Title: James Alward Van Fleet collection
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00096226/00015
 Material Information
Title: James Alward Van Fleet collection
Physical Description: Archival
Language: English
Copyright Date: 1946
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00096226
Volume ID: VID00015
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: Special and Area Studies Collections
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.

Full Text





OPENING REMARKS: ---- ---.--------- .------..

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA ----------.------..-- ------------

DTAN BENTON ---------------.--- ---.-.-.---..--..--
---- --- ---a -- --- --- --a ---aa---- ---a------------

ROBERT TYRIE BENTON --------- ----- ------

STUDENTS --------- aa------ aa--a------a--------------
STUDENTS a --... ---............. ........ aa...... .. aa ..... --

'-A---Y EAST ASIA? ---a.-as----------a----------. -- -----------


President Eisenhower, in 1954, asked me to undertake a military,

economic, and political survey of The Far East. What I observed and

concluded then, seems quite timely even today, in view of discussions

going on in Washington and in the press regarding Red China.

I quote from my Report;

1) "The one indelible impression I have of the vast area of East

Asia is that the Communists are gaining and we are losing ground. This

-2 -

I attribute to the fact that our enemies have one fundamental, easily

understood objective towards the attainment of which all resources and

efforts are bent. For our part, we lack an equally unmistakable goal,

we have yet to achieve unity of action and direction and, indeed, we

have yet to comprehend the true strength of the implacable foe we face.

2) "It is high time we recognized that the threat posed to our

freedoms by the militant forces of communism cannot be easily dodged

or circumvented: there is no pat solution, militarily, politically, or

economically. We must be prepared to admit that there may never be

an acceptable solution if we continue to combat 24 hour-a-day communist

motivation on an 8 hour-a-day democratic basis. It is therefore essential

as a first step that the American Public be made to realize the vital issues

at stake and the contingent sacrifices each individual may be called upon

to make in the struggle for the preservation of the American ideal.

3) "Certainly we must strive to reverse the trend in East Asia,

to halt the enemy advance and to wrest the initiative from him. If we are

to do this, I consider we must attain two separate but related objectives:

one emergency and one long range. The first is to set forth, in precise and

unmistakable fashion, a containing line beyond which we, in concert with

like minded nations, will not permit overt aggression be it direct or indirect.

While this will necessarily represent a continuing commitment, Its only

function, in true perspective, is to establish a firm point of departure for the


Implemlentation of the long range policy. In broad and sweeping terms,

the lonq range policy would have two aspects which should be pursued

concurrently: defensively, the development of increastirT strength and

stability among the free nations of East Asiaz offensively, the main-

tealwe of continuous pressures against the communist design.

4) "The non-communist world has significant assets In Asia.

Individually, the capabilities of the several countries are inadequate

for the successful attainment of far reaching objectives. Integrated and

made mutually supporting the total assets represent formidable strength

for the prosecution of the comprehensive program for the common good.

We must work actively for the creation of a regional, multi-national

organization to insure the progressively phased development of military,

political and economic strengths. Logically, I can only discuss East

Asia since my survey was limited to the countries lying therein. Nonetheless,

I am impressed with the potential of a regional organization geographically

so limited: the component countries represent the bulk of the total strength

in all fields, actual or latent: in that area The United States is unfettered

by either the United Kingdom or France, and only larger grouping might prove

unmanageable at the outset.

5) "The native troops of these free Asian Nations should be trained

and equipped by The United States for the type operation that they would

most likely be expected to perform in their own country and in Task Force

Operations in other Asian countries. These native troops have proven their


value in battle. They should be improved and developed so that advantage

could be taken of favorable situations arising with respect to the enemy

forces of the Chinese communists. Thair strength therefore should exceed

the number required for defense purposes. The cost would be only a small

fraction of the cost for the same number of United States troops.

6) "The propaganda or informational programs of the enemy in East

Asia have been more effective than have the psychological and information

programs of The United States. Therefore, the informational and psycholo-

gical programs in these countries of Eastern Asia should be strengthened and

the emphasis shifted in these programs from United States or individual country

sponsorship to Free Asian Alliance sponsorship as rapidly as developments

will permit.

7) "The Far East and Pacific unified commands should be merged Into

a single unified command for the Pacific Area., located in the Hawaiian Islands,

to centralize responsibility for countering the military threat posed by communism

in the Far East, insure the most effective integration and exploitation of U.S.

forces and those of our Pacific allies, and facilitate coordination of military

and non-military programs and actions.

8) "A Special Regional Organization, comparable to that operative

within the NATO framework, should be established into the Hawaiian Islands

with an area responsibility identical to that of the Pacific Unt led Command;

that this organization be given broad operating latitudes to effect the coor-

dination, on an area basis, of political, economic, psychological, informational


and cultural exchange programs In the Pacific Area; and thdt this organi-

zation effect close collaboration with the Pacific Command to insure the

integration of military and non-military programs and actions.

9) "A vastly expanded program in the educational field should be

developed and maintained, until private endowment by foundations be made

available, to establish Asian support for United States objectives to foster

leadership, mutual understanding, and good will. Typical programs suitable

for initiation or augmentation would include: strong but discreet support for

Pan-Asian centers of learning to The Philippines with an appeal to all

Asian nationalities, in Taipei for overseas Chinese and in Korea for the

Koreans, to include adequate libraries, to insure that great scholarly work

can be carried out at such centers of learning; vastly increased U. S.

Government and private grants for graduate student and professor exchange

between selected Asian and U. 8. universities; larger U. S. Government and

private scholarship grants for nationals of all non-Communist Asian countries

in selected U. 8. universities; larger U. S. government grants for study and

travel in the United States by public officials and leaders in important walks

of life in Asia.

10) "The representation of The United States in Eastern Asia should

be strengthened. It should be tactful and sincere, and it must have the comp-

lete confidence of the leaders of the several Asian nations. We must accept

these leaders as partners and treat them as equals. The leadership of The

United States must be indirect, and a firm and forthright policy that is

realistic, tough and wholeheartedly supported by each nation in The East

Asian Alliance must be developed and carried out."

These foregoing comments were part of my report in 1954. I am glad

to say that many of ay recommendations were implemented. Unfortunately,

others were not, and Ia my opinion, our failure and slowness to act have

compounded our troubles.

Since 1954 1 have made many visits to all the free nations of the

Far East, Nothing could be clearer than this unfolding design of communist

conquest and control of Asia as the current active stage of the communist

program of world domination. For a better understanding of the full meaning

of that design, it is well to state hare the basic assumptions that are rele-

vant to an understanding of the war for Asia. These are as follows:

1) Soviet Russia intends to build a "One World" of

communist states subservient to Moscow.

(a) through a world-wide program of unconventional war--

cold, tepid, warm, and hot -- as opportunities present


(b) but not to the point of risking full-scale global war

with its attendant threat to the survival of the base for

the World Revolution. (The possibility of miscalculation

must always be kept in mind.)

2) Communist imperialism and the Free World represent ir-

reconcilable systems, and conflict on some level is

irrepressible. In the end, one system or the other must

prevail as the dominant influence on this planet. There

can be no hope of a lasting peaceful settlement as long as

the Soviet Regime exists,

3) Full-scale global Ma is not inevitable, but global convict

is not only inevitable it has long since been under way.

Our problem is not merely to prepare for a possible World

War MI, but to win the war for survival In which we are

actually engaged.

4) Central to the aim of a communist "One World" to the current

stage of seeking to complete and consolidate the communist

conquest of Asia, to outflank and undermine the Free World,

as stated by both Lenin and Stalin.

5) The Korean War of 1950-1953 and the War in Indochina were

part and parcel of this communist program of conquest and

thus found their setting in the global conflict that has long

been waged against the Free World. These were not isolated

wars, but were parts of the global war for survival Into which

we are engaged.

6) So long as the Chinese communist regime exists, it will

not abandon its goal of conquest or dominance of East and

Southeast Asia. In our own security interests, we block her

path toward conquest or dominance of the Far East, and she

must consider us as her implacable enemy.

7) For the next several years, communist China is a greater

menace to the Free World than the Soviet Union itself.

Stated another way: For the net several years, the probability

of Chinese communist conquest of further areas critically

important to the Free World is greater than the probability

of full-scale global war initiated by The Soviet Union.


It appears as certain as anything can be in the realm of human affairs

that the victory achieved by communist China at Geneva was but a first in-

stallment: and that regime, flushed with victory, will press on toward its

objective of controlling all Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, and ultimately

all of Southeast Asia. The terms of the truce would appear to be almost

a guarantee of ultimate communist victory -- unless we take strenuous

steps to checkmate communist China. The SEATO Agreements reached at

the Manila and Bangkok Conferences were hopeful, but it must be admitted

that those Agreements constitute but a frail reed against the surging power

of Communist China. I question their value. It is to be noted that The

United Kingdom and France are among the signatories, and it was precisely

the attitudes of these two powers that stood in the way of decisive action

in both Korea and Indochina.

The aggressive aims of communist China and her controlled satellite's

have been publicly announced. Her forces are poised against us in North

Korea, and through her North Korean satellite she has made clear that tho

Korean Armistice is regarded as only a deferral of communist plans for control

of all Korea. He Chi Minh has similarly proclaimed his intention to take

over all of Viet Nam.

The Chinese communist regime thrives on limited wars such as the

Korean and Indochinese wars, the threat against Formosa, and the continuing

subversion. Its program of conquest or dominance is being pushed ahead

at small cost and with no punishment being suffered. Enhanced prestige

furthers the consolidation of the regime's control over its people. It is

equally clear that communist China fears, above all, unlimited war with

the United Sties, in which punishment would be visited Apon her own

domain, in which her Industrial progress and programs wjuld be largely

erased, in which her weakness would become apparent to her own people,

and from which she would not survive.

Up to date, communist China has very adroitly si.ered a middle

course, always pushing forward her program of conquest or dominance,

but never to the point of precipitating unlimited war with The United States.

The formula by now is a transparent one, clearly revealed in the course of

events over the past number of years: when there arises the danger of

determined military action tby The United States, the "World Peace"

propaganda spigots are opened, and a proposal for discussion and

negotiation is brought forth.

Although the pattern is obvious, the lack of resolution in the Free

World Coalition can always be counted on to yield acceptance of the

communist proposal. Not only does the acceptance erase the threat of

determined action against communist China; It also provides further oppor--

tunities to drive wedges among the allies, aimed at breaking up the Free

World Coalition.

9 -

This was the patternn in -cre-a, and it was Cu.:licat;.

at Geneva.

.. to the : "su-, we have :.. J.- nto the han,. of

the Chinese -o.m.-i ito so :ru,.:pltely th't h..vy ..u.t regard

:air r ~-'.'.r,..-r ta;.:.l.z.J as .K'-, i.i of Fi,< ,. war with 'T e

United SLtate:. and erteA-i of ultimate success of driving

L-nit.... .t:.-it i...:.uence out oif ..-:t and ;--theu h t .*-- .

On tL. t-e 'rt it must be ..Ji..itt. that th..-/ have ,.'-I

roun; for cc.iiAi'.Cence.

We :x m fa.e i; -; .lo to the conse>ue'.-.. in e-. ,rn

2uro.pe of the ultimate defeat that threatens us in the Far

e.. rf..i t defeats we have already suffered. have C:ivn rise

in -esterri, E'urope to a tr'nc: toward an "In.-'ependJent" Foreign

Policy that appears to be only a few steps removecj from a

nvutcralist Fli ::;:',, If all of East and Southeast '..i. should

come un-ler coriunist d::.-ization or control, the leverage of

df;cjjf.u.im :owco. over the 'iJl-e Vast and westernn LuropQ would

be greatly strr .;t.hee'. Though we aLbstainedi fro, s3iqning

tlbat Aniiatice Arement, candor requires us to recognize

that we 'rselv..- 'frd .nnotrhe;-r major defeat in the

gl-baJ conflictt for survival. The energy is exploiting that

victory not as a military defeat for France but as a diplow.-

atic ,.t,.feat for. ':?. Unit:i States; ana it is sir.iil.rly int;-

tretep in eastern Europe and among the 1 Asian neutralists

as well.


10 -

h'r must recognize that what anr- the Dree World are

suffering in Viet 1a, iA? merely a part -f the price we

are paying frr weakness in Korea -- for the Pod Chinese

vic. tori..;s in or.- '-h.t our self-i-niprc: limitatior

forced on our cor mandcer-, for an Armisttico that relieved

Pe Chiinn of the strains of war in Korea and peoritted

'_er to ei. ,c- her re0curces to wr.:t was then called

In,]o:-.hia, and for the military nn'd diplomatic prestige

that Armistice gave to communist China. The future will

reveal other prices we would pay for a Free Worl. defeat

in this area.

.*y Luilding up native armies you make the people con-

fidc.t t:'at they can win. wh-an they see they are strong

ani: can survive corr.unist propaganda, infiltration, and

lenaLraLions, their leaders will feel strong, will be

bolC, and will 's2y '". It is the only counter wave

I know that will .-ress back the wave of ;)ropaqanda from

the North. A strong person or natior. radiates confi-

-deca rIn-i resists Tr.a-)rure. It will give the .LCle con-


To go back a nu-ibcer of years, in January 1948, George

Marashx3.1 toltu me of th:? critical situation, then faced by

the Orc-k: overn ment, and indeed of the entire Free World

in sa.king to defeat the communist guerrillas whc were

har2asi;::: that strife-torn littl" }-i:j loW. Hs aska.Zd for

r-,y oinion as to what could be don.: to .ave the situation

in ;.eei;ce. In reply, I gave him -,,hat I thought was the

* ^

- 11 -

recipe for success, that the izain job seamied to me to

create in the Gzeezs the will to fight; and that if the

Greeks had the- will to fight, I was convinced that with

our matari.al assistance -- and not a single American

rifleman -- the Greeks would achieve victory. General

Alarshall liked that answer and told me the job was mine.

This is and m-ut be the fundamental basis of fighting

morale. If an army does not have the will to fight, it

is c:efeated in battle. It is the same in footbtill as

you know. If a team before the whistle does not show

clearly that it has the will to win, it will lose,

Our worthy allies in the Far East, all nave a fight-

in;. morale aLd5 will to win, in great measure. They all

have prido of race, pride in country, and )elief in ideals

which in the final analysis is religion.

A necessary ingredient in the formula for sucues. is

the confidence in their ability to win. That confidence

can be built up by American assistance. Give them the

arms and the training .-o that they know they can win, and

the voice of "NO" to the communist invitation will be

louder and louder. In that part of the world, pride of

race, pride in country, and ideal- or religion are strong.

They do not have that confidence to win, until we give

them the weapons and the training to make them know they

canj win. With l hl.: corning frolic us, we havz allied in the

1 < *

12 -

Far East that are the most worthy we could ever want

to have.

Now, before closing, may I say a few words about Viet

Nan. As I see it there are four solutionst-

1) Pull out coa-pletely.

2) Continue without escalation -- in other words,

half an effort or -- pull back !:alf way as some

persons advocate.

3) Negotiate an Armistice favorable to the enemy,

of course, as history clearly shows.

and 4) Go for Victory!

These four choices were the same in Korea. There,

our high policy blundered by negotiating an Armistice at

a time when we had the enemy -- Red China -- completely

exhausted. We had won victory on the battlefield but

high policy threw it away.

We can achieve victory in Viet Nam and this to me is

the only one of the four solutions that makes any sense.

We can and must win in Viet Nam, but many eminent and

influential Americans (to mention a fwi: Walter Lippman,

Lieut. General Gavin, Senator Fulbright, and Senator Morse)

are advocating a partial withdrawal. WE MUST NOT THROW

AWAY VICTORY. That is what we did in Korea, and if re-

peated in Southeast Asia The Pacific Ocean will become

a Communist Lake.

- 13 -

iMy experience in Greece an-. Korea tells me that

victory in Viet Nam is not far away. There are all too

nany sound reasons v.,hy we are winiiing ai.d WILL win it we

keep the pressure on.

For some months now the war in Viet Nam has changed

from a guerrilla type to one of orthodox warfare. The

Vieb Conq has given battle in larger and larger numbers.

We, in turn, are in position to apply pressure -- heavy

z*resjure -- continuously and on many fronts at the same

tiLie. This calls for heavy supplies on both sides, a

ra--.:;.ir.emesit which we can meet, but which the enemy can-


And so I hale our increased ALL-OUT effort as the

only course of action to bring about victory quickly

and with honor. I predict that the Viet Cong will vanish

anft the war will cnd with a triumph for those of us who

believe in Freedoum.


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