Title Page
 Concept - What was the basic technical...
 Design - How was this basic technical...
 Implementation - How was the project...
 Evaluation - How was the project's...
 Institutionalization - How did...
 Annex A - Project description...
 How to order reports in this...

Group Title: CDIE working paper ; no. 112
Title: Guatemala food productivity and nutritional improvement project (520-0232)
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00073359/00001
 Material Information
Title: Guatemala food productivity and nutritional improvement project (520-0232)
Series Title: CDIE working paper
Alternate Title: Case studies of A.I.D. Farming Systems Research & Extension (FSRE) Projects, Case Study no. 10
Physical Description: 25 leaves : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Byrnes, Kerry J., 1945-
Publisher: Center for Development Information and Evaluation, Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Washington DC
Publication Date: 1984?
Subject: Agricultural extension work -- Guatemala   ( lcsh )
Food supply -- Guatemala   ( lcsh )
Nutrition -- Guatemala   ( lcsh )
Genre: government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: Guatemala
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references (leaves 20-22).
Statement of Responsibility: Kerry J. Byrnes.
General Note: Caption title.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00073359
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 80936612

Table of Contents
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page 1
    Concept - What was the basic technical idea underlying the project?
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
    Design - How was this basic technical idea translated into a project?
        Page 6
    Implementation - How was the project managed by the host-country implementing agency, the TA team, and USAID?
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
    Evaluation - How was the project's performance measured or assessed?
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Institutionalization - How did the project provide for the implementing agency to develop a sustainable capability to continue to perform the types of activities supported by the project?
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
    Annex A - Project description sheet
        Page 23
        Page 24
    How to order reports in this series
        Page 25
Full Text
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Case Studies of
A-I.D. Farming Systems Research & Extension (FSR/E) Projects

Case Study No. 10

Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement Project'


Kerry J. Byrnes2

Center for Development Information and Evaluation
Agency for International Development
Washington, DC 20523

'This CDIE Working Paper is one of the case studies prepared
for a cross-cutting analysis of A.I.D. FSR/E projects, A Review of
A.I.D. Experience with Farming Systems Research and Extension
Projects (A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study, forthcoming). The 12
FSR/E projects reviewed in this series are:

Botswana Agricultural Technology Improvement (633-0221)
Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management (635-0203)
Lesotho Farming Systems Research (632-0065)
Malawi Acri-llrc-1 r' --rch (C12-0202)
Senegal Agricultural Research and Planning (685-0223)
Tanzania Farming Systems Research (621-0156)
Zambia Agricultural Development Research & Extension (611-0201)
Nepal Agricultural Research and Production (367-0149)
Philippines Farming Systems Development-Eastern Visayas (492-0356)
Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement (520-0232)
Honduras Agricultural Research (522-0139)
ROCAP Small Farm Production Systems (596-0083)

Information on how to order any of the CDIE Working Papers this
series is provided on the last page of this report.

Senior Social Science Analyst, Program and Policy Evaluation
Division, CDIE. This case study, prepared under a CDIE contract
with Labat-Anderson Incorporated, is based on a review of project
evaluation documentation. Interpretation of the data reported is
that of the author and should not be attributed to A.I.D. or Labat-
Anderson Incorporated-

Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement Project

The Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement
(FPNI) Project was submitted by USAID/Guatetmala to AID/W in
December 1974, and was approved, as a five-year project, April
29, 1975, for $1,823,000. The FPNI Project was implemented by
the Agricultural Science and Technology Institute (ICTA), a
semiautonomous agency of the Government of Guatemala (GOG).

The FPNI Project was evaluated four times. An initial
evaluation was conducted in October 1975 (Harpstead, et al.,
1975); a second evaluation in January-February 1977 (McDermott,
1977a); and a third in February 1978 (Mann and Dougherty, 1978).
Finally, a project impact evaluation was conducted in May i980
(McDermott and Bathrick, 1982).

The project impact evaluation noted that ICTA was organized
around a concept and style of operation that came to be called
"farming systems research" (FSR). While the evaluation pointed
out that ICTA makes almost no use of this term, ICTA's approach
to agricultural research brings researchers into closer contact
with the farmer-client than does the traditional research method-
ology. ICTA's approach, by helping researchers to know and to
understand the farmer,

enables them to direct their research efforts to seeking
technology improvements that are relevant to his system.
Because ICTA was assigned the small farm operator as its
exclusive client, it directs its efforts toward generating
technology relevant to small farm systems. ...innovations
are tested by small farmers in their system before being
releasc-d or recommended for use on small farms. .
Farmers collaborate in the process of research by employing
recommended practices and by evaluating the results...as to
appropriateness. Employing this approach, farmer confidence
with new technologies results in considerable informal
dissemination to other farmers even before information is
released to extension workers and officially promoted.
Accordingly, the traditional gap separating agricultural
research and extension is significantly reduced (McDermott
and Eathrick, 1982:3).

In reviewing this project, it is important to bear in mind
that support for this project was provided by a number of organi-
zations including USAID/Guatemala, the Rockefeller Foundation,
and two International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs)--the
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and the
International Tropical Agriculture Research Center (CIAT).

Concept What was the basic technical idea underlying the

FPNI's origin may be traced to the late 1960s, when the GOG
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the country's rural
areas. The assessment indicated that food production was just
barely keeping pace with growing demand and that rural incomes
and farmer productivity were stagnating. Further, increasing
amounts of foreign exchange were being used to purchase basic
food imports including maize and beans. In 1979, in response to
this situation, the GOG approved a five-year development plan
(1971-75) that shifted public sector priorities from the agricul-
tural export sector to the food crop sector (subsistence and
commercial production for domestic consumption); and provided for
restructuring the public sector agricultural institutions.

USAID/Guatemala assisted the GOG in carrying out this plan
through a series of projects. One of these, Agricultural Devel-
opment (No. 520-11-190-197.1), sought to improve the agricultural
extension capabilities of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and
to assist in establishing an agricultural research institute
(ICTA) responsive to small farmer technology problems.

As part of this plan, the MOA was reorganized and four new
autonomous agencies were created:

National Agricultural Commercialization Agency (INDECA), to
establish a national basic grains price stabilization pro-
gram including the operation of grain storage centers;

National Agricultural Development Bank (BANDESA), to provide
agricultural production credit and loans for farm capital

Directorate General of Agricultural Services (DIGESA), to
provide technical assistance at the farm level in farm
planning activities leading to preparation and supervision
of production credit loans; and

Agricultural Science and Technology Institute (ICTA), tc
carry out applied and adaptive research programs aimed at
increasing basic grain and vegetable yields.

ICTA was formally created in 1973. From the outset, the
Rockefeller Foundation provided, through CIAT, four expatriate
professionals to assist ICTA's staff in planning and implementing
the Institute's research program. These individuals included an
adjunct director (as staff advisor to ICTA's General Manager), a
technical director, an experiment station specialist, and an
agricultural economist (to serve as coordinator of ICTA'S
rural socio-economics "support discipline" team).

The FPNI Project impact evaluation in May 1980 reported that
planning for the development of ICTA had taken two years and had
involved five work groups including scientists from Guatemala and
other Latin American countries. Experiences from other agricul-
tur-1 research projects such as Plan Puebla in Mexico were care-
full' considered. However, during ICTA's first two years, and
prior to FPNI, ICTA's departmental organization on the basis of
agricultural disciplines was reorganized into a national commod-
ity pro.'-am system which brought together the various scientific
discipli zs to focus on specific crops. Experiment stations were
renamed "c -ntros de producci6n" (production centers) and became
ICTA regior. -1 headquarters. Farm-level testing of crop varieties
and agronom.- practices was initiated in three regions, following
farm-level research guidelines developed by ICTA leaders.

These guidelines were flexible so that research method-
ologies could evolve out of the experiences gained in the
field. ICTA planners also specified that [researchers]
should determine farmer acceptance or nonacceptance by
introducing...new technologies to farmers directly and
incorporating farmer evaluations into the research effort
(McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:4).

While organizational and other startup problems (e.g.,
frictions with DIGESA) were encountered during ICTA's first two
years, the Institute stayed on course to address four specific
problems that had been identified during the rural assessment:
(1) lack of adequate technology for the small farmer, (2) inade-
quate farm testing of the technology being recommended, (3) lack
of evaluation of farmer acceptance of a recommended technology,
and (4) the researchers' lack of knowledge of farmer problems and
their insufficient contact with the extension agents. ICTA's
approach to addressing these problems was summarized in an ICTA-
prepared statement outlining the Institute's philosophy and
policy (A.I.D., 1975:Annex A, p. 2), as follows:

ICTA is a member of the governmental sector and determines
its programs in collaboration with the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, the National Planning Council, the Sector Planning
Office, and other institutions in the Aqriculture Sector.

The programs of ICTA are directed toward contributing to
increased production and the welfare of the small- and
medium-sized farmer.

ICTA scientists are not only responsible for developing
technology but also for its utility and application.

ICTA believes that the appropriate technology can only be
developed by studying the problems at the farm level and in
consultation with the farmer, and by testing the technology
with farmers before practices are recommended.

ICTA must concern itself not only with the technology of
agriculture, but also the customs of the farmer and his
family, availability of inputs and credit, markets, economic
feasibility, infrastructure, and the general quality of
Rural living.--

ICTA must coordinate its programs and activities with
BANDESA, INDECA, DIGESA, and other groups related to the
rural sector.

In late 1973, an AID/W Technical Assistance Bureau (TAB)-
sponsored team visited Guatemala to explore the possibility of a
project to extend the International Maize and Wheat Improvement
Center's (CIMMYT) breakthrough research results in high lysine,
high yielding corn. The team concluded that Guatemala would be
an ideal site for a R&D project on high lysine corn, and that
research findings from the country's lowland and highland areas
could be applied in other countries. While the potential of high
lysine corn was an influential factor in the design, approval,
and authorization of the FPNI Project, this project component was
eventually set aside because no genetic material suitable for the
highlands was available. As a result, the FPNI Project focused
on providing ICTA with continued TA for research on conventional
maize (Guatemala's predominant food crop), other basic grains,
and vegetables.

As defined in the PP (A.I.D., 1975), the goal of the FPNI
Project was "to improve the quality of life of rural Guatemalans
by increasing the quantity and nutritional quality of food avail-
able for consumption and by increasing small farmer incomes in
the process" (PP, p. 1). The project purpose was to "improve the
GOG's capability to develop, screen and introduce new and/or
improved seed varieties, cultural practices and crop mixes while
putting presently available improved farming techniques into
practice." Specifically, the project sought to develop and
strengthen ICTA's capability to carry out a field program of
adaptive research on and farm-level testing of improved tech-
nology for basic food crops.

Carrying out this field program was the responsibility of
ICTA's Technical Production Unit. This unit was organized by
programs along commodity lines, with major emphasis on basic
grains. For each commodity program, a Crop Research team was
formed to carry out research planning and implementation for that
commodity. These teams worked across regions and operated
through eight experiment stations (centros de producci6n) located
in five of the eight agricultural regions of the country.

Within each centro de producci6n, there were one or more
Technology Validation (TV) teams. Each TV team carried out on-
station experiments, as well as on-farm experimental trials
(ensayos de finca). The teams also provided advice to farmers
who cooperated in farmer tests (parcelas de prueba) designed to
validate technology generated in experimental trials. According
to the third evaluation, each TV team carried out experiments and
tests for all crops being researched in the team's assigned
geographic area.

These teams are not separate research groups, but rather,
they execute the research activities agreed upon by the
various Crop Research teams and the Director of Experiment
Station serving that particular geographic area. The
Technology Validation teams are under the administrative
control of the Experiment Station Director for the region in
which they are located, but collaborate closely with, and
are under the technical guidance of the Coordinator of the
Crop Research team and his staff for the experiments and
tests for that crop. There presently are eicht Technology
Validation teams attached to the various research stations
(Mann and Dougherty, 1978:16).

Technical backstopping for the TV teams was provided by
commodity teams organized to develop, for each main ecological
region, high-yielding crop varieties and related agronomic
practices. The PP outlined the operational method, developed and
adapted from the Puebla Plan in Mexico, for linking the produc-
tion (TV) and commodity teams:

Close contact is maintained with the production teams so as
to ensure adequate feedback as well as the transfer of
research results. Each commodity group is responsible for
providing necessary technical. assistance in the production
of foundation seed for varieties released for production. A
key staff member of each commodity group is the production
specialist who is highly experienced in the production of
the particular crop concerned (A.I.D., 1975:7).

Tn addition to the above, the Technical Production Unit
included five "support discipline" (disciplJna de apoyo) teams
that worked across crop lines and regions. The support disci-
pline teams were rural socio-economics, soils management, train-
ing, communications, and registered seed production. These teams
provided indepth expertise in their particular disciplines in
support of the various crop (and animal) research programs, and
carried out their own research activities where such work did not
fit conveniently into a particular Crop Research program. To the
extent that these teams carried out their own experiments, they
operated through the regional staffs attached to experiment sta-
tions, and utilized the same system of station experiments, on-
farm experiments, and farmer tests (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:17).

Agricultural research in the ICTA model is directed toward
specific agro-ecological areas representative of a larger uni-
verse. Researchers focus on technologies that are profitable to
and can be adopted by small farmers. The knowledge of various
disciplines, such as plant breeding, entomology, economics, and
sociology, is focused on a particular crop or the prevalent crop
mix in an area. For example:

Social scientists contribute by studying how farmers make
management decisions and how innovations can be introduced
which are respectful of family labor constraints, customary
behavior patterns, and cultural practices. Input/output
budgets to assess the profitability of each recommendation
are carefully developed and analyzed (McDermott and
Bathrick. 1982:3).

Commenting on ICTA's research strategy, the PP noted that
the strategy was not limited to improving crop varieties. The
strategy "seeks to improve cultural practices... by concen-
trating]...on the major constraints identified in the respective
regions. The regional production teams make periodic assessments
of the respective regions...to identify the major bottlenecks"
(A.I.D., 1975:9).

Design How was this basic technical idea translated into a

The project design outlined in the PP identified the
following as the major project outputs: development and
availability to small farmers of improved varieties for corn,
sorghum, and beans; a technology demonstration program underway
for high quality vegetable production; and trained professional
research and extension staff developed and on-board at ICTA.

The project inputs identified in the project design included
TA, participant training, and commodities.

In the area or TA, project funds were to be u.ised to tinance
the continuation of a four-person TA team to ICTA that had been
initiated under the Agricultural Development Project. (This was
a different TA team than the four-person TA team funded by the
Rockefeller Foundation). It should be noted that ICTA's charter
allowed foreigners to fill ICTA line positions.

The new project altered somewhat the position descriptions
for two of the four on-going AID-funded TA positions. Further,
FPNI called for three new positions (corn breeder, corn produc-
tion, and a research coordinator with expertise in organizing and
implementing multi-crop, integrated research and extension
programs). The basic expertise provided by this mix of TA
specialists was to fill research management and line positions
within ICTA. The TA was to be provided directly to four of the
major crop research programs (corn, sorghum, beans, and vege-
tables) and, through these programs, to the centros de producci6n
and Technology Validation teams.

The design also provided for 12 person months of short-term
consulting support.

The participant training component provided for ten years of
graduate training in U.S. and/or Mexican institutions in such
fields as plant breeding, plant pathology, entomology, and

The PP also outlined other inputs that would be provided by
other organizations. Of these, perhaps the two most important
were provision of short-term TA, participant training, and
genetic materials support by the IARCs (CIMMYT and CIAT); and
continued provision of the four-person TA team funded by the
Rockefeller Foundation.

Implementation How was the project managed by the host-country
implementing agency, the TA team, and USAID?

At the outset of FPNI, ICTA was understaffed with agricul-
tural professionals, with four employees attending long-term
training programs, and five scheduled to depart during 1975.
During this period, ICTA was very dependent on expatriate TA
personnel being provided by donors. When FPNI was approved in
April 1975, the four TA positions being funded urder the USAID/
Guatemala Agricultural Development Project were absorbed into
fPNL and three positions were added. However, there was a delay
of two years before three of the seven positions were filled
(Mann and Dougherty, 1978:20)). In addition to the four Project-
funded TA positions, the Rockefeller Foundation was providing
four TA specialists.

The project impact evaluation noted that the quality of the
TA provided and the way in which it was employed were important
to the successful institutional development that took place. In
this regard, the evaluation team observed that most of the FPNI
TA personnel were in line positions, while all of the Rockefeller
Foundation-funded TA personnel were in line positions.

For example, two leaders of the three original regional pro-
duction teams were AID-supported contract personnel. One of
them was later transferred into the position of technical
director, where he supervised all technical operations. The
other served as training supervisor as well as production
team leader before becoming leader of the national sorghum
program. Both were replaced as production team leaders by
Guatemalans, and all teams in the newly activated regional
programs were staffed by Guatemalans (McDermott and
Bathrick, 1982:5).

The second evaluation (McDermott, 1977a) identified several
problems facing the project. Perhaps most crucial was the fact
that ICTA was losing personnel. During 1976, ICTA lost nearly
20% (27 out of 140) of its personnel. The explanation most often
given was that ICTA's salaries were lower than those in the
private sector. On the other hand, the evaluation pointed out
that a person employed by ICTA gained training and experience
that were in great demand in other parts of the agricultural
sector. While ICTA had established a nine-month pre-service
training school in El Oriente, in 1976 the school graduated only
14 students, which was just over half of the 1976 attrition that
occurred in ICTA.

But the evaluation also found that one of ICTA's very strong
points was its work on "the process by which technology innova-
tion is induced by a public entity in a deliberate manner for a
specific audience or clientele" (McDermott, 1977a:13). The
evaluation noted that ICTA was relying heavily on technology
sources (e.g., IARCs and U.S. universities) to access agricul-
tural science and technology. ICTA's research strategy was to
move technology (e.g., genetic material of corn) from these
sources; to highly-controlled experiments at the centros de
produccio6n; to on-farm, researcher-managed experiments; to on-
farm, farmer-managed tests; and, for a successful technology, to
dissemination by DIGESA and others.

ICTA did not work solely with new varieties; experiments
were also conducted in the area of cultural practices (e.g., time
a experiments, however, were conducted on farm rather than on the
experiment station. It may be noted, however, that a later
(third) project evaluation found that the project's primary
emphasis was on varietal improvement. The evaluation stated
that, while "some work has been done, and is continuing, on
improved agronomic and cultural practices, this appears to have
second priority both in terms of emphasis by AID funded tech-
nicians and by ICTA as a whole" (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:16).

During this process, the selection of research problems and
the technologies to be tested were to be informed by the s-cio-
economics research program (i.e., farm surveys, farm records,
etc.). However, the evaluation noted that:

Gathering information is one thing. The use of the data and
information in identifying problems and deciding on the most
significant opportunity for technology development and
application is another. Currently, there does not seem to
be a standardized process (McDermott, 1977a:14).

An earlier example of the lack of such a standardized process was
encountered by the first evaluation team in 1975. That team

noted some confusion among ICTA personnel in the distinction
between on-farm experiments and field tests. It also noted
a certain tendency to regard the field tests or on-farm
tests more as demonstrations in the extension mode than as
the final test of the technology generation process
(McDermott, 1977a:16).

By the second evaluation in 1977, this confusion had apparently
"to a very great extent" been cleared up within ICTA (McDermott,
1977a:16). The evaluation reported that ICTA had

cleared up some of its own internal confusion about (1) the
distinction between ensayos de la finca and pruebas del
campo, sometimes called parcelas de prueba, and (2) whether
a prueba del campo is a part of the technology development
process or extension work (McDermott, 1977a:8).

However, what was yet needed, the second evaluation stated,
was to improve the linkage of ICTA with DIGESA and other diffu-
sion agencies. On this count, the evaluation noted that:

There seems to be a clear recognition of the fact that ICTA
simply cannot diffuse the technology alone. It needs DIGESA
and others. This recognition did not exist in October, 1975
(McDermott, 1977a:8).

By 1977, the second evaluation found that ICTA was considering a
prueba del campo as a farmer test of a technology, with a minimum
of assistance and supervision by ICTA. But ICTA had not yet
developed "vital linkages" with Guatemalan diffusion agencies
such as DIGESA (McDermott, 1977a:19), nor was it clear how ICTA's
recognition of the need for such linkages was "going to be
translated into effective action" (McDermott, 1977a:8). The
evaluation reported that "ICTA is now discussing the need to
involve DIGESA and others in the pruebas, with the intent to let
the extension people participate in such a manner that they
become convinced just as the farmers do" (McDermott, 1977a:8).

The second evaluation commented favorably on ICTA's socio-
economics program supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. This
program was engaged in developing farm surveys, farm records,
ecological area identification, analytical methodology for
experimental data, evaluation of technology, and measuring farmer
acceptability of practices under consideration for release as
ICTA recommendations. While certain components (e.g., farm
records) of the socio-economics program were "becoming of
increasing value to ICTA" (McDermott, 1977a:12), the evaluation
reported that many ICTA personnel (e.g., production team members
responsible for farm tests) lacked confidence in some parts of
the program (e.g., tile farm surveys).

Yet the socio-economics program was producing information of
importance to ICTA's overall research program. Consider the
following example:

The economists...claim that increasing corn yields in the
Altiplano will likely not increase corn production. The
rationale is that corn is of primary concern only until
there is enough produced for home consumption needs. If
there is to be surplus production for the market, the
farmers would rather grow another crop, wheat or vegetables.
Thus, the vegetable project and the corn project may be
quite linked (McDermott, 1977a:13).

Similarly, in a 1977 trip report, McDermott (1977b) reported
that ICTA's socio-economic unit was

doing some innovative work in farming systems and farm
management, both in substance and in analytical concepts and
procedures. Analytically, "yields" are thought of not only
on units of land, but also in units of the factor that is
rost limiting. Economists, for example, claim that in one
area of the country, farmers exhaust their supply of bean
seed before any other factor, such as labor or land, is
exhausted. In these situations, yields are expressed per
unit of seed. The technology or system most needed is one
that maximizes production per seed unit.

McDer-ott (1977b:7) also noted that testing of cropping systems
technologies by the socio-economics unit had found

that a change in the spatial arrangements of maize opens two
new alternatives. In one experiment maize production was
increased 40 percent with the same land input and a 20
percent increase in labor by increasing the population.
Another alternative is to intercrop. In this same experi-
ment corn population and yields could be maintained while
making 40 percent of the l;ind available for wheat. In a
modification of the pattern, cabbage was produced in the
wheat with no appreciable impact on maize and wheat yields.

Yet, as McDermott (1977b) also reported, the "farming
systems-farm management work" of the socio-economics unit had
"not been widely accepted in other ICTA programs." Some ICTA
personnel considered the work on farming systems as "theoretical
and outside ICTA's method of operation. The idea of
anthropologists planting crops hasn't been accepted" (McDermott,

By the time of the second evaluation (1977), ICTA was making
plans to expand the regional production team concept by opening
up new areas in the three regions in which it was operating, and
by opening up new regions, one each in 1977 and 1978. ICTA had
also come to place a greater emphasis on income and welfare
criteria, as compared with production of basic food grains. The
rationale was that even greatly improved yields of basic grains
on small acreages would have relatively little impact on farm
income; further, there were indications that once farmers satisfy
family needs for corn, they produce other commodities, not a
surplus of corn, because of price. With this realization,
interest was growing within ICTA in alternatives such as fruits,
vegetables, and livestock.

FPNI's third evaluation was conducted in early 1978 (Mann
and Dougherty, 1978). Project funding, the evaluation noted, had
been oriented largely toward varietal improvement research in
corn, sorghum, and bean. However, with the high quality of the
varietal improvement TA provided by the project, the evaluation
team felt that an imbalance had developed in ICTA's ability to
link information generation with information transfer. What ICTA
needed at this stage of its institutional development was TA "to
assist in improving the system of forward and backward linkages
between the information generation and information transfer
processes" (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:1). This linkages also
needed improvement in order to speed up progress of work in
improved agronomic and cultural practices as compared with
variety improvement (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:1).

The evaluation noted that, while basic grains will continue
to be a major part of small farmer production in Guatemala for
inny tye her, thre w.is ai "need to improve s mall farmers' incomes
...beyond that which can be achieved through improvement of basic
grains production alone" (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:3). Thus,
ICTA needed to mount more effective research programs in fruit,
vegetable, and small animal production, and to allocate research
resources to determine the production potential of crop and
livestock alternatives that might have a comparative advantage
under Guatemalan conditions.

The relationship between the USAID/Guatemala-assisted com-
modity programs and the Rockefeller Foundation-assisted socio-
economic research program had considerably enhanced ICTA's
research capability to respond more effectively to farmers'
production problems. But the evaluation found that there was
"little evidence of integrated efforts on the part of the
commodity groups and the socio-econcmic group to deal with
constraint alleviation within a whole farm/household context"
(Mann and Dougherty, 1978:3). Here the evaluation commented:

The importance of this integration is especially pronounced
in the Altiplano because of land scarcity and surplus family
labor. Associated cropping is an important means whereby
the farmer attempts to more intensively use the land avail-
able to him and at the same time to more effectively utilize
the family labor supply (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:3).

The socio-economic team had done some work with associated
cropping in the Chimaltenango region; however, the evaluation
felt that "AID inputs to ICTA commodity programs should pay
special attention to this problem by focusing more specifically
on cross-commodity integration" (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:3).

The need for more effective research on "cross-commodity
integration" was especially noted with respect to ICTA's vege-
table research program. Given the potential for expanded pro-
duction of cool climate vegetables by traditional small farmers
in the Altiplano, the third evaluation concluded

that relatively more research resources should be allocated
to cool climate vegetable research as compared to warm
climate vegetables and to basic grains research. .
Work with cool climate vegetables probably would give
greatest emphasis to agronomic and cultural practices, and
would require close integration r ith highlands research
activities in corn, wheat and beans, since much vegetable
production would likely be carried out in association: or in
succession, with these crops (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:8).

I nt i(jr-.tion ot th s;ocio-ecolnomic unit with commoctity specialists;
would enable ICq'A "to maximize the inputs" of commodity special-
ists "toward more efficient utilization of all factors of produc-
tion available to the small farmer" (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:3).
But the evaluation cautioned that the integration of specialties
and crops

cannot be achieved merely by seeking cooperation among the
various crop research teams. Rather we consider the work in
this area to be sufficiently important to justify establish-
ment of a produ'-ction research team that is specifically
charged with research in associated and successive cropping
(Mann and Dougherty, 1978:9).

Thus, while ICTA had initiated activities on a very narrow range
of crops (basic grains), the requirement to improve production,
productivity, and incomes of small farmers implied the need for
ICTA to expand its scope of research to include (1) associated
and successive cropping systems, (2) horticultural and fruits
production, (3) large and small animal production, (4) cropping
alternatives (potential new crops), (5) farm management and small
farm production planning, and (6) techniques of technology
transfer to large numbers of small farmers (Kann and Dougherty,

The organizational emphasis in ICTA's early years had been
on the concept of the crop-specific program team. In view of the
above considerations, the third evaluation felt that there was a
growing need to give relatively greater emphasis to the formation
of a wider range of support discipline discipliness de apovo)
teams that could work across commodity lines. While the evalua-
tion team was not suggesting elimination of the crop research
teams, the team was suggesting that at least some of the prueba
de tecnoloqia groups should begin to be up-graded into multi-
disciplinary research teams. leaving the crop research teams to
specialize in variety improvement work.

To support the proposed changes in programmatic emphasis,
the evaluation recommended that the project's TA positions be
expanded to include several new positions. Two of the proposed
new positions were for a production agronomist (to work on the
associated and successive cropping production research team) and
an agricultural economist (to work on farm records and analysis
of the whole farm/household firm). This latter position would be
in addition to the agricultural economist position already being
funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Evaluation How was the project's performance measured or

The basic mix of TA specialists provided by the FPNI Project
w.is directed .t fill inq research mai.lj-ment and I ino posit ions
within LI'A. As ne third evaluation ot FPNI observed:

These are all line positions, i.e., none are advisory. In
each case, these technicians have played a major role in
program design and execution. In the case of sorghum, corn,
and beans, emphasis is on screening and testing of imported
and native varieties, and breeding activities designed to
develop superior varieties in terms of yield, nutritional
value, and other characteristics considered necessary for
improvement of small farmer output, productivity and
incomes (Mann and Dougherty, 1978: 16).

As ICTA professionals in training completed advanced degree or

short course training, they returned to ICTA to assume positions
in research and/or research management.

In their impact evaluation of the FPNI Project, McDermott
and Bathrick (1982:12) noted that ICTA was one of the first
national agricultural research institutions in th-; developing
world to implement an innovative methodology for generating tech-
nology appropriate to small farm conditions. 1Tey observed that
this methodology "fits within the broad framework of farming
systems research" (McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:12). Further,
they concluded that, within a relatively short period of time
under the ICTA system, "significantly improved seed varieties and
cultural practices acceptable to the small farmer were developed
for maize, Leans, and sorghum" (McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:12).

Assessing FPNI Project impact, the impact evaluation team
noted the contribution which project-supported research bad made
to developing and testing improved crop varieties, and that this
research capability and its product (improved seed) had provided
a key input to the development of a privately controlled seed
industry. Varietal improvement research and the improved seed
delivery system, in turn, contributed to increased availability
to farmers of high quality seed. This, in turn, resulted in
increased yields of both maize and beans. Field data gathered
from the coastal area indicated that 95 percent of the farmers
were using ICTA-developed varieties in 1980, compared with less
than 50 percent using improved varieties in 1975- More detailed
information on the project's economic impact (e.g., yields) is
reported in McDermott and Bathrick (1982).

Another indicator of project impact was farmer acceptance of
improved practices. For each recommendation, ICTA calculates an
Acceptance Index that represents the percentage of collaborators
continuing to use a recommended technology in the year following
the farmer test, multiplied by the percentage of the farmers'
land on which they apply the technology. ICTA established 50 as
the Acceptance Index required before a new technology would be
considered as satisfactory. Examination of the 1979 Acceptance
Indices for maize revealed that, in the highlands (where subsist-
en(e tfarminq pr--dominattes), two out of ive indices had reached
50 by 1979. It. the coastal area (where small commercial farms
predominate), indices for three out of four recommendations had
surpassed 50 in both 1978 and 1979. This suggested "that
increasing numbers of farmers who have collaborated in field
testing of technologies recommended by ICTA are adopting these
recommendations- Interviews with ICTA personnel and with
individual farmers supported this impression" (McDermott and
Bathrick, 1982:9).

Institutionalization How did the project provide for the
implementing agency to develop a sustainable capability to
continue to perform the types of activities supported by the

The impact evaluation of the FPNI Project assessed the
extent to which the project had been successful in establishing
within ICTA an institutional capability to carry out technology
development (McDeractt and Bathrick, 1982). As stated earlier,
the FPNI Project sought to "improve the GOG's capability to
develop, screen and introduce new and/or improved seed varieties,
cultural practices and crop mixes while putting presently avail-
able improved farming techniques into practice. Specifically,
the project sought to develop and strengthen ICTA's capability to
carry out a field program of adaptive research on and farm-level
testing of improved technology for basic food crops.

The project impact evaluation team concluded that the FPNI
Project had attained the project's purpose because:

1. ICTA used competent expatriate personnel to fill
operational line management and technical positions
within ICTA, while ICTA professionals were pursuing
advanced degree training programs;

2. ICTA arranged for the selection and efficient phasing
of the ICTA professionals who participated in advanced
degree training programs;
3. ICTA developed an inservice training program; and

4. the GOG provided budgetary support.

1- TA Personnel

As earlier noted, the Rockefeller Foundation provided TA
personnel through the contracting of an adjunct director (as a
staff advisor to ICTA's General Manager), a director of the
Technical production Unit, 3n experiment station specialist and
a,- agricultural econcmist (who served as the coordinator of the
rural socio-economics unit. Further, the A.I.D.-funded FPNI
Project provided TA personnel to support the national commodity
programs and regional production teams. One of A.I.D.-funded TA
team members was eventually promoted to Director of the Technical
production Unit-

Over 70 percent of the FPNI Project's $1.7 million budget
was for the contracting of expatriate TA personnel who served in
various line positions within ICTA. Over time, these positions
included coordinators of the sorghum, bean, and vegetable com-
modity programs; director of pathology in the bean program;
senior specialist and program geneticist for maize; directors of
two regional production teams, one of whom directed inservice
training; and later director of the Technical Production Unit.
The evaluation reported that ICTA directors were unanimous in
their opinion -

that without this heavy injection of expatriate assistance,
ICTA could not have benefited as quickly from the scientific
work being done at the international centers and elsewhere
in the world. It was also their opinion that the progress
made in variety screening and testing for developing the new
recommendations would not have been possible without this
assistance (McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:Appendix E-3).

2. Advanced Degree and Short Course Training

The evaluation found that the "timing of arrival and
departure for this assistance was programmed in relationship to
simultaneous massive training so that expatriate line officers
were replaced by trained Guatemalans" (McDermott and Bathrick,
1982:Appendix E-3). This approach enabled research to proceed,
while the Guatemalans were obtaining advanced degree or short
course training under FPNI Project or Rockefeller Foundation

As earlier noted, there had been confusion early on (circa
1975) in the project about whether on-farm, farmer-managed tests
(farmer tests) were a component of technology generation or tech-
nology diffusion. The first evaluation recommended that ICTA
prepare a manual that would describe and set forth standardized
procedures for implementing ICTA's model for technology develop-
ment and transfer. While a draft describing the on-farm field
tests had been prepared by the time of the second evaluation,
ICTA still had not published a manual describing the total ICTA
process;. utibsequent ly, Wauqh, Hildebrand, FumagalLi, and others
(see Additional References) published numerous reports and
articles describing the ICTA research methodology, although many
of these were addressed to international audiences.

3. Inservice Trainino

The project impact evaluation reported that each year a
group of 10 new hires is given a nine-month course cn the theory
and practice of the ICTA system. Graduates of this training are
then moved into the vacant positions created by incumbents who
had resigned from ICTA or been transferred or promoted to other
positions within ICTA.

As a result of the knowledge transmitted through this
inservice training program, when vacancies do occur, quick
adjustments can usually be made. The new-comer usually
arrives with a basic knowledge of what is necessary to get
the job done (McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:Appendix E-6).

On the other hand, the evaluation expressed concern that
other agencies of the public agriculture sector lacked a com-
prehensive understanding of ICTA's system for developing tech-
nology. --

Team interviews suggest that personnel in DIGESA, BANDESA,
and the Ministry of Agriculture's Sectoral Planning Office
do not fully appreciate the difference between ICTA's
techniques of informal diffusion and DIGESA's responsibility
for formal dissemination of recommended new technologies.
Most extension agents interviewed lacked knowledge of the
functioning of the ICTA system and were unfamiliar with
specific ICTA recommendations or their benefits (McDermott
and Bathrick, 1982:11).

This problem, the evaluation suggested, could be addressed by
expanding the short training course (Technology Institutional
Liaison) which ICTA had developed for DIGESA. The evaluation
concluded that "an increase in program understanding on the part
of non-ICTA participants will require the development of new
inservice training programs" (McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:
Appendix E-7).

4. Government Support

The project impact evaluation reported that GOG support for
agricultural research had increased over ten-fold between 1969
and 1980. Further, GOG support to ICTA's annual budget had more
than doubled since the initiation of AID support to ICTA. While
the evaluation recognized that Guatemala's agricultural research
budget was less than 2 percent of the value of the country's
gross agricultural product, the increased budget had greatly
strengthened ICTA's institutional capacity. For example, between
1976 ind 1979, the number of M.S. 's employed by [CTA increased
trom 4 to 15, and the number of B.S.'s from 86 to 103.

With the exception of the rural socio-economics unit, all
technical and support units were strengthened substantially. The
field level technology validation unit was the most strengthened,
increasing from 7 B.S.'s and 1 M.S. in 1976, to 38 B.S.'s and 3
M.S.'s in 1978.

However, by 1980, budgetary limitations had become "perhaps
the biggest constraint affecting ICTA's capacity to maintain its
present system and to permit its expansion" (McDermott and
Bathrick, 1982:Appendix E-5). Indeed, since annual attrition
rates had never been less than 10 percent, the evaluation team
felt that the future of ICTA, particularly with the departure of
expatriate advisors, would depend upon a reversal of the high
attrition rate among advanced degree holders (McDermott and
Bathrick, 1982:Appendix E-5).

As noted above, ICTA's rural socio-economics unit had not
been substantially strengthened. Here the project impact
evaluation reported:

Regrettably, one of the more innovative components of the
project is the only one to have declined professionally.
Resulting from their reluctance to be assigned to field
offices and salary differences, most of the social science
professionals trained by the highly regarded Rockefeller
Foundation funded "advisor" departed from ICTA during 1979.
The one remaining veteran left during 1978 to receive his
Ph.D. but will be returning to the unit this year. Unlike
the former staff which had occupied the central office, the
new staff, composed of two economists and two agricultural-
ists (two of whom had prior ICTA field experience), has
three of them assigned to Regional level offices on a full-
time basis. Considering the vital role of thit unit and the
strengthening that has taken place ICTA-wide, this is the
one unit that will require additional strengthening
(McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:Appendix E-5).

Information from a recent ISNAR-sponsored case study on ICTA
indicates a gradual demise of social sciences within ICTA's FSR
program (Ruano and Fumagalli, n.d.). The rural socio-economics
unit, initially headed by the Rockefeller Foundation-funded
agricul-tural economist, started off as dynamic, innovative, and
closely involved in FSR. The unit spearheaded the development of
the famous sondeo and was actively involved in on-farm trials.
However, with the expatriate's departure and a slow down in
'-maiindi for d Ligno:t:;t ic ;urvey work, the unit declined. Basic Ly,
the unit's work became limited to classic farm management surveys
carried out by technicians with minimal input or guidance from
senior social scientists. Also, while all other programs and
departments carried out planning and programming at the regional
level, social sciences remained organized at the national level
as a service unit. Finally, political unrest made it difficult
to carry out social science research in the field.

Yet, as the impact evaluation team observed, around the
world ICTA had come "to represent a new approach for agricultural
research with agricultural planners and researchers studying ICTA
as a model for possible replication" (McDermott and Bathrick,
1982:12). Based on their review of ICTA and the FP I Project,
the impact evaluation team summarized several "lessons learned"
from the ICTA experience. Lessons relating specifically to
institution building are:

1. The ICTA experience demonstrated the important role
that a donor can play, over a long period, in devel-
oping and strengthening a country's public sector
agricultural institutions. During the five years that
preceded ICTA's creation, USAID/Guatemala worked with
the GOG in planning and implementing the reorganiza-
tion of the public agricultural sector. The Mission's
early and sustained support to ICTA helped to ensure
timely and appropriate assistance.

2. The FPNI Project demonstrated the potential role that
A.I.D. can play in bringing relevant experience to bear
(e.g., the IARCs) and in complementing the resources of
other donors (e.g., the Rockefeller Foundation).

3. The Project demonstrated the importance of simultaneous
investment in human, institutional, and technological
resources and the comparative advantage A-I.D. has in
institutional development. With the support provided
by the FPNI Project and the Rockefeller Foundation,
ICTA was able to implement its research program while
Guatemalans were receiving advanced training.

4. The ICTA experience demonstrates the need, in an insti-
tution building project, to ensure that the institution
has adequate authority and resources to carry out its
mandate. The semiautonomous status of ICTA provided
the institute with flexibility to plan and implement
new programs, hire personnel, and make independent
contractual arrangements.

C. TLA's experience with a high attrition of advanced
degree scientists is a concern shared by agricultural
research institutes in many developing countries. How-
ever, where there are proven macroeconomic benefits to
a country, as was the case in ICTA's experience, a
government should consider special incentive arrange-
ments to retain needed scientific expertise.

Beyond the "lessons learned" with respect to institution
building, the TCTA experience also provided useful experience
with respect to armingg systems research." These lessons are:

1. The Project documents the need for interdisciplinary

technological and sociological coordination in agricul-
tural research projects that aim to develop improved
technologies responsive to the multiple-cropping
systems that characterize most small farm enterprises.

2. The FPNI Project demonstrated that to ensure small
farmer participation in R&D, special programs need to
be developed to ensure on-farm testing of potentially
improved technologies and participation of farmers in
that testing. "When such systems are in place, the
ICTA experience shows that small farmers will assess
the merits of the technology and gradually adopt it"
(McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:14).

3. By 1980, the concept of "farming system research" had
been "almost romanticized by some students of agricul-
tural research. Yet that ICTA's approach to technology
development demonstrated clearly that the unconven-
tional approach clearly produced benefits in terms of
generating improved technologies and practices accept-
able to small farmers.

Further information on ICTA and the Institute's FSR program
are reported in Waugh (1975, 1976), ICTA (1977), Fumagalli and
Waugh (1977), Hildebrand (1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1980, and 1981),
Gostyla and Whyte (1980), and Whyte and Boynton (1983). These
references are included below under "Additional References."


1975 Project Paper for the Food Productivity and Nutritional
Improvement Project (520-0232). (PD-AAA-947-B1)

1977 Project Appraisal Report for the Food Productivity and
Nutritional Improvement Project (520-0232).
(PD-AAA-947-F1) (See McDermott, 1977a)

1978 Project Evaluation Summary for Food Productivity and
Nutritional Improvement Project (520-0232).
(PD-AAA-947-G1) (See Mann and Dougherty, 1978)

Harpstead, Dale D., Ralph W. Cummings, Jr., Fernando Fernandez,
J. Kenneth McDermott, and Edwin J. Wellhausen
1975 A Review: The Institute of Agricultural Science and
Technology in Guatemala (ICTA).

Mann, F., and D. Dougherty
1978 Evaluation of Food Productivity and Nutritional
Improvement Project (520-0232).

McDermott, J. K.
1977a Report of an Evaluation of ICTA.

1977b Trip Report on Evaluation of ICTA, AID/W Technical
Assistance Bureau/Office of Agriculture.

McDermott, J. K., and David Bathrick
1982 Guatemala: Development of the Institute of Agricul-
tural Science and Technology (ICTA) and Its Impact on
Agricultural Research and Farm Productivity. Project
Impact Evaluation No. 30, U.S. Agency for International
Development. (PN-AAJ-178)

Ruano, Sergio, and Astolfo Fumagalli
n.d. Guatemala: Un Estudio del Caso de la Organizaci6n y
Manejo de la Investigaci6n en Finca en el Instituto de
Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricola (ICTA), draft case study
sponsored by the International Service for National
Agricultural Research (ISNAR), The Hague, The

Additional References

Fumagalli, Astolfo, and Robert K. Waugh
1977 "Agricultural Research in Guatemala." A paper
presented at The Bellagio Conference, Bellagio, Italy,
October 1977. Institute de Ciencia y Tecnclogia
Agricola, Guatemala City, Guatemala.

Gostyla, Lynn, and William F. Whyte
1980 ICTA in Guatemala: The Evolution of a New Model for
Agricultural Research and Development, Special Series
on Agriculture, Research and Extension (ARE No. 3),
Rural Development Committee, Center for International
Studiie,, Cornell University, [thaci, New York 14853.

Hildebrand, Peter
1976 "Generando Tecnologia para Agricultores Tradicionales:
Una Metodologia Multidisciplinaria." A paper prepared
for a Conference on Economic Development in Agricul-
tural Regions: Search for a Methodology, Rockefeller
Foundation Conference Center, Bellagio, Italy, August
4-6, 1976.

1977a "Generating Small Farm Technology: An Integrated
Multidisciplinary System." A paper for the 12th
West Indian Agricultural Economics Conference,
Caribbean Agro-Economic Society, Antigua, April
24-30, 1977.

1977b "Socioeconomic Considerations in Multiple Cropping
Systems." A paper for the Round Table Discussion
on Agricultural Production Systems, XVI Annual
Reunion of the Board of Directors, Interamerican
Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IICA), Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic, May 18, 1977.

1980 "Motivating Small Farmer Scientists and Technicians to
Accept Change," Agricultural Administration, 8(1980-

1981 "Combining Disciplines in Rapid Appraisal: The Sondeo
Approach," Agricultural Administration, 8(1981):423-

1977 "Un Sistema Tecnologico Agricola," Notica, No 26, July
1977, Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricola,
Guatemala City, Guatemala.

Waugh, Robert K.
1975 Four Years of History. Institute of Agricultural
Science and Technology of Guatemala (ICTA).

1976 ICTA A Strategy for Agricultural Production Tech-
nology Development and Identification; Adaptation and
Testing; the Initiation of Transfer and Application.
A Paper for an Inte-natio~nal Seminar on Accelerating
National Agricultural and Rural Development, University
of Reading, England, September 5-18, 1976.

Whyte, William F., and Damon Boynton
1983 Higher-Yieldinq Human Systems for Agriculture. Tthaca,
New York: CcrnelL UnIvers-.ity Pres;.

Annex A. Project Description Sheet.

This Project Des.cription Sheet lists the core, operational,
and generic constraints identified in this project, per the
following codes: core (C), operational (0), and generic (G). A
positive (+) sign after a constraint indicates that the project
was effectively coping with the identified constraint.3

Core Constraints (C)

C.1 Farmer Orientation
C.2 Farmer Participation
C.3 Locational Specificity of Technical and Human Factors
C.4 Problem-Solving Approach
C.5 Systems Orientation
C.6 Interdisciplinary Approach
C.7 Complementarity with Commodity and Discipline Research
C.8 Technology Testing in On-Farm Trials
C.9 Feedback to Shape:
a. Agricultural Research Priorities
b. Agricultural Policies

Operational Constraints (0)

0.1 Stakeholder Understanding of FSR/E
0.2 Agricultural Research Policy/Strategy Defining Role of FSR/E
0.3 Long-Term Commitmient of Resources
0.4 Existing Resear:ch Capability and Shelf Technology
0.5 Consensus on FSR/E Methodology
0.6 Capability to Process Farming Systems Data
0.7 Consensus on Criteria for Evaluating FSR/E
0.8 Links with Extension
0.9 Links with Agri-Support Services
0.10 Links with Farmcr Organizations

Generic Constraints (G)

G. Project Management Structure
G. 2 Government Fund inq to Meet Recurre-tnt Cost:
G.3 Stadting with Trlained Manpower
G.4 Management of T:aining
G.5 Management of Technical Assistance
G.6 Factors Beyond a Project's Control

3An analysis of these constraints in 12 FSR/E projects appears
in A Review of A.I.D. Experience with Farming Systems Research and
Extension Projects, A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study (forthcoming),
available from A.I.D.'s Document and Information Handling Facility
(per instructions on last page of this report).

Guatemala/FPNI Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement

Initial Authorization: 1975 (for 5 years)

Goal: "Improve the quality of life and increase the income of small
farmers. Increase production and improve the nutritive quality of
bas:c food grains, beans and vegetables."

Purpose: "Improve the GOG's capability to develop, screen and
introduce new and/or improved seed varieties, cultural practices and
crop mixes while putting presently available improved farming
techniques into practice.

1. Improved varieties of corn, some bearing high lysine gene
developed and generally available to small farmers;
2. Improved varieties of sorghum with high protein content
developed and generally available to small farmers;
3. Improved varieties of beans developed and generally available
to small farmers;
4. Technological demonstration program for increased high quality
vegetable production underway;
5. Trained professional research and extension staff will be
developed and on-board in ICTA; and
6. Data on nutritive content of basic food products will be

Implementing Agency: Agricultural Science and Technology Institute

TA Contractor: USAID/Guatemala (personal services contracts) and
The Rockefeller Foundation.

Evaluations: Four -- in 1975 (Harpstead, et al., 1975); in 1977
(McDermott, 1977a); in 1978 (Mann and Dougherty, 1978); and a
project impact evaluation in 1980 (McDermott and Bathrick, 1982).

Constraints: C.2 (+), C.4, C.5, C.6, C.8, 0.1, 0.3 (t), 0.5,
o ./ (I- ) C_ 2> (ft) G. i, (;G. 4 (f), Cl s ( ) .


This CDIE Working Paper is a case study that was prepared for a
cross-cutting analysis of A.I.D. FSR/E projects, A Review of AI.D.
Experience with FarminQ Systems Research and Extension Projects,
A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study (forthcoming). A total of 13 4case
studies were prepared- These may be ordered from the A.I.D.
Document and Information Handling Facility, 7222 47th Street, .!;uite
100, Chevy Chase, MD 20815. Telephone: (301) 951-9647. Please
request CDIE Working Paper No. 112, followed by the required Case
Study No. and PN number.

Botswana Agricultural Technology Improvement Project (633-0221),
CDIE Working Paper No. 112-Case Study No. 1. (PN-ABC-073)

Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management Project (635-0203),
CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 2. (PN-ABC-074)

Lesotho Farming Systems Research Project (632-0065), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 3. (PN-ABC-075)

Malawi Agricultural Research Project (612-0202), CDIE Working Paper
No. 112--Case Study No. 4. (PN-ABC-076)

Senegal Agricultural Research and Plan. trg Project (685-0223), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 5. (PN-ABC-077)

Tanzania Farming Systems Research Project (621-0156), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 6. (PN-ABC-078)

Zambia Agricultural Development Research & Extension Project (611-
0201), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 7. (PN-ABC-079)

Nepal Agricultural Research and Production Project (367-0149), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 8. (PN-ABC-080).

Philippines Farming Systems Development Project-Eastern Visayas
(492-0356), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 9. (PH-ABC-

Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement Project
(520-0232), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 10. (P--ABC-

Honduras Agricultural Research Project (522-0139), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 11. (PN-ABC-083)

ROCAP Small Farm Production Systems Project (596-0083), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 12. (PN-ABC-084)

Vignettes of Core, Operational, and Generic Constraints in 12
A.I.D.-Funded Farming Systems Research and Extension Projects, CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 13. (PN-ABC-127)

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