Citation
C. G. Jung's theory of the collective unconscious

Material Information

Title:
C. G. Jung's theory of the collective unconscious a rational reconstruction
Creator:
Shelburne, Walter Avory, 1946-
Place of Publication:
Gainesville, Fla.
Publisher:
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
1976
Language:
English
Physical Description:
viii, 206 leaves : ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Archetypes ( jstor )
Collective unconscious ( jstor )
Jungian psychology ( jstor )
Medical treatment ( jstor )
Metaphysics ( jstor )
Mystics ( jstor )
Philosophical psychology ( jstor )
Psychology ( jstor )
Psychology of religion ( jstor )
Unconscious mind ( jstor )
Dissertations, Academic -- Philosophy -- UF
Philosophy thesis Ph. D
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 203-205.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Walter Avory Shelburne.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
Copyright [name of dissertation author]. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Resource Identifier:
025516279 ( AlephBibNum )
02998059 ( OCLC )
AAU0158 ( NOTIS )

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:


Full Text









C.G. JUNG'S THEORY OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS:
A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION











By

WALTER AVORY SHELBURI.E













A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FUIFILJMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY










UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1976














































UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


3 1262 08666 238 3









































Copyright 1976

by
It-halter Avory Shelburne














ACKNOWLEDGMKTS


I would like to gratefully acknowledge the persons of my supervisory

committee for their help in this project: labrilyn ameig, Tom Auxter,

Franz Epting, RLchard Haynes and Tom Simon. Special thanks to Iarilyn

and Tom Simon for their time, encouragement and helpful criticism. I

would also like to thank Debbie Bouers of the Graduate School, who, in

addition to her technical advice, has through her friendliness contri-

buted in an immeasurable and intangible way to the final preparation of

this manuscript.

In addition to this personal assistance, I would also like to acknou-

ledge the help of the following agencies: the spirit of Carl Gustav Jung,

the Archetype of the Self, and the three luminous beings who cleansed my

spirit.














TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page
ACIKOLEDGIMETS..................................................... ill

ABSTRACT.......... ......................... ................... .... vi

TRODUCTION.o ..... ..... ................ ................... .o... 1

CHAPTER 1 JMIG'S RENTAL CONSTRUCTS ................................. 3

Psyche................................................... 3

Unconscious........................ ...... ......*.......** 16

Collective Unconscious.................................... 19

Notes........ o ........... ............... ........ ..... 28

CHAPTER 2 THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART I........................... 30

Introduction ............... ............................... 30

The Symbolic Nature of the Archetypes................... 43

Archetypes and Instincts............................... 47

Notes .............. ............................. ..... 53

CHAPTER 3 THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART II.......................... 54

The Origin of the Archetypes............................. 54

Archetypal Image and Archetype Per Se.................... 63

The Archetypes as Autonomous Factors..................... 72

Archetypes and Synchronicity ............................. 77

Archetypes and Tbhporality............................... 82

Notes .................................... ............. 85






Page
CHAPTER I CRITICISIIS OF THE ARCIHETYPAL THEORY:
GEHERAL COINSIDERATIONS............................ .... 89

Preliminary Remarks ....................................... 89

Psychoanalytic Criticism......... ........ ................ 9

Theological Criticism....................................102

Notes... ....................................... ..... .....111

CHAPTER JUNIG AND THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE: PART I................. 116

The Relevance of the Question............................116

The Charge of Iyrsticism.................................. 117

Itysticism Characterized................................. 119

Is Jung a Ny-stic? .......................................... 120

Jung's Attitude Toward Science............................. 127

Notes........ ....................... ... ... ......... ..141.

CHAPTER 6 JUIIG AMD THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE: PART II................16

Can There Be A Science of Archetypes?.....................146

Jung's Ibthodology. ......................................163

Ibtes........ ........... ..................... .......... 171

CHAPTER 7 THE STUDY OF ARCHETYPES AS A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE........ 174

Introduction..... ........................................ 17

Falsifiability ......................................... 176

Explanation..............................................184

Dvidence................................................. 188

Archetypes and BEolution Theory....................... 196

Loes........ ........................... * ..... ............ 199

BEFEREICES...................................................... 203

BIOGIAPHICAL SKETCH........................................206











Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida in Partial flfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


C.G. JUNGIS THEORY OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS:
A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

By
Walter Avory Shelburne

June 1976
Chairman: !brilyn Zreig
Major Department: Philosophy

This study is an examination of Jung's idea of the collective un-

conscious being primarily concerned with the chief aspect of the collec-

tive unconscious, the concept of the archetype.

In the first half of the dissertation, an attempt is made to

understand what Jung means by the archetypes. The exposition of the

theory of archetypes begins with a look at the basic Jungian mental

constructs, psyche and unconscious, and with a sketch of Jung's theory

of mind. Then the various aspects of the idea of the archetype are

discussed treating such topics as the ontological status of the archetype,

the archetypes as a priori conditioners of experience, the symbolic

nature of archetypes, the archetypes and the instincts, the origin of

archetypes, the phenomenology of archetypes, personification of arche-

types, the archetypes and synchronicity and changes in archetypes through

time.

The exposition of the archetypal theory is undertaken with the aim

in mind of showing how the idea of archetypes can be construed as a

plausible scientific theory compatible with standard scientific








understanding. In the second half of the dissertation, we discuss

problematic aspects of our reconstruction from the point of viet of

criticisms which have been brought against the theory. After a

preliminary chapter in which criticisms of a general nature are

discussed, we treat specific problematic aspects involved with under-

standing the archetypal theory as a plausible scientific one. The

rationality of the archetypal theory is discussed in reply to the

accusation that Jung's theory is mystical rather than scientific.

In addition to the question of rationality, we treat the relationship

between the practical and theoretical aspects of the theory in order

to distinguish between a theoretical and therapeutic discourse about

archetypes, with the latter discourse being concerned with personal

meaningful interpretation of archetypal experience and hence often

justifiably employing philosophical and religious terminology. Thus

we attempt to show how the use of such terminology by Jung in dis-

cussions of archetypes does not count against the scientific nature

of theoretical claims about archetypes.

In addition to attempting to show how the archetypal theory is

a rational one and how its relationship to philosophy and religion

does not count against it as a scientific theory, we also examine

how the theory can be understood in the context of general criteria

for scientific theories. In this regard we discuss the problem of

falsification showing how the theory can not be interpreted as com-

patible with all observational states of affairs. VI also discuss

the explanations and predictions which can be expected from the

theory. Finally the evidence for the theory is discussed.

The conclusion is reached that the archetypal theory can satisfy




vili



general scientific criteria and also meet specific criticisms of it

from the scientific point of vieu and that thus the scientific plau-

sibility of the theory should be admitted.













INTRODUCTrON


In this study we attempt a rational reconstruction of Jung's

theory of archetypes with the goal in view of showing that this

theory is a scientifically plausible one. In regard to this task,

some preliminary questions need to be addressed. What is meant

by a rational reconstruction? TIy is the reconstruction undertaken

from a scientific point of view and what is the purpose of showing

that the archetypal theory is scientifically plausible?

So far as the first question is concerned, the idea of a rational

reconstruction is to clarify the meaning and interrelationship of the

basic concepts of a theory so that the theory can be shoum to be con-

sistent and to be a theory with a clearly specified meaning.

In Jung's style of theorizing, clarity and precision of basic

concepts are much less important than fullness of meaning and phe-

nonenologically accurate characterization of events. As a consequence

many of Jung s ideas are as vague and ambiguous as they are fas-

cinating and insightful. However, the purpose of a rational recon-

struction as we understand it is not to oppose the spontaneity and

richness of creativity with a simple desire for order and clarity.

Rather the aim of a rational reconstruction is the transformation

of the untidy richness of creativity into a more directly useable

form. By attempting to clarify the meaning of the archetypal theory

then, we hope to bring about a wider acknowledgement and study of








the theory so as eventually to contribute to its dissemination as a

fruitful conceptual scheme.

However, our reconstruction from the scientific point of view

needs some justification. For a survey of Jungian literature in-

dicates on the whole a tendency to emphasize the therapeutic aspect

of the theory and its immediate personal relevance.rather than its

employment in an attempt to gain scientific knowledge. But unless

the scientific plausibility of the archetypal theory can be established

on firm ground, the personal and therapeutic relevance of the theory

will be undermined. In Jung's terminology, the dilemma of modern

man is that he can no longer simply believe, he must know. The

modern individual's desire for a comprehensive understanding of

the world can thus not be satisfied by views which are incompatible

with scientific understanding.

But if the author must confess that he is attracted to the arche-

typal theory from the standpoint of its personal existential relevance,

it should not be concluded that the archetypal theory is seen only

as a therapeutic tool. For in arguing for scientific plausibility,

we have in mind a more ambitious goal of eventually showing how the

theory can be used to gain theoretical understanding in a wide range

of scientific disciplines. Vb believe that the theory is not only

scientifically plausible, but that it should be accepted and employed

as well. However, this more ambitious aim must await the outcome

of our attempt to argue for scientific plausibility. For a rational

reconstruction of the theory is necessary before its true scientific


merit can be appreciated.













CHAPTER 1
JUNG'S MENTAL CONSTRUICTS



Psyche

Preliminary Remarks

In order to gain a full understanding of Jung's theory of arche-

types, it is necessary to see his views on this matter within the con-

text of his psychology as a whole. However, within the scope of this

study of the archetypes, we can not attempt to trace the relationship

between all of Jung's views and the archetypes. A principle omission

in this regard is Jung's theory of individuation where he attempts to

examine the role which the archetypes play in the development of per-

sonality.

But if -we can not consider all of Jung's views which are related

to the archetypal theory, it is essential to gain an understanding of

his mental constructs. Thus, as a preliminary to discussing the arche-

typal theory itself, we will examine these constructs. Our approach in

this regard will be to begin with the mental constructs of the widest

application. It will consider first then the most general of the Jungian

mentalistic terms, the psyche.

Psyche-Body Relation

Jung emphasizes that his notion of the psyche is not intended to be

a precise notion in the sense that its limits are well defined. "I know

that very many people have difficulties with the word psychologicall'







To put these critics at ease, I should like to add that no one knows

what 'psyche' is, and one knows just as little how far into nature

'psyche' extends. I1

Before attempting a definitive characterization of the psyche then,

we will examine how the concept is used. For if the psyche is a vague

notion, we have, nonetheless, little trouble for the most part with

regard to deciding whether or not to apply it in specific cases.

Since by the psychic Jung has in mind something close in meaning

to mental, one fruitful way to see how Jung uses this concept is to

explore the intended .relation between psyche and body.

nh this regard then, it is clear that by psyche Jung does not

mean to imply a Cartesian dualism in which the psyche would be a

mental substance. For rather than a thing or a substance, the psyche

is to be considered in terms of a system of energy relations. The

term "libido" is used by Jung to designate the psychic energy. This

energetic viewpoint seems to suggest a reductionist position in which

the psyche understood as physical energy was seen as reducible to

physico-chemical terms or else a vitalist position in which a special

type of mind energy was postulated.

The possibility that Jung might be taking a reductive position is

suggested by the fact that the purpose of the energetic standpoint is

to enable the psychologist to understand psychological phenomena in

such terms as entropy, conservation of energy and equilization of

differences in an analogous way to the manner in which physical phe-

nomena can be so understood. Thus Jung believes that the concept of

libido "accomplishes for psychology the same advance that the concept

of energy introduced into physics" (Vol. IV, p. 112).








Th the absence of any methods of exact measurement of the energy,

quantitative estimations can be reached through appeal to the system

of psychological values, as the value intensity of psychological

phenomena idll be held to be a quantitative estimate of the amount of

psychic energy involved (Vol. VIII, p. 9).

However, Jung makes clear that the analogy between physical energy

and psychic energy cannot be taken in too literal a sense:

. in spite of the nonmeasurability of psychic
processes, the perceptible changes effected by
the psyche cannot possibly be understood except
as a phenomenon of energy. This places the
psychologist in a situation which is highly re-
pugnant to the physicist: the psychologist also
talks of energy although he has nothing measurable
to manipulate, besides which the concept of en-
ergy is a strictly defined mathematical quan-
tity which cannot be applied to anything psychic. . .
If psychology nevertheless insists on employing
its oim concept of energy for the purpose of
expressing the activity . of the psyche, it
is not of course being used as a mathematical
formula, but only as its analogy (Vol. VIII, p. 233).

Jung's energetic standpoint is then obviously not an attempt to

bring about a reduction of psychology to psychophysics. Jung in-

sists on the autonomous position of psychology in relation to

other sciences:

Since, unfortunately, we cannot prove scien-
tifically that a relation of equivalence exists
between physical and psychic energy, we have
no alternative except either to drop the ener-
getic viewpoint altogether, or else to postu-
late a special psychic energy--which would be
entirely possible as a hypothetical opera-
tion. Psychology as much as physics may avail
itself of the right to build its own concepts . .
(Vol. VII, p. 15-16).

But this characterization of libido as a "special psychic energy"

would seem to imply a vitalist position. This suspicion seems confirmed







when we read: "From a broader standpoint libido can be understood

as vital energy in general, or as Bergon's elan vital" (Vol. IV, p.

248), and . ie would probably do best to regard the psychic

process simply as a life-process. In this way we enlarge the

narrower concept of psychic energy to a broader one of life-

energy, which includes 'psychic energy' as a specific part" (Vol.

VIII, p. 17).

However, Jung makes clear that "this broader standpoint" is

a hypothetical and problematic one.2 In order to maintain its func-

tional autonomy, psychology must not conflate its concept of psychic

energy with a possible biological concept of vital energy. "I have

therefore suggested that, in view of the psychological use we intend

to make of it, we call our hypothetical life-energy 'libido.' To

this extent I have differentiated it from a concept of universal

energy, so maintaining the right of biology and psychology to form

their own concepts" (Vol. VIII, p. 17). There is also an explicit

disclaimer of the concept of vitalism: "1' shall not be disturbed

if we are met with the cry of vitalism. Ue are as far removed from

any belief in a specific life-force as from any other metaphysical

assertion" (Vol. IV, p. 125).

It see then that in regard to the question of reductionism,

Jung wants to avoid commitment to either reductionism or vitalism.

Jung's stand on this issue can then best be characterized as de

facto antireductionist. Pather,than attempting to defend the a

priori nonreduction of psychological phenomena to physics or chem-

istry, Jung holds to a de facto antireductionism. This nonreduction

as a matter of fact is supportable by the available empirical evidence







and is strictly speaking neutral with respect to the issue of reduc-

tion in principle.

Jung's noncormnital stand on reductionism is characteristic of

his psychology as a whole where he attempts to define his psycholog-

ical constructs in ways which are as free as possible from philoso-

phical controversy. However, this dislike for philosophy frequently

leads to the situation of unclarity with regard to the full implica-

tions of Jung's views. This situation of ambiguity if well e:empli-

fied when we attempt to comprehend what sort of psyche-body relation

Jung has in mind in constructing his psychology. For Jung's non-

commital views on reductionism fail to give us a definite clue as

to his position on the mind-body problem.

However, in regard to this clue, there are indications that

Jung holds to a nondualistic position in which the psyche is seen

as necessarily dependent on the brain, with psyche entailing em-

bodied psyche.

So far as our experience permits of any inference
at all about the nature of the psyche, it shows
the psychic process as a phenomenon dependent on
the nervous system (Vol. VIII, p. 322, 1926).

. the human psyche lives in indissoluble
union with the body (Vol. VIII, p. 114, 1936).

And just as the material of the body that is
ready for life has need of the psyche in order
to be capable of life, so the psyche pre-
supposes the living body in order that its
images may live (Vol. VIII, p. 326, 1926).

But Jung seems to call into question the view that the psyche is

necessarily embodied, thus suggesting a dualistic position. In a

1934 essay we read such statements as the following:







. the psyche's attachment to the brain, i.e.,
its space-time limitation, is no longer as self-
evident and incontrovertible as we have hitherto
been led to believe (Vol. VIII, p. 113).

The hypothetical possibility that the psyche
touches on a form of existence outside space
and time presents a scientific question-mark
that merits serious consideration for a long
time to come (Vol. VIII, p. 414).

[At death] we may establish with reasonable
certainty that an individual consciousness as
it relates to ourselves has come to an end.
But whether this means that the continuity of
the psychic process is also interrupted re-
mains doubtful, since the psyche's attachment
to the brain can be confirmed with far less
certitude today than it could fifty years ago.
Psychology must first digest certain para-
psychological facts, which it has hardly begun
to do yet (Vol. VIII, p. 412).

One way to come to terms with this apparent radical shift in

position is to attempt to distinguish an earlier necessary embodi-

ment view from a later view when, in the last years of his life,

Jung held to the belief in the existence of disembodied psyches. A

consideration of the dates of the above quoted statements, however,

casts doubt on the idea that Jung's position can be neatly divided

into an earlier and later period.3 Although there certainly is a slow

gradual shift away from the necessary embodiment view, the certitude

with which Jung states that the psyche has a necessary connection

with the body is never replaced with another position which Jung

can state in an unhypothetical way and which can easily be integrated

with the rest of his views.

Just as the parapsychological data have to an extent proved to

be anomalies inexplicable in terms of present physical laws, so do

the considerations concerning the related phenomena which caused

Jung to doubt the psyche's necessary connection with the brain prove







to be anomalous with respect to his psychology as a whole. In order

then to understand the place of these anomalous statements in relation

to the totality of what Jung says about the psyche, the sort of

distinction we must bear in mind is that between a well-worked out

and fruitful concept, the notion of the psyche as embodied and de-

pendent on the brain, versus tentative, hypothetical attempts to

see h]ow this view could be expanded, or perhaps revised, in order

to take into account the full range of the parapsychological phe-

nomena.

Although a full discussion of Jung's parapsychological reflec-

tions can not be attempted here, it would seem that the parapsycho-

logical data did not lead Jung to conclude that commitment to a

position of dualism, in the sense that psyche and matter are radi-

cally different types of entities, was necessary. Rather, present

in the latest as well as earlier writings is the view that psyche

and body (matter) are different aspects of a common fundamental

entity.

. it is not only possible but fairly probable,
even, that psyche and matter are two different
aspects of one and the same thing (Vol. VIII,
p. 215, 1946).

This living being appears outwardly as the ma-
terial body, but inwardly as a series of images
of the vital activities taking place within it.
They are tuo sides of the same coin, and we can-
not rid ourselves of the doubt that perhaps
this whole separation of mind and body may
finally prove to be merely a device of reason
for the purpose of conscious discrimination--
an intellectually necessary separation of one
and the same fact into two aspects, to which
we then illegitimately attribute an inde-
pendent existence (Vol. VIII, p. 326, 1926).







That even the psychic world, which is so extra-
ordinarily different from the physical world,
does not have its roots outside the one cosmos
is evident from the undeniable fact that causal
connections enist between the psyche and the
body which point to their underlying unitary
nature (Vol. XIV, p. 538, 1954).

If one is mindlling to postulate a pre-established
harmony of physical and psychic events, then
they can only be in a state of interaction. But
the latter hypothesis requires a psyche that
touches matter at some point, and, conversely,
a matter with a latent psyche, a postulate not
so very far removed from certain formulations
of modern physics (Eddington, Jeans, and others).
In this connection I would remind the reader of
the existence of parapsychic phenomena . .
(Vol. VIII, p. 234, 1946).

In order to understand Jung's theory of mind, it would seem

essential to understand two problematic aspects of Jung's views.

On the one hand, ire need to understand how Jung's essentially dou-

ble aspect approach can be made compatible with acceptance of dis-

embodied psyches. On the other hand, as exemplified in the last

quotations, Jung appears to want to hold simultaneously to a double

aspect theory and an interactionist view.5

Since we cannot attempt a full discussion of the relevant

problems in the philosophy of mind which these problems raise, we

will be content to point out that whereas the double aspect theory

and interactionisa can perhaps be shown to be compatible in principle,

it is clear that the acceptance of disembodied psyches would at least

greatly complicate such an endeavor. For if it can be shown that

psyches can exist independently of bodies, then the essentially

monistic double aspect view would be in great difficulty.

But if we have then good cause to try to construe Jung's views

on the psyche-body relation independently of the statements about







disembodied psyches, we can nonetheless understand houi Jung's views

on this matter can seem at one moment to be dualistic, while in another

instance he appears to hold to a monistic double aspect theory. For

the psyche is to be studied from the standpoint of the empirical data

as if it wore a distinct entity from the body, although this phenomeno-

logical approach does not for Jung entail a substantial dualism. He

can then say both that . we have absolutely no means of dividing

what is psychic from the biological process as such" (Vol. VIII, p.

16), and also that "so far, then, as our present !oiowledge goes,

neuroses are to be influenced or cured by approaching them not from

the proximal end, i.e., from the functioning of the glands, but from

the distal end, i.e., from the psyche, just as if the psyche were

itself a substance" (Vol. XI, p. 329).

The dualistic point of view is then assumed when we view the psyche

as phenomena. UIen we stop to consider what the psyche is essentially

and in its relation to the body, we see that the psyche is in all

probability merely another aspect of the body.

Characterization of the Psyche

Keeping these considerations about the psyche-body relation in

mind, we are now prepared to appreciate Jung's positive characteriza-

tion of the psyche. Moreover, this characterization is to serve as

a criterion of applicability of the term, defining the permissible

range of its use and giving us at least a method in principle of

discriminating the psychic from the nonpsychic. It is to be then

a sort of operational definition. From the point of view of onto-

logical considerations, we can not of course specify a psychic realm

as distinct from and uncontaminated with a nonpsychic realm.








Heuristically though we can mate such a specification in principle

as this specification is to indicate the phenomenological difference

between the psychic and nonpaychic.

Jung says then that "what I would call the psyche proper extends to

all functions which can be brought under the influence of a will" (Vol.

VIII, p. 183). Ibreover, by will is understood a form of disposable

energy (Vol. VIII, pages 182-183).

The sort of working model that emerges from this characteriza-

tion then is a separation of the psyche and the truly psychological

from the instincts and the only physiological in terms of the poss-

ibility of modification or flexibility in the otherwise rigid cr-

namisms of physiological compulsion.

An example of what is meant by the nonpsychic in terms of animal

life is perhaps instructive. For in consideration of the insect

world, there seem to be no exceptions to the rigid physiological

determinism of behavior. An insect is essentially a physiological

automaton. However, as we consider more complex forms of organisms

idth more centralized nervous systems, the hypothesis of the exis-

tence of at least a rudimentary form of consciousness becomes more

probable. WIth the higher mammals the e:dstence of psychological

processes becomes evident. Thus Jung explicitly affirms the eris-

tence of psychic processes in dogs and domestic animals (Vol. VIII,

pages 173 and 189). For Jung then the psyche is not restricted to

man but only finds its greatest development there as the outcome of

a continuous developmental sequence of gradual phylogenetic emergence.

In specifying the relationship between the instincts and the

psyche then, the instincts are conceived to be ectopsychic in origin.









Jung summarizes his argument on this point in the following way:

If we started with the hypothesis that the
psyche is absolutely identical with the state
of being alive, then we should have to accept
the existence of a psychic function even in
unicellular organisms. . .
But if we look upon the appearance of the
psyche as a relatively recent event in evo-
lutionary history, and assume that the psychic
function is a phenomenon accompanying a ner-
vous system which in some way or other has be-
come centralized, then it would be difficult
to believe that the instincts were originally
psychic in nature. And since the connection
of the psyche with the brain is a more probable
conjecture than the psychic nature of life in
general, I regard the characteristic compul-
siveness of instinct as an ectopsychic factor
(Vol. VITI, p. 115).

In stating that instincts are ectopsychic, Jung does not of

course wish to deny a psychological aspect to instinctual pheno-

mena; and thus he wishes to make clear that the instincts can be

considered from two points of view: as they appear in conscious-

ness, their psychic impact, as it were, and as physiological stim-

uli.

Instinct as a ectopsychic factor would play the
role of a stimulus merely, while instinct as a
psychic phenomenon would be an assimilation of
this stimulus to a pre-existent psychic pattern.
A name is needed for this process. I should
term it psychization. Thus, what we call in-
stinct offhand would be a datum already psychized,
but of ectopsychic origin (Vol. VIII, p. 115).

A further clarification of Jung's theoretical model of the

psyche comes into play when this ambiguous interface region between

the psychological and the physiological is explicitly considered. For

the psychological phenomena associated with the disposable energy

of the will are according to Jung's model merely the end of a con-

tinuum with the physiological at one end and the psychic at the other.







-breover, in the middle of this continuum, Jung identifies psychoid

functions which are quasi-psychic yet not merely physiological. In-

stincts are examples of these psychoid phenomena which though not

psychic in the full sense of Jung's designation yet have psychologi-

cal aspects. Jung states then that the term "psychoid" is "meant

to distinguish a category of events from merely vitalistic phenomena

on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on the other"

(Vol. VIII, p. 177).

Since in order to be influenced by the disposable energy of the

will a function or process must be capable of becoming conscious, the

characteristic quality of those functions which are psychoid is their

incapability of reaching full consciousness. The sense in which

Jung sees the instincts as not capable of full consciousness is made

clear in the following way:

%1 speak of "instinctive actions, meaning by
that a mode of behaviour of which neither the
motive nor the aim is fully conscious and which
is prompted only by an obscure inner necessity . .
Thus instinctive action is characterized by an
unconsciousness of the psychological motive be- f
hind it, in contrast to the strictly conscious
processes which are distinguished by the conscious
continuity of their motives (Vol. VIII, p. 130).

Now the positive characterization of the psyche in terms of

functions which can become fully conscious and hence capable of being

influenced by the disposable energy of the will is not fully described

by distinguishing between the psyche and the instincts. For Jung

mal s the point that there is another type of function which limits

the will and which cannot be described as instinctual in the physio-

logical sense. This function is called spiritual. Identical with

the factors which Jung calls the archetypes, the spiritual function








is like instinct a psychoid function incapable of fuf consciousness.6

A full discussion of what Jung means by the spiritual idll be

given in Chapter 3. Here it will suffice to state that for Jung the

compulsiveness associated wirth the nonpsychic realm is due not only

to dynamisms of physiological origin, the instincts; but, in addition

to this lower limit, the psyche has an upper limit where the psychic

functions gradually fall under the influence of spiritual determinants.

"Just as, in its loner reaches, the psyche loses itself in the organic-

material substrate, so in its upper reaches it resolves itself into

a 'spiritual' form about which ie know as little as we do about the

functional basis of instinct" (Vol. VIII, p. 183).

In terms of the continuum model then, there would appear to be

psychoid processes on both sides of the psyche, and the psyche could

be figuratively said to be surrounded by psychoid processes. But

from a phylogenetic point of view, the question now arises why the

spiritual function is said to be 'higher" than the instinctual psy-

choid function, since the psyche appears to have developed out of

the psychoid processes considered as a whole and thus to be "higher"

than it in the sense of having developed later.. The solution to

this enigma seems to be that although the archetypal psychoid pro-

cesses are probably present, at least in rudimentary form, through-

out the animal kingdom, it is only with the development of the more

advanced forms of consciousness that there is a clear separation be-

tween instinctual and spiritual psychoid functions. Ioreover, it

seems to be just this separation which brings about the phenomenon

of consciousness so that "psychic processes seem to be balances of

energy flowing between spirit and instinct" (Vol. VIII, p. 207). +







Nor in this separation of spiritual and instinctual functions,

the instinctual energies seem to be channelled by the spiritual forms.

In a sense the spiritual function is then that which allows the en-

ergies of man to be employed in other than instinctual activities.

This is the sense in which the spiritual function is higher than the

instinctual. From the standpoint of phylogern, however, the desig-

nation of "higher" is misleading since both types of psychoid pro-

cesses are unconscious in relation to the later developing conscious-

ness associated with the psyche. "Spirit and instinct are by nature

autonomous and both limit in equal measure the applied field of the

will" (Vol. VIII, p. 183).


Unconscious
Now it would seem that an understanding of the positive charac-

terization of the psyche in terms of the irll leads to the conclusion

that the psyche is to be conceived as equivalent to consciousness or

awareness in opposition to the psychoid functions, the distinguishing

feature of which is their incapability of full consciousness and hence

relative autonomy from the will (Vol. VIII, p. 184). However, it is

only when we consider the attribution of an unconscious dimension to

the psyche that a full characterization of what Jung intends by his

psyche construct can be accomplished.

In order to resolve this apparent paradox of the existence of an

unconscious psyche then, it is necessary to focus on the meaning Jung

gives to the notion of the unconscious. He says that "since we per-

ceive effects whose origin cannot be found in consciousness, we are

compelled to allow hypothetical contents to the sphere of the non-

conscious, which means presupposing that the origin of those effects







lies in the unconscious precisely because it is not conscious" (Vol.

IV, p. 140). Thus . everything in the personality that is not

contained in the conscious should be found in the unconscious" (Vol.

III, p. 201).

The unconscious understood in this negative iay as the non-

conscious is relatively unproblematic. whateverr is not immediately

present in awareness is said to be unconscious. memories, for ex-

ample, can be said to be unconscious contents which can be brought

into consciousness at ill. Other unconscious contents such as re-

pressed experiences or subliminal perceptions may also be brought

into awareness, although a special effort or technique is needed.

Since the latter are not as easily recoverable to awareness as the

former, they are said to belong to a "deeper level" of the uncon-

scious. The analogy of depth then amounts operationally to a func-

tion of energy. Contents with a certain critical energy stay in

consciousness and lacking it become unconscious. Then contents

which are ordinarily unconscious become charged with energy, they

intrude themselves into conscious awareness and produce a so-called

"lowering of consciousness" with a consequent disruption of conscious

intentionalities.

The boundary or dividing point then between conscious and un-

conscious is an energy threshold. However, this idea that conscious

and unconscious are qualitatively separate should not be understood

to mean that a sort of energy membrane sharply divides conscious from

unconscious contents. For it rather the case that every psychic

content is to some degree unconscious and that consequently the

psyche is both conscious and unconscious at once.







Consequently there is a consciousness in which
unconsciousness predominates, as weIl as a con-
sciousness in which self-consciousness predomi-
nates. This paradox becomes immediately intelli-
gible when we realize that there is no conscious
content which can with absolute certainty be said
to be totally conscious . (Vol. VIII, pages
187-188).

%V must, however, accustom ourselves to the thought
that conscious and unconscious have no clear de-
marcations, the one beginning where the other
leaves off. It is rather the case that the psyche
is a conscious-unconscious whole (Vol. VIII, p. 200).

It becomes clear then how the characterization of the psyche

in terms of the iill allows for an unconscious dimension to the

psyche. For it is only the possibility of an influence by the will

that is necessary to characterize the psychic as distinct from the

psychoid. And although it is this possibility which is the distin-

guishing feature of the psyche, rather than being identical with

consciousness, the psyche is better conceptualized as for the most

part unconscious, with the conscious region being of comparatively

narrow scope.

The idea of the unconscious then adds a dimension of depth to

the notion of the psyche. Th addition to those items of immediate

awareness, there are other contents on the fringes of consciousness

or just below the threshold of awareness. Jung catalogues these

unconscious contents in the following way: . lost memories,

painful ideas that have been repressed (i.e., forgotten on purpose),

subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense-perceptions that

were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and finally, content

that are not yet ripe for consciousness" (Vol. VII, p. 66). . .

Brerything forgotten or repressed or otherwise subliminal that has







been acquired by the individual consciously or unconsciously" (Vol.

XVII, p. 116).

Often these unconscious contents group together to form subliminal

functional units which then become sort of "splinter psyches" or "frag-

mentary personalities" (Vol. VIII, p. 97). These focal points of un-

conscious psychic activity are designated as the complexes. They are

groups of often highly emotionally charged feelings, thoughts and

images which are associated together so that, for instance, an

environmental stimulus which activates the complex results in the

entirety of the associated psychic contents coming into play and

affecting consciousness. This often leads to a response which is out

of proportion to the initiating stimulus. For Jung the ego itself is

merely a complex, "the complex of consciousness" (Vol. XIV, p. 357).

In so far as the meaning of the ego is psycho-
logically nothing but a complex of imaginings
held together and fixed by the coenesthetic im-
pressions, bodilyy feelings . the complex
of the ego may well be set parallel with and com-
pared to the secondary autonomous complex (Vol. II,
p. 601).


Collective Unconscious
V&th the description of these unconscious components to the

psyche then, the concept of the psyche according to Jung's "defini-

tion" of it in terms of the will is complete. However, Jung goes

on to describe the psychoid region of the unconscious which is desig-

nated as a collective unconscious in contrast to the region of the

unconscious in relatively close association to consciousness which

he calls the personal unconscious. "As to the no man's land which

I have called the 'personal unconscious,' it is fairly easy to prove








that its contents correspond exactly to our definition of the psychic.

But--as we define 'psychic'--is there a psychic unconscious that is

not a 'fringe of consciousness' and not personal?" (Vol. VIII, p.

200).

The above quotation should make it clear that although according

to Jung's specification of what the psyche means in the strict sense,

it should be applied only to consciousness and the personal unconscious,

Jung frequently uses the term to include the collective impersonal por-

tions of the unconscious as well. Thus Jung often speaks of a collec-

tive psyche or of an impersonal, objective psyche. Further discussion

on this point of how the collective unconscious can be said to be

psychic on the one hand and not to fit into the definition of the

psyche on the other must wait until further in the exposition. The

crucial distinction involves discriminating between the psychic con-

tents as they appear in consciousness and their postulated but unob-

served determinants which are said to be psychoid rather than psychic.

There is then for Jung an impersonal and collective aspect to

the unconscious in contrast to the personal unconscious described

above. Moreover, this collective unconscious is said to constitute

a deeper stratum of the unconscious than the personal. Whereas for

the personal unconscious the "depth" of a content represents a corres-

ponding lack of energy and hence a greater degree of nonassociation

to the central focus of awareness, the collective unconscious is

"deeper" in the additional sense of being the foundation of the

"upper" layers. Consciousness and the personal unconscious then

represent the individual and personal heterogeneity which develops

through maturation from a common and universal homogeneity.







"Individual consciousness is only the flower and the fruit of a

season, sprung from the perennial rhizome beneath the earth . .

(Vol. V, p. xxiv).

Jung then uses the term "collective" to mean the opposite of

personal or individual. "I have chosen the term 'collective' be-

cause this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal;

in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of be-

haviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all indivi-

duals" (Vol. IX-A, pages 3-4).

Jung argues that since the body may be said to have certain

universal features which form a common basis for the emergence of

individual differences, it would then be reasonable to expect that

the psyche, which is intimately related to the body, would also have

common and universal features: . Just as the human body shows

a common anatomy over and above all racial differences, so, too,

the human psyche possesses a common substratum transcending all

differences in culture and consciousness" (Vol. [IIl, p. 11). "For

just as there is an objective human body and not merely a subjective

and personal one, so also there is an objective psyche with its

specific structures and activities . (Vol. III, p. 267).

The idea of a collective unconscious thus understood as the

common, universal element of the psyche would seem relatively un-

problematic or perhaps even superflous as a concept since no one

would wish to deny that the psyche has foundations in the structure

of the brain which are common to all men. However, the real import

of Jung's theory of a collective unconscious is brought into clarity

when Jung states that the contents of the collective unconscious are








in fact psychic contents which come into awareness but which are not

the direct consequences of the individual's own personal experiences.

. In addition to memories from a long-distant conscious past,

completely new thoughts and creative ideas can also present themselves

from the unconscious--thoughts and ideas that have never been con-
7
scious before." The collective unconscious is then not only the

structural element common to the psyches of all men; it is also the

active source of original psychic contents.

Additional features of Jung's concept of the collective uncon-

scious come to light when we learn that . ego-consciousness

seems to be dependent on two factors: firstly, on the conditions

of the collective, i.e., the social, consciousness; and secondly,

on the archetypes, or dominants, of the collective unconscious.

The latter fall phenomenologically into two categories: instinctual

and archetypal" (Vol. VIII, pages 217-218).

Thus both instincts as well as archetypes characterize the

collective unconscious. Ibreover, there is in addition a concept

of collective consciousness which is to be distinguished from the

collective unconscious. Jung states that by collective consciousness

he has something similar in mind to Freud's idea of the superego

(Vol. LX-A, page 3, note 2). Like the superego, the collective

consciousness is partially conscious and partially unconscious.

It consists of "generally accepted truths" (Vol. VIII, p. 218),

i.e., of beliefs, values and ideals which are supposedly held in

common by members of a community and which serve as a sort of common

ideological basis or cultural idea for the community. The contempor-

ary phenomenon of the so-called counter-culture would then represent







a process of development or change in the collective consciousness

of our time.

The collective consciousness has its ultimate source in the

collective unconscious. For through the influence of the collective

unconscious on individuals, new ideals, ethical and religious sys-

tems, and basic scientific discoveries come into awareness for the

first time. However, the symbolic quality of these images from the

unconscious is eventually lost as the images and ideas are subjected

to the interpretative powers of generations in order to assimilate

them to the existing system of culture. Through this process the

manifestation of the collective unconscious in one pioneer individual

is gradually transformed into the cultural heritage and collective

consciousness of the community. The result is then often the sort

of transition that the religious insight of an individual undergoes

in the change from the teachings of the individual in his lifetime

to the formation of a doctrine of established belief by his later

followers. It is the difference between an original religious ex-

perience and the dogma of an established church. Jung states then

that . we can hardly avoid the conclusion that between collec-

tive consciousness and the collective unconscious there is an almost

unbridgeable gulf over which the subject finds himself suspended"

(Vol. VIII, p. 218).

Jung makes the point that through the process of socialization

and in attempting to adapt to the demands of society we tend to iden-

tify ourselves with the consequent roles which we must play in order

to fit smoothly into the social order. This part of the personality

Jung calls the persona. The word means mask and like a mask the







persona is the person that we pretend to be in order to have a

well-defined niche in the commmity.

I1hen we analyse the persona we strip off the mask,
and discover that what seemed to be individual
is at bottom collective; in other words, that
the persona was only a mask of the collective
psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing
real: it is a compromise between individual
and society as to what a man should appear to
be (Vol. VZI, p. 158).

By "collective psyche" in this context it is clear that the

collective consciousness is meant. However, there are other

passages in which the term "collective psyche" means collective

unconscious. For example:

It is therefore absolutely essential to make
the sharpest possible demarcation between the
personal and the impersonal attributes of the
psyche. This is not to deny the sometimes
very formidable existence of the contents of
collective unconscious, but only to stress that,
as contents of the collective psyche, they are
opposed to and different from the individual
psyche (Vol. VII, p. 94).

"Collective psyche" is then an ambiguous term leaving still to

be specified the amount of unconsciousness that is implied. This

formulation is sometimes preferable when speaking of the conscious-

ness of a group, particularly when there is a strong group identity.

For since the collective consciousness is grounded in the collective

unconscious, there are then correspondences between the institutions

of culture and the related archetypes. The effectiveness of the

community leader, for example, is often a function of his capacity

to fulfil the expectations brought about by the projection of the

archetype of the hero or Old Wise An upon him, and the guiding ideals

of the community remain cohesive factors for the life of that community








only so long as they remain living symbols capable of constellating

the appropriate archetypal configurations. The ambiguous "collective

psyche" is then sometimes the best description of the Zeitgeist of a

people, as it acknowledges the close relationship between the founda-

tions of culture in the collective unconscious and the embodiments

of those foundations in the accepted standards of collective life.

Ibreover, Jung's use of the ambiguous "collective psyche" be-

comes easier to appreciate when it is made clear that for him the

relationship of the personal psyche to the collective unconscious

is closely analogous to the relationship of the individual to society.

"Now, all that I have said here about the influence of society upon

the individual is identically true of the influence of the collec-

tive unconscious upon the individual psyche" (Vol. VII, p. 154).

Therefore the psychology of a community is not basically different

from the psychology of an individual: . The psyche of a

people is only a somewhat more complex structure than the psyche

of an individual" (Vol. X, p. 86).

Collective consciousness and the collective unconscious may then

both be subsumed under collective psyche due to the close relation-

ship between the two and the similAr relationship of the individual

to the collective aspect in each case. The individual has thus both

an inner and an outer relationship to the collective as he must con-

tend with society without and the collective unconscious within.

One point that should be made clear when use is made of the

term "collective psyche" is that Jung does not mean to imply that

a group consciousness exists in the sense of a psychic entity which







exists over and above the psyches of individuals. For the common

aspects of the psyches of a group can be abstractly said to represent

a group psyche without this having to mean that there is something

psychic which persists independently of the individuals involved.

In so far as the similarities rather than the differences between

collective consciousness and collective unconscious are emphasized as

in "collective psyche," questions then arise concerning the existence

of distinct kinds of group psyches. That is, to what extent is the

idea of a collective unconscious meant to be truly transcultural and

to what extent is there intended to be a different collective uncon-

for each distinct community of men?

Evidence can be found in Jung's work to support either of the

tw7o possible positions suggested above. For example, we find: "The

collective unconscious is simply the psychic expression of the iden-

tity of brain structure irrespective of all racial differences" (Vol.

XIII, p. 11). But there are also statements such as the following:

Io doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of
psychic development, where it is still imposs-
ible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic,
Hamitic, or Ibngolian mentality, all human
races have a common collective psyche. But
with the beginning of racial differentiation
essential differences are developed in the
collective psyche as well (Vol. VII, p. 152,
note 8).

InTasmuch as there are differentiations corres-
ponding to race, tribe, and even family, there
is also a collective psyche limited to race,
tribe, and family over and above the "universal"
collective psyche (Vol. VII, p. 275).

The difficulty of understanding is again partly the result of

the problematic interaction of form and content, of the difference

between a common universal structure and its concrete embodiment in







ways which are characteristic of individual cultures. Ibreover, the

word "collective psyche" tends to obscure these differences which

arise from the fact that the collective unconscious is an abstraction,

a theoretically postulated commonality derived from the phenomena of

concrete cultures in which the archetypes exist as actual symbols

and images.

However, this line of explanation is only partially satisfac-

tory in light of the totality of Jung's writings. It seems that

notwithstanding the differences that come about when the common

structure of the psyche is embodied in culturally characteristic

ways, Jung means that the common structure itself is different with

respect to the different ethnic and racial groups. His statements,

for example, about the inapplicability of Indian yoga practises for

the Iestern psyche (Vol. XI, p. 534) and the characteristic quality

of Jewish psychology which might not be appropriate for non-Jewish

peoples (Vol. VII, p. 152, note 8) seem to support this idea.

However, the concept of racial differences in the collective

unconscious seems one of the least defensible of all Jung's ideas on

the unconscious. For notwithstanding the lack of credibility in

the notion that Jewish psychology or Indian yoga are inapplicable to

someone with a Wlstern Christian heritage, it would seem that the

similarities of a universal structure of the psyche would greatly

overshadow any racial differences that might exist in that struc-

ture, just as the bodies of persons of different races and ethnic

groups seem to be of overwhel2dng similarity differing only in very

minor ways.

There are, of course, marked differences in the collective








psyches of distinct. human groups, if by this term is understood the

culturally distinct ways in which the collective unconscious is

developed and expressed. Ihch of what Jung says about the inherent
psychic differences of people of various human groups can be under-

stood in this way without the necessity of postulating significant

racial or ethnic differences in the structure of the collective

unconscious itself.



1 C.Gr. Jung, Collected Works Vols. I-XIX (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977, Vol. VIII, p. 409. Quotations are from the
following editions: Vol. I, Psychiatric Studies. First Edition, 1957;
Vol. II, Eaperrimntal Fesearches, 1973; Vol. III, The Pychoeesis
of Iental disease 960; Vol. IV, Freud and Psychoanalysis, 1961;
Vol. V, Symbols of Transformation First Edition, 1956; Vol. VI,
Psychological Types 1971; Vol. VII, MT EssaysOn Analytical Psy-
cholo Second Edition, 1966; Vol. VIII, The Structure and Iynamics
of the Psych Second edition, 1969; Vol. IX, Part I, The Archetypes
and the Collective hUnconscious, Second Edition, 1968 (hereafter cited
as Vol. I-A.); Vol. IF, Part II, Aion. Second Edition, 1968 (hereafter
cited as Vol. -I-3); Vol. X, Civilization in Transition, First Edition,
1964; Vol. XI, Psychology and Peligion: 'bst and East Second Edition,
1969; Vol. XII, Psychology and Alchem Second Edition, 1968; Vol. XIII,
1968; Vol. 'IV, ITrsterium Coniunctionis, First Edition, 1963; Vol. XT,
The Spirit in ian a, and Literature 1966; Vol. VI, The Practise
of Psychothera ., Second5%ition, 1966; Vol. XVII, The IS oen
rsonality, 195h; Vol. XVIII, Iascellary; Vol. X Bibliograpl and
Index. Hereafter cited by volume number.
2 It is not in the passage where he speaks of Bergson that this
is made clear but in the essay "On Psychic Thergy," Vol. VIII, pages
3-66 where the implications of the libido theory with respect to the
problem of the mind-body relation are discussed in detail. Unfor-
tunately this seems to be characteristic of Jung's style. Mi.sunder-
standings are produced by a causal or parenthetical comment which
then require many lengthy passages or even whole essays to correct.

3 In determining the chronology of Jung's writings the volume
number of the collected works is not a reliable indicator. The
collected works are grouped by subject matter, and while this serves
as a rough guide to different periods of Jung's work, some of the
early and middle writings appear in the last volumes.







4
T's will consider anomalous facts with respect to a given theory
to be ones which fail to be explained by the theory and which after a
protracted period of such failure lead either to the ad hoc revision
of the theory or to emergence of a new more comprehensive theory which
will be able to encompass their explanation in a context which pre-
serves previously explained data. The sense of anomaly is that used
by T.H. Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
Statements about the disembodied psyche then have this anoma-
lous relationship to Jung's established theory. This becomes evident
when efforts are made to see how the statements can be made consistent
with the established theory.

5 By dual aspect theory is meant the view that mental and phys-
ical are different aspects of some third entity which is itself neither
mental nor physical. Interactionism is the view that mental events can
cause physical events and vice versa.
6 Strictly speaking the archetypes are completely incapable of
being made conscious in the sense that dwat appears in consciousness
is never the archetype per se but only an archetypal image. This
distinction between the archetype per se and the archetypal image
will be fully discussed in Chapter 3.

7 C.G. Jung, editor, Ifa d ag mbols (Iew York: Dell, 1968),
p. 25. Hereafter cited as %an and His Smbols.














CHAPTER 2
THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART I



Introduction


Preliminary Remarks

Our discussion of the notion of a collective unconscious serves

as an introduction to the main concern of this study, the concept

of the archetype. For in addition to the instincts, the collective

-unconscious is said to contain archetypes. It is the notion of arche-

types then which gives Jung's collective unconscious its real sub-

stance, and it is the resolution of questions concerning the arche-

types upon which the real point of a concept of a collective un-

conscious depends.

Thxny such questions inhabit the fringes of consciousness while

reading about the archetypes: What really is an archetype? What

sort of ontological status is it supposed to have? I-hat is the

relationship between the archetypes and the instincts? Were do

the archetypes come from? What is the difference between the

archetype in itself and as it appears in consciousness? 1hat are

the chief archetypes? hiat causes their appearance in consciousness?

These many questions about the archetype reflect the many aspects

and perspectives from which the idea can be considered. In order to

gain an insight into the unifying elements of these different per-

spectives on the archetypes, our exposition idll proceed with a








conceptual overview followed by a detailed discussion of the different

aspects of the concept. flth this approach we hope to gain a unified

understanding of the archetype which will make clear the reasons for

the characteristic complexity of the idea.

Characterization of the Archetype

It will be remembered from the above discussion of the collective

unconscious then, that the contents of this portion of the psyche were

said to be objective and impersonal in the sense that the collective

unconscious is the supposed source of original contents which appear

in consciousness but which seem not to have been conscious before.

For example, an individual has a dream, vision or fantasy composed

of alien images to which he has no personal associations. Ibreover,

parallels to the phenomena's basic themes can then be found in mater-

ials drawn from comparative symbology which are unknown to the person

previous to his experience of the archetypal event.

The following dream illustrates these characteristic archetypal

qualities.

In my dream, I am at an amusement park with my
wife and another couple. The first amusement
we decide to see is a sort of "haunted house."
To enter, we descend a flight of stairs into a
cool, damp cellar, consisting of an empty main
room. looking into one room I see nothing.
At this pint a ghost-like figure appears. I
recognize the "ghost" as a child dressed in a
costume, and am friendly to it. The "ghost"
then leaves. In the next room, I see a table.
Upon the table is a small, incomplete child-like
body. A large knife is hovering in the air over
the table, and proceeds to dismember the body.
Blood gushes out, spurting into the air in great
streams. I think that this "show" is a little
too much for an amusement for the general public,
although I personally am not affected by the gore.
The "body" then begins to carry on a normal con-
versation with me, while the blood continues to







spurt and gush over the table top. The htow
is then over, and the "body" disappears.-

In this particular case, it is the archetypal motif of

ritual dismemberment which is the most outstanding feature of the

dream. The dreamer had no idea as to what this image might mean

and was unfamiliar with the frequent occurrence of this theme in

the literature of alchemy.

That Jung means by an archetype then is a disposition in the

collective unconscious to produce such an image in consciousness

as the one above. Ibreover, Jung distinguishes between the actual

image, which he calls the archetypal image, and the archetype per

se, which as a disposition of the unconscious is unobservable in

principle. However, the term "archetype" is used indiscriminately

for both the archetypal manifestation and the archetypal disposition.

The archetypal image is a concrete instantiation of the hypothe-

tical, unobservable archetypal disposition. Ibreover, archetypal

contents which emerge into awareness assume a form which is a

reflection of the individual consciousness. The fact that arche-

types appear in a personal form seems to be an instance of the ten-

dency to structure awareness of unfamiliar phenomena so that they

resemble familiar forms of experience.

The unconscious supplies as it were the archetypal
form, which in itself is empty and irrepresentable.
Consciousness immediately fills it with related
or similar representational material so that it
can be perceived. For this reason archetypal
ideas are locally, temporally, and individually
conditioned (Vol. XIII, p. 3X6).

In the case of the dismemberment dream, this assimilation of the

archetypal motif into an individual context is illustrated when the







uncanny and alien ritual of dismemberment, concerning which the dreamer

had no knowledge, was represented in the familiar setting of an amuse-

ment part.

Ontological Status of the Archetype

As a disposition the archetype has then the ontological status of

a hypothetical construct. Like the electron, the archetype can be

detected only through the effects which it produces, but, as with

the electron, this unobservability is not held to make the archetype

any less real than directly perceivable objects like chairs and door-

knobs. Unlike the electron, however, the archetypes are unobservable

in principle. Since the unconscious can only be knonm indirectly

through its effect on consciousness, there is no possibility of a

direct perception of these unconscious contents. -breover, the

archetypes per se, existing as dispositions, are only possibilities

to form observable phenomena with the determinate form in which they

appear being the result of the interaction between this disposition

in the collective unconscious and the informing consciousness.

Th basing the ontology of the archetypes on a position of

scientific realism, Jung wants to carefully distinguish his unobser-

vable theoretical entities from metaphysical concepts such as Plato's

forms. The difference is that the archetypes are empirically derived

and grounded. They are the product of Jung's therapeutic work in

which he found it increasingly difficult to fit all of the phenomeno-

logical material into an explanatory framework which included only

a personal unconscious. There exists then the possibility of falsi-

fication to the extent that the archetypal theory fails to provide

adequate explanation for the observed phenomena. The relationship








between experience and the postulated concepts of metaphysics, on

the other hand, is too vague to allow for the possibility of dis-

confirmation in principle.

Relationship of Archetypes and Instincts

Since the archetypes are not the product of an individual's

personal experience, they must then be the result of inheritance.

Rather than inherited experiences or inherited images, however,

the archetypes are transmitted as the disposition to form images

and ideas. There are close parallels here with the instincts, which

rather than being inherited behaviors are instead inherited dis-

positions to produce certain behaviors when activated by the appro-

priate environmental releasing stimuli. 1'th this similarity to the

instincts in mind, Jung often refers to the archetypes as patterns

of behavior.

. they prove to be typical attitudes, modes
of action--thought-processes and impulses which
must be regarded as constituting the instinctive
behaviour typical of the human species. The
term I chose for this, namely "archetype," there-
fore coincides with the biological concept of the
"pattern of behaviour" (Vol. III, p. 261).

Just as the body develops evolutionarily conditioned modes of

responding to external and internal stimuli, Jung hypothesizes the

development of similar phylogenetic patterns for the psyche. The

archetypes are then somewhat like psychic instincts. Ibreover,

since the body is not functionally a separate entity from the mind,

these 'mental instincts" are parallel psychic counterparts to the

inherited modes of bodily response. . There is good reason

for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the

instincts themselves . (Vol. IX-A, p. 4~).








The fact that archetypes can be understood as patterns of be-

havior emphasizes then their biological aspect and their continuity

with naturalistically understood processes. With a widening of the

traditional use of "patterns of behavior," this allows for the possi-

bility of archetypes in animals. "There is nothing to prevent us from

assuming that certain archetypes exist even in animals, that they are

grounded in the pecularities of the living organism itself . "

(Vol. VII, p. 69).

Archetypes as A Priori Conditioning Factors

However, the archetypes can also be seen from the cognitive point

of view as inherent categories of apprehension (Vol. VI, p. 376).

This perspective then underlines their role as the structuring elements

of the psyche and focuses on those aspects of the archetypes which

seem least directly connected with instincts as ordinarily understood.

It may then seem difficult to grasp how the archetypes can be at once

both patterns of behavior and "a priori conditioning factors." How-

ever, man's characteristic pattern of behavior is to develop con-

sciousness which can then act at variance with or in relative in-

dependence of the instincts understood as drives of the body. And,

since for Jung, the mind and body are not really separate entities

but merely different points of view, his shift from the archetypes

as patterns of behavior to talk of archetypes as categories of the

psyche can be seen as a plausible move rather than as a logical jump.

"As a prior conditioning factors they represent a special, psycholog-

ical instance of the biological 'pattern of behaviour'" (Vol. XI, p.

l19, note 2).

Now in characterizing the archetypes as a priori conditioning







factors what Jung has in mind is similar to the idea of categories

worked out by Kant. Moreover, it sometimes appears as if Jung is

attempting to broaden Kant's concept so that in addition to

necessary forms of cognition, the archetypes will also be cate-

gories of the imagination.2 Specifically the archetypes are held

to be forms of thought, perception and imagination (Vol. IX-A, p.

44). However, the comparison of the archetypes to the Kantian

categories is only of limited usefulness. For the archetypes can

be said to be necessary only in the biological sense of being part

of our inheritance which will then necessarily influence us. They

are not necessary in the sense that they could not have been other

than they are. The archetypes are products of evolution and are

thus subject to whatever contingent environmental forces made them

an enduring part of the genotype. A hominoid on a different planet

could then conceivably develop different archetypes.3

I-breover, Kant's categories were the necessary formal aspects

to which any experience must conform whereas Jung's archetypes are

the forms of only certain types of experience. Thus, the archetypes

are more properly described as primordial images than as categories

in Kant's sense. For the archetypes as "thought-forms" (Vol. VII,

p. 66), i.e., dispositions to form certain typical images and thoughts

come into consciousness only under unusual circumstances, rather than

being the structuring aspect of experience in general. This is then

what Jung has in mind when he states: "Only, in the case of our

'forms,' we are not dealing with categories of reason but with cate-

gories of the imarienation" (Vol. XI, p. 518).

From the point of view of similarity with Kant, the archetypes

can be seen to be universal, inborn and formal elements of the psyche







(Vol. IX-A, p. 44). Ibreover, the individual and personal aspects

of the psyche are held to develop from a universal substratum in

the collective unconscious. From this perspective the ego is itself

an archetype in the sense that it is prefigured as an a priori possi-

bility in the collective unconscious of the individual before it

emerges by a process of differentiation. All of the complexes,

in fact, although they are predominantly manifestations of the

personal unconscious, have a "nuclear element" (Vol. VIII, p. 12)

which is an archetype.

. every complex, has or is a (fragmentary)
personality. At any rate, this is how it looks
from the purely observational standpoint. But
when Tie go into the matter more deeply, we
find that they are really archetypal forma-
tions (Vol. V, p. 255).

Ilat this archetypal basis of complexes amounts to is that a

complex which can be traced to events in the individual's personal

history is often "magically" complicated because the personal situa-

tion has been assimilated to the archetypal one. For example,

problems originating from the relationship with the parents are

frequently the result of the fact that the individual has since

childhood seen the parents as gods. The father is perceived as

God the Father and the mother in terms of the Archetype of the

Great oIther or Earth Ibther. The troubled individual then can

not successfully distinguish between parents as individuals and the

archetypal projections in terms of which he has habitually perceived

them.

For every typical human situation there is a corresponding

archetype so that the experience of the individual in such a situation








invariably falls under the influence of an archetypal pattern. In

this respect the description of the archetypes as "patterns of in-

stinctual behaviour" seems amply justified.

Ibwever, the archetypal notion runs the risk of being over-

generalized into triviality if the idea of the archetypes as formal

a priori conditioning factors is taken as a guide for explaining all

human behavior. For example, the archetypes can be seen as the

phylogenetic forms to which ontogeny supplies the content. But,

although this understanding of the archetypes is hypothetically

plausible, it is misleading from an operational point of view. For

although in principle all aspects of the personality are founded on

the common structure of the collective unconscious out of which

individuality emerges like an island out of the ocean, the arche-

types can not be exclusively appealed to in order to form a compre-

hensive theory of behavior. This would be an incomplete and one-

sided perspective ignoring the vitally important ontogenetic factors

influencing individual development.

In the case of the complexes, for example, Jung identifies them

trith the personal unconscious. The archetypal nucleus is called upon

as an explanatory principle only when the psychological situation

seems incomprehensible from an exclusively personal point of view.

That there is a common and universal structure to the psyche is then

a true statement but not always an informative one for all distinct

aspects of behavior.

Further Implications of Kantian Influence

On the basis of the discussion so far, it could be fairly







concluded that on the whole it is more accurate to understand the

archetypes as patterns of behavior than to think of them in terms

of Kant's theory of knowledge. This conclusion, however, would be

too hastily arrived at as the full story of Kant's influence on

Jung's idea of the archetypes has yet to be explained.

Jung's insistence on the label of empiricism to characterize his

work, for example, is a consequence of his methodological ideal of

staying within the bounds of possible experience. Ibreover, in terms

of Jung's thought, the concept of the psyche describes these bounds.

There is no possibility of getting outside the psyche to determine

how the psyche interprets the world, for all experience is most

immediately and inescapably psychic experience. The psyche is the

mediator of all experience, both from within and from without.

If a thinker comes up with a metaphysical scheme which he

thinks grasps the essential nature of reality, Jung then cautions

as to the need for a psychological critique. The claims of universal

validity which the system maker has put forth transcend possible ex-

perience and are justified on the basis of an intuitive certainty.

It is just at this point that Jung's theory of archetypes assumes a

deflationary role by explaining the appeal of the metaphysical system

on the basis of its conformity to the fundamental aspects of the

thinker himself rather than to conformity of the system with the

ultimate nature of reality.

Iten a speculative philosopher believes he has
comprehended the world once and for all in his
system, he is deceiving himself; he has merely
comprehended himself and then naively projected
that view upon the world (Vol. III, p. 185).







Archetypes and Scientific Theories

To complicate matters at this point is the fact that basic

scientific insights are held to be founded on archetypes. For

example, Robert lbyer's idea of the conservation of energy (Vol.

VII, p. 67), the concept of the atom (Vol. IX-A, p. 57) and Kekule's

discovery of the structure of the benzene ring (Man and His Symbols

pages 25-26) are all understood as illustrating the effect of arche-

types.

. we speak of "atoms" today because we have
heard, directly or indirectly, of the atomic
theory of D=eocritus. But where did Democritus,
or whoever first spoke of minimal constitutive
elements, hear of atoms? This notion had its
origin in archetypal ideas, that is, in pri-
mordial images which were never reflections of
physical events but are spontaneous products
of the psychic factor (Vol. IX-A, p. 57).

This archetypal basis of scientific theory is supported when it

is shoin that the ideas have been present in the history of diviliza-

tion for many centuries. In Kebkule's case the solution to his

theoretical dilemma came during a state of relaxation when, dozing

before his fireplace, he seemed to see snakelike atoms dancing in

the fire. Then one of the snakes formed a ring by grasping its owm

tail, the idea of the benzene ring was conceived in a flash of in-

sight.4 his image of a snake (or dragon) biting its omm tail is

called the uroboros and dates from at least as early as the third

century B.C. (Ibn and His Symbols, p. 26).

Naturally the role of the unconscious must always be seen in

proper relation to the activity of consciousness in these cases. Had

Keklle not already spent great amounts of time and energy consciously

thinking about the problem of the structure of benzene, the situation







of an insightful archetypal constellation could not have occurred.

I-breover, there was a great deal of effort necessary after the fire-

place episode before the structure of benzene was finally worked out.

Notwithstanding the well-documented and critical role of the uncon-

scious then, it should not be thought that scientific theories exist

preformed in the collective unconscious.

I, might well imitate Kant at this point and ask how this appar-

ent conformity betWeen symbols from the collective unconscious and

scientific theories is possible. Ibreover, it needs to be made clear

why scientific ideas derived from the archetypes are held to be

genuine discoveries and advances, whereas similarly derived meta-

physical ideas are restricted to a sphere of only subjective validity.

In the case of science then, the archetypal constellation some-

times proves to be instrumental in bringing about a progressive

theoretical advance for science when the image from the unconscious

is assimilated in terms of the already existing body of knowledge.

IMay other ideas from the same source are never put to scientific

use because they do not happen to be compatible with the progress of

science.

Thus with scientific theories, archetypes are sometimes an im-

portant influence within the context of discovery. Regardless of the

origin of a scientific hypothesis, however, in order for it to become

acceptable to the scientific community, it must be validated in terms

of criteria of scientific methodology. These criteria of accepta-

bility involve relating the theoretical terms of the hypothesis to

observational statements in such a way as to constitute an empiri-

cally derived decision procedure which will indicate what observational







states of affairs will count for or against the hypothesis.

Idth metaphysical theories based on archetypal experience,

on the other hand, the relationship between the theory and observa-

tions is not specified in such a way as to form the basis for an

objective decision procedure which could be used to adjudicate con-

flicting metaphysical claims.

Ibreovor, the archetypal images are always the partial result of

the individual traits of the embodying consciousness, with aspects of

personal history and cultural background being always associated rith

their appearance. Thus the personal factor can not be eliminated in

order to arrive at an objectively valid metaphysical statement. In

addition to the inevitable contamination of the personal factor, the

archetypes can be said to be unavoidably anthropomorphic. As the

product of human evolution, they mirror man and are man. Although

the archetypes represent man's relationship to the world, it is only

from the historically conditioned human standpoint reflecting how

the universe affects man.

There is for Jung, nonetheless, a possibility of evaluating the

pragmatic value of the metaphysical ideas considered from the stand-

point of their ability to further and enhance human existence. Thus

very similar to IJietzsche, Jung would judge metaphysical ideas on

their life-affirming quality, while maintaining that the final truth

of the ideas in terms of which of them mirror best the ultimate

structure of reality could not be decided.

In Jung's viewr we must be careful to distinguish subjective,

psychological truth from objective truth about the external world.

Thus, although it is an error to see the archetypes as objectively







true in the sense that they represent literal statements about objec-

tive states of affairs, yet the archetypes have a psychological

validity and are psychologically true in the sense that it is possible

to interpret them in a subjectively meaningful way. The validity of

the archetypes in terms of applicability to the human situation must

then be aclInowledged even in absence of the possibility of a scientific

validation of statements based on them. For example, the existence of

a God can not be either proved or disproved scientifically; yet the

existence of an internal God-image or its equivalent must be acknow-

ledged as a psychologically real and effective event.

The gods cannot and must not die. I said just
now that there seems to be something, a kind of
superior power, in the human psyche, and that
if this is not the idea of God, then it is the
"belly." I wanted to express the fact that one
or other basic instinct, or complex of ideas,
will invariably concentrate upon itself the
greatest sum of psychic energy and thus force
the ego into its service (Vol. VII, p. 72).


The Symbolic Hature of the Archetypes

The way in ihbich Jung characterizes the distinctive psychologi-

cal validity of the archetypes is by emphasizing the symbolic nature

of the archetypal images. The archetypes are said to be "symbolic

formulas" (Vol. VI, p. 377).

The symbol for Jung is to be sharply distinguished from the

semiotic function of signs. Signs are representations of known

things. The trademark of a compare, for example, simply represents

the compa~ itself. Symbols, on the other hand, can not be said to

be logically equivalent to their referents. The symbol points be-

yound itself to an unknown.








Thus a word or an image is symbolic when it
implies something more than its obvious and
immediate meaning. It has a wider "uncon-
scious" aspect that is never precisely defined
or fully explained. .. . As the mind explores the
symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the
grasp of reason (Man and His Symbols, p. 4).

Symbols function as interconnecting links between the conscious

and the collective unconscious, as they bring into consciousness in

representable form the othe-rise unImowable archetypes. The symbols

mediate the experience of the archetypes and because of the unavoid-

able personal characteristics due to embodiment in an individual con-

sciousness are products of both the collective unconscious and con-

sciousness.

There is then in the symbol a synthesis of knamw and unknown

and of real and unreal.

If it were only real, it would not be a symbol,
for it would then be a real phenomenon and hence
unsymbolic. . And if it were altogether unreal,
it would be mere empty imagining, which, being
related to nothing real, would not be a symbol either
(Vol. VI, p. 111).

The symbol . unites the antithesis between
real and unreal, because on the one hand it is
a psychic reality (an account of its efficacy),
-while on the other it corresponds to no physical
reality (Vol. VI, pages 128-129).

To a large extent then, what we add to the picture of the

archetype by calling the archetypal images symbols is an emphasis

on the living intensity of the archetypes as they are experienced.

The archetypal images are not abstract intellectual concepts but

symbols which are not transparent to reason and the intellect. More-

over, these symbols have a certain aura of fascination. They appeal

not only to the intellect as puzzles for the understanding but to the







emotions as well. "They are as much feelings as thoughts . "

(Vol. VII, p. 66).

This characteristic quality of the symbol to evoke emotion is

termed its numinosity, the numen being the specific energy of the

archetypes.

Fifth the description of the nmidnosity of the archetypes, the

close relationship between archetypal images and religious motifs

becomes evident. For Jung accepts Rudolf Otto's characterization

of religious experience as a "careful and scrupulous observation

of . the numinosum . (Vol. XI, p. 7). "%h might say, then,

that the term 'religion' designates the attitude peculiar to a con-

sciousness which has been changed by experience of the numinosum"

(Vol. XI, p. 8).

Although originating through individual experiences of the collec-

tive unconscious, religion is, strictly speaking, a phenomenon of

collective consciousness. And since not all experiences of the

archetypes result in their being assimilated in terms of a religious

frame of reference, another wider designation is needed to character-

ize the effect of the numinous quality of archetypes. Thus the arche-

types are said to be "spiritual" factors.

In a sense spiritual and archetypal are almost equivalent and

interchangeable terms. For when we have understood the transpersonal

nature of the archetypes,5 their aura of numinosity and their ability

to generate images which serve as the foundations of culture, then

we have made definite the meaning of the spiritual.

That keeps us from asserting this equivalence of meaning, however,

is the instinctual perspective. For the archetypes are said to be







"patterns of instinctual behaviour" (Vol. IX-A, p. 4h). And it is the

instinctual aspect of man which seems to stand in sharpest contrast

to what we wish to designate as spiritual.

However, Jung points to Christian prejudice as the origin of the

apparent antithesis between spirit and nature.

. very remarkable opposition of spirit and
nature. Bven though spirit is regarded as
essentially alive and enlivening, one cannot
really feel nature as unspiritual and dead.
1t must therefore be dealing here with the
(Christian) postulate of a spirit whose life
is so vastly superior to the life of nature
that in comparison with it the latter is no
better than death (Vol. IX-4, p. 210).

A more in-depth perspective, then, reveals the paradoxical re-
lation between spirit and instinct. For they seem to be similar pro-

cesses of psychic energy which are distinguished by the application

of this energy into diametrically contrasting modes.

Moreover, it is in the description of the relation between the

spiritual and instinctual that Jung's psychological viewpoint is in

sharpest contrast to that of Freud. For Jung does not conceive all

psychic energy as being instinctual energy as does Freud. He uses

the term for psychic energy, libido, in a way which does not imply

its equivalence with instinctual energy. There is then for Jung

no need of a concept of sublimation in which instinctual energy

must be siphoned off for cultural purposes. Any diversion of the
flow of libido from its natural instinctual channels in Jung's view

leads only to neurotic maladjustment. However, there is more psychic

energy available for the human being than is utilized by the natural

instinctual processes. This excess psychic energy can then be used

for other than instinctual purposes, and we might say that this excess







energy represents a degree of freedom for man to pursue cultural

activities for their own sake. The symbolic images from the collec-

tive unconscious then serve as "transformers" of energy in the sense

that the archetypes represent inherent patterns for this energy flow

(Vol. V, p. 232).

Since the spiritual uses of psychic energy are the result of the

influence of the archetypes which are themselves the product of

evolution, it becomes evident that the development of the spirit

in man is his characteristic pattern of behavior.

In reality of course the world-spurning passion
of the "spirit" is just as natural as the
marriage-flight of insects (Vol. V, p. 396).

The spiritual appears in the psyche also as an
instinct, indeed as a real passion, a "consuming
fire" . . It is not derived from any other
instinct . but is a principle sui geris
a specific and necessary form of instinctual
power (Vol. VIII, p. 58).


Archetypes and Instincts
In order to fully understand the meaning of the term "spiritual"

then, a further clarification of the archetype-instinct relation is

necessary. For we need to grasp how the spiritual if to be of the

same type of stuff as the instincts and yet seemingly different from

and even opposed to them.

A look at animals other than man helps to gain an insight into

what Jung has in mind in this regard. For in the examples of patterns

of behavior in animals, we see clearly the unity which in man becomes

a tension of opposites between spirit and instinct.

A key word "pattern" is then the link which enables us to
cormnect the behavior of animals with the archetypes and instincts in








man. For the instinctual behavior of animals is not to be understood

as just a blind impulsion to action. Rather, for each instinctual

act there is present a total pattern which includes a sort of image

of the instinctual situation.

There are, in fact, no amorphous instincts, as
every instinct bears in itself the pattern of
its situation. Always it fulfils an image,
and the image has fixed qualities. The in-
stinct of the leaf-cutting ant fulfils the image
of ant, tree, leaf, cutting, transport, and
the little ant-garden of fungi. If any one of
these conditions is lacking, the instinct does
not function, because it cannot exist with-
out its total pattern, without its image.
Such an image is an aprioritype. It is
inborn in the ant prior to any activity, for
there can be no activity at all unless an
instinct of corresponding pattern initiates
and makes it possible (Vol. VIII, p. 201).

The instinctual acts of animals then seem to be unified by a

pattern which includes a sort of intuitive recognition of the goal

of the instinctual acts as well as the physiological mechanisms

which supply the necessary energy.

Of course, in the case of animals, our use of "image" must

be metaphorical; but it is Jung's point that this regulating prin-

ciple of the instinct, the factor which especially in the insects

makes the operation of instinctual behavior amazingly precise and

selective rather than haphazard, can be recognized.

The organizing factor of the instinct together with its

specific energy make up a unified pattern of behavior for animals.

In man, on the other hand, the representations of this formal factor

of instinct can come into awareness as actual images. Thus, whereas

in animals the archetypes and the instincts exist in a fused, undiffer-

entiated state; in man, with the formation of consciousness, they







become separable and distinct.

In the human realm then the archetypes become the forms which

regulate the instincts. Moreover, the archetypal images are said

to represent the meaning of the instincts and to be "the unconscious

images of the instincts themselves" (Vol. IX-A, p. 44). The arche-

types thus act as guiding factors for the release of instinctual

energy in appropriate ways characteristic of man as a species.

But what are these human instincts? Jung recognizes five types

of instinctual factors for man: "hunger, sexuality, activity,

reflection and creativity" (Vol. VIII, p. 118). He conceded that

any attempt to enumerate the human instincts is at least a matter

of controversy. The principle reason for this confusion as to what

constitutes an instinct in man is the complication of the psycho-

logical factor. For the criterion of what to count as psychic is

the ability of the functioning of the will to modify the otherwise

automatic and compulsive instincts. It would seem evident then

that the reason we can not decide on what to count as purely instinc-

tual in man is due to the fact that instincts are always in part

influenced by the psyche. Thus Jung says that the instincts per

se are ectopsychic and serve the function only of a stimulus,

whereas the determining factor for human behavior is always the

result of an interaction between the ectopsychic instinct and the

psychic situation of the moment (Vol. VIII, p. 115).

This mutual interaction between psyche and instinct in man has

then the result of making the instinctual element ambiguous. For,

on the one hand, all psychic processes seem to be founded on an

instinctual base, whereas, on the other hand, psychic processes







also influence the working of the instincts. . The instincts

are a condition of psychic activity, while at the same time psychic

processes seem to condition the instincts" (Vol. XI, p. 330).

Thus the twofold nature of instinct becomes most evident in

human behavior where for each instinctual action we have to take

into account both the aspect of "dynamism and compulsion" as well

as that of "specific meaning and intention" (Vol. X, p. 287). For

each instinctual action then we can pose the question as to its

meaning.

The archetypal images are these psychic factors which provide

the meaning for the instincts. They are the necessary forms of

instinctual behavior for man. The sense of saying that something

represents the meaning of an instinct for man is thus clarified by

an understanding of this process of "psychization," the assimilation

of the physiological stimulus to a preexistent psychic pattern (Vol.

VIII, p. 115).

In the animals which have no psyche there is nevertheless pre-

sent a unified pattern of behavior. The instinctual acts are the

ways in which the animal realizes its inherent nature, its possi-

bilities of becoming what it can be. The appropriate fulfilment

of the instinctual nature of an animal is its way of realizing its

meaning.

If we say then that the archetypes in man are the images of

the instincts and represent their meaning, we are emphasizing this

continuity with the lower animals. man also has his characteristic

patterns of behavior, and the archetypes act as the patterning fac-

tors for these human instincts. I11l the fulfilment of the instincts







in man then also lead to an unfoldment of his inherent human nature?

The answer to this question must of course deal with the factor

of the psyche. Hiat is only dimly prefigured in animals becomes in

man with the development of consciousness his particularly human

way of being. For a human being to realize its nature then implies

the development of consciousness.

This development is like an instinct in the sense that it comes

into being conditioned by the archetypal patterns. However, its

nature is to exist as a factor which can operate as a will and hence

control and regulate the "other" instincts. The nature of con-

sciousness contains then the possibility of being able to act

against nature.

It is recognized that man living in the state of
nature is in no sense merely "natural" like an
animal, but sees, believes, fears, worships things
whose meaning is not at all discoverable from the
conditions of his natural environment. Their
underlying meaning leads us in fact far away
from all that is natural, obvious, and easily
intelligible, and quite often contrasts most
sharply with the natural instincts. ve have
only to think of all those gruesome rites and
customs against which every natural feeling
rises in revolt, or of all those beliefs and
ideas which stand in insuperable contradiction
to the evidence of the facts. All this drives
us to the assumption that the spiritual prin-
ciple (whatever that might be) asserts itself
against the merely natural conditions with in-
credible strength. One can say that this too
is "natural," and that both have their origin
in one and the same "nature." I do not in
the least doubt this origin, but must point
out that this "natural" something consists
of a conflict between two principles, to
which you can give this or that name according
to taste, and that this opposition is the
expression, and perhaps also the basis, of
the tension we call psychic energy (Vol. VIII,
p. 52).








Thus the fact that archetypes seem to enter the human picture

on two levels-- as patterns of instinctual behavior and as spiritual

factors--is due to the fact that one of the innate human patterns,

the tendency to develop consciousness, can act against the other

lower drives and become a channel of psychic energy in its own

right independently of the instincts. Therefore the archetypes

seem to have two paradoxically opposite qualities: . The

archetype is partly a spiritual factor, and partly like a hidden

meaning immanent in the instincts . (Vol. VIII, 222). Only

in man then is there this potential split between his natural ten-

dencies and the realization of his human-most potentiality of being.

This split, which is the same as that between the conscious and

unconscious, is a state of necessary tension since the development of

awareness and the giving in to the unconsciousness of instinctual

motivations tend to work against each other and to a large extent

they are mutually exclusive activities. However, Jung's psychological

viewpoint as a whole can be understood as the attempt to show how

this necessary tension between conscious and unconscious and between

spirit and instinct need not necessarily be a conflict. For the

integrated personality is one which learns to live with a balance

between these forces of tension rather than excluding one for the

sake of the other.

But if we can reconcile ourselves to the mys-
terious truth that the spirit is the life of
the body seen from within, and the body the out-
ward manifestation of the life of the spirit--
the two being really one--then we can understand
why the striving to transcend the present level
of consciousness through acceptance of the un-
conscious must give the body its due, and why
recognition of the body cannot tolerate a philos-
oply that denies it in the name of the spirit (Vol. I, p. 94).













Notes


1
This dream was provided by a student and friend, George
Clough.
2
The fact that Kant had a strong influence on the develop-
ment of Jung' s ideas is amply evidenced by the many explicit re-
ferences to Kant scattered throughout Jung's works. Moreover,
when Jung talks of the philosophers who had been important to his
intellectual development, we again find him acknowledging the
influence of Kant: "The philosophical influence that has pre-
vailed in my education dates from Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer,
Ed. v. Hartmann, and Nietzsche. These names at least character-
ize my main studies in philosophy." C.G. Jung, Letters Vol. I
1906-1950, Vol. II 190-1961, edited by Gerhard Adler and Aniela
Jaffe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), letters
Vol. II, pages 500-501, letter to Joseph F. Rychlak dated 27
April 1959. Hereafter cited as Letters Vol. I or Vol. II.
In his autobiography Jung describes an interest in Kantian
philosophy which was part of a "philosophical development" which
"extended from mr seventeenth year until well into the period of
wr medical studies." C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams. Reflections
(New York: Random House, 1961), p. 70. Hereafter cited as
Memories reams Reflections. The extent of that interest is
revealed when Jung relates that while a medical student "the
clinical semesters that followed kept me so busy that scarcely
any time remained for my forays into outlying fields. I was
able to study Kant only on Sundays" (Manories, reams Reflec-
tions. p. 101).

3 Jolande Jacobi, Com Archetype/ m the Psychology
of C.G. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 52.

4 Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Biglewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 165

5By the transpersonal nature of the archetype, we mean to
refer to the fact that archetypal experience is not completely ex-
planable by reference to the individual's past experience or develop-
ment.














CHAPTER 3
THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART II



The Origin of the Archetypes

The next aspect of the archetypal theory which we must tahe up

for discussion is the question of the origin of the archetypes: there

do the archetypes cone from?

One way of approaching this problem is by considering the rela-

tionshiLp between archetypes and rythological motifs. For since myths

and fairytales are one of the most characteristic ways in which

archetypes manifest themselves, if we can discover how ryths origi-

nate, then perhaps this will shed light on the question of the

origin of the archetypes.I

14rthological motifs then are characteristic archetypal images

so that the archetypes are sometimes designated as '"ythologems" by

Jung.

The rqthological feature of archetypal manifestation can be seen

to fit in with what was previously said about the archetypal images

being symbols and having a religious or spiritual significance in

that a myth is a phenomenon of collective consciousness. It is the

end product of a conscious elaboration of the original unconscious

content, which often includes the efforts of many generations of

storytellers. In this way the numinous quality of the rsythologem,

the immediate impact of the living intensity of the unconscious

.5







revelation, is lessened, and the genuine symbolic nature of the arche-

types is expressed in a diminished degree. "The so-called religious

statement is still numLnous, a.quality which the myth has already lost

to a great extent" (Vol. XI, p. 301).

Since the religious expression of the archetypes can also suffer

the same fate as myths and cease to become "living" symbols, it would

seem that Jung's distinction between the religious and the mytholog-

ical in terms of numinoslty is not really adequate. hn addition, there

are examples from primitive cultures where the mythological and re-

ligious coincide. "A tribe's mythology is its living religion . "

(Vol. IK-A, p. 154). ~hen then does a religious statement cease to

be religious and becomes mythological? Does Jung mean that when a

religious dogma loses credibility it becomes a myth?

Ibreover, there seems to be at least in ordinary usage an im-

plied difference in content with the mythological involving more

primitive types of thought and being more concerned with naturalistic

phenomena than the religious. Religions then would seem to be more

sophisticated types of mythologies.

At any rate, it is clear that Jung is not particularly concerned

with establishing strict criteria of usage which would keep the terms

distinct as is evidenced by the following:

. ziths of a religious nature can be inter-
preted as a sort of mental therapy for the suffer-
ings and anxieties of mankind in general . .
(Ihn and His Symbols p. 68).

I was driven to ask myself in all seriousness:
"that is the myth you are living?" . So, in
the most natural way, I took it upon myself to
get to know *my" myth, and I regarded this as
the task of tasks, for--so I told myself--how
could I, when treating my patients, mate due








allowance for the personal factor, for my
personal equation, which is yet so necessary
for a laiowledge of the other person, if I was
unconscious of it? I simply had to kiow what
unconscious or preconscious myth was forming
me, from what rhizome I sprang (Vol. V, pages
xsdv-xnv).

In speaking about his personal myth as in the above, it is

evident that myths are often used as vehicles of the most symbolic

and numinous manifestations of the unconscious. Thus Jung's use

of the term "myth" deviates somewhat from the ordinary usage. Some-

times he means myth to refer to the symbolic archetypal images

themselves, and at other times he uses myth in the conventional way

to indicate the cultural product as an aspect of the collective

consciousness.

Thus both yrths and religious (spiritual) statements2 can be

original symbolic expressions of the collective unconscious.

. esoteric teaching. Ihis last is a typical
means of expression for the transmission of collec-
tive contents originally derived from the uncon-
scious.
Another well-known expression of the archetypes
is myth and fairytale (Vol. IX-A, p. 5).

In attributing a positive function to myths even in the case

of modern man, it is evident that Jung does not see yIiths as a

sort of primitive inferior science, or simply as a crude form of

prescientific explanation. This is because of the symbolic nature

of myths. For if we understand that mythological statements are

not really about the external world but are actually psychological

statements, then we are less apt to criticize the myths for their

variance with current scientific knowledge. Thus myths have a

psychological validity and accurately depict the nature of the








human situation.

The inability of primitive and other unsophisticated peoples to

distinguish between the psychological and the objective sense of

truth frequently leads then to the phenomenon of projection in

which an unconscious content is perceived as belonging to an object

and being a property of the object. Through the agency of pro-

jection natural phenomena take on qualities stemming from the

collective unconscious so that . the whole of mythology

could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective uncon-

scious" (Vol. VIII, p. 152).

In spite of this confusion about inner and outer observed in

Mythological thinking, Jung asserts that mythology should not be

understood as an attempt to formulate a type of scientific ex-

planation.

There can be no doubt that science and
philosophy have grown from this matrix, but
that primitives think up such things merely
from a need for explanation, as a sort of
physical or astronomical theory, seems to
me highly laprobable (Vol. VIII, p. 153).

It would seem rather that the anthropomorphism seen in myth-

ology, the projection of human qualities onto natural phenomena,

is an attempt to grasp the meaning of nature in human terms. It

is then the symbolic meaning of natural phenomena which captures

the interest of the myth-makers. If we look at alchemy, for exam-

ple, only as a sort of proto-chemistry, this can not explain how

the interest in it continued in spite of the failure to produce the

desired objective results over periods of hundreds of years.3 The

alchemist is of course taken in to an extent by his own projections;

but Jung points out that the hubris of assuming that our scientific







world view is thus superior to one founded on mythological projec-

tions is not justified, since if the unsophisticated mind anthropo-

morphizes the world, we have in the present era "mechanicomorphized"4

it with the result that the symbolic quality of our existence is im-

poverished. le must then avoid the mistake of trying to see mythology

as an attempt at explanation in objective terms when its explanations

are symbolic in nature.

Now since the archetypal psyche expresses itself in the language

of myth, it would seen as if the mythological interpretation of na-

ture had been somehow imprinted on the psyche so that these archaic

images reappear in modern man. %e look then to a description of this

process of how the mythological image arises in response to the phy-

sical process in order to gain what apparently is the essential clue

to the question of the origin of the archetypes.

Keeping in mind the previous discussion of the nature of myths,

it is clear that the relationship between the physical process and

images of mythological motifs is not understood by Jung as being one

of simple representation. ihen he says then that the archetypal

image is not to be understood as an allegory of the physical pro-

cess, he means that the objective content of representation is ex-

perienced symbolically and hence takes on psychic aspects due to

projection.

It is not the world as we know it that speaks
out of his unconscious, but the uniaiown world
of the psyche, of which we know that it mirrors
our empirical world only in part, and that, for
the most part, it moulds this empirical world
in accordance with its oain psychic assumptions.
Mhe archetype does not proceed from physical
facts, but describes how the psyche experiences
the physical fact, and in so doing the psyche







often behaves so autocratically that it denies
tangible reality or makes statements that fly
in the face of it (Vol. IX-A, p. 154).

Thus original archetypal (mythological) images are postulated

as being the resultant of an interaction between a physical process

and the primitive psyche, with the physical process being interpreted

in terms of a psychic fantasy content. moreover, it is the subjective

part, the fantasies which arise concomitant with the physical pro-

cess, that are the formative elements for the mythological motif.

That we can safely say about mythical images is
that the physical process imprinted itself on
the psyche in this fantastic, distorted form
and was preserved there, so that the uncon-
scious still reproduces similar images today
(Vol. VIII, p. 153).

It is not storms, not thunder and lightning,
not rain and cloud that remain as images in
the psyche, but the fantasies caused by the
effects they arouse (Vol. VIII, pages 154-155).

Still to be explained, however, is the process of psychic im-

printing through which an original mythological image becomes an

enduring aspect of the collective unconscious, which can then pro-

duce images of similar form even to the present day. then we read

Jung on this point, there seems to be an evident appeal to a theory

involving inheritance of acquired characteristics. For although

Jung is careful to make clear that it is the disposition to form

images rather than the images themselves which are inherited, yet

this inherited disposition is held to be a sort of condensation of

the repeated experiences resulting from typical human situations.

These archetypes, whose innermost nature is in-
accessible to experience, are the precipitate
of the psychic functioning of the whole ances-
tral line; the accumulated experiences of
organic life in general, a million times re-
peated, and condensed into types. In these








archetypes, therefore, all experiences are re-
presented uhich have happened on this planet
since primeval times (Vol. VI, p. 400).

The repetition of these typical human experiences leaves a sort
of function trace in the psyche which then can act to produce ana-

logous mythological images in succeeding generations. 7Thus the

archetypes are described as "mnemic deposits."

From the scientific, causal standpoint the pri-
mordial image can be conceived as a mnemic deposit,
an imprint or engram (Semon), which has arisen
through the condensation of countless processes
of a similar kind. In this respect it is a
precipitate and, therefore, a typical basic form,
of certain ever-recurring psychic experiences
(Vol. VI, p. IW3).

This reference to the influence of Richard Semon seems to clar-

ify what Jung had in mind as a mechanism by which archetypes might

be inherited. For the exposition of Semon's theory in his book

The Ih eme reveals a sort of theory of racial memory which tries to

integrate the factors of memory, habit and inheritance under one

theoretical principle and which appeals explicitly to the idea of

the inheritance of acquired characteristics. For example:

. the engraphic effects of stimulation are
not restricted to the irritable substance of
the individual, but that the offspring of that
individual maymanifest corresponding engraphic
modifications.

However, Jung's mention of Semon and use of his terminology does

not constitute a complete endorsement of his theory. In particular,

Jung is sensitive to the chicken and egg dilemma in relation to the

question of the origin of the archetypes. For the archetypes can

not only be seen as the product of past experiences but can also be

seen as themselves conditioners of experience. Instead of seeking an







explanation of where the archetypes come from by saying that they are

the result of the influence of physical processes on the psyche then,

there is the alternative of conceiving the archetypes as part of the

inherent nature of the psyche itself.

The fact that the sun or the moon or the metero-
logical processes appear, at the very least, in
allegorized form points to an independent colla-
boration of the psyche, which in that case can-
not be merely a product or sterotype of environ-
mental conditions. From whence would it draw
the capacity to adopt a standpoint outside sense
perception? . In view of such questions
Semen's naturalistic and causalistic engram
theory no longer suffices. %e are forced to
assume that the given structure of the brain
does not one its peculiar nature merely to
the influence of surrounding conditions, but
also and just as much to the peculiar and auto-
nomous quality of living matter, i.e., to a
law inherent in life itself (Vol. VI, p. 444).

Jung in the course of his work abandoned Semon's theory of

engrams and talk of mnemic deposits disappears from his later writings.

Archetypes were then simply said to be part of the inherited brain

structure, thus leaving the mechanism of hereditary transmission

unspecified.

lEth Jung's retreat from the position that archetypes are

"deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity" (Vol.

VII, p. 69), we see that the simple correlations he had previously

drawn relating physical processes to the formation of mythological

images must also be reconsidered. that must then be revised in the

theory of mythology is not the concept of projection and the vital

role it plays in mythological thinldng but the implication that

myths were once original contents of consciousness, that they or-

iginate from the fantasizing of individual psyches. With the aban-

donment of the engram theory, Jung is no longer certain he can








reconstruct the process by which the objective physical process and

the interpretive psyche interact to form myths. He seems, on the

whole, in his later work (as exemplified in the quotations immediately

below) to have come to the conclusion that mythological motifs are

not amenable to a simple naturalistic explanation, as if they were

caused by physical processes. Rather the subjective part of the

process, the inherent laws of psychic apprehension, is now thought

to be the essential determining factor.

Thus even the question of how archetypes (mythologems) origi-

nate is not seen by Jung as being a legitimate question since it im-

plies the need for a special explanation of how the archetypes came

to be in the psyche, whereas Jung now sees the archetypes as devel-

oping along with the psyche as part of its inherent pattern of func-

tioning.

anpirical3y considered, however, the archetype
did not ever come into existence as a phenomenon
of organic life, but entered into the picture
with life itself (Vol. XI, p. 149, note 2).

These images are "primordial" images in so far
as they are peculiar to whole species, and if
they ever "originated" their origin must have
coincided at least with the beginning of the
species. They are the "human quality" of the
human being, the specifically human form his
activities take. This specific form is hered-
itary and is already present in the germ-plasm
(Vol. IX-A, p. 78).

The hope expressed earlier then that Jung's ideas on the way

in which myths originate would prove to be the clue to solving the

riddle of the origin of the archetypes proves to be unjustified, and

we are left without a definitive answer to where the archetypes come

from. Jung is naturally quite happy to abandon questions of ulti-

mate origin to the sphere of metaphysics: "Whether this psychic








structure and its elements, the archetypes, ever 'originated' at all

is a metaphysical question and therefore unanswerable" (Vol. IX-A,

p. 101; and . it is impossible to say where the archetype comes

from, because there is no Archimedean point outside the a prior con-

ditions it represents" (Vol. IX-A, p. 69, note 27).8

But perhaps Jung should not be let off so easily. For rather

than postulating that the archetypes are sort of an ultimate psychic

fact for which no explanation in terms of more basic psychological

theory is possible, it seems evident that, heuristically at least,

we must seek an answer to the question of how it is that the psyche

structures experiences in terms of the archetypes instead of other

simpler modes. Perhaps, as Jung seems to think, the archetypes will

eventually prove to be an ultimate mystery for human. consciousness,

but from the scientific point of view this can not be assumed.


Archetypal Tiage and Archetype Per Se
The claim that the archetypes are ultimately inaccessible must

be further examined. For many difficult points in the articulation

of Jung's theory of archetypes seem to hinge on distinguishing be-

teen the unreachable archetype per se and the archetypal image.

The archetype per se was said to be not truly part of the psyche at

all but rather psychoid and to be incapable of consciousness. As a

consequence it was said to be unobservable in principle. The essen-

tial question in this regard would seem to be how such claims as the

above can be justified from the empirical point of view.

But that nothing in principle would count as a direct observation

of an archetype is a result of the total conceptual framework of the

archetypal theory, which as a whole is grounded empirically. In this








respect it would seem not to differ significantly from other

scientific theories. Moreover, if from the behaviorist point of

view, the suggestion is made to do away with the hypothetical

construct of the archetype per se and instead speak only of arche-

typal images, the reply is that this move would mean that a theory

of archetypes is no longer possible. For there must be postulated

an underlying common collective aspect to the psyches of individuals

which idll mate the archetypal manifestations more than personalistic

and idiosyncratic products. W'hat counts as evidentially conclusive

for the presence of archetypes then is just the appearance of con-

tents which prove to constitute universal themes or motifs which can

be recognized in contexts which transcend the individual's personal

sphere of reference. Unless the archetypes are to be reduced to the

merely personal then, there must be postulated an archetype per se

which will be the transpersonal organizing principle for the personal

and culturally determined archetypal manifestation.

It is better on the whole to think of the archetype per se as

a principle or disposition rather than as an entity, i.e., something

which can be clearly distinguished as an individual thing. Thus

Jung says that the phenomenological material does not justify any-

thing other than the postulation of principles which act to form

distinct archetypal images, without it being possible to conclude

anything definite about the nature of the archetype per se.

Ttien one carefully considers this accumulation
of data, it begins to seem probable that an
archetype in its quiescent, unprojected state
has no exactly determinable form but is in it-
self an indefinite structure which can assume
definite forms only in projection (Vol. I-A,
p. 70).








Moreover, this uncertainty about the nature of the archetype per

se extends even so far as to leave undetermined the number of arche-

types and the point of differentiation between one archetype and

another.

Ehpirically speaking, we are dealing all the
time with "types," definite forms that can be
named and distinguished. But as soon as you
divest these types of the phenomenology pre-
sented by the case material, and try to ex-
amine them in relation to other archetypal forms,
they branch out into such far-reaching ramifi-
cations in the history of symbols that one comes
to the conclusion that the basic psychic ele-
ments are infinitely varied and ever changing,
so as utterly to defy our powers of imagination
(Vol. IX-A, p. 70).

Although helhe investigatoJ is forced, for
epistemological reasons, to postulate an in-
definite number of distinct and separate arche-
types, yet he is constantly overcome by doubt
as to how far they are really distinguishable
from one another. They overlap to such a de-
gree and have such a capacity for combination
that all attempts to isolate them conceptually
must appear hopeless (Vol. XI, p. 288).

In considering the problem of the nature of the archetype per

se, Kant's influence on Jung's views must again be acknowledged.

For Jung accepts the Kantian distinction between the thing-in-itself

and that which appears. In these terms then the archetype per se

is held to be inaccessible on analogy with Kant's noumenon, where-

as the archetypal image is that which appears in the phenomenal

realm.9

The existence of a transcendental reality is
indeed evident in itself . . That the world
inside and outside ourselves rests on a trans-
cendental background is as certain as our oim
existence, but it is equally certain that the
direct perception of the archetypal world inside
us is just as doubtfully correct as that of the
physical outside us (Vol. fXV, p. 551).








hien I say "atom" I am talking of the model made of
it; when I say "archetype I am talking of ideas
corresponding to it, but never of the thing-in-
itself, which in both cases is a transcendental
mystery. . One must therefore assume that
the effective archetypal ideas, including our
model of the archetype, rests on something actual
even though unknowable, just as the model of the
atom rests on certain unknowable qualities of
matter (letters, Vol. II, p. 54, letter to H.
Haberlandt dated 23 April 1952).

However, it is unnecessary to follow Jung's Kantian way of

construing the archetype per se. For rather than implicating the

archetypal theory rith a problematic phenomena/noumena distinction,

we can interpret the archetype per se as an unobservable hypothe-

tical construct. Thus, although Jung holds that the archetype

per se is an ultimate mystery, the archetypal theory only requires

that it be the unobservable and mostly unknown structuring prin-

ciple responsible for the archetypal image.

To any case, our efforts to discover the nature of the archetype

directly are frustrated since the archetypal image always reflects the

personal history of the consciousness in which it is embodied. Thus when

we attempt to abstract the archetype itself from its personal and cul-

tural matrix, the result is that the distinctiveness of the archetype

vanishes, and we can no longer say what it would be like in itself.

But if the archetype is then essentially an "irrepresentable form," the

question is how ie are to distinguish collective archetypal manifestations

from merely personal contents of consciousness. It would seem that there

must be definite phenomenological differences between the archetypal

images and other contents if we are to be justified in speaking of the

existence of a collective unconscious containing archetypes. For in the

absence of any common features which the individual archetypes manifest in








every person, we must have general criteria for recognizing what con-

stitutes an archetypal content.

As previously mentioned in the example of an archetypal dream,

archetypal images characteristically have an alien, impersonal char-

acter so that they do not appear to be contents which were once con-

scious and then forgotten or repressed. But this does not mean that

the contents attributed to the collective unconscious contain images

which the dreamer can not recognize at all. Rather it seems that

the strange and alien contents amount to fantastic rearrangements

of items of experience already knotn to the dreamer. If one dreams

of God, for example, the image may be conveyed as that of the figure

of Superman. The archetypal images are for the most part then some-

thing familiar appearing in an unfamiliar context. Thus mythological

motifs may appear in dreams but with modern substitutes for the prin-

ciple characters.

I'e have only to disregard the dependence of dream
language on environment and substitute "eagle" for
"aeroplane," "dragon" for "automobile" or "train,"
"snake-bite" for "injection," and so forth, in
order to arrive at the more universal and more
fundamental language of mythology (Vol. XI, 289).

It would be perhaps advantageous to distinguish the objective

from the subjective aspects of the phenomenology of archetypes.

Subjectively the archetypal appearance is characterized by its sym-

bolic qualities. It has an aura of numinosity and seems to point

beyond itself to an uniknom. From the third person point of view,

however, the symbolic nature of the archetype is less evident as we

have to do only with a content of consciousness whose origin is

unknown, so that what may appear objectively to be a symbol may

upon closer examination prove to be a sign with a simple representational








explanation.

In order to verify the presence of an archetype then, both the

views of introspection and extraspection are necessary.10 The sym-

bolic nature of the person's experience and his for the most part

absence of personal association to the material is taken into

account along with the presence of the sane theme or motif in mater-

ial dramu from the history of symbols. The ability of these his-

torical parallels to provide an explanation of the meaning of the

otherwise inexplicable content is then the crucial factor justifying

the employment of the archetypal hypothesis. Ihen such a procedure

provides the most plausible explanation for the presence of contents

of consciousness, we can say that an archetype is present.

Rather than taking one particular image or dream in isolation,

however, the determination of which contents are said to be arche-

typal is best arrived at with an examination of a series of dreams

or other similar experiences. In this way the margin of error in-

volved in any introspective evaluation is lessened. Then we are also

able to see how the alleged archetype functions in more than one con-

text. From the objective point of view, it is not so much how the

supposed archetype appears as what it does and how it functions that

is crucial for deciding about the presence of archetypes. This is

especially so since the archetypes often appear as images which are

themselves ordinary although the role they play in the dream as a

whole is archetypal. For example, the images of actual persons

knoun to the dreamer may function as archetypal images.11

Although there is thus no definite objective criteria by which

one can identify archetypal images out of the context of the function







they play in particular manifestations, Jung does give us an idea

of the objective features which as a matter of fact are associated

with the appearance of mary archetypes.

-An unfallible sign of collective images
seems to be the appearance of the "cosmic"
element, i.e., the images in the dream or
fantasy are connected with cosmic qualities,
such as temporal and spatial infinity, enor-
mous speed and extension of movement, "astro-
logical" associations, telluric, lunar, and
solar analogies, changes in the proportions
of the body, etc. The obvious occurrence of
oythological and religious motifs in a dream
also points to the activity of the collective
unconscious. The collective element is very
often announced by peculiar symptoms, as for
example by dreams where the dreamer is flying
through space like a comet, or feels that he
is the earth, or the sun, or a star; or else
is of immense size, or dwarfishly small; or
that he is dead, is in a strange place, is a
stranger to himself, confused, mad, etc. (Vol.
VII, p. 160).

On the whole, the fantastic nature of the archetypal imagery

often bears an alarming similarity to or even identity with the

symptoms of schizophrenia. But the schizophrenic, although he has

gained an access to the collective unconscious, has been figurative-

ly spealdng swallowed up by it, so that he has lost the ability to

function as an ego and relate in a practical iay to the objective

world. In a sense he is unable to wake from his symbolic fantasies,

so that they are more symptoms of psychic brealadown than they are

numinous symbols which can be meaningfUly integrated into the total

pattern of his life.

The difference between archetypes and the dis-
sociated products of schizophrenia is that the
former are entities endowed with personality
and charged with meaning, whereas the latter are
only fragments with vestiges of meaning--in
reality, they are products of disintegration
(Vol. VIII, p. 122).







The phenomenology of the archetypal manifestation is often of

imAediate therapeutic relevance as the contents of the unconscious

take on dark and menacing aspects when the point of view which they

represent is not being acknowledged by the conscious mind.

The guise in which these figures appear depends
on the attitude of the conscious mind: if it is
negative toward the unconscious, the animals will
be frightening; if positive, they appear as the
"helpful animals" of fairytale and legend (Vol.
V, p. 181).

In the form in which the archetypes appear is thus influenced

by the attitude of the conscious mind, it would seem that the man-

ifestation of the archetypes are not random and due to chance but

that their appearance is conditioned by certain necessary circum-

stances in the individual. Moreover, an understanding of these

conditions should shed light on the nature of the relationship

between the collective and personal aspects of the psyche. For

by calling the collective unconscious the impersonal and objective

portion of the psyche, the integral part this aspect of the uncon-

scious plays in the life of the individual is not given adequate

consideration. In this regard we find then that the archetypes

behave in an analogous fashion to other contents of the unconscious

in the sense that their appearance functions in a compensatory

fashion to consciousness. That is, the unconscious supplies con-

tents which compensate the conscious attitude by representing fea-

tures of the person's total situation which are overlooked, re-

pressed or undervalued by the conscious personality. The appearance

of the archetype then usually indicates the need for a collective

compensation. Itat this means is that the true nature of the per-

son's situation corresponds to a universal and typical human pattern,







so that what it is that is missing from the person's conscious

attitude is an understanding of the broader human perspective which

an appreciation of the basic patterns of human exd.stence would give.

The archetypal structure of the unconscious
corresponds to the average run of events. The
changes that mny befall a man are not infinitely
variable; they are variations of certain typical
occurrences which are limited in number. Ihen
therefore a distressful situation arises, the
corresponding archetype will be constellated in
the unconscious (Vol. V, p. 294).

One instructive example to make clearer the meaning of collec-

tive compensation can be drawn from Jung's work on the UFO pheno-

menon. After extensive research lasting a decade, Jung concluded

that the UFO phenomenon represented a sort of modern myth in which

the Archetype of the Self, an archetype expressing "order, deliver-

ance, salvation and wholeness" (Vol. X, p. 328), was being projected

into the heavens. Although unable to reach a definite conclusion

about the physical reality of the reported objects, Jung makes a

convincing case for the activation of the Self archetype as a com-

pensation for the ominous world situation following ltrld War II in

which nuclear annihilation seemed possible at any moment.

It have here a golden opportunity of seeing how
a legend is formed, and how in a difficult and
dark time for humanity a miraculous tale grows
up of an attempted intervention by extra-terrestial
"heavenly" powers . (Vol. X, pages 322-323).

The Archetype of the Self then functions to direct attention

within to the possibility of the realization of an inner center of

order and personal unity. V&th the world threatened with destruction,

the Self can provide an inward source of meaning and unity.

Archetypal manifestations are thus the compensatory response of







the unconscious to typical human situations, with the response being

a representation of an inherent pattern of human functioning. In

this way the archetype supplies the insight of a universal perspec-

tive to what are universally experienced problems.12 This enables

the individual then to grasp the meaning of his situation in its

more than personal aspect. If actual persons appear in archetypal

guise in dreams, for example, we can see that the activation of some

universal human pattern is complicating the personal interrelationship.

If a knotm girl appears as the archetype of the anima then, she also

represents a vehicle of symbolic projection.13


The Archetypes as Autonomous Factors

In our investigation of the conditions under which the archetypes

come into consciousness, we have emphasized the similarity of behav-

ior of archetypes to other contents of consciousness in that their

appearance is the result of the overall compensatory influence of

the unconscious. In this regard it must also be pointed out that

the archetypes behave in a similar fashion to the complexes of the

personal unconscious, i.e., they are autonomous factors. Thus,

although archetypes as a rule arise in response to the needs of the

individual, the end result of their activation may be that the arche-

type subjugates or even possesses the person.

The archetypes are then not only objects of consciousness but

also subjects which can be described as having intentionalities which

may oppose that of the ego personality.

They are spontaneous phenomena which are not subject
to our will, and we are therefore justified in
ascribing to them a certain autonomy. They are to
be regarded not only as objects but as subjects
with laws of their own. From the point of view








of consciousness, we can, of course, describe
them as objects, and even explain them up to
a point, in the same measure as we can describe
and explain a living human being. But then
we have to disregard their autonomy. If that
is considered, we are compelled to treat. them
as subjects; in other words, we have to admit
that they possess spontaneity and purposiveness,
or a kind of consciousness and free will. Ie
observe their behaviour and consider their state-
ments. This dual standpoint, which we are forced
to adopt towards every relatively independent or-
ganism, naturally has a dual result. On the
one hand it tells me what I do to the object,
and on the other hand what it does (possibly
to me) (Vol. XL, p. 362).

In describing the archetypes as autonomous factors, Jung

wants to hold to the distinction between the complexes as contents

of the personal unconscious and the archetypes of a collective un-

conscious. For the word "complex" is used primarily to refer to

the autonomous contents of personal origin, to those contents which

develop ontogenetically. The archetype, on the other hand, is in-

herited and thus seems impersonal in the sense that it can not be

explained in the terms of the person's own life history. Naturally,

this clear separation between the personal and collective aspects

of the unconscious is in reality always more or less an interrelation.

For the complexes appear to have an archetypal nucleus and the arche-

types are always manifested in images made up out of combinations

drawn from the individual's store of experience. Nevertheless, it is

still possible in practise to discriminate between those contents of

consciousness which owe their origin primarily to the individual and

his experience from those which lare impersonal and which point beyond

the individual.

The archetype behaves like a complex then in that it is a locus

of thoughts, feelings and images which function in a unified way as







a sort of personality. Rather than indicating that the archetypes

are actually entities outside man, however, the personification which

the archetypal images manifest are typical of autonomous contents which

exist in the unconscious without being integrated with the conscious

personality. The less acknowledgement and understanding an unconscious

element is accorded then, the more it tends to function independently

of the conscious personality and even assume the characteristics of a

personality itself. And since the archetypes are symbolic, numinous

factors which do not originate from one's personal experience, the

ability to integrate them into one's personality has definite limita-

tions. They are, in fact, wider than the individual; they have a

universal collective meaning which the individual can only partici-

pate in but can not hope to completely assimilate. There is often the

real danger that the archetypes will even assimilate the ego person-

ality. "It is perfectly possible, psychologically, for the uncon-

scious or an archetype to take complete possession of a man and to

determine his fate down to the smallest detail" (Vol. XI, p. 409).

Plausible examples of this phenomenon are to be seen in the lives

of Christ and Hitler.

The archetypes seem to have a dual nature, being potentialities

for both evil as well as good. Thus what to one person proves to be

a healing experience giving meaning to life, may prove to another

less stable consciousness to be a source of evil, disorientation or

madness.

Among the most common archetypes which show a distinct personality

are the shadow archetype and the anima and animus. The shadow is a

representation of the personal unconscious as a whole and usually




75


embodies the compensating values to those held by the conscious per-

sonality. Thus the shadow often represents one's dark side, those

aspects of oneself which exist but which one does not acknowledge

or identify with. In dreams it may appear as a dark figure of an

Arab or Negro of the same sex as the dreamer.14

The anima archetype appears in men and is his primordial image

of woman. It represents the man's biological expectation of women

but also is a symbol of a man's feminine possibilities, his counter-

sexual tendencies. The experiences of one's mother and other actual

women are a third contributing factor to the form of the archetype.

The anima often appears in dreams as a strange or unkn on woman.

The animus archetype, the analogous image of the masculine which

occurs in women, may appear as a series of strange men.15

The personification of the above archetypes is often of such a

distinct character that dialogues of significant therapeutic value can

be carried on between the ego and the shadow or anima/animus in the

conscious state. This form of communication with the unconscious,

popularized by the method of Gestalt Therapy, was enthusiastically

recommended by Jung (Vol. VII, p. 201).

In addition to the archetypes mentioned above, there are many

other archetypes which appear in personified form notably the Old

I.se Ien, the Great Hbther, the Earth Mother, the Divine Child and

the Archetype of the Self. However, any attempt to give an exhaus-

tive list of the archetypes would be a largely futile exercise since

the archetypes tend to combine with each other and interchange qua-

lities making it difficult to decide where one archetype stops and

another begins. For example, qualities of the shadow archetype may








be prominent in an archetypal image of the anima or animus.

One archetype may also appear in various distinct forms, thus

raising the question whether four or five distinct archetypes should

be said to be present or merely four or five forms of a single type.

There would then seem to be no decision procedure for determining the

exact boundaries of an individual archetype. For what is to count

as a typical situation and thus indicate the presence of an arche-

type can not be decided a priori, so that for instance ire can not

determine on the basis of general considerations that there must be

so many archetypes. And from the phenomenological point of view,

the appearance of distinct types of archetypal images does not per-

mit us to conclude anything definite about how many archetypes per

se there may be. Therefore, it would seem evident that the complete

cataloguing of the archetypes thereby determining their exact number

is an irresolvable matter and an unreasonable expectation of the

archetypal theory.

In addition to the personified forms mentioned above, there are

many archetypes which do not appear in personal form. For example,

the Archetype of the Self may be manifested as a stone, diamond,

flower or as a four-sided figure. Animals, plants and natural ob-

jects such as the wind, a lake or a mountain may also figure into

archetypal images. There is in fact no determinate condition re-

gulating what form an archetype must assume. This is not to say,

however, that there are not definite conditions an image must

satisfy in order to count as archetypal. But these conditions de-

pend more on the function of the image in the overall context of

the manifestation than they do on the specific form.




If


ith regard to the question of personification, a paradoxical

situation seems to exist since Jung says that all autonomous contents

of the unconscious are personified. "All autonomous psychic factors

have the character of personality . (Vol. I, p. 42). On the

other hand, the archetypes, which presumably are all more or less

capable of autonomous function in the unconscious, do not all appear

in the form of persons. It would seem clear then that personification

is being used in a general sense to mean ascription of traits of per-

sonality to an entity rather than implying that what is personified

must appear as a distinct personality or in the form of a person.


Archetypes and Synchronicity

In our discussion of the phenomenology of the archetypes, dreams

have been emphasized as a characteristic state of consciousness in

which the archetypes come into awareness. Fantasies and visions are

other altered states of consciousness in which archetypes frequently ap-

pear. But in addition to these modes of manifesting themselves,

Jung states that the archetypes may also affect nonpsychic physical

processes. This effect of the archetypes is described by Jung's

theory of synchronicity. In synchronistic events then, there is a

meaningful correspondence between a physical event and a psychic con-

tent with the possibility of a causal connection between the two

having been ruled out. These events are the often recorded meaning-

ful coincidences which seem to defy understanding in terms of either

causality or chance.

An example Jung describes from his therapeutic work serves to

illustrate these ideas.








A young woman I was treating had, at a critical
moment, a dream in which she was given a golden
scarab. Ittiile she was telling me this dream I
sat with my back to the closed window. Suddenly
I heard a noise behind me, like a gentle tapping.
I turned round and saw a flying insect knocking
against the window-pane from outside. I opened
the window and caught the creature in the air
as it flew in. It was the nearest analogy to
a golden scarab that one finds in our latitudes,
a scarabaeid beetle, the common rose-chafer
(Cetonia aurata), which contrary to its usual
habits had evidently felt an urge to get into
a dark room at this particular moment (Vol.
VIII, p. 438).

There would seem to be no plausibility of attempting a causal

explanation here, although chance seems a possible rational explana-

tion. Other examples of synchronistic events, however, seem to

eliminate the possibility of the meaningful coincidence being the

result of the chance intersection of random events. The best

illustration of synchronicity where chance is ruled out occurs in

experiments attempting to verify the phenomenon of extrasensory

perception, ESP. These tests using card guessing techniques are

sometimes structured so that the subject tries to guess the se-

quence of a deck of cards before they are shuffled by a randomizing

machine. As the subject is guessing the sequence of a future order

of the cards, this of course also eliminates the possibility that

the order of the cards can have a causal effect on the mental state

of the subject. The overall results of this type of experiment re-

vealed a probability of reproducing the same results by chance as

1:4OO,000 (Vol. VIII, p. 433). In another experiment one person

guessed all twenty-five cards in the deck correctly after they had

been shuffled, indicating a probability of 1:298,023,223,876,953,125

(Vol. VIII, p. 433).








In the ESP tests the meaningful coincidence is between a con-

tent of consciousness, the person's idea of what cards will appear,

and the actual order of the cards. The archetypal theory comes into

play then as Jung says that an archetype is manifesting itself syn-

chronously in both a psychic content and a physical process. The

term "synchronous" is used instead of simultaneous in the formulation

of the synchronistic hypothesis to indicate that the meaningful coin-

cidence between the psychic and physical events need not occur at

exactly the same time. The physical event can be slightly before

or after the psychic content.

In the ESP examples, it is the archetype of magical effect, the

expectation that a miraculous event can occur, which seems to be at

work.16 Evidence for this is the fact that the results of the ex-

periments are positively correlated with the emotional state of the

subject, so that an enthusiastic, hopeful subject can score well

above chance probability at the beginning of the experiments; and

then his score will move toward the chance probability as the novelty

of the experiments lessen, or if he becomes bored or depressed (Vol.

VIII, p. 434).

The archetypal influence is clearly seen in the first example

given. The woman patient was at a crisis point in her analysis due

to a too narrow rationalistic view which did not leave her sufficiently

open to the possibility of change which could result from tald.ng ser-

iously the irrationally produced contents of the unconscious. The

meaningful coincidence was then the turning point in this regard and

produced the needed change in attitude allowing the analysis to pro-

gress to a successful conclusion. The scarab motif, moreover, is a







classic symbol of rebirth (Vol. VIII, p. 439) so that it would seem

that the patient's situation of impasse had constellated the arche-

type of rebirth and renewal.

Jung postulates that an archetypal ordering principle is at work

in these instances of synchronicity bringing about a situation in

which an outer event and a psychic content are expressions of the

same meaning. The archetypes in these cases seem to be localized

as much in matter and in the environment as they are in the psyches

of individuals.

The psychoid archetype has a tendency to behave
as though it were not localized in one person
but were active in the whole environment (Vol.
X, pages 451l-452).
. the archetypes are not found exclusively
in the psychic sphere, but can occur just as
much in circumstances that are not psychic
(equivalence of an outward physical process
with a psychic one) (Vol. VIII, p. $15).

In using the designation "psychoid" for the archetypes, it

seems that Jung wanted to imply that the archetypes could be mani-

fested in nonpsychic ways, specifically influencing matter. This

use of "psychoid" does not have the same implications as when the
17
instincts are said to be psychoid. In the case of the instincts,

the psychoid label describes a sort of interface region between

the psyche and the physiological processes. . term 'psychoid'

. meant to distinguish a category .of events from merely vitalistic

phenomena on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on

the other" (Vol. VIII, p. 177). ;But the archetype "with its psychoid

nature, forms the bridge to matter in general" (Vol. VIII, p. 216). The

psychoid archetype therefore seems to be "quasi-psychic" in the special







sense that it may be independent of the body.

Synchronicity postulates a meaning which is a
prior in relation to human consciousness and
apparently exists outside man. . the possi-
bility that synchronicity is not only a psycho-
physical phenomenon but might also occur without
the participation of the human psyche . .
(Vol. VIII, pages 501-502, note 71).

It may well be a prejudice to restrict the
psyche to being "inside the body" (Vol. UIV,
p. 300).

The phenomena which Jung describes in his theory of synchro-

nicity undoubtedly exist and his efforts to take account of these

events in his overall theory of the psyche seems a worthwhile and

needed endeavor. However, as we have previously stated, the notion

that there can be a psyche independent of a body and archetypes

which persist outside of man is a postulate which can not be un-

problematically integrated in a consistent way with Jung's theory

of archetypes as a whole. Perhaps the ESP phenomena and the other

events associated with synchronicity will eventually lead to a new

scientific model of the universe. But as this major revolution in

the basic theories of science has yet to come about, the best plan

for trying to gain a coherent understanding of the idea of the arche-

type is, as we have previously argued, to parenthesize the postula-

tion of archetypes existing outside man and to regard this idea as

one possible theoretical extension of the archetypal notion which

has yet to be successfully integrated into the overall theory.

Moreover, the interpretational approach we have used in trying

to grasp the meaning of Jung's archetypes has not had to assume that

archetypes exist outside of man. The overall success of this approach

in making the archetypes comprehensible is perhaps a matter to be








left to the judgment of the reader. However, in taking into account

the full panaroma of Jung' s utterances on the archetypes, it has

been necessary only twice to mention this possibility as a way of

understanding the archetypal theory.

So far as the assertion that the archetypes have a psychoid

characteristic is considered then, this may perhaps best be ren-

dered to mean that the archetypes manifest themselves in a psychic

way but seem to be more than psychic or not only psychic. Wtat this

quality may eventually prove to be would seem part of the puzzle of

the nature of the archetype per se. But this way of conceiving the

psychoid characteristic of the archetypes need not imply that they

exist outside of or independently of man.

In any event, the concept of the archetype is not logically

tied to the notion of synchronicity. Although synchronicity may

well require something like an archetypal hypothesis to make it

intelligible, the reverse is certainly not the case.18


Archetypes and Temporality

One final topic which must be taken up before our exposition of

the archetypal theory is complete is the aspect of the changes in

archetypes through time. Two distinct questions seem to be involved.

In the first place, are there emergent archetypes, that is, do new

archetypes come into being in response to the changing situation of

man? Secondly, how can we account for the changes that archetypes

manifest through time as, for example, the changes that the God

archetype undergoes when the Jehovah of the Old Testament is ex-

perienced as the Christian Trinity and Devil?








It seems evident that an answer to our first question must hinge

on our idea of the origin of the archetypes. As will be remembered,

it was concluded in this regard that the archetypes are inherited

in a similar fashion to other biological structures. If we take

changes in archetypes as being strictly analogous to the way that

the body changes through evolution, we would expect that the chance

of new archetypes coming into being through the evolutionary process

constitutes a very low probability. For the evolutionary process

works in an accumulatory fashion in the sense that the origins of

new structures occurs, as a rule, as an addition to the pattern of

the existing genotype. Highly evolved creatures then tend to be

more complex organisms. Moreover, as a structure becomes highly

evolved, there is less probability of major changes occurring in

it since the chance that single mutations in the genotype will

lead to an improvement in the overall structure compatible with

the rest of the existing genotype is very small. bb would not

expect then the appearance of human beings with new basic struc-

tures for the body, a third eye or an extra limb. These occurrences

would be monstrosities rather than improvements to be passed on to

the next generation. Analogously, the origin of new archetypes

through evolution would seem unlikely, especially in the light of

the basic structuring function that the archetypes are held to play

in the psyche. The archetypes are the phylogenetically old aspects

of the psyche and hence those parts least liable to be changed to

the overall benefit of the organism.

A contemporary man is thus genetically very similar to what man

was like ten thousand years ago, and no radical changes in the overall







pattern of inherited human behavior are to be expected, at least not

for the next few millenia. Moreover, what would a new typical human

situation be like corresponding to which a now archetype could arise?

It would seem clear that any changes in the basic human situation would

only be variations of situations which have existed cotemporously with

the emergence of man as a species.

If from phylogenetic considerations we then reject the practical

possibility of the formation of new archetypes through the evolution-

ary process, the observed changes in archetypal manifestation through

time must be explained from the ontogenetic viewpoint, as the result

of cultural and individual development. The changes in archetypal

manifestation do not thereby indicate a change in the archetype it-

self. By comparison we might consider the human brain which genet-

ically is basically the same structure as it was thousands of years

ago at the damw of civilization. fMdern man's degree of conscious-

ness and his overall conception of reality is, however, far differ-

ent today than it was then, as we see reflected in the development

of culture. The cruial importance of the ontogenetic influence in

giving shape and content to the archetypal disposition must then

not be underestimated, as the basic patterning influence of the

archetype itself can take on a seemingly limitless variety of forms.

Although there can be no new archetypes, there can be new sym-

bols and new myths. The UFO phenomenon is a particularly instruc-

tive example in this regard.

It is characteristic of our time that the
archetype, in contrast to its previous mani-
festations, should now take the form of an
object, a technological construction, in order
to avoid the odiousness of mythological per-
sonification (Vol. X, p. 328).








It is then the interaction between the conscious and uncon-

scious aspects of the psyche that accounts for the changes in arche-

types across time. For with the development of consciousness

through the agency of culture, the archetypal images undergo a

gradual transformation. This is, moreover, what would be expected

if the archetypes are to function as compensatory agents for the

conscious attitude.



1
1 As will become apparent as we proceed, this hope will, not be
fulfilled. It is only in Jung's earlier writing that he attempts to
explain how archetypes originate through ideas about the origins of
myths. However, due to the fact that Jung's views on this matter
become implicated with ideas about the inheritance of acquired
characteristics, this earlier view merits full discussion.
2
In the above we have not distinguished the spiritual from
the religious, as in the previous discussion of the spiritual when
the latter tenm referred to the archetypal manifestation and
"religious" to the product of collective consciousness. Jung does
not always use these terms in a consistent way, although from the
contert it is usually clear whether he is referring to the indivi-
dual or the collective manifestation.
3
However, it is easy to fall into the opposite error of seeing
alchemy solely as a philosophico-religious enterprise and thus fail
to appreciate the important role which alchemical work has played in
the history of chemistry. Jung, in his work with the psychological
significance of alchemical symbols, is particularly open to this
criticism that he has overemphasized the psychological aspect of
alchemy while failing to give due credit to the naturalistic and
practical aspects of the art.
The term "mechanicomorphize" is taken from Joseph F.
Pychlak, A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory (Boston:
Houghton ILfflin, 1968, 7 p 7. is also possible to take the
opposite approach(to anthropomorphiqsj and assign non-human char-
acteristics to human organisms. Some psychologists feel that
the behaviorist does this when he 'mechanicomorphizes' man . . "

Richard Semon, RThe Te& (New York: MacMillan, 1921), p. 11.
6 Dbid., p. 12.







7
This transition apparently occurred sometime between 1925
and 1935.
It is evident that by saying in effect that the question of
the origin of the archetypes is not a useful one to ask, Jung is
attempting to avoid the stigma of the doctrine of inheritance of
acquired characteristics. For from the Lamarckian point of view,
it makes sense to ask how the archetypes come to be in the psyche
and to postulate possible environmental causative conditions. 1Ith
his withdrawal from implicit support of the Lamarckian position,
Jung sees no point to raising the question. However, asking about
the origin of archetypes need not imply a Lamarckian answer. One
might legitimately wish to know whether archetypes have a natural,
biological origin or nonnatural origin as result of intervention
by spiritual agencies. Jung speculates about the possibility of
the latter alternative in the following:
The question is nothing less than this: Does
the psychic in general--the soul or spirit or
the unconscious--originate in us, or is the
psyche, in the early stages of conscious evolu-
tion, actually outside us in the form of ar-
bitrary powers with intentions of their on, and
does it gradually take its place within us in the
course of psychic development? . This whole
idea strikes us as dangerously paradoxical, but,
at bottom, it is not altogether inconceivable
(Vol. I, pages 69-70).

The application of the Kantian phenomena/noumena distinction
to the problem of archetype per se versus archetypal image is not
unproblematic. For the appeal to the archetype per se as the prin-
ciple responsible for the archetypal image would seem to imply the
attribution of qualities to the thing-in-itself, i.e., that the latter
was real and had certain effects. Thus, if we take the archetype
per se as strictly analogous to the thing-in-itself, we end up
attributing properties to that which from Kant's viewpoint we are
not supposed to be able to attribute anything at all. See thrard
Casey's article "Towards An Archetypal Imagination" in r 1974,
p. 29).
10
I0 are using the word "extraspection" in the sense ascribed
to it by Joseph F. irchlak in A Philosonhy of Sience for Personality
eory page 27: "If a theorist takes an extraspective perspective
or frame of reference, he defines his abstractions from his vantage
point as observer, regardless of the point of view of the object of
study."

11 In this portion of a dream of Jung's, for example, the
shadow archetype appears as "Dr. Y. and his son." ~breover, the
image of Jung's father also plays an archetypal role in the dream.
3h contrast to the relationship Jung had with his real father, this
symbolic father acts as a guide to the mysteries of the unconscious.








It started with my paying a visit to my long-
deceased father. He was living in the country--
I did not knoo where. I sar a house in the
style of the eighteenth century, very roomy,
with several rather large outbuildings. . .
Itr father guarded these as custodian.
He was, as I soon discovered, not only the
custodian but also a distinguished scholar
in his omm right--which he had never been in
his lifetime. I met him in his study, and,
oddly enough, Dr. Y.--'who was about my age--
and his son, both psychiatrists, were also
present. I do not Imow whether I had asked
a question or whether my father wanted to
explain something of his own accord, but in
any case he fetched a big Bible down from a
shelf, a heavy folio volume like the Yerian
Bible in my library. The Bible my father
held was bound in shiny fishsldn. He opened
it at the Old Testament--I guessed that he
turned to the Pentateuch--and began inter-
preting a certain passage. He did this so
swiftly and so learnedly that I could not
follow him. I noted only that what he said
betrayed a vast amount of variegated knowledge,
the significance of which I dimly apprehended
but could not properly judge or grasp. I saw
that Dr. Y. understood nothing at all, and
his son began to laugh. They thought that
my father was going off the deep end and what
he said was simply senile prattle. . .
The two psychiatrists represented a limited
medical point of view which, of course, also
infects me as a physician. They represent
my shadow--first and second editions of the
shadow, father and son (Ibmories Dreams
Reflections, pages 217-218).
12
In talking in this way about the insight of a universal per-
spective, there is a temptation to speak in terms of the "wisdom"
of the unconscious. In regard to collective compensation then,
we must be careful to avoid the misunderstanding that this type of
language implies that the unconscious is a sort of higher con-
sciousness which purposively guides the personality to its destina-
tion. For the sort of "guidance" which the unconscious provides
is that which results from the worldngs of a natural process which
itself has no end in view. Jung makes this point in a discussion
concerning compensation by the unconscious.
Yet it would, in my view, be wrong to suppose that in
such cases the unconscious is wording to a deliberate
and concerted plan and is striving to realize certain
definite ends. I have found nothing to support this
assumption. The driving force, so far as it is








possible for us to grasp it, seems to be in
essence only an urge towards self-realization.
If it were a matter of some general teleologi-
cal plan, then all individuals who enjoy a sur-
plus of unconsciousness would necessarily be
driven towards higher consciousness by an
irresistible urge (Vol. VII, p. 184).
13 The anima is in part man's inner image of woman. See page 75
for further characterization of the anima archetype.
14 this generalization is primarily based on the dream material
of Caucasians. Do the shadows of Negroes and other racial groups then
appear as figures with white skin? To my knowledge this question
has not been resolved through empirical studies.
Although the content of all the archetypes is conditioned
by the individual's personal experience, the shadow and the anima/
animus differ from the other archetypes in the fact that their
content is more directly relatable to the person's personal situa-
tion than the other archetypes. In terms of the analogy of depth
then, these archetypes occupy a position intermediate between con-
sciousness and the personal unconscious and the other aspects of
the collective unconsciousness.
16 See Ira Progoff, JunM Synchronicity, and Human Destin
(Hew York: Delta, 1973), p. 106.
Since causation has been ruled out, the question might well
be raised how the "influence" of the archetype can then be made
intelligible. It would seem that some sort of larlike ordering
principle must be postulated not involving a cause and effect
relationship between the objective event and the correlated internal
state of expectancy. Ilaldng clear how the archetype is supposed to
function as this ordering principle is one of the major conceptual
ambiguities which must be resolved in order to make synchronicity
into a viable explanatory hypothesis.
17
Compare use of psychoid as discussed on page 13.

Since the position taken here is that a rational recon-
struction of the archetypal theory is not committed to the task of
a rational reconstruction of synchronicity, we will not attempt a
critical assessment of synchronicity in this study. In order to
carry out that task, several crucial questions would have to be
considered. In addition to the problem of making archetypal
"influence" intelligible, additional clarification is needed as
how the crucial distinction between coincidence and meaningful
coincidence can be made operationally sound. Questions can also
be raised as to the validity of Rhine's statistical procedures
and results. See C.E.M. Hansel's ESP (New York: Scribner, 1966).














CHAPTER 4
CRITICISMS OF THE ARCHETYPAL THEORY: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS



Preliminary Remarks


The exposition of Jung's concept of the archetype having now

been completed, it is the objective of the second half of this study

to consider criticisms of the theory. To an extent we have anticipated

this task in the first half. For in order to rationally reconstruct

Jung's concept of the archetype, it has proved necessary on occasion

to distinguish between essential aspects of the idea and other aspects

which although linked by Jung on occasion with discussion of arche-

types would, if explored in terms of their full implications, lead

to a situation of either obvious inconsistency or hopeless obscurity

and confusion concerning what is meant to be implied by the concept

of an archetype.

As the chief case in point, we have interpreted the archetypes

naturalistically in the sense that it was assummd that they occur as

a natural phenomenon of man rather than as subsistent entities with

an ontological locus outside of man. Closely related to this natur-

alistic stance on the origin and ontological nature of the archetype

was the position taken asserting the psyche's necessary dependence

on the brain. In addition, in terms of our project of reconstruction,

it was found necessary to emphasize the logical independence of the

idea of archetypes from the hypothesis of synchronicity. The assump-

tion of an extrapsychic locus for the archetype which was entailed by


6-t







synchronicity, a locus "in matter," was considered to be an unnecessary

complication to an already cumbersome theory and to be, moreover, an

addition which is incompatible with other aspects of the archetypal

theory as we have reconstructed it.

OCe could, of course, postulate archetypal entities which are

responsible for the phenomena of synchronicity and which subsist in-

dependently of man without having to assume that they were there-

fore supernatural agencies. This supernatural agency hypothesis is

then only one of several conceivable types of nonnaturalistic inter-

pretations.1 However, this assumption of extrapsychic subsistence,

even if it need not invoke the supernatural, still has the effect of

making the archetypes into occult entities, that is, entities which

have very little in common with man as he is understood in terms of

standard scientific knowledge.2

In addition to the questions related to the naturalistic inter-

pretation of the archetypes, we have also previously discussed the in-

fluence of Kantian epistemology on Jung's archetypes (pages 35 and 38).

This topic will be further treated in the third section of this chapter.

The question of evolution theory and its possible consequences

for the plausibility of the archetypal concept, foreshadowed on page 59

will be examined further in the last section of Chapter 7.

The last of Jung's views previously critiqued concerns the ques-

tion of racial differences (page 26). Following Ibrld ar 2I, Jung

appears to have retreated from the implications for racial differences

which he drew from the idea of the collective unconscious. The

claim that different racial groups have a distinctly different collec-

tive unconscious is at any rate not emphasized by Jung in his writings








after Itrld War II, although the quotes in support of such a view
presented on page 26, from Vol. VII, were not retracted by Jung in

the "thorough revision" to which he subjected the book in the fifth

edition in 1942 (Vol. VII, p. 7)3

i.th objections from the scientific perspective and evaluation

of the archetypal concept as a scientific theory having been reserved

for later discussion (Chapters 5,6,7), what remaining criticisms must

then be considered? This question is rendered problematic by the vast

panorama of different types of critical attacks which have been directed

against Jung's views. The project of presenting conclusive counter-

arguments against each individual dissenting author could conceivably

engage one's efforts for several years. But such a volume and variety

of critical literature is not itself a reliable indication of the

inherent weakness of Jung's conceptions nor even of the result of his

violation of beliefs and presuppositions of vested professional in-

terest so much as it is an indication of the obscurity of his method

of presentation, which in its magnificent rhetorical style manages

through its all-encompassing, cosmic scope to have something to offend,

confound or confuse just about everyone. There is also, of course,

a very large and rapidly growing literature from Jungian enthusiasts.

But as the work of even the most immediate Jungian disciples (indivi-

duals such as Aniele Jaffe, Jolande Jacobi and Michael Fordham) offer

supposedly authoritative accounts of Jung's views which differ widely

in interpretational approach and emphasis at crucial points, one begins

to wonder if perhaps there is in fact a problem in that through a com-

bination of intuitive overdetermination5 and lack of precision in for-

mulating and limiting his basic constructs, Jung has tried to explain




Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID EU5DM98K1_3TWTR1 INGEST_TIME 2017-07-17T20:37:53Z PACKAGE UF00098133_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES



PAGE 1

C.G. JinTG'S THEORY OF THE C0LLECTI7E UNCONSCIOUS: A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION TMLTER A70RY SHELBURNE A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVTKSITr OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFTLU^IENT OF THE REQUIREMEI'ITS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHUOSOPHT UNITERSITZ OF FLORIDA 1976

PAGE 2

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 3 1262 08666 238 3

PAGE 3

Copyright 1976 Vfelter Avoiy Shelbume

PAGE 4

ACKMOIilLEDOENTS I irould like to grateful^sr acloioirledge the persons of rcr supervisory committee for their help in this project: Marilyn areig, Tom Aarber, i^anz lifting, Richard Ilaynes and Tom Simon. Special thanks to Iferiljoi and Tom Sijnon for their tiine, encouragement and helpful criticism. I would also like to thank Debbie Botjers of the Graduate School, who, in addition to her technical advice, has through her friendliness contributed in an immeasurable and intangible way to the final preparation of this manuscript, 3h addition to this personal assistance, I TTould also like to aclaiowledge the help of the follo;.jing agencies: the spirit of Carl Gustav Jung, the Archetn>e of the Self, and the three luminous beings tAo cleansed iry spirit. iii

PAGE 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACiaro V/LEDGlJEI'rPS iii ABSTRACT , ^ HrPRODUCTION ,, ., CHAPTER 1 JUl'JG'S I-IEMTAL CONSTRUCTS.. ,,.., 3 Pgyxjhe...... , ,,, 3 Uiconscioiis. . . , .,, .,,, 16 Collective Ifciconscious. . . . , 19 Notes. .................,,..,,,,,,,,, , 28 CHAPTER 2 TI£EORr OF ARCHETTPES: PART I ,,,, 30 Introduction,.., , ,,.,,. ..,,,. 30 The Syrabolic Mature of the Archetypes ,, , l^;^ Archetiypes and Instincts ,,,,... hi Notes.... , ..,,,.. , ,, ^3 CHAPTER 3 THEOrar OF ARCHETn=ES: PART II..... ^ The Origin of the Archetypes ^ Archelypal ninage and Archetype Per Se ., 63 Tlae .'irchetypes as Autonomous Factors,. , 72 Archeigrpes and Synchroniciiy 77 Archetypes and Teniporalitiy. .......,,...,. 82 Notes ^ ......,,, 8^ iv

PAGE 6

Page CHAPTER li CRITICiaiS OF TIIE ARCIIETIPAL TlffiOHT: GHJEI'JUL COITSIDERATIOHS. . , 89 Preliminary Remarks, ,,, 89 Psychoanalytic Criticism 9^ Iheological Criticism.,...,.....,....,.. , 102 Ifotes. •.•••..••••.,•.«••.••..«..«.,, ..........•,.,. .111 CHAPTER ^ JTJIIG AMD THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITDDE: PART I II6 The Relevance of the Question.,,.,.,...,,.,,..,,..,., 116 The Charge of I-^rsticism .,,,.. 11? l-tjrsticism Characterized, .,,, ,,,.,...,...,.119 Is Jung a Ifystic? , 120 Jung's Attitude ToTrard Science.. , 12? Notes il;i CHAPTER 6 JUITG AMD TIIE SCIEIITIFIC ATTITUDE: PART II,, ll;6 Can There Be A Science of Arche%pes? ...II16 Jung ' s Ifethodology ..................I63 Ifotes. ...........171 CHAPTER 7 THE STUDY OF ARCHETYPES AS A SCIEIITIPIC DISCIPLINE., I7I; Introduction. ,.,,................,,..,.,,,,,, ,,..,,.17li Falsifiability ,«,,,..,,, .,,», ,..,,,176 Explanation. .••...•...•....••.....,......,...,,,.,,,,,,,,, i8li Evidence , ..•.,,. ....I88 Archetypes and Evolution Theory , 196 Notes, .•,,.....••......,,•• ....................199 REFERENCES L 203 BIOGRAPHIC.VL SKETCH .......^ ....206

PAGE 7

«-f. +1, ^f^^^a°* of dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial PiiLfirijaent of the Itequireiaents for the Degree of Doctor of Hiilosopl-cr C.G. JUNG'S THEOHY OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUSA RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION By Vfelter Avory Shelbume June 1976 Chairman: Mu?ilyn Zireig ;. !• " Ifejor Department: Hiilosopl-y This study is an examination of Jung's idea of the collective unconscious being primariay concerned id.th the chief aspect of the collective unconscious, the concept of the archetype. In the first half of the dissertation, an attempt is made to understand what Jung means by the archetypes. The e.-cposition of the theory of archetj-pes begins xrith a look at the basic Jungian mental constructs, p^che and unconscious, and td.th a stetch of Jung's theoiy of mind. Then the various aspects of the idea of the archetype are discussed treating such topics as the ontological status of the archetype, the archetypes as a prfx)ri conditioners of*e:cperience, the symbolic nature of archetypes, the archetypes and the instincts, the origin of archetypes, the phenomenology of archetypes, personification of archetypes, the archetjTes and ^ynchronicity and changes in archetypes through tiiae. i Bie exposition of the archetypal theory is undertaken with the aim in mijid of shCTjing hoT7 the idea of archetypes can be construed as a plausible scientific theory compatible idth standard scientific vi

PAGE 8

vii imder^andins. ^^ the second half of the disserbation, v/e discuss problematic aspects of our reconstruction from the point of vietr of criticisms which have been brought against the theory. AS^er a preldjidnaiy chapter in which criticisms of a general nature are discussed, we treat specific problematic aspects involved i/ith underhanding the archetj^al theory as a plausible scientific one. !Ihe rationalily of the archetypal theoiy is discussed in reply to the accusation that Jung's theory is mrstical rather than scientific, nh addition to the question of rationality, we treat the relationship bettTeen the practical and theoretical aspects of the theory in order to disbingulsh bettreen a theoretical and therapeutic discourse about archetypes, idth the latter discourse being concerned id.th personal meaningful interpretation of archetypal experience and hence often justifiabHy employing philosophical and religious teminology. Thus tre attempt to show how the use of such teiroinology bjr Jung in discussions of archetypes does not count against the scientific nature of theoretical claims about archetypes. In addition to attempting to show how the archetypal theoiy is •a rational one and how its relationship to philosopl^ and religion does not count against it as a scientific theoi^r, ,re also examine how the theory can be understood in the context of general criteria for scientific theories. ]ii this regard ire discuss the problem of falsification shordiig how the theoiy can not be interpreted as compatible Tjith all observational i?tates of affairs. I-fe also discuss the explanations and predictions wliich can be expected from the theory. PinaTly the evidence for the theoiy is discussed. Qie conclusion is reached that the archetj-pal theoiy can satisiy

PAGE 9

viii general scientific criteria and also meet specific criticisms of it from the scientific point of vieTr and that thus the scientific plausibility of the theoiy should be admitted.

PAGE 10

HWRODUCTION In this study ire attempt a rational reconstruction of J\mg«s theozy of archetypes ^d.th the goal in view of shoidiig that this theoiy is a scientifically plausible one. In regard to this task, some preliMnaiy questions need to be addressed. Vhat is meant by a rational reconstruction? T*iy is the reconstruction undertaken fl^ a scientific point of viesi and lAat is the purpose of shoidng that the archetypal theoiy is scientifically plausible? So far as the first question is concerned, the idea of a rational reconstruction is to clarify the meaning and interrelationship of the basic concepts of a theory so that the theory can be shoxm to be consistent and to be a theoiy >jith a clearly specified meaning. In. Jung's style of theorizing, clairlty and precision of basic concepts are much less important than fullness of meaning and phenomenologically accurate characterization of events. As a consequence many of Jung's ideas are as vague and ambiguous as th^ are fascinating and insightful. However, the purpose of a rational reconstruction as we understand it is not to oppose the spontaneity and riclmess of creativity vrith a sljiiple desire for order and clarity. Rather the aim of a rational reconstruction is the transformation of the unti(^ richness of creativity into a more directly useable form. By attempting to clariiy the meaning of the archetypal theoiy then, we hope to bring about a vdder aclmowledgement and study of

PAGE 11

the theoiy so as eventually to contribute to its dissemination as a fruitful conceptual schenK. Horrever, our reconstruction from the scientific point of view needs some Justification, For a survey of Jungian literature indicates on the whole a tendency to eniphasize the therapeutic aspect of the theory and its immediate personal relevance . rather than its employment in an attempt to gain scientific knotrledge. But unless the scientific plausibility of the archetypal theoiy can be establii^ed on firm ground, the personal and therapeutic relevance of the theory will be undermined. In Jung's terminology, the dilemma of modem man is that he can no longer simply believe, he must know. The modem individual's desire for a conqjrehensive understanding of the XTorld can thus not be satisfied by viei:s which are incompatible T-Tith scientific understanding. But if the author must confess that he is attracted to the archeigrpal theory from the standpoint of its personal existential relevance, it should not be concluded that the archetypal theory is seen only as a therapeutic tool. For in arguing for scientific plausibility, \je have in mind a more ambitious goal of eventually showing hoir the theoiy can be used to gain theoretical unde,rstanding in a vride range of scientific disciplines. Vfe believe that the theory is not only scientifically plausible, but that it should be accepted and employed as well. Hovrever, this more ambitious aim must await the outcome of our attempt to argue for scientific plausibility. For a rational reconstruction of the theory is necessary before its true scientific merit can be appreciated.

PAGE 12

CHAPTEH 1 JUlTG'o MENTAL CONSTIIUCTS Pg/'che Preliminary Remarks In order to gain a full understanding of Jung's theoiy of archetjrpes, it is necessary to see his vieiis on this matter within the context of his p^yxjhology as a whole. Hbt-rever, within the scope of this study of the archetypes, >7e can not attempt to trace the relationship beti-reen all of Jung's vier-rs and the archetypes. A principle omission in this regard is Jung's theoiy of individuation where he attempts to examine the role which the archetypes play in the development of personality. But if ire can not consider all of Jung's vies^s which are related to the archetypal theory, it is essential to gain an understanding of his mental constructs, Ihus, as a preliminary to discussing the archetypal theory itself, we i-dll examine these constructs. Oar approach in this regard will be to begin with the mental constructs of the xd.de st application. I* i^ill consider first then the most general of the Jungian mentalistic terras, the psyche, Psyche-Body Relation Jung emphasizes that his notion of the psyche is not intended to be a precise notion in the sense that its limits are well defined, "I Imow that veiy many people have difficulties id.th the wrd 'psychological. '

PAGE 13

To put these critics at ease, I should like to add that no one laior.s lAat 'psfyche' is, and one knows o'ust as little hoi-r far into nature •psiyiche' extends."^ Before attempting a definitive cliaracterization of the p^che then, TO will examine hoi-i the concept is used. For if the p^che is a vague notion, we have, nonetheless, little trouble for the most part vrLth regard to deciding ^Aether or not to app^jr it in specific cases. Shics hythe p^hic Jung has in mind something close in meaning to mental, one flniitful way to see ho>x Jung uses this concept is to explore the intended .relation betwen pgyche and body. In this regard tlien, it is clear that by p^/che Jung does not iiean to imply a Cartesian dualism in .Aich the p^he would be a mental substance. For rather than a thiiig or a substance, the psyche is to be considered in terms of a system of energy relations. The terra "libido" is used by Jung to designate the psychic energy. 'This energetic vieiTponut seems to suggest a reductionist position in which the p^he understood as physical energy was seen as reducible to physico-chemical terms or else a vitalist position in irfiich a special tgrpe of mind energy vxas postulated. The possibility that Jung might be taking a reductive position is suggested by the fact that the purpose of the energetic standpoint is to enable the psychologist to understand p^hological phenomena in such tenns as entropy, conservation of energy and equilization of differences in an analogous way 1^ the manner in which physical phenomena can be so understood. Thus Jung belives that the concept of libido "accomplishes for p^holdgy the same advance that the concept of energy introduced into physics" (Vol. TV, p. 112).

PAGE 14

3h the absence of any methods of exact measurement of the energy, quantitative estimations can be reached through appeal to the system of psychological values, as the value intensity of psychological phenomena T/ill be held to be a quantitative estijnate of the amount of psychic energy involved (Vol. Vm, p. 9), Hmrever, Jung makes clear that the analogy beti^een plysical energy and p^srchic energy cannot be taken in too literal a sense: ... in spite of the nonmeasurability of psychic processes, the perceptible changes effected by the psyche cannot possibly be understood except as a plienomenon of energy. Biis places the p^chologist in a situation which is highly repugnant to the physicist: the psychologist also talks of energy although he has nothing measurable to manipulate, besides ^*ich the concept of energy is a strictly defined mathematical quantity which cannot be applied to anything psychic. . . . If psychology nevearfcheless insists on en^jloylng its OTjn concept of energy for the purpose of expressing the activity ... of the psyche, it is not of course being used as a mathematical formula, but only as its analogy (Vol. i/ITI, p. 233). Jung's energetic standpoint is then obviously not an attempt to bring about a reduction of psychology to psychophysics. Jung insists on the autonomous position of psychology in relation to other sciences: Since, unfortunately, we cannot prove scientifically that a relation of equivalence e:cists betTv-een physical and psychic energy, ire have no alternative except eitlier to drop the energetic viei;point altogether, or else to postulate a special psychic energy— which would be entirely possible as a hypothetical operation. Psychology as much as physics may avail itself of the right to build its o;m concepts . . . (Vol, vm, p. 15-16). But this characterization of libido as a "special psychic energy" would seem to imply a vitallst position. This suspicion seems confirmed

PAGE 15

Trfien we read: "From a broader standpoint libido can be understood as vital energy in general, or as Bergon's llan vital " (Vol. 17, p. 2U8), and " . . . tre irould probably do best to regard the psytjhic process siinply as a life-process. In this tray ire enlarge the narroxrer concept of psychic energy to a broader one of lifeenei^, which includes »p^chic energy* as a specific part" (Vol. mi, p. 17). However, Jung nalces clear that "this broader standpoint" is a hcTJothetical and problematic one.2 Jn order to maintain its functional autonany, p^chology must not conflate its concept of psychic enei^ vd-tli a possible biological concept of vital energy. "I have therefore sugge^bed that, in view of the psychological use ttb intend to mabe of it, ^-re call our hypothetical life-energy 'libido. 'To this esrtent I have differentiated it fixan a concept of universal energy, so maintaining the right of biology and psychology to foira their oim concepts" (Vol. VEII, p. 17). Biere is also an explicit disclaimer of the concept of vitalism: "Vfe shall not be disturbed if we are met vdth the cry of vitalism. Ife are as far removed from ai^y belief in a specific life-force as fi-om ai^ other metaphysical assertion" (Vol. IV, p. 12^). I* see then that in regard to the question of reductionism, Jung wants to avoid comraitinent to either reductionism or vitalism. Jung's stand on this issue can then best be characterized as de facto antireductionist. Father than attempting to defend the a priori nonreduction of psychological phenomena to physics or chemistry, Jung holds to a de facto antireductionism. This nonreduction as a matter of fact is supportable hy the available empirical evidence

PAGE 16

and is strictny speaking neutral T^Tith respect to the issue of reduction in principle. Jung's noncoranital stand on reductionism is characteriffbic of his p^hology as a whole i/here he attenpts to define his psychological conrtructs dji ways which are as free as possible from philosophical controvert. Howver, this dislilce for philosophy frequently leads to the situation of unclarity with regard to the full implications of Jung's views. This situation of ambiguity if well e:3eRrplified when we attempt to comprehend i-jhat sort of psyche-bo(fy relation Jung has in mind in constructing his psychology. For Jung's noncommital vieirs on reductionism fail to give us a definite clue as to his position on the mind-bo^ problem. Hoirever, in regard to this clue, there are indications that Jung holds to a nondualistic position in which the psyche is seen as necessarily dependent on the brain, >7ith p^he entailing embodied pj^i-che. So far as our e:qperience permits of any inference at all about the nature of the psyche, it shotrs the p^rchic process as a phenomenon dependent on the nervous sj-stem (Vol, VHI, p. 322, 1926). • . • the human psyche lives in indissoluble union idth the body (Vol. YUl, p. llii, 1936). Md just as the material of the body that is ready for life has need of the p^che in order to be capable of life, so the psyche presupposes the living body in order that its images may live (Vol. VHI, p. 326, 1926). But Jung seems to call into question the view that the psyche is necessarily embodied, thus suggesting a dualifffcic position. Ih a 193U essay \je read such irtatements as the follwdng:

PAGE 17

... the psyche's attachment to the brain, i.e., its space-time limitation, is no longer as selfevident and incontroviertible as we have hitherto been led to heUeve (Vol. vni, p. kl3). The l^rpothetical possibility that the pi^che touches on a form of ejdstence outside space and time presents a scientific question-mark that merits serious consideration for a long time to come (Vol, Vm, p. klh). LAt deatlQ we may establish T-jith reasonable certainty that an individual consciousness as it relates to ourselves has come to an end. But Tjhether this means that the continuity of the psychic process is also interrupted remains doubtful, since the psyche's attachment to the brain can be confirmed tdth far less cei'titude today than it could fifty years ago. Psychology must first digest certain parap^'-chological facts, which it has hardly begun to do yet (Vol. Vm, p. 1,12), One vray to come to terras Td.th this apparent radical shift in position is to atten^jt to distinguish an earlier necessary embodiment view from a later view \jhen, in the last years of his life, Jung held to the belief in the existence of disembodied psyches. A consideration of the dates of ttie above quoted statements, however, casts doubt on the idea that Jung's position can be neatly divided into an earlier and later period,^ Although there certainly is a slow gradual shift airay from the necessary embodiment vleir, the certitude wi-Ui which Jung states that the psyche has a necessary connection with the body is never replaced xjith another position which Jung can state in an unhypothetical way and \M.ch can easily be integrated uTith the rest of his vieirs. Just as the parapsychological data have to an esrtent proved to be anomalies inejrplicable in terns of present pl^sical Istis, so do the considerations concerning the related phenomena which caused Jung to doubt the psyche's necessaiy connection vdth the brain prove

PAGE 18

to be anomalous in.th respect to his pgycholosy as a whole. ]h order then to understand the place of these anomalous statements in relation to the totality of what Jung says about the p^che, the sort of distinction to mxst bear in ndnd is that betireen a T-rell-worked out and fruitful concept, the notion of the pj^yxshe as embodied and dependent on the brain, versus tentative, hypothetical attempts to see hOTj this vlerr could be expanded, or perhaps revised, in order to take into account the full range of the parapsychological phenomena, ^though a full discussion of Jung's parapsychological reflections can not be attempted here, it would seem that the parapsyxihological data did not lead Jung to conclude that comniiianent to a position of dualism, in the sense that psj-che and matter are radicaiay different types of entities, was necessaiy. Ifather, present in the latest as well as earlier Tndtings is the viei-; that psyche and bo(fy (matter) are different aspects of a common fundamental entity. ... it is not on3y possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and ttie same thinp(Vol. VIII p. 21^, 19li6). This living being appears outuardOy as the material boc^y, but inwardly as a series of images of the vital activities talcing place within it, Ihey are tvro sides of the same coin, and vre cannot rid ourselves of the doubt that perhaps this whole separation of mind and body may finally prove to be merely a device of reason for the purpose of conscious discrimination— an intellectuallynecessary separation of one and the same fact into two aspects, to which we then Illegitimately attribute an independent existence (Vol. VHI, p. 326, 1926)

PAGE 19

10 "Diat even the psychic world, which is so e:d;raordinarily different from the physical vjorld, does not have its roots outside the one cosmos is evident from the undeniable fact that causal connections e^dst betireen the pj^yche and the bo^' T/hich point to their underlying unitary natm'e (Vol. :crv, p. ^38, 19^). If one is untdUing to postulate a pre-established haiTOory of pl^ysical and psychic events, then they can only be in a state of interaction. But the latter hypothesis requires a psyche that touches matter at some point, and, conversely, a matter idth a latent psyche, a postulate not so very far removed from certain f onnulations of modem physics (Eddington, Jeans, and others). In this connection I would remind the reader of the existence of parapsychic phenomena . . , (Vol. Vni, p. 23^, 19h6), In order to understand Jung's theoiy of mind, it :rould seem essential to understand t:ro problematic aspects of Jung's views. On the one hand, ire need to understand how Jung's essentially double aspect approach can be made compatible idth acceptance of disembodied psyches. On the othei' hand, as e:
PAGE 20

11 disembodied psyches, ve can nonetheless understand hou Jung's vievrs on this matter can seem at one moment to be dualistic, ..hile in another instance he appears to hold to a monistic double aspect theoiy. For the p^he is to be studied from the standpoint of the empirical data as if it Trcre a distinct entity from the bo
PAGE 21

12 PJeuriffticainy though ire can make such a specification in principle as this specification is to indicate the phenomenological difference betiTOen the psychic and nonpsj'xjhic. Jung says then that 'H/hat I would call the psyche proper extends to all functions which can be brought under the influence of a i/ill" (Vol, YTLl, p. 183). Ibreover, by irill is understood a form of disposable energy (Vol, vni, pages 182-183). The sort of worldng model that emerges from this characterization then is a separation of the p^jrche and the tru3y psychological from the instincts and the only physiological in terms of the possibility of modification or fle:dLbility in the othen.dse rigid c^'namisms of ph^rsiological compulsion, ySn ej:2unple of what is meant by the nonpqrchic in terms of animal life is perhaps instructive. For in consideration of the insect world, there seem to be no e:3ceptions to the rigid physiological detenninisra of behavior, An insect is essentially a physiological automoton. However, as we consider more coiig)lex forms of organisms idth more centralized nervous systems, the hypothesis of the existence of at least a rudimentary form of consciousness becomes more probable. Vfi.th the higher mammals the e:d.stence of psychological processes becomes evident. Thus Jung e3:plicitly affirms the eJcLstence of psychic processes in dogs and domestic animals (Vol. VIII, pages 173 and I89). For Jung then the psyche is not restricted to man but only finds its greatest development there as the outcome of a continuous developmental sequence of gradual phylogenetic emergence. In specifying the relationship betiv^een the instincts and the psyche then, the instincts are conceived to be ectopsychic in origin. '

PAGE 22

13 Jung summarizes his argument on this point in the folloxdng way: If we started with the hypothesis that the psyche is absolutely identical v/ith the state of being alive, then we should have to accept the e:d.stence of a psychic function even in unicellular organisms. ... But if we look upon the appearance of the p^che as a relatively recent event in evolutionary history, and assume that the psychic function is a phenomenon accompanying a nervous :^stem which in some way or other has become centralized, then it woiad be difficult to believe that the instincts were originally psychic in nature, iind since the connection of the p^che T-dth the brain is a more probable conjecture than the pqychic nat\ire of life in general, I regard the characteristic compulslmiess of instinct as an ectopi^ychic factor ^Vbl. vni, p. 11^). 3h stating that instincts are ectopsychic, Jung does not of course vdsh to deny a psychological aspect to instinctual phenomena,and thus he \Ashes to make clear that the instincts can be considered from ti/o potots of vier/: as they appear in consciousness, their p^chic impact, as it irere, and as physiological stimuli. 3hstinct as a ectopi^ychic factor would play the role Ox a stimulus merely, while instinct as a psychic phenomenon would be an assimilation of this stimulus to a pre-existent psychic pattern. A name is needed for this process. I should term it psvchization. Thus, what we call instinct offliand would be a datura already psychized, but of ectopsychic origin (Vol. VIII, p. n^). A further clarification of Jung's theoretical model of the psyche comes into play when this ambiguous interface region betireen the psychological and the physiological is explicitly considered. For the psychological phenomena associated idth the disposable energy of the will are according to Jung's model merely the end of a continuum tTith the physiological at one end and the psychic at the other.

PAGE 23

11; Ibreover, in tlie middle of this continuum, Jung identifies psychoid functions which are quasi-psychic yet not merely pliysiological. Instincts are examples of these p:^nchoid phenomena vrtiich though not p^chic in the full sense of Jung's designation yet have p^chological aspects. Jung states then that the teiro "psychoid" is "meant to distinguish a category of events from merely vitalistic phenomena on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on the other" (Vol. Vni, p. 177). Since in order to be influenced by the disposable energy of the vrill a function or process must be capable of becoming conscious, the characterLstic quality of those functions which are psychoid is their incapability of reaching full consciousness. The sense in which Jiing sees the instincts as not capable of full consciousness is made clear in the folloidng way: Ih spealc of "instinctive actions," meaning by tliat a mode of behaviour of vxhich neither the motive nor the aim is fully conscious and \rh±ch is prompted only by an obscure inner necessity. . . , Bius instinctive action is characterized by an unconsciousness of the psychological motive be-fhand it, in contrast to the strictly conscious processes which are distinguished by the conscious continuity of their motives (Vol. vni, p. 130). Now the positive characterization of the psyche in terms of functions triiich can become fully conscious and hence capable of being influenced by the disposable energy of the will is not fully described by dlstlnguislTing betTreen the pi^he and the instincts. For Jung makes the point that there is another tj^pe of function which liMts the will and which cannot be described as instinctual in the pl^siological sense. Ohis function is called spiritual. Identical i^th the factors lAlch Jung calls the archetypes, the spiritual function

PAGE 24

1^ is like instinct a p^jrchoid function incapable of full consciousness,^ A full discussion of what Jung means hy the spiritual Tdll be given in Chapter 3. Here it Tdll suffice to state tliat for Jung the compulsiveness associated xiith the nonpsychic realm is due not only to (^araisras of pliysiological origin, the instincts; but, in addition to this loT-rer limit, the psyche has an upper limit ijhere the pi^chic functions gradually fall under the influence of spiritual determinants. "Just as, in its louer reaches, the psyche loses itself in the organic mateilal substrate, so in its upper reaches it resolves itself into a 'spiritual' form about lAich ire knoir as little as we do about the functional basis of instinct" (Vol. VIII, p. 183). Tn terms of the continuum model then, there wotild appear to be psychoid pTOcesses on both sides of the p^che, and the psyche could be figuratively sa±d to be surrounded by psychoid processes. But from a phylogenetic point of view, the question non/ arises why the spiritual function is said to be "higher" than the instinctual psychoid function, since the p^che appears to have developed out of the psychoid processes considered as a whole and thus to be "higher" than it in the sense of having developed later.. The solution to this enigma seems to be that although the archetypal psychoid processes are probabOy present, at least in rudimentary form, throughout the animal kingdom, it is only vdth the development of the more advanced foims of consciousness that there is a clear separation betereen instinctual and spiritual psychoid functions. Moreover, it seems to be just this separation which brings about the phenomenon of consciousness so that "psychic processes seem to be balances of energy floidng betireen spirit and instinct" (Vol, Vm, p. 207),

PAGE 25

16 Not; in this separation of spiritual and instinctual functions, the instinctual energies seem to be channelled by the spiritual forms. 3h a sense the spiritual function is then that which allmrs the energies of man to be employed in other than instinctual activities. TMs is the sense in T7hich the spiritual function is higher than the instinctual. PVom the standpoint of phylogen^r, hoi-rever, the designation of "higher" is misleading since both types of psychoid processes are unconscious in relation to the later developing consciousness associated Td.tli the psyche. "Spirit and instinct are by nature autonomous and both limit in equal measure the applied field of the Tdll" (Vol. Vni, p. 183). Ihconscious Ifow it vrould seem that an understanding of the positive characterization of the psyche in terms of the \d21 leads to the conclusion that the psyche is to be conceived as equivalent to consciousness or atfareness in opposition to the p^choid functions, the distinguishing feature of which is their incapability of full consciousness and hence relative autonomy from the will (Vol. VHI, p. 18U). Itorever, it is only when ve consider tlie attribution of an unconscious dimension to the psyche that a full characterization of what Jung intends by his pgyche construct can be accomplished. 3h order to resolve this apparent paradox of the existence of an unconscious psyche then, it is necessaiy to focus on the meaning Jung gives to the notion of the unconscious. He s^s that "since we perceive effects whose origin cannot be found in consciousness, >re are compelled to allow hypothetical contents to the sphere of the nonconscious, which means presupposing that the origin of those effects

PAGE 26

17 lies in the unconscious precisely because it is not conscious" (Vol. IV, p. lltO). Thus "... eveiTthing in the personality that is not contained in the conscious should be found in the unconscious" (Vol. HI, p. 20U). Hie unconscious understood in this negative xra^ as the nonconscious is relatively unproblematic, liiatever is not imraediately present in ai-jareness is said to be unconscious, Ifenories, for e:caniple, can be said to be unconscious contents ivhich can be brought into consciousness at idll. Other unconscious contents such as res pressed experiences or subliminal perceptions nay also be brought Into ai^areness, although a special effort or technique is needed. Since tlie latter are not as easily recoverable to airareness as the former, they are s&id to belong to a "deeper level" of the unconscious. The analogy of depth then amounts operationally to a function of energy. Contents xd.th a certain critical energy stay in consciousness and lacking it become unconscious. IJien contents which are ordinarily unconscious became charged Td.th energy, they intrude themselves into conscious at/areness and produce a so-called 'lOTrering of consciousness" with a consequent disruption of conscious intentionali tie s , Ihe boundary or dividing point then betireen conscious and unconscious is an energy threshold. HoiTever, ttiis idea that conscious and unconscious are qualitatively separate should not be understood to mean that a sort of energy membrane sharply divides conscious from unconscious contents. For it rather the case that every psychic content is to some degree unconscious and that consequently the psyche is both conscious and unconscious at once.

PAGE 27

Consequently there is a consciousness in vrhich unconsciousness predominates, as ttbH as a consciousness in which self -consciousness predominates. This paradox becomes immediately intelligible when we realize that there is no conscious content which can with absolute certainly be said to be totally conscious ... (Vol. VHI. pares 187-188). ' ^^ Vfe must, hoa/ever, accustom ourselves to the thought that conscious and unconscious have no clear demarcations, the one beginning where the other leaves off. It is rather the case that the psyche is a conscious-unconscious whole (Vol. VUI, p. 200), It becomes clear then hour the characterization of the psyche in terms of the i.-ill allows for an unconscious dimension to the p^che. For it is only the possibility of an influence by the ^rUl that is necessary to characterize the psychic as distinct from the p^jrchoid. iAnd although it is this possibility lAich is the distinguishing feature of the psyche, rather than being identical vTith consciousness, the psyche is better conceptualized as for the most part unconscious, Tiith the conscious region being of congiaratively narrow scope. Bie idea of the unconscious then adds a dimension of depth to the notion of the psyche. ]h addition to those items of immediate airareness, there are other contents on the fringes of consciousness or just beloi; the threshold of at/areness, Jung catalogues these unconscious contents in the follmnng way: " . , , lost memories, painful ideas that have been repressed (i,e,, forgotten on purpose), subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense -perceptions that were not strong enough to reach I consciousness, and finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness" (Vol. Vn, p. 66). "... Eroiything forgotten or repressed or othenn.se subliminal that has

PAGE 28

19 been acquired by the individual consciously or unconsciousljr" (Vol. XVn, p. 116). Often these unconscious contents group together to form subliminal functional units vM.ch then become sort of "splinter psfjrches" or "fragmentaiy personalities" (Vol. VHI, p. 97). These focal points of unconscious psychic activity are designated as the coniple^aes. They are groups of oi^ten highly emotionally charged feelings, thoughts and images which are associated together so that, for instance, an environmental stiinulus which activates the comple:c results in the entirety of the associated psychic contents coming into play and affecting consciousness. !IMs often leads to a response which is out of proportion to the initiating stimulus. For Jung the ego itself is merely a complex, "the complex of consciousness" (Vol. XTJ, p. 3^7). In so far as the meaning of the ego is psychologxcally nothing but a complex of imaginings held together and fixed by the coenesthetic impressions, Cbodily feeling^ ... the comolex of the ego may ^rell be set parallel T-rith a^d compared to the secondary autonomous complex (Vol. U p. 601), ' Collective Ifaconscious I'ath the description of these unconscious components to the pjyche then, the concept of the psyche according to Jung's "definition" of it in teiTOS of the idll is complete. HoT-jever, Jung goes on to describe the p^choid region of the unconscious which is designated as a collective unconscious in contrast to the region of the unconscious in relati^ly close | association to consciousness which he calls the personal unconscious. "As to the no man's land which I have called the 'personal unconscious,' it is fairly easy to prove

PAGE 29

20 that its contents correspond exactly to our definition of the pssrchic. But— as tre define 'psychic '--is there a psychic unconscious that is not a 'fringe of consciousness' and not personal?" (Vol. VIII, p, 200). !rhe above quotation should make it clear that although according to Jung's specification of what the psrsrche means in the strict sense, it should be applied only to consciousness and the personal unconscious, Jung frequently uses the tenn to include the collective impersonal portions of the unconscious as well. Thus Jung often speaks of a collective p^che or of an impersonal, objective psyche. Further discussion on this point of hoir the collective unconscious can be said to be psychic on the one hand and not to fit into the definition of the p^che on the other must wait until further in the exposition. The crucial distinction involves discz-lMnating between the psychic contents as they appear in consciousness and their postulated but unobserved determinants xrhich are said to be psychoid rather than psychic. There is then for Jung an impersonal and collective aspect to the unconscious in contrast to the personal unconscious described above, tbreover, this collective unconscious is said to constitute a deeper stratum of the unconscious than the personal. l*iereas for the personal unconscious the "depth" of a content represents a corresponding lack of energy and hence a greater degree of nonassociation to the central focus of awareness, the collective unconscious is "deeper" In the additional sense of being the foundation of the "upper" layers. Consciousness and the personal unconscious then represent the individual and personal heterogeneity which develops through maturation from a common and universal homogeneity.

PAGE 30

21 "Individual consciousness is only the flower and the fruit of a season, sprung from the perennial rhizome beneath the earth . . . (Vol, V, p. xxiv). Jung then uses the terra "collective" to mean the opposite of personal or individual. "I have chosen the teiro 'collective' because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everyiThere and in all individuals" (Vol. IX-A, pages 3-k). Jung argues that since the bo(fy may be said to have certain universal features which form a common basis for the emergence of individual differences, it would then be reasonable to expect that the p^che, which is intimately related to the body, would also have common and universal features: "... Just as the human bo(^ shows a common anatomy over and above all racial differences, so, too, the human psyche possesses a common substratum transcending all differences in culture and consciousness" (Vol, HII, p. 11), "For just as taiere is an objective human body and not mere3y a subjective and personal one, so also there is an objective psyche xjith its specific structures and activities , . . " (Vol. Ill, p. 267). The idea of a collective \mconscious thus understood as the coMuon, universal element of the pqyche would seem relatively unproblematic or perhaps even superflous as a concept since no one would wish to deny that the psyche has foundations in the structure of -Oie brain which are common to all men, Ho;rever, the real import of Jimg' s theoiy of a collective unconscious is brought into clari-ty ^•jhen Jung states tliat the contents of the collective imconscious are

PAGE 31

22 in fact psychic contents triiich come into awareness but uhich are not the direct consequences of the individual's om personal experiences. "... Si addition to memories from a long-distant conscious past, completely ner. thoughts and creative ideas can also present themselves from the unconscious-thoughts and ideas that have never been conscious before."'^ Ihe collective unconscious is then not only the structural element common to the psyches of all menj it is also the active source of original psychic contents. Mditional features of Jung's concept of the collective unconscious come to light vrhen v;e learn that "... ego-consciousness seems to be dependent on tr^o factors: firstly, on the conditions of the collective, i.e., the social, consciousness; and secondly, on the archetjrpes, or domliiants, of the collective unconscious. The latter fall phenomenologic ally into t>/o categories: instinctual and archetypal" (Vol. VHI, pages 217-218). Ohus both instincts as well as archetypes characterize the collective unconscious. Ifcreover, there is in addition a concept of collective consciousness which is to be distinguished from the collective unconscious. Jung states that by collective consciousness he has somethiiig sinilar iji mind to Preud's idea of the superego (Vol. EC-A, page 3, note 2). like the superego, the collective consciousness is partially conscious and partially unconscious. It consists of "generally accepted truths" (Vol. VHI, p. 218), i.e., of beUefs, values and ideals which are supposedly held in common hy members of a community and which senre as a sort of common ideological basis or cultural idea for the community. :ihe contempora^ phenomenon of the so-called counter-culture would then represent

PAGE 32

23 a process of development or change in the collective consciousness of our time. I^e collective consciousness has its ultimate source in the collective unconscious. For through the influence of the collective unconscious on individuals, ner^ ideals, ethical and religious systems, and basic scientific discoveries come into avrareness for the first time. Hoivever, the symbolic quality of these images from the unconscious is eventually lost as the images and ideas are subjected to the interpretative powers of generations in order to assimilate them to the existing i^stem of culture. !Ihrough this process the manifestation of the collective unconscious in one pioneer individual is gradually transforaied into the cultural heritage and collective consciousness of the coraraunity. The result is then often the sort of transition that the religious insight of an individual undergoes in the change from the teachings of the individual in his lifetime to the formation of a doctrine of established belief ly his later followers. It is the difference between an original religious experience and the dogma of an established church. Jung states then that "... we can hardly avoid the conclusion that betvreen collective consciousness and the collective unconscious there is an aLnpst unbridgeable gulf over which the subject finds himself suspended" (Vol. vni, p. 218). Jung makes the point that through the process of socialization and in attempting to adapt to the demands of society v;e tend to identify ourselves with the consequent roles T*ich to must play in order to fit smoothly into the social; order. This part of the personalily Jung calls the persona. The word means mask and like a mask the

PAGE 33

2U persona is the person that -.re pretend to be In order to have a well-defined niche in the comnuniV. I'hen ire analyse the persona ire strip off the mask, and discover that what seemed to be individual is at bottom collectivej in other words, that the persona was onlly a mask of the collective psyche. FtrndanentaTIy the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise betireen individual and society as to what a man shoidd appear to be (Vol. TH, p. 1^8). By "collective p^/che" in this context it is clear that the collective consciousness is meant. However, there are other passages in which the teiro "collective psyche" means collective unconscious. For example: It is therefore absolutely essential to make the sharpest possible demarcation betvreen the personal and the impersonal attributes of the psyche. O^is is not to deny the sometimes very formidable existence of the contents of collective unconscious, but only to stress that, as contents of the collective psyche, th^-^ are opposed to and different from the individual psyche (Vol. VII, p. 9k). "Collective p^che" is then an ambiguous tem leaving stni to be specified the amount of unconsciousness that is implied. This foiTOulation is sometimes preferable when speaking of the consciousness of a group, particularly when there is a strong group identity. For since the collective consciousness is grounded in the collective unconscious, there are then correspondences bettreen the institutions of culture and the related archetypes. The effectiveness of the conrmmity leader, for example, is often a function of his capacity to fulfil the expectations brought about by the projection of the archetype of the hero or Old Vise Ifen upon him, and the guiding ideals of the community remain cohesive factors for the life of that coraraunity

PAGE 34

25 oiLly so long as they remain living symbols capable of constellating the appropriate archetyipal configurations. The aribiguous "collective p^he" is then sometLTies the best description of the Zeitgeist of a people, as it aclmat7ledges the close relationship beti/een the foundations of culture in the collective unconscious and the eribodijnents of those foundations in the accepted standards of collective life. Iforeover, Jung's use of the aiiibi^ous "collective psorche" becomes easier to appreciate when it is made clear that for him the relationship of the personal psorche to the collective unconscious is closely analogous to the relationship of the individual to society. "Now, all that I have said here about the Influence of society upon the individual is identicaUy true of tlie influence of the collective unconscious upon the individual psyche" (Vol. VII, p. 1^1;). Therefore the psychology of a comraunliy is not basically different from the p^hology of an individual: " . . . Ihe psyche of a people is only a somer^hat more complex structure than the psyche of an individual" (Vol. X, p. 86). Collective consciousness and the collective unconscious may then both be subsumed under collective psyche due to the close relationship beti-reen the tt/o and the siutilar relatlonsliip of the individual to the collective aspect in each case. Bie individual has thus both an inner and an outer relationship to the collective as he mu^ contend Tdth society ad.thout and the collective unconscious Td.thin. One point that sliould be made clear when use is made of the te™ "collective p^che" is that Jung does not mean to iiiqjly that a group consciousness ercLsts in the sense of a psychic entity vrfilch

PAGE 35

26 exists over and above the p^hes of individuals. For the coimon aspects of the p^hes of a group can be abstract2y said to represent a group p:^he vdthout this having to mean that there is something P^TJhic which persists independently of the individuals involved. 3h so far as the similarities rather than the differences betireen collective consciousness and collective unconscious are emphasized as in "collective psyche," questions then arise concerning the e:d.stence of distinct kinds of group psyches. That is, to what extent is the idea of a collective unconscious meant to be truly transcultural and to what extent is there intended to be a different collective unc onfor each distinct community of men? Evidence can be found in Jung's wrk to support either of the tiro possible positions suggested above. For example, ,re find: "Ihe collective unconscious is sijnply the p^rchic e^xpression of the identity of bradji structure irrespective of all racial differences" (Vol. XIII, p. 11). But there are also abatements such as the folloTTing: lb doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of p^tjhic development, ifhere it is still impossible to distinguish beti/een an Axjan, Semitic, Hamitic, or Ibngolian mentality, all human races have a common collective psyche. But Tiith the beginning of racial differentiation essential differences are developed in the collective psyche as well (Vol. Vn, p. 1<2 note 8). > F. -«-^ , Inasmuch as there are differentiations correspondong to race, tribe, and even family, there is also a collective psyche limited to race, tribe, and family over and above the "universal" collective psyche (Vol, VET, p. 275). The difficulty of understanding is again partly the result of the problematic interaction of foin and content, of the difference betvreen a common universal rtructure and its concrete embodiment in

PAGE 36

27 WS irhich are characteristic of individual cultures. Ibreover, the irord "collective p^/che" tends to obscure these differences which arise from ttie fact that the collecti^ unconscious is an abstraction, a theoretically postulated coinr»nallty derived from the phenomena of concrete cultures in Trhich the archetypes exist as actual symbols and images, Hoirever, this line of erqjlanation is only partially satisfactoiy in LLght of the totality of Jung's vndtings. It seems that notidthstanding the differences that come about when the common structure of the psyche is embodied in culturally characteristic ways, Jung means that the common structure itself is different Td.th respect to the different ethnic and racial groups, ffis statements, for example, about the inapplicability of Indian yoga practises for the Ifestem psyche (Vol. XE, p. ^3h) and the characteristic quality of JetTish p^chology which might not be appropriate for non-Jewish peoples (Vol. VH, p. 1^2, note 8) seem to support this idea. HoTTBver, the concept of racial differences in the collective unconscious seems one of the least defensible of all Jung's ideas on the unconscious. For nof.rLthstanding the lack of credibility In the notion that Je^dsh p^hology or Indian yoga are inapplicable to someone tdth a Ifcstem Christian heritage, it would seem that the similarities of a universal structure of the psyche would greatily overshadow, any racial differences that Mght exist in that structure, just as the bodies of persons of different races and ethnic groups seem to be of overwhe3Mng simllapity differing only in veiy minor ways. There are, of course, marked differences in the collective

PAGE 37

28 p^/ches of distinct human groups, if ty this teiro is understood the culturally distinct ways in which the collective unconscious is developed and expressed. Iluch of what Jung says about the inherent psychic differences of people of vai-ious human groups can be understood in this way without the necessity of postulating significant racial or ethnic differences in the structure of the collective unconscious itself. .£'^'; Ji»«* f^ollected Vforks. Vols. I-XC^C (Rrinceton: Princeton TAixversiiy ft-ess, 1^6?;, Vol."Tm:; p. ]|09. Quotations are from the follovnng editions: Vol. I, Psychiatric Studies. First liiition, 19^7' Vol. II, aaaerimental Itesearches. 1973; Vol. ni. The Psychogenesis ^J±^^ Qi-sease, 1960j Vol. IV, Freud and Psychoanalv^s . 19^31 — Vol. V, %mbols of Transfoiroation. Plrst Edition, 19^; Vol. ''H. .I^cholof^ical, TvTjes. 1971; Vol. VII, Two Essays ^ Malvtic4 Psycholof?^, Second Edition, 1966; Vol. Vm, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche. Second Edition, 1969; Vol. IX, Part I, The ilrchetyTJes and the Collective Ihconscious. Second Edition, I968 T!iereafter cited as Vol. E(-AJ; Vol. IX, Part H, .Aion, Second Edition, I968 (hereafter cited as Vol. t;,>.b); Vol. X, Civilization in Transition. First Edition, 196it; Vol. XI, PgycholoCTand Religion ; Tfest and East, Second Edition, nnJo' 1°}' ^^' Fsycholopiy ^2^ ^cheiir^. Second Edition, I968; Vol. XEII, I960; Vol. 'Crv, I?;-sterium Coniunctionis. First Edition, 1963; Vol. XV, Ihe Spirit in 1^ Art, and Literature. 1966; Vol. XVI, The Practise of Psychotherapy. Second Edition, 1966; Vol. XVH, Tlie Develome n-b of ^rsonality. ig^Iit Vol. XVTII, ia.scellany; Vol. XIxT ^blioirraphy a5d Inde:-c. Hereafter cited by volume nuriber, It is not in the passage where he spealcs of Bergson that this is made clear but in the essay "On Psychic Qiergy," Vol. VHI, pages 3-66 where the implications of the libido theory idth respect to the problem of the mind-body relation are discussed in detail. Ibfortunately this seems to be characteristic of Jung's style. 1-fi.sunderstandings^are pixjduced by a causal or parenthetical comment Trhich then require manj' lengthy passages or even whole essays to correct. 3 3h determining the chronology of Jung's writings the volume number of the collected irorks is not a reliable indicator, ^e collected works are grouped by subject matter, and while this serves as a rough guide to different periods of Jung's trork, some of the ear^y and middle inltings appear in the last volumes.

PAGE 38

29 h +« K« '* ^x.°°"^^^ anomalous facts i^ith respect to a given theoiy to be ones ..hich f ail to be e:q,la3jied b7 the theory and whiS Sfcer a protracted period of such failure lead either to the ad hoc revision of the theoiy^or to emergence of a new more comprehensive theory which icLll be able to encompass their e:^lanation in a context i^ch preh!TS Pj^°js:iy exgLained data. The sense of anomaly is that used by T.H. I^ in hxs Structure of Scientific Evolutions. Second Edition C Chicago: IMversity of Chicago Press, 1970)1 ' Statements about the disembodied psj-che then have this anomalous relaUonshxp to Jung's established theory. Diis becomes evident iTiiOT efforts are made to see hov: the statements can be made consistent vath the established theoiy. 4 , ^,J^ aspect theoiy is meant the viei^ that mental and pliysical are different aspects of some third entity xAich is itself neither mental nor pliysical. Lateractionism is the viei/ that mental events can cause physical events and vice versa. Strictly spealdng the archetypes are completely incapable of ?!^^!Ln°°"^°J°x^ ^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ '^a* appears in consciousness i,fJ^L^\^^^^^^ P®^ s® ^* on^ an archetypal image. This distinction bet^/een the archetype per se and the archetypal image loll be fully discussed in Chapter 3. n 2'^ w:i=^' ®f ?"*' ^ aal laa §m^2lS. dfew York: Den, 1968), p. d5. Hereafter cited as Ifen and las Symbols.

PAGE 39

CHAPTER 2 THEORT OF ARCHETYPES: PART I Introduction Rrelindnaiy Remarks Our discussion of the notion of a collective unconscious sei'ves as an introduction to the main concern of this stu^jr, the concept of the archeiype. For in addition to the instincts, the collective unconscious is said to contain archetypes. It is the notion of archeIgrpes then irfiich gives Jung's collective unconscious its real substance, and it is the resolution of questions concerning the archetypes vcpon which the real point of a concept of a collective unconscious depends. Ihny such questions inhabit the fringes of consciousness while reading about the archetypes: I-Jhat really is an archetype? Vhat sort of ontological status is it supposed to have? T-hat is the relationship betijeen the archetypes and the instincts? Irhere do the archetypes come from? \ha.t is the difference betireen the archetype in itself and as it apisears in consciousness? T'hat are the chief arche-types? Vhat causes their appearance in consciousness? Ihese many questions about the archetype reflect the many aspects and perspectives from which the idea can be considered. Th order to gain an insight into the unii^ying elements of these different perspectives on the archetypes, our eaiposition toll proceed vjith a 30

PAGE 40

31 conceptual avervie:, fol3oT.;ed hy a detailed discussion of the different aspects of the concept, vath this approach ve hope to gain a unified understanding of the archetype which .rill mke clear the reasons for the characteristic complexityof the idea. Character ization of the Archeiy pe It Trill be remembered from the above discussion of the collective unconscious then, that the contents of this portion of the psyche irere said to be objective and iuipersonal in the sense that the collective unconscious is the supposed source of original contents which appear in consciousness but which seem not to have been conscious before. For example, an individual has a dream, vision or fantasy composed of alien images to which he has no personal associations. IbreovBr, parallels to the phenomena's basic themes can then be found in materials draim from comparative symbology irhich are unloioim to the person previous to his e::perience of the archetypal event. The folloTTing dream illustrates these characteristic archetypal qualities. 3h my dream, I am at an amusement pai-k .rith my iTife and another couple. The first amusement we decide to see is a sorb of "haunted house." To enter, we descend a ilight of stairs into a cool, damp cellar, consisting of an empty main room. looIcLng into one i-oom I see nothing. At tills point a ghost-like figure appears. I recognize the "ghost" as a child dressed in a costume, and am friendlyto it. The "ghost" then leaves. 3h the next room, I see a table, upon the table is a small, incomplete child-like body. A large knife is hovering in the air over ^e table, and proceeds to dismember the body, m^od gushes out, spurting into the air in great streams. I thinic that this "shoir" is a little too much for an amusement for the general public, although I personally am not affected by the erore The yey" then begins to cany on a noLS conversation Tlth me, while the blood continues to

PAGE 41

32 spurt and gush over the table top. The shcnr is then over, and the "body" disappears.' 3h this particular case, it is the arche-typal motif of ritual disnonberment which is the most outstanding featiire of the dream. The dreamer had no idea as to what this ijnage might mean and was unfamiliar idth the frequent occurrence of tliis theme in the literature of alchei;^, I'hat Jung means by an archetype then is a disposition in the collective unconscious to produce such an ±mge in consciousness as the one above. Ibreover, Jung distinguishes bettreen the actual image, which he calls the archetypal image, and the archetype per se, which as a disfosition of the unconscious is unobservable in principle. Hoirever, the teiro "archetype" is used indiscriminately for both the archetypal manifestation and the archetypal disposition. Bie archeiijrpal image is a concrete instantiation of the hypothetical, unobservable archetypal disposition. Ibreover, archetypal contents which emerge into airareness assume a form which is a reflection of the individual consciousness. The fact that archetypes appear in a personal foim seems to be an instance of the tendency to structure awareness of unfamiliar phenomena so that they resemble fainiliar forms of esqperlence, The unconscious supplies as it were the archel^rpal foiTO, which in itself is empty and irrepresentable. Consciousness immediately fills it TTith related or similar representational material so that it can be perceived. For this reason archetypal ideas are locally, terar>orally, and individually conditioned (Vol. XTIl", p. 3^6). In the case of the dismembenaent dream, this assimilation of the archetypal motif into an individual context is illustrated Tjhen the

PAGE 42

33 uncannor and alien ritual of dismemberment, concerning which the dreamer had no knowledge, >ras represented in the familiar setting of an amusement part, Qntolo£;ical Stat us of the Archetype As a disposition the archetype has then the ontological status of a hypothetical construct. Like the electron, the archetype can be detected on3y through the effects which it produces, but, as with the electron, this unobsenrability is not held to make the archetype ai^ less real than direct^jr perceivable ob.jects like chairs and doorknobs. Unlike the electron, hoxrever, the archetypes are unobsenrable in principle. Since the unconscious can only be knotm indirectly through its effect on consciousness, there is no possibility of a direct perception of these unconscious contents. I-fareover, the archetypes per se, existing as dispositions, are only possibilities to form obsenrable phenomena with the deteircinate foiro in which thejappear being the result of the interaction betireen this disposition in the collective unconscious and the infoirdng consciousness. Di basing the ontology of the archetypes on a position of scientific realism, Jung wants to carefully distinguish his unobservable theoretical entities from metaphysical concepts such as Plato's foms. Bie difference is that the archetypes are empirically derived and grounded. Ihey are the product of Jung's therapeutic work in which he found it Increasingly difficult to fit all of the phenomenological material into an ejqplanatoiy frameirork which included only a personal unconscious. Ihere exists then the possibility of falsification to the extent that the ^archetypal theoiy falls to provide adequate explanation for the observed phenomena. The relationship

PAGE 43

3h betireen experience and the postulated concepts of metapl^rsics, on the other hand, is too va^ue to allow for the possibility of disconfirjaation in principle, relationship of Archet'/pes and Instincts Since the archetypes are not the product of an individual's personal experience, they must then be the result of inheritance. Rather than inherited experiences or inherited ijnages, ho^rever, the archetypes are transmitted as the disposition to form images and ideas. There are close parallels here Td.th the instincts, which rather than being inherited behaviors are instead inherited dispositions to produce certain behaviors when activated by the appropriate environmental releasing stimuli. Va.th this similarity to the instincts in mind, Jung often refers to the archetypes as patterns of behavior. . . . they prove to be typical attitudes, a»des of action~tho;;ight-processes and ijrpilses which must be regarded as constituting the instinctive behaviour i^ical of the human species. The term I chose for this, namsly "archetype," therefore coincides id.th the biological concept of the "pattem of behaviour" (Vol, HI, p. 26l), Just as the body develops evolutionarily conditioned modes of responding to external and internal stimuli, Jung hypothesizes the development of similar phylogenetic patterns for the psyche. The archetypes are then somer^hat like psychic instincts, Ibreover, since the body is not functionally a separate entity from the ndnd, these "mental instincts" are parallel psychic counterparts to the inherited modes of bodiOy response. " , , . There is good reason for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves ..." (Vol. IX-A, p. Uk),

PAGE 44

3^ The fact that avchetypes can be understood as patterns of behavior emphasizes then their biological aspect and their continuity Tdth natiu-alistically understood processes, Ifith a vddening of toe traditional use of "patterns of behavior, " this allows for the possibility of archetypes in anjjnals. "There is nothing to prevent us frora assuming that certain archetypes exist even in animals, that they are grounded in the pecularities of the living organism itself . , . " (Vol. VU^ p. 69). Archetypes as A Priori Conditioning Factors However, the archeiypes can also be seen from the cognitive point of vien-r as inherent categories of apprehension (Vol. ^71, p. 376). This perspective then underlines their role as the structuring elements of the psyche and focuses on those aspects of the archel^'pes which seem least directly connected id.th instincts as ordinari^sr understood. It may then seen difficult to grasp hot; the archei^rpes can be at once both patterns of behavior and "a priori conditioning factors. " Hottever, man's characteristic pattern of behavior is to develop consciousness which can then act at variance with or in relative independence of the instincts understood as drives of the body, ^d, since for Jung, the mind and bo<^ are not realOy separate entities but merely different points of view, his shift from the archeiypes as patterns of behavior to talk of archetypes as categories of the pgyche can be seen as a plausible move rather than as a logical jump. "As a priori conditioning factors they represent a special, psychological instance of the biological 'pattern of behaviour'" (Vol. XI, p. 1U9, note 2). Ifcw in characterizing the archetypes as a priori conditioning i

PAGE 45

36 factors what Jung has in rdnd is similar to the idea of categories worked out by Kant. Moreover, it souEtimes appears as if Jung is attempting to breaden Kant's concept so that in addition to necessary foniis of cognition, the archetypes T/ill also be categories of the imagination. 2 Specifically the archetypes are held to be foiTOs of thought, perception and imagination (Vol. IX-A, p. l}h). Ibirever, the comparison of the archetypes to the Kantian categories is onljof limited usefulness. For the archetj^es can be said to be necessary only in the biological sense of being part of our inheritance -Aich vdll then necessarily inQuence us. They are not necessaiy in the sense that they could not have been other than they are. 3he archetypes are products of evolution and are thus subject to vihatever contingent environmental forces made them an enduring part of the genotype. A homtooid on a different planet could then conceivably develop different archetypes. 3 Ibreover, I^t's categories ^rere the necessaiy fomal aspects to irhich any experience must confonn ivhereas Jung's archetjijes are the fonas of only certain tj-pes of experience. Biiia, the archetypes are more properly described as primordial images than as categories in Kant's sense. For the archetypes as "thought-foims" (Vol. vn, p. S6), i.e., dispositions to form certain typical images and thoughts come into consciousness only under unusual circumstances, rather than being the structuring aspect of experience in general. Biis is then what Jung has in mind when he states: "Only, in the case of our 'foms,' we are not dealing vzith categories of reason but vdth categories of the imad.th Kant, the archetypes can be seen to be universal, inborn and foimal elements of the psyche

PAGE 46

37 (Vol. IX-A, p. hk). Ibreover, the ijidividual and personal aspects of the psyche are held to develop from a universal substratum in tlie collective unconscious. Prom this perspective the ego is itself an archei^^e in the sense that it is prefigured as an a priori possibility in the collective unconscious of the individual before it emei'ges by a process of differentiation. -All of the comple:aes, in fact, although th^^ are predominantly manifestations of the personal unconscious, have a "nuclear element" (Vol. Vni, p. 12) which is an archetype. ... every complex, has or is a (fragmentary) personality. At any I'ate, this is how it looks from the purely observational standpoint. But when we go into the matter more deeply, we find that they are really archetypal formations (Vol. V, p. 255). Vhat this archetypal basis of complexes amounts to is that a complex iMch can be traced to events in the individual's personal history is often "magically" complicated because the personal situation has been assimilated to the archetypal one. For example, problems originating from the relationship Td.th the parents are frequently the result of the fact that the individual has since childhood seen the parents as gods. The father is perceived as God the Father and the mother in teiros of the Archetype of the Great Ifother or Earth Ifother. Tlie troubled individual then can not successfully distinguish betireen parents as individuals and the archetypal projections in teiros of ^Mch he has habitually perceived them. i For eveiy typical human situation there is a corresponding archetype so that the experience of the individual in such a situation

PAGE 47

33 invariably falls under the influence of an archei?ypal pattern. In this respect the description of the archetypes as "patterns of instinctual behaviour" seems awply justified. Ibwever, the arcliel^rpal notion runs tlie risk of beir^ overgeneralized into triviality if the idea of the archetypes as formal a priori conditioning factors is taten as a guide for explaining all human behavior. For example, the archetypes can be seen as the phylogenetic forms to ij-hich ontogeny supplies the content. But, although this understanding of the archetypes is hypbthetically plausible, it is misleading from an operational point of vier/. For although in principle all aspects of the personality are founded on the common stznicture of the collective unconscious out of which individuality emerges like an island out of the ocean, the archetj-pes can not be exclusively appealed to in order to form a comprehensive theory of behavior. This irauld be an incomplete and onesided perspective ignoming the vitally ijnpoi'tant ontogenetic factors influencing individual development. In the case of the complexes, for example, Jung identifies them ijitli the personal unconscious, Ihe archetypal nucleus is called upon as an explanatory principle only \ihen. the psychological situation seems incomprehensible from an exclusively personal point of viei/. Qiat there is a common and universal structure to the psyche is then a true statement but not always an informative one for all distinct aspects of behavior. Further Implications of Kantian IhfluKice On the basis of the discussion so far, it could be fairly

PAGE 48

39 concluded that on the '.*ole it is more accurate to understand the arche-types as patterns of behavior than to thinlc of them in terms of Kant's theory of Imovrledge. TMs conclusion, hoiTever, would be too hastily arrived at as the full stoiy of Kant's influence on June's idea of the archetypes has yet to be e:q)lained. Jung's insistence on the label of empiricism to characterize his work, for e:caiaple, is a consequence of his raethodological ideal of staying ^jithin the bounds of possible experience. Ibreover, in teims of Juns's thought, the concept of the psyche describes these bounds. Biere is no possibility of getting outside the psyx:he to detenrdne hou the p^che djiterprets the world, for all e^qjerience is most djnraediately and inescapably psychic experience. !Ihe psyche is the mediator of all experience, both from ixithin and from without. If a tliinker comes up ^dth a metapl-^rsical scheme Trhich he tliinlcs grasps the essential nature of reality, Jung then cauti&ns as to the need for a psychological critique. The claims of universal validi-ly which the gj^stem mater has put forUi transcend possible experience and are justified on the basis of an intuitive certainty. It is just at this point that Jung's theoiy of archetypes assumes a deflationary role by explaining the appeal of the metaphysical system on the basis of its confoimity to the fundamental aspects of the thinker himself rather than to conformity of the system trlth the ultimate nature of reality. lihen a speculative philosopher believes he has comprehended the world once and for all in his system, he is deceiving himself; he has merely comprehended himself and then naively projected that view upon the world (Vol. HI, p. 185).

PAGE 49

1|0 Archet?rpes and Scientific theories To conplicate matters at this point is the fact that basic scientific insights are held to be fotaided on archetj-pes. For ercample, Robert Ifeyer's idea of the conservation of energy (Vol. Vn, p. 67), the concept of the atom (Vol, IX-A, p. 5?) and Ifekule's discoveiy of the structure of the benzene ring (Jfen and ffi£ Symbols. pages 2^-26) are all understood as illustrating the effect of arche"t^'pes, • • . we spealc of "atoms" today because v/e have heard, directily or indirectly, of the atomic theory of Democritus. But v:here did Democritus, or whoever first spoke of minimal constitutive elements, hear of atoms? !Ihis notion had its origin in archetypal ideas, that is, in primordial images which trere never reflections of physical events but are spontaneous products of the pgyclTic factor (Vol. IX-A, p. 57). This archetypal basis of scientific theory is supported i-jhen it is shorm that the ideas have been present in the histoiy of divilization for many centuries. In Kekiae's case the solution to his theoretical dilemma came during a state of relaxation when, dozing before his fireplace, he seemed to see snakelike atoms dancing in the fire, l-hen one of the snalces f owned a ring by grasping its orm tail, the idea of the benzene ring was conceived in a flash of insight. -^ This image of a snake (or dragon) biting its oim. tail is called the uroboros and dates from at least as early as the third century B.C. (l^ and His Symbols , p. 26). Naturally the role of the unconscious must alw^s be seen in proper relation to the activity of consciousness in these cases. Had Kelcule not already spent great amounts of time and energy consciously thinJdng about the problem of the structure of benzene, the situation

PAGE 50

W] h^ of an Insightful archetypal constellation could not have occurred. M>reover, there t;as a great deal of effort necessary after the fireplace episode before the structure of benzene ims finally worked out. Ifoti-rithstanding the well-documented and critical role of the unconscious then, it should not be thought that scientific theories e:dLst prefoimed in the collective unconscious. Ife might v;ell iMtate Kant at this point and ask hoir tliis apparent confoimity betijeen ^/mbols from the collective unconscious and scientific theories is possible, ^breover, it needs to be made clear rhy scientific ideas derived from the archetypes are held to be genuine discoveries and advances, TAereas sindlarly derived metaphcrsical ideas are restricted to a sphere of only subjective validity. 3h the case of science then, the archetypal constellation sometimes proves to be instrumental in bringing about a progressive theoretical ad^rance for science when the image from the unconscious is assimilated in tems of the already e:d.sting bo^ of kno^Tledge. llanjr oHier ideas from tfie same source are never put to scientific use because they do not happen to be compatible ilth the progress of science. Dius vri.th scientific theories, archetypes are sometimes an important influence tdthin the context of discoveiy. Regardless of the origin of a scientific hypothesis, hoirever, in order for it to become acceptable to the scientific community, it must be validated in terms of criteria of scientific methodology. Ihese criteria of acceptability involve relating the theoretical terns of the I^ypothesis to obsenrational statements in such a way as to constitute an empiirlcal3y derived decision procedure which xnH indicate what obsenrational

PAGE 51

states of affairs irill count for or against the hypothesis. l-ath metaphysical theories based on archetypal experience, on the other hand, the relationship beti.'een the theoiy and observations is not specified in such a way as to foim the basis for an objective decision procedure which could be used to adjudicate conflicting aetaplTysical claims, Ibreovcr, the archetypal images are alvrays the partial result of the individual traits of the embocjyLng consciousness, with aspects of personal histoiy and cultural baclcground being always associated x/ith their appearance. Ihus the personal factor can not be eliminated in order to arrive at an objectively valid metaphysical statement. In addition to the inevitable contamination of the personal factor, the archetypes can be said to be unavoidably anthropoimorphic. As the product of human evolution, they mirror man and are man. Although the archetjijes represent man's relationship to the world, it is only from the historically conditioned human standpoint reflecting hoiT the universe affects man. There is for Jung, nonetheless, a possibility of evaluating the pragmatic value of the metaphysical ideas considered from the standpoint of their ability to further and enhance human e:d.stence. Thus veiy similar to lEetzsche, Jung would judge metaphysical ideas on their life-affinnLng quality, while maintaining that the final truth of the ideas in teiros of which of them rdrror best the ultimate structure of reality could not be decided, In Jung's vieir we must be careful to distinguish subjective, p^chological truth from objective truth about the ^eternal world. Thus, although it is an error to see the archetypes as objectively

PAGE 52

h3 true in the sense that they represent literal statements about objective states of affairs, yet the archetypes have a psychological validity and are p^hologically true in the sense that it is possible to interpret them in a subjectively meaningful w^. The validity of the archetypes in teniis of applicability to tlie human situation must then be aclaiowledged even in absence of the possibility of a scientLfLc validation of statements based on them. For exaugxLe, the existence of a God can not be either proved or disproved scientifical3y; yet the existence of an intez^ial God-image or its equivalent must be acknov;ledged as a psychologically real and effective event. Die gods cannot and must not die. I said just no\i that there seems to be something, a kind of superior power, in the human psyche, and tiiat if this is not the idea of God, then it is the "belly. " I wanted to express the fact that one or other basic instinct, or coii^jlex of ideas, will invariably concentrate upon itself the greatest sum of psychic energy and thus force the ego into its seind.ce (Vol. VH, p. 72), ^e Symbol ic Mature of the Archetypes Ihe way in tAich Jung characterizes the distinctive psychological validity of the archetypes is by emphasizing the symbollo nature of the archetypal iinases. The archetypes are said to be "symbolic foiTOulas" (Vol^ VI, p. 377). The symbol for Jung is to be shaiply distinguished from the semiotic function of signs. Signs are representations of Imovjn things. Ihe trademark of a company, for example, sirapOy represents the company itself. Syinbols, on the other hand, can not be said to be logically equivalent to their referents. Bie symbol points beyound itself to an unknorm.

PAGE 53

hli Dius a i-rord or an image is sQonbolic \fhen it implies something more than its obvious and immediate meaning. It has a xd.der "unconscious" aspect that is never precisely defined or fuUy explained. ... As the mind e:xplores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason (^ and Itts Symbols, p. k), Symbols functixin as interconnecting linlcs betireen the conscious and the collective unconscious, as they bring into consciousness in representable form the othertrf.se unlmotrable archetypes. The sjiribols mediate the experience of the archetypes and because of the unavoidable personal characteristics due to embodiment in an individual consciousness are products of both the collective unconscious and consciousness. Biere is then in the symbol a synthesis of known and unknoim and of real and uirreal. If it Trere only real, it xrould not be a symbol, for it vjould then be a real phenomenon and hence un^ymbolic. . . . Jind if it vrere altogether unreal, it would be mere empty imagining, vjhich, being related to nothing real, would not be a symbol either (Vol. VI, p. 111). The Efymbol . . . unites the antithesis betireen real and unreal, because on the one hand it is a psychic reality (on account of its efficacy), while on the other it corresponds to no physical reality (Vol. VI, pages 128-129). % a large extent then, what we add to the picture of the archetype hy calling the archetypal images symbols is an emphasis on the living intensLly of the archetypes as they are experienced. The archetypal images are not abstract intellectual concepts but symbols which are not transparent to reason and the intellect. Ibreover, these symbols have a certain aura of fascination. They appeal not on3y to the intellect as puzzles for the understanding but to the

PAGE 54

h^ emotions as T-rell. "They are as much feelings as thoughts ..." (Vol. vn, p. 66), Biis characteristic quality of the sgnnibol to evoke emotion is teimed its numinositjr, the numen being the specific energy of the arche-t^^s. lith the description of the nurainosity of the archetypes, the close relationship betireen archetypal images and religious motifs becomes evident. For Jung accepts Rudolf Otto's characterization of religious experience as a "careful and scrupulous obserration of . . . the nundnosum ..." (Vol. XE, p. 7). "I-fe might say, then, that the term 'religion' designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been changed by experience of the numinosum " (Vol. n, p. 8). iO-though originating through individual experiences of the collective unconscious, religion is, strictly speaking, a phenomenon of collective consciousness. Jlnd since not all experiences of the archetTpes result in their being assimilated in teiros of a religious frame of reference, another vrider designation is needed to characterize the effect of the numinous quality of archetypes. Thus the archetTPes are said to be "sjjirittial" factors. In a sense spiritual and archetypal are aOiaost equivalent and interchangeable teims. For when \re have understood the transpersonal nature of the archetypes,^ their aura of numinosity and their ability to generate images >jhich serve as the foundations of culture, then ^76 have made definite the meaning of the spiritual. That keeps us from assertiiig this equivalence of meaning, hwrever, is the instinctual perspective. For the archetypes are said to be

PAGE 55

h6 "patterns of instinctual behaviour" (Vol. IX-A, p. hh). Aid it is the instinctual aspect of man which seems to stand in sharpest contrast to xAat we M±sh to designate as spiritual. However, Jung points to Christian prejudice as the origin of the apparent antithesis between spirit and nature. • • . vezy remarkable opposition of spirit and nature. Bren though spirit is regarded as essentially alive and enlivening, one cannot reallyfeel nature as unspiritual and dead. Vfe must therefore be dealing here with the (Christian) postulate of a spirit whose life is so vastly superior to the life of nature that in comparison \r±th it the latter is no better than death (Vol. IX-A, p. 210). A more in-depth perspective, then, reveals the paradoxical relation between spirit and instinct. For th^ seem to be siirllar processes of pgychic energy which are distinguidied by the application of this energy into diametricalOy contrasting modes. Ibreover, it is in the description of the relation between the spiritual and instinctual that Jung's psychological viewpoint is in sharpest contrast to that of Preud. For Jung does not conceive all psychic energy as being instinctual energy as does Freud. He uses the teim for p^jrchic enei^gy, libido, in a way i*ich does not isiply its equivalence i-dth instinctual energy. Ohere is then for Jung no need of a concept of sublimation in lAich Instinctual energy must be siphoned off for cultural purposes. Any diversion of the flwr of libido from its natural Instinctual channels in Jung's view leads only to neurotic maladjustment. H6;revBr, there is more p^hic energy available for the human being than is utilized hy the natural Instinctual processes. This e-^ess p^hic energy can then be used for other than instinctual purposes, and w might say that this e:ocess

PAGE 56

hi energy represents a degree of freedom for nan to pursue cultural activities for their om sake. The ^pibolic images fi^ the collective unconscious then serve as "transfoimers" of energy in the sense that the archetypes represent inherent patterns for this energy floi/ (Vol. V, p. 232). Since the spiritual uses of pcsjrchic energy are the result of the influence of the archetypes v/hich are themselves the product of evolution, it becomes evident that the development of the spirit in man is his characteristic pattern of behavior. 5i feallty of course the world-spuming passion of the 'spirit" is just as natural as the marriage-flight of insects (Vol. V, p. 396), Bie spiritual appears in the psyche also as an instinct, indeed as a real passion, a "consoming fire .... It is not derived from a^y other instinct ... but is a principle sj^ generis. a specific and necessaiy fomi of instinctual povier (Vol. VUI, p. ^8). Archetypes and Ihstlncta 3h order to fuUy understand the meaning of the tenii "spiidtual" then, a further clarification of the archetype-instinct relation is necessaiy. For we need to grasp how the spiritual if to be of the same type of rtuff as the instincts and yet seendngOy different from and even opposed to them. A look at animals other than man helps to gain an insight into what Jung has in mind in this regard. For ±a the exa«?>lBs of patterns of behavior in animals, >;e see clearly the unity which in man becomes a tension of opposdtes betvreen spirit and instinct, A fc?y MOTd "pattern" is th^ the link which enables us to connect the behavior of animals \dth the archelypes and instincts in

PAGE 57

hQ man. For the Surtlnctual behavior of animals is not to be understood as just a blind Impulsion to action. Rather, for each instinctual act there is present a total pattern vhich Includes a sort of Image of the Instinctual situation. ^IZ f!i4^/!''*' "° amorphous instincts, as ?S^SfJJ^°* ^ff ^ ^ "^^^ *h« pattern of its ^tuation. Always it fulfils an image, ^d the Ijnage has fixed qualities. Ihe instinct of the leaf -cutting ant fulfils the Image ^^P^i^i'^'*^^^!^"**^' transport, and^ Sfi J.!?*"^^"^^^^ ^^iIf any one of these conditions is lacldng, the instinct does not faction, because it cannot exist without its total pattem, without its image. Such an image is an a priori type. It is inborn an the ant prior to any activity, for there can be no activity at all unless an instinct of corresponding pattern initiates and makes it possible (Vol. Vni, p. 201). Wie inrtlnctual acts of animals then seem to be unified by a pattem which liK^ludes a sort of intuitive recognition of the goal of the instinctual acts as well as the ptyslological mechanisms which supply the necessaiy energy. Of course. In the case of animals, our use of "image" must be metaphoricalj but it is Jung's point that this regulating principle Of the Instinct, the factor which especially m the Insects makes the operation of instinctual behavior amazin^y precise and selective rather than haphazard, can be recognized. ae organizing factor of the instinct together with its specific enei^ make up a unified pattem of behavior for animals. In man, on the ottier hand, the representations of this foi«al factor of instinct can come into awareness as actual images. Bms, whereas In aniinals the archetypes and the instincts exist in a fused, undifferentiated state; in man, with the foi^ation of consciousness, they

PAGE 58

h9 become separable and distinct. Th the hxnnan realm then the archetypes become -Uie forms which r^ulate the instincts, Ibreover, the archetypal Images are said to represent the meaning of the instincts and to be "the unconscious images of the instincts themselves" (Vol, EC-A, p, kh)» The arche•tgrpes thus act as guiding factors for the release of instinctual energy in appropriate ways characteristic of man as a species. But lAat are these human instincts? Jung recognizes five types of instinctual factors for man: "hunger, sexuality, activity, reflection and creativity" (Vol. VOU, p. 118). He conceded that any attesapt to enumerate the human instincts is at least a matter of controvert. "Hie principle reason for this confusion as to what constitutes an instinct in man is the complication of the psychological factor. For the criterion of what to count as psychic is the ability of the functioning of the will to modiiy the otherwise automatic and compulsive Instincts. It would seem evident then that the reason we can not decide on what to count as purely instinctual in man is due to the fact that instincts are alwajrs in part Influenced by the psyche. Thus Jang says that the instincts per se are ectopsychic and serve the function only of a stlimilus, whereas the detemlning factor for human behavior is always the result of an interaction between the ectopsychic instinct and the psychic situation of the moment (Vol, vm, p. 11^). This mutual interaction between psyche and instinct in man has then the result of making the Instinctual element ambiguous. For, on the one hand, all psychic processes seem to be founded on an instinctual base, wiiereas, on the other hand, psychic processes

PAGE 59

^0 also influence the working of the instincts. "... The instincts are a condition of p^hic activity, while at the sane time p^chic processes seem to condition the instincts" (Vol. H, p. 330), Thus the twofold nature of instinct becomes most evident in human behavior where for each instinctual action we have to take into account both the aspect of "c^ynamism and coiapulsion" as well as that of "specific meaning and intention" (Vol. I, p. 287). For each instinctual action then we can pose the question as to its meaning, Ihe archet3Tjal Images are these psychic factors i*ich provide the meaning for the instincts. Th^ are the necessaiy fonns of instinctual behavior for man. The sense of spying that something represents the meaning of an instinct for man is thus clarified by an understanding of this process of "p^hization, " the assimilation of the physiological stimulus to a preexistent psychic pattern (Vol. Vm, p. 11^). 3h the animals which have no p^he there is nevertheless present a unified pattern of behavior. The instinctual acts are the ways in which the animal realizes its inherent nature, its possibilities of becoming what it can be. The appropriate fulfiljnent of the instinctual natui-e of an animal is its way of realizing its nreaning. If we say then that the archetypes in man are the images of the Instincts and represent their meaning, ,re are eagAasizing this continuity with the lower animals. Ifen also has his characteristic patterns of beha:vior, and the arehetypes act as the patterning factors for these human Instincts, mi the f^ilfilment of the instincts

PAGE 60

51 In nan then also lead to an unfoldnent of his inherent human nature? The answer to this question must of course deal with the factor of the p^he. Wiat is only dimly prefigured in anijnals becomes in man with the developgnent of consciousness his particularly human way of being. For a human being to realize its nature then iniplies the dervelopjnent of consciousness. Ihis development is like an instinct in the sense that it comes into being conditioned by the archetypal patterns. However, its nature is to exist as a factor which can operate as a will and hence control and regulate the "other" instincts. The nature of consciousness contains then the possibility of being able to act against nature. It is recognized that man living in the state of nature is in no sense merely "natural" like an fflilmal, but sees, believes, fears, worships things wiiose meaning is not at all discoverable from the conditions of his natural environment. Iheir underlying meaning leads us in fact far away from all that is natural, obvious, and easily intelligible, and quite often contrasts most shajTxIy ^rlth the natural instincts, tfe have only to think of all those gruesome rites and customs against which every natural feeling rises in revolt, or of all those beliefs and ideas which stand in insuperable contradiction to the evidence of the facts. All this drives us to the assumption that the spiritual prLnciple (xdiatever that mi^t be) asserts itself against the merely natui^ conditions with incredible strength. One can say that this too is "natural," and that both have their origin in one and the same "nature." I do not in the Ifiast doubt tliis origin, but must point out that this "natural" southing consists of a conflict beti/een ttro principles, to which you can give this or that name according to taste, and that this opposition is the Kqaression, and perhaps also the basis, of the tension >re call psychic energy (Vol. Vni,

PAGE 61

$2 Bras the fact that arche-t^Tpes seem to enter the human picture on two levels— as patterns of instinctual behavior and as spiritual factors— is due to the fact that one of the innate human patterns, the tendency to develop consciousness, can act againsrt the other lotTer drives and become a channel of psgrchic energy in its ovm right independently of the instincts. Bierefore the archetypes seem to have two paradoxically opposite qualities: " . , , The archetype is partly a spiritual factor, and partly like a hidden meaning immanent in the instincts ..." (Vol. Vin, 222), Only in man then is there this potential split between his natural tendencies and the realization of his human-most potentiality of being, This split, which is the same as that bettireen the conscious and xmconscions, is a state of necessajy tension since the development of aw-areness and the giving in to the \mconsciousness of instinctual motivations tend to irork against each other and to a large extent they are mutually exclusive activities. However, Jung's psychological viewpoint as a v/hole can be understood as the attempt to show hovr this necessaiy tension between conscious and unconscious and between spirit and instinct need not necessarily be a conflict. For the integrated personality is one which leams to live with a balance bettreen these forces of tension rather than excluding one for the sake of the other. But if T-re can reconcile ourselves to the mysterious truth that the spirit is the life of tlie body seen from within, and the bocty the outv/ard manifestation of the life of the spirit— the two being really one — then we can understand why the striving to transcend the present level of consciousness through acceptance of tlie unconscious must give the body its due, and why recognition of the body cannot tolerate a philosopl-QT that denies it in tlie name of the spirit (Vol. X, p. 9^),

PAGE 62

^3 Notes 1 This dream was provided by a student and friend, George Clough. '6 2 Bie fact that Kant had a strong influence on the development of Jung's ideas is amply evidenced by the mai^ explicit references to Kant scattered throughout Jung's wrks. Moreover, when Jung talks of the philosophers t*o had been linportant to his intellectual development, to again find him acknowledging' the influence of Kant: "Ihe philosophical influence that has prevailed in iny education dates frem ELato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Si, V. Hartraann, and Ittetzsche. Biese names at least characterize w main studies in philosophy." C.G. Jung, Letters. Vol. I 1906-1950, Vol. H 19^0-1961, edited by Geiiiard Mler and JSniela Jaffe (Princeton: Princeton Tfeiversity Press, 1973), Letters. Vol. n, pages 500-501, letter to Joseph F, Rychlak dated 27 April 1959. Hereafter cited as Letters Vol. I or Vol. II, ]h his autobiography Jiing describes an interest in Kantian philosophy which \iaa part of a "philosophical development" which extended from w seventeenth year until toII into the period of n^ medical studies." C.G. Jung, ffemories. Dreams. P^flections Ufeif York: Random House, I96I), p. 70. Hereafter cited as ^fei°°^es, Breams. Bteflections . The extent of that interest is revealed when Jimg relates that while a medical student "the clinical semesters that folloTred kept me so bu^ that scarcely My time remained for my forays into outlying fields. I was able to study Kant only on Sundays" ( Mamories. lireams . Reflections. p. 101). —^ ' ^. 3 Jolande Jacobi, ^mplex /Archetype/Symbol in the Psycholot of Of Of Jung. (Princeton: Princeton University Press7T97i'), p. f CmL XttcS^: ggogoaz^oS Natural Science (B.gle:«,od 5 4, X ^J^^ transpersonal nature of the archetype, v?e mean to refer to the fact that archetypal experience is not completely explanable by reference to the individual's past experience or development.

PAGE 63

CHAPTER 3 THBORT OP ARCHEPTPESi PART U The Origi n of the Archetypea 3he next aspect of the archel^ypal theory lAich ire must tal« up for discussion is the question of the origin of the archeigrpes: Ihere do the archelgrpes cone from? One way of approachins this pvdblm is by considering the relatLonship befereen archel^ypes and mythological motifs. For since norths and fairytales are one of the most characteristic w^s in which archeigrpes manifest themselves, if we can discover hot; norths originate, then perhaps this vdll shed light on the question of the origin of the archetypes J ^hological motif s then are characteristic archetypal images so that the archel^npes are sometimes designated as '%thologems" by Jung. The inrthological feature of archetypal manifestation can be seen to fit in Td.th what was previously said about the archetypal images being ^jrmbols and having a religious or spiritual significance in that a mrfch is a phenomenon of collective consciousness. It is the end product of a conscious elaboration of the oilginal unconscious content, ^Ad.ch often includes the efforts of many generations of stoiyfcellers. ^h this way the numinous quality of the nythologem, the immediate impact of the living intensity of tlie unconscious

PAGE 64

5^ revelation, is lessened, and the genuine s^tabollc nature of the archetypes is expressed in a diminished degree. "The so-called religious statement is still numinous, a qualily T*ich the n^rth has alreatfy lost to a great extent" (Vol, XI, p. 301), Since the religious expression of the archetypes can also suffer the sane fate as Berths and cease to become "living" symbols, it would seem that Jung's distinction between the religious and tlie inythologIcal in terms of numinosity is not realOy adequate. Ih addition, there are exan^xLes from primitive cultures where the ncrthological and religious coincide, "A tribe's in/thology is its living religion , , . " (Vol. K-A, p. 1^), Tihen then does a religious statement cease to be religious and becomes ncrthological? Ifees Jung mean that when a religious dogma loses crediblli-ty it becomes a ncrth? Ibreover, there seems to be at least in ordinaiy usage an implied difference in content irith the iicrthologlcal involving move primitive types of thought and being more concerned vri.th naturalistic phenomena than the religious. Religions then would seem to be more sophisticated i^'pes of mjrthologies. At any rate, it is clear that Jung is not particularly concerned id.th establlslilng strict criteria of usage which would keep the teiros distinct as is evidenced by the follo^^dng: • . • ncrths of a religious natua^e can be interpreted as a sort of mental therapy for the sufferings and anxieties of mankind in general ... (I-fan and las SK/mbols. p. 68). I was driven to ask Herself in all seriousness: "Vhat is the north you are living?" ... So, in the most natural way, ; I took it upon ncrself to get to knavT "my" myth, and I regarded this as the task of tasks, for—so I told inyself —how could I, when treating n^r patients, maloe due

PAGE 65

56 alloxrance for the personal factor, for n^y personal equation, \M.ch is yet so necessary for a IcnOTxledge of the other person, if I was unconscious of it? I simp3y had to laioir T*at unconscious or preconscious rcrfch was fomdng me, from what rhizome I sprang (Vol. V, pa^os xjcLv-xxv), In speaking about his personal north as in the above, it is evident that Berths are often used as vehicles of the most j^ymbolic and numinous manifestations of the unconscious. Thus Jung's use of the tem "ncrth" deviates somewhat from the ordinaiy usage. Sometimes he means north to refer to the symbolic archetj-pal ijnages themselves, and at other tiines he uses rayUt in the conventional >ray to indicate tlie cultural product as an aspect of the collective consciousness. Hius both norths and religious (spiritual) statements2 can be original symbolic expressions of the collective unconscious. ... esoteric teaching. Ohis last is a typical means of expression for the transmission of collective contents originalOy derived from the mconscious. -Another vrell-kno;m expression of the archetypes is myth and fairytale (Vol. IX-A, p. 5). In attributing a positive function to norths even in the case of modem man, it is evident that Jung does not see nortlis as a sort of primitive inferior science, or sdjnply as a crude foiin of prescientific explanaUon. This is because of the symbolic nature of norths. For if to understand that northological statements are not really about the external world but are actuaUy psychological ^ statements, then we are less apt to criticize the norths for their variance with current scientific knoi^ledge. !Ihus norths have a psychological validity and accurately depict the nature of the

PAGE 66

^7 human situation. The inability of primitive and other unsophisticated peoples to distinguish between the psychological and the objective sense of truth frequently leads then to the phenomenon of projection in Tihich an unconscious content is perceived as belonging to an object and being a property of the object. Borough the agency of projection natural phenomena take on qualities stemming from the collective unconscious so that " . . . the T^iwle of aorthology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious" (Yol. Vni, p. 152). In spite of this confusion about inner and outer observed in mrthological thinking, Jung asserts that ncrthology should not be understood as an attempt to formulate a type of scientific explanation. Biere can be no doubt that science and philosophy have gram from this matrix, but that primitives thinlc up such things merely frora a need for explanation, as a sort of physical or astronomical theory, seems to me highly improbable (Vol, VIII, p. 153), It would seem rather that the anthropomorphism seen in ncrthology, the projection of human qualities onto natural phenomena, is an attempt to grasp the meaning of nature in human terms. It is then the symbolic meaning of natural phenomena which captures tloe iiiterest of the myth-mabers. If x^ look at alchei^, for example, only as a sort of proto-chemistiy, this can not explain how the interest in it continued in; spite of the failure to produce the desired objective results over periods of hundreds of years. ^ ihe alchemist is of course taken in to an extent by his o^m projections; but Jung points out that the hubris of assuming that our scientific

PAGE 67

^8 world vie-./ is thus superior to one founded on mrthological projec tix>ns is not justified, since if the unsophisticated ndnd anthropoinorphizes the world, we harre in the present era "nechanicomorphized"^ it TTith the result that the embolic quality of our existence is impoverished, life anist then avoid the mistake of trying to see rcrthology as an aUerapt at explanation in objective tenas when its erqxLanations are sjoiibolic in nature. ?^ Ifow since the arclielgrpal psjrche expresses itself in the language of north, it irould seem as if the sorthological interpretation of nature had been someliow Imprinted on the p^he so that these archaic images reappear in modem man. \h look then to a description of this process of how the nc^hological image arises in response to the pl^sical process in order to gain what apparently is the essential clue to the question of the origin of the archetiypes. Keeping in mind the previous discussion of the nature of myths, it is clear that the relationship betcreen the jd^rsical process and images of ncrthological motifs is not understood by Jung as being one of siB^iLe representation. Vhen he says then that the archet3T>al image is not to be understood as an allegoiy of the physical process, he means that the objective content of representation is experienced symbolically and hence takes on psychic aspects due to projection. It is not the world as we know it that speaks out of hxs unconscious, but the vnkncrm world of the p^che, of which to knot/ that it mirrors our en^rical irorld onOy in part, and that, for the most part, it moulds this empirical world in accord^e ^dth its ora psychic assumptions. JJie archetype does not proceed from physical ;?f ,' ^* describes how tiie pj^he ercperiences the pliysical fact, and in so doing the psyche

PAGE 68

59 oi'ten behaves so autocratically that it denies tangible reality or makes statements that fly in the face of it (Vol. IX-A, p. 1%), Hius original archetypal (ncrthological) images are posttilated as being the resultant of an interaction between a physical process and the primitive psyxihe, irdth the physical process being Interpreted in terms of a psychic fantasy content. Ibreover, it is the subjective part, the fantasies which arise concomitant vrith the physical process, that are the foiroative elements for the n^rthological motif. I'hat we can safely say about northical images is that the physical process imprinted itself on the psyche in this fantastic, distorted form and was preserved there, so that the unconscious still reproduces similar images today (Vol. Vni, p. 1^3). It is not storms, not thunder and lightning, not rain and cloud that remain as images in the pjgrche, but the fantasies caused by the effects they arouse (Vol. VIII, pages l^U-l^^). Still to be explained, however, is the process of pgjrchic imprinting through which an original inythological image becomes an enduring aspect of the collective unconscious, which can then produce images of similar fom even to the present day. VJhen ue read Jung on this point, there seems to be an evident appeal to a theoiy involving inheritance of acquired characteristics. For although Jung is careful to make clear that it is the disposition to foiro ijnages rather than the images themselves which are inherited, yet this inherited disposition is held to be a sort of condensation of the repeated experiences resulting from typical human situations. These archetypes, whose innermost nature is inaccessible to experience, are the precipitate of the psychic functioning of the whole ancestral line; the accumulated experiences of organic life in general, a million times repeated, and condensed into types. In these

PAGE 69

60 archetypes, therefore, all experiences are represented irhich have happened on this planet since prLneval ttoes (Vol. VI, p. 1;00). The repetition of these laical human experiences leaves a sort of function trace in the psyche which then can act to produce analogous rc^ological djnages in succeeding generations. Tttixs the archetypes are described as "mnentic deposits. " From, the scientific, causal standpoint the primordial image can be conceived as a mneraic deposit, an iij?)rint or engram (Seraon), tjhich has arisen through the condensation of countless processes of a similar kind. In this respect it is a precipitate and, therefore, a typical basic fonn, ?£ ^^^^^ ever-recurring psychic experiences (Vol, VI, p. hlO), This reference to the influence of Richard Semon seems to clarify what Jung had in mind as a mechanism by ^fh±ch archetypes itdght be inherited. For the exjwsition of Semon' s theoiy in his book Bie Ihme reveals a sort of theory of racial meraoiy which tries to integrate the factors of memoiy, habit and inheritance under one theoretical principle and which appeals e:
PAGE 70

61 explanation of t^ere the archetypes corae flxjm b7 saying that they are the result of the influence of physical processes on the pgyche then, there is the alternative of conceiving the archetypes as part of the inherent nature of the psyche itself, nie fact that the sun or the noon or the meterological processes appear, at the veiy least, in allegorized form points to an Independent collaboration of the psyche, which in that case cannot be merely a product or sterotype of environmental conditions. Prom whence wuld it drat/ the capacity to adopt a standpoint outside sense ^eption? ... In view of such questions i^eaon's naturalistic and causalistic engram theoiy no longer suffices, tfe are forced to assume that the given structure of the brain does not oire its peculiar nature merely to the Influence of surrounding conditions, but also and just as much to the peculiar and autonomous quality of living matter, i.e., to a lat; inherent in life itself (Vol. VI, p. 1^). Jimg in the course of his work abandoned Semen's theoiy of engrams and talk of mnemic deposits disappears from his later writings. Archetypes were then siii5xly said to be part of the inherited brain structure, thus leaving the mechanism of hereditary transmission unspecified, Ittth Jung's retreat from the position that archetypes are "deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity" (Vol. Vn, p, 69), we see tl:at the stople correlations he had pi^viously dram relating physical processes to the fonnation of rc^thological images must also be reconsidered. Vhat must then be revised in the theoiy of aythology is not the concept of projection and the vital role it plays in nythological tliinldng but the implication that Berths were once original contents of consciousness, that th^ originate from the fantasizing of individual psyches, mth the abandonment of the engram theoiy, Jung is no longer certain he can

PAGE 71

62 reconstruct the process by ijhich the objective physical process and the interpretive ppyche Interact to fom i^yths. He seems, on the whole, in his later work (as exjemplified in the quotations lOTiediately belovr) to have come to the conclusion that mythological motifs are not amenable to a simple naturalistic explanation, as if thery were caused by physical processes. Rather the subjective part of the process, the inherent laws of psychic apprehension, is novr thought to be the essential determining factor. Thus even the question of havT archetypes (n^thologems) originate is not seen by Jung as being a legitimate question since it implies the need for a special explanation of how the archetypes came to be in the psyche, ;*ereas Jung nm sees the archetypes as developing along id.th the psyche as part of its inherent pattern of functioning, Qiipiricany considered, however, the archetype did not ever come into existence as a phenomenon of organic life, but entered into the picture iri.th life itself (Vol. XT, p. m?, note 2). Biese images are "primordial" ijnages in so far as they are peculiar to whole species, and if th^ ever "originated" their origin must have coincided at least \i±th the beginning of the species. They are the "human quality" of the human being, the specifically human fona his activities take, Ihis specific fona is hereditary and is alreacfy present in the genn-plasm (Vol, II-A, p, 78), The hope expressed earlier then that Jung's ideas on the way in which norths originate would prove to be the clue to solidng the riddle of the origin of the archetypes proves to be unjustified, and we are left >d.thout a definitive ansvrer to where the archetypes come from. Jung is naturally quite happy to abandon questions of ultimate origin to the sphere of metaphysics: "Vhether this psytihic

PAGE 72

63 structure and its eleinents, the archetypes, ever 'originated' at aU is a metaplysical question and therefore unanswerable" (Vol. IX-A, p. Idj and "... it is impossible to say where the archetype comes from, because there is no Archimedean point outside the a priori conditions it represents" (Vol. IX-A, p. 69, note 27).8 But peiliaps Jung should not be let off so easily. For rather than postulating that the archetypes are sort of an ultlinate p^hic fact for which no explanation in terms of more basic psychological theoiy is possible, it seems evident that, heuristicaOly at least, we must seek an answer to the question of how it is that the p^che structures experiences in tenns of the archetypes instead of other sljiipler modes. Perhaps, as Jung seems to think, the archetypes will eventually prove to be an ultlanate w^ry for human consciousness, but from the scientific point of view this can not be assumed. Archetypa l 3mage and Archetype Iter Se The claljtt that the archetypes are ultimately inaccessible must be further examiixed. For many difficult points in the articulation of Jung's theory of archetypes seem to hinge on distinguishing bettveen the unreachable archetype per se and the an^hetypal image. Bie archetype per se was said to be not truly part of the psyche at all but rather p^choid and to be incapable of consciousness. As a consequence it TTas said to be unobservable in principle. The essential question in this regard would seem to be how such claims as the above can be justified Srom the empirical point of view. But that nothing In principle would count as a direct observation of an archetype is a result of the total conceptual framework of the archetypal theoiy, which as a whole is grounded en^jirically. Ih this

PAGE 73

61i respect it irould seem not to differ significantly from other scientific theories, ^breover, if from the behaviorist point of view, the suggestion is made to do ai-;ay ^dth the horpothetical construct of the archetype per se and instead speak only of archetypal images, the reply is that this move would mean that a theory of archeig^jes is no longer possible. For there must be postulated an underlying common collective aspect to the p^ches of individuals which will mate the archetypal manifestations more than personalistic and idiosyncratic products. I'Jiat counts as evidentially conclusive for the presence of archetypes then is just the appearance of contents iijhich prove to constitute universal themes or motifs which can be recognized in contexts T^hich transcend the individual's personal sphere of reference. Ibless the arche-types are to be reduced to the merely personal -ttien, there must be postulated an archel^ype per se •t*ich will be the transpersonal organizing principle for the personal and culturally determined archeiypal manifestation. It is better on the whole to think of the archeigrpe per se as a principle or disposition rather than as an entity, i.e., something which can be clearly distinguished as an individual thing. Thus Jung says that the phenomenologlcal material does not justify arything other than the postiiLation of principles which act to form distinct archetypal images, without it being possible to conclude anything definite about the nature of the archetjlie per se. I'hen one carefully considers this accumulation of data, it begins to seem probable that an archeiype in its quiescent, unprotected state has no exactly determinable form but is in itself an indefinite structure which can assume definite forms only in projection (Vol. TI-A, p. 70).

PAGE 74

65 Moreover, this mcertainty about the nature of the archetype per se extends even so far as to leave undetermined the number of archetypes and the point of differentiation bet^^en one archetype and another, Hnpirically spealdng, vre are dealing all the time idth "types," definite forms that can be named and distinguished. But as soon as you divest these l^rpes of the phenomenology presented by the case material, and try to examine them in relation to other archetypal forms, they branch out into such far-reaching ramifications in the histoiy of symbols that one comes to the conclusion that the basic psychic elements are infinitely varied and ever changing, so as utterly to defy our por/ers of imagination (Vol. IX-A, p. 70). Although heCilie investi^ato:!;^} is forced, for episfcemological reasons, to postulate an indefinite ntimber of distinct and separate archetypes, yet he is constantly overcome l^ doubt as to how far tliey are really distinguishable from one another. They overlap to such a degree and have such a capacity for combination that all atteittpts to isolate them conceptually must appear hopeless (Vol, XT, p. 288). 3h considering the problem of the nature of the archetJTe per se, Kant's influence on Jung's vierfs must again be acknowledged. For Jung accepts the Kantian distinction betvreen the thing-in-itself and that which appears. In these teiros then the archetype per se is held to be inaccessible on analogy ivith Kant's noumenon, whereas the arclietypal image is that which appears in the phenomenal realm.^ Bie existence of a transcendental reality is indeed evident in itself .... That the world inside and outside ourselves rests on a transcendental bacltground is as certain as our ovm existence, but it is equally certain tliat the direct perception of the archetypal world inside us is Just as doubtfully correct as that of tlie physical outside us (Vol. XEV, p. 551).

PAGE 75

eG Vhen I say "atom" T am talking of the model made of it J when I say "archetype" I am talking of ideas corresponding to it, but never of the thing-inxtself , T*ich in both cases is a transcendental ^stery. ... One must therefore assume that the effective archetypal ideas, including our model of the archetype, rests on something actual even though unknovrable. Just as the model of the atom rests on certain unknotrable qualities of SJJ*®? ^l!^^ !°^'^* P* ^' letter to H. Haberlandt dated 23 J^jril 19^2). HbT/ever, it is unnecessaiy to follow Jung's Kantian way of construing the archetype per se. For rather than ii>5)licating the archetypal theory .^th a problematic phenomena/noumena distinction, vie can interpret the archetype per se as an unobservable l^^pothetical construct. Ohus, although Jung holds that the archetype per se is an ultimate i^ysteiy, the aix:hetypal theoiy on3y requires that it be the unobservable and mostly unknom structuring principle responsible for the archetypal image, ]h any case, our efforts to discover the nature of the archetype directly are frustrated since the archetypal image always reflects the personal histoiy of the consciousness in which it is embodied. Ihus when ve attempt to abstract the archetype itself frem its personal and cultural matrix, the result is that the distinctiveness of the arehetype ^ranishes, and v,e can no longer say what it .rould be like in itself. But if the arehetype is then essentially an "irrepresentable fonn," the question is hot. we are to distinguish collective archeiypal manifestations fi-om merely personal contents of consciousness. It would seem that there mst be definite phenomenological differences betaken the arehetypal iiaages and other contents if .re are to be Justified in speaking of the e:d^ce of a collective unconscious containing arehetypes. For in the absence of ^ common features xrhich the individual arehetypes manifest in

PAGE 76

67 every person, xre inust have general criteria for recognizing \iha.t constitutes an archetypal content. As previously mentioned in the exaniple of an archetypal dream, arche-liTpal images characteristically have an alien. Impersonal character so that they do not appear to be contents which Trere once conscious and then forgotten or repressed. But this does not mean that the contents attributed to the collective unconscious contain images which the dreamer can not recognize at all. lather it seems that the strange and alien contents amount to fantastic rearrangements of items of e:
PAGE 77

68 explanation, 3h order to verify the presence of an archetype then, both the vleifs of introspection and exfcraspection are necessaiy. ^0 The symbolic nature of the person's e:xperLence and his for the most part absence of personal association to the material is taken into account along vdth tlie presence of the same theme or motif in material dravm from the histoiy of symbols. The ability of these histoidcal parallels to provide an explanation of the meaning of the otheniise unexjxLicable content is then the crucial factor justifying the employment of the archetypal hcrpothesis, Tihen such a procedure provides the most plausible explanation for the presence of contents of consciousness, ve can say that an arche-t^'pe is present. Rather than taking one particular image or dream in isolation, hotrever, the determination of which contents are said to be archetjrpal is best arrived at Td.th an examination of a serf.es of dreams or other similar experiences. In this way the margin of error involved in any introspective evaluation is lessened. Then ire are also able to see how the alleged archetjype functions in more than one context. Prom tlie objective point of viet^, it is not so much how the supposed archetype appears as lAat it does and how it functions that is crucial for deciding about the presence of archetypes. This is especially so since the archetypes often appear as images which are themselves ordinaiy although the role they play in the dream as a Tdiole is archetypal. For example, the images of actual persons knotm to the dreamer may function as archetypal images, H ^though there is thus no definite objective criteria by which one can identify archetjTpal images out of the context of the function

PAGE 78

69 they play in particiaar maiiifestations, Jung does give us an idea of the objective features ablch as a matter of fact are associated >d.th the appearance of many aaTche-tgrpes. An unfallible sign of collective images seems to be the appearance of the "cosmic" element, i.e., the images in the dream or fanta:^ are connected ;d.th cosmic qualities, such as temporal and spatial infinity, enormous speed and extension of movement, "astrological" associations, telluric, lunar, and solar analogies, changes in the proportions of the bo<^, etc. The obvious occurrence of nythological and religious motifs in a dream also points to the activity of the collective miconscious. The collective element is very often announced by peculiar ^nnptoms, as for example by dreams where the dreamer is flying through space like a comet, or feels that he is the eaorthf or the sun, or a star; or else is of immense size, or dwarfishly small; or that he is dead, is in a strange place, is a stranger to himself, confused, mad, etc. (Vol. VII, p. 160). Ch the whole, the fantastic nature of the archetypal imagery often bears an alanning similarity to or even identity with the symptoms of schizophrenia. But the schizophrenic, although he has gained an access to the collective unconscious, has been figurative3y spealdng sirallowed up by it, so that he has lost the ability to function as an ego and relate in a practical iray to the objective world, 3h a sense he is unable to -wake from his symbolic fantasies, so that they are more ^Togtoms of psychic brealcdovm than th^ are numinous symbols which can be meaningfully integrated into the total pattern of his life. The difference betireen archetypes and the dissociated products of ischizophrenia is that the former are entities endoired id.th personality and chained vriLth meaning, whereas the latter are only fragments with vestiges of meaning—in reality, they are products of disintegration (Vol, Vni, p. 122),

PAGE 79

70 The phenomenology of the archetypal manifestation is often of immediate therapeutic relevance as the contents of the unconscious take on dark and menacing aspects when the point of view which they represent is not being acknowledged by the conscious ndnd. The guise in which these figures appear depends on the attitude of the conscious mind: if it is negative tov/ard the unconscious, the animals win be frightening; if positive, they appear as the helpful anijnals" of faiiytale and legend (Vol. V, p. 181), nh the foiTO in which the archetypes appear is thus influenced by the attitude of the conscious mind, it would seem that the manifestation of the archetypes are not random and due to chance but that their appearance is conditioned by certain necessaiy circumstances in the individual. Ibreover, an understanding of these conditions should shed light on the nature of the relationship between the collective and personal aspects of the p^che. For by calling the collective unconscious the impersonal and objective portion of the psyche, the integral part this aspect of the unconscious pl^s in the life of the individual is not given adequate consideration. In this regard we find then that the archetypes behave in an analogous fashion to other contents of the unconscious in the sense that their appearance functions in a compensatory fashion to consciousness. That is, the unconscious supplies contents which compensate the conscious attitude by representing features of the person's total situation which are overlooked, repressed or undervalued by the conscious personality. The appearance of the archetype then usually indicates the need for a collective compensation. I^at this means is that the true nature of the person's situation corresponds to a universal and typical human pattern.

PAGE 80

71 so that ijhat it is -ttiat is missing from the person's conscious attitude is an understanding of the broader human perspective t^hich an appreciation of the basic patterns of human existence would give. The archei^ypal stnictiure of the imconscious corresponds to the average run of events. The changes that maor befall a man are not infiniteHy variable; they are variations of certain -typical occurrences iMch are limited in number, l*en therefore a distressful situation arises, the corresponding archetype idll be constellated in the unconscious (Vol, V, p, 29k), One instructive example to make clearer the meaning of collective compensation can be drawn from Jung's Trork on the UFO phenomenon. After e3:±ensLve research lasting a decade, Jung concluded that the UFO phenomenon represented a sort of rwdem north in ijhich the Arche-lgrpe of the Self, an archetype expressing "order, deliverance, salvation and wholeness" (Vol. X, p. 328), was being projected into the heavens, iilthough tmable to reach a definite conclusion about the physical reality of the reported objects, Jung makes a convincing case for the activation of -ttie Self archetype as a compensation for the ominous world situation follovring Ifcrld Vfer II in vMch nuclear annihilation seemed possible at any moment, Tife have here a golden opportunity of ^eing howr a legend is formed, and hotir in a difficult and dark time for humanity a miraculous tale grows up of an atteB5)ted intervention by e:ctra-terrestial "heavenly" porters , , . (Vol. X, pages 322-323). Bie ArchetTpe of the Self then functions to direct attention id-thin to the possibility of the realization of an inner center of order and personal unity. WLthlthe vrorld threatened xd.th destruction, the Self can provide an inweird source of meaning and unity. Archelypal manifestations are thus the compensatoiy response of

PAGE 81

72 the unconscious to typical human situations, with the response being a representation of an inherent pattern of human functioning. Jn this i^ray the archetype supplies the insight of a universal perspective to vdiat are universally e:cperienced problems.l2 tms enables the individual then to grasp the meaning of his situation in its more than personal aspect. If actual persons appear in archetypal guise in dreams, for example, >re can see that the activation of some universal human pattern is complicating the personal interrelationship. If a knovm girl appears as the archetype of the anim then, she also represents a vehicle of ^pibolic projection.'' -3 The Archetypes as Autonomous Factors In our investigation of the conditions under which the archetypes come into consciousness, we have emphasized the similarity of behavior of archetypes to other contents of consciousness in that their appearance is the result of the overall corapensatoiy influence of the unconscious. In tlais regard it must also be pointed out that the archetypes behave in a similar fashion to the complexes of the personal unconscious, i.e., they are autonomous factors. Bius, although archetypes as a rule arise in response to the needs of the individual, the end result of their activation mgy be that the archetype subjugates or even possesses the person. The archetypes are then not only objects of consciousness btit also subjects lAich can be described as having Intentionalities which may oppose that of the ego personality, piey are spontaneous phenomena which are not subject to our will, and we are therefore jiistified in ascribing to them a certain autonomy. They are to be regarded not onily as objects but as subjects with laifs of their mm. From the point of viet;

PAGE 82

73 of consciousness, we can, of course, describe them as objects, and even explain them up to a point, in the same measure as "we can describe and e35)lain a living human being. But then \je have to disregard their autonomy. If that is conisidered, \je &re coa:g»lled to treat them as subjects} in other wi'dsyW have to ad^ that they possess spontaneity and purposiveness, or a kind of consciousness and free ;dll. life observe their behaviour and consider their statements. This dual standpoint, which vb are forced to adopt towards eveiy relatively independent organism, naturally has" a dual result. On tlie one hand it tells me xvhat I do to the object, and on the other hand what it does (possibly to me) (Vol. XL, p. 362). ^ -^ In describing the archetypes as autonomous factors, Jung wants to hold to the distinction betireen the complexes as contents of the personal unconscious and the archetypes of a collective unconscious. For the vrord "complex" is used primarily to refer to the autonomous contents of personal origin, to those contents which develop ontogenetically. The archetype, on the other hand, is inherited and thus seems impersonal in the sense that it can not be explained in the terns of the person's own life hisboiy, Naturally, this clear separation bettreen the personal and collective aspects of the unconscious is in reality always more or less an interrelation. For the complexes appear to have an archetypal nucleus and the archetypes are always manifested in images made up out of combinations dravm fi^>m the individual's store of experience. Ifevertheless, it is stni possible in practise to discriminate bettreen those contents of conscixjusness which owe their origin primarily to the individual and his experience from those i*ich I are impersonal and which point beyond the individual. The archetype behaves like a complex then in that it is a locus of thoughts, feelings and images which function in a unified iray as

PAGE 83

7h a sort of personality. Rather than Indicating that the archelgrpes are actually entities outside man, hovrever, the personification which the archetypal images manifest are typical of autonomous contents which e:d.st in the unconscious ^d.thout being integrated \Ath the conscious personality. The less acknowledgement and understanding an unconscious element is accorded then, the more it tends to function independently of the conscious personality and even assume the characteristics of a personality itself. Md since the archetypes are symbolic, numinous factors \Th±ch do not originate from one's personal experience, the ability to integrate than into one's personality has definite limitations. Uiey are, in fact, xd.der than the individualj they have a universal collective meaning which the individual can only participate in but can not hope to completely assimilate. Ohere is often the real danger that the archetypes vriJLl even assimilate the ego personality. "It is perfectly possible, psychologically, for the unconscious or an archetjrpe to take complete possession of a man and to detennine his fate doim to the smallest detail" (Vol. XE, p. k09), ELausible exaniples of this phenomenon are to be seen in -ttie lives of Christ and Hitler. "Hie archetypes seem to have a dual nature, being potentialities for both evil as well as good. Thus what to one person proves to be a healing experience giving meaning to life, may prove to another less stable consciousness to be a source of evil, disorientation or madness. Anong the most common archetypes \Aich show a distinct personality are the shadot-j archetype and the anina and aniimxs. The shadow is a representation of the personal unconscious as a whole and usually

PAGE 84

7^ embodies the compensating values to those held by the conscious personality. Thus the shadoi: often represents one's dark side, idiose aspects of oneself which e:dLst but which one does not acknowledge or identify idth. nh dreams it may appear as a dark figure of an Arab or Megro of the same sex as the dreamer. ^U The anima archetype appears in men and is his primordial image of woman. It represents the man's biological expectation of women but also is a symbol of a man's feminine possibilities, his countersexual tendencies. The e:!periences of one's mother and other actual women are a third contributing factor to the fonn of the archetype. Die anima often appears in dreams as a strange or unlmorm >7oman. The animus archetype, the analogous image of the masculine which occurs in vraraen, may appear as a series of strange men.^^ The personification of the above archetypes is often of such a distinct character that dialogues of significant therapeutic value can be carried on betireen the ego and the shadow or anima/animus in the conscious state. Biis form of communication with the unconscious, popularized by the method of Gestalt Iherapy, tos enthusiastically recommended by Jung (Vol. VTI, p. 201), In addition to the archelypes mentioned above, there are many other archetypes which appear in personified foiro notably the Cld va.se Ibn, the Great lather, the Earth Ifother, the Divine Child and the Archetype of the Self. HoTrever, any atteD5)t to give an exhaustive list of the archetypes would be a largely futile exercise since «ie archetypes tend to combine Td.th each other and interchange qualities making it difficult to decide where one archetype stops and another begins. For exaii?>le, qualities of the shadoix archetype may

PAGE 85

76 be prominent in an archetypal image of the anima or aniMis. One archetype may also appear in various distinct forms, thus raising the question whether four or five distirict archetypes should be said to be pre sient or merely four or fives forms of a single type. There i-rould then seem to be no decision procedure for determining the exact boundaries of an individual archetype. For what is to count as a typical situation and thus indicate the presence of an archeignpe can not be decided a priori, so that for instance iie can not determine on the basis of general considerations that there must be so many archetypes, And from the phenonienological point of view, the appearance of distinct types of archetypal images does not permit us to conclude anything definite about how many archetypes per se there may be. Therefore, it vrcrald seem evident that the complete cataloguing of the archel^'pes thereby determining their exact number is an irresolvable matter and an unreasonable expectation of the archetypal theory, 3h addition to the personified foims mentioned above, there are many archetypes which do not appear in personal form. For exariple, the -'irche-l^rpe of the Self may be manifested as a stone, diamond, floT-rer or as a four-sided figure, Aiimals, plants and natural objects such as the viind, a lake or a mountain may also figure into archetypal images. There is in fact no determinate condition regulating what form an archetype must assume. Tliis is not to s^, hovrever, that there are not definite conditions an image must satisfy in order to count as archelgrpal. But these conditions depend more on the function of the image in the overall context of the manifestation than they do on the specific form.

PAGE 86

77 Irath regard to the queistion of personification, a paradoxical situation seems to exist since Jung says tliat all autonomous contents of the imconscious are personified, "iill autonomous psychic factors have the character of personalHy ..." (Vol. X, p. k2). On the other hand, the archetypes, which presumably are all more or less capable of autonomous function in the unconscious, do not all appear in the foim of persons. It would seem clear then that personification is being used in a general sense to mean ascription of traits of personality to an entity rather than in^jlying that vrhat is personified must appear as a distinct personality or in the form of a person. Archefanaes and 97nchronicity In our discussion of the phenomenology of the archetypes, dreams have been emphasized as a characteristic state of consciousness in ^jhich the archetypes come into awareness. Fantasies and visions are other altered states of consciousness in which archetypes frequently appear. But in addition to these modes of manifesting themselves, Jung states that the archetypes may also affect nonpsychic physical processes. This effect of the archetypes is described by Jung's theory of synchronicity. la ^synchronistic events then, there is a meaningful correspondence between a physical event and a psychic content id.th the possibility of a causal connection beti-reen the ti-ro having been ruled out. These events are the often recorded meaningful coincidences TThich seem to defy undersrtanding in terms of either causality or chance. i fsa exaniple Jimg describes from his therapeutic work serves to illustrate these ideas.

PAGE 87

78 A young \Toman I was treatiiag had, at a critical inament, a dream in Trfiich she was given a golden scarab, lihile she was telling me this dream I sat with nor back to the closed windox/. Siddealy I heard a noise behind me, liks a gentle tapping. I turned round and savr a flying insect knocking against the vrindovr-pane flrora outside. I opened the window and caught the creature in the air as it fie;; in. It was the nearest analogy to a golden scarab that one finds in our latitudes, a scarabaeid beetle, the common rose-chafer ( Cetonia aurata ), which contrary to its usual habits had evidently felt an urge to get into a dark room at this partic;xlar moment (Vol. VIII, p. U38). Biere i-rould seem to be no plausibility of atten^jting a causal explanation here, although chance seems a possible rational explanation. Other examples of synchronistic events, hovrever, seem to eliminate the possibility of the meaningful coincidence being the result of the chance intersection of random events. Ihe best illustration of ^ynchronicity vrtiere chance is ruled out occurs in experiments atteanpfcing to verity the phenomenon of extrasensory perception, ESP. Ohese tests using card guessing techniques are sometimes structured so that the subject tries to guess the sequence of a deck of cards before they are shuffled by a randomizing machine. As the subject is guessing the sequence of a future order of the cards, this of course also elbninates the possibility that the order of tlie cards can have a causal effect on the mental state of the subject, Bie overall results of this type of e3qperiment revealed a probability of reproducing the same results by chance as 1:U00,000 (Vol. vm, p. h33). In another experiment one person guessed all tirenty-five cards in the deck correctly after they had been shuffled. Indicating a probability of 1:298,023,223,876,9^3,12^ (Vol. vni, p. i;33).

PAGE 88

79 nh the ESP tests the meaningfld coincidence is between a content of consciousness, the person's idea of what cards will appear, and the actual order of the cards. The archetj^pal theory comes into play then as Jung says that an archetype is manifesting itself synchronously in both a psychic content and a physical process. The tenn "synchronous" is used instead of simultaneous in the formulation of the synchronistic hypothesis to indicate that the meaningful coincidence between the p^jnchic and physical events need not occur at exactly the same time. Ttxe physical event can be slightly before or after the psychic content. In tlie ESP examples, it is the archetype of magical effect, the expectation that a miraculous event can occur, which seems to be at vrork.""^ Evidence for this is the fact that the results of the experiments are positively correlated with the emotional state of the subject, so that an enthusiastic, hopeful subject can score well above chance probability at the beginning of the experimentsj and then his score will move toward the chance probability as the novelty of the experiments lessen, or if he becomes bored or depressed (Vol, VIII, p. k3k). The archets'pal influence is clearly seen in the first example given. Bie woman patient was at a crisis point in her analysis due to a too narrow rationalistic vieti idiich did not leave her sufficiently open to the possibility of change which could result from taking seriously the irrationally prodticed contents of the unconscious. The meaningful coincidence was then the tuitiing point in this regard and produced the needed change in attitude alloTriing tlie analysis to progress to a successful conclusion. The scarab motif, noreover, is a

PAGE 89

80 classic ^yrtbol of rebirth (Vol. VHI, p. k39) so that it would seem that the patient's situation of iinpasse had conrtellated the archetype of rebirth and renewal. Jung postulates that an archetypal ordering principle is at irork in these instances of ^chronicity bringing about a situation in wMch an outer event and a psycMc content are expressions of the same meaning. Ohe arche-types in these cases seem to be localized as much in matter and in the environment as they are in the psyches of individuals, 5he psychoid archetype has a tendency to behave as though it \iere not localized in one person but T-rere active in the whole environment (Vol. X, pages lt^-li52). ... the archetypes are not found exclusively xn the p^jTchic sphere, but can occur just as much in circumstances that are not psychic (equivalence of an outv^ard physical process x-Tith a p^cliic one) (Vol. VIII, p. 5l^). In using the designation "p^hoid" for the archetypes, it seems that Jung x^anted to ijapOy that the archetypes could be manifested in nonpsychic ways, specificaUy influencing matter. Ihis UB6 of "psychoid" does not have the same iittpUcations as when the instiiictsaresaidtobep^choid.''^ lii the case of the Instincts, the psychoid label describes a sort of interface region betireen the p^he and the physiological processes. " . . . tem 'psychoid' . . . meant to distinguish a categozy of events from merely vitaHstic phenomena on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on the other" (Vol. Vm, p. 177). | But the archetype -h^th its p^hoid nature, forms the bridge to matter in general" (Vol. VIII, p. 216). 3he psychoid archetype therefore seems to be "quasi-p^hic " in the special

PAGE 90

81 sense that it may be independent of the body. Sjmchronicity postxilates a meaning which is a priori in relation to human consciousness and apparently exists outside man. , , , the possibility that synchronicity is not only a psychophysical phenomenon but might also occur -without the participation of the human psyche , , . (Vol. VIII, pages 501-^02, note 71). It may well be a prejudice to restrict the pEjyche to being "inside the body" (Vol. XIV, p. 300). The phenomena which Jung describes in his theory of ^ynchroniciiy undoubtedly exist and his efforts to take account of these events in his overall theory of the psyche seems a worthvrtiile and needed endeavor. However, as ire have previously stated, the notion that there can be a pgyche independent of a bo(fy and archetypes which persist outside of man is a postulate which can not be unproblematically integrated in a consistent way with Jung's theory of archetypes as a irfiole. Perhaps the ESP phenomena and the other events associated with gynchronicity will eventually lead to a neij scientific model of the universe. But as this major revolution in the basic theories of science has yet to come about, the best plan for trying to gain a coherent understanding of the idea of the archetype is, as we have previously argued, to parenthesize the postulation of archetypes existing outside man and to regard this idea as one possible theoretical extension of the archeig^sal notion which has yet to be successfully integrated into the overall theoiy. Ibreover, the interpretational approach we have used in trying to grasp the meaning of Jung's archetypes has not had to assume that archeiypes exist outside of man^ The overall success of this approach in making the archeigrpes comprehensible is perhaps a matter to be

PAGE 91

82 left to the judgment of the reader. However, In taking into account the full panaroma of Jung's utterances on the archetypes, it has been necessaiy only twice to mention this possibility as a way of understanding the archetypal theory. So far as the assertion that the arche-types have a pi^rchoid characteristic is considered then, this may perhaps best be rendered to mean that the archetypes manifest themselves in a pi^ychic way but seem to be more than pgychic or not only psychic. Vhat this quali-ty may eventually prove to be would seem part of the puzzle of the nature of the arehelype per se. But this way of conceiving the p^jrchoid characteristic of the archetypes need not imply that they exist outside of or independently of man. 3h any event, the concept of the archetype is not logically tied to the notion of synchronicity. Althoi^h ^ynchronicity may well require something like an archetypal hypothesis to make it intelligible, the reverse is certainly not the case.^*^ Archetypes and Temporality One final topic which must be taken up before our eaqxssition of the archeiypal theory is complete is the aspect of the changes in archetypes through tine. Ttro distinct questions seem to be involved. !Ih the first place, are there emergent archetypes, that is, do new archetypes come into being in response to the changing situation of man? Secondly, how can we account for the changes that arehe-types 1 manifest through tijne as, for example, the changes that the God archetype undergoes when the Jehovah of the Old Testament is experienced as the Christian Trinity and Devil?

PAGE 92

83 It seems evident that an answer to our first question must hinge on our idea of the origin of the archetypes. As t^I be remembered, it was concluded in this regard that the archetypes are inherited in a similar fashion to other biological siructures. If we take changes in archelypes as being strictly analogous to the way that the bo(fy changes through evolution, vie would expect that the chance of Dew archelypes coming into being through the evolutionaiy process constitutes a very lov; probability. For the evolutionaiy process \Torks in an accumulatoiy fashion in the sense that the origins of new structures occurs, as a rule, as an addition to the pattern of the existing genotype. Highly evolved creatures then tend to be more complex organisms. Ifereover, as a structure becomes highly evolved, there is less probability of major changes occurring in it since the chance that single mutations in the genotype will lead to an improvement in the overall structure compatible with the rest of the existing genotype is veiy small. Ife would not expect then the appearance of human beings with new basic structures for the body, a third eye or an extra limb. These occurrences T«>uld be monstrosities rather than improvements to be passed on to the next generation. Analogously, the origin of nev; archetypes through evolution wuld seem unlikely, especially in the light of the basic structuring function that the archetypes are held to play in the p^che. The archetypes are the phylogenetically old aspects of the p^che and hence those parts least liable to be changed to the overall benefit of the organism. A contemporary man is thus genetically very similar to what man was like ten thousand years ago, and no radical changes in the overall

PAGE 93

8h pattern of inherited human behavior are to be e^rpected, at least not for the next fei-7 willenia. Moreover, ^ihat would a neiT typical human situation be like corresponding to i/hich a new archetype could arise? It TOuld seem clear that any changes in the basic human situation would only be variations of situations which have existed coteraporously vdth the emergence of man as a species. If from phylogenetic considerations >7e then reject the practical possibility of the formation of new archetypes through the evolutionary process, the observed changes in archetypal manifestation through time must be escplained fixjm the ontogenetic viei^point, as the result of cultural and individual development. Ihe changes in archetypal manifestation do not thereby indicate a change in the archetype itself. By comparison vre might consider the human brain which genetically is basically tlie same structure as it was thousands of years ago at the dawn of civilization. Modem man's degree of consciousness and his overall conception of reantj-is, however, far different today than it was then, as we see reflected in the development of culture. The cnrial importance of the ontogenetic influence in giving shape and content to the archetypal disposition must then not be underestimated, as the basic patterning influence of the archetype itself can take on a seemingly limitless variety of forms. Although there can be no nevr archetypes, there can be new symbols and nevx ncrfchs. The UFO phenomenon is a particularly instructive exaniple in this regard. It is characteristic of our time that the archetype, in contrast to its previous manifestations, should now take the form of an object, a technological construction, in order to avoid the odiousness of mythological personification (Vol. X, p. 328).

PAGE 94

It is then the interaction between the conscious and unconscious aspects of the psijrche that accounts for the changes in archetypes across tine. For vdth the development of consciousness through the agency of culture, the archetjTal images undergo a gradual transformation. This is, moreover, what would be expected if the archetypes are to function as compensatory agents for the conscious attitude. ^•i^.-.-, ^ ^^ become apparent as we pi'oceed, this hope trfll not be fulfilled. It is on3y in Jung's earlier writing that he attenipts to explain how archetypes originate through ideas about the origins of ^jrths. HoTxever, due to the fact that clung 's vier^s on this matter become implicated xdth ideas about the Inlieritance of acquired characteristics, this earlier vievr merits full discussion, 2 +1, -Qi the above >re have not distinguished the spiritual from the r^igious, as in the previous discussion of the spiritual when the latter te«i referred to the archetypal manifestation and "religious" to tiie product of collective consciousness. Jung does not alvrays use these tenns in a consistent way, although from the contejct it is usually clear whether he is referring to the indi^d.dual or the collective manifestation. 3 _ However, it is ea:^ to fall into the opposite error of seeing alcheuy solely as a philosophico-religious enterprise and thus fail to appreciate the luiportant role which alchemical work has played in the history of chemisti^-. Jung, in his work ^rith the psychological ^jnificance of alchemical symbols, is particularly open to this l^^ y.^ J'^^^^ overemphasized the p^/chological aspect of alchen^y while failing to give due credit to the naturalisSc and practical aspects of the art. n—r.., , ^® ^™' "aechanicomorphize" is taken from Joseph F. T"^' 45^°^?^b^ Science f^ Itersonalitv Theory (Bbston: Houghton mruji 196317 p. 57. ^ is also possiflTtb taS the opposite approachii^bo anthropamorphisnjj and assign non-human characteristics to human organisms. Some psychologists feel that the behaviorist does this when he 'mechanicomorphizes' man . . . " Richard Semon, ^ISL >^eme (Nei-; York: JfeicJHllan, 1921), p. n. Ibid. , p. 12.

PAGE 95

86 7 and 193^ transition apparently occurred SQmetijne bettreen 192^ o the nr^Jt J? ?J^**^\*5^* by Saying in effect that the question of the origin of the archetypes is not a useful one to ask, Jung is attenipting to avoid the stl^^na of the doctrine of inheritance of acquired characteristics. For from the Lainarcldan point of viet^. it makes saise to ask hmr the archetypes come to be in the psyche and to postulate possible enrironraental causative conditions. ia.th hxs VTithdra/al from implicit support of the lamarcldan position. Jung sees no point to raising the question, Hbirever, asking abJut ttie origin of archetypes need not imp^y a LamarcIdLan answer. One ad.^t legitiraate3y idsh to knotf ^Aether archetypes have a natural, biological origin or nonnatural origin as result of intervention ^ ^irf-tual agencies. Jung speculates about the possibility of the latter alternative in the folloidng: The question is nothing less than this: Does the pgychic in general—ttie soul or spirit or the unconscious—originate in us, or is the p^jrche, in the early stages of conscious evolution, actuaUy outside us in the fom of arbitrary powers xd.th intentions of their aim, and does it gradually take its pl^ce within us in the course of psychic development? . . . Biis whole idea strikes us as dangerously paradoxical, but, at bottom, it is not altogether inconceivable (Vol. X, pages 69-70), 9 +« +V, ^e application of the Kantian phenomena/noumena distinction to the problem of archetype per se versus archetypal image is not unproblematic. For the appeal to the archetype per se as the prin''Sif*i^P°"^^-'-® £°^ *^® archetypal image would seem to imply the attribution of qualities to the thing-in-itself, i.e., thS^tte iltter was real and had certain effects. Ohus, if to take the archetype per se as strictly analogous to the thing-in-itself, we end up attributing properties to that which from Kant's viewpoint we are not supposed to be able to attribute anything at all. See Eavrard Casey s article "Towards An Archetypal Imagination" in Spring. 197li, 10 +« ^+ T„ ^*T ^V?^*?® y°^ "extraspection" in the sense ascribed to it by Joseph F. Jjrchlak in A Hiilosoohv of Science for Personality The^ssr, page 2?: "If a theorist^5kgr^e^ri[^5Stivglb rspecSro or fjame of reference, he defines his abstractions from liis vantage rtui^."^ ^ ^^'^'"' ""^Sardless of the point of vier^ of the objectof u A ^^5^3 portion of a dream of Jung's, for example, the shadoi7 archetype ^^ars as "Or. Y. and his son." Iforeovir, the l^L^-" J^f^^^^^""^ ^^^° P^^'^ ^ archeti'pal role in the dream. Smho?^^^f ^J° the relationship Jung had .dth his real fatherf^s qoribolic father acts as a guide to the nysteries of the unconscious.

PAGE 96

87 It started with my paying a visit to my longdeceased father. He was living in the countiy— I did not knoxjr where. I sa;r a house in the style of the eighteenth centuiy, veiy rooiny, with several rather large outbuildings, , . , i'^ father guarded these as custodian. He was, as I soon discovered, not only the custodian but also a distinguished scholar in his o-tm right—which he had never been in his lifetime, I met him in his stu^, and, oddly enough, Dr, T.-w;rho was about ay age— and his son, both psychiatrists, were also present, I do not laiow whether I had asted a question or vrfiether my father wanted to ejqiain something of his own accord, but in any case he fetched a big BLble doim from a shelf, a heavy folio volume like the I^rian Bible in toy libraiy, Bie Bible ray father held JTSLS bound in shiny fishsldn. He opened it at the C)ld Testament— I guessed that he turned to the Bentateuch— and began interpreting a certain passage. He did this so s-^riLftly and so leamedOy that I could not follow him, I noted on3y that what he said betrayed a vast amount of variegated knowledge, the significance of which I dimly apprehended but could not properly judge or grasp, I saw that Qp, Y, understood notliing at aU, and his son began to laugh. They thought that W father was going off the deep end and what he said was simply senile prattle, . , , The tvro psychiatrists represented a limited medical point of view which, of cotirse, also infects me as a physician. They represent my shadow— first and second editions of the shadow, father and son ( l^famories. Dreams. Reflections, pages 217-21571 12 Si talkijig in this way about the insight of a universal perspective, there xs a temptation to speak in tems of the "id-sdom" of the-unconsciou^. ]h regard to collective compensation then, lie must be careful to avoid the misunderstanding that this tiT)^ of language iiaplies that the unconscious is a sort of higher consciousness xrfiich purposiveHy guides the personality to its destina4 ?: * L^^ sort of "guidance" which the unconscious provides is that which results from the Tjorldngs of a natural process which Itself has no end in view. Jung makes tliis point in a discussion concerning compensation 1^ the unconscious. Yet it would, in my view, be wrong to siq)pose that in such cases the unconscious is worldng to a deliberate and concerted plan and is striving to realize certain definite ends. I have found nothing to support this assumption. The driving force, so far as it is

PAGE 97

possible for us to grasp it, seems to be in essence only an urge tovrards self -realization. If it TOre a laatter of some general teleological plan, then all Individuals who enjoy a surplus of unconsciousness would necessarily be driven towards higher consciousness by an irresistible urge (Vol. VXE, p. l8U). 13 ^ ^ ,, "le anima xs in part man's inner image of iraman. See pa^e 7^ for further characterization of the anima archetype. Piis generalization is prijnarfJy based on the dream material of caucasiais. Do the shadotjs of Lfegroes and other racial groups then appear as figures with white sldn? !Ib vsy knowledge this quesUon has not been resolved through empirical studies. 1^ w 4.V ^ ^though the content of all the archetypes is conditioned ^^ individual's personal experience, the shadot; and the anima/ anlms^differ from the otlier archetypes in the fact that their content is more directly relatable to the person's personal situation than the other archetypes. In tems of the analogy of depth tnen, these archetypes occupy a position intemediate betvreen conscioumess and the personal unconscious and the other aspects of zae collective unconsciousness. (Ife.; Iorkf^]£?a,'^i7l); ^.^ ^"^^'^^^ ^ ^ML Sgstisjr ^ na^.^.H^^^T^^S^i?'^ has been ruled out, the question might ^rell J^+^n?°'' *^-i! i^««nce" of the archetype can then be mide intelligible. It irould seem that some sort of laiOike ordering principle must be postulated not involving a cause and effect relationship beti^een the objective event and the correlated internal state of expectancy, llaldng clear hoi7 the archetype is supposed to fimction as this ordering principle is one of the major conceptual ambiguities which must be resolved in order to maloe synchronicity into a viable explanatoiy hypothesis. 17 Compare use of psychoid as discussed on page 1 3, -x x^ ^^°f ^^® position taken here is that a rational reconstruction of the archetypal theory is not corardtted to the task of a rational reconstruction of synchronicitj-, to m21 not attempt a critical assessment of synchronicity in this stu(^. Ih order to cany out that task, several crucial questions would have to be conadered. In addition to the problem of making archetsTal influence" intelligible, additional clarification is needed as how the crucial distinction betvreen coincidence and meaningful coincidence can be made operationally sound. Questions csa also be raised as to the validity of Rhine's statistical procedures and results. See C.E.M. Hansel's ESP (Ifevr York: Scrilbner, 1966).

PAGE 98

CHAPTER k CRITICISI4S OF TIIE ARCHETYPAL THEORY: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Pt'elimlnary Remarks The exposition of Jung's concept of the archetype having now been completed, it is the objective of the second half of this sbuic^ to consider criticisms of the theoiy. To an extent we have anticipated this task in the first half. For in order to rationally reconstruct Jung's concept of the archetype, it has proved necessary on occasion to distinguish betvreen essential aspects of the idea and other aspects which although linked by Jong on occasion vrLth discussion of archetypes would, if e:cplored in teims of their full implications, lead to a situation of either obvious inconsistency or hopeless obscuritsr and confusion concerning \That is meant to be inqjlied ty the concept of an archetj'pe. As the chief case in point, vre have interprerted the archetypes naturalistical3y in the sense that it was assumed that they occur as a natural phenomenon of man rather than as subsistent entities with an ontological locus outside of man. Closely related to this naturalistic stance on the origin and ontological nature of the archetype was the position taken asserting the psyche's necessary dependence on the brain. la addition, in terms of our project of reconstruction, it \ms found necessary to emphasize the logical Independence of the idea of archetypes from the hypothesis of ^ynchronlcity. The assumption of an extrap^ychlc locus for the archetype vrhich was entailed l^ 89

PAGE 99

90 ^chronicity, a locus "in matter," was considered to be an imnecessaiy complication to an already cumbersome theory and to be, moreover, an addition which is ijicompatible idth other aspects of the archetypal theory as \ie have reconstructed it, Che could, of course, postulate archetypal entities which are responsible for the phenomena of ^ynchronicity and vrtiich subsist independently of man vjithout having to assume that they were therefore supernatural agencies. This supernatural agency l^ypothesis is then only one of several conceivable types of nonnaturalistic interpretations. "> Hoirever, this assumption of extrapsychic subsistence, even if it need not invoke the supernatural, still has the effect of naldng the archetypes into occult entities, that is, entities which have veiy little in common with man as he is understood ±n terms of standard scientific knm/ledge.^ 3h addition to the questions related to the naturalistic interpretation of the archelypes, we have also previously discussed the influence of Kantian epistemology on Jung's archetypes (pages 3^ and 38). Biis topic TTill be further treated in the third section of this chapter. The question of evolution theory and its possible consequences for the plausibility of the archetypal concept, foreshadoired on page ^9 will be examined further in the last section of Chapter 7. The last of Jung's rims previously critiqued concerns the question of racial differences (page 26 ). Following VJbrld Ifer H, Jung appears to have retreated from the ijiiplications for racial differences lAlch he drei/ flx>m the idea of the collective unconscious, ^le claiffl that different racial groups have a distinctly different collective unconscious is at ary rate not emphasized by Jung in his writings

PAGE 100

91 aner librld >far U, although the quotes in support of such a view presented on page 26, from Vol. VTI, ^re not retracted by Jimg in the "thorough revision" to i^hich he subjected the book in the fifth edition in 19h2 (Vol. VII, p. 7), 3 lath objections from the scientific perspective and evaluation of the archetypal concept as a scientific theoiy having been i^served for later discussion (Chapters 5,6,7), what remaining criticisms must then be considered? This question is rendered problematic l^ the vast panorama of different types of critical attacks vjhich have been directed against Jung's viei^s. The project of presenting conclusive counterarguments against each individual dissenting author could conceivably engage one's efforts for several years. But such a volume and variety of critical literature is not itself a reliable indication of the inherent wealmess of Jung's conceptions nor even of the result of his violation of beliefs and presuppositions of vested professional interest so much as it is an iiidication of the obscurity of his method of presentation, which in its magnificant rhetorical style manages through its all-encompassing, cosmic scope to have something to offend, confound or confuse just about everyone. There is also, of course, a veiy large and rapidly groidng literature from Jungian enthusiasts. But as the xrork of even the most immediate Jungian disciples (individuals such as Ttoiele Jaffe, Jolande Jacobi and liichael Fordham) offer supposedly authoritative accounts of Jung's vlei^s xAich differ vriLdely in interpretational approach and emphasis at crucial points,^^ one begins to ironder if periiaps there is in fact a problem in that through a combination of intuitive overdeteiTOination^ and lack of precision in formulating and liMting his basic constructs, Jung has tried to e:cplain

PAGE 101

92 too much tor his archetypal theoiy through the use of conceptual categories lAich are sijiiply too vague and too s^/eeping in scope. Jung's work certaijily offers ample justification for this type of comment, but rather than being the result of laziness or lack of attention, such openness and indeteirdnateness in regard to his theoretical constructs was rather the product of a conscious methodology. In Chapter 6 to Tdll have occasion to examine this methodology and consider in v*at measure it is adequate for the tasks which it purports to accomplish. Ohe point to be made here, hoover, in regard to criticisms of Jung is that the aiiibiguity and openness to different possible interpretations characteristic of Jung's foiwulations gives the unEympathetic critic an abundance of possible avenues of attack. Jung is particularly vulnerable when passages are criticized out of their proper context or id-thout regard to V7hat is said in other wriLtings. For it is fi^equeiitly necessaiy to read Jung's explanation of a theoretical point in several different ^^tlngs in order to gain a complete understanding of what he is saying in light of the overall development of his ideas. Jung thus offers more than the usual difficulties for the reader, and as a consequence a significant amount of Jungian criticism is grounded in misunderstanding of Jung's basic ideas. 6 1* vjill be content here viith ttra examples of this type of criticism. Hather than being ijistances of simple errors, they are more aptly described as "a misture of distortion and misunderstanding, which is obviouaLy motivated by ill will. "7 The first sample comes from the pen of Philip Rieff . ih the passage beloi/ this unfortunately influential critic slides from a discussion of

PAGE 102

93 the role of fante^ in mediating the e^^jerience of the a«:hetypes to two subsequent passages on the same page T*ere it is apparent that he is equating "iUusion" and "archetype." though I^eff w feel that the archetypes are Illusions, it should not be supposed, as he teplies, that this in any way approximates Jung's meaning of the teim. It would seem that Rieff wants the reader to think that because ai^hetypal images can be produced through a type of fantasy activity (Jung calls it active imagination) archetypes are then merely "forms of fanta^"^ in the sense of being a system of illusions, Ihat exactly is this "creative impulse" which Jung sets up as the highest activity of man? On first glance, one would think it is merely a nei-; term for artj but actually Jung implies something much more general, public as well as private, Tihat Jung means by fantasy is, in a word: illusion. , , . I^re than ever before, then, both the high cidture and the individual sense of well-being depended, for their veiy e:!astence, on erotic illusions. If old illusions no longer functioned satisfactorily, then they must be replaced by "something nei/," Junr dedicated his life to the pwjduction of something new xn the, way of saving illusions, ... ^ Jung despised the fundamental "unspirLtuality" implied by Freud's suspicious treatment of the dynamics of the unconscious. Ju^ there, in the unconscious, are those superior illusions that would compensate manldnd for the barren interdicts of Christianity and the almost „ equally barren interdicts of psychoanalysis.^ Our second sample of misconceived criticism comes f3nom Edward dLover, whose book Freud ^ ^^m^ is the fortunately as yet unsurpassed nadir of anti-Jimgian literature. Ihe following statements reveal that he fails to appreciate even so basic an idea as the importance of the unconscious iii Jung's p^hology. Glover is apparently unairare of the distinction Jimg draws between collective conscixjusness and the collective unconscious and thus deduces the

PAGE 103

9h absurdity that Jung is actually proposing a brand of conscious psychology, Ifow in so far as Jung is convinced of the overT^ihelMng Ifflportance of the Collective Thconscious (and it must be remembered that although he appears to be sincerely convinced of this, he also adduces considerations vrhich if correct would reduce its in^jortance to the level of purely conscious forces and factors) .... Indeed it is hard for any Fb^eudian xrho takes the trouble to immerse his mind in Jungian pqyxjhology to avoid the honrid suspicion that Jung is nothing more or less than a pre-Preudian who having at first let himself be carried in the stream of Freudian thought has ever since striven to make his peace vri.th conscious psx'chology, '^ But by thus dismissing fi-om further discussion extant criticisms based on misunderstandings of what Jung's archetypal theoiy implies:, xre must not then also exclude certain gysbematically biased critiques. Biese criticisms are based not so much on a misundersbandii3g of Tjhat Jung says as on the failure to see how Jung's archetypes can be made corgsrehensible ^d.thin the scope of a particular conceptual framevrork for understanding human experience." Consequently these criticisms recur as a type or species of criticism ^rfiich adherents of a given intellectual persuasion t^caliy raise against Jung i^ regard to the archetypes. (!Ihe examples to be discussed beloi; are from p^hoanalysis and Judeo -Christian theology.) T*iat is at stake then in the consideration of such systematic critiques is the intelligibility of the archetypal hypothesis fi-om the perspective of a given image of man. Criticism from such a point of vlei7 could readily be mderstood as having begged the questions at issue. Hoirever, this consideration is not a sufficient reason to disregard the criticisms discussed belovr. For in addition

PAGE 104

9^ to helping us imderstand the point of tv/o coiamon types of criticism, lie must consider vAether the phenomena for which the archetypes purport to provide an explanatory framwrork can not be accounted for in less cumbersome ways. Berhaps from the perspective of these other iinages of man, archetypes can be sham to be no longer necessary. At any rate, a discussion of such criticism vrill better enable us in gaining a critical viev/point on Jung's image of man. 1 2 FgAihoanalTtic Critic-! sm If yje consider then the characteristic criticism of J^udians to the archetype concept, this is usually a claim to the effect that all unconscious contents can be accounted for in tenns of an individual's personal history ^rithout the need for an hypothesis of a collective unconscious. According to this line of argument, the latter should then be elijtiinated in favor of a more parsimonious explanation couched in ijidividual developmental terms. As a case in point dLover argues as follows: ... but at the very least we must examine the embiyonic stages of individual development to see i^hether they could not account satisfactorLOy for those mental contents that led Jung to develop his theory of the collective or racial unconscious. 13 . . . n^ iSmgian archetypes are capable of adeJtosbJl^.IaiiL alaa JMc aa long jTShSrSff^n^ exBlored toe eariai joms of individual thSkliT ^ Hie :^di^ and universalit^r of the, collg3H^ ^kkES is undeTilEnrSyii^^""^ ^^ A second representative instance of Freudian systematic cidtician is taten from Nandor Pbdor's PVeud, Jm^Q, and Occultism. Ih the passage cited belmr he gives exai^^les of dreams which from the Jungian point of view vrould provide good paradigm cases of aix^hetypal images.

PAGE 105

9S He concludes that these ijnages can be adequateOy understood in teiros of Freudian personal psychology vrLthout the need for a concept of a collective unconscious of archel^ypes, ^e chief point of interest, hoirever, is vjhether the concept of tlie Old Vase r-3an and the archet^Tpe of transformation inalce any novel contribution to the interpretation of the dream. They do not, liiconscious guidance and sublimation cover "toe situation just as i^ell. Bie spiritual elaaent is a beautiful unconscious fantasy, Bie Jungian contribution is onOy verbal— but it is stimulating and anpeals to tlie imagination, ' 5 >fes then the Carpenter of his dream an archetype of the Self or just a personification of the integrating dirlve? It malces no difference whichever vray you look at it,""*^ Qrchetype of the^ Shadow or neurosis. It malces no difference. The meaning is the same. ^ The Jiingian approach yields nothing that the Freudian does not imply. 17 nh considering the force of this tj-pe of objection, it is important to note that what is at issue is not the existence of the phenomena for which the archetypal theoiy is to provide an explanatory frameiTOrk so much as how these phenomena are to be interpreted. The British psychoanallyst Mthor^r Storr admits for example that: "It is not difficult to prove the existence of an inner world of highly irrational images , , , , "18 and "the existence of the mythological substratum to human experience is recognized by analysts of entirely different theoretical orientations, fi.e., different from Jung^ though they would use another nomenclature, "19 vathough Fodor and OLover argue that Freud's psychology can account for the images alleged to be archei^ypal trtthout need for any theoretical adjusteent of basic Freudian theoxy, another school

PAGE 106

97 of psrjnchoana3jtical thought has deroloped a concept of "internal objects" to account for the type of phenomena at issue. This neo-ft-eudian school is composed of followers of Ifelanie laein. Accordiig to the laeinian viei7 then, the iinages \ih±ch Jung would call archetypes are the result of a process of introjection in which items of experience in the child's immediate environment such as the mother's breast are internalized and become incorporated into the child's ego as internal objects. Si the passage cited beloi;, we see an example of how this explanatory device of introjection of internal objects attempts to ' account for the allegedly archetypal images vrithin the context of an essentially Freudian psychology which explains unconscious images in terms of individual development. Si reali-ty parents and child possess limited povrer or goodness and badness, vjisdora and foolishness. Bie cliild's phanta^ makes gods and demons and all those unearthly creatures of them tAich folklore and inythology, religious legends and artistic creation present to us in sublimated, and the imagination of the insane in more misublimated, fonn. Ibreover, the child places his self -created figures Inside his am body and treats them as live entities alien to himself and beyond his control. "20 Ttie proper Jimgian reply to this line of criticism \d21 appeal to evidence that the images said to be archetypal have collective features which rule out an interpretation solely in terras of individual development. The reaaining in stqjport of the collective nature of such features will consist of a demonstration of the correspondence of the images \T±ih symbols in the histoiy of culture which are unknorm to the individtial previous to his experience of the images. IJius the spontaneous appearance of the same symbols in

PAGE 107

98 cultures vridely separated 3ji space and time x/ill be seen as necessitating a concept of the collective unconscious. The soundness of such reasoning is naturally open to question in various ways. In the case of the individual vrho experiences allegedly archelgrpal images, how is the absence of previous cultural Influence estabOlshed, for example? >breover, vrould not a theory of cultural diffusion better account for the appearance of the same J^pibols in different cultures? Baw&ver, the sort of systematic attack on the archetypal theoiy VTith Tihich we are concerned here is not so much interested in directly inipugning the evidence for a collective unconscious as it is to tiy to sho:-/ how its ovm Ijiterpretative frame^rork makes the allegedly archetypal phenomena Intelligible ^d.thout the need for a concept of a collective unconscious. Vfe vjill then reserve an examination of the evidence given in support of the collective unconscious for a later chapter. For it is our task in the present section to indicate the manner in which the Freudians and KLeinians see the Jungian interpretation of the phenomena at issue as not mereily false or unsupportabO^ by the evidence given but as violating basic assumptions they appear to hold about the nature of man. The sort of assumption on which the tension bettreen the Jungian and Freudian Images of man seems to turn involves the issue of description of human experience in terms of "spiritual" predicates. As T.-iill perhaps be remembered from previous discussion (page h^), V7e were unable to grasp t-Aat -Jung means by the spiritual until vre had contrasted the spiritual and the Instinctual. The spiritual was that vrfiich alloi7s the energies of man to be employed in other than

PAGE 108

99 instinctual activities. !Ihe enrphasis of the Jungian image of man is thus on the existence of a source of creative ^pibolic activity which may manifest itself in artistic, religious and even scientific ws, but which can not be understood merely as an outgrorrth of instlnctuality interpreted in a narrot;, physiological sense. Bjr contrast, what might be characterized as a Freudian image of man seeks to explain all aspects of human activity in terns of the development of the individual's instinctuaLity. This tlie attempt is made to give the so-caUed spiritual aspects of man a reductive biological interpretation, ^ce it is difficult to see hoi; creative symbolic activity relates directly to the biological needs of the individual, from this perspective it is then easy to believe that the symbolic manifestations must be either infantile phenomena or delusions. Thus Storr states: As will be perceived, I am putting fort/ard suggestions as to possible norths which can be variously SKrded exther as paranoid delusions or as religious beliefs. 'rr,! :i,\ ^ ^y^^ KLeinians and Freudians would argue that religxous beliefs are as unnecessary as deP^choanalysts consider that the inner world and xts ojnages are infantile phenomena, admittedlr po'^rerful deteiminants of a man's idea of the external world, and therefore of his behavior, but actually a hindrance in adaptation to reality, ae mythological level of the psyche is, in this viei7, a misconstruction which ought to be outgroim or overcome if a person is to be properly orientated toward people in an adult way, and toT/ard the external world as it actually is. ^2 Diis w of understanding as instinctual perversities that which from the Jungian perspective constitutes man's human-^ost potentialities for being seems to lead to an Incomplete and nondescriptive image of the human situation. Ohe suspicion that there has been an effort to

PAGE 109

100 KqxLain away a vitally important aspect of experience through a biological reductionlsm is reinforced by the often enotionally worded attacks on Jung. If the archetypes irere really only infantile phenomena or delusions, then one wonders if they would elict such emotional counterattacks. As a case in point GLover states that "... he Dunga proceeds to invest hman ideas and iioages irLth an atmosphere politely described as nysticism, but which the less polite observer vjould call an atmosphere of religiosity."^^ vath such differing ways of looking at the human condition as that represented in the writings of Preud and Jung, >re can not attempt here to provide conclusive arguments in favor of Jung's vietTs versus those of JVeud. Such a task would cawy us beyond the purpose of tMs study. 3h so far as ^^hat >re say here about Jung and his theory of archetypes proves to b© intelligible and to offer a genuine gain in understanding the human situation, this may perfiaps count against a Freudian perspective if a comparison :7ith Fmid's ideas fans to provide an equally satisfactoiy explanation. But beyond ;Aat we have said about the archetypes, no effort vrLLl be made to conclusive]y validate the inrportance of a spiritual dimension to erqjerience. Such a question can not be resolved only through argumentation but must be settled as the course of time proves the relative merits of the Freudian or Jungian images of man.^U In any case, it seems evident that the claim that the archetypal theoiy must be rejected on grounds of parsimour can not be upheld. For although it is readiJy admitted that Jung's archetypal theozy is a more cumbersome theoretical device than Freudian explanation in tenns of individual development, in contrast to Freud, Jung's idea of

PAGE 110

101 archetj^es reflects the characteristic quality of the phenomena it seeks to explain. To charge Jung rath violation of parstoony is thus beside the point until another theoiy can provide a simpler er^planation while at the sane time being able to adequately characterize the phenomena. Jung' s view has an obvious advantage over Freud in that in dispensing vdth the idea that dreams and other unconscious products are systematically distorted by the unconscious, Jung can have his theoretical explanations of the Images in close agreement Td.th the phenomenological content. The actual content of the images must then for Jung be taken seriously, not as mere disguishes for sexuality. A passage from Fodor serves to illustrate this point. Ife once had a dream involving a coal mine and under the influence of having read Jung attempted a Junglan type of explanation in terms of the archetype of transfoimation.^^ His interpretation along these lines pi^jceeds in part: Coal preeminently stands for transformation—of vegetable life (and imprisoned sunshine) into stone. Ibreover, coal is something valuable; it is called black diamond, not quite without reason, as both coal and diamond are made of carbon. • . , Treasure is undoubted3y referred to and, if it is in the mine or if it is to be mined, it has been ndned from the unconscious. ^6 Then in an attempt to discount the ijnportance of this interpretation he remarks: "It is interesting to note that, under the influence of Jung, I comjxLetely ignored the obvious uterine element in the coal mine .... "27 The interpretation of the coal mine as uterus does not have much phenomenologlcal plausibility; that is, \je fail to see on what grounds the interpretations of the coal mine as representing a uterus can be adequately defended. If a coal mine is a uterus, then

PAGE 111

102 any enclosed space could on basis of this reasoning be a uterus and any elongated object a penis. % comparison id.th the rb?eudian inteipretation, the KLeinian theoretical model can talce the phenomenology of the iinages successfulily into account. HOT/ever, its explanatory device of the introjection of internal objects lacks credibility. 2he internal objects thesis seems to be, moreover, a sort of ad hoc addition to the Freudian theoiy, an atteng^t to save at any cost the perspective of explanation in terms of individual development. Perhaps someday a theozy ^dll succeed in accounting for what Jung cans archetjrpes idthout the necessity of a concept of collective unconscious and yet Td.thout explaining airay the phenomena. Ho^rever, there is no good reason to believe that the Freudian or KLeinian approach is in fact such an account. Theological Criticism The second type of ^steraatic criticism we idll discuss comes from the theological point of viet/. Rather than opposing the archetypal theory idth an alternative psychological interpretation of events as was the case Tdth the I^eudian and laeinian approaches, the tiieologians are concerned id.th the issue of psychologism. !Ihey object to Jung's theory of archetypes then since, in their understanding, Jung's theoiy attempts an illegitimate psychological reduction of the transcendental concerns of religion. Th regard to the psychological interpretation of religious assertions. Father Josef Cioldbrunner thus remarks that: "In the language of science this thinking of Jung's must be called psychologisra, the levelling dorm

PAGE 112

103 of supra-psychic realities to the level of purely psychic reality. "^^ It is then not so much the theory of the archei^qje itself to iMch the theologians object, as it is Jung's use of the theoiy to understand and es^lain religious experience in a psychological way which attempts to be metaphysically neutral Trf.th respect to such issues as the e:d.stence of God. The Jexd.sh theologian Ikrtln Buber voices this type of criticism of Jung. He feels that Jung's psychological treatment of God in tenas of a God arche-l^rpe has the effect of maldng God into an entity which has reality only within the psyche, Ihus he accuses Jung of overstepping the legitimate scientific bounds of psychology and indulging in a type of psychologically based theology. In short, although the nenj p^rchology protests that it is "no world-viewbut a science, " it no longer contents itself xd-th the role of an interpreter of religion. It proclaims the new religion, the only one which can still be true, the religion of pure psychic iimnanence,^ Jung does not e:cBrcise such a restraint when he ejcplains that God cannot e3d.st independent of men. For, once again, if this is a statement about an archetype called God, then the emphatic assurance that it is a psychic factor is certainly unnecessary (l^lhat else coiiLd it be?) But if it is a statement abotrt some ertra-psychical Being which corresponds to this psychic factor, namely the statement that no such Being e:d.sts, then ve have here, instead of the indicated restraint, an illict overstepping of boundaries. -^° The validity of Buber 's criticism must be evaluated in the face of what Jung has to say about God. Jung distinguishes God-as-he-isKcperienced, the psychic God-image or God archetype, from a possible God entity transcending possible psychic e:cperience to which the God-image could correspond. Ih terms of his scientific methodological

PAGE 113

lOh ideal of avoiding undecidable metaphysical claims, Jung's assertions about God are then to be restidcted to psychological statements about the Ood-lmage. PsychologicaUy, however, Cbd is the name for a comple:: of ideas grouped round a poirerful feeling; the feeling-tone is -what really gives the complex its characteristic efficacy ... (Vol. V, p. 85). Hie idea of God is an absolutely necessary psychological function of an irrational nature, which has nothing whatever to do i/ith the question of God's existence. The human intellect can never ansi/er this question, still less give any proof of God. Jbreover such proof is superfluous, for the idea of an all-poijrerful divine Being is present everywhere, unconsciously if not consciousOLy, because it is an archetype. There is in the psjTJhe some superior power, and if it is not consciously a god, it is the "belly" at least, in 3t» Paul's words. . . , Our intellect has long laioiim that we can foiro no proper idea of God, much less picture to ourselves in what manner he really e:d.sts, if at all. The ejcistence of God is once and for all an unansiTerable question (Vol, VII, p. 71), Ihat Jung says above about God seems relatively unproblematic. Hoirever, Jung frequently uses his God-ijaage construct in ^rays which imply that it has the same meaning as the ordinary traditional religious usage of "God." "Absolute" means "cut off," "detached." To assert that God is absolute amounts to placing him outside all connection \T±th manldnd. Ifen cannot affect him, or he man. Such a God would be of no consequence at all. , , . this urge to regard God as "jabsolute" derives solely from the fear that God might become "psychological." This T-rould naturally be dangeroTxs. An absolute God, on the other hand, does not concern us in the least, whereas a Vpsychological" God would be real (Vol. VII, p. |235, note 6). Yet Jung is not agnostic and affirms his personal view that there is something to which the psychological God-djnage corresponds.

PAGE 114

10^ Biis is certainly not to: say that what to caOl the unconscious is identical v/ith God or is set up in his place. It is simply the medium from which religious e3cperience seems to flow (Vol. X. p. 293). ^ For me "God" is on the one hand a ncrsteiy that cannot be unveiled .... On the other hand "God" is a verbal image, a predicate or ncrthologem founded on archetypal premises . . . ( Letters. Vol. U, pages 25U-25^, letter to Pastor Jakob Anstutz dated 23 Ifey 1955). From these different perspectives from which Jung talks about "God" we can begin to understand why his vietrs attract theological criticism. For Jung believes that he can restrict himself to the "facts" of religious experience and that id.thout comnrLttlng himself to any metaphysical assertions arrive at certain valid engdrical statements about God-as-he-is-experienced. But since these assertions will be based on a cross-cultural comparison of religious symbology, they may come into conflict with the dogma of a specific religion where the archetypally based religious experiences have undergone a prolonged period of interpretation. Thus Jung, says that the doctrine of the privatio boni and its Implication: " Ctoe bonum a Deo, omne malus ab homine" is not supportable by existing archetypal evidence. ... I have felt compelled to contest the validity of the privatio boni so far as the empirical realm is concerned. ... Criticism can be applied only to psychic phenomena, i.e., to ideas and concepts, and not to metaphysical entities. These can only be confronted with other metaphysical entities. Hence my criticism is valid only within the ^'"P^J^cal realm. ... It seems to me, hoover, that the e:d. sting empirical material, at least so far as I am acqu^ted witti it, permits of no definite conclusion as to the archetypsil background of the privatio boni. Subject to

PAGE 115

106 correction, I would say that clear-cut moral distinctions are the most recent acquisitions of civnized man (Vol. U, pages 305-306). For the most part, ho^rever, Jung feels that his enpirical formulations leave the door open for at least theoretical congiatability vdth metaphysical religious statements based on faith. Since these metajAiysical statements such as the assertion that a God exists who transcends the p^che are supported hy faith rather than by experiences, they can not be either empirical3y validated or disproved. For even the numinous experience of the God archetype reveals only that a certain psycliicalOy conditioned factor exists. Bius Jung's reply to theological criticism is that he is making empirical statements about the God archetype rather than uttering metaphysical truths. He is not talking theologicalOy but scientifically. You evidently did not knot; that episbemologicaUy I take rui/iand on Kant, wliich means that an assertion doesn't posit its object. So when I say "God" I am speaking exclusively of assertions that don't posit their object. About God himself I have asserted nothing, because according to my premise nothing ^riiatever can be asserted about God himself. Jill such assertions refer to the p^chology of the God-image. Their validity is therefore never metaphysical but only psychological. All my assertions, reflections, discoveries, jetc, have not the remotest connection with theology but are, as I have said, only statements about psychological facts ( letters. Vol. I, p. Z9U, letter to Josef Goldbrunnejr dated 8 Februarv In spite of all Jung's protests of innocence, the theologians have nonetheless good reason to be upset ^dlii Jung's archetypal treatment of religion. It is not that Jung has explained atray religion by reducing it to psychology— his psychological treatment

PAGE 116

107 maintains the authentic ejdstence of nundnous experience which transcends reference to the personal ego to an indeterminable extent. Rather the difficulty is that the Jungian image of man with its archetypal understanding of the spirit is in real conflict with a traditional religious fvlet-rpoint based on faith. Thus although Jung is attempting to approach religious concerns from a strictly empirical point of view and is not advocating that his vieirs be interpreteci in a religious way, it is hard to avoid perceiving the manifest incompatibility vrith a traditional religious viev;point. For if one holds Jung's theoty of archetypes to be true, then traditional religious understanding can only claim to be a relative and In a letter Jung once admitted limited interpretation. this point: not supreme and solely If the Christian truth is _^ valid, then it believBS it has lost it raison' d'etre and, if I may express ray htmible opinion, it would have lost it. It xroxHd instantly have to turn into a sort of philosophical i^yncretism. I think that this is a most serious point ( Letters. Vol. I, pages 269-270, letter to •.E, Hocking dated 5 Ifey 1939). Jung's claim then is that all experience which could count as supporting a religious understanding, since it must be a psychic experience, falls irithin the damadu of his theoiy. The religious interpretation of this experience is thus always open to question and to possible p^chological critique. ... I approach these problems in a way that has often been charged td-th "psychologisra. " If "psychology" xrere meant, I should indeed be flattered, for vjy aim as a psychologist is to dismiss ;d.thout mercy the metaphysical' claims of all esoteric teachings. ... Let the convinced Christian believe, by all means, for that is the duty he has taken upon himself j but whoever is not a

PAGE 117

108 Christian has forfeited the charLsraa of faith, (Perhaps he was cursed from birth vdth not being able to believe, but merely to ]mm. ) ... One cannot grasp anything metaphysically, one can on3y do so psychologically. Therefore I strip things of their metaphysical tiralppings in order to make them objects of psychology (Vol. XEII, p. k9). The fact that I am content vjith what can be experienced psychically, and reject the metaphysical, does not amount, as any intelligent person can see, to a gesture of scepticism or agnosticism aiTied at faith and trust in higher poirers, but means approxiinately the same as what Kant meant I'/hen he called the thing-initself a "merely negative borderline concept. " Svery statement about the transcendental is to be avoided because it is only a laughable presuii5)tion on the part of a human mind unconscious of Its limitations. Therefore, when God or the Tao xs named an Ijiipulse of the soul, or a psychic state, something has been said about the knowable only, but nothing about the unloioi/able, about which nothing can be determined (Vol. xril, p. 51|). 3uch a position, although technically leaving open a loophole for religious faith, has the practical effect of destroying any ground for belief in the extrapsychological truth of such faith, i.e., a truth that would be more than just valid relative to a particular psychology. Unless one is motivated hy an arbitrary will to believe, the choice of one religious interpretation of archetypal experience over another or over an atheistic interpretation must be on the basis of pragmatic reasoning, i.e., one finds it helpful and congenial to one's personaliigr. Ii)reover, there is some real question to vjhat extent Jung is successful in mai^tadjiing his discourse about reUgious concerns on a solely empirical psychological level. Bie appropriation of the emotionally loaded word "God" to mean the p^hological God-image opens him up to the criticism that he is indulging in theological

PAGE 118

109 discourse. In his Jm^ ^ds, and ?bdem Ibn, Moreno complains then that "Jung, the philosopher-psychologist, interprets man's ideas of God within the framework of his ovm ideas of God."^'' Iforks such as Aisifer to Job leave tlie Impression that what is being expressed is more a personal religious testament than an objective psychological discussion. The claim that Jung's theory of archetypes constitutes a psychologistic treatment of religion is then justified in the sense that his theoiy offers a psychological frama/ork f or understanding id.th which a traditional religious framework can be made compatible only by assuming the subservient role of an undecidable metaphysical interpretation based on the archet^jpal "facts." The question remains, hoirever, to what extent this "psychologism" is the basis for a valid criticism of the archetypal theoiy. For the fact that ps^-chologism can be established does not necessarily mean that something is i-rrong irtth the theoiy. It would seem clear that p^/chologism is an objection only to a misuse or misapplication of the archetypal theoiy rather than to the theoiy itself. If, for exaiiiple, the claim is made that the psychological perspective is the onOy valid way to understand a religious, philosophical or aesthetic work or event, then there exists the manifest possibility of an illegitiJtiate reductionism. Freud's p^chologistic understanding of religion and art in teims of sublimation of sexuality seems an example of this pernicious "nothing but"32 psychologirtic application of a theoiy. But surely there is a legitlinate psychological element in religion,, art and philosophy which can be discussed id.thout the Implication that these disciplines are nothing but confused psychology.

PAGE 119

110 Jung's application of the archetypal theory beyond psychology to these other areas is for the most part sensitive to this problem. But of course ercaniples can be found where Jung is guilty of failing to appreciate a work In its ovm teims because of his at-rareness of the psychological element. He seems to arbitrarily dismiss the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger in this manner: . . . Hegel, who in ny very incompetent opinion is not even a proper philosopher but a misfired psychologist. His in^ssible language, which he shares with his blood-brother Heidegger, denotes that his philosoply is a highly rationalized and lavishly decorated confession of his unconscious ( letters. Vol. I, p. 5oi, letter to Joseph F. I^hlak dated 27 iipril 1959). Ibreover, it can be readily seen hor-x it is Jvaig^s Kantian strategy which brings him into direct conflict with the theologians. Jung will give a psychological treatment of the phenomena and leave the theologians and metaphysicians with the impossible task of talldng about noumena. But vre need not follow Jimg on this point? the archetypal theory can be made intelLigible ;d.thout the need for a Kantian distinction betireen phenomena and noumena. In this vray much of the theological criticism loses its force. For there is no longer the necessity for the misleading en5)hasis on the merely phenomenal nature of the God-image we erqjerience.^-^ But on the other hand, with the abandonment of this Kantian distinction, the question about the locus of the archetypes reappears. Are archetypes on3y psychic entities or is the psyche mereily one place in vjhich they manifest themselves. 3U Our argument for an understanding of the archetypal theory in terms of the foriner alter^iative, which vre ha^e con^rued as a naturalistic interpretation, can now be shora to have the advantage of

PAGE 120

Ill helping to separate the scientific aiais of such a theoiy from unnecessary metaphysical and theological complications. For Jung was perhaps misguided in believing that Kant's doctrines woidd perserve the scientific character of his theoiy and prevent metapl^^sical and theological discourse in its name. It is not clear that Kant succeeded in preventing the claims of science and religion from becoming competing systems of explanation, and, in ar^r case, Jmg in fact fails to Strictly adhere to Kant and sometimes indtdges in discourse which is of dubious scientific justification (Mswer to Job). Ifonetheless, it is in the spirit of Jung's theory to tiy to interpret it in such a way that the scientific import of the theory is not hopelessly implicated vdth nonscientific discourse. «„+, n ^ example of a nonnaturalistic account not involving suTDernatural agencies could be dravm from the work of Carlos Castaneda! Jn Journey to Ibcfclan (New York: Sjmon and Schuster, 1972), for exaii^le,^he purports to describe entities called allies which have intentionality and i*ich "reside" in natural locations such as springs. Such an entity, if it existed, would not be a supernatural agency since it is partly on the basis of such entities that the workmgs of nature are described and understood, according to the vrorld vxeij of sorcery which Castaneda describes. On the other hand, tiying to interpret the archetjrpes as allies would not be a naturalistic interpretation either since it involves appeal to a radically nonstandard understanding of natural processes. Our usage of the tern "naturalistic" then involves at least prima facie !^!ISS^''^*L."^J^ ^andard (i.e., scientifically anlightened, common sense) understandings of nature. 2 -As the interpretation of Jung's archetypes as supernatural agencies is not attributed to any particular author in the follo^djif'. It should be mentioned that this line of interpretation of Jung is one which is veiy popular ^ri.th university students and others v*o are eager to embrace doctrines which from their point of vietj represent sensationalistic alternatives to a scientific world view. Jrnig's social and political vims have been the subject of irf-despread misunderstanding due in no small measure to Jung's notorious ineptness in public affairs, la order not to add to such

PAGE 121

112 ndsunderstandings, it should be made clear that in no sense does Jung's life or work offer any evidence that he was a bigot or advocated racial supremacy. Our critical statements on this matter are intended merely to argue that in fact the concept of the collective unconscious is not relevant to arguments concerning racial differences. For an unbiased account of Jung's social-political T"^^^.^!^^^ unfortunate adventures in public affairs see i\niela Jaffels tol me Ufe and Vfork of C,G. Jung (Ifew York: Harper and Row, 1971). -l^ comparison of discussion of the concept of the archetype in Aniela Jaffe' s book ^ I^^to of Jfeaning (New York: Penguin B^ks, tI-^^'J"^^ Jacobi's The Pgychology of C.G. Jung (New Haven: Tale Iftuversity Press, 1962), and IB.chael Fordham's The Ob.jective Psyche (london: Houtledge and Ifegan Paul, 19^8) offerlrtTat at first sirht seem to be incompatible accounts. Fordham looks at the archetypes from ascientific perspective, while Jaffe emphasizes the role of archetypes in mediating authentic religious, ircrstic and paranormal experiences. Jacobi, on the other hand, by literalizing Jung's often metaphorical language through the use of simplistic and misleading diagrams, creates her own unique account of what is involved in Jung's model of the p^che. However, this is not to say that these books grossly misrepresent Jung's views. Together with a reading of the Greeted I^rte, they help in gaining a fuller appreciation of the many facets Lr^ ^ ^^?^^* ^^ individuals who each read one of these books without reading Jung in the original would in all probability end up with ^Tidely differing ideas of what Jung means by the arche^es. An interesting passage from the Letters, although not mentioning names, must be quoted as relevant here: "There have been so many pupils of mine who have fabricated every sort of rubbish from vrhat they took over from me" ( Letters. Vol. I, p. 5l8 letter to Jurg Plerz dated 13 Januaiy 19l(9). ' Jung's analytical inclinations and abilities at times fail to keep pace with the flood of insights and ideas from tlie unconscious. His expositions frequently become so involved id-th lengthy examples and parenthetical elaborations that the main thread of discussion is lost. Vol. V of the Collected Vforks, Symbols of. Transfonnation. is a good example of this overdetemLnation of content at the expense of f OITO. ^ "OverdeteiTdnation" is a word introduced by Freud to mean the fusing together of different elements in the unconscious to produce single images ;7ith compound meanings. 55ee Jung. Vol. Ill pages 62-63. ^' ' K« 4^ ^i ^° "°* ^t^ *° Imply here that the secondary work should be ignored in an effort to understand .Jung. In the course of a^sition of Jung's work, instructive and thought-provoldng errors arV sometimes made. A case in point occurs in Tbreno's Jung. Gods and Ibto ^fen (Notre Dame, Indiana: IMversity of Notri^e-ffsS^ 1970) where m the course of a discussion of the relationship between

PAGE 122

113 archetypes and norths he reaches the folloi^diig conclusion: In spite of Jung's explanation, the relation of ncrth and archeigrpes is not yet clear. It is the nyfch which foms the archetype, and at the same time, it is the arche-type which produces mythical ideas. Is it a vicious cycle? Not likely, because for Jung, the sub.jective fantasies of myths are the causes of arche t^^es. [Italics mine .J But once the archetype is formed, it is endot/ed Td.th a kind of readiness to arouse the sam n^ythical ideas vxhich were the cause of its foimation, a familiar psychological process, ffeibits and dispositions are formed in the same way; repetition of acts forms the habit, but once the habit exists it is inclined to produce the very acts that were the cause of its e:d.stence (Ibreno, p. 19), By thus clearly spelling out one possible interpretation of irtiat Jung intends as the relationship beti-jeen archetype and myth, we are directed to its implausibility as an account of Jung's viei^ 211 regard to its consistency vd.th his i^ritings on the subject as a vmole . 7 Gerhard Adler, Letter to the editor. Horizon, 19 (I9h9), p. h9i, p Tr.r^y.y.r.^^ SfS^ ^^f^> MlSIEll of the Iherapeutic (New York: Harper lorchbooks, 1963), p. lil, where this temtinology is used. 9 ^^^•f? ^^^' "^'^'' "^'s Confession: Psychology as a language of Faith," Ehcounter. 22 Tl961i), p. Ii9. 10 _ B±rard GLover, "Freud or .Tung," Horizon. 18 (I9l;8), p. 2k3. 11 As Mght be expected, what :re have called criticisms based on misunderstanding could also conceivably be fitted into this second categoiy of systematic aUy biased critiques, iSlthough it is not clear what ideological motives Rieff may have, GELover is obviously a Freudian defending the faith. But as many of Dover's criticisms can not be understood solely in terns of a llanation of why some extant criticians are discussed and others passed over in silence. ^ ^^ Q"e could conceivably critize Jung's archetypal hypothesis from other standpoints than those mentioned here. One could viell image a behayiorist critique, for ejcaraple. Ibwever, an exandnation of such a critique would not shed much light on archetypal theory.

PAGE 123

11h i'^!?i"^*^i^^!Vff^°^ ^'^^d be one drawn from the standpoint of Sn?S:?t2?f^ ..''^^^Sf • ^though the phenomenologi^s a^id e:dstentialists do not for the most part address themselvls to Jung's S^* ?^ *Jf c°llfctive mconscious, it night xTell be thought IrL^^ll ^^^* to frame their ideas idthout appeal to a concept of an unconscious vrould constitute a strong implicit repudiation of "^M^fl"^*^ ^°^ thinloers as ISisserl, Heidegger. Sartre S?houf?ha^S f ''°"^' "^'^^ f ^ ^ ^^^°^i^^ humanlJp^riSr TTitdiout the need for an unconscious, have in actuality smuggled it back xnto thexr vieus xdLth functionalHy equivalent concepts. For example, in Heidegger's vork the concepts of "horison" plus "throimmco^Lci^sf ""^ ^^^*i°^^^^ equivalent to what ^ meiSs l^ ST 13 1950), pf*]?!^ ^°''^''' ^^^^^ ~ "^^ (london: George men and lind.n, ^^ ZMd., p. 38. 15 16 Books, imf "^ !°177' ^^^^^ "^^^ ^^ Qg-g^ltism (Hew York: IMverSity aid., p. 180. ^^ Ibid ., p. 182. 11 p. 38. ^^^°^ ^°^* ^«^^« JmP (Net/ York: ^e Viking Press, 1973), 19 Ibid. , p. 37, 20 T 4. . I^^% Heimann, "Some Notes on the Psycho-analytic Concept of Introjected Objects," British Journal of IfeScal Schology? 2Ph?),QV p. m. 21 Storr, p. 39. Ibid. , p. 68. 23 19 (19U9^°S5.' "^^'''^ °'' ^^^' Applied Jungian Psychology," Horizon 21; ^ +>,o+ +V,. ^^^^"^ misunderstanding it must be made clear that in saying that i±e question of the value of a spiritual ddinension to exTeriSf ?f „^f +?^''f^°^y^^ ^ *^^^h argumentation, the point being made is not that the oinportance of such a dimension cannot be argued for S.1ii%S\*^Ji the final justification of an iinage of man based upon the belief in the value of such a dimension will be ho;/ well it enables us to understand and effectively deal with the human situation intoe long run. Ih cor^jaring the relative merits of Freudian and Jungian images of man then, v/e do not at this time in histoiy have suf^cient per^ctive on what sort of consequences follow from these ways of i^s^^H ?f >,^ ?'^%'" ^ ^ ^^^ ^ ^^ *^^* *h« ^°^h of one vlevr has proved to be clearly superior to that of the other.

PAGE 124

11^ 2^ M U-. .,^n=i4+4«o* L I aE£hg22es Of transformation. They are not perZft^S. \?\Fr^ si^^^ions, places, ways and meaS, that ^pibolize the kind of transformation in question" (Vol. IX-A 26 Fodor, p. 176. 27 M^', p. 177. 28 ^x„ -^ose^^^ldbrunner, Dhdivlduation (Ifotre Dane, Indiana: University of Notre Dane Press, l^^E), p. 172. -^oiana. uni 29 pages 83-8^!^ ^^''' ^^^^^^ ~ — ^^^' ^°''^* ^^^^^ ^ ^'' 196^), ^° Ibid., pages 135-136. lioreno, p. Ill, 32 ^ The editors of Jung's letters. Gerhaixi MLer and Aiiela Jaffe, give the follot.jing ejiplanation of this cotnmDn2y used ej^jression of Jung's: A term frequently used by Jung to denote the cortmon habit of explaining sometlrLng unloioxm by reducing it to something apparently loioim and thereby devaluing it. It is borroired from Vailiam James, PpaCTiatism (1907), p. l6: "Ihat is higher is e:.-plained by what is loirer and treated for ever as a case of 'nothing but'— nothing but sometliing else of a quite inferior sort" ( letters. Vol. I, p. 1)^2, note 1 ). 33 K«n+i=r, w"* the Kantian point of vieii, it might be objected that a Kantian Interpretation of the archetypes is still possible even if we do not Identify the archetype per se i^lth the thing-in-itself . For it is possible to think of both the archetypal image and the archetype per se as part of the phenomenal realm and as distinct irom the noumenal archetypal referent. In keeping T/ith the intent of Jung's line of reasoning on this matter, ire could then state that vrhat is said about the C!od archetype does not necessarily implicate us i-dth claims about God as noumena. 3U ^ f-innr.^ ^"^?^ '^^es Hillman's "Ihy Archetypal Psychology," Sprinp U970;, p. 216, xjhere he opts for the latter alternative.

PAGE 125

CHAPTER 5 JTOIG Al© THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE: PART I The Relevance of the Question In the previous chapter in the course of considering various types of criticism of Jung's idea of airihetypes, we discussed the problem of p^chologism: the claim that Jung was illegitijnately reducing religion and metaphysics to psychology. ]h the present chapter we must consider the opposite problem: the claim that Jung is making psychology into religion and metaphysics. From this fact that Jung is attacked both fi-om the theological and metaphysical perspective as well as from the scientific point of vievx, one might be tempted to conclude that Jung has hopelessly confused the trational distinctions beti^een these areas of inquiiy and produced a type of discipline which fails to be either good philosophy, religion, or good science. But as we have urged in the previous chapter that Jung's theory should not be implicated id.th theological and metaphysical claims, so in the present and subsequent chapters we must consider the scientific status of the archetypes. Ihis question is the most crucial one for our naturalistic reconstruction of the archetypal theoiy. For if Tie are to establish successfully that there is a continuity beti-reen ordinaiy natural phenomena and the phenomena of archetypes, then vre must shoir how the archetype construct can be compatible in 116

PAGE 126

117 prfjiciple Tdth a scientific understanding. If on the other hand, it can be shoxm that Jung appeals to a frametrork of understanding of a radical]y different nature ^riLth different principles of explanation from what constitutes at least a irrLniinal3y acceptable scientific ^andard, then in light of the scientific claims Jung makes for his archetypes, 1 vre would have to conclude that the idea of archetypes is not only nonscientific but perniciously pseudoscientific, deceptively claiming the authority of scientific method. But ire do not mean to imply that for any of Jung's ideas to be meaningful, they must be shorn to be genuinely scientific. Certainly such works as Answer to Job are meaningful and Insightful though most probably not science. Jung was too complete an individual to have been only a scientist, and his xndtings often reflect his extrascientific vieifs and interests. But the fact that Jung at times exceeds the legitimate boundaries of scientific inquiiy as in Job is all the more reason to assess the scientific status of the archetype. For the many facets of Jung's personality—philosopher, therapist, "speculating heretic" (Vol. XT, p. 307), scienti^-invite the unsympathetic and shortsighted critic to dismiss Jung's viei-rs carte blanche as hopelessly unscientific or "jcrstic." j\nd since to underhand our task in this stady to be, at least in part, an attengjt to show why the archetypes merit serious scientific study and consideration, we must then address ourselves to the questions centerijig around the putative scientific status of archetypes. The Charge; of % -sticifan The firfft problem to be tackled in treating the various que^ions related to the scientific validity of archetypes is the issue of

PAGE 127

118 ncrsticisra. For if Jiing's vier/s are mjrstical then certainly they can not be scientific. To simply dismiss Jung's ;7ri tings as norstical is, of course, an extremely unfair and prejudical attitude to talce toward his vrork. HoiTOver, the uncertain relationship betvreen n^sticisra and Jung's views gives the critic a chance to impugn Jung's ideas by JJitimating that they constitute a ncrstical rather than a scientific body of statements. Thus in an article entitled "The IJrstical and Scientific Aspects of the Psychoanalytic Theories of Freud, Adler and Jung," Bdirard Burchard states: But it is only in Jung Qn contrast to Freud and MlerJ that ire find a conscious and deliberate repudiation of rationality and empirical science and a lush proliferation of concepts which are indistinguishable in fonn and intention from those of Christian and Oriental reli^^ious mystics. "^ Though not actually using the peo'orative label "ncrsticism, " Rieff criticizes Jung in a similar vein stating that Jung's views are based on revelation rather than scientific method. There is no arguing id.th revelation. Jung's was a personal language of faith, revelatory, and therefore beyond danger of being invalidated by argument or contrary experience. ... iigainst the democracy of the scientific intellect, he represents the aristocracy of emotional profunditj'-.^ Because it offers no criteria of validity, other than the therapeutic e>q)erience of conviction, Jungian theory amounts at once to a private religion and an anti-science.'^ It would seem that in relation to the quertion of i^ysticisra, there exists a confusion of various issues. For it is unclear exactly what the charge of rcrsticism amounts | to or what the word "rorsticism" is supposed to signify other than "unscientific."^ Ibreover, the accusation that Jung is a myrstic would seem to be the most polemical and

PAGE 128

119 extreme form of criticism of various sorts that Jung is unscientific. But lAereas some critics such as Rieff refrain from using the loaded word V^icism, " the substance of their criticism seems to amount to the similar claim to that of calling Jung a nystic in that they allege that Jimg is involved in paradigmaticalOy unscientific endeavors. The mildly worded srtatement below by PWedman and Goldstein seems to be of this nature: Jungian pj^ychology, viith its emphasis on the archaic and its tendency to passive preoccupation with ssrnbolic content, stands in strong contrast to the rationalism and determinism characteristic of Ifestem thought in general and modem science in particular." Tn order to untangle the confusion of issues centering around the allegedly unscientific nature of Jung's work then, to vdll employ the strategy of considering various plausible reasons which, in light of a knovrledge of Jung's work, would lead one to question its genuine scientific status. Hather than further discussing extant criticisms then, TO >dll proceed ;d.th a consideration of scientifically problematic aspects of Jung ' s work. I^Srsticism CJiaracterized W.T. Stace in his I^sticism and Philosophy argues that genuinely inystical experience can be divided into two basic types. A so-called extroverted mystical e3cperience is to be distinguished from an introverted one. 3h the extroverted ezqp&Aence there is a " . . . unif^^lng vision, expressed abstractly by i the formula 'All is One.' The One is . . . perceived through . . j the multiplicity of objects, "^ Thus the extroverted itystic perceives a oneness of all things which is distinguishable from the individual things themselves. The introverted

PAGE 129

120 rcrstic on the other hand experiences a oneness in a consciousness othend.se devoid of all ideational content. "The Unitary Consciousness, from TThich all the multiplicity of sensuous or conceptual or other empirical content has been excluded, so that there remains only a void and empty unity. "^ In addition to the experience of oneness, Stace lists other characteristics shared ty both types of irysticisra: "Sense of objectivity or reality; feeling of blessedness, job, happiness, satisfaction, etc.j feeling that what is apprehended is ho^3r, or sacred or divine; parado:d.cality; alleged l^ nystics to be ineffable . . . . "^0 Is Jung a %stic ? NoTiT if vre characterize someone as a nystic, ^.m could mean that this person adhers to nystical beliefs. Ifovrever, it would seem that a plausible case could be made for the claim that a true nysfcic must come by his nysticism first hand, i.e., that he must be a person xvho has himself had nystical experience. But as in any case vre vTill consider later the influence of nystical in?itings on Jung's viei^s, ire must pause here to consider whetlier there is any evidence that Jung had personal nystical experiences. In this regard iie discover that although Jung in his autobiography reports several instances of paranoiroal p^yxihic experiences and in one case an out-of-bo^ e^qjerience, plus maiy visions and instances of hearing voices or conversing \Tith spirits,^ ^ there do not seem to have been any genuine cases of nystical experience. Ifereover, in deciding about the nature of Jung's altered states of consciousness, it is important to note that the visions and voices which

PAGE 130

121 Jung describes do not qualify as genuine mystical states. Stace points out that visions and voices are not reaUy i^ysbical phenomena. Not only is this the opinion of most competent scholars, but it has also been the opinion which the great Ji^rstics themselves have generally held,^^ The main point is that the most typical as irell as the most ingjortant type of nystical experience is nonsensuous, whereas visions and voices have the character of sensuous imagery. The introv«rtive kind of mystical states are, according to all the accounts we have of them, entirely devoid of all imageiy.'-' On the basis of the negative evidence then, we might feel justified ±n concluding that Jung had no genuine myfftical e:q)eriences. For in viet7 of the disclosure of the types of unusual experiences lAich Jung does reveal in his autobiography, it would be reasonable to expect a description of a mystical state had there been one to report. Jbreover, at least in regard to the introverted ncrstical state, there is also the fact that Jung argues against its possibility, i.e., in teims of the first characteristic, he says the experience of a oneness in a consciousness devoid of all thought, imageiy and sensation is impossible. "As io2S.as Smjjjata"'^ is cognized bv a sub.ject it remains object. " But when the subject enters ^^W^'^^ and becomes identical idth it, the subject itself is Srajrata, namely void. Aid when the void is really void, there is not even a cognizing subject in it. The subject has vanished and there cajmot be a consciousness of this fact, because there is nothing left any more. Ihere can also be no msraoiy of it, because there was nothing. ... I want to knovr what there is to be knotm, but I don«t want to malce assumptions about things of which I know that one cannot know them. Thus it is absolutely impossible to know xdiat I T-rould experience when that "I" which could experience didn't e:d.st any more. One calls this a contradictio iji adjecto. To

PAGE 131

122 experience Sunyata is therefore an impossible experience by definition, as I explained above, and it is also impossible to experience consciousness in a field of vrhich I know nothing ( Letters. Vol, I, p. 263, letter to •.Y. Evans-Ifentz dated 9 Februaiy 1939). It would seem that Jung's comment that the introvert nystical experience is "impossible bry definition" needs qualification. For although 176 can argue ^dth the ncrsfcic about the meaning of his experience and hoT7 it should be con^rued, \-je are less open to question that he had an e:jill fall into a state of unconsciousness, at least for the time being, in Zen, this displacement usually results from the energy being Tdthdraim from conscious contents and transferred either to the conception of "emptiness" or to the Kban. As both of these musrt be static, the succession of images is abolished and vjith it the energy x^hich maintains the kinetics of consciousness. IJie energy thus saved goes over to the unconscious and reinforces its natural charge to bur^fcing point (Vol, XI, p. 551). Since Jung understands the mystical experience as analogous to other more familiar types of experience of the unconscious (e.g.

PAGE 132

123 dreams or visions), he then irants to say that the feeling that the bounds of the ego have been dissolved and that the experient has become merged viith the oneness he e.^cperiences can not be T/hat it seems to be. For since all experience of the unconscious is possible onl^r through its relation to the ego, the r^zstical experience 1 "5 must also involve the ego. If the Vidians would call sublime psychic experience psyche" or something equivalent to it, I would agree vdth them, but to call it consciousness cannot be substantiated by any evidence. If the highest psychic condition is 3anyata« then it cannot be consciousness, because consciousness is by definition the relation between the subject and a representation. One is conscious o^ something. As long as you are conscious of .^unyata it is not amyata. because there is still a subject that is conscious of something (letters. Vol. I, pages 2k9-2^0, letter to ivTiT^vans-'Wfentz dated 8 December I938 ) . As Jung understands the mystical experience then, it involves only a relativizing of the ego perspective of consciousness rather than a complete elimination of it. In addition, Jung's standpoint also amounts to a denial of the acrstic's claim that his experience is of sometldng outside himself, that it is of something objectively real. It is not a direct experience of the essence of reality that the nestle enjoys hvct only an insight into the unknorm depths of himself. Of course from the psychological point of view, Jung is trying to restrict himself to the phenomena and avoid metaphysical assertions. Ho^^ever, the force of Jung's objections to the mystic's way of construing his experience as seen in the above quotations | seems to be the argument that the p^hologlcal interpretation of rysticism in teiros analogous to other more common experiences of the unconscious is at least consistent Td.th

PAGE 133

12)( p^Tchological common sense, whereas the i^ystic • s characterisation of it is not. Vfe can conclude then that not only is Jung not a i^ystic by virtue of personal e:q)erience but that, in addition, his treatment of ncrstical ejqserience is a psychologistic one e:cpressed in terms Tjhich conflict vjith the ncrstic's aim iray of construing the experience. It Ttdght then seem difficult to understand Jung's mystic reputation except on the basis of an unjustified prejudice. The fact is, hoi-jever, that although Jung disputes some of the claims the E^rstic malces for his e:cperience on psjnchological grounds, he nonetheless considers the rcrstic e:q5erience as having considerable valTxe and significance. This is not really surprising since Jung understands rnysticism as an ezrperience of the unconscious. Consequently the value of the mystical e:xperience is due to the positive effects of the e:5>ansion of consciousness which a direct insight into the unconscious makes possible. The ei^jerience affords an opportunity to realize the limitations of the perspective of ego consciousness and thus helps to bring about the process of individuation, the goal of >jhich is an integration of the conscious and unconscious aspects of the personality. The occurrence of satori''^ is interpreted and formulated as a break-throu£>h . by a consciousness limited by the ego-foim, into the nonego-like self (Vol, XT, p. ^3). So far as 1-festem inysticism is concerned, its texts are full of instructions as to how man can and must release himself from the "I-ness" of his consciousness, ; so that through knowledge of his oxm nature he may rise above it and attain the inner (godlike) man (Vol. XT, p. ^$),

PAGE 134

12^ Satori corresponds in the Christian sphere to an ezqperlence of religious transfonnation (Vol. XT, p. ^7). In relation to the question of the charge that Jung is a ncrstic then, although we can ascertain vrith reasonable certaln-ty that Jung had no personal norstic ezq^xnAences and outline the essential differences bettireen his way of interpreting the e::perience versus the wstic fraraeirork of understanding, there is still some ambiguity about Tihether Jung ascribed to any mystical beliefs. For despite the differences heti^een the way in which inystical e^cperience was characterized and T7hat Jung says about the e:cperience of the archetypes, there is nonetheless some degree of overlap. For e^cample, what we have said about the numinosity of archelypal e^^ierience (Chapter 2) agrees well idth the ircr^tic characteristic of "feeling that what is apprehended is holy, or sacred or divine," Concerning the mystical quality of "alleged ineff ability, " it is difficult to mate comparisons. For it is not clear what sense it makes to talk about degrees or kinds of ineffability. In any case, the irystical ineffability is related to the quality of paradoxicality in that parado:d.cal descriptions vrhich violate basic laws of logic seem appropriate for its description. Ihis way of talldng about the mystic experience is then another way of stating the inability of language and logic to adequately express the ine3q>ressible. The language iMch he finds himself compelled to use is, when at its best, the literal truth about his eicperience, but it is contradLctoiy. "fliis is the root of his feeling; of embarrassment TrLth languageP" But even though Jung does not follow the irystic in an explicit appeal to the transcendental domain of the ineffable, it might well

PAGE 135

126 be arsued that there is, nonetheless, some siMlarity beti;een the description of a i,^,rtical e:.perience as ineffable and the ascription of numinosity to characterize archetypal e^erLence. !lhe point needs to be made, then, that although presumably all allegedljr ineffable experience T.ould be numinous, i.e., charged Td.th a great deal of emotional energy, Jung does not clato the numinous e:cperience of archetypes is ineffable, in this regard ue need to e.:amlne what Jung says about the paradoxical and also consider to T/hat degree the Hidetemmate nature of symbols, i.e., the fact that they refer beyond themselves to an indeterrdnable e.d;ent, constitutes a kind of ineffability. (See the section entitled Can There Be a Science of Archetypes?) But .;e will have occasion to examine these questions in a later section. For the present, it is sufficient to remark that there is a certain family resemblance betireen iiorsticism in the strict sense and some of the things Jung says about the archetypes. HbT/ever, there seems to be no point in talking in terms of a ireak or loose definition of r^rsticism, for the claim that Jung is quasi-iicr^ical must, in any case, be examined on the basis of the individual reasons for such a contention and to the understanding of the several relevant questions involved, the quasi-ticrstical label contributes nothing. Ifcreover, since Jung does not understand the archetypes from a it^^stical point of view but rather understands i^sticism in terms of the collective unconscious, the remaining crucial question to be resolved is thus not whether Jung is a n^rstic In any nai^ginal sense, but Tvhether what he is doing v/ith the archei^al theoxy is paradigmatically unscientific, i.e., opposed in principle to the scientific attitude.

PAGE 136

127 Jun;;'s Attitude Tanavd Science Introduction Postponijig for the present the questions relating to rationality uhich xie left unresolved in the last section, ire turn noir to the issue of Jung's attitude toward science. The relevant issue in this regard is the ex-tent to which Jung's empiricism is nonscientific in attitude, that is, the degree to which Jung holds vievrs incompatible Tdth an attitude necessary for science. Ihe objection could well be raised at this point that this question is an ad homLnem type of consideration. For regardless of what beliefs an iirvestigator holds concerning the nature of the scientific endeavor, the issue of whether his theories constitute good science must in any case be resolved in tenns of what the theories can do in relation to acceptable scientific standards. In Jung's particular case, horrever, there are good reasons for looking into the question of his scientific attitudes and beliefs. (Ihe problem of acceptable scientific standards is the subject of a future chapter. ) One reason is that we need to understand the relationship Jung sees betireen the idea of archetypes and the domain of science. Is archetypology, the sj^stematic stucfy of archetypes, to be understood as one branch of science, or is science merely one manifestation of archetypes?!^ Tn the latter case, the question of validity of archetypal theoiy could not be decided solely in terms of scientific validity. Vfe need then to understand how Jung interprets science in relation to his archetypes. A second reason for investigating Jung's scientific attitudes is to get clear about the empiricistic claims he makes for his theory.

PAGE 137

128 m other uords, on nhat grounds does Jung claoB that the study of archetypes is scientific. Ohis question is particularly crucial in Viet, of the fact that the demarcation bet.^een Jung-s allegedly scientific statements and his extrascientific statements is at ttoes ve^ difficult to make. It is, of course, a separate question whether Jung does What he claims to be doing, but it is nonetheless relevant to the question of scientific validity to see whether what he says he is t^g to do T-nth the archetypes .dll in principle qx,alify as scientific. (This question .dll be examined in the section on methodology. ) Archetvpol o/oas I-^ .hos^^ 3h regard to the question of hoi. Jong sees the archetypes in relation to science as a whole, it may v;ell seem that we have posed an artifical question in asking whether the stuc^ of archetypes is to be considered as a branch of science rather than science being subsumed under archetypology. And to a certain extent this question does pose a false dichotonor. For Jung both defends the scientific nature of the archetype, its compatibility ,.ith a contemporaxy scientific understanding, while also stating that science is one modern instance of the attempt to integrate the essentially mythological archetypes into acceptable cultural forms. ^S°^°??!: ^^ °"® °^ ^^^ J"^ expressions of psychic life, operates with ideas which in their ^ are derived from archetypal st^ctuSs SS? «ms generate a somex^hat more abstract kind of Wth,^ Psychology therefore translates the archaac ^ech of i^jrth into a modem rorthologemJt^,°^ course, recognized as such--T^ch Tvol^'S!!: ri?'""' °' ''' ^ "^°'^"^^" Edward Bilnger expresses this same point in a succint manner:

PAGE 138

129 ?on+=r ' *°/?^ction properly, me ncthological container must be acceptable to the conscious personalxtj-, including the critical intellect. . . . Jmg considers Iiis oim psychological theories as an atteii^t to provide a new ^^^hologjr or vessel for the archetypes wiiich will be acceptable to the modem scientiTic mind.^^ But the understanding of science as a modem enactment of a noHih is a speculative rather than a scientific statement. This attitude toiiard the logos is, then, necessarily part of the i^j/thos. And thus we can see why ex-pressing ir?yfchos and logos as an eitlier/or is misleading (the study of archetypes as science versus science as a type of archetypal phenomenon). For of course the logos must not attempt to usuip the function of the mrthos, whereas the iicrthos Tihile always assuming a bixjader perspective than the logos must not confuse itself irith the logos. However, the point of framing the question about archetj^pology versus science is that the confusion of the rcrthological vnLth the scientific is just the sort of problem that Jung is confronted idth and just the sort of error he is accused of maJdng. For Jung purports to stu^ scientifically about j^hs and to do so phenomenologicalDy, i.e., taldng into account the phenomena in their totaHty. Md in this regard there always exists the temptation and the danger of losing the critical point of vie:/ about archetj'pes and instead proclaojning a new metaphysical doctrine of truth. To avoid this problem and thus to succeed in keeping the scientific statements about arche-b^-pes distinct from metaphysical interpretations of archetypal events, Jung clings to the ideal of empiricism. ^^ This is not to say that Jimg is uninterested in possible metaphysical implications of archetj-pes. Naturally he has his personal

PAGE 139

130 metaphysical viws and from the clinical point of view, he encourages the individual to develop a functional philosophy of life based in part on the individual's experience of the archetypes. But Jung atteimts to distinguish the scientific level of discourse about archetypes from the level of personal metaphysical interpretation. iO-though it would be an exaggeration to say that Jung al^rays succeeds in sharply distinguishing these levels of discourse—all too often he talces the distinction for granted, thus leading to many confusionsthe point to be made is that Jung sees the distinction as a necessaiy one if there is to be a science rather than just a philosophy or metaphysics of archetypes, Tiien Jung says as above that psychology is part of the modem myfcli, this is then a statement on tlie personal level of discourse, i.e., part of hcr.j Jung the individual understands the metaphysical significance of archetypes. But the fact that Jung is motivated to value scientific endeavor frcsii the point of vleir of his personal metaphysical perspective should not lead us to conclude that Jung is merely paying lip service to science or attempting to pa'.m off his ideas by coating them ',ri.th a scientific veneer. For in working \T±th an ideal of empiricism, he is attempting to gain a critical knoTjrledge of the archetypes, one which can inthstand the rigorous 23 demands of scientific Imowledge. Science and the Individual Ihus Jung understands his work in part as an attempt to gain a scientific understanding of archetypes. But even though Jung sees himself as a scientist, this is! not to say that in aspiring to empiricism Jung views science as the only valid path to knowledge or

PAGE 140

131 truth. For Jung's aim is al--7ays to provide a legitlTiate scientific treatment of the irrational phenomena of the unconscious while at the sane time maintaining a position as metaphysically neutral as possible wliich Tdll allow the metaphysical and the ncrthological their otm domain of validitj-. As ^.Te saw in Chapter h, Jung as a matter of fact is unable to carry completely through this essentially Kantian program and at tdjnes gets involved in psychologisfcic reasoning incompatible '.d.th the claims of religion and metaphysics. But, although in this regard, Jung's attempt to rely ttpon a phenomena/noumena distinction is open to criticism, it seems nonetheless clear that T/hat Jung is striving for is a separation of scientific and metaphysicalreligious types of discourse about archetypes as far as this is possible. This separation, moreover, does not entail for Jung the supremacy of either type of discourse but oaly its validity vdthin the IteLts of its aim sphere of application. Thus we find some cases iihere Jung defends the practical and tlierapeutic value of a metapl;ysical -religious outlook against an attempt to elminate it entirely in favor of a world viet-; dominated by the findings of science and other places where Jung defends the necessity of a metaphysically neutral approach for science. Ho science will ever replace «crth, and a n^h cannot be made out of any science. For it is not that "God" is a m^h, but that inyfch is the revelation of a divine life in man. It is not \Te who invent myth, rather it speaks to us as a \-brd of God ( l-femories. Breams. Reflections, p. 3kO), Tiiere is, however, a strong empirical reason why we should cultivate thoughts that can never be proved. It is that they are knovm to be useful. I^Ian positively needs general ideas and convictions

PAGE 141

132 that Tdll give meaning to his life and enable him to find a place for himself in the universe ( Man and liLs 9yinbols, p. 76). r^ subjective attitude is that I hold every religious position in high esteem but draw an inexorable dividing line betireen the content of belief and the requirements of science ( Letters. Vol. I, p, 125, letter to Paul llaag dated 12 June 1933 )« As a scientist I have to guard against believing that I am in possession of a final truth ( Letters, Vol. I, p. 3k6. letter to 11. Irminger dated 22 September 19UU). As our exposition of Jung's vims of science has progressed up to this point, it may seem relatively unproblematic. For to summarize Trtiat we have said thus far in this regard: Jung sees his mm work as part of the contemporary attempt to develop a scientific understanding of the world which is not, however, to be understood as a substitute for the religious and metaphysical needs of man. If this iTere the full story of Jung's scientific attitude, it would be cause for little further comment. Such viei^s on the nature and limits of science might well be shared by many conten^xjrary scientists. However, the problem is that Jung is doing science about the metaphysical and religious needs of man, and not entirely in an objective detached manner either. For Jung not only studies religion and rstaphysics, he advocates them. This close interrelation beti-reen the scientific level of discourse and the level of personal meaningful interpretation is in part a direct result of Jung's therapeutic involvements. Jung, then, is sensitive to the practical -therapeutic as well as the strictOy theoretical scientific aspects of his work. In order to malce Jung's views on the nature of science intelligible then, we need to understand the basis for the particular tensions \ie find in Jung's v/ritings

PAGE 142

133 between what he sees as theoretical scientific knowledge on the one hand versus personal therapeutically revelant understanding on the other. On this account what is necessaiy is to shoi/ how on the one hand when one goes from the scientific perspective of theoretical ImoTTledge about archetypes to the therapeutic perspective, one in effect malres a move not only from theoretical to practical knowledge but also from the scientific to the religious and philosophical. Qn the other hand t^ need to determine to what extent Jung understands the tension between the two levels of discourse about archetypes as due to an incommensurability between theory and practise, betT^een scientific versus therapeutic aims, and to what extent Jung is trying to argue for an idiographic versus nomothetic type of distinction within the realm of theoretical knowledge itself. ^'^ Not/ if we address ourselves to what Jung sees as an incommensurability in principle betxreen his scientific theory and the practical work of therapy, it is not at all clear why this sort of incommensurable relationship must exist. For after all, it would seem that scientific knowledge about psychological matters would prove in the long run to be therapeutic, tfe can easily imagine paradigm cases of "unscientific" therapy such as a witchdoctor treating a case of hysteria by trying to cast out the demon responsible. Even if the ijitchdoctor succeeds and produces a cure, our scientific mentality assumes that suggestion or some isuch mechanism must be at work for which there exists a scientific explanation which if knovm would prove eventually to be therapeutically valuable. Prom the scientific point of vieT7 then, we assume that there are discoverable principles

PAGE 143

131; at work in human psychology which if we knew them would greatly decrease the gap between our theoretical knowledge and what can be accomplished in tenns of practical applications to therapy. From this point of vievx, it is steply the immaturity of science which leads to an incommensurability between theory and practise. But this is not the sort of incommensurability between theoiy and practise that Jung principally has in mind. For parenthesizing for the moment idlographic considerations in terms of applicability of a theoretical knoi-rledge for understanding the individual, it mu^ be emphasized that Jung sees theoretical scientific knowledge as necessary but never sufficient for accomplishing the work of psychotherapy. For it is characteristic of Jung's view of therapy that it is necessary for the therapist to enable the patient to reorganize his philosophical and religious vieTTJolnt. therefore, for Jung it is not that science is rejected in doing therapy but that objective scientific knowledge about psychology must be complemented vrf.th a subjectively meaningful reorientation of world view.^^ The intellect is the soverign of the scientific realm. But it is another matter lihen science steps over into the realm of its practical application. The intellect, which was formerly king, IS now merely a minister—a scientifically, refined instrument it is true, but still only a toolj no longer an end in itself, but merely a precondition (Vol. VI, p. 57). . . . sooner or later it was bound to become clear that one cannot treat the psyche without touching on man and life as a whole, including the ultimate and deepest issues, any more than one can treat the sick body vrithout regard to the totality of its functions . . . (Vol. XVI, p. 76). I can hardly draw a veil over the fact that we p^chotherapists ought really to be philosophers or pliilosophic doctors— or rather that vre already are

PAGE 144

13^ ^* ' '^.' f °°^^ ^^° °3^ i* religion in statu nascendi, for in the vast confusion that reims"" at the roots of life there is no line of division betireen philosopl^r and religion (Vol. WL, p. 79). The most healing, and pscrchologicaUy the most necessaiy, experiences are a "treasure hard to attain, ' and its acquisition demands something out of the common from the common man. As ire hnow, this something out of the common proves, in practical work vrith the patient, to be an innrasion \rj archetypal contents (Vol. an:, p. 82). The statement that Jung sees scientific knowledge and psychotherap7 as incommensurable irrespective of the state of the completeness of scientific Imox^ledge amounts then to a reiteration of the prervlous claim that Jung believes that science can not ser^re as a substitute for the religious and metaphysical needs of man in teims of which the Jungian therapy is primarily oriented. VJien Jung talks about what he calls psychological truth then, he is emphasizing this subjective aspect of the therapeutic process for which the term scientific is not appropriate precisely because of the philosophical and/or religious nature of the questions involved. P^hological truth is that which as a matter of fact proves to be meaningful to the individual. Considered from the standpoint of realism, the symbol is not of course an external truth, but it is p^chologically true .... Psychological truth by no means excludes metaphysical truth . . , (Vol. V, p. 231). Is there, as a matter of fact, any better truth about the ultimate things than the one that helps you to live (Vol. n, p. lo^), Vhen an idea is so old and so generally believed, it must be true in some waj', by which I mean that it IS psychologically true (Vol. V, p. 7). nh his ]^ and ^hetype,, Edward Bdinger furnishes an illuminating

PAGE 145

136 exaiople of essentially irhat Jung has in mind by emphasizing the subjective nature of psychological truth. These are abstract, objective meanings conveyed by signs. Ifovrever, there is another kind of meaning, namely subjective, living meaning which does not refer to abstract Imouledge but rather to a psychological state which can affirm life. It is this sense of the word we use xxhen vre describe a deeply moving e^cperience as something meaningftil. . . * It is the failure to separate these two different usages of the word "meaning" which leads one to ask the unansrrerable question, '".fliat is the meaning of life?" The question cannot be answered in this form because it confuses objective, abstract meaning iiith subjective, living meaning. If vre rephrase the question to make it more subjective and ask, "Ihat is the meaning of njjr life, " it then begins to have the possibility of an ansirer. . . . •'Vho am I?" The latter question is clearly a subjective one. An adequate ansiver can come only from Td-thin. Thus ire can say: Ifeaning is found in subjectivity.'^" This example from Bdinger amply shows the subjective and essentially philosophical emphasis in Jungian therapy. But this subjective therapeutic emphasis should not mislead us into overlooking the possibility of a valid scientific level of understanding. Jung, for example, does attack the question of the meaning of life in general. His ansirer in terms of a theoiy of individuation purports to be an objectiveljr valid account of the p^'chology of the various aspects leading to a fulfilment of the personality and self-realization, Ife must be careful to distinguish then between the subjective psychologically true statements and scientifically valid statements about psychological truth. Vhereas in the first case we have lAat is found by the individual to be subjectively meaningful, in the second case we have generalized statements concerning what has as a matter of fact been found to be meaningful.

PAGE 146

137 I'hen psychology spealcs, for instance, of the motif of the virgin birth, it is onOy concerned idth the ±act that there is such an idea, but it is not concerned \rith the question whether such an idea xs true or false in any other sense. The idea is p^hologicalily true inasmuch as it e3d.sts (Vol, aI, p. 6), But whereas from the scientific theoretical point of vlei-x, psychological truth is the object of study-, in the actual therapeutic situation. He are no longer on a meta -level of psychological truth, so to speak, but on the object-level working director ^vith the patient's "iicrth," i.e., his life-outlook. Ibreover, it is just when the scientist-therapist moves from the objective scientific level of discourse about the unconscious to the level of personal psychological truth that Jung emphasizes the importance of taking what prove to be essentially idiographic considerations into accoijnt. Ih the practical therapuetic situation, vre must, in Jung's view, be prepared to set aside our theoretical p^chological knorrledge to a large extent so that ire can gain an understanding of the individual who may deviate from the scientific ideal case to a greater or lesser degree, Iheories in p^chology are the veiy devil. It is true that we need certain points of view for their orienting and heuristic value; but they should always be regarded as mere auxUiaiy concepts that can be laid aside at any time (Vol. XVTI, p. 7). He {the therapist] should remember that the patient xs there to be treated and not to verify a theoiy. v''-,*^^'!^ natter, there is no single theoiy in the whole field of practical psychology that cannot on occasion prove basically wong (Vol. XVI, p. n^). Thus Jung likes to emphasize that science is nomothetic in nature being concerned >dth the lawlike behavior of classes of particulars, t^hereas in therapy it is just the idiographic particularities of the

PAGE 147

138 individual Trhich need to be understood. Instead of a nomothetic /idiographic terminology, Jung tallcs in tenns of knonledge versus understanding, Erojjr theory of comple?: psiyichic processes presupposes a tmifoiTi human pE^rchology, jusrfc as scientific theories in general presuppose that nature is fundamentally one and the same (Vol, VI, p, ^90), Ifence it is not the universal and the regular that characterize the individual, but rather the unique. ... At the same time man, as member of a species, can and must be described as a statistical unit; otherT.ri.se nothing general could be said about him. . . . This results in a universally valid anthropology or p^chology, as the case may be, Tri.th an abstract pictui'e of man as a average unit from which all individual features have 'been removed. But it is precisely these features which are of paramount ijiiportance for understanding man. ... I can onZy approach the task of understanding \n.th a free and open mind, triiereas Icnovaedge of man, or insight into human character presupposes all sorts of knoiaedge about mankind in general (Vol, X, p, 250), Md if the p^chologist happens to be a doctor who wants not only to classify his patient scientxlically but also to understand him as a human being, he is threatened T-dth a conflict of duties between the tiro diametrically opposed and rautuaUy exclusive attitues of Imoixledge on the one hand and understanding on the other. This conflict cannot be solved by an either/or but only by a kind of tivO-v;ay thinking: doing one thing irhile not losing sight of the other. In Viet/ of the fact that, in principle, the positive advantages of knoirledP^e work specifically to the disadvantage of understanding, the judgement resulting therefrom is likely to be something of a paradox. Judged scientificalily, the individual is nothing but a unit which repeats itself ad infinitum and could just as irell be designated Tri.th a letter of the alphabet. For laiderstanding, on the other hand, it is jujrfc the imique individual human being Tvho, when stripped or all those confoiroities and regularities so dear to the heart of the scientist, is the supi-eme and only real object of investigation (Vol. X, p. 251). Thus, we can see how Jung emphasizes the different aims of science

PAGE 148

139 and of therap/ on ti.-o accounts. As already discussed, Jimg understands theoretical pqjrchology and his type of therapy as finaTIy leading to different types of understanding: theoretical pqrchology to objective scientific l
PAGE 149

HiO" the incommensurability betxreen the theoretical and practical aspects of psyichology can often seem to be simply the adoption of an antiscientific attitude as in this example: Yet this is still "psychology" although no longer science J it is psychology in the idder meaning of the word, a psychological activity of a creative nature, in which creative fantasy is given prior place (Vol. VI, p. ^7). 20 Jung is open here to ttie criticism of giving the false impression of holding to a dichotomous division betireen theoretical and practical psychology, irhereas, in reality, there is in fact a close interdependence and interrelation beti/een the tiro aspects of his psychology. For the distinctive aspects of Jung's therapy are a direct product of his theoretical understanding (compare Jung's emphasis on the practical religious and metapliysical needs of man irith Freud' s)j and, on the other hand, Jung's psychological system is to a large e:ctent the end result of his exi)eriences in worldng id-th patients. Ik can conclude then that there is a real basis for distinguishing a scientific level of discourse about archetypes from a level of personal meaningful interpretation. However, im must be ai-rare of the danger of understanding this distinction between the ttro levels of discourse as a dichotoncr between theoretical and practical knor^ledge about archetypes ajnplying that what is learned in theoiy does not have real application to the practical therapeutic needs of the individual, that therapy goes on completely independently of theoretical knowledge. Qn the other hand, to abandon the distinction altogether is tantamount to giving up the ^ientific perspective of objectivity .rithout which the study of archetypes can easily degenerate into pseudoscience Td.th metapliysical and religious overtones.

PAGE 150

Ilil Notes 1 Psa example of these claims is the follovdng: Nobody has ever shorn me in hoir far ra^r method has not been scientific. One was satisfied vath shouting "unscientific." Uider these circumstances I do malae the claim of being "scientific" because I do exactly i:hat you describe as the "scientific method." I observe, I classify, I establisli relations and sequences befcreen the observed data, and I even shoi; the possibility of prediction (letters. Vol. U, p. 567. letter to E.A. Bennet dated 23 June i960). 2 Bd'rard Burchard, "Ifystical and Scientific inspects of the P^hoanaOytic Theories of Freud, .Adler, and Jung," America n ifournal of Py/chotheraw . ll; (i960), p. 306. IH^eff, "C.Q. .lung's Confession: Psychology as a Language of Faith," Ehcounter. 22 (1961;), p. k7. h M.eff , Triumph of the Therapeutic . p. llU. n^+« + QSrsticalO "The denotation of this neologism in the polemical literature of the social sciences, lAere it is employed as a term of abuse, is obscure. It seems to mean, rougli2y, "unscientific." Joseph Campbell, "Bios and J^hos," in Psvchoanalvsn .^ and Culture edited by George G. laibur and Tferner I hensterberger (mr ^^ International IMversities Press, 19^), p. 331. I^ul Friedman and Jacob Goldstein, "Some Comments on the Psychology of C.G. Jung," Ps^^xhoanalvtic Quarterly. 33 (19610, p. I96. 7 4 j..^?^®°^® "^Sh^ ^'^^ object at this point that in regard to the scientific nature of the archetypes, the question of vrhether Junr himself is n^stical is not relevant. For if Tze can shovx horx the archetypal theoiy is scientifically viable, then the question whether Jung is^himself rcrstical t/ill not matter. HoiTever, the importance of the TK-oblem of inysticisra is that questions of the rationality of the archetj-pal theoiy are brought into focus through a discussion of this issue. Our strategy is thus to work totrards a clarification of the problem of rationality by first discussing the question of Junr's ncrsticism. The investigation of the latter question is then a way to see what is at stake in the issue of rationality by first discussing the limiting case of arationalitj^, i.e., ncrsticism.

PAGE 151

11;2 Hovrever, the examination of the question o^ June's itrrsn^i?l"^"?r ^?^""* *^^ j^^ ^^ ^ ^-e to InS^uceThe ?r^+^;-*^^ rationality of the archetypal theoiy. For ?f Jw xs attemptxng a justification of archetyp^ theoiy from the noSt ;f '^^^of'^stical insight, then the scientific TigSicScfS the archetypal theoiy would be tmdemined, and ire J^ h^^ °^ t?ST?^r^^°'' *c *^ seriously the question of its scientific ^SmXicance. See also page 127 .rhere there is a continuaSon of thxs lone of reasoning attempting to shor; the rc^ev^ice of discussion of Jung's scientific vieirs to the question of the scientific status of the archetypal theoiy. Idppd^cottJ'l96?);'p?ir^ — ^°^°^ ^''^' ^-^' ''^' ^ Ibid. , p. no. ^° aid., p. 79. 11 P 11 oDo ^r^ out-of-body experience see Ifemories. Qreams. Reflections IftJ^:. ?L^'^i^^°^ ^'^'^ paranonna l psychic Sii^n^l=^l|p^ Ifemories, Dreams, Reflections, pages 137 and 1^5. W tells ol?9'Sd%^''ViS?^^ °^P^^ "''' Fo'r'viSs'S'p^ges 191 oTthT;ut;biSr1S^! °' '^"^ ^°^^^^ ^= -^^^^ Paso"^ 12 Sfcace, p. U7. ^^ Ibid., p. i;9. the i^^^l'^T's^J^'^S^T. ^^,^r ^^^ ^" 15 +1, rv^^, feeling of loss of individualitj^ and bein*' mereed i^th S'tSV;Ji'°''^? ^^"^ "^^^^^ e:q>erience uouirbe^^onsL^^nce of the experience of an empty consciousness, if it irere posSbS? ?or can ^\^^Zil Tl^^^^^lrTfi^l^U^ ^^^' '' ctace, pages 3Cl;-305, to the «* o. ai![LrttSSr\ ^iS; S^.fla./SerS'^"'

PAGE 152

li;3 arche-typology is a genuine arche-typal topograpliy, a mapping of the piomary togoi of the iraaginal realm." Casey references Durand's "Efq)loration of the Snaginal," in Sprin/T« 1971, p. 91. Jung does not use the term "archetypology, " but it seems to be appropriately descriptive of the irork of some irriters who approach tne archetypes from a pliilosophical as opposed to a scientific point of viei7. Casey's r.rticle is, moreover, a good example of the archetypology as li^rfchos perspective as discussed under the next heading. 19 nh using the terms "ncrthos" and "logos" below, \re do not mean to refer to the work of any particular philosoplier \±o may have used tliem. The distinction can easily be attacted by citing e:caiiiples Trfiich are not easily classified as either r^y-bhos or logos. However, in our use of this distinction, ire are presuming only that there ejdsts a discemable difference in degree beti-reen what passes for the ideal of exact Imowledge, the logos, and metaphysical speculations of the widest scope, the myfchos, 20 Ifolfgang Giegrich in an illuminating article criticizes ^ch Ife'.jmann's Origin of the Ilistonr of Consciousness (Hew York: Pantheon Books, 1955) for confusing science and mrthology and doing ^culative ircrthology while giving the appearance of an empirical study, nonetheless, he appreciates Ifeumann's work on its Otsi terms. In the folio vdng passage, similar to Jung's view, he e:q)resses the tnought that there is a sense in which the logos is grounded in the nythos since logos can aliTays be interpreted as an ermression of the n^ythcs. Something (some "factor") obviously keeps us from the truly psychological orientation and malces ovr thinldng unpsychological hy maldng us vrtsh for, or even need, empirical verification, scientific truth, and systematizations. This "factor" is our containment in the Great Ibther/Here-ricrbh, t/hose nature it is to create the (mythic J) fantasy of the possibility of heorically breaking out of ircrfcl^ into "fact, " "truth," "science" (ifolfgang Giegrich, "Qntoreny= Fhylogeny?" Sprinpc. 197U, p. 118^. 21 Eiirard Bdinger, "The Collective liiconscious as Manifested in P^nchosis," American Journal of Psychotheratr;-. 9 (1955), p. 625. 22 In order that the reader not thinic tliat ire have been per^*^*i^ ^ ^"^'^ "^ ^ *^® foregoing discussion, it must be pointed out that some i/riters viho take their inspiration essentially from Jung's Trork have not attempted to folloTr Jung in his empirical, scientific approach to the archetypes. For e:cample, in the folloifxng passage Haomi Golderiberg characterizes the work of x*at she calls a third generation of Jungians who go beyond strict adherence to Jung's vierxs and develop their o^m approach to the archetypes. m this regard Jaraes KLLlman is. the dominant figure. Snaginal life becomes primary i/hile natural science and biology become Txorldng areas of

PAGE 153

Mdi Imaginal life. This leads to an "ijnaginal reduction" aimed at shordng the fantasies belund^scientific or scholarly erroiricisra. Facts" and "empirical" proof are no longer ^yoked to validate psyche or psychology. i«ientifxc tenns are by no means the ultimate stopping places. ... "^'0.1 ways of speaking of archetypes are translations from one metaphor to another. _j^en a sober opei-ational definition in the language of science or logic is no less metaphorical than an ijnage irhich presents the archetypes as root ideas, psj^chic organs, figures of ncrth, typical stj^es of Kdstence! or dominant fantasies that govern consciousness (Quoted from James Ilillman, Revision inf^" Psycholop^ (Hew York: Harper and R^j, 197^) ^,*^J^H™^ Goldenberg, ".Archetypal Theo^ After Jung," Spring. 1975, v, 213). ^ch an approach has the disadvantage of maldng loiOTrledfre of archetypes incommensurable lath standarTscientific knSiTledge m the sense that what is said about archety^s if then i? m^ ITt^'f'y'^''''^'^' '^"^"^^^ altogether.^en though ledS're^s^ S^L^I?? ^"^ Tl ^'^^ll-^ ^^^li shed scientific kna.xeoge rests on an irrational basis and is the end result of the worlang out of a ir^h, it is nonetheless uirdse to ^Se up the Ideal of rationality as embodied in the methods of scSnce Ihi., se^s an i^ view to be particularly relevant in ?egSf ?o ;rch^' ^Ut^lt,.^^'' f r^"^ ^Ser of bei^g overwhelmed bj^^he numnosity of the archet^Q^s necessitates a critical attitude 2J a h.S ^"°°^^^th Jung's view of the importance of S?knIng a balance between conscious and unconscious. Ihe ratSml^ ScSSr Stono^.'"' ^^°"— -' ^t Tdthout losing its oxm par^£Mr^^ ^^?St-?in\\%^i.?L^^^^ ^retetT^nf ?; ^ ^°^ '"^^^ *° maintain that the scientific interbul*SSr°L't^^\1^:/^,^^^^^^^ -^^ -pp--" be discarded or Sdonef ^^ scientific perspective must not ^ Mequate substantiation for this claim viill be cresPn+^H ir, the section on methodology in the nex-t chapter. Presented in acterizeftJS:'"'^ ""^"'^ '^"™' "^ ^"^^ '^'^ "^ ^^^ich I^chlak charNoraothetic study essentially prestmes that a theoretical abstraction can be made which has general applicability for several members of a given class (i.e. distribution). Idiographic stuc^, on the other hand, emphasizes the uniqueness of personality manifestation (I^hlalc, p. 2k J.

PAGE 154

11^5 4.V. u ' T ?®^ ^® *^^° distinct issues involved in discussing the basxs for the tension bettreen a scientific level of discourse about archetypes versus a personal therapeutic level. The issue of^an incoimnensurability in principle betireen theory and practise and the issue of nomothetic versus idiographic methods for underSSSSn-^\^'^'^'^x?^ "^ ^^^°^ ^=^6^^' ^2 does not really distinguish beti/een these trro questions but equates nomothetic idth the therapeutic and extrascientific. Ife intent to shoiT how Jung's distinction betiveen the tiro levels of discourse is defensible on dn^nn?'?^+ /!?^ l^f ^'''^^' ^^^^ ^^^°^ ^ *^^ ^°°"d issue, T/e do not intend to fuUy explore the question of the relative merits of nomothetic versus idiographic methods for stwfying the individual. However, it can be reasonably maintained that an idiographic scienS;2'' T *" "-^ possible outside the conbe^ of therapry. Thus, although ^^J^ T^ about the value of an idiographic appS^ach to the individual mal^s sense i.dthin the therapeutic context, Jung fails to +?S^°^J'..?°r.*^®.^^°^^P^° approach does not have to be idenISZ^ the aajns of practical psychology but can also be defended as a legitimate scientific method in its om right. Books' m^/ZlT'^^''* %£ Hid ^rche^ (Baltimore: Penguin 27 sort nf Sr^'L^^'^ ^ ?^ ^ idiographic scientific method is the sort of stuctyrecommended by Gordon mport who suggests, for example S^L^h't^r'^^^^^.'" ^"T ^^" ^^°S^^P^^ ^d lx^?atu?J the S ' of such toigs as the in-depth stucfy of individual cases of persS^alxty. Bersonal3i2L ^ Social aicots^ Beacon PrSs,?960), It seems that in this regard ije have a discrepancy beti;een what Jung says and what he actually does. For the in^SpLltu^ of individual cases is in fact charactei-istic of his work. The massive volume S^nbols 21 'Pransfomation (Vol. V) is prijnarSy an extended commentary centered around the material of one schizophrenic individual. (The person was not a patient of Jung. ) 28 of +h. JUiLS^''^ iscpoted somst,tot out of cont&cb. The reminder

PAGE 155

CHAPTER 6 JUNG AND THE SCIEtJTinc ATTITUDE: PART II Can There Be A Science of Archet.yy v^s? Other questions relating to Jung's vlerrs on science must wait until the section on methodology ^^here we t^II examine Jung's reasons for claiMng that his work on archetypes is scientific. Ih regard to T*at ;re just discussed in the last chapter, it would seem that ,re have not yet fully resolved the question posed at the beginning of that chapter, the question of whether Jung holds vie,7S incompatible T.ri.th an attitude necessaiy for science. So far as this question is concerned, our strategy has been to argue for a distinction hei^reen two levels of discourse; one appropriate for scientific statements about archetypes and one appropriate for abatements on a personal, subjective level of meaning involving iji many cases metaphysical and/or religious interpretations of archelgrpal experience. Bie distinction then is essentially one between the facts of archetypal e^rience versus the attitude one takes towards these facts, vrtiat we should do about them. It was pointed out, moreover, that the frequent shifts in Jung's .rark betvreen the levels of discourse, which Jung understands in tenns of theoretical versus practical :kno,aedge, is due to his professional involvement on both levels as scienti^ and therapist. Thus someti^s he tallcs about his scientific views, and at other times he gives us practical, therapeutic advice or relates his personal, subjective understanding of the metaphysical and religious iinpHcations of the Mi6

PAGE 156

111? archetypes, Hoi^ever, the critic tdll perhaps Td.sh to point out that Jung can not be so easily saved from scientific criticism. For even if TO can distinguish a scientific level of discourse from a level of personally meaningful interpretation, questions can sbill be raised conceiTdiig the justification of what is advocated for therapjr. For we vjish our theoretical knowledge to rule out some therapeutic practises as unscientific even if to admit that scientific knov.ledge is not itself sufficient for therapeutic success as determined by the individual's gain in self-kno-^ledge and self-realization. Horrever, our distinction betireen the levels of discourse is not intended to have the result of immediateny resolving the questions of scientific validity of Jung's vie^rs on the archetypes. Rather the len^hy discussion on this matter is intended to clear the u^ for a proper consideration of this problem by shoidng hmx arguments from the scientific point of view need not be concerned idth eveiything Jung says about the archetypes. Specifically, the question of the scientific validity of the archetypal theoiy is not prejudiced by what Jmg says about what attitude to should take torrards archetypes. "• Only iThen we have come to an understanding of the Grange mixture of statements in Jung's work by means of the distinction betTOen the levels of discourse, then, can we genuinely appreciate the possibility that Jung's repeated pleas to be understood as an empiricist must be given careful consideration. Ohere still remain ample grounds for withholding the sanction of a scientific label to Jung's theoiy of archetypes which to have yet to consider. But keeping what has been said about Jung's views on the

PAGE 157

Ili8 natirre of science in mind, hopefully ire can nm examine these remaining questions irith some insight into the reasons for Jung's unscientific reputation. (A summary of our conclusions as to the extent to which tliis reputations is deserved :rfll appear in the next chapter along ijith our conclusions concerning attitudes necessaiy for science. ) T'fe proceed now to redeem a promise made on an earlier page to consider questions of rationality in relation to the archetypal theoiy. For recalling the context of the discussion in that section, ire T^re considering the question of whether Jung was a ncrstic. .Although ire concluded that Jung did not qualify as a UQrstic either on the grounds of experience or because he held n^ystical beliefs, this conclusion ims reached on the basis of a rather exact characterization ot raysticisra. \k have still to consider ^Aether Jung is advocating views resembling or analogous to nysticisni. !Ihese questions have to do TTith the rationality of the archetypal theoiy. I-fe understand the problem of whether Jung's vierrs are analogous to mystical vierrs as equivalent then to the problem of v/hether the archetypal theory is scientific in the loose sense of satisfying requirements of rationality. Only when we have worted our way to a clear vie?/ of this question Tdll vre be in position to properly assess the problem of whether Jung holds viei^ s incompatible irLth an attitude necessaiy for science. 3h addition, the extent to which Jung's therapy is justifiable on grounds of rationality is at stake. For if Jung's theoretical views can be shorn to be irrational, then we could hardly eapect the therapeutic attitude based on such theoretical views to be justified.^ This question of requirements of rationalitj' comes to focus in li^ht of the apparent similarity between the qualities of ineffability

PAGE 158

Mi9 and paradoxicality which are said to characterize r^rstical experience and what Jung says about the paradoxical nature of an^hetypal e:q»rience and its symbolic character which "is never precisely defined or may explained" (^ ^ m^ 9mS22ls, p. )4). Hov^ever, parenthesizing the problematic of this sdMlarity for the time being (it will be discussed at the end of this section), we can arrive at this same question of requirements of rationality ftxjm other considerations. For in light of the apparent difficulty in maintaining an objective, theoretical level of discourse about archetypes, evidenced by the fact of the mixture of theoretical statements about archetypes and statements of an interpretational character concerning hmr we should relate to archetypal experience that .:e find in Jung's ^^tings, we might .;ell ask: Is a science of archetypes possible at all? Rerhaps in light of the tremendous emotion-evoking quality of numlnosity characteristic of the subject matter, the effort to defend the rtudy of archetjTes as genuinely scientific is an idealistic fanta^. One of Jung-s follormrs, Gerhard MLer, seems to be of this opinion as expressed in the following passage; Jung himself fought against the reproach of beinr a philosopher or metaphysican or even a wstic. iSiT J ^^^^ *his critician because he felt that he had elevated his approach to the status ^;„^'^°fu''''?i ^S P^^haps, also, he was stUl caught in the idealisation of the scientist's ^f^ ^P^^^Jfd by natural science, so rampant 1^ the first half of the centmy. Biere are ?ast philosophical, metaphysical, and even inysti^al aspects and implications in Jung's scientific research and results .... 3 E^en Jung himself had moments of skepticism and doubt conceding whether irrational phenomena lite archetypes .^re proper subject matter for science.

PAGE 159

150 3hdeed, I am persuaded that, in view of the treinendous irrationalitjr and individuality of dreams. It may be altogether outside the bounds of possibility to construct a popular theoiy. T-hy should Tre believe that everything i/ithout exception is a fit subject for science? ... It might be better to look upon dreams as being more in the nature of irorlcs of art instead of mere obse^163-1610 ^^ ^°'' *^° ^i^^ist (Vol. XTIl/pages Of course, scientific is a characteristic of a method of study rather than a subject matter per se. But in this regard T-re w)uld naturally expect that some subjects lend themselves more easily to the methods of science than do others. Certainly p^hology is one of the most difficult subject matters to study in a rigorous scientific way. Moreover, i-dthin p^hology itself Jung's interests can be easily identified as subjects which are at least at the veiy frontier of scientific endeavor, subjects which have either just begun to attract scientific attention or else have been given no previous scientific consideration at all. Such subjects as astrology, alchencr, UFO's, I Ching, and ESP are among Jung's professional Interests in addition to inve^dgations into the delusional ^sterns of the insane and the world^.:ide literature of HBrsticism, i^hology, and religions of all sorts. Vfe might even chance a stTeeplng generalization and say that Jung's chief area of Investigation was the irrational in all of its multlfona manifestations, ^though such a generalization perhaps stands in need of some qualification, it is ea^ to see ho^r as an approximate truth this fact of Jung's professional interest in the occult and the irrational could lead to the conclusion that there is a simllanty between the subject matter and its investigator. Jung addresses this problem in the following passage:

PAGE 160

151 ff you call me an occultist because I am seriously in;vestigating relif^ous, ncrtholocdcal. fbUdoristie ^and philosopliical fantasies inmodem ir.H^-n^^»^T^^n^ •^ancient tercts, then you are bound to diagnose Prettd as a issj^ pervert, since he is doing lifedse^with seroial fantasies, and the psychologically inclined cnrainologist must neisds be a gaol-bird. It is not^ responsibility that aichenor is occult and ystical, and I an jusfc as guilty of the imrstxcal delusions of the insane or the peculiar creeds of manldnd ( Letters, Vol. H, p. 186. letter to Calvin S. Hall dated 6 October 1951;). though this sort of identification betiTeen a subject matter and its investigator is easily e.xposed as an error if taken as a necessaiy or universal type of relationship, it nonetheless contains an element of truth .dth respect to some individuals. For ^m wonder if there is not, as a matter of fact, some relationship betireen Freud's professional preoccupation Td.th sex and his otm sercual problems, bete^een his theoiy of the Oedipus complex and the facts of his oim family histoiy. As an analogous case, Jung had an abundance of first hand experiences idth the irrational i7hich i^as the source for at least part of the motivation for his researches as he confesses below: I was particularOy satisfied with the fact that you clearly understand that I am not a ncrstic but an empiricist. It is true hoirever that a vivid interest in religion and religous truth has guided iht: research ( Letters. Vol. I, p. 237 letter to Norbert DreiTitt dated 2$ September 1937). I'Jien TTe consider then the fact of Jung's interest in the irrational in regard to the question of the possibility in principle of a science of archetypes, we can conclude on the one hand that the irrationality of a subject matter should not disqualify it as legitimate suba'ect matter fbr scientific study, si^e a scientific statement about the irrational need not itself be an irrational statement. But, on the other hand, we must acknowledge certain practical problems for

PAGE 161

1^2 scientific rtudy T-Mch arise due to the irrational nature of archetypes. Tn this regard a mjor practical problem seems to be the difficulty of maintaining a suitable scientific attitude of objectivity and detachment. This is reflected in the problem of the ttro levels of discourse asTTe saw hoTT Jung frequently shifts from an objective scientific level of discourse to a subjective, personal levBl or therapeutic level. Ihis problem is also exemplified in the ve:y close relationship that exists beti-reen Jung's life and wk. For it seems to be the case that archetypal experience does not produce only objective scientific knowledge but also a personal involvement. One does not only assimilate the archetypes to one's scientific understanding, but in a sense one's overall outlook becomes modified by the archetypes. One not only gains a scientific concept of the irrational, there is, at least in the ideal case, a coming to terms T/ith the irrational forces inside oneself. P^ the therapeutic perspective then Jung can be seen to advocate the necessity for direct involvement ,nth the irrational forces experienced in the unconscious. Particularly in regard to this perspective, we need to detentdne the theoretical justification for what Jung says about the irrational. Bius vre need to knot-; whether .*at Jung says about the irrational can itself be justified by rational means. 3h this respect it is essential to understand what theoretical claijns Jung is tiyijig to defend in relation to the irrational. In particular we need to faiow what Jung understands by this terra. I-fe find then that Jung closely associates the irrational idth unconscious processes, whereas for Ixbn rationaHty is a correlate of consciousness.

PAGE 162

153 ITo natter, hm beautiful and perfect man ma^r believe his reason to be, he can always be certain that it xs only one of the possible nental functions, and cavers on3y that one side of the phenomenal vorld which corresponds to. it. But the irrational, that which is not agreeable to reason, rings it about on all sides, ilnd the irrational is Ulcewise a p^hological function—in a word, it is the collective unconscious^ whereas the rational is essentially tied to the conscious mind (Vol. i/TI, p. 71). To a large erfcent, then, the statements which Jung nalces about the UMts of reason and the intellect for comprehending the totality of experience can be seen to be the result of his vier-r that consciousness has a necessarily incomplete comprehension of the totality of the unconscious. There are several related reasons that Jung gives for the loiritations of consciousness to fully comprehend the unconscious. The first has to do idth the fact that loiowledge of the unconscious necessarily is the product of its interaction TnLth consciousness. Since consciousness always mediates the erqjerience of the unconscious, Jung argues that there is a sense in which we never Imovr the unconscious itself but only as it interax:ts idth the more or less interferring medium of consciousness. Between the conscious and unconscious there is a kmd of 'Uncertainty relationship," because the observer is inseparable from the observed and always disturbs it by tlie act of observation (Vol. IX-B, p. 226). Tn the concluding chapter of L^ and I^s STiiibols. II.L. von Franz elaborates this same argument. ^ohnoiT content that I comes up from the unconscious ^.^^"^t ^J-^^ ^^^'^ °^*"^^ ^ ^®^S partly ihte^ated into the conscious mind of the observer. Ihren dream contents (if noticed at all) are in that \i^ semi-conscious. J\nd each enlargement of the observer's consciousness caused by dream interpretation has again an iinraeasurable repercussion and influence on the unconscious.^'

PAGE 163

1^1 As ire havB previously remarked on other occasions, Jung likes to think about the archetype per se in terms of Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself. Ihus, he fi^equently makes the move from assei-ting that there exists an uncertainty relationship bettreen conscious and unconscious to the statement that the ultlinate nature of the archetype per se is unlmotrable in principle as a thing-in-itself, nh Ilysterium Coniunctionis iter psychology was at last given its place in reality and established upon its historical foundations, , , , jQie moment I touched bottom, I reached the bounds of scientific understanding, the transcendental, the nature of the archetype per se, concerning vrhich no further scientific statements can be made ( Ifemories. Eireams. Inflections . p. 221). A third reason for asserting the limitations of consciousness to completely comprehend the unconscious is derived from the consideration that, as a matter of fact, consciousness is limited and finite in potential capacity, vjhereas the unconscious, although not infinite, contains a much larger relative store of content. Since consciousness is only possible through a restriction of attention, this narrower scope of consciousness means then that consciousness cannot be atrare of all aspects of the unconscious. Although this line of reasoning strictly shorrs that consciousness is liMted only at any one tine to what it can be ai-xare of , it is Jung's claim that the overall potential capacity for consciousness is limited, and that thus our attempts to make our actions and endeavors conipletely articulate and transparent to consciousness ^dll alirays fail, and the unconscious in all its manifestations can never be completely assimilated to a conscious awareness, « . , even the most matter-of-fact contents of consciousness have a penumbra of uncertainty about

PAGE 164

15? them. Even the most carefully defined philosopMcal or mathematical concept, which Tre are sure does not contain more than we have put into it is nevertheless more than we asstime (Ikn and liis ^t>ols, p. 29), Since we do not know everything, practically every experience, fact, or object contains something unknom. Ifence, if to speak of the totality of an e:>5)erience, the \-iovd "totality" can refer only to the conscious part of it (Vol. XL, p. la). The fact that the unconscious is never completely assimilated to consciousness means then that for Jung human Kdstence always consists to a large e:ctent of essentially irrational aspects and that consciousness and rationality are alxTays circumscribed by the irrational and vmconscious. . • . the rational is counterbalanced by the irrational, and irhat is planned and purposed by what is (Vol. IX-A, p. 9U). Biat is, I do not believe that reason can be the supreme law of human behaviour, if only because e^qperience shows that in decisive moments behaviour is precisel;^'Mt guided by reason but rather by overpor-zering unconscious impulses ( Letters. Vol. I, p. 402, letter to Pastor H. Ifegmann dated 12 December 19li5). I'fe have on the contrary good grounds for supposing that . . . QjJ?e and fat^ axe irrational, or rather that in the last resort they are grounded beyond human reason (Vol. VU, p, h9)» But from the fact that Jung holds that human erf.stence and reason do not mirror each other perfectly can to then conclude that at least certain aspects of experience li.e beyond the grasp of reason altogether? Jung apparently thinks Ithat this in fact is the case. For he says that "there is a certairi incommensurability beti^een the ^stery of existence and human understanding" (Vol. XII, p. 212), Of course, it is just the archetypes of the collective unconscious

PAGE 165

1?6 that Jung has in irrijid as regards this "mystery. " ^ these TTOrds Preud was expressing his conviction that the unconscious still harboured many things that wiglit lend themselves to "occult" interpretation, as is in fact the case. Ohese "archaic vestiges" or archetypal foms grounded on the instxncts and giving expression to them, have a numinous quality that sometimes arouses fear. Ihey are ineradicable for they represent the Ultimate foundations of the psyche itself. Bigir cannot be grasped intellectually, and when one has destroyed one manifestation of them, they reappeai' in altered form (Italics mineO (Vol. X, p. 272). nh order to understand Jung's position on the irrational then, we need to get clear about precisely what he means by "incommensurability" and "cannot be grasped intellectually." Although it may seem that in this regard what Jung says about the archetypes is veiy similar to mystical utterances, there is one sense in which what he means is vexy mundane. For in pointing to an incommensurability bett-reen archetypal experience and the understanding, part of what Jung wants to emphasize is the particular quality of the lived experience of archeiypes which is not adequately captured by concepts. Harever, many e^^^eriences of an emotional nature have in common idth archetypes this feature of relative ineffability, i.e., the feature of the relative inadequacy of concepts to e:5>ress their lived quality. The particular emotive quality of a beautiful sunset, for example, is best e:cpressed by a poem or a painting rather than hy a concept. Because of the numinosity of the archetypes then, a concept of archeiypes does not adequately convey th^ir essential nature as experienced. Hbi^ver, considerations about the relationship between the experience of archetypes and the formulation of a theoretical understanding

PAGE 166

1^7 are not particularly crucial in regard to the question of the rationality of archetypal theoiy. For Jung does not maintain that an intuitive knoirledge of archetypes based on their iinniediate e^^perience is the only sort of understanding of them possible. Rather he maintains on the whole that intuition is not sufficient for intellectual knoi/ledge. The safe basis of real intellectual Imowledge and moral understanding gets lost if one is content vri.th the vague satisfaction of having understood by "hunch." One can explain and loiow only if one has reduced intuitions to an exact knowledge of facts and their logical connections (Lfan and ig.s Symbols, p. 82). On the other hand Jung frequently points out the inadequacy of an intellectual understanding as a substitute for the experience of confronting the unconscious and the archetypes in a therapeutic context. It IS precisely our e:cperiences in psychology which demonstrate as plainly as could be ^-dshed that the intellectual "grasp" of a p^chological fact produces no more than a concept of it, and that a concept is no more than a name, a flatus vocis (Vol. IX-B, p. 32). I'fe can understand then that from the therapeutic perspective it is just the emotive qualities of archetypes and the particular problems of value and purpose in relation to the individual's life as brought into focus by archetypal e^jperience that are of utmost importance. Ihus much Of what Jung has to say against reason must be understood in a therapeutic context. In this respect it is a misuse of reason rather than reason itself which is the object of vilification. ... a relativation of rationalism is needed, but ?M„^/ ^ ^^? °^ '^^^°"' ^o^ *he reasonable thing for us xs to turn to the inner man and his S^ 2fuf ^^Si^ ^°1^* p. ^Q6, letter to iaigen Bohler dated 8 Januaiy 1956).

PAGE 167

158 The great difficxaty seems to consiErt in the fact that on the one hand ire nust defend the sanity and logic of the huinan rdnd, and on tlie other hand \m have to accept and to irelcome the existence of illogical and irrational factors transcending our coEQjrehension ( Letters. Vol, IT, p, 53, letter to Father Victor Ihite dated 9 April 1952). It would seem evident then that if aXL Jung has in mind by his "cannot be grasped by the intellect" is to emphasize the practical therapeutic aspects of vrorking iTith the archel^Tpes on an experiential level that the question of rationality need not be considered as a serious problem, Hoijever, in addition to the practical problems of assimilating archetypes into one's experience on a personal basis, Jung apparently feels that the archel^'pes also pose particular problems for theoretical understanding, Tliis point is well exemplified in regard to the symbolic manifestations of archetypes. To the scientific rdnd, such phenomena as ^ymbolic ideas are a nuisance because they cannot be formulated in a way that is satisf actoiy to intellect and logic (Vbn and m^ SK/mbols. p, 80), It symbol has a i7±dev "unconscious" aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained. Ilor can one hope to define or explain it. As the mind e:q)lores the ^^nnbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason (rfen and ffi^s Symbols, p. U). This metaphorical way of talldng about what lies beyond the grasp of reason can be made clearer as -VTell as more plausible if instead of talldng about what can not be grasped or understood, vre say that archetypal eicperience can not be completely rationalized, That is, the archetypal phenomena have a sort of cognitive autonomy which eludes atter^ts to completely reduce it to an unambiguous rational foiroulation. An exao^jle using the familiar phenomena of dreams helps clarify

PAGE 168

159 this point* Then TTO tiy to rationally understand a dream then, tre attenpt an interpretatibn which translates the pictographic images of the dream into words. Tfe encounter difficulties, hoTiever, because the dream images frequentljr fail to confoiro to rational expectations of order and logic. Ibreover, even T-dth the most in-depth interpretation, \re somehow feel that something is lost in the transition from the dream images to words. Si addition to the emotive content which is difficult to convey in xrords, it seems that the dream has its aim way of cognitive e:q)ression which an interpretation does not completely capture. The dream linages then repx-esent a certain gestalt of meaning which often resists translation into a linear sequence of ideas. Ibreover, lihen rre say that a dream or other manifestation of the unconscious can not be rationalized, what we previously discussed in terms of the inability of consciousness to completely assimilate the unconscious must be bome in mind. Excepting Jung's appeal to the Kantian doctrine of the thing-in-itself then, the arguments TO mentioned there are additional reasons in support of this vietr. Our way of talldng in teiros of the inability of the unconscious to be completely rationalized might seem to amount to the claim that a complete conscious reduction of unconscious experiences is unadvisable. And the objection could be raised at this point that if this is what our claim amounts to, then it is not so much relevant to the question of theoretical Imowledge as to the problem of how best to deal xdth unconscious experience in a therapeutically beneficial way. Prom

PAGE 169

160 the theoretical perspective, it Trould seem that it is jusfc our task to try to make unconscious e:q)erience intelligibile, i.e., to rationalize it. Hoifever, in spite of Jung's unfortunate uay of expressing hdmself in teims of ,rhat lies beyond the grasp of reason, Tvhat he has in ralnd does apply to the theoretical loioi-aedge of archetypes, (itod, of course, it also has practical therapeutic implications.) For it is his contention that to must make our theoretical statements about the archetypes reflect the actijal nature of the phenomena. That ire need to avoid in the problem of rationalizing the unconscious then is the reading in of more order and logic than is really there. If vie think of dreams in tenns of their being only inf onnational static or noise in the braiji, for example, an explanation satisfactory to the rational need to account for such disturbing phenomena in a theoretically elegant way, ,re not only fail to benefit frem them in a practical ixay, but to also miss the distinguishing feature of the phenomena itself, the fact that its cognitive content constitutes a meaningful message Trtiich can be shorm to compensate the conscious attitude. Thus Jung .rants to argue that a conscious reduction of unconscious experiences is inadvisable not only in terms of the practical situation of the individual dreamer but also frem the standpoint of scientific methodology. The problematic of the rational reduction of unconscious processes must also be kept in mind when to tiy to understand Jung's attitude tovrard the paradoxical. Tn regard to the paradoxical then, to often find Jung associatiJig the paradoxical and the metaphysical. For he says that metaphysical assertions can only be adequately foimulated

PAGE 170

161 in an antinomial way. Eroiy metaphysical judgment is necessarily antinomial, since it transcends eacperience and must therefore be complemented by its counterposition ( Letters. Vol, II p. 25I;, letter Pastor Jakob Anstutz dated 23 Ifey 195^), Hius, when we state a metaphysical truth in a paradoxical way, T-re express what Jung sees as its quality of unknoirability, Paradox is a characteristic of tlie ftiostic iTTitings, It does more justice to the unloiowable than clarity can dc^ for uniformity of meaning robs the raystery of its darlmess and sets it up as something that is knoxm (Vol. XC, p, 275), Paradox is a characteristic of all transcendental situations because it alone gives adequate expression to their indescribable nature (Vol. K-B, p. 70), This use of paradoxical then linlcs the paradoxical xd-th a metaphysical way of interpreting archetypal experience, Ilh this regard there is a real similarity irith the way in which ncrstical experience is commonly interpreted. But irrespective of Jung' s Kantian views on the appropriateness of an antinomial expression for the metaphysical, it seems that there is no problem trith rationality here since to say that archetypal experience is frequently described in paradoxical tenns is itself not a paradoxica] statement. Hoirever, Jung also means not only that the ascription of paradoxical qizalities to archetypal experience applies to the interpretation of the experience in metaphysical terms but also that it applies to a metaphysically neutral description. But in the latter regard when \re say that archetypal experience is paradoxical, this amounts to a restatement of the considerations about the problem of rational reduction of archetypal experience. For rather than as assertion that the experience cannot be described eiscept by contradictory predicates.

PAGE 171

162 this Treak sense of paradoxical implies onHy that you can not pxn doi-m the experience and nalce it unambiguous j i.e., it is open to different interpretations. This use of paradoxical is then not an assertion that the eiqperience transcends logic altogether (the n^rstical sense of parado:dcal), but onOy that it is veiy ambiguous. For example, the frequent archetypal symbol of the snalce conibines both negative and positive qualities. "Hence it is an e:ccellent ^JTiibol for the tiro aspects of the unconscious: its cold and ruthless instinctuality, and its Sophia quality or natural Tdsdoiii, which is eribodied in the archetypes" (Vol. "CTII, p. 333), Ibreover, this ambiguity of the manifestations of the unconscious reflects for Jung the tension beti^en the conscious and the unconscious attitudes. The symbols from the unconscious change their form then in response to the conscious attitude (see page 70). The symbols are a reflection of this c^Tnamic relationship between conscious and unconscious and thus often represent a ^oithesis of oppo sites. And since the ssjiribol derives as much from the conscious as from the unconscious, it is able to unite them both, reconciling their conceptual polarity through its foim and their emotional polarity through its mondnosity (Vol. IX-B, p. I80). Ihat can ire say then about the rationality of Jung's treatment of the archetypes? 2h the first place it is obvious that Jung's sage statements about the untaioTrable are not satisfactory; i.e., i-re want to loiOT-r on iihat grounds he can talk meaningfullyof what is unknovrable. This sort of tallc seems to imply a transhuman perspective from ifhlch the relationship beti-reen our trays of knouing and the world can be detenidned. However, as has been pointed out on other occasions, there is no necessity to follow Jung's I^tian line in order to

PAGE 172

163 rationaUy reconstruct the archetypal theoiy. Md T*en t^ no longer think of the archetype per se as a thing-in-itself, many of Jung's least rational sounding statements need no longer concern us. But if ire disregard Jung's Kantian viei/s on the unlmovable, what Jung s^s about the irrational seems to be both reasonable and defensible on empirical grounds. If there is a genuine similarity here between inysticism and Jung's views, it is that both concur in the discoveiy of genuine irrational aspects of e:{perience. Hoirever, Tijhereas the nystic says that vre have to accept this irrational given and abandon efforts to understand it rationally, it is always Jung's position that vre must try to assijnilate the irrational with our rational understanding as best we can. JSnd although Jung's view that the rationality of consciousness as a matter of fact cannot completely assimilate and rationalize the unconscious may seem at first sight to be the veiy repudiation of the methodology of science, it is Jung's claim that far from deserting science his phenonenological method of approach to the archetypes provides the key for a valid objective understanding of them. \k need to examine this phenomenological method then in order to see irhether it in fact qualifies as a valid and adequate scientific methodology. Jung's IfethoHnln p rw ]h discussing the topic of Jimg's methodology, it is important to understand what substantive issues are at stalce. 3h the first place then, i-re are atteiiipting to get clear about the grounds for Jung's claim that his study of archetypes is a scientific enterprise. This question, moreover, must be considered in the context of the discussion of the last section T.^here the problem of the rationality

PAGE 173

161; Of the archetypal theoiy was taloen up. There it was emphasized that although scientific statements about the irrational need not themselves be irrational, there are nonetheless special problems involved iJi £rtudylng archetypes which fi«ora the theoretical perspective we described by talldjig of the difficulty of accomplishing a rational reduction of archetypal experience, i.e., the need to allow for a certain inherent ambiguity i^ the phenomena in order to characterize them properly. Ife need then to discover what actual consequences for the study of archetypes these considerations of the problem of the rational reduction produce. If ire inquiore how Jung understands what he is doing, ire discover then that he asserts that his psychological views fall id.thin the domain of natural science, although science \r±th certain special limitations. "ihaOytical psychology is fundamentally a natural science, but it is subject far more than any other science to the personal bias of the observer" ( l^femories, Breams, Reflections « p. 200). The problem of subjectivity enters into psychology then at the theoretical level. Jung likes to enphasize that this is due to the fact that in psychology to have no e:rf;rapsychological point of vie;-: from which to view the phenomena since all observations are themselves p^chological processes. "... in contra^ to a^y other scientific theory, the object of psychological e:cplanation is consubstantial ;,d.th the subject: one psychological process has to e:cplain another" (Vol. VI, p. i^k). I l^reover, this difficulty ^cLth objectivity is, as previouslydiscussed, especially relevant trlth regard to the observation of

PAGE 174

16^ unconscious processes. "• . . . this uncontroUable reactive effect of the observing subject on the unconscious limits the objective character of the latter 's reality and lends it at the same time a certain subjectivity'" (Vol. .VUI, p. 229, note 130). For Jung this dilemna of subjectivity in p^chology necessitates tlie toleration of a plurality of vievjpoints. Vh must realize, then, that a psychological theory ndrvors tlie psychology of its foimulator. "The assumption that only one psychology exists or only cgie fundamental psychological principle is an intolerable tyranny, a pseudo-scientifLc prejudice of the common man" (Vol, VI, p. hi). This point of the plurality of theories in psychology is developed in the context of Jung's theoiy of types. He sometimes argues, therefore, that the necessity of considering a plurality of theories must be taken to the ejctent of admitting one "true" theoiy for each type. I believe that other equally "true" explanations of the psycliic process can still be put fon-7ard, just as many in fact as there are types (Vol. VI, p. k93)» For, besides his otm theoiy, he would have to regard seven other theories of the same process as equally true, or, if that is saying too much, at least grant a second theory a value equal to his cam (Vol. VI, pages h90-h9l). I am quite convinced that a natural process which is very largely independent of htmian psychology, and can therefore be viewed only as an object, can have but one true explanation. But I am equally convinced that the explanation of a camplezt psychic process vrhich cannot be objectively registered by any apparatus must necessarily be only the one which that subjective process itself produces (Vol. VI, p. k9l). In addition to the problem: of the typological bias of an investigator making a truth claim in psychology, Jung also states that we must be prepared to see these truth claims as relative rather than

PAGE 175

166 absolute since due to the polaristic nature of the p^he (conscious and unconscious attitudes do not coincide), to mu^ be prepared to admit the reverse of our claim as also valid. Because p^jnchology basically depends upon balanced opposities, no Judgment can be considered to be final in trhich its reversibility has not been taloen into account ( llan and His Symbols « p. 'k7), . « . . T-re must observe the rule that a p^yxshological proposition can only lay claim to significance if the obverse of its meaning can also be accepted as true (Vol. WI, p, 115). rioi'7 if the above considerations are the sorts of things Jung has in mind as a way of reraeding the special problems with subjectivity in psychology, we might well wonder if the solutions are not as problematic as the difficulties for which they are to be remedies. However, Jung's statements about the relativity of truth in pgychology and the necessity for admitting the validity of a plurality of theories remain more or less theoretical methodological ideals for Jung rather than actual practises he observes. Bi any case these sorts of considerations are actually more relevant to problems of practical applications of theoretical reasoning in theraw than they are problems of theory itself. For example, in doing therapy Jung emphasizes that the therapist must never put the desire for tlieoretical confimation of his pet theoiy above the need to understand the patient as an individual. Ibreover, it is just in therapy that the potential conflict of personalities as a result of differing personality types is most Ireenly relevant. Then, the need to consider questions from the standpoint of both the conscious and unconscious attitudes comes to focus mo^ clearly in regard to the working out of the individual's personal problems.

PAGE 176

167 To generalize, as Jung sometimes does on these points, from what is useful in therapor to what is necessaiy for a theoretical psychological understanding in general is at best a questionable move. It is alvrays open to us, hoi/ever, to accept the p^chological facts of subjectivity that Jung points to >dthout dra.dng the same conclusions for theoretical understanding in p^hology. That is, ue can admit that there is a real problem i/ith subjectivity vdthout having to concede that truth claims in p^chology can onOy be considered valid relative to individual personalities.''' But we may consider the queiErtion of subjectivity in psychology as a generalization of the problem of the rational induction of archetypal e>:perience. 3h regard to que^ions of methodology then, if .re can satisfactoil2y detennine the allegedily scientific method ty which Jung studies archetypes, vre need then not be unduly concerned if some of the things that Jung says about psychological methodology in general seem to be problematic, Ife discover, then, that Jung recommends a phenomenological technique for the scientific ^uc^ of archetypes. Here it is essential to understand what he means by phenomenology. The tem connotes for him a theoretically unbiased observation of phenomena. It is clear, moreover, that the Plreudian technique of dream interpretation (see page 101 ) is the sort of unphenomenological theory-biased construal of unconscious phenomena to which Jung is opposed. Ifevertheless, it cannot be maintained that the phenomenological point of viet; has made much headt^ay. theory ^ill plays far too great a ^^f S ?f °£_t'eaJig included in phenomenology as It should. Even Preud, whose empirical attitude xs beyond doubt, coupled his theoiy as a S£e aua non vdth his method, as if psychic

PAGE 177

168 phenomena had to be vie^red in a certain light in order to mean something (Vol. IX-A, p. ^), Here the interpretation must guard against making xise of any other vieiTpoints than those manifestly given hy the content itself. If someone dreams of a lion, the correct interpretation can only lie in tlie direction of the lion . . . (Vol. XTH, p. 88). mat this phenomenological method entails for Jung becomes more evident in the folloTjing where in response to a challenge that his stu
PAGE 178

169 controls and manipulate variables. In Ifeslow's terms Jung's psychology is problem-centered rather than method-centered.^ • • . academic pi^ychology , , , prefers to avoid conQDlex situations by asking ever simpler questions, which it can do vrith impunity. It has full freedom in the choise of questions it \d21 put to Nature. I'fedical psychology, on the other hand, is very far from being in this more or less enviable position. IJevQ the object puts the question and not the experimenter. Bie analyst is confronted \rith facts which are not of his choosing and which he probabOy never would choose if he were a free agent (Vol, X, p. 272). The difference between this and all earlier psychologies is that analytical psychology does not hesitate to taclde even the most difficult and coii5)licated processes, iinother difference lies in our method of procedure. ... Our laboratory is the world. Our tests are concerned xriLth the actual, day-to-day happenings of himan life, and the test-subjects are our patients, relatives, friends, and, last but not least, ourselves (Vol. ]{VII, p. 92). But if it is clear that the primary context of discovery for the archetypes is the clinical situation, it must not then be concluded that this is also the only context of validation. For when Jung uses the tenn phenomenological for his method of study, this should not be understood to mean that it is entirely dependent upon introspective techniques. Ihe other term "empirical" that Jung employs for his method of study is then in some respects more descriptive. Jung thus emphasizes the necessity of supplementing the findings derived from work vrith patients by examining the manifestations of archetypes in a cross-cultural contercfc. For irfien the same sorts of phenomena as appear in the clinical situation can be seen as exemplified in the art, literature, rcrthology and religion of many different cultures, this gives the archetypes an erctraclinical and publicably

PAGE 179

170 observable dimension. Jung then likes to conipare his method of study of archetypes to that of comparative anatoncr. "i-^ scientific methodology is nothing out of the ordinary, it proceeds exactly like comparative anatoi^jr, on3y it describes and compares psychic figures" ( letters y Vol. I, p. 360, letter to Pastor Ilaz Prischlmecht dated 7 iipril 19k^). The psychologist must depend therefore in the highest degree upon historical and literary parallels if he ijishes to eroclude at least the crudest errors in judgment ( Ifemories, Dreams, reflections, p. 200). STmbolisra has today assuned the proportions of a science and can no longer make do vdth more or less fanciful se:aial interpretations. SLsewhere I have attempted to put symbolism on the only possible scientific foundation, namely that of comparative research (Vol. WII, p. IO6), In our discussion of Jung's scientific methodology, one chief question remains to be explored. This question has to do xjith what Jung sees as the appropriate method of characterizing archetypes. For if we understand that the phenomenological method tries to produce an accurate description of the archetj-pal phenomena which is as theoretically unbiased as possible, it seems evident Jung takes this to imply that his descriptions of the archetypes must mirror the phenomena described iji the sense that they are themselves aiabiguous descriptions, I don't know whether I ought to be glad that w desperate attempts to do justice to the reality of the psyche are accounted "ingenious ambiguity". At least it aclmowledges ncr efforts to reflect, as best I can, the "ingenious ambiguity" of the^psjTche. . . . The language I speak must be ambiguous, must have two meanings, in order to do justice to the dual aspect of our psychic nature. I strive quite consciously and

PAGE 180

171 deliberately for ambiguity of expression, because it is superior to unequivocalness and reflects the nature of life (letters . Vol. II, pages 69-70, letter to R.J, Ztri T'ferbloi^slsy dated 17 June 19^2), Ife must, hcnrever, di^binguish here betireen two senses of ambiguous description. Qn the one hand, there are empiricaiay acc\trate descriptions of ambiguity, and on the other hand, there are ambiguous descriptions of ambiguous phenomena. But if Jung is all too often guilty of the latter type of ambiguity, this should not prejudice our attitude toward the genuine problem posed by the rational reduction. For irrespective of Jung's individual style of description of archetypes, a plausible case can still be made for the necessity of having our descriptions of the archetypes take into account their Inherent ainbiguity. 1 In distinguishing betvreen the facts of archetypes versus the attxtude one talces tw^ard them, this has the effect of distinguishing the theoretical claims frem therapeutic considerations on the one hand and frem philosophical interpretations of archetypal experience on the other. Thus, it is misleading to say that in separating facts frem attitudes in terms of the ttro levels of discourse ire have in effect separated scientific from extrascientific claims about archetypes. For what Jung says about horr to deal irf.th archetypes from the therapeutic point of viev; is open to scientific critique and needs scientific justification. Often, hoxjever, Jung can be seen to generalize frem therapeutic experience and to relate his views on vrhat is^beneficial for man in general. In this way a great deal of philosophcr does jm fact appear in Jung's i,rritings. Ih spite of Jung's avowed disloke for the label of philosopher, it is tlms still very evident tnat he is the son of a preacher. J4 -^^ ^® dirtinguishing betireen the two levels of discourse as a distinction beti/een scientific statements about arehetypes versus personal meaningful interpretation is of course Jung's distinction. It should be apparent that V7e have changed tlie meaning of the distinction slightly so that it nm distinguishes facts of archetypal e^erience frem attitudes one t^iloes toiTards the experience. But attitudes can mean one's o;m attitude, the personal meaningful interpretation, or it can refer to i^at attitude is recommended frem a_toerapeutic point of view. As a therapist Jung is naturally qualilted to recommend appropriate attitudes. But irtien he does so, there

PAGE 181

172 IS then the tendency to get involved Td.th philosophical statements. men we argue for a separate consideration then of what Jung says about the facts of archetypal experience versus ;jhat attitudes he advocates \Te take toward them, this hopefully T-jill pave the way for an objective consideration of the archetypes irrespective of our attitude toward Jung's philosophizing, Ibreover, by means of the distinction betiTeen the tiro levels of discourse, we also save ourselves from having to specify the relationship betireen the effectiveness of therapy and the truth of a theoretical vieiTpoint. This is not to say that they are not intimately related, but only that it is veiy difficult to deteniiine what causes success or failure in therapy, 2 or course, it is possible that Jung's theory could be impeccably scientific wliile his therapeutic vie;jpoint ms open to obvious criticisms. For a sound pi^chological theoiy does not automatical3y lead to an effective therapeutic technique. Although in the context of this study ire can not enter further into discussion of Jung's ideas on therapy, it is our view that Jungian therapy on the whole proves to be practicallly effective as iiell as theoreticallv sound, 3 Gerhard MLer, "Analytical Psychology and the Principle of oomplementarxty, in ^ii. -Analytic Process ; Aims, Analysis. Training. edited by Joseph B. Vheeli/right (Ifew York: G,P, Putnam's Sons, 1971), p. 120. ' . r, ^'^ ^* ^°^ Franz, "Conclusion: Science and the Ifticonscious," in Jfen^and ps Symbols, edited by C.G. Jimg (New York: Dell, 196k), pages 3o2-3o3. The point of the inability of the conscious mind to completely assimilate the unconscious ttUI be considered later in this section Trfiere we will say that the unconscious can not be completely rationalized. That discussion T/ill be a continuation of the sorb of reasoning presented here, Ife defer presentation of that discussion for the sake of preserving the continuity of our argument. Jung's -i^Tpology works trilth tiro attitude tjTes called extrovert and introvert vjhich indicate the overall orientation of the individual vrith regard to objective or subject processes respectively. There are also four function types: intuition, tliinldng, feeling and sensation. Together ^dth the attitude types tliis yields then eight basic types of personality: an eictroverted intuitive, thinldng, feeling and sensing type and an introverted intuitive, thinldng, feeling, and sensing type. 7 ... Si fairness to Jimg it must be pointed out Jimg is usually sensitive to a distinction between theoretical and practical knot/ledge as outlined in the section on science and the individual, Horrever, as KaeE^Oified m the passages cited here, Jimg sometimes is guilty of not distfnguisliing between the practical requirements for applying a theoir in therapy and requirements for the acceptance of a theoretical claim.

PAGE 182

173 4.U ' J. \' ^-^ psj^chologists Tjho choose to uork as best they can tath ijiiporfcant problems (problem-centering) rather than restrictinjj themselves to doing only that ^Aich th^ can do elegantly TTitli the techniques alrea^ available (method-centering)." ia,raham K. Fasloxr, The I-sycholo^ of .Science (Ife^ York: Harper and Ibn, 1966), p. 16.

PAGE 183

CMPTER 7 THE STUDY OF AKCIffiTTPES AS A SCIEMTIFIC DISCIELnfE Introduction In the previous tiro chapters we have considered the question of whether Jung holds viet/s incompatible lath those necessaiy for science and also looked at the basis upon which he claims that his study of archet^Tjes is scientific. From these discussions what can be concluded concerning Jung's scientific vier/s? In ttie first instance, it must be remarked that Jung's lutings do not confom to any expectations vie may have had concerning what constitutes ideal scientific >;riting. I-breover, this is due principally to the fact that the works are not unifonnly scientific in character. Ih this regard we have suggested that by separating the theoretical claiins Jung makes for the archetypes from statements where Jung discusses attitudes toward archetypal expei-ience, we could e:camiiie the question of scientific status independent^^ of both what Jung says about the archetypes from a therapeutic perspective and from philosophical and religious implications which also appear in Jung's work. But if such a distinction is successful in isolating the question of scientific ^atus, this is not to sgy that we have then purified the theoiy or arrived at its meaningful core, as if to iJnp]y that Jung should have done this himself at the very beginning. Such an attitude only confuses the logic of reconstruction and the 171;

PAGE 184

17^ process of discoveiy. For if we admit that the ertrascientific aspects of Jung's personality in fact dominate his >nltings as a whole, this is not in the end to the disadvantage of scientific Iaio;fledge. For it is onOy through the wholeness of Jung's personality that we have such a theory which ire can then examine in terms of scientific criteria, that is to say, it is only through Jung's interest in and involvement Td.th the irrational aspects of e^cperience, both as an individual and a therapist. In regard to Jung's scientific views then, our arguments so far have endeavored to sho;^ that Jung did in fact attempt to construct a theoiy compatible idth scientific understanding. Considering the highly irrational nature of the phenomena which are the objects of such a theoiy, success in such an enterprise would most certainly entitle Jung to be regarded as a truly great scientific pioneer and investigator. But did Jung in fact succeed in formulating a theoiy which can be construed as a genuine scientific one? Ihstead of attempting to discuss necessaiy and sufficient criteria of what is scientific in general, our approach to this question has been to e:camine possible reasons on the basis of which the scientific label could be vrlthheld from Jung's theory. Rather than attempting to show that Jung's theoiy is scientific because of its similarity to paradigmatic models of science such as physics and chemistiy, we have atteuqjted to estabU.sh that Jung's theory is not unscientific. This sort of approach allows for a liberal understanding of >jhat constitutes a scientific theoiy. For rather than establishing a priori standards of \fhat science must be, we instead examine the putative scientific theoiy in regard to what it can in fact

PAGE 185

176 acconplish toward a rigorous understanding of its subject matter. But the sort of considerations we have discussed in regard to shoidng that Jung's theoiy is not unscientific do not suffice to establish the scientific status of the theoiy. For if we have successfully shoim, for example, that the theoiy can be understood as a rational theoiy and that religious and philosophical utterances often associated vrith it are not a necessary part of the theoiy itself, these are, for the most part, special problems of the archetypal theoiy. The resolution of these problems is then necessaiy but not sufficient to shov^ that the archetypal theory is not unscientific. There are other considerations which must be Kcamined before the scientific critic idll rest content. For to still need to discuss the problem of falsiflability. Jh addition we need to show what sorts of predictions the theoiy can make and what e^qilanations resxat from it. Ifi.th the examination of these remaining questions, the basis upon which we trill advocate scientific status for the archetypal theoiy Trill not be so liberal a basis as to admit other disciplines such as astrology and numerology from which we would vrish to vrithhold the scientific label. For these questions still to be discussed are the sorts of questions which any discipline must be capable of anstjering in a satisfactory way if it is to be included in the domain of science. Falsifiability A preliminaiy topic which must be discussed in confronting the issue of falsifiability is the problem of specil^dng the basis on which ^m claim that an archetype is present. The question at stake here is brought into focus by the difficulties encountered by the

PAGE 186

177 non-Juncian in detenrdning what observational ^ates of affairs count as evidence for the presence of an archetype. Bie existence and working of the Jungian archetypes seems more difficult to deiaon^trate operationally: one can define objectively particular stujiulus features or combinations of these, and can say whether or not they are present? but the Jungian archetypes have no clearly defined essential features by which their presence may be unequivocany established, and so mai^ specific features are included as possible manifestations of one or another archetype that it is always possible to claim one is present, Ibreover, Jungians themselves, sometimes make statements which seem to indicate that they see archetypes in everything. The following statement from Jacobi thus indicates an attitude insensitive to the problem of falsifiability: fnd sijice all p^hic life is absolutely grounded m archetypes, and since i-re can spealc not only of archetypes, but equally well of archetypal situations, e^gjeriences, actions, feelings, insights, etc., any hidebound liMtation of the concept would only detract fi-om its richness of meaning and implication. ^ Ih order then to shm: that claims involving archetypes can not be made compatible idth all possible observational states of affairs, we must clearly indicate the observational basis for presence of archetypes. A clue to hoi; we can go about meeting this difficulty is provided by reflections on the problem of individuation of ai^rhetypes. This is the problem of hcnr to tell one archetype from another. This problem is one manifestation of what :.;e have called the problem of the rational reduction. For it seems that the archetypal phenomena do not readily lend themselves to classification into unambiguous types.

PAGE 187

178 These unconscious nuclei are the archetypes and they can, up to a point, be classified and enumerated through special images—the northologems—but they have a tendency to, as it vrere, dissolve into each other so that they seem at one time to be numerous and at others to be a single entity.^ Vhen \ie speak of a problem of rational reduction, this is to iJidicate that the ambiguity is inherent to the phenomena rather than being a result of the inadequacy of the classificational criteria. ]h this regard it is helpful to consider the analogous preblem of individuating species or other biological groups such as phyla. Tihen TO consider then on what basis it is decided that in this instance you have Uo species whereas in another instance only one, we do not expect frem our taxanomist a definite decision procedure which can be applied in all problematic cases. Rather the classification of species turns in the end not so much on a priori criteria of species as on the reasonable judgment of the professional taxonomist, subject to its acceptance by the professional taxonandc community. The poijit of this analogy is to indicate that iihen dealing with naturally occurring complex phenomena precise operational definitions can not be expected in regard to the classification of the basic entities. Bius there are no simple answers to the question of where to draw the line beti-reen one archetype and another. But although it is unreasonable to expect a definitive decision procedure for distinguishing archetypes, nonetheless discriminations can be carried out by the experienced Jungian practioner, although on analogy with biological speciation this will not eliMnate the element of conventionality and thus professional controversy concerning the specification of specific archetypes.^

PAGE 188

179 If ;re consider ttien the more general problem of the recognition of archeiypes in regard to the difficultjr of the non-Jungian in deciding -That to call an archelgrpe, the sort of ansner ire give is one couched in terms of lack of experience Tzith the theoiy. To understand the peculiar pheaomena of the arche-t^-pe one needs a lot of practical experience, f.i, the numinous quality, so indispensable to the recognition of an archetype, is an indefinable imponderable like the expression of the human eye, vrhich is indubitable yet indescribable (Letters. Vol, II, p. h90, letter to Stephen I. -Abrams dated 5 Iferch 19B9), Bat of course the claim that difficulties ^dth the empirical interpretation of the theory are due to lack of knowledge of the theoiy or lack of expeirience in applying it in specific cases can easily be construed as a possible defense against all critician of the theoiy. For to say that only the person e:cperienced vrlth application of the theory really knonrs lAether or not it applies in ai^ specific case seeras to Txork against the possibility of there being criticisms of the theory from standpoints which do not alreadj-assume it. In order to understand Jung, it has been said, one must experience Ms findings at first hand— his -rork must be "at least partially lived through and validated existentialOy, befoi^ it can be throughly grasped on a conscious level" Dra Rrogoff , Jung's Fs7/cholog, r and Its Social ileaninf? (London: Pujutledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), p. ix^ Prom the academic side, by contrast, comes the ai^ument that a considerable amount of direct contact is likely to diminish objectivity. This, of course, is the old dilemma often set forth for depth p^chology in general—either one remains outside and therefore insufficiently acquainted ^Jith the facts, or one moves inside and is cured of the desire to criticize. 5 ; Itowever, although the practical difficulties i-rith ImoT-zing hot-? to apply the theory do seem in fact to lead to a situation in which

PAGE 189

180 oiOy experts ±n the theoiy can detennine hoi; it applies in a specific case, this does not have the consequence of making the theoiy unfalslfiable or ijtimune f rom the possibility of criticism. In order to demonstrate this point, it Tdn be necessary to recapitulate the observational grounds for asserting the presence of archetj^es. Pficalling the discussion of this topic from Chapter 3, it was stated that the chief difficulty ixx establisl^g the presence of archetypes ms the fact that although the archetjije was postulated to be part of the collective unconscious, the form of its manifestation in the individual always reflected the cultural and personal experiences of the individual. The problem of identifying the presense of archetypes then is one of distinguishing the personal and collective contents. Ibreover, irhat i:as distinctive of the collective, archetypal contents iras, on the one hand, their sjonbolic and numinisfcic qualities, and, on the other hand, their alien character, i.e., the fact that they appear in consciousness T-dthout the individual being able to account for then solely on tlie basis of his previous, personal experience. But these are introspective and subjective features and if the claiin that there are archetj^es just rested on these types of claims, the critic ivould be justified in pointing out the difficulties of establishing validation of introspective reports. This difficulty would be accentuated by the fact that the reports are usually made by patients in Jungian therapy. Ilorrever, in addition to the subjective introspective reports of archetypal e.^rience, Jung points to! the presence of the same motifs in the nytJiology, religion, art and literature of widely divergent cultures. A loiowledge of cross-cultural ^^bology is then brought

PAGE 190

181 to bear on the symbolic manifestations in the individual. The clal.-u is that these cultural parallels help to ercplain the meaning and diiplications of particular ^Tnbolic manifestations in the individual in .rays .Aich can not be satisfactorily accounted for solely lor appeal to the person's individual development or previous experiences. M example of how this method is used to elucidate the meaning of ^bols by appeal to cultural parallels helps clarify this point. I can remember many cases of people trho have consulted me because they xrere baffled by their aim dreams or by their cliildren's. They were at a complete loss to understand the temis of the dreams. The reason iras that the dreams contained images that they could not relate to anything that they could remember or would have passed on to their children, . . u /Ji^^ recall the case of a'professor who had had a sudden vision and thought he was insane. He came to see me in a state of complete panic. I simp]y took a ItOO-year-old book from tne shelf and showed h±a an old woodcut depicting hxs very vxsxon. "There's no reason for ySu to belxeve that you're insane," I said to him. ihey laieT-7 about your vision 1|00 years ago. " Ihei-^upon he sat doim entirely deflated, but once more normal (I^and ^s 9ymbols, p. 58). It should be evident then where the difficulty is encountered in ImoTdng hoi. to apply the theory. For if the non-Jimgian has access to the same data as the Jungian practioner, he could easily be shoim that the mministic symbolic images >ri.th cross-cultural parallels existed and that in this sense the^ were archetypes; but he .«>uld be at a loss to say which archei^Tes he had been shoim or what was their full meaning. Ih order to deal with the later problems and employ the theory in a meaningful way, it Is thus necessaiy to gain a worldng Knowledge of cross-cultural ^ymbologies. Ihis tdll entail, for ezcample, a toor-rledge of the motifs of world^-dde ncrthologies and

PAGE 191

182 religions. From the standpoint of its empirical basis then, it is ea^ to understand uhy the archetypal theoiy is ft-equently not given Mich seidous consideration. For the archetypal steptic frequently lacks either extensive experience vrith unconscious phenomena or else is unacquainted i/itli the sort of cross-cultural parallels :;hich Jungians claim as validation for the theoiy. But although confirmation of the archetypal theoiy vrould entail a great deal of erudition, the validational basis of the theory, the cross-cultural parallels, are nonetheless part of the public domain. Ibreover, these de facto considerations concerning the practical difficulty of gaining a working Imowledge of the employment of the theoiy do not mean that the validity of the theoiy can not be evaluated by.the non-Jungian. For although to understand ho-j the theory i-rorks IJi a practical way involves specialised loiowledge, the theoiy claims certain states of affairs which can be checked independently of a detailed Imowledge of the manifestations of individual archetypes. For example, the theoiy claims that archetypal manifestations can be demonstrated in all races and civilizations of men ^/ithout exception, llhat then will count as shotting that archetypes are not present in a group of men? In this regard the ideal test case wuld be a tribe which has not had previous cultural contact with other human groups. Biis is to guard against the possibility of the group having talccn over symbols threugh contact id.th other cultures. To gather evidence against the archetypal theory, we have to show that the group has no indigenous religious or nythological symbols. This would in effect involve shovang that the group had no indigenous religious or itcrthological beliefs.

PAGE 192

183 Other consequsnces which follcyj from the archetypal theoiy include the postuiation of biological parallels to the archeiypes in lotrer organians. For since the archetypes are assumed to arise through the course of evolution, th^ must be prefigured in the other animals. Ibreover, due to the close relationship uhich is postulated bettieen the archetypes and the instincts, this is an especially critical point since \ie vrould ercpect whatever instinctual aspects there are in man to have homologies in the animal kingdom. (See page U7.) If the efforts of the ethological school of animal behavior to demonstrate the existence of innate patterns of behavior can be shoim to be misguided, this trill count against the archetypal theoiy. Tims in order to ma2<5e the archetypal theoiy viable, it must be shotm that either ethology or some similar tjrpe of theory is valid. A tliird consequence wliich follows from the archetypal theory is the assertion that archetj'pes idll be manifested in altered states of consciousness," Although this seems to be a very vague claim, what it rules out is the situation iriiere archel^irpes appear only in patients undergoing Jungian therapy or in individuals who have read Jung, In this regard erqierimental results can be brought to bear for or against the theoiy. If experimental techniques designed to produce altered ^ates of consciousness uniformly do not produce ar^ sort of subject reports which describe phenomena similar to the Jungian description of archetypal experience, then this vdll be damning evidence against the theoiy, Ibreover, it must be emphasized here that the reports of subjects can not be uniformly interpreted as archetypal. Electrical stimulation of tlie brains of epileptics, for ercample, tend to produce dream-like states, but they are easily

PAGE 193

I81t identified hy the subjects as being for the most part memories of previous experiences,"^ Ihese three e^camples indicate x/hat sort of evidence rjOTild count againsrt the theoiy, and thus what sorts of states of affairs are incompatible TTith it.^ Explanation iO-though i-re can not enter here into all aspects of the question of archetypal explanation, 5* one principle problem Td.th explanation in the archelg^al theory is that it does not seem possible in principle to predict tjhen an arche-t^fpe ijill be manifested nor what its appearance Trfll be liloe except idthin broad outlines. As has been stressed in this book, there are no lairs governing the specific form in ijhich an archetj'pe might appear, !Ihere are only "tendencies" . , , that, again, enable us to s^ only that such-and-such is likely to happen in certain psychological situations. ^ ^ Hoirever, it is not reasonable to e:cpect lai;s depicting the relationship betireen the arche-type per se and the archelypal image. For the questions of when an archeiype appears and what its manifestation vrtll be like are answered in terms of the interaction bett
PAGE 194

18^ and shortly thereafter Jung was imcertaln of vrhat outcome would ensue flm the possession of the Gennan people by these archetypes. In regard to explanation then, the archetypal theoiy is more like evolution theoiy than Ifevrtonian mechanics. For prediction on the basis of the principles of evolution, such as the prediction that the fittest populations of organisms vdll survive, is always subject to environmental circumstances which are subject to unforseeable changes. For example, txhat species survives might be due as a matter of fact to some environmental accident, such as location relative to the eruption of a volcano, which has no relation to the organisms' adaptation to the 12 envxronment. Bius the coui-se of evolution can not be predicted ;ri.th certainty, although this does not mean that the theoiy of evolution is not e:5)lanatoiy. Oh the archetypal theoiy on the other hand, what is unforseeable that prohibits reliable prediction of the outcome of behavior of individuals or groups due to the activation of archetypes is exactly how a nm archetypal manifestation irill intei^late Td.th the existing cultural matrix. For example, we can explain the appeal of the cult of Guru laharaj Ji, a teenage Indian who is celebrated as the messiali by the Qlvine light ISlssion in the Ifeited States, on the basis of the projection of the Archetype of the QLvine Child. ""^ T.^en xre attempt to determine why this particular archetype is manifested in this particular fom at this particular t±m in histoiy, the anstrers we give in teims of the loss of numinosity of the traditional religious symbols and the consequent appeal of symbolic f onns from a non-TfesteiTi culture which are different enough to seem neir and alive, yet sijullar enough to the old symbols to be easily assimilated to the

PAGE 195

186 existing culture. Horrever, due to the uniqueness and comple:d.ty of the factors i/hich are involved in any pai-ticular time in histo:cy, this ejqjlanation of the appearance of a neir manifestation of the -Archetype of the Divine Child is not sufficient for us to make law-like generalisations from TrirLch ^^ could then e:cpect e:cact predictions. If T'xe consider the situation in the individual rather than talking from a cultural perspective, the uncertainty^ t^ich prohibits our loiOTTing exactly when an archetype trill appear and what its manifestation trill be lilce is again due to the indeterminancy of the relationship beti/een the innate archetype per se and environment. For the appearance of archetypes is conditioned ly one's overall knoijledge and eiqjeriencej^ Ibreover, trhereas from the cultural perspective the difficulty vjith predicting archetypal manifestations is primarily due to the complexity and uniqueness of the relevant factors (here archetypal theoiy shares the same problems vriLth historical ejqilanation and prediction), TTith regard to the individual there is the additional factor of an ethical issue. For in order to be able to separate the variables at tfork in determinijig hot; environment conditions the appearance of archetypes in the individual, tre trould need to perform an isolation experiment on a human being lasting several years. ""^ In addition to the ethical problems tdth the isolation experiment, another reason trliich compHcates the problems td.th determining the appearance and manifestation of archetypes is the effect of the conscious attitude. For the degree to which the individual trorks t^th the archetypes and attempts to understand their relationship to

PAGE 196

187 his personality effects hovj and when thej-appear to the individual. Ibreover, it is evident that Jung's irork in attenipting to trace this relationship betvreen the phenomenologyof archetypes and the development of personality as encompassed by his theoiy of individuation is veiy much pioneer work and that much additional study on this matter still needs to be done, mth regard to e:cplanation and prediction ijith the archetypal theory then, ire must conclude that two principle factors prohibit the theoiy from being able to accomplish feats of explanation and prediction similar to those of the physical sciences. Qn the one hand, it is evident that the archetypal theory is an iinmature theory in the sense that its full empirical implications have yet to be worked out. Ibreover, in many respects the theoretical foundations of the theoiy are still far from adequate. 1^ To mention one e:cample, the relationship xrhich Jung has in mind bet^treen archetypes and instincts needs to be more precisely specified. It has been one of the goals of this study to attempt to make some progress in the direction of clarif^ring foundational questions, but it must be confessed that a great deal of further vrork in this direction needs to be done before to could e:cpect its acceptance and widescale ectployment in such obviously applicable areas as anthropology. But, on the other hand, if we admit that the theory is an immature theory, this is not to say that the theory is not scientifically viable or that its methods are inadequate for what they attempt to accomplish. For the complex nature of the subject matter imposes certain definite limitations on T;hat vre could ej^ject from even a foundationally impeccable archetypal theorjr whose empirical implications

PAGE 197

188 had been throueh^jr trorked out. EspeciaUy id.th regard to e^^planation and prediction then, ire can hardly e:qpect perfect knOTrledge in principle from an archetypal theoiy. Evidence The archetypal image is postidated to be the end result of the interaction betireen the innate archetype per se and the environment. But from the discussion in the last section we sat: that the archet^al theory does not attempt to specify precisely horr these two factors interrelate to produce the archetypal image. Thus, in the absence of axjy archetypal laws speciiying how these two factors interact to produce the archetypal images, the question arises how the innateness of the archetype per se is to be established. For if we are not in fact able to separate these two factors through some type of Isolation e:5>erdment, it might xrell seem that the claim that the archetypes are innate rather than acquired as a result of e3:perlences in individual development would be on very weak ground. Ifcreover, if we cannot sub^antiate the Innate nature of the archetype per se, then the theoiy as a whole vrill lack a credible basis. In this regard it is Instructive to consider in general the sort of evidence Jung gives in support of his theory. la particular vre need to examine hoi-r he attempts to establish that the archetypal images are due to Innate factors. Jung argues then that the archetypal Images are due to innate factors primarily on the basis of paradigm cases In which it can be reasonablyascertained that the persons involved had had no previous exposure to the sort of motifs that appear in the dreams or visions.

PAGE 198

139 iathough ire cannot from an ethical point of view isolate the human subject fi-ora the possibilitjr of cultural influences, in some actual cases it is nevertheless possible to determine that the subject could not have learned of the motifs. Naturally in mo^ cases of alleged archetypal manifestation, this degree of control irill not be possible. For when the individual reports that he can not trace a specific image to something he has acquired through learning, he may be either lying or mistaken. In the latter case the possibility of ciyptomesia must always be kept in mind, i.e., the possibility that the person has forgotten what he had previously learned which now appears as an alien content of consciousness without apparent connection with antecedent experience, when in fact this connection has been simply forgotten. A third corrolicating factor is the element of suggestion, where instead of the ojiages being spontaneously produced their appearance is due to the suggestive influence of the investigator. Ibreover, in order to e^fcablish that the content of the dream or vision is an archetype, in addition to establisliing that it has not been acquired through previous ejqjerience, ire must also shw; that it has cultural parallels. However, in this regard the sort of correlation that ire need to establish betiTeen spontaneous products without previous experiential antecedents and similar manifestations in cultural ^Tmbology is not one beti^een images but rather one bet^reen motifs. Bjr emphasizing tlie similarity betiTeen motifs rather than symbols per se, we rule out the | possibility that the similarity bettreen symbols is due to chance or is a similarity viith no significance. For in order to establish that a qynibol is a manifestation of an archetypal motif, rather than simply comparing the similarity of

PAGE 199

190 isolated ^bols, tts mist examine hoi: the syvibols function in relation to their context. It does not, of course, suffice sintply to connect a dream about a snalce irith the noiiiological occiirrence of snakes, for uho is to guarantee that the functional meaning of the snalos in the dream is the same as in the irorthological setting? ]h order to draw a valid parallel, it is necessaiy to knor; the functional meaning of the individual ^jTtibol, and then to find out Txhether the apparently parallel mj^thological symbol has a similar contex-t and therefore the same functional meaning (Vol, IX-A, p. 50), ^ 1!hus, if lie can shovr that a given content is not due to previous learning and has the required cultui-al parallels, this is the sort of evidence that Jung gives in support of his theory of archetypes. I'breover, it is evident here that it is the first factor, the demonstration that the spontaneous content has not been learned, that iri.ll be the most difficult aspect of the task of evidentially substantiating the archetypes, A paradigm case to irhich Jung refers most often in the latter regard involves the vision of a schizophrenic patient vihich Jung noted in 1906. One day I found the patient standing at the x^^indoTr, Tragging his head and blinking into the sun, Ife told mo to do the same, for then I Tjould see sometlrnig very interesting. Ihen I aslced him trhat he saw, he T7as astonished that I could see nothing, and said: "SureHy you see the sun's penis— \rhen I move ror head to and fro, it moves too, and that is vrhere the iriLnd comes from" (Vol. IX-A. paces Jung, who at that time was of mythology, did not knor-r what not Tjell acquainted tdth the literature to malce of the vision. Hbrrever, four years later in a text describing a rite of lUthras he discovered an account which depicted the same motif.

PAGE 200

191 "Draw breath from the rays, draw in three times as strongily as you can and you TidU feel yourself raised up and walking towards the height, and you vrill seem to be in the middle of the aerial region. ... The path of the visible gods irin appear through tlie disc of the sun, who is God my father. likeirise the so-called tube, the origin of the ministering irind. For you idll see hanging doim from the disc of the sun something that looks like a tube, ilnd toiTards the regions vzestrrard it is as though there were an infinite east >7ind. But if the other Tond should prevail towards the regions of the east, you xtUI in like manner see the vision verring in that direction"' (quoted Albrecht ib.eterich. Sine Mlthrasliturprie. Leiozip. 1903. p. 6) (Vol. IX-A, p. £), "-^ . b, 7 , Tlie possibility of the patient having previously learned of this archetj-pal motif, "the idea of a Tdnd-tube connected vrlth God or the sun" (Vol. IX-A, p. 52), is largely nullified by tlie fact that the passage wliich Jung cites as a parallel was only published in 1903 which was after the patient had been committed. Ibreover, other incidences of this rare motif as depicted in medieval paintings xrere not in tlie local gallery in Zurich where the patient had lived his whole life (Vol, IX-A, p. ^2). Another ercmple cited by Jung in Ifen and lis Symbols involves archetypal dream motifs reported by a ten-year-old girl. "The evil animal," a snakelike monster vriLth mamhorns, kills and devours all other animals. But God comes from the foxxc comers, being in fact four separate gods, and gives rebirth to all the dead animals. A^ small mouse is penetrated by vroiros, snakes, fishes, and human beings. Thus the mouse becomes human. This portrays the four stages of the origin of mankind. A drop of water is seen, as it appears when looked at through a microscope. The girl sees that the drop is full of tree branches. This portrays the origin of the world ( Ifan and His Symbols, p. 59).

PAGE 201

192 The first citation contains the motif of divine restitution, . #okatastasis, as trell as the motif of a divine quaternity. The second and third citations illustrate the cosmogonic itorth depicting the origin of the uorld and man (Ijfen and His Symbols, pages 6O-6I). The problem >/ith this sort of evidence is that it has the character of a selected demon^ration of a lifted number of individual cases. Ibreover, it is never possible >d.th absolute certainty to rule out the possibility of deception and/or ciyptomnesia, and Jung's word is just about all the basis to have for judging the reliability of his subjects and detemlning their lack of previous exposure to symbols from ciatural sources. But ^/ithin the context of his method of investigation, x^hich is phenomenological rather than experimental, it is difficult to see hou lie could go beyond the sort of evidence Jung presents. l€th this l5Te of approach, the best ire could manage i/ould seem to be a larger collection of siMlar paradigm cases. In regard to numbers of cases, Jung often says that he could easily multiply his examples but hesitates to do so since each case requires lengthy discussion in order to mate clear the context out of wliich the symbols are taten for comparison. Establishing such facts not on3y requires lengthy and wearisome researches, but is also an ungrateful subject for demonstration. As the symbols must ?n^h^«^"' °^^ of their context, one has to launch lorth into exhaustive descriptions, personal as vrell as symibological, and this is practically impossible in the frameiTork of a lecture (Vol. IX-A, p. 50). In order to make clear what is meant by an archetypal nwtif then, rather than givijig a sumtnaiy of its essential features, the best approach is to give examples of the motif vdthin its various contexts

PAGE 202

193 of manifestation. This is illustrated Tvhen ire tiy to give a list of archelypes. For vdthout actual examples of how these archetypes function in a given context, such a list produces only a very superficial understanding of what an archetypal motif consists. Ibreover, in any case archetj'pal motifs are not easiOy divided into unambiguous discrete types. These sorts of considerations then are reasons lAy Jung adheres to a descriptive, phenomenological method of investigation ijhich yields evidence of an essential3y nonquantitative nature. IIoiTever, the archetj^pal theoiy irould rest on a very suspect empirical basis if the onJy evidence \ie had for the theory is the sorts of cases just discussed, which for the most part arise out of the context of therapeutic work done by Jungians. Ih order for the theory to be credible at all, it must be shaim to have consequences which are manifested outside of the Jungian therapeutic context. In this regard ;re can appeal to the commonality of sr/mbolic motifs in cultures throughout the world :ri.dely separated in space and tijue. However, although this type of evidence is of a extraclinical and publicly observable nature, it has definite limitations so far as constituting compelling evidence for the archetypal theoiy is concerned. For it is erven more difficult to establish the spontaneous origin of symbolic motifs in cultures than it is in individuals, since the histoiy of and influences on the foraier are more uncertain than for an individual. Ibreover, appeal to cross-cultural similarities will not have much probative stren^h independently of the ability to demonstrate the emergence of these same archetypal motifs in individuals. athough we might expect that, irrespective of the difficulty of substantiating the spontaneous origin of symbolic motifs in various

PAGE 203

19li cultures, anthropological evidence would nonetheless prove to be veiy helpful in e^ablishing the credibility of the theory, this e^ctation is for the most part not fulfilled. For due to the difficult nature of the theoiy in its practical application, anthropologists tend either to accept the theoiy and to interpret their data from a Jungian perspective, or else reject the theoiy from an xmkna.ledgeable standpoint. In the latter case, it is difficult to deteiMne the degree to uhich their findings support the theoiy, since for the mo^ part they are not sensitive to .rhat constitutes an archetype and are unaware of the diverse phenomenology of the various arehel^rpal motifs. ^ 7 Due to the difficulties of evaluating the evidence for the arehetypal theoiy independently of a Jungian framework of understanding, in the last chapter we suggested that reports from e^^rfments designed to dJiduce altered states of consciousness be ^udied in order to see whether anything siMlar to descriptions of arehetypal motifs was reported. If none were reported, then this would be streng evidence against the theoiy. Qn the other hand, hor^ver, the claim that there are such siMlar descriptions which constitute confiiming evidence for the archetypal theoiy is rendered preblematic by the fact that mny of the investigators are d^uenced by Jung's work and thus readily assume his theoretical vie.;point in interpreting their data. Ibreover, in many of the ^udies involving drugs, the element of suggestion was a relevant variable not controlled. (Bbth of these considerations apply to the Masters and Houston stuc^r discussed below. ) But it is clear that this sort of researeh offers the promise of a solution to the problem of e:ctending the validational basis of the

PAGE 204

19^ theory beyond the sort of evidence to uluch Jung originally appealed. For if no additional support for the theory is forfchcoming besides the sort of data for rrhich it ims oi-iginalOy designed to e:q)lain, then ue T;ould have to conclude that the theoiy is on wak grounds. Ife vjill thus proceed to discuss one e:cainple of such evidence from altered states of consciousness research.''^ This research as reported by R.K.I.. Ilasters and Jean Houston in Varieti es o_f Psychedelic ^^^^"°^ . involves T;ork viith the chemical substances LSD-25 and p^'ote and covers a period of more than fifteen years. A total of 206 subjects i/ere given the drugs. Bie investigators reported that the perception of the guides In. the e:cperiinent iras frequently distorted In such a way that th^ were apparently seen as archetypal figures. 3h a fairly comraon distortion the guide may be perceived by the subject as one or rore of a vaidety of archetypal figiu-es. For e:;2mple, a female guide may be seen as a goddess, as a priestess, or as the personification of Tri.sdom or truth or beauty. Descriptions of some of these "archetypal" perceptions have included seeing the guide's featm^s as "gloiTing vrLth a luminous pallor" and her gestures as beinp "cosmic," yet "classical. "20 Ibreover, in the course of the ercpei-iments, rrythological and religious symbolic imageiy -jas frequentlcjr encountered. Jh the p^Tchedelic drug-state rcrthologies abound. The guxde often may feel that he is bearing latness to a multi-layered complex of in/tholopical ^stems as they arise out of their latency in the mind of the subject, ^^ Bie most frequently recurring irythic themes ^re summarized as follows: ^V'^ll °V'^^ Child-IIero, I'yths of Creation, I^hs of the Eteraal Itetum (Cycles of Ilatui-e), IRrths of Paradise and the Fall, Ifero I-^hs, Goddess Ifyths,

PAGE 205

196 I-^yths of nhcest and Parricide (Cfedipus, Electra, etc.}, IJrths of Polarity (light and Darlmess, Order and Chaos), I-Tjrths of the /^di-ogyne (ihle -Female Synthesis J, I^^hs of the Sacred Quest. PrometheusFaust lijrths (lyths of the Trickster). '2 Heli['ious images of some Idnd vrere repoii^ed in ninety-six percent of the 206 subjects. These included images of religious figures: Qirist, Buddha, saints, godOy figures, IfiJJlam HLaketype figures (fifty-eight percent)? devils and demons (fortynine percent)} and engels (seven percent ).23 Despite the factors of the influence of Jung's work and the problem of suggestion, these results seem to con^itute convincing evidence for the archetypal theoiy. Archetypes and Evolution Theorj In considering the scientific status of the archetypal theoiy, it has been ouiconcern to demonstrate that the theory is compatible in principle irith a contemporary scientific understanding, i.e., that the theory can be construed as a viable scientific one. In this regard, it is essential to ecrtablish that the theozy is not logically tied to an evolutix)naiy theory r/hich has been repudiated hy modem biologists, namely, one involving appeal to the inheritance of acquired characteristics. As vre saxr in Chapter 3 (page 6o ), there was one point in Jung's career irhere he postulated that the archetypes xTere inherited by means of such a mechanism and that archetj^pes were the deposits of repeated e^cperiences (Vol. VH, p. 6?). jllot^ver, Jung retracted this viex. and thereafter did not atteii^^t to e:cplain the evolutionaiy mechanism by Tihich archetypes become part of the innate structure of the psj-che

PAGE 206

197 e.xept to say that the archetypes .rere inherited as part of the structure of the brain and hence evolved as man evolved (Vol. XL, p. H^p, note 2 and Vol. IX-A, p. 78). It is cleai' hou the latter position can be construed as in principle compatible .dth Daondnian mechanisms of evolutionary change. Ha^evor, although ue can see ho., this sort of origin of archetypes through evolution is possible in principle, we might still question whether the iiiheritance of such dispositions to produce symbolic linages is plausible from the standpoint of modem evolutionary theoiy. ]h other words, is there any reasoning from the biological pod^t of vieu which can support the hypothesis that such dispositions are in fact inherited? Now although ,re do not Imow what sort of genetic mechanisms might be responsible for the inheritance of such di.spositions, this aspect of ignorance does not count against the archetypal theory since the genetic mechanisms .;hich are responsible for mary aspects of the human being are as yet, to say the leart, imperfect^, understood. Ho,.ever, if it can be shorn how a structure enables a man to be better adapted to the environment i^ such a manner as to produce relative^, inore proger;,. than another man lacldng the structure, then it is reasonable to suppose from the standpoint of modern evolutionary theory that whatever genes are responsible for the structure ..oil tend to increase in the overall population of the species. a.ot.-ing that dispositions to produce symbolic is then reducible to the problem^ it is reasonable to believe that Mages have probably been inherited of shoidng the basis in terms of irhich these dispositions did in fact confer a selective advantage on those humans or predecessors of humans who

PAGE 207

190 happened to have the necessaiy genes to produce then. In. this regard ue point to the fact that man is not a solitary species but evolved as a social andinal. Ihus, it is not difficult to see hoir the sui-vival of nan as a species has been enhanced by mechanisms which facilitate social cooperation such as the development of a shared ciature. Ibreover, it is eagy to understand haii the religious or ncrthological heritage of a human society gives it unity and stability and hoi; "the integration of a social group, its cohesion, is maintained by the direction of certain sentiments toT7ard a ^inbolic center, "^^^ If we admit that religious and mythological ^Tnbolic systems have survival value in that they enhance social cooperation tjithin the human community, the likelihood that dispositions tjhich tend to produce symbolic manifestations xdJ.1 be selected for in the course of evolution would seem to veiy great, Fran the standpoint of modem evolutionary theoi-y, we can conclude from these considerations that the inheritance of archetypes is something Trhich is very lilcely to have occurred, -^

PAGE 208

199 Notes 1 n,™^ 4. i*h ^^®^' "P^f Sociopsycholosical Malysis of Follcbales." Cigrent Mthropology. 1; (1963), p. 2^6. -^i-^i^s, Jacobi, CoiTOle:c. Archetype. Symibol. p. ^9, 3 lUchael Pordham, Hew Dgvclotaisnts in ihalytical P^ircholoErvr (london : Pujutedge and Ifegan Vaxilimi), ^7 ^7. " ^ ^ 1; r^^>,^«« ''^ aspect of disanalogjr i-dth biological speciation in the fr'^^^.J^^.J^fy^^-'^^^.^^^-types is that vhereas it is reasonable to a,qpect that bxological species delineate distinct entities, nane^jr populations of similar organisms capable of interbreeding irlth each other, archetypes are better thought of as processes rather than as distinct entities. Ira Rrogoff suggests then that ... in the final analysis it is incorrect to speak of arche22££ ^s noTins, if ire are implcjdng by tliat each has a speciHT" Sd SSSTSi^^tT^A" ^^ ^^f^. ^ S^ch^nicity. and Ifunan Destiny, p. 1^6. (IT.. Yor;^^Jo^'vaiy^?gfS' f 6^P. MP^ ^i^IE-tation ^r, m^r,^ ^.fTf^^''^^ ^^^^ altered states of consciousness, im have in inind such things as dream research, vrark id.th hypnosis, Kcneriments iTxthp^rchedelic drugs, sensoiy deprivation e:q5eriinents, and work idth electrical stimaation of the brain. uuxit i/iwi .^ -..^^^ '^° "°* ^^^ '^^ ^^ ^®^® ^^at arche-types can only be manifested m altered states of consciousness. Presumably the archetypes influence consciousness in all its states. Hovrever, analogously to other aspects of the unconscious, the archetypes are most noticeable when consciousness is interferred idth in some way as under the influence of drugs or if there is a relaxation of conscious attention as in hypnosis or dreams, 7 ^ 4.1. T^ ^^ ^' '^* Sem-Jacobsen, Depth-SLec trograTihic Stimulation foil ^)^^ — ^^'^^°'' (Springfield, ILHnois.-^^riT. 8 i ^««-?M« ^^* *^^!.if not to say, of course, that there are no possible ad hoc modifications which could save ttie theoiy from contraiy evidence in these cases. For in addition to the fact that ire must not underestimate the ingenuity of theorists, theories ^ not in any case sijnply overthroTm by single incidences of contraiy evidence. Iloirever, in the cases cited, it is veiy difficult to see what sort of ad hoc modifications could be invoted which

PAGE 209

200 would not involve a radical revision of the theoiy itself. I^lcul2ygS Se'"t%e?L'JtirSi^ ?r°^^^^ e.T,lanation. tions conc^g arohetySs^o not'^ol^ SSnfAf '"^?%"^ ^"^quertiln*' ^"^' ''°^'^ "^ ™ ^°=^ ^'^^ discussion on this TV J tT^ ''^',""'? ''^^''ologyof the Child ArchetTpe." to Vol rA^P'-^s ^^-"<^-^^^^ s:o^^=s^,ssr« ^™\T ^°Pl® ''''° ^"^ ^^ "Cr boolcs and never have a dream of anjrthing rerdniscent of mxj^l ^.^t. "* "/^ ^"^ *^^^* " you understand what , you have read, you get a frame of mind or a ^oblematic outlook v.-hich you did not have before, and that, of course, influences your dreams (^iies^ ^01. II, p. 137, letter to a yZg C-reel: girl dated lU 'Dctober 19^4). "' to an Iso'iatSf ^oS^S"^ TS^'tS^S^'''' "^ "J*^ «'-> np^seLf in enon^ous difficulties b^' f raSng Sn^ral fonnulations which az^ intended Z e^Sl the

PAGE 210

201 Trtiole field of htnnan experience. I had to keep to errperienceis that uere directlir accessible to me and coiiipare then -.rlUi data dra:ni from the irhole iiistoiy of the mind. This gives rise to some degree of inexactitude which ma]:es rny efforts appeal' provisional. It is perfect!-'clear to me that evei^-thing I do is pioneer ^rark vjiiich has still to be folloired by a real laying of foundations, but there are gratifjdng" signs that others are beginning to make forays into this territory ( letters. Vol, I, p. 231, letter to Hiidolf Pannr.Tits dated 27 I larch 1937). 17 It might seen that these considerations indicate that one must assume the archet^^pal theoiy in order to be able to see v/hat counts as data 111 favor of it. Ilotrever, this difficultjr of appraisiiig the evidence for the ai-chet^rpal theoiy from a non-Jungian perspective e-oenplxfies tne close interrelationshiTJ that e:dsts bet-zeen theory and evidence. Tliat is to say, the tlieoiy determines irhich data ai-e relevant as evidence and ^rhat is relevant as evidence from one theoretxcal perspective is irrelevant from another. The fact that Jun^' employs a phenomenological method of djircstigation does not of " course mean tliat he does not select what is relevant for description from essentially theoretical considerations. 18 jathin the scope of this study, we cannot hope to e:camine all relevant evidence. Ibreover, in light of the lengths discussion often necessary to malce clear what is meant by the claim that an arcliety^ has been e:q)erienced, ttb thought it better to discuss one e-cample dn detail rather than simply mentioning several. Other sources of evidence involving irork :iith altered states of consciousness wJiich ire will not discuss include the works of such authors as the follotrijif" Carlos Castenada, Journey, to Scblan. Jolin liOy, The Center of the " 2Z£lone (Ilew York: Bantam Bo5!=s71^72), and itanT^ac!ay7T5^aifrPower (]Iei7 fork: Berkeley Publishing Corp., 1972). 19 ^»^.U I festers and Jean Hou^on, The Varieties of Psycliedelic Bqjenence (U&.i York: Dell, 1966), p. §. " ^^ =^=^ ^° aid., p. 92. 21 Ibid ., p. 22lt, 22 Ibid. , pages 22];-22^. ^^ Ibid. , p. 26^. Co. 1966!™^'^3li; ^"^^^^^ ^^™3II E2o2aii2a (Chicago t MLine Publishing 2^ ^ Of course, the arche-^j^pal theoiy is not the only possible explanation of how religious and rtrfahological ^inbolic systems come into

PAGE 211

202 ^^r l*^".^^heP?jnt about the survival value of religions and rytnologies IS adratted, this on2y entails the inhei-itance of dis?hSl^°''''o!° ^^ff ^^^^^^'^ ^2es rather than the full archetypal theoiy. C^e msht Tdsh to argue, for e:xariple, that an that Sas necessaiy for such ^stenis to come into being is language Sd imaginatxon. Ilorrever, it irould seem that the archetyp2 theory Tixth Its hypothesis of the Innate archetj'pesVoffers f theo^ of dispositions to produce images which goes a long va^toiTard e'cplao^ tne culturain;5r universal sJonilarity and emotional a^al of religious and mjrfchological motifs, whereas this additional e.^lanatoiy ainport is lacldng ,i±th other ideas of hw; symbolic Ideas might have originated, j ^^

PAGE 212

REfEREMCES MLer, Gerhard. Letter to the editor. Horizon. 19 (I9h9), It^. ThT'Ar, n ^^ Psychology and the Principle of Complementarity." :pie Ma3ytic IVocess: ^Aojjis, Malvsis. Training; , mited by noSl ••^^''^''^^S^*Jfe^^York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1971, mport, Gordon. Personality and Social Bicounter. Boston: Beacon rress, I960. — — — — — Buber, Martin. lihlipse of God. Ifew York: Harper and Ibu, 1965. ^^^!f^'3^^"%sUcal and Scientific Aspects of the Psychoanalytic Jheones of Preud, MLer, and Jung." American Journal of Psychotherapy. 2h (I960), 2(39-307. ^^ Campbell, Bernard G. 1*2^ EzSlHtion. Chicago : Adline Publishing Campbell Joseph. "Bios and J&rthos. " Psychoanalysis and Culture . ^ted by George G. mbur and Uamer Muennterb^^i'e r. Ifeu Y ork; intematxonal Adversities Press, 19^1, 329-3^3, Casey, ^rard. "Toixard an Archetypal Imagination." Spring. 197li, Castane^, Carlos. Journey to Ibctlan. Net/ York: Sdinon and Schuster, Dry, Avis. Tt^e Psycholonr of Jm^: A Critical Ihtei-pretation. New York: John IJiley and Sons, 1961.^ Bdinger, jai-rard. "The Collective Unconscious as I.fenife^.ed in Psychosis " iknerf£an. Jounial of Ps^^chotherapy. 9 (1955), 62l;-629. ^"°^^' __ . ^o and ArchetvTje. Baltimore: Ifenguin Books, 1972. Faraday, Arm. Qpean Power . New ; York: Dell, I966. "^^'SmlS toSlT^B^f: "^^^^ °' folktales." Cu-^ ^°^°\oSf57ir^^ ^^^ and Occultian. New York: IMversity 203

PAGE 213

20ii Fordham, lachael. Ifew DeveloTments in y\nal^rbical ^ychology. LondonPcoutledge and Ifegan Paul, 19^7. — — --^' M <^.1ectlvB Vs^rche. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Franz, II.L. von. "Conclusion: Science and the Thconscious. " Han and FH.S 9yinbols. Edited by C.G, Jung. Hew York: Efell. 1968"; ~ 376-387. » ^ * Friedman, Paul and Gold£rtein, Jacob. "Some Comments on the Psychology of C.G. Jung.'' Psychoanalytic Quaterlv. 33 (l96k), 191-22^, Giegrich, Tfolfgang. "Qntogeny-Hiylogeny? A Fundamental Critique of lirich Ifeunann's Analytical Psychology." Spring. 197U, 110-129. Glover, Edijard. "Freud or Jung." Horizon. 18 (19U8), 22^-2^7. To-/ i"^^? or Jung, I\pipl±ed Jungian Psychology." Horizon. _. Freud or Jung. london: George Allen and Iftiirin, 1950. Goldbrunner, Josef. Individuation. Ifotre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 196U. Goldenberg, Ilaomi, "Archetypal Theoiy After Jung." Spring. 197^, Hansel, C.E.M. ESP: A Scientific Evaluation. Her; York: Scribner. 1966. " xuiici, Heimann, Paula. "Some Notes on the Psycho-analytic Concept of Introjected Objects." British Journal of Medical Psychology. 22 (191;^), Hempel, Carl G. RiilosoplTV of Natural Science. Qigle^rood Cliffs: Prentice -Hall, 1966. ~"~ Hilljnan, James. "liiy Archetypal Psychology. " Spring. 1970, 212-219, Jacobi, Jolande. Gomplex/.lrchetyDe /Symbol in the Psychology of C.G. Jung,* Princeton: Princeton tiiiversity Press, 1971. _. 21je Psychology of C.G. Jimg. i^qit Haven: Yale Iftiiversity Press, 1962. Jaffe, Aniela. Ihe I^h of Ifeaning. Nerr York: Penguin Books, 197^, ^ ^^" iiJl ^-^e aSl ^ferk of. C.G. Jung. Ifer-r York: liarper and

PAGE 214

205 '^'^'l96l. ^'^^"^^^ ^^^^^ Heflecttons. Ife-; York: Random House, . Complete j:brks. Princeton; Princeton University I•ess. 2.907, • Editor, I^ and ms Symbols. New York: Itell, I968, letters. Edited bjr Gerhard Adler and .flniela Jaffe. Princeton: Princeton IhiTrersity Press, 1973, roohn, T.H. Strucl^^r^ o^ .Scientific Revolutionn. Second Edition. Uhxcago: ihiversity of Chicago Press, 1970. lily, John. The Center of the Cyiclone. Ifew York: Bantam Books, 1972. lorenz, Kbnrad. Byolution and Ifedification of Behpvin-n. ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press, 195^. ^ ^'^^^"Sw'^l^r ^'' 21ie PgZSholoSL of ^ience . ITeir York: Harper and Masters, R.E.L. and Ifouston, Jean, gie Varieties of Psychede lic Experience. New York: Etell, 196S~ , n euB.u.c vx Ibreno, Aitonio. Jmig, Gods and ?fcdem Ian. Tfotre Dame, Indiana: University of Ifotre Dame Press, I970. ^*^Soff, Ira. Jaugj STTichronlclty, and Human Dfestinv. Nei>r York: Delta, 1973. . ^^^^* ?!^P* "^'^'' Jung's Confession: Psychology as a Language of Faith." lihcounter. 22 il96k), k$-^0. ^*«i&uage 01 _. EdjfflEk 21 ihe Therapeutic. New York: Harper Torchbooks, I^nchlak, Joseph F, A Hiilosotahv of Science for Itersonalit v Thee Boston: Houghton lafflin, 19^1 ~ [ ^ '• Scriven, Ilchael. "Birolution and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory." mi and Ifeture. Edited by Ronald timson. Ner-r York: Dell, 1971, ^"'^^?^?' ?«^"^« Pepth-SLect^o<^np^^.^n Stimulation of the Human Brain and Behavaor. Sprmglleld, niinois : Charles GrThSiki7l96Sr~ Semon, Richard. The^ Vkiem. Herl York: I-5aciailan, 1921. Stace, 17. T. Ifcgtlcian and Fhilbsoohv. Ner-r York: J.B. Idppincott, i960. Storr, Anthony . C.G. Juncr. New York: The Viking Press, 1973.

PAGE 215

BIOGRAPHICAL SICETCH I-felter Avoiy Slielbume was bom Jfarch 26, 19k6 in Bristol, , Virginia. He attended the local high school, graduating in 196h. From 196k until I968 he was a student at the Ckjllege of I411iam and Ilaiy in IBlliamsburg, Virginia. In I968 he received the Bachelor of Science degree in Biology. ELans to attend the Graduate School of the University of Florida trere interrupted by the Hilitaiy draft. The author saw service in Vietnam from Februaiy, 1969 until .Ipril, 1970. I^on release from the Ara^ in liiy, 1970, the author came to Gainesville, Florida where he started graduate school in Ehtonology in June, 1970. Ih September of that year, the author transferred from the College of %riculture to the College of Arts and Sciences and began graduate work in philosophy. -The Ilaster of Arts degree in Hiilosopl^r uas axjarded in Iferch, 1973. The author is not married. 206

PAGE 216

rn«f«i.^ f^ ?" ?*uf ^^P ^®^ this stiufy and that in ncr opiMon it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation Ind is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. larilyn Zwiig, thaimai Marilyn Zweig, Assistant Professor of Hiilosophy «« ^ certify that I have read this stvidy and that in w opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Thomas P, Arcter Assistant Professor of Philosophy I certify that I have read this stucfy and that in w opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is f^ adequate, i^ scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Richard P. Haynes Associate Professor of Hiilosophy

PAGE 217

.««.» certxiy that I have read this study and that in w opinion it confoiTOS to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fulOy adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Thomas W, Simon Assistant Professor of Philosophy I certify that I have read this study and that in w opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Tta.3 dissertation was submitted to the CJraduate Faculty of the Deparianent of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Hoilosopl^, Jiine, 1976 Dean, Graduate School