A cross-cutting analysis of agricultural research, extension, and education (AG REE) in AID-assisted LAC countries

Material Information

A cross-cutting analysis of agricultural research, extension, and education (AG REE) in AID-assisted LAC countries
Byrnes, Kerry J., 1945-
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. -- Rural Development Division
Agriculture and Rural Development Technical Services Project
Chemonics (Firm)
Place of Publication:
Washington D.C
LAC TECH, Agriculture and Rural Development Technical Services Project
Publication Date:
Physical Description:
v. : ; 28 cm.


Subjects / Keywords:
Agriculture -- Research -- Latin America ( lcsh )
Agriculture -- Research -- Caribbean Area ( lcsh )
Agricultural education -- Latin America ( lcsh )
Agricultural education -- Caribbean Area ( lcsh )
Agricultural extension work -- Latin America ( lcsh )
Agricultural extension work -- Caribbean Area ( lcsh )
Agriculture ( jstor )
Funding ( jstor )
Educational research ( jstor )
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )


Includes bibliographical references.
General Note:
"February 1992."
General Note:
"Submitted to U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Office of Development Resources, Rural Development Division, LAC/DR/RD."
General Note:
On cover: "LAC TECH Agriculture and Rural Development Technical Services Project, AID/LAC/DR/RD, Chemonics International, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture."
Electronic resources created as part of a prototype UF Institutional Repository and Faculty Papers project by the University of Florida.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Kerry J. Byrnes.

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Full Text
Kerry J. Byrnes
Submitted to:
U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean Office of Development Resources Rural Development Division LACIDRIRD
February 1992

Kerry J. Byrnes2
Submitted to:
U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean Office of Development Resources Rural Development Division LACIDRIRD
February 1992
'The ideas expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) or Chemonics International. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
2Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Advisor, Latin American and Caribbean Agriculture and Rural Development Technical Services (LAC TECH) Project, Chemonics International, Washington, D.C. LAC TECH is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.


The Agency for International Development (AID) has helped strengthen agricultural research, extension, and Box 1. 1987 Per Capita Food Production education (Ag REE) systems in the Latin American and A I D -Assisted LAC Countries
Caribbean (LAC) region since the early 1950s. Despite successes in building public Ag REE institutions LAC SUB-REGION
between the 1950s and 1970s, the region's technology ANDEAN
generation and transfer (TG&T) capacity deteriorated Bolivia
significantly during the 1980s, weakening agriculture's Ecuador I
capacity to contribute to food security, trade, and Peru 3
economic growth in the region. To reverse this trend, CARIBBEAN
a "demand-driven" (market-led) TG&T process needs to Dominican Republic I
be created. Potential assistance options for fostering Haiti
emergence of "demand-driven" Ag REE systems Jamaica
" Prioritizing Ag REE in the LAC Bureau's Agricul- Costa Rica
ture and Natural Resources strategy; El Salvador
* Reorienting existing and planned projects to adhere Guatemala
more closely to guidelines for Ag REE-strengthening; Honauraa
* Ensuring balanced AID support for international, Nicaragua
reional, and national agricultural research systems; Panama U
" Providing appropriate technical support through -30 -0o -1o 1 20
existing or new projects or funding mechanisms; and Percent Below or Above 1g79181 Lel
" Organizing development assistance programming for Ag REE in terms of sub-regional programs.
CONTINUING FOOD INSECURITY Box 2. Growth in Cereal Imports
A I.D -Assisted LAC Countries
AID assistance in the LAC region aims at broad-based, sustainable economic growth that provides for improved LAC SUB-REGION food security. Yet the two basic requirements for food ANDEAN
security are not being met in AID-assisted LAC Bolivia 1974
countries: (1) total food supply is still not adequate in a Ecuador 1987
number of countries to provide sufficient calories to all Peru
of the population, even if the total supply were divided CARIBBEAN
equally: and (2) poor households do not produce or Dominican Republic
cannot afford to buy enough food to enable their Haiti
members to lead active and healthy lives. Jamaica
Increases in food availability have lagged in comparison CENTRAL AMERICA with growth in national incomes. This chronic food in- Costa Rica
security is the result of low agricultural productivity. El Salvador
Poor labor and land productivity result in low levels of Guatemala
food supplies, limited marketing of surplus food, and Hondurt.
cash incomes insufficient to stimulate demand for addi- Nicaragua l
tional farm and non-farm goods and services. Further, Panama
most AID-assisted LAC countries during the 1980s 0 0.6 1 1.6 2
experienced both a decline in per capita food production Cereal __t. (Million MT)
(Box 1) and a growth in cereal imports (Box 2).

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY DECLINING These declines have made it more difficult for public A
Broad-based, sustainable economic growth depends on REE systems to reverse the deterioration in the region' creating a macroeconomic and policy environment food production capability and agriculture's contribution conducive to investing in agriculture. It also depends to economic growth. Further, unfavorable terms o trade have provided no incentive for investment in agrion: (1) generating productivity-increasing technologies c I
thatareresonsie t maket ppotunties famer culture or for farmers to seek alternative productivitythat are responsive to market opportunities, farmer inrangtcolie.EninoureswreA
9 increasing technologies. Even in countries where AID production, and marketing constraints, and (2) farmers' has helped to establish a more favorable macroeconomic willingness and ability to adopt these technologies, and policy environment (e.g., Bolivia), weakened Ag
The paramount function of a country's Ag REE system, REE systems cannot respond vigorously to the improved including public and/or private components, is to gen- environment. 3
rate and transfer the agricultural technology essent.for increasing agricultural productivity and agriculture's TG&T CAPACITY DETERIORATING contribution to economic growth. The Ag REE system To provide an up-to-date assessment of the status of As also helps develop the human resources needed in the REE systems in AID-assisted LAC countries, AID agricultural sector. conducted a survey of its LAC Missions. Mission surn
Despite the potential importance of TG&T to economic vey responses reflected the limited progress and freU growth in the LAC region, public sector investment in quent inadequacies of public sector Ag REE systems as Ag REE in the region declined significantly during the well as numerous constraints impeding greater system 1980s. Declines in host-country public funding for ag- productivity. U
ricultural research were paralleled by declines in AID Mission ratings of progress in strengthening selected Afunding for Ag REE. In FY84-FY91, LAC Mission REE system attributes indicated that progress has beei
Agricultural. Rural Development, and Nutrition greatest for private sector TG&T. By comparison, the (ARDN) funding for Ag REE declined both absolutely progress ratings for public sector Ag REE system attriand as a percentage of total ARDN funding (Box 3). butes were consistently lower, with public sector agri cultural research and extension receiving below averag ratings and agricultural education, on average, rate Box 3. Ag REE Funding as a Percentage of Total lower than the other three categories. U
LAC ARDN Funding. Generally, the Missions rated the adequacy of selected
FY RES EXT EDU public sector Ag REE system attributes (personnel marn
agement, program planning, and budgeting) as "pool Andean: to "very poor," although numbers of persons trained for
88 16.3 15.9 4.0 public research and extension fared somewhat better.3
89 26.6 28.9 6.0
90 12.3 16.9 1.4 The following constraints to Ag REE-strengthening were
91 2.7 4.0 0.3 identified from the survey responses:
Caribbean: 9 The primary constraint is client-country factors (e.g!
88 8.3 17.4 0.0 weak public sector);
89 10.4 20.0 5.8
90 23.2 17.9 6.1 e The secondary constraint is AID policy directive
91 24.7 21.3 3.9 (e.g.. export-led development strategy); and
Central The tertiary constraint is Mission inadequacies (e.g3
America: Mission lacks adequate staff to deal with Ag REE).
88 15.6 10.3 5.5 There was a marked tendency by Missions not to ra
89 3.6 7.7 10.3
90 3.6 4.5 0.9 lack of demand for technology as a constraint. TIU
91 0.5 2.4 0.8 suggests that Missions perceive lack of supply of technology (or its transfer to farmers), not lack of demand as the primary constraint. U
ii !

TRENDS IN AG REE-STRENGTHENING for fostering emergence of demand-driven Ag REE
systems include:
In the 1980s, AID strategy in the LAC region moved
from support for institution building of public Ag REE Setting priorities for Ag REE in the LAC Bureau's systems, toward institution building of private sector Agriculture and Natural Resources strategy systems (e.g., agricultural research foundations).
Including development assistance funding for Ag
The changing institutional focus of AID assistance was REE in terms of sub-regional programs also accompanied by changing commodity priorities, as
AID turned from traditional food crops to nontraditional Ensuring balanced AID support for international, agricultural export (NTAE) crops. regional, and national agricultural research systems
While several Missions are developing projects with Ag Providing appropriate technical support through REE components, Mission responses to the survey did existing or new projects or funding mechanisms not evidence that Ag REE strengthening is an integral
part of Agency strategy. Also, an appraisal of the Ag Reorienting existing and planned projects to adhere REE-strengthening efforts of other donors and more closely to guidelines for Ag REE-strengthening
development assistance agencies (e.g., World Bank and
ISNAR) reflects that Ag REE-strengthening in AID- Placing the issue of Ag REE-strengthening on the assisted LAC countries is not a high priority. Finally, policy dialogue agenda in AID-assisted LAC while several International Agricultural Research countries (e.g., greater autonomy and budget support Centers (IARCs) are located in the LAC region, the for agricultural research) IARC mandate does not include strengthening national- Further, TG&T organizations must develop program level agricultural research, extension, and education selection criteria that include, imer alia, the anticipated systems. market environment and the expected costs and benefits
Too often AID has relied on a "supply-oriented" of program alternatives, the relative importance of approach aimed at strengthening the ability of Ag REE crops, the specific needs and abilities of client groups, organizations to carry out TG&T, without adequate and the specific mix of public and private funding that attention to the basic macroeconomic, policy, and insti- is required for sustaining Ag REE systems. tutional disincentives to investment in agriculture and These recommendations, if adopted by AID, can help to productivity-increasing technology. This. in turn. establish the conditions for emergence of demand-driven constrains the value of developing productive TG&T Ag REE systems in the LAC region. Once these capability in public and/or private Ag REE systems. conditions have been created, a more favorable environBy the time the LAC region turned its attention to mac- ment will exist for design and implementation of projroeconomic and policy' constraints to economic growth ects focused on strengthening Ag REE. Absent these in agriculture, AID assistance for public Ag REE conditions, it is futile for AID to seek to implement a institution building was being or had been terminated, capacity building approach to Ag REE-strengthening. In the process, AID overlooked the lesson learned that
strengthening TG&T capability is a long-term process of
human resource development and institution building
that must include collaboration and support of both The author, Keny 1. Byrnes, is Agricultural Research, public and private sectors. Extension. and Education Advisor for the LAC
Agriculture and Rural Development Technical Services
RECOMMENDATIONS Project (LAC TECH), Chemonics International. This
report was prepared for the U.S. Agency for International
To reverse the deterioration in the TG&T capacity of Development's Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Office of Development Resources, Rural
AID-assisted LAC countries, the client countries and the Development Division (LAC/DR/RD), February 1992. Agency need to begin to identify ways to facilitate the
emergence of demand-driven (market-led) TG&T in the
region's Ag REE systems. Potential assistance options


Table of Contents v
List of Boxes ix
List of Tables ix
List of Figures xiii
List of Acronyms xv
Acknowledgements xix
A. Objective of Report 1
B. Organization of Report 1
C. The Strategic Role of Ag REE-Strengthening 2
1. Some Measures of Poverty in the LAC Region 2
2. AID/Washington LAC Bureau Objectives 4
3. Role of Ag REE-Strengthening 5
4. Implications for LAC/DR/RD Programming 8
A. General Trends in LAC ARDN Funding for Ag REE 15.
1. Funding Trends over Time 23
2. Funding Trends by Subregion 24
3. Funding Trends by Country within Subregions 28
4. Major Trends 31
B. Other Donor Funding & Activity for LAC
Ag REE-Strengthening 31
1. Donor Support for International Agricultural Research Center (IARCs) 31
2. Donor Support for NARS 36
3. Limits of Strengthening NARS through IARCs 44
4. U.S. Government PL-480 Local Currency Generations 47

A. Historical Overview 53
B. Strengthening TG&T Capability of Ag REE
Institutions 67
1. Andean Region 68
2. Caribbean Region 74
3. Central American Region 79
C. Evolution of AID Strategy for Ag Ree-Strengthening 89
1. Growth vs Equity 90
2. Private vs Public 91
3. Implementation Support vs Institutional Development 92
4. Regional vs National systems of Education 92
5. Market Orientation vs Commodity Orientation in Research 93
6. Technology Transfer systems vs Public Sector Extension 94
7. Market-researched vs Preconceived TG&T Models 94
8. Broad Focus on Natural Resource/Environmental Sustainability vs Narrow Focus on Soil conservation 94
9. Policy Environment: Changeable Variable vs Unchangeable Given 94
10. Donor Interest vs Country Need 95
A. Introduction 97
B. Progress of Ag Ree Organizations 97
C. Adequacy of Public Agricultural Research and
Extension 101
1. Public Sector Agricultural Research 101
2. Public Sector Agricultural Extension 104

D. Constraints to Strengthening Public Sector Ag REE 108
1. Constraints Internal to Public Sector 108
2. -Constraints. Internal to.USAID. Mission 110
E. Summary of Status of ag REE Systems in the
LAC Region 112
1. Progress of Ag REE Systems 112
2. Adequacy of Public Ag REE Organizations 112
3. Constraints to Public Ag Research and Extension 112
A. Trends in Funding for Ag REE-Strengthening 121
1. Andean Region 123
2. Caribbean Region 124
3. Central American Region 125
B. Current Mission Projects Having Ag REE Components 126
1. Andean Region 126
2. Caribbean Region 127
3. Central American Region 129
C. ARDO Program-Level Performance Monitoring System 131
1. Andean Region 131
2. Caribbean Region 131
3. Central American Region 132
D. Mission Strategy for Ag REE-Strengthening 133
1. Andean Region 133
2. Caribbean Region 135
3. Central American Region 136
E. Management Questions Facing the Mission 139
1. Andean Region 139
2. Caribbean Region 140
3. Central American Region 140
F. Non-project Assistance 142

G. Opportunities To Be Pursued 143
1. Andean Region 143
2. Caribbean Region 143
3. Central American Region 144
H. Summary 145
1. Trends in Funding for Ag REE-Strengthening 145
2. Current Mission Projects Having Ag REE Components 146
3. ARDO Program-level Performance Monitoring System 147
4. Mission Strategy for Ag REE-Strengthening 147
5. Management Questions Facing the Mission 149
6. Non-project Assistance 151
7. Opportunities To Be Pursued 152
A. Need for Demand-driven Agricultural TG&T 155
B. Conditions for a Demand-driven Ag REE System 158
C. Functions of a Demand-driven Ag REE system 162
1. Research 162
2. Extension 163
3. Education 164
D. Implications for a Demand-driven Ag Ree System 164
A. Potential Assistance Options 168
1. Prioritization of Ag REE-Strengthening"
in LAC ANR Strategy 168
2. Guidelines for Ag REE-Strengthening 171
3. Balancing Support for IARCs, RARCs, and NARS 173
4. Technical Support 175
5. Subregional Programs 176
B. Overview of Assistance Options for Ag REE-Strengthening 177

Box 2. 1. Summary of the Major Changes in the LAG ARDN
Portfolio during FY88-FY91 32
Box 2.2. Summary of 1989 ISNAR, Activities in the LAG
Region 41
Box 3. 1. Experience of the U.S. Land Grant Model in
the LAG Region 57
Box 3.2. Consequences of the Privatization of Agricultural
Research in the LAG Region 63
Box 3.3. The Latin American Model of Decentralized Public
Sector Agricultural Research 64
Box 3.4. An Observer's View of R&D Capability in the LAG
Region 66
Box 6. 1. The Rise and Fall of a Supply-Driven Concept of
TG&T in the LAG Region 156
Box 7. 1. The Small Farmer Cash Income/ Purchasing Power
Constraint 170
Box 7.2. Six Strategic Priorities for Achieving Sustainable
Economic Growth in the LAG Region 171
Table 1. 1. Performance of Agricultural Sector in AIDAssisted LAG Countries 9
Table 1.2. Agricultural Research Indicators in the
LAG Region 11
Table 1.3. National Agricultural Research Resources in
the LAG Region--Expressed as 1980-1985 Averages 12

Table 2.1. Percent Distribution of AID Obligations in the
LAC Region for ARDN Purpose Categories Relating
-Directly to Agricultural -Research, Extension, and Education 16
Table 2.2. Percent Distribution of AID Obligations in
ARDN Portfolio by Purpose Category (FY84-FY89) 17
Table 2.3. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic
Funding Categories (FY88-FY91): $'000 21
Table 2.4. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic
Funding Categories (FY88-FY91): Percentages 22
Table 2.5. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic Funding
Categories (FY88-FY9 1): $'000 by Subregion 25
Table 2.6. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic
Funding Categories (FY88-FY91): Percentages by Subregion 26
Table 2.7. Trends in LAC ARDN Funding for Agricultural
Re.,earch, Extension, and Education: Comparison Across Subregions 27
Table 2.8. Subregional Trends in LAC ARDN Funding for Agricultural
Research, Extension, and Education by Subregion: Comparison Across Categories for Each Subregion 27
Table 2.9. FY89 ARDN Funding for Agricultural Research,
Extension, and Education by Country in Each LAC Subregion: $'000 29
Table. 2.10. Regional Pattern of USAID Mission Investment
in Ag REE as a Percent of FY89 ARDN Resources 31
Table 2.11. U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Grant Funding to LAC International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) 35

Table 2.12. World Bank-Assisted Projects with Agricultural
Research Components in the LAC Region (1981-1987) 37
Table 2.13. ISNAR Activities (Reviews of NARS and Collaboration
in Research Planning and Implementation) in the LAC Region through 1990 42
Table 2.14. ISNAR Collaboration with National Agricultural
Research Systems (NARS) in System-Building Activities 43
Table 2.15. U.S. Government PL-480 Title I Local Currency
Generations in LAC AID-Assisted Countries (FY86-FY90) 50
Table 2.16. Food Insecure Countries 51
Table 3.1. National Research Institutes Created Since 1957 in
Latin America 54
Table 3.2. AID-Funded Agricultural University Institution
Building Programs in the LAC Region 58
Table 4.1. LAC Subregional Averages of USAID Mission Ratings
of Progress of Ag REE Organizations 98
Table 4.2. USAID Mission Ratings of Progress of AID-Assisted
LAC Countries in Developing Agricultural REE Organizations 99
Table 4.3. LAC Subregional Averages of USAID Mission Ratings
of Adequacy of Public Sector Organization Having Primary Responsibility for Agricultural Research 102
Table 4.4. Adequacy of Public Sector Agricultural Research
Organization in AID-Assisted LAC Countries 103
Table 4.5. LAC Subregional Averages of USAID Mission Ratings
of Adequacy of Public Sector Organization Having Primary Responsibility for Agricultural Extension 106

Table 4.6. Adequacy of Public Sector Agricultural Extension
Organizations in AID-Assisted LAC Countries 107
Table 4.7. LAC Subregional Averages of USAID Mission Ratings
of Constraints (to Improving Ag REE) Internal to Public Sector Organizations 109
Table 4.8. LAC Subregional Averages of USAID Mission Ratings
of Constraints (to Improving Ag REE) Internal to USAID/Country Mission 111
Table 4.9. Rank Order of Severity of Adequacy of Public
Agricultural Research and Extension Systems in AIDAssisted LAC Countries 113
Table 4. 10. Summation of USAID Mission Ratings of Constraints
to Improving Ag REE in Public Sector Organizations 115
Table 4.11. Relative Importance of Constraints to Improving
Ag REE in Public Sector Organizations in AIDAssisted LAC Countries 117
Table 4.12. Rank Order of Constraints to Strengthening Public
Agricultural Research and Extension in AID-Assisted LAC Countries 118
Table 4.13. Comparison of Rank Order of Adequacy of Public
Agricultural Research and Extension (PARE) Systems and Magnitude of Constraints to Strengthening PARE Systems in AID-Assisted LAC Countries 119
Table 5. 1. USAID Mission Funding Trends for Ag REE in AIDAssisted LAC Countries during the 1980s 121
Table 6. 1. Typology of Producers for Defining a Client-Oriented
TG&T Strategy 161

Figure 1.1. Role of the Agricultural Research, Extension, and
Education (REE) System Relative to LAC/DR/RD Goals and Objectives 6
Figure 1.2. Per Capita Food Production in AID-Assisted LAC
Countries 7
Figure 1.3. Growth in Cereal Imports to AID-Assisted LAC
Countries 7
Figure 2.1. Total ARDN Obligations (FY84-FY89) Toward ARDN Focus
Statement Goals for the LAC Region 18
Figure 2.2. LAC ARDN Obligations (FY84-FY89) by Purpose Category 19
Figure 2.3. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic
Funding Categories 33
Figure 2.4. World Bank Lending, 1966-1988 38
Figure 3.1. Historical Evolution of Agricultural Research and
Extension Organizational Models in the LAC Region 56
Figure 7.1. Assistance Options for Ag REE-Strengthening in the
LAC Region 178


AD Agribusiness Development Project (El Salvador and Guatemala)
ADF Agricultural Development Foundation (Dominican Republic)
AE Agricultural Education Project (Ecuador and Jamaica)
Ag REE Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education
AID -United States. Agency-for.International -Development
ANACAFE National Coffee Association (Guatemala)
AP Agroforestry Program Project (Haiti)
APENN Nicaraguan Non-Traditional Agricultural Growers and Exporters
ARDN Agriculture, Rural Development, and Nutrition
AREE Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Project (Ecuador)
AST Agricultural Sector Training Project (Dominican Republic)
ATT Agricultural Technology Transfer Project (Peri)
BABCO Belize Agribusiness Company
CAC Commercialization of Alternative Crops Project (Belize)
CARDI Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute (Trinidad)
CARE Caribbean Agricultural Research and Extension Project (RDO/C)
CATIE Tropical Agricultural Research and Training Center (Costa Rica)
CBGA Caribbean Basin Growers Association Project (proposed)
CDRA Agricultural Research and Documentation Center (Haiti)
CENTA Agricultural Technology Center (El Salvador)
CIAT International Center for Tropical Agriculture (Colombia)
CIAT/IBTA Tropical Agricultural Research Center of IBTA (Santa Cruz, Bolivia)
CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (Mexico)
CINDE Costa Rican Coalition of Development Initiatives
CINDE/DIVAGRI Agricultural Division of CINDE (Costa Rica)
CIP International Potato Center (Peri)
CRDP Chapare Regional Development Project (Bolivia)
DESFIL Development Strategies for Fragile Lands Project (S&T/RD)
DIA General Directorate of Agricultural Research, MAG (Costa Rica)
DIA/SEA Department of Agricultural Research of SEA (Dominican Republic)
DOA/RD Department of Agricultural Research-Research Division (MOA of
EAP Pan American Agricultural School (Zamorano) (Honduras)
EARTH Agricultural School for the Rural Humid Tropics (Costa Rica)
ENA National School of Agriculture (El Salvador)
FEPADE Entrepreneurial Foundation for Educational Development (El Salvador)
FHIA Honduran Agricultural Research Foundation
FPX Federation of Agricultural and Agroindustrial Producers and Exporters
of Honduras
FUNDAGRO Foundation for Agricultural Development (Ecuador)
FUNDEAGO Foundation of Agricultural Development (Peri)

FUSADES Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development
DIVAGRO Agricultural Division of FUSADES (El Salvador)
GEXPRONT Non-Traditional Products Exporters Association (Guatemala)
GREXPAN Non-Traditional Agricultural Producers and Exporters Association
HADS Highlands Agricultural Development Project (Guatemala)
HARF Honduran Agricultural Research Foundation Project
IARC International Agricultural Research Center
IBTA -Bolivian Institute of Agricultural Technology
ICTA Agricultural Science and Technology Institute (Guatemala)
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IDIAP Panamanian Institute of Agricultural Research
IICA Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (Costa Rica)
INIAA National Institute for Agricultural and Agro-Industrial Research (Peril)
INIAP National Institute of Agricultural Research (Ecuador)
IPM Integrated Pest Management Project (ROCAP)
ISNAR International Service for National Agricultural Research
ISA Superior Institute of Agriculture (Dominican Republic)
JACC Joint Agricultural Coinvestment Council (Dominican Republic)
JADF Jamaican Agricultural Development Foundation
JARP Jamaica Agricultural Research Project
JSA Jamaica School of Agriculture
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LAC/DR/RD Division of Rural Development, Office of Development Resources,
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, AID LAC TECH Agriculture and Rural Development Technical Support (ARDTS)
Ct- :t
LD .:ock Development Project (Belize)
LUPE Lanc Use Productivity Enhancement (Honduras)
MAG Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Nicaragua)
MIDA Ministry of Agricultural Development (Panamd)
MOA Ministry of Agriculture (generic)
NARS National Agricultural Research Systems
NRM National Resources Management
NTAE Non-Traditional Agricultural Export (NTAE) Technical Support Project
(Costa Rica)
NPSA Non-Project Sector Assistance (generic)
OFWM On-Farm Water Management Project (Dominican Republic)
PAO Private Agricultural Producer Organizations Project (Bolivia)
PNIA National Program of Agricultural Research (Ministry of Natural
Resources, Honduras)
PROEXAG Non-Traditional Agricultural Export Support Project (Guatemala)
PVO Private Voluntary Organization (generic)
RAHE Regional Agricultural Higher Education (ROCAP)
RARC Regional Agricultural Research Center
RDO/C Regional Development Office for the Caribbean

ROCAP Regional Office for Central America and Panaml
RTTS Rural Technology Transfer Systems Project (Ecuador)
SEA Secretary of State for Agriculture (MOA of Dominican Republic)
SERA Agricultural Research Division of the MOA (Haiti)
SRN Ministry of Natural Resources (Honduras)
TG&T Technology Generation and Transfer
TROPRO West Indies Tropical Produce Support Project (RDO/C)
TSP Technical Support Project (generic)
TWM Target,Watershed Management Project (Haiti)
UNA National Agrarian University (Perd)
UWI University of the West Indies (Trinidad)
WM Water Management Project (El Salvador)


The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of a number of people who contributed in one way or another to this study.
-Roberta Van Haeften, LAC TECH -Food Needs Advisor. provided data for Chapter I.C on LAC region food trends (Figures 1.2 and 1.3).
Tom Scarlet, LAC/DR/RD summer intern, and Peter Theil of PPC/PP/RPA provided the data on which the analysis of ARDN funding trends in Chapter II is based. Tom provided the initial round of data for the FY88-FY91 period. Peter provided updated data on the final figures for FY89 obligations. Joanna Bressel, LAC TECH administrative assistant, prepared the Lotus spreadsheet tables. Tim Lavelie and Ben Hoskins of FVAIFP provided the data on the PL-480 program in the LAC region (Table 2.13). Data on other donor funding for agricultural research were provided by Hennie Deboeck of the Secretariat of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and by Carlos Enrique Ampuero of the Inter-American Development Bank. Helpful information also was provided by John McIntire and Anthony Pritchard of The World Bank.
Dan Seyler, Development Information Division, Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) provided the printouts on which Chapter III.B and Annex A are based. Anne Langhaug of LAC/DPP (assigned from CDIE) assisted in obtaining a set of the Country Development Strategy Statements (CDSSs) for all LAC USAID Missions from the late 1970s to the present. Data on trends in USAID Mission strategies vis-4-vis agricultural research, extension, and education are summarized in Annex A.
Various staff persons of LAC/DR/RD provided suggestions for improving the design of the questionnaire for the LAC/DR/RD survey of LAC Mission Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Projects/Programs (Annex C). Aud6n Trujillo, John Fasullo, Mike Korin, and Gale Rozell provided suggestions for improving the questionnaire. Joanna Bressel, LAC TECH Administrative Assistant, reproduced the questionnaire and sent it by international courier to the 13 LAC USAID Missions.
The staff in the Agriculture and Rural Development Offices of 13 LAC USAID
Missions did a great job in completing the lengthy survey questionnaire. Without their input, the cross-cutting analyses (Chapters IV and V) and the country case studies (Annex D) would not have been possible. The key persons in this respect, by Mission, were:
Andean Region
Bolivia: Darell McIntyre and Jonathan A. Sleeper
Ecuador: Richard J. Peters, David L. Alverson, Marco Pefiaherrera, and
Fausto Maldonado
Per: Rudolfo R. Griego

Caribbean Region
Dominican Republic: Kenneth Wiegand
Haiti: David Atteberry
Jamaica: Mark Smith, Barbara Ellington-Banks, and Mark Nolan
RDO/C: Timothy J. Miller
Central American
Belize: .Elizadia. Washington,. FredHunter,.and AI-Hankins
Costa Rica: Ross Wherry
El Salvador: Kenneth C. Ellis
Guatemala: Roberto Castro
Honduras: Dwight Steen and D. Craig Anderson
ROCAP Ronald V. Curtis, Richard L. Hughes, and Jeffrey H. Allen
Albert "Scaff" Brown, LAC TECH agricultural policy advisor, played a key role in providing insight on the history of AID development assistance for agricultural research, extension, and education (Chapter III.A) and in stimulating the discussion in Chapter VI of the concept of a demand-driven Ag REE system. His contributions also are noted in Annex I regarding the possibility of a ROCAP-funded project to support agricultural research and agricultural higher education in Central America.
Gary Hansen of PPC/CDIE/PPE provided information on the endowment mechanism which several AID-assisted LAC countries are seeking to develop as a way to fund agricultural research. Information on the efforts of several USAID Missions to develop endowments is presented in Annex F.
LAC/DRIRD staff who provided useful feedback on drafts of the report include Wayne Nilsestuen (Chief) and Mike Korin, Joe Salvo, and John Dorman.
At Chemonics International, Scaff Brown, Jim Chapman, Ivo Kraljevic, and LAC
TECH program manager Candace Conrad provided suggestions for improving the report, and John Hanson provided editing services.
I also wish to express my appreciation to Francis C. Byrnes who provided various background documents and read and edited several of the draft chapters.


A. Objective of Report
-During the 45 plus years since World -War II, the U.S...Agency for International Development (AID or USAID) or predecessor agencies have provided funding for development assistance programs to strengthen agricultural research, extension, and/or education (Ag REE) in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region. This report reviews and assesses this development assistance in regard to Ag REE's current status in the LAC region, with the objective of identifying the direction, if any, that AID-funded development assistance should take during the 1990s with respect to the issue of strengthening Ag REE in the LAC region.
B. Organization of Report
The report consists of Volume 1: Technical Report and the accompanying Volume 2: Annexes. In the present volume, Chapters I to V provide a reference resource that the reader may use to review and document the evolution of AID assistance for Ag REEstrengthening in the LAC region. Chapters VI-VII are forward-looking: Chapter VI focuses on the direction that Ag REE-strengthening efforts should take and Chapter VII provides a range of potential assistance options that AID could elect to undertake, moving in the direction indicated in Chapter VI.
The balance of Chapter I, beginning with section C, provides an overview of the
current development status of the LAC region, with particular emphasis placed on the degree of poverty characterizing the region, the objectives of AID's Bureau for Latin-America and the Caribbean (LAC), and the role of Ag REE-strengthening in addressing these objectives.
Chapter II reviews funding trends from FY84 to FY91 in the AID LAC Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition (ARDN) portfolio. The chapter provides: (1) an analysis of trends in AID funding for Ag REE in the LAC region, and (2) an overview of other donor activities vis-a-vis LAC Ag REE-strengthening.
Chapter III identifies the principal variables that have defined the course of evolution during the 1980s of AID strategy and project approaches to Ag REE-strengthening in the LAC region. The discussion is based on analyses of AID documents that provide information on the Ag REE components of ARDN-funded projects of the LAC USAID Missions during the 1980s. This documentation includes project summaries, Logical Frameworks, project evaluations, and Country Development Strategy Statements (CDSSs). Based on these analyses, the major substantive changes in strategy and project approach that occurred during the 1980s are identified. Annex A summarizes the relevant material drawn

from USAID CDSSs, while Annex B provides a summary of the Ag REE components of USAID Mission projects during the 1980s.
Chapter IV provides an analysis of LAC USAID Mission assessments of the status of Ag REE in the LAC region. The analysis is based on Mission responses to an LAC/DR/RD Survey of LAC Mission Ag REE projects/programs. The survey was conducted by LAC/DR/RD's LAC TECH project during the summer of 1990. A copy of the survey questionnaire is provided in Annex C. The survey provided the basis for preparing both Mission-specific -case sra. iies (see -Annex D)-as-well-as-Chapter IV's analysis -of Mission assessments of the progress of, adequacy of, and constraints on Ag REE systems in AIDassisted LAC countries. The chapter includes both subregional (Andean, Caribbean, Central American) and cross-cutting analyses of the status of Ag REE in the LAC region. Finally, the chapter summarizes the problems that must be addressed in order to increase the effective impact of development assistance for Ag REE-strengthening in the LAC region.
Chapter V provides a summary of Mission survey responses describing each
Mission's own strategy. program, and plans with respect to Ag REE-strengthening in the Mission's host country. Specifically, the chapter reviews each Mission's assessment of trends in Mission funding for Ag REE-strengthening; provides a summary description of current Mission projects having an Ag REE component; indicates whether the Mission Agriculture and Rural Development Office has a program-level monitoring and evaluation system; summarizes the Mission' strategy, if any, for Ag REE-strengthening; identifies key management questions of concern to the Mission with respect to Ag REE-strengthening; notes Mission-identified opportunities that should be pursued by the Mission or by other donors with respect to Ag REE-strengthening; and summarizes the Mission's position, if any, on non-project assistance vis-a-vis Ag REE-strengthening.
Chapter VI focuses on the concept of a demand-driven Ag REE system. The chapter discusses the need for a demand-driven Ag REE system; essential conditions for establishing a demand-driven agricultural technology generation and transfer (TG&T) system; and the research, extension, and education functions essential for carrying out agricultural TG&T within an Ag REE system, albeit public, private, or a combination of these.
Chapter VII provides a range of potential assistance options that AID could elect to facilitate the emergence of a demand-driven Ag REE systems in the LAC region. In effect, the chapter identifies potential ways in which AID become more proactive in helping to ensure that broad-based economic growth in the LAC region is not precluded by a failure to address the need for strengthening the TG&T capacity of the region's Ag REE systems.
C. The Strategic Role of Ag REE-Strengthening
1. Some Measures of Poverty in the LAC Region
As stated in The World Bank (1990) Poverty report, the population of the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, as a percent of total world population, held constant at 11 % between the 1960-65 and 1988-89 periods. Yet the LAC region's

percentage share of income fell during the same period from 33 % to 27 %, a decline of nearly 20 % (World Bank, 1990: 10). In the past 25 years, real per capita GDP growth in the LAG region fell from 3.7% in 1965-73 to 2.6% in 1973-80 and to -0.6% in 1980-89. Real per capita growth was almost -1.0% in the 1980-89 period, with all other regions except subSaharan Africa having positive real per capita growth during the same period.
The percentage of the LAC population below the poverty line (set at $370 annual income) is 12% if only the "extremely poor" (50 million) are counted, and rises to 19% if the "poor (including. extremely poor)" (70,million) .are counted.. .The rural. population, as a percentage of total population, is 59% in Guatemala, 50% in Panamd, and 44% in Peni, while the rural poor as a percentage of total population for these same countries is 66%, 59%, and 52%, respectively (World Bank, 1990:31). As the World Bank notes:
Poverty as measured by low income tends to be at its worst in rural areas, even allowing for the often substantial differences in cost of living between town and
countryside ... malnutrition, lack of education, low life expectancy, and substandard
housing are also, as a rule, more severe in rural areas. This is still true in Latin
America, despite high urbanization rates (World Bank, 1990:29).
The World Bank estimates that an increase of one year in average years of education may lead to a 3% rise in GDP. In the LAG region, an increase in average years of education from five to six years is estimated to result in a percentage change in real GDP in excess of 2%. Looking across regions, the higher the initial level of education, the greater are the benefits from increasing it, a relationship that underscores the importance of investing in education. For the LAG region, estimated average social returns to investment in education are 26% for primary education, 18% for secondary education 18%, and 16% for higher education. As the World Bank (1990:80) notes:
many of the poor are self-employed in agriculture.... But this does not weaken the
case for investing in education. Educated farmers are more likely to adopt new
technologies, and virtually all studies on agricultural productivity show that bettereducated farmers get a higher return on their land.
Yet, for the LAG region, expenditures on primary education as a percentage of GDP, 1.06% in 1985, are expected to decline to 0. 84 % (at current enrollment rates) by the year 2000.
It is estimated that the incidence of poverty (the share of the population below the poverty line) in the LAG region will decline from 19.1 % in 1985 to 11.4% by 2000. Yet nowhere in the developing world is the contrast between poverty and national wealth more striking than in the LAG region. While the region's average per capita incomes are five to six times those in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, the LAG region's very high degree of income inequality results in almost 20% of the population living in poverty.'
'The World Bank estimates that raising all the poor in the continent to just above the poverty line would cost
less than 1% (0.7%) of regional GDP. and that this amount is-about equal to a 2% income tax on the wealthiest
20% of the population.

According to The World Bank, prospects for reducing poverty in the LAG region depend heavily on policy reforms in several areas. Of first importance, credible macroeconomic stabilization measures are essential for restoring the confidence of investors, encouraging flight capital return, and breaking the cycle of economic crises that has been characteristic of many countries in the region. Equally important are policies to promote growth and reduce inequality. A first requirement is removal of biases that favor the use of capita], in order to ensure incentive to invest in more labor-intensive enterprises and technologies, thereby helping to ensure that productive employment opportunities are generated for-the-poor. Price-and. financial policy reforms are -needed -tt. encourage private investment in efficient labor-intensive, outward-oriented industries.
Further, since 40 to 50% of the poor will still reside in rural areas in the 1990s, improvements in incentives for agricui~uraI production will need to be complemented by active support for rural development. A second requirement is the need to maintain, and in some areas to expand, the provision of social services to the poor. Finally, during the stabilization process, transfers, such as the emergency employment schemes that have been used in Bolivia and Peril, may be needed.
The Bank's projected average GDP growth of 4.2% a year for the LAC region in the 1990s assumes that, during that decade's second half, debt burden will no longer be a serious constraint on regional investment and that, over the next few years, programs to restore economic stability will be put in place. Also, if income distribution improves with growth, as occurred, for example, in Colombia during the 1970s and 1980s, significant progress can be made in reducing regional poverty from 19 % to 11 % by 2000.
2. AID/Washington LAC Bureau Objectives
Given the state of poverty in the LAG region, the objectives of AID's LAG Bureau include, among other priorities, achievement of broad-based, sustainable economic growth which depends, in part, on increasing the contribution of LAG agriculture to the region's econ iomic growth. As outlined in LAG Program Objectives: Implementation Workplan (AID, 1991), indicators of performance relative to this objective include:
* A limited role for the public sector as provider of goods and services;
o Sectora] policies that effectively address impediments to broadly based, sustainable
growth in agriculture;
o Broader participation in income-generating activities;
& Growth in nontraditional [agricultural] exports;
o Priority given in public expenditures to investment in human capital development
and related infrastructure; and
* Improved conservation and diminished contamination of soil, water, and air.

3. Role of Ag REE-Strengthening
The role of a country's Ag REE system is discussed in detail in section A.3 of Chapter VI. Generally, the role of the public and/or private components of a country's Ag REE system is to carry out technology generation and transfer (TG&T) essential for increasing agricultural productivity and agriculture's contribution to economic growth. The Ag REE system also has the role of developing the trained human resources needed in the agricultural sector, particularly the resources needed to develop more productive, sustainable technologies; -to transfer these technologies to -farmers; -and to train- the. human resources required to carry out agricultural research, extension (or technology transfer), and education. The role of an Ag REE system with respect to institutional sustainability, human resource development, and development and dissemination of sustainable agricultural technologies is highlighted in Figure 1.1.
It is important to consider how effectively Ag REE systems in AID-assisted LAC countries have carried out agricultural TG&T in support of broad-based, sustainable economic growth, and whether LAC Ag REE systems are prepared to conduct TG&T that increases the contribution of agriculture to economic growth in these countries. However promising the decade of the 1990s may appear, the decade of the 1980s was a very difficult time for many or most LAC countries, particularly if measured in terms of agricultural sector performance.
During the 1980s, the LAC region placed increasing emphasis on agricultural exports. For the period, Gacitua and Bello (1991: 391-405) report a significant negative relationship between agricultural export promotion and food consumption. While the poverty of agricultural workers and small producers increased, food consumption decreased. "Succinctly, the open market policy implied that, while agricultural output increased, the production of staple food for domestic markets declined in some cases to levels far below the production levels of the 1960s, decreasing food consumption and food security" (Gacitua and Bello, 1991:394). At the same time, public sector programs in agricultural research and extension in most AID-assisted LAC countries did little to improve agricultural productivity, thereby further contributing to the decline in per capita food production (Figure 1.2) and an increase in cereal imports (Figure 1.3). Table 1.1 provides data on other agricultural sector trends in AID-assisted LAC countries.
One factor accounting for the failure to increase agricultural productivity in many LAC countries during the 1980s was a dramatic decline in public funding for agricultural research and extension (Table 1.2). Pardey and Roseboom (1990:2-4) report (1) that the real expenditure per researcher, between 1961-65 and 1981-85, fell by 7.9% in 129 lessdeveloped countries and by 8.3% in 20 LAC countries, and (2) that:

Figure 1.1. Role of the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education (REE) System Relative to LAC/DR/RD Goals
and Objectives (Source: LAC/DR/RD).
C R 0 S S C U T T I N G T H E M E S

Figure 1.2. Per Capita Food Production in AID-Assisted LAC Countries (Source:
BRD World Development Report, 1989).
Bolivia Ecuador
Dominican Republic Haiti
Jamaica CENTRAL AMERICA Costa Rice El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 Percent Below or Above 1979181 Level
Figure 1.3. Growth in Cereal Imports to AID-Assisted LAC Countries (Source: IBRD World Development Report, 1989).
LAC SUB-REGION ANDEAN 174 Bolivia In Ecuador
Dominican Republic Haiti
Jamaica CENTRAL AMERICA Costs Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama
0 0.6 1 1.6 2
Cereal Imports (MIllion MT)

A closer study of the period to period averages... .reveals a general contraction in
financial support for agricultural research in the less-developed countries during the
latter period of the sample.... Anecdotal evidence suggests this contractionary pattern
of support for public sector agricultural research has continued or even accelerated
over the more recent past for many less-developed countries and may even have
spread to some of the more-developed countries as well.... Average spending per
scientist ratios for the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole .., show a
widespread and substantial decline throughout the region in the early to mid 1980s.
This decline-was driven as -much by-stagnating expenditure levels as it was by a
relatively rapid growth in research personnel which, given the current austerity
measures facing many countries in the region, will pose continuing problems for these,
NARS [National Agricultural Research Systems].
Current estimates of the level of resources for research in national agricultural
research systems (NARS) are provided in Table 1.3. Yet as a World Bank official noted at a recent meeting of the Inter-American Council: "If the rural population in [the LAC region] stays as it is, and the urban population increases as expected, production per farmer will have to increase enormously to provide enough food. Since there is no more land that can be used with the current level of technology, and no more water for agriculture, the only way to increase production is through technological advances" personall communication from LAC TECH Agribusiness and trade advisor Ken Weiss).
4. Implications for LAC/DRIRD Programming
How did Ag REE systems in the LAC region reach the point of having such deteriorated capacity for agricultural TG&T? What, if anything, should AID do about the situation, and where, if anywhere, should AID look for solutions to the problem? It is interesting, in this context, that a recent memo of a development assistance agency raised the question of what is being or could be done to address urban problems in the LAC countries, and proposed a discussion of this question at an upcoming meeting. The memo noted that:
Discussion is expected to encompass how our location-neutral [emphasis added]*
activities in such areas as health, credit, private sector, democratic initiatives,
environment, education, etc., relate to urban problems, as well as whether there are urban problem interventions that might be appropriate that don't easily fit with these
"traditional" sectors.
In regard to that memo, the following issued can be raised: If "urban problems" are not addressed in the conte- "agriculture or vice versa, is there any hope of developing sustainable economic and socia, development in the LA C countries?
It is important to bear in mind that food costs constitute a large percentage of the LAG urban consumer budget, even though LAC urban food prices often are highly subsidized. While the urban consumer is a primary beneficiary of food subsidies are a drain on the public sector budget and in the long run will become economically and politically

Table 1.1. Performance of Agricultural Sector in AID-Assisted LAC Countries.
Average Average Annual Growth Rate (%) Agriculture
Annual GNP GDP Agriculture as % of GDP
Growth Rate
COUNTRIES a) 1965-88 65-80 80-88 65-80 80-88 65 88
Bolivia -0.6 4.5 -1.6 H 3.8 2.1 23 24 II
Ecuador 3.1 8.7 2.0 3.4 4.3 27 15
Perd 0.1 3.9 1.1 1.0 3.6 18 12
Dominican Rep. 2.7 7.9 2.2 1 6.3 0.8 23 23
Haiti 0.4 2.9 -0.2 31
Jamaica -1.5 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.9 10 6
Costa Rica 1.4 6.2 2.4 4.2 2.5 24 18
SEl Salvador -0.5 4.3 0.0 3.6 -1.4 29 14
Guatemala 1.0 5.9 -0.2
Honduras 0.6 5.0 1.7 2.0 1.1 40 25
Nicaragua -2.5 2.6 -0.3 I 3.3 -0.2 25 21
Panam& 2.2 5.5 2.6 i 2.4 2.5 18 9
Public & Publicly
Education as % Guaranteed
Average Annual of Total Central Long-Term Debt
Population Growth Govt Expenditure (Millions US$)
COUNTRIES al 65-88 80-88 88-2000 72 88 72 88
Bolivia 2.5 2.7 2.7 31.3 18.4 i 480 4451 I
Ecuador 3.1 2.7 2.2 27.5 i- it 193 9353 I
Perd 2.8 2.2 2.1 20.0 23.6 II 856 12475
Dominican Rep. 2.7 2.4 1.8 14.2 I 212 3216
Haiti 2.0 1.8 1.9 40 683
Jamaica 1.3 1.5 0.5 160 3512
Costa Rica 2.7 2.3 2.0 28.3 16.2 134 3531
El Salvador 2.7 1.3 2.1 21.4 17.1 88 1630
Guatemala 2.8 2.9 2.8 106 2131
Honduras 3.2 3.6 2.9 22.3 90 2739
Nicaragua 3.1 3.4 3.0 16.6 147 6744
PanamH 2.6 2.2 1.6 20.7 15.6 194 3625

Table 1.1. Continued.
Consumption Avg. Index Food as
Food as Food Aid Cereal (Hundreds of Grams of Food % Share
% of Mer- in Cereal Imports of Plant Nutrient Production of Total
chandise (Metric Tons) (Metric Tons) Per Hectare Per Capita Hous,
Imports ('000) ('000) of Arable Land) (79-81=100) ConsmpL'n
COUNTRIES a) 65 88 74/75 87/88 74 88 70/71 87/88 86-88 80 or 85
Bolivia 19 15 22 290 209 328 7 19 H 95 H 33
Ecuador 10 5 13 33 152 563 133 232 H 97 30 H
Perd 17 19 37 355 637 1857 300 622 H 96 35 H
Dominican Rep. 23 16 16 278 252 601 334 556 H 95: 46
Haiti 25 14 25 154 83 205 4 25:1 95 H
Jamaica 20 14H 1 208 340 418 873 914 H 101 39
Costa Rica 9 5 1 235 110 318 H 1001 1806 89 33
El Salvador 15 15 4 177 75 217 H 1043 1262 87 33
Guatemala 11 6 9 320 138 166 298 656 H 92 36
Honduras 11 8 31 146 52 144 j 156 190 f 76 39
Nicaragua 12 25 3 87 44 206H 215 433 1 71 11
PanamH 11 9 3 63 93 H 387 65711 95 38
a) Comparable data not reported for Belize and RDO/C (Eastern Caribbean States)
Source: World Bank (1990), Poverty: World Development Report 1990.

Table 1.2. Agricultural Research Indicators in the LAC Region (adapted from ISNAR, 1989).
Research Expenditures
%Change % Change Principal
Sub- Ex- Researchers Since 1980 In Constant Research
REGION/COUNTRY Ph.D. M.Sc. B.Sc. total pats Total Since 1980 in Constant LCUs 1980 US$ PPP Organization
Bolivia (83) a) 2 31 54 87 17 104 -8.8 -50.6 (83) 2.224 (83) IBTA
Ecuador (86) 5 67 153 225 225 +12.5 -39.2 (86) 10.973 (86) INIAP
PerO (80) 4 30 239 273 273 (85) 0.0 +200.2 (84) 24.759 (84) INIAA
Dominican Rep. (83) 2 29 105 136 0 136 +28.3 +37.2 (83) 4.766 (83) DIA/SEA
Haiti (83) 7 23 2 32 32 +112.8 (83/78) b) 1.623 (83) CDRA
Jamaica (80) 4 23 22 49 49 -49.3 (81/71) 2.399 (81) MOA & CARDI
OECS: CARDI (all):
Antigua (84) 1 3 1 5 5 +66.7 *
Dominica (83) 0 2 4 6 6 -51.1 (84/82) .103 (83) MOA
Montserrat (84) 0 1 1 2 2 *
St. Kitts-Nevis (84) 1 3 2 6 6 +100.0 +8.3 (83) .061 (81)
St. Lucia (87) 6 5 10 21 0 21 1.791 (83) MOA, WINBAN
St. Vincent (86) O 2 2 4 1 5 -20.0 *
Belize (82) 16 DOA/RD
Costa Rica (84) 114 (81) -54.0 (84) 1.984 (84) DIA
El Salvador (80) 106 (80) 4.454 (80) CENTA
Guatemala (85) 2 25. 101 128 4 132 +10.0 -11.1 (84) 6.801 (84) ICTA
Honduras (82) 65 -8.4 (80) 1.554 (80) PNIA
Nicaragua (80) 10 47 57 (80) 3.610 (80) MAG/INTA
Panam& (86) 9 41 90 140 140 +118 +11.3 (85) 5.729 (85) IDIAP
* = Data not available or inadequate to calculate indicator.
a) Year in parentheses is most recent year for which data are available or was year used in calculating the indicator. b) Most recent year relative to present year.

Table 1.3. National Agricultural Research Resources in the LAC
Region-Expressed as 1980-1985 Averages.
Agricultural Research Ex- QualifiPerson- Research Ex- penditures cation
LAC SUB-REGIONS nel a) penditures b) Per Capita ARI d) Index e)
Bolivia 107 3.36 30 0.22 0.3
Ecuador 209 14.06 69 0.54 0.3
Per6 265 18.66 52 0.56 0.12
Sub-Total 581 36.08
Average 50.3
Dom. Rep. 121 3.8 34 0.19 0.18
Haiti 32 1.62 51 0.13 0.94
Jamaica 49 2.4 0.77 0.55
RDO/C 45 2.02 45 f) 0.8 g) 0.47
Sub-Total 247 9.84
Average 43.3
Belize 15
Costa Rica 114 3.29 29 0.24
El Salvador 106 4.45 42 0.24
Guatemala 150 7.4 49 0.22 0.17
Honduras 68 1.55 29 0.17 0.25
Sub-Total 453 16.69
Average 37.3 0.22 0.21
TOTAL 1281 62.61
a) Personnel & Agricultural Research Expenditures: Pardey and Roseboom
b) Ag'l Gross Domestic Product (AgGDP): UN (1988).
Ag'l Research Expenditures: Expressed in millions of 1980 US$.
Expenditures were first deflated to constant 1980 currency units using
an implicit GDP deflator (UN, 1988). They were then converted into 1980
US$ using PPP over GDP indices from Summers and Heston (1988).
c) Ag'l Research Expenditures per Scientist:Ag'l Research Expenditures/Personnel (1000 of 1980 US$).
d) ARI (Ag'l Research Intensity Ratio):Agl Research Expenditures/AgGDP (in
e) Qualification Index: PhD + MS/total scientists (inclusive of expatriate
personnel, who are assumed to hold a higher degree).
f) Average of Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Lucia.
g) Figure is for St. Kitts-Nevis only.
Source: Valverde (-990:28-29)

unsustainable: They will compromise the ability of the market to perform efficiently and reduce the incentive for farmers to produce.
At the same time, there is upward pressure on urban food prices to the extent that the internal marketing system is inefficient, with marketing losses and higher per-unit costs resulting in higher food prices to urban consumers, without any of the benefit of higher prices being captured by the producer. Marketing losses and inefficiency not only penalize the urban consumer but also the farmer, as marketing intermediaries must compensate for anticipated -losses-by lowering commodity prices- to -producers.
The net result of this situation is reduced demand for farm produce, lowered incentive for farmers to produce or raise productivity, and little to no demand for productivityincreasing agricultural technology or support of research aimed at raising agricultural productivity. Thus, the problems of urban food prices, productivity stagnation in rural farming areas, and environmental degradation are highly interrelated greatly influenced not only by economic and agricultural policies but also by the efficiency of marketing, production, research, extension, and educational and training institutions.
Agriculture is as much "location-neutral" as are health, credit, private sector,
democratic initiatives, environment, education, etc. The sector's performance and contribution to economic growth are greatly influenced by a country's urban standard of living. A higher standard of living-greater income and purchasing power-translates into increased demand for food and a signal for the agricultural sector to boost productivity and production to meet the demand for food in urban markets.
USAID strategies, programs, and projects in the LAC region have placed little to no emphasis on a systematic analysis of and attack on the interrelationship between urban and rural poverty. AID's emphasis in recent years increasingly has been outward-looking (nontraditional agricultural export crops) and not inward-looking (traditional food crops). Agriculture is being abandoned at the same time that development assistance agencies are asking what t o do about urban problems and urban development. LAC urban development problems cannot be solved by searching for "urban problem interventions that might be appropriate that don't easily fit with [the aforementioned] 'traditional' sectors [health, credit, ... ]," as if there were some "magic bullet," or a sector that somehow has remained hidden. The agricultural sector is not hidden but is being neglected in a manner counterproductive to broad-based economic growth.. Moreover, continued neglect of and lack of development in LAC rural areas will only lead to a continuing and growing influx of the rural populace to LAC urban areas, further aggravating the urban problem and the difficulty of urban development.
With regard to LAC Bureau objectives, more attention needs to be placed on the LAC urban problem, but in the context of its interrelationship with agricultural productivity in countries where agricultural institutions are not yet adequately developed. Clearly, there is a need for increased attention to the problems of food security and the constraints to increased agricultural productivity (lack of demand for productivity-increasing technologies). This is

where AID should begin to look for a solution to the problem of LAC Ag REB systems having such a deteriorated capacity for agricultural TG&T.
Donors such as AID are now beginning to face up to the serious problems of the
1990s: employment, food production, and protection of the environment. With a growing population, the LAC countries must create more employment. But employment expansion will depend on rapid agricultural growth, and agricultural productivity must increase in such a manner that the environment is not damaged. This will require not only improved technology that does not exist today, but-also strengthened. and. sustainable agricultural technology generation and transfer (TG&T) capacity. Addressing these problems will require a strong increase in development assistance for agricultural projects and programs.


This chapter reviews general trends in USAID Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) agriculture, rural development, and nutrition (ARDN) funding for Ag REE in the LAC region and other donor funding and activity for LAC Ag REE-strengthening.
A. General Trends in LAC ARDN Funding for Ag REE
In 1988, AID/W conducted a review of over 1,000 projects active in AID's ARDN
portfolio in FY84-FY89 or proposed for FY90, in order to examine how the projects related to the ARDN Focus Statement: "The focus of the Agency's [ARDN] program is to increase the income of the poor majority and expand the availability and consumption of food, while maintaining and enhancing the natural resource base" (Chemonics International Consulting Division, 1988). LAC Bureau projects accounted for about 15 percent of the ARDN portfolio. The study related funding obligations for each project to the ARDN Focus Statement's food, income, and natural resources goals and to the specific purpose categories to which the project was directed.' ARDN funding to support agricultural research, extension, or education was comprised of four purpose categories, as reported in Table 2.1 (LAC region) and Table 2.2 (all regions).
For FY84-FY89, 67% of obligations in LAC's portfolio were directed at the ARDN Focus Statement goal of income enhancement, while 20.6% were directed to food, 8.0% to natural resources, and 4.4% to all three goals [Chemonics International Consulting Division, 1988:F-3, Table III-B (1)]. There was a significant recent trend in obligation increases for natural resources (to 25 % of the portfolio) and corresponding declines in obligations for food and income (to 15% and 50%, respectively). Figure 2.1 shows that obligations for the natural resource goal increased as obligations for food and income declined. As Figure 2.2 shows, obligations for technology transfer increased but declined in FY89. While obligations for technology development increased from FY86 to FY88, they declined between FY88 and FY89. Growth in obligations for technology transfer, marketing, and resource development were fueled by declining obligations for credit. LAC funding by Economic Support Funds (ESF) is not programmed to support agriculture, except as country-owned local currencies generated from ESF. LAC does not "projectize" ESF. ESF and PL 480 local currency generations are host country-owned and not accounted for by AID (i.e., not included in the ARDN data base). Thus, available data may underestimate the true investment in ARDN activities.
'Purpose categories were: planning and policy analysis (PPA), technology development (TDE), technology transfer (TTR), marketing (MKT), input delivery capacity strengthening (INP), credit development (CRE), construction (CON), resource development (RED), land tenure (LTE), human resource development (HRD), education system development (ESD), and sector support (SEC).

Table 2.1. Percent Distribution of AID Obligations in the LAC Region for ARDN
Purpose Categories Relating Directly to Agricultural Research, Extension,
and Education.
% Purpose Category
7 Technology development (TED): to conduct* or improve* the capacity for conducting
research on improved technologies for production and consumption. 10 Technology transfer (TTR): to extend* or improve* the capacity for
extension/diffusion/transfer of improved technologies for production and consumption.
0 Education system development (ESD): to develop* or strengthen* the capacity to
develop education institution structure/curricula/operations/facilities.
5 Human resource development (HRD): to improve* or strengthen* the capacity to
improve training and human resource development. 22 Total
*or expand, establish, strengthen, study, organize, etc., as appropriate.
Source: Chemonics International Consulting Division, 1988:F-3.
The study noted that investment in technology transfer has tended to expand in each geographic region, while investment in technology generation has remained static or even declined. This trend was identified as "worrisome, since productive technology transfer depends upon a continuous stream of innovative technology." The study speculated that this "inversion" may reflect increasing attention to: on-farm research and corresponding attention to research on farmer motives for
adoption or rejection of productive technology. The neglect of this topic in traditional
research p- -ams has made much commodity-oriented research unproductive. On the other hand, the decline in technology generation may reflect overdependence on
the output of... international agricultural research... without development of an
indigenous capacity to adapt that output to specific national conditions (Chemonics
International Consulting Division, 1988:33).2
Including all three geographical bureaus (Africa, Asia and the Near East, and LAC), the study concluded that the Agency's goal for the 1990s and the ARDN focus statement goals are appropriate and consistent and should not be changed significantly in the foreseeable future. But the Joint Sector Councils recommended that development and
2During the study period, increasing emphasis was placed in the LAC region on development of nontraditional agricultural exp-r ".TAE) crops. But there are no international agricultural research centers (IARCs) working on such crops; and p,. .iz sector agricultural research systems in AID-assisted LAC countries traditionally have little or no experience with NTAE crops. Thus, farmers seeking to grow and export such crops have tended to rely on private sources for the expertise required to adapt crop-specific technologies to site- specific growing conditions (Byrnes, 1989).

Table 2.2. Percent Distribution of AID Obligations in ARDN Portfolio by Purpose
Category (FY84-FY89).
Technology Development 11.5 14 6 7 64
Technology Transfer 15.5 15 18 10 2
Educational System Development 2.5 4 3 0 0
Human Resource Development 3.5 5 3 5 1
(Sub-Total) (33.0) (38) (30) (22) (67)
Other Sectors
Construction 17.5 10 24 10 0
Credit 17.0 2 20 33 14
Input 2.0 5 3 0 0
Land Tenure 1.5 0 0 9 1
Marketing 2.5 2 0 11 0
Planning & Policy Analysis 6.0 7 6 5 5
Resource Development 4.5 3 4 4 13
Sector Support 16.0 35 12 4 0
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Chemonics International Consulting Division, 1988:F-3.
implementation of "a strategy for AID support for sustained rural economic growth in the 1990s" would provide opportunity to better focus the ARDN portfolio. The following needed changes in the portfolio were identified:
The need to concentrate on sustainable agriculture as well as protection of the
natural resource base, concentrating particularly on the generation and transfer of
appropriate technology and the development of a macroeconomic and policy
environment that provides incentives for the adoption of such technology.

Figure 2.1. Total ARDN Obligations (FY84-FY89) Toward ARDN Focus Statement
Goals for the LAC Region (Chemonics International Consulting Division,
NAT R = aa e r
702 4A
0 0/
FY84 "Y85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89
INC = Income
FOOD = Food
NAT RES = Natural Resources
ALL = All

Figure 2.2. LAC ARDN Obligations (FY84-FY89) by Purpose Category (Chemonics International Consulting Division,
1988:16). (See footnote for key to purpose categories).
.9 I TR
.8 TDE
__ .6 PPA
)1, i MKT
. .3 HRD
. .2 ESD
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89
'Purpose categories are: planning and policy analysis (PPA), technology development (TDE), technology transfer (TTR), marketing (M KT), input delivery capacity strengthening (INP), credit development (CRE), construction (CON), resource development (RED), land tenure (LTE), human resource development (iRD), education system development (ESD), and sector support (SEC).

" The need to continue expansion of relative investment directed at improving the
macroeconomic and agricultural policy environment, particularly host-country
planning and policy analysis capacity.
" The need to reduce allocations to credit and construction, with the savings
reallocated to other areas that would have a potentially larger impact (such as
natural resources and sustainable agriculture, and improving the macroeconomic
and agricultural policy environment).
Further analysis of the ARDN portfolio was carried out by LAG/DR/RD in 1989. This analysis reviewed the portfolio in terms of "strategic funding categories" for FY88FY91. The analysis provides an indication of current and projected trends in ARDN funding for agricultural research, extension, and education in the LAG region. For this analysis, agricultural research, extension, and education were defined as follows:
Agricultural Research: activities carried out at LDG institutions, in the U.S., or at international agricultural research centers (IAR~s) that support agronomic research, including on-station, basic, on-farm, applied, and farming systems research; includes the development of improved agricultural practices and extension efforts when undertaken as part of agricultural research.
Agricultural Extension: activities to transmit knowledge of new agricultural methods, plant varieties, and products directly to farmers; includes strengthening of government or pri-vate extension and outreach services, improving dissemination techniques, and providing improved communication and transportation.
Agricultural Education: all activities supporting] agricultural education; includes all activities supporting faculties of agriculture at the undergraduate and graduate levels.
Tables 2.3 through 2.6 summarize the LAC ARDN portfolio by strategic funding
categories for the FY88-FY9 1 period; the percentages in Tables 2.4 and 2.6 are derived from Tables 2.3 and 2.5, respectively. These tables were originally prepared in late 1989. At the time, the data in the FY88 column were final actual obligations, while the data in the FY89 column were actual obligations, with a possibility that the final obligations could be at variance with the FY89 operational year budget (FY89 OYB). The data in the FY90 column were based on the FY90 operational year budget, while the data in the FY91 column derive from the Annual Budget Submission (ABS) in the FY 91 Gongressional Presentation (GP). The FY89 final actual obligations data were incorporated into the table in November 1990, thus making the FY88 and FY89 data final actual obligations. Updated FY91 ABS data from the approved FY91 OYB as well as the new FY92 ABS data were anticipated to become available in late January 1991. Incorporation of these data into the tables would provide coverage of a five-year time span.

Table 2.3. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic Funding Categories (FY88-FY91): $1000.
FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91
AGRICULTURE (total) 92627 131919 136761 133021
Agricultural Research = 16130 12076 15416 10994
Agricultural Extension 15601 19897 16982 14181
Agricultural Education 4257 14456 3109 2336
Ag/Nutrition Mgmt., Planning & Policy = 2624
Agricultural Land Use and Settlement = 1653 2062 3748 3765
Agricultural Policy 2073 29526 50784 71548
Agricultural Inputs = 595 3942 1417 208
Agricultural Irrigation = 4883 4729 3957 3837
Pest Management = 918 1834 1518 1135
Agricultural Credit 17431 15194 10733 8976
Agricultural Marketing 2906 3828 2492 2411
Agribusiness = 12435 15335 18088 3832
Infrastructure (Rural Roads) 13745 6416 8067 9798
NATURAL RESOURCES/ENVIRONMENT (total) 18484 28823 32044 29825
Forestry 6957 10376 11515 10676
Environmental Mgmt., Planning/Policy = 4162 12557 12575 7886
Soils = 165 1388 2241 1640
Agricultural Land Development 939 1275 1939 1623
Water Resources Management = 781 2718 3331 7450
Energy (Fuelwood) = 5480 509 443 550
GRAND TOTALS 111111 160742 168805 287846

Table 2.4. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic Funding Categories
(FY88-FY9l): Percentages.
FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91
AGRICULTURE (total) 83.3 82.1 81.0 81.7 a)
Agricultural.-Research = 17.4 9.2 11.3 8.3
Agricultural Extension = 16.8 15.1 12.4 10.7
Agricultural Education 4.6 11.0 2.3 1.8
Ag/Nutrition Mgmt., Planning & Policy = 2.0
Agricultural Land Use & Settlement 1.8 1.6 2.7 2.8
Agricultural Policy = 2.2 22.4 37.1 53.8
Agricultural Inputs 0.6 3.0 1.0 0.1
Agricultural Irrigation = 5.3 3.6 2.9 2.9
Pest Management = 1.0 1.4 g i.1 0.9
Agricultural Credit = 18.8 11.5 7.8 6.7
Agricultural Marketing = 3.1 2.9 1.8 1.8
Agribusiness 13.4 11.6 13.2 2.9
Infrastructure (Rural Roads) 14.8 4.9 5.9 7.4
NATURAL RESOURCES/ENVIRONMENT (total) 16.7 17.9 19.0 18.3 b)
Forestry = 37.6 36.0 35.9 35.8
Environmental Mgmt., Planning/Policy = 22.5 43.6 39.2 26.4
Soils 0.9 4.8 7.0 5.5
Agricultural Land Development = 5.1 4.4. 6.1 5.4
Water Resources Management = 4.2 9.4 10.4 25.0
Energy (Fuelwood) 29.6 1.8 1.4 1.8
100 100 100 100
FY Funding as % of Total ARDN Funding, including total Natural Resources and Environment:
FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY91 d)
Agricultural Research = 14.5 7.6 9.4 3.7 6.4
Agricult-ral Extension = 14.0 12.4 10.4 4.8 8.2
Agricult-.-l Education 3.8 9.0 1.9 0.8 1.3
a) Perce: if funding of 5125,000 for Narcotic Awareness not included;
if fur zor Narcotic Awareness is included, percentage is 46.2%.
b) Percent.. funding of S125,000 for Narcotic Awareness not included;
if fundiz. arcotic Awareness is included, percentage is 10.4%.
C) Funding oz 00 for Narcotic Awareness as a percentage of total ARDN
funding of 5- -6 (see Table 2.3)
d) FY91 (if not L.. .ie Narcotics Awarenv.o)

1.Funding Trends Over Time
As a percentage of total funding for Agriculture, funding for agricultural research, extension, and education (Ag REE) fell significantly during the subject period. The decline in funding support for these areas is even more dramatic when the absolute funding is taken as a percentage of total funding for Agriculture and Natural Resources! Environment. LAG funding for Ag REE, as a percent of total funding for Agriculture, and as a percent of total funding for Agriculture and Natural Resources/Environment (the percentages- enclosed -in -parentheses) -fell- in each of three functions-research, extension, and education-as follows:
Research Extension Education
FY88 17.4% (14.5%) 16.8% (14.0%) 4.6% (3.8%)
FY89 9.2% (7.6%) 15.1% (12.4%) 11.0% (9.0%)
FY90 11.3% (9.1%) 12.4% (10.1%) 2.3% (1.8%)
FY91 8.3% (3.7%) 10.7% (4.8%) 1.8% (.8%)
Between FY88 and FY91, funding for agricultural research was cut by more than half (52 %) from 17.4 % in FY88 to 8.3 % in FY9 1, funding for extension was cut by more than a third (36 %) from 16.8 % to 10.7 %, and funding for education was cut by over 60 % (61 %) from 4.6% to 1.8%. If FY91's allocation of $125,000,000 (43.4% of FY91 ARDN funds of $297,846,000) for narcotics awareness is included, the percentages fall even lower, from 14.5 % to 3.7 % for agricultural research, from 14. 0% to 4.8 % for extension, and from 3.8 % to 0. 8% for education.
These trends indicate that the reductions in funding support have been biggest
precisely in the area (education) with greatest potential for developing the human capital on which the success of future agricultural TG&T efforts will depend. On the other hand, funding reductions have been smallest precisely in the area (extension) with the least longterm potential. -for increasing the farmer's returns to adoption of improved technology. Without the generation of new productivity-increasing and/or cost-reducing technologies, investing in extension for transfer of the existing technologies to farmers inevitably leads to a reduction in the marginal returns to farmer adoption of those technologies. By comparison, investment in education and research (technology generation) provide the basis for increasing potential returns to farmers from the adoption of new technologies, because education and research are the basis for developing technologies that are more productive and less costly or risky relative to existing technologies.
Looking at agricultural research, extension, and education relative to the remainder of the LAG ARDN portfolio, if FY91 funding for Narcotic Awareness is not taken into account, funding for agriculture relative to natural resources/environment fell slightly from 83.3% in FY88 to 81.7% in FY91, while funding for natural resources! environment increased from 16.7% in FY88 to 18.3% in FY91. Water resources management accounted for the largest relative increase in the natural resources! environment component of the portfolio, an increase from 4.2% in FY88 to 25% in FY81. The largest relative increment

in funding support in the ARDN portfolio occurred in the agricultural policy area, where funding increased from 2.2% of the ARDN portfolio's agriculture component in FY88 to 53.8% in FY91. But if the $125,000,000 of funding for Narcotic Awareness, or 43.4% of total ARDN funding for the Andean Region in FY91, is taken into account, all of the FY91 percentages fall dramatically-agriculture to 46.2% of the ARDN portfolio (down from 81.7% in FY90) and natural resources/environment to 10.4% of the portfolio (down from 43.4% in FY90).
- 2. Funding Trends by-Subregion
Tables 2.5 through 2.8 summarize funding trends for agricultural research, extension, and education by LAC subregion: Central America (CA), the Caribbean (CN), and the Andean Region (AN). The percentages in Table 2.6 are based on the dollar figures in Table 2.5, while Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are taken directly from Table 2.6.
As the reader may see in Table 2.7, funding for agricultural research as a percentage of total LAC ARDN funding fell by nearly 97% in Central America (15.6% in FY88, 0.5% in FY91) and by over 84% in the Andean Region (16.3% in FY88, 2.7% in FY91), while funding for agricultural research in the Caribbean nearly tripled (8.3% in FY88, 24.7% in FY91).
In agricultural extension, funding as a percentage of total LAC ARDN funding fell by nearly 77% in Central America (10.3% in FY88, 2.4% in FY91) and by nearly 75% in the Andean Region (15.9% in FY88, 4% in FY91), while funding for agricultural extension in the Caribbean increased by nearly 25% (17.4% in FY88, 21.3% in FY91). Thus, the funding trends in agricultural extension in each subregion were parallel to those in agricultural research.
In agricultural education, funding as a percentage of total LAC ARDN funding fell by over 85% in Central America (5.5% in FY88, .8% in FY91) and by nearly 93% in the Andean Region (4% in FY88, .3% in FY91), while funding for agricultural education in the Caribbean increased from 0% to an average of 5% for the period (but 3.9% in FY91). The funding trends in agricultural education in each subregion were parallel to those in agricultural research and extension.

Table 2.5. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic Funding Categories (FY88-FY91): $000 by
FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91
AGRICULTURE (total) 40062 16871 43426 22563 15563 23599 19004 18916 37002 90555 74331 91542
Ag'l Research = 7737 4830 5668 4033 1779 3261 6326 6436 6614 3971 3422 525
Ag'l Extension = 7505 5245 7824 5973 3733 6243 4890 5571 4363 8395 4268 2637
Ag'l Education = 1910 1096 622 419 0 1800 1671 1025 2347 11226 816 892
Ag'1/Nutrition Mgmt.,
Planning & Policy a 1629 572 279
Ag'l Land Use &
Settlement w 515 130 525 935 815 1175 1113 600 323 557 2110 2330
Ag'l Policy 1022 598 1611 1957 86 392 1180 1311 965 28490 47993 68280
Ag'1 Inputs a 50 130 250 160 81 2238 30 15 464 1574 1137 33
Ag'l Irrigation 0 0 0 0 3165 971 184 127 1718 3758 3773 3710
Pest Management a 43 0 84 72 0 0 377 400 875 1779 1057 663
Ag'l Credit 10623 1209 5134 1537 3938 2226 603 607 2870 11759 4996 6832
Ag'l Marketing 174 184 320 628 84 884 1079 1168 2648 2760 1543 615
' Agribusiness = 8252 1356 16515 1271 1282 958 1151 1056 2901 12934 422 1505
(Rural Roads) = 2231 464 4873 5578 600 2879 400 600 10914 3073 2794 3620
ENVIRONMENT (total) 7281 1277 2801 2340 5845 7641 8302 7182 5358 18304 20941 20303
Forestry 856 1023 1421 1144 1950 2565 3366 3801 4151 6500 6728 5731
Environmental Mgmt.,
Planning/Policy = 1370 150 1122 1016 2109 3243 2529 1201 683 8017 8924 5669
Soils = 55 104 258 180 110 44 283 360 0 1240 1700 1100
Ag'l Land Development = 0 0 0 0 815 1235 1881 1520 124 40 58 103
Water Resources Mgmt. = 0 0 0 0 381 45 0 0 400 2507 3331 7450
Energy (Fuelwood) = 5000 0 0 0 480 509 243 300 0 0 200 250
NARCOTIC AWARENESS = 0 0 0 125000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GRAND TOTALS = 47343 18148 46227 149903 21408 31240 27306 26098 42360 108859 95272 111845

Table 2.6. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Summary by Strategic Funding Categories (FY88-FY91): Percentages by
Subregion (* = less than one-tenth of one percent).
FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91
AGRICULTURE (total) 84.6 93.0 93.9 14.9 72.7 75.5 69.6 72.4 87.4 83.2 78.0 81.7
Ag'l Research 16.3 26.6 12.3 2.7 a) 8.3 10.4 23.2 24.7 15.6 3.6 3.6 0.5
Ag'l Extension IS 9 28.9 16.'; 4.0 a) 17.4 20.0 17.9 21.3 10.3 7.7 4.5 2.4
Ag'l Education = 4.0 6.0 1.4 0.3 a) 0 5.8 6.1 3.9 5.5 10.3 0.9 0.8
Ag'l/Nutrition Mgmt.,
Planning & Policy 9.0 1.8 0.3
Ag'l Land Use & Settlement 1.1 0.7 1.1 0.6 3.8 3.8 4.1 2.3 0.8 0.6 2.2 2.0
Ag'l Policy 2.2 3.3 3.5 1.3 0.4 1.2 4.3 5.0 2.3 26.2 50.4 61.0
Ag'l Inputs 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.4 7.2 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.4 1.2 *
Ag'1 Irrigation 0 0 0 0 14.8 3.1 0.7 0.5 4.1 3.4 4.0 3.3
Pest Management = 0.1 0 0.2 0 0 1.4 1.5 2.1 1.6 1.1 0.6
Ag'l Credit 22.4 6.7 11.1 1.0 18.4 7.1 2.2 2.3 6.8 10.8 5.2 6.1
Agl Marketing = 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 2.8 3.9 4.5 6.2 2.5 1.6 0.5
Agribusiness 17.4 7.5 35.7 0.8 6.0 3.1 4.2 4 6.8 11.9 0.4 1.3
0 Infrastructure (Rural Roads)- 4.7 2.6 10.5 3.7 2.8 9.2 1.5 2.3 25.8 2.8 2.9 3.2
ENVIRONMENT (total) 15.4 7.0 6.1 1.6 27.3 24.5 30.4 27.6 12.6 16.8 22.0 18.2
Forestry = 1.8 5.6 3.1 0.8 9.1 8.2 12.3 14.6 9.8 6.0 7.0 5.1"
Environmental Mgmt.,
Planning/Policy = 2.9 0.8 2.4 0.7 9.9 10.4 9.3 4.6 1.6 7.4 9.4 5.1
Soils = 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 1.0 1.4 0 1.1 1.8 1.0
Ag'l Land Development = 0 0 0 0 3.8 3.9 6.9 5.8 0.3 0.1 0.1
Water Resources Mgmt. = 0 0 0 0 1.8 0.1 0 0 0.9 2.3 3.5 6.7
Energy (Fuelwood) 10.6 0 0 0 2.2 1.6 0.9 1.2 0 0 0.2 0.2.
NARCOTIC AWARENESS = 0 0 0 83.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GRAND TOTALS = O0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 a
a) For South America'FY91, percentages (if not include Narcotic Awareness) for research, extension,
and education are 16.2%, 24.0%, and 1.7%, respectively.

Table 2.7. Trends in LAC ARDN Funding for Agricultural Research, Extension, and
Education: Comparison Across Subregions.
Research Extension Education
FY88 16.3 15.6 8.3 15.9 10.3 17.4 4.0 -5.5 0.0
FY89 26.6 3.6 10.4 28.9 7.7 20.0 6.0 10.3 5.8
FY90 12.3 3.6 23.2 16.9 4.5 17.9 1.4 0.9 6.1
FY91 2.7 0.5 24.7 4.0 2.4 21.3 0.3 0.8 3.9
Key: AR = Andean Region; CA = Central America; CN = Caribbean Region Source: Table 2.6.
Table 2.8 provides subregional comparisons of the trends in LAC ARDN funding for Ag REE. The Andean and Central American regions experienced similar downward trends in funding for Ag REE. In the Central American region, ARDN funding for education fell by 85%, research by 97%, and extension by 77%, while ARDN funding in the Andean region fell 93 % for education, 84 % for research, and 75 % for extension. As a result, ARDN funding for Ag REE now comprises only 7% of the Andean portfolio and less than
4 % of the Central American portfolio. Only the Caribbean region experienced an increase in ARDN funding, with funding for education going from 0% to nearly 4% of the ARDN portfolio in the region, research increasing by nearly threefold (from 8.3% to 24.7%), and extension increasing by over 20% (from 17.4% to 21.3%).
Table 2.8. Subregional Trends in LAC ARDN Funding for Agricultural Research,
,Extension, and Education by Subregion: Comparison Across Categories
for Each Subregion.
Andean Caribbean Central America
FY88 16.3 15.9 4.0 8.3 17.4 0.0 15.6 10.3 5.5
FY89 26.6 28.9 6.0 10.4 20.0 5.8 3.6 7.7 10.3
FY90 12.3 16.9 1.4 23.2 17.9 6.1 3.6 4.5 0.9
FY91 2.7 4.0 0.3 24.7 21.3 3.9 0.5 2.4 0.8
Source: Table 2.6.

3. Funding Trends by Country within Subregions
Table 2.9 summarizes, by country in each subregion, FY89 ARDN funding for Ag REE. The reader should note that the data are for a single year (FY89) and that project obligations generally are lumpy (i.e., the level of funding obligated for any particular year may be higher or lower than the preceding or following years). A more reliable indicator would be funding over the life of a project (LOP) or, alternatively, a multi-year average for Ag REE-related project obligations. Thus, the present data only estimate the funding-trend. With this caution-in mind,- LAG Missions can-be.ranked in terms of the relative emphasis placed on agricultural research, extension, and education, as measured by ARDN obligations for Ag REE as a percent of total ARDN obligations (last column, Table
Research-The Mission ranking is as follows:
% Country % Country
36.3 Peri 13.2 Jamaica
21.2 Bolivia 9.2 Belize
17.0 Ecuador 4.6 ROCAP
16.4 RDO/C 1.4 Guatemala
16.3 Dominican Republic 0.0 Haiti
13.6 Honduras 0.0 El Salvador
0.0 Costa Rica
Comparing USAID Missions across the three subregions, the three Andean Missions place the highest emphasis on agricultural research, with an average of almost 25% of the ARDN portfolio invested in -agricultural research; only USAID/Peri invests more than 35 % of ARDN resources in research. The Caribbean Missions fall in the middle of the range. Including Haiti (which does not invest any ARDN resources in research), Caribbean Missions invest an average of about 11 % of ARDN resources in research. The Central American Missions fall at the bottom of the range, investing an average of about 5 % of the ARDN resources in research, although this figure includes two Missions (El Salvador and Costa Rica) that do not invest any ARDN resources in research.
Extension-The Mission ranking is as follows:
% Country % Country
32.7 Ecuador 16.0 RDO/C
31.9 Haiti 10.2 Honduras
31.6 Perd 9.0 ROCAP
26.7 Belize 6.9 Guatemala
23.5 Bolivia 6.7 El Salvador
20.4 Jamaica 5.8 Dominican Republic
0.0 Costa Rica

Table 2.9. FY89 ARDN Funding for Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education by Country in Each LAC
Subregion: $'000.
LAC SUBREGIONS ARDN ($'000 % ($'000) M ($'000) %M ($'0001 JI
Bolivia 6586 1397 21.2 1547 23.5 0 0 2944 44.7
Ecuador 3943 670 17.0 1288 32.7 125 3.2 2083 52.8
Per(I 7619 2763 36.3 2410 31.6 971 12.7 6144 80.6
18148 4830 26.6 5245 28.9 1096 6.0 11171 61.6 CARIBBEAN
Dominican Republic 6921 1131 16.3 403 5.8 1800 26.0 3334 48.2
Haiti 9386 0 0 2997 31.9 0 0 2997 31.9
Jamaica 10191 1350 13.2 2085 20.4 0 0 3435 33.7
RDO/C 4742 780 16.4 758 16.0 0 0 1538 32.4
31240 3261 10.4 6243 20.0 1800 5.8 11304 36.2 CENTRAL AMERICA
Belize 2271 210 9.2 606 26.7 0 0 816 35.9
Costa Rica 7050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
El Salvador 20930 0 0 1412 6.7 0 0 1412 6.7
Guatemala 38255 550 1.4 2659 6.9 280 .7 3489 9.1
Honduras 15375 2090 13.6 1566 10.2 150 .5 3806 24.7
ROCAP 23659 1091 4.6 2122 9.0 10757 45.5 13970 59.0
C. A. Regional 1319 30 2.3 30 2.3 39 3.0 99 7.5
108859 3971 3.6 8395 7.7 11226 10.3 23592 21.7
LAC REGIONAL 2495 14 .6 14 .6 334 13.4 362 14.5
GRAND TOTALS 160742 12076 7.5 19897 12.4 14456 9.0 46429 28.9
Source: LAC/DR/RD

Comparing across the three subregions, three of the top five ranks are held by the
three Andean Missions, with Ecuador ranked first, Peri third, and Bolivia fifth; together, the Andean Missions invest an average of 29% of their ARDN resources in extension. The Caribbean Missions fall in the middle of the range, averaging about 18%; however, overall, Haiti ranks second at nearly 32% and the Dominican Republic ranks next to last at almost 6%. The Central American Missions fall at the bottom of the range, averaging just under 10%.
.Education-The Mission -ranking is as follows:
% Country % Country
45.5 ROCAP 0.0 Bolivia
26.0 Dominican Republic 0.0 Haiti
12.7 Peri 0.0 Jamaica
3.2 Ecuador 0.0 RDO/C
0.7 Guatemala 0.0 El Salvador
0.5 Honduras 0.0 Belize
0.0 Costa Rica
Comparing USAID Missions across the three subregions, two of the top five Missions (Perd at 13% and Ecuador at 3%) are Andean Missions; on the other hand, the USAID/Bolivia Mission invests 0% of its ARDN resources in education. In the Caribbean region, USAID/Dominican Republic invests 26% of its ARDN resources in education, while the other three Caribbean Missions (Haiti, Jamaica, and RDO/C) invest none of their ARDN resources in education. In the Central American region, ROCAP invests almost half (45.5%) of its ARDN resources in education, while the five country-level Central American Missions invest little or none of their ARDN resources in agricultural education.
Overall-In terms of all three Ag REE functions, the country ranking is as follows:
% Country % Country
80.6 Perfi 33.7 Jamaica
59.0 ROCAP 32.4 RDO/C
52.8 E:'..ador 31.9 Haiti
48.2 L,. -:!n Republic 24.7 Honduras 44.7 Boi. 9.1 Guatemala
35.9 Belize 6.7 El Salvador
0.0 Costa Rica
Generally, the Andean region Missions invest almost 60% of their ARDN resources on Ag REE, USAID/Peri (at 81%) placing first among all LAC countries, Ecuador third (53%) and Bolivia fifth (45%). By comparison, the Central American Missions invest an average of about 22%, with ROCAP (at 59%) second among all LAC Missions and USAID/Costa Rica (at 0%) last. The Caribbean Missions fall in the middle range, averaging about 37% of ARDN resources invested in Ag REE, although USAID/Dominican Republic invests nearly half (48%) of its ARDN resources in Ag REE.

The regional patterns for agricultural research, extension, and education are summarized in Table 2.10.
Table. 2.10. Regional Pattern of USAID Mission Investment in Ag REE as a Percent of
FY89 ARDN Resources.
Andean Caribbean American
Research 24.8 11.5 4.8
Extension 29.3 18.5 9.9
Education 5.3 6.5 7.8
Overall REE 59.4 36.6 22.6
4. Major Trends
Box 2.1 summarizes the major changes in the LAC ARDN portfolio during the subject period (FY88-FY91). In summary, on a subregional basis, Ag REE funding, as a percent of total ARDN funding, fell dramatically in two regions (from 36% to 7% in the Andean region and from 31 % to 4 % in the Central American region) and increased dramatically in one region (from 26% to 50% in the Caribbean region). Some of the major trends in the LAC ARDN portfolio are graphically shown in Figure 2.3. The decline in ARDN funding for Ag REE and agricultural credit are apparent, while the increase in ARDN funding for agribusiness, agricultural policy and, more recently, narcotics awareness are similarly evident.
B. Other Donor Funding & Activity for LAC Ag REE-Strengthening
Beyond AID's ARDN funding for Ag REE, others donors also are doing very little to strengthen LAC Ag REE systems.
1. Donor Support for International Agricultural Research Center (IARCs)
AID has been one of the principal donors to International Agricultural Research Centers through the Agency's participation in the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) that coordinates donor funding of the IARC

Box 2.1. Summary of the Major Changes in the LAC ARDN Portfolio during
Andean Region
Overall, ARDN funding for agriculture and natural resources/environment fell dramatically, from 84.6% to 14.9% and 15.4% to 1.6%, respectively. On the -other hand, narcotics awareness funding, in a single year (FY91).wiU increase from
0% (in previous years) to 83.4% of the regional portfolio in FY91.
* ARDN funding for Ag REE fell from 36% to 7% of the regional portfolio.
* Other areas experiencing major decreases in spending were: agricultural credit
(down from 22.4% to 1%), fuelwood (energy) (down from 10.6% to 0%), and
agribusiness (down from 17.4% to .8%). Caribbean Region
* Overall, ARDN funding for agriculture fell slightly (72.7% to 72.4%), while
funding for natural resources/environment rose slightly (27.3% to 27.6%).
* ARDN funding for Ag REE rose from 25.7% to 50% (49.9%) of the regional
* Areas in which there were major decreases in spending were: agricultural irrigation
(down from 14.8% to .5%) and agricultural credit (down from 18.4% to 2.3%). Central American Region
* Overall, ARDN funding for agriculture fell slightly from 87.4% to 81.7%, while
funding for natural resources and the environment rose from 12.6% to 18.2%; thus, a 5.7% decline in agriculture was balanced by a 5.6% increase in natural resources
and the environment.
* ARDN funding for Ag REE fell from 31.4% to 3.7% of the regional portfolio.
* Funding for infrastructure fell from 25.8 % to 3.2 %, while funding for agricultural
policy rose from 2.3% to 61% of the regional portfolio.

Figure 2.3. LAC Bureau ARDN Portfolio Sunummary by Strategic Funding Categories.
Agr Land Use IFY 68
E FY 8I SFY 90 Agr R/E/E \ FY 91
Agr Inputs
Ir rigatllon/InfraaItr.f
Pest Management
Agr Credit
Agr Marketing
Agr Policy
Nat. Res./Energy
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
$ (000,000)
Source: LAC/DR/RD (note: based on FY89 as of late 1989)

system. There are three IARCs in the LAC region: CIAT, CIMMYT, and CIP. These IARCs, in turn, work with the national agricultural research systems (NARS). During the period 1983-89, AID support for the LAC IARCs fell from US$ 13.8 million to less than US$ 12.66 million, a decline of over 7.5% (Table 2.11).
By comparison, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) grant funding for the LAC IARCs has grown from US$ 9.1 million in 1983 to US$ 11.49 million in 1989, an increase of more than 26%. A recent IDB grant of $11.5 million, the latest in a series of annual
-contributions -the- tDB has made to the- LAG ARCs since 1974, marks ,the start of a new approach in the Bank's support of the IARCs. In the past, IDB funds financed the core budgets of the IARCs. Beginning in 1990, $360,000 of the Bank's grant was to fund the preparation of special programs targeted on the specific needs of the WB's member countries, primarily in applied research and training. Over the four-year grant period, about 60% of the Bank's contributions to the IARCs will finance these special programs, the remaining 40% providing budgetary support. Research activities will involve collaboration between the IARCs and the NARS. Depending on funding availability, the Bank is expected to approve about ten special programs during the grant period. The Bank also has provided that up to 10% of its funding can be used for special programs important to the region but conducted by IARCs outside the LAC region. Currently IDB is working with CARDI on development of IDB financing to develop capability (training) in support of agriculture.
As USAID Mission ARDN funding for Ag REE in the LAC region has declined, the Agency's funding of the LAC IARCs, even though this funding also declined, has become more and more important, since the NARS rely on the IARCs as a principal source of scientific expertise (e.g., research methodology), technological innovation (e.g. germ plasm), and training support (e.g., specialized short courses). At the same time, government funding for public sector Ag REE institutions in AID-assisted LAC countries declined during the 1980s. But the decline in host country government and AID funding for public sector Ag REE institutions contributed to a deterioration in the capacity of these institutions to carry out TG&T.
Indeed, a 1990 survey of LAC USAID Missions found that several key components of host-country public agricultural research organizations (budget, numbers trained, personnel management, and program planning) were, on average, rated as poor or very poor (Table 4.3, Chapter 4). The Missions also rated private sector research organizations as having made the most progress in TG&T during the 1980s. This area's average progress rating was 69%, the progress of public research organizations was rated at 55%, while public extension and agricultural education were rated at 51 % and 45 % respectively.

Table 2.11. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) Grant Funding to LAC International
Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs).
Year CIMMYT CIAT CIP Total Tota Total
US$ Million US$ Million1974 2.0
1975 4.0
1976 10.7
1977 6.2
1978 6.2
1979 6.7
1980 7.4
1981 8.1
1982 9.1
1983 6.00 5.40 2.30 13.7 9.1 22.8
1984 6.00 5.60 2.30 13.9 9.1 23.0
1985 6.00 5.54 2.30 13.84 9.74 23.58
1986 6.10 5.60 2.33 14.03 9.64 23.67
1987 5.25 4.82 2.00 12.07 10.28 22.35
1988 5.25 4.82 2.05 12.12 10.53 22.65
1989 (est.) 5.25 5.36 2.05 12.66 11.49 24.15
Source: CGIAR Secretariat and Inter-American Development Bank
The decline in TG&T capacity of public agricultural research institutions, in turn, weakened their ability to link effectively not only with the LAC IARCs (CIMMYT, CIAT, and CIP) but also with the LAC regional agricultural research centers (RARCs): the Tropical Agricultural Research and Training Center (CATIE) in Costa Rica and the Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI) in Trinidad. Faced by the deteriorating TG&T capacity of national-level Ag REE systems, IARCs and RARCs are finding it increasingly difficult to implement TG&T programs in collaboration with the NARS. This became a point of discussion during AID's 1990 International Centers Day. As the BIFAD Briefs reported, the discussions during Centers Day raised the issue of:
the need for improving host-country institutional capacity and leadership in adaptive
research and extension, in order to [ensure] adoption by farmers of new and improved
technology. The IARCs recognized that they cannot be successful without viable
national research and diffusion systems in the countries they serve.

The stagnant or declining public institutional capacity for research and extension in
developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, also was noted, and the national capacity to sustain support of their public institutions without foreign aid was
questioned. AID and the IARC participants wrestled with defining their
organizations' appropriate roles and those of other donors and the host countries in
reversing this trend....
Unless public research and extension institutions are supported,.. .rural economies will
stagnate-and the-natural resource. base.forsustainable agriculture will deteriorate
further, resulting in decreased food yields (BIFAD, 1991:6).
Deterioration of public TG&T capacity has also sparked an increased interest among the IARCs in establishing collaborative links with private sector research groups, i.e., with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and-private voluntary organizations (PVOs). However, such private agricultural research organizations generally focus on different crops (i.e., nontraditional agricultural export crops) than those (i.e., basic food crops) falling within the research mandates of an IARC or a NARS. This raises the question of whether increased reliance of LAC IARCs on collaborative links with private research organizations, and decreased reliance on public agricultural research organizations, would further weaken both public and private research organizations. That is, would such a trend further accelerate the decline of public sector research on basic food crops, while distracting private research organizations from their mandate to focus on NTAE crops?
2. Donor Support for NARS
a. World Bank
Lending by the World Bank in the LAC region during 1981-87 for free-standing agricultural research projects and agricultural and regional development (ARD) projects with research components included six projects in four AID-assisted countries: Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, and Peri (Table 2.12). The cost of the agricultural research components in these Bank projects, as a percentage of total project cost, averaged 15% for the region, while project research costs in the four AID-assisted countries as a percentage of total project cost was only 5.2%. Although Bank lending (loan/credit) amounted to 40.4% of total project cost, the cost of a project's research component as a percentage of total project cost was 0.49%. Further, the Bank provides an extremely small portion of its lending to LAC countries receiving AID assistance, most lending being targeted on non-AIDassisted countries such as Brazil and Mexico; only a small percentage of lending is actually allocated to research.
These figures reflect a downward trend since the 1960s in Bank funding for
agricultural research. During the years (1968 to 1981) that Robert McNamara directed the World Bank, it dedicated a significant proportion of its budgets for loans to finance ARD projects, with a fifth of the loans going to LAC countries. These loans were important because they partially corrected the tendency of many LAC countries to underinvest in their own agricultural and rural sectors.

Table 2.12. World Bank-Assisted Projects with Agricultural Research Components in
the LAC Region (1981-1987) (source: Pritchard, 1990).
Key: Countries in bold are AID-assisted countries.
A = Barbados F = Jamaica
B = Brazil G3 = Mexico
C = Colombia H = Paraguay
D =Guyana I = Peru'
E = Haiti
Year Total LAC % Countries (# of Projects)
1981 32 4 12.5 B (3), G (1)
1982 27 8 29.6 B (4), G3 (1), H (2), I (1) al
1983 36 4 11.1 B (1), G (1), C (1), 1 (1) hl
1984 32 5 15.6 B (1), C (1), E (1), F (1), 1 (1) _q/
1985 39 4 10.3 B (2), G (1), D (1)
1986 28 3 10.7 B (2), G (1)
1987 36 8 22.2 B (6), G3 (1), A (1) d/
a/ 1982: Peril (Agricultural Research & Extension, cost of project's research component: $21.7 million, 26% of project's total cost).
b/ 1983: Perii (Alto Ways Rural Development, cost of project's research component:
$3.7 million, 4.4% of total project cost).
c/l 1984: Haiti (Rural Development II, cost of project's research component: $2.7
million, 9.3% of total project cost); Jamaica (Export Crops I, cost of project's
research component: $0.6 million, 1.5% of total project cost); and Peril (Rural Dev III, cost of project's research component: $1.5 million, 2.2% of total project cost).
d/ 1987: Barbados (Ag Development Rehabilitation-A, cost of project's research
component: $0.2 million, 3.4% of total project cost).

However, when McNamara left the Bank in 1981, it began to cut the actual value of the loans for ARD projects. McNamara's successor, A.W. Clausen, emphasized structural readjustment and the LAC debt crisis; policy reform, market reform, and privatization became the road to development. Since 1980, the portion of the Bank's loans directed to AR]) projects has decreased almost by half, with the real value of AR]) loans falling to almost 20 percent (see Figure 2.4). The Bank believed that it had discovered a better means to help the agricultural sector: structural adjustment loans (SALs). It was expected that these loans would benefit farmers because the loans were tied to policy changes such as currency devaluation,, reduction in governmental subsidies and protection,,and the introduction of price reforms and market-determined exchange rates.
Figure 2.4. World Bank Lending, 1966-1988.
~ 20,000Total Bank Lending
15.000 F
CO 10.000
5. 00
66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
Fiscal Year
Source: World Bank, 1 -id 1989 (as reported in Paarlberg and Lipton, 1991).
During the 1980s, the Bank did not emphasize ARD projects that disburse money slowly, but rather the SALs that disburse money more quickly, with conditions for the implementation of specified policy reforms. Thus, a reduced amount of money has been available for ARD projects. At the same time, the structural adjustment program may have hurt more than helped farmers. Under pressure to reduce national budgets, many developing country governments chose to cut public investments for agriculture rather than touch urban and industrial subsidies. Many governments found it easier to cut subsidies (that is, raise the price of rural :~redit and inputs such as fertilizer, and cut the budgets for agricultural research and extension) than to raise commodity prices.

With the passage of time, the LAC countries were under pressure to repay the interest on their loans and pay import bills during a long and deep recession. This pressure led the Bank to put even greater emphasis on the sectoral adjustment loans (SECALs), thereby cutting even further the amount of money available for ARI) projects. In the process, the Bank began to depend more and more on generalists and trade economists, and less and less on agricultural technicians and agricultural economists. Toward the mid-1980s, when the principal donors put pressure on the Bank to reduce operational costs, the Bank responded by reducing its technical personnel in agriculture.
With the beginning of the 1990s, the Bank is recognizing that a rural investment crisis has been imposed on the previous structural adjustment crisis, especially in Africa and Latin America. The Bank has begun to look for ways to increase public sector investment in agriculture in the Bank's borrowing countries. For example, the Bank now offers what are called "hybrid" loans, which combine structural adjustment support that disburses rapidly and project support that disburses slowly. The Bank also is pushing other means to increase public expenditures on the agricultural sector. For example, the Bank has made an SAL loan to Mexico that was conditioned on the Mexican government increasing its level of public sector funding support for agriculture.
Paarlberg and Lipton (1991) clarify that the change in the Bank's pattern of lending had as a consequence that the Bank not only disburses money but also, by way of example, defines the development agenda. That is, any change in the Bank's policies reverberates outward to the multilateral institutions, international assistance agencies, and national development ministries. Thus, they conclude that:
If the World Bank fails to revive its project lending for agricultural and rural
development in the 1990s, no other competent lending institution will be ready and
able to take its place.... The Inter-American Development Bank... .followed the lead
of the World Bank in the 1980s. and permitted lending for agriculture to fall
(Paarlberg and Lipton, 199 1:495).
They also emphasize that it is not clear that bilateral assistance is ready to fill the vacuum created if the Bank does not provide financing for projects aimed at strengthening agricultural technology systems in the LAC region. On the other hand, private investments in LAG agriculture have favored a few highly profitable commercial subsectors (e.g., horticulture and agroprocessing) and this tendency is not likely to change.
Some would maintain that without a rebirth of leadership on the part of the Bank, developing country governments may have the will but not the capacity to invest in agricultural and rural development. With respect to this, Paarlberg and Lipton (1991:496) write that as World Bank ARD lending
declined in the 1980s, so did Third World governmental outlays-by about $45 billion
per year, according to estimates by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. In Latin America, agriculture's already small share of central government expenditures
fell by 35% in the early 1980s. By allowing its own lending for agricultural and rural
development to falter over the past decade, the Bank may have legitimized an

unfortunate tendency in the same direction among Third World governments as well
as multilateral and bilateral funding sources.
The reduction in public expenditures for agriculture had a negative impact on the capacity of Ag REE systems to generate and transfer agricultural technology. As earlier noted, the real expenditures per agricultural researcher fell by 8.3 percent in 20 LAC countries between 1961-65 and 1981-85 (Pardey and Roseboom, 1990:2-4).
b. .International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR)
Donors also provide funding for the International Service for National
Agricultural Research (ISNAR). But ISNAR has provided only limited technical support for Ag REE-strengthening of National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) in AID-assisted LAC countries. Table 2.13 summarizes ISNAR's LAC collaboration, including the exploratory (initial) Mission to country, system review, system planning, and implementation of system improvements. The boundaries between the planning and implementation phases are not always clear; most of the time ISNAR works on various critical factors simultaneously, with the phases overlapping. While work on some factors is in the planning stage, others are in the implementation stage.
ISNAR has done NARS reviews in five AID-assisted LAC countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Perti, Dominican Republic, PanamA) and exploratory reviews in Costa Rica and Haiti. ISNAR has collaborated in planning and implementation of NARS improvements in four countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica). Table 2.14 summarizes specific ISNAR activities in individual LAC countries to date, while Box 2.2 identifies ISNAR activities in AID-assisted LAC countries during 1989.
In 1989, ISNAR sponsored several regional training and international workshop
events, and two regional training programs were conducted. At CATIE (Costa Rica), IICA, CATIE, and ISNAR sponsored a workshop on Agricultural Research Management, attended by 20 high- and mid-level managers from 10 LAC countries, of which nine were AIDassisted: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and PanamA. In Chile, FAO, IICA, ISNAR and INIA (Chile) sponsored a "raining program on research management. Three ISNAR staff contributed topics on research management: innovation, private-sector linkages, and monitoring and evaluation, plus a paper on basics of biotechnology. Participants attended from Chile and three AID-assisted LAC countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peri.
ISNAR sponsored three international workshops at ISNAR's headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands. The International Agricultural Research Management Workshop (IARM) was conducted for senior NARS managers (7 from the LAC region). This workshop focused on three management areas: planning and priority setting, structure and organization, and program budgeting and management information. The Agricultural Researcher Information System (ARIS) workshop, which included participation of two AIDassisted LAC countries (Costa Rica and Ecuador), focused on helping research managers to learn how to use a human resource questionnaire and database program to quickly process

Box 2.2. Sunimary of 1989 ISNAR Activities in the LAC Region.
Bolivia-Diagnostic review of IBTA; attendance of Bolivians at two regional workshops: Agricultural Research Management (ARM), CATIE, Costa Rica; and Regional Research Management, Chile), and at two international workshops: International Agricultural Research Management (LARM) and Making the Link, The Hague. Ecuador-Assisted in gathering and analyzing data on human resources for INIAP; INIAP's director of human resources spent a month at ISNAR planning a system for human resource management and development. Ecuadorian staff took part in two regional workshops (CATIE and Chile) and three international workshops (IARM, ARIS, and Making the Link).
Peri-ISNAR staff member took part in Peri's annual conference on agricultural research; Peruvians took part in the Regional Research Management workshop in Chile.
Dominican Republic-Hosted a case study in the research-technology transfer linkage study. Dominicans attended the CATIE ARM and Making the Link workshops.
Costa Rica-ISNAR staff provided technical assistance to the National Commission for Research and Transfer of Agricultural Technology. Participated in a workshop for planning the 1990 research program, making presentations on systems for planning, monitoring, and evaluating integrated research and transfer components of national programs, and centers and data banks of scientific-technical information in the agricultural sector). Advised Costa Rica's new National Commission for Research and Transfer of Agricultural Technology on evaluating performance of national research programs. A case study was done on the research-technology transfer linkage. Costa Ricans participated in the CATIE ARM workshop and in two international workshops: Agricultural Researcher Information System (ARIS) and Making the Link. Guatemala--Gua'temalans participated in the Making the Link workshop and in the CATIE ARM workshop.
Honduras-Honduras participated in the CATIE ARM workshop and will participate in a case study of small country NARS.

Table, 2.13. ISNAR Activities (Reviews of NARS and Collaboration in Research
Planning and fimplementation) in the LAC Region through 1990)
(Source: Carlos Valverde, ISNAR).
AID-ASSISTED. Country initial Systemn Research ImplemenLAC COUNTRIES Request -Mission Review Planning tation
ANDEAN REGION ____ ___Bolivia e (83) 0 (89) 9 (89) *(90) *(91)
Ecuador (84) a (87) a (88) *(89) *(91)
Peru3 (85) 0____ (85) _________CARIBBEANREGION _____ _____ __________ ______Dominican Republic (82) e (83) (83) *(84) *(86)
Haiti 9 (83) (83) *(83)1/ ___________Jamaica 0 (90) ____ _____ _____ _____CARDI (E.Caribbean) a (84) a (85) *(85) *(90) *(91)
CENTRAL AMERICA _______________ _________Belize _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Costa Rica (81) *(81) 0(81/87) *(89)
El Salvador _____ _____ _____ ____Guatemala 9 (86) _________Honduras (83) _________Nicaragua_______ ___Panam& 9 (83) *(85) *(85) *(86) _____OTHER LAC COUNTRIES _______________ ____Argentina a (84) _____ _____ *(85) (88).2/Brazil _ _ _ _ _ _____ _ _
Chi.le 0 (80) *(86) ______ (87) *(88) 4
Colombia 9 (84) *(85) ____ *(85) *3
Guyana 0 (81) (82) *(82) _____ ____Mexico (87) ____ ____ ____Paraguay___________ ___ __Suriname (86) ____ _____ ____ _____Uruguay 9 (85) *(86) *(86)2/ (86) *(91)
Venezuela a (91) ____KEY: 1, 2 = Only exploratory review
3 = only system component
4 = only training

Table 2.14. ISNAR Collaboration with National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) in System-Building Activities
(Source: Carlos Valverde, ISNAR).
System-Building Bolivia Ecuador Perd Dominican Costa Colombia Uruguay
Activities Republic Rica
Structure & *
National Research 0 0 *
Program Formulation *
& Budgeting
Monitoring *
& Evaluation
Link NARS *
& Policymakers
Link NARS & Tech- 0 0
nology Transfer
& Knowledge Sources
Human Resources *
Physical Resources 0
Financial Resources *

human resource information. A workshop called Making the Link Between Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer identified and discussed lessons learned from two ISNAR studies [On-Farm Client-Oriented Research (OFCOR) and Research-Technology Transfer Linkages (RTTL)]. AID-assisted LAC countries participating were Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.
3. Limits of Strengthening NARS through IARCs
Despite ISNAR's progress, in. strengthening NARS in.AID-assisted LAC
countries, the CGIAR is concerned about the weakened capability of the NARS to collaborate with the IARCs, and has directed its Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) to develop a background paper on "Relationships Between CGIAR Centres and National Research Systems: Issues and Options" (CGIAR, 1991). In this paper, the TAC notes that IARC activities cannot be effective:
unless there is a certain minimum capacity within the national system to do research,
as well as to establish effective linkages both with the Centres and with local
producers through the extension services. Where this minimum capacity is lacking,
the Centres have sometimes collaborated with bilateral donors in the provision of research assistance [defined as including financial assistance, technical assistance,
etc.], rather than face the frustration of not being able to transfer the benefits of their
work (CGIAR, 1991:6).
But the TAC states that:
Only the Group [CGIAR], itself, can determine the role it wishes to play in this
whole area of activity [i.e., "issue of strengthening national research systems"]. In
particular, it must enunciate its preferences for the extent to which the Centres it
funds should become involved in direct support for national systems, and the ways in
which they might do so (CGIAR, 1991:6).
The TAC further states that while "there is general recognition of the need for research assistance to national institutions to reinforce Centre activities, a recurring issue in the CGIAR has been the extent to which the Centres themselves should become involved in providing and administering it" (CGIAR, 1991: 9). The TAC notes that the IARCs have created research networks that have played a role in providing national programs access to development assistance. But the TAC also notes that: As a consequence, the increasing calls on the time of national scientists are not
necessarily determined by their own national priorities. The driving force may be
supply, rather than demand. Furthermore, active promotion of cooperative and
contract research by the Centres might serve only to aggravate the problem.... As far
as cooperative networks are concerned, if they are to be successful and sustainable,
there is no viable alternative to a demand-driven system in which the countries themselves define the problems and determine the priorities. It is the orchestration of
CGIAR involvement in all these activities to which further thought must be given and
appropriate action taken (CGIAR, 1991:13).

Finally, the TAC notes that IARCs, including ISNAR, play or could play a role in providing research assistance (technical and/or financial assistance) aimed at strengthening national (public and/or private) agricultural research systems. But the TAC clearly states: "If there is a desire to link Centre activities more closely to research assistance, an alternative approach would be to give more explicit recognition to this need, and to modify the structure of some or all of the Centres accordingly" (CGIAR, 1991:6).
The TAC proposes the possibility of establishing "a research assistance agency as a separate unit"-at-some or all of the IARCs. Such an agency would be controlled by. the IARC's board but would have a separate budget and be "entirely self-funding, by charging appropriate overhead costs" on all research assistance it administered. Research assistance would be managed by "full-time specialists" rather than by international scientists on a parttime basis, as often happens at present.
The research assistance unit could draw on Centre programme staff on a paid
consultancy basis, thus maintaining the integrity of the core funding. Some
restructuring of existing Centres along these lines would not be difficult. In some
instances, it would amount to little more than reorganizing the units that already exist
at some Centres, which currently operate under such titles as "international
cooperation programmes (CGIAR, 1991:11-12).
Some would argue that asking IARCs to assume a major leadership role for
strengthening NARS distorts the whole purpose of the IARCS: to provide leadership in identifying and attacking major problems restricting efficient production of specific commodities. In this view, IARCs should stick to doing what they can do best, namely, helping NARS through: (a) literature; (b) germ plasm; (c) training; (d) role models; and (e) influencing national policy makers.
Perhaps an expansion in ISNAR operations could most effectively address the issue, with ISNAR drawing consultants from IARCs, other research institutes, universities, and private sector firms, to meet the spectrum of policy, managerial, administrative, and technical problems of NARS. ISNAR also could refer specific projects to the World Bank, regional development banks, USAID, and other national development assistance programs.
Beyond these points, several questions can be posed regarding the ideas outlined by the TAC Secretariat:
" Re the reference to NARS lacking "minimum capacity," why do the NARS lack
capacity despite all the money, technical assistance, training, etc. expended?
What, if anything, can the IARCs do about these factors-national policies, lack of
funds, civil service systems, etc.?
" Re the referenced "research assistance agency," was not the CGIAR's principal
objective in establishing ISNAR that of "strengthening" NARS? Would not such
an agency be successful only by working in behalf of all the IARCs? Would each
IARC's "research assistance agency" operate independently of other IARC research assistance agencies, or would each IARC's research assistance agency be affiliated

with an overreaching agency (e.g., ISNAR)? How would the agency address
problems of NARS with commodities not represented by any ARC?
* Re the referenced "self-funding," where would the funding originate for direct, indirect, and overhead expenditures? To what extent is ISNAR's budget self-funded?
How would a donor decide where a dollar invested would have greatest impact-in IARCs, RARCs, or NARS? In this regard, is AID overinvesting in the IARCs and private sector research organizations and underinvesting in the NARS? If declining
ARDN funding for public -agricultural research -reflects declining. AID ..interest in
basic food crops and increasing interest in NTAE crops, should AID seek that the
IARCs begin to allocate a larger shared of their AID funding for research on
NTAE crops (e.g., fruits and vegetables)?
What pattern of investment of AID funding in public and private research will have
the greatest impact with respect to achieving broad-based economic growth?
Would the impact on economic growth of AID's grant funding support for LAC
IARCs be increased if the funds were made available to individual Missions to use
in supporting host country collaboration with the LAC IARCs or IARCs outside
the LAC region? Would such a change, by moving AID's funding support for the
IARCs further downstream to support country-specific collaboration between NARS and IARCs, serve to increase the demand for and utilization of IARC
technologies and accelerate and increase TG&T's contribution to economic growth?
Re the referenced "full-time specialist," what would the specialist do and how
would he do it? What would be the best qualifications for the specialist? How
would the specialist relate to the IARC scientists? What would be the "status" of a
specialist in research technical assistance in relation to IARC scientists? Would
such a specialist operate more like an extension subject matter specialist who
serves area-specific extension agents?
Clearly, the TAC paper focuses on the key problem identified in the present Ag REE Inventory-weakened technology generation and transfer (TG&T) capability of national Ag REE systems in the LAC region. This problem acts as a brake on the speed at which IARCs can generate productivity-increasing technologies and transfer them to farmers.
However, the TAC raises the issue of whether the CGIAR should establish a policy on IARCs playing a strengthening role vis-A-vis national agricultural research systems (e.g., establishing a "research assistance unit" in each IARC). But this solution only makes sense:
(a) if IARCs have comparative advantage to take on such an expanded role, and (b) if the magnitude of the problem does not go beyond the resources of the IARCs. Each LAC country already faces uncertainty about which is the best source of technical assistance (e.g. CIMMYT, CIAT, or CIP) in various areas (e.g., farming systems research); no individual center would have a comparative advantage in terms of being the source of technical assistance vis-4-vis Ag REE system strengthening. Continuing need for Ag REE strengthening in many LAC (as well as African and Asian) countries suggests that the

problem is of such magnitude that its solution goes beyond the resources of any one IARC, even those of ISNAR.
Obviously, donors such as AID must ensure an appropriate level of investment at all levels-IARCs (including ISNAR), regional agricultural research centers (RARCs), and NARS, including the public and private sectors. However, what the TAC does not address is the issue of whether the donors (e.g., AID) that comprise the CGIAR should establish a policy of working together to strengthen NARSs, not because the lack of strong national agricultural research systems is a constraint on the IARCs bu rather.because a weakened national agricultural research system is a constraint on broad-based economic growth. While the weak TG&T systems in AID-assisted LAC countries can be strengthened on a sustainable basis only by creating a demand in these countries for strengthened Ag REE systems, the solution being considered by the TAC is more supply- than demand-driven.
The LAC Bureau is currently emphasizing an improved macroeconomic and policy environment as the basis for a vigorous private sector response. Such response is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for achieving the goal of broad-based economic growth in the LAC region. As the macroeconomic and policy environment for investment in agriculture improves, there will be increased demand for productivity-increasing technologies and, thereby, increased demand for adequate TG&T capacity to supply the productivityincreasing technologies needed to respond vigorously to improving market opportunities.
These considerations raise the question of whether AID should begin to exercise a leadership role with respect to making Ag REE-strengthening an integral part of Agency policy dialogue with host-country governments, requiring that these governments agree to make a commitment to Ag REE-strengthening (e.g., increased autonomy and adequate budget support for research) as a condition precedent for AID support in various areas including research assistance.
The possibility of such a policy dialogue approach, based on a demand-driven model of agricultural development, should be considered by AID in reaching a decision about the best means of strengthening the ability of national agricultural research systems to interact with the IARCs. Policy dialogue can be advanced by non-project sector assistance (NPSA) programming to encourage host-government policy reforms and improved budget allocations to Ag REE systems, and/or by more traditional projects and programs providing technical support to regional TG&T. However, policy dialogue traditionally has been fueled by some sort of "carrot" such as Economic Support Funds (ESF) and/or PL-480 local currency generations. The following section reviews the current status of PL-480 local currency generations as a source of funds for Ag REE- strengthening in AID-assisted LAC countries.
4. U.S. Government PL-480 Local Currency Generations
A potential funding source for Ag REE in AID-assisted LAC countries is local currency from the sale of PL-480 food commodities. But currently available data on the PL480 program are not adequate to determine the extent to which LAC Missions, faced by declining ARDN funding for Ag REE during the 1980s, sought or began to use PL-480 local

currency generations as an alternative funding source for Ag REE-strengthening. Table 2.15 indicates that local currency generations under the PL-480 Title I program between 1986 and 1988 increased only in Ecuador. While Title I funding held constant in three countries (Bolivia, Peri, and Jamaica), it fell in Haiti and five Spanish-speaking countries (-3% in El Salvador, -5% in Guatemala, -20% in Honduras, -33% in the Dominican Republic, and 45% in Costa Rica). Thus, if PL-480 Title I funds were used to support Ag REEstrengthening, this only could have occurred in two ways: (1) Missions began to reallocate a larger share of PL-480 Title I funds to support Ag REE activities; or (2) Missions began to allocate available PL-480 Title II local currency- generations to Ag REE-strengthening. The latter possibility would make sense in the context of USAID Missions beginning, over time, to place increased emphasis on getting the private sector (PVOs) involved in Ag REE activities.
Data are not available to track how the importing countries allocated funding available under the Title I and II programs, nor are data available on the extent to which the Ag REE components of Mission projects have been or are being funded by PL-480 local currency generations. However, the general provisions of the PL-480 Food for Development Program include "activities of the Government of the importing country designed to develop and extend the technical base for small farmer agriculture.. .to increase the number of trained farmers and technicians" (U.S. Department of State, 1990: Annex A Food for Development Program). These provisions authorize the use of PL-480 local currency generations to be used in support of TG&T activities carried out by the Ag REE institutions of the importing country.
In Bolivia's case, the FY90 PL-480 program budget provided for up to US$ 20
million for financing lines to provide funds, both through credit and grant mechanisms, for various projects, with several having Ag REE components. One project receiving funding has been the Chapare Regional Development Proiect (US$ 2 million budgeted for counterpart funds in the project's Associated High Valleys Component). Similarly, the FY90 program budget provides US$ 3 million for the National Wheat Program that includes support for research and extension activities carried out by public and private sector entities (U.S. Dept. of State, 1990: Annex B Program Description). Indeed, a recent USAID/Bolivia reporting cable notes that PL-480 funds:
were granted to private sector agricultural research and extension stations, performing
research in such areas as varietal improvement of potatoes, corn and wheat. They also provide technical assistance and training to farmers. Their services have been
quite reliable and are preferred by the vast majority of farmers to the government
The PL-480 program was revised under the "Agricultural Development and Trade Act of 1990." These revisions have implications in terms of accessibility of AID-assisted LAC countries to local currency generations that potentially could be used for Ag REEstrengthening. The revised program has provisions for Title I and Title III, as follows: Title I, a loan-financed concessional sales program to be administered by USDA,
allows local currency payments to be used, among other objectives, for establishment

and expansion of institutions for basic and applied agricultural research and the use of
such research through development of extension services; and for research in agriculture, forestry, and aquaculture, including collaborative research which is mutually
beneficial to the U.S. and the recipient country. Further, the Secretary of Agriculture
is authorized to establish a program of grant assistance to U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations for the purposes of buying discounted external debt of
foreign governments to obtain local currencies needed to finance projects "involving
the research, study, prevention, or control of animal and plant pests and diseases.
Title 111, a bilateral grant program to be administered by USAID, allows local currency proceeds of sales to be used, among other objectives, for research on malnutrition and its causes and for support for research (including collaborative
research which is mutually beneficial to the U.S. and the recipient country), education, and extension activities in agricultural sciences.
Section 413 provides that:
To the extent practicable, assistance for a foreign country under this Act shall be
coordinated and integrated with United States development assistance objectives and
programs for that country, and with the overall development strategy of that country.
Special emphasis should be placed on, and funds devoted to, activities that will
increase the nutritional impact of programs of assistance under this Act, and childsurvival programs and projects, in least developed countries, by improving the design and implementation of such programs and projects" (as cited in 1/14/91 memorandum
from Don Ferguson, USDAIOICD/DRD, on "Authorized Uses of United States
Owned Foreign Currencies: Sections 104 and 305 and Related Provisions").
To be eligible for the Title III program, an LAC country must be a "least developed country," i.e., a country must meet the criteria for its inclusion in the World Bank's Civil Works Preference list, or the country must be a "food deficit" country. To be a "food deficit" country, AID's administrator must determine that the daily per capita caloric consumption in the country is less than 2300 calories, that the country cannot meet its food needs through domestic production or imports due to a shortage of foreign exchange earnings, and that the child mortality rate under age 5 is greater than 100 per 1,000 births.
The Conference Committee Report states that "because calorie and child mortality
data may be inaccurate, out of date, or unavailable, the administrator may be required to use his judgement and the judgement of experts in determining that a country meets the criteria." Also, Title III provides that priority shall be given to countries that have demonstrated the greatest need for food, the capacity to use food assistance effectively, and a commitment to policies that promote food security, and that have a long-term plan for development. On the basis of these criteria and available data (Table 2.16), only four AID-assisted LAC countries (Haiti, Bolivia, Honduras, and Perd) are eligible to participate in Title III (bilateral grant).

Table 2.15. U.S. Government PL-480 Title I Local Currency Generations in LAC
AID-Assist:. Countries (FY86-FY90).
Thru Thru Percent
July Sept Increase
LAC SUBREGICNS FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 86 to 88
Bolivia 20000 20000 20000 22000 20000 0
Ecuador a) 5000 1591 11612 3300 5610 132
Perfi 20000 20000 20000 21000 20000 0
Dominican Republic 30000 30000 20000 20000 14600 -33.3 Haiti b) 15000 10000 0 0 4000
Jamaica 35000 37800 35000 40000 40000 0
RDO/C (E. Caribbean) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belize 0 0 0 0
Costa Rica 20000 16000 11000 15000 15000 -45.0
El Salvador 44000 30400 42600 40000 40200 -3.2
Guatemala 19000 21500 18000 18000 18000 -5.3
Honduras 15000 12000 12000 18000 12000 -20.0
a) Beginning in 1987, funding for Ecuador is Sec. 416 funding.
b) Beginning in 1990, funding for Haiti is Title II Government
to Government.
Source: Food for Peace Summary, Latin America & Caribbean Year
End Totals Title I, II, III, 416 (1986-1990). Office
of Food for Peace, Bureau for Food for. Peace and
Voluntary Assistance, United States Agency for
International Development.

Table 2.16. Food Insecure Countries (Source: USAID/FVA). KEY:
= Countries receiving IBRD Civil Works Preferences
** Countries with average daily calorie supply less than 2,300
* Countries with child (under five) mortality rate greater than 100 per 1,000.
AID- GNP/Capita Avg. Daily Under 5
Assisted 1989 Calorie Mortality
LAC Supply Rate
** Country 1988 1988
=** *= Haiti 400 1911 171
** Bolivia 600 2086 172
** Honduras 900 2164 107
"= Per 1090 2269 123
Nicaragua 2361 95
Dom. Rep. 790 2357 81
Guatemala 920 2352 99
Ecuador 1040 2388 87
El Salvador 1040 2415 84
Jamaica 1260 2572 22
PanamA 1780 2468 34
Costa Rica 1790 2782 22


This chapter identifies key trends in AID support for Ag REE-strengthening in the LAC region. It first presents an historical overview of AID-funded Ag REE-strengthening efforts since the -1950s, -and then reviews programsduring the 1980s, identifying the extent to which Agency-funded projects have assisted in developing the technology generation and transfer (TG&T) capability of Ag REE systems. Finally, the chapter identifies key trends in the evolution of AID strategy and project approaches to Ag REE-strengthening.
A. Historical Overview
AID' has funded Ag REE projects or projects with Ag REE components in the LAC region for over 40 years.2 Jim Chapman (personal communication) identifies three major phases:
* 1950-70 Assistance to Ministries of Agriculture in the areas of agricultural
extension and/or research
* 1970-85 Creation of semiautonomous agricultural research and/or extension
institutes (ICTA, CENTA, IDIAP, INIAP, INIPA, IBTA, etc.)
* 1985- Creation and development of autonomous private sector foundations
which conduct or contract out research and extension (FHIA, FUNDAGRO, etc.)
The pattern of creating semiautonomous research institutions was evident even earlier than the 1970s. As Valverde (1990:25) notes: "The reorganization of research and the adoption of decentralized institutes as structural models was the generalized patterns in the 1960s." Table 3.1 lists the national agricultural research institutes that have been created since 1957 in the LAC region. A visual outline of the evolution of agricultural research and extension models, from "ministry model" to "semiautonomous model" to "fully autonomous model," is given in Figure 3.1.
'AID is also understood here in the generic sense of including the Agency's predecessor agencies.
2As Valverde (1990) notes, during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, technical and financial assistance to national agricultural research systems (NARS) also was provided by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, United Nations special funds, resources from the Inter-American Development Bank, agencies for cooperation (FAO, CEPAL, ECLA, UCA), and bilateral aid from Canada, Great Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany.

Table 3.1. National Research Institutes Created Since 1957 in Latin America.
(AA = Administrative Autonomy: A = Autonomous; S = Semiautonomous)
Country Acronym Name and Year AA
Bolivia IBTA Instituto Boliviano de Tecnologfa Agropecuaria (1975) S
Ecuador INIAP Instituto Nacional de Investigaci6n Agropecuaria (1959) S
Perd INIPA Instituto Nacional de Investigaci6n y Promoci6n Agraria (1981) S
INIAA Instituto Nacional de Investigaci6n Agropecuaria y Agroindustrial (1987) S
Dom. Rep. IDIAA3 Instituto Dominicano de lnvestigaci6n Agropecuaria
Jamaica NARIJ' National Agricultural Research Institute of Jamaica
Guatemala ICTA Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologfa Agricolas S
Nicaragua INTAs Instituto Nacional de Tecnologfa Agropecuaria
Panama IDIAP Instituto Nacional de Investigaci6n Agropecuaria de Panam4 (1975) S
3Not implemented.
'In the process of being implemented.
SResearch activities were initiated in 1979 by the administrative systems of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Table 3.1 (continued)
Country Acronym Name and Year A
Argentina INTA Instituto, Nacional de Tecnologra Agropecuaria (1957) S
Mexico INIA Instituto, Nacional de Investigaci6n Agropecuaria (1961) S
Uruguay CIAAB Centro de Investigaciones Agrfcolas "Alberto Boerger" (1961) A
Colombia ICA Instituto, Colombiano Agropecuaria (1962) S
Chile INIA Instituto Nacional de lnvestigaci6n Agropecuaria (1964) A
Brazil EMBRAPA Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuaria (1973) A
cp Venezuela FONAIAP Fondo Nacional de Asistencia y Investigaci6n Agropecuaria (1973) S
Venezuela INIA Instituto Nacional de Investigaci6n Agraria (1978) S
Mexico INIFAP Instituto, Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, y Agropecuaria (1986) S
Uruguay INIA 7 Instituto Nacional, de Investigaci6n Agropecuaria (1989) A
Guyana NARIG National Agricultural Research Institute of Guyana
'LAC countries that do not currently have USAID Missions.
'The law creating INIA is under discussion in the Uruguayan Congress.
Source: Valverde (1990:26).

Figure 3.1. Historical Evolution of Agricultural Research and Extension
Organizational Models in the LAC Region (Source: Valverde, 1990:27).
Csta RIca
Hondura B3 alva
Ecuador c~imbla
Looking back across these developments over the past 40 years, Chapman asks:
Is there no common denominator among them which would appropriately characterize
the evolution of REE systems in [the] LAC [region]?... It would be interesting to
know why these changes or shifts...took place, what were [the] strengths and
weaknesses of each type of institutional form, what are the lessons to be extracted
from all of this and what are the implications for future efforts in REE?

The very existence of the "changes or shifts" identified by Chapman suggests that
AID assistance for Ag REE-strengthening in the LAC region also has undergone a dramatic shift during the past four decades. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, the focus of AID project assistance was on institution building in agricultural universities or ministries of agriculture, with the objective of transferring the U.S. Land Grant model of university research, extension, and education (see Box 3. 1). This was a major thrust of AID's program during the mid-1950s in Colombia, where Michigan State University assisted Colombia's National University in developing agronomy departments at Palmira, Medellfn, and Bogot. Table 3.2 lists other AID-funded. agricultural university. institution-building.programs in the LAC region.
Box 3.1. Experience of the U.S. Land Grant Model in the LAC Region
(Vessuri, 1990:1547-1548, 1551).
"...a peculiar organizational R&D pattern, based on the land grant
colleges and the experimental station system of the United States, was implanted throughout Latin America in the mid-1950s and early 1960s.
Examples of this included the National Institute of Farming Technology (INTA) in Argentina (1957), the National Institute of Agricultural Research (INIAP) in Ecuador (1959), the National Agricultural and Livestock Research Fund (FONAIAP) in Venezuela (1959), the National Institute of Agricultural Research (INIA) in Mexico (1960), the Agricultural Research and Promotion Service (SIPA) in Per (1960), the Colombian Agricultural and Livestock Institute (ICA) (1963), and the National Institute of Agricultural Research (INIA) in Chile (1964). Their mission involved improving the diffusion of technology already available in the industrialized countries. Consequently, the industrialized countries' priorities for technological development were also adopted, within limits imposed by resource availability. In general, the resulting technology has been capital-intensive and has centered on products of temperate climates, forms of production appropriate to the natural resources of the developed countries, and crops with good prospects in the export markets, such as corn..., sugar..., milk, beef..., and rice....
These institutes have tended to disregard the development of capabilities
to make fuller use of native productive potential....
(But) "the institutes lost efficiency, among other things, because of
their broad range of activities resulting from the tremendous heterogeneity of agricultural production in Latin America. The North American 'federal' scheme they copied was a response to high regional heterogeneity of the U.S.
agricultural sector, in the context of a relatively homogeneous production structure that facilitated the linkage to the different farming interest groups. On the contrary, the single-agency model adopted in Latin America tended to hinder such a relationship and the ability to respond to the needs
of many different groups, frequently with conflicting interests."

Table 3.2. AID-Funded Agricultural University Institution Building Programs in tie LAC Region (llansen, 1989). Year Country Assisted University Assisting University
51-57 PanamA' National Institute of Agriculture University of Arkansas
54-57 Chile University of Concepci6n University of California
54-57 Ecuador University of Quito and Guayaquil University of Idaho
54-56 Mexico Superior Institute of Agriculture Texas A&M University
54-68 Perd National Agrarian University North Carolina St. University
57-63 Guatemala University of San Carlos University of Kentucky
60-63 Paraguay National University of Asunci6n Montana State University
64-67 Washington State University
62-68 Uruguay Universidad de la Repiiblica Iowa State University
64-73 Brazil University of Cear- University of Arizona
64-73 Brazil University of Sao Paulo Ohio State University
64-73 Brazil University of Rio Grande do Sul University of Wisconsin
64-73 Brazil University of Vicosa Purdue University
65-70 Costa Rica University of Costa Rica University of Florida
65-73 Dominican Rep. Superior Institute of Agriculture Texas A&M University.
86-88 Costa Rica BARTH (Agricultural School for California Poly. State University,
the Rural Humid Tropics) Rutgers University,
University of Nebraska,
Virginia Polytechnic University
'Rutgers University provided TA to IDIAP in PanamA during the mid-1980s.

But transferring the Land Grant university model to LAC countries proved very difficult, if not impossible, given that the functions of research, extension, and education were most always housed in separate organizations, with most countries lacking any mechanism to integrate and coordinate these functions. The result of the lack of any single institution for carrying out the functions of agricultural research, extension, and education in an integrated manner was a tendency to address these functions individually through separate projects. Again, drawing on Colombia as an example, AID started two extension projects in the mid-1950s:'
* In 1955, in the Department of BoyacA, a pilot extension program [Servicio Thcnico
Agrfcola Colombiano Americano (STACA)], modeled on the classical U.S.
extension program, was started; and
In 1957, following establishment of the Cauca Valley Corporation (CVC), modeled on the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), an extension program, modeled on
the Boyaci STACA program, was started.
Initiation of these extension projects by USAID/Colombia was influenced by two
factors. First, a functioning agricultural research program [Departamento de Investigaci6n Agrfcola (DIA)] had already been started in the Ministry of Agriculture by the Rockefeller Foundation.10 But DIA had neither the mandate nor the resources to carry out technology transfer; hence the need to create an extension capability. Second, while the university's agronomy departments potentially could do extension, the university was an autonomous institution that had neither mandate nor incentive to carry out agricultural research or extension. Thus, the situation dictated that a structure to carry out extension could only be established outside the existing research (DIA) and educational (National University) institutions.
In 1957 the Government of Colombia established the Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA), with a mandate to carry out agricultural research and extension. While the Rockefeller Foundation continued to provide technical assistance support to ICA through much of the 1960s, by 1968 the foundation began to reallocate its Colombian program field staff to the newly created International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Palmira, Colombia. But this did not create a severe technical assistance vacuum because by 1966 USAID/Colombia, with technical assistance from the University of Nebraska, had undertaken a major project to develop ICA's agricultural research and extension capability.
Thus, within a matter of only a decade or so (from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s), USAID/Colombia supported a series of agricultural institution building projects-first in education, then in extension, and finally in research. The pattern that has been illustrated here for Colombia, of addressing the separate functions of research, extension, and education
9Much of the following history relating to USAID experience in Colombia is drawn from conversations with Albert (Scaff) Brown and Francis C. Byrnes.
'"This program was modeled on the success of the Rockefeller Foundation agricultural research program in Mexico.

through a series of separate projects, has been repeated over time in other AID-assisted countries in the LAG region, although not necessarily in the same sequence.
But there was a recognition in each case that increasing agricultural productivity depends on improving agricultural technology, while improving technology depends on research to generate technology, extension to transfer the technology to farmers, and education to develop the human resources to carry out research and extension. Thus, AID's agricultural institution building- projects during this period sought to provide the missing ingredient, whether it. be, research, .extension,education, .or--& combination of -these. Indeed, where technical assistance staff of a U.S. Land Grant university were involved, they invariably sought to duplicate the Land Grant model of research, extension, and education within the specific institution being assisted.Following the creation of the International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) in the early 1960s (e.g., the International Rice Research Institute), the early success of some IARCs in developing productivity-increasing agricultural technology (e.g., "miracle" IR-8 rice), and growing perceptions that agricultural extension in the LAC region had nothing to offer, or that what it had to offer was not what farmers needed, there was increasing recognition of the need to direct greater attention to agricultural research. But there also was growing frustration that public sector agricultural research organizations, plagued by political interference and low salary levels, could not provide the ind of environment essential for a productive agricultural technology generation system. These factors led many AID-assisted LAC countries between the late 1960s and early 1980s to create semiautonomous agricultural research and/or extension institutes (e.g., ICTA in Guatemala).
Thus, the perception that extension would be severely limited without being able to offer farmers productivity-increasing agricultural technologies led AID-funded project assistance over time to increased emphasis on agricultural research. The emphasis on research tended to focus on how to increase or boost commodity productivity. Research capacity building during this period focused on establishing research experiment stations, with the emphasis being on strengthening the capacity of agricultural research system to carry out production research. However, over time there was increasing realization that farmers would not adopt new agricultural technologies unless the technologies were adapted to the more site-specific circumstances characterizing farmers' fields.
A new orientation emerged between the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, as agricultural researchers began to move off the experiment stations and into farmers' fields. The success of Mexico's Puebla Project in boosting corn yields through on-farm adaptive research was an important step in the development of the farming systems approach to agricultural research. During this period, several LAG AID Missions initiated farming systems research and extension (FSR/E) projects or projects having FSR/E components." Yet FSRIE projects
"Byrnes (1990a) reviews three AID-funded FSR/E projects implemented in the LAC region between 1975 and 1987: Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement (520-0232) (Byrnes, 1989b); Honduras Agricultural Research (520-0139) (Byrnes 1989c); and ROCAP Small Farm Production Systems (596-0083) (Byrnes, 1989d). Other FSRIE projects implemented in the LAC region are identified in Byrnes (1989a).

often did not live up to expectations because they could not overcome long-standing constraints to linking the Ag REE functions (Byrnes, 1990a).
During this period AID increasingly became frustrated with the lackluster
performance of public agricultural research and extension organizations. In case after case, host country governments failed to provide adequate counterpart support to meet the recurrent costs of whatever technology generation and transfer (TG&T) model AID technical assistance projects sought to implement. For example, in 1986, despite an evaluation team's recommendations- and totally frustrated by.a lack of .Ministry, of-Agriculture .support,, USAID/ Panamd sought to cancel the Agricultural Technology Development and Agricultural Technology Transfer projects (Byrnes, et al., 1987).
The increasing frustration felt by AID with trying to implement agricultural TG&T through public sector research and extension organizations had two main results:
" AID bilateral support for national-level, public sector agricultural research began to
decline; indeed, there have been no new bilateral USAID programs for direct
strengthening of public sector agricultural research in the LAC region in over five
* AID support for public agricultural research in the LAC region increasingly is
being limited to funding the region's International Agricultural Research Centers
(IARCs) and two regional centers (RARCs)-the Centro Agron6mico Tropical de
Investigaci6n y Ensefianza (CATIE) in Costa Rica, which provides assistance to
Central America; and the Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development
Institute (CARDI), in Trinidad, which primarily serves the countries comprising
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The three LAC IARCs are:
International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), Colombia; International
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), Mdxico; and the International
Potato Center (CIP), Perd.
Further, by 1985, AID was under pressure to find ways to cut development assistance budgets and to increase the private sector's role in development. Increasingly, from one country to the next, USAID Missions, frustrated with a perceived lack of progress in supporting public sector agricultural research and extension organizations, began to search for ways to "privatize" agricultural TG&T, especially for nontraditional agricultural export (NTAE) crops that could provide these countries with an improved ability to earn foreign exchange desperately needed to repay bank loans.
Indeed, in a period of less than five years, between 1984 and 1989, USAID Missions created and funded private agricultural research organizations in five countries, including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Perd, and Ecuador, with similar organizations also being considered for Guatemala and El Salvador (Sarles, 1990). Underlying AID's push

for privatization of agricultural research in the LAC region has been the assumption (yet to be proven) that privatization (somehow) can overcome a series of constraints that have impeded institutionalization of effective agricultural research capacity in public sector organizations. These constraints, all conditioned by factors external to the research organization, are (Sarles, 1987:6-7; 1989):
*Stability and Level of Funding: Lack of control of the research budget, with the
available funding consistently low and its availability in terms of timing controlled
not by -the Ministry -of Agriculture but by, the -Ministry of Finance;
*Constituency Support/Relevance of Research: A political, rather than scientific
or economic orientation towards setting the research agenda, filling important
positions, and coordinating with extension, with the average Research Institute
Director's tenure being short;
" Professionalism: With personnel systems often tied to the government's civil
service system regulations, low salaries and a lack of incentives result in a failure
to attract and retain qualified research managers and researchers, with the result
that priorities often are not established or are not enforced; and
" Coordination with Other Key Institutions: Lack of integration between public
and private sector research, and among research, education, and extension.
The first of these, stability and level of funding, while clearly interrelated to the other constraints, has proven to be the most problematic constraint. Indeed, the LAG Missions currently supporting private agricultural research organizations are now searching for strategies and mechanisms to ensure financial sustainability of these research organizations. One strategy being explored by several Missions is that of establishing an endowment sufficiently large to generate a dividend stream to meet the expenses of a private research organization (Hansen, 1990). Typically, the AID-funded private research organizations are mandated to carry out agricultural research on the nontraditional agricultural export (NTAE) crops.
Yet the need for improved TG&T capacity for traditional food crops has not, over the past few decades, become any less urgent, as government research and extension programs in most AID-assisted LAC countries did little to stem growth in cereal imports (Figure 1.2) or decline in per capita food production (Figure 1.3). Indeed, as host-country government funding for Ag REE fell dramatically during the past decade in many of these countries (Table 1.2), AID funding for Ag REE during this same period also fell (see Chapter II). Further, as scarce resources were being redirected to support the development of private sector research on the NTAE crops, there was a failure to realize the negative consequences for TG&T for the basic food crops (see Box 3.2).

Box 3.2. Consequences of Privatization of Agricultural Research in the LAC Region (from Vessuri,
"The new private organizations focus their attention on technologies, that, by their very nature, allow for the private appropriation of profits. Their activities cannot thus be expected to cover the development of technological potential in the broadest sense, that is, including education, training, etc.; without these fun *ctions, however, the ability of the rest of the system to develop new technologies would quickly be exhausted. Likewise, private organizations will not assume specific activities of a generic nature or with a low probability of bringing about immediate results. Finally, the new private organizations are not interested in developing certain agronomic techniques (cropping practices, pasture management, etc.) because of the difficulty of privately appropriating their benefits. This means that a broad range of users neglected by the new institutional formats can be served only
by public organizations...."
We are now at the outset of a fifth decade (the 1990s) of AID development assistance, during which AID's traditional "war on hunger" portfolio of projects already is under pressure, at least for the Andean countries, to become a portfolio of "war on drugs" projects. AID's attention and resources increasingly are being diverted from a traditional role of raising crop productivity (the "corn booster" role) toward a new role, namely, that of "coca buster." As part of this new role, AID projects in Perd and Bolivia are encouraging Andean peasants to grow crops other than coca and discouraging drug consumption in the population at large."2 Indeed, about 43 % ($125,000,000) of AID's LAC ARDN for FY91 portfolio is targeted for "Narcotic Awareness."
USAID/Bolivia is now designing the "Alternative Development Project" to follow the "Chapare Regional Development Project." Yet, while the Mission is required by the U.S. Congress to spend millions of dollars to discourage Bolivian peasants from migrating to the Chapare to grow coca, there are indications that the Mission is beginning to realize that developing alternative technologies, be these for NTAE crops or traditional food crops, cannot proceed if the required markets for alternative crops, as well as the required TG&T capability in Ag REE institutions, public or private, is weak or absent (Byrnes, 1990b, 1991).
The limited TG&T capability available to support a "Chapare Regional Development Project" provides a dramatic example of a more general problem facing the LAC region, namely, that of the continuing constraint on agricultural TG&T caused by a failure of national governments to allocate the autonomy and resources that are required to develop and sustain Ag R.EE systems that can carry out TG&T efficiently. Indeed, the autonomous or semiautonomous structure of most national agricultural research systems (NARS) in the LAG region is called into question in a recent analysis of "the Latin American Model" of
"2A World Bank official reported at a recent meeting of the Inter-American Council that the price of coca leaves is such a small portion of the price of coca that processors can increase what they pay farmers enough to keep coca more profitable than any other crop. Others maintain that Bolivian farmers do not like a market that is unstable, which prevails when there is effective interdiction against coca trading, and would prefer to grow and sell crops that have long-run market sustainability.

decentralized public institutions (Valverde, 1990:25-31). Box 3.3 abstracts key points from Valverde's analysis.
Box 3.3. The Latin American Model of Decentralized Public Sector
Agricultural Research (from Valverde, 1990:27, 29-30).
"Beginning with the premise that total autonomy is nonexistent within
a public or semipublic system, it could be said that, functionally, a decentralized public institution is autonomous insofar as it has the authority to organize, plan, budget,- andexecutetheresearch activities delegated to it. ... it is autonomous in terms of its direction, administration, management, and operation, always taking into account that these activities are in keeping with the socioeconomic development policies of the country and
agricultural sector.
"In the... LAC region, the degree and type of decentralization of
central government research activities ranges from decentralized autonomous bodies (EMBRAPA-Brazil and INIA-Chile), to decentralized bodies strongly tied to the central and bureaucratic semiautonomous systems of the state (INIAP, IBTA...). Between these two extremes lie 'different degrees of dependence on the central government. Regrettably, no clear and convincing indicators have been develc~ed to distinguish an autonomous decentralized institution from a semiautonomous one. Thus, a decentralized institution is not necessarily autonomous in terms of its administration, management,
and operation.
"...most decentralized bodies in LAC are in one way or another compulsorily subordinate to or linked to the ministry (agrarian sector) in all that refers to the strategies, policies, and priorities established by the minister of the sector and to the coordination of the programming, budgeting, execution, and evaluation of the results.
"In practice, however, coordination in extreme cases has been converted
by the ministry into an excess of control measures, resulting in the disappearance of the operative and administrative flexibility of the decentralized institute. Consequently, the administrative status of the decentralized body does not differ in any way from that of any other department acting within the norms governing the ministry or public departments of the
central government.
"To be more precise, anything in the [LAC] NARs concerning the structure, organization, and management of financial and human resources generally operates entirely within the norms of the ministries of agriculture and finance as well as the national regulations on personnel management. ...
These norms and regulations are suited to routine office work, but they are not flexible enough to accommodate exceptional situations such as those
involved in agricultural research activities.
"Research by nature deals with biological entities and complex ecological systems. It needs constant personal attention and a flow of physical resources, specific and not always predictable research materials, and a time schedule not always subject to rigid fiscal calendars. For example, laboratory and field experiments need constant attention which does not fit into the strict routine established for professionals and technicians
working within the central bureaucratic system. (continued...)

Box 3.3. The Latin American Model of Decentralized Public Sector Agricultural Research (continued from Valverde, 1990:27, 29-30).
"Without going into budgetary details, it may be said that, under the central government system of budgetary allocation and payment of most LAC countries, the activities related to research involving biological entities and dynamic ecological systems are [not] compatible with budgetary execution. The common problem encountered is that neither the allocation of resources nor the calendar of payments conforms to the needs of the research calendar.
"In other words, the element of administrative flexibility is absent
or limited with regard to the operation and allocation of the physical, financial, and human resources necessary to execute the research activities. . It would seem that a feasible alternative would be to grant real autonomy to the decentralized institutes in terms of a series of exceptions to the laws, which, without surpassing any legal framework, would permit them to implement measures to increase their level of flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness in the management of available resources. It would also allow them to attract and manage additional resources.
"Autonomy, therefore, appears to be a precondition to taking the measures needed to allow the implantation of salary structures-escalafones-and
fiscal systems according to the research activity. These are the basic
elements needed to end the decline and continuous drain of talent that is
becoming more and more acute within the research system. "0
Valverde goes on to identify the functional and/or activity areas where administrative flexibility and autonomy are needed in a NARS. These areas are as follows:
*Generation and management of income
*Establishment and maintenance of a researcher wage scale
*Decisions about international technical cooperation
*Flexibility for travel abroad
*Hiring consultants
*Flexible budgetary execution
*Management of donor resources
*Flexibility in making contracts and procuring goods
The end result of a lack of administrative flexibility and autonomy in LAG public Ag REE systems (or NARS), combined with the decline in host country public (see Chapter I.C.3) and AID (see Chapter 11) funding for Ag REE has been decline in the TG&T capacity of Ag REE systems in AID-assisted LAC countries (see Box 3.4).

Box 3.4. An Observer's View of R&D Capability in the LAC Region (Vessuri, 1990:1543, 1550).
"Observers of the (LAC) region expect that in the coming years science and technology capability will undergo a process of accelerated obsolescence,
and will, therefore, become increasingly out of step with the social and material needs of the population....
"...Latin American R&D systems have not kept pace with international developments and continue to be deficient. There is research capability, but it excels only in more or less isolated enclaves. Conditions are much that in more than a few cases, the very weight of the often low-quality, obsolete,
and bureaucratized institutional research infrastructure acts as a powerful obstacle to change. Latin American universities are mostly politicized and controlled by self-serving interest groups. National research systems are
handicapped in their ability to create the scientific and, technical profiles required by the production systems undergoing deep transformation during the current technological revolution in the industrialized countries. Probably no single country in the region is able to face by itself the technological
challenge of the coming decades.
"Most recent studies point to a serious deterioration of working conditions in the research field and the growing alienation of researchers, who lack
stimuli and often the minimal conditions to pursue their work."
While the "low-quality, obsolete and bureaucratized institutional research infrastructure" often may act as "a powerful obstacle to change," it does not follow that this should be an excuse for the development assistance community to allow national governments to continue to fail to allocate the autonomy and resources that are required to develop and sustain Ag REE systems that can carry out TG&T efficiently. Yet in AID there is no evident consensus on whether the apparent AID strategy (neglect of the public Ag REE system in favor of developing private Ag REE systems) should continue. In the absence of any consensus to address these problems, the present strategy has been based on "rolling redesign" tha t responds not to the basic problems faced by LAG Ag REE systems but rather to whatever may be the latest development panacea."3 Yet an unanswered question remains in terms of what role, if any, AID should play in assisting LAC countries with strengthening their Ag REE systems, whether public or private, and whether designed to support TG&T for traditional food crops, NTAE crops, or a mix of commodities including traditional export crops, livestock, fisheries and aquaculture, and forestry.
As AID has increased its support for agricultural research on NTAE crops by private sector organizations and reduced its support for public sector research on traditional food crops for domestic consumption, the Agency has skirted three issues:
1. Is there is a continuing need for public involvement in agricultural research in AID-assisted LAG countries?
"3Over the past decade, the focus has shifted from one area to another, including institution building, FSR/E, coca substitution, policy dialogue, privatization, structural adjustment, sustainability, and so on.

2. If there is a continuing need for public involvement in agricultural research in AID-assisted LAC countries, is there an optimal role or scale of public involvement in agricultural research that varies, from one country to the next, as a function of each country's resource endowments (e.g., size of country)?
3. If each AID-assisted LAC country has a continuing need for public involvement in agricultural research, and if the optimal scale of this involvement varies as a function of each country's resource endowments, what criteria can be used to decide what kind of public sector agricultural research capacity building is most appropriate in each country situation?
Clearly, in retrospect, small and/or resource-poor countries (e.g., Haiti) cannot afford the same full-scale NARS of the type that can be afforded by larger countries with more resources (e.g, EMBRAPA in Brazil, ICA in Colombia, or INIA in Mexico). But small and/or resource-poor countries do need to have some minimum capacity to reach out to external technology sources (e.g., IARCs) and bring productivity-increasing technologies to their countries for "downstream" or adaptive research. On the other hand, the larger and/or resource-richer countries (e.g., Ecuador) have the potential to develop "upstream" research capacity to carry out more applied or basic research geared to these countries' agricultural potential.
While the overall strategy of donors (e.g., Rockefeller and Ford Foundations) was to reduce funding to national programs and to create and increase funding for International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs), AID's defacto "strategy" in the LAC region has been to reduce funding for public agricultural research programs and to create and increase funding for private agricultural research organizations. While the strategy of other donors was reinforced by the creation of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) to marshal and coordinate donor funding for research on basic food crops, no comparable group was created to marshal and coordinate funding for the various private agricultural research organizations created by AID in the LAC region. Yet, while the donor community has continued to focus primarily on basic food crops, AID redirected its attention from a primary focus on research on traditional food crops for domestic consumption to research on foreign exchange-earning NTAE crops. In the long run, there is uncertainty about whether this approach will contribute to or be counterproductive to AID's stated development goal, namely, "to increase the income of the poor majority and expand the availability and consumption of food, while maintaining and enhancing the natural resource base."
B. Strengthening TG&T Capability of Ag REE Institutions
With this overview in mind, the discussion turns to a review of AID support for Ag REE-strengthening in the LAC region during the 1980s. Ag REE's current status in the region (reviewed in Chapter IV), is not a simple function of AID's activities in the region during the 1980s. The current situation grew out of nearly 40 years of development assistance implemented in a complex of environmental constraints (political, economic, social, cultural, biophysical, and agro-climatic). Keeping this in mind, this section analyzes the most recent decade of AID support for Ag REE-strengthening in the LAC region. When

the decade of the 1980s is seen in the light of this overview, one can identify the variables that have defined the course of evolution of AD strategy and project approaches to strengthening the TG&T capability of Ag REE sys:tms in the LAC region. These variables are defined following this section's country-specific analysis which is based on a much more detailed analysis in Annexes A and B.
1. Andean Region
a. Bolivia
USAID/Bolivia placed little emphasis during the 1980s on Ag REEstrengthening. The Mission's portfolio was driven by two objectives: (1) to find alternative crops and technologies to substitute for coca; and (2) to reactivate the private agricultural sector by strengthening and expanding the capacity of private agricultural producer organizations (PAOs) to provide their members private-sector services (e.g., seed, credit, technical assistance, machinery, storage, transport, and marketing).
Yet a recent training needs assessment of USAID/Bolivia's C hapare Regional
Development project identified the need to strengthen public and private sector capability to carry out adaptive on-farm research as essential if the project is to be successful in developing crop alternatives to producing coca (Byrnes, 1990b). In both of the project's target regions (Chapare and Associated High Valleys), the Mission's strategy depends heavily on agricultural TG&T as a key to achieving the project's mandate to provide crops and technologies that 'e remunerative alternatives to coca production. Yet none of the Mission's project -e 1980s, except Chapare, focused on strengthening the capability of public or private oi .L;-. ons to carry out agricultural TG&T.
The Mission's Private Agricultural Producer Organizations (PAO) project has had
some success in strengthening PAO capability to provide member services. But the project's emphasis on private-sector services neglects that farmer demand for services depends to a significant extent on farmer demand for and the available supply of agricultural technology. While the 4/90 evaluation of the project found one PAO that was providing, via a check-off system, funding for agricultural research, this PAO was reaching only a relatively elite group of farmers in the Santa Cruz region; otherwise, none of the PAO project's inputs is directed at strengthening private or public capacity to generate technologies that farmers will demand.
While USAID/Bolivia's portfolio in recent years has lacked a long-term program or series of projects to strengthen public or private agricultural TG&T capability, the success of the Mission's current coca substitution initiative ultimately will depend, to a large extent, on Bolivia's agricultural TG&T capability. In this regard, a study conducted by the International Se-'.'ice for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR, 1989a) identified the need to rebuild Boli,. s agricultural TG&T system. The study found that IBTA's resources have deteriorated because of a loss of qualified staff, degradation of priority-setting and programming systems, and incapability of extension to attend efficiently to the needs of the rural population.

The study proposed restructuring IBTA by creating "regional services for research and transfer of agricultural technology." While the regional services initially would be funded by the GOB and departments, there would be a strategy to develop the system gradually, whereby the regional services would receive increasing local support from development corporations, regional agricultural chambers, etc. Once local support provided a majority of the funding for the regional services, they would become autonomous entities, adopting a status similar to that actually held in the Department of Santa Cruz by the Research Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT/Bolivia). The study recommended a phased action plan to-implement -the- system,-.and-identified .a global -project-that donors -could support to provide the components needed for institutional strengthening. Such a global project or program could include the following projects or subprojects:
9 Strengthening the central unit of a national agricultural research and technology
transfer system;
* Strengthening and consolidating national agricultural research and technology
transfer programs;
& Establishing or consolidating technological linkage units; and
* Supporting the regional services of the agricultural research and technology
transfer system.
While the study's proposed action plan for implementing the agricultural research and technology transfer system recognizes the need to train the personnel required to operate the system, neither the study nor the action plan identified the problems or needs of Bolivia's agricultural education system. A subsequent study by the World Bank recommended that, rather than attempting to restructure IBTA nationwide, the Bank should assist Bolivia in implementing a more limited restructuring, with an emphasis on providing support for revitalizing IBTA in defined target regions offering the greatest potential for agricultural growth.
b. Ecuador
USAID/Ecuador sought in the early 1980s to strengthen public Ag REE systems. The Integrated Rural Development (IRD) project sought to strengthen the ability of the Secretariat for Integrated Rural Development (SEDRI) to coordinate extension by various implementing agencies. A second project, Rural Technology Transfer System (RfTS), sought to strengthen the capability of public agencies-first SEDRI and then the National Science and Technology Council (CONACYT) and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)-to assist implementing agencies in improving technology transfer and linkage of REE institutions. But USAID/Ecuador's efforts to develop public sector ability to coordinate agricultural TG&T repeatedly were frustrated during the early 1980s. A mid-1984 evaluation recommended a major redesign that marked a shift away from these projects' initial extension focus and toward an emphasis on education through provision of opportunities for in-country and U.S. short-term and degree training. Training also was reinforced by Mission support of an

Agricultural Education project that funded scholarships for Ecuadoreans to study at the Pan American Agricultural School (EAP) in Honduras.
The 10/85 amendment of the RTTS project revised the project's strategy to place greater emphasis on working with private sector producer associations. While a public agency (MOA) continued to be RTTS' lead institution, the project assisted producer associations to carry out commodity-specific TG&T activities [later called Research Extension Linkage Units (RELUs)], assisted by the University of Florida and Utah State University. The RELU activities proved successful tver the-next few years and led to-a 5/88 project amendment to establish a self-sustaining private sector technology validation and transfer system. The RELU concept became a key component of a private sector agricultural research foundation (FUNDAGRO) created under the Agricultural Research. Extension. and Education project (see below).
But even as USAID/Ecuador sought to strengthen public sector TG&T capability for food commodities, the Mission, under the Non-Traditional Agicultural Export (NTAE) project, began to focus on NTAE crops. A strategy of technical assistance to private groups (e.g., Federation of Ecuadorean Exporters) reflected a growing emphasis on providing development assistance through private organizations. Yet the mid-1988 NTAE evaluation concluded that more time and resources would be needed to develop private sector ability to achieve NTAE project objectives. Indeed, the evaluation stated that the Mission's strategy of turning to the private sector had not provided any "magic bullet" for solving the institutional problems that other projects (IRD and RTTS) already had encountered in trying to work through public agencies.
The launching of the Agricultural Research. Extension, and Education (AREE) project in 1988 further evidenced the Mission's growing private sector orientation. AREE, which seeks to improve a public-private TG&T system for certain commodities, is being implemented by the private Foundation for Agricultural Development (FUNDAGRO) that grew out of the Mission's frustration with Ecuador's public agricultural research institute (INIAP). While the Mission partially funds FUNDAGRO, a recently completed Agricultural Sector Assessment (Whitaker, et al., 1990) pointed to a need for increased public support for agricultural research and science. The assessment identified Ecuador's inadequate science base and discriminatory macroeconomic policies as the two major constraints to agricultural progress. Based on this assessment and a series of Mission-sponsored policy dialogue seminars, the Minister of Agriculture requested technical assistance to implement a plan for an autonomous National Research Service to replace INIAP. Also, the Mission has begun to explore the potential of non-project sector assistance (NPSA) to stimulate development of Ag REE in Ecuador (Brown, 1990b, 1990c).
c. Perd
USAID/Perti provided support, during much of the 1980s, to strengthen public sector Ag REE organizations. From 1980 to 1989, the Agricultural Research. Extension. and Education (AREE) project assisted the National Agrarian Research and Promotion Institute (INIPA) in developing public agricultural TG&T capability. Mission

support for public agricultural research and extension was to continue under the follow-on Agricultural Technology Transfer (ATI) project that had been designed by mid-1987. But, in late 1987, agricultural extension was pulled from INIPA and placed in the MOA, and INIPA was renamed the National Institute for Agricultural and Agro-Industrial Research (INIAA). Further, about the same time, Peri failed to meet U.S. Government drug certification requirements, and also fell in arrears on loan repayments; as a result, the Foreign Assistance Act's Brooke-Alexander amendment required AID to cut off funding for USAID/ Peri's bilateral projects with the Government of Perd.
This led the Mission to redesign the AT project, whereby the implementing agency was changed from INIAA to the Foundation of Agricultural Development (FUNDEAGRO), the creation of which had been earlier assisted by the Mission.14 The redesigned ATT project contract, signed with FUNDAGRO in late 1988, was to assist in improving TG&T links between FUNDEAGRO, INIAA, and the private National Agrarian Organization (ONA), with the primary emphasis being on channeling AID funding to support private TG&T through private groups-Ingeniero Agr6nomo associations, producer associations, and irrigation users districts, with some funding going to INIAA to support participation of agricultural researchers from that organization.
It should be noted that the AREE and AlT projects also provide funding to strengthen agricultural education institutions such as the National Agrarian University (UNA). Further, these projects and Agricultural Planning & Institutional Development have funded advanced degree training either in-country or in the U.S. Thus, in retrospect, both the AREE and the ATr projects provided assistance to strengthen all three REE functions. However, while the AREE and ATT' projects focused on strengthening Peri's TG&T capacity, this capacity also was strengthened through area-specific projects such as Uper Huallaga Agricultural Developmen and Central Selva Resource Management. The former project, as in USAID/Bolivia's Chapare Regional Development, sought income alternatives to coca production, while the latter, as in the Associated High Valleys component of the Chapare project, sought to address poverty problems in a related region (i.e., Peri's high jungle region). More recently, there is increased recognition of the need to address natural resource problems.
The Mission's Semiannual Project Report (USAID/Peri, 1989) stated that AREE had been "successfully completed" and that the end-of-project evaluation had "served to document the extent of success and provide guidance to the current ATT Project." AlT was reported to have developed "productive, collaborative relationships with all participating institutions." Further, it was stated that the project was expected during the next reporting period "to begin impacting at the goal and purpose level." At the same time, the documented assessed progress with respect to the fifth objective of the AlT project's technology generation component, namely, that INIAA's national programs develop a sufficient degree of maturity to ensure continued political and financial support, adequate to sustain the level of effort
*'FUNDEAGRO grew out of an earlier foundation (FUNSIPA) created as a way of moving private funds to support research within INIPA.

existent at the project's conclusion. On this count, the report stated that a forum of former INIAA chiefs had discussed:future needs and goals and that all had mentioned:
that INIAA still has the same problems as it did five years ago and, before anything can be accomplished, these problems need to be resolved. Their concerns included
the lack of resources, too many of the same experiments tested at different experiment
stations, lack of publications, and lack of awareness of farmers' needs (USAID/Per,
While the Semiannual Project Report identifies progress areas, there appears to be some uncertainty about whether the government will be willing and able, by the PACD of August 31, 1993, to make a commitment to sustain the publicly-funded Ag REE system.
By comparison with the case of Colombia, reviewed in section M.A, USAID/Peni's program during the 1980s did not go through a sequential evolution of initially focusing on one function (e.g., extension) and later on others (education or research). However, while support initially was aimed at strengthening public sector agricultural TG&T (INIPA renamed INIAA), Mission support for strengthening Perl's agricultural TG&T capacity was redirected in the late 1980s toward supporting private agricultural TG&T implemented through FUNDEAGRO.
Comparison of the Peruvian and Ecuadorean cases reveals that USAID/Perfi sought to develop TG&T capability primarily in public sector agencies. FUNDEAGRO provided a mechanism to ensure a more efficient channeling of donor funding to public sector research by INIAA. USAID/Ecuador initially sought to strengthen REE capability by working through public organizations, subsequently through public sector organizations coordinating a mix of public and private agencies, and finally through a private sector foundation (FUNDAGRO) that has a mandate to work through both public and private institutions. Yet the GOE now is interested in creating an autonomous National Research Service to replace the existing public research organization (INIAP).
Projects in Ecuador (AREE) and Peni (ATI) have sought to increase private sector involvement in TG&T activities, although this appears to have been more aggressively pursued in the AREE project than in the ATT project which initially was designed to support the development of public sector agricultural TG&T. Subsequently, however, a series of events-the removal of the extension function from INIPA and its placement under the MOA. the renaming of INIPA to INIAA, and the failure of Perd to comply with drug certification and loan repayment requirements-led the Mission to shift its support for developing TG&T capacity to the private sector FUNDEAGRO.
d. Andean Region Summary
Efforts are underway in all three Andean countries to develop improved agricultural TG&T systems. There is increasing emphasis by the USAID Andean Missions on developing the capability of private organizations (i.e., foundations and PVOs) to carry out TG&T activities. In both Bolivia and Ecuador there are proposals to renew efforts to

strengthen public agricultural TG&T capability. Proposals for Bolivia call for restructuring IBTA, either in specific regions or nationwide. In the case of Ecuador, there is a proposal to create a new autonomous. National Research Service. But USAID/Ecuador and USAID/Perti have placed increasing emphasis on private agricultural research foundations (FUNDAGRO in Ecuador; FUNDEAGRO in Peri) initially established and operated with AID support. The possibility of using non-project sector assistance (NPSA) to stimulate Ag REEstrengthening is being explored by USAID/Ecuador.
These three relatively large and resource-rich Andean countries have not been able to establish a satisfactory track record vis-A-vis the performance of and governmental support for public sector TG&T organizations. This situation reflects a continuing discussion about whether there is need for public involvement in agricultural research. There also is a lack of consensus on what should be the appropriate role or optimal scale of public involvement in agricultural TG&T. The situation exists largely because there is no consensus on the criteria that should be used in deciding what kind of public sector research capacity is most appropriate in each country situation.
Generally, each of these three Andean countries has tried at one time or another to develop a "National Agricultural Research System" (such as ICA in Colombia) that far exceeded the government's willingness and/or ability to support it. In effect, as far as public sector agricultural research and extension are concerned, these countries have had mds voluntad que billetera (more will than wallet). Yet each of these countries minimally requires a measure of "downstream" research capacity, that is, ability to reach out and interact with external technology sources (IARCs) in order to import potential productivityincreasing technologies and adapt these technologies to site- and situation-specific conditions. But what is lacking is a consensus on the extent to which each of these countries also need to develop a measure of "upstream" research capacity to carry out more applied or basic research. There also is a lack of consensus on the extent to which the TG&T system should be publicly supported.
The case of Ecuador is illustrative. Brown (1990c) notes that INIAP was one of the premier public sector agricultural research organizations in Latin America; today INIAP is struggling to survive. As Venezian and Mocada (1989) have noted:
The weakness of INIAP is caused fundamentally by the drastic reduction of its budget
in the last eight years, which was not accompanied by equivalent adjustments in the
size of its programs and the number of personnel; this has resulted in low
remuneration and scarcity of operational resources, with the consequent loss of the
best qualified investigators, and the loss of drive and corporate spirit of the
The unsuccessful struggle to adjust to a continuous decline in financial support during the 1980s drained away managerial as well as scientific talent, and drastically reduced scientific output and reputation. The decline of INIAP was exacerbated by political interference in the institute's operations, and by the rigidities of a civil service system which prevented providing competitive remuneration to government employees.

The Ecuadorean case (INIAP), and also those of Bolivia (IBTA) and Peril (INIPA renamed INIAA), illustrate a basic inability to develop sustained political support for publicly-funded Ag REE organizations. This was an influencing factor in leading USAID in Perti and Ecuador to turn to creating and supporting private research foundations (FUNDAGRO, Ecuador; FUNDEAGRO, Peril). While FUNDAGRO evidenced at least an ability to coordinate research that is of a more "downstream" or adaptive nature, the current system is not structured to meet Ecuador's existing or potential needs for research of a more "upstream" nature-both applied and basic. Indeed, Ecuador's inadequate science base was identified in the recent agricultural sector assessment as one of the two major constraints to progress in Ecuadorean agriculture.
In the case of Bolivia, even with the very favorable macroeconomic policy environment that has been established, progress in the agricultural sector is severely constrained by a weak public TG&T system (i.e., IBTA) and a weak private sector. Bolivia is the only AID-assisted Andean country where AID has not opted to establish a private agricultural research foundation.- Rather than tackling the issue of the kind of program the Mission should support with respect to strengthening Ag REE in Bolivia, USAID/Bolivia has based its agricultural portfolio on the Private Agricultural Producer Organizations project, which is aimed at strengthening the capacity of private agricultural producer organizations (PAOs) to deliver private sector goods and services to organization members. But compared with USAID/Ecuador's RTTS project, which assisted Ecuadorean producer associations in implementing agricultural TG&T activities (i.e., the RELUs), the PAO project was not designed to include a role for or to assist PAOs in developing TG&T activities. Differing World Bank and ISNAR recommendations on restructuring IBTA reflect a lack of consensus on what should be the appropriate role and optimal scale of public sector involvement in agricultural TG&T.
This situation exists, in large part, because there is no consensus on the criteria that should be used to decide what kind and scale of public sector research capacity is most appropriate in the case of Bolivia. Currently support for strengthening the TG&T capacity of IBTA is being driven by political pressure on the Mission to support the Chapare Regional Development project in finding crop and technology alternatives to coca production. Yet, in terms of developing long-term capacity of Bolivian Ag REE institutions to carry out TG&T, neither the PAO nor the Chapare projects provide opportunities for Bolivians to obtain the advanced degree training essential for developing science-based agricultural TG&T systems.
2. Caribbean Region
By comparison with the large Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peril), USAID Missions in the Caribbean region must focus on a diverse mix of relatively small island countries-Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Eastern Caribbean island states (Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) that are assisted by AID's Regional Development Office for the Caribbean (RDO/C).

a. Dominican Republic (DR)
USAID/DR support for Ag REE in the 1980s initially was provided through the Natural Resource Management (NRM) project. But NRM supported implementation of project activities that lacked an institution building objective. A Natural Resources Planning & Development subproject emphasized basic data development such as agricultural zoning studies to determine priority farming areas and profitability of selected plant species. An education component focused on developing plans for and training people to carry out environmental education, while an extension component was limited to soil and water conservation.
NRM's Soil & Water Conservation subproject focused on agricultural TG&T through .the subproject's hillside farming systems research (FSR) program, pilot extension programs on conservation, and short courses for paratechnicians. While NRM emphasized the DR's natural resources (soil, water, forests), Inland Fisheries focused on the DR's potential to produce fish in ponds. Another water-related project, On-Farm Water Management (OFWM), focused on the potential of irrigated agriculture and included research, extension, and education components. The former project (Inland Fisheries) was implemented by an NGO, while the latter (OFWM) was implemented by a public agency.
During the mid-1980s, USAID/DR began to turn its attention to a more systematic approach to developing the TG&T capability of Ag REE institutions. The Agricultural Research and Extension (517-0180) project was designed during this period but apparently was not implemented. The project's design provided for creating an autonomous institute to strengthen private and public agricultural research and extension capability. But the Mission decided to pursue this objective not through a public institution but rather through creating a private Agricultural Development Foundation (ADF). Subsequently the ADF was implemented under the Agricultural Technology Development (ATD) subproject of the Commercial Farming Systems project. The ADF initiative emphasizes reliance on a private sector-led institution to guide and finance agricultural TG&T, with a focus on collaborative on-farm research involving agribusinesses and outgrowers.
While ATD does not include a strong education component, support for agricultural
education (opportunities for advanced degree and in-service training) has been provided under two projects, Agricultural Sector Training and Agribusiness Training. The former project, Agricultural Sector Training, provides support for establishing ongoing systems for assessing training needs as well as for financing overseas M.S. and Ph.D. training, with the objective of having participants, upon completion of their degrees, return to the DR to help establish new graduate programs in agricultural science. The project design also provides for establishing a Fund for Advanced Education to finance M.S. scholarships and in-country thesis research. The latter project, Agribusiness Training, supports development of short-cycle training by the Superior Institute of Agriculture (ISA), a private agricultural higher education organization that received considerable Mission and donor support during the 1960s-1970s. While providing short-cycle training for agribusiness owners and managers, Agribusiness Training also is developing opportunities for private sector research.