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 Brazilian factory women
 Factory women in New Jersey

Title: Women, production and reproduction in industrial capitalism : a comparison of Brazilian and U. S. factory workers
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00081771/00001
 Material Information
Title: Women, production and reproduction in industrial capitalism : a comparison of Brazilian and U. S. factory workers
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Safa, Helen Icken
Publisher: Helen Icken Safa
Publication Date: 1986
Subject: Caribbean   ( lcsh )
South America   ( lcsh )
Spatial Coverage: South America -- Brazil
South America
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Bibliographic ID: UF00081771
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.

Table of Contents
    Title Page
        Title Page
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
    Brazilian factory women
        Page 5
        Page 5a
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
    Factory women in New Jersey
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
Full Text

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A Comparison of Brazilian and U.S. Factory Workers

\cZ 22
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Helen I. Safa
Department cE Anthropology
Livingston College
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

J4 C- C UA- t

A Comparison of Brazilian and U.S. Factory Workers **

Women have always constituted a source of cheap labor for industrial

capitalism. (Saffioti 1971). But the way in which women are incorporated

into the paid labor force differs for women of different cultures, classes,

and stages of capitalist development. With the development of industrial

capitalism and the movement of production outside the home into the factory,

the family ceased to function as a productive unit and became dependent on

wages earned outside the home. While production became increasingly public,

reproduction remained within the private sphere of the family, though clearly

also affected by the larger economic changes occuring within society. As

Bridenthal (1976: S) has pointed out, "for women, the experience has become

one of pulls between opposing forces, work and family" and the constant

attempt to reconcile the dialectic between the two.

It is through the allocation of labor at the household level that we

can see how larger economic forces impinge on women's productive and

reproductive role. This paper will examine the way in which women combine

their productive role in paid labor with their reproductive role as wives and

mothers in two societies at very different stages of development: Brazil and

the United States. While more industrialized than most Latin American

countries, Brazil is still heavily dependent on foreign sources of capital

and technology for much of her industrialization and economic growth. Partly

as a result of this dependence and the rapid shift into capital-intensive

industrialization, Brazil is also characterized by a labor surplus and high

rates of unemployment and underemployment, much greater than ever existed in

the U.S. Under these conditions of labor surplus, clearly only the most

This research was sponsored by a collaborative research grant from the Social
Science Research Council. The Brazilian data in this paper were collected by
Dr. Heleieth Saffioti, sociologist at the University of Araraquara, Brazil.
Her assistance in the preparation and analysis of this study are gratefully

productive members of the potential labor force can find employment,

excluding large numbers of women, particularly older, married women with

children. (cf. Sao Paulo 1978: 74). Thus, the percentage of women employed

in Brazil is less than half of that in the United States, while only

9.93% of married women in Brazil are employed compared to 41% in the U.S.

(Vasquez Miranda 1977: 270).

This study focuses on women factory workers in these two societies

since factory work represents entry level jobs into the formal labor market

in both countries for workers with relatively low educational and skill

levels. In Brazil, and most Third World countries, due again to the large

labor surplus, there exists an extensive informal labor market, in which

women play a predominant role, working as domestic servants, street vendors

and in other forms of casual labor (cf. Arizpe 1977). Factory work then

often represents the first stable form of employment open to Third World

women, and is generally reserved for young, single women who were born in

the city or have lived there since childhood and thereby been able to acquire

more education than most migrant women, who are largely confined to the

informal labor market.

The data analyzed here consists of 100 interviews with young, mostly

single women employed in a textile and garment plant in Sao Paulo, Brazil

and 80 interviews with older, mostly married women employed in a garment

plant in New Jersey. Sao Paulo was chosen for comparative purposes because

it is the most highly industrialized city in Brazil, if not in Latin America,

and the center of capital accumulation and economic growth, the showplace

of the "Brazilian miracle". In Sao Paulo, the percentage of women employed

is 35.3%, almost double the national average of 18%, but the number of women


employed drops off sharply after the age of 24, when most women marry.

(Sao Paulo 1978: 75). Thus, in Sao Paulo and Brazil generally, single

women still constitute the primary source of cheap female labor, much as in

the early stages of industrialization in Western Europe and the United States

(Tilly and Scott 1978). At a more advanced level of industrial capitalism

as in the U.S., however, young women remain in school longer and are

primarily employed in clerical and other white-collar jobs. Therefore,

marginal industries such as the garment industry examined here, are forced

to turn to a supplementary labor reserve, namely older, married women for

these low-paying, unskilled jobs. Thus, it would appear that in advanced

capitalist countries married women generally constitute a secondary labor

reserve, at least in blue-collar jobs and are employed only when the supply

of young, single women is not sufficient. Even in Sao Paulo, the women

employed in the garment plant (who constitute 20% of the sample) are older

and more likely to be married than the women employed in the textile factory.

Therefore, the nature of the industry as well as the nation's stage of

development help determine labor recruitment patterns.

How do these different recruitment patterns for women in paid produc-

tive labor at different levels of capitalist development affect the

allocation of labor at the household level? A look at the household

composition of these two samples appears to indicate a very different

allocation of labor in Brazilian and U.S. working class families. Whereas

the Brazilian women are generally members of large households with multiple

wage earners, the New Jersey families are small, with one or two wage-

earners. These differences in household composition and number of wage

earners within Brazilian and U.S. working class families, can be explained

I think, by different survival strategies of working-class families within

an industrial capitalist mode of production at two different stages of

development. In Brazil, where married women are generally denied access to

formal paid employment in factory jobs because of the abundance of young,

single women for these jobs, other family members are forced to become wage

earners at an early age, since multiple wage-earning is critical to the

family's survival. In the United States, however, where married women

may contihueto be employed, it is not as necessary for other family

members,and particularly children, to contribute to the family income.

Both Brazilian and U.S. working class families often rely on more than one

wage earner, but in New Jersey, it is generally husband and wife who are

employed, whereas in Sao Paulo, with lower wages and higher costs of living,

several members of the household, including children, are forced to work.

Through a study of the allocation of labor at the household level we

can see how Brazilian and U.S. working class families employ different

strategies to maximize their family's survival. Both groups of working

class families have lost control over the means of production through the

process of proletarianization and have to survive through the sale of their

labor. They have entered what Tilly and Scott (1978: 105) referring to

early industrialization in western Europe, term a "family wage economy", in

which "the composition of the household no longer was dictated by a need

for household laborers, as in the family economy, but by a need for cash.

The balance between wage earners and consumers in the household determined

family fortunes."

In order to maximize the number of wage earners per family, Sao Paulo

working class families incorporate other adult kin into the household and

send as many members into paid labor as early as possible. In contrast,

New Jersey working class families are much smaller, with only one or two

wage earners per household. Among married couples, the principal

breadwinner is usually the man, but women often continue to work after

marriage and childbirth to supplement family income and to support their

children's prolonged education Women may also reduce the number of

,S children they have, in order to invest in the upward mobility of a few,

r \ rather than in the labor of many. In short, while in the Sao Paulo family

) ~Vage economy, the emphasis is on the maximization of the number of wage

4 arners per household, in New Jersey, the reduction in the number of wage

earners is balanced by the reduction in the number of consumers, particu-

larly children. In both Sao Paulo and New Jersey families, however, the

\ household and not the individual remains the basic unit of decision-

making, allocating the labor of household members to paid wage or domestic

Y4 responsibilities so as to maximize the family's chances for survival or

upward mobility.

Brazilian Factory Women

While the U.S. may be characterized as an advanced capitalist economy,

where the vast bulk of the population depends on wages, Brazil is a depen-

dent capitalist society still incorporating many pre-capitalist features.

Brazilian industrialization, particularly in the post-was years, has been

largely financed and directed from abroad, particularly in the Sao Paulo

area where this study was conducted. The textile industry was one of the

first industries in Sao Paulo and has remained technologically quite mixed,

with very modern, capital-intensive plants, especially in synethetics,

and some older, more labor-intensive plants, particularly in natural fibers

such as the cotton textile factory studied here. The proportion of

,,nen workers is generally much lower in capital-intensive, highly automated plants,

which favor a reduced number of male workers at higher wage and skill levels.

(cf. Blay 1978:144-5)

Economic development and industrialization has apparently not led to higher

labor force participation rates for Brazilian women, at least in industry. In the

Sao Paulo area, despite very rapid rates of industrialization since 1940, the

percentage of women employed in the secondary sector has increased from only 14% in

1940 to 17% in 1970 (Vasquez Miranda 1977: 266). This is due to the fact that

industrialization in Sao Paulo in recent decades has been primarily capital-inten-

sive in such industries as metallurgy, machinery, chemical, pharmaceuticals and

electronics. Ihile bureaucratic and clerical activities for women have increased

in these larger establishments, these occupations have been limited predominantly

to younger single women who have completed high school and some have even started

college. (Blay, 1978: 213)2) Thus, while the overall activity rate for womeh has

not charged much since 1940, there has been a marked shift of women out of agricul-

ture a;:i into services with industry remaining fairly stable (Population Council,

1978: 9, Blay 1978: 142).

The labor force for industrialization in the Sao Paulo area was drawn largely

from foreign immigrants (especially Italians) and rural migrants expelled from *e

their peasant and artisan activities in the countryside. In our sample, 57% of the

women factory workers are born outside the greater Sao Paulo area, chiefly from the

surrounding state of Sao Paulo and the Northeast. However, as was pointed out

earlier, factory workers in Latin America generally are not recent migrants, and

our sample is no exception. Over 60% of the migrants in our sample have been living

in the city for over 10 years, while over half qaid they came as children with

their parents. The educational level is also higher than that found among recent

migrants, who are generally employed in the informal economy as domestic servants,

petty vendors, etc. Among the factory women interviewed, 65% have completed

primary school, (signifying four years of education) while 23% have gone on to

secondary school. In short, a factory job in Brazil and Latin America generally,

represents a considerable advancement over jobs in the informal sector. While

wages are very low by U.S. standards (48% earn between 2-3 minimum salary units

monthly ) they are still higher and much more stable than what can be earned in

the informal sector, especially by women.

However, most women work in factories only for a short period of their lives,

from the time they finish primary school until they marry. Thus, in our sample

49% have worked in this factory less than four years and all but three of these

women are under 24. Among these factory women 64% are under 24 (24% under 18),



and only 13% are married and 5% formerly married.4) The most apparent reason behind

the small number of married women employed at the factory is the reluctance of the

owners to pay the rather liberal maternity benefits to which permanently employed

pregner, women in Brazil are e titled. Cultural attitudes also work against the

employ.; nt of married women and 51% of our sample of single women indicated that

they ip-,nned to work only until marriage or pregnancy. While cultural attitudes

Sundou' odly favor married women staying home, it would appear to be primarily th

) abundance of a cheap, unskilled supply of young, unmarried women which mitigates \

against the employment of married women.

!ence Brazilian factory women are forced to make a real choice between their

productive and reproductive roles; if they marry and have children, they will

probably be forced to give up working at least in factory jobs. Undoubtedly, many

married women continue to work in the informal economy, in self-employed activities

which ire deemed more compatible with their domestic role.

r.,ployed single women living at home are expected to contribute to the family

income. Only 23% of our sample (and not a single married women) indicated that

they s~cnd their salary only on themselves, the rest contributing all or most of

their -alary to family and household expenses. Asked what would happen if they

were not working, 42% noted that their families could not afford to buy the same

things. It ir/-ear then, that the meager wages of these women makes a' -

contribution to the family's welfare.

Tn fact, Brazilian working-class families appear to be surviving by following

a policy of multiple wage-earning, which drives both men and women into the labor

force nt any early age. (Sao Paulo 1978: 65) In our sample, 89% of the women

started working under the age of 18, mostly in factory work.5) Those currently

living :ith their parents almost always started working under 18, suggesting it is

parental pressure which forces them to find a job. Households tend to be large


and to include large numbers of young adults who can work and contribute to the

family income. Thus, 28% of our sample consist of households numbering seven or

more members, with 40% of the families having four or more working members each.

(In the large families with seven or more members, 85% have four or more working

members). In most cases our respondents live with their parents (sometimes only

the mother), siblings, and occasionally other related young adults of the same

generation such as cousins.

IWhere neither parent is present, the woman nay be living with siblings or

other relatives and friends. However, young married couples generally live alone

or with their children and seldom with other relatives. Only two women live alone.

The point appears to be to maximize the number of working members of the household,

all of whom are expected to contribute to the family income.

The relationship of family income to the number of persons working in the

household is shown by the fact that the highest incomes are found in households

with the largest number of workers. Thus 52.6% of families in our sample with

monthly incomes of Cr. 6000-10,000 or more have from four to seven working members,

compared to 25% of those with one to three working members. (Table 1) Many of

these working members are brothers and sisters of the respondent. Most of these

siblings are also employed in factory or service jobs. Among 68% of respondents,

from one to three additional siblings are employed in the household, and in more

than three-fourths of these families, incomes range between Cr. 4000 to Cr. 6000

monthly. This is still low considering the large size of these families, but at

this stage at least older children seem to make a substantial contribution to

S family income.

-4 It is difficult to know how these families survive when these older children

are small and unable to work, particularly since it is difficult for mothers to make

up for their children's lack of earning capacity. It is significant that in our sam-

ple, married women have lower family incomes than single women, most of whom live in


households with various wage-earners. (Table 2) Married women with children may

continue to earn some income through the informal economy, by doing piece work at

home or petty vending, but this is generally not the equivalent of a paid factory

Qor Oher formal job. This hardship undoubtedly helps account for the high rate of

;Wriw4tnortality in Sao Paulo today, which has increased 40% in Sao Paulo in the

.9b0:10 decade with the decline in purchasing power (Wood 1977: 57). At the

6nett ime, high infant mortality rates induces families to have large numbers of

h cl0cdfen in the hope that some will survive to adulthood.

Rapid inflation and lagging wage rates have accelerated the decline in

pi'chasing power of working class families in recent years, resulting in a

decrease in the real minimum wage in Sao Paulo from 100 in 1960 to 70 in 1970

(Ibid.: 58). Minimum wage rates have been tightly controlled to keep labor costs

low and have not kept up with the rapid rise in prices. As a result, from 1958 to

1969 the purchasing power of the wage of the head of the average family fell by

36.5% and even with more members working, the family's real income still fell by

9.4% (Sao Paulo 1978: 64). To cover basic minimum expenditure on food, housing,

transport, clothing, etc., a worker earning the minimum wage in 1975 needed to

work 466 hours and 34 minutes a month, or 15 hours and 55 minutes a day, 30 days

a month (Ibid.: 46). Workers have responded by extending the number of hours

worked and by increasing the number of workers per family. The number of members

employed in the average working class family in Sao Paulo from 1958 to 1969 .-

increased from 1 to 2 (Ibid.: 63), with many mor .wking at non-regulated and

prakhay unreported jobs in the informal economy. Women also try to stretch an

insufficient wage by substituting domestic labor inputs (such as kitchen gardens

and chickens) for market purchases (Schmink 1979: 9). Consumption patterns have

also changed, with a decreasing percentage of income spent on such basic items as
food and clothing,/an increase in transport, education and recreation (Sao Paulo,

op. cit., 68).


The necessity for a multiple wage-earning strategy in Brazil has therefore

been made particularly acute by a government policy which has allowed prices to

rise, while keeping wages tightly controlled to keep labor costs low. This was

the price the poor of Brazil paid for the "economic miracle" initiated by the

military government in 1964, which has slowed considerably in the early 1970's in

the wake of the worldwide recession. During this period, income inequality in
Brazil already / the highest in Latin America, grew markedly; a recent study

found that from 1960 to 1970 the share of total income among the richest 5 percent

of the population increased 72 percent, while nearly 75 percent of the population

experienced no change during this ten year period. (Population Council 1978: 11).

The top 5% of the population took home 36.3% of total income, a share virtually

the same as that of the poorest 80% (36.2%). (Sao Paulo 1978: 60). The Population

Council (Ibid.: ll)quoting from studies by Kocher:(197) and Repetto.(1974) notes:

"Studies of the relationship between fertility and economic
development indicate that, for countries at similar aggregate
income levels, the less skewed the social and economic distribution,
the lower the overall fertility level and the more rapid the fertility
decline... In other words, the more the benefits of economic growth
accrue to a small minority of the population, the greater would be the
tendency for low-income groups to maintain high fertility."

The data presented here offer one possible explanation for these findings.

That is, poor families continue to have large families under conditions of

extreme income inequality4 soraa to hve- additinal wagHearners in the family.

High fertility levels of course mean increased number of workers, which can itself

keep wages down, by increasing competition for jobs, not only between men and

women but among men as well. Thus, high fertility levels may be contradictory

to the long-range, aggregate interests of the working class as a whole, but I

would argue, it still appears functional from the perspective of the individual

working-class family, which has only its labor to sell. As long as men as the

principal breadwinners are not being paid the equivalent of a family wage, that


is enough to support themselves and their dependents, then other members of the

family are forced to contribute. In Brazil today, minimum salaries do not even

cover the maintenance of the worker during his/her working years, no less the long-

term consumption needs of the household (Schmink 1979: 8).

Factory Women in New Jersey

In the early days of industrialization in the U.S., the textile industry also

.employed only young, unmarried women. In New England, where the textile industry

began, these women were primarily the daughters of farm and artisan families who

lived in boarding houses furnished by the factory and under close surveillance

from the management. However, as the industry burgeoned, the cost of these

relatively good living conditions for a resident female labor force grew too

expensive for textile owners, and they turned increasingly by the middle of the

19th century to immigrant labor from abroad. (Kessler-Harris 1975:220-1).

Immigration thus proved another fruitful way of reproducing a cheap labor supply,

particularly since immigrant women tended to work all their lives, married or not,

Married women often worked at home taking in boarders and sewing at exploitative

piecework rates on the putting out system.

With the entry of immigrant women into the labor force, working conditions in

the textile factories deteriorated rapidly, as did real wages. The cost of labor

decreased, since immigrant women were paid less and did not have to be accomodated

in relatively expensive boarding houses, which were designed primarily to protect

the chastity and reputation of native-born American women. The proportion of

gainfully employed immigrant women or their daughters increased steadily until

1910, when reform movements designed not only to improve factory conditions but to

"Americanize" these women began to take effect (Ibid.: 228). Immigrant women,

especially mothers, were encouraged to stay at home to take care of their children

and to regard retirement from paid labor rather than job advancement as a sign

of upward mobility (Ibid.: 223). Special concern was voiced over the health of

these women, probably reflecting as in Britain, a concern over the poor quality of

future generations.

One of the chief outcomes of the reform movement was the initiation of

protective legislation for women. Nothing so symbolized women's dual productive

and reproductive role. As Kessler-Harris (1975: 229) notes, protective legislation

"recognized that women had two jobs, one of which had to be limited if the other

were to be performed adequately. Yet legislation institutionalized the primary

role of social reproduction by denying that women were full-fledged members of the

working class... Protective legislation thus provided a device for dividing work-

ers along gender lines and stratifying the work force in a period when homogeneity

in levels of skill threatened to lead to developing class consciousness and to -. .

give rise to class conflict."

As in Brazil, protective legislation for women reduced competition with men

by reducing the economic desirability of female employees (Ibid.: 230). Reduced

competition from women and children was accompanied and probably contributed to

rising wages for men, which made it financially easier for many married women to

remain home. Unions also contributed to the establishment of a family wage,

though some unions were often antagonistic to women (Ibid.: 224). Humphries

(1977: 251-2) has documented the way in which both protective legislation and a

family wage were championed by the English working class as a way of reducing the

labor supply, particularly of married women. As in the United States, this was

also one of the few issues on which the working class could seek middle-class


Despite these obstacles, however, the percentage of married women in the

U.S. labor force has increased dramatically, especially since World War II, and as

of March 1974, represented 58% of all working women (U.S. Dept. of Labor 1975:16).


However, the increase has not been uniform in all sectors, or for all age and

ethnic groups. The tremendous growth in clerical jobs in the post-war period

attracted primarily young and childless white women initially, but the demand

gradually absorbed married women with children as well (Ibid.: 13-14). Black

women shifted out of the domestic service category into other types of service

jobs (Ibid.: 105). Older married women without clerical skills were relegated

to marginal industrial jobs like the garment industry. They face less competition

in these poorly paid, marginal industries from younger women, who prefer cleaner,

more well paid clerical jobs. Older women also possess the sewing skills

necessary to compete at the piecework rates on which most garment plants operate.

Because of its marginality, the garment industry has always provided a haven for

newly arrived immigrants, most recently Hispanics, who do not possess the

language and other educational skills needed in clerical and other types of

service employment.

1hile the median age of operatives and particularly sewers is higher

nationally than either clerical or service workers (1970 Census of Population,

Vol. I, Part I, Table 226), in the garment plant we studied in New Jersey, certain

special factors contributed to the older age of their female labor force. The

most important factor is that the plant basically has been following a slow

process of attrition, not hiring many workers in production since the 1950's.

However, many female workers who were hired in the 1940's and '50's have stayed

on, so that 71% have been working in the same plant twenty years and more.

Eighty percent of these women are over 40 and over half are married. The remain-

der are almost equally divided between single and formerly married (usually

widowed) women, the majority of whom are over 50. Most of these women live in the

local working-class neighborhood or nearby, the daughters of Italian, Polish, and

other east European workers who were attracted to the job possibilities in manual


labor in this area earlier in the century. Their husbands are also predominantly

factory workers, as are their brothers and sisters. They live in a blue-collar


The reason this plant has not hired many workers since the 1950's is that

production has been moving to other areas, first cheaper labor areas within the

U.S. (e.g. West Virginia), then to Puerto Rico in the 1950's, and now to newer

foreign areas like the Dominican Republic. This has become a prevalent trend

in the garment industry in the Northeast, which suffered a 40% decline in jobs

in the 1960-70 decade, a loss which continued at the rate of 12,000 jobs per year

through 1973. (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1975: 104-5). The decline is brought

on primarily by the desire to cut labor costs by moving to areas of lower wages

and non-unionized labor, both in the U.S. and abroad. The "runaway shop!' thus

represents a new strategy for supplying a cheap labor force in advanced

capitalist societies where unions and other factors have helped to drive up labor

costs, and is particularly attractive to labor-intensive industries such as

garment. Rather than importing immigrant labor, the runaway shop "exports jobs."

The women at the New Jersey plant are aware that jobs are being lost and

fear for the security of their own employment, even though the plant is unionized.

One of the chief complaints is that workers are constantly being switched from

one job to another (to replace lost personnel) which slows down their piecework

rate, and hence their wage. One of the brancbs of the factory often closes one

day a week for lack of work, and of course the women are not paid a full wage.

Wages in the garment industry are the lowest of any major industrial group

in the U.S., about $3.00 an hour in 1974 (NACLA 1976: 8). Though wages can be

increased substantially through piecework, almost 40% of the women sampled earn

between $100 and $139 a week, while the highest weekly salaries run to $160 and

over. Though much higher than those of Brazilian women factory workers, wages

K -15-

are still insufficient to support a family and barely enough for a single person

to live one. Over half the families sampled have a total annual income of less

than $10,000. Significantly, the lowest incomes are found among the single and

formerly married (mostly widowed) women in our sample, 40% of whom depend solely

on their own wages. In 68% of these families with a single wage earner, annual

incomes are under $8000. (Table 3) Single women live alone or with a relative

(usually a sister) and often in a home that they have inherited from their

parents and thus have considerably reduced housing costs. Widows and other

formerly married women either live alone (45%) or with their children (45%),

most of whom contribute to the family income. The highest incomes in this exS

are found in families with two or more wage earners, most of whom are husband

and wife. All but five of the forty married women in our sample have households

with two or more wage earners.

O ,1OVU:However, while both husband and wife may work, there is a clear difference

/ from the Brazilian multiple wage-earning family, particularly in the dependence

on' ldren. In New Jersey,children do not make a major contribution to

family income because 1) the number of children per family is quite small and

2) children recieve a much higher education, and require longer years of support.

Once they leave school, they tend to marry and have their own families to


The families of these New Jesey women factory workers are much smaller
than in Sao Paulo. Median .' size in New Jersey is approximately 2.5 com-

pared to 5.06 in Sao Paulo; 53% of these households consist of one or two persons.

While it must be recognized that most of these families are at a different

stage of the life cycle, with most children glawn and living outside the house-

hold, the total number of children they have had is also much smaller; over

half of the New Jersey women had only one or two children, while in Sao Paulo,

43.3% of our respondents had over five siblings.s)


This small number of children is all the more striking when compared to the

families in which these women were raised, which were much larger: 20% of

these New Jersey women had seven or more siblings, while another 20% had five to

[f. In short, when we compare total number of siblings among older women

factory workers in New Jersey, with the size of families in the younger genera-

tion in Sao Paulo, they begin to look very similar. Clearly there has been a

sharp decline in family size from their parents to their own generation among

our NeweJersey responded, T f

reign or o-tercturls in dg both cases,

we are dealing with a predominantly Catholic population; two thirds of the New

Jersey women as compared to 80% of the Sao Paulo women are Catholic.

There appear to be several factors that help explain this drastic reduction

in family size in New Jersey. First, many of these women were bearing children

during the depression, which induced low fertility levels in the U.S. generally.

Secondly, the economic value of American children during this period was reduced

by legislation such as child labor laws and compulsory education (which are also

law in Brazil, but often not implemented). Thirdly, contraceptive technology,

might have been more widespread in the U.S. during the period these women were

having children (1940-50) than in Brazil today, where income as well as lack of

information serves as a real barrier (Population Council, 1978: 16).

In addition, however, changes in labor demand and the consequent cost of

children in the U.S. may have induced these families to have fewer children. As

increased opportunities for both sexes opened up in the U.S. in white-collar

jobs, requiring higher levels of education, working class families may have

been induced to reduce their number of children in order to give them more

education. There was no longer a need for a large labor pool, as is still prev-

alent in Brazil, but for a smaller number of more highly skilled workers

------- -- --- --r----" U'--11--------------~----~ ~-

education. It is doubtful if they could have managed solely with the husband's

salary, since most men, like their wives, were employed in relatively low-paying

,' L factory jobs.

The movement out of blue-collar into white-coller jobscan be seen by

comparing the employment of the father and son. (Table 4) Whereas most fathers

(husbands of our respondents) were or are employed in blue-collar jobs, in

prepared to meet the growing demand for administrative as well as skilled

industrial jobs. At the same time, the cessation of large-scale immigration and

the movement of younger women into white-collar jobs opened up marginal jobs in

the garment indu try for older, married women who previously might have been

denied employment, The additional income provided by the women's employment,

whilp blue-collar or service work. While the sample here is very small and therefore

families with sons, 55% are employed in white-collar jobs compared to 40% in
_- .. -- - -

j -7IWhile it is difficult to establish a relationship between the mother's

~ employment and the children's education with the data collected here, it.is
worth noting that in all but a few cases, among the children who went to college

or graduate school, the mothers have been working twenty years and more.

Clearly we are dealing here with a very different survival strategy from

that observed among Brazilian working class women. Families are quite small,
should be Interpreted witn a great aeal or caution, tne trena rowara wniie-cuuxar

employment is unmistakable. The percentage of daughters in white-collar work

is even higher (70%) probably reflecting the surge in clerical employment among

women. In addition, the degree to which white-collar employment is dependent on

a higher education is shown by the fact that most of the oldest sons and

daughters of these New Jersey working-class families who now hold white-collar

inhq hnve hbee n to cnlee and sometimes Praduate school.1) (Table 5 and 6).


pUL.i ec.:LuaI .L.LJI, LIItUU~In Ti1 WI nIIOUL consiceraile rlnancial sbUl.'rto aiiU

sacrifice from their parents. As Gimenez (1977: 19) points out:

"Only under exceptional circtustances will the capitalist classes
'nake direct investments to upgrade the quality of sTecific sectors
of the labor force...Ordinarily that upgrading is financed by the
workers themselves who, by investing in their own 'human capital'
or by reproducing labor power of quality higher than their own,
through the training and/or education of their offspring, give rise
to the phenomenon of 'social mobility.' It is through the process
of self-upgrading, into which the working classes and salary earners
are forced, that differences i reproductive behavior e:lerre."

but both husband and wife work to promote their children's mobility fror blue-

collar into white-collar work. This reflects the decreasing demand for blue-

collar workers in the U.S., particularly anonf woren, and the tremendous

increase in white-collar and particularly clerical employ-ent. It also reflects

increasing educational opportunities in the U.S., made possible through mass
.. ~--~e-~..-1 -- .-~- ^ -- ^-1---..-1 --r. --^-^1-_--^ ___-^ __ ,--- 1- ___--I -~.--..- -^1 -I-0

Self-upgrading among work-ers involves a dual burden on the family; not only

up by the parents, and chiefly the brother. She writes:

"Since i.uch of the foregone labor of children is labor that
would have been allocated to the family farm which is
continued by mothers when fathers take ware labor on the
average, the mother's labor hours increase more than the
father's as children's education level increases." (Hinge-
Kalman 1978: 18).

must they bear the direct costs of education (sor-e of which may be absorbed by

the state), but they must also suffer the loss of their children's Taer which

would otherwise have been allocated to the family. Minge-Kalpan (197f) documents

this very well in the case of European peasant families v.io are in a transition

toward wage labor. As the children cease to work on the family farr and require

more years of education for skilled wage labor, their foregone labor is made :,


loss of wages in some way. The data from New Jersey factory families

would seem to suggest that they may compensate by having women continue

to work past the age of marriage and childbearing, which in turn may induce

the woman to have fewer children. This would then help explain why the

industrial female labor force in Sao Paulo (and Brazil generally) consists

largely of young, unmarried women while in the U.S. there is a much higher
I think a similar argument for a re-allocation of labor at the

household level can be made for urban working-class families. Here how-

ever, we are dealing with older children and young adults, aged 15-25,

whose labor is not appropriated directly by the family but contributed in

the form of wages to the family income. If these young people require

and have the opportunity to obtain a higher education, and cannot work and
rnTr,'ihiits^ *Tn C-imv *r-m< *.-,n ihr *mitv l t mt rTnmnncatP fnr thi4
married women in the U.S. helps compensate for the loss of their children's

percentage of older married women employed in factory work. The work of
-~^"D" ~~~~~----------------------~~"~~' ~ ~"-- -`--- -------r`-

mass, skilled labor market such as occurred in the United States or

western Europe during the height of industrial growth. (Safa 1977) In

1972-3, for example, of Sao Paulo's 735,000 employees in the industrial

sector, only 18% were skilled (Sao Paulo 1978: 74), despite the fact that

the city represents the height of Brazilian industrial growth. Thus,

wages. Ine change in the composition or tne family wage economy also

helps explain why Brazilian urban working class families continue to have

large families while New Jersey working class families have only a small

number of children.

The limited growth of the modern industrial sector, in a dependendent

capitalist society such as Brazil, where growth is heavily dependent on
fnrpion t+chnnn1nav eanitn- and ma-rk1At inhihitR the devenlnment of a




married women were only recruxteu iwri .iu an.... :

when the tremendous surge in clerical employment and prolonged education
exhausted the supply of younger, single women. Thus, it would appear to

be only at a later stage of industrialization, when there is a sharp

reduction in the demand for unskilled workers and an increasing demand

for skilled workers (in administrative and clerical tasks as well as

rnndictionl- and when there are educational opportunities readily available
Sao Paulo workers have not the incentive to educate their children ror a

more skilled labor market that our New Jersey families had. The continued

existence of a labor surplus also prevents the formal employment of more

marginal sectors of the labor force, such as married women with children,

who only entered the labor force in large numbers in the post-industrial

or monopoly capitalist phase of most advanced industrial societies. Older,

S.*--.-. .--a -s.eor in these marginal jobs
there may be a reduction in family size to enable working class families

to working class families to enable them to acquire these skills, that
by the anti-iaoor puyoi.L.i v. .....-. ..._

took power in 1964. Though they did succeed in promoting growth rates

of nearly 10 percent between 1968 and 1972, few of the benefits of this

boom went to the working class. On the contrary, in Sao Paulo itself,

the center of the boom, they paid for it in terms of declining real wages,

high infant mortality, malnutrition, lowered life expectancy, and other

to invest more in a few children than in the labor or many. rrpa4nia

children for these more skilled jobs requires more family expenditure and

\ a prolonged period of dependence which in itself may require married

0 'f women to work.

\ W~hile the problem of labor power in Brazil may be similar to other

dependent capitalist economics, it has undoubtedly been made more acute
-" --- -- .I Rna, ilian military government, which


their"succ'ess" appears to depend largely on the maintenance of a multiple

wage-earning strategy (cf. Schmink 1979:9).

indicators of worsening social conditions. (Wood 1978: 60-61 Sao Paulo

1978). As we have shown, despite the increasing numbers of household

members in the labor force, brought on by the decline in purchasing power,

real family income in Sao Paulo continued to drop between 1958 and 1969

(Ibid.: 59). Though the families studied here are by no means the

worst off in terms of income and other indicators of living standards,

1 to 3






4 to 7 4 4 10 20 38
Workers 10.5 10.5 26.3 52.6 38.4
33.3 22.2 29.4 57.1

7 to 10 0 0 1 0 1
lAbLtb -




No. of Workers Less than 3001 to 4001 to 6000-10,000 Cr. Row
in Household 3000 Cr. 4000 Cr. 6000 Cr. and more TOTAL













** Figures in cells represemtN, row percentage, and column percentage

________^T* ^ _v-t y ^y__________








Income in

Less than
3000 Cr.

3001 to
4000 Cr.













1 1 I .1
4001 to S j 27 2 34
6000 Cr. 14.7 79.4 5.9 34.3
33.3 33.3 66.7

More than 3 31 1 35
6001 Cr. 8.6 88.6 2.9 35.4
20.0 38.3 33.3






** Figures in cells represent N, row percentage, and column



Under 3 4 3 10
$5000 30.0 40.0 30.0 1552
12.5 13.8 23.1

$5000 13 X 4 3 20
to $7999 65.0 20.0 15.0 30.3
54.2 13.8 23.1




$8000 5 5 2 12
to $9999 41.7 41.7 16.7 .18.2
7n R -17 ? 15_4

Column 24 29 13 66
Total 36.4 43.9 19.7 100.0

**Figures in cells represent N,,row percentage, and column
percentage respectively.

$10,000 2 -10 2 14
to $15,999 14.3 -71.4- 14.3 21.2
8.3 34.5 15.4

and over





















rjyv-,l^ ->^..^^.




in cells represent N, row percentage, and column
*r6n-sernn.ners ro-cnir t- p1 1V1




Column 11 8 1 20
Total 55.0 40.0 5.0 100.0




First Son





High 3 7 1 11
School I--LL-' 27.3 63.6 9.1 44.0
23.1 63.6 100.0






By -


Workantinn nf
lra ua e





. ............. I ... .. i



** Figures in cells represent N, row percentage,
percentage respectively.

and column







. .I



Education of
-First Daughter



" 'Ed ......
















**Figures in cells represent N, row percentage, and column
percentage respectively.

High School Crv 5 5 0 10
J-* 50,0 50.0 0.0 43.5
31,3 83,3 0,0

College 9 1 1 11
81.8 9.1 9.1 47.8



[I I -

choices are snapea oy tneir pju~Lun 1n ... .... -, -
and social structures in which the households is located, and by the
processes of change which these structures are undergoing."

3) In 1976-77, the minimum salary in Brazil was equivalent to U.S. 71
monthly. (Population Council 1978: 15). It is adjusted annually based
on a complicated formula combining productivity and cost of living

4) Most of the married women have been married only a short time (less than
5 years) and only 10 have children.

c, MTn4imum uanPC a-re lower for non-existent) for minors, which makes them
1) Because of the small size, the sample does not pretelxu ivu u r-o-
tive of factory women in either locale. We are more interested in the
relationship between work and other variables in the two cultures.

2) Tilly (1978a: 3) defines the analysis of family strategies as "the
principals which lead to observable regularities or patterns of
behavior among households. It asks who participates in making decisions,
what concerns and constraints impinge on them. It asks who bears the
cost or benefits from strategies in which individual interests or needs
are often subordinated." Tilly (Ibid.) adds that "these strategies have
different effects on individuals, depending on their position and
activities in the family. All households members' imperatives and
torce (bao rauio '3 >'rJf .- ''--" 4n -h. Fmilv hv the economic

6) The percentage of women working at home in Sao Paulo in 1972 increased
A -g --- 4 A ;gyf ci I% i n rrca? e
all the more attractive for unskilled factory jobs. In f192 in ao
Paulo 70% of the boys and 49.5% of the girls aged 15-19 were in the labor

9) Because of the wide age differences in our sample and since so few of
our Brazilian respondents are married, we compared the size of the family
in which Brazilian factory workers were raised, with the total number of
children borne by New Jersey factory women.

10) The Population Council: 13) reports that "among children aged 7-10, the
proportion enrolled in school in 1970 was 66.3%, although the first
eight years of schooling are free and "compulsory".

from 38% at ages 25-29, to 63.4% at ages uo-au, auu IuI>,.i.U ..---
through age 69. (Sao Paulo 1978: 75).

7) In Sao Paulo in 1961, 62.9 infants died per 1000 live births compared to
89.5 in 1970 and 95 in 1973. Much of this is attributed to the decline
in the real minimum wage, lack of public services such as water and s
sewers,and malnutrition.

8) Protective legislation in the U.S. initially included regulation of hours
of work (e.g. no night shifts, limited number of hours), minimum wages,
and sanitary working conditions. It is interesting that minimum wages
for women were established earlier than for men.

- 11) Miriam Cohen (1977) documents the way in which the changing employment
*.t .... ;In a, Vnrak rity- Arrl.in. the danresiotnn induced Italian

fact, when production reached its peak in the early 1950's and labor
was in scarce supply, the factory was very lenient with married women,
allowing them unpaid maternity leaves, time off during summer vacations
or when their children became ill, etc.

at tU I *. '--I[- LS A ------
working class families to orient their daughters toward white-collar
work because the future looked better than in factory (largely garment)
labor, resulting as well in a marked increase in educational levels.
For example, by 1950, while only 8% of the first generation of Italian
female workers were employed in clerical labor, 40% of the second
generation were in those occupations. Cohen attributes this not to
embourgeoisement, but as a shift in working-class strategies made
necessary by the city's employment structure. (Ibid.: 135).

12) Although many of the women in our New Jersey sample were hired at an
early age, I would argue they would not have been retained had there
been an ample supply of younger, single women to replace them. In

Arizpe, Lourdes

America, Vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 3 11.

Bureau of Labor Statistics

1975 A Socio-economic Profile of Puerto Rican New Yorkers. U.S. Dept.
of Labor, Middle Atlantic Regional Office, New York, N.Y. Regional
Report 46.

Cohen, Miriam

1977 Italian-American Women in New York City, 1900-1950: Work and
School. In Milton Cantor and Bruce Laurie, eds. CLASS, SEX,AND
"M!t I. tAN1 t1'irnnrn 1 <-r--- ; .-,*I rTno rwnAr PT-rpq -
1977 Women in the Informal Labor Sector: The Case of Mexico City. In
Women and National Development: The Complexities of Change.
Chicago: U. of Chicago Press.

Blay, Eva Alterman

1978 Trabalho Demesticado: A Mulher na Industria Paulista. Sao Paulo:
Editora Atica.

Bridenthal, Renate

1976 The Dialectics of Production and Reproduction in History. Radical

1977 Population and Capitalism. Latin American Perspectives, Issue 15,
YRfulnW Y-bZRf-A me. i- ,, -s--...-T ---

Gimenez, Martha
Minge-Kalman, Wanda

1978 A Theory of the European Household Economy during the Peasant to
Worker Transition: with an Empirical Test from a Swiss Alpine
Village. Ethnology.

1975 Capital's Flight: The Apparel Industry Moves South. Vol. XI, No.
3, New York, New York.

Humphries, Jane

1977 Class Struggle and the Persistence of the Working Class Family.
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1, 241-258.

Kessler Harris, Alice

1975 Stratifying by Sex. Understanding the History of Working Women.
In LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION. Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich,
David M. Gordon, eds. Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Co.

Population Council

Sao Paulo Justice and Peace Commission

1978 Sao Paulo: Growth and Poverty. London: Bowderdean Press.

Schmink, Marianne

1979 Women, Men and the Brazilian Model of Development.
ed at Latin American Studies Association. Mimeo.

Paper present-

Tilly, Louise A. and Joan VW. Scott
.. ....-- W- Iniv New York. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
1978 Brazil: Country Profiles. Prepared by Mello Moreira, Lea Melo
da Silva and Robert McLuughlin.

Safa, Helen Icken

1977 The Changing Class Composition of the Female Labor Force in Lati..
America. Latin American Perspectives. Issue 15, Volume IV, no.
4, pp. 126-136.

Saffioti, Heleieth

1971 A Mulher na Sociedade de Classes. Brazil: Quatro Artes.
Michigan Occasional Paper no. iv, rut ..-, ---,

"." 19yy-"'?o..me n., 7-Ju^bat ..... .. .

1978a Wlomen and Family Strategies in French Proletarian Families.
Case of Sao Paulo and Belo"'iorl'aite- AThb.a.. Mich.
Vol. IV, No. 4, pp. 56-65.

Wool, Harold

1976 Future Labor Supply for Lower Level Occupations.
Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, March pp. 22-31.

Monthly Labor

U.Z* UtIp.CL LUtIAL. --

1975 1975 Handbook on Women Workers. Women's Bureau, Bulletin 197.

Vasquez de Miranda, Glaura

1977 Women's Labor Force Participation in a Developing Society: The
Case of Brazil. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society.
Vol. 3, No. 1.

Wood, Charles H.

1977 Infant Mortality Trends and Capitalist Development in Brazil: The
-- --- .. Tfi-n American Perspectives

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