American air service observation in World War I

Material Information

American air service observation in World War I
Frank, Sam Hager, 1932- ( Dissertant )
Mahn, Dr. ( Thesis advisor )
Woty, Franklin ( Reviewer )
Proctor, Samuel ( Reviewer )
Imann, F. H. ( Reviewer )
Gropp, A. H. ( Degree grantor )
Place of Publication:
Gainesville, Fla.
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
Physical Description:
xii, 482, 2 leaves. : illus. ; 28 cm.


Subjects / Keywords:
Aircraft ( jstor )
Artillery ( jstor )
Aviation ( jstor )
Balloons ( jstor )
Principal place of business ( jstor )
Radio observatories ( jstor )
Schools ( jstor )
United States history ( jstor )
War ( jstor )
World wars ( jstor )
Aeronautics, Military ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- History -- UF ( lcsh )
History thesis Ph. D ( lcsh )
World War, 1914-1918 -- Aerial operations ( lcsh )
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )


A knowledge of enemy strength and activity has always been essential to the formulation and execution of successful plans for military operations. After centuries of war in Europe cavalry reconnaissance evolved as the principal means of obtaining this strategic intelligence. It was always a difficult mission to perform and became even more arduous after the rise of mass armies and the increase of fire power at the time of the French Revolution. By a curious coincidence, man-carrying balloons appeared during the era of the French Revolution. Military leaders, conscious of the importance but mindful of the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory reconnaissance. Initially hailed these remarkable spheres as the solution to their problem. The experience of military aeronautics in the following century revealed, however, that balloon detachments lacked the mobility necessary to participate in the war of movement. A contempt for the technique of aerial observation developed among general staffs because of conspicuously inaccurate reports from aeronauts who vrere often free-lance adventurers with more courage than training or knowledge in military science. Interest in aerial surveillance waned and In most armies balloons were subordinated to the use of cavalry reconnaissance. Failing to dissolve the fog of war, commanders sought some system which would Insure victory in spite of their blindness. This was the basis for the doctrine of the offensive a ou trance " -the headlong offensive. It was a simple and attractive formula: a determined advance at all costs to impose a commander* s will on the enemy, making the latter's movement of little importance. This doctrine lessened the army's dependence on its reconnaissance branches such as the cavalry or aeronautics. The soldiers that settled into the trenches of western Europe after a few disastrous months of open warfare in 1914 were the victims of the attempt to wage the offensive a outrance with massed armies and devastating fire power. The awful results of this fighting have become familiar to us all. The poverty of their strategic doctrine was clearly demonstrated to the generals on both sides and the following years of the war were spent in a halting search for weapons and techniques of achieving victory. Machine guns, poison gas, and tanks were some of the developments in land warfare. On the sea, the submarine proved to be an extremely effective weapon. Even the air became a battleground In World War I. This study presents a detailed narrative and analysis of one of the aspects of aerial warfare which the United States Air Service performed during World War I—observation aviation. While bombardment and pursuit aviation of the American Expeditionary Forces caught the public fancy and subsequently have received substantial amplification by "air power" enthusiasts, it was the use of airplanes for liaison purposes and for close-support observation and reconnaissance that was the most significant in terms of achievement. This achievement, albeit limited In tline and scope, has often been overlooked and deprecated in an effort to substantiate arguments of "Air Force" versus "Army" or tactical (fighter) versus strategic (bombardment) aviation doctrines. This study is a consideration of the "Air Service" concept of Vtorld War I. It does not attempt to present a case for or against the "Air Force" concept which maintains that military aviation should be a separate, independent, and co-equal establishment. While lengthy considerations of present developments in aerial reconnaissance such as were highlighted by the American U 2 Incident of May, 1960, may be difficult, a study of aerial observation during the war when it was first significantly effective may be of interest and value. In an age when supersonic speeds are limiting further progress in fighter aviation and when guided missiles are threatening to replace piloted bombers, perhaps the study of observation--one of the original goals of man's quest for flight--is not without purpose. The author has not dealt with all phases of America's military aviation effort in World War I, The Navy's achievement in the air is beyond the scope of this study. The Lafayette Escadrille, that colorful band of American adventurers who, along with French aviators fought the Germans in the skies of western Europe even before the United States entered the war, made little contribution to the development of American aerial observation during World War I. Also omitted are the activities of the Americans who served in pursuit or bombardment organizations with the British Royal Air Force or the Italian Air Service, This work is not simply a chronicle of United States Army aviation units. Although Air Service organizations are mentioned from time to time, their function in the narrative which follows is to distinguish the activities of the men who served in them. Indeed, the focus of this study lies in the role played by aerial observation in shaping the developments of the war. It is a premise of this work that observation was the motivation for the first employment of airplanes and that in World War I other branches of aviation grew from this central theme. Pursuit and bombardment aviation were never so completely separated from observation as to discontinue performing reconnaissance while carrying out their specialized assignments. While most of the narrative is concerned with the operations of observation squadrons the activities of these other units as well as those of balloon companies is also presented. The writer has tried to make his narrative intelligible to those who, like himself, are outsiders to military aviation. The overly technical and obscure dialect of military aviation has been avoided as much as possible. Changes of rank and assignment were rapid during the war, so that the prefixes to officers' names varied from month to month. When describing a particular event, the rank held at the time has been give. When speaking more generally, the highest rank attained by the individual is used. Perhaps no two writers would make the same choice of events or of chronological limits in telling this story. Primarily concerned with a well-knit and comprehensive account, I have chosen to begin with the development of aerial observation prior to the entry of the United States into World War I, In describing this experience it seemed worthwhile to carry the narrative back briefly to the evolution of aircraft. In several Instances, when It was felt that such an analysis would contribute to a better understanding of the central theme, considerable detail has been lavished upon the discovery of a particular technique. Oftentimes, on the other hand, developments that do not reveal the basic trends in aviation have been omitted or referred to only in passing. If pursuit and bombardment developments appear neglected, it is because this study is not intended as an exhaustive account of all types of aerial activity, and throughout such activities have been relegated to their proper relationship to observation operations. This study is an attempt to tell the story of the tool of aerial observation used in World War I. For a fuller comprehension of the subject it seeks to explain the development of the means and doctrine of observation aviation prior to and during this conflict. Throughout the countless millennia in which men have implemented their unfriendly Impulses, military Intelligence has been of decisive Importance in making command decisions of strategy and tactics. Without minimizing other Important factors affecting warfare, such as morale and logistics, a disregard for the intelligence aspect of the art of war might lead to disaster. With this much in the nature of explanation I must nevertheless confess a sense of inadequacy. In so vast and complex a field, this work must be regarded in the nature of an experiment. Despite intensive reading in the source materials and representative works It would not have been possible for me to undertake this study had I not been unusually fortunate in securing the assistance of many people. I am under especially heavy obligation to Dr. John K. Mahon, who served as chairman of my supervisory committee and guided this study. To Dr. Franklin A. Doty, Dr. Frederick li. Hartmann, Dr. Rembert W. Patrick, Dr. Samuel Proctor, and Dr. Oscar Svarlien, I wish to express my appreciation for their help in the preparation of this dissertation.Their scholarly advice has been an encouragement throughout my studies and they have contributed to the solution of many of the difficult problems involved in this work, I owe particular thanks to the historians and archivists at the United States Air Force Historical Division Archives. Dr. Maurer Maurer was particularly helpful during the earliest stages of investigation. Miss Marguerite Kennedy and Mr. Frank Myers greatly facilitated my researches. Colonel Laurence Macauley and Major James F, Sundernan aided me in getting clearance and approval to use the materials in this depository. To the staff of the Air University Library go sincere thanks for a multitude of services, Mr. John Cameron saw to my repeated requests for books. Recognition for assistance is also due Dr. Robert Krauskopf and the archivists in the World War I Branch, War Records Division of the National Archives and Records Service, Finally, I acknowledge with pride the contribution of my wife, who has been at the same time the chief help and the primary distraction in the completion of this study, and whose efforts in both roles could not have been more delightful.
Thesis--University of Florida, 1961.
Bibliography: leaves 425-482.
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Manuscript copy.
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University of Florida
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Copyright [name of dissertation author]. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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A krLowlidv of enamy strtngth and activI ty has alwfiy* been

essential to the formulation and ex*cution of successful planS for

mAlitary operations. Aftor oenturits of war in Europe c8valry

reconnalssance evolved as the principal means of obtaining thi

strategAc intelligence. It was alwys a difficult missJon to perform

and became even more arduous after the rise of mass armies and the

Increes* of fire power at the time of the French Revolution.

By a curious coincidence, man-Carrylft& balloons appeared

during the *ra of the Fr*nch Revoluticin. military le-aders, con"tous

of the Importancl Wt mindful o the difficulty of obtaining satis-

factory recon"is initially htfied th*oe mmarkable sph*"s as

tht solution to Mir problem. The txperiance of military atronautiva

in the following ftntury revealed, however, that balloon detachments

J&ced thr r,*bjjt* necossary to participate In the war of mo"=nt,

*ntempt for the technique of aerial observation dtveloped among
100*ral staffs bicause of tonspituously Inaccurate reports from zero-

Aut* who weA often fr,@e-lance advmwturars Vith more coureae than

tralniAg or knowl#*Oe In military $cienoe* Tnt*rest In atrial

4orv*411ance wamod and In most armies balloona viert subordinated to

tho u** 61 cavalry

Failing to4pftolve the fog of t,7*r, cm-,nandiexs sought s(we'

sysm!tvhich would insure victory in #pit* ot their blindsve-ss. This

9. lqgl_


was the bftslf for the doctrine# of the ofWslvtA outramogit-tb*

headjong offimsive. it waa a simple and *ttract1v# formu1a: t

detormIned advance at all cotts to Impbse A covaftdar4t vill on

the ervany, making the latterts mo*ement of little lmportapa&.

This doctrine lessenL*d the armyl!f dap*ndmcq on Its reconnaissance

branchs such as the cavalry or aewonautics.

The soldiers that stttl*dwinto the tr#nches of iwstarn Europe

after a Lw,7 d1sartroiis months of open varfart in M4 vere the victims

of the attqmpt to wage the offmwAy*_ 1 outrgnce with mgt:ed armies and

devastating fire power. The wful reoults of this fighting have

betome familiar to us all. Vit poverty of tM Ir strattgic doctrIne

was clearly d4wianstrattd to thea gen8r&ls on both sides and the

followin8 years of the war wwrf spent In a halting s*4rch for w6apons

and techniqt)es of achieving vittory. Machine guns, poison g4$4 and

tanks vere some of th4 dtvelop-.&nts In land warf4r#. On the sea, tha

subrmrine proved to be an extreqe4y effective wenpon. Elftn the a i r

bec=e a battl#ground in World War I.

This study prestnts A-dttail*d rmrr*tiVe and analysim of on*

of the aspects of aerial warfAre vh1ch the Unitisd Statts Air Service

performed during World War 1--ob.4ervatlon avT#t1on. All* bomb4rdnmt

and pursuit aviation of tht A"riean lxp4dttlonary Fore** e*-Aht the

public fancy and subvequently he*e rec,#1V0d Aubstt*ntiAl*SKpl11JcAtinn

by "air Powartt cnt1iusllsts, It was t* use of alrplant* for liatson

purpoaes and for clo"-support ob&ervation -and reconwJ#Vvpo* that was

the mos t s 18ni f I cant I n tom, s of achivv4ps 1AAS AChiVV4"Mt, *141 t

I lywl ted I n t i,4e and scope, hai often bion ov*rlooked and deprecated in

an effort to substantlatg arguments of "Air torcell verqus "Army" or

tactical (fighter) versus str*ttgic (bombardment) aviation doctrine&.

This study Is a considerition of tht "Air Servicell concept of krld War

I. It does not atttmpt to PresCnt a ta8C for or a,-ninst the "Air

Force" concept which maintains that military aviation should be A

separate, indtpendent, and co-equal establistment.

WIA116 lengthy considerations of prdsent do-telormients in aerial

reconmissaftce such -is xre highlighted by the A-.ieric-an U 2 incident

of t-*y, 1960, may be difficult, a study of nerial ob;,ervation durin-

the war when it was first significantly eff6ctive -may be of interest and

value. In an age whdn supersonic sp*6ds are limitinn- further progress

In flghtmer aviation and when guided missilts arc thmatening to replacg

piloted bcmbars, perhaps the study of observation--one of the original

;Oals of mzMts juest for fllght--Is not without purpose.

Thd author bns not dealt with all phases of America's military

aviation effort In 'World Vbr 1. The Nnvy's achlevNeTwnt in the air Is

beyond the scope of th15 study. The Lafayette Escadrille, that color-

ful band of American adventurers who, along with Vrtnch aviators fought

the *rmans In the skiz-s o *Oatcrn Europe even befor* the UnIted

StatAw entered the war, nad#- little contribution to the dtvalopm,ent

of Amrican acriAl observation during World War 1. Also omItted are

the activities of tho AWericans who served In pursuit or bombardmcnt

orgnnizot4ons vith the British Royal Air Forct or th,6 Italian Air

Ser*lce. this vorl Is not simply a chronicle of United Statqs Army

avlatiog uftltS4 Although Air Servioc organizations arc r*ntioned

-Hl IV

fromtimeto imethei ftctlo In he arraive bic folows Ist
distngush he ctiitis o th me i~h, srve inthel. n~lcd, th
fou fti tuyle nteroepo yarilosrainIn
shapn,, the8evcopmets o thewar

ItIsa rmie fths ok ha bsrvtonwa hemoi
vatin fr te frstwplo~wn ofairlans an tht I wold ar !
othe brache of viaton rev r= hla ntra thne. urs it n
bobadmn aiain er ev~rs compete tpratd rmIIfr
vaio -stodicntnu pefonl~ rto isace, h tcar ing

worthwhile to carry the naomigilve back briefly to the evolution of

Aircrafto In *w*al Inat4ticts, when it va felt that such an analysis

Vould contribute to a be=isr understanding of the c*tral thwfw,

consid*rabLe ktall has beft lkvisha4 upon the discovory of a

particul*r e*chnique. Oftentimes, on the other hand, developvwnts

that do not rev**4 the ba8ic trends Ift aviation have been omitted or

referred to only In jmssin3. It pursuit and bxmbardmeat devtloprmcnts

appear fte&lecti5d, It Is becauut this study Is not intendo-d 6s an

exhaustive account of all type5 of aerial activity, and throughout

such activities have betn relv&,Ated to thtir proper relationship to

043orvation VIwations.

This study Is an attwknpt to tell th6 story of the toot of

"vial obstrvntjon udmewd in World War 1. For a fuller comprehension of

the swbitot it vwk-s to4op4aln the development of the means and

doctrine of obftrvation avlatiou prior to and during this conflict.

Throughout the countlea; millenia in which men have Impla*tnted their

unfriendly imptilses, military Intelligence 4as been of docisive

Importance In making con4md docislon8 of strattAy and tactics.

Without minimizin- loportant fa<-tors affecting warfare, such as

morale.,and logistics, a disraf,-ard for the 1ntcll1&*nce aspect of the

iKrt of wmi might lead to diwiqti--r.

With this mu<-h in the n"uro of e.Vlanation I must ntvcrth*1e,,,,s

coftf4ts A*MnA* of lnadtquacy. T-n so "st and complex a fit1d, this

work must 1* Moarded In thdbsAature of an experi7mmt. Despite

lntensimeax*Ins In the source twbarials and reprascntative works it

T'Duld not hM* * potAOle for me to undertake thl* study had I not


been unusually fortunate in securin- the assistance of =ny people.

I ar under especially heavy obligation to Dr. John K. jahon,

who servod as chalmnn of ny supcrvisory comittee and guided this

study. To Dr. Franklin A. Doty, Dr. Fr*derick Ii. llart-.-zann,

Dr. Rembert W. Patriclx, Dr. Smuel Proctor, and D-r. Oscar Svnrlien,

I %;ish to e,,njr-P-zs my appreciation for their help In the pre-pnratlon

of this dissertation. 11mir scholarly advice 4as b;ccn an Mcollrage-

ment throu--.4out my Studlinn and thty have contributed to the solution

of many of the difficult problems lnvolvcd In this

I oac particular thanl
the TInitcd States Air Force Historical Division Archiver,. Dr. t-Laurer

Maurer was partlcularl hclful durin- the earlitst stages of

investiZation. Merguarito Kennedy and Nr. Frank Myers r;reatly

facilltated my rcse.irchc5. Colonel L.,wr4nce Macauley and 'lnjor James

Y. Sundam= ilded me In 3ettin- clearance nnd approval to use the

matcrials In this dcoository,

To the star-f ol' the Air University Library go sincere thrinks

lor 3 Multitude of services. Mr. Jolm C*meron saw tc my repeated

rt,-quests for boo!s. R(co,-,nitlon for anSIStance is also due Dr. Robert

Krau'-Iopf aftd the archivists in tht World 14or I 1ranch, 14ar Record--

Division of the National A-rchiver, and T*cords Servicc.

Finally, I ic!cnoiled-e ulth pridt the contribittion of -my i,;Ife

,dio has becn at the nn-.t tine the chief ht:lp and the prirmr,,

distraction In tM completion of this study, and whose efforts in both

role-, could not have bc,#-,n iiore dcli-htful.






# I I




Chap to r


L14 V -Alr Craft
Hemv cr -Air Craft

TWENTIETH CENTup,,y . . . . . . . . . 21

The War, 1904-1905
TI-L-*, ltalo-Turklsh War, 1911-1912
Tho Mallan Wars, 1912-1913
The Europoon War, 1914-1917

UNUM STAM AWY . . . . # . . . . 65

fliatorieal Plaakimound oE the AinerIcan Air Scrvlt(
r..*,Pirloncia in Aerial Observation



TV* Al 85





vil. 171

pwmppmm-mp- -71,


Vlll* THE TOUL SECTOR OPS W IM . . . . . 211

'* tion
.1 v
A*W m 247
The X Aaro Squadron In the Baccarat Sector
TW light of the 99th Squadron tn the St. e Sector
ITT C*rpj$ Air Sjrviao on the Vesle River
B n

ico r




CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . 337




III. PICTURES OF AIRPLANES . . . . . . . . 413
Figure 1. AllAd Aircrnft U8*d in World War I
Figure 2. Allied Aircraft Used In World War I
Figure 3. Germn Aircraft Used in World I*r I

IV. MAPS . . . i A . . . . . 417
Figur4 4. Situation &t 8:00 A. X. Augvst 23, 1914
Flyure 5. Situation At 4,100 P. August 23, 1914
Figure 6. Quitt Sectorg In tht Spriukof 1916
Figure 7. Situation on tho Marne SaMofit on
July 14, 1918
Figure 8. Sitwtion on the St. x1hiel Salient
on September 12, 1918
Figure 9. The M4Dua*-0)(reonne 0fr-*ensiv1# of the American
First Amy, Septembw 26-Novembcr 11, 1918
Flgvre 10. Major Offeiftsiv* op*mtlons A. E. F.

. . . . . . 424

X1, Ad-*91ft WA



1. Alliod Aiwrcraft UsAd in World Wet I . . . . . 414

2, Allied At" ft Used In world Wr I . . . . . 415

3. (ermzn Aircraft Ustd in World War I . . . . . 416

4. Situation at 8#400 A. N. August 23, 1914 4 0 . 418

5. situation at 4iQ0, P. m. AuVst 23, 1914 . . . 418

6. CWet Sectors In tho spring of 1918 . . . o # # 419

7. Situation on the m*rft* saltent on July 14, 1918 . 420

8. Situation on the St. m1hiel Salient on
Sepb,!tnbcr 12, 191B 4 . . . . . . 4 421

9. The lleus*-Argomc offensive of tae Az-i&r1can
First Army, Septcmbtr 26-November 11, 1913 . . . 422

10. Major Offensive optrattons A. 9. F. . . . 423



la*T I


114TO *ALD W, I




Shortly aftcr noon on July 22, 1312, a 5ritlsh gafteral, Sir

Arthtir lklle5ley, not yet the Dulm of Wellin-torio --tood vlth menbers of

hta ntAff on a windy hill n"r Snlomancn, Spain. He was- munchin3 on a

chlcko le- and -Mmin- uow and then through a tele-scope at tha ar-my

of hia Frenci advorsAry, 14apoleoiils illustrious Nnrshal Auj,,u,,,tC dc

Naroont, mahouverin,,g, on the pialr b*lovis Wollin-ton later wrote, "in

the usual French styla, nobody Imcw with what object." 'Iarshal 'lln-.1ont

w4s iinvitt1wly marichlrW, his, army ncro8s the front of Welles-loy's entire

cami*nd* Behind th(# crest on tihich tht British staff stood, and hidden

Erm, t4* Fr*nch, wro thl*i divisions vfalting for thi order to onttrg*

40ad pounce upon th,2ir um-uspettln,,,t caevy.

Ganeral Welle,-,Iey wos quite pl"sc-d Tin the situation on this

pnr t I cu I= & f ternoon And el oft4 wl t 4 t1to f I rs t tmrm, f ood t ha t he had

IZd in sevtTal dzy--, -or his emzy had 1)4cn followin- the Fr*nch so

,losily thAt dwre had bmw no opportWilty for cookcd rations, He

turft*d to 0* of the SpAnish or M8 nvat, f y emd, af tcr notino

th* InportWm* of a p,#*Walls knowing -uhat the enmy on Uie othcr sidt

11 in 4vin-, chcmrfully concludcd- -,Ian cher Alava . .

Toftine, his chIctm*n bane over his shouldcr


Wclle:!;1cy mounted his horse end galloped off to gtvt his attack order

to his brother-in-law, Sir Zdi-mrd Pacto~., (It vas th14-- same
Packenhan, who, threc years l*twx, IeZ, ans Of thia, day ncar
zl4maaca aaain5t Andrsw Jackaonls -mlllt his dcath in the suampa
'Q 4T 0413 It' Tt

nomth of Nov Orbk*n!,-.) rackcnham4s attacl,-, t*mchcd fron behind tht

hill, smh '4=3ont with such foroc that t1w Fronch vmr& badly defatcd

and the power of :apolqvn dcstrope4 la Spatn, I'larmont 4ad not 1
what vas on tb* other side of Q* hill*

Vballinrtonls rom*rlz to AlavA ir., h*Owocr, by no tmns the

earliest rttorded oetAtfrat of a Srsat mllit,&ry loider rc-arding thc

s1r&b1l1t,, of lmowln,7, the nituation b#yoad tlig horizon. Doija throu""h

the coattirics soldiers haw boon concomed with hl3h ,,round

from '%Ailch timy til:;ht olmeorve Om acti-efts of their entty, and on the

basis of this Intelli-ence davtolop plans for *ctlon. Chicfs and

-enerals cltmW trms, or mounto$m, or htog; precarlously on rooftops

to gall% Vantas# points. 1W they r, too old, or fat, or too

covorwd with honor8 to p#rfovm, obstWjOons tliO&lvca' th4ly de'1c;Dated

this tmrk- to thffir morc a3ile litul*ftnus, A= Qatinued to g*ek rvew

and I)ctter vmys to look doon Gn their fo#o, In Cpeoar4s War Cmumentarics

the author often d4grwvs+.s to nw, tiun thapocc"tIon of b hilltop Qr to

d##-r-xJ1)o tt* bulldtn,, of an ob&tWvzit1onW6 to :Ommfflld inportant

tcrraln. 2 tfedi'i-oal counan4sws In iddition to ulldino Obtch toustrs on

I Philip
1931), Vp. 220-221. <*v Yorlk- Wwper ;md
2 Julius cae5ar' C'10"05 Uay
=d De Rr-Ajq CLvill, trcms. and 68 JOW4
Dent md Song, Ltd., 1951), 11:



tA nj4a pon lants by conatructing novable twors

from *vhich th*y loAft4t*iPthg battleme"ats of walled to*i5, OK the daY

hefore tjW &*tle of Z#Upanca an trun-enious British eapta4n of 'VInrine8

SOU;3ht OMMUORi1bvith Wallin-ton to demonstr4U a dsvicc that he

calInd t= artifIcicl hill," 4ftl3md for obrcrvatim. 13 t1le YeArs

that followd, the cdW1ryt,,,, traditionil role In -.Mit,ry operation-,

ms that of the eyes of the army, Fron, Wclllngton':,, Oay to our oum,

tt*r# has I>dft no el*w3o In the princtPle of warfara which r*qulrQs a

corvandtr to posse.,,s th&t Info=ation of the enemy sufficient to

determine, his capabilittiss.

D"pitetbe6fact that it i av Inportimt to armics of today aa

it ,ms to the legio of Uawr, t* art not -concerned here with

terrestrial ob#ervWtift, but rather with Vne fii-,tory and davolojxwnt

of that typa of ojwo*NffU*n which only within the last century has

bro"dantd the vI*1 IkWiOptive of the rillItcry comawdcr,*4wial

Observotiono sha4 trtat th In:ttrmentn of aar1*1 observatton In

tt* chrdholo3ftal o*#r of their 4evtlo-,nent: first, t4e bftlloon; and

I*tcr, the mlllt4ry air,-ilane,.

Waht*3r-tbgjL-Air Craft
1P -

V** myti- gaMpnA folklore of nearly all nationE have Accounts

of wingeRtm"t*rs,&4d of mortals 'who defied tht '-Ods in attmmpts to
fly. TIP $OWt 119WO of Da*Oalus and lcamr,, hi,, son, to a

O*iod poor to 300 D.C, 3 T1* Elying, carpet f=tasy of the Arabian
444w, 44#
t SMr,
and Ce. of Toams (Neqq York., Harcourt, Rrace

141-lits is probably the relic of a story of tt* de!lre for atrial flij,,,ht.

The first recordod efforts of man to soar above his nountain8, towers,

and "artificial hills" wer* accomtss of exq>eTlnentn with balloons, and

until the end of the last CCnt1jry nost of the attempts to solve the

riddle of M,-ht wtre coacentratod upon this nedlu-1.

Accordin.- to variolis hlstorl=5 seitietime durln,; the fourteenth

century v1ion belli3leroritn In xmstern Europe mr* hacklri- at each other

with bnttlca=r. and broad_-,,ords and pegkln,, over castic walls from

tower,, covorod with o.,.Mdes, tht Chinese wre d*ftly disposing, of their

cnenlevs with -unpowder, and _,=dIn- up Elm balloan8 fashioncd from

paper, a gubstancc that mz all but unlmo-m in Europe. There are no

rcc=dor, how&ver, to indicate that thefo balloons carricd passcnger-s. 4

During the latcr middle aoes, churcl-ncn began to manifest an

intwre8t in zteronautics. One priest, noting that aripty e3g shells were

vcry lt,,ht nnd that the dew rose fron t1te grans In the carly mornIn-

sunllht, su=*,-tcd that If eg- sholls filled with dow o*r* hoated 'by

the sun's rays, all that was ri&cc,"5ary to raine any weight was to

collect cnou,,h e,,,, sl-iclls and 4ew. Aiothe'r cleric, Jol2i Wilkins, Lo r d

M-1hop of Charter durin- the riddle of the sevcnte*rth Ccntury, gave

It as his M-Ad opinion that Tien -right achicvc flight in any of' t lie

followin,-, waya: Wth the stdrits o an-,*ls; vith t1v help of fowls;

with wlns tastcned to the body; or with a flyiag chnrlot.

4 Jozepb Needlia-i and Wan,, Lin-, Scieng *sW Civilization itl
j 0
China (Cambridge- Cambridge University Press, 1954, 1M), 1, 251;
TIT, 167.
5 Uslic Stephens and Sidney LAa (eds,), Thk UCtjanary of
'atlonnl Blaraphy (London Oxford Uni1ftsity I`Mls, 1937), XXT, 2_64. A

]h 1670, Jesuit fr-ii*r, Francesco do L=-Tev,,1, ar-ttr
In P,
workln,, on # vaeutn ballom for sonc tine al>tmdonod h15 rezotearciies, for,

as hit piouslj 4rotd*

God *ld not er swch Invention to taid tffeet by rnason
of, th* di*turOce that I t'i ould cause to the civil government of
m.n, For vi'm 5o 0 tity tzm be secure a,',talmt attacc,
since at agy ti- y be placed directly over It, and
desa*ading dow *4 41oldlern; that the mm it would
hap*m* to pr1v,,m* hou on t1vu ma, for our ship,
dtn'awdin- out of Ir t o sails of 5tashlps jay OvoTsct
th*m, M11 the1r*ft.,%rn tl*lr ships 4y artlflrlal fireworks and
fire- S. M,4tl 14* 1r4y not only to ships tytit to -reat
build* 0A. "s t %nd t"'Ith Stich security that Othay 'V111ch
ca5t the-me thing& dom from a 6 Somight out of gurishot, cannot be
offe"ded by those fr8h below.

On June 5, 1785, the Mont,",01fler brothors, Joseph and Jacqtmsl
4tterme, dupltcated the fdAt that tht Chinese had reputedly nchltved

ac.nrly 500 ytars-tkrlier, and *pt a siwll balloon In the air far a feT,7

minuter.. Four noTiths later tt*y sent up a sbeep, a raostcr, and a duck

by a larl,%or balloon. T1* Oont,,,*lficr balloons, 1,7hich the French called

810bes ae'ruStatifluka and later slm-,qly montqjf.jrs-, t--era raised t)y [Act

air produeted by burn4n- stra,T, raf,,#, and chopped wood, The inwifttors-

and their coat*mporarles thought that they had discovto-rtd a neu

which 1k* call*d for tbecIftlVes, It V.AS only a Short t1r'A befort the

*rror of this crihftwas proton.

A French J, A. C. Charle-n, discover1n,--- thct the

rarafied *ir of W& only one half as 1wavy as cold air,

hit upon Vie us# of I-vqNftft*ftj, *414b r*c*nt Zn-llsh experloents had

found to t* only 10urtfthth -As AJOy. The fir-st hydro,,mn bAlluch

waa ssmt up frT oo Aust 27, 17805. It came dovii abomt 15 n, iles

tnt*rivx 10story of Fli--ht (L*don:
0"1* 1 94S)* Pp* ZM*

rom i t s a sccns I on po I n t a nd i -a s de nj troyed by the torr i f i ed pwo-sn t s

who believed It to be a mon_Acr frah tlic sHes. After punct"ring the

envelope vAth mu8lats and pitchforks, they tied the shrinking bae, to a
I f-Z

horse's tail and sent the bcast egallopin- acxo-,,_ t1w country until the

balloon ,,ns torn to shreds. TIAe Fr*nch Governsmnt took staps to prevent

,such action In th* future by publishin- n len-t1by en,Planation a-11surin-

the countrynen thnt thc ba-s mre ha=less, and 111ni-ht soneday prove

servic*ablo to the wants of Society."

For Jean Franols P11^1trt dt Rozltr the Mont-,Olflers built a

over si,.. feet hi3h, to i-Itich t1ity 7,usj>cnde(; d ba,-[ct thrte feet

square. To sustain fli-lit they placcd an Iron -rabw_ under the ba- In

which a fire wvs to be kc,-)t burnlr7, durin- the fli8ht. Dt Rozlerls

fricn,-. prottstcd n5ainst his offering' hinstlf- to ssctence nnd suggestcd

that two condc==d cri-iinals be sent tip in his plAce (thi-, had been

done previously when i naii was givcn thc choice of bcln- han-od or of

ju:ipin- from the top of Notre Dan* cathedral in n -11d*r). Do Rozicr

protested that Such a su--cntion t,7ns hi,,hly i-,iproper for no cri,-An I

should be perriittcd the lionor of bein- the firSt hunai to fly.

De aozicrls first Eli-ht, which took place an October 15, 1733, 137,ted

only four nnd one half --iinutes. The balloon, anchored by a rope, ronne
L the ftcxt few AMf,-s he nnd* a nur.iber of
to a heisht of 84 feet. During

captivji fli-,hts with Andri Gimud de Vilette, wlio, It is of Intercst to

note, was concerned ijIth balloons prLiarlly ab, an instrumtrit of .IiIiLary

reconnaissance. Two nonths, aftcr hl,, flrr,t captiv* flIght, Do Rozier,

acccE-,panled by tjjC :L:arquis d'Arlando, = officer of tht Army, made tht


f irtt El i", stor4lher Parts. 7
a Fn 411#4 transportation Itras the crosaing of the
BonglIsh ChonAGO In johol 1735, Da Rozier *ad a companion *svInded
from Frencc In a Wbination Utht-supportvd envotlope W hydrogan sphere.
they had boon "*AW or nonths for favorablt wiado bVt unhappily the
vinds ftrin,- t1ieUbvoyAWshifNM1 anli Sao then back aver the Kench
wast, At a bel3ht of OjGOO feet the hydrogen balloon exploded,
probably a33ravatcd by the hot air balloon, =d thc acronauts iTerc
d4shcd to the ground. 3
jean Pleare Qaajols Muthard, financially Mtked by an
Amman, UslanOd v6d flevv* balloon across the Enjllsh Channel in
1785. Dr. jolm Jeffries, A physician from Boston, p0d L700 to build
t1w bal loon ^nd an v& tional 6100 for the ,orl vi lcgc of riding in I t.
Th the4r 1118ht fron *Awr to COOIS tho f1lors had to jottinon all
their ballast, their nXtsitional Inatroments, ood, iater, all their
clothing, and rinally, to quotaDr. -Wfries:
I felt the necessity of castinj evey nancthing to alter our caurae;
happily (it alxiovt in5tantamously occurred to ne, that probably
14C nl,,ht be *110 to suj>ply It kw vithin oursclvvz), rw, Ot
recollectio had drerWwch At breakfast; and not havlni
luld znly rMact)JOWNIV. . OuTt robably Mtn c.-,tra qukntity hAd be*n
sacret6d by tkidntys, UAW lNi 03ht nou nVall ourselves of by

'4' OE tY First FrenCh -E2ul>ll
(London: Mord ell 109), T1, 11,
PAZ t ThMas Siferaon, Unibed staor,-
J=* 19, 1783, Iri julAan P.
(Princeton., Princwton
4Un*ty P FMM7.
WWI A^ Across the Englia
Wkl!ftaas the ronaut," 4oqazir* of
wkfflaa tile

MEE, 4-.ZftR. AW

dischargtng. The evcnt fully justifltd my 6wectation
and we Were enabled to obtaln, I verily btlttve, five or 51x poonds
of uriae; which circumstancos, hovtvtf.triv1al or ludicrou5 it may
st*nm . was of real utility to ts.

This was tlie fir.!;t aerial ChanneL crossing; oth*rs followed, and free

ballooning bccamc an acccptcd fact. The gucc6ssful p6ssaZe of this

important bit of water has for centurica bftn the halLoiark of success,

as witncss the Rontns, the Normans, and in 1785, the balloon.

Less tlian a year after h1s jucoessful crossin,,, Blan,hard

opened a "Balloen and Pnrachvto Aerostatic Acadmyll near London and

began to give instruction In balloonlag. An ntternpt to let dom a

sheep In a parachute btfore a paying avdiance proved so unsuccessful

that to avoid btinS mobbed alanchatd was forced to refund the admisaion

fee5. This disgusted him with England tnd he moved to (emmny and

later to Amcrica.

The military balloon made Its first ap,7)tarance on June 2, 1794,

shortly before the Battle of Flourus, i*en the Frenoh Revolutionary

Ar,-iy und*r General Jean 5aptlstc Jourdan opposed the Austrians. Captain

Jtan Narie-JoSeph Coutelle, the pilot, had been experimcnting with

balloons for some tine at 14oudon, and his reommaissanct over Maubsugo

appears to hAve been effcctlve not only As a nean5 of obsorvation, but

also as a morale factor in Its disturbances of the Austrians. Other

balloons vere bullt for Coutelle during the Revolutiorory Wars and

these balloons were -!till In use when Napoleon car* to power.

Napoleon was Initially enthuelastic gbout the halloon for

10 John Jeff ries, A NarrativeoL_Ibl 1-;o &WWORA Xox&&AA of
Doctor Jcfrlies with Mons, Blanchard (London-, J.4%blnson, 1786),
p. 86.

nd" tary CoutellA ,mple a-upport In d~loplng
h" S'4WV1C** rn I the oraanization of a 4110on Comnany

for 30*W in h oa to 'es"t. At th* naval bWle of Aboukir

Bay moot of Coutelle"s *quilabut was destroyed, and umpof balloons In

E1Wt %q* direa pW4 demomtrating Francews#Oc!mical prowess

than towavd the tactical4tVloymnt of aerial observation. Coutelle

salvagel %bi of Koon units and broQght tW, back to France

there they -00 lly 4W AlIzed In the w=tng y#-wrz of tho

o4ghtmenth c4ftury. Tf*0614 billoons, hovv6r, were us4d occaslonnlly

in oxhibition flisl4Wa*wt P*ris, Gaily OtQorated billom; u!md 4uring

the celel>ration #Ang Napol*onfs cororAtlon au omperor were subs,,*-

qwmtly turm* dWto Joiotph Gay-Lusgac, #ho 60ptoyed t1sm In his

reswarcf*s in pt4" 41ectricity.

Later, ooeasiopst attempts were aaain made to

inttr*st N*pol*.-OMb llo4". Tn 1808 Major Nichol#s Lhomond *Abmitted

a plan which cal1*610t the cwstruation of a fle*t of balloons, each

capable of trawomkg a thousmd troops, two (annon, and twenty-five

hor4" across tholfi&l-lh C41MMI. A fav years later, d-urino the retrqat

fr%* MOSOW, it 44wopomd to s*Apd the naperor on hi! way by the ust

of a balldft. Na"poW6n, wftld h"a nothing to do with any of thest

sch"Ws. twilv a S that ht disban6ed followIng h18 EXIptiah

,Mluable to him. Vm B,#ttlp- of W*terloo

MW 10 to a InWAty to find ovt v*re hit reinfores-
N"O* tW
ts M dmW6te of t** Prussians that i4mington vaa
41 Alf-
a vtSkge coinetd*hbe, Wimarloo, a word that now d-enot.*s

fog&t on tht sap,* battlefl*ld the

-MW" '4 Akm&-h I

3attle of Fleurus, just ZI ye&ri after CoAA*11e made his recannalssanCi

over the Austrinns. 11 Ater 0aute4tt4 nothIng inportant occurred in

military aoronauttQs In France for 50 ys.

In the 1820's military balloonin in 4troe caterad an era of

=7,pectacular re5earch -and d*veloprWt. 11w use of balloons as aerial

p1ttforms for rt-connaissance and signalina was altered to provide also

for the dropping of bonb! and propapnda. Intftest In the use of

balloon," uith *rmles was revived In 1855-1856, during tho CrImezn War.

Tho fjigllsh dlscisae4 the feasibility of employin;,, 'I>alloons for

re-_onnalssance and bombardment, =d art the 5elge of Sevastopol the

Russian fore" h*d a balloon wTi1ch4n*d* 3e"ral ap;c*nsions. Littir, Is

recorded of the rolt-, played by balloons In this conflict; thc-Ar contri-

bution to the autccr*e of the soig* so4ws to have loden slight.

Napoleon TIT onMed tht services of Wo lmwding Freacb aorotauts in

185SO Louis and Dagene Godard, dorln8 the Italian ciapaigii against

Aust*1a. Reconnaissance -ascatsions werQ f$Pdjw *t Pos"oli, at

Castftedolo, from the C;astiglioae Hills, and at the Battle of Solferino,

but tt*y had little or no effwct on t* cwrA*++gn.

DrAring tlm 1860's, the British conductvd some -ainor c-xp'triments

with balloons for observation and reconn&lssano *t A14fshot under

Henry T. Co:oxll, a civillin Instructor, Dito"At in the projccts

died In tht British Wdr Offic# *d Coxwll w*Wt to 307many in 1870 to

train tht Geman Ballom corpt. The O#nwans utod balloons in only

11 John g. C. Ful kr, 1he World
and Their TnMA!!pe mpon HtntM
11, 492-542.
12 Henry T. Coxwell, jygjo 111;aT_"Ex
NY (Londoh
Wo Ii. A 1 lp-n *nd Co. 1887 r,



0. ,$,.t tf* #4ncb, but interest was stimulated in their

dov*lopmnt. Count SardThand von Zeppflln, who had been -an observer

wIth the-ftion Amy 4uring the Aw*ric= Civil War and had made his

first asoont In a 4*11oon at St, Paul, ?,'1nrt*tota, In 1863, "rvad

aoring the Franco-Prvsqlan War as a cavotry officer, but was, iastru-

mental ia maintAining Intorqst to acrial fli-ght In Ctrmany. In the

Franco- llrussltn War F*11% Nadar forned an organization namod tbe

Dallon Posto, for floating nall and passongorn "t of beseled Pftris.

"The entire Go**fhwnt esceped by balloon wln tho fall of the city

,qOOKOd im Inont 11 13

T.n 1884 Captains Char1es Ren&rd -and A. C. Krebs of the French

Ariy, u*rMnp, on -dwws of their ova and financed by an Army appro-

priation of $40,000, constructed a torpedo-shaped airship weiZhing

4,000 poijnds and po**sed by a nine horsopawcr motor. Renard had

patttrued his balloon aft#r a rio
fmch Acadciy almost 100 years bZdrc, But "he added a motor that

pft",Itted his airship to fly by Its mm pouer and rettirn to Its starting

point. In contr"t to *4rlfar belloons, vhich could not carry obstrvers

to a definite destinatlo*, fthardO8 ship could manfuvtr in any

4irection, 14

Suhseqmtnt oi=ents Isd to the dirigible, of which one of

tho first v&iF devidi#d In 11M ultlh 'tin Internal lattia* frariem4ork and

1100'" F. jolstmn. Hwfwa.-, jkj1*1t.O4,1 A-GrA2h1c History
2f 46jWn (NewYork-. DM11, SAW and PArce, 1941), p. 272.
Itannica, 1960, 1, 463.

d"AdMoft AMEAMM,


an altntntzi skin." is Finally) after Tiany tttwpts anfJ Ta*ny disast*rs,

In the be-Inn1n8 of the twentietli cantury siTftoltarwously vitb the J

development of t4e airplaac, Albert seatos-Dunont and Count zcppolin,

worlin- on very difercnt linez. daveloped the airship to a practical

S to "Ic.

In 1904 the JW11ot-14b=dy airship t4iich tha Frtnch had been

develapin- since 1896 ,ms perf*cted, in the n*ct ;ear e;Teriocnts In

aerial bombing were c-arried out and In 1906 the Fmoch Goverment

ordentd its first airship. in 1907 t'Lie Frftch btttin ii rtgular school

of acronautical Iiistruction for pilots, nfth4nics, and ground crows at

Chnlais-Mendon, whe-rt coutollo, had begun his e.V'ertrients In 1704.

13y 1914 France, Russia, Ger.-jany, England, and the United States

had aeniri-id airships thAt had betn mplo,.,,ed in allitary m,#uwijvcr-- and

had co,,-,nunicated with the gromd. Germny alono had adopted the rigid

Zeppelin powered by gasoline =,rines tnd later by diesel motors as a

military wc*pon. L1,-htnr-t1=-air navi,,Attion was an estAWIshed f ct

but the Interest of the vorld of aviation now turned to t1A rapidly

developinl- honvlex-thnn-air riar-tilnes.

Ilepyler-t1up-Air Craft

In tlie 1131it of the prOent tmport*nce of llghter-th=-air in

proportion to hftvier-than-air aviation, the troooftt of the foTntr nmy

socn, out of proportion. It should be borne in mind, hovrwfr, that In

15 Watson 0, Picrec, Air War: its
and Social 17J77;x P*
im-liQatlons (Ncw York, tjad4rn A* B6W


tA of observttion aviation it tms in the lighter-than-air

figld that progroms vs6s most consistent ind most productive up to the

beginning of the prgacnt cptury.

During t1mo riddle agws vh#n mcn Intcrprctad 4,mcivrtt writings

instead of txpartr)WAt1no, tl* wrotc boldly At>otlt f lying. A DeAz, less

dded to emoSesia, studied thw r;vchantssa and flight of birds. Roer

BAcen, In the thirteozth century, wrot*'Xf

ln.strvmmt to flit *ItIvill so that onp sittin- in the midst of the
Instrum"t, doe turne imn onglO, by which t1lo 'vIn3*4 boln'-
-artificially 0'Posed. -,nay 'Mt th*'ayrc after the manner of -a
flylmr, bird. 1

In succeeding centuries there cane nn incronsing -,rmip of

worial *nthusia*t&,, with t3ore o-,tiralzm, thAn method, who learnnd at

painful cost that flyina requires mort than raddles an-d ottier air-

behtla,$ dovices a4* .d to arms And leas.

Sarly In t4msotteenth Oentury, the IncredibL* Laonardo da

Vinci took 1,*ave of his paintinS Ion,- enough to Invent a tank, design

artilltry, and bOld movable bridge8. Th addition to this, he desi,-,mcd

an ornitbopter (a flylnZ oachirwo pouvrod by flappin,- wln;'s) -md a

htAdcoptcr (a nmchi&#Ich rtscs by the action of a horlzontal rotating

fsn), and v mich lass. *amplicated daw1co-+A-t1c1i he felt mi-lit L-e useful

in cO=VctICb uqth 01 WtOt1*MCh1rft-- the palkehutc. H* 'was successful In

flyin3j moftls of his hilicoptvr, and lelft in his notebooks plens for a

machine 96 feet in dia"Mr, with-a frtet*--of bazaboo and iron and a

covarinol, of starchat linan. A 44vised also a propellrr for use on his,

juoted 1 Jm= R. ftm=, The Tools 04 Ihr (Garden City,
14M. 'and Co., 1942),


'round vehIcIts and studied the fll;ht of birds and the rislstante of

air to their flights. 17

Almt the same time thnt Leoifterdo biv?,,on his aeronautical

research-as, one of his countrynm, BaptistQ D-nte, kmo=Od to the

world that Z-w luid mda a succes-ful Glider flIght In northern Italy.

No one was lookln- wlwn Ra-pti,&te took to t44t air and his contemporaries,

zcoffin3ly sugggiasted t1int he and hi,- alider might do well to join tht

other Dante, who two ccnturie! before had recounted his travels in the


Joaeph Addi.son, the English *ssayist, objectea to flying and In

1713, writinS In resporise to a Ictter from I'Daedalus," h4 deciared that


would fill the world with Inninerable Arii.oralities and give Such
occiasions for intrigu*s as peopte cannot meet with, who have nothIn3
but te-s to earn, t1ion. You shovId have a couple of lovors make a
mldni-oZit ansipenntion upon the top of thr- monument, and see tht
cupol4 of St. Paul's cov*rad with both ne:xos 111w the outside of a
pigeon hou-sc. Nothin- tmld L-,* more frtquant than to s*e a beAu
flyin- In 4nt a garret window, or n allnnt Ovin; chase to his
T-.iistrc-ls, 111a n hawk after a lark.fs

'nio! 14nrquis de Baclueville decided to use t4e roof of 'Notre

Damc In Iarls, In5te&d of the cupola of St. Paul's catlodral. One

morninl- in 1742, after attachla3, padle-C*OWd wim,s to h1s wrists and

ankles, he attempted to fly acrost, the scino FAver, Unforttmately, lie

flew only as far as a washQrvm-ant-3 barre a fcnq ff*t from the bank and

17 Born Dibiier, Laon*rdo da Vinci: MiliUiry Ufftm
,er (Portland,
Me. Southworth-Anthocnseii Prasr,, 19n), pp. -22-27.
is Menry G. Bolin (ed. ), Thw )Arks of t le
Jonepli Addison (London- Geor,-A Bell end SoM!



b 4w ly amuotawd his retir t f rm

fur sf*nt t of W, 114e *xplaining 'why he lind
tri andRy he did not InUnd to do any :pore of It,
4#00nd 1310 Sir Ce"JWIey built a s,*llder thAt vorhad,, one

that vould really eart7 4 man In the air. The rian-liftino glider,

balnod upon 14 stnalftr model-vftstrocted A f#w, years- bef orc, vw a

brilliant trltnph, not Alone bcc*use it flov, for there 1z evidence that

a faw o 4 r I ier p I orWi had mzaraWd to s tay a I o f t fo r -,' 'me s ccon d8 and

laftd without brealtin- #V1 t1vAr b"s, but because It anbodled sound

A*rodynamlc principloo, -Ohich Cayley Md patAfttly dl.-covered for

h#19elf. This -114* ,msv, In Vlany xwdfct.-,, the prototypt of the cioderm

alrf*we. Ca*IV fAM"pW that to build a flyin- mazhine it vould bo*ry to ma*W VP coaQ&%, dyn*osc probk*m of ,ev*rml forcet

worltint, In opposition to 4ach otl*r, to jtigglo out eat reaultant forct,

tmd then to biAlld a Oidcr uhich coold fully utilize that forc* in

order to rfrWln aloft, Thoalr im&,Xstrar*c, intangible, and unpre-

dict*b4c vwdianj, d1ault to obocvW#W to undqwst*nd. Yct Cayley,

bornlin -ft age wh#n the -cjcftjfjj&Od had largtly rtPlaced ancitnt

iWvm5j so thoro4&ly maatcrc& narodynanic Vriaciplc5 that conrpctent

onairmars 1>oltcvl th;t only 0*
f ApMcr. of # witable notot preventod
him 19

9A404 Oite bi 11T* Wajostically from thd top
of A J'l I q*11& POIAt Plain b*lm" with Perf-ec t Mpdiniss
AMA- ?"*mlcall TochnicaL and social
of cayloy and Ills
w "(1140ftn: Max ftriali,



-md zafecyl, fired the Imagiaatloii and throu'-'hout the ninatvmnth Cemtury

o.Verinantation mnt fomard vigorously In Enflandp Gerrmy, France,

and elsewhere. $me of the k*d4m, wm*s were J* Stringfellow, who in

1348 built the first successitil 6irplant mod-el p6tkr4d by a tiny st*iot

engine; 14. S. AwpsoAj vho forn#4 "The Amprial Transit Company" in 1843,

t,7itli a pro5pactus for tho benofit of stookholdtrs, showing airports of

the conpany in India; Alphons;c P**sud, x,*o built mael plancn ttat

really flew, po*rc
tui-mals to study w1w, contours and povered his OxpcrUmental ships with

st,2=. engines, and the inventive Sir 111ram Maxin., of m4ehlr* gm fame,

who built nonstrositl,!,5 that, in 1894, lifted tt$OMtlVes off the Around

a bit wlill* uhirling dizzily around a circular track to uhich they were

f I nQ d. 20

One of the truly great plomors, brilli*rtt but doom8*d by

incredible and p*rsistent bad fortutfqM u*s Smftiel P. This

Acierican e-x-ar,hltect, in nssociation with ChmW_4A M. Monly, bullt

stc=.-powcrcd contraptions called aprodrorz*s. S*4bow tl*y newx did

fly, but *>qcrta who eymninod thom In U81ht of prOm-ent knoWedge

adjud-td them capable of flight and Mnalay*s planes at tiomt nust bt

comsid*red magnifi,cnt fiailuraz, 21 The Lang,,1*y-1*(h1y airdromes,

20 "Aaronautics," RUpycl Bgwm aj 1960, 1, 242-243.

Langley got $50,000 from C#KgV#1*iWt the f the apanish-
Anerican War to coaftet-experimnts for tbW War = t. 1W 1,1h S
fortunatt in gottinZ 'th#ft,pop*rAtlon 4zkf C is Manly's engines,
weighing 125 pounds, 4iwwloped 52 hor
CI 4Wd far In *dvance of
anything known At h1a t1r,4% One of his WetzhU13 only
2.4 p"ndz, to the horstpoutr, w" hvi It In ran4es of
all the *n1nent ongine#rn consulte as 3 ounds per horscpx*r. 11-& *n^1nc t.** eyll *nd 1IqUI:d



P 1 la, in 1903 from Lwtg1A94s hous_boat In

t*4 po tn of ontr of the onlookwjj his full-
*iow Ship nto like a h4adul of wrw," All seemed

WWI in M of twwoff.

An t later a cr4ph' aft6r part of the &hip fc1l
forward part In whi(,-h
turxwd cowplqtely over
Pj*d In Away, *fthout haVing flo,,Ai

tering thd Langley** flasco, WilbuT and Orville

Wight, 1,:ho *W"MM shop In Dayton, Ohio, installed an ent-Ine

in a gllder uith'wltich they had bAmm eWrInQPting, Ttmir contenptible

PUch box, of jobd Inaw* U#le togOlftr by &Iuc and wir* and powermd

by a V*AMIng, fou In*t 140as little mort, than A witch*s

broostlck, but I i d, fly. the %umlnS of Doc*nbcr 17, 1903,

at the dowl of KI tty4wk-, C4rollna, tri a haltIng,

orratic flisht f I Mod*w f I "'Isaw Imow it, was born.
0 .1 9
Peopt"'W 1 drforftncc

viadrt4Wt dny,, th-,- longest lastin-

amd cov"IY4pa dIsAwee of 8524#tt.

104wrights, qw0t ad'wM0w*0M0t only In c tructing A

y had 4C4 that Wfore tba*, Wt In their Idea

In f11,0,ht by mcans of a fww wires

tk"Ings of4jwir blpl" In wy numer they
4w 4w
tan houMkwlthout at a tA m,
I t coutpeo to Wbblln,-,
L, 1 W4 S one
or YaArs to come.



wished, tieIr M81it i,7a& no aocident, for they had prepAred with the

utmo5t care, In twistrutting thcir propellfra thty leorned to nvoid

Langje7l's nistalcs, and even tuilt thamslvos a wind tt=cl. In buildin-

thoir prelininary gliders they learned frqt Ow eontributionn to aQro-

dy-namics innda by Otto Lilientlwj and OctAve Chanute, pionters in -lider

e%eriT-ents. 23

Meanwhile, flying machinc6 vexq bein,, constmctcd in France,

En3land, and cls*vdiare in Europ% Louis Blerlot, Alborto S4ntoi-Dtrlont,

Renrl Farnan, =d Ii. Latho--i wre 6*ong thote who contributcd. to the

ripid develorcent of aviation v1dch proccded world war T- They flew

asto=din,, distanecs, and to armwing lifights in their rickcty and

cnprlelou8 crates. Tfitey rztunted, hut t4y also studic4 the pcculfar

properties of the stran-( i3cdliim to vhich they were entru-:tln- their

liver. AlbVrto Saiitos-Duriiont* the, %*althy sportsman who In 1901 had

5ailed one of his cigar-shnped airships around tho Eif'fal Toi-mr,

c,,porh-aented with planer, And 1>01t tht F1r.,,,t airplane to flY In Zuropc.

Ile also built a tiny monoplane, (mly 250 ponnd5, cnlled t4n

Dempis.ol1c, which Qould en-sily T>e takim apart and carried around the

country in hia nutomobilc. 0%1 July 25, 1901), Louis Blcriot cros:cd the

Channel, 1=11no iri a ncadov behind Dovwr Castle, ftot far from the ;spot

from which Blanchard and Affries had asdd In their balloon for the

first lightor-than-air crossin,'-* 120 yo-wts t0forea. 24

LI11*athal, German, who madw ovor 2,000 glider fliahts,
is cr*dited with the discov*ry ol7 the OvantAgO of curvIn,, flat wing
sur**ces. Chanute, in the United St-A#.,,, d#,-%1Zn#d, corwwtruct4d, and
f 1&w i I r c ra f t wi th n ovabla -5 ur aee&.
24 Johnston. Horizonz Unlinitt- A ry pf Aviation,
p. 276.

Fto as fast a;i 127 -ml Its tin hour, f iom
as hl,-,h ........... . . . . . stwlne4 M Tit llnlt*d only by the
capacity o ks. No longer the plane a Mielctoft
fusela^e ovwd fabr1c. Instead of Wn- pr"*riously perc"d
on"a T1 M4601' n i Ishly axposa4, t1w p1lot tnzs partially
oncloao4 In a a windshield to protect M-5 4ead. Thc
fonAard-nounted lavator vas fotaid to be too sensitive,
and the rcar tallpldWwlth hined flaps to se-rVe two function 0
eUvators, boo" 9Qbn, &* predwinznt type va.& the biplane, tAcAw,;a
It w5 found nore --tOle and 3tructurally safer. 14cnoplanc5 at th*t
time 1wd a dtwoncertin- habit of fallin&wapart in when tlkiv
pilot tried "thing b*sjd*4 J#W Thu:, At the onset of
Tbrld VLir 1, air4ftCt had r-ejpwd a sta,,,,a of development whtre they
could be cnployed Qoctively for military use.


ni Tfm mny CENTURY

The foregoing survwy6of the history of iheronautlcs, touching

vpon its proposed use In viarl, 'ws sy#otymous vith tho history of

observation avitt4on, for InitiAlly 41 millt4ry flying, both In

balloon* and In Airplanes* tunctla*d priv*rIly as the *yoi of the

cot**dar and not as = off*ns1w_ veqpon. In fa:t) In 1898 the Hague

P*ftce Conference *outht to prohlblt all types of sertal missions bAt

1nnoc*nt r*connnissance4

The 'RussoJtPanasrj*r,, 1904-1905

The first combat use ol awlol observation in tho twenieth
century came durlng the Ri)sso-Japanese War of 1904-005. kltln*-z at

the aelge of Port Arthur in 1904, Sir 1= Hamilton, a BrItIsh observer

With the ilp"'anooe armies, doclared:

TILjt Missia*s are #ending up bAlloons t "tn'd in front of
tht 12th Division, &udgin,, by max Sout4iAfrlcan
Axptriances, t147 thould siow obtain a lot of mlsl6adla- Infor-

Sm notio ot=ber 25 on pag#4* fo.r.- iftount, of tio
effort-, 0 the nagw F0000 confe es to t tMe of airplanes.
Tan Hamilton, A Staff 0 1"
japAntse 14 (London#. ld, I- F 1*15
Hamilton was forc#d to his lack
of ev= Misleadint 1ntOll1a*00w*

Tn 'VWst, 1904, duri4g the Japwl*rc advance on Russian-held
L140YWf, a Rwnlan captive b#lloon vhich ms not mobile was the only
one to appear In combat, I Sarly in December, 1904, a provisional
bolloon battalion arrived -at the front and i gas plant was established
near t1w railro# et Mukden. Tht,, tmit was equipptd with two 5,000
cub4c foot spherical balloons, each capable of carrying two men. Durin-
the Battle of Chontaupu a balloon was t*4-= to a point about 15 miles
swth',,*,st of Hbkdot but wa not ub6d, a,, the battle occur-red during
a blinding snowstorm.. 4
During the Battle of MuRden in March, 1905, the Russians had
ono balloon in the air for thret days. It always ascendcd at lea3t two
and a half miles to the rear of the ndvanced infantry line. The
observer reported his findings by ratgns of a telephone whose wire va3
in tho anchoring cable. An Akerican o:r-ficer travelling vith tht
Rutsfan staff raported that the Russians found the balloov of littlu
value. 5
At Vladivostok on nearly every clear day an inflated balloon

3 Rdport No. a of CApt. Peyton C. Kar-ch, United States General
SUff Oba*rvtr with the Japtntmne.Arny, dattd Qctolmr 5, 004. U.S.
11 ont, Raports of MlAfta&Z Oboexyert Attoched to the Armlen
lncia=a DurIJIMBEENOWN&M". *r (Whshifigton: Coverment
Offic-a-, 1_911 Itzl9v
4 It Is of I to note thdt durin- the I*ttle of Chentanpu
4 R#sst&n gmoral, =0, Ing a batt*ry of aboout 200 selge guns near
the r*$4ro*d, proposod t'o dAr t h4* fire ftmn a balloon. Me
incloment weather, howomx,. madw thia Wractianblo,
5 rt of Cot4 Alllm V. Jud4on, obsert*r with the Russlan
jfO_" n churta. Wwr Di t, Fkoxts of military Ob9cxvrS
a Armtes. in

was taken onto a lar-',e tu, which was #torvit*d 'vith a larp'e squiere-sall

wind screen. Tho tu- then proce"d out of the hnrbor to thA nine

field, whore two officers ascended to a height of 400 to 800 feet. As

the tu,- cruised about sloly, su1xiar1nv mints could be clearly ssAn and

their positionn verified. Hostile mines Vere Sought out and the

horizon *as searched for JAp=,*,pe vftsola. This use of ballooni by the

Russl=s lmpra5scd one American amy oboervar tiho 7=ote that

Doubtless a balloon slitp vould be o grtst value fox nsval u--c
under many circumstances, to onable obs*rvatlons to bo madc of the
Interior of h hostile harbor, *,,dtb A vitw to ascertainina the ,
vessels tharc, and for tM purpose of studying the tAne f141d.u

The Italo-Turkish War 1511-1912

The ltal<-Turkish 1,hr of 1911-1912 7 furnished the airplane with

its first opportunity of particlpatln: In 7.1ilitary operations under war

con d I ti ons. The Turks ho',mvcr, had no pl4na.,t to m, ploy In -an, of, the

cinpaigns. Thc flying machin*s used Vy the Italians x*r* mostly single-

seated craft pmwrcd by 50 horsepavewr Artz=l riotors. Thee plane-q, of

which there was -a variety of types, were c4pable of attaining an altitude

of only 3,000 fect and were IV7ilt*4 to flights of less than two hours

duration. Ln spitt, of the diflicultIes of these crudt --'raf t,

reconnaissance nissions. were flown durin- the donert mripaign znd the

Information secured ms of use to the Italian forov4,

6 ibid., p. 185.

7 Tht pop-ular nam* for this T*r iA sCK t rj1W4O*d4nrr.; It might
better be Tmown as the War for Lib". IU& r'* 19
also a mlsnov*r. Most of the fighting of this C Ok P *t
aca. Nanchurin pjcyiA hoat to tht-- arrijA' of T4W 5 who
brou-1it considerable do-Vaststion to tha7und t to occupy.



At t$ t of ope',riations, the ltallm covOM4er wis not

Inalla" to Pulth confUWno& in aerl4l photoraphzq =4 relied upon

inaccurate -akd obftlett mps, Mports from sorial obs*rvers vXre, for

the most prt, discomted. The4wT*ny asau It of OQtobcr 23, 1911, on

the Italian position.,; broke doun completely becau* of r#deployments

bamed on the reports of It#11= fliAms in the days Imnediately pr*eadlng

the attacl,-*

tn Daccnbar oC the annie ytar, at the bittla of Ain Zara, ItAliAn

orr-es, '-alned a d*djsjw- victory iijiich sn#pp*d the ba<,-Itbone of hostile-

rcslstamc- Before th* battle, i=ccntratlon-s, of enemy tr*op-- were

loaated and sletehew of thw tOrrain the rotites o' antmy

advanct ware ndft by th4 Italian f liern. Evon tM rctrcat of, the cnem. y

izas reported to t1WA 4W cotfraander. a

UnIlke balllgeamntn th# Italiann 1ipt tht results

of their c=bat a sac-rtt. Follm.,;In6 tht war no reports

ot, the use of aviatior pvbM.,,d, and -,illitary attacheb- =nd

little to report to haawcomtries eoncernlng tlio- var tise of

aircraft. They I hoPOWW' to dwK4 t1leir ourl conclusianr' 'when,

In 1912, ttaly b*gw f**Wtshly to OAIftd to buy airplanes.


*tj(*cr de 12W 4't41o*Turh1sh V,&r had produeod in the
M r *x* Arrigo
Ma Ion CqA.* 1925), pp, 167-173;
IS- traw** Cecilla AdYO


area of -,iilltary c77iployn=t. of almraft disappeamd durtii- the Ral=

Wars of lql2-1913. Both tie Tvr:F; ond the Ballan Allies seen to have

realized the vals,c of -aerial obseTvation. ) Hzivin,.', no aviation

or-NnIzation of their own, thty purchaned forti,-n alroraft, chiefly

FTCnr-h and Italian, and hir4d foral,-'n pilots, Fronch, Rjgslnn, and

Swiss, to fly t1wn. The =-,ults obtnined t,-.ere practically negligible.

A lack of trained ob'servm-, or of reliable najx-,, the abscnee of any

ground orgsniz*tlon to smpport the aerial optrqktfons, all contributed

to tho raea,,,Ier results. Many milftmvy 1*ndors throughout ttic world

continued to rcgard the nlr;plane an littIQ riore than a plaything and o

little valuc even as a neans o'l -ecurin- Information. A Geman officer,

iAio iad --arved as part of the training nission to Tbrkte7, criticized

the Tirks for usin- alrer-aft instcad of horsts for reconnaltnancc

tran--portntion. concludcd,

Riwent 'tNpexlencc conf Irms In an frrafutatblc marmer, t4c opinion
alwayz; held by autlioritlits on M-,hcr --trat*,V tliat If vActorv I,-
to bo renddrod not merely de"'islvk but con,*iletc, then a large
rorce of cavalry its convcnicnt mobility 18 Indl.spnns-able.

The Europlan. War,,-1914-1'917

Ilic doctiin( of the offensive outrauccl whirh dot-,iinatP-d the

thinkin- of m*-,t of the -mllltAry leader, of Europe In the y6ars irn.e-

diately pre-cedin,-, the otitbreat; of World 14ar 1, r,,duced all tr4tc-ical

9 Ernst C. Jla4nrcich, The Diolonacy of -13W Jtlkqa WnvSx 1912
1913 (Cambridja: Harvard Uftivitrstty Press, 193S), p?,. 'M-230; 380-
3 18 2 .
10 Tinci2lot Lawton, "A Gqrrian View of th,2 Turkivh Deftet,,"
Fc)rtni,,-,,Iitly Rcvici =Jjj (May, M6.



i, 26

to-' ve. 70,100tures of Lioutenant Colonel De

Chief of tAnjocatlans horcau of the Freneh General Staff,

dt0wrad at t&# COntor of 11131umv Ar Studiez during the smwr of 1911,

Vitt Mnsl*Md Wto Adby languatts and 'txre enthusAstically studied

by studanyo of tQWQt of wwr. 11 The h*adlon3 offannive wan a simple

formulat A jOerntmod advanoe at all cost, to imposa the cqwmanderls

Vill on th* Cnaosy, Aftn,,, tht j#tt#r's movvwcnt& of little lmortancc.

It was A mid, "For the attack only M things afo

n4gennaryl to is and to decide what to do. Mint

the 'mony Inndrato do Is of, no Amportancc." 12 VAs doctrine Icssened

tht nevowmAnt's, 0,04h1b upon rea*tnafosancc,

Althou,,gh 6A bftlc -,y-,tAki w*s, the s=o* It wa, variously

applied by difforelt 4atiom In Cormany t1w, 1,old advianoe was 4ased

on a bypothesis as to tht onemyts positions followed by an onvelopK3

-Attaci, The concItis4onb about the anany 4ro to be based on a detxr-

nin*tloll of the bir-at Mean:" open to the ro:a rachor than on actual infor-

mation from nir or -round scouta. t,ft ttv nrnics, corps, or divfnton-

vere to marah around We enamyto flanks.

Me Wis of th15 zYmm vM th& Ow="111 iltperkencc th'it

Intelli^dw 4bttut the Offty Otruld not be forthcaMK3 In dMe to allow

,,*, comander to fornujj!5Eplarz bazed on It* The varl=8 commands were

mcustoned to tardy$ incoOplete, and often Inaccurate reports and their

L1ddcJAOkqvt, Str*;#L;y: The Indirpt, ARarolch
O*v Yorh: FrOWC!k A, Molor, 1954); p. 167.

in Falls, TO Trvat 14ar (Nei; Yorl-. G. P.


rcndy aectptaace K a solution uAlah allawwd then to diar4gard rclonw

nals5anc, was not difficult to

ImProved airplanes and dixitibUn appe*red toQ shortly Wore

the outbreak of Norld par I to MOO= arly potcntlallty Vhich might

have Inducod Urman leadars to chanje WO vy4ten* The air service

bccamc merely a means of cOcking thp accurany of the colmand*5

hypotheals, Therc Vas no foel,&S SM guch a choctt vas zKolunly

necessary and conscquently no particular re3ard was shown to the air


As n result of tho Orman Interpretation of the Zffensly 'I

outrangy, the t*ctics and technlj"tA of (Arman nilitary Qbstrvation werc

not hQhly dtvcloped. In fact, twro ticre -,crtalu cruditie5 which wero

almost unbcliovablc in view of Us prile W Gurn*uy's pryoor army in

Its Wicianny, The air ol.sarvcr ,,Tas considorad mer*ly as the flylnZ

counterpart of a caVnlry Snout. Both madt visvat scarahn and randcr&

oral and vritten rcports to the vowmenis tother N-ith Ghttches or mnp--.

T'here ias, ho,nvcr, i grcat deal of d0farance hx_,tuVVn tiTe horizontal

view of the cavalryman and t4e posalbility of vertioal observations of

the airman. Me 117itud snarcli of tlie fo=er *a comnaried with the

large-scald #=tiina tion of tit latar was ovcrlookod* The difficulties

,Wmd limitations of serial obsorvAtion very not Ipprulatod. Nost

cc==dcr5 coiisidored the alrplanc to bf simply an elcvat*d platform

froti -Yhlcb any Miter accustomed to terventrIal reconnaftionec nould

makc, a natisfActory tcatch. The noet for extensive spenializad traWn'-,

wns not recoCnlzad.

Expcrienc, =13ht Ove helyaml We alrm*n but only tt Aw wart


2 3

I pa, tad In the anno*l E*p#r<>r,, g M=euvers

Ity for practiiz* In 1aft*-,Cn1C& troop

lad trAMmOgOth only t1w small zarrisorm

S ta, t a the wal lness >f the are-a

nw it find tho-llaawy," If the obscrvcr was,

undmfth Ot Ily Mako a good bocaw',"C

Iw P~ III t tralnT4& LittX*-or no attention was paid to

flying Orpla* A 4 a s at which tiW would be forco4 to fly tinder

NWt 14 c t

f tALtcomals5ance m3 not merely a fault

of t1i* cornadgmws lind the opportunity of

C thfi"JRv Methods $ilch would

d d15-bu--ina ml--slons vere unlmo*n,

NO conception t1wtAoM#W for d4itinln- and limltlng

missions, for Outlinin4- t1T& of mAMuver In order to obtain an

of th# air vviqsions, or for specifyinZ tho

Little lation ofgthe 0@,Tnan army dirl-iblcs.

1*CrCatiM*w t o -.urrount*d thw-,, particularly the
dt*Olnz. on paper they had varto,.is

fun Igsed advtA@MO vere scarcely rjpV#kred


Sq B&F, wo--, C of the ##ad state of G,== air recovtnals,3aace

44" 40h, be 50 of f ioem vev sont f rom the War

CO *in U* tftctics And tcchniqm o,
wEmt only for their boeng< but to



bolster ttve reputation of tive air service* b:j attaching officers vith

tactical 1*akground to It. T* effect, hovevar* vas nullified by the

failure of the ainien in the reconnalasince before the war. This

dbvelopment shook tho- faith eveiN of air enthusiasts. Faoo4 by a partly

justified distrust In air Intelliaonce, tt* =#11 C-ermao air force

prepared to surve In a war which trumy obve'wrs bejjev*d would j-,auso

Its quick collapse.

Among Gerniany*s opponents, France afld Russia had the largest

arMICS'll Both vere eagq fxpononts of the concfpt of t1w offentsive 'a

outrance, In Fr*nce this systqm r*prto*%*W a ree-ent chnga. Up to

about 1912 most Avthoriti*s had CqMPROPIktod an Initial defensivot

based on frontier fortr*6*s, folloood by 6 vigorous offensfve.14 The

first porlod &wtV the FreAch comown*W an opportunity to ascertain the

enemy's intentions and to Mw tile affvn"ve on the results of this

information. Thit system encourag*d all i s of raeonnalssance.

Militiry airanavtlcs flourished in this fertile field and by 1912

Franec wan acknowledged the forqmost e-xpommt of aerial observation,

It should be noted that during chis period of axp4wsAon of

military kviation, many responsible offlcerQ#Oe quit# slow to sease

the values of aerial ubscrvation. In 1910 aW'p of Trtnch offAcers

from the, Ecole de Ouerre 5pent an afternoon at sipW air races near Paris.
An eldtrly g**ml &mong thtm, Eml* d* $Onq nt FOrdinand Fooh,
"a Ia
when asket; by a nexispaper reporter wtmt he Vftught of tfWVftft rdplitd.

RuDsla had 114 lnfan&ry diiftsloow. 62
division5, Great Britain 6, OeMany 87, aM# Aus
Liddell RArt, S



ropfoifing to a raCa then An progress: "That is -ood -port, but for the

army ttm maxoplane 1:, worrhlAss." 4

(kn#r*l Jos"h i6eques C. Jofrc, -wlio was appoint*d Ch1cf of

th-,, CAneral Staff in 191,2, nfrved a-, tho tool for the proponents of the

OfL*Mdyg outrancoo 'Me new doctrirm was blunt in Its- disrt-ard of

roconmaissance* 1.11'.o the Q* authoritle,, tho Frftch Gcncral Staff

ww of the opialon that Intol-li-ance vv-old always be 1nccrmj-)lete,

Inaecurgte, -md ta 13W) i4re cnndid In pointim., out t1lo i-matmes's

of contemporary airdfWft and tindor their attacl, Fronili ri 111 tary
4m 16
-aeronfttics sank to the levelt of its German countcrpnrt.

'nit publiefty ,1,vcn to tho German n1litary dirt-Olts Induced

Fmnch authorities shortly bcfore the war to believe tlint there was

value It tNts type- of aircraft, A con-,truction progr,-di, wns

liaunchsd and a Orl#lblc 1>ow began. 11-te war Interrupted tIA-1 before

At h4d an opportvm1ty of mking more t'nan a ssuper'Icial Inpres-sion on

the nttltu4it of the rillitary atAthorittes.

The OgLewtv't 't outrance thcoi-I appcilad to tlic lhls,Ian

C r5 ju8t as It did elmAiere, vith the uSual adverse effect on

15 BaW H. Liddell Itart, Fpqlp Tke "an of a1c'ans- (Boston:
LfttlW, Brm-i and Co., 1932), P. 44.
16 Th-iVth of Franmws supexiority In militan
y avintion over
the *40kIni; o World Wpr I I-- -!ontlnued by -many authors.
tic hoving the numboor of Ifflots, airplanes and obscrvar,- In
th air -strvic* mraly -,o b#"d the yc#r 1912, the year riarking
rd- turn in th* t*melopm tut o f tlAw arm o f the French --a I I I ta ry
*wnt. For #1 *.*4mVlt of tht-, ml5tal,,* sco Hann 91)41drt8
"Lo4ktdortf, 116.9 Con 11 pt of Total rll In Edward 'F%
of t'j11jLM- 11imAZlit from
Prinottoti UnIver--ity Press, 1943),
:he Or 5tvanz;tli of the belligerents at
*w pp. 33-34 Infra.

glem afift.

Rusrian -military aeronautics. if *11omncts arc na8a for Russlats

,cncral baclwardne,,,s in nilitary teclmolo,*gy, the davrelopnent of It,,- air

ar-1 ;as, *Imilar to tliat olf' France. By the be,-Innln- of 1913 there vms

iavideace of -m cf'ort to set iip an cf'cctivc or',,=1zition, With t4e

introductlon oj'- thu- of,cnsivc a outram* doctrine, hovivver, a decline

,ct In. Men t'io war brolm out Rusnlai com-andcr-, nc1thcr s',ou-ht nor

reccived any awlstancc fro-m the air. 17

The Fritish conception of the proper employment of the

air arm *ar, cnC of rcconntisrancc. it tia,,, thouglit that Plancs mi-lit

ilell be -,cnt out to reconnoiter the e-Aiy vmltlon,, irior to the battle.

Jurt 2s its ariy was -rziall in compari,,,on to thn Euroqe= the

Br I t I sh at force wa -- I i 1vvl oe. 11 cr. Its sta','O of development ms

-it tht stnc *s #1-,4irvh*rt, it ind not suffered tlia sudden fnll from

:)opularltv of the Fronch air s*rv1c-c, howtver, and Its morale was very

111 -11. 11 1

In a -=Jority of the airplan*a ttmploycd durln,,, the carlicst

of Wrld 1ar 1, the observer sat In the front cockpit. On

either t;idc hin vlcu of the grouncl was nnrtially cut off by !either the

7=oplanols win, or the blpl=,els lw-7nr x;ln-. -Aheaa o: Mn wan a

projectin- crt,Jqe and ttliaunt pipe uid -,ometim*s z radiator. A -,laze

of wir4s tnd bracfes and thcv en-irm exhnu-,t tstre ad&d lmpedlncnt-- whtn

lie amempttd to po4tr over t1wverio-us obstacles. Th4 coclplts were

narrow =d ttic movtmonts of t1m observer i*v,- samtraly rmtralited.

17 Mcholns N. Gblovincj The Cgq-,m1,zn of 1914, T1,ke
of thajokr And 2M tiona 'In P'fu*Ua, train. A. B. S.
ILItUlt., (Fort T-,L,,nv*m,;orth, Rdh5ns.* Conmand and 4W 41 Staff SC110ol
Pre-ss, 1933), p. 61,

In wao a outdatod by AiVstj, 19141, i=-d cvnn the
Doc 0'afojm*d carrted fual cnou,-,h for a Elight of only
a few h
11tary airplanca foloyod by the in 1914 -re
dividcd into "10 -'r The *W" claas con--lated cf nonoplnnos made
b7 -the !Zmel#r, =1 aircraft manufacturer. Ilie "B" class
IncliMPO biplanes cljoly of *lbatros, Avlati%,, and Otto manufacture.
Witl-i the-*Acaption o'a' the Otto pvshcr, both tionoplants and b1plane-a
voro tractor nodels- (;,ith the prop4L-Ilor novntcd on the noe,,e of the
C'us*la", ). Pm*=,d by Othomwpowr 1r*rccdcs an-laez, the machines
frad a M-ht Wuran*# of four hours, a cruirlii- speed of 55 to 60
x1log per houz-- load-liftin- caiactt7 of tw persona mad thair

Shortlyly 2 MW vxar the Corian trny proposed to build
stmdardiz#d LwowMMd threc--plaa* dnchlom but the caxA##canent of
thl progwow to b4- dropped. At that tlrw tjw Indi
Cr naks purcluuin- of all gave the arr.1y i colinc-
tit: alnort #*w tyM #vo-r bu I It In Gervmy. 113
The first of tW milltary Flanes, built In 1912, wa,,.
CaW al# it hAd acci*dattoiaa and could
I 'hjWd of ozily 80 rfl4os per bour. By tltic be-Innin- of the mr
Brit*** turiiat&oUt thoctll Tabloid, Which Could fly 105
W10501P4*0kiour. -,fr#hch "I 110ry pff"xn-- porhsps a trif Iw b*ttor,
Mstly corWm_'-4W&ftcC thoft unned by civilian pilots In

tun4 der F V*V4."o 44
IMM'), pp. 40-41

t ly Coro



crcSsW3 the Qhwmcl, fighting for prtvas and now recordn,

Tligre were neither boob wks nor bomb sights, first because it

WOZ thought that that type Of Vw4re not faasibl# and that most

wore satisfied with the thought thAW their planes night be useful for

linited s-:=t1n; and obsatioa, siKoad, because If they had had the

Idea, their machines werat doing wtal a4al',"1i to get-up Into the nir

without carrying a load of bcmrb., al-so. Ot 4mor 4id not exist;

a well-diricted pistol shot whtch liffided In tht %&I tAnk would have

b"n sufficient to sond the pfta* dovn In fleams. 14hot, then,

was the p I c turo o f n i I i tary w4a ti on w1wn the 'war opened I a Augo s t,

1914, There iowt lass than 240 alrplsms In zll of Europo fit to cross

th* Cli=aj.

T= reswrd to the ntmbft of aircraft avall4ble In 1914, Franot,

with sc-veral hundo*d pl4anes had moro than aoy other nAtIon. Gemaay

had, hoim"r, a more standardi*W air fort*. 1 IIle 1*18tfts had the

best types, twt their entire fore,* tot*116d but 30 Mrptabps. The

RusslanS had 8Wiairplat s, but only 4Ci pilots, and t4w*typ*s of planes

were so d1ff#mnt that i4nltss a pilot had flo art-at d0#1 be he'd

connidcribl# trouble with a new ty-,w of al Tt-Aly Md a total

of about 200 airplaries, hilf of whJch vwre arod British built,

and half of vffiich vvre slow, heavy ships o e-Capronl type.

At the outbreak of t* *r 3-oftany had abOft 254 n1litary,
pilots and 271 cbservers. After theptmits 0 rent uftt supplUd,
howtver, thcrr# was lItt1c I#ft over for
G@or- P. Neumftn (ad.), Die
(Berlin,, E. S. W t t I*r und SW
luad even f ewe r n I I I tary f I yi nir pe r


At the ot t of hostilities Gcrti-fttly had a ncn1nal strength 20

of 180 airplanos on t14 ** rn front. 21 This force was fac*4 by a

force of -approx4mnttly, the Satie strength. With the -units figur*d at
zlminal str*n,&th, the British had 48 airplanes, 22 the French 1361, 23

and th# Belgiann 24 24 making & total of 208. The Del,,Ian air force
iccompll-5bed little cf value so that If It Is uniteded the Allies had

184 ai", lancs to the Gern.ans' U0.

On the *astern front th* Gerrrv=s 1--id a nmarical superiority

bea,4ufe the Russians apparently coticantrnted their small air service
o:oposit* th* Austro-lhmgarian armits. in the light of prewar Otrm#n

mIlItAry avlation d*v*lopv*nt it It, not surprising that thIS Initial

superlorfty la nmbtr5 d1<1 not play any de,,Isive role in Oft initial

20 Prollably It Is Impossible to -1ve the air strcngth accuratcly
in numbers of machinti. Ohviously specific firturds- nrit e-xact for only
a certin pcriod of t5tw. Nominal stMngths are appro,imations baaed
on the number of planes authorized for the avintion units at the front.
Authcrs often fail to statt x-hether their nwbers nre actual strcn,,th
at a g1vcn datic, idwthor thcy aris d#scribing front-line sltrength or
grand totals includinS trainlyig and *V.erimental nachints.
21 DeT 191A-biAj21j2* ja lit1rischen 0-7eratlontn
zu LUWO (B*rlin, R#1cjivtrj*A, 5' I-, ftzZ586.
22 Ualtor Raloigh, Tho r in the Air: Beinp, the Story of the
t9ft- ta Air Force (oxford: Clarendon
lNufflavia Ila ttw 06 t uscr AU

M IY22), 1, 411, 11ils fi,3,u glftn by Releigh includes s=#
Ing plaues, which v*r# #U137f t aviation p-nrks In Zhaland.
Thi fvrllt,, and t* lat*r volums by 5wry A. Jqncs, Is hereafttr cited
as *,f In th* Air.
France., Mini,-A"t do In Ootrre, ftat-najor de llarrw, s
anifis Ensooms dAaA In grande jjIttre (Paris: Impri-merie nation*le,

.4111y Co I)Ws on the Winjl trans. A. J. Insall (London:
J. Ma"Itm, Lt46j'P?9"34)' '"* VO


All of the belll:ercnts had son*, typ,, of air oraanizatlon

when c=e to 8uropa in Augu,-t, 1914. Their units, hoAver, wvare

limited to noncombatant funttion LPY the llague convIfttlohs and

declarations of 1907. 25

The f1rit1sh Royal Flying Corps, as It ex.isted during.- the suver

of 1914, was divided into a Militery and a Awal WIng. 'rac division

bet n tIo-air functions however, a w1do on*, with Clio result that

the Naval Win- quickly Lveomft knolm as tl'* Royal N".,nl Air Servict and

then tJW title Royal Flying Corps cmr* to z,,vand -for the Military 141ing

alont, The growth in tach castmwas 1#ss rapid In ntmibers than in design

and arrm*nt* By Auguot, 1915, the British ExptdIt1<*iarY Forccn had

inzrmsed froh 4 to 10 dlvi5ions but the Royal Flying Corps fro-m

25 The pronouncementg of internatiousl Inv on *erial uarfare
wer* va". Tn 1899 -at tht FirSt fttue Pwae# Conferen" a declitration
ws slzrAd atntino that the high contracting partfe!k agrewd to prohibit
launching of projectiles and explo5fviw 1--rom Ualloons or other aerial
vas-%--Ir, for ft p9riod of five years, This prohibition wms dxtetidee in 1907
at t4o Second Hafue Conf*reneq until the Third Pe-ace 0anference (411ch
was never held) but this c*claratlon was Si3nad by only 27 of the 44
poutrz r*proowtad. Of the n*tfons Irtvolve4 in World War I, RelGiiv,
Gr*at Britain, and the United Stikt#.s ware si;zwrs of this declaration.
Nonc of the othar belliger*nts w*re oblisted to thtke rcatrIction--
It uar, obviously no restraint 6,- It i!ontalxwW t provL31,on thnt it x-tas
"t bindin- vhen, In ccm of war bet*en thi contractint pow6rs, one of
the bellijerentn was joiroed by a non-oontra--ting pouett James B. Scott
(ed.), P,.coftue Conyeat,12ns and Declaration* of IggJAM,1907 ( 2d ed,
rev.; NcwfflWk.- Oxf6rd LWIVt'rsity Prt#n, 1915), pPIRE127OW7,27.
ArticI4 25 of the Hagot Convention of 1907 con"rnln3 tlw Laws
and Cust*ns cf 4*tr on b6nd forbade the bd0q>arAvent "by :bot#vcr m*#ns"
of undef=401 tmnm, villjWt, hous**, or Nollfn,-S. The quoted phr"t
was e.-,prftzsly insnrtcd to covit aerial 4tttc1,x, Th#M, -vat no definition,
however, of #undl&nded," All of t1w r*jor bPllie,&Pftts of krld War -1
ratified this convention. lbld.# 100-129.
The Indefinitenc5s of International Inti alloved all nations
concc-rned to Ins-ist that they alone d &nd Waot the
othar5 violated t1*P*. Actually, botb eld#G W= 0 4soc aII
possiblt 4dvant0q4t nnd otily military nnd te-A
their a*rIal attacks. law


nizAtion *Van military tiviation

4 uftm the Prisstan War MinIstry and I

'Minisfry. Frow theae, 33 field aviation Of0tions
and 'S e"Oft- 1wrl iomw#re forftd whon mobilization w*,,,

ordox-Od. Zach at *nd army cors (except raocrvb corps)

had a f 14KA avia, Derrestaltuii- (0.11,L,) had

Unitsl 27 0
no avlqwon its 4tjmp control.

.............. -- ics as, a separAte brancli of the 4=y

as Oarly as 1912 policy rwzined In use Antil aftAr the war

bqW, The pilot h046verl, U" Under Separatoe cowtAndn.

tkw *ow4n of t4w w:ny st4f f in cac 1i

arfty t "Chief of Air Rcconnaiaftnce
Sorviae,*' Us*d (All ataff Offlc6rs) "We attached to

the Intell, AM=- V;* 28 ThLw ob.,,,,erverq Vvim
lu* Y to the airdrcmea only

to '0 t Vi r The air Actions of aim arny were under

1, 331: 434-435.
lp 4**v. Mlljtary sn-rviec
41.4 t*9 t1w an Ield


thvot thw FT*nch
twor qe=Ah
t tw.- pt I pt*ltkd
F*ul F. X. Ar,,notwtkud.


an aviation off1c<,-r called tht ODirector of Avititlon Servict." It oas

Ms role to furnish tl* airpj1=e*, 3e ha4 no control over the


it not =,isiual fDr alrmm to land in 4warch of inEormation

durin- the early days of tho ilar, It vftti3t of the c'ustot.1 of

tWe czvolry to question Inhabitants of a loc&llty being scoutcJ- onc

Britis4 ob5crvatlon crcw on AuVst 20, 1914 vh1le on a search nission

in ttio Brusral:3-Charlavof area, lawdod their-Ainchine In order to Wcry

the country,7i= 4bout thi prisence of Germans* 30 DQring that 5a,-ie

month A German plane landed bo*tween two hostile forts during the attack

on Ueg'e and ra'7Orted the emb-at situation at this point to ltD

c o,-Ttdcr. 31 71io source,,, 6o not IndleAtc tiluat of valut was so*n and

how At influcnc*4 the 6attle. Such uzlt or, airpianpg *A a sort of taxi

service for obacrver-,, althwigh perliaps liit--rt-stinGj, hardlly rtpresented

the nost efcctlvc Utilitation 0' flylm', nachln*a.

Dtirln" the Germn advAnce throueh Delgitin nnd northern France

under the stratopy of Gcnieril li*lnuth von Moltkcls wrslon of tl*

Schlicffan !'I=, the C*rrwn5, by not talting advantaige'of infar=tion

furnished them by t'tvtlr aerial oboemors, lost an opportunity to

destrov both the French Fifth Arny and the entire Brittsh Expeditioniry

Forc;c. On A-u-u!3t 23, Ganer-a-1 Charles L. LanraFc, cawandirw, the

29 Charles Dinlarmv,, "Le sort de no,,5; r
40 4vion
pendant lia Guarr* de 1914-1918,* goy14
1929), 415-418.
3ORaIeAgh, The War in the Air, 1, 302*

Ye-unwi=., Dic Dcutschewn DjfmatLlsixw 397.

h F b position south'*ot of *Aaur at tk*
unction T14 Oft'r= Second Army, uader
Gowal I Vo tA* *Anbro at Charleroi dvrin3 the
precadin- na olloving, riornlrw, had forcwd Gcimwal
wac*c *n' lef baek aWt ftur miles, Thot 4kuse 'ties crosstd 1y
tho Germau TbIrd T91or 31ft ellwrr Von Hausen, noar Dinant
49k" ,an to withdtfw his rear
durina the Ott f t1* Pd. beg
ti,,rw ts 6urin, I .......... ng of 23 and at nine o'clock that night
he ordered a gA
M C-0 nvii i I a British jz%'Tedltionary Force vas holdiM3 a line

erOm Glvt7 tO M-Ous 4R* aloWthe Conde Catial faciii& the
Cowman first Army urift 4exandar von rjiick. About 11-30 P.11.
August 23 Geftral Sir Joseph FvQfth, the ceftihnder of the British
tr-uops, received vord that 14a4e*C was withdrawin'-jw 32
At 10M AT. on the 23d W* 4Wiatlon units of tht Gerr=
Third Army reportei-Ozat Lanrezaomwas bo3lrmin,, to vithdrav to the
southTswst* A Germian division in the vicinity of Civet wwa ordered to
proceed to tlao aouthtwst, crossirW,, Ove *ust noar Rnmy to lnte=ept
the Freach novowent, It plgn"d to push [onzard tot-7ards P11illipoville
In purmit of th&matn force w soon as the Mett" had botn cros*ed.
"TIOtteution of thWpMi fts held up, hovever, uhcA a 5taff ofio*r
of 44- cond Army 412000*0 =40,epoebmikpthat tho latter force was
he 11-eench zit daybreak, for Wkoxval von 001ow bellipved that

9 London** cons-tible and Co. 1919), pp.
situation on thv- n, airing of Auguat 23,


Lanrozac 'was holdln,,, his position in fdo st ifiiiah of the xeU4!(,

with his east f1A1j$j^ ot t-"t. 300ral Ernst von Ifoeppner, vho was

than Chi*C, of Staff of- VooftuseTifs ThM"Iy, later wrote-.,

So I t hapwed that a ck AC15104 to be ma4e as to vheth*r
v* should trust to ths intoll 9 giMpW on August 23 or
bal e In th#our sts fren TT* latter
Prelff to* . . the -in- for tia advtmae
of the ora*t#r portion ar'lli W 33

Moanwhi le Lnnrezac tms moving rapidly to the southmest, and

on the mornina of August 24 occupied a line from to Chlnw/ and

northNA--st toward Maul>euW, tTith his 1#ft."out 16 miles In rcar of

Sir John FrOnchts rt-ht. Tft-BrftiMi beg#nQWr wlthdr I early that

gwne snoring and closely t4w* by Von Klucl, reachtd the
qW 34
line La. tOn-,tWV111C-PAW*1-4Ub BOIZOAtte by nioo! o'clock- that evertfn,.

Tfte, comblywd effort of t4A German Seeond md Thlrd Armies

proved to be a blow struck at shzdmis, Before the day vas over,. th*

lodin', of both aoes, confused In the coavewg 0 of

advance, Nxre so n, Ixed up tMt Laroomac was- able to continue his wl th-

drawal that night almost u4thout Interruptioii.

EVIO*Onk that, during these critical days of 1914, the G'

cam.iaaders did not have mch confidence in thicir aerial observation is

found in t1w COMan offielal histarj vhicll, comentInZ on this

P-artleu`tsw OPMOJC, concluded-., 4F


34 See ri,,uxwa,5 on page 414Wr
tho afternowof Amaust 23, 014.

t of h 3nd 0=11 Vot of DelOWM to the
il* zed by our avlaws in every Casc,
4 t -W the Second and AM Avvies, a5 a
P n' t, and not as w* willingly holleved, a
disordflot flkht.35
Win 'vbrld Ar is Wort the entrance A the UnItch sLates
Wto the caafliet, air powoc u*o used primarily to support nround
Qperations, ThapAr 4rms Are subordinate olomeats of thQ army In each
country and theraf"AMW responsive to the ammands of thosc sarviccn.
Since tht 04reatdft concentration of effort vas on land varfaTc, army
COMMandors OOMC to "qqrd the flyina wanhines aa the veyes" of tO
ground force* Wth t1w. priTmrj missions of McrVing t1W di-spojf tion of
enemy foroot and of spott%4 the cwpltoemont of his willcry. It
breast apArOnt, cvan bKore the end oi^: 1914, that would liavr-
to be tahen to prevont tnAwy plaaeB from catryinj out thOr ob=rvation
missions* For this purpose, planes v1th great spetd, fire power, and
maaeuverabilit7 ier# nace5!;ary, and both :Ades set to worl to devinlop
the-zi. Thi,-, was the g,,enesis uf the fighter p1nne, wlios& miiLsion urns, to
Attroy otbev VhN=5 and aaln coutrol of Vc air over the battleiiald.
Althau,-h tRA4-#c=twdino, *4r forces Ad been trained and equipped
prtmKily for obscrvation, airplWoM ,re ,,oon dcMacd low other
Alitary roW. Aa the pri"Itive airtraft on lw-uid at the I>e,-,jnn1ji3 of
theAwar 6onon4trcitcd, wore fpMC1a1!=td typea of aircraft vould hove to
Q*d*veloped to perforn as 0411M nad bombers. Airplanos gryj
stmootly WON and bmwotar. The Qrfornancc

W WAI rt Powr, ran,,,,*--1,-aj)rcvcd -reatly. 'Me chanIns, fortuncs
IC Arndt, (Wipait: Johann A. Barth, 1023),
Lji"- X,



of the 41r tiar between 1914 and 1917 v#Ve lara&ly the rssult of mwo-

nautical dcvc1opnant.&,, 'with first on$ sIde jftd then tNk other iinlng

a temporary aavinta3e 1>ecavso of SqpeM#'v and advanced typc of plane

or item of CqUi'*x3ent.

No nation ent*r*d t1te wer propwMd for torial coml>at. At the

tiria, the Gc=ans helievod that the Franob had airplavks iquippcd with

T-Achiac guns :oon after the hostflltioV b" Tk- fact, occordin-,

to one rellable French source, Is th4t at the bo,51nnina of the j*r the

antire Frtach Or forct possessmd only t--;o nachim 3ums*. 37 Ohe French

airman latnr wrote the ixact oppostbe to the Gwmgn claimm., "We vw'rc

not armod: A simple carbine, a Gamalry muket firlriA one sliot at a

time. 'May (ana W* Talew it) ofton bad TiaChine guns."38 Actually,

neither the G=ans a9 nor the Freach, nor tho RrItish Royal P17ing

Corps Nad nachine auns on tlia4r plane.,.* whea the mr began. 40 0:1*

enternrislaj,* airr= of tl'4t Royal Flyin- rps mounted one on hi,' machine

during Auttist, 1914, but ,m-a or4orod to rawvc It because It o4ded too
much additional Veight to his airnlant,

%flooppnt-r, Dcutpchlmds Krie.,,, In (I
..... .. ... ... .. _&_r LUL :I.
1912 (Pnrfs; 4A 1OWMs-Sanc livre, 192m,
36 Omri Clftibrd, *La Premicr VICtoty C* 4
forccs, a' 1(;p
cr _Aqqs, 11 (Janftry, 1930), 6.
39 Cuneo, Wiggpd Mars, 1, 131.

40palel't"11, PA TAIar in the Air, 1, 260.

41 Charlez F, 5,nowden C=blr-, 'Mf- Air nt
of the Growth of A the
Tear 1733 Until t44ftr
Pre3n, 1931), 'P. MPEVRWVWI, Ci

AMMERM .0affiffim


o have boe7nmore *'gleftive than the

r Thia proMbly was 4m to a combination

of faCtora. A or #hs' French tirpllmes uer# pusher nodcl,,.

Tht pilot aad 0 r sat la front of the win-s with a cledT forward

f4Wd of f Ire vn1"P*!#d by vngU'e, propellor, or wiras* 1oth the

Dritish and-4#rwns-b4*#*r* tractor types in vikich tl* observer nat

In the fon,,nrd coch ounded by tirf* and urln3s aad witli his

p0tontlal Eleld of fira tdtw4rd reatrimAd by the tn,Ine and propelldr.

TlwFrench aviator,,,, nordover, mre flying, In defen3e of their oua

territory, which@my h#v# made 6,wi -more Inclirwd to stek combat rather

than vfertly to eo, e with tht* oround forcos by a1r sootitln,.

The- total i of Fr*njrh elr vietories In 1914 ajpbars to

h#oe baw qnall but @p#Xrnnns t1m convinced that all Fran
cbrrl#d nzachin#Vna. .1bera i*"- also widely publiciz*4 picturcB of

French Ni4aport5 40"bsft'N*t5 stood up through a hole In thc Ving

to fire oV*v th,& foAm"'td propellyer. Actually, this and oth*r nodels

mra siraply c.Verlmarftl proj#cts but own a Garmwi author a4ni ts

that by ftbr4ary, 1915, "Gvfttna4rmen fled pmc1p1,t*te1y." 4Z nis risky

only 4A* tw*n "tdftce of OW low dtatowof the Gcrry= -air :iervicc,

nq*Awl notW- n, ore than thl P04*pted threat of Prench Aerial

t*aUects of the-*train caused by --I-n nonths of

fiwd"i6 lil#t %aft to luM* begun to

*W10Y of #(Pat*ntly 11n1ted only by the

Id Bo*lc4tA *rman


1=30atlan of tht airmen. Theraiwere singleahot WIN And Oarbinow,

revolvers, notomatic rKles and carbines, hand Sr#r*des (thrown or

dralted on the end of a long cab* to mrtkn a OWN machint), steel

arrouz (ori3inally designed for attacking ground forces), and small

bombs. Zma simulated veapoas veto cirried aloft to am* the enany. 43

The Gormann, :7-ecurcd thp *dvanta, in W*-aum.,ar of 1915 whtn

they ssli:cccded ID nountia,- In a Fokk#r Tionon,4* f Ixot machine 3u;i

ubich could be fircd forward through the firltut propeller, 44 ThIs

430ne of the more amosing early duel5r, canownters in the air
to A p lace betwoon a G&rnan and a 40 t I sh f ly I n- .arw. Nt*n the
coml>atants lund ejai4tustcd all their rifle =0 09TAr asMeNtion, they
RAW away with WIT Vory WAMIC Platols, Wth Utah My mWe
Vory pocr nhootinq, After a Q1 4 pilots realtzhe that 06 only
chancO of scaring a hit van to got nlosxup, but Q&Wy Wd their
Mnnhin= aloa Me, the humobr of thealtuqtton ANN . (the
German pilot] to forcibly, so thtt he root M- US laughtyr at the tight
of the two o1x-.crvcrs solemnly loading up U 900" 1 n lbar-atle Atr, a
green llqht anaverint a red one. Wdoa ly the rs were also
too tic!tlcd to r,,hoot :7-traloht, for 4*04 30t r# n*dr his
LonI5 A. >tranf, %ccolloctions of_& rat. J* Hamilton,
LN., 1931), p, 211.
44 Anton7 Folk-cr, thc Dutch invcnto tt, thisMaphic story
of the first tina he went up to try out IA4 CC* ,0 le I Igas
li4p Pff,
f 1 y i nz around aboy t s i x thotvWd foet hi '11 gima 406;-, r biplane
0 . appearod out of a Old two or WNW, below, Mis
i-,as ny opportunity to show *kt t1oft-, #ton TwxOt 1 00 rapldly
towartl I t. The -,planc, an obvervation type in th#
Year, van flyinS leisurely alonZ. zoaq
they tnuld havc no rca4-on to f*4r *jllcts thr 1L.,
MPPrOaC41ng$ I thou3st & WIV&t a &*Vdly ac
could acad 111to the plant--, I Wd owar d
the Vzonch; I = flying Worely to prove I I f
had Invented vou"Id 'vork. 11; this ti,w I h to fire
and the Harch pilots no doubt,
why 4 was ON= up bohind thom, S I
job con1d 3v to bell. It VMS too yp
I W no wl A to ki I I Fronclvw;i t1*V* #0
their oim killAnz." Basil 11. Ljd4i;l Hart, A
Uhr,-T21471119 (London: Sbor and Ober, L


revolutionary flyW *;un quickly oflAw th, Garmana a stiperiority in the

air which apurrtO tt* All4ed poowr5 in th,21r searcli for a stIll better

plana. Lintil tMy could nateh the Vokkcr, the Dritish and tl* rrench
resorted to fo= tion flyln- and sought saf`ety in ntn1>#r_,. At one tftle

in 1916 th# Brltl;h v=d no lesa than 1Z fl,84ter,, to escort one

obsorvation planm* 45 The Al11*_- also divelop*d tlleir own Interrtipter
gany to fire their machine gLm,, throu"gh the bbwdts of the Propellers.' 1+6

The ti-;o bezt Alliod nwhfm v5,ad In World Uar I xrc tht

Lewl,- npd the VIakft*rs,,, The Levis machine which wai-ht(I timn
20 po=ds without Ow ,7aJter aclcet (the Lewis vws desi"n*d to be cooled

by vater, Wt e-..pdfttncc -it high altitudes proved that the OlEficult,

vws not in cooliw, thc -'un, but in kaepln- it from frecrfn-), wn- fed
Mmunition by nza*zinc. After 47 or 97 shots, dep4nding on tht size

of tht naitinition Orqr, the empty ma,,azinc lind to be removed and replacod

with a loaded one. A ;good pirt oil thiq v,wponls efficicacy cmi,c fro-m

45 JYMj $j LIng on fighttr tactics t'he Allics were able
4;to o t zt::i behind the opposln- front, thus enablin3
their 4wn recomhTUxanco an, artIlltry nacMner, to work undisturbed.11
Ibid., 2.02.
46 In4w ary, 1915, Roland Carroa, a f=ou- French aviator,
eloped a of f1rIn;,t P*ehlne guns t4rou'-h airplan* propellerS
cti tmtedatcd Fokher*.-, Invention. A netal plate iclamped to the
pro.e'ller 5erved to deflect bullstzr,, ,ihich failed to pass throu-1i the
tOC b4ad#G. After tie Qwmmns capttired (arros and his plane,
baorned tA is* t of the; ed thl S
'Tin'ch :"Ucccn-c'e-' and adnpt
n to the*w The r4*ncb countcrtd vith n*v typcS of
and trl*d of ingtMous schcme8 to rftain ncrial
Y* qpdoft 6ffort lnvalvod a -mall c"e holdln- a
Ch U14w CA5t*ned In front uf t4e pxoe11cr.
Evolution, md Dcvelarricnt

"'OMN I "Iff


It-r 1L-"htnCCa*j the -,Wmer had no stable f'O'Ur4ation for bA6* 4nd oftm

=!,cfi qo;lnnst tavrific And pr,,:srwrc. The Vickirs machinet atm was fed
frm q 4*4t of 500 cartrid-,ec, and ttwoforo wiw noro llabl* to imo

whmever the vind co%,Id tet at t1m belt, IYoth th Fronch wid

hmmvar, notmtcd the Vl,Zors up foftoAg, with t unition bf-,It
7rotcctcd frm-, t1io vla4 I),, o strea:ilfned 4*41 cowr. rils fl=d

opcrated by th# pilot, lvtd -thc advxm4W of a bl- &-Vunltion

capacity wit"lout tllo dan-er Of --l=a5stva Doth tlio Lmila and
Vickors had -a ,11-Int i;aarnln of ofAw ot
4$ h*ftls, and could flru-
at the rata of n!'>011t nint shots -per mwd* a,,tnunition was

PrReti-'ally t1jo S=C--.30 and .303 czillbzr, reaWtIvely.
pilots fircd a fined *MAnq=fth1nc Cftt zy=hrOniz'*.-J to

lf'l.rc tbxmi-1i the propollor, and observers vere armed witZi a movnblc

Parnbcll= -;a.-1i1nn 3tm, Goram -avivtors liad # mM*-j-d a
aerial ,-unncry bec--Utc o: the -vagopr n=tvr of shots tlgey could ire

Witlimit rn-loadln-. (The Parabell+ cot:ld f1re 1,000 rounds bacorn It

had to )o reloaded.) That 15, t1joy coold fire --C nany shots that ivcn
$ 47
if t1m operator ,=c not a -ood -wAmmwn lwcould bt

Aerial tAachlnc -.un Arlnuni t ton- of 104id rounds,

partly of stftl-nam4l alnor-?Iorcin- hk11TCt*j *41,of t-_nctr WIlets
j I ',jelpod thO St his fire, nnd

partly or, a-Dloslvj tmllot.,% Uach Mar--jgWc hic, jL46*11tion to SUU

hi s nvedn; the rule was to have h Wth bult*ka OWer

Tblt]., 2'a'3-32*)*


The prop* Ansla o tile vind to be n sucrior

alrpon6, =4 tHP tritish md rrcrich fo=d their af-:orts wlhen

t1w Dot, 11avi 14jand 2 and t1mo Mouott, TAth 110 horca.,owr engines,

proved nttch for tba Vokker, In preparaLion ior W Sonme offensive

In 1916 t1w Allics also ImpravAd the stratQ31c use of airplamcn,

concentrating- tlvft In larger fomatlm.,, and cnrryin3 ttic ofennive to

the saomy. The Swans, In turn, wre forcqd to Myrease the sizc of

thoir thyinj iormatlann aad to oonccnratr- tlietr noritil forces for

offensive oporations,

The 6ormans, wedded to standaQ airwr8ft types, hositated to

maRc a nhan3c. At lact, hovowtt, they discardS thAr A; monoplane

Tambes In favor of thtir cqtmlly Albatroo bipl&ncs 711ich

ove the obscrver an unobstructA vicv. They later developed a

gizantic rachinc wlli t7o bodics and t= motors, azid propellart,, and a

car in the Tiiddle, It vaa so pat*rfully notorod tliit it provt'd to I-le

speedier than the Y'renali ant British scomus, but it could ncithcr climb

nor nanamcr as well as these lgeser craft. It wng orned with two

machine ons.

The Allic6 air nu,)romcy of I'Mt t= of short duration. in

AdItion to Improved aircraft, the Gormans soon developed better mctuads

Of fQKt1nZj suc4 ai titte "Circus systion"-squa0rons tactically controlled

by picked flyin; lcadorn+ Ov"Ad Boricke nnd Raron ',Jrmfrcd von

RQMjW*en xr* Wic leading stars of tvo of thca* oirtuscn. Sypcrior
- A-
-R!IU -s Ilso a factor vhich favored Gorman nviation durin3 th,2 mr.

AINQU VMJ A111005hintaincd suQh#cy in nombers, something like

MAP to onc, t4 $Pminns mdmthat minterical supcriorlty loot, xiallcr


by virt" a'l their 4tter-trgincd pilotat If* sdqhimcs sent

out their pilot.-, uwctchedly trzinc4. Vwce, then, some of thV
rcasons for tile InaMity of the Allies to astab&hond sustAin air

supcriority for =y lent-th of tl'-A. 43

1917 t1he air var -rw -st=dlily zor-- individual
tl iA 4

air battles sonct!=5 iavol-vln,* *s nany as 100 o 0,00rations

a-ninst cncny air units, elther In the4ir or on tlia -'r4and, cant to

be n dominant fciturc of the air wr, both Idcz; -tr1v1n- to iachimlt

aerial rwperiorlty. Fl-titer pilots bec=a popuUr heroe,-, In t1io uarrin-

countrics an t1teir C.vjalolts uv" reported 0010-.!U117 'ty t*,10 Press.

Outstnndin,, =ong those fliers wcr# Geor,-,a Guynowr, Rene Foxick, lmd

Cliarle-, 1%iazaerraer of Frince; Baron Ranfr6d vbn Richthoh4w, OsvAld

IOelcke, Ma-: jrmlnann, VXormer Voss, and Herman rs*ing' of *WvOny;

Eduard ,Lam=h. and Albert Bnll of Great Britain; and Villian A. Bishop

of 49

!,.lthou,,h tha frIC;1iter plane continued to dominatow tl-w' air mr

nnd the fi,-htcr Aceu aoWwre4 the Imaginntim of the public, proXra-38
also wao ziadc in bmT>ardncnt, capi6cl-n1ly dwrin- 1917. Ar&
'> y com. anders

began to see the taQtlcal ndvnnta;cs to 1*-,.g64ncd by 1:mhln--many rail

483 cufteo' nara, 11, 280-231.

4 1 up t1w, buli
-Accourms f ttic exploits of
the popular literature n'vallabk for I War I avIctioll,
Althobgh the -)tiblic scvwcd Pleana iittlv of fells lve-
nindtd acronautics, lost riilftary ca#014"p
over, -all of the fosmou.-, 12,-,hter pilot a C Wn
nttrib-uto. with th(Ir couragg, t .. a
invariably a lact o"' -illltary dlaciil 5
demanded. For a list of bool:s d in thc biblia-raphy on oirms, bi


end t1te Z>ut it vas nore d1j"ficult

Cor to be raincd froon

1VO01a tation aud Industrial centcrs farther remove
from tho 1a in p4rticvlar, 8toadily

their boomlft; 0"Mwwatl

'On *11 Wclal bombardment and
i zure, of c otir se, t I,
laraor b
poztt,,ible by the air a is ority enjoyed by the Allied air fcrcas durin--

n"t of 1917,

in January, 1915, KaN*r WilWL*1= 11 gave pernis;ion to hlss

forcos to ntt,4ck otW Brlti.% tar,,4tt--. A fow strikcs

at p I nn, t j by Garn= planez- In December, 1914, and

thcre ',nre 1915, but most of the raidsc- 4uring 1915-
M16 e'tes#AWby inz,,. 66 January 19, 11)15, Zerpyttim3 dropcd

bombs on vi in Norfoll'-., Eroland, and killed five r,*eople, In the

first raid Ortondon, H., 26, 1915, 1 sin-le airship drop ad a ton of

b4nNs' 1,1111ng-O&M po$la-md Injurin- 35, London MOz bombod four

Tiore tttft In tho 4"nths of 1q15. Ourin- 1915-1516, ZCPPOliftn

A W 4 tonTs on Cn3land, Inflictin-. 1,725 asualtio--
w of bombs dropped by German pl*aes, rassultin-,


TO Sil1tisli adopttd a variety of vaefturcs:

rol duty; antr-Aircraft gms

C111 I t oun^ltal centers; aral g blact;out

44 lk**e defense, hw4ewr$ had

allour. t Goi= air raids on


little a-ilnst tic Zcppc1Ins &rin- non-t of 1916. The wftth*r

proved to be Vic eiort cff-*ctlvz dc`cn*c* On January 31, 1916* nine

naval Zeppclints attaclk-cd tw.oct5 in t1a Nidlands, killiar; 59 p;!Ople at

S1ircws!)u-.'Y, Za-lzmv,. Four -marc attac:u' on Scotland and Diland rurinl

April caused -4 (1"Vip,. 7111c f1rst really afftctivc defanzo a,"ninst

t'zc-,c caiic on -3e-,tQnber 3, 016, when th,. first alrslilp was

,liot don- by o P>r1t1,-h alrnl=c. were nhot doqm t1mt "=c month,

and by 1917 L:tc Zc;>PO1i11 t1ircat Had be*n -xininized. Wit'l the develop-

non',,, of inccndiA,*y toe hu-,c, vulnerable ras Lcg; -,hnrply

(JLi1n1,.1.Aicd in i-mpoitanc6.51

At t1ia beinnizi- of thc war t1le Britisti had no S.rccial

artillery for ust agaln.,,-t ho,-tile ilr-.raft. DArin,, the no,,,t Ywr their

troopc in Franco-, unable to 17ard olff enany lirplanes, Ealt thi; dcfi-

cicncy Locnly. At: t1to :G=c U7,c British pla.qc-, wro auffcrin,- ziore

frm. -round firt tan fvoii liostilt aircraft. Dy 1916 tie 3-Inch f1cld

,,un iad bcon conv-rtcd to =tl-alrcraft u,-c aad until th4 ind of the
war it rarlained the ,,*tnndard nobllr -un in tlic zoac o'f oieration--.

In France and discus-ioms about =tloalrcraft

dc-'cn--c datcd from 106. As early a; 1910 an anti -aircrn ft -un lind

-ippcared at tnc =iual riancuvcrso 'let them fts only one sucli _-un In

1914 i4-.o-n the Izar bcf;an. To MI th! -ap, field #011*-' lmrc 1,et on

bases %ealch first parmitted an elevation of only 40 but

later (1915) 70 Tho 75 r*i. field -=s, ,itrippc6 of splinter shIcIds

and whaaj,,, tmrc ni"ntcd on pedc.-,tal-s-1, Wt 10#Win,5 then on tr=trs for

51 1:;id., 281, 21bldt 270-28S.

dMft a*--"* Amami

t 'vork. France %opt the awe
th 14 not vary tht types to =y -rat
Cnd of foOconfllct one nio6el Trez mounto-d on a
wilor md towd by trttefit. 1>
At Ow of ho-st1lft*r,, C*rmany had 13 anti-alraraft ,*un-,,
sl.-. mro noxint t f rwl-.s. f*Ajr tiara nountod on nobA to pedtAtals and
dram by hor*"; twrwjnounted on tvaXersina carrleq-,es iand 4opt
In t1ta rear to t P Rhina-brid,' and han,-
"Cz- ars, Tliese
m*poni d*6r# auma"K, flold-auns *nd additlorwl special 4ntl-
aircraft artillery places. Light fi;dld hovitzers, which In prm:dr days
had 'IP6*#md prm1r.i subittituta, "ore nu, but ntvndoawd early In
1915 bamew of Ow'slm4 voloclty of t*eir An46tomt1c
bre- 616M Nftft 20 to 30 shell per -minuta r*to of f irt,
and rw -,hraA)nel shells w1th wore *xp1oz1vcs
1,-;65 n, p oll*, oc 54
twavier stecl ballVall of these wero developW dtiring the war.
# OvelooW of clobftuft t,7Wonr, aml tocluilques of anti-

*gp6e did notAftkatoly deal with this- problem %Wch bec;rae
It In direct p to the Lmprovemnt of afrc"ft.
-1*1 bed to be to assure correct fusc ,ettjn,,
1i LO
x4as a pro '=Y swls did not e.-m, tod,* in tht inir but
lnjurj of the tround f cYrce,&,,, Othor
IS 0 also tl*ve mttor of the morale

Ot lag MtLaCrIOAM aull
or"-- 4r1*nnqp, V (April,

in Ueltlrlnj


of the units. Antfftfrcraft 'Aire vas b*y' thousands of

evory ono of vhon Vas -n Self-appointed critil, NOtw1tbStMd1ng th*

fact tliwt,ev*ry ,,hot of an infantrymen or artillexpow did not tilt an

opponent, they htwpad abu.,,a and critteism on tTw'Mftt1-a1rcraft gu=ors

tilthmt cwnidtrin,, tlie novelt7 of the wapon and the practical dlff-

cultic5 o, firin-. -at teTggets novin,, in three dlticn--,Ionze* at M,34 sneeflz.

Prior to the war, Zuro,%aan t-alitary 1wders had g'iveri little

3ttontion to tht organizatlon mv-a
The air r-ervice had bomffi collocted in part under an In,-,Pcctor of

Airship Troopr, (Uohtcr-than-air sections) and In part txider at

In.apector of Avlatton Troopfi (1-*av1er-t*m-a1r Dotli of

these were under an of Militft-j Air and Motor Trnnsporto

vhich in turn va.,, aubordinate to the Gaaa.ral Inspector of 11111'arj

Transport. All of th4* toWanders woro stationod In 'OerAin.

Ilion the Azar cooo, thore was no clift'gC O*c#pt In tbe dlvi;ion

of the troops Into nobtle units to operate *t the frnnt. These nections

wrc pltaced under the varlouz corps and arnien, bAit no air oCflcera Vere

detailed to go to t1* front on th'C Variou.5 stafra.. Thoy '-'taY'c-j in

Btr1in. Tbs In"ector of Avl*tlon Troo" had no connection vith the

field or fortrem; avlatlon voctionn,.

Ttw lack of =,,y starff officers '-C.Or aviation at the variau.-,

ccram=d-, (inder which tl& flviw, ilctions, operagvtKj undoubtedly contributed

i-.iucii to the failtir*a air reconnats,$na o *-Weve !"Tenter

rosulta In 1914* Vo partictiLar officer had the olk'11211ifl tolity of

qnourln- the ro-,-ulnr Issuanco of orders MW ac n,-, APrecelpt

of reports fron t4c airwon. 2we wt8 no to collectt

'frl -Mom-

Inv,11i- o and to asstire its
thio Intomation. NO one at

Ity and limltatfow,, of nlrirraft. No
on4 Cur, f the loaderr. of t1it varloiil flying units-
wbich ,-ood. 'roorc vzis no Intelil'-ent
cooperation ,ars mnd t4e 4wrial ob5ervcra. This
Ca.11d have orrmw had s*cn to it that the airmcn
*wa tiel 11, ar schobe of -.,mouvor talmn by tho
supportlqg fo jl*atls of thc oi,>erations.
in 0 ton vcm Obviuus. Tha aenarnl
Stafr haO prop In 10,12 Ind 1913 btt vith no results.
tW f Irst hkorr tho Insritctor of Aviation Troops
sutnlttiO a ro I to Cf#R$01-#n OOnt'rO11ZCd Carmnd of' 111 avintion
wtions at tile I tf llerreMoltim-, Althou-h the War 1,11ni-st-ry
InIttiat **W inelload to nO VIC thia 'SuIg'"Stion, It Inot the opp-o-
Sition rth thc Twa*tor of Militnry Air and *,Iotor T msport nnd
tIVEPwal Dis."*ctor of It'!111tary Tr=znort. The old policy
*4 56
Tn 00tobigN 191 the lac Unvo rcornanlzad to
ir ft&tln thi; army under onic
rl t:-. Th
1OFfaration, and wi"PTOYment of

1, 104-106.
tion of a short ,,mr p+a7td a role
tw, at ed., of nat I


acrI&I unitS WAD placed under the Ginaral Ccm,=d1n,, tho Air Vorces,

Gt=ral E=*,t von Iloeppner, n cavAlry offtcer, uzs named to this nov

post, and vitli tlic annislanat of an e!ccljcnt :7;taff, hc novcd the Geman

air force to a position of rCnCVwd Vilor, 57

As Imaq no the Witish nit wervla#* continued to do v0l nt

the front, thcrc little effort fox Proposals for

t'nc e--tnblinlriont cf zn Air -'Iinistry sutriittcd In 19A and 1915 failed

to arounc riuch Interost. la the 011 of 1915, Wo Zoppolin air raid',

colvinatod In n strike at London by five WrIZOW on the niSht of

October la-14. TVis notch Kill& 47 people, woinded 102 othcrs, and

catned $400,100 wcrth of damajo, but no Zeppelin wasr brou,-ht dolm.

W FoOcr nc=c during tho winter of 1115-016 marked the beginning

of a no-vaiont tf4icli finally iistablish(d the Air 1,11ni.stry and th#

Royal Air Orce.

The Wltish Joint Alt Wnzittoc, with the responsibility

of coordInatinn the activities of the Rolal Flyl-n:r, Corps and th-a PQyal

Vavnl Air Scrvi=, ccascd to moct aftcr Cc var boann and all cQntral

cantrol two oervices fell Into an unseemly scramble

for aupplies zLnd possonnal. 58 In May, 1916, an Air Board, handod by

57 "1* took on hil appointatnt at the '101t vhoTl t* Gormon
air foroe recovicrin; its noroln, aW his QW13ht W to =urc
th-at the Gcrnnn 'inmca vcr< ncver a3ain to suffer such w opirit of
honlessne5s aG van their fate in th,,, firnt weeks of tho struoe'lo on
the Som-c." Joncz, Ilic-1,47hr in, thi; Air ', 11, Ap-pendi,. V11#
53 Ralei--h, The Wor in, Vhc Airl 1, 472 ff.
Italian Army Watiol-W4 one toin3 th&t stroeW in ny #ndx art which
mad, md laugh a good dcal Intcrnally althouZh I lmflpt an *r-olutoty
3rftvc countamnftcc. He Nllat t ffl to say to younwill b-2
absolutcly unintclIQUIc and UnOinkable to you as EnglisAjon, but I
raZrct to sny t1int h,Nrc, in Italy, it is q Unt, t4h thove nextsts


Lord 4eov-,*,o 14 Curvo*n tia,5 e-, tabl I ahod 11il orsan i 7*tlon served d

gnlnly In an advlwor7 enpacity for althongh it had wharic of ortaniving

and coorjinatjnL the of ratc'ricl and of ptev=Lin; nompctltlon,

it had no outliority to InstItuts z policy >003 aircraft ordcrs.

111im,ianao>ettent, i4v,*,tc, and dola,, continued.

Enrly in Oncc-ib-cr, 1916, 6 =w SovernoW headed by Dnvid

Lloyd WorIc came to pourr. Ile Air Bo,2r4 continued and ralacd to

the rank of a Oar A nwber of other var agencies were

rnVrtr;)Cd to )rovciAt any ,oafitc i:ln ttie Air :inistry vhicli conccrned

itsclf principally i*ith tlie procurQwcnt of aircraft. 59

In Sao, 1917, a cablaot committee was sct up undor ticutcaant

Gworal Jan Chrintiam louts to consider the problema of *Ar WfQnsc

and ot3anization. As a rctult o th* rcport of t1ii-s to-,."ittcco the

Royal Air Fcrcc Wanst1tWOU) Art was panaed on April 1, 1913. The

autoAqmoua Roy8l Air Met vas formad by a mcrZer of the Roynl Naval

Air ScrViM and the Royal Flying Corps?0

In tKe French a1r Mrvicc, the denand for ntaff offictrs

air ohacrv= grcatly enccoWd t4o number available Ktur tht War

bam Cavalry or infantry offlacm, p1lols not othcrwie assiqned,

a certa4n, ocaa5tonal, shall I sny, friation? between the rillitary =6
navol bran-les At "1mqow5ibW.*0
HONVOW, 00, 1")Xi), ,),W51q4W5.

110 WW- jn jjpA!;, V1, 2-17.

Tha Awaamud raport of the Prime vlnistcrlt Conmittco on Air
Organization Atalnut Air Raids, Sated Aust 17, 1917,
In'Wrth of UNW8 Buys& Mr Form." Air ;,ovcr Mssorjay III (July,



evcn _-tudcnt of ficers wcre =ploye as sub!titutcs. Si- of war

co,iplctcly bTokc dmm t',t-e old systom oC divided comand (ob5crVCrs under

corrsad of arriy plots under t4e dirtctor of air strvloe)

I)uu It Yas not =t1l December 16, 1914, that an "Instruction on the

Cicneral Or3anization and Direction of tho Air Service" set up a new

s, stc-i, The army aviation directors *,cow ehiof-, of the air s*rvicc

and tiad all the army avlalon unddr thtlr comund lnclodin,,, the

obscrvzr-,. Vie !taff officera wcre allo%*d to join the air Dervlce to

obtain a united System. 61

The chiefs of the air swrvlo* suffered a deelln*hln importance

*en escadrillta bt-;tn to bc attached to corpz; rnthor than army

hcadqutrtcrs =d had virtually no authority or control over units

scr,rln.-, under theat cmr=ds. 62 Me V.,q)rmiance of a fev nonths of

conbat brought out some dellcets In this policy. M d1v1.,Aon -after

division and corps after corp,, uns throvin Into t1w 1>attle and the

rc:)laced unItz were withdrawa frcri the front, tho avIotion =Its-

ordcred bactc -ond fortli often did not baw sufficient time at tht front

to beco-,-m :anllfor with the terrain and tt* oltuetion.

A-, a re-sult of the problvms rAl,-,ad by thl-, d4ccntralization,

a =7 or3anizition wia5 propo,-ted tealch ;!*oarottNtl t1ve air setvice from

t1te -round forccs,. T1w :,:one of, op*vatlons of it#ch ar.iy ,As divided into

Tto 5 arny licadquartars var, In --ame uasc:j too ccmp late# Aepe low linizon
that nhould ',-qve contimer] ofcn moratod.
62 Ce=an field aviftion units unre as- I ther to army or
corT-,-- liciadquartcr,,,. Thc British orSaniz#tl t f0sov 14 the
matter of thio French and awigiwd--air o" i-i -ANOW OcNelons
<,uch a-- corps or divi,-iont,

all ponticd to t'lle corps sectoren, at the

f r W,,,, =dcr a co"-,,nndant of corps acro-

nautics P 4,,oz-,nandant of *Yny acronalotic,-.

r, Y t I r rice v= undor tl,,c Cwmandant of' a=y

aeroxinutAas, M15 of ted the distrlbution of all air units,

watclied over thOr te tjctjcXt1 trainin- and --qulpmcnt, and

w5ured tho action of all the ilr unitG of the army. Ile

directly contONTed thd1WtId1W aziploynont of only tile Qs(idrjjles

m4 billoon detactow. .'tach to thQ arny licadquartcrs. ilic

rmminin- a4r ,,eetion5, 'vhicli fwformod thr! dutlc3 fctncrl 'g'wJgned

to corps or dlvl;Ion 11)#t, v#r* undcr tl-a camandant of corps

corps aeronautics po:ise5sed his o staff.

It Consin'ted of a balloon officer, a tactical officer, an intel1l,',ence

o44fiear, wid ;ri photlJOWofficer. TIA balloon officor adviscd the

Comandant on the perfom=ze of belloon units. in t1w zow. The

tactical officer a5zfstAk t1vt camt=dant In ordors Tor aviation

4md balloon ziisalon*vnd In roaa4*vrin- reports mi the e=cuti= of

r1l'aftiono a* v'11 aw)*@kpIn,, In totch vith the corps s-taf'-5 and

comseandant oC aTny**#;WautIcs* The Intalliooenoe officer, -Cnerially

obl-*F, prepared reconnafssmce evaluated

.reorts-, and thcir delivery to t1t propew Infantry and

artVWry oqw**. 1"dPiwtoeraphy offi(mr assi-attd in preparint, And

photo-,iat. PSOticular attcntion t;an, plid to the location

In aration for PrLAInInary qrtlllt*-ry bombardmcnt.

t 390tiomi, *WA t* emphmsins 'fts on


speed in devotopmcnt and delivery of combat zone Oicturcz* This staff

was to onsure t4c correct wiployncrit of the air strvice-, In the

particular sector. V''

When the sivintion on the we,-tern front 1>ccorie one K

stabilincd warfarc, the duties of obscrvation nVintion settlM Into

four scwral Miasions: the intantry mission, tht artillery =18sion,

the rccDnnaissaaca minslon, and the photo;raphic vinslon. All of thcne

acre Perfo7ned by both airplanes and balloaa, aad sot the Pattarn for

American aerial operntionz which were varriN on later in tha wnr.

The Infantry mission was tisually vlow
an tht part of the ol-iqervers th= on the part o t1i't i: fantry. The

purpo;a of the mlwion was to Morve the pro3rons of the infantry

advance or to locate too front line 110mcun of Kfautry battalions

In ordr-r t4at t4e icort-tander might lmow th-c location of h1o combat units.

Variout nu-an; of lovatIng tho infantry werc attempted, all of which

Ilere nore or leas nolliliW by the disinclination of t4c infantry, Our

WOr first battle, to let anyone, friend or foo, knov whcre they w*rc.

DurInZ 1915 the French u3cd f0l narkers to dcnotc the pozition of

t'heir ;'6nt It apparcntly ha6 not occurred to th* orijnator

of tiii5 achage- that tlic not only narkcd the lines Or the Frcnc4i

infantry commandcr but for the Orman artillery npotttrz a8 well.

Latcr bca3al fl,*zrerPP*ere Lu4eod to numt the front tints, but Owe, too,

,erc ua6"l for both NOW IM fib, FinnIly nt VASs amd an SO

Samme in 1916, panels vere carried by the infantry and theaw arrangqd

Orcel 0=116, L# gtA*u-njj
(005: E. Flanstrion, 1907 pp. SAW

5 31

A A trouad anvo the non In the air t* information
that t1wyQKntCd&1191ff1t Inn risk to tile non Ca the ground.

Ile artillcry Onalon became cntromclY important WOY in tho

45r, lolls the Geiiann "calted INVall; in wpottQ3 their b1ts, W

NOW loam developed an antramely efficient aarlal artillery

obsorvatloq servinc* 65

Artillary rcc:o:-Lnn1!;sancc missions ganeral!y did not rcquire

1003 V113hts Irito t1to CnCny*S territory* Arvillory batterica werlo

loca,44 a compirntively n4ort Mansce belaind tht liaes, =d thc

p"rposo of thIs sort of renonnainsaacc vas sinply Lo scout aronad for

new 3tn emplacawnts nad to see if the Oermanz had moved from any old

onoso This van a difficult as0gament, for lj5U.111Y tile %Crc 1-qrd

to interpret. Ob-,orverc; lind to jud,-,o from thQ color toile of Zua pits

tAwPP.'4wr tlioy u,"w occuplod or not; the differonce i,,= often norely a

-4adc. kiy 4ppreciable nhan;c in the of a forast Onve an

inindiatc Van that a batter-y tw; and cort-nin MnO,, of

constructlon ver% utro positive eviAme on- to the Dccupntion of a

Mina poeltioa. The condition of th* jtthn fron ncarby duZouts to the

q*placogpatn ;avc addlHOW ClUQwj aad Sometinas too Carth ItSCIE

vould ,-,hov t buried ntreak. L-i t1* vintortime, a 4ar! on L',Ic

64 Donald Magf'--iln, "Likhtry Alrpllnwa aQ AirplAn*a V
CdSh4nd,', Alr._J 11111JI10[tAry 11111 (Octohor, 1918), 1-2,
65 7or 011ont lysis and Volleotlan of pictures
il -,10 of 0, n ,wr La vinibilito Ic

1917) in tile wider Markcd
F= 11 wd some Ormften In the
1,1-mW Divin-loa Archivea at -lawell Air
archivao 1<,, hereatter refcrx4d to as the

2round and neltad snow oppeare4 under the muzzle of a at=*

ArtIllery r' la)gc, or spotting artilltry firr-, consl*wl of

W*tchin'-' tht fall of Sholls on a twr-et *td sendin4 back informAtion

nt-=inari f or tlyt t-attcry to Improve 14ts OhtarVcr.-. first

atteopted to point o-ut zi tzrgct to theartill#ry by flyin7, over the

obje(,,tivt In clrcle5 or In figures of or by to-s-sIsla out papor

or tin'41, or by settin3 off **eft bonbs. With Ruch haphat4rd

p=Codumt It It viall wonder t;4ct rtillery officer,- oere

Contan'PtUOUS of the value of airpBOW. In 1915 Fvpce adopted a slow

but ftccurnte mothod in Ailch aft*r'qfthsalvo t1w owlal observcr

dropptd at the b*ttery a card which sholmw4 3rtqphically vIvre the shots

fcll. This rwttiod wes later mplaced by md1o riessaglu.

Fugitive targets, or, As they werp someti--cv more aptly called,,

targets of apportunity,, opdftd the door to a sudden and unenodcted

boobardr*nt, Th#y rcquired quick cooj*fation beW#en airplane crew

and artillery personne-1. 'For If t1ve ob3orver sfV a truck

convoy prooeeding alon; a road, he d1racted 4 b#Wr7 to fire at It.

ai* 75 ,,m gun In-tach dlvisioti ues, to be''ept free for action-a-tinst

Eu.-Itive terr;ets And wns ra-Intcx*d on 9 llirgo nwbft of pointA, In the

encmy territory*

Rmonnalasance operatIons coa&uctcd 4w!"Wr i had t-uo main

aspects, def" and OM*Ihze. Tit roc&-nai -#Nr*atim whinh tht

Fronct-i trorked out on the So*o. in 1916 T,7111 t* uM4CV4'4bde1, since

It Includ%4 all form oil sQoutin.- fh*ory and provW* And hod to do

both vAth Qirpl-u% 4md vitli balloon o

66 Ibid.


soon aff h#*i*d to launch an Offcnslve, the

1ttfr#Ia In carefully stitdied$ photo3raphod, and

n;pped; not r a Pon distance, but far back of tho IIM*S*
Zv, ont!irny trcnclh, cv4 approach, barba4 -4re

=chin* -I;un AMPAPSOPOIts, hamQuartarc-all of tliese wtre repeatedly

examined AM worWO on countloss photo,-raphs. Obliiquo photo-,raphs

turned up a num? of unTnmm, dugouts, and their stze sugqcstrd hov

many rertervea they could accoinodatt. All these data vers carefully

Colloctod ond vVa1u;40Qhd as thia time for the attack drew near, a

lar,-a %4hb#r of photo,1(#0s, maps, mid ixr* f>rvpared and lssucd

to CrOnVag office=

An artillery pAphration, baged on the intelligence gather& In

I>art by laorial obaervation, xq* the pro Tudo to a b13 offensive. 11C

Puriost-K SO,> InAaftrdlent txws five-rold: to cripplo the aotny

ortillery; to vma5h Weir machine tun Omplacements; to dostroy Qw-

Wrbed vire lentanghoweats; to injure the pernonael in Oie Onemy trenches

as rwch is possiblAq and to pravout the reaerven from coming up to toose

trenolies, TIII-- pre.,=Ation often contin"td for wevoral days untll the

Oerman orwilation wA5 s)ppowcdly crippled, Ita artillery damaled, and

Itz Inkntxy prVensive, OpMent, and tonae. Prartia," the xemst

strilin in t1lotwar vwaa for No Wantry to ramOn "ndor bombardment for

loir, titmi *tthout Wing able to Mm took trmchet. it IRIS a C11101

,nly thin,,,, comparabb u4th It *as tt,* ,,trafn on troops

who-440wtMt tlwl vould soon be ordered to Wason,
CAN --
on tho 4fonvive, the obscrv*r, 111te other

1*0 at would bzppaa Wt, w*s apt to blc


norvouu and unCc)!tn1n of himself, 110 bad no Iflin or, 1mtt)A_ to ZMde

MT-, and he had to takeo thimp -as they cm"w, He never Im* w*thar sm*

cnemy riowrnt ims a Zentiirw assault or only a f#lnt,

Frm, t)'o-- tine Illmn tlic- #MW714ijkft to pr*pme for action and

the actual adv=co, the observet's vorkimbWSPme almoSt continuous. 114

had to lc-trn the direction from uhich thp lpmy upold attact, and all

of thf information he gatb*xad had to b# report#d Whediately. The

er"nyts artillery preparation .3. Ily was atned against tMt part of

the- front which would No mttackk; bvt ttmm 'was alols the pot-Ability

that the tnfty would alm its assmItt st ior4z other point*

When tUe-onemy vas f1w1ly luvfted, tim obmtrver then had to

discover wtwther the cntrv Intetfdod to try anotftr rmh. Tb* nev front

lines and their relationship to t4e old o#im4 were 41ootefived. **on the,

Froch Infant*rI vas stoj)pwl, the Froneh umm4ly <14& in at oncg; but in

a sinilar situation the (A466 infantry into the shell

hold-, and uod thoh as the Oftsft or, t1VW1T mo-v SY941 of
Plioto[raph.-, ahmmd thcon mattors quickly nd cleeYly,, *nd they also

indicated how tt-4 Tinos 'would 49me to be orUmted and stren,thon#d In

order to k" tift ft I*ftt iw, po*mfl I As Id lines h4ki,, be*n,

TW tacMnaisgano& nOW40W, lost saft of its lmpotft#tw -vihen the

grotiad foro@s reachtod a stalOvt!P In th st 't,44-Or of t* wm7r- In

at least t1,70 io4w ft, homimr, QW f;au or; to uttliz*

th#tr obsorvation *vlation to t%1* fu in"we'ry

critical tituatloris* the 14#jOt6bl* lact, op In

DArd=elles ctwjf4tn during the

the AustrIans wre pmmftted to

0 to Wit"lout t'* Italian,, re-211zin"; tbc

qF ration. Ttm di=.ter nt CAporttto I&te in
1917 a hl C"ftr the -t'ar. 7
be 14 In triportmmc of tl-*

orttnm of t1w photogrnplilc mlssfon.

of and n' o""a I - s" bot h :S I des C O'U Id '1,3 in t:a i n

Qail*Owttl* -Aaps In a or, almw-,t dally r#vf-,,,,,1on, Ikotographs

for *omm4cs had to be takw ttic ship waz flylag on an even

aourft at a fiwad altXtudft Aviators a scrioss of point,,
6h tNe aroftd-4nd fllell; in a stfftrlit lfne over the area to be

Photogilrbed., tu n made aucceasivt whilc rmappiw,

r'W4 r P 1 t5 wert sealedd; s*e vart enlarged, some
reduc*1; tAy4of p4W tosethor, zenerany over m outiina riap

Of thia, t tt* oVpr1appIn,, pzart, coincided. The tihote

mosaic, 100154& 1 aw pvzzle--, woz. t1ten photq;rap1*,d, onking,
one., picture, t atr-.y savcd by producin3 comprthcnsive,


leal P the cznc-fa polntcd domm-inrd,
4&*d nj ortion. They used for -*naral information and for
--alitary The obliqut pboto-

trapils" but froa Angla, sav* a sort o

tic MOM -w U 'AlMance in war tmAps but:

40wwww*for ohoving contour7s araid, topogrl,-ffilcal dot*115 which
AgMik- Phot so Staftoscopic photo'3raphy

# 44WULj440rid War (11#w
T" 32.



brought out relief Zeatums =4 N040d 1ntzj* to astimatt 1wiaht

and depth, Unt"s ho uv,,ro only a 4#* hunIFIL*t hi&, the aerial

Obstrver could tell not"lin's Aboot tht f of obj*ets on tl* ,roun*--

for txample, the dopth of tronchot. NWWWft did a4t*,,-,ular pthoto-r*ph

indicate much about depth. A sbercosco,)1c photo I-two Pict-a-res of

the saw obmt tak*n aide by 51do-brought out the misaing Cacts.

At the outbroak of the u* CermmW *Nw*kft jk wre, Vold I

cqutpped for photooraphy; none of prkpared to pcrforn,

ni; spe-Jalty. The Gtz-,"mr, 1mro tfRt'W1.^,arn %i-,,at sort oE aerial

photoggmpha had vsluv- They soon realiz* that *hflo 6,000 fqet was

a high attitude for visual reconn* ttw toOphoto Ions could

take pictures beyond the r;mSo of thtbbest wt1*-#1rcrvrft guns. T1,*-Y

wcr* not handle'4pped, as ;mre t* Allies,, In so"ring c&,Aera lemsas;

boforc the war Germ,=y and Austri# *4 atipplied ttm world with

optiaml &Loss. In ord<-,r to establish her first photographic oections,

Britjin T-m4 to ndvgrt1se for privataly %,nwd An=,, And to pay top

pricam, for t4mop. TLw first 13r1tishWr*l photograph vw,, taken in f

Novcmt,*r, 1914, nt Nci3ve Chapell** FrW* did not establish her

,Ystmn of allotting one photoaripthic unit to anch arny until Dccenbcr,

1914; And Britain was a month Ltlrr In puttl&hc photogmaphli nervice
0 #1 rst V*w4:L of Opomt1m 0
on an OfficAent basig. During the

British photogr#phlc section In Pmnca only 40 W*-tives-s*re developed.

T* rrench Air Service toon demonctrat*d thAt $ photogr#ph

could bcor t0sn over mwi" linws,., T)rotiaht baeL to the *tV4tR*1.i4, d4vtloped,
printed, interpretcd, Aud fd'r"'Imlded to tlWqfttil In 4 -Vr tim

as 15 minutetq. This, of cmm"111' II. but thme tuo hour&


s valuable Intolli,, cc uas con,,-Id*red

13 YY of t" *art onc &,Irplana out of every fmir on

for photo,-,raphic strvlce.



T11storical _ZIck;ro=0 of tbqW*cr1can.Ajr 4rvice

5anja:,In Fran1:1in witnes,5ed tht fir--t successful frt&-balloon

Eli-ht of hwzan bein-s wlooi 'h* ww; United 1jtat4em Mininter to Vraace

In 1783. by thlL =d subs*qucnt ascensions, Franklir

repcrted his obserwitions to his saf*ntltic frifitidn. La ter 4e

su=csted mic uac-s foi: this "new born bab7,0 InaWdin- thie w7iploymcrt

of ballo=5 a-, a of troop rinrr)ortation. 2

During the spring of 17QO4, a Paris nouvjwpsr r*portca the

nscension of a hallom in PhlladelpliiA on Deetr+*r 23, 17-53. 3 ja-mas

U11co-, a local cnrpcntm, and some zmiowls rode lit a cage Which ms

liftod by 47 'Lalloons. rne= appear; to 5a no evidence to 5ubstmtiate

thif sto)'7. 4 Ln a WAlloon 434-nzion which toolt plaea or JuI7 17, 1784,
utter from Franklin to Sit Jo, idcnt of t1w
Royal So--Ioty In Lomloii, datarJ Decem Labaree
and IZ-zitfield J. Bell, Jr. (ed.), 'Mr etwo krom ills
Pc-r-onhl T-.,gttnrs (New 11avoni yala P'q. 55-58
o504 r-"o
2 $cc rran1,11-i's letter to ,Tzin Tn3erh z Aaftd January 16,
1784. ibio., p. 53.
3 jour-nol do "arts, mrLy 13, 17,)4, P. 535.
1+ Joseph Jaclson, "Vie Flr--t
!Inzazlne cw,' 'Ind 3104r h 0
A ;a 411 forgp
"Notcej on the M*nninaspof I 1CVt"
Amcriczm 11istortcal Review* XXV



Peter C+s, an wjojodjWoofftnt of Baltimora, topplid from, the

basket as h1r, hot 4wir balloon be to risc.

The first swcoesvZut *sp*nslon oZ a balloon in the Unittd Staton

vac m*do on January 9, 1793, 4kt Phllsd*lphia by the darin,- Frcm,,h acro-

nalut Joan riorre Blenabard. A swbatantlnl tund hod been subscrlbld to

provide for the Prtsidcnt of- the qnito-d

Staten, vas on* olu tl* Cor t patroun of the af"fair. Blt-mchard0s

hyaro,,,cn ballom rosj-- frowtWy*rd of the Wialnut strcct Prison in

philadtlphiaAnd wa rrled by t1w wind to land in Deptfor(I Toims-Mp,

Ncw J*rscy, 46 m1nu larer+ Ills initial vc-loome by the citizens of

Deptford va;% not particularly cordial. Had Manchard not been trmcd

with A pmsport furrVM#d hin, by Pres1dont Wk$hin-ton It might have

boAa fatfil* for non*Oof the Doptford poople apolze Frtnch aad Alanclwrd

spokle no Emeglish. Blanchard, howemr, qttlckly returned to Philadelphia

to 5* rewaivod by ?M#14ont Washlnl**.ton at tl* 1wcutive Mansion.

S&,v otl-mr Jmerlcam wrw Also interertod in those early

wq)eritents-vlth balloomn. At o*rly as Fobruary, 1734, Thonts icHcrSon

was concerned with the: probl" of n1litary defetive and maritim. trade

,,which tl* dcvalopftnt of balloons n"ght prenent. 7 Jeffcrfon's close

friand, Francit Ropkinnon, %71* Pas Initially mconcerned x1th balloons

and tiiRnpx*kn*d iath their pot*ntlalitl6s, faootiously cmpar*d the

5 Dalloon Hoax," pp. 51-52.

;e 314ftc-Wd, Joufmil of M Farty-Fifth Ascerslort,
(Pill lphla*# Charl6t, List*

5ft. to Francis Hopl-lnaon, dttml
of Thomas Jcffer-,,on, V1, 542.


flyinQ 3pbore to a pa-ipou.,, politiclan-

full of hot air . driven along by evvvy curront of Wind, and
those i:lio si-iffer t:'acn,clves to be carriod up by then run a 3reat
Risk that tho Bubble may burst and let then ftill fr4on the Height
to whlc7i i 1)rinciple o- Levity har rni--ed thuq_8

1,itc in '!arch, 1704 after construction on a Mllo= had be;un in

Piilladcl hia, lloplAnson noted ;Ith som contwpt tlu witle-,prand T)-,Jbllc

interest !a Nnlloons. 9 !Itnln two "lontlis 11C beca-4 Infcctcd wit"i tile

balloon fc-ver and joined hi-, frian4i in c:tporfm,mt:l with hot 11r

hi I loons 10 Jcf'Lcrson, too, t7a,_ fascInated v-ith thc novelty. 11

The u_-c of, the millt4ry balloon by the United StatcS Army was

first propo-,ed durin- the scminole 14r, on Sopteqber 3, 1340, Colonel

John 11. Silerburne, wlao had fir3t-hand c,:pcriencn In r1oridn, wrote to

the 1-1ccrctary of 'elar, icel rolwsett, that the protrnctc6 tffort to

forret out these Tndlans for rtnoval to t,,te Want -,-A-ht be c-Npc:Ited by

the uSe of balloons. n,* -,criltropical j-unlles &nd -vt1domer's tcrrain

of Florl6a it nclt difficult to stirpriw, rrou-i4, and dcfcat the

Zndian,'. A. sl-,etch and simple, plan of no,turnal ascmsions_ and
Lett-cr frot Francis Hopl ,arch 12, 17,-!,, i4id., V11, 20.
9"The Zimlle of Con-res-- is nLm_,t for',,,ottcn, 4knd for onb F-ersan
thit All mantion that Respectable body a 11131 1 t-,a I T o ' ,m A I r
balloon. I have a sinuulor ReaarA ror Ccmtr will thcrefore asl:
an unfash1o=1>lc Westloa. Mien mayme hope t C0114ress tillit Way,
an, ,Iiat are thcy doin-? But T -row saucy and havo not Tim* noi *Von
for thtkt." Lctter fr=1 Francls HOPIJWSan to T*ftas JOfh.-r_-On* rch 31,
1734, !bid., p. 57.
10 Let-ter froz;i Franci,, floplfnnon to Thomar, Joffercon, May 12,
17034, Ibid., ;). 246.
11 Letter fron Thomm,,,, jofftrton to J*ne#;4"rp#, datcd May 21,
1734, ibid., p. 230.

by dl-light a,,raults 't=3 prcs'ented. The Wheels

nt turTteO slouly and althou-h the natter was

cubjected to adgbaaiderabI4 ahount of consultation and coordination,

nothlnr, bi the4=y of final decision or acw action toot-, Pliace before

tlie- war ims brought to * clor-&. 12

tn 1346, durin- the ftxicnn war, Joln Wisc oE Lanca--tcr,

Paimsylvants, propoftd t1w us* of a captive talloon secured to a warshlp

as a neans for tl* Otriftl bObzrdment of Eort San Juan de Ulua' Vhich

gwirded the harbor of *ra Cruz. 13 Durin3 t4a latter Part of the year

the 1,*r Dcpartmcnt wa-, Involved with t1w fox,wlntlon of a plan o attack

on th15 fornidable point, 1,1150 soue*t to -,hov how the use of an acrial

wonpon uou4l reduco, eoats In nore7 anid Aive.-. Tho War DcpartTrent

pl-eonholed M: su3aestlon and even ne-,lected to ant-wer It. Finally

It was doci(104 to taVe Vera Cruz 1y lan6in-s tviar thc port and land

assaults on tlin c1tv rather t1m attenpt to Imock out tl-EC fortnes's and

inwide Cron tfie 8eft* 14

in 1859 -io'4m "A.-ge and a*ttc companion-, flev IA7ro--.i St. Louis,

to flcndcr-,,on, W7 Yorl*,, a diatance o" 1,100 -milos, in IcsS

than 20 hours. 15 Other lon--dlstanm M34t,, ware nct ilwayn so

Oydon, "First Att=pts nt 11ilitary Aviation in
tlv@ gnited State*," J6 of t14-Avoekfc4w llilitary HL-tory
11, No. 2 (Swj*rl 19'WT* IP05.
13 J01M Wis", system O .10W40tics (Phlladclphia: Joseph A.
SPWI, IP,50), n. 257.
14 J-es'tin v. smitil, R&War With llc%Ico (Nm Yorl: IlAc-.,Allan
Co.t 1919)* it 349-355.
I STW 4 a r"ord not equs I I ed tintl 1 19 10.



successful* Later tMt aanc ywr tuto bzilloonlstctcok off fron

,.Iat:=tmtm, 'ork, and u-cre blot.m. in WW balloan 300 unschwdukd

liito tli,, wil4wrnam5 of Camda. rhar"cii lost in tho Zf'oreat '.-or

nearly -a xcL- but vmre fimally rosmtd by 4 pftty of Unbarman. 16

Balloontata uere int&riwtad in = aerta14 row-,Ins, of t4c Atlmntfe

Oce= throug4iout tw nincto4wth country. Tn 1844 Cdgar Allen Poe, in &

calebratod h~% priatetJ in a *Neu Yo.-*'* nompa-.,*r, qmo=cad the accc-,I-

,)MsIrAent of this enterprim. 17 A nuw#W of acrommits announced t1mir

1ntwnt1on:,, of tmdorttiling the vo7iaj#' and jirev#llad upon Con,-,ress to

approprwAftp funds for a trans-44ontle E111-lit. No *deral funds,

hovTwr,, ftr# ,,at n--Idk for th*&P vl$ionary sc In 1358 the

coo, plotion of the layina of a trans-Atlantic tcl,*Sraph cabli by Cyrw,

Fleld inltlate4 new lnfttvat In f1jftts. Swe largc

balloons, vore tw4lt and tested but non# oE tb*R i*v4 M* fllgbt. 13

Tht Union aml#n adoptcd t4c bnlloowft*r1y In tha Civil Wnr,

u,,ln3 it tt the FftSt A-attlo of Bull Run, in LD61. Thaddewz,, S. C.

toix, -a civili*i #mployod by t1'm Army of the Pot=ac, nadt a rae

bmlloon C'11:7>lit afttr tht defeat of the Uhion Arny and v= able to

o hnervo ond to raport 14 Confvderatc Advanca. 19 DurLng ttio reor-'aniza-

tion of the Union A=y following, bull Pvn he tia4 daily aseensions to

16 t- said, S#ptaWW 29, 1851); p. 1; Octob-,r 6, 135q,
........... ....

17 Nft, York., Apri 1 13, 1844, p. 1.

is Sm 0-
w belloon Umgilastc* peraiqsWd In ition to croso
the Atlantic to tui A. It-, -_w'qTTTbov IC In
a Tnlloon," ciw tober, I
*M r 0 1"* *.
19 N -_
Fradaric4 S* I
Armies (BnItImorat. jolms

20 Profeiksox Lowc, as Cbiof Aero-

can Balloon Servicc, res,pon5ible only to
with ono Army capt*ln, 50 nonooml-7-
and a nw.bcr of voluntcer civillii
1115 oqW4peat comit-,ted of fotir 1)alloon--,
tvo hor -a- ns ond #vt aald cart tor t4c zv;

In the Peninsular C=
vatim hWoonA&4v.-#* with varyin-1 Asl&
frcn, report,-. awl aotivity, ,mother fQnctlon of the
or 22
balloon th tioa m' artilleryy fire. DuriTV, thc
YorIttowilITIC ho1ft4&,cnb1c anapped vlhllc Mejor ,Oncral Vitz-
John Porter, an a Union corpr, cmmandar,, cn,a8ed in his
ob**rvftlon' tAnd tw would have conw dmin
belAnd t1mwk A r Om
"n < U' 0'
Th 01W ound Ricihwnd In tlie spring of 187'62 t4a Union
#WCt1vAJW o91W 1'alloona* On the first d'*- Of the
n up in one of Lovm'5
a -ab to 94 9-mop',Wlph lino. Vor SMIC
xllasrD not itl t1le Cowmand OstOut

'Lpp 205 40 280-303.

of thQv
III p. 274.
ncrics nt=47 ,,rcacding


In the Wnr Donnrtment Office to AhS443tan. The ona3rawracn nn4 sonators

asscmblcd therc Are thua prIvilege:4 to got battlKieW reports from the

front bKore the Cawandin, General weelved thorl, 'Alat Value this

particular arrawancat va5 to Connr#as or to the prosecution ci the 'war

:cnaina a nystory. Z4

A copy ot a roport cr, one of La

:fountain, N4io on AUg=t 10, 1861, tiade two asconsions to 3,00 feet

over an area ovcr the YorAtown ponknouln in Virninja Is of Intcrest.

11is sketch sh4n7s siweral Confederato blvouics, near lunpden, W-wport

WS, and PIC Point and rcports the nAmbex and type of Shipq near

Norfolk and In the James River. 25 Aa obeervation mission from a modern

airplane could hardly have pvtn bettcr informotlon, =4 La Z&uatatals

rtconnuWAnct report must hov* boon no5t *Kcano to 140011W, staff.

on Junc 1, 1862, Acronatit Low-, obsi4rving fror, an

altitude of 1,100 Wat, reported the tormetion of a Inr3c conntcy-

nttackinw force nbout to attick near 110';31r Oav. UnlmoT,;n to tY

Conkdtratcs, McClellan =5 We quickly to Ws to stet this attack

and defeat It. 76 At Fradurich5burS in Novbwber K Sw xa& yew,

howcvc-,r, iajnr General Ambro-s4c Burnside Vat; nisled by reports of his

balloon ob5orvers and foolishly attawktd General Hobert E, Lie,

Haydon, Acrogggtics in t'he
25 Reproduatiaori of one of tlv-* Earliest Reconnalsaunces, Reported
by John Loa Wyontals, Aeronaut, MGM 10, 1861 Q p1W fran Lhe
ori,-,inal In the Old Record,; Section, Of floo of t1w 496A"nt Nnar0l),
in the USAF 14D Archives.
26 3, Dflicial Rucordt, 111, 279-20.


WWI= erroneously that OV*r half of Leela army WS at a considerable

distance froa NoWrIaWbura. The Qn0derans exhibited little fenr

of t1w Union balloom As the special worrespaYeat of the London

Ti=s noted #t Frrdtr1chsbur.e,, "Thc a-T*rioace of tmnty tiontlis' 1,7ar-

Earn boo taught th", C."27
OP-Mv little formidshIc such vaacs of wnr ax

In t)e sWe imod*0 terrain si. nontli,,11 later

No t1van tlircc oaitive ballemos, in char3e of skilled observer--
loaked down upon tho Confederate carthomrks. Signal stations and
obswvatorles Imd been 2stabijahed on aacH commnndjn,3 Might; a
Me of field telegraph bad been laid from Falnomth Ancral
Joseph llooltcrls contmd post3 to Unitod Statcs Fords 4nd the ChItf
& SON, had outtarflaY, rcmained at the fornor village In
conmunICAtion V+th Ganorat SKIwick. . it seemed impossible
that a 5innIn Confoderat* battalion could chan, 08ition
without both Rolm md 04300 bcing at once advined.38

5-:t in t1A i0arlY MOrAIN**, Of 057 Is 103, rivor nim rom over the
Chancellornvillo b4ttlofiold, looker's obaervation was blinded, and

tho nentt dn!,, Stonciiill J,-
Hooket-18 rQht and gain cna of the outstanding Confederate victories

of the var.

Soon thcroafter the Enllooii Corp.5 iian trartr>fcrrtd to the

contyal & the STnal Cwns. It= the Signal Ory tommandcr, Colonel

,QLaort J, Qyer'', uas unel4le to -s,?-*cvre the -,en and mate"riel lie dcr-,cd

necannavy, tht ronsvnMded t1vat the Bnlloon Corpr bi abollohed. ills

suf;gestlon um, acted upon and the Ailloon Corps ims discontinucd in

June, 1863. 29

77 LnaQaTjn, January 1, 1361, p. 9.
211>1 Da
WrZy an Am! Awmican
i V I 111km t and
And MnA V, LAW, 4PS; our_ ormy--GI.;
"Now MWIMMIss, 1 3)j pyo 37-3C.


After this disbandimnt of the balloon corps in Junej 136a, a

1,,intus ot, nlno&,t 30 ycari follovcd, wh1ch the Unitcd Statft

,-ovorrriant m=ifestod virtually no lnteve5t in *ervautic-r. in IM7
Tlri,-Adicr Caneral Adolphus W, Greely, 30 who Wad Won t-iprqw* by thi

billoons cnp1o.*,vd -durin- the Civil liar, was appointed Chief SiMal

0,tlt:nr and Anitilted 4 ncv intcrest on the Wt of tho Linited Statcr,

Amy W ni2ronautics* 31

Onc of GcnarAl Greely's first novi-, touar4s the rosurrection

of -Jljtarr aviation ;ns to aond to Froncc for a b*lloon, The Oweral
32 witch Grjttlys A,-,tntr, procuvtd 1)n Fr=,:tj uts- flioNnl at the
Columbian L.Vosition Iri Olca-o in 1893; latc-r tt* balloon wes 5*nt

to Fort LoNm, 'Colovado, i4wrc It i;as uaed for training purpwws.

About this $am tirw, Ivy Baldwin, -a proqftonial eporq*ut* enll-.tcd

an rar,,,,,Onnt to hove ctuir-c of tlw 'aUoon. By 1896, hot4wvar, At wa:

vorn out a;id lixl to be di=nrd-,*t1. Sarzaatt Tvj, Baldwin md his vffe

conotructe4 the =,.-t United StOes Ammy bar1low%.

Durin,, the Span i sh-Alwr i cmhp Witt, fought fluring tt* svmer Of'
k- -,rwl "'orps iqas put
119', First LieuNthant Josov'tl E. Miiold ol: tb#, 517

in charp of balloons for the eitpeditionary forc*, Deepite thil

confusiort and di--ordtr st Th-apa, Florldat Liujgptiant 11**Icld azsembled

30 4rctle durin- the
first Tnt M 1 YiMr dtt V% dlv vecounted In A. 1.
'QztjeAlm In t 1 I
To4d, Agp&" 0 Okll -d (nW Yo). licGraw-RIll Book Co.* 1961).
31 Russell J. Parl-anson, "Uhrtq4 States S"W^Orpa D*rloon.,,
1371-1902,11 zillitza Affalr.,;l XMI (ikbruary, 1961), 197.
35, Thin ms an ironic name-f*r ttk# logr 1AA3
rccormndation of Col. Alb*t J. MWYft til
dif=nt1n-u,2 the ur,,e of balWns,


hi t and c=SWIcd for Cuba on thr Rto Grnndp.
not 3410* Pernluslun to unload his troops or

5UPPO*A#1kfOr six1i"af tcrmthT Invatlon force had dlio"barkod tt

LOMAS. IV; ashillo it xNas dincovored that t1A balloon lizd bean

damsW by OW, moisture, and rouali haadlin;, RelardWs of tho fact

tImt t1he bmllooava:, tmflt for twit operation, three anaaat:!; more
corKed out on Ka*Wt 139S. The pruacroc of Admiral Curvora's flast

in SOntiA, harbor mis *tflnitaly confirwO and Inforaotlon an the 4

terrain u0s 5upplicd to the commander of the Zround force, Cancral

William WaVer.

On thc nex.tQWN July 1, 1891* alainst Ma:,f ield* z advice, the

1alloon' O*rryln"' 4"W Colonel Gcor,,ge Derby, ShUtcrts chief

enzWooring Offiver, w" Alod tl oen Weld In the reay of troops

vQt1n3 to aa5autt Ina Juan M11*T** nounandcrt; Imnefited fr&-,i tlv"-

reports of We obscrv#rn. SOMAopening of artIllary fire wnq =33onted

and routes of adv*nce imro spotted. Infantry troops, hounver, did not

volc&e the antra attontlon 31VM% tlielr ariw_ of tlw battleficld by tae

Spenloh lunuars who diracted a strjoMrof fire at the balloon. In a

4&rt 04MI4 th$ balloon warmso riddled by Spanish 5hot that it came

So*%mg dava with its joOMMAtyr, Colonel DoNy, never reQ01n; a

4boxch. 33 Tho UNnOURV Synt**Army balloon service uras
A L_
;Aia 41mg-
aftin the S GOTAUM cnii War,

t oC thov balloan activities I;s
III AStuAy of Wr 14ar
1131), P?. 230-280; ind
(3019ton: Litt1c, urom and


11-tc Signal Corp-:, under tlie leadersIMp of Gcrieral,,, Aclolphus 14.

Grooly =6 J=es Allim, who Grooly i,- Chlef Signal Officer In

1905, Tlaintniiied an actIve Interest in nillitary Wronlutlcs. Not only

did the 31,-nat Corps, seek to Promote tbc ob-,crvaticn balloon but it also

encoura-ed Dr. Ec;minl P. Lan-ley in his acro)aaut1cnl remarh.

leaders of the 31,emal Corp5 aalled attention to dcvclojmcnts alon'-, this

linc at home and abroad, aa& ur-ed thQ ado-tion of, apj,ropriatlon meastires

i,;Mch would emnbte the inmy to talle ftill ndvantarre of aeronautical
C-.p*ritentation na relatcd to milltary rEconnaissance.

At the turn of tht cantmry Intorczt In military aermautic,_ was

enhanced somewlint by the txperimontAttoo of, Lorioley and the Wri-lit

hrothcrs and the rltso of ballooning as a sport* nic latter was evidenmd

by thc, activities of the nouly oraanizcO Acro Cltb of ncrlcn Aiich,

4m)ever, ,,as Interested no well in the nore scrious business of hclnln;

to pror;iote the pr0,',rC,-,s of aviation in genar,11. A smnll balloon

dctaclrcnt tooi rart in the ar-my marpeuver-, In 1902, but was diScontinucd

34 A 30noral iib.^,Vlntintion for the suc ry statement about the
military avlation #xTerience of the 1jaited lxfore har cntry
Into ;orld Wnr I may bi found in the =nual report-s of ttiv Chief Signal
Officer. Vor morc -peclfic refurcmes scc: Clayton Disaell, ErIef
lllstoiT of tho Air Corps'and jt., Lat(,-t_ Dcvejopment.,3 (Fort Nonroc, Vn. -
Const Artillery School Pres-, pp. 3-9, 'C'handIvr and 110V
Our Armv Grdmm-'-', pp. 12-178; Arthur The 4merican Air
'I"Ift" --5-1rez
Service, A M004 of 1" proia!R2,_ its Dirtlim1t, TFS ra I and
Its Final AC !JIMAvients (Nitto York: D. AppletWan (hcrczfr clfa4 as Te, Am#:rimn Air Servicr ; and Lloyl Morri,-, md
Kendill SnIth, Ccfjjn,,_ tInjimited: The StojX of AmorIcan Aviation Frm,
KI tt I: to Sun sonics (N&v York. Co., 1953), pp. 145-159
y 11aW erc
(hcreAf t4tr citcd a,, Ccl Jag Unlinited), Brief a-count- iceampanled by
approprInto pictures are ound In A Chronicla of theAxtptlon IndQstrv
In A-Licrjcaj_190,3wl947 Olarri;burr,, Pa.. J. lloraue m ne Co., 1943),
pp. 7-13; Iiistoricil Offlof of the Arriy Air Force-;4, clal pictorlzli
History of thc AAF (New Yorlt: Duclij, ,lo*wand Psar ), p:. 21-35;
and Alfre4 Coldber- (ed.), A III-story of twUhlte" Air Force, 1907-
1957 D. Van Mostraffd Co., Tnc., 19Z)WPP. 211

J~ur 7
s~prlyAj~e te. .4 io prl; 197 te Sgna C1
puretoo a allon fom he Lul, Coard irmin arts An InJun
divaledKwoCn1+t~d~anto eranut~al uty
on A~st1, 107,Gkaral ame Alln, hlo Sigal ici

of he nied tom Anyannuned ho oaionof n ctoautc !
Divsin WNth S~na Crp, hi uitu*6no u t hnde ll
mato rehot~a t Onlitry alloCairmacinon aa nl MO

Meet." aptin, ARM Chndle, *to ad ln; eaninteostd i
miliaryWo~lcsvk- apoinad a hod o th nevdivsio. 3
Captin ho.ias WN Wlt te frstdiriibl baloo


an hour nnd i;,jrrled onou-h :tunj or a of 125 rilles. Carrltod ott

tmder official nuspla,2s, the Fort Myer te5ts, which at thn

time were considered to lmve, been rather ri.-Id, ereat*d nuch riore of a

stir than the M.,11it at K'itty 11auth, fiw ycsr; earllcr4 Enthusla2m tin's

arountd to n hysterical pitch and the coi)ld scarcely find

.,ufficlant prairQ for the m1-11 U&r tool, A few daytq after the fIrst

tes;.ts caum a tra,*Jc avaImpin-, On Sapt44pbar 17, 1908, Orvjjje Urf-')'t

t 'k off fra',i Fort 1'.Yer with First Li*utjnfAt Thomas E. Selfrid;7,e t5 a

pn5sen-ar, tnd --s a result oE a Zuy wirc oAilln3 a prop*llcr the plane

crashed, hilling Sel'rldgo and injuring Vjri-ht saverely. It was

itvidl-nnt that nlLhou,,'h flying was aa acconpllshtd fact, -aviation i-M' in

Its rude beginnin-,,s and th# nzen who i*nt into tho air had to faice ("rave

It wa,-, not until after thd El"I rest In August, 1909, that the

1,,-nr Dejertxnt acqulre, Itr, Brat oirplane,

A,, >art 6f OeIr original contract witb the War Dcf>artmcnt,

the rl-hts had a-,,roed to tkach two officers to operate the iiachine.

Th Octobor, 1909, '6111bor W1,1,ht trnined Lltutnannts Frank P. tatri and

Frederic ;-" 11=phrlts, at a fte4d at College Pax%, .'%aryland, Shortly

after Pcrfor.,,iinn -,olo fli'-Tit, both of there offietwa imre ordered to

return to their ro4ular d4-Vet,,, LaIn to the cava1rj-,-*#d thinphri*s, to

the O"Infers, leavina twsiznal corvwfth no qU*14Q4&P11Ot4

Firr>t Lieutenen t blkjwnin
unoMcl-al flyln& training fra.wNilbur
1-Y wawk 4#as P10044P ch4w' of

tw Arrnyls plane, which 'w*s moved to Fort'AW I HOWm4w
the vinter vcathor vould zillow more flying. Fo to f ly b-

a bit 0 tralnfiv, by correaxwA" withthe 1j#! lb>y tr4w-and


4rror- 4011 1911 L1" V*t Foulois was tt)e only pilot in thk United

T* Aoroau*joal Dlvf-v Aviation Soliool at collo8e Park,

Maryl-and, u4a the covftd of Captain Charles Chandl*r, beg-an its

training, operatiAns In the summ of 1911, A =bt-r of of fccrs

leawrmd to fly at this nobool. E-,j>orWcnt-- in acrial photo,,,raphy from

an nirpidne w*ra z+uo conducted, Durin,, the wintcr rionttv the school

operated at Aupsta, Qcorgla, and in the winter of 1912-1913 part of

the avlAtIon school io@nt to San Diego, California, for furthcr trainin-.,

In addition to tMs ditaohmtnt two overscs! trainin.- zchoGl-- isere

6stablished; one In the PhIlIppiner,, and one in llawaii. Betwoon March,

1913 =d 1914, Llautcnmt tranl F. 1,nl7v traincd --averal pilots it a

suomssful school at Fort William McKinlcy near Manila. 36 Lieutenant

Harold Geiger wa Itss sjcc*ozful in his efforts to operate a pilot-

instruction cent4et at 7ort Mm*j*jejia In 11awali. During the latter

montlv5 of 1913, the lack of fa-cilitics zmd difficulties with the wind-

awapt terrain ad4d to the probjen,,, he 11ad %ijtj-L tlis z3caplanes c--uscd

Lioutmant C41,3cr to give up his enterprise. 37

I-ri Deccmber, 1913t the Sl.,=l Corpa decided to consolidate Its

traininl- activiti*s and entablial*d the Sf,-,nal Corps Avlfttion sclool on

North IslAnd near Seft Dteao, CaliforniA. In -addltion to pliot training

the Army Initiated grouwd training or the nonflyin- specialist needed

36 Report of the Chi,*f Slgzwl OU Ictr in U.S. War Department,
MmAwmat-, 1914 (Weshin-ton: Oovermeiit Printin- OfflcQ, 1914),

to operate airplaner, Dstin;uislitd aviation scienti!;ts frovi the

ittlitioni= Institution, s' illed tn-inoers frotn private lmlustry, and

ncteorolozlstu 'rom thc United Stat*,,, We4ther utironu w*re brought in to

supplevient the lnrtruction conducted by this school. 33

Ci July 18, 1914, Congrcsf, Vtabll.-hed tht Aviation Dvttion of

the Corpa an auttiorizdd ztrcngth of 60 ofticori and 260

enlisted Tien. It vms

charr,cd with tfic duty of operatin- or supervising the optrttlon of
all nilitary aircraft, hicludinS talloons aud lanes, all
applia=cf- p-crtalnln'-Z to n*18 crat; al" witli tht duty of trainInC,
of f i cers mnd enlisted ,m in nAttCrs perta Inin,-, to mil i tary

tic tct linitcd officcrs to unnnrricd lieuttmnts of the line, provided

for flyin- pay, and estnblished the acrimautical ratlaZs of Junior
Nilitary Aviator =d 11,111itary Avittor.

r-porience in karift Obiervatim

Me first artilltry direction to be flown by United

States Army airpllh4s wert ptrformed In liov=bar, 1912. 'rhe plan&n

ordercd the firc of the liattarles to the taratt!3, located the Inits, and

fon=ded thc nccr-,ssary corrictionn. The aerial observers co=unlc-ated

vith tht ground batt4rlts, t-y rndIotc1&3rap4yj, by dropped mossa-05, nnd
by snol-,( ,Iznals. Although thb -at-aalln- teQhn
0 4.1 *ft were crude and

subjcct to error, It im.-, found that plzmcs 'Llyin- at 2,000 fett could

locate tar-ats that eould not 1w fmnd in my other way. 41

345 ibid., P. 517. 39 n1d., p. 514. iffikL& ". .515,

41 r D",artment, AnnU4n 3,

d-w2imm-mmif m-

A i p a n s f u ~ y a m l % a h e n f p i o s f r m Cll g e
ON, VOIQM1 too pat I themanuvos coduced n th viiniyIo

Brlt*ort Cnactiut inAv~ut, 91 ad 11a Alho~hGice er
ordeed o priom acialfrco ahel~t o, oer ,0I

feet Myucr farly uccssfl empt ',,en hQInclmen wcthI
110td vsiblit* I msimpsgile o crry bsawrs1rtli ol
machnesuac aaept nde th mot faoralf ondtion an itua,
nooti~r formon piots o pr~r thcr on onervtio. 4
11= ht-nitd Waes 16 ot rco~izethe evoutinaI
govsrnen wichCetrl Atol~n, 1tirti ad etup ~e hezxzi
powe on ~brary 2, 111,a tost stuaion evelpedbetwenimerc

no longtr a Provis-ional or.,,anlzntlon, undcr tl-tc cmn.aud of Captain

Benj,=Iin Foulois, ryent ii d*t*,-,1v*ent of five officers hnd t1irce zfrpla'1105

to Galveston, Tgmar,, to join the United Statcs e,.* edition a," inst 'Vora

Cruz:. Tao tr=sports -miled bofore the deteelvmut arrivead and th*

plancs, never unpackod, rcturacd with t1w, dttacft*nt in July, 11)14.

Durin- 1915 Pancho Villta and his *Acan bandlt; anga3ed In a

mnber of aeross-ne-bordar raids into Tox-ao and New s"le-Aco. Another

detac1twht, agtin fron the 1--t Acro Squadron, N^s sent to Drounrwille,

Taxat, in April, 1915, Lieutenants Thoma,- M1111no and Byron Q. Jouts,

t lae p I lot5 of thi, s & tacivqomt f I ow over th* bordc r arw and we rte f I re d

on b,,t V411a',- -mn. A wriber of, r"onwlsasactc mit',sions wr* rlown but

t* plznes suffem4ad mtc'11=1cal difficulties and xre mostly =0epondabit.

*rly on the nornin8 of Mircli 9* 1916, a bond o Pancho Villa's

ieclco raided Col=bus, Net,: Me"xico, Ullin- tor at",bcr of

Amorican soldiers and civilians. A ponitive oxpedftloa Undcr the

ca,n=td of Ar13*d1dr Gjanoral Jobn J. Perrliln3 uas orderad to cro--s the

boracr =d caDture Villn. The Ist Acro Squadron, under tm gm-wand of

Cnptain Foulois, arrived at ColitnIxis, on Rarcti 15, 1916, In May, 1916,

ihcn it rcacl*wd its raxjmum stron-th, tMv, unit *mr, made up of 16

offlc#rs and 122 enlistod mm,

te7zporarlly tATTmn Into custody. Thou,,h thc-y were rolonaed 11*ith
reZrcts," t4eir comandin,,,,off leer xnkod for an-tpolo,'-'y in t1ve form
of a 21-gun -,alutc* lhvar4 refusod ;md thus btxo*o the clunpion of
em over-eiguty sqainaf t1va, fortlfm ar, r#wmr, UnAblt to f,,et imw,
iii knarica to ft-ht his northeTn anenies, 4mrta uO dft*1no with
Germn n,-Cmte, at a tint ulhon world oiinion 0,1 anti4xr TI-A
UnIt6d statcnoffended by tl,-Ie refunil to s4lute in A t
dctornined to prevent tho dilivery of 4 car-,o of 4-,Z,%a
vc--scl, *"uptzd Vora Cruz lwrbor.


6w* V t from Coltabua, Now to gn a-CwanCe6 ba,-,Q at

Cona Crandft,, q*Wco, on Mnrch 11), 1916, one airpInno turned back, m2

crac* up in a forced ni-,,Itt ljandln:, and th, other were forccd

dom In the dox1mc53. Tils "Irst m1s,,ton wa,, symptmatlc of the trond

toward failure thtt do"Od the Ist Acro Sq!ndron throu,-hout the Mc.%ican

e*peditlon. Thescoaring, liclahts of thc Sierra tta-drc Nountains, gu,,tj

atlabj du,-t, thd haat kGpt the rickety alrplnnea from bcln- usseful

rvchincs during thc sumaeor of 1916. On one occasion, Captatn Foulois,

who had landed at Chihu*Awa -city to dell-4cr dispatchiCs- to the mcrican

consul, 'tM,, arrested and jailtd. He ,ms rcl4ftisod but T-,*anwh11o a crot:d

of Mcmdcans I*d nutilated hi-s n1ane, burning holous in the wins wit'll

ciVrettet, slashing tbe,, fabria, =d rmr,:oV1n," 501me of the nuts and

bolts. FouloiWv#$ #bA# to fly ba,!k to hj:3 landing field. 44

By April 20, only two of th orl-Inal ej-ht airpianc-, -crc

still opArational, Thcy werc tal,.*en to Coluibus, conde=cd, and dc-1troy&.

Uot me of tke 12 replacment planes prov*d to be any more serviceable

thm tW *4wlier ones. 45 Short fli-,ht!; in -ood wentlitr, with mail and

to t* 4bout all thnt -,ouW 4C e7iDcct-d. 'ric I s t

Acro Squadron continued to 1>0 bau-cd nt Col-mbus until carly 1917, but

Ita opev&tlons vftr .!$%*Ico dirlaishad affter the s=m-r o[ 1916.

The c *r of h# **Tican punitive czp(ditlon to 11,!e:Ico,

Brqor *ar-al Jdm J, P*rahin,-, was not ploosed ulth tbe nvi-tlon
44 44
In, Jr.,, Witli PcrGhing Intlexico (Tiarrisbur-,
TIA11 Publi5hin- C0*1 1935), !1. 122.

C1 51,,vtal Of Ic--r in th* War Dcpnrtment,

scrvIce. He telt tlAt the prosencc ot aven on't depoxidablo scoutin-

plane would have served to prevent a n=bnr of ntedlcss deatlis of

Awerican soldiers. A wcll-trajned croup of aviator,- provided with zm

up-to-date Elect of plazien undoubtedly =ild linve been of value in

reconnoitering the sparsely settled x-ia,-telands of northern 40_xico.

Ptr-"Mn- finde no criictsn of lil,- oviators, thcir darin- and coura-c

ovoked Tils ',most onthusla-,tic at3nirationl" but lie not pleased with

t1ve performance of their antiquoted alrcrnft. 46

In comparlson witli thQ w1al otierations which verc goin', on

In i3uropC at the samf- time, the efforts ind accoripllsl-nants of the

l5t Aero Sqimdron in the !'Im.1caa punitive c,,pedItion wwre nost uns-pec-

tacular. Tn spite of Its poor c%-perl(mcc In -,illltary aviation, wlien

thc- United Statos entQrcd World Wnr I in April, 1917, sho was

coctnIttin- horself to action In Lit Air as well as on 1,-md and sen.

46 John J. Persnino) 'n' t'!2trionCO"" in thl Morld War (NW York.
Fredcrick A. Stokes Co., 1931), 1, 159-160.






P x ob I em, s_,o f _QrgAn i za t I m

1,1hen the United Statts declared war on Gormany on Aj>r11 6,

1917, the str<-ngth of the Acronautical Division of the Unlt6d States

brmy4g Signal Corps stood ot 131 officers and 1,067 enlf3ted Tien. 1

These were distrlbutod rou3kly into sexton sqmdrons. The 1st Aero

Squadron, fully orgAnIzed, ms locat*d St Colmmbus, Mov lexicon; the

2d qtiadron was divf&4 between San Mego, 041fornla, and the

Philippine-,,. The 3d, 6ch, and 7th Wre b*1nn organized at San Antonio,

Texss, Mweli, and Pananit, rtspectively. Tht two remalrin& squia4rons,

the 4th =d 5th, *re tn t4 process of btiin- organized, but veref

being used as dotact-z*nts in operating the flying gehools. The Sipnal

Corps Aviation Schools at tjiwola, Long IslMd, t*w York, #nd San

Mcgo, CA11fornia, we*re In operation as prit*ry flying sch"Iss of the

Regular A=,y. A school at Zssslr%ton, Penns7l-vania, hbd julkt b*n

and 11, li, I
0104 at 1919
(We th I ag, ton Owrfflim- ml i'- ftar cited
as United StatespArm" AN= ft Fro&,C!1510040wqf -

U.s., war Dep*tawnt' '04 WA P If 1
L.and lormjn t1w World woz.
(overrmont NqWting Offic*, 111AMM)l
Htreafter akted is t4ar W*rt"Nm"Wwoftt


qPMO for Nttlaftl Ouard Instruction, ana Glenn Curtiss vas operating

civilitm ochools at Newport NOws, Vir-,tnii, and Minmi, Florida, for the

instruction of 125 z*smtrve Aviators. 3

It Is di f f icult to determine hcn; many planes were In the

service on April 6, 1917, but on the prcvious Jantiary 5, there- vere 73

planes on order but not yet 8*11vered. ne A=,y had only 55 trainin3

plave,- in !F;erv1ce at the outbreel: of the, var, all of than entirely

without imr equipment and Valuelesa for aervice nt the front. of these

55 planes, the Natlo"I Advisory Co=,Ittee for Aeronautics, which was

conductln, a seAAntif1c Study of thh problvna of fliaht, advised that

51 were obsolete aud thw other 4 obsolcacent. The" i:ere no bombers,

no fightmm, And no service plVts. 4

None of 04 Srny pilots haa received any training that w"ld

f it them f or combat duty. Only Aeronautica I Divi s ton of f I cers had

any experLence In the orWization of persormel and materlel, or in the

tactical *sployaosnt ,,uvd coordimtion of aerial units with grnund troops.

F"t avfttion affictrs ted been piv*n tethnictl trtinint; As woron-autical

The balloon pereqnnel of thL- Aeronautical Division zt the

3 1414., P#rt 1, p, 93. tatlonnl Goard c=talned no
av+Wtit'On units 1-.t o Company, Nei.; Yorl National Guard,
tonal rcco,,nitlon as the lst
UA It sbanded In t4ay, 1917. A second
ork onal Gward squad&-ton kv in the press of oranization
otw I tbrmok of the war, but no Res*rve Corps tinits proper had

Ith Gorrmny, A Statizptictal $Limnry
IMM"Entft Printin-- Offico, L75
,AVr Service, MeritAn Expeditionary Forcan-,
P In Foulois Collection, USAF RD Archivcs.


outbrcnk of thc war consistad of approximately six offiters and 50

onli.-ted man. The Unitmed States Army po8sessed thrcc servlccahlc free

balloons and two captive balloons. The only facilitieS for balloon

traininr, tore at a ballocift school at Fort Omaha, Nebraska.

Advisory -anizetlons
., 2tu

scwxal technical board-s comltt*es, and councils fijrthered

the develoment of the United States Air Service by their Inwsti.-la-

tions, reseArch, and advice. The rinro irportant of these organization

worc: the Nation-al Advisory Ca,=Ittee for Aeronaotlc5; the Aircraft

1"roftction Board; the Aircraft aoard; tho Joint Amy and ToQhnical

Aircraft Board; the National R-Ozcarch Council, and the War industries


The National Advisory Comittee for Aeronautics was Istab-

lIsMd by tho Naval Appropriation Act of narch 3, 1915. During the

t7zir the Cornitttwt lnvtstigatid the condition of tha- aircraft industry, ;

madt recar=andatlons to the 14r and Navy Deparuments for Increasin--

tl-ic qoality prodQction of aircraft, recmaiended the cre*tlon of the

Aircraft Production Board; mado Avallnblq to that Botrd information

acquired by t4 Cccgiittee fr= a Census of thi production facilities

of manufacturers of airplane tnglnes; and took the Initiative In

organlzinS ,*round schools for aviators, It actvd as a cleariftghotisc

for Inventions submitttd to tho Army and NOty, *nd as a source of
1 .4P4- I
5Rcport of the Director of Military AegmVAtics in Wow ilkepart-
Ticnt, Annuml Rc2orts,, 1913, 1, M9,