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God, man and politics

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Title:
God, man and politics The political philosophy and theology of Jacques Maritain
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Jung, Hwa Yol, 1932-
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Gainesville
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University of Florida
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1962
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v, 569 leaves : illus. ; 28 cm.

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Catholicism ( jstor )
Democracy ( jstor )
Metaphysics ( jstor )
Morality ( jstor )
Natural law ( jstor )
Political philosophy ( jstor )
Political science ( jstor )
Political theory ( jstor )
Religion ( jstor )
Theology ( jstor )
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF ( lcsh )
Political Science thesis Ph. D ( lcsh )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
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Bibliography: leaves 506-565.
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Manuscript copy.
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Thesis - University of Florida.
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Vita.

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GOD, MAN AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

OF JACQUES MARITAIN










By
HWA YOL JUNG


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY









UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


February, 1962


































Copyright by
lra Yol Jung
1962














ACKNOWLEDGMEINTS


The author would like to express his deep gratitude to

Professor Manning J. Dauer, the chairman of his doctoral supervisory

committee, for his discerning guidance and warm personal encouragement

without which this dissertation would have been impossible. He is also

grateful for the assistance in the beginning of this dissertation given

by Professor Alfred Diamant, who is now teaching at Haverford College,

Pennsylvania. He is deeply indebted to his doctoral committee members:

Professors Oscar Svarlien, Ernest R. Bartley, Frederick H. Hartmann,

Arnold J. Heidenheimer of the Department of Political Science and

Professor George R. Bartlett of the Department of Philosophy.

The author is grateful to his wife who has read and typed a part

of this dissertation. Finally, this dissertation is a token expression

of the author's appreciation for the teachers and friends who have given

him their moral support and financial aid since his arrival in this

country in 1954.














TABLE W CONTENTS


Page

ACKMOWLEDGUNHTS ..... . .... ......... ii

INTRODUCTION . . ..... . ...... 2

Chapter

SECTION I. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL
T1OLOGY

I. TI STATE OF POLITICAL PHILOPHY .. . . . 5

II. GOb AMD POLITICS . . . . . . . . 34

III. TM POLITICS OF CHRISTIAN THlLOGY . . . . . 56

IV. DgIOC1ACT AND CRISTIAN TO~LOGY . . . . . 97

SICTION II. TM ISM AMB JACQWS MARITAIN

V. TH DMCELOfWMT W6 TMISM( . . .. . . . 115

VI. TH MATrME OF TUIS4 . . . . . . .. 134

VII. TI~ISM AND JACQIS MARITAIN . . . . . 150

VIII. TI PHIIDSOPICAL REVOLTS W JACQWS MAINTAIN . . 181

SECTION III. TM FOmBATION OF JACQWS MARITAIM'S
POLITICAL PKILOF9Hr

IX. TH) PHILOSOPHICAL AND TOBLOGICAL FOWBTIOW OF
MAINTAIN'S POLITICAL PRILO9SOPR . . . . .. 228

X. TE SPECULATIVE ORDR . . . . . ... .. 248

XI. TR PRACTICAL ORDIR . . . . . . . . 272









SECTION IV. THE POLITICAL PHILfOOFHY OF
JACQUES IMRITAIN

XII. MARITAIN'S PHILOSPITY OF CULTURE ANW SOCIETY:
A THIOCEMTRIC HMANI SM . . . . . *. 0 296

XIII. HAN: PESONALITY AND IWIVIDUALITY . . . 347

XIV. TH MATURE OF POLITICAL SOCIETY . . . . . 365

Natural Law and Wumn Rights . . ...... 369
The Common Good . . . . .. 403
Maritain's Philosophy of International Relatieas.. 412


The Relation of Church and State


. . . . . 422


XV. MARITAIN'S PSERSALIST PHILOS IPR OF

SECTION V. ceOsCLUSI


XVI. COWCLe . . .

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPY . .

Appendix

I. DIAGRAM F THE ORERS .

1. DIAGRAM OF TM SCIENCES .

III. TM1 DIVISION OF PMILOINPT .

BIOGRAPHICAL SKECH . . .


* .

* .


DIOCRACt . ..


440



473

506


* .

* *


* 0

* 0 0 0

* 0 *

* 0


; ; 0 ; ; 567

S; . 568

S. . . 569

. . . 570


























My teachings are very easy to understand and very
easy to practice,
But no one can understand them and no one can
practice them.
In my words there is a principle.
In the affairs of men there is a system.
Because they know not these,
They also know me not.
Since there are few that know me,
Therefore I am distinguished.
Therefore the Sage wears a coarse cloth on top
And carries jade within his bosom.

-- Lao Tzu













INT3SawCTIOK


In the beginning was Methodology. This is the spirit that more

or less represents the present state of political science. Arnold

Brecht aptly cements that the twentieth century is the century of

methodology in the social sciences. The primary concern of political

scientists with methodology is related to "the decline of political phi-

losophy" in the contemporary world.

The decline of political philosophy implies the fact that we are

no longer concerned with the question of a good political life. The

exclusion of the question of a good political life from the "cognitive"

research of political science is due to the idea that a value theory has

no place in political sciencee (science in the sense of the natural sciences

like physics and chemistry). Thus, the cognitive theory of political

science is tantamount to the denial of the idea that a good political life

is worth seeking.

A sound political philosophy is one which can legitimately search

for a good political life as once did the classical philosophers, Plato

and Aristotle. The question of a good political life implies a value

system. Therefore, in political science, the search for a good and

better political life bee~mes a perennial question. It is the most

pressing quest for the political philosopher and the political scientist

to provide a system for political man and political society in order that

the life of mankind as a collection of moral agents may be worth living.







The political philosophies of Christian theologians provide us

with value system which are derived froa their theological concepts and

dispositions. In contemporary political science, the investigation of

their political ideas and philosophies has been unduly neglected. As

the main title of this essay indicates, a trinity of "Ged, Man and Politics"

suggests a possibility for what we might call "political theology."

Political theology, from a political point of view, is that part of

political philosophy whose principles are derived ultimately from what

is theological.

Jacques Maritain is a Catholic theologian and philosopher. It

is hoped that an examination of his political philosophy and theology

will be a small contribution to the systematic analysis of political

theology. As it will be shown, his political philosophy is deeply rooted

in his Thomistic metaphysics and theology. Therefore, what he says on

a metaphysical and theological level is closely related to his cultural

and political views. As William Ernest Hocking has once said, there is

no settled truth. Philosophy, conceived as perennial quest for truth,

opens the door to the examination of the political philosophy and theology

of Jacques Maritain.
































SECTION I


POLITICAL PNILOPHY AnB POLITICAL THEOLOGY













CHAPTER I


TH1 STATE OF POLITICAL PHILOOOPNH


The contemporary scene finds "the science of politics"1 pre-

occupied and hopelessly entangled in a labyrinth of heated and un-

resolved controversies over methodological problems or what is ironically

called a "methodology of methodology."2 Professor Arnold Brecht aptly

describes the state of political science when he says that the twentieth

century '. . has become the methodological century in the social

sciences. 3

The voluminous literature concerning the affairs of politics and

the study of politics emphasizes the scientista" and the "scientific-ness"

which characterize the modern Zeitgeist, somewhat belatedly fulfilling

the prophetic understanding of Auguste Comte. The outcome of this would


1"The science of politics" here refers to a cognitivist definition
of scieoee. See, for example, Hans Kelsen, "Science and Politics,"
American Political Science Review, XLY (September, 1951), pp. 641-61.

2Arnold A. egew, "Comment on Smith and Apter: or, Whatever
Happened to the Great Issues?" American Political Science Review, LI
(September, 1957), p. 765.

political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century
Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 5.

4Bernard Crick, a British political scientist, deplores the
scientific orientation of American political science in his American
Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1959).
Auguste Coate's sociologist is based upon his categorization of
the three stages of the intellectual development of the West: theological,







seen self-evident, if not self-defeating. Such a preoccupation would

lead to methodological solipsism, hence to the poverty of creative,

constructive political philosophy upon which rests not only the foundation

of a political society, but also the guidance and direction of the

science of politics. Despite the mple evidence that scientifically-

minded political scientists have attempted to -epley Ockham's razor to

sever the whisker of philosophy from the science of politics, Professor

Carl J. Friedrich has concisely illustrated the indispensable correlation

between philosophy and the science of politics.5 And John Plamenatz of

Oxford University firmly believes that political philosophy cannot be,

and is not, dead.6

Unfortunately, the extreme emphasis on methedelegy and the attempt

at scientific method as a means of studying "the objective society"7 has


metaphysical and scientific. The theological and the metaphysical stages
are the things of the past; the scientific stage is distinctively a
modern phenomenon. See a concise exposition of Auguste Comte in Harry
Elmer Barnee, 'The Social and Political Philosophy of Auguste Coete:
Positivist Utopia and the Religion of Humanity," An Introduction to the
History of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948),
pp. 81-109.
The immediate influence of objectivity in the social sciences is
a more recent event. The sociology of Mx Weber has a decisive influence
on formulating the objective mood of contemporary social science. See
his Methodology of the Soctal Sciencq, tr. and ed. Edward A. Shils and
Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949).

5See his "Political Philoeephy and the Seienee of Politics,"
Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. Roland Young (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 172-88; Leo Strauss, What.
Is Political Philosophy? And Other Itudies (Glencee, Ill.: Free Press,
1959); John Plamenatz, "The See of Political Theory," Political Studies,
VIII (February, 1960), pp. 37-47.

60p. cit.

7This phrase is taken from Everett Knight, he Objective Society
(New York: George Braziller, 1960).







only a false claim to be truly in the spirit of the Enlightenment. As

the reputed historian of ideas Carl L. Backer show, the "climates of

opinion" in the Enlightenmeat were full of the "didactic impulse" and

"messianic enterprise" which were expressed in the key symbols of

"bienf#jpace" and '"hpanit.~"8 Such a didactic impulse is anything but

the scientific spirit of our age.

This essay is concerned with the relationship between God and

politics. More specifically, it is concerned with the Christian politi-

cal philosophy and theology of Jacques Maritain. From a political point

of view, political theology is not a part of theology which is essentially

a systematic inquiry into the "ultimate reality." Instead, political the-

ology is primarily political and secondarily theological: it is a part

of politics which has a theological foundation. Political theelegy, in

short, is a part of the whole corpus of politics.

Politics may be divided into "the practice of politics" and "the

theory of politics."9 Since the former is the art of politics, it is


8The Heavenly City of the gizhteenth-Century Philosophers
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932). Also see Ernst Cassirer,
The Philosophy of the Eaulihterunat, tr. Fritz C. A. etelln and James
P. Pettegrove (Boston: Beaeen Press, 1961); Alfred Cobban, In Search
of Bmanity: The 1ole of the Enlijhtensnt in NMdern Mistpry (Oev
York: George Braziller, 1960); Charles Frank2l, The Faith of tesiop
(New York: King's Crwvn Press, 1948).
Jedith N. Shklar, who seemed somewhat nostalgic about the
"Aufklaruu," has written *se of the most stimulating works of politi-
cal theory in recent years. She traces the reasons for "the decline
of political faith" in the rise of romanticism, fatalistic Christianity,
existentialism, and the decline of liberalism and socialism. Unfertu-
nately, she does not diousss the possible implications of scientist and
scientific relativism on the decline of political faith. After Impia:
The Wecline of Political Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957).

9George Catlin, "Political Theory: What Is It?" ?elitical
science Quarterly, LXXII (March, 1957), p. 2 and "The Function of
Political Science," Western Political Quarterly, IX (December, 1956),
p. 817. See his earlier expositions on the method of politics in







beyond the scope of this essay. The latter, when it is defined in a

loose manner, is "political science.". Carl J. Friedrich states;

Modern political science is largely a critical examination of
comon-sense notions concerning the working ofpolitical
institutions and procedures. Three axiomatic truths
regarding the nature of power lies at its foundation: namely,
that power ordinarily presupposes a group of human beings who
can share objectives, interests, values, in other words, a
cemmnity; second, therefore-power presupposes objectives,
interests, values, ends, which these human beings can share,
fight over, or exchange; third, that all power situations
contain both consent (shared objectives) and coaetraint
(contested objectives). . Mdern political science ..
is concerned with the instruments or techniques of political
action in term of the objectives they are supposed to serve.10

As John N. Hallowell states, ethics or moral philosophy is the rational

understanding of the nature of "the good" and, in politics, man "seeks

the implementation of that good in social life; and to assist in the

implementation of that good is . .the major function of political

science."11

However, there is no consensus among political scientists regard-

ing what "political science" is and ought to be. In contrast to what

Hallowell defined above, oans Kelsen explains: "Scienee is a function

of cognition; its aim is not to govern but to explain. . the scien-

tist must not presuppose any value . . he has to restrict himself


The Sciqnqe _gd Method of Polities (Mew Serk: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927)
and A Study of the Principles of P~tUJ (New York: Maerillan, 1930).

10As quoted in Vernon Van Byke, ,elitical Scieace: A Philo-
sophical Analysis (Stanird: Stanford university Pres, 1960), p. 132
from Carl J. Friedrich, Cotstitutt9naL GovQrnrmnt nd Dmocracy (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1941), pp. 593-94.

11Min Currents in Modern Politicol Th ught (New York: Henry
Holt, 1950), p. 1.







to an explanation and a description of his object without judging it

as good or bad . ." Therefore, "The principle of objectivity applies

to social science as well as to natural science, and in particular to

so-called political science." For Kelsen, who is expressing the repre-

sentative opinion of what we may call the "scientific school" in the

social sciences, the ascertainment of fact is the goal of scientific

research whether that scientific research deals with the natural sciences

or with the social sciences.. For him, the only valid method of political

science is the canon of "scientific aethed."12

What we may call the "pure theory of political science" of Hans

Kelsen is derived from an over-emphasis of the term "science" at the

expense of what is truly "political" and the purpose of polities. As the

ancient philosopher Aristotle thought, the purpose of politics is to

guide a,good political life. Thus, ethical consideration is primary to

the study of politics. The factual findings in political science must

serve the ends of a good political life. In this sense, political phi-

losophy logically precedes political science, that is to say, the former

is an end whereas the latter is but a means.

In recent years, the term "political philosophy" is used inter-

changeably with that of "political theory." As Harry Eckstein says, "What

we called 'political philosophy'is generally called 'political theory' in

the department of political science."13 George Sabine uses the term


120p. cit., p. 641.

13"Political Theory sad the Study of Politics: A Report of
a Conference," Merican Political Science Review, L (June, 1956), p. 476.
George Catlin uses the term "political theory" to include political
science and political philosophy. See his "Political Theory: What Is
It?" and "The Function of Political Science." George Sabine uses the
term "political theory" in the inclusive sense as Catlin does. Sabine







courses of action are morally obligatory, an expression of choice or

preference growing from an attitude of desire, or fear, or confidence

toward what the present holds and what the future may bring forth."15

Political philosophy is concerned with what ought to be or

ought to be done. It is primarily normative and prescriptive and thus

goes beyond the boundary of what is factual. David Easton speaks of a

"value theory," and Thomas P. Jenkin calls it "prescriptive political

theory." Thus what we need in political philosophy is a value system.

Essential to a political philosopher is an ability to make value judgments:

that is to say, he has to make the correct assessment of facts, discrimate

and evaluate them in order to prescribe certain preferable action for a

good political life. Thus, political philosophy is essentially evaluative.

No one better expresses the valuative nature of political philosophy than

Leo Strauss when he writes:

The meaning of political philosophy and its meaningful character
are as evident today as they have been since the time when
political philosophy first made its appearance in Athens. All
political action aims at either preservation or change. When
desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse;
something better. All political action is, then, guided by
some thought of better or worse. But thought of better or
worse implies thought of the good. The awareness of the good
which guides all our aetions, has the character of opinion: it
is no longer questioned but, on reflection, it proves to be
questionable. The very fact that we can question it, directs
us towards such a thought of the good as is no longer question-
able -- towards a thought which is no longer opinion but know-
ledge. All political action has then in itself a directedness
towards knowledge of the good: of the good life, or the good
society. For the good society is the complete political good.

In short, "political philosophy," according to Leo Strauss, "is the

attempt truly to know both the nature of political things and the right,

15Ibid., p. 11.







"political theory" in the most comprehensive manner when he says: "A

political theory . covers three kinds of factors: it includes

factual statements about the posture of affairs that gave rise to it;

it contains statements of what may be roughly called a causal nature,

to the effect that one kind of thing is more likely to happen, or may be

more easily brought about, than another; and it contains statements that

something ought to happen or is the right and desirable thing to have

happen." In short, a political theory is "faetual, causal, and valu-

ational. ,14

It goes without saying that the factual, causal and valuational

aspects of political theory are intricately related. They are three

different but integral parts of the thing called politics. Political

philosophy, in particular, is concerned with what is valuational. That

is to say, "there are elements of valuation: an estimation of importance,

not in the sense of what is likely to happen, but of what ought to happen,

the discrimination of a better from a worse way, the conviction that some


includes in political theory the factual, the causal and the valuational.
"What Is a Political Theory?" Journal of Politics, I (February, 1939),
pp. 1-16. Lee Strauss uses "political philosophy" in the sense of
classical political philosophy, which the author has adopted. "What
Is Political Philoeophy?" Journal of Politics, XIX (August, 1957), pp. 343-
68. John Planenatz uses political theory and political philosophy inter-
changeably. "The fse of Political Theory." Harold V. Lasswell and
Abraham Ka~lan use political theory to include political science and
political philosophy when they say: "Political philosophy includes not
only doctrine, but also logical analysis of both doctrine and science;
the tern polittcal theory may be used as a comprehensive designation
for all these types of sentences." Power and Society: A Framework for
Political iulItry (Mew Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. xi. It
seem, however, that the seat comprehensive distinction of political
theory is made by Jersy Heuptaan in The Llepas of Politics (Parkville,
Mo.: Park College Press, 1957). He distinguishes between political
science, political policy, political theory and political philosophy
(pp. 12-20).

14'What Is a Political Theory?" pp. 5-6.







or the good, political order."16

Political philosophy is intimately related to philosophy. As

a matter of fact, many political philosophers would consider political

philosophy as a branch of philosophy. Leo Strauss says, "political phi-

losophy is a branch of philosophy."17 For George Catlin, "Political

Philosophy is merely a part of the seamless robe of Philosophy."81 For

the reason that political philosophy is closely related to philosophy,

especially moral philosophy or ethics, we must begin with the nature of

philosophy itself.

The term "philosophy" has many meanings and connotations.19 Karl

Jaspers writes: 'What philosophy is and how much it is worth are matters

of controversy. One may expect it to yield extraordinary revelations or

one may view it with indifference as a thinking in the void. One may

look upon it with awe as the meaningful endeavour of exceptional man or

despise it as the superfluous brooding of dreamers. One may take the

attitude that it is the concern of all men, and hence must be basically


16"What Is Political Philosophy?" pp. 343, 345.

17Ibid., p. 343.

18"Political Theory: What Is It?" p. 23.

19William Ernest Mocking defines a man's philosophy as "the sum
of his beliefs." Philosophy as a science is defined as "the examination
of belief," Types of Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1929), pp. 3-4. Paul Tillich, a theologian, defines philosophy as "the
attempt to answer the mest general questiens.about the nature of reality
and human existence. ." And "philosophy tries to find the universal
categories in which being is experienced." fyntics of Faith (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 90-94. Philosophy is also defined as
"the science of sciences" that concerns "the criticism and systema-
tization or organization of all knowledge, drawn from empirical science,
rational learning, comon experience, or whatever." Philosophy includes
metaphysicss, or ontology and epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics,
etc." Degobert D. Runes (ed.), The Dictionary of Phileoephy (INw York:
Philosophical Library, n. d.), p. 235. Another dictionary defines





13

simple and intelligible, or one may think of it as hopelessly difficult.

And indeed, what goes by the name of philosophy provides examples to

warrant all these conflicting judgments." Thus, if philosophy is anything

at all, it is not something that offers "cempellingly certain and uni-

versally recognized insights." In philosophy "there is no generally

accepted, definitive knowledge."20 As Alfred North Whitehead says, "In

human experience, the philosophic question can receive no final answer.

Human knowledge is a process of approximation."21 Similarly, Karl Jaspers

writes: ". . the essence of philosophy is not the possession of truth

but the search for truth, regardless of how many philosophers may belie

it with their dogmatism, that is, with a body of didactic principles

purporting to be definitive and complete. Philosophy means to be on the

way. Its questions are more essential than its answers, and every answer

becomes a new question."22


philosophy as "a theory of truth, reality, or experience, taken as an
organized whole, and so giving rise to general principles which unite
the various branches or parts of experience into a coherent unity."
James Mark Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology
(Vol. II; Gloucester, Mass.: Petee Smith, 1957), p. 290. Philosophy
is also defined as the "process and expression of rational reflexion
upon experience." James Hastings (ed.), Incyclopaedia of Religion aed
Ethics (Vol. IX; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 844.

20Karl Jaspers, hay to Wisdom, tr. Ralph Manhein (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1954), p. 7.

21Science and Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library,
1948), p. 131.

220p. cit., p. 12. Paul Tillich, referring to the term '"ph.-
losophia perencm ," comments that "only the philosophical question is
perennial, net the answers." Op. cit., p. 94. A. N. Whitehead says
that philosophy asks the simple question: "What is it all about?"
Op. cit., p. 131. Ierbert Feigl also states that philosophy must ask
two questions: "What do you mean?" and "HNw do you know?" "Logical
Etpiricism," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigl and
Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 5.







Nonetheless, philosophy strives to ask questions about the

whole. "Philosophy," A. N. Whitehead writes, "is an attempt to express

the infinity of the universe in terms of the limitations of language."

As he says again, "philosophy should aim at disclosure beyond explicit

presuppositions."23 Or, as Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested, "whereof one

cannot speak thereof one must be silent"?24

Philosophy contains that element which is concerned with

human action and human things, i. e., moral philosophy. Political

philosophy .is close to, or a part of, moral philosophy. Consequently,

it is not limited to knowledge itself. Knowledge is the pre-condition

for moral judgments and always has moral action in view. Aristotle

called it "a practical philosophy." For George Catlin as well as for

Aristotle, political philosophy is a branch of ethics. "Political

philosophy," John R. Hallowell says, "is most directly and intimately

related to ethics, since the reconciliation of conflicting purposes

can only be brought about by a prior commitment to an objective good

that transcends subjective desire and it is one of the functions of

ethics to determine what that objective good is."25

Political philosophy is a branch of philosophy, which is concerned

with the political: political philosophy may be called a "public philosophy."

If philosophy and politics are conceptually distinct, political philosophy


230p. cit., pp. 21, 130.

24As quoted in Herbert Feigl, "Logical Enpiricism," Readings
in Philosophical Analysis, p. 16.

2p. cit., p. 8.







is a sort of hybrid of the two. Carl J. Friedrich says that political

philosophy is "that branch of philosophy awd political science . by

which the two are linked; it brings the main knowledge, both facts and

generalizations, of political science into philosophy; and it brings the

relevant aspects of philosophy to bear upon this knowledge.'26

In political philosophy, theorizing must be based upon what is

factual. "Theorizing without relevance to fact," William A. Glaser

states, "is a dilettantish hobby rather than a useful contribution; and

fact-finding without theory produces a jumble that either is wholly useless

or is used to justify defective empirical or ethical propeoitione."27

Moreover, if the purpose of political philosophy is to guide a good politi-

cal life, then we must try to bridge a chasm between political philosophy

sad practical politics. As Leo Strauss writes, classical political phi-

losophy "is characterized by the fact that it was related to political

life directly."28

However, we always find a gap between philosophy or theory and

practice. Kenneth W. Thompson is acutely aware of this gap when he says:

"a perennial problem for Western civilization has always been the re-

lationship between theory and practice."29 The lacuna between reason and


26Q. cit., p. 173.

271"he Types and USes of Political Theory," Social Lesearch,
XXII (Autumn, 1955), p. 291.

8"On Classical Political Philesophy," Social Research, XII
(February, 1945), p. 100.

29Political Re lit agd the Crisis of World Politztcs: P
Merican M proach to foretmsa policy (Prineeten: Princeton University
Press, 1960), p. 62.







experience, theory and practice, thought and action, and the abstract

and the concrete is a problem in the entire area of human knowledge and

action. Mans J. Morgenthau moat aptly points to the crux of this problem

in politics: "Here, in this inescapable tension . between theoretical

and practical knowledge, between the light of political philosophy and

the twilight of political action, is indeed the ultimate dileme. . .30

Nevertheless, we need net consider that philosophy and practice are two

entirely isolated things as does Michael Oekeshett when he says that

"Philosophy is not the enhancement of life, it is the denial of life."31

Political philosophy mst guide a good political life. As John

Plamenatz considers, political philosophy is net primarily concerned with

"explanations of how governments function" but with "systematic thinking

about the purposes of government."32 Therefore, a political philosopher

plays, in a sense, the role of an empire in the games of politics. The

ability of a political philosopher to make value judgments seems indis-

pensable. Furthermore, political philosophy itself is not limited merely

to the linguistic analysis and clarification of political concepts and

ideas as T. D. Weldon conceives it to be.33 Since political philosophy


30Pjleas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1958), p. 381.

31eperience and Its lbdgs (Cambridge: University Press, 1933),
p. 355.

320. cit., p. 37.

33See his Vocabulary of Politics (laltimere: Peliean Beeks, 1953).
Peter Winch criticizes Welden from a less radical philosophical point of
view. See The Idea of a social Scieace and Its Reation to Philosophy
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). He agrees with Weldon in
defining philosophy as what he calls the "underlabeurer conception."
sHwever, he distinguishes "philosophy" from "scisece." "Whereas the
scientist," he says, "investigates the nature, caoees and effects of
particular real things and processes, the philosopher is eenceziid with





17

does not repudiate its dependence on the factual, value judgments necessary

to political philosophy should not be construed as an emotive expression

of personal preferences. They are to be construed as a kind of preference

but a preference which is based on meaning and factual contents.

As Leo Strauss states, it is impossible to study all important

political and social phenomenawithout making value judgments3 4 John

H. Nallowell says that "the refusal to pass an ethical judgment is a kind

of ethical judgment none the less."35 "What," Eric Voegelin.asks, "could

a judgment that resulted in reasoned preference of value over value be

but a value-judgment?"36 J. Roland Pennock considers that "an increased

emphasis on precision and on concrete and verifiable facts" would naturally

create "the tendency to avoid the intangible subject of values, or at

least to avoid analysis in this basic field." Nor can the validity of

value judgments be measured with a mathematical precision. However,

Peanock hastens to add that "this is not to say that we can do without

analysis and without being able to communicate to others the grounds for


the nature of reality as such and in general." He conceives the role of
philosophy to elucidate concepts and the clarification of linguistic
meanings, but "the philosopher's concern is not with correct usage as
such and not all linguistic confusions are equally relevant to philoso-
phy. They are relevant only in so far as the discussion of them is
designed to throw light on the question how far reality is intelligible
and what difference would the fact.that he could have a grasp of reality
make to the life of msn." Thus, he maintains that in considering
concept and thought the philosopher must deal with reality. he rejects
Weldon's conception of philosophy having "a purely negative role" in
promoting the understanding of social life and institutions (pp. 7-15).

34%"hat Is' Political Philosophy?",p.349.

35"Politics and Ethics," American Political Science Review,
XXXVIII (August, 1944), p. 645.

36The New _cience of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1952), p. 16.







our judgments."37 Therefore, as Gunnar Myrdal suggests, we can and

should make our value judgments explicit rather than implicit.38

For Jacques Maritain, political philosophy is a moral or

practical philosophy, that is to say, it deals with the ends and norms

of human conduct. It is a practical philosophy as distinct from a

speculative philosophy because it is essentially concerned with the

application of knowledge rather than knowledge for the sake of knowing.

Political philosophy, for Maritain, is distinguished from the

science of.politics. "Political philosophy," he says, "does not claim

to supersede and replace either sociology or political science." In

contrast with the latter, the former is more "abstract" and "less bound

to 'the detail of phenomena'." Political philosophy may be materially

dependent upon political science, but the latter is formally dependent upon

the former. Maritain's position is clearly normative in that for him "should

be" becomes "an incentive to make something be." Political philosophy con-

siders "net only things as they are, but also things as they should be."

For him "devoir etre" is an incentive to action. Political philosophy,

in short, "raises the material scrutinized by sociology and political

science both to a higher degree of intelligibility and to a higher degree

of practicability, because it sees this material in the light and per-

spective of a more profound and more comprehensive, a sapiential knowledge

of Man, which is Ethics and deals with the very ends and norms of human

conduct." As value and fact are closely related, for Maritain, political


37"Political Science and Political Philosophy," American
Political Science Review, XLV (December, 1951), pp. 1082, 1083.

38See his Value in Social Theory, ed. Paul Streeten.(London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).







philosophy, although it may be distinct from political science, is

interrelated with the factual contents which political science may find.

Furthermore, Maritain believes that political philosophy is

efficacious "because it deals with the terrestrial hopes of the human

community. "39 Therefore the significance of Maritain's political phi-

losophy lies primarily in his offering a moral basis, in the form of his

profound Christian theology, not only for political society but also for

the science of politics. Maritain himself expresses his concern over the

lack of this moral basis in political science when he says that "the facts

of political science taken apart from political philosophy have only a

technical but no 'cultural' value.'40 The political philosophy of Jacques

Maritain is a Christian political philosophy. The word "Christian" is a

theological notion: Maritain's political philosophy as knowledge has its

foundation in Christian theology and his political philosophy as the

practical guide for a good political life is grounded in Christian faith.

Oswald Spengler at the turn of this century boldly predicted the

decline of Western civilization.41 The word "decline" suggests an intel-

lectual atavism.42 And it is a healthy atavism. In the recent literature


39The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, ed.
Joseph W. Evans and Lee R. Ward (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1955), pp. xi-xii.

40Charles O'Donnell, The Ideal of a Mew Christendom: The
Cultural and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain (Unptblished
Ph. D. dissertation; Cambridge: Rarvard University, 1940), p. 150.

41The Decline of the West, tr. Charles Francis Atkinson (2 vols.;
Mew York: Alfred A. Knepf, 1950).

42Ayn Rand describes the attitudes of modern intellectuals as
follows: "If we look at modern intellectuals, we are confronted with
the grotesque spectacle of such characteristics as militant uncertainty,
crusading cynicism, depgtic agnosticism, boastful self-abasement and
self-righteous depravity -- in an atmosphere of guilt, of panic, of







of political philosophy the idea of "decline" is not absent.43 There

are good reasons why the decline of political philesephy may be justified.

Plato wrote his Republic with the decline of Athenian democracy; Thomas

Hobbes finished his Leviathaw to restore order and unity in the chaotic

days of the Crownellian revolution; and many others have followed and

will follow the footsteps of Plato and 1obbes. "The owl of Minerva does

not take flight until the shades of night are falling"?44 Although we

may not find a Plato or a Hobbes in the modern world, we find a few

scholars who see our need for a Plato or a Nobbes. No one seem to have

ever pictured such a fatal portrait as Michael Oakeshott, when he poeti-

cally wrote: "In political activity . men sail a boundless and

bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchor-

age, neither starting-place nor appointed destination. The enterprise

is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and

the seamnship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner

of behaviour in order to make a friend of every hostile occasion."45


despair, of boredom and of all-pervasive evasion." As quoted in the
New York times book Reviev (April 9, 1961), p. 3 from her book, For
the Mew Intellectual (New lerk: Randim House, 1961).

43For example, see: Alfred Cobban, "The Becline of Political
Theory," op. cit., pp. 20-28; David Easton, "The Decline of Modern
Political Theory," Journal of F itics, XIII (February, 1951), pp. 36-
58; Sheldon S. Wolin, "Liberalism and the Decline of Political Phi-
losophy," Politics ad Vision: Coatinuity nd IJaoavatien in Western
Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brewr, 1960), pp. 286-351; Judith
N. Shklar, op. cit.

44T. V. Smith, Powr qnd Cencience (Glemwee, Ill.: Free Press,
1950), p. xii.

45f"Plitical Education," Philoeophy, plitlfs and peciety, ed.
Peter Laslett (New York: MWcmillan, 1956), p. 15.







The intellectual, for Okeshott, can at best engage in "the sweet

delight which lies in the empty kisses of abstraction.'46

A political philosopher may be likened to the captain of a

sailing ship of politics. There are many factors in our society which

deny the role of this captainship. This seems to be a tragic scene of

our era. Despair may not be cherished for its own sake. But, as

Everett Knight says, it is "better than the paradise of complacency"4 7

"Today," Leo Strauss writes, "political philosophy is in a state

of decay and perhaps of putrefaction, if it has not vanished altogether.,"8

Miss Judith N. Shklar made a sweeping analysis of "the decline of politi-

cal faith" after the Rnlighteamint. If the word "decline" implies a high

point at certain historical juncture, her historical point of reference

is the Enlightement. Sheldon S. Wolin, on the other.hand, comes to the

conclusion that "the judgment that political theory is dead is premature."

Moreover, it needs no "artificial respiration." "The task," he says,

"therefore, is not to revive political theory but to rescue it." The

rescue work for him is to restore what is "political" to political phi-

losophy.49

There are several reasons why some political thinkers consider


46perience and Its Modes, p. 356.

470p cit., p. 12.

48What IsfPolitical Philoeophy?" p. 345.

49"Shklar's After Utopia: The Bolcine of Political Faith,"
Matural Law Fr, V (1960), p. 177.
For Wolin, the term "politics" includes: "(a) a form of
activity centering around the quest for competitive advantage between
groups,'individuals, or societies; (b) a ferm of activity conditimoed
by the fact that it oeeurs within a situation of change and relative
scarcity; (c) a form of activity in which the pursuit of advantage
produces consequences of such a magnitude that they affect in a sig-
nificant way the whole society or a substantial portion of it." Politics
and Vision, pp. 10-11.








or primarily ethical. The issue, Wolin thinks, is "substantive; that

is, it concerns the status of politics and the political."55 "The decline

of political categories and the ascendancy of social ones," he states,

"are the distinguishing marks of our contemporary situation where politi-

cal philosophy has been eclipsed by other forms of knowledge."56

Therefore, according to Wolin, when modern social science

explains what is distinctively political in terms of sociology, psychology

and economics it is tantamount to the erosion of distinctively political

phenomena. Wolin urges us to make efforts "to restore the political art

as that art which strives for an integrative form of direction."57 This

was of course what classical political philosophy did for the attainment

of a good political life. For Aristotle, politics was undoubtedly an

integrative force: politics was "the supreme practical science" and

all others were."subordinate and ministerial."58

Leo Strauss deplores the fact that political philosophy and po-

litical science of our time are "cut into pieces which behave as if they

were parts of a worm." Like Wolin, he maintains that "large segments of

what formerly belonged to political philosophy or political science have

become emancipated under the names of economics, sociology, and social

psychology."59 Thus the function of political philosophy seems to be to rescue

the study of politics from this deplorable condition.


55bid., p. 288.

56Ibid., p. 292.

5Ibid., p. 434.

58W. B. Ross, Aristotle (New York: Meridian looks, 1959), p. 183.

59"What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 346.


I __ __






22

that political philosophy or theory is in the decline. The first reason,

as Sheldon S. Wolin stated, is that the loss of what is political, that

is, the loss of the status of politics, is the decline of political phi-

losophy. The second reason for the decline of political philosophy is

given by Leo Strauss,50 Eric Voegelin,51 and Alfred Cobbaa.52 They all

maintain that the decline of political philosophy is due to the rise of

positivism. The third reason for the degradation of political philosophy

is the prevailing trend of historicismm.!' (The term historicism has

several meanings as explained below on pages 29-30). The forth and last

reason for the downfall of political philosophy (and political science)

is related to the first reason. It is stated by Mans J. Morgenthau and

Benjamin I. Lippincott, for example, who maintain that political philoso-

phy and political science are taken over by philosophers, sociologists,

and theologians.53 We shall new proceed to consider these four reasons

in order in the remainder of this chapter.

To return to the first reason for the decline of political

philosophy Wolin states that the basic task of political philosophy is to

do as Mobbes did: to identify and define what is truly political.54 He

maintains that the recent controversy between political philosophy and

political science misses the whole point if political philosophers and

political scientists believe that the real issue is solely methodological


50"What Is Political Philosophy?" and "On Classical Political
Philosophy."
51op. cit.

52p. cit.

53nmns J. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 25; Benjamin E. Lippincott,
"Political Theory in the United States," Contemporary Political Science
(Paris: UNMSCO, 1950). Also, see: Jerzy Iuptmann, op. cit., p. 17.

54Politics and Vision, p. 289.







Leo Strauss, in his consideration of the decline of political

philosophy, begins with a historical reference to the classical politi-

cal philosophers: Plato and Aristotle. If the history of Western phi-

losophy, as A. N. Whitehead once said, is merely footnotes to Plato, we

might as well say that the history of Western political philosophy is

footnotes to Aristotle's Politics.60

The second reason, according to Strauss, for the decline of political

philosophy is due to the rise of "science." Scientism (or positivism) in the

modern world has eventually succeeded in destroying the very possibility of

political philosophy.61 When political science is concerned unswervingly


60George Sabine says that political philosophy began in Athens,
and that the most significant political writings were produced in Athens
in the fourth century 3. C. (Plato and Aristotle) and in England between
1640 and 1690 (lobbes and Locke). He further comments that ". .
Aristotle's Politics was probably the most important treatise on the
subject [political theory that was ever written." "What Is a Political
Theory?" pp. 3-4.

61"What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 346.
Thomas I. Cook believes that the positivistic attitude results
in "a mechanistic interpretation" of man. Me maintains that man should
be "valued" rather than "described." He argues that "the social sciences,
if they are to be scientific, mest abandon the misguided and misleading
hope of reducing man and society to a complete pattern of descriptive --
predictive law, must accept the inherent and insuperable limitations of
human existence as a necessary and limiting postulate." In short, the
social sciences are the sciences of values. "The Methods of Political
Science, Chiefly in the United States," Contemporary Political Science,
pp. 75-76.
Ernest Negel, for example, comes to the defense of scientific
philosophy when he says: "The recommendation to use scientific method
is the recommendation of a way for deciding issues of factual validity
and adequacy; it is not the recommendation of an exclusive way in which
the universe may be confronted and experienced." Ipgic without
Metaphysics and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (Glencoe,
Ill.: Free Press, 1956), p. 382.







with scientist, it becomes preoccupied with methodological questions.

"The tmet striking difference," Strauss writes, "between classical po-

litical philtosphy and present-day political science is that the latter

is no longer acocerned with what wes the guiding question for the former:

the question of the best form of government, or of the best political

life. On the other hand, m&aern political science is greatly pre-

occupied with a type of question that was of much less importance to

classical political philoiphy: questions eoeerning method."62 Thus,

in a sense, political "science" ossified political philosophy altogether.

Strauss maintains that modern positivism is not even whet Auguste

Coste desired it to be. While modern positivism holds that science is

the highest form of knowledge as did Comte, it no longer concerns itself

with "absolute knowledge of the Why" but it has receded into the "relative

knowledge of the New." By insisting that political scienee should be

value-free or ethically neutral, positivism becomes "nihilism."63 Like

Strauss, Eric Voegelin believes that positivism, especially the objectiv-

ism of MNW Weber, has vitiated political science altogether. For Vbegelin

the sin of positivism is its exclusion of value judg ets from political

science. Thus, the restoration of political science is essentially "a

return to the censeioisness of principles" which was completely destroyed

by the positivistic era. Ne urges us to put value judgments "back in

science in the form of the 'legitimate beliefs' which created units of

social order.t64 Leo Strauss insists that "The social scientist is not


62"On Classical Political Philosophy," pp. 100-101.

63"What Is Political Phileeophy?" pp. 346-47.

64i. .it., pp. 2, 3. Vaegelin lists the following three
characteristics of the scientific creed: "(1) the assumption that the
mathematized science of natural phenomena is a model science to which







immune to preferences; his activity is a constant fight against the

preferences he has as a htoin being and a citizen and which threaten to

overcome his scientific detachment." Worst of all, moreover, "The value

judgments which are forbidden to enter through the front door of politi-

cal science, sociology or eceameics, enter these disciplines through the

back deer."65

Alfred Cobban also feels that "political theory" has declined and

he proposes to restore '"oral aad political theory.'66 The decline of

political theory, he says, "may be regarded as a reflection of the feeling

that ethical values have no place in the field of social dynamics and

power politics." For Cobban, the rise and fall of political theory is a

general law of history: political ideas and doctrines grow, change, and

decay. Moreover, political ideas are related to the conditions of


all other sciences ought to conferm; (2) that all realms of being are
accessible to the methods of the sciences of pheamoena; and (3) that all
reality which is not accessible to sciences of phenomena is either
irrelevant or, in the more radical form of the dogma, illusionary."
"The Origins of Scientism," icisil search, XV (b cember, 1948), p. 462.

65"What Is Political Philosophy?" pp. 347, 350.
John H. Hallowell criticizes positivism in the following manner:
"The inadequacy of positivism as the most valid perspective in which to
achieve,a description and understanding of physical and social phenomena
is proven by this fact: that the positivist cannot avoid engaging in the
metaphysical speculation he claims to have dispeneed with." gp. cit.,
p. 321. Julius Rudolph Weinberg also says: "It is now clear that Logical
Positivis cannot eliminate metaphysics without destroying itself, and
that it cannot establish the logical fowudatione of science without
alteration of the principles absolutely essential to its teaching." An
fclllatito of tJlacal fteitlvis (Lenden: lRetledge and Kegan Paul, 1936),
p. 199. fPr.a comprehensive criticism of logical positivism, see C. E. M.
Joad, A Critique of Wopicel osiitivis (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1950). The effect of logical positivism on ethics, Joad thinks,
is that "the spread of logical positivist emdes of thought may well tend
to the erosion of desirable and to the growth of undesirable beliefs"
(p. 144). Criticism of positivism frem a Catholic point of view is
found in Frederick C. Copleston, G -Frjary P rle-hy: Stu4ies of
Logical Pe itivis and Existentia iM (ladon: Burns and Oates, 1956),
pp. 1-124.
660p. cit., especially pp. 36-58, 229-45.







political life at a given time. "Por political theory to exist," he

writes, "it seem to me, there mvst be an active political life.w67

Alfred Cobban is a child of our age: he is pessimistic. He

believes that "political pessitem is deeper than it has been since

St. Augustine wrote the De Civitate Dei." The decline of political

theory may not be saved, and the same can be said of the decay of present

political life. "Conceivably," he says, "political theory at the present

day may not be undergoing one of its many metamorphoses, passing through

a chrysalis stage before emerging in a new ferm. It may just be oeming

to an end."68

As Hiss Judith N. Shklar nostalgically looks back to the

Enlightenment, Cobban happily returns to the same era in search of

solutions for our age. His "search of humanity" is primarily that of

the. great men of the Enlightenment. He deplores the fact that our century

has neither Bentham nor Burke. Like Sheldon S. Wolin, religious revival

is no answer for the present crisis and for the decline of political

philosophy. While Arnold Toynbee consoles himself with the possible

rise of a religion in the midst of decaying Western civilization, Cobban

thinks, on the other hand, that "the religious approach to political

problem is not without its dangers," although "religious revival M be

a way out." But, for him, religious revival is "not a political way."

It is not the solution simply because "Western civilization is essentially


671bid., pp. 23, 26. However, George Sabine is of the opinion
that ". . when political philosophy is produced in quantities, it is
a sure symptom that society itself is going through a period of stress
and strain." Qp. ct., pp. 2-3. iPossibly,. then, the less political
philosophy there is, the happier society is.

68p. cit., pp. 21, 26.







political, and politics has been its vital centre throughout the modern

period, even though the last great age of fundamental political thinking

was the eighteenth century.'"9 Fer Cebban, the political crisis of our

age is the crisis of civilization itself, since Western civilization is

essentially political. Unlike Leo Strauss who seeks the solution of po-

litical phileeophy from the classical Greek period, Cobban returns to

the Enlightenment: neither Plato nor Aristotle, but eoathea, Burke,

Reosseau, MHetesquieu and Locke are the saviors of the present crisis.

aFwever, like Strauss, Cobban maintains that "politics was essentially

a branch of morals or ethics . the decline of political theory is a

necessary result of the decline of moral philosophy."70

Cobban comes to the same conclusion, as does Strauss, that "the

influence of two modes of thought which have had a fatal effect on (the]

ethical content (of political theory/ . are history and science."

For him, the "autonomy and primacy of ethics" were essential to the

Enlightenment. "The Enlighteament," Cobban explains, 'may sometimes

have mistakenly derived its history and its science from its ethical

ideas; at least it never made the mistake of trying to derive its ethics

from its history and science. This is what its successors have done."71

Cobban believes that the rejection of moral philosophy is the

cause of the decline of political philosophy. He finds a target of

attack in T. B. Weldon's Vcabulary ef fl1ticq. which embodies the spirit

of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein whose analytic mind has greatly

influenced the present shape of logical empiricism. For Cobban, Te


691bid., p. 27.
70bid., p. 237.
711bid., pp. 237-38.





29

Vocabulary of Politics is "a declaration of the bankruptcy of political

philosophy." Weldon becomes the protagonist of scientist that alienates

politics from ethics altogether. MHreover, according to Cobban, the

"esoteric jargon" used in modern political science do not help political

philosophy to become a practical science. On the contrary, "a good deal

of what is called political science seems to hii(7 a device, invented by

academic persons, for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without

achieving science." The political philosopher should be "essentially

concerned with the discussion of what ought to be. His judgments are at

bottom value judgments."72

A. N. Whitehead said that the Enlightenment was "an age of reason

based upon faith" whereas the Middle Ages was "an age of faith based upon

reason."73 Alfred Cobban finds the solution for the decline of modern

society and political philosophy in the rational and ethical contents of

the Inlighteament. lmwever, the Enlightenment itself is not the solution.

Instead, as he sees it, it "can only be a starting-point."74

The third reason for the decline of political philosophy is .the

rise of historicism. Leo Strauss defines historicism as the study which

"considers history as an integral part of political science."75 Re

criticizes historicism because it rejects the question of the good society.

Strauss maintains that in historicisa there is no essential necessity for

raising the question of the good society because it is based on the


72Ibid., pp. 234, 239-40.

73Science and theq Udern World (Mew York: New American Library,
1941), p. 57.
740. cit., p. 244.

75"On Classical Political Philosophy," p. 98. Leo Strauss
distinguishes histericism from positivism. When the former reaches
its full growth, then it may be distinguished from the latter by four
characteristics: "(1) It abandons the distinction between facts and





30
assumption that the character of society and of human thought is histori-

cally relative.76. For Cobban, historicism is no better than scientist.

History, like science, leaves us in a "drift." The modes of inquiry of

science and history would alienate political thought from ethics. His-

toricism is lacking in the sense of direction and purpose. however, Leo

Strauss distinguishes what is "historical" from what is historicistt."

He may reject what is historicist, but he upholds what is historical. He

explains that "a historical interpretation is one that tries to understand

the philosophy of the past exactly as that philosophy understood itself.

The historicist interpretation is one form of the attempt to understand

the philosophy of the past better, than it understood itself; for it is

based on the assumption, wholly alien to the thought of the classics, that

each philosophy is essentially related to its time -- to the 'spirit' of

its time or to the 'material conditions' of its time, or to both."77 What

Strauss upholds as historical seem to coincide with Etienne Gilsen's

statement that "the ultimate explanation of the history of philosophy has

to be philosophy itself."78

For Dwvid Easton historicism means something essentially

different. listoricisa is an exclusive engagement in the investigation

of a history or analysis of political ideas at the expense of developing

values, because every understanding, however theoretical, implies
specific evaluations. (2) It denies the authoritative character of
modern science, which appears as only one among the many forms of man's
intellectual orientation in the world. (3) It refuses to regard the
historical process as fundamentally progressive, or, more generally
stated, as reasonable. (4) It denies the relevance of the evolutionist
thesis by contending that the evolution of men ot of non-man cannot make
intelligible man's humanity." "What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 355.
76bid., p. 356.

770"n Classical Political Philosophy," p. 99.
78The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 304.







"some ideas about the desirable course of events" and of "creatively

constructing a valuational frame of reference." Thus Easton says that

historicism diverted "the systematic theory about political behavior

and the operation of political institutions." While Strauss and Cobban

strees the development of political ideas based on moral judgments,

Easton is concerned with a "systematic empirically-oriented theory

about political behavior" which would make possible the discovery of

the "unifermities in human, and in particular, in political behavior

which can be used as a basis for predictions."79

The fourth and last possible reason for the decline of politi-

cal philosophy is closely related to what Sheldon S. Wolin calls "the

sublimation of the political." Having pointed out the intellectual

sterility of political scientists, Has J. Hergenthau remarks that, "It

is not by accident that some of themost important contributions to

contemporary political theory hare been made not by professional politi-

cal scientists but by theologians, philosophers, and sociologists."'

bwever, Mergentheu, unlike Wolin, does not conceive these contributions

as the decline of political philosophy. Instead, he seems to welcome

them. The names of Reinhold Miebuhr, Jaeques Maritain, Rsesell Kirk,

John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Talcett Parsons, Walter Lippm en, George


79?p. tR., pp. 36, 40, 51.

80D, git., p. 25. Exactly the same point is made by Benjamin
I. Lippincott when he says: "The parado5 is that there has been more
creative work done in political theory by sen outside the professional
field than by these within it." Qp. cit., p. 220. Jerzy Neapcmenn
also says: "'. find eatuine political philosophy nowadays one has to
go to religion (Reinheld Wiebuhr), journalism (Walter Lippmea), phi-
losophy (Rtu.ell Kirk) . ." Op cit., p. 17.







Orwell, John Maynard Keynes, and others indicate that "outsiders" have

made many contributions to political philosophy.81

The decline of political philosophy has meant several things.

As Sheldon S. Wolin has noted, it is essentially the sublimation of

what is political. The restoration of political philosophy is a rescue

work that would make politics an integrative force. However, the decline

of political philosophy seems to be deeply rooted in the rise of positiv-

ism which has been striving to make political science "scientific" in

the sense of the natural sciences. Thus value judgments become not

only "meaningless" but also undesirable. The question of a good politi-

cal life, as Strauss and Cobban have pointed out, has ceased to be a

major concern of the political scientists. Instead, the main question

of political science is the question of methodology to achieve the "scien-

tific" status of political science itself in the image and pattern of the

natural scienceslike physics and chemistry..

The restoration of political philosophy will depend upon the

cooperative efforts to ask the questions concerning the ends and goals

of a good political life in society. A sowud political philosophy,

therefore, becomes the question of creating a good political life and

society based on a value system. Sheldon S. Wolin seems to have rejected

altogether a theological politics or a political philosophy based on

theological notions as "a confused mixture of diluted religious ideas


Lindsay Rogers, for example, mentions Reinhold Niebuhr,
R. G. Collingwood, N. Lenin, Michael Oakeshott, George Orwell and
John Maynard Keynes. Except for Lenin and Oakeshott, they are
"outsiders." "Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An
Appraisal of Its Contribution to the Study of Politics," Approaches
to the Study of Politics, pp. 189-214.







spiced with a dash of market place virtues."82 However, Alfred Cobban

has been suspicious of religious ideas in the resuscitation of a good

political society, but he has net entirely rejected religious ideas.

When political ideas and ideals become stagnant with professional po-

litical philosophers and political scientists, we must inevitably look

for the sources of inspiration from "outsiders." In the contemporary

world, the theologians are an indispensable group of intellectuals who

can provide the genuine sources of inspiration in the regeneration of

political ideas and ideals. Among these theologians, we discover the

Catholic philosopher and theologian, Jaeques Haritain.

This essay is essentially an exposition and interpretation of

the political philosophy and theology of Jacques Maritain. First of all,

we must place Jacques Maritain aiog other emineat Christian thinkers.

Since Maritain is a Thomist, we must examine his political ideas in the

light of Thomism. Moreover, Haritain's political ideas are inseparably

related to his theological and metaphysical system. The theological and

metaphysical system of Jacques Maritain is the foundation of his politi-

cal philoegphy. After his political ideas are expoRuded, this essay will

be ended with a concluding evaluation.


82?elitics ad Vision, p. 288.













CHAPTER II


GOD AND POLITICS


It was not too long ago that Nietzsche, through Zarathustra,

tried to convince the world that "God is dead," and to build "a new way

for living" in the inculcation of the transvaluation of all values.

Christianity, he thought, was the religion of "the botched and the weak."

Power stood for the source of the good, and everything bad sprang from

weakness. That was the philosophy of Nietssehe. In less than a century,

Christianity and Christian theology have again proved to be the religion

of "power" rather than weakness. The modern world has witnessed the

strength of Christian and Jewish theologians* The names of Reinhold

Niebuhr, Jacques Maritain, Karl Barth, Bail runner, Paul Tillich,

Nicolas Berdyaev and Martin suber have colored the intellectual history

of the twentieth century which belongs to us.

Some political theorists have already implied that the decline

of political philosophy is partially due to the lack of initiatives on

the part of political theorists. The contributions to political phi-

losophy have been made from sectors of theology, philosophy and soci-

ology. As the title of this essay indicates, it is hoped that a step

may be made toward a systematic analysis of what is called "political

theology," "the theology of politics," or "theological







politics."1 Political theology has been in existence since the dawn

of humen civilization, but political theology as a possible subject of

study is a farily recent development. And a systematic analysis of

political theology is almet a wattrodden path. Political theology is

nothing more and nothing less than what Nathaniel Micklem calls "the

theology of politics."2 Political theology is that part of political

philosophy which considers politics from a theological point of view.

Therefore, the term "theological politics"3 is less misleading than

"political theology" simply because in the former the comnntation of

politics is preserved better than in the latter. From a political point

of view, political theology is a department of politics rather than a

part of theology. To say that politics is considered from a theological

point of view is to assert: "All political problems are at bottom

theological.'4 Christianity alone, to be sure, is not the source of po-

litical theology, but it presently occupies a large portion of con-

temporary political theology.


11t is futile to look for any uniform meaning of the terms
"political theology," "social theology," "politische Theeleole" and
"thiolegie politique." The ideas of "political theology" are fre-
quently found in the current literature. For exaple, see: NMthaniel
Micklem, The Theology of plitics (Loedon: Oxford University Press,
1941); Ernst X. Kitorowicz, The Kiig's Two -odies: A Study in
Mediaeval Pslitical Tbhlogy (Princeton: Princeten University Press,
1957); Themas Gilby, between Cma-nity and society: A Iphilosophy and
Theology of the State (London: LoUmens, Oreen, 1953); John A.
lutchison, The Two Cities: 4 Study of God and thmn Politics (Garden
City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1957); Heinrich A. Isemen, The nate iU
Cathelic Thought: A TreKtipe in Politi Lendon: B. Narder, 1943), pp. 91-122; Judith I. Shklar, 22. cit., pp.
164-217. Jacques Haritain himself uses the term "political theology"
here amd there.
20. vit.
3lninrich A. Romme uses "political theology" or "theological
politics." Op. cit., p. 92.

Nathaniel Mioklem, op. Oit., pp. x, vi, 38.








In the investigation of political theory, theology5 is the field

of study most neglected by the investigators. Professor Charles S.

Hyneman, in his recent volume on the present status of American politi-

cal science, expresses his legitimate concern with the failure to


5Religion must be distinguished from theology. Religion
may be defined as a system of beliefs or "a belief in the con-
servation of values." It includes certain characteristic types of
beliefs, practices, feelings, moods, attitudes, etc. See, for example,
James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedig of Religion and ethics, X, pp. 662-
63. Theology may be defined as a systematic exposition of religion and
God or the Supreme Being. Theology is defined as "the science which
deals, according to scientific method, with the facts and phenomena of
religion and culminates in a comprehensive synthesis of philosophy of
religion, which seeks to set forth in a systematic way all that can be
known regarding the objective grounds of religious belief." Ibid.,
XII, p. 293. Another dictionary defines theology as "the system of
theological doctrine developed dogmatically; that is, by a method whose
ultimate appeal is not to reason, but to authority, either that of
Scripture or of Scripture and tradition combined." James Mark Baldwin
(ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, II, p. 693. Theology is
also defined as "a study of the question of God and the relation of God
to the world of reality." Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), The Dictionary of
Philosophy, p. 317.
This essay is concerned only with Christian political the-
ology although political theology must be all-inclusive of various
types of world religions as far as they are related to some aspects
of politics. e inrich A. Romnn defines the potential meaning of po-
litical theology so that religious experiences, religious sentiments,
or irrational feelings are all excluded. Political theology only
includes religious "doctrine." Op. cit., p. 93.
As we distinguish theology free religion, we can distinguish
theological discourse from religious discourse. Professor Charles W.
Horris describes religious discourse as "prescriptive" and incitivee"
by its use and mode, whereas theological discourse is "critical,"
i. e., appraisivee" and "systemic." Theological discourse, by use, has
the same characteristic as moral discourse: they are appraisive.
Since this essay is concerned with politics, it is worth while comparing
political discourse with theological and religious discourses (and moral
discourse). Political discourse, like religious discourse, is pre-
scriptive. Theological discourse and moral discourse have an
appraisive character. However, we can bridge the gap between the
prescriptive and appraisive aspects in theological, moral, religious
and political discourses. Norris says: the "ought" is something that
is positively appraised. Signs, LmuaBn e and bghqvtor (New York:
George Braziller, 1955), pp. 125, 138-42, 145-48.







examine and evaluate "the significance of religion for politics."6 The

intellectual history of the West and the East reveals the significant

role played by religion in various cultural systems, past and present.

"Christian theology," Dente L. Germino recently remarks, "has,

after long neglect, gradually been reassuming its formerly prominent

place among the intellectual disciplines."7 And some like Eduard

Beiaman have urged the consideration of the "Christian foundations of

the social sciences."8 Heimarn deplores the fact that the social

sciences exclude, by their formative concepts, the Christian dimension

of social life.9 "'od, spirit, and liberty in history," he writes,

"exist in reality but met in the social sciences."10 Therefore, if the

social sciences would be realistic at all, they '"ust be capable of


6The following statement of Hynamen is worth quoting fully:
"Religions appear to be virtually untouched. Certainly no American
political scientist has provided a noteworthy analysis of the idea-
system (or idea-systems) that characterizes religions in general.
Neither has an American political scientist carefully explored the sig-
nificanee for legal government of the belief-system, organizations, and
rituals we call Christianity. .. ." The Study of felitics (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 62-63. MIst regretful is the
absence of any outstanding study of a relationship between polities and
religion similar to these which exist in other fields, such as Max
Weber, The Pftestant Ethic sad the Sirit of Caitalise (New York:
Charles Scribner's Se8s, 1958); R. iH. Tawney, Relition aad the Lise of
Cpttulin (Wew Tork: Harcourt, Brace, 1926); Irnst Treeltech, TMe
ocial_ Tchrian of the Christian Cburche, tr. Olive Wyon (2 vols.;
Newo Frk: Marper and Brothers, 1960); Christopher Beweon, LeUgion
and Culture (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948). The philosopher Ralph
Barton Perry's ?uritantsm and wenecracy (New York: Vanguard Press, 1944)
may be regarded as an exception.

7"T'w Types of Recent Christian Political Thought," Jpurnyl
9o Politics, XXI (August, 1959), p. 455.

8"Christian Feadatiens of the Social Sciesces," Social basearch,
XXVI (Autmi, 1959), pp. 325-46.

9Ibid., p. 345.

10Ibid.





38

integration into a Christian theology of life and history."11 Moreover,

a true morality is always the fruit of religion. For Meimann, godless

"humanism is often a moving, but always a tragic phenomenon."12

In pointing out the neglect of political theology, it is not

maintained here that political philosophy should be based upon the-

ology or that political theology is the only geed political philosophy.

However, to neglect political theology is to make modern political

theory incomplete and inadequate.13

In an analysis of political theology, a few words of warning

are in order. The political theorist ga political theorist must be

aware of the fact that he is ineompetent to judge the fundamentals of

religious knowledge. As Loren P. Beth warns us, "The political philoso-

pher, g political philosopher, is qualified to construct a theory of

the state, but he is net a theologian and is in no position to judge of

either the existence or the value of religious truth."14 Therefore,

some political theorists, like Arnold Brecht, oome to the conclusion

that the reality or the existence of God must be accepted as either an

assumption or a scientific hypothesis. It is beyond the scope of this

essay to question, as does philosopher Walter Kaufmamn, the existence of

God.15


llbid.

12Ibid., p. 334.

3Arnold Brecht makes exactly the same statement in his Political
Theory, p. 459.

14T"he percan Theory of ChurQc aad State (Gainesville: Uni-
versity of Florida Press, 1958), p. 137.

15Critique of telilgion wd bilobopin (Garden City, N. Y.:
Doubleday, 1961). See especially chapter v, "The God of the







Arnold Brecht is most notable among these in favor of the

"scientific" political theory which, he insists, should accept the

possibility of the existence of God as a hypothesis.16 having pointed

out the fact that religion has played a great role in thegenesis of

Western culture and the religious influence on the rise of modern

democracy, he declares that there is professional reeognition that the.

questions concerning the relation between religion and politics are

'within the scope of political scieaee." "In view of the ipertant role

played by religion in any public affairs," he urges, "political science

must indeed be concerned with religion. To disregard the religious

factor would often mean to distort reality and to base analysis and

conclusions on defective data. Whenever religion enters political

motivations it becomes part of the subject matter of political sciesee."17

Moreover, he points out that religion can be a source of knowledge. He

hastens to add, and rightly so, that ". .. to say that religion as a


Philosophers," which exmaines Plato, St. Theoes Aquinas and Pascal, pp.
137-72. In one passage, he asks the question: "Can one prove God's
existence?" The answer is yes, but "this does net mean that God
exists" (p. 168).

16ne makes what he calls the "scientific" exposition of God's
existence in relation to political scieaee in Political Theery,
especially chapter xiii, "Twentieth-Century Political Science and the
Belief in God," pp. 456-79;,"The Latent Place of God in Twentieth-
Century Political Theory," Th1 Political Philosophy of Irald Brecht,
ed. Morris D. oFrkeseh (new TYrk: Exposition Press, 1954), pp. 148-60.
His theory is reminiscent of the Pascalian wager in the social sciences.
Pascal argued that "either God exists, or he does not exist." Since
neither proposition can be proved, we must weger: "If we wager that God
exists and we are right, we win everything; if we are wrong we lose
nothing. If you passed this up, 'you would be imprudent'." Walter
Kaufmmn, op, Ct., p. 170. Kaufmana himself argues: "They say that
we cannot induce belief merely by representing to ourselves the great
advantage of belief. Uat it is Pascal's IAic that is at fault, not
his psychology" (p. 171).

17politie! TEry, pp. 456, 459.







social phenomena is a relevant factor for political science is not

the same as saying that religion is a prerequisite for the scientist's

own understanding of reality."18

Arnold Brecht proposes to offer a "scientific" analysis of

God's existence and the reality of God. He condemss the modern scien-

tific element which brackets God's existence and reality as inter-

subjectively impossible. He argues that the scientific spirit has tended

to interpret "the bracketed Ged as a rno-existent Ged."19 Me believes

that this attitude tends to avoid the issue. Ikither is this problem

that which the theologians and the philosophers should solve, "because

we are dealing here, not with the meaning of God, but with the meaning

and scope of science and of political science in particular."20

Brecht further rejects the scientific attitude of the "fifty-

fifty balance" of God and no God. "We," he writes, "are confronted with

the near-paradox that God's reality may sae day be scientifically evident,

but that if there be no Ged we shall never know that for certain. In

popular parlance, we may some day know his existence, but we can never

know his non-existence."21 He further argues against the fallacy of

assuming that a student '"ho proposes to open the brackets must first

prove the existence of God."" He points out that this argument is "a

legal principle" rather then "a scientific one." In the legal sense only,

the burden of proof that the defendant is guilty lies oe the shoulders


18%bid., p. 459.

9he Political thiloMsohy of Arnld Irecht, p. 149.
20Ibid., p. 150.
21b.Ld., pp. 150-51.
22_bid., p. 151.







of the prosecutor, but in the scientific sense, he argues, the burden

of proof rests on "both shoulders, not merely on one."23

However, he makes it clear that his position is not a plea

"for a surrender of the negative alternative to the positive one; it

is a plea only for due recognition of both." "After fifty years of

bracketing God," he writes, "we should by now be mature enough

sometimes to remove the brackets and to shift them from the positive to

the negative alternative, therewith acknowledging God's latent place in

twentieth-century political theory; and still to fulfill our specific

function well -- the function of the political scientist to distinguish

severely between mere speculations, hypotheses, assumptions and personal

beliefs, on the one side, and scientifically established data, capable

of intersubjective transmittal, on the other."24 Since the prevailing

attitude of the social scientists has been tending towards the negative

alternative (the non-existence of God), he 'argues for taking the positive

alternative (the existence of God) in the "scientific" research.

.The position of Arnold Brecht may be untenable both to the theo-

logiams and to the scientists. That is to say, it would be tee "scien-

tific" for the theologians; and it would be too "unscientific" for the

scientists. But we must recognize the fact that even from a scientific

point of view we can cogently argue for the positive relationship between

God and politics. Brecht seems to be essentially Kantian in that the

reality of God can be neither proved nor disproved.25 The existence of

God is neither scientifically verifiable nor unverifiable: God's existence

is beyond the ken of scientific verification. In a scientific political

23Ibd.
24Ibid., pp. 156-57.

25political Theory, p. 460.







theory, therefore, we must distinguish "religion as a subject matter

of scientific inquiry" from "religion as a source of knowledge."26

"In deciding," Brecht writes, "to limit our scientific work to the

negative alternative alone, and to keep the other 'bracketed,' we have

not eliminated the latter. This is the fundamental situation."27 To

bracket God from political theory does not eliminate hia28 from reality.

The odds are against those who assume the non-existence of God since

"we may some day know God's existence, but we can never know his non-

existence."29 Thus his conclusion is:. a scientific political theory

may as well accept the existence of God as a scientific hypothesis.

This agnostic position -- as John Dewey phrases it, "a

shadow cast.by the eclipse of the supernatural"30 -- is a blasphemy

to the religious mind which unquestionably believes in God and in the

creation of man and nature as the divine work of God. And it is heresy

to the scientifically-minded, who considers the existence of God as a

superstition and who believes in God but says that, since God's ex-

istence cannot be proved by the scientific method, the question of God

is beyond the realm of social and political philosophy. But the plea of


26Ibid.

27bid., p. 464.

2Brecht does not capitalize "him" for the reason that, he
explains, "this paper deals with the scientific question of God's reality
and, therefore, should not give the answer surreptitiously in the style
of printing. Capitalization of the tern God is justified even so, in
order to distinguish the idea of one God from ideas of a plurality of
gods." The Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht, p. 158.

29Political Theory p. 470.

30A Comon Faith (New Naven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 86.






Arnold Breeht to take the peeitive alternative in the social sciences

is to open the gateway for the scientifically-minded political theorists

to trod once again the forgotten path of political theology.

"Political theories," George Sabine writes, ". . live on two

planes or play a double role. They are theories, or logical entities

belonging to the abstract world of thought, but they are also beliefs,

events in people's minds and factors in their conduct. In this latter

role they are influential (if they are) not beeaee they are true but

because they are believed."31 In this sense the Declaration of Inde-

pendence, for example, is an influential political document, not beeaose

all men are created equal in fact but because it is beli d (to be true)

that all men are created equal. John ewey, while distinguishing "the

religious" freo "religion," evem talks about "the common faith of

mankind."32 In the same setw, religious decaets, doctrines, religious

thinkers (i. e., theologian) are influential in politics (if they relate

their religious thought to politics). The t of political theology is

its link between theology and politics.

It has frequently been pointed out that modern scholarship

suffers from the deplorable condition of compartmentalization. The

compartentalization of the study of politics from religion and theology

is no exception. Joechim Wach oowee to the core of this problem when

he says:

One of the met unfortunate aspects of modern scholarship has
been the departmentalisatien of the study of smn. Gre ted,
that men is, at his best, an integral organism of which the
physical, mental, aed spiritual are aspects, we mast deplore
the fact that the inquiry into theee different aspects of his
nature is carried en in widely separated fields of study. But

31"hat Is a Political Theory?" p. 10.
320p. ct., p. 87.







what is much more disturbing is the tendency in some quarters
to deny that each of these domains of human eistenoe, notwith-
standing their interrelationship and interaction, possesses
its own laws. This important fact is neglected or outrightly
denied by determinists in different branches of the study of
man..33

Professor John U. Nef, being aware of this oempartuentalliation, calls

it "an aMies of reederq7 scholarship."34 The necessity of studying

'"an's experience as a whele" and the andca of modern scholarship rightly

place hia "in a dilema." "The very separation of scimene from faith,

from ethics and from art, which is so characteristic of our times," he

writes, "is at the roots of the industrialized world in which we live."35

To be sure, this integral study of men's experience as a whole cenfroats

the danger of becoming shallow. Mbne the less, this risk is worth taking,

as does John U. Nef, in contrast to the narrow approach where the whole

men is chopped off into innumerable pioses.36 Thus, the very axiom of

modern scholarship beeemes its myepia.

With this integral approach of the wA91 a s in view, we must

define the scope of political theology itself. By political theology

I mean that part of theoretical politics or political philosophy which

is based upon the theological as the ultiejtj source of politics. The

proposition that "all the political problems are at bottom theological"

is the key notion in political theology or, as Mathaniel Micklem phrased


33The CoMarative Stidy Of leUieog ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa
(Mew York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. xaw.

34Cultural Foundation e p Industrial CrivtliatjLe (New TYrk:
Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. xi.

35=., p. 4.

36A humanistic view of "the whole man" is well constructed in
Lewis Wimford, The Conduct of Life (Now Tork: Mareeurt, Brace, 1951).







it, "the theology of politics."37 Therefore, as John H. Hallowell

thinks, political theology must assme "beth an intimate and logically

necessary conMction" between theological presuppositions and his po-

litieal philosophy.38 Cranted that there is such a connection, however,

it should be noted at the outset that a logically necessary conwction

between theological presuppositions and political philosophy cannot be

pushed too far. In the study of political theology, we must thus be able

to distinguish historical causelity from lgiael inferpct. In relating

theological concepts and notions with ena's political philosophy, we must

not only casider the theological reasoning of a political philosopher

but also see the ataerlal connection and conclusions of his political phi-

loeophy based upon certain sets of theological notions and presuppositions.

Take the example of original sin. This theological concept alone cannot

determine or deduce a uniform pattern of political philosophy Sang

Christian theologians. Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusions that

material connections are much mere important than logical connections.

There is a significant relation betvwen original sin and the political

philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr and that of Karl Barth. But their politi-

cal philosophies are markedly far apart from each other. This does not

mean that there is no logical connection at all. An example can be given


37The most comprehensive exposition of a concept in political
theology is given by Irnat N. Kantorowicz in analyzing the.origin of
"T'h King's Two Bedies." Me oencludes that "the KIMN'S TWO ]-ISI is
an offshoot of Christian theological thought and casequently stands
as a landmark of Christian political theology." ap. eit., p. 506.

38NMn CurrIptA n pdern Political Thougt, p. vii.








in the political philosophy of Jacques Maritain and that of Karl Barth.

The consequence of the former from the Thomistic emphasis on reason,

nature and philosophy gives ample room for realistic and positive

thinking in political matters while the consequence of the Barthian

Orthodox emphasis on revelation, grace and theology reaches a negative

attitude or "indifferentism" towards political affairs.

However, the reasoning of Reinhold Niebuhr seems to have an

entirely different practical consequence on politics. The notion of

original sin for Niebuhr carries its weight towards a realistic approach

to politics. Power politics is the inevitable outcome of man's sinful-

ness and selfishness. Thus he accepts power struggle in international

relations as an inevitable reality. His assessment of the reality of

international politics has greatly influenced the American "realist

school" of international politics. George Kennan once said that Niebuhr

is the father of all the American realists.39 Some consider that Niebuhr

is more concerned with Christian ethics than with Christian theology.

Dante L. Germino regards Niebuhr as "a theological gadfly rather than a

theologian.140 In the same sense, Walter M. Horton speaks of the depth

of the "continental theology" in contrast to the Anglo-American

theology.41

For Judith N. Shklar, political theology "assumes that all po-

litical ideas and institutions ought to be based upon direct revelation


39George Kennan is quoted as having said that Reinhold Niebuhr
is "the father of all of us," that is, of the American realists. Kenneth
W. Thompson, op. cit., p. 17.

400p. cit., p. 477.

41Contemporary Continental Theology (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1938), p. 217.







and that political truths are a part of general theology.'"2 She could

thus reach the conclusion that political theology is "certainly not the

Christian political theory, par excellence.'43 This definition of

political theology is based on revelationall theology" alone to the

exclusion of natural or rational theology. Revelational theology is

represented by the crisis theology of Karl Barth. It is the Orthodox

Protestant theology as opposed to the "liberal" theology of the

nineteenth century. Revelational theology is less drastically

represented by Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr.

The revelational theology of Karl Barth and Eail runner is a

return to the theology of the Reformation and, especially for the former,

to the Word of God. It is contrasted with the Thomistic theology as

represented by Jacques Maritain. The supreme emphasis of revelational

theology is found in the notions of revelation, grace and the redemption

of man's sinfulnecs coming directly from God. It emphasizes the total

"other-ness" of God from nature, the world and man. Thus, men's sinful-

ness is redeemable only by the grace of God. Infinite God outdistances

the finite world, nature and man. Revelational theology minimizes the

role of human reaoon, nature and natural law at the expense of what is

supernatural, revelational, and inspired by grace.

Revelatiomal theology, thus defined, is directly opposed to the

rational or natural theology of Thomism. It rejects completely the

Thomistic concepts of apalogia entis (analogy of being), human reason,

natural law, nature. As the Catholic political philosopher Ieinrich A.


420p. cit., p. 169.

43[bid., p. 170.








Rommen points out, the revelational theology "offers scarcely a

possibility for a political philosophy and ethics based en human nature

and reason."44 In this sense, Miss Shklar's definition of political

theology is in complete agreement with Romen when the latter says:

"If . on the basis of this theology revelationall theology7 a po-

litical philosophy and ethics should ever be constructed, it will be

truly a political theology.'k5

Political theology thus narrowly defined in terms of revelational

theology alone excludes the political philosophy.based upon natural the-

ology, e. g., Thomistic theology. Natural theology is as much theology

as revelational theology. Thus we must define political theology in

such a way that it will include political philosophy based upon both

revelational theology end natural theology. Heinrich A. Rommen defines

theology to mean "either natural theology, i. e., God revealing Himself

in His creation to the human rational mind, revealing Himself in the

conscience, or supernatural theology, the doctrine.of God, revealing

Himself positively in Christ and the inspired Sacred Scriptures,


440p. cit., p. 95. He further points out the fact that "St.
Thomas in the questions dealing with political philosophy and ethics
more often quotes Aristotle and Cicero than the Scriptures, whereas
Luther and Calvin must always quote the Scriptures. (Calvin, rejecting
natural law not to the degree that Luther does, chooses to quote the
Decalogue as the substance of natural law rather than any of the ancient
or Stoic philosophers, a fact that must be explained by the Occamist
concept of natural law in Calvin's thought)" (p. 112). The Polish
Catholic thinker Przywara called St. Thomas the "Christian Aristotle."
Walter M. Horton, op. cit., p. 65. However, it seem to be of cardinal
importance to remember that St. Thomas Aquinas was Christian first and
Aristotelian second. According to Etienne Gilson, there was no doubt in
the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas that philosophy was to facilitate men's
knowledge of God, and Aquinas baptized Aristotle. For example, see:
Elements of Christian Philosophy (Garden City, X. T.: Doubleday, 1960),
pp. 5-21. Furthermore, St. Thomas Aquinas' notion of the ideal state was
found in Holy Scripture (p. 274).
450p. cit., p. 95.







interpreted by the infallible doctrinal authority of the divinely

instituted papacy or, as in Protestantism, by divine guidance of the

individual conscience, with or without the assistance of tradition .

and of the consensus of theologians."46

Political theology, therefore, wust include the canon of

Scriptures, the dogmas, the tradition and the writings of theologians

in relation to politics. However, political theology is not directly

concerned with the prSacical consequences of these things. Thus, for

example, the movemets of "Christian Demcracy" in the contemporary

world are irrelevant to political theology. It is essentially the

relationship between theological doctrines (deriving from the notion of

God) and political philosophy. The relation of church and state is a

subject of political theology as far as it is on a theoretical level.

Political theology includes revelational theology and natural

theology as long as they are related to politics; that is to say, when

theologians talk about politics in terms of their theological doctrines

and concepts. Therefore, the Christian political philosophy, if it is

Christian at all, is a political theology par eycelleaee. This does not

mean that all political writings of Christians by their religious

allegiance to Christianity belong to the realm of political theology.

Some political writers who are Christian by faith do not necessarily

expound political theology. When a political philosophy is ultinetely

founded upon the theelegieal, then it becomes a political theology.

Political theology as defined here poses another question when

we take into consideration the Thomistic distinction between "theology"

and "philosophy." "From the standpoint of Catholic theology," Romen


46Ibid., p. 93.







writes, "a specific political theology cannot be held. St. Thomas

bases political philosophy on natural reason and natural law, not on

revelation and supernatural theology.'47 In Themism, theology is clearly

distinguished from philosophy. In philosophy, the role of reason, nature

and natural law has a "genuine" but not absolute autonomy from revelation,

the supernatural and grace. Thus, political "philosophy" is a real

possibility. Political philosophyy" is put in juxtaposition with po-

litical "theology." The Themistic political philosophy is based on

human reason and natural law; "political theology" (defined in terms of

revelational theology) becomes an impossibility. As Erik Peterson says,

"political theology" is a "theological ispossibility."8 "The merit of

'political theology'," Rommen concludes, "lies, then, in certain aspects

of its criticism and not in its positive system, which is inadmissible."'9

Deriving from the distinction between philosophy and theology,

political theology (in the sense of revelational theology) for the

Thomistic thinker is not theoretically feasible. The terms "political"

and "theology" are mutually exclusive. The theology of Karl Barth, for

example, has only the negative connotation for the Thomistic thinker.

This amounts to the denial of "political theology" itself.

However, we are not compelled, for the present purpose, to accept


47bLd., p. 111. In this connection, the Protestant thinker
Walter M. I~rton writes: "I must confess my opinion that Catholic
philosophy is much more interesting and rewarding to study, as a
possible source of light and guidance, than Catholic theology." Op. cit.,
p. 83.

4As quoted in Heinrich A. loman, op. cit., p. 114.

49bd., p. 115.







the strict Themistic distinction between philosophy and theology. Even

a Thomist, like Jacques Maritain, does not separate philosophy from

theology. Although philosophy has a "lgenuie" autonomy in the natural

faculties of the human mind, it is not absolutely aute omoes from the-

ology. On the contrary, philosophy is illuminated by theology. "Thus,"

Remme writes, "a repudiation of political theology does not mean that

theological .upernatural truth is of no corrective and directive

influence in political philosophy or that ecclesiastical authority has

no right to teach in this field.450 Jacques Maritain himself considers

a political theology aa the genuinely political philosophy or political

science although he recognizes political philosophy and political science

as distinct from political theology. Maritainenplains that "these

fields of research such as the history of religion, anthropology, politics,

economics, and the rest, which depend on history or on methods of positive

enquiry for all the observational material they amass, and for their

empirical basis -- are not Gonstituted as completely and genuinely expli-

cative 'sciences' unless integrated with theology. Only a theological

anthropology or a political theology would merit the name of ethical

sciMae or political sagLace strictly speaking."51

Political theology is defined here in such a way as to include

natural thology and reelatiLnal theolory in relation to polities,

especially political phileeophy. We are not compelled to repudiate "po-

litical theology" (in the sease of revelational theology) as in the the-

ology of Karl Barth, despite the strict distinction between theology and

philosophy in Themism. Granted that revelational theology in its extreme

50IWb., p. 116.
1An aR y on Cthistion Pkil~o by, tr. Edward H. Flamery (New
York: Philoeephical Library, 1955), pp. 98-99.







form (i. e., Karl Barth) negates rather than affirms the importance

of politics and political philosophy, this negative political theology

is as important as the positive political theology of Th emis from a

political point of view.52 Political theology is that part of political

philosophy of which the ultimate foundation lies in the theological. The

Thomistic political philosophy is distinguished from theology; neverthe-

less, its ultimate source is Christian theology. Whether Christian the-

ology is based upon either revelational theology or natural theology, it

is a political theology as far as it is related, negatively or positively,

to politics, Political theology is a political philosophy under the

ultimate aegis of the theological. It is based upon the proposition

that all the political problems are at bottgS theological. Therefore,

the political philosophies of Karl Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, Jacques

Maritain,, Sail Brunner, Paul Tillich and others are political theologies

par excellence. The Christian political philosophy is a political the-

ology in the true sense of the term as it is defined here. J. V. Langmead

Casserley, a Protestant thinker, explains why the Christian political phi-

losophy is a political theology par *ceLylece when he says: "Theo-

logians of all traditions agree in rejecting this alleged priority of

philosophical reflection ever theology and faith."53 Theology is under-

stood as "the study of the content of revelation" and faith, "the ac-

ceptance of revelation." Jacques Maritain's philosophy of democracy, for

example, has its foundation on the pillar of the Gospel. Thus, his


52From a political point of view, the matter of revelational
theology and rational theology has been oepeended in a brief but precise
form by Bente L. Germino in "Two Types of Christian Political Thought."
These two types refer to the "fideists" revelationall theology) and the
"rationalists" (rational theology).
53Th Christian in Phile~9phy (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1951), p. 186.







democratic philosophy of governments is a part of his political the-

ology in general.

hving defined the seeps of political theology, we must now

state what is net political theology. Jacob Taubes, in examining the

relation between theology and political philosophy, notes that "In the

beginning theology emerged as a problem of political theory. .. .

'theology,' oecurs for the first time in a dialogue between Adeiiantus

and Socrates discussing the place of poetry and literature in the

state."54 Be goes so far to say that, "As there is no theology without

political implications, there is no political theory without theological

presuppositions."55 And he is quite right when he says, "There is, in

fact, no theology that should not be relevant for the order of society.

Even a theology that claim to be apolitical altogether, and coneeives

the divine as the totally foreign, as the totally other to man and world,

may have political implications." Moreover, it is often quoted that even

Proudhon, an atheistic anarchist, said there is theology at the bottom

of politics.56

Political theology is defined here only in terms of theism and

of the recognition of the supernatural. Thus it is useful to distinguish

what is a "religion" from what is "the religious."57 As keinrich A.

Remen suggests, theology would exclude "religious experiences, religious


54"Thoelegy ad Political Theory," edgl _e*earch, XXII
(Spring, 1955), p. 57.

551bid., p. 58. Nathaniel licklew also says: veryy
conceivable political theory rests upon an implicit anthropology, a
theological or anti-theological estimate of man as related to his God,
to his fellows and to eehines." Op, %t., p. xi.
56"Theology and Political Theory," p. 58; Remen, oa. cit., p. 117.
57This isaDeweyan distinction in A C ja raith, pp. 1-28.







sentiments, or irrational feelings."8 It only implies religious

"doctrines" as far as they are related to politics. As many Christian

thinkers believe, Harxism is a form of religion or atheism (pseudo-

religion). Some would consider the Platonic Idea of Good as a theo-

logical concept,59 especially through the influence of neo-Platonism.

However, these types of "theological" or "pseudo-theological" notions

are excluded from the consideration of political theology here. As

Etienne Gilson notes, ". .. if Plato has never said that the Idea of

Good is a god, the reason for it might be that he never thought of it

as of a god. And why, after all, should an Idea be considered as a god?

An Idea is no person; it is not even a soul; at best it is an intelli-

gible cause, much less a person than a thing."60

In sumary, political theology as defined here includes

revelational theology and natural theology in Christianity as far as they

are related to political philoeephy. The extreme form of revelational

theology, i. e., the dialectical theology of Karl Barth has a negative

connotation in political theology. Nonetheless, it is as important as

Thomistic theology from a political point of view. Thus, St. Augustine,

Kierkegaard, Luther and Karl Barth are as important as St. Thomas Aquinas

and Jacques Maritain. In examining the political theology of Jacques

Maritain, we must keep in mind the fact that the Themist, following the

footsteps of St. Thomas Aquinas, makes the distinction between "philoso-

phy" and "theology." Nowever, to say that the political philosophy of


580p. cit., p. 93.

59See Jacob Taubes, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
60God and Philosophy (Mew Iaven: Yale University Press, 1941),
p. 26.





55

Jacques Maritain is a political theology is not to blur the distinction

between philosophy and theology. All the Thomists, including Jacques

Maritain, recognize the fact that theology elevates philosophy. Politi-

cal theology, thus, is based upon the affirmation that all the political

problems are at bottom theological. The political philosophy of Jacques

Maritain, as well as the political writings of contemporary Christian

theologians, is the proper subject of political theology.

In conclusion, let us restate, with the aid of Paul Tillich,

what political theology or the theology of politics is. For Tillich, the

"theology of culture" (theenemy) is based precisely upon the proposition

that "Religion is the substance of culture and culture the form of

religion."61 Let us substitute politicss" for "culture," then we get the

formula for the "theology of politics" or political theology: Religion

is the substance of politics and politics the form of religion.


61The Protestant ra, tr. James Luther Adams (Chicago:
University of Chieago Press, 1957), p. 57.













CHAPTER III


THE POLITICS OF CHRISTIAN TBOLOGY


We have defined the scope of political theology as the inter-

dependence and interrelation between theological doctrines and ideas

and political philosophy. Political theology is also defined in such

a way that it should include both revelational theology and natural

theology. From a viewpoint of extreme revelational theology as in Martin

Luther, Soren Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth of our time, theology has only

negative political implications. In revelational theology there is an

unbridgeable chasm between God and man, on the one hand, and between

reason and faith, on the other hand. Since man is sinful, he can be

redeemd only by the grace of God. This attitude creates a kind of total

"indifferentism" towards cultural and political matters. Thus theology

and political philosophy are not exactly friendly twins.

Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, there is

an intimate relationship between theology or religion and politics. As

Arnold Brecht has shown, even the scientific method cannot lightly

dismiss the importance of the interrelationship between theology and

politics. If we would look at Jecques Haritain in the light of Christian

theology as a whole, we would be in a better position to understand his

political philosophy.

Political theology, the link between theology and politics, is







almost a terra incognit# on the part of political theorists. "The

moral and spiritual anarchy of our age," John H. McLachlan writes, "is

probably due to opinion being muddled and misled, to the continuing

acceptance of archaic conceptions such as the idea that religion has

nothing to do with politics."1 Ernst Troeltsch earlier wrote that

politics, without being integrated with religious and ethical conceptions,

"can do nothing but further the barbarization and mutual destruction of

the nations."2

H. Richard Niebuhr, following the footstep of Ernst Troeltsch,3

regards the relation between the Christian faith and civilization as

"the enduring problem."' Paul Tillich, one of the great Protestant theo-

logians of our time, explicitly states that "the strictly systematic

character of a theology does not need to prevent it from being 'practi-

cal' -- that is to say: applicable to the personal and social problems

of our religious life."5 However, for Tillich "it is theology and not

philosophy which is able to offer an ultimate understanding of culture."6


'1The Present World Predicament," Hibbert Journal, LVIII
(January, 1960), p. 112.

2Christian Thought: Its History and Application, ed. Baron
F. von H~gel (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 173.

3Ernst Troeltsch's The Social Teaching of the Christian
Churches is certainly the most comprehensive study regarding the
relation of Christian religious doctrines to social matters.

4hrist and Culture (Mew York: Harper and Brothers, 1956). The
first chapter is entitled "The Enduring Problem" which is a preliminary
discussion concerning the relation between Christianity and civilization.

5The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1948), p. i.

6Richard Kroner, Culture and Faith (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951), pp. vii-viii.







Moreover, all cognitive, aesthetic, social, and political matters are

"spiritual concerns." "The history of Christian theology," John

Dillenberger and Claude Welch write, "is always the record of a continuous

conversation, carried on within the church and between the church and the

world in which it lives. Thus the development of theology is always a

dual movement, an expression of the inner life of the community of faith

as it acknowledges the presence of God in Jesus Christ, and at the same

time a partial reflection of the contemporary world."'

Jesus himself was not indifferent to culture. As John Moore

says, "Jesus was not an anarchist, indifferent or opposed to the claims

of political authority; he told his bearers to pay their taxes, to 'render

unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.' But that saying continues,

'and unto God the things that are God's.'" However, the essence of

Christian thinking is that ultimately "Caesar is subject to God and the

things of Caesar must be brought under God's will."9

Richard Kroner makes a philosophical excursion into the relation

between theology and culture while he recognizes the inherent limit of

philosophy which is "determined and also illuminated by faith and the-

ology." The limit of philosophy (in contrast to faith and theology) is

essentially analogous to the proposition that "the human mind and the

divine mind are separated from each other by a chasm which is reflected

by the antagonism between culture and faith." This is the prevailing


7Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1958), p. 1.

8Protestant Christianity Interpreted through Its Development
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 179.

9"Christian Ethics and Western Thought," The Vitality of the
Christian Tradition, p. 307.







attitude of contemporary Orthodox Protestantism. The crisis theology

of Karl Barth is extremely emphatic about this chasm that Kroner

speaks of.

Unlike Karl Barth, however, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and

tail Brunner recognize cultural and historical exigencies although they

all look at san's ethical problems "from the point of view of sacred

theology rather than from a& philosophic viewpoint." Richard Kroner,

critical of the Barthian fideistic position, says that "Karl Barth and

other theologians do not solve the problem of how the secular and the

sacred are related to each other, because they ignore or disregard the

task and the function of philosophic thought." All Christian thinkers,

however, would be in complete agreement in that the ultimate solution for

cultural problems is the Christian faith. "The philosophy of faith,"

Kroner writes, "can show that . the content of Christian faith does

'solve' the ultimate task of culture which culture can never solve." The

Christian faith, for the very reason that it can transcend culture, "is

able to integrate" culture and "to embrace and permeate all its realms."10

Only a few generations ago Ernst Troeltsch came to the deplorable

conclusion that the Christian Church "no longer possessed a fixed and

objective ideal of unity," and "the social philosophy of the Christian

community has also suffered an undeniable disintegration, through its

dependence upon continually changing conditions." The result, according

to him, was obvious: the secular social theory "has far outdistanced

the social philosophy of the Church."1 The same cannot be said of the


10Richard Kromer, op. cit., pp. ix, 7-8, 208, 209.

11The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, II, p. 991.
K. E. Aubrey deplored the theological lag in cultural problem and







contemporary scene. It ranges from the political organization of

Churches' laymen to the seminars at various universities. The movements

of "Christian Democracy" in Europe range from family and youth organi-

zations to trade unions and political parties.12 They are a part of

continuous efforts to inculcate the Christian principles in politics

and economic affairs through laymen rather than through the Churches.

On the part of the Catholic Church, the new innovations began

with Vincent Joachim Pecci, later Pope Le XIII.13 On the intellectual

level, the encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879) encouraged the study of the

philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Catholic circle. On the practical

level, the encyclical Rerumn ovarum (1891) became the landmark of Cathoic

social and economic thinking which essentially attempted to avoid the


urged Christian theology to "render a new service to culture. . .
[In order to do thisJ theology.must reorientate its work so as to
concentrate upon the cultural problem . .. [The contemporary)
situation demands of theology a new religious world-view, which offers
an interpretation of civilization itself. This theology will be neither
a non-social metaphysical theory nor a non-metaphysical social teaching,
but a re-examination of assumptions of culture in terms of a world-
view." Present Theological Tendencies (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1936), pp. 17-18.

12Michael P. Fogarty defines Christian Democracy as "that
aspect of the ecumenical or catholic movement in modern Christianity
which is concerned with the application of Christian principles in
the areas of political, economic, and social life for which the Christian
laity has independent responsibility." Christian Qmocroey in Western
gurope 1820-1953 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 5, 345.
This book is probably the most comprehensive study of Christian Democra-
cy in Europe. Representing a Reman Catholic point of view, there is
Church and Society: Catholic Social and Political Thought and Movements
1789-1950, ed. Joseph Moody (New York: Arts, 1953). There are numerous
works written country by country. However, some excellent examples are:
Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Demcracy in Italy and
France (Notre Dome: University of Notre bhme Press, 1 52) and Alfred
Diammnt, Austrian Catholics and the First Repubj:c (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960).
13The nine most important social teachings of Pope Leo XIII is
found in The Church Speaks to the Modern World: The Social Teaching
of Leo XIII, ed. Etienne Gilson (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1954).
From a Protestant point of view, Winthrop S. Hudson writes Understmading







one extreme of laissez-faire capitalism and the other extreme of secular

or "atheistic" socialism; on social and political matters, we must take cogni-

zance of the encyclicals such as Imnertale Dei (1885), Graves de Comuni

(1901) and, most recently, Pope John XXIII's Hater et Neagster (July, 1961).

From a Protestant point of view, the Ecumenical Mavement (the

World Council of Churches) was an attempt to arrive at doctrinal

unity in Protestantisa.14 There is also the "Christendom" movement in

England* In the university circle in this country, the Lilly Endement

research program in Christianity and politics at Duke Wniversity under

the directorship of John H. Hallowell and the Institute of Ethics and

Politics at Wesleyan University under the direction of Kenneth W.

Underwoed are comparatively recent phensena to integrate Christianity

with political and social matters in university teaching.15


Roman Catholicism: A Guide to Papal Teaching for Protestants (Phila-
delphia: Westminster Press, 1959).

14The Ecmenical Movement or the World Council of Churches began
with the first Assembly held at Asterdam in Holland from August 22 to
September 4, 1948. Ome hundred and forty-seven churches from forty-four
countries were represented by three hundred and fifty-one delegates and
two hundred and thirty-eight alternates. The second Assembly was held
at Ivanston, Illinois, in 1956. It mst be clearly noted that the
Council itself is not a church and cannot define doctrine and policy
of various churches, although the creation of the Council is an
aspiration of a united Christian church. The Council publishes a
quarterly journal called cumenical review whose present editor is
Willem Adolph Visser 'T soft, who wrote The YIeanin of Ecumenical
(Londen: 9CK Press, 1953). See also: John T. MNeeill, modern Christian
Movements (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954) which includes Roman
Catholic novements. From a historical point of view, there is A history
of the Kcunigpl MIvement, ed. Ruth louse and Stephen C. Meill (Phila-
delphia: Westainster Press, 1954); and from a doctrinal point of view,
Walter M. Norten wrote: Christian Theole~y: An Ecumenical NAproach
(MNw York: Harper and Brothers, 1955). From a Catholic point of view,
see: Gustave Weigel, A Catholic Primer on the ciumnical "veent
(Westminster, Nd.: Ifen! Press, 1959); Bernard Leeming, The Chrches
and the Church: A Stsdy ef cumeniwt (Westminster, Md.: Newmn Press,
1960).
15The Lilly Indowment program is oriented on a high professional
level that includes conference and publication. Its publication







Along with these new developments, Christian political theology

is a force that should be recognized in the modern theory of politics.

The fundamental supposition of Christian political theology is that all

the political problems and political philosophies are at bottom theo-

logical. Theology is the first principle of Christian political philoso-

phy. The completely systematic analysis of political theology, of course,

must include all the religions of the world, whether they be past or

present, primitive or modern. It must include, for example, Christianity,

Judaism, Islamism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and examine their

theological implications and influences on politics. In doing so, politi-

cal theology must learn its lessons from comparative religion, philosophy

of religion, sociology of religion, psychology of religion, and other

intellectual disciplines.16


includes such works as Kenneth W. Th~ onpot Christian Ethics and the
Dilemma of Foreig Policy and John.Wild, uuman Freedom and sociall
Order (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959). On the other hand, the
program at Wesleyan University is primarily aimed at teaching under-
graduates the relation between Christianity and social problems. For
an exposition of this program, see: James R. Brown, "Inter-
Misiplinary and Inter-Faith Dialogue as an Approach to the Study of
Ethical Problems in Politics," Ethics ayd the Social Sciences, ed. Leo
R. Ward (Motre Dame: University of Metre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 104-16.

16ome examples are: Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane:
The Mature of religion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961) and
Patterns in Comparative Religion, tr. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1958); Nircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa (eds.), The
History of Religions: Essays in Wethodology (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1959); Joachim Wach, The Cpr native Study of Religions,
ed. Joseph H. Kitagawa (New York: Columbia Ilniversity Press, 1958),
Types of Religious Experience Christian and Men-Christian (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951) and peciology of Kligiten (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1944); Hanry Nelson Wieman and Walter M.
Horton, The Growth of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1938); John
Milton Yinger, Religion in the Struggle of Power (Brhm: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1946) and Religiog, Society and the Individual (New York:
Macmillan, 1957); William Ernest Mocking, Living Uelitjn and a World
Faith (New York: Macmillan, 1940); Charles W. )Mrris, Pathe of Life







Christianity is a catholic and universalistic religion in

the modern world. The sphere of its influence has no longer been

limited to the Western hemisphere; it has rapidly spread and taken its

roots even in the Eastern hemisphere.17 "Religion as form of life and

Weltamchbawng," writes Mircea Eliade, "is represented by Christianity."18

Despite the catholicity of Christianity in form and substance, it is

only one form of religion from a comparative point of view. Therefore,

theoretically speaking, Christian political theology is a part, although

a large part, of political theology in general. To complete a systematic

analysis of political theology, we must include all the religions of the

world, be they living or dead.

For the discussion of political theology -- Christianity or

Christian theology and politics in this case -- it is convenient to

divide hmen existence into the two fundamental '"dalities" given by

Paul Tillich: one is the historical order and the other is the eternal

order.19 One is the temporal, the natural, the profane, or the finite


(new York: George Braziller, 1956); F. S. C. Northrop, The NMt:^ of
gast and West (Mew York: Meemillan, 1946); Georg SiuEl, ScLalorg of
Religion, tr. Curt Resenthal (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959);
Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Meridian
Books, 1960); William Jmes, The Varieties of Rligious Ifperience (New
York: Mndern Library, 1929); Rudolf Otte, The Idea of the bply, tr.
John W. Harvey (Rew lark: Oxford University Press, 1958); C. G. Jung,
Psychology od RIelzLes: Wet a*d Egst, tr. R. F. C. Mull (New York:
Pantheon, 1958); Erich Pream, Psychcneilyuis and RelVion (Mev Haven:
Yale University Press, 1950); Serdon W. Allport, The Individual *k 14i
Religion (evw Vork: Nacmillan, 1960).

17he meet comprehensive study of the expansion of Christianity
is found in Kemneth Scott Latourette, A history of the expansion of
Christiaity (7 vols.; New York: Warper and Brothers, 1937-1945). A
shorter version is A istpry of Christianity (new York: Harper and
Brothers, 1953).
18The Secred & d the Profae, p. 162.

19The Shaking of the Fowndations, p. 18.







world and the other is the spiritual, the supernatural, the sacred, or

the infinite world. Politics refers to the former, whereas religion

refers to the latter. Man can be looked at in the same way: he is

hOmo religious and hbQo historicus, or he is spiritual and temporal.

Thus man is fundamentally a two-dimensional being. Regardless of what

type of religion it may be, according to NMreea Eliade, a noted

historian of comparative religion, all religions encounter the sacred

in contrast to the profane.20

Religious man would have a fundamentally different outlook on

the world of politics from the non-religious. For him the world of

politics as part of the historical order is secondary in the order of

importance: there is the higher order of the supernatural, the sacred,

or the eternal world. "For religious man," Eliade ceients, "space is

not homogeneous . . there is . a sacred space, and hence a

strong, significant space; there are other spaces that are not sacred

and so are without structure or consistency, amorphous. For religious

man, this spatial nonhomogeneity finds expression in the experience of

an opposition between space that is sacred -- the only real and real-ly

existing space -- all other space, the formless expanse surrounding it."21

While the sacred world always represents the absolute reality,

the profane world appears for religious man to be only a momentary

temporality. "Whatever the historical context in which he [religious

men7 is placed," says Eliade, '"hoo reoiigisu* always believes that there

is an absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends this world but


20The Sacred and the Profare, p. 14.

21Ibid., p. 20.







manifests itself in this world, thereby sanctifying it and asking it

real."22 here lies the difference between the naturalistic notion of

man anthropocentricc humanism) and the theocentric notion of man (thoo-

centric hum aium).23 Nan is the center of the universe in the former;

if there is God, God is either the object of belief or valuable for the

service of men.24 In the latter, however, the order is reversed: God

is the pivot of human existence and the world.

It is usually agreed that the naturalistic comeeption of man is

the product of the Renaissance and inculcated in the course of scien-

tific development. Mircea Eliade says that ". . the comeletely profane

world, the wholly desacralized cosmos, is a recent discovery in the

history of the humen spirit." Man, however, never seems to be able to

escape completely from his religious experience: there is always sme

object for belief or worship even if it be neither God nor the Supreme

Being who governs the universe. "To whatever degree he may have de-

sacralized the world, the man who had made his choice in fever of a

profane life never succeeds in completely doing away with religious

behavior."

Whatever the nature of man may be, the world of politics for

religious man appears to be at its best only one of many possible

dimensions of human existence. Politics, considered as such, seems to

be more rewarding and exacting. Politics and other dimensions of life

are existentially interrelated with one another. Religious dimensieo

22Ibid., p. 202.

23From an anthrepocentric point of view, Erich Kahler wrote ap
the Neasure: A Itw Aj roach to Ristory (New York: George Braziller,
1961). Jacques Naritain presents one of the best examples of theo-
centric htmenism in True R ism, tr. Margot Adamson (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1938).
24For example, see Ludwig Feuerbach, The essencee of Chraitianity.







and political dimension, in the last resort, cannot be excluded from

mutual dependence. Mircea Eliade pinpoints this fact when he says

that the sacred and the profane worlds are "of concern both to the

philosopher and to anyone seeking to discover the possible dimensions

of human existence."25

A political theorist who studies political theology must keep

in mind that, for religious an, e. g., a Christian theologian, politics

is always portrayed in the image of the profane world in contrast to

religion in the image of the sacred world. It is not too difficult to

understand, therefore, why a Christian theologian would consider

Communism as a pseudo-religion in which the proletariat has a kind of

"soteriological function" and the stateless society has a kind of

"Judaeo-Christian eschatological hope of an absolute end to history."26

For a theologian who is trying to bridge the chasm between

theology and politics or between the sacred and the profane worlds,

political theology is the means to achieve this unity. Some

theologians, notably Karl Barth, may try to discard the profane

world of politics altogether. However, paradoxically enough,

they can never escape from political involvement. The record

of Barth's opposition to Nazism, despite his theological belief,

clearly shows why even the utterly profane world of politics must become

the concern for even such a theologian. For more politically-minded

theologians like Reinhold Miebuhr and Jacques Maritain, Christianity has

cast its lot with the world of politics even though it is profane.


26Ibid., p. 207.


25The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 13, 15, 23, 203.





67

That was the reason why Reinhold Niebuhr accused Barth of "indifferentism"

towards the world of politics.27 Niebuhr's ethical concern over the

world of politics is a supreme form of Christian activism. Niebuhr

cannot tolerate the Barthian attitude of Christians having "nothing

special to say to the godless people of our age which [they] would not

have said in any age."28 even Dmil Brunner who shares the Christocentric

Barthian orientation "saw some point of contact in men's 'capacity for

the world'."29

Will Herberg shews clearly why even Karl Barth had to become

involved in politics.30 He considers Barth as "truly the Carlylean Hero

as Theologian," and Barth is not merely an "eventful" men but also an

"event-making" man.31 In examining Karl Barth, Herberg comes to the

conclusion that "contemporary theology is reasserting its relevance to

all of human life, man's social concerns included." And even in the

social philosophy of Karl Barth, Herberg distinguishes "a kind of pre-

Barthian Barth" from real Barth. Barth has been concerned with "the


27ssays in Applied Christianity, ed. B. B. Robertsen (New York:
Meridian Books, 1959), "Barthianism and the Kingdeom" pp. 141-93.

28Ibjd., p. 173.

29Will Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," p. 16.

30Herberg's exposition of "the social philosophy of Karl Barth"
is an indication that Barth had to be involved in politics.

31p. ct., p. 12. "Eventful" men and "event-making" men are
coined by Sidney Book in The Hero in -pstgry: A Study in Ui tation
and Possibility (Boaton: Beacon Press, 1943), p. 154. Book dis-
tinguishes the two categories of eventful mn and event-making m~n:
"The eventful mn in history is any men whose actions influenced
subsequent developments along a quite different course than would have
been followed if these actions had not been taken. The event-meking
man is an eventful man whese actions are the consequences of out-
standing capacities of intelligence, will, and character rather than
of accidents of position."







problems of society, church, and state, war and revolution, totalitari-

anism and democracy." This was why Barth expressed his stern oppo-

sition to Nazi totalitarianism: his discriminating judgments in politics

came to "bring the Christian to the side of constitutional democracy."32

The fideistic position of Barth totally rejects reason, nature

and philosophy. H. R. Mackintosh remarks that "Barth gives no place to

Natural Revelation."33 Revelation, faith, and grace are the key concepts


32Will Herberg, op. cit., pp. 13, 21, 45.

33Types of Modern Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1937), p. 277. The fideistic position of Karl Barth is clear throughout
his theological writings. The ipistle to the Romans, tr. Edwyn C.
Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) was merely the beginning
of this great theologian. Joachim Wach comments that "Two theological
books profoundly impressed the generation of students which populated
the German universities after the First World War: the Commentary on
the Epistle to the Romans by Karl Barth and The Idea of the Holy by
Rudolf Otto." Types of Religious Experience Christian and Non-Christian,
p. 209. The most systematic exposition of Barth's theology is found in
Church Dogmtics (4 vols. in 7; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1936-1958); Dogmatics in Outline, tr. G. T. Thomson (New York: Philo-
sophical Library, 1949) is a sketch of his theological outlook. His
Gifford lectures make his fideistic position clear and here we find
his negative attitude towards society and culture: The Knowledge of
God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the reformation,
tr. J. L. M. Haire and Ian Henderson (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1938). His social thinking can be found in The Word of God and the Word
of Man, tr. Douglas Horton (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957),
Against the Stream and Co-munity, State and Church. An excellent
exposition of Barth's social and political thinking is found in Will
Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," Coeunity, State and
Church, pp. 11-67.
Among numerous materials concerning theological tendencies of
the contemporary world, the following works seem to be useful for the
present exposition of "the politics of Christian theology": E. E.
Aubrey, Present Theological Tendencies, Roger Hazelton, kew Accents in
Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960); Carl F. H.
Henry (ed.), Contemporary VvaeRalical Thought (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1957); Walter M. Horton, Contamporary Continental Theology
and Theology in Transition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943);
H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology; Daniel Day William, What
Present-Bay Theologians Are Thinking (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1952); Karl Pfleger, Wrestlers with Christ, tr. I. I. Watkin (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1938).







for Barth. In his Gifford lectures, he made absolutely clear that

"natural theology" is an impossibility, le somewhat apologetically

stated that his lectures could only serve "indirectly" to the intentions

of Gifford lectures, which require a general topic on "natural theology"

and its relation to the human ethics and the world. The Barthian fideistic

position implies an indifferent attitude towards the historical order

altogether. "Not ethical autonomy," remarks H. R. Mackintosh, "is the

watchword, but obedience to the Word of God, speaking in man's heart

to disclose to him his duty for the actual or existential moment through

which he is living."34 "The knowledge of God and the service of God"

is an antithesis to "natural theology." God (not man) and the Church

(not the world) are exalted. "The church," Barth vehemently states, "is

neither a charitable institution, nor an institution for the general

betterment of the world and man. She is not an institution for the culti-

vation of fellowship, nor is she a place of intellectual entertainment."35

For Barth, God alone can save the world, aad "the synthesis Cof God and

the world we seek is in God alone, and in God alone can we find it. If

we do not find it in God, we do not find it at all.36

As has been suggested in the preceding pages, there are three

possible attitudes, which the theologians may take concerning the re-

lationships between the sacred world and the profane world. According

to H. Richard Miebehr, these are the relations between "Christ and


34O. cit., p. 319.

35The KYwl4aed of God and the Service of God according to
the Teac&hin of the Reformetion, p. 209.

36Karl Barth, The ird of God and the Word of Men, pp. 281,
322.








culture."37 These three different attitudes, moreover, correspond to

the attitudes concerning the connection between faith and reason, between

grace and nature, and between theology and philosophy.38

The first position is that of "Christ over culture." It is the

logical consequence of the primary emphasis on faith, grace, and the-

ology at the expense of reason, nature and philosophy. In the Middle

Ages, the Tertullan "family" and the Augustinian "family" represented

this position. Kierkegaard, Luther and Barth represent the same position

when they discard the role of reason, nature and philosophy in the Christian

faith. Thus the "other-ness" of God is the necessary chasa between the

sacred world and the profane world. A Thomist appears for them as a kind

of "semi-rationalist." "Contemporary Protestant thought," Samuel E.

Stumpf writes, "is fundamentally critical of natural law theory, even

though it does not repudiate the doctrine entirely. The ground of this

critical attitude is that the doctrine of natural law is originally the

product of rational philosophy, which rests upon certain notions of the

nature and capacities of man which Protestantism does not accept."9

The theology of Reinhold Kiebuhr revolves around Christian ethics.

Thus, his chair of "applied Christianity" is an appropriate title. Dente

L. Germino calls him "a theological gadfly" rather than a theologian.40


370p. cit. Ernst Troeltsch classified three types of Christian
thought: the Church, the soct, and mysticism in The Social Teaching of
the Christian Churches, II, p. 993.

38This distinction, as it existed in the Middle Ages, is made
clear by Etienne Gilson in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938). Three distinct categories are:
the primacy of faith, the primacy of reason, and the harmony of reason
and revelation.
39A Handbook of Christian Theology (Mew York: Meridian Books,
1958), p. 246.
40"Two Types of Christian Political Thought," p. 481. Edward D.







Niebuhr's whole political "realism" is based upon the notion of original

sin.41 The natural law of Thmism is totally rejected by him. Reaen

Catholicism appears to his at its best "the blind child of light," in


O'Connor, a Catholic thinker, writes that "Niebuhr's interest in the-
ology is chiefly motivated by ethical preoccupations, and his theo-
logical positions are manifestly influenced by ethical convictions."
"The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr," Review of Politice, XXIII (April,
1961), pp. 193-94.

41A1l Niebuhr's writings seem to have positive social
implications deriving from his ideas of Christian ethics. The Mature
and Destiny of Man (2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941-
1943) must be considered as the point at which his theology lays the
ground for his social and political philosophy. The theme of the fallen
and pessimistic nature of men permeates all of his writings. Ameng his
works, the following are important far the purpeee of the present essay:
An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Meridian Books, 1956);
Moral M and Inoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932)
which has great impacts on political realism in international politics;
Christian Realism and Political Problem (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1940); Christianity sad Plwer Politics (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1940); The Children of Light and the Childre0 of
Darkness; The Structure of Nations and Erpire (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sens, 1959); Esays in Applied Christianity.
The most penetrating expositions on Niebuhr's thought are
compiled with his own comments in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W.
Bretall (ads.), Reinhold Niebuhr: Ei Religious, Social, and Political
Thought (New York: Maemillan, 1961). Gordon Harland appraises Niebuhr's
thought in The Thought of Reinbold Niabuhr (MNw York: Oxford University
Press, 1960) which includes the social and political thought of Niebuhr.
Holtan P. Odegard critically analyzes the political philosophy of Niebuhr
in Sin and Sqceace: Leinpold Miebuhr as political Theologia (Yellow
Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1956). Ronald F. Howell wrote an
excellent article: "Political Philosophy on a Theological Foundation:
An Expository Analysis of the Political Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr,"
Ethics, LXII (January, 1953), pp. 79-99.
It mest be noted here that the cardinal virtue of Niebuhr's
political philosophy is realism based upon the notion of selfish,
pessimistic and sinful man, and yet Niebuhr seem to attempt to
transcend this limitation by means of faith, love and justice. This
appears to be an engulfing conflict between realism and idealism in
Niebuhr's thought. "Indeed, the unsolved problem in Niebuhr's philoso-
phy," Kenneth W. Thempson writes, "arises precisely from this crowing
point in his thought," that is to say, "from the depths of human
selfishness and sin to the bright suit of transcendent faith." "The
Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr," Reiniild Miebuhr: iis
Religious, Social, and Folitical Thinbht, pp. 168, 169.







contrast to the "children of darkness.'"2 He thus characterizes the

"misgivings of Catholic politics," first of all, in Catholicism's

identification of "the moral ambiguities of politics . with eternal

sanctities." Secondly, the misgiving of Catholic politics is that "the

Catholic church tends to identify the historic church with the Kingdom

of God." Thirdly, Niebuhr thinks that an alternative of "moral nihilism"

(e. g., the Barthian position) cannot be found in the Catholic principle

in "the infLexible propositions of 'natural law'."43

The contemporary Orthodox Protestant theologians -- Reinhold

Niebuhr, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and Paul Tillich -- attack the theo-

logical position of Protestant "liberalism" that had been flourishing

in the nineteenth century.4 They all are critical of the liberal

position which brought Christ down to the level of culture -- this is the

second possible position that H. Richard Neibuhr calls "the Christ of

culture" and Karl Barth calls "culture-Protestantism. 45 The Orthodox

Protestantism of our day completely rejects the Protestantism of Albrecht

Ritschl, Friedrich Schleiermacher, the historical Jesus research of


42The Children of Light Mad the Childree of Darkness, p. 13.

43Essays in Applied Christianity, p. 248.

44For the development of Protestantins, see: John Dillenberger
and Claude Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted through ItV
Development and William 'Hrdern, A Laymn's Guide tp Protestant
Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1955). Expositions of aeo-Orthodon
Protestantism are found in William Hordern, The Case for a New
reformation Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959) and
Edward John Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1959).

45H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, p. 102. It is what
is called Kulturproteptantismus by the Germans.







Albert Schweitaer, and the Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch.46 In

short, Protestant liberalism is "the acculturation of Christ.'47 On

the other hand, many Protestants would not regard Imoral nihilism" of

the "Christ-against-culture" type (the first and fideistic position)

as the solution of the chaotic world of today. "The widespread reaction,"

writes H. Richard Niebuhr, "against cultural Protestantism in our time

tends to obscure the importance of answers of this type to the Christ-

and-culture problem."48

Unlike Karl Barth, many Protestant thinkers of our time accept

the limited role of reason. Rudolf Otto, who has been concerned with

the significant implications of the "non-rational" feeling ) for meta-

physic, has even remarked that "no one ought to concern himself with the

'NMman ineffabile' who has not already devoted assiduous and serious

study to the 'Ratio aeterna'."'9 Bail Brunaer's acceptance of limited

natural theology in the Protestant circle has already been mentioned.

Here he departs from his colleague Karl Barth.50 Thus, not all Protestant


46Albrecht Benjamin Ritschl, The Christian pctrine Qf
Justification and Recoacil atopp, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay
(2d ed.; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1902); Friedrich Schleiermecher,
The Christiap Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and M. S. Stewart (Edinburgh:
T. and T. Clark, 1928) and On Religion: Speeches to Its Culurod
Despiseys, tr. John Omen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958); Albert
Schweitzer, h* Quett qf the Historical J-aus, tr. W. Montgomery (3d ed.;
New York: emisllan, 1957); Walter Rauschenbush, A Theology of the Sgcial
Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1917). For the expositions of liberal
theology, see: H. R. Mackintosh, Types of M~dern Theology on Schleiermacher
(pp. 31-100), Ritschl (pp. 138-80) and Troeltsch (pp. 181-217); H. P. Van
Dusen and D. E. loberts (eds.), Liberal Theelegy (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1942); L. Harold DeWolf, The Case for Theology in
Liberal Perlspecti (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959).
47H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 102.
48Ibd., p. 101.

49The Ide1 of the Iply, p. xxi.
50Fer the controversy on nature and grace between Barth and Brunner,
see: Matural Theology: Comprising "Mature and Grace" by dail Brunner







thinkers reject the role of natural law in the modern world. Robert

L. Calhoun sees the necessary correlation between democracy and natural

law.51 Natural law concept for John Wild is an indispensable foundation

for reconstructing a "realistic philosophy" and othics.52 Anglicanism

also is imbued with the important role of reason in theology.53 "The

political side," writes hathaniel Micklem, "belongs to the sphere of

Reason rather than of Revelation.n54

Pcau Tillich has a unique theological character of his own.55 By


qnd the Reply n"!" by Karl larth, tr. Peter Fraeakel with an introduction
by John Baillie (London: G. Bles, 1946). On this problem, also consult:
H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1941)
and John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Iecant Thought (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1956).
Karl Barth, in his Gifford lectures, said that he could not, as
a Reformed theologian, directly affirm and fulfill the intention of Lord
Gifford under whose name Gifford lectures have been initiated. And he
declared that "natural theology" exists due to "a radical error" and he
intended to keep himself away froe it. The 7 uwAedge of God and the
Service of God according to the Teaching of te Refrmation, p. 5.

51Democracy and Natural Law," Natural Law Ferum V (1960),
pp. 31-69.

521ntroduction to Realistic Philosophy (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1948) and Plato's ~2emrn Enemies and the Theory of Natural
Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

53Anglican theology has been imbued with rational theology.
For example, see: William Temple, Iature, Man and God (London:
Macmillan, 1935); E. L. Mascall, Me Who Is: A Study in Traditional
Theism (London: Longmans, Green, 1943) and Existece and Analogy: A
Sequel to 'He Who Is' (London: Longmans, Green, 1949). As Mascall
himself makes clear in the preface of ie Who is, "this book is put
forward as a small contribution to the reconstruction of Anglican the-
ology" (p. xii). His philosophical approach is unquestionably "Thomistic"
in these two volumes.

54The Theology of Politics, p. xii.

55The systematic theology of Paul Tillich is found in Systematic
Theology (2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1957) and
in The Protestiut Era, tr. James Luther Adam (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1948). His works which have cultural implications
include: The Religious Situation, tr. H. Richard Niebuhr (New York:







kis own admission, he avoids the party struggle or stands always "on

the boundary" between opposing views: "between Barth and Hirscb,

between American empirical theology and European dialectical theology,

between Protestantisa and Catholicism."56 It is not strange, therefore,

that the Catholic Jesuit Gustave Weigel, in his review of Tillich's

The Protestant Ira, has said that "There is something Thomistic about

this brilliant thinker not in the sense that he subscribes to the more

characteristic Thomistic theses -- he rejects many of them violently --

but in the sense that he is moved by the same feeling for unity and

completenes in his vision of the real. . He has made luminous that

strange thing, Protestantism, to which he is passionately attached."57


Meridian Books, 1956); Dynarics of Faith; The Courage To fe; The Shaking
of the Foundatioqs; The New Betn (New York: Charles Scribner's Sees,
1955); Love, Power, and Justice (Mew York: Ocford University Press,
1954). An analysis of Tillich's thought is found in Charles W. Kegley
and Robert W. Bretall (eds.), The Theolyg of Paul Tillich (New York:
Macmillan, 1952), which includes Tillich's em events. Walter
Leibrecht (ed.), Recigion ad Culture: Xssays in ft/or of PFul Tillch
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959) is a collection of essays which
deal with Christianity and culture in general.

56Walter M. Horton, "Tillich's Role in Contemporary Theology,"
The Theology of faul Tillich, pp. 45-46. Walter Leibrecht maCes Tillich's
position mest clear when he says: "For Tillich, theology and philosophy
are called to actualize themselves in continuous dialogue and encounter
with scientists, artists, sociologists, economists, depth psychologists
and others intent on expressing and interpreting reality.!' In contrast
to the Barthian position, Leibrecht states: "If Karl Barth is the theo-
logians' theologian, cendeaning the mediating function of theology, Tillich
stands forth as the theologian for iverymen in the predicament of his
existence." Therefore, the theology of Paul Tillich is "a truly ecumeni-
cal theology." mis theology provides "in his concept of theonomy a
creative possibility for a fruitful encounter of the Protestant and
Catholic principles in the present ecumenical discussion." "The Life
and Mind of Paul Tillich," itligion and Culture: Essays in Btnrz of
Paul Tillich, pp. 10, 17.

57As quoted in Walter M. Horton, "Tillich's Rle in Conteporary
Theology," pp. 41-42.







Paul Tillich makes clear the relation between reason and

revelation. For Tillich, faith is of man's ultimate concern; it is

"an act of the total personality." According to him, even modern

humanism is a "humanist faith of the moral type." Faith has all the

elements of doubt, courage, and love. Thus faith is the "integrating

power" of life, and it "determines and unites all elements of the

personal life." The truth of faith is determined by "adequacy" of

expression of ultimate concern, the adequacy of essentially symbolic

expression. Resulting from this conception of faith, Protestantism has

been in a position to criticize Roman Cathelicism: "'x church has the

right to put itself in the place of the ultimate. Its truth is judged

by the ultimate."

The Reformation, according to Tillich, was essentially the revolt

against "the exclusion of the prophetic self-criticism by the authori-

tarian system of the Church and the growth of the sacramental elements

of faith over the moral-personal ones." Tillich, however, has no at-

tachment to Protestant liberalism which has lost sacramentalism and

became "nore and mere a representative of the moral-personal type." It

is no better than the authoritarianism of Roman Catholicism, for "the

Pauline experience of the Spirit [the Spirit of love, justice and truth/

as the unity of all types of faith was largely lost in both Catholicism

and Pretestantism."58


58Yynamicp of Faith, pp. 4, 69, 72, 98, 108. Karl Barth
expresses virtually the same opinion when he says: ". . the church
service both in Roman Catholicism and in Protestantism is a torso.
The Roman Catholic church has a sacramental service without preaching.
. . [The Protestant church has7 a service with a sermon but without
sacrament." The Knowledge of God Ead the Service of God according to
the Teachiln of the Reformation, p. 211.







Paul Tillich raises no objection to science as a source of

knowledge.59 His only objection is the scientific spirit that produced

the idea of infinite progress, eternal peace and happiness. Similar to

the Catholic thought, Tillich does recognize the role of reason, which

has essentially no conflict with faith. "Reaeon is the precondition of

faith; faith is the act in which reason reaches ecstatically beyond

itself. . Man's reason is finite; it moves within finite relations

when dealing with the universe and with man himself. . The ecstatic

experience of an ultimate concern does net destroy the structure of

reason. Ecstasy is fulfilled, not denied, rationality.", Thus, there is

no conflict between faith and reason, as long as the latter recognizes

its own limitation. "They are within each other.'60

Paul Tillich further speaks of "doubt" as an element in the

dynamics of faith. However, "the doubt," he explains, "which is

implicit in every act of faith is neither the methodological nor the

skeptical doubt. . It is not the permanent doubt of the scientist,

and it is not the transitory doubt of the skeptic, but it is the doubt

of him who is ultimately concerned about a concrete content." The

element of doubt for Tillich is truly "the Protestant principle." Hence

he believes that "the concept of 'infallibility' of a decision by a

council or a bishop or a book excludes doubt as an element of faith in

those who subject themselves to these authorities." This is truly the

essential criticism of Protestantism against Roman Catholicism. Faith

devoid of doubt, therefore, "has become static, a nenquestioning surrender


59The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 5.

60Dynamics of faith, pp. 76, 77.







not only to the ultimate, which is affirmed in the act of faith, but

also to its concrete elements as formulated by the religious authorities."

In regard to cognitive reason, Paul Tillich recognizes three

forms: the scientific, the historical and the philosophical. They have

no conflict with the truth of faith. "Science," he writes, "can

conflict only with science, and faith only with faith; science which

remains science cannot conflict with faith which remains faith."

"Neither scientific nor historical truth can affirm or negate the truth

of faith. The truth of faith can neither affirm nor negate scientific

or historical truth."61 Nevertheless, the scientific observer is never

absolutely "pure" -- pure in the sense that he can exclude "interfering

factors." As regards philesephy and faith, they both are concerned with

ultimate reality, but the former is conceptuall" and the latter is

"symbolical." Furthermore, there is "a continuous process of interpre-

tation of philosophical elements and elements of faith, not one philo-

sophical faith."

All in all, Paul Tillich recognizes an important role of reason

in the scientific, the historical and the philosophical truths. They

have no essential conflict with the truth of faith. From this con-

sideration of the important role of reason, he comes to a very sig-

nificant practical conclusion when he says: "The humanist faith in the

essential rationality of man is more favorable for general education

and democracy than the traditionally Christian faith in original sin and

the demonic structures of reality. The Protestant faith, in an unmediated,


61lbid., pp. 20, 28, 29, 82, 89. Bail Bruaner also says that
it is not necessary that science should be subordinated to theology.
Science serves men best if they remain true to its own law. Christianity
and Civilisation, Part 2, p. 137.







person-to-person encounter with God, produces more independent

personalities than the Catholic faith and its ecclesiastical mediation

between God and men." Mereover, "Lutheran faith in personal forgiveness

is less conducive to social action than the Calvinistic faith in the

honor of God."62

Many political theorists would agree with Tillich in that

rationality is an important element for democracy;63 and "independent

personalities," when translated into a psychological term, that is, the

individualism of democracy, are mich more. favorable to democracy than are

the more dependent personalities who adhere to the Catholic faith. Thus

Tillich leaves us in debt about the possible relation between Catholic

rational philosophy and democracy, and the total structure of Niebuhr's

political philosophy with which original sin has an intimate relation.

ail Drunner also has the "scholastic" tone in his own right.

In this respect, he differs from Karl Barth. His consistent exposition

of Christian ethics deserves due attention along with the ideas of Paul

Tillich. However, Brunner makes it clear that he has no taste for the


62Dynamics of Faith, pp. 93, 94, 116-17.

63For example, see: J. Roland Pennock, Liberal DBeecracy: Its
Merits and Prospects (New York: Rinehart, 1950), pp. 23-24. Ameng a few
meanings of "rationalism," Peneeek interprets rationalism (which is
pertinent to the workings of democracy) as "the assurance that men
generally have a proclivity to use their rational powers and to act
accordingly" (p. 24). The Christian conception of reason, e. g., Thomism,
mast not be confused with "rationalism" as in the Enlightenment when
reason was emeacipated from faith. In the Christian conception of reason,
reason is never dissociated from faith although it may have its own dis-
tinct function (the rational faculties of the human mind) from theology.

64Brumner's most systematic work on theology is Bogmtics
composed of two volumes: The Christian Doetrine of God and The Christian
ectrine ef Creation and de4mytion, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press,' 1950-1952). Other theological works include:
Lavelation and leaeon: e Christian Doctrine of Faith and Ioowledge,







intellectualism of Roman Catholicism, especially the Thomistic the-

ology and ethics. He notes that there are many books written under the

title of "reason and revelation"; but there is none entitled "reve-

lation and reason" (revelation over reason, not vice versa).65 IH

emphasizes the fact that this is fundamentally a difference between

himself and a Roman Catholic theologian. Therefore his book is sig-

nificantly entitled jeaelation and Realsn: The Christian Doctrine of

Faith end Knowledge.66 However, the title alone should not mislead the

emphasis of contents. For Maritain, there is no doubt that theology is

the peak of metaphysics and philosophy. But he would make philosophy or

metaphysics the first part and not the last, the beginning and not the

end, and base and not the peak of theology.67

In comparison with other post-Reformation theologies (perhaps,

Barthian crisis theology), Brunner believes that his theology is the true


tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946); The Philosophy
of Religion: from the Standpoint of Protestant Theelogy, tr. A. J. D.
Farrer and Bertram L. Woolf (London: James Clarke, 1958); The Divine-
fimen t= counter tr. Amandus W. Leos (Philadelphia: Westmitster Press,
1943); The Mediator, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1947); The scandall of Christianity (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1951); The understandingg of the Chur~c, tr. Harold Knight (Phila-
delphia: Westminster Press, 1953); The Theology of Crisis (1ev York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929). His whole cultural thought seems to
have culminated in his Gifford lectures: Christianity and Civilisation
(2 parts; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948-1549). His ethical
and social thought is found especially in The lvine Iperative, tr.
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947); Men in Revolt:
A Christian Anthropology, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1947); Justice and the Social Order, tr. Mary Hottinger (2d ed.;
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945).

65For example, Etienne Gilson's Reeson and Revelation in the
Middle Ages and chapter ii, "Reaon and Revelation," A. E. Taylor's
The Faith of a Moralist (Vol. II; Londen: Macmillan, 1930).
66Mote that "revelation" and "faith" precede "reason" and
"knowledge" respectively.
67The Drewa of Descartes, tr. Mabelle L. Andison (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1944), p. 91.







Reformation theology. "In post-Reformation theology," he writes,

"this Reformation point of view was very largely lost." That is to

say, the true Reformation theology for Brunner was to start with reve-

lation and "thee work outwards to reason." Nowever, he does not

tolerate "the Roman Catholic misunderstanding" (Roman Catholicism

which is identified with the order of "reason and revelation" instead

of "revelation and reason"). Thus he is concerned with "the formu-

lation of a Christian and theological doctrine of revelation as a

doctrine of believing knowledge." The essential formula is "reve-

lation and reason in faith." For Brunner, Christian philosophy is

"both possible and necessary, because as Christians we neither can nor

should cease to think. It is not reason, but rationalism, that makes

Christian philosophy appear impossible.'8 Me would regard, without

hesitation, the Roman Catholic theology as a kind of rationalism or

semi-rationalism. So far, it seems that the difference of Brunner's

point of view and the Thomistic view concerning the interconnection

between revelation and reason (or between theology and philosophy) is

one of emphasis rather than of kind. If we consider the distance between

the two poles, theology and philosophy or faith and reason, then we would

have some kind of order like "Barth Brunner and Tillich the Thomist -

the rationalist."

As it has already been suggested, there seems to be an intimate

relation between one's theological attitude (i. e., the relation between

theology and philosophy or faith and reason) and his view on the cultural

order in general. When a theologian like Karl Barth emphasizes the


6Revelation and Reason, pp. xi, 12, 392, 393. See also The
Philosophy of Religion in regard to the relation between faith and reason.







importance of revelation, grace and theology at the expense of reason,

nature and philosophy, he is likely to produce the ideal type of "Christ-

against-culture" category. Thus the fideist position tends to produce

a kind of cultural and political "indifferentism." On the other hand,

when a breathing space for reason, nature and philosophy is given, then

Christianity becomes involved with the cultural order. That is to say,

the fideist position like that taken by Karl Barth is essentially a

negative one, whereas the "rational" position is a positive one in terms

of the relation between Christianity and culture. Jacques Maritain, Emil

Brunner, and Paul Tillich take the positive position, while Barth stands

alone at the negative pole.

The positive attitude of Brunner is expressed in his panoramic

view concerning the relation between Christianity and culture in his

Gifford lectures. He makes.it clear that "only Christianity is capable

of furnishing the basis of a civilisation which can rightly be described

as human."69 However, there is,.in a strict sense, neither a Christian

civilization nor the Christian state. They have never existed before and

will never exist.70 Paul Tillich agrees: "There was, and still is, a

religiously colored society, but there is no true religious community."71

For Brunner, the state and civilization have been the "irrational products

of history" rather than the moral force of religion (in this case, Christi-

anity). This is the essential position of "Christianity beyond


69Christianity and Civilisation, Part 1, p. v.

70The Divine Imperative, p. 463; Christianity and Civilisation,
Part 2, p. 127.

71"The World Situation," The Christian Answer, ed. Henry P.
Van Dusen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), p. 36.







civilisation" as it is described by Brunner himself. In other words,

according to iH. Richard Niebuhr, it is the "Christ-above-culture" type.

As Brunner says, "Culture-idolatry is the sure road to cultural decay."

"Culture and civilization," he continues, "although they belong ex-

clusively to men, are not in themselves the truly human." To be the

truly human, culture mest be spiced with the Christian principles. When

we use the term "Christian civilization," according to Brunner, it is

"a compromise between Christian and non-Christian forces."72

Emil Brunner is truly a Protestant theologian. For him the

ultimate justification of truly Christian ethics can be made by

grace alone. "Every form of natural ethics," he states, "is anthro-

pocentric." "All natural morality and ethics -- whether based on

religious or rational grounds -- is either eudaemonistic or legalistic."73

This is exactly what the Catholic ethics based upon natural law could

imply for Brunner. "The Divine Comaand" is the basis of Christian ethics.

Man's ultimate ethics require the obedience to the Divine Comeand. Only

the order of God is infallible; all human knowledge and natural ethics

are subject to error.

Even "irrational" existentialism (not Christian existentialist

theology) tinged with romenticies has become imbued with the importance

of reason.74 What George F. Themes calls "the tragic dualism of head


72Chritianity and Civilisation, Part 2, pp. 127, 129, 131.

73The Divine Iperative. p. 68.

74Karl Jaspers emphasizes the idea that contemporary inter-
national politics mest recognize the importance of "reseen" and thus
"philosophy" itself. "The new thinking," he writes, "is the age-old
one which thus far has net penetrated far enough to form and guide
communities of men: it is reason; it is philosophy." Although reason







and heart" is a controversial topic in Christian philosophy and the-

ology.75 In the Christian camp, the Thomistic theology (Roman Catholic

theology in general) has been continually stressing the important role

of reason and the distinct role of "philosophy" (in contrast to "the-

ology"). Etienne Gilson well expressed Thomism as "the harmony of

reason and faith."76 In the Middle Ages, Thomism was opposed to the

Tertullian family (the primacy-of-faith school), on the one hand, and

to the Averroists and the nominalists, on the other hand. In the modern

world, the struggle of Thomism turned to the opposition to Protestant

revelational theology (especially the crisis theology of Karl Barth) on

the one hand and, on the other hand, to contemporary "rationalism" and

"naturalism" which are regarded as the offshoots of the Renaissance and

the Enlightenment. Even H* Richard Niebuhr, a Protestant thinker, praises

St. Thomas Aquinas "who is probably the greatest of all the synthesists

in Christian history . .77

The Thoaistic position is the third alternative in regard to

the relationship between Christianity and civilization. H. Richard

Niebuhr calls it the "Christ-above-culture" school. It is opposed to

the other two extreme positions of the fideist and the liberal. This


is essential to politics, reason should not be construed as "a
property." But it is "a vehicle." Moreover, "the real meaning of
democracy can be established only by reason itself." The Future of
Mankind, tr. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), especially pp. 187-317.

75"Christianity and Modern Philosophy," The Vitality of the
Christian Tradition, p. 249.

76Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, pp. 69-99.

77Christ and Culture, p. 128.







position gives a balanced position, as Thomism is a "balanced philoso-

phy" as described by Frederick C. Copleston.78 Christ or the Church

remains fundamentally above the cultural order, and yet the cultural

order is not viewed as anti-Christ. Christ, in turn, is not eeceidered

as the "Christ of culture." Among many Thomists of our time, Jacques

Maritain is one of the most outstanding representatives.

Philosophy, in contrast to theology, has a distinct role as to

its methods, objects and principles. In the same way, the political

order is viewed as distinct from the religious world. For the Thomist,

therefore, the state and the church are two equally perfect scieties.

To recognize distinct philosophy is to permit the rational faculties

of the human mind to solve the worldly problems. Thus, differing from

the fideist position of either Karl Barth or Reinhold Niebuhr, the

Theaist considers human reason and natural law as the direct or immedi-

ate foundations of a political philosophy, although theology has an

indirect upperhand over philosophy, The political philosophies of

Heinrich A. Reamen and Johannes Messner represent the Thomistic position

par excellence.79 among political theorists and philosophers, John H.

Hallowell, Tves R. Simon and Eric Voegelin recognize the rational approach

to politics. There are also many twentieth-century philosophers who


78Aui_ a (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1955), p. 254.

798e Ieinrich A. Remen, The State in Catholic Thought: A
Treatise in Political Pkilosophy and Johanes Messner, Social 5thiVs:
Natural Lw in the fMde World, tr. F. F. Doherty (St. Louis and
London: B. Herder, 1957). The representative thoughts of contemporary
Roman Catholic WUinkers are found in Robert A. Caponigri, l4dern
Catholic Thinkers (New '~rk: harper and Brothers, 1960).







take the rational approach to theology. Seoe of their names are C. C.

J. Webb, A. E. Taylor, A. N. Whitehead, William Ernest Hocking and

Charles Hartshorne.80

As it has been pointed out, the balanced position of Thomism

avoids the two extreme positions of Barthianism and theological liberal-

ism. Thus this balanced view has even attracted some of.the Protestant

thinkers. "Because of the intellectual and practical adequacy of rthe

Thomistic] system," H. Richard Niebuhr writes, "[Aquinas'] way of

solving the problem of culture and Christ has become the standard way for

hosts of Christians. Many a Protestant who has abandoned the Ritschlian

answer is attracted to Thomian without being tempted to transfer his

allegiance to the Roman church, while in Anglican thought and practice

his system is normative for many; on the Christ-culture issue the lines

drawn among Christians cannot be made to coincide with the historic dis-

tinctions among the great churches."81


80See C. C. J. Webb, God and PersOonality (New York: Macmillan,
1918) and Divine Personality aWd Auan Lift (New York: Macmillan,
1920); A. E. Taylor, The Faith of a ANralist (2 vols.; London: Macmillan,
1930); A. N. Whitehead, Process ond Reality: An Essay in Cosmology
(New York: Macmillan, 1929); William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of
God in Homan Experience: A Philosophic Study of Religion (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1912) and sciencee and the Idea of God (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Charles Hartshorne,
The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New Maven: Yale
University Press, 1948).
The approach which is found in the above works might be
called a "philosophical" approach to religion or theology. As George
F. Thomas points out, it is not entirely true to say that modern phi-
losophy freed itself from medieval theology only to serve science. A.
N. Whitehead, for example, recognized the importance of religion to
science. Thus, it is not quite true when Frederick Copleston says:
"Instead of serving the theologian, the philosopher will serve the
scientist, for science has displaced theology in public esteem."
Contemporary Philosophy, p. 30.

81Christ and Culture, pp. 128-29.







Despite the three different positions of Christian political

theology, we must recognize these positions as Christian in essence.

With a few exceptions (like Karl Barth), a general conclusion can be

stated that "all sensitive Christian thought today must define the

personal and social principles so that the Christian evaluation of life

becomes a prophetic criticism against the evils of present society, and

a light to point the way to a better order."82 Hwever, what Nathaniel

Micklem calls "the ultimate question" remains above the demands of

politics, economics and other questions of the profane world. The

superior position of the religious order, all Christian thinkers would

agree, is truly an integrating factor between the cultural order and the

religious order. "We shall not succeed in subordinating the economic

to the truly human," William Temple said, "unless we subordinate the

human to the divine.,83 In other words, "there is no separating religion

and economics for politics."'84 What V. A. Demant calls the "vicissitude

of civilization"85 can only be elevated by the eternal order of the

Christian faith. Despite the various contemporary theological tendencies,

all Christian political theologies have something in common. That is to

say, the cultural order must be elevated by the eternal order of Christi-

anity. From a theological point of view, even continental theology

(e. g., the crisis theology of Karl Barth) is justified by Walter M.

Morton in that "it makes up in depth: the sense of the sublime, without


82Daniel D. William, What Prepent-Pey Theologians r ThrkigI,
p. 73.
3As quoted in Nathaniel Micklem, The Theology of Politics, p. 107.

41bid., p. 10.

85Relilion and tbe Secline of Capitalism, pp. 157-76.







which theology becomes as prosaic as arithmetic."86 This "sense of an

extra dimension" is not only present in continental theology but also

present in the religious order. Thus the ills of the political order

are always seasoned with the spice of what is sacred and eternal.

Religion, thus, has the outlook of life-orientation; theologians

look at the totality of life: theirs is a synoptic vision. When they

appraise democracy, for example, it does not appear to them merely as a

set of institutional arrangements of government but as the whole structure

of cultural pantheon: democracy is a way of life. No doubt, the religious

outlook has its limitations in looking at politics from a distance in-

vigorated by religious considerations. nonetheless, this wide vision of

religion may balance the kaleidoscope of politics. Or is it the maelstrom

of political theology?

While Catholic theology looks back to "the thirteenth, the

greatest of centuries," the names of Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and Reinhold

Niebuhr signify the Protestant return to the Reformation. Nicolas

Berdyaev raises his banner for the rediscovery of Orthodox theology, and

"he is primarily concerned to champion the claim of his Orthodox gnosis

to be recognized as a genuinely Christian theology."87 In the Catholic

renaissance of Thomies, Dirk Jellema now speaks of "the second generation"

following Jacques Mlaritain and Etiefne Gilsen.88 All these names indicate

the various trends of contemporary Christian theology, but they are not

totally unrelated. "As Tillich's speculative philosophy parallels the


86Contoeporary Contijontal Theology, p. 217.

87Karl Pfleger, Wrestlers with Christ, p. 291.

88"Ethics," Coatemporary Ivenallcal Thought, p. 124.







'Orthodox Gnosticism' of Berdyaev,".Walter M. Horton writes, "so a

certain schQlasticiam in Brunner's thought parallels the scholasticism

of Maritain and Przywara."89 As their philosophical and theological

reasoning are interrelated, so are their social and political ideas.

The contemporary theological mood is tragic and peesimistic

through and through in looking at the world that is obsessed with the

"tragic sense of life" (settjaiento trizico).90 Writing in 1946,

Reinhold Niebuhr said that "this generation of mankind is destined to

live in a tragic era between two ages. It is an era when 'one age is

dead and the other is powerless to be born'."91 "History show," Paul

Tillich writes, "that, over and over again, the achievements of man, as

though by a logic of tragedy, turn against man himself."92 This is the

reason why Judith N. Shklar speaks of the Christian eschatologicall

consciousness."93 The Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset well

describes the theologians' attitude regarding the physiegnemy of cen-

temporary civilization when he speaks of "vital disorientation."9

Therefore, it is clear that "the end of the world," "the crisis

of civilization," or "the twilight of civilization" suggests the general

mood of Christian theologians and philosophers. For these theologies,


89Contepocqry Continental Theblogy, p. 230.

9Miguel de rnamuno, Tr1eic e3nse of Life, tr. J. E. Crawford
Flitch (Nw York: Bever Publications, 1954).

91Diseerning the giaWs of the Times: earmonU for Today and
Tomorrow (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), pp. 39-40.

92'he World Situation," The Christiaa Apwer, p. 44.

93Ater Utic, p. 166.
94
9Thte Mdera W tr. James Cleugh (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1961), p. 78.







the world represents the anarchy of spiritual values. The Catholic

theologians like Jacques Maritain seeks his guidance for modern philo-

sophical and political solutions from St. Thomas Aquinas, while Protestant-

ism looks for the days of the Reformation. This century may be charac-

terized as the century of "longing for the past." As we recall, politi-

cal philosophers like Leo Strauss get their inspiration.from classical

political philosophy, and Alfred Cobban nostalgically looks back to the

Enlightenment.

However, we should net confuse the pessimistic mood of these theo-

logians with complete fatalism.95 Their views and ideas are not devoid

of suggestive insight. The philosophy of democracy of Jacques Maritain,

the political realism of Reinhold Niebuhr and the concepts of justice and

power of Paul Tillich provide us with profound insight into the political

philosophy of modern times.

For Christian theologians, the modern world is stricken by the

bacilli of secularism; the anarchy of spiritual values is the disease of

our time. This is what Paul Tillich refers to as "the shaking of the

foundations." Scientism and scientific relativism have been regarded


95Judith N. Shklar, op. cit., pp. 164-217. As the book's
subtitle indicates, this work is concerned with "the decline of politi-
cal faith." According to her, "Christian fatalism" adds only another
dimension to the decline of political faith. Thus it offers nothing
constructive. What is needed is not mere criticism (as is found in
Christian theologians) but "adequate theoretical alternatives." However,
her examination of Christian "social theology" is partial in that she
sacrifices the constructive ideas of the theologians in order to make
Christian social theology suitable for her theme: the decline of politi-
cal faith. It is one thing to say that Christian social theology offers
nothing constructive, and it is another to reject the idea that social
reconstruction can be achieved on the basis of the Christian religion.

96tlhen [man] has rested complacently on his cultural creativity
or on his technical progress, on his political institutions or on his
religious systems," Tillich writes, "he has been thrown into disintegration





91

as the endless dehumanization of man. Science as a source of knowledge

is welcome for Paul Tillich. He is merely objecting to the scientific

spirit that, having forgotten "the shaking of the foundations," believes

in everlasting progress and happiness. Thus the complacent "liberalism"

of the nineteenth century has been completely repudiated. Modern anthro-

pocentric humanism that believes in the goodness of human nature merely

represents the further secularization of man and the world. The Christian

theologians are theocentric humanists. They believe that man is es-

sentially spiritual. This is the personalist philosophy of the Christian

theologians just mentioned. Jacques Maritain, Nicolas Berdyaev and Paul

Tillich are all "personalists." Thus Will Nerberg concludes that "the

strong personalistic emphasis" of Roman Catholic (Jacques Maritain),

Eastern Orthodox (Nicolas Berdyaev), Jew (Martin Buber), and Protestant

(Paul Tillich) is "a cornerstone of (their] social philosophy."97

Maritain's Christian democracy, Berdyaev's "personalist socialism" and

Tillich's "religious socialism" are all personalisms that emphasize the

spiritual character of men. Democracy (in contrast to totalitarianism)

is the only means to restore the lost spirituality of man.

A Christian political theology must take into account the nature

of man. To say that all politics are or eust be based upon the nature

of man is merely to beg the question: what do we mean by human nature?


and chaos; all the foundations of his personal, natural and cultural life
have been shaken." The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 6. Therefore,
the shaking of the foundations is essentially the hard reality of the
eschatological end of the historical order.

97
9Four Ixistentialist Theologians (Garden City, N. Y.:
Doubleday, 1958), pp. 3-4. This is not used in the sense of Borden
P. Bowne's use of this term, but rather in the sense of individualism.







The great political treatises of the past, like Aristotle's Politics,

Hobbes' Leviathan and Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Governent, ex-

plicitly assumed human nature. To be sure, a Christian anthropology is

different from what we call the scientific anthropology of our days.

The Christian conception of men is of "the fallen nature." The

notions of original sin and the soteriological function of man play an

important role in Christian political theology in general. Rudolf Otto,

thus, characterizes Christianity as "a 'religion of redemption' par

excellqUce."98 The basis of Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism in

politics is derived from his conception of the fallen and selfish nature

of man. Neo-Orthodox Protestant theologians repudiate theological

liberalism and political liberalism because liberalism does not take into

consideration the "realistic" (fallen) conception of man. The rational-

istic optimism about man (the goodness of human nature) is rejected by

the Christian theologians. Johannes Messner describes the two charac-

teristics of "Christian psychology." "The first," he writes, "is the fact

of original sin, the reason for the inadequacy of humes nature. The second

fact is that of the redemption. God entered the world with a human nature,

assured man of the covenant which the Creater has inscribed in his nature,

and guaranteed the value of man as raised above every earthly value so


98The Idea of the YlvY, p. 164. "(Christianity'sJ charac-
teristic ideas today," Otto writes, "are Salvation -- overabounding
salvation, deliverance from and conquest of the 'world' and from
existence in bondage to the world, and even from creaturehood as such,
the overcoming of the remoteness of an enmity to God, redemption from
servitude to sin and the guilt of sin, reconciliation and atonement,
and, in consequence, grace and all the doctrine of grace, the Spirit
and the bestowal of the Spirit, the new birth and the new creature.
These conceptions are common to Christendom, despite the manifold
cleavages that divide it into different confessions, churches, and sects,
and they characterize it sharply and definitely as a 'religion of
redemption' par excellence ... ."







that neither society nor state nor nation nor race nor the whole earth

can outweigh his dignity. Thus in the view of Christian psychology the

world in its ultimate meaning is thoocentric."99

The sinfulness of man is recognized by all types of Christian

theology, but this concept is somewhat graded as is the relation between

reason and faith philosophyy and theology or nature and grace), Reinhold

Niebuhr makes virtue out of the sinfulness of man, and his political

realism is grounded upon peesimies. For Johannes Messner, "human nature

is impaired." Thus a Christian cannot idealise human nature. "Nan's

nature," he says, "is still rational nature with its knowledge of good

and evil and the impulse to act in correspondence with reason, but he can

no longer take for granted the unerring cognizance of the good in its

more particular implications and the firm propensity toward it." For the

Catholic thinker, therefore, natural law ethics is a "realistic" ethics

which admits "the principle of man's moral consciousness and self-determi-

natio!' and, at the same time, mea's "weakness and perversities." On

this ground, the Catholic thinker rejects the optimistic view of mn

which prevails in theological liberalism and rationalism. ie also re-

pudiates the complete pessimism of Luther, Barth, or Miebuhr. Ne would

say that the optimistic rationalism and the Lutheran pessimism "both put

a check on amn's moral exertion, the Lutheran pessimism by making moral

endeavor meaningless, the rationalist optimism by making such exertion


"Secial Xthles, pp. 7-8. In contrast to the Christian doctrine
of man, Hessner lists three other types of the concept of mn: 1. the
naturalistic doctrine of mn, 2. the materialist doctrine of mam, and
3. the idealist doctrine of men (pp. 8-12). The ideas of human nature
in the periods of classical antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renais-
sance are found in Uersehel Baker, The *Ieas of Mln (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1961).






unnecessary."100

On the nature of man, Karl Barth and Bail Brunner differ from

each other. "There is," Hugh Ross Mackintosh notes, "that fundamental

subject on which [Barth/ and Brunner disagree somewhat seriously --

the imago Del in man. Briefly, we may say that in Barth's judgment this

Iskv has been totally lost and obliterated by sin, while Brunner contends

that it is still represented even in the sinful by their humanity and

personality."101 Therefore, logically and practically speaking, Brunner

has more breathing space than Barth for the consideration of reason, phi-

losophy, and culture.

The Christian anthropology is theocantric. Nathaniel Micklem

goes so far as to say that ". . the politicians make an even greater

mistake than the theologians when they forget original sin."102 The

concept of original sin delimits the natural world and man himself in

Christian philosophy. While the fideist position of Protestantism

minimizes the role of reason and thus philosophy, Reman Catholicism

represents the intellectualism of modern Christian theology.

All the Christian theologians have deplored the spiritual

anarchism of our age, the age of secularism. Criticisms of totalitari-

anism, capitalism, liberalistic individualism and scientist are es-

sentially based upon non-spirituality. Their explanation of corrupted

temporality is a mono-causal explanation. This, however, does not mean

that their political thoughts are monolithic.103 There is certainly a


100qocial Ethics, pp. 82, 83.

O11Types of Modern Theology, p. 316.

102ihe Theology of Politics, p. 16.
103"Christian political thought," Dante L. Germino writes, "is




Full Text

PAGE 1

GOD, MAN AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF JACQUES MARITAIN By HWA YOL JUNG A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNQL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA February, 1962 H f '

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-% 4^ .<] I . 1 i I UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 3 1262 08552 2117

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Copyright by ftum Tol Jang 1962

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to e3q>re8s his deep gratitude to Professor Manning J. Dauer» the chairman of his doctoral supervisory coraolttee, for his discerning guidance and warm personal encouragement without which this dissertation would have been liq>osslble. He Is also grateful for the assistance In the beginning of this dissertation given by Professor Alfred Dlamant, who Is now teaching at Haverford College, Pennsylvania. He Is deeply Indebted to his doctoral committee members: Professors Oscar Svarlien, Ernest R. Bartley, Frederick R. Hartmann, Arnold J> Heldenhelmer of the Department of Political Science and Professor George R. Bartlett of the Department of Philosophy. The author Is grateful to his wife who has read and typed a part of this dissertation. Finally, this dissertation is a token expression of the author's appreciation for the teachers and friends who have given him their moral support and financial aid since his arrival in this country in 1954. Hi

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TABLE OF C0NTEMT8 Page AGUOWLEnaCBNIS ii mTRODUCTION 2 Cha|>ter SECTION I. POUTICAL PHUjOSOPHT AMD POUTXCAL TRBOLOGT X. THE STATE OT FOUTICAI. PHILOSOPRT S ZX. GOD AND FOUTICS 34 XXX. THE POUTICS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 56 IV. DEMOCILACT AND CHRISTIAN THBOL06T 97 SECTION II. TRQMISM AND JACQUES MARITAIN V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOMISM IIS VI. THE NATDRE OF THOMISM 134 VXX. THOMISM AND JACQUES MARITAIN 150 VIII. THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVOLTS OF JACQUES MARITAIN 181 SECTION III. THE FOUNDATION OF JACQUES MARITAIN '8 POUTICAL PHILOSOPHY XX. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF MARITAIN*S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 228 X. THE SPECULATIVE ORDER 248 XI. THE PRACTICAL ORDER 272 iv

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Tk* author would like to express his deep gratitude to Professor Manning J. Dauer, the chainaan of his doctoral supervisory rowif ttee, for his discerning guidance and wamn personal encouragement without which this dissertation would have been iiqpossible. He is also grateful for the assistance in the beginning of this dissertation given by Professor Alfred Diamant, who is now teaching at Haverford College, Pennsylvania. He is deeply indebted to his doctoral coomittee nembers: Professors Oscar Svarlien, Ernest R. Bartley, Frederick R. Hartmann, Arnold J. Reidenheimer of the Department of Political Science and Professor George R. Bartlett of the Department of Philosoplqr* The author is grateful to his wife who has read and typed a part of this dissertation. Finally, this dissertation is a token ejqpression of the author's appreciation for the teachers and friends who have given him their moral support and financial aid since his arrival in this country in 1954. ill

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKMOWLEOGMENTS 11 INTRODUCTION 2 Chapter SECTION I. POUTICAL FHILOSOPmr AND POUTICAX. TRBOuxnr X. TBI STATE OT FOUTICAL PHILOSOPRT 5 II. GOD AND POUTICS 34 XXZ, THE POUTICS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 56 !. DOnCRACT AND CHRISTIAN THBOLtXTT 97 sECTicm II. THnasM and jacques maritain V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOMISM 115 n. THE NATURE CfF THOMISM 134 II. THOMISM AND JACQUES MARITAIN 150 III. THE PRILOSOPRICAL REVOLTS OF JACQUES MARITAIN 181 SECTION III. THE FOUNDATION OF JACQUES MARITAIN 'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY XX. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF MARITAIN'S POUTICAL PHILOSOPHY 228 X. THE SPECULATIVE ORDER 248 XX. THE PRACTICAL ORDER 272 Iv

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SECTION IV. THE POUTICAL PHIL0SOPR7 OF JACQUES MARITAIN US* MARITAIN 'S PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETTt A THEOCENTRIC HUMANISM ..,««««•*« <(s 4 «>•. t « * 296 XIII. MAN: PERSONAUTT AND INDIVIDUALITY . , » » * * * » 347 nV. THE NATURE OF POUTICAL SOCIETY •****,•** » 365 Natural Law and Human Rights « « 4 t ?« 4» « 4 « • * 369 Hie Cotaoon Good ,,,%»»»*»********* 403 Mtrltaln's Philosophy of International Relations* . 412 The Relation of Church and State ««««4 444i| 422 XV. MARITAIN 'S PERSONAUST PHILOSOPHY OF DEmCRACY * , 4 « 440 SECTION V, CONCLUSION WnU CONCLUSICHI *» 4 4 * 4 4 ***** 4 * 4 4 * 4 4-* * * ^73 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY it*****^******* ****** 506 Appendix t* DIAGRAM OF THE (ADERS 4 4 # 4 44 ••••••4444 567 n« DIAGRAM OF THE SCIENCES , i i t i , , i » 568 III. THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY < 4 4 « < . • 569 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH * 4 4 * 4 4 * 4^4 4 4 • 570

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Uy teachings are very easy to tmderstand and very easy to practice, But no one can understand thera and no one can practice them. In my words there Is a principle. In the affairs of men there Is a systea. Because they know not these. They also kiu>w me not* Since there are few that know me. Therefore I am distinguished. Therefore the Sage wears a coarse cloth on top And carries Jade within his bosom. — Lao Tzu

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IHTRODOCTIOH In the beginning was Hethodology. This is the spirit that more or less represents the present state of political science. Arnold Brecht aptly comments that the twentieth century is the century o£ methodology in the social sciences. The primary concern of political scientists with methodology is related to "the decline of political philosophy" in the contemporary world. The decline of political philosophy implies the fact that we are no longer concerned %7ith the question of a good political life. The exclusion of the question of a good political life from the "cognitive" research of political science is due to the idea that a value theory has no place in political science (science in the sense of the natural sciences like physics and chemistry). Thus, the cognitive theory of political science is t«itamount to the denial of the idea that a good political life is worth seeking* A sound political philosophy is one which can legitimately search for a good political life as once did the classical philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. The question of a good political life implies a value systea. Therefore, in political science, the search for a good and better political life becomes a perennial question. It is the most pressing quest for the political philosopher and the political scientist to provide a system for political man and political society in order that the life of mankind as a collection of moral agents may be worth living.

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a Tha political philosophies of Christian theologians provide us vlth value systems which are derived from their theological concepts and dispositions. In contenqporary political science} the Investigation of thalr political Ideas and philosophies has been unduly neglected. As the main title of this essay Indicates, a trinity of "God, Man and Polities'* suggests a possibility for what we might call "political theology." Political theology, from a political point of view. Is that part of political philosophy whose principles are derived ultimately from what Is theolof^lcal . Jacques Marltaln Is a Catholic theologian and philosopher. It Is hoped that an examination of his political philosophy and theology will be a small contribution to the systematic analysis of political theology. As It will be shown, his political philosophy Is deeply rooted In his Thomlstlc metaphysics and theology. Therefore, what he says on a metaphysical and theological level Is closely related to his cultural and political views. As Vllllaa Ernest Hocking has once said, there Is no settled truth . Philosophy, conceived as a perennial quest for truth, opens the door to the examination of the political philosophy and theology of Jacques Marltaln.

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8BCTI0N I POtXtlCAL PHJCtbsdPHT AND POUTICAL THEOLOGY

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CHAPTSR I THE STATE OF FOUTICAL PHILOSOPRT The conteoporazy scene finds "the science of politics" preoccupied and hopelessly entangled in a labyrinth of heated and unresolved controversies over methodological probleas or what is ironically called a "methodology of methodology."^ Professor Arnold Brecht aptly describes the state of political science when he says that the twentieth century ". , . has become the methodological century in the social sciences."^ The voluminous literature concerning the affairs of politics and the study of politics eiiq>hasizes the "scientism" and the '*acientific-ness" which characterise the modem Zeitgeist , somewhat belatedly fulfilling the prophetic understanding of Auguste Comte.^ The outcome of this would ^'*The ccience of politics" here refers to a cognitivist definition of science. See, for example, Hans Kelsen, "Science and Politics," American Political Science Review . XLV (Septesdier, 19S1), pp. 641-61. ^Arnold A. Rogow, "Comment on Smith and Apter: or. Whatever Happened to the Great Issues?" itoerican Political Science Review . LI (September, 1957), p. 765. Political Theory; The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thoug;ht (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 5. ^Bernard Crick, a British political scientist, deplores the scientific orientation of American political science in his American Science of Politics; Its Origins and Conditions (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959). Auguste Comte's sociologism is based upon his categorization of the three stages of the intellectual development of the West: theological.

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6 seem self-evident, If not self -defeating. Such a preoccupation would lead to Biethodologlcal solipsism, hence to the poverty of creative, constructive political philosophy upon which rests not only the foundation of a political society, but also the guidance and direction of the science of politics. Despite the ample evidence that scientificallyBlinded political scientists have atteiq>ted to employ Ockhaa's razor to sever the whisker of philosophy from the science of politics, Profaaaor Carl J. Friedrich has concisely Illustrated the indispensable correlation between philosophy and the science of politics. And Jbhn Plamenatz of Oxford University firmly believes that political philosophy cannot be, and is iK>t, dead«^ Ikifortunately, the extreme emphasis on methodology and the attempt at scientific method as a means of studying "the objective society" has metaphysical and scientific. The theological and the metaphysical stages are the things of the past; the scientific stage is distinctively a modern phenomenon. See a coadse exposition of Auguste Comte in Harry Elmer Barnes, '*The Social «kd Iblitical Philosophy of Auguste Comte: POsitlvlst Utopia and the Religion of Humanity," An Introduction to the History of Socioloiey (Chicago: Uaiversity of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 81-109. Ihe iimedlate influence of objectivity in the social sciences la a more recent event. The sociology of Max Weber has a decisive influence on formulating the objective mood of conteaq>orary social science. See his Methodology of the Social Sciences , tr. and ed. Edward A. Shlls and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1949). ^See his "Political Philosophy and the Science of Politics," Approaches to the Study of Pblitics . ed. Roland Toung (Evanstont Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 172-88; Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959); John Plaaenatz, "The Use of Political Theory," Political Studies , III (February, I960), pp. 37-47. ^ ^Op. cit . 'This phrase is tidcan from Everett Knight, The Objective Society (New York: George Braziller, 1960).

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7 only a false claln to be truly in the spirit of the Enlightenment. As the reputed historian of ideas Carl L* Becker shows, the "climates of opinion" in the Enlightenment vere full of the "didactic iaq>ul8e" and "messianic enterprise" which were expressed in the key symbols of "bienfaisance ** and * *hiMnanit4 »"^ Such a didactic iim>ul8e is anything but the scientific spirit of our age. This essay is concerned with the relationship between God and politics. More specifically, it is concerned with the Christian political philosophy and theology of Jacques Maritain. From a political point of view, political theology is not a part of theology which is essentially a systematic inquiry into the "ultimate reality." Instead, political theology is primarily political and secondarily theological: it is a part of politics which has a theological foundation. Political theology, in short, is a part of the whole corpus of politics* Politics may be divided into "the practice of politics" and "the 9 theory of politics." Since the former is the art of politics, it is "The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers osltions on the method of politics in

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beyond the scope of this eaaay. The latter, when It Is defined In « loose manner. Is "political science." Carl J* Frledrich states: Modern political science is largely a critical exanination of coDBionsense notions concerning the working of political institutions and procedures. Three axiomatic truths regarding the nature of power lies at its foundation: namely, that power ordinarily presupposes a group of human beings who can share objectives, interests, values, in other words, • community; second, therefore power presupposes objectives, interests, values, ends, which these human beings can share, fight over, or exchange; third, that all power situations contain both consent (shared objectives) and constraint (contested objectives). . . . Modem political science « « • is concerned with the instruments or techniques of political action in terms of the objectives they are supposed to serve. ^^ As John H. Hallowell states, ethics or moral philosophy is the rational understanding of the nature of "the good" and, in politics, man '*8eek8 the Implementation of that good in social life; and to assist In the inqplementation of that good is . . . the major function of political science. "^^ However, there is no consensus among political scientists regarding what "political science" is and ought to be. In contrast to what Rallofwell defined above. Bans Kelsen e:^plains: "Science is a function of cognition; its aim is not to govern but to explain. . . . the scientist must not presuppose any value .... he has to restrict himself The Science and Method of Politics (Hew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927) and A Study of the Principles of Politics (!few York: Macmillan, 1930). *^"As quoted in Vernon Van ^yke. Political Science: A Philo* sophlcal Analysis (Stanford: Stanford Uhlverslty Press, 1960), p. 132 from Carl J. Frledrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), pp. 593-94. ^ ^Maln Currents in Modem Political Thought (New York: Henry Holt, 1950), p. 1.

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9 to an explanation and a description of his object without Judging It as good or bad . . . ." Therefore, "The principle of objectivity applies to social science as veil as to natural science, and in particular to so-called political science.** For Kelsen, who Is expressing the repreMntatlve opinion of vhat we may call the '*8clentlflc school'* In the social sciences, the ascertainment of fact Is the goal of scientific research whether that scientific research deals with the natural sciences or with the social sciences. For him, the only valid method of political science Is the canon of ''scientific method."''^ What we may call the "pure theory of political science" of Hans Kelsen is derived froo an over-oaphasls of the term "science" at the expense of what is truly "political" and the purpose of politics* As the ancient philosopher Aristotle thought, the purpose of politics is to guide a good political life. Thus, ethical consideration is primary to the study of politics. The factual findings in political science must serve the ends of a good political life. In this sense, political philosophy logically precedes political science, that is to say, the former is an end whereas the latter is but a means . In recent years, the term "political philosophy" is used interchangeably with that of "political theory." As Harry Eckstein says, "What we called 'political phllosoplgr' la generally called 'political theory' in 13 the department of political science." George Sabine uses the term ^ ^. dt .. p. 641. 13"Polltlcal Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a Conference," Aaierlcan Political Science Review . L (June, 1956), p. 476. George Catlln uses the term "political theory" to include political science and political philosophy. See his "Political Theory: What Is It?" and "The Function of Political Science." George Sabine uses the term "political theory" in the inclusive sense as Catlln does. Sabine

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11 courses of action are norally obligatory, an eaqpresslon of choice or preference growing iron an attitude of desire, or fear, or confidence toward what the present holds and what the future may bring forth.**''' Political philosophy Is concerned with what ought to be or ought to be done. It Is primarily normative and prescriptive and thus goas beyond the boundary of what Is factual. David Saston spates of a *Value theory," and Thomas P. Jenkln calls It "prescriptive political theory." Thus what we need In political philosophy is a value system* Essential to a political philosopher is an ability to make value Judgments: that Is to say, he has to make the correct assessment of facts, dlscrlmate and evaluate them In order to prescribe certain preferable action for a good political life. Thus, political philosophy is essentially evaluative. No one better expresses the valuatlve nature of political philosophy than Lao Strauss when he writes: Tha neaning of political philosophy and its meaningful character are »b evident today as they have bean since the time when political philosophy first aude its appearance in Athens. All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; •oaething better. All political action is, then, guided by some thought of better or worse. But thought of better or worse lollies thought of the good. The awareness of the good which guides all our actions, has the character of opinion: it is no longer questioned but, on reflection, it proves to be questionable. The very fact that we can question it, directs us towards such a thought of the good as is no longer question* able — towards a thought %ihich is no longer opinion but knowledge. All political action has then in itself a dlrectedness towards knowledge of the good: of the good life, or the good society* FOr the good society is the complete political good* In short, "poUt^^cal philosophjr, " according to Leo Strauss, '*is the atten^t truly to know both the nature of political things and the right, ISjjbid., p. 11*

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10 "political theory" In the nost cooprehenslve manner when he says: "A political theory . . . covers three kinds of factors: It Includes facttial statements about the posture of affairs that gave rise to it; it contains statonents of vfaat may be roughly called a causal nature, to the effect that one kind of thing is more likely to happen, or may be ore easily brought about, than another; and It contains statements that soBMthlng ought to happen or is the right and desirable thing to have happen." In short, a political theory Is "factual, causal, and valuational."^^ It goes without saying that the factual, causal and valuational aspects of political theory are intricately related. They are three different but integral parts of the thing called politics* Political philosophy, in particular, is concerned with what Is valuational. That is to say, **there are eleaients of valuation: an estimation of importance, not in the sense of what is likely to happen, but of idtat ought to happen, the discrimination of a better from a worse way, the conviction that Includes In political theory the factual, the causal and the valuational. "What Is a Political Theory?" Jtoumal of Politics . I (February, 1939), pp. 1-16. Leo Strauss uses "political philosophy" in the sense of classical political philosophy, which the author has adopted. "What Is Pblltical Philosophy?" Journal of Politics , XIX (August, 1957), pp. 34368. John Plamenatz uses political theory and political philosophy interchangeably. "The Use of Political Theory." Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan use political theory to include political science and political philosophy when they say: "Political philosophy Includes not only doctrine, but also logical analysis of both doctrine and science; the term political theory may be used as a con^rehensive designation for all these types of sentences." Power and Society; A Framework for Political Inqulnr (New Haven: Yale Uhlverslty Press, 1950), p. xi. It seesw, hgfwever, that the snst comprehensive distinction of political thoory is made by Jerzy Hauptaami in The Dilemmas of Politics (Parfcville, Ho.: Park College Press, 1957). He distinguishes between political science, political policy, political theory and political philosophy (pp. 12-20). l^"What Is a Political Theory?" pp. 5-6.

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12 or the good, political order.'* Political philosophy Is Intimately related to philosophy. As a matter of fact, many political philosophers would consider political philosophy as a brwich of philosophy. Leo Strauss says, "political phi* losophy Is a branch of philosophy. "'^^ For George Catlln, "Political Fhllosophy Is merely a part of the seamless robe of Philosophy. "^^ For the reason that political philosophy is closely related to philosophy, especially moral philosophy or ethics, we must begin with the nature of philosophy itself. The term "philosophy" has many meanings and connotations. Karl Jaspers writes: "What philosophy is and how ouch it is worth are matters of controversy. One may expect it to yield extraordinary revelations or one may view it with Indifference as a thinking in the void. One mtf look upon it with owe as the meaningful endeavour of exceptional men or despise it as the superfluous broodlngs of dre^m^rs. One may take the attitude that it is the concern of all men, and hence must be basically ^^•Vhat Is Political Philosophy?" pp. 343, 345. ^^ Ibid ., p. 343. ^^"Pblitical Theory: What Is It?" p. 23. 19 '^'Wllllam Ernest Hocking defines a man's philosophy as "the sum of his beliefs." Philosophy as a science is defined as "the examination of belief." Types of Philosophy (Hew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. 3-4. Paul Tilllch, a theologian, defines philosophy as "the attempt to answer the most general questions about the nature of reality and human existence. ..." And "philosophy tries to find the universal categories in which being is experienced." Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 90-94. Philosophy is also defined as "the science of sciences" that concerns "the criticism and systematizatlon or organization of all knowledge, drawn from empirical science, rational learning, coomion experience, or whatever." Philosophy includes "asetaphyslcs, or ontology and epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, etc." Dagobert D. Runes (ed. ), The Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, n. d.), p. 235. Another dictionary defines

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13 8iiq>le and intelligible, or one inay think of It «• hopelessly difficult. And indeed, what goes by the name of philosophy provides examples to warrant all these conflicting Judgments." Thus, if philosophy is anything at all, it is not sonething that offers "compel lingly certain and universally recognised insights." In philosophy "there is no generally accepted, definitive knowledge. "^^ As Alfred North Whitehead says, "In human experience, the philosophic question c«i receive no final answer. Human knowledge is a process of approximation. "^^ Similarly, Karl Jaspers writes: "• . . the essence of philosophy is not the possession of truth but the search for truth, regardless of how many philosophers may belle it with their dogmatism, that is, with a body of didactic principles purporting to be definitive and conqilete. Philosophy means to be on the way. Its questions are more essential than its answers, and every answer becomes a new question. "^' philosophy as "a theory of truth, reality, or experience, taken as an organised whole, and so giving rise to general principles which unite the various branches or parts of experience into a coherent unity." JasMS Mark Baldwin (ed. ), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (Vol. II; Gloucester, Mass.: Petee Smith, 1957), p. 290. Philosophy is also defined as the "process and expression of rational reflexion upon e}q>erience. " James Hastings (ed.). Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Vol. IX; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 844. ^^Hurl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom , tr. Ralph Manheim (Mew Raven: Tale Otiiversity Press, 1954), p. 7. ^^ Science and Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 131. ^ ^. clt .. p. 12. Paul Tillich, referring to the term "philosophia perennis ." conoents that "only the philosophical question is perennial, not the answers." Op. cit .. p. 94. A. M. Whitehead says that philosophy asks the simple question: "What is it all about?" Op. cit .. p. 131. Herbert Feigl also states that philosophy must ask two questions: "What do you mean?" and "How do you know?" "logical l^>iriclsm, " Readings in Philosophical Analysis , ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellers (New York: i^pleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 5.

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14 Nonetheless, philosophy strives to ask questions about the whole. "Philosophy," A. N. Whitehead writes, "Is an attempt to express the Infinity of the universe In terms of the limitations of language." As he says again, "philosophy should aim at disclosure beyond explicit presuppositions. "23 or, as Ludwlg Wittgenstein suggested, "whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent "7^^ Philosophy contains that element which is concerned with human action and human things, 1. e,, moral philosophy. Political philosophy is close to, or a part of, moral philosophy. Consequently, it is not limited to knowledge itself. Knowledge is the pre-condition for moral judgoffints and always has moral action in view. Aristotle called it "a practical philosophy." Por George Catlln as well as for Aristotle, political philosophy is a branch of ethics. "Political philosophy," John H. Hallowell says, "is most directly and intimately related to ethics, since the reconciliation of conflicting purposes can only be brought about by a prior coomitraent to an objective good that transcends subjective desire and it is one of the functions of ethics to determine what that objective good Is."^^ Political philosophy is a branch of philosophy, which is concerned with the political: political philosophy may be called a "public philosophy." If philosophy and politics are conceptually distinct, political philosophy ^ ^Op. dt .. pp. 21, 130. oil ^^As quoted in Herbert Peigl, "Logical Empiricism," Readings in Philosophical Analysis , p. 16. Op. cit .. p. 8.

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15 Is a sort of hybrid of the two. Carl J. Trledrlch says that political philosophy is "that branch of philosophy and political science ... by which the tvo are linked; it brings the sain knowledge, both facts and generalisations, of political science into philosophy; and it brings the relevant aspects of philosophy to bear upon this knowledge*' In political philosophy, theorising aust be based upon what Is factual. "Theorizing without relevance to fact," William A. Glaser states, "is a dilettantish hobby rather than a uaeful contribution; and fact-finding without theory produces a Juable that either is wholly useless or is used to Justify defective ea^irical or ethical propositions." ' Moreover, if the purpose of political philosophy is to guide a good political life, then we must try to bri^e a chasm between political philosophy and practical politics. As Leo Strauss writes, classical political philosophy "is characterized 1^ the fact that it was related to political life directly."^® However, we always find a gap between philosophy or theory and practice. Kenneth W. Thonpson is acutely aware of this gap when he sayst "a perennial problem for Western civilization has always been the re29 latlonship between theory and practice." The lacuna between reason and ^ ^Qp. dt .. p. 173. ^'"Ihe Types and Uses of Political flieory, ** Social Research. Xni (Autumn, 1955), p. 291. '^"On Classical Political Philosophy," Social Research . ZII (February, 19';5), p. 100. ^ ^Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics; Aa American Approach to Foreign Policy (Princeton; Princeton Utaiversity Press, 1960), p. 62.

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16 esqperlence, theory and practice, thought and action, and the abstract and the concrete la a problem In the entire area of htiman knowledge and action. Sana J* Morgenthau most aptly polnta to the crux of this problen in politics; "Here, In this Inescapable tension . • . between theoretical and practical knowledge, between the light of political philosophy and the twilight of political action. Is Indeed the ultimate dllenoaa. . * ,**^ Nevertheless, we need not consider that philosophy and practice are two entirely Isolated things as does Klchael Oakesfaott when he bb^b that **Fhllosophy Is not the enhanceaM»nt of life. It Is the denial of llfe."^^ Political philosophy oust guide a good political life* As John flaawiatz considers, political philosophy Is not prlsiarlly concerned with "e:q>lanatlon6 of how govemnents function" but with "systematic thinking about the purposes of govensaent • "^^ Therefore, a political philosopher plays. In a sense, the role of an 'Wpire" in the gemea of politics. The ability of a political philosopher to make value Judgnenta seems Indispensable. Furthermore, political philosophy itself is not limited merely to the linguistic analysis and clarification of political concepts and ideas as T* D. Weldon conceives it to be.-'^ Since political philosophy ^ ^Dileignas of Politics (Chicago: lAiiversity of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 381. ^ ^iKperience and Its Hodes (Cambridge: Qaiversity Press, 1933), p. 355. ^ ^Qp. cit .. p. 37. ^^See his Vocabulary of Politics (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1953). Peter Winch criticizes Weldon from a less radical philosophical point of View. See The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosop h y (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). He agrees with Weldon in defining philosophy as what he calls the "underlabourer conception." However, he distinguishes "philosophy" from "science." "Whereas the scientist," he says, "investigates the nature, causes and effects of particular real things and processes, the philosopher is conceiaeu with

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17 docs not repudiate Its dependence on the factual, value Judgments necessary to political philosophy should not be construed as an emotive expression of personal preferences. They are to be construed as a kind of preference but a preference which is based on meaning and factual contents. As Leo Strauss states. It Is Impossible to study all important political and social phenomena without making value Judgments.^ John R. Rallowell says that "the refusal to pass an ethical Judgment is a kind of ethical Judgment none the less."^^ "What," Brlc ?oegelln asks, "could « Judgment that resulted In reasoned preference of value over value be but a value-Judgment?"^° J. Roland Pennock considers that "an Increased •aphasis on precision and on concrete and verifiable facts" would naturally create "the tendency to avoid the intangible subject of values, or at least to avoid analysis in this basic field." Nor can the validity of value Judgments be measured with a mathematical precision. However, Pennock hastens to add that "this is not to say that we can do without analysis and without being able to coDDainicate to others the grounds for the nature of reality as such and in general." He conceives the role of philosophy to elucidate concepts and the clarification of linguistic meanings, but "the philosopher's concern is not with correct usage as such and not all linguistic confusions are equally relevant to philosophy. They are relevant only in so far as the discussion of them is daaigned to throw light on the question how far reality is intelligible and what difference would the fact that he could have a grasp of reality make to the life of man." Thus, he maintains that in considering concept and thought the philosopher must deal with reality. Re rejects Weldon's conception of philosophy having "a purely negative role" in promoting the understanding of social life and institutions (pp. 7IS). ^"What Is political FhilosophyT" p. 349. ^5 "Politics and Ethics, " American Political Science Review . XXXVIII (August, 1944), p. 645. ^ °The New Science of Politics (Chicago; Dniverslty of Chicago Praaa, 1952), p. 16.

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18 our Judgments. "^^ Therefore, as Gunnar Ityrdal suggests, we can and should make our value judgments explicit rather than inqiliclt.-'^ For Jacques Maritaln, political philosophy is a moral or practical philosophy, that is to say, it deals with the ends and norma of human conduct. It is a practical philosophy as distinct from a speculative philosophy because it is essentially concerned with the application of knowledge rather than knowledge for the sake of knowing. Political philosophy, for Maritaln, is distinguished from the science of politics* "Political philosophy," he says, "does not claim to supersede and replace either sociology or political science." In contrast with the latter, the former is more "abstract" and "less bound to *the detail of phenomena'." Political philosophy may be materially dependent upon political science, but the latter is formally dependent upon the former. Maritaln 's position is clearly normative in that for him "should be " becomes "an incentive to make something be." Political philosophy considers "not only thinj^s as they are , but also things as they should be ." For him "devoir etre " is an incentive to action. Political philosophy, in short, "raises the material scrutinized by sociology and political science both to a higher degree of intelligibility and to a higher degree of practicability, because it sees this material in the light and perspective of a more profound and more comprehensive, a sapiential knowledge of Man, which is Bthlcs and deals with the very ends and norms of human conduct." As value and fact are closely related, for Maritaln, political 37"politlcal Science and Political Philosophy." American Political Science Review . XLV (December, 1951), pp. 1082, 1083. 38see his Value in Social Theory , ed. Paul Streeten (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).

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19 philosophy, although It say be distinct from political science. Is Interrelated with the factual contents which political science may find. Furthermore, Marltaln believes that political philosophy is efficacious "because it deals with the terrestrial hopes of the human co—unlty« "-^^ Therefore the significance of Marltaln 's political philosophy lies primarily in his offering a moral basis, in the form of his profound Christian theology, not only for political society but also for the science of politics. Marltaln himself expresses his concern over the lack of this moral basis in political science when he says that "the facts of political science taken apart from political philosophy have only a technical but no 'cultural' value. "^^ The political philosophy of Jacques Marltaln is a Christian political philosophy, nie word "Christian" is a theological notion: Marltaln 's political philosophy as knowledge has its foundation in Christian theology and his political philosophy as the practical guide for a good political life is grounded in Christian faith. Oswald Spengler at the turn of this century boldly predicted the decline of Western civilization.^^ The word "decline" suggests an intellectual atavlsm.^^ And it is a healthy atavism. In the recent literature •^ ^The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Marltaln . ed. Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward (Mew York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1955), pp. xl-xli. ^^Charles O'Donnell, The Ideal of a New Christendom; The Cultural and Political Philosophy of Jacques Marltaln (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation; Cambridge: Harvard University, 1940), p. 150* ^^ The Decline of the West , tr. Charles Francis Atkinson (2 vols.; Mew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950). ^^Ayn Rand describes the attitudes of modem intellectuals as follows: "If we look at modem Intellectuals, we are confronted with the grotesque spectacle of such characteristics as militant uncertainty, crusading cynicism, dogmatic agnosticism, boastful self-abasement and self-righteous depravity — in an atmosphere of guilt, of panic, of

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20 of political philosophy the idea of "decline" Is not absent. ^^ There are good reasons why the decline of political philosophy may be Justified. Flato vrote his Republic vlth the decline of Athenian democracy; Thooas Hobbes finished his Leviathan to restore order and unity In the chaotic days of the Cronwelllan revolution; aad many others have followed and will follow the footsteps of Plato and Hobbes. "The owl of Minerva does not take flight iintll the shades of night are falling"?^ Although we may not find a Plato or a Hobbes in the modem world, we find a few scholars who see our need for a Flato or a Hobbes. Mo one seans to have ever pictured such a fatal portrait as Michael Oakeshott, when he poetically wrote: "In political activity . . . men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and en«ny; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to make a friend of every hostile occasion. "^^ despair, of boredon and of all-pervasive evasion." As qtwted in the Hew York Times Book Review (April 9, 1961), p. 3 from her book. For the Hew Intellectual (Hew York: Random Bouse, 1961). ^^or exaiiq>le, see: Alfred Cobban, '*The Decline of Political Theory," op. dt .. pp. 20-28; David Baston, "The Decline of Modem Folltical Theory." Journal of Politics . XIII (February, 1951), pp. 3658; Sheldon S. Wolln, "Liberalism and the Decline of Political Philosophy, " Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Uttle, Brown, 1960), pp. 286-351; Jtidith 1. Shklar, op. cit . **T. V. SBilth, Power and Conscience (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1950), p. xli. ^^"Political Educatiop." fhilosophy. Politics and Society, ed. Feter Laslett (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 15.

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21 tbrn intellectual » for Oakeahott, can at beat engage In "the awaet dellgbt vhlch liaa in the empty kiaaes of abstraction."^^ A political philosopher may be likened to the captain of a sailing ship of politics. There are many factors in our society which deny the role of this captainship. This seems to be a tragic scene of our era* Despair may not be cherished for its ovn safca* But, aa Everett Knight ssys, it is '*bettcr than the paradisa of complacency."^' **Today, " Leo Strauss writes, '*pol^<^lcal philosophy is in a state of decay and perhaps of putrefaction, if it has not vanished altogether,"^ Miss Judith H* Shklar made a sweeping analysis of "the decline of politi* cal faith" after the Btalightenment. If the word "decline" implies a high point at a certain historical Juncture, her historical point of reference is the Enlightenment. Sheldon S. Wolin, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion that "the Judgment that political theory is dead Is premature*" Moreover, it needs no "artificial respiration." "The task," he says, "therefore, is not to revive political theory but to reacue it." The rescue work for him is to restora iriuri: la 'political" to political phi* losophy.*9 There are several reasons why some political thinkers consider ^ nEiqperience and Its Modes, p. 356. ^ ^Op. cit ., p. 12. ^"What Is Folitical Philoaophy?" p. 345. ^^"Shklar's After Utopia; The Decline of Folitical Faith. " Natural Law Forum . V (1960), p. 177. For Wolin, the term "politics" includes: "(a) a form of activity centering around the quest for competitive advantage between groups, individuals, or societies; (b) a form of activity conditioned by the fact that it occurs within a situation of change and relative scarcity; (c) a form of activity ir which the pursuit of advantage produces consequences of such a magnitude that they affect in s significant way the whole society or a substantial portion of it." Politics and Vision , pp. 10-11.

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23 or primarily ethical. The issue, Wolin thinks, is "substantive; that is, it concerns the status of politics and the political. "^^ "The decline of political categories and the ascendancy of social ones," he states, "are the distinguishing marks of our conteiiq>orary situation where political philosophy has been eclipsed by other forms of knowledge. "^^ Therefore, according to Wolin, when modem social science explains what is distinctively political in terms of sociology, psychology and economics it is tantamount to the erosion of distinctively political phenomena. Wolin urges us to make efforts "to restore the political art as that art which strives for an integrative form of direction."^'' This was of course what classical political philosophy did for the attainment of a good political life. For Aristotle, politics was undoubtedly an integrative force: politics was "the supreme practical science" and all others were "subordinate and ministerial. "^^ Leo Strauss deplores the fact that political philosophy and political science of our time are "cut into pieces which behave as if they were parts of a worm." Like Wolin, he maintains that "large segments of what formerly belonged to political philosophy or political science have become emancipated under the names of economics, sociology, and social CO psychology.""^ Thus the function of political philosophy seems to be to rescue the study of politics from this deplorable condition* 55ibid., p. 288. ^ ^Ibid .. p. 292. ^^ Ibid . . p. 434. ^^. D. Ross, Aristotle (New York: Heridian Books, 1959), p. 183. ^^"What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 346.

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22 that political philosophy or theory is in the decline. The first reason, as Sheldon S. Wolin stated, is that the loss of what is political, that is, the loss of the status of politics, is the decline of political philosophy. The second reason for the decline of political philosophy is given by Leo Strauss, ^^ Eric Voegelin,^^ «kd Alfred Cobban.^^ fliey all maintain that the decline of political philosophy is due to the rise of positivism. The third reason for the degradation of political philosophy is the prevailing trend of "historicisn . " (The term historlcisn has several meanings as explained below on pages 29-3C ) . The fourth and last reason for the downfall of political philosophy (and political science) is related to the first reason. It is stated by Hans J. Horgenthau and Benjamin E. Lippincott, for exaiq>le, who maintain that political philosophy and political science are taken over by philosophers, sociologists, and theologians.^^ We shall now proceed to consider these four reasons in order in the remainder of this chapter. To return to the first reason for the decline of political philosophy Wolin states that the basic task of political philosophy is to do as Hobbes did: to identify and define what is truly political. ^^ He maintains that the recent controversy between political philosophy and political science misses the whole point if political philosophers and political scientists believe that the real issue is solely methodological ^0"What Is Political Philosophy?" and 'H)n Classical Political Philosophy. " S^ Qp. cit . ^ ^Op. cit . 53 Hans J. Horgenthau, op. cit .. p. 25; Benjamin E. Lippincott, "Political Theory in the Ihiited States," Contemporary Political Science (Paris: UNESCO, 1950). Also, see: Jerzy Bauptmann, op. cit .. p. 17. ^Politics and Vision , p. 289.

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24 Leo Strauss, in his consideration of the decline of political philosophy, begins %^th a historical reference to the classical political philosophers: Plato and Aristotle. If the history of Western philosophy, as A. N. Whitehead once said, ia aerely footnotes to Plato, we might as well say that the history of Western political philosophy is footnotes to Aristotle's Politics .^ The second reason, according to Strauss, for the decline of political philosophy is due to the rise of "science." Scientisra (or positivisa) in the modem world has eventually succeeded in destroying the very poiBslbility of political philosophy.^'' When political science is concerned unswervingly ^^George Sabine says that political philosophy began in Athens, and that the most significant political writings were produced in Athens in the fourth century B. C. (Plato and Aristotle) and in England between 1640 and 1690 (Hobbes and Locke). He further connents that ". . . Aristotle's Politics was probably the most important treatise on the subject /political theory/ that was ever written." "What Is a Political Theory?" pp. 3-4. ^^"What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 346. Thomas I. Cook believes that the positivistic attitude results in "a mechanistic interpretation" of man. He maintains that man should be 'Valued" rather than "described." Be argues that "the social sciences, if they are to be scientific, must abandon the misguided and misleading hope of reducing man and society to a complete pattern of descriptive — predictive law, nust accept the inherent and insuperable limitations of human existence as a necessary and limiting postulate." In short, the social sciences are the sciences of values. "The Methods of Political Science, Chiefly in the United States," Contemporary Political Science , pp. 75-76. Ernest Nagel, for example, comes to the defense of scientific philosophy when he says: "The recommendation to use scientific method is the recommendation of a way for deciding issues of factual validity and adequacy ; it is not the recommendation of an exclusive way in which the universe may be confronted and experienced . " Logic without Metaphysics and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (Glencoe, 111.: Pree Press, 1956), p. 382.

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25 vlth •clttntisB, It becones preoccupied with methodological questions. **thm aost striking difference," Strsuss writes, **between classical po* litical philosophy and present-day political science is that the latter is no longer concerned with what was the guiding question for the fonaer: the question of the best form of government, or of the best political life. On the other hand, modem political science is greatly pre* occupied with a type of question that was of much less importance to classical political philosophy; questions concerning method. "^^ Thus, in « sense, political '*science** ossified political philosophy altogether. Strauss maintains that modem positivism is not even what Auguste CoBte desired it to be. While modem positivism holds that science is the highest form of knowledge Mt did Comte, it no longer concerns itself with "absolute knowledge of the Why" but it has receded into the "relative knowledge of the How." Wy insisting that political science should be value-free or ethically neutral, positivism becomes "nihilism. "^^ Like Strauss, Brie Vbegelin believes that positivism, especially the objectivism of Max Weber, has vitiated political science altogether. For Voegelin the sin of positivism is its exclusion of value judgments from political science. Thus, the restoration of political science is essentially "a return to the consciousness of principles" which was completely destroyed by the positivistic era* Be urges us to put value Judgments "back in science in the form of the 'legitimate beliefs* which created units of social order. "^ Leo Strauss insists that "The social scientist is not ^^"On Classical Political Philosophy," pp. 100-101. ^3"what Is Political Philosophy?" pp. 346-47. ° ^0p. cit .. pp. 2, 3. ?oegelin lists the following three characteristics of the scientific creed: "(1) the assumption that the mathematized science of natural phenomena is a model science to which

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26 Inmune to preferences; his activity is a constant fight against the preferences he has as a fauMn being and a citizen and which threaten to overcoiBe his scientific detachment." Worst of all, aoreover, "The value Judgpents which are forbidden to enter through the front door of political science, sociology or economics, enter these disciplines through the back door. "^5 Alfred Cobban also feels that 'Apolitical theory" has declined and he proposes to restore "^ral and political theory. ••^^ The decline of political theory, he says, *\Mgr be regarded as a reflection of the feeling that ethical values have no place in the field of social dynanics and power politics." For Cobban, the rise and fall of political theory is a general law of history: political ideas and doctrines grow, change, and decay. Moreover, political ideas are related to the conditions of all other sciences ought to conform; (2) that all realma of being are accaasible to the methods of the sciences of phenomena; and (3) that all reality which is not accessible to sciencas of phenomena is either irrelevant or, in the more radical form of the dogma, illusionary. " '•The Origins of Scienticm." Social Research . XV (December, 19A8), p. 462. *5««what Is Political Philosophy?" pp. 347, 350. John H. Ballowell criticizes positivism in the following manner: ''The inadequacy of positivism aa the most valid parspactlva in which to achieve a description and understanding of physical and social phenomena is proven by this fact: that tha positivist cannot avoid engaging in the metaphysical speculation he claltos to have dispensed with. " Op. cit . , p* 321. Julius Rudolph Weinberg also says: "It is now clear that Logical Positivism cannot eliminate metaphysics without destroying itself, and that it cannot establish the logical foundations of science without alteration of the principles absolutely essential to its teaching." An Ixamlnation of Logical Positivism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936), p. 199. For a coiq>rehenslve criticism of logical positivism, see C. B. M. Joad, A Critique of Logical Positivism (Chicago: Uhiversity of Chicago Press, 1950). The effect of logical positivism on ethics, Joad thinks, is that "the spread of logical positivist modes of thought may well tend to the erosion of desirable and to the growth of tmdesirable beliefs" (p. 144). Criticism of positivism from a Catholic point of view is found in Frederick C. Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism (London: Bums and Gates, 1956), pp. 1-124. ^ ^Qp. cit .. aapedally pp. 36-58, 229-45.

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27 political life at a given time. "For political theory to exist,** he writes, "It seems to me, there must be an active political life. ' Alfred Cobban Is a child of our age: he is pessimistic. He believes that "political pessimism Is deeper than It haa been since St. Augustine wrote the De Clvltate Del ." The decline of political theory may not be saved, and the ••• can be said of the decay of present political life. *^ncelvably, " he says, *'polltlcal theory at the present day may not be undergoing one of Its many metamorphoses, passing through a chrysalis stage before emerging In a new form. It oiay Juat be coming to an end.**^® As Miss Judith H. Shklar nostalgically looks back to the Enlightenment, Cobban happily returns to the same era In search of aolutlons for our age. His '*search of humanity" Is primarily that of the great men of the Enlightenment. He deplores the fact that our century has neither Bentham nor Burke. Like Sheldon S. Wolln, religious revival Is no answer for the present crisis and for the decline of political philosophy. While Arnold Toynbee consoles himself with the possible rise of a religion In the midst of decaying Western civilization, Cobban thinks, on the other hand, that "the religious approach to political problems Is not without Its dangers," although **rellglous revival may be a way out." But, for him, religious revival Is "not a political way." It Is not the solution singly because '*We8tem civilization Is essentially ^ ^Ibld .. pp. 23, 26. However, George Sabine Is of the opinion that ". . . when political philosophy Is produced In quantities. It Is a sure symptom that society Itself Is going through a period of stress and strain." Op. clt .. pp. 2-3. Possibly, then, the less political philosophy there Is, the happier society Is.' 68 Op. clt .. pp. 21, 26.

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28 political, and politics has been its vital centre throughout the nodem period, even though the last great age of fundamental political thinking was the eighteenth century. "^^ For Cobban, the political crisis of our age is the crisis of civilisation itself, since ffestem civilization is essentially political . Qnlike Leo Strauss vho seeks the solution of political philosophy from the classical Greek period, Cobban returns to the Enlightenment: neither Plato nor Aristotle, Init Bentham, Burke, Rousseau, Montesquieu and lodce are the saviors of the present crisis. However, like Strauss, Cobban maintains that "politics was essentially a branch of morals or ethics ... the decline of political theory is • necessary result of the decline of moral philosophy. "^^ Cobban comes to the same conclusion, as does Strauss, that "the influence of two modes of thought which have had a fatal effect on /they •tMeal content Zbf political theory/ . . . are history and science.** For him, the "autooMBy and primacy of ethics" were essential to the Enlightenment. "The Enlightenment," Cobban explains, "may sometimes have mistakenly derived its history and its science from its ethical ideas; at least it never made the mistake of trying to derive its ethics from its history and science. This is what its successors have done."'^^ Cobban believes that the rejection of moral philosophy is the cause of the decline of political philosophy. He finds a target of attack in T. D. Weldon*s Vocabulary of Politics which eisbodies the spirit of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein whose analytic mind has greatly influenced the present ehepe of logical empiricism. For Cobban, The ^'ibid., p. 27. 7 0lbid .. p. 237. ^ hbid .. pp. 237-38.

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29 Tbcabulary of Politics Is "« declaration of the bankruptcy of political philosophy." Weldon becomes the protagonist of sclentlsm that alienates politics fran ethics altogether. Moreover, according to Cobban, the "esoteric Jargons" used In modem political science do not help political philosophy to become a practical science. On the contrary, "a good deal of what Is called political science seems to {i^iit^ a device. Invented by academic persons, for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without achieving science." The political philosopher should be "essentially concerned with the discussion of what ought to be. His judgments are at bottom value judgments."'^ A. H. Whitehead said that the Enlightenment was "an age of reason based upon faith" whereas the Middle Ages was "an age of faith based upon reason."'^ Alfred Cobban finds the solution for the decline of modem society and political phllosopt^ In the rational and ethical contents of the Enlightenment. However, the Enlightenment Itself Is not the solution. Instead, as he sees It, It "can only be a starting-point."'^ The third reason for the decline of political philosophy Is .the rise of hlstorldsm. Leo Strauss defines hlstorldsm as the study which "considers history as an Integral part of political science." He criticises hlstorldsm because It rejects the question of the good society. Strauss maintains that In hlstorldsm there Is no essential necessity for raising the question of the good society because It Is based on the ^^Ibld., pp. 234, 239-40. ^• 'Science and the Modem World (New York: Itew American Library, 1948), p. 57. ^ ^Op. clt .. p. 244. '^'V)n Classical Political Philosophy," p. 98. Leo Strauss distinguishes hlstorldsm from positivism. When the former reaches Its full growth, then It may be distinguished from the latter by four characteristics: "(1) It abandons the distinction between facts and

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30 assumption that the character of society and of human thought is historically relative. 7^ Por Cobban, hlstoricism is no better than scientism. History, like science, leaves us in a '*drift." The modes of inquiry of •cience and history would alienate political thought from ethics. Hlstoricism is lacking in the sense of direction and purpose. However, Leo Strauss distinguishes what is '•historical" from what is "historlcist." He may reject what is historlcist, but he upholds what is historical, la explains that "a historical interpretation is one that tries to understand the philosophy of the past exactly as that philosophy understood itself. The historlcist interpretation is one form of the atteaq>t to understand the philosophy of the past better than it understood itself; for it la based on the assun^ition, wholly alien to the thought of the classics, that each philosophy is essentially related to its time -to the 'spirit' of its tine or to the 'material conditions' of its tin«, or to both."'^^ What Strauss upholds as historical seems to coincide with Etienne Gilson's statement that "the ultimate e3q>lanation of the history of philosophy has to be philosophy itself."^' For David Easton hlstoricism means something essentially different. Hlstoricism is an exclusive engagement in the investigation of a history or analysis of political ideas at the expense of developing values, because every understanding, however theoretical, iiq>lies specific evaluations. (2) It denies the authoritative character of modem science, which appears as only one among the many forms of man's intellectual orientation in the world. (3) It refuses to regard the historical process as fundamentally progressive, or, more generally stated, as reasonable. (4) It denies the relevance of the evolutionist thesis by contending that the evolution of man out of non-man cannot make intelligible man's humanity." "What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 355. ^^Ibid., p. 356. ^^"On Classical Political Philosophy," p. 99. 78 ^ °The Unity of Philosophical Experience (Hew York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1937), p. 304.

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31 "0— id««s about the desirabl* course of events'* and of "creatively constructing a valuatlonal frame of reference*" Thus Easton says that hlatorldsm diverted "the systeaatlc theory about political behavior and the operation of political Institutions.** While Strauss and Cobban stress the development of political Ideas based on moral judgments, Baston Is concerned with a **syst«Batlc ea|>lrlcally>orlented theory about political behavior** which would make possible the discovery of the **unlformitles in human, and in particular. In political behavior which can be used as a basis for predictions*** ' The fourth and last possible reason for the decline of political philosophy is closely related to what Sheldon S* Uolin calls "the sublimation of the political.** Having pointed out the intellectual sterility of political scientists, Hans J* Morgenthau remarks that, "It is not by accident that sone of the most important contributions to contemporary political theory have been made not by professional politlon cal scientists but by theologians, philosophers, and sociologists."^ However, Morgenthau, unlike Ublln, does not conceive these contributions as the decline of political philosophy* Instead, he seems to welcome them. The names of Reinhold lUebuhr, Jacques Maritain, Russell Kirk, John Dewey, Bertrmd Russell, Talcott Parsons, Walter Lippmam, Gaorga ^ ^Oo. clt .. pp. 36, 40, 51. ^ Q^* cit *. p. 25. ficactly the amae point is made by lanjamin E. Lipplncott when he says: "The paradox is that there has been more creative vork done in political theory by men outside the professional field than by those within it." Op. cit ., p. 220. Jerzy Hatipcmann also says: "To find genuine political philosophy nowadays one has to go to religion (Reinhold Niebuhr), Journalism (Walter lippmann), philosophy (RiMsell Kirk) . . . ." Op. cit .. p. 17.

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32 Orwell, John Haynard Keynes, and others Indicate that "outsiders" have made many contributions to political philosophy* ^'^ The decline of political philosophy has aaant several things* As Sheldon S. Wtolln has noted, it is essentially the sublimation of what is political. The restoration of political philosophy is a rescue work that would make politics an integrative force. However, the decline of political philosophy seems to be deeply rooted in the rise of positivism which has been striving to make political science "scientific" in the sense of the natural sciences. Thus value Judgments become not only "meaningless" but also tmdeslrable. The question of a good politlcal life, as Strauss and Cobban have pointed out, has ceased to be a major concern of the political scientists. Instead, the main question of political science is the question of methodology to achieve the "scientific" status of political science Itself in the image and pattern of the natural sciences like physics and chemistry. . The restoration of political philosophy will depend upon the cooperative efforts to ask the questions concerning the ends and goals of a good political life in society. A sound political philosophy, therefore, becomes the question of creating a good political life and society based on a value system. Sheldon S. Wolln seems to have rejected altogether a theological politics or a political philosophy based on theological notions as "a confused mixture of diluted religious ideas 81 Lindsay Rogers, for example, mentions Reinhold Nlebuhr, R. G. Collingwood, N. Lenin, Michael Oakeshott, George Orwell and John Maynard Keynes. Except for Lenin and Oakeshott, they are "outsiders." "Political Philosophy In the Twentieth Century: An Appraisal of Its Contribution to the Study of Politics," Approaches to the Study of Politics , pp. 189-214.

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33 •piced with a dash of market place virtues. "^^ However, Alfred Cobban has been suspicious of religious Ideas In the resuscitation of a good political society, but he has not entirely rejected religious ideas* When political ideas and Ideals become stagnant with professional polltlcal philosophers and political scientists, we must inevitably look for the sources of inspiration from 'Viutsiders.'* In the contoaporary world, the theologians are an Indispensable group of Intellectuals who can provide the genuine sources of inspiration in the regeneration of political ideas and Ideals. Among these theologians, we discover the Catholic philosopher and theologian, Jacques Maritaln. This essay is essentially an eaqwsltion and Interpretation of the political philosophy and theology of Jacques Maritaln. First of all, we must place Jacques Maritaln asiong other eminent Christian thinkers. Since Maritaln is a Thooist, we must exaodne his political ideas in the light of Thomism. Moreover, Maritaln *s political ideas are inseparably related to his theological and metaphysical system. The theological and metaphysical system of Jacques Maritaln is the foundation of his political philosophy. After his political ideas are expounded, this essay will be ended with a concluding evaluation. ^ ^Politlcs and Vision , p. 288.

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CHAPTSR II GOD AMD POLITICS It was not too long ago that Nletssche, through Zarathustra, tried to convince the vorld that *\iod Is dead," and to build "a new way for living" in the Inculcation of the trmsvaluatlon of all values. Christianity, he thought, was the religion of "the botched and the weak." Power stood for the source of the good, and everything bad sprang from tMidcness. That was the philosophy of Metssche. In less than a century, Christianity and Christian theology have again proved to be the religion of "power" rather than 'SfejduMss*" The modem world has witnessed the strength of Christian and Jewish theologians* The nanes of Reinhold Nlebuhr, Jacques Maritaln, Karl Barth, EcsLl Brunner, Paul Tlllich, Ricolas Berdyaev and Martin Buber have colored the intellectual history of the twentieth century which belongs to us* Co— political theorists have already Inplied that the decline of political philosophy is partially due to the lack of initiatives on the part of political theorists. The contributions to political phl« losoplqr have been made from sectors of theology, philosophy and scci* ology* As the title of this essay indicates, it is hoped that a step may be made toward a systematic analysis of what is called "political theology," "the theology of politics," or "theological 34

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35 politics."'' Political theology has been in existence since the dawn of human civilization, but political theology as a possible subject of study is a farlly recent development. And a systematic analysis of political theology is almost an untrodden path. Political theology is nothing more and nothing less than what Nathaniel mcklem calls "the theology of politics." Political theology is that part of political philosophy which considers politics from a thfM>logical point of view. Therefore, the term "theological politics"^ is less odsleading than "political theology" simply because in the former the connotation of politics is preserved better than in the latter* From a political point of view, political theology is a department of politics rather than a part of theology. Tb say that politics is considered from a theological point of view is to assert: "All political problems are at bott<» theological."^ Christianity alone, to be sure, is not the source of polltlcal theology, but it presently occupies a large portion of conteaqporary political theology. ^It is futile to look for any uniform meaning of the terms "political theology," "social theology," "polltlsche Theologle " and "theologie politique ." The ideas of "political theology" are frequently found In the current literature. For example, see: Nathaniel Mlcklem, The Theology of Politics (London: Oxford Oliver slty Press, 1941); Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's TWo Bodies: A Study in Hediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton Italversity Press, 1957); Thomas Gllby, Between Coaaunlty and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State (London; Longmans, Green, 1953); John A. Hutchison, The Two Cities: A Study of God and Human Politics (Garden City, N. T. : Doubleday, 1957); Helnrlch A. Kommen, The State in Catholic Thought; A Treatise in Political Philosophy (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1945), pp. 91-122; Judith N. Shklar, op. clt .. pp. 164-217. Jacques Marltaln himself uses the term "political theolofor" here and there. 2op. clt . ^Helnrlch A. fUMonen uses "political theology" or "theological politics." Op. clt .. p. 92. A Nathaniel Mlcklem, op. dt .. pp. x, vi, 38.

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36 In the Investigation of political theory, theology' Is the field of study most neglected by the Investigators. Professor Charles S. ^ynawan,, In his recent volume on the present status of American political science, expresses his legitimate concern with the failure to Religion must be distinguished from theology. Religion may be defined as a system of beliefs or "a belief In the conservation of values." It Includes certain characteristic types of beliefs, practices, feelings, moods, attitudes, etc. See, for example, James Hastings (ed.). Encyclopaedia of Religion and Bthlcs , X, pp. 66263. Theology may be defined as a systematic exposition of religion and God or the Supreme Being. Theology is defined as "the science which deals, according to scientific method, %d.th the facts and phenomena of religion and culminates in a comprehensive synthesis of philosophy of religion, which seeks to set forth in a systematic way all that can be known regarding the objective grounds of religious belief." Ibid . . XII, p. 293. Another dictionary defines theology as "the system of theological doctrine developed dogmatically; that is, by a method whose ultimate appeal is not to reason, but to authority, either that of Scripture or of Scripture and tradition ccmbined. " James Mark Baldwin (ed.). Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology . II, p. 693. Theology is also defined as "a study of the question of God and the relation of God to the world of reality." Dagobert D. Runes (ed.). The Dictionary of Philosophy , p. 317. This essay is concerned only with Christian political theology although political thcKilogy must be all-inclusive of various types of world religions as far as they are related to some aspects of politics. Helnrlch A. Roramen defines the potential meaning of political theology so that religious experiences, religious sentiments, or irrational feelings are all excluded. Political theology only Includes religious "doctrine." Op. cit .. p. 93. As we distinguish theology from religion, we can distinguish theological discourse from religious discourse. Professor Charles W. Morris dascrlbes religious discourse as "prescriptive" and "incitive" by its use and node, whereas theological discourse is "critical," 1. e., "appralslve" and "systemic." Theological discourse, by use, has the same characteristic as moral discourse: they are appralslve. Since this essay is concerned with politics, it is worth while comparing political discourse %rith theological and religious discourses (and moral discourse). Political discourse, like religious discourse, is prescriptive. Theological discourse and moral discourse have an appralslve character. However, we can bridge the gap between the prescriptive and appralslve aspects in theological, moral, religious and political discourses. Morris says: the "ought" is something that is positively appraised . Signs ^ I.anguage and Behavior (Mew Tork: George Braslller, 1955), pp. 125, 138-42, 145-48.

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37 •XJHBlne and evaluate "the significance of religion for politics."^ The intellectual history of the West and the East reveals the significant role plajr^d by religion in various cultural systeiis» past and present. 'Christian theology. ** Dante L. Germino recently remarks, "has, after long neglect, gradxially been reassuadng its formerly prominent place among the intellectual disciplines."' And some like Eduard Heiaunn have urged the consideration of the 'Christian foundations of the social sciences."^ Heimann deplores the fact that the social sciences exclude, by their formative concepts, the Christian dimension of social life.' 'V^od, spirit, and liberty in history," he writes, *'exlst in reality but not in the social sciences. "^^ Therefore, if the social sciences would be realistic at all, they 'Wst be capable of °The following statement of I!(yneman is worth quoting fully: ''Religions appear to be virtually untouched. Certainly no American political scientist has provided a noteworthy analysis of the idea* system (or idea-systems) that characterizes religions in general. Neither has an American political scientist carefully explored the sig* nificance for legal government of the belief-system, organizations, and rituals we call Christianity. ..." The Study of Politics (Urbane: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 62-63. Host regretful is the absence of any outstanding study of a relationship between politics and religion similar to those which exist in other fields, such as Kax Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Kew Tbrk; Charles Scribner's Sons. 1958); R. H. Tawney. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926); Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teachlm of the Christian Churches, tr, Olive Wyon (2 vols.; Mew York: Harper and Brothers, 1960); Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture (liew York: Sheed and Ward, 1948). The philosopher Ralph Barton Perry's Puritanism and Democracy (New Ybrk: Vanguard Press, 1944) may be regarded as an exception. '"Two Types of Recent Christian Political Thought," Journal of Politics , XXI (August, 1959), p. 455. a ^"Christian Foundations of the Social Sciences," Social Research . XXVI (Autumn, 1959), pp. 325-46. 'ibid., p. 345. lOibid.

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38 integration into a Christian theology of life and history. "'^'^ Moreover, a true morality is always the fruit of religion. For Heimann, godless "hoMnisa is often a moving, but always a tr^ic phMMMsenon.**^' In pointing out the neglect of political theology, it is not maintained here that political philosophy should b« based upon theology or that political theology is the only good political philosophy. However, to neglect political theology is to make modem political theory incooplete aad inadequate. ^^ In an analysis of political theology, a few words of warning are in order. The political theorist qua political theorist must be aware of the fact that he is Incompetent to Judge the fundamentals of religious knowledge. As Loren P. Beth warns us, "The political philosopher, as political philosopher, is qualified to construct a theory of the state, but he is not a theologian and is in no position to Judge of either the existence or the value of religious truth. "'^^ Therefore, some political theorists, like Arnold Brecht, come to the conclusion that the reality or the existence of God must be accepted as either an assuiq>tion or a scientific hypothesis. It is beyond the scope of this essay to question, as does philosopher Walter Kaufmann, the existence of God. 15 ll^bid. l^Ibid.. p. 334. *^Amold Brecht makes exactly the saae statanent in his Political Theory , p. 459. l ^The American Theory of Church and State (Gainesville: !tai« versity of Florida Press, 1958), p. 137. ^ 'critique of Religion and Philosophy (Garden City, N. T. : Doubleday, 1961). See especially chapter v, "The God of the

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3f Arnold Brecht Is ao«t notable ataong those In favor of the "scientific" political theory which, he insists, should accept the possibility of the existence of God as a hypothesis. ^^ Raving pointed out the fact that religion has played a great role in the genesis of Western culture and the religious influence on the rise of loodem democracy, he declares that there is professional recognition that the. questions concerning the relation between religion and politics are *Vlthin the scope of political science*" "In viev of the inportant role played by religion in many public affairs," he urges, "political science ust indeed be concerned with religion, lb disregard the religious factor would often mean to distort reality and to base analysis and conclusions on defective data. Whenever religion enters political motivations it becotoes part of the subject matter of political science."^' Moreover, he points out that religion can be a source of knowledge, lis hastens to add, and rightly so, that "... to say that religion as a Philosophers," which examines Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas and Pascal, pp. 137-72. In one passage, he asks the question: ''Can one prove God's existence?" The answer is yes, but "this does not mean that God exists" (p. 168). ^htt sMkea what he calls the "scientific" exposition of God's existence in relation to political science in Political Theory. especially chapter xlil, "IWentieth-Century PoilClcal Science and the Belief in God," pp. 456-79; '*The Latent Place of God in TwentiethCentury Political Theory, " "^be Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht . ed. Morris D. Forkosch (itow York: Exposition Press, 1954), pp. 148-60. His theory is reminiscent of the Pascalian wager in the social sciences. Pascal argued that "either God exists, or he does not exist." Since neither proposition can b« proved, we must wager: "If we wager that God exists and we are right, we win e veryt hing; if we are wrong we lose nothing. If you passed this up, 'you would be imprudent'." Walter Kaufmann, op. cit .. p. 170. Kaufmann himself argues: "Ihey say that we cannot Induce belief merely by representing to ourselves the great advantage of belief. But it is Pascal's logic that is at fault, not his psychology" (p. 171). ^^ Political Theory , pp. 456, 459,

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40 social phenomeiwn Is a relevant factor for political science is not the saoM as saying that religion is a prerequisite for the scientist's own understanding of reality. "^^ Arnold Bracht proposes to offer a '^scientific" analysis of God's existence and the reality of God. Be condemns the modem scientific element which brackets God's existence and reality as intersubjectively impossible. He argues that the scientific spirit has tended to interpret "the bracketed God as a non-existent God."^^ Be believes that this attitude tends to avoid the issue. Weither is this problea that which the theologians and the philosophers should solve, '*because we are dealing here, not with the neaning of God, but with the aieaning and scope of science «td of political science in particular. "^^ Brecht further rejects the sciottlflc attitude of the "fiftyfifty balance" of God and no God. "wa, " he writes, "are confronted with the near-paradox that God's reality may some day be scientifically evident, but that if there be no God we shall never know that for certain. In popular parlance, we mqr soow day know his existence, but we can never know his non-existence."^* Be further argues against the fallacy of assuming that a student "who proposes to open the brackets must first prove the existence of God."^ Bs points out that this argtment is "a legal principle" rather than "a scientific one." In the legal sense only, the burden of proof that the defendant is guilty lies on the shoulder^ ^ ^Ibid . . p. 459. ' ^The Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht . p. 149. 20lbid., p. 150. ^ 4bid . . pp. 150-51. 22ibid., p. 151.

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41 of the prosecutor, but in the scientific sense, he argues, the burden of proof rests on "both shoulders, not merely on one.'*^^ However, he makes it clear that his position is not a plea "for a surrender of the negative alternative to the positive one; it is a plea only for due recognition of both." "After fifty years of bracketing God," he writes, "we should by now be mature «wugh eoanetimee to r^oove the brackets and to shift them from the positive to the negative alternative, therewith acknowledging God's latent place in twentieth-century political theory; and still to fulfill our specific function well —• the function of the political scientist to distinguish severely between mere speculations, hypotheses, assumptions and personal beliefs, on the one side, and scientifically established data, capable of inter subjective transmittal, on the other. "^^ Since the prevailing attitude of the social scientists has been tending towards the negative alternative (the non-existence of God), he Argues for taking the positive alternative (the existence of God) in the "scientific" research. The position of Arnold Brecht mxy be untenable both to the theologians and to the scientists. That is to say, it would be too "scientific" for the theologians; and it would be too "xinscientific" for the scientists. But we oust recognise the fact that even from a scientific point of view we can cogently argue for the positive relationship between God and politics. Brecht seems to be essentially Kantian in that the reality of God can be neither proved nor disproved. ^^ The existence of God is neither scientifically verifiable nor unverifiable: God's existence is beyond the ken of scientific verification. In a scientific political 23lbid. 24ibld., pp. 156-57. ^^ Polltical Theory , p. 460.

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42 theory, therefore, ve must distinguish "religion as a subject matter of scientific inquiry" from "religion as a source of knowledge. "^^ "In deciding," Brecht writes, "to limit our scientific work to the negative alternative alone, and to keep the other 'bracketed, ' we have not eliminated the latter. This is the fundamental situation."^' To bracket God from political theory does not eliminate hlm^^ from reality* The odds are against those who assume the non-existence of God since "we may some day know God's existence, but we can never know his non* existence."^' Thus his conclusion is: a scientific political theory may as well accept the existence of God as a scientific hypothesis. This agnostic position — as John Dewey phrases it, "a shadow cast by the eclipse of the supernatural"^^ — is a blasphemy to the religious mind which unquestionably believes in God and in the creation of man and nature as the divine work of God. And it is heresy to the scientifically-minded, who considers the existence of God as a superstition and who believes in God but says that, since God's existence cannot be proved by the scientific method, the question of God is beyond the realm of social and political philosophy. But the plea of ^^Ibld, "ibid., p. 464. 28 Brecht does not capitalize "him" for the reason that, he explains, "this paper deals with the scientific question of God's reality and, therefore, should not give the answer surreptitiously in the style of printing. Capitalization of the term God is Justified even so, in order to distinguish the idea of one God from ideas of a plurality of gods." The Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht, p. 158. ^ ^Politlcal Theory, p. 470. ^ ^A Common Faith (New Haven: Tale University Press, 1934), p. 86.

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43 Arnold Brecht to take the positive alternative In the social sciences Is to open the gateway for the sclentlflcally-odnded political theorists to trod once again the forgotten path of political theology. "Political theories," George Sabine writes, ". . . live on two plaoas or play a double role. They are theories, or logical entitles belonging to the abstract world of thought, but they are also beliefs, events in people's minds and factors in their conduct. In this latter role they are influMitial (if they are) not because they are true but because they are believed."^* In this sense the Declaration of Independence, for example, is an influential political doctnent, not because all men are created equal in fact but beecosa It is believed (to be true) that all men are created equal. Jk>hn Dewey, while distinguishing "the religious" from "religion," even talks about "the common faith of Kikind."^^ In the same sense, religious documents, doctrines, religious thinkers (1. e., theologians) are influential in politics (if they relate their religious thought to politics). The tao of political theology is its link between theology and politics* It has frequently been pointed out that modem scholarship suffers from the deplorable condition of coapartsMntalization. The compartmentalisation of the study of politics from religion and theology is no exception. Jbachim Hach comes to the core of this problem when he s^rs: One of the most unfortunate aspects of modem scholarship has been the departmentalization of the study of man. Granted, that man is, at his best, an integral organism of which the physical, mental, and spiritual are aspects, we must deplore the fact that the Inquiry into these different aspects of his nature is carried on in widely separated fields of study. But 31"What Is a Political Theory?" p. 10. ^ ^Op. cit .. p. 87.

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44 what Is ouch more disturbing Is the tendency In sooe quarters to deny that each of these domains of human existence, notwithstanding their Interrelationship and Interaction, possesses Its own laws. This Important fact Is neglected or outrlghtly denied by determlnlsts In different branches of the study of nan. J'' Professor John U. Nef , being aware of this compartmentallsatlon, calls It "an axiom of /oodeni/ scholarship."^ The necessity of studying "man's experience as a whole" and the axiom of modem scholarship rightly place him "In a dlleamui." "The very separation of science from faith, fCMi ethics and from art, which Is so characteristic of our tlows," he writes, "Is at the roots of the Industrialized world In which we llve."^^ To be sure, this Integral study of man's experience as a whole confronts the danger of becoming shallow. None the less, this risk Is worth taking, as does John U. Nef, In contrast to the narrow approach where the whole MB Is chopped off Into Innumerable pieces. ^^ Thus, the very axiom of modem scholarship becomes Its myopia. With this Integral approach of the whole man In view, we must define the scope of political theology Itself* By political theology Z mean that part of theoretical politics or political philosophy which Is based upon the theological as the ultimate source of politics. The proposition that "all the political problems are at bottCMii theological" Is the key notion In political theology or, as Nathaniel Mlcklem phrased ^ ^The Comparative Study of Religions , ed, Jbseph M. Kltagawa (New Tork: Columbia Utolverslty Press, 1958), p. xxv. ^Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization (New Tork: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. xl. 35ibld., p. 4. ^^A htimanlstlc view of "the whole man" Is well constructed In Lewis Mumford, The Conduct of Life (New Tork: Barcourt, Brace, 1951).

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45 It, '*the theology of politics.**^ Therefore, as John R. Ballofiell thinks, political theology must assuae "both an intimate and logically necassary connection" between theological presuppositions and his po» litlcal philosophy.^ Granted that there is such a connection, hovever, it should be noted at the outset that a logically necessary connection ba twan thaological presuppositions sad political philosophy cannot be pushed too far. In the study of political theology, we must thus be able to distinguish historical causality from logical Inference . In relating theologieal ecmcepts and notions with one*s political philosophy, «e must not only consider the theological reasoning of a political philosopher but also see the material^ connection and conclusions of his political phi* losophy based upon certain sets of theological notions and presuppositions • Take the example of original sin. This theological concept alone cannot determine or deduce a tmlform pattern of political philosophy among Christian theologians. Thus, we cone to the inevitable conclusions that material connections are much more important than logical connections. There is a significant relation betwe«m original sin and the political philosophy of Relnhold Niebuhr and that of Karl Berth. But their political philosophies are markedly far apart frost each other. This does not mean that there is no logieal connection at all. An example can be given ^'The most comprehensive eiq>osltiott of a concept in political theology is giv«i by Emat H. Kuitorowlcz in analysing the origin of "The King's tm Bodies." He concludes that "the KIIC'S TWO BODIES is an offshoot of Christian theological thought and consequently stands as a landmark of Christian political theology." Op. clt .. p. 506. ^ ^Haln Currents in Modem Political Thought , p. vii.

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46 In the political philosophy of Jacques Karitain and that of Karl Barth. The consequence of the forser from the Thomistic enq>hasi8 on reason, nature and philosophy gives aaple room for realistic and positive thinking in political matters while the consequence of the Barthian Orthodox emphasis on revelation, grace and theology reaches a negative attitude or "indifferentism" towards political affairs. However, the reasoning of Reinhold Niebuhr seems to have an entirely different practical consequence on politics. The notion of original sin for Niebuhr carries its weight towards a realistic approach to politics. Power politics is the inevitable outcome of man's sinful> ness and selfishness. Thus he accepts power struggle in international relations as an inevitable reality. His assessment of the reality of international politics has greatly influenced the American "realist school" of international politics. George Kennan once said that Hiebuhr is the father of all the American realists. ^^ Some consider that Niebuhr is more concerned with Christian ethics than with Christian theology. Dante L. Germino regards Niebuhr as "a theological gadfly rather than a theologian. "^^ In the same sense, Waltet M. Horton speaks of the depth of the "continental theology" in contrast to the Anglo-Aoiarican theology.^* For Judith N. Shklar, political theology "assumes that all po* litical ideas and institutions ought to be based upon direct revelation ^^George Kennan is quoted as having said that Reinhold Niebuhr is "the father of all of us," that is, of the American realists. Kenneth W. Thoaq>son, op. cit .. p. 17. AO qp, cit .. p. 477. ^^• Contemporary Continental Theology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938), p. 217.

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47 and that political trutha are a part of general theology. "^^ She could thus reach the conclusion that political theology Is "certainly not the Christian political theory, par excellence . "^^ This definition of political theology Is based on "revelatlonal theology'* alone to the exclusion of natural or rational theology. Revelatlonal theology is represented by the crisis theology of Karl Berth. It is the Orthodox Protestant theology as opposed to the "liberal" theology of the nineteenth century. Revelatlonal theology is less drastically represented by EtdLl Brunner and Reinhold Miebuhr. The revelatlonal theology of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner is a return to the theology of the Reformation and, especially for the fortaer, to the Word of God. It is contrasted with the Thomistic theology as represented by Jacques Maritain. The supreme emphasis of revelatlonal theology is found in the notions of revelation, grace and the redemption of man's sinfulness coming directly from God. It enq>haslce8 the total "other-ness" of God from nature, the world and man. Thus, man's sinfulness is redeemable only by the grace of God. Infinite God outdistances the finite world, nature and man. Revelatlonal theology minimizes the role of faustan reason, nature and natural law at the eiqiense of what is supernatural, revelatlonal, and inspired by grace. Revelatlonal theology, thus defined, is directly opposed to the rational or natural theology of Thomlaa. It rejects completely the Thomistic concepts of analogia entis (analogy of being), htman reason, natural law, nature. As the Catholic political philosopher Heinrich A, ^ ZQp. cit .. p. 169. 43ibid., p. 170.

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48 Ronoen points out, the revelatlonal theology "offers scarcely a possibility for a political philosophy and ethics based on human nature and reason."^ In this sense. Hiss Shklar*8 definition of political theology is In conplete agreement with Roomen when the latter says: "If ... on the basis of this theology Revelatlonal theology/ ^ PO~ lltical philosophy and ethics should ever be constructed, it will be truly a political theology.'"^" folitical theology thus narrowly defined In terms of revelatlonal theology alone excludes the political philosophy based upon natural theology, e. g., Thomlstlc theology* Natural theology is as much theology as revelatlonal theology. Thus we must define political theology in such a way that it will Include political philosophy based upon both revelatlonal theology and natural theology. Belnrich A. Ronmen defines theology to mean "either natural theology, 1. e., God revealing Himself in His creation to the htaoan rational mind, revealing Himself In the conscience, or supernatural theology, the doctrine of God, revealing Himself positively in Christ and the inspired Sacred Scriptures, ^Qp. cit .. p. 95. He further points out the fact that "St. Thonas in the guaestlones dealing with political philosophy and ethica mora often qxiotes Aristotle and Cicero than the Scriptures, whereas Luther and Calvin must always qiiote the Scriptures. (Calvin, rejecting natural law not to the degree that Luthar does, choosas to quote the Decalogue as the substance of natural law rather than any of the ancient or Stoic philosophers, a fact that must be explained by the Occamist concept of natural law In Calvin's thought)" (p. 112). The Polish Catholic thinker Przywara called St. Thomas the 'Christian Aristotle." Walter M. Horton, op. cit .. p. 65. However, it saaaw to be of cardinal inq>ortance to remember that St. Thomas Aquinas vaa Christian first and Aristotelian second. According to Etienne Gilson, there was no doubt in the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas that philosophy was to facilitate man's knowledge of God, and Aquinas baptized Aristotle. For example, see: Elements of Christian Ktilosophy (Garden City, H. Y. : Doubleday, 1960), pp. 5-21. Furthermore, St. Thomas Aquinas' notion of the ideal state was found in Holy Scripture (p. 274). ^ ^Qp. cit .. p. 95.

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49 Interpreted by the Infallible doctrinal authority of the divinely instituted papacy or, as in Protestantism, by divine guidance of the individual conscience, with or without the assistance of tradition . . . and of the consensus of theologians. '^ Political theology, therefore, must include the canon of Scriptures, the dogmas, the tradition and the writings of theologians in relation to politics* However, political theology is not directly concerned with the practical consequences of these things. Thus, for •xample, the mcnremtntB of *\nnristi«n Democracy" in the contonporary world are irrelevant to political theology. It is essentially the relationship between theological doctrines (deriving from the notion of God) and political philosdpHy. The relation of church and state is a subject of political theology as far as it is on a theoretical level. Folitlcal theology includes revel ational theology and natural theology as long as they a>:c related to politics; that is to say, when theologians talk about politics in terms of their theological doctrines and concepts. Therefore, the Christian political philosophy, if it is Christian at all, is a political theology par excellence . This does not mean that all political writings of Christians by their religious allegiance to Christianity belong to the realm of political theology. Some political writers who are Christian by faith do not necessarily expound political theology. When a political philosophy is ultimately founded upon the theological, then it becomes a political theology. Political theology as defined here poses another question when we take into cottsideration the Thomistic distinction between "theology" and "philosophy." "From the standpoint of Catholic theology," Roomen ^^Ibid., p. 93.

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50 writes, '*a specific political theology cannot be held. St. Thomas bases political philosophy on natural reason and natural law, not on revelation and supernatural theology."^' In Thoaism, theology is clearly dlstln^lshed from philosophy. In philosophy, the role of reason, nature and natural law has a "genuine" but not absolute autonony from revelation, the supernatural and grace, nms, political "philosophy" is a real possibility. Political "philosophy" is put in Juxtaposition with politlcal "theology." The Thomlstlc political philosophy is based on human reason and natural law; "political theology" (defined in terms of revelatlonal theology) becomes an inqpossibility. As Erik Peterson says, *\>olitical theology" Is a "theological imposBlbility , "^ "The merit of 'political theology*," Romaen concludes, "lies, then, in certain aspects of its criticism and not in its positive system, which is inadmissible."^ Deriving from the distinction between philosophy and theology, political theology (in the sense of revelatlonal theology) for the Theadstic thinker is not theoretically feasible. The terms "political" and "theology" are mutually exclusive. The theology of Karl Barth, for •xaaple, has only the negative connotation for the Thomlstlc thinker. This amounts to the denial of '^litlcal theology" itself. Bwever, we are not compelled, for the present purpose, to accept ^ ^Ibld . . p. 111. In this connection, the Protestant thinker Walter M. Horton writes: "I must confess ay opinion that Catholic philosophy is much more Interesting and rewarding to study, as a possible source of light and guidance, than Catholic theology . " Op. clt .. p. 83. ^^As quoted in Helnrich A. Ronmen, op. c lt>« p* 114* ^^Ibld.. p. 115.

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51 the strict Thoalstie dlatlnetlon betwacn philosophy and theology. Even « fhMdst, like Jacques Maritain, does not separate philosophy from th€M>logy* Although philo8(»phy has a "genuine" mitonooy in the natural faculties of the huMn aijid, it is not absolutely autonoiaous from theology. On the contrary, philosophy is illuminated by theology. '^Thus,'* SosHMi writes, "a repudiation of political theology does not mean that theological supernatural truth is of no corrective and directive influence in political philosophy or that ecclesiastical authority has no right to teach in this field. "^^ Jacques Maritain himself considers a political theology as the genuinely political philosophy or political science although he recognizes political philosophy and political science as distinct from political theology. Maritain explains that "those fields of research such as the history of religion, anthropology, politics, economics, and the rest, vfalch depend on history or on methods of positive enquiry for all the observational material they amaas, and for their ampirical basis •> are not constituted as coaplately and genuinely e3q>li> cative 'sciences' unless integrated with theology. Only a theological anthropology or a political theology would merit the name of ethical science or political science strictly speaking. "^^ Iblitical theology is defined here in such a ^tj as to include natural theology and revelational theology in relation to politics, •specially political philosophy. Me are not compelled to repudiate "political theology" (in the sense of revelational theology) as in the theology of Karl Berth, despite the strict distinction between theology and philosophy in Thooism. Granted that revelational theology in its extroM ^bid .. p. 116. An Essay on Christian Philosophy , tr. Edward H. Flannery (Knr York: Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 98-99.

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52 form (1. e., Karl Barth) negates raCher than affirms the Importance of politics and political philosophy, this negative political theology is as important as the positive political theology of Thomism from a political point of view.^^ Political theology is that part of political philosophy of which the ultimate foundation lies In the theological* The Thomlstic political philosophy is dlstlngttish*d from theology; nevertheless, its ultimate source is Christian theology* fAiether Christian theology la based vpoa eltlwr revelational theology or natural theology, it is a political theology as far as it is related, negatively or positively, to politics. Folltical theology is a political philosophy under the ultimate aegis of the theological* It is based vqpon the proposition that all the political problems are at bottom theological, therefore, the political philosophies of Karl Barth, Relnfaald Niebuhr, Jacques Raritaln, IkII Brunner, faasl Tllllch «id others are political theologies par excellence . The Christian political philosophy is a political theology in the true sense of the term as it is defined here. J. V. Langmead Casserley, a Protestant thinker, e3q>lalns why the Christian political philosophy is a political theology par excellence when he says: "Theologians of all traditions agree in rejecting this alleged priority of philosophical reflection over theology and faith. '*^^ Theology is understood as ''the stu^ of the content of revelation" and faith, "the ae* ceptance of revelation.** Jacques ttaritaln's philosophy of democracy, for •xample, has its foundation on the pillar of the Gospel. Thus, his CO ''^From a political point of view, the matter of revelatlonal theology and rational theology has b««n expounded in a brief but precise form by Dante L. Germlno in '*Iiid Types of Christian Political Thought." These two types refer to the "fldelsts" (revelatlonal theology) and tha "rationalists" (rational theology). ^ ^The Christian in Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 186.

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53 clflBOcraClc philosophy of government is e part of his political theology in general* Having defined the scope of political theology, we most now state What is not political theology. Jacob Taubes, in exanlning the relation between theology and political philosophy, notes that "In the beginning theology emerged a» a problem of political theory. . . • 'theology' occurs for the first time in a dialogue between Adelmantus and Socrates discussing the place of poetry and literature in the state. "^ He goes so far to say that, "As there is no theology without political implications, there is no political theory without theological presuppositions.'*^^ And he is quite right when he safs, "There is, in fact, no theology that should not be relevant for the order of society. Iven a theology that claims to be ^>olltical altogether, and conceives the divine as the totally foreign, as the totally other to man and world, may have political i]iq>lication8." Moreover, it is often quoted that even Proudhon, an atheistic anarchist, said there is theology at the bottom of politics. 5^ Folltical theology is defined here only in terms of theism and of the recognition of the supernatural. Thus it is useful to distinguish what is a "religion" from what is "the religious."'^ As Heinrieh A. suggests, theology would exclude "religious experiences, religious ^"Theology and Political Theory," Social Research. XXII (Spring, 1955), p. 57. ^ ^Ibid . . p. 58. Hathanlel Micklem also says: "Every conceivable political theory rests upon an Inplidt anthropology, a theological or antl>theelogical estimate of man as related to his God, to his fellows and to machines." Op. dt .. p. xi. ^""Theology and Political Theory," p. 58; Rommen, op. cit .. p. 117. S^This IsaDeweyan distinction in A Common Faith, pp. 1-28.

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34 sentiments, or Irrational feelings."^® It only lollies religious "doctrines" as far as they are related to politics. As nany Christian thinkers believe, MandsB Is a form of religion or atheism (pseudo* religion). Sone would consider the Platonic Idea of Good as a theological concept, ' especially through the influence of neo-PlatoniM>» However , these types of "theological" or "pseudotheological" notions are excluded from the consideration of political theology here. As Etienne Cilson notes, ". . . if Plato has never said that the Idea of Good is a god, the reason for it might be that he never thought of It •• of a god. And why, after all, should an Idea be considered as a god? An Idea is no person; it is not even a soul; at best it is an intelligible cause, nuch less a person than a thing. "°^ v > In suanary, political theology as defined here includes revelational theology and natural theology in Christianity as far as they are related to political philosophy. The extreme form of revelational theology, 1. e., the dialectical theology of Karl Barth has a negative connotation in political th<»}logy. Nonetheless, it is as important as Thomistic theology from a political point of view. Thus, St. Augustine, Kierkegaard, Luther and Karl Barth are as Important as St. Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Marltaln. In examining the political theology of Jacques Maritain, we must keep in mind the fact that the Thomist, following the footsteps of St. Thomas Aquinas, makas the distinction between "p^^osO" phy" and "theology." However, to say that the political philosophy of S ^Qp. clt .. p. 93. eg •''See Jacob Taubes, op. clt .. pp. 57-58. ^ ^God and Philosophy (New Haven: Tale Iftilversity Press, 1941), »• 26.

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55 Jacques Harltaln Is a political theology Is not to blur the distinction between philosophy and theology. All the Thomlsts, Including Jacqties Harltaln, recognize the fact that theology elevates philosophy. Political theology, thus. Is based upon the afflmatlon that all the political problems are at bottom theological. The political philosophy of Jacques Harltaln, as veil as the political writings of contemporary Christian theologians. Is the proper subject of political theology. In conclusion, let us restate, with the aid of Paul Tllllch, what political theology or the theology of politics la. For Tllllch, the "theology of culture'* (theonomy) Is based precisely upon the proposition that "Religion Is the subst«ace of culture and culture the form of religion. "^^ Let us substitute 'politics" for "culture," then we get the formula for the "theology of politics" or political theology: Religion is the substance of politics and politics the form of religion. °^ The Protestant Bra , tr. J«nes Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 57.

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iWi''.*UivK>i::? ! CHAPTER III THE POUTICS OF CHRISTIAN THBOLOGT We have defined the scope of political theology as the Interdependence and Interrelation between theological doctrines and Ideas and political philosophy, folltlcal theology Is also defined In such a ^ay that It should Include both revelatlonal theology and natural theology* From a viewpoint of extr^oe revelatlonal theology as In Martin Luther, S0ren Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth of our tlae» theology has only negative political Implications* In revelatlonal theology there Is an unbridgeable chasm between God and man, on the one hand, and between reason and faith, on the other hand* Since man is sinful, he can be redeeoaed only by the grace of God. This attitude creates a kind of total "indlfferentism" towards cultural and political matters* Thus theology and political philosophy are not exactly friendly twins. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, there is an intimate relationship between theology or religion and politics. As Arnold Brecht has shown, even the scientific method cannot lightly dismiss the importance of the interrelationship between theology and politics. If we would look at Jacques Marltaln in the light of Christian theology as a whole, we would be in a better position to understand his political philosophy. Political theology, the link between theology and politics, is 56

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57 almost a terra Incognita on the part of political theorists. "The moral and spiritual anarchy of our age," John H. McLachlan writes, **is probably due to opinion being muddled and misled, to the continuing acceptance of archaic conceptions such as the idea that religion has nothing to do with politics." Ernst Troeltsch earlier wrote that politics, %rithout being integrated with religious and ethical conceptions, "can do nothing but further the barbarization and mutual destruction of the nations."^ H. Richard Niebuhr, following the footstep of Imst Troeltsch,^ regards the relation between the Christian faith and civilization as "the enduring problem."^ Paul lillich, cnt of the great Protestant theo* logians of our time, explicitly states that "the strictly systematic character of a theology does not need to prevent it from being 'practical' — that is to say: applicable to the personal and social problems of our religious life."^ However, for Tlllich "it is theology and not philosophy which is able to offer an ultimate understanding of culture."^ ^"Thc Present World Predicament." Hibbert Journal . LVIII (January, 1960), p. 112. • ^Christian Thought; Its History and Application , ed. Baron F. von Hugel (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 173. ^Emst Troeltsch *s The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches is certainly the most comprehensive study regarding the relation of Christian religious doctrines to social matters. ^Christ and Culture (Hev York: Harper and Brothers, 1956). The first chapter is entitled "The Enduring Problem" which is a preliminary discussion concerning the relation between Christianity and civilisation. ' The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. i. ^chard Kroner, Culture and Faith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. vii-viii.

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58 Moreover, all cognitive, aesthetic, social, and political matters are "spiritual concerns."^ "The history of Christian theology," John Dillenberger and Claude Welch write, "is always the record of a continuous conversation, carried on within the church and between the church and the world in which it lives. Thus the development of theology is always a dual movement, an expression of the inner life of the community of faith as it acknowledges the presence of God in Jesus Christ, and at the same time a partial reflection of the contes^porary world, "^ Jesus himself was not indifferent to culture. As John Moore says, "Jesus was not an anarchist, indifferent or opposed to the claims of political authority; he told his bearers to pay their taxes, to 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.' But that saying continues, 'and unto God the things that are God's.'" However, the essence of Christian thinking is that ultimately "Caesar is subject to God and the things of Caesar must be brought under God's will."^ Richard Kroner makes a philosophical excursion into the relation between theology and culture while he recognises the Inherent limit of philosophy which is "determined and also illtiminated by faith and theology." tbm liadLt of philosophy (in contrast to faith and theology) is essentially analogous to the proposition that "the human mind and the divine mind are separated from each other by a chasm which is reflected by the antagonism between culture and faith*" This la the prevailing 'Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 1. ^Protestant Christianity Interpreted through Its Development (New Torkl Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 179. '"Christian Ethics and Western Thought," The Vitality of the Christian Tradition , p. 307.

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59 attitude of contemporary Orthodox Protestantism* The crisis theology of Karl Barth Is extremely eiq>hatlc about this chasn that Kroner speaks of. Onllke Karl Barth, ho w var, Relnhold Hlebuhr, Paul Tllllch and tell Brunner recognize cultural and historical exigencies although they all look at aan's ethical probleas "from the point of view of sacred theology rather than /irom wj philosophic viewpoint." Richard Kroner, critical of the Barthlan fldelstlc position, says that "Karl Barth and other theologians do not solve the problem of how the secular and the sacred are related to each other, because they Ignore or disregard the taak and the function of philosophic thought." All Christian thinkers, however, would be in coaq>lete agreement in that the ultimate solution for cultural problems is the Christian faith. "The philosophy of faith," Kroner writes, "can show that . • . the content of Christian faith does 'solve' the ultiiMte task of culture which culture can never solve." The Christian faith, for the very reason that it can transcend culture, "is able to integrate" culture and "to embrace and permeate all its realms. "^^ Only a few generations ago Ernst Troeltsch cme to the deplorable conclusion that the Christian Church "no longer possessed a fixed and objective ideal of unity," and "the social philosophy of the Christian e«HMnity has also suffered an undeniable disintegration, through its dependence upon continually changing conditions." The result, according to him, was obvious: the secular social theory '*ha8 far outdistanced the social philosophy of the Church. "^^ The aaaa cannot be said of the lORichard Kroner, op. dt .. pp. ix, 7-8, 208, 209. ^'^ The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches . II, p. 991. B. B. Aubrey deplored the theological lag in cultural problems and

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60 contemporary scene. It ranges from the political organization of Churches* laymen to the seminars at various universities. The movements of 'Christian Democracy" in Europe range from family and youth organizations to trade unions and political parties. ^^ They are a part of continuous efforts to inculcate the Christian principles in politics and economic affairs through layaen rather than through the Churches. On the part of the Catholic Church, the new innovations began 13 with Vincent Joachim Peed, later Pope Leo XIII. On the lntellect>ial level, the encyclical Aetemi Patris (1879) encouraged the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Catholic circle. On the practical level, the encyclical Rertm Hovarum (1891) becane the lancksark of Cathoic social and economic thinking which essentially attempted to avoid the urged Christian theology to "render a new service to culture. . . . fin order to do thl^ theology must reorientate its work so as to concentrate upon the cultural problem .... /The conteoporarxZ situation demands of theology a new religious world-view, which offers an interpretation of civilization itself. This theology will be neither a non-social metaphysical theory nor a non-metaphysical social teaching, but a re-examination of a88i'!iq>tlons of culture in terms of a worldview." Present Theological Tendencies (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936), pp. 17-18. ^Tttchael P. Fogarty defines Christian Democracy as "that aspect of the ecumenical or catholic movement in modem Christianity which is concerned with the application of Christian principles in the areas of political, economic, and social life for which the Christian laity has Independent responsibility." Christian Democracy in Western gurope 1820-1953 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 5, 345. This book is probably the most con^rehensive study of Christian Democracy in Europe. Representing a Roman Catholic point of view, there is Church and Society; Catholic Social and Political Thought and Mofvamenta 1789-1950 . ed. Joseph Moody (New York: Arts, 1953). There are numerous works written country by country. However, aomm excellent examples are: Mario KLnaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Peaocracy in Italy and France (Notre Dame: Ihiiverslty of Notre Dame Press, 1952) and Alfred mamant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). '"'The nine most important social teachings of Pope Leo XIII is found in The Church Speaks to the Modem World: The Social Teaching of Leo XIII, ed. Etienne Gllson (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1954). From a Protestant point of view, Winthrop S. Hudson writes Understanding

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61 one extreiRe of lalsseE-falre capltallsn and th* other extreiae of secular or "atheistic" socialism; on social and political matters, we must take cognl< sance of the encyclicals such as Imaortale Del (1885), Graves de Coamunl (1901) and, most recently. Pope John XXIII *s Hater et Maglster (JUly, 1961). Fron a Protestant point of view, the Ecumenical Movement (the World Council of Churches) waa an attempt to arrive at doctrinal unity In Protestantism*^^ There Is also the 'Christendom" movement In bigland* In the university circle In this country, the Lilly andowraent research program In Christianity and politics at Duke Dhlverslty under the directorship of John H. Rallowell and the Institute of Ethics and Politics at Hesleyan Dblverslty under the direction of Kenneth W. Uhdervood are ccmparatlvely recent phenomena to Integrate Christianity with political and social matters In university teaching. ^^ Roman Catholicism; A Guide to Papal Teachlnji^ for Protestants (Phlla* delphla: Westminster Press, 1959)^ ^^Iha Ecumenical Mov&nent or the World Council of Churches began with the first Assembly held at Amsterdtta In Holland from August 22 to September 4, 1948. One hundred and forty-seven churches from forty-four countries i#ere represented by three hundred and fifty-one delegates and two hundred and thirtyeight alternates. The second Assembly was held at Evanston, Illinois, In 1956. It anst be clearly noted that the Council itself Is not a church and cannot define doctrine and policy of various churches, although the creation of the Council Is an aspiration of a united Christian church. The Council publishes a quarterly journal called Ecumenical Review whose present editor Is WlllffiB Adolph Vlsser 'T Hooft, who wrote The Mewing of Ecumenical (London: SCM Press, 1953). See also: John T. McNeill, Modem Christian Movements (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954) which includes Roman Catholic movements. From a historical point of view, there is A History of the Ecumenical Movement, ed, Ruth Rouse and Stephen C. Melll (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954); and from a doctrinal point of view, Walter M. Horton wrote: Christian Theology; An Ecumenical Approach (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955). Prom a Catholic point of view, see: Gustave Welgel, A Catholic Primer on the Ecumenical Movement (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1959); Bernard Leemlng. The Churches and the Church: A Study of Ecumenism (Wastmlnster, Md. : Newman Press, 1960). ^^The Lilly Endowment program Is oriented on a high professional level that Includes conference and publication. Its publication

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62 Along with these new developments. Christian political theology Is a force that should be recognized In the modem theory of politics. The fundasnental supposition of Christian political theology is that all the political problems and political philosophies are at bottom theological. Theology is the first principle of Christian political philosophy. The ooeqpletely systeawtic analysis of political theology, of course, oust include all the religions of the world, whether they be past or pr«a«nt, primitive or modem. It oust include, for axaaple, Christianity, Judaism, Islamism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and examine their theological implications and influences on politics. In doing so, political theology must learn its lessons from comparative religion, philosophy of religion, sociology of religion, psychology of religion, and other intellectual disciplines.^^ includes such works as Kenneth W. Thonp8
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63 Christianity is a catholic and unlversalistic religion in the modem world. The sphere of its influence has no longer b««a liadted to the Western hemisphere; it has rapidly spread and taken its roots even in the laatem hemisphere.^' "Religion as form of life and Weltanschawmg. " writes Mircea Bliade, '*is represented by Christianity. '*^° Despite the catholicity of Christianity in form and substance, it is only one form of religion from a comparative point of view. Therefore, theoretically spedcing. Christian political theology is a part, although a large part, of political theology in general. To complete a systeoMtle analysis of political theology, we must include all the religions of the world, be they living or dead. For the discxission of political theology — Christianity or Christian theology and politics in this case — it is convenient to divide taiman existence into the two fundamental 'Wdjilities** given by Paul Tillich: one is the historical order and the other is the eternal order. '^^ One is the temporal, the natural, the profane, or the finite (Mew York: George Braziller, 1956); F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of last and West (New York: Macmillan, 1946); Georg Simmel, Sociology of Religion, tr. Curt Rosenthal (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959); Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Meridian Books, 1960); William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (Nnr York: Modem Library, 1929); Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, tr. John W. Harvey (New York; Oxford University Press, 1958); C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion; West and East , tr. R. F. C. Hull (New York: Pantheon, 1958); Erich Frmma, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Raven: Yale Uhiversity Press, 1950); Gordon W. Allport, the Individual and RLs Religion (Mew York: Macmillan, 1960). ^'The most comprehensive study of the expansion of Christianity is found in Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of the Expansion of Christianity (7 vols.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937-1945). A shorter version is A History of Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothars, 1953). ^ %he Sacred and the Profane, p. 162. ^ ^The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 18.

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64 Horld and the other is th« spiritual, the supernatural, the sacred, or the infinite world. Politics refers to the former, whereas religion refers to the latter. Han can be looked at in the same way: he is IHHj O religiosus and homo historicus . or he is spiritual and temporal. Thus man is fvindamentally a two-dimensional being. Regardless of what type of religion it may be, according to Mireea Eliade, a noted historian of coiq>arative religion, all religions encounter the sacred in contrast to the profane. ^^ Religious man would have a fundamentally different outlo<^ on the world of politics from the non-religious. For him the world of politics as part of the historical order is secondary in the order of importance: there is the higher order of the supernatural, the sacred, or the eternal world. "For religious sun," Eliade cooments, "space is not homogeneous .... there is ... a sacred space, and hence a strong, significant space; there are other spaces that are not sacred and so are without structure or consistency, amorphous. For religious Mn, this spatial nonhomogeneity finds expression in the experience of an opposition between space that is sacred — the only real and real-ly existing space -all other space, the formless eiqpanse surrounding it."^'Tlhlle the sacred world alw^r^s represents the absolute reality, the profane world appears for religious moi to be only a momentary temporality. "Whatever the historical context in which he /religious maii7 is placed," says Eliade, "homo religiosus always believes that there Is an absolute reality, the sacred , which transcends this world but * "The Sacred and the Profane, p. 14. 2^Ibid., p. 20.

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65 aalfetts Itself In this world, thereby sanctifying It and making It real."^^ Here lies the difference between the naturalistic notion of man (anthropocentrlc humanism) and the theocentrlc notion of man (theocentrlc humanism). ^^ Man Is the center of the universe In the forsMr; If there Is God, God Is either the object of belief or valuable for the service of man.^^ In the latter, however, the order Is reversed: God Is the pivot of human existence and the world. It Is usually agreed that the naturalistic conception of man Is the product of the Renaissance and Inculcated In the course of sclen« tlflc development. Mlrcea Ellade says that **. . . the completely profane world, the wholly desacrallzed conaos. Is a recent discovery In the history of the hiaaan spirit.'* Man, however, never seems to be able to escape completely from his religious experience: there Is always soma object for belief or worship even If It be neither God nor the Supreaie Being who governs the universe. "To whatever degree he may have deacrallsed the world, the man who had made his choice In favor of a profane life never succeeds In conq>letely doing away with religious behavior.** Whatever the nature of man may be, the world of politics for religious man appears to be at its best only one of many possible dimensions of human existence. Politics, considered as such, seems to be more rewarding and exacting. Politics and other dimensions of life are existentlally interrelated with one another. Religious dimension "ibid., p. 202. ^^rom an anthropocentrlc point of view, Erich Kahler wrote Man the Measure: A Wew Approach to History (New Tork: George Braziller, 1961). Jacques Marltain presents one of the best exaaf>les of theocentrlc htmanlsm in True Hamanlsm , tr. Margot Adaasoa (•« York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938). ^^or example, see I;Lid%rlg Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity .

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66 and political dlnension, in the last resort, cannot be excluded froa mutual dependence. Mircea Bliade pinpoints this fact vhen he says that the sacred and the profane worlds are "of concern both to the philosopher and to anyone seeking to discover the possible dia«nsions of human existence. "^^ A political theorist who studies political theology imist keep in mind that, for religious Mtti, •• g** a Christian theologian, politics is mlvmyB portrayed in the laage of the profane world in contrast to religion in the image of the sacred %K>rld. It is not too difficult to understwid, therefore, why a Christian theologian would consider CcMiiminism as a pseudo-religion in which the proletariat has a kind of "soteriological function" and the stateless society has a kind of "JUdaeo-^Christian eschatologlcal hope of an absolute end to history . "^^ For a theologian who is trying to bridge the chasm between theology and politics or between the sacred and the profane worlds, political theology is the means to achieve this unity. Some theologians, notably Karl Berth, outy try to discard the profane world of politics altogether. However, paradoxically enough, they can never escape fr<»& political involvement. The record of Berth's opposition to Nazism, despite his theological belief, clearly shows why even the utterly profane world of politics must become the concern for even such a theologian. For more politically-minded theologians like Relnhold Nlebuhr and Jacques Marltain, Christianity has cast its lot with the world of politics even though it is profane. ^ ^The Sacred and the Profane , pp. 13, 15, 23, 203. ^ ^Ibid . . p. 207.

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67 That wu the reason why Relnhold Nlebuhr accused Barth of "Indifferentism" towards the world of politics. ' Nlebuhr 's ethical concern over the world of politics is a suprene form of Christian activism. Hiebuhr cannot tolerate the Barthian attitude of Christians having "nothing special to say to the godless people of our age which /they/ would not hava said in any age.**^* Even Eail Brtumar who shares the Christocentric Barthian orientation "saw mmt point of contact in man's 'capacity for tha world*. "2* Mil Harberg shows clearly why even Karl Barth had to becoaa involved In politics. ^^ He considers Barth as "truly the Carlylean Hero as Theologian," and Barth is not merely an "eventful" man but also an "event -making" raan.^^ In exanining Karl Barth, Herberg comes to the conclusion that "contemporary theology is reasserting its relevance to all of human life, man*s social concerns included." And even in the social philosophy of Karl Barth, Herberg distinguishes "a kind of pre* Barthian Barth" from real Barth. Barth has been concerned with "the ^ ^Essays in Applied Christlfmity . ed. D. B. Robertson (Hew York: Meridian Books, 1959), "Barthianism and the Kingdom," pp. 141-93. 28jbid., p. 173. 29yiix Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," p. 16. ^Herberg *s esqposition of "the social philosophy of Karl Barth" is an indication that Barth had to be involved in politics. •* ^0p. dt .. p. 12. "Eventful" man and "event -making" man are coined by Sidney Hook in The Hero in History; A Study In Limitation and Possibility (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943), p. 154. Hook distinguishes the two categories of eventful man and event-making suns "The eventful man in history is any man whose actions influenced subsequent developments along a quite different course than would have been followed if these actions had not been taken. The event -making man is an eventful man whose actions are the consequences of outstanding capacities of intelligence, will, and character rather than of accidents of position."

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68 problems of society, church, and state, war and revolution, totalitarianism and democracy." This was why Barth e3q}ressed his stem opposition to Hazl totalitarianism: his discriminating Judgments in politics came to "bring the Christian to the side of constitutional democracy,"^ The fidelstic position of Barth totally rejects reason, nature and philosophy. R. R. Mackintosh remarks that "Barth gives no place to Natural Revelation. "^^ Revelation, faith, and grace are the key concepts 32will Herberg, op. dt .. pp. 13, 21, 45. ^• nCypes of Hodem Theolosty (Hew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 277. The fidelstic position of Karl Barth is clear throughout his theological writings. The Epistle to the Romans , tr. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) was merely the beginning of this great theologian. Joachim Wach comments that "Two theological books profoundly inpressed the generation of students which populated the German universities after the First World War: the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans by Karl Barth and The Idea of the Holy by Rudolf Otto." Types of Religious Experience Christian and Non-Christian , p. 209. The most systematic exposition of Barth 's theology is found in Church Dogmatics (4 vols, in 7; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936-1958); Dogmatics in Outline , tr. G. T. Thomson (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949) is a sketch of his theological outlook. His Gifford lectures make his fidelstic position clear and here \ie find his negative attitude towards society and culture: The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation. tr. J. L. M. Haire and Ian Henderson (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938). His social thinking can be found in The Word of God and the Word of Man , tr. Douglas Horton (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), Against the Stream and Community. State and Church . An excellent exposition of Berth's social and political thinking is found in Will Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," Community. State and Church, pp. 11-67. Among numerous materials concerning theological tendencies of the contemporary world, the following works seem to be useful for the present exposition of "the politics of Christian theology": B. E. Aubrey, Present Theological Tendencies . Roger Hazelton, New Accents in Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960); Carl F. H. Henry (ed.). Contemporary Evangelical Thought (Hew York: Harper and Brothers, 1957); Walter M. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology and Theology in Transition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943); H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology ; Daniel Day Williams, What Present-Day Theologians Are Thinking (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1952); Karl Pfleger, Wrestlers with Christ, tr. B. I. Watkln (New Ybrk: Sheed and Ward, 1938).

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69 for Barth. In his Glfford lectures, he made absolutely clear that "natural theology" is an impossibility. He somewhat apologetically stated that his lectures could only serve "indirectl;j [" to the intentions of Glfford lectures, which require a general topic on "natural theology" and its relation to the human ethics and the world. The Barthlan fldeistic position Implies an Indifferent attitude towards the historical order altogether. "Not ethical autonomy," rasutrks H. R. Mackintosh, "is the watchword, but obedience to the Word of God, speaking in man's heart to disclose to him his duty for the actual or existential moment through which he is living."^ "The knowledge of God and the service of God" is an antithesis to "natural theology." God (not man) and the Church (not the world) are exalted. "The church," Barth vehemently states, "Is neither a charitable Institution, nor an institution for the general betterment of the world and man. She is not an institution for the cultivation of fellowship, nor is she a place of Intellectual entertainment."^^ For Barth, God alone can save the world, and "the synthesis /of God and the world7 we seek is In God alone, and in God alone can we find it. If we do not find It in God, we do not find it at all."^^ As has been suggested in the preceding pages, there are three possible attitudes, which the theologians may take concerning the relationships between the sacred world and the profane world. According to H. Richard Mebuhr, these are the relations between "Christ and ^Op. clt .. p. 319. ^ ^The Knowledge of God and the Service of God accordinj^ to the Teaching of the Reformation , p. 209. ^^rl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, pp. 281, 322.

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70 culture. "''' These three different attitudes, moreover, correspond to the attitudes concerning the connection between faith and reason, between grace and nature, and between theology and philosophy.^ The first position Is that of "Christ over culture." It Is the logical consequence of the primary eophasls on faith, grac«» mad theology at the expense of reason, nature and philosophy. In tite Middle Ages, the TertuQian "family" and the Augustlnlan "faodly" represented this position. Kierkegaard, Luther and Barth represent the same position when they discard the role of reason, nature and philosophy In the Christian faith. Thus the "other-ness" of God Is the necessary chasm between the sacred world and the profane world. A Thomlst appears for them as a kind of "seml-ratlonallst." 'Xkjntemporary Protestant thought," Samuel E. Stuiqpf writes, "Is fundamentally critical of natural law theory, even though It does not repudiate the doctrine entirely. The ground of this critical attitude is that the doctrine of natural law is originally the product of rational philosophy, which rests upon certain notions of the nature and capacities of man which Protestantism does not accept. "^^ The theology of Reinhold MlelHihr revolves around Christian ethics. Thus, his chair of "applied Christianity" is an appropriate title. Dante L* Germlno calls him "a theological gadfly" rather than a theologian. ^^ ^^ Op. clt . Ernst Troeltsch classified three types of Christian tlwught: the Church, the sect, and mysticism in The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches . II, p. 993. -^^Thls distinction, as it existed in the Middle Ages, is made clear by Btlenne Gllson in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (Mew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938). Three distinct categories are: the primacy of faith, the primacy of reason, and the harmony of reason and revelation. 3 ^A Handbook of Christian Theology (New York: Meridian Books, 19S8), p. 246. ^^"TuD Types of Christian Political Thought," p. 481. Edward D.

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71 Rlebuhr's vhole political *hreall8m" Is based upon the notion of original sln.^^ The natural law of Thoadm la totally rejected by him. Eo — n Catholicism appears to him at Its best "the blind child of light," In O'Connor, a Catholic thinker, writes that "Nlebuhr's Interest In theology Is chiefly motivated by ethical preoccupations, and his theological positions are manifestly Influenced by ethical convictions." "The Theology of Relnhold Nlebuhr," Review of Politics . XXIII (April, 1961), pp. 193-94. ^ ^All Rlebuhr's writings seem to have positive social lapllcatlons deriving from his ideas of Christian ethics. The Iteture and Destiny of Man (2 vols.; New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 19411943) must be considered as the point at which his theology lays the ground for his social and political philosophy. The theme of the fallen and pessimistic nature of man permeates all of his writings. Among his works, the following are important for the purpose of the present essay: An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Meridian Books, 1956); Moral Man and lanoral Society (Itew York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1932) which has great iiqpacts on political realism in international politics; Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1940); Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1940); The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness ; The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1959); Essays in Applied Christianity . The most penetrating expositions on Nlebuhr's thought are compiled irlth his own connents In Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (eds.), Relnhold Nlebuhr; His Religious. Social, and Political Thought (New York: Macmillan, 1961). Gordon Harland appraises Nlebuhr's thought in The Thought of Relnhold Nlebuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960) which Includes the social and political thought of Nlebuhr. Holtan P. Odegard critically analyzes the political philosophy of Nlebuhr in Sin and Science: Relnhold Nlebuhr as Political Theologian (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antloch Press, 1956). Ronald P. Howell wrote an excellent article: "Political Philosophy on a Theological Foundation: An lm>osltory Analysis of the Political Thought of Relnhold Nlebuhr," Ethics . LXII (January, 1953), pp. 79-99. It must be noted here that the cardinal virtue of Nlebuhr's political philosophy is realism based upon the notion of selfish, pessimistic and sinful man, and y«t Miebuhr seems to attenqpt to transcend this limitation by sans of faith, love and Justice. This appears to be an engulfing conflict between realism and idealism in Nlebuhr's thought. "Indeed, the unsolved problem in Nlebuhr's philosophy," Kenneth W. Thompson writes, "arises precisely from this crowning point in his thought," that is to bmj, "from the depths of human selfishness and sin to the bright susmdt of transcendent faith." '*Ihe Political Philosophy of Relnhold Nlebuhr, " Relnhold Nlebuhr; His Religious. Social, and Political Thought, pp. 168, 169.

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72 contrast to the "children of darkness. "^^ He thus characterizes the "misgivings o£ Catholic politics," first of all. In Catholicism's Identification of "the moral ambiguities of politics . . . with eternal sanctities*" Secondly, the misgiving of Catholic politics Is that "the Catholic church tends to Identify the historic church with the Kingdom of God." Thirdly, Hiebuhr thinks that an alternative of "moral nihilism" (e. g., the Barthlan position) cannot be found In the Catholic principle In "the Inflexible propositions of 'natural law'.**^ The contemporary Orthodox Protestant theologians — > Relnhold Nlebuhr, Karl Barth, Bail Brunner and Paul Tllllch — attack the theological position of Protestant "liberalism" that had been flourishing in the nineteenth century,^ They all are critical of the liberal position which brought Christ down to the level of culture — this is the second poaslble position that B. Richard Melbuhr calls "the Christ of culture!' and Karl Barth calls "culture-Protestantism."^ The Orthodox Protestantism of our day completely rejects the Protestantism of Albrecht Ritschl, Friedrlch Schleiermacher, the historical Jesus research of ^ ^The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness , p. 13. ^Essays in Applied Christianity , p. 248. ^^or the development of Protestantism, see: John Ullenberger and Claude Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted through Its Development and William Hordem. A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1955). Esqposltions of neo-Orthodox Protestantism are found in William Hordem, The Case for a Wew Reformation Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959) and Edward John Camell, The Case for Orthodox Theology (Philadelphia: Wastainster Press, 1959). ^^H. Richard Nlebuhr, Christ and Culture, p. 102. It la what is called Rulturproteetantlsmus by the Germans.

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73 Albert Schweitzer, and the Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch.^° In short, Protestant llberallsn la "^the acculturation of Christ."^' On the other hand, many Protestants would not regard "moral nihilism" of the 'XShrlst-agalnst-culture** type (the first and fldelstlc position) as the solution of the chaotic world of today. "The widespread reaction,** writes R. Richard Riebuhr, ''against cultural Protestantism In our time tends to obscure the importance of answers of this type to the Christand-culture problem."*® Uhllke Karl Berth, many Protestant thinkers of our time accept the limited role of reason. Rudolf Otto, who has been concerned with the significant liqpllcatlons of the '*non-rational" (feeling) for meta« physic, has even remarked that "no one ought to concern himself with the 'lAimen ineffablle' who has not already devoted assiduous and serious study to the 'Ratio aetema'."^ BeLI Brunner's acceptance of limited natural theology in the Protestant circle has already been mentioned. Here he departs from his colleague Karl Barth.^ Thus, not all Protestant ^^Albrecht Benjamin Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay (2d ed.; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1902); Frledrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and M. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1928) and On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Desplsers . tr. John Oman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958); Albert Sctweltser, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, tr. W, Montgomery (3d ed,; Mew York: Macmillan, 1957); Walter Rauschenbush, A Theology of the Social Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1917). For the caqwsltlons of liberal theology, see: H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Mt>dem Theology on Schleiermacher (pp. 31-100), Ritschl (pp. 138-80) and Troeltsch (pp. 181-217); H. P. Tan Dusen and D. B. Roberts (eds.). Liberal Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19A2); L. Harold DeUolf, The Case for Theology in Liberal Perspective (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959). *^H. Richard Niebuhr, op. dt .. p. 102. ^bid . . p. 101. ^ ^The Idea of the Holy , p. zxi. ^n?or the controversy on nature and grace betwcea Berth and Brunner, Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by ttnll Brunner

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74 thinkers reject the role of natural law In the modern world, Robert L* Calhoun sees the necessary correlation between democracy and natural 51 law.*"Natural law concept for John Wild is an indispensable foundation for reconstructing a "realistic philosophy" and ethics. ^ Anglicanism also is imbued with the important role of reason in theology. ^^ "The political side, " writes Nathaniel Micklem, "belongs to the sphere of Reason rather than of Revelation,"^ Psu?. Xillich has a unique theological character of his own.^^ By and the Reply "Ho J" by Karl Barth. tr, Peter Praenkel with an introduction by John Balllle (London: G. Bles, 1946). On this problem, also consult: H. Richard Nlebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmlllan, 1941) and John Balllic, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Pwught (Hew York: Columbia University Press, 1956). Karl Berth, in his Gifford lectures, said that he could not, as a Reformed theologian, directly affirm and fulfill the intention of Lord Gifford under whose name Gifford lectures have been initiated. And he declared that "natural theology" exists due to "a radical error" and he intended to keep himself away from it. The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the pleaching of the Reformation, p. 5. ^^ "Democracy and Natural Lnr," Natural Law Forum. V (1960), pp. 31-69. ^ ^Introduction to Realistic Philosophy (Mew Ylori:! Harper and Brothers, 1948) and Plato's Modem Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (Chicago: IMiverslty of Chicago Press, 1953). '^Anglican theology has been imbued with rational theology. For example, see: William Temple, Nature. Man and God (London: Kacmillan, 1935); B. L. Mascall, He Who Is; A Study in Traditional Theism (London: Longmans, Green, 1943) and Existence and Analogy: A Sequel to 'He Wlio Is' (London: Longmans, Green, 1949). As Mascall himself makes clear in the preface of He l^ho Is. "this book is put forward as a small contribution to the reconstruction of Anglican theology" (p. xii). His philosophical approach is unquestionably "Thomistic" in these two voltimes. ^he Theology of Politics , p. xii. '^The systematic theology of Paul Tillich is found in Systematic Theology (2 vols.; Chicago: IKiiversity of Chicago Press, 1951-1957) and in The Protestant Era , tr. James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943). His works which have cultural iiqplications include: The Religious Situation, tr. H. Richard Niebuhr (New York:

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75 lU-s own admission, he avoids the party struggle or stands always "on the botindary" between opposing views: "betw««n Barth and Hlrscb, between American empirical theology and European dialectical theology »!' between Protestantism and Catholicism*"^^ It is not strange, therefore, that the Catholic Jesuit Gustave Weigel, in his review of Tillich's The Protestant Era, has said that "There is something Thomistic about this brilliant thinker not in the sense that he subscribes to the more characteristic Thomistic theses — he rejects many of then violently — but in the sense that be is moved by the same feeling for unity and completeness in his vision of the real* . * . Be has made luminous that strange thing. Protestantism, to which he is passionately attached.'*^ Meridian Books, 1956); Dynamics of Faith ; The Courage TO Be ; The Shaking of the Foundations ; Tlie Kew Being (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1955); Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 195A). An analysis of Tilllch's thought is found in Charles W* Kegley and Robert W, Bretall (eds*). The Theology of Paul Tilllch (Hew York: Macmillan, 1952), which includes Tilllch's own ccMtments. Walter Laibrecht (ed*). Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tilllch (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959) is a collection of essays which deal with Christianity and culture in general. S^alter H. Horton, '^Tilllch's Role in Conteiq>orary Theology," The Theology of Paul Tilllch . pp. 45-46* Walter Lelbrecht makes Tilllch's position most clear when he says: "For Tilllch, theology and philosophy are called to actualize themselves in continuous dialogue and encounter with scientists, artists, sociologists, economists, depth psychologists and others Intent on expressing and interpreting reality*" In contrast to the Barthlan position, Leibrecht states: "If Karl Barth is the theo« loglans' theologian, condemning the mediating function of theology, Tilllch stands forth as the theologian for Everyman in the predicament of his existence." Therefore, the theology of Paul Tllllch is "a truly ecumenical theology*" Ris theology provides "in his concept of theonoaQr a creative possibility for a fruitful encounter of the Protestant and Catholic principles in the present ecumenical discussion." "The Life and Mind of Paul Tilllch," Religion and Culture: lasays in Honor of Paul Tilllch, pp* 10, 17. "am quoted in Walter M* Horton, "Tilllch's R^le in Contemporary Theology," pp* 41-42.

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76 Paul Tllllch makes clear the relation between reason and revelation. For Tllllch, £alth Is of man's ultimate concern; It is "an act of the total personality." According to him, even modem hvmanism is a "humanist faith of the moral type." Faith has all the elements of doubt, courage, and love. Thus faith is the "integrating power" of life, and it "determines and unites all elements of the personal life." The truth of faith is determined by "adequacy" of expression of ultimate concern, the adequacy of ••••ntially systolic e3q>ression. Resulting from this conception of faith, Protaftffititiwa has iMUtfi in a position to criticize RcKoan Catholicism: "no church has the right to put itself in the place of the ultimate. Its truth is judged by the ultimate." The Reformation, according to Tillich, was essentially the revolt against "the exclusion of the prophetic selfocriticism by the authoritarian system of the Church and the growth of the sacramental elements of faith over the moral -personal ones." Tillich, however, has no attaehmant to Protestant liberalism Which has lost sacramental ism and bee saw '^re and more a representative of the moral -personal type." It is no better than the authoritarianism of Roman Catholicism, for "the Pauline experience of the Spirit /the Spirit of love. Justice and truth/ as the unity of all types of faith was largely lost in both Catholicism and Protestantism. "5® 5 8pynamics of Faith, pp. 4, 69, 72, 98, 108. Karl Barth expresses virtually the same opinion when he says: ". . . the church service both in Roman Catholicism and In Protestantism is a torso. The Roman Catholic church has a sacramental service without preaching. ... /The Protestant church h«^ a service with a sermon but without sacrament . " The Knowledge of God m^d the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation , p. 211«

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77 Paul Tllllch raises no objection to science as a source of knowledge. ^^ Rls only objection Is the scientific spirit that produced the Idea of Infinite progress* eternal peace and happiness. Similar to the Catholic thought, Tllllch does recognize the role of reason, which has assentlally no conflict with faith. "Reason Is the precondition of faith; faith is the act in which reason reaches ecstatically beyond Itself. . * . Man's reason is finite; it moves within finite relations when dealing with the universe and with man himself. «'k>a The ecstatic experience of an ultimate concern does not destroy the structure of reason. Ecstasy is fulfilled, not denied, rationality.'* Thus, there Is no conflict between faith and reason, as long as the latter recognizes its own limitation. '*They are within each other. '*^ Paul Tllllch further speaks of "doubt" as an element in the ^jmaMics of faith. However, "the doubt," he e^qplains, 'Vhlch is tapllcit in every act of faith is neither the methodological nor the skeptical doubt. ... It is not the permanent doubt of the scientist, and it is not the transitory doubt of the skeptic, but it is the doubt of him who is ultimately concerned about a concrete content." The element of doubt for Tllllch is triily "the Protestant principle." Hence he believes that "the concept of 'infallibility' of a decision by a council or a bishop or a book excludes doubt as an element of faith in those who subject themselves to these authorities." This Is truly the essential criticism of Protestantism against Roman Catholicism. Paith devoid of doubt, therefore, "has become static, a nonquestioning surrender 59 The Shaking of the Poundatlons, p. 5. fe Opynaaies of Paith . pp. 76, 77.

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78 not only to the ultimate, which is affirmed In the act of faith, but also to Its concrete elements as formulated by the religious authorities." In regard to cognitive reason, Paul Tllllch recognizes three forms: the scientific, the historical and the philosophical. They have no conflict with the truth of faith. "Science," he writes, "can conflict only with science, and faith only with faith; science which remains science cannot conflict with faith which remains faith." "Neither scientific nor historical truth can affirm or negate the truth of faith* The truth of faith can neither affirm nor negate scientific or historical truth. "^'Nevertheless, the scientific observer is never absolutely "pure" — pure in the sense that he can exclude "interfering factors." As regards philosophy and faith, they both are concerned with ultimate reality, but the former is "conceptual" and the latter is **«yal)ollcal." Furthermore, there is "a continuous process of interpretation of philosophical elements and elements of faith, not one philosophical faith." All in all, Paul Tllllch recognizes an important role of reason in the scientific, the historical and the philosophical truths. They have no essential conflict %rith the truth of faith. From this consideration of the important role of reason, he comes to a very significant practical conclusion when he says: "The humanist faith in the essential rationality of man is more favorable for general education and democracy than the traditionally Christian faith in original sin and the demonic structures of reality. The Protestant faith, in an unmediated, 61 lbid . . pp. 20, 28, 29, 82, 89. Etell Brunner also says that it is not necessary that science should be subordinated to theology. Science serves men best If they remain true to its own law. Christianity and Civilisation. Part 2, p. 137.

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79 personto-per son encounter with God, produces more Independent personalities than the Catholic faith and Its ecclesiastical aedlatlon between God and man." Moreover, "Lutheran faith In personal forgiveness is less conducive to social action than the Calvlnlstlc faith in the honor of God. "62 Many political theorists would agree with Tillich in that rationality is an important elesient for democracy; ^^ md "Independent personalities," when translated into a psychological term, that is, the individualism of deaocracy, are much more favorable to desiocracy than are the sK>re dependent personalities who adhere to the Catholic faith. Thus Tillich leaves us in doubt about the possible relation between Catholic rational philosophy and dcnocracy, and the total structure of Niebuhr's political philosophy with trhlch original sin has an intimate relation. Boll Brunner also has the "scholastic" tone in his own right. In this respect, he differs from Karl Berth. Rls consistent exposition of Christian ethics deserves due attention along with the ideas of Paul Tillich. °^ However, Brunner makes it clear that he has no taste for the ^ ^Dynamics of Faith , pp. 93, 9A, 116-17. 6^or example, see: J. Roland Pennock, Liberal Democracy; Its tterlts and Prospects (New York; Rinehart, 1950), pp. 23-24. Among a few sttanings of "rationalism," Pennock interprets rationalism (which is pertinent to the workings of democracy) as "the assurance that men generally have a proclivity to use their rational powers and to act accordingly" (p. 24). The Christian conception of reason, e. g., Thomlsa, nust not be confused with "rationalism" as in the Enlightenment when reason was emancipated from faith. In the Christian conception of reason, reason is never dissociated from faith although it may have its own distinct function (the rational faculties of the human mind) from theology. ^Brunner 's most systematic work on theology is Dogmatics composed of two volumes: The Christian Doctrine of God and The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption , tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950-1952). Other theological works include: Revelation and Reason; The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge .

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80 Intellectualism of Rostan Catholicism, eepeclally the Thoadstlc theology and ethics. Re notes that there are many books written under the title of 'Veason «q4 revelation"; but there Is none entitled "revelation and reason" (revelation over reason, not vice versa) . ° He •phaslzes the fact that this Is fundanentally a difference between himself and a Rommi Catholic theologian. Therefore his book Is slg« nlflcantly entitled Revelation and Reason; The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledj^e ."^ However, the title alone should not mislead the «q>hasls of contents. For Marltaln, there is no doubt that theology Is the peak of metaphysics and philosophy. But he would make philosophy or metaphysics the first part and not the last, the beginning and not the end, and base and not the peak of theology.^' In comparison with other post-Reformation theologies (perhaps, Barthlan crisis theology), Brunner believes that his theology is the true tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946); The Philosophy of Religion; From the Standpoint of Protestant Theology , tr. A. J. D. Ferrer and Bertram L. ^foolf (London: James Clarke, 1958); The Divine Human Encounter , tr. Amandus U. Icos (Ptiiladelphia: Westminster Press, 1943); The Mediator, tr. Olive wyon (Philadelphia: Westadnster Press, 1947); The Scandal of Christianity (nilladelphla: Westminster Press, 1951); The Misunderstanding of the Church , tr. Harold Knight (Philadelphia; Westminster Press, 1953); The Theology of Crisis (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929). Rls whole cultural thought seems to have culminated in his Gifford lectures: Christianity and Civilisation (2 parts; Rev York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948-1949). His ethical and social thought is found especially in The Divine Iw»eratlve . tr. Olive wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947); Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia; Westminster Press, 1947); Justice and the Social Order , tr. Mary Hottinger (2d ed. ; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945). ^^For exan^le, Etienne Gilson's Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages and chapter 11, "Reason and Revelation," A. E. Taylor's The Faith of a Moralist (Vol. II; London; Macmlllan, 1930). 66Note that "revelation" and "faith" precede "reason" and "knowledge" respectively. ° ^The Dream of Descartes , tr. Mabelle L. Andlson (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), p. 91.

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81 Reformation theology. **In post -Re format Ion theology,'* he writes, "this Reformation point of view was very largely lost." That Is to say, the true Reformation theology for Brunner was to start with revelation and "then work outwards to reason." However, he does not tolerate "the Roman Catholic misunderstanding" (Roman Catholicism which Is Identified «rlth the order of "reason and revelation" Instead of "revelation and reason"). Thus he Is concerned with "the fonmilation of a Christian and theological doctrine of revelation as a doctrine of believing knowledge." The essential formula Is "revelation and reason In faith. " For Brunner, Christian philosophy Is "both possible and necessary, because as Christians we neither can nor should cease to think. It Is not reason, but rationalism, that makes Christian philosophy appear Impossible. "^^ He would regard, without hesitation, the Roman Catholic theology as a kind of rationalism or seml-ratlonallsm. So far. It seems that the difference of Brunner *s point of view and the Thomlstlc view concerning the Interconnection between revelation and reason (or between theology and philosophy) Is one of emphasis rather than of kind. If we consider the distance between the two poles, theology and philosophy or faith and reason, then we would have some kind of order like "Berth Brunner and Tllllch the Thomlst the rationalist." As It has already been suggested, there seems to be an Intimate relation between one's theological attitude (1. e., the relation between theology and philosophy or faith and reason) and his view on the cultural order In general. When a theologian like Karl Berth emphasises the Revelation and Reason , pp. xl, 12, 392, 393. See also The Philosophy of Religion in regard to the relation bet%reen faith and reason.

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82 inq>ortance of revelation, grace and theology at the expense of reason, nature and philosophy, he is likely to produce the ideal type of "Chrlstagainst-culture" category. Thus the fideist position tends to produce a kind of cultural and political "indif f erentism. " On the other hand, when a breathing space for reason, nature and philosophy is given, then Christianity becomes involved with the cultural order. That is to say, the fideist position like that taken by Karl Barth is essentially a negative one, whereas the "rational" position is a positive one in terms of the relation between Christianity and culture. Jacques Marltaln, BidLl Brunner, and Paul Tilllch take the positive position, while Barth stands alone at the negative pole. The positive attitude of Brunner is e:q>ressed in his panoramic view concerning the relation between Christianity and culture in his Gifford lectures. He makes it clear that "only Christianity is citable of furnishing the basis of a civilisation which can rightly be described •• human. "^' However, there is, in a strict sense, neither a Christian civilization nor the Christian state. They have never existed before and will never exist. '^ Paul Tilllch agrees: "There was, and still is, a religiously colored society, but there is no true religious comounity. "'^ For Brunner, the state and civilisation have been the "irrational products of history" rather than the moral force of religion (in this case, Christianity). This is the essential position of "Christianity beyond ^^ Christianity and Civilisation . Part 1, p. v» * "The Divine Imperative, p. 463; Christianity and Civilisation . Part 2, y. 127. '*"The World Situation," The Christian Answer , ed, Hsnry P. Van Dusen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), p. 36.

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83 civilisation" as It Is described by Brunner hliMelf . In other words, according to H. Richard Miebuhr, it Is the "Chrlst-above-culture" type. As Brunner says, 'Xhilture-ldolatry Is the sure road to cultural decay*" 'Xhilture and civilisation," he continues, "although they belong ex> cluslvely to laan, are not In themselves the truly human." Tb be the truly human, culture must be spiced irlth the Christian principles* When we use the term 'Christian civilisation," according to Brtinner, It Is 72 "a compromise between Christian and non-Chrlstlan forces."'^ Bnll Bmxmer Is truly a Protestant theologian. For him the ultimate Justification of truly Christian ethics can be made by grace alone* "Every form of natural ethics," he states, "Is anthropocentrlc." "All natural morality and ethics — whether based on 73 religious or rational grounds — Is either eudaemonlstlc or legalistic." This Is exactly what the Catholic ethics based upon natural law could Imply for Brunner. "The Divine Command" Is the basis of Christian ethics. Man's ultimate ethics require the obedience to the Divine Cooaand* Only the order of God is infallible; all human knowledge and natural ethics are subject to error. Iven "irrational" existentialism (not Christian existentialist theology) tinged with roaumtidsm has become imbued with the iiqportance of reason. ^^ Xfhat George F. Thomas calls "the tragic dualism of head ^ Christianity and Civilisation. Part 2, pp* 127, 129, 131. * ^The Divine Imperative , p. 68. 'nCarl Jaspers emphasizes the idea that contemporary international politics oust recognize the Importance of "reason" and thus "philosophy" itself* "The new thinking," he writes, "is the age-old one which thus far has not penetrated far enough to form and guide eomnunities of men: it is reason; it is philosophy." Although reason

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84 and heart" Is a controversial topic In Christian philosophy and theology.'^ In the Christian camp, the Thondstlc theology (Roman Catholic theology In general) has been continually stressing the In^ortant role of reason and the distinct role of "philosophy" (In contrast to "the> ology"). Etlenne Gllson well expressed Thomlsm as "the harmony of reason and faith. "'^ In the Hlddle Ages, Thomlsm was opposed to the Tertulllan family (the prlmacy-offaith school), on the one hand, and to the Averrolsts and the nominalists, on the other hand. In the modern world, the struggle of Thomlsm turned to the opposition to Protestant revelatlonal theology (especially the crisis theology of Karl Barth) on the one hand and, on the other hand, to contemporary "rationalism" and "naturalism" which are regarded as the offshoots of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment* Even R« Richard Nlebuhr, a Protestant thinker, praises St. Thomas Aquinas "who is pro|)ably the greatest of all the synthesists in Christian history . . . .•*^^ .; The Thomistlc position is the third alternative in regard to the relationship between Christianity «id civilization. H. Richard ( Hiebuhr calls it the "Christ-above-culture" school. It is opposed to the other two extreme positions of the fldelst and the liberal. This is essential to politics, reason should not be construed as "a property." But it is "a vehicle." Moreover, "the real meaning of democracy can be established only by reason itself." The Future of Mankind, tr. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: Uaiversity of Chicago Press, 1960), especially pp. 187-317. ^^''Christianity and Modem Philosophy, " The Vitality of the Christian Tradition, p. 249. ^ ^Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages , pp. 69-99. ^' Christ and Culture , p. 128.

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85 position gives a balanced position, as Thomlsm Is a "balanced philosophy'* as described by Frederick C. Copleston. ^ Christ or the Church remains fundamentally above the cultural order, and yet the cultural order Is not viewed as aatl*Chrlst. Christ, In turn. Is not considered as the 'Christ of culture.** iteong many Thomlsts of our time, Jacques Marltaln Is one of the most outstanding representatives. Philosophy, In contrast to theology, has a distinct role as to its Methods, objects and principles. In the sane way, the political order is viewed as distinct froB the religious world* FOr the Thomist, therefore, the state and the church are two equally perfect societies. To recognize distinct philosophy is to permit the rational faculties of the human mind to solve the worldly problems. Thus, differing from the fideist position of either Karl Barth or Reinhold Niebuhr, the Thomist considers human reason and natural law as the direct or lanediate foundations of a political philosophy, although theology has an indirect upperhand over philosophy. The political philosophies of Heinrich A. Roomen and Johannes Messner represent the Thomistic position par excellence . ^^ Among political theorists and philosophers, John R. Hallowell, Tvtts R. Simon and Eric Voegelln recognize the rational approach to politics. There are also many twentieth-century philosophers who ^ ^Aqulnas (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1955), p. 254. 7Q "See Heinrich A. Rooaen, The State in Catholic Thought; A Treatise in Political Philosophy and Johannes Messner, Social Ethics; Natural Law in the Modem World , tr. F. F. Doherty (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1957). The representative thoughts of contenq>orary Roman Catholic thinkers are found in Robert A. C^>onlgrl, Modem Catholic Thinkers (!tew Ibrk; Harper and Brothers, 1960).

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86 take the rational approach to theology. Some of their names are C. C. J. Webb, A. E. Taylor, A. N* Whitehead, William Ernest Hocking and Charles Hartshome,"" As it has been pointed out, the balanced position of Thomlsm avoids the two extreme positions of Barthlanlsm and theological liberalism. Thus this balanced view has even attracted some of the Protestant thinkers. "Because of the Intellectual and practical adequacy of /the ThomistlcJ system," H. Richard Nlebuhr writes, "/Aquinas '7 way of solving the problem of culture and Christ has become the standard way for hosts of Christians. Many a Protestant who has abandoned the Ritschllan answer is attracted to Thomlsm without being teiq>ted to transfer his allegiance to the Roman church, while in Anglican thought and practice his system is normative for many; on the Christ-culture issue the lines drawn anong Christians cannot be made to coincide with the historic distinctions among the great churches."®^ SOsee C. C. J. Webb, God and Personality (Hew York: Macmlllan, 1918) and Divine Personality and Human Life (New York: Macmlllan, 1920); A. E, Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist (2 vols.; London: Macmlllan, 1930); A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (Hew York: Macmlllan, 1929); William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience; A Philosophic Study of Religion (Hew Haven; Yale University Press, 1912) and Science and the Idea of God (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Charles Hartshome, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). The approach which is found in the above works night be called a "philosophical" approach to religion or theology. As George F. Thomas points out, it is not entirely true to say that modem philosophy freed itself from medieval theology only to serve science. A. N. Whitehead, for example, recognized the importance of religion to science. Thus, It is not quite true when Frederick Copleston says: "Instead of serving the theologian, the philosopher will serve the scientist, for science has displaced theology in public esteem." Conteaporary Philosophy , p. 30. ^ ^Christ and Culture , pp. 128-29.

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87 Dsaplt* the three different positions of Christian political theology, we must recognize these positions as Christian in essence. With a few exceptions (like Karl Barth), a general conclusion can be stated that "all sensitive Christian thought today aust define th« personal and social principles so that the Christian evaluation of life becoaes a prophetic criticisai against the evils of present society, and a light to point the way to a better order. '*^^ However, what Nathaniel Mlcklen calls "the ultimate question" reaains above the demands of politics, econosdcs and other questions of the profane world. The superior position of the religious order, all Christian thinkers would agree, is truly an integrating factor between the cultural order and the religious order. "l<7e shall not succeed In subordinating the economic to the truly human,** WllllaB Teaple said, "unless we subordinate the •83 htnutn to the divine."^ In other words, "there is no separating religion and economics /or politic^. "^ What V. A. Demant calls the 'Vicissitude of civilization""' can only be elevated by the eternal order of the Christian faith. Despite the various conteiqporary theological tendencies, all Christian political theologies have something in ccxnmon. That is to uaj, the cultural order oust be elevated by the eternal order of Christianity. From a theological point of view, even continental theology (e. g., the crisis theology of Karl Berth) is justified by Walter M. Horton in that "it makes up in depth ; the sense of the sublime, without S^Danlel D. WilliasM, What Present-Pay Theologians Are ThinkinK . p. 73. 83 As qtioted In Nathaniel Mlcklan, The Theology of Politics , p. 107, ^Ibid . . p. 108. ^ n^eligion and the Decline of Capitalism , pp. 157-76.

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88 which theology becomes as prosaic as arithmetic.'*®^ This "sense of an extra dimension" is not only present in continental theology but also present in the religious order. Thus the ills of the political order are always seasoned with the spice of what is sacred and eternal* Religion, thus, has the outlook of life-orientation; theologians look at the totality of life: theirs is a synoptic vision. When they appraise democracy, for ex«iq»le, it does not appear to them merely as « set of institutional arrangements of govenaaent but as the whole structure of cultural pantheon: democracy is a way of life. No doubt, the religious outlook has its limitations in looking at politics from a distance inVlgorated by religious considerations. Nonetheless, this wide vision of religion may balance the kaleidoscope of politics. Or is it the maelstrom of political theology? While Catholic theolo^ looks back to "the thirteenth, the greatest of centuries," the names of Karl Barth, Bgd.1 Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr signify the Protestant return to the Reformation. Nicolas Berdyaev raises his banner for the rediscovery of Ortho(k>x theology, and "he is primarily concerned to champion the claim of his Orthodox gnosis 87 to be rec^nized as a genuinely Christian theology." In the Catholic renaissance of Thomism, Dirk Jellema now speaks of "the second generation" following Jacques Marltain and Etienne Gilson.^® All these names indicate the various trends of conteii;>orary Christian theology, but they are not totally unrelated. "As Tilllch's speculative philosophy parallels the 86 " Contemporary Continental Theology , p. 217. ^^Karl Pfleger, Wrestlers with Christ , p. 291. ^"Bthics." Contemporary Byangellcal Thought , p. 124.

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89 'Orthodox Gnosticism* of Berdyacv,": Walter M. Horton writes, **so « certain scholasticism in Brunner's thought parallels the scholasticlsa of Marltaln and Przywara."^^ As their philosophical and theological reasonings are interrelated, so are their social and political ideas. The contemporary theological mood is tragic and pessimistic through and through in looking at the world that Is obssessed with the "tragic sense of life" CseMtlaiento tri^gico) .^^ Writing in 1946, Relnhold Mlebuhr said that "this generation of mankind is destined to live In a tragic era between two ages. It Is an era when 'one age Is dead and the other is powerless to be bom*."^'' "History shows," Paul Tlllich writes, "that, over and over again, the achievements of man, as though by s logic of tragedy, turn against man himself. "^^ This is the reason why Judith N. Shklar speaks of the Christian "eschatological consciousness."^^ The Spanish philosopher Jbs^ Ortega y Gasset well describes the theologians' attitude regarding the physiognomy of contemporary civilization when he speaks of "vital disorientation."^^ nierefore. It Is clear that "the end of the world," "the crisis of civilization," or "the twilight of civilization" suggests the general mood of Christian theologians and philosophers. For these theologians, "^ Contenporarv Continental Theology , p. 230. ^"Miguel de Utoamuno, Tragic Sense of Life, tr. J. E. Crawford Flitch (New York: Dover Publications, 1954). 91 •^ Discerning the Signs of the Times; Sermons for Today and Tomorrow (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), pp. 39'>40. ^^"The World Situation," The Christian Answer , p. 44. ^ ^After Utopia , p. 166. 94 -«._ w_j — ^. — ^_ jjjig, Cleugh (New York: Harper and The Modem ftMft, tr. Brothers, 1961), f, 78.

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90 the world represents the anarchy of spiritual values. The Catholic theologians like Jacques Maritain seeks his guidance £or modem philosophical and political solutions from St. Thomas Aquinas, while ProtestantIsm looks for the days of the Reformation. This century may be characterized as the century of "longing for the past." As we recall, political philosophers like Leo Strauss get their Inspiration from classical political philosophy, tnd Alfred Cobban nostalgically looks back to the Bnllghtenment . However, we should not confuse the pessimistic mood of these theo* loglans with complete fatalisa.^^ Their views and ideas are not devoid of suggestive insight. The philosophy of democracy of Jacques Maritain, the political realism of Relnhold Nlebuhr and the concepts of justice and power of Paul Tlllich provide us with profound insight into the political philosophy of modem times. For Christian theologians, the modem world is stricken by the bacilli of secularism; the marchy of spiritual values is the disease of our time. This is what Paul Tlllich refers to as "the shaking of the foundations." Scientism and scientific relativism hove been regarded ^^ Judith H. Shklar, op. cit «. pp. 164-217. As the book's subtitle Indicates, this work is concerned with "the decline of political faith." According to her, 'Christian fatalism" adds only another dimension to the decline of political faith. Thus it offers nothing constructive. What is needed is not mere criticism (as Is found in Christian theologians) but "adequate theoretical alternatives." However, her examination of Christian "social theology" is partial in that she sacrifices the constructive ideas of the theologians in order to make Christian social theology suitable for her theme: the decline of political faith. It is one thing to say that Christian social theology offers nothing constructive, and it is another to reject the idea that social reconstruction can be achieved on the basis of the Christian religion. '""When /man/ has rested complacently on his cultural creativity or on his technical progress, on his political Institutions or on his religious systems," Tlllich writes, "he has been thrown into disintegration

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91 « the endless dehumanisetlon of man. Science M « source of knowledge is welcome for Paul Tilllch. He Is merely objecting to the scientific spirit that, having forgotten "the shaking of the foundations," believes In everlasting progress and happiness. Thus the complacent "liberalism" of the nineteenth century has been completely repudiated. Modem anthropocentrlc humanism that believes in the goodness of human nature merely represents the further secularization of man and the world. The Christian theologians are theocentrlc humanists. They believe that man Is essentially spiritual. This Is the personallst philosophy of the Christian theologians Just mentioned. Jacques Marltaln, Mlcolas Berdyaev and Paul Tilllch are all "personal Ists." Thus Will Herberg concludes that "the strong personallstlc emphasis" of Roman Catholic (Jacques Marltaln), Eastern Orthodox (Nicolas Berdyaev), Jew (Martin Buber), and Protestant (Paul Tilllch) Is "a cornerstone of ^heir/ social philosophy. "^^ Marltain's Christian democracy, Berdyaev 's "personallst socialism" and Tilllch's "religious socialism" are all personalisms that emphasize the spiritual character of man. Desiocracy (in contrast to totalitarianism) Is the only means to restore the lost spirituality of man. A Christian political theology must take into accottnt the nature of man. To say that all politics are or must be based upon the nature of man is merely to beg the question: what do we mean by human nature? and chaos; all the foundations of his personal, natural and cultural life have been shaken." The Shaking of the Foundations , p. 6. Therefore, the shaking of the foundations is essentially the hard reality of the eschatological end of the historical order. 97 Four Existentialist Theologians (Garden City, R. T. ! Doubleday, 1958), pp. 3-4. This Is not used in the sense of Borden P. Bowne's use of this term, but rather in the sense of individualism.

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92 The great political treatises of the past, like Aristotle's Politics. Hobbes' Leviathan and Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Govertanent . explicitly assuned human nature. To be sure, a Christian anthropology is different from what we call the scientific anthropology of our days. The Christian conception of man is of "the fallen nature." The notions of original sin and the soteriological function of man pl^ an in;>ortant role in Christian political theology in general. Rudolf Otto, thus, characterizes Christimilty as "a 'religion of redemption^ par excellence ."^" The basis of Relnhold Niebuhr's Christian realism in I T politics is derived £roa his conception of the fallen and selfish nature of man. Neo-Orthodox Protestant theologians repudiate theological liberalism and political liberalism because liberalism does not take into consideration the "realistic" (fallen) conception of man. The rationalistic optimism about man (the gootlon ' par excellence . . . ."

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93 that neither society nor state nor nation nor race nor the whole earth can outweigh his dignity. Thus in the view of Christian psychology the world In Its ultimate meaning Is theocentrlc." The sinfulness of man is recognized by all types of Christian theology, but this concept is somewhat graded as is the relation between reason and faith (philosophy and theology or nature and grace)* Relnhold Mebuhr makes virtue out of the sinfulness of man» and his political realism is grounded upon pessimism. For Johannes Messner, "human nature la impaired." Thus a Christian cannot idealize human nature. "Man's nature," he aigrs* "la still rational nature with its knowledge of good and evil and the impulse to act in correspondence with reason, but he can no longer take for granted the unerring cognizance of the good In Ita more particular implications and the firm propensity toward it." For the Catholic thinker, therefore, natural law ethics is a "realistic" ethics which admits "the principle of man's moral consciousness and self-determination" and, at the sane time, man's "weakness and perversities." On this ground, the Catholic thinker rejects the optimistic view of man which prevails in theological liberalism and rationalism. Hs also repudiates the complete pessimism of Luther, Berth, or Riebuhr. He would say that the optimistic rationalism and the Lutheran pessimism "both put a check on man's moral exertion, the Lutheran pessimism by making moral endeavor meaningless, the rationalist optimism by making such exertion ^^ Social Ethics , pp. 7-8. In contrast to the Christian doctrine of man, Messner lists three other types of the concept of man: 1. the naturalistic doctrine of man, 2. the materialist doctrine of man, and 3. the Idealist doctrine of man (pp. 8-12). The ideas of human nature in the periods of daasical antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance are found in Herschel Baker, The Imat^e of Man (New York: Harper and Brothera, 1961).

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94 unnecessary. "*"" On the natttre of man, Karl Barth and Emll Brunner differ froa each other. "There Is," Hugh Ross Mackintosh notes, "that fundamental subject on which /Barth/ md Bruimer disagree somewhat seriously •>« the tnag0 Del In man. Briefly, we may s<^ that in Berth's Judgment this Ima^o has been totally lost and obliterated by sin, while Brxmner contends that It Is still represented even In the sinful by their humanity and personality."'-"^ Therefore, logically and practically speaking, Brunner has more breathing space than Barth for the consideration of reason, phi* losophy, and culture. The Christian anthropology Is theocentrlc . Hathanlel ttLcklea goes so far as to say that "• . . the politicians makm an even greater mistake than the theologians when they forget original sln."^®^ yjjg concept of original sin delimits the natural world and man himself In Christian philosophy. While the fldelst position of Protestantism minimizes the role of reason and thus philosophy, Roman Catholicism represents the Intellectuallsm of uodem Christian theolo^. All the Christian theologians have deplored the spiritual anarchism of our age, the age of secularism* Criticisms of totalitarlaalsm, capitalism, libarallstic individualism and scientism are essentially based upon non-spirituality. Their esqilanatlon of corrupted temporality is a mono-causal explanation. Ilils, however, does not mean that their political thoughts are monolithic. ^®^ There is certainly a ^ ^Social Ethics , pp. 82, 83. Types of Modem Theology, p. 316. ^Q ^e Theology of Politics , p. 16. 103'«Chrlstian political thought," Dante L. Germlno writes, "is

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95 plurality of Ideas. Excapt that there Is an extreme kind of Barthian 'Hndlfferentlsm" towards the world of politics, the role of political theology has been generally recognised to bridge the gulf between the eternal and the historical orders. The Roman Catholic has been extremely conscious of lack of unity and order since the breakdown of medieval Christendom* Thus order and unity for the Catholic thinkers like Christopher Dawson have been of singular concern. 'Va,'* Davson writes, "cannot do this ^accomplish social discipline and unityj by politics alone. "^^ For him the answer is clear: social discipline and unity demand faith and spiritual sanctities. The gigantic struggle in the modem world is a struggle between the two images of Christ and anti-Christ. The political expression of this struggle is between democracy (spirituality) and totalitarianism (secularism). Whatever the merits and demerits of theological thinking on politics, we cannot lightly dismisa the opinions of the Christian theologians. The ills of politics may well be seasoned with theological "spice." Regardless of a variety of political opinions, all the theologians must agree with Nathaniel Micklem in that: "All the political problems are at bottom theological . . . obviously a man's political outlook is coloured or even determined by his real thought, or thoughtlessness, about God and man and the meaning of human life. ... No political theory is likely to affect deeply the conduct or outlook of maa unless it be reinforced by the sanctions of religion /In this case. not monolithic; its message is not clear and unambiguous." "Two Types of Recent Christian Political Thought," p. 455. ^^^ Sevond Politics (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939), p. 12.

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96 Chrl8tianlt3K7."^°' The theologian, at last, reaches the end o£ his philosophical journey from the dark night of temporality. Within the private world of the sacred he may once again remend>er Eliot's portrayal of the hollow world and "the hollow men": • • * This Is the way the world ends This Is the way the world ends This Is the way the world ends Not with a bang but a whimper. ^^^ *" The Theology of Politics , p. Ix. I06j;^ S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men, " The Complete Poems and Plays 1909''1950 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 59.

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CHAPTBR IT BBOCRACT AND CHRISTIAR THEOLOGY In Christian theology, the Christian faith perfomed a kind of opening gambit for politics. The theosls of Christian political theology has to be realized in boilding a spiritual pantheon on th« temporal world. The syncretistic efforts of the theologians against the spiritual nakedness of the nodem world, however, have not merely aimed at finding the perfect scapegoat for their theological idio* syncrasies on politics. The vitriolic attack of the theologians on the anarchy of spiritual values is the result of their theological tendency of looking at the political world from the standpoint of the eternal order. The danger of this tendency lies in putting everything into a rigid Procrustean bed of spirituality.^ Therefore, Christian political theology is a theocentric politics. The cultural and political crisis of our age has been at bottom a spiritual crisis* The urge for the revival of religion for modem society is not the phexKMBenon of the West alone. S. Radhakrishnan, a renowned Indian William Temple has a formula for the relationship between God and the world: The world God God the world «• God In other words, "In the sense in which God is necessary to the world, the world simply is not necessary to God." Mature. Man and God , p. 435* f?

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98 philosopher, also urges the need of religion In modem civilization and especially for the survival of democracy.^ For the Christian theologians, Western civilization has ceased to care for man as a spiritual being* Th^ crisis of our age Is Its spiritual dlsteaper; and the nodem world without the sanctities of the Christian faith Is nothing but a moral suicide. In this respect, all theologians share a kind of "togetherness" although they may differ from each other In suggesting their practical solutions* The relation between democracy and Christian theology deserves special attention simply because many maintain that Christianity is phm source of democracy, and donocracy Is the only spiritual answer against atheistic totalitarianism. In the struggle against the "pseudo-religion** of totalitarianism, we sean to need sows kind of absolutistlc democratic faith or "the courage to be."^ '*We," Nathaniel Micklem writes, "need the Impulse of religious conviction at least as passionately held as the pseudo-religion of Germany and Russia. Such a philosophy and such a religion are not to be found except in the Christian faith." "The answer to the Razl creed," he continues, 'la to be found, not in politics, but in theology. "^ Moreover, all these political aberrations of ^Religion and Society (U>ndon: George Allen and Qnwln, 1947). ^This is the title of one of Paul Tillich's books. The Courage To Be . Nathaniel Micklem writes: "There is, of course, strictly no theology of Marxism, for the Coswtmists deny the existence of God and regard religion, not without reason, as one of their worst enemies. Tet, such is the religious incurability of man, there is a kind of pseudotheology or substitute religion of the Connunists." The Theology of Politics , p. 13. ^Ibid.. p. 35.

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99 totalltarlanlsa are derivad froa bad theology. Bmest Barker, thus, aptly speaks of CoonunlsBi aa ''religiously irreligious."^ Many hove already b««n tabued «rLth the idea that relativisn and skeptleiaa hafva weakened the denocratlc faith itself. J. Roland Pennock, although he does not consider religion as a prerequisite for deaiocracy, holda that not only relativlsB **tended to weaken the belief in unchanging principles of right and wrong,** but also "relativisa and general skepti* eiasi are not the only ideological factors in contenporary society tending to destroy faith in, and enthuaiaam for, liberal daaocracy. It would appear that Baterialism and secularism have tended to have a sindlar effect."^ It is dangerous to atteopt to build democracy on the quicksand of rela« tivism. Aa A. D. Lindsi^ tersely remarks, "Democracy inpliea faith, but a reasoned faith."' Mot all theologians treat equally the totalitarianism of German National Socialism and Ruaaian ConBunism. Karl Berth, for example, makes a discriminating Judgment between Maalsm and Russian Communism. The former for Barth committed the immortal sin of falsifying Christianity and the crime of Antl-Semitiam; but the latter is "non-Christian" but not **anti-Chri8tian. " "In its relationship to Christianity, Communism, aa distinguished from Nazism, has not done, and by its very nature cannot do, one thing: it has never made the slightest attempt to reinterpret or to falsify Christianity, or to shroud itself in a Christian garment. *The Citigen's Choice (Casdnridge: Oniversity Press, 1937), p. 9. ^Liberal Democracy; Its Merits and Prospects (Mew York: Rinehart, 1950), pp. 131, 138. ' The Essentials of Democracy (2d ed«; Maw Torki Oacford Oniversity Press, 1951), p. 73.

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100 It has never cosonitted the basic crime of the Kazls, the raiBoval and replaceaent of the real Christ by a national Jesus, and it has never committed the crime of anti-Seailtism. There is nothing of the false prophet about it. It Is not anti-Christian. It is coldly non-Christian. ... It is brutally, but at least honestly, godless.*^ Hence, Karl Berth, Will Herberg remarks, "attempts to make certain positive distinctions which would put Coonuninn in a more favorable light. "^ Charles C. West also coanents that Barth "finds Communism at least a systMa which has made a serious attempt to solve the social problem."'-^ Nicolas Berdyaev, who was bom in Russia and attracted by the "idealism** of Cofoaunism and its social reform, makes the Barthian position on GMmamism rather doubtful. He essentially agrees with Barth in that Cooounism has at least atteoq>ted to solve social problems. Communism for Berdyaev was *'a transformation and deformation of the old Russian messianic idea."^'^ Communism generally appears to be an antiChristian giant. Luigi Sturzo, a Catholic liberal thinker, believed that totalitarianinn inevitably '*leads to a perversion of Christian civilisation . • . ." '*The totalitarian state," he writes, "is the clearest and most explicit present form of the pantheistic state. "*^ ®"The Church between East and West," Against the Stream , p. 140, ^"The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," Community. State, and Church , p. 61. ^®As quoted in Will Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," p. 61 from Communism and the Tlieologians (Philadelphia: Ifostminster Press, 1959), p. 300. ^ ^The Origin of Russian Communism , tr. R. M. Prench (London t G. Bles, 1937), p. 228. ^2"The Totalitarian State." Social Research. Ill (Kay, 1936), p. 235.

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101 For Berdyaev, CoanRmlsm states the problem of society, but not that of man. '*rhe spirit of conaainism, the religion of coasnmlsm, the philosophy of communism," he writes, "are both anti-Christian and antihumanist. But the social system of connunism possesses a large share of truth which can be wholly reconciled with Christianity, more so, in any case, than the capitalist system, which is most anti-Christian."^^ Thus, Berdyaev seriously questions the Barthian proposition that Coonunism Is not anti-Christian, although he agrees with Berth in the matters of Communist enthusiasm for social reform. While German National Socialism is the height of anti-Christianity for Berth, capitalism is for Berdyaev. Nor do all theologians blindly tolerate the "evils" of existing democracies. "He are fighting for 'democracy'," Nathaniel Micklem writes, "while all men of sensitive mind must admit that the evils of our democratic system are intolerable. That is our dileona. "''^ Many theologians have found a spiritual anarchy in modem democratic countries. Their mission is to save the world from its spiritual anarchy, and consequently they are seriously concerned with politics and civilization In general. Religion ceases to be a stumbling block for politics, and Christianity for them cannot remain indifferent to culture. Although they believe that the evil of spiritual anarchy exists in modem democracies, this does not mean they are ant i -democratic. When they become concerned %flth politics they have usually spoken in favor of democracy. owaver, for the complacent democrat, Brunner's warning is a lesson. Not unlike his Catholic cotinterpart Jacques Maritain, Boiil ^ ^Op. cit .. p. 225, ^ ^Op. cit .. p. 92.

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102 Brtumer completely rejects "deaocratlsm** or nob-rule. ''Anarchy," he writes, '^st be prevented by the exercise of authority, tyranny oust be checked by democracy . "^^ He warns the chao^lons of democracy not to forget that "as a rule, the people aa a whole is not a very eoHpetent guardian of the coaaon weal . . • • unqualified democracy nearly always degenerates into mob-rule and latent anarchy. "^° Thus, his criticism of democratism is not unrelated to the Christian notion of original sin* Brunner thinks that democratism "arises out of an optimistic view of the goodness of human nature."^' The politically and ethically minded Reinhold Hlebuhr Is thoroughly nauseated by any type of optimism (contrary to the doctrine of original sin); he firmly believes that "a Christian view of huoMutt nature is more adequate for the development of a democratic society than either the optimism with which democracy has become historically associated or the moral cynicism which inclines human connunities to tyrannical political strategies. "^^ l^at did happen to Tillich's "scholastic" rooark that the belief in buua's rationality would cultivate more fertile •ell of daaocracy than thA Christiui conception of original sin aikd the demonic structures of society? '*Man's capacity for Justice," Niebuhr remarks, 'Vnakes democracy possible; but tMm*s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary. "^' Thus, for Niebuhr, democracy is based upon man's capacity. And democracy is adaptable to a greater degree of Justice than other political forms* Democracy is a social orientation In *^ ^The Divine Imperative * p. 467* 1 6ibid . ^^ Ibid * ^ ^The Children of Ll^ht and the Children of Darkness, p. xv* . "Xbid., p. Kill.

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103 which freedon and order are made for each other. For Brunner, It la the presence of freedom in the Christian principle that made it differ from collectivism. Not unlike Niebuhr's order, Brunner finds responsibility of individuals to the community as the characteristic which dis« tinguishes the Christian principle from individualism. Thus Nlebuhr and Brunner must accept the conclusion that democracy is essentially tha embodiment of the Christian principles of ethics, and democracy is necessary to the attainment of this goal. If, as Nlebuhr Insists, democracy is a social organization in which freedom and order have a brotherly relation, then Paul Tllllch's idea of "religious socialism" or a "theonomous" culture is truly a democracy. Walter M. Horton writes, "/^illich*^ Ideal of a truly 'theonomous' culture is one in which freedom and order are united. This ideal needs to be powerfully presented, if modem culture is not to flee from chaos into tyranny."^" Etienne Gilson, a Catholic thinker, considers the purpose of society to be the perfection of personality. This idea Is not dissimilar to the personallsm of Boll Brunner who has rejected individualism and collectivism as detrimental to the development of human personality. Also, for Gilson, democracy provides society with necessary authority for the benefit of the common good and the "efficacious 21 guarantee of personal liberties." The notion of the conoion good of Gilson •as a matter of fact, of Catholic thinkers in general <-is similar to Brunner 's Idea of "common weal" or "the Christian principle of connunlty" in which dynamic Justice and the freedom of the individual ^^"Tillich's xftle in Contemporary Theology," The Theology of Paul Tlllich . p. 45. See also Eduard Heimann, "Tllllch's Doctrine of Religious Socialism. "ibid ., pp. 312-25. ^^"Democracy as We Conceive It," Church and Society, pp. 268-72.

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104 are fulfilled* For Niebuhr, democracy alone Is apt to respond to the demands of social Justice. The various ideas of these Christian thinkers seem to work toward one goal; the realisation of Christian ethical principles. For lack of better terminology, ve might call its political expression 'Christian democracy. '*^2 When Christian theologians look at democracy, democracy is not BMirely "a political device," but it is "an idaal" as well. That is, it is something good (something Christian) to be accoiq>lished. Therefore, Christian democracy is a normative social theory. As Emil Brunner has already warned us, democracy is not what Nathaniel Mlcklem calls "ochlocracy," the technical name for mob-rule. "Liberal democracy is the assertion in political life of the worth, the t . : dignity, the due freedom of man as man. "^^ The essence of dtt« < ' mocracy is its spirituality, usually the spirituality that only Christianity can offer. Luigi Sturzo said that every code of ethics demands a religion; ^^ for the Christian theologian, every good code of ethics demands the Christian faith. "The democracies," Micklem writes, "are in danger because they have forgotten or neglected or denied the religious basis of their faith. They can only resist the onslaught of an atheist religious or quasi-religious faith and the corrosion of ''^From an empirical point of view. Bans Kelsen criticizes the democratic philosophies of Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Marl tain. Kelsen 's essay is a critique on Brunner 's Justice and the Social Order . Niebuhr 's The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness and Haritaln's Christianity and Democracy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945). "Foundations of Democracy," Ethics . L3CVI, No. 1, Ft. 2 (October, 1952), pp. 40-67. *-*Nathaniel Hicklem, The Idea of Liberal Democracy (London: C. Johnson, 1957), p. 75. 24, Op. clt .. p. 235.

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105 ••cularlsB by a quickening sense of the religious basis of our political ideals. "25 It is not nerely a theological idiosyncrasy that the theologian locrtw at deancracy and totalitarianism as a gigantic battle between the good of Christianity and the evil of atheisai* Bs alludes to the histori* cal and philosophical insight into Comnainisi itself. The transition from Hegelianism to Marxism, aa Btienne Gilson relates, can be seen more clearly through the 'Vnaterialism** of Feuerbach: "construing Feuerbach as a materialist is one of Marx's most personal contributions to the development of modem philosophy. **2^ Feuerbach turned the theocentric man into an "Anthropolatry." According to Feiicrbach, '^d has not created in his own image, but mam has created God in his own image. "^^ The "dialectical materialism" bears truly the combination of Hegel and Feuerbach in Marxism. Therefore, as all Christian theologians would agree, Marxism aa a secularism has, philosophically speaking, the fervor of a religion. Communina has not only a religious fervor in its actiial operation but also haa its philosophical root in the religion of an "Aathropolatry. " Thus, the antimony between democracy and totalitarian Communism becoews a religious problem. Arnold Brecht haa already noted the fact that, despite the ^ Sjhe Idea of Liberal Democracy , p. 136. * °The Itaity of Philosophical Experience, p. 283. 2^Ibid. , p. 281. Ludwlg Feuerbach 's view on Christianity is found In The Essence of Christianity , tr. George Bliot (Mew Tbrk: Harper and Brothera, 1957).

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106 secularization of the aodeni world since the Renaissance, God has continued to play a relevant role in politics. Christianity vas a great force in the genesis of modem democracy; judging froa the above examination of Christimi theologians, Christianity is playing an im* portent role in the development of democracy itself. Arnold Brecht insists that democracy in the ao^m world "is in need of a constant injection of ethical ioipulscs, mad these impulses . . . were supplied in the past, and are still being supplied, chiefly by religious feelings. ••2® In addition to theologians' interest in democracy, many Christian philosophers, e. g., John H. Hallowell, Yves E. Simon, A. D. Lindsay, George F. Thomas, nieodore M. Greene, Mortimer J. Adler and Walter Farrell,^' have come to the conclusion that Christian morality alone can provide the genuine foundations of democracy* Donocratic political institutions and cultural activitiaa must be based upon the assua^tion ^ ^Political Theory, p. 458. 29jbhn H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); YVes R. Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) and "Thonism and Democracy, " Science. Philosophy and Religion; Second Symposium , pp. 258-72; A. D. Lindsay, The Essentials of Democracy and The Modem Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press, 1943); George F. Thomas, chapter xiii, "Christianity and Democracy, " Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy (Mew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 283-305 and "Christianity and Democracy," The ?itality of the Christian Tradition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), pp. 335-58; Theodore M. Greene, Liberalism: Its Theory and Practice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1957); Mortimer J. Adler and Walter Farrell, "The Theory of Democracy," Thomist. Ill (July, 1941), pp. 397-449; III (October, 1941), pp. 588-652; IV (January, 1942), pp. 121-81; IV (April, 1942), pp. 286-354; IV (July, 1942), pp. 446-522; IV (October, 1942), pp. 292-761; VI (April, 1943), pp. 49-118; VI (July, 1943), pp. 251-77; VI (October, 1943), pp. 367-407; VII (January, 1944), pp. 80-131.

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107 that man la essentially a spiritual being. Aa such he nust define his aorality on the basis of religious values. Nor is genuine democracy possible without faith in the ultimate authority of God. It should also be noted that "the second meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life" in Septnaifx, 1941, hM shsim the highlight of the philosophical (Christian and non^ristian) interests in democracy.30 Despite the insistence of Christian thinkers that Christian religious values provide the best answer to the foundations of democracy, there is no conclusive consensus among political theorists that democracy is and should be based upon certain elements of Christianity or that ChrlstlaQity necessarily offers a danocratic form of government. In discussing "cultural prerequisites to a successfully fxmctloning democracy," Ernest S. Griffith advances his hypothesis that the Christian and Hebrew faiths offer "a powerful matrix" for the successful function of democracy. In particular, the Christian character of "absolutes" are not only desirable but also necessary to democracy. ^^ It is worth while quoting Griffith's comparison of seven categories of Christian religious values with the essentials of desncracy: 1. Love for and belief In freedom: beat based upon belief in the sacredness of the Individual aa a child of God. 2. Active and constructive participation in connunlty life: best based upon the obligation of the Christian, the Jew, and other believers to accept responsibilities, cooperating with and working for their brother men. 3. Integrity in discussion: best based upon the inner light of truth being primary in a world God meant to be religious. '"See Science. Philosophy and Rellg|lon; Second Symposium . 31 ''"Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium, " American Political Science Review . L (Harch, 1956), p. 103.

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108 4. The freely aaamaed obligation of economic groups to serve society: best based upon the Christian insight into the nature of society as set forth, for exaBq>le, by the parable of the body and its nanbers. 5. Leadership and office holding regarded as public trusts: best based upon or inspired by the exanple and teachings of religious prophets, such as Jesus, who accepted such a service "to the death." 6* Attitudes assuring that passion will be channeled into constructive ends: best based upon rallgious faiths that xinlte an obligation to love and serve with a recogjiltion of the primacy of individual personality* 7. Friendliness and cooperation among nations: best based upon the vision of world brotherhood derived from a faith that we are all children of a coanon Heavenly Father. ^^ Jtofan PlsBenatz argues against any necessary correlations between democracy and Christianity. He distinguishes the Christian eiq>hasis of the spiritual value of man fron the legal and political expressions of tlie good doBocrat. *1telther the Christian nor the d«nocrat,** he maintains, "exclude or suppose one another." The good Christian believes in the spiritual value of the human soul, and he believes in individualism. "But a good Christian need not be a d&nocrat, nor a good democrat a Christian. "^^ ' For PlaMmats democracy is more than a system of govertaaent, but it is also a syat«DB of govemoient. "It Is a set of political institutions 3 2ibid . . p. 113. George F. Thomas lists seven Christian eoBCopts which contribute to the cause of democracy: (1) the Christian faith in the dignity and worth of every person; (2) the belief in the fundamental equality of all men; (3) the Christian notion of liberty and right; (4) the realistic view of man; (5) the existence of the church as an autonomous conmunity that prevents the rise of totalitarianism; (6) the deeper basis of the unity of the conmunity and the common good; and (7) the hope for a world of community based upon the Christian notion of brotherhood of men. Christian Ethics and Horal Fhilosophy. pp. 283-305. ^^"Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," p. 118.

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109 together with the manners and norals, the ways of thinking and feeling that go with those institutions."^ "The ways of thinking and feeling" of the people are the cultural prerequisites for the successful function of democracy. However* for Plamenats, these are not necessarily equated with the Christian spiritual values. For example, the individualism of the modem democrat — "a respect for the right of every man to order his life as he pleases provided he admits the same right in others" — is different from "the Christian sense that the value of every human soul is infinite. "^^ While the Christian spiritual values for Griffith and the ways of thinking and feeling of the people for Plamenatz are the cultural prerequisites for the success of democracy, J. loland Pennock emphasises the social and economic conditions «7ith which democracy may successfully function. ^^ It is interesting to note What Pemiock says about religion and politics, especially Christianity and democracy. He agrees with FI— en ats in that there are no necessary correlations between religion and politics. Instead, religion is "a two-edged sword." He does not suggest, however, that "religious beliefs may not be favorable to democratic attitudes." But his own conviction is that "it is impossible to ^Ibld.. p. 115. 35^bid., p. 118. -'^Llke Pennock, Seymour Martin Lipset, a political sociologist, recently discusses the social and economic prerequisites of democracy in Political Man; The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, H. Y.: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 45-96 and in "Some Social Prerequisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political legitimacy." American Political Science Kevlew. UII (March, 1959), pp. 69-105.

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110 establish any necessary or even probable correlations in this area /in the relation between religion and politics^." In short, for Pennock, "the political implications of religious belief are ambivalent." Religion may or may not work for democracy. Religion may reinforce a sense of social responsibility; but he says that with a slight shift of emphasis, it may sound like "the credo of fascism. "-'' In discussing this controversial topic of the relation between Christianity (or religion) and democracy, we must, first of all, dist;inguish democracy as a set of Juridical and political arrangements of government and democracy as a cultural or ethical concept. While the Christian thinkers defend the ethical notions of democracy which are related to Christianity, we cannot merely criticize these ethical concepts from a political point of view. This is a kind of unequivocal fallacy of "disparateness" or disparate levels of conceptualization. Secondly, we oust not confuse the theoretical principles of democracy derived from, or coincided with, Christianity, with the practice of Christian institutions. The authoritarian practice of the Church is usually given as a historical instance as to why Christianity, Roman Catholicism in particular, does not work for the benefit of democracy. It seems that the contributions of the Christian principles for the preservation and genesis of modem democracy should not be outweighed by some ill practices of Christian institutions in history. Another important point to remember is the fact that these contemporary Christian thinkers outwardly exert themselves for the support of democracy and democratic values with firmer conviction than, say, do the ethical relativists of the Dewey school. ^'"Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Syiiq>08iuffl, " pp. 129, 134-35.

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Ill In the battle against totalitarianism, democracy based upon scientific relativism has been proven to be weak and powerless. What the Christian principles can offer is the ethical and psychological contents of certainty In the democratic faith* "Religion in its qultessentlal character,** Reinhold Hlebuhr writes, "is devotion to the absolute and a yearning after value and truth which transcends the partial, the relative and the historical."^ As Charles W. Morris notes, "Religious language Is charged with eiqpressors which Indicate approval by an Individual or group of individuals of certain supreme goals of life rather than others; it is rich in motivators ii^lch aim to Induce a certain vay of life believed to lead to the attainmant of the preferred goal; and it contains statements about the world which are felt •39 to Justify the approved goal and the recommended techniques. Therefore, the preferred goal and the recommended techniques of Christian theologians, in their political expressions, are without doubt the democratic faith. Moreover, there is no reason why the Chrlslan principles of spiritual freedom, spiritual dignity and worthiness of person, love, human equality In the sight of God and of community cannot be psychologically translated into the "cash-valtie " of political principles of lismorracy, that is, political freedom, individualism, fraternity, equality and cooaon weal. There is no reason to deny that fffaat man ^ Hieflections on the End of an Bra (Hew York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1934), p. 183. ^^"Baplridsm, Religion and Dconcracy, " Science. Fhilosophy and Religion; Second Symposium, p. 223. His earlier philosophical treatise on deaiocracy from a "pragmatic" point of view is found in Pragmetism and the Crisis of Democracy (Chicago: Dhiverslty of Chicago Press, 1934). His strong conviction for democracy against totalitarianism is expressed when he says: "If democracy provides no living alternative to fascism and communism, then blood and brawn wamt meet" (p. 21).

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112 believes on the religious level has political lnqplicatlons* Ralph Barton Perry has already shown why the elanents of Puritanism have been instrtmental to the cause of American democracy*^ As a Barthian '*lndifferentism*' is unrealistic, some political empiricists who attes^t to separate religion from politics for an entirely different purpose are equally unrealistic. Christianity, mora than any other living religions of the world today, is a positively culture-bound religioa. The Intolerant enq>iriclst oust take seriously what the "liberal empiricists" like Charles W. Morris state; "The eni^iriclst, if equipped with an adequate th«>ry of signs, is not driven to assert that religious discourse is 'aaaningless, ' and need not find himself in opposition to the religious quest. "^ The nqropla of the Intolerant eaopiricist is the sight of a frog that lives in the bottom of a well, sees nothing but a small porticm of the sky, and says "this is the whole universe'" The faithful democrat gust always remenber what A. D. Lindsay said: "Democracy is a faith, but a reasoned faith." ^fi democracy is a reasoned faith, and, as one of the foreaost present-day Christian political theorists John R. Hallowell says, "danocracy rests upon a faith in man as a rational, moral, and spiritual creature, "^^ then Jacques Karltaln*s philosophy of democracy, which ^Puritanism and Democracy . &•• also: Characteristically Aaerlcan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949). ^^''Eiqpirlcism, Religion and Democracy," p. 224. E. A. Burtt points out that 'lletaphyslcs they /the ntoderrt philosophers of scienc^ tended more and more to avoid, so far as they coald avoid it; so far as not, it became an instruawnt for their further mathematical conquest of the world." And he urges boom sort of reconciliation between "scientific" manipulation esad "metaphysical** speculation. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1955), p. 306. ^ nThe Moral Foundation of Democracy , p. 128.

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113 Is based upon the Thoolstlc philosophical and theological system. Is a suprana axanple of this view. Marltain*8 philosophy of denocracy Ight wall be contrasted, within the Christian camp, with those views of Protestant theologians like Relnhold Hlebuhr and Ball Brunner.

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SBCriON II THGMISM AMD JACQUES MARHAIH t -;-

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CHAPTER V THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOMISM It Is hoped that the preceding section will serve as a kind of prolegonenon to the understanding of the political theology of Jacques Marltaln* Political theology, from a political point of vlev. Is defined as that part of political philosophy which has Its foundation rooted In the theological, whether It be revelatlonal or nattxral theology* All the thelstlc conceptions of political philosophy are political theologies.^ In short, political theology Is founded upon the propo* sltlon that "all the political problems are at bottom theological*'* In political theology, theology is the ultimate reservoir of political philosophy. Christian political philosophy, ultimately speaking, is a political theology. Strictly speaking, as will become clear later, it is more appropriate to use the term political "philosophy" rather than "theology" for a Ihosdstic view of politics due to the clear distinction between theology and philosophy in Thomism. However, there Is no compelling reason why the Thomistic political philosophy cannot be called a "political theology" (as in the political philosophy derived from revelatlonal theology), sinq>ly because, df its being a Christian philosophy, '^Charles Hartshorns and William L. lease deal with a variety of "theisms" in their Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: Qniversity of Chicago Press, 1953). US

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116 It ultimately resorts to (natural) theology. As Jacques Marltaln declared, even the truly explicative science of politics must be a political theolo£y» and, for this reason, the truly genuine political philosophy must be a political theology. Nonetheless, It Is advisable for us to keep In mind this Thomlstlc distinction between theology and philosophy. The political theology of Jacques Marltaln must be understood In the context of conten^>orary political philosophy as a whole. To analyze political philosophy and theology Is the proper business of political theory Itself. The decline of political philosophy has been largely due to the oonttaporavy tendency to neglect the concern over the ends and goals of political life; and "philosophy" Is discarded at the expense of "theory/* Largely due to the emphasis on scl^itlflc research In politics, political theology seems to have been the most neglected field of Investigation In political theory. Arnold Brecht argued that even scientific political theory cannot dismiss political theology^ Although it may be that Christian theologians are critical of our age and speak of "the shaking of the foundations," they have ceased to e3q>ress merely their "eschato logical consciousness." Even the "theologians' theologian" Karl Berth, at times, had to concern himself with historical exigencies, and politics has ceased to become too mundane. The political theorist should not confuse the prevailing theological mood with theologian's contribution to the understanding of politics and culture as a whole. The writings of Reinhold Nlebuhr, Jacques Marltaln, Paul Tillich and Gmll Brunner are cases in point. Their contributions to political notions such as dsoncracy, power. Justice,

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117 order, authority, etc. have borne fruitful results, and their Insight Into political phenomena must be welc<»iied by political philosophy. The political theology of Jacques iiarltaln becomes clearer if It Is examined In the total context of Christian political theology. It has been made clear that there Is an Intimate relation between a theological position and politics or culttnre as a whole. A theologian's position regarding the Interrelation between faith and reason, between grace and nature, and between theology and philosophy decides his attitude towards cultural, social and political problens. Karl Berth who is Imbued with the analogla fldel has produced a negative attitude towards or dlsconcem over cultural affairs. On the other hand, Jacques Maritain, a Thomlst who accepts the analogla entls (analogy of being), has a positive attitude towards cultural matters. The cultural concerns of Paul Tllllch and Emll Bruuier have been Justified by their middle-ground (somewhat "scholastic") position between faith and reason* Moreover, the theological concept of original sin has become the foundation of Niebuhr's political realism, based upon the "realistic" account of human nature. Jacques Maritain is a Thomlst by his own admission. No one has contributed more than he to the systematization of Thomlsm in the twKitleth c«itury.2 Maritain* s Degrees of Knowledge may be considered as a Btienne Gilson may be considered to be coiiq>arable in status to Maritain, but he is essentially known as a superb historian. Of course, there would be a difference in opinion in determining who is really the greatest Thomlst of the twentieth century. For example, Martin Grabmann, himself a well-known Thomlst, considers Reginald GarrigouLagrange as "the best authority and representative of ThonisLic metaphysics in our day." The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas , tr. Nicholas Ashenbrener (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1931), p. 21. Etienne Gilson here and there alludes to the fact that Maritain is "one of its Zthe Thomlst tamiljj finest specimens." Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages , p. 84. Be that as it may, all Catholic thinkers and "outsiders" would sgree that no one excells Maritain in Catholic cultural and social philosophy. Walter M.

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118 little Summa TheoloRlca of the twentieth century. 3 His political philosophy Is determined to a large extent by his acceptance of Thomlsm as the "phllosophla perennls *" Therefore, contrary to the prevailing attitude of Protestantism, the predominant Catholic position accepts natural law as the basis of Christian ethical theory. The acceptance of natural law Is the consequence of accepting Thomlsm in the Catholic camp* However, one need not be a Catholic to subscribe to natural law theory* Thomlsm or Heo-Thomlsm must be reckoned as a force In the twentieth century philosophy. "Against the great mass of nondescript contributions," Walter Cerf In his brief auBBtary of the Proceedings of the Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy writes, "three grand currents of contenq>orary thought are easily recognizable: the enq>lrlcists, the existentialist, and the Catholic currents. The empiricist current Is mainly British, American, and Scandinavian; the existentialist, on the whole, continental and South American; and only Catholicism Is represented Internationally, although Its main strength Is In France, Germany, and Italy. Catholicism always surprises the outsider, not only with the variety of views permissible within Its dogmatic franework, but also with the energy It exhibits In assimilating to Itself the main tendencies of modem thought and science. At the moment, though. Horton says that In Marltaln we find "the best e3q)re88lon of the Catholic critique of modem culture." Contemporary Continental TheoloRV . p. 47. See also Frederick Copleston, Aquinas , p. 250. %hls Is certainly his opus ma^um ; Decrees of Knowledge , tr. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1959). See also: Science and Wisdom , tr. Bernard Wall (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 19 AO) and An Essay on Christian Philosophy , tr. Edward H. PUnnery (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955).

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119 •xistentlalim is its favorite partner*"^ Moreover, the unity of MeoThonlsta on fundanental lssu«« should not be construed as the nonexistence of diversity irithin the Catholic camp itself. Although Maritain recognises that he and Etienne Gilaon are in agreement on fundamental issueS) the "outsider" cannot fail to recognize existing differences within the Catholic camp. "Throughout the work of Gilson and Haritain," a critique of ThcMnisiB notes » "one can hardly fail to be struck by the vast difference between their treatment of Thoaaa and their often very cavalier criticisms of other philosophers*"^ Jos^ Ferrater Mora, recognizing conflicting philosophical tendencies (what he calls "the anarchy of philosophic systems") in contemporary thought, aptly tuBBsrises these two aspects in the following pasMig*! ... no one of the present-day NeoScholastic currents is a mere repetition of the original systems; changes are constantly introduced into them according to the formula novis Vetera auaere — "to add new things to the old ones." Most influential in particular is the revival of Thomism, to the extoat that the Neo-Scholastic movement is sometimes equated with the Meo-Thomist movement. The doctrine of the analogy of Being; the theory according to which all beings apart from God consist of essence and existence; the explanation of movement and change in terms of the passage from "The Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy," Philosophical Review . UCIV (April, 1955), pp. 394-95. Jos6 Ferrater Mora probably gives the beat summary of varioua philsophical schools of our time in Philosophy Today; Conflicting Tendencies in Contemporary Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), especially chapter 1, "The Present Situation in Philosophy," pp. 1-78, where he mentions Thomism. Thomism is also represented in a survcty of Twentieth Century Philosophy; Living Schools of Thought (New York; Philosophical Library, 1943). And it is represented in a survey of I. M. Bochenskl's Contemporary European Philosophy , tr. Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner (Berkely and Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1956). nfalter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy , p. 144.

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120 potentiality to actuality; the hylomorphlc doctrine of matter; nioderate realism in the theory of universals; and other Thomistic tenets often pass as representing the philosophic opinions of all NeoScholastics. That such Is not the case can be easily verified by even a perfunctory examination of various Neo-Scholastlc philosophic periodicals and treatises. But aside from the aforementioned differences within the Neo-Scholastlc movement, quite a variety of opinions can be detected in the seemingly more unified Neo-Thomist current. Thus, contanqMrary Neo-Thomlsts like Jacques Maritain, Reginald GarrigouLagrange, Etienne Gilson, and Martin Grabmann are at one on a number of fundamental Issues. But it would be wrong, and even unfair, to conclude that they all share the same "philosophy." In point of fact, they only agree on what is less philosophical in their philosophies -on the theological truths which such philosophies are supposed to Interpret and clarify, 6 In order that we may determine the nature of Xhomism and Maritain's philosophical and theological position, we must begin with a brief historical account of the development of Thomism. Although it may be said that Thomism as a philosophy and a theology has shown rather an amazing continuity for the past seven centuries, Thomism gained its momentum by the encyclical letter Aetemi Patris (August 4, 1879) in which Pope Leo XIII made Thomism a kind of official philosophy of the Catholic Church.^ And a year later, the Aetemi Patris was liiq>lemented ^Op. dt .. p. 59. The content of the Aetemi Patris is found in The Church Speaks to the Modern World; The Social Teachings of Leo XIII , ed. Etienne Gilson, pp. 29-54. The lltterae encycllcae (encyclicals) began with the Ubi prlmum (December 3, 1740) pronounced by Pope Benedict XIV. The word "encyclical" has a Greek origin: &a. (in) and kyklos (a circle). They are papal letters usually relating to doctrinal and moral matters. They are infallible, when the Bope speaks, ex cathedra . Anne Fremantle (ed.). The Papal Encyclicals in their Historical Context (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 21-29. The "official" status of Thomism in Roman Catholicism is usually a source of criticism by "outsiders." George H. Mead says: "The fundamental difference of attitude which I have recognized between Scholastic thought and that of other schools, lies in the acceptance of authority as an ionediate ground for determining the Judgment on the part of Scholastic thought. ... I think all disagreements and unfriendliness that may exist come back to this: the principle of

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121 to •stabllsh "Tbomaa Aquinas [atj the connon patron of all tk« Catholic schools."^ Thomlsm has since become the fermenting ground of Catholic philosophy.^ It anist be noted at the outset that "the ultlaat* axplanation of the history of philosophy has to be philosophy Itself." That Is to say, "Philosophy consists In the concepts of philosophers, takea In naked, liq>ersonal necessity of both their contents and their relations. The history of these concepts and of their relationships Is the history of philosophy Itself. "1>0 A. E. Taylor said In 1925 that even an educated Englishman of one hundred years ago would not name St. Thomas Aquinas In a list of the great philosophers of the past such as Bacon, Locke, Hume, Descartes, Spinoza, Lelbnlts and Kant. Francis Bacon conteaq>tuou8ly likened Aquinas to "a spider spinning cobwebs."^'* Macaulay made the remark In 1828 that "we extol Bacon and sneer at Aquinas*"'-^ However, today we must Include Aquinas and Tbomlsm In the rank of the great philosophers authority appears to us to have rendered static and Immobile the Scholastic mind, when once the Sunma of Aquinas had been definitely erected. There exists within It no place for unshackled scientific question. Investigation, and Imagination." Present-Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism , ed* John S. Zybura (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1927), p. 47. nrhe Church Speaks to the Hodem World , p. 29. Besides all Catholic Universities, some centers for the study of Thomlsm and Scholasticism In general are such places as the University of Louvaln and the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studlea at Toronto, Canada. T:he Unity of Philosophical Experience , pp. 302, 304. Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modem Temper (New York! Har«}urt, Brace, 1956), p. 201. 12 A. B. Taylor, "Sc. Thcmas as a Philosopher," St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1925), p. 33.

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122 and philosophical systems of the past. According to Taylor » even thosa «fho are not professed Thomlsts must agree to the fact that "St. Thomas CteJ one of the great master-philosophers of human history whose tlK>ught is part of the permanent inheritance of civilized Europeans and whose influence is still living and salutary. "^^ It was during the twelfth and the first half of the thirteenth century that a great quantity of Greek philosophical literature had begun to be known in medieval Christendom. Much of this literature was transmitted by the Arab world that discovered Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle. The original Greek texts of Aristotle were foreign to medieval Christendom until the time of Aquinas (1225-1274). The two great Islamic philosophers of the Middle Ages who had been under the spell of Aristotle were Avicenna (ibn Sina) (1120-1198) and Averroes (ibn Rushd) (1126-1198). Through the latter the philosophy of Aristotle was transmitted to the academic world of medieval Christendom. In the Jewish world, there was Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) who also followed the philosophical method of Aristotle. ^^ As James K« Felbleman writes, "Maimonides sought to reconcile Aristotle with Scriptures. But he thought of it as the reconciliation of reason with revelation, for he knew no reason other than Aristotle and he recognised no revelation other than the Hebrew Scriptures. The same task had been fulfilled by Averroes in his own time for the combination of Aristotle with Moslem revelation, and was to be fulfilled a century later by ^"^Ibld. 14 Irving L. Horowitz has recently written an interesting article on this matter: "Averroism and the Politics of Philosophy," Journal of Politics . XXII (November, 1960), pp. 698-727.

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123 Aquinas for Aristotle and Christian revelation ."^^ When the philosophy of Aristotle was Introduced to the medieval Christian academic circle through the Arab world, especially to Albert the Great to whoa Aquinas owed his knowledge of Aristotle, Aristotle was already modified* Frederick Copleston says, "A theologian-philosopher like Albert or Thomas was not Inclined to take over Aristotellenlam without modification; for It was quite obvious to him that some of Aristotle's theories were lncoflq>atlble with orthodox Christian theology, especially If Averroes*s cooBentarles were regarded as giving the true Interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy."'-" Aquinas and Malmonldea utilized, to a full extent, the pagan philosophy of Aristotle for their theological Interests* James Felbleman has said that Aquinas totally abandoned the "theology" of Arlscotle*^' "Thtnnas," Etlenne Gllson says, "has removed from Aristotle all the obstacles to Christian faith that were not evidently there. "^^ 8t« TImmms Aquinas, the official philosopher and theologian of the lonan Catholic Church, followed the footsteps of St. Dominica and Albert the Great and represented "the typical Intellectuallst saint of However, for Felbleman there was no doubt as to who was really "Aristotelian." He thinks that Aquinas subordinated Aristotle to Christianity as Malmonldes "definitely subordinated philosophy to theology, making philosophy subservient to Scripture," and that "It was Averroes who gave back to philosophy an authority of its own while holding theology inviolate, tluis resolving all the contradictions between them by keeping them apart." Relli^lous Platonism . pp. 200, 204. Harry V. Jaffa also concludes that "Thomas' charges against the Averroists in the conmentary correspond with distortions in his interpretation of the doctrine of the Ethics, and of Aristotle's philosophy in general." Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 166. ^ ^ediewral ghiloeoohy . p. 100* ^ ^Rellgious Platonism . p. 199. IS Elements of Christian Philosophy , p. 32.

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124 the whole Middle Ages" and at the saM tine "the supreme glory of the Dominican order."*' Aquinas* position Is not only revered by the Catholic thinkers, literary men, philosophers and theologians* There are some followers outside the Catholic circle Itself. The Influence of Aquinas is largely confined to the Roman and Anglican Catholic circle because of his official position in the Church. Martin D'Arcy, himself a Thomist, notes that "St« ThcMsas was idtotlfied with the Catholic position. Being a theologian as well as a philosopher, it was too much to e3q>ect that controversialists would keep the two separate. He does not do so himself in his writings, and undoubtedly this mingling of religion with pure thought has proved a sttanbling-block to many who have no religious prejudice against hlffl."^^ Ibr Aquinas, there was no doubt that faith Itself was above reason or philosophy. But there is a strong indication that, while he distinguished philosophy frcMn theology, he atteaqpted to reconcile the two. Btienne Gilson, the most well-known historian of ThcmlsM and the medieval philosophies, makes the position of Aquinas clear when he says: "Himself a theologian, St. Thomas had asked the professors of theology never to prove an article of faith by rational demonstration, for faith is not based on reason, but on the viord of God, and if you try to prove It, you destroy it. Be had likewise asked the professors of philosophy never to prove a philosophical truth by resorting to the words of God, for philosophy is not based on Revelation, but on reason, and if you 10 T. P. Tout, "The Place of St. Thomas Aquinas in History," St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1925), p. 1. Thomas Aquinas (Westminster, Nd.: Newman Bookshop, 1944), p. 259.

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125 try to base It on authority, you destroy It."^^ Ferrater Mora is quite right when he says: "In principle, Reo-Scholastlc tenets may be maintained without adhering to Catholic theological dogmas. As a believer, the Heo-Scholastlc philosopher abides by theological authority; as a philosopher, he cannot accept any 'authority' but rational proof. "^^ There la no doubt that St. ThooMS Aquinas, philosophically speaking, vas an Aristotelian. However, how much and how far he was an Aristotelian Is subject to a historical controversy. Prom the standpoint of pure Arlstotellanlsm, Aquinas sacrificed Aristotle for Christ. For the present day fldelstlc Christian thinkers like Barth, Aristotle was exalted at the expense of Christ. In a discussion of Gllson's comoient on this subject, Walter Kaufmann says, "St. Thomas made 'Aristotle say so many things he never said'; and Gllson might well have added that St. Thomas also aade Scripture say what It never had said. 'In order to metamorphose the doctrine of Aristotle, Thomas has ascribed a new meaning to the principles of Aristotle'; and In order to transform the religion of the Bible, he ascribed a different meaning to God. "23 Be that as It may, the concensus among the Thomlsts and the nonThomlsts Is that Aquinas was an Aristotelian but always held the Christian faith (theology) above philosophy. Aquinas himself refers to the pagan philosopher Aristotle as "the Philosopher" throughout his inrltlngs. But he would never agree that he had sacrificed Christ for Aristotle. A. B. Taylor said, "The Thomlst philosophy Is no mere Arlstotellanlsm revised but a masterly synthesis of both Plato and Aristotle * *The Onlty of Philosophical Experience , p. 62. 22 Op. clt ., p. 58. ^^ Qp. clt .. p. 144.

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126 vlth one another and with Augustine j effected by original insight of the first order. "^^ This iaq>lies that the reconciliation between faith and reason and between theology and philosophy represents the cardinal virtue of Thomism as a philosophy and a theology* The philosophy and theology of Aquinas retains essentially the "Christian" character. "St. Thomas," says G. K. Chesterton, "did not reconcile Christ to Aristotle; he reconciled Aristotle to Christ. "^^ 9/ As quoted in E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy , p. 19. ffe cannot overlook the connection between Augustine and Aquinas as Christian thinkers. Jacques Marltaln says that "the whole substance of the Augustinlan teaching on truth has passed into St. Thomas." And it is foolish, in his opinion, to "oppose Thomism and Augustlnlanism as two systems." "St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas," St. Augustine; His Age, tlfe. and Thought (Garden City, M. T. : Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 199223. R. J. Henle shows Platonic elements In Aquinas in Saint Thomas and Platonlsm (The Hague: Martinus Nljhoff, 1956). James K. Felbleman is of the opinion that the vogue of Aristotle in the Roman Catholic Church since the days of Aquinas has neglected three Important facts: (1) Aristotle was a Platonlst. (2) Aristotle had his own religious ideas. "Now, nothing in Aquinas can be shown to be in accord with the religious ideas of Aristotle, only with some of his other ideas." (3) ". . . while Aristotle was not an absolutist but, on the contrary, put everything in a suggestive and probative rather than a flnallstlc way, Aquinas subscribed to the dogma of a revealed religion, and the only possible way in which he could hope to reconcile a probative philosophy with a dogmatic religion was to render the philosophy as absolute as the religion by fusing them into a new and absolute synthesis, which, in so far as it failed to be tentative and probative, meant not only a surrender of the philosophy to religion (which was, as a matter of fact, in this case called for) but a distortion of the philosophy to the extent to which it is Involved with its own method." Religious Platonlsm . pp. 198-200. Despite the differences of opinion in these writers, however, one thing seems to be shown clearly; Aquinas was truly a Christian. In substance, his ideas are Christian, and only in method and approach was he an Aristotelian. 25 Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 28. See also Etienne Gil son, Ilanents of Christian Philosophy , p. 14. Gil son says that Aquinas baptized Aristotle in Aquinas' theological writings.

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127 Philosophy for Aquinas was to facilitate "nan's knowledge of God,** and "science, logic, and philosophy never serve any other end than to permit a mpre perfect contemplation of God."^° Although Aqulnaa considered the pagan philosopher Aristotle as "the Philosopher," It Is clear that Aristotle was the philosopher whose philosophical athod could be of service to Christian theology. Aquinas, according to Walter Kaufmann, "attempted nothing less than to pull the fangs of reason and to make It subservient to the church."^' For Kaufmann, Hartln Luther killed reason altogether; the difference between Aquinas and Luther Is that "Aquinas realised no less than Luther that reason poses a great threat to the Christian faith, but he also saw that It could be eo^loyed In the service of faith, which he proposed to do."^^ Christianity Is Indebted for Its growth to Greek philosophy.'' The thought of St. Augustine is certainly Influenced by Platonic nysticlsm through Plotlnus (Heo-Platonism); and the philosophy of St. ThosMS Aquinas is methodically Aristotelian. It seems safe to say that, for the cause of Christianity, Aquinas was Aristotelian in his philosophical method alone and close to St. Augustine in spirit . Comparing 26 Gllson, Elements of Christian Philosophy , p. 18. 27 Op. clt .. p. 145. "ibid., p. 146, '^On this subject, see the following two sources: Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1957) and Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944).

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128 St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas to Greek philosophy, Etienne Gilson COM— n ts that "the personal philosophical thought of Augustine is to Plotinus as the personal philosophical thought of Thotoas Aquinas is to Aristotle. "3^ We should not assume that religion and philosophy are always incompatible. F* M. C!omford has already shown that the outward difference between them "only disguises an iiward and substantial affinity bfttveea these two successive products of the same consciousness. "^^ In Christian philosophy, however, we must accept the conclusion of Richard Kroner wfa^i he says, "Qiristian philosophy was c«it«tred in the idea of God. It was therefore always theological or theocentric in principle. God, not the cosmos, was in the foregrotuid of interest; he was the arche of Christian metaphysics* He was regarded as the si4>rem« ground of all knowledge and all existence, of world and of man, of the Ideas and of matter, of virtue and of happiness. "^^ The synthesis of the pagan philosophy of Aristotle and the Christian faith had been accotiq>lished in Thonas. For him, the ultimate object of theology and philosophy was "one and the same. "33 In this •«ase, Aquinas sacrificed Christ for Aristotle no more than St. Augustine sacrificed Christ for Plato. The Averroists were truly Aristotelians. Therefore, Copleston writes that "some historians have maintained that the name 'Averroists* is a misnomer. . . . They should El— ents of Christian Philosophy , p. 16. 31 From Religion to Philosophy t A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957). ^" ^Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), p. 37. Etienne Gilson, Elanents of Christian Philosophy , p. 19.

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129 rath«r b« called 'Integral Arlatotellana*. This contention sacma to ma very reasonable." 0£ course, there was, within the faculty o£ arts at Paris, th« BMyvMMnt of a group called integral Aristotelians or "Latin Averroists" to whose doctrine Aquinas vehemently objected.^ Aquinas and his philosophy were representative of the Scholastics and the Scholastic philosophy. ^^ "St. Tfawnas," writes Martin O'Arcy, "in the perspective of history, has come to be accepted a» the representative philosopher and theologian of the thirteenth century."^^ This ii^lies that there was a diversity of philosophic systans in the Middle Ages, which are usually lunq>ed together under the name of Scholasticism. One of the ablest historians of the Middle Ages, Etlenne Gilson, has the diversity of medieval philosophy in many of his works. For exonple, St. Thomas Aquinas may be ccMi^ared to St. Bonaventure.37 Although Thomlsm was the representative of the medieval Scholastics, it never commanded its due position even In the Oomlnlcaii order in Aquinas* lifetine. The works of St* Bonaventura, John Peckham, Robert Kllwardby, Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham are examples of the existence of strong opposition to the philosophy and theology of Aquinas. "The acknowledged greatness of St. Thomas," O'Arcy writes, "did not . . . bring unity into the Scholastic philosophy of the Medieval Philosophy , pp. 66, 101-102. 35 Scholasticism and Thoodwi should be distinguished. Copleston, for exanq>le, explains "the term 'Scholastics' to mean in general those philosophers who consciously and deliberately adhered to one of the medieval traditions." Aquinas , p. 237. A Tbomist is a Scholastic, but a Scholastic is not necessarily a Thomlst. ^hoaas Aquinas , p. 252. 37 See Etlenne Gilson* s The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure . tr. Don Illtyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (London: Sheed and Ward, 1940).

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130 succeeding centuries. The Franciscan school continued to flourish; the Averrholsts were not silenced, and new systow ware Invented. The admirers of Thomlsm look upon the period succeeding the death of St. Thomas as one of decline, and It Is hard to resist the Impression. ""^^ Etlenne Templer, the bishop of Paris, condemned Averrolsm. After the death of St. Thomas Aquinas, he renewed his condemnation of Averrolsm* According to Jacques Marltaln, Tenqiler Included In the list of condeaciatlon the theses of Slger of Brabant and of Boethlus of Dacla and, above all, a score of Thomlst propositions. The opposition of the Paris and Oxford theologians did not subside; nor that of the Franciscan doctors. In 1282, a General Chapter of the Friars Minor prohibited the reading of the Smama Theologlea In Franciscan schools. St. Thomas Aquinas was canonized by Pope John XXII on Jtily 18, 1323 at Avignon. Pope Jdhn XXII recognised the fact that "Thomas, alone, has llltmlnated the Church more than all the other doctors."^' The rise of John Duns Scotus and the nominalist movement of the English Franciscan, Wlllim of Ockham, had been manifested as the great obstacle to the cause of Thomlsm, without mentioning the rise of modem philosophy that was rooted In the philosophy of Descartes. However, Thomlsm had its eminent followers throughout the centuries. Their names era an Index of the rise and decline of Thomlsm throughout the successive 38 Thomas Aquinas , p. 252. 39 St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Joseph W. Evans and Peter O'Reilly (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 53, 57, 58,

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131 centuries. John Capreolus, a noted Dominican called Thomas de Vlo who is gwierally known as Cajetan, Frandscus Sylvester de Sylvestrls, Francis Suarez, and John of St. ThiMBas Indicate a somewhat sporadic continuity of Thooism* However, as Frederick Copleston warns us, these activities on Thomism "should not be taken to mean that the philosophy of Aquinas enjoyed an undisputed reign in the Catholic seminaries and educational institutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. ... In many ecclesiastical seminaries and educational institutions philosophy came to consist of an emansculated Scholastic Aristotellanlsm, tinctured with ideas taken from other currents of thought, especially Cartesiani8m«"^0 Xc was the decisive action of the Papacy that determined the destiny of Thomism and its circle in the Roman Catholic Church. On many occasions, Pius IX "expressed the need of a return to St. Thomas and the main Scholastic tradition." But it was not until 1879 when Leo XIII asserted the permanent value of the phllosopl^ of Aquiooas and urged the Catholics to draw their philosophical and theological inspiration from Aquinas. Copleston states, ho«fever, that "It is not strictly true to say that Leo XIII 'inaugurated' the revival of Thomism. What he did was to give impetus to an already existing movestoat." As Copleston continues to say, "when Leo XIII extolled Thomism he was not trying to put a full-stop to philosophical activity among Catholics; rather was trying to renew it and give it a fresh liq;>etus. And there can be little doubt that as a matter of fact the rsrvival of philosophy anong Catholics ^ ^Aaulnas . pp. 237-38.

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132 has coincided with the revival of Thomlsm."^^ Leo XIII 's proclamation of the encyclical letter Aeterni Patria was unquestionably a strong and infallible inpetus to strengthen the position of Aquinas in the Catholic philosophical circle. Leo XIII atteeq^ted "to resolve all apparent contradictions between reason and faith, btttweoi the striving after teeqwral ends and the higher ordination to a divine end, by a loftier view co-ordinating both, and thereby to re-establish that harmony between the two which had been achieved in the Sunrna theologica »"^^ Thomism has become a kind of "Magna Charta'* of the philosophy of the Catholic Chiirch* Furthermore, in 1907, Leo XIII "exhorted the bishops t0 tellng firmly to scholasticism, and charged the General of the Dominicans to see that the Order placed under him should meet the 'arrogant criticism of the modems' everywhere with the Thomistic doctrine which forms a firm bulwark in the midst of errors t"^^ The encyclical Aeterni Patris prescribed the idea that "the best way to philosophise is to unite the study of philosophy to obedience to the Christian faith. "^ This encyclical made it clear that the purpose of philosophy is to come to the def«ise of faith or religion, "it is the glory of philosophy to be astesaed as the bulwark of faith and the strong defense of religion*" Thoolam thus showed the best possibility for this crusade to defend the Catholic faith. "Our first and most cherished idea," Leo XIII said, "is that 3rou should all furnish ^ 4bid .. pp. 238, 258. Ren6 FulJJp-Miller, Leo XIII and Our Times , tr. Conrad M. R. Benacina (New York: Longmans, Green, 1937), p. 81. *^Ibid., p. ISA. The Church Speaks to the Modem World , p. 30.

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133 to •tudlous youth a generoas and copious supply of those purest streams of wisdom flowing Inesdiaustlbly from the precious fountalnhead of the togellc Doctor." Despite the papal encouragment of Aquinas In the Catholic philosophical circle, Leo XIII specifically mentioned the contributions of other Catholic thinkers in the past such as St, Augustine, St. Anslem, St. Bonaventure, and others. The encyclical letter Aeterol Patrls has a wider Implication than Its encouragm^it of the philosophy of Aquinas In the Catholic circle. As Etlenne Gllaon connents, **In defining the method of Christian philosophy or, rather, the Christian way of philosophizing. Pope Leo XIII was therefore laying down the doctrinal foundation of the social and philosophical order.'**' The Important factor, which cannot be readily dlaalssed In this encyclical. Is that It laid the doctrinal foundation , not only of the philosophical order, but of the Catholic social, political and economic order as well. Finally, Thoodsm witnessed Its flowering days and ardent follow^ ers In this century, sev«» centuries after It was founded. Every one would agree with Hartln D'Arcy when he says that "Thomlsm has a host of exponwits In every part of the world, and . . . never has It been so flourishing since the death of Its fowider.**^ ^ ^Ibld .. pp. 30, 36, 48. Thomas Aquinas , p. 258.

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CHAPTER VI THE HATURE OF THOMISM The philosophy of the mendicmnt Friar of the Dominican order has finally stretched its triumphant wing Into the Catholic philosophical circle, and has become a force that should be recognized In the contemporary world of philosophic systems. It seems true that Thomlsm has been flourishing In this century for the first time since the death of Its founder. Its gallery of Ideas and knowledge has undoubtedly added some vivid touches to the modem world. To take the advice of Its followers seriously, the philosophy of the thirteenth century has ceased to be a mere relic of the phlloaophlc museum. 'In addition to The "Sumaa Theologlca" of St. Thomas Aquinas , tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (22 vols.; London: Burns, Oates and Washboume, 1914-1940), the following works on St. Thomas Aquinas and his philosophy have been taken into consideration here: Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1939), The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1954) and Elements of Christian Philosophy ; Martin Grabmann, Thomas Aquinas , tr. Virgil Michel (New York: Longmans, Green, 1928) and The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas , tr. Nicholas Ashenbrener (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951); Reginald GarrigouLagrange, Reality; A Synthesis of Thomlstic Thought , tr. Patrick Cummins (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1950); A. D. Sertillanges, S. Thomas d'Aquin (2 vols.; Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1922); Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas . tr. Frederic Eckhoff (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1944); A. Vlhitacre et al .. St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1925); 6. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas (Garden City, N. Y. : Image Books, 1956); F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955); Martin C> D'Arcy, Thomas Aquinas (Westminster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1944); Josef Pleper, The Silence of St. Thomas; Three Essays , tr. Daniel O'Connor (London: Faber and Faber, n. d.); Gerald Vann, Saint Thomas Aquinas (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1940) and Maurice de Wulf, The System of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Dover Publications, 1959). 134

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135 THe vlrtu« of Thomisn Is its reconciliation between ratio and fides or vhat Etienne Gil son calls **tbe haraony between reason and revelation."^ It was an effort to reconcile the pagan philosopher Aristotle irith Christ. In its philosophic«l method, Thomism is Aristotelian. "Thomas Aquinas," writes Etienne Gilson, "was not a pupil of Moses, but of Aristotle, to whom he owed his method, his principles, up to even his all-iflq>ortant notion of the fundamental actuality of being. "^ Thomism thus becomes truly "the philosophy of an imperial intellect."^ Its intellectual pinnacle is the metlwdical adoption of the philosophy of Aristotle. In this respect, Thomism as a Christian theology occupies a unique place: As Gilson writes, "The metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas was, and it still remains, a climax in the history of natural theology."' As Aquinas may be compared to Luther or even Augustine, Jacques Maritain may be contrasted to Karl Berth in our time. It is with good reason that Frederick Copleston calls Thomism "a balanced philosophy."^ Etienne Gilson concisely describes, in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages , the essentials (and the contrast of essentials) of the medieval Christian philosophy. The three positions of the medieval Scholastics are comparable to the contemporary positions of the Christian fideists, the Christian "rationalists" (the Thomists), and those of empirical bent. Essentially we can ^Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages , pp. 69-99. ^God and Philosophy (New Haven: Tale Uhlversity Press, 1941), p. 67. nror the defense of the philosophy of an imperial intellect in a»dem philosophy, see: Fulton J. Sheen, God and Intelligence in Modem Fhilosophy (Garden City, N. T. : Image Books, 1958). ° God and Fhilosophy, p. 67. 6 Aquinas , p. 25A.

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136 characterize modern tystaBS Into tbese three positions when we talk about the relation between faith and reason, between theology and philosophy. Th* Msential feature of the philosophy of Aquinas is "a sort of marriage" between reason and revelation. Aquinas reconciled Aristotle with Christ or the pagan philosophy of Aristotle with Christian theology. Aquinas saw essentially no contradiction between theology and philosophy: instead, philosophy could be the effective instruiMit for the furtherance of faith itself. However, we must not overlook the fact that Aquinas was a faithful Christian. Josef Pieper deplores the fact that the "silence'* of Aquinas has been conq>letely ignored. It is often forgotten that the magnum opus of Aquinas (Sianman Theolosica ) is an unfinished philosophical synq>hotty. He draws attention to the following passage of Aquinas: "Principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis ignota . the essential principles of things are unkno%m to us."^ This is what Pieper calls the "philosophia negativa of St. Thomas": "a philosophical question cannot be answered in fully sufficient form." Moreover, Aquinas "relinquishes neither the Bible nor Augustine (nor, consequently, Plato) for the sake of Aristotle. "8 Aquinas suddenly stopped writing because his philosophical work appeared to be nothing but "straw. "^ This was "a hint that history hea The Silence of St. Thomas , p. 93. ®Ibid., pp. 93. 106. 9 Frederick Copleston, Aquinas , p. 10; Martin C. D'Arcy, Thomas Aquinas , pp. 47-48; G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas , pp. 141-43; Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas , p. 93; and Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas , pp. 54, 271.

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137 never been able to explain. "^0 Aquinas, G* K. Chesterton explains, "had only long afterwards called up Aristotle as an ally; and now in that last nightmare of sophistry, he had for the first time truly realized that some might really wish Christ to go down before Aristotle. He never recovered from the shock." "We may be sure that the great philosopher had entirely forgotten philosophy."^-'' Therefore, "The Summa . * . « with its thirty-eight treatises, its three thousand articles and t«a thousand objections, rsnained unfinished." "The divine touch had been too profound to permit him to give himself thenceforth to his ordinary works." However, according to Jacques Maritain, Xquinas wrote some irorks afterwards* He wrote Responsio ad Bemardum and his second commentary on the Canticle of Cant ic lea . ^^ This is firm evidence that Aquinas was a faithful Christian; he did not doubt that faith was above reason, as Christ was above Aristotle. If any one misses this point, he seeoui to miss the whole truth of Aquinas' theology as well of his philosophy. As the saying goes, he who knows this fact, and knows nothing else, knows more about Aquinas than he who knows everything except this fact.'*^ G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas , p. 141. ^ 4bid .. p. 142. 12 St. Thomas Aquinas , pp. 54, 271. "^fhen S. B. Schattschneider characterizes the American party system, he singles out the fact of decentralization. And he says: "He who knows this fact, and knows nothing else, knows more about American parties than he who knows everthing except this fact." Party Government (New Yorkt Rinehart, 1942), p. 132. St. Thomas Aquinas, at his death bed, said: "I receive Thee, Price of my redemption. Viaticum of ny pilgrimage, for love of Whom I have studied and watched, toiled, preached, and taught. Never have I said anything against Thee; but if I have done so, it is through ignorsnce, and I do not persist In my opinions, and if I have done anything wrong, I

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138 To understand Che essence of Thomlsm, ve must know the simple fact that it was an attempt to reconcile reason with faith or philosophy with theology, revolving around the pagan philosophy of Aristotle and the Christian faith. Thomism was a synthesis of reason and faith that avoided the extrene positions of "the primacy of faith" and of "the primacy of reason •** Aquinas had the vision that philosophy based upon the rational faculties of the human mind could be an effective Instrument to defend the Christian faith Itself. This point was also made clear by FOpe Leo XIII in his encyclical letter Aetemi Patrls . What G. K« Chesterton calls "Christianized Aristotelianism" is Aristotle's philOAOphy that was baptised by Christ or the Christian faith. Aquinas never sacrificed theological or revealed truths for philosophical i principles* One extreme position in the Middle Ages was held by those theologians who stressed the primacy of faith: "Those theologians according to whom Revelation had been given to men as a substitute for all other knowledge, including science, ethics and metaphysics."'-^ This was r^resented by "the Tertullian family," who recognized "an irreconcilable antagonism between Christianity and philosophy*" The pagan philosophy of Greece was the curse for Christianity. This group mercilessly condemned Greek philosophy. Gilson concludes, therefore, that "Had the Middle Ages produced men of this type only, the period would fully deserve the title of Dark Ages i^ich it is commonly given. It would leave all to the correction of the Roman Church. It is in this obedience to Her that I depart from this life." Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas * p. 56. Ktienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages , p. 5.

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139 deserve the name not only from the point of view of science and of philosophy, but from that of theology as «rall*'*''^ TIm ••cond group, who also emphasised the primacy of faith, was more ** enlightened" than the Tertullian family. This group is called "the Augustinian family." They made untiring efforts "to blend religious faith with rational speculations." However, for St. Augustine, tlM safest way to reach truth w«s not to start from reason in order to find the certitude of faith. On the contrary, the proper method of finding truth is "the way whose starting point is faith and then goes on from Revelation to reason. "^^ As we recall, this was the same point that Bail Brunner made in putting the order of revelation first and then reason. The Reformation theology looked for inspiration from St. Augustine not from St. Thomas. While the Tertullian family repudiated the usefulness of reason and philosophy altogether, the Augustinian family started trlth faith and revelation and then moved to reason and philosophy. Therefore, the revealed truths were "the obligatovy starting point of rational knowledge" or philosopl^. "Understanding," St. Augustine said, "is the reward of faith. Therefore seek not to understand that thou mayest believe, but believe that thou mayest under St and. "^^ St. Anselm (eleventh century), and Gioberti (nineteenth cKitury) belong to the Augustinian family. The other extremists were those who maintained the primacy of reason. It «nis a kind of proto-type of modem rationalism. This group was represented by the Arab ^^Ibid., pp. 8, 15. ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 15, 17. ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 17, 19.

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140 Aristotelian, Averroes. According to Averroes, as Gilson notes, "the absolute truth was not to be found in any sort of Revelation, but in the writings of Aristotle. . . ." Averroes thought that some agreement between faith and reason was not absolutely impossible. He maintained, however, that "religion and Revelation are nothing but philosophical truth made acceptable to men whose imagination is stronger than their reason." While the Tertullian family condenaied philosophy altogether, Averroes* position coiiq>letely ignored theology which was beyond philosophical truth. Nothing but philosophy affirms absolute truth, lAich is demoti8trabl« by pure hum^n reason. Although Averroes denied faith end revelation from a philosophical point of view, he did not maintain that religion had no ftinctlon at all. On the contrary, he held that religion has "a definite social function that could not be fulfilled by anything else, not even philosophy."'-^ The second group who came to the support of the primacy of reason was the Latin Averroists. Their position was rather different from that of Averroes himself since they were all Christians. When faith and reason were at odds, they had to believe in "the doctrine of twofold truth."'-' The fundamental position of the Latin Averroists was that: "The conclusions of philosophy are at variance with the teaching of Revelation; let us therefore hold than as the necessary results of philosophical speculation, but, as Christians, let us believe that what ^^Ibid., pp. 39, 43, 50. 19 Ibid ., p. 58. Gilson hastens to add that "Philosophically Justified as I think it is, such a designation is not an historically correct one. ... I have not yet been able to find a single medieval philosopher professing the doctrine of the twofold truth."

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141 Revelation says on such matters is true) thus, no contradiction will ever arise between philosophy and theology, or between Revelation and reason."^^ In short, medieval rationalism represented by Averroes and the Latin Averroists has the same outlook on modem rationalism especially in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries* The reconciliation between reason and revelation characterizes . what Gilson calls "the Thoraistic synthesis" or "the harmony of reason and revelation*" The philosophical outlook of Aquinas, according to Gilson, was to reject the one-sided view of the Tertullian and the Augustinian vie«rs, on the one hand, and Averroes and the Latin Averroists, on the other. The compromise between the two orders (philosophy and theology or reason and revelation) was "to handle philosophical problaM as a philosopher and theological problems as a theologian. "21 Aquinas, therefore, defined the proper nature of religious faith and the rational nature of philosophy, without obfuscating the essMitlal difference between the two. Although they are not water-tight compartments, they are "specifically different kinds of assent." The philosophical assent was rational, whereas the religious assent demands the htanan will. "Revelation," Gilson writes, "is a self-sufficient and self-contained order of truth, whose ultimate foundation is divine authority alone and not the natural light of reason." Although Aquinas distinguished rational knowledge from revealed truths, all Thoraists would agree that he did not separate the former from the latter. Philosophical knowledge has ^ °Ibid .. p. 57. 21 Ibid ., p. 72. See also The Unity of Philosophical Experience . p. 62.

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142 it« own distinctive sphere, and faith is not a principle of rational knowledge. Nonetheless, faith Is an Infallible guide to philosophical knowledge and prevents philosophy from conmlttlng errors. But It is reason that becomes a body-guard of faith, not vice versa . Cajetan, John of Saint Thoiaas, and Jacques Marltaln are the "finest specimens" of the third spiritual family or the Tboolstic favlly.^^ It Is Interesting to note that these three fundamental positions are not imrelated to the dlffer^it outlooks of modem philosophy and theology. Gllson had a kind of historical continuity In mind when he spoke of "the unity of philosophical e:q)erlence," The spiritual frntlly of St* Augustine had made headway against Thomlstlc philosophy and theology In Deslderlus Erasmus of "Qirlstlan huaianlsm" on the one hand and In the spiritualism of Martin Luther, whose right heir of our time Is Karl Berth, on the other hand. It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that Thomlsm Is at war with the spiritualism of St. Augustine. Jacques Marltaln, for exanq>le, thinks that Aquinas consummated Augustine. "If ZAqulna^ fights the too material disciples of Saint Augustine," Marltaln writes, "It Is not to destroy Saint Augustine but rather to follow and understand him in a more living and more profoundly faithful manner, in a more perfect commerce of spirit. "^^ The Averroists* position has been continued through the nominalist movement of William of Ockham and to the modem rationalim of R. Descartes and of Francis Bacon, whose positive outlook is not altogether dissimilar to contemporary empiricism. The coiiq>romising position between the Christian fideists 22 5.easo^ anu Revelation in the Middle Ages , pp. 73, 78, 8A. 23 St. Thomas Aquinas , p. 105.

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143 and the radical enplrlclsts la that of the preaent-day follower a of Aqulnaa. Moreover, aa far aa natural theology la concerned, we cannot eliminate from thla camp auch phlloaophers aa Alfred North Whitehead, Wllllaa Bmeat Hocking, Charles Hartshome and othera. The revolta agalnat medieval Christendom (Roman Catholicism) were those of the Protestant (the Reformation) and the humanist (the Renaissance). Roman Catholicism and the Catholics have liked to call these two by the nasM of the "heretical" church and the "secularised" society* The revival of Catholic theology and philosophy Is essentially the "return from exile." This Is why Roman Catholicism has acted "like the mother of two unruly children /the Protestant and the humanlstj."^^ The vantage point of Thomlsm Is Its capacity to assimilate o — t hing new, whether It be scientific or otherwise, without violating Its fundamental tenets. As the German Thomlst, Hans Meyer, writes, every philosophical system must take Into consideration the two basic factors: "the Influence of a particular historical era and the basic scientific attitude as It Is expressed In established principles and methods." Thomlsm Is the philosophy that can take Into account these two factors. He comes to the conclusion, therefore, that "The Tbomlstlc system ... was so all-embracing and so receptive to anything new that It flourished throughout the continuing forward movement of Intellectual progress. "^^ Of course, the assimilating capacity of ThomlMi Is due to the simple fact that It Is "a balanced philosophy." The Thomlst, thus, would like to call Thomiai the "perennial philoaophy." Jbsef Plqper Salter M. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology , p. 41* ^he Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas , pp. 546, 547.

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144 speaks of the "timeliness" of Aquinas. For him, the attitude of Aquinas Is quite relevant to the world of today: the attitude of "the all-Inclusive, fearless strength of his affirmation, his goierous acceptance of the whole of reality, the trustful magnanimity of his thought. "26 Thomlsm, being a balanced philosophy, should be considered as neither a "conservative" nor antiquated philosophy, according to Fredrick C. Gopleston. Copleston rejects the Idea that Thomlsm has the "conservative** outlook in coarlson with the two other gigantic currents of modem philosophy: existentialism and empiricism. ^7 There is a strong indication that Thomlsm can ride the wave of contenqK>rary existentialism (not the "atheistic" existentialism of, say, Jean-Paul Satre).^^ I* L* Mascall, who adopts a Thomlstic approach, and Etlenne Gllson agree that the true innovation of Aquinas was his recognition of exittentiality. *%» Gllson," Hascall connents, "had unconsciously allowed himself to be unduly Influenced by the climate of the time ^y exl stent la lisin?*"^^ "My only point," Gllson writes, "is that a decisive metaphysical progress ^he Silence of St. Thomas , p. 103. 27 See his analysis on these two schools of thought (en^iridsm and existentialism) in modem philosophy: Contgnporary Philosophy . 28 See, for example: Jacques Marltain, Existence and the Existent . tr. Lewis Galatlere and Gerald B. Phelan (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1956) which, as the subtitle suggests, is "an essay on Christian existentialism"; E. L. Mascall, Existence and AnaloRy . see especially chapter ill, "The Existentialism of St. Thomas," pp. 44-64. Probably the best known Catholic existentialist today is Gabriel Marcel, who wrote T'ng Philosophy of Existence , tr. Manya Harari (London: Harvill Press, 1948) and The Mystery of Being : Vol. I: Reflection and Mystery , tr. G. S. Fraser (London: Harvill Press, 1950) and Vol. II: Faith and Reality , tr. Ren^ Hague (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951). 29 Existence and AnaloRy . p. 45.

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145 or, rather, « true aataphyslcal revolution was achieved when soiaebody began to translate all the problems concerning being from the language of essences Into that of existences. From Its earliest origins, metaphysics had always obscurely aimed at becoming existential; from the time of Saint Thomas Aquinas It has always been so, and to such an extent that metaphysics has regularly lost Its very existence every time It has lost Its exlstentlallty. "^^ Therefore It Is obvious that one of the essential contributions of Aquinas was. In recognizing the Importance of exlstentlallty, his ability to go beyond the essentlallsm of the past* Although Meyer recognizes the sublime mission of the perennial philosophy (Thomlsm) to abandon what Is no longer tenable and to accept what appears to be established knowledge, Thomlsm Is rather Incapable of assimilating what Frederick Copleston calls "neoposltlvlsm. "^^ Tha antagonistic attitude of a Thomlst towards soma amplrldsts lies In the fact that Thomlsm Is a Christian philosophy and theology. Although Jacques Marltaln shares no enthusiasm for the Protestant antlIntellectuallsm (that of Luther and Karl Berth, for example), the Godless philosophy of logical eo^lrldsm Is as distasteful as atheistic existentialism. It should be r art f red once again that Christ was not sacrificed for the pagan philosophy of Aristotle. Instead, Aristotle was merely a methodical instrument that could serve the cause of the Christian faith. Aquinas, of course, distinguished between faith and ^ ^God and Philosophy, p. 67. ^*^For discussion of logical aapiricism by Marltaln, see pp. 212-18.

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146 knowledge or theology and philosophy. However, as Josef Pleper well stated, "there Is no 'philosophy of St. Thomas' that can be presented In complete detachment from his theology. He does not believe In 'pure' philosophy, "32 "Philosophies making no room for religion," Perrater Mora contends, "are, to be sure. Incomplete philosophies. "^^ Therefore, the term "secular Thmalsm" Is a contradiction In terms. ^ Also, from the viewpoint of the "liberal esq^ilrlclsts" like Charles W. Morris, the enq>lrlclst needs not be In opposition tp religion. For a Thomlst, "the Thomlstlc view of philosophy would not appeal to the supporters of sclentlsm or logical positivism, but neither would the view of philosophy proper to these schools be in agreement with the philosophical aspirations of all our conteo^orarles."^^ Thus, we must be In general 09 The Silence of St. Thomas , p. 103. In another work, he says: "Theology Is always prior to philosophy, and not In a merely temporal sense, but with respect to inner origin and their relationship in that origin. Philosophical enquiry starts with a given Interpretation of reality end of the world as a whole; and in that sense, philosophy is Intimately connected, not to say, bound to theology. There is no such thing as a philosophy which does not receive its Impulse and impetus from a prior and uncritically accepted interpretation of the world as a whole." Leisure the Basis of Culture, tr. Alexander Dm (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), p. 151. ^ ^Philosophy Today , p. 143. •'^The term "secular Thomlsm" is used by Harry V. Jaffa in his Thomlsm and Aristotelianism (Chicago: Iftiiversity of Chicago Press, 1952). He says, Neo-Thomism "might better be described as secular nKHolam, because within Its ranks are some who accept the authority of Thomas' philosophy but do not necessarily adhere to his theological doctrines" (p. 6). ^ ^Elements of Christian Philosophy , p. 18. It must be pointed out that not all Thomlsts reject the utility of contemporary empiricism and linguistic analysis. Frederick Copleston, for example, says; "reflection on the foundations of /Thomlsts 'JT metaphysics in the light

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147 •gr ti e n t with Walter C«rf *s suBBuiry of thm Proceedlnga of th« Eleventh International Congreas of Philosophy. He said that there is an alliance between Catholic philosophy and existentialism, but the Proceedings "contain few exaaq>les of Catholic interest in science, and none at all indicating Catholic recognition of modem empiricism. "^^ Etienne Gilson believes that modern philosophy inflated with scientism is a ''philosophical suicide.** The Comtean version of positivism is no better than Harxian dialectical materialism. The growth of modem science, according to Gilson, destroyed "the old balance between the human and the physical sciences, to the advantage of the latter," and, in doing so, it destroyed %rith it the Western creed which expresses "a firm belief in the eminent dignity of man." The default of scientism is analogous to the fact that "the European burnt his old ships before making sure that the new ones would float •"^'^ As scientism is rejected, anthropocentric hunanisB, not unrelated to scientism, also is replaced by what is called theocentric humanism. In this sense, the Thoodst saist at least agree with Richard Kroner, when he sayst Christian philosophy was centered in the idea of God. It was therefore always theological or theocentric in principle. God, not the cosmos, was in the foreground of interest; he was the arche of Christian metaphysics. He was regarded as the sttpreme ground of all knowledge and all existwice, of world and of man, of the Ideas and of matter, of virtue and of happiness. Sow God can be of modem eaq»iricist criticism and of linguistic analysis might lead ThoadLsts to achieve a greater clarification of, say, the nature of 'etaphysical principles' and of their status in relation to pure tautologies on the one hand and to eaq>irical hypotheses on the other*" Aquinas , p. 251* ^falter Cerf, "The Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy," p. 295. 37 The Unity of Philosophical Experience , pp. 266, 277.

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148 conprehended as the supreme principle, how creation can be conceived In speculative fashion, how the relation between God and the Ideas, or between him and the human soul can be understood In terms of logical thought — all these questions were answered differently by Individual thinkers, but the theocentrlc orientation always remained unvaried. "38 It Is not altogether true to say that all the Thomlsts dispensed with the values of scientific theories and modem science. Frederick Gopleston notes that the Qhlversity of louvaln, one of the fountalnheads of modem Thomlsm, has made considerable efforts to keep pace with modem science and scientific theories. In relation to other philosophical positions, not all the Thomlsts are merely polemical: some have attempted to understand other philosophical systems. Some have even tried to understand epistemology through the eyes of Descartes and Kant.^' Of course, Jacques Marltaln would reject the eplstemologlcal or metaphysical approach from either a Cartesian or a Kantian starting point. It Is obvious that not all Thomlsts would agree with one another on all points. Frederick Copleston again suggests that: "Turning to Aquinas' metaphysics we again find considerable differences of attitude among ThcHaists." Generally, we may classify them either a« revisionists or as conservatives. The former, represented by the Thomlsts at Louvaln, look at Thomlsm in the light of an ever-changing world and life; and the latter, like Jacques Marltaln, are those who try to adhere to the spirit and letter of Aquinas as imich as possible. ^ "Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy . p. 37, ^^Frederick Copleston gives the examples of Mercier and Mareichal. Aquinas, pp. 240-55.

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149 Ho««v«r, as Goplsston points out, they all "strsss •tapfaysics' independence of changing scientific hypotheses and its connexion with ordinary experience. "^^ As Josef Pleper notes, if ThoiniaB aaans anything at all, it must aean "nothing nore nor less than the teaching of St. Thomas." However, we must risk the danger of coomittlng a kind of "Konseguenzmacherei ." Every Tbooist would be likely to assert that he alone is a tnie Thomist. The philosophy of a Thomist might be completely foreign to the philosophy of Aquinas »^^ Therefore, it is quite understaiuiable that Pleper should say that "the term 'Tbomism* has many meanings •"^'^ *°lbld., pp. 241, 246. ^ Josef Pleper, The Silence of St. Thomas , p. 85. He makes this point clear wh^t he compares Tolstoy with a Tolstoyan. ^^Ibid.. p. 84.

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CRAPTEK VII THOHISM AND JACQUES MARITAIN Catholicism has returned from its exile.*' **Prom her long period of exile and disfavor," Walter M. Hsrton says, "she is nov returning, clothed with new authority."^ Once again Catholicism is in a position to act like the mother of two unruly children of the Protestantism and the (anthropocentric) humanism of our age. The two most significant innovations of the Catholic Church are the encyclical letters Aetemi Patris (1879) and Rerum Movarum (1891). The former determined the fate of Thomism in the Catholic Church, and the latter determined the Church's outlook for social policies, specifically the relation between capital and labor. ^ ^Christopher Dawson and J. P. Bums (eds.), Essays in Order (KMr York: Macmillan, 1931), p. xvi. The brief accounts of the revival of Catholic theology are found in Walter M. Horton, "The Revival of Catholic Theology," Contemporary Continental Theology , pp. 41-8A and E. B. Aubrey, "HeoThomlsm, " Present Theological Tendencies , pp. 113-50. Prom a doctrinal point of view, Karl Adam's The Spirit of Catholicism , tr. Dom Justin HcCann (Rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1946) is a classic. Prom a Protestant point of view, Jaroslav Pelikan's The Riddle of Roman Catholicism (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959) has been praised by Catholics as well as Protestants. ^Contemporary Continental Theolo^ . p. 41. <» -"The best collection of writings on Catholic social and political thought and movements is found in Joseph N. Moody (ed.), Church and Society . 150

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151 Walter Mt Horton calls Jacques Karltaln a '*lay apostle of Thomlsm."^ Harltain Is not a bom Catholic; he was converted to Catholicism In 1907 after his soul-searching efforts to find the Absolute.^ "Maritain's ability to distinguish between Catholicisn and Catholics," Horton notes, "springs in part, no doubt, fron the fact that he was not bom a Catholic, but became one fron conviction."^ Although the Bergsonian "anti-intellectualism" (intuitionism) had no ultimate attraction for Maritaln, it gave him the favorable disposition towards religion or, like "the pilgrim of absolute Catholicism" of L^n Bloy, "a devouring hunger for the Absolute." Leon Bloy's influence was the turning point for Haritain, the turning point towards the pilgrimage of the Absolute. However, as Horton notes, "Maritain's pilgrimage of faith did not end when he met Leon Bloy. Bloy convinced his heart; St. Thomas, somewhat later, convinced his head."^ Harltain wrote of Bloy later that he "sought the Absolute for Whom he lived a little too much in the personal intimations of his heart and the intuitions of his artistic ^Contemporary Continental Theology , p. 48. Christopher Dawson lists the following as leading philosophers and theologians of the Catholic movement: Sertillanges, Harltain, Gilson, Rousselot and Marechal for the Frenchspeaking world; and Przywara, Wust, Carl Schmitt, Theodor Haecker, von Hildebrand and Grabmann for the Germanspeaking world. Essays in Order , pp. xvii-xix. Of course, this list can be extended. ^The best biographical reference on Harltain is written by his wife, Ralssa Harltain. The two separate works are found in one volume: We Have Been Friends Together and Adventures in Grace , tr. Julie Keman (Garden City, N. T. : Image Books, 1961). ^Contenporary Continental Theology , p. 51* 'Karl Pfleger, Wrestlers with Christ, pp. 26, 38. o " Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 52.

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152 genius, so that he took too slight account o£ the universal deliverances of the intellect and reason; and often made his tentlments the starting point In his acquisition of practical knowledge and the basis of unqualified assertions."^ Marltaln, furthermore, separated from his one-time con^anlon Charles Peguy, who, although syn^athetlc with the cause of socialism, had nothing but contempt for the "pigsty of modem society" or "a society of swine."''*' "Maritaln in conformity with hla temperament at one bold leap," Karl Pfleger writes, "Jumped over the intermediate stage straight into a life of Catholic practice and replaced Bergson as his teacher by St. Thomas."''^ Peguy refused to take the course Harltaln advised, simply because Maritaln' 8 advice seemed to him "not only unseasonable at the present Juncture but no way of escape from the actual difficulty. . . .** While Maritaln cut the Gordlan knot of his difficulties by the adherence to Thomlsm, Peguy refused to accept ilUiuinas by saying: "Don't bother me with your St. Thomas. ... I would give the entire stjoMM for the Ave Maria and the Salve Regina. The certainty of faith is not attained by arguments. . . . Your Thomas is an algebra in which I find 19 nothing for my soul." * 'Karl Pfleger, op. cit .. pp. 60-61. Pfleger comes to defend Bloy when he says: "Maritaln, the neo-Thomlst philosopher, is a wise man and is no doubt right. But Maritaln is Maritaln, and Bloy is Bloy. 'We become nothing, not even a blockhead, not even a swine. ' Every man is what he is and Bloy was the man who hungered for the Absolute." ^ ^Ibid . . pp. 83, 88. ^ hbid .. pp. 95-96. ^ ^Ibid . . pp. 96, 99.

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153 Mo matter what the artist like Charles Peguy felt about Aquinas and the Su—aa Theo logics . Harltaln's teaq>etuous pilgrimage to the Absolute has ended with the discovery of the Catholic faith, first of all, and of St. Thomas Aquinas later. He cast his lot with Catholicism and Tbomlsm for the reconstruction of philosophy end society . For the reconstruction of philosophy, besides his polemics against other phllo* sophlc systems, Marltaln wrote his Degrees of Knowledge In which he •ttsaq>ted to reconstruct and Integrate all types of human knowledge In the Thomlstlc vein. For the reconstruction of society, no present-day Thomlsts can excel him. As Frederick C. Copleston says, Marltaln "has made a signal contribution" to the implication of the Thomlstlc principles to the social and political problems of cur tlme.^^ The social and political ideas of Marltaln are rooted in nKRnism which Marltaln regards as a theology and a philosophy. As philosophy cannot be separated from theology in Thomism, Marltaln 's social and political ideas cannot be separated frooD the fountainhead of his theology and philosophy in general. Thomism ultimately channels the flow, depth and width of Marltaln 's social and political Ideas. His political conviction is unquestionably on the "liberal" side of French politics. He stands firmly against the "conservative" side of Charles Maurras.^^ In the titanic struggle between * ^Aqulnas (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 249. ^^J. P. Mayer writes that "Jacques Marltaln . . . has criticised Maurras's political philosophy .... This criticism of Maurras's political philosophy is all the more Important because Jacques Marltaln was himself a 'Maurrassien ' before 1926. It is not difficult to understand the links between the agnostic Maurras and French neo-Thomism. " Mayer concludes that, "In Marltaln, one sees that the liberal tradition of French Catholicism is still alive — in spite of Charles Maurras." Political Thought in France from the Revolution to the Fourth Republic (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), pp. 94-96. Joseph W. Evans

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f 154 deaiocracy and totalitarianism, Marltaln Is an iioswervlng chanplon of democracy. It Is no mere coincidence that Marltaln has Inherited the spirit of the "militant democrat" Jules Favre who is his grandfather. fhe influence of St. Thomas Aquinas, and therefore Aristotle, on Harltaln's political philosophy as well as on his general metaphysical system, is conspicuous. Marltaln himself confesses that, "It was after ray conversion to Catholicism that I made the acquaintance of St. Thomas. After iny 'passionate pilgrimage' among all the doctrines of modem philosophers, in whom I had discovered nothing but disenchantment and splendid uncertainties, I felt, as it were, an illumination of the reason. My vocation as philosopher became clear to me. 'Woe is me should I not thomistlze. ' . . ." Professor L. Noel of the Qalversity of Louvaln remarks that Marltaln "discovered Thomism when his philosophic training was already finished, and that under the Influence of ideas quite contrary to the Thomlstlc philosophy. Scholasticism appeared to him as a novelty to which he forthwith became attached with the enthusiasm of a neophyte." and Leo R. Ward, in their foreword to the political writings of Marltaln, say that "Marltaln had once shared with Father Humbert Cl^rlssac, his spiritual director, certain sympathies for some of the nationalist and monarchical aspirations of L* Action francaise . Yet he viewed the condemnation with great Interest and with filial respect. Happily, it was the occasion for his serious study of Maurras' doctrines and for his own painstaking work on social and political problems." The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Marltaln . p. ix. Marltaln 's own account and condemnation of L'Action francalse is found in The Things That Are not Caesar's , tr. J. F. Scanla!n (Mew iork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930). '• ^I Believe, ed. Clifton Fadiman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1939), p. 197. ^^"The NeoScholastic Movement in French-SpeakIng Countries," Present -Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism , ed. John S. Zybura (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1927), p. 245. Charles A. Fecher

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155 Raedless to say, Marltaln has played an Inportant role in the recent Thomlstlc revival that accepts ThOMlsii as the "phllosophla perennls ." For him Thomlsm is not only a great philosophical system of the past; he presents it as the living philosophical system of our time, ntyy all tines. TboHlsm Is not "relegated to the limbo of the dead systaoa.'*^' As Gerald B. Phalan writes: 'Karltaln sees Thoadm not atr«ly as a historical thing, a system of thought, vital only In the past and Interesting In our age merely as a historical phase of human reflection. . . « Marltaln stands for a living, not an archaeological » Ttonlm*" In his philosophy he opposes vehemently "the decadent modem mind," "posltlvlstlc eoplrlclsm, " and the "pseudo-metaphysics of sdentlsm. "^^ Marltaln accepts Thomina, as Waldonar Gurlan says, "because for also cotonents: "The philosophy of Jacques Marltaln Is grounded firmly on that of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas; he has sought to bring that philosophy over Into the modem world In the belief that its principles are as valid now as when they %rere first laid down, and that it can be of help in solving contemporary problems." The Philosophy of Jacques Marltaln (Westminster, Md.: MewBan Press, 1953), p. ix. '•'Christopher Dawson, Essays in Order , p. xv. ^^ Jacquea Marltaln (London: Sheed and Ward, 1937), p. 31. Phelan further eulogizes; '^Iarltain*s philosophy is deeply rooted in the tradition of Christian culture; his thought is guided by the light of the greatest philosophical mind of all time, St. Thomas Aquinas; and his Intellectual efforts are oriented towards progressive development with an energy, at once cautious and daring, which makes for vigorous growth, and keeps the old philosophy forever young. . . . Because Jacques Marltaln *s thought is full of that holy daring which keeps the perennial philosophy alive and progressive; becat^? his outlook is courageous, confident and modem; because his philosophy is firmly rooted In the traditional Wei tanschauung of the Christian world; because his genius reflects the true spirit of the Angelic Doctor, a spirit of reverence for the past, of love of the present and of trust in the future, I regard him as The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century, God-given guide and leader of thought for the age we claim as ours" (pp. 10-11).

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156 him Thomism Is, In Its substance, the expression of universal truth, able to Incorporate the truth of all times and capable of being liberated from purely historical elements and additions." Horeover, "Thomism Is for Marltaln neither a catalogue of terms, whose meaning and application [axBj fixed definitely, nor an encyclopedia which has only to be consulted for the solutions of problems." And In particular, "Marltaln 's Christian political philosophy, developing after 1926, emphasizes more and more the dignity and the proper ends of nature and temporal history In the line of Thomistlc thought. With the rise of totalitarianism, Marltaln Insisted more and more upon the fundamental 19 values of a democratic philosophy of life and society." Thus Marltaln has found the solution of modem human probl&ns In Thomism. Although he emphatically opposes "all atteiopts to modernize Thomism" and abides by the spirit «td letters of Aquinas, he hlaiself has modernized It, and, In doing so, has added new Insight Into the thirteenth century philosophy of Aquinas which can be applicable to a modem climate. It Is not altogether a misnomer to call the contemporary Thomistlc 20 movement "Neo-Thomlsm. "^ If we find In this new Insight and application ^^"On Marltaln's Political Philosophy." Thomlst . V (January, 1943), pp. 9, 12. ^^e must recognize the fact that Marltaln refuses to call hiawelf a "neo-Thomlst" (In contrast to a "Thomlst"), and he rather prefers to be called a "paleo-Thomlst." Existence and the Existent , tr. Iicwls Galantlere and Gerald B. Phelan (Garden City, N. Y. : Image Books, 1956), p. 11. Norah Willis Mlchener gives the following interview account of Jacques Marltaln when the latter gave lectures at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at Toronto, Canada. On March 21, 1949, Michener asked Marltaln: *^ you try to follow St. Thomas Aquinas strictly?" Marltaln answered: "Thomism is living, so we must not reject the work of comnentators. Cajetan and John of St. Thomas are the most profound and genuine commentators. As far as possible I stick to them, but Thomas himself comes first," Marltaln on the Nature of Man in a Christian Democracy (Hull, Canada: Editions "L'Eclalr, " 1955), p. 123.

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157 of Thomlsm a profound and discerning originality, it is only in the sense that, in the words of Charles A* Fecher, '^iginality lies . . « in an extension and development of traditional forms; in the correction of the tradition where correction is needed; and finally in the discovery of new insights and truths which, owing to the limitations of historical clxcumatances, the earlier masters of the tradition were incapable of i21 discovering for themselves."^ John S« Zybura, in summarizing the role of the "New Scholasticism" in general, writes, "It is heir at once to the best thought of the ancient and of the medieval past; it aims to make this double treasure functional for the present; by a fruitful union of the best in past and present it seeks to prepare the birth of a new and a richer synthesis in the future; it is loyal to the spirit and best traditions of the Philosophia perennis ."^^ Josef Pieper speaks of the 'perennial" character of nKMsiam, and he siqra: **thoaM8 is, in effect, placing himself with the stream of traditional truth nourished by the past; without claiming to give a final solution, he leaves the way open for future quest and discovery as that stream flows onward toward the yet unknown. "^^ Thus he warns us to use the term "Tho mism " carefully: it is not a usual ism in the philosophic schools of thought. The ^ ^The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain , p. x. Benedetto Croca is quoted to have said that "The originality of thinkers lies not always in their seeing things that nobody else has ever seen., but often in the stress they give now to this commonplace and now to that." Arthur Livingston, "Introduction," Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class , tr. Hannah D. Kahn (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. x. 22 ^ •Present-Pay Thinkers and the Mew Scholasticism , p. Ix. ^ ^The Silence of St. Thomas, p. 88.

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158 Thomlsts vould like to maintain that Thomism is the perennial philosophy and at the sastc time a balanced philosophy. Although it is not true to say, as Frederick C. Copleston has already pointed out, that Pope Leo XIII "inaugurated" the revival of Thomism, the encyclical letter Aetemi Patris gave the decisive momentum to the fate of Thomism in the Catholic circle. And Thomism more or less became the official philosophy «id theology of Roman Catholicism. In dealing with Jacques Maritain as a Catholic philosopher and theologian, ve must define the papal authority and the role of a theologian or a philosopher in Roman Catholicism. As philosophy oust be distinguished from theology, strictly speaking, Thomism mist be equally distinguished from Roman Catholicism as a religion. In principle , a Thomist need not adhere to Catholic theological dogmas. As the Thomists maintain, the truth of philosophy must be determined by its own intrinsic logic, principles and methods. In short, a Thomist as philosopher does not need to accept the authority of the Church and the Pope. Jacques Maritain more than once alludes to the fact that the truth of a philosophy must be determined by its own principles and methods. However, it is equally true that not only theology and philosophy in Thomism are intimately related but also a Catholic theologian and philosopher, by his allegiance to the Catholic faith, cannot go against the ultimate authority of the B1sIk>p of Roone. As it has already been stressed, this does not mean that there could be no diversity in the Catholic philosophical and theological circle. It only points to the fact that the authority of the Pope is infallible on the matters of morals and faith. "This supernatural being of the Church,*' according to Karl Adam, "expresses itself chiefly in her

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159 BO«t primary creations, in dogma, morals and worship."'^ "It is urged," soys John Henry Newnan, "that, as all religious knowledge rests on moral evidence, not on demonstration, our belle£ in the Church's Infallibility ust be of this character. ''^^ "The world of the Church Is the word of revelation. That the Church Is the Infallible oracle of truth Is the fundamental dogna of the Catholic religion and 'I believe what the Church proposes to be believed' Is an act of real assent, including all particular assents, notional and real; and, while It Is possible for unlearned as well as learned, it Is imperative on learned as well as un96 learned." A Catholic philosopher and a theologian must abide by this prescription. The Pope, as the Vicar of God, the successor of St. Peter and the head of the Body of Christ, Is Infallible. As a natter of fact, ^ ^The Spirit of Catholicism , p. 15. The authority of the Church has mandates to teach and guide the faithful through what is called the maglsteritm ordlnarium on matters of faith, morals, discipline, and administration. In these matters, the Pope is Infallible, that is to say, he Is preserved from error by God Himself. The doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope was instituted by the canons of the Vatican Council of 1870. "The Pope, when he speaks, ex cathedra, has infallibility by solemn Judgment or by the maglsterlun concerning the truth about morals and faith. The encyclicals demand an assent without reservations and make a formal act of faith obligatory. " "Even If the pope himself Is a bad man," Anne Fremantle remarks, "what he proclaims as truth to the Church cannot be anything but truthful ... . ." The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Context , p. 25. The Pope is only infallible irtten he acts as the head of the Church, and the infallibility does not mean that the Pope cannot sin against morals or faith. G* G. Coulton argues against the doctrine of papal infallibility in Papal Infallibility , a public lecture delivered at the Cambridge University on February 24, 1930. This pamphlet was published by the oxthor himself. ^ 'ah Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (Garden City, N. Y. : laage Books, 1960), p. 98. ^°John Henry Newman, An Essay In Aid of a Gramnar of Assent (Garden City, H. T.: Image Books, 1955), p. 131.

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160 'H:he pronouncements of the encyclical letters are themselves in' fallible. "^^ The role of a Protestant theologian differs from that of a Catholic theologian. It was the infallible authority of Romanism that the Protesta nt Reformation stood against. Since then there is little room for the "grammar of assent" in Protestantism. Although there is something "Thomistic" about his philosophy, Paul Tillich is truly a Protestant theologian when he asserts that "doubt" is uniquely the "Protestant principle." The concept of the "infallibility" excludes the element of doubt from faith itself. "The concept of th« *in* fallibility' of a decision by a council or a bishop or a book," Tillich writes, "excludes doubt as an element of faith in those who subject themselves to these authorities."^ Speaking of a theologian's doubt and lack of certainty, Tillich writes that "Me considered the theologian as a believer in spite of his doubt and despair, and as a member of the Church, in whose power all theological work is done, in spite of his lack of certainty. "2' The Reformation theology of our time, which stresses the notion of Christocentricity and "the Word of God," would imply the rejection of the infallible authority of the Church. Paul Tillich defines "theologians" as those "persons who ask the question of our ultimate concern, the question of God and His manifestation." And the foundation of all ^ ^The Church Speaks to the Modem World, p. 4. ^ ^Dynamics of Faith , p. 28. 29 The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 122*

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161 theology Is "the Divine Spirit." '*Iio be a theologian," he continues, "'•ans first of all to be able to receive spiritual knowledge."^ Of course, the maxim that "The Bible and the Bible alone Is the religion of Protestants" cannot be pushed to Its logical absurdity. "Theology," Tllllch writes, "does not exist outside the community of those who affirm that Jesus Is the Christ, outside the Church, th« assembly of God."'' C. R. Dodd defines, '*The Bible /a^/ a tmlty of diverse writings which together are set forth by the Church as a revelation of God In history." It Is also claimed that "the Bible could be read, Jtist as It stood, without the guidance of tradition, and with equal authority attaching to all Its parts, exposed It to the dangers of a chaotic Individualism. Where there was no longer any cooiDon standard or perspective, the lliM was not easily drawn between a Just freedom or re« sponsible Judgement and the play of arbitrary preference."^' Despite all these opinions and cautions, the fact still remains that for the Protestants there Is no doctrine of "the Infallible authority of the Pope." "The basic difference between Catholic and non-Catholic approach to religious truth, " the Jesuit theologian Gustave Welgel says, "is that the non-Catholic constructs In the light of his own experience and needs, while the Catholic receives it so that no reconstruction Is called for or even In place. "^^ This Is «^y, as E. K. Aubrey says, ^ ^Ibid . . p. 119. ^ ^Ibld .. p. 120. 32 22. The Bible Today (Cambridge: Uhlverslty Press, 1946), pp. 14, ^^**The Significance of Papal Pronounceaients," The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Context , p. 18. W. A. Vlsser 'T Hooft

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162 "The Renaissance discovered the Individual in culture; and the Reformation •phasized the individual in religion."*^ The religious truths for the Catholic are revealed by the Church. The function of the Catholic theologian and philosopher is not to construct religious doctrines but to elucidate or rationally defend the religious dogmas and doctrines advanced by the Church. As Iteigel points out, the Catholic faith is a question of development . ^^ It is the growth of the whole Church, where the theologian plays an important role. Nonetheless, the episcopate alone has the authority to determine the Catholic faith. His authority is infallible on the matter of faith and morals* Weigel describes the function of the Catholic theologian in the whole development of the Catholic faith as follows: The first manifestations of growth will be in the meditations of the Church's theologians. They will formulate, often quite unconsciously, the living expansion. The theologians do not make the doctrine; they find it. The formulations of the theologians are not the authentic expression of the Church's teaching; only the magisterium can authentically express it. But the theologians are commissioned for their task by the directing magisterium and they work under its constant vigilance. They do more than merely repeat the authentic declarations; they compare them with the other sources of doctrine; they systematize and J. H. Oldhon describe the creed of the Roman Catholic Church as follows: "The Church is one. This inq>lies that its form of government Is nionarchical , for the papacy is the principle of unity. It is holy , because it is the continuation of the life of Christ, because it represents God's Kingdom on earth, because its teaching, priestly and pastoral ministry mediates the truth, grace and love of Christ, and because the members of the Church are members of the Body of Christ. It is also Catholic or Universal, not merely in principle, but also in actuality. Finally, it is apostolic . All ecclesiastical authority is derived from the apostles, who have transmitted their office to their lawful successors, and were themselves appointed by Jesus Christ." The Church and Its Function in Society (London: George Allen and Ubwln, 1937), p. 30. 3 ^Present Theological Tendencies , p. 36. ^^or the idea of "development," see John Henry Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine .

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163 their findings; they talk the language of their time and ar« very much under the Influence of history. Hence it is that the consensus of the Church's theologians actually Is the true echo of the teaching Church, for in the theologians we have the agaplificatlon of the authentic message so that it can be heard effectively by audiences gathered in many points of the ecumenical Church. Ubtll the consensus is reached, there will be wrangling* anong the theologians and the famous odium theologicum will raise its ugly head, but time as the instrument of the Holy Spirit will bring about gradually and quietly the consensus which the maglsterium will canonize when there is need to do so.^ The function of the theologians in Roman Catholicism, therefore, is clear: the theologians do not make the doctrine but they are comnlssloned to find it. Moreover, Fbpe Plus XII in Humanl Generis (1950) made it clear that "when some point hitherto under discussion among theologians is expressly settled by the Pope in such a document /encyclical/, everyone should understand that, in the mind and will of the Pontiff, the point at stake should no longer be considered as freely debatable among theologians*'**^' However, the ultimate authority of the papacy does not seem to deny the initiatives and originalities of the Catholic theologians in so far as they remain within the confines of the dogma of faith. The encyclical letters, for example, by their very nature, are so broad that there always remain room for detailed expositions for the Catholic theologians and philosophers. ^° ^°"The Significance of Papal Pronouncements," The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Context, p. 17. 37 •' The Church Speaks to the Modem World, p. 5. ^^aritain, on March 22, 1949, was asked whether, at the peak of his philosophical career, he finds that his philosophy conflicts at any point with his religion. He answered: "Ho; it is the proper privilege of St. Thomas to make unity and consistence." Norah Willla Mlchener, op. cit .. p. 123.

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164 The encyclical letters are binding upon the Catholic theologians and philosophers as well as laymen. 'Christian philosophy" is **the philosophical method reconinended by the encyclical Aeterni Patris as the best way to philosophize there is*" This encyclical letter, moreover, not only prescribed the "doctrinal foundations" for 'Christian philosophy" but also directly laid the practical basis for the Catholic social order. "Far from being an unpractical suppleaient to the doctrine," Etienne Gilson writes, "the teaching of the Christian philosophy of the Scholastics, especially that of St* Thomas Aquinas, is considered by the Pope a necessary prerequisite to any practical scheme in view of restoring the social order. "^' The interpretations of papal encyclicals require the skill of the "qualified Catholic theologians" who have received "a sound theological training." Moreover, "the teaching of the encyclicals," Gilson advises, "should not be made either broader in scope or more narrow than it is* Dealing as it does with a restatement of the Catholic faith as well as with its applications to definite problems, this teaching must be understood as given." And no one should yield to "the temptation of ' inqiroving ' " the teachings of the Pope which are manifested in the encyclicals, '^ly a Pope has authority to complete the teaching of one of his own encyclicals as well as that of the encyclicals of other Popes, since only a Pope has mithority to write and to publish such a document. "^^ The duty and function of the Catholic theologians have hereby become clear, especially in terms of the authority of the Bishop of Rome ^^ The Church Speaks to the Modern World, pp. 6-7. ^^Ibid. . p. 21.

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165 and the aeanlng of papal encyclicals. Keeping all these considerations In mind, vb can safely proceed to examine Jacques Marltaln as one of the foremost theologians and philosophers In looan Catholicism. It would seem more meaningful to examine Marltaln 's views and Ideas In the broad context of the papal encyclicals concerning the matters of faith and morals, especially his Interpretations of St. Thomas Aquinas in the light of the contemporary world and his social and political philosophy which Is deeply rooted in Thomism. Marltaln declares that God himself is the 'tester of theo*41 loglans."^ Theology is rooted In faith; hence, theology presupposes faith. There is no theology without faith. Furthermore, theology Is the guide for moral philosophy. The empirical disciplines like politics must be Integrated trith theology so that they may attain the status perfectus sdentiae . Political science which is Integrated with the> ology may be called a "political theology." Thus the most perfect explicative political "science" is a political theology. Political philosophy must comprehend, not Just accept, the principles of theology in order to perfect Itself. This is a synoptic account of the views that Marltaln holds. Maritaln's Christian political philosophy is a political theology. Due to the historical exigencies of our time and to the personal Interest of Marltaln himself, we must at least confess that he is certainly more outspoken than his master St. ThoiMa Aquinas in the nexus of cultural, social and political matters. ^^ An Essay on Christian Philosophy , tr. Edward H. Flannery (New Torkt Philosophical Ubrary, 1955), p. 56.

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166 After writing his Essay on Christian Fhllosophy, ^^ Harltaln was hailed as an lopeccable ThcMnlst. While Etlenne Gilson distinguished himself as a Thomlstlc historian of philosophy, Marltaln may be called a systematic Thomlst. Marltaln himself admits that, while Gilson is advancing Thomlsm from the historical standpoint, he is attempting "to bring together some elements of a solution on the doctrinal level. "^-^ More than once Marltaln and Gilson admit their essential agreement in the interpretation of St. TlKMoas Aquinas. From a social and political point of view, Marltaln surpasses Gilson. In the Catholic circle, Marltaln can be singled out for his contributions of the ^plication of Thomlsm to contemporary cultural, social and political problems. As G. R. Chesterton points out, not all Thomlsts agree with each other on all points. Some passages of Aquinas are still in dispute and subject to controversy.^ Nor are the Thomlsts, as Martin D'Arcy suggests, trying to set the clock back to the Middle Ages by going directly to Aquinas. ^^ Thomlsm is not a museum piece nor has it only an archeological interest in the modem world. Chesterton extolls the virtues of Orthodoxy. ^^ For the Thomlst, Thomlsm is truly the philosophla ^^This work has been continued in his Science and Wisdom , tr. Bernard Wall (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940) and consummated in his Degrees of Knowledge , tr. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959). ^ ^An Essay on Christian Philosophy , p. 4. ^Salnt Thomas Aquinas , p. 150. ^ ^Thomas Aquinas , p. 270. Josef Pleper cites an example of the e«l*lnrated discussion bet%feen Martin Grabmaxm and Franz Pelster on ••••aea and axlstence in 1925. The Silence of St. Thomas , p. 84. *°Chesterton, a reputed Catholic literary man, gives one of the best defenses for Orthodoxy in Orthodoxy (Garden City, N. Y. : Image Books, 1959).

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167 perennls or **the Everlasting Philosophy. "^' As Jose£ Pleper has already pointed out, the perennial philosophy has a "timely" and "timeless" character at the saiM tlaa. Haritain says that in dealing with the Thomlstic doctrine. It "is not of a medieval Thomism, but of a lasting and present Thomism that I speak. "^ In his first Thofiiistic exposition of Christian philosophy, Haritain clearly distinguishes between "the order of classification" (the nature) and "the order of exercise" (the state). The nature of Thaadsm is everlasting in this sense, but the state of Thomism is essentially its developoent or growth. Thonism seen from its growth must take into account the development of modem science. Marltain says that it is for the love of the spirit and the soul that he thomistizes. Some like Charles Peguy thought that the Sunma Theologica was a dry piece of algebra. Haritain, however, foxind a ceaseless Inspiration from the writings of Aquinas, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas* But he himself admits that Thomism does not profess to be the *^anacea** for the modem ills and to dispense with all intellectual efforts and encourage inmnbility. For Haritain, niomlsm is truly the perennial philosophy. "There is a Thomist philosophy; there is no neo-Thomlst philosophy." "I," Haritain continues, "am not trying to include the past in the present, but to maintain in the now the presence of the eternal." He merely emphasizes the eternal and spiritual principles or norms which are *'G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 198. ^ °St. Thomas Aquinas , tr. Joseph W. Evans and Peter O'Reilly (New York: Herldian Books, 1958), p. IS.

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168 embodied In Thomisra. "Thomlsm ... does not wish to destroy but to purify modem thought, and to integrate everything tme that has been discovered since the time of Saint Thomas." Furthermore, "Thomism is neither of the right nor of the left; it is not situated in space, but in the spirit."^' Nonetheless, Martin D'Arcy is Inclined to believe that "there la a left wing and a right wing of Thomism; there are conservatives and liberals." According to him, the Dominican order represents the conservatives. The Dominicans are reluctant to try out their innovations. "Of one mind with them," says D'Arcy, "are M. Maritain, who has done so much to make the philosophy of St. Thomas better known, and M. Gilson, who, while standing outside all factions, has striven to give the world an authentic interpretation of St. Thomas, based not on his commentators but on his text."^*' Thomism for Maritain also becomes an answer to the exigencies of our time. "Thomist theology," Maritain says, "also, incorporates the great principles of Christian politics . . . *"^^ As Etienne Gilson has stated, there are practical (cultural, social and political) implications in the encyclical letter Aetemi Patris . However, Thomism stands above the "party politics." Strictly speaking, there is no Thomist political party. For Maritain, Thomism has a truly catholic or universal outlook in all respects. "The wisdom of Saint Thomas transcends every *'lbld., pp. 18, 19. ^ ^Thomas Aquinas , p. 271. St. Thomas Aquinas , p. 20.

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169 partlcularlzation. And In this It shares sonethlng of Catholldaa itself." Thus It is not a particularistic philosophy subject to the limits of tine and place. The philosophical and theological visdosi of Aquinas, according to Haritain, is above the "particularization of race and place." The "double catholicity of reason and grace, of the human spirit and the Church" denies even the idmtification of the religion of Christ with the Vfest, because, in doing so, the very catholicity of the Christian religion itself is denied. As Thcnnism is the catholic philosopt^ and theology, Catholicism is the true religion of the world. Horeover, we can safely surmise that the political philosophy based upon Thomism must also be construed as the only true and catholic political philosophy." For Maritain, therefore, Catholicioa is the true and universal religion, and Thomism is a universal philosophy and a universal the«> ology. Nor does Thomism in the andem world merely wear the garment of the thirteenth century. Thomism for Maritain is "not a medieval muaaqf to be studied archaeologically, but an amor of the living intelligence and the necessary equipment for the boldest explorations . . . ." Thus, Aquinas did not write for the thirteenth century but for our time: "he is a contemporary writer, the most 'present' of all thinkers." The phi* losoplqr of Aquinas is "of its very nature a progressive and assimilative philosophy, a missionary philosophy," and, above all, is not "a relic of the Middle Ages."^^ However, this "progressive" character of Thoniaai does not iaply that "the value of a metaphysics" should be construed as '^Ibid., pp. 20, 70. ^ ^Ibld . . pp. 20, 70, 80, 103.

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170 dependent upon the kaleidoscope of historical exigencies and the paraphernalia of a social structure. Further, having noted the disruption of the unity of Western culture, Marltaln believes that unity should be restored to Western civilization. The unity of a culture, of course. Is determined by "a coamon philosophical structure, a certain metaphysical and moral attitude, a clatlon, Marltaln says, Thomlsm, as a philosophy. Is really Independent of the articles of faith: "Its principles and structure depend upon e3q;>erlence and reason alone. "^^ "Thomlsm, " Frederick C. Copleston agrees, "Is and remains a philosophy. Despite Its de facto connexion with Catholicism, It Is iK>t part of the Catholic faith. . . •** In other worda, **A Catholic philosopher is not committed to Thomlsm because he is a Catholic.*^ Ife must also remenriier, as Marltaln maintains, that ThtMnism is not only a philosophy but also a theology. What Frederick C. Copleston has said is true in principle . However, the fact remains that a large majority of Thomists are Catholics and ^Ibld . . pp. 69, 84, 87. 55jbld., p. 21. ^ "Aquinas , p. 239. ''Aquinas himself," Copleston says, "distinguished clearly between philosophy and theology, and Thomlsm has developed as a philosophy which is prepared to stand or fall on its own intrinsic merits or demerits and which appeals to reason, not to faith or to revelation" (p. 252). A

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171 vice versa . Thus it is extremely difficult to see how Catholicisn and Thoadm can be meaningfully separated. When Thomism has been professed to be more or less the official philosophy of the Catholic Church, this problem of separation becomes insurmountable, indeed. There is practically no choice but to conceive Catholicism (religion) and Thomism (philosophy and theology) as tvo sides of the same coin. The same can be said of Thomism as a theology and as a philosophy. At least from • Catholic point of view, a true Thomist must be a faithful Catholic at the same time. Maritaln considers the humanist Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, and the rationalist Enlighteiatent as the three great spirit* ual crises of Western civilization.*' He points out that Aquinas was "sent for the salvation of the intellect," and that "objectivity is the first condition of unity" since Thomism contains the two fundamental activities of man: Intelligence and love.^° In short, Maritaln, after having noticed the crises of Western culture, invokes "a resurrection of metaphysics and a new expansion of charity" (based upon Ttomlsm and the Catholic faith), which are the essential preconditions for human unity. ^^ For Maritaln, the anti-theological and anti-metaphysical ^' St. Thomas Aquinas , p. 60. Of course, all Catholic thinkers would agree with Maritaln in his generalization. Romano Guardini dramatizes the disorientation of the West, starting with Greece and ending with the "Mass Man" of the modem Western world, in his book: The End of the Modern World; A Search for Orientation, tr. Joseph Theman and Herbert Burke (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956). Also see: Christopher Dawson, Understanding Europe (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952) and Progress and Religion (Garden City, N. Y. : Image Books, I960). CO St. Thomas Aquinas , pp. 61, 62. S^ibid., p. 62.

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172 civilization, like ours inflated with positivisnii pseudo-scientific skepticism and subjectivist idealism, pinpoints the fact that there is no "dynamic" factor which demands "a great elan " towards the restoration of metaphysics and ontological values. All the philosophical movements like neo-Hegelianism, pragmatism, phenomenolism and Bergsonlanism, in the last analysis, are no remedy for humanity. They only represent what Ferrater Mora calls "the anarchy of philosophic systems" and "philosophic pulverization. "°^ Thomism alone, together with the Gospel and the Catholic faith, can rectify and deliver Western culture from chaos created by "aberrant philosophies" and, moreover, "preside architectonically over the elaboration of that new social order, that Christian econon^, that Christian politics . * . ."^*' > Marltain believes that Ihomism would re-establish and resuscitate "human intelligence in order with the grace of God." The sanctity of Aquinas is the "sanctity of the intelligence." The true Christian life itself is grounded on Intelligence. The cardinal virtue of Thomism, therefore, is its "free conversations with peripatetlclsm" and, moreover, "a wisdcHD of the natural order" that can freely converse with politics, anthropology, history, art and many other studies. ^^ The disease of intelligence, Marltain says, denies what is rational, religious and moral in modem society. The sources of this disease of intelligence are what he calls "agnosticism," "naturalism," and "anthropocentric individualism."^^ Agnosticism, according to Marltain, ^Philosophy Today , pp. 1, 65. Ferrater Mora gives us fifty different tending schools (isms) of thought todiqr* ^ ^$t. Thomas Aquinas, p. 70. ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 87, 63ibld., p. 91. ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 87, 94, 120.

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173 really began with the Cartesian reforms, especially with the Cartesian rejection of theology and then metaphysics; naturalism repudiates the supernatural order: the denial of the whole life of grace; and the third and last category, anthropocentrlc IndlvlduallsB, Is a radical disease that claims the self-sufficiency and absolute Independency of the atomic cells of Individuals. First of all, Harltaln suggests, «• must get rid of the antl-lntellectuallsm of Martin Luther, which denies and even hates huaun reason, and of the rationalism of Descartes which denies the supernatural world. Again, Thoolsm Is the only cure for these Ills of the modem world. There are four reasons why Marltaln calls Aquinas "the apostle of our times." The first reason Is that Aquinas Is "the apostle of the intelligence." This was due to the fact that Aquinas was true to the philosophy of Aristotle* The second reason la "the absolutism of truth" In Aquinas: the absolutism achieved by the transcendence of "the First Truth." The First Truth Is the first datum of the Intellect, depending entirely upon God, from which all other things proceed. The third reason why Aquinas Is called the apostle Is that Thomlsm alone can deliver the three errors of Western civilization after the collapse of medieval Christendom: the errors of agnosticism, naturalism and anthropocentrlc Individualism.^ The first principles attained from metaphysics or natural theology, according to Harltaln, can make the Intelligence "ascend even to God" and thus save the Intelligence from "the deceptions of agnosticism." It is always worth while remembering, however, that the human Intelligence, ^bld . . p. 98.

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174 as lo^rCant It ls> is "on the lowest rung of the ladder of spirits.'* The affirmation of the naturalistic and anthropocentrlc ioage of man is tantonount to the repudiation of the human person, whose essence is related to the spiritual and supernatural world. "Saint Thomas," Maritain writes, "loves God more than the intellect, but he loves the intellect more than all the philosophers have loved it." Aquinas was an Aristotelian; he recognized Aristotle as "the best interpreter of natural reason, "^^ Obviously, however, Aquinas loved God more than he loved Aristotle. The only true reason was reason Illuminated by faith; faith is the only guard against philosophical errors which originate from the naked natural faculty of human beings* Therefore, the fourth and last reason for considering Aquinas as the apostle of our age is that he can preserve and increase "the faith of souls, "^^ Aquinas is "a pillar to the Church," and Thomlsm alone can "fecundate" the soul. The encyclical letter Aetemi Patris confirmed this fact. Or, shall we say, this encyclical letter made Aquinas a pillar of the Church. As it has been repeatedly made clear, because Thomlsm and the Catholic faith are intimately related, we must take into account Maritain 's assessment concerning this relational problem. ^^ Maritain makes it perfectly clear that: "It is not in religious faith nor in the authority of the Church that Thomist philosophy has its "ibid., pp. 101, 103, 105. ^ hbid .. p. 113. "'Maritain gives a detailed historical account of the relation between Thomlsm and the Catholic Church in St. Thomas Aquinas , pp. 11958.

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175 ralson d'etre *** there Is no 'Hiathollc phllosopby." Thomisn Is founded on evidence alone and lives by reason alone." The merit and demerit o£ Thomlsm, therefore, must be determined only by its **lntrln8ic denonstration of the truth*" Howwrer, according to Maritain, Thomlsm still remains in "continuity with the superhuman sources without which the htoMn weakens," as philosophy is illuminated and exalted by revealed truths and faith. For this reason, Maritain says that philosophy should be "coomlssloned by the Papacy." He is emphatic in stating that "it is equally false either to accuse the Catholic Church of Inftoslng on its faithful an 'ideological conformism* in matters of philosophy, or to regard the philosophy of Saint Thomas as something 'indifferent' for a Catholic, and which would propose itself for his consideration in the •MM manner and under the same conditions as any other philosophical doctrine. ^ Philosophy, like every scientific pursuit, Maritain Insists, is Independent of revelation and faith in its own work and in its own principles. It has the right of autonomy in its own natural light of reason and produces its own evidence. He does not suggest, howcsver, that philosophy and theology are 'Srater-tight coiiq;>artments." He suggests, in« stead, that philosophy is distinct from faith, but not separated from faith. "Philosophy, " Maritain writes, '*i8 nevertheless subject to the maglsterium of faith, every enunciation of a philosopher that is de« structive of a revealed truth being clearly an error, and reason enlightened by faith along having authority to Judge whether such an enunciation of a philosophy ... Is or is not contrary to faith.** ^^Ibid. . pp. 119, 120, 122.

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176 Faith or revelation, therefore, plays the role of "negative rule In regard to philosophy." It has a right of inspection over the conclusions of philosophy," In this manner, philosophy is illuminated by faith and theology. Philosophy, in turn, comes to the aid of theology itself. "Theology cannot develop in the human mind without making use of philosophical truths." It is not philosophy, however, that superelevates theology. On the contrary, theology superelevates philosophy and uses it as "an instrument." "When the Church exercises her authority over the philosophical sphere," Maritain trrltes, "she does this essentially with reference to faith, with reference to revealed truth, the deposit of which it is her mission to guard. "'^ Similarly, the mission of the Church is to guard the natural order and natural law in order to perfect her office. Thus, the Church perfoirms the double fxmction, that is to say, she safeguards not merely the deposit of revelation but also "the natural rectitude of reason itself." Moreover, the Church, in her commitment to the philosophy of Aquinas, does not propose to adhere to this or that particular aspects of truth, but proposes to adhere to "a whole body of doctrine." All In •11, Maritain agrees that the Church "has canonized the philosophy of Saint Thomas, " that is to say, she has made it an order of Canon Law. The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, in the final analysis, becvne "the philosophy of the Church, " even though she would not impose it on her faithful "in the name of her doctrinal magisterium. " It is not a ^^Ibid., pp. 124, 126. ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 124, 125.

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177 71 The truths of faith. Marl tain affirms, are Independent of philosophical truths; they are superior to any philosophical conception since they are derived directly fron God, Maritain notes that Christ philosophized nowhere in the Gospel. What we need here, Maritain says, is "common sense" which is **reason in its natural vigor, that spontaneous and naturally right use of the intelligence."'^ G. K. Chesterton even asserts that "the fact that Thoodaai is the philosophy of comoon sense is itself a matter of coonion sense. "'^ For Maritain, the Thoadst doctrine establishes "demonstratively the conclusions instinctively laid down by coaaaon sense," and, moreover, "there is perfact continuity between its principles, even the loftiest and the most subtle, and the priaacy evidences of common sense. "'^ Tfaomism is the philosophy of sense as well as the philosopl^ of reason. For Maritain, there is no doubt that Thomism is *^hilo8ophy par excellence in regard to faith and revealed truth, philosophy par excellence in regard to natural reason and common sense. "'^ ThomlnB la a living philosophy and theology, not cased in the coffin of the thirteenth century. The usefulness of Thosdaai is untrammeled even by cultural considerations. From the vantage point of Thomism, Maritain ^^Ibld., pp. 124, 145, 150, 151. / ' ^ ^Ibid . . p. 147. ^^Saint Thomas Aquinas , p. 145. ' ^St. Thomas Aquinas , p. 149. ^ hbid . . p. 150.

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178 •ails out to solve contenqwrary theological, philosophical and social problems and to pulsate "the twilight of civilization." Th<»iilsm for hin is the doctor's prescription for the modem diseases of antiIntellectuallsm, secularlsn, and anthropocentric humanlm. In short, Maritain wages an immortal battle against a Luther, a Barth, a Bergson» a Janes, a Nietzsche, a Satre, a Freud, a Rousseau, a Descartes, a Russell, a Oewey as well as a Marx. And yet his battle is dlscrlmi* native, variant, unequal and, above all, unequivocal. This sweeping battle against the main Intellectual currents of the West springs from the distinctive characteristics of TbomLam, which, as a theology and a philosophy* provides "intellectuallsm" and realism on the one hand and the Christian order on the other hand. Thomism is so well described by H. Richard Niebuhr as a "both-and" philosophy and theology. ^^ Raginald GarrigouLagrange is quoted to have characterized the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas as "the philosophy of being " in contrast to "the philosophy of becoming " (e. g*, phenomenalism, Bergsonian phi* losophy as conceived by Maritain). And the philosophy and metaphysics of Thomism, in addition, "stands in living relationship with reality."''^ Therefore, where the distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders, between reason and faith, and between philosophy and theology is clearly and precisely drawn and where these two distinct spheres are harmonized and yet arranged in a hierarchic order, we find the characteristics of Thomism. Metaphysics, although it is the highest and loftiest compartment of knowledge, reaalns a knowledge (of God) ^ ^Christ and Culture, p. 129. ''Martin Grabmann, The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas , pp. 21, 23.

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I7f Attained by human reason . However, theology Is a divine (above or beyond human reason) knowledge} which Is properly called wlsdcwn , and pertains to the realm of revelation. This seems to be the clue to the understanding of the philosophy of Jacques Karltaln. Although the %forks of Marltaln as a Thomlst are, strictly speaking, mainly "philosophical** and oust be Judged m» such, they are none the less ultimately theological (that Is to say, they are deeply rooted In theology) and theocentrlc, as philosophy cannot be separated from theology. Thus Marltaln 's political philosophy oust be considered on its "philosophical" grounds. Tet it (In its loftiest form) cannot avoid being a political theology since politics for Marltaln Is ultimately theocentrlc and its probloas are ultimately resolved on theological grounds. Marltaln himself has declared that the true political philosophy is, and cannot avoid being, a political theology. Dietrich von Rlldebrand also distinguishes 'Christian ethics" (or moral philosophy) from 'Wral theology." The former is a purely philosophical coloration and analysis accessible through the light of human reason (lumen naturale) in contrast to moral theology accessible through the light of faith. Honetheless, be admits that Christian morality essentially presupposes God's existence. Although we do not reduce "all moral obligations to positive divine commandswnts," Christian moral values "only possess the ultimate reality which Justifies the gravity of the moral order, of its majestic obligation. If they are 78 ultioMitely rooted and embodied in the Absolute Person of God."'° 7 8christian Ethics (New York: David McKay, 1952), pp. 453-63.

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180 We seem to cone to the Inqportant conclusion that ve must distinguish method from substance. Christian morality is essentially philosophical in its method, and yet the substance o£ Christian moral values must resort ultimately to God (or what is theological). The true political philosophy is of necessity a political theology. Therefore, the political philosophy of Jacques Maritaln oust carry the same theological burdens as Relnhold Nlebuhr, Ball Brunner, Paul Tillich, Hlcolas Berdyaev, and other Christian theologians.

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CHAPTER VIII Tm PHILOSOPHICAL REVOLTS OF JACQUES MARITAIH Cultural and social reconstruction must begin vlth Its phllo* sophlcal foundation. Harltaln, therefore, proposes to reconstruct "« new Christendom" and "a new Deaocracy" based upon the "Intellectual and spiritual revival," which Thoaisn alone can offer.^ He proposes to do this from the position of a Thoaist, not a "neo-Tbomist." "All in all," Karitaln remarks, "I would rather be a paleo-Thomlst than a neoThomist."^ Karitaln 's philosophy of culture is truly "intellectual" and "spiritual." His is spiritual in that he rejects "anthropocentric humanism" such as Marxism and the ideological doctrines contained in Cartaslanism. It Is intellectual in that Karitaln rejects "antihumanist irrationalism. ** He rejects as well what he calls "the gospel of the hatred of reason" or "a tidal wave of irrationality" which is at once the antithesis of rationalism. For Karitaln, this tidal irrational wave has begtin with Kartln Luther and continued in Rousseau. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Barth have continued to ride over the Irrational wave. For him the Barthian position is "a reactive and archaic position," ^ Scholasticism and Politics , tr. Mortimer J. Adler (Garden City, H. T.: Image Books, 1960), pp. 7-8. ^Existence and the Existent , p. 11. 181

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182 which is, in fact, "a return to primitive Reformation." Rationalism and irrationallsm are not totally unrelated. According to Maritain, "The irrational tidal wave is in reality the tragic wheel of rationalistic htmanism. " The former has its root in reaction to the latter* Thus Maritain proposes to reconstruct a philosophy of culture and an integral humanism, which is derived from Thomism. Thomism Is the answer to the reconstruction of modem philosophy and a philosophy of culture* "^ The syncretistic character of Thomism provides a powerful weapon irith which to attack the main Intellectual currents of the West since the time of the disruption of medieval Christendom, on the one hand, and it has an Intellectual and spiritual force, on the other hand. Thomism for the Thomists is a kind of apocalypse of modem philosophy* Fulton J. Sheen, a popularizer of Thoodsm in the contemporary world, •Oggests the reason why Thomism alone can fulfill "the ideals of modem philosophy."^ The syncretistic character of Thomism would include its rationality (Intellectual), spirituality (Christian), realism and a neatly-constructed hierarchy of being and knowledge or what Sheen calls "a great pyramid."^ Thoalsm, within the Christian camp of philosophy and theology, belongs to the rational wing. It is an "intellectuallst" philosophy in ^Scholasticism and Politics * pp. 7-19* ^According to Sheen, Thomism can fulfill "the ideals of modem philosophy" in the following three aspects: (1) the expression of life Itself, (2) the expression of life in a continuous and progressive manner, and (3) life as a process of unification. God and Intelligence in Hodern Philosophy , pp. 82-108. ^Ibld .. p. 106*

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183 contraat to the Protestant Reformation theology of "anti-lntellectu•llna*' of Luther and Barth of our tine. The Thonlstic doctrlnet Harltaln maintain*, has "two authentic sources; experience and In* telllgence.*^ The Intellectuallst philosophy Is at once a tool that the Thomlst employs to criticise the "Irratlonallst" or '*antl-lntellectuallst" phllosopl^.' At the sasw time, the theocentrlc (Christian) character of Thosilsm Is a tool that Is used against the anthropocentrlc philosophies such as Carteslanlsm and Mandsa. Harltaln 's philosophical outlook as a Thomlst has two essential features: one Is critical and polemical and the other Is creative and constructive. The latter Is used for his aspiration to resuscitate modem philosophy and culture; the former 1* an exercise In Thomlsm. These two facets In Harltaln, of course, go hand In hand. Although the critical feature of Harltaln 's philosophy should not be neglected, more Important Is his constructive side. Harltaln himself affirms that "Thomlstlc philosophy should /not7 limit Itself to a defensive and critical function. On the contrary, /lie believe^ that Its possibilities of Invention and of progressive synthesis are inexhaustible . . . ."^ The philosophical revolts of Jacques Harltaln are a few critical exer* dses for him In Thosilsm concerning the main Intellectual and philosophlcal trends of our time. Harltaln is critical of anti'intellectualism, ^l»rgsonian Philosophy and Thomiam , tr. Kabelle L. Andison (Mev York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 16. 'Fulton J. Sheen provides one of the best Thomistlc attacks on conteiiq>orary "anti-intellectualism. " See op. cit .. especially pp. 7181. °Ber«sonian Philosophy and Thomlsm. p. 20.

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184 rationalism, logical empiricism and Marxian dialectic materialism. Anti-intellectualism or irrationalism, a foe to Thomism, is represented by Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Martin Luther, and JeanJacques Rousseau. Maritain has been particularly concerned with the anti-intellectualism of Bergson. His criticisms of Bergsonian philosophy, moreover, constitutes his first exercise in Thomism. '< Bergson, a one-time teacher of Maritain at the Sorbonne, is undoubtedly one of the "anti-intellectual" giants of the twentieth century, to whom Mai^itain has never ceased to pay all due respect and gratitude. What Maritain is questioning, however, is "the salutary conflict . . . between Bergsonian thought and that of Thomas Aquinas." In the soulsearching efforts in philosophy, Maritain admits the fact that he was already "a Thomist without being aware of it." And when he became acquainted with the Sunma Theologica. "its luminous flood was to find no opposing obstacles" in him.' Although he found no "revelation of a new metaphysics" in Bergson 's lectures, Maritain saw the enlightened path in Bergsonian philosophy which presented "an unforgettable emphasis" and "lively reaction" against "the pseudo-metaphysics of scientism" and "antietaphysical science," all of which awakened in him "a desire for metaphysics." In Bergson's philosophy, Maritain found the path for the absolute and the rejection of scientific relativism. Although he has become critical of certain aspects of Bergson *s irrationalist or 'ibid., pp. 12, 17.

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185 Intuitlonist philosophy and metaphysics from a Thonistic point of view, Marltain humbly bows to Bergson when he s^s: '^rgson did not desire to erect a whole system of metaphysics, his metaphysics Is nevertheless one of the most profound, most penetrating, and most audacious of our time. The critical discussion thereof I have endeavoured to conduct ... is In hoasfa to his greatness*" He admits the fact that "The Bergsonian doctrine opens up a new era In the history of knowledge, Bergsonian philosophy renews hxnaan thought* "^^ Marltain 's recognition of Bergson's greatness does not, of course, liiq>ly the absence of critl* clsm. His first book, that is, a polemic gainst the Bergsonian doctrine, by his own admission, is scMoewhat a landmark of a new movement (Thomlsm) in the history of ideas in twentieth-century France*'-^ For Marltain, there was no hesitation in his choice between Bergson's "creative evolution" and Aquinas* "hierarchy of growing perfections" or between the philosophy of the "elaa vital " that flows in the ever-changing stream of '^becoming" and the philosophy of '*the Intellect" that Is "capable of attaining being* "^^ If one Is able to criticize Bergson and his philosophy, then it goes without saying that he must criticize William James and ^^Ibid., pp. 278, 304, 324. Marltain discovers the "two Bergsonisms." One Bergsonlsm is what he calls "a Bergsonism of fact" of which he is critical, and the other is "a Bergsonism of intention" which, according to him. Is oriented toward Thoalst wisdom. They are not absolutely incompatible, however different in meaning. "The first tends to tear down what the second desires to build up" (pp. 288, 344). The first part (Bergsonism of fact) and the second part (Bergsonism of intention) are contained in pp. 65-281 and 285-345 respectively* ''*The first critical studies of Marltain In Bergson's philosophy appeared in 1913. "ibid., p. 330*

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186 pragmaclsm on somewhat the aasae groimds.^^ On the occasion of the publication of B^i^gson's Creative gvolutlon (1907),'^^ Jamae remariced that "it inflicts an irremediable death-vound upon Intellectualism." For J«M«, the Russo-Japanese War and the advent of B«rgson's publication were **the two great modem turning points in history and thought.** Janes wrote to Bergson» "I feel that at bottcnn you and I are fighting the same fight, you a commander, and I in the ranks. . . ."^^ Thus, it •••aw that the father of pragmatism cast his lot and energy with Bergson in the fight against intellectualism. As regards Janes, Btienne Gilson remarks that '*I still want to know if vay religious e^erience is an experience of God, or aa aKperience of ii^self."^° Naritain uses the Thomistic notions of the "analogy of being" and "the intellect" as the main weapons for the battle against the irrationalist philosophy of Bergson. The method of Bergson 's philosophy of life, intuition, becoming (change in contrast to being), or the "elan vital" has no place in Thomism. For Bergson, "the usual error of a sheer '-^Maritain says that pragmatism is "a particularly morbid phano— non in Western civilisation," because It takes a negative attitude toward wisdom and thus annihilates all speculative values. Science and Wisdom , p. 72* ^^. Arthur Mitchell (Hew York: Hodem Library, 1944). *'As quoted in Fulton J. Sheen, op. cit .. p. 263 from letters of William James. Bergson 's appraisal of pragmatism is found in 'H)n the Pragmatism of William Janes: Truth and Reality," The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics , tr. Habelle L. Mdison (Mew Torkt Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 209-19. * "Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages , p. 97. This comment of Gilson was made In reference to William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (Mew York: Modern Library, 1929) given as Gifford lectures.

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187 Intellectuallsm" Is Intolerable. ' Intellectuallsm Is "only In the discontinuous. In the laaaobile. In the dead." Mot the Intellect but "instinct is molded on the very form of life." "The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life*"^^ Ttms, for Bergson, intuition and instinct not the intellect play the vital role in the life force. As Maritain notes, for Bergson, "life is essentially a creative ^fnaaism." In the owtaphysics of the "elan vital " the role of the intellect is discounted; the overflow of intuition and instinct are the very pulsation of life itself. Life is not something static; the iDetiq>hysics of life is "becoming" (change). "Philosophy," Maritain writes, "is the deepening of becoming in general the true evolutionism, and hence th« true continuation of science." The notion of "duration" is a vital correlative with that of intxiition. 'Hetaphysics consists in 'seeing in tiaa a progressive growth of the absolute'." And "time is creator." Thus, Maritain remarks that "the intuition in duration" is the fundonental notion for Bergson; "the irrationalism of the Bergsonian philosophy" is secondary, not priniary. In the everlasting stream of life, the notion of "becoming" be c om e s an Imporcant idea. "If change is not everything, it is nothing; it is not only real, but constitutive of the reality, it is the very substance of things. "^^ Thus, while Arthur Schopenhauer found nothing in Darwinian evolutionism but the glooay picture of the survival of the fittest in nature, Bergson saw the enlightened idea of ^^^ The Two Sources of Morality and Religion , tr. R, Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (Hew York: Henry Holt, 1935), p. 269. ^ ^reative Evolution , p. 182. * ^ Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomisw. pp. 312, 318, 330.

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188 the li£e force In the Spencerlan version of evolutionism* The Bergsonian philosophy of oitl-lntellectuallso and irrationalisa is untenable to the Thomistlc philosophy of being and the intellect. Marltain, therefore, has an Inpulsive urge to criticize the philosophy of Bergson, which drove out '*being" from philosophy and replaced it with "becoming." "Bergsonian philosophy ... by the very fact that it tries to do without being, is logically incapable of establishing an absolute and total, real and essential distinction between God and things ^or the worl47*'* "The doctrine of analogy • . • can have no place in an antl-intellectualist philosophy." The philosophy of Bergson dispossesses of the natural faculty of the human mind (or the intellect). "Bergsonian philosophy," Maritain states, "offends intelligence and ruins the principles of reason, "2^ In short, the philosophy of the "elan vital " is the metaphysical purge of the aiudogy of being and the intellect without which there is no essential and real distinction between Cod and the world. Karitain contends that Bergsonian philosophy is not the perennial philosophy. It is merely the 'philosophy of a mo a mn t." Although there is some virtue in Bergsonian philosophy in that it victoriously attacks "agnosticism, Kantianism, and the silly, narrow positivism which reigned unchallenged" and it drove out "the darkness of official atheism." It has tackled "the philosophical problem in terms of mechanicism, the problem of the world In terms of Spencerlan evolutionism, the problem of the soul in terms of psycho-physical parallelism, the problem of freedom in terms of associationist psychology. And in order to refute these errors It has chosen to abandon being and the intellect. But being is ^ ^Ibid . . pp. 196, 280.

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189 the only thing that endures.'*'^ Becoeiing or change Is tenporary and WMwntary; being alone is a perennial category. The fault of Bergsonian philosophy is to be found in its "ontological gap.** For Bergson, the true morality and religion spring from creative dynamisa* He distinguishes dynamic morality and religion from static orality and religion, on the one hand, and the open society from closed society, on the other. The dynamic morality and religion are associated with the vital force of the spirit (or nystlcism), while the static morality and religion are related to the pressure of social mechanisms. The former are "supra-rational** and the latter are **inf ra-rational . ** The closad society Is "that whose members hold together but care nothing for the rest of humanity." On the other hand, the open society is "the society ^ich is deemed in principle to entbraoe all hum«iity»" Democracy has its proper place in the open society (associated with the dynamic morality and religion). For Bergson, the formula for doaocratic society would be the antithesis of "authority, hierarchy, immobility. "^^ Democracy for him is "evangelical in essence and ... its motive power is love." The origins of democracy for Bergson could be found in Rousseau •nd Kant in their sentiments, philosophy and religion. For Bergson, there is no doubt that Christianity provides a dynamic morality and a dynamic religion. Moreover, tha true Christian society must be construed as an open society. Maritain also comments that Bergson recognised "the unique valiie and the transcendence of the fact of Christianity." In comparison to Greek oysticism. Oriental ^^ Ibid . . p. 280. ^^ The Two Sources of Morality and Religion , pp. 266, 267, 282.

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190 nysticlsm, and the Prophets of Israel » 'Xlhrlstian mysticism alone has reached real achievement.*' Marltaln praises Bergson in the latter 's rediscovery of "the great philosophic tradition of hunanity." BoiMrver, the fact remains that the error in Bergson 's concept of morality and religion springs from his anti-lntellectualism (the disregard for the intellect and being). Thus, Bergson 's philosophy leaves out "many es* sential truths."^ The philosophy of being and the philosophy of becoming for Harltain are, by their nature, equally "cosmic* " But the former is •*cosmic rational" and the latter it "co«b1c irrational," Froa a Thooistic point of view, Bergson 's major treatise on morality, in the final analysis, "retains all of morals except morality itself." It disregards "the strictly rational and human content of ethics" although it contains everything dynamic and enlightened.^^ Etlenne Gllson confesses that he follows Bergson "in his description of mystical intuition as a source of religious life." But he is "still wondering what the nature of that intuItlon actually is. Is it a self-sufficient intuition of an object which Mqr olao be the object of religious faith, or is it an eaqpcrience in faith and through faith of the God in whom we believe ?"^^ With the three reformers of Luther (theology), Descartes (philosophy) and Rousseau (morality), Jacques Marltaln finds "the birthplaces of the modern world." If Marltaln is capable of attacking luther, the founder of Protestantism, then he should criticise, on the grounds, the Protestant fidelsts Including Kierkegaard, Barth and * ntergsonlan Philosophy and Thomlsm , pp. 326, 328, 330. 2*lbld., p. 334. ^• ^eason and Revelation in the Middle Ages , p. 97.

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191 Nlebuhr. For Maritaln, th« civilisation based upon Luther's doctrine would be "a homicidal clvilieation. "^^ Although Maritaln's comments on Bergson's philosophy were an admixture of criticism and admiration, there is no room to admire any of the three reformers who are guilty of the original sins of modem philosophy and society. From an "Intel lectuallst" point of view, Harltain, in regard to Luther, can find nothing worthy in "an inverted Pharisee" and "a runaway victim of scruples." The Protestant Reformation for Harltain was "the anti-Christian revolution." It was an "immense disaster for humanity," which was "only the effect of an interior trial which turned out badly in a religious /person/ who lacked humility." The Lutheran notion of the salvation by faith alone, according to Harltain, has even misunderstood St. Augustine. For Harltain, Luther is "an enemy of philosophy," a pessimist, and a "fallen monk," who had everything — kindness, generosity, tenderness, pride, and vanity — but the "force of intellect." Luther studied Scholasticism imperfectly and hastily, and "he had derived nothing but an arsenal of false ideas and vague theological notions, and a disconcerting skill in specious argument. "^^ The idea of grace for Luther, Harltain believes, was merely the discharge of Luther's philosophy of feeling and sensation (especially concupiscence). The Protestant Reformation, therefore, "promises rest to the reason only in contradiction, it sets a universal war within us. It has inflaaed everything, and healed nothing. It leaves us hopeless in face of the great problems, which Christ and His Doctors solved for redeemed ^ "Three Reformers; Luther. Descartes. Rousseau (Hew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. 14, 21. "ibid., pp. 5-6, 10, 11, 13.

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192 humanity so long as It was faithful, problems which, naarly four centuries ago, once more began to rack the htdnan heart like angelic instmments of torture."^" There are two aspects of the anti-lntellectuallsm of Luther* One is Luther's "egocentrism" (not mere egoism but "a metaphysical egoism"). "Luther's doctrine," Maritain comments, "is itself only a universalization of his self, a projection of his self into the world of eternal truths." The other is that Luther was *hniled by his affective and appetitive faculties." Luther was "a Kan of Ulll only," He was '*tlie first great Romantic" with "the absolute predominance of Feeling and Appetite." Luther was "fed on instinct and feeling, not on intelligence." Whereas "Rousseau dreams . . . Luther acts." Whereas the former combined optimism and anti-intellectualism, the latter c
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193 but th« enslaving life of events and the senses. Individuality, In contrast to personality, is "comnon to man and beast, to plant, Icrobe, and atom.'* Individuality is "a olsunderstanding, " "« blunder," and "the degradation of true personality."^ > Proa Maritain*8 point of vi»f, the distinction between personality and individuality, which is a metaphysical principle, is of cardinal inqwrtance. This metaphysical principle is the foimtalnhead of the solution of many social problems. "This distinction between the Individual and the person when applied to the relations between man and city," Naritain writes, "contains, in the realm of metaphysical prlnd* pies, the solution of many social problems." The rejection of reason for Marltain is tantamount to the rejection of personality in the affirmation of individuality alone. The Individualism that undermines human reason culminates in "the monarchic tyranny of a Hobbes," '*the democratic tyranny of a Rousseau," or in "the GodState of a Hegel. "^^ The anti-intellectualisffl of Luther, Haritain says, was "helped by the Occamist and nominalist training in philosophy." For Luther, all speculative knowledge (in contrast to faith) was "a snare." The Scholastic theology was "an abominable scandal." Luther said that "Reason is contrary to faith."'' For him, Aristotle was "the godless bulwark of the papists," and St. Thomas Aquinas "never tinderstood a chapter of the Gospel or Aristotle."-'-^ Luther, therefore, was attacking philosophy ^°Ibid.. pp. 15, 19, 2A. ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 22, 23. ^^Ibld.. pp. 30, 33-34. ^^alter Kaufmann, in his criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas, made the comment that St. Thomas Aquinas had said many things that Aristotle

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194 itself* To learn philosophy £or Luther was Just like learning "witchcraft. "^ Luther con^letely "delivered man from the Intel ligence » ** and paved his way to anti-intellectualism and voltintarism. As a volontarist, Luther became the father of German romantic philosophy from Fichte to Mietssche. Arthur Schopenhauer, for exaiiq>le, was a voluntarist who stressed the idea of the human will, and he said that reason was feminine, unproductive and non-discursive.^^ Maritain notes, further, that "Lather's contempt for reason is, moreover, in harmony with his general doctrine about human nature and original sin. "^^ Luther, therefore, is not unrelated to the romantic movement in his stress on the primacy of the will and the disrespect for reason and intelligence. Maritain notes that the voluntarism and pessimism go hand in hand, and the German romantics inherited the Lutheran doctrines. Be that as it may, was it not the romantic movement, the revolt against the tyranny of reason, which almost buried the rationalism of the Enlightenment? E. E. Aubrey points out, "this nineteenth century scholastic revival took place under the influence of the Romantic never said and, moreover, he had said things that the Scripture never said. Critique of Religion and Philosophy , p. 144. ^ TThree Reformers , p. 30. ^^See his The World as Will and Representation , tr. B* F. J. Payne (2 vols.; Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958). This work is undoubtedly the opus magnum of Sclrapenhauer, but, for the present discussion, more Important is his book: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and on the Will In Nature (London: G. Bell, 1910). Reason for Schopenhauer has no material but only formal content. Thus, what is reasonable and rational is synonymous with being consistent and logical. ^"Three Reformers, p. 33.

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195 vhich. In its protest against tha rationalism of the Enlightenment, gave new force, on the one hand, to the ^preciation of historical tradition, and on the other hand to intuitive faith. "^^ It seesM that the history of ideas has a strange tincture of the Hegelian dialectic t the thesis of one doctrine sesms to spin out its own antithesis or the reaction of an opposite doctrine* The philosophy of feeling and appetite for Maritaln is "a deformation of the real." As a Thomistic intellectualist, Haritain extolls "the primacy which Catholic theology grants to contes^plation." Moreover, the human will would be more living "as it roots Itself more deeply in the spirituality of the intelligence." The intelligence is the "absolute <{ueen" in the speculative order and the practical order. The intelligence alone is the yardstick for the proximate rule of human action. Thus, antl-intellectuallsm is tantamount to the denial of social order itself. As Maritaln says, "every interior act of the soul which Involves order and government belongs to reason." Maritaln concludes: . • . the Thomist doctrine of the intelligence and the will shows us why all philosophy based on the absolute superiority of will or feeling, that is, of faculty occupied essentially and exclusively with what affects the subject, will tend naturally to subjectivism; why, at the same time, it will cause the will to fall from its own order and will pass inevitably into the service of the lower affective powers and the instinct, for the metaphysical nobility and the spirituality of the will come only from its being an appetite rooted in the intelligence; why finally, such a philosophy, if it captures a part of humanity, means for it a series of disasters, simply because it asks light and guidance from a power in Itself blind. In the beginning was Action: the motto which the Germanic Faust is so proud is written on tha standard of death. 38 ^ ^Freaent ThaoloEJcal Tendencies, p. 116. ^ ^Three Reformers , pp. 28, 35, 39, 44.

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196 For Marltaln, the reconciliation between intelligence and will has never been achieved in modem philosophy, and the conflict between these two "spiritual faculties" still occupies the minds of our age. With the recognition of this fact, Maritain seems to be all out for a possible reconciliation. Of course, for Haritain, the resuscitation of reason is the first task in the age of anti-intellectualism. For Maritain, Luther c«se to the conclusion that "concupiscence cannot be conquered," and he identified it with original sin. Sigsund Freud, in Maritain 's opinion, made a science of concupiscence (the Freudian theory of the libido). ^^ The theory of the libido is a kind of theological notion of "concupiscence." In a sense, Luther, before he was bom, became the first victim of Freud. Freud, for Maritain, is "an investigator of genius" and "an admirably penetrating psychologist," from a point of view of the psychottialytic method and psychology. But Freud is "like a man obsessed," from a standpoint of philosophy. Maritain violently disagrees with a Freudian "radical enqpiricism and an erroneous metaphysics." In his opinion, Bergsonian "philosophical" irrationalism and even the rational scientism of Berthelot are much nobler than Freudian "psychological" irrationalism.'^ 39"Freudianism and Psychoanalysis: A Thomist View," Freud and the 20th Century, ed. Benjamin Ifelson (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 247. ^ "ibid .. pp. 231, 249* It should be remembered that Sigmund Freud had no favorable opinion concerning the thing called religion. He had a kind of Mietschean view of religion. Religion for Freud was a kind of the need for protection against the consequences of human weakness or helplessness. It was a kind of infantile helplessness aroused by the need for protection. For him, religious ideas "are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most insistent wishes of mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength of these %rishes." The Future of an Illusion , tr. W. 0. Robson-Scott (Garden City, H. Y.: Doubleday, 1957), p. 51.

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197 Freudian psychology, txom thm philosophical standpoint of Harltaln, is aboodnable because the unconscious of Freud is nothing but the '*six notes** of being "repressed, active, bestial, infantile, aloglcal and sexual. "^^ Therefore, 'iTreud's larval philosophy** denudes baauHH nature and shows only its ugliness, and it is a radical denial of spirituality and freedos. Freud's philosophy of pure huoum bestiality Bakes the life of reason and spirit absolutely naked, and brings man down to the animal level. Haritain writes that "there are typical differences between the instincts as they are to be found in oan and the instincts as they are found in aniaials lacking reason. Instincts have a far greater relative indetemination in man than in aniaals and require to receive their final regulation at the hands of reason. '*^^ "In spite of its extreae diversity," Tho— s Ernest Rulme writes, '*all philosophy since the Renalsswice is at bottom the »mm philosophy. The family resemblance is much greater than is generally supposed. The obvious diversity is only that of the various species of the same g«tus."^^ Although Haritain considers it absurd to maintain that the Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance, the Cartesian Revolution, the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the ideas of Rousseau as a unilinear series terminating in the revelation of the French Revolution, it is equally fallacious, despite their differences and oppositions, to refuse to see **the final convergence" of these movements.^ Thus, for example, the ^^"Freudianism and Psychoanalysis: A Thoadst flew,** p. 252* ^ ^Ibid .. p. 250. ^ ^Speculations; Kssays on HuMnlsm and the Philosophy of Art , ed. Herbert Read (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1924), p. 12. ^ ^Three Reformers , p. 95.

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198 antl-lntellectuallsm of Luther Is not totally unrelated to Rousseau's irratlonallsn. Tfhlle Rulme is looking at It from the standpoint of pure philosophy, Haritaln here conceives essentially of the Weltanschauungen of the great chain of these converging novenents. For Haritaln, Kousseou is "the father of modernlea>" a useless tfraaaar, an antl-intellectualist, an optimist, *'a stupendous perverter,** ''paranoiac and genius, poet and madman. "^^ Anti-intellectualism (the primacy of feeling and sentiments), as in Luther, and the perverter of Christianity (not unrelated to I^ither from a Catholic point of view) are Maritain's main charges against Rousseau. ^^ Thus, despite the vast ^ ^Ibid . . pp. 118, 121, 157. It is interesting to observe that Earl Barth is soiaeifhat syBpathetic with Rousseau in his Protestant thought; From Rouaiaau to Kitschl , tr. Brian Cozens (H«r York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 58-117. Barth says that any one who understands Boiisseau merely as "the dreamer . . . the idler, the subjectivist, the barren critic o£ civilization, the author of a voliiminous treatise on education who consigned his five illegitimate children to the Foundlings* Home without ever seeing or wishing to see them again, the author of the Contrat Social who had not the faintest notion of how to fit himself to be a citizen or a member of any society ... is in a position to claim that he has indeed understood the eighteenth century perfectly. But he has completely failed to understand Rousseau" (p. 59). '^usseau was already a man of the new era, in eighteenth-century garb" (p. 60). ^^Rousseau's view on the role of religion in a civil society is found in his Social Contract in The Social Contract and Discourses , tr, G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), chapter viii, '^Jivil Religion," pp. 129-41. For the rcmantic mind of Rousseau, the infallible voice of the pure nature, uncontaminated by the divine will sounded like a piece of nusic to his ears. In this spirit, he wrote the educational treatise of 6nile and the political treatise of Social Contract in which the volont^ g^n^rale became a political n^th that contains the germ of both democracy and totalitarianism. As Karl Barth said. Social Contract has become the "political ogre." For Rousseau, the state needs a religion to exalt the morality of its citizens. However, there was no doubt in his mind that Christl* anity is not suitable for it. Religion and politics, prior to the appearance of Christianity, went hand in hand. Through the powerful exercises of the authority by the Christian Church, Christianity for Rousseau has been more harmful than beneficial to the state. Rousseau distingulahas three kinds of religion: human religion, national religion

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199 difference of manners and conditions between Rousseau's optlndnB (the belief In the goodness of human nature as portrayed In Emlle) and Luther's pessimism (original sin), in Maritaln's view, there is a spiritual filiation between these two men. While Luther worked in the evangelical realm (religion and theology), Rousseau worked in the sphere of morality* Maritaln does not deny, however, that reason plsys a role in the anti-lntellectualist and romanticist mentality like Rousseau. On the contrary, it "serves passion, aid then it displays a prodiglotis talent for sophistry*"*' For Maritaln, Rousseau is '^pompous with virtue, censor of the vices of his age," and, above all, he had the false sense of sincerity* Rousseau was a hypocrite and, moreover, a Utopian dreamer. He lacked the "act of practical reason." His "heart is still tainted and putrescent, thoroughly rotten with sensual self-love and self-complacsncy. " Not unlike Luther, Rousseau, who was Imbued with "the endless inclinations of material individuality," has coopletely broken "the unity of spiritual self." "Rousseau's man is Descartes 's angel acting like a beast." and priestly religion. He rejects Rinnan Catholicism (the priestly religion); he has a favorable opinion concerning the Christianity of the Gospel, which is the "holy, sublime and true religion." It is "the pure and •Imple religion of the Gospel." No wonder Karl Berth is more sympathetic toward Rousseau. National religion is a state religion, the dogma and cult prescribed by che law for the benefit of state morality. Rousseau favors a "civil profession of faith" to foster civil morality in the state* He thinks that every honest dtizwi should "renounce the Roman Catholic Church." He also rejects the Hobbesian formula of the relation betweon state and church, because the priestly interest of Christianity will eventually and always prevail in the Hobbesian Leviathan* In short, Rousseau holds that no state has ever been founded without religion. As for Christianity, it has weakened, rather than strengthened, the authority of the body politic* 47n Three Reformers, pp. 95, 96.

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200 For Marltaln, Koueseau as "a reformer of norallty" Is m sheer mockery. There is no moral virtue without the "supreme act of rational command. '"^ As the morality of Roussemi is a false morality, Karitain is of the opinion that the whole eighteenth century, which hore the authentic ijm>rints of Rousseauan virtue had no true morality. It was a halo of Bousseau's false morality* Therefore, Roussemi's optimistic anti-intellectuallsm is under attack. Rousseau is "the finest specimen of naturalist nysticism of feeling." He aimed iK>t "at our heads, but a little below our hearts." "JeanJacques, like Luther, is a very perfect and unalloyed specimen of anti-intellectuallst religious thought. "^^ Rousseauan optimism and perversion go together with his antiintellectual ism. Rousseau's "perpetual postulate" of the optimistic conception of man, in the opinion of Marltaln, is "a flagrant absurdity.** Therefore, his Emile was "a r(»Bantic piece of mechanism, and Idle 4re««."^ "The rich ideological forest of the Contrat Social " is a sheer ^Ibid .. pp. 99-100, 102, 104. *'lbld., pp. 112, 150. ^^'The optimism of Rousseau should not be over-stressed. Karl Berth thinks that there are two Rousseaua. One Rousseau is optimistic and the other is pessimistic. Pessimistic Rousseau begins with the disastrous incidents followed by the publication of Bnlle . Christopher de BeauBMt, Archbishop of Paris, Issued a pastoral letter which eondemottd telle . The Parliamentary Court of Justice in Paris publicly burned the book on June 11, 1762. His Protestant native city, Geneva, also went against Rousseau. "These events," Berth writes, "were a turning-point in Rousseau's inner life. From then dates the decline in his Inward frame of mind and attitude which threw him on to the defensive, breeding pessimism, misanthropy and even persecution mania." Karl Berth speaks of the "role of the righteous sufferer" in reference to Rousseau, and Rousseau has "a kind of Christ-character." He definitely supports Rousseau rather than the Archbishop of Paris (de Beaximont) who was "In favour of human reason" over revelation, and prefers Rousseau to the theologians of Qvomwa, who favored "their rational orthodoigr. ** Protestant Thought, pp. 89-91. —————

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201 farce. The natural goodness of nan Is a logical consequence of Rousseau's confused conception of nature Itself. Marltaln states that Rousseau '*locks Into a single equivocal pseudo-concept the 'nature' of the aetaphysicians and the 'nature' of the empiricists."^^ Ipiwaeau's assertion that 'Wn is bom free"^^ appears to Maritain to mean no more than that •B is "a ssnrage in a wood." Moreover, the general will is a "fraudulent aQTSticism" or "the lOTth of political pantheism. "^^ For Maritain, this mysticism of the general will is associated with perfunctory reason and rationality, but it is really "the orysticion of sentiment and passion" which Maritain discovers in Emile as well. Nor does Maritain deny that Rousseau had a religious disposition. Rousseau's Catholicism (for twenty-five years) was an outward and visible show filled with "greedy sensuality." His naturalism was "the finest religious dispositions without supernatural life." Thus, the religlcm of Rousseau was the perversion of the Gospel md Christianity. "JeanJacques," Maritain writas, "has perverted the Gospel by tearing it from the supernatural order and transporting certain fundamental aspects of Christianity into the sphere of simple nature. One absolute essential Christianity is the supernatural quality of grace. Remove that supernatural quality, and Christianity goes bad." Thus, the cardinal sin of CI -'^ Three Reformers, p. 128. '^To coiqplete the sentence, Rousseau said; '>(an is bom free; and everywhere he is in chains." The Social Contract and Discourses . p. 3. S3 -^' 'Three Reformers , p. 134.

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202 Rousseau, for Marltaln, is his "naturalization of Christianity." Rousseau is truly, as Marl tain describes hlra, "nature's saint." If Rousseauan romanticism prepared the Catholic renaissance of the time of Chateaubriand, It was merely an accident. According to Marltaln, Rousseau was not recalling the Christian truths but debased and perverted thoB. His naturalism and optlaim that nursed "a purely natural paradise of happiness and goodness" were the perversion of Christianity. Marltaln sirys, "It was JeanJacques i^w completed that aaiazlng performance, which Luther began, of inventing a Christianity separate from the Church of Christ: it was he who complete the naturalization of the Gospel." "Rousseauism is a radical naturalistic corruption of Christian feeling ."^ For Haritain, Christianity wittout the dmrch is inconceivable, and, above all, Rousseau's optimistic conception of man demolishes the Christian notions of original sin and redes^tion^ Rousseauan optimism and naturalism may drastically differ from Lutheran pessimism, but, for Marltaln, Luther and Rousseau together perverted Christianity when they separated the Church from Christ* Moreover, their anti-lntellecttiallst religious thoughts are a sort of paralleliam* Hiwve r, Marltaln himself raalisas that the optimism of Rousseau was attracted to "the opposite and not less erroneous direction" of the philoaopl^ of tha Enlightenmant. Thus, Rousseauism lies in the Junction of Luther's pessimism and the optimism of the Enlightenment on the one hand and of Luther's anti»intellectualism and the rationalism ^Jtbld., pp. 142, 147.

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203 of the Ag« of Reason on the other. Mov, we auat consider Marltaln's crlticlsas of the antithesis of antl-lntellectuallsn: Cartesian rationallsM. RenI Descartes is a doolnant figure in the history of philosophy. He is rightly regarded aa the "father of modem philosophy.** Marltain is concerned with Carteslanisa because it contains the germ of errors of modem philosophy and, moreover, of modem technological, materialistic, and scientific civilization. He is not exclusively attacking Cartesian rationalism* It is the excessiveness or "superelevation" of rationalism that is under the fire of criticism. "It would be suicidal to blama reason," Marltain admits. It is the rationalism that refuses the guidance of the highest and loftiest knowledge and reality (theology and God). Nor does Marltain attempt to demolish the whole structure of Cartesian philosophy. He openly recognizes the Cartesian contributions to the development of modem physical sciences. It is ia^Mrtant to note, moreover, that Marltain is not concerned with the philosopher as much as Cartesian philosophy, its doctrines and its isms . As Marltain says, ". . . what I have criticized is less Descartes than the Cartesian spirit. Z mail, that which the ideas set down by Descartes in modem thought, in virttie of their internal logic, and taking into account historical con* tingencies, %iould necessarily engender of themselves."^' However, it would seon advisable to recognize the fact that the logical correlation and continuity of philosophical doctrines must not be confused with historical contingencies. For instance, Russian Commmism presupposes Marxism. Yet to push this presupposition too far is a kind of mono-causal ' ^The Dream of Descartes , p. 185.

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204 explanation of ideological (or philosophical) continuity at the expense of historical contingencies. The Thomistlc tools of the graded order of being (analogy of being), the pyramid of knowledge and realism open the way to the criticism of Cartesianism. Others like Bergson, Luther, Freud and Rousseau have been criticized by Maritaln for their lack of "Intellectuallsffl." The case of Cartesianism is rather different. Descartes is , criticised, not because of his anti-lntellectualism, but rather because of his excessive rationalism which looks like a blasphemy to the Thomlst. From an antl-intellectualist point of viofw, «• oust admit that Maritaln has something in cooaon with Descartes. Sut Descartes has nothing in common «rith the anti-intellectualists. Descartes, although he retained "much of scholasticism,"^^ built a new philosophical edifice. Karitaln admits that there is a material but not formal continuity between Scholasticism and Cartesianism.^^ Descartes is somewhat under criticism from both contemporary scientific •aplricists and Thomlsts precisely because Cartesianism lies in th« juncture of modem scientific philosophy and medieval Scholasticim* Thus, Bertrand Russell sees in Descartes a still unresolved dualism between contemporary science and Scholasticism.^^ Cartesianism for a Thoalst is too unScholastic. It must be made clear at the outset that the kernel of Cartesianism is the cogito ergo sum (usually called just the coglto) ; "I think, 5^Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (!tew York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. 557. ^^ The Dream of Descartes, p. 34. ^ ^Op. dt .. p. 557.

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20S th«rttfor« I am." The owthod by which Descartes arrived at the coglto Is known as 'Ylarteslan doubt." Doubt Is the core of the Cartesian philosophical nethod.^^ In the notions of the coglto and doubt, there lie th« seeds of rationalism, subjectivism, idealism and even skepticism. The term "I" stands for mjr perceiving mind rather than other minds (subjectivism); the whole sentence ("I think, therefore I am") is the expression of rationalism and leads to idealism. The term "doubt" is the possible seed of skepticism. However, a philosophical attitude of the perceiving mind must be distinguished from skepticism as a philosophical method . From the latter point of view, Descartes may be called a "skeptic." However, from the forsier point of view, he is far from being a skeptic. "Doubt" here becomes a certitude. Maritain even calls Carteslanlsm a "dogmatism." The Cartesian Reformation, according to Maritain, is "the great French sin" in the history of modezn thought, as the Lutheran Reformation is "the great German sin."^ Descartes is criticized by Maritain because of his absolute Intellectualism, mathematidsm, idealism and rationalistic naturalism. For Maritain, "the original sin of modem philosophy" began with the Cartesian philosophy. ''ibid., pp. 563-64. " "Three Reformers , p. 86. It is interesting to note the conclusion reached by Norman J. Wells concerning the relation between Descartes and the Scholastics. He says that ". . . Descartes' adversary is not St. ThosMS for . . . St. Thomas' authentic position was not known to Descartes. . . . Rather, Descartes' adversary or adversaries, 1. e., the theologians who maintain the position Descartes attacks, are certain Thomistae smd the tradition they exemplify." "Descartes and the Scholastics Briefly Revisited," !tew Scholasticism. XXrt (April, 1961), pp. 172-190.

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206 In contrast to the Thoolstlc hierarchy of knowledge In which the method of one type of knowledge cannot be substituted for another, the original sin of Descartes, for Haritain, is the separation of philosophical wisdom from theological wisdom; that is to say, Descartes denied the possibility of th»>logy as a way of knowledge. ^'^ Maritain regards "intultiveness** (as to its node), "Innateness** (as to its origin) and "independency" of things (as to its nature) as the "three great notes of angelic knowledge. "^^ Gartesianism also has thttse three characteristics. Thus, it has an an^JLisn on a Thomistic scale, and is a blasphemy, indeed. The sole authentic and legitimate axdietype of knowledge for Descartes, in Maritain 's view, is a kind of "angelic knowledge." For Maritain, understanding is reduced to "intu« ition" (Intuitus) in Gartesianism. The Cartesian "innatlsm, " according to Maritain, meant to be autonomous and self-sufficing (with i»} illumination from the highest knowledge). In Gartesianism, the intelligence ' is reduced to "simple perception, " and its rationalism disowns even ' reason itself. For Maritain, the (Thomistic) angelic Intellect, however, is not a Cartesian type; it is not made of "faked-up intuitions." It is Infallible and genuinely intuitive. Thus, the fault of Gartesianism is not lack of intellect, but, rather, it tries to elevate human intellect to the superhximan (angelic) level. "It is thus," Maritain remarks, *1 Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom , pp. 28-29. For Maritain, Averroes also separated philosophical wisdom from theological wisdom. Thus, Averroes is the forerunner of Descartes. According to Maritain, Kant also continued the sin of separatism. "Just as Descartes separated philosophy from theology, so Kant separated science from metaphysics. As Descartes denied the possibility of theology as a science . so Kant denied the possibility of metaphysics as a science " (p. 30). 62 Three Reformers, p. 4; The Dream of Descartes, p. 49.

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207 "that the angelic cognition, depending solely on the knowledge of God, is independent of objects, from which it does not draw ideas, and which are not its formal rule «...** Rational cognition is for Descartes "a sort of natural revelation ," In short, Cartesianism is "a usurpation of the angelic privileges. "^^ Moreover, the absolute intellectualism of Descartes is based upon what is mathematical. Cartesian rationalism contains in embryo "the intuition of the scientia mirabilis " (the "admirable science").^ Thus, there is in Descartes a radical change in the very notion of intelligibility: "to be intelligible is to be capable of mathematical reconstruction."^^ For Maritain, this is "the idea of mathematical Gnosis." When 'tethematies becomes the Queen of Sciences," Cartesian dogmatism, in Maritain *s opinion, does injustice to reality. With the advent of Newtonian physics, there is a new seed in the Cartesian admirable science for the rise of modem scientism. When the admirable science is elevated to the angelic level, there is "a kind of collusion between what is human knowledge and what is revelation. "^^ When matheBMtics in Descartes becomes the sole measurement of intelligibility, the mathematics of phenomena is rated above theology and science above wisdom on a Th<»iil8tic scale. Moreover, philosophy is at once conceived ° ^Three Reformers, pp. 67, 68, 77. ^The Dream of Descartes , p. 27. ° ^Three Reformers , p. 73. ^ °Ibid . , p. 68; The Dream of Descartes, p. 27.

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208 In the pattern of theology or "the angellsm of Cartesian philosophy." The cardinal odstake of Carteslanlsm, for Marltaln» Is the cogito, which contains both ideallsn and rationalism. Pure thought, independent of objects or things, is self •sufficing and autonomous. Cartesian rationalisn is a "quasi-Platonic atteiopt to reduce demonstration to the transcendental unity of a non-discursive intellection^ " which differs from the classical notion of reason found in Aristotle and the Scholastics.^' Hereby, according to Karitaln, "human reason reaches its full spirittial measure in Descartes." Ihis rationalistic idealism becomes "the original sin of modem philosophy." '^Cartesian reason practised Kantian apriorlsm before it was named. "^ Cartesian idealism falls flat when it confronts the realism of St. Thomas Aquinas. When human reason attempts to attain the status of angelic intellect, Descartes Is charged with conspiracy of the hierarchy of being and knowledge. And, at the same time, there Is the conspiracy of agnosticism. "Cartesian dogmatism after a long flight," Marltaln says, "will have become agnosticism when it falls to earth. "^^ It seems that a more serious charge against Cartesianism is not its usurpation of angelic privileges (its rationalistic naturalism) but its lack of realism. The charges against the superhumanly elevated Cartesian rationalism, of course, must be based upon a particular scale of Thomlsm. That is to say, Cartesianism is here weighed on a particular scale. However, for the criticism of lack of realism in Cartesianism, ° ^The Dream of Descartes, p. 24. ^ ^Three Reformers, pp. 70, 76. ^^Ibid. . p. 77.

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209 modern scientific empiricists are at once in sgr asMs n t with Theadsts even if for different reasons* As Bertrand Russell has already remarked, Cartesian philosophy does not resolve the dualistic problem between modem science and Scholasticism. Descartes, therefore, for a modem eiq>irici8t, still retains the 'Wtaphysical" element of medieval Scholasticism* A. J. Ayer remarks that '*an error of Descartes" was the idea that "his mind was a substttice which was wholly independent of anything pl^slcal." This is not only a meaningless (empirically unverifiable) "metaphysical" assertion but also unrealistic* '*rhe proposition that mind and matter are completely Independent," Ayer writes, "is one which we hove good empirical grounds for disbelieving, and one which no a priori argument could possibly serve to prove."'" Prom the point of view of the Thomistic pyramid of knowledge, Cartesianism commits a fatal separatism, the separation between what is modem and what is ancient, between the soul and the body, between faith and reason, between metaphysics and science and between knowledge and love.^^ "St. Thomas brings together, Descartes cleaves and separates, and this in the most violently dogmatic way*"'^ In the final utalysis, of most significance is the practical considerations of Cartesian jdaological elements, that is, the cultural significance of Cartesianism as Haritaln conceives it. For Haritain, there axB three possibilities of Cartesianism concerning its cultural implications: idealism (the connection between thought and being), ^ "Language. Tmth and Logic (2d ed.; London: ?. Gollancz, 1946), p. 142. ' ^Three Reformers , p. 82. ' ^The Dream of Descartes , p. 166.

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210 rationalism (the intellectual hierarchies and the meaning of knowledge) and dualism (the conception of man). Cartesian idealism holds that ideas are things or objects that can be attained by (pure) thought alone and, in turn, ideas are the immediate objects of thought itself. The cultural significance of Cartesian idealism, according to Maritain, is *'a sort of anthropocentric optimism of thought."'^ Thus, this is not unrelated to Rousseauan optimism and anthropocentric naturalism. The difference between the two, however, is obvious: Cartesian optimism is based upon reason and thought, whereas Rousseauan optimism is one which is grounded in sentiment and feeling. The cultural significance of Cartesian rationalism, according to Maritain, has an impact on conteuq>orary Western civilisation. Cartesian rationalism is a kind of "anthropocentric naturalism of wisdom" from which inevitably ensue the doctrines of progress and the salvation of humanity by reason and science alone. The spiritualism of science in Descartes, however, looks to the Thooistic eyes like "an autophagous spiritual, psychological childishness and metaphysical humbug." Man must becOTie spiritualized only by joining, not with the spiritualism of science, but with "a spiritual and eternal living One." "There is only one spiritual life which does not mislead -that which the Holy Spirit bestows." Therefore, from the standpoint of a Thoolst, "rationalism is the death of spirituality."''* Rationalism is the antithesis of anti-reason; nevertheless, it is not unrelated to the anti*lntellectualism of our time. "Many of our ^^ibid., pp. 160-69. ^ Sbid .. pp. 178, 179.

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211 contenporarles," Marltaln writes, "will se^ nourlshnent for their souls In anti-reason, and below reason, nourlstment which should be sought only above reason. And to have led so many reasoning animals around to a hatred of reason is another of rationalism's misdeeds.**'^ The third and last cultural significance of Carteslanism is its dualism. For Haritain, it is "an anthropocentric angelism and materialism of civilization." It is an anthropocentric angelism because it elevates human reason and intellect to the level of angels. Moreover, the "admirable science" is raised to the level of theology Itself. Thus, the spiritualism of reason is an affirmation of the fact that man becomes the 'Vnaster of his nature by imposing the law of reason alone" at the expense of theology and the supernatural. Rationalism for Marltaln crowns "an entirely different morality" which is exclusively materialistic and technological. For Marltaln, technological civilization is a logical consequence of science exalted in Carteslanism. In Carteslanism, man is "a consumer crowned by science." Marltaln believes that "this is the final gift, the twiOAtleth century gift of the Cartesian reform."'^ Technique and mechanics are exalted, and they become the goal of humanity. As a result, for Marltaln, the true idaa of humanity is literally lost. Marltaln has noted the cultural Implications which were translated from the phllsophical doctrines of Carteslanism. Hera it is not the intrinsically philosophical discrepancies of Carteslanism that Marltaln has criticized. Of more significance are the cultural ^ ^Ibld . . p. 179. ^ hbid . . pp. 182-83.

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212 Implications themselves which can be translated from Cartesian Idealism, rationalism and dualism. The cardinal error, from a cultural point of view, is the "anthropocentric" conception of Descartes. Therefore, the philosophical revolt of Marltaln here is the war against the Cartesian anthropothelstlc conception. ^^ When contemporary European civilization is regarded as the product of the mistaken conceptions of Descartes and when we discover the traces of the Cartesian doctrines (ideological elements) in our civilisation, then Descartes and his philosophy can lu) longer remain a "dream." We might consider them as the actuallgation of "the dream of Descartes." We should once again ask if contemporary philosophy and civilization are the iqpocalypse of the Cartesian Reformation. In the conteiqiorary circle of philosophy, no serious philosopher can ignore the importance of the philosophical school called "logical empiricism."'^ Nor does Marltaln neglect this school.^' ^^Ibld., p. 186. 78 The best brief account of logical en^iriclsra is found in Herbert Pelgl, "Logical finpiricism, " Readings in Philosophical Analysis, pp. 3-26. From an American point of view, Ernest Nagel made an early assessment of European logical positivism in "Impressions and ^praisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe, " Logic Without Metaphysics , pp. 191-246. From a historical point of view, the best essay on logical eiiq>lrlcism is probably Joergen Joergensen, The Development of Logical Empiricism ("International Encyclopedia of Unified Science," Vol. II, No. 9; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). See also an earlier essay: George de Santlllana and Edgar Zilsel, The Development of Rationalism and Empiricism ("International Encyclopedia of Unified Science," Vol. II, No. 8; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941). '^See his account of logical empiricism in Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 27-43.

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213 According to Marltain, the spirit of logical emplrlclsn Is not entirely unrelated to the rationalism of Descartes. As a matter of fact, Marltaln regards logical eaq>lricl8m as an offspring of Cartesian philosophy* Jacques Marltaln, from the standpoint of Thomlstlc eplstemology, looks at "logical empiricism" and criticises It. ^ He mentions Morltz Schllck, Kudolf Camap, Phlllpp Frank, Otto Meurath and Hans Relchenbach as the chief representatives of the "Vienna Circle."^'The Vienna Circle (Wiener Krels )*^ was officially formed primarily of a small group of scientists by profession headed by Morltz Schllck In 1929. It would be an extremely one>slded view to say, as the poet T. S. Illot does, that "logical positivism Is the most conspicuous object of censure. Certainly, logical positivism Is not a very nourishing diet for more than the tmmll minority which has been conditioned to It," and it is in our age "the counterpart of surrealism.***^ Btienne Gilson is far more modest 80 It would be mistaken if we identify the "Vienna Circle" with what is nowadays called "logical empiricism." For Instance, strictly speaking, Hans Relchenbach is not associated with the Vienna Circle, but with the "Berlin Group." 81 The long list of logical eiqplrlclsts is found in Jbergen Joergensen, op. clt . 82 An authoritative account of the development of the Vienna Circle is found In Victor Kraft, The Vienna Circle , tr. Arthur Pap (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953). 83 "Introduction," Josef Pleper, Leisure the Baals of Culture , tr. Alexander Dm (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), pp. 11-12.

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214 when he says: "The Thomlstic view of philosophy would not appeal to the supporters of scientism or logical positivism, but neither would the view of philosophy proper to these schools be In agreement with the philosophical aspirations of all our contemporaries*"^ Harltaln criticizes the Vienna Circle for its "bad conceptualization," for "a delusive purism," and for its "posltivlst superstition" in an "enigmatic and 'blind' fashion." fie admits, however, that there is "something heroic" about logical empiricism in its '\nerciless struggle against language*"®^ Jbergen Joergensen defines logical eiq>iriclsffl and its purposes as "an e]q>ression of a need for clarification of the foundations and meaning of knowledge rather than of a need for Justification of a preconceived view; ... it is more interested in cooperation among philosophers and between philosophers and investigators in the special sciences than in the advancement of more or less striking individual opinions* Many logical eiiq>riclsts are "philosophers of science," strictly speaking. As regards their cooperative efforts for philosophical investigation, they are as a group as solid as the group of Catholic philosophers. Maritaln thinks that logical empiricism, so far as it stresses mathematical links and linguistic analysis, is excellent. In regard to the notion of logical meaning and the notion of signs, Maritaln has no objections to the works of logical enq;>lrlcists. And their standard of "intersubjectivation" is warmly welcome.®' However, Maritaln objects ^Elements of Christian Philosophy , p. 18. ^^ Scholasticism and Politics , p. 39. ® ^. cit .. p. 1. ^'^Maritain himself ei^llcates the theory of signs. See his

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215 to the limits of the "fixed rules of signification," logical empiricists' stress on "a simple tautological process" and to their "method of (experimental) verification."^^ Maritain criticises logical empiricisai for its neglect of "the intellect" in knowledge. T. S. Eliot is also critical of logical empiricism for its "method of philosophising «rlthout insight and wisdom. "°^ For Harltaint the intellect in logical empiricism "remains outside the quarters where the work is being directly accomplished. "Language and the Theory of Sign, " Language; An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function , ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New Tork: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 86-101 and chapter xi, "Sign and Symbol," Redeeming the Time , tr. Harry Lorin Binsse (London: G. Bles, 19A3), pp. 191-224. In reference to "neo-realism" (G. E. tfoore and his associates), T. E. Hulme said: "When I had seen in these further subjects, the possibility of the rationalist, non-empirical method, I began to see that it was this method which formed the basis of the writing on logic and ethics which I had before found incon^rehensible." Here the rationalist, non-empirical method is meant to be a kind of method in geometry. Speculations , p. 42. 88 A similar view is shown by T. E. Rulme who %nrote that "(1) the Haturalists refused to recognise metaphysical knowledge because (2) They themselves were under the influence of an unconscious tnetaphyslc which consisted in (3) Taking physical science as the only possible type of real knowledge." Op. cit .. p. 21. The original view of ScMick's theory of meaning and verification and radical physicalist theory have been considerably modified. See Schlick's original view in "^teaning and Verification," Readings in Philosophical Analysis , pp. 146-70. Some modified views may be found in the following: Hans Reichenbach, "The Verlf lability Theory of Meaning," Readings in the Philosophy of Science , pp. 93-102; Rudolf Camap, "Testability and Meaning," Readings in the Philosophy of Science , pp. 4792; Bertrand Russell, "Logical Positivism," Revue Internationale de Philosophie . IV (Janvier, 1950), pp. 3-19 and An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (New Tork: W. W. Norton, 1940); C. G. Herapel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," Revue Internationale de Philosophie . IV (Janvier, 1950), pp. 41-63. ^'"Introduction," Jbsef Pieper, Leisure the Basis of Culture , p. 12.

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216 on and Is forbidden to enter." Therefore, the posltlvlst conception of knowledge or his epistemology is "a philosophical error." The truth of knowledge, according to Marltain, cannot be dependent simply on the fixed rules of signification and a simple mathematical and tautological process. Maritain sees "two ways of analysing the world of sensible reality and of constructing the concepts relevant" to knowledge in general and the sciences of nature. One is "enq>iriological analysis," and the other is "ontological analysis." The "barbarism" of logical eiq>irici8m, in Maritain 's opinion, is its "deontologization" of knowledge. That is to say, logical empiricism coB^letely ignores the second way of analyzing the world of sensible reality. We should iranediately recall the fact that Maritain has already criticized Cartesianism on the Thomistlc grotmds of the analogy of being . "Science, " Maritain writes, "tends to construct definitions, not by essential ontological characters, but by a certain number of physical operatiirically meaningless (metaphysical) category. Any "ontological" categories, as a matter of ^ ^Scholasticism and Politics , p. 38. ^ 4bid .. pp. 39, 41, 42.

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217 fact, are neanlngleas. Furthermore, the main defect of the Vienna Circle for Maritaln is its particularized conceptualisation of knowledge, which he has 92 called '*a delusive purism* '* The real cause of this defect is that the scientists attempt to become "philosophers." '*rhe misfortune of the Veinnese," Maritaln writes, "is that they are philosophers." The result is their inevitable limitations for the concepttxalizatlon of knowledge. For Maritaln, their philosophical spirit, with a critical revision, is derived froM empiricism, nominalism and, above all, logistics. Moreover, they are "good disciples of Descartes." As a result, logical empiricists suffer from "many specifically modem prejudices and Ignorances." Tbey only know, in Maritain's opinion, "one science, the science of phenomena, the science of the laboratory." Thus they reach the truth in a blind fashion. "The essential error is," Maritaln writes, ". . . to confuse that which is true (with certain restrictions) of the science of phenosgna, and that which is triie of all science and of all knowledge in general, of all scientific knowing. It is to apply universally to all human knowledge that which is valid only in one of its particular spheres." The error of logical empiricism, according to Maritaln, is its narrow criterion of truth (the criterion of 'Waning'*) based upon "scientific" foundations, which require the Intersubjectlve character in accordance with the fixed rules of meaning and verification. Maritaln contends, therefore, that "if the mMBilng of a judgment consists in Its method of (experimental) verification [aaij ... if any judgment which cannot be ^^Kalph Barton Ferry also notes that the denial of the verifiablllty of moral judgments in logical positivism is due to its particularized conception of what constitutes knowledge. Realms of Value , p. 120.

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218 thus verified Is devoid of meaning, then this school's own theory has no meaning, because It Is Incapable of being verified In this manner. 93 It Is Incapable, even In principle, of space-time verifications*" Since logical empiricism has Its own distinctive criterion of meanlngfulness, the term "science," from a Thomlstlc point of view. Is restricted to "the science of phencxnena" or what Is observable. For Karltaln, therefore, logical empiricism looks at knowledge from "a unlvoclst" point of view. That Is to say, the scientific criterion of truth Is the only standard of measuring the truth of knowledge. Marltaln quotes Aquinas wIk) said: "It is a sin against Intelligence to want to proceed In an Identical manner In the typically different domains *physical, mathematical and metaphysical -•> of speculative knowledge."'^ On the other hand, logical eiq>lrlclsts would maintain that they are only asking for the factual validity and adequacy of knowledge. "The recommendation to use scientific method," Ernest Nagel contends, "is the rec<»imendation of a way for deciding Issues of factual validity and adequacy ; It is not the recommendation of an exclusive way in which the universe may be confronted and experienced . "^^ For Marltaln, logical eiq>iricism, as well as dialectic materialism, appears to be a form of sclentism. The scientific theory of the Vienna Circle is "of endogenous origin," whereas the Marxist theory of science is "of exogenous origin. "^^ Perhaps the materialism and rationalism of Marx would not be unrelated to Cartesianlsm through the ^ ^Scholasticism and Politics , pp. 42, 43, 44, 45. ^*Ibld., p. 46. ^ ^Logic without Metaphysics , p. 382. ^^Scholasticism and Politics, p. 48.

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219 rationalism of Hegel and the materialism of Peuerbach. However, we should not push to a reductlo ad absurdum the alleged sclentlsm of dialectic materialism and logical empiricism. Marltaln takes the side of neo-posltlvlsn rather than that of Marxism on the matter of religion. While the eplstemology of neoposltlvlsm leaves Its door open to religious spheres, Marxism keeps Its door shut. However, Marltaln Is of the opinion that. In terms of speculative philosophy and metaphysics, they are both phllosophla negatlva * Moreover, Marltaln notes, the Vienna Circle would appear as the useless kind of "bourgeois" philosophy to Marxists; In turn, Marxist eplstemology %iould appear to logical empiricists to be the worst kind of metaphysics. Dialectical materialism for Marltaln Is really a "dialectical trickery." It Is an Illusory, negative kind of scientific theory; the Marxist theory of science, In short. Is "a destruction of science. " As many philosophers would agree, Marltaln believes that Marx really Inverted Hegel. Somewhat mistakenly (since Marltaln Is an Aristotelian rather than a Platonlst), however, Marltaln makes an analogy between Marx-Hegel and Arlstotle-Plato: "In a sense, Marx Is, In relation to Hegel, what Aristotle Is In relation to Plato; he has brought Hegelian dialectic down from heaven to earth. As a result It has become the more pernicious . "'' Would Marltaln also be willing to grant that Aristotle brought Plato down ^^Ibld., p. 51.

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220 from heaven to earth and Aristotellanism has become the more pernicious theory of eplstemology? Marltaln is at least sympathetic with Marxist's "courage of systematic unity" and, moreover, with "Its aversion for idealism /and/ its affirmation of the reality of the external world ^thicij do not displease a Thomist." The two mistaken traits of Marxist epistemology, in Marltaln' 8 opinion, are "practlcallsm" and "dlalectldsm. " On these two counts, Marxist theory of science is destructive. In regard to practlcallsm, the Marxists stress the application of knowledge to action to the exclusion of "the irreducible speculative value of science." To produce "a usable theory of knowledge" is the goal of Marxist eplsteBology. It ignores the notion o£ "speculation" and, thus, deprives emplrio logical sciences of their "speculative nature." Marltaln says: "it makes knowledge Itself consist in an activity exercised on things. In an activity of work and domination of matter, and of transformation of the world. "^® Ho one more staunchly defends, from a Thomistic point of view, the vitality of speculation and contemplation than does Josef Pieper. Although "leisure" differs from contemplation, he writes that "Leisure ... is a mental and spiritual attitude •— it is not si^ly the result of external factors, it is not the inevitable result of spare time, a holiday, a week-end or a vacation. It is, in the first place, an attitude of mind, a condition of the soul, and as such utterly contrary to the Ideal of 'worker* in each and every one of the three aspects under 98 'Ibid ., pp. 48. 49.

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221 vliich it was analysed: work as activity, as toil, as a social function." Leisure, moreover, is "a form of silence," which is necessary to the apprehension of reality. In short, like contemplation, it is "of higher order than the vita active ." And "one of the foundations of Western culture is leisure."^' Therefore, the notion of contemplation or speculation is the basis by which a Thomist nay criticise the practicalism and activism of Marxian epistemology. For Marltain, Marxian "dialecticism" destroys the essence of science. He has no objection to the correct notion and usage of dialectic "either in its ancient sense as a logic, of the dialectic of the concrete, conceived as an historical development due to the internal logic of a principle, or of an idea, in action in the human concrete." However, the confusion of Marxist epistemology is that of the theory of knowledge and history . Marxism has confused the theory of knowledge (or science) with the history of science. Historicism (or dialecticism) simply points to the fact that "science as a specific energy of truth, as a specific vitality of intelligence, has vanished, has been annihilated in the illusion of historical explanation."^^ Maritain's epistemo logical charges against the "practicalism" and "dialecticism" of Marxism might be called his methodical a rgu ments. However, there seems to be a more serious substantial argument against Marxism. Marxism is a materialism and an economic theory. The Hegelian dialectic has served as a methodical instrument for materialisa, the substance of which has been derived from Marx's interpretation ^ ^Leisure the Basis of Culture, pp. 25, 51-52, 56. ^Q Oscholasticism and Politics , pp. 51, 52.

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-Ill'-"" 222 of Ludwlg Feuerbach. Marltaln, at once in agreement with other Christian theologians, considers the substance of Marxism as a form of materialism. Thus, from a Christian point of view, Marxism becomes the antithesis of Christianity: atheism. Marxian materialism implies "an absolutely atheistic position. "^^'The absolute materialistic conception of reality and history, therefore, has no room for the Christian notion of tran« scendence* The combination of Marxism and Coasgunism really cooapletes "a religion of atheism." Strictly speaking, Marltain seems to distinguish Marxism from Communism. Marxism (or dialectic materialism) is the dogma of the religion of atheism, and Communism as a rule of life is its social and ethical e:q>re8sion.^^^ C(»inunism conceived as such really becomes a problem of "the philosophy of culture." As Communism or Marxism becomes a religious problem to all Christian thinkers and theologians, so does it to Jacques Marltain. Marltain says that '^knnminisra is so profoundly, so substantially a religion — an earthly one >•> that the 103 conminlst does not know that it is a religion." ^^ ^Ibld . . p. 26. '•^ ^Ihrue Hamanism , p. 28* Waldemar Gurian, a Catholic political theorist, regards Communism as "a political religion." He writes: "• . . its political religl(Ki contains many elements characteristic of nodem secularistlc society: belief in the decisive iaf>ortance of technical progress, the assunqttion that ecomMoic organisations and psychological manipulations are almighty, the concentration upon liork and activity in this world. . . . Bolshevism and conounism can only be overcome i£ they are understood as the ultimate products of the various forms of secularism taken seriously and so reaching its ultimate consequences. Technical and military means are necessary in order to contain and drive back the USSR, but only if their limits are realized can they be truly efficient, can they achieve a flaal victory." The Soviet Union: Background. Ideology. Reality (Notre Daw: tkiiverslty of Notre Dame Press, 1951), pp. 14-15. ^"•^True Humanism, p. 31.

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223 Karitaln, like Nicolas Berdyaev, regards Harxism as a aesslanlc ideology. For him, Harxism Is a kind of aesslanlsm which Is at once Jetrlsh and Hegelian. ^^ Mlrcea Ellade, fron a religious point of view, nost clearly explains the ayth of Karx hlawelf enriched by "a whole JudaeoChristlan aesslanlc Ideology." The Marxian myth synbollBes, '*on the one hand, the prophetic role and soterlologlcal function that /Man(7 attributes to the proletariat; on the other, the final battle between Good and Evil, which is easily conparable to the apocalyptic battle between Christ and Antichrist, followed by the total victory of the foraer* It is even significant that Marx takes over for his own purposes the Judaao-Christian eschatological hope of an absolute end to history * . . ."'^"S For Karltaln, '^Connunism is the final state of anthropocentric rationalism." Like other Christian thinkers, Marltaln believes that C— III 1 81 "sets Itself against Christianity by pretending to substitute for the universalism of the Ifystic Body of Christ its own earthly unlversallsm. "^^^ It is true that Marltaln locrics at Marxism and Conmunism as a religion of Anti-Christ. However, he assesses the problem of Communism more realistically when he says; "the social problem of the emancipation of the proletariat haa in fact the priority over the etapfaysical and religious problem, the class war over the anti-religious war . . . ." For Marltaln, Comounlsm is a "communion in economic activity," which inevitably creates "the titanism of Industry." As Bmil Bnnmer would certainly agree, he says that Communism "transforms Christian ^O^Ibid. . p. 44. *" ^The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 206-207. ^Q ^Scholasticism and Politics , p. 27.

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224 connunlon Into an entirely teo^ral and despotic comoRinlsm. "^^' Marltaln's philosophical revolts against the laain Intellecttial currents of the modem «K>rld hove been exercises In Thoadsm. Rls critical philosophy does logically precede his creative and constructive philosophy. It serves the function of cleansing "erroneous" philosophical and ideological systems, and, in doing so, lays the ground for a new philosophical and ideological system which embodies the true spirit of Thomism* For Karitain, Thomism is the tiniversal standard by which other philosophical doctrines and their ideological iiq>lications on cont&nporary civilization can be weighed. Although the philosophical revolts of Karitain are primarily of epistemological Interest, we cannot neglect their cultural iiiq>llcations since philosophical doctrines themselves imply cultural significance. From a cultural point of view, Marltaln's critical ^praisals are the first steps towards the Thomlstic reconstruction of contemporary civilization. This, of course, does not violate the "speculative" worthiness of Marltaln's theological and philosophical thinking which he BO vehemently emphasizes. It merely strengthens the view that he is a systenatictd philosopher of culture as well as a theologian-philosopher. Maritain firmly believes that all philosophical doctrines have profound cultural in^lication, and the Dialady of culture is, at bottom, that of philosophy. We xaiet not, however, push to the furthest logical conclusion the relation between (speculative) philosophy and (practical) culture. When we do so in a dogmatic and deterministic way, then we become the victims of confusion between what is philosophically necessary 107ibid. See also Bull Brtinner, Justice and the Social Order. p. 405.

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225 and what is historically contingent . Maritain himself has already made it clear that it is absurd to assert that there is a certain "unilinear" pattern in the Lutherwa Refomation, the Renaissance, the Cartesian teforaation, the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the Rousseaulsm. He does not deny, however, that there is a sort of convergence of these movements into a certain pattern. Be makes it rather clear that these movements. In fact, have converged into modem Western culture. The disease of contemporary civilisation is at bottom the derivative of these movements. Harltain does not hesitate to assert that, for Instance, Conmunism Is "the final state" of naturalistic and anthropocentric rationalism, which sinqily iiq>lies that there is a causal relationship between Comminism and the very movements of the Cartesian Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Rousseaulsm. Then, would not Harltain have in fact conmltted the mistake he has rejected as absurd? Perhaps we should take more seriously what H. A. L. Fischer has said: '^e intellectual excitement has . . . been denied me. Man wiser and more learned than I have discovered in history a plot, a rhythm, a prede> termlned pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following another as wave follows wave, only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalisations, only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognise . . . the 108 play of the contingent and the unforeseen." For Maritain, social and political reconstruction oust begin ^^'as quoted in Franklin M. Fisher, "On the Analysis of History and the Interdependence of the Social Sciences," Philosophy of Science . XXVII (April, 1960), p. 147.

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226 with philosophical reconstruction. Thomism alone is a kind o£ tabula rasa in which we forget the mistakes of the past as well as the present and therefore begin with a fresh start in the philosophical and cultural reconstruction of the modem world. The syncretistic character of Thcmism has served as an indispensable tool for the criticisos of main philosophical currents. Thoraistic intellectualism has been used to criticize the anti-intellectualism of Bergson, Luther* Freud and Rousseau. We might as well be able to apply this tool to reject the romantic and "irrational man"''^^ portrayed by one of the main philosophical currents of our time, that is, existentialism* **9o emotion,** C. S. Lewis says, "is, in itself, a judgment: in that sense all emotions and sentiments are alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it."^^^ The Christian (theocentric) character of Thcndsm, which refuses to separate the human philosophos from the divine sophos . and Thomistic realism have found the defects of the naturalistic irrationalism of Rousseau as well as of the Cartesian naturalistic rationali«o and the Marxian anthropocentric rationalism, into which all the previously mistaken views have converged. Maritaln uses ThtMaism for the recovery of intellectualism which is BO vulnerable in our age and for the reconstruction of "theocentric humanism.'* For him, Thomism thus becomes the Philosophy (at once speculative and practical) of the twentieth century. St. Thooias Aquinas speidcs directly for our age, not for the thirteenth century. ^^^^William Barrett, Irrational Mam A Study in Existential Fhilosophy (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1958). ^^ Qyhe Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 12.

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SECTION III THE POOimATION OP JACQUES MARITAIN*S FOUTICAZ. PHUjOSOPHT

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CHAPTER IX THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THBOLOGZCAL POUHOATION OF MARITAIH*S POLITICAL PHILOSOPffiT Jacques Harltaln is liiq>eccably a Thomist; he refused to be called a "neo-Thomlst," not bwiause he desires to turn the clock of history back to the thirteenth century, but because he Is of the firm belief that Thomism Is a living philosophy and a living theology. St. Thomas Aquinas speaks directly to the uorld of the twentieth century. As it has already been shown, the intellectuallsm inherited from the classical philosophy of Aristotle and the Christian character of St. ThcMoas Aquinas have be«»i the fountainhead of Thomistic criticisms of modem philosophy and culture. This a^ect we called the "critical" philosophy of Maritain. Now we imist turn to the constructive side of his philosophy. At the outset, it is of utmost iiqportance for tis to realize that Haritaln's whole system strives at unity and is integrative . In the specifically and hierarchically distinct degrees of knowledge (speculative and practical), all types of knowledge and wisdom converge to the final point of the Christian idea of God. Theology, therefore, is of its nature speculative and practical at once. In the speculative order of knowledge, the lower levels of physical sciences, mathematical sciences. 228

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229 metaphysics and theology (science that is human and rational) converge to the highest and loftiest summit of the wisdom of God himself (infused wisdom). And in the practical order of knowledge, the lower strata converge to the self-same final sunrait of the infused wisdom of God. God is the source of speculative knowledge and practical knowledge. Moreover, this hierarchy of knowledge is '*a double movement in the Christian universe."^ The first of the two-way traffic can be lotted at from a divine point of view downward (from the law of the Incarnation to the lowest level of physics). And the second way in which the same traffic can be looked at is from a human point of view to the infused wisdom of God. In short, it is "a twofold continuous movement of the descent of God to man and the ascent of man to God." The allowance of the ascent of man to God makes Maritain's system as well as Thomism in general different from orthodox Protestantism. On the other hand, Maritain also rejects the hiananist position because "as soon as man came to believe that the second movement was the first," he retreated to the abysmal mistakes of anthropocentric hwaanism (juithropocentric knowledge and culture). 'Han forgot," Maritain writes, "that God has the first initiative always in the order of the good, and forgot that the descending movement of divine plenitude in us is primary in relation to our movement of ascent. He sought to treat this second swement as primary, and himself to take the first initiative in the line of goodness. Thus the movement of ascent was necessarily separated from the movement of grace. That is why the age in question was an age of dualism, of schism, of division, an age of ^Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, tr. Bernard Wall (New Tork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 18.

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230 anthropocentrlc humanism cut off from the Zncamation; an age In which science finally carried the day against wisdom, and the effort of progress turned to the destruction of human values." However, it should be remembered that Maritain does not reject humanism per se » He is merely warning against the wrong kind of tnananism, that is, anthropocentrlc hisoanism which, as we have noted, has developed from the Renaissance, Cartesianism, the philosophy of Illumination and Rousseauism. Thus, Maritain says: "the radical vice of anthropocentrlc humanism was that of being anthropocentrlc, not of being humanism." "It is that the creature should be truly respected jLn his contact with God and because he holds everything of God. Humanism, yes, but a theocentric humanism, an inte2 gral humanism, the humanism of the Incarnation." In the ordered pyramid of knowledge, however, this does not ioply that there is no essoitial distinction between one form of knowledge and another. True though it may be that all types of knowledge must follow the hierarchic law of governance, each of thea maintains its own distinct autonomy which cannot be siibstituted for another. Therefore, the P3rramid of knowledge is not a monolithic nomism but a pluralistic order* Philosophy, for instance, has a method and object of its own that are distinct from, and non-substitutable for, theology. Philosophy is integrated into theology, but philosophy in its own sphere is "both autonomous and infra-valent." In short, the lower forms of knowledge occupy "infra-positions" to the higher forms of knowledge, but they have, at the same time, their own spheres of autonomy. ^Ibid.. pp. 74-75, 78. ^Ibid .. p. 102.

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231 It has bttcona clear now why, in the Integrative system of Marltain, ve cannot separate one form of knowledge from the rest. Nor can political philosophy be separated from the rest of knowledge. Therefore, the triie political philosophy and political science are at once political theology. If we separate them, we violate the very Thonlstic principle that governs the hierarchy of knowledge. In education, Harltaln emphasises the prerequisite background in the degrees of knowledge. Therefore, the quadrivltim of knowledge In education conq>rlses first, mathematics; second, physics and the natural sciences; third, philosophy (the philosophy of nature, metaphysics and the theory of knowledge); fourth, ethics and political and social philosophy (and connected studies).^ This is why we cannot chop off one part (e. g., political philosophy) of Harltaln 's system from its whole and root. In doing so, we not only do injustice to his system but we also lose the possibility of adequately understanding his system. Ue must come to grips with the foundation or root of his political philosophy, and relate his political philosophy to other degrees of knowledge, especially In the practical order to which it belongs. His political philosophy is directly related to the philosophy of history, moral philosophy and moral theology, and it is also related rather indirectly to the various branches of the speculative order. In Thomlsm, the speculative (conten^latlve) value of knowledge is fully recognized. This is the basis of Harltaln 's criticism of pragmatism and Harxlsm. He believes that the former is sold to the "cash value" of knowledge, and the latter is solely concerned with the application of knowledge to action.

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232 Marlcaln himself explains vhy ve must climb the sunrait (the foundation) of the hierarchy of knowledge and wisdom (theological wisdom and infused wisdom of grace) when he says: "All other more visible orders, social, political and econc»aic, Inqportant though they may be in their place, are secondary to it and even depend on it.'*^ This is also the reason why Marltaln admires Pascal more than he does Machlavelll or Hobbes. "Much more profound than Machlavelll or Hobbes," he writes, "it is by the flame of a metaphysical and religious conception of man, at once high and passionate, that Pascal Illuminates his political ideas. "^ In reference to the political ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, Tves R. Simon says that "the most enlightening teaching of St. Thomas is not found in any of his political ifritings, but in the psychological, ethical, metaphysical and theological treatises where he develops, with great thorough' nass and unmatched accuracy, his sublime theory of liberty."^ The same is true in Marltaln 's case. In connection with our Immediate concern of social and political philosophy, Stienne Gilson conaents that "Thomas Aquinas has left us certain principles applicable to the solution of social and political problems, but he himself has derived these funda> mental notions from the principles of his own philosophy and theology."^ Marltaln, partially because of the urgency of our time, has been more ^Science and Wisdom , p. 19. ^Redeeaiing the Time , tr. Harry Lorln Binsse (London: G. Bles, 1943), p. 29. ^"Thomlsm and Democracy," Science. Philosophy and Religion; Second Symposium , p. 272. ^ Elements of Christian Philosophy , p. 262.

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233 pre-eminently concerned than his master with the solution for cultural, social, political and economic problems. Without knowing the philosophical and theological fotmdation of Maritain's political philosophy, we are likely to walk the blind alley of his political philosophy* As the various degrees of knowledge are distinauished but not separated from each other, the relationship between the supernatural and the natural, between faith and reason and betwe«i theology and philosophy holds the same truth* In the natural order, reason and philosophy have autonomous spheres of their own and are not merely subjugating themselves to the supernatural world, faith and theology. Thus Maritain does not have to HMintain, as Rudolf Bultoann does, that the Christian faith is a kind of "withdrawal from the world" which transcends the world of the true (i* e*, the knowledge of God), of the good (i. e., political morality) and the beautiful. Be does not have to insist that "every phenomenon of history is andiiguous" simply because it is separated from God and does not reveal God*s will in itself.^ For Maritain, the world or the «itire order of nature has the sphere of its own, distinct from the stipematural world. Therefore, "the natural «id of the world, though it is not the absolutely supreme esad, is, nevertheless, a real end; it is not a mere means. This is a point which is, in my opinion, quite important for the philosopher of history, or of culture in general."'^ The political and social order is a natural development, which is founded upon the demands 9 Rudolf Bultmann, Bssavs: Philosophical and TheoloRJcal . tr. James C. G. Greig (London: SCM Press, 1955), pp. 103, 153. 10 Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History , ed. Jos^h W. Evans (Hew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. 131.

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234 of the order of nature and In which "certain requirements of natural law /com^ to the fore.'* However, we cannot stand in a sort of half-way position in understanding Maritain's whole system. As philosophy is superelevated by theology, so the natural order is illuminated by the supernatural order. The philosophy of history belongs to moral philosophy, and not to the theology of history which is centered upon the Kingdom of God and the history of salvation. However, Haritain makes it absolutely clear that "the philosophy of history is an outstanding exmple of the necessity for a true philosophy of man, an integrally valid moral philosophy, to have the philosopher illumine the knowledge of the natural order with the light of a more elevated knowledge received from theology, while he uses the method proper to philosophy and advances with steps, so to speak, of philosophy, not of theology." In this sense, it is clear that we oust speak of the philosophical and theological foundation of Maritain's political philosophy. There is no doubt that political philosophy, conceptually speaking, pertains to the order of nature. But it can never be separated from (political) theology. It is precisely because of this separatism that Haritain criticizes Cartesianism and Kantianism, and there lies the pitfall of anthropocentric humani«B. The world or the entire order of nature, in actual fact, is in "vital connection with the universe of the Kingdom of God." It is closely linked with the supernatural end and virtues. "The world," Haritain says, "is not in a state of pure nature but is vitally and organically related to the Kingdom of God — the actiial natural end of the world is this natural end superelevated." Although, in the political

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235 and social order, certain requirements of natural law come to the fore, "in actual fact It Is only under the action of the Gospel leaven, and by virtue of the Christian Inspiration making Its way In the depths of secular consciousness, that the natural development In question /takes/ place." It Is true that the natural end of the world Is a relatively ultimate end (a real end but not a means). But "only the supernatural end Is the absolutely ultimate end."'''' This Is the center of Marltaln's thought and the (theological) foundation of his political philosophy. A political philosophy is a genuine possibility, but the only true political philosophy must become at once political theology. All in all, Jacques Harltaln is truly a Christian political philosopher (a political theologian). Before we plunge into the ordered hierarchy of knowledge, we must consider the relationship between philosophy and theology. As we have noted, ThcHnism is a philosophy and a theology. From the standpoint of the history of philosophy, Thomlsra is essentially a combination of the pagan philosophy of Aristotle and Christian theology. The nature of Thomlsm, according to the followers of Aquinas, is the harmony of synthesis of philosophy and theology (reason and revelation). As we have previously noted, this is the essence of Thomlsm and thus the whole system of Jacques Maritain. Marltaln once said that "The more I think about this problem of Christian philosophy the more it appears a central point of history of our time since the Renaissance t and probably as the central point of ^ 4bid .. pp. 40, 116, 130, 131.

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236 the history of the age to come."^^ In discussing the meaning o£ Christian phllosopt^» we must distinguish the nature of philosophy from its state . ^^ That is to say, we must distinguish what Maritain calls "the order of specification" from "the order of exercise." In its nature and essence philosopl^ is entirely dependent upon rational reason and rational evidence alone. The philosophic domain is within the sole natural or rational faculties of the htnan mind. Philosophy is the affirmation of what Is rational and natural. In this sense, Maritain as well as Aquinas is truly an Aristotelian. Here philosophy can even be addressed to "non-belienrers" (non-Christian philosophers). The designation "Christian" which we apply to philosophy does not refer to what is in its philosophic essence or nature. Philosophy is by its nature "the perfect achievement of reason, perfectiBP opus rationis . Therefore, philosophical wisdom is attainable through the purely natural and rational faculties of the hianan mind. It is "independent of the Christian faith as to its object, its principles and its methods. "^^ In the sense of habitus or state (the order of exercise) alone, we can talk about "Christian philosophy," "preChristian philosophy," or "non-Christian philosophy." When we speak of the philosophy we are concerned with philosophy in the Christian state . Here Christian philosophy must take into account the higher wisdom, 12 An Essay on Christian Philosophy , tr. Edward H. Flannery (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. viii. 13 Ibid ., p. 13; Science and Wisdom , p. 79. An Essay on Christian Philosophy , p. lA. ^^Ibid., p. 15.

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237 mystical vtadom and theological wisdom. Philosophy Is lllimliiated or superelevated by the higher wisdom as well as the Christian faith. In the Christian state , there Is "a certain synergic and vital union of philosophy with faith and theology. "^^ Theology Is rooted In faith. Christian philosophy cannot repudiate the value of the Christian faith. A separated philosophy Is slnq>ly untenable. Marltaln, therefore, distinguishes St. Thomas Aquinas from Aristotle In that "It may be said that by the very fact that be Is a Christian, /philosophy/ takes on an added value and Import coDq>ared with the views of an Aristotle, who had no Idea of an order of revelation.'**' In regard to the distinction between philosophic nature (specification) and state (exercise), we must note a "dissymmetry" between the speculative order and the practical order. So far we have been concerned with the former. In the speculative order, we have noted that the opus phlloeophlcum Is oxtlrely Independent of regulation by the higher wisdom. The case of speculative philosophy Is "Christian only by reason of Its state." The case of practical philosophy Is rather different. It Is "Christian both by reason of Its state and by reason of Its object ." "In the practical order It /philosophy^ ceases to be fully autonomous. Its objective structure calls for positive regulations from a superior source."'-^ In political philosophy, which belongs to the practical order, there Is an additional Import. In Christian political philosophy, there is no adequate jK>lltlcal philosophy eatcept political theology. That is Rc lanoe *'nd Wisdom , p. 81. An Essay on Christian Philosophy , pp. 15-16. 18 Science and Wisdo m, p. 100.

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238 to say, the true political philosophy Is, and must be. Illuminated by the higher wisdom, theological wisdom and Infused wisdom (or the wisdom of grace). Here we must avoid lumping philosophy and theology together on the one hand and separating then on the other. Nonetheless, "• . . faith guides or orientates philosophy, velutl stella rectrlx . i^thout thereby violating Its autonomy; for It Is always In keying with Its ofm proper laws and principles and by virtue of rational norms alone that philosophy judges things." Theology (natural theology) Is also rational and htsnan. "Rooted In faith," Marltaln writes, "/theologyj conducts Its reasoning on the authority of the revealed word mid proceeds ex causa prima ; Its object Is the revealed datxm Itself, i^lch It seeks to elucidate rationally," Theology deals with the divinely revealed trutht In theology "judgments are resolved, thanks to faith. In the light of divine revelation and finally in the Increate light." This Is the reason «riiy theology enjoys Its supreme unity. It Is at once a speculative and a practical science .^ For Marltaln, theological wisdom Is "a td.sdom of faith and reason, of faith making use of reason. It Is natural In the sense that It proceeds according to hvmian logic and ... to the labour and equipment of reason; It Is supernatural In Its roots because It exists and lives only through faith. "^ However, philosophy Is not the handmaiden of theology or "phllosophla ancllla theologlae ." which, according to Marltaln, was used by St« Peter Damlanl to sllaice philosophy. For Marltaln, philosophy Is placed In the service of theology when, and only when. In Its 19 An Essay on Christian Philosophy , pp. 29, 34, 72. 20 Science and Wisdom , p. 23.

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239 ovn tforklngs theology enploys philosophy as an Ingtruaent of truth In order to establlah conclusions which are not philosophic but theological . "^'Philosophy, thus, can serve theology. The relation between philosophy and theology is somewhat analogous to that of servant and master but not to that of slave and master. "Wte should recognise the subordination /instead of subordination, Maritain prefers to use the terns "infravalence" and "infraposition'7 of philosophy to the superior orders of wisdom; and it demands that, in face of these orders of wisdom, we shall maintain and affirm the specific character, and the autonomous existence of philosophy in its own right and method. "^^ In short, philosophy certainly serves theology, but when it is engaged in its own pursuits it is a free agent. "Thomistlc philosophy," writes Maritain, "completely distinct in itself from theology, and dwelling, as it always must, both in its own hoae and in that of theology (where it is better off than in its own), has still many tasks, arrangements, and reclassification of materials to attend to before it can finally take up residence in its own quarters — witbmit breaking off its vital relations trith theology in the process* Iven though these quarters cannot boast of the spacious chambers and lofty ceilings of theology's imposing mansion, it has withal the duty not to neglect them."^^ The distinction between philosophy and theology would lead to the affirmation of an autonomous moral philosophy and an autonomous political philosophy that is distinct from moral theology. Spewing from the ^ ^An Kssay on Christian Philosophy, pp. 34, 35. ^ ^Science and Wisdom , p. 101. ^ ^An Essay on Christian Philosophy , p. 37.

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240 nature (specification) of philosophy, there Is room for a "secular" philosophy. The logic of subalternatlon, Infraposltlon, or Infrovalence seems to have tremendous cultural and political iiiq>licatlon8 in Maritain's thought. "Theology has Jurisdiction over the whole human world and it Biay even se^n especially important to-day that it should extend its view to matters of ethnology, politics, and sociology as well as the interpretation of profane history. "^^ Although there is a genuine political philosophy or a moral philosophy which is distinct from moral theology, Maritain's thought consuomates In Christian theology by this logic of Infraposltlon and infravalence. Hence, the philosophical aspects of his system must be brought to judgment before "the superior tribunal of theological wisdom." Mo doubt, the natural human end is in Itself a real end, not merely a means. However, it becomes truly a real end when it is Illuminated by the absolutely real end of the supernatural. Political philosophy is in itself an autonomous practical philosoptrir, but it must be illuailned by moral theology in order to attain its true character of practical philosophy. "The christian philosopher, " Maritain writes, "will deal with it /the relation of the church and mankin4/ by moving from humanity to the church: the theologian by moving from the church to hvonanity. For the latter the central probloa is the mystical body of Christ: for the former that of the world and its meaning. "^^ In the light of Thomlsm, therefore, it is not too difficult to * ^$cience and Wisdom , pp. 120, 121. 25ibid., p. 123.

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241 undsrstand the foundation of Maritaln's political philosophy, fbr Maritain, "political philosophy dMila with societies demanded by the very nature of man." In this respect, "the decisive influence of Aristotle is obvious, hardly surprising for a disciple of St* Thomas Aquinas." Buman nature, as it is considered exist entially, postulates the fact that man is not only a physical entity but also a moral and spiritual being. Moreover, there is no natural human nature. Man, when he is considered exist entially, is sinful and thtis demands redemption. "All politics," therefore, "is based on specific images of man and on specific vieirs of the ultimate end of himan life."^^ Thus ethical considerations are paramount in Maritain's political thinking. "Bolitics," he says, "is a branch of Ethics," though it is a "branch specifically distinct from the other branches of the same generic stock." In other words, political philosophy may be distinct from moral philosophy and moral theology in the practical order, but it is none the less subalternated to moral philosophy and moral theology. Be states again, "Folitics is essentially ethical, and Ethics is essentially realistic, not in the sense of any Realpolitick . but in the sense of a real comoon good." But this earthly coomon good of politics is a relatively ultimate end of man.^^ It is clear that, for Maritain, there is moral philosophy above political philosophy and moral theology above moral philosophy in the practical order. The practical order must be distinguished from the speculative order, although both hierarchies culminate in theological wisdom and infused wisdom. And yet, "His political, practical philosophy 26 Ualdemar Gurian, "On Maritain 's Political Philosophy," Thomist . V (January, 1943), pp. 10, 12 (italics added). 27 ""Th-; End of Machiavellianism," Review of Politics . IV (January, 1942), pp. 28, 29-30.

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242 retains always a speculative character and its interest in concrete events remains a moral and spiritual one.^^ Although Maritain maintains the superiority of theology based on faith and beatitude above all types of knowledge, his method of philosophical investigation is speculative and rational. Maritain "does not seek to be a political scientist, but remains always a political philosopher";^ more prominently, he remains a metaphysician and theologian rather than a political theorist. And yet his philosophy, for that reason, is all the more valuable for the political scientist and theorist. Although political philosophy or political theology is properly a practical order, it is necessary for us to understand the speculative side of his system. lUrltaln*s treatise on "critical realism," The Degrees of Knowledge , based on "the Aristotelian-Thomist conception of knowledge," is clearly his opus magnum . 30 Yves R. Simon, probably the most distinsuished disciple of Maritain, remarks that "no Thomist has ever written a more authentically Thomistic book than the Degrees of Knowledge . "^^ Throughout his writings Maritain has devoted far more space to the theory of knowledge than his Scholastic predecessors. In formulating his critical ^^aldemar Gurian, "On Maritain's Political Philosoplqr*" PP* 19, 20. ^Ibld., p. 20. i!here are two translations of Distinguer pour unir. ou Les degres du savoir ( The Degrees of Knowledge ), the first by Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson (1933), and the second newly translated (1959) under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan from the fourth French edition. The latter is a far better translation and is used here for all quotations and references. 31 "Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences," Thomist . V (January, 1943), p. 102.

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243 realism, Marltaln criticizes modern epistemologists and remarks that "an exclusively reflexive philosophy Judges not about what is, but about the idea o£ what is anJ ae Llcm of the idea, and of the idea of the idea of the idea of what is. And it does so in a tone that is all the more superior, the more it fails to lay hands on the real and avoids the risk of scraping the skin off them; whereas the courage that properly belongs to the philosophy of nature, as well as to metaphysics, is to face up to extram^ital realities, to lay hands on things, to Judge about what is." In another passage he criticizes the idealists: "It is absurd to demand that philosophical thought begin, even before it knows anything validly, by proving that it can know (for it could only do so if it did know). It is absurd to suppose at the very start that anything %fhich cannot help but be Judged true by the mind can, as a result of so— evil genius, not be true, so that then that selfsame mind might be asked to show that, as a matter of fact, it is not so* It is absurd to admit that the mind could only attain phenomenal objects and then ask it to prove that such objects are extramental realities*" Accordingly, Marltaln takes the position of a realist in the recognition of extramental realities indcspendent of human thought and ideas *^^ For Marltaln the act of knowing presiq>poses an ontological order* In other words, "Inasmuch as the intellect primarily bears neither on itself, nor on the ego, but on being , then the very first evidence . . « the evidence that is first in Itself for the intellect, is that of the principle of identity 'discovered* in the Intellectual apprehension of being or the real." Referring to "the relation between the soul that T:he Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 7A, 84-85.

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244 knows and the thing known," Marltaln says, "There is a secret, mysterious and holy substance In this great machinery of logic that no treatment can change — the essence or nature, the Inmost ontologlcal depth of the thing, made present to the mind through the Idea*" He enq>ha8lzes that "this distinction between the mode of existing of the thing and the thing Itself, or Its nature. Is of capital liiqx>rtance In the theory of knowledge." And "In the act of knowing, the thing (In the very measure In which It Is known) and mind are not only Joined, they are strictly one." This notion of one-ness Is the mode of the definition of truth for Marltaln as It Is for St. Thomas Aquinas. The definition of truth, according to Aquinas Is the "adequation or conformity between Intellect and thing." And Marltaln adds that "conformity Is established between the being possessed by the thing and the being affirmed by the mlnd.^^ Since truth Is grasped In relation to existence, a new problem of "thing" and "object" arises. The misunderstanding of this fundamental problem, according to Marltaln, confuses "the noetic of so many modern authors." He Insists that "being (the being enveloped In sensible things) Is the first object attained by our Intellect." The notion of being Is simply "what exists or can exist ." And Intellect can perceive only what exists or can exist In the thing In Itself "without positing extramental being." This notion Is what Marltaln calls "the principle of Identity." Thus, "that apprehension of being Is absolutely first and Is Implied In all other Intellectual apprehensions." Furthermore, he Insists that, "In God alone are subject and object Identified. He knows Himself exhaustively and all things In Himself, because His act of knowledge Is His very Infinite essence." Because God Is Infinite, ^^Ibld., pp. 77, 87, 88.

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245 "existence and knowledge" are purely and absolutely the sane thing* "There Is no distinction, not even a virtual distinction, between esse divinum and intelligere dlvlnum * His existence is His own very act of understanding."^ Marltain believes, therefore, that the capital error of the idealists (Dascartes in particular) was separation of "the ob^ject and the thing ." Hcwever, this does not mean that the object and the thing cannot be distinguished. On the contrary, Marltain says, "If, with Aristotle and St. Thomas, thing and object are distinguished in this fashion but not separated, and if, while maintaining their unity, al* lowance is made for what comes from the thing and for what cooes from the mind in knowing, then it is clear that . . . the mind draws forth . . . the universe of intelligibility or of human knowledge. And that universe is, on the one hand, detached from the universe of existence, in order that it may be known. It is, on the other hand, identified with it. In order that it may itself subsist."^' In short, Marltain analyses the disease of the modem mind in terms of his notion of critical realism; condemns modem philosophers for having disclaimed totally the proper function of the intellect and hnstfn reason; and maintains that '*huBian reason is in a position to survey the whole vast field of Its activity.'* In order to cure the disease of the modem mind, Marltain proposes that, in the words of Gerald B. Phelan, '*The scope of human knowledge must first be clearly defined and accurately mapped; the alms and purposes of man's thought determined; ^Ibld . , pp. 94, 110, 113. 35ibld., pp. 128, 130-31.

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246 the various degrees and sorts of knowledge distinguished and their respective values estimated; order must be restored to the Intellectual as well as the practical life, and the hierarchy of knowledge re-established."^^ Therefore, It becomes of utmost Importance to fix the proper place for each branch of human knowledge and to determine Its relationships to each of the other branches.^' Agreeing with Btlenne Gllson that, "First one must extricate himself from the obsession that eplstemology Is the primary condition of philosophy," Marltaln says, "an authentic critique of knowledge, recognizing as It does that It Is foolish to regard the retracing of Its own footprints as the first step along Its path, does not pretend to be a prerequlred condition of philosophy* . • . [tJ critique of knowledge presupposes a long effort of knowing, knowing which Is not only spontaneous but scientific, too, and not only scientific (in the modem meaning of the word 'science', but philosophical, psychological, logical and metaphysical krrawledge as well." Marltaln, like Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, thinks that the critique of knowledge does not come at the beginning of metaphysics, but rather it "forms part of metaphysical knowledge trhlch is the highest wisdom in the natural order." Thus, "Critique of kxx>wledge or qplstemology does not exist as a discipline distinct from metaphysics. To give it a separate existence is to set a third term between realism and idealism, between yes and no. And that 36 Jacques Marltaln (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), p. 20. 37 W. 0. Martin remarks that "Marltaln has established himself as a contemporary master of the subject of the order of knowledge." The Order and Integration of Knowledse (Ann Arbor t University of Michigan Press, 1957), p. 302.

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247 is the whole claim of those modems with their unthinkable notion of a 'pure phenomenon' which empties the very concept of being, the most general of all our concepts, of all things."^ ^The Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 79, 80.

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CHAPTER X THE SPECULATIVE ORDER Jacques Maritaln Is truly a master of the integration of all human knowledge. He strives for unity which, according to him, is not equilibrium or balance. All types of human knowledge meet and Join together at the summit of theological wisdom and infused wisdom. As it has already been noted, the flow of knowledge between the summit and the bottom is a two-way traffic: the first is from the summit to the bottom (from a divine point of view) and the second is from the bottom to the top (from a human point of view). The first is primary and the second, though iiq>ortant and autonomous in its own right, is secondary. "Western civilisation," Maritaln writes, "may well be aware of the several precious gifts belonging to the spiritual order that it has given to the cosnunlty of mankind. One of these gifts is the pure sense of speculative truth. "^ This is the speculative domain in contrast to the practical. In both domains, Maritaln 's whole system comprises the ordering of knowledge, theology, metaphysics, philosophy, logic, the philosophy of nature on the one hand and moral philosophy, the philosophy of culture, the philosophy of history, political philosophy Science and Wisdom, p. 70. 248

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249 and the philosophy of art on the other band.^ These tributaries of knowledge converge to the highest and loftiest wisdom, which Is the governing body of all types of knowledge. Thus, what we might call the "law of governance" of a higher order over a lower order Is from up, downward, although each type has a kind of autonomous status of Its own. Jacques Marltaln, like his predecessors Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, divides the wtole range and scope of human knowledge Into two realms: the "speculative" and the "practical."^ The difference between these two realms of knowledge arises from the purposes or alms, the e»ida which they pursue. Speculative knowledge Is by definition oriented toward contemplation or thought, whereas practical knowledge Is oriented toward action. In other words, speculative knowledge Is knowledge of truth for the sake of truth; practical knowledge Is knowledge for the sake of doing (as In ethics or moral philosophy) and of making (as In art or the philosophy of art). Thus the practical Intellect Is the guide In art and human conduct; the speculative Intellect Is the guide In wisdom and science, or philosophy. This distinction Is derived from 2 Among the numerous works of Marltaln, the following are the most representative: The Degrees of BCnowled^e ; Science and Wisdom ; An Essay on Christian Philosop hy; Approaches to God , tr. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954); A Preface to Metaphysics (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939); An Introduction to Philosophy , tr. E. I. Wat kin (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); An Introduction to Logic , tr. Imelda Choquette (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937); Philosophy of Nature . tr. Imelda C. Byrne (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951); True Human Ism , tr. Margot Adamson (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1938); On the Philosophy of History ; Scholasticism and Politics ; Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); and The Philosophy of Art . tr. John O'Connor (London: B. Husq>hrle8, 1923). See Appendix I.

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250 the classical tradition. Greek wisdom, Marltaln connents, "discerned with sureness the fundamental distinction between speculative philosophy and practical philosophy, the object and nature of metaphysics, physics and logic, the hierarchy of the sciences and the subordination of the special sciences to the sinqplest and most universal science, the science irtiich is the most highly speculative and the most disinterested, which has to do with being as such and with the causes of being." In Thotnlsm, Greek wisdom is superinqiosed by Christian theology. The former begins with things, visible reality and works upward, whereas the latter starts out with the law of the Incarnation and Illuminates downward. In the latter sense alone, the unity of knowledge is acconq>llshed. "If the ancient world," Marltaln writes, "appears as the world of a competition of wisdoms , the christian world will appear to us as the world of synthesis and of the hierarchy of wisdoms ."^ At the summit of the great pyramid, there lies the loftiest peak of theology, which is at once speculative and practical in its nature. The term "knowledge," as Marltaln uses it, has three different meanings. The first meaning is most comprehensive; "it means knowing In a firm and stable way ." Since it is human or rational wisdcnn, it is not exhaustive (for Instance, there is Infused wisdom above it on the highest plane). But it none the less is capable of Intellectual perfection. In its own right, for the attainment of truth. Secondly, the term "knowledge" is used in an Intermediary sense. It is used in contradistinction to the highest form of understanding. It therefore means "science" in opposition to "wisdom." "Wisdom," Marltaln defines, "is Science and Wisdom , pp. 12, 18-19.

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251 knowledge through the highest sources and in the deepest and sio^lest sense.'*' Knowledge In the second sense (science) means "knowing In detail and by proximate or apparent causes ."^ In turn, science is defined as, "in Its widest meaning, synonymous with knowledge; in the narrow sense, a particular discipline with its own proper object and formal reason; more precisely, an organically constituted body of evident, certain, and necessary truths. A science is true if it is adeqiiate to Its object and can resolve its conclusions in evident principles."' The third meaning does not bear any significance here. It is used in an Inferior way; it Is not used in the framework of phllosophla perennis but only in the common speech of men. In this sense, knowledge does not convey the true mode of understanding. It is truly used in opposition to wisdom. In short, the term "knowledge" can be used, in its widest sense, to Include wisdom and science; and it can be used. In its narrowest sense, in place of science in contradistinction to wisdom. Speculative knowledge presupposes "abstraction by intellect.** This notion of speculative intelligibility is linked to non-materiality. Harltaln holds that, "It is therefore by the diverse modes or degrees in which the objects of thought discovered in things by the operations of the Intellect are freed from matter that it becomes possible to establish the essential divisions of science." Science in general deals with "the necessities immanent in nature, with the universal essence realised in individuals in the concrete and sensible world." The ^Ibld. , pp. 4-5; An Essay in Christian Philosophy , p. 113, "Science and Wisdom , p. 5. ^ An Essay on Christian Philosophy , p. 114.

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252 essential divisions of science are based upon the various degrees of intelligibility of the objects of knowledge.^ Marltaln follows St. Thomas Aquinas in distinguishing three kinds of wisckrat in the hierarchic order of knowledge: infused wisdom or the wisdom of grace, theological wisdom and metaphysical wisdom* They are distinguished on the basis of their "objective light" and their "formal object." In terms of objective light, the first (infused wisdom) has "the kinship of love with the supernatural." It attains God . in a superhuman way. "It is a trlsdom of love and of union. As its principles theologians «iisnerate faith and charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit acting under God's actual inspiration and illumination." It is sovereign and, therefore, "it can make use of everything. It may use the treasures of the Imagination and of creative intuition, and the stammerings of poetry: and then it sings with David. Or it may make use of the ideas and treasures of the intelligence and the stamnerings of the philosophers: and then it teaches with St. Augustine."' Theological wisdom is the second form of wisdom. "Its special . light is the ccHnmmicatlon of the knowledge i^ich God has of Himself, uhich is made to us by revelation /[not by love as in infused vtadotgj, and which offers to unfold its content to the effort of our intellect." Thus, the method for theological wisdom is human, discursive, or rational. It is a wisdom of faith that makes use of human reason and logic. The third form of wisdom is metaphysical wisdom, which will be discussed in detail later. It has for its special light "the intelligibility of ®lbid., p. 43. 9 Science and Wisdom , pp. 22, 23.

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253 Being. "''^ In accordance with the "Law of governance" the wisdom of grace is above theological wisdom and theological wisdmn, above metaphysical wisdom. Infused wisdom and theological wisdom belong aright to the s(q>ematural, trtiereas mettqxfayaical wisdoa belongs to the natural order in which it is the queen. In the world of nature (in the speculative order), there are essentially three degrees of abstraction. They are Fhysica . the knowledge of saisible nature (the sensible real ), which is the first and lowest degree of abstraction; Mathauatica . the knowledge of quantity as such (the preter real ), which is the second degree of abstraction; and Metaphysica . the knowledge of what is beyond sensible nature (the transsensible ), or being as being, which is the third and the highest degree of abstraction in the natural order. ^'^ "The division of the three orders of abstraction," Maritain writes, "is an analogical division. The three orders are not part of the same genus i they constitute fundamentally different genera. "^^ Physics , the lowest degree of abstraction, is represented by physics itself. It is divided by Maritain into two distinct sciences i the science of affirmation (primarily inductive science of sensible nature) and the sci«ice of corporeal being. He defines science in the strict sense of the term: "Scioice . . . considers only the intelligible necessities InBersed in the reality of this world of existoice. Each of our typical knowledges considers in it one, and only one, universe of ^®Ibid., pp. 23-2A. The Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 35-38; Science and Wisdom . p. 38. See Appendixes II and III. 12 Science and Wisdom , p. 38.

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254 intelligible necessities, while if there is a supreme knowledge, a knowledge-in-chief, a knowledge of first principles, it will consider all these different universes together, not in such a way as to replace the particular knowledge that concerns itself with each of then, but in order to know that knowledge itself, to defend and justify its principles, and thus to establish unity. "^^ The second degree of abstraction is Matheaatica * Following the dictisn that "every higher discipline is regulative with respect to its inferiors," the law of governance, mathematics governs the lower world of empirical sciences, the first degree of abstraction. Though mathematics is materially inductive like other empirical sciences, it is formally "a deductive science, a science of the propter quid ." Mathematics "will tend to rule the lower sections of knowing, if not to encroach upon metaphysics itself ."^^ In concluding our discussion of the worlds of Physica and Mathematica, we should eBq>ha8ize again Maritain's insistence upon seeking a unity in speculative knowledge and upon finding a formula to distinguish but not to separate all types of knowledge. In this spirit he stresses the knowledge accuasulated by modem science, though science itself culminates in metaphysics. In recognizing the important developments which have occurred in modem science, he declares, "it seems that a true philosophy of the progress of the physical and mathematical sciences in the course of modem times, precisely because it is its duty to set forth by critical reflection the spiritual values with which that 13 The Degrees of Knowledge , p. 136. ^^Ibid., p. 41.

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235 progress is pregnant, must recognise In it the sign, not o£ a restriction and In^KTverlshment , but of an liqirovement and growth td.thln the organic structure and differentiation of thought. It must therefore, on the one hand, reveal the essential conpatlblllty of this raatheoatlcal and emplrlometrlcal progress with the knowledge of the onto logics I type which Is proper to philosophy. On the other hand. It must respect the nature of the E3q>erliiiental Sciences. . . ."^^ Although formally the BSthenatlcal and en^lrlcal types of knowledge have some connection with higher types, each lower type, each Individual science, maintains an autonomy In regard to Its particular sphere of knowledge, and this Individual autonomy within the whole xmlverse of knowledge In turn contributes to a widening of the scientific field. Below metaphysics and above science of the emplrlo logical type there exists another type of knowledge — the philosophy of nature. "The philosophy of nature," Marltaln explains, "knows the same world as the enplrlo logical scl«ice, the world of change and movement, of sensible and material nature; but the resolution of concepts Is made here In Intelligible being, not In the observable and measurable as such."^^ If the philosophy of nature Is related to political philosophy at all. It Is because man Is related to nature Itself. The conflict between philosophy and science Is the core of the problem of the philosophy of nature. Metaphysics actually lies halfway between the philosophy of nature and the highest and loftiest spiritual wisdom of the Divine Spirit. Thus metaphysics, because of Its superior ^^Ibid., pp. 200-201. Scholasticism and Politics , p. 54.

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256 position to the philosophy of nature, rules the philosophy of nature as well as the lowest level of abstraction of physical sciences* "Metaphysics is more perfectly speculative than the philosophy of nature and the sciences of phenomena*"''' However, we must distinguish the philosophy of nature, which is a type of ontological knowledge, from the sciences of the observable phenomena. Besides, the sci^ices of phenomena know the order of nature in an unsatisfactory way without the aid of a higher knowledge. Therefore, "they require to be completed by another knowledge of the same sensible universe, which will be an ontological knowledge — in truth, a philosophy of nature." The philosophy of nature, due to the fact that it is a higher type of ontological knowledge (philosophical), rules the lower sectors of the sciences of es^tirio logical type. In the first and lowest order of abstraction or intelligibility, everything is resolved in the observable; however, in the ontological type of intelligibility, everyting is resolved primarily in intelligible being as such. "Thus the object of natural philosophy does not lie in the detailed phenomena of sensible things but in intelligible being itself as mutable . . . ." In short, "Bringing with it the light of philosophical illumination, the philosophy of nature liberates in the scientific universe an intelligibility t^ich the sciences themselves cannot provide* It discloses in sensible reality, known in so far as imitable, analogical traces of de^er realities and truths which are the proper object of metaphysics."^* The philosophy of nature, therefore, occiq>les a unique position in the hierarchy of speculative knowledge. It is "the battleground of Science and Wisdom ^ p. 71. ^®Ibld., pp. 52, 61, 68.

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257 science and phllosoptty" because it occupies an Intermediary position between metaphysics and enqplrlo logical science. Marltaln holds that "the proper object o£ the philosophy of nature does not extend to that specific diversity of bodies, nor to the whole multitude of their phenomena, and Is constituted only by transcendental being as determined and particularized In the corporeal, mobile and sensible worlds." Therefore, "the philosophy of nature Is In a certain continuity with metaphysics. In spite of the essential difference separating then," and It Is thus superior to mathematics. Furthermore, It must be noted that, "Ihllosopl^ does Indeed provide a deductive science of corporeal being , but that it Is Incapable of providing a deductive science of the phenomena of nature."*' If one wants to understand "the eplstemo logical conditions and characteristics of the Philosophy of Mature," one oiust realize that the philosophy of nature, "however obscured by sensible matter ... belongs to an ontologlcal type of eiqplanatlon, wherein the natural movement of the speculative Intellect finds full play. It does not cling to empirical conditions, but to reasons of being and to causes properly so called. It aims to discover the essence of things. "^^ Proceeding from an ana lytic -synthetic method as in philosophy proper, ^^ the philosophy 19 The Degrees of Knowledge , p. 38. ^ ^Ibld .. p. 175. 21 According to Marltaln, philosophy proper uses an analytlcosynthetic method. "The analytic method, which predominates in the natural sciences and is inductive, proceeds from the observation of facts to the formulation of the laws governing them; the synthetic method, which is dominant in speculative science and is deductive, goes from the general to the particular, from first principles to specific applications, from the simple to the complex." An Essay on Christian Philosophy , p. 109.

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258 of nature "depends on experlmce much more stringently than Metaphysics and must be able to carry Its judgm^its right down to sense verification. NeverthelesSt it is a deductive scioice, assigning reasons and intelligible necessities in proportion as it ascertains the intrinsic constitutive or the 'quiddity' of its objects." In this way, the philosophy of nature "participates in some way in the light of metaphysics, even as our soul participates in some way in the nature of pure spirits* The specifying object of the Philosophy of Nature is the ontological mutability and the formalities in which the mind can discern a difference of being (corporeity, quantity, motion, life animality, etc.) within corporeal natures taken as such. And this suffices to assure its distinction and autottowy in regard to the experimental sciences. "^^ Metaphysics is the highest degree of abstraction or intelligibility in the order of nature. Metaphysics itself is not without relation to a practical philosophy. It is "somewhat indirectly" related to a practical philosophy, since man is part of the universe and the world of hunan action is linked with this universe. As theology (as a rational defense of divine revelation) should defend its principles and the faith against the adversaries of faith, the task of metaphysics, "as siq>reme science of the natural order," is to defend "the real value of reason and of its principles against the skeptics. . . »^ "Since metaphysics considers the highest reasons for being, it will, as a result, be the regulating science par excellence, scientia rectrix." In the speculative order it occupies "the supreme and nche Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 175, 178. ^ ^An Essay on Christian Philosophy , pp. 41, 56.

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259 masterform of knowledge*" It Is primarily In the domain of what Maritaln calls \A»dom, differing from science in the letter's strict sense. As we recall, there are three forms of wisdom: the highest form of wisdom, infused wisdonj theological wisdomj and the lowest form of wisdom* metaphysical wisdom. And yet metaphysics is a form of science In Harltaln's wider definition of the term. Science in the wider sense is wisdom which "knows things through first causes and the highest reasons for being," and in its narrow sense is that which "knows things through second causes or proximate principles." Then, "Metaphysical wisdom is St the purest degree of abstrsctlon because it is farthest removed from the senses; it opens out onto the immaterial, onto a world of realities which exist or can exist s^arately from matter." Maritaln maintains, therefore, that it is of necessity and by its nature '*the lot of all IwMm science," and that it "sets ua down in the midst of the eternal end the absolute." Thus, "Metaphysics is not a means; it is an end, a fruit, a good at once self-justifying and delightful, a knowledge for the free man, the freest and naturally most regal knowledge, the door to the leisure of that greet speculative activity In which Intellect alone can breath, set, as it is, on the very peak of causes. "^^ Again, he writes that, "It has for its own special light the intelligibility of Being in its pure state (1. e., without interior reference to a construction in the imagination or a sense experience) at the highest degree of abstractive intuition . . « Being in Its own proper mystery, ens secundum quod ens ."^^ Metaphysics is thus not only the highest of the three 24 The Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 5, 41, 46. 25 * Science and Wisdom , p. 24«

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260 degrees of abstraction, but also philosophy '^In the strictest and most correct sense of the terra." Metaphysics Is a science of being qua being: The object of metaphysics Is not In the least the world of the universal knovm In the most general and therefore least determined fashion. In other words. It Is not the generic classes of the things of nature. It Is an entirely other world, the world of the super-universal, the world of transcendental objects which, dlsmgaged as such, do not demand, as genera do, to be completed by progressive differentiations coming as from outside, but offer a field of intelligibility which has in Itself its own ultimate determi' nations* And those objects can be realised outside the whole order of the genera and differentiations of the world of experience. That is why metaphysics is a perfect knowledge, a true science. 26 Though the proper object of metaphysics is not God (as in theology or "natural theology" which is part of metaphysics itself), "a wholly Innaterlal subsistence is an object of metapl^sics."^^ Metaphysics Is distinguished from theology according to its specific object and light in %»hlch the matter is studied as to its mode. The metaphysician approaches his subject from the standpoint of being as being, even if he must realize the fact that God is the first cause. The theologian , on the other hand, approaches his subject in the light of the Divine Being and its communication to us*^^ However, of cardinal importance is the fact that "the field of metaphysical wisdon itself conqprises the reflexive knowledge of the relation of thought to being (critique), the knowledge of being as being (ontology in the strict sense), the knowledge of pure spirits and the nChe Dearees of Knowledge » pp. 5, 41, 46. 27lbid., p. 218. ^ ^Sdence and Wisdom , pp. 104-105.

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261 knowledge of God according as these knowledges are accessible to reason alone (pneumatology and natural theology). . . ." Fbr Marltaln, metaphysics occupies the highest nmg on the ladder of hianan knowledge In the natural order, since It contributes to the understanding of God and to the ej^lanatlon of all being. If "metaphysics descends to the actual existence of things In tine, and rises to the actual existence of things outside time. It Is not only because actual existence Is the sign pa.r excellence of the Intrinsic possibility of existence, but also and especially because existence Itself Is « . . the seal of all perfection, and cannot reaialn outside the field of the highest knowledge of belng*"^ The relationship between philosophy and science deserves attention. Marltaln conceives of science as the study that "proceeds from the visible to the visible" and "from the observable to the observable," wbereas philosophy "proceeds from the visible to the Invisible, /that i,aj to what Is of Itself outside the order of sensible observation (for the sliqple reason that the principles which Ahe phllosopheij^ reaches are In themselves pure object of understanding and not object of sensible apprehension or Imaginative r^resentatlon. Here Is a world unimaginable by nature or 'negatively*)." Since they have utterly different formal objects, other principles of explanation, diverse conceptual InstnsiHmts, and, on the part of the knowing subject himself, qxilte distinct Intellectual virtues or discriminating lights, the doaaln proper to philosophy and the domain proper to the sciences do not overlap. No e]q>lanatlon In the scientific order will ever be able to displace or replace an e3q>lanatlon belonging to the philosophical order, and vice versa. Thus "the sciences do not depend on philosophy for their Intrinsic development." Marltaln maintains further that the sciences are dependent 29 The Degrees of Knowledge , p. 218.

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262 In principle (formally), and only In principle, on philosophy. Accordingly, he writes: Truth to tell, scientific esqplanatlons do not reveal the very being of things. Since they explain only proximate causes or even that kind of formal cause which Is the conformity of phenomena to mathematical law (and such moreor-less arbitrarily constructed entitles fashioned as a support for this type of law), they can never satisfy the mind. For the mind will always, and necessarily, raise questions of a higher order and strive to penetrate Into the purely Intelligible. From this point of view, we can say there Is a certain dependence of the sciences on philosophy. Inasmuch as they seek the ralson d'etre and yet reveal it only imperfectly, the sciences themselves inspire the mind with a desire for philosophy and look for support to a higher knowledge. Moreover, the scientist as a human being poses "stable ontological nuclei" or "substantial x*s, that serve to support phenomena." Haritain points out here that the sciences by themselves are Insufficient to explain the principle of causality (metaphysical causality), and that they must, therefore, presuppose the first principles; otherwise, "an infinite regress in this order clearly renders all demonstration in^ossible." Thus, "it is philosophy that determines the nature of the primary objects the sciences work on and, consequently, their own very nature, value and limits. For exao^>le, philosophy, not mathematics, will tell us whether or not irrational ntmbers and transfinite numbers are real beings or beings of reason. ..." Philosophy also "assigns the order reigning among the sciences: sapient is est ordinare ." And philosophy, being superior to the sciences, is independent of them. Although there is no fonaal dependence of philosophy tqwn the sciences^ Marltain maintains that the history of philosophy shows unequivocally that "there is, to be sure, a great MATERIAL dependence of philosophy on the sciences." And yet, he declares, "To imagine that philosophical doctrines have to be changed with every scientific revolution would be as absurd as to

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263 think that the soul is transformed «d.th every change of dlet."^^ It is "also an Illusion to believe that by appealing to scientific facts without first illuminating them by a higher light « any philosophical debate — the debate about hyl(»K>rphisai, for instance — may be settled. "^^ Maritain*s acceptance of Thoraism fundamentally presupposes a belief in the imnutability of philosophical principles* Thus if he accepted a hypothesis that philosophical principles themselves change because of the discovery of new scientific principles and laws, there would be no valid ground whatsoever for accepting ThcHnism in the present age* Thoraism would become merely a museum piece in the history of philosophy* Since modem science has aodified not only the tone but also the basic trend in the method of inquiring into the philosophical principles and problems in question, there seems to be an unbridgeable chaaa between scientific philosophy and Thomism, especially "the philosophy of science" and the Thomistic philosophy of nature*^^ ^ ^Ibid *. pp.4750. 31 Philosophical facts may be distinguished from scientific facts. A philosophical fact is "the fact that something exists, the fact that a multitude exists* that change and becoming exist, that knowledge and thought exist, that desire exists ." Ibid ., pp. 57, 58. 32 For instance, compare any work of Jacques Marltain with, say, Hans Reinchenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957). Henry Margenau, a physicist and philosopher of science, stresses the fact that "ultimately sociology, ethics, politics, and «v«i religion are infected by the germ that is born when a truly great discovery in pure science is made." Recognizing "the cultural lag between scientific discovery and its philosophic understanding," he ventures to surmise "the features of the coming philosophy, which will be a true transcription of the ideal resources, attitudes, and comnitments of present science." "Perspectives of Science," Key Reporter . XXV (Autuma, 1959), pp. 2,3,8.

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264 Be that as It may, Marltaln holds that the Thomlstlc principles of philosophy not only purify concepts of the nature of philosophy after "three centuries of neglect and misunderstanding'* (probably since the Cartesian revolution), but also guard against "both a lasy separatism and a facile concordism and re-establish a vital bond between ifphilosophy and e3q>erimental scienc^ without upsetting the distinctions and hierarchies which are essential to the universe of knowing." He continues, "In determining the nature and true value of pfaysico-matheoatical science, the place, role and extent of its esqplanations, not only does metaphysics ke^ the system of our cognitions in order, but it raiders mathematical ptqrsics the essontial service of protecting it against distortions that would be almost inevitable without it; above all, against the harmful illusion that leads it to regard itself as a philosophy of nature and to believe that things begin to exist only wti&x they are measured by our instruments." For Maritain, TbcMnism alone can save philosophy from the mistakes of the past as well as of the present since the time of Descartes. Thus he writes confidocitly that, "One is right in holding that Thomistic philosophy is, more than any other philosophy, in a position to provide the sciences with metaphysical frameworks within which they may deploy their own necessities unhaiiq>ered and suffer no violence. This is so not only because Thomistic philosophy is essentially realistic and gives a critical justification for the extramental reality of things and the value of our powers of knowing « . . but also because it guuirantees the autonomy and specific character of each and because its metaphysical explanation of the real have as their necessary consequence no systematic

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265 deformation tyrannically Imposed on experience. "^3 Although In metaphysics Harltaln establishes a unity o£ the speculative order of knowledge In the uorld of nature, his philosophical system continues and terminates finally In theology. It Is In this respect that he Is a theologian as well as a philosopher following the footstep of his master, St. Thomas Aquinas. He Is a philosophertheologian. Martin Grabmann says that, "for Thcnaas, theology Is not merely science and the highest of all the sdaices, but rather wisdom — sapient la dlvlna ."^ Theology thus considered, moreover, has profoimd la^llcatlons In man's practical life. "Since St* Thomas elevates the science of theology to wisdom, he thereby gives It an eminent ethical significance, stressing the Intimate, mutual relation between theology and life. For this reason Thomas frequently enq>ha8lze8 the lnqMrtance of supernatural ethical purity and sanctity for a theological knowledge. "35 For Marltaln, theological wisdom and Infused wisdom vivify metapl^slcal wisdom, just as metaphysical wisdom vivifies the lower levels or strata of knowledge Including the philosophy of nature, mathematical sciences and physical sciences. ^^ Marltaln points out that "metaphysics suffers not only from the common necessity of abstraction and discourse; It also suffers a weakness proper to Itself. It Is a natural theology; Its object Is, above all, the Catise of causes." However, "metaphysics makes God known to us only by analogy, known, . . . not In those things T^he Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 60, 64, 66. ^The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas , p. 29. 35|bid.36 Science and Wisdom , p. 86.

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266 which are His very own, but in the commonness of transcendental perfections which exist at once in Htm and in things — though in infinitely different snodes." At the sumnit of metaphysical inquiry there is the higher wisdom of natural theology, the knowledge of God, which is the last and the highest department of metaphysics. "Our knowledge of God does not proceed merely from ananoetic intellection or intellection by analogy. It is necessary to add that this analogy is uncontaining, uncircumscriptive ." Thus, "All the divine perfections are strictly identified in God. When ^PUtritain saysj being of God, the word continues to signify being and does not signify, does not present to /his7 mind, goodness of knowledge, and yet the being of God ta His knowledge and His goodness. His mercy and His Justice*'* Therefore, God is "simple, one, good, omniscient, all-powerful, free. . . ."3' Furthermore, Maritain maintains that there is a higher type of. theology, apophatic theology which "knows God by the way of negation and nonknowing," above cataphatic (or natural) theology which "proceeds by way of affirmation and of science." He says: "i^phatic theology, or theology by way of non-knowing, is not a pure and simple ignorance, but an ignorance which knows, for that is its proper mystery. ... It is one of the ways of metaphysical knowledge or ordinary theology, and indeed its most exalted moment." It is rightly called "mystical theology," it is theology, in a usual understanding of the term, that is understood by faith or mystical conteii^>lation. Maritain explains, "in the metaphysical knowledge of God, it is from the heart of the intelligible that our intellect, having discovered the ananoetic value of ^ ^The Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 6, 226, 227, 229.

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267 being and of objects which belong to the transcendental order, rises, thanks to them, to the divine ana lo gate. On the contrary, in the knowledge of faith it is fron the very heart of the divine transintelligible, from the very heart of the deity that the whole process of knowledge starts out, in order to return thither* That is to say, from this source, through the free generosity of God, derives the choice of objects and of concepts in the intelligible universe which falls under our senses, which God alone knows to be analogical signs of what is hidden in Him, and of which He makes use in order to speak of Himself to us in our own language*"^ Finally, there is still a higher point beyond mystical eiqperience. This is what Haritain calls "the Beatific Vision." He says "Faith, a substitute for vision here below, and a beginning of eternal life, kiujws this selfsame object WXTHOm: SEEING IT, giving, as it does, even in obscurity, an infallible adherence to what first Truth has revealed of itself.'* However, "the Beatific Vision knows Him BY and IN His very essence, stcut in se est , according to what He is in Himself, in a way proportionate to what He is, without mediation of any creature or concept." According to Haritain, there is a capital difference in the uses of analogy in the realm of faith and in the realm of metaphysics. "In the case of metaphysics, analogy constitutes the very form and rule of knowledge. God is not attained in virtue of His incoamunicable nature and selfhood . . . but only according to that which is shown in His reflections . . . and in the analogical participations irtiich things proportionate to our reason offer us of Him." Namely, 'betaphysics is poised at the suamit of the created world, and from that ^Ibid .. pp. 236, 237.

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268 vantage point, it looks upon the inaccessible entrance towards which all created perfections converge — but without seeing Him in Himself. Faith is installed in that very entrance itself, at the very heart of the Uncreated, but God has closed its eyes to Himself. And it is through the images of creatures which it remembers having seen here below that it describes His mystery. Deity as such is achieved, but without being seen and without any apprehension exc^t by the analogies that God chooses in the created thing to instruct us about it."^ Finally, the Beatific Vision is enjoyed only by "the blessed in heaven. "^0 From the stanc^int of this essay, the relation between theology and philosophy is extremely important. As it has already be«i noted, theology and philosophy are intimately related, although they are distinguished from one another. As the lower form of knowledge (or wisdom) aspires to the higher form, philosophy aspires to theology. "Theology is quite a different thing from a simple application of philosophy to matters of revelation t that would be a monstrous conc^tion; it would submit revealed data to a purely human light and subordinate theological wisdom to philosophy." This is the scandal of anthropocentric humanism. Instead, theology is "an elucidation of revealed data by faith vitally linked with reason, advancing in step with reason and arming itself with philosophy." Thus "philosophy, far from subordinating theology to Itself, is properly the 'servant' of theology in the immanent use theology makes of it. Theology is free as regards philosophical doctrines. ^Ibld., pp. 241-42, 249, 251. Charles A. Fecher, The Fhilosophy of Jacques Marltain . p. 111.

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269 It is theology that chocea mong these doctrines the one that will In its hands be the best instrinent of truth. "^^ Marltaln writes elsewhere that "the premisses of philosophy, however, are independent of theology, being those primary truths which are self-evident to the understanding, whereas the premisses of theology are the truth revealed by God. ... It is therefore plain that philosophy and theology are entirely distinct. But if philosophy and thcK>logy are entirely distinct, they are not therefore unrelated, and although philosophy is of all the human sciences pre-eminently the free science, in the sense that it proceeds by means of premisses and laws which d^end on no science 8«q>erior to itself, its freedom — that is, its freedom to err — is limited in so far as it is subject to theology, i^ich controls it extemally*"^^ In regard to the problems which are concerned with the destiny of man and with the conduct of the universe, metaphysics, like other sciences, is resolved in an unsatisfactory way if it is not illuminated or superelevated by a higher type of wisdom. We should remember moreover, the law of the hierarchy of knowledge and wisdom: "the lower . . . always tends to the higher and seeks to make contact with it! supremum infimi attignit ad infimum supremi ." Metaphysical wisdom is strengthened by supernatural faith and by theology in the search for truth. Thus Maritain concludes: "now if the lights of faith and speculative theology bring home to the philosopher with greater force, perfection, and certitude his act of purely rational TThe Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 252-53* 42 An Introduction to Philosophy , pp. 95-96.

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270 adherence to the object of philosophical knowledge, such as the existence of the first transcendent cause, and even to the first principles of reason, for how much greater reason ought the light of wisdom par excellence, niystical experience of the things divine, aid and purify the philosophical intellect. '"^^ It is the speculative order of knowledge, then, that nan's intellect through abstraction finds knowledge for its own sake, truth for the sake of truth. The speculative order contains three degrees of intelligibility in the order of nature: Physica wherein empirical knowledge of the sensible world is resolved in sensible being; Mathematica wherein enq[>irical knowledge of the sensible world is resolved in quantity as such; and Metaphysica wherein human knowledge is resolved in being as being. In metaphysics man's natural knowledge as such attains its highest summit of the great pyr^nid; from metaphysics it reaches out toward knowledge of pure being revealed through analogy in cataphatic theology, through faith or mystical contemplation in apophatic theology, and finally "the sight of God face to face as He is" in the Beatific Vision. Metaphysics, the queen of natural knowledge in the practical order, however, must of its very nature be superelevated by theology. In the hierarchy of knowledge Maritain distinguishes the various strata, but he does not separate them from one another; through the logic or law of subaltemation (infraposition or infravalence) each field of knowledge, a higher form regulates a lower form of knowledge without violating the letter's autonomy in the proper sphere of its own. Thus, physical science and mathematical sciences are subaltemated to ^^ The Degrees of Rnowledf^e . pp. 284, 286.

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271 metaphysics, and philosophy and metaphysics to theology. We must look at Maritain's whole system from the vantage point of unity; that is to say, no one part may be considered wholly apart from the rest. And his political philosophy does not stand alone without reference to the whole and integrative system. This is the reason why, although political philosophy belongs to the practical order, we cannot and should not ignore the different genus of the speculative order. Horeover, theology is the unifying element in Maritain's integrative system. Theology is thus at once both speculative and practical . Without reference to theology or without being integrated into theology, political philosophy is lllegitimatised or de-philosophized. *^See p. 253 infra .

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CHAPTER XI THE PRACTICAL ORDER If to philosophise is essentially htaoan, that is, living a truly human life, as Josef Pi^er thinks it is, then philosophizing must not be restricted to contemplation or pure speculation* It must also be practical as well as speculative . When the art of philosophising is to come to grips with the whole of reality, the practical order is an integral part of that t^iole. Horeover, from a cultural and political point of view, the practical order is our immediate concern, whereas the speculative order is somewhat indirectly related to human action since, for instance, man lives in the world of nature. Here we are concerned with knowledge not for the sake of knowledge but for the sake of action and the act of making. Human conduct is of supreme interest in the practical order, in which the practical reason is much more inqKjrtant than the speculative reason. As physical science, mathematical science, the philosophy of nature and metaphysics meet and join together at the loftiest summit of theology, so social and political philosophy, the philosophy of history and moral philosophy in general must converge to the selfsame sumnit of theology. All the speculative and the practical sciences must take theology into account. Theology is the highest knowledge of all, supremely and formally, which is at once speculative and practical. It encompasses 272

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273 all. All must be considered In the light of theological truths. If science is divided into "infinite" and "finite," then the infinite science is theology and the rest are finite sciences. Theology, which is infinite, has no division of what is speculative and practical.'However, Maritain maintains that "if the superior forms of wisdom (theology and the wisdom of grace) by virtue of their very superiority are at the same time speculative and practical, they are first of all and principally speculative*"^ Theology is more speculative than practical, because "not only is theology 'chiefly concerned with divine things rather than with human acts,' but even when treating of these latter, that is to say in its practical part, it does so on account of the perfect contenq;>lation of God. . • ." Hawever, moral philosophy itself cannot be said to be more speculative than practical, "because it constitutes exactly that practical part of finite knowledge which stands in contradistinction to its speculative part."^ One science (knowledge) can be siibaltemated to another on the basis of the following three categories: "its end, its principles (only), or its subject (and its principles)." The first category does not coincide with the second and the third categories. However, there is a connection between the second and the third categories: "Whenever there is subalternation as to subject there is always subaltemation as to principles; but it is possible to have subaltemation as to principles trithout subaltemation as to subject*"^ The relation between physics An Essay on Christian Fhilosophy . pp. 75-76. 2 Science and Wisdom , p. 71. An Essay on Christian Philosophy , pp. 79, 80. ^Ibid .. p. 83.

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274 and mathematics «iOuId be an instance of the former; and the relation of mathematics to philosophy would represent the latter case. The same holds true in the case of the relation between moral philosophy adequately considered and (moral) theology. That is to say, moral philosophy adequately considered is subaltemated by reason of principles only without being subalternatad as to subject. Moral philosophy, adequately considered, obtains its idea of man's last end (the supernatural end) from theology alone. Theology and faith are "essentially and specifically orientated toward the beatific vision," whereas, in contrast, moral philosophy adequately considered is "orientated toward natural and terrestrial evidence." (Moral) philosophy, however, does not need (moral) theology as physics needs mathanatics to resolve its principles. "Philosophy resolves its conclusions in naturally evident first principles by its own powers." Philosophy needs theology for perfection and completion. Moral philosophy, because it is subaltemated to theology, is "the beneficiary of a complement or fulfilisent, a superelevation that is supernatural in origin." Thus, it is "indirectly attached to a supernatural root." In turn, moral philosophy adequately considered is "employed in a ministerial way by the superior light of faith." The moral philosopher leaves the matters concerning faith to the theologian. He is, however, "con^leted and illumined by faith." "Without faith there could no more be a moral philosophy adequately considered than there could be a theology. "5 Therefore, a moral philosophy as well as a theology must ^Ibid., pp. 88, 90, 91, 95.

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275 presuppose faith Itself. It Is not necessary for a laoral philosopher to possess "the science of the theologian,'* but he must comprehend (not merely accept ) It In order to perfect his moral philosophy. Moral philosophy, because It Is subalternatod to theology, cannot encroach upon theological truths, which cooqprlse primarily "the Scriptures and the Gonclliary and Patristic Tradition, and only in a secondary and Instrumental way the pronouncements of the philosophers."^ The positive and empirical fields of research, as in politics, economics, anthropology, sociology and the like, are not const Itued as "coo^letely and genuinely explicative 'sciences' unless Integrated with theology," Therefore, "Only a theological anthropology or a political theology would merit the name of ethical science or political science strictly speaking." However, since the distinction betwe«i theology and philosophy exists, these disciplines can also be integrated with moral philosophy. "As there ought to be a theological anthropology and a political theology, so too there ought to be a philosophic anthropology and a political philosophy."^ Philosophy — cultural, social, political, or moral — cannot be pure philosophy. It is "only inqierfectly autonomous" and, thus, must be subalternated to theology to attain its truly perfect status. The MM* holds true in the studies of "ethnology, sociology, politics, pedagogics, the philosophy of profane history, as it is /in the studies o^ the history of religions and comparative mysticism."^ ^Ibid .. p. 97. ^Ibid .. p. 99. a Science and Wisdom , p. 71.

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276 In Marltaln's system, theology has not abandoned what is human and natural. In fact theology provides the basis for what Is human and natural. To become truly human means to become theological. Marltaln's theological ventures Into the mundane natural world, from a political point of view, are what distinguish him from, say, the crisis theology of Karl Barth. In this sense, Karl Barth and Jacques Marltaln represent the antipodes of the Christian attitude towards civilization and politics. As Marltaln himself often notes, the theology of a Karl Barth Is one of an "antl-humanlst." Of course, Marltaln condemns anthropocentrlc humanism, not because It Is "humanism," but because It Is "anthropocentrlc." "A position essentially anti-humanist," Marltaln ctMiisents, "would be an absolute condemnation of culture and civilization. The ultra-Calvinism of the theology of a Karl Barth is perhaps such a tendency. But this absolute condemnation of things hunan is Manichean, not Christian, and incoiiq>atible with the central dogpw of Christianity, the n^stery of the Incarnation."^ We are not conq>etent here to judge the theological truth e3q>re8sed by a Karl Barth and a Jacques Marltaln. From the cultural and political standpoint, the latter is far more realistic than the former. The following passages e^qplain the fact that Marltaln remains Christian and, at the same time, is concerned with the mundane natural world. He even said that "it is not good to despise the creature of flesh and blood. "^^ Having condemned the "misfortune" of modem history under the banner of rationalism and division rather than of Christianity and unity, Marltaln inritest Q Some Reflections on Culture and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 2. Science and Wlsd«wn . p. 11.

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277 Their adventure In phlloaopfay is not without relation to the political adventure of modern stateSf which have anaged to differentiate themselves in their proper order but under the banner of Gallicanism or Josephism or antireligion. So that, mutatis mutandis , problems of the layChristian state have their resemblance in problems of profane christian wisdom. In both cases the struggle is between the notion of infravalent end and the notion of means : or» more exactly between the conception of the tenqwral as an order of means and ends with its own last end inf rava lent and subordinated with regard to the ultimate supernatural end, and the conception of the temporal as a mere stage in the order of the ultimate supernatural end.^'*This is the matter that concerns us in Maritain's philosophy of culture, which will be discussed later. How we should go on with the practical order itself. Along with the q>eculative order, distinguishable from but not separable from the speculative order, there existp in Jacques Maritain's system the practical order of knowledge. ^^ In the hierarchy of practical knowledge we are directly concerned with knowledge for the sake of acting, while the speculative order is concerned with knowledge for the sake of knowing . Speculative philosophy (knowledge) and practical philosophy (knowledge) are "different in type." "The first," Maritain writes, "is lifted up towards the Timeless by the three moments of abstractive vision ... the second redescends towards time according to a continuous flux of thought %rhich, after a process in wiiich the speculative still merges with the practical -which is practical philosophy itself — terminates at the last in a purely practical proceeding — which is the Judffsent of prudence."^^ Thus, prudence is the immediate guide for ^ 4bid .. p. 128. 12 ''''See Appendix I. ^ ^Science and Wisdom , p. 108.

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278 directing moral action. Practical knowledge, as the regulator of action, is the virtue o£ prudence. Practical knowledge is divided into "speculatively practical knowledge" and "practically practical knowledge." Maritain esqilaina that "speculatively practical knowledge (t^iich is practical philosophy) proceeds according to a general mode of organisation or (one may say) a strategy of knowledge; and practically practical philosophy proceeds according to a mode of conceptualising of the object and (one may say) of equipment of knowledge different in type from the strategy and equipment of speculative knowlege."*'^ Practical knowledge or philosophy, thus, is concerned with man and his existence in the concrete and historical movement* It is concerned with concrete human acts here and now . It is clear here that the philosophy of history rightly belongs to the practical order. It is also obvious in practical knowledge that man and his existence existentially considered (not his pure nature but his "fallen" nature) must have the supernatural end in view. The whole order of practical knowledge is subalteimated to theology. "Speculatively-practical knowledge and pract ica I ly-pr act ica I knowledge," Maritain explains, "differ from one another by the mode of defininj^ and conceptualising , and their respective typical ways of constructing concepts ." Though the cardinal distinction between the speculative order and the practical order lies in the ends they pursue, the difference between speculatively practical knowledge and practically practical knowledge lies in the fact that "in the speculatively-practical sciences, the conc^ts preserve their naked value of abstraction and l^Ibid.

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279 intelligibility 1 while in the practically-practical science they incorporate a train of concrete overtones that tune in with the dynamic currents through which action comes into existence*" In other words« speculatively practical knowledge is '*more speculative and more abstract," whereas practically practical knowledge is "more practical and more concrete,"^^ The speculative order considers the world of existence, that is, the universe of physical sciences, mathematical sciences and of metaphysics, whereas the practical order, though it considers the world of existence, finds its end in human action and conduct. The practical order "seeks to know, no longer for the sake of knowing but for the sake of acting; it seeks to acquire, respecting an object lAich is something practical (an act to be done), a science which proceeds in a practical manner in regard to its own finalities and the conditions of the object, but nevertheless remains speculative or explanatory in mode in regard to the general or fundamental cognitional equipmoit, and considers the imiverse of action and operative values from the point of view of its raison d'etre and the intelligible structures immanent in it." It is Important that Haritain does not maintain that there is a separation of knowing and acting. The practical order of knowledge does not siB^>ly stop at the point of knowing for the sake of knowing, but it extends to and includes acting. Therefore, knowing in the practical order has a utilitarian value for human action and conduct. Maritaln observes that, although practical philosophy has nothing to do with the degree of abstraction which is the characteristic of speculative philosophy, still "it cuts right through the whole field of knowledge, ^^Ibld., pp. 138, 139, 142.

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280 from the metaphysical heavens from uiilch it is suspended, to the world of experience, on which It must needs rest." it is pointed out further by Marltaln that "aads play the role of principles ." and that, differing from the philosophy of Kant, "practical philosophy is not limited to prescribing. ... It is a science, it knows. But it does not conq>letely and truly know its object, which is sonething to be done, unless it knows how it should be done," Thus it "is not knowledge of simple observation. It is also, and essentially, a regulative science, a normative science." In this respect, Marltaln invariably suggests that "it gathers into a scientific systan all the knowledge necessary to regulate action from afar , that is, all the rules for action which the Intellect can discern by adapting to practical use an equipment and a mode of discerning the true which is typically speculative." Ethics (moral philosophy), politics (political philosophy) and economica, all of which are the sciences of human behavior, verify this principle. "Although there are two perfectly distinct types of philosophical science corresponding to the speculative order and the practical order," Marltaln characteristically does not fail to integrate these two distinct orders into a higher knowledge (wisdom). In accordance with the law of the hlera^'cfay of all human knowledge, "theological science . . . because of its eminence, includes within its unity both the speculative and the practical order. "^^ The nature of theology is explained as follows: "If we take the word 'theology' in the very general sense of sacred docttlne /sacra doctrine as Aquinas calls itj — including the tffaole organism of our knowledge of the mysteries, faith itself, the ^ ^he Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 311-13, 317.

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281 theological dlscursus and the gifts of knowledge, understanding and wisdom — then the practical science we are discussing here is evidoitly a part of theology thus understood*" Moreover, the fact that "one and the same theology has a speculative side and a practical side » . . is the privilege of theology, due to its eminence and the unity it derives from its association with divine lighn and uncreated science."'-' Thus the practical order, like the ^eculative order, must accq;>t its guidance from theology; "the practical part of theology As in a positioi)/ to regulate our actions from above. "^^ Political philosophy is an integral part of moral philosophy. The universe of human action is the proper object of a practical philosophy, e. g., political philosophy. Speculative philosophy is called Christian only because of its state (not nature ) . However, practical philosophy must be considered Christian because of its state and also because of its object. Maritain explains that practical philosophy is "in a relationship to theology of subaltemation and not only of infraposition . Because here the object — human acts — is taken in its actual existence and as needing direction in its concrete movement towards its concrete ends."^ As the relation between philosophy and theology in the speculative order is of cardinal in^rtance in Maritain 's whole system, the relation between moral philosophy and (moral) theology is of more significance since moral philosophy is concerned with human action or with man existentially considered . Science and Wisdom , p. 140. nche Degrees of Knowledge , p. 313. 19 Science and Wisdom , p. 117.

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282 As In the speculative order, moral philosophy Is distinguished from theology although It Is not entirely separated. For Marltaln, iBoral philosophy must rightly be subaltemated to (moral) theology. By distinguishing philosophy from theology here, two things are accomplished: first, philosophy Is not Just subjugated to theology and second, the Idea of theology Is elevated. "Just as grace does not suppress nature, so theology suppresses nothing that duly belongs to philosophy." However, the moral philosopher must turn to theology for enlightenment. "Just as theology continues to exist In heaven below the beatific vision, to which It Is subaltemated without being siq>pres8ed, similarly on earth below theology In Its practical and moral fiinctlon there ought to exist an adequately conceived moral philosophy subaltemated to theology though not suppressed by It — an enlarged or uplifted philosophy of human acts."^^ It Is true that theological truths are Indispensable to the full consideration of ethics (moral philosophy) and the object of morals must take Into account these theological truths to reach Its perfect status. But Marltaln warns us that this does not In^ly a kind of "theological Imperialism" over morals and moral philosophy. We must avoid the misconception that "there exists no moral or practical philosophy but only moral theology; and that thus theology may claim for Itself alone and In an exclusive way the wtole field of hxman action." Thus, first, there Is "moral theology" and, second, below It, there Is "moral philosophy adequately considered," that Is to say, moral philosophy that Is subaltemated to theology. Marltaln explains that moral philosophy 20 An Essay on Christian Philosophy , p. 74.

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283 adequately considered "la moral phlloaophy taken as constituting purely and simply (simpliciter ) a true moral science , in a state which makes the mind of itself adequate to or in conformity with its object, that is to say, hianan action «"^^ The above consideration concerning the relation between moral theology and moral philosopl^, by Maritain's own atkilssion, is "of extreme importance both in relation to the hierarchies of knowledge, and in relation to the cultural order itself *"^^ The cultural implication of this relation is of immediate concern in this essay. This is the reason why we must speak of the philosophical and theological foundation of Maritain*s political philosophy* Iforal theology, at well as moral philosophy, is "a form of knowledge*" However, the former is rooted in heaven and the latter is tooted on earth although both cover the same material field of the natural and siq>ematural mystery of human conduct. Practical philosophy adequately considered and moral theology, Maritain writes, "can cover the same field and have the same object, human acts, and still remain two specifically distinct forms of knowledge by reason of the formal determinant sub quo . "23 In moral philosophy, things are seen froa a human point of view (that is, from below), whereas moral theology looks at things from above, that is to say, from a divine point of view. Moral philosophy, moreover, has its oim distinct function and exercise in the natural world, which "theological or sacred wisdom cannot 21 Science and Wisdom , pp. 109, 110. ^ ^Ibid .. p. 110. p. 112, ^Aa Essay on Christian Philosophy , p. 67; Science and Wisdom .

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284 exercise In Its place. "2* As theology is not "a single application of philosophy to revealed data" and thus con^letely distinct from philosophy, moral theology Is In "no soise 8lnq>ly moral philosophy enriched by the data of faith. Nor Is It moral philosophy as oillghtened and elevated by faith." On the contrary. It transcends all philosophy and knowledge that can be known through natural light and human reason. However, moral theology never repudiates the existence of a moral philosophy Itself. Philosophical knowledge has Its own right to Judge things In Its own (natural) light. Moral philosophy Is "the style of reason" and Its principles are those of "practical reason," while moral theology derives Its own light from the " lumen dlvlnum ." Since moral theology and moral philosophy (adequately considered) are distinct, "moral philosophy will not contain a treatise on the Infused virtues, or on original sin and grace, or on moral sin and venial sin, /whll^ moral theolo^ will not contain a treatise on political science pure and sliiq>le nor will it undertake a study of the cultural connexions of the Greek and Buddhist worlds, or the Influence of class and nation on the temporal welfare of modem states." For Maritaln, "political science pure and slnq>le" means politics which is dealt with politically or politics "from the point of view of the ordering of man towards temporal and political life." However, if a theologian writes a treatise conceimlng politics, then he will not write it from the point of view of the ordering of man towards temporal and political life, but rather "from the point of view of the ordering of man to spiritual and supernatural good." Political science will not be Science and Wisdom , p. 112.

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285 dealt with politically, but theologically. Thus, "the treatise will be theologlco-polltlcal." This does not lnq>ly that a theologian cannot deal with the details of politics. On the contrary, "Stich a treatise Is not bound to remain in the heights: It can descend to the lowest details: but It will always be concerned with details considered from Its own formal viewpoint «"^^ This Is the clue that Harltaln himself, at his loftiest aoaeat of political thought. Is a political theolotilan . His political treatises, at their loftiest suomlt, are theologlco-polltlcal. Hotrever, we will do hln an Injustice If we repudiate him for writing politically and philosophically . Moral theology and moral philosophy adequately considered are "two worlds of different kinds" as nature and grace are, not because they deal with different objects but because the former considers human conduct "according to the ordination of man's life to the siq>ematural end which is the perfect knowledge of God" and the latter deals with 26 the life of man ordered to a natural and tecaporai end. However, we should not have any illusions about the fact that moral philosophy must be subject to the superior tribunal of moral theology. As the natural and tenporal end of man must be illumined by the last and supernatural end, moral philosophy must be elevated and coaqpleted by the light of moral theology. In Christian ethics or "moral philosophy adequately considered." we cannot Ignore the notion of human nature. Indeed, it is one of the fundamental bases, if not the only basis, of Christian moral philosophy. "ibid., pp. 113, 117. ^ ^Ibid .. p. 119.

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286 A practical philosophy, e. g., political philosophy, deals with the universe of human conduct and things. Thus, It must take Into consideration human nature. "Man," Marltaln writes, "la not in a state of pure nature, he Is fallen and redeemed. "27 xi^g iq y)^,. Marltaln calls "nan exlstentlally considered." Moral philosophy or ethics, which deals with all the aspects of human action and things, must account for man existent la lly, that Is to say, the fallen and redeemed man but not In his pure state %)falch Is of course Inadequate If not Impossible. The same holds true In politics, economics, practical psychology, sociology, and Individual morality, all of which belong to the domain of moral philosophy. Marltaln, however, speaks of the possibility of "all purely natural ethics." There Is no natural man, exlstentlally speaking: that Is to say, all men are sinful and demand redenq>tlon. Purely natural mati Is only "the realm of sln|>le possibility." Thus, a purely natural ethics falls outside "the province of moral science." Marltaln gives Aristotle as an example of the possibility of formulating a purely natural ethics. Moreover, a purely natural ethics really lacks two things: "the knowledge of the true ultimate end to which man Is actually ordained, and the knowledge of the Integral conditions of man's actual existence. "^^ Accordingly, a purely natural law does not exist. The fallen nature of man, even If rescued by grace, still Is "wounded" or "iaqialred" (as J. Messner puts It). There Is only one science of human conduct In gradu sdentlae practlcae : "It Is that one which takes Into account at once the essence and the state, the order 27 An Bssay on Christian Philosophy , p. 39. ^®Ibid., p. 63.

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287 of nature and the order of grace." Therefore, for Marltaln, the Aristotelian ethics that discounts the order of grace Is "too deficient."^ This Is "practical philosophy Inadequately considered." The Christian moral science, which accounts for the fallen and redeemed nature of man. Is the only moral science adequately considered. "Of Itself i^thlcq/ has to do with theology, either to become Integrated with or at least subaltemated to theology*" Ethics, when adequately considered, oust be Integrated with or subaltemated to theology if we take Into account the existential conditions of man* Moral theology Is at once a vmlty* When man Is considered factually and exlstentlally, then the only true last end Is the supernatural aid* In moral philosophy we must take Into consideration the notion of prudence* It occupies a distinct place In the moral conduct of man In the practical order. "Prudence," Marltaln writes, "Is clearly a habitus specifically distinct from either speculatively or practically practical moral science, since an Ignorant man can be prudent In his personal oondtict and since, strictly speaking, prudence (like the other oral virtues) stq>poses only the first natturally known principles of practical reason and Information derived irma experience." Prudence Is also characterized by that "trfilch Immediately governs the act to be done . . . by a judysent and coomand appropriate to the absolute Indlvlduallstlon of the concrete case."^^ Marltaln esqplalns that prudence, which Is of the Holy Ghost, comes to us "from reason llluoilned by faith. "^^ ^'ibid., p. 6A. The Degrees of Knowledae * pp. 462, 463. 31 An Essay on Christian Philosophy , p* 67.

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268 Moreover, prudence is needed in moral science to attain certitude: "strictly moral science supposes prudence (and therefore the other moral virtues). If not In respect to the e:^>eriiBental material and partial truths It can gather up, at least for its coiqplete truth and scientific certitude." Therefore, for Instance, "St. John of the Cross and St. Alphonsus were able to produce absolutely sure practical doctrine only because they were not only learned but prudent and e^qperlenced."^^ "All moral science," Marltaln declares, "Is continued and completed by prudence." Marltaln divides prudence Into "acquired" and "Infused" prudence. Moral philosophy adequately considered Is continued and am^leted by acquired prudence, whereas moral theology Is continued and coo^>leted by Infused prudence. Acquired prudence Is "a state of grace In the soul of man where It Is Joined with charity and superelevated by Its conjunction with Infused prudence." As man searches for the ultimate end (a supernatural one) and the teiqwral end (a natural one). Infused prudence appertains to the former and acquired prudence to the latter. "As grace does not destroy nature, nor supernatural life destroy 'civil' life, vhsa the soul has acquired the natural moral virtues /prudence/, these natural moral virtues co-exist In the Just soul with Infused virtues. This point Is of capital Importance for Christian ethics." This co-existence of moral virtues (of acquired and Infused prudence) forms "a vital and synergic union" In the moral life of man. Here again Is a distinction similar to that which exists between moral philosophy ^nd moral theology. It is the distinction between the tenq>oral TChe Degrees of Knowledge , pp. 462, 463.

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289 and the spiritual, bet%reen the kingdom of God and the social world, between nature and grace. Thua the acquired moral virtues which adjust human action and conduct to the tenporal ends of man are llluoinated and exalted by reference to the infused moral virtues* In an attempt to fuae the two (acquired moral virtues and infused moral virtues), Maritain warns us against **a tendency to treat ten^wral things or things of *civil life' — especially of politics and social life — viewed separately and without sufficient reference to the light of theology — as if man lived in a state of pure nature and as if our Saviour had never come." In the philosophical system of Maritain there is also a close relationship between the sciences of e3q>erimental knowledge (behavioral knowledge) and moral science. The scioices of e3q>erimental knowledge are behavioral in the sense that they are concerned with the investigation of htman behavior. Thus they are not the sciences of phenomena (the sciences of the empirio logical type) which have no place in practical knowledge. He closely relates moral or practical science (the "science of freedom") with nature, with human inclinations and dispositions. The former does not consider a world which is separated from nature. He insists t "It is rooted in nature, it unfolds itself in every sort of natural condition." in this sense, the degrees of instances of moral science require "as wide as possible a basis of ei^eriaiental knowledge." Moreover, the two sciences benefit from each other. Since "experience plays a fundamental part in moral science," a large nuDd>er of scientific disciplines (such as sociology, economics, and what are called the cultural sciences or humanities -"which are a sort of methodical and scientific investigation of the field of experience")

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290 are preparatory to moral science. On the other hand, "the morallsm of moral science" furnishes the value judgments that experimental science needs. "Ftcti the Instance when the facts and Information they /e9q>erlmental sciences^ have gathered are scientifically grouped and classified, they cannot fall to have reference to valueJudgments." Thus, when scientists pass explicit value Judgments on the material they gather, they are engaged In tasks belonging to the category of practical science. Marltaln warns us, however, that "the sociologist, the ethnologist, the folklorlst and the historian especially, while they need to have a moral philosophy so as to understand the things th^ are talking about, ought to fulfil as far as possible their methodological obligation to avoid those Judgments of value which th^ are always apt to mingle with their work."33 However, Marltaln refuses to recognize the sciences of human behavior as absolutely autonomous sciences. He maintains that they differ from sciences of phenomena (sciences of the eoq>irical type) and purely speculative sciences (sciences of the onto logical type) in that the scienccis of human behavior are concerned with normative considerations of the regulation of human conduct and are therefore "Inseparably" Interrelated. "These disciplines are in no s^ise autonomous sciences coiiq>arable with physics or chemistry." Thus he condensis the positivist ^ ^Science and Wisdom , pp. 210, 211, 213, 219. Herbert Johnston says, "the social sciences will first have to be sound in themselves, pursued, agait^ as the speculative study of an operable object and leading to valuefree, ethically neutral conclusions." And "Personal philosophical convictions on the part of the social scientist are important as well as inevitable; but they are not a part of social science taken in and by itself." "A Pattern for Relating Ethics and the Social Sciences," Ethics and the Social Sciences * pp. 86, 90.

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291 and behavioral approach as being "a great illusion. "3^ In regard to political philosophy, Maritain indicates that it is a part of moral philosophy and at the same time can be an explicative science (political science in the strict sense). Maritain, like Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, acc^ts the view that political philosophy occupies "the peak of moral philosophy" in regard to the vita civilia . As moral philosophy in general is subaltemated to theology, so is political philosophy; and Maritain specifies a political theology iriiich, in a tenqwral society, exalts and elevates the supernatural end of auin. And there is a distinction between political philosophy and political theology. Maritain gives us the follotring exai^ples: St. Thomas Aquinas' De Regimine Principum stems from the latter; his conmentary on Aristotle's Politics from the former. ^^ Maritain notes that in De Regimine Principum . "St* Thomas points out the supreme principles of politics, and deals with politics from the viewpoint of their relation with man's eternal destiny." It is "an organic work of moral theology concerning political matters, or else a treatise of theologico-political science." In contrast, a treatise 6iiiq>ly on political science "would consider its object politically , and would get down to details i^le adopting the point of view of temporal life" (without reference to the supernatural life). We have learned, however, that Maritain does not consider Machiavelli's Prince as a genuine treatise on political science. It is "a typical example of political pseudoscience" simply because it is based iqK>n a separated philosopt^, which means a philosophy inadequately considered without the illumination from a higher wisdom such as XL • ^Science and Wisdom , pp. 168, 169, 170, 172. 35 An Essay on Christian Philosophy , p. 100.

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292 theological wisdom and infused wisdom. In Maritain's opinion, "We have still to wait for someone to write a treatise on politics simp licit er . from the point of view of a philosopl^ in union with theology. "36 This was said long before he trrote his Man and the State , which, we are inclined to believe, is a treatise on "politics pure and simple." And we are prone to identify that "someone" with Jacques Haritain himself. Maritain Insists that since moral philosophy -ethics — is a practical science, it must not be content with "the intrinsic and universal principles"; it must proceed to "the more particular determination of huoDtan acts and their rules" — "the good of the agent himself and the good of others." The virtue of justice (the good of others) in particular introduces "a nianber of most ini|>ortant questions pertaining to «^at is called natural right , and treating in the first place of man's obligations to God (a question of natural religion), secondly of his obligations to his fellow-men. "37 Moral philosophy also introduces the rights of the individual, the rights of the family, and the rights of society. Hence, political philosophy as a part of moral philosophy emphasizes the moral aspects of human life, and embraces inqwrtant concepts with which Maritain is concerned, such as the Thomistic natural law, the dignity of the human person, and the spiritual values of justice, freedom, and love. Maritain claims, "It is evident that the normal result of existing with the people is political and social action with and for the people, and an effort to foster the progress of social justice. This is not simply a task of techical adjustment or material Science and Wisdom , p. 121. ^ ^An Introduction to Riilosophy . p. 99.

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293 improvement. It requires an idee of the dignity of ttie human person, and of the spiritual values of Justice, freedom, and neighborly love. The task is to help prepare for a new order while being intent on the spirit of the Gospel."^ In political philosophy, as in moral philosophy in general, Maritain emphasises over and over again the theological inspiration and the need of evangelical action in human societies. He resorts ultimately to the stq»ematural good which theology alone can adequately inspire and illtminate. Since man's conduct must be regulated in reference to the supernatural end, "ethics or philosophic morality is evidently inadequate to teach him everything he needs to know in order to act rightly. It must be completed and elevated by the teachings of revelation. "39 But it should be well remembered that alttwugh Maritain resorts to the primacy of theology and the supernatural end, the ten^poral and the natural have not been reduced to nothing. They always have a sphere of their own, "It is not good to despise the creature of flesh and blood." As Jacques Maritain himself has enq>ha8ized, what has been said on the levels of theology, metaphysics, philosophy and, above all, their interrelationships will inevitably produce deep iiq>acts on the cultural order in general and on the rawidane level of politics. It is truly the founts inhead from which the various tributaries of cultural, social, and political philosophies continuously flow. Theology is at once a unity, which knows no division of the speculative and the practical. Theology is of its very nature both speculative and practical. Reason, philosophy and nature bow to faith, theology and grace; but theology never throws p. 127. 38 The Range of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 39 An Introduction to Fhilosophy , p. 267.

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294 dust in the eyes of philosophy. Instead, it illtnainates and elevates vhat is below In an imperfect condition. What is above is continued with what is below. Without seeing the integrative unity and the flow of Karltain's whole system, we merely infatuate and destroy it. As Maritain so well esqiresses it, "If ... we look on the cooing of an authentically christian philosophy as so characteristic, it is not because we make it prior to theology but because we picture to ourselves an integrally tnioumist civilisation in which the great waves of wisdom in man, sweeping from the sacred heights of faith to the extreme coast of the human and tha profane, will set free all that is true in the human and the profane."^" ^Science and Wisdom , p. 133.

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SBCTION IV THE POUnCAL PHILOSOPinr OP JACQUES MARITAIN

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CHAPTER XII MARITAIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF CULTIOLE AND SOCIETY: A THEOCENTRIC HUMANISM For Jacques Maritain as well as for other Cattx>llc theologians and philosophers, theology is the queen of all sciences (speculative and practical). But she is not a dictatorial queen; Indeed, she is a liberal queen. A philosophy of culture and society is within the proper domain of practical philosophy, since it is concerned with human action and things. "Practical philosophy," Maritain writes, "is still philosophy and remains a mode of speculative knowledge; but, unlike n^taphysics or natural philosophy, it is from the outset directed to action as its object, and however large a part verification of fact may play in it, however much it must needs take historical necessities and conditions into account, it is above all a science of freedom."'Theology, which is at once speculative and practical, is an overseer of the philosophy of culture. In contrast to such Catholic theologians as Reginald GarrigouLagrange who is exclusively concerned %rith theological problems, Maritain is known as a philosopher of culture and society within as well as without the Catholic circle. Maritain himself writes that "Whereas for centuries ^ Tirue Humanism , p. viii. 296

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297 the crucial issues for religious thought were the great theological controversies centered on the dogmas of faith, the crucial issues will now deal with political theology and political philosophy." Thus, the center of gravity of "a new approach to God" is neither dogmatics nor speculative knowledge but "the field of culture and in the historical life of man."^ The close relation between God and the temporal world, in Karltaln's thought, is best ejqiressed In his philosophy of culture. God and culture meet at the summit of Karltaln's ideal of a new Christendom. Harltaln is truly a philosopher of culture and society rather than a political philosopher. Therefore, we must consider him pre-eminently a philosopher of culture rather than a political philosopher in a narrow sense.-' Marltaln's trttole system, it is worth while remembering again, is striving for unity and Integration that pull the speculative and the practical orders together. Thus, to use the notion of analogy which is an extremely Important concept in Marltaln's philosophy, what is valid in the relation between theology and metaphysics, faith and reason, grace and nature and between the supernatural and the natural is also valid in the relation between religion and culture and between church ^The Range of Reason (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1952), pp. 92, 94-95. ^Concerning the e;iq>08ltlons of Marltaln's philosophy of culture, see particularly: E. L. Allen, Christian Humanism (Hew York: Philosophical Library, 1952); Charles O'Donnell. The Ideal of a Mew Christendom , pp. 162-270; Philip S. Land, "Practical Wisdom and Social Order," Social Order . V (November, 1955), pp. 391-400; Francis J. Marlen, "Social and Political Wisdom of Maritaln," Social Order . V (November, 1955), pp. 386-90; Charles A« Fecher, The Philosophy of Jacques Maritaln . chapter xxll, "Integral Humanism," pp. 264-74; Joseph W. Evans, "Jacques Marltaln's Personallsm. " Review of Politics. XIV (April, 1952), pp. 16677 and "Jacques Maritaln and the Problem of Pluralism in Political Life," Review of Politics . XXII (July, 1960), pp. 307-23.

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298 and state. As Maritaln himself has repeatedly eophasised, philosophy is subaltemated, or is infravalent, to theology; so, too, the same analogy governs the relation between religion and culture. The order of freedom (in the practical order) is comparable to the order of nature (in the speculative order). Thus, Karitain's philosophy of culture is the philosophy of freedom. The relation between what is speculative and what is practical has been nowhere better expressed than in his "philosophy of freedcHs. " As his speculative systaa is Thomistic, so is his practical system. St. Thomas Aquinas is always "a contemporary auttor."^ In his philosophy of freedom (or culture), Maritain sliows that "the order of Freedom necessarily presupposes the order of Nature /or Being/," although they are two heterogeneous worlds, that is to say, they are distinctively different worlds.^ Maritain maintains that St. Thomas Aquinas unites these two orders without confusing them and "grounds" the order of freedom on the order of nature.^ To say that freedom presupposes nature means that "ethics presupposes metaphysics and speculative philosophy and that the true use of our freedom presupposes the knowledge of Being and of the supreme laws of Being. Metaphysics is a necessary prerequisite of ethics." Freedom is grounded on reason itself. Thus, for example, the crises in the political and economic order '*urge us strongly to study metaphysics."' ^Jacques Maritain, Scwne Reflections on Culture and Society (Chicago: Ctaiversity of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 1. ^Freedom in the Modem World , tr. Richard O'Sullivan (Hew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 5. ^Ibid. , p. 4; Some Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 11. ' ^Freedcwn in the Modem World, pp. 13, 14.

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299 Ethics or moral philosophy must be based upon human nature, that Is to say, what man Is. The question of 'Sihat man Is" Is a metaphysical question and even a theological question. "Ethics," Marltaln writes, "which we may consider as the rationalisation of the use of Freedom, presupposes metaphysics as Its necessary prerequisite. A system of ethics cannot be constituted unless Its author Is first able to answer the questions: What is man? Why Is he made? What is the end of human life? " Thus, for Marltaln, a sound ethics must presuppose human nature or man, who is "a metaphysical being, an animal that nourishes its life on transcendental things." Therefore, ethics, although It has a dls* tinct existence, oust depend upon metaphysics for the determination of man's last end (which is the supernatural end) as well as for "a knowledge of the laws which govern the choice of means." These laws arise from the very rational nature of man. Moreover, a proper ethics must require, besides metaphysics, "an lomense amount of information of an experi* mental kind." Thus, it is obvious why moral philosophy must rest upon speculative knowledge; especially, OMtaphysics is necessary to determine the last end of man, human nature, the knowledge to obtain proper means for an ethical action, and the knowledge of esqierloMntal kind. They are interrelated, but the realm of action is distinct from the realm of speculation, and the realm of freedom is distinct from that of nature. Marltaln 's philosophy of freedom has an application in the temporal as well as in the spiritual. He believes that since Kant and his Critique of Practical Reason, the opposition between nature and freedom became a common place in modem philosophy, whereas St. Thomas ^Ibid., pp. 14, 19.

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300 Aquinas strived to Integrate them.^ For Marltaln, God alone knows the secrets of freedom. He has created It and "He alone can act upon that Freedom. "^O A philosophy of freedom imist begin with a doctrine of free will. The notion of freedom Is much wider than the notion of free will. "Free Will Is Indeed the source and spring of the world of Freedom," and It is "a datum of metaphysics," because it is essentially the question of the "rational nature" of man. For St. Thomas Aquinas and Marltaln, the root of freedom is in reason, that Is to say, to be free is "of the essence of every intellect."^ Biywever, this metaphysical root of freedom must "develop in the psychological and the moral order." Also, Marltaln 's philosophy of freedom Is bound up with the notion of person . The concept of person is an expression in action of what is in metaphysical order. "It Is our ^ty by our own effort to make ourselves persons having dominion over our own acts and being to ourselves a rounded and a whole existence." A person is defined as "an individual substance of rational nature" (indlvidualis substantia rationalis naturae) . And this definition of person is "of fundamental inq>ortance in philosophy and 12 law." Moreover, Harltaln's philosophy of freedom has an ii^ortant application in the social as well as in the spiritual order. *'^ ^Some Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 11. ^ ^reedom in the Modern World, p. 26. '•* Some Reflections on Culture and Society , pp. 12, 15. ^ ^Freedom in the Modem World , p. 30. ^ ^Some Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 15.

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301 Fr«« will or freedom of choice is not "free from any dangers vlthln us," and It Is "Imnersed In a world of feelings, instincts, 14 passions, and sensible and spiritual desires." Thus, in order that man may become a master of himself and "self-sufficient,** that is to say, to govern his own life without external constraint, he needs the aid of what Marltain calls "freedom of autonomy," as the Individual needs the person In an analogical sense* Thus, freedom of choice is not an end in itself. Marltain holds that the root of many contemporary errors lies in the confusion of the two kinds of freedom, which he has distinguished above. For Marltain, the cooocn error of modems is to make freedom of choice the highest end in Itself. Freedom of choice is rather "a oieans to the conquest of freedom in Its autonomous sense, and the dynamism of freedom is in this very conquest demanded by the essential postulatlons of human personality."^^ Consequently, freedom of choice is called "the initial freedom" and freedom of autonomy Is called •*the terminal freedom.**^* Freedom of choice or free will is of course a prerequisite for morality, but it ^es not constitute morality itself. Free will does not define "the essence of morality." True morality or a true humanism must raise Itself beyond and above free will or the huaum. This is the dynamism of freedom and a true fauaanlsm. Man is given this freedom of choice in order that he may reach freedom of autonomy. '^Through the ^^Ibld.. p. 13. * ^Some Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 15; Freedom in the Modem Iforld . p. 31. 16 Some Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 20.

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302 initial freedom the formation of the political cotmsunityy begun, prepared and inspired by nature, " Maritain writes, "is accooplished as a human work of reason and virtue. This preparation is crovmed by the conquest and achievement of the terminal freedom, which at its fullest transcends the order proper to culture and the State.' As man's final goal is not a natural one but a supernatural one, analogically speaking, person and freedom of autonomy, rather than individual and freedom of choice, are final or terminal ends. However, it onist be made clear immediately that individual and freedom of autonon^ are distinct from person and freedom of autonomy, as nature and reason are distinct from grace and faith. This distinction Is of utmost isportance is Maritain 's speculative as well as in his practical system. And the two systems are analogically linked with each other. This Is also the architectonic structure of his political philosophy. Therefore, the freedom of choice of each individual and the common good, which is the right and highest terrestrial good and constitutes a "principal element" in Itself, are not the final ends in themselves. They are only Infravalent ends. The Iniman person and the autonomous freedom are above the common terrestrial good. The human person strives towards his spiritual perfection and freedom of autonomy, which "pro18 ceeds something higher than the State." The supreme type of autonomous freedom is transformed by love and reached by the saint. The social application of freedom is obvious. There is an anlogous problem in the ordering of social life. Maritain himself admits ^^ Ibid . ^^ Ibid .. p. 18.

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303 that th« idea of freedom dominates the majority of great Western political philosophies of modem times. ^^ There are two misconceptions of freedom; ona is the "liberalist" or "individualist" conception and 20 the other is the "collectivist" conception of freedom. The former is represented by the French example and the other is dressed in German Rational Socialism and Russian garb. The individualist conception of freedom midces freedom of choice an end in itself. Thus, in the Indl* vlduallst political philosophy, the primacy of social Justice and the coonon good is thrown into the background or neglected. In the collectivist political philosophy, according to Maritaln, it is rightly conceived that social life should not be centered or based upon freedom of choice or the initial freedom but should be based upon freedom of autonony or the terminal freedom. ^^ But it is wrongly conceived in the collectivist political philosophy that the autonomous freedom should b« actualized in a transitive type of production, material accomplishsient and the raalisation of povar.^^ As a consequence of this misconception, "the freedom of the person, freedom of choice and autonomous freedom are .23 eclipsed by the grandeur of collective work."^ Therefore, it is obvious that Maritaln conceives of a third t]rp« of political philosophy which rejects the individualist and the collectivist political philosophies. His is "communal and personal," which makes ^ ^Freedom in the Modem World , p. 39. ^®Ibid. , pp. 39-41; Some Reflections on Culture and Society. pp. 16-17. 21 some Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 17. 2 2ibid . ; Freedom in the Modem World , p. 41. ^• 'Some Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 17.

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304 "Justice and amity the proper foundations of this /socialj life."'* In his personal and conmunal political philosophy, the conraon good of the teiiq;>oral order provides social life with material as well as moral substance, and this terrestrial common good is yet subordinated to the spiritual or eternal good of every citizen and to the autonomous freedom. Therefore, **the connon good in the temporal order is an intermediate (not a final) end."^^ The interior principle of the spirit belongs to a sacred domain above the state, and it "subordinates all material goods, progress in technique, and development of power, all of which are a necessary part of the conmon good of the State. "^^ The common good of the t«q>oral order has its integrity and its proper good; however, it must acknowledge its subordination to the final end and cannot exalt itself to the siumnit of the absolute good. The purpose of man's possession of freedom of choice is to attain freedom of autonomy and the absolute end. Therefore, these two are integrated but not separated, and at the same time a due recognition is made to the real end of civilization or social life of which the true end is the ccnmnon good. "Political philosophy," Haritain writes, "being thus directed not towards pure and simple freedom of choice, nor towards the realisation of Freedom of power and domination over the external order of nature and history, but towards the realisation and progress of the spiritual freediMB of individual persons, will make of Justice and friendship the true foundations of social life."^' "Where the spirit is, there is 2*Ibld., p. 19. 2 %reedom in the Modern World, p. 42. 2 6son>e Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 19. 27yreedom in the Hodem World, p. 45.

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305 liberty."^® This is the core of Haritaln*8 philosophy of culture, a theocentrlc conception of culture. Arnold Tbynbee conceives the rise and fall of a civilisation as the process of challenge and response. A civilization dies away and is thus teaporary. But the Church (the Itystical Body of Christ) is everlasting* Western civilization is dominated by Christianity. "It is dominated, no matter what it may do, and even when it denies it, by Christianity.'*^^ For Maritain, tlnis, Western humanism springs from religious and transcendental sources. Western humanism springs not only from medieval Christianity but also from the heritage of Greek antiquity in the names of Honer, Sophocles, Socrates and Virgil.^ As it will be clear, we oust distinguish the humanism of pagan antiquity from the theocentric humanism of Jacques Maritain. The Hellenic hwnanism is an anthropoeentric humanism, which is expressed in P]rthagoras* formula that "man is the measure of all things." The HcHaeric or Olympic religion, which is the most genuine Greek religion, is truly an anthropoi»>rphic one. Religion here is humanized and temporal 1 zed. Erich Kahler expresses this well when he says: '*The hieratlcal inflexibility of the Oriental gods had aeltad away; all has becooe human, flexible and diversified. These gods manifest themselves to men not only in htiman shape, but as ^ "Soae Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 1. Arnold Tbynbee expresses the same spirit when he says: "The realm of the spirit may be freedom's citadel." An Historian's Approach to Religion (London: Oxford Ubiversity Press, 1956), p. 251. ^ ^Scholasticism and Politics , p. 225. ^ "True Humanism , pp. xiv-xv.

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306 htiman beings, with characteristic feelings, thoughts, plans and ways, with con^lex individual lives adorned by colorful and even libertine 31 adventures."'^* This anthropoioorphic conception is exactly what is not a theocentrlc hutnanism. Maritain's conception of a true himanisn is grounded in Roman Catholicism. When Western civilization will reach its loftiest height, it is actualized in the form of Catholicism. Maritain says, "I who am a Catholic understand and appreciate that the momentum of such a movement carries it towards a Catholic form of civilisation. "^^ Catholicism alone penetrates into the depths of culture and vivifies it. "All religions other than the Catholic religion, " writes Maritain, "are in more or less narrow and servile fashion, according as their metaphysical level is more or less elevated, integral parts of certain definite cultures, particularised to certain ethnic climates and certain historical formations. The Catholic religion alone is absolutely and strictly transcendental, supra-cultural, supra-racial and supra-national — because it is supernatural . . . ."^^ However, in his later writings, the basis of his integral humanism seems not limited to Catholicism when he says: '*The new approach to God will be a new approach to the true God of the JudaeoChristian tradition, the true God of the Gospel, Whose grace, perfecting nature and not destroying it, transcends reason in order to strengthen, not to blind or annihilate it, makes moral conscience progress in the course of time, and leads htunan history, that is, the ceaseless and ceaselessly thwarted effort of mankind toward naancipation, in the •^^ Man the Measure , pp. 82, 87. •^ ^reedom in the Modem World , p. 71. ^^"Religion and Culture," Essays in Order , p. 32.

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307 direction of Its supratenporal acconpllshment."^ It Is of cardinal Importance to raallze, at the outset, that Harltaln never identifies religion with culture or civilization. Therefore, the earthly civlllBatlon and the Church are '*tvo hetero^ geneous worlds." Civilization, as the vork of reason, belongs to the teBq>oral order, whereas religion belongs to the supernatural order, to the Kingdom of God. In the same manner, the Catholic religion Is not the same as the Catholic nor Id or Catholics. Walter M. Horton attributed Harltaln' 8 ability to distinguish between Catholicism and Catholics partially to "the fact that he was not bom a Catholic, but became one from conviction. "^^ However, as it is clear now, the distinction between Catholicism (as a religion) and the Catholic world (as a form of culture) is deeply rooted in the very Thomlstic interpretation of Harltaln, in which theology, faith, grace and the supernatural are distinguished respectively from philosophy, reason, nature and the natural. However, these two sets of orders are not separated from each other. Harltaln writes: "It Is of the highest importance to recognise the distinction between these two orders and the independence of the spiritual in relation to the cultural order* ""^ A Christian civilization, which may be illuminated by the supernatural virtues and end, still remains "something temporal, essentially terrestrial and therefore deficient and belongs to the order of nature."^' Therefore, Harltaln Is ^ ^The Range of Reason, pp. 93-94. ^ ^Contengwrary Continental Theoloyy. p. 51. ^ ^eedom in the Hodem World , p. 97; "Religion and Culture," p. 35. 3-^ "Religion and Culture," p. 35.

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308 in a position to declare that 'Catholics are not Catholicism. The errors » apathies, shortcomings and slumbers of Catholics do not involve Catholicism. Catholicism is not obliged to provide an alibi for the failures of Catholics. The best apologetic does not consist in justi* fying Catholics or making excuses for them when they are in the wrong, but on the contrary, in emphasir^lng their errors and pointing out that, far from affecting the substance of Catholicism, they serve only the better to display the virtue of a religion which is still a living force in spite of them.**^ Maritaln does not condone the mistakes of some Catholics in the past, and yet he is a staunch and Impeccable defender of Catholicism. As we recall, Reinhold Nlebuhr has been critical of "the blindness of Catholicism" and of the Catholic being a blind child of light. ^^ Although Reinhold Hiebuhr would be safe in criticizing a > Catholic civilization or world, he is nonetheleiss mistaken in the eyes of Maritaln when he uses Catholicism and a Catholic civilization interchangeably. Maritaln would be in a position to criticize Reinhold Nlebuhr, in turn, on the basis of his distinction between the Catholic world and Catholicism. It is easy to understand why even the Protestant thinker H. Richard Hiebuhr has come to admire the Thomistlc position (a '^hristabove-culture" type) of which Jacques Maritaln is the most distinguished oo Ibid,, p. 37. In regard to this point, see his The Things That Are Hot Caesar's which is a passionate condemnation of the aoveaent called the Actionfrancaise . The main spirit of this book is expressed when Maritaln says: '*Bil8 supretmacy of matter must be resisted not only by the assertion of the rights of the mind and the reason but also by the asseveration of the supremacy of divine grace and the primacy of the spiritual" (p. xxvl). ^ ^The Children of Li^ht and the Children of Darkness , pp. 12-14.

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309 representative in the contemporary world. In the Protestant world, no one will surpass Paul Tllllch «rho presents a similar position In his Idea of "the theology of culture" or "theonomy." Moreover, It seems that no Protestant theologian Is closer to flarltaln In his philosophy of culture than Paul Tllllch, despite the letter's rejection of the Infallible authority of Catholic philosophy and theology. In his charac* terlzatlon of the Thomlstlc approach to the philosophy of religion, Paul Tllllch explains: "The rational way to God is not innedlate, but mediated. It is a way of inference which, although correct, does not give unconditional certainty; therefore it must be coiq>leted by the way of authority. "^^ Here Paul Tllllch raises the most crucial question as to whether philosophical principles and conclusions can be Judged by their own light without ultimately resorting to theological authority. Marltaln's "theoccntric humanism" is truly a moral "revolution." And it is a "Christian heroism," to borrow his own terminology. Maritain is fond of quoting Charles Peguy's statement that "the social revolution will be a moral revolution or not at all." The complete moral revolution of his theocentric humanism is to reinstate the concept that "man is God and through God, not apart from God."^^ We oust be careful not to misunderstand the meaning of "revolution** here. It Is more in the sense of "reformation" rather than the modem use of revolution. Harltaln's revolution is not like the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution which attempted radically to eradicate the past and replace It with a new epoch. For Maritain as well as for Charles Peguy, the social ^ "The Theology of Culture , p. 16. ^^Jacques Maritain, The Ran^e of Reason , p. 93.

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310 revolution oeane that "Tou can only transform the social order of the modem world by effecting at the same time and first of all within your own soul a renewal of moral and spiritual life; by digging down to the moral and spiritual foundations of human existence, and reviving the moral ideas that govern the life of the social body as such; and by awakening a new impulse in the secret sources of its being. "^^ This view coincides with his philosophy of history, which is essentially realistic in the sense that the past history is not discarded for the sake of a Utopian ideal. Maritain often refers to "the conei ste historical ideal appropriate to the coming age of civilization.**^ ' Haritain, first of all, notes the fact that the question of humanism is inexactly posed partially because the term "humanism" still has its affinity with the naturalistic conception of the Renaissance and also because "the notion of Christianity is contaminated for many by the memories of Jansenism and Puritanism. '^ "Tlte dispute is not between humanism and Christianity, " but it is between two different conceptions of humanism. "^^ Thus, Maritain renders the widest definition of humanism, which would include at once Rxaianuja, Confucius, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Nietzsche, Ghandi and others. Consequently, Maritain does not criticize humanism as such, but rather a false conception of humanism. He defines culture or civilization in terms of "the comnon ^ ^Freedom in the Modem World , pp. 142-43; True Humanism , p. 114. ^Qn the Philosophy of History, p. 113; True Humanism , p. 254. ^Some Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 2. p. 19. Ihid. ; Freedom in the Modem World, p. 82; True Humanism.

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311 good of human beings in the terrestrial or the temporal order." Therefore, in this sense, "there is no culture that is not humanist* ** An anti-humanism is the absolute condemnation and repudication of culture or civilisation* The anti-husanist tendency, in Maritain's opinion, is represented by "the ultra-Calvinism of the theology of a Karl Barth." A Barthian theology tends to repudiate culture or civilisation.^^ From a cultural point of viaw, Haritaln is nore realistic than Karl Barth* Hany have already pointed out that Christianity is, and has always been, a culture-bound religion; it has been bound up with Western civilization* More realistically speaking, Christianity has influenced the \festem cultural modes at different periods and at the same time, the Christian religion itself has been Influenced by historical exigencies and cultural and historical contingencies.^' Thus, the extreme Barthian position is even attacked within the Protestant camp* Reinhold Niebuhr is the supreme example of those who condemn the "silence" of a Barth or the unrealistic Barthian position. For Marltain, the Barthian position (the condemnation of culture altogether) is not "Christian" but "Kanichean, " which is incompatible with the central dogma of Christianity. Marltain lalntains that the condemnation of the world in the Gospel is not the ^ "Freedom in the Modern World , p. 83; Some Reflections on Culture and Society ; The Twilight of Civilization , tr. Lionel Landry (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943), p. 7. In the Twilight of Civilization Marltain points out that "the splendid attitude of Karl Barth, during the present war, and the progress of his doctrine about the temporal order, are proof that the 'counter-humanism' of his theology is now balanced by more humanistic-conceptions" (p. 7). During the Hasi regime, Barth was a strong opponent of National Socialism. ^7see Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949). Considering Christianity as a historical religion, he says that "the Christian must find that religious thought is inextricably involved in historical ttought" (p. 3).

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312 condemnation of politics per se . but it is a separated politics. Thus, he writes, "The Gospel condemns the world. What is meant by the world in this case is not nature; it is nature only insofar as it pretends to suffice unto itself and reject the gift of God. And what is meant is not politics, but politics only insofar as it claims to regulate entirely by itself alone the lives and destinies of men and to set itself apart from the truth of God, \'ho has aad* man according to His own image. "^° Maritain repudiates what R. Richard Niebuhr has called the "Christ-against-culture" type (e. g., the Barthian position) and, at the same time, the "Christ-of -culture" type (Protestant liberalism of the nineteenth century as well as Catholic liberalism of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century). As we recall, the question of humanism (or a philosophy of culture) is closely related to the anthropological and metaphysical question of what man is and to the theological question of xaan and his relation to the supreme principle of his destiny (the relation between grace and freedom). It is evident that Christian psychology necessarily involves the question of man's original sin and therefore his redeim>tion. In Catholic thought, differing essentially from the Protestant Orthodox position, man carries the burden of original sin and requires salvation by the grace of God. But Maritain as well as other Catholic thinkers maintains that man is not entirely corrupted in the substance of his being, but he is merely wounded in his nature. Johannes Messner has already spoken of the idea that man is impaired . This position is unquestionably consistent with the Catholic recognition of the autonomous ^ 8The Twilight of Civilization , p. 34.

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313 role of htnaan reason. Therefore, a Calvlnlstlc position or a Barthlan position, for Marltain, Is **a too simple dramatisation of fallen nature." In Calvinism and Barthianism, "free will" is coaq>letely denied to man, that is to say, in Maritain's terminology, the freedom of choice of man based upon the idea that man is an intelligent being is entirely dimied. "The Protestant discovery," as Maritain calls it, is that "as a result of original sin man is taken to be essentially corrupt : that is the doctrine of Utther, of Calvin, of Jansenius." Free will or freedom of choice "has been killed by original sin" in Protestantism, and is replaced, in stead, by "predestination."^' Man's salvation, according to this Protestant discovery, is acc(Mq>lished only through the grace of God. In the conten^iorary world, this problem is solved within the Protestant camp by the cultural philosophy of Paul Tillich %ifaen he recognizes the Important role of reason in the cultural world — in his theology of culture. In this sense, Gustave Ueigel found the "Thomlstic" element in Paul Tilllch. This is also true, to a certain extent, in the cultural philosophy of Bmil Brunner who also maintains that religion and culture are not two antimonies. On the other hand, there is an insurpassable difficulty involved in the cultural and political phllosophy of Reinhold Nlebuhr. Reinhold Niebuhr's political realism is based on his theological notion of original sin ("essentially corrupted" human nature) and the selfishness of man. But, in the height of his theological thought, Rlebuhr tries to transcend these human frailties. The Christian 49 True Humanism , pp. 2, 9.

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314 nsist live in a deeper dimension, that is to say* he must transcend his selfish limitations. However, this seems to be a theoretical impossi* bility. The sinful man (utterly corrupted) oust transcend his limitation on the high level of Christian love and justice; but it is inqwssible to transcend it precisely because he is annpletely com^ted. Kk> one has pointed out this difficulty in Miebuhr's thought better than the great admirer of Niebuhr's political realism, Kenneth W, Thosqison. Thompson writes, "/Niebuhr'eiZ mind's ascent from the depths of humai selfishness and sin to the bright sunmit of transcendent faith traverses the rough crags and peaks along which are strewn the rennants of earlier philosophical enterprises . * . his religious faith frees him from the need for having illusions about human nature at the same time that it prevents him from making these realities normative. The Christian, he argues, lives in a deeper dimension than the realm in which the political struggle takes place. . . . Indeed, the unsolved problem in Niebuhr's philosophy arises precisely from this crowning point in his thought." Maritain notes that "In the state of fallen and redeoaed nature there is for humui life no perfection save a supernatural perfection: and this perfection itself is a paradox — > a more perfect soul is suspended above a more fearful abyss. "^^ It is clear that the Barthian position appears to be theoretically more consistent in that the condemnation of culture or civilization based upon his theological conception of man leads him to the side of a cultural and political indifferentism. However, his position is in fact (not theoretically) rather inconsistent since he 50"The Political Philosophy of Reinhold Kiebuhr, " Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious. Social, and Political Ttought . pp. 168-69. ^ ^g9ience and Wisdom , p. 92,

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315 has none the less been sporadically concerned with current political problems* Nlebuhr, on the other hand. Is nore realistic In that he Is Intricately Involved In social and political problaas, but he appears to be In a theoretically isiposslble position. For Marltaln, there are two conceptions of humanism: one Is a theocentrlc or Christian humanism (distinct from what he calls "classical" (Christian) humanism of the Renaissance); and the other Is aa anthropocentrlc humanism (which began with the Renaissance). He apologetically states that the term "anthropocentrlc" Is "not par* tlcularly fellcltlous." But he uses this term due to lack of a better term "to eaq>re88 a concept which shuts man up In himself and separates him from Kature, Grace and God.""' The great defect of this anthropocentrlc humanism Is Its "negation, denial, and separation." The age of anthropocentrlc htmanisa is governed by the low of "the separation and opposition between nature aad grace, between faith and reason, between love and knowledge, between the affective life of love and the senses, /an47 ve are now witnessing a dispersion, a decomposition which is final." For Marltaln, the "ultra-pessimist conception of human nature held by Calvin and Jansenius resulted also In an anthropocentrlc position. "^^ Therefore, by theocentrlc humanlra Marltaln means the "authentic humanism" of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross rather than "the Christian humanism or naturalism which flourished from the beginning of the sixteenth century and of which we have experienced ' ^The Twilight of Clviligatlon . p. 4; Freedom in the Modem Morld, p. 89. ^ ^True Bumanlws. pp. 16, 22.

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316 54 to the point o£ nausea." Consequently, he rejects the ant 1 -humanism of "the theology of grace without freedom" (Luther, Calvin and Barth) and an anthropocentrlc humanism of the theology or "metaphysic of freedom without grace." This theocentric humanism is also called "integral humanism, " because it is the humanism that is integrated with Christianity. It is also the humanism of the Incarnation, because it is essentially linked with the Gospel, love Aid charity. Maritain mentions two major difficulties of anthropocentrlc htmianlsm: "In the first place, it begins by a process humanly disastrous; ^^Haritain would regard Machiovelll (a child of the Renaissance) as the forerunner of "anthropocentrlc humanism" in politics. In the Machiavellian conception of Realpolitih. nolitics is separated from religion (even morality) altogether. Machiavelli is thus considered to be the "father" of modem politics and political science. This process of separation has really consximmated in the political philosophy of Hobbes. See Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, Ill.t Free Press, 1958) and The Political Philosophy of Hobbes; Its Basis and Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952). Describing the rebirth of (enthropocentric) humanism in the Renaissance, Moses Hadas writes: "What the rebirth really meant was a fresh realization of man — his high achievements and higher potentialities, his independence and his self-sufficiency. The glorification of man was the favorite theme of early Renaissance literature, and concern with man is what gives its primary meaning to the word humanism." Humanism; The Greek Ideal and Its Survival (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 120. Maritain insists that an authentic humanism can never be anti-religious. It must be integrated with religion and, moreover, it is authentically human only If God is served first. In his brief discussion of the issue between "theistic religion" and "religion without God" (or "anthropocentrlc humanism" in Maritain 's sense), Charles Hartshome remarics: "There is at least this to be said for humanism, however. It has often been an effective protest against intellectual dishonesty and laziness in religion, as well as against the notion that love of God can really be actualized apart frcMn love of our human fellows. We may learn from the humanists to be more sensitive to the absurdity of a piety which falls short of simple decency and helpfulness in ordinary affairs We may learn to realize more constantly and fully that loyalty to the objective God, whatever else it may be, must at least be devotion to the knowable truth, and to the full good of humanity." Reality as Social Process (Glencoe, 111.: Pree Press, 1953), pp. 180-81.

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317 to enrich humanity It oust first renounce the heritage to which Its whole history Is linked; secondly, since it Is Impossible to establish an Integral humanism without Integrating It Into a religion, and since all the theocentrlc religions, that Is to say, all the existing religions, must by hypothesis be eliminated, there remains for anthropocentrlc humanism only the founding of a new religion. "^^ '*To declare war on God Is a religious act," and, moreover, the dialectic of modem anthropocentrlc humanism, by eliminating all the existing religions, must by necessity create a new religion* Karitain points out the case of Auguste Comte (a religion of '*IlL]manity'*) and of Russian Conounism. In the integral or theocentrlc humanism of Karitain, there is no conflict between "the vertical movement" towards the supernatural end and "the horizontal movement of historical progression." On the contrary, the latter is served better if it is integrated with the former. ^^ Thus, if God plays a part in htman affairs, humanity is served better. The dialectic of the modem world is criticized both for being "humanist" and for being "theocentrlc." On the former ground, the Orthodox Protestant position is rejected and on the latter ground, anthropocentrlc humanism is repudiated. In anthropocentrlc humanism, man is the cotter of the universe; in theocentrlc husianism, in contrast, the center for man is God. Theocentrlc humanism is distinctively human . Anthropocentrlc humanism denies this hiaum element and becoaes "inhuman humanism. " A genuinely human humanism, therefore, isiat recognize the supernatural or the eternal above the natural and the tenr^rsil. Aa they may be distinct S &So— Reflections on Culture and Society , p. 4. ^ ^e IVlllght of Civilization , pp. 13-14.

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318 from each other, so Is the relation between religion and culture in general* Therefore, Marltain, as we have seen, is in a position to make a distinction between Catholics (or the Oathollc world or culture) and Catholicism (or the Catholic Church). It is the distinction between the things that are Caesar's and the things that are God's, although the latter are on a higher plane than the former. Consequently, Maritaln is in a position to criticize those who consider "Catholicism as though it were itself a terrestrial state or a terrestrial civilisation ." This is what he calls "inqperialism in 57 spirt tualibus . " Theocentric humanism lies neither in the separation of religion from culture nor in the identification of religion with culture. The age of theocentric humanism is truly "the reconciliation of the vision of Joseph de Maistre and that of Lamennais in the higher unity of the supreme wisdom of which St. Thomas Aquinas is the herald to our time."^^ Looking at theocentric humanism from the Thomlstlc synthesis, Marltain has already criticized the Protestant Orthodox position or "the satanocratic conception of the world" of Luther, Calvin and Barth. In the same manner, he has objected to the tragedy of the separatism of anthropocentric htaiianism in our age, which is c(»npo8ed of "three movements" in order of time beginning with the Renaissance. And these three movements, although they have followed one another in time, have co-existed and mixed one with another. The first movement (sixteenth-seventeenth centuries) Is essentially "a reversal of the order of ends," that is to say, the supernatural end was replaced by the 57'^eligion and Culture," p. 36. ^^reedom in the Modem World, p. 126.

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319 earthly or natiiral end. The second moveoient (eighteenth-nineteenth centuries) is "like a demiurgic loperlallsm with regard to the forces of Blatter,'* where culture is held apart from the supernatural end; and the third movement (twentieth century) has consoHuited this process in which what Is (religiously) htmian is replaced by materialism (what is material and technical) whose motto is "technlqtse is good, machinery is good.** Katerialism is equally represented by both Karxism and capitalism. ^^ Maritain has thus criticized the separatism of anti-htmanlaa (hasad upon the satanocratic conception of the world) and of anthro* pocentric humanism. The identification of the supernatural (the Kingdom of God) and the natural (the world) is also an error for Karitain* In the Identification of these two different raalma, they occupy the same ground, and the cultural and political world is regarded as the realisation of the Kingdom of God on earth. This error is esqpreaaed in what Maritain calls the "theophanlc" East and in the "theocratic** West. The error of Eastern Christendom lies in its "cry that here and now heaven should cone down upon earth. **^ Probably the theology of Russian Orthodox Nicolas Berdyaev might be considered to be the best representative of our time. In the West, the Counter-Reformation on the Catholic side, Gallicanism, Josephism, and Puritanism would represent the "theocratic** concept. Historically speaking, the best example is provided by the Spanish Armada at the time of Philip II, when the European Catholics rejoiced that '*Spaln was clearly the elected champion of Cod's Church** ^ ^True BLimanlsm . pp. 22-24 60ibid., p. 97.

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320 and God would defend the Spanish Armada for the right of the English Channel. ^^ For Marltain, this theophanic or theocratic conception is "an outrageous prevarication." And he holds that "medieval Christianity never professed theocracy in the political sense, since it always affirmed the distinction bet%feen the two Powers Z^the supernatural and the teinporal7."^2 Marltain Insists that the coining of a new Christendom based upon theocentric humanism is not a sacred but a secular idea, although it is derived fr«B the true spirit of Christianity (Catholicism). A new Christian order is not sacred but secular in its manifestation in the modem world. This idea of a new Christian order being secular is rooted in Marltain 'g distinction between religion, Christianity, the Church or the Kingdom of God and culture. Christians or a Christian civilization. Christianity is not the same as the Christian world or civilization. Nor is the Christian religion a kind of anthropomorphism of pagan antiquity, where religion was a (principal) part or one of the constituent elonents of its civilization. Instead, Christianity is essentially supernatural and belongs to the domain of God. It is "not a part of man, nor of tha world, nor of a race, nor of a culture, nor of civilisation." The Christian religion thus transcends all forms of civilization and particular cultures. Marltain makes it clear that **A philosopher of culture who raises the question of the Christian world is not raising the issue of the truth of Christianity , but of the temporal responsibilities of Christians . "^^ ^^Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), p. 400, ^ ^reedom in the Modem World , p. 159. "• ^True Humanism , pp. 34, 89-90.

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321 The Christian religion Is one and universal In eternity, but civilization Is many, it dies and is reborn. Under the heading of anthropocentric humanisa, there are capitallsn, German National Socialism and Conraunlsm. Harltaln, like Nicolas Berdyaev and Ball Brunner, criticizes capitalism. Berdyaev, who has been influenced by Harxlan idealism, has said that capitalism is the worst enesqr of Christianity. As for Harltaln, GonBRinlsm Is "the final state of anthropocentric rationalism" in the dialectic of the modern vorld. CooDunism Is the culminating point of the anthropocentric postmedieval era. For Harltaln, capitalist society (or bourgeois society) is but "one aspect of the world of anthropocentric humanism." Hsx Weber and R. H. Tawney hove already related Christianity (Protestantism) with the rise and development of capitalism. As for Harltaln, "truly the mere idea of any bond or fellowship between Christianity and such a society /Capitalist or bourgeois society^ is Itself the height of paradox."^ He has no objection to the vitalism of capitalism, that Is to say, to "a spirit of the exaltation of men's active and inventive powers, of human dynamism and individual initiative." But he speaks against the "frankensteln of a usurious economy" and "the tltanlsm of Industry" in which there is "a spirit of hatred of poverty and of contempt for the poor." In capitalism, he finds "a spirit of the enslavement of all things ^ ^eedom in the Hodem World , pp. 116, 119. 130. ^^ True Humanism , p. 108; Freedom in the Modem Tforld . pp. 129,

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322 to the endless Increase of the sacred pile of material goods. '^^^ In capitalism, "the dignity of labour" is forgotten when the proletariat or the poor becomes "an instrument of production," a "hand" but not a person, on the one hand and the rich becomes merely a "consumer" on the other. ^' The basis of the worth and dignity of labor lies in "spiritu* al perfection, the freedom of exultation or fulfilment and of autonomy." In order to bring back the economic order in harmony with social Justice and an organic unity in the structure of civil society, we need "a certain measure of collectivisation which bursts the cadres of family econooiy." Therefore, "the governing rules of the industrial economy ought to subordinate this collectlvist movement to the interests of htaoan personality and the common good." Maritain, when he speaks of a usurious ecoiKMBy, is not unlike Bmil Brunner who has criticized the capitalist economy for its concentrated energy in profit -making and thus for the loss of Christian comnunion. Maritain is extremely conscious of the inhuman condition created for the proletariat by an uncontrolled capitalism. As a matter of fact, he conceives of his communal and personallst society "only after the dissolution of capitalist society." As for Communism or Communistic totalitarianism, Maritain, like Berdyaev, points out its messianic and eschatological elements. In it Christianity is replaced by a new religion, atheism, and it is "antiChristian" and "antl-Christic." The false idea of the revolutionary thought of ComnHmism is an establishment of "the Kingdom of God in ^ freedom in the Modern World, p. 130. ° ^True Humanism , p. 108; Freedom in the Modem World, pp. 58-59, 129, " ^Freedom in the Modem World , pp. 56, 61,

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323 history. "^^ There Is no doubt In Marltaln's mind that Connunlsfli Is antl«Chrlsti«n rather than what Karl Berth calls a-Chrlstlan or nonChristian. For Barth, Nazlsa alone was truly an anti-Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, Karitain and Berth hove something in common in that both think that Rasism is more erroneous and irremediable than Communisau For Maritain, Masl's racism is "a biological inferno." Rasism is a "pseudo-theism" or the irrationallst perversion of the idea of God* As for Berth, the perversion of Christianity is worse than the atheism of CoMsnnlsm. Karitain expresses the same thought when he says, in reference to Hazism, that '*The consequence is that, in actual existence, such a process of spiritual poisoning is for human minds and human history a factor of perversion more irremediable than atheism Itself." There is a slim possibility for the cure of the materialist atheism by "some Internal tr«ui8formation, " and yet Nazism and its formidable racial paganism had to be cured only by "a crushing defeat of At«7 undertidclngs of aggresslKMi. " In conclusion, however, "althcmgh Razl racisa is more irremediably destructive and constitutes simply the worst plague for our world, there is no human regeneration to be expected either from Communism or from Nazi racism." Therefore, the possibility of some internal transformation of Communism is not due to Comnunism itself; it is only due to the fact that Communism cannot eradicate the human and religious sources of the Russian people.'^ So ouch for the criticisms of anthropocentrlc humanism of the modem world. We shall return to Marltaln's concept of a new Christendom °^ Trtte Humanism , p. 47. 7 °The Twilight of Civilization , pp. 21, 24, 25-26.

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324 based upon theocentrlc hiimanlsm and the thoughts of St. Thomas Aquinas. Marltain notices the fact that the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas Aquinas had been too late for an application to the Christian order of the Middle Ages. As a natter of fact, "the Augustlnian conception of grace and freedotn dominated the Middle Ages." As the modern age is governed by Calvinism and Molinism, Marltain holds that "the theology of St. Thomas will govern that of a new Christendom." Therefore, in Thomism, Marltain finds not only a reconstruction of modem philosophy but also a rebuilding of our civilization. The ideal of a new Christen* dom Is not a form of theocracy. For Marltain, civilization can never be identified with religion. Christendom, as Marltain understands it, "describes a certain temporal regime whose formations, in very varying degrees and in very varying ways, bear the stamp of the Christian conception of life. There is only one Integral religious truth; there is only one Catholic Church. But there can be diverse Christian civilizations, diverse forms of Christendom. In speaking of a new Christendom, /he 1^ therefore spewing of a ten:q;>oral system or age of civilization whose animating form will be Christian and which will correspond to the historical climate of the epoch on whose threshold we are."'^ A new Christendom is not merely a political system but a type of civilization or culture, in which the ideal of a c<»Maunal and persottftlist philosophy must be actualized. A new Christendom is communal because the specifying end of its culture (and its polity) is directed towards the highest temporal end True Humanism , pp. 67, 126.

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325 of the coomon good which Is not "a staple sum of individual goods and vhich is superior to individual interests in as anich as each individual is a part of the social whole." In this sense, Maritaln's notion of the connon good is something not entirely dissimilar to Rousseau's idea of the volonte g&i^rale although Haritain considers the Rousseauan general will as a kind of totalitarian berth. However, the main difference would be that the conoon good for Maritain is not a final end, it is a temporal end towards the achlev«Mnt of spiritual perfection and the autonomous freedom. A new Christendom is also personalist, because the teiiq>oral common good is essentially directed to the perfection of person* ality. In short, the common good is the "Intermediate or infravalent end" of the acccnnpllshment of the human persona; it does not thus constitute an absolute end in Itself. Horeover, it is not the business of the social polity to aim at the perfection of personality and of the freedom of autonoB^. Its real aim is to accosiplish the common (terrestrial) good and the freedom of choice. Thus, Maritain restates that "the social polity is essentially directed, by reason of its own temporal end, towards such a development of social conditions as will lead the gener* ality of a level of material, moral and intellectual life in accord with the good and peace of all, such as will positively assist each person in the progressive conquest of the fullness of personal life and spiritual liberty. "^^ Maritain insists that a new Christendom is not a Utopia. He reminds us more than once that he can never be an idealist simply because ^^Ibid., pp. 127, 128.

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326 Thomism is a realism. He speaks of "the prospective image of a new Christendom," that is to say, "it relates to a concrete and individualised future to the future of our time, but ... it matters little whether this future be near at hand or far,"''^ Much later, Maritain wrote that "The liope of the coming of a new Christian era in our civilization is ... a hope for a distant future, a very distant future." His mood is one of pessimism as to the present but one of optimism as to the future. Although 'Ve have crossed the threshold of the Apocalypse," cotipled with the advent of the destructive atcKoic bombs, this does not imply that "the end of the world is due tomorrow." He still believes that "a new phase will begin, and it is to that phase that ^e delegates his/ hopes for the coming of a new age of Christian civilization, more successful than the Middle Ages." The Christian era will come, and will come only, in the distant future. As a matter of fact, Maritain finds hope for the realization of a new Christendom first in the soil of the United States if it were ever to come about anywhere in the distant future. Provided that the coming of a new Christendom is not a hlstorl* cal inevitability, but a hope, then this new order is necessary ; it bec(xnes a moral imperative to purify the conditions of our present civilization. "If civilization is to be saved," Maritain writes, "the new age must be an age of theocentrlc huaanlma. "'^ We must leave to the future historians the final judgment as to whether a new Christian era, conceived as a concrete historical ideal, is realizable . Maritain*s ideal of a new Christendom is conq>ared to that of '' hhid , . p. 135. ^ ^The Range of Reason, pp. 93, 217-18.

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327 medieval Christendon* Medieval Christendom, however, was "only one of Its possible forms of realisation*" Marltaln's philosophy of history do«s not recognise the fundamental reversibility of historical movement as opposed to the concept of "eternal recurrence." As Marltaln says, '*Tlme Is linear, not cyclical. "^^ As to the possible form of a Christian cultural and social order In the circumstances of the modem world, Marltaln rejects what he calls "an unlvocal Interpretation" and also "an equivocal interpretation. "76 xhe former Implies that the rules and principles which govern human action "apply always In the same fashion." On the other hand, the latter In^lies the other extreme position; that Is to say. It means that "historical circumstances grow so different with the lapse of time that they come to depend on principles that are also different. "^^ For Marltaln, therefore, the true solution as to the possible form of a new Christendom is found In "the philosophy of analogy." The course of world's history must be interpreted neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically . The analogical interpretation of history would in9>ly that "The principles /which govern hiouun action and history? do not vary; nor the governing rules of practice: but they are applied In modes that are essentially different and that correspond to one concept only according to a similarity of proportion. "'° This philosophy of analogy, of course, dominates Thomism itself. Thus, Marltaln considers ^ ^On the Philosophy of History * p. 2. 7 "True Humanism, pp. 131-32; Freedom in the Modem World. pp. 103-104. ^' ^Freedom in the Modem World , p. 104. ^^Ibid.

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328 the analogical principle as "the guiding star" for the interpretation of philosophy and history. He affirms the idea that the cooing new Christian order would incarnate "the same (analogical) principles, be conceived as belonging to an essentially (specifically) distinct type from that of the mediaeval world. "'^ Ho%fever, Marltain is silent on the question of whether or not a new Christian order, if it is bom in Europe, would be different specifically frorary world, in spirit they are speaking the same language. Marltain excludes from a new Christendtxn Marxian economic determinism, "from which /lie noteii7 many of fitaj critics often borrow /ItsJ way of posing the problem ." Instead, he prop>oses to formulate a ' ^True Humanism, p. 133. S®"The World Situation," The Christian Answer , pp. 43, 44.

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329 Christian philosophy of culture. "Great as Is the part (which I In no visa seek to dladnlsh) played by the economic factor In history,** Harltaln writes, "It Is not primarily from economics but from more himan and deeeper aspects of culture, and above all from the Implications of the spiritual and the temporal In civilisation, that I shall seek ny •81 guiding light. "^ As a matter of fact, Harltaln warns us not to confuse the political order with the economic order of society. In his organic theory of society, he envisages a union of the two orders; but "the political order, having a more formal and less material character, is stiperlor to /the economic order^." The tendency to assimilate the political into the economic order is "an error arising from a materialist philosophy. "®2 How we shall return to the substance of a new Christendom In (analogical) comparison with that of medieval Christendom. The Holy Soman pire for Karltala is of living significance for today, as the sacrum imperltim had been a historic myth of the Middle Ages. "This concrete historical ideal, this myth or symbol of the Holy Bnplre, corresponds to what may be called a Christian consecrational conception of the temporal. "^^ The five characteristics of the Holy Empire, which are entnaerated by Harltaln, are analogically relevant to his conceptualization of a new Christendom. How«v«r, the suggested image of a new Christendom is "specifically distinct frcHii that of the Middle Ages and directed by ° *True Humanism , p. 136. " ^Freedom in the Modern Vtorld . p. 56. 83 True Humanism , p. 140.

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330 another ideal than that of the Holy Eapire,^* First of all, the ideal of a new Christendom based upon an Integral or theocentric humanism is characterized by an organic unity in pluralism. Medieval Christendom had "a tendency towards an organic unity at the maximum in point of quality: a unity which excludes neither diversity nor pluralism.'*^ Without diversity and pluralism, it would not have been called "organic." Medieval society is pluralistic insofar as the term "pluralism" is defined in terms of "a multiplicity of associations." It was not a pluralist society in the sense that pluralism includes "a multiplicity of affiliations." "So long as no association claims or receives hegemony over many aspects of its members' lives," William Kornhauser writes, "its power over the individual will be limited. This is a vital point, because the authority of a private group can be as oppressive as that of the state." Therefore, lack of multiple affiliations prevented medieval society from having democratic control.^" For Maritain, a return to an organic unity in a new Christendom must contain "a much more developed element of pluralism than that of the Middle Ages." The consecrational unity of medieval Christendom was maximal . On the contrary, a coming new Christian order would contain only a minimal unity and the maximum of civil tolerance. However, this minimal unity is essentially organic, not mechanical, and is therefore '%mch superior to . . . the liberal-individualistic order." Since the pluralist commonwealth is essentially tenq>oral, Maritain insists, "this temporal or cultural unity does not in itself require a unity of faith S ^Ibld . . pp. 140, 155. Q ^The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 79-81.

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331 mad religion, and ... it can b« Christian while including aon« Christians in its circle." However, civil tolerance for Maritain does not iaply "dogmatic tolerance," that is to say, the respect for the rights of conscience does not regard "the liberty of error as in itself good." At any rate, Maritain insists that 'Vie laust give up seeking in a coasBon profession of faith the source and principle of unity in the social body." The unity of a secular order must be sought "in conformity with good reason and the coonion good," since a Christian conmonwealth is a ts Mporal order only "vivified and iDq>regnated with Christianity. '*°^ In a new pluralistic order, Maritain pays due attention to "economic pluralism" and "Juridical pluralism." Differing from the medieval order, he takes cognisance of modem economic dcvelopoient and technical and mechanical contrivances of our time in our industrial and agricultural econon^. However, these new developments must be in conformity with the communal and personalist conception of society. Therefore, this new order demands, to a certain extent, the collectivication of ownership; and there must be "a renewal and revivification of the family-type of economy and ownership," "co*operative services," and "a trade>union type of organisation," while the new order utilises the new technology and mechanization.^' However, it is difficult to conceive of the family-type of economy and ownership in the age of "the managerial revolution." Juridical pluralism is the problem that takes into consideration a religioxts diversity in the new Christian order. It is essentially the problem of unbelievera. While medieval Christendom had no problem with g ^True Humanism, pp. 155, 157, 165, 166, 168. S^ibid., pp. 158-59.

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332 unbelievers since they "were outside the walls of the city," the new social order must take cognizance of the fact that believers and unbelievers are mingled in the modem state system. Therefore, believers and unbelievers must "live alike and share together in the same temporal conmotwealth." "The legislature %iould hence recognise the differing juridical status of the diverse spiritual groups included in one comoionweal . " Nonetheless, the Christian spirit must permeate into this secular pluralistic society while "the various non-Christian spiritu* al groups included in it would enjoy a just liberty."®® In short, the organic tinity of a new Christian order is "a simple unity of friendship." Apart from the first characteristic of pluralism, the second characteristic of the medieval order was "the predominance of the ministerial rdle of the tenq>oral order in relation to the spiritual," that is to say, the temporal order was subordinated to the spiritual one. liovever, in the new Christian order, the temporal order is only a Christian conception of "the lay or secular state." Therefore, the authority of the state is supreme in its own sphere. It will cease to become merely instmmental or rainistrial to the spiritual order. Maritain writes that "the secular order has in the course of the modern age built up for itself an autonomous relation with regard to the spiritual or consecrational order which in fact excludes the notion of instrumentality." Realistically speaking, "this is a historical gain, which a new Christendom must know how to preserve." This imist not be construed to mean that the notion of spiritual primacy has been abandoned in Maritain 's ideal of a new Christendom. On the contrary, the modem lay state is 88ibid., pp. 159-60, 161.

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333 only recognised as "« princlpel agent on a lower plane . " that is to say. It has ceased to be purely Instniaental to the spiritual order. Although the new (secular) Christian order reoialns a real end, it sust recognize the final spiritual end or "the highest principal agent" of the spiritual order. *^ The third characteristic of the oedieval Christian order is related to the second characteristic. In correlation to the ninistrial function of the state, the institutional forces of the state trere used for the spiritual good and the spiritual unity of the social order itself. Therefore, "the heretic was not only a heretic, but one who attacked the lifespring of the socioteiqporal coanunity as such." In a new Christendom, however, the notion of Instrumentality of the state is excluded. And at the same time "the extraterritoriality of the person" must also be recognised with regard to teiq;>oral and political means. In contrast to the medieval order in which the state was merely a sacred arm of the spiritual, now the power of the state is an accomplished fact of history. The freedom of the person (freedom of autonooiy) is emphasized in contrast to the freedom of choice which is manifested in the two extremes of the llberclistic and the dictatorial conceptions. God must always be enthroned, but the mode of collaboration between the state and the Church must vary according to historical conditions. "Once it was primarily by the use of temporal powers and legal constraints; in the future it will probably be, even in politico-religious connections, by way of moral influence. "^^ In our age of statlsm, Maritain rightly stresses the idea ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 142, 170-71. ^ °Ibid . . pp. 144, 172.

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334 of freedom (especially the freedom of the person). As to the freedom of expression, Harltaln rejects both the totalitarian control and llberalistic nonregulation. The totalitarian method of regulation is "detestable," and the expression of opinion is not "an end in itself and an unrestricted right." Instead, the "pluralist method" — by justice and a progressive self -regulation — strikes Marltain as "good, being no less strong than just." The same principle may be applied in regard to the law. "This pluralist commonwealth, though less concentrated than the mediaeval, is much more concentrated than the liberal conception. It is an authoritarian State . . . ."^'It seems that we should not misconstrue the phrase "an authoritarian State" in the strict sense that we use in political theory. In an earlier work, Marltain maintained that a communal and personalist society (a new Christian order) will be essentially "a society of coxrporatlve. authoritative , and pluralist type."'^ Thus, we should use the term "authoritative" instead of "authoritarian" in order to avoid any confusion. Marltain seems to mean that the new order must be based on the sound foundation of authority. Marltain rules out "6tatiane " and "the wheels of a bureaucratic machine." And the organic unity of a new order is achieved by chosen leaders in their "responsible office." Marltain 's supreme concern here seems to be with the idea of the common good in a new society. In regard to the problem of supreme political control, he is, unlike his master St. Thomas Aquinas, of the opinion that "the stability in the exercise of authority should give way in historical ^^Ibld., pp. 175-76. ^^reedom in the Modem World, p. 55.

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335 conditions where efficiency counts for acre even than stability to those which attend the selection, by the appropriate organs in the connunity, of the man who will be the dlrector-ln-chlef of the common good."^^ Maritaln is concerned with the moral authority of the law, which has been "almost totally lost under liberalism. '*^^ In the pluralist coosnnwealth, the economic order, which is subordinate to the political sphere, must strive for the moral accoa^llshment of personality. Capitalism as well as totalitarianism are completely rejected; and the law of common use (usus communis) of economic goods is the essence of the new order. This can be achieved only after "the liquidation of capitalism." The dignity of the workers is exalted, and a society of persons (workmen, technicians, investors), co-partnership, and "the associative oimership of the means of production" are the coaq>onents of the new econosiic order. And "this corporative organisation needs to be conceived as established from below upwards, according to the principles of personal democracy, with the suffrage and active personal participation of all the interests at the bottom, and AS emanating from them and their unions . . . ."^^ Be that as it may, these technical morphologies and specifications are subordinated to a higher ethical consideration, the perfection of the comnon good and, ultimately, of personality based upon a Christian philosophy. The fourth characteristic of the medieval ideal was "a diversity of social races " on the basis of "tlw hierarchy of social functions and '^IMd., p. 57. ^ ^rue Humanism, p. 176. ^ hbid , . p. 183.

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336 relations of authority." The teaq[>oral authority In the Middle Ages was an Image of "father's authority in accord with a consecratlonal conception of the family," e. g., the Roman Idea of the paterfamilias . This hierarchical conception of authority, according to Maritaln, formed the basis of the economic system of feudalism. The representative exanq>le of this medieval conception of hierarchical authority, which played a large part In the formation of medieval culture, Is the Benedictine Order. While a certain disparity of social categories was important in the medieval Christian order, the question of political or any other social forms of authority must be grounded on "an essential parity" in a new Christendom. Therefore, Marltain holds that the conception of authority in a new Christendom is found not in the Benedictine Order but In the Dominican Order. In the political order, moreover, the forms of government, although they may be regarded as having their sources of authority in God, must lose "a sacred character." Authority resides In these forms of government only by virtue of "a certain consensus , " that is to say, by "a free and vital determination of the nultltiide" or the populace. Furthermore, authority is "pei^iodlcally renewable with regard to the holders of power," and "the head /of the power holders/ is slB^ly one who has the right of command over others who are his equals or companions." ° For Marltain, a personalist democracy in the new Christian order is at once opposed to the sacred character of the Middle Ages and to the Rousseauan conception of democratism. The "affective and moral" conception of a personalist democracy must be conceived so that, on Its ^^Ibld., pp. 145, 147, 194.

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337 external plane, the "Inner freedom of the hximan being" may be translated into political institutions and the social body.^' For Maritain, therefore, this ethical conception of democracy really does correspond to "a popular civic consciousness," which implies, on the social and political plane, the respect for human personality in every individual who composes a part of the whole. In this manner, a new society will becooa a society sans classes . Haritain writes, however, that "this society without a bourgeoisie and without a proletariat will not be a society without any internal structure or any differentiations and organic inequalities. But the hierarchy of functions and advantages will no longer be bound up with hereditary categories fixed theretofore by blood « . . nor as to-day by money . . « ,^ The fifth and last characteristic of a new Christendom is its culminating point. In medieval Christendom, the common work for the faithful end the Christian polity was "to build a figurative and symbolic image here on earth of the Kingdom of God." God was «l ^.hroned, and an empire was built for Christ. For Haritain, it is naive to maintain that the cooBon task of a new civilization or society is to realise a sacred work on earth or the medieval ideal of building God's empire in this world. Nor is a new Christian order "the myth of a class or of a race, a nation or a State." It is a secular order vivified and impregnated with the Christian spirit; its ideal is guided by the Gospel, which embodies the dignity of personality, a spiritual vocation and fraternal love. The dynamic principle of a new Christendom is its orientation ^ ^Ibid . . p. 195, ^ hhid ,, p. 196; Freedom in the Modem World , pp. 57, 58.

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338 "In its entirety towards a socio-temporal realisation of the Gospel."^ Unlike the medieval ideal, a new order is not "consecrationally but secularly Christian ." It auist now take cognizance of the fact that the modern world is no longer a community of Christian believers alone. The solution for a new Christendom must be sought in the due recognition that this world is a world of believers and unbelievers. Marltain's pluralistic solution for the coexistence of Christian believers and unbelievers is a compromising rather than a dogmatic position of a Christian theologian. His conception of a lay Christian state is more encompassing in scope than the movements of Christian Democracy in Europe. Nevertheless, from a Christian point of view, it embodies a similar philosophy. Marltain's prograsniatic proposals for a new Christendom are concerned with (primarily) internal and external transformations based upon a theocentric humanism, whose supreme representatives are St* Ttomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross. This new Christian order is essentially a system of civilization or culture rather than a political or an economic system in the usual sense of the terms. Therefore, Maritain speaks of the transcendence of not only economics but also of politics. In actuality, however, he does not oppose political and economic elements as such in a new Christendom, but he opposes what he calls "econoraism" and "politicism." Bconomism merely retreats to a materialist philosophy like Mairxism. As we recall, Maritain is opposed not only to dialectic materialism but also to those who oppose Marxism as such while utilizing ^ ^True Humanism , pp. 147, 197, 199.

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339 the fundamentally Harxlan techniques t Politlcim !• "Indeed the corruption of politics.'* It refers to the politics that is devoid of spiritual and moral contents* It refers to the aggrandizement of power by a political party or by a class that conceives of itself "as essential for a 'substantial transformation* of the order of civili100 zation.'"Foliticisa is identified with "a purely technical idea of a political activity," that is to say, political and social activity being then regarded as intrinsically amoral and social facts as special instances of purely physical facts, which it is sufficient to deal with according to purely technical rules, while private conduct remains subject to the rules of personal morality. In this conception political knowledge is essentially identified with a pure and simple art , with a technique; an art which is perh^s subordinated by such a one to some external moral system, but whose ends and particular texture are strangers to morality: ends, for example, such as the purely material existence, the power and material prosperity of the State. *°* The supreme example of politicism, for Maritain, is the "immoralism" of Machiovelli. Machisvelli is "the great political hereslarch of modem times." Nonetheless, Haritain admits that "every error has its truth; the truth of machiavellianisra is a reaction against a false conception of ethics, against what may be called supennoralism (meaning by this the melancholic claims of a pharisaic morality, one which is purely formal and geometric, which denies at once natinre and life)." Although every error may have its truth, this truth never justifies the error. '*rhe political and social sphere is not only technical, but primarily and essentially human, i. e. ethical or moral. The achievements of men in that sphere are intrinsically htnnan and moral. "^^^ lO Olbid .. pp. 207-208. ^Q^Ibid. . p. 208. ^^ ^Ibid .. p. 209.

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340 Pblltlcal morality rightly conceived, for Karltaln, Is not Individual morality. In this sense, Harltaln Is truly an Aristotelian. For Aristotle, politics (or political science) was "the supreme practical ^r ethical/ science." Therefore, It was above, not Identical with. Individual morality or ethics. ^^^ As the common good of a political order Is not merely a sum of Individual good, Marltaln maintains that It Is naive to say that "politics Is reducible to Individual morality or a single application of the latter." Politics, instead, "Is specifically concerned with the good of men gathered In a commonwealth, the good of the social whole." "The particular object of politics Is the comnon good of the social body: that Is Its measure,"^"* Harltaln' 8 Ideal of a new Christendom based upon a theocentrlc humanism Is not a world of Catholics although It Is derived from Thomism, a recognized philosophy and theology of the Catholic Church. Nor Is It Catholicism Itself. 'Hie new Christian order Is neither a political system nor an economic order, but a system of civilisation. Its economic element rejects the capitalist system which has nothing but contempt and hatred for the poor and enslaves all things to the stockpile of material goods. Nor can the "suffering" proletariat be "liberated" by the erroneous materialism of Marx. A moral restoration of the proletariat Is achieved only with due recognition of the dignity of work, the worker and of the human personality of the worker. Marltaln thus writes that "the Christian world of to-day as a whole should have broken with the regime of civilisation spiritually founded on bourgeois humanism and ^°^. D. Ross, Aristotle , p. 183. *O ^True Humanism , pp. 210, 212.

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341 economically on the fecundity of money, while at the sane tliae keeping Itself Immune from the totalitarian and communist errors to which that regime leads as its logical catastrophe."*^' Marltaln is critical of the antl-humanist tendency within the Christian camp, some of whose thinkers reject the very idea of a Christian social and political order* For them, "the things of man pull one way, the things of God another way.'*'^^^ Nor can Marltaln tolerate anthropocentric humanism which has its root in the Renaissance* The "inraorality'* of Machiavellism is a repudiation of politics itself* Marltaln would agree with Eduard Helmann in that 'Wrality is the fruit of religion," and anthropocentric **humanism is often a moving, but always a tragic phenomenon*' ' Ho sooner than "Man the Measure" is enunciated, the idea is adumbrated and antiquldated. Or is it an "exchange of greeting between Machiavellian Immorality md Lutheran pessimism"?'*^^ A new Christendom, Marltaln insists, is not a 'Hitopia, " the thing that cannot be realised* (ki the contrary, it is "a concrete historical Ideal" that Is realizable * Although it may be actualized in the offing, this new Christian order is yet an aim and, thus, daoMada preparatory action. This preparatory action is "political action with 109 a remote objective*"* It is "an effort to renew the temporal order on ^°^Ibid., y, 240* lO ^reedom in the Modern World , p* 157. ^^^'\:hristlan Foundations of the Social Sciences.** Social Research* XXVI (Autumn, 1959), p. 334* 108 Freedom in the Modem World , p. 157. ^^ ^True Humanism, p. 254.

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342 Christian principles," the Gospel and charity. It Is neither the unlvocal application nor the equivocal rejection of medieval Christendom. Instead, It Is an analogical application that takes into account certain accomplished historical facts and existing conditions. Marltaln also recognizes the fact that the theologians have in the past worked out some measures, under the pressure of events in history. In order to resist unjust law and tyranny; and they have contrived certain measures of force which may be Instrumental in the establishment and execution of Just law. As the political order and the temporal state must use coercion or force to maintain public order, so does the spiritual power have "the right in certain defined cases to use a measure of coercion." But this power of coercion can only be justified when It is used as an instrument of justice. ^^^ At the smae tine, we must be forewarned of the fact that the totalitarian measure can also be used for the noble name of justice. When coercion is used for the cause of justice, we are not answering the question but, instead, begging the question. Thus we must either define the exact domain of justice or specify the limits of coercion. A new Christian order is a tnoral rennovation rather than a revolution in the radical sense of the French or Russian Revolution which atteiDpted to discount history or the past. It is a rennovation that demands preparatory political action. Mow the problem remains in regard to means and ways. Since Marltaln speaks from the standpoint of a Catholic, it is the question of Catliolic action (not in a political sense) hie et nunc . As to the conduct of the individual Catholic as such, Marltaln makes it quite clear that it is '*a question for the ^^ Opreedom in the Modem WOrld . pp. 151, 153.

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343 Church . * . moreover, the giving of such Instructions Is hardly the business of a philosopher." Maritaln has been criticized for having offered no prescribed action for the Individual Catholic as such and for what had been Interpreted as an attitude of "a sanctified de« tachment*" It was felt that his philosophical questions were In fact "'a smoke-screen' concealing Inqpenetrable obscurities." Maritaln replied to his critic by saying that the notion of a sanctified detachment Is "the very contrary of a Christian attitude. "^^^ "The Christian, Indeed, Is never resigned . "*^^^ Since Maritaln holds that he Is In no position to Instruct Catholic action, It Is clear that whenever he speaks of Catholic action for the construction of a nmr Chrlstendoa he egresses either his philosophical and ox>ral conviction or his Interpretation of the Catholic Church's attitude concerning morals. Earlier Maritaln has said that Catholics or the Catholic world and Catholicism are not the sane thing. Therefore, he emphatically maintains that "reform and revolution of the temporal regime are not the affair of the Church, which has not a temporal but an eternal and a spiritual end above and beyond political and social Issues* "''''^ The fact that "the Church Is In the world but Is not of the world" does not mean that the Church Is tied with a temporal order. "If she Invites men to be faithful to social Institutions ... it signifies her recognition that the stability of law Is an Important element In the welfare of mankind. "^^^ The Church (The Ifystlcal ^^^ True Humanism , p. 261. Maritaln refers to Charles Smith who has criticized Freedom In the Modem World . ^^ ^True Humanism, p. 131. ^* ^reedom in the Modem World , p. 147. 114 True Humanism, p. 117.

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344 Body of Christ) has no bond with historical exigencies and circumstances. It is not tied with teoq>orary human institutions* This position seems not without some difficulty. From a Barthian point of view, Maritain*s position is exactly one which ties the Church, the t^stical Body of Christ, with the world and civilization. Therefore, it loses its very stq>ematural character. Ijooking at it from another angle, some m^ be able to argue that Maritain's position is a kind of para-dualism. Besides the Church being the Itystical Body of Christ, is it also a human Institution (a body of the faithful who are also the citizens of a tei^poral state) fro& a purely political and social point of view? Or should it be construed that "the Church takes particular care not to become an adherent of any particular regime or class or party "^^5 and thus cannot become involved with the Catholic world? Maritain proffers his own individual position as a Catholic philosopher and theologian. Since Maritain rejects a hybrid conception of religion (Catholicism) and culture (Catholics and the Catholic world), he makes it clear that "the considerations /he iti/ proffering belong to a wholly different plane from what, since its initiation by Pope Pius XI, Catholics of various countries know under the ^pelation of catholic action , which belongs essentially to the religious and apostolic order." Maritain rejects clericalism within the Catholic circle when he says: "it is not for the clergy to hold the driving-wheel of truly political and tenq>oral action." He is a forerunner of Christian Democracy when he writes: 'It is not for the Church but for Christians as teBq>oral —hers of this teiq>oral organism to strive directly and immediately to ^^^reedom in the Modem World, p. 147.

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3A5 transform and act upon it In the spirit of Christianity. "^^° This is exactly the same philosophy that guides Christian Democracy in Europe. Maritain further clarifies the activity of the Catholic on three distinct levels: the spiritual, the teaporal, and the intennediate 'Srhich Joins the spiritual and the teaqporal." On the first plane of activity. Catholics act as *^Baabers of the Mystical Body of Christ." On the second plane. Catholics act as "citizens of an earthly city." The spiritual and the tenporal planes are clearly distinct: there are the things that are God's and the things that are Caesar's. But they are not separated. According to Maritain, the third plane of activity, strictly speaking, belongs to the spiritual order. However, it is intermediate in the sense that "the plane of the spiritual . . . Join* Che teaq>oral." This position ensues when the Catholic laymen "Intervene in political affairs in the defence of religious interests," and therefore it is not "the same thing as working towards a political aim directed to the achievement of a certain conception of the toaporal coonon good." In regard to the encyclical letters that prescribe action for the faithful, Maritain maintains that they are the papal elaborations of "the principles of a Christian political, social and economle wisdom , which does not descend to particular determinations of the concrete, but which is like a theological firmament for the doctrines and more particular activities engaged in the contingencies of the temporal sphere." The recognition of these three positions does not ^^ ^True Humanism , pp. 264, 265.

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346 obscure Maritaln*8 owa conviction. He as a Catholic may become Involved in the mundane affairs of politics by the light of his Catholic conscience, but he maintains that **lt would be Intolerable If In the so doing (hej claimed to speak In the name of Catholicism and Implied that all Catholics as such should follow ChtsJ road. "''*' For Marltaln Catholicism (religion) Is not of the temporal or profane order (culture). As religion transcends the world of culture, so CatholiclMi attst trsnscend the Catholic world* This distinction Is of fundamental Importance In his philosophy of culture and politics. "To ask Catholicism to specify a political or national Ideal . . « would be contrary to the nature of things, precisely because Catholicism Is by nature transcendent • "'''^^ The temporal or political world Is not the Christian religion, but the activation of the Christian ferment or spirit that motivates one's concern over the temporal and political world and things* "The Christian religion Is annexed to no tenqwral regime; It Is compatible with all forms of legitimate government; it is not its business to determine which type of civil rule men must adopt hlc et nunc ; it Imposes none on their will nor, so long as the higher essential princi* pies are respected, does It specify any particular system of political philosophy, no matter how general, such as that system which occupies us at the moment. "^^' • , % ^l-'lbid., pp. 293. 294, 295, 300. ^ ^ ^Scholasticism and Politics , p. 209. ^^ ^The Twilight of Civiligation . p. 60.

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CHAPTBR XIIX MAH] PERSOHAUTY AND IHDIVIOUALITY In his philosophy of culture and society, Jacques Marltaln has already alluded to the fact that the laodem world needs "a radical purification." His idea of a new Christendom is a moral and spiritual "revolution" which is analogically but not univocally rooted in medieval Christendom. This new Chrlstendon is truly a philosphy of the mind since it is basically the transformation of the huown spirit that will in turn change the outlook of the temporal world. Mor will it be a kind of NietMcheaa trantvaluation of all values. Marltaln has insisted that a new Christian order is not a Utopia but a concrete historical ideal because it is realizable in our time, not Inmedlately, but in a relatively indeterminate future. Nor is it a sacred or consecratlonal order, but a tanporal order impregnated with Christianity. A new Christian order is not identified with political systasis as such; rather, it is a form of culture or civillEation. Nonetheless, it Includes a lesser area of politics* Man is the basic unit of human civilization and polity; that branch of knowledge which deals with human action is called a practical philosophy. It is practical because it deals with human action. Moreover, all practical philosophy must presuppose the speculative knowledge or metaphysics. The question "What is Man?" is a metaphysical 347

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348 question. Thus, metaphysics Is pre8iq>po8ed and necessary In a phllsophy of culture, freedom and polity. For Marltaln, a new Christendom Is persona list and conanunallst at the some time. It is coonunal In the sense that the aim of society or polity is to achieve Its common good. The common good of a tenporal order Is not merely a sum of individual good and advantages. In this vay, Marltaln insists, we can avoid the error of the ''bourgeois Individualism" (or individualistic liberalism) of the nineteenth century. He writes: The end of the state is the common good, which is not only a collection of advantages and utilities, but also rectitude of life, an end good In Itself, which the old philosophers called bonuna honestum , the intrinsically worth good. For, on one hand, it is a thing good in itself to Insure the exist«ice of the multitude. And, on the other hand, it is the Just and morally good existence of the conmunlty which may thus be insured. It is only on this condition, of being in accordance with Justice and with moral good, that the conmon good is what it 1st the good of a people, the good of a city, and not the *good' of an association of gangsters or of murderers.^ The comaon good, therefore, is "a thing ethically good.'*^ A tenqwral order, which is at once conmunal and personal, achieves "the moral realities of justice and civil anlty . which . . . correspond to what the Gospel calls brotherly love on the spiritual and stqtematural plane. "3 The summit of Marltaln* s phllospphy is his insistence vtpon the idea that the common good of society or polity is not a terminal aid as Scholastldam and Politics , p. 73. Jacques Marltaln, The Person and the Coiaaon Good , tr. John J. Fltsgerald (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 43; Scholasticism and Politics , p. 73. *£he Person and the Coaaon Good, p. 92.

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349 the taqx)ral order Is not a final end* As the teo^oral end is subordinated to the suqpematural or spiritual end, so Is the coomon good* However, we should not forget the fact that the temporal order and the comaon good are real ends even though they are subordinated to the superior order of the supernatural. This Is the Inemrable law of Harltaln*s whole system Including his political philosophy. His system, therefore, Is a personallst philosophy %ifalch culminates In the perfection of splrltiiallty. As the freedom of choice (free will) onist strive for the attainment of the freedom of autonomyf so the common good must be directed towards the superior end of spirituality w It Is hardly necessary to repeat that, for Harltaln, the right foundations of a sound political phllosopl^ are comaunal and personal at the same time. Since the end of polity Is the coomon good, we shall return to this coamunal character of Marltaln's political philosophy later. Now we are concerned with the personal character of his political thought. Thus, It Is iaqwrtant for us to understand his concept of person or personality, irtilch cosies to the fore of his political philosophy (Including dasocracy). Horeover, personallsm Is the thing comcn In most contemporary theologians such as Paul Tllllch, Emll Brunner, Mlcolas Berdyatfv and Hart In Buber. Marltaln's personallsm Is based iq>on the Thoalstlc "metaphysical distinction between Individuality and personality."^ This metaphysical distinction of personallsm. In turn, bears Its fruits In Marltaln's own ^bld .. p. 3; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , tr. Doris C. Anson (New York: Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1943), pp. 1-2. E. L. Mascall points out that this Is an Isqportant distinction. The Importance of Being Hwnan: Some Aspects of the Christian Doctrine of Man (New York: Colw^la University Press, 1938), p. 39.

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350 social and political philosophy. "The human parson," Marltaln writes, "Is ordained directly to God as to Its absolute ultimate end. Its direct ordination to God transcends every created coamon good — both the cooiaon good of the political society and the Intrinsic cotnmon good of the universe." As he points out, here Is "the very message of Qirlstlan wisdom In Its trlusqih over Hellenic thought," and of the Christian character of St« Thomas Aquinas vibo "did not take over the doctrine of Aristotle without correcting and transfiguring It*"^ Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas crowned Aristotle with the Christian faith. However, Harltaln points out that there Is nothing new about the distinction between the Individual and the person, which Is "a classical distinction belonging to the Intellectual heritage of mankind."^ S. L. Mascall agrees with Marltaln In that the conc^tlon of personality is not confined to the Judaeo-Chrlstlan heritage. But he also points out that "it is very significant that it was only when it entered into theology, through the controversies in the early Church about the nature of God, that its full «>ntfait and is^lications became manifest."''' As Marltaln himself wrlces, "the consciousness of the dignity of the person and of the rights of the person remained liiq>llclt in pagan antiquity, over which the law of slavery cast its shadow. It was the message of the Gospel %)faich suddenly awakened this consciousness, in a divine and transcendent form, revealing to men that they are called upon to be the sons and heirs of God in the Kingdom of God. Under the evangelical impulse, this same awakening was little nche Person and the Common Good , p. 5^Ibld., pp. 23-24; The Rights of Man and Natural Uw . p. 5. The Importance of Being Hanan . p. 38.

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351 by little to spraad forth, with regard to the requirenfloits of natural law, over the realm of nan's life here on earth, and of the terrestrial city."* A person may be defined as "an Individual substance of rational nature" (Indlvldualls substantia ratlonalls naturae ). This Intellectual character Is what distinguishes man from other living creatures; consequoitly, the society of persons Is essentially different from that of ants. Man Is "a political animal because he Is a reasonable animal, because his reason seeks to develop with the help of education, through the teaching and the co-operation of other men, and because society is thus required to accoaqpllsh human dignity."^® Moreover, the Image of God Is found In Intellectual creatures alone. To begin with, Marltaln notea that "Each Intellectual substance Is made, first, for God, the separated conmon good of the universe, second, for the perfection of the order of the universe ... and third, for Itself, that Is, for th* action (Imman^it and spiritual) by which It perfects Itself and acccHipllshes Its destiny." However, from the stan<^lnt of this world. Intellectual creatures are ordained for the perfection of the created world, that Is to say, they are 'individuals" before they are "persona." It Is only from the standpoint of the supernatural world that "they are related to an Infinitely greater good -the sarated conaon Good, the a The Rights of Man and Natural Law , pp. 68, A5, 105. In the Modem World , p. 30. It should be noted that this definition of the person as "ratlonalls naturae Indlvldua substantia " (an Individual substance of rational nature) Is originally defined by Boethlua In the early part of the sixth century A. D., and this same definition was adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas. Frederick Gopleston, Oonteaporary Philosophy , p. 103. Scholasticism and Folltics . p. 72*

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352 divine transcendent Whole," before being willed and governed for the perfection of this world. The Idea that man la Intellectual In the Image of God is re* lated to "an eaaentlal thesis of Thomlsm" In which the speculative Intellect Is superior to the practical. That Is to say, "the resemblance to God Is less In the practical than In the speculative Intellect*" The bluest end of the practical Intellect Is a common good. Due to the su^ierlorlty of the speculative over the practical Intellect, the good and the end of the speculative Intellect are "serlor to every created common good." This Is the reason why contei^»latlon is the highest form of human activities. The contemplative life Is siqterlor to the polltlcal life. Therefore, the problem of action and content latlon Is "at the very heart of social philosophy," and Its solution Is "of prime importance to every civilisation worthy of the nose."^^ With these ideas and the primacy of the common good over the individual or private good in the political order in the foreground, we shall exotoine the metapl^slcal roots and the practical liq>licatlons of the distinction between the person and the individual. Marltaln notes the two contradictory conc^tions of the person or the self. One is the Pascalian esqiresslon that "the self is detestable"; and the other is the Thomlstlc idea that "the person is that which is most noble and most perfect in all of nature," that is to say, a person is "an individual substance of rational nature. "*^^ 8e explains this contradiction in that man is caught "between two poles; a material pole, which, in reality, TChe Person and the , Conroon Good , pp. 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18. ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 22-23; Scholasticism and Bolitics . pp. 61-62.

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353 do«a not concern th« true person but rather the shadow of personality or i^t, in the strict sense* Is called Individuality , end a spiritual pole, which does concern true personality ,"^ "Outside of the inlnd," Marltaln says, "only Individual realities exist**' Individuality Is the opposite of "the state of universality ifhlch things have In the mind." By reason of the very nature of thing's existence. Individuality designates a "concrete state of unity and Indlvision" which distinguishes one thing from others. In the animate or inanimate things that are terrestrial, individuality has its ontological root in matter "in as much as matter requires the occupation in space of « position distinct from every other position. "^^ Matter is a kind of non-being; it is "an avidity for being. "^^ That is to say, matter bears "the impress of a metaphysical energy — the 'form' or 'soul' . . . ,^ In man, like other corporeal beings, human individuality is rooted in matter, the indivisible character of which distinguishes him froa other things or beings. Man has the soul; the human soul and matter constitute "one substance, which is both carnal and spiritual." Therefore, "soul and matter are the two substantial co-prlneiplea of the SMS being, of one and the same reality, called man."^' Man, as an individual, is subject to the physical world. That is to say, "each of u« nThe Person and the Conmon Good , p. 23; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 63; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , pp. 1-2. \he Person and the Comn>on Good , p. 25; Scholasticism and Politics , p. 65. Scholasticism and Politics , p. 65; The Person and the OoiaBon Good , pp. 25, 27. ^he Person and the Conmon Good , p. 25. ^ ^Ibid .. p. 26.

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354 Is a fragment of a species, a part of the universe, a unique point in the inaense web of cosmic, ethical, historical forces and influences — and bound by their laws."^ However, aan, as a person, frees himself from the control of the physical universe. By reason of man's spiritual soul (or his subsistence), there is within him "a principle of creative unity, indepoidence and liberty."^ Personality is a much de^er mystery than individuality. The utyBtevy of personality may be clarified when personality is related to love. Love is concerned with persons. Man, by way of personality, is endowed with spirituality^ which contains in itself the intellect and freedom. Thus, he is "capable of superexisting by way of knowledge and of love." For Maritain, we find in God "the sovereign Personality whose existence itself consists in a pure and absolute superexistence by way of intellection and love."^^ Unlike individuality which is rooted in matter, personality is deeply rooted in the spirit. Man, because he is rooted in the spirit by means of personality, requires the communication of knowledge and love with other persons . The person, on account of its spirituality, is directly linked with the absolute. In this sense, for Maritain, man is created in the Image of God. He writes t the deepest layer of the human person's dignity consists in its property of resembling God — not in a general way after the manner of all creatures, but in a proper way. It is the image of God. For God is spirit and the human person proceeds from Him in having as principle of life a spiritual soul capable of knowing, loving and of being ifi Ibid., p. 28; Scholasticiwn and Politics , p. 66; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 3. 19 The Person and the Consion Good , p. 28; Scholasticism and Politics , p. 66. T^he Person and the Cogaon Good , p. 30; Scholasticism and Politics , p. 67; The Riy^hts of Man and Natural Law , p. 3.

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355 uplifted by grace to participation In the very life of God so that. In the end. It might kaov and love Rim as He knows and loves Hiaself .21 It is inqMrtant to note that Marltaln distinguishes, but de«« not s^arate, personality fron individuality* As natter and soul are the two substantial co-principles of the sis iMing, individtiality and personality are "the two metaphysical aspects of the human being*" Thus, Marltaln insists that "we must emphasise that th^ are not two s^arate things* There is not in ^oan/ one reality, called [hLaJ individual, and another reality, called /IxiaJT person* One and the same reality is, in a certain sense an individual, and, in another sense, a person. Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives fron natter, and a person by reason of that in us irtiich derives fron spirit. "22 Individuality, slnply because it is rooted in matter, should zx>t be assumed to be "something evil in itself." Instead, it is something obviously good because it is the vary condition of htman existence. "But it is precisely as related to personality that Individuality is good. £vil arises when, in our action, we give pr^>onderance to the individual aspect of our being. "23 ^ji^ distinction between personality and individuality should not be mistaken for "a s^aration." The idea of "Death to the individual, long live the person!" is derived from this misconception of separating the person from individuality. "The pity is that, T^he Person and the Common Good * p. 32; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 4* ^he Person and the Connon Good , p. 33. ^^id*

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356 in killing the individual, they also kill the person. "^^ However, if man is bent toward material Individuality, then he will be oriented towards the Pascallan detestable ego or self; but if he develops toward spiritual personality, then he will be oriented toward "the g^ierous self of the heroes and saints." Thus, man must win his personality: "man will be truly a person only in so far as the life of the spirit and of liberty reigns over that of the senses and passions. "^^ Having considered the metaphysical distinction between the individual and the person, we shall now deal with its applications to social and political matters* We have already noted that, for Maritain, man, due to the possession of personality, tends toward the coomunications of intelligence and love with other persons . Thus, personality tends by its very nature to commmlon. This is the reason why a sound political philosophy must be personal and coapunal at the same time. A person is not an isolated entity like the Lelbnltzean monad: "the person requires flMoibershlp in a society in virtue both of its dignity and its needs." Human society is a society of persons, and the person is the 26 social unity.Maritain calls this overflow of social connunlcations required by reason of the person "the law of stq;>erabtmdance inscribed in the depths of being, life. Intelligence and love." Moreover, he finds this coomunlcative process with other persons necessary due to the deficiencies which derive frcKo individuality. Society alone can provide ^^rbld., p. 35j Scholasticism and Politics * p. 70. The Person and the Connon Good , pp. 34-35. ^^Ibld., p. 37; Scholasticism and Politics , p. 71; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 6.

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357 the person with the "conditions of existence and development lAlch It needs." Person's needs do not mean only material goods such as food, clothing and shelter but Include something that elevatea the perfection of moral llfe*^' "Man Is a political animal because he Is a rational animal, because reason requires development through character training education and the cooperation of other men, and because society is thus indispensable to the accfnaplisfament of human dignity."^^ It is of cardinal importance to note Maritain's notions of the person and the common good and how he avoids individualistic liberalism and totalitarian collectivism. He avoids the former by his idea that the end of society (human) is neither the individual good nor the collection of the individual goods of the persons who constitute that society.^ The «ad of human sodfty is its coonon good, that is, the connon good of a multitude of human persons. It is the good of the body politic •• a whole. ^^ However, the coonion good of a multitude or a whole is related to the good of a person as "there is a correlation between this notion of the person as a social unit and the notion of the comcaon good as the end of the social whole. Xh^ iaply one another. "^^ The whole is not merely the stmi of its parts, but the parts must basefit from the 27 The Person and the Common Good , pp. 38-39; Scholasticism and Politics , pp. 71-72. 28 The Person and the Common Good , pp. 38-39; Scholasticism and Politics , p. 72; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 6. 29 The Person and the Common Good , pp. 39-40; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 7. 30 Scholasticism and Politics , p. 72; The Person and the Comnon Good , p. 40; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , pp. 8, 12. The Person and the Common Good , p. 39.

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358 whole. The latter statement implies Maritaln's avoidance of collectivism, because the common good must flow back to the individual good of a person. This is what Marltaln calls "the law of redistribution." This law means that the connon good of society must be redistributed to its parts precisely because they are persons. ^^ "We see, th^i," Harltaln writes, "that the true conception of political life is neither exclusively personalist nor exclusively coomunal." The reality of the political life must be expressed In terns of "reciprocal subordination and mutual Implication."^^ Marltaln has so far enqphaslzed the sociability of the person and the nature of the comaon good or the gpod of the body politic. Between the concept of the person and the cosoDion good, there is "the typical paradox of social llfe."^ This paradox results fnm the fact that '*each of us Is In his entirety an individual and In his entirety a person. "33 As It has been noted, the Idea of person is "an analogical Idea" whose being is fully realised in the absolute of God. Thus, "the person as such is a whole," and we might say that society is "a whole cooqposed of wlioles."^^ Although the person is to be a part (member) of society, he cannot be "treated In society as a part in a whole." On the contrary, he Is to be treated "as a whole in society. "3' Ikii** P» 66; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 9. *rhe Person and the Conwon Good » p. 45. ^Ibid., pp. 45, 92; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 18. 35 The Person apd the Common Good , p. 46. ^Ibld., pp. 46-47; The Rights of Man and Natural Uw . pp. 3, 4, 5. The Person and the Coanon Good , p. 48.

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359 Moreover, personality as "a spiritual totality" Is the transcendent %ibole, that "surpasses and is superior to all tenqwral societies*" Thus, Marltaln comes to the conclusion that "A single huntan soul Is worth more than the whole universe of material goods. There Is nothing higher than the imnortal soul, save God* With respect to the eternal destiny of the soul, society exists for each person and Is subordinated to lt*"3® Personality as a spiritual totality "transcmds political society" because It Is ordained to the order of the absolute. Furthermore, the cooawn good of political society Is only "a practical good, and not the absolute good which * . * Is the supreme object of the theorectlcal Intellect. "3* It Is an Infravalent real end, but Its aim Is lost If It does not favor the higher spiritual end of the human person. The paradox of social life, although It Is "something natural and Inevitable," Is thus resolved In what Marltaln calls "tlw law of transc«id«ice" which means that the transcendence of the human person as a spiritual entity Is recognized over political society and Its cotanon good which is only an Infravalent end* Marltaln maintains that this solution is "dynamic" or "an heroic philosophy of life fastened to absolute and spiritual values."^^ It has been lndlcat«d that man is by nature sociable and requires society for the perfection of his moral order* But bow can he transcend political society which is necessary for his moral perfection? The answer 1st man is "not a part of 38 ^Ibld., p. 51; The Rights of Man and Matural Law , p. 13. 39 The Person and the Conmon Good , pp. 535A. ^ ^Ibid .. p. 68.

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360 political society by reason of his entire self and all that Is In him." That Is to say, he is a part of political society and, as such, he imist serve Its conaon good only by reason of certain things (not his entire self) which are In him. And by reason of other things, the human person transcends political society* "In the same way," Marltaln writes^ "a good philosopher Is engaged In his «itlrety In philosophy, but not by reason of all the functions and all the finalities of his being* He Is engaged In his entirety In philosophy by reason of the special ftmctlon and special finality of the Intellect In hla.'*^^ In this manner, Marltaln Is In a position to criticize Individualism and totalitarianism. "Anarchical individualism," he writes, "denies that man, by reason of certain things which are in him, is ew gaged in his entirety as a part of political society. Totalitarianism asserts that n«n is a part of political society by reason of himself as a irittole and by reason of all that is in him. . . ."^^ Martin Buber, a contcaqtorary Jewish theologian, comes to the same conclusion Insofar aa he rejects individualism and collectivism. As he writes, "if individualism understands only a part of man, collectivism understands man only as a part: neither advances to the wholeness of man, to man as a whole. Individualism sees man only in relation to himself, but collectivism does not see man at all, it sees only 'society*. With the former man's face is distorted, with the latter it is masked." However, Buber does not come to this conclusion from the distinction between spiritual personality and material individuality as does Marltaln. His *^Ibid,, p. 62; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , pp. 14, 15. ^ ^he Person and the Common Good * p. 62; The Rights of Man and Natural Law* pp. 8, 15, 16.

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361 alternative solution comes from what he calls "the fundaioental fact of huoan exl8t«icc'*t man with maa or "betweim man and man." "The fundaental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such nor the aggregate as such." But it is a kind of personal relation between "X" and "Thou." "J and Thou exist only in our world, beoause man exists, and the I, moreover, exists only through the relation to the Thou ."^^ Maritain*s criticisms on the political philosophies which are based on a materialistic conception of world and life, are basically derived from his notion of human personality which is rooted in the spirit. These materialistic political philosophies are "bourgeois liberalism," "Goonunism," and "anti-communistic and anti-individualistic reactions of the totalitarian or dictatorial type." "All three disregard the human person in on* way or another, and, Ia its place, consider, willingly or not, the material individual alone." The materialistic cone^tion of life, for Maritain, does not recognize the spiritual and eternal element in man; thus it cannot understand the nature of a truly human society. The "atomistic and mechanistic" conceptions of bourgeois liberalism destroy the organic unity of society, whereas the totalitarian polity devours the person. Horeover, bourgeois liberalism is "the most irreligious" of the three. "Christian in appearance, it has been atheistic In fact.**^ In conclusion, Maritain* s social and political philosophy is personalist and conmunalist; a sound political philosophy for Maritain " between Man and Man , tr. Ronald Gregor Smith (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 200, 202-203, 205. Also see his classic, I and Thou , tr. Ronald Gregor Smith (2nd ed.; New York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1958). ^?he Person and the Conmon Good , pp. 81, 87, 91.

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362 can be neither exclusively personalist nor exclusively coninunallst. Man at a spiritual totality enters Into "a society that Is the mystical body of an Incarnate God" i^ere he achieves "his spiritual perfection and his full liberty of autonomy, to his eternal welfare. "^^ True as it may be that man's Individual good must be subjugated to the coaaon good of political society, man is made for God and eternal life before he becomes a part of that society; and he is a part of the family before he bacooMS a part of political society. "This is the origin of those primordial rights i^ich political society must respect. . . ."^ The common. good of political society, moreover, must be redistributed to the individual good of a person; and the person Insists on serving the coDBion good freely.^' The paradox of social life la essentially derived from this tension between man's necessary allegiance to political society and the common good and his primary bent toward spiritual perfection. Maritain's Insistence ixpon the primary liqwrtance of spiritual perfection is what makes him essentially a religious thinker. "Absolutely speaking," he writes, "the coniaunion in which each mind enters, in a personal and solitary fashion, with truth through theoretical knowledge, and with God throtigh conteoqplation, is better than the treasures of cfnammicable culture which minds receive from one another." Therefore, "the paradox of social life is resolved in a progressive ^ ^Ibid .. p. 70. *^lbld., p. 65; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 9. 47 The Person and the Comm9n Good , p. 67.

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363 moment that irill never be terminated here-belov*"^ From the horlaxmtal movenant of political aoclety and history, man must ascend towards the vartlcal moven^it* To begin vlth, the person is subordinated to the connon good o£ political society; and at the same time the latter must flow to the good of a person. In view of man's transcend«ital end, "it is essential that society itself and its common work are indirectly subordinated *"^^ In the end, a sound political philosophy must be one which responds to "the most profbimd aspirations of human nature." It must recognize the truth, in Haritain's thought, that man is a religious anlisal. As Mascall points out, we need not "go all the way with Maritain*a strict Thomlst Aristotelianism in order to accept the general features of his expositian*"^^ Man, due to the possession of his personality, is distinct from other corporeal beings (or other animals). Han is not exalted Just because he is man , but he is elevated because he is created in the proper Image of God. Thus, the notion of personality is closely linked with his "integral humanism." Martin Buber arrived at his I-Thou relation (or between man and man) in a manner different from ^Ibld., pp. 74, 92. 49 Ibid ., pp. 92-93; The Rights of Man and natural Law , pp. 18-19. ^he Importance of Being Hanan . p. 42. Frederick Gopleston explains the major theme of contemporary pcursona lists is that man is more than a mere m«Dd>er of society or a mere part of the whole. Thus, for personallsts, "to interpret the person as a mere part of the state or of the race or of the class or even of htoaanity is to misinterpret him." Moreover, he says that, although one may or may not agree with these kinds of statements, "they are not without some practical relevance." Contemporary Philosophy , p. 124. See especially chapter vii, "The Human Person in Contemporary Philosophy," pp. 103-24.

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36A that which led Marltaln to his conception of man, but they reach a comnon conclusion when they reject both atomistic Individualism and totalitarian collectivism*

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CHAPTER XIV THE NATURE OF FOUTIGAL SOCIETY The •unrnlt of Jacques Marltain's political philosophy as well as of his philosophy of culture is the conc^tion of personality which is rooted in the spirit and linked with God* It is clear, as Maritain says, that the "distinction between the individual and the person, when applied to the relations betireen man and city, contains, in the realm of metaphysical principles, the solution of many social problems."^ By reason of personality, man attains "a richer and nobler exi8t«ice" (or spiritual superexistoice) than "a mere parcel of matter'* in which individuality is rooted. He is not merely a part of political society, but is a whole: "he is a universe unto himself, a microcosm in which the whole great universe can be encompassed. . • ."^ Therefore, the height of htanan spirituality surpasses all the common good of political society. As Maritain has often pointed out, this "spiritual dynsadsa" at work in human culture inqplies a two-fold movesMnti Firsts there is the movement of descent, the by which the divine plenitude, the prime source of •iistence, descends into human reality to permeate and vivify it. For God infuses in every creature goodness nchree Reformers , p. 23* The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 3. 365

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366 and lovabillty together with being, and has the first initiative in every good activity. Then there is the movement of ascoit, which is the answer of man, by which human reality takes the second initiative, activates itself toward the unfolding of its energies and toward God. Speaking absolutely, the first movement is obviously what matters most; to receive from God is of greater momcmt for man than to give to God, and he can only give what he has received. 3 The human person transcends all tenq>oral societies «nd is superior to them. "A single human soul," Maritain writes, "is of more worth than the whole universe of bodies and material gpods*"^ The essential and primordial objective of political society is to produce its coomon good; and "the political task is essentially a task of civilisation and culture." What is "political" here is truly Aristotelian. Maritain characterises his conc^tion of society, in the first place, as "personalist"; second, as "coumunal"; third, as "pluralist"; and fourth, "theist" or "Christian." As we have already noticed in his philosophy of culture, these four characteristics are the principles that Maritain found in medieval Christendom which was "humble and magnanimous." However, he has not ignored the historical progress and development of human society; thus, these medieval principles are applied analogically (not univocally) to the contenqwrary «iorld. The ideal of a new Christendom and the cretation of the "New Man" is Inspired by the Gospel and related to "something beyond history, and r^resents for hiaaan history a *myth* — the 'myth' which temporal history needs. If we understand it as applying to ststes where human existence is progressively established by the structures of common life and T^he Range of Reason « p. 3. The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 13.

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367 civilization, it concerns histoxy itself and represents a 'concrete historical ideal,' imperfectly but positively realizable. '^'^ The gravitational center of Maritain's political philosophy is not purely Aristotelian. Aristotle was a pagan. Instead, Maritain has truly inherited the Christian tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas -of course, tinged with Aristotelianism. Maritain writes that the Aristotelian conception of political society is "freed of its slavery-condoning dregs as «fell as of the static quality to which Greek thought was generally subject, and made dynamic by that revelation of the movesMint of history, and of the infinite aspirations of the person, and of the evolving potential of humanity, which was brought to us with the coming of the Gospel." Thus, for Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas igq>roved Aristotle whenever necessary, and the former perfected the latter. "The most fundamental aspiration of the person is the aspiration towards the liberty of expansion and autonomy , " that is to say, towards spiritual perfection.^ Aristotle is exalted in the social and political philosophy of Jacques Maritain as well as in that of his master, St. Thomas Aquinas. After all, "every interior act of the soul which Involves order and government belongs to reason."' As Aristotle says, man is "a political animal." Thus, "the human person craves political life, communal life, not only with regard to the family community, but with regard to the civil conounlty. And the commonwealth, insofar as it deserves the name, is a society of htiman persons." For Sibld . . pp. 20-21, 44, 47-48. *Ibld., pp. 44, 45-46. ^ Three Reformers , p. 39.

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368 Karltaln, the Aristotelian dictum that man Is a political animal means, not only that man belongs naturally to political society, but also that "man naturally asks to lead a political life and to participate actively in the life of the political community."® As his political thought grew mature, Marltain came to the conclusion that the realisation of a new Christendom is a political task, and the ideal of this new Christian order became associated with a "new Democracy" based directly upon the Gospel. As a matter of fact, his whole emphasis has shifted from a purely epistemological and metaphysical excursion to the application of the derived principles to cultural and political matters. This political task must tend, not only to the common good of the multitude, but also to "the betterment of the conditions of human /InternalJ life itself." Marltain' 8 conception of political society, based upon the reality of human nature and the human person, has been named by himself "a humanist political philosophy, or a political humanism." "It represents the political philosophy which /Tie holds7 to be true, and to be the only true one." He warns us that we should not confuse this humanist political philosophy -as a matter of fact, a political philosophy itself — with a particular form of government or regime. It may be realized in various forms of government. However, he considers this political humanism as best realizable in Aristotle's "mixed" regime, which he names "the democratic regime." "The regime which political humanism regards as the best in itself is a mixed regime in which the type characteristics of the three classical regimes, or rather of the ®The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 13.

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369 three abstract outlines, tbe three pure forms, elicited by Aristotle, are organically united. . . . The three classical forms of govenaent do not realize In an equal and unlvocsl manner the requirements of humanist political philosophy. They realise thesi analogically, and after a fashion more or less perfect.'* A "mixed" (or republican) regime for the realization of this humanist political philosophy will fulfill "its .requirements In a oianner proportionate to tho conditions and the possibilities of our tine." It Is the "*new Democracy' which Is In preparation at the core of the present death-struggle," presumably against totalitarianism and bourgeois or capitalist liberalism. We let Marltaln sunmarlze his owe conception of "a sane political society," a humanist political philosoplq^, or a "new Democracy" s /Its keynotes aro/^ the coneon good flowing back over individuals; political authority leading free men towards this coomon good; intrinsic morality of the cona»n good and of political life. Personalist, communal, and pluralist inspiration of the social organization; organic link between civil society and religion, without religious compulsion or clericalim, in other words, a truly, not decoratlvely. Christian society. Law and Justice, civic friendship and the equality which it implies, as essential principles of the structure, life and peace of society. A common task inspired by the ideal of liberty and fraternity, tending, as its ultimate goal, towards the estsblisteent of a brotherly city wherein the hiaoan being will be freed from servitude snd misery.^ Satural Law and Human Rights Jacques Marltaln makes some casual references to natural law throughout his writings, but natural law doctrine does not play any forefront role in bis political philosophy until he confronts the 'ibid., pp. 43, 50, 51, 54-55.

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370 discussion of the rlg|ht8 of maa*'-^ "In order to treat the problem of the rights of the himan being ... In a philosophical manner," he writes » "we must first examine the question of what Is called natural law*"'*'' In another place, he asks: "How could we understand human rights If we bad not a sufficiently adequate notion of natural law?"^^ He Is primarily concerned with the moral aspects of natural law as the basis of human rights* Therefore, we should not overlook his esqposltlon on natural law when the rights of man occupy a significant place in his practifCal aspects of politics. Etnest Barker speaks of the "timeless and spaceless core" of the natural law school and of "the undying spirit of Natural Law*"^^ '*7;oday we are faced with a revival of Natural Law»" writes Franz Newaann.'-^ Recently, this renaissance of natural law was highlighted by the publication of Natural Law Fort«n «*^ Of course, natural law doctrine is not Freedom in the Modem World , p. 72; True Humanism , p. 106. The most conq;>rehen8lve recent treatise of society based on nattural law appears to be: J. Messner, Social Ethics . \he Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 59. Tlan and the State (Oiicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 85. 13 "Introduction," Otto Gierke, Natural Lsw and the Theory pf Society 1500 to 1800 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 1. "Types of Natural Law," The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1957), p. 69, The annual published since 1956 by the Natural Law Institute which was organized in 1947 as a function of the Law School of the University of Notre Dame. Joseph O'Meara, the Dean of the Notre Dame Law School, states that the Natural Law Fdisut) proceeds from "the faith that nstural law can help solve some of our problems." "Foreword," Natural Law Fortsn , I (1956), p. 1. See especially, A. P. D'Entreves, "The Case for Natural Law -Re-Examlned," Natural Law For
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S71 monopolized by the Catholic circle In contenqporary legal and political thaorlea. Bowever, Its upsurge la largely accounted £or by the revival of Thoolam*^^ In this sense, Arnold Brecht, In his survey of the twentieth-century political theory, cooments that natural lav has staged Its revival "In the ifake of religious crusaders*"^^ Frans Meuoann conHients that natural law doctrine has evexk an "Ideological character" of the Bonan Catholic Church*^® Natural law doctrine has confronted a staunch attack from the Protestant sources* Therefore, Helnrlch A« In regard to the modem trends of natural law theory , see Gottfried Oletse, "Natural Law In the Modem European Oonetltutlons," Natural Law Forum . I (1956), pp. 73-91; Ren^ Th^ry, "Ten Years of the Philosophy of Law In France," Natural Law Forum . I (1956), pp« 104-lA} Frelherr von der Heydte, "Natural Law Tendencies In Contemporary German Jurisprudence," Natural Law Forum . I (1956), pp. 115-21; Guldo Fasso, "Natural Law In Italy In the Past Ten Years," Natural Law Forum . I (1956), pp. 122-34. Frelherr von der Heydte, In his discussion of "the natural law tendencies In contasiporary German Jurisprudence," mentions the neoThoalsts, the Protestants, the neo-Hegellans and the neo-Kantlans. We slso find such names as F. C. S. Northrop, Leo Strauss, Lon L. Fuller and John Wild. For an historical survey of natural law doctrine from a Catholic point of view, see Helnrlch A. Bonmen, The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy , tr. Thosias R. Hanley (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 19 48). F. t^femn Wlndolph, by his own admission, takes the middle ground between a Thomas Hobbes and a St. ThosMS Aquinas. Leviathan and Natural Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). He notes "the disagr e — en t between political philosophers known as posltivlsts and the adherents of natural law. The posltlvlst insisted that in order to think clearly about political natters Zbn^ must make a rigid separation between politics and morality -between things as thmy are and tm [ovmJ might conceive that they ought to be. The champion of natural law answered that such a s^aratlon was undesirable and, in any evcoit, iaapoasible. Natural lav r^resented the cooBaon reason of mankind and was the only basis and Justification of political forms. To this the posltlvlst replied that natural law was 'nothing but a phrase*" (p. vi). As it will be discussed later, therefore, the battle between the natural lav theorist and the posltlvlst is essentially one of the relation b*tw9en the "ought" (value) and the "is" (fact). ^ ^Political Theory , p. 322. to Op. dt .. pp. 82-83.

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372 RonBMHt writes, '•The student of the history of natural law will notice that there exists an interd^endence between natural theology, metaphysics, and political theory. He will also notice that the idea of natural law flourishes when law is defined as the rule of reason and for reason and that it recedes into the background when law is defined as will.**^ It would be a mistake, however, if we construe that all Protestant thinkers are aqainst natural law doctrine. Natural law doctrine also faces its foe In Ernest Nagel. ^ Having noted that a renaissance of natural law would have been inconceivable at the turn of this century, Franz Newaan cites the case of "Karl Bcrgbofara's witchhunt against Natural Law in all Its foms, and in all juridical disciplines. • . ,'*^*' However, the Catholic defense of natural law doctrine as "a fundamental basis for a rational ethical syston" is expressed by John A. ifyan and Francis J. Boland when they say: There are some who deny the existence of natural law and ridicule the term as outmoded, anti-modem, and possessing merely an historical interest. Conceptions of the natural law and of natural rights were peculiar to the Schoolmen, it is averred, but are without legitimate place in modem moral philosophy and politics. No substitute exists, however, for the natural law, as a fundamental basis for a rational ethical system, and the result is that much of modem 19 The State in Catholic Thought , p. 166. 20 Ernest Nagel, "On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller," Natural Law Forum . Ill (1958), pp. 77-82; "Fact, Value, and Human Purpose," Natural Law Forum . IV (1959), pp. 26-43. The discussion began with an article written by Lon L. Fuller in support of natural law: "Human Purpose and Natural Law," Natural Law Forum . Ill (1958), pp. 68-76. See also Fuller's reply to Nagel in "A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel," Natural Law Fbrum . Ill (1958), pp. 83-104. ^ Op. cit .. p. 69.

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373 political thought, from the view of ethics, is without principle. Politics, without the natural law as an ethical basis, finds ultimate e3q>ression in the absolute or totalitarian State which denies the traditional determinants of morality and makes the fiat of the State the moral law. Political philosophy that rejects the principles of natural law, must also reject the principle that the human personality is a distinct entity, created by God, with rights and duties and destined for an eternal end with God.^^ The natural law doctrine of Jacques Maritain is, needless to say, a Thomist theory of natural law. He writes: The genuine idea of natural law is a heritage of Greek and Christian thought. It goes back not only to Grotlus, ifho indeed began deforming it, but before him to Suares and Francisco de Vitoria; and further back to St. Thomas (he alone grasped the matter in a wholly consistent doctrine, which imfortunately was expressed in an insufficiently clarified vocabulary, so that its deepest features were soon overlooked and disregarded); snd still further back to St. Augustine and the Church Fathers and St. Paul (we remember St. Paul's saying: *When the Gentiles who have not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, these, having not the Law, are a law unto themselves . . .*); and even further back to Cicero, to the Stoics, to the great moralists of antiquity and its great poets, particularly Sophocles. 23 Natural law is defined as "participatto legis aetemae in ratjonali creature . "2^ As nature comes from God, the natural law comes from the eternal law. "Natural law is law only because it is a participation in Bt«mel lew* ..25 ^ ^Catholic Principles of Politics (Hew York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 1. ^ hun end the State , pp. 8A-85. Earlier, Maritein had made • similar statssMat. But he did not seem to consider that Grotius deformed the idea of natural law. See his writing. The Riahts of Man and Natural Law , pp. 59-60. Freedom in the Modern World , p. 80. ^ hlan and the State , p. 96} The Rights of Han and Natural Law . p. 61*

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374 Natural law la an unwrltt^i and unchangeable law*^^ In this •«iae, Antigone is regarded by Maritaln «• "the eternal heroine of natural law."^' Natural law is "even known to human reason not in terms of conceptual and rational knowledge," but in terms of connaturality. Natural law is not like a geometrical proposition. Its immediate origin of artifical systematisation, for Maritain, has begun with Grotius and has been completely distorted in eighteenth-century rationalism* Thus, natural law conceived after the pattern of written code is "in reality arbitrarily and artificially formulated. "^^ For Maritain, eighteenth-century rationalism has completely distorted the true conception of the classical and Christian tradition of natural law. Maritain, at the outset, makes it clear that "The /natural/ law and knowledge of the /natural/ law are two different things," that is to Ttan and the State , p. 85; The Rifthts of Man and Natural Law . pp. 60, 62. 27 Man and the State , p. 85; The Rights of Man and Natural hav , p. 60. Sophocles presented Antigone's reply to the accusation of Creon for having violated "the proclamation by trtiich the rites of burial were denied to her /Xntigone'^ brother": Antigone says, "It was not God's proclamation. That final Justice that rules the world below makes no such laws. Your edict, Kiag, was strong, but all your strength is weakness itself against the immortal unrecorded laws of God. They are not merely now: they were, and shall be, operative for ever, beyond man utterly." As quoted in F. Lyman Windoph, Leviathan and Natural Law , pp. 19-20. Tten and the State , pp. 82-83. Eruest Barker notes that Gierke's study concerning natural law from 1500 to 1800 is the question of "a secular Natural law." 'The School is thus a rationalistic school, emancipated from the Church; its tendency, we may say, is to subject the Church to Natural Law rather than Natural Law to the Church; and its thinkers seek to determine the nature of the Church, and the proper scheme of its relations to the State, by principles which are themselves independent of the Church. . . . the school of Natural Law is not only emancipated from the Scriptures of the Church: it is also emancipated from the ratio scripta of Roman law." "Introduction," Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, xli-xlii.

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375 •ay, "knowing that there is a law does not necessarily mean knowing what that law Is."^ He agrees with Max M. Laserson when the latter •ays: "The doctrines of natural law must not be confused with natural law Itself. The doctrines of natural law, like any other political and legal doctrines, may propound various argimants or theories in order to substantiate or Justify natural law, but the overthrow of these theories cannot signify the overthrow of natural law itself. Just as the overthrow of some theory or philosophy of law does not lead to the overthrow of law itself. The victory of Judicial positivism in the XlXth Century over the doctrine of natural law did not signify the death of natural law itself. . . ."^® As it has been noted, for Maritain, as for all Th p. 80.

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376 not derived from the same foundations or justifications as Is his o%m conception of natural law. He has made It clear that It Is possible to formulate the cosaaon principles of action for human rights even If we are powerless to agree upon their theoretical justifications.^^ He thus regards the gap between practical conclusions and rational Justifications as a kind of paradox. For him. It Is paradoxical fundam^itally because we cannot agree upon a conmcn rational Justification and yet It Is Indispensable. Nonetheless* Marltaln, as a philosopher, cannot Ignore the '*rlght'* theoretical Justification of human rights. He is convinced that his "way of Justifying the belief In the rights of man and the ideal of freedom, equality, and fraternity is the only one which is solidly based on truth." But he is tolerant of other points of view when he says: "That does not prevent me from agreeing on these practical tenets with those who are convinced that their way of Justifying th«Bi, entirely different from mine or even opposed to mine in its theoretical dynamism, is likewise the only one that is based on truth. "^ Although it may be true, as E. L. Allen thinks, that, in regard to the rights of man, "Karltain has nothing new to offer, "^^ it would be a grave mistake to ignore his rational Justification of the rights of man, that is to say, to ignore his philosophical explanation of natural law. Thttre are two essential characteristics or con^onents in ^is speech is reported in "The Possibilities for Co-operation in a Divided World: Inaugural Address to the Second International Conference of UNESCO," The Range of Reason , pp. 172-8A. Ttan and the State , p. 76. ^he Range of Reason , pp. 180-81; Man and the State , p. 78. 35 Christian Humanism , p. 38.

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377 Marltaln's notion of natural law: one is the "onto logical'* elamant and the other is the "gnoaeological" alanwit. The first is looked at from the eeeence or onto logical structure of human nature, and the second, from "natural law as known »"^^ Haritain takes it for granted that "there is a human nature, and that this hwnan nature is the same in all men." And he also takes it for granted that man is a being gifted with intelligence or reason. ^^ Therefore, man who is endowed with a nature and intelligence poB««saM "the power to determine for himself the ends which he pursues*" "This means that there is, by the very virtue of human nature, an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and according to which the hunan will must act in order to attune itself to the essential and necessary ends of the human being. The unwritten law, or natural law, is nothing more than that*"^ Thus, unlike many Protestant thinkers, Maritain believes that human reson directs the human will in pursuit of man's ends. For the majority of Protestant thinkers, natural reason is incapable of directing hisaan action and «nds; human action must be directed by man's will which is directly linked with God. for Maritain, this unwritten law comes from the eternal law; but natural law as such is a natural question. Huntington Cairns, in reference to the legal philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, notes that "Truth for the thirteenth 36 "Natural Law and Moral Law," Moral Principles of Action: Man's Ethical Imperative , ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 62; Man and the Stat e, pp. 85, 89. 37 The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 60; Man atjtd the State . pp. 85-86. ^Aan and the State , p. 86; The Rights of Man and Natural Law . p. 61.

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378 century could be known either by means of revelation or reason, and it was plainly St. Thomas' intention to construct a legal system the Justification of which rested on rational grounds* His philosophy as a whole was directed ultimately towards the problems of revelation and faith; but it could in its legal aspects, at any rate, be tested at all points by the processes of reason."^ The term "law" in natural law is not Jus but lex > Haritain explains. Thus natural law is lex naturalis . In natural law, (human) reason is "the measure of human actions." Human reason is "a measuring measure (mensura mensurans )." but It is also "a measured measure (mensura mensurata ). for human reason is m>t the siqireme rule of good and evil." In order to measure human conduct, practical reason is measured by natural law.^^ In regard to its first element, that is its ontological element, natural law is "the normality of functioning of the human being. "*^'' That is to say, natural law (the normality of functioning) is '^grounded on the essence of that being: man."^^ By reason of its specific structure and ends, therefore, natural law "should achieve fulness of being in its growth or in its behavior." "Every kind of being existing in nature, a plant, a dog, a horse, has its own 'natural law.*" According to Maritain, the word "should" has a metaphysical meaning. It is used in the sttise that: "a good or a normal eye 'should' be able to read letters on a blackboard from a given distance." However, "the 39 Huntington Cairns, Legal Fhilosophy from Plato to Hegel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 19A9), p. 204. ^^"Hatural Law and Moral Law," p. 62. ^ Hbid .t Man and the State , pp. 86, 87, 88. TIan and the State , p. 88.

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379 sane word should starts to have a moral meaning, that Is, to Imply moral obligation, when we pass the threshold of the world of free agents."^-' natural law for man is moral law. It is moral law, because man obeys or disobeys it freely. Natural law, as we have considered in the preceding pages, is '*the ideal formula of development of a given being; that is to say, in its ontological structure, "natural law is an ideal order relating to human actions, a divide between the suitable and the unsuitable, the proper and the iiq>roper, which depends on human nature or essence and the unchangeable necessities rooted in it."^ "Thou shalt do no murder** is "a precept of natural law,** because the preservation of man*8 being is his right. As Maritain says, "Man's right to existence, to personal freedom and the pursuit of the perfection of moral life, belongs, strictly speaking, to natural law. "^^ On the same principle, it is clear that genocide is against the very notion of natural law itself. In short, natural law is "something both ontological and ide*l . " As such, it is **coextenslve with the whole field of natural moral regulations, the whole field of natural morality. Not only the primary and fundamental regulations but the slightest regulations of natural ethics means conformity to natural law. . . ."^^ Th« second element, or gnoseological element, of the notion of ^^Ibid., p. 87; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 62. ^ ^Man and the State, p. 88; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 63. ^ ^The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 71. ^ Slan and the State, p. 89; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 63.

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380 natural lav, for Marltaln, Is concerned with natural law "In so far as it is naturally known ; That is to say, known through inclination , by way of congeniality or connaturality, not through concqptual knowledge and by way of reasoning."^' Natural law is made manifest by way of certain Judgments; but since it is '^knowledge through connaturality" these Judgments, unlike rational knowledge, are m>t obtained by any "conceptual, discursive, rational exercise of reason."^ Thus, the regulations of natural law are not known like "a series of gec»netrical theorems.'* They are not discovered by an intellectual or rational exercise, or by way of rational knowledge. Rather, they are known through "the guidance of the inclinations of human nature*" Therefore, this kind of knowledge "is not clear knowledge through concepts and conceptual Judgments; it is obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality or congeniality, in which the intellect, in order to bear Judgment, consults and list^is to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of abiding taidencies make present in the subject ."^^ Maritain writes that "The only practical knowledge all men have naturally and infallibly in cooaon as a self-evident principle, intellectually perceived by virtue of the conc^ts involved, is that we must do good and avoid evil. This is the preamble and the principle of natural law." However, "it is not the law itself. Natural law is the ensemble of things to do and not to do which follow therefrom in necessary fashion, and from the simple fact that man is man , nothing else being ^''"Natural Law and Horal Law," p. 63; Man and the State , p. 89. ^"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 63. Man and the State , pp. 91-92.

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381 taken Into account. '*^^ Ther«for«, natural law known through connaturalIty or (huaaa) nature's incUnatlona la in its fullest tense an unwritten law. Natural law, for Haritain, "deals only with principles tanediately known ." Since it is known through inclinations » it is obvious that it is known "in an imdemonstrable manner. "^^ However, we must distinguish hiBoan indinationa from anijoaal instincts quo animals (not htanan beings). Inclinstion, for Maritain, is still "refracted through the crystal of reason in its unconscious or preconscious life."^'^ If these natural inclinations presuppose "a prioMry, self-evident principle" like "do good and avoid evil," are they then a sort of Bergsonian intu^ ition? Will Herberg seems to be convinced that connaturality is a kind of "intuit ion. "^^ Kai Nielsen calls knowledge through connaturality "a murky doctrine."^ There is evidence that Maritain would not equate knowledge by connaturality with intuition when he says} "Henri Bergson and William James, who were so much concerned, the one with intuition, and the other with experimce, never did, I think, bring out and make use of the old notion of knowledge through connaturality." Thus, he seems to distinguish knowledge by connaturality from intuition. But he does p. 90. The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 63; Man and the State . T:he Range of Reay)n . p. 27. ^^"Matural Law and Moral Law," p. 6A. 53 Four Existentialist Theologians , p. 11. 54 "An Examination of the Thoaistic Theory of Natural Moral Law," Natural Law Fonsa . IV (1959), p. 49.

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382 not seem to make clear anywhere how they differ* Is knowledge by connaturality distinct from Intuition because It Is still a mode of ••knowing"? If so, how can It be distinguished from "Intuitive knowledge"? Or Is It a "murl^ doctrlna"? However, Marltaln seeaa to a^ee with Bergson in that "mystical experience" of Christian contemplatives has the full fruit of knowledge of connaturallty. He does not dwell on this point because it is "laore theological than philosophical. "^^ This is what J. Messner calls "a theology" of natural law. Messner himself is a Th(»nist when he says: "There is certainly no real objection to a 'theology* of natural law which lays open a rich fund of problems of an anthropological, metaphysical, qpistemological, and methodological character* But it stna Indisputable that less today than ever before the 'philosophical' investigation into, and establishing of, natural law should be questioned as the central task of natural law theory. It is certainly not by chance that Thomas Aquinas, having the best of the Middle Ages with him, in spite of the prevailing tmlform Christian outlook, treated natural law theory philosophically , and that he does so in his Stanma Theologiae *"^^ Natural law as an unwritten law is not conceived as static in so far as it is knowable through connaturallty* 'Plan's knowledge of it," Marltaln writes, "has Increased little by little as man's moral conscience has developed*" Our knowledge through moral conscience is imperfect, but "very likely it will continue to develop and to become 55 The Range of Reason , pp* 22, 2A. 56 Johannes Messner, "The Postwar Natural Law Revival and Its Outcome," Natural Law Pbrxim . IV (1959), p. 103.

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383 more refined as long a« humanity exists *'*^^ For Marltaln, there Is no doubt that our knowledge of nattural lav has been "progressively shaped and molded by the Inclinations of human nature, starting fron the most basic ones*" But he Is tmable to provide evldmice for this development. Re merely says: "Do not expect me to offer an aprlorl picture of those genuine Inclinations which are rooted In man*s being as vitally permeated vlth the preconsclous life of the mind, and which either developed or were released as the movement of mankind went on. They are evinced by the very history of human conscience*"^ Moreover, the knowledge of natural law was '*flrst eiq>ressed In social psttems rather than In personal Jud^oents." Thus, Marltaln says that the knowledge of natural lav "has developed within the double protecting tissue of human Inclinations and huoan society." It s< obvious that knowledge by connaturallty and the manifestations of society In regard to natural law must coincide. Natural lav contains only "basic principles In moral life — progressively recognised from the most coionon prlncl4>les to the more and more specific ones*" Moreover, "Only when the Gospel has penetrated to the very depth of huMMi substance will natural law appear In Its flower and Its perfection*"^ Since the knowledge of natural law can be known by the development of human Inclinations and human society, Marltaln conments that "a careful examination of the data of anthropology would show * . . the Man and the State , p* 90* ^Ibld*. p* 92. ^Ibld*, pp* 90, 92-93*

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384 fundamental dynamic schaaes of natural law.'**® J, Messner is particularly concerned with this anthropological question in regard to natural law. Although "the anthropology centering on the idea of the *animal rationale' still stands," he notes that "the schools of biological, evolutionary, historical, sociological, psychological, ethnological anthropology have broken so much new ground that natural law doctrine will have to show in imich greater detail how its metaphysical anthropology fits in with indisputable sn^irltcal facts »" This seems to be the fundamental question for the Thomist. Since they refuse to iixq>ose the theological truth or the authority of God on the realm of natural law (nature in general), Thomistic philosophical doctrine must show that its natural law doctrine has no contradictions with empirical facts* Messner again notes that "Coiq>aratively, the medieval natural law school had knowledge only of a very narrow range of enq>irical facts* Since thm w« have learned that mankind has existed at least half a million years, that the very highly developed ancient civilizations never approached scientifically the problem of natural law, that innumerable peoples and tribes are guided by codes of law or rules of custom which, prima facie, seem very difficult to fit into the medieval natural law doctrine."*^ As we have seen, Jacques Maritain has asstimed the continuous development of the basic tenets of natural law since the dawn of civilization. Messner seems to hove questioned Maritain' s very assun4>tion when he says that the ancient rules of custom seem very difficult to ^°Ifeid., p. 93. "The ?c'... ^ Katural Law Revival and Its Outcone," p. 103.

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385 fit Into thtt — di«val natural law doctrine. -,> Fbr Marltain, we must consider natural law In terma o£ the obllftatlons and the rights Involved in the requireotents of natural law* Be notes that the ancient and medieval worlds have given more attention to the obligations than to the rights of man* and that it was not until the eighteenth century that the rights of man (probably in reference to the Freeh Declaration of the Bights of Man) have been brought to the fore in natural law* "That discovery was essentially due to a progress in moral and social experience, through which the root inclinations of human nature as regards the rights of the human person were set free, and consequ«:itly, knowledge through inclination with regard to them developed*""^ Although Maritain has totally rejected the rationalistic philosophy of natural law of the eighteenth century, he has given it credit for its having brought forth the light of human rights that are required by natural law* Am a Thcndst, Maritain cannot ignore the relation of natural law to eternal law. He says, "the caxcept of Katural Law is given its definitive meaning only when that of Eternal Law has been established." He maintains that "the concept of Eternal Law is not solely theological," and one qiay make a philosophical excursion to eternal law. "God exists. He is the first cause of being, activating all beings." Vor Maritain, as well as for St* Thomas Aquinas, "Eternal Law is one with the eternal wisdom of God and the divine essence itself*" Since God is the first cause and law is a measure and a rule, "a thing is ruled and measured insofar as it participates in the measure and rule existing in the one Ttan and the State , p. 94.

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386 lAo rules." Horeover, all things are measured and ruled by Eternal Law. For that reason, "they participate in this Law insofar as they derive from it the inclinations throu^ t^ich they tend naturally toward their proper operations and ends." Thus^ it is essential to note that "the divine reason alone is the author of Natural Law." The divine reason is the cause for the existence of natural law, and It is also the cause of both human nature and its essential inclinations. The knowledge of human nature and its inclinations is thus dep^ident upon eternal law. "Natural Law is a participation in the Eternal Law."^^ We must be cautioned finally that the principle of analog alone is applicable to the relation between two different types of law: the notion of law is analogically common to eternal law and natural law, eternal law and human law, and natural law and positive law* For Haritaln, the most significant aspect of natural law is its moral implications. As Heinrich Rommea points out, "/A/ reason wi^ the Catholic philosopfay of the state eaq»hasizes the principle of natural law is the relation of ethics and politics*"^ However, we must also stress the ijsi|>ortance of practical applications of natural law to the rights of man In the political philosophy of Jacques Marltain. In the postwar natural law discussion, J. Messner expresses his concern over the focus on the fundamental natural law principles such as their ontologlcal and metaphysical foundation or their political and social validity in most general terms* "Thus it has been occtq>led with problems which St. Thomas thought should not be so much in vogue, since the ^^"Natural Law and Moral Law," pp. 63, 67. The State in Catholic Thought , p. 195.

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387 fundanentals of natural law, namely, its general principles, ««re, he thought, established and were familiar to the human mind. . . * What he thought to be the chief task will still have to be the main pursuit of the traditional natural law doctrine: the application of the natural principles to the changing world in the political, social, economic, cultural field. "^^ In this sense, Maritain's practical applications of natural law to the rights of man inqwrt an added significance in his political philosophy. The true philosophy of human rights must be based upon the idea of natural law. "The same natural law which lays down our most fundamental duties, and by virtue of which every law is binding, is the very law which assigns to us our fundamental rights. "^^ Natural law is not a written law; its first principle or preamble is "Do good and avoid evil." Mow we shall examine the relation of natural law (lex naturalis) to "natural right" (jus naturalis), to "the law of nations" (Jus gentium), and to "positive law" (either customary or statute law). When it is a question of written law, the relation betiraen lex and jus is simply a relation of identity. Thus, positive right and positive law are synonyms: "positive right and positive law emanate from social authority and are sanctioned by the constraints of society." Thus, we are concerned here with "the notion of debittm legale ," that is to say, we are concerned with the order of legality or the Juridical order which, of course, supposes the moral order. However, natural law deals with the domain of morality, not that of legality. It is "The Postwar Natural Law Revival and Its Outcome," p. 105. The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 66; Man and the State . p. 95.

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388 concerned with the notion of "debttim morale ." Natural law is promulgated in our reason as knowing through coonaturality or inclinations. Juridical authority, not the moral order, is inherent in hunan species; the right of legal constraint derives frwa it. Therefore, Maritain writes , "there is a natural Juridical order contained with the Natural Law and the natural order of morality, but in a sinq>ly virtual manner." In this sense, we can speak of natural right . "As soon as a precept of Natural Lav is expressed in written law, it becomes a precept of written law and by this token it is part of positive right, of the Juridical positive order*" Natural right, since "it remains enveloped in the Natural Law," does not require "formulation in positive law and in the Juridical order in the full and formal sense of the word." It is, for exatq>le, unlike the law of nations in which "the notion of right (jus ) no longer takes on merely a virtual, but a formal and actual meaning as fiell.^' The law of nations or the common lav of civilisation, for Maritain, is unlike natural law in that the former is known through "the conceptual exercise of reason" while the latter is known through inclinations or connaturality.^ This is the specific differ^ice between natural law and jus gentium . The law of nations is known through "the rational, logical, conceptual exercise of the common reason, starting from more profound and more primary princi^iles %ihich are the principles of Natural Law."^ ^^"Natural Law and Moral Lav," pp. 69, 71, 72. ^ton and the State , p. 98; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 72. 69 "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 69.

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389 However* Harltain says that it Is difficult to define the lav of nations because it is "intermediary betwe«i natural law and positive lav."' The law of nations contains both things which belong to natural law and which are beyond natural law. It specifically contains the things beyond natural law because it differs from natural law in the manner in which the knowledge of that law is attained* Thus, the distinction between the law of nations and natural law is not based on their content , Froa a point of view of its content, the law of nations must contain certain regulations which are based u|>on human nature or which are connected with the first princi4>le of natural law: "Do good and avoid evil*" Therefore, jus gentium must deal, like natural lav, "%iith rights and duties which are connected with ctiw first princl|>le in a necessary manner*"''* In short, "the law of nations belongs at once to the moral order and to the juridical order; it prestq>poses a debitun morale , a moral obligation appealing to conscience, before the legal obligation, dcbitum legale *"^^ However, we must remember Karitain*s distinction between natural law and the law of nations. This distinction lies in the mode of knowing rather than in the contwit of the law. Positive law or right is "the body of laws," whether it be customary law or statute law. While the law of nations is connected irith the first principle in a necessary manner, positive law is connected with it in "a contingent manner. "^^ It is not concerned with the whole Ibid.; Men and the State , p. 98. wan and the State , p. 99. ^^"Hatural Law and Moral Law," pp. 74-75. Tfan and the State , p. 99; The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 70; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 75.

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390 body of civilization or humanity. Rather, it is the laws and customs of "a particular social group" or society. "Human reason intervenes here as a creative factor not only in that which concerns the knowledge of the law — as in the case of the law of nations — but in that which concerns the very existence of the law."' How, there is the inseparable relation of the law of nations and positive law to natural law. It is the virtue of natural law that both the law of nations and positive law take on the force of law. "They are a prolongation or an extension of natural law, passing into objective sones which can lass and less be sufficiently determined by the essential inclinations of human nature*"'^ Hatural law, therefore^ provides Its general (moral) guidance for the law of nations and positive law; it leaves certain regulations "to the ultimate determination and initiative of the human reason." "The Natural Law itself requires that what it leaves undetermined be ultimately determined by htman reason." There are "iBq>erc^tible transitions" between natural law, the law of nations and positive law.^^ Finally, we can relate the law of nations and positive law to eternal law, since the former are co-extensive with natural law and, in turn, natural law is a participation in eternal law. As Maritain writes, "the positive law obliges men in consciesice — in other words the debitum legale that it institutes is also a debltum laorale — because it obliges by virtue of the Natural Law. By the same tokoi "^^"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 75. ^n and the State , p. 99. The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 71; Man and the State . p. 100.

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391 «• ••• that an unjust law Is not a law. This follows as a consequence . . . from the fact that the positive law obliges by virtue of the Natural Law which is a participation In the Btemal Law."''' Natural law, which is an unwritten and inmutable law, serves as the foundation of the rights of man; and the isost significant aspect of natural law is that it can offer the aoral basis of husuin rights. As Maritain has said, natural law is moral law. Although nattiral law is the only true theoretical or rational Justification of human rights* Maritain has not dogmatically rejected other practical ideologies and conclusions concerning human rights as long as they are concordant with his own. Therefore, Maritain' s concq^tlon of the law of nations is essentially the same as President It>osevelt's four-point program which can fulfill the yearnings of the civilized world conmunity. The Four Foints of Roosevelt, as Maritain lists them, include: (1) "Freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world"; (2) "Freedon of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world'*! (3) "Freedom from want"; and (A) "Freedom from fear."'® When politics is a practical art, thai the practical conclusions of iKman rights •body far more inqwrtant consequences in political society which must laplesMnt and actualize the rights of man. Although man's right to existence, to personal freedoa, to the pursuit of the perfection of moral life and to the private ownership of material goods belongs to natural law,'^ the details of economics, politics and social activities ^ "Natural Law and Moral Uw," p. 76. T:he Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 72; Man and the State . p. 100. ' ^Hsn and the State , p. 100. The right to material goods

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392 are subject to positive law. In the discussion of "the rights of the human person," Marltaln makes an lnq>ortant distinction between "the possession and the exercise of a right." There are certain Inalienable rights of man which are grounded on the very nature of man. Therefore, man possesses these rights absolutely. However, since man Is living with other persons In a civil society, the exercise of his rights Is nonetheless restricted under certain circumstances. Every law must aim at the common good of political society or the body politic* In the same manner, the exercise of man's right Is subject to the common good and social justice. Thus htsnan rights are "Inalleiable only substantially.'*^ In Marltaln* s discussion of human rights, there are essentially three categories: the rights of human persons, the rights of the civic person (political rights) and the rights of social persons (particularly In reference to the worker). The liiq;>ortance of the rights of human persons springs from Marltaln' s own persona list social and political philosophy. We must consider here that human personality springs from the very nature of mam Man Is a religious animal. Man as a spiritual animal transcends the natural or temporal order Itself, as the sup^rnatural world and the Gospel are above the profane world. Thus, human personality Is Inviolable. The transcendence of the person Is directly linked with God. The human person transcends the State. Nonetheless, belongs to natural law, "Insofar as mankind Is naturally entitled to possess for Its own common use the material goods of nature; It pertains to the law of Nations ... In so far as reason necessarily concludes that for the sake of the common good those material goods must be privately owned, as a result of the conditions naturally required for their management and for hwaan work. If ®^Ibid., p. 101.

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393 for Maritaln, the grace of God "perfects nature and does not destroy It."®^ Even "the universe of truths" (of science, of trisdon, and of poetry) belongs to a higher plane than the political coomunlty* Although the state may oppose "the propagation of errors which might threaten the fundamental ethics of conmon life" and may ask a mathematician or a physicist to teach mathematics or physics. It cannot force these scientists to adopt certain philosophical or mathematical doccrlne.^^ The Russian scientist I^rsenko's genetics Is sheer nonsense. The rights of human persons Include the provisions of natural law: the right to existence and life, the right to personal freedom end the right to the pursuit of the perfection of moral and rational life. Marltaln also stresses "family society, * which is primordial end prior to the political society. Thus, "The rights of the fasdly, the rights of the human person as father or mother of the family, belong to natural law In the strictest sense of the word."^^ The saae Is said about religious liberties. In the rights of htnan persons, the freedom of religious association and of marriage Is Included. Fblltlcal rights are predicated upon the Aristotelian dictum that man Is a political animal: he Is not only naturally bom Into political life, but Is also obliged to participate In the political life of the community. Among political rights and liberties, Marltaln !• mtfhattc about universal suffrage. It Is necessary for free men to TIhe Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 74. ®^Ibld., pp. 76-77. 83 Ibid ., p. 82; Man and the State , p. 104.

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394 choose those who hold authority towards the cosnon good. As Maritain •ays* "this is the most elementary form of active participation In political llfe*'*®^ The second aspect Is concerned with political parties. Maritain condemns the totalitarian single party system as "the worst form and the catastrophe of the party system." "Vfhat we ask of a new Democracy Is not to abolish polltcal parties, but rather to regulate the make*up of the State, of the legislative assemblies and the organs of government. In such a manner that the latter, while subject to the control of the assemblies In matters of major interest, would be freed from party domination." The root of a true political democracy lies In the political rights of citizens. The right of the people to choose their constitution and form of ^yvernment Is "the first and most fundamwital of political rights," although they are subject to "the requirements of Justice and natural law." Maritain envisages what we call the constitutional government or the democratic government* Other political rights Include "the three equalities: political equality assuring to each citizen his status, security and liberties with, the State; equality of all before the law. Implying an Independent Judiciary power which assures to each one the right to call upon the law and to be restrained by It alone If It has been violated; equal admission of all citizens to public employment according to their capacity, and free access of all to the various professions, without racial or social discrimination." The political rights also Include the right of association and freedom of expression. Maritain prefers the term "freedom of ^ \he Rights of Man and Natural Law , pp. 84-85.

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395 investigation and discussion" to "freedom of speech and esqpression." Freedom of investigation is "a ftmdamental natural right, for man's very nature is to seek the truth." It is not an unlimited right* However, he rejects censorship and police methods as the worst way even to insure the repression of activities which are detrimental to political society* "In any event I am convinced," Maritain writes, "that a democratic society is not necessarily an unarmed society, %ihich the en—I— of liberty may calmly lead to the slaughterhouse in the nttae of liberty. "^^ As Maritain has already emphasized, his proposal for the effective defense of liberty is based upon an organic and pluralist philosophy. Maritain' s political rights, as we have sewi, do not contain any drastic provisions that differ irom those of the constitutional govemm«its we find in Europe and the Itoited States. There is nothing new in his proposals in contrast with the operating factors in i^merican democracy. His practical conclusions on politics might have well been influenced by Aaterican dsnocracy since his arrival in this country. In his third category of human rights, social rights or the rights of the social person, his particular concern over the workers is indicative of his social thinking. He is particularly concerned with the amelioration of the worker. His personalist social and political philosophy is clearly reflected upon social rights* For Maritain, the economic and the social orders are as important as the political order for the improvement of human conditions. His emphasis upon "the dignity of work" implies that the worker is not ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 86, 87, 88, 89, 90*

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396 merely a co&saodity, he must be treated as a human person. Thus, the dignity of work is "a moral datum. "^^ In this sense, he not only represents the voice of Christian theologians, but also has provisions similar to those found in the encyclical letter of Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Hovarvan (1891). The right to %K>rk means "the right of every one to find work which will afford a living for himself and his family . . . [andj as men become aware of this ri^t, it will assume a powerful force of social transformation."^' Social rights also Include the right to a Just wage, the right to relief, unenq>loyment insurance, sick benefits, and social security.^ The rights of the working groups Include freedom to organize and to join trade-unions of their own choice and the right to strike. His drastic proposal is "a system of Joint ownership and of Joint management," which is based upon the idea of "the worker's title ." This proposal is opposed to both the socialist planned economy and the capitalist system. It is what he calls "'associative* enterprise."^ As %re may recall, his personallst philosophy would only be materialized after the breakdown of Individualistic capitalism, which sacrifices the dignity of work for "a commodity of labor" and for the fecundity of money. Harltaln is opposed to Marxian socialism because it grants "primacy to economic technique," it tends "to entrust everything to the Tlan and the State , p. 105. The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 94. Tlan and the State , p. 104. og The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 98.

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397 powttr of the State, adotlnlstrator of the welfare of all, and to ita adentlfic and bureaucratic machinery." In short. It "leads in the direction of a totalitarlanisa with a technocratic base." His "associative" proposal does not ioaply any kind of "paternalimi" on the part of the managaoMnt for the benefit of the workers. As he says, "such a conception tenda to treat the worker as a minor, and opposes in the most radical manner that consciousness of the social dignity and the rights of the working person. . . ." Nor does Marltain favor "State corporatism." For him, "the State has a simple function of coordinatioQ and control. A fundamental truth must here be safeguarded, that of the distinction between the political order and the economic or order, between the political structure of the State and the economic organisation of society. The idea of an economic State is a monstrosity." This is perfectly consonant with his pluralist philosophy. Haritaln has consistently proposed a persona list philosophy of society as opposed to the two extreme "liberal-individualistic" and "coEPBiunlstic" types. "The political life of the State must express the thought and the will of the citizen, with regard to the comaon good and to the common task, which are of an order, not merely material, but principally moral and truly human. "^^ "The advocates of a personalistic type of society," he writes in another place, "see the mark of human dignity first and foremost in the power to make these seme goods of nature serve the conmon conquest of intrinsically human, moral, and spiritual goods and of man's freedom of autonomy. Those three groups Aiberalindividualistic, communistic, and per sons llst^ Inevitably will ^ ^Ibid .. pp. 97, 99-100, 103.

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398 accuse each other of Ignoring certain essential rights of the himan being* It remains to be seen who makes a faithful Image and who a distorted Image of man," * A few remarks are In order in the conclusion of Marltain*s conception of natural law and huaan rights. As he has maintained, natural law is the only true Justification of the positive rights of man. It is based upon the onto logical structure of the human being and is knowable through inclinations or connaturality. The supreme virtue of natural law is its moral content that provides the basis of positive law or human rights. Thust Maritain rejects a moral or political philosophy which "recognizes Fact alone" as opposed to the notion of "Value": "If the affirmation of the intrinsic value and dignity of man is nonsense, the affirmation of the natural rights of man is nonsense also."'^ In the Thomlstic tradition, the foundation of this ideal order of natural law, that is, the derivation of natural law, is of course "the Eternal Law." Thus, his notion of "value" is derived from the recognition of this fact: natural law is a participation in the Eternal Law. As we have seen, the contents of Maritain's human rights are not different from the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Four Boints of President Roosevelt. If natural law is the basis of human rights, then the latter must be deduclble from the former. Unfortunately, Maritain has nowhere shown this process of deduction. Furthermore, there is no absolute guarantee in his system that the TIan and the State , p. 107. ^^Ibtd., p. 97.

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399 enumeration of human rights would be consonant %rlth the true tenets of natural lav Itself. As Marltaln himself said, the knowledge of natural law and natural law are two entirely different things. The first principle of natural law Is "Do good and avoid evil," which the law of nations and positive law must take Into account. Granted that It Is a good moral principle, the problem In moral philosophy still remains In Its determination. In an objective fashion, of what Is good and what Is evil. Of course, good Is the consonance with the essence of husum being and evil Is Its opposite. Thus, the problem remains In tha determination of what Is really the true nature of the human being. We are still not convinced that Marltaln 's eniioeratlon of human rights is consonant with the true essence of the htman being as expressed in law. Such a doubt arises sliiq>ly because there is no theoretical guarantee that his knowledge of natural law captures the true essence of natural law. Tet, practically speaking, we must not overlook the value of his categories of human rights because they embody democratic principles. If natural law is kno%m at all, it is known only through inclinations or connatural ity. Will Herberg spoke of coimaturallty as a kind of Bergsonian intuition. But, to take the words of Marltaln seriously, it is not "intuition." Knowledge by connaturallty is neither a rational kotn^ledge nor intuition. Hot too surprisingly, Kai Nielsen calls "knowledge through inclinations" a "merky doctrine." Marltaln even distinguishes "authentic and fundamental inclinations"

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400 93 from 'Wrped, perverted or devious Inclinations." But he does not provide any Justification of how we know which Inclinations are authentic or perverted, Vernon J. Bourke, In defense of Jacques Marltaln, arbitrarily distinguished '*tvo kinds of knowledge of natural law: a) the way In which most men (not moral scientists) may grasp natural moral law; and b) the way in which a moral expert reflects on, and endeavors to offer a scientific or philosophical explanation of natural law."'^ And Marl tain is a moral expert; when lui speaks of knowledge of natural law by inclination or connatural ity, he refers to the first category above. However, this would seem to be a misinterpretation of Maritain's notion of the knowledge of natural law. It is true that he considers the knowledge of natural law to be in a primitive stage. When he speaks of knowing natural law through inclination or connatural ity, he is not merely Including "the ordinary person" (non-expert on morals). He speaks of the perfection of knowledge by connaturality in Christian contemplatives, which cannot be e^qplained by concepts or ideas, that is, by rational knowledge or explanation. Nonetheless, it is connaturality. Haritain, as a moral expert, will have better knowledge of natural law than the ordinary person. But his knowledge of natural law is nevertheless knowledge by connaturality. Bourke admits that "modern Thomists are not yet doing a proper job of staking their position clear to their ^^"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 65. 94 Vernon J. Bourke, "Natural Law, Thomism — and Professor Nielsen." Natural Law Forum . V (1960), p. 115.

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401 colleagues."'^ Since the knowledge and the existence of natural law are two entirely different things, as Marltaln Insists, the former does not affect the latter In any significant manner. We are only concerned with our eplstemologlcal root, that is, the knowledge of natural law. The ultimate Justification of the natural law theory of Marltaln must be fottnd in the Thomlstlc tradition. Since he insists that philosophy cannot be separated from theology in the true tradition of Thomism, natural law must not be separated from eternal law and the essence of the human being must not be separated from the divine essence. Marltaln, therefore, rests his ultimate Juatificatlon on the authority of God. He writes: In the last analysis, as every creature acts by virtue of its Principle, which is the Pure Act; as every authority worthy of the name (that is to say. Just) is binding In conscience by virtue of the Principle of beings, which is pure Wisdom: so too every right possessed by man is possessed by virtue of the right possessed by God, Who is pure justice, to see the order of His «rlsdom in Beings respected, obeyed, and loved by every intelligence* It is essential to low to be an order of reason ; and natural law, or the normality of functioning of human nature known by knowledge through inclination, is law , binding in conscience, only because nature and the inclinations of nature manifest an order of reason, — that is of Divine Reason . Natural law is law only because it is a participation in Eternal Law.^° A basic argument against natural law is pointed up by the Rumean tradition. This argument, among other questions, declares that 95ibld., p. 119. ^ "Man and the State , p. 96.

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402 the "ought" can never be deduced from the "Is." Natural law Is the law that takes into account the essence of the human being or human nature. Thus, for instance, the first principle of natural lav is a moral prescription. The fact of human nature has been taken into account in this moral prescription. It would seem that there is a factual relation between the "ought" and the "is," although the former is not identical with the latter nor can the former be deduced from the latter. However, the relation between natural law and human nature is an extremely difficult problem. There is no conclusive evidence as to what really constitutes the thing called human nature. Granted that the existence and the knowledge of human nature are two entirely different things, we are concerned here with the knowledge of human nature. As Kai Nielsen says, "the concept of human nature is a rather vague cultural concept; it is not a scientific one. Vfhile I think this criticism is surely debatable, it does raise a problem for the natural moral law theory since it is clear that the statement, 'there is an essential human nature, ' is not the obvious, self -evidently true statement Aquinas and his 97 contemporary followers take it to be." However, the crucial difficulty stems from the fact that there are varying and even opposing theories concerning human nature as such. Maritain assumes that there is an immitable natural law or an unchangeable human nature. At the same time, he insists that the knowledge of 97 Op. cit .. p. 57.

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403 natural law must take Into account the discoveries of anthropology. Even modem scientific anthropology has yet to find an answer as to whether or not human nature Is Imoiutable. Margaret Macdonald argues that "human beings are not like exactly similar bottles of whisky each marked 'for export only' or some device Indicating a connon destination or end. Men do not share a fixed nature, nor, therefore, are there any ends which they must necessarily pursue In fulfilment of such nature. There Is no definition of 'man*. There Is a more or less vague set of properties which characterize In varying degrees and proportions those creatures which are called 'human*. "^^ In knowledge of human nature and natural law, we must yet find certain objective standards to distinguish between perverted and authentic human nature: 1. e., find natural law. The Common Good Jacques Marltaln has often stressed the fact that his philosophy of culture and society Is personallst and comminallst. We have examined In detail the "personallst" emphasis of his political philosophy. Since these two cardinal aspects of his political philosophy are the two sides of the same coin, we have sporadically commented on its communal characteristic. But we have not considered the communal aspect or the notion of the common good in his social and political philosophy. Tves R. Simon remarks that ". . . the idea of common good '^"Natural Rights." Philosophy. Politics and Society , ed. Peter Laslett (Hew York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 44.

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404 domiaates the whole political philosophy of St. Thomas. "^^ In Maritaln's social and political philosophy. Its persona list character comes to the fore and Is preponderant; and yet the achlevaaent of the ccxaoon good remains the supreme aim of political society or a tcs^ral order* As the tenq>oral order Is a real but Infravalent end to the supernatural order* so Is the comnmal to the personallst aspect* Marltaln says that "It Is essential to the common good that It respect and serve the suprataqtoral ends of the human person. "^^ This merely follows from the fact that the teoq>oral common good Is the Intermediate or Infravalent i^^ relatively absolute) end of the human person. "A civilisation, then, the common good of idilch Is referred to a type so trtmscendent,'* Marltaln writes, "should necessarily aim at securing for the mass of Its citizens conditions that are worthy of man and that will put each citizen thus equipped for the life of reason and of virtue In the way of advancing towards perfect freedom and of achieving his eternal destiny. "^^^ Nor Is the comoaon good of political society (a tenporal order) construed merely as a material ead. It Is also moral* As Marltaln writes, "It Is ... an error to consider, as Is sometimes done, that the tenporal onanon good, the end of the State, mecns an exclusively material good. It Is both material and moral, but mainly moral t the iq>rlght life on this earth — In time -of the human miltltude assembled 99 "Thomlna and Democracy," Science. Killosophy and Religion: Second Symposlimi . p. 2S8. 100 True Htaaanlsm . p. 127j Freedom In the Modem World , p. 42. Helnrlch A. Bommen says,". . . the coonon good Is not an absolute value." The State In Catholic Thought , p. 311. Freedom In the Modem Vforld . p. 44.

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405 In a social body."^^^ Thus, the common gpod Is something ethically good. The cofonon good is the end of society or a teoporal order. The notion of the coamon good, of course, finds its origin in the Greeks. The notion of the coonon good is well e3q>re8sed by Heinrich B o nw a n when he saysi "The coonon good is the prevailing principle that controls any other Interest in its order. It is the creative principle, the conserving power of the body politic; it is the final cause of the state, its intimate end; it and nothing else gives the political, sovereign power its moral authority and legit imacy."'*^^ The coonon gpod as the good of the uhole multitude has an or* ganlc connotation. Maritaln makes It absolutely clear that "the sodsl body and the oomnon good are realities that are irreducible to a single enumeration of individuals and of individual goods or virtues. "^^ Much later, Maritaln added another meaning to the notion of the ccHimon good when he saidt "The conmon good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole. ... It is the good hnaac life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their coomunion in good living. It is therefore cooiDon to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit from It."^^^ Yves R. Simon has been quite concerned with the ^^ \he Things That Are Mot Caesar's, p. 139; Freedom in the Modem World , p. 42. • 'The State in Catholic Thought , p. 310. ^ ^Freedom in the Modem World , p. 108; The Things That Are Not Caesar's , p. 139; The Person and the Common Good , p. 42. The Person and the Common Good, pp. 40-Al.

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406 notion o£ the consnon good. His Is the best expression of the Idea that the comnon good Is not the sum of Individual goods. He writes: This philosophy /of the coaaaon goo47 rests on a realistic conception of the social body, that is, that society enjoys a reality of its own, a reality that cannot be reduced to a sum of Individual realities. The good which is the object of political activity, the common good, is not reducible to a mere uvm of individual accomplishments; it is the perfection, the good, of the whole as such, the perfect cooperation of men in their corporate life and In their collective action. Accordingly, political power cannot be exercised for the prlviate good of a master or for the particular welfare of any group within the state. The only legitimate purpose of politics is the perfect living and acting together of all parts of the body politic. Every idea of exploitation of other men for the sake of the men in power is radically excluded by the very object of political activity. 1^^ It is very important to note that Haritain's conception of the common good contains the germ of both anti-individualisffl and anti-totalitarlanism. When he says that the coiaM>n good is not a mere sum of individual goods, he is essentially anti-individualistic. At the same time, this, with a slight shift of e^hasls, might hove sounded like an authoritarian creed. Karitain also said that the common good is not merely the proper good of a whole. Thus, he built a dam against a totalitarian system in which the individual good appears only to be a dot in its immense universe. Helnrlch A. Rommen expresses a similar view as opposed to individualism and totalitarianism in that, in individualism, the individual remains "a social monad" in Leibnitz* sense; man is not considered as a political being; and thus, 'Vfhat is called conanon good is merely a distributive sum of the interests and private goods of the Individuals." On the other hand, in totalitarianism, the Individual '•"^"Thomism and Democracy," pp. 258-59.

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407 goods are coropletely submerged In societal ends, and "the individuals are mere marionettes In the service of inqpersonal powers of economic productive relations or of a mystical and irrational spirit of the nation revealed in a deified leader for ends and purposes that are utterly foreign to the individual. **^^^ For Maritain, his "law of redistribution" is essentially an element of anti-totalitarianism and a sheer statism* The common good demanded by the body politic, for Maritain, espouses "not only the collection of public conraodities and service* which the organisation of comaon life presupposes: a sound fiscal condition, a strong military force; the body of Just laws, good customs, and wise institutions which provide the political society with its structure; the heritage of its great historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and cultural treasures"; but the common good also Includes "the sociological integration of all civic conscience, political virtues and sense of law and freedom, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches of tmconsclously operating hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude. Justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroian in the individual lives of the BMobers of the body politic. "^^ The common good and authority are closely related; as a matter of fact, "the cotonon good is the basis of authority, authority, when it is unjust, betrays its own political essence. "^^ When the notion of ^^^ The State in Catholic Thought , pp. 315-16. ^lan and the State , pp. 11-13; The person and the Oocmon Good , pp. 42A3. 109 *"^ The Rights of Man and Natural Law , p. 11.

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408 authority Is translated Into "power" In the sense of Realpolitlk . then Marltaln is In a position to criticize Machiavellianism; coupled with his own notion of the comaon good which entails necessarily a moral good, Machiavellianism becomes sheer obscurantism of iaooralism and a carlcture of power politics. Yves R. Simon raises an objection to the common belief that, because of the Tbomistic «aq>hasis on authority, "the political philsophy of St* Thomas is wholly incompatible with any kind of democratic spirit." However, Marltaln has said that the common good alone is the foundation of political authority. Ftirther, "The essential function of authority," according to Simon, "is to direct the multitude toward its common good."^^^ For Marltaln* authority is necessary to direct the cosoaon good of persons; the achievement of the common good "requires that certain individuals be charged with this guidance, and that the directions i4hich they determine, the decisions which they make to this «id, be followed or obeyed by the other members of the community." Moreover, besides its essential function to achieve the common good, authority for Marltaln, "must exercise subsidiary functions" not only of penal sanction but also of moral direction and training. '^^ Marltaln distinguishes authority from sovereignty. According to him, it is permissible to use the latter term only Insofar as it means "either the natural right of the body politic to full autononqr* or the right «rtiich the State receives from the body politic to topnost independence and topmost power with regard to the other parts and power "Thomlsm and Democracy," pp. 261, 262. ^^ S:he Rights of Man and Natural Law , pp. 9-10, 56.

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409 agftncles of the political society or with regard to the external relations between States." However, since he treats the notion of ttrrmteignty, not in teras of Juridical theory, but in tents of political philosophy, he believes that "political philosophy must get rid of the word, as well as the concept, of Sovereignty • • . because, considered In its genuine meaning, and in the perspective of the proper scientific reals to which it belongs • . . this conc^t is intrinsically wrong and bound to mislead us if %w keep on using it." Both in the past and in the modem totalitarian states, sovereignty has meant "power without accoimtability" and "the right to be obi^ed" and in effect it is "but one with the conc^t of Absolutisa*" Hence Maritain feels that "there is no valid use of the concept of Sovereignty" in the political sphere* Nevertheless, he has set down two elements of what he calls "genuine Sovereignty"} the first is a natural and inalienable right to supreme independence and supreme power; and the second is the absolutely and transcendently siq>reme character of that independence and power. What he says, however, is that "neither the first nor the second element inherent in genuine Sovereignty can by any means be ascribed to the State. The State is not and has never been genuinely sovereign."''''^ Authority is necessary in political society, and it must be directed to the accooq>lishment of the comnon good of the people. Authority is exercised by the leaders «iho, as we have already noted, must be chosen (elected) by the fundamental right of the people. Authority has been distinguished frcMa sovereignty, and, moreover, authority is not power. Maritain says that " power is the force by means of Tton and the State , pp. 29, 43, 50.

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410 which you can oblige others to obey you. Auttwrtty is the right to direct and coomand, to be listened to or obeyed by others. Authority requests power. Pbwer without authority is tyranny. "^^^ It seems necessary here to discuss Haritain's conc^ts of "community," "society," "nation," "state," and "body politic." These concqpts have been used in Haritain's earlier writings; but they are clarified as his political thought becomes more mature. Primarily, Maritain did not make any noticeable distinction between the state and the body politic. Fbr instance, he said in one place that the temporal common good is the end of the "State." Also, he had to re-define the notion of "people" as a social and ethical concept. Maritain notes that, although cotanunity and society "may licit ly be used synonymously," there is a preliminary distinction to be made between them. "A ccnnmunity is more a work of nature and more nearly related to the biological; a society is more of a work of reason, and more nearly related to the intellectual and spiritual properties of man." The former is "a product of instinct and heredity in given circimstances and historical frameworks," «^ereas the latter is "a pnxhict of reason and moral strength." While the community "springs up froa nature," the society "finally springs from hvraan freedom." In regard to the concept of nation, Maritain maintains that "the Nation is a commimity, not a society. The Nation is one of the most important, perhaps the most complex and complete community engendered by civilized life." He defines a nation as "a community of people who become aware of themselves as history has made them, who ^^ ^Ibid .. p. 48.

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411 treasure their own past, and who love theoiselves as they know or imagine theinaelves to be, irith a kind of inevitable introversion. . . . Yet for •11 of that the Nation is not a society; it does not cross the threshold of the political realms. It is a coonunity of communities, a self-aware network of common feelings and representations that human nature and instinct have caused to swarm around a number of physical, historical and social data." In contradistinction to the nation, "both the Body Politic and the State pertain to the order of society, even society in its highest or 'perfect' form." Maritain warns that "serious misunderstandings follow upon any failure to distinguish clearly between the State and the Body Politic. . . . These do not belong to two diverse categories, but they differ from each other as a part differs from the whole." The body politic or the political society is the whole, whereas "the State is a part — of this whole* . . . Political society, required by nature and achieved by reason, is the most perfect of tenqwral societies. It is a concretely and wholly human reality, tending to a concretely and wholly human good — the common good. It is a work of reason, bom out of the obsciure efforts of reason disengaged from instinct, and implying essentially a rational order. . . . Justice is a primary condition for the existence of the body politic, but Friendship is its very lifegiving form," He e^licitly rejects the absolutist's notion of the state, though being the uppermost political agency, is "neither a whole nor subjsct of right or a person." Thus democracy alone provides for the common good demanded by the body politic. Maritain accepts the popular notion of denocracy wherein political authority originates from the people. "The people are the very substance, the living and free

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412 substance of the body politic. The people are above the State, the people are not for the State, the State is for the people." The people, who are united under Just laws by mutual friendship and for the conaaon gpod of their human existence, constitute a political society* The notion of body politics Implies the whole unit composed of the people. '-'^^ As Maritain writes, "The notion of people is a social-ethical idea, with the word 'ethical' only eE^hasizing ... the very word 'social.'" The ethical (human) content of the people is used in opposition to the concepts of "race" (as in Nazism) and of "class" (as in Marxism). For Maritain, only the broader concept of the people "is possessed of a primordial social value on a genuinely human level. "'^^^ Maritain' s Philosophy of International Relations No serious philosopher of our time can readily dismiss the question of international affairs. With the advent of the atomic bomb, coiq[>led with the periodic recurrences of world-wide war, "the future of mankind" seems to be at stake. Karl Jaspers, an existentialist philosopher, has recently raised his voice to bridge the gap between philosophy (thought) and politics (action). Since politics alone "cannot solve the question whether or not mankind will survive . . . philosophy and politics should get together. "^'^^ Jacques Maritain is by no means as prominent and discerning a thinker and regular connentator as is his Protestant counterpart, "*Ibid., pp. 2-6, 9-11, 24, 26. The Range of Reason , p. 122. 116 The Future of Mankind, pp. vlli-ix.

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413 Eeinhold Nlebohr, on the problems of world politics* However, he provides an altemetive view* Vhea the theological notion of original sin overplays its role, the traditional Christian ideal of peace and brotherly love must inevitably stage its metamorphosis into power politics* Niebuhr has a de^ insight into the realities of contecq>orary international politics, but it may safely be said that he does not suggest any definite future goalJi for international society* ^'^' The ideal of ''eternal peace" %rill never be fully realized, but Kant had foresight and an ideal and never suffered from myopia. *-^^ Maritain's conception of world government, like his ideal of a new Christendom, is tinged with a concrete historical ideal* He speaks of "the organisation of the international community on a foundation of friendship and of Justice*"^^ He once eoaenaited that "The coonon good in our day is certainly not just the common good of the nation and has not yet succeeded in becoming the cooanon good of the civilized world community. "^^^ It would be imrealistic for us to eiqpect a world Miebuhr's view on international politics can be found in Christian Eealism and Bolitical Froblems . Christianity and Power golitice . and Horal Man and Immoral Society . Koineth W, Thompson surveys "political realism" in international relations in Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics * Among political scientists, the names of Hans J. Morgenthau and George F* Kennan are well-known* See Kennan, American Diplomacy. 1900-1950 ((%icago: Ifciiversity of Chicago Press, 1951) and Realities of American Foreign Policy ; Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: Ihiiversity of Chicago Press, 1946) and In Defense of the National Interest (Hew York: Alfred A. Knof, 1951). It is interesting to compare the pessimistic view of human nature between Miebuhr and Morgenthau, which oiay justify their realistic view of international politics. 118 See Carl J. Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). ^^ ^freedom in the Modem World , p. 108. 120 The Person and the Common Good , p. 45.

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414 government today or in the near future. But to have a realizable Ideal for our future events is no harm; man cannot live in the darkness of Immediate exigencies of time and place alone. Maritain makes it clear at the outset that he considers "the problem of world governoent from the point of view of political philosophy and not from that of immediate practical activity. "^^^ Thus* he is not concerned with the details of the realization of world government; to do so is no less dangerous than unnecessary for a professional philosopher: it Is dangerous for a philosopher to enter the unfamiliar dark room of politics.'''^ He shares the philosophy of "the Conmlttee to Frame a World Const itut ion ."^^^ For Maritain, the problem of our world is an "either/or" choice. He writes that "The problem of World Government — I would prefer to say, of a genuinely political organization of the world -is the problem of lasting peace. And in a sense we might say that the problem of lasting peace is simply the problan of peace, meaning that mankind is confronted today with the alternative: either lasting peace or a serious risk of total destruction. "^^^ Probably the advent of the atomic bomb made him hasten to this conclusion. Although his inmediate 12 wan and the State , p. 188. HDhe details of the similar view are found in G. A. Borgese, Foundations of the World Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). 123 Conmlttee members were: Robert M Hutchins, G. A. Borgese, Mortimer J. Adler, Strlngfellow Barr, Albert Guerard, Harold A. Innis, Erich Kahler, Wilbur G. Katz, Charles H. Mcllwain, Robert Redfield and Rexford G. Tugwell. G. A. Borgase, op. dt .. p. v; Maritain, Man and the State , p. 200. llan and the State , pp. 189, 191.

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415 influence might have been incurred from the "secular opinions" of some one like Emery Reves. Maritain never loses his Tbomist moral insight in world problems. '^^^ His picture of the world, therefore, is not that of "an essentially economic interdependence" and "the pathological claims of opposed nationalisms." It is fundamentally a "recasting of the moral and political structures of human existence." He writes: In the first place, both economic life and political life depend on nature and reason . I mean nature as dominated by material forces and laws and by deterministic Sfvolucion, even when the human mind interfere in the process with its technical discoveries — and on reason as concerned with the ends of human existence and the realm of freedom and morality, and as freely establishing, in consonance with Natural Law, an order of human relations. In the second place, it is nature and matter that have the upper hand in the economic process; and it is reason and freedom that have the «q>per hand in the political, the genuinely political process. ^^^ Maritain's enphasis on the moral and political structures of human existence, as we have already noted, is entirely consistent with his fundamental position. Morality, of course, implies the idea that natural law is moral law of which the first principle is "Do good and avoid evil." As Robert M. Hutchins writes, "St. Thomas said that peace was the work of charity and Justice, of charity directly and of justice indirectly. The work of religion and the church is charity. The work of the state and govermMnt is Justice. ClMirch and State — universal and world state — must now work together for world peace founded on universal charity, which would realise the brotherhood of man, and 125 See Irving Louis Horowitz, "Jacques Maritain i The Thomist World State," The Idea of War and Peace in Contemporary Philosophy (Mew York: Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1957), pp. 65-79. Tian and the State , p. 190.

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416 universal democracy, which would bring justice to all mankind. "^^^ Moreover, Marl tain's concern with the political over the economic is derived from his ability to recognise first, the distinction between politics and economics and then, the primacy of the political over the economic, . Maritain rejects not only the Marxian economic interpretation of social process, but also Hegelian statism. "The fundamental amorallty of the foreign policy of modem states" is grounded on the idea of the onnipotent state and "a right of absolute sovereignty." Hegel "gave full metaphysical expression to the idea of the State as a superhuman person. "^^^ As Maritain insisted, the state is not above the body politic: it must always be in the service of human ends. As the end of the state is the common good of the people, so the end of a world state is the common good of international society as a whole. This ioqilies Maritain*s rejection of a recent school of "national interest theory" whose renowned representative and originator is Reinhold Nlebuhr. Maritain would agree with Sooery Reves when the latter says: Nothing can distort the true picture of conditions and events in this world more than to regard one's own country as the center of the universe, and to view all things solely in their relationship to this fixed point. It is inevitable that such a method of observation should create an entirely false perspective. Tet this is the only method admitted and used by the seventy or eighty national governments of the world, by our legislators and diplomats, by our press and radio. All the conclusions, principles and politics of the peoples are necessarily drawn from the warped ^^^ St. Thomas and the Vtorld State (Milwaukee: Marquette Uhiversity Press, 1949), p. 44. 128 Man and the State, p. 192.

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417 picture of the world obtained by so primitive a method of observation. ^29 Therefore, for Marltaln, '*the two main obstacles to the establishment of a lasting peace are, first, the so-called absolute sovereignty of modern states; second, the Impact of the economic Interdependence of all nations upon our present Irrational stage of political evolution. In which no world political organisation corresponds to world material unification. 130 Marltaln's main concern here Is what he calls "the Inor^anlzatlon of the world** of today. It Is our necessity for a world govemm^it or '*a one world politically organised. "^^^ Marltaln agrees with his colleague, Mortimer Adler, In that '*the only cause of war Is anarcl^." logically, a world government repudiates anarchy; the cause of war Is eliminated; and finally a lasting peace Is established. As the preamble to the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution (1948) reads. The people of the earth having agreed that the advancement of man In spiritual excellence and physical welfare Is the common goal of mankind; that universal peace Is the prerequisite for the pursuit of that goal; that Justice In turn Is the prerequisite of peace, and peace and justice stand or fall together; that Iniquity and war Inseparately spring from the competitive anarchy of the national states; that therefore the age of nations must end, the nations have decided to order their separate sovereignties In one government of Justice, to which they surrender their arms; and to establish, as they do establish, this Constitution as the covenant and fundamental law o£ the Federal Republic of the World. ^^^ 129 The Anatomy of Peace (New Yorkt Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 1 Stan and the State , p. 194, l^hbld., p. 196. 132 G. A. Borgese, op. clt .« pp. v-vl.

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418 Marltaln's reply to the objections to the idea of a world government is that "if the Idea is grounded, as we believe* on true and sound political philosophy, it cannot be in^sslble in itself ." Moreover, he maintains that he is "not much of an idealist" since he is an Aristotelian realist. The idea of a world government is not a "beautiful idea" but "a great idea" and "a sound and right idea, "^33 Maritain distinguishes, in the establishment of a world government, what he calls "the fully political theory" from "the merely governmental theory." The latter is associated with his concepts of state and government, the former is considered in terms of body politic. For him, a world government based upon *:he merely governmental theory "would be wrong and disastrous." The difference of these two theories lies essentially in his distinction between state and body politic. As we have noted, the basic political reality for Maritain is not the state itself. Th«^ state is only a part of body politic which is an organic concept of political society. The body politic is grown out of the moral sense of the people %rfao are organized under just laws and control the state itself. Therefore, it is in the service of men. The root of governing function lies in the body politic, not in the state* The idea that "one body politic is one organized people" does not iiq>ly "a federal unity." It is based upon "a pluralist unity ." The pluralist unity is predicated tspon a world-wide civic friendship (which is not charity) and a %)orld conraon good. As the body politic of one nation is based upon the principle of pluralism, the pluralism of a ^^ ^Man and the State , pp. 200-201.

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419 world government Incites "the particular bodies politic themselvM, vlth their own political structures and lives, their otm national and cultural heritages, their own multifarious Institutions and eoomunltles — all this being enveloped, treasured and held sacred by the same will which would tend, beyond all this, to a world-wide living together, and which would have achieved this ala by the foundation of a world political society." The world society based upon this pluralistic principle o£ the "s«q>ra-natlonal State and the multiplicity of nations" alone can In the long run promote peace, happiness and freeposes, first of all, "a will to live together developed In all the peoples*" This Is what we usually call the develoi»aent of the sense of "world coninunlty." Secondly, "the passage to a one world politically organized can only occur after a long time." This is the same condition In regard to the coming of a Christendom In the remote or Indeterminate future. Marltaln has never failed to eophaslze the fact that our moral condition today Is In a primitive stage and that "mankind is still in a prehistoric age with regard to the application of the Gospel in actual llfe."134 Finally, Marltaln envisages "a kind of world council" in the establishment of a world government. Its main virtue is that it is "endowed with unquestionable moral authority " with which to exercise spiritual responsibility. Thus, its function would be "only a function of ethical and political irlsdom." And the world council "would be made up of the higheat and most experienced authorities in moral and Juridical ^^Ibid., pp. 202, 209, ?10, a2.

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420 sciences." It Is not like the present International Court of Justice, especially in Its moral and political function. The members of the council would be picked from various nations in an equitable proportion and would be directly elected by the people of all nations, among men proposed in advance by nations' respective governments. They would lose their national citisenshlp and be given world citiEenship so that they might be completely free from the control of their respective governments. Maritain thinks that "the idea of such a supren^ advisory council could perhaps have a chance of being accepted by all States and governments." This supreme advisory council would constitute "the foundation of a world community politically organized." Since it is "a senate of wise men," it Is reminiscent of the philosopher-kings in Plato's Republic , if we only remember their differences in the exercise of authority and function. Maritain 's conception of a %K>rld government is vulnerable to criticisms, those criticisms which we usually attach to what we label the "idealist" school in international politics. The tincture of Maritain 's idealism is not a dogmatic iiiq>osition of the theological notions of the Kingdom of God and of charity on international society. As he writes, "Civic friendship will still remain infinitely different from charity. Just as the world society will remain Infinitely different from the Kingdom of God." And he merely insists on "a change in the inner structures of

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421 man's morality and sodality. "^^^ The meaning of Maritain's idea of a world government is found in aoma of what G* A Borgese calls "saven pillars of social and political planning" for a world constitution* Among these seven pillars, Maritain has similarly enq>hasi8ed the democratic character, the primacy of ethics to politics, the ethics of power for the administration of Justice, and the idea of a lasting peace. ''^^ Irving L. Horowitz, in his examination of Maritain's ideas of international society, has coanented that "the main locus of international conflict embodies primarily the struggles within an economic world order, and the joint struggle against a different economic ordering of things." He criticises Maritain for the letter's failure "to go beyond the idea of the State as a political instrument to tha State as representative of the dominant military, political and economic forces" and for "^floundering/ in a sea of metaphysical abstractions."^' If Maritain's conception of a world &>vemment and society lacks elaboration, we must remeniber that, at the outset, he made it clear that he was not going to consider this problem from the point of view of practical details. His lack of elaboration, therefore, does not stem from his blindness to the prescmt realitites of international politics. He is looking at the problem of world ^yvcmment from the standpoint of political philosophy* We also could question, outside the metaphysicians' circle, whether international conflict should be explained primarily in terms of economic causae* ^^^Ibid., pp. 206, 213-16. 136 Op. cit .. pp. 288-300. ^^ ^Qp* cit ., p* 69.

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422 Marltaln's philoBophy of culture has been focused on the Ideal of a new Christendom, which stenned analogically from medieval Christen4oa* His idc» of a world government is one of what Henri Bergson calls "open society" and "dynamic morality," which also have the same qualifications of a Christian order. Unfortunately, Haritain does not allude the hope of a new Christian order to international society. We might cogently ask whether the ideal of a new Christendom is suitable for an international order? In conclusion, idealism on a philosophical plane should not be rejected as something useless as many of us tend to believe* "The connonwealth of man"^^ is an ideal which, Haritain himself confesses, may be "the old temptation of philosophers."'^^ Ideal, however, is not an illusion but a goal we can strive for apart from our realization of the present realities of power politics and national interest. What we seem to need is a vision with which to see the future rather than our immediate "cash-value." As Hannah Arendt says, "even if all criticism of Plato is right Plato may still be better company than his critics. "^^" The Relation of Church and State One of the most persisting problems of Western civilization is undoubtedly the proper relation between religion and culture. Sven before the rise of the modem state system and the schism in Christianity 138 This is the title of a work by Frederick L. Schuman, The Commonwealth of Man (Hew York: Alfred N. Knopf, 1952). 139 Man and the State , p. 216. 140 Between Past and Future; Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking Press, 1961), pp. 275-76.

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423 lta«lf, there not only persisted a power struggle between the religious «nd the secular orders but also, as Joachim Wach writes, ''Internally, the Ourlstlan cooiBunlty was frequently torn by struggles and discussions over Issues of doctrine, cult, and organlsatlon."^^^ We find an ebb and flow In the power struggle between the religious and the secular orders* The Gelaslan theory, tha Gregorian theory, the doctrine of Hlldebrand, Boniface VIII' s Onaa sanctam (1302), the divine right of kings, etc* are all romlnlscent of this power struggle In the past* With the development of the modem state systea and the rise of Protestant Reformation, the separation of church and state Is an established political doctrine and the guarantee of religious freedom has becoaa a constitutional Issue* As Jenwa G* Kerwla writes* "The problsm of the relationship between Church and State haa occupied aa*a minds for centuries* With the datm of the Christian era, the emphasis of Christianity on the dignity and worth of the individual, and on the prljsary allegiance of man to God rather than to any human agency, immediately posed the problem of the relationship of man's supernatural allegiance and his functions and duties in a man-made sodety*"''^^ This controversy continues to our day* Aa Kerwin says, "'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's snd to God the things that are God's' bacaas for Christianity a guiding 141 Sociology of Religion , p. 327. 1A9 Catholic Viewpoint on Church and State (Garden City, N. Y.i Hanover House, 1960), p. 7. Among numerous writings on the relation between church and state, see especially Frank Gavin, Seven Centuries of the Problem of Church and State (Princeton! Princeton University Press, 1938) and Albert Hyma, Christianity and Politics; A History of the Principles and StruiMtles of Church and State (Philadelphia: J, B* Lippincott, 1938).

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424 principle of the new dlspensatlon."^^^ However, we must add that this Is subject to various Interpretations. Loren P. Beth captures the core of this problem when he says: "The conflicts between church and state through history have seldom been based on the assumption that each did not have a separate sphere of legltitaate action, but have Instead turned on the questions of where the botmdarles shall be and of %A)o shall decide disputes arising which concern both; 1. e., who shall draw the boundaries. Merely to assart a doctrine of s^aratlon does not answer these questions. "^^ Theocracy and caesaropaplsm are the things of the pasty as philosophy has ceased to be solely the handmaid of theology. And at the same time many would also argue that total s^aratlon of church and state Is as much undesirable as Inqwsslble. Thus, the problem Is to find a fonmila for peaceful coexistence. This section Is not Intonded to be a discussion on the whole problem of church and state. Such a discussion Is not only Impossible In a short span of time but also unnecessary. But a few things must be clarified before we plunge Into Marltaln's exposition concerning the relation between church and state. In our discussion. It seems quite Important to distinguish the two aspects of the Church, on the one hand, and to distinguish the theory from the practice of separation, on the other. And these two things are not totally unrelated. The Church, when It Is used In a theological discourse, has the meaning of being a st^ematural society that transcends the world and history; the second meaning of the Church Is that It la an Institution In time and space. Op. clt .» p. 15. The American Theory of Church and State (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958), p. 136.

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425 Firom a point of view of practical politics, the Church as an institution in tiate and space would, of course, be more inqMrtant than the Church that is regarded as a stqpematural order. The distinction between the theory and the practice of separation sesws to be of cardinal significance in discussing any theologian's position. What Maritain says here on a theoretical plane should not be confused with the practice of the Boiaan Catholic Church as an institution in space and time. We always find sooM discrepansies betwaea theory and practice. Frank Gavin pinpoints this matter when he sayst "In the vbole problem of the relations between Church and State there are two fundamental poles: First and foremost is the theological issue, and dqpending upon what you think the Church is will be the Church's attitude toward the State; the other pole is the practical and historical exigency, and again and again in human history men have had to make coiqpromlses, sacrificing principle in order to provide opportunity for the necessary minimum fulfilm«it of so much as can be salvaged from a situation theoretically impossible •"''^^ We cannot criticise Maritain' s theoretical position from the ill-practices of the Soman Catholic Church, provided that we find some ill-practices. We oust consider his conception of the relation of church to state on its ova merit and/or demerit, unless he himself refers to the practices of the Church itself. Moreover, we must avoid a tendency to dichotomize Protestant and Catholic on the relation between church and state. True as it may be that Protestant countries like the United States have lived up more faithfully than have Catholic countries to the principle of s^aration, 145 Op. cit .. p. V.

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426 this is not always the case. The case of the sixteenth century shows the best exaiiq>le. As J. W. Allen writes. The line of main division between those In the sixteenth century who thought of the State In terms of relation, was between those who identified or tended to Identify Church and CcMoaonwealth and those who practically separated the two* Alaost all those who conceived of the Church as a body governing Itself by Its own organs •part from the State, held that the Church should have a controlling direction of all secular policy. On the oth^r hand, those who regarded Church and Commonwealth as but two aspects of one thing, necessarily placed control of the Church In the hands of the civil magistrate. The controversy between the eiqMnents of these two views Is the sixteenth: century form of the medieval controversy as to the relation between Pope and En^eror. All through the century the main division o£ opinion in the Middle Ages was reproduced. That division corresDonded In no way to the division between Catholic and Protestant.*^ Jacques Marltain makes it clear, to begin with, that the term "the Church" is used in "the Catholic concept of the Church." Therefore, his argumentation on the problems of church and state is related to other churches "only in an indirect and qualified manner," if at all. Moreover, he states that he will discuss these problems as a Christian philosopher , not as a theologian , ^^^ The term "s^aration of church and state" has a definite meaning in political theory. When Thomas Jefferson spoke of "a wall of separation between Church and State," he meant constitutional guarantee for no established church and the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Therefore, the doctrine of s^aration of church and state is predicated upon the siqtpositlon that there is a d(»ialn which belongs only to the churches and an autonomous domain which belongs to the A History of Political Thouaht in the Sixteenth Century (Hew York: Barnes and Noble, 1960), p. 11. 147 Man and the State , p. 147.

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427 state. This Is the political and legal expression of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Marltaln does not use the eiq>res8lon "separation of church and state," because It Is rather "a misleading expression." Instead, he uses the expression "the principle of cooperation" between church and state.. This seoes to be due to his European background. Harltaln understands the American doctrine of separation of church and state to mean "a refusal to grant any privilege to one religious denomination In preference to others and to have a State established religion, a distinction between the State and the Churches which Is coo^Mtlble with good feeling and mutual cooperation." Although there may be a "sharp distinction," there Is "actual cooperation" at the sasie time. His "principle of cooperation" Is, needless to say, essentially the American doctrine of serration of church and state. He seems to be more appreciative of the American practice than the European one when he says of the formers "Sharp distinction and actual cooperation, that's an historical treasure, the value of which a European Is perhaps more prepared to appreciate, because of his own bitter experience."'-^ As Jerome G. Kerwln explains the Catholic theories on church and state. It should be pointed out as obvious that no Catholic could accept the union of church and state which would blur the distinction between the two. The Catholic also rejects the principle of modem positivism that akes eyery act of the state legal because It Is enacted by the state --a doctrine that sets aside divine or natural law as a standard by which all political acts must be measured. The Catholic also refuses to accept any idea of separation of church and state which sets off each in an isolated compartment, each part having no relationship in co-operating for the connon ^ ^Ibid . . pp. 182-83.

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428 good. The Church cannot Ignore men's ceoq>oral needs. The Oiurch has a vital concern In whether a man receives a living wage, whether he lives in decent housing, whether his treatment is fair, humane, and Just under the law. Man must eat in order to pray. To set off the two spheres, tsnporal and spiritual, in an artificial manner is wrong in theory and isqMssible of realisation. The state will either be friendly to religion or hostile — there is no middle ground. The Catholic also rejects the idea that religion is the expression of a national spirit and that it is English, French, German, or Spanish. As has been said, the Church's intent is not primarily in the polls but in the cosmopolis . ^^^ Maritain*8 position on the problems of church and state is closely related to his philosophy of culture and history. As we have already seen, there is, for him, an ioqwrtant distinction between religion and culture as theology and as philosopl^. But they are not separated . Therefore, he has objected both to separatism «^ich isolates culture from religion and to "theological liberalion" which identifies religion with culture. This position has been most clearly shown in his philosophy of a new Christendom. For Maritain, the hope of a new Christendom has become a political "myth," since it is essentially a political task. A discussion of Maritain' s conc^tion of the probleoui of church and state involves essentially a restateaent of his philosophy of a new Christian order. The idea of the republica Christiana of the Middle Ages is not dogmatically imposed upon the creation of a new Christian order. Instead, its principles are applied only analogically ; and this new order is a myth that aims at "the very unity of the human person, slmultsneously a member of the body politic and of the Church. . . .** Op. cit .. p. 83.

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429 It is « secular order only evangelically Inspired by Christianity* The hope o£ a new Christendom may be materialized only through the psychological transformation of the individual mind. "The unity of religion is not a prerequisite for political unity*"^^^ It is a political society vfaere the believers and the unbelievers can coexist side by side. This is the reason why we must understand the real value of Maritain's philosophical conc^t of analogy . In order to understand the notion of analogy in the problems of church and state, we must first of all discuss what Haritain calls "the general ianutable principles." There are three general principles* The first one is "the law of the primacy of the spiritual ."^^*' As a consequence of this principle, we must recognise the fact that the Church is superior to the body politic or the state. '-^^ For Maritaln, there is no question that the human person is infinitely superior to the body politic as the svqpematural aid is a higher end than the natural end. The end of the hisnan person transcends the body politic and is above "the cotnnon good of what might be called civilization as a whole." The natural end of civilisation and the intrinsic comaon good of the universe are not the absolute end; they are indirectly ordinated to the supernatural end. This is the law of Slan and the State , p. 160. ^^ ^Ibid .. p. 150. See his Things That Are Wot Caesar's and Joseph Lecler, The Two Sovereifflties i A Study of the Relationship Between Church and State , tr. Hugh Montgomery (London: Bums, Gates and Washbourne, 1952), chapter iv. The Primacy of the Spiritual: Its Practical E:q>res8ion Throughout the Ages*" pp. 50-84. ^^ \an and the State , pp. 148, 150, 151-52, 153, 154, 156, 157-59, 167-68, 171.

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430 the supremacy o£ the spiritual or the human person* Although the Church Is "In the body politic," for Marltaln, there Is an order of values: the eternal life is higher than the order of tenqwral life, that Is, the body politic. The second general principle is "the freedom of the Church to teach and preach and worship, the freedom of the Gospel, the freedom of the word of God." From the standpoint of the unbelievers, the Church is an association of the faithful. For Maritain, the right of freedom of association is the most basic and inallaoable of all human rights. However, for the believers, the Church is a supernatural society which leads them to a supernatural life. In short, there must be the freedom and independence of the Church without Interference from the body politic. Moreover, for Maritain, an absolute division between the Church and the body politic is like cutting the human person into two. Thus, the third general principle is "the necessary cooperation between the Church and the body politic or the State." This third general Imtmitable principle is highly Important in Maritain* s conc^tion of the problems of church and state. These general principles are Inmutable; however, the ways of applying and realizing them are only analogical to any given historical era. That is to say, the application of these inmutable princJ4>le8 "takes various typical forms in reference to the historical climates or historical constellations through which the development of mankind is passing. . . ." The historical climates are the existential conditions of the social, political, juridical^ moral and ideological characteristics of the human community at a given time. Maritain characterizes the historical climate of the Middle Ages as "a sacral

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431 age»" It was sacral because the pover of the Church was superior to that of the prince; the tenporal power was merely an instrtBD«it to realise the spiritual aiaa of the Church* The second historical climate is "the baroque age" which is represented by post-medieval centuries* In this age, although "the tenets of sacral civilization were more or less preserved," the notion of state-religion came to the fore* The third historical climate, for Haritain, is represented by the modem age which "is not a sacral, but a secular age." In this secular age, for the first time in Western history the order of ten^ral life itself "has gained complete differentiation and full autonomy." Therefore the modem secular age is different from the sacral Middle Ages in that its political power is no longer the spiritual arms of the Church and in that the equality of all the members of the state is recognised regardless of their religious affiliation — whether they are believers or imbelievers. The ideal of a new (Siristendom must take into accomit these considerations. If this new order is to be realised, it will be "a body politic Christianly inspired." Since this Christianly inspired political society is a moral society, it still "could and should never endorse or approve any way of conduct contrary to Natural Law." The object of law is always to make men morally good*'-^^ Now we shall examine the specific provisions of what Haritain calls the principle of the necessary cooperation betweoi the Church and the body politic* "The things that are Caesar's are not only distinct from the things that are God's; but they must cooperate with them*"^^ ^53ibid., pp. 167-68, 171* 15A Loren P. Beth enumerates eight pure categories of the relationship betwe«i church and state) (1) pure theocracy, (2) total

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432 Pbr Maritaln the principle of cooperation has three loq>llcatlons: the moat general and Indirect form of mutual assistance, the public acknowledgtnent of the existence of God, and the specific forms of mutual assistance. The first category of cooperation in^lies the Idea that the body politic can assist the Church If It fulfills Its own duties and muIs In accordance with the principles of natural law* To fulfill the demands of justice Is the first and necessary contribution of the body politic to the spiritual Interests of the Church Itself. The second category is rather self-evident. However, Maritaln does not imply by any means that RomiKi Catholicism is to be recognized pub Ilea lly. He would prefer that the public expression of a common faith would be of a form of Christian confession. But the other religious confessions are not excluded here: "the other religious confessions institutionally recognized would also take part in this public e3q;>re88ion«'* In the third category of the specific forms of cooperation, Maritaln explains more details of the problems of church and state. He makes it clear that the spiritual mission of the Church rather than the political power or privileges of its members (1. e., the clergy) must be helped. He writes, "a social or political discrljaination in favor of the Church, or the granting of juridical privileges to her ministers or to her faithful, would be precisely of a nature to jeopardize, rather than to help, this spiritual mission." However, Maritaln considers the exeoq>tion of the clergy from military obligations, not as a social separation, (3) mixed theocracy, (4) total identification, (5) total conflict, (6) Erastianism, (7) totalitarianism and (8) partial separation. He chooses "partial s^aration" as the realistic relationship between church and state for the modem condition. Op, cit .» pp. 124-25.

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433 privilege, but aaerely as the recognition of the fact that the clergy have a God-givot peaceful mission in the human community. For Maritain* the idea that the body politic oust not encroach upon the matters of religion does not iiq»ly that it is without authority for '*the exercise of justice and the enforcement of law.'* It only means that the state cannot "impose any faith whatsoever tqwn, or expel any faith whatsoever from, the inner domain of conscience*" The civil power can even "request the prayers of the religious coonunities historically rooted in the life of the people" and should grant "institutional recognition to those religious coomunities — as well as to all associations, religious or secular, educational, scientific, or devoted to social service, «ihose activity is of major iiqtortance for the cocmon welfare -in contradistinction to other religious groins or secular associations «rtiich «iJoy freedom but not institutional recognition*** Horeover, the state can exercise its authority to dissolve any religious sect which is destrtsctive to its common life. Although the body politic '*would recognize the juridical personality of the Church as well as her spiritual authority in ruling her members in her spiritual realm, and it would deal with her as a perfect and perfectly ind^>endent society," the Christian faithful are the citizens of the state. As such. Christian citisens "are no more legally privileged than any other citiswis." In short, the body politic must guarantee and recognize the full freedom of the Church and insure its full liberty and exercise of spiritual mission as well as the rights of the human person. For Maritain, more positively speaking, the principle of cooperation or assistance is "a two-way traffic," not a one-way notion: the Church may be asked to help accooiplish the coosMn good of the body politic, on

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434 the one hand and the latter may help the former in the fulflllm&it of Its spiritual mission, on the other. ^^^ It seesw that, for Marltaln, the United States is the best embodiment of his principle of necessary cooperation between the Church and the body politic. As the American Declaration of Ind^endence is best in accord with his conception of natural law and natural rights, the Constitution of the United States is the best expression of the principle of necessary cooperation betwe^i church and state. Although Maritaln does not ignore the rationalist influoice of the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment, "the Constitution of this country is de^-rooted in the age-old heritage of Christian thought and clTllization." This Constitution can be described as "an outstanding lay Christian document tinged with the philosophy of the day. The spirit and inspiration of this great political Christian document is basically repugnant to the idea of making human society stand aloof from God and from any religious faith. "^56 ^^ ^an and the State , pp. 171, 172, 173, 173b, 174, 175, 178. Ijoren P. Beth describes the revolutionary American mind as "a rationalistic view of human nature: morality derives from the nature of humanity, not from specific religious beliefs. . . . From this it followed that the religious beliefs of any individual make no difference to social morality. . . . They «rere personal affairs between God and man." And this rationalistic belief in a natural religion and a natural law is "divorced from the medieval natural law connected with the divine law." Indeed, it is a secularized belief. Thus, the Founding Fathers, although not irreligious, "were likely to be ant 1clerical, anti-ecclesiastical, anti-scriptural, anti-authoritarian." Op. cit .. pp. 66-72. Gornttlla Geer Le Bourtilller considers the American theory of natural law as enq[>irical, non-metaphysical and nontranscendental in American Democracy and Natural Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), especially chapter ill, "Natural Law in America," pp. 109-53. Therefore, according to Beth and Le Bourtilller, the Founding Fathers are closer to the philosophy of the Enlightenment than to the Christian tradition. Otto Gierke did not extend his research of natural law to the

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435 Marltaln Is a Roman Catholic thinker, and he makes a few remarks in defense of the Roman Catholic Church especially against the accusation that it is an "authoritarian Church. "^^^ He denies that the Church's exercise of authority on its faithful is fostering authoritarian trends in political life. He believes that this accusation comes essentially from lack of a theological and historical insight. First of all, the lack of historical insight implies the fact that the critics of Catholicism "do not grasp the significance of the diversity of historical climates which in past times made the authority of the Church over the State — and now make the nutual freedom of the State and the Church — requisites of the coianon good of civilization." Secondly, these critics are lacking theological insight in that they do not realise the fact that the authority of the Church is merely the American Revolution. But Ernest Barker tells us that "in the Puritan atmosphere of North America the secular Law of Nature recovers its theological basis." "Introduction," Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800 , p. xlvll. There is no doubt, as Carl L. Becker and Le Bourtilller say, that natural law concept was accepted as a conax>nplace at the time of the An»rican Revolution. However, Carl L. Becker believes that "the eighteenth century did not abandon the old effort to share in the mind of God," The Declaration of Independence; A Study in the History of Political Ideas (Hew York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 39. Moreover, Becker, in The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers , has attempted to prove that "the Philosophes A>f the eighteenth century or the Enlightenment^ were nearer the Middle Ages, less eoMKiclpated from the preconceptions of medieval Christian thought, than they quite realized or we have commonly supposed" (p. 29). ^^'One of the most severe attacks on this matter is found in Paul Blanshard, American Freedom and Catholic Power (2d ed, ; Boston: Beacon Press, 1958). Marltaln dismisses Blanshard 's book "because it is simply unfair . . . /in ttsj criticisms ^hlch7> instead of clarifying matters, are constantly vitiated by biased and devious Interpretation, and which confuse all issues in a slandering manner, up to ascribing to the Catholic Church 'a full-blown system of fetishism and sorcery'." Man and the State , p. 184. James M. O'Neill may balance Paul Blanshard in Catholicism and American Freedom (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952).

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A36 eiqpresslon of its bondage to God and Ics spiritual miasion and, thus* its organization is essentially contrasted with the organization of political society* The authority of the Church originating from above downwards is only due to the fact that "the Pope in the Church is the Vicar of Christ." However, the foundation of political society from below upwards is precisely due to the fact that "the rulers in political society are the vicars of the people." Moreover, for Maritain, "no govemmaat is less authoritarian than the government of the Catholic Church." The Church has no police force or physical coercion: it is only responsible for the spiritual connon good of the people. In addition, '*The bishops are not to the Pope as generals to a chief of supreme headqtiarters, or as civil servants to the central administration." Maritain maintains that the Church, by preaching the Gospel and the liberties of the spirit, "has taught men freedom." "The cause of freedom and the cause of the Church are one in the defense of man." Maritain, in his discussion concerning the problems of church and state, recognizes without any doubt the primacy of spirituality of the human person and, thus, champions the freedom of the Church* The principle of the necessary cooperation between church and state, as he sees it, is essentially the expression of the Constitution of the United States or the American doctrine of separation of church and state, which represents "a sharp distinction and actual cooperation." Maritain*s realistic recognition of the fact that the modem age is a secular age, coupled with his idea concerning the relation betwecm religion and political society, would produce, as we have seen, immense consequences in his political philosophy -particularly in his approach

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437 to the problems of church and state. Jacques Marltaln, like John Courtney Murray » i« seeking to acconraodate his Catholic thinking and principles to daaocratic ideas* He often quotes Cardinal Manning's rq;>ly to Gladstone: "If Catholics were in power tomorrow in England, not a penal law would be proposed, not the shadow of a constraint put upon the faith of any aan. We would that all aen fully believed the truth; but a forced faith is a hypocrisy hateful to God and nuui* ... If the Catholics were tooorrow the 'Imperial race* in these kingdosw they would not use political power to molest the divided and hereditary religious state of the people. We would not shut one of their Churches, or Colleges, or Schools. They would hove the saae liberties we enjoy as a minority. "^^ From a practical point of view, the problems of cimrch and state, as Loren P. Beth has suggested, appear to be oiore subtle than the mere assertion of the doctrine of sQ»aration of church and state. The subtle problems seem to be the twilight sone created by religious and political issues and the authority to decide who should control this twilight zone itself. For Maritain, there would be no problem if both the Church and the body politic come to an agreement as to whether a particular problem is religious or political. In case of conflict between church and state, Loren P. Beth suggests that "Modem Roman Catholic political theory seems to assert the right of the church as the divine agent of God on earth to make the decision. "^^ Generelisation is always a risky venture; Loren P. Beth must exclude st least Maritain in his ststement. ^ton and the State , pp. 181, 184, 185-86, 187. 159. Op. cit «« p. 136.

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438 When the principle of cooperation, as Marltaln suggests, loses Its effect In certain circumstances. It seems that there Is no realistic solution except mutual restraints ; where the principle of cooperation falls, there Is no recourse but imitual restraints or, more positively speaking, compromises* Marltaln has completely rejected the idea that the hierarchic authority of the Church would have any ii^>act upon the working of political society and suggested, at the ssoe time, that the Church, by preaching the liberties of the spirit, has taught men freedom* These two aspects seen rather contradictory* The first seems to claim that we cannot translate what Is on the religious plane into the political, on the one hand and the second maintains that spiritual freedom can be translated into political freedom, on the other*''^^ As a statement of fact, even in the modern age. Protestantism seems more congenial to the nourishment of democratic ideas (including political freedom) than does Roman Catholicism — not to mention the past* Theodore M* Greene points out the fact that the doctrine of the papal infallibility is a form of author itarlanism.^^^ To be sure, this rejects only that part of Marltaln' s defense for the Catholic Church which seems to equate the cause of the Judith S. Shklar seems to dismiss the correlation between a theological notion and its political iiiq>llcatlon when she says: ". * . religious toleration is not easily translated into social or political tolerance, and the effect of religious doctrine and policy on subsequent secular behavior is remote in this, as in all other, cases* This of course is the stwob ling-block of social theology." After Utopia , p. 191. This kind of conclusion is plausible when one looks at the problem from a practical point of view. However, from a theoretical point of view, there is an intimate relation between one's theological attitude and his political views. Libera lifmt Its Theory and Practice pp. 66-67.

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439 Catholic Church with political freedom. The democratic character of Marltain't approach renaios none the leas intact. As it has been suggested earlier, the practice of the Roman Catholic Qiurch and Naritain's theory are two entirely differ«it things. For Maritain, church and state must be driven "not as a tandem but in doid>le harness. "^^^ It must be cautioned, furthermore, that the religious factor alone does not seen to be capable of explaining the success or failure of modem democracies. A mono-causal explanation, tifalch seesw to be a perennial human tendency, is not only too siiq>lified a view, but also an aberration of the coa