A comparative study of cooperation in voluntary and statutory consortia

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A comparative study of cooperation in voluntary and statutory consortia
Blackwood, William Olson, 1946-
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Colleges ( jstor )
Community associations ( jstor )
Community colleges ( jstor )
Community education ( jstor )
Cooperation ( jstor )
Coopetition ( jstor )
Higher education ( jstor )
Political action committees ( jstor )
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Universities ( jstor )
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Educational Administration and Supervision thesis Ph. D ( lcsh )
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Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography: leaves 148-153.
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by William Olson Blackwood.

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This work is dedicated to my wife Debbie, and my three
daughters, Ann, Cindy, and Carol. Without their support
and encouragement the work would never have been completed.
To insure that their contribution does not go unheralded,
I dedicate this to them.


The author would like to acknowledge the faculty members without

whom this dissertation would never have become a reality. First, I

would like to thank Dr. Ralph B. Kimbrough who served as my advisor

for my master's degree and who encouraged me to enter a doctoral


Thanks also go to Dr. James L. Wattenbarger in whose class the

seed for this dissertation was planted. Dr. Wattenbarger's patience

and understanding kept this novice from panic on many occasions.

Special appreciation is extended to Professor Emeritus and Dr.

Oscar Svarlien from the Political Science Department. Dr. Svarlien,

representing the author's minor discipline, graciously devoted his

time to helping me with this undertaking. But more importantly,

he provided a fine example of the traditional scholar. His sense

of values and his ability to separate the "willows" from the "oaks"

has earned him my deepest admiration.

My most heart felt thanks goes to Dr. Phillip A. Clark who

undertook the chore of committee chairman. Over the last four years,

Dr. Clark has provided an example of a teacher, a professor, a scholar,

a man, and a friend. Words cannot express the respect which I hold

for him.

And finally, I would like to thank Colonel Richard J. Glikes,

Lieutenant Colonel John Carlin, and Major Floyd T. Banks for their

encouragement and assistance in this undertaking. Without their

assistance, it would have been impossible to juggle the work schedule

which allowed me to finish my course work and my writing.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ... .. ... .. .. .... . iii

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . .... .. . . vii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . ... x


I. INTRODUCTION . ... ........... . 1
Background and Significance of the Study .... ... 1
Statement of the Problem . . ... . . 10
I T is . . . . . . . . 11
Criterion Variables . . ...... . . 11
Definition of Terms .. ... .. .. . 13
Delimitations and Limitations . . . .... 18
Assumptions . ... .. . . ....... . 19
Procedure . . . . . . . 20
Organization of the Research Report . . . .. 22

Cooperation ........ . . . . . .. 23
Interorganizational Theory . . ....... . 34
Consortia....... . . . . . . 63
Community Education . . . . . 73
Conclusion .. .... . . . . . . 78

III. RESULTS AND FINDINGS .... . . . . . 81
Consortium Director Responses . ... ....... 81
Board Member Responses . . . . . .... 92
Institutional Member Representative Responses . 97
Findings Related to the Instrument . . . ... 107


Summary of the Study .. . . . . . . 122
Recommendations for Future Study . . . . .. 124







REFERENCES . . . . . . . . .























Lack of Member Institution Partici

Medium of Communication . . .

Standardized Action . . .

Existence of Benefits . . .

Areas of Cooperation . . .

Credit Transfer . . . . .

Dependence on Resources . . .

Basis for Governing Authority .

Jointly Developed Fund Proposals .


Changing Organizational Behavior . . . . . .

Stages of Organizational Growth . . . . . .

Interorganizational Analysis . . . . . . .

Organizational Behavior Predicted
from Organizational Characteristics . . . . .

Descriptive Data . . . . . . . . .

Key Elements in Cooperative Endeavors . . . .

Instrumental Elements in Birth . . . . . .

Bases for Power (Influence) . . . . . .

Organized by Purpose, Process, Place, or Clientele .

Optimum Numerical Range . . . . .

ation . .... 86

. . . . 86

. . . . 87

. . . . 87

. . . . 88

. . . . 89

. . . . 89

. . . . . 93

. . . . . 94

20. Joint Acquisition of Material and Equipment












Table Page

21. Decision Categories Perceived
to Consume the Greatest Time . . . . .... 95

22. Decision Making Freedom .. . . . . . 95

23. Consortium Staff Influence . . . . .... 96

24. Type of Administration . . . . . .... 97

25. Cooperation Effectiveness . . . . .... 98

26. Attempts to Identify with Consortium . . ... 99

27. Institutional Administrative Staff Influence . .. 99

28. Administration Attitude Toward the Consortium . 100

29. Administration Attitude Toward Cooperation .... 100

30. Faculty Attitude Toward Cooperation
in the Consortium .. . . . . . . 100

31. Faculty Ties with Professional Association .... 101

32. Trust in Member Institutions . . . . . .. 101

33. Perception of the Environment . . . . .. 102

34. Distribution of Benefits . . . . . .... 103

35. Institutional Equality in Terms of
Quality of Program . . . . . . . ... 103

36. Existence of Student Exchange Programs ...... 104

37. Existence of Joint Faculty Appointments . . .. .104

38. Existence of Faculty Exchange Program ...... 105

39. Existence of Joint Committees .. . . ... .105

40. Existence of Joint Academic Programs . . ... 105

41. Existence of Jointly Sponsored Research . . .. .106

42. Existence of Joint Service Programs . . ... 106

Table Page

43. Existence of Joint Evaluation Procedure . . .. 106

44. Summary of Criterion Variables . . . ... .120

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy



William Olson Blackwood

August 1977

Chairman: Phillip A. Clark
Major Department: Educational Administration

There is a dearth of studies connecting the scholarly literature

on cooperation and interorganizational theory with the phenomena of

interinstitutional cooperation manifested by consortia. Advocates

for the development of consortia are divided on how to create them in

order to achieve greater cooperation. lFostering interinstitutional

cooperation is a major part of the community education movement which

is expanding rapidly across the United States. It would be useful to

those involved in this movement to know if there is a form of organiza-

tional structure which facilitates cooperation better than another. The

practical significance of the problem and the implications for organiza-

tional development added to the scholarly importance of this work. For

these reasons, a comparative study of cooperation in voluntary and

statutory consortia was undertaken.

The purpose of the study was to attempt to answer the following

questions: Is there a difference in the nature of interinstitutional

cooperation within voluntary consortia as compared to interinstitutional


cooperation within statutory consortia? If there is a difference

then what are the implications for educators who are trying to develop

organizational patterns which facilitate cooperation?

Thirty voluntary and 30 statutory consortia were randomly selected

throughout the United States. Three structured opinionnaires were

designed for each of the following groups within a consortium: consortium

director, consortium board member, and institutional member representative

to the consortium. Sixty, 100, and 164 opinionnaires were sent respectively

to each of the groups. The results for each were tabulated, and the mean

scores and frequency of responses were utilized to compare the two groups.

Although the directors' return rate was high enough to be con-

sidered representative, the board and institutional members' return rates

were not. The differentiated return rate within the two groups cast

doubt on the validity of the results from the director groups. The

opinionnaires were found to be bias toward the voluntary group. Based

on these problems no conclusions could be drawn; however, some observa-

tions about future approaches to the problem were made.

One may approach the study of cooperation from three view points,

e.g., cooperative action as a result of choice, as a result of organiza-

tional output, or as a political resultant. Although the initial

thoughts were that cooperation could best be understood from a

rational-actor paradigm, the writer is now convinced that cooperation

can be best understood in an interorganizational setting as a political




Background and Significance of the Study

Mutual aid, collaborative effort, or cooperation is as old as man-

kind himself. The importance of cooperation is reflected not only in

all the world's religions as an ethical and moral norm (Nisbet, 1968,

p. 384), but is also reflected in theories of evolution. Peter Kropotkin

in his classic work Mutual Aid advanced the idea that mutual aid is more

important for survival and evolution than the notion of mutual struggle.

Kropotkin, in reference to "survival of the fittest" defined the fittest

as those who learned to cooperate (1972, p. 30)

Nisbet (1968) defined cooperation as "the joint or collaborative

behavior that is directed toward some goal, and in which there is common

interest of hope or reward" (p. 384). He distinguished five types of

cooperation: automatic, traditional, contractual, directed, and spon-

taneous (p. 385). Automatic cooperation refers to cooperation found

in nature. Traditional cooperation refers to cooperation that is pre-

scribed by social tradition. Contractual cooperation refers to that

prescribed by contract and enforceable by legal sanction. Directed

cooperation refers to cooperation which is directed without the partici-

pants consent or knowledge; it is exemplified by the military. Spon-

taneous cooperation refers to cooperation that is based on amity. Nisbet

pointed out that rarely do these types of cooperation exist alone and


that normally each can be found in all spheres of society. He noted,

"It is inconceivable that complex, large-scale organizations could

operate today without directed cooperation" (p. 386). From this state-

ment, it can be inferred that Nisbet did not believe that a consortium

could operate as effectively with another type of cooperation being

the principle type.

Studies on cooperation have taken place in all settings, but the

number of studies in academic settings is relatively small when compared

to business, industry, and political settings.

Nisbet did not report the empirical and observable measures used

to determine the type of cooperation or to determine its existence.

From studies discussed in the review of literature, (Montana Commission

on Post Secondary Education; Mummert; Migocki; and Silverman) certain

empirical and observable measures of cooperation can be found. These

are summarized as follows:

1. The presence of faculty, student, and resource exchange

agreements and frequency of exchange;

2. The number, diversity, and boundaries of service provided;

3. The amount and type of joint planning, programming, and


4. The presence of articulation agreements and the scope

of such agreements;

5. The role of the staffs in decision making;

6. The number of joint committees and frequency of meetings;

7. The number of personal acquaintances in other organizations;

8. The directness of relationships;

9. The number and diversity of participating institutions

and number of effective participation opportunities.

Although the writer has been unable up to this time to find

evidence of people using the medium and timeliness cf information flow

as an empirical and observable measure of cooperation, it certainly

seems justifiable.

Chester I. Barnard, in Rubenstein and Haberstroth's book (1960),

perceived the importance of cooperation to the organization. Barnard

wrote the following:

The persistence of cooperation depends upon two condi-
tions: (a) its effectiveness; and (b) its efficiency.
(p. 81)

An organization comes into being when (1) there are
persons able to communicate with each other (2) who
are willing to contribute action (3) to accomplish a
common purpose . . For the continued existence of
an organization either effectiveness or efficiency is
necessary; and the longer the life, the more necessary
both are. (p. 82)

From the above one can conclude that the continued existence of

an organization depends on the persistence of cooperation.

Gulick and Urwick (1937) stated that one can organize-by purpose,

process, persons or things, or by place (pp. 21-30). They pointed out that

people within an organization may fit into all four categories, but if

they do, one of the categories has to be given preference (p. 15). By

giving precedence to one, the others are, to a degree, ignored. These

ignored factors provide a potential basis for cooperation. Take for example

three universities organized by purpose; one to provide a liberal arts

education, one to provide a religious education, and one to provide a

military education. All will have departments such as English,

math, and history. These departments would be the process aspect of

the organization. All the history professors have the same process in

common, although the organizations to which they belong have different

purposes. Process, therefore, provides an organizational framework

for interinstitutional cooperation.

Education as a major enterprise has stressed cooperation as a

major goal over the years. Educators have argued that cooperation will

give more effective utilization of limited resources, greater economy of

operation, enhanced community service, and better academic programs. Few

authors documented this as early as William Rainey Harper did. Harper,

the "father" of the junior college movement and the first president of

the University of Chicago, stated in his book The Trend in Higher


A still further change will be the development of a spirit
of co-operation. It is only within a few years that there
has been any co-operation worth mentioning among colleges
and universities, and the co-operation which has so far
been inaugurated is of an exceedingly superficial character.
Enough of it has been worked out, however, to make those
who have tasted it desire still more, and the few steps
already taken are but precursors of many to follow. (1905, p. 386)

Although cooperation has been stressed over the years, it has

only been recently that formal mechanisms for cooperating have been

developed. State systems of higher education, "1202" commissions,

interstate compacts, and consortia are a few of the mechanisms which

reflect growing concern for interinstitutional cooperation and coordina-

tion. Martorana and McGuire (1976) see the tendency for greater inter-

institutional cooperation and coordination as a movement which has

been termed regionalism. However, their study of regionalism limited

interinstitutional arrangements to those that were "officially"

recognized, and hence left out voluntary arrangements such as consortia.

M. M. Chambers identified three ways in which states have sought

to bring about a coordinated system of higher education (1961, pp. 2, 3).

One method is known as consolidation. Under this method all or several

of the governing boards are abolished, and the institutions are placed

under one statewide governing board. A second method, known as com-

pulsory coordination, imposes a new board over all the existing governing

boards. These "superboards" function in one of two ways, i.e., as an

operational board with complete power and authority, or as a coordinating

board acting as a facilitator of lateral cooperation with only persuasive

powers. The third method is known as voluntary cooperation. Under this

method, institutional leaders initiate lateral cooperation to solve

mutual problems and work on areas of mutual concern. As evidenced by

the following quote, Chambers argued in behalf of voluntary cooperation:

We have ample evidence that there are ways of providing
the facts essential to these assurances without destroying
the autonomy of the institutions, or abolishing their
governing boards, or interposing any additional layers of
power-laden bureaucracy between the governing boards and
the legislature which directly represents the people of
the state. The simple and sensible solution is voluntary
coordination carried on continuously, patiently, per-
severingly, and with a certain satisfaction in a job well
done, both on the part of the participants and on the part
of the citizenry. (1962, p. 31)

One formal structure for facilitating the growth of cooperation is

the consortium. It should be noted that there are many types of consortia:

business, banking, political, and educational; unless stated otherwise

herein, consortium will be used in reference to the academic consortium.

Consortia have grown phenomenonally from 1965 to 1976. Most have come

into existence either as voluntary or statutory consortia. The method

of creation has been one of the most significant issues in the entire

consortium movement. The debate is over the level of cooperation

achieved by voluntary consortia versus that achieved by statutory

consortia. Those favoring statutory creation argue that the voluntary

method seldom goes beyond superficial cooperation. The voluntarist

argue that the statutory approach impinges on institutional autonomy,

educational diversity, and academic freedom.

This division has been one of the reasons why there still is no

commonly accepted definition of consortium. The following definitions

are provided to highlight the difference that exists. Lewis D. Patterson

(1970), who attempted to be specific and represent a narrow view, noted

five conditions which must be met in order to be classified as a


Each consortium: (1) is a voluntary, formal organization,
(2) has three or more member institutions, (3) implements
multi-academic programs, (4) employs at least one full-time
professional to administer consortium programs, and (5)
has a required annual contribution or other tangible evi-
dence of long term commitment of member institutions. (p. 3)

In contrast to Patterson is Raymond S. Moore (1967) who gave a broad


A consortium is an arrangement whereby two or more
institutions--at least one of which is an institution of
higher education--agree to pursue between, or among,
them a program for strengthening academic programs im-
proving administration, or providing for other special
needs. (p. 14)

The typology of consortia is not all inclusive and varies with

authors and definitions of consortium. In terms of structure, the

voluntarist advocates the horizontal pattern of organizational structure

with decentralized authority whereas the statutorist advocates a

vertical organizational pattern with centralized authority (Kreplin

& Bolce, 1973, p. 30). However, both positions advocate the same goals.

A primary objective for any consortium is to bring about greater efficiency

in achieving a common purpose through cooperation. Johnson (1973)


The purpose for which consortium exist, or the goals
which inspire their establishment, are implicit in the
tasks undertaken and the accomplishments attained . .
The expanded community itself provides a new universe for
interinstitutional comparison and evaluation, with co-
operative research into common problems and shared risks
in undertaking educational experiments. (p. 427)

A review of the scholarly literature indicated that much had been

written on consortia, but very little had been done to determine whether

in fact the stated goals were being attained. Bradley advanced five

factors, based upon his dissertation, on which to measure consortium


1. Expanded Student and Faculty Opportunities
2. Promotion of Greater Managerial Efficiency
3. Promotion of Experimentation and Change
4. Promotion of Exchange through Interpersonal contacts
among the members, and
5. Entrepreneurship (1971, p. 2)

He used these factors to measure the effectiveness of two consortia

that he studied. The yardstick for effectiveness may cover Bradley's

factors, but ultimately it has to be determined whether the consortium

is perceived by the member institutions as meeting their needs.

A great surge of interest in the area of interinstitutional

coordination and cooperation has been stimulated by a nationwide move-

ment referred to as community education. The study therefore has

practical significance for the community education movement. A major

root of the community education movement is cooperation and coordination.

Decker (1972) noted four items which are necessary for community education

to be successful.

In the history of implementing community education, one
important fact stands out--the success of community
education depends on special conditions occurring in a

The social climate must facilitate communication
and cooperation between all community citizens.

The people of a community must actively participate
in making the change. 'The people are the best judges
of their immediate problems; and only with their assent
and understanding can lasting progress be made.'

Professional educators must view education broadly
so that the role of education becomes service to all
community citizens. Educational administrators must
work with community citizens in establishing and imple-
menting educational policies. Administrators may not be,
and frequently are not, the original source of interest
in a new program, but unless they give it their attention
and actively promote it, it will not come into being.

There must be a high level of cooperative rapport
between all agencies and organizations who have a role in
influencing the quality of living of individuals and of
the community as a whole. (pp. 78-79)

Although there is still no comprehensive theory of community

education, it is apparent from Decker's work that cooperation is absolutely

essential if the community education movement is to be successful. The

foundations of community education were outlined by Olsen and Clark

in the following tenets:

1. Systematic involvement of community members in the
total educational process:
2. Maximum utilization of all human, physical, and financial
resources of a community;
3. Interinstitutional and agency coordination and cooperation;
4. Life long learning experiences for all community members;
5. Systematic involvement of community members in problem
6. Curriculum program and services centered in and based
upon the enduring life concerns of all people.
(1977, pp. 123, 126, 132, 139, 141)

Cooperation permeates the tenets, and it is difficult to understand how

any of these tenets could be operationalized without cooperation.

Community educators and the National Community Education Association

have been instrumental in securing legislation which mandates cooperation

and lay involvement through advisory councils. Many states have legisla-

tion supporting and providing appropriations for community education.

Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, and Utah were among the first to enact

such legislation. On the national level, the 93rd Congress passed legis-

lation fostering the growth of community education as part of the

Education Amendments of 1974. These Amendments were signed into law by

President Ford.

Many community educators, Kerensky and Melby; Seay; Baillie;

Ault, Clark, Dunker, LaPlante, Pishney, Weaver, and Wilson (Note 1);

and Migocki (Note 2) have argued that the traditional bureaucratic struc-

ture should be sought out. A point of view supported by other educators

(Hanson, 1974; Palola & Padgett, 1971). Is this a valid argument? The

results of this study provided some indicators as to the validity of

this argument.

The sample was a national sample drawn randomly from across the

United States. This meant that the results of the study should have high

generalizability. Thus, the study could be of importance to scholars

in the fields of education administration, sociology, and organization

development all across the United States.

In conclusion, it can be seen that there is a dearth of studies

connecting the scholarly literature on cooperation and interorganizational

theory with the phenomena of interinstitutional cooperation manifested by

consortia. Advocates for the development of consortia are divided on

how to create them in order to achieve greater cooperation. Fostering

interinstitutional cooperation is a major part of the community education

movement which is expanding rapidly across the United States. It would

be useful to those involved in this movement to know if there is a form

of organizational structure which facilitates cooperation better than

another. The practical significance of the problem and the implications

for organizational development combined with the high generalizability

of the results add to the scholarly importance of this work. Therefore,

the present study seemed to be justified and was proposed as follows.

Statement of the Problem

The focus of the proposed study is on the following questions:

Is there a difference in the nature of interinstitutional cooperation

within voluntary consortia as compared to interinstitutional cooperation

within statutory consortia? If there is a difference, then what are

the implications for educators who are trying to develop organizational

patterns which facilitate cooperation?


An extensive review of the scholarly literature did not yield

any evidence to indicate that there would be any difference in coopera-

tion within a consortium between voluntary and statutory consortia.

Although there was a great deal of scholarly opinion which supported

voluntary cooperation as being more effective, it was the opinion of

the writer that a null hypothesis was more appropriate than a direc-

tional hypothesis. The hypothesis is as follows:

There will be no difference in the nature of interinstitutional

cooperation within voluntary consortia as compared to interinstitutional

cooperation within statutory consortia.

Criterion Variables

1. There will be no difference in (a) faculty exchange programs

and (b) frequency of faculty exchange among member units of a consortium

whether it be voluntary or statutory.

2. There will be no difference in (a) student exchange programs

and (b) frequency of student exchange among member units of a consortium

whether it be voluntary or statutory.

3. There will be no difference in the importance of domain con-

sensus to cooperation among member units of a consortium whether it be

voluntary or statutory.

4. There will be no difference in the medium of information flow

among member units of a consortium whether it be voluntary or statutory.

5. There will be no difference in the directness of communications

among member units of a consortium whether it be voluntary or statutory.

6. There will be no difference in the percentage of institutions

which are effectively participating within a consortium whether it be

voluntary or statutory.

7. There will be no difference in the number of articulation

agreements among member units of a consortium whether it be voluntary

or statutory.

8. There will be no difference in the dependence on shared resources

among member units of a consortium whether it be voluntary or statutory.

9. There will be no difference in the number of joint programs

offered among member units of a consortium whether it be voluntary or


10. There will be no difference in the presence of joint evaluation

efforts among member units of a consortium whether it be voluntary or


11. There will be no difference in staff influence over decision

making whether it be voluntary or statutory consortia.

12. There will be no difference in the number of joint committees

among member units of a consortium whether it be voluntary or statutory.

13. There will be no difference in the existence of benefits pro-

vided to member units of a consortium whether it be voluntary or


14. There will be no difference in the range of member institution

strength and developmental level whether it be voluntary or statutory


15. There will be no difference in the number and types of pro-

blems that hinder or prevent the achievement of cooperation.

16. There will be no difference in the number and types of

factors that facilitate cooperation.

17. There will be no difference in the type and level of co-

operation among member units whether it be voluntary or statutory


18. There will be no difference in the frequency of attempts made

by member institutions to identify with the consortium whether it be

voluntary or statutory.

19. There will be no difference in the administration and faculty

attitude toward cooperation in the consortium whether it be voluntary

or statutory.

20. There will be no difference in goal orientation among member

units and the consortium whether it be voluntary or statutory.

Definition of Terms

Articulation agreement. A written agreement between or among

two or members of the consortium specifying the purpose, terms, and

duration of the agreement.

Board member. The individual that represents member institutions

of the consortium and occupies a place on the consortium governing or

coordinating board.

Boundaries of service. The geographical boundaries outlining

the area which each member institution of the consortium serves.

These boundaries may not exist formally or in writing, but may be

determined by a consistent pattern of serving only a certain population,

or rendering only certain services, or by teaching only certain disciplines.

Community education. A democratic community-based process which

emphasizes the systematic involvement and coordinated cooperative use

of all community resources (human, physical, and financial) in solving

community problems (social and educational) and in fulfilling the educa-

tional needs of the people as identified by them.

Consortium. An arrangement whereby four or more organizations

work jointly toward common ends.

A. Statutory consortium. Organizations required to band

together by a legislative or quasi-legislative body,

i.e., schoolboard. Normally characterized by a vertical

organizational structure and a centralization of authority.

B. Voluntary consortium. Organizations banded together by

the members of their own free will. Normally characterized

by a horizontal organization structure and a decentraliza-

tion of authority. Those so classified by Patterson (1975)

in his 1975 Consortium Directory excluding those with less

than four members.

Cooperation. The joint or collaborative behavior exhibited by

people and organizations as they work together toward a goal in which

there is common interest. See criterion variables for indices.

A. Automatic cooperation. "The impersonal coordination,

jointness of behavior and mutuality of interest that

arise directly from ecological position" (Nisbet, p.

385). The key is that it is unplanned and goes on

without the participants being fully aware of it.

B. Contractual cooperation. An exchange agreement where

the terms specify the who, what, when, where, and how

of the exchange. A failure on the part of either party

to the agreement allows the other party to seek com-

pliance through legal sanction.

C. Directed cooperation. An arrangement where the partici-

pants are basically unaware of the organization's goals,

and have no choice in deciding goals or in deciding

whether or not to seek their attainment. They understand

and work to achieve their immediate goals but are unaware

of how all the goals fit together. A few people at the

top of the organization normally are aware of the total

plan. The military exemplifies this type of cooperation.

D. Intra consortium cooperation. The cooperative activities

that go on between and among organizations with a

consortium. See criterion variables for indices.

E. Spontaneous cooperation.

Unprescribed by tradition, contract, or
command, it is situational in character and
practically constitutes the essence of rela-
tionships within the family, neighborhood, play
group, and other close personal forms of as-
sociation. (Nisbet, p. 386)

The essence of this type of cooperation is some basis of

friendship. Spontaneous cooperation occurs in all types

of endeavors.

F. Traditional cooperation. This type of cooperation is

based on traditional social norms or mores.

Coordination. The time aspects of cooperation which allows the

group to harmonize. Timing allows the group to achieve greater impact

by synchronizing. Coordination cannot be achieved without some type of


Directness of relationships. Refers to the staff relationships

among and between member institutions and the consortium headquarters.

If there is direct contact between an institutional officer and his

counterpart in another institution, then a direct relationship will be

said to exist. If the action, however, goes up through the institutional

hierarchy, and then laterally to another institutional head, and down

through that hierarchy to the initiating officer's counterpart, then

an indirect relationship will be said to exist.

Director. The administrative executive of the consortium who is

responsible for carrying out the policies of the governing or coordinating


Domain consensus. A mutual agreement as to who is serving a

given population, what services are provided to a given population and

by whom, and what disciplines are taught by whom and to whom.

Effective participation opportunities. The number of opportunities

available in the consortium for meaningful participation. A member that

does not or cannot contribute to the consortium's purposes because other

members have already met the consortium's needs would not be effectively


Faculty exchange program. A program whereby faculty can teach,

study, or do research at any of the member institutions.

Horizontally structured organization. An organization with no

superior authority above the members.

Institutional contact. An individual at each member institution

of the consortium that has consortium responsibilities but does not

occupy a place on the governing or coordinating board.

Joint committee. A committee made up of representatives from

several member institutions of the consortium which meets to work on

activities of a joint nature.

Joint evaluation. A procedure by which joint programs and activities

conducted at a member institution are evaluated by all members of the


Joint program. Programs that are jointly sponsored and funded by

the member institutions but carried out at one institution.

Medium of information flow. The method by which information is

transmitted within the consortium.

Personal acquaintances. The business or work acquaintances that

the person being questioned can list by name in the other institutions

within the consortium.

Resource sharing. The sharing by mutual agreement of all resources

(fiscal, physical, and human) to accomplish the stated purposes of the


Role of the staff in decision making. The part played by each

member institution's staff in a decision that effects the consortium.

Student exchange program. A program which allows students to move

among the member institutions of a consortium taking courses from the

different faculties, and which provides for the total transfer of credit

earned among member institutions.

Vertically structured organization. An organization that has

one or more levels of authority above the members will be classified

as vertical. The military represents a vertically structured organization.

Delimitations and Limitations

The sample size has been limited to 30 voluntary and 30 statutory

consortia. The consortia have been limited to those with four or more

member institutions.

Non-parametric statistics as necessary to evaluate the criterion variables

were used to determine whether any significant difference existed

between consortia.

The review of literature has been limited to the literature

dealing with cooperation, consortia, interorganizational theory and

development, and interagency coordination and cooperation in community


This study was an ex post facto design and, hence, subject to all

of the restrictions attributed to this research method. Primarily no

cause and effect conclusions can be drawn, only relationship conclusions.

The fact that most academic consortia do not have member units outside

of education may limit the generalizability of the study to academic

consortia. Maturation, instrumentation, and selection may affect the

internal validity of the study. Since much of the consortia movement

is new and is receiving much attention, it is logical to assume that

the external validity of the study may be weakened by the Hawthorne

Effect, especially if the statutory consortia as a group are older and

more established than the voluntary consortia. Assuming its presence,

cooperation may not sustain itself as the voluntary consortia age.

Measurement of the dependent variable may also be a source of weakness

for external validity.


The researcher has developed the following assumptions to provide

some framework from which the reader can understand the writer's per-


Philosophical Assumptions

1. People can influence and have the right to influence

their destiny by forming organizations to serve them

and by choosing which ones serve them.

2. People have the right of self-government.

Theoretical Assumptions

1. All organizations have limited resources.

2. The potential to cooperate is held by all organizations.

3. Organizations have the obligation of providing the

most effective and efficient service to their clients

that is possible.

4. All organizations desire fully to service the wants

and needs of their clients.

5. Those items selected as measures of cooperation are

in fact indices of cooperation.


The research design was ex post facto and has utilized the survey

technique. Descriptive, comparative, and evaluative analysis were

used. A discussion of the sample and participant selection, instrument,

data collection, and data treatment follows.

Sample and Participant Selection

The consortia population was identified from the following works:

The 1975-76 Yearbook of Higher Education, 1975 Consortium Directory,

and A Guide to Higher Education Consortiums: 1965-66. The 1965-66

Guide lists both voluntary and statutory consortia. The 1975 Consortium

Directory lists only voluntary consortia. The Yearbook of Higher

Education lists voluntary consortia, associations, and statewide boards

of higher education. Those consortia that have four or more member units

were identified. Consortia with two or three member units were avoided

because of the small number of possible communication channels. Those

listed in the 1975 Directory were deleted from the 1965-66 Guide. An

inspection was made of the remaining entries to be sure that no other

voluntary consortia were left in the 1965-66 Guide. This was done

because of the difference in dates of the two directories. The inspec-

tion was made by reading titles and eliminating those that could logically

be inferred to be voluntary, or those that were categorized as voluntary.

The voluntary consortia were randomly selected from the 1975

Consortium Directory. The statutory consortia were randomly selected

from the Guide to Higher Education Consortiums: 1965-66. However

because of the relatively small number of statutory consortia listed,

this work was supplemented by The 1975-76 Yearbook of Higher Education

where a random selection of statewide boards and associations was made

to meet the needed sample size. Those statewide systems that did not

have a compulsory coordination system were eliminated to help avoid

introducing a possible error.

Selection of study participants was made in two ways. The

consortium director was selected by virtue of his position. Two board

members were randomly selected from all the members of the governing

or coordinating board of the consortium. Four institutional contacts

were randomly selected from all the institutional contacts in the

consortium. This gave seven participants from each consortium for

an n equal to 420. The consortia that agreed to participate are

reported in Appendix A.


Three validated and structured opinionnaires were used to collect

the data from each referent group for this study. Some of the questions

were parallel, but most were divergent.

These instruments were constructed after a careful review of the

literature, and after a careful review of instruments used in similar

studies. The instrument was tested on 30 respondents in the field

before being published. The instruments appear as Appendix B.

Data Collection

The printed opinionnaires along with an appropriate cover letter

were mailed to all referent group members who, through telephonic survey,

had agreed to participate. Participants were asked to answer the

questions and return the opinionnaire. A list was maintained as to

the date the opinionnaires were sent out. Telephone follow-up was

made on all opinionnaires that had not returned in two weeks. Opinion-

naires which had not returned two weeks after the telephone follow-up

were not used in the study.

Data Analysis

Descriptive non-parametric statistics were used to elevate the

responses. Primarily this involved tabulating frequency of response,

calculating the mean, and analyzing the differences. A difference

was said to exist if there was (1) a 15% difference in the frequency of

response, or (2) one point on a five point scale for which mean scores

were calculated.

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was utilized

in tabulating data.

Questions which had open responses were tabulated manually. This

allowed a grouping of major areas of similarities which helped in dis-

cerning differences between the two groups of consortia.

Organization of the Research Report

The study has been organized into five chapters. Chapter One

contains the introduction and report of how the study was done. Chapter

Two is the review of related literature. The findings are presented in

Chapter Three. Chapter Four is a discussion of the findings. The

conclusions and recommendations are reported in Chapter Five.




Cooperation has been defined for the purpose of this study as the

joint or collaborative behavior exhibited by people and organizations

as they work together toward a goal in which there is common interest.

Cooperation occurs in many ways, e.g., legal contracts, arrangements,

resolutions, agreements, formally or informally, directly or indirectly,

and voluntarily or involuntarily. In an effort to achieve clarity

throughout this section, the levels and types of cooperation are

identified in the next few paragraphs.

Ertell (1957) identified two major levels of interinstitutional

cooperation. One level may be termed superficial and does not "touch

the main stream of institutional individuality, identity or program"

(p. 8). This level of cooperation is reflected by the occasional sharing

of resources such as library books, faculty members, and facilities.

The other level of cooperation Ertell identified was characterized as

going "directly to the main stream of academic process" (p. 9). This

level delves into institutional identity, sovereignty, and pride. These

factors can represent substantial roadblocks to interinstitutional


One can readily establish a continuum ranging from no cooperation

to a fully integrated system with joint planning, execution, and

evaluation. Ertell maintained the latter was the kind of cooperation

which would produce the functional efficiency necessary to meet future

problems. He noted that cooperation developed slowly starting with

superficial cooperation and moving, as time went on and trust developed,

toward the fully integrated level of cooperation. The importance of

the first stage in the developmental process was to lay the needed founda-

tions of knowledge, experience, and trust before more in depth coopera-

tion could proceed.

Ertell reiterated in several places in his book the necessity of

reaching the integrated level of cooperation. One can deduce that

although he favored an evolutionary approach, he also favored shifting

to another strategy if the voluntary approach was not working.

Levels of cooperation can also be identified by using Talcot

Parson's (1960) concept of parallelism between organizational hierarchy

and levels of generality of concerns. Cooperation at the lower levels

of the hierarchy would indicate a deeper level of cooperation than if

found only at the higher levels. In stating this, the presumption is

made that the presence of cooperation at the lower levels is not a

grass roots attempt to initiate interorganizational cooperative endeavors

which might not be reflective of the organization's goals.

Noting that there are levels of cooperation, there are also types

of cooperation. These types can occur at any of the levels of coopera-

tion. Nisbet (1968) identified five types: automatic, traditional,

contractual, directed, and spontaneous (p. 385). Automatic cooperation

refers to behavior that is largely unplanned and unnoticed by the

participants. He noted that most cooperation stressed by naturalists

is of this type.

Unplanned cooperation between two groups (whether
national, economic, religious, or racial) may exist
simply by virtue of an independently perceived threat to
the security of each; such cooperation may be stimulated
by action or threat of action by an outside group, but
it is predicated upon a pre-exisitng compatibility of
norms and aspirations. (p. 385)

Traditional cooperation results from past or present social norms

or mores. Nisbet exemplified this type by reference to the Chinese

clan, the joint family of India, and the village community of medieval


Contractual cooperation is prevalent in the United States and

stems from an exchange agreement.

Terms of cooperation are specific and conditional
upon the will of the participants or governed by legal
sanctions, and they are precise both in terms of length
of cooperation and of what is specifically required by
the relationship. (p. 385)

Contractual cooperation can be formal such as credit unions or consumer

cooperatives, or informal such as car pools and baby-sitting pools.

Directed cooperation arises from command or direction and is best

exemplified by the military organization. This type of cooperation quite

often leaves the participants without any knowledge as to the overall

organizational goal. The participants complete their portion of the

mission often without knowing if the overall objective has been achieved.

Spontaneous cooperation was defined as follows:

Unprescribed by tradition, contract, or command, it is
situational in character and practically constitutes
the essence of relationships within the family, neighbor-
hood, play group, and other close, personal forms of
association. (Nisbet, p. 386)

Some kind of a basis for amity appears necessary for spontaneous coopera-

tion. This type of cooperation may permeate the other types and could

support or negate even directed cooperation. One can conclude, there-

fore, that in an organization which directs cooperation, management

must develop methods to aid in the development of spontaneous coopera-


Although Nisbet identified five seemingly distinct and separate

types of cooperation, he pointed out that all of the types exist simul-

taneously, and rarely does one ever find them isolated. He also stated

that cooperation probably would not be the major force it is if it

were not for competition (Nisbet, p. 390).

One may surmise that the type of cooperation could be a good

indicator as to the life expectancy of cooperative endeavors. Auto-

matic cooperation may terminate upon elimination of the threat that

induced cooperation. Spontaneous cooperation may terminate when the

underlying friendships terminate. Contractual cooperation will last

only as long as the contract specifies, or until the contract is vio-

lated. Directed cooperation will last as long as there is sufficient

force to carry out the directives. Traditional cooperation will last

until the social norms or mores change. Cooperation as it evolves

could conceivably change from automatic to spontaneous to contractual

to traditional to directed. It could also go directly from automatic

to directed, and by no means is it implied that cooperation has to

start or end in any ordered sequence of types.

One of the earliest and most comprehensive studies of cooperation,

is that of May and Doob (1937) in Competition and Cooperation. May

and Doob tried to answer the questions as to why people cooperate or

compete, for what things they compete or cooperate, the persons with

whom or the situations in which they cooperate or compete, and the

manner in which people cooperate or compete. In answering these

questions, the authors developed a theory and then looked at coopera-

tion and competition from four viewpoints: experimental, sociological,

anthropological, and life history. The authors developed a theory

with postulates, propositions, and corollaries which is reported in

Appendix C.

These postulates and corollaries provide a framework within which

to understand the relationship between cooperation and the individual.

Since the study at hand is concerned with cooperation between and

among groups, May and Doob's material is necessary in order to gain

a greater understanding of why the individuals who make up groups co-

operate. This, in turn, may offer plausible explanations about why

groups cooperate differently. Propositions seven, eight, and nine

of the May and Doob study are of particular significance to this study.

Proposition seven stated that whether one enters a situation

as a competitor or cooperator depends on his chances for success.

The greater the likelihood of success, the higher the probability

that one enters as a competitor. If this can be applied to organiza-

tions, it could indicate when and how another organization might join

a consortium.

Proposition eight stated that in a cooperative situation, an

outside competitor changes the performance of the cooperators. There-

fore one might assume that cooperation would be impeded if there were

not groups against which to compete. If all institutions in a certain

area belonged to a consortium, then one might expect to find little

incentive to cooperate. This lack of willingness to cooperate is

readily apparent in the government's civil service structure.

Proposition nine gave some empirical and observable measures of

group performance (size, sex, nature of the task, degree of participa-

tion) that are related to the amount of cooperation in a group. Hence

these could be checked for consortium boards between voluntary and

statutory consortia.

May and Doob (1937) quoting Poe wrote, "If we can get people to

meet regularly together in every school district to discuss cooperation

and how to cooperate, the cooperation itself will surely follow" (p. 65).

This statement reflects a belief in a form of spontaneous cooperation

which is voluntary.

May and Doob found that schools do not facilitate cooperation and,

in fact, may even hinder it. They cited a list of practices which did

not contribute to cooperation and concluded "that only in extra-curricular

activities do American students learn the essence of cooperation" (p. 80).

The authors speculated that the American school system, with its inherent

paradox of stressing the ideals of cooperation while being basically com-

petitive, has contributed to the number of mental cases in this country

(p. 82).

The authors draw the following conclusions about clubs, associations,

utopian communities, and economic cooperatives.

The minimum essentials for success of a cooperative
organization or community in America, as suggested by our
theory, are:

(a) The group cannot deviate too far above or below an
optimum numerical number (which optimum for nearly
all forms of organization has not been scientifically

(b) The levels of aspiration of the group must be kept
similar and such that they can best be reached by

(c) At first and as long as contacts are retained with
competitive aspects of American culture, a certain
amount of competition for immediate goods should be
permitted, especially if it fosters cooperation toward
the ultimate goal.

(d) If it can be arranged, there should be one or more
outside competing groups. If such do not exist actually,
they should be created imaginatively as potential threats.

(e) Cooperation should be kept, as far as possible,on a
voluntary level (any member is free to resign).

(f) The members should be constantly in contact with each
other or at least psychologically aware of each other.
They should do many things together. The channels of
communication among them should be kept open.

(g) The required activities should be compatible with the
existing abilities and habit structure of the members;
e.g., they should not be required to learn a new
language. (p. 84)

Ertell (1957) developed a theory or philosophy of interinstitu-

tional cooperation which supported some of May and Doob's theory. He

started by attempting to identify the underlying conditions under which

interinstitutional cooperation works. Ertell advanced the following


It will probably be helpful if the participating
institutions are, or at least conceive themselves to
be, on a par in terms of standards and caliber of pro-
As a general proposition it appears that the chances
for successful ongoing cooperation are enhanced when the
participants derive benefits at least roughly proportionate
to their contributions.
For certain kinds of interinstitutional cooperation
proximity of institutions is obviously essential. [joint
classes] For other kinds it is of less significance or
even of virtually no consequence. [visiting lecturers]

Voluntaryism as a principle underlying cooperation is
highly significant in at least three respects. First
cooperation must be voluntary in the sense that it entails
no loss of identity or self-control on the part of the
participants and that it preserves initiative and responsibility
in each one. Second, voluntaryism requires that flexibility
and adaptability be preserved. . Finally, voluntaryism
means simply that the members of the participating institutions
desire to cooperate and to make cooperation work. (pp. 107-108)

In regard to the type of approach to take in developing cooperation,

Ertell concluded that an evolutionary approach would be the wiser policy

in order to avoid any serious setbacks to cooperation caused by mistakes

in initiating the relationships. He hedged on this by saying that, "the

process of experimentation and gradual development cannot be long

delayed" (p. 108).

As to where to begin a cooperative endeavor, he concluded that

beginnings should be made in areas of activity outside of academics.

As to the roles of trustees, administrative officers, and faculty

members, he concluded that approval by either or both the trustees and

the senior administrative officers was necessary. He advocated the

early and active involvement of the faculty in their respective areas.

He concluded:

The point seems evident: cooperation does take time,
especially as it may modify certain administrative pro-
cedures. One of the obstacles to the further development
of cooperation is the shortage of administrative time.
Hence to add the responsibility for any large-scale
cooperative effort to the workload of an already time-
pressed administrator may merely invite failure of the
effort. (p. 109)

The final question he addressed was that of inducements to inter-

institutional cooperation and what institutions can gain from coopera-

tion. The author concluded that a "dedicated man," substantial founda-

tion grants, or some situation of urgency can be the inducement to

establish a cooperative relationship. Ertell went on to argue however,

that in some cases the desire to make and keep first-rate institutions

can be enough of an inducement.

As to the gains to be had from cooperation, he mentioned the

improvement and enrichment of programs, economies of operation, increased

community services, and benefits to students and faculty, but the major

advantage was the effective utilization of available resources.

Harper (1905), as pointed out earlier, was an advocate of cooperation.

He favored the principle of individualism. Colleges should cultivate

particular strengths and stop trying to be all things to all people (p.

385). Harper's organizational scheme is a very logical division of labor,

but it would not facilitate inter-disciplinary studies.

M. M. Chambers (1961) has been an ardent advocate of the voluntary

approach to coordinating higher education. Chambers stated, "It is

of the essence of a university that it shall not be controlled too

largely by political authority" (Chambers, 1961, p. x). He argued

legislative control of the budget was, in effect, control of educational

policy. Chambers was very critical of a procedure where a -university

president has to defend a portion of his budget to a clerk or traveling

inspector from the state capital. Chambers in reviewing the three

methods of coordination stated:

That any one of these schemes is of itself a guarantee
of better public support, better efficiency and economy,
better service to the people of the state, to say nothing
of superior presidents and faculties, superior universities,
or excellent state colleges and better state systems of higher
education, is definitely not demonstrable from the available
evidence. (1961, p. 7)

Chambers identified mediocrity as the greatest danger to higher

education. To avoid this danger, he argued for a "reasonable sphere

of freedom" (1961, p. 67).

As a possible counterpoint to Chamber's hypothesis, Glenny (1959)

found that voluntary arrangements were relatively ineffective at state-

wide planning because they paid too little attention to the whole

educational system. Palola's (1969) study also does not support Chamber's

viewpoint that state level planning and coordination results in uniformity,

mediocrity, and rigidity.

Chambers (1962), however, advocated spontaneous cooperation.

From the following quote one could surmise that Chambers knew that

spontaneous cooperation could occur in a centralized system.

Voluntary coordination is really a spirit and a way that
is capable of penetrating and permeating any structure.
In fact, one could say with a great deal of cogency that
the degree of success attained under the various systems
of formally centralized control depends in a very large
measure upon the extent to which they are permeated by
the spirit of voluntary coordination. (Chambers, 1962,
p. 46)

E. David Migocki (1975) wrote a research and conceptualization

paper entitled Cooperative Agency Relationships. He postulated:

There will be no significant agency cooperation unless there
first exists a conciliatory relationship, say among the
departments of a given agency, or between personnel of
several agencies, or between agencies and the-man-in-the-
street; further, that such conciliatory relationships cannot
exist unless predicated on a viable communications-
participatory mechanism. (Migocki, 1975, p. 8, note 2)

In defining and describing relationships, he noted that relation-

ships could be (1) adversary, symbolic or conciliatory; (2) formal

or informal; (3) horizontal or vertical; and (4) representative or

direct. Migocki viewed "turfism" (the nature of organizations to

preserve and/or enlarge their domains) as a primary obstacle to

building cooperative agency relationships.

In reference to the process of building cooperative agency rela-

tionships, he concluded that the process could be helped but that it

could not be forced. He maintained that the timeframe for growth was

controlled by events, personalities, and needs.

Migocki identified six components necessary for the successful

implementation of cooperative agency relationships. These components

are timing, communication, role definition-structure, self-fulfillment,

sanction-legitimization-leadership, joint planning--funding--operating--

evaluation: synergism. He placed a great deal of importance on com-

munication. Without adequate and timely communication, which requires

a great deal of time, cooperation is almost impossible.

Hansen (1974) did his doctoral research on Avenues of Cooperation

Between Three State Agencies Responsible for Post High School Education.

He researched the relationships between the agencies responsible for

adult and continuing education, vocational and technical education, and

community junior colleges. Hansen stated:

The development of effective interagency cooperation was
seen to include the criteria of recognition of need,
cooperative intent, agency flexibility, complementation
of effort, ongoing cooperative processes, and a reciprocally
accepted common concern in meeting goals. Individual agency
actions relative to effectiveness also involved their
evaluative assessment of present and potential alternatives
regarding organizations structures, programs, fiscal
policies, facilities and resources, personnel, and current
interagency relationships. (p. xxiii)

Having read what has been written about cooperation, a note of

caution needs to be added. Depending upon the author, three different

perspectives can be identified. Some writers stress cooperation to

benefit the state. Some writers stress cooperation to benefit the

institution. And lastly, some writers stress cooperation to benefit

the clients. No doubt all three clientele are served in a cooperative



From these works one can see certain conclusions being reached

independently. There is general agreement that one can define levels

and types of cooperation,but to separate them in a field environment

is almost impossible. Cooperation requires an investment of time.

It also requires at least goal compatibility, and good communication

between the members. The nature of cooperation is affected by organiza-

tional structure and the amount, availability, and distribution of

essential resources. Lastly, there seems to be agreement that the

principle of voluntarism is important to all types cooperation, and

therefore can determine how successful a cooperative endeavor may be.

Interorganizational Theory

We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were
beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I
was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new
situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be
for creating the illusion of progress while producing con-
fusion, inefficiency, and demoralization. (Petronius
Arbiter, ca. 60 A.D.)

The architect's adage that "form follows function" certainly

applies to organizations. There is no doubt that an efficient organiza-

tional framework can only be built after a thorough understanding of

the goals, purposes, and functions of the organization has been gained.

In that light, it has to be noted that there is no one best organiza-

tional framework. Although over the years the bureaucratic model as

advanced by Max Weber has been used extensively, one finds it is used

where some other organizational framework or structure would be more


Quite often organizations are reorganized or renewed to make them

more cost effective, or more efficient in terms of achieving one or all

of the organizations stated goals. In this study, the concern is with

determining if organizational structure, as manifested by voluntary and

statutory consortia, is related to cooperation. Hence, cooperation

is the common denominator for measuring effectiveness.

The following paragraphs highlight some of the differences that exist

between organizational and interorganizational patterns. One of the most

distinguishing differences is conflict. Conflict in organizations has

been viewed as dysfunctional. However conflict in interorganizational

patterns is a given, and is not dysfunctional (Lancaster, 1970;

Litwak & Hylton, 1962, p. 397; Scott & Mitchell, 1972, p. -193).

Traditionally society has had a "division of labor" and each organization

has been oriented toward only one function. Hence the competition for

scarce resources was between organizations rather than within them. This

prevented conflict from becoming internalized which could result in a

weakening of the organization. Since people's needs are usually inter-

related, it does not make sense to treat them as though they were frag-

mented. Interorganizational patterns are an attempt to treat inter-

related needs in an interrelated way.

Another point of contrast is authority:

In a bureaucracy, authority and responsibility are delegated
internally from position to position, office to office, to
handle problems effectively. In interorganizational patterns,
where leverage of position is reduced, the handling of pro-
blems is less through formal structure, and more shared by
specific agreement or are presented by those who have
responsibilities and problems but no right of command to
those who possess competence and such means of accomplishment
as access to a necessary population. (Clark, 1965, p. 234)

Another major difference is in the area of decision making.

In a bureaucracy, solutions to problems take the form of
deliberate decision. The organization assembles the elements
of the problem, weighs the alternatives, and makes a
purposeful or deliberate decision. In the patterns of
influence that connect autonomous organizations, on the other
hand, solutions to problems are less formally and consciously
determined. The solutions approach those found in decentralized
political systems, where the solution is a social choice; that
is, a resultant of the interactions of interested, autonomous
organizations. (Clark, 1965, p. 236)

Thompson and McEwen, although not writing specifically about

interorganizational goal setting, have noted the following:

Because the setting of goals is essentially a problem
of defining desired relationships between an organization
and its environment, change in either requires review
and perhaps alteration of goals. (Thompson & McEwen,
1958, p. 23)

They caught the essence of goal setting as a purpose to be decided

rather than as an obvious matter of fact. This is especially so in

interorganizational patterns.

Thompson and McEwen also drew attention to the impact environment

has on interorganizational relations. A study of organizations should

note whether the environment is turbulent or nonturbulent. Some of the

conceptual approaches discussed later on are designed for static or

nonturbulent conditions.

The authors perceived organizational power on a continuum with

environment dominating the organizations (railroads) at one end, and

the organization (oil companies) dominating the environment at the

other. Adjustments between the organization and its environment can

be made competitively or cooperatively. The authors identified three

sub-types of the cooperative method of adjustment--bargaining, co-

optation, and coalition.

These four areas of authority, conflict, decision making, and goal

setting are significantly different processes in the inter versus intra

organizational environment.

Standards of work, personnel assignment, and research and develop-

ment are additional factors which are affected by the pattern type.

In the interorganizational patterns "Standards setting often takes the

form of manipulating resources and incentives in a large market or

economy of organizations" (Clark, 1965, p. 235). In other words

personnel assignment is influenced by money and prestige. Clark cited

the Physical Science Study Comnittee (PSSC) experience in support of

this contention.

They [PSSC] were in a position to use the leverage of money
as well as the prestige of science to influence local
authorities toward certain kinds of teachers and certain
kinds of teaching materials. (p. 235)

Clark found that the major difference in research development was

that of internal control versus external control. Whereas the organiza-

tional pattern has a section that deals with research and development,

the interorganizational pattern normally pays an outside agency for

this function.

As was pointed out in the introduction, Gulick stated one can

organize by purpose, process, clientele or material, or by place (Gulick &

Urwick, 1937, pp. 21-26). It was noted that no matter which of the

four one chooses to organize around, the others still exist and provide

a framework for interinstitutional organization. Each method of organi-

zation has a disadvantage in terms of cooperation and coordination.

These are listed below and will be referred to later in the text.

(1) Organization by major purpose

(a) An organization fully equipped from top to
bottom with all of the direct and collateral
services required for the accomplishment of
its central purpose, without the need of any
assistance from other departments, drifts very
easily into an attitude and position of complete
independence from all other activities. (p. 23)

(b) Purpose departments must be co-ordinated so
that they will not conflict but will work
shoulder to shoulder. (p. 24)

(2) Organization by major process

(a) A given profession or skill tends to show a
greater degree of arrogance and unwillingness
to accept democratic control. (p. 24)

(b) The necessity of effective co-ordination is greatly
increased. . Process departments must be co-
ordinated not only to prevent conflict, but also to
guarantee positive cooperation. (pp. 24-25)

(3) Organization by Clientele or Material

Departments set up by clientele seldom escape political
dominance by those groups, and are generally found to
be special pleaders for those groups, at times in op-
position to the general interest of society as a whole.
(p. 26)

(4) Organization by place

(a) the increased difficulty of maintaining a uniform
nation-wide, state-wide, or city-wide policy. (p. 30)

(b) An administrative system also set up by area is
perculiarly subject to spoilation by politicians
as long as we have the spoils system. (p. 30)

Gulick also addressed the principle of homogeneity:

The efficiency of a group working together is directly
related to the homogeneity of the work ..
It follows from this (1) that any organizational structure
which brings together in a single unit work division which
are non-homogeneous in work, in technology, or in purpose
will encounter the danger of friction and inefficient; and
(2) that a unit based on a given specialization cannot be
given technical direction by a layman. (pp. 9, 10)

This obviously has significance for interinstitutional organizations

because if valid, it would mean that the bringing together of diverse

organizations like the public school system, the Health and Rehabilitative

services department, and the local police under a single unit could pro-

duce friction and inefficiency. The question then is what generates the

inefficiency? If it has been assumed that inefficiency results from

friction [conflict], then one can logically question the validity of

the principle as it applies to interorganizational patterns.

Gulick ended the discussion of technical efficiency with the fol-


As Dr. Frank J. Goodnow pointed out a generation ago,
we are faced here by two heterogeneous functions,
"politics" and "administration," the combination of
which cannot be undertaken within the structure of the
administration without producing inefficiency. (p. 10)

If Dr. Goodnow is correct, decision-making in interorganizational

patterns will be inefficient, assuming that Clark (1965) is correct about

the process being political.

It was pointed out in the introduction that Barnard saw the

essential elements of an organization as communication, willingness

to serve, and common purpose (Barnard, 1938, p. 82). He also saw

cooperation as necessary for the continued existence of the organiza-

tion. Barnard noted the paradox that exists in relationship to organi-

zational purpose: "an organization must disintergrate if it cannot

accomplish its purposes, it also destroys itself by accomplishing its

purposes" (p. 91). The answer to this dilemma is in redefinition of

purpose. Barnard stated, "most continuous organizations require repeated

adoption of new purpose" (p. 91).

Any discussion of the historical development of organizational change

refers back to this statement by Barnard. Organizational development

is a planned process for changing organizations (Litterer, 1973, p. 740).

Litterer saw organizational development in two stages: diagnosis and

intervention. Diagnosis meant assessing where the organization was in

terms of procedures, structures, attitudes, groups, norms, and other

such factors. Intervention referred to the steps taken to change the

above parameters so that organization could better realize its goals.

The diagram in Table 1 from Litterer's work depicts his approach to

organizational change.

Organizational development is a product of its historical growth.

Lippitt and Schmidt (1967) identified the stages of growth experienced

by most organizations. Those "stages" are depicted in Table 2.

The importance of organizational growth to this study is pointed

out by Silverman in the section on consortia. Developmental level

(growth level) may be a structural determinant of interinstitutional


Table 1

Changing Organizational Behavior


Change in organization

Change of position in Formal-
organization task

Change of personnel
in organization



Self-concept --group




Leave or withdraw

-Attempt to change formal-task role

Change self-concept

(Litterer, 1973, p. 741)

Table 2

Stages of Organizational Growth

mental Consequences if concern
stage Critical concern Key issue is not met
1. To create a new What to risk Frustration and inaction

BIRTH 2. To survive as a What to sacri- Death of organization
viable system fice
Further subsidy by
"faith" capital

3. To gain stability How to Reactive, crisis-domin-
organize ated organization

Opportunistic rather
than self-directing
attitudes and policies

YOUTH 4. To gain reputation How to review Difficulty in attracting
and develop pride and evaluate good personnel and

Inappropriate, overly
aggressive, and dis-
torted image building

5. To achieve Whether and Unnecessarily defensive
uniqueness and how to change competitive attitudes;
adaptability diffusion of energy

MATURITY 6. To contribute Whether and Possible lack of public
to society how to share respect and appreciation

Bankruptcy or profit

Source: Gordon L. Lippitt and Warren H. Schmidt, "Crises in a Developing
Organization," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 45, No. 6, November-
December, 1967, p. 103.

Exchange Theory

Exchange theory has been used as a theoretical base in many

studies of cooperation. Blau stated that the basic underlying

assumption of social exchange is as follows:

Men enter into new social associations because they
expect doing so to be rewarding and that they continue
relations with old associates and expand their inter-
action with them because they actually find doing so to
be rewarding. (Blau, 1968, p. 452)

From this assumption, one can logically deduce how the exchange process

is conceived.

Blau used four examples to define and limit social exchange. He

stated that a man could give money to someone because of (a) physical

coercion, (b) conscience demand, (c) an uncontrollable impulse or,

(d) "because he enjoys receiving their expressions of deferential

gratitude" (1968, p. 454). He defined the last example as social

exchange whereas the other examples only defined the boundaries.

In brief, the concept of exchange refers to voluntary
social actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions
from others and that cease when these expected reactions
are not forthcoming. (Blau, 1968, p. 454)

Blau stated that "the economic principle of eventually declining

marginal utility applies to social exchange as well" (1968, p. 454).

The reason for this is caused by foregone alternatives which makes the

individual feel he has given something up in order to exercise a

particular alternative.

Blau further noted that social exchange was an evolutionary process

which started with minor transactions of little importance. As the

relationship grew and trust developed the more important areas were

dealt with in the exchange. There appears to be a correlation here

to what Ertell said about the evolutionary approach to voluntary

cooperation. It seems appropriate to make a connection between the

development of social exchange and that of cooperation.

Blau went on to highlight the linkage between exchange and power.

In essence, he showed that the giving of gifts or rendering of services

obligated the receiver to reciprocate. If there is no reciprocation

then the giver has claim to a superior status. It follows also that if

the gifts or services are more than returned a counterclaim is made.

Emerson, cited in Blau, established four conditions which have to be

met in order for the giver to attain power over the receiver through

social exchange.

First, they [the receivers] must not have resources that
the benefactor needs, otherwise they can obtain what they
want from him in direct exchange. Second, they must not
be able to obtain the benefits he has to offer from an
alternative source, which would make them independent of him.
Third, they must be unable or unwilling to take what they
want from him by force. Fourth, they must not undergo a
change in values that enables them to do without the
benefits they originally needed. (p. 456)

An interesting distinction can be drawn from economic, social,

and power exchanges. In an economic exchange, repayment of the benefit

is decided in advance and normally formalized through a contract. In a

social exchange, the what and when of repayment of the benefits is

decided afterwards by the one who received it. In a social exchange

with the accompanying imbalance of power, the what and when of re-

payment is made by the benefactor at his discretion.

The relationship between power and exchange is therefore an

exchange process. The unilateral giving of resources is compensated

for by the giving of superior status and/or the public acknowledgement

of greater power to the benefactor.

Blau noted when power entered into the exchange process that a

secondary exchange developed.

Thus, a secondary exchange--of fairness in the exercise of
power in return for social approval by subordinates--emerges
as power becomes differentiated in a collectivity. The
social forces set into motion by this secondary exchange
lead to legitimation and organization, on the one hand, and
to opposition and change, on the other. (p. 456)

This secondary exchange is of importance in explaining the action of

members against a member of overwhelming prestige, e.g., the collective

restraint exercised by the Latin American nations vis-a-vis the United

States in the OAS. The importance of exchange theory will be shown in

subsequent pages not only as a framework for studying interorganizational

relationships, but also as a method of understanding relationships

between diverse institutions.

Studies reported by Stogdill (1974) support the existence and

importance of the fairness exchange (p. 289). He found that "high-

power members of a group offering unconditional cooperation tend to be

exploited" (p. 289). This was especially true in the situations where

low-power members found high-power members following through on their

promises to cooperate. Cooperation and liking was reported to be enhanced

when the members were of approximately equal power and there was a

conditional offer of cooperation. Stogdill went on to point out that

coalitions tend to form when there is an imbalance of power that can

be counterbalanced by concerted action.

Theories of Coalition

Few would argue that bringing autonomous organizations together

to work in a cooperative and coordinated fashion is an art. The art

is one of influence. Banfield (1964) in his book entitled Political

Influence referred to three processes of decision making: central

decision, social choice, and mixed decision-choice (pp. 326, 337).

He noted that in the central decision process, there may not be an

ultimate criterion upon which to base a decision, however, in the social

choice process there is. The criterion is "the distribution of influence.

Coalition formation is an attempt to control the distribution of in-

fluence. According to Banfield, "The importance accorded to each

alternative in a choice process depends, then, upon the relative amount

of influence exercised on its behalf" (p. 331).

The process of social choice, to be a winner or a counterbalancing

force, requires a disproportionate share of influence. The study of

coalition formation is an attempt at determining how this is done.

Gamson (1968) defined coalition as "the joint use of resources to

detennine the outcome of a decision" (p. 530). The importance of

coalition theory was noted by Gamson.

Coalition theory is relevant for understanding social
organization in two ways: (1) in the rise of new forms
of social organization and (2) in the operation of
existing social systems. (p. 533)

The first of these reasons is more relevant to this study because

it provides a nexus between the evolutionary growth of cooperation and

organizational growth.

For example, consider a situation in which a number of
originally autonomous units join in an association that

draws on the resources of the units ta compete for the
achievement of their collective goals. The new association
might become so successful that its maintenance becomes
more important for the members than the achievement of any
advantage relative to each other. Finally, the autonomous
nature of the original units may disappear completely. (p. 533)

Although three coalition formation theories are encountered in the

literature, minimum power, minimum resource, and anti-competitive,

only the last two are discussed here.

The minimum resource theory is quite often referred to as the

size principle, and assumes that the players are after what they feel

is owed to them. The size principle was advanced by William Riker in


In social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games
with side payments, participants create coalitions
just as large as they believe will ensure winning and
no larger. (pp. 32, 33)

Gamson (1968) stated it this way:

The central hypothesis of the theory is that a coalition
will form in which the total resources are as small
as possible while still being sufficient. (p. 531)

This means that interorganizational patterns could have too many

members. If that is the case, then these members do not aid the total

effort. Extraneous members may perceive themselves correctly as having

no meaningful role. This situation could lead to a cleavage in the

structure and hence a breakdown in cooperation.

Anti-competitive theory resulted from work done by Vinacke


The basic assumption of anti-competitive theory is
that players in the coalition situation do not want
to compete with each other; on the contrary, they are
concerned mainly with preserving social relationships
within the group. (Gamson, 1968, p. 532)

Cooperative endeavors in the area of adult education that exist

to the satisfaction of community junior colleges, adult and continuing

education, and vocational and technical education schools may be

explained under this theory.

Howard (1967) studied interinstitutional cooperation through an

analysis of the recipients of Title III funds of the 1965 Higher Education

Act. He found that cooperation was ill defined, and largely passed

over. Howard stated that the successful elements of cooperation, the

issues posed by cooperation, the distinguishing differences between

incidental projects and developmental programs, the quid pro quo elements

of cooperation, and the impact of cooperation on institutional autonomy

were unknown (p. 109). Howard quoting from Katz reported that "rela-

tionships which are one-sided in character are not likely to endure"

(p. 136). Cooperation requires an investment of time and energy. Hence,

small institutions may only be able to become involved in one area

whereas the large institution can become involved in numerous areas.

Howard also stated, "The more collegially organized university may well

be more easily involved in a cooperative program" (p. 114). From this,

one can determine that Howard also saw the cooperation as an exchange


Chester Barnard (1938) saw cooperation as an exchange which

supports Katz's statement about one-sided relationships:

The efficiency of cooperation therefore depends upon
what it secures and produces on the one hand, and how
it distributes its resources and how it changes motives
on the other. (p. 59)

Levine and White (1961) used exchange as a conceptual framework

to explain relationships between health and welfare agencies. The

authors posited that for an organization to achieve its stated pur-

poses it needed the following:

It must have clients to serve; it must have resources in
the form of equipment, specialized knowledge, or the
funds with which to procure them; and it must have the
services of people who can direct these resources to the
clients. (p. 586)

They maintained that if the above items were in infinite supply there

would be little need for cooperation, and organizational interaction.

However since the situation is generally not one of infinite supply,

organizations must interact, cooperate, and sometimes limit their func-

tions to achieve their stated goals.

The authors identified three related factors which were the major

components of the exchange system. These factors were as follow:

(1) the accessibility of each organization to
necessary elements from sources outside the
health system,

(2) the objectives of the organization and particular
functions to which it allocates the elements it
controls, and

(3) the degree to which domain consensus exists among
the various organizations. (p. 589)

The authors stated that organizations have varying degrees of

dependence depending on "access to elements outside the system" (p.

598). The writers found that corporate organizations [those which dele-

gate authority downward] interacted less with other agencies than did

federated organizations [those that delegate authority upwards]. Howard

supported this position when he wrote about the case of involving the

more collegially organized university. Gulick also supported this


In reference to the objectives and functions, the authors stated,

"the organization's function establishes the range of possibilities for

exchange" (p. 595). Levine and White classified the agencies under

study as to whether they provided a direct or indirect service to the

client. They found that treatment organizations rate high in referrals

and educational organizations rate low (p. 593). This meant that treat-

ment organizations cooperated more than did educational organizations.

They also found high prestige organizations "lead in the number of joint

activities and prestige seems to exert some influence on the amount of

verbal and written communication" (p. 595). Thus, high prestige organi-

zations tend to be more cooperative.

Studying joint board membership, the authors could not find any

evidence to indicate that joint board membership facilitated coopera-

tion between agencies. The authors concluded that if the boards did

anything they served more as a link to the community than as a link to

the agencies (p. 595).

Domain was a central factor in the study and was viewed as a pre-

requisite to exchange.

The domain of an organization consists of the specific
goals it wishes to pursue and the functions it undertakes
in order to implement its goals. In operational terms,
organizational domain in the health field refers to the
claims that an organization stakes out for itself in terms
of (1) disease covered, (2) population served, and (3)
services rendered. (p. 597)

The authors identified three strategies for achieving domain consensus:

(1) negotiation, (2) orientation, and (3) legitimation. Negotiation

referred to a bargaining process whereby there is a continual give and

take. Orientation referred to specificity of function. Legitimation

referred to the situation where an agency licenses all institutions.

The importance that Levine and White attached to domain is re-

flected in the following quote:

These processes of achieving domain consensus constitute
most of the interaction between organizations. While
they may not involve the immediate flow of elements, they
are often necessary preconditions for the exchange of
elements, because without at least minimal domain consensus
there can be no exchange among organizations. (p. 599)

Valdes' doctoral dissertation (1975), entitled A Study of the Scope

of Cooperation and Coordination between Community Colleges and Community

Schools in Florida's Community College Districts, supported the importance

of domain consensus to cooperation (p. 103).

Although the importance of domain consensus is not challenged,

Baker (1973) is critical of Levine and White's approach. Baker felt

that Levine and White did not consider the impact of a turbulent environ-

ment on the interorganizational relationship. He stated, "inter-

dependence exists among these local parts only to the extent that rele-

vant resources are not available from outside the local region . ."

(p. 187). Baker maintained a static non-changing environment was the

ideal and may exist in some instances, but he maintained that a rapidly

changing environment is more prevalent.

Litwak and Hylton (1962) advanced a theory of interorganizational

coordination based on four factors:

(1) Organizational interdependence,
(2) Level of organizational awareness,
(3) Standardizations of organizational activities, and
(4) Number of organizations. (p. 395)

The authors addressed their remarks to coordinating agencies which

they defined as "formal organizations whose major purpose is to order

behavior between two or more other formal organizations by communicating

pertinent information" (p. 399). An example of a coordinating agency

of significance to this study is the consortium headquarters.

Litwak and Hylton noted that organizations are independent because

of conflicting values or organizational specialization. They need coordina-

tion, however, because of a common goal which can only be fully achieved

through cooperation.

In light of this, they offered the following hypothesis:

Co-ordinating agencies will develop and continue in
existence if formal organizations are partly inter-
dependent; agencies are aware of this interdependence,
and it can be defined in standardized units of action.(p. 400)

The authors performed a limited test of their hypothesis on com-

munity chests and social service exchanges. Interdependence "meant

two or more organizations must take each other into account if they are

to accomplish their goals" (p. 401). Awareness meant "that the agency

as a matter of public policy recognizes that a state of interdependency

exists" (p. 402). Standardized actions referred to behavior which was

"reliably ascertained and repetitive in character" (p. 402).

From their research, the authors advanced the following rules:

1. Standardization is curvilinearly related to
co-ordinating agencies: too little leads to no
co-ordination or ad hoc informal types of co-
ordination, while too much means the use of rules
or laws rather than co-ordinating agencies.

2. There is a monotonic relation between awareness and
co-ordination, with low observability meaning little
co-ordination and high observability leading to high

3. There is a curvilinear relation between inter-
dependence and co-ordinating agencies: high inter-
dependency leads to the merger of organizations, with
co-ordination taking place intraorganizationally,
while low interdependence leads to no co-ordination
rather than to co-ordinating agencies.

4. There is a curvilinear relation between number of
organizations and the development of coordinating

Thus in spite of awareness of interdependence, it is
more difficult to develop co-ordinating agencies where there
are a large number of organizations to co-ordinate (5,000).
On the other hand, where there are only a few organizations
(2-4) there is no need for co-ordinating agencies. . (p. 416)

Litwak and Hylton (1962) designed a table to represent types of

coordinating mechanisms which reflect the above rules. It has been

reproduced as Table 3. It is readily apparent that this concept does

account for changes in the environment.

One interesting fact of Litwak and Hylton's study was the necessity

for developing procedures to preserve autonomy and conflict (p. 413).

The authors pointed out that:

If the community chest were to concentrate just on the
co-operative functions, there would be a tendency for
organizational merger of member agencies or, as a minimum,
the development of uniformity of services. (p. 413)

Following the historical development of community chest and the

business world, the authors pointed out how in the former case, develop-

ment was from cooperation to competition and in the latter case from

competition to cooperation. Hence, it can be shown that as organiza-

tions develop, the focus on competition or cooperation changes.

Organizational Structure and Cooperation

Aldrich (1971) conceptualized "populations of organizations" as

boundary maintaining systems (pp. 279-280). He perceived the crucial

element as the authority to control organizational entry or exit.

Relying on Carlson's (1964) typology of organizations (which is a Latin

square with member control over participation on one axis, and

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organizational control over admission on the other axis) and Etzioni's

(1961) classification of compliance structure, Aldrich made predictions

about what type of strategy an organization would use when it is in

conflict with another organization. These predictions are reported


Organizations with normative control structures are more
likely to follow the tightening up strategy than the
expansion strategy, since admission to the good graces of
the organization constitutesone of the major control

One factor that might lead normative organizations to
employ an expansion strategy is the absence of a rigid
ideology to which all members must subscribe.

Indeed, conflict between utilitarian organizations is
ordinarily so benign that only a minimal degree of member
compliance at the lower levels of the organization is
required. Given the prevailing business values of 'size'
and 'growth', it is highly unlikely that a utilitarian
organization will use the constriction strategy except as
a short run tactic that is taken out of absolute economic

Organizations with coercive control structures are a
different case. They are continually oriented to minimal
member participation; the primary type of conflict they
face is inadequate control of the behavior of their
inmates. . Although the authorities of coercive
organizations are not likely to use expansion as a strategy,
expansion can be used by the opposition to co-opt or capture
the lower level functionaries of the coercive-type organization.
(pp. 289,290)

Aldrich thus developed the concepts of authority, membership, and

autonomy in his conceptual scheme. It appears that the impetus to

join and cooperate in a consortium would depend on its type, i.e.,

normative, utilitarian, or coercive.

Baker and O'Brien (1971) advanced nine hypotheses about organiza-

tions. The authors used the concept of an interorganizational field

for examining interorganizational relationships. Their hypotheses

are reported below:

Hypothesis 1
Organizations which control the input resources for
other organizational systems in the field will exert
greater influence on the goal selection and decision-
making of those other organizational systems. The extent
of such influence will be directly proportional to the
scarcity of resources and the availability of alternative
sources of the resources to members of the interorganiza-
tional field.

Hypothesis 2
The degree of cooperation between agencies which have
similar functions will decrease as the extent to which they
draw from a common and limited supply of input resources
increases. Also, the more limited the supply of resources,
the greater will be the degree of competition that will
be perceived between the agencies.

Hypothesis 3
To the degree an organization is dependent upon another
system or other systems for information used in guiding its
own system functioning, the other system, by its control
of needed information will be able to exert control on the
actions of the local organization.

Hypothesis 4
The greater the degree of feedback dependence which
organizations in a field have with any one organization,
the lower the degree of thrust among members of the
interorganizational system.

Hypothesis 5
In a large organizational field a number of large
suprasystems will exist, each with considerable decision-
making and influencing capabilities, which will affect
intersystem relations throughout the interorganizational

Hypothesis 6
Organizations with highly similar goals will tend to
see each other as competitive, while organizations with
complementary goals will tend to see each other as more

Hypothesis 7
Cooperation will be greatest among organizations with
complementary organizational role expectations. When
interorganizational role ambiguity exists, conflicts and
gaps in intersystem relationships will occur.

Hypothesis 8
Organizations linked to other organizations by frequent
interaction of a particular type will express different
expectations for these other organizations, determined by
the character of the enduring interaction form.

Hypothesis 9
Rapid change in relationships and operation of systems
in an interorganizational field will encourage the openness
of organizational systems within that field toward innovation
in operations and new intersystem cooperation. (pp. 133-136)

One could therefore expect to find cooperation flourishing in a

consortium where there are abundant resources, complementary goals, and

a high degree of trust. Those organizations in the consortium that

control critical resources and information should have a disproportionate

share of the power. This is not to imply that the potential for power

is recognized or used.

P. J. Mummert did a study of cooperation between elementary schools

and relocation agencies. One of the objectives was "to uncover the

reasons for organizational cooperation--or its absence--in terms of

the particular traits of each organizational type" (Mummert, 1972,

p. xii). He analyzed the following organizational traits:

The organizations vertical dependence on higher or-
ganizations, interpreted function consensus regarding
the other organizations' domain, staff composition,
decision-making structure and operational formality.
(p. xii)

His findings are reported below:

(a) The less vertical attachment between an organization
and its source of resources (the forces which control
them), the more autonomy it is likely to have in
influencing their use and carrying out its activities.

(b) The greater the lateral and longitudinal interest
a service agency has in its clients, the greater its
need for relationships with other organizations.

(c) The broader the domain of an organization with
respect to purpose, skills, clientele, and geography,
the more it will be recognized by other organizations.

(d) The greater the diversity of an organization's staff,
the greater the likelihood that its services and
response to clients will change.

(e) The more influence all members of an organization's
staff have over decisions, the greater the communica-
tion within the organization and engagement in informal
contacts with other organizations.

(f) The less an organization's staff must rely on rules
and regulations for guidance, the more freedom from
restraints staff members will have in dealing with
clients. (p. 244)

Mummert found a direct correlation between his six postulates and

cooperation. The greater an organization's conformity to the postulates,

the stronger the cooperation (p. 244).

One exception was in the case of the school's domain,
which in addition to contributing to its "exposure"
was related to defensive behavior which hindered
chances for cooperation. With respect to these postulates,
the characteristic's of the school indicated little
propensity for interaction. (pp. 244-245)

The author went on to identify seven strategies which could be

used to promote cooperative endeavors between the organizations he


The seven strategies are institutional neglect, institu-
tional location, institutional guidance, institutional
integration, institutional change, institutional inter-
action, and institutional elimination. (p. 245)

Form and Nosow (1958) studied how individuals and organizations

behave in disasters. The study was done in Flint and Beecher, Michigan,

shortly after the tornado of June, 1953. Any disaster site is a natural

setting for automatic cooperation. The authors found that organizational

behavior could be predicted from a knowledge of the organizations

characteristics (p. 130). Table 4 depicted below is taken from their work.

c U

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The authors found variables affecting individuals came into play

during a'disaster which impacted on organizational behavior which, in

turn, impacted on interorganizational behavior. The authors identified

three stages of disaster: predisaster stage, emergency stage, and post-

disaster stage and found that cooperation was different in each stage.

They found the predisaster plans centered on coordinating organiza-

tions, and where they existed, they were not followed. When cooperation

did occur, it was spontaneous in nature.

It was also observed that organizational cooperation was
facilitated among organizations with similar internal
structures. Thus, the State Police, the Flint Police,
and the National Guard worked out a system of coordination
much more rapidly among themselves than with other organiza-
tions. (p. 236)

The reason for this may be similarity in goals and functions; a

point that Levine and White (1961) also make. In reference to goals

and functions, these writers stated the following:

Cooperation is highly stimulated when the perspectives of
people and organizations converge; when they define goals
and means to achieve these goals in the same way. This is
the heart of a cooperative system, whether the system is a
formal organization, two or more organizations acting
together, or the relations between an organization and
private citizens. (p. 241)

In summarizing, Form and Nosow (1958) stated the following about

interorganizational cooperation.

Integration of participating organizations becomes dif-
ficult because (a) the unique structures of the partici-
pating organizations differ, (b) the conditions that
characterize their community performance normally differ,
(c) their perceptions of one another in the community
social structure differ, (d) the social characteristics of
their members differ, and perhaps most crucial, (e) their
cooperative activity cannot become routinized because one
cannot simulate disaster adequately, and the tendency is
for each organization to preserve its self-identity over
its cooperative identity. (p. 244)

Schmidt and Kochan (1971) wrote about goals, resources, and

activity interdependence in terms of conflict and the potential for

conflict. They viewed conflict as a dynamic process which moved from

antecedent conditions (scarcity of resources), through affective states

(tension), cognitive states (awareness), and finally ended in conflictful

behavior (p. 260). Schniidt and Kochan stated, "The essential difference

between competition and conflict is in the realm of interference, or

blocking activities" (p. 361). By this the authors were referring to

blocking or interfering with goal attainment. Of particular interest

to this study is their diagram of conflict potential shown in the


From the diagram one can see that the potential for conflict

increases as activity interdependence, shared resources, and goal

incompatibility increases. However, from the previously reviewed

works, the potential for cooperation increases with shared resources,

activity interdependence, and complementary goals. Thus the perception

of goals may be critical in determining whether a situation evolves into

a cooperative or conflictive relationship. If one drew a

line on their table from their point U to a point this author has

labeled C in brackets, this line could be considered the cooperation

potential axis.


From this section one can glean certain recurring organizational

traits that are related to and have an impact on cooperation. These

traits follow: organizational goals, organizational governance,

organization's stage of development, resource availability, prestige,




High Z

/ /


POll TI 1011 Co) L CI mI. 0 ItI0 !1

(Schmidt & Kochan, 1971, p. 366)

domain, communication in the organization, type of organization,

staff influence, organizational structure, awareness of interrelation-

ships, and factors around which organization takes place, i.e., purpose,

process, place, clientele or material.


The consortium is relatively new to the educational system of this

country. Johnson (1973) stated:

The Atlanta University system and the Claremont College
date back to the 1920's, and the cooperative centers in
Virginia and Georgia began in the 1940's. However, the
distinctly new form and new spirit did not fully emerge
until 1958, when both a large university group (the
committee on Institutional Cooperation) and a college group
(the associated Colleges of the Midwest) set the pattern
for multipurpose cooperation among widely scattered
institutions. (p. 426)

Consortia experienced a relatively slow but steady growth until 1965.

They have expanded rapidly ever since.

Consortium for the purpose of this study is defined as an arrange-

ment whereby four or more organizations work jointly toward common

goals. This is not a generally accepted definition. The more widely

accepted definition is that which has previously been defined as

voluntary consortia. The typology of consortia is not inclusive

and varies with authors and definitions; however, two major subgroups

can be identified: voluntary and statutory. The Danforth Foundation's

conference on consortia noted three ways that consortia could be

brought about: voluntary, voluntary with state backing, and enforced

or statutory. For the purpose of this study the voluntary approach

with state backing is not dealt with because it is hardly a reality

to date. Within both these categories, one can further subdivide

consortia by purpose, organization, size, philosophy, funding, and

geographical proximity.

Franklin Patterson (1974), who does not recognize statutory consortia,

as consortia, developed a tripartite typology for voluntary consortia:

cooperative consortia, service consortia, and Title III consortia (p. 14).

Cooperative consortia are those having joint academic plans and programs.

Service consortia are those providing the members with one or more

particular services. Title III consortia are those existing under

Title IIIof the 1965 Higher Education Act (P.L. 89-329). Patterson

characterized the latter as having "low income students, substandard

resources; and critically inadequate financial resources" (p. 18).

Many other typologies exist: single purpose or multi-purpose,

limited structure or complex structure, interstate or intrastate.

For this study, parts of the above typologies will be used as adjectives

to describe both voluntary and statutory consortia.

The governance structure of both types of consortia is defined

in the documents which bring a consortium into existence. In the case

of statutory consortia the documents can be statutes, regulations,

resolutions, executive orders or ordinances, while in the case of

voluntary consortia the documents can be informal or formal statements

of agreement or intent, contracts, resolutions, constitution, or

articles of incorporation.

The following quotes reflect the varied governmental arrangements

of voluntary consortia.

In examining the organizational structures considerable
variation was found in factors such as consortium member-
ship, selection of board members, voting regulations,
provisions for board officers and committees, fiscal
years and annual meetings. A salient consistent factor
was that the institutional presidents and or their
representatives retained a vast majority of all of the
potential votes on consortium policy questions. (Patterson,
L. D., 1971, p. 3628A)

Franklin Patterson (1974) writing three years later found the

following to be the case:

In their essence, the majority of formal consortium
arrangements feature a single form of governance: a
board consisting of the presidents of the member
institutions, which sets policy and overseas [sic] the
implementing actions of the executive director and his
staff. . Board chairmanship is usually carried
by one of the presidents, elected by his fellows. (pp. 43, 44)

One can find a continuum ranging from no boards to a very complex

arrangement of seven boards at the Claremont colleges. It appears,

however, that F. Patterson's observations and research are correct.

Johnson (1973) maintained that the trend was toward legal incorpora-

tion for economic reasons. In his words, the objective seems to be

one of "functional interdependence and corporate independence" (p. 421).

Martorana and McGuire (1976) classified the governance and

administrative patterns of regionalizations, they found as follows:

advisory board, governing board, executive director, institutional,

or state agency (p. 51).

The authority for both types of consortia can be classified as

coming from three sources, i.e., statutory authority, administrative

authority, or institutional authority.

Voluntary consortia have been scrutinized and studied in the

1970's and certain weak points seem to be noticed by all. One

criticism is that such consortia do not have "a planned system of

educational complementarity designed to use institutional and

instructional resources more efficiently" (Patterson, F., 1974, p. 34).

Hence student interchange is on a relatively random basis.

Another criticism is of the weakness of the executive director

of the consortium. The director has only a small carrot and no stick.

Even Title III money goes directly to the member institutions rather

than to the consortium headquarters. Factors contributing to the

director's weakness are as follows: the board, made up of the insti-

tutional presidents, controls the consortium; and the director has no

constituency to which to appeal because faculty and students do not

identify with the consortium. Where the consortium has membership

fees, the director is caught between raising fees and losing member-

ship, or increasing membership and compounding the communication problem.

A third criticism is that "interinstitutional programs are not

developed and administered without an investment of manpower, money,

and other resources" (Patterson, L.D.,1970, p. 6). Hence the investors

see it as a high risk situation which may have only minimal returns.

L. D. Patterson also noted two other weaknesses of voluntary

consortia. He found that community involvement, in the way of represen-

tation from welfare and governmental agencies, school districts, and

business, has been limited, and is likely to increase slowly if at all.

He offered the following reasons for this lack of a broad representation:

(1) the reluctance of institutions to invite external
forces to participate in the formulation of educational
programs and policy, and
(2) the community's narrow concern for education directed
to immediate and practical relevance. (Patterson, 1970, p. 4)

Patterson stated that college presidents fear that a "highly developed

consortium might infringe upon the individuality of member institutions"

(p. 4). These concerns no doubt exist and are overcome only by forces

of equal or greater magnitude.

From the late 1960's on, one finds the public relations type

literature giving way to literature based upon research. One of the

early research works was a doctoral dissertation done at Cornell

University in 1969 by R. J. Silverman.

Silverman based his work on bargaining and exchange theory. Of

the five voluntary consortia he studied, two were studied in depth

(5 months) and while the other three were observed only briefly (3

weeks total). The hypotheses he developed from his research are

reported below:

1. The more threatening the environment, the greater
the impetus for the threatened organizations to
join in a consortium.

2. The nature of consortium involvement is dependent
upon the nature and significance of the benefits
from such involvement.

3. Colleges interacting in strength areas will increase
the probabilities of reciprocation and mutual
respect within the consortium context.

4. Interaction patterns are strongly related to the
prestige ratings of the member organizations and
representatives in a consortium.

5. The thrust of the director (idealist, high task
activity) is related to the growth of a consortium.

6. Representatives on the boundaries of their
respective organizations are more likely than
non-boundary personnel to have "meaningful
interaction" in a consortium.

7. The reward function will be less conflict-
laden when the organizations representatives have
heterogeneous or complementary operational goals,
perspectives, expectations or needs.

8. Problem solving among organizational representatives
is related to the homogeneity of their goals, needs,
purposes, or perspectives.

9. Problem solving activity is more likely among
representatives of highly paradigmatic disciplines.
(Silverman, 1969, pp. 272, 273)

Silverman (1975) identified the following factors as relative to

the operational success of voluntary consortia: member institutional

prestige, strength, developmental level, and climate. He also found

that resource distribution and problem solving result in different

interorganizational patterns (Silverman, 1975, p. 35).

Silverman reported that prestige can be a basis for association,

i.e., the relationship can be defined as being among equals, or as

being among unequals. He drew the following conclusions about the

impact of prestige.

If the relationship is formally defined to be among
equals, the more prestigious do not desire to inter-
act with the less elite, and, indeed, will often
sabotage programs designed to bring them together.
.If the relationship is formally defined to
be among unequals, the more prestigious do not object
to interacting with the less prestigious. The greater
the gap, however, the more peripheral the orientation
of the more elite institution. (p. 38)

He found that cooperation should be based on strengths and on

the ability to reciprocate in complementary areas.

In regard to developmental level, he found:

The greater the differences among the needs of the
member organizations, as a result of developmental
heterogeneity, the less likely will programs and
other products satisfy any particular institution's
requirements. (p. 39)

Based on these data, Silverman suggested that institutions were

likely to engage in cooperative endeavors only when the gains in

prestige or the chances of survival outweighed the loss or possible

loss of distinctiveness, identity, or local autonomy (p. 39). He

maintained that the motivation to join a consortium came from the

availability of additional resources or from the ability to solve

mutual problems. Therefore, there has to be a short term direct

return to the institution if it is going to join the consortium. Grusky

(1966), writing about organizational commitment, hypothesized "the

greater the rewards an individual has received or expects to receive

from an organization, the greater will be his degree of commitment to

the system" (p. 490). This may also apply to organizations.

In regard to climate, Silverman (1975) found "that the values,

goals, constraints, and tensions related to different environments

are dysfunctional for cooperative endeavors" (p. 40). He cited examples

showing how research faculty will relate to colleagues with similar

interests no matter what the distance before they relate to teachers

within the institution. Since, however, one is attempting to improve

cooperation between institutions, the link between those of the same

discipline areas can be a strength.

As far as organizational decision making is concerned, Silverman

found the following:

A problem-solving, integrative model rather than a bar-
gaining, distributive paradigm allows the organizations
representatives to be less concerned with short-run gains
than with longer-term benefits through which questions of
purpose not survival issues, can be addressed and strategies
developed for their realization. . As the reward
posture precludes long-term development, so the problem-
solving approach fails to consider the forward motion
resulting from receiving short-term benefits. A combination
of the two orientations, internal and external, based on
immediate payoffs and larger commitment is most conducive to
consortium growth and development. (p. 43)

Hence, those consortia that fail to change from short term to

long term orientation do not grow and may be said to wither on the

vine. Interorganizational growth, therefore, requires a change in


Evans (1968) advanced seven hypotheses about interinstitutional

cooperation and tested them against the San Francisco consortium.

The author's first hypothesis follows:

The greater the number of problems and challenges
facing each institution which are viewed as being
solvable only through cooperation, the greater the
success of an urban consortium. (p. 3)

Evans stated in relationship to the above hypothesis that even

though there were mutual problems of enrollment and finance, none of

these brought the consortium to life. He maintained it "was Clark

Kerr's proposal to place a full branch campus of the University of

California in downtown San Francisco" (p. 3), that gave impetus to

the movement. The momentum of the movement carried it through to

implementation even though Kerr's proposal had been shelved. In other

words a viable threat to institutional identity and power was the

catalytic agent which lead to automatic cooperation.

His second hypothesis was "The institution with control of the

greatest resources will be the least willing to cooperate" (p. 4).

Evans maintained that just the opposite was true in San Francisco. He

does not explain why. From what Blau (1968) stated about exchange theory,

and Silverman (1975) stated about prestige, one can question the

validity of this hypothesis.

His third hypothesis follows:

The greater the commitment of the member institutions
to other organizations f(,c their individual support and
status, the more difficult will be the development of a
strong program of joint projects. (p. 4-

Evans stated that the San Francisco consortium has "the broadest

conceivable spread of basis of support" (p. 4). Hence, the develop-

ment of a strong program of joint projects was expected. The hypothesis

is supported by others. By having a broad base of support, the

probability of having organizations that are not dependent on others

for their support is increased.

His fourth hypothesis was that "The diversity of types of educational

institutions can be both an asset and a liability" (p. 5). Evans noted

both sides of the issue quite well; however, he did not address the

problem of which was greater--asset or liability. He did state, "Urban

consortium, by defining their membership by geography, must face

diversity more than institutions cooperating on the basis of specific

function" (p. 5).

The fifth hypothesis is stated below:

The greater the ability of an urban consortium to start
with several tangible, pragmatic projects of benefit to
each member and to the community, the more successful
the consortium will be in developing a regular source of
support plus funds for more experimental programs. (p. 6)

The San Francisco consortium at the time this was written, needed to

demonstrate that it could obtain benefits or provide services which the

individual members could not do by themselves. Silverman's work verifies

this hypothesis.

The sixth hypothesis follows:

The greater the number of bridges between the Consortium
and community organizations, the greater the chances for

success in making a meaningful contribution to the
solution of urban problems. (p. 6)

Evans did not address this hypothesis outside of saying the consortium

had a broadly representative advisory council. Levine and White's

(1961) study refuted part of this, but May and Doob's (1937) work

supported it.

The seventh hypothesis follows:

The riat.:l the commitment of each members' chief
administrator to the Consortium concept, the greater
the probability of its success in maintaining its
continuity of existence, and in implementing projects. (p. 7)

Evans stated that the San Francisco Consortium does not have the

support of members' chief administrators.

After reading this work by Evans, it seems fair to conclude that

this particular consortium will be a long time in becoming effective,

if it ever does. The type of cooperation generated (automatic coopera-

tion) forces it to die or change to a more stable form.

Up to this point, only voluntary consortia have been considered.

As previously noted, it is not the only form. A brief note needs to

be added about statutory consortia. Statutory consortia include, but

are not limited to, the following: state university systems, regional

associations, interstate compacts, and consortia brought about by

ordinance such as the Duval County Community Education Consortium,

Duval County. Florida (Ordinance 75-109-68. Mar. 75).

Since statutory consortia are created by law, they also have

the force of law to implement plans and programs. This results in

directed cooperation. If a consortium member does not want to participate

in a program, there is no recourse.

Goal setting, decision making, and conflict resolution is

handled in the same as it is in single organizations. In other words,

there is a final authority to make the difficult decisions. Empire

building and the host of bureaucratic ailments that cause problems

in single organizations may beset statutory consortia.


For the purpose of this study the term consortium has been given

a broad definition. Consortia have been divided into two groups, i.e.,

voluntary and statutory. Within each of these categories, consortia

can be further classified by purpose, process, clientele, place, or

structure. Although voluntary consortia have been studied to some

extent, statutory consortia have not been studied under that title.

The studies of voluntary consortia have shown that the investments

made by member institutions are usually proportional to the returns

expected. The studies also have shown that cooperation, when limited

to specific areas and usually areas of strength, is far deeper. And

finally, there is much support for the point that the director is a

primary determinant of the nature and scope of cooperation within the


Community Education

The purpose of this section is to examine the Community Education

movement, identify its major postulates, demonstrate how cooperation

fits into it, and point out the views of community educators on organiza-

tional structure.

There are many definitions of community education in use, and

no new definition has gained any particular prominence. Zimpfer

(1974) constructed a matrix with the elements of the definition on

one axis and frequency of usage on the other. She derived the fol-

lowing eclectic definition from the matrix.

Community Education is a (I) theoretical concept that
purposes education which (II) serves the entire community
through (III) solving social problems by using community
resources, and through (IV) fulfilling the educations needs
of the whole community. (Zimpfer, Note 3)

Zimpfer's definition left out an important aspect of community

education which is the systematic involvement of people in the problem

solving process.

Olsen and Clark (1977) stated their views as follows:

It is a philosophy that subscribes to the systematic
involvement of community members of all ages in the
educational process. It further suggests that maximum
utilization of all human, physical and financial
resources of a community. It is a philosophy that
stresses interinstitutional and agency coordination
and cooperation.. It recognizes that learning is life-
long and that it is essential that we provide various
types of learning experiences for community members,
regardless of their ages. It is a philosophy that
advocates democratic involvement of community members
in problem solving and stresses that educational cur-
riculum programs and services should be community-
centered. (p. 123)

The stress placed on the systematic involvement of people comes

from the belief that only the people know of their wants and needs.

If the community educator expects to meet the wants and needs of the

people, he must first identify them. Normally this is accomplished

through a needs survey. The important fact, however, is the realiza-

tion that the lay citizens are the one's who know what they need, and

not the professional educators. Hence the perception of the profes-

sional educator is not relevant in determining wants and needs.

Smith, Peck, and Weber (1972) stated the following, "Essentially

the movement seems to be an effort to persuade communities that their

schools should be the catalytic agent for all community action" (p. 17)

In the same vein LaNoue and Smith (1973) stated the following:

Put simply, the community school seeks to break down
the barriers between formal education and community
activity by encouraging neighborhood residents to use
school facilities to enrich their lives. Community
schools, therefore, are not restricted to a particular
age group or curriculum but remain free to meet expressed
neighborhood needs. (p. 42)

It has to be noted that these last two definitions stress the social

aspect of community education.

Seay and Associates (1974) defined it as, . .the process

that achieves a balance and a use of all institutional forces in

education of the people--all of the people--of the community" (p. 11).

Certain continuums exist on the subject of community education.

The past definitions have pointed out the education oriented to social-

problem oriented continuum. Weaver (1972) noted other divergent

points concerning a definition, ie., "program oriented versus process

oriented, school-based versus community-based, and community education

within a hierarchial organization versus community education as a

social system" (pp. 155, 156). These continuums have followers on

both sides, but the weight of the movement appears to be toward the

right of each of these continuums as they are stated.

Taking the above into account the author has formed a definition

of community education. Community education is a democratic community-

based process which emphasizes the systematic involvement and coordina-

ted, cooperative use of all community resources (human, physical, and

financial) in solving community problems (social and educational) and

in fulfilling the educational needs of the people as perceived by


This definition is aligned with certain major themes which

appear to be held in common by a great number of writers. Although

not all are stated in the same fashion, the themes seem to center

around the systematic involvement of people, maximum use of all resources,

development of community programs, interagency coordination and coopera-

tiontion, identification of community problems, community development,

lifelong learning, and curriculum programs based on the life concerns

of people (Clark & 01sen, 1977; Decker, 1972; Decker, 1975; Kerensky

& Melby, 1971; Minzey & Letarte, 1972; Seay, 1972).

As was noted in the introduction, a major underlying construct of

community education is cooperation. Tasse (1972) did a perceptual

study of the key elements of agency school cooperation:

There was significant differences in the perceptions
of four groups on four elements of agency-school
cooperation: (1) community involvement, (2) feasibility
analysis, (3) community school director, and (4)
Community involvement is a vital element of agency-
school cooperation.
The community school director occupies a central
role in agency-school cooperation.
Evaluation is a key element in agency-school co-
operation primarily on the basis that community education
has a built-in evaluation instrument--participants.
Community based action projects which enlist
community participation are important to agency-school
cooperation. (p. 4766A)

A significant issue in community education which has not drawn

much recent attention is the impact of the bureaucratic structure on

community education. The sharpest and clearest attack has come from

Kerensky and Melby (1971) who wrote, "Our large, tall hierarchial

organizational patterns are literally strangling our schools and the

people in them" (p. 15). They continued, "The effect of overstandardi-

zation and pyramidal organizational patterns have been disastrous.

Not only is it an ineffective organizational pattern for problem

solving, it has become a major problem in itself" (p. 15).

Seay and Associates (1974) pointed to a movement away from the

traditional line and staff type organization. The alternatives to

them were either "cooperative cooperation" or "fruitless competition."

Although they did not condemn the bureaucratic structure, they did

state that one of the significant problems for the future was "how to

build an organizational and administrative structure that will

facilitate lifelong learning" (p. 149).

Ault, Clark, Dunker, LaPlante, Pishney, Weaver, and Wilson

(1967) stated, "The line-staff structure in community education should

be simplified and should permit the possibility of task force and

matrix organization to accomplish tasks requiring such involvement"

(Note 1). Many others have also criticized the bureaucratic model.

This study may be able to evaluate two organizational models in terms

of facilitating cooperation.


Community education has been and is an active force in fostering

greater interagency and interinstitutional cooperation and coordina-

tion. Community educators are attempting to identify organizational

forms that more closely follow organizational function.


During this literature review several points have been reiterated

by various authors, and some points have been mentioned only once.

The following summation of the major points highlights material which

is important to this study.

1. There are at least two levels of cooperation, superficial

and in depth, which reflect the extent of institutional involvement.

2. There are levels of cooperation which parallel the organiza-

tional hierarchy's level of concern.

3. One can identify five types of cooperation: automatic, con-

tractual, directed, spontaneous, and traditional. These types usually

appear concurrently and are difficult to distinguish.

4. There is a theory of cooperation which helps explain the

actions of individuals in organizations.

5. There appears to exist an undefined optimum range in terms

of numbers of organizations for effective cooperation.

6. Competition can be used to foster cooperation toward a goals

or objective.

7. Cooperation is more likely when there is an abundance of

resources and when the goals can be best achieved by cooperating;

the opposite is also true.

8. Cooperation is more likely when an attitude of friend-

liness permeates the relationship.

9. The individual's estimate of his chances of securing his

goals influences his decision to enter the situation as a competitor

or cooperator.

10. Cooperation between institutions is enhanced if the

institutions perceive each other as equals in terms of the quality

of education, prestige, developmental level, and standards.

11. Cooperation is enhanced when the participants derive

benefits roughly proportionate to their contributions.

12. Cooperation is enhanced when the members have a commitment

to cooperate.

13. The environment has an impact on interorganizational relations.

A rapidly changing environment allows conditions that would not occur

in a static or non-changing environment and which favors new inter-

organizational cooperation.

14. The following are structural determinants of interinstitutional

cooperation: developmental level, prestige, climate, strength, domain,

accessibility to necessary resources, and functions as related to

organizational interdependence.

15. Social exchange theory is useful in understanding inter-

institutional cooperation, especially if one deals with power exchanges

and their accompanying secondary exchange of fairness.

16. Organizational influence in an interorganizational field

is determined by dependence upon information and resources. Hence,

the more organization X is dependent upon organization Y's informa-

tion and/or resources, the more control Y has over X.

17. There is greater potential for cooperation between organiza-

tions that have complementary goals and role expectations.

18. Cooperation is stronger in organizations that have (a) less

vertical attachment to their resources, (b) greater lateral and longi-

tudinal interest in its clients, (c) broader domains, (d) diversified

staffs, (e) staffs that influence decisions, and (f) staffs which

have freedom in dealing with clients.

19. Facilitating cooperation between organizations is difficult

because of organizational structures, perceptions of status, conditions

for performance of duties, difficulty in developing a type of routine,

and the problems in developing cooperative identity.

20. Threatening environments are more conducive to cooperation

than non-threatening environments. Automatic cooperation which evolves

from a threatening environment usually ends with the threat.

21. The nature of involvement in a cooperative activity is

dependent on the benefits received from such.

22. Interaction in areas of strength will facilitate reciproca-

tion and respect.

23. Personnel on the peripheries of their organizational boundaries

are more likely to interact with other organizations.

24. Consortium directors are influential in the growth of a

consortium. Directors, whose thrust is idealist and highly task

oriented, are positively related to growth.

25. Cooperation has an evolutionary growth cycle. The critical

point is the transition from immediate short term gains to deferred

long term gains.

26. Limited or conditional offers of cooperation elicit more

cooperation than do unlimited or unconditional offers.

27. Educational organizations do not cooperate very well with

other organizations.

28. Cooperation does require an investment of time.
Presented in Chapter III are the results and findings to the

criterion variables stated in Chapter I.



The answers to the opinionnaires are presented in three sections.

Responses from the consortium directors (CD) are reported in section 1;

responses from the board members (BM) are reported in section 2; the

institutional member representative (IR) responses are reported in sec-

tion 3; and section 4 is a critique of the instrument. Responses to

questions which are the same in two or more opinionnaires are presented

in the first section and are appropriately labeled. The results are

presented within each section in the same order as they appeared on the

opinionnaire with the exception of the open ended responses which appear

at the end of each section.

Consortium Director Responses

Sixty opinionnaires were sent out, and 42 were returned for an

80% rate of return for voluntary, and 60% rate of return for statutory.

Of the 42 returned, only 36 were completed. This gave an adjusted rate

of return of 66% for the voluntary, and 53% for the statutory. Only

the completed forms were used in calculating the data.

A difference has been defined as a one point separation on a five

point scale in questions for which mean scores were calculated. A dif-

ference has also been defined as a 15% separation in the frequency of

response for those questions where the mean score was not calculated.

The responses to the open ended questions were distinguished based on

the frequency of mention and the similarity of content.

A statistical procedure was not utilized in this study. However,

a score of 2.20 would be statistically significant at the .05 level with

an n=20 (voluntary) and n=16 (statutory) for the two groups of directors.

A significant difference for the board members at the .05 level with

an n=15 (voluntary) and n=15 (statutory) for the two groups would be

2.43. The institutional member representative groups with n=36 (voluntary)

and an n=14 (statutory) to have a significant difference would be 1.98.

Table 5 reflects the length of time that the director has held the

position and the size of his staff.

Table 5
Descriptive Data

Months Number of Number of
as Director Professional Staff Support Staff
mode mean median mode mean median mode mean median
Voluntary 36 47.5 52.5 1.0 4.7 2.2 1.0 3.8 2.6
Statutory 99 42.5 21.5 0.0 12.2 2.3 1.0 13.0 2.7

Table 6 reflects the mean response made by the respondents on how

essential items listed on the left were to a successful cooperative

endeavor. The numbers in the table have the following meaning: (1)

nonessential, (2) could have, (3) would have, (4) should have, and (5)

essential. "Could have" meant that it was nice but not necessary; "would

have" meant it was necessary in some cases but not in all; "should have"

meant that it was important in all cases but not essential.

Table 7 lists the two most important factors identified by the

greatest number of respondents as being instrumental in bringing the

consortium into existence.

The two most often listed bases for cooperation in the voluntary

sample were "contract" and "other." The two most often listed in the

statutory sample were "forced by external authority" and "contract." The

"other" category of the voluntary sample most frequently cited "mutual

interest" and "constitutions" as the bases.

Table 6

Key Elements in Cooperative Endeavors

Voluntary Statutory

Members of comparable prestige

Members of comparable financial strength

Members at approximately the same
stage of organizational development

A hostile external environment which
threatens member institutions

Domain consensus among the members

Goal compatibility among the members

Direct communications between members
at the action level

Effective participation opportunities
for each member

Size of the consortium (number of members)

The presence of an outside competitor
against which you can compare yourself

An adequate supply of essential resources

A positive attitude on the part of
organizational leaders

Direct benefits of both a short and
long term nature to the members

Small, influential, and diversified
staff which has some latitude
in doing its job

Role orientation of the members

Limited offers of cooperation instead
of unlimited offers

Friends in the member institutions

2.7 2.5

2.0 2.3

2.2 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.7

4.5 4.2 4.4 3.9 4.7 4.4

1.7 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.4 2.3

4.2 4.2 4.0 3.8 4.1 4.4

4.9 4.7 4.7 4.3 4.8 4.7

4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 3.9 4.4

4.3 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2

3.8 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.3

2.9 3.0 3.3 2.5 3.3 3.3

2.8 2.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 3.4

The most often cited bases for power (influence) noted by consortium

directors and board members is reported in Table 8.

Table 7
Instrumental Elements in Birth

Voluntary Statutory
1 Recognized Recognized Recornized Economic Economic Economic
before before before
forced forced forced
2 Political Economic Economic Political Political Political

Table 8
Bases for Power (Influence)

Voluntary Statutory

33% Expertness 35' Legitimation 56, Legitimation 54% Legitimation
33% Ability to 28% Ability to 25% Expertness 36% Ability to
provide provide provide
resources resources resources

Table 9 reflects the items that were given the highest priority

by the largest number of respondents in response to the question con-

cerning what the consortium was organized to facilitate serving.

Table 9
Organized by Purpose, Process, Place, or Clientele

Voluntary Statutory

52% place 53% combination 62% process 33% process

There was no most frequently listed "combination" given by the

voluntary board members; however, place and purpose were most fre-

quently combined with the other choices.

Of the voluntary directors, 55% perceived their consortia as being

in a mature state of development, and 45% as being in a youthful stage. The

statutory group perceived themselves just the opposite. Seventy-five

percent saw themselves in a youthful stage of development, whereas

only 25% saw themselves in a mature stage.

The question as to whether or not there was an optimum numerical

range of institutions for cooperation, and if so, what that range was,

yielded the results shown in Table 10.

Table 10

Optimum Numerical Range



Yes 50% 61% 56% 45%

No 50% 38% 37% 54%

Range 6-11 7-12 5-12 5-11

The responses shown in Table 11 indicate the lack of institutional

participation was more serious in the statutory group than in the


The mediums of communication that best facilitated cooperation

were rank ordered as shown in Table 12 with frequent regular meetings

being seen as the best medium. The "combination" response most fre-

quently included frequent regular meetings reinforced by phone calls,

verbal, and written methods.

Table 11

Lack of Member Institution Participation


22% 21%

77% 78%


56% 41%

37% 58%

Table 12

Medium of Communication

Voluntary Statutory

1 50% Frequent 30% Combina- 43% Frequent 41% Frequent
Regular tion Regular Regular
Meeting Meeting Meeting

2 28% Verbal and 30% Written 28% Telephone 41% Verbal and
Written Written
Communica- Communica-
tion tion

As to the directness of communication within the consortia, 52%

of the voluntary directors said it was "direct most of the time," and

the rest of the group was evenly split among the other choices. Of the

statutory directors, 37% said "direct most of the time," but 31% said

"indirect most of the time," and the rest were evenly split among the

other choices.

In response to the question as to whether any action was standard-

ized (continuous and repetitious), both groups answered affirmatively

as shown in Table 13.

Table 13

Standardized Action

Voluntary Statutory

Yes 65% 64%

No 35% 35%

The examples cited in support of this covered a wide range of

topics, e.g., library exchange, cross registration, meetings, projects,

off campus programs, common calendars, and data reporting.

As to the extent to which member institutions know what to expect

from other member institutions, 70% of the voluntary directors and 66%

of the statutory directors responded "knows more often than not." This

was supported by 100% of the voluntary board members, and 80% of the

statutory saying "yes" in response to a similar question.

When asked if cooperation existed in name only, 85% of the

voluntary directors and 86% of the statutory directors said "no."

The existence of short term and long term benefits provided by

the consortium was confirmed by the respondents as shown in Table 14.

Table 14

Existence of Benefits

Voluntary Statutory

Short term 68% yes 53% yes

Long term 95% yes 68% yes

Table 15 reflects areas of cooperative endeavor. Although other

areas may exist, only those identified were specifically listed in the


Table 15

Areas of Cooperation

Library books

Faculty members







76% yes 50% yes

50% yes 37% yes

75% no 75% no

53% no 50% no

93% no 71% no

64% yes 62% no

84% yes 100% yes


33% yes 57% yes

27% yes 50% yes

60% no 62% yes

82% no 71% no

58% no 71% no

40% yes 55% yes

85% yes 100% yes

In reply to the question, "are academic credits completely trans-

ferable between member institutions?" 70% of the voluntary directors

and 31% of the statutory directors said "yes." However, 43% of the

statutory directors replied that the question was "not applicable."

This was supported by the institutional representatives whose

responses are shown in Table 16.

Table 17 represents the degree of dependence upon member

institution resources.