I onal Agricultural Trade and Policy Center
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT
Troy G. Schmitz & James L. Seale, Jr.
WORKING PAPERS SERIES
Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences
INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND POLICY CENTER
MISSION AND SCOPE: The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center
(IATPC) was established in 1990 in the Food and Resource Economics Department
(FRED) of the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of
Florida. Its mission is to provide information, education, and research directed to
immediate and long-term enhancement and sustainability of international trade and
natural resource use. Its scope includes not only trade and related policy issues, but also
agricultural, rural, resource, environmental, food, state, national and international
policies, regulations, and issues that influence trade and development.
The Center's objectives are to:
Serve as a university-wide focal point and resource base for research on
international agricultural trade and trade policy issues
Facilitate dissemination of agricultural trade related research results and
Encourage interaction between researchers, business and industry groups,
state and federal agencies, and policymakers in the examination and
discussion of agricultural trade policy questions
Provide support to initiatives that enable a better understanding of trade and
policy issues that impact the competitiveness of Florida and southeastern
agriculture specialty crops and livestock in the U.S. and international markets
Welfare Implications of the Byrd Amendment
Troy G. Schmitz and James L. Seale, Jr.
Arizona State University and University ofFlorida
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000 allows producers,
who successfully petition the U.S. government to impose anti-dumping or countervailing
tariffs on competing imports, to keep the proceeds of those tariffs. In Louisiana,
hundreds of crayfish farmers and processors are vying for a portion of over seven million
dollars in duties on Chinese imports. U.S. candle makers are also fighting over $65
million collected from Chinese candle companies who pay 54% tariffs to get their
products into the U.S (King). One candle company, Candle-lite, received $38 million in
fiscal year 2002 while one ball bearings company, Torrington, received $ 37 million in
2002 (U.S. Customs Service). This amendment also has implications for steel, rubber,
pencil, pineapple, and pasta markets (King). In fiscal year 2002, the U.S. government
wrote checks totaling nearly $320 million to companies that could prove that they were
involved in any anti-dumping or countervailing case that eventually led to imposed tariffs
(U.S. Custom Service).
The so-called "Byrd Amendment" effectively allows U.S. producers and processors to
collect the resulting import tariff revenue that would otherwise accrue to the U.S.
government. Furthermore, even though CDSOA was passed in 2000, there is a
grandfather clause that allows these groups to collect the tariff revenue from certain anti-
dumping and countervailing (ADCV) duties that were implemented prior to the 2000 Act.
The CDSOA has serious present and future welfare implications in terms of transfers in
Ricardian Rent among consumers, producers, and taxpayers. It also provides an even
greater incentive for a proliferation of future anti-dumping lawsuits.
We begin by providing a general discussion of CDSOA and provide empirical evidence
regarding ADCV tariffs placed on specific products. We then draw upon partial
equilibrium trade theory in order to develop an "optimal anti-dumping tariff' that
maximizes the sum of producer surplus and tariff revenue. This optimal anti-dumping
tariff represents the first-best situation for producers that successfully lobby for ADCV
tariffs against competing products from other countries under the Byrd amendment. The
optimal anti-dumping tariff is compared to the optimal revenue tariff (the one that
maximizes tariff revenue only) and the optimal welfare tariff (the one that maximizes the
sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tariff revenue).' Tariff revenue and
producer surplus associated with the optimal anti-dumping tariff are discussed and
compared to those under the optimal revenue and optimal welfare tariffs. Finally,
conclusions are drawn.
THE BYRD AMENDMENT
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, known as the CDSOA or
"Byrd Amendment," was enacted on October 28, 2000 as Title X of the Agriculture,
Rural Development, Food and Drug Appropriations Act, 2001 ("Act"), Public Law 106-
387 (U.S. Department of Treasury)." The CDSOA modifies Title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930 by instructing Customs to put all collected anti-dumping and countervailing tariffs
into special accounts, one for each case, and to pay out these collected revenues directly
to companies successfully participating in each case (U.S. Department of Treasury).
Previously, the collected tariff revenues accrued to the general Treasury (eBearing.com).
For a company to be eligible for payouts, it must prove that it successfully litigated a
dumping or countervailing duty case against a specific industry in a specific country. If
eligible, a company shares, with the other original litigating companies, all past and
future collected ADCV duties. Companies that did not participate in an original dumping
or countervailing duty case do not receive any of the collected funds (eBearing.com).
The CDSOA went into effect for 2001 and was controversial from its inception.
President Clinton signed the "Act" but asked Congress to revisit and repeal the CDSOA
before adjournment; however, Congress did not act. In industries that receive protection
from imports under U.S. ADCV duty laws, ineligible companies for CDSOA payouts
complain that eligible companies receive an unfair advantage derived from the subsidies
(payouts). Small companies complain that their industry is harmed by unfair imports but
they do not have the money to hire expensive lawyers to litigate ADCV cases
(eBearing.com). The U.S. Treasury Department's budget report states that the CDSOA
allows "double dipping" because eligible companies not only receive protection from
imports through increased import prices due to ADCV tariffs but now also receive
corporate subsidies from the collected ADCV revenues (Thomas).
U.S. trading partners have also reacted vigorously against the CDSOA. Eleven member
countries asked the WTO to form a panel to investigate the CDSOA with respect to the
U.S. WTO obligations under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and the WTO
Subsidies Agreement. The WTO formed a panel on September 10, 2001, and on
September 16, 2002, that panel found against the U.S. on the CDSOA payments and
recommended that the CDSOA be repealed (U.S. Department of State). On October 18,
2002, the U.S. appealed the ruling to the WTO Appellate Body, but on January 16, 2003,
the Appellate Body confirmed that the CDSOA was incompatible with WTO rules
President Bush's budget for fiscal year 2004 also calls for a repeal of the CDSOA.
However, in spite of this and the WTO ruling, as of February 4, 2003, 67 U.S. senators
had signed a letter to the President requesting that the President resist the WTO action
and maintain the CDSOA. With such strong support in the U.S. Senate for the CDSOA,
it is still not clear that the law will be repealed.
In fiscal year 2001, the first year of payouts, 900 claimants received $230 million dollars
(Table 1). In 2002, the second year, over 1200 claimants received almost $330 million
(Table 1). Although most of the payouts go to non-food companies, food companies
received over $22 million in 2001 and almost $20 million in 2002 (Table 1). In 2001,
there were nine food-industry anti-dumping and four food-industry countervailing duty
cases for which companies received tariff revenues under the CDSOA. In 2002, food-
industry anti-dumping cases in which companies received payouts increased to 12 while
Table 1: CDSOA FY 2001 and 2002 Disbursements for Food Products
Case Number Case Name (1000$) (1000$)
A-570-848 Crawfish tail meat/China 0 7,469
A-475-818 Pasta/Italy 17,533 4,674
C-475-819 Pasta/Italy 2,480 2,528
A-533-813 Preserved mushrooms/India 171 2,155
A-351-605 Frozen concentrated orange juice/Brazil 0 1,175
A-570-831 Fresh garlic/China 25 536
A-549-813 Canned pineapple/Thailand 1,792 531
A-560-802 Preserved mushrooms/Indonesia 83 443
A-337-803 Fresh Atlantic salmon/Chile 0 173
A-403-801 Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway 46 59
C-403-802 Fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon/Norway 18 29
A-570-851 Preserved mushrooms/China 0 20
C-408-046 Sugar/EU 8 17
C-489-806 Pasta/Turkey 7 9
A-489-805 Pasta/Turkey 11 4
A-570-855 Non-frozen apple juice concentrate/China 0 1
A-301-602 Fresh cut flowers/Columbia 33 0
Food Total 22,209 19,824
Grand Total for all Products 231,202 329,871
Source: U.S. Customs Service.
food-industry countervailing duty cases remained at four.
In some cases, the same company that received payouts under an anti-dumping case also
received payouts under a countervailing duty case. For example, eligible U.S. pasta firms
shared $17.5 million and $4.7 million under the anti-dumping case A-475-818 in 2001
and 2002, respectively, and shared $2.5 million under countervailing duty case C-475-
810 in both 2001 and 2002. In the anti-dumping case A-540-843, canned
pineapple/Thailand, one company, Maui Pineapple, received the entire revenue of $1.8
million in 2001 and $0.5 million in 2001.
In fiscal year 2002, crayfish firms receive in total the largest food-industry CDSOA
payouts. These firms and the CDSOA payouts that they received are reported in Table 2.
Of the 27 eligible firms, Atchafalaya Crawfish Processors received payouts of $.8
million. Four received payouts of over $.5 million and another 17 firms received over $.1
million. On average, the 27 crayfish firms received $.3 million in fiscal year 2002. In
total, CDSOA payouts (column 3) were 21% of production and operating costs (column
4) of these firms. In fiscal year 2002, three citrus processors received $1.18 million in
CDSOA payouts. Citrus World received 67% of the payouts for a total of $.8 million
DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL TARIFFS
In order to derive and compare the optimal anti-dumping tariff, the optimal revenue tariff,
and the optimal welfare tariff, we consider the following system of equations that
represent the supply, demand, and excess demand curves for a particular product in the
United States along with the excess supply curve for the foreign market (i.e., the rest of
the world). To make the solution tractable, we assume that each of these equations is
linear and that the U.S. and foreign markets are competitive. This system can be viewed
as a linear approximation to the actual underlying behavioral relationships,
PD = a+ bQD
Ps = a +
P, = c + d
P =2y + N
in which P is the price, Qs is the quantity supplied by the U.S., I represents U.S. imports
from the foreign market, and QD is the quantity demanded, which equals the quantity
supplied (Qs) plus imports (1). If we introduce a specific tariff T, then T drives a wedge
between the excess demand and excess supply curves. In partial equilibrium, the
following relationship must hold:
PED PEs = T. (2)
Inserting the relationships for PED and PES and solving for imports (I) yields:
Table 2: CDSOA Disbursements for Crawfish Tail Meat from China, FY2002
Claim Filed Amount Paid Allocation
Claimant (1000$) (1000$) Percentage
Atchafalaya Crawfish Processors 3,758 793 10.6
Seafood International Distributors 3,347 707 9.5
Catahoula Crawfish 2,937 620 8.3
Prairie Cajun Wholesale Seafood Dist. 2,449 517 6.9
Bayou Land Seafood 1,990 420 5.6
Crawfish Enterprises, Inc. (CPA) 1,892 399 5.3
C.J.'s Seafood & Purged Crawfish 1,773 374 5.0
Riceland Crawfish 1,517 320 4.3
Cajun Seafood Distributors 1,511 319 4.3
Acadiana Fishermen's Co-Op 1,508 318 4.3
Bonanza Crawfish Farm 1,482 313 4.2
Randol's Seafood & Restaurant (CPA) 1,445 305 4.1
L.T. West 1,126 238 3.2
Sylvester's Processors 1,036 219 2.9
Carl's Seafood 1,037 219 2.9
Choplin Seafood 999 211 2.8
Blanchard Seafood, Inc (CPA) 990 209 2.8
Louisiana Seafood 947 200 2.7
Harvey's Seafood 783 165 2.2
Louisiana Premium Seafoods 771 163 2.2
Bellard's Poultry & Crawfish 502 106 1.4
Phillips Seafood 450 95 1.3
A&S Crawfish 330 70 0.9
Becnel's Meat & Seafood 324 68 0.9
Teche Valley Seafood 225 48 0.6
Amaudville Seaford 171 36 0.5
Lawtell Crawfish Processors 80 17 0.2
TOTAL for A-570-848 35,380 7,469 100
Source: U. S. Customs Service
(CPA) indicates member of the Crawfish Processors Alliance.
Table 3: CDSOA Disbursements for Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil,
Claim Filed Amount Paid Allocation
Claimant (1000$) (1000$) Percentage
Citrus World 277,335 784 66.7
A. Duda & Sons dba Citrus Belle 75,817 214 18.2
LD Citrus, Inc 62,553 177 15.0
TOTAL for A-351-605 414,705 1,175 100
Source: U.S. Customs Service
I = (3)
The equilibrium U.S. price is derived by inserting equation (3) into the excess demand
curve (PED), which yields:
d(T + y c)
Finally, the U.S. quantity supplied in equilibrium can be derived by inserting equation (4)
into the demand curve (1):
(c- a)(d-)+d(T + y -c)
O = (5)
Equations (3-5) give the equilibrium quantity imported, the U.S. price, and the quantity
supplied as functions of the specific tariff T and the parameters of the various supply and
demand equations. These relationships can be used to find the equilibrium tariff under
various tariff regimes.
As a base of reference, we first derive the optimal revenue tariff in terms of the
parameters of the various supply and demand equations. We then derive the optimal anti-
dumping tariff, rewrite it as a function of the underlying optimal revenue tariff, convert
the parameters to point elasticities, and then compare the two. Finally, we make
inferences with respect to the optimal welfare tariff.
First, consider the optimal revenue tariff. The objective of the optimal revenue tariff is to
maximize tariff revenue with respect to the tariff. However, since tariff revenue is simply
equal to the specific tariff (T) multiplied by equilibrium imports (1) this problem can be
written mathematically as:
MAX, TR =T(d ) (6)
(d -) )
which makes use of equation (3). The optimal revenue tariff (TORT) is found by taking the
derivative of equation (6) with respect to the specific tariff (T), setting it equal to zero,
and solving for T. The derivative of equation (6) with respect to Tis:
0TR 2T + (y c)
= 0. (7)
aT (d )
After simplification, the optimal revenue tariff becomes:
Hence, the optimal revenue tariff is always exactly one half of the distance between the
intercept of the excess demand curve and the excess supply curve.
Now, consider the optimal anti-dumping tariff defined as the tariff that maximizes the
sum of producer surplus and tariff revenue. The tariff revenue (TR) is the same as in
equation (6). Producer surplus for U.S. producers (as defined by Just, Hueth, and
Schmitz, 1981) is equal to the area above the supply curve, bounded by the domestic
price. Since the supply curve is linear, producer surplus is:
PS = Q(P-a). (9)
However, the quantity supplied (Qs) can be written in terms of P, a, and fl using equation
(1), so that producer surplus can be rewritten as:
PS = ( a) (10)
The optimal anti-dumping tariff is derived by making use of equation (4) to get the price
in terms of the specific tariff (T), and maximizing the sum of producer surplus and tariff
revenue. This can be written as:
MAX TR + PS= +( y -) ( -a) + ) (11)
(d I) 2c (d 3)
Taking the derivative of (11) with respect to T and setting it equal to zero yields:
a(TR + PS) 2T+(7-c) d(c- a) d2(T+7-c)
+ + = 0. (12)
OT (d 3) P(d 3) P(d )2
Solving for equation (12) with respect to T and simplifying yields:
d(c a)(d 3) + p(c y)(d 3) + d2 (c Y)
A 2(d ) + d2
Solution (13) holds only if ftlO and dc6. However, these conditions are not too
restrictive. The former holds as long as the supply curve is not perfectly elastic. The
latter relationship holds as long as the excess demand curve is downward sloping and the
excess supply curve is upward sloping.
In order to simplify this relationship further, the above parameters must be converted into
their elasticity equivalents using the technique developed by Schmitz and Schmitz, 2003.
Assuming that the point elasticities for each of the four curves are taken at the price,
domestic quantity, and import levels that would exist under free trade, each of the
parameters can be written in terms of elasticities and corresponding values that would
exist under free trade using the following relationships:
a= I- I b= p -
D ED(QW +'W)
1W I- I d = P\
E ED EDIW
EES ES IW
in which Pw, Qw, and Iw are the equilibrium price, quantity, and imports, respectively,
that would exist under free trade and eD, ES, eED, and eES are the elasticities of demand,
supply, excess demand, and excess supply, respectively. If we further substitute (14) into
equation (13) and performing several rounds of simplifications, the optimal anti-dumping
tariff can be expressed as:
A P, (v- 1)w(1+ p(1- v))
_ED (1 + 2w ((1 -v)) (
in which v is the ratio of the excess demand elasticity with respect to the excess supply
elasticity, w is the ratio of the excess demand elasticity with respect to the domestic
supply elasticity, and p is the ratio of imports that would exist under free trade (Iw) with
respect to the domestic quantity that would exist under free trade (Qw).
In order to compare the optimal anti-dumping tariff in equation (15) with the optimal
revenue tariff in equation (8), we substitute the relationships in (14) into equation (8) and
simplify to get:
P_ (v 1)
TORT =- P -1) (16)
To obtain the optimal anti-dumping tariff in terms of the optimal revenue tariff, take
relationship (16) and insert into (15) to get:
2w + 2w w(1 v)
= = To^ = m7oR (17)
ORT 129OR(T v ORT
1 + 2w p(1 v)
in which m represents the percentage markup of the optimal anti-dumping tariff over the
optimal revenue tariff. The top and the bottom of the markup rule m have a common
right-hand term that contains v, w, and p. This common right-hand term is always
negative because v and w are always negative as long as the domestic and excess supply
curves are upward sloping and the domestic demand and excess demand curves are
downward sloping. Furthermore, p is a share parameter that is always positive.
After accounting for the common right hand term, the only remaining terms to compare
are 2w in the numerator with the number one in the denominator. The numerator is
always negative because w is negative and the right-hand term is also negative.
However, the denominator of m could be positive or negative depending upon whether
2wp(1-v) is less than -1 or greater than -1. If 2wp(1-v) < -1, then the optimal anti-
dumping "tariff' would mathematically be negative (in other words the optimal anti-
dumping "tariff' would actually be an export subsidy). However, if we explicitly rule out
the possibility of a negative tariff, then we must come to the conclusion that under the
cases in which 2wp(1-v) < -1, the optimal anti-dumping tariff is zero. In other words, this
case behaves essentially as a corner solution.
The only viable case in which the tariff is positive occurs when the term 2wp(1-v) > -1.
Under these situations, both the numerator and the denominator of m are negative,
meaning that the optimal anti-dumping tariff is positive. Furthermore, the absolute value
of the numerator is always larger than the absolute value of the denominator because 2w
is always a negative number, while the number one is a positive number and the common
right-hand term in the numerator and the denominator is negative. Hence, we must come
to the conclusion that under the cases in which 2wp(1-v) > -1 (which generates a positive
tariff), the markup rule m is always greater than one, which implies that the optimal anti-
dumping tariff (if it exists and is positive) is always larger than the optimal revenue tariff.
To summarize, the optimal anti-dumping tariff is either zero (representing a corner
solution) or it is larger than the optimal revenue tariff (when it is positive). This
argument can be taken one step further in order to compare the optimal anti-dumping
tariff discussed above (that maximizes the sum of tariff revenue and producer surplus)
with the optimal welfare tariff (that maximizes the sum of tariff revenue, producer
surplus, and consumer surplus). It is well-known that the optimal welfare tariff is always
smaller than the optimal revenue tariff (Schmitz and Schmitz, 1994). Hence, through
transitivity, the optimal anti-dumping tariff is either zero (representing a corner solution)
or it is larger than the optimal welfare tariff (when it is positive).
The above arguments are further illustrated in Figure 1 in which S and D in the left-hand
panel represent the supply and demand curves and ES and ED in the right-hand panel
represent the excess supply and excess demand curves. First, consider the optimal anti-
dumping tariff. The optimal anti-dumping tariff is the tariff that maximizes the sum of
tariff revenue and producer surplus. In the figure, the optimal anti-dumping tariff is
represented by (pl-7cn) where pi is the domestic price under the optimal anti-dumping
tariff and r1 is the resulting equilibrium world price under the optimal anti-dumping
tariff. Tariff revenue under the optimal anti-dumping tariff is given by area (hiknr) and
producer surplus under the optimal anti-dumping tariff equals area (abc). So total
producer welfare equals (hiknr+abc).
The optimal revenue tariff in figure 1 is (p2-C2) in which P2 is the domestic price under
the optimal revenue tariff, and 7r2 is the resulting equilibrium world price. While the
tariff revenue under the optimal revenue tariff (area ijklnor) is always larger than the
tariff revenue under the optimal anti-dumping tariff, producer surplus (ab) is always
lower under the optimal revenue tariff.
Now consider the optimal welfare tariff represented by (p3- s3) in which p3 is the domestic
price, and 7r3 is the resulting equilibrium world price. The tariff revenue under the
P S P
D 71 ED
Figure 1: Optimal Anti-Dumping, Revenue, and Welfare Tariffs
optimal welfare tariff (area klm) could be larger or smaller than the tariff revenue under
the optimal anti-dumping tariff. Producer surplus (area a) is always lower under the
optimal anti-dumping tariff. However, the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus,
and tariff revenue under the optimal welfare tariff (area abcdefg + klm) is always larger
than the sum of producer surplus and tariff revenue under the optimal anti-dumping tariff
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 allows manufacturers that
successfully petition the U.S. to impose anti-dumping or countervailing tariffs on imports
to keep the proceeds of those tariffs. This paper analyzes the welfare implications of the
so-called "Byrd" amendment by deriving an "optimal anti-dumping tariff" for U.S.
producers that receive anti-dumping or countervailing tariffs and comparing it to the
optimal revenue and optimal welfare tariffs. We show that the optimal anti-dumping
tariff is either zero or (when it is positive) is always larger than either the optimal revenue
or the optimal welfare tariffs.
We also compare tariff revenue and producer welfare under the optimal anti-dumping
tariff, the optimal revenue tariff, and the optimal welfare tariff. We show that tariff
revenue is always largest under the optimal revenue tariff but show that producer surplus
is always largest under the optimal anti-dumping tariff. Tariff revenue under an optimal
anti-dumping tariff may be larger or smaller than under the optimal welfare tariff.
Although producer welfare is always lowest under an optimal welfare tariff, total surplus
(consumer and producer surpluses plus tariff revenue) is always largest under an optimal
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lhup \ \ \.ebearing.com/legislation/2000act.htm.
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Schmitz, T.G. and A. Schmitz. "Food Supply Management and Tariffication: A Game Theoretic Approach." Journal
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Thomas, Bob. "Bush Budget Slashes Byrd Amendment, Alters Byrd Bill." The Intelligencer Wheeling News Register.
hli. "ii !t% .-register.net/news/storv/025202003 new03.asp. February 5, 2003.
U.S. Customs, Customs.gov. "CDSOA FY2001 and FY2002 Disbursements, Final."
hli11 1 11 i ni.. IIl'.I _.) v/xp/cgov/import/add cvd/.
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on Byrd Amendment: Underlying antidumping laws not affected, USTR emphasizes."
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/03011601.htm. January 16, 2003.
U.S. Department of Treasury, Customs Service. "Distribution of Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset to Affected
Domestic Procedures; Notice." http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
in/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=02-16693-filed.pdf. Federal Registry 67, No. 128, Wednesday, July 3,
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SThe optimal revenue tariff and optimal welfare tariff are well-known results from trade theory. A detailed discussion
of each tariff instrument can be found in Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 1981 or Schmitz and Schmitz, 1994.
" Senator DeWine (Ohio) was the original author of the CDSOA, but it was Senator Byrd (West Virginia) who added
the CDSOA to the Agriculture Spending bill of 2000.