Food production and equity in agricultural producer strategies

Material Information

Food production and equity in agricultural producer strategies
United States. Agency for International Development. Office of Policy Development and Analysis.
Place of Publication:
Washington, D. C.
United States. Agency for International Development. Office of Policy Development and Analysis.
Publication Date:


Subjects / Keywords:
Farms ( jstor )
Food production ( jstor )
Agriculture ( jstor )

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
The University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not claim any copyright interest in this item. This item may be protected by copyright but is made available here under a claim of fair use (17 U.S.C. §107) for non-profit research and educational purposes. Users of this work have responsibility for determining copyright status prior to reusing, publishing or reproducing this item for purposes other than what is allowed by fair use or other copyright exemptions. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder. The Smathers Libraries would like to learn more about this item and invite individuals or organizations to contact Digital Services ( with any additional information they can provide.
Resource Identifier:
191867696 ( OCLC )


This item has the following downloads:

Full Text





This is a preliminary paper drafted by A.I.D. staff and does not represent official Agency policy. It was prepared principally by Martha Horsley and has benefited from comments by Regional Bureau, TAB, and PPC staff. The paper is intended to lead to a better understanding of the many factors and complex relationships involved in the analysis of production and equity effects in agriculture 'and to serve as a point of departure for discussion leading to better articulated AID policy.

U.S. Agency for Ihternational Development bureau for Program and Policy Coordination Office of Policy Development and Anayxie September 1975


The purpose of this paper is to investigate, at a very general level, the compatibility of two agricultural sector objectives, food production and equity (i.e. increasing the real incomes of the poor), under existing less developed country (LDC) conditions. Both of these objectives should be viewed as subordinate to the ultimate goal of establishing a minimum standard of living for the bulk of the LDC population. The purpose of the restriction "under existing LDC conditions," is to define the strategy choice in terms of options which are obvious and may be feasible in most LDCs. In crude terms, the two options considered are "small farmer development" and generally-unfocused agricultural development, which in fact turns out to be large farmer biaFed. The latter is therefore referred to as "large farmer development".

An optimum strategy in most LDCs would include major changes in the

distribution of productive resources, in pricing policies, and in organizational forms; these are discussed briefly at the outset. The paper does not focus on such changes in detail, however. Rather, it concentrates on the effects of the two producer strategies under given organizational structures, forms of land and other asset ownership, and overall pricing policies.

Alternative means of achieving production increases -- investment in education, health, extension, credit or group-oriented institutions -- are discussed, implicitly, on an ad hoc basis only. Any assessment of their relative merits would require a more specific context.

1. The Two Ubjectives: Food Production and Equity

AID has two major objectives in its program of assistance for agricultural development. One is a "production" objective to help the less developed countries (LDCs) increase their domestic food production in order to alleviate hunger and malnutrition. The other is an "equity" objective to help increase the real incomes of the lower income groups, c-ranonly referred to as the of poor majority".

The objectives of food production and equity stem directly from the Agency's Congressional Mandate as described in the Foreign Assistance Acts of 1973, 74, and 75 plur relevant Committee reports, as well as U.S. commitments stated in the World Food Conference.* Regarding the equity objective, the 1975 House of Representatives bill states that assistance to the food and nutrition sector -which claims the majority of AID's development assistance -- "shall be used primarily for activities which are specifically designed to increase the productivity and income of the rural poor." Regarding the production objective, Resolution I of the Food Conference highlighted the seriousness of the world food problem in the following terms:

An increase in agricultural productivity and sustained expansion of food production in (LDCs) at a rate much faster than in the past is essential in order to meet
the rapidly growing demand for food, due to rising population and incomes (plus) the requirements for
security stocks,,and to raise the consumption of undernourished people to universally accepted standards .

The 1975 House Report of the Committee on International Relations states its belief that concentrating development assistance on the smaller, and hence poorer, farmers (which would have an equity impact in the sense that

*See refs 1, 19, 20, and 37.

rheir real incomes would be increased) and increasing food production are complementary activities .

the ( committee reiterates its belief that small-farm, labor-intensive
agriculture is the key to greater food production, as well
as to more equitable distribution of income in the rural areas
of the developing countries, where most of the world's poor live. (p.46) The 1974 House Report, however, clearly recognizes the possibility that there may be a conflict in attempting to satisfy both objectives simultaneously.

Thus the Report states, while a small farmer strategy is more consistent with the Congressional injunction to-support activities which "directly improve the lives of the poorest . . . people and their capacity to participate in the development of their countries", there may be circumstances imposed by the world food crisis which justify temporarily relinquishing a small farmer focus. The Report goes on to say:

AID should, however, take care that its programs in support of short-term production increases in certain countries, as opposed to those in direct support of longer term structural
changes needed to increase the productivity of the small farmer,
are kept to the minimum required to deal with the current emergency
situation and are not used to the detriment of the small fazvor-,M
the rural poor.

Perhaps the best way of looking at the issue is to say that the production and equity obJectives are both intermediary to the ultimate goal of achieving a minimum standard of living for the bulk of the LDC population. Conceptually, the food production objective can be interpreted as concern with the supply side of the minimum standard of living objective, since food may account for halfor more of consumption requirements among lower income groups. The equity objective can be interpreted as concern with the demand side. Unless the real incomes of the poor are increased, they will not be able to purchase the increased food supplies, or other goods necessary for a decent living standard, in the market place. The question to be addressed here is: Given the possibility of conflict, or trade-off, between the production and equity objectives, what is the best means of achieving the combined minimum standard of living objective? The balance of this first section of

will. seek to clarify Lhe meanings given to the objectives of food production and equity before turning to this basic-question.

Improved equity is defined here as improved ability on the part of those who need it, the poor, to obtain a higher standard of living. It would thus entail, at a minimum, an absolute increase in the real income of the poor, and, ideally, a concomitant improvement in their real income relative to that of higher income groups. The poor, or the "poor majority" in the terms of the Congressional Mandate, have been defined in income, nutrition and health status terms and probably include most LDC small farmers as defined below in Section III A. An increase in real income could of course result from a fall in food (or other basic consumer-good) prices or increased production and consumption of home-grown food as well as an increase in cash income (not offset by a rise in the general price level). A refinement of the equity concept can be made by distinguishing between a "direct I' equity impact, where resources or benefits are channeled directly to the "poor ma ority" target group, ard an "indirect" equity impact, where real incomes of the target group are raised through secondary effects, say, lowering relative food prices or increasing demand for landless labor. This distinction will be useful in subsequent sections which attempt to compare the equity effects of two producer strategies.

Regarding the food production objective, it might be argued that

increasing aggregate supply rather than domestic food production the appropriate objective since imports from food surplus countries could provide an alternative means of increasing food supply. Vhile not excluding the possibility of trading non-food exports for food, this paper will focus

on increased domestic production as having the major potential for

increased LDC food supply. For some LDCs, such circumstances as relatively small size, unfavorable physical environment for food crops, and favorable foreign exchange position and prospects could justify significant reliance on imports to meet food deficits. But reliance on imports to meet the bulk most LDCs.
of LDC food needs does not appear feasible for/ Projections to 1985 based on current trends of income, population and agricultural production yield up to a five-fold increase (from 16 to 85 million tons) from 1970 to 1985 in the cereal deficit alone for LDCs.* Developed countries could conceivatLy provide the imports required to meet such a massive deficit but this assumes that the balance between demand and supply growth in these countries will yield the requisite surplus and that developed courftries will be willing to provide confessional financing on a much larger scale than heretofore (see USDA source cited in footnote for further discussion).

There are, on the other hand, several real political and economic reasons why many LDCs desire self-sufficiency in food production. These include continuing restrictions on world trade in agricultural co cities, and the role of political considerations in influencing allocation of food aid. Finally, the fact that agricultural yields are quite low in most LDCs (including many with favorable natural endowments) relative to those prevailing

*This is an FAO estimate used by the World Food Conference (the base period is an annual average for 1969-71). The figures exclude Asian centrally planned economics. While alternative projections, based on different definitions and assumptions, prepared by USDA result in somewhat lower deficit the relative increase is still massive (from 20 million tons in 1970 to 50 to 70 million tons in 1985, depending on assumptions). For a comparison and discussion of various projections, see USDA, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 98, The World food Situation and Prospects to 1985, pV. 32-39. (ref.36 .)


in develInped i'nuritr1i.s, suggests buth to LDCft and donor agencies the potential for meeting the bulk of food needs within LDCs themselves through improved mobilization and. allocation of local resources -- supplemented with aid from developed countries in the form of agricultural inputs, research and technical assistance. *

Section II identifies some of the major reforms required in many LDCa to create an environment conducive to achieving the minimum living standard goal. Although the discussion is brief, the policy implications for AID are clear. Section III, which constitutes the bulk of the paper, attempts to analyze the food production and equity effects of alternative producer strategies (small farmer and large farmer) under existing conditions, i.e. assuming no major reforms take place. Section IV summarizes the conclusions of the previous section and discusses briefly the program/policy implications for AID.

II. Major Reforms

There is considerable agreement among development experts that major reforms are required in most LDCs to create an environment conducive to achieving the minimum standard of living objective for the rural areas. There is less agreement, of course, on the particular form and extent of the reforms required although they can be generally characterized as falling into one of three categories:

i. reforms affecting the distribution of productive resources#

ii. reforms related to pricing policies, and

iii. reforms related to organizational forms and development approaches.

Certainly one of the factors inhibiting greater participation of the

poor in the development process is their limited ownership of (or access to)

*This is not to argue that food aid cannot play a complementary role beyond
meeting emergency situations. It will be suggested later in the paper that food aid can help meet short run food deficits in LDCs where broadly-based
food production efforts have longer gestation periods.

aproducti/I' rehource~ti ,,, phyfiicad capital, and "human capitall. Lan redistributionl, land-to-the- tiller prograrni, and resettlement an Inew land are alternative means of providing lower income farmers or landless agricultural laborers with their complementary primary resource.* This is perhaps the most powerful redistribution mechanism in the rural areas since it has broad implications for political power and the distribution of government services. The wide-spread availability of agricultural inputs, and financial capital needed to acquire these inputs, can facilitate the accumulation of physical capital; and improving the quality and quantity of rural education can help upgrade the human capital factor by giving the individual the means of acquiring additional knowledge and skills. Similarly, improved health and nutrition will help him attain his potential. Finally, success in population control will increase the per capita level of all these resources and hence the

likelihood that the minimum living standard objective will be achieved. The

problem is, of course, that all these reforms, with the possible exception of the land redistribution and land-to-the-tiller program (and even these

require substantial resource inputs if production levels are to be sustained

require massive human and financial resource inputs.

The second category of reforms, i.e. those relating to Pricing Policies,

involve agricultural terms of trade with other sectors, the pricing-.of inputs and outputs so that proper and adequate production incentives are transmitted, and monetary and fiscal Dricing policies which encourage saving, investment, adoption of appropriate technologies, and desired income redistribution. An agricultural land tax, based on potential rather than actual productivity, is a frequently recommended example of fiscal reform. Pricing policies are also difficult to change, however. Poor input and product prices are often due to

*See ref. 13 for a recent summary of the relationship between land reform and
economic development.

'm iscrmnception and/or political design. Cheap credit for small farmers, for example, sorunds good but results in extremely limited total credit availability, partly because of decapitalization. Political constraints on other policies, e.g. the agricultural land tax, arise from the fact that political and economic power coincide.*

The third category of major reform, organizational forms and development

approaches, would entail increased attention to spatial organization, regional planning, and integrated rural development. Depending on existing constraints,

reaching the poor might involve rural infrastructure development, promotion

of market towns and rural industrial development, and/or agricultural reorganization, including land consolidation, collectivization, or decommunalizatiol

Proponents of more effective regional and rural development** argue that

significant long-run benefits are associated with establishing rural growth

poles even if there are short-run losses in efficiency. Rural industry tends

to be more labor-intensive, for example, thus providing income-generating activities for a larger segment of the population. In addition, improved

rural economic organization tends to stimulate increased investment in agricultur

improved input and product markets and more widespread and rapid adoption of

innovations. There are problems, however. Although it has been shown in China

that comprehensive regional or rural development can be largely self-financed,

the typical LDC central government approach requires substantial resource allocation (or reallocation). In order to conserve scarce resources, the

programs must be carefully integrated with pricing policies. In addition, it

may not be clear what specific strategy is optimum in a given situation.

As a result, few LDCs have made the necessary financial and manpower commitments.

*See ref 25 for general discussion of agricultural pricing policies
**See refs. 28, 29, and 30.

The reforms mentioned here, of course, have their less radical countetparta: land tenure reform rather than land redistribution, agricultural subsidies rather than basic pricing policy reform, and selected rural development project support rather than comprehensive regional planning efforts. Government action often takes these less radical forms, for both economic and political reasons. And therefore the following discussions of the effects of alternative producer strategies generally assumes existing patterns of resource holdings, market imperfections, and organizational forms. This is not to imply that change is impossible, only that it is slow in coming and, when it comes, it is partial. *

To clarify somewhat further,it will be important to keep two points in mind throughout the following discussion. One is that the assumption of no major reforms lends a conservative bias to the discussion of small versus large producer potential, i.e. more scepticism must be introduced about the ability of the small farmer to contribute to production goals than if major reform is assumed. In fact, in the terms of the following discussion,

if all three types of major reforms were instituted, there would be less reason to specify a target group approach. The development process might well exhibit major complementarities, rather than conflicts, between the production and equity goals. The other point is that, despite the difficulty of reforms, those mentioned probably constitute the most effective means of achieving the minimum standard of living objective. Many development experts have come to t ;he conclusion that the forces of inequality are so strong that "pro-poor" programs without the above reforms often end up primarily benefiting the nonpoor. Nothing short of major equity-oriented programs, undertaken on several fronts simultaneously, will succeed in income redistribution.**

*Ref 31 provides an example of the economist's increasing interest in taking into explicit account the institutional setting of development. qiy1
**See ref s 9 and 16 for additional observations on the "elusiveness of eut.

Thui, where LDC governments are Interested and willing to undertake reform, AID might wisely adjust its funding priorities in favor of support efforts, involving, for example, multiple goal sector analysis, regional playing, land reform and revision of agricultural policies. III. Alternative Producer Strategies

The discussion in this section is confined to alternative producer strategies. Producer strategies are considered important because they can affect both the supply and the demand side of the minimum living standard objective and because they directly involve the majority of the active agricultural population. No further value judgment regarding their superiority over other possible strategies

-- focusing on say landless agricultural laborers or on increasing food availabilities to the consumer by reducing losses from off-farm handling and storage -- is intended. In particular, this section will analyze the food production and equity implications of a small farmer strategy versus a strategy which is neutral in intent with reaArd to ItA beneficiaries. The latter. in the absence of malor reforms, turns out in practice to be a large farmer strategy and will be referred to as such below.

The selection of a small farmer target group as one strategy option is an explicit attempt to introduce an equity bias into a production-oriented program. The.pros and cons of such a bias have been hotly debated among aid donors and within LDCs for the last few years, although not necessarily in the present context. It is sufficient to note here that although a small farmer strategy by definition entails greater direct equity effects than a large farmer strategy, the ultimate impact on a combined goal of food production and equity (including indirect equity effects) is not obvious.

Section A below discusses alternative criteria for defining a =all

farmer target group and proposes farm size as perhaps the best available proxy for income and wealth. Some rough target group definition is a prerequisite to any further analysis, even at the general level. Section B Dramonte aw4A


on relative productivitleR, by farm rilze, anid Section* investigates the total equity effects of small versus large farmer strategies. Section D attempts to draw the major implications of alternative stratneef oralrural and national development.

A. Target Group Definitions

As noted earlier AID's Congressional Mandate reiii1rpq_.,yjority

attention to assisting the "poor majority", in LDCs. It is not entirely clear, however, what constitutes a "small farmer" by reference to the poor majority. The working definition of the poor majority elaborated by the Congressional Mandate Implementation Task Force includes all individuals with a per capita income less than $150 (alternative definitions pertaining to nutrition and health status have also been offered -- see ref.l), however

income data are difficult to acquire in the rural areas. Moreover, the

ideal equity index in the agricultural sector would include a measure of

assets, which is even more difficult to acquire.

Farm size is a poor proxy for rural poverty for a variety of reasons:

(a) It does not reflect non-agricultural income obtained
by rural households;

(b) It may not reflect differences in yields resulting from
differences (1) in land quality (2) degrees of irrigation
and (3) cropping patterns;

(c) It may not reflect differences in price of given yields
resulting from market imperfections -- monopoly - monopsony
problems in agricultural markets.

Nevertheless, it is probably the best income/assets proxy for which data

are available across countries, and it has the advantage of being a convenient

definiton for measuring the evidence on productivity effects of alternative

producer strategies.



Target Groups Relative Area Limits Proportion of Agricul- Proportion of Land
(hectares per holding) tuyelpopulation

Latin America

SuL rar4 inals* ;.11ll Farmers
-'ed ium/large farmers

-- 2.49
2.5 to 14.9
-- 15

South Asia

Subr-argi nals * Small Farmers
Med i',L., large farmers

Tropical Africa

Subma rginals* Small Farmers
Mt' . large farmers

- 2.49
2.5 to 7.49
-> 7.5

1 to 4.9 > 5

0.50 0.29 0.21

0.07 0.24 o.69

0.30 0.10

not available

- "n*-lude landless agricultural workers, which ngX'.:.1:ral population in some countries.

constitute 30 per cent or more of the active

Source: 'apter V of ref. (6). The farr-size limitation for "small farmer" has been expanded upward
- .5 hectares for both South Asia and Tropical Africa in order to increase inter- gional
- 'parability of farm size and income.

0.48 0.33 .0.19



The accompanying table gives a classification of agricultural populations by farm size for three of the major developing regions of the world -- Latin America, Tropical Africa, and South Asia. The agricultural population in each region is divided into three groups: subrn~rgnal3 (including landless agricultural workers), which constitute approximately 50 percent of the populations; small farmers, which constitute another 30 percent; and medium/large farmers, which make up

the remainder. The relative farm-area limits for the category "submrPirnal&' have teen dicteemined by using country-level estimates of' thc size of holding necessary to achieve minimum accepted standards Qf family subsistence income. The smaller estimated subsistence holding in

Afrc~,for cxample, can be explained in part by the ty-pically smaller

family ize. The "small farmer" category is also a relative concept,

base'i on regional norms.

Relating this table to AID's mandate to give direct assistance to the "poor majority", we might include both the "submarginals" and the "small farmers" in the target group. This would bring the percent of the agricultural population included in the target group to about 80 percent in Latin America and South Asia and 90 percent in Africa. (The percent directly covered by the small producer strategy would be less, however, by the percent of landless agricultural workers included under the submarginal category.) The percent of cultivated land eligible would amount to approximately 20 percent in Latin America, 30 percent in South Asia, and perhaps about 30 percent in Tropical Africa.


7hese regional averages disguise wide differences among countries and among subregions within each country. They are only illustrative and have limited operational significance. A small farmer strategy ultimately has

to be defined within the specific context of the individual country and p program examined. In such a definition, soil fertility and water availability (rainfall or irrigation) characteristics mi3ht establish a "standardized hectare" dividing line between small and-large farmers. Besides farm size other distinguishing behavioral characteristics of farm groups might also be useful, e.g., a submarginal farmer might be distinguished from a small farmer as a net buyer of food and a net seller of labor; "medium" farmers might be defined to include only those interested in selective mechanization to smooth out their seasonal demands for labor, while the definitiot,,"large farmers, might be reserved for those engaged in generalized labor-displacing mechanization. Corporate plantations using traditional, labor-intensive techniques for growing tea, rubber or sugar might form a fifth category.

The discus sion in the following sections makes an arbitrary distinction between the polar approaches of "small farmer" and "large" farmer" strategies, though it is recognized that in practice there is a continuum of farm sizes and groups, as well as of strategies that affect them. It does this for purposes of presenting the broad conclusions from available investigations which are typically country specific. Thus, the conclusions offered here must be viewed only as broad tendencies and interpreted with care when they are to be applied to specific countries or sub-regions.


F. vlienc'p on ke.1atlvv Jroductivftleon

motaiesi bieil or ayirlulturiil c(*rimut data and sample surveys suggest rLhat neL benef it (or value-added) from food production in the LDCs is similar across farm size for a given value of resource inputs.* The findings draw heavily on studies of foodgrains production but include some data on total production by farm size. This emphasis is appropriate in view of our concern with the food consumption patterns of the poor. Thus, in the poorest countries, our primary concern might be for basic foodgrains production. In somewhat more developed countries, this concern might be extended to the supply of protein and food items satisfying other basic nutrition needs.
The findings are typically reported in terms

of product per unit of labor, land, or capital (labor, land and capital productivity, respectively). There is a clear tendency for labor productivity to be higher on large farms, on the one hand, and for land productivity to be higher on small farms, on the other. While the relationship between capital productivity and farm size is less clear, available evidence suggests a peak in the small to medium farm range and a gradual decline as size increases. These countervailing relationships reflect different technologies employed on different size farms which, in turn, may be due to (a) different input and output prices facing the small and large farmer, (b) varying degrees of risk aversion and/or (c) different production possibilities due to different amounts and
of fixed factor endowments (especially land/family labor). They thus reflect a tendency for farmers to husband most carefully the resource(s) which they perceive to be in relatively scarcest supply (clearly land

*See references 2, 4, 6, and 34 for cross-country evidence and 8 for
the Indian case.

for'small farmers, and labor, especially in peak seasons, for large farmers). These considerations lead small farmers to choose types of intercropping and
crops and cropping systems (e.g./ multiple cropping) which require intensive use of labor and result in relatively high yields per acre. By contrast , large farmers may engage in land extensive activities, such as cattle raising, and enhance their labor input by combining it with substantial amounts of agricultural machinery. At any rate, the overall relationship, in terms of net returns per unit of total resource costs, appears to be roughly one of constancy across farm size.*

The significance of this constant ratio of net output to cost lies in its implication of similar levels of economic efficiency across farm size, and hence similar levels of food production for a given value of resource inputs.** The ratio might in fact be better described as a profitability measure rather than an economic efficiency measure, since it includes the effects of crop choice as well as the effects of cropspecific technology and input choice. In any case, the finding does bring into question any unqualified pessimism about the viability of the 8=11 farmer due to some inherent inefficiency.

*Reference 7 points out statistical biases in the U.S. farm data which have led to the commonly held view that this relationship does not hold true in the U.S. The author shows that when these biases related to farm class definition, estimated labor costs, and variations in land quality -- are adjusted for, the U.S. data do show a rough constancy of net returns to total resource inputs across farm size. (Note that higher yields per hectare on large farms do not necessarily imply higher net returns per.unit of cost.)

**There is a sizeable literature on the measurement and interpretation
of "efficiency" by farm size. The measure discussed here is a crude one and is sensitive to the prices, or impu;ed prices, used to weigh
the components of the index. See ref26 and 32 for a more precise Mmaure
which distinguishes price and technical efficiency.

- 16-A rnot.) Iylr.pitatipp of all th -fIndIng; on productivity discussed

Itv I 11,i t IL#,.y dt imisL menLiur,,, th. ,haan e In food production in rfspon-,e to ;. c.hangv Ji, policies, resource inputs, institutions or techniques. ( ost'of them measure average productivity or yield per hectare or per worker over a given time period. ) One stndy attempting to examine this-question finds the results to vary depending upon the input. Specifically, in. the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, India, production response to increased fertilizer application was found to be higher for small farmers, but it was found higher for large farmers in the case of the provision of. irrigation.* A recent, less rigorous study looking at adoption rates and productivity changes in several Asian countries, due to the introduction of new rice technologies, concludes that:

Farm size has little meaning.' It acquires significance
only when viewed within the context of the community, the
productivity of the land, the infrastructure, the services
available, the intensity of land use, population pressures, the
tenure system, and the social and economic values attached
to land ownership.**

Thus, it is apparently not farm size, but rather the conditions and circumstances associated with farm size, that we must consider in any assessment of potential production levels.

Perhaps the best available way to assess the potential change in relative productivities is by looking at case history type studies of individual projects and of specific,�agricultural development efforts.*** These studies often have a regional focus, such as studies of the "Green Revolution" in parts of Asia and Latin America. The time period turns

*See references byG.R. Saini In 6.

**See reference 10.

***See for example refs. 12, 15, and 21.


out to be an important consideration in analyzing the evidence. "'he length of time it takes for program or policy actions to have an impact will depend on several factors, including: (1) the differing technical gestation periods of various inputs (application of fertilizer will have a more immediate impact on production than construction of major infrastructures for example), (2) the time required to create or restructure institutions to serve the agricultural secto r or a particular group of farmers,-and(3) possible differences in the speed of adoption of new inputs and techniques between small and large farmers, owing to lack of familiarity or skill in employing new techniques, conflicting habits and customs, or aversion to perceived risk. I Z

In the short run (say & to 0 years), these studies suggest'that food production will be higher under a large farmer strategy than under a small farmer strategy. The reasons for this lie largely in the concept of access. Longer term inputs, such as irrigation, may be available for large farmers but not yet completed for small farmers. While seasonal inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and pesticides may be theoretically available to small farmers, the lack of rural roads and market facilities may inhibit physical access of the small farmer to off-farm inputs. The large farmer orientation of the agricultural credit and extension services may inhibit small farmers' institutional access. Finally, although the evidence is mixed, small farmers may be slower to adopt new practices than large farmers. The lag may be due to labor or financial bottlenecks, risk aversion, or acculturation problems -- unfamiliarity with new procedures, conflicting cultural habits and customs. Improved analysis of factors determining small tax=r response requires additional empirical research.

.mother factor related to access consideration Is tho degr" of divisibility of inputs. The greater the degree of divisibility, the greater the accessibility of more productive inputs to small farmers. Seedsfertilizersand pesticides are obviously highly divisible. Other inputs may not be but can be rendered "divisible" with time and the proper institutional arrangements. Irrigation and basic farm implements, for example, can be made sufficiently divisible if appropriate technology is emRloyed (e.g., feeder canals and more efficient animal drawn implements). Heavier equipment, where required (not for rice but perhaps for wheat in some types of soils) can be made divisible through rental arrangements.

In sum, the implementation problems of helping small farmers obtain increased access -- and in particular the requirement of sequential programming -- may make it difficult to introduce changes in the short run. Rural road construction, manpower training, and introduction of new organizational modes all require both planning and execution time.
On the other hand, some experts believe *ith proper extension advice, there is considerable scope in the short run for increasing total farm output through improved on-farm storage and more intensive land use. Also, there is evidence in some areas that the small farmer -- due to his intense commitment to the land -- may be more of a profit maximiser than the typical large farmer and that, where ecological conditions

favor small-scale, labor-intensive farming, the small farmer will

invest proportionally more of his available resources.* Thus, one

might say that in the short run it impossible to get an increase in agricultural production under a small farmer strategy equivalent to

that under a large farmer strategy but that it is not probable

In the medium run, say from two to five years, where basic rural

infrastructure and trained manpower already exist or can be put in place

or trained quickly, and where appropriate organizational modes which

Sie rafarenre 18


kfpcr)3tri dow~n r:af bt- vIentilied, progress can be relatively quick. !AW1nf 1ct~rA. rw~'ilt. w.'r' obtamned1 f'-r example, in the early phaseof the Comilla Program (East Pakistan) and the Ethiopia Minimum Package Program in two or three years. It should be noted, however, that a high-quality,) intensive, pre-implementation planning effort was evolvedd in both cases. Also, we must be concerned with factors -- soch as manpower availabilities and political reaction from the elites -- required for sustained success.

In the longer run, say 6 to 15 or 20 years, where physical

infrastructure can be extended to remote areas, where institutions for example, agricultural research institutions -- can be re-oriented toward the small farmer, and where information, education, and new organizational modes have had a chance to permeate the rural areas, food production under a small farmer strategy should be as large for a given amount of investment as under a large farmer strategy. Indeed, as explained below in Section D, it may well be greater.

Despite these findings, the difference in the financial costs of credit for small and large farmers is often cited as evidence of the inability of small farmers to compete in the market place. Indeed project analysis showsthat interest rates charged to small farmers must clearly exceed those currently paid by large farmers if the value of the portfolio is to be maintained.* This may be a specious comparison, however, for several reasons. First, sources of credit to which only large farmers have access may be substantially subsidized below the opportunity cost of capital. An observed difference between interest rates charged to large vs. small

*Note that this Id oes .not mean that small farmers will not be able to borrow at the higher rate. If capital productivity is higher on small farms, they may be able and willing to pay the premium.


farmers would in this instance be misleading. Second, assuming that no subsidies exist, there are ways of reducing costs by administration of

small farmer credit through group approaches, as is apparently the case

for example in China. And third, even if higher costs of lending to
small farmers cannot b e absorbed through group approaches, the difference

between total costs of all inputs per unit of output for small farms, as

compared with large farms, may not be as great as the lending cost difference

would suggest. This is because a smaller proportion of total inputs on

small farms may be credit financed.

Finally, it is worth noting under the general heading of cost

comparison that there are considerable 11sunk costs" associated with large farm development which are typically already in place. These

include roads to the farm gate, institutions oriented toward large producers, fixed capital investment (including, for example, irrigation) and investment

in human capital . There are few "aunk costs" associated with small farm

production however. Thus the short-run or "marginal cost" of financing

small farmer development is greater because it includes virtually all fixed

costs as well as variable costs, whereas the "marginal cost" of financing

large farm development may consist primarily of variable costs, e.g.,

seasonal production or marketing credit. In the long-run, however, total costs of small farmer development need not exceed total costs of large

farmer development.

C. Equity Effects under Alternative Strategies

This section considers the impact of small and large farmer strategies ,)n equity; i.e., on increases in the real incomes of the poor. It concludes that the ability of a large farmer strategy to match the equity effects of a small farmer strategy in the short-to-medium run is open to question and even ,nore doubtful in the long run.


S ir. r. sma1: farmers a re taken tc, be included in the "pocr majority" (therit =:Iy Le exceptions in som-e countries, of course), a small farmer strategy, to th~z extent it succeeds in raising the real incomes of small farmers, would appear to be superior to a large farmer strategy on equity grounds by definition. This ignores, however, the distinction suggested at the beginningof the paper between a "direct"' and an "indirect" equity impact. For a small farmer strategy (and similarly for a large farmer strategy), the direct impact is the change in real income accruing to participating small farmers from increased productivity and returns.* The indirect impact is the change in real income accruing to other groups in the poor majority (non-participating small farmers, the rural landless poor, and the urban poor) who as (1) net buyers of food, benefit from relative declines in food prices resulting from increased food production, as

(2) net sellers of labor, benefit from increases in real wages through increased employment, and/or as (3) net sellers of food, suffer from a decline in product impact
price. The adverse/of (3) should be less under a small farmer strategy since non-participating farmers (who are net sellers of food) will be fewer and production increases (and hence product price declines) will be slower in coming. Indirect equity effects through (1) and (2) are, however, uncertain.

In principle, it should be possible to (a) increase food production with a

large farmer strategy and (b) benefit those poor who are net buyers of food through the income effect of lower food prices -- since food expenditures constitute a large proportion of total expenditures by the "submarginals" and the utban poor -or, Wb) to the extent that food prices did not decline sufficiently to reduce

*Looking at the direct equity impact of a small farmer strategy, rno distinction need be made in financing food versus non-food crops, much less high. value food
crops versus basic food crops. The indirect 'equity impacts discussed here, however, do assume that primary emphasis in both strategies would be basic food crops.


profits to former levels, tax away either in income or in kind part of the large farmer profits, using this revenue to finance poor-oriented production and/or welfare projects.* In addition, in theory, since wages are linked to subsistence needs, a decline in the price of food may result in a decline in wage costs relative to other factor costs and possibly encourage a substitution of labor for capital throughout the economy. This could generate additional employment opportunities for the rural and the urban poor. Thus, both the food price decline and the profits produced by a large farmer strategy could be linked to the equity goal of benefiting the "poor majority."

The critical assumption of this approach is that retail food prices will

decline significantly or that part of the interim profits will be taxed away for development purposes. However, where agricultural price supports are maintained (at the retail as well as farm level) in the face of declining production costs-for exampli
as they were at least in the early phase of the Mexican wheat production program/'food prices will not decline and food buyers among the poor will not be benefitted. In addition, few countries have had the political will to tax away large profits reaped by the rich under any circumstances. Referring again to the Mexican wheat

production program, after the initial period when large farmers benefited enormously from (1) the new seed varieties, (2) the government-financed irrigation investment

concentrated on large farms in the northwest, and (3) government-maintained prices, price supports were removed and product prices declined substantially. High

interim profits of large farmers -- due in part to subsidies on capital inputswere not taxed away for development purposes, however, and the net result of the early years of the program was to further skew the distribution of income in the wheat growing areas.

*Another possibility, which may be more politically feasibleis for the government to finance say rural public works in part through deficit financing. Success
would depend on the inherent-income elasticity of the tax system and the ability of the economy to absorb inflationary pressures.


Thuh, t'ie theoretically favorable indirect equity impact of a large f:Irrr,.r etratf-g7 In the ".hr.rt-to-medium term is questionable. In the lomag-r=. .L is even mrre doubtful, since demand for staple foods is income inelastic. f,";ce basic calorie needs are satisfied, staple food demand will grow only as fast as population growth. An increase in staple foods obtained with short-run production increases on large farms may, in fact, pre-empt the small farmer for years to come. Not only will current incomes of small farmers fall with the'decline in product price (depending on the relative size of their marketed surplus), but also, in the absence of substantial cost-reducing innovations, future production incentives will be depressed.

Distinguishing the rural from the urban poor highlights another

fundamental flaw in the equity case for a large farmer strategy. Private and public food distribution networks and programs in developing countries are largely aimed at urban rather than rural areas. This may reflect the presence of more efficient transportation and marketing channels for linking rural with urban treas than for linking one rural area with another. It also reflects the fact 7hat the urban poor typically have greater political power than the rural poor. lus, increased food production from large farmers is not as likely to reach the .ural poor as it is the urban poor (or if it does, the price may not be much lower). ,imilarly, amcng the rural poor, the submarginals are most likely to be excluded iom the food distribution networks.

Given the important relationship between employment and income, an equity

-.ise for a large farmer strategy would exist if large farmers made intensive use .f hired labor. Available evidence does not support this conjecture, however,


Farn management studies show that not only do small farmers use aore labor per acre initially, but, when large farmers are provided profit increasing inputs, they tend to use less rather than more labor per acre (by investing in labor displacing equipment -- often made artificially attractive through subsidized credit and import advantages). Also, there is much controversy about the yield-increasing contribution of mechanisation. Many studies showing increased yields from tractorization, for example, have not adjusted for increased use of other inputs. It is rather clear, however, that the net effects of mechanisation on employment and income distribution have

been adverse.*

In sum, while conclusive quantitative evidence of equity effects does not exists a priori analysis of the various components of equity impact and some historical evidence suggest that, although there are potentially favorable indirect equity effects in the short-run, a large farmer strategy will not have a favorable equity impact in the long run, in either the direct or the indirect sense. The small farmer strategy on the other handt clearly has a favorable direct equity impact since the beneficiaries are members of the poor majority. The higher the proportion of the poor majority accounted for by small farmers, the greater the direct equity impact of the small farmer strategy. If such a strategy included land reform, the impact would be even greater1n addition, the long-run indirect equity impact of a small farmer strategy should also be favorable. As discussed below, the small farmer strategy appears to contribute more to sustained rural income generation in the long run.

*See ref. 8, ch. 5, and ref 22 for evidence and further discussion.


D. Impact on Key Factors in Rural/National Development

The contribution of alternative producer strategies to food

production and equity objectives can be assessed at 3 given point in time; however we must also be concerned with the establishment of a self sustaining development process. This section discusses the probable impact of these strategies on key factors in overall rural and national development, namely on (1) the level of demand for domestic goods,

(2) the labor intensity of the prevailing consumption pattern, (3) savings and (4) demographic trends.* The evidence suggests that the optimum
strategy may/depend on the time frame. In the short run, the high savings are appealing.
rates and the large marketable surplus of large farmers/ As small farmer incomes rise above the subsistence levelhowever, both savings and marketable surplus will increase, thus eroding the principle arguments for the large farmer approach and enhancing the superiority of the small farmer strategy as a means of obtairIng increased rural income generation and sustained national growth.

Deficient demand, particularly in smaller countries, is recognized as a major deterrent to economic growth in some LDCs- For a given level of national income, the overall level of demand for domestic goods will be determined by the amount of income spent at home versus abroad. Typically, upper income agricultural producers have a higher marginal propensity to import -- to satisfy both consumption and investment demand than lower income agricultural producers; thus, a small farmer strategy is likely to generate more value-added activity in the domestic non-agricultural sector than a large farmer strategy. Assuming equal export performance, the balance of payments effect of the small farmer strategy would also be favorable.

*Another key factor might be education of the labor force. A small farmer strategy would appear superior here because of the broader participation implied.


By contrast, because of the higher "reservation demand" of small

fagrmers for theJr own f.arm products, a smaller proportion of their output

Is actually sold (on the market. This means that the income generated

through ancillary activities such as transportation, handling, and

processing is less, as is small farmer cash expenditures on other goods.

The smaller marketable surplus tends to be a temporary phenomenon, however;

research in the Philippines, for example, shows that annual per capita

consumption of rice rises with income up to about 264 kilograms of paddy

and then levels of f.* Beyond this point, reservation demand declines and

marketable surplus rises.**

Another important factor in the establishment of self sustaining

growth in labor surplus economies is the labor-intensity of the prevailing

consumption patterns. The labor-intensity of the goods demanded is important

because of the employment generating effects, the higher propensity to

consume out of income to labor than out of income to c.~pital, and the need

tocanserve scarce capital. Most studies show that, except for the very low income groups which consume foodgrains (which might be produced with capital

intensive methods), the labor-intensity of average consumption patterns

decreases with income.*** This implies that a small farmer strategy would

promote a more labor-intensive consumption pattern than a large farmer


*See ref 23 p. 73**Ref '7is a recent study of the effects of alternative farm sizes (small,
medium, and large) in the U.S. According to that study, the small-farm
structure generates an estimated 30 percent more in off-farm income,
primarily in the areas of agribusiness and consumer goods and services, than the large-farm structure. of course in the U.S., the typical small
farm is perhaps 100 hectares where it might be I or 2 hectares in the
LDCs. No comparable LDC studies are known.
** See refs 5, 27, 33, and 35.

. -27-

R(:garding savings, recent studies of small farmers in Korea, Taiwan,

banglade6h, and Zambia ghow that their marginal private savings rates cATs be as high as 50 percent if the incentives to save -- generally considered to involve a profitable technology plus attractive deposit rates and convenient savings institutions -- exist.* Of course, average savings rates of large farmers are likely to be even higher than those of small farmers, although the productivity of large farmers' capital investments may be lower. On the other hand, heavier*public taxation cF the agricultural surplus for development purposes is considered more politically feasible under a small farmer approach than under a continuing emphasis on large farmers since the latter are in a stronger position than the former to exert restraining influence on tax rates and, in addition, on the distribution of government expenditures. If these behavior patterns are typical, reinvestment in the agricultural sector could, on balance, generate as high a growth rate under a small farmer approach as under a large farmer approach. One-should note, however, that the incentive and ability to save by tenant farmers or share croppers -not to mention landless agricultural workers -- is considerably less than for the owner-operator; thus the savings/investment potential will vary with tenure patterns.

Finallyregarding demographic trends, migration to cities should be discouraged by a small farmer strategy to the extent that the latter leads to a relatively higher standard of living for the poor in the rural areas. The increase in urban overhead costs associated with relieving congestion and extending existing urban service levels to new migrants may well render the provision of urban services more costly in the long run than the

*See ref . 3


provision uf comparable rural services. In addition, rising incomes among a broad spectrum of rural families, when accompanied by other modernizing influences -- such as education, mass communications, and increased availability of consumer durables -- appears to be accompanied by a decline in fertility among those families.* Given limited non-human resources, this spontaneous decline in fertility permits per capita incomes, hence standards of living, to rise faster than would be otherwise possible.

TV. Conclusions and AID Program/Policy Implications

A.' Conclusions

In summarizing the preceding discussion it is perhaps useful to begin with the equity objective. While something of a case can be made for a large farmer strategy serving the equity objective, it is a shaky one, especially when the two following considerations are taken into account. First, it may be more difficult (and costly) to shift to a small farmer strategy in the future - after programs and institutions biased toward large farmers have been strengthened and after real incomes and production incentives of'small farmers have been reduced -- than to begin with a small farmer strategy in the first place. Second, the case fcrthe large farmer strategy serving the equity objective is an indirect one based essentially on its effect on lowering food prices to the consumer; however, the price decline may not occur or may occur with some delay. The indirect case is further weakened when the previously discussed problems entailed by food distribution to therural poor are taken into account. It

*See ref 24


follows that if a smail farmer strategy has a roughly equivalent impact on food production, it must -- since small farmers are the primary beneficiaries -- have a superior impact on equity.

Thus, the assessment of the small farmer strategy in meeting the

equity objective rests in part on Its success in meeting the food production objective. The main conclusion from the analysis on relative productivities is that the choice of a small or large farmer strategy will depend largely upon the time period for achieving the food production objective. Consideration of the strategy choice impact on key factors in rural and national development reinforces this conclusion. The shorter the time period, or the more urgent the food crisis in a given country, the less appropriate strategies at the small farmer end of the spectrum-are likely to be.

But this conclusion rests on two important assumptions. First. it

rests on the assumption that existing physical and institutional infrastructure are seriously deficient for small farmers and/or a profitable technology does not exist in a readily usable form. To the extent that this is not true, the time period becomes less of a constraint. Second, it rests on the assumption that there are not alternative ways of meeting a short run food crisis. Countries with high-cost domestic production and/or limited. agricultural resources might find it more economical to meerexpanded needs through imports than through expanding domestic output. Thus, increases in these cases
in domestic food production can be seen/as a long-run objective, not a short-run requirement. Also, a relatively small country in a favorable foreign exchange situation has the option of importing some food and, assuming it has some physical potential for food production, can accordingly be more free to pursue a small farmer strategy even in the short run than a large country in an unfavorable foreign exchange situation. Even the latter type of country could be provided some "degrees of freedoms', however,

S tne ra t epg *, n hP hort riim, IhA 1 tr~ prrtIvdod f trA aid until growth in doventic fo' prndirt ir'n rprh.q An Areecptshle levvl.

Itk preceedting aiialysiti suggests Lhat, to the extent possible, AID should support major reforms which might allow a more rapid attainment of both food production and equity objectives. Where such reforms are not in progress, a small farmer strategy better meets a combined food production and equity objective. Thus, as is consistent with the Congressional IMandate, AID should concentrate its assistance to agricultural producers in the small farm sector. The implications for AID programs and policies arising in this context are even stronger if we keep two points in mind. The first is that other aid donors and LDC governments will continue to finance generally unfocused agricultural production programs which do not have a target group orientation; and the second is that, although small farms may occupy a small proportion of total agricultural land (as small as 20 percent according to Table 1), AID could not expect to affect a much larger area in any case, in view of the Agency's limited development budget. Thus, AID can focus on small farmers while other resources are allocated more broadly within the sector. It is also worth noting that a small farm strategy appears to better ensure the participation of women as decision-makers. Individual country studies in Africa, for example, show a significant number of female heads of farm in small farm areas where one or more males seek supplementary income through off-farm employment.

At the agricultural project and program level, the weight of the

Congressional Mandate and the evidence discussed in this paper would appear sufficient, notwithstanding the various qualifications, to suggest that the Agency should, indeed, require agricultural production projects to be

small-farmer oriented (some elements of such a strategy may also benefit


Of course the eaae of implementation will vary by country. There may be Fiome countries, for example, which appear to have only small producers. Must we establish a cut-off point? There may be other countries where AID is financing large resource transfers. Is it possible to program large resources in the small farm sector in short time periods? AID must find reasonable answers to these questions which uphold the spirit of the Congressional Mandate.

Another obvious policy implication for AID is that carefully programmed PL 480 food aid -- certainly Title II and perhaps Title I -- be provided to those countries which, of course, have a need for the food aid for both domestic and balance of payments reasons, but also where AID is collaborating in mounting a small farmer-oriented development strategy. A major concern with food aid programs has been possible disincentive effects on domestic production. But if food aid is linked to a major small farmer - oriented food production strategy, including provision of relevant physical infrastructure through labor-intensive rural works prog . rams, which would increase the demand for food, prices and incentives for producers could be maintained.
It is recognized that small farmer assistance is more difficult to

program and will therefore require maximum programing flexibility, including local currency use in Us, freedom to choose the most appropriate inputs and outputs, more use of technical assistance funds for local hire and local procurement, and rapid response and assistance from AID/W. A first operational step in pursuing this policy would be for each Mission to define more precisely, ideally in collaboration with the host government, the "small


/target groups appropriate to that country, employing some of the notions discussed in Section III A above suitably amended to fit individual country situations. This definition would be employed as one criterion for identifying, designing and approving agricultural project proposals.

Additional research, analysis of existing research, and guidance is clearly

in order. In devising specific strategy options attention should be given

to decreasing small farmer costs'of production relative to those of the large

farmer. This can best be accomplished through a combination of small farmer oriented agricultural research and farm management studi-es for typical small farms. We need in particular to address the difficult problem of helping
of submarginal" small farmers to increase their food production in cost-effective

ways. Although the limited size and/or quality of their land holdings may, preclude their ever being full-time farmers, and their inaccessibility by reason of

location or fragmented holdings may make the cost of reaching them directly with

small farmer institutions prohibitive, financial and technical assistance on

pricing policies, markets, input supplies and research could help.them, as well

as more "viable" small farmers, substantially increase food production. The problem of submarginal farmers takes on particular importance in view of the

fact that they, along with completely landless laborers (who constitute 30 per cent or more of the active agricultural population in some countries),

constitute the poorest and worst-nourished of the poor majority, and that their

p position, if not taken explicitly into account, could be worsened. Small farmer

projects should be carefully designed to facilitate the participation of submarginals.


List of References*

1. AID/PPC. A-263, 4-30-75, Congressional Mandate and attached paper,
".The Congressional Mandate: Aiding the Poor Majority."

2. AID/TAB. "Small Producers Economics" (Rough draft of AID paper).

3. AID. Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit (1973). Papers by Dale
Adams and Richard Roberts.

4. Bachmnan, Kenneth L. and Raymond P. Christensen. "The Economics of
Farm Size" in Southworth and Johnston, editors, Agricultural Development
and Economic Growth, 1967.

5. Ballentine, Gregory, and Ronald Soligo. "Consumption and Earnings Patterns,
and Income Redistribution: The Case of Colombia: (unpublished draft, 1974).

6. Berry, Albert. "Cross Country Evidence on Farm Size/Factor Productivity
Relationships," (unpublished paper presented at The Purdue Workshop
on Empirical Studies on Small Farm Agriculture in Developing Nations,
Purdue University, November 1972).

7. Berry, R.A. "Farm Size and Factor Productivity in U.S. Agriculture"
(unpublished draft, January 1973).

8. Bharadwaj, Krishna. Production Conditions in Indian Agriculture: A
Study Based on Farm Management Surveys. University of Cambridge,
Department of Applied Economics, Occasional Paper No. 35. (London
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

9. Blair, Harry W. "The Elusiveness of Equity: Institutional Approaches
to Rural Development In Bangladesh", Cornell University Special Series
on Rural Local Government, November 1974.

10. Castillo, Gelia T. "Diversity in Unity: The Social Component of Changes
in Rice Farming in Asian Villages" in Changes in Rice Farming in Selected
Areas of Asia, International Rice Research Institute, 1975.

11. Chenery, Hollis et al. Redistribution with Growth, 1974.

12. Dalrymple, Dana and William I. Jones. "Evaluating the Green Revoluticn"
(June 1973).

13. Darner, Peter. Land Reform and Economic Development, 1972.

*There is an extensive literature on most of the topics discussed in this paper. The "List of References" is just that. It does not constitute a selected,
much less an exhaustive, bibliography. An effort has been made, however,
to refer to (l)recent research and (2) publications of particular interest
to AID as well as to summaryy material.


14. Vord Voundatlon. "Employment in Developing Countries: (July 1974).

15. Crlff I i, 0 jth. 'l1e Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay
on the (;reen Revolution (1974)

16. Harberger, Arnold C. "Fiscal Policy and Income Redistribution"
(unpublished draft for AID Princeto4-Brookings Contract, 1974).

17. Heady, Earl 0. and Steven T. Sonka. "Farm Size, Rural Community Income,
and Consumer Welfare", American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
August, 1974.

18. Herz, Barbara. Demographic Pressure and Economic Change: The Case of
Kenyan Land Reforms. (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University,

19. House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, Report on Foreign
Assistance Act of 1974. House Report No. 93-1471, October 25, 1974.

20. House of Representatives-Bill IH.R. 9005 (August, 1975) and Co ittee on
International Relations Report, "International Development and Food
Assistance Act of 1975" (Report No. 94-442).

21. IBRD. Rural Development: Sector Policy Paper (February 1975)

22. International Labor Office. Mechanization.and Employment in Agriculture,

23. IRRI Research Highlights for 1974, 1975.

24. Kocher, James E. "Rural Development, Income Distribution and Fertility
Decline," published by the Population Council, 1973.
25. Krishna, Raj. "Agricultural Price Policy and Economic Development in
Southworth and Johnston, editors Agricultural Development and Economic
Growth, 1967.

26. Lau, L.J. and P. A. Yotopoulos, "A Test for Relative Efficiency and
Application to India Agriculture", American Economic Review (March

27. Mellor, John and Uma J. Lele. "Growth Linkages of the New Foodgrain
Technologies." AID Employment and Income Distribution Project
Occasional Paper No. 50.

28. Miller, James C. "Regional Devel opment: A Review of the State-ofthe-Art" TAB/UD, Agency for International Development (August 1974)

29. Mosher, Arthur. Creating a Progressive Rural Structure, 1969, and
To Create a Modern Agriculture, 1971.

30.' Owens, Edgar, and Robert Shaw. Development Reconsidered: Bridging
the Gap Between Government and People (1972).

31. Sen, Amartya. Employment Technology and Development, 1975.

32. idi,, furilt S. "Relative Efficiency in Wheat Production in the Indian
Punjab", American Economic Review (September, 1974).

33. Soligo, Ronald. "Factor Intensity of Consumption Patterns, Income
Distribution and Employment Growth in Pakistan", Rice University
Program of Development Studies, Discussion Paper No. 44 (1973).

34. Statement of Edgar Owens, House Foreign Affairs Committee Sub-Comaittees
on International Organizations and Foreign Economic Policy (September

35. Summan, Tucay M. "Short-run Effects of income Distribution on Some
Macro-Economic Variables: The Case of Turkey" Rice University Program
of Development Studies, Discussion Paper No. 46 (1973).

36. USDA, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report
No. 98, The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985 (1974).

37. World Food Conference (November 1974). Draft Resolutions.


Full Text
xml record header identifier 2008-10-21setSpec [UFDC_OAI_SET]metadata oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc http:www.openarchives.orgOAI2.0oai_dc xmlns:dc http:purl.orgdcelements1.1 xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.openarchives.orgOAI2.0oai_dc.xsd dc:title production and equity in agricultural producer strategiesdc:creator United States. Agency for International Development. Office of Policy Development and Analysis.dc:publisher United States. Agency for International Development. Office of Policy Development and Analysis.dc:date 1975dc:type Bookdc:identifier (OCLC)dc:source University of Floridadc:language English