and administration, business administration services, and protection of school A? funds, property, and persons. Financial support for public education is dependent upon resource allocations from revenue generated by the taxing efforts of local, ^Morphet, j hns, and Reller, Educational Organization and Administration , op. cit. , pp. 469-500.

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160 state, and national governments. The variations in fiscal capacity 'and effort, sources of revenue, tax structures, and legal systems have resulted in major differences in providing equal educational opportunities for society's youth. The inequalities and inequities in opportunity, ability, and. effort of governmental units in financing education have prompted increased activity directed toward greater equalization efforts among the several states. Reischauer and Hartman 43 identified three forces responsible for the increased interest in school finance problems. The first was a "taxpayer's revolt" which threatened the traditional sources of school revenues. The second force was a series of court decisions that dealt with the constitutionality of current practices and methods of generating school revenues. The third force identified by Reischauer and Hartman was the decline in school enrollments of nonpublic schools which fostered an attempt to bolster those systems through governmental financial assistance. The attempts to secure public revenues for nonpublic schools raised the questions of whether and how public revenue could be used to assist nonpublic schools. The general fiscal dilemma outlined by Reischauer and Hartman was that schools have been confronted with spiraling expenditures and inflationary costs and, at , the same time, they have found it increasingly difficult to generate adequate revenue from the traditional sources. This condition has resulted in attempts to find new and more equitable means for both raising and distributing revenues for 43 Robert S. Reischauer and Robert W. Hartman, Reforming School Finance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1973), pp. .1-2. 44 Ibid., p. 17.

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161 use by local school districts. The tax structures employed by governmental bodies are designed to distribute the costs of those services provided among the various members of the political community; however, the costs have not always been shared on an equitable basis. Increasingly, the courts and public opinion have demanded that the standard of equity by applied to the various tax structures. Due 5 has identified three other criteria, in addition to equity, for the evaluation of taxes—economic distortions, compliance and administration, and revenue elasticity. Distortion effects were defined as those effects that cause persons to alter economic behavior in a fashion contrary to the objectives of society. Com pliance and administration , were defined in terms of the collectability and costs of administering taxes. Taxes should be collectable to a high degree of effectiveness with minimum real costs to the taxpayers and reasonable cost to the government for collection. Revenue elasticity was expressed in terms of the ability of tax revenues to keep pace with increased government expenditures due to increasing national income levels. Tax rates should accommodate such increases. Equity was assessed according to four characteristics: first, persons regarded as being in the same relevant circumstances should be taxed the same amount; second, the tax burden should be distributed on the basis of ability to pay as measured by income, wealth, and consumption; third, provisions should be adopted which exclude low-income groups from taxation on the grounds that they have no taxpaying capacity, and fourth, there should be a . , 45john Due, "Alternative Tax Sources for Education," in Financing Education , ed. Roe L. Johns, Kern Alexander, and K. Forbis Jordan (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing, 1972).

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162 progressive, or at least proportional, dimension in the overall distribution of taxation. ° Methods of equitable distribution have not been as clearly defined and accepted as the concept of tax equity. While tax equity, in its pure form, does not exist in every instance of tax methods employed, there is, at least, a general consensus of what equity constitutes in the tax area. Evidently, greater consensus can be found on techniques of raising revenue than on its distribution. Johns and Morphet 4 ' have identified what they believe to be critical characteristics of a defensible state support program which distributes revenue funds to local districts. Selected criteria related to state support of education included: 1. The plan of financial support for schools in each state should be designed to assure a foundation program providing essential , reasonably adequate, and well-balanced educational opportunities for all who should benefit from public education. 2. The state should provide for each district, 'on an objective basis, the difference between the funds available from the required uniform minimum tax effort and the cost of the foundation program. 3. The educational and financial provisions for the foundation program should encourage sound and efficient organization, administration, and operation of local school districts and schools. 4. The foundation-program plan should provide maximum opportunity and encouragement for the development and exercise of local leadership and responsibility in education. 48 46 Ibid., p. 128. Roe L. Johns and Edgar L. Morphet, The Economics and Financing of Education: A Systems Approach , 2nd ed. (Engl ewood~Cl iff s, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969). 48 Ibid., pp. 283-86. .

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163 The National Educational Finance Project stated more specific criteria by which to assess state school finance plans. The plan should: 1. Include all current expenditures as well as capital outlay and debt service to facilitate equitable budgetary planning for all phases of each district's educational program. 2. Recognize variation in per pupil program costs for local school districts associated with specialized educational activities needed by some . but not all students, such as vocational education, education of exceptional or handicapped pupils, and compensatory education. 3. Recognize differences in per pupil local district costs associated with factors such as sparsity and density of population, e.g., pupil transportation, extra costs of isolated schools, variations in cost of living. 4. Be funded through an integrated package which facilitates equitable budgetary planning by the local school district. 5. Utilize objective measures in allocating state school funds to local school districts. 6. Integrate federal funds with state funds and allocate to local districts in conformance with the criteria herein set forth to the extent permitted by federal laws and regulations. 49 While administrators are concerned with tax methods, their interests focus more on the distribution of governmental revenue to the school districts and schools. Equity, to educators, should exist within each school district, among districts within a state, and among states. Unfortunately, educators are not in accord as to what constitutes financial equity in education. The complexities of sociopolitical conditions, program accounting information, data analysis 4"Roe |_ # Johns and Kern Alexander, eds., Alternative Programs for Financing Education (Gainesville, Florida: National Educational Finance Project, Vol. 5, 1971), pp. 233-34.

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164 techniques, definitional problems, and other conditions have combined to complicate the issue of equity in designing and implementing revenue systems for support of education. In addition, governmental services are being overburdened with demands from different sectors of society to the point at which the issue emerges of determining an equitable relationship among the subsystems and their levels of support for a given political system. Various alternative designs have been recommended by concerned individuals and organizations for reducing the inequities found in many state support programs for education. However, it will be the responsibility of legislators and other key policy makers to ultimately decide the issue of financing equal educational opportunity for society's youth.. Given the democratic structure and the competition of various factions and interest groups for tax revenues, such policy decisions will have to confront the critical deliberative questions posed by Deweyan pragmatism: "What will satisfactorily terminate deliberation, that is relieve the conflicts and tensions of the situation? Has the proposed solution taken into consideration all of the pertinent facts of the situation? Does the proposed solution anticipate the consequences in the larger environment as well as the immediate situation?".. While such questions may direct the deliberative process, the decision makers will also confront ethical questions more directly related to an evaluation of any selection they may choose. In the Aristotelian framework, the political and legal structures existed as a natural rather than as an arbitrary order; and within the political system individuals were viewed as members of such an order because of their mutuality of interests in the betterment of the total community.

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165 While Aristotle offered no specific criteria for assessing whether or not a specific action increased or supported mutual interests and total community development, the question still remains: "How is a just proportion to be determined in social and political matters when men share a common life in order that their association might bring them to self-sufficiency, and, at the same time, they are considered free and equal in relation to each other?" Fleming 50 has claimed that while the task of equalizing and improving school finance does not guarantee social or economic equality, efforts should be continued to maintain public schools as a system. She also argued that, if an open society is to exist, all races and classes should have the same chance at formative experiences, in which a parent's social standing and wealth do not dictate a child's expectations. Such a goal can only be achieved, Fleming argued, by an evenhanded raising and spending of money within school districts. She stated: The question of equalizing public school resources is a moral and political issue as much as an educational one. The goal is justice in the distribution of educational funds in a country that strives to be a democracy. As long as there is a large and important public education institution, its benefits', however imperfect, should be equally available to all children. 51 Fiscal management tasks are generally considered to consist of 52 . budgeting, accounting, auditing, and reporting. The most critical 50 Virginia Fleming, The Cost of Neglect/The Value of Equity : Guidebook for School Finance Reform in the South (Atlanta, Georg i a : Southern Regional Council, 1974). 51 Ibid. , pp. 7-8. S^Knezevich, p r0 g ram Budgeting, op. cit. , p. 113.

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166 task in relation to fiscal management is budgeting because it incorporates and reflects the organization's goals and objectives. Jordan^ described budgeting as "sequential planning" which consisted of four basic dimensions--a program plan, a revenue plan, an expenditure plan, and a specified time span. Related subtasks to the budgetary process included the specification of goals, the organization of a plan, the establishment of priorities, the formal adoption of a budget document, the administration of the budget, and a review of its outcomes. The effectiveness of a budget as a plan is dependent upon the ability of the planners to have each of the different phases and subtasks flow together to obtain a coherent and logical pattern. Naturally, the quality of a budget results from the ability of the planners to provide adequate and meaningful input information so that the key decisions during the entire process are based on relatively valid data. To facilitate quality input data, many experts now recommend the adoption of the planning-programming-budgeting-system (PPBS) concept. PPBS is one of the more recent budgetary reform measures that have been introduced to improve the budgetary process. Adopted by federal agencies in the 1960s, PPBS has become a major force in the area of fiscal management in business, in industry, and increasingly in education. Knezevich has described program budgeting as a "resource allocation decision system" which reflected the following six distinguishing features: 1. Explicit statements of desired outcomes (objectives) are an integral part of the budget document. "k. Forbis Jordan, School Business Administration (New York: Ronald Press, 1969), pp. 111-15.

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167 2. Budget exhibits are organized around major programs of the organizations, that is, there is a programmatic format with activities clustered around objectives. 3. Expenditures or operating costs are aggrevated around program elements, subcategories, or categories rather than around inputs unrelated to . measurable outcomes or subject matter disciplines and instructional functions where objectives are nonexistent or obscure at best. 4. Benefits as well as costs are exhibited for major programs. . 5. There is a multiyear costing framework projecting new program resource demands for at least the next five years. 6. Data are organized to facilitate resource allocation decisions by executives. 54 The primary concern of budget officers in PPBS is to determine relationships between objectives and expenditures for each alternative. This task involves the collection and organization of fiscal data in terms of programs so that appraisals can he made, preferably through the means of cost-effectiveness analysis. Cost-effectiveness analysis is an analytical tool designed ,to evaluate the relative effectiveness of alternative means to achieve common objectives or end-states. The purpose of such efforts is to aid the evaluation of the relative worth of alternative courses of action or sets of social priorities. The approach to solving problems of choice can proceed from either a fixed-cost position or a fixedeffectiveness level. If one adopts a fixed-cost approach, he simply establishes a specified amount of resources (usually expressed in dollar amounts) that will be allocated to a given program, and then 54 Knezevich, Program Budgeting, op. cit., p. 132.

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168 he proceeds to assess identified alternatives that yield the greatest effectiveness. The fixed-effectiveness approach reverses the initial position by setting a target level of desired effectiveness (outputs) and then proceeds to identify and assess alternatives that involve less costs to the system in terms of resources. A major handicap to cost-effectiveness analysis in education, as with other forms of analysis, is the lack of a consensus in regard to justifiable output measures. However, Wilkinson55 has postulated that because of the current and projected economic and social conditions, as expressed in terms of cost and productivity, increased pressures will continue for more extensive use of cost-effectiveness techniques. The philosophical criteria which undergird such techniques as cost-effectiveness analyses are usually expressed in terms of the deliberative process as^outlined in Dewey's problem-solving method. The key points inthe pattern ofS'reffective thinking giitl ined by Dewey (in relation to cost-effectiveness) were -that alternative courses of action needed to be identified and their consequences and implications must be envisaged and deduced. Contemporary programmers and decision theorists have accepted these sequential processes and expressed them in quantitative languages. However, it is unlikely that Dewey would have wholeheartedly accepted such efforts. It is probable that he would have asked the question: "Are the ends or aims sought to be viewed as ends-in-themselves, or as means for the resolvement of present problems?" Another concern that Dewey would probably have expressed would be in relation to the quantification 55 Gene L. Wilkinson, "Cost Evaluation of Instructional Strategies," Audio Visual Communications Review 21 (Spring 1973): 11-30.

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169 aspect of modern analytical methods. "The casting up of accounts of profit and loss" was a phrase that Dewey used to describe what deliberation should not consist of in the determination of a solution. Such activity tends to regard ends as fixed rather than as directive stimuli to present choice situations. Budget planning should be flexible and should be administered so that the larger purposes of a system are served as changes take place or new considerations develop that cannot be accommodated within budgetary constraints which are not relevant to present conditions. Budgets are tools of management, not management itself. Quantification, of course, is essential in the budgetary process, and it can serve a valuable role in analyzing the intricate interrelationships that are present in a system faced with resource scarcity and demands for goods and/or services. Samuel son^° has described this condition as the reason for economics. He defined economics as: . . . the study of how man and society choose, with or without the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources to produce various commodities over time and distribute them for consumption, now and in the future, among various ". people and groups in society. $\ The task of educational systems is to select a proper mix of resources to meet the unlimited educational needs and wants of its varied clients. Thus, education, in a sense, can be described as an economic choice whereby educational effectiveness and efficiency must be related to the use of scarce resources to achieve goals and objectives which have been judged important and valuable for individuals and society. A system 56paul A. Samuelson, Economic s, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955). ; 57 Ibid. , p. 6.

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170 is confronted with the task of utilizing its resources in such a manner that it can achieve an equal marginal utility proportional to its variously priced objectives so that each good or service is consumed up to the point where the last unit of money allocated to a specific program provides equal utility to that of the last unit of money spent on other programs. The concept of marginal utility, as critical as it is, is again an elusive pursuit for educational planners and budget officers because of the problem of "pricing." The value of various programs and objectives are difficult to translate into quantifiable terms. Bentham suggested that decisionmakers need to ask the following types of questions when deciding value among alternatives: "What are the probable consequences of the alternative proposals?", "Which policy alternative would result in the greatest happiness for the greatest number?", and "How would the consequences of the alternative proposals compare in relation to the value elements of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent of pleasures and pains?". The last question suggests that value can, to some degree, be quantified, at least to the point where the alternative proposals of allocation can be ranked according to their ability to foster pleasure or diminish pain. Accounting, auditing, and reporting tasks are in most instances circumscribed by a number of legal constraints. Ethical valuing in regard to these tasks should primarily focus on duties and responsibilities, and on the absoluteness of good will as defined by Kant. In many cases there is an attraction to manipulate a system's fiscal resources to the point where the standard of honesty is grossly

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171 distorted. Unfortunately, the collective negotiations process has in a number of cases resulted in the division of a system to the point where the subsystems become adversaries in the struggle for the financial resources of a system. As a result, some administrators have been prone to inflate certain accounts for the purpose of keeping monies which ordinarily would have been negotiable. Such practices by administrative personnel should be measured against what Kant termed our "perfect" duties to others. In all matters, Kant contended that individuals should keep promises, be truthful, respect others, repay debts, and seek a system of positive laws and obey them. Certainly, an administrator confronted with Kant's question, "Could a person regard his proposed action as a possible object of his will if it was to take place in accordance with a law of nature in a system of nature of which he himself was a part?", would have to consider such practices nonethical. Another problem encountered when dealing with accounting, auditing, and reporting matters is that in many instances the legal requirements so encumber a system that it can lose the flexibility oftentimes required in meeting certain difficulties. Internal procedures should insure that some degree of leeway is permitted so that administrators may accommodate contingent events. However, for those who would deviate from the required procedures, institutional safeguards require the question: "What is the factual evidence based upon empirical investigations or considered judgments for assertions about benefits and disadvantages of a course of action?". In other words, a rationale or justification should be given when exercising discretion beyond that normally assigned to an administrator.

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172 In matters and tasks related to finance and fiscal management the major issue encountered was the problem of developing a morally justifiable system of distributing "common goods." The ethical concept which related directly to this matter is the concept of dist ributiv e jus tice . In Aristotelian ethics, distributive justice was defined in terms of a "geometric" proportion between persons and shares of common goods. According to Aristotle, inequalities were appropriate provided they were justifiable and required by moral considerations. In addition, the utilitarians have provided administrators with a theory of proper distribution, and they also recognized that inequalities were to be expected. The utilitarians expressed their formulations for a just distribution system on the principle of maximizing the net expectable utility by combining equality and inequality in such a manner that the greatest number were served. However, any formula for distributing common goods should recognize certain prima facie obligations to provide for just and equitable compensation, equality of opportunity, merits of valuable services, equality of welfare, and utility. The neglect of these variables will automatically result in a nonethical form of distribution. Therefore, administrators should hold the value of distributive justice in high regard when engaged in administrative decisionmaking related to finance and fiscal management. School and Commu ni ty Relations The development and maintenance of good school -community relations is a critical task area which has received increased recognition as a result of certain social and political forces in recent years. A major

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173 force has been the popularization of the concept "p?rticipatory democracy." Its historical roots can be traced to the currents of equal itarianism, the advance of science and technology, and the popularization of knowledge combined with the efficacy of schooling. These elements have combined to heighten the sensitivities and expectations of the citizenry in regard to educational policy issues. The challenge to the patrician leadership of school men has come in the form of demands for a greater share in the determination of school related goals and policies. This democratic spirit has caused consternation and difficulty for those administrators and systems illprepared to cope with such matters as militant pressure groups, citizens' advisory committees, and pressure from influential s in the community power structin . Formal public schooling is a political enterprise in its attempt to serve the various subsystems and suprasystems. Interactive forces help shape the schools' goals and purposes, and at times their methods of operation. It is the task of administrators to determine and operational ize the community's conceptualization of th and goals for its youth. In the context of its political environment, schools should improve community understandings of the need for certain educational programs in order to gain their support. At the same tin the school system should seek means to assist the general community in ro Its cultural and social possibil it Campbell et al. 58 have suggested that the critical tasks related to the operational area of school -community relations include CO Roald F Campbell, Edwin M. Bridges, John E. Corbally, Jr Raphael 0. Nystrand, and John A. Ramseyer, Introduction to Educational Administration, 4th ed. (Boston, Massachusetts: andTJacon, 1971 ), p. »

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174 ascertaining the composition and character of the community and determining the desires and aspirations that the citizens hold in regard to public schooling. These tasks are compounded in those communities marked by a high degree of heterogeneity in economic classes, social and religious customs, and cultural practices. Morphet, Johns, and Reller have stated that administrators faced with such a condition have a central responsibility to help build an "integrated school community." They held: The people must be held together at least in the educational world by some mutual ties that provide a feeling of identity and belonging. Since we may well begin with school communities that are quite heterogeneous and lacking in community or integration, this may be among the most important tasks facing the schools. 59 To accomplish such a noble task, administrators need to become involved in the political processes and practices of their communities. Such efforts should be directed toward achieving a broad base of public participation and support. Grieder, Pierce, and Jordan have stated such support: ... is probably the best guarantee that the school will truly reflect community interests, will obtain support so that a good job can be done, and will be protected from domination by limited special interest groups and from unscrupulous attacks by power hungry demagogues and unfair critics. 60 This opinion is endorsed by Kimbrough"' who has conducted several major 59 Morphet, Johns, and Reller, Educational Organization and Administration, op. cit., p. 207. Grieder, Pierce, and Jordan, Public S chool Admini stration, op. cit. , p. 634. "'Ralph B. Kimbrough, Political Power and Educational D ecision Making (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

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175 studies of political power and educational decisionmaking. He asserted that educational leaders need to have a thorough knowledge of the power system in their communities. Kimbrough claimed that the knowledge gained as a result of involvement and investigation should result in the use of political resources to gain support for educational improvement projects. However, Kimbrough cautioned that administrators should not be too idealistic when translating the concepts of "participatory democracy" or "grass roots democracy" into operational terms. He noted an unw tic tendency among schoolmen to overemphasize the form of democratic decisionmaking which reflects an indeterminate and emotional form of sloganeering. Instead, administrators should proceed with concrete operational tactics which encompass the substance of broad representation in decisionmaking by developing an understanding of both the formal and informal interaction system which are instrumental in a workable systepi of decisionmaking. 62 The establishment of a workable communications network is vital to the goal of achieving political support and harmonious schoolcommunity relations. Such ?. network can engender genuine understanding between both the system and its varied clients. A subsid.iry function of a communications network should be to foster an increasing amount of interaction between groups and individuals representative of the various factions in a community in both an informal and formal fashion. Studies have been conducted on the role of groups and individuals who help to shape decisions in an informal manner. Homans" has 62 Ibid., pp. 271-72. "•^George C & World, 1950). ° 3 George C. Homans, The Human Grou p (New York: Harcourt, Brace,

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176 observed that small groups are major facts of human association; and more frequent interactions among such groups will lead to greater understanding and acceptance. Katz and Lazarsfeld 64 have concluded after reviewing a number of sociological studies that communications are more effective when they are channeled through the opinion leaders of various informal groups. In addition to "grass roots" opinion leaders, Hunter 65 found that the opinions expressed by prestigious influential exerted greater sway in regard to major policy-issue decisions. Kimbrough, in a similar fashion, suggested that because of these findings administrators need to become conscious of the power structure and utilize it to the advantage of education. He -stated: "The great need in educational leadership is to make professional opinion heard at the palace level of politics—that is, in the circles of interaction where the big policy decisions are given consideration.""" The maintenance of a viable communications network is directly related to the efficient and effective use of sound communication . strategies and tactics. Conway, Jennings, and Milstein 67 have provided administrators with specific processes for collecting, organizing, 64 Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Person al Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Commun cat ions (Gl encoe , Illinois: Free Press, 1955). G^Floyd Hunter, Community Power: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1953). 66 Kimbrough, Political Power and Educational Decision Making , , op. cit. , p. 273. °^James A. Conway, Robert E. Jennings, and Mike M. Milstein, Understanding Communities (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1974.

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177 analyzing, and synthesizing data obtained from community investigations. They stated that community attitudes and opinions need to be continually monitored and assessed by administrators because of the fact that the decisionmaking process for any governmental agency, including schools, is exposed to political , social , and economic forces exerted by various community groups and individuals. The aim of such a monitoring process, according to Conway, Jennings, and Milstein, is to enable administrators to modify the impact of the changing nature of communities. They stressed that systematic assessments need to be conducted in regard to: citizens' attitudes and opinions about the schools; how they are changing; and to what degree they are changing. Such efforts are conducted, in their terms, because: To continue to be an effective local educational leader in curricular change, in fiscal policymaking, and, above all, in planning for education, the administrator must have a continuous flow of this information in usable form. To be a molder rather than a follower of public opinion, he needs to be able to. refine his problem, determine the information required to pose or test alternative solutions, obtain information, sort it, and analyze it. 68 In addition to the development of a systematic framework for assessing community opinions, McCloskey^^ has identified a number of key principles which are beneficial to sound communication strategies and the maintenance of a network. Several of the more critical principles included: _ take the initiative; initiate constructive frames of reference; °°Ibid., pp. xii-xiii. ^^Gordon McCloskey, Education and Public Understanding , 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 113-36.

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178 make information accessible; get participation; involve leaders; avoid threat; be friendly; communicate continuously; use all available media; reward participants; prevent rumors by providing facts; appraise sources of aid and opposition; and be truthful. In addition to establishing a systematic communications network and insuring its proper use, school systems should adopt a formalized public communications structure in the system. The use of the term public communications rather than public relations is more desirable, according to Seay, because "it becomes clear that the communication process is used to achieve the goals of public understanding and support" rather than simply a means to promote the system. Seay also listed a number of activities that a public communications program should utilize to achieve the goals of public understanding. He stated that some useful activities included: publishing a newsletter; providing news releases; publishing an annual report; using surveys, polls, and questionnaires; producing audio-visual presentations; publishing fact sheets; providing brochures; publishing monographs, writing special reports; organizing a speaker's bureau; and training staff in the art 71 of holding conferences.' 7? Unruh and Willier have suggested four major objectives of school -community communications. They stated the most important objective is to inform the various client groups in regard to the activities, innovations, achievements, and possibilities of the educational effort Maurice Seay, "Community Education: A Developing Concept (Midland, Michigan: Pendell Publishing, 1974), p.. 236. ~~ T ~~. 71 Ibid., pp. 254-57. '^Adolph Unruh and Robert A. Willier, Public Relations for Schools (Belmont, California: Fearon Publishers, 1974), pp. 54-55.

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179 of the system. A second objective is to provide ample opportunity for feedback from the client groups and individuals. The third objective performs an instructional function. The goal is to educate the public about the value of a good education program for community and individual development. The fourth objective is to provide continuous communications to avoid a negative reaction to sudden and intensive "sales" promotions during campaigns for bond referendums. Unruh and Willieralso held that communications should be developed with insight, intelligence, and imaginations In all matters and tasks connected v/ith school -community relations, there is the question of probity versus expediency. While these two qualities are viewed as extremes on a continuum, they in large part measure the moral character of individual choices. An action is truly ethical if it is the result of personal decisions to act in a moral way and if the way chosen can be accepted as truly moral. The selected ethical systems discussed dealt with this central problem; and all confirmed that integrity, uprightness, and honesty were virtues necessary for the maintenance of an ethical framework. While they differed in their conceptualizations and definitions of morality, the systems generally recognized that one should come to his own decisions. Ethics cannot and must not dictate or save persons from conflicts. Rather., it permits choice among principles; and it is each person's task to decide which applies in a particular situation. However, once the choice is made, one becomes subject to an absolute demand. Therefore, administrators when confronted with questions of probity need to decide if that indeed should be the object of one's motives and intentions; and once that dilemma is resolved there is the matter of

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180 what guides or principles provided by the various ethical systems should or should not be adhered to in determining one's actions. Those who would choose expediency, in its perjorative sense,, need also to decide if the profession of school administration is their correct vocation. Moral Autonomy in an Organizational Setting The discussion of ethical valuing in educational administration has primarily focused on those responsibilities and tasks that an administrator in his professional role is confronted with in making and executing policy decisions. However, an administrator is also a person who is subjected to a myriad of forces which can lead to a belief that the locus of one's personal existence lies without rather than within one's self. There is a marked tendency for administrators -to derive their values from the group. A number of studies'^ have reiterated that this tendency militates against the development of independent beliefs or convictions. The dominant modes of existence appear, at times, to be conformism and adjustment rather than moral autonomy. The existentialists focused on this condition of modern man and organizational structures and rejected those external determinants which decrease each person's freedom. Knell er found that "the good for the existentialist is always a positive affirmation of self. Evil lies in following the crowd. However, the free choice of an act involves a personal responsibility for its commission."' 4 Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941), and William H. Whyte, Jr. , The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956). '^George p. Kneller, Existentialism and Education (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 65.

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181 Amorally autonomous person is characterized by the criteria that a person finds the locus of evaluation within himself, assumes responsibility for his acts, and is self-governing as he strives for freedom and mastery of his own existence. Frankena held that to be autonomous the individual must increasingly make firsthand judgments; and the autonomous person is likely to be able to resist social pressures to choose an alternative that he would not select if left 7 fi to his own devices. Rich has described a morally autonomous person in terms of his ability to contend with situational contexts and moral dilemmas. He stated: The morally autonomous person is flexible and capable of reinterpreting principles in the light of conflicting situations, he can envision the social consequences of his acts and modify his behavior accordingly; and he can reconstruct his behavior, because his openness to experience provides him with alternative modes of action. The morally autonomous individual is not closed off from the ideas of others and the diverse moral systems found in the larger society; yet ultimate decisions for actions are his own, and he realizes that it is he and he alone who has to assume responsibility for his actions. 77 An existentialist motif in the description of moral autonomy provided by Rich is evident; however, the account is not one of despair but one of hope that such a position can be maintained in a modern organizational setting. By substituting the term "professional administrator" for "morally autonomous individual" the implications for educational leaders become apparent. The qualities and attributes 75 William K. Frankena, "Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education," Harvard Educational Review 28 (Fall 1958): 300-313. 76 John Martin Rich, Education and Human Values (Reading, Massachusetts: Add i son-Wesley Publishing, 1968), p. 837" 77 Ibid.

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182 listed by Rich are descriptors of not only moral autonomy but also of what it means to be a professional . Etzioni^ has pointed out that professionals are basically responsible to their consciences and that this autonomy is necessary for effective professional work. This form of authority, to Etzioni, is distinct from administrative authority which assumes a power hierarchy in which "the higher in rank have more power than the lower ones and hence can control and coordinate the 79 latter's activities.' In order for a professional to act, he needs to be immune from ordinary social pressures and free to experiment, to innovate, to take risks, and to be open to change and creativity. However, the ultimate justification for a professional act is that, to the best of the professional's knowledge, it is the right act. To further the professional ization of educational administration, the most significant and critical task is to insure that administrative positions are occupied by morally autonomous individuals. The challenge is made difficult by those forces which would have as their criterion of rightness of actions and decisions the mere fact that they had been sanctioned by "higher" levels of authority in a system. The existentialist question which confronts this issue is: "How can, or should, a morally autonomous individual conduct himself in an organizational setting which impinges on his personal freedom and integrity?". The "authority syndrome" evident in Watergate demonstrates the compelling need for professional administrators who are imbued with ethical valuing questions which reflect a concern for their decisions of ^^Amitai Etzioni, Modern O rganizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 76. ~~ 79 Ibid.

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183 choice. Individuals who can be described as morally autonomous are the most valuable resource that an organization has, and their loss would be destructive of its ability to maintain itself as a worthwhile endeavor.

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CHAPTER IV DEVELOPING AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK Developing an Integrated Value System The Nature of Values A morally autonomous administrator should possess a well-defined and integrated value structure so that he may adequately function and ably resolve problems which occur in the practice of his profession. If an individual is viewed as a "system", values can be construed to be those elements which function as "directors" and "regulators" of the system's movement toward a steady state. Therefore, each individual administrator can be characterized by the quality and ability of his value structure to reconcile internal and external forces in a manner which' does not lead toward entropy. The development of an integrated value system for individual administrators can more fully be achieved provided administrators understand the nature of values, the sources of values, and strategies for developing a scale of values. The contention can also be made that an administrator who possesses an integrated value system can more adequately cope with commonly met problems of right and wrong in school administration. Theories of valuation are generally concerned with the matters of good and evil. In normative ethics repeated emphasis has been given to those values which should be stressed for harmonious human conduct. " 184

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185 A value can be defined as the significance which a person attaches or ascribes to matters related to a particular activity or experience, or to life in general . In ethical discourse three types of values are often described to distinguish among those virtues which have greater veracity and utility. The regulative concept of "end", as used by Kant, suggests that values can be described as subjective, relative, or absolute. Subjective values serve an end which can only be appreciated by the individual concerned and therefore cannot be described or defined. Relative values (extrinsic) evaluate means according to their suitability to serve an end, and they can be defined and described by the purpose they serve. Absolute values (intrinsic), such as truth, serve no other purpose, but are ends in themselves; and they can be described but not fully defined. 2 Roubiczek has described the role of values to an individual in the following manner: The great significance of the values resides in this fact--that they make internal reality completely real. At the same time it is of their very nature that we can and must choose between them; they enforce choices; and thus their reality removes all doubts about another essential inner experience-freedom of will, which means freedom of decision and action as well as freedom of choice, for choice would be meaningless if it could not have consequences. Values have been referred to in the literature as virtues, and it is important to note that except for absolutes, values have, as Aristotle suggested, both a positive and a negative dimension. To Aristotle, the negative side of any given virtue (value) could be expressed as an excess or as a deficiency. To make the same point, in another fashion, Haul Roubiczek, Ethical Values in the Age of Science (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 219. 2 Ibid., p. 241. 3 Ibid., pp. 236-37.

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186 one can assess the positive and negative features of any given value in terms of the ends sought. For example, the concept of respect is generally held to be a value of worth, but it can in some circumstances be translated into something more akin to reverence or awe, or perhaps deference, when the end sought is the favoring of one who holds political power. Evidence of this can be cited in the testimony of individuals at both the Nuremberg and Watergate trials. Those accused, in both cases, demonstrated an excessive respect for an individual rather than for jurisprudence and ethics. Another example that can be cited is the treasured value of knowledge which can easily serve as a doubleedged sword in relation to the ends or purposes for which it is applied. Modern scientists became acutely aware of this condition when they witnessed the destructive -power of nuclear weapons. With the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, scientists were suddenly confronted with the responsibility that flowed from the development of nuclear fission and fusion techniques. Ethical discourse is basically concerned with relative and absolute values; therefore, a discussion of ethical values will not consider subjective values. However, it must be recognized that subjective values are critical to a more complete understanding of an individual and his conduct, because in large part they dictate tastes, preferences, and other idiosyncratic desires. Absolute values have been defined as being good in themselves, and because of this condition, relatively few such values have been identified in the literature. Traditionally, the values of truth, goodness, and beauty, have been held as such worthwhile ends. Christian ethics would probably add love as another absolute value to be sought as

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187 an end in itself. However, the selected normative systems have provided a different set of end values which should be considered as absolute. Aristotle, for example, assumed a monistic position and postulated that the "highest of all goods achievable by action" was the value of happiness for both the individual and the community. Kant also expressed a monistic theory by asserting that the highest good which was to be "esteemed beyond comparison as far higher than anything it could ever bring about" was the value good wi 1 1 . However, to the utilitarians the chief value was pleasure , which could take a variety of forms. The existentialists, on the other hand, did not express a common standard to determine ultimate worth. However, they did express a common theme which can be translated into an intrinsic value and that was the concern for the actualization of the self. Dewey's theory of valuation was unique in that he attempted to deny the validity of any absolute or intrinsic values. His opposition to the concept of fixed ends led Dewey to the belief that values could only 'be construed as relative in nature. The worth of any value was to be determined in Dewey's system by the ability of a value to achieve an intermediate end, i.e., if a value was instrumental in bringing about a contextual goal or resolving a conflict, than it could be judged good or worthwhile. However, it can be implied from certain excerpts that Dewey would have subscribed to the value of general welfare being an important, if not intrinsic, end. Relative values, or extrinsic values, are a means to, or parts of, other things said to be good in themselves. They can be described as either instrumental or beneficial in regard to their suitability toward achieving the ends sought. If a relative value is an effective

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188 producerof something else, it can be described as instrumental! y good, i.e., it is a good means. The end, however, may or may not be judged as good, because a "good means" in this instance is not measured by the ends. If a relative value is productive of an end judged to be good in itself, than such a value can be termed beneficially good, i.e., a means to a good. A listing of the various values found in the selected ethical systems is provided in Table 5. The table contains both the relative and absolute values cited in the normative theories. Sources of Ethical Values To create an integrated value framework, administrators should recognize that their values have been shaped by four basic sources. The first source of values for. an administrator is social in character. These values reflect those habits and customs which have been shaped by the socialization and enculturation processes that each person goes through during his lifetime. Primarily, these ethical values can be attributed to family influences, peer associations, religious training, and schooling patterns. Political and economic types of valuing are also included in this category of ethical values because, in Deweyan terms, these values generally result from one's experiences and interactions with his immediate environment. A second source of values is intellectual in character. These values result from one's interactions with the larger environment through such media as formal education, travel, extensive reading, and specialized training. An individual who places a high degree of importance on this form of ethical valuing is generally marked by • his openness and flexibility. A group of specific values usually

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TABLE 5 CLASSIFICATION OF ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE VALUES BY ETHICAL SYSTEMS 189 Utilitarian Deweyan Kantian Aristotel ian Existentialist Amity Association Benevolence* Imagination Justice Pleasure** Power Probity* Reputation. Skill Sympathy Wealth Activity Creativity Discovery Exploration Generosity Imagination Independence Sensitivity Welfare** Amity Benevolence Dignity Duty* Friendliness Good Will** Gratefulness Honesty* Justice* Love Order* Preservation* Rationality* Realization Respect* Social able Truthfulness* Ambition Confidence Continence Courage Equity* Friendliness Generosity Gentleness Happiness** Humor Intelligence 1 ' Justice* Know! edge Magnificance Truthfulness Wisdom* Actualization** Authenticity* Aspiration Candor* Humility Independence Lucidity Sincerity* Solicitude Truthfulness Uniqueness *Absolute or major relative value **Chief value (not necessarily absolute)

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190 associated with intellectual valuing would include such values as knowledge, understanding, tolerance, rationality, and comprehensiveness. A third source of values for an administrator is organizational in character. These values result from one's interactions while serving in an associational or organizational role. Generally, the values in this form result from one's identification with those values which have been incorporated in the organization's policies and procedures. There are also values associated with the expectations and requirements of specific structured roles that are oftentimes embodied or assimilated by an individual in the performance of his job. A fourth source of values is strictly personal in character. However, the values in this category are not to be confused with idiosyncratic tastes or preferences, but with substantive values which result from the interactions one has with himself through the processes of self-examination, introspection, and intuitive insights. Having identified and described those sources of values which an administrator possesses, it is important to note that each form of valuing is critical to an integrated value structure. In addition, each source of valuing can serve as a means to describe an administrator by assessing which type of values he tends to emphasize in his decisionmaking situations. For example, while an administrator may tend to emphasize social values, another may tend to emphasize personal values. Besides the differences which may exist between the categories, there also exist, of course, differences within each category among administrators. To give substance to the discussion a table has been prepared and recommendations have been presented to aid administrators in establishing a scale of values. The values included in the table are

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191 the same as those identified by the selected ethical systems. They have been arranged according to each identified source of ethical valuing. While differences of opinion might exist as to the proper placement of a specific value, the listing can serve as a beginning point for the establishment of a scale of ethical values. "Table 6 is not to be construed as the only possible arrangement of the normative values. Each administrator, because of experiential differences, would probably make modifications in the listing. Therefore, each person should determine the proper ordering within and among the categories. Strategies for Developing a Scale of Val ues Since an individual is the major determinant of those values that he demonstrates through actions and decisions, a person, to avoid value conflicts which can destroy his ability to cope, should establish a personal scale of ethical values. However, a completely integrated value structure could possibly result in a closed structure rather than an open system of valuing. Therefore, some discord is necessary to provide an individual with sufficient dissonance to provoke those motivational forces which lead to deliberative activity. Dewey has postulated that deliberative activity further refines the quality of reflective intelligence. This activity functions as a control mechanism for habits and impulses; and. the result of critical deliberative activity leads to more inclusive aims and insures a reasonable course of action. Aristotle, in a similar fashion, viewed deliberation as essential to the improvement of the decisionmaking process. Therefore, a useful recommendation, based on the concepts found in Deweyan and Aristotelian ethics, would be that a person should

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TABLE 6 CLASSIFICATION OF ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE VALUES BY IDENTIFIED SOURCES 192 Social

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193 engage in critical and deliberative activities to gain greater proficiency in decisionmaking skills. In addition, the major focus of • such activity should be directed toward a critical examination of one's values to harmonize major ethical concerns and conflicts. The question as to whether the deliberative process should be pursued as a single individual or in relation with another, or others, is an appropriate question. Existentialists would argue that the process should be conducted, in an introspective manner. While they did not exclude the possibility of examining objects of interests (values) with others, they did recommend that the discussion should not lead to the "objectification" of the values involved. Rather, the activity, if conducted through the medium of others, according to the existentialists, should be in the elucidation of the character of good things. The existentialists and other ethicists would remind individuals that they are ultimately responsible for their selection and ordering of ethical values. As a result, a second recommendation which can be stated for establishing a scale of values is simply that an individual should primarily use the technique of self-analysis when conducting a critical examination of his value structure; and if he decides to share this experience with others, the exchange of views should be governed by the notion that the role of the other is simply . to add depth and clarification to the analysis of the decision alternatives. The purpose served by a critical self-analysis is to provide an ethical orientation which truly represents a person's commitment to

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194: values and ideals. Neumann 4 has suggested that the "old ethic" with its collective values and its rigid legalistic framework is inadequate for modern conditions. The "old ethic" fosters suppression and repression as the main techniques to be used by individuals in order to achieve adaptation to the ethical ideals, and these activities result in a facade personality or "persona." 5 According to Neumann, the purpose of the "persona" is to protect the individual from his inner self. He stated: The persona is the cloak and the shell, the armour and the uniform, behind which and within the individual conceals himself --from himself, often enough, as well as from the world. It is the self-control which hides what is uncontrolled and uncontrollable, the acceptable facade behind which the dark and strange, eccentric, secret 6 and uncanny side of our nature remains invisible. If individuals are to achieve an integrated value framework, it is essential that the "shadow" or unconscious psychic, elements be incorporated so that the total personality of an individual serves as the basis of ethical conduct. Another question, that an individual may be concerned with when attempting to reconcile value conflicts and make proper decisions, is the issue of whether one should use quantification techniques in assigning discrete weights to relative and absolute values. Dewey, of course, has argued that the "recording debit and credit" technique is inappropriate, whereas Mill has argued to the contrary. To resolve 4 Erich Neumann, Depth Psychology and a New Ethic , trans. Eugene Rolfe (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbacks, 1969). 5 Ibid., p. 37. 6 Ibid., pp. 37-38. ..

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195 this issue, one should critically examine the possibility of weighting the value variables, but, as Dewey stated, to expect an exact analysis may be an unrealistic plan. However, in any scaling which attempts, to prioritize values some form of "calculus" will have to be employed. One possible method would be to attempt an accounting of the consequences rather than to try to assign a given weight to a specific value directly. By envisaging the consequences and using Mill's "elements", one can begin the scaling process in relation to the conditions of a situation. Consistency is an important variable in assessing one's ability to make responsible and ethical decisions, and one of the major purposes served by a scaled value structure is to provide a fair degree of regularity in making choices involving like circumstances. Certainly, if a person is viewed as one who constantly shifts his position from one situation to the next, the tendency among others is to disregard the worthwhileness of that person's evaluations. On the other hand, if one makes what might be termed automatic decisions which disregard the circumstances of a situation, the tendency is to judge, that person, as dogmatic and close-minded. Between these two extremes in handling decisionmaking is the proper course for administrators. Values are both subjective and objective at the same time; therefore, a fair amount of consistency is required, but ethical choices should be assessed in a deliberative manner which is conducive to an objective analysis of the conditions and circumstances of the problem situation. In the same vein, a consistency should be evident in one's ethical positions involving matters related to both his personal and professional life situations. While in recent years "popular" philosophers have attempted to divorce these matters, such practices which involve

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196 the use of double standards result in severe strain on the individual. Therefore, individuals should seek to harmonize or reconcile those postures which would lead to the adoption of double standards, i.e., one should adopt a standard of conduct which allows him to function in basically the same manner in both his professional and personal life. A charge of hypocrisy is difficult to combat by those individuals who assume different value frameworks for their professional conduct and their personal conduct. To provide more specific direction to administrators attempting to develop their own value framework for administrative decisionmaking, the following principles are suggested as guides: 1. Identify the ethical values which relate to administrative decisionmaking. 2. Clarify the meanings of each value. 3. Extend informative experiences about the values selected. 4. Arrange appropriate contexts for practice and confirmation of the selected values. 5. Use intrapersonal and interpersonal techniques to facilitate greater understanding of each value's role in administrative decisionmaking. 6. Develop a scale or hierarchy of ethical values for administrative decisionmaking. 7. Evaluate the quality and the results of actions taken according to the scaled value framework. 8. Make the necessary adjustments to the scaled value system by rearranging and modifying the value weights which have been • -judged as inappropriate for administrative decisionmaking.

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197 Developing a Value Framework for Educational Administration Normative Decisio nmaking Meth ods While it is the' responsibility of each administrator to develop his own value system, the possibility of developing a framework for the profession should also be examined. The need for a value framework for the profession of educational administration was recognized by Graff and Street who stressed the importance of establishing an adequate value theory as a necessary element in the professional ization of educational administration. The reason for such activity is simply that the profession cannot proceed to its full development until the "easy" ethics found in professional codes have been supplanted with more viable and flexible guides for administrative decisionmaking. The profession, according to Graff and Street, needs a distinctive value framework because of its responsibility for "cherished human values. "8 The questions developed at the end of the discussion of each ethical system can serve as a beginning point for developing a value framework for the profession. To further aid this development, the chief virtues which have been identified in regard to the critical task areas are suggested as possible "intrinsic" values which should be held in common by administrators in the practice of their profession. The values identified, in relation to their importance to administrative 7 0rin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value Framework for Educational Administration," in Administrative Behavior in Education , ed. Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg [New YorkP Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 120-52. 8 Ibid., p. 121.

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198 tasks, included beneficence, duty and dignity, equity, distributive justice, and probity. In addition, the concept of moral autonomy was identified as critical to the development of a professional administrator. However, autonomy, in this sense, does not imply a state of "separateness" from the organizational setting, rather it implies a sense of "commitment" for an administrator to "extend the bounds of his own freedom [and] to act with initiative and resourcefulness at whatever level he finds himself." The proper measurement of our schools requires administrators to establish a value structure which lies between the extremes of legalism and antinomianism. Fletcher 10 has suggested that the most viable alternative is "situationism," which recognizes the validity of principles, but rejects both the application of laws and the belief that one should enter into ethical decisionmaking situations with no presuppositions whatsoever. Legalism , as defined by Fletcher, results in an elaborate system of rules which not only complicates decisionmaking, but also produces a belief in the casuist position. Antinomianism , on the other hand, results in a position which completely rejects the validity of any principles and therefore produces decisions which are unpredictable and spontaneous, and at times anarchic in character. 11 Unfortunately, Fletcher has defined situationism in terms of the Christian doctrine of love. Therefore, the only principle 9 Solon T. Kimball and James E. McClellan, Jr., Educatio n and t he New America (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1962), p. 315. 10 Joseph Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Westminister Press, 1967), pp.. 168-77. 11 Ibid. , p. 170.

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I 199 and value for decisionmaking in situational ethics is the concept of love. Laudable as this position may be, the agapist philosophy is judged inappropriate for administrative decisionmaking. For example, Fletcher stated: This situational approach is based upon a monolithic law of love, which is nearer in a. way to antinomianism than to legalism. It shoulders aside all codes, all statutory and prescriptive and absolutistic laws or rulesJ2 Certainly, the ethics of educational administrators should not be established on such an indeterminate value; rather, ethics should be based on a more well-defined structure. Even though Fletcher defined love in a social rather than a romantic sense, he still equated it with altruism. He further defined love as a "personal ist devotion to people," and he held that, in all cases, personal interests were to come first, before "the natural or Scriptual or theoretical or general or logical or anything else. 3 The spirit of love, to Fletcher, should also lead to selflessness and concern only for the common good. This underlying altruistic element expressed in the doctrine of situationism simply does not "fit" well with administrative tasks and responsibilities, which require that self-concerns be wedded with other-concerns. Niebuhr' 4 has also rejected the belief that love is a sufficient force for resolving conflicts in collective relations, because it is an "ecstatic impulse" which leads to the belief that self-interest and 12 Ibid., p. 174. 13 Ibid., p. 34. '^Reinhold Niebuhr, Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings , ed. D. B. Robertson (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing, Meridian Books, 1967), pp. 25-46.

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200 self-concern are to be denied or suppressed to the point of complete selflessness. On the other hand, the spirit of justice helps to strengthen the principle of love, because justice incorporates a sense of obligation and a desire to give one his proper due. In addition, the spirit of justice demands that the value of selfinterest be considered when attempting to create "tolerable harmonies of balanced interests and mutually recognized claims." The contention can also be made that love, as defined by Fletcher, tends to evoke sympathy and sentimentality which are generally illsuited to administrative decisionmaking. While administrators need to have empathetic concerns, the value of sympathy can lead to falsity or what Sartre termed "bad faith." More basic to the rejection of situationism as an alternative style of decisionmaking is the fact that administrators simply cannot afford to ignore rules, regulations, prescriptions, laws, and established procedures when formulating and executing either policy or administrative decisions. Feldman and Kanter' 6 have suggested that organizational decisionmaking has to consider the physical, economic, and legal constraints which. affect the choices and consequences of those decisions involving the system. They claimed that the purposes served by rules and regulations were to enable and expedite "programmed" decisionmaking, and to facilitate and direct the behavior of the subsystems toward the goals of the system. They further postulated that the degree of constraint depended on "(a) the nature of the system making the decision, 15 Ibid., pp. 25-26. Julian Feldman and Herschel E. Kanter, "Organizational Decision Making," in Handbook of Organizations , ed. James'G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 614-491

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201 (b) the interdependence of the subsystems, and (c) the extent to which a 'good' decision-making procedure is known."'' However, while administrative decisionmaking and governance responsibilities require constraints, the purpose of organizational rules and regulations should not be viewed by administrators in terms of rigid enforcement, or by subordinates in terms of adherence and compliance to rules themselves. Therefore, administrative decisionmaking should be based on a value framework in an area between situationism and legalism. Figure 3 suggests the optimal region on a continuum between antimonianism and legalism for an ethical decisionmaking approach by educational administrators. X Y /////////////// z Antimonianism Situationism (optimal region) Legalism Figure 3. A Continuum of Decisionmaking Methods Moral Assessments of Actions and Decisions The most difficult issue in any discussion of ethical decisionmaking and conduct is the question of how actions and decisions made by others are to be assessed. Should an organization or an individual be held accountable for conduct other than through the legal establishment? More specifically, should a professional group invoke criticism or censure of its members for nonethical conduct or moral transgressions? The answers to these questions are critical to the advancement of any ethical framework for the profession. To resolve this issue, the question of whether man is a free agent or whether he is a determined being has to be resolved. 17 Ibid., p. 619.

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202 Ethical discourse has identified three different positions in relation to the issue of whether man is free to subject to the causal laws of heredity and environment. The most vocal libertarians are the existentialists who claim that man is an innately free existent, and that the concept of freedom is baseless, i.e., not subject to causal laws. At the other extreme are the hard-determinists who argue that an individual's conduct is determined by causal forces which account for his total behavior. Skinner'° is an example of a harddeterminist who believes that the causal antecedents can be identified, verified, and controlled by a technology of behavior. Skinner claimed that the concepts of freedom and dignity stand in the way of further scientific achievements toward developing a technology of behavior, and that these concepts need to be sharply reviewed so that the environment can be controlled for the betterment of man. In addition to the hard-determinists and the libertarians, a third group has been identified in ethical discourse. This group is known as soft-determinists. Their position basically advocates that while a person's actions are determined by causal antecedents, the actual task of ascertaining the exact causes of behavior is presently beyond the capabilities of modern scientific methods. Mill's "correction" of utilitarianism was directed toward lessening the hard-deterministic * element found in Benthamite utilitarianism. The soft-determinism of : Mill is captured in the following excerpt. °B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1971). l^Paul Edwards, "Hard and Soft Determinism," in Determinism and Freedom , ed. Sidney Hook (New York: Crowell -Collier Publishing, 1958), p. 125.

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203 . .. . given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the char. acter and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act might be unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event. This proposition I take to be a mere interpretation of universal experience, a statement in words of what everybody is internally convinced of. No one who believed that he knew thoroughly the circumstances of any case and the characters of the different persons concerned, would hesitate to foretell how all of them would act. Whatever degree of doubt he may in fact feel , arises from the uncertainty whether he really knows the circumstances, or the character of some one or other of the persons, with the degree of accuracy required; but by no means from thinking that if he did know these things, there could be any uncertainty what the conduct would be. Nor does this full assurance conflict in the smallest degree with what is called our feeling of freedom. We do not feel ourselves less free, because those to who we are intimately known are well assured how we shall will to act in a particular case. We often, on the contrary, regard the doubt what our conduct will be, as a mark of ignorance of our character and sometimes even resent it as an imputation. 20 Most ethical theories hold that certain conditions have to be met before one may assign praise or blame to an action or decision of a person or organization. Two conditions generally agreed upon and recognized as critical for making correct judgments are: first, the agent must be able to perform an action; and second, the agent did the action knowingly. However, beyond these two conditions the ethical theories differ in their assessment of moral actions. . ^^John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1874), pp. 581-82.

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204 Hard-determinists are especially critical of those who would assign praise or blame to another. Their basic thesis is simply that every event has a cause. Because of this condition, the hard-determinists ask how one could ever be justified in blaming or praising someone even for a voluntary act. They base their argument on the belief that even voluntariness can be traced back to causes—environmental or hereditary-belonging to a world the agent never made. The hard-determinists are haunted by the knowledge that many of the causal antecedents of acts have not been investigated by those who mete out praise and blame on the grounds that the agent performed an action knowingly. In addition, the hard-determinists would hold that not all of the causal antecedents ?1 of voluntary acts are voluntary. Soft-determinists agree with the hard-determinists that behavior has causal antecedents. However, they disagree in regard to whether or not one may assign praise or blame to an agent for his actions and decisions. They claim that even though the action taken was the only one a person could have done, one may still correctly assign praise or blame for what he did. The best position for the profession of educational administration to take in relation to the question of man's freedom and responsibility may be the libertarian. While this posture may seem radical to some, it is logically and morally the most defensible position for the advancement of a value framework for the profession. Its adoption would mean that the profession can proceed with the development of a value pi Elizabeth L. Beardsley, "Determinism and Moral Perspectives," in Readings in Ethical Theory , ed. Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 656.

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205 framework which can aid administrators in making ethically sound decisions. The libertarian position should not be misinterpreted as representing a complete rejection of identifiable reasons for a person's behavior. However, reasons are not necessarily causes. In addition, libertarianism should not be equated with a rejection of scientific analysis; it is simply a recognition of the limitations of science and of the Skinnerian attempts to create a "technology of behavior." A soft-determinist position, while it permits the assignment of praise and blame, is a logically weak argument on which to develop a value framework for the profession. The soft-determinist stresses that the major causes of behavior are of an internal nature. However, internal causes seem to be no less causes for their being internal. As the hard determinists have argued, if conduct and decisions are in fact predetermined due to antecedent causes, how can a person be blamed or praised for their behavior? Ah adoption of the hard-determinist position would mean that the activities of a profession directed toward internal governance of the moral quality of its members' actions and decisions is in itself an immoral activity. Therefore, this position is rejected on the grounds that its adoption would terminate any further meaningful dialog on ethical valuing in both the private and professional domains of administrative decisionmaking. A second major question that should be resolved before developing an ethical theory for educational administration is the type of normative system that should serve as the basis of making judgments of actions and decisions. Four basic types of normative theories have

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206 been discussed in relation to administrative decisionmaking, and each of the representative systems raised critical and deliberative questions which related to identified critical tasks in educational administration. However, the question remains as to which type of normative system is the most appropriate for educational administration as a profession. The teleological theories of utilitarianism and instrumental ism presented arguments which tended to favor the belief that moral judgments are to be based upon the consequences which flow from the "voluntary" actions of agents. The act-teleologists claim that the actual rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by its actual consequences rather than by whether or not it is in accordance with a rule that has been found to be useful to an agent. Whereas, the ruleutilitarians argue that individuals should determine rules of behavior which will promote the greatest general welfare. Frankena has stated the rule-utilitarian position as follows: ... the question is not which action has the greatest utility, but which rule has. We should ask, when we are proposing to do something, not "What will happen if I do that in this case?" but "What would happen if everyone were to do that in such cases?"22 Brandt^ has also suggested that rule-utilitarianism holds as its thesis that one should decide particular cases by following general prescriptions which have the greatest utility in relation to the general welfare. 22 William K. Frankena, Ethics (Engl ewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 30. 23Ri chard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Engl ewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall , 1959), p. 398.

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207 The appeal to the general welfare made by both forms of utilitarianism is indeed worthy and should be recognized by administrators as an important value in decisionmaking. However, the justification of the appeal is based on faulty logic because consequences are difficult to assess. It can be argued that the total consequences of any given action can never be determined. Another weakness in the teleological perspective, with its emphasis on the relevance of consequences for moral assessments, is that by knowing the consequences one still finds it difficult to judge the morality of an agent. If the consequences of an action are the only measures to be adopted, then the questions of intentions and motives go unanswered. Brandt provided an excellent example of the weakness found in relying solely upon the consequences as a measure of morality. He stated: The law makes a distinction between murder and merely attempted murder. However, it is difficult to believe that, no matter how justified for its own purposes may be the distinction made by the law, an attempted murder is less morally reprehensible than a successful one. The man who aims and misses has acted, as far as he is concerned (aside from markmanship) exactly as the one who aims and strikes. 24 The rule-deontological position, as represented by Kantian ethics, holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action, or the correctness of a rule, is a function solely of factors other than the consequences of an action or rule. Rule-deontologists judge an agent by his motives and intentions and his consistency to will the maxim of his choice to be a universal law. However, a basic weakness in this argument has been found which lessens its attractiveness as a basis for a value framework. The weakness resides in the belief that all individuals 24 Ibid., p. 462.

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208 possess a high degree of rationality and practical reason. Many individuals do not possess a good will as defined by Kant. Therefore, it is logically possible that an agent can meet the requirement of the categorical imperative, but the consequences of the action would not be right or obligatory for others. Garner and Rosen^ have provided an example of the weakness found in the rule-deontological position, as expressed by Kant. They stated: Suppose S_ acts on the maxim "Anyone who has fingerprints with Properties F, G_, and H can murder his wife if she leaves the house messy." Let us assume that the maxim passes the test of the categorical imperative and S^ is morally correct in murdering his wife. 26' The best normative position for ethical administrative decisionmaking may have been expressed by the act-deontologists. Actions and decisions are assessed by act-deontologists in relation to not only their consequences but also in terms of the intentions and motives of the agent responsible. They view the rightness or wrongness of an action, or the correctness of a rule, as a function of many factors, some of which may be the consequences of that action or rule. Unlike the act-teleologists, the act-deontologists recognize the value of rules and principles in moral reasoning. Carritt 2 '' has outlined the act-deontological position in regards to the role of principles and rules in justifying judgments of actions and decisions. He stated 25 Richard T. Garner and Bernard Rosen, Moral Philo s ophy : J\ Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethi cs ~[Tfew York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 102. : , ~ 26 Ibid. 27E. p. Carritt, The Theory of Morals: An Introduc tion to Ethical Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 115.

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209 that their role is secondary but useful as summative guides to moral reasoning. He held: I may repeat the decalogue, like the -multiplication table, by rote, but when any doubt arises as to the universal validity of a percept I must follow the Socratic method and image, as definitely as may be, instances where my moral judgment would work. But if we can judge an instance without general rules, it might seem as Butler says, that the inquiry after them is merely an occupation, not without some usefulness, for "men of leisure." The usefulness suggested is, I suppose, that where the right course is obscure or the passions violent, rules may save the ship. So far as this is so I think that their function is that of ballast rather than compass. 28 Garner and Rosen have also postulated that act-deontology is the theory which fits or explains the range of phenomena better than other competing theories. They stated: ... act deontology can maintain that consequences are sometimes to be taken into account, and even that sometimes only consequences are to be taken into account. The act deontologist insists that he can account for the fact that we often use rules in our moral reasoning. Furthermore, act deontology best accounts for the fact that often the character of the situation or person must be considered if one is to make a justified judgment. The theory also best explains why we insist on knowing the exact nature of the action under consideration, and why we often change our judgment when we discover that we were mistaken about the facts of the case. Finally, it can be pointed out that only act deontology can account for the universal acceptance of the procedure of offering counter-examples to normative theories. Our claim is that when a conflict arises between a rule, any rule, and a considered particular judgment, it is, in most cases, the rule that must be changed. We do not judge particular actions by appealing to absolutely unquestionable rules, but rather by appealing to 28 Ibid.

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210 rules that have gradually been formulated by generalizing from particular judgments. 29 The development of an ethical theory for educational administration is perhaps the most critical of all tasks. The profession has far too long attempted to satisfy the demand for an ethical framework by resorting to the "easy" ethics of written codes based on the "Thou shalt not" principle which, in a sense, is the least ethical form of ethical valuing. ^Garner and Rosen, Moral Philosophy, op. c it. , p. 110.

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CHAPTER V SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS Summary The problem of this study was to develop deliberative and critical ethical questions which could serve as guidelines in the administrative decisionmaking process. This task was accomplished by the explication of selected normative ethical systems of thought which were of the highest rank to assure types of ethical theory worthy of consideration. The literature suggested four basic types of ethical theories, and each type was represented in the discussion of leading ethical systems. Table 7 represents a summary of the theories discussed in relation to the typology based on the criteria of rule and act, and teleological and deontological . TABLE 7 SUMMARY OF NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORIES Deontological (Concerned with Actions) Teleological (Utilitarianism) (Concerned with Results) Rule Act Kantian Ethics Aristotelian Ethics Existentialist Ethics Deweyan Ethics Utilitarian Ethics (Bentham, Mill) 211

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212 The teleological ethics expressed by Bentham, Mill, and Dewey all stressed the importance of assessing the consequences of actions and decisions in order to determine and evaluate the best solution to a problem. That action which produced the greatest good for the greatest number was held as the most important criterion in the assessment of actions and decisions. On the other hand, the deontological ethics expressed by Kant, Aristotle, and the existentialists emphasized the importance of assessing the agent's intentions and motives in order to arrive at correct ethical judgments. Each of the selected systems produced deliberative and critical ethical questions worthy of consideration by administrators who have the responsibility of formulating and executing policy decisions. The questions produced by the explication were then examined in relation to identified task areas of educational administration, namely curriculum and instruction, pupil personnel services, personnel development and administration, finance and fiscal management, and school and community relations. The examination resulted in the identification of major ethical value concepts which appear to have "intrinsic" worth to the profession of educational administration. The value concepts identified included beneficence, duty and dignity, equity, distributive justice, and probity. In addition, the value of moral autonomy was recognized as an important quality that each administrator should strive to achieve in the practice of his profession. To help practicing school administrators cope with the problems of determining right and wrong, certain strategies were identified to facilitate the identification and clarification of one's own values to help resolve commonly met problems in administration. The creation

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213 of a hierarchy of values was deemed an appropriate method for administrators to clarify value issues and problems, and specific suggestions were made as to how such a scaling of values could be accomplished by each administrator. In addition, the need for developing a value framework for the profession as a body was recognized and efforts were made to identify the necessary elements for the foundations of such an endeavor. An evaluation of the various types of normative ethical systems resulted in the suggestions for a value framework which would hold as its central tenets the values of freedom and responsibility as expressed in the libertarian position, and an assessment of conduct and decisions as embodied in the act-deontological perspective. Moral autonomy, deemed necessary for professionals, libertarianism, act-deontology, and partial situationism were evaluated as the most appropriate forms of ethical valuing for professional administration. Implications for Pro f essional Train ing 1 2 The arguments of Smith, Immegart and Burroughs, and Graff and Street have all attested to a need for the inclusion of ethics as a worthwhile subject for professional training programs in educational Philip G. Smith, Philsophic-Mind ednes s in Educational Administration (Columbus, Ohio: College of Education, Ohio State University, 1956). 2 Glenn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs, eds., Ethi c s and the School Administrator (Danville, Illinois: Interstate Printers & Publishers, 1970). 3 0rin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value Framework for Educational Administration," in Administr ativ e Behavior in Education , ed. Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Greff (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

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214 administration. Unfortunately, their appeals have not resulted in substantive progress toward the realization of this goal. A partial reason is that ethics has often been described as the province of philosophers and theologians, and not administrators. However, ethics can be viewed as an applied philosophical science which can be adapted to problems related to administrative decisionmaking. To accommodate the study of ethics in administrative programs, some universities have assigned the course to be taught by departments outside of educational administration. While this alternative has value, particularly in relation to no program requirement at all, it is limited by the fact that professors outside of educational administration tend to treat the subject in a manner ill-suited to the types of problems encountered by administrators. The courses generally do not contribute to the generation of major insights into administrative decisionmaking directly related to critical tasks and responsibilities; and students, in many cases, fail to recognize the value and role of ethics in professional decisions. A possible alternative for administration departments to meet the need for ethical considerations would be to incorporate ethical concepts and issues into already established courses. Since most departments have courses directly related to the critical task areas, this alternative would not mean the addition of another course to the curriculum. Tables 8 through 12 summarize the concepts and questions which have been identified in relation to the critical task areas. The tables are suggestive of how ethical values and questions could be embodied in existing courses. However, this alternative presents certain difficulties and questions of whether it is the most appropriate

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215 TABLE 8 MAJOR ETHICAL VALUE CONCEPT AND CRITICAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION Major Ethical Concept Critical Ethical Questions Beneficence How should an organization foster pleasures and diminish pains of its members, and thereby contribute to the end happiness? , What types of qualitative pleasures are provided for, or encouraged by, an organization, as opposed to quantitative pleasures? How should a system alter, modify, or change individual habits and impulses in an ethical manner so that the intellectual activity of deliberation is increased? How should a system foster "dialogic" relationships so that individuals may become whole, authentic, fulfilled selves? What meets the needs, fits the capacities, and corresponds to the possibilities of an existent being? What thwarts, destroys, or starves a being in its activities?

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216 TABLE 9 MAJOR ETHICAL VALUE CONCEPTS AND CRITICAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO PUPIL PERSONNEL SERVICES Major Ethical Concepts Critical Ethical Questions Duty and Dignity What is the factual evidence based upon empirical investigations for assertions about benefits and disadvantages which would accrue to an individual who took a certain position or action? Does the organization and its administration provide for equality of treatment, or do some individuals count for more than their fair share? Did the action which resulted in injury to others result from prior deliberation? Has the injurious act committed by voluntary choice? Does the proposed solution anticipate the consequences in the larger environment as well as the immediate situation?

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217 TABLE 10 MAJOR ETHICAL VALUE CONCEPT AND CRITICAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION Major Ethical Concept Critical Ethical Questions Equity What mean secures the highest good under the circumstances? What are the organizational limits in defining and mandating duties and obligations which are to be incumbent upon individuals in the conduct of role-related tasks? What are the governance requirements that an organization or an individual must meet before exercising a directing or restraining influence over persons? What is the criterion for determining the value of various means in resolving problems? Should it be willed that the maxims individual actions become universal law? What is the relation of freedom to responsibility and decisionmaking? What types of qualitative pleasures are provided by a system for the beneficence of others, as opposed to quantitative pleasures? What is the relation of the individual to the general welfare of the organization? How is morality and justice to be assessedby strength, by appeal to absolutes, or by critical examination of relative conditions?

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218 TABLE 11 MAJOR ETHICAL VALUE CONCEPT AND CRITICAL OUESTIONS RELATED TO FINANCE AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT Major Ethical Concept Critical Ethical Questions Distributive Justice What will satisfactorily terminate deliberation, that is relieve the conflicts and tensions of the situation? Has the proposed solution taken into consideration all of the pertinent facts of. the situation? Does the proposed solution anticipate the consequences in the larger environment as well as the immediate situation? How is a just proportion to be determined in social and political matters when men share a common life in order that their associations might bring them to selfsufficiency, and, at the same time, they are considered free and equal to each other? Are the ends or aims sought to be viewed as ends-in-themselves, or as means for the resolvement of present problems? What are the probable consequences of the alternative proposals? What policy alternative would result in • the greatest happiness for the greatest number? How would the consequences of the alternative proposals compare in relation to the value elements of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent of pleasures and pains? Could you regard your proposed action as a possible object of your will if it were to take place in accordance with a law of nature and in a system of nature which you were yourself a part?

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219 TABLE 12 MAJOR ETHICAL VALUE CONCEPT AND CRITICAL OUESTIONS RELATED TO SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS Major Ethical Concept Critical Ethical Questions Probity Should policy decisionmakers legislate a person's duty toward helping others, or should the matters of beneficence be determined by one's "private ethics?" What are those duties and obligations which are incumbent upon individuals and organizations in the conduct of human affairs? Should organizational authority be challenged in moral decisions? What is the relation of moral knowledge to the practice of virtue? Do the personal motives of the decisionmakers reflect candor and sincerity or are there elements of bad faith involved?

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220 for student understanding of the overarching value of ethics in decisionmaking. The process of decisionmaking has been described as the most critical and difficult process involved in administration. Therefore, it is ironic that programs, supposedly designed to produce better decisionmakers, do not offer a course in administrative decisionmaking or, at least, stress its value by using simulation strategies and case study methods more frequently than generally found in university coursework. These types of experiences are indeed worthwhile for students who are seeking both line and staff positions in school systems. In addition, such assigned activities should involve critical ethical questions for deliberation and possible debate by the students. Another alternative, therefore, is to create a course which combines ethics and decisionmaking processes as the central ingredients. The course should be designed to familiarize students with major ethical concepts and practices, types of ethical valuing, forms of systematic decisionmaking, and critical issues in educational administration. The. course should also be designed to accommodate an investigation and clarification of each student's own value structure, and it should prepare students for the development of their own scale of values. In addition, the course should culminate in activities which utilize simulation gaming and case studies directly related to problems of value decisions in educational administration. Such strategies and practices have been successfully demonstrated in business administration departments of leading universities, and they serve to emphasize the practical value of ethics in administrative decisionmaking..

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221 Professional training programs in educational administration need to become more reliant upon the expertise and skills of their own members. For example, administration departments need to expand their programs so that the courses taught, by members outside of the : departments of educational administration are brought back into the departments. This would involve, for some universities, the addition of another course to their program of studies. However, the suggested alternative, if adopted, would eliminate some of the problems associated with courses being taught outside of the depart, ments of educational administration. The suggested course content would combine the basic ingredients of both ethics and managerial decisionmaking. Therefore, the course, as envisioned, would actually reduce the total number of courses in a student's program. The course should come toward the end of a student's doctoral program. Hopefully, by the time a student actually takes the course he would have gained some insights into the tasks and subtasks associated with the various critical functions found in administration. If department members were in agreement in regard to the value of ethical decisionmaking, they could possibly combine the second and third alternatives to produce a more comprehensive structure. This simply means that the value concepts and critical questions related to the various task areas would be incorporated into established courses, and that a separate course in ethical decisionmaking would be the capstone of the program.

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222 Conclusions Contemporary decision theorists have continually tended to evaluate actions and decisions only in terms of the consequences produced. However, the total reliance upon consequential ism, as expressed by the teleological theories, was not viewed as a sufficient form of ethical valuing for administrators. The Watergate scandal has provided evidence of the weaknesses inherent in viewing ethical problems only from a teleological perspective, because when the true intentions and motives for an action or decision were known to others, these factors had more influence upon the acceptance or rejection of any pol icy decision than simply the immediate consequences. Therefore, the perspective of act-deontology was held as being more consistent, comprehensive, workable, and universal izable than those principles expressed by other normative theories, because actdeontology focused upon' not only the consequences of acts and rules, but also upon the intentions and motives of the responsible decisionmakers. The adoption of an act-deontological ethical framework for the profession of educational administration would not mean a complete abandonment of the "easy" ethics now embodied in professional codes, organizational policies, and social customs. The recognition that professional educational administrators work in an organizational setting and therefore cannot completely ignore rules has been made in the discussion of the optimal method for administrative decisionmaking. However, the rules by which administrators govern, and are governed themselves, should be viewed as summative and not constitutive in nature.

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223 Recommend ations General Recommendations The review of the literature related to the value dimension of decisionmaking in educational administration revealed that significant consideration needs to be devoted to the role of ethics in administrative decisionmaking. Based upon a critical review of selected ethical systems and an examination of the significance of each to the critical task areas/ the following recommendations are presented: 1. A course should be established in departments of educational administration to accommodate ethical decisionmaking. 2. Major ethical concepts and critical questions should be included in established courses related to educational administration. 3. A distinctive value framework for the profession of educational administration should be developed. 4. The act-deontological perspective is recommended as the most appropriate form of assessing ethical decisions and actions made in the conduct of school administration and should be included as part of the profession's value framework. 5. Moral autonomy and libertarianism are recommended as the most appropriate forms of supportive rationale for the profession's value framework. 6. A limited form of situationism or contextual ism is. recommended as the most appropriate method of decisionmaking by school administrators.

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224 Recommendations for Further Study 1. An empirical research study should be conducted to investigate those value concepts which successful administrators exemplify in the formulation and execution of policy decisions. The study should also examine various professional roles to. determine which values have greater significance for those administrators serving in such capacities. 2. An empirical research study should be conducted to investigate the levels of success achieved in organizational goal identification by persons who are subordinate to administrators who exemplify different methods of decisionmaking according to the continuum of antinomianism, situationism, and legalism. The purpose of such a study would be to determine the optimal region of the continuum for methods of administrative decisionmaking. 3. An empirical research study should be conducted to investigate which type of normative ethical system has greater validity and completeness for administrative decisionmaking.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Edward 0. Shaffer was born in New Castle, Pennsylvania on December 5, 1942 to the family of Thomas and Josephine Shaffer. Mr. Shaffer graduated from Brandon High School, Brandon, Florida, in 1960, and then entered the University of South Florida majoring in social science. Mr. Shaffer received the Bachelor of Arts degree in December 1963. In 1952 Mr. Shaffer married the former Bonnie Jean Dobson of Brandon, Florida. The union resulted in three sons—Edward, David, and Philip. Mr. Shaffer began his teaching career at East Bay High School, Riverview, Florida. He served as the social studies department head until 1973 when he was assigned to Greco Junior High School, Temple Terrace, Florida as the Dean of Men. During this time Mr. Shaffer had continued his graduate studies at the University of South Florida majoring in social science—education, and he was granted the Master of Arts degree in August 1967. In 1974 he was awarded an EPDA fellowship at the University of Florida which culminated in the Specialist in Education degree being conferred in August 1974. Mr. Shaffer returned to Hillsborough County School System as the Dean of Men at Leto Comprehensive High School, Tampa, Florida in August 1974, but he resigned his position in January 1975 to return to the University of Florida and complete the dissertation requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. 225

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. n K.' Forbis Jordan, Chairman Professor of Education I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. L ''-> ; >S.. :.. Ralph E. Kimbrough Professor of Education 1 certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Arthur J. Lewis Professor of Education This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Education and to the Graduate Council , and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. June 1975 Dean, Graduate School

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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 3 1262 08552 7769


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T85 2079
00085_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_085.txt
T86 1785
00086_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_086.txt
T87 1718
00087_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_087.txt
T88 1812
00088_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_088.txt
T89 1842
00089_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_089.txt
T90 1639
00090_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_090.txt
T91 2170
00091_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_091.txt
T92 2054
00092_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_092.txt
T93
00093_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_093.txt
T94 1901
00094_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_094.txt
T95 1935
00095_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_095.txt
T96 1711
00096_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_096.txt
T97 1594
00097_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_097.txt
T98 1948
00098_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_098.txt
T99 1628
00099_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_099.txt
T100 1772
00100_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_100.txt
T101 2205
00101_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_101.txt
T102 1883
00102_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_102.txt
T103 1967
00103_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_103.txt
T104 1847
00104_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_104.txt
T105 1672
00105_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_105.txt
T106
00106_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_106.txt
T107 1756
00107_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_107.txt
T108 1904
00108_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_108.txt
T109
00109_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_109.txt
T110 1936
00110_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_110.txt
T111 1872
00111_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_111.txt
T112 1760
00112_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_112.txt
T113
00113_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_113.txt
T114 1455
00114_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_114.txt
T115 1908
00115_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_115.txt
T116 1662
00116_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_116.txt
T117 1854
00117_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_117.txt
T118 1815
00118_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_118.txt
T119 1751
00119_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_119.txt
T120 1684
00120_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_120.txt
T121 1731
00121_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_121.txt
T122 2218
00122_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_122.txt
T123
00123_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_123.txt
T124
00124_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_124.txt
T125 1953
00125_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_125.txt
T126
00126_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_126.txt
T127 1970
00127_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_127.txt
T128 1897
00128_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_128.txt
T129 2260
00129_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_129.txt
T130 1975
00130_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_130.txt
T131
00131_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_131.txt
T132 2060
00132_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_132.txt
T133 1894
00133_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_133.txt
T134 2113
00134_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_134.txt
T135 2351
00135_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_135.txt
T136 1793
00136_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_136.txt
T137 1944
00137_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_137.txt
T138 1150
00138_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_138.txt
T139 1533
00139_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_139.txt
T140 1931
00140_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_140.txt
T141
00141_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_141.txt
T142 1882
00142_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_142.txt
T143 1863
00143_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_143.txt
T144 2040
00144_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_144.txt
T145 2514
00145_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_145.txt
T146
00146_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_146.txt
T147 1937
00147_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_147.txt
T148
00148_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_148.txt
T149
00149_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_149.txt
T150
00150_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_150.txt
T151
00151_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_151.txt
T152
00152_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_152.txt
T153 1950
00153_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_153.txt
T154 1966
00154_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_154.txt
T155 2024
00155_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_155.txt
T156 1784
00156_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_156.txt
T157 2093
00157_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_157.txt
T158
00158_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_158.txt
T159 1957
00159_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_159.txt
T160 1905
00160_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_160.txt
T161
00161_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_161.txt
T162 1916
00162_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_162.txt
T163 1871
00163_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_163.txt
T164 1979
00164_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_164.txt
T165 1805
00165_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_165.txt
T166
00166_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_166.txt
T167 1838
00167_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_167.txt
T168
00168_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_168.txt
T169 1736
00169_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_169.txt
T170 1877
00170_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_170.txt
T171
00171_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_171.txt
T172 2037
00172_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_172.txt
T173 2199
00173_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_173.txt
T174
00174_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_174.txt
T175 1954
00175_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_175.txt
T176
00176_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_176.txt
T177
00177_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_177.txt
T178 1922
00178_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_178.txt
T179 1933
00179_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_179.txt
T180
00180_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_180.txt
T181
00181_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_181.txt
T182 1803
00182_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_182.txt
T183 1974
00183_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_183.txt
T184 2018
00184_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_184.txt
T185
00185_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_185.txt
T186
00186_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_186.txt
T187 1956
00187_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_187.txt
T188
00188_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_188.txt
T189
00189_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_189.txt
T190 1861
00190_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_190.txt
T191 2143
00191_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_191.txt
T192
00192_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_192.txt
T193 376
00193_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_193.txt
T194 1473
00194_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_194.txt
T195 2134
00195_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_195.txt
T196 1921
00196_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_196.txt
T197
00197_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_197.txt
T198 1821
00198_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_198.txt
T199 1184
00199_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_199.txt
T200
00200_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_200.txt
T201
00201_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_201.txt
T202 854
00202_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_202.txt
T203 1752
00203_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_203.txt
T204
00204_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_204.txt
T205 2003
00205_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_205.txt
T206 1706
00206_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_206.txt
T207
00207_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_207.txt
T208
00208_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_208.txt
T209
00209_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_209.txt
T210 1919
00210_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_210.txt
T211 1702
00211_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_211.txt
T212 1880
00212_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_212.txt
T213 2555
00213_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_213.txt
T214
00214_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_214.txt
T215
00215_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_215.txt
T216
00216_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_216.txt
T217 2058
00217_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_217.txt
T218
00218_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_218.txt
T219 2496
00219_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_219.txt
T220 691
00220_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_220.txt
T221 1352
00221_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_221.txt
T222
00222_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_222.txt
T223
00223_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_223.txt
T224 1923
00224_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_224.txt
T225 1502
00225_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_225.txt
T226 922
00226_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_226.txt
T227 2095
00227_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_227.txt
T228 2516
00228_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_228.txt
T229 1226
00229_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_229.txt
T230 1845
00230_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_230.txt
T231
00231_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_231.txt
T232
00232_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_232.txt
T233 1599
00233_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_233.txt
T234 1250
00234_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_234.txt
T235 1521
00235_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_235.txt
T236 1478
00236_deliberativecrit00shaf_Page_236.txt
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METS:behaviorSec VIEWS Options available user for viewing this item
METS:behavior VIEW1 STRUCTID Default View
METS:mechanism Viewer JPEGs Procedure xlink:type simple xlink:title JPEG_Viewer()
VIEW2 Alternate
zoomable JPEG2000s JP2_Viewer()
VIEW3
Related image viewer shows thumbnails each Related_Image_Viewer()
INTERFACES Banners or interfaces which resource can appear under
INT1 Interface
UFDC_Interface_Loader