Citation
Value orientations and modernization in two Colombian cities

Material Information

Title:
Value orientations and modernization in two Colombian cities
Creator:
Coombs, David W. ( Dissertant )
Vandiver, Joseph S. ( Thesis advisor )
Smith, T. Lynn ( Reviewer )
Saunders, J. V. D. ( Reviewer )
Iutaka, Sugiyama ( Reviewer )
Bradbury, R. W. ( Reviewer )
Place of Publication:
Gainesville, Fla.
Publisher:
University of Florida
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
1971
Language:
English
Physical Description:
xiv, 324p . ; tables.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Cities ( jstor )
Cultural values ( jstor )
Fathers ( jstor )
High school students ( jstor )
High schools ( jstor )
Medical students ( jstor )
Persona ( jstor )
Schools ( jstor )
Students ( jstor )
Universities ( jstor )
Dissertations, Academic -- Sociology -- UF ( lcsh )
Sociology thesis Ph. D ( lcsh )
Urbanization -- Colombia ( lcsh )

Notes

Abstract:
The major proposition of this dissertation evolved from participation of the writer in a teaching/research project in Colombia and knowledge of two facts: (1) that the rare and degree of modernization are highly variable in the world; (2) that economic, biological, and geographic explanations for this variability have not been sufficient. Given this reality, it was proposed that these differences, and therefore the degree of modernization or socioeconomic development achieved by any society or group, depend, to a large extent, on the strength with which value orientations are held by the leaders of that society or group. This proposition made logical and empirical sense since it is known that cultural values, implicitly or explicitly, become personal goals for most men and that effective leaders set the direction and tempo of any social group, large or small. Drawing on Florence Kluckhohn's theory of variation in value orientations, it was hypothesized that community leaders in Medellin--Colombia ' s best developed city--would hold, to a greater degree than would comparable leaders in the highly traditional city of Popayan, Colombia, those value orientations associated, by Kluckhohn and others, with the North American middle-class and the "modern" personality. This was, then, a comparative study to test the degree of association between modern values in leadership groups and the level of modernization reached by the areas they control and manage. Because some variation was expected within the Medellin leadership group, other hypotheses were formulated to predict variation in value orientations according to salient social characteristics (type of occupation, age, . education, father's occupational and educational status, etc.). Since, however, the leaders as a group were too homogenous to be differentiated by social class, senior high school boys were drawn from various social class levels and their value orientations elicited. The comparison their responses with those of the leaders also permitted a broader examination of generational changes. Data were collected from leaders by means of interviews and from students by means of a questionnaire. In both cases the same instrument was Used--a Spanish language translation of the urban version of Kluckhohn's value orientations schedule. In Medellin 60 leaders selected from seven sectors of leadership—commercial, industrial, banking, government, quasigovernment, the church, and the university --were interviewed and 417 male high school seniors were questioned. In Popayan 59 leaders from the same sectors were interviewed and 154 students were questioned. Value orientations expressed by leaders and students were compared with a purely "modern" profile of value orientations. Gross results showed that leaders in both Medellin and Popayan preferred modern value orientations in two of the four arean tested and traditional or other types of value orientations in the other two. A more detailed analysis revealed that Medellin leaders did, however, make more modern responses than did Popayan leaders, although the differences were not statistically significant in all cases. This difference was even more marked when leaders from "economic" sectors of the two cities, such as the commercial and industrial, were compared. Variations in student value orientations followed the same mixed pattern as that of the leaders except that detailed analysis showed Popayan students with a significantly greater number of modern value choices than Medellin students. Despite some support for the prediction that Medellin leaders would be more modern in their values than Popayan leaders, the reversal of these differences with regard to students in the two cities does not lend unambiguous support to either the hypothesized difference between the two cities or the proposition that the value orientations defined here as "modern" are clearly associated with modernisation.
Thesis:
Thesis - University of Florida.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 316-322.
Additional Physical Form:
Also available on World Wide Web
General Note:
Vita.
Original Version:
Photocopy of typescript. Ann Arbor, Mich., University Microfilms, 1973. 21 cm.

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Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
Copyright [name of dissertation author]. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Resource Identifier:
023530713 ( AlephBibNum )
01143558 ( OCLC )
AAL8619 ( NOTIS )

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Value Orientations and Modernization
in Two Colombian Cities



















by

DAVID W. COOMBS


A DISSERTATION PRFESE'iTED TO THE :GRACUA7'E COUNCIL OF
THE UI7'"PERSITv OF FLORID.A IN PAflTlAL
FULFILLMEI T OF Tui.- EQUIRE.IEN'S FOR T:'E 0::GREE OF
D.-C'2'O OF PHrLCSOPH







UNIVFI -.S- TY :): FLORIDA
1 90 ? i














ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


First and foremost the writer wishes to express

his appreciation to the present chairman of his supervisory

committee, Dr. Joseph S. Vandiver, and to his former

chairman, now at the University of Alabama, Dr. Irving L.

Webber. To Dr. Webber gratitude is due for his guidance

in both carrying out the research for this dissertation and

in its preparation. Thanks are due to Dr. Vandiver for his

careful review of the dissertation text and for the useful

suggestions he made which strengthened the finished product.

Special credit is owed to Dr. Webber's wife Lois for the

support she gave the writer in both Colombia and the

United States.

Other members of the supervisory commiLtec,

Dr. Sugiyama lutaka, Dr. J. V. D. Saunders, Dr. T. Lynn

Smith, and Dr. Robert Bradbury also deserve the writer's

appreciation for their kind assistance and the services

rendered over the past seven years.

Grateful appreciation is cxporcsee to the Rocke-


ii






feller Foundation and the Center for Latin American Studies

of the University of Florida for the grant assistance

which made the Colombian research project possible. Extra

credit is due Dr. William E. Carter, Captain Rayiiond Toner,

and M!rs. Vivian 'Holen of the Center for their prompt atten-

tion to the needs of the Colombian project and its personnel.

The writer is, of course, obligated to his co-

workers in the research project, Alfredo Ocampo Z., and

J. Selwyn Hollingsworth, Their efficient, selfless efforts

in the organization and implementation of the research and

in dealing with problems encountered in the analysis of the

results, were all-important for its quality and completion.

In Colombia, a number of persons lent the writer

invaluable assistance during various stages of the field

research. Miss Susana Caicedo, Miss Nancy Henao and

Miss Ana Cristina Zamorano of the secretarial staff of the

Universidad del Valle in Cali spent many extra hours typing

lists of information, and rough drafts. Mr. Jorge

Valencia, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in Palmira,

went far beyond the call of duty in helping us organize the

pretest of the instrument. Mr. Ivan Amaya, Assistant

Manager of the Asociacfon Nacional de Industriales (ANDI),

iii








in Medellin, rendered rapid and invaluable help in drawing

up sample frames for the industrial and banking sectors.

To other informants in fedellin and the respondents them-

selves, an obvious and lasting debt of gratitude is due.

In the United States, a great many people helped

in the latter stages of the project and during the writing

of the dissertation. Florence Kluckhohn and Harry A. Scarr

gave us important statistical and theoretical insights.

Dr. Edward C. McDonagh arranged for the writer a light

teaching load at the University of 7.l.abrama which facili-

tated the completion of the dissertation. Mrs. Sue Free-

nan and Miss Naomi L. Chri:stian, secretaries in the

Sociology Department .t the University of Alabama spent

long hours typing rough drafts. Many others, too numerous

to name, helped indirectly in ways small and large.















TABLE OF CONTENTS


ACKNOWLEDGENTS . . . . . . .


LIST OF TABLES. . . . . . . . .


ABSTRACT. . . . . . . . . .


CHAPTER
I.


INTRODUCTION. . .


Organization of the Dissertation.


II. THE SETTING .


The People . . . . .
History and Background. . . .
Why the Antioquenos . . . .


III. THEORIES OF MODERNIZATION . . .


Defining Modernization. . . . ..
Environmental Theories of Modernization
Sociopsychological Theories of
Modernization . . . . . .
Cultural Value Theories of
Modernization . . . . . .


7. RESEARCiH DESIGN


Hyl otheses. . . . . . .
The Me P during Instrument. . .
;;icrory and aMothod of the
Scmpl in Process. . . . .
Field Procedures . . . .
Data Processing. . . . . .
P Statistical Portrait of LI'eadrs
Students Interviewed . .


.154
. . 57


.160
1:30
185


and


. . ii


6
. . . 1


. . . 6


. . . 13
. . 23
. . . 36


. . . 46


S. 46
S 953


. 73


S. 112


. 152





APPENDIX

I ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VO2 ION OF THE VALUE
ORIEN': ATTON INSTRUMENT. . . . .

II SPA'ISU-ILANGUAGE VERSION 0O, THE VALUE
ORi EN'.:RM.O TNSTRUMENT. ............


B1 OGPRAPHY. . . . . . . . . .

BLOGF:F TICAL SKETCH . . . . . . .


. 234



. 300

. 316

. 323


CIAPT LEX


V. RESULTS . . . . . . . . . .

Value Orientations in Medellin. . . .
Medclln and Popayiin: A Comparison of
Values in a Modcrn and a Traditional
City. . . . . . . . . .


VI. DISCUSSION. . . . . . . . . .

Value Orientations in M-edelln. . . .
The Intercity Comparison. . . . . .

!II. SUMiMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . .


206

207



237

252

252
267

273


V












LIST OF TABLES


Table

1 Numbers and Percentage Change of the Popula-
tion, Medellin, Bogota, and Cali, 1918 to
1968. . . . . . . . . .. .12

2 Educational Level of Leaders and Their
Fathers, Medellin, 1967 . . . ... 193

3 Leaders Fathers According to Occupational
Level, Medellin, 1967 . . . . ... 194

4 Social Class Level of Students' Barrio of
Residence, by School, Medellin, 1967. . 197

5 Students' Fathers According to Occupational
Level, Medellin, 1967 . . . . ... 200

6 Students' Fathers According to Educational
Level Attained, Medellin, 1967. . . . 203

7 Value Profile of Community Leaders,
Medellin, 1967. . . . . . . ... 208

8 Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A
"Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations
(Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orien-
tation as First Choice (Test 2) by Occupa-
tional Sector, Medellin, 1967 ...... 210

9 Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A
"Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations
(Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orien-
tation as First Choice (Test 2) According to
Educational Experience, Medellin, 1967. 215


vii









10 Average Number of Times Leaders with Studies
Abroad Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value
Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern"
(Dominant) Orientation as First Choice
(Test 2), According to Duration of Foreign
Study, Medellin, 1967. . . . . . .

11 Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A
"Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations
(Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orien-
tation as First Choice ( Test 2), According
to Father's Education, Medellin, 1967 . .

12 Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A
"Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations
(Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orien-
tation as First Choice (Test 2), According
to Age, Medellin, 1967 . . . . . .

13 Value Profile of 6th Year High School Students,
Medellin, 1967 . . . . . . . .

14 Average Number of Times Leaders and 6th Year
High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern"
Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and
2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as
First Choice (Test 2), Medellin, 1967 . .


15 Average Number of Times Leaders and 6th Year
Students at the Jorge Robledo Institute
Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value
Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern"
(Dominant) Orientation as First Choice
(Test 2), Medellin, 1967 . . . . .

16 Average Numb-er of Times 6t0 Year High School
Students Chose: 1) A "I-iodern" Ranking of
Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a
"Modern" (Dominant) Ori.entation as First
Choice (Test 2), by Socioeconomic Class
of School, Medellin, 1967. . . . .


vi i


217






218






220


222






223


S 225


S 227







Table


17 Average Number of Times Gth Year High School
Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of
Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a
"Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First
Choice (Test 2), -by Upper- and Middle-
Class Schools versus Lower-Middle- and
Lower-Class Schools, Medellfn, 1967 . . 230

18 Average Number of Times 6th Year High School
Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of
Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a
"Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First
Choice (Test 2), by Socioeconomic Class
Level of Residence, Medellin, 1967. . . 231

19 Average Number of Times 6th Year High School
Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of
Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a
"Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First
Choice (Test 2), by Occupation of Father,
ledellin .1967. ..... . . . .. 233

20 Average Number of Times 6th Year High School
Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of
Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a
"Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First
Choice (Test 2), by Education of Father,
Medellin, 1967. . . . . . . .. 234

21 Average Number of Times 6th Year High School
Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of
Value Orientations (Test 2i and 2) a
"Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First
Choice ( 'est 2), by Rural or Urban Resi-
dence in Early Childhood, Medelln, 1967. 236

22 -verago Nurmber of Times Leaders in Medellin
and Popayan Chose: 1) A "Nodiern" Ranking
of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a
"Modern" (DrOninant) Orientation as First
Choice (Tcst 2) 1967 . . . . . 243










23 Average Numbei of Times Students in Medellin
and Popayan Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking
of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a
"Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First
Choice (Test 2), 1967 . . . . . 251














abstractt of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of i:he U11-;ersity of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of
the Reoui iements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND MODERNIZATION
IN TWO COLOMBIAN CITIES

By

David W. Coombs

December, 1971

Chairman: Joseph S. Vanciver
'4ajo-- p .. .., nt: Sociology


'.:-3 major proposition of this dissertation evolved

f:- p.-ti-ci.pat.i: n of the writer in a te:-c',ing/research

project: in Colombia ad k~. led.c of two fdcts: (1) that

the rate and, deree of modernaiza.ion are: hi1ghl.y variable in

the ",,or:d; .2} th .t eco.nor..ic, biological, and geographic

e-.pla'a-.r:. for this: variability. hax.' no bcern sufficient.

Civen Lt:is roalit.y, I.t :': proposed t'hat these iffere-nces

and thrcf-'f ;: the ,degree of ,:od-erni za :... or socio'economic

d:vel" pre-( : ,t achieved by any soc.i-ety :r croup, '-.pond, to a

-..rge e.:tnt, o:,n the strength .i.th w- ch c t-..i value

ori .'nta. ...ons ara he .e b; the Led.ars..- Lha. society or


A L.








group. This proposition made logical and empirical sense

since it is known that cultural values, implicitly or

explicitly, become personal goals for most men and that

effective leaders set the direction and tempo of any social

group, large or small.

Drawing on Florence Kluckhohn's theory of variation

in value orientations, it was hypothesized that community

leaders in Medellin--Colombia's best developed city--would

hold, to a greater degree than would comparable leaders in

the highly traditional city of Popayan, Colombia, those

value orientations associated, by Kluckhohn and others,

with the North American middle-class and the "modern" per-

sonality. This was, then, a comparative study to test the

degree of association between modern values in leadership

groups and the level of modernization reached by the areas

they control and manage.

Because some variation was expected within the

Medellin leadership group, other hypotheses were formulated

to predict variation in value orientations according to

salient social characteristics (type of occupation, age,

education, father's occupational and educational status,

etc.). Since, however, the leaders as a group were too

xii







homogeneous to be differentiated by social class, senior

high school boys were drawn from various social class

levels and their value orientations elicited. The compari-

son of their responses with those of the leaders also per-

mitted a broader examination of generational changes.

Data were collected from leaders by means of inter-

views and from students by means of a questionnaire. In

boch cases the same instrument was used--a Spanish language

transIlation oo the urban version of Kiuckhohn's value

orientations schedule. in Medellin 60 leaders selected

from seven sectors of leadership--commrercial, industrial,

banking, government, quasicgovernment, the church, and the

university--were interviewed and 417 male high school

seniors were questioned. In Popayan 59 leaders from the

same sectors were interviewed and 154 students were ques-

-ioned.

Value orientations expressed by leaders and stu-

dents were compared with a purely "modern" profile of

v lue orientations. Gross results showed tha- leaders in

both Nedellin and Popayan preferred modern value orienta-

tions inr two of the four areas tested and traditional

or other types of value orientations in the other two.

:-'iii








A more detailed analysis revealed that Medellin leaders

did, however,, make more modern responses than did Popay6n

leaders, although the differences were not: statistically

significant in all cases. This difference was even more

imar':ked when leaders froin "economic" sectors of the two

cities, such as the commercial and industrial, were com-

pared.

Variations in student value orientations followed

t.ie same nixed pattern as that of the l.'aders except that

detailed analysis showed Popayin students with a signifi-

cantly greaer number of modern value choices than Medellin

students.

Despite some support for the prediction that

Medellin leaders would be more modern in their values than

Popa.yan leaders, the reversal of these differences with

regard to students in the two cities does not lend

unambiguous support to either the hypothesized difference

betwccn the t:.c cities or the proposition that the value

orienitations defined here as "modern" are clearly

associated with modern.iation.


xiv













CHAPTER I


INTRODUCTION



For many years it has been noted that certain coun-

tries and areas within countries which are deficient in

natural resources nevertheless achieve superior levels of

socioeconomic development. This has occurred in Colombia

where the pace of socioeconomic modernization is uneven,

some regions and cities advancing much faster and further

than others. Strong integrating trends of accelerated

horizontal and vertical social mobility are weakening this

phenomenon but the differences persist. Development of the

city and metropolitan area of Medellin, for example, has

been so great that it is often cited as an outstanding

exception to the general rule of underdevelopment. Yet

this isolated region is much less well-endowed in natural

resources than many slower-developing areas. Degree of

development (or modernization) is, then, to some extent

independent of resources and climate and, in the absence of

external influences such as an influx of outside capital

1








(as in Venezuela), th;-: hu.an factor must be responsible.

In fact, the businesslike attitudes and energetic behavior

of the people cf Medellin are legendary in Colombia and

uhis makes that area ideal for determining why the people

of one rather than another region are more prone to develop

themselves and their territory.

Answers to this question are of vital importance

to Colombia as well as to most of the world which is

still traditional and underdeveloped. Modernization is the

national goal of practically every articulate Colombian one

meets. The general consciousness of the progress ideal is

demonstrated by the large amounts of space which the coun-

try's newspapers devote to the efforts made and myriad

problems encountered in lessening the gap between Colombia

and such r.odels of optimum development as the United States.

In the opinion of many students of social change

and modernization, one important answer is to be found in

the cultural values which guide a people's individual and

coj ective way of life. Florence Kluckhohn (1961:1) and

cultural anthropologists in general "regard a knowledge of

-he basic assunptions (or values) of a people as indis-

- -..al:~: e t, thec intierpretation of concrete behavior."







Anthropologist Kluckhohn proposes (1961:10-20) that dif-

ferent combinations of values or value orientations are

related to markedly different ways of life and, by

implication, to different levels of socioeconomic devel-

opment. She believes that a "Future" orientation towards

time, a "Doing" orientation towards activity, a M.astery-

over-Nature orientation, and an Individualistic orienta-

tion in man-to-man relationships are "modern" values which

shape the behavior of "modern" populations like the middle

classes of the United States. Other social scientists as

well as many philosophers agree with her interpretation and

would specify further that these value orientations are

closely linked with successful entrepreneurship and the

Protestant ethic. Thus, there is a belief among those who

stress the importance of values that individuals or groups

who 1.ive by specific "action" values of this type will

develop and use more fully their own capacities as well as

those of the environment in which they operate.

The vital role of influentiall" or leadership

groups in promoting co-mmunity development is obviously

and especially vital. The values they hold should, there-

fore, b)e a key factor in determiinng whether .and to .'hc.t






4

degree modernization will take place. Such is the thinking

of Aaron Lipman (1966:14-15) who remarks that "in general

,-ontemporary economists are in agreement that the entre-

preneur is a business leader whose function in the promo-

tion of economic development is fundamental."

Given that cultural values and modernization are

connected, and that community leaders are particularly

important in initiating and guiding social change directed

toward such a development, then the values or value

orientations of leaders should be important areas of

investigation for the student of modernization. Accord-

ingly, this dissertation is intended to do just that as

part of an overall research project in which variations

in value orientations among leaders and high school stu-

dents in three Colombian cities were investigated. The

three cities, Medellin, Cali, and Popa5an, represent,

insofar as can be determined, different points on a

continuu-m of socioeconomic development, Medellin being the

most developed or modern and Popayin leasr so. Students


The project was financed through a Rockefeller
Founc'ation grant to the Center for Latin American Studies
of the University of .lorida, as part of an agreement
between the Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia and
the U-iversity nf Florida.








were included in the study in order to provide comparisons

between generations and along social class lines. The

leaders by themselves were clearly too homogeneous to

enable us to do these things.

Medellin is the principal focus of this disserta-

tion so that the largest part of the data presented

involves descriptions and comparisons of value orienta-

tions held by leaders and students in that city. A

comparison is also made between the leaders and students

of Medellin and those of Popayan in view of the fact that

the two ciJtiees are considered within Colombia polar

opposites of socioeconomic development. The "modern"

value orientation profile which is attributed to the

North uAmerican mnidde class and "modern" entrepreneurs

is used as a baseline for all comparisons. It is expected

that respondents in the relatively well-developed city of

'eCdellin will express "modern" value orientations to a

greater degree than those in Pcpayan and indeed will

approxim" te "modern" entrepreneurs in this respect.

Although we have presumed th-t: values act as

precipi eating factors of the modernization process, the

rt.zscarch design employed in this t rojcct permits 's to







inquireoonly if values are associated with modernizaticr.

In this sense our goals are exploratory rather than

definitive.


Organization of the Dissertation

The development of this report begins in Chapter II

with a description and a history of the city of Medellin

and its people. Following this, in Chapter III is a review

of the literature on modernization and an explanation of

the theoretical basis for the research. Chapter IV

describes the research design used, the biographical

characteristics of leaders and students questioned and

states the hypotheses which guided the research. Results

of the research--the detailed findings from Medellin and

the intercity comparisons--are reported in Chapter V.

Chapter VI entails a discussion of the results, while the

seventh and final chapter provides a summary of the results

and offers some conclusions.












CHAPTER II


THE SETTING


MedellIn is the capital of the department of

Anticquia, which is located in the wide mountainous area

where the western and central Andean ranges o- Colombia

come together just north of the city of Cartago. This

vast, rugged region encompasses the present-day departments

of Antioquia, Caldas, Risaralda, and Quind.o, in the north-

western quarter of the Colombian territory.

This is the patria chica of the Antioquenos, a

cultural and racial group whose dynamic expansion has

radiated southward from some of the original settlements

just east of Medellin to take in all of the valleys and

slopes above 3,000 foet. Until 1905, all of this territory

was in!:cli.-ded in the department of Anticquia. In that year,

Cldas to the south became a separate department, while

in 1966-1967 the departments of Quindfo and Risaralda

were created out of the southern and western portions of

Caldas.








Today Antioquia, with an area of 65,395 square

kilometers, is still the largest of the four departments

which now make up "Antioquenio country." It is larger than

Sw.itzerland, Denmark, or Ireland, and among the Colcmbian

departments, only Boyac6 has a larger land area. It

consists for the most part of rough mountainous terrain

cut in half by the Cauca River, which runs north to the

Caribbean. The mountains of Antioquia are not quite as

high, however, as those farther south and to the cast

across the iagdalena River. They range from about 1:000

meters Lo 3,700 meters, none reaching the snow line. Most

of the population lives in the highlands of central and

southern Antioquia between 1,600 and 2,400 meters where

the mean temperatures range from 170C to 220C (Controlaria

General de la Republica, 1935:40). Northern and north-

western Antioquia are relatively empty and still unex-

plored, especially in the lower jungle territories.

The narrow valley basins and plateaus of lower

Antioquia shve become the sites of small towns and cities.

As a result, much of the farming is done on the hillides

and slopes so that the hyperbole-loving Antioquenos claim

that their kind of vertical agriculture requires that one

"-ow ij th a shotgur. and :i.-_ vst with prrots."







The city of Medellin is located in the wide part

of such a narrow intermontane valley called the Aburra in

the south-central part of Anticquia at an altitude of

approximately 1,540 meters, or 4,600 feet, where a genu-

inely springlike climate prevails the year around. The

Aburra valley is about six kilometers wide by 18 kilometers

long and is split by the Medellin River. The city and its

satellites have completely urbanized the valley and are

climbing the mountains on both sides for about 15 kilo-

meters along its length.

Medellin is Colombia's second city and one of the

most important and highly developed industrial centers in

Latin America. Large, modern factories line the highways

leading into the city from the north and south, and one is

impressed by their size and the clean, well-landscaped

appearance they present. It is, as one foreigner (Davies,

1963:293) observed,

a most remarkable city to find in the mountains.
It could hardly be less advantageously placed, for it
faces forbidding mountain barriers in all directions.
Its climate alone, that of an English summer day
(700F) is in its favor. And yet Medellin is the
industrial capital of Colombia, a city seething with
energy. . Medellin, for an industrial city, is a
remarkably clean, well-laid-out, and delightful town.
Even its industrial plants look attractive.








Principal industries include such diversified

products as textiles, ready-made clothing, plasticware,

chocolate and candy of all kinds, beer, cement, cigarettes,

hats, phonograph records, crockery, glassware, bottles,

matches, aluminumware, paints, zip fasteners, electric

irons, pressure cookers, refrigerators, stoves, rayon,

hosiery, machinery, steel pipe, and tubing. There were,

in 1962, 1,681 industrial establishments in Medellin

employing 62,328 workers, or 24.8 percent of the nation's

industrial work force (Aragon, 1963:674).

Medellin and its satellite municipios have been

growing rapidly since the early nineteenth century when it

became the capital of the department, but the population

increase has been especially notable since large-scale

industrialization began after the turn of this century.

Today, almost half of Antioquia's population and most of

its wealth are concentrated in the metropolitan area of

Medellin, which is made up of the municipio of Mcdellin

together with the municipios of Bello, Itagu{, and

Envigado. These last named had populations of 93,207,

70,000, and 61,546 respectively in 1964, which brought the

population of the four together up to 997,640 for that








year (Asociacfon Colombiana de Facultades de Medicira,

1967). (See Table 1.)

Because of traditionally high birth rates and the

Antioqueios' .well-k;nown reluctance to accept outsiders,

the city has drawn its migrants from nearby farmsteads

and small towns much more than other Colombian cities with

large immigrations such as Bogata or Cali. In 1946 Parsons

(1949:176) reported that 65.4 percent of the city's workers

had migrated from rural areas of Antioquia, 31.2 percent

were from Medellin, and only 3.3 percent were from outside

the department of Antioquia. A somewhat similar pattern

seems to hold true today. According to birthplace infor-

mation gathered from a questionnaire administered to senior

boys in four Medellin high schools in 1967 in the study

reported here, only 12.2 percent came from outside the

department, and 51.9 percent had been born in Medellin

itself.

Because Medellin has been the only large city to

develop in Antioquia, this writer found that critics in

other parts of the country liken it to an octopus sucking

wealth and talent from the hinterland. It is for this

reason, they say that MedellIn presents such an impressI ve
































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front of modernity and prosperity when compared with other

cities in Colombia. The Calenos point to Buga, Palmira,

Tulua, and Cartago in the Valle and challenge the listener

to find cities of comparable size and development in

Antioquia outside of Medeilln and its suburban municipios.

The city does in truth seem to be an island of

modern industrial development perched proudly in lofty

isolation, although efforts are being made to decentralize

industry into small towns away from Medellin.


The People

Newcomers from Europe have not played a role in

Medellin's recent growth as they have in the industrial

centers of southern South America. If Colombia has

received few foreign immigrants since independence,

Antioquia and Medellin have' received even fewer. The

census of 1918 (Rodriguez, 1925:178) showed that there

were 235 resident foreigners in Medellin, or 3 per 1,000

population,compared with 10 per 1,000 in Bogota, 11 per

1,000 in Cali, and 26 per 1,000 in 3arranquilla. Seventy-

three of the resident foreigners in Medellin at that time

were members of religious communities (RodrigLez, 1925:

149-50). The census of 1938 reports that of 1,958,555







"Antioquenos" in all of Antioquia and Caldas, only 5,081

were foreigners. Rodriguez (19-12:J78) says that the

relatively smaller numbers of foreigners to be found

in Antioquia and Medellin result from the "special apti-

tudes of the Antioqueno race for hard work and business

which make life difficult and competition hard for the

foreigner." He remarks further that even the Syrians,

who are commercially active everywhere else in Colombia,

are almost totally absent from Antioquia. It is the

boast of many Medellin industries that they have no for-

eign personnel on their payroll, not even in a consulting

capacity.

The racial background of the Antioqueno includes

white, Negro, and, to a lesser extent, Indian elements. The

white element, descended from Spanish immigrants who

arrived in the eighteenth century, clearly predominates in

the highland valleys and plateaus above 1,500 meters so

that light hair, blue or green eyes, and fair complexions

are not uncommon there. In the hot lowlands and river

valleys, the Negro and mulatto are numerically superior.

Parsons (1949:53) says that the upland whites and near-

whites with their traditions of having large families are








outreproducing the lowland Negro and mulatto elements and

the population is becoming whiter.

In Medellin a colonial census taken in 1778

(Parsons, 1949:53) reported that of 14,507 people, 18 per-

cent were white, 27 percent mestizo, 20 percent Negro,

35 percent mulatto. According to the 1918 census, 49.7

percent were white, 11.3 percent were black, and 39 percent

were mixed (Rodr~guez, 1925:17S). Since the respondents

filled in the blanks themselves, the results are open to

question; nevertheless, the population of Medellln

represents a good cross-section of the department's people,

for all roads and railroads lead eventually to Medellin,

the pride, joy, and mecca for Antioquenos no matter w.-here

they live.

Physical type and skin color vary with altitude

here, too, but in a socioeconomic sense. The large,

prosperous upper- and middle-class neighborhoods are

inhabited almost exclusively by people of fair completion,

while working-class sections abound with a variety of skin

1
T. Lynn Smith's article on "The racial composition
of the population of Colombia" (Journal of Inter-;r.erican
Studies, 7 [April, 196G]) details the difficulties in
obtaining hard data on racial characteristics in Colombia.





16

tones ranging from coal black to rosy white. While the

Antioqueo in general, irrespective of skin color, is

thought of in Colombia as being dynamic and successful,

it seems evident that the most successful of them have been

white, probably the descendants of the Spanish colonists

who settled the upland areas of the department.

Personality differences between the Antioquenos

and other Colombians have been long noted by Colombians

and resident foreigners alike. Parsons (1949:1) describes

the people of Antioquia as "energetic and thrifty . the

self-styled Yankees of South America. They are shrewd,

aggressive individuals," he continues,

whose extraordinary colonizing genius and vigor
have made them the dominant and most clearly defined
population element of the republic. Their long and
effective geographical isolation in the interior
highlands of Colombia is reflected in a determined
conservatism and marked cultural particularism.
B:3ing Antioquei.o means more to them than being
Cclombian.

An American observer with long experience in

Colomrbia (Romoli, 1941:147-149) said of the Antioqueios:

. life is no fun unless (they) are doing some-
t'"ing. When one venture prospers, they do not
recline on their success in genteel repose, but go
out and invest their profits in something else; if
it fails they are urdismayed and cast about for
another scheme. Busin-jss is their sport and they





17

are extremely proficient at it; they establish them-
selves in other parts of the country and prosper
exceedingly. . there is a vigorous, cheerful,
pushing quality about them that is more northern
than their latitude."

She contrasts this character with that of the Bogotano who

is

reputedly tuned to muted chords, inclined to a some-
what pessimistic intellectualism, more speculative
than creative . The Bogotano is an intellectual.
He is.brilliant in conversation and frequently so in
print. . Mention a man of prominence in business
and they murmur politely, "oh yes, very able"; speak
of an author and their faces light up [Romoli, 1941:
279-280].

In Colombia the man of Bogota or PopayAn stereotypically

bends his energy and intelligence toward politics and

iteratr -e. le flirts with the sciences and religion. He

bandies about his favorite ideas and beliefs, avoiding, if

possible, ignoble reality. The writer-can testify frcm

everyday personal experiences as well as those gained from

conducting interviews with community leaders that the

Antijoquehos of Medellin do seem to be different--harder

working, more dynamic, dependable, and serious. Of those

numerous experiences, the following stand out.

During the interviewing in Medellin, in no case did

ni interviewee fail to keep an appointment, and only three

arrived more than rivo minutes late (after tne time set).







Small talk was minimal, and within a short time after the

interview was completed, the interviewer was on his way.

By contrast, in Cali and to an even greater extent in

Popayan, appointments were frequently not kept, and no

explanation provided. In Popayan, this writer had the

frustrating experience of trying to interview four men

consecutively who failed to show up at the appointed time.

However, it must be said in all fairness that once present,

the Popayan leaders were by and large friendlier and more

gracious than their counterparts in Medellin and Cali. It

was often difficult to take leave of many Popayanejos who

became attentive "hosts" after the interview, dispensing

interesting conversation and, on occasion, even libations.

Before conducting the interviews it was necessary

to obtain the names of top leaders from the chambers of

conrnerce, the branches of the National Association of

:Industrialists, and other such organizations in each city.

In M~odellin thase lists of names were promised us on the

afternoon of the same day requested. To our great sur-

prise, tne deadline was met and the information provided

was later verified to be complete and accurate. In Cali,

it was necessary to press and keep pressing for several







days until the corresponding lists were delivered. Thus,

it appeared that the Antioquenos were men of action as well

as words.

One cannot help but be impressed by the physical

appearance of Medellin in contrast with that of Cali or

Bogota. The commercial and residential areas of Medellin

are the cleanest and best maintained in Colombia. Downtown

Medellin abounds with attractive skyscrapers and well-

Locked shops staffed by courteous, attentive personnel

eager to do business. It seemed to this writer that in

Cali many sales people were unwilling tc make an extra

effort in getting something for the customer which was not

at hand. In Medellin it was a common experience to meet

clerks who would run personally to another store to obtain

an item requested which was not in stock.

in Cali, the streets in working-class sections were

usuaiy unpaved and unlit unless they happened to be thor-

oughfares, but the writer was unable to encounter a single

unpaved, unlit street in Medellfn, even after an extensive

tour through the worst sections. Moreover, it was inter-

esting to observe that Medellin has been honeycombed with

a e,.,el.l-organized net of four lane, limited-access highways,








a rarity in Cali, where the population is almost the same

size. Such material progress is a reflection of the civic

spirit shown by the Antioquenos, who are popularly believed

elsewhere in Colombia to comply faithfully with depart-

mental and municipal tax levies.

The fact that nine of the ten largest industries in

Medellin are locally owned and operated while five of the

ten largest in Cali are controlled from outside the country

(two of the remaining five are sugar companies, one of

which was founded by Lithuanian immigrants) is another

difference for which the enterprising spirit of the Antio-

quenos is responsible.

It can be said in defense of Cali that nightlife

there seemed much better developed. There were possibly

20 discotheques operating in Cali during 1967 (as well as

other kinds of nightclubs, cabarets, etc. ) most of which

did a good business weekends and week nights. In Medellin,

only three could be found, all of them inferior in quality

and poorly patronized. The Antioquenos are generally

believed to be in bed by 10:00 p.m. in order to be fresh

for the next day's business, and if they entertain, do so

quietly at home.







Everett Hagen (1962:71-76) attempted to delineate

empirically personality differences between the Antioqueno

businessman and his counterpart in Popayin. With an

Amnerican psychologist and using the thematic apperception

test, he tested a group of business leaders in both cities

and found striking collective differences between the

,'edelln and Popayan groups. The Medellin sample of 20 men

was selected not only for position but also for the amount

of social mobility they had demonstrated in their life--

time. According to Hagen, the businessmen of Medellin

saw the situations pictured as problems to be resolved by

hard work (rather than by magic solutions) and showed

confidence in their ability to solve them. They analyzed

every situation rationally before expressing opinions,

taking the point of view of each person pictured, instead

of identifying a preconceived type of situation, i.e., the

old against the young. The Antiquenos also showed a high

need for autonomy, accomplishment, and order; they

possessed a sharp sense of reality and viewed the world as

Panageable with good judgment and persistence.

:Yger. reports that a similar group in Popayan saw

the pictures differently. They associated each situation







\iith an historic or literary event. They often phliloso-

phized and rambled off the subject into the tendencies of

modern youth or the course of history. If they did comment

on specific situations- it was done in stereotypical terms

('that boy ought to listen to his father"), or they

imagined triumphs gained magically without effort. The

Popayan business leaders showed little need for autonomy

and order, and considered the world unmanageable by man,

whose place they felt was predetermined.

Hagen warns us that these are aggregate results

whereas differences between specific individuals wculd be

hc!rdar to detect. Nonetheless, Hagen feels that the

collective differences are marked enough to say that the

incidence of the "creative personality" among the Antic-

Cuenos is probably much greater than elsewhere in the

country. He believes that this is a reason for the greater

success of their endeavors. In addition, Hagen found that

the Medeii~n group put a higher value on work--not only

for self-improvement and productivity, but also for its

intrinsic worth. As a corollary to this, they supposedly

regard success as proof of God's grace. Hagen believes

these strongly held attitudes indicate the existence of a







puritan ethic in Anticquia and, indeed, Antioquenos are

well-known in Colombia for their strict observance of

Catholic ritual. In the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries the Bible was widely read by those able to read,

and commonly given a literal interpretation. Lopez de Mesa

(1930:12) remarks that Antioquenos of that period "emptied

the Bible" in order to give their children Hebrew first

names.

Why did this group of people develop such markedly

different behavior patterns? Or, in terms of the ideas

presented here, why did they develop a value system which

has made their subculture so different from that of other

Colombians? The following history offers some tentative

answers to these questions.



History and Background

The area of present-day Antioquia and Caldas was

first explored by Spanish conquistadores between 1537 and

1545. Two streams of exploration ran through the mountain-

ous terrain, one originating in Cartagena to the north and

the other in Quito, Ecuador (via Cali) to the south. The

Spaniards were following Indian tales of gold, and several

significant gold deposits were actually found. This news








brought on the initial stages of colonization by gold-

seeking Spaniards and hordes of Negro slaves brought in

to work the mines when it was found that the Indian popula-

tion was inadequate for mining.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

gold mining continued to be the principal occupation of

old-timers and newcomers alike. Some fairly large deposits

were found, and these were mined by Spaniards using Negro

slaves, while small-time operators panned for gold in the

rivers. The formidable terrain and low state of agricul-

ture required importation of food and supplies at high

prices, and most of the miners' profits went for such

expenditures.

In 1616 the valley of Aburra began receiving set-

tlers. Some were migrants directly from Spain, while

others were mixed breeds moving from the warm mining camps

of the lowlands into cooler, malaria-free areas. By 1674

the valley's population had reached 3,000; records show a

considerable white settlement as well as a church, plaza,

and numerous stores (Parsons, 1949:62). Authorization from

Madrid for a town charter for Medellin was requested in

1666 but was held up until 1675 by the machinations of







residents from the old established lowland capital of

Santa Fe who were jealous of the precocious village's

growth.

On November: 17, 1675, the first Cabildo and town

mayor were chosen by the governor. The Cabildo was made up

of six prominent citizens, all Spaniards, and included men

with names such as Restrepo, Angel, and Velez, all of

which frequently occur in any listing of the contemporary

industrial and commercial oligarchy of Medellin. One of

the. Cab-ildo's first acts was to establish a jail with a

whipping stock for "thieves, vagabonds, 2nd those guilty

o. s.mll crimes" such as smoking in church (Betancur,

1925:20). The punishment for smoking in church was scaled

as follows: for Negroes and Indians--25 lashes; for

mestizos--1 day in jail; for whites--10 peso fine

(Betancur, 1925:20).

During the late seventeenth century and throughout

the eighteenth century, a n,-ew settlement took place as

immigrants from old Spain--the Basque country, Asturias,

Castle, and Andalusia--filtered into Antioquia. Many came

a- family units and settled in the highlands above 1,400

rn'eters near present-day Medellin and to the east, instead






of prospecting in the lowland river valleys. They estab-

lished homesteads in the cool, high meadowlands and,

though isolated, brought in Spanish women instead of

marrying Indian or Negro women. Extensive family inbreed-

ing occurred in subsequent years, so that a limited number

of last names can be found even today.

The idea has arisen in Colombia that these colo-

nists were Sephardic Jews looking for an isolated part of

the new world to escape the Inquisition. Hence, the

reasoning goes, the business acumen of the Antioquehos is

to be attributed to their Jewish heritage. Research shows

that this assertion is false. Lipset (1967:27-28) says

that similar stories have grown up in Mexico about the

residents of Monterrey, who are noted for their success in

commerce and industry. Parsons (1949:2) says the story is

a myth perpetrated by jealous rivals in Bogota to explain

the Antioquenos' superior record in business and industry.

Hagen (1962:79) dismisses the allegation in more or less

the same way and adds that records show no Jews among early

settlers.

The white colonists were at first only moderately

successful in agriculture because the region remained a







poor backi..ash of Iew, Granada, far inferior to the savanna

of Bogota or the Cauca Valley in development. Gold mining

continued to be the chief source of income, especially as

far as the Spanish crown was concerned, and many foodstuffs

and supplies continued to be imported with great difficulty

and at high cost.

The beginning of change which "transformed this

tranquil but impoverished backwoods into a virile, liter-

ate, and relatively wealthy state" came about with the

appointment of Juan Antonio Mon y Velarde, an exceptionally

dynamic and reform-minded royal inspector in 1784 (Parsons,

1949:5).

Mon y Velarde's changes in the economy and politi-

cal administration led to an increase in many activities.

New towns and agricultural settlements were founded in the

upland districts, an agrarian reform (Colombia's first) was

carried out, bounties were offered for new crops, and

vagrancy laws were enforced so that unemployed idlers were

engaged in the construction of public works. Mining

activities were deemphasized in favor of agriculture, for

Mon y Velarde saw no reason why the province could not be

self-sufficient. Within a short time comparative





28

prosperity reigned as gold profits were better distributed

and new lands were more productive. Mon y Velarde's own

words that "all were born to work and he who doesn't is

useless" became a proverb in Antioquia.

During the same period, the aforementioned colo-

nizing of the mountainous lands to the south began. Early

marriage and large families put pressure on land and food

supplies, leading to the first big movement of Antioquenos

to the south around 1800.

Most of the southward-migrating colonists were the

children of the Spanish immigrants who had settled in the

highlands to the east of Medellin during the eighteenth

century; they carved out new homesteads and towns in a

cooperative fashion in the tradition of our own pioneers.

Since the climate and terrain were similar to that found in

"old Antioquia" around Medellin, the movement was rapid.

By the middle 1800s present-day Caldas and Risaralda were

almost fully occupied, and Manizales, now the capital of

Caldas and a city of approximately 250,000, had been

founded.

L6pez (1927:52) remarks that the typical colonist

came into Caldas with little more than "a hatchet, seed,







wife, and children; trust in God, confidence in himself,

his wife. . Travelers reported that 30 to 40 fami-

lies would clear an area, designate the flattest part

for a plaza (church, school, city hall) and then distribute

farmsteads by lot (Uribe, 1942:16). Priests traveled about

the colonized areas on mules like circuit riders. Notaries

did the same to adjudicate landholdings and disputes.

Uribe (1942:13) states that the family groups learned to

master the environment and after great difficulty and fre-

quent failures imposed their will without outside help.

This epic colonization was unusual in tropical

Latin America for several reasons: first, it involved

real pioneers who, of their own volition and independent

of government help, were interested in establishing family

farms and homesteads; second, they were mostly white; and

third, the areas they left behind were not abandoned.

This phenomenon of mass migration and colonization

continued on a large scale up to about 1925. The intro-

duction of coffee as a highly profitable cash crop about

1900 spurred the colonization of empty lands remaining.

As Parsons (1949:9) notes, it also reinforced the pattern

of small hillside tracts in contrast to the large







plantation-type holdings to be found in the Cauca Valley

and the savanna of Bogota.

The development of Medellin as a city began after

1830 when the Colombian government opened the doors to

foreign trade. Enterprising Medellin merchants suddenly

exhibited the same aggressive, pioneer spirit as their

rural bretheren and soon cornered most of the import-export

business in western Colombia.

Economic progress was such that during the late

1830s a high-fashion tailor arrived in Medellin to do

business, as well as an American craftsman skilled in

making fine furniture (Betancur, 1925:26-29). The same

source reports that during this period leading citizens

such as Juan Uribe and Gabriel Echeverri began giving

elaborate dances and parties.

Through the latter half of the nineteenth century

Medellin prospered as the dominant trading center of

western Colombia. Foreigners visiting Colombia during this

period began commenting that the city and its people were

the most progressive and laborious of the nation. By 1900

Vergara y Velasco (1901:472) could refer to the Antioquenos

as the "Yankees of Colombia."







At the end of the nineteenth century a number of

wealthy, enterprising Antioqueno merchants saw and acted

on new opportunities to invest their money in manufactur-

ing. They also initiated and promoted coffee growing among

both the small farmers of Antioquia and the colonists who

had pioneered in Caldas to the south. Applying their

customary vigor and determination to these tasks, they

soon made M-ledelln the industrial capital of Colombia as

well as the marketing center for coffee (which by 1910 was

Colombia's leading export).

There has been some debate as to exactly why the

businessmen of Medeilln invested their commercial profits

in industry rather than land or conspicuous consumption.

This practice contrasts with that usually followed in

Bogota or Cli, where successful merchants more often chose

to become gentlemen farmers and groom their sons for the

professions.

The same phenomenon also occurred in Japan towards

the end of the last century. Mendel (1966:15-21) states

that

Pro-modern Japanese elites did not have the aversion
to manual labor or commerce typical of the Chinese
elite. Wealthy merchants in China bought land to
become gentry. Japanese merchants could not buy







land or indulge in affluent consumption forbidden
by the Tokugawa laws.

Abundant land was also scarce around M1edellin, and this was

probably one reason why "the capitalists of Medellin took

very definitely the road of manufacturing enterprises"

(Vasquez, 1955:309).

But Vasquez believes that their motives were not

purely economic because manufacturing enterprises up to

then had not done well and the returns were low. He

remarks (1955:309-310) that

among this group of capitalists and entrepreneurs
there were some who were not attracted by traditional
investments (commerce, usury, mining, farming, the
coffee market). In general it is difficult to suppose
after computing risks and bother that the new activity
of manufacturing could render more than the 24 percent
earned in lending. One supposes they made overly
optimistic calculations or something else moved them.

He believes that the risk factor was reduced somewhat

because of their willingness to cooperate and invest

together and points out that cooperative efforts were not

new in Antioquia (as they were elsewhere in Colombia)

because of the requirements of mining and "something

peculiar in their way of life" (Vasquez, 1955:310). He

also feels that they were endowed with unusual vision and

could foresee long-range profit possibilities.







Large-scale industrialization actually began at

Medellin in 1906 when a modern textile mill began operating

with imported machinery brought down the Magdalena River by

boat and then over the mountains by mule train. Due to

technical difficulties and the cost of repairing the

damaged machines, the venture failed. In 1908 a new com-

pany, the Compania Colombiana de Tejidos, usually referred

to as Coltejer, began with a better-equipped mill. Bene-

fiting from the previous failure, Coltejer grew and,

after a series of mergers and a surge of prosperity brought

on by World '.*War II, it became the second largest corpora-

tion in CoJombia and one of the largest in Latin America

(Hagcn, 1962:39). Coltejer, along with other Colombian

industries, expanded phenomenally during the early 50's.

In 1940 Coltejer paid $357,034 in dividends and employed

1,272 persons. In 1947 the company paid out $3,211,223

in dividends and employed 7,194 workers (Parsons, 1949:

178). Profits were so great that management's biggest

problem was in distributing them, and a class of nouveaux

riches grew up (Parsons, 1949). In 1967 Coltejer employed

approximately 10,000 workers and manufactured, in addition

to textiles and fabrics, thread, textile machinery, valves,

fittings, and food products.







The success and growth of Coltejer was rapidly

duplicated by scores of other industries so that by 1925

Medellfr. had become the industrial center of Colombia

and one of t:he most modern and progressive cities in

Latin America. Vasquez (1955:419) says that the relative

success of textile manufacturing and the experience

acquired in its management, organization, financing, and

technical operation led to the increase in industrializa-

tion which would have seemed impossible in 1910.

Betancur (1925:S5-86) gives some insight into this

process of industrialization by relating the history of

Felix de Bedout, founder of a large printing and office-

supply manufacturing company. He describes Bedout as the

personification of thrift, work, self-help, duty, and

character. In 1989 with few resou::ces other than a high-

school education, bedout founded a printing plant at the

age of 21. At first he ran a one-man operation and in his

first month earned only 19.7 pesos. He began experi-

menting and improvising with new printing techniques which

he learned from patiently studying foreign magazines and

catalogues. Gradually the business grew with the city so

that by 1925 he had 56 machines and 90 workers in a plant




35

which manufactured writing paper, envelopes, and notebooks

as well as printing books, magazines, etc. Bedout, upon

seeing that the city's overall growth was leading to an

increase in managerial activities, had the vision and the

initiative to take advantage of the situation by manufac-

turing and selling office supplies.

Medell{n in the 1920's had evolved into a rela-

tively modern industrial city. Besides fire protection,

parks, and schools, the city government provided its

citizens with such public services as paving and water,

public health clinics, a bacteriological laboratory, a

chlorination plant, a tuberculosis hospital, an orphanage,

public housing, "peoples" savings banks, etc.

A perusal of a city-sponsored magazine published in

1925 reveals imaginative, sophisticated advertising by

Medellin industries. The backward little market town

scornfully described by colonial officials had become an

island of modern industrial civilization in an under-

developed country.

Although the manufacture of textiles and synthetics

continues to be the largest single type of industry in

M~edelli.n, the area today produces goods ranging from







rtrulctural steel to phonograph records. The postwar

cdvelopnmenr_ of Cali and especially Bogota as industrial

centers has lessened the absolute dominance of Medellin

as the focus of Colombian industry (Bogota ranks today as

the first industrial city in Colombia, with Medellin

second). Nevertheless, Antioquenos point out that much

of the large-scale industry in Bogota and Cali is foreign-

owned and operated---he result of government policies--

while the industry of Medellin is overwhelmingly owned

and operated by native-born Antioquenos.


Why the Antioquenos

There have been any number of sociohistorical and

psychological reasons offered to explain the Antioquenos'

peculiar behavior, which in the context of Colombia and

most of Latin America can be called deviant. Although

there is reason to believe that the "entrepreneur" or

innovating businessman type is no longer considered

"deviant" in Colombia (the man of action as personified by

the successful businessman is becoming something of a new

hero or model in many parts of Latin America), this was

prcoably not true antil recently. Lipman (1966:39), for

example, found a "social atmosphere" in which stimuli for






the entrepreneurial personality was undervalued. He

remarks that typically the socialization of children in

Colombia "has not been conducive for Colombians of a dedi-

cation to commercial activities." Money and success have

not been enough to gain high status and "traditional val-

ues" are encouraged by the educational system, which

discourages change and works against the creation of an

efficient industrial leader. Fals-Borda (1963:36) argues,

however, that since World War II a new aristocracy of money

has risen in Colombia.

Lipset (1967:8), writing about Latin America in

general, concurs with Lipman in that, "almost.everywhere

in Latin America the original upper class was composed of

the owners of latifundia, and these set the model for elite

behavior to which lesser classes, including the businessmen

of the towns, sought to adapt." These landed gentry, like

those of southern Spain, scorned pragmatism and material-

ism, preferring the easy life of a gentleman farmer or

politician (for a contemporary description of the indolent

life favored by the aristocracy of Andalusia and

Extremadura in southern Spain, see James Michener's book

Iberia, pp. 350-360, and especially his account of the







extremladu-ran Hacendado on pp. 54-56). Lipset notes, how-

ever, that the Antioquenos are a deviant case, a major

exception to the rule (1967:10). He says that the model

for the aspiring Antioqueno was not the landed aristocrat

but the gold miner and small businessman and later the

industrialist. In Medellin, Lipset reminds us, the

intel-lectual has had little status and a man was expected

to demonstrate his worth by opening a business. Yet, as

he points out (1967:10), historical accounts show that many

Antioquenos owned slaves, so that the latifundia social

system of patron-slave relationship did exist. He con-

cludes that the type of work done (in mining and on small

far)} together with the Iberian culture, led to a mixing

of pragmatic-materialistic values with such traditional

ones as particularism, ascription of status, etc.

Many writers likewise note that the predominance of

mining or the management of small farms and businesses in

Actic-4uiaj required the master to pitch in and actually work

shoulder-to-shouldc.: with his subordinates to make the

enterp-ise a success. It should be noted that up until

the lr-tt._r n.. cnteenth century, outsiders commented on the

ba.ck'ward;ness of the entire population, the lack of culture,







and the rough and ready "frontier" atmosphere. Such

"aristocrats" as there were, were in fact small-scale

traders, miners, or the more successful colonists and

farmers who had migrated. This indicates that they were

a relatively rude, pragmatic, unpretentious lot forced by

the mountainous topography and isolation to work hard for

their status. They were undoubtedly quite different in

background and behavior from the aristocrats of eighteenth

century Bogota or Peru. As one source (Controlaria

General de la Republica, 1935:122) indicates,

The topography of Colombia has had a great influence
on the development of this hard-working people.
Mining has been one of their principal industries,
and it requires ingenuity, perseverance, and hard
work. The fact that it is more difficult and that
the mountains require more daily toil in getting
means of subsistence have made of the Antioquenos
the most practical and confident people in the country.

It is probable then, that in Antioquia willingness

to work hard, confidence in one's ability to master prob-

lems, and other "deviant" qualities associated with the

entrepreneurial personality have for a long time been the

dominant values. The Antioqueno outside of Antioquia or

Caldas has been looked upon as different, a deviant because

of these quallities. Like many immigrant minorities in







Latin America, Asia, and Africa, they have usually done

well in other parts of Colombia outside of their patria

chica. Hacen (1962:364-365) partially confirms the

"Colombian national myth" that most of the nation's

industry is run by Antioquenos with an analysis of the

regional origins of the men who founded the 110 largest

nonfinancial enterprises in the departments of Antioquia,

Cundinamarca (Bogota), and Valle del Cauca (Cali). He

learned that 75 or 68 percent of those enterprises were

founded by Antioquenos who, during this time period,

constituted about 40 percent of the combined population of

the three departments. In the Valle del Cauca, 17 of the

44 largest enterprises were initiated by AntLcque.os while

natives of the department had founded only eight. In

Cunidinamarca, Antioquenos had founded 13 of the 59 largest

enterprises as compared with 17 begun by native sons. In

Antioquia itself only one of the 53 largest nonfinancial

companies had beon founded by a Colombian from outside the

region.

In seeking geographical and historical reasons for

the frequfnth ap-pearance of tne "creative personality"

ainon the Antioqueos, IHagen (1962:32-83) also cites the







demanding topography and the importance of mining activi-

ties. He credits early mining experiences with requiring

a tradition of hard manual labor, cooperative risk-taking,

and knowledge of machine technology. Families were forced

to calculate risks carefully and join together in order to

spread them out.

Nevertheless, Hagen (1962:85) warns against over-

emphasizing these factors as causes since mining was

carried out all over Colombia. He feels that the European

background of the colonists might be equally significant.

Rejecting the idea cf a Jewish heritage, he believes that

the development of an energetic, capable entrepreneurial

class in Antioquia might be due in part to an extra infu-

sion of Basque blood. This hypothesis is based on a survey

of the Mede.lin telephone directory in which he found that

20 to 25 percent of the city's top executives had Basque

surnames as compared with 15 percent of all telephone

subscribers (Hagen, 1962:80). In point of fact, many

prominentt last names such as Uribe, Echaverria, Echeverri,

and Restrepo are of Basque origin. The question remains as

to whether the Basques were really more influential or num-

erous in Antioquia than in other parts of Colombia.







It is also possible that the unusual "Protestant

ethic"-like qualities of the AntioqueSo people are a

response to the opportunities for homesteading and col-

onization that grew out of Mon y Velarde's agrarian and

mining reforms. Perhaps these opportunities released a

hitherto-repressed potential for creative self-improvement.

Avenues of self-expression and fulfillment were suddenly

available and seized upon. It may be that pioneer self-

reliance and belief in one's own ability to master the

situation were then developed and carried over into com-

merce during the nineteenth century and into industry

during the twentieth. T. Lynn Smith (1967:8-24) observes

that the "family-sized," middle class farm system generally

requires and produces a type of personality which is self-

confident and well endowed with managerial skills.

Whether because of environmental conditions, mining

experiences, the structural changes of Mon y Velarde, the

influx of white settlers, or the combination of these and

other factors, the AntioqueBos did in fact develop a pre-

dilection for hard work and an attraction for commercial

and industrial vocations.

The willingness to risk, a quality or ability

often said to be an essential part of the entrepreneurial







personality, also distinguishes Antioquenos from other

Colcmbians and is considered a major reason for their

greater record of achievement. They offer and accept

credit as a working resource to a much greater extent than

elsewhere in Colombia. They also have less fear of making

long-time investments and waiting for a profit.

The cooperative "in-group" spirit of the Antio-

quenos is almost as frequently cited as is their willing-

ness to take risks. The large donations made by industry

to the city of Medelln in the form of cash and executive

personnel (fce staffing key governmental positions) are a

manifestation of that spirit. Mendel (1966:15-21) remarks

that the traditional unity and cohesion of Japanese society

was also a factor in its economic development.

The point was made in the introduction that the

values held by a group of people obviously influence their

behavior and that the values of their leaders are espe-

cially important in determining the shape and progress of

that group.

"'Modcrn" and "traditional" sets of values which

supposedly typify modern and traditional cultures have been

delineated bv social scientists interested in the problems






of socioeconomic development. These values, when inter-

nalized as beliefs and feelings, are believed to set

behavioral norms and thus lead some groups to master them-

selves and their environments to a greater extent than

others. As stated in the introduction, it is thought that

the following value orientations or beliefs constitute a

"modern" value profile: 1) man is capable of mastering his

natural environment; 2) man should plan for his future in

terms of means and goals; 3) he should act or do rather

than remain passive or just speculate; 4) each individual

should depend primarily on his own ability. Limited

evidence shcws such a profile to be strongly held by the

North American middle class. It is logical to expect that

these would be the dominant value orientations of the

entrepreneurial personality as exemplified by the suc-

cessful businessman, industrialist, or community leader.

Because Antioqueios in general have been significantly more

successful as entrepreneurs than other Colombians and

because Medellin has been the most highly developed city

in Colombia, it is also logical to predict that the

leadership of ledellin will hold these value orientations

to a greater ex:tent than elsewhere in Colombia and indeed







will approximate the North American middle class in this

respect. If this be true, then we have discovered another

answer to the question, "Why the Antioquenos?" These

particular value orientations have, of course, been

implied in the concrete description presented above of the

Antioquenos' "deviant" behavior (e.g., that they place a

high value on work, are willing to take long-term risks,

that they prefer action to speculation, etc.).













CHAPTER III


THEORIES OF MODERNIZATION


Defining Modernization

There is some disagreement on the part of histo-

rjarc and others as to precisely when and how the "modern"

age began. Some seem to think it was initiated with the

discovery of America and the beginning of the Renaissance

during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth cenLuiies.

Others believe that the first industrial revolution of the

late eichteenth and early nineteenth centuries began: the

process of modernization which marks the beginning of the

mod-rn era. The following statement by Hagen 1i962:10)

illustrates the latter view:

In the eighteenth or early nineteenth century
following a numr.ber of improvements in
methods in Western Europe during the Middle Ages
the.e began in England a series of advances in
technology and a rise in per capital income rapid
enou-cgh so that marked change occurred within
e-ach generation, and indeed during each decade.
,na.nge at such a pace may be termed economic
q r7.-; th.







Apart from the timing, there is widespread agree-

ment about other important facets of this profound change

in man's personal and social life. Itis agreed: (1) that

the modern age began in Western Europe and has reached its

fullest development there and more recently in the rest

of Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan; (2) that

it had barely begun in many areas of the world by the

latter half of the twentieth century; (3) that the process

of modernization which initiates the modern age consists

of a tremendously broad transformation in the culture or

way of life of a society; (4) that this transformation is

very complex, involving many causes as well as a multitude

of effects which reinforce the process itself; (5) that

the beginning of the modern age in non-Western European

countries has been largely stimulated by the diffusion of

cultural elements from Western Europe.

Obviously it is hard to define or describe in a

sentence what modernization is. It usually is concep-

tualized as a process of social change leading to a state

of being called "modern" in which a society has the

following characteristics: a complex division of labor,

a highly mechanized technology, a national economy of







high per capital production and consumption, a complex

but relatively open class structure, a high degree of

urbanization, widespread education, and widespread

participation in the mass media. Wilbert Moore (1963:89)

describes the dynamics of modernization as involving a

series of smaller scale changes in specific areas such

as values, social organization, technology, etc. All

such changes taking place in a single social system, no

matter how far removed in time and space from each other,

are viewed as being related in a cause-and-effect hierarchy

of importance (small changes causing bigger ones which in

turn lead -to more small changes). A society is hereby

conceived of as a system or an organism transforming itself

as a whole through modification of its parts, whether such

Lmodification is a consequence of external influence (for-

eign cultures) or internal tensions, and whether cr not

nodificaticn of one part keeps pace with that of other

pr ts. Both fro-n this point of view and empirically.

mncdernization is a soT.ewhat disjointed process, five-year

plans notwithstanding, since one part of a society, such

as it. eCucational institutions or industrial technology,

-.ill often change faster tban other parts.




49

Moore (1963)also insists that the specific changes

which are the beginning of the process usually differ from

place to place and time to time. For example, in one area

at one time modernization may initially mean reducing

illiteracy, providing good water, or eliminating malaria.

In another place the process may be manifested by new

roads, hydroelectric facilities and the subsidization of

light industry. Be that as it may, when the process is

more or less continuous it should eventually result in

the almost

total transformation of a traditional or pre-
modern society into the types of technology and
associated social organization that characterize
the "advanced" economically prosperous and rela-
tively politically stable nations of the Western
world [Moore, 1963:39].

To reach this blessed stage is usually an arduous task for,

as Moore (1963:92) says, even though modernization has

been going on almost everywhere at different rates, the

social order of the underdeveloped areas deviates from

that of the advanced areas in so many ways that there is

room for "improvement" everywhere. Since World War II

improvements in nations which are in the incipient stages

of modernization have been determined by political leaders

who decide what the most important problems and priorities







are. In making these kinds of choices, modernization

has usually been equated with economic development

(primarily embodied as industrialization) and to a much

lesser extent, social development. Because of this, it

is often referred to as "socioeconomic development." Moore

(1953:92) seems to think that while economic development

is not all that is entailed in modernizing a society, it

is perhaps primary in importance. This he believes

because: (1) the most important consequence of the process

from the viewpoint of both leaders and masses in under-

developed countries is the raising of the average man's

level of living to "modern" levels and (2) without an

efficient, moderately prosperous economy, and a good civil

service, social objectives cannot be sustained (though

they nmay be temporarily met by virtue of external help)

Until recently, most students of modernization accepted

this emphasis on economic development in general and

indu4strialization in particular. In line with this,

A'e:: Inkeles (1964:33) mentions the tremendous interest

of ycuiger sociologists in the impact of industrialism

i. the world followingg he says, the tradition of

e -,ie 'h it e nd Wil li:*'. F. Cgburr.) ,.ike Ogburn and







White, most expect to find the development of uniform

institutions and social patterns in a variety of different

cultures as a result of industrialism. Arnold Rose

(1953:26) for one believes that a "world culture" has been

developing among advanced societies for four centuries as

a consequence of economic development in the forms of

industrialization and the expansion of world trade. The

principal features of his "world culture" are of course

the social developments which are part and parcel of the

modernization process such as urbanization, specialization,

secularization, increased social mobility, universal edu-

cation, and a general rise in the level of living.

In short, this economic orientation emphasizes the

primacy and fundamental importance of economic growth in

the modernization process. Since economic growth is

considered so important it might be well to explain

precisely what it means. In the most general terms

economic growt-ch means the expansion of commerce, industry,

and other money-producing agencies which lead to a general

rise in income. Hagen (1962:11) defines it more exactly

as being a two step process: (1) the discovery of new

knowledge making possible an increase in the output of






goods and services per unit of labor, capital, and mate-

rials used in production; (2) the incorporation of that

knowledge in productive processes. By his definition,

economic growth depends on innovation--innovation which

Hagen observes must happen first as discovery in pure

science, then as the adaptation of discovery in engineer-

ing, and finally as the application of discovery in pro-

duction. It is noteworthy that he includes not only

scientific and technical discoveries as elements of

economic growth but also the devising of new forms of

organization and procedures to make production more effi-

cient (Hagen, 1962:11).

According to Hagen (1962:12), if this innovative

process of economic growth becomes continuous,- meaning a

continuing improvement in techniques, products, and income,

then it should also become a permanent behavior pattern

(pa-t of the culture) and provide more than just basic

necessities for a growing population. In this event the

fundamental economic problem of being an underdeveloped

or "traditional" society is solved.

There is currently some disagreement with this

largely economic view of modernization. The disagreement







appears to be based on the generally poor results or

economic development plans which have been implemented

in underdeveloped countries throughout the world. There

is, of course, some question as to how well many of the

plans were implemented, but,even with this factor accounted

for, there does exist disillusionment with an approach

whose results were expected to carry traditional societies

a long way on the road to modernization. As a prominent

Israeli political scientist and economist puts it,

The experience of many developing countries indi-
cates that national plans based on narrowly construed
economic models of development have proved to be
inadequate. The expectations of the 1950's for
accelerated development according to discernible
stages of economic growth have not materialized.
"Century skipping" has not occurred during the
United Nations' first declared "development decade"
[Galnoor, 1971:8].

This line of reasoning is also espoused by Donald McGrana-

han (1971:67) of the United Nations Research Institute for

Social Development:

. the concept of "development," which spread with
great rapidity after the Second World War, has been
rather consistently defined by most economists, at
least in an operational sense, as growth of the per
capital Gross National Product (GNP) or similar
national accounts figures. .. Recently, as a result
of the apparent failure of the developing countries to
achieve, on the average, a satisfactory rate of growth
per capital GNP, there has been considerable criticism







of a narrowly economic approach to development.
In trying to explain what has gone wrong, a number
of observers have concluded that there has been
insufficient attention to social (or to social and
political) factors. . It has also been increas-
ingly argued that social factors are part of the
very nature and process of development and should
not be regarded merely as external causes or effects
of it.

With this in mind McGranahan-(1971:63) urges us to view

economic factors and "level-of-living" factors (e.g.,

health, education, nutrition, etc.,---more broadly defined

as social factors) as interdependent aspects of an evolving

system which cause and affect each other. "Under this con-

ception, development comprises both economic and social

elements, which tend to change together as a complex"

(McGranahan, 1971:68).

In order to measure and operationally define

"development" or modernization McGranahan has worked out a

list of eighteen quantitative "core indicators" (McGrana-

han, 1971:70). A single reading of these social and

economic facts would hypothetically "indicate" the level of

development or modernization in a society at any particular

time (assuming they are valid). Readings over time would

indicate the course of modernization--the direction and

degree of changes which make up the modernization process.







The indicators include such variables as expectation of

life at birth, per capital daily consumption of animal

protein, telephones per 100,000 population, and electricity

consumption per capital.

Hagen (1962:23) also decries the overemphasis on

economic factors in both the study of modernization and in

past attempts to stimulate it. As an economist in Burma

during the years 1951 to 1953, he found the economic situa-

tion there highly favorable for the beginning of technical

and organizational innovation and, supposedly, the modern-

ization of the Burmese economy and society. When this

failed to take place as expected, he concluded that,for

social and cultural--rather than economic reasons, the

typical Burmese was not motivated to take advantage of this

opportunity to increase his own income as well as help

modernize his country (see Hagen, 1962:432-470). Even-

tually Hagen decided that the type of technological and

entrepreneurial innovation which generates economic growth

must be preceded by a series of social, cultural, and

psychological changes--innovations in political organiza-

tiorn and social relationships as well as innovations in the

values, beliefs, &nd attitudes members of a society have






about their place and purpose in the world (iHagen, 1962:

33-34). He feels that making such basic changes in a

traditional people's way of thinking, feeling, and acting

is exceedingly difficult--requiring a great deal of pain-

ful and creative effort as well as tension and pressure.

To illustrate this thesis, he points out (1962:44) that

the successful operation of a large "modern" factory in a

traditional society requires radical changes of behavior

in both the entrepreneur and in interpersonal relations

(unless it is being run by foreigners from a developed

country). Iore specifically, a modern econor.ic enterprise

cannot be successfully operated by members of a traditional

culture who are organized in a rigid hierarchical structure

of ascribed statuses, who fear innovation, refuse to face

problems, etc. For Hagen, sustained economic growth is

produced by a certain innovative personality type which

has been formed in a modernizing culture and accowodated

by a modernizing social structure. In his view, full-

icale economic development is th last stage of the

modernization process and a sign of itb maturity. From

studies of the history of modern arid modernizing countries

IIagen (1962:21) says that the process is at first a slow







one beginning with the necessary sociocultural changes

which lead eventually to the economic growth stage. For

a modern country like England this final stage of economic

growth was reached in the late eighteenth century with

the industrial revolution. In Colombia, a modernizing

country, this stage was reached during the first two

decades of this century and in effect is barely under way.

In Burma it has presumably not yet been reached. In short,

the "modern" age fully arrives once sustained economic

growth begins but the modernizing process by means of which

a nation reaches this stage and becomes "modern" must begin

somewhat earlier.

Galnoor (1971:9) is in substantial agreement with

Hagen's view when he quotes Leopold Faufer's definition

of development:

Development means many things. It means dams and
factories, roads and canals, bush-clearing, elec-
trification, soil improvement, universities,
secondary schools, primary schools, sanitation,
research, and a multitude of other activities and
achievements. But, above all, development means
people. . The preparation and activation of
people is the cause of economic and social devel-
opment.

In essence these men are saying that a modern society is

one which is created by people with modern personalities







'who relate to their work and each other in a modern way.

The modern social relationship is essentially a bureau-

cratic one of cooperation and competition within a frame-

work of mutual respect and equal opportunity. The modern

personality is one whose thinking and behavior are guided

primarily by modern value orientations, and attitudes,

such as curiosity about the natural world, interest in

solving rather than avoiding problems, the desire to

achieve and be judged by achievement. A society where

thLs type of personality predominates is modern or is

becoming so. Thus, modernization is more a process of

social and cultural change than one of economic growth.


Environmental Theories of Modernization

This type of theory explains the origin of the

modernization process in terms of factors which are largely

external to the individual and his personality. In these

explanations, modern behavior in a society is principally

a consequence of the physical, social, cultural, or

economic environments of that society. Exponents of this

view insist that even though these environmental circum-

stances can be transformed by the hand of man, it is from

their forn and content tnat the possibilities of







modernization for -the individual and his society are

derived.

Some of these theories stress the influences of

physical or biological forces. Others put emphasis on

man-made social structural or cultural environments which

react back on man to shape his personality and behavior.

In some cases modernization is explained as basically a

consequence of one environmental factor while others try

to trace the combined effects of several factors on the

beginning of the modernization process.


Par-ticularistic Theories

The "one key factor" theories are usually described

as particularistic or deterministic theories. LaPiere

(1965:23) remarks that this type of explanation

involves an assumption that social change (or
modernization) is the product of some particular
variable, some single "cause," and that not only
is every change attributable to that cause, but
every change in that cause will produce a con-
comitan: change in society.

However, on closer analysis many of these single factors

turn out to be single themes made of many parts.

The following are examples of the single-factor


approach.




60

1. "Diffusionism" holds that one or a few dominant

cultural centers (e.g., Egypt in ancient times, the

United States today) create and innovate, diffusing new

ideas, techniques, etc., to others. This theory, once held

by the diffusionist school of anthropology, is no longer

accepted as the only explanation of change and development.

Nevertheless, men such as Becker and Barnes (1961:341)

stress the central importance of "culture contact" in

bringing about fundamental change. They regard the culture

contacts stemming from the sixteenth century period of

exploration as being instrumental in breaking down the

feudal order, increasing scientific curiosity, and giving

:ise to .world commerce, modern capitalism, the middle

class, and the national state. These :'innovations" in

their turn are said to have initiated the industrial

revolution and the modern age.

Hagen (1962:15) likewise places a great deal of

emphasis on the role of cultural diffusion in bringing

about change--

no one can doubt that the main source of change
in societies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa
during modern times is intrusion by the West and
the parade of economic power and prowess by the
West. If there are no serious internal stresses







and no disturbing forces from the outside, cultural
change in any society proceeds at a snail's pace
[Hagen, 1962:15].

Hagen is far too sophisticated however to attribute all

societal change to any single variable and the question

arises in his mind as to why some non-Western societies

have taken advantage of imported Western ideas, technology,

etc., faster and more thoroughly than others. To find out,

Hagen (1962:16) feels that we must look for the specific

underlying factors or conditions which dispose one group

to make use of outside help more readily than another.

If this can be accomplished, we will, he believes, be able

to hasten as well as understand the process of moderniza-

tion.

2. Geographic determinism, the most popular .

version of which hypothesizes that moderately cocl or cold

climates produce people who are somewhat reserved, ener-

getic, hard working, provident and thus more disposed to

develop themselves and their society. Conversely, warm

climates are thought to make people lazy, easygoing,

talkative, cheerful, open, etc., and, therefore, less

eager to master themselves and their surroundings. LaPiere

(1965:25) states that Ellsworth Huntington has been the






pri:rary exponent of this theory. Because climate and

geography do have some influence on how people behave,

the geographic variable is still very much a part of

some multivariate analyses of modernization. McClelland

(1961:338), for example, believes that while climate

obviously cannot account for all variation in levels of

development (as witness the difference between climatically

similar Germany and Poland) it is, he thinks, a limiting

factor in the sense that extremes cf heat and cold have

been barriers to rapid or thoroughgoing modernization.

3. Biological determinism maintains that differ-

ences in levels of social, cultural, or economic develop-

ment are a result of inherent racial differences. Thus,

the countries of Western Europe are more highly developed

than those of Africa because the European is physically

and mentally superior to the African. During the nine-

teenth and early twentieth centuries this theory gained a

number of adherents because of such articulate spokesmen

as Count J. A. de Gobineau in France and Houston Stewart

Ch.mberlain in England. Adolph Hitler formulated his own

version of the theory and used it to guide his policies

of enslavement and extermination of minorities in Europe.







4. William F. Ogburn's theory of cultural lag

(1964:86-95), in common with the theories of Karl Marx and

Thorstein Veblen, expresses the idea that social change

(and therefore modernization) is fundamentally dependent

on inventions in "material technology" (or technological

innovation in contemporary terms). Thus, the diffusion of

modern technology into traditional or underdeveloped

societies should, after varying time lags, bring about the

modernization of social organization and individual behav-

ior. This,of course, has been the basic modus operandi of

many economic development planners since World War II.

Though not denying the role of technological inno-

vations in leading or hastening the modernization process,

most social and economic theorists refuse to accept the

idea that they are inevitably the beginning of the process.

LaPiere (1965:32) insists that recent changes in China

have had their origin in ideological rather than technical

innovations. Wilbert Moore (1963:87) offers proof that

"nonmaterial" culture can lead while technology lags, in

the fact that the ideology of economic development is now

almost everywhere accepted by political leaders in under-

developed countries at the same time that their technology







lags. Moore (19G3:87) calls this desire for material

well-being "a worldly doctrine (which) is the single

most successful conversion movement in the history of

ideological diffusion." It is, in effect, a modern secular

religion.

5. The influence of elite groups in the modern-

ization of traditional societies has been proclaimed by

Edward Spicer (1952) and others who have taken their cues

from earlier ideas expressed by Vilredo Pareto in Mind and

Society. For Spicer, the educated elites are the best

read members of their societies and are most in contact

with advanced countries and this makes them more receptive

to new ideas. In a way, "they clearly see the difference

between what is and what might be" (Spicer, 1952:18). What

elites adopt in the way of new technology, customs, ideas,

values, etc., is sooner or later adopted by the masses.

According to this line of thought, the more thoroughly

modern an elite group becomes, the more modern will the

society it dominates eventually become. The moderniza-

tion of elite thinking is nonetheless difficult to put into

practice because true modernization implies equalitarian

social relationships and achievement of status, changes







which would threaten the near monopoly of wealth, power,

and prestige which most traditional elites presently

nj oy.

6. Arnold Toynbee's "challenge of the environment"

theory (1947) specifies that nations grow when some

environmental challenge or problem is responded to in a

positive "problem-solving" way by a creative minority.

Such a challenge, whether it comes from the physical or

the social environment, must not be too severe, that is,

beyond the capabilities of the group challenged. According

to this line of reasoning, Greenland was too severe a

challenge for the Viking colonists whereas Iceland was -not.

In the same way tropical Africa could be said to have been

too much of a challenge for its inhabitants. At the other-

extreme, li title or no challenge will, Toynbee claims,

result in the stagnation or even disintegration of a

civilization. McClelland (1961:7) feels that Toynbee's

theory is so general that it has little explanatory or

predictive power, unless the right amount of challenge can

be precisely specified. Otherwise, one can always find a

background of challenges in the history of developed

countries and speculate that they were "just right" for

stimulating development.







rhere are, of course, other "one factor" explana-

tions for social change and modernization which have not

been presented. The above are intended as prominent

examples of the approach rather than an exhaustive list.

The belief that a certain combination of religious values

or precepts are of vital importance for the development of

an industrial society is perhaps the most glaring omission.

For the most part, deterministic theories are out of vogue

because as Hagen (1962:19) remarks, when taken singly the

independent variables they postulate explain only a limited

amount of the developmental differences to be found among

nations.



Multivariate Theories

The obvious complexity of the modernization process

has led to a reference for multivariate explanations over

particularistic ones. Economist Walt Rostow (1960:4-16)

has postulated a series of five stages which a modernizing

society passes through on the road to development. Each

stage involves a complex of changes in the economic

environment which implicitly brings on a subsequent stage.

In stage one, the "traditional" stage, which is considered

typical of many underdeveloped countries today and of







pre-eighteenth century Europe, production and innova-

tion are severely limited though not static. Growth is

cyclical and quantitative rather than qualitative in

nature.

During stage two or the pre-take-off, methods of

production undergo sufficient improvement to allow for

some capital formation which permits an increase in output

per head. The initiation of such improvements is said to

be an outgro-.'th of either foreign penetration or ascendency

to power of rulers who, because they are interested in

economic growth, give freedom to growth-minded organizers.

When this stage is fully developed, social and "other"

resistances to economic development are thought to be

largely overcome.

Stage three is called the "take-off" stage and

is characterized by large scale increases in investment

and manufacturing. A modern institutional framework also

evolves and after several decades, stage four is achieved.

Maturity or stage four is a period in which the

economy has become capable of financing practically any

known type of public and private investment while the

society has technologically achieved the capability of







materially realizing such investments. This high-

investment process leads to stage five.

Stage five heralds the age of high mass-consumption

as exemplified by the United States and West European

countries. Here durable consumer goods are mass-produced

and consumed by a population desirous of and able to have

much more than the basic necessities.

Joseph Spengler (1965:262) criticizes Rostow's

theory of developmental stages on six points: (1) Rostow

fails to say exactly how one stage ends to give rise to

another; (2) he overlooks the "fact" that external influ-

ences are ineffectual if traditional value systems do not

change; (3) he ignores inner stresses which may easily

confound development in any one stage; (4) he gives us no

clear qualitative criteria for the stages; (5) he presumes

a unilinear development for all societies; (6) the sources

of changes within each stage are not clearly identified.

A su:ir.ary of other mult-ivariete economic theories

of modernization is provided by Hagen (1962:36-47). He

prefaces it with a list of economic characteristics

typical of traditional societies which economists believed

were barriers to modernization. These are, in effect,







variables in the economic environment. which economists

thought had to be changed in order to initiate the modern-

ization process. They include: (1) chronic low income

leading to inadequate savings for investment; (2) the

"demonstration effect" of Western countries, which leads

the upper strata of underdeveloped nations to spend most

of their income in conspicuous consumption; (3) inadequate

demand, which offers little reason for investment; (4) a

lack of capital to set up the necessary "infrastructure"

(roads, schools, etc.,) for development to take place;

(5) an excess population which eats up most of the income

produced.

Hagen observes (1962:37) that by 1960 most

economists had added social and cultural variables to

their economic models for development after seeing so many

countries with favorable economic environments fail to

begin modernizing. They began stressing, in addition to

economic reforms, the need for cultural changes such as

the inculation of risk-taking and profit-making values,

changes in political values, changes in the definitions of

"high" status and "low" status, and the development of

"'national" loyalties from strictly local communiTy







loyalties. Ironically, men like Max Weber and Schumpeter

had long before emphasized the role such factors play in

producing industrialization. McClelland (1961:11) states

that Max Weber's theory of social and economic organiza-

tion laid the main groundwork for these later efforts to

understand the cultural and psychological mainsprings of

modernization. Weber held that the development of modern

economic institutions like capitalism was the result of a

conflict between "traditionalism" and rationality which in

turn arose from the changes in religious and ethical values

that accompanied the Protestant reformation (Weber, 1947:

324-354). For Weber, "traditionalism" was embodied in a

hierarchical, authoritarian social structure in which the

individual accepted his place and relationship to peers,

superiors, and inferiors unquestionably on the basis of

traditional values and norms. By way of contrast, ratio-

nality was exemplified by the modern bureaucratic organ-

ization in which, ideally, the rules and one's place were

subject to change on the basis of practical needs and

one's merit in performing assigned duties.

Weber believed that rationality had won out over

traditionalism in Western cultures such that the social







u nd economic systems of Western nations had in our terms

become "modernized."

Weber's critics often charge that contemporary

Western cultures and societies are far from being "ratio-

nal" (as he defined it) in their orientations or in

the typical behavior of the individuals who make them up.

The critics' claim that traditionalism still dominates to

d large extent the thought and action of Western man has

been answered by Wilbert Moore. Moore's hypothesis is

that the disparity between the real and the ideal is in

itself "change-producing" and a stimulus to approximate

the ideal as far as possible (Moore, 1963:80). Moore points

out that even though the social order is also a moral

order, "sin" or nonconformity occurs everywhere because,

among other things, ideal values are often not achieved

and norms governing conduct are often contradictory.

Moore believes that the resulting tension between the

ideal and the real is conducive to change in social

organization and the ideology itself. CIn other words,

the culture sets forth the ideal in terms of goals and

behavior and most people in the culture strive to achieve

these goals, however imperfectly. The goals themselves






operate as a constant challenge to their own shortcomings.

Thus, when rational social and economic behavior (oriented

towards materialistic goals) is the ideal of a culture,

most participants, or at least those .who have internalized

the culture, will strive to behave rationally and achieve

material goals.

Working at the micro-level in the study of a

small, relatively well-developed, Colombian village,

A. Eugene Havens (1966:175-176) came to believe that a

particular complex of social variables was responsible for

that community's unusual progress. They are: (1) coloni-

zation of the area by independent small farmers rather than

adventurers seeking plantation land; (2) the acceptance

of risk in exploiting opportunities by the frontiersmen-

colonists; (3) the openness and equalitarianism of their

social structure; (4) the colonist's use of existing sources

of credit and technical information; (5) the encouragement

of change by church and family structure; (6) the effec-

tiveness of voluntary associations in problem-solving

(those who took part in them developed "trust" for each

other and the government). Havens believes that these

were sufficient conditions for development. In this






particular community these variables operated together.

From a macro-level perspective of cross-cultural research,

Samuel Eisenstadt (1965:659-674) emphasizes the importance

of more-or-less the same set of social-environmental

conditions for national modernization. He insists that

class structures as well as institutions like the family

and government must become adaptable and flexible enough

to take advantage of external pressures for modernization.


Sociopsychological Theories
of Modernization

In this species of theory, a personality type or

speci-fc personality factors are linked with modernization.

Generally, modernization is seen as the consequence of a

comnpletx psychological change--the transformation of the

traditional personality type into a modern one. Such a

metamorphasis is considered a necessary and direct cause of

modernization though it is usually acknowledged to be the

effect of broader social and cultural changes. Hagen, for

example (1962:9), conceives of social change and modern-

ization as beginning in the following way. First a change

in social structure occurs (because of external or internal

events) which leads to a change in the parental behavior of






a significant segment of the society. This changing

childhood environment then creates a different personal-

ity type which, when fully developed, acts to complete

the modernization process by promoting inLensive social

and economic developments.

Like Hagen, most sociopsychological theorists

do not believe that the majority of a society's mem-

bers must acquire "modern" personalities for the modern-

ization process to visibly begin. Instead, it is thought

sufficient if there is an important minority which

docs so.

Whatever proportion of "modern" personalities

is necessary or however exactly one defines a modern

personality, there is agreement among those with a

sociopsychological point of view that "modern" personal-

ities play a vital role in modernizing a society. What-

ever their' origin (they might even be ambitious foreigners

as in Venezuela or Kuwait, for example), they must be

present with sufficient power to both originate and imple-

ment the changes which bring on socioeconomic growth.

Wilbert vicore (1963:96) indirectly supports this view

when he says that the simple desire for a better life does







not automatically lead to its fulfillment. In other words

motivation cannot be assumed and

although Webar's emphasis on the importance of
the "Protestant Ethic" as precedent to the
emergence of capitalism is clearly not a necessary
precondition of industrialization in the contempory
world, some degree of "achievement orientation" of
ambition for personal betterment and the acquisi-
tion of the education and skills to further that
ambition, must exist in some groups and spread
rather widely, if sustained growth is to be accom--
plished [Moore, 1963:96].

Kaspar Naegele (1961:1216) offers a similar ratio-

nale for analyzing psychological factors in modernization

when he states that

Psychological facts are relevant for any attempt
to account for changes in social organizations or
wider corporate patterns. Changes in and of any
society involve changes in the configuration of
motives and dispositions characterizing the mem-
bers of that society. Wide shifts in an economy--
e.g., from agricultural to industrial patterns--
cannot proceed without changes in people's orga-
nization of emotions [Naegele, 1961:121.6].

More specifically Joseph Spengler (1965:243-272)

insists that the modernization of a society begins with

changes in the typical personality characteristics of its

leaders. "It is in," he remarks, "change in the contents

of men's minds and in changes associated therewith (e.g.,

changes in habits and institutions) that technological

progress, the correspondent of mutation, has its principal







source" (Spengler, 1965:247). According to Spengler,

quialitative changes in culture and personality give rise

to the activities of the entrepreneur which are more

important for economic development than are quantitative

increases in capital and machinery. He believes that the

opposite view caused David Ricardo to neglect the contri-

butions of the "creative entrepreneur" and so underestimate

the economic growth of late nineteenth century Europe

(Spengler, 1965:256).

Under the heading "Types of Men in Sociology,"

Alex Inkeles (1964:52) reviews both early and more recent

efforts to devise sociopsychological personality types. in

order to explain the marked differences between different

societies at the same time and in the same society at

different times. He begins with the personality types

delineated by Thomas and Znaniecki in The Polish Peasant

in Eurcpe and America and with the foxes and the lions of

Vilfredo PareLo's M:ind and Society. Inkeles (1954:52)

feoel that Pareto's innovative "foxes" and traditional

"lions" are two of the most important theoretical personal-

ity types ever conceptualized. Parcto characterized his

.o.-:es a:s Spculative and willing to experiment or risk




77

while the lions were portrayed as attached to tradition and

lacking in imagination. Pareto believed that a society led

by foxes would be dynamic, progressive and ready to inno-

vate for the sake of improvement. His portrait of the

"fox" describes the contemporary idea of the innovative

entrepreneur or creative person who is considered indis-

pensable for the initiation and development of the modern-

ization process. Inkeles (1964:52-53) also mentions more

recently elaborated personality types such as those of

David Riesman. Riesman's personality types represent dif-

ferent models of conformity to a given type of society at

different stages of development. His "tradition-directed"

man is the modal type of personality he would expect to

find in a traditional, predominantly rural society. The

behavior of such a man is largely guided by long-standing

cultural values and norms which are accepted without ques-

tion. In the event that cultural changes--resulting from

foreign contacts or the machinations of deviants--bring

about possibilities for social mobility, capLtal accumula-

tion, or scientific and technical progress, a new

personality type emerges which Riesman calls the "inner-

directed" man. Such a man would be socialized to achieve







to the limit of his ability by taking advantage of new

opportunities for self-advancement. This personality

is a desired response to these new conditions and a more

flexible tradition which encourages personal improvement--

rather than demanding strict adherence to all the details

of the old tradition. In other words, an ambitious man

is allowed not only to step out of his father's footsteps,

but,as opportunities and demand increase, he is encouraged

to rise above his father's position. The stimulation of

such a man would involve impressing on him early in life

a desire to achieve and create in whatever direction his

interests lay. It would also mean the development of

self-discipline and persistence in the face of obstacles.

The internalization of these values and norms would pro-

duce a prototype of the capitalistic entrepreneur, the

source of whose behavior or direction, according to

Riesmani, comes from within. In Riesman's terms it was

the "inner-directed" man who, like Pareto's fox, realized

the opportunities for economic development which were

available in Western Europe after the seventeenth century.

It is, Riesman implies, the "inner-directed" personality

which present-day traditional societies need to cultivate,

encourage, and provide with opportunities.







Inkeles (196':53) states that Riesman's complex

personality types, while illuminating major social

processes of adjustment and change with historical per-

scective, have been difficult to find empirically. He

reports progress in measuring some of these qualities--

including McClelland's apparently successful measurement

of the need to achieve--but none in finding a completely

"inner-" or "other-" directed man.

Daniel Lerner in The Passing of Traditional Society

(1953) constructs a hypothetical personality type which

shares certain elements of Riesman's "other-directed"

personality and which he believes will at least accompany

the modernization process if not actually originate it.

Generally, Lerncr's theory holds that modernization in the

form of a modern life-style has arisen within the "European

orbit," is spreading to the non-European world, and is

essentially connected with a distinctive "modern" oersonal-

it. The "modern life-style" involves urban living,

liferacy, use of the mass media, political awareness and

activity, and democratic relationships (Lerner, 1958:43-75).

Le near's modrn" personality is distinguished mainly by

his rational postivist outlook, participation in rational




80

institutions, and his psychic mobility or empathy, that is,

his capacity to see himself in the other fellow's situa-

tion. This sensitivity to others is of course the major

component of Riesman's "other-directed" man.

Lerner operationally defined the elements of the

empathic or modern personality from response to nine

survey items used in the Middle Eastern research from

which his theory is derived. Thus, the empathic individual

is one who shows that he: (1) has the ability to analyze

the value of the mass media for his own use; (2) has the

ability to criticize the mass-media and his rulers;

(3) can picture himself living in a foreign country; and

(4) can imagine what other people would do to solve his

problems (Lerner, 1958:69-70). The person who has not

developed these personality traits is classified as either

traditional or transitional according to his distance

from said traits. The traditional personality of the

Middle East is described by Lerner (1958:43) as being

like the modal personality type presumed to exist in

medieval Europe: immobile, a stranger to empathy, and

suspicious of the new. He is, for example, unable to

conceive of himself outside of Turke.' or as running his




81

government. Not surprisingly, the transitional personality

is said to be.somewhere between traditionalism and moder-

nity (Lerner, 1958:72). He is usually illiterate, may

or may not be urban, exposed to mass media, etc., but

somehow has become fairly empathic.

Essentially, then, Lerner assumes from his data

that those who have clear opinions on issues are the

least restricted and traditional and the most rational,

positivist, empathic, and modern. Operationally, opinion-

knowledge indicates empathy and modernity.

Does this personality type really give birth to a

modern society or is it the product of a modernizing

society? Larner's data show (1958:63) that incipient

urbanization and the development of the mass media lead to

the beginning of personality modernization. Certain

individuals respond to new influences and knowledge with

personality changes and they reinforce and irreversibly

set in motion the modernization process. His personality

is, therefore, an effect which becomes a cause.

Critics cf Lerner's theory (Dawn, 1959:660-661;

Gutick, 1959:135-138) point out that his objective criteria

of _-odeernization do not, in fact, correlate well. The







correlation between urbanization and political activity,

for example, is diminished by the fact that election

participation in Syria and Lebanon was higher in villages

than in cities. Moreover, they ask whether high mass-media

participation always leads to the weakening of tradition

and authority and whether one can infer the existence of

empathy from the fact that a variety of opinions are held?

In short, Lerner is criticized for creating a modern per-

sonality type cut of superficial evidence and presuming

its connection with an objective state he calls modern

but which, according to his own data, is not clearly that.

Lerner (1958:393) regards his conclusions as hypothetical

regularities made more plausible by the results of his

research.

Possibly the most prominent sociopsychological

theory of modernization to appear in the great post-

World War II search for the mainsprings of economic

development is that of David McClelland. In his monumental

work, The Achievingq Societjy (196 C), McClelland, who is a

psychologist, has tried specifically to pinpoint the

psychological forces behind creativity and accomplishment

and demonstrate through various quantitative methods that







these factors are -vital for economic development. He

begins by demonstrating logically and empirically the

limited or insignificant influence of such environmental

factors as race, climate, and political institutions on

the rate of economic development (McClelland, 1961:6-7).

He then argues (1961:8-14) against traditional economic

theories which in his opinion mistakenly regard the

modern entrepreneur as a totally rational, self-interested

man, motivated to increase productivity (and the common-

wealth) for personal profit. McClelland insists that

many times external conditions (demand, etc.,) are unfavor-

able for economic growth or investment and yet people

invest. He cites as proof of this contention the building

of railroads to the West Coast in the 1860's, investment

in innovations or developments which had no foreseeable

economic advantage (such as the automobile), and the fact

that in many underdeveloped countries where there is

little rational reason for investing (risks are high,

markets are small, etc.,) large-scale investments have been

made. With regard to this last point, it might be

recalled from Chapter II that the industrialization of

Medellin began when seemingly irracional investments were







made in textile mills--at a time when much better returns

were available elsewhere and in a product for which there

was apparently little market or transport to markets.

Beginning with Weber and Schumpeter, McClelland

(1961:11) finds that some economists began to sense that

there were "irrational" reasons which contributed to

varying propensities to save, invest, and create. Freud,

he points out (1961:38), had just discovered that motives

to fill needs and take action are not always or even

primarily rational. Most of these scholars talked about

variables such as attitude towards work, spirit of

adventure or risk, and joy of creating. Whatever the

specific approach, McClelland (1961:6) believes that this

point of view had led to recognition of "irrational"

forces for economic development that lie within man him-

self, in his motives. Coupled with this has come the

belief that psychology can shud light on the process of

modernization by findLnu out what kind of man concentrates

cn azc:.c.:.ic (and technical) activities and why some men

are so successful at them. McClelland himself feels that

thcce :psychological motivations which do spur economic

g'rwth ?rre closely related to cultural value orientations






in the sense that an individual's psychological disposi-

tion to act as an entrepreneur or agent of modernization

are manifestations of his cultural values. McClelland

observes (1961:17) that empirical proof for the relation-

ships between personality traits, cultural values, and

economic development is hard to come by but he believes

that his own research and that of Florence Kluckhohn

represent solid efforts to find such proof.

With this justification for a psychological

explanation of modernization completed, McClelland begins

to build his own theory for the genesis of the "achieving

society." Essentially, McClelland holds that an inner

motive called "need for achievement," if held by suffi-

cient numbers of people, is the most direct cause of

economic development. This need for achievement (which

McClelland expresses as "N achievement" for shorthand

purposes) is a desire to excel for the sake of excellence

itself. It is similar to what Max Weber described as the

Calvinist's irrational need to do a job well for its own

sake and to the fundamental motivation of Riesman's "inner-

directed" man.

McClelland located and measured the need for

achie"emen.t while' analyzing fantasy responses of college




Full Text

PAGE 1

Value Orientations and Modernization in Two Colombian Cities by DAVID W. COOMBS A DISSERTATION PRfJSEwTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVHRcITY 07 FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF Til-" REQUIRZMEMTS FOR THE DL'GREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNT.Vr.RS ''TY 1 9 7 1

PAGE 3

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost the writer wishes to express his appreciation to the present chairman of his supervisory committee. Dr. Joseph S. Vandiver, and to his former chairman, now at the University of A].abama, Dr. Irving L. Webber. To Dr. Webber gratitude is due for his guidance in both carrying out the research for this dissertation and in its preparation. Thanks are due to Dr. Vandiver for his careful review of the dissertation text and for the useful suggestions he made which strengthened the finished product. Special credit is owed to Dr. Webber's wife Lois for the support she gave the writer in both Colombia and the United States. Other members of the supervisory conmittee. Dr. Sugiyama lutaka. Dr. J. V. D. Saunders, Dr. T. Lynn Smith, and Dr. Robert Bradbury also deserve the \^;riter's appreciation for their kind assistance and the services rendered over the past seven years. Grateful appreciation is expressed to the Kockcii

PAGE 4

feller Foundation and the Center for Latin American Studies of the University of Florida for the grant assistance v/hich made the Colombian research project possible. Extra credit is due Dr. William E. Carter, Captain Raymond Toner, and Mrs. Vivian Nolen of the Center for their prompt attention to the needs of the Colombian project and its personnel The writer is, of course, obligated to his coworkers in the research project, Alfredo Ocampo Z., and J. Selv.'yn Hollingsworth, Their efficient, selfless efforts in the organization and implementation of the researcli and in dealing with problems encountered in the analysis of the results, were all-important for its quality and completion. In Colombia, a number of persons lent the writer invaluable assistance during various stages of the field research. Mxss Susana Caicedo, iMiss Nancy Henao and Miss Ana Cristina Zamorano of the secretarial staff of the Un5versidad del Valle in Call spent many extra hours typing lists of information, and rough drafts. Mr. Jorge Valencia, Secretary of the Chamber of Comn;erce in Palmira, went far beyond the call of duty in helping us organize the pretest of the instrument. Mr. Ivan Amaya, Assistant Manager of the AsociacTon Nacional de Industriales (ANDI), iii

PAGE 5

in Medellin, rendered rapid and invaluable help in drawing up sample frames for the industrial and banking sectors. To other inform.ants in Medellin and the respondents themselves, an obvious and lasting debt of gratitude is due. In the United States, a great nany people helped in the latter stages of the project and duririg the writing of the dissertation. Florence Kluckhohn and Harry A. Scarr gave us important statistical and tr.eoretical insights. Dr. Edvard C. McDonagh arranged for the writer a light teaching load at the University of 7'labama which facilitated the completion of th'3 dissertation. Mrs. Sue Freeman and Mii.s Naomi L. Christian, secretaries in the Sociology Department at the University of Alabama spent long hours typing rough drafts. Many others, too numerous to name, lielped indirectly in ways small and large. iv

PAGE 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . ' ii LIST OF TABLES ABSTRACT. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 Organisation of the Dissertation 6 II. THE SETTING 7 The People . 13 Kistory and Background 23 V.'hy the Anbioquenos 36 III. THEORIES OF MODERNIZATION 46 Defining Modernization. ... 46 Environiaental Theories cf Moderni?;ation . 53 Sociopsychological Tlieories of Modernization 73 Cultural Value Theories of Modernisation 112 17. RESEARCH DESIGN ' 152 Hypotheses 154 The Measuring Instro.raent 157 Hiscory and Method cf the SaropLing Process s 150 Field Procedures. ..... 130 Data Processing 185 A Statistical Portrait of I,er-.d^rs and Students Interviewed 191 V

PAGE 7

V. RESULTS 206 Value Orientations in Medellin 207 Medellin and Popayan: A Comparison of Values in a Modern and a Traditional City 237 VI. DISCUSSION 252 Value Orientations m Medellin 252 The Intercity Comparison -6? VII. SUyil-LZ^RY AND CONCLUSIONS 27 3 APPENDIX I ENGLISH-L^-J^GUAGE VJ^PvSION OF THE Vx\J.UE ORIENTATION INSTRUMENT 234 II SPANISH-LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE VALUE ORIENTAriON TNSTRU.MSOT 300 BI3LI0GPJ\PKY. . . . BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 316 323 VI

PAGE 8

LIST OF TABLES Table Numbers and Percentage Change of the Population, Medellin, Bogota, and Call, 1918 to 1968 12 Educational Level of Leaders and Their Fathers, Medellxn, 1967 193 Leaders Fathers According to Occupational Level, Medellin, 1967 194 Social Class Level of Students' Barrio of Residence, by School, Medellin, 1967. . . . 197 Students' Fathers According to Occupational Level, Medellin, 1967 200 Students' Fathers According to Educational Level Attained, Medellin, 1967 203 Value Profile of Coinmunity Leaders, Medellin, 1967 208 Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2) by Occupational Sector, Medellin, 1967 210 Average Number of Times Loaders Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2) According to Educational Experience, Medellin, 1967. , . 215 vii

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Table 10 Average Number of Times Leaders with Studies Abroad Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), According to Duration of Foreign Study, Medellin, 1967 217 11 Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice ( Test 2), According to Father's Education, Medellin, 1967. . . . 218 12 Average Number of Times Leaders Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), According to Age, Medellin, 1967 220 13 Value Profile of 6th Year High School Students, MedellTn, 1967 r 222 14 Average NunilDer of Times Leaders ana 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), Medellin, 1967. . . . 223 15 Average Number of Times Leaders and 6th Year Students at the Jorge Robledo Institute Chose: 1) A "xModern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), Medellin, 1967 225 16 Average Nuirber of Times 6t>Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Socioeconomic Class of School, Medellin, 1967 227 viii

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:able 17 Average Number of Ti:TiG3 Gth Year High School Students Chose: I) A "'.Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Upperand MiddleClass Schools versus Lov;er~Middleand Lower-Class Schools, MedelliTn, 1967 .... 230 13 Average Number of Ti^es 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a ."Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Tost 2), by Socioeconomic Class Level of Residence, Medellin, 1967 231 19 Average Number of Tines 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), by Occupation of Father, Mcdellin, 19 67 ............... . 233 20 Average Number of Times 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Clioice '(Test 2) , by Education of Father,. Medellin, 1967. ........ 234 21 Average N'omber of Times 6th Year High School Students Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1'; a.id 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice ( Test 2) , by Rural or Urban Residence in Early Childhood, Medellin, 1967. . 236 22 Average Number of Times Leaders in Medellin and ropayan Chose: 1) A "Modern" Ranking of Value Orientatr.icns (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Tost 2), 1967 243 ax

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Tablo 2 3 Average Numbei of Times Stucents in Medellin and Popayan Chose: 1) A "Modern"' Ranking of Value Orientations (Test 1) and 2) a "Modern" (Dominant) Orientation as First Choice (Test 2), 1967 251

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/vbstract ci Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Kequi reiTients for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND MODERNIZATION IN TWO COLOMBIAN CITIES By David \\. Co orab s December, 1971 Chairman: Joseph S. Vanciver Major Depar-;jT.ent: Sociolcgy Tr^e ;riajor proposition of this dissertation evolved from p;"AVti--ipat:,o)i of the vrriter in a tenching/reaearch projecf: ;i.n Colombia and knov^ledge of tv,'G facts: (1) tliat Zh'.-i rare and degree of D.odernizar. ion arc? highly variable in the ••/or Id; {2] that GConou^.ie, biological, oiid geographic explav^ationo for thi;3 variability have noh been suj"fi client. Gj.ven th.is reality, it v.'as proposed thac these differences, and therefore the degree of .'liodernizat,-' on or socioeconomic development achieved by any socvloty C'lr croup, d'V.pe3-id, to a large extent, on. the strength v.'i.th v:hich C'c-rtain value oriental, ions are he .d oy the lea.ders of Lhat'. soctety or xi

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group. This proposition made logical and empirical sense since it is known that cultural values, implicitly or explicitly, become personal goals for most men and that effective leaders set the direction and tempo of any social group, large or small. Drawing on Florence Kluckhohn's theory of variation in value orientations, it was hypothesized that community leaders in Medellin--Colombia ' s best developed city--would hold, to a greater degree than would comparable leaders in the highly traditional city of Popayan, Colombia, those value orientations associated, by Kluckhohn and others, with the North American middle-class and the "modern" personality. This was, then, a comparative study to test the degree of association between modern values in leadership groups and the level of modernization reached by the areas they control and manage. Because some variation was expected within the Medellin leadership group, other hypotheses were formulated to predict variation in value orientations according to salient social characteristics (type of occupation, age, . education, father's occupational and educational status, etc.). Since, however, the leaders as a group were too xii

PAGE 14

hciP.ogGneous to be differentiated by social class, senior hii^'h school boys were drawn froni various social class levels and their value orientations elicited. The coir.parison of their responses with those of the leaders also permitted a broader examination of generational changes. Data were collected from leaders by means of interviev;'s and from students by means of a questionnaire. In bcuh cases the same instrument v/as U3ed--a Spanish language translation of the urban version of Kluckhohn's value orien'^ations schedule. In Medellxn 60 leaders selected from seven sectors of leadership--ccittniercial , ind"asti"ial, banking, gcvernrrient , quasigx.vern.ment , the church, and the universi ty--were interviev;ed and 417 male high school senJ.ors v/ere questioned. In Popayan 59 leaders from che same sectors were interviev/ed and 154 students were questioned. Value orientations expressed by leaders and students v;ere compe-ired v.'ith a purely "modern" profile of value orient itions. Gross results sho-.ved tho.t leaders in both MedelJ.in and Fopayan preferred modern value orientations in two of the four arear. tested and traditional or other types of value or i enta Lvions in the other tv/o . :: i i i

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A wore detailed analysis revealed that Medellin leaders did. hov/ever,. make more modern responses than did Popayan leaders, although the differences were not statistically significant in all cases. This difference was even more marked v;hen leaders f.roin "economic" sectors of the tv;o cities, such as the con'onercia] and industrial, were compared. Variations in student value orientations followed the same inixed pattern as that of the leaders except that detailed analysis shov/ed Popayan students with a significantly w'rea'.er number of modern value cnoices tlian Medellin students. Despite some support for the prediction that Kedellin leaders would be more ir.odern in their values than Popayan leaders, the reversal of these differences with regard to students in the two cities does not lend unambiguous support to either the hypothesized difference between the tu'c cities or the proposition that the value orientations defined here as "modern" are clearly associated with modernisation. XLV

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION For many years it has' been noted that certain countries and areas within countries which are deficient in natural resources nevertheless achieve superior levels of socioeconomic development. This has occurred in Colombia where the pace of socioeconomic modernization is uneven, some regions and cities advancing much faster and farther than others. Strong integrating trends of accelerated horizontal and vertical social mobility are weakening this phenomenon but the differences persist. Development of the city and metropolitan area of Medellin, for example, has been so great that it is often cited as an outstanding exception to the general rule of underdevelopment. Yet this isolated region is much less well-endowed in natural resources than many slower-developJ.ng areas. Degree of development (or modernization) is, then, to some extent independent of resources and climate and, in the absence of external influences such as an influx of outside capital

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(as in Venezuela) , the hu.iian factor must be responsible. In fact, the businesslike attitudes and energetic behavior of the people cf Medellin are legendary in Colombia and •chis makes that area ideal for determining why the people of one rather than another region are more prone to develop themselves and their territory. Answers to this question are of vital importance to Coloinl^ia as well as to most of the v>7orld w'nich is still traditional and underdeveloped. Modernization is the national goal of practically every articulate Colombian one meets. The general consciousness of the progress ideal is demonstratied by the large amounts of space which the country's nev/spapers devote to the efforts made and myriad problems encountered in lessening the gap between Colombia and such models of optimum development as the United States. In the opinion of many students of social change and modernization, one important answer j.s to be found in the cultural values v/hich guide a i^eoplo's individual and collective way of life. riorence Kluckhohn (1961:1) and cultural anthropologists in general "regard a knowledge of the basic assur.ptions (or values) of a people as indispensable to the interpretation of concrete behavior."

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Aiithropologist Kluckhohn proposes (i9ol: 10-20) that different combinations of values or value orientations are 7:elated to markedly different ways of life and, by ir.plication, to different levels of socioeconomic development. She believes that a "Future" orientation towards ti'-ic, a "Doing" orientation towards activity, a Masteryover-Nature orientation, and an Individualistic orientation in man-to-man relationships are "modern" values which shape the behavior of "modern" populations like the middle classes of the United States. Other social scientists as v;ell as many philosophers agree with her interpretation and v;oulc specify further that these value orientations are closely linked with successful entreprer.eurship and the Protestant ethic. Thus, there i.s a belief among those who stress the importance of values that individuals or groups who live by specific "action" values of this type will develop and use more full^ their ov;n capacities as well as those of the environment in which they operate. The vital role of "inf luentials" or Jeadership groups in p romoting comraunity development is obviously and especially vital. The values they held should, therefore, be a key factor in determining whether and to v.'hat

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degree modernization will take place. Such is the thinking of Aaron I.ipman (1966:14-15) who remarks that "in general contempoi'ary e'ronomists are in agreement that the entrepreneur is a business leader whose function in the promotion of economic development is fundamental." Given that cultural values and modernisation are connected, and that conuaunity leaders are particularly important in initiating and guiding social change directed toward such a developmeiit , then the values or value orientations of loaders should be important areas of investigation for the student of modernization, Accordiiigly, tliis dissertation is intended to do just that as part of an overall research project in v/hich variations in value orientations among leaders and high school students in three Colombian cities were investigated. The three cities, Medellin, Cali, and Popayan, represent, insofar as can be determined, different points on a continuum of socioecOiiomic development, Medellin being t'ne most: developed or modern and Popayan least, so. Students The project v/as financed through a Rockefeller Foundation grant to the Center for Latin American Studies of the University of iMorida, as part of an agreement between the Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colcnbia and the University of Florida.

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v/ere iacluded in the study in order to provide comparisons betv;een Generations and along social class lines. The leaders by themselves v;ere clearly too liom.ogeneous to enable cs to do these things. Medellin is the principal focus of this dissertation so that t.he largest part of the data presented involves descriptions and comparisons of value orientations held by leaders and students in tliat city. A compariscn is also made betv/een the leaders and students of Medellin and those of Popayan in view of the fact that the tv/o cities are considered v;ithin Colombia polar oppo.i;ite:j of socioeconomic development. The "modern" value orientation profile which is attributed to the north /\m3rican middle class and '"'modern" entrepreneurs is used as a bac'eline for all comparisons. It is expected that respondents in the relatively v;ell-developed city of Medellin will express "modern" value orientations to a greater degree than those in Popayan and indeed will approxi.iTi6.te "modern'' entrepreneurs in this respect. Although v;e have presumed that values act as precipitating factors of the modern L'^ation ni-ocess, the resGvarch design employed in thrs project permits 0.3 to

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inquire only if values are associated with modornizaticr . In this cense our goals are exploratory rather than definitive. Organization o f the Di s sertation The development of this report begins in Chapter II with a description and a history of the city of Medellin and its people. Follov;ing this, in Chapter III is a review of the literature on modernization and an explanation of the theoretical basis for the research. Chapter IV describes the research design used, the biographical characteristics of leaders and students questioned and states the hypotheses which guided the research. Results of the re-search — the detailed findings from Medellin and the intercity comparisons — are reported in Chapter V. Chapter VI entails a discussion of the results, while the seventh and final chapter provides a summary of the results and offers some conclusions.

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CHAPTER II THE SETTING Medellfn is the capital of the departraent of Anticquia, which is locaced in the wide moLintaincus ax-ea where the western and central Andean ranges of Colo.T.bia come togethrar just north of the city of Cartage. This vast, rugged region encompasses the present-day departments of Anticquia, Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindio, in the northv.'estern quarter of the Colombian territory. This is the pa tria chica of the Antioquenos, a cultural and racial group whose dynamic expansion has radiated southv/ard from some of the original settlements just east of Medellin to take in all of the valleys and sJ.opes above 3,000 for,t. Until 1905, all of this territory V7as incliided in the department of Anticquia. In that year, C'Tvlday to the south became a separate department, vv'hile j.n 1956-1957 tlie departments of Quindio and Risaralda v/ere created out of the southern and western portions of Caldas.

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Todai' Antioquia, vith an area of 65,595 square kilometers, is still the largest of the four departaents v/hich now make up "Antioqueho country." It ±s larger than Switzerland, Denmark, or Ireland, and among the Colombian departments, only Boyaca has a larger land area. It consists for the most part of rough mountainous terrain cut in half by the Cauca River, which runs north to the Caribbean. Tlie mountains of Antioquia are not quite as high, however, as those farther south and to the east across the Magdalena River. They range from about 1,000 meters to 3,7 00 meters, none reaching the snow line. Most of the population lives in che highlands of central and southern Antioquia between 1,600 and 2,400 meters v;here the mean temperatures range from 17'C to 22°C (Controlaria General de la Republica, 1935:40). Northern and northv\?estern Antioquia are relatively empty and still unexplored, especially in the lower jungle territories. The narrow valley basins and plateaus of lower x\ntioquia hs^/e become the sitc-.s of small towns and cities. As a result, much of the farming is done on the hillsides and slopes so that the hyperbole-loving Antioquenos claim that their kind of vertical agriculture requires that one "sow with a shotgur. and harvest with parrots."

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The city of Medellin is located in the wide part of such a narrow intermontane valley called the Aburra in the south-central part of Anticquia at an altitude of approximately 1,540 meters, or 4,600 feet, where a genuinely springlike climate prevails the year around. The Aburra valley is about six kilometers wide by 18 kilometers long and is split by the Medellin River. The city and its satellites have completely urbanized the valley and are climbing the mountains on both sides for about 15 kilometers along its length. Medellin is Colombia's second city and one of the most important and highly developed industrial centers in Latin America. Large, modern factories line the highways leading into the city from the north and south, and one is impressed by their size and the clean, well-landscaped appearance they present. It is, as one foreigner (Davies, 1963:293) observed, . . . a most remarkable city to find in the mountains. It could hardly be less advantageously placed, for it faces forbidding mountain barriers in all directions. Its climate alone, that of an English summer day (70°F) is in its favor. And yet Medellin is the industrial capital of Colombia, a city seething with energy. . . . Medellin, for an industrial city, is a remarkably clean, well-laid-out , and delightful town. Even its industrial plants look attractive.

PAGE 25

10 Principal industries include such diversified products as textiles, ready-made clothing, plasticware, chocolate and candy of all kinds, beer, cement, cigarettes, hats, phonograph records, crockery, glassware, bottles, matches, aluminumware, paints, zip fasteners, electric irons, pressure cookers, refrigerators, stoves, rayon, hosiery, machinery, steel pipe, and tubing. There were, in 1962, 1,681 industrial establish-ments in Medellin employing 62,3 28 workers, or 24.8 percent of the nation's industrial work force (Aragon, 1963:674). Medellin and its satellite municipios have been growing rapidly since the early nineteenth century when it became the capital of the department, but the population increase has been especially notable since large-scale industrialization began after the turn of this century. Today, almost half of Antioquia's population and most of its wealth are concentrated in the m.etropolitan area of Medellin, which is made up of the municipio of Medellin together with the municipios of Bello, Itagui, and Envigado. These last named had populations of 93,207, 70,000, and 61,546 respectively in 19C4, which brought the population of the four together up to 99 7,64 for that

PAGE 26

11 year (Asociacion Colonibiana de Facultades de Medicina, 1967) . (See Table 1.) Because of traditionally high birth rates and the Antioquenos ' well-known reluctance to accept outsiders, the city has drawn its migrants from nearby farmsteads and small towns much more than other Colombian cities with large irrimigrations such as Bogata or Call. In 1946 Parsons (1949:176) reported that 65.4 percent of the city's workers had migrated from rural areas of Antioquia, 31.2 percent were from Medellin, and only 3.3 percent were from outside the department of Antioquia. A somewhat similar pattern seems to hold true today. According to birthplace information gathered froia a questionnaire administered to senior boys in four Medellin high schools in 1967 in the study reported here, only 12.2 percent came from outside the department, and 51.9 percent had been born in Medellin itself. Because Medellin has been the only large city to develop in Antioquia, this writer found that critics in other parts of the country liken it to an octopus sucking wealth and talent from the hinterland. It is for this reason, they say that Medellin presents such an impressive

PAGE 27

12 0) -C CO r-l ri sr, U a D-> (U ' 4-1 C 0) u u (1) a< ^ c, n I— I <3 H W "3 U O 0) s: a ia --H •d c, fd O cq o •H -.J PO C ' G 00 !' x: r-, i: OJ

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13 front of modernity and prosperity v/hen compared with other cities in Colombia. The Calenos point to Buga, Palmira, Tulua, and Cartago in the Valle and challenge the listener to find cities of comparable size and development in Antioquia outside of Medellin and its suburban municipios. The city does in truth seem to be an island of modern industrial development perched proudly in lofty isolation, although efforts are being made to decentralize industry into small towns away from Medellin. The People Nev;comers from Europe have not played a role in Medellin' s recent growth as they have in the industrial centers of southern South America. If Colombia has received few foreign immigrants since independence, Antioquia and Medellin have received even fewer. The census of 1918 (Rodriguez, 1925:178) showed that there were 235 resident foreigners in Medellin, or 3 per 1,000 population, compared with 10 per 1,000 in Bogota, 11 per 1,000 in Cali, and 26 per 1,000 in Barranquilla. Seventythree of the resident foreigners in Medellin at that time were members of religious communities (Rodriguez, 1925: 149-50). The census of 1938 reports that of 1,958,555

PAGE 29

14 "Antioquenos" in all of Antioquia and Caldas, only 5,081 were foreigners. Rodriguez (1942:178) says that the relatively smaller numbers of foreigners to be found in Antioquia and Medellin result from the "special aptitudes of the Antioqueno race for hard v/ork and business which make life difficult and competition hard for the foreigner." He remarks further that even the Syrians, who are commercially active everywhere else in Colombia, are almost totally absent from Antioquia. It is the boast of many Medellin industries that they have no foreign personnel on their payroll, not even in a consulting capacity. The racial background of the Antioqueno includes white, Negro, and, to a lesser extent, Indian elements. The white element, descended from Spanish immigrants v;ho arrived in the eighteenth century, clearly predominates in the highland valleys and plateaus above 1,500 meters so that light hair, blue or green eyes, and fair complexions are not uncommon there. In the hot lov/lands and river valleys, the Negro and mulatto are numerically superior. Parsons (1949:53) says that the upland whites and nearwhites with their traditions of having large families are

PAGE 30

15 outreproducing the lov/land Negro and mulatto elements and the population is becoming whiter. In Medellin a colonial census taken in 1778 (Parsons, 1949:53) reported that of 14,507 people, 18 percent were v/hite, 27 percent mestizo , 20 percent Negro, 35 percent mulatto. According to the 1918 census, 49.7 percent were white, 11.3 percent were black, and 39 percent were mixed (Rodriguez, 1925:178). Since the respondents filled in the blanks themselves, the results are open to question; nevertheless, the population of Medellin represents a good cross-section of the department's people, for all roads and railroads lead eventually to Medellin, the pride, joy, and mecca for Antioquenos no matter where they live. Physical type and skin color vary with altitude here, too, but in a socioeconomic sense. The large, prosperous upperand middle-class neighborhoods are inhabited almost exclusively by people of fair complexion, while working-class sections abound with a variety of skin T. Lynn Smith's article on "The racial composition of the population of Colombia" (Journal of Inter-American Studies, 7 [April, 196G]) details the difficulties in obtaining hard data on racial characteristics in Colombia.

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16 tones ranging from coal black to rosy white. While the Aatioquerto in general, irrespective of skin color, is thought of m Colombia as being dynamic and successful, it seems evident that the most successful of them have been white, probably the descendants of the Spanish colonists who settled the upland areas of the department. Personality differences between the Antioquenos and other Colo:T\bians have been long noted by Colombians and resident foreigners alike. Parsons (1949:1) describes the people of Antioquia as "energetic and thrifty . . . the self-styled Yankees of South America. They are slirewd, aggressive individuals," he continues, whose extraordinary colonizing genius and vigor have made them the dominant and most clearly defined population element of the republic. Their long and effec:tive geographical isolation in the interior highlands of Colombia is reflected in a determined conservatism and marked cultural particularisra. Baing 7-intioqueno means more to them than being Cclom.bian. An American observer with long experience i.n Colombia (Romoli, 1941:147-149) said of the Antioquenos: . . . life is no fun unless (they) are doing somat.'!ing. When one venture prospers, they do not recline on their success in genteel repose, biit go O'Jt and invest their profits in something else; if it fa: Is they are uidismayed and cast about for another scheme. Business is their sport and they

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17 are extreraely proficient at it; they establish themselves in other carts of the country and prosper exceedingly. . . . there is a vigorous, cheerful, pushing quality about them that is more northern •han their latitude." She contrasts this character v;ith that of the Bogotano v/ho is reputedly tuned to muted chords, inclined to a somevvhat pessimistic intellectualism, more speculative than creative. . . . The Bogotano is an intellectual. He is. brilliant in conversation and frequently so in print. . . . Mention a man of prominence in business and they murm.ur politely, "oh yes, very able"; speak of an author and their faces light up [Romoli, 1941: 279-280] . In Colombia the man of Bogota or Popayan stereotypical ly bends his energy and intelligence toward politics and literat>:re. He flirts with the sciences and religion. Ke bandies about his favorite ideas and beliefs, avoiding, if possible, ignoble reality. The writer can testify from everyday personal experiences as well as those gained from conducting intervie"w"s v;ith community leaders that the Anti oqviehos of Medellln do seem to be dif f erenb--harder working, more dynamic, depenvdable, and serious. Of those numerous experiences, the following stand out. During the int.er yiewing in Medellin, in no case did an inte?;viewee fail to keep an appointment, and only three am-'/'od mir-re than rive minutes late {after tne time set).

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18 Small talk was miairaal, and ',;ithin a short time after the interview was completed, the interviewer was on his way. By contrast, in Cali and to an even greater extent in Popayan, appointments were frequently not kept, and no explanation provided. In Popayan, this writer had the frxi.strating experience of trying to interview four men consecutively who failed to shov/ up at the appointed time. However, it must be said in all fairness that once present, the Popayan leaders were by and large friendlier and more gracious than their counterparts in Medollin and Cali. It was often difficult to take leave of many Pop ayanejc s who became attentive "hosts" after the interview, dispensing interesting conversation and, en occasion, even libations. Before conducting the interviev7s it was necessary to obtain the names of top leaders from the cha:nbers of commerce, the branches of the National Association of Ir.dustrialists, and other such organisations in each city. In Medellin these lists of names were promised us on the aftern.oon of the same day requested. To our great surprise, tre deadline was met and the information provided was later verified to be complete and accurate. In Cali, it v/ac necessary to press and keep pressing for several

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19 days until the corresponding lists v;ere delivered. Thus, it apr.eared that che Aatioquerios v;ere men of action as well as v.'ords. One cannot help but be impressed by the physical appearance of Medellin in contrast with that of Call or Bogota. The commercial and residential areas of Medellxn are the cleanest and best maintained in Colom.bia. Downtown Medellin abounds with attractive skyscrapers and wellstocked shops staffed by courteous, attentive personnel eager to do business. It seemed to this writer that in Cali "lan;;^sales peoxjle v/ere unwilling to make an extra effort in getting som.ething for the customer which was not at hand. In Medellin it was a comir.on experience to meet clerks v;ho would run personally to another store to obtain an ir.em requested which was not in stock. In Cali, tiie streets in v/orking-class sections ware usu.ally unpaved and unlit unless they happened to be thoroughfares, but the v;riter was unable to encounter a single unpaved, unlit street in Medellin, even after an extensive tour through the worst sections. Moreover, it v/as interesting to observe that Medellin has boon honeycombed v;ith a well-organized net of four lane, limited-access highways.

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20 a rarity in Cali, where the population is almost the same size. Such material progress is a reflection of the civic spirit shown by the Antioquenos, who are popularly believed elsewhere in Colombia to comply faithfully with departmental and municipal tax levies. The fact that nine of the ten largest industries in Medellin are locally owned and operated while five of the ten largest in Cali are controlled from outside the country (two of the remaining five are sugar companies, one of which was founded by Lithuanian immigrants) is another difference for which the enterprising spirit of the Antioquenos is responsible. It can be said in defense of Cali that nightlife there seemed much better developed. There were possibly 20 discotheques operating in Cali during 1967 (as well as other kinds of nightclubs, cabarets, etc. ) most of v;hich did a good business weekends and week nights. In Medellm, only three could be found, all of them inferior in quality and poorly patronized. The Antioquenos are generally believed to be in bed by 10:00 p.m. in order to be fresh for the next day's business, and if they entertain, do so quietly at home.

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21 Everett H^gen 11962:71-76) attempted tc delineate erapirically personality differences between Lhe Antioqueno businessnan and his counterpart in Popayan. With an A:neri car. psychologist and lising the thematic apperception test, ho tested a group of business leaders in both cities ard found striking collective differences between the Medellin and Popayan groups. The Medellin sample of 20 men v;as select-ed not only for position but also for the amount of social mobility they had demonstrated in their lifetime. According to Hagen, the businessmen of Medellin saw the situations pictured as problems to be resolved by hard work (rather than by magic solutions) and shov.'ed confidence in their ability tc solve them. They analysed every situation rationally before expressing opinions, taking the point of view of each person pictured,, instead of identifying a preconceived type of situation, i.e., the old against the young. The Antiquenos also showed a high need for autonomy, accomplishment, and order; bhey possessed a sharp sense of reality and viewed the world as manageable with good judgm^ent and persistence. ilager. report;^that a similar group in Popayan saw the pictures differently. They associated eaci-i situation

PAGE 37

22 \vitli an historic or literary event. They often pliilosophized and rambled off the subject into tiie tendencies of modern youth or the course of history. If tliey did comment on specific situations,it v;as done in stereotypical terms (''that boy ought to listen to his father"), or they imagined triumphs gained magically without effort. The Popayon business leaders shov/ed little need for autonomy and order, and considered the world unmanageable by man, whose place they felt was predetermined. Hagen warns us that these are aggregate results whereas differences betv/een specific individuals would be harder to detect. Nonetheless, Hagen feels that the collsctive differences are marked enough to say that tlie incidence of the "creative personality" among the 7\ntioquenos is probably much greater than elsev/here in the country. He believes that this is a reason for the greater success of their endeavors. In additioii, Hagen found that the Medeilin group put a higher value en v;orknot only for selfimprovement and productivity, but also for its intrinsic worth. 7-vs a corollary to this, they supposedly regard success as proof of God's grace. Hagen believes tiiese strongly held attitudes indicate the existence of a

PAGE 38

23 puritanethic in Antioquia and, indeed, Antioquerios are well-known in Colorrutua fcr their strict observance of Catholic ritual. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Bible was widely read by those able to read, and corrjmonly given a literal interpretai;ion . Lopez de Mesa (1930:12) remarks that Antioquenos of that period "emptied the Bible" in order to give their children Hebrew first names. Why did this group of people develop such markedly different behavior patterns? Or, in terms of the ideas presented here, v;hy did they develop a value system v;hich has made their subculture so different from that of other Colombians? The following history offers some tentative answers to these questions. History and Background The area of present-day Antioquia and Caldas was first explored by Spanish conquist adores between 1537 and 154 5. Two streams of exploration ran through the mountainous terrain, one originating in Cartagena to the north and the other in Quito, Ecuador (via Call) to the south. The Spaniards v.'ere follov'/ing Indian tales of gold, and several significant gold deposits were actuall.y found. This news

PAGE 39

24 brought on the initial stages of colonization by goldseeking Spaniards and hordes of Negro slaves brought in to work the mines when it was found that the Indian population was inadequate for mining. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gold mining continued to be the principal occupation of old-timers and newcomers alike. Some fairly large deposits were found, and these were mined by Spaniards using Negro slaves, while small-time operators panned for gold in the rivers. The formidable terrain and low state of agriculture required importation of food and supplies at high prices, and most of the miners' profits v;ent for such expenditures. In 1616 the valley of Aburra began receiving settlers. Some were migrants directly from Spain, while others were mixed breeds moving from the v/arm mining camps of the lov;lands into cooler, malaria-free areas. By 1674 the valley's population had reached 3,000; records show a considerable white settlement as well as a church, plaza, and numerous stores (Parsons, 1949:62). Authorization from Madrid for a town charter for Medellin was requested in 1666 but was held up until 1675 by the machinations of

PAGE 40

25 residents from the old astablishsd lov;lar,d capital of Santa Fe wiio v;ere jealous of the precocious village's grov7th. On NoverJoec 17, 1675, the first Cabildq and town inayor were chosen by the governor. The Cabildo was made up of six prominent citizens, all Spaniards, and included men with napies such as Restrepc, Angel, and Velez, all of whicn frequently occur in any listing of the contemporary industrial and commercial oligarchy of Medellin. One of the Cai";ildo's first acts was to establish a jail with a v.'hipping stock for " thieves ^ vagabonds, ?.nd those guilty of snail crimes" such as sm^oking in church (Betancur, . ir-2 5:20). The punisl-aT:iGnt for smoking in cliurch v/as scaled as follows: for Negroes and Indians --25 lashes; for mestizos--! day in jail; for v;hites--10 peso fine (Betancur, 1925:20). Daring the late seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, a nev; settlement took place as immigrants from old Spain — the i3asque country, AsLurias, Castile, and Andalusia--f il tered into Antioquia. Many came as family unic? and settled in the highlands above 1,^00 p;.eters near preseni:-day Medellin and to the east, instead

PAGE 41

26 of prospecting in the lowland river valleys. They established homesteads in the cool, high meadov^7lands and, though isolated, brought in Spanish women instead of marrying Indian or Negro women. Extensive family inbreeding occurred in subsequent years, so that a limited number of last names can be found even today. The idea has arisen in Colombia that these colonists were Sepliardic Jews looking for an isolated part of the new world to escape the Inquisition. Hence, the reasoning goes, the business acumen of the Antioquehos is to be attributed to their Jewish heritage. Research shows that this assertion is false. Lipset (1967:27-28) says that similar stories have grov/n up in Mexico about the residents of Monterrey, who are noted for their success in commerce and industry. Parsons (1949:2) says the story is a myth perpetrated by jealous rivals in Bogota to explain the Antioquenos' superior record in business and industry. Hagen (1962:79) dismisses the allegation in more or less the same v;ay and adds that records show no Jews among early settlers. The white colonists were at first only moderately successful in agriculture because the region remained a

PAGE 42

21 poor backwash of New Granada, far inferior to the savanna of Bogota or the Cauca Valley in development. Gold mining continued to be the chief source of income, especially as far as the Spanish crown was concerned, and many foodstuffs and supplies continued to be imported with great difficulty and at high cost. The beginning of change which "transformed this tranquil but impoverished backwoods into a virile, literate, and relatively wealthy state" came about with the appointment of Juan Antonio Mon y Velarde, an exceptionally dynamic and reform-minded royal inspector in 17 84 (Parsons, 1949:5). Mon y Velarde's changes in the economy and political administration led to an increase in many activities. New towns and agricultural settlements v;ere founded in the upland districts, an agrarian reform (Colombia's first) was carried out, bounties were offered for new crops, and vagrancy laws were enforced so that unemployed idlers were engaged in the construction of public works. Mining activities v;ere deemphasized in favor of agriculture, for Mon y Velarde saw no reason why the province could not be self-sufficient. Within a short time comparative

PAGE 43

28 prosperity reigned as gold profits were better distributed and new lands were more productive. Mon y Velarde's own words that "all were born to work and he who doesn't is useless" became a proverb in Antioquia. During the same period, the aforementioned colonizing of the mountainous lands to the south began. Early marriage and large families put pressure on land and food supplies, leading to the first big movement of Antioqueiios to the south around 1800. Most of the southward-migrating colonists were the children of the Spanish immigrants who had settled in the highlands to the east of Medellin during the eighteenth century; they carved out new homesteads and towns in a cooperative fashion in the tradition of our own pioneers. Since the climate and terrain were similar to that found in "old Antioquia" around Medellin, the movement was rapid. By the middle 1800s present-day Caldas and Risaralda were almost fully occupied, and Manizales, now the capital of Caldas and a city of approximately 250,000, had been founded. Lopez (1927:52) remarks that the typical colonist came into Caldas with little more than "a hatchet, seed.

PAGE 44

29 wife, and children; trust in God, confidence in himself, his wife. ..." Travelers reported that 30 to 40 families would clear an area, designate the flattest part for a plaza (church, school, city hall) and then distribute farmsteads by lot (Uribe, 1942:16). Priests traveled about the colonized areas on mules like circuit riders. Notaries did the same to adjudicate landholdings and disputes. Uribe (1942:13) states that the family groups learned to master the environment and after great difficulty and frequent failures imposed their will without outside help. This epic colonization was unusual in tropical Latin America for several reasons: first, it involved real pioneers who, of their own volition and independent of government help, were interested in establishing family farms and hom.esteads; second, they were mostly white; and third, the areas they left behind were not abandoned. This phenomenon of mass migration and colonization continued on a large scale up to about 1925. The introduction of coffee as a highly profitable cash crop about 1900 spurred the colonization of empty lands remaining. As Parsons (1949:9) notes, it also reinforced the pattern of small hillside tracts in contrast to the large

PAGE 45

30 plantation-type holdings to be found in the Cauca Valley and the savanna of Bogota. The development of Medellin as a city began after 18 3 when the Colombian government opened the doors to foreign trade. Enterprising Medellxn merchants suddenly exhibited the same aggressive, pioneer spirit as their rural bretheren and soon cornered most of the import-export business in western Colombia. Economic progress was such that during the late 1830s a high-fashion tailor arrived in Medellin to do business, as well as an American craftsman skilled in making fine furniture (Betancur, 1925:26-29). The same source reports that during this period leading citizens such as Juan Uribe and Gabriel Echeverri began giving elaborate dances and parties. Through the latter half of the nineteenth century Medellin prospered as the dominant trading center of western Colombia. Foreigners visiting Colomibia during this period began commenting that the city and its people were the most progressive and laborious of the nation. By 1900 Vergara y Velasco (1901:472) couJd refer to the Antioquenos as the "Yankees of Colombia."

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31 At the end of the nineteenth century a nujTiber of v;ecilthy, onterprising Antioqueno merchants saw and acted en new cppor !:"anities to invest cheir money in manuf actux"ing. They also initiated and p.corrioted coffee growing among both the small farmers of Antioquia and the colonists who had pioneered in Caldas to the south. Applying thej.r customary vigor and determination to these tasks, they soon made I-Iedellin the industrial capital of Colombia as well as the m.arketing center for coffee (wiiich by 1910 was Colombia's leading export). There has been some debate as to exactly why the businessmen of Medellin invested their commercial profits in industry rather than land or conspicuous consumption. This practice contrasts with that usT.:ally followed in Bogota or C^li. , where successful merchants more often chose to become gentlemen farmers and groom their sons for the professions. The sam.e phcnom.enon also occurred in Japan tov/ards the end of the last century. Mendel (1966:15-21) states that Pro-modern Japanese elxtes did not have the aversion to mamial labor or commerce typical of the Cliinese elite. Wealthy merchants in China bought ].and to become gentry. Japanese mercnants could not buy

PAGE 47

32 land or indulge in affluent consumption forbidden by the Tokugav/a laws. Abundant land was also scarce around Medellin, and this was probably one reason why "the capitalists of Medellin took very definitely the road of manufacturing enterprises" (Vasquez, 1955:309). But Vasquez believes that their motives were not purely economic because manufacturing enterprises up to then had not done well and the returns were low. He remarks (1955:309-310) that among this group of capitalists and entrepreneurs there were some who were not attracted by traditional investments (commerce, usury, mining, farming, the coffee market) . In general it is difficult to suppose after computing risks and bother that the new activity of manufacturing could render more than the 24 percent earned in lending. One supposes they made overly optimistic calculations or something else moved them. He believes that the risk factor was reduced somewhat because of their willingness to cooperate and invest together and points out that cooperative efforts were not new in Antioquia (as they were elsewhere in Colombia) because of the requirements of mining and "something peculiar in their way of life" (Vasquez, 1955:310). He also feels that they were endowed with unusual vision and could foresee long-range profit possibilities.

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33 Large-scale industrialization actually began at Medellin in 1906 when a modern textile mill began operating v/ith imported machinery brought dov/n the Magdalena River by boat and then over the mountains by mule train. Due to technical difficulties and the cost of repairing the dam.aged machines, the venture failed. In 1908 a new company, the Compania Colombiana de Tejidos, usually referred to as Coltejer, began with a better-equipped mill. Benefiting from the previous failure, Coltejer grev/ and, after a series of mergers and a surge of prosperity brought on by World War II, it became the second largest corporation in CoJombia and one of the largest in Latin America (Hagen, 1962:39). Coltejer, along v^ith other Colombian industries, expanded phenomenally during the early 50 's. In 1940 Coltejer paid $357,034 in dividends and employed 1,272 persons. In 1947 the company paid out $8,211,223 in dividends and employed 7,194 v/orkers (Parsons, 1949: 178). Profits v;ere so great that management's biggest problem was in distributing them, and a class of nouveaux riches grew up (Parsons, 1949). In 1967 Coltejer employed approximately 10,000 workers and manufactured, in addition to textiles and fabrics, thread, textile machinery, valves, fittings, and food products.

PAGE 49

34 The success and grov.'th of Coltojer was rapidly duplicated by scores of other industries so that by 1925 Medellln had become the industrial center of Colombia and one of i:he ir.ost laodern and progressive cities in Latin America. Vasquez (1955:419) says that the relative success of textile manufacturing and the experience ?cquired in its management, organization, financing, and technical operation led to the increase in industrialization which v;ould have seemed impossible in 1910. Betancur (1925:35-86) gives some insight into this process of industrialization by relating the history of Felix de Bedout, founder of a large printing and officesupply manufacturing company. He describes Bedout as the personification of thrift, work, self-help, duty, and character. In 1S89 with few rosou.vces other than a highschool education, bedout founded a printing plaiit at the age of 21. At first he ran a one-man operation and in his first month earned only 19.7 pesos. Ke began experimenting and improvising with new printing techniques v;liich he learned from patiently studying foreign magazines and catalogues. Gradually the business grew with the city so that by 1925 he had 56 machines and 90 workers in a plant

PAGE 50

35 which manuf acturecj writing paper, envGlcpes, and notebooks as well as printing books, magazines, etc. Bedout, upon oeeing that 'ihe city's overall growth v;as leading to an increase in managerial activities, had the vision and the initiative to take advantage of the situation by manufacturing and selling office supplies. Medell in in the lS20's had evolved into a relatively modern industrial city. Besides fire protection, parks, and schools, the city government provided its citizens with such public services as paving and water, public health clinics, a bacteriological laboratory, a chlorination plant, a tuberculosis hospital, an orphanage, public housing, "peoples" savings banks, etc. A perusal of a city-sponsored magazine published in 1925 reveals imaginative, sophisticated advertising by Medellxn industries. The backward little market tov/n scornfully described by colonial officials had become an island of modern industrial civilization in an underdeveloped country. Although the manufacture of textiles ar:d synthetics continues to be t};e largest single typo of industry in Medell in, the area today produces goods ranging from

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36 structural steel to phonograph records. The postwar development of Call and especially Bogota as industrial centers has lessened the absolute dominance of Medellin as the focus of Colombian industry (Bogota ranks today as the first industrial city in Colombia, v/ith Medellin second). Nevertheless, Antioquenos point out that much of the lacgs-scale industry in Bogota and Call is foreignowned and opf^rai:.ed---i;he result of government policies-v;hile the industry of Medellin is over\s?helmingly owned and operated by native-born Antioquenos. Why the Antioquenos There have been any number of sociohistorical and psychological reasons offered to explain the Antioquenos* peculiar behavior, which in the context of Colombia and nost of Latin America can be called deviant. Although there is reaoOii to believe that the "entrepreneur" or innovating businessman type is no longer considered "deviant" in Colombia (the man of action as perr.onified by the successful businessman is becoming something of a new hero or model in many parts of Latin America) , this v;as probably not true until recently. jMpm.an (1966:39), for example, found a 'social atmosphere" in which stimuli for

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37 the entrepreneurial personality was undervalued. He remarks that typically the socialization of children in Colombia "has not been conducive for Colombians of a dedication to commercial activities." Money and success have not been enough to gain high status and "traditional values" are encouraged by the educational system, which discourages change and works against the creation of an efficient industrial leader. Fals-Borda (1963:36) argues, however, that since World War II a new aristocracy of money has risen in Colombia. Lipset (1967:8), writing about Latin America in general, concurs with Lipman in that, "almost. everywhere in Latin PjTierica the original upper class v/as composed of the owners of latifundia , and these set the model for elite behavior to which lesser classes, including the businessmen of the towns, sought to adapt." These landed gentry, like those of southern Spain, scorned pragmatism and materialism, preferring the easy life of a gentleman farmer or politician (for a contemporary description of the indolent life favored by the aristocracy of Andalusia and Extremadura in southern Spain, see James Michener's book Iberia, pp. 350-360, and especially his account of the

PAGE 53

38 extremadaran Hacendado on pp. 54-56). Lipset no'ces , however, that the Antioquenos are a deviant case, a rr.ajor exception to the rule (1967:10). He says that the model for the aspiring Antioqueno v;as not the landed aristocrat but the gold miner and small businessman and later the industrialist. In Medellin, Lipset reminds u.s , the intellecraal has had little status and a man was expected to demonstrate his worth by opening a business. Yet, as hs points out (1967:10), historical accounts shov/ that many Antioquenos owned slaves, so that the latifundia social Gystem of patron-slave relationship did exist:. lie concludes that the type of work done (in mining and on small farms) together v/ith the Iberian culture, led to a mixing of pragmatic-materialistic values with such traditional ones as T^articularism, ascription of status, etc. Many writers likewise note that t.he predominance of mining or the management of small farms and businesses in Aritio-^uia required the master to pitch in and actually work shouldertoshoulder with iiis subordinates to make the enterprioca success. It should be noted that up until the lartf>r nineteenth century, outsiders commented on the backv/arc^noss of the entire population, the lack of culture.

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39 ana the rough and ready "frontier" atmosphere. Such 'jLristocrats" as there were, v;ere in fact small-scale tr5.ders, miners, or the more successful colonists and farmers who had migrated. This indicates that they were a relatively rude, pragmatic, unpretentious lot forced by ';he mountainous topography and isolation to v7ork hard for thsir status. They were undoubtedly quite different in bac]:ground and behavior from the aristocrats of eighteenth century Bogota or Peru. As one source (Controlaria General de la Republica, 1935:122) indicates. The topography of Colom^bia has had a great influence on the development of this hard-working people. Mining has been one of -cheir principal industries, and it requires ingenuity, perseverance, and hard work. The fact that it is more difficult and that the mountains require more daily toil in getting means of subsistence have made of the Antioquenos the m.ost practical and confident people in tlie country. It is probable then, that in Antioquia willingness to v/ork liard, confidence in one's ability to master problems, and other "deviant" qualities associated with the entrepreneurial personality have for a long tim.e been the dominant values. The Antioqueno outside of Antioquia or Calais has been looked upon as different, a deviant because of these gualit.ies. Like many immigrant m.inorities in

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40 Latin America, Asi,a, and Africa , they have usually done well in other parts of ColomVjia outside of their patria chic a, Hacen (1952:364-365) partially confirms the "Colombian national myth" that most of the nation's industry is run by Antioquenos wil:h an analysis of the regional origins of the men who founded tl>e 110 largest nonfinancial enterprises in the departments of Antioquia, Cundinamarca (Bogota) , and Valle del Cauca (Call) . He learned tha'c 75 or 68 percent of those enterprises were founded by Antioquenos who, during this time period, constituted about 4 percent of the combined population of the throe departments. In the VaJle del Cauca, 17 of the 4 4 largest enterprises v;ere initiated by Antioquenos while natives of the department had founded only eight. In Cundinamarca, Antioquenos had founded 13 of the 59 largest enterprises as compared with 17 begun by native sons. In Antioquia itself orily one of the 53 largest nonfinancial companies had bc-er founded by a Colombian fjicm outside the region. In seeking geographical and historical reasons for toe frequent appearance of the "creative persona j.ity" among the Antioquenos, Ilagen (1962:32-83) also cites the

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41 demanding topography and the importance of mining activities. Ke credits early mini.ng experiences v.'ith requiring a tradition of hard manual labor, cooperative risk-taking, and knowledge of machine technoJ.ogy. Families were forced to calculate risks carefully and join together in order to spread them out. Nevertheless, Hagen (1962:85) warns against overeniphasizing these factors as causes since mining was carried out all over Colombia. He feels that the European background of the colonists might be equally significant. Rejecting the idea cf a Jewish heritage, he believes that the development of an energetic, capable entrepreneurial class in Antioquia might be due in part to an extra infusion cf Basque blood. This hypothesis is based on a survey of the Medellin telephone directory in which he found that 20 to 2 5 percent of the city's top executives had Basque surnames as compared v/ith 15 percent of all telephone subscribers (Hagen, 1962:80). In point of fact, many prominent last names such as Uribe, Echa\/erria, Echeverri, and Restrepo are of Basque origin. T?ie question remains as to ^v'hether the Basques were really ino_re influential or numerous in Anr.ioauia than in other parts of Colombia.

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42 It is also possible that the unusual "Protestant ethic"-like qualities of the Antioqueno people are a response to the opportunities for homesteading and colonization that grew out of Mon y Velarde's agrarian and mining reforms. Perhaps these opportunities released a hitherto-repressed potential for creative self-improvement. Avenues of self-expression and fulfillment were suddenly available and seized upon. It may be that pioneer selfreliance and belief in one's own ability to master the situation were then developed and carried over into commerce during the nineteenth century and into industry during the twentieth. T. Lynn Smith (1967:8-24) observes that the "family-sized," middle class farm system generally requires and produces a type of personality which is selfconfident and well endowed with managerial skills. Whether because of environmental conditions, mining experiences, the structural changes of Mon y Velarde, the influx of white settlers, or the combination of these and other factors, the Antioquenos did in fact develop a predilection for hard work and an attraction for commercial and industrial vocations. The willingness to r isk , a quality or ability often said to be an essential part of the entrepreneurial

PAGE 58

43 personality, a] so ^distinguishes Antioquenos frora other Colcnbians and is considered a iTiajor reason for their greater record of achievement. They offer and accept credit as a v;orking resource to a much greater extent than elsewhere in Colombia. They also have less fear of making long-time investments and v/aiting for a profit. The cooperative "in-gro\:p" spirit of the Antioquenos is almost as frequently cited as is their willingness to take risks. The large donations made by industry CO the city of Medellin in the form of cash and executive Tiersomiel (for staffing key governmental positions) are a manifestation of that spirit. Mendel (1966:15-21) remarks that the traditional unity and cohesion of Japanese society was also a factor in its economic development. The point was made in the introduction that the values hold by a group of people obviously influence their behavior and that the values of their leaders are especially important in determining the shape and p.i'ogress of that group. "Modern" and "traditional" sets of values which GUt-posedly typify modern and traditional cultures have been delineated bv social scientists iriterested in the problems

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44 of socioeconomic development. These values, v;hen internalized as beliefs and feelings, are believed to set behavioral norms and thus lead some groups to master themselves and their environments to a greater extent than others. As stated in the introduction, it is thought that the following value orientations or beliefs constitute a "modern" value profile: 1) man is capable of mastering his natural environment; 2) man should plan for his future in terms of means and goals; 3) he should act or do rather than remain passive or just speculate; 4) each individual should depend primarily on his own ability. Limited evidence shews such a profile to be strongly held by the North American middle class. It is logical to expect that these would be the dominant value orientations of the entrepreneurial personality as exemplified by the successful businessman, industrialist, or community leader. Because Antioqucnos in general have been significantly more successful as entrepreneurs than other Colombians and because Model lin has been the most highly developed city in Colombia, it is also logical to predict that the leadership of Mcdellin will hold these value orientations to a greater extent than elsewhere in Colombia and indeed

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45 v^ill approxirnate the North American middle class i.n this respect. If this be true, then we have discovered another ansv/er to the question, "Why the Anti oqueiios? " These particular value orientations have, of course, been implied in the concrete description presented above of the Antioquenos' "deviant" behavior (e.g., that they place a high value on v;ork, are willing to take long-term risks, that they prefer action to speculation, etc.).

PAGE 61

CFJVPTER III THEORIES OF MODERNIZATION Defining Modernization There is some disagreement on the part of historians and others as to precisely when and hov; the "modern" age began. Soncseeir. to think it vas initiated vith the discovery of America and the beginning of the Renaissance during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Others beii.'ive that the first industrial revclutioi^. of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries began the process of modernization v;hich marks the beginning of the modern era. The following statement by Hagen (1962:10) illustrates the latter viev/: In the eighteenth or early nineteenth century . . . following a nuii±>er of improvements in methods in V/estern Europe during the Middle Ages theie began in England a scries of advances in technology and a rise in per capita income rapid enough so that marked change occurred \/ithin each generation/ and indeed during each decade. Change at such a pace may be termed economic nrcv;l;h. . 46

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47 Apart from the timing, there is v/idespread agreeirient about other important facets of this profound change in man's personal and social life. It is agreed: (1) that the ir.odern sge began in Western Europe and has reached its fullest development there and more recently in the rest of Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan; (2) that it had barely begun in many areas of the world by the latter half of the twentieth century; (3) that the process of modernization which initiates the modern age consists of a -i^remendously broad transformation in the culture or way of life of a society; (4) that this transformation is very cojr.plex, involving many causes as v;ell as a multitude of effects v/hich reinforce the process itself; (5) that th.e beginning of the modern age in non-Western European countries has l^een largely stimulated by tlie diffusion of cultural elements from Western Europe. Obviously it is hard to define or describe in a sentence what modernization is. It usually is conceptualized as a process of social change leading to a state of being called "modern" in which a society has the following characteristics: a ccniplex division of labor, £ highly m.echanized technology, a national economy of

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48 hiyh per capita production and consumption, a coiTiplex but relatively open class structure, a high degree of urbanization, widespread education, and widespread participation in the mass medi'^. V^ilbert Moore (1963:39) describes the dynamics of modernization as involving a series of smaller scale changes"' in specific areas such as values, social organisation, technology, etc. All such changes taking place in a single social system, no matter hov; far removed in time and space from each other, are viewed as being related in a cause-and-ef feet hierarchy of importance (small cfianges causing bigger ones which in turn lead to more small changes) . A society is hereby conceived of as a system or an organism transforming itself as a whole through modification of its parts, whether such modif ic3 tion is a consequence of external influence (foreign cultures) or internal tensions, and whether or not nodificaticn of one part keeps pace v/i th that of other p:»rts. Both from this point of view and empirically, mcdernization is a somewhat disjointed process, five-year plans notwithstanding, since one part of a society, such as it'i educational institutions or industrial technology, vill often change faster than other parts.

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49 Moore (1963) also insists that the specific changes which are the beginning of the process usually differ from place to place and time to time. For example, in one area at one time modernization may initially mean reducing illiteracy, providing good water, or eliminating malaria. In another place the process may be manifested by new roads, hydroelectric facilities and the subsidization of light industry. Be that as it may, when the process is more or less continuous it should eventually result in the almost total transformation of a traditional or premodern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the "advanced" economically prosperous and relatively politically stable nations of the Western world [Moore, 1963:89] . To reach this blessed stage is usually an arduous task for, as Moore (1963:92) says, even though modernization has been going on almost everywhere at different rates, the social order of the underdeveloped areas deviates from that of the advanced areas in so many ways that there is room for '"improvement" everywhere. Since World War II improvements in nations which are in the incipient stages of modernization have been determined by political leaders who decide what the most important problems and priorities

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50 are. In making these kinds of choices, modernization has usually been equated with economic development (primi-rily embodied as industrialization) and to a much lesser extent, social development. Because of this, it is often referred to as "socioeconomic development." Moore (1953:92) S3ems to think that while economic development is not all that is entailed in modernizing a society, it is perhaps primary in importance. This he believes because: (1) the most important consequence of the process from the viewpoint of both leaders and masses in underdeveloped countries is the raising of the average man's level of living to "modern" levels and (2) without an . efficient, moderately prosperous economy, and a good civil service, social objectives cannot be sustained (though th<.^y Ti'.ay be temporarily met by virtue of external help) . Until recently, most students of modernization accepted this emphasis on economic development in general and industrialization in particular. In line with this, iMsx Inkeles (1964:33) mentions the tremendous interest of younger sociologists in the impact of industrialism in the world (followin-j he says, the tradition of Leslie White and WiJ.liam F. Cgburr.) . I'.ike Ogburn and

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51 White, laost exx:>sctto find the development of uniform -institutions and social patterns in a variety of different cultures as a result of industrialism. Arnold Rose (1958:25) for one believes that a "world culture" lias been developing among advanced societies for four centu.ries as ^ ^o^S'^q uence of economic development in the forms of industrialization and the expansion of world trade. The principal features of his "world culture" are of course the social developments which are part and parcel of the modernisation process such as urbanization, specialization, secularization, increased social mobility, universal education, and a general rise in the level of living. In short, this ecoriomic orientation emphasizes the primacy and fundam.ental importance of economic growth in tr.e modernization process. Since economic growth is considered so important it might be well to explain precisely what it means. In the most general terms economic grov/i:h means the expansion of comaiierco , industry, and other money-producing agencies which lead to a general rise in income. Hagen (1562:11) defines it more exactly as being a two step process: (1) the discovery of new knowledge making possible an increase in the output of

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52 goods and services per unit of labor, capital, and materia] s used in production; (2) the incorporation of that knov/ledge in productive processes. By his definition, economic grov;th depends on innovation-innovation v;hich Hagen observes raust happen first as discovery in pure science, then as tlie adaptation of discovery in engineering, and finally as the application of discovery in production. It is noteworthy that he includes not only scientific and technical discoveries as elements of economic growth but also che devising of new forms of organization and procedures to make production more efficient (Ilagsn, 1962:11). According to Hagen (1962:12), if this innovative process of economic growth becomes continuous, meaning a continuing impj:ovement in techniques, products, and income, then it snould also become a permanent behavior pattern (part of the culture) and provide more than just basic necessities for a growing population. In this event the fundamental economic problera of being an underdeveloped or "traditional" society is solved. There is currently some disagreement with this largely economic view of modernization. The disagreement

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53 appears to be based on the generally poor results or economic development plans which have been implemented in underdeveloped countries throughout the world. There is, of course, some question as to how well many of the plans were implemented, but, even with this factor accounted for, there does exist disillusionment with an approach v;hose results were expected to carry traditional societies a long way on the road to modernization. As a prominent Israeli political scientist and economist puts it. The experience of many developing countries indicates that national plans based on narrowly construed economic models of development have proved to be inadequate. The expectations of the 1950 's for accelerated development according to discernible stages of economic grov.'th have not materialized. "Century skipping" has not occurred during the United Nations' first declared "development decade" [Galnoor, 1971:8]. This line of reasoning is also espoused by Donald McGranahan (1971:67) of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Developm.ent : . . . the concept of "development," v/hich spread with great rapidity after the Second World War, has been rather consistently defined by most economists, at least in an operational sense, as growtli of the per capita Gross National Product (GNP) or similar national accounts figures. . . . Recently, as a result of the apparent failure of the developing countries to achieve, on the average, a satisfactory rate of growth per capita GNP, there has been considerable criticism

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54 of a narrowly economic approach to development . In trying to explain v;hat has gone wrong, a number of observers have concluded that there has been insufficient attention to social (or to social and political) factors. ... It has also been increasingly argued that social factors are part of the very nature and process of development and should not be regarded merely as external causes or effects of it. With this in mind McGranahan (1971 : 53) urges us to view economic factors and "level-of-living" factors (e.g., health, education, nutrition, etc., ---more broadly defined a^ social factors) as interdependent aspects of an evolving system which cause and affect each other. "Under this conception, development comprises both economic and social elements, v/hich tend to change together as a complex" (McGranahan, 19 71:68). In order to measure and operationally define "devclop.Tient" or mcdernization McGranahan has v;orked out a list of eighteen quantitative "core indicators" (McGranahan, 1571:70). P, single reading of these social and economic facts would hypothetically "indicate" the level of development or modernization in a society at any particular time (assuming they are v?.lid) . Readings over time would indicate the course of modernization-the direction and degree of changes which make up the modernization process.

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55 The indicators include such variables as expectation of life at birth, per capita daily consumption of animal protein, telephones per 100,000 population, and electricity consumption per capita. Hagen (1962:23) also decries the overemphasis on economic factors in both the study of modernization and in past attempts to stimulate it. As an economist in Burma during the years 1951 to 1953, he found the economic situation there highly favorable for the beginning of technical and organizational innovation and, supposedly, the modernization of the Burmese economy and society. V7hen this failed to take place as expected, he concluded that, for social and cultural — rather than economic reasons, the typical Burmese was not motivated to take advantage of this opportunity to increase his own income as v;ell as help modernize his country (see Kagen, 1962:432-470). Eventually Hagen decided that the type of technological and entrepreneurial innovation v;hich generates economic growth must be preceded by a series of social, cultural, and psychological changes--innovations in political organization and social relationships as v;ell as innovations in the values, beliefs, and attitudes members of a society have

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56 about th'sir place and purpose in the world (Hagen, 1962: 33-34). He feels that making such basic changes in a traditional people's v.'ay of thinking, feeling, and acting is exceedingly dif f icult--requiring a great deal of painful and creative effort as well as tension and pressure. To illustrate this thesis, he points out (1962:4-1) that the successful operation of a large "modern" factory in a traditional society requires radical changes of behavior in both the entrepreneur and in interpersonal relations (unless it is being run by foreigners froni a developed couni-.ry) . I-'ore specifically, a modern econoraic enterprise cannot be successfully operated by members of a traditional culture v;ho are organized in a rigid hierarchical structure of ascribed statuses, who fear innovation, refuse to face problems, etc. For Hagcn, sustained economic growth is produced by a certain innovative personality type which has bean formed in a modernizing culture and accomodated by a modernizing social structure. In his view, fullsca2e economic development is the last stage of the modernization process and a sign of its maturity. From studies of the history of modern and modernizing countries Ilagen (1962:21) says that the process is at first a slow

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57 one beginning with the necessary sociocultural changes which lead eventually to the econoraic growth stage. For a modern country like England this final stage of economic grov.'th was reached in the late eighteenth century with the industrial revolution. In Colombia, a m.odernizing country, this stage was reached during the first two decades of this century and in effect is barely under way. In Burma it has presumably not yet been reached. In short, the "modern" age fully arrives once sustained economic growth begins but the modernizing process by means of which a nation reaches this stage and becomes "modern" must begin somewhat earlier. Galnoor (1971:9) is in substantial agreement with Hagen ' s view when he qviotes Leopold Faufer's definition of development: Development moans many things. It means dams and factories, roads and canals, bush-clearing, electrification, soJ 1 improvement, universities, secondary schools, primary schools, sanitation, research, and a. multitude of other activities and achievements. But, above all, development means people. . . . The preparation and activation of people is the cause of economic and social development. In essence these man are saying that a modern society is one 'Which is created by people wxth modern porsoiialities

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58 who relate to their work and each other in a modern way. The modern social relationship is essentially a bureaucratic one of cooperation and competition within a framework of mutual respect and equal opportunity. The modern personality is one whose thinking and behavior are guided primarily by modern value orientations, and attitudes, such as curiosity about the natural world, interest in solving rather than avoiding problems, the desire to achieve and be judged by achievement. A society where this type of personality predominates is modern or is becoming so. Thus, modernization is more a process of social and cultural change than one of economic growth. E nvironmental Theories of Modernization This type of theory explair.s the origin of the modernization process in terms of factors v;hich are largely external to the individual and his personality. In these explanations, modern behavior in a society is principally a consequence of the physical, social, cultural, or economic environments of that society. Exponents of this view insist that even though these environmental circumstances can he transformed by the hcnd of man, it is from their torn and content tnat the possibilities of

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5^ modernization for -the individual and his society are derived. Some of these theories stress the influences of physical or biological forces. Others put emphasis on ir.an-niado social structural or cultural environments which react back on man to shape his personality and behavior. In some cases modernization is explained as basically a consequence of one_ environmental factor while others try to trace the combined effects of several factors on the beginning of the modernization process. Pa rticularistic Theories The "one key factor" theories are usually described as particularistic or deterministic theories. LaPiore (1965:23) rf;marks that this type of explanation involves an assumption that social change (or modernization) is the product of some particular variable, some single "cause," and that not only is every change attributable to that cause, but every change j.n that cause will produce a concomitan-c change in society. However, on closer analysis many of those single factors turn out to be single themes made of many parts. The following are examples of the single-factor approach.

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60 1. "D if fusionisia " holds that one or a fe-,; dominant cultural centers (e.g., Egypt in anrient times, the United States today) create and innovate, diffusing new ideas, techniques, etc., to others. This theory, once held by the diffusionist school of anthropology, is no longer accepted as the only explanation of c hang e and development. Nevertheless, men such as Becker and Barnes (1961:341) stress the central importance of "culture contact" in bringing about fundamental change. They regard the culture contacts stemming from the sixteenth century period of exploration as being instrumental in breaking down the feudal order, increasing scientific curiosity, and giving :.:ise to v.'orld commerce, modern capitalism, the middle class, and the national state. These ''innovations" in their turn are said to have initiated the industrial revolution and the modern age. Hagen (1962:15) likewise places a great deal of emphasis on t}ie role of cultural diffusion in bringing about changeno one can doubt that the main source of change in societies in Latin /'ar.erica, Asia, and Africa during modern times is intrusion by the West and the parade of economic power and prowess by the West. If there are no serious internal stresses

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61 and no di:-;turb.ing forces from the outside, cultural change in any society proceeds at a snail's pace [liagen, 1962:15]. Hagen is far too sophisticated however to attribute all societal change to any single variable and the question arises in his mind as to why some non-Western societies have tciken advantage of imported Western ideas, technology, etc., faster and more thoroughly than others. To find out, Hagen (1962:16) feels that v/e muse look for the specific underlying factors or conditions which dispose one group to make use of outside help more readily than another. If this can be accom.plished , we v:ill, he believes,' be able to hasten as well as understand the process of modernization. ^' Ge ographic determ in ism , the most popular version of which hypothesizes that moderately cocl or cold climates produce people v;ho are somewhat reserved, energetic, hard v;crking, provident and thus more disposed to develop themselves and their society. Conversely, warm climates are thought to make people lazy, easygoing, talkative, cheerful, open, etc., and, therefore, less eager to master theiaselves arxd their surroundings. LaPiera (1965:25) states that Lllsworth Huntington has been the

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62 primary exponent of this theory. Because climate and geography do have some influence on how people behave, the geographic variable is still very much a part of some multivariate analyses of modernization. McClelland (1961:338), for example, believes that v;hile climate obviously cannot account for all variation in levels of development (as witness the difference between climatically sim.ilar Germany and Poland) j.t is,he thinks, a limiting factor in the sense that extremes cf heat and cold have been barriers to rapid or thoroughgoing m.odernization. ^ • Bi ological deterniinism maintains that differences in levels of social, cultural, or economic development are a result of inherent racial differences. Thus, the countries of Western Europe are m>ore highly developed than those of Africa because the European is physically and mentally superior to the African. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this theory gained a number of adherents because of such articulate spokesmen as Count J. A. de Gobineau in France and Houston Stewart Chc.nberlain in England. Adolph Hitler formulated his own version of the theory and used it to guide his policies of enslavement and extermination cf minorities in Euro'oe.

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63 4. William F. Ogburn's theory of cul t ural lag (1964:86-95), in common with the theories of Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen, expresses the idea that social change (and therefore modernization) is fundamentally dependent on inventions in "material technology" (or technological innovation in contemporary terms). Thus, the diffusion of modern technology into traditional or underdeveloped societies should, after varying time lags, bring about the modernization of social organization and individual behavior. This, of course, has been the basic modus operandi of many economic development planners since World War II. Though not denying the role of technological innovations in leading or hastening the modernization process, most social and economic theorists refuse to accept the idea that they are inevitably the beginning of the process. LaPiere (1965:32) insists that recent changes in China have had their origin in ideological rather than technical innovations. Wilbert Moore (1963:87) offers proof that "nonmaterial" culture can lead while technology lags, in the fact that the ideology of economic development is now almost everywhere accepted by political leaders in underdeveloped countries at the same time that their technology

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64 lags. Moore (1963:87) calls this desire for material well-being "a v/orldly doctrine (which) is the single most successful conversion movement in the history of ideological diffusion." It is, in effect, a modern secular religion. 5. The influence of elite groups in the modernization of traditional societies has been proclaimed by Edward Spicer (1952) and others who have taken their cues from earlier ideas expressed by Vilredo Pareto in Mind and Society . For Spicer, the educated elites are the best read members of their societies and are most in contact with advanced countries and this makes them more receptive to new ideas. In a way, "they clearly see the difference between what is and v;hat might be" (Spicer, 1952:18). What elites adopt in the way of new technology, customs, ideas, values, etc., is sooner or later adopted by the masses. According to this line of thought, the more thoroughly modern an elite group becomes, the more modern will the society it dominates eventually become. The modernization of elite thinking is nonetheless difficult to put into practice because true modernization implies equalitarian social relationships and achievement of status, changes

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65 v;hich would threaten the ricar monopoly of wealth, power, and prestige which most traditional elites presently enjoy. 6. Arnold Tcynbee's " challenge of the environment " theory (1947) specifies that nations grow when some environmental challenge or problem is responded to in a positive "problem-solving" way by a creative minority. Such a challenge, whether it com.es from the physical or the social environment, must not be too severe, that is, beyond the capabilities of the group challenged. According to this line of reasoning, Greenland was too severe a challenge for the Viking colonists whereas Iceland was not. In the same way tropical Africa could be said to have been too much of a challenge for its inhabitant-s . At the other extreme, li Ltle or no challenge will, Toynbee claims, result in the stagnation or even disintegration of a civilization. McClelland (1961:7) feels that Toynbee' s theory is so general that it has little explanatory or predictive power, unless the rignt amormt of challenge can be precisely specified. Otherwise, one ^an alv/ays find a background of challenges in the history of developed countries and speculate that they were "just right" for stirriulating development-

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66 There are, of course, other "one factor" explanations for social change and modernization which have not been presented. The above are intended as prominent examples of the approach rather than an exhaustive list. The belief that a certain combination of religious values or precepts are of vital importance for the development of an industrial society is perhaps the most glaring omission. For the most part, deterministic theories are out of vogue because as Hagen (1962:19) remarks, when taken singly the independent variables they postulate explain only a limited amount of the developmental differences to be found among nations. M ultivari ate Theories The obvious complexity of tb.e modernization process has led to a preference for multivariate explanations over particularistic ones. Economist Walt Rostov (1960:4-16) has postulated a series of five stages which a modernizing society passes bhrougli on the road to development. Each stage involves a complex of changes in the economic environment v;hich implicitly brings on a subsequent stcige. In stage one, the "traditional" stage, which is considered typical of many underdeveloped countries today and of

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67 pre-eighteenth century Europe, production and innovation are severely limited though not static. Growth is cyclical and quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. During stage two or the pre-take-of f , methods of production undergo sufficient improvement to allow for some capital formation v;hich permits an increase in output per head. The initiation of such improvements is said to be an outgrov/th of either foreign penetration or ascendency to power of rulers v/hc , because they are interested in economic grov;th, give freedom to growth-minded organizers. VJhen this stage is fully developed, social and "other" resistances to economic development are thought to be largely overcome. Stage three is called the "take-off" stage and is characterized by large scale increases in investment and manufacturing. A modern institutional framework also evolves and after several decades, stage four is achieved. Maturity or stage four is a period in which the economy has become capable of financing practically any knov;n type of public and private investment while the society has technologically achieved the capability of

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68 materially realizing such investments. This highinvestment process leads to stage five. Stage five heralds the age of high iTiass-consumption as exemplified by hhe United States and West European countries. Here durable consumer goods are mass-produced and consurried by a population desirous of and able to have much more than the basic necessities. Joseph Spengler fl965:262) criticizes Rostow's th.aory of dcivelopmantal stages on six points: (1) Rostov fails -^.o say exactly how one stage ends to give rise to another; (2) he overlooks the "fact" that external influences are ineffectual if traditional value systems do not change; (3) he igr^ores inner stresses which may easily confound development in any one stage; (4) he gives us no clear qualitative criteria for the stages; (5) he presumes a unilinear development for £ill societies; (5) the sources of changes within each stage are not clearly identified. A suiiijT.ary of other multivaricte economic theories of modernizacion is provided by Hagen (1962:36-47). He X^refaces it witli a list of economic characteristics typical of tradiLicnal societies v;hich economists believed were barriers to modernisation. These are, in effect.

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69 variables in the Qconomic environment, which eccncniists thouglit had to be changed in order to initiate the modernization process. They include: (1) chronic lov; income le-'ding to inadequate savings for investment; (2.) the "deraonstration effect" of Western countx-ies, which leads the upper scrata of underdeveloped nations to spend most of their income in conspicuous consumption; (3) inadequate demand, v/hich offers little reason for inves tiaent; (4) a lack of capital to set up the necessary '' infrastructure" (roads, schools, etc.,) for development to take place; (5) an excess population which eats up most of the income produced. Hagen observes (1962:37; that by 1960 most economists had added social and cultural variables to their economic models for development after seeing so raany countries with favorable economic environm.eats fail to begin modernising. They began stressing, in addition to economic reforms, the need for cultural changes such as the inoulatlon of risk-taking and profit-making values, changes in political values, changes in the definitions of "high" status and '"low" status, and the development of 'national" J.oyalties from strictly local comraunicy

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70 loyalties. Ironically, men like Max Weber and Schumpeter had long before emphasized the role such factors play in producing industrialization. McClelland (1961:11) states that Max Weber's theory of social and economic organization laid the main groundwork for these later efforts to understand the cultural and psychological mainsprings of modernization. Weber held that the development of modern economic institutions like capitalism v/as the result of a conflict between "traditionalism" and rationality which in turn arose from the changes in religious and ethical values that accompanied the Protestant reformation (Weber, 1947: 324-354). For Weber, "traditionalism" v;as embodied in a hierarchical, authoritarian social structure in which the individual accepted his place and relationship to peers, superiors, and inferiors unquestionably on the basis of traditional values and norms. By way of contrast, rationality was exemplified by the modern bureaucratic organization in which, ideally, the rules and one's place were subject to change on the basis of practical needs and one's merit in performing assigned duties. Weber believed that rationality had won out over traditionalism in Western cultures such that the social

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71 and econorriic systems of Western nations had in our terms becoiTia "incderriized. " Weber's critics often charge that contemporary Western cultures and societies are far from being "rational" (as he defined it) in their orientations or in the typical beh.avior of the individuals who make them up. The critics' claim that traditionalism still dominates to a large extent the thought and action of Western man has been ansv.'ered by Wilbert Moore. Moore's hypothesis is that the disparity between the real and the ideal is in itself "chanvge-producing" and a stimulus to approximate' the ideal as far as possible (Moore, 1963:80). Moore points out that even though the social order is also a moral order, "sin"' or nonconformity occurs everywhere because, araong other things, ideal values are often not achieved and norms governing conduct are often contradictory. Moore believes that the resulting tension between the ideal and the real is conducive to change in social organii^ation and the ideology itself. In other words, the culture sets forth the ideal in terms of goals and behavior and most people in tlie culture strive to achieve these goals, however imperfectly. The goals themselves

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72 operate as a constant challenge to their ov/n shortcomings. Thus, when rational social and economic behavior (oriented towards materialistic goals) is the ideal of a culture, most participants, or at least those who have internalized the culture, will strive to behave rationally and achieve material goals. Working at the micro-level in the study of a small, relatively v;ell-developed, Colombian village, A. Eugene Havens (1966:175-176) came to believe that a particular complex of social variables was responsible for that community's unusual progress. They are: (1) colonization of the area by independent small farmers rather than adventurers seeking plantation land; (2) the acceptance of risk in exploiting opportunities by the frontiersmencolonists; (3) the openness and equalitarianism of their social structure; (4) the colonist's use of existing sources of credit and technical information; (5) the encouragement of change by church and family structure; (6) the effectiveness of voluntary associations in problem-solving (those who took part in them developed "trust" for each other and the government) . Havens believes that these were sufficient conditions for development. In this

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73 F.?.rticular ccnununi.ty these variables operated together. From a macro-level perspective of cross-cultural research, Sanael Sisenstacit (1965:659-674) emphasizes the importance of more-or-less the same set of social-environmental conditions for national modernization. He insists that class structures as well as institutions like the family and government must become adapcable and flexible enough to take advantage of external pressures for modernization. Sociopsycholcgical Theories of Modernization In this species of theory, a personality type or specific personality factors are linked with modernization. Generally, modernization is seen as the consequence cf a complex psychological change-the transformation of the traditional personality type into a modern one. Such a metamcrphasis is considered a necessary and direct cause of modernization though it is usually acknowledged to be the effect of broader social and cultural clianges. Hagen, for example (1962; 9), conceives of social change and modernization as beginning in the follo'.ving way. First a change in social structure occurs (because of external or internal events) which leads to a change in the parental behavior of

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74 a significant segment of the society. This changing childhood environment then creates a different personality type which, when fully developed, acts to complete the modernization process by promoting intensive social and economic developments. Like Hagen, most sociopsychological theorists do not believe that the majority of a society's m.embers must acquire "mcdern" personalities for the modernization process to visibly begin. Instead, it is thought sufficient if there is an important minority which does so. Whatever proportion of "modern" personalities is necessary or hov;evor exactly one defines a modern personality, there is agreement among those with a sociopsychological point of view that "modern" personalities play a vital role in modernizing a society. \'7'aatever their origin (they might even be ambitious foreigners a^3 in Venezuela or Kuwait, for example), they must be present with sufficient power to both originate and implement the changes v/hich bring on socioeconomic growth. VJilbert Moore (1963:96) indirectly supports this view whan ha says that the simple desire for a better life does

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7 5 not automatically lead to its fulf illrriCiit . In other words rnotivaticn cannot be assumed e.nd although Vvebax"'s emphasis on the importance of the "Protestant Ethic" as precedent to the emergence of capitalisia is clearly not a necessary precondition of industrialization in the contempory world, some degree of "achievement orientation" of ambition for personal betterment and the acquisition of cha education and skills to further that ambition, must exist in some groups and spread rather widely, if sustained growth is to be accomplished i'Aoore, 19 63:96]. Kaspar Naegele (1961:1216) offers a similar rationale for analyzing psychological factors in modernization v;hen he states that Psychological facts are relevant for any attempt to account for changes in social organizations or . wider corporate patterns. Changes in and of any society involve changes in the configuration of motives and dispositions characterizing the members of that scciety. Wide shifts in an economy-» e.g., from agricultural to industrial patterns-cannot proceed without changes in people's orgar-ization of emiotions [Naegele, 1961:1216], More specifically Joseph Spongier (1965:243-272) insi.sts that the modernization of a society begins with changes in the typical personality characteristics of its leaders. "It is in," he remarks, "change in the contents of men's minds and in changes associated therewith (e.g., changes in habits and in:otitutions) that technological progress-, the correspondent of mutation, has its principal

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76 source" (SpenglGr, 1965:247). /according to Spengler, qualitative changes in culture and personality give rise to the activities of the entrepreneur v;hich are more important for economic development than are quantitative increases in capital and machinery. He believes that the opposite vicv; caused David Ricardo to neglect the contributions of the "creative entrepreneur" and so underestimate the economic grcv;th of late nineteenth century Europe (Spongier, 1965:256). Under the heading "Types of Men in Sociology/' /""ilex Inkoles (1964:52) reviews both early and more recent efforts to devise sociopsycnclogical personality types, in order to explain the marked differences betv/een different societies at the same time and in the same society at different times. Ha begins with the personality types delineated by Thomas and Znaniecki in The Polish Pea sant in Europ e and Araa rica and v.-ith the foxes and the lions of Vilfredo PareLo's Mind and Society. Inkoles (1964:52) feels that Pareto's innovative "foxes" and traditional "lions" are tv;o of the most important theoretical personality types ever conceptualised. Parcto characterized his foxes as speculative and willing to experiment or risk

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77 while the lions were ijortrayed as attached to tradition and lacking in imagination. Pars to bolievad that a society led by foxes would be dynamic, progressive and ready to innovate for the sake of improvement. His portrait of the ''fox" describes the contemporary idea of the innovative entrepreneur or creative person who is considered indispensable for the initiation and development of the moderni:iation process. Inkeles (1964:52-53) also mentions more recently elaborated personality types such as those of David Riesnan. Riesman's personality types represent different models of conformity to a given type of society at different stages of development. His "tradition-directed" man is the modal type of personality ho would expect to find in a traditional, predomdnantly rural society. The beliavior of such a man is largely guided by long-standing cultural values and norms which are accepted v/ithout question. In the event that cultural chances--resulting from foreign contacts or the machinations of deviants--bring about possibilities for social moijility, capital accumulation, or scientific and technical progress, a new personality type emerges which Riesnan calls the "innerdirected" man. Such a man would be socialised to achi3ve

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78 to the limit of his ability by taking advantage of new opportunities for self-advancement. This personality is a desired response to these nev; conditions and a more flexible tradition which encourages personal improvement — rather than demanding strict adherence to all the details of the old tradition. In other words, an ambitious man is allowed not only to step out of his father's footsteps, but, as opportunities and demand increase, he is encouraged to rise above his father's position. The stimulation of such a man would involve impressing on him early in life a desire to achieve and create in whatever direction his interests lay. It would also mean the development of self-discipline and persistence in the face of obstacles. The internalization of these values and norms would produce a prototype of the capitalistic entrepreneur, the source of whose behavior or direction, according to Riesman, comes from v;ithin. In Riesman's terms it was the "inner-directed" man who, like Pareto's fox, realized the opportunities for economic development which were available in Western Europe after the seventeenth century. It is, Riesman implies, the "inner-directed" personality which present-day traditional societies need to cultivate, encourage, and provide with opportunities.

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79Inkeles (196-'1:53} state:^ that Riesman's complex personality types, while illuminating major social processes of adjustraent and change with historical perspective, have been difficult to find empirically. He reports progress in measuring soivie of these qualities-including McClelland 's apparently successful measurement of the need to achieve--but none in finding a completely "inner-" or "other-" directed man. Daniel Lerner in The Passing of Tradition al Soc iety (10 53) constructs a hypothetical personality type which shares certain elements of Riesman's "other-directed" personality and which he believes will at least accompany the modernization process if not actually originate it. Generally, Lerner 's theory holds that modernization in the form of a modern life-style has arisen within the "European orbit," is spreading to the non-European v/orld, and is essentially connected with a distinctive "modern" personality. The "modern life-style" i.nvolves urban living, literacy, use of the mass media, political awareness and activity, and democratic relationships (Lerner, 1958:43-75). Levner's "modern" personality is distinguished mainly by his rational postivist outlook, participation in rational

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80 institutions, and his psychic mobility or empathy, that is, his capacity ^o sog himself in the othar fellow's situation. This ^sensitivity to others is of course the najor ccnponent of Riesman's "other-directed" man. Lerner operationally defined the elements of the empathic or modern personality from response to nine survey items used in the Middle Eastern research from which Viis theory is derived. Thus, the empathic individual is one who shows that he: (1) has the ability to analyze the vaJ.ue of the mass media for his own use; (2) has the ability to criticize tlie mass-media and his rulers; (?) can pic Lure himself living in a foreign country; and (4) can imagine what other people would do to solve his problems (Lerner, 1953:69-70). The person who has not developed these personality traits is classified as either traditional or transitional according to his distance from said traits. The traditional personality of the Middle East j.s described by Lerner (1958:43) as being like the modal personality type presumed to exist in medieva] Europe: immobile, a stranger to empathy, and suspicious of the new. He is, for example, unable to cor.celve of himself outside of Turkey or as running his

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81 gc/vernment. Iv'Ct surprisingly, the traiisitii^nal personality is said to be. somewhere between traditionalism and modernity (Lerner, 1958:72). He is usually illiterate, may or may not be urban, exposed to mass media, ate, but somehow has become fairly empathic. Es3e?itially , then, Lerner assumes fromi his data that those who have clear opini.ons on issues are the least restricted and traditional and the most rational, positivist, empathic, and modern. Operationally, opinionknowledge indicates empathy and modernity. Dogs this personality type really give birth to a modern society or is it the product of a moe-'.ernizing society? Lerner's data shov; (195G:63) that incipient urbanization and the development of the mass media lead to the beginning of personality modernization. Certain individuals respond to new influences and knowledge with personality changes and they reinforce and irreversibly set in iaotion the raodernizc-ition process. Ilis personality is, therefore, an effect which becomes a cause. Critics cf Lerner's theory (Da.vn, 1959:660-661; Gulick, 1959:135-138) point ov;t that his objective criteria of -Tiodernization do not, in fact, correlate well. The

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82 correlaLion between urbanization and political activity, for example, is diminished by the fact that election participation in Syria and Lebanon was higher in villages than in cities. Moreover, they ask whether high mass-media participation always leads to the weakening of tradition and authority and '.whether one can infer the existence of empathy from the fact that a variety of opinions are held? In short, Lerner is criticized for creating a modern personality type out of superficial evidence and presuming its connection witli an objective state he calls modern but which, according to his own data, is not clearly that. Lerner (1958:393) regards his conclusions as hypothetical regularities n^ade more plausible by the results of his research. Possibly the most prominent sociopsychological theory of modernization to appear in the great postWorld War II search for the mainsprings of economic development is that of David McClelland. In his monumental work. The Achieving Society (1963 ), .^icCleiland, who is a psychologist, has tried specifically to pinpoint the psychological forces behind creativity and accom.pl ishment ai\d de"-ionstrate through various quantitative tiiethods that

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83 these factors are -vital for econcniic development. rie begins by demonstrating logically and empirically the lijTiited or insignificant influence of such envirciimental factors as race, climate, and political institutions on the rate of economic development (McClelland, 1961:6-7). Ks then argues (1961:8-14) against traditional economic theories vvhich in his opinion mistakenly regard the modern entrepreneur as a totally rational, self-interested man, motivated to increase productivity (and tb.e ccmraonv^ealth) for personal profit. McClelland insists that r.^.ariy times external conditions (demand, etc.,) are unfavorable for economic grov.'th or investment and yet people invest. He cites as proof of this contention the building of railroads to the West Coast in the ICGO's, investment in innovations or developments which had no foreseeable ecoi::omic advantage (such as tlie automobile) , and the fact that in many underdeveloped countries where there is little, rational reason for investing (risks are high, markets are small, etc.,) large-scale investments have been made. With regard to this last point, it might be recalled from Chapter II that the industrialization of Medellin began v/hen seemingly irrational investrr.ents were

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84 made in textile inills--at a time when much better returns were available elsewhere and in a product for which there was apparently little market or transport to markets. Beginning with Weber and Schumpeter^ McClelland (1961:11) finds that some economists began to sense that there were "irrational" reasons which contributed to varying propensities to save, invest, and create. Freud, he points out (1961:38), had just discovered that motives to fill needs and take action are not always or even primarily rational. Most of these scholars talked about variables such as attitude towards work, spirit of adventure or risk, and joy of creating. Whatever the specific approach, McClelland (1961:6) believes that this point cf view had led to recognition of "irrational" forces for economic development that lie within man himself, in his motives. Coupled with this nas come the belief that psychology can shed light on tlie process of modernization by finding out what kind of man concentrates en .^coi.c.aic (and technical) activities and why some men are so successful at them. McClelland himself feels that these psychological motivations which do spur economic gvov;th are closely related to <;ultural valiio orientations

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in the sense that an individual's psychological disposition to act as an entrepreneur or agent of modernization are ir-.anif estations of his cultural values. McClelland observes (19 61:17) that empirical proof for the relationships between personality traits, cultural values, and economic development is hard to come by but he believes that his own research and that of Florence Kluckhohn represent solid efforts to find such proof. With this justification for a psychological explanation of modernization completed, McClelland begins to build his own theory for the genesis of the "achieving society." Essentially, McClelland holds that an inner rriotive called "need for achievement," if held by sufficient numbers of people, is the most direct cause of economic development. This need for achievement (which McClelland expresses as "N achievement" for shorthand 2:.urposcs) is a desire to excel for the sake of excellence itself. It is similar to what Max Weber described as the Calvinist's irratior'.ai need to do a job well for its own sake and to the fundamental m.otivation of Riesman's "inner directed" man. !4cClellan.d located and measured the need for achie'/ement wnil'.; eralyrring fantasy r'?;:pon^os of college

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86 students to a variety of pictures (McClelland, 1961:38-43). lie was paradoxically afraid to use the actual achievements of individuals as an index of the reed for achievement because he felt that unusual ability or other motives s\jch as desire for prestige, power, or approval could lead to extraordinary achievement. Subsequently, he began conducting cross-cultural experiments in which the experimental subjects were aroused to achieve. Analyses showed that the fantasies and free associations produced under conditions of achievement revolved around "standards of excellence, doing well, and v;anting to do well" (McClelland, 19Sl:43). The fantasies of control-group subjects who were not "-'.roused to achieve" failed to jhow much of this content. From those results it v;as hypothesized that the frequency of such fantasies found in testing persons who were not artifically aroused to achieve would indicate for everyday situations the degree of their "need" for achievement. Thus, the higher the frequency indicated by an individual, the higher is his score and presumably his need to achieve. McClelland fou.id in all of the varied cultures whore exp-^riments were condricted that those whc scored

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87 high v.-erc: Uoually middle class and perfox"ined better on probleros wliere individua l achievement was stressed (McClelland, 1961:45). Extrinsic rewards (money) or the value of cooperation with others did not move them to perform any better than those he classified as low in need for achievement. The ubiquitousness of this result confirmed McClelland' s (19 61:46) belief that high needachievers pursue standcirds of excellence for themselves. Since the itianager-entrepreneur role is perhaps the most important occupational role in a society's eco.'omic development, McClelland v;ished to find cut whether individuals in such roles v/ho had a high need for achieveir.ent v;era unusually successful in carrying them out. To do this he made a series of comparative studies in four countries: the United Si-.ates, Italy, Turkey, and Poland (McClelland, 1961:259-271). McClelland found that: (1) £:verywhere except in Turkey individuals sam.pled from m.i-ddleand high--lev'ol managerial-entrepreneurial jobs scored much higher in need for achievement than did those ill professional occupations of equal importance; (2) in all but the United States, the more (apparently) successful a manager-entrepreneur v/as, the higher his need for

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88 achievement. In the United States the latter results were ambiguous because the high-salaried executives in the group of 28 tested from large corporations had lower need-achievement scores than did those whose salaries were in the middle group. In the sample drawn from smaller business enterprises, those with high earnings scored significantly higher than did middle and low wage earners . This rather limited evidence for a cause-andeffect relationship between high need for achievement and economic development has been supplemented with the results of several ingenious studies McClelland designed to test this relationship in the past. Since it was obviously impossible to administer psychological tests to business leaders of past societies, other measures of need-achievement were devised. First, folk tales from 45 preliterate tribes were analyzed and scored for need-achievement content (McClelland, 1961:63-70). It was learned that tribes in which folk tales stressed the need for achievement usually had a much higher percentage of "full-time" entrepreneurs in their populations than did those whose folk tales were low in need-achievement

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89 content (2'cClelland , 1961:56). Next, children's stories wi'iich were written between 1925 and 1950 in thirty different countries were scored for need-achievement content. Tlieoe scores were found to bo positively correlated with econoTuic developraent , as measured by increases in electrical power output during those years (McClelland, 1961: 70-97) . Going further into the past--as far back as ancient Greece and pre-lncan ?eru--McClelland (1961:107-157) analyzed "doodles" on pottery, types of literature, etc., for evidence of the need to achieve. He found his evidence in the form of large differences between cultures and time periods in the extent to which the achievement ethic was erapliasised. These variations v;ere compared with differentials in various indices of economic development such as ccal imports, expansion of trade, and number of inventions, and !>'.cClelland (1961:119-120, 125, 131, 139) observed Lhat an increase in need-for-achieveirtent imagery '..'as followed by economic grcvth. The validity of sach m.ethods may be questionable but McClelland feels (1961:191) that he is unique in relatinQ psychological motivations to actual economic

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90 growth in a way that is systematic, quantitative, and comparative rather than speculative. He challenges those who disagree to prove him false. Until this occurs, he believes that his research has proven that where there exists a large concentration of people with a high need for achievement, there will occur a surge of economic progress. Past spurts of social and economic development such as the rise of capitalism and the industrial revolution are therefore attributed by McClelland to the influence of large numbers of people with a high need for achievement. In a minor test of McClelland' s theory, Edward. Roberts (1970:2 3-27) administered need-for-achievement forms to fifty young entrepreneurs who had founded highly successful business enterprises during the years 1960-1962. Roberts states that all possessed a "very high need for achievement." They expressed themselves as being interested in situations v^here their actions could be the "big difference," where there was "moderate" risk, and in v;hich there ware tangible measures of accomplishment. Having estaljlished to his satisfaction the link between the need for achievement and economic growth.

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91 IIcClella:id tr.en sought to find cut hov; individuals and groups of individuals acquired the motivation to £ichieve. A colleague, Marian R. Winterbottom (1958 : 453=178 ) , looked for the immediate origins of the achievement motive in child-rearing practices. She variously tested twenty-nine boys with high need-achievement and examined, their upbringing for common patterns. From this she learned that the mothers of these boys set high standards of accomplishment and expected early self-reliance and mastery. Subsequently, it v;as found uhat mothers of sons v/ith lew need for achievement set lov.'er standards of excellence, were more restrictive, and encouraged their sons to be dependent. Since Catholic mothers tended to fall in this group, McClelland (1961:47) relates these findings to Max Weber's hypothe-iis about the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. He believes that early emphasi.s or. self-reliance and the psychological motivation to achieve are links between '•/alues of the Prot esi'-ant ethic and the rise of modern capitalism. Thus, in his model the cmpliasis on se]f -discipline and reaching for perfection which came out of the Protestant reform.ation (."iji to f:ur],ier training for independence and mastery in

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92 childhood, which brought on higher levels of need for achievement in more people, v/hich resulted in the rise of modern capitalism and the modern age. McClelland (1961:47) reniarks that Weber's personality portrait of the Protestant entrepreneur is one of a man with a great need to achieve. To further explore these new connections, McClelland (1961:51-54, 356-362) began testing Weber's hypothesis by comparing Protestant and Catholic countries for levels of economic development v;hile holding resources and climate constant. Exceptions notwithstanding, he found that Protestant countries were, on the average, more advanced than Catholic ones. Next, McClelland attempted to verify the effect of his intervening variables. He presented results from several studies showing that: (1) Protestant parents in New England and Germany demanded earlier independence and self-mastery from their sons than did Catholic parents of similar socioeconomic backgrounds; (2) Protestant boys in both places had higher levels of need for achievement. In this systematic way McClelland confirmed his belief that modernization in the West is a product of an

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93 increase in the need for achievement brought on by a ravolMtion in family training which accompanied the Protestant reformation. Ke does not belie^'e Protestantism as such generated the revolution but rather that it v;as caused by Calvin's heavy emphasis on already existing values (McClelland, 1961:362-363). This means that ultimately conditions which lead to a high level of needachievement are imbedded in the total culture of a society ---in dominant values and ideologies. In the final analysis xMcClelland goes back to cultural patterns for first causes. McClelland (19 61:391-4 37) ends his opus magnum by asserting that socioeconomic development prograras implemented in the 1950 's were failing .because_the_massiy.e cultural ciianges needed to transform child-rearing practi.ces and inculcate the vital need to achieve were impossible to make. He recommends that foreign aid be channeled through American private industry, which supposedly would send to underdeveloped countries able executives with a higher need for acnievei.ient than United States government employees and \mo v."Ould set concjrete goals and v;ork with achievement -oriented natives .

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94 Next to McClelland' s the best-known theory of personality and modernization to emerge since World VJar II is perhaps that of Everett Hagen (1962) . Like McClelland, Hagen v;as stimulated to ask himself "why have the people of sonie societies entered upon technological progress sooner or more effectively than others" (Hagen, 1952 :ix). As previously mentioned, Hagen had observed that some countries with favorable economic resources developed far more slov/ly than less-favored ones. For this reason he began hunting for noneconomic behavioral factors and after extensive research he put together a complex web of interacting scciopsychological variables v/hich convinced him tliat the relation between personality type and modernization i3 so \'ital that the latter cannot occur without a charge in t!i8 former. Once the empirical importance of personality factors was established, however, he did, like McClelland, come to assume that vital personality changes were in the final analysis an effect of prior changes in a society's social structure and culture. Thus, when the collective behavior patterns of men change for whatever reason, this affects the personality of the individuals involved, who then act to bring about more changes in their

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95 society. Personality is a middle link. The "creative" personality which according to Hagcn ' s theory directly initiates modernization is, therefore, to a large extent, a composite of new values and cognitions which express the rise of new social relationships and a new technologicalcommercial culture. Like McClelland, Hagen links the preliminary social and cultural changes, which are his "first" causes, to the emergence of the new personality type by way of changes in child-rearing practices and home environment, but unlike McClelland he tries to define these intervening changes as fully as possible. In On the Theory of Social Change Hagen (1962: 55-122) begins the presentation of his theory by quickly defining "traditional" society and then developing within this definition his model of the "authoritarian" personality typically found in a traditional society. For Hagen (1962:55-56) the definitive characteristic of a traditional society is the continuation of behavior patterns from generation to generation. Supporting this relative stagnation are other characteristics such as the regulation of behavior by custom rather than law, a rigid, hierarchial social structure, ascription of social status, and low

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96 economic productivity. Hagen remarks (1962:59) chat hypothetically an industrial (modern) fjociety might come to have these characteristics and in fact become traditional or stagnant once again, although up to the present he finds that none has "regressed" in this sensa. Emanating from and at the s
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97 than accoinplLshinenb. He also comes 'co have, in Hagen's terms, a high need to depend on and submit to traditional authority coupled with a high need for aggression against and dominance over those he considers of lesser rank. Simultaneously he has a low need for achievement, autonomy, arid order and maintains a low regard for the welfare of other people as individuals. In conjunction with these needs the authoritarian personality is further described by Hagen (1962:98) as being blind to or fearful about linusual situations and details. When confronted by anything extraordinary the individual is apt to rely on traditional rules or the authority of others. As a corollary to such dependence, Hagen says (1962:93) that the typical autb-oritarian refuses to question either the decisions of superiors or traditional values and practices and as such poses a formidable obstacle to change. Among peasants, this type of personality gives rise to specific beliefs and actions v;hich are to some extent peculiar to their situation. Hagen 1,1962:65) points out that the authoritarian peasant v;ith his fear of the unuG;.ial, indifference to acl"iievem>ent , cuid dependence, typically believes that he is imipotent or powerless to

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98 control many concrete things that commonly happen in his life such as drought and sickness. Coping with these problems or making nonroutine judgments on his ov.-n causes him anxiety. He simply does not look for or see new ways of solving problems or doing things. A need for achievement or the ambition which might stimulate innovation is absent. Thus, in these areas, the peasant appeals to magic. Hagan (1962:70) notes that such a peasant is, however, "rational" insofar as rationality does him any good, that is, he has rationally observed that there is a best time for p.lantjng, a best type of soil condition and irrigation procedure, a best design for a canoe, etc. "In all of these matters he exercises v/ith craft, skill, and high rationality a learning accumulated throughout tiie generations" (Hagen, 1962:70). But with regard to many natural events he believes no action on his part can help or save him and he attributes their {jenesis to unseen, supernatural forces which may or may not be placated by magic. Hagen (1962:70) iraintains that the traditional peasant's feeling of powerlessness over many aspects of

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99 his physical vvorld also applies to the social stracture of jiis society. Whether or not he believes it just, he fatalistically accepts it as is and barring external intervention makes no attempt to change it. Like Lerner, Hagen (1962:71) feels that the traditional peasant simply cannor visLialize himself in any position or role above the one he v/as born to. It is, in Hagen' s opinion, partly because of such acquiescence on the part of both peasants and elite that the hierarchical structure of authority and power in most traditional societies has remained stable for so long. Moreover, he believes that the authoritarian peasant eventually comes to feel satisfaction with his role and his dependence on ei.ithori ties or tradition for decisions and directions. Hagen' 3 portrait of the typical "elite" personality (1952:74-75) reveals that beneath exr.erior differences, the oligarch is remarkably similar to the peasant. Essentially the elite: meiriior of traditional society is also an authoritariaix who possesses more privileges and a great deal more authority than docs the peasant. He may be "Western" in some v.'ays (e.g., clothing, entertainment), but most of his '/a lues, his view of the 'corld, and his sense of i.dentity

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100 are still quito different from those of .Tiiddleand upper-class individuals in modern societies. He is, for one thing, almost all-powerful than]:s to his inherited status. The traditional elitist accepts this high status as rightfully his. Nevertheless, Hagen says, he feels tliat life is potentially very threatening due to the felt existence of capricious natural forces beyond his control. Like the peasant, he believes that "reason and logical instrumentalities" are very limited in their uses. To m.aintain his identity and separateness from the peasant he holds manual labor and hard v;ork generally in repugnance. His occupational values are humanistic rather than commercial or scientific. In term.s of FloL-ence Kluckhchn's value orionte.tions , Hagen (1962:118) describes the elite authoritarian as one who thinks and acts almost exclusively in the context of the past or present rather than the future, .-.'he fatalistically accepts nature's dictates rather than trying to change them, and v/nose favored mode of activity is spontaneous "being" or "being-in-becoraing" (self -fulfillment) rather than "doing" or accomplishment.

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101 Hagen astutely observes (1952:77) that traditional elites typically want their countries to develop or modernize bat at the expense of outside agencies rather than as a result of their own efforts. As a consequence of this paradoxical wish, management positions in industry are nov; higVily regarded by the elite but they seldom are able or willing to perform the role. They give orders, Hagen remarks (1962:80-81), to maintain status rather than solve problems, with the results that such orders are bereft of analysis and "creativity" in either technology or social organization (Hagen, 1962:80-81). Lij:e their peasants, the elite seldom innovate and the creative process itself is avoided. Satisfied with tiveir social situation and the opportunities it gives then?, to express their aggressive desires and need to dcm.inate, they consequently feel little need to achieve. These sentiments plus a fear of all that is unfamiliar give chem a strong attachm.ent to things as they are. Essentially then, the elite meniber of traditional society is authoritarian in more or less the S2me way as the p^iasant and is differentiated from him principally by the tact fnat he possesses more refined tastes, more

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102 privilsges, and a .groat deal more authority than docs the pciasant. The peasant's authority usually extends no further than his v/ife and children, whom he can and typically does dominate in a high-handed manner. For Hagen, the prototype personality of modern society is one which he calls " innovational. " In pure for.-u it is in inany ways the very opposite of the authoritarian personality, representing a sort of modern omega to a traditional authoritarian alpha. The innovative man, for example, conceives of the natural world as an orderly system amenable to analysis and control rather than as an unpredictable threat. He has a strong need for achievement, autonomy, and order. He tends to understand himself better than the authoritai ian and hence he emphathizes with others. Being innovative means, of course, that he is creative by contrast to the dependent, fearful authoritarian, v.'ho abhors change. Like McClelland' s achievementoriented person, Hagen' s innovator responds affirmatively to the challenge of problems which call for original, creative solutions. Hagen (1962:38-94) lists seven . qualities which he says "'imprecisely" define creativity and wliich in a siommar^' fashion define the innovative

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103 personality. Following these, the typical innovator can be said to have: (1) an openness to nev; experi.ence (he is unafraid of unasual siruations and problems); (2) a tendency to see phenomena of interest as forming logical systems of cause and effect which can be explained with analysis and effort; (3) creative imagination; (4) independent direction and confidence in making his ov.'n nudgments; (5) satisfaction in attacking and resolving problems in which the natural order underlying apparent confusion is revealed; (6) a felt duty to achieve which transcends the desire for material rev;ards; (7) intolligonce and energy. This, then, is the modern personality v/hich, if present in sufficient numbers and with sufficient freedom to innovate, VN;ill, according to Hagen, transform, a traditional, stagnant society into a dynamic, modern one. Howdoes this presumably desirable development take place? Hagen offers an answer to this question wiuh a series of propositicAo about the formation of the innovative and authoritarian personalities in childhood and about the circuiT.stances which promote the large scale appearance of tl;e innovative personalitv . On the socialization of the

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104 innovative or creative personality Hagen presents material drawn from social psychology and psychoanalytic theory (Kagen, 1962:123-143). Very briefly stated, the innovative persoiia] ity is the product of a type of childhood environp.ei'it \/hich permits the child to explore the world around him and at the same time provides aid in understanding it as v/ell as giving him guidance, restraint, and nurturance. In effect, the child is trusted to be autonomous whi]e acquiring the kind of self-control which allows him to control his surroundings and achieve goals. In this way he comes to envision the world as challenging but understandable and open to improvement or change. . By way of contrast, the authoritarian personality is shaped in a family environment where strong external controls are imposed without explanation--unquestioning obedience being demanded — and without guidance. Hagen (1962:161-180) draws on the observations of anthropologi^jts in Buriaa and Java as well as from his own experiences in those two traditional societies to illustrate the type of family environment which produces the authoritarian personality. He points oub that in both places infants and children are viewed as irresponsible

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105 and incapable of n\anaging impulses (Hagen, 1962:168). They are considered toys or robots rather than autonomous beings. In essence, children there are ruled rather than trained by their parents and the ruling is so inconsistent and arbitrary that children are neither expected to nor do develop initiative and independence. Thus, they grow up perceiving the world as a place where willful individuals and forces demand submission and where one's birthright determines to whom one submits and from whom one can demand submission. A high need for submission to traditional authorities and rules is complemented by high needs for dominance over and aggression onto inferiors. This, in Java and Burma, is the pattern of socialization which produces the authoritarian personality. Such personalities will, of course, pass on their authoritarian needs and view of the world to their children, a fact which in part accounts for the stability of traditional societies. JIagen points out (1962:175) that the perception of the physical world as dominating human fortunes, the traditional social structure--whi.ch. he believes accomodates the authoritarian personality and no other--and the authoritarian personality itself interact to reinforce each other

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106 anJ create authoritarian personalitlos over and over. These tliree elements fit well together in a closed circle so that the possibility of significant social change originating from within, is, in Hagen's opinion (1962: 175-180) slight. Nevertheless, deviants always arise and no society is perfectly integrated so that there always exist seeds for change vv'hich can blossora, then disrv.pt the structure and/or the modal personalities^ of important groups to begin a series of more profound structural changes . Granting that such a potential for real change always exists, Hagen at this point (1962:185) tries to identify some of these seeds of modernization. Ke begins by asking himself about the kinds of influence which can cause a group in a stable traditional society to abandon traditional ways and work for technological and economic change. "In other words v;hat influences will cause a group to emerge with altered needs, values, and cognitions" (Hagen, 1962:185). He answers hds question with the argument that the "basic cause of such change is the perception on the part of the members cf some social group that their purposes and values in life are not respected

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107 by groups in ths society \.'hora thsy respect and whose estGem the value" (Hagen, 1962:185). To support this proposition he maintains that an individual's contentment with his life depends to a large extent on the respect accorded his major activities by the society in general and his reference groups in particular. Thus, to be satisfying, such activities need not b-3 highly ranked but should be thought appropriate by the person carrying them out and respected by others. Applying this general maxim to social relations in a stable, traditional society, Hagen remarJcs (1962:186) that in .such a situation, each group's values and activities are respected so that each individual feels he has a worthv/hile place and, as a result, there is little incentive to change the structure or accept new ideas. In the event that this situation. Is changed by a "withdrawal of status respect" from some significant group, there will eventually show up am.ong members of the grovip a strong disposition to make important structural changes in their own social relations, roles, and values. If such changes involve the adoptio.n of "modern" relationships, roles and values, arid these are generally accepted or even tolerated

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108 by the society, then the modernization process will have begun. How might "status respect" be withdrawn from a group? Hagen (1962:187-189) lists four ways in which this might occur: (1) displacement of a traditional elite group by another by force; (2) denigration of valued symbols--a superior group (elite) changes its attitude toward the activities of an inferior group (peasants) frOiT. one of respect to scorn; (3) inconsistency of status symbols — one group becomes high in some symbols (economic) but remains low on others (prestige); (4) ncnacceptance in a nev/ 50ciety--migrants expecting respect find that their values and activities are ridiculed as "useless." Hagen (1962:190) believes that the Antioquenos ran into this type of situation when they established themselves in Color.ibia and t}^at this v;as the origin of the series of changes which culminated with the appearance of the innovative personality among therti and which heralded the beginni.ng of their modernii-.ing role in Colombia. Hagen also feels U962:192) that withdrawal of status respect is responsib].e for iviuch of the turbulence found since World War II in underdeveloped countries. Ke

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109 describes tne elites of these new nations as having becoiiie Westernized enough to siiow scorn for the beliefs, values, and purpcses of low groups while the lower classes have become resentful of a society v/here they were expected to iV:eet their obligations without recognition. If this be true, then, as he points out, the impact of the West has been indirect in disrupting traditional society. Once status respect has been withdrawn, Hagen believes (1962:193) that conflict breaks out v;ithin affected individuals who want to continue their traditional activities yet want the respect of reference groups which has been withdrawn because of those activities. The added burden of rage and anxiety v;hich results alters the home environT^ent "in predictable ways" and affects the personities of children present. After one or more generations, the traditional authoritarian personality is modified by the widespread appearance of a retreatist or ritualist mentality. Fathers no longer exert their auth>ority at home with consistency and confidence. Many will, according to Hagsn (1962:210), come to doubt the whole value system and structure of their society. Their sons, authoritarian yet confused and afraid, will retreat even further into

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110 apathy. Needs for aggression and dorainance will be repressed. Retreatism is not a dead end. As retreatlsm deepens in successive generations, it creates circumstances of home life and social life that are conducive to the development of the innovational personality. The historical sequence seems to be: "authoritarianism, withdrawal of status respect, retreatism, creativity" (Hagen, 1962:217). Eventually, retreatist fathers come to feel so much doubt about their own place and guilt aliout relinquishing tlieir authority that they convey thiij sense of guilt and sham.e to their sons. At""' this stage mothers and many fathers want to correct the retreatist pattern in their sons and yet find a return to the old authoritarianism nov; \intenable. As a result they begin setting different goals and developing a need for achievement and autonomy Liy evincing a heretofore unknown degree of attention to and interest in their sons (Hagen, 1962:22). As the child develops initiative instead of retreating, he is rewarded v/ith love, praise, etc. In this -way the innovative or creative personality arises 'from retreatism. Hagen quotes (1962; 223) the biographies

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Ill of self-xnade, i.nn.Qvational personalities to show that they shared this kind of background. If, at this point, the transihion to economic grc'/th and :.v.odernizat ion i;; to begin ^ values conducive to technc.lcgical innovation ajid comine-i cial activities should be available? for adoption by the ne^vly creative personalities. Hagcn believes (1952:235) that when the model of technological progress and business is available (i.e., from foreign examples), many creative men will seize it if it appears that such activities will permit them to achieve. He believes that the first generation of innovative Antioquoncs chose this model because they had some experience with it (from mining) and, though it was scorned by other Colou'bians, it seemed to offer them the high economic status held by prestigious foreign businessV men. If the achievenent-oriented new innovators adopt com.T.e. cc la 1 and technological values, then they will begin a thoroughgoing process of modernization in their society. Tl-is, then, is Hagen's causal model for molernization: a di.sruptive series of social attitude changes leads to rearessicn and retreat in cectaii' groups and the breakdown

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112 of the authoritarian personality. This is followed by the genesis of a rebounding new innovational personality type which, if offered teclinical and commercial roles for selfexpression/ will initiate modernii^ation. Thus, for a modernized way of life to take root, a change in personality type mast occur as the final link in a complex chain of causes. Cultu ra l Value Theories of Modernization De fining Vc-ilues The primal importance of values in guiding the course of individual actions is pretty well acknowledged by anyone who has paused, even in the least, to question the wellsprings of his own and others' behavior. George Horaans (1961:214) states succinctly the attitude of social scieritists who have studied human values and their effects v.-hen he says, "The most important of all givens in explaining or predicting the behavior of men are their values, and particularly the relation of these values to one another." Yet there is incomplete agreement about what a value objectively is and precisely what it does. Perhctps this is realD.y not surprising in view of the importance and pervasiveness of values. Philosopher

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113 Ciiarles Morris (1956:9) calls the term "value" one of the "Greac Words like 'science,' 'religion,' 'art,' 'morality,' and 'philosophy,' and like these others its meaning is multiple and complex." Nevertheless, there scarcely breathes a scholar inteiested in values v;ho has not attempted to say in a short statement, v;hat a value is and v;hat it does. One of the more prominent of these is Harold Fallding (1965: 224), who defines a value as "a generalized end (goal) that guides behavior tov/ard uniformity in a variety of situations, ••/ith the object of reporting a particular selfsufficient satisfaction," English sociologists Bryan .Green and Edward Cohns interpret this definition (1966:44) as referring mostly to individual motivation and therefore criticize it as being too psychological a conception of value--e.g., it implies that familiar values such as wealth, loyalty, independence, and friendliness are offered to people as goals in a smorgasbcard fashion for an individual's choice and pleasure. They define a value as a verba l s ymbol for a generalized end v/hich has connotations of rightness, goodness, or inherent desirability (Green and Johns, J96C:39). They explain this conception

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114 with the proposition that values enter into personal behavior not only as motivating or rostraining factors but also into "social system interaction" as a means of legitimizing authority, mobilizing support, or reinforcing morale. For them a value is a cultural or social goal for action rather than an individual preference. Clyde Kluckhohn (1953:59) believes that the term value should include both general cultural prescriptions and individual preferences. He defines a value as "a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, ^nd ends of action." It is thus not just a preference, a desire, but a formulation of the desirable , the "ought" and "should" standards v;hich influence action. Philosopher Morris talks about these two conceptions of values and adds a third usage of the word value which he says is commonly employed (Morris, 1956:10-13). Individual preference for things, persons, colors, forms of physical activity, etc. , he calls operative values in that one acts or operates by then. "Reference to 'value' in such cases is simply a way of referring to the actual

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115 direction of preferential behavior toward one kind of object rather than another" (Morris, 1956:10). Generally approved cultural values he calls conceived values in that they involve a general conception of the preferable, which are symbolically indicated objects. "The problem of the relation of conceived values to operative values is a phase of the problem of the relation of behavior controlled by symbols to behavior not so controlled" (Morris, 1956:11). The other way in which Morris finds the term used is in referring to that which is preferable or desirable regardless of whether it is so preferred or conceived of as preferable. In this sense a value is anything which is objectively preferable or "good" for one. "Stress is on the propert-'es of the object itself and such values are called object values" (Morris, 1956:11). Morris holds that these three usages are related through use of some form of the term prefer . In effect, all three refer to preferential behavior and this appears to be Morris' personal definition of value — an object of preferential behavior, be it commonly or individually preferred or objectively preferable. For Morris (1956:12) the three conceptions of value do not refer to different

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116 entities or values per se but are different aspects of the value field. The research focus of this dissertation has bocTi on ho'.v different combinations of commonly preferred cultural values will influence the degree to v;hich different groups are modern or tradii:ional in their behavior. In view of this interest in the social and economic effects of cultura].--ra bher than per3onal--values , the meaning attached here to the term value v\?ill be that of Morris' "conceived value.'' Tliis is the same meaning used by Alex Inkeles (1364:74) in his definition of values as "the expression of the ultimate ends, goals, or purposes of social action." Inkeles adds to his definition the observation that, as ultimate ends, values also express moral imperatives in the sense of defining what is right as well as what is good. Inkeles also supports {1964:74) Florence Kluckhohn's viov/ of values--that there is a ^mito range of human values v/hich are comir.onlv held, but with varying degrees of strength, everywhere. He believes, like Kluckhohn, tb.at trie same range of human qualities and relationships have been recognized in most societies--

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117 e.g., honesty and duplicity, silence and loquaciousness, stoicism and eiaotionality , activity and passivity all have been deeply valued in human societies--and that the main difference resides in the extent to which different cultures evaluate qualities as important or mj.nor, good or bad. Cultural Values and Mod ern izatio n If the values of a culture are those social goals considered to be the proper objects of action and if we assutao that in any society the behavior of its influential elements is, to a large extent, determined by some sot of generally approved values, then, in modern societies, influontial people could logically be expected to behave in accordance with a certain combination of goals or values which is peculiarly modern. As cultural standards or goals, values can be external objects or abstract symboJ.s but to influence effectively the behavior of individuals and thus the social life of any group, they must be not only accepted verbally but also internalized to become part of an individual's personality. A value becomes "cultiival" to the degree that it is internalized

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118 by ever increasing numbers of individuals in a society and operates as a motivating force in their actions while producing similar effects (though not exactly the same effects, since each individual will give his interpretation some unique touches) . The interaction of culture and personality is not well understood but it is generally acknowledged that personality is to a large extent a cultural product and is, in fact, an individualized version of the general culture in v/hich it has been formed. Viewed in this way, the modern personality types delineated by Hagen and McClelland are manifestations of modern values, e.g., the need for achievement representing a high evaluation of achievement. Logically, one can deduce from such a view that, if, without the action of modern personalities a society cannot become modernized from within, then it likewise cannot become so without the active influence of modern values and norms, since they are the essence of modern personality. In short, personality is impossible v;ithout culture. While making a case for the crucial significance of the modern personality in modernization, both Hagen (1962:236) and McClelland (1961:356373) acknowledge that changes in modal personality types are derived from cultural changes.

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119 Marxist-criented thinkers look upon cultural phenomena as the result rather than the cause of technological and economic changes. In their view, a society first industrializes (modernizes) and then nev-' social roles come to change the interests and values of individuals. Yet, many of these same thinkers admit the fact that "traditional, conservative" values have aborted attempts to restructure and modernize backward societies. Although there is little doubt that technical and social structural changes can lead to a transformation of values, it is held here that values, once established, become an independent force and as such can stem techrsological changes and economic development or stimulate them. In Japan and Russi£i, for example, both industrialization and the process of modernization in general were the result of changes in values~-brought about by the rise to political po-./or of man with "modern" values. As Kahl says (1963:7) values tend to become institutionalized as objective conditions and interests and in the short run at least, "values determine circumstances; most men behave the way their culture has taught them to behave, for they perceive throvagh cultural lenses the alternatives aval] able to { hohi."

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120 The Colombian sociologist, Orlando Fals-Borda (1963:48), is saying much the same thing with regard to his own countrymen when he states that the backwardness of the lov/er-class Colombian is not due to an atavistic and iminutable inheritance, but to cultural conditioning promoted by economic adversities, calamities, and political abuses, by certain attitudes and religious deficiencies, and by the crystallization of ignorance. If these adverse factors which have molded the personality structure of the Colombian are basically changed for others (emphasizing) positive and constructive action, you will see him. change his conduct and philosophy of life. This is a phenomenon created by man and for this reason the Colombian can mold and better it, if he so desires. Timasheff (1964:35-87) credits Franklin Giddings v.'ith being the first sociologist to clearly see the significance of social values per se in the social life of man. Giddings proposed that rational decisions v;are made on the basis of social values which he defined as the collective appraisal of certain satisf :ictions , modes of activity, and forms of social organization. Like Florence Kluckhohn, he believed these varieties of appraisal were limited as well as influenced by physical conditions and the lav/ of natural selection. Value orientations toward activities and relationships which are not suitable for the env/ironmeiit of those groups which hold them will.

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121 unless changed, cause the disintegration of such groups or societies. Functional orientations ("wise choices") are rev/arded in that the society whose menibers act on them, flourishes. For Giddings, values were the modes and mechanisins of an evolutionary process which underlies all social change. Concerning specific links between values and modernization, there is general agreeirient (see McClelland, 1961:165-166; Spengler, 1965:255; LaPiere, 1965:272-283; Moore, 1963:93) that a certain complex of modern values is a necessary if not sufficient cultural condition for moderni'^ation to begin. McClelland (1961:166), for example, finds the modernization of resource-poor, heavi.ly populated nations like Israel, Switzerland, and the Netherlands empirical proof that the "quality of the people — their values and motives--apparently can outweigh many handicaps." Latin Pjnericans, on the other hand, "have long \v-oi'idered vvhy their part of the world has lagged behind . . . despite abundant natural resources'" (Xahl, 1968:7). Arguments a-Qong s cudents of development revolve around howvalues operate, the degree of their importance, vliat kind of people should hold them, and to a lesser extent, which v a 1 u e s are " ir^o de rn , "

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122 Kahl (196.3:7) maintains that Ilax Weber's Prot estant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism represents the first systematic attempt to define with any exactness the relationship between values and modernization. Since the second World War and the increase in concern for the relative deprivation of traditional, underdeveloped peoples, there have been fresh attempts to identify modern value systems and show how they contribute to the process of modernization. The following statemeni; by Kahl (1968: 6) summarizes current thinking about the general characteristics of traditional and modern values. Traditional values are compulsory in their force, sacred in their tone and stable in their timelessness. They call for fatalistic acceptance of the world as it is, respect for those in authority, and submergence of the individual in the collectivity. Modern values are rational and secular, permit choice and experiment, glorify efficiency and change, and stress individual responsibility. In talking about the requirements of economic growth, Wllbert Moore (1963:93) illustrates the above definition v.'ith specific exainples of modern values such as the high evaluation of achievement, freedom to move in the social system, and placement in it according to the merits of performance. Ilagcn (1962:117) also discusses specific values v.'hich ho calls modern, includirig high evaluations of

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123 conmercial and technical activities and of empirical, scientific, fact-finding. In addition, he proposes that a moderi'i personality will expand the scope of application ("social area") for such traditional moral values as i:onesty, loyalty, and respect for property and human life. That is, a modern man will tend to be more honest with and expect more honesty from strangers than will a traditional man. Econoniist Albert Hirschman (1958:14-19) states that a belief in cooperation and mutual trust are values which are necessary for modern, effective entrepreneurship and for economic developm.ent . Kahl (],958:6} classifies as modern, preferences for: living in a nuclear rather than extended family; equality between the sexes; ycuth; and having a small numher of children. Other beliefs and goals whi.ch are commonly thought of as "modern" are-belief in democratic government and political equality, a high evaluation of and coiicorn for the general v/elfare, belief in progress and personal improvement, respect for human life and property in general, openness to change and innovation, find a high evaluation of formal, education. Also modern, but more generalized and abstract than the

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124 above are the following four "core" value orientations: an orientation towards the future, a preference for "doing" or acting upon other persons, situations, and things, belief in man's ability to overcome natural obstacles; and a desire for self determination in social relations ("Individualism"). These, of course, are value orientations derived from Florence Kluckhohn's set of alternative solutions to the basic problomL'> of human existence (Kluckhohn, 1961:1-20). Given the existence of certain values or value orientations which are part and parcel of a "m.odern" personality, related tc the modernization process in nations, and therefore justifiably labeled '"modern," the questions then arise: hew can such beliefs and feelings be measured, and how are they related to other variables which contribute to the modernization process (or--hov; are they specifically related to the modernizacion process, e.g., as causal factors, as effects, etc.). David Smith and Alex Inkales (1966:353-377) have tried to guago social and psychological "modernity" in individuals with an instrument measuring attitudes, values, opinions, information levels, self -reported behavior, and

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125 verbal fluency. I hems irjclude questions such as "where is Washington, can an ambitious, hardworking but poor man succeed against fate, do you prefer to plan in advance, who is most worthy of respect--a monk or a factory manager." Answers on each item are scored as "modern" or "tradi.-tional" and a san'imary index score'is calculated for each individual. The final score supposedly represents the degree to which a person possesses "modern" attitudes "presumably of the sort gene rated by or required for effective participation in a modern society." This composite score is called an OM for overall modernity. ' The instrument is intended to be a cross-cultural measure of modernity as well as useful for "screening modern individuals in practical employment situations." Their instrument \v'as tested in one form or another in six "developing" countries: Argentina, Chile, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, and Israel. Although the authors m.ake no direct prejumpticns about the link between values and the mcdernizatio.:> process, thoy do state that the items were based on 30 personal qualities (such' as^ interest in planning, readiness for nev; experience) which dispose one to be m.odern ir his "institutional relations--as in bcr-ing an

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126 active citizen, valuing science, maintaining autonomy in kinship matters, and accepting birth control," and which are assumed to be "the end product of certain early and late socialization experiences such as education, urban experience, and work in modern organizations" (Smith and Inkeles, 1966:355). Thus, it appears to the writer that they consider values to be an effect of the modernization process. Joseph Kahl (1968) has carried out by means of interviews what is perhaps one of the most ambitious studies of the relationship between values and modernism yet attempted. Regarding his instrument he v/rites (1963: 44) that a factor analysis of the iteras used demonstrates that each does in fact measure modernism and traditionalism and that collectively they measure a "syndrome of modernism or traditionalism.'' Kahl's value syndrome of modernism is composed of the following seven closely interrelated scales: activism, low integration '.;ith relatives, preference for urban life, individualism, perception of low com:nunity stratification, m.ass media participation, low stratification of life changes (Kahl, 1963:21). Other values v;hich Kahl found to be associated v/ith modernism

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127 to a lesser degree are--trust in people, favorable attitude toward manual work, and (contrary to expectations) distaste for large corapanies. For Kahl, however, the "typical modern man" can be described by his ansv.'ers to the seven core scales. He is an activist, he believes in making plans in advance for important parts of his life, and he has a sense of security that he can usually bring those plans to fruition. Unlike the fatalistic peasant who follows the routines of life and shrugs his shoulders to indicate that much of what happens will be beyond his control, the industrial laan attempts to organize the future to serve his own purposes [Kahl, 1968:133]. Tiie modern man is further described as willing to leave the extended family, to depend on his own initiative, and as perceiving his society as open and his ov/n opportunities as plentiful. The traditional man is the opposite. He perceives himself as permanently stuck in a life which does not change and which cannot be controlled to any great extent. Therefore he seeks little and expects to gain little, he takes what the fates may bring; he pursues security through close personal ties, primarily with relatives but also v^7ith a fev; friends and v;ith patrons in high positions who will protect him so long as he stays in his place. To this exchange he brings resignation and gains safety [Kahl, 1968: 133-134] . These "typical men" are, of course, two ideal, polar types and most real men will approxi.mate bi;t not v;holJy exemplify

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128 one or the other. Kalil himself states (1963:22) that his results shov;od that it is possible for some men to be modern on some values and traditional on others such that "within a given individual there may exist tensions resulting from the conflict betv/een traditional and modern values." Thus one man, for example, simultaneously may hold values which stress an old-fashioned view of life and a modern view of technical skill and prestige. It should be clear from the above description that Kahl's "modern man" is future-oriented, individualistic, prefers doing things, and is confident of man's ability to master nature. Kahl explicitly conceives of him as being motivated by the same value orientations that in this dissertation have been associated with the modern man. His theoretical debt to the Kluckhohns would seem to be heavy. Kahl carried out his field research in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States. He interviewed samples of respondents in rural areas, sm.all towns and cities, and metropolitan centers in all three countries. His most significant finding was that "a commitment to modern values about work is related positively to socioeconomic status"

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129 (Kahl, 1968:15). The correlation between a modern value syndrome and SFjS was .58 in Brazil and .56 in Mexico. Urban residence was also positively correlated v/ith modernism but much less so than SES= In Brazil, with SES held constant, urban residence showed a correlation of .14 v/ith modern values while in Mexico the coefficient of correlation was .10 (Kahl, 1968:45). Kahl reports (1968: 135) that all in all SES accounted for one third of the variation in modernism v/hile urban residence represented less than one tenth. Thus, of all the background characteristics he recorded, social class position turned out to be his best predictor of modernity in values: the higher tb.e position, the more modern was the response. Because the similarities between respondents at similar class levels in all three countries were so striking, Kahl also concludes (1968:21) that position in the' social structure determines an individual's degree of modernism much more than nationality. The fact that rural, small tov/n, and metropolitan respondents who shared similar SES were much more like each other in the values they espoused than like neighbor-respondents at different social class levels leads Kahl to believe (1968:46)

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130 "that a modern perspective diffuses through society via the social class hierarchy. People of upper middle status are in intellectual contact with one another regardless of the geographical zones in which they live." He thinks that the middle or upper middle class individual in a small town has acquired a metropolitan mentality thanks to his education, travel, and the mass media. In Kahl's view such a person has developed "empathy," in Lerner's terms, for his social counterparts in the big cities. Lov;er class respondents, regardless of location, v;ere found by Kahl (1968:46) to be much more traditional. From their replies, Kahl got a conception of lower class men as being less sure of themselves in the modern world, dependent on personal relationships, fatalistic, and apathetic about their chances for successful careers. "Having had less material success, they expect less" (Kahl, 1563:46). Within the network of interrelated characteristics which determine an individual's socioeconomic status and his ability to rise Kahl found (1968:138) that educational attainment and aspirations were the most closely related to modernism. V7ith regard to educational aspirations, modernism accounted for one eighth of t'.ie variation in

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131 education^.l expectations for respondents' sons after SES and location were controlled (Kahl, 1963:139). On the other hand, Kahl found (1953:49) that men v/ho reached high school, irrespective of location, were significantly more modern in their values than those v;ho had not. Kahl seems to hold two models of causation into which he fits his modern value syndrome. In the principal model, modern values are largely, though not entirely, a function of socioeconomic status. Upper and middle-class people anywhere tend to be modern because of their location in "social space" (Kahl, 1968:83). Other hard-to-measure factors such as personal life experiences account for the variation in modernism among people in those classes. Values, in this model, are viev;ed as functions of SES but determinants of edacational aspirations and attai.nment v.'hile the educational factors largely determine one's occupation and behavior, wliich in turn tend to reinforce the values already held by the individual (e.g., a modern occupational role will demand modern values) . Modern values are for Kahl an intervening variable period somewhere between SES and modern educational and occupational behavior: "T.t wouJ.d be convenient to think of values as a

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132 perfect intervening variable, such that SES, plus location, plus personal life experiences produce general values and they in turn produce specific attitudes toward education ..." (Kahl, 1968:84). That values are not perfect predictors of behavior (given a certain SES level and specific life experiences) is because of "other influences" too hard to measure nov/ (Kahl, 1968:85). Ultimately, however, in this raodel socioeconomic status is the first cause of the modernization process. Wliat circumstances create the large middle and upper classes v/hich carry modern values? Kahl says (1968:51) that industrialization is the cause behind the first cause in his raodel. He states that his results (especially those shovv'ing the dependency of modern values on SLS) support the position of Alex Inkeles that social structure tends toward convergence in industrial (or industrializing) countries, creating sets of cultural values that reflect status positions and the exigencies of life thai: are associated with them regardless of previously different national traditions [Kahl, 1968:51]. According to this model, Kahl would not have expected to find significant, value differences between the leaders of Medellin, Cali, and Fopayan since by and large they all hold the same socioeconomic status.

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133 Kahl does .not s::plain precisely how (a3Siiii:iing, as this model does, that modern values are really a consequence of a modernization process already well begun) industrialization (and modernization) can begin where values and behavior are still traditional. Perhaps ha would (in the case of Mexico and Brazil) attribute this to external influences. Kahl's other model is implied from his statement that a lower-class person v;ith middle-class (modern) values will acquire a modern education and move up in status into a modern (industrial or commercial) occupation (Kahl, 1968:84). In this model, modern values help explain the transition from traditional to modern society by their influence on educational and occupational aspirations. Mere, new opportunities and experiences (industrialization) produce racdern values which lead one to aspire to and often attain a higher education, which in turn brings on a new socioeconomic status (presuming one is of lov;ar-class birth). Presumably, if enough people m a society acquired modern values in this way, nev/ and larger middle and upper classes would be created v/hich would hasten and consolidate the -.nodernization process. Again the appearance of

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134 industry and large-scale commerce seems really to initiate the racdernization process. However, in the latter m.odel, values are a prior and more important influence. Most of Kahl's evidence supports the first model, of course. Floren c e jXluckho hn's Theory o f Variation in Value Orientation In spite of the multiplicity of points of views and concepts, there does appear in the above a general conviction that a certain set of values is associated in some v/ay with socioeconomic development. This dissertation is based on the belief that certain combinations of these values will, lead to certain behavior patterns which, if !-.eld by sufficient numbers of people or certain influential groups, will load to the modernization of a society. Because Florence Kluckhohn's theory of variations in value orientations has provided the theoretical framework for this research, it seems appropriate at this point to review her theory and show how it logically offers an explanation for the existing differences between societies in their degree of modernization. Florence Kluckhohn's analysis of core value patterns takes place within a fraroev.'ork of orderly and

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135 systeir.atic variability based on the idea that value systems are made up of dominant and variant values v/hich from one system to another are variably ordered in preference. Behind this idea is the proposition that individuals and groups liold to, first, a series of dominant value orientations v;hich most influence tlieir behavior, and secondly, variant value patterns laade up of alternative value orientations v;hich also affect behavior though to a lesser degree (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961:1-4). The variant value orientations, v.'hen not defined as "deviant," serve useful functions in providing men with alternative means cf behaving or confronting problems. They also, when held as dominant value orientations by certain individuals, make possible variety and balance in a society's activities. In effect, such variant and lesser-valued activities often fulfill a variety of needs (e.g., American intellectuals and artists who prefer and act on certain values wliich are not lield as dominant by rao5:t people m American society, nevertheless do things in their professional roles v;hich are useful for the functioning of Aip.erican society) . In addition, variant values provide a common ground for understanding between men whose dominant

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136 valuer, are different. In the same way they are invaluable as tools for comparing different cultures whose dominant value systems differ but which share values in common either as variants or when the dominant of one is the variant of the other. The vari'jty in both individual and societal value patterns postulated by Kluckhohn is restricted in scope and follows a definite order, in contrast v/ith the previous theories which, she says, were built around the idea that variation in cultural values is random and limited only by the number of cultural groups in existence (Kluckhohn, 1961:3). Tliis reasoning is based on the following assumptions: (1) there is a systematic variation in the realm of cultural phenomena, as definite as the systematic variation in physical and biological phenomena (Kluckliohn, 1961:3); (2) "there is a limit ed number of common human pro blems ^or which a.l 1 peo ple at all times must find some solutio n"; (3) "v:hile there is variabil ity in solutions of all the prob lems , i t is neit h er 1 imi tl ess nor random but is defi niteiy variable withi n a ran ge of poss ible s^olut£ons^" ; (4) "all the alternatives of all solutions are presen t in all societies at all times but are differentially preferred" ;

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137 (5) every society -has, ir addition to its dominant profile of val.ue orientations, I'l Umerous variant or substitut e profiles; (6) "in societies v/hich are undergoing change the ordering of preferences v/ill not be clear-cut for some or even all the value orientations" (Kluckhohn, 1951:10). Kluckhohn (1961:11) has singled out five basic problems v;hich she feels are cciiimon and crucial to all human societies. They are stated as questions in the follov.'ing way: (1) v;hat is the character of innate human nature? (2) what is the relation of man to nature (and the supernatural)? (3) what is the temporal focus of human life? (4) what is the modality of human activity? (5) what is the modality of man's relationship to other M-.en? In answering the^e universal questions and thus resolving the dilemji';as they pose for thinking, actiiig, and feeling, man is t'neoretically limited to the following solutions or value orion.tations upon which he may base liis general behavior and way of life (see diagram below) . For each question there exist three alternatives. Italics are the author's

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138 Problem Postulated range of vo.riation in value orientations Human nature can be perceived as: Evil Mixture of Good (mutable or Good and Evil (mutable or immutable) (mutable or imiriutable immutable) Man can believe and live in: Subjugation Harmony v;ith Mastery to Nature Nature over Nature Respecting time, man can orient himself tcv/ard the: Past Present Future Regarding modal activity, man can prefer: Being Being-inBe coming Doing Man's relationship witVi other men may be structured as: Lineal Collateral Individualistic V7ith regard to each of the five problems, a person or society will theoretically gi.ve first preference to one of the above solutions or value orientations upon which to pattern attitudes and behavior. The totality of preferred value orientations becomes the dominant va].ue profile

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139 v;hile the regaining value orierxtations , ranked as secondary or tertiary preferences/ make up variant value profiles. It is possible that the meaning of some of the value-position alternatives may not be entirely clear to the reader. The following definitions are offered with thi.s in ro.ind. Further clarification is available in Kluckhchn, 1961:11-20 and 1955:346-352. The "Harmony with Nature" orientation toward nature is probably somewhat unclear to maiiy people in Western culture because it is by and large not emphasized in those cultures. Florence Kluckhchn (19 55:347) defines it as one in which all natural forces and man 'nimself are regarded as one harmonious whole. One is viewed as an extension of the other and both are needed to make the whole. In past centuries this orient3.tion to-zard nature was considered the dominant one in Chinese culture. Kluckhchn' s conception of a past tim e orientation (1955:348) involves looking to and living oy traditions of the past— either to maintain them or recapture them. There is a strong emphasis on o].d norms and values. Her "Present" time orientation is one in which the individual Ij.ves for th.-2 moment, giving little thought to the past

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140 or the future (iromediate or long range) . Those v/ho are oriented tov/ard living in the present or the here and now tend, for example, to ignore definite appointments so that they would be unlikely to arrive for a two o'clock appointment at precisely or even approximately two o'clock. A future-oriented individual would, by way of contrast, tend to be carefully punctual in keeping appointments and spend a good deal of his time planning or thinking ahead. In the extreme, such a person could almost never live in or enjoy his present situation in as much as he would theoretically be constantly preoccupied with what he should be doing in a half hour, tv/o days, or three months. Kluckhohn reemphasizes here the point that all individuals and societies must deal with all three time dimensions (or are variously oriented to all three time dimensions) but they will usually learn to show preference for one. Fayerv;eather (1959:73) found an example of this phenomenon in his cross-cultural study of executive behavior. He reports that although Mexican executives do have a sense of the future (in being able to follow a schedule), they ignore both future and schedule whenever something they Cvonsider more important com.es up in the immediate present.

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141 Because raore things were considered "important" in Mexico than in the United States (such as personal contacts) , they were often inattentive to plans or appointments. Of the three modal types of activity postulated, "Being-in-Becoraing" is perhaps the least obvious. Kluckhohn points cut (1955:349) that philosophers have long distinguisried between "Being" as a state of spontaneous self-indulgemce and "Becoming" as a state of conscientious self-developiLent . Being-in-becoming is essentially what the philosophers called "Becoming." The "Doing" orientation motivatcis one to achieve and accomplish things which can be measur^sd by external standards. Plirases like "do something!" or "getting things done" express this value position. It is, of course, closely related to McClelland' 3 "need for achievement." Kluckhohn (1961:18) describes Collateral relationships between men as being brotherly. Such a relationship assumes mutiaal deoendcnca and cooperation on a basis of relative equality, Lirieal relationships on the other hand are hierarchical, assuming the natural superiority of some men over others and a dependence which is based on Inequality of position. T'ne typical master-sla^o

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142 relationship would be the prototype of this value orientation. Individualistic relationships presume a type of cooperation in which each individual depends on his own resources and initiative as much as possible. Each person theoretically gives more to the relationship than he takes. Dependence is de eraphasized and the individualistically oriented personality v/ill presumably have a high neec. for autonomy. " Kluckhohn (1955:351) stresses the idea that all three orientations are given some attention by all societies. Even the most extreme gemei nschaf t society leaves the individual some autonomy whereas even in individualistic, equalitarian America many relationships are strictly regulated along a chain of commandand-obey positions. To better illustrate her theoretical framework, Kluckhohn (1961:11-20) cites v/hat she regards as the dominant value profile of middle-class North American culture and compares it to the one she found among a small isolated community of MexicanAmericans in New Mexico. In her view, North Am.ericans: (1) think of human nature as basically evil though subject to perfection; (2) seek mastery of nature; (3) are oriented towards the future

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143 and the realization of future goals even while working in the Present; (4) prefer Doing to Being or Being-inBecoraing; and (5) are Individualistic in their relations with others. On the other hand, the Mexican -Americans were found to prefer: Subjugation to Nature, Present Tiriie, Being as the mode of activity, and Independence in human relations. Florence Kluckhohn considers the North American value profile to be internally consistent, that is, the value orientations preferred are said to be complementary with one another. In the case of the Mexican-Americans the Independence orientation is thought to conflict with the others. This is said to reflect cultural malintegration due to rapid social change. She also considers equal stress on two alternative value orientations — especially in ranking both first so that dominant and formally varient value orientations are equally preferred as solutions — as evidence of rapid social change (Kluckhohn, 1961:25-2^). 2 The va]uG orientation towards human nature was not recorded for the Mexican-Americans.

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144 Kluckhohn maintains over and over that by viewing a cultural value system as always containing all possible value orientations but in varying patterns of preference or rank order, it is possible to treat variability and change more freely. The importance of knowing the nature of the ordering of choices among alternative orientations is obvious whether individuals or groups are being studied. Such knowledge facilitates interand intracultural comparisons because one is comparing cultures or individuals with a universal, integrated frame of reference so that differences are of degree, not kind. If, for example, in comparing Colombian cities, it v/as found that some or all the dominant values prevalent in Medeilin vary from those of Call, a natural conclusion V'/ould be that the variation is related to the difference in socioeconomic development and differential stress on occupational roles (or at least the differential performance of said roles in the two cities) . By taking the dominant value orientations of one city and seeing v;hat rank or preference they are given in the other and vise versa, it is possible to pinpoint the degree of variance. Using this point of view an investiaator is able to recognize important

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145 developments and directions in cultural change as being simply a shift in preference of a limited number of general value orientations already present in a society's cultiaral pattern rather than the substitution of one set of dominant values for another previously unknown set. Kluckhohn insists that these changes do not occur at random but follow an ordered pattern growing out of the interaction and eventual integration of external and internal pressures. Although Florence Kluckhohn believes (1961:30) that an individual or group may prefer any combination of value orientations or solutions to the various problems (each orientation varies in preference independently) , it is comimonly supposed that the dominant value profile ascribed to the North American middle class is a complementary set of m.odern value orientations. Except for the stress on Individualism, the dominant value profile found among Mexican-Americans is considered to be a traditional one typically held by lower-class individuals in traditional societies. A third set of values orientations made up of an emphasis on past Time, Being-in-Becoiriing, Harmony v;ith Nature, and Lineal relationships is often assvociated

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146 with the elites of traditional societies. The identification of these particular profiles with modernization and being modern, and traditionalism and _b.ej.ng traditional is accepted here and used as a basis for hypotheses about the relationship between values and different degrees of modernization. There is ample evidenceto justify this position. LaPiere (1965:271-272 and 113-114) states that in preindustrial , traditional societies", members are reconciled by their ideology to passive acceptance of the status quo, including "the impoverishment and hardships that are consequent upon a limited control of nature." Fatalism, he remarks, is so much ofa traditional orientation that in traditional societies only deviants consider chronic hardships and natural calam.ities as being within man's capacity to control. LaPiere believes (1965:271-272) that the emergence in Western Europe of "a more active, self-confident orientation toward the v.'orld is one of the major ideological developments of social history, and it set under way the great burst of individual enterprise that has culminated in modern society." Kahl (1968:118) reinforces this viev/ from his own research when he states that modernization, through an emphasis on education, increases

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147 an individual's sense of mastery over his life and provides him v.'ith motivation for "doing" things. Moore (1963:102-104) insists that modernization always entails an increase of individualism in social relations as well as a Future time orientation which is manifested by a stricter division betv^een leisure and work time. McClelland (1961:325) reasons that because the modern entrepreneurial spirit involves "hustling," high need-achievers imbued with the entrepreneurial spirit should have a special attitude towards time--e.g., they would not v/ant to v/aste it, would perceive it as passing sv/iftly, would be thinking ahead in terms of future goals, etc. He found that high need-achievers did use more anticipatory tenses indicating a "forward orientation" and he, remarks that 'Western cultures in general have a conception of history as "going somewhere" in contrast to Eastern cultures which think of tim.e as a "quiet motionless ocean" (McClelland, 1961:328). Lewis Mumford (1971:55) points up the contemporary spirit of the Future time orientation with the observation that "the key machine of the modern industrial age is not the steam engine but the watch. ..."

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148 Most scholars trace the increasing emphasis on these particular value orientations to the Renaissance and the "scientific revolution" of the sixteenth century, which took place in the West and gave rise to a more fundamental "rational" orientation toward the environment. This rational, innovative approach to problems and life in general is often considered the basic cultural difference between East and West. If hhis be true, then the modern age can truly be said to have begun with the Renaissance and the growth of rationality. One piece of negative evidence came to light with respect to the presumed association between the Masteryover-Nature orientation and the modernization process and modern personality. McClelland (1961:176) looked for the presence of nine values commonly believed to be "modern" in children's stories published between 1925 and 1950 from countries which did or did not modernize more rapidly than expected. Among these values was the "optimistic" belief that man by and large is master of nature. Specifically, he hypothesized: (1) that references to man over nature would be more frequent in the literature of more rapidly developing countries;

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149 (2) that "ego's" actions would be successful more often in the litera.ture of more rapidly developing countries (McClelland, 1961:173). Neither hypothesis v/as confirmed. Here is a clear case of an eminently "reasonable" psychological hypothesis not being confirmed in fact. What could be more "self-evident" than that men who have in fact advanced economically should have had confidence in their ability to advance before they started? Such confidence v;ould seem to be a prerequisite of their working hard and effectively for progress, but v;e find just as much "fatalism" and belief in the dominant forces of nature as in the more backward countries which are often assumed to be backward because of such beliefs. Children's stories are not the only way of measuring such beliefs, of course, but they do serve to make one skeptical as to whether what is so "logical" and self-evident is necessarily true [McClelland, 1961:189-190]. Yet McClelland did find (1961:191-192) that nature as a source of pressure to cooperate in order to survive v/as more salient in the literature of children's stories in more rapidly developing countries . . . (this) result is not surprising since practically anyone v/ould have predicted that at the very core of modern technological society lies a concern with nature as something v;hich requiires manipu].ation, management, or cooperative action. VJhat is surprising is that this concern with nature is not unambiguously a faith in one's ability to conquer or subdue it, nor is it associated with the achievement syndrome. It would seem to this writer that the recognition of the necessity to conquer nature implies a stronger faith

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150 in one's ability to do so. Furthermore, McClelland elsewhere in his research (1961:222) reports that that embodiment of the "modern" personality, the entrepreneur, will, in the absence of hard facts, be optimistic about his chances for success and display more than an average amount of self-confidence. Those who would doubt the validity of his method (and in this case, the writer is one of them) and believe that many of the "disproven" values are still important adjuncts of modernization have, McClelland says (1961:189) the burden of proof shifted to their shoulders. It is interesting to note that five of the nine "modern" values were found to be associated with modernization in McClelland 's analysis of children's stories. These v/ere: Universalisra (over particularism in relationships), specificity (over dif fussness) , group or collectivity (over self), belief in efficacy of hard work, and rationality (McClelland, 1961:190). The four values that were not emphasized in the stories v;ere: achievement of status, affective neutrality, mastery over nature, and material need-satisfaction.

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151 If the -cheory of variation in value orientations and the method used in this dissertation to test it prove to be valid and reliable, the results of the present study v;ill shed some light on the relationship between values. the modernization process, and underdevelopment,

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CHAPTER IV RESEARCH DESIGN This chapter explains the methodology used in the planning and execution of the study. Included are the general objectives of the study, the specific hypotheses which guided the research followed by description of the instrument utilized, the sample selection, field procedures, analysis of the data, and characteristics of the sample interviewed. The general objectives of the study v/ere the following: (1) To describe the value-orientation profiles of community leaders and sixth-year male high school students in Medellin. (2) To determine if there exists a relationship between value orientations held by a group and the level of socioeconomic development reached by that group. (3) To explore the extent of intergenerational change in value orientation rankings in Medellxn by comparing leaders' value profiles with those of students. (4) To 152

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153 find out whether there is variation. in the expression of value orientations by social class in Medellin. The fulfillment of the second objective involves two steps which directly influence the content of the hypotheses: (a) the comparison of value-orientation profiles elicited for leaders and students in Medellin, considered here a "modern" city, with the value-orientation profile of the North American middle class, which is presumed to be a "modern" profile; (b) a comparison of value profiles found among leaders and students in Medellin with those found among comparable categories in the "traditional," less-developed city of Popayan. Both the general goals listed above and the specific hypotheses to follow V7ere based on five assumptions derived from Florence Kluckhohn's theory and to a lesser degree from general ideas about the dynamics of social change and modernization. These are the "givens" of the research; it is assumed that: 1. Certain combinations of value orientations are more closely related to high levels of socioeconomic development or modernization than others.

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154 2. The value orientations of Mastery-overNature, Doing, Future-time, and Individualism in human relations are the dominant values of the North American middle class and are, therefore, "modern" value orientations in the sense of being closely associated with the achievement of high levels of socioeconomic development. 2. The more closely the value-orientation profile of a society or human group fits the North American model, the more highly developed its social and economic life will be. 4. Community leaders are instrumental in effecting social change within a conimunity ; therefore, the more "modern" their value-orientation profile, the more modern or better developed will be their community. 5. North American culture has had increasing influence over Colombian society, especially among leaders, the upper and middle classes in general, and younger people. These then, are the assumptions v/hich directly underlie the hypotheses. Hypotheses Hypothesis l.--The value orientation profile of cor.ununity leaders in Medellin will be modern; that is

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155 it will appro:
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156 Hypothesis 7 . --The value orientations of students in Medellin will fit the modern model more closely than will those of leaders. H ypothesis 8 . --The value orientations of upperclass students in Medellin as represented by those in the top-ranked private school will fit the modern model more closely than will the value orientations of lower-class students in the lowest-ranked school. Hypothesis 9. --The student value orientations of the "high" or top-ranked private school will be closer to the modern model than v;ill those of the "high" or topranked public school. . . H ypothesis 10 . --There will be a direct relationship between modernity of students' value orientations and their social class position. Hypothesis 1 1. --The value orientations of community leaders in Medellin will be closer to the modern model than will the value orientations of leaders in Popayan. Hypothesis 12 . --The value orientations of students in Medellin will fit m.ore closely the modern model than will value orientations of students in Popayan.

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157 The Measu ring I n strument The instrument used in this research was created by Florence Kluckhohn and used for research conducted among different cultural groups in a rural ai'ea of New Mexico and later in Boston. Marked and consistent differences in value orientations held by five ethnic-cultural groups in New Mexico were revealed by hhe rural version of the instrument. The rural version has also been utili/:ed in Japan, Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela. For our research, it was decided to revise and translate the urban schedule intended by Kluckhohn for use in Boston, because the items were considered to be more universal in content as well as more applicable to the urban populations studied. Both versions of the instrument employ 22 items, each one of v/hich describes a specific, real-life problem and three alternative solutions. The problem.s are presented as situations (such as deciding on the ideal type of work, the best way to raise children, ucilize free time, etc.,) which demand a value-orientation response in the sense that each of three solutions to a particular problem represents one of three possible value orientations tov/ard the basic issue underlying the problem. For each item

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158 a respondent is asked to choose the solution he thinks is best and second best. Thus, he expresses his value orientations towards the basic issues of time / activity , man-nature and man-man relationships in a rank order of preference. Five items apiece measure time and humanrel ational orientations, and six each measure orientations toward activ ity and man-nature relationships . Items testing beliefs about the nature of innate human nature had not, at the time the instrument was devised, been satisfactorily developed and therefore v;ere excluded by Kluckhohn. Perhaps the structure and purpose of the items. can be better understood from the two examples belov/. The first is entitled "Job Description": Three young, unm.arried men had finished their schooling and had to decide what kind of work they wished to go into. A. One decided to go into the kind of occupation which others in his family before him had followed. He believed the best way is to hold and strengthen the traditions of the past. B. The second sought for the kind of work opportunities which offered considerable chance for future success. He believed it best to look for new developments in the future, even though he might have to start off in a position less good than others available at the time.

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159 C. The third decided to take the best job which came his v.'ay and wliich gave him the money ha needed to get along in the present time. Ha believed it foolish to think lauch either of the past, which has gone by, or the future vjhich he thought too uncertain to count on. The basic issue expressed by the problem here involves the orientation one has tov/ards time and the three alternatives represent three value orientation positions-Past, Future, and Present. The second item is called "Ideal Job": Three young, married men v;ere talking about their notions of the ideal job. Here is what each one said: A. The first said: The kind of job I v^ould like best to have if I could is one which is not too demanding of my time and energy. I would like to have time to enjoy myself and don't v;ant a job which makes me feel I must always be competing. B. The second said: Ideally, I would like a competitive job--one which lets me show what I can accomplish in a line of work for which I am suited. C. The third said: Ideally, I would like the kind of job which would let me develop different kinds of interests and talents. I would rather have an understanding of life and people than be successful in one particular field. This item purports to measure value orientations toward kinds of activ ity, and the three solutions to the problem represent the alhernativa activiby modes of

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160 Being, Doing, and Being-in-Beconing, respectively. Complete copies of both the original English-language instrument and the Spanish-language version used in Colombia are reproduced in the appendix. History a n d Method of the Sampling Process D efining a Sample an d Universe of Leaders It v/as decided first of all to sample 60 topechelon leaders in each comniunity for interviewing. Such a number was thought sufficient to give us a clear valueorientation profile for the power elites while not so large as to strain limited resources of time and manpower. Then came the problem of how to define and determine the universe from which to drav; the 60, that is, who were the community leaders, what activities did they carry on, and where could they be located? Discussion with Colombian members of the team led to the general conclusion that the leadership of Colombian cities is exercised within seven major activity 3ectors--the industrial, commercial, banking, governmental, quasigovernmental, religious, and university. The top people in these areas in effect

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161 constitute the power elite and, the offices they hold, the power structure. From there we had to decide what the positions and offices of the top leaders were specifically called in each sector. According to such a delineation a sector-by-sector list of names could be made up from which to draw the sample. After some discussion the decision was reached to define the universe in terms of the follov/ing leadership posts: (1) the presidents, managers, and board members of the 10 most important industries plus local board members of the National Association of Industries (ANDI) ; (2) the managers and/or owners of the 20 most important commercial firms along with local board members of the National Federation of Commerce (FENALCO) ; (3) the presidents, managers, and board members of the five largest banks; (4) the managers and board mem±)ers of the two or three leading quasigovernmental enterprises; (5) the rectors and governingboard members (trustees) of the universities; (6) the mayor, his chief advisors, and principal city council members; (7) the archbishop, chancellor, and vicars of the archdiocese and the rector of the seminary. Excluded were noncitizens of CoJ.ombia and nonresidents of the community.

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162 In Medellin all of the above comprised a total of 207 leaders from which to draw the 60. Divided among the seven activity sectors, the numbers for the subuniverses were: industry 69, commerce 31, banking 33, governraent 28, quasigovernment 15, church 7, university 24. In most cases these numbers were large enough to draw the required samples from each sector as well as leave a pool of replacements which could be used in case some respondents proved to be foreigners or nonresidents or it v;as impossible to interview them. The pool turned out to be rather small in some cases, however. Definition of the archbishop, his top aides, and the rector of the seminary as constituting the leadership in the church sector gave us a grand total of seven possible respondents in Medellin from which to random-sample five for interviews, leaving only two replacements. In Popayan, the fact that there is only one university left absolutely no replacements. The leading officials of that institution filled the five-man allotment for the educational sector and, therefore, all of them had to be found for interviewing or the sector would simply remain underrepresented in the total sample for that citv.

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163 The next step consisted in allotting to each sector a proportion .of the 60 leaders to be sampled. The distribution by sector of the 6 respondents for the two cities was raade as follows: Nuinber of Respondents Sector Industrial Cor.imercial Banking Governmental Quasigovernmental University Religious Total Medell

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164 the fact that their control is more concentrated and centralized. Filling the Universe; I. Selection of the Leading Industries, Cornraercial Firms, Banks, and Quasigovernmental Enterprises in Medellin As a first step in this part of the process we went to Medellin and asked the assistant manager of ANDI, the director of the Medellin stock exchange, and the head of the chamber of commerce to provide us v.'ith lists of the city's most important industries along with names of their managers and board members. They were told to use any criteria they judged fit but we put emphasis on the annual value of production. This particular datum turned out to be confidential but, nonetheless, the na;Ties of 20 industrial companies alleged to be the largest in Medellin along with their top management and board members were obtained from the three lists. With respect to commercial firms, the manager of the regional office of FENALCO and his assistant gave us a list of the 69 businesses they considered largest in Medellin is also the national headquarters of that organization.

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165 Medellin together with the number of their owners or mana2 gers . The list was by category; that is, they named the two or three biggest firms in various important fields such as men's clothing, general merchandising, auto agencies, and food wholesaling. The leading banks were much easier to determine, their number being fewer and relative position more clearcut. The names of the 5 largest banks v/ere provided by ANDI and their choice was corroborated by informants in the stock exchange and the chamber of commerce. The names of the presidents, managers, and board members of the banks were obtained later. As far as the most significant quasigovernmental organizations v;ere concerned, m>ost informants questioned (in ANDI, FENALCO, the chamber of commerce, stock exchange, universities, and banks) agreed that only 2 were really outstanding within the city of Medellin. On the basis of these consistent opinions, we included only the managers and board members of those two in the subuniverse for that sector. 2 Usually one and the same person,

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166 There still remained the task of narrowing down from the 20 industrial companies and 69 business enterprises named the 10 and 20 most important ones. Thus, in the next step, t?ie names of each of the industries and business firms were typed on individual index cards and, during a follow-up trip to Medellin, the cards were shown to the assistant manager of ANDI and three leading bankers. These men first went through the 20 industry cards and selected what in their judgment were the 10 most important companies in Medellin and then, following the same procedure, the 20 most important commercial enterprises 3 from the 69 business cards. In addition to this method a rank-order list of Colombia's top 30 "enterprises" published by the Camara d el Comercio de la Costa v;as consulted. Their ranking was done on the basis of data supplied by the Bogota stock exchange and included criteria such as patrimonio (assets) , net profits, production, number of employees, salaries, taxes paid, dividends, capital, and number of stockholders. Of the 30, 11 were listed as having their home offices in 3 One of the four. Dr. Ivan Amaya of the ANDI, took the trouble to make his choices less subjective by checking them against some data on hand.

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167 Medellin and of those 11, 9 were industrial companies (the other 2 were banks). This ranking afforded us a fifth list based on objective criteria. Third and finally, a comparison was made of these independent lists and from them were selected the 10 industries and 20 business firms thought to be the most important and influential in Medellin. The ten "most important" industries picked by consensus from the five lists are: 1. Compania Colombiana de Tejidos, S. A. "Coltejer"4 (Textiles, fabrics, thread, food products, textile machinery, valves, fittings) 2. Fabrica de Hilados y Tejidos del Hato, S. A. "Fabricate" (Textiles, fabrics, synthetics, thread) 3. Compania Colombiana de Tabaco, S. A. (Cigarettes, tobacco products) 4. Cerveceria Union, S. A. "Cervunion" (Brewery) 5. Tejidos El Condor, S. A. "Tejicondor" (Textiles and fabrics) 6. Empresa Siderurgica, S. A. (Iron and steel produc^-s including v/ire, pipe, valves, machinery) 7. Compania de Cemento Argos, S. A. (Cement and cement products) 4 Brand name.

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168 8. Enka de Colombia, S. A. (Boxes, crates, packaging products) 9. Compania Nacional de Chocolates, S. A. (Chocolate and candy) 10. Industries Alimenticias Noel, S. A. (Food products) With these 10 companies plus ANDI we felt that we had listed the 10 highest-level industrial entities in Medellin from which to dravv? the sample. The managers and board members of the 10 along v.'ith the president and board of ANDI taken together composed a subuniverse of 69 industrialists from which a random sample of 20 v;as drav;n for interviewing. The following 20 commercial firms were considered largest and most important by the three bankers and the ANDI assistant manager: 1. Cadenalco, S. A. "Ley" (General merchandise chain--similar to 5-and-lO-cent stores in the United States) 2. Droguerias Aliadas (Drugstore chain) 3. Mercados La Candelaria (Supermarket chain) 4. Pedernal Corona (Distributor of porcelain products) 5 Brand name.

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5. Peter Santamaria y Cia. 169 6 6. Urbanizadora Nacional (Construction and real estate) 7. Almacenes Valher (Retail clothing-store chain) 8. Felix de Bedout e Hijos (Printing, retail stationary, and book stores) t 9. Agenda Auto (Automobile agency) 10. Jesus Mora y Cia. (Auto-truck agency) 11. Cacharreria Mundial (Variety store chain) 12. Almacen Sin Nombre (Variety store chain) 13. General Electric de Colombia (Distributor of G. E, products) 14. Mora Hermanos. 15. Mario Posada y Cia. 16. Almacenes Radiales (Appliance Store Chain) 17. Manuel Piedrahita y Cia. 18. Calzado Cauchosol de Antioquia (Shoe store chain) 19. Caribe Motor de Medellin (Auto agency) 20. Almacenes Primavera (Retail clothing chain) ^Type of business is not known.

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170 The ranking is according to frequency of choice by the four informants (no commercial firm appeared in the published list of Colombia's 30 largest enterprises). The 7 owners and managers of the above 20 business firms gave us a pool of 22 commercial leaders. The director and board members of the local FENALCO provided 9 more for a total subuniverse of 31 from which to random-sample 10 for interviewing. The five banks selected as the largest and most influential in Medellin are the following (not in rank order of importance) : 1. Corporacion Financiera Nacional 2. Banco Industrial Colombiano 3. Banco Comercial Antioqueno 4. Banco Cafetero 5. Banco de Bogota All five are national banks in the sense that their operations are carried on throughout the country. Two of them — the Banco Industrial Colombiana and the Banco Comercial Antioqueno--are headquartered in Medellin and 7 Practically none was incorporated so they had no boards of directors

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171 both v.'ere named in the listing of the country's 30 biggest enterprises. The presidents and/or managers of the five 8 9 banks and the board members of four composed a subuniverse of 3 3 respondents for the random sampling of 10 interviews in the banking sector. With regard to the quasipublic sector we decided to use as sources of respondents only the two entities which were conceded real influence in the city of Medellxn. The tv;o are Institute del Desarrolo de Antioquia (IDEA) and the Empresas Publicas Municipales. IDEA is an organization v/hich finances and promotes a wide variety of social and economic development projects in Medellin and throughout the department of Antioquia. It has even fostered and financed a numl^er of other semiautonoraous organizations such as a tourist bureau (Turantioquia) and pov/er and light o "^Only the Banco Comercial A.ntioqueno had both a "president" and a "manager" (of the Medellin branch only) . The rest had either one or the other, never both. It seems that (according to v.'hat the presidents of the Ccruoracion Financiera Nacional and Banco Comercial Antioqueno told me) when a manager is not specifically named, the president does his job. 9 The Banco de Bogota had no regional or Iccal board for its Medellin branc?i, having abandoned the practice of naming such boards several years ago, so that oily the departmental manager for Antioquia and the Medellin branch manager were included in the subuniverse.

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172 companies in remote rural areas. IDEA'S original financing came from the sale of the state railroad and city airport to the national government. It presently is capitalized by return of interest on loans made. It was accorded a great deal of influence by informants. The Empresas Publicas is a semiautonomous organization analogous with the Empresas Municipales in Cali. It provides all the electric pov;er , water, and telephone service for Medellin. The managers and board members of IDEA and the Empresas Publicas numbered 15, from v;hich the random sample of five allotted to the quasigovernmental sector v;as drawn for interviewing. Filling the Universe; II. Th e Governmen t al, Church a nd Univer sity Se ctors in Medellin In these cases the task v.'as much simpler. In the governmental sector, for example, the decision was first made to include the mayor and his chief advisors. These included the contr alor municipal (or city auditor) , the secretaries of education, government, housing, public v7orks, and public health, the city treasurer, the

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173 personero munici pal (or solicitor) , the chief of city planning, and the chief of valorizacion (v;ho is in charge of assessing a special tax for street paving) . To these 11 men v/ere later added all principal members of the city council, making a total subuniverse of 28 from which to draw a sample of five. Regarding the Catholic Church hierarchy, v;e chose (after some discussion among colleagues familiar with church affairs) the archbishop, his secretary, the chancellor of the diocese, tv/o vicars-general, the rector of the seminary, and the chief of s indicatura (or chief trustee) , for a total of seven possible respondents. In the subuniverse of higher education were included the rectors of the city's three universities (Universidad de Antioquia, Universidad de Medellin, and Universidad Pontif icia Rolivariana) , members of the consojo superior (board of trustees) of the Universidad de Antioquia, the trustees of the Universidad de Medellin, a nd the alumni chief and president of the economic affairs l-O board of the Universidad Pontif icia Bolivar lana. The The Universidad Pontif icia Bolivariana has no higher council of trustees but simply a governing council of professors and deans.

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174 total pool of respondents in this sector came to 24, from which five were drawn at random. Drav.'ing the Interview Sample The next part of the process consisted of drawing randomly, sector by sector, the 60 coimunity leaders to be interviewed from the total universe of 207 names we had obtained in the seven sectors. To begin, the seven lists of names or subuniverses were numbered. This was done simply by starting with numlDer one at the top of each list and numbering through to the last name. The longest list was the industrial with 69 names garnered from the ten companies and ANDI. The shortest, amounting to only seven names, was that for the church sector. After this the allotted number of interviewees was drawn at random from each sector list using a table of random numbers. Thus, for instance, the sample of 20 industrial leaders to be interviewed was selected from the subuniverse list of 69 nam.es by randomly picking numbers by chance between one and 69 until v;e had 20 numbers and the corresponding names of the industrialists they reoiesented. In this particular ca^e Lhe chance

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175 distribution of respondents was more or less even throughout the list so that none of the ten industrial companies (or ANDI) with which the 69 V7ere connected was overrepresented. The remaining 4 interviewees in the other sectors were picked in the same way. However, it turned out that some individuals were drawn at random two and even three tim.es, either from different sectors or from different organizations within the same sector. This was of course due to the fact that some people serve simultaneously on the boards of a number of industrial companies, banks, and quasigovernmental entities. Previously we had agreed to include in the sample frames all the names appearing as managers or board mem}jers of the top ten industries, five banks, etc., even though the same name might show up several times. Such cases were thought to reflect the greater importance of those individuals and gave them the coramensurately better chance of being drawn that they deserved. One man, for example, was on four of the ten industrial boards and one of the two quasigovernmental boards. Another's name appeared on the boards of two industries, two of the five banks, and one of the

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176 qudsigoverniTiental enterprises. When the same name was drawn over again it was replaced by randomly drawing another number from the same sector. Naturally, the repetition of names on the boards of leading organizations in the same or different sectors demonstrates a tight-knit, interlocking pattern of leadership which provides for fev/er but more influential leaders. It is interesting to note that many men sampled from the boards of the industrial companies (for example) and classified in the sample as industrial leaders exercised their major occupations as bankers, lawyers, engineers, etc. This was, of course, compensated for by the appearance of industrialists on the boards of directors of banks, semipublic organizations, or the trustee councils of the universities. Such cases of "other sector" occupations occurred in all but the comm.ercial and church samples. Owners and managers of business firms seldom claimed they worked at any other activity. In the event of refusals or when it became a virtual impossibility to interview the original respondent within a reasonable time limit, and in cases where noncitizens or nonresidents were drawn, replacements for them

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177 were picked from the same sector following the same randomsample procedure. The definition of refusal included those cases where it seemed virtually certain that efforts to contact an individual for an interview were being put off by secretaries or assistants even though the respondent himself never directly refused to be interviewed . Defining the Sample of Secondary School Students We decided to administer the schedule as a questionnaire at four all-male secondary schools, two private and two public, in each city, each school representing a polar extreme in the social class background of its student body. The sample was defined as all 6th year high school students enrolled in (1) the private and the public schools with the highest-status student bodies in terms of socioeconomic level and (2) the private and the public schools considered lowest in this respect. We depended upon information from reliable people in each city as to which those schools were. The There are five years of primary school and six of high school in Colombia.

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178 informants included faculty members of schools of education in local universities, public education officials, leading businessmen, and the rectors of the high schools themselves. Popayan presented no problems of selection because there were only four schools going through, the sixth year at the Bachillerato level. In Medellin, on the other hand, some inquiries had to be made because of the larger numbers of schools and the fact that it v/as impossible to find any objective classification of private or public schools according to 12 the socioeconomic status (SES) of their students. Luckily the informants were in substantial agreement as to which were the two or three top schools in both the private and public sectors. Opinions as to the bottom ones in the two categories v/ere somewhat more vague and usually at least three or four schools were named. By a process of comparing the various schools named and discussing them with the most knowledgeable 12 One exception: The rector of the Liceo Antioqueno in Medellin had made an analysis of the socioeconomic background of his own student body and categorized it by social class.

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179 informants, v;e managed to pinpoint four schools. In Medellin we judged our most reliable informants to be personnel at the Instituto de Sociologia of the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and the Rector of the Liceo Antioqueno. The Liceo Antioqueno is the teaching high school of the Universidad de Antioquia and the largest high school in Medellin. Its rector claimed to have intimate knowledge of all the secondary schools in the city derived from his past experiences as head of the faculty of education at the Universidad de Antioquia. Mostly on their recommendations and in accordance with monthly tuition figures for the private schools under consideration, the four schools finally picked at Medellin (along with the number of students interviewed and their SES) are the following: Private High Instituto Jorge Robledo 56 students — upper-clas ass Lov/ Instituto Parroquial Jesus do la Buena Esperanza 62 students--lower-L,lass Public High Liceo Antioqueno 198 students---middle-class

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180 Low Liceo Gilberto Alzate Avendano 101 students-~lower-middle and lower-class Total number of students 424 Field Procedures Before going into the field an accurate, clear translation into Spanish of Kluckhohn's urban schedule had to be prepared. This was done by a completely bilingual Colombian sociologist \vho v;as also familiar with the instrument's theoretical basis. To assure accuracy, the new Spanish version was translated back into English by another bilingual colleague v;ho had no connection with the study. His Spanishto-Knglish rendering was compared with the original English-language instrument. This procedure led to some modifications in the language of the Spanish version, v/hich was subsequently subjected to a pretest. Pretesting the I nstrument The pretest was carried out in the city of Palmira, 18 miles from Cali. A sample of 16 leaders was selected by the same m.ethod that ws planned to use in Medellm, Cali, and Popayan. In addition, the instrument was administered as a questionnaire in several Palmira high schools. Both the interviews and the school pretests illuminated defects

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181 and oversights so that changes were made in the instrument and the interviewing procedure itself. Questions regarding the occupational status of leaders' and students' fathers were made more precise: specific positions, work definitions, and organizational affiliations were requested. A decision was made to have leaders being interviewed read the items themselves and verbally state the order of their preferences to the interviewer, who would record them. Another change involved not asking leaders, as originally planned, their perceptions of how their parents would respond to the items since during the pretest it became obvious that many of the older leaders could only hazard vague guesses. This aspect of the research, however, was continued for students questioned in the three cities, although the results obtained were, in the opinion of this writer, of doubtful validity. Interviewing the Leaders Community leaders were interviewed personally by three men; the writer, another Moi. hh American colleague, and a Colombian collaborator. Both myself and the other North American spoke fluent Spanish. Each man conducted one third of the interviews in each sector of each city.

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182 The data analysis -later showed that there were no significant differences in the responses collected by the three interviewers, so interviewer bias is assumed to be minimal. Other efforts to assure uniformity included the use of standard introductions for both leaders and students in which the study was explained as research on everyday problem-solving, confidentiality was assured, and the study's scientific importance emphasized. Leaders interviewed were given a copy of the schedule items to read and verbally indicated their preferences to the interviewer, who held, in addition to a copy of the item.s, an ansv/er sheet and questions on the respondent's background characteristics. Interviewers were forbidden to elaborate on the content of the item.s and simply reread them slowly v/hen interpretations were asked for. In order to avoid "contamination" of the sample selected, none of the interviewees v;as allowed to keep a copy of the items, even though many requested copies. This v/as allimportant because the pov;er structure of Colombian cities is fairly cohesive and copies might easily have been circulated and fall.en into the hands of individuals v;ho had been sampled but not interviewed.

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183 Leaders sampled for interviewing were contacted by telephone and appointments requested. Although some difficulty was experienced in reaching leaders at their offices or getting through secretarial ranks, persistence was usually rewarded with an appointment. In making these requests emphasis was placed on the scientific importance of the study, the importance of knowing t heir responses as coirmunity leaders, and our connections with the Universidad del Valle. In Medellin, it was usually necessary to make an average of three or four calls to secure an appointment. There were several outright refusals from elderly leaders, although in one case, a glance at the items led a reluctant old gentleman not only to grant an interview but become an enthusiastic proponent of the study. The average interview in Medellin lasted about 25 minutes, but a few took only 15 minutes, while there were several long ones lasting over an hour in which the respondent philosophically discussed or criticized the items at great length. This writer found to his surprise that 2-:edellin leaders were by and large most "un-Latin" not only in faithfully keeping appointments once these

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184 were set but in kQeping them on time. This v/as much less true in Cali or Popayan. Nevertheless, another interviewer reported that he drew several men in Medellin who without explanation failed to keep appointments. In most cases, the subuniverses of leaders in each sector were large enough to permit easy replacement of refusals, no-shows, or those v/hom we were unable to contact. In the interview situation itself, cooperation from the respondents was excellent. Questioning the Students In the case of the students, the instri.iment was administered as a questionnaire to groups in one or more rooms. Permission to do so was secured without difficulty from the rectors of the four schools selected in Medellin. As with leaders, efforts were made to minimize administrative effects on responses by using a standard procedure for introducing the material in all four schools. We stressed the fact that the questionnaire was not an exam nor a psychological test and that there were no right or wrong answers. Both leaders and students were told that individual answers were of no interest per se since collective results were sought. Our identity with the

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185 Universidad del Valle was stressed but in spite of this there was apparently some suspicion that we were working 13 for the CIA. In retrospect, it would have been better to use Colombians in the schools. Hostility and misbehavior was encountered in one room at the Liceo Antioqueno but, .for the most part, the administration of the questions went smoothly. No interpretation of the items was given to students, although questions about procedures were answered. Data Processing Once the interviews were completed the responses of approximately 94 8 individuals interviewed or questioned in all three cities were coded by three members of the research team. The data from the answer sheets were transferred in the proper codes onto sheets of 80-column paper to facilitate the punching of identically organized IBM cards. In order to minimize possible effects of coding error, no more than onethird of the data from each city 13 One student at the Avendano school asked the writer if we were not attempting to get a psychological "fix" on the Colombian people so that they might be more easily m.anipulated and exploited. A group of his peers concurred in this suspicion upon hearing the question.

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186 v.'as coded by any one person and after the coding was completed the original responses of each leader and every tenth student were matched against their coded form. Follov/ing this, IBM cards were punched from the coding sheets, verified and after a method of analysis had been arrived at, processed by IBM 360/50 and 360/65 computers at the University of Florida. The Method of /analysis Due to the complex nature of the item responses (the three alternatives to each item were ranked in order of preference by each individual, making for a large number of possible cor±)inations) and the difficulties inherent in any comparison which is both interand intracultural, a great deal of time and effort was spent in working out a feasible method of analysis. In fact, two methods were used. The first and simplest involved a frequency count of first, second, and third value-orientation choices of all leaders and students, item by item. Thus, for example, if a majority of leaders chose Future first on three, four, or five of the five time items, then the dominant value orientation for leaders with respect to time v;as Future. If Present was the

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187 majority seccnd choic-~ on those items, then the value profile in the time area was listed as Future > Present > Fast. This straightforward method of response counting met the first objective of the study by providing a description cf value orientation profiles for leaders and students in Kedellin. Other objectives entailed comparisons (of Medellxn leaders and students with each other, with the allegedly "m.odern" North American middle class, and with leaders and students in Popayan) , and underlying them all were ideas about the degree to which the value orientations of these various groups were truly "modern." We wanted to know, for axaraple, how "modern" the values of Medellin leaders v;ere in comparison v;ith those of Popayan leaders. Therefore, a ruethcd of analysis v;as required which would give us the degree to which group responses fit the "modern" model. After consulting with Dr. Harry Scarr, v/ho was then Florence Kluckhohii's principal statistical consultant, the following method was devised. First, the number of times each respondent in each group made pure North Americcin middle-class or "modern" clioices on the items in a particular value area (e.g., the five time

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188 items) was recorded. Purely modern choices were defined as Future > Present > Past, Doing > Being-in-Becoming > Being, Mastery-over-Nature > Ilarmony-with-Nature > SubmissiontoNature, and Individualism > Collateral > Lineal in that order . The number of such responses in each value area was summed for each individual in each group. A sum of sums was then taken for each group of respondents and divided by the number of respondents in the group to obtain an "average" response for that group. This average is presented in the results as the mean or average number of times a group of leaders or students chose a "modern" value profile. The following example should clarify this procedure. The leaders were first divided into broad occupational groups such as commercial, industrial, etc. There were in the commercial group 10 respondents interviewed. The number of "modern" profile responses made in each value area by each respondent was summed. Let us suppose that each of the letters in the left-hand column below represents a single commercial leader. We wish to know for how many of the five time items each man made a purely modern response (Future >

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189 Present > Past) . The numbers in the right-hand column represent the number of time items in v/hich each leader chose this profile exactly as above. Number of Time Items Corrimercial in Which a Modern Leaders Profile Was Chosen Leader A 2 Leader B 1 Leader C Leader D 5 Leader E Leader F 2 Leader G 2 Leader H 3 Leader I 1 Leader J • 2 Thus, Commercial leader "A" chose Future >• Present > Past on two of the five time items, "B" on only one of the time items, etc. When the figures in the right-hand colunm are added and then divided by 10, we get the average or mean number of items on which commercial leaders chose a purely "modern" profile. In this instance, E 18 -r 10 s 1.8 so that on an average of 1.8 iteiris, commercial leaders chose the modern value profile. This particular analysis was referred to as the "hard" test because responses had to take the form of a "purely modern" rank-order of preferences in order to be counted.

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190 A second analysis was made of the responses using essentially the same method but in which only the first choice from each item was examined. Therefore, if a leader chose Future first on four of the five time items, he was given a score of four no matter v/hat his second or third choices had been. The scores for each group of individuals were summed and an average obtained in the same way as for the complete value profile. In the time value area, commercial leaders actually had an average of 3.9. This indicates that the ten commercial leaders chose Future first on an average of 3.9 or on almost four out of five time items, while tliey ranked . Future > Present > Past in that order only 1.8 of the same items. This second analysis of the data v/as called the "soft" test since item responses v.-ere adjudged modern as long as the first choice or dominant value orientation was modern, irrespective of how the other tv.'o alternatives were ranked. Differences between the hard and soft test scores of the various groups were tested for statistical significance by m.eans cf one-v/ay analysis of variance and t-tests.

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191 A Statistical Portrait of Leaders and Stude nts Interviev/ed The following description of leaders and students sampled should not only give the reader a clearer picture of the various types of individuals included within those two groups but also aid in the interpretation of results since most of the social characteristics presented belov\7 were used as independent variables in the analysis and comparison of intracity responses. It should be noted that, even in the relatively homogeneous sample of leaders, there were some significant background differences which made for variations in value orientations. Leaders Fifty-six of the 60 community leaders sampled in Medellin v/ere men. Of the four women in positions of leadership, two were members of the city council and two held positions with universities. Most leaders interviewed were relatively young, although none was less than 30 years old. Twenty-one of the 60 were between 30 and 39 and 15 were between 40 and 49 so that 60 percent were less than 50 years old. Only seven leaders were over age 60. The youngest leaders were working in the governmental and

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192 quasigov-ernmental sectors, while the oldest were from the church and banking. With respect to positions held, more than half of the 60 leaders (37) were on the boards of directors of the organizations from which they were drawn in the sample. Nine were also presidents of the companies with which they were associated, and 13 held the position of manager. One man from the commercial sector classified himself as "proprietor" of his firm. The remaining respondents held posts in the city government or the archdiocese. Professionally, 25 of the 60 leaders classified themselves as administrators or executives, seven each. as lawyers and bankers, five each as engineers and businessmen, two as medical doctors, five as clergymen. a nd four as "other." Table 2, comparing the educational backgrounds of the leaders interviewed and those of their fathers, indicates that whereas 44 or 73.3 percent of the leaders had been graduated from a university, only 13 or 2 5.0 percent of the leaders' fathers had been. Only nine leaders had terminated their studies in high school, but 2 8 reported that their fathers had done so. Of the 50 leaders

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193 with some university studies, 26 had studied abroad--16 of them in the United States, eight in Europe, and two in other Latin American countries. Table 2 Educational Level of Leaders and Their Fathers, Medellin, 1967 Fathers of Educational Level Leaders Leaders No. Percent No. Percent University graduate 44 77.3 13 25.0 Some university studies 6 10.0 2 4.0 Some high school studies 9 15.0 28 54.0 Some primary school studies 1 1.7 9 17.0 TOTAL 60 100.0 52* 100.0 *Eight of • the leaders did not report their fathers' educational background. Table 3, which provides information about the occupational backgrounds of leaders' fathers, shows th.at, unfortunately, 26 leaders did not provide these data. Of the 34 who did, 20 had fathers in occupations comparable to their ov/n. None had fathers in the lowest occupational category of domestic and service laborers.

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194 Table 3 Leaders' Fathers According to Occupational Level, Medellin, 1967 Occupational Level Leaders' Fathers No. Percent Group I 2 33.3 2 Group II 11 18.3 Group III 3 5.0 4 Group IV Not reported 26 43,4 TOTAL 6 10 0.0 Professional and technical workers, owners, managers, and officials of large firms. 2 Clerical workers, salesmen, owners, managers, and officials of small firms. 3 Craftsmen, foremen, skilled workers. 4 Domestic and service workers, laborers. As to birthplace, it was found that 37 were born in Medellin, 16 elsewhere in Antioquia, and two in neighboring Caldas. Thus, 55 or 91.7 percent of the leaders interviewed originated in the Antioqueno region. Of the five remaining leaders, on'3 was born in New York but was brought back to

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195 Medellin by his Anticqueno parents a month later. These figures do nothirxg to disprove the idea prevalent in Colombia that outsiders who want to set up a business in Medellin are not welcomed. It is doubtful that the leadership of any other Colombian city is so largely native. It might also be noted that of the 55 leaders who specified size of birthplace, 51 or 85 percent were urban-born while only 4 or 6.7 percent reported their birthplace as being rural. Students The 39 5 students questioned were, other than being all male and all in their sixth or final year of high school, more heterogeneous as a group than were the leaders. This result v/as intentional because we wished to discover whether or net there v/ere differences between lov/er-class and upper-class Colombians in the value orientations they reportedly held. Such a comparison was obviously impossible to make with the sample of leaders but it was fairly simple to include both lowerand upperclass individuals in the sample of high-school students. In Medellin, however, the socioeconomic classification of "nigh-school studeiit bodies did not turn out exactly as

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196 intended because students at the "high status" public school (Liceo Antioqueno) proved to be predominantly from middlerather than upper-class backgrounds. Thus, a "middle-class" dimension was added to the comparison. Table 4 shows the type of barrio (in terms of social class) in which students from each school lived. As one might expect, the majority of the students questioned at the exclusive Institute Jorge Robledo lived either in upper-class barrios (40.7 percent) or uppermiddle-class barrios (29.6 percent). None reported themselves to be living in lov/er-class areas. The largest proportion of students questioned at the Liceo Antioqueno reportedly came from middle-class barrios (40.7 percent) but with substantial minorities from both upper-middle-class and lower-middle-class barrios. In keeping with this middle-class image, few students at that school reported themselves living in either upperor lower-class sections of the city. At the Gilberto Alzate Avendano school most students in the sample (60.4 percent) reported that they lived in lov/er-middle-class barrios. Personal observation gave this writer the impression that the majority of the

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197 Table 4 Social Class Level of Students' Barrio of Residence, by School, Medellin, 1967 Social Class of Barrio of Residence Upper-class Upper-middleclass Kiddle-class Lov;er--iriiddleclass Loverclass Not reported TOTAL Institute Jorge Robledo No. Percent 22 40.7 16 29.6 3 5.6 1 1.9 12 22.2 54 100.0 School Li ceo Antioqueuo No. Percent 11 5.8 27

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198 Table 4 --Continued

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199 students v/ere, in .fact, fro~» lo\.'er~cla3s backgrounds, as our informants had believed. Most of the students at the lov/est-ranked school, the ParrcTuial de Bello, also reported that they resided in lower-middle-class barrios, although a substantial number (17.9 percent) placed their residence in lowerclass barrios, the largest proportion to do so in any of the four schools. The age distribution of the students (as a group) was fairly limited. The vast majority (292 or 74.4 percent) were between 17 and 19 years of age. Eighty-two or 20.8 percent were between 20 and 23, while four were over 23. Fifteen reported that they were 16 years old. Examination of Table 5 shows that a good many students either did not report their father's occupation or reported it in such a v/ay that it was not classifiable in any of the four categories used. At tlie Jorge Robledo the majority of those students who did report this information indicated that they had high-level occupations of the kind found in Group 1. A surprisingly large number of students at the liiceo Antioquerio gave occupations for their fathers of the type foimd in Group 3.

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200 Table 5 Students' Fathers According to Occupational Level, Medellin, 1967 Occupational Category Institute Jorge Robledo School Liceo Antioqueno Group I^ Group II 2 Group IIl3 Group IV4 Not classifiable TOTAL Ho. Percent Ko. Percent 22

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Table 5--Continued 20: Gilberto Alzate Avendano Parroquial De Bello No. Percent No. Percent Total No. Percent 1.0 3.6 43 10.9 12

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202 Predominance of Group 2 occupations for the fathers of students at that school had been expected. Likewise, there were more students with fathers in Group 3-type occupations at the Parroquial de Bello than predicted. However, the large number of unreported or unclassif iable occupations does limit the representativeness of these results . In Table 6 are presented the educational levels attained by the students' fathers. As might be expected, a high proportion of fathers of Jorge Robledo students reported having university degrees, while the great majority of students at the Gilberto Alzate Avendano and the Parroquial de Bello indicated that their fathers did not go beyond primary school. Although 77.5 percent of the students reported that they had lived in Medellin (including Bello) most of their lives, only a slight majority of 51.9 percent said they actually were born in Medellin itself. This is especially notable in the Escuela Parroquial de Bello, where only five of 56 students were born in Medellin. The upper-class Institute Jorge Robledo had the highest percentage of Medellin-born students (74.1 percent).

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203 Table 6 Students' Fatliers According to Educational Level Attained, Medellin, 1967 Educational Level of Father Institute Jorqe Robledo School Li ceo Antioaueno University graduate ^^o. Percent 17 31.5 No. Percent 16 8.5 Some university studies Seme primary studies 7.4 Some high school studies 21 38.9 11.1 1 .5 71 37.6 74 39.2 l\0 s-cuaies 1.6 Not classifiable 11.1 24 12.6 TOTAL 54 100.0 189 100.0

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204 Table 6 --Continued Gilberto Parroquial Mzate Avendano De Bello Total No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 1 1.0 — 34 8.6 2 3.6 7 1.8 26 27.2 7 12.5 125 31.6 61 63.5 43 76.8 184 46.5 3 .8 8 8.3 '4 7.1 42 10.7 96 100.0 56 100.0 395 100.0

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205 Of those students not born in Medellin, the ir.ajority (75.0 percent) reported Antioquia as their birthplace. They and their farailies v.-ere undoubtedly part of the great migration of rural and small-town Antioquenos into Medellin which has accelerated in the past 30 years. Eighty-seven percent of all the students reported that both of their parents had been born either in Antioquia or other departments of the Antioqueno region. This supports the hypothesis that migration into Medellin has been from nearby areas (unlike migration to Cali) and that "outsiders" have had very little influence in the development of Medellin.

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CHAPTER V RESULTS In the tables which follow are the analytical results of this study beginning with the value orientation choices made by leaders and students in Medellin. It is perhaps v;ell to bear in mind that the basis for comparison here is the assumed value orientation profile of the North American middle-class. The profile is considered to be a "modern" one characteristically held by entrepreneurs and middle-class groups in m.odernized or economically developed societies. We believe that "modern" values in effect orient the thoughts, feelings, and actions of those v;ho hold them in the direction of social and economic achievement. An example of a "modern" value profile with respect to time, activity , ma n-nat ure rel ationsh ips, and man-to-man relationships is presented here for comparative purposes. 206

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207 Man-Nature Man-Man Time A ctivit y Relationships R elatio nshi p s Dominant Future Doing Mastery of Individualism orientation Nature Secondary Present Being-inHarmony with Collateral orientation Becoming Nature (cooperative) Tertiary Past Being Submission Lineal orientation to Nature (hierarchical) Thus, the dominant value orientations in the above (Future, Doing, Mastery of Nature, and Individualism) v;ould be the first choice or the dominant value orientations of modern groups like the North /American m.iddle-class . The third-ranked set of value orientations, that is to say, values which would be the third choice of m.odern peoples, are considered to be the first choice or dominant orientations of miost individuals in traditional societies. As such they are often referred to as "traditional" values. Value Orientations in Modellin L eaders The value orientation profile held by the 60 community leaders interviewed in Medellin is the following one .

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208 Table 7 Value Profile of Conmiunity Leaders* Medellin, 1967 Man-Nature Man-Man Time Activity Relationships Relationships Dominant Future BeinginMastery of Collateral orientation Becoming Nature Secondary Present Doing Harmony v/ith Lineal orientation Nature Tertiary Past Being Submission Individualism orientation to Nature *N = 60 Medellin leaders were, as a group, "modern" in two of the four areas tested: time and man's relationship to nature . In their orientations tov/ard activity and man to man relationships the loaders showed a first preference for Beingin-Becoming or self development and Collateral relationships. These arc values which are thought to be neither typically "modorn" nor "traditional" but somewhere in between in their effects on thought and action. The modern orientations of "Doing"--acting on the external environment — and '-Individualism" in human relationships were ranked second and third respectively. These findings irefute

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209 in part Hypothesis 1 that Medellin loaders would have a completely rr.odern value profile (see Chapter IV, p. 154) . These results can be examined in greater detail by breaking down or cross-classifying the leaders into smaller groups according to their basic characteristics, and this should provide insight as to what type of leader did net show a first preference for modern value orientations in the activity and man-man relationship areas. Table 8 presents data on the value orientations of Medellin leaders according to the basic occupational sectors in which tliey worked. Here one can see how the leaders varied by the kind of work they do. The reader is reirdnded that this presentation of results and those for all subgroups of leaders and students is different from that made for leaders and students as a whole (see Chapter IV, pp. 136-190) . The figures in the following tables of this section represent the average number of modern choices made by Medellin leaders and students (modern choices = Future > Present > Past, Doing > Being-in-Becoming > Being, Mastery > Harmony > Submission, Individualistic > Collateral > Lineal in Test 1 and Future, Doing, Mastery, or Ind:i.vidu.ilistic over any combination of the remaining

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210

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n 211 1

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212 two alternatives in Test 2) . Because Test 1 involves ranking the alternatives in a modern order or profile it is considered the "hard," or "conservative" test for the presence of a modern value system. In Table 8 for example, Test 1 results by occupational sector show that industrial leaders interviewed in Medellin ranked the three value alternatives towards time in the "modern" fashion (Future > Present > Past) on an average of 1.55 items out of the five which dealt with the way time is valued. But according to Test 2, where the second and third choices are ignored, they chose a future alternative first on an average of 3.45 items out of five. Data from this method of analysis reveal that, on the average, leaders in the quasigovcrnmental sector chose "modern" value orientations on more items than leaders in any other sector (except in the time area and with regard to "Individualistic" as a first choice in the m.an-to-man area). They were, generally speaking, closely followed in this respect by leaders in the commercial and industrial sectors. With the notable exception of the time area, church leaders made modern choices on the smallest number of items. Ttests performed on the differences between

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213 the sector means showed that statistically speaking church leaders were significantly less modern in their choices than were quasigovernmental , commercial, and industrial leaders in all cases outside of the time area. This was most apparent regarding activity values where the scores of church leaders were especially low. Leaders in the university sector also tended to score low, especially on Test 1, where they were significantly less modern than quasigoverrimental and commercial leaders over all items, as well as in the time , m.an-nature and man-to-man areas. In brief, the findings in Table 8 show that quasigovernm.ental, coriinercial, and industrial leaders were most "modern'' in their value orientations v;hile church leaders (except for the time area) and to a lesser extent academic leaders, were least so. Hypothesis 2 (see p. 155) is, therefore, supported on this basis. Because church leaders were less modern than other leaders i.n the activit y and man-to-man areas, the 60 Medell-in leaders taken as a whole were unexpectedly nonm.odern in these ai'eas . The significance of differences between moans v;as interpreted at the .05 level.

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214 Other interesting differences were found when leaders were corapared on the basis of their educational experiences. In general, loaders with university studies chose "modern" value orientations more often than did those without university studies, just as Hypothesis 3 predicted (see Table y) . The only exception to this general result occurred on the activity items. Aside from this discrepancy, it appears that exposure to university studies had some influence in making leaders raore modern in their value orientations. Differences between the two groups were statisticall y significant over all items and in the time and man-nature areas . Hypothesis 4 proposes that Medellin leaders with university training in the United States or Western Europe would be more modern in their choice of value orientations than would those leaders who had studied in Colombia. When leaders were compared solely on this basis, few large or statistically significant differences were found, although foreign educated leaders did tend to score higher than those who attended Colombian universities. However, upon comparing foreign educated leaders in terms of numbers of years spent studying abroad, it was discovered that those

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215 c

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216 with three or four years of foreign study were somewhat more modern in their value choices (except in the acti vity area) than were those who had studied overseas two years or less (see Table 10) . Leaders' responses were also analyzed in terms of their fathers' occupation and education. In the first case it turned out that leaders whose fathers were professionals or owners/managers of large organizations were just slightly more modern as a group than those with fathers v/ho were clerical or sales workers. The educational background of leaders' fathers proved to have more influence than did occupation on value orientation differences. Figures in Table 11 demonstrate that, generally, leaders whose fathers had exposure to a university education v;ere more modern than leaders with fathers v-;ho had not gone beyond primary or secondary school. A big exception to this general result is to be seen in the time area. The "purely modern" value ranking of Future > Present > Past (Test 1) was chosen on the average only one out of six times by leaders whose fathers had gone to a university. Otherwise the results lend weak support to Hypothesis 5.

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217

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218 (0 C O •H 4J 03 4J C o -p W a; u H -x O r^ ^o U CTi. c •H c 0) ^ 0) CO o (0 o 0) 3 u 0) 5 H c o •H -P rO +J C QJ H u 4J c c H o U Q 0) 01 TJ G < H 9h CM c (0 G •0 0) c o H -p (d u 'J O X! 0) -c -p 4J c •H !-i O U U ^^ c (0 0) p I c >1 -p •H > H P U -< •H 0) P H

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219 Table 12 provides an interesting comparison of Medellin leaders by different age groups. When the comparison Is raade over all 22 items, there is clearly an inverse relation between age and the average number of "modern" value choices--as age goes up the number of "modern" choices goes dov;n. The difference betv;een the youngest age group of leaders (30-39) and the oldest (60 years plus) is particularly apparent. This relationship appears in all specific value orientation areas except the activity area, where the youngest and oldest age groups are about equally "modern," and in the mantoman area, where leaders in the 3C~39 age group were slightly less modern than those in the 40-49 and 50-59 age groups. In order to illustrate in sununary fashion which social characteristics most influenced a preference for "modern" value orientations, an ideal type of "modern" leader has been constructed with those characteristics which were found to be closely associated with "modern" value orientations. Thus, the Medellin leader most likely to have a "modern" value profile was born in an urban area of Antioquia and directs a quasigovernmental agency

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220

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221 such as Las Emoresas Publicas (he is almost as likely to be manager of a commercial or industrial enterprise) . He has a university degree in law or engineering and has spent throe or m.ore years studying abroad. He is married and between 30 and 39 years of age. His father also had a university education and worked in the professions or as the manager of a large enterprise. In contrast to this, the ideal type of leader who is least likely to be "modern" in his value choices is a priest who was born in a rui"al area and educated in theology in Colombia. If not a priest, he is probably a m.an with no university studies. Priest or not, he is likely single, 60 years of age or more, and the son of a man with a primary school education who v/orked as the owner or meinager of a sm.all business enterprise. Studen ts The value profile for the 39 5 senior high school boys questioned in Medellin is presented in Table 13. A comparison of this table with the value orientation profile of Medellin leaders (p. 208) shows that this sample of younger generation Antioquenos is miuch like the older as far as their expression of value orientations is

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222 concerned. They too are "modern" in their orientations towards time and the natural environment but somewhat traditional regarding man-to-man relationships and and between the modern and traditional with regard to the type of activity they prefer. Hypothesis 6 (that the students would have a completely modern profile) is, like the first hypothesis, only partly substantiated by these data. Table 13 Value Profile of Sixth Year High School Students,* Medellin, 1967 Time Man-Nature Man-Man Activity Relationships Relationships Dominant Future Boing-inMastery of orientation Becoming Mature Collateral Secondary Present Doing orientahion Tertiary Past orientation Being Harmony with Nature Submission to Nature Lineal Individualism *N = 395 (all males) Table 14 provides a more specific comparison of students and leaders with data representing the average of

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223 <=t 0) r— i M .C ID CO € -i-) = o V CO _r; tJi -H n: s^ fO 0) >H rC -P (H (U re) H 2 G n3 CG 0) > o G H I — » G re! o ct; G 0) 5-1 > H G XJ 'T) 0) 2: P 0} 0)

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224 items in which "modern" value choices were made. Again the results for the two groups are similar although some differences are brought out by this type of analysis. Over all items, for example, leaders placed modern value orientations first (Test 2) more often than did students. Leaders also show up with a greater number of purely modern profile choices in the a ctivity area and with Mas tery-overNature ranked first on more rnan-nature items. All in all, leaders proved to be slightly more modern in their value orientation choices than did students, and this general finding seemingly refutes Hypothesis 7 which predicted the opposite. This result is perhaps not so surprising as it might seem once social class differences betv/een the two groups are considered. Class differences between leaders and students can be controlled to some extent by comparing the scores for leaders v;ith those of students from the Jorge Robledo Institute, a private school for boys from upper-class families and the top ranked school in our sample. Compared with students from other schools, Jorge Robledo students were, except in the man-nature area, the most modern in their reiipcises. The figures in TabJ.e 15 show

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225

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226 that Jorge Robledo students, on the average, made more modern choices than did leaders except in the man-natur e area and with respect to Test 1 in the activity area. Though it is almost irapossible to discriminate betv;een leaders in terms of their social class position, such a distinction can be made for the students and this possibility was in fact one of the principal reasons students were included in the study. Tabla IS presents the value choices of students by socioeconomic class as represented by the school which they attended. In general, upper-class studeiits at the Institute Jorge Robledo were the most modern in their responses, v/'nile lower-class students from the Escuela Parro<]uial do Bello were least modern, and this finding largely bears out the prediction made by Hypothesis 8. Hypothesis 9 (that the top private school students would be more mod^jru than students at the top public sc'aools) v/as also borne out, but to a lesser degree. It would appear that the higher the social class level, the more modern are the students' value orientations except for the fact that students at tlie lower-middle-class Gilberto Aizate Avendano school v/ere more modern in their choices than were students at

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227

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228
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229 the iTiiddle-class Liceo Antioqi.i.eno. If we coiriJDine student responses from the tv;o "best" schools , --the upper-class Jorge Robledo and middle-class Liceo Antioqueno---and compare them v;ith the combined responses of the lov;er-miiddle and lower-class schools, there appears to be little difference (see Table 17). Thus, even though upper-class students at the Institute Jorge Robledo were clearly more modern in their value choices than students from, the other schools, this alone is not enough evidence to confirm Hypothesis 10 chat the degree to which modern values are held varies directly with social class level. The background data collected provide other ways of separating the students into social classes (apart from; school of attendance) in order to test Hypothesis 10. Table 18 shows value choices by social class level of the neighborhood in v/hich the students lived. These results show that students living in upper-class neighborhoods v;ere , with the exception of the mannature area, the most modern in their responses. Thus, when neighborhood of residence is used as an index of social class position, upper-class students are still most m.odern in their value orientations, altliough students from the other end of the social class

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230 fit 0> c H c a; c (D rH w (D C o H -P fO -IJ c •H u o to o 4-1 c c I (U o (0 . CO r^ OJ (7, > M w E o Q c d) w 4J c a) 4J O : o ,c <; o CO ^

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231

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w 232 scale generally resemble them more in this respect than do students from the middle-classes, and Hypothesis 10 remains as unconfirmed. When the students' responses are examined by the type of occupation they attribute to their fathers, the same curious pattern emerges (see Table 19). Students hose fathers occupy high level positions vv'ere clearly the most modern in their choice of value orientations but students whose fathers were at the bottom of the occupational classification v;ore either close behind them or expressed the same degree of modernity as students with fathers in middle level occupations. In a final test for class differences, the students' answers were analyzed by father's education. In this case a somewhat different pattern was found. Those whose fathers had university studies were more modern i.n their value choices in most areas and this particular result is generally in line with previous differences, but on the basis of the figures in the preceeding two tables, one would also expect that students whose fathers had ended their studies in primary school would be m.ore modarn than these with high school educated fathers. In

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23:

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234 o ra c H c >< W O o +J t: (1) xi ;3 o o ru CO 01 •H u: i-i ra QJ >^ 4J VD W 0) E -H E-t O i (U cn (0 !^ > w M H nj C o H -p rtl -p c (U H u o 4J c c o G c S-l 0) c ^0 c a; w c o -H •p .-d +J c o H o (U 3 l-^ > M-l o vD 0> a; o G O H P fd u -( ^o w >1 4J a) o •H o c I C rd >v >1 -p •H > H 4J u E •H o H 4J u '0 H »-l 0) -P i; fc -P 0) -P W (1) (U

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235 this instance, however, the similarities between the polar class groups .does not emerge. A number of other background variables were used for the analysis of students' responses as part of the search for association and causation. Accordingly, the answers of those students who spent their early, formative years in urban places were compared with the responses of those v7ho had spent their early years in rural areas. The figures in Table 21 demonstrate that urban bred students were, on most items, more modern in their choices than those v;ho had been reared in the country. Extension of this line of analysis led to com.parisons of students by size of birthplac e and by whether reared in cities of over 100,000 population or not. There v/ere, hov/ever, no notable differences bstv/sen students when they v/ere grouped in these ways despite the differences found in the simple urban-rural comparison. At this point, let us sumjnarize this presentation v^ith a model of the "modern" Medellin student constructed from those social characteristics which were most closely associated with modern value orientations. Typically such a student v/ould be between 16 and 17 years of age,

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236

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237 attending cither the Institute Jorge Robledo or the Gilberto Alzats Avendano school and would live in an upperclass barrio . He would have been born and reared in an urban area. His father should be a professional man or involved in the management of a large company and he could likely ccunr. some years of university study. By way of contrast the student who would typically be least "modern" in his value orientations is between 20 and 23 years of age, in attendance at the Escuela Parroquial de Bello, and living in a lower-iaiddle-cl ass barrio. He v/as probably born in a municipio of betv/een 8,000 and 25,000 population but roared in a rural environment. His father v/ould be a clerical worker or the ownermanager of a sm.all enterprise with a limited education of some primary or high school studies. tlgJ-_?Ar:-JJ!!i-A^^"^ Popayan : A Comparison of Values in g Moder n a nd a Traditi ona 1_ _C i t^ A major purpose, perhaps the prim.ary one, of this investig;rLiori has been to ascertain insofar as possiole the relationship V;'2tween the expression of basic value crientaticns by led..iership groups and the degree of modernization (socioGCononLc development) of the environm.ent in v.'liich they operate. This has ber^-.n done with t];o belief that the

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23C extent of modernization achieved by a society and its people, as measured by various indices of socioeconomic development, is a concrete indicator of the values which predominate in that society's culture and in the minds of its people. More specifically, it has been proposed that certain combinations of values such as themodern set of value orientations delineated here will, if they are of primary importance in guiding the thoughts, feelings, and actions of leadership groups in a society, lead to the achievement of a high level of socioeconomic development such as that reached in this century by the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. In order to test this proposition, valu3 orientations held by leaders and students in two Colombian cities, considered to be polar opposites in terms of their development, have been compared. The results of this comparison, between the modern city of Medellin and the traditional city of Pcpayan, are presented in this section 2 A Look at Popayan Popayan is a city of approximately 80,000 inhabitants located 5,733 feet above sea level at the 2 The author wishes to express gratitude to J. Selwyn Hollingsworth, a collaborator in the research project, for his help in providing information in this section.

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239 southern end of the Ccraca Valley in southwestern Colombia. The Andes mountains come north out of Ecuador in a solid mass and split into two chains just to the south of Popayan. The climate at that altitude is exceedingly mild in spite of the fact that Popayan is only a little more than two degrees north of the equator. The mean annual temperature is about 6 5 degrees Fahrenheit and a daytime high of 74 degrees is considered hot (Crist, 1950; 131) . Popayan has been aptly and succinctly described as "a city which abounds in v/ell-preserved colonial architecture, which has a sense of pride in its history, and which appears to bask in the light of past accomplishments rather than to strive for future accomplishments" (Hollingsv/orth, 1970:39). Popayan reminded this writer of Charleston, South Carolina, and Natchez, Mississippi, in its overall arribience. A visitor rapidly com.es lo feel that Popayan is not only a traditional city but fully awaie of its traditions and proud of them. The slcv;, dignified, measured pace of life in Popayan standi in sharp contrast to the dyncimic hustle and bustle of Medell.in. Klion Mede] lln and Popayan were compared in termiof basic

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240 economic indices (sea Chapter IV) these contrasting impressions were verified and as a result, Popayan became for our research the traditional counterpart to modern Medellin. Popayan was founded by Sebastian de Belalcazar, a lieutenant of Pizzaro's, Belalcazar had marched northv/ard from Peru on a gold-hunting expedition and paused long enough to found Popayan on January 13, 1537, leaving Lorenzo de Aldana there as his governor while he continued north and then east to tlie savannah of Bogota. Several of the man in Belalcazar 's party led expeditions of their own directly northward into what is now Antioquia during tiiis initial exploratory period (1537-1545) and one of them, Jorge Roblcdo, discovered the present day site of Medellin in August of 1541 (see Chapter TI, p. 23) . However, there was no permanent v/hite colonization at Medellin until 1616, so Popayan predates Medellin as a settlement by 72 years and as a city of consequence by almost 250 years, since Popayir. rapidly became the political and economic center of western Colombia v;hiie Medellin remained a rude village until the 'oeginning of the nineteenth century.

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241 Around 1600 Popayan became the preferred place of residence for those Spaniards w!io had been successful in exploiting the mineral and agricultural resources of southv;estern Colombia. These men liked the silubrious climate to be found there as v/ell as the urban atmosphere v/hich developed as a consequence of its position as a political center of the Spanish crov/n. Sebastian (1964:13) reports that the more successful ranchers, farmers, and mine owners indulged themiselves in the construction of fine homes and churches all during the colonial period. A high school -A'as '.istablished in 1540, and Popayan became the cultural center of v;estern Colombia, as well as th/e political and economic focus of that vast region. Throughcat the latter years of the colonial era Popayan was looked upon as a "mother country in miniature" in which the feudal life style of southern Spain was reproduced (Crist, 1950: 132). In the early republican years (1810-1850) Popayan, even then a venerable monument to the past, retained its influence as a leading city while Medellin was just beginning to develop. In 1S27 the University cf the Cauca was founded and later attended by 15 cf Colombia's

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24 2 presidents. After 1850 Popayan began to lose its dominant position in western Colombia to Medellfn and Cali. According to the census of 1905, both of these latter cities had by that year bypassed Popayan in population — Medellfn and Cali with 53,936 and 30,740 inhabitants, respectively, to Popayan's 23,448. Traditional values and norms had become so well entrenched in Popayan that the area's aristocratic, languid, leisure-loving leadership was no match for the pragmatic, commercially oriented, and aggressive leaders of Medellfn. To make matters worse, in 1903 the province of which Popayan is capital was subdivided into several provinces, leaving Popayan with only 30,495 of the 537,280 square kilometers it had once controlled. The American traveler Henry Franck hiked through the area in 1915 and was not particularly impressed with the famous old city. Though it was barely eight in the evening, Popayan was as dead as a graveyard at midnight — and darker. If Popayan is dead by night, little more can be said for it by day. Languid shopkeeping is almost its only visible industry, and the population seems to live on what they sell one another [Franck, 1917:88] . Medellfn, on the other hand, had by that year become a modern city with a well-developed coiomsrco, burgeoning

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243 industry, and such amenities as movie theatres, a street cBir system, and an electric utility company that was aggressively promoting the use of electrical appliances. Moreover, there were in 1915 three business colleges operating in Mcdallxn to supply the growing demand for office personnel which the city's development had generated. V7ith the passing years these differences have become even more narked. V/hile Popayan continued to stagnate, Hedellin became the nation's first city in industrial development and second only to Bogota in population. Call during these same years also surged ahead as a ccirjnercial center and later in industry, to deprive Popayan of pre-eminance even in the reduced domain of the Cauca Valley. A variety' of reasons have been adv'anced by both foreigners and Colombians for the relative decline of Popayan in the postcolonial period. Some attribute the city's stagnation to the fact that the inland railroad from the Pacific was built to Call rather than Popayan. Others insist that the loss of its provincial territory in 1903 brought on Popayan' a decline. The American anthropologist, /Andrew Whiteford, v/ho did comparative case studios of

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244 Fopayan and Queretaro, Mexico, adds a social psychological effect to thijs loss of territory: As Popay^n . . • was divested of its richer lands, which became part of the wealth of new or neighboring states, its fortunes declined drastically. Its rich and fertile valleys became the state of Valle del Cauca; its mines, which once supported the aristocracy in a life of royal wealth, passed to the states of Narino and Antioquia, and even its mountainous southerly regions of unexplored but potential riches were turned over to the state of Huila. Popayan was left to rule a decimated state, small in size, and composed principally of rolling hills and unexplored mountains. The shock of loss, the feeling of impoverishment in both cases led to a paralysis, an inactivity, which deterred and impeded the full and active exploitation and development of those resources and potentialities which did remain. The result was stagnation. Throughout the major part of the first half of the present century both cities (Popayan and Queretaro) dreamed of their past, lamented their lost v/ealth and prestige, and estivated. Where they had once played important parts in the commerce between the regions to the north and south of them these roles declin-^d as nev; roads v;ere built and railroads passed them by. Increasingly they became isolated from their national capitals, and traffic with the outside '.v'orld dwindled at the very time when other cities were expanding their commerce and increasing their relationships vv/ith other regions and oth nations. Popayan was superseded by Cali as the principal city of southern Colombia . . . [Whiteford, 1964: 14] . Whiteford (1964:246-247) believes that the leaders of Popayan reacted to this loss of provincial territory by entering first into a catalepticlike state and then emerged from that with a backwardlooking reemphasis on

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245 tradition. Ke describes the city's ultimate response as one of " . . _. intensifying its traditionalism, immersing itself in poetry and history and deliberately turning its back upon the noise, the dirt, the disturbance--and the v/ealth — assvociated with progress" (Whiteford, 1964:247). Although political events undoubtedly have had some influence on Popayan's lack of development, the historical fact remains that Medellin and Call began modernizing at an accelerated rate before the construction of the Pacific railroad and Popayan's loss of territory. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that cultural and other sociopsychological factors play an important role here. The emphasis in Popayan on the leisurely gentlemanfarmer way of life, the disdain for progress as illustrated by efforts to keep out industry and retard com.munication v/ith the outside v;orld (Whiteford, 1964:13), and the pride in humanistic accomplishments of an aristocratic past lead one to susp-^ct that the values of the people are significant reasons for the relative lack of progress. A recent mayor of Popayan refers to this indirectly in his discussion of the city's problems when he talks about "the inertia of the centuries" and "the state of immobility

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24 6 of the people, their laclc of civic spirit on occasions, the fact of living only in their past glories, (and) of holding to their pastoral economy ..." (Caicedo, 1969) . Glynis Anthony (1968:167) reinforces this view when he says, "Even after independence was a v;ell established fact, Popayan remained a stronghold of conservatism and a living monument to the more attractive aspects of Colonialism." It goes almost without saying that an upper-class of leaders who possessed such traditional values and were so well served by the status quo v/ould be little interested in economic development or modernization. Those who were dissatisfied or held different values v;ould be encouraged to go elsev/here. As the reader v;ill recall fromChapter.il, p. 21, Hagen's application of the Thematic Apperception Test to leaders in Popayan revealed that they not only rejected notions of progress or striving but fatalistically disbelieved in their efficacy (Hagen, 1962:368-369). Medellin leaders, on the other hand, expressed optimism about their abilities ho solve problems, overcome obstacles, etc. Thus, it seems safe to suppose that as long as the leaders of Popayan find adherence to traditional values satisfying, Popayan will remain more or less as it is. To

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247 this writer, hov;ever, it appeared that younger leaders in that city were both dissatisfied with the general stagna/ tion and less interested in tradition. Middle-aged and older leaders seemed on the other hand to be content ^/ith the status quo. The traditional life stylo of these latter groups was made apparent to the interviewers by the casual v/ay they showed up late 'or not at all for appointments. As stated in Chapter II, this practice was in sharp contrast to that in Medellin. At any rate, from this foregoing sketch of Popayan and its people it should be logical to expect that the dominant value orientations of leaders and students there v/ould be the kind classified here as "traditional." Res ul ts of th e Intercity Comparison Hypothesis 11 predicts that Medellin leaders will express the modern ranking of value orientations more often (on more items) than will Popayan leaders. In Table 2 2 the two leadership gjroups are compared in this respect. The results from Test 1 for all 22 items shov; that the Medellin leader typically chose the complete modern value profiJ.e on one item more than did tlie typical

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248 rsi Eh u CO c fd o c to n 1—1 (U C •H W Xi (0 OJ CO E •H O 0) 4J c o Q o U T3 0) O 0> CM Ci 4J 0) w c o H .u c •H o (0 > o en C H c en cs; (0 > 0) CM 4-1 0) u •H o -p CO 0} rj c o +J h •H o +J ^, I c ro F<

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249 Popayan leader. However , Test 2 figures reveal that on the average both groups put a "modern" value orientation in first place on an equal number of items. A sim.ilar pattern prevails in specific value areas with the exception of the activity area, wliere Popaydn leaders were as modern as Medell.in leaders on Test 1 and significantly more modern on Test 2. Since Test 1 is considered the "hard" test or the more conservative of the two tests, it can be said that overall and in three of four specific value areas, Medellin leaders were more modern in their choice of value orientations. When the tv;o groups of leaders were compared by occupational sectors, it turned out that aside from the activity area and, in the case of commercial leaders, the time area, all occupational subgroups in Medellxn except church and university leaders were miore modern in their responses than their counterparts in Popayan. The church leaders of Popayan were particularly noticeable for the degree to which they made modern choices, scoring higher on Test 1 than any other sector of Popayan leaders. In Medellin, on the other hand, they were next to the bottom in this respect, scoring only slightly higher than university leaders.

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250 With regard to students, Hypothesis 12 predicted that Medellxn students would choose "modern" values and value profiles more frequently than would Popayan students. Table 23 provides the data necessary for a ccrparison between the tv;o groups. The figures constitute a clear refutation of Hypothesis 12. In every case--over all items and in each value ar3a--Popaydn students v;ere more modern than students in Medellin in their choice of value orientations. When student responses in both cities are classified by schools, it appears that in Medellin the relatively low scores from students at the big Liceo Antioqueno (189 of 39 5 students questioned) were the chief reason that Medellin students as a whole came across with fewer modern value choices. Responses at Popayan 's "middle class" high school, which is comparable with the Liceo Antioqueno vis-a-vis the socioeconomic status of its students, were much more modern.

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!51

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CHAPTER VI DISCUSSION Value Orientations in Medellin Leaders The first hypothesis predicted that the majority of Medellin leaders would hold a "modern" value profile like the one attributed to the North American middle class. Research shov;ed that the majority of leaders in fact expressed a "modern" ranking of values in tv;o of the four areas tested: they chose Future > Present > Past as their orientation towards time and ranked Mastery > Harmony > Submission in their orientation towards nature. But in their respective preferences for type of activity and mant oman relationships most loaders ranked Being-in-Becoming > Doing > Being and Collateral > Lineal > Individualistic rather than in the "modern" fashion of Doing > Being-inBecoming > Being and Individualistic > Collateral > Lineal. See page 20 7 for an illustration of this profile, 252

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253 From these findings one might say that the hypothetical prediction was "half right." Nevertheless, it was expected that the Medellin leaders v/ould be modern in their activity and personal relationship preferences just as they were in the way they evaluate time and their relationship with nature. The review of the literature on modernization and the "modern" personality clearly indicated that "Individualism" and "Doing" (achievement) were modern values and that the modern way of life was characterized by and even dem.anded individualistic social relations and active manipulation of the external environment. Kahl (1968:6), for example, characterized the high evaluation of individual responsibility as a modern value and in his research found that low integration with relatives and "Individualism" were part of a "syndrome of modernism" (1968:21). Hagen (1962:88-94) describes the "creative" personality as having a high need for autonomy and independence in making decisions. By way of contrast, the traditional, authoritarian personality is said by Hagen to be alm.ost totally dependent on traditional authority. In terms of man-to-man relationships this is like saying he has a "Lineal" value orientation. McClelland' s research

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254 demonstrated that men with a high need for achievement performed better on problems where individual effort was emphasized rather than team work (McClelland, 1961:45). In conjunction with McClelland, Winterbottom (1958:453478) found that a group of 29 boys who showed a high need for achievement had mothers who stressed self-reliance and self-mastery while the mothers of boys with a low need for achievement encouraged dependence. There are also results from other basic value studies to be reckoned with. These are more comparable because the same theoretical frame of reference and the same or a similar instrument v/ere used. Among Chilean workers and students (Sanchez, 1967:25-27), Japanese students (Caudill and Scarr, 1962:67), Texan and Morman farmers (Kluckhohn, 1961:264-268), and Italian-Americans in Boston (Scarr, 1970), the Individualistic orientation was found to predominate and the Lineal was ranked third. This is the modern profile one would expect to find among all of the above groups which, with the possible exception of the Chilean workers, live in modern subcultures and would likely be composed of individuals with modern personalities. It is especially curious that Chilean

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255 •;orkers v;ere not only more raodern than Medellin industrialists, etc., in the activity area, but proved to be modern all across tlie board, more so, in fact, than Chilean students. On the other hand, Scarr (19 70) also found that Irish-Americans in Boston (SE3 not specified) ranked the Collateral orientation first and the Individualistic one last. Thay v/ere in fact, surprisingly nonmodern in all but the time area. iMoreover, Albert Hirschman (1958:1419) insists that mutual trust and a high evaluation of "cooperation" are also modern. Antioquenos, it will be recalled, arc highly praised by other Colombians for the unusual amount of trust and cooperation they display, and this is often cited as a principal reason for their success in business. In the report on his case study of Antioquerio colonists at Tamesis, Havens (1966:175-176) state;3 that one of the most important factors in the colonists' success v/as their ability to develop effective voluntary groups v;here cooperation and trust prevailed. Perhaps, then, the historical emphasis on m.utual help among the Antioquenos would militate against predorainance of an Individualistic value orientation and in favor of

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256 the Collateral orientation which was their first preference. Yet there is also the popular notion in Colombia that the Antioquono works for another man only until he has enough to start his own business. This would indicate an Individualistic orientation. The possibility also exists that the emphasis on family situations in the man-to-man items caused many respondents to give last preference to the Individualistic alternative. Family bonds in Antioguia and all of Latin America are still strong enough that a Latin, who is individualistic in extraf amilial relations, may not be so within hi3 family. An instrument defect of this nature might have obscured the results. Of course, the aforementioned Chilean results cast some doubt on this possibility sinctB the same type of instrument was used in research there. Yet, even if this were true — that Medellfn leaders are Individualistic but outside the family setting— one would still have to fit this finding in with the statement by Inkeles and Smith (1966:353-377) that "autonomy in kinship matters" is one of the key personal qualities which makes an individual modern in his institutional relations.

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257 The preference sho'.vn for a Being-in-Becoming mode of activity might perhaps be due to the tendency of Latin cultures to idealize humanistic values and denigrate material achievement. Although the Antioqueno subculture is said by other Colciribians to be materialistic and profitoriented, there rem.ains the possibility that in this case lip service v/as paid to the broader ideals. It should also be pointed out that Chilean university students (but not workers) as well as the Irish and Italian-Americans in Boston preferred the Being-in-Becoming alternative. The fact that Chilean students ranked first whereas Chilean workers did not, led this writer to wonder if perhaps this alternative, with its implications for a v;ell-rounded life, might not appeal generally to the better educated. This line of reasoning was discarded, however, when a re-exa:iiination of the results for Medellin students revealed that lov/er-class students preferred Being-inBecoming to a greater degree than did middleand upperclass students. In any event, the Being-in-Becoming orientation is not classified here as a traditional one nor is it necessarily antim.odern, in the sense of being opposed to achievement or accomplishment, as the Being orientation is considered to be.

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258 One verifiable reason for the unexpected lack of modernity in the activity and man-to-man relational areas lies in the fact that nomnodern responses from certain kinds of leaders affected the total profile for the leaders as a whole. The more specific analysis of responses done for different categories of leaders revealed which kinds v/ero more modern than others in their value choices. One can see in Table 8 that respondents from the religious and academic occupational sectors made value choices which were significantly loss modern than those of other leaders in both the activity and man-to-man areas. It was partly because of their influence that scores for leaders as a 2 whoie were not as moderii as predicted. The churchmen were especially effective in lov/ering average scores, except in the time area. With respect to activity , they gave first preference to the modern alternative on only one out of six items, whereas the number of modern activity responses made by commercial and 2 Leaving out religious and university loaders had the effect of raising the leaders' scores on all 22 items from 6.80 to 7.16 (Test 1) and fromll.30 to 11.64 (Test 2) . Doing the same for the activity and m an-to-ma n items raised scores from 2.13 to 2.26 and 2.4 7 to 2.6 2 in the activity area and from 1.08 to 1.18 and 2.03 tc 2.16 in the mantqman area.

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259 quasigovernmentalleaders was notably above the group average. It was because of them that unmarried leaders as a group were so much less modern than were married leaders in. a ctivity and m an-to-ma n preferences. They were also responsible for the low average scores of universityeducated leaders (among whom the religious were included) O" the activity items. When the figures for university graduates were examined by field of education, it was learned to no one's surprise that those v;ith degrees in theology were significantly less modern than other graduates in all but the time area, where the church leaders exhibited an unusually strong Future orientation. This latter deviation was due possibly to the belief that man has a future not only in this life but in afterlife and should be planning ahead to attain for himself a proper role in the afterlife. That church leaders were in large part responsible for the low scores of the leadership sample in the activity and m an-to-man areas is perhaps not unusual if th.e hierarchy of the Roman Catholic church is indeed .as conservative and tradition-oriented as it is alleged to be. The ideology of the church certainly does not endorse

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260 individualism and -matGrial achievement. In fact, the church's very organization seems to indicate a Lineal value orientation. The question remains as to why academic leaders demonstrated a less-modern orientation than did other leaders. The reasons are not clear. At Jfirst glance it might seem that this result has something to do with the relatively passive life academicians tend to lead which, in conjunction with the emphasis in universities on abstract thinking and variety, would dispose them to prefer a humanistic orientation like Being-in-Becoming. Along these lines it is interesting to recall that McClelland (1961:259-271) found that leaders with entrepreneurial3 manager type positions had a liigher need to achieve than did leaders with so-called professional occupations. The relatively vague standards of excellence and less stringent competition in professional life might not require in a man an Individualistic or a Doing orientation to the same degree that commerce or industry does. But closer These positions are found primarily in commerce, industry, and, in our case, quasigovernmental entities which in Medeliin draw their directors and managers from industry.

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261 inspection of the respondents' background data showed that most of the academic leaders were, in this case, also businessmen so that this explanation is much less plausible. There are, no doubt, other background factors which were responsible but which the writer was unable to detect. Another datum worth discussing is that leaders with three or more years of exposure to a foreign university education were significantly more modern than those educated exclusively in Colombia. It is likely that men in the former category received an education which, both in content and as a process, was more rational and empirical than the university education typically acquired in Colombia, v/here a traditional humanism has been emphasized. This fact plus the extended experience of living in an atmosphere where empiricism and rational problemsolving are stressed probably account for the larger preference they displayed for miodern orientations towards time, nature , and human relationships. The prediction that leaders whose fathers had gone to a university would be more modern than those whose fathers had not was also borne out. Differences, however, were not, for most value areas, statistically significant.

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252 If v;s accept the b.voad assunpticn that these distinctions in paternal backgrounds represent a social class difference/ then it can be said that the above result corroborates the direct correlation between holding modern values and socioeconomic status that Kahl (1968:45) encountered. The correlation coefficient for Kahl's two variables v/as .58 in Brazil and .56 in Mexico. No such degree of correlation could be expected, of course, from the data presented here, and it is perhaps wrong to assume that a generation ago there was a social class difference in Medellin between those who had a university education and those who did not. Even though social class differences were hard to define, let alone detect, among the leaders, tliere did appear marked differences between age groups of leaders with respect to the value orientations they held. Generally, there v/as an inverse correlation between the degree of modernity in value expression and age, so that a real generation gap separated the youngest group of leaders, aged 30 to 39, from those 60 years and older. That younger leaders were significantly less traditional than older leaders is probably a function of the life

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263 cycle since men 60 years or older raost likely recognize the nearness of death and lose confidence both in the future and in their abilities to overcome natural obstacles. Before discussing the students' value orientations, a final comparison is in order between the findings of this research on value orientations toward nature and those of David McClelland. McClelland (1961:176) did not find an association between modernization and a belief in man's ability to master natural forces. He suggests, therefore, that the commonly held assumption that a self-confident, domineering orientation towards nature is a cultural prerequisite for great socioeconomic development may be a myth. He calls for evidence proving that it is not. One of the major findings presented here is that the majority of a representative sample of men closely involved with the modernization of Colombia's best-developed city did, in fact, express a belief in man's ability to domi.nate nature. Students There was the expectation, stated in Hypothesis 6, that the students as a group would also express a "modern"

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264 value orientationprofile. The gross results shov;ed, however, that they, like the leaders, were predominantly modern in their orientation towards time and nature but more traditional than modern in their human relational preferences and neither modern nor traditional in their first choice of the Being-in-Becoming mode of activity. Once again a major preposition proved \:o be "half right." There were differences, nonetheless, in the degree of attachm.ent to the various value orientations chosen. Over all items and especially in the ac tivity and m an-natur e areas, leaders show up with a greater number of modern choices, and so the expectation of Hypothesis 7 that the younger generation would be more modern than the older was not borne out. Some of the reasons for this reverse difference become apparent when the student data are broken down by subgroups. Because the students were deliberately selected from different social class levels, they are much more varied a group than are the leaders, and herein lies a primary reason for their lack of modernity relative to the loaders. Probably the most salient difference between leaders and students is the face that leaders, by virtue of their occupational

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26 5 positions, are all upper-class or upper-middle-class while most of the students come from lower-middle or lov/er-class backgrounds. Tlie data show that while upper-class students were actually more modern than the leaders (who could have been their fathers or grandfathers), students from niddle-class homes were significantly less so. Curiously, many lower-class students, especially in the Avendano school, proved to be almost as modern in their value choices as upper-class students and somev/hat more modern than the middle-class boys. This phenomenon refutes Hypothesis 10 that a direct relationship would appear betv;een the modernity of students' value orientations .and Lh.eir social class positipn. Nevertheless, the tendency of upper-class students from the Institute Jorge Robledo to be more modern than the leaders points to a minor generation gap which indicates that upper-class boys in Medellin are more modern in their outlook on life than their parents or grandparents. Whether or not this gap exists with respect to the middle and lower classes cannot be determ.ined here inasmuch as none of the adult leaders interviewed could honestly be placed at those class levels. If the difference is real, it can be said that Antioquenos

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266 are, in general, becoming increasingly "modern" in their value orientations. The question remains as to why the responses of students at nearly opposite ends of the social class structure were somewhat alike. It was of course expected that the sons of an active elite in a developing area v;ould be at least as modern as their fathers. They are the children of parents or grandparents who have made it to the top in a modernising society and ought to be convinced by their forefathers' success about tlie efficacy of a modern, selfconfident orientation. But what of the circumstances in the lives of lower-class boys? Lack of a verifiable answer leads the writer to speculate that the unexpected modernity of the lower-class students from the Avendano school may have been due to the possession, by many of those at the bottom v;ho have yet to try, of high aspirations coupled v/ith optimistic orientations for action. It is also possible that lower-class boys such as these, who make it through to the end of high school, are above average for their class in ambition, achievement drive and confidence. Why then were students from the middle-classes so much less modern in their value orientations? Again it is

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267 necessary to speculate that this may be due to the influence of parents who are or have been struggling to make a better life for themselves and their children and that such a struggle has brought inevitable setbacks and a lessening of self-confidence in one's ability to master circumstances. This particular finding certainly does not square with the prevalent idea that "middle-class" values are universally much involved with optim.ism, individualism, striving, and achievement. Perhaps in North America the modern-value orientation profile delineated here is the dominant value profile of the middle-class (or of middleclass adults) , but it was not predominant among middleclass boys in Hedellxn in 19 57. The Intercity Comparison Leader s In the conservative or "hard" analysis of Test 1 the value orientation profiles of Medellin leaders fit the United States middle-class model more closely than those of ^opayan leaders in all va''ue areas except the activity. On the less-demanding "soft" test, where only first choices were counted, the two groups of leaders were about eciual in the number of modern value orientations

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268 chosen. By rigorous standards then, Medellin leaders v;ere by and large more modern than their counterparts in Popayan. Nevertheless, the soft test and activity area findings do not enable us to say that Medellin leaders as a group were completely and unambiguously more modern, although the weight of evidence is in their favor. Rut because the v/eight is with the men from Medellin, the hypothesisj that they would hold modern value orientations more strongly than leaders from the traditional city of Popayan is tentatively accepted. If we are right, this means that there is a relationship between leaders having the values v;e have defined here as "modern" and the level of modernization reached by the society which they lead. When a sector-by-sector comparison is made between leaders in the two cities, the figures show that only the church and university leaders in Medellin scored lower than their opposites in Popayan. In the entrepreneurialmanagerial sectors of industry, coromerce, banking, and quasigovernment, the leadership of Medellin was clearly more modern. It was pointed out in Chapter VI that church officials in Popayan were above average in their choice of modern values while Medellin cluirchmen were well below.

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269 Eliminating the church leaders from both samples would probably increase the disparity between the two groups, making the Antioquenos even more modern relative to the Payaneses. There is no ready explanation this writer can offer for the curious differences between the two groups of church leaders. The Antioquenos are allegedly very traditional when it comes to their religion and this feeling was possibly reflected in its values of its keepers. On the other hand, the church leaders of Popay^n may have been more affected by the spirit of reform and change which is sweeping the church in Latin America, especially since they were confronted with the obvious backwardness of Popayan and its province. In any event, they appear to be the most potent force for modernization in Popayan. Finally the question should be considered as to v>7hy Popayan leaders v/ere , as a group, more modern on the activit y value items. It appears that once again church leaders in the two cities were largely responsible. This is a value orientational area in which Medellin church 4 Colombian term for residents of Popayan.

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270 officials scored particularly low while their opposite number in Popayan came through with above-average scores. Why there should be such an extreme difference in this particular area is not clear. Students . For the younger generation, the results were reversed. In this case, the comparison revealed a clear and unambiguous rejection of Hypothesis 12 in v;hich Medellfn students were expected to express a more modern value-orientational system than Popayan students. There were no exceptj.ons here--Popayan students scored higher on both the rigorous and the "soft" tests in every value area. Why were the students of Popayan closer to the North American model than either the leaders of their own city or students from a much more modern city? Answers are difficult to come by. Perhaps they, like the leading priests of their city, have become somewhat disenchanted with, and, self-conscious about, the relationship between Popayan 's traditionalism and its L-ackwardness . Whatever the reason for these results in Popayan, the youth of Medellin appear, on the face of it, to be rejecting so-called middle-class values as young people supposedly

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271 aro doing in modernizad, industrial countries throughout the world. Such a lack of emphasis on striving, future planning, and material achievement may in fact be "miodern" as far as this generation is concerned. There is also the possibility that in Medellin falsification of responses took place. There was at the Liceo Antioqueno, v-/here responses were surprisingly nonmodern, a certain amount of resentment of the investigators on the part of some students. Conversation v/ith several teachers revealed that many students believed that the researchers were CIA agents carrying out a psychological study iri order to more easily m.anipulate and exploit Colombians. Low scores at the Liceo Antioqueno were largely the reason that Medellin students as a whole scored lov.'er than Popayan students. At this stage, hov;evor, it would be very difficult to prove one way or another that a significantly large number of students did bias the results by falsifying responses. In short, intercity differences were found, some expected, others unexpected. It is interesting to note that sm.all geographic differences existed in Kahl ' s results in Brazil and iMexico (Kahl, 196S). Kahl found

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272 that locational differences (between cities, regions, rural or urban areas, countries) were less important than social class differences in determining values. Therefore, he would expect only minor value differences between Medellin and Popayan. Significant differences appeared, nonetheless, along with some of the class differences that Kahl encountered. On the basis of our results one could not say as Kahl would that the industrial or "modern" man has evolved to the same degree among the upper-classes of both developed and developing societies. Like Hagen, we find that there are still elites which are largely traditional in spite of outward appearances and that some are more modern than others.

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CHAPTER VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Fundamentally our study has been motivated by a desire to locate and measure certain values connected with the modernization process. This wish was prompted by curiosity and knowledge of two facts: (1) that the rate and degree of modernization has been highly uneven in the world, some societies progressing much further and faster than others; (2) explanations of these disparities which rely on economic causes or differences in climate, resources, etc., have not been satisfactory since there are nations with favorable economic circumstances and abundant resources which have failed to modernize as rapidly or extensively as nations less favored in these things. Concern and curiosity about these facts have, in the past i,wo decades, led to a seaich for other (social, cultural, and social-psychological) factors which influence modernization. 273

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274 It is not surprising that a complex process such as modernization is the result of a complex matrix of causes. Nevertheless, some of these interacting factors are probably more basic and more important than others. It is our belief that the cultural values men hold are basic in shaping and motivating their behavior so that certain kinds of values will result in definite behavior patterns. From this it is logical to conclude that modernization, being to a great extent a function of particular behavior patterns, is also a function of certain combinations of values. Tliis view is now widely accepted (see Chapter III) and is succinctly stated by Aval (1963:35) when he remarks that "... Changes in political and social institutions, or investments by foreigners, v/ill not, by themselves, bring about sustained economic development, unless the fundamental human values in the society are conducive to development." Given the truth of this belief our research has attempted to find out if certain basic value orientations, widely assum.ed to be behavioral guideposts for the "modern" personality, are in fact associated with modernization. The research design utilized did not permit us to investigate v;hether or not these value orientations are truly

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275 causes of the modernization process but it does permit an inquiry into vi^liether or not the two phenomena are really related somehow to one another. As such, this is an acceptable first step in any effort to determine causes. These particular values, derived from Florence Kluckhohn's theory of variations in value orientations, are considered basic because they orient the actions, thoughts, and feelings of a man in his basic relationships with nature and other men and with regard to the time and activity dimensions of his life (see introductory paragraphs of Chapter VI) . In order to test our beliefs about their importance in socioeconomic development, we have hypotliesized that the key decision-makers or leaders of societies or groups which are modernizing will express a preference for "modern" value orientations to the degree that the areas they coiitrol and manage have become modern. The regional variation of Colombia makes that country a good laboratory for testing these propositions as well as others about generational changes and social class !iiif f erences in values. Accordingly, samples of conOTunity leaders and senior high school students in three

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276 Colombian cities at different stages of development were interviewed and questioned in an effort to elicit their value orientations. It was naturally expected that leaders and students in the most modern city (Medellin) would hold "modern" value orientations to a greater degree than their ccuntorparts in the least modern, most traditional city (Popayan) . This dissertation compares leaders and students in the tv/o polar cities on the degree to which they approach the "modern" value-orientation model. The actual results shov;ed that leaders in Medellin and Popayan preferred a mixture of "modern" value orientations and other types which are neither modern nor traditional. In terms of their approach to time and the natural forces most leaders in both cities clearly expressed a first preference for the modern orientations of Future and Mastery-of-Nature. Yet, with regard to act ivity and mant o-man relationships they usually chose Being-in-Becoming and Collateral over the modern orientations of Doing and Individualism. These results .vore not expected in iMedellin since it was predicted that the leaders of Colombia's most modern and progressive city would be overv/helmingly modern in their value choices.

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277 Historically speaking, the /mtioqueno leadership has displayed (since the beginning of the nineteenth century) a dynamic pattern of behavior sirailar to that of North Araerican entrepreneurs. In comparison with Popayan leaders, hov-'ever, they did prove to be m.ore modern except on the items which dealt with activity preferences. Specifically, Medellin leaders usually made more "modern" choices in the "hard" or conservative analysis (Test 1) even though the differences were not great enough to differentiate them from Popayan leaders in the gross profile results. Why were the Medellin leaders less modern than expected? A more detailed analysis of their responses revealed that leaders sampled from the religious sector had demonstrated a stronger than average preference for the Being-in-Becoming orientation and due to their influence the leadership group as a whole appeared to prefer that activity orientation more strongly than many key subgroups of leaders actually did. Industrial and coirunercial leaders, for exaiT\ple, displayed the expected preference for the Doing alternative. In addition, this v.-riter. suspects that the v/ording of the Beingin-Becoming alternative in the several items might have made it seem

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278 so attractive as to bias the respondents' choices. In other words, many respondents who were in fact not predominantly oriented to that activity may have chosen it first because the wording made it seem as if they should be. Leaders in the religious and university sectors also showed an above-average preference for the collateral orientation in their man -man relation shijjs^. This result partially explains the general rejection of the Individualistic alternative in that area. Yet, none of the Medellin leaders was as modern in this area as expected. We can only speculate as to why this occurred. It may have been due to the oft-remarked but un-Latin disposition of the typical Antioqueno to cooperate and work with his fellows for a common cause. Such a propensity may have made the Individualistic alternatives seem egotistical and selfish. Moreover, many of the m an--to-man relationship items used exam.ples of personal relationships within family groups and the relatively strong famdlial ties of the Antioquenos are v;oll known. This factor also would have biased respondents against the Individualistic alternatives and in favor of the Collateral ones.

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279 Students in Medellln followed the general pattern of the older generation (predominantly modern choices in the time and man-nature areas while Being-in-Becoming and Collateral orientations were preferred in the activity and man-man rel ationship areas). Yet, to our surprise they were less modern than were the leaders on m.any items, especially in the man-nature and activity areas. To some extent this was due to responses from one particular school, which was predominantly attended by boys with middle-class backgrounds. A noticeable amount of hostility v/as encountered there and the possibility exists that some of the responses v/ere deliberately falsified. Students from the upper-class high school v;ere, as predicted, the most modern. Students in Popaydn were, to our surprise, more modern than the Medellin students in all four value areas. This unexpected situation was the reverse of that for the leaders. Vlhy were the students of traditional Popayan more modern in their expression of value orientations? It m.ay be the case that the Medellin students, whose city is much larger and less isolated than Popayan, and who, by and large, are the beneficiaries of a greater prosperity, had

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280 been more directly and strongly influenced by the new youth subculture of Western countries on achievement. An industrialist in Medellin told this writer that a 1966 survey of aspirations of high school students there had revealed a surprising lack of interest in business careers, in contrast to previous surveys. If this be true, the Medellin students could still, in a sense, be considered more "modern." As mentioned previously, this writer has speculated on the possibilities that the Being-in-Becoming orientations in the activity items are phrased too attractively and that the en famille situations of several human relational items are not truly cross-cultural; that is, they measure family relationships rather than human relations in general. If such proves to be the case, these items need to be reworked into more valid measurements. If, however, the instrument as used is valid, there are several things which may be happening. First of all, we should remember that the leaders of Medellin did express modern value orientations to a greater extent than did Popayan leaders. We can tentatively conclude, therefore, that the more modern or better developed the

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281 city, the more modern are the value orientations of its managerial class. Since these results were somewhat air.birjuous, this particular finding and conclusion need to be tested further, in a variety of settings with clear-cut differences in levels of modernization. It may also be that leaders in both cities have been evolving toward modern value orientations through the years and that the rate of change in some value areas is greater than others just as the rate has been faster overall in Medellin than in Popayan. For example, it may have been easier for Colombians to adopt a modern Mastery orientation towards nature than an Individualistic orientation in working relations. In tliis case we would conciade that the lack of congruency or "fit" in the holding of dom.inant value orientations reflects a process of cul^T.ural change which is preceding or accompanying the modernization process. Kahl (1968:22) found that individuals in Mexico, Brazil, and the United States could be modern on some values and remain traditional on others. On the other hand, we might possibly have caught (especially among Medellin students) a reverse process of change: an evolution away from modern orientations in

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282 these areas toward new ones neither traditiona] nor modern. Being-in-Becoming may represent a new "modern" value orientation for V/estern cultures. Taking another tack, it may be that value orientations such as Individualism are not necessarily, as they are assumed to be, connected with the modernization process. Even so, our findings make it appear that Mastery of Nature, Future, and probably Doing are in reality associated with modernization to some extent--we unfortunately could not determine, as mentioned earlier, the degree of association or whether these values are truly prior and causal factors. Finally, a higher level possibility must be considered: that values per se are not as important in determining behavior, and ergo such social processes as modernization, as we think they are. Perhaps people do work from immediate needs, external pressures, or impulses rather than being motivated by the abstract goals, ideals, or values which they express. Still, I would conclude that we have established a weak but real association

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283 between modernization and Florence Kluckhon's values. The foregoing doubts are perhaps a roundabout way of saying. "ip.ore research is needed."

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APPENDIX I ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE VALUE ORIENTATION INSTRUMENT 1. Help for Family relational A man has had financial trouble of some kind and must seek help in order that he and his family can get through a difficult period. Here are three ways of getting help about which we wish your judgment. (Collateral) Would it be best if he depended mainly on his brothers and sisters or on some close group of relatives and friends to help him out as much as each can? (Individual) Would it be best for him to try to raise the money by himself, on his own, from an outside organization which deals with such problems? (Lineal) Would it be best for him to go to a recognized leader--a respected person of experience and authority in the family or community--and ask him for help and advice in handling the problem? 2. Ideal Job activity Three young married men were ^alking about their notions of the ideal job. Here is what each one said: (Being) The first said: The kind of job I would like best to have if I could is one which is not too demanding of my time and 284

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2$5 energy. I like to have time to enjoy myself and don't v;ant a job which makes me feel I m.ust always be competing. (Doing) The second said: Ideally, I would like a competitive job--one which lets m.e show what I can accomplish in a line of work for which I am suited. (Being-inThe third said: Ideally, I would like the Becoming) kind of job which 'would let me develop different kinds of interests and talents. I would rather have an understanding of life and people than be successful in one particular field. 3. Bringing up Children time Some people were talking one day about the ways in which young children should be brought up. Here are three different ideas which were expressed. (Past) Some people said that young children should always be brought up according to the traditions of the past-~the time-proven ways of doing things. They believe that the traditional ways are best, and that v;hen forgotten or not follovs?ed things go wrong. (Present) Some people say that young children should be reared in the traditional ways, but that it is wrong to follow them exclusively. These people believe that it is best when each new generation adjusts to any situation by adopting whatever now ideas and methods may help them, but keeping whatever of the old they like--that is, they think it just depends on the situation. (Future) Some other people don't place much faith in bringing up young children in the

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286 traditional v;ays--which they think are interesting only as stories about what used to be. These people think it best if their children are brought up so as to make them able to have new ideas and discover new and better ways of living. 4. Length of Life man-nature Three men were talking about whether people themselves can do anything to make the lives of men and v;omen longer. Here is what each said: (Over) One said: It is already true that people like doctors and others are finding the way to add many years to the lives of most men by discovering new medicines, studying foods and doing other things such as vaccinations. If people will pay attention to all these new things they will almost always live longer. (Subjugation) The second said: I really do not believe that there is much human beings themselves can do to make the lives of men and women longer. It is my belief that every person has a set time to live and when that time comes it just comes. (With) The third said: I believe that there is a plan of life which works to keep all living things moving together, and if a man will learn to live his whole life in accord with that plan he will live longer than other men. 5. Expect in Life time People often have very different ideas about what has gone before and v;hat we can expect in life. Here are three ways of thinking about these things.

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287 (Present) Soine people believe that man's greatest concern should be with the present time in which he lives. They say that the past has gone and the future is too far away and too uncertain to be of concern. It is only the present which is real. (Past) Some people think that the ways of the past (ways of the old people or traditional ways) were the most right and the best, and as changes come things get worse. These people think the best way to live is to keep up the old ways and try to bring them back when they are lost. (Future) Some people believe that it is almost always the ways of the future-"tbe ways which are still to come — which v;ill be best and they say that even though there are sometimes small setbacks, change brings improvements in the long run. These people think the best way to live is to look a long time ahead, work hard and give up many tilings now so that the future will be better. G. Technological Change man-nature Tliree persons were talking one day about tlie changes which science has brought about in the way people live. They mentioned all such things as changes in farming methods, in transportation, in the field of medicine, in types of food and housing. All agreed some changes had come but each of them had quite different ideas about what the long run effects v;ould be. Here is what each one said: (Subjugation) The first one said: It is good that such advances have been made, but in the long run one has to be lucky to have things go right in life. Science can help a lot v/ith some kinds of things people come up against, but it will never be able bo help much v/ith the really big things in life.

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288 There are many things which just come to pass and everyone, i f he is smart, will learn to accept this fact. (Over) The second one said: I don't agree v/ith you. My view is that man can and must learn to control the forces of nature. We have already gone a very long way and it is my belief that in time there will be scientific ways to control or overcome most things. (V,'ith) The third one said: Perhaps you both have something to say, but in my opinion what matters most is that people learn to keep the balance between themselves and the forces of nature. It is my belief that human beings and the great forces of nature are all one whole-that is, related parts of a total universe, and we can expect the most \;hen we work to fit in , with and live with nature. 7. Children's Character act i vity Three parents were talking about the kind of cliaracter they wanted their young children to have. Here are three different opinions that v.'ere expressed. (3eing-inOne parent said: I want my children to learn becoming) to be creative in a number of ways. I hope they develop an interest and ability in following the various paths which lead to understanding and wisdom. (Being) A second parent said: I want my children to grow up able to express themselves freely, to get a kick out of life in whatever situation they find themselves. (Doing) A third parent said: I want my children to have the drive to make something of themselves, the ambition to "get up and go."

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289 That v/ay they'll be successful and achieve something in their chosen path. 8. Appeal of Religion activity Three people v/ere talking about what it is about religion that appeals to them. Here is what each said: (Being-inReligion appeals to me because the wisdom in Becoming) its teachings broadens me and helps ma to understand better the manysidedness of life. (Being) The second said: Religion appeals to m.e because I enjoy the beauty and drama of it, and I like the feelings which corae from participating in the services. (Doing) I think religion appeals to me because it teaches people that accom.pl ishing things = for themselves and society is the right way. 9. Job Decision time Three young unmarried men had finished their schooling and had to decide what kind of v/ork they wished to go into. (Past) One decided to go into the kind of occupation which others in his family before him had followed. He believed the best way is to hold and strengthen the traditions of the past. (Future) The second sought for the kind of work opportunities which offered considerable chance for future success. He believed it best to look to new developments in the future, even though he might have to start off *in a position less good than ethers available at the time.

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290 (Present) The third decided to take the best job which came his way and which gave him the money he needed to get along in the present time. He believed it foolish to think much about either the past which has gone by, or the future v/hich he thought too uncertain to count on. 10. Inheritance relational When a father or mother dies and leaves property, there are different ways in which the property can be distributed among the children and managed by them. Here are three ways: (Lineal) m some places it is thought best that the ownership, or if not the ownership at least the management, of all the property be put into the hands of one selected person — usually the eldest son. (Collateral) In other places the sons and daughters all share in the property but all are expected to stick together and manage things as a family group. If some one person is ever needed to make certain decisions, all the heirs will discuss the matter and come to an agreement as to the one best suited to do so. (Individual) In still other places it is thought best that each son and daughter take his or her own share of the property and manage it on his own, independent of the other brothers or sisters. 11. Philosophy of Life m.an-nature Three people were talking about the need for having some philosophy of life— such as religion. They had different ideas on the subject:

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291 (With) One said: Han is part of the grand plan of nature. Having a philosophy of life helps me to understand this plan and to live in the ways to keep myself in tune with that total plan. (Subjugation) The second one said: As I see it, there are many natural and supernatural forces over v/hich man v;ill never gain control. A philosophy of life is necessary to help men accept and adjust to their fate on this earth. (Over) The third said: I'm afraid I don't agree with either of you. I think man can do as much or as little as he wishes to overcome these natural and supernatural forces. For me a philosophy of life is necessary to teach men how to rise above these forces and shape their ov/n destiny. 12. Teaching Young relational Three mothers from different kinds of families v/ere talking about the ways in which children should be taught. Here is what each one said: (Individual) The first mother said: I believe children should be taught, when still quite young, to sLand on their own two feet, to make their own decisions, and to take responsibility for themselves. People get along best when they can make their ov/n mistakes and profit from them, and when they learn hov/ to be independent enough of their families to go off on their own--sometimes even at great distances. (Lineal) The second said: I believe that young children should be trained first to obey and respect their elders--their parents and grandparents. It is the elders of the family v;ho have the greatest wisdom and

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292 people get along best when they are trained to accept and respect this wisdom. (Collateral) The third said: I believe that young children should be taught to respect and keep ties with their close relatives— father, mother, sisters, brothers, etc. People get along best when they have a large group of close relatives upon whom they can always depend for help and advice, and whom they, too, can help. 13. Religious Ceremonies time Some people in a community like your own saw that the church services (religious ceremonies) v.'ere changing from what they used to be. (Future) Some people were really pleased because of the changes in religious ceremonies. They felt that nev; v;ays are usually better than old ones, and they like to keep everything — even ceremonies--moving ahead. (Past) Some people felt that in changing the ceremonies much of the old tradition would be lost and that the church would not have the same meaning any more. (Present) Some people felt the old v/ays for religious ceremonies might be best but you just can't hang onto them. It makes life easier just to accept some changes as they come along. 14. High School Students man-nature Some Iiigh school students were discussing which of the books they were reading and studying in their various courses they really liked most.

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293 (Over) One said: The books I like most show me how other people have conquered their problems. I like the picture of mankind over the centuries struggling with all kinds of situations and so'aehow always m.anaging to come out on top. (With) The second said: I like best those books which tell of the v/ays in which men have learned to understand the great forces of nature and so adjust to them that man and nature are always seen as a whole in which each completes the other. (Subjugation) The third said: I think the really great books are those whose characters show that they have learned to accept the fact that man is and al'^^7ays will be powerless to change the forces v.'hich are outside and beyond him. 15. Not Working activity Three men were talking one day about the ways in which they liked to spend time when they v/ere not working. Each had a different idea: (Being) One man said that he had no definite ideas as to v;hat he liked best to do when not working. Sometim.es he did one thing, sometimes another--it just depended upon how he felt that day. (Being-inAnother said that he preferred to do things Becoming) which would help him become a better, broader man. Sometimes he did physical things to build his body strength, sometimes mental things so t:hat he might learn more. This, he said, was the best way. (Doing) The third said he liked doj.ng thirigs that he could see results f rom.--playing competitive games or building things; He felt

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294 that extra time was wasted unless one could show something for it. 15. Church Organization relational Some people were speaking about the way in which the churches they belonged to were organized and what this organization meant to them in leading their daily lives. Here are three opinions that v.-ere expressed: (Collateral) The first one said: In my church all are made to feel a part of a great brotherhood which is held together by many common bonds. VZhat it teaches us is that people must act together in unison and provide a brotherly kind of support and guidance . (Individual) The second one said: In my church there is, of course, a minister and other officials but they do not offer guidance unless called upon. I like my kind of church because each person is made to feel that the relationship between God and man is an individual one and one must learn to take responsibility for his ov/n acts. (Lineal) The third one said: My church is different still. In it there is a long tradition of a clergy which has special powers and training for the guidance of people. In much of my life I do not feel myself adequate to decide alone wliat is best to do and I am happy to depend upon them for guidance and direction. 17. Need for Education activity Today there is, in almost every place in the world, talk about the need for education. But people have different ideas about the kind and amount of education

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295 that is desirable.. Here are three ideas expressed by thres different men: (Doing) One man said: A good educational system is necessary so that people will learn well the skills and knowledge which will help them to become efficient and successful in whatever they undertake. (Being) The second man said: I feel that going to school many years and being well-trained is fine for some people but certainly not for everyone. I for one believe it is m.uch more important to do the things I feel like doing and to really enjoy life as I go along. (Being-inThe third man said: I don't agree with Becoming) either of you. I think a fine and long education is important, but it should be used to make each man v/iser and deeper. In this way, a person can develop more fully his knowledge of himself and mankind. . . . 18. Natural Forces m annature People often v\'orx-y about such disasters as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and the like. One day several persons were discussing the power of God in relation both to man and to the natural forces which create these great events. Here is what each one said: (With) One man said: It is my viev/ that there should be a harmonious "oneness" or wholeness among God, the forces of nature, and living creatures. It is v/hon men do not live in the proper ways to maintain (keep) this harmony that such disasters come. (Over) The second man said: I do not believe that God uses his power directly to control the forces which bring earthquakes, floods.

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296 and the like. It is up to man himself to try to find out why such things happen and develop the ways of controlling and overcoming them. (Subjugation) The third man said: I do not think the ways in v;hich God uses his power to control the forces of nature can be known by man, and it is useless for people to think they can really conquer such things as earthquakes, floods and hurricanes. The best way is to accept things as they come and do the best you can. 19. Disaster in Family man-nature A man and his family were struck hard by disaster. There was much illness over a long period of time. Also, the father lost his job and had serious financial problems. Some people were discussing the man's problems and the reason for them., (Subjugation) One person said: You can't really blame any man when such misfortune comes to him. Things like this just happen and there isn't much people themselves can do about it. One must learn to accept the bad along with the good. (With) A second person said: Misfortunes of this kind happen when people do not follow the right and proper ways of living. When people live in ways to keep themselves in harmony with the great natural forces of life things almost always go well. (Over) A third person said: It was probably the man's own fault. Ke should have taken steps to keep things from going so far v/rong . If people use their heads they usually can find ways to overcome a great deal of their bad fortune.

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297 20. Expectations about Change time (a: Students) Three young people were talking about what they thought their families v;ould have one day as compared with their fathers and mothers. They each said different things. (Future) The first said: I expect my family to be better off in the future than the family of my father and mother or relatives if we work hard and plan right. Things in this country usually get better for people who really try. (Present) The second one said: I don't know whether my family will be better off, the sarae, or worse off than the family of my father and mother or relatives. Things alv/ays go up and down even if people do v;ork hard. So one can never really tell how things will be. (Past) The third one said: I expect my family to be about the same as the family of my father and mother or relatives. The best way is to work hard and plan ways to keep lip things as they have been in the past. (b: Leaders) Three older people were talking about what they thought their children would have when they were grown. Here is what each one said: (Future) One said: I really expect ray children to have more than I have had if they work hard and plan right. There are always good chances for people v/ho try. (Present) The second one said: I don't know whether my children v/ill be better off, v.-orse off.

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298 or just the same. Things always go up and down even if one works hard, so v.-e can't really tell. (Past) The third one said: I expect my children to have just about the same as I have had or bring things back as they once v/ere. It is their job to work hard and find v/ays to keep things going as they have been in the past. 21. Ways to Live activity There v;era three people talking about the way they liked to live. They liad different ideas: (Being) One said: What I care most about is to be free to do whatever I '.•;ish and whatever suits the way I feel. I don't alv;ays get much done but I enjoy life as I go along-that is the best wav. .15 (Doing) A second said: What I care most about i: accomplishing things--getting them done just as well or better than other people can do them. I ] ike to see results and think that they're worth working for. (Being-inThe third said: What I care most about is Becoming) thinking and acting in the ways which will develop many different sides of my nature. I may fail to do as v/ell as others in the things which many people think are important, but if I am becoming a wiser and more understanding person, that is 'vhat suits me best. 22. Team Sports relat ional V7e all know there are different kinds of sports and v/ays of organizing them. These three people all liked team

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299 sports (for example, football, baseball, hockey, basketball) but had different ideas about the type they felt v;as best. (Individual) The first said: I like the kind of team sports \vhich are organized in such a way that the individual is allowed to prove himself as an individual and get credit for it. (Lineal) The second said: I like the kind of team sports where there is a definite leadership and organization and v;here everybody knov;s just where he fits in. (Collateral) The third said: I like the kind of team sports where there is organization enough to keep things going, but where the main thing is that I can pull together with a bunch of people like myself.

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JiPPENDIX II SPANISH-LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE VALUE ORIENTATIONS INSTRUMENT 1. Ayuda a la familia Un hombre ha tenido varies problemas financieros y debe buscar ayuda para que el y su farailia puedan atravesar sste periodo dificil. He aqui tres maneras de conseguir dicha ayuda sobro las cuales deseamos su juicio: A. Seria r.ejor si buscara el apoyo de sus hermanos y hermanas o de un grupo cercano de familiares y amigos para que le ayuden a la medida de cado uno? B. Seria mejor si tratara de conseguir el dinaro por SI mismo, independientemente, pidiendolo a una organizacion especializada que trata de estos asuntos? C. Seria mejor si buscara un lider reconcido, una persona prominente y respetada con experiencia y autoridad de su familia o la comunidad y le pide ayuda y consejo para resolver su problema? 2. El trabajo ideal Tres jovenes casados hablaban sobre sus ideas del trabajo ideal. He aqui lo que cada uno dijo; A. Dijo el primero de ellos: El tipo de trabajo que ra
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301 quisiera un trabajo en el cual siento que debo constantemente estar compitiendo con otros. B. Dijo el segundo de ellos: Idealmente me gustaria el trabajo en que se compite con otros, en el cual puedo demostrar lo que soy capaz de lograr, en la clase de trabajo para la cual soy apto. C. Dijo el tercero: Idealmente me gustaria la clase de trabajo que me perraita desarrollar diferentes tipos de intereses y de talentos. Preferiria poder llegar a comprender la vida y la gente, que tener exito en un campo especifico de actividad. 3. Crianza de los ninos Varias personas conversaban un dfa sobre las maneras corao deben criarse los ninos. Se expresaron estas tres ideas distintas: A. Algunas personas dijeron que a Ics ninos se les deberia criar siguiendo las tradiciones del pasado, o sea la forma de hacer las cosas que ha ensenado la experiencia. Creen que las formas tradicionales son las mejores y que cuando se olvidan o no se aplican las cosas andan mal. B. Otras dijeron que a los niiios se les debe criar siguiendo las formas tradicionales, pero que es equivocado insistir adherirse a ellas exclusivamente. Estas personas creen queesmejor cuando cada generacidn se adapta a cualquier situacion adoptando cualesquiera nuevas ideas y m.dtodos que les ayuden pero manlreniendo aquellas tradiciones que les gustan. Es decir, piensan que depende de la situacion que se presente. C. Otras personas no dan mucha fe en criar a los nines siguiendo las maneras tradicionales, las

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302 cuales consideran 30I0 como interesantes historias dc como sucedian las cosas. Estas person.as creen que la major manera es criar a sus ninos para que tengan nuevas ideas y descubran maneras de vivir nuevas y mejores. 4. Duracion de la vida Tres hombres hablaban sobre si la gente puede por SI misma hacer algo para prolongar la vida del hombre. He aqui lo que dijo cada uno: A. Uno de ellos dijo: Ya es cierto que gente como los medicos y otras personas estan encontrando maneras para auraentar muchos anos en la vida de la mayorfa de los hombres a traves del descubrimiento de nuevas medicinas, de estudiar los alimentos y de hacer otras cosas tales como la vacunacion. Si la genbe pone empeno en todas estas nuevas cosas casi siempre se prolongara su vida. B. El segundo dijo: Realmente no creo que los seres humanos puedan hacer mucho ellos mismos para prolongar la vida del hombre. Creo que cada persona tiene un tiempo determinado de vida y cuando le llega el momento pues le llega. C. El tercero dijo: Creo que la vida tiene un plan que opera para mantener todas las cosas disenvolviendose juntas, y si un hombre aprende a vivir toda su vida de acuerdo con dicho plan vivira raas tiempo que otros. 5. Que se espera de la vida A menudo la gente tiene muy distintas ideas sobre lo que ha sucedido antes y sobre lo que podemos osperar de la vida. Ke aqui tres maneras de pensar sobre estas cosas .

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303 A. Aiguna gente crce que la principal preocupacion del hombre debe ser el presente en el cual vive. Esta gente dice que el pasado ya paso y que el future esta demasiado lejos y es demasiado incierto para preocuparse. Solamente el presente es real. B. Aiguna gente piensa que las maneras del pasado (las maneras de los viejos y costumbres tradicionales) eran las mas apropiadas y las mejores, y que a medida que sobrevienen cambios las cosas se ponen peor. Cstas personas piensan que la mejor manera da vivir es raantener las maneras antiguas y tratar de revivirlas cuando se pierden. C. Algunas personas creen que casi siempre las maneras del futuro--las que han de venir--seran las mejores y dicen que aunque algunas veces hay pequenos retrocesos, el cambio trae mejoras a la larga. Estas personas piensan que la mejor manera de vivir es mirar hacia muy adelante, trabajar fuerte y sacrificar muchas cosas ahora para que el future sea mejor. 6. Cambios tecnologicos Tres personas hablaban un dia sobre los cairJjios que la ciencia ha traido en la forma de vivir. Nom}:;raron tales cosas como camloios en los nebodos de labrar la tierra, en al transporte, en el campo de la medicina, en tipos de comida y vivienda. Todas estuvieron da acuerdo en que sx habian sucedido algunos cambios pero cada persona tenia ideas bastante distintas de cuales serian los efectos de alios a la larga. He aqui lo que dijo cada una: A. La primera dijo: Esta bian que se hayan logrado estos adelantos, pero a la larga uno tiene que tener suerte para que las cosas le marchon bien en la vida. La ciencia puede ayudar bastante en relacion con algunas de las cosas con las cuales debe onfrentarse la gente, pero no podra nunca ser de gran ayuda respecto

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304 a los problemas realmente importantes de la vida. Hay muchas cosas que simplemente suceden y cada uno, si es sabio, aprendera a aceptar este hecho. B. Dijo la segunda: No estoy de acuerdo contigo. Mi punto de vista es que el hombre puede y debe aprender a controlar las fuerzas de la naturaleza. Ya hemos avanzado muchisimo y creo que con el tiempo vondran metodos cientificos para controlar o sobreponerse a lamayoria de las cosas. C. Dijo la tercera: Tal vez amJ^os tengan algo que decir, pero en mi opinion lo mas importante es que la gente aprenda a m.antenerse en equilibrio con las fuerzas de la naturaleza. Creo que los seres humanos y las grandes fuerzas de la naturaleza son un todo, o sea partes relacionadas del universe total, y podemos esperar lo mejor cuando nos esforzamos en armonizar y vivir. con la naturaleza. 7. Caracter de los ninos Tres padres conversaban sobre el tipo de caracter que ellos deseaban para sus ninos. He aqui las tres opiniones diferentes que se expresaron: A. Un padre dijo: De&eo que mis hijos aprendan a ser creativos de varias maneras. Espero que desarrollen el interes y la habilidad para seguir los distintos caminos qua llevan a la comprension y a la sabiduria. B. El segundo dijo: Deseo que mis hijos crezcan con la ca£;acidad de expresarse libremente, de sentir el goce de la vida en cualquier situacion en que se encuentren. C. El tercero dijo: Deseo que mis hijos tengan el empuje hacer algo de si mismos. La anibicion

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30 5 para ser de arranque. De esta raanera tendran exito y realizaran algo en el camino que esco Jan. 8. El llamado de la religion Tres personas conversaban sobre que les atraia de la religion. He aqui lo que dijo cada una: A. Dijo la primera: La religion me atrae porque la-sabiduria de sus ensenanzas amplia mis horizontes y me ayuda a coraprender mejor los muchos aspectos de la vida. B. La segunda dijo: A mi me atrae la religion porque me complace su belle?:a y draraatism.o, y m.e gusta la sensacion que resulta de participar en los services religiosos. C. Dijo la tercera: Creo que la religion me atrae porque ensena a las personas que realizer cosas para ellas mismas y para la sociedad es lo apropiado. 9. Decisicr. sobre el empleo Tres jovenes solteros habian terminado sus estudios y debidn decidir en que tipo de trabajo deseaban entrar. A. Uno decidio seguir el tipo de ocupacion que personas de su familia antes que el habian seguido. El creia que lo nejor es mantener y reforzar las tradiciones del pasado. B. El segundo busco aquellas oportunidades de trabajo que ofrecian posibilidades considerables para el exito future. Creia que era mejor mirar hacia las posibilidades de avance en el future, aun si tenia que empezar en una posicion menos buena que otras disponsibles entonces .

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306 El tei^cero decidio tomar el mejor einpleo quo se le ofrecio y el cual le daria el dinero que nccositaba para sostenerse en el prcscnte. El creia que era tonto pensar demasiado o en el pasado que ya paso, o en el futuro que pensaba demasiado incierto para tomar en cuenta. 10. Herencia Cuando al padre o la madre muere y deja propiedades, hay varias maneras mediante las cualos se pueden repartir las propiedades entre los hijos y administrarlas . He aqui tres m>aneras: A. En algunas partes se piensa que la mejor forma es que las propiedades, o si no la propiedad por lo menos el mane jo de todas ellas, debe quedar en manos do una persona especifica/ generalmente el hijo mayor. B. En otras partes todos los hijos com.parten la propiedad poro se espera que todos se maatengan unidos y las manejen como un grupo familiar. Si alguna vez se necesita a alguien para tomar ciertas decisiones codes los herederos discuten el asunto y acuerdan quien es el mas capacitado para hacerlo. CEn algunas otras partes se piensa que es mejor que cada hijo tome su parte de la propiedad y la maneje por si mismo, independientemente de los otros hermanos. 11. Filosofia de la vida Tres personas hablaban sobre la necesi.dad de tener cierta filosofia de la vida — como por ejemplo la religion. Tenian distintas ideas sobre el asunto: A. Una de ellas dijo: El hombre es parte del gran plan de la naturaleza. El tener una filosofia

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307 de la .vida me ayuda a entender este plan y a vivir en tal forma que me mantenga a tono con dicho plan. B. La segunda dijo: Mi manera de pensar es dsta: hay muchas fuerzas naturales y sobrenaturales sobre las cuales nunca ganara control el hombre. Es necesaria una filosofia de la vida para ayudar a que los hombres acepten y se comporten de acuerdo con su destine en la tierra. C. La tercera dijo: Siento decirlo pero no estoy de acuerdo con ninguno de ustedes dos. Yo creo que el horrJjre puede hacer mucho o poco, tiinto como lo desee, para sobreponerse a estas fuerzas naturales y sobrenaturales. Para mi se requiere una filosofia de la vida que le ensene al hombre a sobreponerse a estas fuerzas y a forjarse su propic destino. 12. Ensenando a la juventud Tres madres de tipos de familia diferentes hablaban sobre las varias maneras como deberia ensenarse a los nines. He aqui lo que dijo cada una: A. La primera dijo: Yo creo que desde muy jovenes debe ensenarsele a los ninos a pararse sobre sus propios pies, a tomar sus propias decisiones y a hacerse responsables de si mismos. La gente lo pasa mejor cuando aprende y se beneficia de sus propios errores y a ser suf icientemente independiente de su familia para m.archar por SI miisma--algunas veces aun bien lejos. B. Dijo la segunda: Creo que lo primero que dobe ensenarse a los ninos pequenos es a obedecer y a respetar a sus raayores--sus padres y abuelos . La mayor sabiduria la tienen los mayores y la gente .lo pasa mejor cuando se les ha onsefiado a accptar y respetar dicha sabiduria.

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308 Dijo Xa tercera: Creo que debe ensenarss a los ninos pequenos a rcspetar y a estar ligados a sus familiares cercano3--padre, madre, hermanos, etc. La gente lo pasa mejor cuando tiene un grupo considerable de familiares cercanos en quienes puede apoyarse siempre para ayuda y consejo y a quienes a su vez puede tambien ayudar. 13. Ceremcnias roligiosas Algunas personas en una ciudad como esta vieron como los servicios religicsos (ceremonias religiosas) estaban cambiando de lo que eran antes. A. Algunas se mostraban realnente satisfechas de los cambios en las ceremonias religiosas. Pensaban que las nuevas costumbres son por lo comun mejores que las antiguas; y les gusta mantener todo avanzando, aun las ceremonias religiosas . 3. Otras personas pensaban que al cambiar las ceremonias, se perderia gran parte de la vieja tradicion y que ya no tendria la iglesia el mismo sentido. C. Algunas personas pensaban que las tradiciones viejas de las ceremonias religiosas podrian 3er mejores pero que simplemente no se puede amarrar a ellas. La vida se vuelve mas facil si se aceptan algunos cambios a medida que aparecen. 14. Estadiantes de bachillerato Algunos estudiantes de bachillerato discutian sobre cuales de los libros que leian y estudiaban en los varies cursos los austaban m^s.

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309 A. Uno de ellos dijo: l.'OS libros que mas me gustan son aquellos que me muestran como la gente se ha sobrepuesto a sus problemas. Me gusta visualizar el genero humano luchando a traves de los siglos con la naturaleza y siempre en alguna forma resultando triunfante. B. Dijo el segundo: Me gustan mas aquellos libros que narran como el hombre ha aprendido a entender las fuerzas de la naturaleza y a adaptarse a ellas de tal manera que tanto el hombre como la naturaleza siempre se visualizan como en un todo en el cual el uno completa al otro. C. Dijo el tercero: Creo que los libros realmente importantes y que mas me gustan son aquellos que muestran a los persona jes que han aprendido a aceptar el hecho de que el hombre es y simpre sera incapaz de cambiar las fuerzas de la naturaleza que estan fuera y mas alia de su control. 15. Tiempo libre Tres hombres conversaban un dxa sobre como les gustaba pasar el tiempo cuando no estaban trabajando. Cada uno tenia una idea distinta: A. Uno de ellos dijo que no tenia ideas definidas de como pasar el tiempo cuando no estaba trabajando. A voces hacia una cosa, a veces otra---3implemente dependia de como se sentia ese dT^a. B. El otro dijo que preferiria hacer aquellas cosas que le ayudaban a convertirse en un hombre mejor con mas perspectiva. En algunas ocasiones hacia ejercicios fisicos para aumentar su fuerza corporal, en otras mentales para poder aprender mas. Esta es, el dijo, la mejor manera de pasar].o.

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310 C. El tearcero dijo que le gustaba mas hacer aquellas cosas cuyos resultados podia ver-juegos de coinpetencia o construir algo. Pensaba que el tiempo extra se pierde a menos que uno pueda hacer algo con el. 16. Organizacion de la iglesia Algunas personas hablalDan sobre la forma como estaban organizadas las iglesias a las cuales pertenecian y sobre que significaba esta organizacion en el transcurso de sus vidas cotidianas. He aqui tres opiniones que se expresaron: A. Dijo la primera: En mi iglesia a todos nos hacen sentir como parte de una gran hermandad que se mantiene unida por muchos vinculos en comun. Lo que se nos ensena es que la gente debe actuar junta, al unisono y proveer un tipo fraternal de guia y apoyo. B. Dijo la segunda: En mi iglesia hay, por supuesto, sacerdotes y otros clerigos pero no ofrecen orientacion a menos de que se les pida. Me gusta mi tipo de iglesia porque a cada persona se le hace sentir que la relacion entre Dios y el hombre es individual y que uno debe aprender a responsabilizarse de sus propios actos. C. Dijo la tercera: Mi iglesia es distinta do las suyas. Hay on ella una larga tradicion de clero con poderes y entrenamiento especial para guiar a la gente. En gran parte de mi vida no m.e considero capaz de decidir por mi mismo que GS mejor hacer y estoy contento de depender de 3u orientacion y consejo. 17. Necesidad de la educacion Hoy en casi todos los sitios del mundo se habla de la necesidad de la educacion. Sinembargo la gente tiene

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311 ideas diferentes oobre la clase y cantidad deseable de educacion. He aqui tres ideas expresadas por tres senores distintos ; A. Dijo uno de ellos: Un buen sistema educacional es necesario para que la gente aprenda bien la tecnica y el conocimiento que les ayude a ser eficientes y a tener exito en cualquier actividad que desarrollen. B. Dijo el segundo: Pienso que ir al colegio per muchos anos y estar bien preparado es magnifico para algunas personas, pero ciertamente no lo es para todo el mundo. Yo , por ejemplo, creo que es mucho mas importante hacer lo que ne provoca y gozar realmente de la vida a medida que esta pasa. C . Dijo el tercero: No estoy do acuerdo con ninguno de ustedes. Creo que una larga y excelente educacion es importante, pero deba usarse para hacer que cada hombre sea mas sabio y prof undo. Asi, una persona podra desarrollar mas completamente el conocimiento de si mismo y de la humanidad. 18. Fuerzas naturales La gente se preocupa a menudo de desastres tal.es como las inundaciones , los terremotos, los huracanes y siniilares. Un dia varias personas dj.scutian £:obre el podej de Dios tanto en relacion con el hombre como con las fuerzas naturales en donde se originan estos magnos acontscim.ientcs . He aqui lo que dijo cada uno: A. Un senor dijo: Mi punto de vista es que debe existir una unidad armoniosa total entre Dios, las fuerzas de la naturaleza y las criaturas. Es cuando los horabres no viven el genero de vida necesario para mantener esta armonCa que suceden estos dosastres.

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312 B. Dijo el segundo: No creo que Dios ejercitc directaiT\ente su poder para controlar las fuerzas que se desatan en los terremotos, las inundaciones y similares. Le corresponde al hombre por si mismo tratar de averiguar por que suceden tales cosas y desarrollar la manera para controlarlas y sobreponerse a ellas. C. Dijo el terccro: No creo que el hombre pueda llegar a saber la manera como Dios usa sus poderes para controlar las fuerzas de la naturaleza, y es inutil que la gente crea que podra llegar a conquistar realmente cosas tales como los terremotos, las inundaciones y los huracanes. Lo mejor cs aceptar las cosas tal como se presentan y hacer lo mas que se pueda. 19, Desastre en la familia Un hombre y su familia fueron golpeados duramente por la desgracia. Se presentaron muchas enfermedades durante largo tiempo. Ademas el padre perdio el trabajo y tuvo series problemas financieros. Algunas personas discutian los problem.as de este hombre y su razon de ser. A. Una persona dijo: Realmente no se puede culpar a un hombre cuando le suceden tales infortunios. Cosas como estas simplemente suceden y no es mucho lo que puede la misma gente hacer al respecto. Uno debe aprender a aceptar las cosas malas lo mismo que las buenas. 3. Otra dijo: Esta clase de infcrtunios suceden cuando la gente no sigue las formas justas y correctas de vivir. Cuando la gente vive de ^ tal manera que su forma de vida este en armonia con las grades fuerzas naturales de la vida, las cosas casi siempre andan bien. C. Dijo la tercera: Probableraente fue culpa del hombre mismo. He debido dar los pasos necesarios para prevenir que las cosas llegaran

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313 a ser tan malas. Si la gente usa su cabeza, usualmente puede encontrar manoras para sobreponerse en gran parte a su mala fortuna. 20. Esperanza (a: Students) Tres jovenes estaban hablando de lo que creian que sus f amilias--es decir, ellos mismos y sus hi jos--tendrian algun dia, coraparado con lo que sus padres tuvieron. Cada uno pensaba de distinto modo: A. Uno dijo: Yo creo que mi familia tendra mas en el futuro que la familia de mis padres o mis parientes, si trabajamos duro y hacemos nuestros planes con cuidado. La vida en este pais casi siempre mejora para la gente que de veras trabaja duro. B. Ctro dijo: Yo no se de seguro si mi familia vivir^ mejor, lo mismo, o peor, que la familia de mis padres o mis parientes, La vida sube y baja aun cuando la gente trabaja duro. Asi es la vida! C. Todavia otro dijo: Yo creo que mi familia vivirS mas o menos como vivieron las fam.ilias de mis padres y de mis parientes. Lo mejor es trabajar duro para guardar todo lo del pas ado. (b: Leaders) Tres personas mayores hablaban de lo que esperaban que sus hijos tuvieran cuando fueran grandes. Aqui esta lo que dijo cada uno: A. Una persona dijo: Rcalmente yo espero que mis hijos tengan mas de lo que yo he tenido, eso es , si trabajan dure y hacen sus planes con

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314 cuidado. Siempre hay buenas oportunidades para los que trabajan duro. B. Otra dijo: Yo no se si mis hijos viviran mejor o peor, o lo mismo, que yo he vivido. La vida sube y baja, aun cuando la gente trabaja duro. Asi gs la vida! C. La tercera dijo: Yo espero que mis hijos vivan mas o menos como yo he vivido, y que hagan volver la vida como era antes. Es la responsabilidad de los hijos mantener la manera de vivir del pasado. 21. Maneras de vivir Habia tres personas que hablaban sobre la manera como les gusta vivir. Tenian ideas diversas: A. Una de ellas dijo: Lo que mas me importa es sentirme libre para hacer lo que me plazca y lo que mas se acomode a mi estado de animo. No siempre realize muchas cosas pero le saco jugo a la vida a medida que ella se presenta --esta es la mejor manera de vivir. B. Una segunda dijo: Lo que mas me interesa es poder realizar algo--hacer las cosas tan bien o mejor que otra gente. Me gusta ver resultados y pensar que vale la pena trabajar para lograrlos. C. La tercera dijo: Lo que mas me interesa es pensar y actuar en forma tal que desarrolle muchas facetas variadas de mi naturaleza. Puedo fallar hacer algo tan bien cono los otros en aquellas cosas que mucha gente piensa com.o importantes, pero si cada dia me convierto en una persona mas sabia y comprensiva esto es lo que mas me sienta.

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315 22. Deportes de equipo Todos sabemos que hay diversas clases de deportes y de como organizarlos . Conversaban tres personas, a todas ellas les gustaban los deportes que se juegan en equipo (ej. futbol, basketbol, bexsbol) pero tenian ideas diversas sobre el tipo que pensaban era mejor. A. La primera dijo: Me gustan aquellos deportes en equipo que estan organizados en forma tal que se deja al invividuo probarse a si misrao como individuo y obtener credito por ello. B-. Dijo la segunda: Me gust a el tipo de deportes en equipo donde hay una direccion y organizacion definidas y en donde cada persona sabe exactamence su puesto. C. Dijo la tercera: Me gusta el tipo de deportes en equipo donde hay suficiente organizacion para mantener el rodaje de las cosas, paro donde lo principal es que puedo coordinarme en funcion de equipo con los companeros tales como yo.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Anthony, Glynis. 1968 Colombia: Land of Tomorrow. New York: Roy Publishers, Inc. Aragon, Victor. 1963 "Antioquia." Pp. 672-674 in Colombia en Cifras. Bogota: Libreria Colombiana-Comacho Roldan. Asociacion Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina. 196 7 Z-klgunos Elementos Para un Diagnostico Demografico de Colombia. Boletin 14. Ayal, Elie;:er B. 1963 "Value systems and economic development in Japan and Thailand." The Journal of Social Issues. 19 (January) : 35-51. Becker, Kov.-^rd, and Harry E. Barnes 1961 Social Thought from Lore to Science. Vol. I. 3rd ed. New York: Dover Publications. Betancur, Agapii:o D. 1925 "Medellin vie jo." Pp. 7-110 in La Ciudad. Medellin: Tipografia Bedout. Caicedo, Alvaro. 19 69 El Tieiiipo (April 2): 6. Caudill, William, and Harry A. Scarr. 1962 "Japanese value orientations and culture change." Ethnology 1 (January) : 53-91. Controlar£a General de la Ripublica. 19 35 Geografia Econoii'.ica ue Colombia: I Antioquia. Bogota: Controlaria General de la Republica. Jlb

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317 Crist, Raymond E. 1952 The Cauca Valley Colonibia: Land Tenure and Use. Baltimore: Waverly Press. Crist, Raymond E. 1950 "The personality of Popayan." Rural Sociology 15 (June) :130-140. Davies, Howell (ed.). 1963 The South American Handbook: 1963. London: Trade and Travel Publications Ltd, Dav/n, C. Ernest 1959 American Historical Review 64 (April) : 660-661 . Eisenstadt, S. N. 1965 "Transformation in Modernization." American Sociological Review 30 (October ):659-674. Fallding, Harold. 1965 "The Empirical Study of Values." American Sociological Review 30 (April) : 224-231 . Fals-Borda, Orlando. 1963 "El Hombre." Pp. 33-48 in Colombia en Cifras. Bogota: Libreria Colombiana-Camacho Roldan. Fayerweather , J. 1959 The Executive Overseas. Syracuse, N. Y. : Syracuse University Press. Franck, Harry A. 1917 Vagabonding Down the Andes. New York: The Century Co. " Galnoor, Itzhak. 1971 "Social Information for What?" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 393 (January) : 1-19. Green, Bryan S. R. , and Edward A. Johns. 1966 An Introduction to Sociology. London: Pergamon Press .

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318 Gulick, John, 1959 American Anthropologist. 61 (February) : 135-138 . Hagen, Everett E. 1962 On the Theory of Social Change. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press. Havens, A. Eugene. 1966 Tamesis: Estructura Y Canujio. Bogota: Ediciones Tercen Mundo . Hirschman, Albert. 1958 The Strategy of Economic Development. Nev/ Haven: Yale University Press. Ho 1 1 in g swo r th , J . S e lv;yn . 1970 Value Orientations of Leaders and Students in Popayan, Colombia. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Florida. Homans, George. 1961 Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. Inkeles, Alex. 1964 VThat is Sociology? Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Inkeles, Alex, and David H. Smith. 1966 "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity." Sociometry 29 (December) : 353-377. Kahl, Joseph. 1968 The Measurement of Modernism: A Study of Values in Brazil and Mexico. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. Kluckhohn, Clyde and Henry A. Murray. 1953 "Personality Formation: The Determinants." Pp. 53-70 in Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, and David M Sclineider (eds.) Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

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319 Kluckhohn, Florence R. 1955 "Dominant and Variant Value Orientations." Pp. 342357 in Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, and David M. Schneider (eds . ) Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture (2nd ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Kluckhohn, Florence R. 1951 Variations in Value Orientations. Evanston, 111.: Row Peterson and Co. Lapiere, Richard T. 1965 Social Change. Nev/ York: McGraw-Hill. Lerner, Daniel. 1958 The Passing of Traditional Society. New York: The Free Press. Lipman, Aaron. 1956 El Empresario Bogotano. Bogot^: Tercer Mundo . Lipset, Seyraour M. 1967 "Values, education, and entrepreneurship. " Pp. 350 in Syemour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.) Elites in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press. L6pez, Alejaudro. 1927 Problemas Colombianas . Paris: Editorial ParisAmerica. Lopez de Mesa, Luis. 1930 Introduccion a la Historia de la Cultura en Colombia. Bogota: Libreria Colombiana. McClelJand, David C. 1951 The Achieving Society. New York: The Free Press. McGranahan, Donal.d V. 1971 "Analysis of Socio-Economic Development Through A System of Indicators." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 393 (January) :55-Sl.

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320 Mendel, Douglas H., Jr. 1966 "Japan today: Case study of a modernizing nation." Transaction 3 (March/April) : 15-21 . Michener, James. 1968 Iberia. New York: Random House. Moore, Wilbert E. 1963 Social Change. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall. Morris, Charles. 1956 Varieties of Human Value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mumford, Lewis. 1971 "Reflections: Science and Technology III." The New Yorker (October 24):55-127. Nacgcle, Kaspar D. 1961 "Social Change — Introduction." Pp. 1207-1222 in Talcott Parsons, et al. (ed.). Theories of Society. Nev/ York: The Free Press. Ogburn, V7illiam F. 1964 "Cultural Lag as Theory." Pp. 86-95 in William F. Ogburn on Culture and Social Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Parson, James J. 1949 Antioqucno Colonization in Western Coloitibia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Roberts, Edward B. 1970 "How to succeed in a new technology enterprise." Technology Review 72 (Decr-nber) : 23-27 . Rodriquez, Jorge. 1942 "DemogrSfia de la raza Antioquena." Pp. 149-154 in El Peubio Antioqueno. Medellin: Universidad de Antioquia. Rodriguez, Jorge. 1923 "Habitantes de Medellin." Pp. 173-l8l in La Cuidad. Medellin: Tipografla Bedout .

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321 Romoli, Kathleen. 1941 Colombia: Gateway to South America. Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, Doran and Co. Rose, Arnold 1958 The Institutions of Advanced Societies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rostow, Walt W. 1960 The Stages of Economic Growth. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Sanchez, Vicente, and Patricio Saavedra. 1968 "Programmed change of values." Santiago, Chile. Mimeographed . Scarr, Harry A. 1970 Letter to Collaborator, August 21. Sebastian, Santiago. 1964 Gu^a Artistica de Popayan Colonial. Producciones Latino-Americanas , Limitada. Smith, T. Lynn. 1967 Colombia: Social Structure and the Process of Development. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. Smith, T. Lynn. 1966 "The racial composition of the population of Colombia." The Journal of Inter-American Studies 7 (April) : 213-235 . Speng3.er, Joseph J. . 1965 "Social Evolution and the Theory of Economic Development." Pp. 243-272 in Barringer, Blanksten, and Mack (editors) Social Change in Developing Areas. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. Spicer, Edward. 1952 Human Problems in Technological Change. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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322 Timasheff, Nicholas S. 1964 Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth. New York: Random House. Toynbee, Arnold J. 1947 A Study of History. New York: Oxford University Press . Uribe, Ricardo E. 1942 "Panorama Antioqueno." Pp. 6-10 in El Pueblo Antioqueno. Medellin: Universidad de Antioquia. Vasquez, Ospina. 1955 Industria y Proteccion en Colombia: 1810-1930. Bogota: Editorial Santa Fe . Vergara y Velasco, F. J. 1901 Nueva Geografia de Colombia: Tomo I. Bogota: Imprenta de Vapor. Weber, Max. 1946 The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited by Talcott Parsons. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press. Whiteford, Andrew H. 1964 Two Cities of Latin America. Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday and Co. Winterbottom, Marian R. 1958 "The relation of and need for achievement to learning experiences in independence and mastery. " Pp. 453-478 in J. W. Atkinson (Ed.), Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH David W. Coombs was born on March 19, 19 39, at Indianapolis, Indiana. In June, 1957, he v;as graduated from Fort Lauderdale High School in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In June, 1961, he received the degree of Bachelor of r-rts from the University of Motre Dam.e, and in July of that year he entered Lhe Peace Corps, in which he served two years as a volunteer in Chile. In September, 1963, he enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida. From iTune, 1964, to June, 1955, he held a university fellowship. He v;orked as a graduate assistant in the Department of Sociology from Septerriber, 19 65, until June, 19S6. In Septem]:)er, 1966, he began v/ork as a research and teaching assistant at the Universidad del Valle in Call, Coloiobia. In January, 1968, he returned to the University of Florida where he held the positions of research assistant and teaching assistant until July, 1969. In September of that year he began work as an Instructor in Sociology at Spring Mill College in Mobile, /ilabaina. From September/ 323

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324 1970, to the present he has been a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at the University of 7\labama in Tuscaloosa. He is a meitibor of the American Sociological Association, the Southern Sociological Society, the Rural Sociological Society, the Association for the Advancement of Science, and r.he American Academy of Arts and Sciences. _

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. -^^:^^^JZ-e^Jos^ph S. Vandiver, Chairman Professor of Sociology I certify that T have read this study and that in my opinion it confcrras to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Ii*-<>t-A^ ' Aa>oCo^_ T. Lynn SVnith Professor of Sociology I certify that I have read this s cudy and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for tlie degree of Doctor of Philosophy. .=:^ D. Saunders Professor of Sociology

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the decree of Doctor of Philosophy. ^^^ ^ SujriyatBa lutaka Associate Professor of Sociology I certify that I have read this study and that in ny opinion it confor:ns to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of philosophy. R. W. Bradbury Professor of Econoaics This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Soclolo^ in the Collet^e of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillniBnt of the requireraents for the de^^ree of Doctor of jrhilosophy. December, 1971 Dean, Graduate School

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the des^^ree of Doctor of Philosophy. ueiyaraa lutaka Sugiyaf Associate Professor of Sociology I certify that I have read this study and that in ay opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissi^rtation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. <^^ ^^ R . 'JV . Bradbury Professor of Economics This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Sociology in the Gollet^e of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfilliuBnt of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of ir-hilosophy. December, 1971 Dean, Graduate School

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