Front Cover
 Table of Contents

Group Title: Catholic university of America. Studies in Hispanic-American history ; vol. II
Title: The triangular struggle for Spanish Pensacola, 1689-1739
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00055630/00001
 Material Information
Title: The triangular struggle for Spanish Pensacola, 1689-1739
Physical Description: viii, 175 p. : ; 23cm.
Language: English
Creator: Ford, Lawrence Carroll
Publisher: The Catholic university of America press
Place of Publication: Washington D.C
Publication Date: 1939
Subject: Pensacola Bay (Fla.)   ( lcsh )
History -- Pensacola (Fla.)   ( lcsh )
History -- Florida -- Spanish colony, 1565-1763   ( lcsh )
Thesis: Thesis (PH.D)--Catholic university of America, 1939.
Bibliography: "Essay on the sources": p. 156-169.
Statement of Responsibility: by Lawrence Carroll Ford, M.A.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00055630
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: aleph - 000117378
oclc - 01444384
notis - AAN3215
lccn - 39018146

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Full Text


The Triangular Struggle

For Spanish Pensacola

1689- 1739




Copyright 1939




It is proposed in the present study to unfold the story of the
conflict for possession of Pensacola Bay. This conflict was be-
tween Spain, actually occupying the bay, and her two rivals, France
and England, disputing the occupation with her. The struggle for
Pensacola constitutes a phase of our so-called Intercolonial Wars
that has heretofore not been treated as a distinctly political and
diplomatic contest with the Spanish documents as the chief source
of information.
Studied in the light of these, the story of the Pensacola tri-
angular struggle reveals certain more or less interesting and new
features. For one thing, it will be seen that the political bicker-
ings in Europe and the diplomatic intrigues at the European courts
affected colonial affairs in North America considerably less than
is generally believed. Thus, while Spain and France were at war
with each other in Europe, their colonials on the north coast of
the Gulf of Mexico were fostering not merely peaceful but actu-
ally friendly relations. The present study further reveals the fact
that after 1721 France was no longer a serious threat to Spanish
Pensacola. After this year it was England that Spain had to
contend with for the retention of Pensacola. This situation lasted
till 1763 when, barring the city of New Orleans, the gulf-coast
region of the Mississippi was ceded to England by the Treaty of
Paris. The recession of France in North America began on the
coast of the Gulf of Mexico and not on the banks of the St.
Lawrence. Finally, it might be observed that, just as before 1670
Spain clung tenaciously to the St. Augustine region on the Atlantic
coast, she held with equal tenacity to the Pensacola region after
1670 when the English of Carolina and Georgia began penetrating
into the hinterland where they expected to find Spain more vulner-
able than on the Atlantic seaboard. The extension of one frontier
automatically meant the extension of another frontier; and in
every case, as at Pensacola, territorial extension signified inter-
colonial conflict. Finally, as we see it now, it was probably well


that France acquired and held the basin and valley of the Missis-
sippi, constituting in this way a barrier to English westward
expansion and indirectly a protection of Pensacola against un-
doubted English aggression and occupation. Eventually, Pensa-
cola became an English possession, not by conquest, but by treaty.
The writer wishes to express his thanks to Mr. D. C. Mearns,
Acting Superintendent of the Reading Room of the Library of
Congress and to the officers and personnel of the Manuscript
Division of that Library for the necessary research facilities and
the assistance which from time to time they have extended to him.
He also wishes to signify his gratitude to the late Dr. James
Alexander Robertson, Archivist of the State of Maryland, who as
curator of the photostats of the Florida State Historical Society,
known as the Stetson Collection, kindly accorded him permission
to consult these valuable records under his care. To his major
professor, the Rev. Dr. Francis Borgia Steck, O.F.M., the writer
owes an inestimable debt of gratitude for indispensable direction
in the preparation of this work. Only for Dr. Steck's ripe scholar-
ship, sustained inspiration, tireless industry, and sympathetic
interest, the study could not have been completed. The writer is
grateful also to Dr. Richard J. Purcell and Dr. Leo F. Stock of
the Department of History and to Dr. John J. Meng of the De-
partment of Politics for technical and literary assistance. Finally,
the writer appreciates the helpful and encouraging spirit of his
fellow-members of Dr. Steck's seminar in Hispanic-American
History; their friendly interest in the work and their friendly
comments and suggestions were of material value.


Early Spanish Explorations and Attempts at Colonization-
The De Luna Enterprise, 1559-1561-The Silent Period
and the Beginnings of the Triangular Struggle, 1561-
1685--"Redscovery" of Pensacola Bay, 1686-The Pez
Memorial, 1689-Opposition of the Junta de la Guerra,
1690-1691-The Real Cidula of 1692-The Pez-Sigfienza
and the Torres Expeditions, 1693-The Real Cidula of
1694-Governor Arriola's Investigation, 1695-French
Aggression after the Treaty of Ryswick, 1697-1698-
The Real Cidula of 1698-The English Threat from
Carolina, 1698-The Bay of Pensacola Occupied by
Spain, 1698 -. -_ 1

Iberville's First Voyage to the Gulf Coast, 1698-1699-At-
tempt to Enter Pensacola Bay, 1699-Governor Arriola's
Effort to Secure Aid from Mexico, 1699-The Dual
English Menace from Carolina and from Darien, 1699-
1700-Diplomatic Backgrounds: the Treaty of Miinster
(1648) and of Madrid (1667, 1670)-Pensacola and the
Bourbon Accession, 1701-1702-The Diplomatic Contro-
versy over the French Intrusion, 1701-1702-Mobile, a
Further French Threat, 1702-Internal Affairs at Pensa-
cola, 1698-1702 -----__ __ .33

The Shifting Policies of Spain regarding Pensacola, 1700-
1704-Attempts to Strengthen Pensacola against the
English, 1703-1704--Moore's Raid on Western Florida,


1704-Defense Projects against the English Threat and
Relations with the French at Mobile, 1704-1706-The
Great Fire and Landeche's Rescue Expedition, 1705-
Pensacola or St. Augustine?-Renewed English Aggres-
sion and Indian Hostility, 1707-1713--Conditions at
Pensacola in 1713 -0____-- 63



English Intrigue among the Indians, 1713-1715--Spanish
Counteraction among the Indians, 1713-1718-Partial
Rehabilitation of Apalache and Efforts to Strengthen
Pensacola, 1715-1718-Friction with France, 1713-1719
France's Occupation of St. Joseph's Bay, 1718--The
Founding of New Orleans, 1718-The Military Struggle
for Pensacola, 1719-1720-The Diplomatic Contest for
Pensacola, 1720-1721-The Outcome Favorable to Spain 92



Pensacola Restored to Spain, 1720-1722-The Suggested
Abandonment of Pensacola, 1721-1723-The Abandon-
ment of St. Joseph's Bay, 1722-Elvira's Report on
Pensacola, 1722-Difficulties with the Louisiana French,
1721-1738--English Intrigue: the Talapoosa Plot, 1727
-English Attack on Spain's Indian Allies, 1723-1728-
Attempts to Strengthen Apalache for the Defense of
Pensacola, 1724-1739-The New Threat: English
Georgia, 1732-1739 __.____ _------ 125



~__ __



Early Spanish Explorations and Attempts at Colonization-The
De Luna Enterprise, 1559-1561-The Silent Period and the
Beginnings of the Triangular Struggle, 1561-1685--"Re-
discovery" of Pensacola Bay, 1686-The Pez Memorial, 1689
-Opposition of the Junta de la Guerra, 1690-1691-The Real
Cidula of 1692-The Pez-Sigiienza and the Torres Expedi-
tions, 1693-The Real Cidula of 1694-Governor Arriola's
Investigation, 1695-French Aggression after the Treaty of
Ryswick, 1697-1698-The Real Cidula of 1698-The English
Threat from Carolina, 1698-The Bay of Pensacola Occupied
by Spain, 1698.

The vast stretches of mainland north of Cuba and the Gulf of
Mexico were for a century and a half referred to by Spain as "La
Florida." To these largely unexplored and unoccupied territories
the Spaniards laid claim by right of discovery and by virtue of
the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1493. During the first half-century
following the discovery of Florida by Juan Ponce de Le6n in
15131 Spain had no fixed policy regarding her new mainland
possession. The earlier stages of her activities in Florida con-
sisted as a rule of mere exploring expeditions and futile attempts
at settlement along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Among these
were the enterprises led by Juan Ponce de Le6n (1513, 1521),.
Pineda and Garay (1519-1523), Ayll6n (1526), Narviez (1528),
De Soto (1539-1543), and the De Luna-Villafafie expedition
The first real attempt to colonize western Florida was made by
Pinfilo de Narviez. He was commissioned by the king of Spain
to settle the entire northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico "from the

'Ponce de LAon's title to the first actual discovery is disputed by some
scholars. See Henry Harrisse, The Discovery of North America (London
and Paris, 1892), 77-109, 142-153.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

Rio de las Palmas2 up to Florida."3 Narviez's expedition was a
major one with a serious purpose.' Had it proved successful, this
expedition would have materially altered the subsequent course of
North American history, particularly as regards France's later
occupation of Louisiana and the Mississippi valley. It will be
shown in a later chapter that it was the prospect and accomplish-
ment of this occupation, with its consequent threat to Spain's
lifeline between the mother country and her North American
possessions, that chiefly caused the Spanish fortifications and settle-
ment of Pensacola Bay. Yet more important, it created in western
Florida a situation unusual in other American frontier regions,
namely, a three-cornered international and intercolonial rivalry
between Spain, France, and England. It is, moreover, significant
that the Narviez expedition actually reached not only the Apalache
region but also Pensacola Bay."
The next important Spanish expedition to the Apalache and
Pensacola regions was that of Hernando de Soto, who explored
the interior of "La Florida" for some three years. While it is
not thought that De Soto himself ever saw Pensacola Bay, it is
known that a scouting party sent out by him in December, 1539,
brought back word of an excellent harbor, which, by their de-
scription, may quite well have been that of Pensacola.' There is
no evidence that De Soto planned the colonization of a bay which
he himself almost certainly never saw. But there is very convinc-
ing evidence that the colonization of Florida or at least a part of it
(most likely western Florida) was one of his two chief aims, the
other being that of a search for a strait.7 At any rate, the king,

Most probably the present Rio Grande.
SFrancis Borgia Steck, O.F.M., The Jolliet-Marquette Expedition, 1673
(Washington, 1927), 9-13.
'The expedition included four hundred colonists, several secular priests
and five Franciscan friars, among these last a bishop-elect, Juan JuArez.
See Steck, op. cit., 9.
SSteck, op. cit., 11.
SFrancis Borgia Steck, O.F.M., "Neglected Aspects of the De Soto Expe-
dition," reprint from Mid-America, XV (1932), 8.
Ibid., 6-7, 11-13. Conversion of the Indians has not been mentioned as a
third chief aim simply because this was quite common to all such Spanish

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

on April 20, 1537, authorized De Soto "to conquer and colonize
the province -of the Rio de las Palmas up to Florida."* Moreover,
De Soto took with him not only six hundred soldiers, but also
eight secular priests and four friars.' Disaster overtook the
expedition, preventing a Spanish settlement in western Florida at
this time.
Twenty years after the De Soto expedition, Don Tristan de
Luna y Arellafio, son of the governor of Yucatin, led another
major force of about two thousand Spaniards and one thousand
Indian allies,-an uncommonly large figure, be it noted, for the
times,-to Pensacola Bay in a first attempt to colonize that region."
De Luna and his men experienced the same difficulties that earlier
and later would-be Spanish colonists underwent more than once.
Disease, dissension and famine being rife, four companies of
soldiers were sent inland some forty leagues to the north to a
village called by the Indians Nanipacna, where results were little
if any better. After a further venture northward to Coosa, where
they fared almost as badly in some respects, even though the natives
were inclined to be friendly, the soldiers were recalled to the port
where they had landed, after seven months of exploration of the
hinterland. De Luna was then replaced in command by Angel
Villafafie, who attempted to reach Santa Elena on the Atlantic
coast. This venture also proving a failure, the entire enterprise
was abandoned. Even the small garrison which had been left at
Pensacola (then called Santa Maria de Filipinas) was withdrawn.
Thus was abandoned the first serious attempt at Spanish settle-
ment of Pensacola.11 Herewith terminated Spain's interest in this
Region for more than a century. Indeed, Philip II issued a decree
on September 23, 1561, to the effect that further endeavors to
colonize Florida should be given up.2 When this policy was re-
versed four years later, it was at St. Augustine on the east coast
that Menindez laid the foundations of Spanish Florida.
'Ibid., 6-7.
SIbid., 7, 15.
"Woodbury Lowery, The Spanish Settlements within the Present Limits
of the United States, IJz3-z561 (New York and London, 1901), 358-376.
SLowery, op. cit., 358-376.
SIbid., 376.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

The policy of concentrating all Spanish activities in Florida on
the eastern coast prevailed until about 1633,1" when Franciscan
friars began in earnest the labor of making the western region--
Apalache-Christian and Spanish. Even then the government
supported these missionary efforts in the West only with consider-
able reluctance. A change came when reports began to be heard
of English intrigue among the Indians of western Florida. After
an abortive revolt in Apalache in 1656, the governor of Florida
established a garrison consisting of a captain and twelve soldiers
at San Luis (Tallahassee), to protect as much the royal as the
spiritual interest of Spain in these western regions." This presidio
and others subsequently established served as points of departure
for explorers northward and westward into the Pensacola area.
For a century and a quarter after the withdrawal of De Luna's
garrison, Pensacola seems to have been forgotten or neglected by
the Spaniards. But English aggression from the northeast and'
French penetration from the north and west became more menac-
ing in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, and Spain's
attention was once more turned perforce to the importance of
fortifying and settling the Pensacola Bay territory. English fur-
traders were encroaching from Carolina, after the foundation of
Charleston in 1670, and were busily intriguing with the Indians.
northeast of Pensacola Bay. Simultaneously, what.at least seemed
to be an even more deadly peril was feared from the French as
a result of the Jolliet and the La Salle expedition. The Jolliet
enterprise, which descended the Mississippi as far as the mouth
of the Arkansas in 1673, proved to the satisfaction of the French
government that the Mississippi flowed into the Gulf of Mexico,
and not, as many had believed, into the Gulf of California or into
the Atlantic.15 This new French discovery meant that Spain's
already impoverished exchequer must be further drained by an

SMaynard Geiger, O.F.M., The Franciscan Conquest of Florida (Wash-
ington, 1937), 230.
John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and their Neigh-
bors (Washington, 1922), 119.
"Francis Borgia Steck, The Jolliet-Marquette Expedition, 1673, 163. As
to Spain's policy of secrecy respecting the Mississippi, see the same writer,
op. cit., 212-215.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

occupation of the northern Gulf coast lest it become French. This
point was driven even further home in 1684, eleven years after
the Jolliet expedition, by another bold French intrusion. In that
year La Salle had the temerity (from the. Spanish viewpoint) to
attempt to found a French colony on the Gulf coast, somewhere
near the mouth of the Mississippi.
Even Charles II saw that something would have to be done;
otherwise France would follow England's Jamaican example and
chisel off another important part of Spain's imperial edifice in
America. That Spain was not at this time the altogether decadent
third-rate power that she has often been considered seems clear
from the fact that she sent no less than eleven different forces by
land and by sea in an endeavor to locate and dislodge the La Salle
colony.1' Some of these expeditions, the one commanded by
Delgado, for instance, started from St. Augustine, using Apalache
as a way-station. Others were sent from Mexico, but explored
western Florida in the course of their search. In both cases, the
result was a great increase of interest in the Pensacola region.
Indeed, these searches led directly to the "re-discovery" of Pensa-
cola Bay and to the foundation of Pensacola by the Spaniards.
Pensacola was to serve the dual purpose of an eastern barrier to
French and a southwestern barrier to English aggression.
Since the "re-discovery" of Pensacola Bay was the direct result
of one of the searches by sea for the La Salle colony, it is this
particular expedition that must first be considered. On September
10, 1685, the Armada de Barlovento1 captured a French corsair
ship which had on board a young man, Denis Thomas by name.
Thomas was subjected to the examination customary in such cases.
In his testimony he set forth facts which were at first received
with incredulity by the court of inquiry sitting at Vera Cruz. On
further investigation, the officials learned to their dismay that what
Thomas declared was apparently only too true, particularly since
it was so well corroborated by what the other prisoners stated. The

"William Edward Dunn, Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region
of the United States, 1678-1702 (Austin, 1917), 58.
The "Armada de Barlovento" ("Windward Fleet") was used in the
pursuit of pirates and in the coastal defense.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

gist of it was that Thomas had reached the islandof Santo Domingo
on one of La Salle's ships, had changed his mind about the venture,
had decided to return to France, but had been on the pirate ship
when it was captured by the Armada de Barlovento. Thomas had
learned from one of La Salle's servants that the colony was to be
located near a place called "Mississippi," but he did not know just
where the place was.18
After a careful study of the testimony of Thomas and the other
prisoners and of whatever maps happened to be available, it was
decided by the responsible officials that the matter should be
promptly presented to the viceroy as being one of extreme urgency,
in order that appropriate action might be taken as soon as possible.
The principal argument advanced at the time for speedy and
drastic action was that such a colony in foreign hands would
present an ever-present peril to the treasure fleets of the Indies.
This is especially interesting in view of the fact that precisely the
same argument was later employed by Andr6s de Pez, an influential
naval officer, in his memorial to the viceroy in 1689 relative to the
occupation of Pensacola. In the latter case, however, and in at
least one instance between the time of the Thomas testimony and
that of the Pez memorial, mention is made of the advantage of
possessing the northern Gulf coast for its own natural fruitfulness
in timber and in the products of the soil.19
The foundation of Spanish Pensacola was in itself the logical
result of an extreme alarm felt among the officials of New Spain
regarding the possibility of a foreign settlement on the northern
shore of the Gulf rather than any original recognition of the merits
of the bay or the advisability from that standpoint of a Spanish

Declaration of Denis Thomas, Oct. 27, 1685, Archivo General de Indias,
Audinecia de M~xico, 61-6-20 (hereinafter cited as Mexico). See also
Dunn, op. cit., 36-38.
'The king to Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duque de la Palata,
Viceroy of Peru, Sept. 5, 1687, A.G.I., Indiferente General, 147-5-13 (here-
inafter cited as Ind. Gen.). Although addressed to the viceroy of Peru, this
letter also states that the king has given the viceroy of New Spain the same
orders relative to the northern Gulf coast. This document, not cited in
Dunn or other secondary sources, is found in the Library of Congress in the
form of a certified transcript.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

colony on it. Here again, the r6le of Pensacola in the triangular
struggle for western Florida is demonstrated. In the Apalache
region, England was recognized as Spain's most formidable foe,
owing to Carolina's geographical propinquity to Apalache. In
Pensacola, on the other hand, the French were regarded as the
more important or at least the more immediate threat. This was
a natural attitude in view of the Jolliet and La Salle expeditions
and in view of Pefialosa's traitorous intrigues against Spain during
this period. It is true, nevertheless, that just as France aspired to
the dominion of the entire region of the Mississippi valley and
eastward, England not only entertained designs on Apalache but
also had agents working in her favor among the Indians of the
Pensacola hinterland.20
The alarm of the Spanish officials at the idea of an alien settle-
ment on the northern Gulf coast is attested by the urgent haste
with which they now proceeded. Denis Thomas was examined on
October 27, 1685. That same day Admiral Gaspar de Palacios,
pilot-major of the Indies, sent his report on the matter to the vice-
roy. The report was received on November 3 and immediately
the viceroy referred it to the fiscal. The fiscal made his recom-
mendations on November 4, and these were adopted at a special
meeting of the viceregal council the next day. On November 21,
a sea expedition was sent out to investigate the truth of Thomas'
testimony. This was the Barroto-Romero expedition, which "re-
discovered" Pensacola Bay."2
On the advice of Admiral Palacios, Juan Enriquez Barroto and
Antonio Romero were selected as co-pilots and were instructed to
proceed directly to Havana. Here they were to secure a vessel
and search the entire northern Gulf coast, at least as far as the
Rio del Espiritu Santo (the Mississippi). The Spanish authorities
were determined to locate the colony which La Salle was reported

"Declaration of Romo, Oct. 24, 1698, contained in a letter of Martinez
to the governor of Havana, Feb. 21, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22; informed of
Villareal, Mexico, 61-6-25; the king to Alburquerque, August 12, 1705,
Archivo General y Piblico, Mixico, Historia, Tomo a98 (hereinafter cited
as A.G. y P., Mex., Hist., 298).
n "Instrucci6n y derrota que han de observer y guardar Juan Enriquez
Barroto y Antonio Romero," Nov. 13. 1685. Mexico. 61-6-20.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

to have planted somewhere on the Gulf coast. Barroto and
Romero arrived at Havana on December 3, 1685, and at once
presented to Governor Munibe the viceroy's instructions. These
included the supplying to Barroto and Romero of a government
ship for the undertaking. But this particular feature of the
instructions could not be carried out; wherefore the expedition
chartered a rather dilapidated private vessel named Nuestra Seiora
de la Concepcion y San Joseph. A launch was taken aboard the
larger vessel, to be used in examining indentations along the coast
where the water was too shallow to permit entry of the mother
ship. Governor Munibe provided forty-two men. To these were
added ten Spanish adventurers who volunteered to serve without
pay. One of these was Juan Jordan de Reina, later celebrated for
his connection with the foundation of Pensacola and for his map
of the French settlements in Santo Domingo.
The Barroto-Romero expedition sailed from Havana on Jan-
uary 3, 1686, and after a stormy voyage arrived at Apalache Bay a
fortnight later. Here they had their first intimation of impending
trouble with the English. The lieutenant of Apalache warned
them to be careful in their dealings with the Indians to the west.
These, said the lieutenant, were in a bad mood because of the recent
expulsion of English fur-traders by the Spanish garrison of
Apalache.22 This news was no doubt a source of additional
anxiety to the expedition, heretofore bent on concentration against
the French alone.
A little more than a month later, on February 6, 1686, the
expedition "re-discovered" Pensacola Bay, long forgotten or until
now left unnoticed by the Spaniards.23 This "re-discovery" was
destined to cause a revival of interest in the possibilities of what
seemed to be an excellent harbor. Moreover, in the eyes of Spain
it appeared a good protection in the control of the Gulf of Mexico,
while to the English and the French it represented a point from
which to threaten and dispute this control. The remaining activities
of the Barroto-Romero expedition are of little direct interest to

SDunn, op. cit., 61.
Juan Jordan de Reina to Governor Munibe, Mar. 16, 1686, Mexico,

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

the story of Pensacola. Although the Nuestra Sefora de la Con-
cepci6n y San Joseph sailed westward to Mobile and ultimately
to the Mississippi mouth, the important fact of its voyage was the
calling once more to Spain's attention of the existence and
strategic value of Pensacola Bay. The Barroto-Romero expedition
arrived at Vera Cruz on March 13, 1686.
Little advantage was taken at first of the "re-discovery" of
Pensacola Bay.) A second maritime expedition was sent out on
Christmas Day of 1686 by the new viceroy, the Conide de Mon-
clova. This expedition, under the joint command of Martin de
Rivas and Antonio de Iriarte, took Barroto and Romero along as
pilots. But the principal objective of the expedition was the search
for La Salle. Hence it did not even re-enter Pensacola Bay, the
Spaniards being certain that La Salle would not be found there.
Monclova sent out a third expedition in June, 1687. Led by
Andris de Pez (destined shortly afterwards to play a prominent
r6le in the actual foundation of Pensacola) and Francisco de
Gamarra, the expedition attempted to enter Pensacola Bay, but
was thwarted by contrary currents. It returned to Vera Cruz in
September, 1687, without having done anything serious about
Gaspar de Sandoval, Conde de Galve, was made viceroy of New
Spain in 1688, replacing Monclova, who was transferred to Peru.
During Galve's term began the first really important activity in
the matter of colonizing Pensacola. In the year following his
arrival in New Spain, the ruins of the La Salle settlement were at
length discovered on the Texas coast. The very factor which had
previously led to Spain's "re-discovery" of Pensacola Bay, namely,
the search for La Salle's colony, had soon proved an obstacle to
Spanish colonization of the bay region. This obstacle was now
removed. The Barroto-Romero "re-discovery" of the bay, the
entrance of Pez into the picture, the appointment of Galve as vice-
roy of New Spain, and the complete confidence which the new vice-
roy reposed in Pez,-these circumstances now led to Spain's
occupation of Pensacola, partially for its own natural advantages,

SScattering documents in Mexico, 616-20; also, a "Consulta de la Junta
de Guerra," March 22,1691, Mexico, 61-6-21. See also Dmnn, op. cit., 78-80.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

but even more largely to forestall an occupation by France or
In the latter part of 1689, Pez formally proposed to Viceroy
Galve the fortification and colonization of Pensacola."s In his
memorial to that effect, he stressed the value and importance of
Pensacola as opposed to St. Augustine. He pointed out that the
harbor of St. Augustine was a poor one and that relatively little
commerce was carried on there, since it was entirely off the trade
routes between Florida, Cuba, and New Spain. The Florida-Cuba
trade, he said, was carried on mostly through Apalache, not St.
Augustine. The St. Augustine presidio, moreover, was a useless
expense. It cost the king 96,000 pesos per annum to maintain,
whereas for a trifling sum the harbor could be rendered useless,
so that the English of Carolina would have no good of it. The real
danger, according to Pez, was from the French. They had already
attempted to settle a much less suitable spot on the Texas coast.
Should Spain now fail to occupy Pensacola Bay promptly, the
French would be only too glad to abandon their fruitless venture
on the Texas coast for an infinitely more promising one in western
Florida, which would present a constant and most perilous threat
to Spain's North American trade and dominions.26 Pez further
pointed out that the harbor of Pensacola was by all odds the best
on the northern Gulf coast. Moreover, it could very easily be
fortified, in view of the fact that there were two promontories at
the entrance of the bay. On one of these a fort could be built com-
manding the channel and effectually prohibiting the entry of hostile
warships. The expense to the Real Hacienda might be advanced

The Pez memorial itself has been lost, but its proposals are found in
various documents in Mexico, 61-6-20 and Mexico, 61-6-21. Although Pez
submitted the memorial, it was probably drawn up by Barroto. See "In-
forme de Don Carlos de Sigienza y G6ngora, in "Testimonio de Autos
ejecutados," July 16, 1698, Mexico, 61-6-22.
SPez was not a man of the most scrupulous veracity, but for evidence
that he was perfectly correct in his statement of the French attitude toward
Pensacola, see Pierre Margry, Dicouvertes et Etablissements des Frangais
dans I'Ouest et dans le Sud de I'Amirique Septentrionale (Paris, 1879-1888),
IV, 96-97, 143-144, 472 ff., 489 ff.; Martinez to the governor of Havana,
Feb. 21, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22; Arriola to the king, May 9, 1699, ibid.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

as an argument against the settlement of Pensacola. To this
potential opposition Pez replied that much expense had already been
undergone in connection with such places as St. Augustine, Lower
California, and the Philippine Islands, none of which offered the
advantages promised by Pensacola. Pez's last argument for the
occupation was the usual one of conversion of the Indians; these,
he said, were desirous of becoming Christians.2T
The viceroy, although he agreed with Pez on the value of
Pensacola and on the desirability of occupying the bay, was loath
to consent to such a radical reversal of previous Spanish policy as
would be involved in the relinquishment of St. Augustine. The
royal treasury, moreover, was in no condition to stand the initia-
tion of any unnecessary new measures of colonial expansion,
however desirable these might seem to be when considered from
certain angles. The upshot of the matter was that Viceroy Galve
adopted a compromise course of action. He not only sent to the
king through the ordinary channels all the usual documents per-
taining to the project, but also wrote a personal letter to the presi-
dent of the Consejo de Indias. In this letter, he vigorously
advocated the colonization of Pensacola, without including a rec-
ommendation for the abandonment of St. Augustine." This
letter was taken to Spain by Pez, who reached Madrid in January,
1690. Here he privately interviewed the Marquis de Los Velez,
president of the Consejo de Indias, and delivered to him the vice-
roy's recommendations.
Meanwhile, in the course of the routine normally followed in
such matters, the Pensacola proposal had been considered by
Martin de Solis, then fiscal of the Consejo de Indias. Solis had
at one time been a member of the Audiencia de Mixico, and must
have had at least a general knowledge of events happening and
apt to happen in that part of the New World. After a careful
study of the matter, Solis drew up, on February 22, 1690, a com-
promise set of recommendations for' the consideration of the
Consejo de Indias.

"Dunn, op. cit., 149; also, the viceroy to the president of the Council of
the Indies, June 29, 1689, Mexico, 61-6-21.
0 The viceroy to Los Velez, June 29, 1689, Mesico, 61-6-21.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

On the favorable side of the ledger, the fiscal set forth his belief
that Pensacola would be a logical place for Spanish colonization.
He further realized that its occupation by a foreign power would
be a serious threat to Spain's holdings and commercial enterprises
in North America. He felt that Pensacola was much too important
to forget again, as had been done for generations.
On the unfavorable side, Solis pointed out that the viceroy had
made no special report on the Pez memorial and apparently had
made no independent investigation of his own. The evidence in
favor of the proposal therefore consisted merely of Pez's own
unsupported statements; these, not having been investigated, might
or might not prove to be true. Certainly, this further expense to
the royal treasury should not be undertaken on the basis of the
unauthenticated claims of one man, even though that man had held
several high royal and viceregal appointments in the Indies.29
In so far as St. Augustine was concerned, Solis totally disagreed
with Pez; the presidio there, he thought, should be strengthened,
not abandoned. In conclusion, he recommended the establishment
of missions among the Pensacola Indians."0 Further action, he
declared, might well be based on the future reports of the mission-
aries who might be assigned to the Pensacola region. In spite of
his partial agreement with some of Pez's ideas, Solis in the main
disagreed with him both generally and specifically. Pez considered
the French the most likely interlopers, and was chiefly interested
for that reason in an early Spanish occupation of Pensacola Bay.
Solis, on the other hand, was more in fear of English penetration
from Carolina, and consequently favored concentrating Spain's
Florida forces in and around St. Augustine.
It appeared for the moment that the Pez memorial would be
rejected and that the whole scheme for the fortification and settle-
ment of Pensacola Bay would be dropped. Had this eventually
occurred, Pez's prophetic gifts would almost certainly have been
verified, and the French would very shortly have occupied Pensa-

Pez had seen active service against the buccaneers in the Caribbean and
had engaged, as mentioned above, in the search for La Salle.
""Respuesta fiscal," Feb. 22, 1690, Mexico, 61-6-21. See also Dunn,
op. cit., 150-151.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

cola Bay, either in preference to, or in conjunction with, their
settlement of Mobile and other Gulf ports. This seems apparent
from Iberville's journal and from the general French attitude
toward Pensacola as seen in the diplomatic correspondence, treaty
discussions, and private instructions to French ministers abroad.*
Before the Junta de Guerra, to whom the fiscal's reply and the
other documents pertaining to the question had been referred by
the Consejo de Indias, had had time to act, the president of the
Consejo de Indias was presented with Viceroy Galve's letter of
June 29, 1689, strongly recommending the adoption of Pez's
colonization scheme. This private letter of the viceroy almost
completely changed the attitude of Solis. It was no longer a
question of Pez's unsupported idea, but of a proposition advanced
by the viceroy of New Spain. Although the second respuesta
fiscal has not been found, it was probably made on March 22, 1690,
exactly a month after the first one.*' Despite the loss of the exact
respuesta, it is evident from other contemporary documents that
Solis reversed his former position, except in so far as the proposed
abandonment of St. Augustine was concerned. While he still
opposed this abandonment for fear of English encroachments from
Carolina, he was now insistent that the Pensacola fort be erected.*
A further delay ensued, and the actual vote was not taken until
October 12, 1690. With a single exception," the members of the
Junta followed the lead of one of its most influential members, the
Marquis de la Granja, and opposed Pez's proposal, even though
it now had the approbation of both the viceroy and the fiscal."
La Granja and the majority of the Junta held that Spain's anxiety
to prevent a French settlement on the Bay of Espiritu Santo was
due to the comparative proximity of that bay to Vera Cruz.
Pensacola, however, was several times the distance from the coast
of New Spain. In the belief of the Junta there was no reason to
think that any of the three most dangerous maritime rivals to
"Margry, IV, 96-97, 143-144, 472 ff., 489 ff.; Archives du Ministtre des
Afaires Etranglres, Espagne, CCXCVI, 51, 54.
SThe viceroy to the king, May 15, 1693, Mexico, 61-6-21.
""Voto del Sr. Granxa" (undated), Mexico, 61-6-21; Dunn, op. cit., 151.
Gaspar Portocarrero supported the memorial.
"Voto del Sr. Granxa," Mexico, 61-6-21.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

Spain (i.e., France, England, and Holland) had any intention of
seizing Pensacola Bay. All three rivals already possessed naval
bases in the Antilles better suited to harass Spanish commerce than
Pensacola would be. So far as actual invasion of New Spain was
concerned, the Junta ridiculed the notion on the ground that
geographical distances rendered this impracticable. Moreover, said
La Granja in explaining his negative vote, both the English and
the French certainly knew of the existence of Pensacola Bay. Yet
they had made no attempt to occupy it; wherefore there was no
valid reason for assuming that they would at this time reverse
their previous policy in this regard.
Regarding the other portions of the Pez memorial, La Granja
and the majority of the Junta were equally strong in their opposi-
tion. The projected abandonment of St. Augustine they held to
be absurd to the point of puerility. Concerning the proposed con-
version of the Pensacola Indians, the Junta suggested rather
ironically that a more appropriate measure would be the conversion
of those Indians who still remained pagan in long-settled and far
more important Spanish colonies. The Junta did not believe that
the fiscal's mere residence for some years in New Spain had turned
a legal man into a soldier; therefore they rejected with contumely
the idea that Solis was professionally qualified to advise them on
the proper location of Spain's military and naval outposts. Nor
were they willing to accept Andris de Pez as the logical leader of
such an enterprise, even granting that its accomplishments were
On the more positive side, La Granja felt that the unsupported
claims of Pez as to the fertility and strategic importance of the
Pensacola Bay area would bear questioning and additional in-
vestigation. Even should the bay be found as admirable as
represented, it would be better merely to block the channel and
thus prevent its use by the French or the English than to impoverish
an already badly depleted royal treasury by the erection and
maintenance of a settlement which could only prove a useless
expense at a time when every available peso was sorely needed for
other purposes. At best, a Spanish occupation of the bay would

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

be a measure of profitless expansion at a time when Spain needed
to concentrate on defending the vast dominions which she had
already acquired and settled. Furthermore, the harbor, if colonized,
would be much more frequented by smugglers of other nations
than by Spanish galleons going deliberately far out of their way
for the sole purpose of being buffeted and perhaps destroyed by
hurricanes and contrary currents."' To sum the matter up in a
nutshell, it was felt by the Junta that St. Augustine should be
maintained at all costs; that Pensacola Bay should be blocked up
rather than occupied; and that the Armada de Barlovento, if
properly strengthened, would prove much more effective for the
defense of New Spain and Spanish shipping than would a base
at Pensacola, so remote from the center of Spain's activities in
the Indies.
On March 22, 1691, the Junta made its report to the king re-
jecting in so far as rejection lay within their power the Pez
memorial in toto.s8 Charles II, however, was disposed to dis-
regard the ideas of the Junta and to accept the proposals contained
in the Pez memorial, save for the one which suggested the
dismantling and relinquishment of St. Augustine. The king so
informed the Junta, which was still greatly displeased with
the whole idea. A third consult followed on September 27,
1691; in this the Jhwta reminded the king that Pez's testimony
still stood unsupported, it being manifest from his own diary
that he had never actually entered Pensacola Bay. As to
Viceroy Galve's advocacy of the settlement, it should be remem-
bered that neither of his predecessors (Laguna and Monclova) had
ever suggested any such measure, even after the Barroto-Romero
expedition had "re-discovered" Pensacola Bay. The Junta felt
that the viceroy should be ordered to send experienced navigators
and military engineers to the bay; these should thoroughly examine
it, in order that the real truth of the matter might be ascertained.
The appropriate maps and reports based on these findings should
then be sent to the king for his consideration and transmission to

""Consulta de la Junta de Guerra," Mexico, 61-6-21.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

the Junta for final study and recommendations. Above all, St.
Augustine must be fully maintained because of the English.*'
The king assented and issued a real cedula to that effect on June
26, 1692.40 The Conde de Galve, still viceroy of New Spain, was
only too glad to be able at last to take some sort of positive action
in a venture which had deeply interested him from the beginning.
It was only natural, of course, that he should entrust the leader-
ship of the exploring expedition to men in whom he had personal
confidence. Pez, formerly an ordinary seaman in the Spanish
navy, had later become a captain in the Armada de Barlovento and
had recently been promoted to the rank of admiral of the Armada.
Galve now appointed him commander of the expedition, with the
unanimous consent of his junta general, which had been convoked
December 17, 1692, to adopt plans for the execution of the real
cidula of the preceding June." Along with Admiral Pez was to
go as expert scientific adviser Don Carlos de Sigiienza y G6ngora,
mathematician and cosmographer, who was a noted savant, learned
in the sort of thing about which the king sought information. Pez
and Sigiienza y G6ngora had their own set of instructions pertain-
ing exclusively to the field in which each was to render service.
The expedition, consisting of two vessels, each carrying over
one hundred men, together with supplies for eighty days, set out
from Vera Cruz on March 25, 1693. In accordance with the
viceroy's instructions, Pez sailed straight across the Gulf to
Pensacola Bay, which he reached in thirteen days. In memory of
the fact that the De Luna expedition of 1559-1561 had entered
the bay on the eve of St. Mary's Day, the feast of the Assumption
(August 14), and in order to honor the viceroy whose interest had
made the venture possible, it was decided that the bay and the
projected settlement on it should no longer be called "Panzacola"
(after the insignificant Indian tribe resident nearby), but rather

""Consulta de la Junta de Guerra," Sept. 27, 1691, Mexico, 61-6-21.
"Real cedula," Mexico, 61-6-21.
"Testimonio de las Dilixencias executadas en Virtud de RI Zedula de
S Mgd. Sobre El reconocimiento de la Bahia de Santa Maria de Galue
(antes Panzacola)," Mexico, 61-6-21.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

"Santa Maria de Galve."'2 As previously stated, there were two
promontories, on the eastern and western sides respectively of
the bay entrance. The name "Punta de Sigiienza" was now given
to the eastern promontory, while the point across the channel to
the west was given the august designation of "Punta de San
Carlos," in honor of the king and his patron saint. A relatively
short distance in from the western point of entrance was a beach,
higher than the eastern shore. This was named the "Barranca de
Santo Tome." It was destined later to be the site of the fort,
the presidio of San Carlos de Austria.
The expedition had entered Pensacola Bay on April 7. The
work of exploring, sounding, computing distances, and other pre-
liminaries were begun on the next day by a party led by Pez,
Sigiienza y G6ngora, and Juan Jordan de Reina, the last-named
of Barroto-Romero expedition fame. This work continued for
almost three weeks. On April 26, 1693, in keeping with the
viceroy's instructions, the expedition sailed westward to Mobile
Bay, then to the mouth of the Mississippi, and finally homeward
to Vera Cruz, where they arrived on May 13."
Dissension now arose among the leaders of the expedition as to
what steps should be taken in view of their findings. Sigfienza y
G6ngora sent his recommendations to the viceroy at once and
followed up this advantage by forwarding his map of the bay as
soon as Vera Cruz was reached. He recommended the immediate
erection of two wooden forts, one at the Punta de Sigfenza and
the other at the Barranca de Santo Tome on the opposite shore.
Pez, on the contrary, desired that the viceroy send the information
to the king, with a request for 13,180 escudos (197,700 pesos) and
a garrison of 200 soldiers, the supplies and the colonists to be sent
directly from the mother country." In both Sigiienza's report and
that of Pez, which latter was not presented to the viceroy until

"Ibid. In his excellent work, often cited herein, Dunn thinks that the
frequent later spelling, "Galvez," is probably due to "the prominence of the
great GAlvez family," but as early as Feb. 4, 1695, the Count himself is
carelessly referred to as "Gilvez." (A.GJ., Ind. Gen., 147-5-22.)
""Testimonio de las Dilixencias executadas," Mexico, 61-6-21.
"Pez to the viceroy, June 1, 1693, in "Testimonio de las Dilixencias
executadas," Mexico, 61-6-21.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

Pez reached Mexico City, emphasis was laid on the danger of
France occupying the bay as soon as the war in which she was then
engaged was terminated. The essential difference of opinion lay
in the fact that, while Pez was willing to wait for action until such
time as the supplies he deemed requisite should arrive from Spain,
Sigiienza y G6ngora feared that such a delay might easily under-
mine the entire project, since France might in the meantime occupy
the bay and make all the Spanish efforts abortive.4"
The viceroy called another meeting of his junta general on June
2. After a discussion of all the factors involved, it was felt that
since the real cedula of June 26, 1692, had left immediate and
permanent occupation to the viceroy's discretion, at least a tempo-
rary occupation ought to be effected. In the meantime, a full
report could be sent to Spain, with a request for such aid as might
be necessary to make the temporary settlement a more permanent
one. It was also felt that the addition of a third party to the
personnel of the expert committee would not be amiss; the factor
of New Spain, Sebastian de Guzmin, was therefore appointed to
assist Pez and Sigiienza in formulating the procedure necessary
to carry out the decision of the junta general."
The result of the consultation held by Pez, Sigiienza, and Guz-
man was three more or less conflicting reports to the viceroy.
Sigiienza and Guzmin both wished an immediate, even though
temporary, occupation. Among Sigiienza's recommendations was
one to the effect that an attempt be made to colonize Pensacola
partially from New Spain, while awaiting reinforcements from
the mother country." Guzmin held that, while something should
be done at once, New Spain would prdve a forlorn hope as a source
of immigration, since it was then busy with a project for the re-
settlement of New Mexico, which had been laid waste as a result
of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. Guzmin thought, however, that a
temporary occupation, sufficient to hold off a potential foe, might
be effected by a combination of twenty-five soldiers from St.

Sigiienza to the viceroy, May. 15, 1693, ibid. See also Dunn, op. cit., for
a more detailed statement of the above.
"Consulta de Junta general," June 2, 1693, Mexico, 61-6-21.
SSigfienza to the viceroy, June 4, 1693, ibid.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

Augustine, twenty-five from New Spain, and aid from Apalache
and friendly Indians. Guzmin favored one small fort for the
moment, while Sigiienza's plan called for two forts and con-
sequently for more troops, possibly one hundred in all." Pez held
firmly to his idea of awaiting troops and supplies from Spain,
although he conceded that a warship might well be sent to Pensa-
cola Bay in the meantime to hold off possible foreign aggression
or at least to warn the authorities of New Spain in time for more
vigorous action. Pez further argued that an insignificant forti-
fication would do no good in the event of a hostile attack. On
the contrary, he said, it would even prematurely and unnecessarily
call the attention of foreign powers to Spain's intentions concern-
ing Pensacola. This being the case, such an establishment would
actually invite France or England to capture the weak Spanish
garrison and immediately seize the bay.'*
The recommendations of Sigiienza and Guzmin were presented
to the viceroy on June 4, while Pez's ideas on the subject reached
him the next day. The result was practically a foregone conclusion.
Galve held Pez in the highest esteem and was inclined to adopt his
suggestions almost as soon as they were received. On June 8, the
viceroy's junta general decided that since the moneys necessary for
the occupation of Pensacola could not be obtained in New Spain,
Pez should once more be sent to Spain on a personal mission in
the matter. It was also voted that Pez's expenses should be met
by the government of New Spain until such time as the necessary
funds could be had in Spain."0
Viceroy Galve evidently considered the business to be an urgent
one. On the day immediately following the meeting of his junta,
he wrote the king a lengthy letter. In this he recorded the results
of the Pez-Sigiienza expedition, and added his own personal rec-
ommendations, which were entirely favorable to the undertaking.
Pensacola Bay, wrote the viceroy, would prove of the utmost value
to whatever nation was fortunate enough first to occupy it. It was
imperative that it be made a Spanish stronghold at the earliest

"Guzmin to the viceroy, June 4, 1693, ibid.
Pez to the viceroy, June 5, 1693, ibid.
1 "Consulta de Junta general, ibid.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

moment possible; and hence he was sending Pez to Spain to secure
the king's authorization of the project and the necessary troops
and supplies. This step, Galve explained, he was taking not only
because of his own beliefs, confirmed though they had been by the
findings of the expedition which he had sent to explore the bay,
but also with the advice and unanimous approval of his junta
general. Two hundred soldiers would be required to ensure the
retention of Pensacola, once it had been occupied.1
Three days later, the viceroy wrote another letter to Juan de la
Rea, secretary of the Consejo de Indias, telling him what he was
doing. These two letters, together with Sigiienza's map and the
other documents pertaining to the expedition, were sent to Spain
a short time afterwards, when the fleet left Vera Cruz for Spain,
bearing Admiral Pez on board one of its vessels."5
Meanwhile, another expedition had been sent to Pensacola and
thence westward to Mobile Bay overland. This force was under
the command of Don Laureano Torres y Ayala, newly appointed
governor of Florida. It reached Apalache by way of Havana on
May 15, 1693. Here the expedition rested and secured additional
supplies, re-inforcements, and native guides. On June 8, the
Torres expedition left Apalache for Pensacola Bay, which it
reached on July 2. The Pez-Sigiienza squadron had, of course,
long since left the bay, and had reached Vera Cruz almost a month
before. The findings of the Torres expedition relative to Pensa-
cola were almost identical with those, of Pez and Sigiienza. This,
naturally, strengthened the case for the occupation.
One significant matter came to the attention of Torres which
seems to have been unknown to the Pez-Sigiienza expedition.
Previous to this time, possible English aggression in the Pensacola
hinterland had not been considered to be as likely as a French
intrusion in that area. The English threat had been largely
limited in the earlier years to corsair ships which ranged the Gulf
from time to time for purposes of casual plunder rather than with
an aim to establishing a permanent colony. Now, however, Gov-
ernor Torres learned from the Indians that the English, who

SThe viceroy to the king, June 9, 1693, ibid.
SThe viceroy to Juan de la Rea, June 12, 1693, ibid.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

hitherto had menaced only St. Augustine and possibly Apalache,
had penetrated the country north and west of Pensacola. This
new threat from Carolina, combined with the immediately more
pressing French danger, made Spanish colonization of Pensacola
seem all the more urgent."
The fleet bearing Admiral Pez, the viceroy's letters to the king
and to De la Rea, Sigfienza's map of Pensacola Bay, and the other
documents pertinent to the findings of the Pez-Sigiienza expedition
arrived in Spain in December, 1693. Torres' letter to the king
must have arrived about the same time, although the exact date of
its arrival is not known. Confronted as it was by the indisputable
fact that all those who had explored Pensacola Bay were agreed
that an early Spanish occupation of the bay was both necessary
and desirable, the hitherto obdurate Junta de Guerra finally with-
drew its opposition to the plan. On April 2, 1694, it recommended
that the fortification of the bay be proceeded with as soon as
possible;"5 and on June 13, 1694, Charles II issued the necessary
real cidula to that effect.55
It must have appeared to all interested parties that the project
would now be carried out at once. But one very important
obstacle, that of financing the work, had yet to be surmounted. The
real cidula had given the viceroy permission to go ahead, provided
he made no move in the direction of an abandonment of St. Au-
gustine. The bay was to be occupied temporarily by a force from
New Spain, as both Sigiienza and Guzmin had previously recom-
mended, while the king on his part promised to send the two hun-
dred soldiers and the supplies requested by the viceroy as soon as
feasible. Viceroy Galve had told the king that a previous plan of
his to have the merchants of New Spain underwrite the affair had
failed and for this reason had requested the king to ask the Con-
sulado of Seville to advance 20,000 pesos toward ite The Con-
sulado had assumed this type of responsibility on other occasions,
but this time it declined to advance the money, even though the
Junta de Guerra asked it to do so, promising future repayment of

Torres to the king, Aug. 5, 1693, ibid.
""Consulta de la Junta de Guerra," Ind. Ges., 147-5-29.
"Real c6dula," Mexico, 61-6-21.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

the loan. The Junta de Guerra apparently did not learn of this
refusal on the part of the Consulado until some eighteen months
later, when the viceroy wrote that he had found himself unable to
begin the work until the necessary aid had arrived from Spain."
Although Galve had been deterred by lack of resources from
occupying the bay named in his honor, he was not altogether in-
active in a project so dear to his heart. In 1695, he sent Andres
de Arriola to Pensacola Bay with instructions to investigate condi-
tions there and to report his findings for purposes of comparison
with those of Pez and Sigiienza. Arriola, later governor of Pensa-
cola, was an experienced naval officer who had just returned from
a daring voyage to the Philippines in an 80-ton boat. The confi-
dence reposed by the viceroy in Arriola may be judged by a letter
written by him to the king on December 29, 1695. In this letter
the viceroy enumerated the services of Arriola. He described his
voyage to the Philippines in search of two missing Manila galleons,
then told of his investigation of the Bay of Santa Maria de Galve,"
and concluded by heartily recommending Arriola for some good
post, as for example, the presidency of the Audiencia de Santo
Domingo or the governorship of Havana."5
Galve's letter and Arriola's actions, both before and after the
letter, convey a favorable impression of both men. Again, the
reader can scarcely fail to be impressed with the importance of
the viceroyalty of New Spain as a connecting link between the
far-flung Philippines, the New World, and Spain. In the letter
one further sees the recognition by the Spanish governmental
authorities of the menace confronting them in the persons of the
corsairs. Also apparent are the instant and energetic steps taken
by the Spanish authorities to avert the menace of the corsairs so
far as possible. Of even more interest is the testimony borne in
the viceroy's letter to the use already being made of Pensacola

""Para despachar una carta del Virrey Conde de Galve de 10 de Dice.
1695," ibid.
"Another reason for Arriola's voyage to Pensacola Bay lay in the fact
that several pirate ships had been sighted near Tampico.
"Galve to the king, Dec. 29, 1695, Mexico, 61-6-19. The post actually
given to Arriola was, of course, the governorship of Pensacola.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

Bay as a sort of naval base and centre for the re-fitting of Spanish
men of war with masts and other timber supplies. The Pez-
Sigiienza expedition of 1693 had made a new main-mast for one
of its ships from one of the majestic pines prevalent in the Pensa-
cola region. This timber supply was one of the strongest argu-
ments for Spain's occupation of the bay, though second in
importance, to be sure, to the threat of a foreign seizure of the
bay. Arriola's formal report on Pensacola was not made, at least
not in writing, until July 16, 1698. On this date, Arriola told of
his findings in a report filed with the viceroy in conjunction with
a similar report made at that time by Sigiienza y G6ngora. It will,
therefore, be considered in connection with Sigiienza's report, and
the actual founding of the presidio at Pensacola.
Arriola had made the final investigation of Pensacola Bay for
Viceroy Galve in the summer of 1695.5' As has been noted above,
Galve wrote to the Junta de Guerra on December 10; 1695, stating
that he had found himself unable to effect even a temporary
occupation of the bay until the promised help in the form of men,
money, and supplies came from Spain. Early in 1696, the Pensa-
cola project lost a sincere and influential friend by the death of
Galve. But his last letter to the Junta de Guerra reminded the
Junta that the action regarding Pensacola which the king had
authorized on their recommendation had not yet been taken. The
Junta naturally inquired into the reasons for the delay, and learned
for the first time of the refusal of the Consulado of Seville to
lend the necessary moneys. Attempts were then made to raise the
funds by a private loan; but both private and public credit had
been exhausted in a long war, and nothing could be done at the
On September 20, 1697, the treaty of Ryswick was signed. This
pact, which was a convenient truce rather than a, genuine peace,
caused Spain to have even more fears for her American possessions
than had been the case during the war. It was feared, and as
subsequent events proved, with only too much reason, that Louis
XIV had by no means relinquished his designs on the Mississippi-

Arriola left Vera Cruz for Pensacola Bay July 14.
"Dunn, op. cit., 172-173.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

Gulf regions of New Spain. Trustworthy reports from France
came to the ears of the Spanish government that the French king
was fitting out four vessels. These were under orders to take
aboard colonists in the French Antilles. Having done this, they
were then to seize, fortify, and settle some Spanish Gulf port.
That this port was to be that of Pensacola was strongly surmised
by the alarmed Spaniards, since Pensacola Bay provided easily the
best of the harbors in the vicinity."' These reports from France
produced more action and more rapid achievement than had been
accomplished by all the previous recommendations and urgent
clamors of viceroys, naval commanders, fiscal, and other interested
officials in Spain and in the New World. What men like Pez,
Galve, Sigiienza, Solis, and Arriola had been urging for almost a
decade was now consummated in a few months and with a haste
that was almost as ludicrous as the, previous delays had been trying.
A real cidula was issued on April 19, 1698, ordering Galve's
successor as viceroy of New Spain, the Conde de Moctezuma, to
take whatever funds he could raise from any source whatsoever, to
occupy Pensacola Bay at once, and to send as many men as possible.
In order that work on the fortifications might be commenced
immediately, he was directed to send along with the landing-force
the only military engineer then resident in New Spain, an Aus-
trian by the name of Jaime Franck. While this was being done,
the home government in Spain would levy the men, supplies, and
moneys needed to make the settlement a permanent one."
Yet other steps were taken to ensure a speedy occupation of the
bay. A naval officer named Martin de Zavala was given a dual
mission. The treasure galleons from South America were over-
due; this naturally occasioned some fear that they might have been
intercepted by corsairs. Zavala was given two ships and one
hundred soldiers; with these he was to sail for Havana in search
of the galleons or news of them. If he found that the galleons
were safe and had proceeded to Spain, he was to go on to Vera
Cruz and join the viceroy's expeditionary forces bound for Pensa-
cola Bay."

""Testimonio de Autos ejecutados," Mexico, 61-6-22.
m Instructions to Zavala, Apr. 24, 1698, Mexico, 61-6-33.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

To make certainty more sure, the Spanish government, now
thoroughly aroused from its long torpor, ordered Juan Jordan de
Reina, who had accompanied both the Barroto-Romero and the
Pez-Sigiienza expeditions, to sail with Zavala. Jordan was given
secret instructions upon which to base his own semi-independent
course of action. Upon his arrival at Havana, he was to requisi-
tion in the name of the king a warship, fourteen cannon, one
hundred men, and such supplies as might be necessary to sustain
a garrison and to construct a fort. After securing these soldiers
and supplies, Jordan was to sail at once from Havana to Pensacola
Bay, which he was instructed to hold against all comers until such
time as aid could arrive from New Spain." It was, of course,
conceivable that the viceroy might have dispatched a force to the
bay before Jordan's arrival there. Events proved, however, that
such was not the case.
Zavala's two vessels reached Havana on October 13, and re-
mained there two weeks. The rest of the story of the race for
Pensacola Bay is a curious mixup, from which the Spaniards
emerged victorious. The governor of Cuba was unable to provide
Jordan with all the assistance required by the real cedula. Instead
of the frigate called for by the real cidula, Jordan was given two
smaller ships; instead of the one hundred men provided for, he
had to content himself with fifty; instead of the fourteen cannon
requisitioned, only six were obtainable. With this limited force
and equipment Jordan'sailed from Havana on November 6, and
arrived at Pensacola Bay on November 17. Thus he effected a
temporary occupation before either of Spain's two most serious
rivals could quite attain the coveted goal."
Was Spain's unusual haste to carry through a project which
had been hanging fire for years the product of a sudden and un-
justified alarm, caused by wild rumors and groundless reports?
That this was not the case is clearly demonstrated by documentary
evidence and especially by the subsequent actions of the French.

""Instruccion que ha de observer el Capn Dn Juan Jordan de Reyna,"
Apr. 28, 1698, in "Testimonio de Autos ejecutados," Mexico, 61-6-22.
"Dunn, op. cit., 180-181; Jordan to the viceroy, Dec. 6. 1698. Mexico.
61-6-22: Jordan to the king. Nov. 7. 1699. ibid.

26 The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

France at this time and for years afterwards was bent on securing,
fortifying, and colonizing not only the mouth of the Mississippi
but also the northern Gulf coast. Witness her founding of Mobile,
Biloxi, and New Orleans, as well as her temporary occupation of
St. Joseph's Bay, not far from Pensacola." While such events
as the founding of New Orleans and the occupation of St. Joseph's
Bay did not occur until the early years of the eighteenth century,
they represented merely a continuation and further development
of an earlier French policy directed along exactly the same lines.
It is true that the principal object of the Iberville expedition of
1698-1699 was the occupation of the mouth of the Mississippi.
It is equally true, however, that Iberville's fleet attempted to enter
Pensacola Bay a very short time after the Spanish occupation of
the bay. That the French squadron was unable to accomplish this
entry was due solely to the fact that there was already at Pensa-
cola a Spanish garrison whose commander refused to allow the
French to come in.'6 It must also be remembered that Iberville
sailed from Brest in October, 1698, the same month and year in
which Arriola left Vera Cruz and Zavala departed from Havana.
Such a synchronization is almost too perfect to have been the
result of mere coincidence.68
Similarly, the fact that the race for Pensacola was not merely
between France and Spain, but a triangular one including also
England is readily demonstrable from contemporary documentary
evidence coming from English, French, and Spanish sources. The
Torres expedition of 1693 found abundant evidence of an English
penetration into the Gulf hinterland north of Pensacola. This
penetration had probably been extended into the country north
and west of Mobile.69 The fact of an English involvement in

"A.G.I., Audiencia de Santo Domingo (hereinafter cited as Santo
Domingo), 58-1-30; ibid., 58-1-24; Duran to the viceroy, Jan. 12, 1719,
A.G. y P., Mex., Hist., 298.
"Iberville's letters and journal, Margry, IV, 117, 142-143; Arriola to the
king, May 9, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.
"Iberville an Minislre de la Marine," Margry, IV, 87; Oficiales reales of
Vera Cruz to the viceroy, Oct. 22, 1698, Mexico, 61-6-22; Zavala to the
king, July 28, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-33.
"Torres to the king, Aug. 5, 1693, Mexico, 61-6-21.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

the struggle for Pensacola has been generally overlooked. That
there was such an involvement is unquestionable.70
The aggressive intentions of the English colonists in Carolina
were of a serious nature. This is manifest from an incident
which occurred in the summer of 1698. One of the officers of
Governor Torres of Florida, Francisco Romo de Uriza, was sent
on a mission to Charleston during that summer. While at the
English governor's mansion, Romo met several Indians. Upon
asking where they were from, he received the startling reply that
they were from Pensacola. To this Romo objected on the ground
that Pensacola belonged to Spain. Governor Blake replied by
telling Romo bluntly that England and France had agreed to
disregard Spain's claim to the bay. The two nations had further
agreed, said Blake, that whichever of them first succeeded in
occupying the bay should be allowed by the other to remain in
possession of it. The English governor concluded by calmly add-
ing that he himself intended to seize it for England the next
year, and that it really belonged to England anyway, since it was in
the same latitude as Charleston.71
A few days before Jordan's departure from Havana for Pensa-
cola, Zavala had sailed for Vera Cruz. He arrived there on
November 18, only to learn that the viceregal expedition for
Pensacola had left more than a month before. Hence, instead of
proceeding to Pensacola, Zavala remained at Vera Cruz, awaiting
a report of the results of the viceroy's expedition.72
The principal expedition of the three designed for the occu-
pation of Pensacola, namely, the one sent by the viceroy of New
Spain, was led by Andris de Arriola, who had visited the bay in
1695. Before outfitting the expedition, the viceroy requested
recommendations both from Arriola and from Sigiienza y G6n-
gora, the latter of whom had been 'with the Pez expedition to
Pensacola in 1693. The first part of Sigiienza's report was merely

"A good account of certain phases of this is found in Verner W. Crane's
Southern Frontier (Philadelphia, 1929).
nDeclaration of Romo in Martinez's letter to the governor of Havana,
Feb. 21, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.
"Dunn, op. cit., 192.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

an attack on Pez. He declared that Pez had not written the cele-
brated memorial attributed to him; that it was the work of
Barroto; and that Pez had never really been in Pensacola Bay
until the 1693 expedition.
Proceeding then to recommendations as to the best means of
occupying and holding the bay, Sigiienza advised that a fairly large
force be sent. The troops, he said, could be supplied from New
Spain, St. Augustine, Havana, and Apalache; of these, one hun-
dred and fifty might well come from New Spain. Sigiienza
thought that three ships would be needed. He advised the erec-
tion of a fort on the Barranca de Santo Tome (the bluff on the
western shore of the bay just inside the entrance), since the
Punta de Sigiienza, on the opposite shore, was too low and sandy.
This recommendation of a single fort, designed to command the
channel, rather than of two forts, was a departure from Pez's
original scheme, at least if that scheme was properly interpreted
by the dissident Marquis de la Granja."7 Expense, the unsuitable
topographical character of the Punta de Sigiienza, and the belief
that a single properly armed fort would suffice to command the
entire channel were no doubt the chief reasons for Sigiienza's
single-fort proposal, although his animosity toward Pez may have
been a minor contributing factor. The main thing, in Sigiienza's
belief, was to get the Pensacola project under way before some
other nation, presumably France, took action in that direction."
Arriola's report agreed in the main with that of Sigiienza. He
believed that the fort would have to be a wooden one because
of the lack of stone around the bay. He differed with Sigiienza
as to the number of forts necessary to command the channel.
The entrance to the bay was rather broad, the distance between
the eastern and western shores amounting to some three thousand
varas. For this reason Arriola agreed with Pez's recommendation
of 1689 that a fort on either side of the entrance would be neces-
sary. Arriola then stated his belief that the Pensacola region was
not the golden Arcadia that Pez, Sigiienza, Juan Jordan de Reina,

"Voto del Sr. Granxa," Mexico, 61-6-21.
""Informe de Don Carlos de Sigienza y G6ngora," July 16, 1698, in
"Testimonio de Autos ejecutados," Mexico, 61-6-22.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

and others had claimed it was. In fact, declared Arriola, the
countryside was barren, sandy, and swampy. Finally, in his opin-
ion, it was not Pensacola but the Mississippi on which the French
really had their eye. As a good soldier, however, Arriola did not
urge his viewpoint in the face 6f a royal cidula to the contrary,
but expressed his willingness to co-operate in every way requisite."
After a twelve-day study of the somewhat varying reports of
Sigiienza and Arriola, the latter's recommendations were accepted,
at least in principle, in preference to those of Sigiienza.' The
latter did, however, have the satisfaction of seeing adopted his
advice that only one fort be constructed. When the Arriola expe-
dition arrived at Pensacola Bay, the engineer, Jaime Franck, saw
that it would not be feasible to build a fort on the Punta de
Sigiienza in view of the extremely unfavorable nature of the
Pez had stated that it would cost only a trifle more than 13,000
pesos to occupy and fortify the bay,7" while the estimate of the
moneys necessary for the Arriola expedition was 39,000 pesos.
The difference between the two estimates lies evidently in the
fact that Pez's estimate did not include all that was contained in
Arriola's figures." Arriola left Vera Cruz October 15, 1698,
with three ships, two hundred soldiers, one hundred and twenty
sailors, nine artillerymen, three surgeons, twelve carpenters, six
brickmasons, four smiths, the helpers for these artisans, three
priests, and twelve cannon." He had experienced considerable
difficulty in getting his men. Residents of New Spain were
inclined to stay where they were rather than fare forth on some
new adventure about which they knew little or nothing. As a

""Informe de Dn Andr6s de Arriola," July 16, 1698, in "Testimonio de
Autos ejecutados," Mexico, 61-6-22.
""Respuesta fiscal," July 28, 1698, ibid.
"Papel del Ingeniero Don Jaime Franck," Dec. 9, 1698, ibid.
'"Pez to the viceroy," June 1, 1693, in "Testimonio de las Dilixencias
executadas," Mexico, 61-6-21.
Pez in a letter to the Junta de Guerra in 1691, found in Mexico, 61-6-21,
had made much higher estimate, in which he included the pay for 200 soldiers.
""Regulaci6n de gastos," July 17, 1698, in "Testimonio de Autos
ejecutados," Mexico, 61-6-22.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

result, all men who had ever served in the Armada de Barlovento
was drafted into service. Accordingly, the alguaciles and their
assistants prowled the streets of the Mexican towns, picking up
beggars, ex-convicts, drunkards, and wastrels for service at Pensa-
cola, much after the fashion of an English press gang.81
On September 16, Arriola had been given two sets of instruc-
tions. If he found that the French had won the race for the bay,
and if in his judgment their force occupying Pensacola was weak
enough that it could be ousted, he was to eject the intruders
forcibly, should they decline to leave peaceably. If, on the con-
trary, the French had occupied the bay with a force too strong
for immediate eviction, Arriola was to return at once to Vera
Cruz for further instructions. Should he find the bay to be
unoccupied, he was to enter it with two of his vessels and build
the fort, under Franck's expert supervision. He was instructed
to leave the third vessel outside the entrance to keep watch over
any possible intrusion.82
Tempestuous weather made the voyage to Pensacola a trying
one. The fleet did not reach the bay until November 21. At
Pensacola, Arriola was fortunate enough to find the bay occupied
by his fellow-Spaniards. Juan Jordan de Reina had arrived from
Havana only four days before with his small expeditionary force."
The narrow margin of victory for Spain in the international race
for Pensacola is indicated by the fact that Iberville had already
sailed from Brest with the full intention of seizing the bay imme-
diately upon his arrival there. Nor would Governor Blake have
been far behind in occupying the bay for England, had the
Spaniards not forestalled him.
The fort was constructed as rapidly as possible from the pine
trees which abounded in the region. This was not unusual, for
stone was scarce in many of the coastlands of the Indies. Franck
felt the fortification of Pensacola to be a useless and expensive
labor. He called attention to the fact that there were other har-

n The viceroy to the king, Sept. 18, 1698, ibid.
""Instruccion dada al Mre de Campo D. Andris de Arriola," Mexico,
*Dunn, op. cit., 180-181.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

bors in the neighborhood; these the French might occupy anyway,
as they actually did a few years later in the case of St. Joseph's
Bay."8 That Franck was not wholly right, however, may be seen
from the fact that the French found the other bays so valueless
as compared to Pensacola that they very soon voluntarily evacu-
ated St. Joseph's Bay. Neither they nor the English ever seri-
ously attempted to occupy any of the other neighboring bays,
whereas both Iberville and Blake were definitely interested in
Pensacola Bay. The Franco-Spanish War of 1719-1721 was par-
ticularly marked in its New World phase by the struggle for
Pensacola; this plainly shows the importance attached to its pos-
Arriola was at first strongly inclined to agree with Franck's un-
favorable attitude toward Pensacola and found the situation in the
beginning far from agreeable. Considering the nature of his gar-
rison, he may well be pardoned for the rather disgruntled feeling
evinced in his correspondence with the viceroy and the king."
Later he seems to have changed his mind, for in 1706 he wrote to
Viceroy Alburquerque, advocating emphasis on Pensacola in pref-
erence to St. Augustine.86 Food was only too frequently a
problem at Pensacola, while the motley crew of convicts and scape-
graces who comprised the garrison must have been very trying to
old soldiers of the type of Arriola and Martinez, his second in
To make matters worse, the precious rogues who theoretically
guarded the new presidio seem to have diverted themselves in their
leisure time by trying to burn the place down, so that they could
go home. One such attempt, on the night of January 3, 1699,
burned to the ground eight buildings, including the chapel, Jordan's
quarters, and the storehouse for provisions. The burning of the

SSanto Domingo, 58-1-30; ibid., 58-1-24; Duran to the viceroy, Jan. 12,
1719, A.G. y P., Mex., Hist., 298; Franck to the viceroy, Dec. 20, 1698;
Mexico, 61-6-22.
aArriola to the viceroy, Dec. 22, 1698, Mexico, 61-6-22; Arriola to the
king, Dec. 1, 1698. ibid.
Arriola to Alburquerque, Aug. 20, 1706, Santo Domingo, 58-1-28. This
informed is not found in any secondary source known to the present writer,
but a certified transcript is preserved in the Library of Congress.

The Occupation of Pensacola by Spain

storehouse added imminent famine to the growing list of causes
for discontent. About forty of the Mexican convicts ran away,
but most of them were later captured. Even the weather was bad,
being unusually cold for Florida. This general discontent and
discomfort led to frequent dissensions, if indeed the general situa-
tion may not be better described as one of constant discord."8
It had been intended that Zavala should command the expedi-
tion, if he reached Vera Cruz in time. But in view of his later
record of disobedience and in view of Arriola's proved soldierly and
virile character, Zavala's late arrival at Vera Cruz was probably
a blessing in disguise. As for the conversion of the Indians, one
of the chief motives alleged for the settlement of Pensacola, the
three priests who accompanied Arriola's expedition may well have
rendered spiritual service to both Spaniards and natives. The
Pensacola tribe, always small and insignificant, had been almost
wiped out by the more powerful Mobiles." During the same
month that fire threatened to frustrate the undertaking, January,
1699, an even greater peril to Spanish dominion at Pensacola had
to be faced: the arrival of the Iberville squadron.

"Arriola to the viceroy, Dec. 22, 1698, Mexico, 61-6-22; Franck to
the secretary of the Consejo de Indias, Feb. 10, 1699, ibid.
Serrano y Sanz (ed.), Docwmetos histdricos de la Florida y la Luisiana,
siglos XVI al XVIII (Madrid, 1912), 197.



Iberville's First Voyage to the Gulf Coast, 1698-1699-Attempt
to Enter Pensacola Bay, 1699-Governor Arriola's Effort to
Secure Aid from Mexico, 1699-The Dual English Menace
from Carolina and from Darien, 1699-1700-Diplomatic
Backgrounds: the Treaty of Miinster (1648) and of Madrid
(1667, 1670)-Pensacola and the BourbonAccession, 1701-
1702-The Diplomatic Controversy over the French Intrusion,
1701-1702-Mobile, a Further French Threat, 1702-Internal
Affairs at Pensacola, 1698-1702.

Scarcely had the Spaniards founded the presidio*of San Carlos
de Austria on Pensacola Bay when the first great external danger
to the new colony presented itself. On the morning of January
26, 1699, a fleet of five French warships reached the entrance to
the bay. This was the expeditionary force of which the Spanish
government had been warned early in 1698 by at least two trust-
worthy sources.1 This warning more than any other single factor
had been the cause for Spain's abrupt haste in effecting an occupa-
tion of the bay, a project which had previously been so long
delayed and so vigorously opposed.
Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, who was in command of the French
squadron now anchored before the harbor of Pensacola,2 was a
Canadian by birth." He had long been in the service of the king
of France, participating successfully in naval campaigns in the
waters around Acadia (Nova Scotia) and Newfoundland. A
recent campaign in the Hudson Bay region, in which he had with
only one warship routed a squadron of three English men-of-war,

SDiego de Peredo to Enrique Enriquez de Gumin, March 14, 1698,
Mexico, 61-6-21; "Capitulo de librillo en q. se expresa el intent q tienen
franceses en tomar pie en el Seno Mejicano," ibid.
SThe Spaniards did not learn of Iberville's presence until later.
SIberville was a native of Montreal.

French Intrusion and English Menace

added fresh laurels to the brow of this energetic young colonial.
This most recent triumph further convinced the French govern-
ment of his courage and competence. It was but natural, there-
fore, that when Louis XIV decided to seize the mouth of the
Mississippi and the northern Gulf coast, he should turn to the
intrepid Iberville as best qualified to command the expeditionary
On October 24, 1698, the Iberville squadron set sail from Brest,
with directions to proceed first to the French portion of the island
of Santo Domingo and thence to the northern Gulf coast. His
original force consisted of about two hundred men.' These men
and the necessary supplies were embarked on board two frigates,
the Badine and the Marin. The Badine carried thirty-two guns,
while the Marin had an armament of thirty-eight cannon. Iber-
ville himself commanded the Badine; the Marin was placed under
the orders of the Chevalier de Granges de Surgres.5 Two smaller
vessels also accompanied the frigates.'
Iberville reached Cap Fran;ois, Santo Domingo, on December
4, 1698& Eight days later, he was joined by the Marquis de
Chasteaumorant, who added to Iberville's fleet the frigate which
he commanded, the Francois, and which carried fifty-eight guns.'
During his stay on the island of Santo Domingo, Iberville added
to his forces a number of filibusters. Most prominent among these
was the notorious Dutch freebooter, Laurent de Graaf, who had
recently forced the city of Vera Cruz on the coast of Mexico to
pay a heavy ransom.9 On December 30, the French fleet left
Santo Domingo and skirted the Gulf coast of Florida until it
reached Pensacola Bay on the morning of January 26, 1699.10

'Dunn, op. cit., 190. Compare, however, Pontchartrain (Ministre de la
Marine) to Iberville, July 6, 1698, Margry, IV, 68, in which he tells Iber-
ville that he has ordered that he be given 280 soldiers.
SMargry, IV, 51.
SIbid., IV, 87. Iberville refers to the smaller vessels as traversiers.
SMargry, IV, 87.
Ibid., IV, 78; Dunn, op. cit., 186.
Margry, IV, xxiv, 93, 103, 143.
SIbid., IV, 143.

French Intrusion and English Menace

Iberville's expedition had two major purposes. First and most
important in the eyes of the French was the foundation of a
colony on the Mississippi, near its mouth. Second, as is clear
both from Iberville's own words and from subsequent actions of
the French, Louis XIV intended to occupy the better harbors along
the northeastern Gulf coast as soon as possible." Thus the
attempted entrance of the Iberville-Chasteaumorant squadron into
Pensacola Bay was not merely a reconnaissance. It had a definite
purpose, namely the founding of a French post on the bay.12
While there is convincing evidence that the French as well as
the English fully intended to occupy Pensacola Bay, Iberville's
visit in 1699 had an additional purpose. The Jolliet expedition
of 1673 proved to the satisfaction of the French that the Missis-
sippi emptied into the Gulf of Mexico rather than elsewhere."
But the exact location of the mouth of the river had not been fully
established in so far as the French were concerned. That Iber-
ville himself did not know just where the mouth of the Mississippi
was is attested by many contemporary documents, most of them
letters written by Iberville to Pontchartrain, the Minister of
Marine."1 He suspected that the mighty river might empty into
Pensacola Bay, a suspicion that may well have been a primary in-
centive in attempting to enter the bay. We gather this from his
letter of June 18, 1698, addressed to Pontchartrain."
A further purpose of the Iberville expedition to the Pensacola
region was to circumvent a southwestward movement on the part
of the English in Carolina. Blake's assertion in the summer of
1698 that he intended shortly to occupy Pensacola Bay for the
British crown had been made to Romo, a Spanish officer. It is
possible that Iberville did not know of this, despite Governor
Blake's statement to Romo that an agreement had been reached
with France, according to which Pensacola Bay was to be occupied

SIbid., IV, 53-55, passim.
SIbid., IV, 54-57.
SFrancis Borgia Steck, The Jolliet-Marquette Expedition, 1673, 163.
"Margry, IV, 53, 55, 71, 73-75, 80, 81-82, 88-89, 91, 93, 98-99, 101-102,
113-114, 118 ff., 154 ff.
"Ibid., IV, 53.

French Intrusion and English Menace

by whichever of the contracting nations, England and France,
should first succeed in reaching it, the other nation placing no
obstacles in the event of such an occupation. On the other hand,
the possibility of Iberville's ignorance of this agreement may be
somewhat discounted when his position at the time is taken into
consideration. Iberville was not only a high and trusted officer
in the French navy, but also the officer specifically charged with
the Florida venture. Indeed, Blake may not have told Romo the
truth in the matter, nor may any such agreement have actually
existed between England and France. Documentary evidence to
this effect has so far not been discovered. All the testimony avail-
able is to the contrary, tending strongly to show that England and
France were seriously considering dismembering the colonial em-
pire of the helpless Charles II, who was in poor health and about
to die.1e
Even if Iberville was totally unaware that England had specific
designs on Pensacola Bay, he certainly knew of actual and prospec-
tive English penetration from Carolina in a general southwesterly
direction. This knowledge was shared by other high French
officials, including Pontchartrain." Such being the case, it would
surely have been his plan and his duty to check on behalf of
France this English penetration. The only practical way to
accomplish this would have been by actually occupying and fortify-
ing the Mississippi mouth and the northern Gulf coast. Specula-
tion aside, Iberville's statement that he proposed to occupy both
the mouth of the Mississippi and the northeastern Gulf coast is
supported by the actual occupation a little later of Mobile and
Biloxi. Further testimony to the precise goals of the Iberville
expedition of 1699 is borne by the Chevalier de Surg&res, in
command of the Marin. In the journal of the Marin, Surg&res
says outright that the expedition would have occupied Pensacola
Bay had not the Spaniards barely anticipated them in so doing.1

SCharles II died the year after Iberville's first voyage.
Margry, IV, Ivi-lvii, 4-5, 20, 26-27, 59-60, 80-81, 88, 90, 94-95, 107-108,
217, 286-288, 303, 304-305, 308, 322-323, 333, 341, 343, 344-345, 357, 359,
361-363, 366-367, 371-373, 382, 395-398, 401, 406, 418-419, 429-430, 456-457,
471-472, 476, 483-485, 489-490, 516-518, 531-532, 540-541, 543 ff.
Ibid., IV, 230: "C'est asseurement un tres beau port, aussy beau au moins
que Brest, et que nous perdimes par nostre retardement."

French Intrusion and English Menace

The French fleet arrived off Pensacola on January 26, 1699,
about nine o'clock in the morning, but it remained for the time
outside the harbor. This was because of a dense fog through
which the French could barely see the entrance to the bay and the
two Spanish ships anchored therein. The fog grew heavier, and
about ten o'clock the French vessels exchanged blank shots in
order to keep in touch with each other.1 To this notification of
the presence of a foreign and possibly hostile fleet, Arriola replied
with a warning salvo of three gunshots.20 The fog finally cleared
away and Arriola was able to make out the French flag flying over
the intruding squadron. Since he was unaware of the precise
intentions of the newcomers, Arriola deemed it the part of sound
judgment to prepare for any contingency. He himself took charge
of the small Spanish fleet and entrusted the defense of the presidio
to his veteran lieutenant, Francisco Martinez. Among other pre-
cautionary measures, those deserters who had been re-captured
were amnestied on condition that they participate in the retention
of the newly founded settlement.21 Arriola also raised the royal
standard of Spain over the presidio, to indicate, no doubt, that
Pensacola Bay was already in the possession of Spain, a power at
least ostensibly and legally at peace with France.22
It was stated before that Arriola's instructions at the time of
his sailing for Pensacola Bay with the intention of occupying it
were two-fold. In case he found the French already in actual
possession of the bay, he was not to attempt to dislodge them if
they were in too great force. If, in his judgment, he could effect
their expulsion without too much difficulty and uncertainty as to
the issue, he was to do so; otherwise, he was to return to Vera Cruz
for further instructions. Practically identical were Iberville's
orders from the French government, thus demonstrating the
delicate balance of affairs in this nominal state of peace between
France and Spain.28 This uncertainty of foreign policy on the
"bid., IV, 228
*Dunn, op. cir., 185. Surg&res, however, says that the Spaniards fired
only two warning shots. See Margry, IV, 228.
"Dunn, op. cit., 185.
SMargry, IV, 75.

French Intrusion and English Menace

part of the principal European powers unquestionably accounts for
the discreet attitude of the French squadron at Pensacola. France
certainly wanted to occupy the bay and could easily have done so,
since the forces under Iberville's command were considerably
superior to those under Arriola's orders.
After the exchange of greetings by way of cannon salutes and
mutual display of flags, nothing more occurred between the French
and the Spaniards on the 26th. The next day, Chasteaumorant
sent M. de Lesquelet, lieutenant of the Badine, ashore with a letter
to Arriola, explaining the purpose of the visit of the French
squadron. In this letter Chasteaumorant stated that he had been
instructed to halt the filibustering activities of some five or six
hundred Canadians who, Louis XIV had been informed, were
attempting to carry on in the vicinity acts incompatible with the
amicable relations existing between the two crowns. In view of
this, Chasteaumorant requested that his ships be permitted to
enter the harbor, to take on wood and water, and to secure tempo-
rary protection from the south winds.24 In exchange for this act
of consideration, which surely could not be unreasonable under the
circumstances, Chasteaumorant offered to provide the Spanish
garrison with whatever supplies they might need in so far as these
were available from the French fleet. As an earnest of good faith,
he even gave Arriola details as to the size and strength of his
squadron.25 It is worthy of note, however, that Chasteaumorant
omitted certain details which might well have proved of interest
to Arriola. Some of these the Spanish commander seems to have
suspected. The chief omission of Chasteaumorant was, of course,
the presence of Iberville as actual commander of the French
squadron. Arriola did not learn of Iberville's presence until some
time later. Why did Iberville lurk in concealment on the Badine
instead of frankly coming forward in his true position as leader
of the expedition? The answer is plain, both from his own words
and from those of Surg&res previously cited. The French coveted
Pensacola, and they would have taken it, had Arriola been a man
of less resolute character. But there were other evidences of lack

: Ibid., IV, 143, 229.
SDunn, op. cit., 186.

French Intrusion and English Menace

of candor on Chasteaumorant's part. It was but natural that he
should have failed to tell the Spanish commander that he was
disappointed to find him already in possession of Pensacola. It
was, however, scarcely the act of a friendly guest that Chasteaumo-
rant played the r6le of spy on his Spanish host. Yet both he and
Iberville were doing exactly that during their stay at Pensacola.2
Arriola made the sort of reply that might have been expected of
one in his circumstances and under the orders to which he was
subject. His response to the French requests is a model of com-
bined firmness and Castilian courtesy. He replied to Chasteaumo-
rant that he had express orders from his king and master that no
foreign vessels whatever were to be permitted to enter the harbor,
be those vessels friend or foe in origin. He did not, however, wish
to seem unreasonable, and would, he said, be only too glad to
supply the French with the requisite woodland water. Regarding
the desired shelter from the south winds, he offered to provide
the Frenchmen with a pilot who would show them a safe anchorage
outside the harbor entrance. Besides, said Arriola, the shallow
character of the channel would not permit the entrance of ships
so large as those of Chasteaumorant into the bay proper. To
these words of politeness and amity Arriola felt himself obliged
to add others. These were to the effect that should the French
endeavor to force an entrance into the harbor in contravention of
his orders to the contrary, he would feel himself compelled to
resist by every means at his disposal such a violation of the com-
mands which he had received from his royal master.2"
As stated above, Iberville had been busily trying to ascertain
the strength of the Spanish forces. Bluff mariner though he was,
Arriola on his part proved almost as adept at the noble art of
diplomatic intrigue as were the French. Iberville had succeeded
in learning that Arriola had only three hundred men in his gar-
rison. He had also learned that the Spanish fleet was much smaller
and weaker than his and that the presidio was in an unfinished
condition, difficult, if not impossible, of defense against force

"Margry, IV, 143, 229.
SArriola to the king, May 9, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22; Margry, IV, 143, 230.

40 French Intrusion and English Menace

majeure, should matters come to blows.28 Arriola, realizing the
weakness of his position, labored assiduously to discover what the
strength of the French force was, and what it was up to. To this
end, he sent Martinez and several other men to visit the Francois,
Chasteaumorant's flag-ship, as it seemed, although that honor really
belonged to the Badine, since that vessel carried the real French
commander in the person of Iberville. Martinez learned without
much difficulty that the French expedition was a major one of
five ships, manned by about one thousand soldiers and colonists.
But he was unable to inspect at close hand the two traversiers,
since these were kept at a distance. To his queries concerning
these smaller vessels, Chasteaumorant replied by means of an
interpreter (the notorious filibuster De Graaf) that they were
buccaneer ships which had been taken off the Cuban coast.
Martinez did not believe this, and he reported to Arriola that in
his opinion they really had on board prospective settlers.29
Negotiations continued rather fruitlessly. In the course of
these, Chasteaumorant promised that if Arriola would let him
enter the port and take on supplies he would immediately after-
wards return to France."0 In view of Iberville's known intentions
and in the light of subsequent developments, the deliberate men-
dacity of Chasteaumorant requires no proof. Regardless of Chaste-
aumorant's honeyed words, Arriola was not the sort of guileless
dupe to be taken in by such transparent prevarications. Hence, in
a second letter to the ostensible commander of the French expedi-
tion, he reiterated his firm determination to prevent at all costs
an entrance of the bay by any foreign fleet.31
The French made one more reconnaissance on the morning of
January 29,82 sending boats to sound the channel entrance. Iber-
ville and Surgires engaged in this work themselves. This would

"Margry, IV, 143, 229.
Martinez to the governor of Havana, Feb. 21, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.
Arriola to the king, May 9, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.
There is a discrepancy between the French and Spanish reports as to
this date. Both Iberville and Surg&res say the sounding was made on
January 28. Vd. Margry, IV, 143, 229; "Testimonio de autos executados,"
Mexico, 61-6-22.

French Intrusion and English Menace

indicate that they disbelieved Arriola's declarations as to the
shallowness of the channel, and that they considered the obtaining
of this information too important to be done by proxy."s Arriola
immediately ordered the boats to withdraw. On the thirtieth, the
Iberville squadron sailed westward, abandoning for the moment its
designs on Pensacola. In this connection, it may be pointed out
that, had Chasteaumorant been telling Arriola the truth as to his
intention of sailing directly from Pensacola to France, the westerly
course he took was evidently not in accord with this intention. It
would be a most improbable hypothesis to assume that the French
commander meant to emulate the exploits of Columbus by trying
to reach an eastern goal on a vessel sailing westward.
What had happened, then, of sufficient importance to cause
Iberville to relinquish temporarily his idea of seizing the bay for
France? One factor has already been mentioned, namely, Iber-
ville's instructions from his home government to use a certain
amount of prudence in view of the state of peace theoretically
existing at the time between France and Spain. A second possible
factor may have been this: by means of his reconnoissances and
soundings Iberville had become convinced that the mouth of the
great river he was seeking was not at Pensacola Bay, but some-
where to the west of that bay. From the descriptions of the
Mississippi available to the French it is perfectly certain that,
whatever Iberville may have thought as to the location of its mouth
prior to his voyage to Pensacola Bay, his researches around the
entrance to the bay must have presented to him visual evidence
in abundance that the Mississippi lay elsewhere."' Since this was
the case, and since the Mississippi was his primary objective and
Pensacola only a secondary goal, what could have been more
natural than to leave the bay to the Spaniards, who were already
in actual possession, and proceed westward under full sail in an
effort to anticipate a possible occupation of the Mississippi mouth
by the English? This move on the part of the English was greatly

"Margry, IV, 229.
"Ibid., IV, 144. Of the entrance to Pensacola Bay, Iberville writes:
"L'eau y est sale; il tombe dans le lac deux on trois petites rivires. L'eau
est salCe partout dans cette baye, d'oh il sort pen de courants.

French Intrusion and English Menace

feared by the French, and Iberville's energy in action was equalled
only by his capacity for putting first things first.
Arriola had succeeded in temporarily averting the French threat
to Spain's possession of Pensacola, even though this relief was
largely due to a more pressing French interest elsewhere. The
doughty Spanish governor was not so naive, however, as to believe
that all peril had passed. He at once held a council with his
advisers and lieutenants to determine what steps to take in case
Iberville should return after accomplishing whatever purpose might
have brought him to the region. It was clear to the Spaniards
that France would not have dispatched a fleet of five warships and
a force of a thousand men on a mere reconnoitring expedition.
Moreover, the alien fleet would surely not have attempted to
return to France by sailing in a westerly direction; a French
colonization somewhere along the Gulf coast was evidently their
aim. Though Arriola had always believed that the real objective
of the French was the Mississippi and not Pensacola,85 it was
nevertheless his duty as governor of Pensacola to take all pre-
cautionary measures within his power.
The council called by Arriola held an animated discussion on
the relative advisability of three possible steps which might be
taken to ensure the safety of Spain's new base at Pensacola. The
sending of a vessel after the French on a mission of espionage
was suggested as a means of ascertaining what the French had in
mind. This idea was almost immediately rejected as not feasible,
since the vessel would almost surely be detected and captured by
the French. In that case, the Pensacola garrison would not only
fail to learn of the French plans, but would in addition be in the
position of having its very limited fleet diminished by one ship.
Even now the Spanish forces at Pensacola were too weak to with-
stand a major assault.
The second suggestion was that matters be left as they were,
with Arriola remaining at Pensacola in personal command. This
suggestion, too, had little to recommend it. The French might
occupy the mouth of the Mississippi and then cruise eastward and

"Arriola to the viceroy, Dec. 22, 1698, Mexico, 61-6-22. Arriola's con-
clusions were, of course, only partially correct.

French Intrusion and English Menace

attack Pensacola. Should this eventually occur, the Spaniards
would be in a very poor position to defend the new presidio be-
cause of their inferior forces.
The third proposal was that Arriola go in person to Mexico and
appeal directly to the viceroy for reinforcements. Only one mem-
ber of the junta, Juan Jordan de Reina, opposed this plan. Jordan
agreed that someone should apply to New Spain for aid, but
thought Arriola's presence at Pensacola was too imperatively
needed to permit his going to Mexico in person. He offered to go
himself, but he was overruled. Considering Arriola's opinion of
Pensacola at the time,--an opinion he later reconsidered,u--it
seems likely that he was only too willing to get some respite from
his present difficulties, especially since inclination and duty effected
in this case a perfect reconciliation. At all events, it wab decided
by the junta that Arriola should go in person on the mission to
Mexico. He sailed for Vera Cruz on February 2, 1699, leaving
Francisco Martinez in charge."7
After an uneventful voyage, Arriola arrived in New Spain.
Here he found that the problem of retaining Pensacola against the
French had been relegated to a secondary r6le by new develop-
ments. More serious than the French venture was an Eng-
lish drive from Carolina toward the Gulf. This new evidence
of English aggression once more brought into prominent play the
old Anglo-French threat of which the Spaniards had been apprised
by Governor Blake of Carolina the year before. There was, how-
ever, one essential difference in the older and the newer peril.
Whereas the earlier Anglo-French designs on Florida had been
confined to Guale, the St. Augustine region, Apalache, and (by
1698) Pensacola, a growing British imperialism now had Darien
as one of its principal objectives.
A southwesterly thrust from Carolina had been going on with
constantly increased impetus ever since the foundation of Charles-
ton in 1670. This advance culminated in the destruction of
Apalache in 1704. Now, at the moment of Arriola's arrival in

"Informe of Don Andr6s de Arriola to Alburquerque, Aug. 20, 1706,
Santo Domingo, 58-1-28
""Testimonio de autos executados," Mexico, 61-6-22; Dunn, op. cit., 191.

French Intrusion and English Menace

New Spain, the worried viceregal government found itself con-
fronted by what seemed an even more serious peril. Report after
report came from responsible Spanish officials that large numbers
of Scottish Presbyterians were planning to establish or had already
established a colony on the Isthmus of Darien, connecting North
and South America. As early as November, 1698, the governor
of Caracas had given the viceroy information to this effect. In
January, 1699, the governor of Havana confirmed the report, en-
closing sworn statements by various mariners who declared that
the Scotch expedition was already on the high seas and that Darien
was its objective. Later reports from Panama were even more
alarming. These reports stated that four thousand Scotch had
already reached Darien and that six thousand more were on the
way there.
It will be recalled that the three ships commanded by Martin de
Zavala had been detained at Vera Cruz, awaiting news of the out-
come of Arriola's race for Pensacola. Late in January, 1699,
word had been received of the successful occupation of the bay
by Jordan and a few days later by Arriola. The delay in receiving
this news was responsible for Zavala's continued presence at Vera
Cruz. Upon the news of the projected Scotch colony at Darien,
Zavala's vessels were joined to the fleet prepared for the purpose
of ousting the intruders from the isthmus.38
Arriola's arrival and his report of the new French menace to
the Gulf coast produced a division of opinion among the members
of the viceregal junta. It was apparent now that the international
rivalry for the Gulf and Caribbean regions had assumed a three-
fold character. The sole question to be decided was, therefore,
whether the French or the English menace was the greater. The
viceroy argued that the fleet should be sent against the Scotch
rather than against the French, whereas the majority of his junta
agreed with Arriola that the French peril was the more immediate.
The viceroy conceded that the French intended to occupy Pensa-
cola, but believed that Chasteaumorant, having found the bay al-
ready irithe hands of the Spaniards, would return to France, since
no other part of the Gulf coast was apt to prove sufficiently attrac-
Dunn, op. cit., 192.

French Intrusion and English Menace

tive for settlement."' The Scottish Darien venture was, he argued,
a matter of much graver import to the safety of the Spanish
dominion, the galleons, and the Catholic faith. The Scotch,
notoriously aggressive in their heresy, would endanger the salva-
tion of the natives and would undermine their loyalty to the Span-
ish crown. A Scotch colony at Darien would work with the
English of Jamaica to jeopardize everything Spanish in that region
of the New World. Moreover, the Scotch would certainly not
confine their aggressions to the Caribbean area, but would cross
the isthmus and be a constant thorn in the flesh to the Spanish
South Sea trade from Peru and the Philippines."
Both Arriola and Zavala took the opposite position and they
were supported by the majority of the junta. Arriola could not do
otherwise. He had seen the strength of the French too close at
hand, and in his capacity as governor of Pensacola he felt it his
bounden duty to urge the defense of that post at all costs. Zavala,
in turn, urged the fact that he would not even have been in New
Spain had not the king in the real cidula of April 19, 1698 given
express orders that nothing be left undone to secure and retain
Confronted with this almost unanimous opposition, the viceroy
gave in for the moment. Later reports from Panama resulted in
a reversal of this decision; but by the time the Spaniards were
prepared to eject the Scotch, the latter had already voluntarily
withdrawn, finding too many climatic and other difficulties for
their enterprise to succeed. It was now late in the summer, 1699,
and Arriola's mission had been fruitless in so far as bringing relief
to Pensacola was concerned."2 He had succeeded, however, in
bringing to the viceroy's attention by means of a written report
some of the needs of Pensacola; these included, one hundred
additional men for the garrison and a four-months' supply of

SOne need mention only New Orleans, Biloxi, and Mobile to show how
wrong the viceroy was.
'The viceroy to Zavala, Mar. 28, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-33; the viceroy to
the king, Sept. 24, 1699, ibid.
"Dunn, op. cit., 193.
SIbid., 194.

46 French Intrusion and English Menace

provisions, and an addition of several more warships." But no
immediate relief for Pensacola was available. Much to his disgust,
Arriola was ordered back to Pensacola and instructed to make a
further survey of the Gulf region in order to determine the in-
tentions of the French. He was promised the one hundred new
recruits as soon as these could be transferred from the prisons and
the criminal haunts of New Spain, but he was denied the additional
warships." Hence the position of Pensacola was now in some
respects worse than if Arriola had not gone to Mexico at all. In-
stead of securing more warships for the defense of the bay, he
would now have to take at least one of the vessels already at Pensa-
cola and once more go in search of the French.
While Arriola was in New Spain, where he was obliged by
reason of the Darien episode and other unforeseen circumstances
to remain almost the entire year, Pensacola had a fresh scare.
This time it was caused by the English. Romo's declaration of
Governor Blake's designs on Pensacola" had been forwarded by
the St. Augustine authorities to Francisco Martinez, whom Arriola
had left in command at Pensacola. The notice of threatened
aggression from another quarter reached Pensacola on February
4, 1699." Naturally, there was great uneasiness at Pensacola,
especially when further reports came from Governor Torres at St.
Augustine and from the lieutenant at Apalache, all tending to
confirm Romo's report that the English were preparing to enter
western Florida.47
The Spaniards at Pensacola were too much occupied with these
latest indications of danger from the English to concern themselves
greatly about the French peril. Alarm was increased on April 22,
when several Pensacola Indians arrived at the presidio of San
Carlos de Austria and reported to Martinez that white men had
visited a bay west of Mobile Bay, but east of the Mississippi. The

"Ynforme de Arriola, Mar. 14, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.
""Consulta de Junta general," May 23, 1699, ibid.; "Respuesta fiscal,"
March 28, 1699, ibid.; decree of the viceroy, Mar. 28, 1699, ibid.
SDeclaration of Romo, Oct. 24, 1698, Mexico, 61-6-22.
"Martinez to the governor of Havana, Feb. 21, 1699, ibid.
STorres to the king, Sept. 16, 1699, ibid.

French Intrusion and English Menace

previous rumors of English intrusion and the description given by
the Indians who said that the visitors to the bay carried red flags
naturally led Martinez to conclude that the interlopers were Eng-
lish.'4 Affairs at Pensacola being in a bad condition because of
famine and mutiny,'9 Martinez, despite his anxiety, was able to
make only half-hearted efforts to ascertain the true identity of
the strangers. On May 2, two English sailors were captured.
They told Martinez that near Pensacola there was an English
settlement called Jamestown (Santiago). The lieutenant's cup
was by now full to overflowing, and he decided to wash his hands
of the whole matter by sending the two English prisoners to the
viceroy and dispatching a detailed report of all that he had heard
relative to the English advance. The vessel bearing his informa-
tion and the prisoners left Pensacola on May 4 and arrived
at Vera Cruz sixteen days later.50
The evidence forwarded by Martinez was at once sent to the
new viceroy, Jose Sarmiento Valladares, Conde de Moctezuma.
The viceroy immediately passed the report on to his fiscal, Baltasar
de Tobar, for the customary respuesta fiscal. This was rendered
on June 5. Making a careful study of the data, Tobar after a
fortnight or so reached the conclusion that the Indians had been
mistaken in their identification of the nationality of the intruders.
Through their mistake, natural enough, they had unconsciously
deceived Martinez, who was already disturbed by the previous
reports concerning English visits in the vicinity of Pensacola.
Tobar believed that instead of being English the men seen near
Mobile Bay were in reality members of the Iberville-Chasteaumo-
rant squadron. Hence he urged that the viceroy act at once in
accordance with the real cidula which commanded that every
precaution be taken against French intrusion in the Gulf region,
and especially around Pensacola."
The viceroy still had his heart set on an expedition against the
Scotch of Darien. He therefore persisted in disbelieving that the

Martinez to the viceroy, May 4, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.
Franck to the governor of Havana, May 15, 1699, ibid.
Dunn, op. cit., 197, 200.
"Respuesta fiscal," June 5, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.

French Intrusion and English Menace

French had any imperialistic designs on the Gulf coast. Realizing,
however, the seriousness of the responsibility resting on his
shoulders, he made inquiries of two men who had traversed the
region just west of Pensacola. Was there a possibility, asked
Viceroy Moctezuma, that the French had found between Pensa-
cola and the Mississippi a snug harbor other than Mobile Bay,
which was known to be inferior to the harbor of Pensacola? One
of these men was Bartolom6 Guillen, a pilot who shortly before
had been at Pensacola. Guillen's reply to the viceroy's interroga-
tion was that, saving Mobile Bay, no respectable harbor existed
between Pensacola Bay and the Mississippi. He acknowledged,
however, that west of Mobile Bay there did exist some small
islands, the Cayos de San Diego. Between these islets, a sort of
anchorage, somewhat protected, could be had, but on no such scale
as prevailed at Mobile or Pensacola.52
The second witness summoned was none other than the savant
who had accompanied Pez on the 1693 expedition to Pensacola
Bay, Don Carlos de Sigiienza y G6ngora. Sigiienza, now old and
feeble,"' agreed with the testimony given by Guillen. Oddly
enough, the viceroy, despite his refusal to take any steps against
the French menace to Pensacola and despite his refusal even to
attach credit to the possibility of any English threat in that direc-
tion,"4 recommended to the king that the presidio of San Carlos
de Austria be maintained. This recommendation, he said, was not
made because of any great inherent value to.the Spanish crown of
"Santa Maria de Galve," but because of its potential value to the
French should Spain abandon it. Once Pensacola was in the hands
of a foreign power, explained the viceroy, it could be used as a
base of operations from which to attack the galleons proceeding
homeward from New Spain."5
Even while the viceroy smugly assured himself that the report
of a European settlement between Pensacola and the Mississippi
was but an ignis fatuus designed to draw less clear-thinking men

"Guillen to the viceroy (undated), ibid.
Sigiienza y G6ngora died the next year (1700).
"The whole hinterland was full of English!
"The viceroy to the king, July 14, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.

French Intrusion and English Menace

than himself into a maze of mare's-nests and delusions, increasing
evidence to the contrary kept reaching the eyes and ears of the
stranded Pensacola garrison. Repeated affirmations of the exist-
ence of such a colony were made to Martinez by the Indians.
Vessel after vessel was sighted which seemed to be charting its
course toward the new rival of Santa Maria de Galve. Finally, on
August 15, letters by Martinez, Franck, and Jordan were dis-
patched to Mexico. These letters contained the latest evidence of
an English settlement west of Pensacola. On board the same ship
went Jordan and a number of members of the Pensacola garrison
who had been rendered hors de combat by prolonged privations."
When the vessel reached Mexico, Arriola was among the first to
learn of the new peril which had arisen during his absence from
Pensacola. It is significant of his devotion to immediate duties
that Arriola, who had never liked his position, strongly urged the
immediate eviction of the English, just as he lad advocated drastic
measures against the French when they had seemed the more press-
ing foe."' This time the viceroy promised immediate action, owing
probably to the fact that by now he had learned of the withdrawal
of the Scotch colony from Darien. He sent orders to Zavala,
whom he supposed to be waiting at Havana in accordance with
his instructions, to reconnoitre the Gulf coast with his three ships
and to drive out any intruders."
The viceroy's orders to Zavala might have been proper enough,
had Zavala been at Havana to have received them. But he had
grown tired of waiting at Havana and had proceeded to Spain,
instructions to the contrary notwithstanding." When the viceroy
learned this, he summoned a junta general on October 29, at which
the task of dislodging the English was imposed on Arriola. For
this aggressive action against a totally unknown and presumably
hostile force, Arriola was given his one hundred convicts, the ship
which had brought Jordan, and a twenty-six gun frigate." Not

"Jordan to the king, Nov. 7, 1699, ibid.
Arriola to the king, Oct. 27, 1699, ibid.
SThe viceroy to the king, Sept. 26, 1699, ibid.
Dunn, op. cit., 194, 202.
SIbid., 202.

French Intrusion and English Menace

relishing the idea of undertaking a task of such uncertain magni-
tude with a wholly inadequate force at his disposal, Arriola wrote
the king on November 15, expounding the circumstances, and
reiterating his conviction that Pensacola was not worth holding. It
would be better, he said, to block up the entrance to the harbor and
prevent its use by other nations. The sums necessary for the
maintenance of the presidio could then be expended on a fleet of
warships, this being in his opinion the only really practical means
of preventing the inroads of other powers into the Gulf region.61
In late December, soldier that he was, Arriola once more sailed for
the command which he considered an almost intolerable burden.
It was characteristic of Arriola that, notwithstanding his habitual
promptness in obeying orders, he made as sure as possible of his
ground before attempting decisive action against his unwelcome
neighbors. Although the Iberville expedition had estimated the
Pensacola garrison at some three hundred at the time of its January
visit to the bay, and although Arriola had brought with him one
hundred additional soldiers,-if they could be called soldiers,-he
was able, when setting out against the supposed English colony, td
take along only one hundred men. Only forty were left behind
to man the presidio.6" Such had been the devastating effects of
disease, famine, and desertion.
On March 4, 1700, the disconsolate band of military pilgrims
left Pensacola for they knew not what. After a brief stop at
Mobile Bay, the Arriola expedition continued westward along the
coast until they reached the vicinity of the present Biloxi. Here
they sighted a small boat flying the British union-jack.68 This at
first glance seemed to confirm the suspicions of the Spaniards con-
cerning the presence of English forces in the region. But when
the boat was overhauled and its crew of ten made prisoners, the
latter turned out to be, not Englishmen at all, but Frenchmen sail-
ing under false colors. In fact, as the fiscal, Baltasar de Tobar,

a Arriola to the king, Nov. 15, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-22.
"Dunn, op. cit., 204. But M. de Ricouart, Iberville's lieutenant com-
manding the Renommie says there were one hundred and forty Spaniards
with Arriola. Vd. Margry, IV, 388.
Franck to the king, June 4, 1700, Mexico, 61-6-22.

French Intrusion and English Menace

had suspected, they were members of the Iberville-Chasteaumorant
Upon examining his prisoners, Arriola learned that, contrary
to the viceroy's belief,65 the French had not returned to France
upon finding Pensacola Bay already occupied by the Spaniards.
Nor had Spain's prior occupation of Pensacola Bay kept Iberville
from establishing other settlements along the coast. Arriola was
informed by his captives that the French had built a fort at Biloxi
in April and that this settlement had been followed by another post
about twenty-five leagues up the Mississippi, the mouth of which
Iberville had discovered and entered in the course of his voyage
westward from Pensacola."
The question of the nationality of the newcomers being now
settled, the problem confronting Arriola was what to do about it.
He had with him four small ships and a number of soldiers,
variously estimated at between one hundred and two hundred. It
seemed evident, however, that the French were in force and that
any effort to dislodge them would prove abortive. Considering
the apparent improbability of success in the event of a recourse
to arms, Arriola did the only thing possible. On March 23, he
went to the French fort at Biloxi and protested to the commanding
officer, M. de Ricouart, warning him that his presence there con-
stituted a violation of existing treaties." The French commandant
received the protest in all good humor, and wined and dined the
famished Spaniards for two days. At the expiration of this time,
he declared courteously but firmly that the French had not intended
their occupation of Biloxi as a threat to Pensacola; that they had
been forced to take this step to forestall a seizure of the region by
the English. As to his evacuating Biloxi, M. de Ricouart replied
that such a step would be impossible unless and until he received
orders to do so from the king of France, under whose orders the
post had been established.

"Respuesta fiscal," June 5, 1699, ibid.
The viceroy to the king, Sept 24, 1699, Mexico, 61-6-33.
SArriola to the viceroy, June 4, 1700, Mexico, 61-6-22.
Margry, IV, 539-541.

French Intrusion and English Menace

Having decided'that this formal protest was at present the sole
recourse within his power, Arriola sailed for Pensacola on March
27. The hurricanes prevalent in the Gulf region now joined the
growing list of the enemies of Spain. On the night of the thirty-
first, a storm blew up and destroyed three of the four Spanish
ships. Arriola and those of his men who survived spent the next
five days in making their way back to French Biloxi, since an over-
land return to Pensacola was out of the question in their exhausted
and famished condition. The French commandant at Biloxi once
more received the Spaniards with every courtesy and consideration.
He extended to them true Gallic hospitality until such time as word
of their unhappy plight could be sent to Pensacola and aid dis-
patched from that place."
This unfortunate expedition under Arriola's leadership was the
only one that the Spaniards attempted against the French in the
northern Gulf region. Arriola once more tried to convince the
viceroy and through him the king that it was worse than useless
to maintain a Spanish garrison at Pensacola.6" Franck again
concurred in Arriola's opinion and wrote the king directly to that
effect.70 All was in vain. The Spanish crown showed itself as
obstinate in its determination to hold Pensacola as it had been
sluggish in occupying it. Arriola was given a four-months' leave
from his post, however, being replaced by Martinez.
In order to understand the claims of other nations to New
World territories, originally deemed exclusively Spanish, a brief
discussion of the diplomatic origins of these claims will not be
amiss at this point. This is particularly true since the gradual
legalization of the claims by warfare and by treaty have a very
definite bearing on the history of Pensacola. It is true, generally,
that political and economic claims made by one nation upon another
not infrequently result in some form of action by way of applying
or enforcing those claims, such as wholesale smuggling and at times
actual warfare. This was as true in the case of Spain's colony
at Pensacola as elsewhere.

SIbid., IV, 386 ff.
"Arriola to the viceroy, June 4, 1700, Mexico, 61-6-22.
"Franck to the king, June 4, 1700, ibid.

French Intrusion and English Menace

Spain claimed Florida and consequently the Pensacola region
by virtue of discovery and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1493.
From the very nature of things it was inevitable that this claim
of territorial and economic monopoly would not remain perma-
nently uncontested. England and France were growing constantly
in might and wealth, Spain, on the other hand, tended to decline
in these respects, though this decline, however undeniable, was
probably neither so rapid nor so extensive as some historians have
The first legally conceded breach in the territorial monopoly
of Spain in the New World came not from England or from
France, but from the United Netherlands. During the first half
of the seventeenth century, the Dutch made themselves masters of
a large part of the Bahia-Pernambuco region in northern Brazil.
This territory, previously Portuguese, had in 1580 become Spanish,
Philip II making good his claim to the vacant throne of Portugal
At the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War in 1648, the particular
pact governing future relations between Holland, now independent,
and Spain, her former mistress, was the treaty drawn up at
Miinster on January 30, 1648. This treaty was ratified by Spain
on March 1, 1648, and by Holland on April 18 of the same year.
Normally, a treaty between two European powers might be con-
sidered irrelevant to the scope of this discussion. But there was
one article in the treaty of Miinster,-the third-which furnished
the precedent for all future breaches in Spain's monopoly of the
Indies. The article in question read as follows:

Each (power) shall remain in possession of, and shall
enjoy effectively, the countries, cities, places. lands, and
domains which it now holds and possesses, without being
molested or disturbed in them, directly or indirectly, in
any fashion whatsoever.

This sweeping general article was buttressed and localized in
Article 5 of the same treaty, which stated, in part:

The aforesaid Sovereign King and States-General
respectively shall remain in possession of and shall enjoy
such domains, cities, castles, fortresses, commerce, and

French Intrusion and English Menace

lands in the East and West Indies, and also in Brazil and
on the coasts of Asia, Africa, and America respectively
as the aforesaid Sovereign King and States-General
respectively hold and possess."

From these articles it will be seen that as early as the treaty of
Miinster of 1648 Spain herself explicitly and publicly acknowl-
edged and proclaimed the end of her complete monopoly in the
Indies. Once this precedent was established, other nations were
not long in clamoring for rights and privileges identical with those
accorded the Netherlands. In so far as Pensacola and other
Florida points were concerned, Holland did not prove a material
source of danger. She had opened the way, however, for Eng-
land and France to demand similar concessions; and both of these
nations constituted serious threats to Pensacola. For instance,
Article 8 of the treaty of Madrid of 1667 reads in part:

And for what may concern both the Indies and any
other parts whatsoever, the crown of Spain grants to the
King of Great Britain and his subjects all that is granted
to the States of the United Provinces of the Netherlands
and their subjects in their treaty of Miinster, 1648, in as
full and ample manner as if the same were herein par-
ticularly inserted, article for article and point for point,
with nothing omitted.72

A similar provision is in Article 7 of the so-called "American"
treaty of Madrid of 1670. It reads in part:

Moreover it is agreed that the Most Serene King of
Great Britain, his heirs and successors, shall have, hold,
and possess forever, with full right of sovereignty, owner-
ship, and possession, all the lands, regions, islands,
colonies, and dominions, situated in the West Indies or
in any part of America, that the said King of Great
Britain and his subjects at present hold and possess.7"

"Frances Gardiner Davenport (ed.), European Treaties bearing on the
History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648 (Washington,
1917), I, 353-366.
"Ibid., II, 107.
Ibid., II, 194.

French Intrusion and English Menace

From these treaty articles it is clear that Spain's monopoly was
definitely broken as early as 1648, and in the case of England as
early as 1667. For an aggressive and growing power like Eng-
land to rest on its laurels at this juncture would have been un-
natural. For the France of Louis XIV to acquiesce in being ex-
cluded from the benefits extended to her rivals, Holland and
England, was equally unthinkable. It was inevitable that an
expansive spirit should manifest itself both in England and in
France, and that the two traditional enemies should agree on at
least the one point that each wished its share of the crumbling
Spanish empire. To both powers Spain's occupation of Pensacola
appeared to be an attempt to check their natural advance; where-
fore Pensacola was destined to bear the brunt of constant threats
and repeated attacks from both the French and the English.
With this background in mind, the main thread of the story of
international rivalry for Pensacola may be resumed. In November,
1700, Charles II died, bringing to an end the Spanish Hapsburg
dynasty, with its policy of exclusionism. Charles was succeeded
on the throne of Spain by Philip V, the grandson of Louis XIV
of France. The accession of a French Bourbon to the Spanish
throne brought in its train a gradual change in the relations be-
tween Spain, France and England. This change was pronounced
in its repercussions on Pensacola. Its effects in this regard will
be dealt with in a later chapter because they were most prominent
in Queen Anne's War, the American counterpart of the European
War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713.
While the War of the Spanish Succession did not begin until
two years after the accession of Philip V, the placing of this
French prince on the throne of Spain involved a readjustment of
colonial relationships between Spain and France. One of the
major colonial problems in North America was created by the
proximity of Spanish Pensacola to the new French settlements to
the west. On this subject, a prolonged diplomatic controversy
raged between Spain and France. Eventually the European situa-
tion forced a sort of alliance between the two ancient rivals,--an
alliance which did not prove a lasting one in all respects.
Exactly one year after Arriola's visit to Biloxi, on March 23,

French Intrusion and English Menace

1701, the French foreign minister, Pontchartrain," informed the
court of Madrid of the official attitude of France toward the
Pensacola region.1" In a letter to the Duc d'Harcourt, French
ambassador to Spain, Pontchartrain declared that France had
originally been interested in the region merely as a possible com-
mercial outpost and as a desirable southern outlet for Canada.
But, he continued, Iberville had discovered in the course of his
investigations and explorations that the English were cherishing
aggressive designs in that direction. Although he fully recognized
the necessity of checking this English threat, Iberville wished to
retain the friendly co-operation of Spain in a situation which
vitally affected the interests of both nations. For this reason, said
Pontchartrain, he had sent a map of the region and an accompany-
ing memorial to the French government; these Pontchartrain was
now transmitting to the Spanish crown as an evidence of good
faith.76 In his memorial Iberville told of the rising power of the
English colonies. He emphasized the danger that threatened
France and Spain in this rising power and in its proved disposition
to penetrate into the Gulf hinterland. In conclusion, Iberville's
memorial suggested that it would be better for Spain to abandon
the expensive and profitless Pensacola venture and to cede the
port to the French, whose arms were more capable of defending
it against the English.
Was Iberville sincere in his protestations of friendship for the
Spaniards? He was not, if a letter written by him to Pontchar-
train on June 29, 1699 be accepted as credible evidence. In this
letter he does not confine his comments to the Pensacola region,
but suggests the possibility, if not the advisability, of a French
thrust into New Mexico and even into the mining regions of
Mexico itself." That the intercolonial diplomacy of the three
rival powers was of a pretty tricky sort is further indicated in a
message sent by Viceroy Galve to the Consejo de Indias in 1695,
and by it transmitted to the king, then Charles II. In view of the

Son of the preceding minister of the same name.
"A translation of Pontchartrain's letter is found in Mexico, 61-6-22.
Margry, IV, 543-550.
"Ibid., IV, 126.

French Intrusion and English Menace

general hostility existing between England and Spain at this time,
it is most revealing to discover in this document the viceroy of
New Spain proposing to His Most Catholic Majesty a union of
the arms of Spain with those of the heretical Anglo-Dutch mon-
arch, William III, "para exterminar de la America la Naci6n
Francesa!",8 Perhaps Iberville was no worse than his times.
On February 1, 1701, word came to Spain, and was transmitted
to the Junta de Guerra, that Arriola had discovered the French
settlement at Biloxi and that general dissatisfaction prevailed at
Pensacola."9 In spite of, or perhaps because of, this unfavorable
news, the Junta de Guerra, upon its receipt of the Pontchartrain
letter and the Iberville memorial, held a meeting on June 6, 1701,
to consider what should be done so far as the Pensacola region was
concerned. The Junta thanked the French for their warning re-
garding the English. As to Pensacola, it could not be ceded either
to France or to any other nation. It had been occupied because it
lay within the Spanish dominions, because it possessed strategic
advantages to Spain, and because for this very reason its occupa-
tion by any other power would be to the disadvantage of Spain.
The Junta thanked the king of France for his interest in the Catho-
lic faith and in the preservation of the integrity of the Spanish
dominions, and he welcomed the proffered co-operation of the
French forces in resisting a possible English attack.
The Junta had evidently taken Arriola's word for it that there
would be no getting rid of the French west of Pensacola except by
a costly and dangerous frontal attack. It suggested that since the
French had apparently decided to settle within the pleasant domains
of "La Florida," the least the French officers could do would be
to request commissions from the king of Spain. Should they do

"Indiferente General, 1447-5-22. Here one naturally recalls the Fran-
ciscan explorer, Louis Hennepin, and his anti-French attitude, as mani-
fested at the very time the viceroy made this suggestion. It is highly
interesting to observe that, if authentically published, his Nouvelle Dicou-
verte (Utrecht, 1697) and his Noueau Voyage (Utrecht, 1698) were dedi-
cated to "His Majesty, William III, King of Great Britain, by R. P. Louis
Hennepin, Missionary Recollect [Franciscan] and Notary Apostolique." It
may be added that the vexing Hennepin problem is still unsolved.
"This material is found in Mexico, 61-6-33.

French Intrusion and English Menace

so, said the Junta, they might rely on the paternal interest and
assistance of the viceroy of New Spain, since their colonies lay
within the boundaries of that viceroyalty.so
The Junta was unanimous in making the above recommenda-
tions, except for one member, the Conde de Hernan Nfiiez. Iber-
ville's memorial, he contended, was evidently a true recital of the
facts; it agreed both in substance and in detail with what Arriola,
Franck, Martinez, and other Spanish officials had repeatedly
written relative to Pensacola. He felt that the English and the
Dutch would already have taken Pensacola except for the proximity
of large French military and naval forces which, they feared,
would go to the aid of the other Bourbon monarchy. It was
manifestly a useless and expensive venture for Spain to attempt
to keep Pensacola, and she would probably be unable to do so
anyway should it be attacked by an Anglo-Dutch force. It would
be far better, argued Hernan NTfiez, that the bay be in the hands
of a friendly and a Catholic power rather than that it fall a prey
to the worst enemies of Spain and of the faith. As to the possi-
bility of Pensacola's being protected against an Anglo-Dutch
attack by the Spanish navy alone, the count reminded the Junta
that the home fleet was in so wretched a condition as to be totally
inadequate to defend even the coasts of Spain, to say nothing of
colonial coasts.81
After receiving and considering the report of the majority of
the Junta, Philip V asked for further elucidation of certain points
which were not quite clear to him. He wished to know, for
example, how the Junta proposed to finance its grandiose idea of
combining Pensacola and the new French settlements nearby under
the Spanish flag. Would the necessary revenues come from New
Spain or would they have to be sent by the mother country, which
was in an impoverished condition? How would the colony be
defended ?

This suggestion, if transmitted to the starving Spanish garrison at
Pensacola and to the Biloxi French who were sending them provisions from
time to time, must have caused a certain amount of cynical mirth to both
"Consulta de la Junta de Guerra," June 6, 1701, Mexico, 61-6-35.

French Intrusion and English Menace

The Junta had a second meeting on June 21, and drew up a
lengthy reply to the king. Of the revenues from New Spain which
might be diverted to financing the new colony of Pensacola-
Mississippi it cited the following; the media anatas of the en-
comiendas, the alcabalas, the quicksilver profits, the royal fifths
from silver, and several others. The Junta felt that these and
other revenues from New Spain would prove ample for the main-
tenance and defense of the new colony without the necessity of
taking recourse to funds from Spain.
As to the fortifications of Pensacola and the new French settle-
ments, that detail had already been attended to. Iberville had
suggested some additional outposts against the English. With
this suggestion the Junta agreed, provided that the new posts as
well as the older ones fly the colors of Spain. Iberville had in-
formed the French government, and it the Spanish, that the Eng-
lish colonists were extremely numerous. This the Junta did not
believe. Besides, there were no mines in the Pensacola region to
tempt English cupidity. Even should the English endeavor to
seize the Pensacola region, they would have to contend with war-
like Indian tribes, hostile to the English, but friendly to Spain.
Moreover, the Armada de Barlovento could be strerigthened, to
defend Pensacola from attack by sea. As for safeguarding the
interests of the Church, the Junta suggested that Jesuit mission-
aries be sent to Pensacola, since they had been so successful else-
Detailed explanations of their votes were given by the Duque
de Jovenazo and by Martin de Solis, who formerly, as fiscal
of the Consejo de Indias, had taken an active part in the founda-
tion of Pensacola. Solis was now a member of the Consejo de
Indias and also of the Junta de Guerra. He reminded the Junta
of his original interest in the Pensacola project. This interest, he
; id, was still with him. He still felt that Pensacola Bay was
oo important a base to be thus lightly abandoned to a foreign
nation which, while at present friendly, might by a turn of fortune
some day be numbered in the ranks of Spain's adversaries. It was
particularly a pity, thought Solis, that so promising a venture
""Consulta de la Junta de Guerra," June 21, 1701, ibid.

60 French Intrusion and English Menace

should be given up so soon after its inception. As for the diffi-
culty of retaining Pensacola against a powerful foe, he suggested
that this difficulty might be obviated by founding an additional
colony between Pensacola and Apalache, and by constructing a
good overland route to Pensacola from the port of Apalache.
Iberville had estimated the number of English families resident
in "San Jorge" at some 60,000 families. Like the majority of his
colleagues on the Junta, Solis felt this to be a highly exaggerated
estimate. In his view it was preposterous to assume that in a new
and relatively unalluring colony like Carolina there could be more
families resident than there were in the viceroyalties of Peru and
New Spain, with all that those opulent lands had to offer pros-
pective immigrants. Solis further argued that, if necessary, aid
could be sent to Pensacola from New Mexico, from Parral, and
from Nuevo Leon !8
The explanation offered for his vote by the Duque de Jovenazo
is also enlightening. Jovenazo took what he must have con-
sidered a common-sense point of view. He agreed with almost
everybody on some point. He thought that Iberville was right
in his project of further colonization of the Gulf region. On
the other hand, said Jovenazo, that would take a good while.
Fortunately, however, he added, so would the fell and nefarious
plots of the English. He realized that Spain could not spare any
additional colonists for the Indies, but he thought settlers might
be secured from Flanders, still a Spanish possession despite the
successful revolt of the Dutch provinces. As for the revenues
which the Junta suggested could be diverted from New Spain to
Pensacola, Jovenazo agreed that the revenues certainly must
exist, at least on paper. But he pointed out that every frontier
presidio was constantly complaining of privations due to delay
in the receipt of salaries and supplies. Pensacola should by all
means be retained. Since it was already established and was most
important strategically, and since it could serve as a base for the
projected establishment of the other colonies around it, Jovenazo
felt that one hundred well-armed men with an abundant supply

SIbid. Solis evidently shared a fairly common misconception as to the
distance between Pensacola and Mexico by land.

French Intrusion and English Menace

of all necessities should at once be sent to Pensacola direct from
The report of the majority of the Junta-Count Hernan
Nifiez still dissenting,-was sent to Philip V. On July 5, 1701,
that monarch had it translated into French and sent to his royal
grandfather, Louis XIV of France." On the other hand, King
Philip of Spain did not trouble himself even to reply to the
Junta at this time. The whole discussion was dropped for nearly
a year.
Early in 1702, the French carried out an earlier project of Iber-
ville's by establishing a fortified settlement on Mobile Bay. This
was in further pursuance of their general policy not to confine
their activities to the Mississippi, but to buttress the Mississippi
colony by settlements along the Gulf coast in the direction of the
coveted Pensacola. This occupation of Mobile evoked another
series of diplomatic protests and a fruitless exchange of letters
between Iberville and Martinez, who was now in command at
Pensacola. Iberville refused to retire, repeating that his every
action was taken in order to thwart the English and that he was
consequently acting in the interests of Spain as well those of
Although Spain seems fully to have recognized the importance
of Pensacola, she was in no position to do much to relieve the dire
straits in which the hapless garrison found itself a good part of
the time. Indeed, it was extremely fortunate for the Pensacola
garrison that the French were at Mobile and Biloxi. The
Spaniards would have fared very perilously had it not been for
the aid in food and supplies frequently and generously extended
by their French neighbors. England and France still wanted
Pensacola, but between 1698 and 1702 neither nation made an
overt attempt to seize it. The religious situation had changed but
slightly. Unlike Apalache, Pensacola does not seem to have
become a base for extensive missionary activity. It was merely a
military and naval outpost of the far-flung Spanish empire. The

SMargry, IV, 552-553.
"Ibid., IV, 576-580.

62 French Intrusion and English Menace

recommendation of the Junta relative to the Jesuits was not
carried out. It is known, however, that there were two Augus-
tinians and two Franciscans there at the time of Iberville's visit in
European political events finally reached a climax in the War
of the Spanish Succession. This compelled a temporary cessation
of the colonial bickering between Spain and France. It marks
the beginning of a new period in the kaleidoscopic history of

"Ibid., IV, 229. Careful attention to this phase of the Pensacola story,
while examining the original sources, revealed no details whatever. That
missionary work among the remnants of the once formidable Pensacola
tribes was carried on seems almost self-evident, considering Spanish methods
of territorial occupation everywhere else in America. But searching among
the Spanish documents for at least some details proved fruitless.



The Shifting Policies of Spain regarding Pensacola, 1700-1704--
Attempts to Strengthen Pensacola against the English, 1703-
1704-Moore's Raid on Western Florida, 1704-Defense
Projects against the English Threat and Relations with the
French at Mobile, 1704-1706-The Great Fire and Landeche's
Rescue Expedition, 1705--Pensacola or St. Augustine?-Re-
newed English Aggression and Indian Hostility, 1707-1713-
Conditions at Pensacola in 1713.

It has often been assumed that Spain's foreign, and conse-
quently also American, policy underwent an abrupt change with
the accession of a Bourbon to the Spanish throne in 1700, and
that thereafter Spain was a mere vassal of Louis XIV. How-
ever, this is only superficially true. The accession of Philip V,
the first Bourbon king of Spain, stimulated Francophile sentiment
in the case of certain court circles. This, however, was but a
natural development, and not a revolution. It is true that during
Philip's reign (1700-1746) the general trend of Spanish policy
was in the direction of a French alliance. But there were many
particular instances which proved deviations from this general
trend. Among these was the consult of the Junta de Guerra of
June 6, 1701, previously cited. It will be recalled that at this
meeting the Junta firmly declined to turn Pensacola over to
France, even to avoid the risk of its being forcibly taken by the
English. The vote of the Junta on this occasion was unanimous,
barring that of one man, the Conde de Hernan Nifiez. One may
object that this consult was promulgated only a few months
after the coronation of Philip V and that it was, therefore, really
a verdict of the old ministers of Charles II, with their exclusionist
tradition. This assumption merits, some credenie in view of the
personnel of the Junta de Guerra at that time. /Subsequent events
demonstrated, however, that this resolute opposition to vassaldom

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

to French imperialism was no mere flash in the pan, representing
a last stand by a conservative element. The most striking proof
that Spain did not become at once and permanently a tail to the
French kite lies in the fact that, as will be shown in the next
chapter, the two countries actually fought a war twenty years
after Philip's accession to the Spanish throne. This war, in its
American phase, centred around Pensacola. Outwardly, in the
earlier years of the eighteenth century, the relations between Spain
and France were in general friendly. But even then this friend-
liness was marred by a considerable amount of Spanish sus-
picion and French covetousness. In fact, Pensacola's entire story
during the first years of the Spanish Bourbon regime was one of
outward tranquillity, accompanied by continuous intrigue and
counter-intrigue among three nations viewing for its possession.
In the beginning the new French King of Spain and his queen
identified their interests with those of their native, rather than
with those of their adopted country. On January 11, 1701,
Philip V wrote as follows to Don Josef de Larrafieta, lieutenant-
general of the city of Puerto Bello in the province of Tierra

I have very probable news that the English and Dutch
are preparing to invade and conquer the Indies and that
for this purpose they have made ready a fleet of a great
number of warships and landing-forces. I have (there-
fore) wished to inform you of these advices in order
that you may be warned of them and may take all those
precautions which may be necessary for defense and for
opposition to any invasion whatsoever. Toward this end
you will avail yourself of the arms of France, both of
those which may be found on the island of Santo
Domingo and other places in the possession of that
crown, and of those which will shortly be sent by the
Most Christian King, my lord and grandfather, to those

The king further stated that identical orders had been dispatched
to the viceroy of New Spain and to the governors of all the

"The king to Don Josef de Larrafeta, Jan. 11, 1701, Ind. Gen., 147-5-14.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

fortresses and ports of the Indies-orders which would of course
include Pensacola.
Equally convincing is a letter of the same date, written by
the queen to Don Jose Sarmiento de Valladares, viceroy of New
Spain. The queen wrote:

By a dispatch of December 31 of last year, which you
will receive on this occasion, you will understand the
amity and union of this crown with that of France. In
consequence of this alliance and close bonds, I have re-
solved that there shall be allowed to enter the ports of
the Indies the French vessels which may arrive at them.
For their money, you may give them the necessary sup-
plies and the materials for keels when it may be

These orders are all the more significant since they were issued
less than a year after Arriola, acting under royal orders, had
refused admission to Iberville's fleet, when the latter attempted
to enter Pensacola Bay.
That the French proffer of aid and Spain's acceptance of it was
not a passing gesture is seen from a letter written to the king
on March 31, 1703, by Francisco Fernindez de la Cueva Enriquez,
Duque de Alburquerque, then viceroy of New Spain. In this letter,
Alburquerque, deploring the military and naval weakness of the
viceroyalty, reiterates:

All the aforementioned circumstances of the status of
the military forces in their great weakness, to which is
added the existing lack of every sort of arms and artil-
lery in the principal ports [among which he mentions
Pensacola] and presidios, notwithstanding that which has
come from France to these parts for two years.'
It is interesting to note in this connection that in a letter written
to Viceroy Alburquerque on April 20, 1703, the King laid great
emphasis on the sending of regular supplies to Pensacola and
designated the transport Santa Rosa and the balandra' San Joaquin

'The queen to Valladares, Jan. 11, 1701, A.G. y P., Mes., Hist., 298
SAlburquerque to the king, Mar. 31, 1703, Mexico, 61-6-23.
'A small vessel much used in such operations.

66 Spanish-French Alliance Against England

as carriers of these supplies to Pensacola. He further ordered that
the two vessels go together, accompanied if at all possible by the
Armada de Barlovento.5
Another indication of the king's interest in the Pensacola ven-
ture may be seen from the lengthy letter which he wrote on
November 24, 1703 to Alburquerque concerning the settlement
of families in Pensacola.* After mentioning the petition of two
soldiers asking that they and their families might be permitted to
remove to Pensacola and settle there, Philip V deplored the fact
that emigration to Pensacola had proved negligible. Although the
new settlement had been represented by its advocates as offering a
haven of security and potential wealth to those who desired a
change, comparatively few colonists had gone there from either
Spain or Mexico or the Antilles. That his advisors in the mother
country concurred in the king's views is manifest from this same
royal letter of November 24. A clear statement of the Spanish
policy at the time of developing and extending the Pensacola enter-
prise was also made in this letter, King Philip declaring:

It has been considered in my Junta de Guerra de
Yndias how much it behooves (us) to augment that popu-
lation by soldiers and families, and (all the) more on the
present occasion,7 in order that there may be someone
who may defend it and maintain it. I have (therefore)
resolved to order you and to command you, as by the
present letter I do, that under the same concessions
which are mentioned,8 you facilitate and foster by all
means possible to you the peopling of Santa Maria de
Galve, urging that some families be sent from your city9
and provinces toward that end. Grant them the exemp-
tions and privileges which are mentioned, informing me
on all occasions of the way in which you execute this

'The "Windward Fleet," used to keep pirates away and to protect and
supply the ports of New Spain.
*The king to Alburquerque, Nov. 24, 1703, A.G. y P., Mex., Hist., 29&
T Queen Anne's War.
'That is, of free land and certain special privileges and exemptions.
That is, Mexico City.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

The necessity of occupying the bay as a naval base had by this
time been so deeply drilled into the mind of the home govern-
ment that it was no longer a debatable question whether Spain
should retain Pensacola. Informed quarters, of course, knew
only too well what former governor Arriola and Franck, the
engineer, thought of the colony. But if on the strength of their
reports the Spanish government entertained any idea of abandon-
ing Pensacola as a futile and wasteful venture, the eagerness of
France and England to occupy the bay in the event of Spain's
withdrawal from it would have been a sufficiently compelling rea-
son for Spain to retain it and profit by its strategic position.
Moreover, important naval bases are seldom relinquished volun-
tarily by a nation at war, and in 1703 the War of the Spanish
Succession was raging furiously on both the European and the
American front.
The meager evidence at present available does not throw much
light on the question of just how far Spain intended to expand her
settlement of the Pensacola area. In 1706, however, we find
Arriola advocating a further expansion of a project which had
earlier been odious to him. The king's letter of November 24,
1703 is convincing proof that expansion or development of some
sort was desired by the crown. It is probable that only the
exigencies of the war and the depleted state of the royal exchequer
prevented what might have proved an earnest move by Spain on
behalf of Pensacola's growth and progress.
On January 28, 1704 an episode occurred which, though not
immediately concerning Pensacola, might have proved the ruina-
tion of that ill-starred and long-suffering colony. After 1633,
first Franciscan missionaries and then Spanish soldiers and
civilians had transformed the wilderness between St. Augustine
and the Pensacola region into a fertile and smiling land known as
"Apalache." The missions and settlements of this western region
had repeatedly served land expeditions as half-way stations be-
tween St. Augustine and the Pensacola area,10 while Apalache
Bay had served as an intermediate port of call for sea expedi-

SE.g., the Torres expedition.

68 Spanish-French Alliance Against England

tions en route for Pensacola Bay from Mexico or Havana.11
Again, in case of an attack, Pensacola could more easily obtain
succor from the relatively near-by Apalache garrisons than from
the more distant forces at St. Augustine, Havana or Mexico.12
Furthermore, should Apalache be destroyed, Pensacola would be
practically isolated from the rest of New Spain. As a result, it
would fall an easy prey to a major attack. This actually happened
in 1719. In that year Pensacola, due largely to the destruction of
Apalache, changed hands no less than four times in about six
months. Evidently a strong Spanish hold on Apalache was essen-
tial to the security and well-being of Pensacola.
It was on October 27, 1702, that James Moore, the English
governor of Carolina, led a combined land and sea expedition
against St. Augustine. After a siege of eight weeks, this attempt
to destroy the Spanish power in eastern Florida proved unsuc-
cessful. Moore beat an ignominious retreat to Charleston, where
he sat, like a stung bear, licking his sores and nursing his wounds.
Being not only an unprincipled slave-trader,1" but also of a ran-
corous and vindictive disposition, Moore determined to avenge
his disgrace by again attacking the Spaniards at another point.
Besides, he hated the Spaniards both because of their nationality
and because of their adherence to the Catholic faith. That he
was superseded in the governorship of Carolina by Sir Nathaniel
Johnson almost immediately after his unfortunate debicle at St.
Augustine must have increased his choler and hastened his deter-
mination to get revenge on the Spaniards.
Since Moore found St. Augustine too strongly fortified, it was
only natural that he should turn his eyes next in the direction of
western Florida, a region more opulent in material resources and
less protected by powerful garrisons. If we are to judge by
Moore's own words, his original intention was to seize Pensacola,
while Apalache was an afterthought. This is a point frequently
overlooked by historians when treating the Ayubale massacre. In
a letter to Admiral Whetstone, dated January 28, 1703, Moore

n E.g, the Barroto-Romero expedition.
This because of geographical propinquity.
SCrane, op. cit., 19, 40, 119.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

If it Pleaseth God to Give us Succor, it is a Matter
of that Great Consequence that if to that Wee ad the
conquest of a small Spanish Town called Pancicola, and
a new french Colony .... Both, Sea Port Towns. .
It will make her Majestie Absolute and Soveraigne Lady
of all the Maine as far as the River Mischisipi, which
if effected the Colony of Carolina will be of the Greatest
Vallue to the Crown of England of any of her Majesties
Plantations on the Maine except Virginia by ading a
Great Revenue to the Crown, for one halfe of all the
Canadian Trade for furrs and Skinns extended as far as
the above mentioned River, Mischisipi, which is now
interrupted by those Two little Towns,... and the Best
Service any of her Majesties Subjects can do the Crowne
is to add to Its Dominion and Revenue."

From Moore's exploits in Apalache it is plain that Pensacola
not only served the Spaniards as a naval base, but it also pre-
sented a serious obstacle to English expansion from Carolina into
the lower Mississippi and the northeastern Gulf regions. It is not
altogether apparent from trustworthy contemporary sources why
Moore deflected his proposed attack from Pensacola to the Apa-
lache country just east. Two possible reasons may be surmised.
Apalache was much richer than was the Pensacola area, and hence
the former offered more opportunities for loot and rapine. Again,
Pensacola was closer to Louisiana, and hence was more likely to
receive timely aid from the French. At all events, Pensacola,
originally intended as Moore's first victim, escaped for the
moment, while the rich mission region of Apalache had to bear
the brunt of Moore's vindictive assault.
Moore was perhaps ahead of his times in seeing the advantages
to England of a southwestward penetration from Carolina into
western Florida and Louisiana. His successor in the governorship
of Carolina, Sir Nathaniel Johnson, sanctioned a sudden foray
into Apalache, where more booty might be had for less pains.
On September 7, the Carolina assembly consented to an attack
on Apalache. The members of the assembly may have realized
that Moore was not entirely to blame for his failure at St. Augus-
"Ibid., 77. Quoted by Crane from "The Journal of the Commons House
of Assembly of South Carolina," Jan. 28, 1703.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

tine. At any rate, they urged that he be placed in command of
the proposed expedition. Despite his earlier designs on Pensacola,
Moore was only too glad to lead such an enterprise. He raised
an army of about fifty whites and a thousand Indian allies.1"
With these he invaded the Apalache district and on January 14,
1704, destroyed the mission of Ayubale. The details of the
Ayubale massacre, which was immediately afterwards extended to
the other Apalache missions, need not be repeated here.1e The
destruction of Apalache seriously jeopardized the continued exist-
ence of Pensacola as a Spanish possession and proved that France
was not the sole foe to be dreaded by the Pensacola Spaniards.
Blake's statement to Romo in 1698 that he intended to occupy
the bay the next year, the presence in western Florida of Eng-
lish fur-traders as early as the Barroto-Romero expedition of
1686, the discovery by Governor Torres in 1693 of English
penetration into the Pensacola area, and Moore's letter of 1703
to the English admiral Whetstone,--all this proves definitely
that at this early date the English had aggressive designs on the
Pensacola region.
An inevitable result of the continual English aggressions in
western Florida was a firmer union between the Spaniards and
the French. Uniting their forces, they would check-mate and if
possible destroy their common enemy. Numerous plans were en-
tertained of dislodging the hated intruders from Carolina. Evi-
dence of close co-operation between the Spaniards and the French
during this period is the fact that France supported Francisco
Martinez," now governor of Pensacola, for the governorship of
St. Augustine, in case Governor Zfiiiga should be elevated to the
governorship of Cartagena as a reward for his successful de-

"Ibid., 79. But Governor Zfifiga of Florida said there were 1500 Indians.
See letter of the king to Alburquerque, July 10, 1704, A.G. y P., Mex.
Hist., 298.
s Brief, but good, secondary accounts are found in Crane, Swanton, and'
others. For Moore's own account, see Carroll's Collections.
"Crane, who is usually quite careful, calls this man "Martin." But it is
evidently Martinez, Arriola's former lieutenant and later his successor in
the governorship of Pensacola.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

fense of St. Augustine against Moore.'1 The French govern-
ment would hardly have ventured to offer a suggestion of this
kind for a particular post in Spanish Florida if the two crowns
had not been in intimate co-operation. Moreover, it is significant
that Martinez was a man who had won the confidence of Iber-
ville. Again, the Spanish crown, formerly so jealous of its pre-
rogatives, had issued royal cidulas as early as March 25, 1701 and
May 31, 1702, giving permission for the purchase of necessities
by the officers of French warships." After the destruction of
Apalache, the Spaniards of Pensacola naturally found themselves
forced to turn to the French for assistance, since it could be
obtained much more easily from Mobile than from St. Augustine,
Havana, or Mexico.
This entente cordiale existing in the early years of the eight-
eenth century was not altogether unmarred, it is true, by some
lingering jealousy on the part of the Spaniards. Although the
French government had, perhaps too officiously, suggested Mar-
tinez as Zifiiiga's successor at St. Augustine, the post was given
by the Spanish crown to Andris de Arriola.20 Arriola was the
predecessor.of Martinez in the governorship of Pensacola and
had shown great firmness in maintaining the right of Spain to
Pensacola even against the French.21 His appointment of Arriola
in preference to the Francophile Martinez may have been intended
by Philip V as a tactful reminder to France that despite his
French extraction he was determined to maintain his sovereign
prerogatives as ruler of the Spanish empire, whether in Europe
or in the Indies. Philip's determination to keep Florida and with
it Pensacola a Spanish possession, even against an ally, was made
still more evident in 1721, when he refused to cede Pensa-
cola to the French at any price. Hence the appointment of Arriola
to the St. Augustine post may not have been due solely to his
undoubted valor and qualities of leadership, though in all fairness
it must be stated that Arriola was noted for precisely those
qualities, and in a marked degree.

"Crane, op. cit., 78.
Alburquerque to the king, April 18, 1704, Mexico, 61-6-24.
"The king to Alburquerque, Aug. 22, 1704, A.G. y P., Mex., Hist., 298.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

No sooner was he made governor of Florida than Arriola
received orders to work with the governor of Havana toward
formulating a plan whereby the English might be dislodged from
Carolina and thus be prevented from repeating their actual attacks
on St. Augustine and Apalache and executing their threatened
assault on Pensacola. But the venture did not succeed. Governor
Johnson learned of the impending danger, and was thoroughly
prepared when the attack was made. This did not occur until
August, 1706, after the Spaniards had finally decided to co-operate
with the French, the destruction of Apalache having impressed
upon them the need of such co-operation if they were to have any
real hope of success against the English. Accordingly, the expe-
dition which set out to capture Charleston was composed of five
French ships and a Spanish landing-force from Cuba and Florida.
Informed in advance of these manoeuvres, Governor Johnson was
able to repulse the attacking force, even capturing two hundred
and thirty prisoners.22 This defeat momentarily put an end to
Spain's idea of saving Florida by destroying Carolina. Conse-
quently, Pensacola remained in the same precarious position as
As has been said, the entente cordiale existing between the
Spaniards and the French was not free from jealousy and bicker-
ing, even in the halcyon days of the first years of the reign of
Philip V. The new king of Spain retained in his service most
of the old ministers of the Hapsburg regime. They were for
the most part hostile to the French influence, still regarding France
as Spain's major enemy. The attitude of this venerable camarilla
was shared by most of the old soldiers who served under the
Spanish flag in the Indies. In Pensacola the situation was not
entirely different from that obtaining elsewhere in the Spanish
empire. There was, to be sure, the saving grace that Pensacola
frequently had to depend for succor on the French at Mobile.
This, together with the family union of the two Bourbon crowns,

"Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina under the Proprietary
Government, 1670-1719 (New York, 1897), 396-401; William J. Rivers,
A Sketch of the History of South Carolina to the Close of the Proprietary
Government by the Revolution of 1719 (Charleston, 1856), 210-214.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

kept general relations between Pensacola and Mobile on a
fairly friendly footing.
Iberville's brother, Jean Le Moyne de Bienville, was now gover-
nor of Louisiana. He believed that to keep back the English it
was necessary to preserve the friendship of the Indians near
Louisiana and western Florida. For this reason he bestowed
upon their chiefs such presents as were compatible with the
impoverished state of the French colony. This policy, however,
occasionally conflicted with the Spanish efforts to retain suzerainty
over the tribes of western Florida. The Pensacolas had by this
time been pretty well exterminated by the more powerful Alabama
and Mobile Indians. The unfortunate Apalache Indians who had
survived Moore's raid of 1704 were hopeless wanderers on the
face of the earth. Other tribes, like the Touachas, also needed
protection from the ferocious incursions of the English-led
Creeks.28 Some of these Spain attempted to settle near Pensa-
cola, but was apparently unable to defend them against the Creeks.
In 1705 this led to a considerable exodus of Indians from the
Spanish lands of western Florida to Mobile and its vicinity, where
they sought the protecting aegis of the oriflamwme. Bienville
received the newcomers kindly and allotted them lands near Mo-
bile. This consequent migration of the Apalaches was significant
to Pensacola in that it made the rehabilitation of the territory
between Pensacola and St. Augustine very difficult, if not impos-
sible. So it was but natural for the Pensacola colony to establish
closer and closer relations with the Mobile French.
Denis Penicaut, a carpenter, had gone to Louisiana with Iber-
ville. He composed a lengthy and interesting account of his voy-
ages between France and Louisiana and especially of conditions
in the new French colony. In this same account he presents an
illuminating picture of the friendly relations existing in 1706 be-
tween Pensacola and Mobile. He writes:

At the beginning of this year Don Guzmin, Spaniard
and governor of the fort of Pensacola for the King of

Margry, V, 457.
SIbid., 460-461.

74 Spanish-French Alliance Against England
Spain, arrived at our fort of Mobile to see M. de Bien-
ville, who received him with a cannon salute and with
volleys from the garrison, which was under arms. He
remained there four days, in which he was entertained
by M. de, Bienville and by all the officers. While he
was at our fort, a French Canadian named Boutin begged
him to do him the honor of being kind enough to hold
his child (for baptism) along with the daughter of M.
Lesueuer, cousin of M. de Bienville, which Don Guz-
min agreed to do. This baptism was celebrated with all
the pomp desirable. The garrison, being under arms,
fired three gun shots: Don Guzmin upon leaving the
chapel, caused his valet de chambre, who went ahead,
to throw more than a thousand piastres to all the soldiers
of the garrison of the fort. He also requested of M. de
Bienville the liberty of the French prisoners, which
the former granted him. Before his departure, he asked
M. de Bienville for two carpenters, whom he took with
him, to build two houses for him in his fort of Pensa-
cola. His departure was likewise saluted by artillery and
musket fire, and by the ruffling of drums. Some days
after the departure of Don Guzmin, M. de Bienville,
seeing that the victuals were beginning to diminish
greatly and that no vessels were arriving to bring any,
gave permission to several persons to go hunting or to go
to live as best they might among the nations of savages
friendly to the French.25

In addition to its human interest, Penicaut's relation shows that
Pensacola was not the only colony neglected by the home govern-
ment. French Mobile fared no better. Bienville had so lavishly
entertained his distinguished guest that desperate measures had
to be taken to avert starvation at Mobile. But Bienville had finally
received adequate provisions from France. Hence in 1707 Pini-
caut could write: "We went, a few days afterwards, to Pensa-
cola, with M. de Chasteaugue26 to take back to the governor of
the fort the victuals he had lent us the preceding year."21 Evi-
dently, there were times when Pensacola, bad as conditions gener-
ally were, had more to eat than did its French neighbors. As a
rule, however, it was the French who aided the Spaniards. For

"Ibid., 461 ff.
SChiteaugue was a brother of Bienville.
SMargry, V, 470.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

instance, in 1703, the governor of Mobile supplied the Spaniards
with fifty muskets and five hundred rounds of ammunition from
his scanty stores." Again, in 1704, the French had to provide
Pensacola with all necessities for five months, including in its sub-
sidy 6076 pounds of flour. However, Pensacola's plight was not
entirely the result of governmental negligence or indifference to
the colony's welfare. It must be remembered that 1704 was the
year of Moore's raid, and that many of its survivors had taken
refuge in Pensacola, the only remaining Spanish fort in western
Florida. This naturally created a condition of virtual famine, the
ordinary garrison usually having none too much to eat. Mean-
while, the viceroy of New Spain sent re-inforcements and supplies
from Mexico, thereby improving the situation to some extent and
making it possible to repay the French."
As though these predicaments were not enough, Pensacola had
another fire in February, 1705.30 It began accidentally in the
kitchen of the chaplain adjacent to the fort proper, and it spread
so rapidly through the wooden presidio that everything was burned
to the ground except one bastion and the powder magazine.
Almost all the supplies were destroyed, and, the harassed gover-
nor was obliged once more to have recourse to the hospitality of
his French colleague at Mobile. The latter, as usual, came to the
rescue with food, arms, ammunition, tools, and other necessities.
He also gave the Spaniards a boat, so that they might sail to
Vera Cruz and obtain aid from the viceroy of New Spain."1
The viceroy took immediate steps to relieve his unfortunate
compatriots at Pensacola. Acting with a promptness that must
have been as welcome to the distressed colony as it was rare in
the annals of the times, Alburquerque immediately sent a brigan-
tine of the Armada de Barlovento to Pensacola, laden with
.emergency supplies. He followed this up by ordering Admiral
Don Antonio Landeche to proceed forthwith to Pensacola on the

"The king to Alburquerque, Dec. 10, 1704, A.G. y P., Mes., Hist., 298.
"The king to Alburquerque, Aug. 12, 1705, ibid.; Alburquerque to the
king, June 6, 1706, Mexico, 61-1-25.
"Junta de Guerra de Indias to the king, Dec. 2, 1707, Mexico, 60-5-2.

76 Spanish-French Alliance Against England

frigate Nuestra Seiora del Rosario. Landeche carried with him
provisions for six months, besides money with which to pay the
workmen who were to rebuild the presidio. Funds were also sent
for the purchase, cutting, and use of timber in repairing and
refitting the Armada de Barlovento. In addition, Viceroy Albur-
querque sent arms and ammunition to repay the Mobile French
for those which they had sent to Pensacola, and also furnished
fifty recruits for the Pensacola garrison."2 These were needed
because disease, famine, death, and desertion constantly dimin-
ished the number of men capable of defending the presidio.
Along with the Nuestra Seiora del Rosario and under its con-
voy, the viceroy sent two other vessels laden with supplies for
Havana and St. Augustine. The rescue fleet under Admiral
Landeche sailed from Vera Cruz on August 14, 1705. Because
of the more pressing need at Pensacola, it went there first. After
leaving at Pensacola the supplies, moneys, and men destined for
this place, the fleet proceeded to Havana. Here the admiral left
the necessary provisions and convoyed the two supply ,ships part
of the way to St. Augustine. After bidding them godspeed,
Landeche returned on the Nuestra Selora del Rosario to Pensa-
cola, where he intended to take aboard masts for the Armada de
Barlovento. This he was prevented from doing, however, by one
of the hurricanes common in this region. Anchor was duly cast;
but in spite of this precaution, the Nuestra Senora del Rosario
was so badly battered by the tempest that the admiral was obliged
to foresake that portion of his program. He even had difficulty
in salvaging supplies necessary to his own navigation. His vessel
being in need of extensive repairs, Landeche deemed it best to
apprise the viceroy of his deplorable situation. Happily, a French
ship which had brought relief to the Pensacola garrison was
available. Soon it was on its way, carrying the sergeant-major,
Don Sebastian de Moscoso, and the captain, Don Diego de Castro,
who were to report to the viceroy.
Dismayed and grieved at the loss of a capital ship whose services
were so direly needed, the viceroy wrote to the king on June 6,
1706. He told him the sad news and expressed his own sorrow


Spanish-French Alliance Against England 77

at the misfortune, concluding with the statement that he had done
everything possible and that good men were scarce in New Spain."
In the meantime, Admiral Landeche had returned to Mexico and
presented in person his tale of woe to Viceroy Alburquerque. The
latter sent him back to Pensacola with the transport El Rey David,
which had been purchased to augment the diminishing number of
vessels in the Armada de Barlovento. This voyage was accom-
plished under more auspicious circumstances than had been the
case with its predecessor, and Landeche was able to bring back
to Vera Cruz one hundred and seven timber-cuttings, to be used
as masts and ships' supplies."
The viceroy now concerned himself even more directly with
the safety of Pensacola by purchasing a brigantine and stationing
it in the bay. Landeche returned to Pensacola with instructions
from the viceroy to inspect minutely the fortifications of Pensacola
and to make recommendations as to what means might best be
employed to put the bay and the presidio in a state of defense.
That he might have sound technical advice, the viceroy decided to
send to Pensacola as soon as possible an engineer, Don Luis
Bouchard de Bocour.3"
In obedience to the king's repeated orders, the viceroy sought
information concerning the comparative conditions and relative
values of the different ports, bays, and estuaries which might be
used as bases of operations against Carolina. Quite logically, Don
Andres de Arriola was one of the men from whom the viceroy
sought the desired information. He was in a position to speak
with authority, since he had been the first Spanish governor of
Pensacola and was also conversant with conditions at St. Augus-
tine and in other parts of Florida.
In response to the viceroy's query as to whether there was a
good port on the Atlantic coast to shelter a fleet for the proposed
joint attack by land and by sea, Arriola replied in the negative.
St. Augustine, he said, had no real harbor and its port was much
too shallow. He reversed his former opinion concerning the

"Alburquerque to the king, June 6, 1706, Mexico, 61-1-25.
Junta de Guerra de Indias to the king, Dec. 2, 1707, Mexico, 60-5-2.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

merits of Pensacola as compared with those of St. Augustine. In
his informed of August 20, 1706, he wrote of the harbor of St.
Augustine: "This is in my opinion of no importance, and the
expense which is being incurred in the maintenance of this pre-
sidio [is] very unfruitful. I consider much more important Santa
Maria de Galve, as I have informed His Majesty." Arriola also
cited the fact that the authorities at St. Augustine had been able
to render no aid to Apalache at the time of Moore's merciless
devastation of that fertile province.* His evaluation of Pensa-
cola must have somewhat embarrassed the viceroy, for in a letter
to the king, dated March 31, 1703, Alburquerque had consigned
Pensacola to the rank of a minor port."T Arriola's slighting
reference to St. Augustine evoked an instant and heated retort
from Don Francisco de Corcoles y Martinez, governor of Florida.
He replied to Arriola's charges that if St. Augustine had been
unable to succor Apalache during the Moore foray, it was because
the St. Augustine garrison had been busy guarding the main thing,
namely, St. Augustine, the loss of which would have been ruinous.**
The year 1707 was characterized by Indian raids, instigated by
the English. That these raids almost wiped out Pensacola was
due largely to the crass stupidity and blind jealousy of the Spanish
governor, Joseph de Guzmin. Bienville, whether through altruism
or through enlightened selfishness, tried to warn Guzmin of the
impending trouble. It was, of course, Bienville's policy to main-
tain links of intimate friendship with as many Indian tribes as
possible. To that end, he not infrequently sent young Frenchmen
into the wilderness to live among the Indians and to keep an ear
to the ground. In the summer of 1707, the French governor was
informed by Anglophile Indians, made prisoners by a tribe friendly
to the French, that the English were planning a wholesale raid,
first on Pensacola and then on Mobile. Bienville at once warned
Guzmin. But the Spanish governor was too proud to listen to
advice, even from a friendly source. In consequence, the Pensa-

"Informe of Arriola to Alburquerque, Aug. 20, 1706, Santo Domingo,
Alburquerque to the king, Mar. 31, 1703, Mexico, 61-1-23.
"Corcoles to the king, Jan. 22, 1710, Santo Domingo, 58-1-28.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

cola garrison was caught napping by Indian raiders a few days
later. Under the leadership of a handful of Englishmen, several
hundred members of an Upper Creek tribe, called the Talapoosas,
swooped down on the unsuspecting Spaniards and burned and
plundered the entire town, except the presidio itself. Even this
they succeeded in entering before the unwary garrison could be
called to arms. The Spanish casualties were eleven slain and
fifteen captured, the latter being taken away as slaves to the
Talapoosa country north of Pensacola." All this was the result
of the foolish arrogance of one individual who at this time un-
fortunately shared the prejudices of too many of his nation against
the French.
Governor Guzman, however, may have learned a lesson. When
Pensacola was next besieged, in November of the same year, the
garrison was ready to give the invaders a warm reception. As
usual, advance word of the impending attack was dispatched from
Mobile. This time, happily, Guzmin had the good sense to take
Bienville's word. He prepared to hold Pensacola -against its
besiegers until such time as Bienville could appear with the
promised relief. Here again it is noteworthy that, partly as a
result of the destruction of Apalache, it was not to St. Augustine,
but to Mobile, that Spanish Pensacola looked for aid. At the
same time Guzmin was helped considerably by the fact that dis-
sensions arose among the hostile forces. In the course of the
siege more than three-fourths of the enemy deserted and went
home. When Bienville arrived, on December 8, the besieging
army, composed of thirteen Englishmen and three hundred and
fifty Indians, had already withdrawn. The French governor,
Bienville was reasonably entitled to a word of thanks from Gov-
ernor Guzmin; instead, he was reproached for having allowed so
many Indians subject to Spain to settle around Mobile!"
Philip V and his advisers were kept apprised of events in and
around the Pensacola Bay region by numerous informed, letters,
and dispatches, written by Viceroy Alburquerque, by Arriola, and

*The king to Alburquerque, Dec. 4, 1709, A.G. y P., Mer., Hist., 298.
Binard de la Harpe, Journal historique de lrtablissement des Franfais
d la Louisiane (New Orleans and Paris, 1831), Nov. 16, 24, 1707.

80 Spanish-French Alliance Against England

by other officials of New Spain who were conversant with affairs
in western Florida. An enlightening informed was sent to the vice-
roy on December 3, 1707, by Christ6bal de Villareal, an oidor of
the Audiencia de Mixico. This informed, minute in detail, covers
the entire Floridian situation and refers specifically from time to
time to different sections of Florida, including Pensacola. Villa-
real's verbosity makes his report a very human and revealing
document. He gossips on garrulously, through sheer loquacity
giving the reader a panoramic view of each section of Florida, of
its relation to the other sections, and of the state of the frontier
with reference to English and Indian aggression. Yet, with all
his unflagging energy in attempting to cover the entire field
minutely, Villareal apparently did not know of the Indian raid
of the summer of 1707, when Pensacola town was burned to the
ground and its presidio barely saved; at any rate, he does not
mention it. The second siege, that of November-December,
Villareal could not, of course, have heard of, since his informed
was written five days before Bienville arrived with his relief force.
That Villareal was not entirely correct in sizing up the situa-
tion is quite plain from his statement that the English were
concentrating on St. Augustine because "Pensacola and Mobile
are nothing, they say, and they will depopulate them whenever
they wish to." Surely, the raid in the summer of 1707 and the
siege of November and December in the same year by large forces
of English and Indians do not indicate lack of interest in Pensa-
cola on the part of the English. Indeed, a little later in the
informed, Villareal more or less contradicted himself by admitting
that Pensacola was in real danger from the English, especially
since the destruction of Apalache had severed Pensacola from
overland communication with St. Augustine. He pointed out the
alarming extent of English infiltration in the Pensacola region, as
did numerous other contemporary Spanish and French writers."
The year 1708, though not so full of actual military events as
was 1707, came perilously close to witnessing the destruction of
Pensacola and Mobile. Punicaut wrote that in 1708 Chiteaugui,
one of Bienville's brothers, while foraging through the wilderness,
a Informe of Christ6bal de Villareal, Dec. 3, 1707, Mexico, 61-1-25.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

put to flight a party of hostile Indians who, in his opinion, intended
to attack either Pensacola or Mobile or the Indian tribes who were
friendly to the Spaniards and the French. About the same time,
the governor of Pensacola requested Bienville to lend him three or
four French hunters to kill game for him around Pensacola.
Bienville, obliging as always, acceded to the request. As they
approached Pensacola, the hunters came across two Alabamas who
asked them where they were going. Upon being told, the Alabamas
did not attempt to kill the hunters or make them prisoners, which
might have proved difficult, since the Frenchmen were armed.
Instead, they promised to go with them and show them the way.
The hunters, realizing that the Alabamas wished to get them to
an Alabama village, where they would immediately be seized and
later burned at the stake, waited until night. When the Alabamas
had fallen asleep, the hunters killed and scalped them. Pinicaut
naively remarks that many people would no doubt disapprove this
action, but he himself considers it justified, since it was necessary
for the safety of the hunters.42 This episode, trifling as it seems,
shows that during the seemingly peaceful year of 1708 Pensacola
was sitting on a powder-keg, with a lighted match dangerously
near the fuse.
Although Governor Guzman of Pensacola probably did not
know it, the Carolina assembly had approved in the fall of 1707
a far-reaching plan for the seizure of Mobile and the subsequent
occupation of the Mississippi mouth and lower valley. What
this would have meant to Spanish Pensacola is apparent. That
an immediate attack on Pensacola was included in the plan is not
directly indicated by available documentary evidence. But when
the intimate relationship between Pensacola and Mobile is con-
sidered, and when one recalls how often Pensacola's very existence
was saved by aid from Mobile, it is clear that, once Mobile was in
English hands, Pensacola would not long have remained a Spanish
possession. This is all the more certain from the fact that the
English had repeatedly expressed a desire for Pensacola and the
year before had led two Indian raids on the town. Nor could
the Spaniards have done much about it. Apalache had been
Margry, V, 478-481.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

destroyed four years previously. St. Augustine was accessible
only after long travel through a sub-tropical wilderness. Mexico
and Cuba were even more distant. Only for the possibility of
French aid from Mobile, Pensacola would have been completely
at the mercy of the English. Perhaps it was as well that Governor
Guzmin dozed peacefully through his daily siesta, since he probably
could have done little, if anything, to alter the course of events.
Meanwhile, his French ally, Bienville, was acting with char-
acteristic energy to save the day. He sent his brother Chiteaugue,
to restore peace between the Chickasaws and the Choctaws..8 He
enlarged the stockade at Mobile in order that the friendly neighbor-
ing tribes might use Mobile as a place of refuge and enroll them-
selves in the ranks of the town's defenders. As a final desperate
measure, Bienville even appealed to Guzmin and to the viceroy
of New Spain for powder and for goods to trade with the Indians
in exchange for their support." What the indefatigable labors
of the Frenchmen might not have been able to avert by measures
of defense was luckily turned aside by chance. A report came to
Charleston from Jamaica that a large Spanish and French force
was being raised in an attempt to duplicate with greater hopes of
success the 1706 attack on Charleston. This report so greatly
alarmed the Carolina authorities that all available forces were kept
at home, including about fourteen hundred Indians who had
offered the English their services. Thus was Spanish Pensacola
once more saved from destruction.
In the same year, 1708, the Spanish crown rewarded two of its
most faithful servants. None had done more to make and to
retain Pensacola as the northern outpost of Spanish rule on the
Gulf than had Andres de Pez and Andr6s de Arriola. More
than any other single individual, Pez had been responsible for
awakening Spanish interest in the possibilities of Pensacola Bay
as a naval base. Arriola's entire career had been one of loyal and
distinguished service to the Spanish crown in its North American

"The Choctaws, a powerful tribe, were usually friendly to the French
and hostile to the English; hence they indirectly formed a bulwark for
"Crane, op. cit., 91.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

possessions. Like Pez, he also had been intimately connected with
the Pensacola venture. In a letter written by Viceroy Alburquer-
que to the king on June 29, 1708, mention was made of promoting
these two officers." Pez, the probable author of the celebrated
memorial of 1689, which urged the occupation of Pensacola Bay,
was given the office of "Castellano de San Juan de Ulia" in Vera
Cruz harbor. This promotion was appropriate, since Vera Cruz
was the Mexican port with which Pensacola had most of its
communications. Upon Arriola was bestowed a position which
would keep him still more closely associated with the fortunes of
the colony whose first governor he had been. He was made
General de la Armada de Barlovento. The continued existence of
Pensacola as a Spanish base was largely dependent on the Armada,
and no greater security by sea could have been offered it than the
appointment of its former governor as admiral of the fleet one of
whose major duties was to provision and protect Pensacola and
the other Gulf ports.
Unlike the year 1707, which had witnessed two major Anglo-
Indian attacks on Pensacola, the years 1708 and 1709 offer the
historian little that is. spectacular in the history of this Spanish
possession. The struggle for control of the bay went on as ruth-
lessly as ever, but mainly under cover. The failure of Carolina's
projected southwestward thrust in 1708 was followed in the Eng-
lish colony by internal political, religious and social dissensions,
this, no doubt, preventing for the moment another march on
Pensacola." These conditions did not, however, prevent abundant
activity on the part of the restless Carolina frontiersmen, who
were a perpetual thorn in the side of the Pensacola Spaniards.
The extent of English intrusion into the Pensacola hinterland
is attested by much documentary evidence. Most revealing is a
letter written to the king on January 22, 1710, by Don Francisco
Corcoles y Martinez," governor of Florida." Seventeen English-

Alburquerque to the king, June 29, 1708, Mexico, 61-1-28.
SCrane, op. cit., 89, 91.
"Crane (p. 107) speaks of GuzmAn as governor of Pensacola in 1715.
This is apparently an inadvertence, unless Guzmin had two terms of office.
Salinas y Varona was certainly governor in 1712, whereas Guzmin's term
had preceded his.
Corcoles to the king, Jan. 22, 1710, Santo Domingo, 58-1-28.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

men had been shipwrecked in a launch a league and a half from
St. Augustine, where they had no right to be, since Spain and
England were then at war with each other. Hence they were
arrested by the Spaniards. Governor Corcoles y Martinez, in
turn, arranged for their release in exchange for twenty-four
Spanish prisoners from St. Augustine and nine other Spanish
soldiers belonging to the Pensacola garrison. The names of six
members of the Pensacola garrison were Juan Gabriel de Vargas,
Francisco Joseph Fernandez, Alexo de Zilas, Antonio Monilla,
Salvador Joseph de Aguado, Juan de Roxas. But the names of
the remaining three are not known because they made no separate
statements and hence did not sign their names. These nine Pensa-
cola soldiers made sworn affidavits to Governor Corcoles y
Martinez which must have astounded that official, since he had
always belittled the importance of Pensacola and had concentrated
all his strength in St. Augustine. The English, according to the
Pensacola soldiers, had penetrated southward well into Florida
and southwestward as far as the borders of Nueva Vizcaya.4 So
far as the Pensacola hinterland was concerned, said Vargas and
his comrades, the English had a "teniente" in every principal town
of the disputed area between Pensacola and San Jorge (Charles-
ton). They were carrying on a flourishing fur trade. In addi-
tion, they had seduced the Indians from their Spanish allegiance
by means of lavish presents of guns, clothing, beads, and other
In 1706, Governor Corcoles had savagely opposed Arriola's
suggestion that St. Augustine be abandoned in favor of Pensa-
cola. Now, four years later, he saw that he and also Arriola had
been partly right. In other words, both presidios must be main-
tained if the English were to be halted in their advance into
Florida. Once the English were allowed to dominate the Apalache
country, they would continue down the Gulf coast, first to Tampa
Bay and then to the keys. Here they would be in an excellent
position to harass Spanish shipping between Vera Cruz, Havana
and Spain. If they were allowed to take Pensacola, they would
likewise be a menace to Spanish vessels and would in addition find
"Ibid. This last statement as to Nueva Vizcaya seems incredible.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

it possible, once Mobile was captured from the French, to penetrate
westward and southward into Mexico. In a letter to the king,
dated January 22, 1710, Governor Corcoles referred as follows to
the provinces infiltrated by the English:

When these (the provinces) are dominated by the
English, there is no security in the kingdom of New
Spain. Nor will there long remain the town of the
French who are in Mobile thirty leagues from Pensacola
or the new town of Santa Maria de Galve." This presidio
is what they most covet and try to capture. It cuts them
off by land, and they desire ... to settle and fortify the
places which they have already seen in advance, and one
of them will be ... Tampa Bay (This is) a port
capable of receiving a considerable number of vessels.
And when they have succeeded in doing this, the .
galleons which sail through the straits from Havana will
receive great damage because of its nearness, being only
twenty-five leagues from it."5

With due allowance for exaggerations and undue fears, all
available evidence makes it plain that increasingly large numbers
of Carolina fur-traders and other English adventurers were
wandering about the Pensacola area. Very likely, the nine captured
soldiers of the Pensacola garrison were correct when they re-
ported that some of these Englishmen were stationed in certain
advantageous positions, not only to engage in trade but also to
await a propitious moment for seizing both Pensacola and Mobile.
That an earlier return to the attacks of 1707 did not at once
materialize seems to have been due primarily to dissension in
Carolina rather than to any extraordinary exhibition of strength
on the part of the Spanish forces at Pensacola.
The leading spirit in the English attacks on the Floridas during
this period was Thomas Nairne, the Indian agent for Carolina.
Nairne had been a planter at St. Helena near the Florida border.
He had participated actively in the wars on the eastern Florida
frontier and had gone west often enough to realize the strategic
It will be recalled that Pensacola had been founded only twelve years
before, in 1698.
Corcoles to the king, Jan. 22, 1710, Santo Domingo, 58-1-28.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

advantages accruing to whatever nation should possess Pensacola
Bay. In 1707 he had fallen out with Governor Johnson over
several contentious matters. One of these matters was the ques-
tion as to what rights the established Church of England should
allow the dissenting Protestants. There were large numbers of
the latter in Carolina, particularly in Colleton County. Here a
considerable number of French Huguenots, German Protestants,
Scotch and Ulster Presbyterians, and north country English Non-
Conformists had settled. Nairne, as an Englishman and as a
Protestant, thoroughly hated both Governor Johnson and the
Catholic Spaniards, and the two rival animosities, rankling within
his bosom, sometimes stifled each other. For example, in 1707,
Johnson had favored an immediate assault on Mobile and probably
also on Pensacola. Nairne would normally have been among the
first to concur enthusiastically in this plan. But, eager to vent
his spleen on the governor, he managed to divert and to localize
the attack, confining it entirely to Pensacola, as has been seen
above. Since both the summer and the November attack on Pensa-
cola failed, Nairne was somewhat discredited for the time being.
Going to England, he succeeded in regaining the favor of the
proprietors. He was restored to his former office of Indian agent,
an office he had lost as the result of a charge that he was a Jacobite
agent, surely an unjust accusation, considering the fact that he
was one of the stiffest Protestants in Carolina.52
The feuds which had rent Carolina asunder for several years
gradually died down. Hence in 1711 Pensacola found itself again
besieged by an expeditionary force of English and Indians. If
Villareal and Corcoles were correct in belittling the importance of
Pensacola, the English were surely going to a great deal of trouble
and expense. The first news Pensacola had of the approach of
its enemies was a sudden attack by pro-English Indian scouts on
some day-laborers who were cutting wood outside the fortifica-
tions. A captain, his sergeant, twenty soldiers and two religious
rushed out to aid the laborers. But they found the attackers
more numerous than had been anticipated. The members of the
rescue party were slain, captured, or put to flight. Of the two

"Crane, op. cit., 145.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

charitable religious, whose names unfortunately are not mentioned,
one was killed and the other taken captive. Nothing certain is
known of the fate of this captive religious, but since his captors
were pagan Indians, his lot must have been the usual cruel one of
torture and death."3
Although the English and their Indian allies were unsuccessful
in their attempt to follow up this minor victory by capturing
Pensacola, they invested it by land. Very likely they would have
captured it, had not other factors favored the Spaniards. For one
thing, the main body of the Anglo-Indian expedition was diverted
from Pensacola to the powerful Choctaw tribe, who were friends
of the French and consequently also of the Spaniards. Thus
diminished, the force harassing Pensacola proved insufficient to
take the town. Meanwhile, Don Gregorio de Salinas Varona, who
had replaced Guzmin as governor of Pensacola, wrote not only
to the king of Spain but also to Fernando de Alencastre, Duque
de Linares, Alburquerque's successor as viceroy of New Spain.
In both these letters Governor Salinas unfolded the perilous plight
of Pensacola. Prompt relief came from Mexico and saved the
beleaguered colony."4
In the past, Pensacola had been obliged to wait indefinitely for
supplies. Sometimes they arrived on time and in sufficient
amounts. But more commonly, intervals of from six months to
a year elapsed before a fresh supply arrived. In the latter case,
the garrison was forced to depend largely on the good-will of the
French in Mobile. In view of the latent rivalry which persisted
between France and Spain even during the years of their alliance,
this was an unwholesome situation, especially since Pensacola had
long been desired by the French. Governor Salinas described this
state of affairs to Viceroy Linares, who had recently arrived in
Mexico from Spain, hoping that perhaps the new broom would
sweep clean. Luckily for Pensacola, this hope was realized.
Salinas had pointed out to the new viceroy that Pensacola's un-
happy situation was the result of several circumstances. First, the
garrison at Pensacola was too small for the defense of such an

aThe king to Linares, Aug. 4, 1713, A.G. y P., Mex., Hist., 298.

Spanish-French Alliance Against England

important post. Then, the garrison, inadequate at best, was still
more inadequate on account of the discontent brought on by the
tardiness of pay, the scantiness of rations, and the lack of sufficient
arms and munitions for defense."
Upon receipt of Governor Salinas' plea for assistance, Linares
acted with unwonted energy for a viceroy of New Spain. He sent
the tender of the Armada de Barlovento to Pensacola with six
months' supplies." The vessel carried also six months' pay for
the garrison, two thousand one hundred pesos for the repair of
the fortifications, twenty-five muskets, twenty-five cutlasses, fifty
quintals57 of powder, one hundred priming-horns for the guns,
and fifty-six felons. The latter had been condemned to penal
servitude on public works by the Sala del Crimen of the Audiencia
de Mixico. While Salinas appreciated most of the tender's cargo,
he reluctantly added to his unreliable soldiery the fifty-six
criminals. They were a poor substitute for the hundred soldiers
which he had requested as re-inforcements.58
The Pensacola governor therefore wrote the king on July 12,
1712, setting forth the course of events, his present state of affairs,
the requests he had made of Viceroy Linares, and the latter's
response. In addition, he begged the king to order Linares to
send him enough men to defend Pensacola, and also a vessel to
be stationed permanently in the bay for the protection and service
of the presidio. Pensacola was by this time dear to the heart of
Philip V. Hence, on June 12, 1713, he wrote to the viceroy of
New Spain in part as follows:

It has seemed proper to order you and command you,
as by the present (letter) I do, that you succor precisely
and punctually the above-mentioned presidio with every-
thing necessary, since its importance, preservation and
security deserve my Royal attention and the greatest
vigilance, preference and care of my Council."'

"The king to Linares, June 12, 1713, ibid.
"A quintal is a hundred-weight.
"The king to Linares, June 12, 1713, A.G. y P., Mex., Hist., 298.

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King Philip concluded by commanding the viceroy to furnish
"the aforesaid port with a vessel of moderate size corresponding
to its needs."60
The frequent exchange of aid between Pensacola and Mobile
threatened to degenerate about this time into a general exchange
of commodities between Louisiana and New Spain, in contraven-
tion of all Spanish policy in the matter. On March 4, 1711, a
French ship entered the harbor of Vera Cruz and asked permission
to sell certain French merchandise, so as to be able to buy victuals
for the Mobile garrison. Mobile, said the French captain, was
short of food as a result of having shared its own provisions with
the famished Spanish garrison of Pensacola. Though he must
have felt that there was some justice in the French request, Vice-
roy Linares was under strict orders not to allow foreign, even
friendly, commerce with New Spain. Hence he compromised by
giving the French as much provision as they had lent to Pensacola.
On October 31 of the same year, he informed the king of what
he had done.
Upon receiving the viceroy's letter, King Philip referred it to
the Council; the latter passed it on to the fiscal for his comment.
The fiscal, in his respuesta, answered drily that he had already in
1709 replied to a similar letter from Linares, in which the vice-
roy had told of having given succor for Mobile. In his reply of
that year, the fiscal had stated that in accordance with the Bull of
Pope Alexander VI of 1493 not only Mobile but the entire coast
of the Gulf of Mexico was Spanish domain. This being the case,
he argued, the French had no business at Mobile; the mere fact
that France was in de facto possession conferred upon her no
rights de jure; he could not, therefore, approve the aid extended
to the Mobile French by Linares. "Although," he wrote, "the
union of this crown with that of France is so close ... it should
never extend to the occupation of each other's dominions, on
account of the prejudices and confusion which it would cause to
both monarchies." He concluded by pointing out that it was even
more important to deny Mobile to the French than to withhold
Canada from them. Mobile, he declared, was on the Gulf of


90 Spanish-French Alliance Against England

Mexico, and hence a menace to everything Spanish in that region."
The fiscal and the Consejo de Indias found themselves on this
point in conflict with Philip V. The latter wished peace and
friendship with his native France, as long as amicable intercourse
would not jeopardize his own territorial holdings. Here he
drew the line. As to economic intercourse with France, King
Philip was also more liberally inclined than were his ministers.
Still, even he took what would nowadays be considered a very strict
stand in the matter. On this one specific occasion he thought
Viceroy Linares had acted sensibly and decently; after all, the
Mobile French had repeatedly succored Pensacola. Hence the
king proceeded as he had done on a similar occasion in 1709. He
approved the viceroy's action on the ground that "in the aid which
he has given Mobile, there was no act sanctioning possession nor
[was there] anything prejudicial to the royal rights." At the same
time, he cautioned Linares to permit no commerce with the French
or with any other foreign nation. The Consejo de Indias, grum-
bling to the last, reluctantly acceded to the will of the king, but be-
sought him "to order that provision be made that the presidio of
Santa Maria de Galve which Your Majesty possesses be well
supplied, since in this way that governor [namely, of Pensacola]
will be excused from asking aid from Mobile.""2
The treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, put a nominal end to the
war which was known in Europe as the War of the Spanish
Succession and in North America as Queen Anne's War. This
treaty gave Spanish Pensacola a brief breathing spell so far as
open and direct attack was concerned. It did not, however, remove
the causes of the trouble, nor did it in any permanent sense termi-
nate the three-cornered struggle for the Pensacola area. English
adventurers were still brewing trouble among the Indians to the
north of Pensacola. And Spain's late ally, France, was still
casting covetous glances at the fine harbor which she had long
sought to obtain. These covetous glances were destined soon to
develop into hostile action. Only six years after France and

SConsejo de Indias to the king, Apr. 22, 1714, Indiferente de Nuewa
Espaia, 136-4-5.
"Ibid.; the king to Linares, May 30, 1714, A.G. y P., Mexico, Hist., 298

Spanish-French Alliance Against England 91

Spain had worked together as allies against England in Europe
and in the New World, Spanish Pensacola was once more called
upon to defend itself,-this time not against the English, but
against the French.



English Intrigue among the Indians, 1713-1715-Spanish Counter-
action among the Indians, 1713-1718-Partial Rehabilitation
of Apalache and Efforts to Strengthen Pensacola, 1715-1718
-Friction with France, 1713-1719-France's Occupation of
St. Joseph's Bay, 1718-The Founding of New Orleans, 1718
-The Military Struggle for Pensacola, 1719-1720-The
Diplomatic Contest for Pensacola, 1720-1721-The Outcome
Favorable to Spain.

During Queen Anne's War, as we have seen, several futile
attempts were made by the Carolina English and their Indian
allies to capture Spanish Pensacola. When the sanguinary period
of open hostilities ended, the Spanish fort still stood firmly in the
path of any projected English expansion southward to the Gulf.
It remained, in fact, a lasting obstacle to two English dreams of
empire. On the one hand, Carolina could hope for no extension
to the Mexican gulf as long as Spain's banner floated over the
presidio at Pensacola. On the other hand, the English dared not
attack the French in Louisiana with Pensacola in their rear.
Hence it is not especially surprising that what England had been
unable to seize by war she designed to ruin in times of peace. The
natural method for accomplishing this aim was to suborn the
Indian tribes north of Pensacola. Many of these were foes to
the Spanish dominion; while others were purchasable by means
of trinkets, muskets, and other things they craved.
The earlier work of James Moore and Thomas Nairne among
the Indians passed largely at this time into other hands. Chief
of these new agents was a Welshman from Montgomeryshire
named Price Hughes. He had but lately arrived in Carolina,
probably at the instigation of Thomas Nairne.1 After his arrival

SCrane, op. cit., 99.

English Maneuvers and French Hostilities

at Charleston, Hughes spent the remainder of his brief career in
America traveling and trading among the Indians west of Caro-
lina and plotting expansion of English colonization as far west
as the Mississippi. The realization of this scheme would have
rendered Spanish Pensacola virtually an enclave in a British
domain. Indeed, it appears doubtful if Pensacola could long have
remained Spain's northern outpost in the eastern Gulf region, had
the plans of Hughes materialized.' For a year and a half, the
Welshman trafficked with the Indians of the Pensacola hinter-
land. Nor did he cease his operations until La Mothe-Cadillac,
the French governor of Louisiana, issued a warrant for his arrest.
In the meantime, Cadillac had set out for Illinois to locate a mine
the existence of which had been rumored.* The task of arresting
Hughes devolved, therefore, upon M. de la Loire, the French
agent among the Natchez, the tribe Hughes was then visiting.
In April, 1715, Hughes was taken captive to Mobile. Here he
was well treated by Bienville, who was again governor of the
French colony during Cadillac's absence.' After three days' stay
at Mobile, Hughes was released and he wended his way to Pensa-
cola. Here also he was well received by the governor, Don
Gregorio de Salinas Varona,' despite the fact that the success of
his schemes would have spelled the loss of Pensacola to the Spanish
crown. Dissatisfied with the present failure of his plans, Hughes
left Pensacola and set out for the land of the Alabamas. He was
slain, however, by a party of hostile Indians. With his death,
the leadership of English intrigue in the Pensacola-Mobile region
passed into other hands, not less willing, but perhaps less capable.*
Spain had not been entirely successful in the past in holding

SEspecially with Mobile English and communications with St. Augustine
yetrmely difficult.
Margry, V, 507 ff; Crane, op. cit., 105.
'Margry, V, 507-509; Crane, op. cit., 106.
Crane (p. 107) erroneously refers to GuzmAn as still being governor of
Pensacola. By this time, however, Gasmun had disappeared from the scee,
succeeded in the governorship by Salinas Varona. See A.G. y P., Mre.,
Hist., 298, for the two letters of the king to the viceroy, dated June 12, 1713.
and Feb. 20, 1716.
SCrane, op. cit., 107.

English Maneuvers and French Hostilities

the loyalty of the Indians north of Pensacola. Now, however, the
lust and the cupidity of the Carolina traders reacted in her favor.
Hughes had been slain by a party of Tohome Indians who had
been victimized by the English traders. His death was a presage
of worse things to come. In the same year, 1715, there occurred
a general uprising against the English of almost all the tribes be-
tween Pensacola and Carolina. This uprising, usually referred to
as the Yamasee War, had its western manifestation in the volte-
face of the Lower Creeks. These abandoned their quondam
English allegiance for service in the Spanish interest, thus provid-
ing an excellent northern bulwark for Pensacola.' During a brief
period Carolina was on the verge of destruction, being saved only
by aid from Virginia and by the defection of the Cherokees from
the conspiracy. But the rising was put down. Thereupon, the
English and the Cherokees attempted to exterminate Spain's Indian
Allies, the Yamasees, the Apalaches, the Creeks, the Choctaws, and
other tribes friendly to Spain and to France. This would-be
general massacre was foiled, due to the fact that the pro-Spanish
Indians received word of it before it could be carried out.8
Obviously, those Indian tribes who had just tried to wipe out
the Carolina settlements could not continue to live in the prox-
imity of these settlements. Hence a wholesale exodus took place.
The Yamasees migrated southward to eastern Florida, settling in
the vicinity of St. Augustine.' The Lower Creeks withdrew from
the upper waters of the Altamaha bn the Carolina frontier to their
old homes on the Chattahoochee (Apalachicola) River, which they
had abandoned about the year 1690, when the Creeks left the
Spanish alliance and went over tO the English.10 The Choctaws
huddled around Mobile." The Apalaches divided into three
groups. One of these settled in the Creek country; another moved
to Mobile,12 where many of their fellow-tribesmen had found

1Pez to Diego de Morales, Jan. 18, 1716, Santo Domingo, 58-1-24.
SCrane, op. cit., 182.
Pez to Morales, Jan. 18, 1716, Santo Domingo, 58-1-24.
SMargry, IV, 594 if.
u Crane, op. cit., 170.
Serrano y Sanz, op. cit., 228.

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