Preliminary papers. The Rockefeller Foundation. April 29-30, 1975

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Preliminary papers. The Rockefeller Foundation. April 29-30, 1975
Conference on Social Science Research in Rural Development
Farming Systems Support Project,


Subjects / Keywords:
Farming ( LCSH )
Agriculture ( LCSH )
Farm life ( LCSH )


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Full Text
APRIL 29-30, 1975

May 1, 1973
Carl Gotsch (Parts 1, 2 and 3) and
David Heaps (Part 4)
The generality of the seminar topic--employment and rural development-predictably solicited a wide variety of observations and comments on the problems of rural areas. All of the traditional proposals for improving the situation--improved technology, input delivery systems, infrastructure, removal of factor price distortions, etc. --were raised, receiving varied emphasis depending upon the participant's backg round and personal research efforts. From the beginning, however, there was also a substantial effort to define more explicitly the circumstances in which various programs and proposals were socially and politically "possible". This distinction between the nature of the environment and the specific characteristics of the activities to be undertaken was aimed at insuring that only those policy options for which descriptions of the environment and the requirements for implementing the technical programs could be satisfactorily matched, would be considered "viable". Failure to find such consistencies in both the technical and socio-political dimensions of a proposal was to condemn it to the limbo of irrelevance.
In the seminar report that follows, no effort has been made to develop the perspective indicated above chronologically or to attribute comments to individual participants. Instead, remarks and observations by those attending and extracts from prepared papers have been grouped into four broad categories: (1) the analysis of the

environment, (2) thc analysis, both technical and institutional, of various programs and policies, (3) remarks addressed to the questions of how "policy options" were. to be defined, i.e. how additional rigor could be introduced into the process of deciding on the kinds of development efforts that were compatible with particular physical, political and social environments, and (4) opportunities for'donor agencies to assist with these and related matters.
There was no doubt in the minds of the participants that the economic, social and political environments in which the problem of unemployment and poverty exists differ widely. This was seen to be true not only between countries, in which substantial differences in social organization could be easily detected, but also within regions and between the smallest sub-units, e.g. villages. Speakers cautioned that global statements that sought to associate particular situations with scenarios derived from more general environmental descriptions should be undertaken with some care. Indeed, insistence on the need for disaggregation of the situations in which purposive development was to be undertaken was a recurrent theme throughout the seminar.
There was, however, general agreement among the participants--sometimcs
explicitly stated, often implicitly assumed--that knowledge about the following enviroimental attributes was necessary if any diagnosis, selection and implementation of programs was to be successful.

Agro-climatic environment: The need to describe the physical environment, particularly with respect to the potential for increasing agricultural productivity, was taken to be axiomatic. Several delegates pointed out however that despite the obvious need to understand the natural environment, many of the more dramatic failures or rural development programs could be laid at the door of simple miscalculations of the effects of climate, rainfall, soils, etc. (These fears were made especially concrete by the presentations of the IITA staff regarding the difficulty of finding alternatives to the practice of "shifting cultivation" that were consistent with the physical environment of the fore st tropics.)
Distribution of resources and political power at the local level: A number of grass-roots institutional va- iables crucial to the effective implementation of employment-oriented programs were identified. For example, there was a unanimity of view that the type of social stratification that existed within the village was a strong determinant of the outcome of any program or policy that depended on employment generation by directly favoring the disadvantaged. Analysis of this variable would require knowledge of the pattern of land ownership and the prevailing tenure system, and of the role of traditional types of status as derived from non-wealth sources of. pow,.'e:r including the family, the tribe, castes, etc.
Ability of implementing agencies: A good deal of thought was given to the problem of assessing the administrative and managerial skills present in a given environment. Examples were provided in which the failure to assess correctly the capacity of government bureaucracies to implement complicated development schemes

could have been foreseen from the beginning. (It was also noted, however, that entrusting various groups with the carrying out of difficult tasks provided an opportunity to learn-bydoing in ways which a cautious paternalistic view.would never have permitted.) Implicit in these latter comments was a concern that in most developin g cuuntries the bureaucratic system was much too centralized to supervise effectively development programs at the grass-roots. As a generalization, the experience of the seminar participants thus lent support to evidence from other sources that the best intentions of the central regime and bureaucracy cannot be carried out without a clearly articulated mechanism for local involvement.
While there was general agreement to the, importance of effective local institutions in implementing development programs, it was also noted that local associations might be worse than no associations at all if they were organized in such a way that no concern was given to the representation of the weaker sections of the community. In cases where local organizations already existed, it was particularly necessary to investigate their makeup before programs sensitive to the distribution of power were undertaken.
An assessment of the number, size and quality 'of non-governmental bodies was also deemed necessary. It was pointed out, however, that the presence and competence of such groups as universities, churches, etc. vary a great deal from place to place and it is hard to make a judgment about what kind of an impact they are likely to have. However, as several participants suggested, in those cases where the government bureaucracy is. unable, because of its own dependence on certain powers in the rural or urban areas to implement programs. aimed at the disadvantaged, the role of non-government agencies may be crucial in improving conditions among the rural poor.

Make-up and political wvill of ruling elites: Most rural employment programs
originate with the national regime. Hence there was a good deal of discussion regarding the nature of the political process that prompts a regime to concern itself with employment problems. It was. generally -conceded that most regimes do not concern themselves with employment out of an idealistic need to eliminate poverty. It -would be best to assume, at least in a government's initial years, that it is concerned about rural employment largely because it sees unemployment as a potential threat to regime maintenance. The scenario judged most likely was one in which a regime became 'concerned about the problem of poverty because of the number of people who are simply not getting enough to eat, realizing that this problem was much more explosive when it appeared amidst considerable affluence by other classes in the society or found spokesmen among the educated unemployed.
The extent to which national parties are beholden to certain organized rural groups
for support in the countryside was also judged an 'important element in 'assessing the environment within which employment-oriented programs were expected to function. Indeed, it was -pointed out that the rise and fall of efforts to introduce rural works programs in several developing countries (and poverty programs in the United States) contain a lag structure in which the program is first prepared and implemented by the national government only to have that government subsequently modify or withdraw the program in response to pressures from local constituencies.
In the discussion of the relationship between nat ional governments and local groups, it was also pointed out that the causality could be reversed, i.e. that a number of cases existed in which the central authorities had in fact acted in such a way that initiatives for self -improvement at the local level were smothered higher up. A frequently encountered

example is one in which village level activities have sprung up around the comnitmenL of a particularly charismatic individual. However, lig,-level resistance may also occur when the spread effects of initial programs result in increased demands for the fulfillment of heretofore latent needs and aspirations.
Lastly, it was argued by several seminar participants that the constraints imposed by a country's foreign policy stance were important in determining the extent to which it was free to consider alternative domestic employment strategies. It was suggested, for example, that the jockeying currently underway among the major powers required a degree of alignment that made domestic policies in ldc's more difficult to implement. This was seen, to be especially true among countries that were still within the international capitalist system but were seeking to revolutionize the nature of their social environment. Such international dependencies, regardless of their origin, were seen, on balance, to be detrimental to programs that could be of the greatest help to. the weaker groups in the community. Country Studies
In an attempt to make the foregoing general observations more concrete, the seminar took up a number of countries in substantially more detail. In each case, emphasis was given to those aspects of the economic and political aspects of the environment that bore On the implementation of employment programs. (Most comments in the discussion did not deal in detail with the physical environment that would have to be the base for increased agricultuv'al productivity, an omission that was to plague the later discussion of technology.)
China: Given the perspective of employment-generating strategies, the (hincse
experience was of paramount interest to the group. The historical basis for development ii recent.years is roughly as follows:

(1) Land reform. It was noted that most land reforms were of the type in which land is given to the peasants without any process of struggle in which new attitudes, and behavior patterns are forged. As a result, there is usually a lapse of only a few years before the land acquisition process begins again. The Chinese, however, preceded the take-over by raising the consciousness of the peasantry who themselves confronted the landlords and took over the land. By this action they helped to insure that the process would not be easily reversed.
(2) Labor organization., Labor has been organized into larger and larger production units.. However, considerable care and experimentation (replete with a number of mistakes) has been evidenced about the appropriate level for various tasks. For example, it was soon discovered that decisions involving the day-to-day activities in crop and livestock production required management decisions to be made within a production team involving no more than several dozen families. Larger organizations such as the commune, however, made it possible to create a significant amount of capital (irrigation works, flood control, roads, etc.) through labor intensive works programs.
(3) Dispersal of economic activity. In 1961 a decision was made to create an industrial base of small-scale enterprises in the country. These were oriented at processing agricultural commodities and at. providing for supplies of inputs particularly those related to intermediate mechanical technology. Certain types of consumer goods industries in which economics of the firm were not terribly important were also created in the rural areas.
(4) Terms of trade. In addition to the generally increased direct attention that the
Chinese have paid to agriculture-in recent years, they have also sought to improve the terms of trade between the rural and urban sector.

These historical policies add up to an environment highly conducive to implementing employment-oriented programs. The political regime has its power in the peasantry of 'the countryside. Political competition at the national level is not a day-to-day phenomena and hence the planning and implementation of long-run national development strategies is possible. Village level social stratification of the type that would make the distributional consequences. of employment programs a problem has been eliminated by the nationalization of land and a high degree of equity-oriented socialization at all levels. The need for a substantial central bureaucracy has been minimized by a concErted effort to place responsibility for the implementation of development programs at the local level. As indicated by the variety of capital-generating works programs such as terracing, the construction of irrigation works and the building of roads, substantial initiative and organizational skills at the grass-roots must be present.
As several participants pointed out, achieving the environment that currently exists in China has not been without its problems. There has been and to some extent continues to be a difficulty with the role of the political cadre in organizing and deciding objectives at the local level. It was feared by the delegates that in the future, the exhaustion of readily obtainable local mineral resources might alter the ability of local manufacturing to service agriculture's needs.
.Bangladesh. The similarity of Banglalesh and China, as reported by various conference participants seemed to end at the technical level, i.C. South China and Banigladcsh are both density populated rice growing areas. Although little is lown about Chinese
advances in varietal improvement, the presumption must be that the fertile deltas of the
great rivers have the same potential for increased rice yields that have been demonsti'ated

by the IRRT strains in Banigladesh. Judging from all reports, however, the latter is still well behind China in its ability to control the seasonal flooding that makes the introduction of new technology in many areas of Bangladesh so difficult.
It is, however, on the social and political level that the two countries differ profoundly. Despite. a socialist rhetoric, land in Bangladesh has thus far remained in private hands without any effort to introduce effective land reforms. (Land ceilings have been set at levels that will have virtually no effect on ownership patterns.) At the moment,, there is no local government to which development activities at the grass roots could be attached. The Basic Democracies mechanism utilized by the Ayub regime has been dismantled but nothing has been created to take its place.
The ability of the. central bureaucracy to implement rural development programs is problematical. The group is essentially urban oriented and urban based with limited knowledge of villagers and village life. Moreover, the difficult ies following the war with West Pakistan have produced a need for the political regime to rely heavily on the traditional sources of power in the countryside. This type of dependence has naturally insured that measures having distributive effects in favor of the poor would either be difficult to initiate or be captured by the class of larger framers cum moneylenders that make up the dominant group in most villages.
Several pointed out that it was ironic to give lip service to poverty in Banigladesh~
given the very considerable scope there for the creation of capital by the application of labor and local resources. For example, it was estimated that a large number, of the thousands of tanks that scatter the *country side could yield additional protein in the form of fish.

However, considerable excavation and cleaning would be required. Unfortunately, most tanks are owned by more than one family and the problem of organizing the' families so that all contribute equally has thus far been virtually un surmountable.
The case of the tanks was to come up a number of times in the seminar as an example of the more general problem of public goods. One participant remarked that of the four principles on which Bangladesh is to exist: nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism, the latter two had never been observed to co-exist in any country. In the context of the public good case, the point was related to the extent to which coercion could be tolerated in dealing with situations in whic h (1) development required the participation of large numbers of the group, (2) the benefits from the joint activity were difficult for those involved to visualize, and (3) various social and cultural relationships tended to dominate thinking about the merits of joint activities. As might be expected, no consensus was reached among the participants on this question.
Chile: The Chilean case underlined the point that even in the presence of land reform and a significant commitment to a socialist economic system, a variety of obstacles to improving the employment situation in rural areas could be expected.
(1) Production efficiency. Much of the land was communally farmed and the peasants were expected to work 80, percent of the time on the cooperative holdings. However, given the incentive structure,- peasants found it more profitable to work on their- own small private plots. The result has been an inappropriate allocation of labor and capital between public and private uses.
(2) Problems with inputs. The Government's monopoly of fertilizer, seeds, machinics and other agricultural inputs has produced a wide variety of bottlenecks in the input distribution system.

(3) Landless labor. With the "reformist" approach to land reform, many of the
poorest rural inhabitants have benefited little from the reorganization going on in the agricultural sector.
(4) Agro-climatic environment. Chile has substantial areas that are basically
unfavorable to significant improvements in the productivity of agriculture. Many of the poorer areas are in rugged and mountainous terrain. Increasing employment in such areas will be extremely difficult.
Nor have the reforms resolved the institutional problems associated with increasing employment. To be sure, the once powerful hacienda owners have been replaced by cooperatives that operate the lands that were formerly privately tilled. But these groups, as might be expected in a "reformist" system, have behaved viz-a-viz the government and other segments of the rural society in approximately the same fashion as the previous owners. Until recently, labor needs beyond those that cooperative members could supply were met by hiring labor from outside sources. Wages paid were market determined and were well below the incomes cooperative members received from their share of the cooperatives revenues.
The groups organized under the "asentamentos" program continue to exercise a more powerful influence on rural programs than the small peasant farmers who neither benefitted from the agrarian reform nor were effectively organized into cooperatives that would insure the supply of new inputs.
While in contrast to Bangladesh, Chile has a strong central bureaucracy with a substantial amount of technical personnel in the field of agriculture, thus far the mechanism. for translating this sort of expertise into effective local programs has been lacking. It was also pointed out that at this juncture in. Chile's history, the ruling political regime was in a

-12- -16somewhat precarious position with respect to carrying out policies that would alienate the new groups that have arisen in the countryside regardless of the need for further structural reforms aimed at providing greater equity for the poorer sections of the rural society. It is being seriously challenged by an opposition seeking to broaden its base of political support and hence cannot afford to initiate further distributive programs if these mewl a lessening of support for the current political constituencies.
Despite the difficulties indicated above, it was clear that the seminar debate had shifted ground in moving from the Bengali to the Chilean case. The questions were more oriented toward what should be done than toward what could be doae, the group had accepted implicitly that the political commitment of the center was real and that it had every intention of carrying out a variety of significant reforms. What was frequently missing was the knowledge and the resources with which to actually implement the programs.
Summary: The attempt to describe, in somewhat more concrete terms, the environment in which. rural employment programs are to be implemented inevitably revealed the limited knowledge among the conferees about any given situation. In most instances, more questions were raised than answered. Consequently, the comments made above about various country conditions must be judged as partial and incomplete. Indeed, the discussion made clear that it was unlikely that the expertise of any one individual could encompass the variety of technical, social and political phenomena about which judgments were required. In the process of debate, the need for multi-disciplinary work in approaching the development problem was again underlined.

The papers and discussions at the seminar underlined the many forms that efforts to generate rural employment might take. It was noted that not only were there differences in general characteristics, e.g., technology, service delivery systems, resource redistribution, the provision of infrastructure and economic policies, but further variation existed within each of these categories. In order to provide a basis for assessing the probability of successful implementation, the various alternatives were examined with respect to the demands they would make on the environment into which they were to be introduced. These included (1) the extent of "hard" technical knowledge that was available, (2) the demands that would be made on resources, especially scarce administrative and managerial capacities., (3) the severity and/or sensitivity of the distributive characteristics inherent in the. specific policy or program.
The discussion on technology, both agricultural and non-agricultural, was divided into three general categories. First, there is the highly divisible improved variety fertilizer nexus that has played such an important role in the so-called green revolution. The seminar spent little time debating the virtues of this means of increasing productivity noting only that its divisibility m inimized adverse distributive effects at the same time that minimal demands were made on supporting institutions for its diffusion. (The tour of IITA's work demonstrated, however, how far the humid tropics were from having materials of this sort that coid beco r,, the basis of a rural development program. The same.could be said of many of the world's arid and semi-arid areas where irrigation water was not available.)

The question of intermediate technology, or more specifically, the "indigenization"
*of agricultural.and non-agricultural mechanical technology at the grass-roots was ex-tensively reviewed. It was noted that past experiences in agro-climatic zones where substantial increases in productivity had occurred from inputs of improved seed and fertilizer were among those in which demands for additional human and animal power had prompted rapid developments in locally manufactured technology. It was also argued that the extent to which such indigenous technology develops depends very much on the historical pattern of industrial development and urbanization. When this consisted of a few large urban centers set in a relatively backward rural environment, the linkage between farm needs and manufacturing capabilities were generally too weak to be effective. Indeed, as far as agriculture is concened, "indigenization" seemed from the discussion to be almost synonymous with a more disaggregated industrial structure.
The question of tractorization and its effect on employment was, as usually, sharply contested examples of favorable and unfavorable situations being cited. On the one hand, tractors appear in some cases, notably the Indian Punjab, to have increased cropping inteosities thereby increasing the overall demand for labor. In other situations, e. g., Pakistan and Ethiopia, not only has labor been displaced but share cropping has been replaced by capitalist enterprises, a change in the social relationships of production that has produced a further deterioration in the economic condition of the weaker sections ol the rural community.
With respect to the environment, it was argued that the larger the unit size of holding, (owned or operated) and the greater the political influence of the groups in the rural areas who want tractors, the harder it would be to contain premature and inappropriate mechaniztion.

(As several participants noted, the objective of postponing the introduction of this type of mechanical technology is not to deprive farmers of a means of lightening the drudgery associated with tillage operations, but rather to protect the position of those who would suffer severely in terms of labor displacement.) Delivery systems supplying services to rural areas
A number of the participants in the seminar felt that a better understanding of how to organize and maintain delivery systems for services was the key to rural development. Proposals ranged all the way from a detailed blueprint of how this could be done in a microarea to the general proposition that the provision of adult education ought to have one of the highest priorities of any rural activity. This general category is quite demanding in terms of the administrative and managerial capacities existing in the environment and needs to be evaluated with particular care on that score.
Rural credit: The problems of providing credit to small farmers are widely known and the seminar did not concern itself with any lengthy diagnosis. The fact that the costs of administering small loans are almost equal to those of administering large loans and that the risks are greater was explanation enough as to why credit programs gravitate to the larger farmers. The status and extra-market influence of the affluent farmers of the community only reinforces a phenomenon that has a powerful internal logic.
In connection with credit and other services, the question of cooperatives was discussed in some detail. The dismal record of cooperatives was pointed out at the same. time that there was general agreement that some sort of village organization that could receive various nationally supplied inputs was imperative. It was argued that many of the problems of cooperatives stem from the failure to relate effectively intimately connected

functions, e.g. credit and marketing. Cooperatives, if they w(.:re to be successful should be multi-purpose cooperatives and would have to be aided in the early years of their formation by supervision and protection of governmental or non governmental institutions higher in the system.
Rural works: The possibility that labor could be used to generate capital through
organized public works has always been an attractive possibility in rural areas. li almost every situation, there are communal projects that could be undertaken. (In Bangladesh, the excavation of tanks, in China, terracing and the construction of irrigation works, etc.) Admittedly, the same problems of local organization indicated above prevail with 'this type of activity. But, as various participants pointed out, many of the difficulties of management coild be overcome if villagers were permitted and encouraged to define their own needs. Some cadre or outside organizer would undoubtedly be required but the day-to-day supervision and management could be left to local people.
As in all situations involving the provision of services through government channel, or the organization of villagers to receive those services, the counter-argument was that such efforts can only benefit. the weaker groups if in fact they possess either protectors or political power. In the absence of organization among the landless, tenants and small farmers, i.e., among those most likely to be the target groups otemployment schemes, it would be relatively difficult to make them the true beneficiaries of the programs.
Education: Education, particularly for adults, was seen as an important clement in helping those at the bottom of the income distribution both to improve their material well being anid to gain a better understanding of their situation within 'he society. The curriculuri should contain not only material to develop literacy and to diffuse lknowledge about improved

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But a good part of the discussion on the effect 6f such measures as land reform on employment dealt with the lessons from countries where a land reform had already been carried out, but where new problems had arisen in its wake. The case.of Chile has already been cited. Cuba, Algeria, the USSR and Yugoslavia were also mentioned as instances in which the nationalization of land was accompanied by substantial inefficiencies, and even inequities.
The question was then raised as to what form the redistribution of land might take
in the eventthat the political and administrative demands could be met. A variety of options were noted ranging from complete nationalization to more modest reforms that left lands in the hands of the small and medium owner-operators. Each had its strengths and weaknesses. There was, on the one hand, the acknowledged ability of large holdings, communally or privately operated, to circumvent the indivisibilities of technology and certain types of services. On the other hand, there was a general consensus that the incentive systems contained in a system of small owner-operators was not to be sneezed at. It was proposed at one point thatthe two nations be combined, i.e., that the ownership of land be nationalize,! but leased back to individual tenants for operation. The nationalization would permit some control over subsequent distribution decisions and the individual leaseholding arrangement (a cash rent, i.e., a land tax would be charged) would continue to provide the incentive for private exploitation. Those who advocated reforms that would retain the institution of private property were of course in agreement with the diagnmsis conceding the need to insure that decisions would be taken at the right level and that incentives were being maintained. Both these problems were seen by most of this group of participants as being best resolved in the, context of small family-owned farms.

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With respect to demands on managerial requirements, most economic policies require relatively little broad-based administrative input. However, what is required is competence in understanding the economy and in assessing the quantitative implications of different .types of market interventions, i.e., substantial demands may be placed on a very particular type of expertise.
In the political arena, concern for.economic phenomena tends to introduce a number of new actors into the. picture. For example, there is hardly an economic decision taken in the rural areas on output prices that does not affect some groups in the city. Higher wheat:prices to farmers also mean higher food prices to consumers. In the area of investment, rural areas also compete with the rest of the economy for both foreign and domestic resources. The result of this plurality of interests is to produce an. environment in which marginal--- and indeed'even major (devaluation) -- economic reforms may find the constituency for their implementation.
A policy option as defined by the seminar had to meet feasibility requirements of bed: a technical and political nature. Because of the number of generally defined characteristics of the environment (resources) and the variety of possible programs and policies (activities),. it was agreed that the.discussion of policy options necessarily takes place within the context of specific country settings. However, three kinds of social and political climates were considered as a means of identifying the range of policy options open to each. These fundamentally different situations can be characterized as (1) deep structural change (2) reformist, and (3) "modernization."

The first of these, structural change, contained only a small number of examples for .it was seen to involve not only the rural areas but the entire society. In one sense, it could hardly be called a strategy because its inception and outcome were determined by forces only partly under the control of the initiating leadership. However, there was a question regarding what policies or programs would be consistent with the post-revolutionary situation. As expected, these lay not in the area of distribution but in the area of growth and an incentive system that rewarded efficiency and hard work.
The second type of situation, encountered more frequently, contains some elements of reform, e.g., land redistribution, founding of cooperatives, etc. However, this situation differs from the previous one in that many of the environmental conditions remain intact, e. g., marketing channels continue to be what they are, the research establishment is not severely affected, financial markets remain in traditional hands and the roles of the center and the periphery in the decision-making process remain unaffected.
The limits that reformism puts on the ability to deal with the employment problem are considerable. While there is less of a problem of village level stratification, the rural-urban and regional differentials may continue to be important. Certain target groups such as landless labor and small farmers may also find themselves excluded from reform benefits. Nevertheless, delivery systems for inputs such as credit, information, education, etc., arc more likely to reach target groups in the weaker sections.
Lastly, and by far in the majority, are societies whose development strategy is based on a "modernization" of the existing rural environmefit. The major thrust is to increase agricultural output through the application of modern technology. (In this case, new organizational and managerial forms should be included.) Development efforts might include virtually the full range of activities described earlier. Only those involving a redistribution of resources would be specifically excluded.

Under sud a strategy,, increased employment becomes very much a problem of a trickle-down effect in the presence of fairly rapid growth. Attempts to get at the poverty problem directly will be frustrated either because: (1) the necessary program cannot be sanctioned and undertaken or it cannot be implemented. That is, the intendedbeneficiaries cannot be reached within the stratification associated with the status quo. Because of the wide variety of actors involved-in decisions on economic policy, some progress could probably be made in improving factor price relationships, in trying to minimize the employment distorting impact of biased relative prices, etc. Under any circumstances the seminar agreed that the best that can be done with respect to dealing with the problem of inequity in such strategies is to "lean against the wind" in as many areas as possible.
Virtually all participants pointed out that the kind of generalization indicated above was too static a conception of the ultimate outcome of development programs on the generVation of employment. However, there was considerable divergence in judgments as to what this meant. There Were, on the one hand, the optimists who felt that the cumulative, interacting effects of the development process would be likely to act in diffuse and indirect ways permitting new groups to rise within the ^economy and by virtue of their newfound economic status, claim a larger role in influencing the course of events for themselves.
The pessimists, on the other hand, agreed with the importance of concentrating
on the dynamics of the situation but felt that without significant cnvironmental changes, the cumulative effects would continue to worsen the position of te currently disadvantaged.

The wide-ranging discussion on the role of donor agencies tended to be diagnostic rather than prescriptive. The relative paucity of specific action proposals to emerge underlined the difficult problems inherent in identifying relevant developmental strategies to mitigate rural poverty and rural unemployment. The participants were agreed that mudh more systematic analysis and hard thought were still required to provide effective support action for rural development objectives.
Possible avenues for donor program operations were explored within a general conceptual frame comprising three primary components:
(a) the need for improved knowledge of alternative developmental strategies in
varying types of rural settings;
(b) the need for political will or commitment as a prerequisite of effective rural
programs -- and the kinds of policy actions which should be considered when
this precondition is lacking;
(c) the constraints and parameters which are likely to be encountered in the implementation and management of rural development programs even when
improved knowledge and political will are present.
It was pointed out that developmental assistance agencies could not be considered as a uniform group and that they differed considerably because of size, resources, objectives, internal composi tion and operational methods. The World Bank, for example, would be tile logical agency to approach for the creation of a capital -intensive rural electrification scheme while the Ford Foundation might have special advantages for flexible and'selective activities involving research, training and high-level advisory* services. Research
-Throughout the discussion on donor agency activities, the emphasis consistently was laidl on the overriding necessity to gain more basic knowledge about the processes of -rural

development. Greater understanding was considered to be the indispensable precondition to
resolve the thus far intractable problems of rural poverty. Some of the specific subject
areas suggested for applied research were as follows:
(a) Why do the benefits of rural development projects and reform measures, even
when seemingly well-conceived, still invariably accrue largely to the privileged
rather than to the poor for whom they are designed? There is an urgent need therefore to learn more about traditional peasant and small farmer behavior, about general rural behavior patterns, about the raticnales underlying traditional farming systems and the behavior of rural elites.
(b) Knowledge needs to be derived more directly from authentic local conditions
by indigenous researchers and scholars rather than just through the efforts of foreign social scientists. It is important therefore that well-focused research projects be increasingly undertaken at the local level with national
scholars taking the initiative while "outsiders" cooperate in an ancillary
(c) In view of the shortage of scholarly resources available for basic research on
rural issues, it was thought that such limited resources might be more effectively employed by improved inter-university coordination, better communication and interchange, and by selecting more relevant issues for exploration.
It was emphasized that the dispersal and ad hoc use of such resources continue
to militate against the attainment of useful research results.
(d) The need was stressed for more collaborative research'involving inter-disciplinary and comparative studies of social values and social situations in rural
areas. Thus far, it was noted, work in this field tended to be discrete and compartmentalized, and failed to make use of the spectrum of potential resources and knowledge available.
(c) It was pointed out that more realistic knowledge was needed about the various
kinds of basic services administrative, technical and financial -- which are required to provide the essential underpinnings of rural development programs
and that the methodology of regional planning was neither well nor widely
(f) A number of participants expressed the view that entrenched social and political
processes do impede rural development and that counterveiling policies, such as decentralization, might be usefully explored to combat these factors. The
identification and understanding of such impediments to development were
considered a research objective of the highest order of priority.

(g) Other issues --such as the-application of technology and mechanization,
the social and material costs of rural infrastructures -- were also cited as
areas in which further research is required to advance essential rural
development goals.
Rural development projects, even when graced by political commitment and official
support, have often failed at the implementation level. At the top, administrative procedures and organiizational competence have been deficient; at the bottom, there has often been inadequate popular responsiveness and limited understanding of what was being attempted. Chile and Tanzania were cited as two examples of countries in which major governmental actions to effect large-scale land reform programs failed because of these two levels of deficiency. There is therefore at all levels of rural administration, and policy-making an u rgent need for improved training and particularly the development of effective cadres. With increased efforts now being made by some countries to achieve greater administrative decentralization by dispersing administrative personnel through the rural areas, the quantitative need for trained administrative personnel to work in the rural sector will in all probability increase in the period ahead. Rural Institutions
It was noted that most institutions designed to serve small farmers and rural poor perform inadequately. At the same time they constitute --as inadequate as they may bethe only existing operational agencies which directly serve the rural people. Where particularly promising institutions of this type can be identified,, perhaps in such fields as education or community development, they should be judiciously encouraged by donor agencies. It was suggested-that all such institutions need not necessarily be governmental agencies, andlthat support should also be considered for appropriate non-governimental

institutions, such as farm and trade associations, unions, coopratives, and voluntary agencies,
particularly those exercising influence and leadership at the village level.
Educational Institutions
(a) Individual scholars and institutions of higher learning in poor countries face
many problems in undertaking collaborative projects with their analogues-in
the developed countries. Contrasting pay scales tiod differences in standards of living or basic perspectives often render such joint efforts ineffective and
disharmonious. Instead of continuing to support often incompatible collaborations of this nature, donor agencies were urged to foster directly the development of the research capacities of indigenous institutions, to encourage work
on 'local trainees, to improve the capacity of country research and study activities for scholars and institutions of the developing world which would not only advance action-oriented research objectives but would permit indigenous universities and research centers to develop more direct contacts and interchanges
with the political and administrative decision-makers in their own countries.
(b) An inordinate number of the educational 'systems in developing countries are
dysfunctional. They were established originally on expatriate models with
little or no concern being manifested at that time or now for adaptation to the agrarian and pre-industrial societies in which they are located. They remain antiseptically removed from the needs of the rural sector. Similar criticism
can be directed to vocational and technical schools which were set up to produce
graduates with modern sector skills largely inapplicable to current rural conditions. Systematic program efforts, undergirded by ongoing research, arc required to determine the most appropriate forms of general pre-university education and vocational training required for rural dwellers of school age.
(c) While adult education is conventionally advocated -as a means of. contributing
to the improvement of rural life, little has been dcne to determine realistically
its essential relevance, significance, and limitations. If, as its proponents
assert, adult education can bean important technique for developing local
rural leadership and disseminating pertinent information, little knowledge is available as to the specific best means available by which adult education can
attain such objectives. More work and study are needed in this area.
Exprimental Outlook
The need for experimental and innovative ventures in the rural sector has long been
advocated. Few specific proposals have however been advanced to serve as potentially
replicable models for this purpose and thus to chart feasible programs. It was suggcst2d

that consideration should be given to the establishment of a rural development pilot project to be initiated under optimum conditions which would include full host government support and the availability of the best professional experience on the subject. Such a venture, it was thought, might over a sufficient period of time provide valuable insights for the wider application of rural development programs in countries 'committed to this objective.

Some Tentative Propositions Concerning Rural Development
in the Less Industrialized Nations
Presented at the
Workshop for Extended Rural Development in Asia Cornell University
November 23,-19T4
Lowell S. Hardin, Ford Foundation
These observations draw heavily on the Foundation's experience in agricultural development and on efforts to relate what we may have learned there to the larger, more complex problems of overall rural development. The context is Latin America, Africa, Middle East, as well as Asia; hence these comments are not focused on any one region.
A Bit of the Foundation's History with Aaricultural Programs
Experience with traditional community development and agricultural
extension projects in the 1950s and early 1960s to our view produced less than satisfactory results. Too often the required economic force, the profit potential of markedly improved technology, was lacking. Without such an engine to drive the system agricultural development did not move very fast or very far. Hence the shift to research; to emphasis on the development, adaptation, testing and use of improved production technology. We are encouraged that a global system for solving food production problems is evolving.
National and State
Agricultural Research and Food Production Services in the LDCs
International Agricultural -- Resource Base InstituResearch Centers; Regional tions, Individuals in
Units, Networks Industrial Nations
Some Observations on Agricultural Development
Focusing on agricultural development as we have during the past ten years we came to believe that:
1. For agricultural development to take place, access to and use of outside
inputs are almost universally required. These are classically technological in character (genetic materials, tube wells, plant protection) but certainly

can be structural or institutional (markets, access to inputs, etc.).
Despite many Readers' Digest stories to the contrary, I see relatively
few illustrations of people pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps.
2. Well-trained agriculturalists (teams) can diagnose situations, do a
fairly good job of selling out the constraints impeding increased agricultural productivity and production. This function appears to be best
-. done by a team of a least two people an agronomist/biological scientist and an agricultural economist/farm management type.
3. Having conducted the diagnosis, feasible courses of action can be specified through implementation is often a much more complicated and difficult matter.
4. If trained agriculturalists can do diagnoses, presumably they can help
teach others to perform this function. One wonders, however, whether
training efforts are being tilted as far in this direction as would be
5. Relatively few pilot projects achieve sought-for generalization and wide
multiplication because:
a. They are built around a unique personality, institution or situation
speciall market outlet).
b. They often have a larger infusion from the outside (especially in
management talent and budgetary flexibility) than can be sustained
at any attainable budgetary level over a large area.
c. They are so location-specific that only the methodology (and perhaps
only part of that) is transferable.
6. Agricultural development projects tend, quite naturally, to face the
toughest going where resource endowments are most meager. Those who
seek' to achieve income redistribution among agricultural areas therefore are most frustrated when tackling regions of low agricultural potential (the Appalachia effect is indeed powerful and pervasive).
Looked at socially, I wonder if we aren't at times kidding ourselves
when we undertake agricultural development efforts in regions where
resource endowments are meager and are destined to remain so. In these
situations, while it is very difficult politically, perhaps we should
call a spade a spade: what is faced is a welfare operation or the
necessity to generate non-farm employment.
7. Rural public works can be made to contribute importantly to agricultural
development where resource endowments permit economically feasible production responses. I refer to rural public works of the non-"leafraking"
types roads, water conservation and management, well drilling, etc.
Merging Agricultural Development and Rural Development
When we move to rural development projects with an agricultural component, I, at least, am much less sure of myself. The rhetoric here (as to a

degree with agricultural development) tends to move toward group activities, collective action. Often, it seems to me also, this tends to be more an "ideology than a methodology." The movement toward group organization is a type of solution may in turn be influenced by our fragmentary knowledge of what goes on inside the People's Republic of China.
With respect to rural development, we are concerned with an assessment of all the resources and services (not just the agricultural ones) in search of means whereby productivity can be increased. Generalizations are difficult, of course, but one has to start Vith a small enough universe (area or region) that it can be analyzed and that realistic alternatives can be conceptualized. Sometimes the unit of observation becomes a village. Some of this research takes on the attributes of a case study. While often anecdotal in nature, such studies may be a necessary starting point. If so, care has to be exercised not to generalize too quickly.
There are some advantages to thinking in terms of area development.
This helps assure exploration of rural-urban inter-relationships and differences. as well as rural-urban contrasts and opportunities. And again, one needs to make hard judgments with respect to welfare (redistributive) vs. productivity considerations.
Recently Foundation staff and some of their Latin American colleagues held a seminar on Rural Development in Colombia. Ideas that emerged from their discussions included the following:
1. The three case studies (Project Puebla, Garcia Rovira and Cajamarea) are
probably more nearly agricultural development than rural development projects. Taking the seminar's definition of rural development (any socioeconomic change in rural areas accompanied by greater participation in
benefits and decision-making) however, would, as I understand it, include
the three projects under study.
2. Rates of adoption of "improved technologies" were substantially lower than
project developers had predicted (i.e., 11% of the farmers had adopted im-' proved technologies in Puebla after four years). A combination of reasons
is advanced as possible explanations for the relatively slow rates of
a. Agriculture and the commodities central to the technological push turn
out to contribute a relatively unimportant portion of the income of the smallholders in the project areas. Often agriculture in total may contribute less than 20% of the incomes with off-farm work being the principal earning source.
b. Even "improved practices" are not very profitable or involve risks,
smallholders are unprepared to bear.
c. Externalities make adoption of "improved practices" difficult because
of the non-availability of essential inputs such as credit, etc.
3. The projects did have large indirect effects: many similar projects have
been initiated; research and training in rural development have been stimulated; and some modifications have been made in the programs of agricultural research stations better to get at the questions previously unaddressed.

4. The projects were formulated and carried out in relative intellectual
isolation. Design and execution appear not to take advantage of accumulated experience elsewhere; there is limited inter-project dialogue
among similar initiatives even within the same country.
5. The quantity and quality of resources applied to the design and execution
of the projects under study were unequal to the task. For this reason it is unfair to judge these as real "pilot" projects because of this limitation to the test.
6. Many of the problems with the projects trace back to inadequacies in
theory or analytical framework for rural development (which the seminar
treated as essentially synonymous with alleviation of poverty). This
suggests that descriptive studies presumably are necessary before hypotheses can be formulated and tested. It is argued that one must know
what is and how it got that way as a starting point. Even the ordering
of extant knowledge, however, requires a frame of reference. It is
argued that one could measure whether productivity increases commensurate
with costs are likely to be derived from:
a. Improved crop production technology, taking full account of
natural and human resource constraints.
b. Investment in irrigation or other private or public works.
c. Land and/or tenure reform to evolve change patterns of ownership
of means of production and of rights to the resulting output.
7. Even more fundamentally, strong disagreement exists concerning root causes
of rural poverty and stagnation. Two sets of answers emerge to the question, why are the "have nots" so poor relative to the "haves"?
a. Neoclassicists argue that underdevelopment of the "have nots" is due
to their being left behind by technological change. If so, this is
correctable by providing a strategic combination of conventional
tools in somewhat the way intended by the case projects.
b. The opposing view holds that underdevelopment of the "have nots" is
due to historical, lopsided progress of the "haves" who exploited, alienated and marginalized the "have notes That is, the poorest
have not been left behind, they have been pushed behind.
Based upon the above, the seminar recommended that as an interim
measure'at least the Foundation's rural development program continue its current agricultural and agricultural economics emphases, making special efforts to achieve broadened participation in decision making and benefits.
Summing Up
Quite a bit of the talk in rural development today, it seems to me, stresses institutional organization from the bottom for improved diffusion. While this smacks a good bit of the model of'development, espoused by USAID in the 1950s, of transfer of technology and diffusion locally through improved extension, it may have a new component. This is the component of "power to the people" means of more directly and effectively involving the poor in the process.

Recognition is given to the high payoff input model which closely parallels the neoclassical theme. It argues that poor farmers do not resist technical change. They simply do not have the appropriate kinds of technologies and associated inputs accessible to them. This, in turn, places emphasis on chemical-biological research sector, on industry to provide the inputs, and increasingly on analysis of the "externalities" which may still be limiting in the presence of improved production practices and availability of inputs and markets.
Personally I have the impression that the high payoff input model works reasonably well if the new technology which is vastly superior is in fact in the pipeline. It suffers from inadequate diagnostics for establishment of priorities on what technology to generate and where to do the work.
We seem to be searching for a theory of induced innovation for institutions somewhat comparable to the Hyami-Ruttan model for induced biological, chemical, and mechanical change. Vern argues that the induced innovation model permits a country or a region to find a development path consistent with its resource endowment. The system is driven by the operation of the price system responding to present and prospective price relationships. The model is based on the theory of the firm.
To a substantial degree, the Foundation's work in rural development has adopted a view espoused by many institutional theorists: technological change becomes a source of institutional changes. If we can put the right kinds of parameters on technological change scale neutral, proper kinds of income distribution effects, etc. then this may be a-reasonable horse to ride.
But increasingly we are not content to leave the matter of institutional change at that point. Several seem to be calling for political action. Suggestions that "poor power" rural enterprises be strengthened make an appeal for charismatic leadership, group organization, and group action at the local level.
In assessing its situation the Foundation's India staff says that we must ask ourselves of each grant: What are the consequences for the less advantaged, for one region of the country vs. another? What are the production, income, employment and nutrition effects? What is the impact on the human and physical resources of a grantee, its locale, the state and the nation?
Having rambled much too widely, let me attempt bome tentative propositions. As a trial effort, let me paraphrase them thus:
I..Given the tight food situation globally, local adaptive research on biological, chemical and mechanical (as necessary) technological change, needs
continued strengthening. (Induced technological innovation, the neoclassical
approach guided by the theory of the firm.) Efforts here can be improved
by more rational setting of priorities, better linkage to resource bases
including the international centers as sources of essential outside inputs.
In our concern for farmer adoption of improved practices let us not rediscover the "diffusion" model without making reasonably certain that the
system has something worthwhile to diffuse.
2. More good farm and market micro studies and greater capacity to undertake
them are much needed. From such studies comes better understanding of

what farmers and farm families do, how they do it and why. Diagnostic
techniques which quantify and causally identify the constraints impeding
increased agricultural productivity and production are as yet not very well developed. In the absence of such micro studies, there is danger that production researchers seek answers to the wrong questions; that
public policies will continue to be made without realistic understanding
of their probable consequence at the farm and family levels.
3. We need to be brutally realistic about the limits (on any approach to
agricultural development as a driving force for rural development) imposed by resource constraints size of farm, irrigation water' or rainfall, topography, climate, soils, etc. If the only solutions rest in the non-agricultural sector we should not be a party to building false
expectations that agricultural productivity can be rapidly and economically
1. We should put our minds to understanding how and why institutions change,
how such innovations may-be induced by non-violent means. This suggests
that our own research, the research of others that we help support and the training of those who can do such research in the future need to be tilted
a bit more in this direction. It may well be that accumulated experience has been inadequately mined for the insights contained therein. FAO proposes to form a rural development institute for this purpose. The O.D.I.
conference suggested a rural development network with some type of rural
development institute as a communications (possibly analytical) hub. Your
Cornell study proposes an international institutional network to promote:
(a) the transfer of ideas about rural development strategy, training efforts,
research approaches and findings; (b) the exchange of staff responsible for
training and/or research; and (c) the sharing of research results about
rural development itself and about the ancillary training and research required. Further, there is a Bellagio social science group which is now attempting to focus in on social science research for rural development.
From these and other intellectual inputs should emerge a more coherent analytical frame if not a full-blown theory.
We are entering what I judge to be a highly dynamic period in which
new stresses of two types may well appear. In the third world nations (the oilrich LDCs) capacities may be stressed by the infusion of large capital inputs. We may have some firsthand opportunity to observe and learn from this phenomenon in countries like Iran, Nigeria, Algeria, the states in the Persian Gulf, Venezuela and Indonesia. A second set of stresses appears to be developing in fourth world nations (LDCs without major mineral resources) which are under increasing financial and balance-of-trade pressures with sources of needed outside capital outputs quite uncertain. The keen observer-analyst should be able to gain new insights from reactions to these two types of stresses. And if the People's Republic of China continues to open, we can hope for better understanding of what is happening there.
In this environment we as a foundation will likely try to retain sufficient flexibility to enable us to experiment, to participate in and learn from the dynamics of current developments while continuing to push initiatives of the type outlined above.

Reed Hertford*
Back round
During the first week of May, 1974, the agricultural program staffs of the. Foundation's Offices for Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East and Africa met in Ibadan, Nigeria, to review questions of professional and program relevance. A number of the participants from the Latin American staff were dissatisfied with discussions of that seminar which dealt directly with rural development on the grounds that they failed to delineate the subject area and indicate the kinds of Foundation programs which might fit into it. Also, important .differences were evidenced in definitions, assumptions, language, and modes of analysis which seemed to prevent the sort of interpersonal conmmnunication around the rural development theme that the Foundation's Latin American agricultural program staff enjoys in other subject areas, particularly in agricultural economics.
A second seminar was agreed to for the purpose of trying to overcome some
of these differences and to move toward a greater consensus concerning the meaning of rural development and its possible implications for Foundation programs. The seminar was ultimately held in Sasaima, .Colombia, for two days in mid-July. A list of participants is appended to-this report. Nine members of the Foundation's staff attended, along with seven Colombians (primarily from the Colombian Agricultural Institute, ICA); a Peruvian; and one staff member from the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of California (Berkeley), the
*This report suffered from being written.three months after the. seminar but benefited from very excellent notes taken of the proceedings by Norman Collins,
Alain de Janvry, Jim Himes, and Ismael Rochin.

International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), and the International Development Research Center (IDRC). Alsoattached is a copy of the program for. the two days of meetings.
The first day was devoted to discussions of available socioeconomic data on three rural development projects in Latin America with which the Foundation is involved: the Puebla Project in Mexico, the Garcia Rovira Project in Colombia, and the Cajamarca Project in Peru. In examining this information, the following kinds, of questions were addressed by papers prepared by Santiago Friedmann (Puebla), Ismael Rochin (Garcia Rovira), and Efrain Franco (Cajamarca). Who are smallholders? What is the organizat lon of their farms and families? What objectives and constraints operate within that organization? What have smallholders' responses been to change agents operating through the rural development projects? What have those change agents been? How effective have they been, and how have they been organized?
After assessing existing strategies, current needs in the rural development field were discussed on the second day. In the last hours of the seminar, an attempt was made to identify those needs which might be addressed by the Foundation, given its comparative advantages in assisting .with problem definition and supporting research and training activities.
This report, like the seminar, is divided into tw.principal parts. The one which follows draws on the papers by Franco, Friedmann, and Rochin and attempts to highlight major impressions ("observations" or "conclusions" would apply as well in some cases) about the three rural development projects. Since participants in the main were critical of these projects, the impressions listed are:themselves rather negative and critical. The last section of the report relates to discussions of the .second day--namely, those dealing with program implications.

0 mres ionI s
As available socioeconomic data on, each of the three rural development
projects were presented, similarities emerged which either strongly supported or rejected available literature and data on small farmers and processes of rural development. It is these similarities, confirming or contrasting with current wisdom, which are recorded here as "major impressions."
Low Rates of Adoption.--Data presented by Friedmann on the Puebla Project and by Franco on Cajamarca--similar data.being available on Garcia Rovira-point toward low rates of adoption of "improved technologies." Friedmnann reported that, after four years, only 11 percent of all farmers had adopted the Puebla Project recommendations (these-included recommendations with respect to seeding densities and the rate and timing of chemical fertilizer applications for corn in four project subregions). The comparable figure reported by Franco for Cajamarca was 0.16 percent after two years of project, operations (recommendations related to seed type and to levels of chemical fertilizer application for corn, wheat, and barley).
Are small farmers reluctant adopters?1/ Or do low rates of adoption reflect the fact that the "improved" practices recommended by the rural development projects are not particularly profitable?2/ Or are practices profitable and farmers willing adopters, but are the complementary resources (e.g., credit) and new inputs unavailable by reason of institutional and/or other nonagroeconomic constraints? None of the three.projects currently has replies to these questions.
1/ For an excellent discussion of this view, see F. Cancian, "Stratification and Risk-Taking: A Theory Tested on Agricultural Innovations," American Sociological Review, Vol. 32, No. 6 (December, 1967), pp. 912-927.
2/ One oE the original studies of the profitability hypothesis was done by Zvi Griliches, "Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological Change," Econometrica, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Qctober, 1957), pp. 501-523.

Agriculture's Unimportance to Small Farmers.--Strategies of the rural
development projects focus on improving technology on a limited' set of cropls. While the crops chosen are important components of the value of crop production in each project area, incomes derived from crops--and from agriculture generally--appear to be a much smaller proportion of total income of small \ 1/
farmers than would have been expected on the basis of available literature.- /
In the case of Cajamarca, the value of crop production represents only
14 percent of gross farm income from all sources for farms in the smallest size class (3.5 hectares or less).-2/ The most important single source of income for these farms is wages and salaries, the largest part of which (62 percent) is earned outside agriculture. Total income derived from agriculture (including crop and livestock production, agricultural labor incomes, and transfers within the agricultural sector) is only 38 percent of income reported from all sources
by smali farms. As the size of farms increases in Cajamarca,- two things happen to this figure: (1) it increases to a level of 67-84 percent, and (2) its composition changes with the share represented by livestock production increasing.
Data available on Puebla indicate that total crop production represented
4/ Teedt r o
only 35.5 percent of all farm family incomes in 1970.- These data are not currently available by farm size class;'income derived from agriculture as a
1/ See, for example, Bruce F. Johnston, "Agriculture and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries: A Survey of Research," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June, 1970), pp. 369-398.
2/ Proyecto Piloto Cajamarca-La Libertad, "Estudio de Diagnostico Socioeconomico del Area de Influencia del Proyecto Piloto Cajamarca-La Libertad" (first draft, August, 1974, Table 3).
3/ The Cajamarca diagnostic excluded farms in the area with 100 or more hectares.
4/ Puebla Project, "The Puebla Project: Seven Years of Experience, 1967-73" (unpublished manuscript, 1974), Table 10.1.

proportion of gross farm income is likewise unavailable; and it may be that the
1 /
35.5 percent figure cited is not strictly comparable with the data on Cajamarca./ Still, there is the inference that crop production is surprisingly unimportant to small farmers in Puebla in terms of its contribution to their total income. Rochin reported, in the case of Garcia Rovira, that "there are no precise figures on how much income is earned from each economic activity."2/ Ilowever, he did note that 86 percent of all heads of families in the area claimed to be employed primarily on their own lands. This information, of course, would be consistent with agriculture's relative unimportance as a source of income were on-farm returns lower than those earned off the farm. And, if that were the case, there might be the additional inference that on-farm employment is only a marginal 3/
or residual use of labor time of small farmers.-3
Much more data and analysis are needed, however, on (1) incomes by source
and (2) employment and labor productivity by activity before such inferences can be verified.
Low rates of adoption of project-recommended technologies and the apparent unimportance.of crop production to small farmers suggest that the direct effects
of the rural development projects on incomes may have been small. These effects need to' be quantified in each case, however, and compared with costs, carefully
1/ Substantially more attention and resources appear to have been devoted to estimates of farm income in the case of Cajamarca. The Puebla data on income are not fully defined in the source cited.
2/ R. 1. Rochin, "In igm;ghts Into the Socio-economic Basis for Rural Developmont: The Case of Garcia Rovira, Colombia," Paper prepared for the Ford Foundation Agricultural Advisors Serinar on Rural Development, Sasaima, Colombia, July 19 and 20, 1974, p. 10.
3/ A number of interesting hypotheses flow from this proposition. One, for example, would be that a rural development project could have an important effect on wages and/or. salaries of small farmerseven if they do not adopt the recommended technologies.

accounted for. It might be shown, for example, that Puebla, Cajamarca, and Garcia Rovira are cost effective, even though their impact.on farm incomes has
been small.-/
Large Indirect Project Effects.--Whatever the direct income effects of the projects may be, it appears that some nonincome, indirect effects have been large. Puebla can now claim success in sponsoring: similar projects throughout Latin America--perhaps even within Mexico itself where rural development projects are now operating with Puebla-like models-in the states of Mexico and Tlaxcala, and others are on the drawing boards in 17 different regions--and in contributing to a "conscientization" with respect to small subsistence farmers. In Colombia the 6 initial pilot projects, of which Garcia Rovira was one, have led to 24 more rural development projects and a complete reallocation of resources within ICA which is responsible for public programs of agricultural research, extension, and education. They may have also contributed to the creation of a graduate program in rural development at the ICA/National University Graduate School. In the case of Peru, nonincome, indirect effects of Cajamarca appear to have been rather more modest, although the Project was instrumental in the decision to open two new rural development projects and to establish, within the Cajamarca area, an experiment station.
Isolation.--The background papers and literature cited on Cajamarca, Garcia Rovira, and Puebla make each of the three rural development projects vulnerable
to criticisms of intellectual isolation.
1/ Two cost-henefit analyses are, in fact, available for the Puebla Project including one contained in Chapter 14 of the 1974 manuscript cited earlier, Puebla Project, op. _cit., and one authored by Delbert Myren and Jairo Cano, "Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Puebla Project," in Strategies for Increasing Aricultural Production on Small Hloldigs (Mexico: CIMYT, 1969). These analyses could be refined, however, and then extended to others of" the rural development projects for which cost-benefit analyses are yet unavailable. More is said
about this at a later point in this report.

One such criticism is that the projects do not appear to have benefited from the accumulated wisdom, lessons, anfd experiences of others with similar kinds of objectives. Nowhere, for example, in the document
on Puebla is a reference made to Mexico's long history of experience with land reform, colonization, and irrigation projects and the fa"t that Puebla's vaJ.ue might be measured in terms of its contribution over and ibove that which would have obtained had, say, an irrigation project been put iin the Puebla area.
Another criticism is that the projects are isolated one from the other.
This seems to be true, for example, within Colombia and as between projects in Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. Mechanisms like ALADER and the Ford-Rockefeller grants to the University of California at Berkeley may help reduce this isolation at a regional level. The creation within ICA last year of a submanager for rural development and a couple of divisions concerned with evaluating and coordinating efforts among individual Colombian rural development projects may be beneficial at the national level; COCOSA should have similar effects in the case of Mexico. Still, there is an impression that interproject relations. are not .strong.
Finally, there is the criticism made by de Janvry that the projects have isolated themselves from the dynamics of development in the project areas, in other sectors of agriculture, in other economic activities, and in the world economic system. The proposition was stated in his paper in the following way:
"The induced influx of technologies from the Green Revolution through small farmer projects has been looked at as permitting a break with the low-level equilibrium trap and shifting subsistence peasants to the blessed status of commercial farmers.
Focussing rural poverty in this context is, in my view, an historical inconsistency. . On-the contrary, it needs to be
done in the context of the economic destruction of traditional
societies after the first industrial revolution in England; of the barriers to industrialization, especially after the second
industrial revolution in the 20th century; of unequal commercial

exchange between imperialist and dependent nations and the consequent need for low wages in the periphery; of the exhaustion of import substitution policies to promote industrialization and the transformation of industry into an economic and social enclave in
the 1960's; and of the resulting reinforcement of structural dualism and marginalization of large sections of society. . Rural poverty should be analyzed in the framework of marginality instead
of traditional culture."1/
The Cajamarca "diagnostic" has been criticized in these terms for providing only a snapshot. of the current state of poverty in the region and neglecting to consider the historical conditions which produced that poverty over time. This criticism would applywith greater force, however, to research on Garcia Rovira and Puebla.
"Pilot" Projects--A Misnomer.--Observed problems with the continuity of project staffs; with the design of experiments (socioeconomic and agronomic); with overall project organization, coordination, and planning; with intellectual isolation of some of the projects; and with theformidable and still unresolved problems 'encountered in socioeconomic data collection 'and analysis-all suggest that some of the pilot programs (as' most of the rural development projects have been termed) have not been assigned resources of the quality and quantity necessary to ensure that learning through systematic experimentation
is maximized.-Several hypotheses can be entertained to explain why this has been so.
One would be that there were ways of making the projects truly pilot endeavors but not the will to do so. Under this hypothesis, the major objective of the
1/ Alain de Janvry, "[he Political Economy of Rural Development -Projects in Latin America" (unpublished manuscript, July, 1974, pp. 1 and 2).
2/ The problems are identified and-discussed in the last 12 pages of the Cajamarca diagnostic; in the case of Garcia Rovira, they are highlighted by Rochin, "Integrated .Rural Development: I.Lessons from the Colombian Experience," Paper presented at the Ford Foundation Seminar of Program Advisors in Agriculture (Ibadan: IITA, 1974); and, in the case of Puebla, Friedman focused on
these problems during his oral presentation.

rural development projects is seen to be one of proving that available, new biochemical technologies, supplemented by institutional credit, will be adopted by small farmers and lead to increases in incomes and improved conditions of life. Another hypothesis would be that there was the will but not the way to make the projects effective pilot endeavors because the human and financial resources required to sustain .a truly experimental effort were found to be utinavailable. Stress is laid in this regard on the availability of qualitatively relevant human resources--trained in and capable of handling problems of rural poverty.I/ A final hypothesis would be that there was a will and a way but that the problems evidenced by the rural development projects were symptoms of poorly articulated project objectives; that objectives were poorly- articulated because there was little appreciation for what is really needed for small farmers to develop; and that there was little appreciation for what is needed because there was an incomplete understanding of how poor farmers got to be poor. Without a theory to explain and help understand the dynamics of poverty, project activities were bound to flounder and become less purposeful and effective.
Other Impressions.--Below are listed three impressions derived from discussions which did not occupy, perhaps, as much: time at the seminar--and, hence, are presented here apart from the rest -and rather summarily--but which were judged to have been of importance nonetheless.
1/ The first of these two hypotheses appears to be most relevant to the
case of P'uebla, Garcia Rovira, and the other five ICA rural development pilot projects, while the second hypothesis may be most relevant to Cajamarca. In the seminar there was also some discussion as to whether the :rural development projects were really mechanisms for social control or "incorporation."

1. Criteria seem to be lacking currently which would provide the
basis for judging when a project has been successful, when
its mission has been completed, and when its activities
should be terminated.
2. Not unrelated to the preceding point is the fact that criteria
used in choosing among alternative rural development sites have
not been made explicit. If the reasons for making interventions
in a particular geographic area were more explicit., so, too,
undoubtedly would be the conditions for withdrawal.
3. The rural development projects have extremely high profiles
within the community of international assistance agencies--an
impression which really only extends an earlier one that certain
indirect effects of the projects have been large.
A number of research needs of the rural development projects are suggested directly by the preceding section, and they might be divided into four or five
major areas.One wou.d be analyses of adoption rates of recommended practices by smallholders which sought to explain specifically the low rates of acceptance of recommendations made by the rural development projects. Attention would 'be given in these studies to the effects on adoption of the characteristics of the
technology recommended; on-farm determinants of the responses. of farmers to new
1/ These reflect more the views of the author of this report than those of
the participants in the Sasaima seminar. The agenda did not call for a discussion of "research priorities" and little discussion, except for some extraseminar sessions, related directly to them.

production opportunities; iand intervening institutional, cultural, and sociopolitical factors--those nonagroeconomic elements referred to in a previous section of this report.
"Another set of studies is needed which would carefully quantify incomes of smallholders and their family members by principal source and estimate employment rates and labor productivity by major farm and off-farm activity. The essential purposes of these studies would be to provide a better understanding of when and why crops become unimportant to small farmers as a source of income and how a change in crop technology would affect the small farm family, its income, and the allocation of its available labor time. Since searching for, obtaining, and then using a new production technology are timeconsuming activities, which may result in some loss of income, the suggested research on the determinants of adoption might be related in important ways to studies 'of income and employment. For this reason, plus the fact that comparability of income and employment data should be maintained as between projects, it would seem essential that there existed opportunities for cross-study and cross-project discussions and dialogue in both the adoption and the income and employment work.
A third area of research would include benefit-cost analyses of existing and planned rural development projects. These would be done less for the purpose of calculating social investment yields per se than for purposes of checking the sensitivity of expected project outcomes to particular assumptions, identifying areas for profitable in-depth socioeconomic research, and sharpening the specification of project plans and priorities. Because there is not available at present a model .or theory of rural development and poverty, it is extremely difficult for project personnel to organize complex and interrelated

observations on smal.lholders for purposes of fixing goals and plans of work. Something needs to be done about this and well before a theory of poverty finishes cooking. One way of attacking the problem is with the benefit-cost methodology. In the hands of an experienced practitioner and knowledgable "applied welfare economist," techniques of benefit-cost analysis do provide means of ordering a vast quantity of data.
A fourth area of work which is needed would include case studies of other kinds of rural development projects which promise to provide insights for the Pueblas, Garcia Roviras, aTnd Cajamarcas. Irrigation, land reform, and colonization projects have been mentioned. A careful synthesis of existing studies may be all that is required.
A final area of research need, which was intimated, concerns whether the qualitatively relevant manpower really exists which is capable of assisting with solutions to rural poverty. If not, what qualities and characteristics at what levels of training are needed? Increasingly, this question is being asked by national agencies. Certainly, the Foundation and the graduate agricultural economics programs with which it has collaborated would want to know more about the relevance of current M. S. training in agricultural economics for planning, monitoring, and fieldwork'in rural development.
Before turning away completely from implications for research to program implications, it is worth asking whether mechanisms exist for supporting a menu of research like the one suggested here which would more fully exploit opportunities for comparative analysis between projects. Some such mechanisms-ALADER, the University of California at Berkeley group, and perhaps even CEDEAL--are now available. Are these adequate, however? Is something else needed? These questions were not discussed at any length at Sasaima.

Turning more directly to the disdussions of the second (lay and possible program implications for the Foundation, a rather sharp distinction was drawn between the area :of rural development and rural development projects.
The Foundation was drawn into the rural development projects as a result of a long-standing interest in graduate agricultural economics programs in Latin America. Specifically, as Colombia and, to a perhaps lesser extent, Peru began mounting Puebla-type projects in 1970-71, the Foundation was approached to partially finance the extension of agricultural economics competence to the undertaking of socioeconomic diagnostics in certain project areas. The final package of financing included some complementary support for activities of the rural development projects per se, but it was neither the focus of the Foundation's assistance nor the primary basis for its involvement.
Sasaima produced. a consensus that this kind of action involvement at the
project level need not be extended further unless there are unique opportunities for insights gained to be applied to similar projects within a country and the Latin American region more broadly, manpower inputs--project leadership and staff--are of pilot quality, training efforts of long-standing Foundation interest are to be reinforced, mechanisms exist for interaction and feedback between the project.and policy analysis and decision making, and the Foundation's
inputs are small in relation to those of collaborating national institutions.
In contrast, discussions at Sasaima led to a conclusion that rural development more broadly should not only be an area of future interest for the Foundation's Latin American program but possibly one of its major interests. This conclusion was based moire on an understanding of the meaning and importance of rural development than on agreements about what the specific content of a rural development program-might be.

For most participants at Sasaima, rural development came to mean any socioeconomic change in rural areas accompanied by greater participation by larger numbers of rural inhabitants in determining the direction of that change and in benefiting from its results. It is understood by this definition that rural development means greater access by rural inhabitants to resources, a more equal distribution of benefits from development, and a more equitable distribution of power in the countryside.
Less progress in the direction of specifying a rural development program undoubtedly reflected less accord among participants about the causes of rural poverty and stagnation. That, in turn, appears to be a consequence of the absence of a comprehensive theory of poverty. All subscribed to a view that there is some economic and social dualism in Latin America--a dichotomy of sorts which distinguishes haves and have-nots. But some consider the underdevelopment of tie.have-nots as a passive state-that of being "left behind" by technical change--which could be activated by a strategic combination of conventional 1/ .2/ 3/ Ti
tools in the best tradition of Lewis,-/ Fei and Ranis,- and Schultz.-/ This is essentially neoclassical, liberal wisdom; the highest current level of its 4/
perfection is now the model of induced development of Hayami and Ruttan.Others view the underdevelopment of the have-nots. in a dynamic context and as
1/ Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," The Economics of Underdevelopment, ed. A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 400-449.
2/ J. C. 11. Fei and Gustav Ranis, D)evelopment of the Labor Surplus Economy (llomewood, llinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1964).
3/ T. W. Schultz, Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
4/ Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

a product of specific. his torical developments correlated with the lopsided progress of tile haves and their alienation, marginalization, and exploitation of tile Contrary to neoclassical wisdom, this perspective
does not consider the have-,nots to be people who have been left behind but rather pushed behind.
Passions and differences among proponents of these two views run deep in Latin America. Neocl.assicists associate the opposing perspective with unconscionable ideologists who argue from a baseof economic fiction. They are also classified as impractical types since inevitably an appeal is made by them for a multidisciplinary, integrated systems approach to development, for example,
" the reasons for the impoverishment of rural areas often lie
outside of these areas themselves . the ultimate cause of rural
poverty is still lack of integration into the overall socio-political
and economic system not only on a nationwide, but sometimes on a
worldwide, scale and hence the application of a package programme. . It must take account of the interrelationships of
socio-polit cal, economic, and technical factors in a systems
approach."The standard reply to the neoclassical criticism is that facts should not be confused with already existing self-evident truths. The issue is not at the observational or descriptive level but at the level of establishing valid connections between what is ready observable.
Until a new, more comprehensive theory of rural poverty emerges, which is capable of reconciling some of these existing differences, Sasaima participants
were of a mind that an interim rural development program might be defined simply in terms of an extension of the Foundation's current agricultural program in
i/ See, for example, Herbert R. Kotter, "Some Observations on the Basic
Principles and General Strategy Underl.ying Integrated Rural Development," Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (April, 1974), pp. 1-12.
2/ Ibid., p. 2.

Latin America but with an important qualitative difference: that additional concern be evidenced for who is benefiting from thile program and how much how many have to say about its final outcomes. This would not imply any abrupt
break with existing activities. Indeed, a rural development program cast in these terms would he more revisionist than reformist. The emphasis would still be placed on developing research and training capacities, for example. However, there would be the twist that "capacities" would not relate exclusively to the traditional agricultural economics discipline at the graduate level but to capacities at any level in educational and research systems which could address relevant problems of poverty and rural development. It was agreed that this could involve anything from support for an M. S. graduate program--which has a serious commitment to problems of rural development and is exploring differing views of the causes of poverty--to support for training centers for fieldworkers in rural development. Two provisos were inserted: that the Foundation's inputs lead to a self-sustaining activity (e.g., it would not be interested in simply training fieldworkers to fill existing positions in Colombia's rural development projects) and that the undertaking be related in some way to the talent and institutions of long-standing Foundation concern.
In addition to the examples already mentioned, it was felt that this kind of rural development program would permit advancing projects like the following to the consideration of the Foundation:
Proposals which would lead to additional comparative analysis and
cross-country generalizations about the rural development projects
discussed in the seminar.
Programs for national-level policy research for rural development
(like, for example, the COCOSA program)..

Resource base proposals to further synthesize available information and I, terature in an attempt to provide a more comprehensive theory of poverty and stagnation.
Research which provided an assessment of the relevance of existing production technologies available at the national and international levels for small farmers.
Proposals promoting additional interaction between international and national research centers concerned with smallholders' production technology.

Friday, July 19
Moderator Reed Hlertford
8:00 Opening Comments
8:30 Santiago Friedmann, Puebla
9:45 Coffee break
10:00 Ismael Rochin, Garcia Rovira
11:15 Efrain Franco, Cajamarca
12:30 Lunch
Moderator James R. Himes
14:00 Reed llertford, Towards a synthesis of
common and contrasting lessons 15:15 Coffee break
15:45 Alain de Janvry, Suggested directions
for the community of effort 18:30 Dinner
20:00 Informal evening discussions with
Rodrigo Botero, Executive Director, Foundation for Higher Education and
Development (FEDESARROLLO), and Rafael Marino, General Manager, ICA Saturday, July 20
Moderator Norman R. Collins
8:00 James R. lumes, Other program options
in rural development
9:15 William D. Carmichael, The place of rural
development within Foundation programs 10:30 Coffee break

Saturday, ,jul 20 (continued)
11:00 Michael Nelson, Suggested agenda for
discussion of rural development "position paper"
12:00 Lunch
Moderator William D. Carmichael
13:30 Opening comments
14:00 Discussions leading to the rural development "position paper" 15:15 Coffee break
18:30 Dinner

(C) Botero, Rodrigo Executive Director, FEDESARROLLO
(A) Caballero, Carlos Consultant in rural development, Ford Foundation.,
(A) Cardona,' Canuto Rural Development Program Advisor, ICA
(B) Carmichael, William D1). Head, Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, Ford Foundation
(B) Collins, Norman R. Program Advisor, Agriculture, Office for Latin
America and the Caribbean, Ford Foundation
(B) de Janvry, Alain Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural
Economics, University of California, Berkeley
(A) Franco, Efrain Cajamarca Project
(B) Friedmann,. Santiago Project Specialist, Ford Foundation, Mexico
(B) Guardiola, Beatriz Administrative Assistant, Ford Foundation, Bogota
(B) HIertford, Reed Program Advisor, Ford Foundation, Bogota
(B) Himes, James R. Representative, Ford Foundation, Bogota
(C) Marino, Rafael General Manager, ICA
(B) Nelson, Michael Program Advisor, Ford Foundation, Mexico
(B3) Rochin R. Ismael Program Advisor, Ford Foundation, Bogota
(A) Rojas, Alvaro Director of International Department, IFI, Bogota
(A) Rojas, Elsa Secretary, Ford Foundation, Bogota
(A). Scobie, Grant Staff, Agricultural Systems Program, CIAT
(A) Valderrama, Mario Director, Division of Agricultural Economics, ICA
(A) Villadiego, Tomas Rural Development Section, Division of Agricultural
Economics, ICA
(A) Zulberti, Carlos IDRC/Ciqueza Project
(A) Attending July 19
(B) Attending July 19 and 20
(C) Attending evening session, July 19

Second International Seminar
on Change in Agriculture
dReading. England. 9-19 September 1974
Paper le
By Guy Hunter
Overseas Development Institute, London
1. One basis upon which much of the programme of this Seminar, and
the choice of background Papers, has rested is the work of the Reading University/Overseas Development Institute joint programme of research,
which has been running for the last five years. The research was
based upon a belief that, however good agricultural policies might be,
there is a widespread failure in implementation; and that a major part of this failure (certainly, not all) could be ascribed to a failure to
learn the lessons of experience in the choice of organisational methods
and of institutional forms. The programme was run in what was, in
1969, an unusual method. The field research financed by the programme (which was in turn financed by O.D.M., the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, F.F.H.C., Barclays International-and Shell International) was
executed, save in one instance, by Indian and African scholars, in consultation with the Reading/O.D.I. staff; and- its initiation was the outcome of consultation with the Ministries of Agriculture in India, Kenya and Nigeria. The work was supplemented by 'library work' in
London, the overseas experience of the staff and a few-specially
commissioned Papers.
2. The purpose of this present Paper is to lay before the Seminar
the main hypothesis underlying this work. It does not cover the whole range of subjects to be covered by the Seminar. This hypothesis underlies both the research, the choice of documentation, the subjects of plenary addresses though their content is not dictated! and the
arrangement of subject matter.
3. The hypothesis can be put in the following form: "Agricultural
development takes place among local farming communities at various points
in a continuous transition from fully 'traditional' to more 'modern'
technical and social organisation; in various different ecologies; with
various post-harvest treatment of crops or animals produced; and under
the guidance of Governments with different resources of personnel, administrative capacity, and budgetary resources. In considering the
choice of methods (administration, organisation and institutions) for
implementation of agricultural policies, consideration of four main
factors will lead to choices which are more likely to succeed
1) The attitudes, capacities and needs of the local farming community at-the time.
2) Technical factors, especially the type of crop or animal husbandry mainly concerned.

le: 2 Choice of Methods for Implementation
3) The nature of the processing and marketing channel.
4) The administrative resources and capacity of the main
agency of change (usually, the Government or a
parastatal agency)."
4. These criteria may look deceptively, and indeed unrealistically short and simple. In such an immensely complex subject they certainly cannot be complete and decisive. It is necessary, therefore, to spell out some of the major issues which underlie each 'criterion' perhaps 'guideline' would be more modest and this is done below.. We do not claim that the use of these criteria will provide to overseas Governments or donors an infallible and precise guide to the choice of administrative methods and institutions in all cases; the world, and chance, are too complex for that. But we do claim that if the criteria are carefully considered and sensibly used, the repetition of grave mistakes will be substantially reduced, and the chances they are still chances of success will be substantially, and even critically, increased.
Criterion 1: The Attitudes, Capacities, and Needs of Farmers
5. This criterion is by far the most difficult and complex to apply.
In commonsense terms, backward 'tribal' farmers in India or Africa will differ in attitudes to innovation, in their capacities to manage change, and the need of assistance which they have, from a group of sophisticated Punjabi wheat farmers, or Kilimanjaro coffee farmers, or successful West African cocoa farmers, who have long since learned to adopt scientific methods, geared the farm to cash, earnings, and learned to adapt to both market prices and new technological advances. But between these extremes lie the majority of situations, where some change in attitudes and capacities has taken place, but, in varying degrees, not a complete change and one which is not yet self-assured and secure.
6. Attitudes may be religious, social and customary, and economic.
They tend to be highly specific in place and time, particularly in the earliest stages of innovations, when local sub-cultures retain maximum vigour. There are, however, a few general attitudes which are widespread at this stage aversion to taking risks with the main subsistence crop; fear and suspicion of outsiders, especially officials; dependence of small farmers on some forms of power or authority within the community public opinion of the collectivity itself, chief, landlord, etc. Beyond these generalised fears there may be far more specific rules and taboos about particular crops (especially the staple food) as to planting dates, etc., and communal arrangements for such matters as access to fields, mutual help, grazing rights. In general, the process of modernisation, including wider contact outside the village, involves a gradually increased dominance of economic motives, at the expense of attitudes which obstruct economic success, and a corresponding diminution of some (but not all) of the attitudes and behaviour patterns of the traditional idiosyncratic culture.
7. Capacities. The technical skill of the farmer himself is not
usually a critical issue lie is in many ways skilled already, and can pick up line-sowing, for example, in a season or two. Illiteracy is, of course, limiting at later stages, when chemical and engineering techniques, and

GUY 11UNTER Paper le: 3
can be critical in innovation; but this is more relevant to the content of the 'package' and less to organisation and institutions. Socially determined capacities are ,,ore important. The farmer, for many reasons (tenure, public opinion, etc.) may not be able to use his land as he might wish, whatever his personal attitude. Economic capacity of the farm family (apart from labour) may be restrictive. A short-straw variety may reduce necessary thatching or animal foodstuff, may deprive the family economy of vital milk or ghee or transport or fertiliser; high cash input requirements (even on credit) may be beyond him, if the cash-flow in the rural economy is minimal and indebtedness gravely feared or socially disapproved. Finally, managerial capacity in a social context (e.g. active participation in running a Cooperative) may be very low, not merely from lack of sophistication in handling money and accounts but because of social dependency which excludes challenge to local magnates.
8. Needs, naturally, overlap lack ofcapacities. Access to inputs,
to markets, to water supply, to fencing material, to information are among the most common needs, which must usually be supplied organisationally from outside before adoption of new methods can even start. Extension services can be greatly frustrated by the lack of investment and organisational services outside their control but vital to the programme which they are trying to achieve.
9. Implications for organisation flowing from this and other criteria
are dealt with below.
Criterion 2: Technical and Environmental
10. Ecology, population density, type of human settlement, type of
crop grown, seasonality, will all, in varying degrees, affect the organisation of implementation. Certain crops and organisational requirements e.g. a steady flow of uniform-sized and equally ripe tomatoes for canning --imply performance which may be extremely difficult for small farmers. Irrigation involves organisation and disciplines which may be new; extensive pastoralism involves considerable modifications of extension pattern and marketing organisation; tree crops with a long period before bearing involve investment in labour and possibly credit or even subsistence payments. Acute shortages of resources land, grazing, water, supplies will involve government action to ration or control. Highly dispersed settlement patterns make grouping (Cooperatives etc.) hard to organise, in contrast to dense and compact communities. Iost of these points are painfully obvious; but they are not always taken into account, particularly where the organisation of programmes, extension staffing and credit systems are highly centralised and governed by uniform rules: to contact 400 farm families in a big village might be possible for one extension officer; the same number in a'pastoral area might be quite impossible.
Criterion 3: Nature of Processing and Marketing Channel
11. This could be regarded as an extension of Criterion 2
(Technical). It includes the cases where a crop (Tea, Tobacco, Sugar, Rubber, Palm-oil are examples) requires major processing for a market well outside the village (domestic or international 'export'). Such

le: 4 Choice of Methods for Implementation
cases lend themselves to 'integrated management' by a Company, very large Cooperative', or parastatal Board, servicing out-growers, and often providing research, Ebtension, credit, collection of the crop, processing, grading, marketing and payment. There are many well-known examples. This system supplies from outside the managerial capacity which farmers in early stages may lack, whether as individuals or as Cooperatives, and
can sometimes be applied atiery early stages of modernisation.
12. In contrast, staple cereal foods, which may be used: a) for
family consumption; b) for paying share-crop rents; c) for brewing beer; d) for repaying obligations; -e) for seed and insurance-storing, and f) for minor sales, present a far more difficult problem. For. example,
crop-season credit for fertiliser, which will be applied to the whole crop, may be very hard to recover because: a) the credit agency does not control the disposal of the crop; b) the credit debt looks very high in relation to the few bags which may ultimately be sold for cash; and c) because small merchants usually have an advantage over official
organisations in handling this type of situation.
Criterion 4: Administrative Capacity of Government
13. This poses difficult issues which have rarely been raised in
this form. Because government disposes of a number of paid staff
. (Extension, Cooperative, Community Development, Credit service, etc.,
etc.), it is easy to draw up on paper increasingly elaborate duties and
increasingly sophisticated systems of coordination (for 'integrated
rural development', for example), as though the staff were a totally flexible instrument of infinite capacity. Lloreover, as the years go
by, more duties and more committees and reporting requirements are added,
without reducing the original load. A second, common, phenomenon is a tendency to create a new Agency for each new need, so that Crop Boards,
Land Boards, Credit Corporations, Natural Resource Boards, Irrigation Authorities, Ranching Corporations, Settlement Boards, with their inevitable accompaniment of coordinating committees, are set up in profusion, and almost without regard either to the skilled manpower available (especially at field level) or to the conflicts of function and authority
which, though excluded on organisational charts, invariably arise in
14. It would seem clear that the complexity of organisation must be
related to the skill-resources of government. Where these are small,
extremely simple organisational forms, with a high degree of delegation of discretion to act locally, will be necessary. This cuts across the
manifest tendency to increase complexity and centralisation through
planning controls, theoretical perfectionism, attempts to do too
many things at once (very evident in 'integrated' schemes), and a blind
eye to the realities of Departmental jealousies, bureaucratic traditions
and the motivation, conditions of service and career opportunities for
the minor staff in the field.
Limitation of the Hypothesis
15. The focus of the Reading/ODI work has been on the choice of
organisational and institutional forms within a given policy. Thus
the field is limited in several ways. First, it is not directly concerned with the formulation of the content of policy, except, somewhat

GUY HUNTER Paper le: 5
indirectly, in so far as a policy may be organisationally impossible to implement. Policies may be chosen primarily on political grounds; and political beliefs may even rule out certain organisational methods e.g. private enterprise, though it will still have to find a mechanism of implementation, largely through public institutions: a bureaucracy, Party Cadres, Cooperatives, Communes, etc. In this Seminar, the opening sessions take account of some of these political choices. Secondly, technical agricultural policy was outside the field cf research. Clearly, if a policy of growing cotton is applied to land which is unsuitable there are many lesssimple but still catastrophic mistakes no amount of good organisation can prevent failure. To a large extent technical choices are very highly location-specific, and therefore unsuited for handling in generalisations of the type which we have considered. Thirdly, the research has concentrated on development policy for the mass of small farmers, largely neglecting plantation agriculture and (except by implication) the management of very large collective or State farms.
16. By this time we feel able to go beyond the mere statement that
the four Criteria must be 'taken into account', and to suggest, from the basis of experience and research, some at least of the detailed implications for organisational choices which flow from the use of these Criteria. These implications are arranged under organisational headings, since they may result from applying more than one of the main criteria. I have largely avoided using a 'stage-theory' presentation, because of the well-known difficulties of such an approach But because we are dealing with a transition, through time, from one pattern of agricultural and economic activity to a different pattern, and because organisational choices have to take into account the point on the line of transition which. a particular farming community has reached at a given time, the concept of sequence and timing through the 'stages' of transition, although they are blurred at the edges, will be always in evidence.
Extension Organisation
17. Because of the insecurity, suspicion and fear of change which
is strongest in the very earliest stages of development, it would appear that a classical 'Community Development' approach is best suited. to communities at this point. Ideally, C.D. staff are trained to get to know a farming community, to listen, to help the community to meet expressed needs, and thereby to gain the trust of the farmers. They may go beyond this, in suggesting new possibilities (not locally known, and therefore not felt as needs), but they will. not act on these without local consent. This style contrasts, unfortunately, with the most common style of extension staff, who come with a package of supposedly superior practices, usually centrally devised, which they try to persuade the community to adopt.
18. If this initial contact is successful, a time will come when
the farmers, or a substantial number of them, want to go a step further, particularly in increasing incomes rather than in improving social facilities, with which C.D. is oftenmost concerned.

le: 6 Choice of Methods for Implementation
At this point fairly simple but well-founded technical agricultural advice, through extension of tested agricultural techniques, becomes appropriate. There are occasions when a complete and advanced agricultural package can be introduced 'at a blow'; but since this may involve multiple changes, perhaps commercial as well as technical (purchased inputs, credit, new types of organisation, as well as a different agronomy and crop-protection system), it is more often desirable to advance by stages: line-sowing before fertiliser, savings before credit loans, improved cultural practices before revolutionary changes in varieties and methods. Close contact with farmers by relatively simply trained staff will here be essential.
19. At a much more advanced stage the role of extension and the type
of staff may have to change. The period of motivating farmers to accept change will have passed; what they now need is more and more specialised advice, both agronomic (fertiliser mix, disease control, implements) and economic (costs, prices, farm management). They will also require commercially significant quantities of inputs efficiently delivered and of reliable quality. Extension staff will require better technical training, better supported by specialist advice. The University may well enter the extension field at this point. Further, Government, quite apart from the Extension service, will face new duties, in the efficient organisation of supply, repair, marketing, seed-production, agricultural chemicals and maahines. Further, because demand is rising, Government may soon be able to pass over the executive responsibility (though not the supervision) to the private sector, since the farmer has, at. last, become a profitable customer for inputs and a producer of commercially. worthwhile outputs, increasedboth in volume and quality.
20. There is considerable evidence that, despite appearances, even
poor farmers can find sources of small amounts of cash (US 0 50) when they really want to (e.g. for school fdes, to meet social imperatives). Secondly, that, despite appearances, savings groups of various kinds are quite widespread in many traditional economies, and can also be stimulated. Thirdly, that borrowers are prepared to accept quite high interest rates on small loans for short periods, e.g. 10 per cent for 6 months, equivalent to a 20 per cent per annum rate (but only $2.50 on $50 for six months). Fourthly, that official crop-season subsidised credit schemes, for farmers in a fairly early stage of development, are extremely costly and not often efficient agriculturally. They are costly either because of low repayment levels or (more frequently, nowadays) because of the high staff costs of loan recovery, except in certain cases where credit is given and recovered by an organisation having monopoly control of the crop. They are agriculturally ineffective because the purchased inputs are spread too thinly, or used for other than the intended purpose, or partially used for consumption or social needs.
21. All these findings point to a far more cautious and more selective
use of official crop-season. credit schemes. Some suggestions would be:a) To exhaust other methods of assisting farmers before
purchased inputs for credit started.
b) To stimulate savings before loans (the Comilla principle).

GUY HUNTER Paper le: 7
c) To stress cash purchases by emphasising the cost of credit,
which should be reflected in realistic interest rates.
d) Experimental use of free fertiliser for demonstration over
.1 year, followed by cash sales.
e) Encouragement of small, mutually guaranteeing, credit groups.
f) Use of Cooperative credit only after the Cooperative is
firmly established with adequate staffing and management,
since credit is both the least profitable and the most
difficult Cooperative function.
g) Extreme caution in credit provision where the destination
of the crop is not controlled by the credit agency.
22. All these suggestions reflect the fact that the wise handling
of production credit by farmers is a skill which comes late in his growth towards modern farming, requiring training in its disciplines; that institutional credit is not necessarily his first need, but may become more important when he is already successful and wishing to expand; and that, on the record, credit administration through official channels is always difficult, and usually both inefficient and expensive.
Grouping of Farmers Cooperatives and Other Groups
23. Agricultural administration has to find some intermediary
between official services and-the vast multitude of small farmers, as a point for distribution of physical or credit inputs, as a channel for distribution of information, and as a focus for shared facilities (e.g. storage). Formal Cooperatives have been widely used for this purpose, sometimes for political reasons, soi etimes-simply as a convenient administrative tool. By criterion 1 (Attitudes, Capacities and Needs) the circumstances in which a formal Cooperative is likely to succeed in the various tasks set it are fairly few and specialised.
24, The Cooperative is a social organisation which cuts across the
most common forms of social grouping in most traditional agricultural communities in the developing countries for example, kinship systems, age-grade systems, landlord-tenant'relations, patron-client relations, employer-employee relations, clan systems, tribal societies (West Africa), caste and status systems, and even the mutual assistance' schemes (house-building, weeding, harvesting) common in many early societies, which are built on wholly different lines.
25. Nevertheless, if the Cooperative is accepted as an alien
imovation useful for agricultural progress, we must estimate its chances of success in performing two very different and distinguishable functions
a) As a democratic, egalitarian system it is unlikely to
succeed in the early stages of development, when
attitudes of dependency are very high. Only after
a period of economic success which has included a
substantial proportion of previously dependent members
of the community are they likely to modify or sup-

le: 8 Choice of Methods for Implementation
plant the dominance of traditional magnates in the
management of Cooperative affairs.
b) As an economic organisation cooperatives demand considerable
managerial skill, and.a value system which puts a neutral
role efficiency above the obligations to political,
kinship or patron interests. I{4re again, a fairly late
stage of development is implied.
c) Purely as a coherence system (i.e. one relying heavily on
loyalty to the group), Cooperatives are likely to succeed
when the group is small, its members know each other
and have interests consciously shared. This would argue
that Cooperatives should initially be small (50 100
members). This conflicts with commercial efficiency and
capital-accumulation arguments, which point to large
societies with substantial turnover and capital, able to
provide worthwhile services. This difficulty may be.
resolved by a small start, and a very gradual expansion.
d) The implications are
i) that formal Cooperatives are not a tool of first choice in the earliest stages:
ii) that coherence will be more likely if: a) the group is initially small, and b) it is built round a clearly needed physical facility (stores, pump, well, motorboat, dairy, etc.) used equally by all members. Pure credit cooperatives have the least impetus to coherence each man wants his own loan.
Popular Representation/Participation
26. There is an increasing emphasis on various forms of elective or
semi-elective popular representation, as an active element in agricultural developent, often including executive, or at least decision-, making, responsibility. While these units at village-level (Gram parchayat, Village Development Committee, etc.) have a fairly obvious function (to express local wishes and to contribute local knowledge), the two or more higher tiers, which exist in many countries and in some Projects, appear to have representative functions (they are no longer face-to-face with village people), and in some cases executive functions where staff are more or less directly under their control.
27. It is doubtful how far the Reading/ODI work can rightly include
this subject, since the purpose of establishing-these Committee systems is primarily for political education of the citizens and perhaps for strengthening a dominant political Party by diffusing Party activity widely through the provinces.. But in so far as development as such is in issue, two points emerge. First, direct mobilisation of effort is likely to be successful primarily at village level. The higher levels give orders or pep-talks to villagers; but they may also have an effect (where this is necessary) in prodding the executive bureaucracy into greater energy where that bureaucracy is controlled by the central government. There is little evidence that the higher levels,

GUY 1UNTIM Paper le: 9
where they themselves control development staff, achieve high levels of efficiency or impartiality. Secondly, in so far as development depends on technical expertise and technical decision-making, there is reason to fear failure. The record is often of mainly politicallybased decisions, and of ambitious projects which lack staff and expertise for implementation. In countries where trained personnel are scarce, a tough and competent administration, prodded and checked by local councils but not controlled by them, may be both more economical in staff and more technically sound in programming. The information available from mainland China would appear to contradict this statement, since the Communes appear to be effective. But it is as yet hard to distinguish how much-this efficiency is owed to local election-and how much to a bold decentralisation of administration through the Party cadres and nominees, combined with revolutionary enthusiasm and revolutionary discipline too.
The Commercial Function
28. The variations in political policy and in the facts of national.
history make this subject the least anenable to wide generalisation. Some countries have indigenous traders and entrepreneurs; in some, immigrants (Asians in East Africa: overseas Chinese in much of S.E. Asia) have, unless politically excluded or restrained, pre-empted much of the commercial sector. In heavily planned economies, and anti-capitalist economies, or where there is no effective indigenous trading network, this is the stamping ground for parastatal Boards and Corporations, or state-supported Cooperatives.
29. Where these large organisations-deal with a mv"jor crop of high
value, not mainly locally consumed in unprocessed or lightly processed
-foi'm, with a fair proportion grown by sizeable and efficient growers, they can succeed fairly well witness some of the Kenya Crop Boards, .originally aimed mainly at European growers. But faced by a mass of small growers, bad access by road, uneven q8ality, and local markets,they seldom can compete with small traders; and, if they have a monopoly, smuggling and black markets will appear, because (in contradiction of the exploitative trader theory) traders and smugglers give the farmers either better prices or quicker and more local service. There is here a penalty exacted by ideological preferenceswhich falls most sharply on the small men whom ideology is designed to protect: it may be a penalty outweighed by other political and social benefits. It is also necessary to weigh the opportunities for patronage and corruption which Boards give, their re-emphasis on State and centralised power, and the economic prizes they offer to the elites and the party which can capture and monopolise control of Government.
30. The main implication has already been mentioned under Criterion
4 the necessity to match administrative patterns to available managerial skill and budgetary resources. What the Reading/O.D.I. programme has not studied is the possiblity of improving efficiency by better management practices, ably set out in thepaper by Belshaw (5a), and certainly of major importance. A glance at the administrative superstructure of very small States will at once raise questions of proportion. Can State with a population no bigger than that of one or two Indian Districts really require so many Ministries, Departments and Boards?

le:lO Choice of Methods for Implementation
31. Every person, every village is, in some degree, unique. Clearly
no administrative system can treat everyone differently. This is a difficulty more real in theory than in (possible) practice. General patterns of farm systems exist over areas at least as bi, as one dxtension officer's area, and frequently to sizeable administrative areas. The difficulty of adjustment lies in the administration, not in the facts. Again, within a single village there may be a few sophisticated and wealthy farmers, some halfway in transition, some still highly traditional who is to be served? The answer is again fairly clear the smaller, less favoured, more 'traditional'. For if Government programmes are firmly aimed to be feasible and profitable to them, the better-heeled citizens will look after themselves. The trouble with much of the Green Revolution has been that a fairly capital-intensive and complex package has been offered which is, in effect, out of reach of the weaker members.
32. Again, how is the judgement the application of criteria to
be made? Can anyone weigh up all the factors, or decide at which point in a complex transition one particular farming community stands, at a point in time? Again, real life is simpler than theory. Really local people know most of the real local facts, which seem so complex to outside observers, and which Governments at the centre rarely bother about. What is, indeed, more difficult estimate the exact point at which a local custom will bow to an economic incentive, and the exact moment when new local leadership will emerge. These questions can indeed only be answered by (intelligent) trial and error.
33. If the need for closer adaptation of policies and programmes to
local situations is accepted, the clear implication is that these situations must be 'known', and the knowledge acted upon. They are, of course, known by the people who live in them. 'Known' must mean known to government, administrators, decision-makers; and also, perhaps, 'analysed, quantified and recorded', since this is the language which officials and planners understand. This leads to the major, central implication: that local programming decisions must be made very near to the field; because it is only there that there is any real chance of effective local knowledge.
34. Fourprocesses are necessary to push decision-making and discretion downwards from the centre; to establish an acceptable point to which it is pushed; to establish an effective contact with farmers and an.upward flow of information from them; and to retrain field staff to listen first and advise afterwards. Everyone knows how difficult this is, but primarily because the first step delegation of authority is never taken. It is not t tken because: a) politicians, planners and administrators at the centre insist on knowing best; b) simultaneously, knowing that they don't really know, they hang on to slowly changing generalised orthodoxies: 'Credit is the first step', 'Cooperatives must be created', 'Elected committees must be set up everywhere', 'Traders are exploiters', 'Extension staff must deliver packages and achieve targets', 'Integrated Rural Development'.
35. Ministers, planners, donors and universities all share the blame for these orthodoxies. There are, indeed, some hopeful signs

GUY HUNTER Paper le:ll
of change. 'District Planning', 'Farmer Service Centres' at local levels; some variations on the Cooperative model. But they are still tentative; and there is still a great deal of detailed work to do in establishing the minimum essential central control; the maximum feasible local discretion; the point and the quality of expert technical input; and the variety of forms of farmer organisation and contact. It is not only work which is needed, but a change of heart at the centre, both as to exercise of authority and as to the nature of the agricultural planning process.
1. The paper by Phillips and Collinson (4c) and the chapter by
Waheeduddin Khan in Serving the Small Farmer refer.
2. See, e.g., the Animation approach in Niger described in the paper
by Gentil (3o).
3. This transition is admirably described in Kahlon's chapter in
Serving the Small Farmer.
4. Papers by Youngjohns (3i), Hyden (3k) and Texier (3p) refer
5. The paper by Haldipur.(5b) and the chapter by Sinha and Jain
in Serving the Small Farmer refer.
6. Here Trapman's report on Kenya is highly relevant.
7. Roughly 11 million inhabitants to one District.

by Guy Hunter
April 15, 1975
1. One major danger in the use of social sciences in development is
that policy and action should follow too closely the findings of partial analysis.
2. This danger is visible at all levels from general ideologies to
micro decisions. At the macro-level, Marxism is as good an example as any. Over the last century Marxist theory has had a compelling appeal, particularly to intellectuals. Its sweeping analysis, based on a high degree of abstraction from selected processes of history and applied to a huge range of human activity politics, economics, culture, religion has a satisfactory elegance and comprehensiveness. But when the believers try to guide action from this analysis, they have to explain away formidable anomalies, which arise from factors assumed away in the analysis. The poor, instead of growing poorer, grow demonstrably richer; well meaning reformers, of the type of, say, Robert Owen, have to be dubbed as Menshevik enemies of the working man; colonial District Commissioners, trying to persuade Africans to &~end their children to school, or to plant corn in rows, have to be described as capitalist and imperialist exploiters. Worst of all, the analysis precluded any objective assessment of how, after the revolution, the new governors would avoid the temptations of power and greed, or solve the social tensions aroused by a philosophy of violent group conflict needed to heat up the revolution; nor did it consider the social and economic results of attempting to run large nations through the clumsy bureaucracy of the State.
3. At an intermediate level, economic Planning is subject to the same
criticism. The high degree of abstraction (from very suspect data) which is involved in a national economic plan constantly neglects vast-areas of human motivation, ignores deeply held beliefs and fears, and, equally, forgets the opportunities for evading or exploiting the mass of government regulations through which its authors hope to ensure that their projections are fulfilled. It may honestly confess the partial nature of its approach; but it is apt to be used for total social action.
14. Finally, at the micro level, a similar but perhaps more subtle trap
can be seen; alas, I have been falling into it lately myself. For, just because of the imperfections of macro planning, a considerable number of "development thinkers" have sought salvation in' micro-planning at the District; nay, at the sub-Disti-ict; nay, at the village level. For here we shall at last reach reality the actual, complex conditions of motivation and of circumstance in which the poor live; and here we can tailor action to full reality.
5. Quite complex, multi-disciplinary analysis is needed at this level.
In the rural area, an economist with farm-management training must be there; surely a social'anthropologist would be essential? The need for an agronomist goes without saying; but what about a public administration expert with management theory experience to suggest a system for running the Extension Service? And a political scientist? for we cannot forget elitism, TANU, political arenas and socio-political scenarios. An ecologist... ?

6. To research-minded people this analysis is immensely attractive and
I (gladly) prophesy that a very great deal of it will be done over the next ten years. But how does it look to the administrator and to the government? Where are all these experts to be found? How much will they cost? How long will they take to survey even a group of a dozen villages before anyone should dare to suggest an executive programme which will meet all the difficulties which their final report will enumerate?
7. I am sorry to ask these destructive questions, for I firmly believe
that the switch of attention to local realities, and the careful reconnaissance of an area before a programme for it is imposed would represent a great advance, not only from general ideological approaches but from central national direction. But can we really believe that government in a large country will take on this huge task of detailed diagnosis and detailed local prescription? Is it possible to treat some millions of farmers in this nurse-maiding way?
8. What I am saying is NOT that the research should not be done, at least
in a far greater number of varied situations each of which might, to the best feasible degree, typify an area. My thesis is really in two parts. First, that the choice of action cannot simply arise from analysis (if sociological issues arise, a sociologist must be sent in). Action is constrained by other considerations by feasibility in manpower and expense; by knowledge of the capacity of 3rd level field officers; and, above all, by the aim of providing, not a thousand individual prescriptions but a physical and motivational environment within which the main actors (farmers and officials) can use moderately enlightened common sense and discussion to find their own way through their part of the forest. Government action must be broader and simpler than the sum of analysis implies.
9. The second part rests on a belief that sample researching at micro
level (more of it, and better done), will in fact reveal common factors, common guidelines to conduct, by means of which commonsense can indeed be enlightened. This, of course, implies a belief that the local social process itself, enabled by adequate infrastructural help, but not constrained by detailed regulation, has the necessary dynamism to meet its own problems.
10. Ultimately, this means a belief in the free society.* But even relative simplicity of government action will not be achieved by simple thinking, or just saying "Participation," "Democracy." Just as clear and simple engineering design is painfullyevolved from Heath Robinson complexity, so the lines of simpler
and more effective government action will need much hard and detailed work in
elucidating local facts and problems. The tabk of the Social Scientist remains, to inform the designers of action; but the design will not follow their detailed path.
*Cf. "We all want to be God, and to manage things much better than
eliminating just these possibilities of error in which human freedom consists."

Draft Outlines of Research and Ilaxiagement
Development Programmes in the Field of
Rural Development for 1974-75
Asian Centre for Development Administration Kuala Lumpur
March, 1974

Summary of Programme Elements
This programme would undertake primarily four activities during 1974-75 :I. Organise a management development programme for senior officials.
of Asian governments for a duration of two to three weeks in the
first quarter of 1975. (For details see section II below).
II. Implement a research programme providing support to the management development programmes. The research projects listed are:
(A) A comparative study of approaches to rural development
in Asia with a view to determining their relative
(B) Study of "programme innovations" in the field of rural
development in Asian countries.
(Details of research programme given in section III below).
III. -Diffuse useful literature in the field of rural development among
scholars, administrators, and relevant institutions. An effort
would be made to undertake the following activities in this area:
(A) Prepare an annotated bibliography on rural development;
(B) Compile already published material which could be useful
for policy-making and programme implementation in the
field of rural development;
(C) Prepare and circulate a digest of significant developments
in the field of rural development.
(For details see section IV below).
IV. Collaboration with other international organisations on projects
relevant to ACDA's research interests.
(For details see section V below).

Policies and Programmes of Rural Development in Asia
The chances of improvement in the quality of life of many Asians, who mostly live in rural areas, depends upon the effectiveness of the rural development programnmes of their countries. *The effectiveness of these programmes is determined by various factors such as the extent to which they are part of a comprehensive policy and strategy of national development, the degree to which they make correct diagnosis of the causes of rural underdevelopment and mobilize and organize adequate human and material resources to overcome it.
Due to a variety of political, economic, social and administrative factors operating in different Asian countries, the rural development programmes have come to develop different characteristics and consequently achieve different degrees of effectiveness. The purpose of this management development programme is to:(a) Understand the process of conception and formulation of
policies and programmes of rural development in different
countries of Asia;
(b) Isolate the critical factors which determine their
effectiveness; and
(c) Examine the relationship between the elements of
different approaches to rural development and the
problems different countries face.
It is expected that the programme would be able to achieve the
(a) It will sensitize the participants to the critical
factors which determine the effectiveness of these
(b) It will enhance their capacity to organize, implement
and evaluate rural development programmes of their

(c) It will deepen the understanding of the participants of
the rural development programmes of Asian countries in general and those of their own countries in particular.
Contents of Programme
The central focus of this programme would be a study of why different approaches to rural development were adopted in different countries; what programme characteristics and societal conditions explain the varying impact of these approaches on rural communities;
and finally what can be done to enhance the effectiveness of different country programmes.
The following method would be used. To evaluate the impact of rural development programme, the contemporary conditions of rural communities determined through community stiidies and micro-data would be compared with conditions at an earlier historical point (say at the time of end of Second World War) to determine the extent of change that has since occurred. Such a change could be the result of the combined impact of the feroes of unplanned change and planned programmes of rural development. Independent determination of the 'impact of either would enable
the evaluation of 4he impact of the other.
The impact of rural development programmes would be evaluated in terms of their avowed goals as well ap in terms of desired developmental changes they produce including the following:(a) Impact on productivity, income distribution, poverty;
(b) Impact on rural social structures flexibility in class
structure, changes in leadership, consolidation of
community institutions;
(C) Impact on national integration (rural-urban) popular
Isolation of the factors which explain the differential impact
of rural development programme is a difficult methodological task. There aro numerous inter-related factors and it is difficult to

separate them analytically and empirically. An effort would be made to seek an explanation in terms of the content of policies governing rural development, structure and scope of these programmes, the pattern in which they are introduced mobilizational and administrative capacity of the governments, the level of socio-economic development of the country and finally the resource constraints. Hopefully, such analysis would lead to generalizations which could be helpful in reconstructing rural development programme in Asia. (For details of contents of this programme see Appendix A).
I. All participants would be requested to bring along with them
the major basic documents concerning their country programmes
as well as prepare a short paper analysing their country
II. After a period of a week's stay at Kuala Lumpur during which
they would be exposed to different approaches to rural
development, the participants would be divided into groups for field work. They would proceed to selected countries for field observations. A field observation guide would
be prepared by the group itself. After termination of the
field work, the participants would re-assemble in Kuala
Lumpur and discuss and compare their observations. Each
participant would prepare a paper on some aspect of the
country programmes he observed.
III. During the last week of the programme, the participant would
be required to prepare a critical review of their country programmes and prepare a blueprint of changes they would
Participants in this course would include officials of the following categories:-

(a) National/regional directors of the programmes of rural
(b) National/regional directors of departments of cooperation,
or local government, or agricultural extension services;
(c) Senior officials of Ministries dealing with rural development;
(d) Senior members of staff of training institutes concerned
with training for rural development.
It is expected that not more than 25 persons will participate in the programme and that more than one participant will generally be invited
from each participating country.
The course should run at least for 15-20 working days.
Follow Up
The follow up may take the following form:
(a) The participants from each country may be asked to arrange
a seminar at national/regional level and present the blueprint prepared by them at the Centre to such a semin-ar;
(b) A particular area/region may bQ selected to implement the
changes suggested;
(c) A national institute concerned with training and research
in problem of rural development should be associated with this area to evaluate the consequences and utility of the
(d) The ACDA staff should associate itself with such
experimentation and evaluate it when possible.

It is suggested that ACDA should engage in a comprehensive research programme on rural development. The importance of such a programme cannot be over-emphasized. The success of national development programmes is reflected as well as determined by the extent to which problems of rural areas, where most of the people in Asia live, are effectively tackled. But precise knowledge about these problems and the efforts made to solve them is scanty and fragmented. The purpose of this research programme would be to generate systematic and useful knowledge in this field.
Main Components of Programme
This research programme would have two basic components:(a) Comparative study of effectiveness of programmes of
rural development in Asia;
(b) Study of programme innovations in rural development in
Asian countries.
The research programme would be useful to ACDA in three different ways:(a) It will strengthen ACDA's capacity to advise Asian
Governments on formulation of policies and programme;
(b) It will provide useful and relevant material for
training programmes for Asian rural development
administrators; and

(c) It would make useful professional contributions -Lo
the body of knowledge dLaling with development.
The main purpose of this project would be to collect
systematic and useful analytical information pertaining to the
impact of rural development programmes on Asian rural communities.
An effort would be made to organize data from individual countries
in such a way that useful hypotheses about the process of rural development are generated and tested. The end-product of this
project would be a statement specifying different approaches to rural development and isolating the conditions which determine
their impact. This statement would not only be a useful academic
contribution to the field but would also provide necessary material for management development programmes at ACDA and enhance its capability to advise Asian governments on rural
development policies and programes.
The project would be divided into three phases:(a) In the first phase, a paper could be prepared by ACDA staff suggesting the research design for the survey. This paper would be presented to scholars willing to collaborate on this project.
(b) The research scholars would then conduct research, do field work where necessary and submit papers to LCDA which would be discussed in a symposium at ACDA.
(c) The revised papers would be edited and published by ACDA.
The basic foci of research interest would be the following:-

(a) Delineation of the characteristics of the rural
communities in different"countries, including social, economic and political aspects; description of major
problems of rural communities such as poverty, unemployment, low productivity, rural migration, etc.
(b) Mapping the dynamics of change; description of the
external and internal unplanned forces of change such as demographic imbalance, montization of the village
economy, penetration of mass media, increase in physical
mobility, and their impact on the traditional rural
society would be analysed.
(c) Description and analysis of programmes of planned
change. The programmes of planned change to be studied would include land reforms, local government, community
development, cooperatives, communes, peasant associations,
agricultural extension, family planning, etc. The
evaluation and analysis of these programmes would cover a brief historical review, analysis of basic assumptions
and goals, determination of their structural adequacy,
and their overall capacity to achieve the developmental
(d) Isolation of critical variables which determine the
impact of rural development on rural poverty, unemployment, maldistribution of income, productivity, popular
participation, etc.
(For statement on specific studies, see Appendix B).

The purpose of this study would be to select certain
"programme innovations" in Asia in the field of rural development
and systematically study them. This study would hopefully suggest the conditions under which such innovations emerged and made their,
impact on rural communities.
I. The innovations may include a new co-operative approach, a
new unit of local administration, or a method of implementing land reforms.
II. About two to three innovations evolved in different
countries of Asia would be selected for study.
III. Main foci of interest would be:(a) To describe the conditions under which the
innovation emerged;
(b) To describe and analyse the processes through
which such innovations overcome resistance, and
diffuse through the society;
(c) To evaluate the impact of these innovations on
development of rural areas.
I. A common research design would be developed to study
such innovations.
II. The research staff of a national research institute may
be contacted to do the field work on these innovations.
The project should not take moro than a year to complete.

ACDA is already collaborating with Social Development Division
of ECAFE. Research linkages with other organizations will be established and strengthened.
The purpose of these activities would be to inform the administrators, scholars and other agencies interested in rural development about the literature produced on the subject of rural development. Following three activities would be undertaken:A. Preparation of an annotated bibliography on rural development:(a) The bibliography would cover the published material
pertaining to all aspects of rural development in Asia;
(b) An effort would be made to include significant material
published in English and possibly in French during the
last ten years;
(c) An effort would be made to include the significant
material available in local languages if translation
facilities are available.
B. Compilation of published material for use in management development programme as well as for circulation among interested
scholars and administrators. An effort would be made to compile
material on rural development published in scholarly journals and
not easily available to Asian scholars and administrators. This
compilation would also be served as background readings for the
management development programme on rural development.
0. Preparation of biannual digest on significant developments in
the field of rural development in Asia.

Appondix A
I. Introduction to Asia Rural Community:
1. Rural communities in different Asian countries types.
(a) Ecological;
(b) Cultural and Social structural;
(c) Economic; (d) Political.
2'. Ilajor problems of Asian rural communities.
(a) Low productivity;
(b) Unemployment, underemployment;
(c) Naldistribution of income;
(d) Rural migration;
(e) Population increase;
(f) Illiteracy.
3. Effects of unplanned forces of change on Asian communities.
(a) Effect of demographic changes;
(b) Ertension of market and monetization of rural economy;
(c) Effect of mass media;
(d) Effect of increased physical mobility.

- 12,Policies and Programmes of Rural Development
Constraints and choices in policy-making for rural development:
1. Determinants of Policies of Rural DeVelopmont.
(a) Ideology and doctrine:
(i) Sources of ideology; indigenous,
transnational, international;
(ii) Regime orientations and commitments;
(b) Constraints:
(i) Economic constraints;
(ii) Political constraints;
(iii) Administrative constraints.
(c) Framework of decision-making.
2. Major Policy-models of Rural Development in Asia:
(a) L.issez faire productivity model;
(b) Limited intervention solidarity model; (c) Extensive intervention equality model.
3. Typology of programmes of rural development:
(a) Technology-oriented programmes agricultural
extension agro-based industry; assumptions,
scope, limitations, impact;
(b) Solidarity-oriented programmes community
development cooperatives, local government,
assumptions, scope, limitations, impact;
(c) Equality-oriented programmes land reforms;
assumptions, scope, limitations, impact.

Administration of Rural Development
1. Institution Building for Rural Development:
(i) Importance of institutions'in rural development.
(ii) Problems of institution building.
(iii) Strategies of institution building.
(iv) M4odels of institution building.
2. Implementation of Rural Development Prograime Major
(i) Problem of coordination between different rural
developments departments, different mechanisms
of coordination;
(ii) Problems of motivations and understanding of rural
development programmes by rural development
(iii) Training for rural development;
(iv) Relationship between rural development administration
and the local community in context of power structure;
(v) Relationship between political parties, rural development administration and local government.

- 14
Evaluation of' Rural Dovelopment Programme
1. Criteria of evaluation:
(i) Impact on productivity income distribution, creation
of opportunities for the less privileged, redistribution of resources -urban vis-a-vis rural areas.
(ii) Impact on rural social structure flexibility in
class structure, leadership changes, participation
of lower classes.
(iii) National integration (rural-urban) political
2. Determinants of impact on Rural Development:
(i) Programmatic:(a) Contents of policy; structure of programmes
and pattern of their introduction.
(ii) Administrative and mobilizational capacity of
(iii) Societal development:(a) Level of socio-economic and political development of the country.
(iv) Ecological constraints; resource endowment,
Future of Rural Development
1. Critique of existing approaches.
2. Exbcploration of alternative approaches.

Appendi, B
Research Studies to be prepared under "Comarative
Stud& of Different.Approaches to Rural DevelormenL In Asia"
There would be two types of studies under this programme:
(A) Comparative studies of similar type of programmes
in several countries and case studies of rural
development in individual countries;
(B) Country studies.
(A) Comarative Studies STUDIES TO BE PREPARiED BY ACre STA15
(Subject to availability of research assistance).
1. Basic approaches to rural development in Asia;
2. Effect of international, transnational and national
ideologies on programmes and policies of rural
3. Cooperatives and rural development in Asia; 4. Institution building for rural development.
1. Analysis of factors influencing policies of rural
2. Effects of community development programmes on
rural productivity, unemployment, distribution of
incomes and popular participation;
3, Land reforms and their impact on rural development
in Asia;
4. Effects of farm technology on productivity, unemployment, distribution of income;
5. Analysis of government policies toward rural
6. Role of peasant organisation in rural development.

- 16
(B) Country Studies
There will be two types of country studies under this programme. First, all participants in management development programmes would be requested to bring with them a short review of programmes in which they are engaged. An outline for preparing such studios would be supplied in advance. Second, there would be ten studies of country programmes prepared by professional social scientists. These studies will be distributed as follows: two on India, two on China, one on Iran, one on Philippines, one on Korea, one on Malaysia, one on Thailand and one on Pakistan. As far as possible national scholars would be asked to prepare these studies.

Agricultural Development Council, Inc.
After more than a decade of relative neglect rural development has again emerged near the top of the agenda in development policy. The President of the World Bank has pledged his organization to direct its resources toward improving the productivity and welfare of the rural poor in the poorest countries.1 The U.S. Congress has instructed the U.S. aid agency to direct its effort toward "meeting the basic needs of the poorest people in the developing countries..2
In the developing world the new concern with rural development
represents, in part, a reaction against the distortions produced by'tie production-oriented development efforts of the 1960's, which were in turn a reaction against the economic failures of rural development programs of an even earlier vintage. There are, however, major differences in the rationale and orientation between the rural development programs being initiated in many developing countries in the 1970's and those of the 1950's.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Coloquium on "New Concepts and Technologies in Third World Urbanization," University of California (Los Angeles), May 17-18, 1974, and to a seminar at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, April 4, 1974. This draft has benefited from the comments of the participants in the two seminars and from comments by David Brown, Robert Evenson, Arthur Mosher, John Mellor, Wilbur Maki, Richard Niehoff, Edward Soja, Robert Stevens.

In the 1950's the major concern was to induce rural people to substitute rational economic calculation for the dictates of custom and tradition. In the 1970's the concern is to achieve greater equity in the distribution of the gains from economic growth between urban and rural areas and between economic and social classes within rural areas.
These shifts in development thought have, however, had relatively little impact on the lives of most rural people. Large elements of the rural population have not shared at all in the impressive gains in agricultural and industrial production that have been achieved in many developing countries over the last several decades. In many areas the welfare of substantial elements of the rural population, particularly
the landless, has declined both relatively and absolutely. Most of the world's rural people continue to live in environments, and in economic and political circumstances, which are intolerable to them and which should be intolerable to the larger societies of which they are a part.
While welcoming the renewed concern with the welfare of rural people this inquiry was initiated with considerable skepticism regarding the potential achievements of rural development programs. Indeed, it represents an attempt to disprove a long standing personal hypothesis to the effect that rural development does not represent a viable project, program or plan objective.4
It would be possible to devote a good deal of effort to the development of a workable definition of rural development or of rural development programs. Such discussions have a tendency to dicotomize around the issue of whether the objective of rural development is to increase agricultural production or to increase the well-being of people living in rural areas.

Activities directed primarily toward single objectives, such as a crop production campaign, the organization of cooperative credit institutions, the extension or improvement of rural roads,, the control of malaria or cholera, or the adoption of family planning, are not included under the rural development program rubric even though their successful implementation does contribute to the wealth or welfare of rural people. This definition excludes, therefore, a number of widely publicized programs such as the intensive agricultural districts program in India, 5 and the Puebla Project .i n Mexico. 6 Rather than pursue this issue further in this paper, I refer you to the several works of Arthur T. Mosher on this topic 7 and to Table Al.

Rural Development Program Experience
The experience with attempts to implement rural development programs in poor countries, and in the poorer regions of the developed countries, does not inspire confidence in the capacity to achieve either the equity or the productivity goals that have been set before us in the new policy commitments and directives.
The aid supported community development efforts initiated in many countries in the early 1950's (in India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, for example) were by the mid-1960's in. serious trouble.8 These programs had been based on the assumption that the mobilization and development of community resources -- human and physical -- motivated by the multipurpose village worker and supplemented by credit and limited grants of materials would lead to the modernization of rural society. Program commitments to self-determination at the individual village level, where resistance to change by the traditional leadership was most strongly entrenched, tended to weaken the independence of the village level worker and to emasculate the reform objectives of the program. Nevertheless, the programs did result, in some areas, in highly visible symbols of development -- roads, schools, water supply, community centers. The community development programs were least successful in efforts designed to expand the economic base needed to support rural development -- in introducing changes in farming practices that were capable of increasing agricultural productivity or in efforts to generate employment and income through expansion of village industries. Neither the communities themselves nor the village level worker had access to the materials in which high

productivity technologies, were embodied or the knowledge or authority to institute more efficient institutional performance. 9
In many countries the establishment of new communities has been viewed as a more promising route to rural development than the reform or modernization of old communities. This has been particularly true in many Latin American countries where development of new lands on the frontier has remained technically feasible. It has also seemed a promising alternative in some areas of Southeast Asia -- in Malaysia, the outer islands of Indonesia, and the Cagayan Valley and Mindanao in the Philippines. But the record has typically been one of limited accomplishment or outright failure. In his review of the experience of 24 tropical land development projects in Latin America, Nelson concluded that, "few spheres of economic development have a history of, or reputation for, failure to match that of government-sponsored colonization in humid tropical zones. ,,OHe found that the probability of failures was directly related to the level of government participation in the organization and management of the project. Spontaneous colon-' ization was uniformly more successful than directed or semi-directed colonization. The government was much more effective in the role of organizing specific services or transportation facilities to service spontaneous settlement. And access to markets, including. hi .ghway development, appeared to be the most pervasive factor characterizing successful settlement projects (Table A2).1

The Comilla Rural Development Project
The examples cited above are typical of the experience which led in the 1960's, to widespread disillusionment with the effectiveness of many comprehensive regional and. rural-development programs. Yet these, and similar experiences, represent an incomplete, and perhaps even biased perspective on the broadly based or "integrated" rural development efforts. There are a-number of widely cited examples of successful rural or community development projects which have made effective contributions to the income and welfare of rural people.12 A number of these efforts have been patterned at least in part on the experience of the village development program of the Bangladesh (formerly Pakistan) Academy for Rural Development.13
The Academy was established in 1959 as a training center for public officials responsible for rural development programs with the primary objective of helping the officials put to more productive use the administrative and technical skills they had, and of aiding them in-the 14
acquisition of new skills needed in rural development. The program evolved out of an effort by the Academy staff to understand rural development processes in Comilla District, where the Academy is located, and to utilize development activities in the Comilla villages as a laboratory for the training activity. The program, involved three elements: (a) development of a two-tiered, village and thana, cooperative system; (b) inducing. cooperation among public agencies in labor intensive resource development efforts -- particularly irrigation, drainage and roads; and (c) development of the capacity of local government to coordinate and direct the efforts of departments responsible for civil administration and development (agriculture, water, health, education, and others).

The program was clearly successful in terms of the generation and diffusion of technical and institutional change, and in improving the welfare of rural villages in the Comilla Thana. The cooperatives proved capable of generating modest savings and in partially replacing traditional moneylenders as a source of credit. They also became effective channels of technical information about rice production practices, health practices,, and farm and cooperative management between the villagers and the technicians located at the Thana center. Many of the cooperatives also proved capable of managing capital investments such as tube wells; handling the distribution of inputs such as fertilizer, insecticides and seeds; and of organizing services such as tractor plowing. Roads, irrigation, and drainage were improved. In areas where such changes occurred the value of farm output increased; the incomes of owner and tenant cultivators grew; and land values rose in response to the greater productivity and higher incomes. And the experience gained in the Comilla Thana did have an impact on rural administration and development in a number of otbe. Thanas in East Pakistan.
After independence the Government of Bangladesh announced that the Comilla project would be utilized as the model for a national rural development program that would extend to all 413 of the nation's Thanas. Yet the content of the model that is being extended could be described more accurately as a cooperatives development program than a rural development program. And in 1974 the current Vice Chairman of the Academy appeared to be committed to a model of rural or village development that was considerably less intensive in its use of professional and technical inputs than in the original Comilla Project.

A review of the Comilla, and a number of other rural development projects, does lead to a modification of the hypothesis stated above. It clearly has been possible in a number-of situations where high levels of professional inputs directed by dedicated or inspired leadership has had access to external resources, to mobilize village level resources to accelerate rates of development in specific rural communities.
Modification of the earlier hypothesis does, however, still leave us with an unresolved puzzle. Why is it relatively easy to identify a number of relatively successful small scale or pilot rural development projects but so difficult to find examples of successful rural development programs? Where does one go for the insight needed to understand the reasons for the relative success of many rural development projects and the failure of rural development programs?
There are three bodies of literature which represent useful components of an attempt to develop a more comprehensive model designed to provide insight into-the morphology of rural development projects, programs, and processes. These include (a) the urban-industrial impact hypothesis,
(b) the theory of induced technical change; (c) the new models of institutional change drawing on the literature on institution building and on the economics of bureaucratic behavior. The urban-industrial impact hypothesis helps to clarify the relationships between the development of rural areas and the development of the total society of which rural areas are a part. It is particularly useful in understanding the spacial dimensions of rural development -- where rural development efforts are likely to be most successful. The induced technical change provides a guide to what must be done to gain access to efficient sources of economic

growth -- the new resources and incomes that are needed to sustain rural development. The models of institutional change provide insight into the possibilities and limits of how to organize rural institutions to utilize the human and physical resources available to rural communities. The Urban-Industrial Impact Hypothesis
The literature on the relationship between urban-industrial and rural development has its origins in the early efforts of Von Thunen to determine both the optimal intensity of cultivation and the optimal farm organization or combination of farm enterprises. 15 In the United States the implications of urban-industrial development for agricultural development were outlined by T. W. Schultz in the early 1950's.
The Schultz perspective can be stated in a series of three hypotheses:
"(1) Economic development occurs in a specific locational
matrix.... (2) These locational matrices are primarily industrialurban in composition.... (3) The existing economic organization
works best at or near the center of a particular matrix of
economic development and it also works best in those parts of
agriculture which are situated favorably in relation to the center."16
Schultz was particularly concerned with the development of a hypothesis that would explain the failure of agricultural production and price policies to remove the substantial regional disparities in the rate and level of development of rural areas in the United States. The rationale for the urban-industrial impact hypothesis was developed in terms of more efficient functioning of factor and product markets in areas of rapid urban-industrial development.
Formulation of the urban-industrial impact hypothesis generated a series of empirical studies designed to test both the validity of the empirical generalizations and the factor and product market rationale.17 The effect of these studies has been the development of a model of rural development in which the rural community is linked to the urban-industrial.

economy through a series of market relationships;18 (a) The product market through which the commodities produced in the rural sector are transmitted to theurban sectorand through which incomes are generated in rural areas; (b) The markets for purchased inputs through which move the capital and operating inputs, in which the new technologies are embodied, that the rural economy obtains from the industrial sector;
(c) The-labor market through which labor is allocated between the rural and urban sectors and among economic and household activities in each sector; (d) The credit and land markets through which both land and non-land assets are reallocated both between and within the urban and rural sectors; (e) The market for consumer goods and services through which rural families achieve access to or are excluded from the patterns of consumption which characterize urban families. In developing countries the markets for consumer goods and services represent an important source of change in the transition from subsistence to market agriculture.19
It is clear that both the rate of growth of the urban economy and the efficiency with which the intersector product and factor markets transmit the sources and products of productivity growth among sectors place important constraints on the possibilities of development in rural areas. Rural development in France was inhibited for a century by the stagnation in demand associated with slow growth of both population and per capita income. Neither the product market nor the labor market functioned as dynamic sources of rural development. In contrast the availability of an expanding market for livestock products in the United Kingdom was an important factor in Denmark's successful rural development

experience. The rapid economic growth in rural areas affected by the new cereals-fertilizer technology, in Taiwan and the Indian Punjab, reflects the capacity of the factor markets to deliver to rural areas the high-payoff technical inputs suited to local factor endowments. The urban-industrial impact hypothesis is also consistent with the
results reported by Nelson (Table A2) on-the sources of success and failure of colonization efforts in Latin America. It represents the implicit theoretical foundation for a number of proposals to organize rural development efforts around new towns, and. urban-industrial growth
centers or growth poles.21.
The only formal test of the urban-industrial impact hypothesis with which I am familiar in a developing country is the intensive analysis by Nicholls in the State of Sao Paulo (Brazil) for 1940-50.2 Prior to
1900 the growth of Sao Paulo was closely associated with the coffee boom that extended from 1840 to 1940. After 1940 there were clear indications that urban-industrial development was beginning to exert a differeritf-al impact on labor productivity in agriculture by facilitating the flow of capital into and the flow of labor out of agriculture. The urbanindustrial impact was limited, however, due to the locational impact of resource based opportunities for development and the failure of the Brazilian Government to invest in the research capacity and services necessary to permit the agricultural sector in Sao Paulo to respond effectively to growth in the urban-industrial sector.
The implications of the urban-industrial impact model are not
entirely congenial to the new rural development ideology. Development

processes in the contemporary rural community in a developing society can not be isolated from development processes in the larger society. Even the most intensive rural development efforts are unlikely to succeed if rural development is viewed as an alternative rather than a complement to urban-industrial- developments. Yet, acceptance of an urban-industrial impact or "growth-pole" strategy clearly implies differential rates of development among areas. This may be consistent with efficient use of development budgets. But it may also be accompanied by intensification of social and political stress. Perhaps an even more serious problem is that no one really knows how to-make the growth poles grow!

Induced Technical Change 2
The design of a successful rural development strategy involves a
unique combination of technical and institutional change. The ability of rural areas to respond. to the opportunities for economic growth generated by local urban-industrial development, or by the expansion of national and international markets, depends on the capacity for adaptive responses on the part of cultural, political and economic institutions to realize the growth potential opened up by new economic opportunities. And it depends on the capacity to transfer, adapt or invent technical innovations capable of generating substantial new income flows in response to the new economic opportunities resulting from expansion of inter-sector factor and product markets.,
During the early stages of economic development the capacity of
rural areas to successfully respond to the opportunities for growth that are potentially available to them depends critically on the achievement of rapid technical change leading to productivity growth in agriculture. Significant growth in agricultural productivity can rarely be real .ized by the reallocation of resources within traditional agricultural systems. The capacity to respond to growth opportunities becomes available primarily through technical changes embo -died in new and more efficient inputs better crop varieties, cheaper plant nutrients, and more efficient sources of power --capable of releasing the constraints on growth of agricultural output.
A critical limitation on the capacity of rural areas in most

developing countries, and in many of the backward rural areas in the hi ghly developed countries, is the-location-specific character of muchof agricultural technology. This limits the gains that can be realized by the simple transfer of agricultural technology from areas of high to areas of low productivity. A necessary condition for sustained productivity growth in agriculture is the institutionalization of experiment station capacity capable of producing a continuous stream of ecologically adapted and economically efficient technology -- consistent with resource endowments and relative factor prices - for each commodity of economic significance in each agricultural region.
The evidence is relatively clear that alternative paths of technical change in agriculture can be made available (Figure A3). Technology can be developed to facilitate the substitution of relatively abundant (hence cheap) factors for relatively scarce (hence expensive) factors. The constraints imposed on agricultural development by an inelastic supply of land may be offset by advances in biological or biological and chemical technology (as in Japan). The constraints imposed by an inelastic supply of labor may be offset by advances in mechanical technology (as in the United States).
Failure to invest in the experiment station capacity necessary to effectively loosen the constraints imposed by resource endowments can effectively limit a region's-'capacity to respond to new economic opportunities. The effect of such failure during the initial stages of development is that the agricultural sector fails to become a source of the new income streams needed to generate growth in rural communities

and in the regional economy. The effect of such failure during the later stages of development is a widening gap between economic well-being among rural areas and between urban and rural areas. The result is the emergence of stranded populations -- people left behind -- in the Appalachias, the Mezzogiorono, Northeast Brazil, the Deccan Plateau, and other lagging regions.

Models of Institutional Innovation
The stress in the last two sections on the role of inter-sector factor and product markets, and the role of technical change induced by market forces which reflect regional resource endowments, should not be taken to imply that rural development can be left to an "invisible hand" that directs either technical or institutional change along an "efficient patV.
Improvements in the welfare of rural people in poor countries, and in poor regions, will require institutional innovations which effectively link urban and rural areas through a series of non-market, as well as market, relationships. These non-market relationships
focus primarily on (a) the investment in rural people and in the amenities that are necessary to improve both productivity and the quality of life in poor communities -- particularly in.the areas of education and health, and (b) modifications in the institutional infrastructure necessary to enable rural people to mobilize both the economic and political resources that are potentially available to them.
The returns to investment in the capacity of rural people is shaped
by development. Almost all rural people in poor countries enter the