Title: Transcripts of interviews conducted by Gwendolen M. Carter, 1972-1985
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00095707/00036
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Title: Transcripts of interviews conducted by Gwendolen M. Carter, 1972-1985
Physical Description: Archival
Language: English
Creator: Carter, Gwendolen M.
Copyright Date: 1982
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Bibliographic ID: UF00095707
Volume ID: VID00036
Source Institution: University of Florida
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RW(o ........talk about 1974 because that is the year of change when
the whole power balance in southern Africa changed. In '74 you
had the Voice of Reason,out of southern Africa, you know the
orchestration of the speeches from Pretoria, then the reaction
in Lusaka and the reaction in Pretoria when Voter talked about
the Voice of Reason ouk of Africa, which had all been coordinated.
Out of that coordination the three elements were crystalized,
apartheid, Namibia and Zimbabwe. At the timeone thought that
Zimbabwe was really not at the top of the list, but that probably
Namibia would be the first one of the elements to be removed---
the elements of conflict, but as it happened in the course of the
negotiations the cause detante ended as a result of the South
African invation of Angola. The only thing that was achieved was
Zimbabwe because it wasn't an ongoing exercise. What happened at
the end of 74 was that through this orchestration---74 was the 10th
anniversary of Zambia's independence---and that was when this Voice
of Reason speech was made in October. Bzt Smith had already agreed
as part of these negotiations to allow the leadership of Zimbabwe
to leave and to travel to Lusaka and there to arrange some deal
which would allow a political process to start. The idea was that
the party which was legal which was the ANC (African National Council
of the Bish&p) was to coordinate all the other elements. The first
people who came over to negotiate this were Mugabe and Nkomo in
October, about a month after this Voice of Reason sppech. But that
meeting was never held because Mugabe was re t d as be4g3 the
leader of XANd and he was told to go to get-at i but he did
give the opportunity to Josha XL to discuss the differences within
ZAPU that had lead to the formation of __ and to the defection
of people like Chi was So he was able to sort that out.
Then when the meeting did take place in December you had the Bishop,
fikugabe (now apepted------sorry Mugabe was out of it, that's the
whole point Zoli came, you had the leadership that had been
living in Lusaka and of course you had Joshua. There was so
much fighting going on between all these diverse people, personalities,
that in the end Nyrie went back to Dar and KAt4i walked out of
the meeting as well.

page 2

They were under such pressure then, they had to finally do some-
thhg. They signed the Unity Accord on the 8th or 9th of Dec. 1974.
At the same time this was going on in State House, the rank and
file of ZANO"didn't know any of this and this whole Nyrari revolt
was going on in the camps, killings, kidnapping, and that spilled
over into January and February and ended with the murder of S
GC Which was an ethnic murder probably, right? Or was it inside the...
RW It's a very good question because it will probably never be resolved.
There is a commission of inquiry report which was called by Khanda
and it was international in the sense
The Commission arrived at the conclusion, more or less, that ZANO
leadership had killed S and that Tonogara actually was
the man who carried out the deed. Tonogara in the modern book,
there's a great deal about this, because Tonogara has always said
that he had nothing whatever to do with it, and one of the first
things he wanted was an inquiry into this and he was going to hold
himself completely available for it. But what happened was that
after the funeral of S the ZANO and the
EANO leadership that were in Lusaka at the time were arrested and
were detained. Mugabe wasn't among those people because he wasn't
GC He wasn't there because he wasn't accepted.
RW As a leader, Zatoli wasn't involved either. He'd gone back to
Salisbury at the time already. The Bishop simply traveled between
Salisbury and Lusaka and became the nominal head of the ANC at
that time. Soon after that he came to Europe and that was when I
---why I was trying to find out whether it was 75 or 76---It must
have been 75----The Bishop then came to Europe where he for the
first time, one man represented all the parties and he was accepted
in this role for a short time. But while he was outside, he made
the mistake of sacking Joshua, you cannot sack Joshua---he and
Joshua had had differences, but the little man thought that he
was bigger than the big man at that time and that was really the
beginning of the end for the Bishop. The Bishop then want back
inside and he at that time was actually drawing very big crowds,
much bigger than Joshua.
GC Was he.ippressive in those days---because he certainly wasn't later?

page 3

RW He was never very impressive, but you know he came across in those
days as a very honorable man, as a very straight man and that's
what 'e lacked later because later he lacked even the credibility
of honesty. At that stage you had the feeling that here is a man
who is not a politician standing in for the politicians and he's
doing quite a good job. Probably at some future date he'll have
some kind of nominal conciliatory role, but he was never a politician;
and that was his problem---he saw himself as one. He had very bad
advice, of course, from and from George. It was
in their interest to elevate him because they had no longer a
power base. But at that stage he did have a power base.
GC It came out tf the Pearce Commission, didn't it?
RW In 71, yes, and that was transferred to him. It was a transfer
of power from the leaders who were detained and said, now look,
you organize this thing. It was SW who carried the
message to him and said this is what you must do and it took him a
day or so to decide. I have a feeling that this is in David's book
as well, I'm not sure. After S death, the whole thing
became very, very messy.
CR When the leaders were put in detention in Lusaka, where was Mugabe?
RW I'm trying to remember. He certainly wasn't there. He might have
fled into Mozambique from there, but he vanished---just completely
disappeared from sight and Zatoli was the leader of ZANO. Because
of all this going on and because of the split between Joshua and
ghe Bishop and all these people claiming to be leaders, that was
when we started to go back to Moshel. Moshel called the leadership
of the army---of the guerrillas----in Mozambique and he said, look
we have problems with politicians too, why do you need this party?
You're going to get your rights through the government and so you
ought to carry the responsibility of decision making all the way
through. He tried to build what was referred to at the time as
a Third Force, a Third Force to the parties to ZANO and ZAPU, but
that didn't work because of the nature of ZANO's structure and also
the way they were fighting the war because ZANO was fighting in a
different way from ZAPU. ZAPU's way wasn't that if a direct
/98HYAIRtion because they were still coming over the riger if they
were fighting at all and they were attacking big strategic things
like for example they shot down the plane.

page 4

GC But actually they had such bad terrain, didn't they?
RW It wasn't territory, where ZANO could come in through
the Shono villages and actually spread through the Shnno territories
through the structures of the villages and this is why it was
important to keep the politicians in because the whole thing was
inmeshed in traditional life, political life, and the whole way
in which the guerrilla campaign had been fought was all part of
the instruction. It was not possible for Moshel who had fought
a completely different type of war with a completely different
terrain, also different people whose traditions had been very
largely destroyed as we know by the Portugese. It wasn't such a
cohesive people. He had to accept in the end that this was not
the way to do it, that there was in fact a high command which had
been established by the guerrillas at the time.
CR There was a question whether Mugabe had been accepted as the
political leader of ZANO/
RW He wasn't at that stage of the picture.....At that stage he had
no role at all. We're talking of the time when Moshel had rejected
politicians, by that he meant Zatoli and the -rest. Magabe was not
even there. He was a name to a group of people in the camps and
he had been chosen as the leader by the ZANO executive in prison
in one particular prison in Queque, who had unseated Zatoli. They
didn't know
When the invitation then came to the party that Zatoli must come---
I'm going back in time again----then they sent Mugabe because he
had been elected, but he had been elected by a small group of
peoge, about 5 or 6, including T for example, who were
all in this prison together. They had rejected and unseated
Zatoli, but the President who had called a meeting had refused to
accept this. So Zatoli was reinstated and Zatoli was the signatory
to the AMC unity accord and Mugabe was not. I've lost track in
my mind at the moment of where exactly Mugabe was at that time. He
probably did come with Zatoli but he certainly wasn't the signatory
he wasn't part of the immediate entorage. He was not imprisoned in
Zambia when the ZANO high command were imprisoned after
S was dead in March 75. What happened next was that at
some stage or other he went during that very bloody period into
Mozambique and here you can check with David's book---My information
is that he was in a small place on the coast (in Kwalimali) and
that he was here under some kind of house arrest. That'.is what I

page 5

was told at the time by Kadas, of course I never checked that out.
During this time he did various things. He was teaching. He was
showing an enormously low profile and he was extremely skilled in
his realtionship with the military. He didn't push himself but
they new he was there, the things he was writing and he was saying
got through to them all right and also to the local----this is what
I've been saying now as I've not been able to check out whether
how long he was in Kwalimali and what he was doing there, but I'm
told that the local people in Kwalimali, and they told me that when
I was these two years ago I talked to one person who gave me this
story----and that's why I---you know one person is not enough to
give evidence that this is what happened----said that when Moshel
later got absolutely furious with Zatoli and the other people who
were actually living in Mozambique---the Bishop and Zatoli had
houses in Mozambique in Maputo, but they were cut off from the camps.
The Kadas didn't want to see them and at that point there were the
people imprisoned in Zambia, the Bishop didn't have access to
these camps because he wasn't really ever there leader. So the
whole structure of the Zimbabwe thing at that time was so completely
chaotic that this was the time when Mugabe built his relationships
with people like Tongo Gara and with other Kadas and with leaders
among the guerrillas. Later when the Third Force idea came along
it was the guerrillas who then in one camp passed one resolution
which is available, when they said that they from now on would
speak to no one except through----and that's where your query about
was he accepted---through Comrade Robert Mugabe, not to, and he
isn't representing us, but whenever we want to talk to these idiots
out there, we will talk through him and that was the beginning of.
his establishment of his leadership. In otherwords, confirmation
of what had already been decided by the top leadership in prison.
From there it just continued. The P people (that's where
I didn't finish my sentence earlier) told Moshel they had this man
there and they were extremely impressed with the work that he had
been doing and Moshel sent for him and they clicked immediately.
They hadn't met before. From the moment that the guerrillas
accepted Mugabe there was really never any doubt. Zatoli issued
statements as the president as ZANO etc. But it was hopeless as
far as then he split the pasty as you know, there are

page 6

There are small even now. But it's meaningless
and not really very important and it wasn't important then.
Because the realists accepted Mugabe, then that was that and the
thing that did it was the Kissinger shuttle, when as I said earlier
the Patriotic Front was formed. Out of expediency a few weeks before
the Geneva Conference because the guerrillas fought to speak as
one voice #1, #2 Mugabe wanted, or ZANO wanted to have access to
the arms---the Soviet arms---and the alliance was really never
meant initially to be anything else but an umbrella. It was only
after the failure of Geneva that it went on into the next stages
and that was when the leadership problem kept cropping up---when
they started to negotiate and try to get the on the military
side together, which they might have done if M hadn't been
killed. He was killed too at that time by a bomb.---Jason Moyo--
He was killed probably after Geneva. The death of Moyo did away
with the possibility of combining the leadership udder one or two
generals because if you'd had Tongogaro on the one hand and Moyo
on the other, then it would have worked perfectly. It was Moyo
who negotiated the alliance. Militarily you.had certain logistical
problems and tribal problems but it could have been possible and
politically they did move towards a joint committee of some kind.
They had a liaison committee which Also functioned during the
the entire L /House talks.. There was always this joint
committee which met and the idea of that joint committee was that
at one stage they would have one party. They would eventually
have one old---I say old---go back to the unity. But they didn't
because of the question of leadership and it was because of this
unresolved problem of leadership that although L worked
L worked because you always had ZANO meeting ZANO,
EXPO meeting ZAPO and then this liaison committee meeting and
small groups meeting on specific---for example you had a legal
group meeting on specific points. In the legal group you'd have
ZANO and ZAPU lawyers and you'd have advisors meeting ---so there
was a series of bridges which were happening during L
but onee L was over when the next step was to be taken, namely
the return home, Joshua you see was. already home, but it was the
return home for ZANO, and Z decided that before they could
return home they must go back to base, which was Mozambique, and
it was there that they decided to fight the elections on their own
and to come back as ZANU and it was at that point that Joshua then

page "

decided to keep the patriotic front for himself. ZAPU had
S been banned and would have had to be unbanned. ZANU99--Mugabe--
was also not able to continue using the word ZANO on its own,
they had to use ZANO PF because ZANO was being appropriated by
ZAtoli so the parties that were fighting the elections, you see,
were P which was ZAPU, ZANO PF which was
Mugabe and the old ZANO and what was left of the loyal support
for ZAtoli under ZANO and the Bishop's ANC---these were the
parties. Chicorea and df course were with the Bishop.
They went with the Bishop during the----after the breakup with
Joshua the Bishop had gone back inside and he thought that he
coid deal with Smith on his wwn---That is where S ith proposals---
and then your point about the secret meetings between Smith and
Khomo which the Nigerians discovered---there were 2 meetings
which had been arranged in Lusaka and that second meeting was a
particular distress to Mugabe because it had been done at a time
when he was supposed to be talking to-----when he alone was
supposed to be talking to Joshua and yet Joshua had stepped out
of line and had done this on his own, sayin g that he had intended
to inform Mugabe about it. There were constant clashes and conflict.
GC It's a wonder it worked.
RW Well, that's why I say what we see now is a result of all that
plus the historical perspective of the Shona and
GC Do you believe the story that Nkhoma asked Walls to approach
the South Africans as to whether they would support tim if he
made a drive for the President----
RW Do you mean after the election or before? No, I don't believe
that. I think that what happened at that time the observers
would confirm all that---there were so many people who were
misled by the intensions which were fed through the Smith
channel, that there was a very strong r support for the
Bishop. The analysis that went on before the electioneering
started or during the electioneering, was something like this---
The Bishop was a Monico, the Bishop is Shono, he will get the
whole of Monicoland and he will take part of the Shono land

page X

constituencies with him. He'd probably get about 30. Joshua
will probably get about 20, which he did. He may pick up one
or two more in the central provinces, which between the two of
them would then give them perhaps more than half of the 80 seats
which were being disputed so that even if one party, ZANO, because
of its numberical strength, bets more than half of the ----
there still won't be enough to get the 50 which they must get
in order to control parliament, because you have the 20 reserved
seats other wise. So these were the mathematics that were being
worked out all the time and your friend in Bloomington who was so
certain---this certainty was backed up by the Sh- --------
but it was not backed up by the observers----I mean the British
and people like that, who kept doing these exercises ad it was
at that time that the whites, people like Walls, had only one
objective and that was to get Mugabe out.
GC Did they realize he was going to be such a strong leader?
RW First of all they thought he was a Marxist and a Communist and
all the dreadful things----all these images which have been
painted---and they thought that if he did by any chance get 41 or
42 seats----nobody thought 51 or 57----ZANO was talking of 63 and
that would have been crazy. Then they would have been prepared to
back Nkomo/Muzariba alliance with the white force, but I don't
believe that there was ever any open approach to the South Africans
or anything like that---that's what I'm really trying to say----
but certainly the whites thought along those lines.
GC That's of course a story that's very useful to Mugabe now.
RW Walls did give an interview, if you remember, a very foolish
GC VERY foolish in which he really tried to sell them down the river
it sounded like---
RW Well he explains this kind of scenario, if such and such a thing
happened we would then come in, but I realized that this wasn't
so I didn't do anything about it.
CR You mentioned that the guerillas in the camps said they would
speak through Robert Mugabe, not that he was representing them,
and in the states people were talking at that point that Mugabe
was the political leader but not the military leader of the party
and that Mugabe might be able to negotiate an agreement with

pace ~8L

someone, but that he would have to sell out to the military wing
and the military wing was thought of as being----of not seeing
eye-to eye with Mugabe. At what point did it occur to you that
it was certain that whatever he did he would carry the day.
RW After that acceptance by that camp. After that----because you see
ZANO was issuing very militant stuff against ZambiX at the time
attaching him because their leadership was in prison, etc. This
sudden rejection of everybody except Mugabe made it very clear.
CR So, once Mugabe became the firm political leader it seemed that he
was the firm leader of the whole thing.
RW Yes, it took a little time because of this 18-man committee that
had been setup which was supposed to be half ZANO and half ZAPU
but that never worked because ZApu fel very insecure then in
Mozambigue and they literally just went away. They fled the
fighting in the capitol and these sort of details of course will
never become known. But the 18-man high command, which was
the Third Force, if it had come to be a real force, might not have
accepted Mugabe. This was the idea of Mushel. He thought that
somebody would emerge from the ranks of the military and become
THE leader, like he himself had emerged, that was his idea.
But that was a matter of weeks and then after that really Mugabe
was the only person. I didn't know about this business of having
to set a political solution to the military because his strength
always came from this alliance with the military----Tongogara.
GC I thought Tongo gari was supporting Mugabe.
RW Yes, that was his alliance.
GC A tragedy that he was killed because he could have done so much.
RW I think he would have made a lot of difference in the country's
GC Colin Legum had a story about Tongo gari at L---------
that he went up to Smith one day and said, "Well, how's old
Mrs. Smith?" because he used to take the fruit off the trees----
she used to give them to him---and they were having this very
amicable conversation. Afterwards the Bishop said---why do you
talk to him and not to me. He said---because you are a traitor.
RW Yes, I'm sure that's true.
GC Well I guess Tongo told it pretty straight. That's one of the
things that I remember. When we get this transcribed and then
lay it side by side, it will fill in a number of gaps, I think,
in the Martin book.

page I /O0

RW Well, I think the gaps in the Martin book are really more on
the ZAPU side. One must really talk more about what happened
in ZApu and the role of ZAPU and Joshua himself is down-graded


RW -----op u're hv ing t) discu sion th aid te suBect

RW Well, I think what is missing in the book is the importance of
ZAPU and a better analysis of Joshua as a National Leader and
the reasons why XRA Zatoli and his people moved out in 1963.
That I think in an analysis---one must give credit to Joshua,
to ZApu's difficulties in those early years, and the kind of
bloody rifts which ZANO experienced in 1974-75, ZAPU went
through in the 60's. Joshua was imprisoned and there had been
an attempt to find a conventional kind of war----you had mentioned
that they were fighting in a very difficult terrain. They were
infiltrated by traitors---
GC The story I had was that they went in with the ANC and the ANC
couldn't speak the language and therefore the villagers reported
RW The ANC was certainly part of the battle. Whether it
was the ANC that gave them away, I don't know, but the fact is that
they were battles before then. There was ene successful battle---
and this gives you an idea of the problems that they had-----the
valley is deserted, I mean there ---literally----a group of people
went over and their job was to kill game and to stock up a kind of
quartermaster cave and they did this very successfully---they'd
been inside the country, hadn't been reported, hadn't been seen,
hadn't been infiltrated yet, you know---they were safe---this was
in 66. The game warden saw that there were a lot of deer missing
and he taught he had poachers. And when he followed checked he
realized it was more than poachers and they fought this terrible
battle. They actually shattered the cave where the meat was kept
by bombing it. They couldn't have destroyed it otherwise. So
you see, they had enormous problems whereas ZANO later in 70's
when they went in through Mozambique with the help of Filimo
into the villages, the entire structure was different.

page 11

GC Someone has said to me that they thought the crucial thing was
as to whether ZAPU or ZANO came in on that north east corner
and that ZAPU tried originally and then withdrew and then ZANO
came in there and had the Tanzanian, Mozambique support for it
and never lost it, and came down then through the villages.
RW Again I don't remember what David says about this but I'll tell
you what I know about that. I don't think its a question of
having the ZAno----of ZANO having the support of the Tanzanians
and Filimo. They were simply there because it was natural for
them to be there because of the Shono link. It's not by chance
that all the people who in Dar in 1963 formed ZANO for Shono---
and in that sense David is right when he gives books emphasis on
the Shono because they are the interest-----But in political terms,
I think one must not overlook .the role of the Nationalists
&- the development of the Nationalist movement which was not a
trial movement and I think also the movement out of Nationalism
into Socialism is not anything to do with Shono per se---This is
a development we have had in other liberation movements. But in
the case of ZANO being in that triangle that you speak about,
when Trima encountered ZANO gropps, they reported the presence
of these people----they kept coming across these people who said
they were Shonos and they could speak to them....It was ZAPU who
played down the importance of ZAno and of course the arm7 were
given by the Soviet Union to ZAPU. The only arms that ZANO had
were the arms which they got either through----with money which
they got from the OAU or from the Chinese, but in spite of this,
although Filimo was depending on the Soviet Union for its support-,
in spite of the Soviet Union saying to them, Look these people are
not important. Because they saw that these people were present no
matter what ZAPU says---they are to work with ZANO. That's how
that happened.
GC But there were training capps of ZANO?
RW That came later, much later, because ZANO was formed in Dar and
and always supported w)ho was ra
man in exile. So that has always been there, but
the link with Filimo was/physical/;jncuse they met---they met them
in the bush when Filimo was still ---before it was government.

page 12

Which was quite an important point.
GC There's another story, leaping ahead, and that is that Filimo
was-quite sure that Mugabe was going to win because they'd been
doing a test analysis in the villages, is that true? I put
that into my lecture that I've been giving.
RW I don't know if they actually did a test, but I'm quite sure
that that is right because ----One of the stories which expend
is that of a man that I was told was a Bishop man and certainly
the Bishop had after all won quite a large majority the year
before, so some people must have voted for him. This man was
pointed out to me as/ghono-speaking Zimbabwian working for a
friend of mine and she's terribly sorry that he won't be voting
for Joshua because of the but of course he
will be voting for the Bishop again. Well, after this was all
over this man told me he never would have voted for the Bishop
nor would he have voted for the Bishop the previous year because
he said here in Salisbury they keep telling us about the terrorists---
have been telling us for years and years---he was an old man,
well over 60, and I met him as I said in the' house of this friend
of mine. The reason I went back to speak to him was because of
this introduction by my friend that he was a Shono, but etc, etc,
After the elections he told me the following story, he said, madam
do you know the Bishop? I said yes---by that I meant he's a man
of God, he's not a politician. He said, no, he's not a man of
God. I said, what do you mean? It was at that point that I
became interested and I went back to speak to him....And he said
here in Salisbury they keep telling us about the terrorists and
they keep telling us about these bad people who kill out women
and children back in the villages and he didn't say it, but
obviously he can't read or write---he said when I went back home
to the village, he said I have a new wife and I wanted to visit
my family---In the night the first night that I was there there
was a knock at the door and there were three young men outside
and they very politely greeted me and asked whether they could
sleep within the house the night and I said yes. When I turned
around, my wife had already put the pot on---she obviously knew
what to do. They ate and then they slept and in the morning
when the old man woke up, they had gone. He stepped outside his
hut and saw them. People had come from all over---you know how
the Shono villages are. You have one--almost like a farm house----

page 13

every family has its own area. Well, people had come from the
other houses and were all standing around waiting for him to
come out and they greeted him, very politely and said you are
a greatly honored man, the B have been to see
you. And he said then in the afternoon, the three, my three,
came and they were wearing uniforms and they were carrying guns
and were marching and they were singing and we sang with them
all afternoon and all night. In the morning the police came
and they took away 4 women, including his own daughter, and in
the late afternoon the police said they could come and fetch
the women and of course they were dead. That happened,madam,
he said, when the Bishop was our leader, no he is not a man
of God, he's a man of the devil. This interview I did with
SI was glad I wasn't alone because I couldn't
tape it. It would have been impossible to tape and he spoke
very poor English. But I've told you this because it shows you
how deep the villages were involved with the guerrillas. So
when you talk about Filimo making a check, I'm sure that that's
the sort of thing that they would have had access to the villages
at the border certainly with whom they could communicate.
GC The story that is told is that already before the Kissinger
iniative with the S. Africans, etc. to try to resolve the
situation, that already the leaders, by this I mean Nyrari,
and K and I don't know who else---had decided that there
should be an association which would be concentrated on economic
arrangements and they then brought in Reginald Green and the
others to draw up plans----were you aware of this at the time?
RW Yes, I knew that because the Liaison Committee was here. The
other reason that I knew about it is I've been following Front
Line----now that's another thing----perhaps I think it is the
last point which one ought to make, you're quite right about
these arrangements it was the Front Line States---
The reason for the difficulties within SADCC, the political
reasons have always got to be tracked back to this Front Line
concept because although Zimbabwe is today a member of the
Front Line States and of course Mozambique joined it after
Mozambique and Angola became independent----the thought to
ZANO that here you have presidents meeting and deciding their
fate and making decisions that they should or shouldn't go to
Geneva or that Kissinger should or shouldn't be talked to----

page 14

was to them. They werebeing talked about and
decided upon without their participation---it was a Yalta
situation which they never accepted and that's never been
GC You think that had more impact to complicate the relationship
between K and Mugabe thanxthan perhaps with anybody else?
RW Yes, I think that's right because of the additional problems
of the imprisonment in Zambia and the support which Khanda
gave to Nkhomo...
GC All these came together there .
CR How did Nkhama and Mugabe get along?
RW NKhama was never at the center of the Front Line decisionmaking
It was really Nyrari and Khanda.
GC Because after all he was really so vulnerable...
RW He was not old, but ill. Well, he wasiinvolved inso far as
the Rhodesian cattle had strayed over the border and then the
foot and mouth disease which this brought---so in that sense---
and also they started an army because of They hdd to
put a fence up because of the stray cows.
GC But they had the link with K
RW But on the economic thing, when I was Khanda early March in
1980, I saw him just after the election and I went to see him
and asked him---I wanted his comments on---you know now Nkomo
had been defeated or at least----the Patriotic Front has won.
He refused to divide the Patriotic Front into ZANO-Zani and he
also said he had supported a country and not a party which was
his way of disassociating himself from very strong support of an
individual....and he came to independence---because one of the
other things that he said was when I asked him whether he was
going to come to the independence celebrations, he laughed and
he said, that's what my advisors want me to do, but of course
I have appointments in the Far East because things have happened
much later than we thought they woid---but he came back from the
far east and he was at the independence celebrations and he got
a tremendous cheer and I think that really was very important
for hkm because he wasn't really sure if Zimbabwians would accept
him. But when Khanda came they went crazy.

.page 5

GC It's very interesting, but it's interesting that after Mugabe
came in, we get first Moshel avenue and then Julius Nyrari
RW The reason for that is that each time naming happened it was a
state visit
GC Yes, but all I'm saying is that all the naming is in order of
importance---he became the third one---that was after Feb. last
year because I was there. All of that plays into what you were
saying about relationships, etc.
RW And all these political nuances within the region, they can't
not have an effect on the working of SADCC. Khanda told me
at that same interview---he said that he was terribly happy
that on the first of April they will be meeting---1980---meeting
for the first time as Front Line States---with the inclusion of
Zambabwe as a front line state which meant that you were moving
the border closer to South Africa and Namibia and that for the
first time they would not be talking political, but would be
talking only economics as a result of the Agreement.
It was April 1980 and I saw him just before that and he was
going off on the Far Eastern trip soon after I saw him.
CR With the liberation of Zimbabwe, there's K and Nkomo
and Moshel and Mugabe----with the liberation of Namibia there
seems to be only and what's his realtionship
with the Front Line States? Does he have a close personal
relationship and a distinct animosity with some people?
RW No, I think it's a much easier relationship with exactly
what you've just said. First of all, its different again in
each case. He is a guest of Angola and I think by now he's
probably an unwelcome guest as all guerrillas are, aren't they?
Because look at the retribution they bring....
GC That's why they'd like to get rid of them by getting Namibia
out .of the way.
RW And Zambia has a very similar problem because the northwestern
province/iut off----people have died there---there's been famine
and starvation because you couldn't get to them with famine relief
because land mines had been planted there.

page 16

GC Are there actually South African troaps/+!ere?
RW There've been S. African troops It always
goes back to the Rhodesian was, the land mines. You don't
know when land mines were placed there. The only people who
know is the people who went over and they step on them and
villages have been marooned in that area....It's a tremendously
chaotic situation. How much of it is due to Zimbabwe, how much
of it is due to Namibia, so Zambia, you know there's the personal
relationship but they do support SWAPO and fortunately the ZANO 1
Liberation Movement and is the undoubted leader of it,
with the exception of the people who are on
but that is something which will be resolved without any conflict.
He probably doesn't have the same sort of close relationship
with Tanzania or with Mozambique because there's no physical need
----the bases are not there, but Namibia and SWAP6 is completely
established. There is a Namibia Institute as you know in Zambia
GC So they have a link, but Sam is also not that kind of a man----
I mean he's a charmer---he's/charming person to talk to---I
talked to him in Lusaka in 76 but-----now I gather that ANC
has been accepted in the Front Line, at least into the inner
RW Yes, and that I think is a very important development because
what it means is that the Front Line presidents and really I
mean the founding fathers---Nynari and Khanda---they don't
want to have another split in the South African ranks and the
ANC is now considered the only party....and so whatever conflicts
you have, personality and ideology, will hav be be done within
the framework of the ANC as far as S. Africa is concerned---
and that is a very interesting development of the last few weeks.
GC Yes, I read about it when I was in -Montreal, I was quite
staggered by it---that they'd gone that far. I think it must be
complicating to have the Front Line States meeting as Front Line
States and then meeting as SADCC kind of side by side in a way.
I dare say they're doing quite well to try to keep it apart,
but obviously they're both operating.

page 17

RW Well the Front Line States didn't have the formality I think
that SADCC has got. The Front Line States didn't have....
GC That I could understand...
RW They are identical, aren't they?
GC Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland or Malawi...
RW No, they can't have that and the Front Line States have got
an honorary front line---Nigeria.
GC Is that officially honorary?
RW I must check that....
GC That surprises me, I didn't......let's check that out. I'm
not surprised because of Nigeria's role in the whole situation
of independence for Zimbabwe, but apparently Nigeria itself at
the moment is rather strapped-----well not just the economic
but circumscribed by the breakup of the----there's some inter-
action on the local level-----We have it in the Nigeria chapter,
we have it in a book that I'd love to send you a copy of it if
AFRICA and it's a bit about the Nigerian role and the conclusion
that Owen G of Nyfe came to is that 'it's far more difficult
for Nigeria to take an active role politically because of the
confusing situation within the governmental structure now---in
Nigeria with new elections.
RW And you know that there are people who want back.
GC Oh, reilly? But I don't think he'll come back.
RW It was touch and go earlier in the year...He's in the Ivory
Coast now....
I wanted to say something about the Namibian problem. When
you talked to Randolph....I want to speak to Peter
about this------I want to find out what is acceptable to the
SWAPO leadership with regard to this proportional representation,
you know the West have come up with this complicated two and
one business.
GC They're resisting it at the moment.
RW They have completely rejected it and I understand that the
West is going to come up with a new formula....a formula which
would mean that they don't have to go back to the South Africans
and I can't think what that would be. They don't want to
renegotiate with S. Africa, they're afraid that if they do

page 18

the S. Africans will unravel all those little stitches....
GC Randolph might know, of course, because he's very close to
RW I'm sure he'll know. But there must be some way in which
one can get around it and if you get Namibia off the ground
this year they we really are......with the ANC which is your
GC Then you can focus on----somebody told us that the Front Line
States really had their eyes on Namibia settlement and not on
revolution in S. Africa---but that must be changing.
RW Well, as I said there were these three things---Zimbabwe,
Namibia and Apartheid.
GC Their suggestion was that they weren't going to attach the
Apartheid issue because with the strength of S. Africa they
weren't going to make this a formal part of their program
because maybe they were shifting...
CR But there was a big difference between former colonies and S.
Africa----the occupied colonies should be liberated, independent
states should change their own form of government.
CR Independent states should change the form of their government...
GC But do it themselves.
RW Yes, but at the same time they had been prepared to accept anti-
apartheid, but now the changes that they're actually accepting ---
armed struggle on the part of the ANC---but what one doesn't know,
and this is the dilemma of SADCC as a whole anyway, isn't it,
that on the one hand they say we have to work economically in
order to get away from the economic domination of S. Africa.
And on the other hand---they keep doing more business with
S. Africa---If they support the AMC then they stand to be bombed
like Angola, which was bombed because of SWAPO. /h4e say they
wanted bases, but....
RW But you see--- and here is an item from the TIMES of Zambia---
"according to statistics released today S. Africa/ is the
largest supplier of import next to Britain, raising its share
of the Zambian market from 11% in 1979 tol6% in 1981. That's
the real dilemma.

, page 19

GC It is a dilemma and I suppose if one goes on long enough one
can say that if the ANC ever became successful in S. Africa
there's no reason to divert their activities from there, they
might just as well use them, bring-them all back again.
RW Well, that's what can happen, I mean that's what----but that
is an interesting point you make because if you think of the
situation in 1965 when you had Northern Rhodesia and Southern
Rhodesia----there you really have twin economy---you did have
this complimentary thing of the light industry in the South
and the heavy industry in the North, or the raw materials
being in the North and the consumer goods being produced in
the South....Now that was broken with sanctions and UDI....
GC Yes, Kowanda really made something very definite...
RW Yes, he did and then he had to circumvent that by going to the
vo,2-~ et...... so now he's not back yet because as we see he's
still buying from S. Africa, he's not buying from Zimbabwe, yet---
or at least not to the extent that he was in 1965 so this is
where the shift has to happen....and then as you say, what
happens if you take over S. Africa in 1990 or...
CR Or there are other twists that I've heard ... the longer that
ANC does not take over the government of S. Africa the better
it will be for SADCC because it will give them an impetus to
divert their economies and majority rule in S. Africa
might not dixxr be a very good thing economically for the other
....for the SADCC countries.
GC So they'd better get their base established before so that at
least they have some wmil relative weight of----hence then
the need to get the harbors and the raillines and the production
in order to get a wider base at least throughout the whole
area before that decisive change.
RW If you look at the Botwwana-----at the former High Commission
and the Trade Unions.....the Customs Union arrangement
and what that meant for the non-development of the country


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