War and revolution
 Stages of totalitarian economy
 Two men in a boat - not to speak...
 Book reviews

Title: Living Marxism
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00089429/00005
 Material Information
Title: Living Marxism
Physical Description: v. : ; 24 cm.
Language: English
Publisher: International Council Correspondence,
International Council Correspondence
Place of Publication: Chicago Ill
Publication Date: Fall 1941
Frequency: quarterly
Subject: Communism -- Periodicals   ( lcsh )
Socialism -- Periodicals   ( lcsh )
Genre: periodical   ( marcgt )
Dates or Sequential Designation: Vol. 4 (Feb. 1938)-v. 6, no. 1 (Fall 1941).
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Bibliographic ID: UF00089429
Volume ID: VID00005
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 24493886
alephbibnum - 001586476
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Preceded by: International Council correspondence
Succeeded by: New essays

Table of Contents
    War and revolution
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        Page 2
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        Page 8
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        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Stages of totalitarian economy
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        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
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    Two men in a boat - not to speak of the eight points
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        Page 25
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        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
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    Book reviews
        Page 79
        Page 80
Full Text


VoL VI No. 1
FALL 1941
P. O. Box 5343 Chicago, Illinois


The relation of war to revolution has become one of the most important
problems of our epoch. It has become, furthermore, one of the most be-
wildering problems of a time in which former non-interventionists have
become interventionists, pacifists clamor for war, National Socialism craves
Empire and Peace, and Communist apostles of the revolutionary class war
meekly renounce all use of violence as an instrument of national and inter-
national policy.
While it would be an utterly meaningless proposition to deal with the
questions of war and peace in general, a careful historical investigation shows
that war as we know it today has been implicit in present day bourgeois
society from its earliest beginnings in the 15th and 16th centuries and that,
more especially, every major progress in its historical development has been
achieved, if not by war itself, by a series of violent events of which war
an essential part. This is not equivalent, of course, to a prediction that
and other forms of collective violence, could not be gradually regulated
ultimately elimininated entirely from the life of human society. Su
range developments are not considered in this discussion. The on
cern of the following study is the relation of war to revolution in
time and the various conflicting and complementary tendencies that can
discovered in the previous phases of its historical development.
While for most phases of the history of the last four hundred years
a close relationship between definite forms of war and social change is
readily admitted by most students of the subject, there are at least two
periods for which such general consensus cannot be found. They are at
the same time the favorite playground for writers of various descriptions
who delight in dealing with war not in terms of a strictly empirical (strate-
gical, social, political, economic, historical) investigation, but from broader
aesthetic, philosophical, religious, moral or humanitarian viewpoints. Here
belongs the famous description of the war (and the state) of the Italian
Renaissance as a "work of art" by the German historian, Jacob Burck-
hardt. Another example is the frequent glorification of the wars of the
pre-revolutionary 18th century as an all time high in the history of human

culture. Despite its characteristic counter-revolutionary bias, this class of
literature has for our purpose the advantage of being comparatively free
from the peculiar superstitions of the 19th and 20th centuries. Thus it
happens that just the writers of this class a queer species of "historians
in reverse"-have been able to bring to light a number of otherwise neglected
phenomena that are of particular importance for the study of war and

The first of the two apparent "exceptions" to the main contention of
this study is presented by the middle period of the Italian Renaissance that
was terminated by the French, Spanish and German invasions which began
in the last decade of the 15th century and destroyed the indigenous political
development of Italy for more than three centuries. There is indeed, at
first sight, very little unity between the numerous little wars that were
fought out between the leaders of the well equipped and well paid profes-
sional armies in the service of the various princes, republics and popes, and
the incessant domestic disorders that were begun and terminated within
every unit of that political microcosm.
Instead of one characteristic connecting link, we find here a bewildering
mass of superficial connections. War was widely used as a means for in-
ternal as well as for external aims, and civil struggles were frequently
decided on the battlefields of a war against an outside enemy. Yet this
temporary overlapping of war and civil discord was of an occasional and
accidental nature, without consequence either for the mercenary soldiers
who fought the extremely bloodless battles of this period or for the sub-
ts of the quarrelling parties. "A town may rebel a score of times," said
temporary observer, "it is never destroyed. The inhabitants may retain
hole of their property; all they have to fear is that they will be made
a levy." Nevertheless all of these disconnected elements were already
ed to a conceptual unity by the political genius of a great statesman,
io Machiavelli. He dealt with the comparatively unimportant political
cords and belligerent conflicts of his time in the manner in which Plato
and Aristotle had dealt with an equally restricted experience in theirs. He
thought that a revolutionary conspiracy from below or, if that failed, a
revolutionary action by "the prince" from above would bring about the
forceful unification of the Italian nation under a republican or monarchistic,
but by all means a modern bourgeois government.1) This lofty dream of the
great political thinker did not mature. It lost its basis and was swept away
- just as was, in our time, a still greater revolutionary plan devised by
another political genius through the adversity of external conditions and
an altogether unexpected turn of events. The scene of great historical action
shifted from the Mediterranean world of Machiavelli's city states to the

l)These two aspects of the expected event are discussed with complete impartiality
in the two main books of Machiavelli, THE DECADES OF TITUS LIVIUS and THE

great monarchies that bordered on the Atlantic just as it is shifting today
from the nationally divided areas of 19th century Europe to the greater
battlefields of a world-wide war. Yet Machiavelli's reasoning was valid in
regard to the historical facts on which it had been founded. Even a more
realistic thinker who would not admit that the chaotic and fragmentary
relations between war and civil war in 15th century Italy had presented
a sufficient basis for the far-flung political speculations of Machiavelli could
still recognize in them the first undeveloped germs of that essential unity
of war and revolution that is shown in more mature forms by subsequent
phases of modern bourgeois society.

For the time being, the whole development with its visionary dreams
and its modest achievements was interrupted, not only for Italy but for the
whole European society, by the forceful inauguration of a new period. In
this new period both the intensity of war and the intimacy of its connection
with what we know today to have been the historical prelude to the political
and social revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries reached an all-time
high not surpassed even by 20th century warfare in the Wars of
Religion beginning with the Reformation and reaching their climax in the
Thirty Years War that exterminated one-third of the German-speaking people
in Europe, seven and one-half out of twenty-one millions. This was indeed
the first historical appearance of all the enormities of the "ideological" wars
of the present epoch. It was for this reason denounced from the outset by
men like Sir Thomas More and Erasmus as vehemently as the monstrosities
of "total war" are denounced today by any 20th century pacifist. Even
Francis Bacon was horrified by the consequences that would result for the pol-
itical and cultural stability of his time from the inclination in cases of religion
"to put the sword in the hands of the common people." He called it "a thing
monstrous," that should rather "be left to the Anabaptists and other furies."2)
This recoiling of a certain section of the intelligentsia from the violent and.
plebeian aspects of a fundamentally progressive movement is typical of all
revolutionary epochs. A common phenomenon of our time is that a belated
discovery of the violence connected with the revolutionary struggle for social-
ism and its counterrevolutionary repercussions has alienated so many humani-
tarian people from a progressive aim that apparently could be reached only
at such terrible cost.

There has been much superficial speculation about the reason why
that first catastrophic phase of the development of the modern ideological
war came to such a rapid end just when it seemed to have reached its
greatest intensity. It is of course sheer mysticism to assume that men at such
extreme moments as those reached by Roman society in the last century
before Augustus or by European society at the end of the Thirty Years

2) Bacon, ESSAYS III Of Unity in Religion.

War in 1648 "drew back at the edge of the precipice" 3) as it were. Nor
is there any historical evidence for that most appealing assumption according
to which since the middle of the 17th century the furious passion of
the Religious Wars have been gradually replaced by a new and more tolerant
attitude toward religious differences. It is safer to rely on the judgment of
the learned scholar who says that in this new period "the devil of sectarian
religious fanaticism was exorcised" not "through the grace of a deeper reli-
gious insight," but rather "in a spirit of cynical disillusionment."4)
In spite of the undoubted progress achieved during the 18th century
through a comparatively successful restriction of the belligerent excesses of
the preceding epoch,5) it is only the most reactionary-minded who today
look back to this pre-revolutionary 18th century as an unmixed blessing,
a truly "halcyon time" and the only "lucid interval" in the dismal history of
human insanity.6) It was a "lucid interval," indeed, as far as the immediate
atrocities of warfare are concerned. Yet from a more general point
of view the virtue of this short interval between two dynamic epochs
is mainly of a negative character. The apparent moderation of warfare re-
sulted from the fact that war was now no longer being used as an instrument
of ecclesiastical policy and had not yet begun to be used as an instrument
of national policy. Thus it was transformed for the period of more than
a hundred years known in general history as The Enlightenment into a veri-
table institution and perfectly adjusted to the needs of those powers who
alone at that time were in a position to make use of this "peculiar institution."
From the point of view of socialism, which today in this respect has
become almost a general opinion, we can by no means agree with that elo-
quent praise which until recently was lavished upon a time when, it is as-
sumed, war was a "sport of the kings." But in truth it was only conducted
in the same backward manner as any other kind of capitalist business was
under those immature conditions. We live today in an epoch when even in
the economic field the motive-power of the so-called "enlightened self-interest"
of independent commodity producers is no longer accepted as a sufficient
substitute for a social control of production. How could we accept as a
model of perfection a period in which this same spirit of "enlightened self-
interest" was still naively applied to all fields of social and political life?
We need only look more closely into the vivid description of the
"civilized" wars of the 18th century presented to us today by belated en-

3) Hoffman Nickerson, THE ARMED HORDE, 1793-1939. New York 1940; p. 35.
4) A. 1. Toynbee, A STUDY OF HISTORY, vol. IV, London 1939, p. 143.
The author of this article is indebted to all the six volumes of Mr. Toynbee's work
that have up to now appeared for many valuable facts and ideas.
5) According to Toynbee "the evil of war was reduced in the 18th century to a min-
imum which has never been approached in any other chapter of our Western
history, either before or after, up to date."
6) Hoffman-Nickerson, 1. c. p. 63.

thusiasts of the "age without enthusiasm," to discover the prosaic truth that
underlies all such poetic metaphors. It was a time in which both business
and warfare were still restricted by "small numbers, poverty, and the laws
of honor."7) In the sphere of business these "laws of honor" were repre-
sented by the remainders of the rules of the medieval craftsmanship, in the
sphere of war by a kind of artificially revived code of medieval chivalry
which, however, had by now been filled with a new and entirely bourgeois
content. The following is a description of this "sport of kings" by one of its
most fervent modern admirers.
"A war was a game with its rules and its stakes a territory, an inheritance, a
throne, a treaty. The loser paid, but a just proportion was always kept between
the value of the stake and the risks to be taken, and the parties were always on guard
against the kind of obstinacy which makes a player lose his head. They tried to keep
the game in hand and to know when to stop. It was for this reason that the great
eigthteenth-century theorists of warfare urged that neither justice, nor right, nor any
of the great passions that move people should ever be mixed up with war. Hapless
indeed are those belligerents who take up arms in conviction that they are fighting
for justice and right. Both parties being persuaded that they are in the right, they
would fight until they were exhausted, and the war would go on forever One must
go to war admitting that the cause of one's adversary is as just as one's own; one
must take care to do nothing, even for the sake of victory, that may exasperate him,
or close his mind to the voice of reason or his heart to the desire for peace; one must
abstain from treacherous and cruel acts. For there is nothing that arouses an adversary
to greater fury."

This is indeed the very essence of early bourgeois philosophy: freedom,
equality, property, and Bentham. The ideas of the shopkeeper of the dawn
of the capitalist era are raised to the dignity of a universal law and applied
to all institutions and to all eras of human development. Even the curious
paradoxical spirit of old Mandeville is conjured up: "Private Vices Publick
Benefits," wrote Mandeville in 1706. "It was avarice and calculation that
made war more human," echoes the famous bourgeois historian in 1933.

Even for that epoch when the scope and intensity of warfare were
reduced to their lowest level, the relationship between war and revolution
still held good since this was also a time when all vestiges of revolutionary
processes had been wiped from the surface of society. The comparative decline
of war is closely connected with an equal decline of the revolutionary process.
On the other hand, the events of the subsequent epoch show that just this
apparently so peaceful and so well balanced period of the 18th century was
both for war and revolution the time of a new incubation. Even greater
revolutions and greater wars that were to break out in European and
American society in the immediate future were already germinating under
the surface of this apparently stable equilibrium of the political and social

71 The terms in quotes are used by the Italian historian, Guglielmo Ferrero in his
description of 18th century warfare in his book, PEACE AND WAR, London 1933,
pp. 7-8.

powers. From the viewpoint of present day psychology, psycho-analysis and
so-called "psychology of the masses" it seems curious that historians and so-
ciologists should still continue to treat as non-existent those forms and phases
of the driving forces of a given epoch which do not appear on its surface
but are temporarily repressed into unconsciousness or directed into other
channels by a process of "social sublimation."s) All those much advertised
forms in which the "Age of Reason" tried to restrict and civilize war were
in fact only so many forms to prepare that hitherto unequalled outburst of
the slowly-accumulated new driving forces of the fully developed bourgeois
style of modern warfare that was to explode in the wars of the French
It appears then that during the three centuries preceding the full ma-
turity of modern bourgeois warfare there has never been a time in which
the essential unity of war and revolution has been interrupted. More par-
ticularly, the much glorified period of the Enlightenment cannot be de-
scribed as an interval during which the revolutionary passions of the Religious
Wars had been really tamed and controlled by a supreme effort of human
morality and reason. They had in truth only suffered a temporary check
under the impact of the failure of either side to win the upper hand in the
religious wars. An influential part of the population had become aware of
the fact that they had begun to care much more for the newly opened ways
of acquiring material wealth than for any further sacrifices of their personal
comfort for the sake of a truer form of religion. The great revolutionary
driving forces of the new bourgeois class that had made their first historical
appearance in the fury of the Religious Wars and were to reappear in the
violent social and political battles of the French Revolution were not weak-
ened or destroyed during the intervening period of the so-called Enlighten-
ment. They were only repressed and had gained tremendous future mo-
mentum just because of this temporary state of repression.

The phases of the historical development of war and revolution from
1789 to 1941 should not need a detailed explanation. It is of course a great
shock for those naive democrats of Europe and the U. S. who until recently
had quite honestly believed in the opposite claims of the Nazi propaganda
to be reminded of the historical fact that modern "total war" is by no means
one of the devilish inventions of the Nazi revolution but is really in all its
aspects, including its very language, the genuine product of democracy itself
and more particularly the fruit of the American War of Independence and
of the great French Revolution. Nevertheless this is such an obvious fact of
the most recent history of our society, and it has been so often expounded in

8) For a criticism of this attitude-somewhat mysterious in form but sound in -sub-
stance see Denis De Rougemont, LOVE IN THE WESTERN WORLD, New York
1940,Book V, Love and War, pp. 223 ff. and the same author's study on PASSIONW
AND THE ORIGIN OF HITLERISM, in The Review of Politics, vol. 3 No. 1, January, 1941.

unambigious terms by all historical and military experts9) that its utter neglect
by the public opinion both in the totalitarian and the democratic countries
presents in itself a major problem. The secrecy which until today surrounded
everything connected with a modem war seems to be an intrinsic and neces-
sary condition of the existence of present day society itself. "We do not
know the war" this means, among other things, that we caniiot control
what we do not know. If we did know, we would no longer live under
the conditions of a .society based on capitalist competition or even of a so-
ciety based on those imperfect and fragmentary forms of planning that are
compatible with the maintenance of private property and wage labor. A full
knowledge, and an ensuing conscious control of the war by the people them-
selves pre-supposes that society of freely associated producers which will re-
sult from a genuine social revolution. Under such conditions, there would no
longer be any need for war. Thus it appears that the amazing amount of
plain ignorance and equally surprising unpreparedness to think hard, clearly,
and realistically about the war do not result from an insufficient state of
our general political education. They belong to the essential features of a
pre-socialist society and are of the essence of war itself.

The whole theory and practice of bourgeois warfare during the last
150 years is dominated by the idea of "total war". Total war was invented
and first practised on a gigantic scale by the fourteen citizen armies or-
ganized and put in the field at the darkest hour of the new French Republic
for the purpose of defending the revolution against a host of threatening
enemies from without and from within. This was the meaning of the famous
"lev6e en masse" that was decreed by the law of August 23, 1793 which,
for the first time in history, put all the resources of a belligerent nation -
its men, foodstuffs, labor, industry, the whole genius of the people, and the
tremendous passion of its newly aroused enthusiasm into the service of
the revolutionary war. This was indeed, within the limits set by the degree
of technical and industrial development, a "universal draft" and a veritable
"total war". If we disregard for a moment the abysmal difference in
language between a period when the revolutionary spirit of the bourgeois
class was genuine and powerful and the present phase of its beginning
decay what we read in the speeches of the National Convention and in
the text of the revolutionary decree itself might indeed have been written
"The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge weapons and transport sup-
plies; the women will make up old linen into lint; the old men will have themselves
carried into the public squares to rouse the courage of the fighting men, to preach
hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.

9) See for a most up-to-date, factual report on the gradual rise, survival and thypo-
thetical) decline of the mass army and other implements of modern total war
the above quoted book of Hoffman Nickerson. For a masterful treatment of the same
matter in condensed form see the chapter on "THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY AND
INDUSTRIALISM UPON WAR" in Toynbee's work, vol. IV, pp. 141-151.

"The public buildings shall be fumed into barracks, the public squares into munition
factories; the earthen floors of cellars shall be treated with lye toa extract salpeter.
"All fire-arms of suitable caliber shall be turned over to the troops: the interior shall
be policed with shotguns and with cold steel.
"All saddle-horses shall be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in
cultivation will draw the artillery and supply wagons." 10)
Yet even that, the highest point ever reached in the history of bourgeois
warfare, the revolutionary total war, showed the fateful marks of an intrin-
sic ambiguity. This war for the defense of the revolution and for the delivery
of all oppressed peoples was inevitably conceived and carried on from the
outset as a national war of the French people against foreign countries.
From a war of defense it soon developed into a war of conquest; the promised
delivery of the oppressed peoples degenerated into a mere propagandistic
pretext for the annexation of their territories, and the revolutionary war
was at all times conducted indiscriminately against every country, free or
unfree, which did not side with the French republic in its mortal struggle
against the coalitions of its enemies. It is characteristic that the first steps
toward the "war of revolutionary expansion," that is, toward the use of
revolutionary slogans as a means of external warfare, were not originated
by the Jacobin radicals but by the moderate Girondist faction which was
already secretly aspiring to conclude rather than to further expand and
intensify the revolutionary process. Yet it was the revolutionary Jacobins
who later carried through, with all their tremendous energy, the new policy
of war and conquest which they had reluctantly accepted as a means for their
internal revolutionary policies. A similar development was to recur, after a
long interval but under closely analogous conditions, in the internal and
external policies of the Russian revolution of 1917. At the present time the
old Girondist slogan of revolutionary warfare is used as one of the chief
ideological weapons of the Nazi propaganda in spite of the recent extension
of the Nazi war into an indiscriminate attack both against the "decaying
capitalist democracies" of the West and the new totalitarian regime of the
Soviet Union.
This latest development was prepared during the whole 19th century
through a gradual dissolution of the original revolutionary content of the
bourgeois total war and a corresponding weakening of that tremendous
striking force that it had manifested during the epoch of the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars from 1792 to 1815. The long period of gradual dis-
integration and decay of the so-called National Wars in 19th century
Europe can be subdivided, according to Marshal Foch, into three succes-
sive periods:
"War became national in the first instance for the sake of winning and securing
the independence of peoples that of the French in 1792-93, of the Spaniards in
1804-14, of the Russians in 1812, of the Germans in 1813 and of Europe in 1814. At

10) Translation by Hoffman Nickerson, I. c. p. 64.

this stage it produced those glorious ana powerful displays of popular passion known
as Valmy, Sarragossa, Tarancon, Moscow, and Leipzig.
"War then went on being national for the sake of winning unity of races or nationality.
This is what the Italians and the Prussians claimed to be fighting for in 1866 and 1870.
In its name also the king of Prussia, after he had become German emperor, put for-
ward a title to the German provinces of Austria.
"But if war is still national today, it is for the sake of securing economic benefits and
profitable trade agreements.
"After having been the violent means whereby peoples wrested a place in the world
for themselves which made them into nations, war has become the means to which
they still resort in order to enrich themselves." 11)
This is indeed a brilliant description of the various successive phases
that bourgeois war had to pass through in close analogy with the simultaneous
decline of the revolutionary tendencies and achievements of the ruling bour-
geois class. And again we can observe the fallacy of the ordinary pacifist
confusion of the periods of comparative peace with the truly progressive
phases of human development. The last period of peace which was en-
joyed by Europe during the so-called "colonial era" from 1879-1914 was,
as de Rougemont observes, nothing more than a period of utter cultural
decay. "War was growing middle-class. The blood was getting commercial-
ized." "In short, colonial warfare was but an extension of capitalistic com-
petition in a form that laid a heavier burden on the country at large though
not on the great business firms."
The most impressive further consequence of this state of affairs was the
eventual collapse of all Revolutionary-Napoleonic and Clausewitzian, com-
petitive-capitalistic and nationalist-bourgeois warfare in the first world war
of 1914-1918. This long-prepared-for, crowning war of the nationalistic
age was no longer fought between single nations but between extremely
heterogeneous groups of nations. It proved that the old competitive form
of unrestricted total warfare was utterly impotent either to win victory
or to allow for a real peace after the conclusion of the belligerent action.
Even the revolutionary repercussions of the collapse of the war and the
impossibilities of the ensuing peace in the defeated countries of Central
Europe seem to enhance rather than to detract from the general picture of
an irretrievable break-down and decay of the whole traditional structure
of Western capitalist society.
Nor has the relation of war to revolution attained a new positive phase
in the developments of warfare during the post-war period. From a purely
formalistic point of view it might be said that the revolutionary significance
of war has increased in the last 25 years in the sense that the former rigid
distinction between war and civil war has shown a tendency to become
more fluid and finally to dissolve altogether. Whereas during the first world

11) Marshall F. Foch, LES PRINCIPES DE LA GUERRE, Paris 1903. English trans-
lation by de Rougemont, pp. 245-46.

war the proposition to "transform the capitalist war into a civil war" was
still regarded as an utterly impractical slogan by the majority of the socialist
workers themselves,12) twenty years later the Spanish War originated as
a genuine civil war and in its further process developed into a rehearsal
of the present war between the totalitarian and democratic countries. With
the outbreak of the present war the existing confusion has reached an even
higher point. This war has revealed from the outset and at all its decisive
junctures the features of a world-wide "ideological" and "political" war,
that is, of a struggle between different factions of a civil war rather than
of an old fashioned war of one country against another.
Thus, the whole development traced in this study seems to have moved
in a circle. In the latest phase of bourgeois society we come right back to
the ideological wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. Yet, closer investiga-
tion reveals this apparent revival of the intimate relationship between war
and revolution to be a matter of appearance rather than of real historical
significance. What has actually happened is much better described by the
paradoxical formula that in the present epoch not only war, but even "civil
war," has lost its former revolutionary character. Civil War and Revolu-
tion are no longer synonymous terms.
Moreover, it is not at all certain that this new pseudo-revolutionary
feature of present-day totalitarian warfare, which stirred up such intense
feelings throughout the world, has come to stay. The opposite event is
equally possible, and this possibility has been further increased through
the recent extension of the war to Russia. The present tendency of the
Nazi regime to improve its comparatively weak position within the exist-
ing power-field of capitalist competition by a concomitant drive toward a
totalitarian reconstruction of the whole existing system of society may still be
entirely abandoned in the further course of the war. The totalitarian war
would then return to the forms of an ordinary capitalistic war that is
conducted from both sides merely for an external gain of national power.
It is true that even the continuance of the war in such an old fashioned
bourgeois style may ultimately result in an internal change of the given
structure of the society. Yet in that case the internal repercussions of
the war will not result from any conscious action of either belligerent
party, whatever the "aims" proclaimed by their ideological propaganda.
They will result, if at all, from the force of unforeseen circumstances as,
for instance, from the action of a new revolutionary class that was not
represented in the councils of this war. They will result without and
against the common intentions of both the belligerent powers. The ques-
tion whether such further developments of the present crisis can be expected
at all on the basis of the existing conditions, will be discussed in the con-
cluding section of this study.
The main differences between the present "totalitarian" form and the

12) See Living Marxism, vol. V no. 4, Spring 1941, pp. 2-4.

older forms of bourgeois total war are not as both Nazi propaganda
and its foolish democratic antagonists would have us believe derived from
the fact that bourgeois society today has entered a new phase of its revo-
lutionary ascendency. Yet these differences do express a real change in its
objective economic structure and development. As already shown, war in
capitalist society was at all times a necessary complement to the normal
conduct of business. Already the great theorist of 19th century warfare,
General Carl von Clausewitz, followed up his famous description of war
as a "continuation of politics by other means" with the remark that war is
"even more closely related to trade which also presents itself as a conflict
of human interests and activities, and that politics itself must be regarded
as a kind of trade on an enlarged scale." 18) He described the war of the
first part of the 19th century as being "much like business competition
pushed to its logical consequences and unrestrained by any law other than
expediency." This is how "the great interests of the nation", that is, the
common interests of the capitalist class and more particularly those of the
leading groups, were attended to at a time when capitalist production was
still predominantly regulated by the competition of apparently independent
commodity producers. In the same manner also the most recent methods of
total warfare, as they are applied in more or less perfect forms by both
sides in the present world war, represent a later and more highly developed
form of the conduct of the old capitalist business. "New forms of material
production," said Marx "appear earlier in the forms of warfare than in
peace-time production." Thus the present totalitarian war anticipates those
new economic forms which will be achieved at a later date through the com-
plete transition of all capitalist countries to a planned rather than to a
market-conditioned and to a monopolistic and state-capitalist rather than
to a competitive and private mode of capitalist production. It is mainly for
this reason that the present war is not just a "repetition" of the 1914-1918
conflict, but seems to show an "essential difference" from the characteristic
form of its predecessor.14)
This difference, among other things, appears in the lessened importance
of the "armed horde." According to a generally reliable source, only one
third of the German army is even nominally infantry and much, if not most,
of its real work is done by the long-service professionals of its tank corps

13) C. v. Clausewitz, VOM KRIEGE, 1832-Book II, chapter 3, section 3.
14) See Clement Greenberg and Dwight MacDonald, 10 PROPOSITIONS ON THE WAR,
in Partisan Review, vol. VII, no. 4, July-August 1941, p. 271. The authors do not
agree on the character of this existing "difference". One of them believes that the
novel characteristics of the present war arise from the fact that "a new kind of
society" is already existing in present-day Germany. They do not further clarify
this point, but lose themselves in a discussion of the greater or lesser "desirability"
of fascism and other mainly subjective problems. This tendency detracts to a certain.
extent from the otherwise considerable value of their attempt at a serious discussion
of the main problem of our time.

and air force.16) Most of its military operations up to the Russian campaign
have been performed by a surprisingly small contingent of selected "shock
troops" and with a comparatively low number of casualties.
Another feature in the character of the present totalitarian war which
points to the general decline of the enthusiastic competitive spirit in the
present phase of monopoly capitalism is the notable decrease of that wave
of general enthusiasm that was aroused by the national wars of the 19th
century and that reached its climax during the first years of the world war,
1914-1918. Despite the vastly increased efforts of expert professional propa-
ganda, there is nothing in the attitude of the general public toward the
present war that reminds one even slightly of the strong ideological intoxi-
cation of whole nations that was so characteristic of the wars of the pre-
ceding epoch.
Finally, although every war of the last century and every successive
year of warfare between 1914 and 1918 evidenced an increasing extension
of the principle of planning beyond the traditional limits of the military
field, this principle has now for the first time been consistently applied to
a complete mobilization of all resources and manpower of a society that
by its technical and industrial development has far transcended all previously
existing levels. What is new here is not the idea of the "universal draft"
per se, but the fact that in its application today nothing is left to individual
initiative and competitive strife. Another novelty consists in the fact that
this time the principles of "war economy" were already applied in the
preceding time of peace. The whole industrial system of such nations as
Germany and Russia had been methodically subordinated in advance to
the needs of a war that was not to begin until many years later.16) Since
the outbreak of the present war the traditional barriers between production
for war and production for peace have been broken down everywhere. The
resources of all countries have been pooled for the use of a world-wide war
In all these respects the present "total war" of Nazism shows a dif-
ferent character from the older forms of total warfare which reflected the
spirit of a predominantly competitive capitalism. Today's total war thus
appears as a new form of total war a total war of monopoly capitalism
and state capitalism as against the competitive total wars that pertained to
a preceding economic epoch.

15) Hoffman Nickerson, p. 397.
16) Ironically, the first formal adoption of the principle of "total war" in post-war
Europe was decreed not in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany. A bill for the mob-
ilization of all forces and resources of the nation for "la guerre total" was submitted
to the French Chamber of Deputies under the sponsorship of the socialist leader,
Paul-Boncour, and passed overwhelmingly over the votes of the Communists on March
3, 1927.

The same economic developments that have gradually destroyed the
positive function of war as an instrument of the bourgeois revolution have
created the objective premises of a new revolutionary movement. The prob-
lem of war and revolution assumed a new aspect through the rise of an
independent movement of the working class. Against this new threat the
ruling bourgeois class has now to fulfill a repressive function. Under the
changed historical conditions it becomes increasingly difficult to decide
whether a given form of war or even war itself has still retained any posi-
tive significance for the revolution of the 20th century.
First of all it must be stated that on the various occasions during the
last two or three decades when the proletarian class has embarked on a
struggle for its independent aims, the social revolution of the workers has
not derived any benefit from those positive functions that assumedly can
be fulfilled by a revolutionary war for the emancipation of an oppressed
class. As far as the bolshevik revolution in Russia is concerned, its "revo-
lutionary wars" mark a particularly dismal chapter of its history. It found
its tragic conclusion in the broadcast address of July 3, 1941, in which
Stalin no longer referred to socialism and the working class at all. Instead,
he asked the various peoples of the U.S.S.R. to defend their national state
existence within the Russian Empire and generally to display "the particular
qualities that are inherent in our people." Since then, the tremendous new
forces that were released in Russia by the revolution in 1917 have been
used as tools for the ambiguous defense of the capitalist status quo in Europe
and the U.S.A. against the equally ambiguous innovations that would result
from the defeat of the "democratic" powers of the West in their com-
petitive struggle with the "totalitarian" forces of Nazi-fascism.
How are we to understand the paradoxical contention that war, the
mighty tool of the bourgeois revolution of the past, may have lost all posi-
tive importance for the socialist revolution of the present epoch? Surely,
the historical movement of the 20th century is not separated by a Chinese
wall from its predecessors. If it were true that war fulfilled an entirely
positive function in the revolutionary change of society in the past, it would
be difficult to see how it could have lost its progressive function today.
The answer is to be found in the already discussed ambiguities that
were inherent in the bourgeois war from the outset, and in the underlying
ambiguities of the bourgeois revolution itself. There is no doubt that the
revolutionary and nationalist wars of the 18th and 19th centuries were
necessary steps in the process that led to the establishment of the existing
capitalist society and its ruling bourgeois class. Yet, in spite of the glowing
revolutionary passion in the hearts of the citizen soldiers who did the violent
and bloody job, their real function had much less to do with the genuinely
emancipatory and democratic aspect than with the simultaneously repressive
effect of the revolution. It is an unjustified historical generalization to refer
to modern mass war as an outcome of the French Revolution in general.
A closer examination reveals that it sprang from one particular phase of
that revolution. It originated at the critical juncture when the rise of the

Vendee and outside aggression had enforced the replacement of the much
more democratic principles of the first phase of the revolution by the au-
thoritarian and violent measures of the revolutionary dictatorship of the
Jacobin party.
In the second place, the further development of universal conscription
and all other features of "total war" during the 19th century lay not so
much in the hands of democratic France as in those of the anti-democratic
Prussian state. This was not, as some people have said, mere historical irony.
It had its foundation in the greater appropriateness of an exalted use of
force for the purpose of the reactionary governments of Central Euope who
restricted their "Wars of Liberation" to the recovery of the national inde-
pendence of their parochial states from the French Empire while at the
same time refusing to grant the institutions of a genuine democracy to their
own people. Again, in the following decades, when the new form of mass
war reached a still higher pitch in the American Civil War and Bismark's
three Prussian wars of aggrandizement, it was bourgeois nationalism in its
narrow parochial sense rather than democracy that was entrenched in the
centre of Europe through the outcome of these, increasingly violent and
sanguinary wars.
From that time onward all capitalist and imperialist wars up to 1914
were opposed more or less consistently by all shades and currents of the
international movement of the working class. It was only under the impact
of the world war and the ensuing economic and political crisis that two
minorities within the German socialist party rediscovered the "positive" value
of war for the socialist revolution. One of these minorities led the abortive
revolution of the German workers and later took refuge in the pro-Russian
activities of the Communist Party. The other accepted the war itself as a
genuine fulfilment of the social aspirations of the workers and thereby
anticipated the "revolutionary" war that is waged today, against Soviet
Russia and democratic capitalism alike, by the counter-revolutionary forces
of National Socialism.
The significance of war for the future revolutionary movement of the
working class is today entirely in the balance. Whatever the outcome of
the present "total" war will mean for the rival factions of the international
ruling class, it is clear that for the workers the assumedly "revolutionary"
war is only another and further-enhanced form of their normal condition of
oppression and exploitation. In spite of all the clamor and turmoil this in-
ternecine struggle within the. ruling capitalist class is no longer as
former capitalist wars have been a necessary form and part of histor-
ical progress. It produces even those minor changes of the existing
economic and political structure which are indispensable to keep the old sys-
tem going in an altogether distorted form. The capitalist war has exhausted
all its revolutionary potentialities.
The struggle for the new order of society does not take place on the
battlefields of the capitalist war. The decisive action of the workers begins
where the capitalist war ends.
Karl Korsch


A comparison of the evolution of Italian and German economics after
the establishment of the respective totalitarian governments gives rise to
speculation as to whether there are any inherent laws which have determined
the parallelism of their development. Despite the differences in the economic
structure of Italy and Germany, both countries have run through a sequence
of economic stages which, though longer in one country than in another,
and occasionally brought about by different events, are nevertheless related by
their consecutive order and essential characteristics.
Before a more detailed inquiry into the functioning of the system during
each of these stages enables us to name either of them, let us first charac-
terize them by those external characteristics which the totalitarian parties
themselves emphasize.
The first period was called "sindacalista" in Italy, "Staendestaat" in
Germany, and in Portugal, Spain, France, "corporatism", "Corporativism",
or "Etat Corporatif". The fact that totalitarian ideologues and legislators
mistook the intention for the achievement and regarded this period as the
inauguration of their final aim created a good deal of theoretic confusion.
It led either to their giving up the corporatist ideology in the later stages
(Germany) or to declaring the inaugurative act of each of the following
stages as the "final achievement of the realm of corporatism" (Italy). In
the countries which have not yet progressed to the later stages, every leg-
islative act is considered as the first true fulfillment of corporate state
ideas (Spain, France).
The corporate State period was characterized by a variety of new class
organizations, institutions and offices, which among them carried on a good
amount of the class struggle to the exclusion of the workers' class organ-
izations. The latter were rooted out. In contrast to this, the one party
state established its supreme authority by incorporating and co-ordinating
into its frame-work as many organizations as possible, by carrying on ex-
periments in the social and economic field and by directly interceding in
the class struggle where it aimed not at equilibrium but at satisfying com-
pletely one class or another.
This period came to an end when the state was no longer able to pre-
vent open class struggle from breaking out. The bloody suppression of
"left wingers", ideologues of the "second revolution", totalitarian "integral-
ists", "national bolshevists", corporativists, etc., left the economic sphere
to the organizations of big business and the political power concentrated
in the hands of an economically independent and, socially speaking, relat-
ively homogeneous group.
The second period was usually described by totalitarian authors as the
stage of the "economic miracle". It coincided with a period of world pros-
perity. The intervention of the state into economy was restricted to main-

training equilibrium, supporting the weak points of industry, securing a con-
stant flow of capital through foreign loans or pump-priming, supervising
the capital market and foreign trade, and preventing the emigration of
capital. Totalitarian authors ascribed the prosperity of this period to the
so-called "moral renovation", to the absence of class struggle, the control
of foreign trade and the encouragement given to capital. Anti-totalitarian
authors also emphasized the efficient control of consumption through the
regulation of markets and prices. We shall see that the economic policy
of this period resembled the mercantile system or "geschlossener Handel-
This period ended with the periodic economic crisis. Enter the third
stage. From now on the totalitarian party-state felt obliged to save the
economy from disaster by the following methods: taking over the losses
and preventing new ones, keeping employment up, splitting the general crisis
into a series of partial ones, and overcoming economic congestion by shift-
ing consumption to newly created outlets. The growing pressure that arose
from the collapsing equilibrium led to ever-more-complicating and haphaz-
ard constructions, which, in turn, instantly called for new measures of plan-
ning and control.
This third stage was generally described as autarchyy" or "Wehrwirt-
schaft". It implied a considerable amount of "planning", state interven-
tion and nationalization of business corporations. Mechanisms of control,
originally conceived as temporary, were systematized and made difficult to
repeal. Production was shifted from marketable commodities to substitutes
and armaments. Amortization was shifted from individual business to the
whole of industry.
The "radical" totalitarians emerged once more. Theorists of etatism
and all-around corporatism occupied important posts. Totalitarian apolo-
gists announced that the "second revolution" had come and that the Chief
had resolved to set up a new economic system and abolish capitalism for
good. Socialist critics denounced the new system as "state capitalism", the
worst of all class societies, and liberal critics regarded the new system as
"inverted bolshevism".
The new equilibrium, however, proved to be less steady the more the
new corporations merged into the capitalist nexus. The crisis, prevented
from breaking out and destroying unsound parts of the economic structure,
became latent. All parts of the economy became more or less afflicted with
excessive investments, artificial planning and pooling and participation in
national losses. All outlets on the home market became glutted in accord-
ance with the laws which govern capitalist economy.
The totalitarian state had to decide, then, whether it wanted to trans-
form the "economy of national defense" into a complete war economy (which
in the end was impossible without actually going to war) or whether to
abolish all the laws of capitalist economy. There was no other way for
a dictatorship since a return to economic liberalism would precipitate a

crisis. The totalitarian countries found imperialism the easier outlet and
they declared war on foreign rather than on home capitalism, i. e., they
shifted the internal crisis to international affairs.
This period lasted two years in Italy, from the Matteoti crisis of
1924 which established the totalitarian regime to the Farinacci crisis.
In Germany it covered only fifteen months from the Reichstag fire in
1933 to the Roehm purge.
The second period covered the years of prosperity: in Italy 1925-31;
in Germany 1934-36. Economically, this was a period of inflation in Ger-
many. In Italy a policy of harsh deflation particularly of wages -
was combined with encouragement to foreign investments in Italian industry.
As a result of the world crisis, foreign capital investment was discon-
tinued in Italy. The crisis that followed and the threat of crisis in Ger-
many after the technical means of pump-priming had been exhausted, led
to a complete reversal in the traditional attitude of the totalitarian polit-
icians towards economy. The ensuing "period of economic revolution" last-
ed in Italy through the Ethiopian war and sanctions, and until 1938 in
The economic system that has obtained since then in the totalitarian
states has been described as "war economy". We shall see whether this
meant a capitalist system distorted by the necessities of war or a system
whose functioning was entirely determined by the war.

The syndicalistt" or "corporate" stage of totalitarian economy was
characterized by the establishment of class organizations which waged con-
tinuous class war against each other and which tried, with more or less
success, to wrest the state power from others, to lay hold on as much political
power as possible and to realize economic aims through political means.
In this class struggle the state used its mediatory power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner.
In Italy the Marxist trade unions were dissolved, but the first fascist
"syndicates", which included employers and employees in one organization,
proved unmanageable. Independent workers' unions under fascist leaders
were established and their chief, Rossoni, attacked the government's financial
policy. In Germany the semi-official Nazi shop stewards continually press-
ed their demands on the official "German Labor Front". The struggle
for the often postponed elections of the shop stewards was a main issue in
German politics. The "old militants" of the Nazi organizations got busy
in the economic sphere as soon as they tired of book-burning, Jew-baiting
and Marxist-killing. Storm Troopers often turned to "direct-action" against
refractory employers or landlords.
At the same time the Peasants' Estate, the League for the Defense
of the Middle Classes, the Estate of Industry, etc., were no sooner called

into being that they began to "snatch all the covers" of state protection.
Each wanted to create a monopoly for its own products and to exclude the
others from participating in the national cartels. The peasants and the
middle classes obtained favorable regulations of investments, prices and mark-
ets. Their goal of social security was temporarily satisfied; and the unem-
ployed were given something to do, though not remunerative jobs.
The economic and financial policy remained, however, in the hands
of liberal businessmen or officials Stefani in Italy, Schmitz and Hugenberg
in Germany: men hostile to any interference on the part of the state in
business operations. To them the state's job was to root out "Marxism",
keep the demands of the middle class within the bounds of National Re-
novation, protect industry with tariffs and real estate with subsidies. A
careful perusal of the laws and decrees in the economic field during this
period shows that their common aim was to drain the greatest amount of
ready money into the pockets of big industry with the sole exception
of the measures aimed at securing jobs for Nazi partisans.
The failure of the totalitarian governments to secure social security
for the middle classes led to extremist revolts the preparations for the
second "March on Rome" and the Roehm conspiracy. Both were crushed.
At the same time the totalitarian parties took the opportunity to smash the
old conservative parties and to free themselves from any outside interference
with the political machines they had set up. The totalitarian states came
out of these crises with considerable increases in homogeneity, efficiency,
independence and power, but they deliberately renounced direct intercession
in economy and steered clear of using it as a means of class struggle.

In the prosperity period, the radical totalitarian partisans were replaced
as shapers of economic policy by the pre-totalitarian leaders. Rossoni was
not heard from for a long time, fascist shop stewards were abolished, shop
stewards were not re-elected in Germany and the Nazi shop cells disap-
peared from the scene of social politics. At the same time that the theory
of corporations was exalted to the sky, Bottai, the main theorist of corporat-
ism, was relegated to a mock Ministry of Corporations which was not al-
lowed to create corporations. Up to 1932 there was only one corporation
- that of the Theater. In the meantime the famous Carte del Lavoro
was elaborated by moderate-conservative jurists like Rocco, and the Min-
istry of Finance was given to the business man Jung.
In Germany Schacht was made Minister of Trade. Goerdeler was
recalled to the post which he had occupied at the time of Bruening's chan-
cellorship. As Commissar for the Control of Prices he had more power
than Dr. Darr6 the leader of the Peasants' Estate and Minister of Agricul-
ture. Dr. Trendelenburg, Minister of Commerce in the Weimar.Republic
was nominated president of the Estate of Industry in place of the Nazi
ideologues who had applied for or held this position.

In Germany as in Italy financial policy became liberal or conservat-
ive according to circumstances, but never totalitarian. Northern Italy was
industrialized and electrified with the help of English and American cap-
italists. Germany amazed the world by the sweeping success of its unham-
pered capitalistic policy of re-employment through re-armament, state loan
expenditure, and inflation combined with rigorous control of foreign ex-
change and foreign trade, protective tariffs, prohibitive control of imports,
dumping, subsidies, export-stimulating clearing agreements, liberal taxation
combined with tax bonuses for investment, and last but not least, freedom
to form cartels, trusts, pools, and coercive cartels (which established the
domination of the business branches of the big business corporations). All
these measures increased profits, encouraged investment, and kept consump-
tion down. All these measures may be found in any handbook of German
mercantalism from List to Schacht or in any list of requirements drawn
up by industrialists during the days of the Weimar Republic. The much
decried "Banking Enquete" ended in Germany with a rather helpless and
regretful "report" which did not lead to anything approaching the state
control that the Nazi radicals wanted. Business maintained its legal re-
presentations through chambers of commerce to the exclusion of corpora-
tions, Nazi organizations and state-created institutions.


By 1932 the crisis really broke out in Italy as soon as the influx of
foreign capital was discontinued, and exports of the over-capitalized and
hypertrophic industry of durable goods slackened. In Germany there was
the same phenomenon of over-capitalization and over-investment in durable
goods though here it was only felt as an increasing strain on economic policy.
Neither country had created home markets for the consumer goods industry
during the time of prosperity. Retail trade lagged far behind the sweeping
growth of capital goods, and had actually not reached the level of former
prosperity phases. In Italy the state had to take over 80% of the total
industrial shares in order to prevent a wholesale bankruptcy of Italian in-
dustry. The state became practically the master of industry as the taking
over was done through the state banks. In Germany, on the contrary, the
state financed the industrial "miracle" by means of special bills which had
been "pressed into the hands of business", as the official "Institut fuer
Konjunkturforschung" admitted in one of its "Reports". Twice before
Germany had experienced an increase in unemployment as soon as the print-
ing of currency had been discontinued. Schacht and Wageman rather frank-
ly expressed the fear that further inflation would lead to general disaster.
A well-documented paper which circulated in industrial quarters at the
end of 1936 stated that "investments made since 1933 must be written off
entirely as they are irrational and cannot yield profit under normal condi-
tions". The result was that business treasuries were uneasy in the midst
of plenty and felt themselves at the mercy of the state.

There were social differences corresponding to these economic differ-
ences. In Italy fascist and business "society" had already merged into one
by 1932. In Germany, however, the National Socialist Party faced a strong
bourgeois and Reichwehr opposition through 1936 and kept their "Fuehrer-
kaders" separate from a "society" which did not respect them.
Opposite causes had similar results in the climate of totalitarian econ-
omic policy. The state had to find profitable employment for the hyper-
trophic capital structure for which it was responsible in one way or another,
and of which it was in charge, however involuntarily. Contrary to the
legend of liberal critics the totalitarian state, far from carrying through
a policy of nationalization, decided to create economic conditions in which
unprofitable investments became profitable.
This was the self-styled "anti-capitalist" move or "second revolution"
of the totalitarian parties. The "old militants" re-appeared: Rossoni re-
placed Rocco, and Bottai was given the important post of Governor of Rome.
Goering, Wagner, Kepler replaced Goerdeler and Trendelenburg. New
posts were created for Nazi partisans. Autarchy was declared to be the
"task" of industry, and the Four-Year Plan was announced at the Party
Congress to the amazement of Dr. Schacht who had advised against it.
Interference with business was systematized and legally established during
this time. Goering was given discretionary powers to issue compulsory
regulations. At the same time important shifts were effected in property and
management; party officials stepped in and acquired seats in the boards of
joint stock companies, created new holding companies and trusts (Herman
Goering Werke, the Italian State Banks). A considerable legislative out-
put swelled the volumes of the Official Gazette and the Commercial Codes.
To create the new conditions of autarchy took considerable time. In
Italy the struggle between the old and new principles continued through
the Ethiopian War. Sanctions, though they did not create autarchy, helped
Mussolini to persuade the nation of its necessity. Not until the end of
the war, however, was the complete system of the new corporations (which,
as we shall see, have nothing in common with the original idea of corpora-
tive "Estates") legally set up. In Germany a year and half passed before
Dr. Funk replaced Schacht as Minister of Finance and another year before
he also became President of the Reichsbank.

Technically, financially, and economically, the new stage was not char-
acterized either by the increased number of bureaucratic regulations which
were only its consequence or by, the increased participation of government
employees in business, a situation whose social significance will be discussed
at once but which was incidental, economically speaking. Rather the new
stage was characterized by
1.) The replacement of public works by the production of "substitutes".

2) The replacement of pump-priming, inflationary methods by methods that
forced, and enabled, industry to make self-liquidating investments.
3) The replacement of state interference with particular marketing con-
ditions through the creation of new general conditions of capital expansion
on the home market.
Whereas over-produced capital had actually to be destroyed in the
second period and wasted in the form of armaments, roads, unprofitable
equipment, etc., the third period saw the creation of innumerable new in-
dustries whose work was artificially rendered profitable. There was no
increased satisfaction of the nation's needs, however, and the profits so made
were turned to a further production of armaments.
The boundaries of capitalist expansion were thus widened, not by open-
ing new markets and increasing the efficiency of satisfying existing demands,
but by the creation of new detours of production and the limitation of the
sources of satisfaction. Full employment was maintained by adding to the
industrial pyramid rather than by enlarging the basis of production. It is
obvious that this involved widespread reorganization of the capital structure
and business machine, as well as the formation of new trusts, the abolition
of old ones, and continuous modification and adaptation of the technical
and managerial machine.
This rebuilding of the business organization involved changes in the
social composition of the managing and supervising personnel. On the one
hand party officials availed themselves of the chance to acquire both property
and key positions in industry. They willingly amalgamated with the for-
mer ruling class. On the other hand, representatives of the old business
class were called upon to sit on the boards of planning and supervision.
Goering became the largest industrialist in Germany, and Agnelli, the owner
of the largest mining and industrial plants in Italy, became the dictator of
Italian economic policy. Party officials, military leaders, and big business
managers virtually merged into one class.

In the second stage of totalitarian economy the state had tried to steer
clear of economy and to interfere only in case of necessity. But it never-
theless had become involved in an ever-growing and increasingly, complicated
network of bureaucratic regulations. In the third stage it abandoned its
aloofness a feature which has caused superficial critics to define the
system as one of "State Capitalism".
This much-misused phrase, State Capitalism, may mean one of three
things to those who use it: 1.) That a certain amount of private business
is done by the state or taken over by it within the framework of capitalism.
Thus defined, state capitalism does not appear as a, new system. 2.) That
the state controls so great a percentage of industry that there is practically
a general state monopoly which does business without any regard for profit.


This is certainly not true of Germany or Italy. It has been the principle
of both fascists and national socialists to turn back into private hands as
many business corporations as possible after the crisis was over, and to make
it possible for all entrepreneurs whether private, or corporate, or public
institutions to earn profits. 3) That the state controls the flow of capital,
of demand and supply, and leaves to entrepreneurial activity only the ex-
ecution of its demands. This is more than a definition in that such a pro-
position would not only describe the actual control that is being exercised
but would also imply or suggest the idea that the aims of the state could
be artificially imposed upon production and thus actually be carried out
through a decree of the government. The feasibility of this is to be ques-
tioned, however. Neither is the state free to decide the tasks to be per-
formed by production nor are its decisions carried out in actual fact. A
system in which the decisions of the state were not determined by any
but technical reasons and production were carried through regardless of
profits might be called State Socialism, although such a definition vould
not take into account the generally accepted definition of socialism as an
economy controlled by consumer needs. A system in which consumption
itself has to be "controlled" cannot, however, be called State Socialism.
The economic policy of the totalitarian state might be described as
widening or narrowing the "environmental conditions" of national pro-
duction so as to maintain "full employment" in a profit-earnig industry.
As equilibrium in such an economy would be unstable, the regulations would
have to be changed continually. Regulations that concern general condi-
tions would call forth new regulations that concerned the technical and
economic "tasks" of industry, and vice-versa, ad infinitum.
Thus in the totalitarian state the laws which governed capitalist pro-
duction continue to be in force, but the symptoms by which they were felt
will now be reversed. What might have appeared as price fluctuations
in a free capitalist system will appear in the totalitarian state as fluctuations
in industrial organization. What used to appear as disproportionalities of
capital now appear as lack of proportion in technical equipment, raw mater-
ial and supply of labor. Instead of adjusting supply to demand, demand
is now adjusted to supply.
It is obvious that unless the natural sources of national wealth were
to be wasted in wholesale fashion (at the expense of the national defense
program and other implements of totalitarian regimes), the expansion thus
created could not exceed certain limits. Contradictions between the various
systems of regulations were bound to arise. The only outlet that remained
was imperialist expansion. What appeared as Wehrwirtschaft was, there-
fore, from the outset an investment in the business of national imperialist
expansion. The distortions brought about by the creation of such an ever-
grownig field of investment must invariably increase the strain of the exist-
ing disproportions, yet they are offset by the successes of the expansion
program. As the disproportions grew larger and larger, however, the field

of expansion, too, had to grow larger at an ever-increasing rate. The neces-
sary consequence was war.
War economy was not, therefore, the necessary consequence of a con-
trolled economy in the way that sanctions were the accepted consequence
of the decision to embark on a program of autarchy. War economy was
a new feature that grew out of the decision to switch policies when the
"natural" and intrinsic sources of inward and outward expansion were ex-
hausted. It implied a return to the pump-priming methods of the second
period and called for a new set of bureaucratic controls which were mainly
concerned with limitations of consumption.

Schematically we find, therefore, four periods and two transitions:
1.) the introductory stage of experiments and class struggles where the
state was used for different economic ends first by one class and then by
another; 2.) the stage of "Keynesian economy" where mercantalism was
combined with public works and pump-priming; the state deliberately re-
frained from direct economic activity; 3.) a period of "revolution"; a.) the
state took over a certain amount of business which subsequently returned
to private entrepreneurs; b) the state enlarged and systematized the field
of planning and control; c.) the state and entrepreneurial class merged.
4.) the stage of "conditioning measures" when autarchy led to the creation
of "inner expansion" and reconstruction; 5) the transitional stage of im-
perialist expansion; .6.) a final return to "war economy".
The system which has finally emerged from these developments reveals
characteristics of all the various stages. This system is a "corporate com-
munity" in that state and party officials share in property and managerial
functions. It is a "Keynesian economy" in that the state is the greatest con-
sumer, and pyramid-building represents a considerable percentage of national
output. It is "war economy" in that the problems of autarchy and of es-
tablishing new large-scale industries are resolved with. the help of the state.
It is a capitalism based on "conditioning measures" in so far as its develop-
ment and expansion, as well as the forms and symptoms under which the
abstract laws of capitalist economy are allowed to become manifest, are
determined by state intervention and the mononpolistic agreements of cor-
From another..point of view the totalitarian system as we know it today
may also be called "managerial capitalism", since the decisions dictated by
technical and economic considerations are no longer hampered by the rights
of ownership and title holders. Yet it should be emphasized speaking
of "managers" that the true technical directors have nowhere acquired
the disposing power p.f technocrats; the real power rests mainly with econ-
omic and business managers.

The new system might also be called "managed capitalism" or a "poli-
tical capitalism" for the reason that behind the efficiency of the system lies
the merger of political with economic power on a national scale. One may
also speak of "abstract" or "totalitarian" capitalism because of the fact
that the economic laws of capitalism control the economic developments of
the system without any interference from such "faux frais" as capitalists
and holders of rent-income.
Finally, it may be called "pure capitalism" because profit is entirely
transformed into rent and no longer determines the rate of investment and
accumulation. The true law of capitalist accumulation is rising to the sur-
face of economic development: the proportions of the schemataa" (as de-
veloped in the second volume of Marx's Capital, in Rosa Luxemburg's
Accumulation of Capital, and Hilferding's Financecapital), that is, the pure
necessity of expansion, the law of declining profit rates, the law of con-
centration, the increasingly higher organic composition of capital these
govern the policies of the big corporations and the state's "planning" depart-
But why quarrel about names? Political reasons might even militate
in favor of calling the system a "state economy" in order to emphasize its
political rather than its economic characteristics. And now after roughly
tracing the origin of the system a scientific analysis should describe its
functioning, its working and its tendencies. This will be done in a second
H. Bruggers


If God is a great mathematician as some scientists believe, our lesser
gods seem to be engaged in a sort of numbers game. Wilson had his 14
Points, a relatively high number compared with the 8 Points (plus two
on the sly) of Churchill and Roosevelt. The oft-bewailed deterioration of the
intellect seems now to be a fact; today it takes two men to count up to
eight. But the superiority of the free spirit of democracy over the dark forces
of fascism is still assured, for in their counter-declaration Hitler and Mus-
solini were able to count up to only four. This modesty, however, might be
explained by the fascist leaders' inability to overcome their "proletarian"
Like all meetings of statesmen the Churchill-Roosevelt Conference served
two purposes: to decide first what to do and second what to say. The first
decision of course has nothing to do with the second. As far as the public
is concerned the meeting was a mere propaganda stunt. Real pacts are not
publicized. What is published is what the authors of pacts want other people

to understand. The Eight Points of Roosevelt and Churchill are utterly
meaningless save as a renewed declaration of war on the Nazis. They are
also meant to suggest to those nations not as yet actively engaged in fighting,
or still pondering the question of whether or not to line up with Germany,
to think twice in the face of Anglo-American determination to see the war
through to a victorious end.
In order better to understand the full implication of the Roosevelt-
Churchill meeting, it might be well to review the events of the recent past.
The Anglo-American bloc has lost two great battles, one in France, the other
in the Balkans. Nothwithstanding the relatively easy victory in France, Hitler
was not able to follow through with an invasion of England. Whether or
not this was an "error of necessity" we do not know. At any rate the war
continued. With the end of the Balkan campaign almost the whole of
Europe was in the hands of the Germans. The Blitzkrieg proved itself even
in the difficult terrain of Yugoslavia and Greece. In fact, the rapidity of the
German advance surprised Hitler himself. The day his battalions began to
march he pointed out that the going would be difficult and that such sur-
prises as occurred on the Western front should not be expected. Yet all was
over in about three weeks.

After the Debacle
The more optimistic Allied spokesmen had hoped that the Balkan cam-
paign would become the turning point of the whole war. Forced to fight
on "two fronts," Germany would be in a position similar to that in the
first world war. Though it was difficult to recognize a "second front" in the
sea and air activity against England and in the engagement of small forces
in Lybia, careless commentators nevertheless predicted a German defeat. The
Balkan front was considered a bridge-head from which the invasion of
Germany could finally be launched. Only after the debacle was it said that
the whole affair was after all of small importance, merely a question of the
salvation of the Yugoslav soul, the Greek tradition and the honor of England.
The battle of the Atlantic again became the "really decisive one" and it was
pointed out that Hitler's "seven league boots are not watertight."
More cautious politicians among the Allies expected the campaign in
the Balkans to last several months at least. Undoubtedly they had been
encouraged by the Italian difficulties in the Greek campaign. But it was
the precariousness of the Allied situation rather than over-confidence that
made them accept the fight. They must have hoped that a prolonged struggle
in the Balkans would draw Russia and Turkey into the melee. But these
two nations- were too deeply convinced of England's essential weakness and
of America's inability to determine events. They preferred to wait rather
than to gamble with the imperialist book-makers. The previous successes
of the German army weighed heavily. And the Germans nourished the illu-
sion that a benevolent neutrality would be highly rewarded later on. They
did not demand military participation on their side. So the waiting-policy

seemed the better one; and there would still be time to jump on the victor's
band-wagon, if a victor should emerge.
Modern warfare can successfully be waged only by industrially highly
developed nations. Necessarily the war centers around America, England
and Germany. All other nations can only be minor partners to one or the
other major war camp. The action of lesser nations are determined by the
interests of their ruling classes, their geographic position, their value to
the great contestants and by the abilities of the latter to supply and support
them. Greece, for instance, waged war against Italy and Germany because
England controlled the Mediterranean. The British need for allies in that
territory put Greece in a favorable position. English dominance and its
acceptance was profitable for both the English and the Greek ruling classes.
Besides, British troops could reach Greece with or without her consent. A
German and Italian occupation involved, however, not only territorial losses
but also the end of all privileges connected with the English alliance. However
willing to fight the ruling classes in Greece might have been, yet it was
England and Germany that forced the issue.
The defense of ruling class interests in Yugoslavia coincided with the
war designs of the Allies. Yugoslavia was, however, divided by national
rivalries inherited from the last war. With the help of demands by Hun-
gary and pressure by the Croats, Germany tried to enforce her will on the
Serbs. To give in to German demands would have meant the slow destruc-
tion of all Serbian influence in Danubian Europe. On the other
hand, a successful Serbian defiance of Hitler would have stimulated all the
suppressed anti-Germanism in the Danubian countries. To induce Serbia
to resist Germany was of the utmost importance to England and America.
But it was also the logical course for the Serbian ruling classes unles they
wished to abdicate freely and forget their aspirations. The date of the
struggle, however, was fixed by England and Germany.
The Balkan war was England's war underwritten by the United States.
The German victory strengthened her position greatly. It was to be expected
that the Germans would turn their victory into an initial step towards the
Suez Canal and the oilfields of Mossul. A defeat for the Allies in the Near
East following upon one in the Mediterranean could turn out to be as di-
sastrous as the invasion of England itself. The defeat of Chamberlain-
England had been augmented by a defeat of the England of Churchill. The
defeat of France had been laid to the appeasers. But the Balkan debacle
was Churchill's responsibility. Resistance had proved as much a failure as
appeasement. Discouraged, the British might come to terms and Hitler was
determined to help them do it.

Hitler as Peace Angel
Like the Romans who conquered a formidable part of the world in
a mere "defensive" struggle, Hitler claims to wage war for the sole pur-
pose of establishing a lasting peace. Europe, he says, alternated consistently

between war and peace because of the disruptive "balance-of-power" policy
of Great Britain. At the same time, though England is proclaimed the source
of all evil, all of Hitler's peace offers find their way to London. In a speech
before the German Reichstag after the Balkan war Hitler complained:
"All my endeavors to come to an understanding with Britain in fact, to arrive
at a lasting and friendly cooperation with her were wrecked by the desire and
the determination of a small clique who either through hate or avarice rejected
every German proposal for an understanding. They were resolved to resort to war
whatever happened. Their endeavors received the most powerful support both openly
and secretly from the so-called great democracies on both sides of the Atlantic."
Hitler offered the establishment of a German-English partnership for
the control and exploitation of the world on the basis of an uncontested
German rule over continental Europe. He hoped to convince the Britisi
that such a situation would correspond with their own interests, and he founa
men in England who agreed with him. All that was necessary was to makt
those who remained reluctant to see the light. He produced the fact of a
German-controlled Europe. He threatened the Empire by attacking in Africa.
He demonstrated with the conquest of Crete that there are no "invulnerable
islands." British shipping was being destroyed on a progressive, scale. Clouds
of airplanes darkened the sky and lighted the ground of England. But all
without avail. The English could not be convinced .either of their weakness
nor of German strength. In speaking to the Reichstag on May 4, 1941, there
was a tone of disappointment in Hitler's victory speech:
""If any other man (except Churchill) had experienced as many defeats as a politician
and as many catastrophes as a soldier he would not have remained in office six months
unless he also possessed the sole gift that Mr. Churchill possesses: the gift of lying
with a pious expression on his face, and of distorting the truth until finally glorious
victories are fabricated from the most terrible defeats. In this way Mr. Churchill may
be able to throw dust in the eyes of his fellow countrymen, but he cannot eliminate
the consequences of his defeats. Th fact that this man who would be court-martialed
in any other country gains fresh admiration as Prime Minister in his own ...is merely
proof of that blindness with which the gods afflict those whom they are about to
No doubt Hitler felt himself cheated of his victories. He was actually
fighting for peace. Not for an everlasting peace, but for a peace that would
give Germany another "creative pause," that would allow her to consolidate
her gains, to develop new strength on a larger scale in order to make the
next step from the dominance of Europe to the dominance of part of the
world. The first step had to be taken against England, the second was to be
made with England's help. America's early entrance into the war, however,
changed the whole situation. The English appeaserss" faced not only the
"anti-fascist" English imperialists but the United States as well. The fight
against England turned into a German-American struggle for England.
The war began to shape itself into one between continents. After the Balkan
defeat the U. S. Secretary of the Navy's Chicago Daily News (4/21/41)

"The European phase of the war is over, temporarily, and Hitler won it. From this
point on the war, if it goes on, must become a war of continents truly a world
war. The battle of production here in America is the most important battle, the
really decisive battle, of the whole war from now on."
The further pursuit of the war became the exclusive responsibility of the
United States, a fact that Roosevelt willingly acknowledged.

You Cannot Trust Hitler

To find out why Hitler's hopes for an appeasers' peace came to nought
we must look back into history. We will find that not mere ideologies but
social and economic forces determine the character of the present war. In
many ways this war is a replica of the first world war. The direction of
the German expansionist policy prior to 1914 was symbolized by the at-
tempted construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and by the Kaiser's
naval program. Germany was making inroads into the interest spheres of
British imperialism. The dream that occupied imperialists at the beginning
of the century became the goal of all the leading German parties during
the war. In 1916 the spokesman of Social Democracy proudly announced
in the German Reichstag that
"The peace which seems possible today will leave Germany and her allies in the
eyes of Europe as a group of powers, whose spheres of economic control extends
from the marches of the Elbe to the waters of the Persian Gulf. Thus Germany will
have won by her arms the kernel of a great sphere of economic control, worthy to be
set as a closed economic territory by the side of those of the other world empires."
The military defeat destroyed the realization of the dream but not
the dream itself. But the defeat served as a great lesson. It was clear that
the strength and resources of Germany were no match against a coalition
of all the other great powers. The first prerequisite of winning the second
world war was to prevent the recurrence of such a coalition. This idea was
back of the bewildering German diplomacy during the days of Weimar, as
well as in the Third Reich.
The same "balance-bf-power" policy which, according to Hitler, turned
Europe into a warring camp, also provided for the comeback of German
imperialism. After the first world war England became Germany's "friend."
Lord Palmerston had been right: England's enmities and friendships are
not for eternity; only her interests remain invariable. It was in the interest
of Britain to have Germany strong on the Continent and weak as an im-
perialist competitor. It was to England's interest that France should con-
tinue to be dependent upon England, unable ever to control Europe on
her own account. Germapy had not only to serve as a counterweight against
French ambitions, but also as a threat to Russia's expansionist designs in the
Far East. It can be said that the re-armament of Germany was really
undertaken by the Macdonald-Simon Government in London. The German
submarine construction really got under way only after the English-German

Naval agreement of 1935. So, although Mr. Thyssen might flatter himself
that he and his colleagues paid Hitler's way into power, the monster of
German imperialism was created by the British Frankenstein.
Of course one must not conclude that it was merely the selfish stu-
pidity of English statesmen that led to the resumption of the war. England
was quite convinced of her ability to control the Germany she strengthened.
Capitalist statesmen will not understand that the force of the economic
world crisis is more powerful than all the power and cleverness of poli-
ticians. The job of politicians is to proceed as if they really do determine
events. Still, their clear eyedness might turn into utter blindness not, however,
because they are really blind, but because politics not history is made by
politicians. History is made by all.
In addition, England had insured herself heavily against the possible
loss of control over Germany and Europe by a change of policy towards
the United States made as early as 1917. England's policy was of course
also determined by the actions and counter-actions of other nations. To a
certain extent Germany herself could exploit English needs both as a pro-
tege and as an enemy.
If England helped in the reconstruction of Germany, Hitler was con-
vinced that an understanding with Britain was a necessity. If England's
friendship was limited, not so Hitler's. He thought it sheer folly to think
of fighting England again, but he also thought that Germany and England
together could rule the world. The arch-enemy was France. It was France
who had been responsible for the harshness of Versailles, had prevented the
Anschluss with Austria, had insisted upon reparations, occupied the Ruhr
and encircled Germany with the Little Entente and an Eastern Pact. The
desire for revenge need not disturb British interests. The expansionist as-
pirations of Germany could find an outlet in Central Europe, through peace-
ful trade-penetration into the Balkans and possibly by taking from Russia's
manifold riches.
There were appeasers in England who began to weigh the value of
a closer cooperation with Germany. The world crisis had somewhat shaken
their confidence in the security of capitalism. It was certainly worthwhile
to make some additional concessions to Germany to ease the tensions of
Europe. Political unrest gripped the world; it might lead to great social
upheavals in those nations that suffered most from the crisis. To support
Hitler was to support the capitalist system proper. It was the reactionary
side of Hitler that appealed so strongly to the British ruling class.
Hitler understood his position as well as what his English admirers
wanted. When the radical elements within the Nazi movement began to
disturb the English capitalists, he hastened to assure them by way of the
London New Chronicle that "under certain conditions and in the interest
of the cause he was ready to divorce himself from his old friends and early
party comrades." His cause was still the cause of England and when he

served the cause, the London Times (7/2/1934), commenting on Hitler's
bloody party purge, did not spare the applause.
"About Hitler's methods one may think as one likes. Yet, Hitler has shown his honest
determination to change from a revolutionary to a sober constructive policy. Although
coming to power by force, this power is now used to destroy all radicalism based
on force."
What aid England granted Germany in order to safeguard her own
interests turned into just so many Hitler victories. German pleas changed
into requests and then into demands. As long as those demands concerned
the property of others and did not disturb vital British interests, it was
good business to appease Hitler. There was no hurry about calling a halt
to his appetite. British resistance was low because her fears of Germany
were small. There was no reason to doubt that after Munich Chamberlain
was deeply convinced that he had managed to gain "peace for our time,"
that is, peace for the English. There is no reason to assume that Hitler lied
when he insisted that he had no further territorial demands. He probably
did not have them on that particular day. But neither Chamberlain nor
Hitler were masters of the situation; the situation mastered them.
With the Sudeten region in German hands it was easy to take the
whole of Czeckoslovakia. Its incorporation into the Reich opened the gates
to the Balkans. The Balkans led to the Near East, the Near East to India.
What in Germany had begun as a struggle for the restoration of pre-Ver-
sailles borders and for economic concessions to keep the capitalist system and
Hitler's regime alive, led necessarily to the same situation that initiated
the war of 1914. Because Hitler could not be controlled, because he could
not control himself, all imperialist forces of the world 'were released once
Germany's determination to overcome the economic crisis by way of
expansion revived the danger that all the major imperialist powers would
once more combine against Germany. Those nations had to be divided
among themselves; they could not be taken on all at once. The proper
timing of actions, surprises and sudden turns, the Blitzkrieg methods, an
unprincipled diplomacy, might prevent combined action against the Nazi
drive. Certainly Hitler could not be trusted, but neither could anybody else
be trusted. At what point would the appeasers turn into warriors? What
unknown agreements had been reached? The Nazis gained confidence through
easy victories. Yet the French had confidence, too, in their Maginot line.
The British had confidence in the French Army and the combined sea power
of England and America. They had not been fooled by Hitler's earlier
antics. Why should they be fooled now? They had laughed when Hitler,
during one stage of his development, had suddenly scrapped the idea of
revenge against France, when he proclaimed, in spite of all that he had
written in Mein Kampf, that he had always held that a Franco-German
rapproachment was more important than an Anglo-German one. They had
not been disturbed by the splendid relationship between the Reichswehr and

the Red Army, the less so as this relationship had been maneuvered by the
British themselves. England was certain that neither France nor Russia
would fight on Germany's side. They did not believe that Hitler would
dare to attack, as Hitler did not believe that they would dare to resist. But
the bluffers were caught in their own bluff.
Since the days of Napoleon England has been convinced that a united
Europe means the end of England's privileged world position. Europe must
always be divided, nations must remain nations. Despite his hatred for
bolshevism it was Lloyd George who sent Lord Lothian to Lenin to make
certain that bolshevism in Russia became and remained a national bolshevism.
By securing Lenin's rule he created Hitler's national socialism in advance.
Through a policy of proportioning the strength and opportunities of the
decisive European powers England determined the question of Europe's
peace or war. She knows that ruling classes might fight together but that
they do not combine, as combinations imply liquidations. A German-Russian
unification would mean the elimination of either Russia or Germany. The
same would hold true for a Franco-German combination. Britain knows
that the United States of Europe cannot be realized through the agree-
ments of statesmen but, if realized at all, only as the result of enormous
struggles that give Europe to the victor.
In each country the interests of the ruling classes are closely bound
up with the nation's previous history, existing relations, and its particular
position within the frame of a given world situation. Any change of borders,
activities, alliances, losses, and opportunities affect the ruling classes deeply,
because all existing relations are power and property relations. All external
shifts and struggles are thus undivorceably connected with internal shifts
and struggles between the classes and within the ruling class. To recognize
this fact, one has only to think of the series of social and political upheavals
that took place in the process of bringing a small country such as Rumania
into the German fold, of the turmoil in France that accompanied the at-
tempts to coordinate the French and German interests, of the butcheries
;n Russia, long before the outbreak of the war, the changes in Germany
that accompanied the new imperialism, the mixture of revolution and im-
perialism in the Spanish civil war, and so forth.
The interests of the diverse ruling classes in the various European
nations prevents a European unification by agreement. The defeat of a
nation is the defeat of its ruling class. In so far as nations can "disappear"
at all, its ruling classes also disappear. "Defeat" is only another term for
the concentration of capital in fewer hands. War has to decide whether
these hands belong to French, Russians, or Germans. All that England had
to prevent was not a European war, but the decisive defeat of all European
nations by one. The chances for such an occurence seemed slim in 1939.
Yet, thoroughly frightened by the temporary nearness of a German victory
during the last war, England prepared diplomatically for all eventualities.
Her policy followed two general lines. One was a quasi-independent European

policy in the traditional manner, the other the creation of an Anglo-American
world bloc of resistance to Europe if it should come to the worst.
The antics of the politicians produced "crisis" after "crisis." Who
would outbluff whom? Each one fought for peace on his own terms, all
thus fought for war. But the "crises" the politicians produced were only
the results of the crisis that existed independent of their doings, that de-
termined their actions and forced them to play their ridiculous diplomatic
game. The world trembled through the contradictions of the economic class
system it supports. Vast changes must be brought about by human actions.
These actions, however, are determined by nationally-orientated class and
group interests and are thus competitive actions, actions of war.
The armament race gained new impetus. The weaker a nation is in
an economic sense, the greater the need for superiority in arms. Yet, the
very weakness of such a nation hinders such superiority. Its expansion in
armaments must simultaneously be an economic expansion. Under existing
conditions economic expansion is possible only through territorial expansion.
Once this process is under way, more and still more arms are needed to
consolidate the gains. The process is cumulative. These forces, set in
motion, cannot be stopped short of their destruction by other, still greater,
forces, or through utter self-exhaustion.
The nations which are unable to prevent the advance of others enter
the armament race. Appeasement is only the first phase of war. The general
armament caused by a particular nation's superiority in arms inevitably de-
stroys the basis for all non-martial procedures. In capitalism it is either the
status quo as the result of a previous war that rules, or it is a new war.
The politicians may believe that they decide events, yet it is the war, as
previously it was the economic mechanism of capitalism itself, that moves
the movers, controls the controllers. How, under such conditions, can Hitler
be trusted? He can no longer trust himself. He ceases to understand what
he is doing. And this he shares with all his enemies.

British Imperialism: Old and New
Lord Palmerston's maxim that nothing but the profit counts which
expresses not an English but a general attitude said nothing about the
self-development of this invariable interest. His saying relates, furthermore,
to a stage of English imperialism now past. The new imperialism speaks
not only of opportunities but also of eternal friendship, i.e., of a "union
of the English-speaking people" that is to rule the world. This idea is of
course not new; but it meant something other during the days of the old
imperialism than it means today. Who does not smile today when he
reads the proud descriptions by English capitalist apologists like Stanley
Jevons who wrote in 1866:
"The several quarters of the globe are our willing tributaries. The plains of Nortl
America and Russia are our cornfields; Chicago and Odessa our granaries, Canada

and the Baltic our forests; Australasia contains our sheep farms, and in South Am-
erica are our herds of oxen. Peru sends silver, and the gold of California and Aus-
tralia flows to London; the Chinese grow tea for us and coffee sugar and spice arrive
from the East Indian plantations. Spain and France are our vineyards, and the
Mediterranean are our fruit gardens; our cotton grounds, which formerly occupied the
Southern United States, are now everywhere in the many regions of the earth."
How funny it is today to think of Cecil Rhodes' "Secret Society," the
purpose of which was to "realize British rule all over the world and to
bring about the recovery of the United States of America as an integral
part of the British Empire." This same process has meanwhile turned into
an "Americanization of the World." This change of character in the
hoped-for union of the English-speaking world was initiated by the first
world war and is now vigorously pushed forward by the second.
The reason for this transformation is the development of capitalism
itself. England's rule was based on the weakness of other nations. It was
difficult to break her early industrial and trade monopoly. But only in her
colonies has she been able to prevent important industrial development,
that is, to live up to some degree to the elder Pitt's postulate that not
a single nail should be produced in English possessions. Through colonial
exploitation and her early start in industry Britain could undersell wherever
competition was not hindered by military means. Because she was the work-
shop of the world free-trade was her philosophy. It was free trade that
secured her monopolistic advantages. Europe's struggle against England, as
well as the American War for Independence, were attempts to break the
English monopoly that hindered the capitalization of other nations. And
it was through these struggles rather than through free-trade that the
world market came into being. Because "power is more important than
wealth" as Adam Smith once remarked, it was possible so to speak -
to develop capitalism in spite of the capitalists.
The growth of world capitalism diminished the world importance of
Great Britain. Yet her favored position was seriously challenged only during
the first world war. The first attempt, as Napoleon himself confessed, had
been quite utopian as there did not exist at that time a real basis for the
unification of Continental Europe. In order to defeat the German chal-
lenger in 1914-18, however, it was necessary not only to rely to a great
extent upon American production but on her military support as well.
At the end of the last century America began to display imperialistic
designs of her own. But she was still a debtor nation, a nation largely
dependent upon agricultural exports. She was a secondary power. The war
changed this quite suddenly. America's rise to a major power was, to be
sure, inevitable, but without the war it would have taken considerably
longer. Out of the war America emerged a creditor nation, ready and able
to export everything and to invest capital abroad. She was on the verge of
surpassing all other nations, Britain included. The world crisis of 1929
called a halt to this development but increased the need for further im-

perialistic expansion. In the grip of the depression the general development
changed into general stagnation, but the positions of the nations relative
to each other remained largely the same. The war had obviously been won
by the United States. To quote just one item of many: In 1913 England
controlled 60 per cent of the world's foreign investments; in 1936 only
50 per cent. During the same period French foreign investments dropped
from 25 per cent to 10 per cent, and German from 15 per cent to minus
6 per cent. That is, Germany was in debt abroad. U. S. investments, how-
ever, rose from minus 12 per cent to 25 per cent.
Britain still remained, nevertheless, the richest country in the world.
She was only tending towards decline, but this unmistakably. Not only
were her foreign investments shrinking, her profits from abroad diminishing,
her trade with both the outside world and her colonies declining, but her
political prestige and her indirect control over other nations were slowly
going down as well. It seemed that in the not so distant future the British
Empire would cease to be an Empire. The Dominions became more and
more independent; India clamored for Dominion status. The forces of
capitalism itself destroyed England's unique position that had been based
on out-moded conditions.
Free-trade no longer favored England. Tariff policies created home
industries in the developing nations able to challenge English rule. The
political strength of these nations increased. Even the colonies and the
suppressed races of the world saw the dawn of a new day. The cry
for self-determination and capitalist liberty arose everywhere. Great national
movements mixed with the struggles of the great imperialist rivals. During
the war, the controller nations could not help fostering the development of
their possessions. Nationalistic movements were further fanned for a
while by Russia, then Germany in order to exploit them for the needs
of these countries. In brief, the continuance of the old imperial rule of
Britain became increasingly more problematic.
Farsighted politicians learned to understand during the last war that
the days of Cecil Rhodes were gone for good. Yet it was difficult to accept
the new situation. Up to the last England attempted, and even now tries
at all cost, to maintain as much as possible of the old glory and privileges. This
allowed for a number of illusions, among which was the half-truth based
on the completeness of the German defeat in 1918 and the temporary dis-
appearance of Russia as an imperialist force that the next great war
would be one between England and America. These were the two great
capitalist rivals, almost equal in strength and equally determined to rule
the world. In the course of time and in accordance with the rules of capi-
talist competition they would have to clash.
The European nations did not participate in equal measure in the post-
war prosperity that came to an end in 1929. However slowly, England her-
self was running down. American mass-production, brought to a climax dur-
ing and shortly after the war, was not equalled by any other nation. It

spelled the end of English rule, for it was clear that England must export
or die. She must invest abroad or face ruin. Her economy is determined by
her dominance in the capital market and by her large contribution to in-
ternational trade. England cannot become self-sufficient. Even if the agri-
culture of golf courses should be changed into agriculture pure and simple,
it would not suffice to keep the population alive. Yet her exports, vital
as they are to her existence, declined steadily. All the expansion there was
was inward. No increase in foreign trade resulted. She would have to
stop the American competition or cease to exist, as a main capitalist power.
Thus ran the arguments. Even in purely physical terms, not to mention
the requirements of a progressive capital accumulation to escape permanent
depression conditions, it seemed obvious that England's real enemy was the
United States.
In self-defense England would be compelled to come to a closer under-
standing with the Continent. Indeed, England's policy supported this rea-
soning, for her relations with Japan, for instance, were clearly designed
to hinder American expansion in Asia. Her South American intrigues op-
posed, first of all, American interests. However, there was no sense in grant-
ing Japan what she denied the United States. So she supported Russia to
keep Japan in check, and Germany to keep Russia in bounds. France was
assured that the Rhine would always remain England's frontier. In turn,
American statesmen had to be assured that England's competition must
not be taken seriously, that it was a mere business proposition which would
not at all invalidate close political alignment. A complicated situation no
doubt, but then such is the capitalist world.
There exist forces in Britain of course whose interests strictly oppose
those of America and this to such a degree that if the question of sub-
ordination were raised at all, they probably would prefer to be subdued
by Europe rather than by America. These forces play no important part
in English politics, however. Britain is large enough to harbor all kinds
of interests within her realm. But the variety of interests that English rule
incorporates makes for the most chaotic and contradictory lines of British
procedure. It seems at times that this chaos of variegated interests can never
be bound to one particular and persistent course. The American writer
Guerard once described this situation by saying:
"It is only in retrospect that the English rationalise their drifting into a national pur-
pose, England has no single principle of action, not even 'sacred egotism'; she has
at least five and they are incompatible. It is not 'perfidy' it is inner contradiction.
England was honest when she promised to evacuate Egypt, and honest when she
constantly refused to do so; honest when she pledged her support to France in case
of aggression under the Locarno pact, and honest when she reminds the world that
such an agreement is to be taken only in a Pickwickian sense."
One of the reasons for the persistency of English democracy lies in the
complicated composition of English capitalistic interests. So that Britain and
the Empire shall not fall apart, accumulated frictions have to be dissipated

through shifts of policies which, from any other view, remain un-understand-
able; by governmental changes that eliminate pressures of economic groups
which would disturb the needed internal balance. In brief, a balance-of-
power policy similar to that employed in foreign affairs appears as a demo-
cratic inclination in internal and Empire politics.
Notwithstanding all this, as soon as the balance-of-power in Europe
breaks down, all these variegated interests combine, because the necessity to
resist at all costs the domination of Europe by a single power prevails for
most of them. The absence of such a threatening situation was the reason
for the lack of English unity against the outside world. This lack of unity
was not a weakness but a luxury.
So long as Britain was not threatened on the Continent, she could use
all her remaining strength to make her further retreat before America as
painless as possible for herself and as hard as possible for the United States.
But in the case of a unified Europe, Britain would clearly be at the mercy
of the United States; she would cease at once to be on equal terms with
America. She would no longer be able to fight independently for the main-
tenance of her position, for she could not attack the United States without
inviting defeat by Europe, and she could not fight Europe unless supported
by the United States. She would not have the choice between Europe and
America, because an alliance with Europe would transform England into
a mere outlying province of the far more powerful nation that controlled
the Continent. There would be less to lose through the acceptance of Am-
erican protection.
Despite all the remaining rivalries between England and America, the
Anglo-American alliance during the last war showed the real direction of
Britain's future imperialist policy. At an important British war conference
in 1917 it was pointed out that the co-operation of the Anglo-American
fleet would have to continue after the war. Only' in this way could a re-
currence of the situation that had led to the war be prevented. It was
further said that to rule the seas is to rule the world and that meant that
the two most powerful navies must work together. No other nation must
ever be allowed naval parity with either England or America. Thus Anglo-
American co-operation would hopelessly outnumber any and all nations.
Though dressed in terms directed against Germany, this principle was a
declaration of war on the part of England and America against the rest
of the world.
The idea of a permanent Anglo-American alliance penetrated American
war propaganda as well as British. It was now maintained that the policy
of both nations was identical, faced as they were by the danger of European
unification through Germany's military expansion. In his book The Defense
of the Empire, Norman Angell illustrates this point quite well. Germany,
he writes,
"which had annihilated France as a great power, overcome Russia, opened the roads
to the East through Slav territories and the Near East, was in a position to occupy,
when she would, the Continental parts of the narrower seas such a Germany would

have been master of our policy: irresistable. We might as well, in such contingency,
have had no armamaments at all, because the outcome would have been a foregone con-
clusion... Even distant America, at the period of the German onslaught, was stirred,
by the same spectre, of this growing Germanic power. One of the, most effective bits
of war propaganda in the United States was a map of Europe showing pan-Germania
dominating the whole."
America's refusal to enter the League of Nations was directed not
against England but against Europe. Austen Chamberlain reassured the
House of Commons in 1929 that in all important questions of international
relations, legal or otherwise, Anglo-American conceptions stood together
and in opposition to those of Continental Europe. The Dominions were even
more than the mother country interested in the continuation of the alliance
created by the last war. Canada of course had no other choice. But notwith-
standing the continued commercial rivalries between England and America
in Asia, fear of further Japanese expansion prompted Prime Minister Hughes
of Australia to say on the eve of the 1921 Washington Naval Conference
that he would "salute with satisfaction every American warship laid down
in the ship yards." In 1936 Winston Churchill, in an article on Naval Policy,
vehemently opposed all those who insisted upon naval parity with the United
States. He pointed out that a big American navy, exceeding even that of
Britain, was exactly what England needed to feel secure.
Events have meanwhile shown that against all appearance to the con-
trary the Anglo-American bloc of 1917 continued to constitute the basic
policy of both nations. They could not unite, for as we said before, com-
bination implies liquidation, but they could work openly and under cover
against a third force that seemed detrimental to their interests. It is clear,
too, that the capital mergers which progressed with the spreading of Am-
erican investments supported a common policy with England rather than any
sort of solidarity with the crisis-ridden and bankrupt European nations. Am-
erican capitalists began to look on England as if she were their own
country, just as the English had once looked upon America as lost territory
that had to be regained. Despite jokes about Yankee coarsness and English
nobility, there was much intermarrying. The frictions that remained were
family frictions, internal struggles for economic and political advantages,
rather than rivalries between two imperialist nations.

The End of Appeasement
But what about Chamberlain and the policy of appeasement? What
about the Nazi hope of coming to an understanding with the umbrella-men?
It might well be that the Nazis, like most of the Marxists before them,
overrated the importance of the existing frictions between Britain and the
U.S.A. But whether the Nazis seriously engaged in wishful thinking about
an Anglo-German collaboration or not, they had to consider and make ready
for an Anglo-German war.
The Nazis' desire for a friendly solution of the issues at stake was
largely of a propagandistic nature. It was in line with anti-semitism in

Germany and abroad, with their support of the nationalistic aspirations
of the Hungarians, Croats, Bulgarians, Finns, Arabs, with all the other
devices that spread confusion and disunity among their actual and poten-
tial enemies. Her repeated willingness to come to terms with Britain led
astray many diverse elements: those English politicians who preferred a
European orientation, those who thought themselves, as did the German
capitalists before them, capable of controlling and using the Nazis, and those
who expected that things would eventually straighten themselves out. And
of course the threat of a possible Anglo-German collaboration led to be-
wildernment in France, Russia, and the United States.
In view of the tremendousness of the issues for which this war is
fought, all these propagandistic devices seem to be quite insignificant. Yet
Germany cannot afford to overlook even the smallest item that may work
in her favor. Against a powerful coalition of enemies Germany is indeed
extremely weak. She has no navy capable of opposing the combined sea
power of the allies, no comparable productive capacity or raw material
sources, not even man power. To be able to fight the United States with
any possibility of success, she must first subdue the whole of the European
Continent a very difficult undertaking in the midst of war. What she
lacks generally she has to make up for specifically with better organizational
methods and greater efficiency. The superiority of the German war mach-
ine of which diplomacy and propaganda are a part is based on her
inferiority in other respects. This situation is not a recent one but has
accompanied the whole of German history and explains her stern military
However, it no longer matters whether the Nazis seriously believed
in the possibility of an Anglo-German collaboration, or whether the idea
was mere propaganda. More interesting is the question as to why there
were people in England who preferred an appeasement policy. Some of the
appeasers went quite far in their readiness to satisfy German demands. Mr.
Garvin, for instance, urged consistently in the English Observer that Cen-
tral Europe and the Danubian countries should be brought under German
control in order to secure a lasting European peace.
"Under German control" did not, however, mean the outright annex-
ation of the Danubian countries by Germany, but a sort of economic union
that, by relieving temporarily the tension in Germany, would without
doubt increase the tension between Germany and Russia, as the latter na-
tion would be most directly threatened by a German penetration into the
Balkans. Behind the willingness to grant far-reaching concessions to Ger-
many was both the desire to keep England out of war and, if a war should
be unavoidable, the desire to have it occur in the East. Such a war would
interrupt Germany's march to the Near East. She would instead turn into
the Ukraine. It would appear easier to the Germans to expand at the ex-
pense of Russia than to face once more the combined forces of France,
England and America. Hitler himself had spoken ecstatically about what

Germany could do with the wheatfields of the Ukraine, the oil of the Cau-
casus and the minerals of the Ural mountains. Furthermore, a number
of study commissions had spent some time in Russia and had returned con-
vinced that it would not be an easy task for Germany to subdue the Bol-
shevik regime. Thus with the possibility of a prolonged and exhausting
war between Russia and Germany, peace and strength could be preserved
in the democracies. In the end the democracies would be able to control
further both Germany and Russia, regardless of the outcome of their war.
Behind this reasoning there was no more than the inability to realize
the full force of the new military power of Germany and the meaning of
Nazi diplomacy, which was determined by a consistent distrust of all na-
tions' politicians, and agreements their own included. If the English
appeasers hoped to solve their problems by re-directing Germany's expansion
from one sphere to another, the Nazis made ready for a struggle in all the
spheres that German arms could possibly reach. They were realistic en-
ough to understand that they were facing a multitude of enemies as soon
as they reached out to become the first European power. At the same time
that they did all in their power to strengthen the belief that the direction
of their expansion was towards the East, they prepared nevertheless for a
war against the West. If, however, the Russians had not played into
Hitler's hands, he most probably would have attacked Russia first, but with-
out losing sight for a single moment of the inevitable struggle in the West.
The Russian-German pact was no doubt the most important victory the
Nazis ever won the greater because it had been prepared by the enemy
himself. The Russian-German pact was the direct result of pre-war Eng-
lish diplomacy. It was exactly the opposite from what had been intended
by the policy of appeasement.
The appeasers wanted an alliance neither with Germany nor with
Russia. Since Russia's power was overestimated and Germany's underes-
timated, it was reasonable to expect that a war between them would inac-
tivate them for some time to come. Thus neither the fate of Austria nor
that of Czecho-slovakia could stir Britain to action. Lord Halifax could
not see that the Munich agreement of October, 1938, had in any way been
broken by Germany when she invaded Czechoslovakia six months later.
In one of his speeches he pointed out that the Czech state "had ended its
own life by internal disruption", and he admitted that "the architects of
Munich had not contemplated the operation of the guarantee of Czech in-
dependence in a situation of this kind". But with the German attack on
Poland and the signing of the Russian-German pact, the whole situation
changed at once. Suddenly it was clear that Germany was either not ready
for a major war, or was bent on an attack against the West.
At this time Germany was probably still trying to wrest further con-
cessions from England and France without serious struggles. Both nations
could either go to war or give Germany half of Poland and the whole of
the Danubian territory. Germany would thus have had an enormous ad-

vantage in the European struggles which would have been merely postponed.
France's military position would have been extremely weakened and the
black-mailing tactics of the Nazis considerably increased. Just what was
the situation? Did Germany feel herself too weak even for a war against
Russia, or did she feel strong enough to risk war against the West? In
the later case the war would be inevitable and its postponement could serve
only the Germans. Thus there was no longer any need to weigh the
question of peace or war. Over night the appeasers turned into warriors.
There was, however, still another element involved in the appease-
ment policy. This element should not be exaggerated but neither should
it be overlooked. This was the fear on the part of private capital that it
would face destruction in the course of another war. The English cap-
italists as a whole had gained nothing by the last war. On the contrary,
their position had become increasingly more precarious. The war had led,
furthermore to a state-controlled capitalist economy in Russia. Germany
herself had come quite close to similar changes, and if the German revolu-
tionary forces had succeeded, the whole European Continent might well
have ceased to support a private capitalist economy. The turmoil of the
first world war, as subsequent events proved, had not been sufficient to
realize the potential threat, but who could be sure that a second world
war could be terminated with equal success? Who could be sure that it
had not been a mere stroke of good luck that secured the preservation of
the traditional capitalist system after 1918? Would the exhausted Allied
troops, desiring peace above all, really have fought against a powerful rev-
olutionary wave that involved the greater part of Europe? And even if
they had remained loyal to their masters, would they have been able to
crush a revolutionary force? No one could be certain. Not even in 1918
since, at that time, the German army and parts of the Russian had not
been disarmed. Though the Germans had lost the decisive battle in the
West and were in full retreat, there had been no panic, the retreat was or-
derly. Besides, the victory of the Allies had been a costly one, expensive
enough to make them accept an armistice instead of a triumphant march
to Berlin.
What would a prolonged second world war bring? Ten years of
depression had left their marks all over Europe. Even a second defeat of
Germany might result in no more than a collapse of the whole European
capitalist economy. Long before its conclusion, the war itself would in
all probability lead to important social and economic changes in England
as well as in Europe. It might endanger the Empire there was the
possibility of a series of national revolts. For the first time in capitalist
history capitalists became convinced pacifists. They were unable either to
overcome the economic crisis by means hitherto effective or to envision es-
cape from the crisis by way of warfare. Just as they had learned to eat
from their reserves rather than to attempt to increase their profits by fur-
ther capitalist accumulation, so they became deeply interested in the main-
tenance of the political status quo. Not that they had ceased to be imperial-

ists. It was only that they could no longer act as imperialists without en-
dangering the whole economic structure and the social institutions so dear
to them. Out of the fear that they might lose as private capitalists what
the nation might gain by imperialist actions, the more class-conscious of the
old bourgeois class in Germany, England, France, and the United States
as well hesitated to enter another war. The case of Thyssen only dramat-
izes this attitude that also came to light in the English appeasement policy
and that still plays its part in the policy of American isolationists. A fas-
cistic revival at home in the exclusive interest of private capital would be
quite desirable, but vast imperialistic adventures under the auspices of fas-
cism would only hasten the transfer of economic and political power into
the hands of the aspiring fascist elites.
The sudden shift in English policy in 1939 thus also indicates the
degree to which the old capitalist power groups had already been displaced
by new political forces, themselves capitalistic, yet in many respects dis-
tinct from that ruling class which fought the last world war. The strength-
ening of the state as against individual enterprise, the pre-dominance of "pol-
itical" over "economic" power as a result of capital concentration and, more
directly, of that concentration under prolonged crisis conditions, was a neces-
sary prerequisite to overcoming in some manner the capitalistic stagnation
and to launching a new series of imperialistic struggles. In Germany the
fascist elites had already completely merged with the old capitalist class; in
sociological terms the initiative in the war could thus fall to Germany. The
fact that in the other capitalist nations this same process was also on its way
helps to explain the sudden turn from appeasement to war. If England
and France were sacrificing their capitalist interest in an increasing measure
to Germany, it meant the slow destruction of private capital in the demo-
cracies, for this situation had to sharpen progressively the internal crisis
in these nations which, in turn, would foster the fascization process. An
appeasement without an end, and there is no other appeasement, even if
it is designed to safeguard private capital, turns inevitably into a powerful
lever for the further fascization of the world and the end of traditional
In 1939 it must have been clear even to the most willing foreign Nazi
sympathizers that the Nazis were neither the protectors of private capitalist
interests in Germany, nor respecters of private or any other sort of prop-
erty elsewhere. The imperialist drive of the Nazis spelled not only the
end of her own "independent" bourgeoisie, threatened not only England's
privileged position in the world, but forecast also the end of private capital
in Britain. Further appeasement would have been suicide. Both from a na-
tional and a capitalistic point of view. War was once more the lesser evil.
A defeat of Germany, administrated by all the democratic private capitalist
forces of the world, may not only safeguard national independence and the
Empire, may not only improve England's position in relation to Europe
and America, but may also stop or at least slow up the capitalist transfor-

mation process towards a state-controlled capitalist economy, which elim-
inates the hereditary capitalist class.
Nothwithstanding their reluctance to enter any war, the motivations
of the English appeasers have always been a mixture of specific class in-
terests and official British foreign policy. Both were fused, but fused in
such a way that the emphasis given to one or the other was determined
by necessities produced by the interplay of the numerous world forces. In
other words, the emphasis upon appeasement to safeguard the prevailing
English ruling classes could never become strong enough to lead, on its own
part, to disaster. Appeasement might come to an abrupt end at any par-
ticular moment. The signing of the Russian-German pact was that moment.
It was clear that the German-Japanese alliance did not allow Russia
to change her policy at will. England was thus threatened simultaneously
in both Asia and Europe. Russia's inactivity would force England to ap-
pease Japan unles she would be willing to weaken America's striking power
in the Atlantic and Europe by engaging her in an Asiatic war. America,
the English ally, had thus to be restrained in her ambitious Asiatic designs.
This was possible only by granting America far-reaching concessions. Eng-
land's position was indeed a very difficult one. She was bound to lose from
whatever situation might arise; her policy was restricted to creating con-
ditions that involved the smallest loss. It was this difficult position in which
Britain found herself that never allowed Stalin's fear that England and
Germany might strike a bargain at his expense, to come to rest.
A war between Germany and the Western powers was indeed highly
profitable to Russia, provided that it did not end with a rapid and over-
whelming German success. But such a contingency was not easily think-
able in 1939. At least the risk to be taken appeared rather small. The
war would grant Russia security for more time to come time that could
be used to speed armament production, to acquire strategical positions. Rus-
sia felt freer not only in regard to the West but also in regard to the East.
Russian imperialism could only wax if all the other imperialist powers were
engaged in deadly combat. Stalin's famous smile on the occasion of the
signing of the German-Russian pact came directly from the heart. That
smile brought to England the blood, sweat and tears that Churchill loves
so dearly.

The Struggle for England
The full meaning of the diplomatic game that was played before the
outbreak of the war came to light only in the course of subsequent events.
Political cynicism is hidden behind high-sounding ideologies., No one in
England could admit that Germany had been appeased in order to be de-
prived of her ambitious goals, that peace was to be maintained in order
to foster a war profitable to Britain. Nor were the Germans willing to
declare that their pact with Russia was designed to outsmart English diplom-

acy, that it would not change Hitler's attitude towards Stalin's Russia, and
that the great "Christian Crusade" had merely been postponed. Nor was
Stalin able to announce that he shook hands with von Ribbentrop because
with "Asiatic cunning" he had just succeeded in double-crossing friend and
foe alike and that he merely worked for the greater glory of the "father-
land" which, with a war between the imperialist rivals, would now really
be in a position to "overtake" the capitalist world. Nor was America willing
to lift the mask of neutrality and reveal its war-hungry face that had not
changed expression since Roosevelt's quarantine speech of 1937. Thus the
appeasers were taken for appeasers, the aggressors for crusaders, Hitler
and Stalin were judged as'two of a kind, and America was celebrated as
the only civilized nation on earth. The innocent ones among the rulers
and their subjects excited themselves on the apparent, not on the real, issues
at stake.
What appeasement meant was revealed by its failure. How close to
success the English had come in their attempt to drive Hitler into Russia
had long been demonstrated by the Nazi-Polish non-aggression pact signed
in 1934. This pact spelled the possible creation of a Berlin-Warsaw-Kiev-
Baku axis against Russia. The Polish ruling class, however, encouraged
by the French who feared a stronger Germany and so counteracted English
plans, were deadly afraid, and justifiably so, that a strengthened Germany
at the expense of Russia would only be the prelude to their own end. They
preferred the bird in the hand to the two in the Russian bush and were not
able to overcome their suspicion in favor of an alliance with Hitler. Up
to 1939 the Nazis tried to win Poland for a war for the Ukraine. The last
offer was probably made by Goering himself during his visit to Colonel
Beck in January 1939. No agreement was reached and two months later
the Nazis marched into Prague. However, Poland was still allowed to
participate in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.
Out of the growing fear that German expansion might not be pre-
vented, nor diverted into a war against Russia, England and France signed
a pact with Poland to secure her integrity. Germany answered with the
Hitler-Stalin pact. Thus the war which, as far as Britain was concerned,
should have found Poland and Germany side by side against Russia turned
into a German-Russian alliance for the new partitioning of Poland. The
new world war had begun in earnest. And a few months later, to the
amazement of everybody, France's military power was broken in a few
weeks. Britain, now isolated, seemed to be lost.
However, at the moment when England seemed weakest her really
powerful position in the world became at once manifest. At that moment,
the unfolding of the war really began. Every capitalistic and nationalistic
interest opposed to Germany practically entered the war. All that was now
necessary for Britain was to "carry on" no matter what might happen. The
most senseless activities as, for instance, the Balkan campaign of some time
later, became reasonable undertakings. As long as the war continued, noth-

ing was lost that could not eventually be regained. The appeasers pushed
themselves aside; a new defense effort was made. No peace with Hitler
under whatever terms and conditions became the sole strategy necessary.
Time had to be gained time to allow America to arm herself sufficiently
and prepare a new A.E.F.; time to organize the whole Hitler opposition
all over the world and throw it actively into the war. Every interest op-
posed to Germany was now concentrated in the defense of Britain.
The destruction of England might prove to be equal to a vast "world
revolution", though not necessarily one of a proletarian character. The
consequences of an end of Britain and the collapse of the Empire are un-
forseeable. But this much seems almost certain: that it would release
nationalistic and imperialistic forces all over the -globe which might well
escape any kind of control. All ruling classes in all the world might be
directly endangered. There would in all probability be a general rush of the
numerous national and imperialistic scavengers to grab as much as possible
in the re-division of the world initiated by a total British decline. America
- prepared or unprepared would act at once, and so would Japan and
Russia. National uprisings in India and the Near East would mix with
the general struggle for positions and resources. Manifold interests would
clash. The whole world would become embroiled in warfare. The organ-
ization of the various operating forces would become impossible; alliances
would collapse over night, all plans and procedures would be overturned.
Chaos would rule; not only the necessary capitalistic chaos without which
the capitalist world cannot exist, but chaos in an as yet inconceivable sense.
Production of life-essentials would be further reduced; destruction would
rule supreme. Revolutions would mix into the imperialistic and nationalistic
struggles; in brief, a situation could arise that would escape all compre-
hension. The small-time "Nihilists" of the Nazi Party as well as the
imperialist Babbitts recoiled before the spectre of the enormity of the pos-
sible world conflagration released with the destruction of Britain. They
were not willing to accept the final consequences of their cherished social
structure. They tried to re-organize the world in accordance with their
specific capitalistic needs, to prevent its being thrown into complete anarchy.
They proved to be able to enjoy the entrance to hell, not hell itself. Britain
and the Empire must be saved either for German-Europe or for America.
But it must be saved, it must not be allowed to fall apart and thus turn
the whole world inside out.
Hitler must have hoped that the Russian pact, the rapid defeat of
Poland and France and the invasion threat would convince the English ruling
class that it would be better to accept the losses implied in an understanding
with Hitler than to continue a war whose outcome pointed not only to the
utter destruction of Britain but of the whole capitalistic world. Hitler's
arguments were indeed powerful and convincing, yet no ruling class has
thus far freely abdicated either before an internal or an external foe. The
British ruling class was aware of its own role within the capitalist world
structure. It dared Hitler to invade. Yet Hitler had no intention of doing

so, quite independent of the question whether or not he would have been
able to do so if he had wished. If England was not willing to come to
terms before an invasion, after a successful invasion there would no longer
be a question of reaching an understanding. Not exen the fleet, not to speak
of the resources of the Empire, would fall into Hitler's hands. Part of
the ruling class, if not all, would have left the country. Valuables would
have been removed or destroyed. Hitler would have found himself in pos-
session of some additional territory, whose inhabitants he would have been
unable to feed, and a demolished productive apparatus which, in the face
of an already acute shortage in raw materials, would be a very questionable
gain. The war would not have been terminated but only spread further,
and would have taken on new forms which might be even more destructive
than the methods previously employed. The whole of Europe might be
slowly starved to death, as there was no way to force America's acquiescence
to the new situation by military means. There was no reason why America
should come to terms with Germany after a successful invasion of England.
Europe's position was extremely difficult due to the long disruption of world
trade and the great part played by non-consumption production. The job
facing Germany was too gigantic to suggest success. Even political unifi-
cation seemed to be an impossibility in the face of the continued war that
would make the food problem increasingly more threatening, that would
make it more and more difficult to hold the superiority in armament pro-
duction. Even after the invasion the world would still be closed to German
Europe; she would still have to fight on in the Near East, for India, in
defense of Africa, and possibly against Russia. But now she would have
only a decimated army, a still more insignificant navy, and a weakened air
force the unquestionable results of an invasion of Britain.
England must not be defeated but forced into an alliance with Ger-
many. Britain had to be shown that to subordinate her interests to those
of Germany, to pool her resources, i. e., to pool her riches with Germany's
poverty, was still better for her than to continue an apparently endless fight
on the side of America which would lead only to the ruin of the whole
world. Thus the great attacks of the Luftwaffe, often described as part
of an unsuccessful invasion attempt, came to a sudden end from time to time.
Nazi air bombers were careful not to demolish the English railway system,
not to destroy too many harbors and docks, not to interfere too much with
other essentianls for the continuation of Britain's economic life. Their de-
struction was a sort of demonstration of what could happen to Britain if
an all-out war really got under way. The concentration of bombing at-
tacks such as on Conventry were only "samples" gigantic symbols of
future possibilities.
The military defeat of England would not be enough to serve German
ends. It would have meaning only if it terminated the war with an Anglo-
German agreement that led to the pacification of the Continent and to the
resumption of international trade. Germany's refusal to attempt at any
time the invasion of England brings out her essential weakness, but also

the conscious and instinctive recognition on the part of her politicians of
the real issues of the war. The only peace they seem to be able to get is
a peace by force. Yet, force may exclude the possibility of a peace that
leads to the establishment of a European situation that will force the United
States, for some time to come and in her own interest, to come to terms
with Hitler, to share the rule of the world with the Nazis.
To share the world with Hitler may mean to lose it to Hitler. Not
necessarily so, but possibly. Who knows if Hitler will not succeed in con-
structing with Britain's help a real United States of Europe able to compete
on equal or better terms with the United States in Asia and South America?
Nations there would have the choice between America and Europe; they
may counteract American politics, they may have to be continuously bribed
or be completely subjected by military force. The creation of a closed econ-
omic system in the Western hemisphere alone forecasts, through the reor-
ganization processes connected therewith, the end of innumerable vested
American interests. A period of warfare to ease America's position may
well coincide with a period of European reconstruction under German
dominance. Will Europe regain her position in the world economy that
she lost during and after the first world war? Her productive capacity
pooled, her organization centralized, she might well be able to exceed all
the capacity of America.
However far-fetched all this may sound at the present stage of de-
velopment, it is nevertheless one possible perspective a perspective already
foreshadowed by actual occurences such as the co-ordination of Central
Europe, the Franco-German agreements, the barter exchange and its suc-
cess in South America before the outbreak of the war. Actual occurences
determine actual policies, but the threat inherent in that practice of ex-
panding the present practice into a permanent one leads straight to the fears
of the future previously described. Thus long-run perspectives and im-
mediate practice both determine the present activities of the various na-
tions. In order that the larger perspective may disappear, its small-scale
reality must first be ended. Thus Britain's independence from Europe must
be defended at all costs, the unification of the European Continent must be
prevented .by every means.
Even if Hitler's optimism in regard to the possibility of an enforced
Anglo-German understanding had been justified, this understanding could
no longer be a question between England and Germany. It was a question
to be settled between the Nazis and America. Of course, without the Anglo-
American alliance it is difficult to see how England could have withstood
German pressure for long. But with this alliance a reality, England was
no longer master of her own decisions. Thus the Balkan battle, Hitler's
second great attempt to bring Britain "to reason" could have no results.
It is not Britain but America that must be convinced of the futility of an
attempt to defeat Germany.

To do business with Hitler means to do business at England's expense.
If Hitler at present and in view of objective limitations has to be satisfied
with sharing the world with Roosevelt, the latter, who does not face such
limitations, cannot be convinced that it would be right to turn into a "Ben-
edict Arnold". Why should he "eat the crumbs from Hitler's victorious
table", when at small expense he can have the whole cake and table too?
What Hitler can offer America she can get herself without his help. When
Hitler says that he has no designs in the Western hemisphere it is merely
funny. The Western hemisphere was America's long before Hitler offered
it so generously.
Yet America's help to Britain is no act of charity. The American
isolationists' complaint that lease-lend billions and other aid to Britain im-
poverish America merely to satisfy the interventionists' perverse love for
England is just as "hypocritical" as the American "defense needs" enumer-
ated by the "Great Hypocrite" himself. What Britain has lost to America
and what she is going to lose makes up a hundred-fold for all the "aid"
received and all the "aid" to come. How pitiful are the attempts of Eng-
glish businessmen to keep up their world trade in spite of the war. During
the course of this war most of it will fall automatically to the United
States. How realistically Churchill spoke when he "allowed" the United
States to protect "British interests" in Asia. The longer the.war lasts and
the more "aid" America extends, the weaker England will be. The prof-
essional appeasers cannot help being just as generous towards Roosevelt
as, not so long ago, they were toward Hitler. When interviewed by a re-
porter of the Chicago Tribune (9/16, 41), Lord Halifax declared:
"...The necessity forces itself upon the minds of the American statesmen of pushing
her defense boundaries further out, as, for instance, to Iceland. The defense of
America and the defense of the British commonwealth are essentially a single problem;
this is why we provided America with bases in the West Indies and so on... The
British government will be agreeable to America CONTINUING AFTER THE WAR her
defense policy of extending her frontier further out."
Halifax simply states that whatever America takes' now in the course
of the war she will be allowed to keep. But here he is only plagiarizing
from his old friend Hitler, who also has the habit of offering what is already
taken. More sensible men than Lord Halifax are, however, no less aware
of the losses involved in the Anglo-American alliance. G. Crowther of the
London Economist, for instance, writes in the October issue (1941) of
Foreign Affairs:
"If the American people have to learn the responsibilities of their strength, the ,British
people have to learn the limitations of their weakness and there can be little
doubt which of the two is the more painful adjustment to make."
He cautions his American friends to take it easy in the face of the great
opportunities open to them, and he advises his fellow Englishmen to lose
what they must lose as cheerfully as possible. "Thumbs up" while the
pockets are rifled.

Because of the fact that Britain will lose regardless of who wins the
war Germany or America one phase of the German-American strug-
gle consists of competitive bids for England's support. It is up to the
British to decide whose offer to accept. In the end, however, it depends
on the fortunes of war whose offer they will accept or will be forced to
accept. England's weakness, paradoxically, turns into a new strength. She
can at the moment almost at will wrest great concessions from both Am-
erica or Germany. Thus it appears that Britain is determining America's
policy, that her Foreign Office dictates in Washington. Thus she can
continue to sing defiantly that there will always be an England, being
quite sure that Hitler will not attempt an invasion for some time to come,
if ever. It was Churchill who after the Balkan debacle maintained that
a Nazi invasion of Russia would be far more likely than one of England.
At present, because of the great role that private capital still plays in
England, the British ruling class is convinced that though it will lose under
any circumstance, its losses will be smaller under Roosevelt's than under
Hitler's "protection". To change their minds, or to bring to power "new
minds" and, at the same time, to convince the United States of the use-
lessness of her resistance to the realization of a German Europe, Hitler
marched into Russia. This march had many reasons behind it but the
most important, it seems to us, was the recognition that an open and full-
fledged war with America had become unavoidable.

The German-Russian War
Seldom can a single clear-cut reason be found for political occurrences.
A general policy emerges out of a multitude of reasons which are by no
means in harmony one with another. The always-latent yet unexpected
turn in German-Russian relations has as many causes as it has objectives.
It is true that Germany wants to have the wheat, oil, and raw materials
that Russia provides. But this is not enough to explain the German attack.
For the time being, and probably for a long time to come, war destroys
the possibility of getting these materials in significant quantities. A con-
tinuation of the German-Russian trade would have yielded better results.
To be sure, if the German invasion turns out to be successful, the direct
possession of the Ukraine and the Caucasus will in the long run be of
greater value than any sort of trade agreement that might fluctuate at any
time or vanish altogether. It seems clear, however, that no immediate need for
Russian supplies could account for the invasion. As a matter of fact, aware
of the possibility of a German attack and anxious to postpone it as long
as possible, Russia had stepped up her deliveries to Germany precisely at
the moment when the German-Russian relations began to deteriorate. There
was, furthermore, an ever increasing Russian dependence upon German in-
dustrial products because of the blockade. The future of German-Russian
trade pointed towards improvements.

It is argued, however, that Hitler counted upon a very short war in
Russia and hence on the possibility of a rapid exploitation of Soviet resour-
ces in a very short time. Though the methods of control and production
have been improved considerably, and although it is not possible to draw
conclusions for the present war from the last one, still those experiences
cannot be altogether disregarded, and the German general staff knew from
the, last war how difficult it is to organize production in occupied territory
and make it yield even meager results. It should also be obvious that
though the German general staff may have hoped for a short war, it could
not base any decision on the mere hope. It must have taken into consideration
the possibility of a prolonged war, the more so as it was certainly aware
that mechanized warfare is less successful in less developed? countries. Yugo-
slavia and Greece did not disprove this fact because there the enemies had
not themselves been mechanized, the onslaught could be prepared and sup-
ported from near-by bases in Rumania and Bulgaria, the territory was
limited, the supply lines short. In Russia the German army faces another
mechanized force. The farther the Germans advance, the less efficient
their mechanized force must become. It takes time to move the bases from
which to operate further. It is not a question of travelable roads: the de-
centralized Russian industry, the Russian "scorched earth" policy, the large
stretches of mainly agricultural territory must slow down a mechanized
army and diminish its destructive power.
The industrial density of the West not only increased the independence
of the advancing motorized columns, not only provided them with repair
facilities, oil, and other essentials, but made the Western nations far more
vulnerable than Russia. With the rapid capture of important industrial
sectors the supremacy of the German army was assured. The military
striking force of the allied armies became a temporary and meaningless
factor because of their early divorce from their industrial bases. There
was thus little fighting and there were millions of prisoners. In Russia
the situation is different, and such sweeping immediate successes as had been
possible in the West were not to be expected. In the face of these ob-
stacles, the actual advance of the German army in Russia seems rather
more imposing than their quick victory in the West. It is nonsense to speak of
Hitler's "time-table" that the Russian army has upset. To speak in such
terms merely means to take the German propaganda more seriously than
the Germans do themselves; for, after all, this time-table business is a mere
stunt of the German propaganda institute in line with their success movies
and other devices for scaring the timid.
We are inclined to believe that the Nazis were well aware of the
difficulties they would have to face in Russia. They most probably at-
tacked when they did, not because they felt that Russia was weak, but
because they were aware of her full strength. Of course the Nazis might
have expected Russia's early political collapse as well as a revival of Ukrain-
ian nationalism. Yet by merely looking at their own methods of suppres-

sion, largely copied from the Russian, they must have: known how slim
the chances were. To destroy the ruling group in Russia, the army must
first be' destroyed. To revive nationalism in the Ukraine, the Ukraine
must first be "liberated". Today it is more difficult to revive nationalism
than it has previously been to suppress it.
Because of its friendly relations with the Red Army, the German
Reichswehr was certainly well informed about Russia's military position.
Even during the last war Russia's army commanded great respect. It is
held by a number of historians that Germany lost the war only because
of her preoccupation with the Eastern Front. Why then in face of all
this did the Nazis risk the war? Hitler himself enumerates the following
1) An Anglo-Russian bloc was in the making. Sir Stafford Cripps was trying, and
seemingly successfully, to turn Stalin against Germany. The ambiguity of Stalin's
policy came to light in Russia's attitude towards the anti-German government in Yugo-
slavia. The Balkan war was instigated by both England and Russia.
2) The price Russia demanded for her collaboration with Germany was too high and
ever-increasing. She took more than had been arranged for in Poland, Finland,
Rumania and the Baltic. Stalin's appetite, as demonstrated by Molotov during his
Berlin visit, was insatiable.
3) Russia increased her army at her Western front continuously, thus forcing Germany
to do likewise, which greatly hampered all other German operations and endangered
Germany herself.
Hitler did nrt deny, however, that for him the pact with Russia was
from its very inception only a momentary expediency to destroy England's
policy of encirclement. "I considered myself entitled", he said, to "set
the strongest power in the East, by especially solemn declarations, at rest
concerning the limits of our interests." There is no need for disputing
Hitler's arguments. Russia certainly did everything he blames her for and
possibly more that he does not know about. Here Stalin acted in exactly
the same manner that Hitler himself did. For Stalin, too, the pact was
merely a momentary expediency to be broken at any opportune moment.
If Hitled tried to come to an understanding with Britain, why should
Stalin not try to do likewise? As far as "appetites" are concerned, it is
doubtful that the "limits of interests" of which Hitler spoke to Stalin
included most of the Balkan down to the Dardanelles. The Bukovina
which Stalin took in addition to Bessarabia was rather small compensation
for Hitler's Balkan "interests". And if Stalin took some important parts
of Finland, he thereby only enabled Hitler to take entirely without cost
the rest of Finland. The Red Army assembled for the same reason on
Russia's Western borders that Hitler's divisions stood ready on Germany's
Eastern front. What Hitler says against Russia is exactly the same thing
that Stalin can say against Germany. Both are speaking the truth. Cap-
italist nations are never lying when they proclaim their enmities. They
are always lying when they speak of eternal friendships and inviolable trust.

However, it was Germany that broke the treaty first. The non-aggres-
sion pact had served its purpose. It had served its purpose earlier for
Hitler than for Stalin. The question may arise: could Stalin have not
known that, pact or no pact, sooner or later the Nazis would fight Russia?
Of course he knew of that possibility. But such arguments are beside the
point. Stalin said that
"by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany we secured for our'own: country
peace for a year and a half and the opportunity of preparing its forces to repulse
Fascist Germany should she risk an attack on our country despite the pact."
Thus he admits as openly as Hitler that the pact was made to better prepare
for the possible war with Germany, in case Hitler should change his mind.
But Stalin's mind, too, is not fixed; it might also have changed. All the
bolshevik "treachery" of which Hitler speaks, may also be interpreted as
just so many steps to safeguard Russia against the day when Hitler should
re-discover his "civilizing" mission. All the "treachery" of which Stalin
may accuse Hitler can also be interpreted as so many German steps to insure
themselves against the "resumption of the bolshevik world-revolution", that
is, against Russian imperialism. In the capitalist society any preparation
for security is a preparation for war. Security and aggression are only
two words for the same thing.
It was clear after Munich that war was inevitable. The great ques-
tion was only where and when it would start. That it would involve all
nations was also clear. Not so clear, however, were the combinations of
the opposing power blocs. There was the danger that England and France,
out of the same considerations that forced Stalin into his non-aggression
pact with Hitler, would make some sort of agreement with Germany that
would start the war in the East instead of in the West. There was the
danger that France and England would allow Hitler for the time being
- to march into the Ukraine; there was the greater danger that Hitler
would march without their consent. Would the Allies really storm the
Siegfried Line just to stop Hitler's march into Russia?. And if they should
try "to hang their washing" there would they succeed? Would Japan not
take advantage of such a situation and attack in the East to get in Siberia
what she failed to get in: China? In that case would America really start
a war against Japan? Would she not prefer instead to let Japan increase
her strength at the expense of Russia and thus leave the "Open Door" in
Asia open for the entry of American imperialism? Would England not wait
to attack Germany until Russia was sufficiently weakened, in.order to kill
two birds with one stone? These dangers were not merely speculative. For
had not Russia been excluded from Munich? Did not the policy of "col-
lective security" fail to win the ears of the bourgeois diplomats? In the
face of all these dangers what would be better than to turn the whole
situation around? Peace with Germany would start the war in the West.
It would put Russia in the position that England apparently tried to occupy.
And then, doubtful as it was that the British would take the Siegfried Line,

just as problematic was German success against the Maginot Line. Japan
would not dare to attack Russia at peace on her Western front. She would
involve herself further in China thus bringing on a crisis with the United
States. If America entered the war, there would still be time to change
to the side of the Allies. Then Germany as well as Japan could be attacked.
With America's help victory might be assured in the Far East, and in the
West with the help of France and England. Out of the second world
war Russia might emerge if not strengthened, at least not weakened. She
would have been able to hold her own.
It is hard to see how Stalin could have chosen any other course than
he did. Even if the worst should happen, that is, a quick German victory
over England which might prevent America from entering the war, there
was still reason to believe that Germany would be quite busy for years
to come organizing the new Europe and preparing the next war against
the United States. Of course in that case, peace with Germany would
have been an expensive proposition. Russian concessions to Germany would
have been enormous, but if freely given, might have prevented a German
attack. Germany would once more have been the mediator between Russia
and the rest of the world and would have preferred peace for precisely this
reason that her new position would bring her greater profits than a
devastating war. All this, to be sure, in order to become reality, presupposed
a peace between German Europe and the rest of the world. But with
such a peace, Russia's independence would not necessarily be threatened
and hence Stalin's regime not necessarily endangered. Risky as such a sit-
uation would be, it would still be a lesser risk than a war with Germany
under conditions as they existed in the fall of 1939.
Unfortunately for Stalin and Russia, there was neither a quick Ger-
man victory over England, nor a quick entrance into the war in an effective
way on the part of the United States. The unexpected results of the
German Blitzkrieg on the one hand, and the German weakness in her deal-
ings with England on the other, overthrew all political perspectives that
could have been considered before the onset of the war. Russia, instead
of being secure in the East and in the West, was now exposed on both
sides as never before. However, Hitler might not have attacked Russia
if he had been able to come to terms with England and thus, for the time
being, with America. He would probably have waited at least another
year to reorganize the Continent for the purpose of another and greater
offensive. Thus Rudolph Hess flew to England to offer peace not, as is
generally assumed, by telling Churchill that Germany would attack Russia
instead of taking more from England, but to tell him that Germany would
not attack anywhere, that the European Continent which she now possessed
was about the "limit of her interests". Those proposals were made much
earlier, immediately after the Balkan campaign, but Hess's arrival in Eng-
land was to indicate that Hitler was really serious and willing to stick
to his proposals.

Because of the fact that an understanding had already been reached
between America and England to continue the war under any circumstances,
Churchill could "prophetically" announce that Hitler's next victim would
be Russia. He could "quickly", a few hours after the entry of German
troops in Russia, outline a "new policy" that proved his "genius" able to
make proper decisions in the twinkling of an eye. And thus it appeared
that Roosevelt adopted Churchill's attitude towards the new situation,
when in reality Churchill merely followed out the orders of his master's
The Russian-German war is first of all America's product. It was
Roosevelt who turned out to be the true leader of the "Communists"; who
made them, as R. M. Yoder has said, "go to bed convinced that no aid
should be granted imperialistic England only to wake up singing 'God Save
the King'." And it only speaks for the fairness of Roosevelt when he now,
although belatedly, discovers that the Russian Constitution really corres-
ponds to the Four Freedoms for which American democracy is fighting.
And as behooves the proper wife, Mrs. Roosevelt, in her column "My Day",
speaking of E. Lyons's book, "The Red Decade", that exposes the ways
and means of Bolshevism in the U.S., describes the red-baiting attitude
of its author as thoroughly un-American, for America has always stood in
favor of social changes. The "Waves of the Future" now shine in so many
colors that one can easily forget to swim.
Rudolf Hess could not have gone to Churchill with a Hitler proposal
that the Nazis would turn against Russia instead of continuing their fight
against England, for the march into Russia, on the basis of the newly
created European situation, would be no more and no less than the con-
tinuation of the war against England and America. The invasion of Russia
is an attempt to make impossible once and for all a final German defeat.
It puts England in greater danger than she has hitherto faced. It is a more
forceful attempt by the Nazis to tear Britain away from the United States,
to make her accept the Nazi rule in Europe. Through Russia, Iran and
Iraq can be reached, Turkey can be brought into the German fold without
a fight, the Near East can be brought under German control with minimum
effort and the way to India can be opened.
The conquest of England would be just as costly to Hitler, if not
more costly, than the Russian invasion. The conquest of England would
have been a barren one. Not so success in Russia, for this would enable
the Germans to begin seriously breaking up the Empire without exposing
herself too much anywhere on the Continent. The conquest of the Caucasus,
Iran, and Iraq, would immediately yield all the oil that Germany could
ever use. It would minimize to a greater extent the effect of the Anglo-
American blockade against Europe. And most important of all, the fiction
of an independent England would be maintained.
The breaking up of the Empire, the conquest of Egypt and India,
could take place in a manner less costly to the capitalist society as a whole.

Rulers would change, not the rule of the "master race" itself. The chaos
to be expected in the wake of Britain's collapse could be prevented. Am-
erica would now be hampered in the fulfillment of her imperialistic desires
precisely by reason of being Britain's ally. She would, in turn, prevent
all other nations from taking from the Empire while the taking was good.
The only nation really able to profit by the maintenance of Britain's fictitious
existence would be Germany. The breaking up of the Empire would prove
to the British that they were unwise when they chose Roosevelt instead
of Hitler. Political changes could be expected in England, changes that
might throw Britain into Hitler's lap without any effort on his part. Or
rather, the effort exerted in the conquest of England but expended in the
Near East and Russia instead would now have yielded not only England,
but Russia and the Near East, too. And if even now the British should
not come to terms, the final invasion of England, if unavoidable, could
now be made with much greater guarantee of success. This general per-
spective is much more reasonable, however risky, than the mere satisfaction
of the emotional desire of subding Britain physically and at once.
How well the United States was aware of this line of reasoning that
prevailed among the Nazis came to light in Roosevelt's opening of the
Red Sea for American shipping, in the great and ever-increasing amount
of war materials sent to the Near East, in the training of American sol-
diers in desert-fighting, and last but not least in the "Retreat" that the
American ambassador Stinehardt purchased for himself and his staff out-
side of Moscow, safeguarded against air attacks and equipped with every-
thing for a long siege, months before the German invasion of Russia started.
This German strategy, furthermore, made it conceivable that in the
Far East, Japan, lured by the Siberian prospects, might be induced to turn
away from her expansionist policy directed southward. America might thus
remain unchallenged in the Pacific and be more inclined to reconsider the
Nazis "share-the-world-plan". If America would sacrifice England, Ger-
many would sacrifice Japan. German propagandists were the most suc-
cessful in re-awakening the world to the new "Yellow Peril". The relations
between Japan and Germany cooled of at that moment when her relations
with America seemed to have reached the breaking point. Once more both
America and Japan felt their difficulties might be solved without going
to war. The occupation of Indo-China was a precautionary move, as was
the new China offensive, and before that the non-airession pact between
Moscow and Tokio. Whatever Japan may do, however, in the final analy-
sis her destiny is determined by the outcome of the war between German
Europe and America. Japan will have to go as t he wind 'blows.
To prevent a German attack on Russia, there was just one policy for
Stalin to follow, and that was to strengthen Germany in the eyes of
England and America. Thus the ridiculous pro-German propaganda ol
the "Communists", and the fight to keep America out of the war. It is
quite amusing to compare the Bolshevik utterances in regard to the war
and to Germany before the Nazi invasion of Russia and afterwards. This

is just as amusing as comparing Roosevelt's attitude towards Finland's fight
against Russia unsupported by the Nazis and against the same Finnish
fight against Russia with the support of the Nazis; just as funny as Chur-
chill's accepting Roosevelt's Four Freedoms that guarantee national self-
determination, and at the same time imprisoning 7000 people of India for
expressing agreement with the Four Freedoms; just as funny as the Am-
erican isolationists' desire both to protect Britain and to keep out of the
war, for the first necessitates the reverse of the second; and finally just
as funny as Hitler's latest aspiration to bring socialism to Russia real
socialism, not the fake socialism of the Bolsheviks.
However, behind all these cheap propagandistic reversals are very im-
portant strategical maneuverings. As long as Germany appeared strong,
and as long as she appeared secure on the basis of the non-aggression pact
with Russia and in the face of her military successes, there was a chance
that England might come to terms with Hitler in recognition of the hope-
lessness of her situation. Thus the war might have been terminated. This
is why Sir Stafford Cripps never came to see Stalin until it was too late.
Molotov bluntly refused to receive the British delegate, "for political reas-
ons", as he said. Only an Anglo-German agreement could prevent the war
that Russia feared, never an Anglo-Russian agreement. Thus Russia main-
tained, literally to the last moment, that a German-Russian war was simply
inconceivable. Russian appeasement of Germany became frantic.. After
the Balkan campaign, and the final recognition that for the time being
Germany could not be stopped in Europe, Stalin did everything in his
power to show his friendly feeling towards Nazi Germany. He refused
to recognize any longer the national existence of Belgium, the Netherlands,
Norway, Yugoslavia, but he did recognize the anti-British government of
Rashid Ali in Iraq. In addition, deliveries to Germany increased enorm-
ously. But there were no further German demands on Russia. Probably
all of them would have been fulfiilled. There was no German ultimatum
as has been alleged. There was only Rudolf Hess and his mission, and
that failed. Roosevelt's answer had been given in unmistakable terms:
the Atltantic patrol and the occupation of Iceland.
Hess's peace offer undoubtedly contained a guarantee of the integrity
of the British Empire and her fleet. Any other proposal would have been
simply idiotic, but whatever the German policy is, it is not idiotic.
A peace that merely maintains the British Empire can mean nothing to
America and nothing to an English ruling class that still believes in a chance
to win the war despite all previous reversals. America does not defend
Britain as such, but she defends Britain solely to prevent the unification
of Europe under German dominance. The "defense of Britain" is only
incidental. Hess brought no bargain for America, not even for an England
assured of America's help "to the end", for the very existence of a German
Europe means the slow but 'certain destruction of British world rule. It
means the possible degrading of the United States from the first to the

second world power. However, as the United States News (7/18, 41)
"It is necessary for an understanding of President Roosevelt's strategy to understand
the stake of his struggle as he sees it. That stake, essentially, is to decide who is
to be the boss of the world in the future Germany and her satellites, or the United
States and her friends".
Roosevelt's strategy brought the Nazis into Russia. After the Balkan
campaign, Molotov could only believe more firmly in his earlier lie "that
a strong Germany is an indispensable condition for durable peace in Europe",
for now that the hypocritical wish had become a painful reality, the world
simply had to be convinced of Germany's invincibility and peaceful inclin-
ations. But the American imperialists refused to accept Stalin's point of
view just to keep the Nazis out of Russia. Churchill, who knows Am-
erica's responsibility only too well, advised his new friend Stalin in a letter
(7/26, 41) to direct his requests for help to America rather than to Brit-
ain, for "the extent and character of the aid Britain gives to Russia depends
to a considerable degree upon the assistance Britain receives from the United
The fact that the German-Russian war is first of all a war between
Germany and the United States, explains, in part, the course of the war
itself. England was not going to make her own position still more difficult
by risking an invasion in the West to help Russian defense. America was
not ready to participate in such an adventure. But without an A. E. F.
there would be no B.E.F. What if a new B.E.F. should again be de-
feated? It might well mean the end of the Churchill government and
a return of the appeaserss". Why should Churchill risk what Hitler did
not dare? .A possible failure might not only overthrow the Churchill cab-
inet, but weaken England in every other respect too. Her chance of get-
ting better terms from Hitler, if coming to terms with Hitler should prove
unavoidable, would be lessened. Her dependence upon America would
become still greater and thus also the losses implied in the alliance with
the United States. The only sound policy for Britain to follow is to keep
her own forces intact, to avoid losses wherever possible, and to keep her
bargaining power strong in regard to both Germany and the United States.
After all, America might lose the war without losing anything, but
England will lose even in victory. The weaker she finds herself on the day
of peace, the more she will have to lose. The war can only be won -
this much seems clear with an all-out effort on the part of the United
States. Unless such an effort is made, only an act of despair could make
England send troops to France and Spain to open up a Western front.
The Russian war was of course highly desirable. It might weaken
Germany sufficiently to make her propose a peace that would give better
guarantees for the continuation of British rule than anything hitherto sug-
gested. It might keep her occupied long enough to drain her resources
sufficiently to assure success to a final Anglo-American invasion of the Con-

tinent. A successful invasion necessitates enormous forces and endangers
the fleet, so vulnerable to air attacks and so necessary to invasion. But
only joint-activity, joint-responsibility with America could induce England
to risk that much. America, however, was not ready and Hitler did not wait.
It is nonsense to believe that the Allies refused effective aid to Russia
merely to satisfy the desire of some reactionaries to see the two totalitarian
nations tear each other to pieces. No two nations would destroy each
other just to please the rest of the world. To refuse aid to Russia is to
help Hitler to victory, but it is Germany, not Russia, that threatens the
interests of Anglo-American capitalism. A war of mutual exhaustion might
have been conceivable under conditions as they existed prior to 1939. But
now, with all the European resources in German hands, it even became
questionable that the Russian would hold out for very long. It is true
that the industrial superiority of Western Europe does not exclude military
failures. There are "accidents" in history; there have been "miracles".
Yet no sane person would base his policy on the expectation of new miracles.
If aid to Russia was slight, it was probably for no other reason than the
simple one that the Allies found no way to make it more effective.
It is also wrong to assume that little aid only was forthcoming be-
cause of the fear that a Russian victory might in the end turn out to be
just as bad as a German victory. There is no basis for such reasoning.
In relation to Europe Russia occupies about the same position that China
does to Asia. It is not enormous China that represents the "Yellow Peril",
but Japan. In Europe it is not Russia but Germany that threatens to
dominate. Like the danger of China, so the danger of Russia is of the
future, a future that may never arise if the present German-Japanese threat
is removed. Through force of circumstances, and not because of the ab-
sence of imperialistic inclinations, has Russian imperialism thus far been
largely a failure. Her attempts in China yielded small results; her gains
in Europe have been presents from the hands of Hitler,- who turned out
to be an "Indian giver". Whatever the course of the war, Russia will
emerge from it weaker than she entered. In the event of final victory for
the Allies, her decimated army will meet millions of fresh American and
English troops on German and Asiatic soil. There will be no Russian ex-
pansion either to the East or to the West. Because Russia had to play a
major part in the war, she will be forced to play a minor one at the peace
conferences. The head of the American mission to Moscow, W. A. Harri-
man, was certainly right when he said (10/10, 41):
"that AFTER THE WAR we will find Russia much more interested in nationalism
than internationalism, and a nationalist Russia is a Russia we can well become
intimate with."
The Allies recognized quite early how little help they were able to
give. British and American observers looked upon Russia as a hopeless
case not only from the beginning of the present war, but even prior to

the outbreak of German-Russian hostilities. Although the war started
at the end of June, the London Economist, for example, was already con-
vinced at the end of May "that Hitler will soon control the raw material
resources of Russia". On July 11th, 1941, American newspapers reported
"form unimpeachable British sources, that the Churchill war cabinet is
convinced that the Red Army must win now or be lost for good."
If the British overestimated Russia's strength and underestimated that
of Germany prior to the war, they were inclined to think differently after
the Fall of France and the Balkan campaign. However, Russian resistance
caused them to change their minds once more. To keep Russia going, they
were now willing to do anything, which was not much. After three months
of fighting, the Nazis had captured or inactivated about 50 per cent of
Russia's industrial capacity and weakened the Red Army almost beyond
repair. Unless the trend of events unexpectedly turns again, it is difficult
to believe that the Russians will be able to keep on fighting much longer.
It is not German but Russian industry that is a shambles. The prolonga-
tion of the war will thus progressively favor the Nazis. The road of
supplies from abroad is largely closed, and what is still open is of little
importance. The Russian winter, on which great hopes are staked, cannot
alter anything on its own account. Even the old army of the Kaiser was
able to withstand three Russian winters in succession. As things stand
at this writing, it seems almost certain that the Allies are in the process
of loosing the third phase of the world war the one now fought in
We shall not be disappointed if further developments should prove this
assumption wrong. We do not profess to know the actual strength of either
the Russian or the German army. We do not know what reserves exist.
We know as little as anybody else what will happen next on the Russian
front. All that we know is what everyone can see: the fact of German
success and the admitedly dangerous position in which the Russians find
themselves. On the basis of these facts, it seems more reasonable to expect
a Russian defeat or at best another temporary stalemate than the
collapse of the German war machine.
The very reluctance on the part of the British to open up a Western
front, the very reluctance of Roosevelt to declare war on Germany, seems
to indicate the present hopelessness of the Russian situation. If it is true,
as General Wavell said, that "the Germans must be beaten on their own
soil, exactly the way Napoleon was beaten," the proper time for an invasion
would have been during the height of the German-Russian war. Of course
General Wavell also pointed out that for such purposes "we certainly netrd
American manpower, just as we did in the last war"; vet, if the Russians
had any chance of winning, it would be incomprehensible that merely the
unpreparedness of America should have delayed an invasion. If Russia
represented a real danger to Germany, it should riot have been too difficult
to make the Western attack with the help of the combined Anglo- Am-

erican fleet. After all there are millions of English soldiers at hand, en-
ormous 'quantities of war materials accumulated, and there are enough
American troops to initiate a new A. E. F.
The hesitance of the Allies to risk an invasion may be explained by
their fear that such a contingency would possibly lead to a Hitler peace
offer which the Russians might accept. The surest way to keep the
Russian fighting was not to attack in the West. There will not arise the
question of a new Hitler-Stalin pact as long as Hitler can be reasonably
sure that he can force a military decision and thus settle the Russian ques-
tion "once and for all". Without a Western invasion, Stalin must keep
on fighting to the last, in the hope of making the Germans realize that
they would be far better off to accept a new truce instead of seeing the
war to the end. What would really happen, however, dependent upon
events on the battlefields. And there the Nazis were once more victorious.
But even now, with the Germans hammering against Moscow, one
still can not be too sure of what will happen next. There exist a number
of possibilities, any of which may be realized. It is not impossible that
the Stalin regime will be able to maintain itself even after the fall of
Moscow. But its collapse and the installation of a new regime willing to
come to terms with Hitler are also possible. It is also not impossible that
Stalin himself, in order to save his own regime, will conclude a separate
peace. Yet whatever may occur, it will not count for very much. Even
if parts of the Red Army should succeed in withdrawing to the East; even if
war materials should reach Russia; even if there is a chance of re-organ-
izing the Russian forces for a new Spring offensive all these possibilities
do not effect the immediate realities of this war. The "final" victory over
the Nazis is pushed too far into the future to have much meaning even
for the Russians. In view of this situation a Vichy-peace might prove to
be the "lesser evil". If it indicates anything, the fact that the Russians
have thus far not changed their "line" again shows that all the advantages
are still on the side of the Nazis.
That the Allies recognize that for all practical purposes Russia may
be considered lost also comes to light in the new and sudden change in
Japanese-American relations. As long as it was not clear which way the
war on the Continent would turn, neither Japan nor America was willing
*to act. We have pointed out that Japan's attitude was a very ambigious
affair. The Moscow-Tokio pact, the occupation of Indo-China, in fact
the whole policy of Japan, could work in two ways, for and against Ger-
many. Which way it will finally work depends on the fortunes of the
German-American struggle.
The Moscow-Tokio pact strengthened Japan in regard to both America
and Germany. Japan could operate more freely in Asia and with a greater
measure of independence. The German-Russian war was also, in part,
an answer to the Moscow-Tokio pact. It robbed Japan once more of

her new position of relative independence. With Russia's defeat, Japan
stands alone in the Pacific against the combined Anglo-American forces. She
must either come to a still closer cooperation with Germany or consider
herself lost. As long as Russia existed as a real power, America was to
a certain extend handicapped in her Asiatic ambitions, for as little as the
Japanese-American interests in Asia can be harmonized, just as little are
the Russians willing to leave Asia to the Americans. As long as a number
of rivals fought for the same thing, there was always a chance to go with
one of them against another. The Russian defeat excludes such an oppor-
tunity. Thus Japan feels herself completely "encircled" at that moment
when she faces a single enemy. Churchill has made it clear in his declar-
ation that England would be on America's side in the event of a war bet-
ween America and Japan; that, in this respect, too, there are no longer
rivalries between Britain and the United States; that Britain would be
willing to sacrifice her Asiatic interests to America but not to Japan.
Since America has shown her unwillingness to sacrifice England, Ger-
many is determined to hold on to Japan. Yet until Russia was brought
down, all expectations that Japan might march into Siberia because of the
German-Russian war, that she might stop American shipments to Russia,
were not fulfilled, because it would have been utterly stupid to enter the
war on the side of the Axis while Russia still had a chance of keeping alive.
Japan's government of reconciliation with America functioned only as long
as there existed a chance that the Germans might be stopped. Now, how-
ever, it depends on Germany's strategy whether or not Japan will attack
Russia in the Far East. A Vichy-peace with Russia might prevent this.
An outbreak of hostilities between Japan and America might induce the
Russians to participate on the side of America.
It is now clear that Russia's defeat was essential for Germany, not
only for a new attempt to pry Britain lose from America, but also to con-
tinue, if necessary, the war against the United States in the battlefields
of the Far East and in the Pacific. The complete destruction of Russia's
power was necessary in order to accomplish either a temporary peace or
to secure the continuation of the war that still leaves all the advantages
to the Nazis. Thus the Russian collapse might well release the long pre-
pared American-Japanese war.

America -- Germany Japan
It could be argued that even now the Japanese may try to escape their
most unhappy situation. This would, however, amount practically to sui-
cide. America, like Germany, would prefer to deal with her enemies piece-
meal. If avoidable, it would be foolish for the Japanese to give America
that opportunity. It is much more to be expected that an all-out war of
America against Germany will lead to a Japanese declaration of war on
the United States, not because the Berlin-Tokio axis provides for it, but
because any other policy would spell the end of Japan as an independent

capitalist power. Aware of the unavoidability of this conflict, America may
for this reason be the first to attack.
Japanese imperialism cannot retreat. It can adopt a waiting-
policy only as long as Germany, or America, or both, deem it best to main-
tain peace in the Pacific. Japan can exist only by continuous expansion.
To offer her, as Mr. Hull does, "spheres of interest" in the Asiatic trade
is to offer her nothing. It is not "trade" with which America is concerned.
If it were "trade" she would prefer Japan to China, for her business with
Japan is the better one. "Trade problems" are not the issue; the whole of
American commerce in China and Japan is of little significance. Free-trade
in the former sense of the term has long since come to an end, it cannot
re-appear. Trade, today, implies the direct posesssion of large territories,
or it implies military force able to dictate to weaker nations. The only
trade possible today is that exercised by the Japanese army in China, by
the German armies in occupied Europe. All that America has thus far
offered Japan is plain starvation. All that it will ever be willing to offer
is the maintenance of a powerless Japan at the mercy of the United States.
Starvation of Japanese capital, a stoppage of imperialist expansion, is equal
to real starvation, for, unless socialism arises in important and decisive areas
of the world, starving Japanese capital means to murder her population.
To give Japan what she must have for her capitalistic existence means for
America to give up her most important sphere of imperialistic expansion. And
in this connection, Chiang Kai-shek appears as what he actually is, a tool
of American imperialism, but not the "liberator" of "his people". For the
"liberation" of the Chinese people can never proceed with the help of
England, America, or Germany, but only in the form of a struggle against
all capitalist nations and against capitalism in China itself. But such a
liberation would not be a "national liberation". It is "too late in history"
to expect a recurrence of national wars such as shook the world a hundred
years ago. Within the framework of capitalism nationall liberation" means
the choice, if one has the choice, between different imperialist power blocs,
each of them equally capable of preventing self-determination of the people
they "protect". National issues are mere subterfuges to hide the real im-
perialist notions of the great powers. It will thus be the task of socialism,
not to do what capitalism failed to do, namely to assure national inde-
pendence for the various countries, but to do away with the whole problem
in its traditional as well as in its imperialistic form.
It is capitalism that rules in the United States. It will not sacrifice
its own interests just to help those of the Japanese. People who are so
delighted that the paper-cities of Japan can be destroyed over night are
as capable of "unselfish acts" as the Japanese who celebrate with pomp
and circumstance the Fifth Anniversary of their organized slaughter of the
Chinese population.
No permanent agreements can be reached between America and Japan.
The only obstacle to a Japanese-American war was the existence of the
Red Army. With the latter out of picture America .may force the war,

for she will not be able for some time to come to do much in Europe.
The possible direct connection between Japan and Germany must be pre-
vented. It may well be that the greatest proportion of American war efforts
will be directed against Japan, in an attempt at a quick victory, that will
free America for more efficient action against the Nazis. But concen-
tration upon the issues of the Pacific may also indicate a dawning recogni-
tion on the part of the American Administration that it is too difficult a
task to beat Hitler in Europe; that it would be wiser to operate where
operations yield better results.
As far as South America is concerned America has displayed no hesita-
tion, as Roosevelt's recent coup d'etat in Panama so strongly reveals. Am-
erica may cease to hesitate in Asia, too, and thereby demonstrate that her
struggle is not directed against "Nazi-Germany", but for the greatest pos-
sible control over the world economy. Of course, in the long displayed
hesitancy to declare war on Germany there is also hidden the desire to
leave a way open for retreat, if retreat should become unavoidable. After
all, Germany is fully aware of the fact that America is at war with her.
The "Hypocrite" and the "Rattlesnake" have already declared war a dozen
times. The German population has long since been made acquainted with
the fact, and no "psychological effect" detrimental to the Nazis can any
longer be expected through the mere formality that accompany openings
of hostilities. It seems to be mere "politeness" on the part of the Nazis
to help maintain the illusion that both nations are still nominally at peace.
The lack of a war declaration hurts nobody but the United States. It hin-
ders the necessary centralization needed for modern warfare. It is explain-
able only by the Roosevelt Administration's own uncertaintity as to what
course to pursue. Thus, the greatest support the Nazi have yet found in the
United States has been provided by Roosevelt's own strategy. It is quite
understandable that the Administration should complain so bitterly about
"sabotage" on the part of the isolationists. Yet one may be sure that even
if there had not been a single isolationist in America, the situation would
have been just as it is. The isolationists perform a real service for the
Roosevelt Administration by opposing war measures that Roosevelt other-
wise would have to oppose himself. If the isolationists had not existed,
Roosevelt would have been forced to invent them, because of the fact that
the discrepancy between his imperialist ambitions and the possibility of
realizing them is still too great.
The isolationist bloc means for Roosevelt what hara-kiri means for
the Japanese: it "saves face". All possible defeats that he may suffer or
has suffered, he can put easily on the shoulders of his "opponents". This
is the secret of the persistence of American democracy even under an "Emer-
gency". Yet all "steps towards war", i. e., "short of war", "lus far taken
have shown that the isolationists in America are entirely powerless, unable
even to influence events. It is also certain that if war is finally declared,
the great bulk of the present isolationists will become ardent interventionists.
Like'the English appeasers they will accept the new situation not because

their "patriotism" is greater than their "convictions, but because their
real interests cannot be divorced from the interests of American capitalism
as a whole. A defeat of America will hit both interventionists and isolation-
ists equally hard. The only isolationist act thus far undertaken was Repres-
entative Fish's attempted gesture to introduce the issue of a war declaration
in Congress. The war mongers and the peace-mongers both recoiled in utter
terror, not because they doubted that Congress would declare war-for this
Congress declares anything that Roosevelt wants them to declare-but be-
cause of the certainty that Congress would declare war if forced to make
a stand.

German Europe
We are not so sure as Hitler claims to be that the Russian war is
practically over. We do not know enough about the actual conditions in
Germany and in the occupied countries. However, with the exception of
Norway, where large parts of th population have opposed Nazi rule, and
of Yugoslavia, where remnants of the army are still fighting, it seems that
the opposition in Nazi-occupied territories consists of no more than the
activities of professional provocateurs and isolated nationalist or bolshevist
fanatics. The masses remain apathetic. We do not know the real attitude
of the Vichy-goverment, nor the real situation in Italy. This ignorance,
however, we seem to share with Roosevelt and Churchill, as both-to judge
by their actions also do not know whether to see in Vichy-France a poten-
tial friend or a potential enemy. It seems clear, however, that France
cannot be transformed into a "real friend" without a successful invasion
and defeat of Germany.
Notwithstanding all the difficulties that will accompany the reorgan-
ization of Europe, Hitler proclaimed before the start of the great October
offensive, that if victory should be won, the basis for a durable peace will
have been laid down. For a long time the Nazis have hinted at the calling
of a European Congress for the coordination and pacification of the Con-
tinent. If Europe should indeed become an entity under Nazi dominance,
it will be difficult, if not impossible, to defeat Germany on European soil,
What, then, are the chances for a Nazi-dominated United States of Europe?
It must first be noted that the Nazi pattern of domination provides
for both employment and abolition of national issues. Useful as national
rivalries and race-issues are for the diplomatic and military conquest of a
country, as soon as the the latter is accomplished, the frictions originally fan-
ned must be dampened. This is often difficult, as may be seen from the troub-
lee that arise in the occupied nations. Political and economic positions have
to be reshuffled over and over again, until each nation has that admistra-
tion that serves the Nazis best. Of course the larger plans in this respect
do not answer the changing needs from day to day, and thus contradictory
moves are always possible. But their occurence does not eliminate the
general policy that the Germans follow in their attempt to bring Europe
under complete control.

For a Pax Germanica it would be foolish of the Nazis not to bring
to an end the various territorial claims of different national entities. Na-
tionalism is now fiction anyway. If the groups in each nation that received
their privileges from the existence of certain boundaries and particular in-
dustries are eliminated; if each nation in Europe is economically controlled;
if a political leadership is developed whose interests are thoroughly integrat-
ed into the Central German control system there is then no longer any
need to suppress ideologies and national cultures which, divorced from their
previous material base, are destined to die out by themselves in the course of
time. In brief, the Nazis will appear as "saviors" rather than as "destroyers"
of nationalism. They will shift populations until there are, in given ter-
ritories, no longer issues of race or national minorities to disturb the "peace".
There will be no French in Alsace-Lorraine, no Croats in Serbia, no Serbs
in Croatia, no Slovaks in Rumania, no Rumanians in Slovakia, and so forth.
The world will look then like a sort of zoo. People who think of them-
selves as national groups because of certain common characteristics will be
separated so as not to devour each other and to make the job of the "animal-
keeper" easier. They will be left to enjoy their particular cultures or idio-
syncrasies until they grow tired of them. They will be allowed a fictitious
self-determination until the old ideologies are worn out. The Nazis will
foster this separation in order to rule better. For only by keeping the
people ideologically apart is it possible, under present conditions to maintain
a centralized rule over them; to keep them from recognizing that their par-
ticular existence is, in reality, part and parcel of the common existence of
the world population. Nevertheless, the "renaissance" of nationalism today
does not prove that its importance based upon the destruction of world
trade is growing. It only indicates that national issues may still be used
for the re-organization of world economy through the struggles of different
imperialist power blocs. National issues in the traditional sense are every-
where on their way out. As Bruce C. Hopper remarked recently: "The
prevalence of treason in the small states since 1938 indicates the extent to
which nationalism is already broken down."
It would be foolish to assume that because Germany wins battle after
battle, the war in one way or another must soon end. It would
be just as foolish to think that Germany may win all the battles and yet
lose the war. Though the present war is in many respects a repetition of
the last one, in this particular respect it is not. Even if the imperialist
drives are essentially the same as far as direction is concerned, in this war
the Germans not only win battles that can be utilized at a coming peace
conference, but they transform at once the whole European economy with
a view of establishing a German dominated Europe that is there to stay.
The "odd thing" in this regard, writes the London Economist (6/14, 41),
"is the extend to which this prospectus of the "new order" coincides with the plans
of reformers both of the Right and of the Left in democratic communities. The union
of Europe has been under discussion for two decades.. NOW IT IS AN ACCOMPLISHED

It is true that this "accomplished fact", as the Economist further re-
marks, is "an obvious travesty of the ideas" of the social reformers of yes-
terday, for "Europe has been united by destroying all freedom personal
and national save that of a small gang in control of Germany". But
then, under conditions of capital production, the United States of Europe
will always remain a travesty no matter under whose auspices it may be
realized. Even as an unhappy substitute for an "ideal capitalistic United
States of Europe", it may still be forceful enough to endanger both Britain
and the United States. The very fact that this "travesty" is fought so
bitterly should indicate that the American and British rulers are quite
convinced of the possibility that Nazi Europe may endure, despite its mis-
erable character. The very existence of this German Europe makes it in-
creasingly more difficult to think in terms of a German defeat. All the
plans of redivision now concocted in Anglo-American headquarters may
find growing opposition even in those countries that are supposed to be
"liberated" by American arms. If Germany is not defeated soon, it is
quite conceivable that Germany's enemies of today may change into her
friends tomorrow, both ideologically and materially. This danger is well
recognized by the more realistic of the spokesmen of the Allies. The article
in the Economist already quoted points out that:
"The lesson of the New Order which most need to be absorbed is that the age of
enterprise has given place to the age of security. Every category of producers -
workers, peasants, industrial lists was weary of the struggles of Europe. It may well
be that even the control itself which the Nazis have come to exercise is not altogether
unwelcome. The desire for independence is not one that goes easily with the search for
security. The extent therefore to which the Nazis have found willing collaborators is not
altogether surprising. Industrialists have, of course, been driven into collaboration
by the need for row materials, but there is no doubt that many of them would have
been ready for it without this compulsion. It is, after all, only extending to the whole
of industrial Europe the practice of monopoly which has long been the goal of the
average businessman and his associations. The heavy industry of France, Belgium
and Holland were already inextricably bound up with German industry and one of
the reasons why there was so little resistance is that the Nazis are not altering
economic relations so much as abolishing the political frontiers which, until 1940,
hindered the unlimited cartellization and merging for which many industrialists were
perfectly prepared."
With the continuation of the war, the further interlocking of European
industries is unavoidable. The European blockade, unless it assures a quick
collapse of Germany a situation less and less to be expected will turn
finally into a blessing for the Nazis, because it forces the European nations
into continually closer collaboration with Germany. As long as the Con-
tinent is ruled by German arms, the recognition must grow in all European
nations that it will be far better for them, in order to relieve their own
miseries, to help Germany terminate the war successfully. To prevent this
situation Germany must be defeated by extra-European powers and by
military measures. "Undying love" for "real national independence", and
"undying hate" for the oppressors are, after all, only luxuries in which the

various governments-in-exile may indulge; but the puppet-regimes and their
subjects in the occupied nations face other problems. They are bound to
develop vested interests of their own and will be ready to defend them with
the same vigor with which the goverments-in-exile try to regain their lost
positions. In the course of time, those puppet-regimes will have to serve
Germany better, not only in order to defend their own newly-acquired
interests, but in order to defend their, own lives. Thus if Germany is not
defeated soon, the whole European Continent will have to be defeated.
With the defeat of Russia, or with the conclusion of a separate peace,
the power of German Europe will be greatly enhanced. Of course, a Nazi
Europe is no blessing for the workers and the other powerless groups in
society. It will not improve their lot. It will only allow the Nazis to
stay in power either by continuing the war, or by reaching a peace that
can serve only as a prelude to a new and mightier war. If the unification
of Europe by itself would mean anything, it would be difficult for a worker
and socialist not to support Hitler for, after all, if socialism presupposes
the end of national boundaries, the United States of Europe could be con-
sidered a progressive step in the direction of socialism. However, the
British Empire as well as the United States of America is proof enough
that a mere enlargement of the capitalist state from a national to a con-
tinental or imperial form implies nothing of interest to the workers. It
is a step in the development of capitalism, no doubt, and thus a step in
history vitally affecting the working class. Yet it is of interest only to a
working class still capitalistically determined, and it is thus a step against
Theoretically, and independent of the possibility of its attainment, even
a United States of the World could very well maintain its capitalistic
character and would not constitute a socialistic goal. Socialism begins not
with the state and geography, but with the worker and his relation to the
means of production and the products of his labor. Unless this fundamental
problem is solved, no problem can be solved socialistically. Thus the work-
ers, one might say, must oppose Hitler not so much for what he is doing
as for what he is not doing. Because he claims he is doing something for
the workers, it is obvious that he is acting against them. Nobody can do
anything for the workers. What the workers need they can realize by
themselves alone. Short of socialism, that is, the conscious regulation of
production according to social needs, the production for consumption and
for no other purpose, the elimination of special interests in society and
special power centers able to control the rest of society and thus to preclude
a social production-short of this goal and of all activity leading toward
it, the crisis resulting in the present war will continue to prevail in a unified
Europe. The war will go on and the great energies released in the uni-
fication process will be wasted in the more rapid destruction of the products
of labor. Capitalist society will never find peace again. The possible temporary
cecesation of warfare will only bring out into the light of the day that crisis
that was at the bottom of the war and that the war has been unable to solve.

The "new"crisis will again lead to the resumption of war in the relentless yet
futile attempt to make the capitalistic system work through organizational
changes that leave untouched the essential socio- economic relations between
capital and labor.

Hitler's "Secret" Weapon
How was it possible for Germany to accomplish what she did in so short
a time? We have already traced the event of Germany's comeback as an
imperialist power to the simple fact that after the last war the world re-
mained a capitalistic world, and thus a world divided on the question of
whether or not to destroy Germany for good. Roosevelt and Churchill
spoke of mistakes that were made in 1918, particularly of the mistake of
not disarming Germany completely. At their Atlantic meeting they vowed
not to repeat this mistake. The truth is, however, that Germany was dis-
armed in the most thorough fashion after the last war. Re-armament started
from practically nothing, and was rendered possible not by any mistakes
made at Versailles, but by rivalries among the victorious Allies. To avoid
the recurrence of such a situation it is not enough to keep Germany disarmed;
all nations except that nation or that bloc of power which gains an absolute
monopoly in arms must be kept dismarmed. And this is the goal of Roose-
velt, and Churchill.. By announcing their determination to destroy Ger-
many as a military power once and for all, they are proclaiming themselves
the dictators of the world.
This is an attempt, or rather, a hope, at out-doing the Nazis. If, for
reasons of objective limitations, Hitler does not at the moment aspire to
more than a German Europe with great:influence in all parts, of the world,
his Anglo-American opponents need not share such "humility", for they are
already in possession of most of the world. Certainly it seems easier for
those who control the world to capture Continental Europe than for one
nation controlling Europe to capture the world. Hence the confidence in
final victory on the part of the Allies ideologists. Thus also Mr. Adamic's
recent suggestion to adopt a "Two-Way-Passage" policy, that is, to have
Europe controlled by "returning" Americans, who have learned during their
stay in the U.S.A., how best to solve all social, political and human prob-
lems. America is seen here as ,a sort of Ordensburg a la Hitler, educating
a ruling class able to control Europe for, a "Thousand Years". The Nazi-
slogan Hitler ist Deutschland is transformed by Mr. Adamic for the needs
of American imperialism in the more comprehensive Dale Carnegie is the
World. This "spirit" even gripped more successful writers than Adamic.
The German ex-patriot Thomas Mann writes in the July, .1941, issue of
Decision, that today
"the term 'Europe' is already a provincialism. The concept of the world state has
been born and will not rest until it has achieved reality. The notion that. such a world
stale must be ,German is a lunatic lest."

However, this lunatic jest, Mr. Mann forgets to state, has not been
made by the Nazis but by the propaganda experts of the Allies. It is not
Hitler's goal, but it expresses the actual fears of lunatics and it is out to
create more fearful lunatics. Furthermore, it serves to justify the propa-
ganda for an "Anglo-American World State", for "Union Now", for "hemi-
spheric control", and all the other current slogans of American capitalism.
Behind the concept of the illusary capitalistic world state, which "will
never come to rest", is nothing more than the desire of the most vicious
of American imperialists to "out-nazi" the Nazis.
Thus far, however, Hitler's "provincialism" has proved more ef-
fective than the attempt of the Allies to transform the poor novels of H.
G. Wells into a rich reality. Notwithstanding the "new concepts", namely,
the recognition that it is not enough to suppress one nation in order to
maintain peace but that all nations must be suppressed by one, these great
"concepts" have utterly failed against the direct actions of the Nazis.
Hitler recognizes no problem but that of how to stay in power. His
"program" consists of the various steps necessary to secure Nazi rule. What
kind of steps these are is of little importance. All are satisfactory as long
as they answer Hitler's single-tracked need. This "narrow" point of view
provides for a consistency in action which transcends all the various con-
tradictory steps that have to be taken because of the force of changing
The principle that assures success for each capitalistic enterprise remains
successful if applied to a whole nation. Yet, as in the case of a single
enterprise, what one does, one does not know. Even what one "wants",
aside from power, one does not really know. Hitler may "want" to
prolong the war and thus bring about peace; he may "want" peace,
and thus extend the war. What he "wants" and what he does are
two different things, and thus it really, makes no difference whether he
consults the stars or the German general staff. However, he consults
both the stars, because there is no information as regards the future;
the general staff, because he wants to remain in power the next day and,
if possible, the next year. The Nazis' "direct actions" are still reactions
to forces that escape control and comprehension.
Yet there is a kind of knowledge, a degree of planning, and a limited
predictability with regard to certain phenomena. The greater the sphere
of action that falls under the control of a single-track interest, the more
forceful will that interest be. Just as a capitalist monopoly controls more
of the social life than does a small enterprise, and controls it more con-
sciously, so the centralized political and economic system in Germany con-
trols its sphere of interest better than do the less centralized "democracies".
"Better" means her only better for the Nazis. As little as the exten-
sive control of society by monopolies was profitable to society, just as little
can "social" be applied to the still greater social control exercised by the

Nazis. In both cases only the immediate needs of the controllers find
recognition. In this manner the more efficiently the controller's needs are
met the more social needs are violated. The whole of society is more and
more adapted to the specific needs of the ruling class needs which,
even from a capitalistic point of view, correspond less and less to the
needs of society as a whole. The more conscious regulation there is under
such conditions, the more chaotic society becomes. One has only to look
around today to recognize this immediately as a fact.
Although the "successes" of the Nazi regime benefit no one but its
ruling class, they remain successes nevertheless if compared with the de-
monstrated inability of the Allies to break the Nazi Rule. Because of the
fundamental weaknesses of Germany, which we have already dealt with,
the Nazi successes remained a mystery, though an explanation of them was
sought in "secret weapons". A Goebbel's joke was taken seriously. If the
reasons for the Nazi victories remained "secrets", they were at least "open
secrets" and their recognition has been delayed only because of Allied pro-
paganda devices adopted early in the game. The secret of fascistic succes-
ses is fascism itself.
To admit that much means for the "fighters of democracy" not only
to admit defeat in advance, but also to admit a share of responsibility for
the rise of fascism. The transformations taking place in particular nation-
find their reasons in the present status of world capitalism. The "German
crisis" that brought Hitler to power was part of the world crisis. Hitler
was nourished in New York, London, and Paris as well as in Munich. If
the capitalists in the "democracies" have only a pitiful smile for the Dumm-
kopf Thyssen, the latter, if he is still able to, can get a great kick out of
every defeat the Allies suffer. Did not Hjalmar Schacht warn them even
in 1931 that "large-scale alienization of German industry would produce
nationalist and social reactions which would make peaceful conduct of
foreign business impossible"? After all, even in Germany, as now in Europe
and on a world-wide scale, Hitler took, as he still takes, primarily from
"foreign capital", since the German capital was either near bankruptcy or
actually out of business.
The German capitalists lost little by Hitler's ascent to power. They
hoped that fascism would bring them gains, and thus supported Hitler for
reasons of their own. Peaceful attempts to escape the dead-end that Ger-
man capitalism had reached proved futile. The famous rationalization of
German industry, a triumph of technique, was a flop economically. Though
productivity was greatly enhanced and competitive power strengthened, the
economic and political counter-measures of the competitor nations turned
all this effort into just so much waste. So, after the rationalization of
technique, came the "rationalization of political economy". The state was
to bring back "profitability" where the capitalist automatismm" had failed.
After trying hard to erect a dictatorship without Hitler (Bruening, von
Schleicher, von Papen), they found that a dictatorship could be erected only

with Hitler, that is, as a "popular movement". Half they were drawn,
half they went themselves" into the arms of the fascist state. They had
not the slightest reason to distrust the "drummer" when, in a speech before
the industrialists of Rheinland-Westphalen, he assured them that his pro-
gram stressed particularly
"The necessity of private property and of an economic order based upon the profit
system, individual initiative, and inequality of wealth and income."
They knew then that Hitler was "their" man; internally against the work-
ers, externally against foreign competitors and monopolists.
The increase of profitability at the expense of labor, though still a
factor, is now, however, a factor of minor importance because of the small
part of the total capital that now accounts for labor. Of course high wages
can still be brought down, but then ten years in Germany had brought
them down already. To lower them still further to any great extent would
lead only to a decrease in productivity, a fact now generally acknowledged.
At any rate the little to be gained thereby would not solve the problems
that Hitler faced. The question of unemployment simply had to be solved.
In so far as Hitler's movement was a "popular movement" it was a "move-
ment of the unemployed" in the widest sense: workers, intellectuals, profes-
sionals, crisis-ridden peasants, bankrupt traders and industrialists, all were
constantly fearful of losing even that miserable hold they had on life. Hit-
ler's employment program was one of public works, made temporarily pos-
sible by a levelling process that cut down wages wherever possible and raised
the income of the unemployed to the lowest wage levels. But once this
levelling process spends itself, this type of work-creation find its end unless
the levelling process is extended beyond the proletarian layers of society.
To solve the problems of German capitalism "at the expense of labor"
can mean only to increase its productivity and decrease its actual income;
that is, it can only mean more unemployment. But Hitler came to power
precisely for the reason that this traditional capitalistic policy could no
longer be employed without endangering the whole capitalistic structure.
Capitalism can solve its problem, however, only at the expense of labor.
This dilemma may be temporarily overcome through the extension of the
levelling process over larger territories and greater masses. What works
for a while at home, works for a longer time when carried out abroad.
With limited resources, the economy that polarizes society into a small gang
of owners and broad masses of paupers will near stagnation and permanent
crisis conditions when a certain point in the process of capital concentration
is reached. To overcome this stagnation it must find new resources. But
the capitalist stagnation was world-wide, and each nation found itself in
need of new spheres of exploitation in order to realize those additional
profits that are necessary to get the home economy once more afloat. The
smaller the resources and the sooner the "blessings" of the leveling processes
of the crisis found their end, the more pressing became the need for conquests.
The lack of resources explains the aggressive character of the fascist na-

tions. The "lethargy" of the democracies is explained by their greater and
richer possessions. The levelling process, which is resorted to in lieu of
real capital accumulation, and which is in evidence also in England and
the United States (Keynesian Economy and the New Deal), exhausted
itself earlier in Germany 'than in the richer nations. Because the latter
would not freely grant what Hitler needed to stay in power, he tried to
take it by force.
If Hitler succeeds, the present German "prosperity" may well continue.
The more territory he takes in, the more raw material he can reach, the
more capital he can expropriate, the more workers he can exploit and
exploit without making the concessions he still has to give to the German
workers to make this whole process of acquisition possible at all the
longer will the "prosperity" last.
The "secret" of his success is quite simple. It consists of nothing more
than the earlier adoption of the "new" organizational principles that in-
creased Germany's military power. Just as in the beginning of capitalism,
the division of labor a mere organizational principle gave those en-
trepreneurs and nations that first employed it enormous advantages over
those still engaged in traditional handicraft, so a "new" principle, or rather
the extension of an old principle over a greater field of activities gives the
Nazis their present advantage. One must remember that the industrial
revolution that changed the world was only the result of the division of
labor already in force; organizational changes preceded technological ones.
The early adoption of "new" organizational principles by the Nazis has
in the same manner led to a new industrial revolution. Necessity being
the mother of inventions, this industrial revolution is of course closely con-
nected with the German war needs, and thereby differs from the industrial
revolution which made possible the capitalization of the world. In view
of the previous general stagnation of capitalism, it is an industrial revolu-
tion nevertheless. The very collapse of liberal capitalism is its base. Reality
itself proved that laissez faire was only an ideology that apparently fitted
the early conditions of capital expansion. What was real in liberal society
was the exploitation relations between capital and labor. The only real
organization in the economy was that which existed in each enterprise, or
monopoly. To organize a whole nation as efficiently as each enterprise
is organized, or, rather, to look upon the whole nation, or the whole Con-
tinent, as an enormous factory of bosses and workers in this consists
the "new realism" of which the Nazis are are so proud. What they had
not been able to learn from Marx, because they burned his books too early,
the capitalist reality itself made them understand with the result that they
became better capitalists than the capitalists before them.
To be a bigger capitalist is to be a better one. German capitalism,
although highly advanced, remained a "poor" capitalism in comparison to
English and American capitalism. In Germany, the concentration of cap-
ital did not proceed as rapidly as in the United States. Thus an apparently

new contradiction arises, for if fascism results from a highly concentrated
monopoly capitalism it should have reached America first, not Germany.
But many roads lead to Rome. Though there was less concentration of
capital in Germany, there was more cartellization. Though the enterprises
and trusts were not so rich as they are in America, the Germans made up
for this lack in capital strength by more thorough organization through
the cartel system. Thus the weaker monopoly capitalism in Germany lost
its "private" character earlier than the stronger one in America; thus the
*nation "economically" much better adapted to the "laissez faire system"
than the American plutocracy, lost its "democracy" first. It had to become
a bigger and thus a better capitalism by way of pooling its resources and
organizing its activity rather than by the ordinary way of general competi-
tion. Therefore politics, not market economy, began to determine the
destiny of German capital. Technological changes in Germany, and the
resulting increase of productive capacity, demanded in order to become
possible at all central control over all capital, labor, and natural re-
sources. The new industries, especially in the field of chemical production,
could no longer be built upon the basis of a private property capitalism of
the old order, for as the Deutsche Bergwerks Zeitung wrote:
"Today you have to produce where production seems the most profitable from the
viewpoint of BOTH national and private economy, that is to say, where you have
to use minimum manpower and materials to obtain maximum volume and quality
of production... Now then it is inevitable that you give one enterprise what you taker
from another, and conversely, and there is no way of adjusting a balance equitable,
for all... The idea of balancing and compensating must not be allowed to hamper
technological and economic development, even if the measures to be taken imply
a new set-up which might hurt particular interests."
All this, of course, took place by way of internal and external struggles
that involved the most contradictory and variegated interests of all layers
of capitalist society. The "end-product" of these struggles was the Nazi
state of today.
When we say that the capitalist crisis has to be solved at the expense
of the workers, we are fully aware that there is more to capitalism than
just this particular process. If the crisis cannot be solved at the expense
of the workers, it becomes a permanent condition of society, though this
permanence may be obscured by the most lively and deadly activities. The
capitalist crisis, as well as its prosperity, sees continuous changes in the
distribution of wealth. Profits are concentrated into fewer hands. The
crisis only accentuates this process. When people Fpeak of Hitler's under-
takings and Roosevelt's "New Deal" as "socialistic measures", they actually
speak of the re-distribution of wealth. This, too, is a levelling process,
because it still further weakens the weaker capitalistic elements, and thereby
still further strengthens the stronger ones. It is the enforcement by pol-
itical means of what would otherwise occur at a much slower rate in the
general development of capitalism: the polarization of society into controlled
masses and a few controllers. However, this does not solve the capitalist

crisis, but "artificially" increases the economic activity, until the leveling
process has spent itself. In short, what exists and what is produced are still
sufficient to finance in the interest of social stability some non-profit-
able enterprises. But it is not enough to overcome the crisis capitalistically,
that is, through the stepped-up accumulation of capital.
Unfortunately for all concerned, if a nation engages in this type of
economy on a large scale, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to reverse
the trend. For new power centers are developed and new vested interests
created, all bent on the continuation of the levelling process. Those forces
have a large "clientell", a "mass following" among those who have to be
"appeased" in order to maintain social peace. What has been thought of
os only an "emergency" to be abolished by the new prosperity "just around
the corner" becomes the "new prosperity", and by itself precludes the ar-
rival of a "true" capitalist expansion. Yet to continue to think and act
in terms of the "emergency" means to come nearer and nearer the point
where the "economy of re-distribution" will cease to support the capitalistic
structure. To escape that point an "emergency" within the "emergency"
must be created. At that point a nation goes to war.
With their creation of German Europe the Nazis merely demand the
right to participate on more equal terms in modern "welfare economics".
Unable to equal Roosevelt's WPA on German soil, they asked for more
Lebensraum. It is their serious attempt to safeguard the capitalistic struc-
ture, not to abolish it, that causes them to speak in "socialistic" terms.

The Atlantic Brenner
What happens in America today is what happened in Germany only
yesterday. What happens in Europe today is the attempt of German cap-
italism to hold the initiative which it won by being the first highly developed
country to go fascist. And as the principle of an organized capitalism
yielded immediate results in Germany, so it may bring corresponding results
on the Continent, if the battlefields of the war can be kept outside Europe.
In fact, from a purely technical-economic point of view it might yield even
better results since the additional agricultural territory, the new raw
materials, and the additional cheap labor lend themselves more effectively
to an economic integration of the total economy than does an extension
of the previous emphasis upon an industry lacking raw materials and unable
to feed its working population. However, for political-economic reasons
it may yield fewer results since the bureaucratization necessary to "harmon-
ize" the thousandfold needs and interests of Europe with the specific war
needs of Germany may be costly enough to offset gains in other fields. The
relationship between Germany and the extra-German nations of Europe
may deteriorate, or develop, into one similar to that between North
America and South America at the present stage of development the
controller nations having to feed the controlled nations instead of being fed
by them. The war itself is responsible for this situation; its continuation

makes the whole prospect of continental economy increasingly more prob-
lematic. At the present time and despite all successes "Europe", as Mary
MacCollum has said, "is absorbing the Germans, the Germans are not ab-
sorbing Europe". Thus, as in the last war, the Germans are the ones to
clamor for peace, not because it is characteristic of beer- drinkers to be friend-
ly, but because the Germans get the jitters when they realize their real
position in the world.
Though Germany never followed a policy of autarchy, German Europe
is an autarchy because of the blockade. To enter world trade means to
send additional armies into extra-European territories. But for a long time
to come, German arms will be unable to carry on business in the Western
hemisphere and in Asia. To make Europe self-sufficient in regard to food-
stuffs is not altogether impossible, but it will take so much time that, even
if undertaken with success, it well might "benefit" only a dying population.
It means the re-allocation of economic activities on the largest scale, the
industralization and intensification of agriculture, the education of millions
of peasant masses. It means work, work, and more work. Work that is
rendered largely senseless by the fact that at the same time these efforts
are made, foodstuffs rot away in other parts of the world and agri-
cultural production is reduced in favor of armaments. If the war should
end with capitalism still intact, the dislocations and disproportionalities of
profit production will be even greater than they were before the onset of
the war. To utilize the economic possibilities inherent in the unification
of the Continent would mean to organize the Continent as an integrated
part of world economy.
The control of the Allies over the foodstuffs and raw materials of
the world, although a forceful weapon, is not powerful enough to bring
Hitler down. Their control over South America and Asia promises neither
permanence nor profits unless Hitler's plans for a German Europe are shat-
tered. To stop the exchange of goods between South America and Europe,
for instance, means for the United States that she must compensate her
"friendly neighbors' for their losses. In this way Hitler hurts America
either way; by extending his barter system to South America and by not
doing so. To make the coordination of the economies of South America and
North America a profitable business is just as difficult, if not more so,
as to make Europe a source of profit for Germany. Both processes tend
to pauperize both the controlled and the controlled nations.
To make South America profitable to the United States means to
change much of her agricultural into industrial production. This is still
in line with the general trend of capitalist development. The transformation
of agriculture into industry is another expression for the concentration of
capital. Within a given territory a certain stage of capital concentration
prevents further capital expansion. Just as in the case of labor, so in the
case of agriculture the appropriation of profits from the land diminishes
with the diminishing importance of agriculture within the whole capitalist

setting. Just as in the case of the labor of other nations, so must other
agricultural territories be absorbed by the more powerful capitalistic na-
tions. Thus, even without the war, a "hemispheric policy" would have
been adopted by the United States.
The European nations are dependent upon the foodstuffs and raw
materials from overseas. Their "independence" is not real. A successful
transformation of the still backward agricultural nations of South America
into industrial states would make necessary the transformation of the in-
dustrial European nations into agricultural states. It would necessitate
a general European exodus to the Western hemisphere. Marx who once
said that because "money is the god of the Jews, all Christians have turned
into Jews" could now say that "because Europe is emptied of the Jews, it soon
will be emptied of the Europeans". Stating the problem, however, means
to realize its insolubility. In reality, South America will remain an agri-
cultural territory because of American control. If America wins the war,
South America will become even more "backward", that is, impoverished.
A nation that has not been able to solve the problems of her own Southern
States, or rather, that solved them capitalistically by impoverishing the poor-
er sections still further, has nothing to offer in the way of hemispheric con-
trol except a large-scale repetition of this process.
German Europe, too, is not organized in order to benefit the world,
but as -a means to win the war. And here it is quite possible that it will
help the Germans, albeit at frightful expense, to "carry on". For this
reason the blockade will never be relaxed until America is ready to share
the world with Hitler or until Hitler is defeated. It is not so much the
idea that the hungry people of Europe will rebel that makes the democratic
humanitarians so human that they will not relax the blockade. Even the
dullest of them must know by now that unarmed people, however hungry,
cannot arise against a war machine such as the Nazis possess. It is rather
the hope that they will starve and die, so that Hitler cannot utilize their
labor in his reconstruction schemes that may enable him to wage war
German Europe, even at its "best", will be a sickening substitute for
a needed continental world-integrated economy. It will be a wasted effort,
just as the industrial revolution in Germany turns out to be a wasted effort.
To be sure, the changes in Germany have made her largely independent in
regard to certain essential raw materials. She could thus enter the war
with greater confidence than in 1914. This industrial revolution, laughed
at as the German Ersatz industry, will prevent an early collapse of the
German war machine. Attempts to extend this revolution over the whole
of Europe may also serve to prolong the fighting ability of Germany. Yet,
the greater productive capacity is nullified through the increasing destruc-
tive needs of capitalist society. The energies needed in the reconstruction
of German Europe may exhaust Germany sufficiently to make her vulnerable
in the highest degree on the very day of. her greatest triumph.

Roosevelt's and Churchill's entire strategy, if one can use this term
here at all, consists then of the simple attempt to prevent peace. Foremost
in their minds is the thought that the war must continue no matter what
happens, and no matter how long. Hitler must not be given the opportunity
to utilize his conquest. Even if he wins continuously, his enemies are so num-
erous that the victor over nine might well be sufficiently exhausted to be
brought down easily by his tenth opponent; This last opponent is, of course,
America. What does it matter if France went down? A weaker France
may arise again. If Russia and the Balkans lost out? They will only be
more dependent upon America later on. What does it matter even if
England is invaded? It will show her who is master of the world. Am-
erica Hitler will never be able to subdue. Roosevelt's war spirit is not
determined by the fear that Hitler may invade the United States, but by
the certainty that he will not. All the battles in Europe lost by the Allies
will in the end also be lost by Germany. Once more America will be the
sole winner. A defeat of Russia will no more alter Roosevelt's determin-
otion to bring down German fascism than have previous defeats. New
theatres of war will be opened, more lend-lease aid extended, and, in Mus-
solini fashion, America will only more speadily prepare herself for that
final thrust when the time is ripe.
However, this "clever strategy", dictated as it is by necessity, has its
Achilles heel in Britain. The English politicians cannot be too enthusiastic
about this long range point of view. When will the time be ripe, if ever?
Though delayed action may suit the United States, and, for a time, Eng-
land too, in the end it may be deadly for the latter. Thus England's needs
may force the United States into active engagements before she is really
ready and able to administer that final blow to Hitler.
After the Balkan debacle it was said that the outcome of the war de-
pended on the "Battle of the Atlantic". However, the war is a world war
and its outcome does not depend upon a particular scene of battle, but is
determined by a great complex of economic, political, and military factors.
The Russian defeat may put Britain in about the same position that Greece
occupied before the swastika was raised over the Acropolis. The British
had to sacrifice Greece, and they are fearful that England too may be sac-
rificed in order to prolong the war. Will America really be able to save Eng-
land? Only recently Prime Minister Mackenzie found himself obliged
to remind his American friends that they must be serious not only in their
guarantee of Canada, but also in regard to England proper. He can rest
assured; America will do her utmost to defend Britain. The question is
only, will the utmost be enough? Even if Churchill is convinced that it
will be, not everyone is.
Things have changed in England. Not that socialism is sprouting
there, but the rapid disappearance of the Chamberlain-men indicates the ex-
istence of a "popular movement" capable of influencing events. The Labor
Party has always closely guarded the interests of British imperialism. It,

too, fears a unified Continent, because it fears that the increased competitive
power of a united Europe will destroy the better living standard of the
English labor aristocracy. Their opposition to "appeasement" indicated only
that they were even better imperialists than their masters. However, their
imperialism is determined by a stricter nationalism, and for very good
reasons. They think not so much in terms of British world capitalism as
in terms of the British Isles. The ideologists of the English labor move-
ment have not forgotten what happened to the German labor bureaucracy
and to those workers who insisted upon an independent labor movement
when Hitler came to power. Out of sheer physical fear that all this will
be repeated in England, they are quite willing to accept Churchill as the
true symbol of English unity, and to look upon this ordinary imperialist
war as a genuine anti-fascist struggle. Still, they are beginning to view
with great suspicion the trend of the war that now turns more and more
into a mere defense of American imperialism. They may put pressure on
the Churchill cabinet to safeguard British interests more consistently, and
may force Churchill, in turn, to put pressure on Roosevelt, who seems in-
clined to gamble away the whole British Empire just to insure final victory.
In the interest of Anglo-American unity, America may therefore strike
"before her hour has arrived". And yet, in doing so, she may once more
play into Hitler's hands: first by not acting early enough, that is, during
the German-Russian war; and second, by acting too soon, that is, before
Hitler is sufficiently weakened and before America is sufficiently armed.
The "correctness" or "incorrectness" of America's policy will be judged
in the battles still to come. Until then the inconsistencies displayed in
American politics may well continue.
The "battle of production" in America will not determine events.
Even if brought to a climax in a reasonably short time it may well have
been in vain, for though it is true that battles are won by the possessor of
the superior war machine, it is too simple a conclusion to foresee an Am-
erican victory merely because of her greater productive capacity. Those
political accountants who measure production against production and then
predict defeat or victory forget that, aside from the element of accident
and the problem of transportation, there must still be considered the more
important fact that in capitalist society class and group interests, not tech-
nical abilities, are of foremost importance. These interests may foster of
hinder the war effort.
However necessary, it is impossible to include the class element in the
calculation of warfare. The only way to deal with the matter to some
degree is to suppress class frictions and to subordinate the diverse in-
terests to the will of the war leaders. Under certain conditions, though
not always, dictatorship guarantees "unity" and concerted action. The
strength of private property in England and America, though waning, is
still effective enough to interfere with the "proper" execution of the war.
How long will it take to merge capital and state completely? That the

war has gone the way it has shows clearly that the foreign policy of a
nation is not a thing apart, but is closely related to existing class relations.
As the war progresses and brings about shifts in class relations and re-
arrangenments in the relationships of all existing interests, the objectives for
which this war is fought are also bound to change. Thus the further
trend of the war will be determined by what happens on both fronts, the
one at home and the one abroad. Predictions as to the future become less
than probabilities. There might be many changes and there might be none.
The only thing that seems to be a certainty is that the war is going on.
The present goal of Churchill and Roosevelt, however, is as clear as
Hitler's. Though England's world domination was assured under less
developed conditions because she ruled the waves, this is no longer suf-
ficient because of the capitalization of the world accomplished in the mean-
time. The nation that is to rule the world must rule it, and not just the
seven seas. The difficulties here involved suggest a sort of "automatic"
police system which necessitates the continuation of numerous quasi-inde-
pendent states, the control of raw materials, foodstuffs and trade. Already
the numerous nations of Europe are assured of their continued national
existence. Already the framework is laid for the control of the world's
resources. The control of trade will be assured by the destruction of all
save the Anglo-America navies. The "freedom of the seas" upon which Roo-
sevelt so firmly insists means to free the seas still more completely of all
vessels that do not fly the flags of Britain, America and, of course,
"Panama". At the end of September, 1941, an Allied Committee sat in
London whose job it was to construct in advance the framework for the
great humanitarian effort of feeding the dead when the war is over. A
big reservoir of foodstuffs and other supplies is to be created to be poured
into Europe as soon as the Nazis are done for. Yet even the European
allies of the Anglo-American bloc, not to speak of Hitler's continental
allies, were beset with great suspicions. Ivan Maisky, the Russian repres-
entative at the conference, protested the "all-British character of the pro-
posed central coordinating bureau and reserved for himself the right to make
proposals that would give it an inter-allied character." The representative
of the Netherlands
"warned against exceptions to plans for access of all nations to world trade and
raw materials after the war, and declared that everyone will have to make sacrifices.
He referred specifically to point IV of the Atlantic declaration in which Britain and
the United States promised to provide such access to all nations, but, with due res-
pect for their existing obligations."
"With due respect for their existing obligations" can mean only
their "obligations" to America that usurped world "leadership" in the very
effort of defending "the smaller nations against aggression." Under such
conditions, the various nations and their governments will be just so many
puppet regimes of the Anglo-American power bloc. They will have es-
caped Hitler only to be caught by his enemies.

If all the other issues of this war are still clouded, it is perfectly
clear that this war is a struggle between the great imperialist contestants
for the biggest share of the yields of world production, and thus for the
control over the greatest number of workers, the richest resources of raw
material and the most important industries. Because so much of the world
is already controlled by the small, competitive power groups lighting for
supreme rule, all controlled groups in all nations are drawn into the strug-
gle. Since nobody dares to state the issues at stake, false arguments are
invented to excite the population to murder. The powerlessness of the
masses explains the power of the, current ideologies. Yet these ideologies
are not invulnerable.
The ranks of the powerless, armed with deadly weapons, exercise the
greatest power there is the power to kill. The final meaning of the
existing social relations will enter the consciousness of men.. There will
be for once a perfect harmony between the material and the mental side
of capitalist society. This might be more important than all the empty
phrases that have issued from the Brenner Pass and the Atlantic Brenner.
Men may then see clearly that capitalism means death and life something
Paul Mattick



Labor. By Manya Gordon. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1941. (524
pp.; $4.00).

Similar to Yvon's book of some
years ago, but more comprehensive
and in part with superior material,
Miss Gordon's book deals with most
of the important changes in Russian
labor policy and labor legislation
from the beginning of the bolshevik
regime to the present. Interesting as
are her descriptions of the attitudes
toward labor problems in pre-war
Russia, they serve rather as an in-
troduction since the book as a whole
is designed as a critique of bolshe-
vism. Nevertheless, such things as
the story of Count Witte's intelligent
suggestions for solving the labor
problem in Czarist Russia, the story
of the Zubatov-movement, the char-
acterization of the early labor move-
ment and the first Duma help one to
understand the Russian develop-
ment better.

There is little in the book, how-
ever, that will surprise our readers.
The author produces the data which
simply show that the working and
living conditions of the Russian pop-
ulation apart from the ruling
bureaucracy have not been im-
proved but have deteriorated. For
example: "Between 1929 and 1937
a working family's food expendi-
ture increased 5.4 times, while the
head of the family's income in rubles
increased 3.3 times, from 75 rubles
to 250 rubles. Instead of the much
publicized increase in wages during
the Five Year Plans, 1928-37, there
was an actual decrease in real wages
of something like 40 per cent...
...Whereas in 1937 the production of
machines was twenty-eigth times as
much as in 1913, wages were lower
than in pre-war Russia".

In the attempt to prove that the
bolshevik regime is rather worse
than that of the Czar, Miss Gordon
corrects a number of misunderstan-
dings as to the character of pre-war
Russia. She brings to light facts
such as this: "despite being rigidly
anti labor and hostile to trade un-
ion activities, Russia was in advance
of the Western nations in a number
of labor laws". However, Miss Gor-
don does not recognize that here she
has her fingers on an important item
that helps to explain the totalitarian
tendencies closely associated with
capitalist development in Russia.
Rather, she is inclined to accept
those facts as signs of a possible
liberal development that has been
unnecessarily interrupted by the
wrong policies of bolshevism. How-
ever, it has been revealed through-
out the world that forced capitaliza-
tion in relatively backward nations
is accompanied by advanced labor
laws despite all anti-labor policy. In
Germany, for instance, state foster-
ed industries coincided with the "An-
ti-Socialist Laws" as well as with the
most advanced social legislation.
Miss Gordon, although very able
in selecting and assembling relevant
data is, unfortunately, also possessed
of what is usually called a "hum-
anitarian". and "noble-minded" at-
titude a quality that is now iden-
tified with "democracy", "liberal-
ism", and "progress". The facts she
produces and the philosophy she ad-
heres to do not fit well together. For
instance, though Miss Gordon points
out that the promises made to the
workers by Lenin and Trotsky could
not have been kept because of the
economic backwardness of the na-
tion, she herself nevertheless believes
that a "democratic regime", a re-

gime more to her own liking, would
have been able to improve the con-
ditions of the population. She points
out that "communist concentration
on machinery instead of on the essen-
tial needs of the people made a
mockery of all the propaganda about
a victorious Socialism". It does not
occur to her that this "communist
concentration" was nothing else than
the "production for the sake of pro-
duction" that characterizes all cap-
italist nations. The form of gov-
ernment democratic or dictator-
ial does not effect the main feat-
ure of capital production, which is
accumulation for the sake of ac-
cumulation. Even in a "socialism"
more to her liking, this process
would be valid and would finally
lead to a fascist dictatorship. The
bolsheviks merely did in advance
what in Miss Gordon's "socialism"
would have appeared at a later date.
For though the bolsheviks changed
the government and abolished priv-
ate property in the traditional sense,
they did not end the capitalist mode
of production. This latter essential
item however, does not bother Miss
Gordon in the least. Her concept
of "socialism" differs not at all from
that of the bolsheviks. The differ-
ence lies in her "noble-mindedness"
that lives and lets live but does not
question how. Besides, the problem
of the Russian dictatorship cannot
be understood solely from the point
of view of the internal struggles be-
tween bolshevism and the democrat-
ic forces in society; they are just as
much determined by external occur-
rences within the setting of world
competition. But being a champion
for democracy, it is only natural
that Miss Gordon does not look for
the reason for dictatorship in the
capitalist democracies.

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