Philippines farming systems development project

Material Information

Philippines farming systems development project Eastern Visayas (492-0356)
Series Title:
CDIE working paper
Alternate title:
Case studies of A.I.D. Farming Systems Research & Extension (FSRE) Projects, Case Study no. 9
Byrnes, Kerry J., 1945-
Place of Publication:
Washington DC
Center for Development Information and Evaluation, Agency for International Development
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
Physical Description:
27 leaves : ; 28 cm.


Subjects / Keywords:
Agriculture -- Technology transfer -- Philippines -- Visayan Islands ( lcsh )
Traditional farming -- Philippines -- Visayan Islands ( lcsh )
Crop reports ( jstor )
Personnel evaluation ( jstor )
Farming systems ( jstor )
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage:
Philippines -- Visayan Islands


Includes bibliographical references (leaf 24).
General Note:
Caption title.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Kerry J. Byrnes.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
The University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not claim any copyright interest in this item. This item may be protected by copyright but is made available here under a claim of fair use (17 U.S.C. §107) for non-profit research and educational purposes. Users of this work have responsibility for determining copyright status prior to reusing, publishing or reproducing this item for purposes other than what is allowed by fair use or other copyright exemptions. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder. The Smathers Libraries would like to learn more about this item and invite individuals or organizations to contact Digital Services ( with any additional information they can provide.
Resource Identifier:
80564525 ( OCLC )


This item has the following downloads:

Full Text




Case Studies of
A.I.D. Farming Systems Research & Extension (FSR/E) Projects

Case Study No. 9

Philippines Farming Systems Development Project--Eastern Visayas1


Kerry J. Byrnes2

Center for Development Information and Evaluation
Agency for International Development
Washington, DC 20523

'This CDIE Working Paper is one of the case studies prepared
for a cross-cutting analysis of A.I.D. FSR/E projects, A Review of
A.I.D. Experience with Farming Systems Research and Extension
Projects (A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study, forthcoming). The 12
FSR/E projects reviewed in this series are:

Botswana Agricultural Technology Improvement (633-0221)
Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management (635-0203)
Lesotho Farming Systems Research (632-0065)
Malawi Agricultural Research (612-0202)
Senegal Agricultural Research and Planning (685-0223)
Tanzania Farming Systems Research (621-0156)
Zambia Agricultural Development Research & Extension (611-0201)
Nepal Agricultural Research and Production (367-0149)
Philippines Farming Systems Development-Eastern Visayas (492-0356)
Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement (520-0232)
Honduras Agricultural Research (522-0139)
ROCAP Small Farm Production Systems (596-0083)

Information on how to order any of the CDIE Working Papers this
series is provided on the last page of this report.

2Senior Social Science Analyst, Program and Policy Evaluation
Division; CDIE. This case study, prepared under a CDIE contract
with Labat-Anderson Incorporated, is based on a review of project
evaluation documentation. Interpretation of the data reported is
that of the author and should not be attributed to A.I.D. or Labat-
Anderson Incorporated.

Philippines Farming Systems Development Proiect-Eastern Visayas

The Philippines Farming Systems Development Project-Eastern
Visayas (FSDP) (492-0356) was authorized, as a five-year project,
in September 1981, for $3,000,000 (which included $1,400,000 in
grant funds and $1,600,000 in loan funds). The Government of the
Philippines (GOP) was to provide $2,813,000 in budgetary support
to the project. The original PACD (9/30/86) was subsequently
extended for one year.

USAID/Philippines employed the host country contracting
mode, whereby the GOP contracted for the project's TA directly
with Cornell University. The PP provided for one TA team member,
an agricultural economist (farm management); however, during
contracting, 36 months of the short-term TA were reallocated to
create a second TA position (rural sociologist). The agricul-
tural economist served as the contractor's Field Representative
(FR) until his departure from FSDP, at which time the rural
sociologist became the FR. At approximately the same time, a
position for an agronomist was added to the TA team, thereby
returning the total number of TA team members to two.

FSDP was evaluated twice: a process evaluation conducted in
September-November 1983 (Mazo, et al., 1983); and a mid-project
evaluation in May 1985 (Sajise, et al., 1985). An audit of the
project was issued in 1987 (A.I.D., 1987). A third evaluation
scheduled for mid-1986 was preempted when the new government of
President Corazon Aquino came into power. This case study is
based on material discussed in the aforementioned evaluation and
audit reports as well as on material from the PP (A.I.D., 1981).

Concept What was the basic technical idea underlying the

Agricultural research in the Philippines traditionally
focused on constraints to increased production of lowland,
irrigated crops (e.g., rice). Farmers in upland and rainfed
areas unsuitable for monoculture, generally found agricultural
research with a single commodity focus irrelevant to the mix of
crops and livestock which they produce. What was needed,
according to the PP, was "a shift in emphasis from a single
commodity focus to a resource endowment focus which analyzes the
interaction between the farmer and the resource base he has to
work with to increase production and income on his small land
area (PP, p. 3).

FSDP was designed as the first activity under the Mission's
"emerging Rainfed Resources Development portfolio" (PP, p. 3).
The project's target area, the rainfed and upland areas of the
Eastern Visayas, comprised Region VIII of the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Food (MAF).3 The project's goal was "to improve the
livelihood of the small farmers in selected rainfed areas of
Region VIII." The project's purpose was "to establish a proven
mechanism for adapting rainfed, agricultural technologies to the
resource conditions found in Regior VIII and to disseminate such
technologies as appropriate."

FSDP was conceived as a FSR/E project to serve small
farmers. According to the PP, GOP interest in FSR came from

the realization that many farmers, particularly in rainfed,
upland environments have not benefitted from recent tech-
nological innovations. ...proper utilization of rainfed,
upland resources is becoming a critical resource management
issue...and interest in developing appropriate, sustainable,
technologies for these areas is growing (PP, p 12).

In the view of the PP, the "farming systems approach" had
already "proven effective in other areas of the Philippines" and
would provide the FSDP with a means

to adapt existing technologies to the resource conditions
found in Region VIII. . FSR emphasizes...production
trials, planned ind carried out by and with farmers on their
own fields. It is not a substitute for the more traditional
research...and provides feedback which can help refine or
redefine research priorities.... The...approach...readily
fosters the adoption by small farmers of improved technolo-
gies since the farmers...are involved in the development and
testing of such technologies (PP, p. 4-5).

Accordingly, the project's "intent" was "to establish a
mechanism for developing and testing dissemination of improved
rainfed technologies" (PP, p. 7). Further, the PP noted that
"the existing farming system is the starting point or building
block from which any changes and improvements must be made" (PP,
p. 16). Similarly, the PP indicates that the "starting point for
recommending any change in the present farming system will be the
agricultural practices currently being used by the farmer-
cooperators" (PP, p. 21). Further, the PP states that FSDP's
activities would
be directed toward assisting the small, rainfed farmers in

3 The current Ministry of Agriculture and Food's acronym
(MAF) is used in this case study, even in places where the former
Ministry of Agriculture's acronym (MOA or MA) would apply. Where
"MA" has been replaced by "MAF" in a cited quote, the substitution
is indicated as follows: [MAFI.

making low cost improvements to their present agricultural
practices while encouraging development and usage of optimal
farming systems. This will focus on testing and adaptation
of selected, existing technology for both crop and livestock
production to fit differing conditions and not on the
development of wholly new technology (PP, p. 21).

Design How was this basic technical idea translated into a

The design of the FSDP provided for three outputs, as

1. Establishment of six field sites at which farmer
cooperators would participate in agricultural research
in collaboration with an interdisciplinary team.
Assessment of market opportunities and completion of
researcher- and farmer-managed trials, resulting in
improved farming systems which can be disseminated to
other farmers in the region.

2. Increased capacity of MAF staff to plan, coordinate,
and undertake FSR and disseminate technologies.

3. Improved administrative and research capacity of the
Visayas State College of Agriculture (VISCA) to support
farming systems development in the region. VISCA will
have also trained farmers, researchers, and extension
workers to undertake FSR.

The direct target beneficiaries were estimated to be some 360
small farm households in Region VIII.

Drawing on the work of farming systems (FS) practitioners,
the PP provided a review of the FS concept and proposed a model
for operationalizing FSR in the Eastern Visayas. This model
identified five stages: (1) selection of target areas; (2)
descriptive or diagnostic stage; (3) design/prescriptive stage;
(4) verification stage; and (5) dissemination stage/pilot
production program.

The PP identified nine general steps for carrying out the
project's FSR/E approach:

1. At each field research site within a recommendation
domain, a field team or Site Research Management Unit
(SRMU) was to be established. Each SRMU was to include
a combination of MAF personnel as well as a farmer-
cooperator who would be involved in the team's planning
and decision making process (PP, p. 5).

2. Each SRMU was to conduct a baseline study to identify
the constraints and the opportunities of the existing
farming systemss.

3. Based on the results of the baseline study and other
data sources, each SRMU was to conduct farm-level,
researcher-managed trials, with the project providing
non-land production inputs, the SRMU providing the
management, and the farmer-cooperator providing the
land and labor.

4. Selection of the production technologies to be included
in the farm-level trials was to be made by VISCA and
the MIAF Technical Staff, in consultation with the SRMJs
and farmer-cooperators. These technologies were to be
drawn from

those available which have potential application
in the target area. Emphasis will be placed on
improving... existing systems although the
introduction of new plant and animal materials may
be appropriate depending on evaluation of the
baseline date. In cases where solutions to the
identified constraints are not available for
testing in farmers fields, VISCA will conduct
research trials under more controlled conditions
on the college campus (PP, p. 6).

5. Trials were to be evaluated following each harvest.

6. Trials were to be repeated over several seasons. Based
on experience and results,

[the farmer] will decide whether or not to
increase the size/extent of [his] involvement and
whether to expand the technology developed on the
contracted portion of his land to other areas of
his farm. The final measure of success will be
improvement in...traditional farming systems that
are adopted spontaneously by other farmers in
communities contiguous to the test area, or which
can be extended to other farmers through normal
extension channels, and that have net positive
effects on farm household employment, nutrition,
income and livelihood (PP, p. 6).

7. Following two years of researcher-managed trials, the
exten-sion service was to take the results that seemed
promising and test them in multilocational, farmer-
managed trials. At this stage, the farm family would
provide its own land, labor, capital, and management
inputs. Further, looking beyond the farmer-managed
trials, the PP stated that "no later than the third

year of project implementation improvements to farmers
existing farming systems will have been identified and
will be ready for dissemination outside of the research
areas" (PP, p. 18).

8. Training in organizing and operating SRMUs, and in
research methodologies to be used in farmers' fields,
was to be provided by VISCA to SRMU personnel and
farmers. Training was also to be provided to upgrade
the economic research capabilities of selected VISCA
and MAF staff, and to improve t'-e skill of SRMU workers
to do economic analyses.

9. An intensive evaluation was to be conducted during the
project's third year to identify "second generation
issues" related to the wider dissemination of the new

The information gained...could form the basis for
a follow-on activity. This follow-on activity
would focus on the development of supporting
systems...[that]...could include, but not be
limited to cooperatives, agricultural credit,
extension services, processing, storage, and
marketing (PP, p. 7).

The PP noted that FSDP would differ in several ways from
other FS projects that were already being ipilemented. First,
the link between extension and research would be strengthened
from the outset by having research and extension personnel
working together on the field teams. Second, the field teams
would begin by conducting research directly with the farmer
cooperators rather than be starting at the experiment station and
then moving to the farm level for verification. Finally, the
project would build on and utilize the reorganization of the MAF
which had integrated its separate bureaus under a single regional
director. It was expected "that by incorporating the above
features into the project design that the time and resources
required to move from the research to the dissemination stage
will be minimized" (PP, p. 13).

To support the proposed strategy for implementing FSR/E, the
project's design provided the following inputs:

Field Support -- This input was to assist in meeting
operational expenses of the Project Director's Office (in the
MAF), the Technical Coordinator for Research and Development
Office (in VISCA), and the SRMUs, and to cover other project
expenses (e.g., construction and commodities).

Training -- This input included degree training (10 Ph.D.,
16 M.S.); short-term fellowships and non-degree training (study
tours and short courses); and in-service training (a two- to
three-month training program at VISCA for SRMU members and
MAF/Region VIII and VISCA staff); and workshops and seminars.

Technical Assistance -- This input included a long-term (48
mm) consultant, an agricultural economist (farm management), to
assist VISCA and the MAF/Region VIII implement the project.
While the project design provided 48 mm of short-term consul-
tant (STC) support, it provided no short-term TA from rural
sociology or anthropology. However, as earlier noted, during the
contracting of the project, 36 mm of STC were reallocated to
provide for a long-term position for a rural sociologist.

Special Studies -- This input, beyond providing funds for a
study of infrastructure and agricultural support services,
preparation of a PID for a follow-on project, and design of the
follow-on project, provided for indepth socioeconomic studies of
each target area. The PP felt that these studies might "fall
beyond the purview of MAF and VISCA personnel...actually con-
ducting the FSR" (PP, p. 20). The purpose of these studies was

to gather baseline data so that impact on beneficiaries can
be measured at a later date. Other special studies such as
time allocation studies, the role of women in farm-level
decision making, factors influencing farmers to adopt new
technology may also be conducted. Particular attention will
be paid to market analysis of crops where marketable surplus
is projected to expand as a result of project activities
(PP, p. 20).

The project's organizational structure was spelled out in a
Memorandum of Agreement (Mazo, et al., 1983:Appendix E) between
the MAF/Region VIII and VISCA. First, overall policies, rules,
and guidelines for the coordination and implementation of the
project's FS activities were to be formulated by a Regional
Project Management Committee (RPMC) that would include, among
others, the MAF/Region VIII Regional Director, the President of
VISCA, the FSDP Project Director (designated by the Regional
Director), and Region VIII farmer representatives.

Thus, the Regional Director was to establish a Project
Director's Office (PDO) and appoint a Project Director (PD) who

have general supervision of project activities including
those in Research Development at VISCA. Overall project
management and field operations will be the responsibility
of the Project Director.... All official project communi-
cations will be channeled through the Project Director...for
appropriate action (Mazo, et al., 1983:Appendix E).

The MAF was also to provide an interdisciplinary team for each
Site Research Management Unit (SRMU). Each SRMU was to be
staffed by MAF personnel reassigned or newly hired to fill
various project positions (agronomist, extensionist, economist,
economic researcher, research assistant, driver, clerk, etc.).

VISCA, to be responsible for research leadership and train-
ing, was to provide a Technical Coordinator for Research and
Development (TCRD) and a project training coordinator. Technical
support to the SRMUs was to be provided by a VISCA Technical
Support Unit staff comprised of an agricultural economist, an
agronomist/soil scientist, an animal scientist, a plant protec-
tion scientist, a horticulturalist, an agricultural engineer, and
a rural sociologist.

Technical input was also to be provided through project-
financed on-campus research relevant to ongoing FSR activities at
the SRMUs. VISCA was also to conduct an in-depth socioeconomic
study of each target area to provide baseline data so that the
project's impact on beneficiaries cculd be evaluated.

Irnlenentation How was the project managed by the host-country
implementing agency, the TA team, and USAID?

When the FSDP began in 1981, the project "suffered the pangs
of a newly started project" (Mazo, et al., 1983).

There was no money when the core project staff was, organ-
ized. Funds for the first year could not be carried in that
year's annual budget..., prompting the Ministry of the
Budget to shell out funds from its sources for foreign-
assisted projects. Releases of funds were delayed. In
fact, a portion of the 1982 funds was released only in 1983
(Mazo, et al., 1983). 4

4. The actual funds made available in 1982 were only 55% of
programmed funds, while actual releases reached only 71% of
available funds which turned out to be only 39% of programmed
funds. Actual funds made available in 1983 were only 66% of
programmed funds, while actual releases reached 95% of available
funds which turned out to be 63% of programmed funds (Mazo, et al.,
1983:50). "While the percentage between the programmed funds and
the budgetary allocation increased between 1982 and 1983, the
absolute amount actually decreased by some P1.6 million. Actual
releases, however, increased in absolute amount by P240,792.00"
(Mazo, et al., 1938 :50).

Further, supplies and materials had to be borrowed from other
projects and funds to get the project started. As of the first
evaluation, the TCRD indicated that the VISCA Technical Staff was
operating on funds for 1982 which were only released in 1983.

Up to the time of the first evaluation in fall 1983, funding
to VISCA had come only from the AID-provided funds.

No GOP funds have been released yet even up to the first
week of November 1983. This is an indication of the tight
budgetary situation being experienced by the government....
National leadership has made several pronouncements to
effect savings and minimize budgetary deficit through
budgetary cuts. It is very likely that the present economic
situation arising out of the devaluation of the peso will
trigger off a decreasing trend in releases of GOP funds for
the project in the ensuing years (Mazo, et al., 1983:50).

The first evaluation noted that project's participants had
not considered "the economics of project implementation," more
specifically, "recurring costs for salaries, transportation,
etc." (Mazo, et al., 1983:58). The evaluation concluded that:

Greater project stability might be attained in the ensuing
years if the more recurrent costs for project operations,
such as vehicular maintenance, gasoline, and other operating
expenditures, can be channeled to the loan/grant funds,
while the GOP funds are allocated for salaries...of the
project staff (Mazo, et al., 1983:50).

The evaluation suggested that USAID/Philippines should consider
the possibility, in any extension of the project, of allowing AID
funds to cover a greater share of recurring operating costs.

Another problem noted by the first evaluation was that the
research team leaders at VISCA and the SRMUs were not aware of
how much funds were being (or had been) set aside for their
particular research or site.

This lack of information hinders the team leaders from plan-
ning and programming for particular research activities in
their areas of responsibility. This could very well be a
vital factor in the success or failure of the faring
systems project (Mazo, et al., 1983:52).

As previously noted, the TA team included an agricultural
economist who also served as the contractor's FR, and a rural
sociologist who had been added to the team during the contract-
ing of the project. The first evaluation encountered that FSDP
staff felt that the agricultural economist's duties as FR had
diverted his attention from providing technical support to the
socioeccncmic studies being developed by the SRY-'U economists.

While the rural sociologist had assisted in developing the
socioeconomic studies during the project's first two years, the
designation of this individual as FR, following the departure of
the agricultural economist, meant that the rural sociologist's
administrative duties as FR began to reduce the amount of time he
could provide to support the SRMU economists.

During FSDP's first two years, on-farm trials were a major
field activity. During this period, the TA team did not provide
any long-term TA support in agronomy. The trials were designed
by VISCA Technical Staff and SRMU staff, although not necessarily
in a coordinated manner. Not surprisingly, the first evaluation
expressed concern over whether the on-farm trials were truly
consistent with a FS approach.

For example, the first evaluation found that the project's
crop trials in any one farm were introducing at least three
modifications. In some cases, this included the introduction of
expensive production inputs (commercial fertilizers and pesti-
cides). In other cases, the modification included "the cha_3p of
the main crop" (Mazo, et al., 1983:324).

Given the PP's position that "the existing farming system is
the starting point or building block from which any changes and
improvements must be made," the evaluation questioned "why...the
main crop...grown during the past years is changed."
The evaluation noted that this "may be viewed as tantamount to a
total change" of the existing FS (Mazo, et al., 1983:24). The
evaluation also expressed concern over the project "introducing
more than one or two major modifications at the same time" in an
existing farming system, also noting this as being "tantamount to change in the farming system" (Mazo, et al., 1983:2).

Viewing the modifications being tested, the first evaluation
expressed concern that FSDP staff "may be thinking incorrectly
that the goal of farming systems research is to introduce an
entirely new farming system and the role of...verification trials
is to demonstrate the superiority of [the] new system (Mazo, et
al., 1983:25). The evaluation cautioned that, where the proposed
changes "are well beyond the financial capability cf the farmers"
and "they are no longer from the project, such
introduced changes will not be absorbed into the system" (Mazo,
et al., 1983:2).

An example of a questionable research initiative was a study
of ducks that was not linked with the farmers' crop production
activities or conducted in sites where farmer-cooperators had
previously raised ducks. This, the evaluation felt, indicated

a seemingly widespread misconception that the purpose of
FSDP-EV is to introduce a new livestock system to replace,
rather than modify, the existing systems of the farmer-
cooperators. The suggestion of one of the researchers to
have separate cooperators for livestock further displays a
serious misunderstanding of what is meant by integration of
crops and livestock under a farming systems approach to
research (Mazo, et al., 1983:25-26).

Another example was the deworming of swine using an expensive
drug that might not be within the farmer's reach at project end.

The first evaluation found, in all but one of the sites,
evidence that farmer participation did not go beyond farmers
being asked about their problems and giving their consent for the
project to conduct trials in their fields. The evaluation team
reported "many cases wherein a farmer-cooperator appears to have
had little control over the choice of the cropping pattern for
the verification trials thereby suggesting that farmers have had
little say about the proposed solutions" (Mazo, et al., 1983:32).
This point was supported by a number of instances cited by the
evaluation (Mazo, et al., 1983:30, 32):

Growing crops on fields where farmers indicated another
crop as the traditional crop.

Planting crops in spite of the farmers' warning that
the timing was wrong and could bring about severe pest
infestation, with the project telling the farmers that
timing would not be an important factor because
insecticides could be applied if needed.

Planting rice in a farmer's field even after the farmer
indicated that he preferred to eat corn and would now
have to buy it.

Not considering farmers' preference for the eating
qualities of the traditional rice variety and that this
variety commands a price almost twice that of the
variety the project was trying to introduce.

Ignoring the farmer's wife in the design of procedures
to gain farmer cooperation in identifying production
constraints, despite project case studies having shown
that the farmer's wife plays a major role in making
decisions about the investment of family resources.

Basing design of cropping trials (e.g., choice and
timing of planting of individual crops) on agronomic
considerations, without reference to seasonal
variability in market demand and prices or the farmer's
knowledge about these factors.

Thus, as the first evaluation found, it was not surprising
that most farmer-cooperators did not feel or act

as partners of the site teams in the conduct of the
experiments. A number of them have been involved only in
plowing the field and, in many cases, all other labor was
either provided by SRMU or by hired hands. Some farmers
said that they are participating in the experiment because
of the free inputs which include fertilizers, planting
materials, animals and labor (Mazo, et al., 1983:33).

The minimal participation of farmer-cooperators, combined
with their apparent perception of not being members of the site
teams, led to a situation where the farmers had a minimal under-
standing of what was being done by the project in their fields.
As the evaluation team reported,

all but two of the farmers interviewed...believed that the
trials are demonstrations of new technology that is already
proven and that they are expected to adopt them. There was
...rappreciation of farmers for the notion that the trials
repr-sented experiments to test and to compare different
approaches under farm conditions (Mazo, et al., 1983:33).

Some farmers did not know the varieties of the crops planted in
their fields; few farmers could tell the rationale for rotating
leguminous crops with grain crops. Where farmers had not been
kept apprised on the cost of inputs applied in a trial, they
would have a difficult time evaluating the advantages, if any, of
a new practice as compared with traditional practice. The
evaluation also noted that the project, in designing trials, may
have failed to consider competing demands on the farmer's labor
that precluded farmers from greater participation in the trials.

The first evaluation noted a need for more on-the-job orien-
tation in FSR/E, to ensure that SRMU staff adequately understood
the FSR/E concept, its implementation requirements, and the
rationale for conducting on-farm trials. For example, the
evaluation formed a number of impressions:

That the project staff's only intent in gathering data
was to prove the relative advantage of improved

That project staff were often attributing the farmer's
failure to adopt new technology to stubbornness or
ignorance of scientific farming.

That the project was not studying the potential impact
on market prices if crop yields were to increase

-- That the project was not adequately considering the

role of farmer wives in deciding what farm activities
to undertake.

That the project was not considering how government
policies affect farmer decisions.

While the intent of the project was to develop the MAF's
capability to carry out FSR/E, this would require that the site-
level MAF personnel on the SRMU teams be able to provide station-
or university-based researchers with feedback on farm-level pro-
duction constraints that might be investigated in the "back-up
research program." However, by the time of the first evaluation,
the planning and implementation of the "back-up research" program
had been delayed.

The first evaluation found that the studies proposed in the
draft VISCA "back-up research program" were not linked in any way
with the project's farm-level trials or even with specific
problems at the project sites (Mazo, et al., 1983:34). Further,

[MAF] site personnel informed the Evaluation Team that they
[had] not made any suggestions to the VISCA Technical Team
on the specific back-up research to be conducted, and they
seem not to feel comfortable to do so. This may be an
indication that, aside from feeling inadequate in research
background, they might still be under the usually inhibiting
influence of a "professor-student relationship"...experi-
enced during their college days in VISCA. ...most of the
[MAF] personnel are VISCA graduates and had been students of
the VISCA Technical [Team] (Mazo, et al., 1983:34).

Such "inhibited feelings," the evaluation noted, would not be
conducive to the site teams developing an effective working
relationship with the VISCA Technical Team. On the other hand,
since the personnel on the site teams had limited experience, the
project would need to exercise caution not to set unrealistically
high expectations for "the input of the site personnel in the
identification and planning of the back-up research program"
(Mazo, et al., 1983:35).

During implementation, the original project staffing pattern
was modified several times. One modification was the addition of
a Project Monitoring Officer to the PDO. Also, a second econo-
mist position (economic researcher) had been added to each SRMU,
and a part-time home management technician had been detailed to
each site. The evaluation questioned whether there was a need
for having two economists at each site, especially since the
voluminous socioeconomic data gathered by the project had not
been a-alyzed. On the other hand, while the PP had provided for
a livestock specialist in each SRMU, no SRMU had been assigned a
livestock specialist.

While SRMU personnel were expected to perform to a certain
extent as researchers, their training and experience were largely
in extension. Not surprisingly, SRMU personnel felt that they
needed more training on experimental design, field plot tech-
niques, statistical analysis, and report writing. The economists
and economic researchers, mostly recent college graduates, voiced
a need for more training in socioeconomic research.

More than eight VISCA instructors and researchers had been
assigned on an almost full-time basis to the project. The first
evaluation found that VISCA's role in the SRMUs had become much
greater than originally envisioned. While the PP had identified
the Project Director's role as providing general project super-
vision including the development of project-supported research at
.VISCA, the PP indicated that the VISCA-based TCRD would play a
leadership role in formulating the project's research program
both on campus and at the project sites.

However, by the time of the first evaluation, the evaluation
team found that the PDO had delegated to VISCA the responsibility
for all research decisions. The PD felt that VISCA had the tech-
nical capabilities to assume responsibility for technical leader-
ship, and that the job description for the PD (PP Annex E) did
not specify a technical leadership role. The evaluation con-
cluded that the PD had not provided as much leadership in tech-
nical matters as required for successful project implementation.

The evaluation also concluded that administrative support
needed to be provided to the PDO and the TCRD office.

the Project Director and the Technical Coordinator for
Research and Develop.ent were observed to be enmeshed in
...administrative matters which could be delegated to other
personnel with lesser technical matters to attend to. Thus,
the pattern may be further modified to provide for someone
to handle...purely administrative tasks at the PDO and TCRD
office. This will also provide more time for the Project
Director and Technical Coordinator to attend to the more
substantive technical matters of the project (Mazo, et al.,

One adjustment made by FSDP to deal with "the reduced role
and corresponding lack of availability of technical expertise in
research on the part of the PDO" (Mazo, et al., 1983:44) was the
creation of a Steering Committee ('C) to review the research
program prepared by the SRMUs. The SC, as a working group of the
RPMC, was to be an institutional link between VISCA and the MAF,
and to provide a forum for evaluating research proposals from the
SRP Us and the VISCA Technical Team, and for identifying and
resolving issues related to project irplementation.

However, even with the SC, there were differences in
perspective among the parties involved. The first evaluation
felt that responsibility for developing research should remain
with VISCA but recommended that PDO capability in research,
economics, and management be strengthened to enable the PDO to
provide leadership and participate in formulating and
implementing FSR by SRMUs and VISCA.

Interestingly, while the PDO deferred research decisions to
VISCA, the first evaluation noted the

comments...from the SRMU personnel about confusion over
whether they were to follow suggestions from the PDO or from
the VISCA Technical Team. The [evaluation] team also heard
comments of members of the Technical Team on their frustra-
tion resulting from the hesitancy of some site researchers
to follow their suggestions and their failure to acknowledge
involvement of VISCA personnel in the conduct of field
trials in some areas (Mazo, et al., 1983:44).

The first evaluation also noted that VISCA's decision to
involve economists and social scientists in the Technical Team,
"as a response to the...complaint that research...ignores these

contributed to the limited ability of assume
greater responsibility for the...research program. The
apparent absence of an organizational system to feed
economic and social data into decisions] on field trials the effectiveness of the team (Mazo, et al.,

The problem of integrating VISCA's participation could have been
solved by strengthening VISCA's authority and responsibility vis-
a-vis the FSR/E process. However, as the evaluation noted,

this solution would not have been consistent with the proj-
ect purpose of establishing within MAF line agencies the
institutional capability of carrying out [FSR] and of
linking research to capabilities (Mazo, et al., 1983:45).

While acknowledging the need to strengthen PDO's capability
to take on greater responsibility in carrying out FSR/E at the
farm level, the first evaluation also saw the assignment of VISCA
professionals to SRMUs as being highly desirable. However, the
evaluation cautioned that "there is a need to carefully and
explicitly define this role as advisory, with responsibility for
final decisions, and corresponding responsibility for blame or
credit with the PDO and the SRMUs" (Mazo, et al., 1983:45).

Given approximately 72 research locations scattered over the
Eastern Visayas (6 sites and 12 farms per site) and problems with
transportation including travel time, the evaluation questioned
whether this number of research locations could be adequately
supervised and visited regularly by the PD, the VISCA Technical
Team, and the TA team members. As the evaluation pointed out,

the existing farming systems of the farmers are neither
understood nor appreciated by the majority of the staff
involved in the project. The generally large number of
locations at each site where field tests are underway may
have prevented the SRMU staff from spending time to fully
understand the existing systems and how these should affect
the proposed interventions (Mazo, et al., 1983:56)

The first evaluation concluded that the project had too many too
many research locations, and in view of the lack of experience of
project participants in implementing FSR, that the project have
fewer sites and not more than four or even two research locations
per site: "one cooperator who experiments with one change in his
system, and a second cooperator with a similar farm but not using
the innovation." As the project gains experience, then on-farm
trials could be expanded to additional locations and sites.

The first evaluation found no indication that the FSDP had
made any effort to involve farmer organizations or any other
community organizations in the project. "Group involvement came
only in the group meetings organized for the purpose of briefing
the farmers of the project, but all dealings between the project
and the farmers are on [an] individual farmer basis" (Mazo, et
al., 1983:42).

By the time of the second evaluation, FSDP was entering its
fourth year. Most construction of infrastructure facilities and
equipment acquisition as well as degree and short-term training
had been completed. While tne second evaluation found that the
project's initial diagnostic phase had been weak, the project had
evolved toward "a more...problem-solving approach" (Sajise, et
al., 1985:1), and "from a cropping systems approach to a farming
systems approach" (Sajise, et al., 1985:25).

While the project had placed a greater emphasis on farmer
participation, the second evaluation found that field research at
most sites had not yet moved beyond researcher-managed trials,
that recommendation domains were not clearly defined, and that
technologies needed further testing and refinement under differ-
ent conditions. On a positive note, the evaluation did find that
the SRMUs and the VISCA back-up researchers were developing "a
needed problem-solving approach in which problems are... farmer-
identified. Interdisciplinary work is developing; and, in all,
the project is moving towards a true farming systems approach"
(Sajise, et al., 1985:3).

The project's broadened approach included the addition of
livestock specialists in the SRMUs; it also included considera-
tion of the interaction of ecosystem variables within the farming
system. However, the second evaluation expressed concern over
the project's pre-mandated focus on major commodity cropping
patterns and recommended that the project's scope be further
broadened to include other aspects of FS in the project's target
area (e.g., minor crops like vegetables, non-crop production
activities such as cheese production). In this regard, the
evaluation noted that FSR "must consider the sustainability of
the possible recommendations and the implications of that
sustainability in terms of farmer willingness to make necessary
trade-offs" (Sajise, et al., 1985:61).

One indicator of the greater participation of farmer-
cooperators was the involvement of cooperator organizations in
the development of the work plans of the SRMUs, the evaluation of
research results, and the extension of technologies. While the
second evaluation recognized that SRMUs were playing and could
play an extension role, research needed to be emphasized over
extension until technologies were better developed.

The second evaluation noted that FSR projects "may
inevitably evolve over time. Practitioners learn by experience
and adjust methods periodically to better serve farmers" (Sajise,
et al., 1985:31). The evaluation team recommended that FSDP's
strategy would be more effective if the following were carried

having SRMUs give more attention to problem identifica-
tion and the use of descriptive information on farmers'
problems to identify specific issues or hypotheses to
subject to further research;

-- making better use of exploratory survey procedures;

-- paying more attention to research methodology;

devoting a smaller share of project resources to
cropping pattern trials;

changing somewhat the nature of farmer participation;

getting back-up research more closely related to
problems faced by resource poor farmers; and

taking better advantage of the multidisciplinary com-
position of the SRMU teams and VISCA technical group.

Also, FSDP needed establish the necessary links with government
agencies (e.g., Bureau of Lands) to clarify land classification
and tenure issues in most project sites.

Further, the second evaluation team outlined a sequence of
operational procedures to implement FSR (Sajise, et al., 1985:33-
34). This, however, suggests that FSDP had not established, even
three years into the project, an adequate sequence of operational
procedures for implementing FSR effectively and efficiently.

The second evaluation also noted the project's pre-mandated
focus on crops grown by upland farmers which effectively directed
research resources to previously neglected crops but "eliminated
problem identification as the first step in the farming system
approach at the site level" (Sajise, et al., 1985:32). Thus,
while most SRMUs merely targeted their efforts on farmers with
less than 3 hectares of land, there was little stratification of
the target population due

to the implicit assumption that all farming households in
upland areas are relatively homogeneous.... . The
various sondeos, socioeconomic profiles, and baseline
studies reflected an assumption of homogeneity with data
presented largely in terms of modal distributions.
Cooperator select:.on and technologies being developed and
methods of working with site farmers have, as one result,
assumed homogeneity. . Understanding diversity would
allow for better targeted research and extension efforts,
and would allow for a better understanding of cases of
adoption and non-adoption (Sajise, et al., 1985:35, 57).

While the need for stratifying farmers became apparent to most
SRMU teams as project implementation proceeded, the evaluation
recommended that greater attention be given to training SRMU
teams in how to develop research proposals based on stratifying
farmers and defining recommendation domains.

FSDP had come to place increased emphasis on participation
of farmer-cooperators, and made progress in "adopting more of an
interdisciplinary and locally relevant problem solving approach
to research" (Sajise, et al., 1985:25). But the second evalua-
tion team cautioned the FSDP against putting

an overemphasis on trying to improve farmer welfare through
mobilization of farmers and their existing resources at the
expense of trying to develop new technologies.... Both...
approaches--farmer mobilization and technology development--
are being used simultaneously by the...FSDP-EV and some con-
fusion appears to exist as to the effects of each on produc-
tion. While mobilization of farmers certainly can have
significant short-term benefits, long-term benefits can be
limited if the farm system itself is not significantly
changed (Sajise, et al., 1985:23-25).

Evaluation How was the project's performance measured or

Looking back on the project's first two years, the first
evaluation concluded that FSDP had generated

a high degree of interest and enthusiasm among all the
participants the project staff, the consultants, and most
important, the farmers. Very significantly, the project has
brought about the beginning of an understanding of the
dynamics of farming systems and the practices and concepts
of farming systems research (Mazo, et al., 1983:Foreward).

While the second evaluation noted, two years later, that FSDP had
made progress in introducing new technologies in the form of
improved crop varieties and management practices, the evaluation
team found that it had been "unable to identify technologies
completely ready for broad extension" (Sajise, et al., 1985:27).

One problem was that the work of the SRMU teams placed proj-
ect personnel in the position of being perceived by cooperators
(and non-cooperators) as extension workers, not as researchers.
When members of the second evaluation team asked cooperators what
was the project's purpose, farmers usually responded "to give
advice to farmers" (Sajise, et al., 1985:46). Asked how they had
benefitted from the project, the same cooperators cited the new
crops and varieties, the provision of inputs (e.g., fertilizers)
for cropping pattern trials, and livestock dispersals.

This pattern led the second evaluation team to express
concern over FSDP's involvement in extension. First, the team
felt that the project should avoid placing itself in a position
of providing inputs and advice to a small, select group of
cooperators. Yet in interviewing non-cooperators, the team found
that these farmers knew little about the project's activities;
this led to the conclusion that the project's activities were,
for the most part, not having an impact on non-cooperators.
While this potentially could be explained by a lack of inter-
action between cooperators and non-cooperators, that there were
no "technologies completely ready for broad extension" may have
been a contributing factor.

The second evaluation also noted that FSDP's extension role
had the effect of hiding the project's main purpose (technology
development) from farmers. Indeed, the team noted:

What little was known about the project by non-cooperators
related to the extension role of introducing new crops and
varieties. Very few farmers, cooperators and non-cooper-
ators, had any notion that [FS] involves research to develop
and screen new technologies (Sajise, et al., 1985:47).

There were various problems involved in establishing VISCA's
support to FSDP. For example, project-supported back-up research
at VISCA had tended to be oriented more to disciplinary interests
of the VISCA Technical Team and less to immediate problems and
needs at the sites. This problem, however, had been overcome by
the time of the second evaluation; indeed, the evaluation team
reported that it was impressed by the assignment of VISCA Tech-
nical Team members to specific sites to ensure that they would
interact with farmers and SRMU teams on a regular basis. This,
the evaluation noted, would help to ensure that VISCA's back-up
research is responsive to the problems of resource poor farmers.
However, the evaluation also noted that there was an increasing
demand by the SRMUs for technical help that the VISCA staff could
not adequately meet because of academic commitments. Yet, as the
second evaluation noted, a monthly visit of a Technical Team
member to the SRMUs is not adequate (Sajise, et al., 1985:70).

The second evaluation noted that the project's substantial
administrative load precluded the TA social scientist (the rural
sociologist) currently serving as FR from providing vital TA in
social science. The evaluation recommended that, during the
remaining LOP, a long-term social scientist be provided or that
substantial local administrative assistance be provided to the
project's rural sociologist.

Assessing the overall contribution of the project's TA
component, the second evaluation noted a "prevailing perception"
among FSDP staff and VISCA that the TA had "not been very effec-
tive in establishing new diagnostic tools and research designs...
on-site" (Sajise, et al., 1985:79). A preference for long-term
TA for a project extension or follow-on was seen as being needed
in two areas: (1) training and extension, and (2) agricultural
economics/economic anthropology with extensive FSR/E experience.

Institutionalization How did the project provide for the
implementing agency to develop a sustainable capability to
continue to perform the types of activities supported by the

The FSDP was originally authorized in September 1981, as a
four year project. What progress had been made to institu-
tionalize FSR/E in the MAF/Region VIII?

By the second evaluation (May 1985), MAF/Region VIII offi-
cials felt that FSDP should be integrated into the Ministry's
system of four Regional Integrated Agricultural Research Stations
(RIARS). With a mandate to study cropping patterns in rainfed
lowland and upland fields, RIARS management had decided to use a
FS approach and to expand RIARS activities in upland areas.

However, as early as the first evaluation, little attention

or consideration had been given to integrating FSDP functions and
activities into existing MAF programs beyond the LOP. Nor had
the project addressed the potential for linking implementation of
FSDP with the MAF's extension delivery system, despite an MAF
extension unit being present at all FSDP sites. The evaluation
reported that

the "Special Project" status of the FSDP-EV had isolated the
project from the rest of the [MAF]. Middle and lower level
MAF staff who are not part of the project indicated a perva-
sive feeling that the project is not part of [the MAF].
...there has been little thought given to the relationship
of the project to the RIARS (Mazo, et al., 1983:46).

Further, there had been "no attempt at examining the implications
of staffing patterns, qualificationss, salaries, etc. for
eventual integration, nor any consideration of a possible RIARS
role in the management of administrative control of the project"
(Mazo, et al., 1983:46).

The second evaluation recommended that FSDP be integrated
into the RIARS system by August 1985, and proposed an organiza-
tional structure for this integration. The FSDP PD would become
the Assistant Manager of RIARS, and the site research teams
(FSDP's SRMUs and RIARS' Provincial Technology Verification
Teams) would be renamed Field Research Management Teams (FRMTs).
Also, FSDP's RPMC would be dissolved, and the RIARS' Regional
Research Council (RRC) would be expanded to include RPMC members
not already members of the RRC. However, the Steering Committee
of FSDP would remain and be expanded to include other staff
members of the A.F including the Manager of RIARS and others.

The second evaluation recommended that a special committee,
consisting of staff from VISCA, FSDP, RIARS, and the MAF/Region
VIII Office, be formed by June 1985, to prepare details for the
merger recommended by the evaluation. The integration of the
FSDP into RIARS would, in the evaluation's view, secure the
institutionalization of FSR/E by virtue of stabilizing the
critical positions of the SRMU (renamed FRMT) personnel. Also,
the evaluation stated its assumption that "a major follow-on
activity" would provide for the "multiplication" of the FSR/E
approach through "the involvement" of Agricultural Production
Technicians, Subject Matter Specialists, Extension Technicians,
and Municipal Agricultural Officers (MAOs). Finally, there was
an assumption that the follow-on activity would address the
required support services for technology adoption. The second
evaluation recommended that support for a follow-on activity
should be funded by USAID/Philippines for a period of three
years, with corresponding counterpart funds from the GOP. This
follow-on support was deemed to ensure the institutionalization
of FSR/E in the regular structure of the KAF.

What became of these recommendations? In the fall 1986, an
audit of the FSDP was conducted (A.I.D., 1987). As of November
30, 1986, $2.3 million or 50 percent of the $4.6 million in AID
funds obligated for FSDP had been expended. While the audit
noted that FSDP had made progress in developing appropriate agri-
cultural technologies for the farmers in the project's target
area, the audit concluded that FSDP would not be cost effective
unless actions were taken to ensure that these technologies were
disseminated to as many small farmers as possible.

Unless the technologies developed by the project are
disseminated to as many small farmers as possible the
project will have limited impact because only the 360
families targeted during the research phase will benefit
from the more than $2.3 million expended during this phase
of the project (A.I.D., 1987:20).

The audit noted that to ensure that dissemination continues after
FDP ends, the activities supported by the project needed to be
institutionalized within MAF/Region VIII.

A review of the PP indicates that the project design took
the following position:

that no later than the third year of project implementation
improvements to farmers existing farming systems will have
been identified and will be ready for dissemination outside
of the research areas. At this stage, it may be appropriate
to test alternative methods for dissemination of the tech-
nologies.... Procedures and a detailed plan for dissemina-
tion of the technologies developed at the appro-
priate time in the project implementation process" (A.I.D.,

The audit noted that the project had "assumed that technology was
available for rainfed, upland areas." But neither "the existing
methodologies nor the specific technologies available proved
suitable to the project areas" (A.I.D., 1987:3).

In May 1985, FSDP began more basic research to implement the
recommendations of the mid-project evaluation (Sajise, et al.,
1985). The audit noted that the project's implementors had

discovered that intensive diagnostic studies were necessary
to identify the...needs and problems of small farmers.
Based on the results of these studies, the project then
began researching, developing, and testing new technologies
to address these needs and problems (A.I.D., 1987:3).

However, the project focused on technology development, with only
limited emphasis being placed on technology dissemination.

Further, the audit found that :he detailed planning and

budgeting necessary "to ensure dissemination" had not been
completed, and project activities had not been institutionalized"
in MAF/Region VIII "to ensure continued dissemination of proven
agricultural technologies" (A.I.D., 1987:2).

The initial draft proposal for extending the project for one
year emphasized technology research and development but did not
contain specific plans and a budget for dissemination, nor did it
discuss methods for institutionalizing project activities in MAF/
Region VIII. This draft, prepared by the contractor (Cornell
University) and MAF/Region VIII, had not been approved by
USAID/Philippines at the time of the audit.

Following discussion between the audit team and USAID/
Philippines officials, FSDP staff and USAID/Philippines prepared
a considerably improved final plan or proposal for a one-year
extension of FSDP. This proposal stated that FSDP would begin to
"disseminate proven on-farm research mechanisms to a wide
audience" of MAF/Region VIII and VISCA staff "and disseminate
appropriate upland technologies to a wider audience" of extension
agents and upland farmers. Also, the proposal provided for TA to
design a three-year follow-on activity focused on technology
dissemination. The proposal indicated that MAF/Region VIII was
undergoing reorganization but that USAID/Philippines and VISCA
project personnel would ensure that the revised MAF/Region VIII
structure institutionalizes FSR/E activities.

While the one-year extension proposal was deemed by the
audit to be "a good beginning, it did not specifically plan for
institutionalization of project activities...or plan and budget
for technology dissemination" (A.I.D., 1987:3). The audit
stressed that:

For this project to have impact on farmers..., the research
methodology must be integrated into the activities of the
[MAF/Region VIII] and the research must be linked with the
division of the [MAF/Region VIII] responsible for extension.
Neither of these can occur if the project continues to be
implemented outside the [MAF/Region VIII] structure. In
addition, in order that proven agricultural technologies can
be successfully disseminated, a specific plan needs to be
developed which will:

identify a target number of direct beneficiaries;
identify a strategy for reaching these farmers;
identify the inputs necessary for achieving
dissemination; and
S set a timetable for dissemination to take place
(A.I.D., 1987:3-4).

Accordingly, the audit recommended (1) that USAID/Philippines
develop a plan (including strategy, budget, inputs, and time-
table) to disseminate agricultural technologies that had proven
successful under the project, and (2) that USAID/Philippines
ensure that the design of follow-on activities include a plan for
institutionalizing FSR/E in MAF/Region VIII.

While the audit acknowledged that the final plan or proposal
for the one-year extension addressed the issues of dissemination
and institutionalization, the audit took the position that

addressing the the plan...does not constitute
sufficient action to ensure that these objectives will be
achieved. While the one-year plan is a good beginning,
dissemination and institutionalization will be the subjects
of the three-year add-on activity. Therefore, the two
recommendations cannot be closed until the design and plans
for the add-on activity are completed and address the
concerns of this audit report (A.I.D., 1987:5).

The FSDP was finally extended, including a TA component, for
one year to the end of 1987. Further, USAID/Philippines granted
the FSDP a three-year extension, effective January 1, 1988,
without a TA component (Tully Cornick, personal communication).
However, the available secondary documents provide no further
indication of the status of institutionalization of FSR/E in the
MAF/Region VIII. In the long run, given the MAF's extension

the primary agricultural research component will probably
remain in the regional agricultural colleges. The linkages
that we [a former member of the TA team speaking], in con-
junction with the MAF and VISCA, tried to develop between
these two institutions were predicated on the assumption
that this was the long term solution to the integration of
research and extension in the Philippine context (Tully
Cornick, personal communication).


1981 Project Paper for Farming Systems Development Project-
Eastern Visayas (492-0356). (PD-AAM-430)

1987 Audit of Farming Systems Development Project-Eastern
Visayas (492-0356). (PD-AAV-833)

Mazo, Jose V., Rebecca V. Barbusa, James Beebe, Emiliana N.
Bernardo, and Agapito C. Tauro
1983 Report on the Process Evaluation of Farming Systems
Development Project Eastern Visayas (492-0356).

Sajise, Percy, Doyle Baker, Sam Fujisaka, David Hitchcock,
Inocencio Bolo, and Enrique Pacardo
1985 Mid-Project Evaluation Report of Farming Systems
Development Project Eastern Visayas (492-0356).

Annex A. Project Description Sheet.

This Project Description Sheet lists the core, operational,
and generic constraints identified in this project, per the
following codes: core (C), operational (0), and generic (G). A
positive (+) sign after a constraint indicates that the project
was effectively coping with the identified constraint.5

Core Constraints (C)

C.1 Farmer Orientation
C.2 Farmer Participation
C.3 Locational Specificity of Technical and Human Factors
C.4 Problem-Solving Approach
C.5 Systems Orientation
C.6 Interdisciplinary Approach
C.7 Complementarity with Commodity and Discipline Research
C.8 Technology Testing in On-Farm Trials
C.9 Feedback to Shape:
a. Agricultural Research Priorities
b. Agricultural Policies

Operational Constraints (0)

0.1 Stakeholder Understanding of FSR/E
0.2 Agricultural Research Policy/Strategy Defining Role of FSR/E
0.3 Long-Term Commitment of Resources
0.4 Existing Research Capability and Shelf Technology
0.5 Consensus on FSR/E Methodology
0.6 Capability to Process Farming Systems Data
0.7 Consensus on Criteria for Evaluating FSR/E
0.8 Links with Extension
0.9 Links with Agri-Support Services
0.10 Links with Farmer Organizations

Generic Constraints (G)

G.1 Project Management Structure
G.2 Government Funding to Meet Recurrent Costs
G.3 Staffing with Trained Manpower
G.4 Management of Training
G.5 Management of Technical Assistance
G.6 Factors Beyond a Project's Control

5An analysis of these constraints in 12 FSR/E projects appears
in A Review of A.I.D. Experience with Farming Systems Research and
Extension Projects, A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study (forthcoming),
available from A.I.D.'s Document and Information Handling Facility
(per instructions on last page of this report).

Philippines/FSDP Farming Systems Development Project-Eastern
Visavas (492-0356)

Initial Authorization: 1981 (for 5 years)

Goal: "to improve the livelihood of the small farmers in
selected rainfed areas of Region VIII"

Purpose: "to establish a proven mechanism for adapting rainfed,
agricultural technologies to the resource conditions found in
Region VIII and to disseminate such technologies as appropriate"

1. Field research sites established: (a) specific improvements
in current farming systems identified and disseminated; (b)
site-specific and multi-locational trials completed; (c)
farmers trained and participating in research; (d) Ministry
of Food and Agriculture (MAF) staff trained; and (3)
physical facilities completed;

2. Improved capacity of the Visayas State College of Agricul-
ture (VISCA) to support farming systems development in
Region VIII: (a) on-campus trials completed in support of
field research trials; (b) farming systems teams estab-
lished; (c) VISCA conducting training in farming systems;
(d) VISCA staffed trained; and (e) physical facilities
completed; and

3. Improved capacity of Region VIII MAF to plan, coordinate,
and undertake farming systems research: (a) Project
Director's Office established; (b) MAF Regional staff
trained; and (c) physical facilities cDmpleted.

Implementing Agency: Region VIII/Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, and Visayas State College of Agriculture (VISCA).

TA Contractor: Cornell University.

Evaluations: Two -- a process evaluation in 1983 (Mazo, et al.,
1983); and a mid-project evaluation in 1985 (Sajise, et al.,
1985). A project audit was issued in 1937 (A.I.D., 1987).

Constraints: C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6, C.8, C.9.a, 0.4, 0.5, 0.8,
0.9, 0.10 (+), G.1, G.2, G.4, G.5


This CDIE Working Paper is a case study that was prepared for a
cross-cutting analysis of A.I.D. FSR/E projects, A Review of A.I.D.
Experience with Farming Systems Research and Extension Projects,
A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study (forthcoming). A total of 13 case
studies were prepared. These may be ordered from the A.I.D.
Document and Information Handling Facility, 7222 47th Street, Suite
100, Chevy Chase, MD 20815. Telephone: (301) 951-9647. Please
request CDIE Working Paper No. 112, followed by the required Case
Study No. and PN number.

Botswana Agricultural Technology Improvement Project (633-0221),
CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 1. (PN-ABC-073)

Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management Project (635-0203),
CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 2. (PN-ABC-074)

Lesotho Farming Systems Research Project (632-J365), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 3. (PN-ABC-075)

Malawi Agricultural Research Project (612-0202), CDIE Working Paper
No. 112--Case Study No. 4. (PN-ABC-076)

Senegal Agricultural Research and Planning Project (685-0223), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 5. (PN-ABC-077)

Tanzania Farming Systems Research Project (621-0156), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 6. (PN-ABC-078)

Zambia Agricultural Development Research & Extension Project (611-
0201), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 7. (PN-ABC-079)

Nepal Agricultural Research and Production Project (367-0149), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 8. (PN-ABC-080).

Philippines Farming Systems Development Project-Eastern Visayas
(492-0356), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 9. (PN-ABC-

Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement Project
(520-0232), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 10. (PN-ABC-

Honduras Agricultural Research Project (522-0139), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 11. (PN-ABC-083)

ROCAP Small Farm Production Systems Project (596-0083), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 12. (PN-ABC-084)

Vignettes of Core, Operational, and Generic Constraints in 12
A.I.D.-Funded Farming Systems Research and Extension Projects, CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 13. (PN-ABC-127)