Citation
The Military and militia in colonial Spanish America, St. Augustine, Florida

Material Information

Title:
The Military and militia in colonial Spanish America, St. Augustine, Florida
Creator:
Arana, Luis R
Johnson, Mark
Florida -- National Guard
Place of Publication:
St. Augustine, Fla.
Publisher:
Department of Military Affairs, Florida National Guard
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
3 v. : ill. ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
History, Military -- Florida ( lcsh )
History -- Florida -- Spanish colony, 1565-1763 ( lcsh )
History -- Florida -- Spanish colony, 1784-1821 ( lcsh )
History -- Saint Augustine (Fla.) ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
General Note:
Cover title.
General Note:
Reprint of works and articles by Luis Arana, Mark Johnson, and others about military history of Spanish Florida published during the past twenty years.
Funding:
The Florida National Guard's Special Archives Publications was digitized, in part by volunteers, in honor of Floridians serving both Floridians in disaster response and recovery here at home and the nation oversees.

Record Information

Source Institution:
Florida National Guard
Holding Location:
Florida National Guard, St. Augustine Barracks
Rights Management:
All rights reserved by the Florida National Guard. Digitized with permission.
Resource Identifier:
000936817 ( ALEPH )
16414203 ( OCLC )
AEP7960 ( NOTIS )

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:

00000 ( .txt )

00001 ( .txt )

00002 ( .txt )

00003 ( .txt )

00004 ( .txt )

00005 ( .txt )

00006 ( .txt )

00007 ( .txt )

00008 ( .txt )

00009 ( .txt )

00010 ( .txt )

00011 ( .txt )

00012 ( .txt )

00013 ( .txt )

00014 ( .txt )

00015 ( .txt )

00016 ( .txt )

00017 ( .txt )

00018 ( .txt )

00019 ( .txt )

00020 ( .txt )

00021 ( .txt )

00022 ( .txt )

00023 ( .txt )

00024 ( .txt )

00025 ( .txt )

00026 ( .txt )

00027 ( .txt )

00028 ( .txt )

00029 ( .txt )

00030 ( .txt )

00031 ( .txt )

00032 ( .txt )

00033 ( .txt )

00034 ( .txt )

00035 ( .txt )

00036 ( .txt )

00037 ( .txt )

00038 ( .txt )

00039 ( .txt )

00040 ( .txt )

00041 ( .txt )

00042 ( .txt )

00043 ( .txt )

00044 ( .txt )

00045 ( .txt )

00046 ( .txt )

00047 ( .txt )

00048 ( .txt )

00049 ( .txt )

00050 ( .txt )

00051 ( .txt )

00052 ( .txt )

00053 ( .txt )

00054 ( .txt )

00055 ( .txt )

00056 ( .txt )

00057 ( .txt )

00058 ( .txt )

00059 ( .txt )

00060 ( .txt )

00061 ( .txt )

00062 ( .txt )

00063 ( .txt )

00064 ( .txt )

00065 ( .txt )

00066 ( .txt )

00067 ( .txt )

00068 ( .txt )

00069 ( .txt )

00070 ( .txt )

00071 ( .txt )

00072 ( .txt )

00073 ( .txt )

00074 ( .txt )

00075 ( .txt )

00076 ( .txt )

00077 ( .txt )

00078 ( .txt )

00079 ( .txt )

00080 ( .txt )

00081 ( .txt )

00082 ( .txt )

00083 ( .txt )

00084 ( .txt )

00085 ( .txt )

00086 ( .txt )

00087 ( .txt )

00088 ( .txt )

00089 ( .txt )

00090 ( .txt )

00091 ( .txt )

00092 ( .txt )

00093 ( .txt )

00094 ( .txt )

00095 ( .txt )

00096 ( .txt )

00097 ( .txt )

00098 ( .txt )

00099 ( .txt )

00100 ( .txt )

00101 ( .txt )

00102 ( .txt )

00103 ( .txt )

00104 ( .txt )

00105 ( .txt )

00106 ( .txt )

00107 ( .txt )

00108 ( .txt )

00109 ( .txt )

00110 ( .txt )

00111 ( .txt )

00112 ( .txt )

00113 ( .txt )

00114 ( .txt )

00115 ( .txt )

00116 ( .txt )

00117 ( .txt )

00118 ( .txt )

00119 ( .txt )

00120 ( .txt )

00121 ( .txt )

00122 ( .txt )

00123 ( .txt )

00124 ( .txt )

00125 ( .txt )

00126 ( .txt )

UF00047693_00002 ( .pdf )

UF00047693_00002_pdf ( .txt )


Full Text



Digitized with the permission of the
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD





SOURCE DOCUMENT ADVISORY

Digital images were created from printed source
documents that, in many cases, were photocopies of
original materials held elsewhere. The quality of
these copies was often poor. Digital images reflect
the poor quality of the source documents.

Where possible images have been manipulated to
make them as readable as possible. In many cases
such manipulation was not possible. Where
available, the originals photocopied for publication
have been digitized and have been added,
separately, to this collection.

Searchable text generated from the digital images,
subsequently, is also poor. The researcher is
advised not to rely solely upon text-search in this
collection.



RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS

Items collected here were originally published by the
Florida National Guard, many as part of its SPECIAL
ARCHIVES PUBLICATION series. Contact the Florida
National Guard for additional information.

The Florida National Guard reserves all rights to
content originating with the Guard.



DIGITIZATION

Titles from the SPECIAL ARCHIVES PUBLICATION series
were digitized by the University of Florida in
recognition of those serving in Florida's National
Guard, many of whom have given their lives in
defense of the State and the Nation.








Department of Military Affairs
Florida National Guard







'M






The Military and Militia in Colonial Spanish America
St. Augustine, Florida










STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL




POST OFFICE BOX 1008
STATE ARSENAL, ST. AUGUSTINE
32085-1008




While selecting the articles of Luis Arana from previous
issues of El Escribano, several other articles by different
authors surfaced which seemed especially appropriate readings for
this conference and are included in this second booklet. To
provide an overview of Florida's Spanish history, three chapters
were excerpted and are included from "Florida's Army: Militia,
State Troops, National Guard 1565-1985." As the activities of
Florida's living history and re-enactment groups are so important
to the ongoing celebration of our Spanish Heritage, informal
reports or guides for living history activists on two periods of
Spanish Florida history is also included.


1. Chapters Two, Three and Five from "Florida's Army: Militia,
State Troops, National Guard 1565-1985" Robert Hawk
(Englewood: Pineapple Press, 1986)

2. St. Augustine's Military Society 1700-1820 (Juan Marchena
Fernandez: translated and adapted by Luis Arana)

3. The Defense Structure of East Florida 1700-1820 (Juan
Marchena Fernandez)

4. Florida in the Late First Spanish Period: The 1756 Grinan
Report (Michael Scardaville and Jesus Maria Belmonte)

5. Spanish Troops of 1565-1586 (Robert Hall) (Outline guide for
living history participants of Spanish 1565 period)

6. El Vestuario de los Soldados del Presidio de San Agustin en
1740 (A guide for uniforms and equipment associated with
living history re-enactors, Spanish Florida 1740 period.
(National Park Service)















Chapter Two



SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND
DEFENSE 1565-1700






Florida: the warm and sunny recreational capital of the sailed for home through the Bahamian Channel be-
United States, with Disney World and nearly two thou- tween Florida's east coast and the Bahama Island chain
sand miles of beaches and hotels. Florida: home to mil- to the east. As the principal source of Spanish power,
lions of all ages and nationalities, and the second fastest these ships and their wealth had to be protected. Should
growing state in the American republic. It hasn't always any hostile power control the Channel, Spain would suf-
been this way. For much of its history since Columbus fer catastrophic consequences. For the first fifty years
opened the New World, Florida was a desolate, unheal- following its discovery, Florida's potential remained
thy and isolated place. It was inhabited by Indian tribes, unexploited by Spain or her many enemies. While it was
myriads of dangerous insects and beasts of the forest the transit point for several continental exploration ex-
and swamp. The soil was poor. It had debilitating peditions, and did receive the usual attentions of sol-
weather and was colonized by a handful of Spanish sol- diers and missionary priests, nothing permanent
diers, priests, civilians, slaves, and convicts entrusted resulted. It was not until the French established a settle-
with the task of holding this vast and unpleasant pen- ment near today's Port Royal, South Carolina, that
insula for Spain and the Empire. Spanish fears and interest were aroused. Although the
Florida is a long and generally flat peninsula hang- settlement at Port Royal quickly failed, rumors of a more
ing off the southeastern corner of the North American substantial settlement to be established by the French
continent. Florida is slightly larger in area than England near the mouth of the St. Johns River (today's Jackson-
and Wales combined. Its long coastline is indented with ville) finally galvanized the Spanish court into effective
many bays and river outlets, the interior heavily forested action. A military settlement of hostile and heretic
with dense subtropical vegetation. Large areas are, or French Huguenots, virtually at the mouth of the Ba-
were, covered by great swamps. With its poor soil, and hamian Channel, could not be ignored.
the absence of precious metals or anything else of real Phillip II of Spain authorized and partially paid for
natural value, it might have remained an unoccupied the creation of a substantial fleet to carry both colonists
fringe territory within Spain's great American empire, and soldiers under the command of Spain's most prom-
But it had significant strategic value for the protection inent admiral, Pedro Menendez de Aviles. He was to
of the empire that would lead to its settlement and to the proceed to Florida, eject the French, and establish a
many wars for its protection. permanent military colony on the east coast of the pen-
Huge fleets of Spanish ships, filled with the incre- insula to ensure the future protection of this vital flank
dible wealth of Mexico and Peru, formed in Havana and of Spain's New-World empire.


S13'






FLORIDA'S ARMY


- I ". ..t. "
'r~p -S

-S '~"~- --' ----=- :


-T





















0 "' i"W

















Prdt) ~rm dezdeAviles. (Co(urtesy- of the St. Augustine Historical Society.)
1 i ,
;c- ,



p7 i





+L

L= t N l
r. ,, o, Il
i ---:.

PdoM''d'd A i'e.(oreyo h t uutn itriclScit.

14"






SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1565-1700


































FLORIDA MILITIA, 1565: As there were no standard military uniforms in 16th-century Florida, Regulars and Militia alike dressed to
individual taste and preference. Each man was armed according to circumstances and mission. Generally, the Regulars had the best arms and
equipment. For the frontier warfare of the period, the crossbow, arquebus and sword with minimum armor were considered most suitable. (From a
painting by Robert Hall of St. Augustine.)

The French won the race. Under the command of St. Augustine, now the oldest permanent European set-
the very capable Jean Ribault, the French established tiement on the North American continent.
Fort Caroline near the mouth of the St. Johns River. However, at the moment of its foundation, St. Au-
When Menendez arrived, his forces much reduced by gustine's longevity as a settlement was certainly not ap-
storms and bureaucratic delays, he found himself out- parent to anyone. The French were known to be on their
manned and outgunned. He took his ships and men to way with a large fleet and more than enough soldiers to
a small inlet and harbor some thirty-five miles south of overwhelm the Spanish force. A huge tropical storm
the French settlement. This location's main advantage moved into the area. Knowing the storm would delay the
was a sandbar which protected the harbor entrance and French and also conceal his own movements, Menendez
would prevent, or delay, the entrance of all but the decided to move at once against the French fort. On the
smallest of hostile ships. On the eighth of September, 16th of September, 1565, Menendez and nearly all of his
1565, Menendez went ashore and formally established 500 soldiers began a rain-drenched march northward.

15*
.. .. ... ,
ii. !
, ..... ", =

. i n..- -







FLORIDA'S ARMY






ROUTES OF SPAIN'S ARMADAS

St Augustine ................ > To Spain






Veracruz Havana

Santiago
\ Acapulco .. -" .,r_
"$f*' anto Domingo

o~~. ncSan Juango


.. "... *.












17th-century map depicting the trade routes of Spanish-America. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Historical Society.)



This was also the "birth date" of North America's oldest vivors were reported by friendly local Indians to be
militia tradition. Since he took almost all of his regular coming northward up the island beaches. With only 50
soldiers with him, the "useless" civilian settlers left be- soldiers and very few supplies to sustain the tiny outpost
hind were, by law, designated milicia and made respon- of empire, Menendez was faced with a momentous de-
sible for protecting the new settlement. This first of cision. He did what he considered necessary to insure
Florida's militia forces numbered less than fifty men the survival of his new colony. The trapped and desti-
and, as they were not challenged militarily, they would tute Frenchmen, blocked in their northward advance by
prove sufficient, an unfordable ocean inlet, surrendered and were
The Spanish assault on the poorly garrisoned brought to the Spanish side of the water where, except
French fort, unexpected because of the storm, was en- for the professed Catholics among them, they were all
tirely successful. Most of the resident women and chil- slain. 200 the first day and another 150 the second, in-
dren were spared but nearly all of the garrison was cluding Jean Ribault himself. A later expedition to the
killed. Leaving the majority of his soldiers behind to oc- wreck sites netted the few remaining Frenchmen. They
cupy his newly conquered and named Fort San Mateo, were allowed to live, being transported to prison in Ha-
Menendez returned to St. Augustine. vana. To this day the inlet across which the doomed
The storm had done the Spanish another favor. It Frenchmen were carried is called Matanzas. which
had wrecked all the French ships on the barrier islands means "slaughter" in Spanish.
south of the new settlement of St. Augustine. The sur- The new settlement's existence was to remain ten-


S16-






SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1565-1700

i- t T.-'.'.., ;- ,,



M R .* ..- -.. A- 3' -* __ *I -- ,e



77
16h- cen ', c hD"-- -a-- .g .. .S. A t 18 .(. h .
-:; 'fi^^ E--.--^





ed -- p n re ,ive


...i u p i i, a r N

fis M t



=u .f ..t u o .. nul a







foc a,.-. .< t, m ncat wt o e ,ai h._, rec ;a. -an-" "k'n su1bs idyN provided b the- ,Im eri-"a lSpan-'i-sh-
-1 0. '-4 -4 4.







.4 ; ,; --. ,.. -,-4 ,,/ -. -. -...
-t of i of he i thse garriston rou 3 me
r of a ticialsretchinge swrdof ta in a to ulle- or tent- Tere Si, heu am


















withlar S.old ier as ifsresidio or hedquarTers.It mn sc able f-bod ied ent.eretautrviedally.hon..neaedsptrado,
7. -W *

r 7 n i- A guf ne.















regular soldiers and a few dozen militia. This miniscule call self-sufficient. It survived on the annual situado,






pen of a treaty rather than the sword of n invader to full authorized strength. There was, however, always






-17
) j^l "^.^^'^ "> fc>l Mr>hO~uU ulfHtHtMl~lIK M U* lH ^.1ritl. f~ll hl ~ *fb -.--,.....^ -.. ""^S ,^!";^ '; ^ ,'^ ^ ?"'i, .~~iii1 iiiif>ta. SS_ l^ "'"""'"'" -^.l.';'^ "''^" ^ ^ ^
/ ^ -- ''-' -H ^ 'K f .* -- -.l l~~ u- < w ~ ** ~ lM W .I -- -*-r^ l- l f -iZll Y l t ~ . ~" .'-w- B .*.. A*"w.~ itmln Ml=/A~h-bf ;-ri ll g 1 l. ^,n~.^. ff*.- ,.
-. ..T... *- ***>ui' CltBwnwiiud('.irtf~l~~)iln.tl^il t-mlfji>MiLp N T*^ "ai n h '^ '^e ''* "^ .^^*1
K J -jlY lLUVlfw J, )l-~uwM MMHU m n4.ln~ll lm~'l ylic>~< hn^ U T4'llf ~ w A*lll^ M U.

16th-centur mp epcigteDaeatconS.A us ine 56 C uts fteS.A gsieHsoia oit.
uos o mc o henettw enuie.Bengo te emnnt s clnyFord ws'tterbi oplro
edge of- th mie trmie n o h atpae nscesfl natatn e ooist.Isrlaiei
Spns Amrc to reev suples mnyorei-liuatcivciae, an geea oet e
focmns Ofcal srthn fo oa'sMait pele ms potent~Cia sttlr.Sileoghcmo
the ChspaeBy lrd a rtce yamltr eesnt anantepoic nispeaiu x
forc that raeynmee or hntrehnde se.Ee soFord wan' clos to beingeoo















Spais Aeria o ecevesuplismoeyorren-laton uattaciv clmaeandgeerl 17tyre






FLORIDA'S ARMY




... r d o -





4 ..
-. J^ ^.^^

























against Drake's pirates. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Historical Society.)

companies. For most of the first 200 years of settlement forms as they chose to wear. Unless they had private
of Florida, which meant St. Augustine, the near con- means. Indians, blacks. and all other enrolled or im-
scant threats posed by the Indians, pirates, and heretic pressed militiamen received their weapons from the
colonies to the north created a permenant need for all government.
the military force that could be mustered. Volunteer mi- Due to the general unattractiveness of duty in Flor-
litia companies existed from at least 1671; because of ida. recruits and replacements for the regular garrison
the frequent need to employ the volunteer and enrolled rarely arrived on time or in full strength. In result, the
militia, little distinction was made between the two. best of the local militiamen were taken into the regular
There were several volunteer militia companies, garrison companies. In spite of an Imperial Spanish law
One was composed of those men born in Spain or of which prohibited more than 10 to 15 percent of a gar-
Spanish parents. From the earliest days the earliest days there was also a prison to be from local families, the garrison at St. Au-
volunteer company composed of free black residents gustine generally drew 30 to 40 percent of its strength
and also, one of Christianized Indians. Even slaves, con- from local sources. This was illegal, but necessary. In
victs, and stranded sailors or shipwreck victims could spite of this constant drain of its best men into the reg-
legally be impressed into the militia. Militiamen re- ulars. the local militia survived and saw considerable
ceived regular pay for active service and for most train- service throughout the first period of Spanish occupa-
ing and drill days. The white militia companies tion in Florida.
normally provided their own weapons and such uni- The first major test of the Spanish Florida garrison,


18,






SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1565-1700










As the English were to discover, cannonballs could
not split or crack the coquina stone of Castillo de
San Marcos.








regular and militia, was a disaster. The small settle- available to protect St. Augustine and its people when a
ment, containing approximately 300 persons in total. large band of English pirates landed in the city late one
was attacked by an English pirate fleet commanded by May evening. Sixty city residents, men. women and chil-
Francis Drake in 1586. Drake had more than 2000 men. dren, were slaughtered, more than two dozen kid-
After a brief skirmish, during which the Spanish regu- napped. The remainder of the settlement's residents
lars and militia managed to kill twenty of Drake's men, repaired to the old wooden fort. The pirates looted and
the Spanish were forced to withdraw to the woods west burned the city and demanded ransom for their cap-
of St. Augustine. Drake proceeded to loot and burn the tives. With difficulty, the ransom was paid, the captives
tiny settlement and then reembarked to continue his de- rescued. The pirates sailed away.
predations elsewhere. This pirate raid, and the establishment of an Eng-
At the very end of the 16th century, in 1597, there lish settlement at Charleston in 1670. finally convinced
was a major Indian rebellion in the lands to the north of the government in Spain of the need to finance the con-
St. Augustine. To quell the disturbance required the struction of a stone fortress to protect its Florida colony.
services of all of Florida's soldiers, regular and militia. Work on Castillo de San Marcos began in 1672. It was
During the first half of the 17th century, the Spanish es- built of local coquina stone, quarried on the island
tablished an extensive system of Indian missions and across the bay from the city. Coquina stone is a material
garrison settlements in Florida's interior from St. Au- composed of an accretion of tiny seashells: compacted
gustine to today's Tallahassee. However, from the mid- and waterlogged it's and easy to quarry. When dried.
dle of that century onwards, a ruinous backcountry war coquina becomes a stone of incredible durability. It is al-
promoted by the English colonists in the Carolinas most like some kind of stone sponge. As the English
gradually destroyed this colonizing and missionary ef- were to discover, cannonballs could not split or crack the
fort. Virtually all of Florida's indigenous Indian popu- stone; they merely caused small dents and rolled into
lation was killed, died of European diseases, or were the moat. Except for the gradual disappearance of the
taken north as slaves. Florida's interior would remain original plaster coating to protect it from moisture
largely unpopulated for most of the next century. damage, Castillo de San Marcos survives even the tour-
Between 1565 and 1672, St. Augustine was pro- ists of today. Work on the fort continued slowly. There
tected by a series of nine wooden forts. These were es- was a dearth of skilled labor and money. which. if it ar-
sential to help Florida's soldiers assigned to protect the rived at all from Mexico, was always late. The principal
fragile colony. The first fort was destroyed by Drake; the exterior walls, much as they appear today, however, were
others, in their turn, succumbed to the insects and trop- in place by 1696. Additional outworks, interior bomb-
ical rot associated with Florida's climate. Other wooden proofs, and other improvements were added over the
stockades were located at numerous locations through- next few decades. The important work on the walls was
out the province. Each of these, in turn, was captured completed none too soon. The European War of the
or rotted away. In 1668, the ninth wooden fort, a much Spanish Succession in 1700 spread to the New World
repaired and inadequate structure, was all that was and to one of its most isolated outposts, Spanish Florida.


19



















Chapter Three



SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE
1700-1763






The rapid growth and spread of the English colonies to of the coquina walls. Included in this total were 230 reg-
the north had been a source of concern and occasional ular and militia soldiers and approximately one
conflict to the Spanish in Florida since the middle of the hundred Indian militia. These 330-odd soldiers, mili-
seventeenth century. The English sponsored raids on tia, and Indians represented the entire defense force of
Spanish settlements, and the Spanish retaliated with Spanish East Florida. Still, they had the new fort and
raids of their own. This backcountry war, as previously they were able to send word of their plight by a small,
noted, had led to the virtual depopulation of interior fast ship to Havana. It would be enough to ensure their
Florida. By 1700, Spanish authority extended no fur- survival.
their northward than today's Florida-Georgia border. In The English had badly underestimated the
reality, Spanish power extended only a cannon shot's strength of the fort and overestimated their ability to
distance from its new fort at St. Augustine. successfully lay siege to and capture it. Their numbers
In 12, E l ch a m i o were too few and their cannon inadequate. They settled
In 1702, the English launched a major invasion of a r
Spanish Florida. This force was commanded by ames down to a long siege and awaited the arrival of larger
Spanish Florida. This force was commanded by James
cannon from Jamaica. There were several sharp skir-
Moore, colonial governor of the Carolinas. He had six cannon from Jamaica. There were several sharp skir-
mishes when the Spanish soldiers and militia sallied
hundred soldiers and militia plus about three hundred dishes when the Spanish soldiers and militia sallied
Indians. A part of this invasion force, under Captain forth from the fort to destroy nearby homes which of-
fered protection to the English. The siege became a
James Daniel, came down the St. Johns River. It landed ttin the English. The siege became a
waiting game, the English waiting for the big cannon
west of St. Augustine and marched overland to provide a the English waiting for he big cannon
and the Spanish for help from Cuba. The Spanish pa-
the forces necessary to besiege the fort from the land and te an ish for he fro a. T Spanish a a
tience was rewarded first. A Spanish battle force arrived
side and also to capture and occupy the city itself. Gov- frm aana rinin tr s and s les. The Eng-
from Havana bringing troops and supplies. The Eng-
ernor Moore, with the rest of the troops, arrived by sea s w t i.
Slish ships were trapped in the bar inlet. Governor
and anchored his eight schooners inside the bar, today's
S Moore had no choice; he burned his ships, abandoned
Salt Run. He set up his camp and the siege cannon on
SR H s u hi i on ion his cannon and larger stores, and fled cross-country
Anastasia Island, directly across the bay from the Cas- ck to he Caroina. Before he depend the Eng-
back to the Carolinas. Before they departed, the Eng-
tillo San Marcos.
lish totally destroyed the small city, burning every house
As the city had no separate defense works of its and pulling down the walls of the few stone structures
own, all the inhabitants joined the soldiers and militia in town. The first great invasion of Florida from the
within the walls of the fort. Fifteen hundred men, north was over, but everyone presumed there would be
women, and children were crammed within the confines more.


.21








FLORIDA'S ARMY

"-i' 2! ;-,, C,:l
I % + .. .. ,.,,. ,.
Aii


',,'' .% ,





..- ... ,; ,,

,,-I . ., -"
: i. : -,: d:

























.00F,
'-p, .'t* "









.. "


















'.'ml.].meo ()..it.rgi[( a'',., (O )uII-tesx o)f the St..-Augistine Hisio)rica! S)cictv.)
~T :-22.






SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1700-1763




Handing Jenkins his ear, Fandino remarked,
"Take this to your king and tell him if he were
here, I would do the same to him."



The Spanish had learned several lessons from this dians, invaded Florida. After killing a number of local
northern invasion. Although their new fort had done Spanish Christian Indians, and stealing as many cattle
well, the English bombardments did point up the desir- and horses as he could locate, he returned to the Car-
ability of adding additional bombproofs within the olinas. The Spanish were unable to stop him and could
walls and of higher exterior walls to minimize the dam- only respond by launching several raids of their own
age caused by cannon and musket fire at short range. into Georgia and the Carolinas. By the late 1730s. it was
Also, unless they were willing to have the city burned apparent that open warfare couldn't be far away: oniv
down every time an invading army laid siege to the fort, an appropriate spark was needed to set it off.
the city needed defensive walls and bastions of its own. The necessary spark was provided by a Spanish sea
During the next few decades all of these necessary captain. Juan de Leon Fandino. During the course of
changes and additions were made to the city's defenses, his privateering activities against English shipping
It would be a far stronger position to take the next time which was operating in violation of Spanish trade laws
the English ventured south, and Spanish-English treaty provisions, Fandino stopped
There were many causes for the sporadic conflict the English brig Rebecca of Glasgow. The ship was way
between Spanish Florida and the English colonies to the off its stated course and the manifest was wildly inac-
north, especially after the settlement of Georgia under curate. Some back talk by the brig's master, a Captain
the leadership of James Oglethorpe. There were rival Jenkins, prompted Fandino to slice off one of Jenkins'
land claims, conflicting Indian and overseas trade poli- ears. Handing it to Jenkins Fandino remarked, "Take
cies, occasional problems with piracy and with Indian this to your king and tell him if he were here, I would do
revolts and raids. Of course, there were the age-old re- the same to him." Eventually, Jenkins, and his ear, ap-
ligious differences, but they lacked the power to moti- peared before the English Parliament and war against
vate hatred now as they had in years past. The most Spain was duly declared. To the English, it was to be,
annoying point of conflict between the two cultures con- what else, the "War of Jenkins' Ear." To the Spanish, it
cerned slaves. A great many black slaves ran from the was "La Guerra del Asiento de los Negros," the war over the
English colonies to Spanish Florida. Once there, most contract for the Negroes. (The English had been fla-
disappeared into the interior to live alone or with the grantly violating their treaty with Spain concerning the
Indians. But some, accepting Catholic baptism, settled importation of blacks into Spanish America.) This new
in and around St. Augustine itself. Slave-owners, or war would provide an excuse for another English colon-
their agents, would come to Florida and demand the re- ial invasion of Spanish Florida.
turn of these runaways. The Spanish authorities re- Anticipating an invasion by the English and having
fused to recognize their demands. They agreed to pay barely seven hundred regular soldiers and militia with
some compensation but argued that the converted which to defend Florida, Governor Manuel de Montiano
blacks were now considered free citizens under Spanish asked for and received some reinforcements from Ha-
law, no longer subject to the laws of the English. A large vana. Six half-galleys manned by 120 sailors and filled
number of these former slaves even had their own town, with supplies, arrived from Cuba just before the Eng-
Santa Teresa de la Gracia Real de Mose,just north of the lish closed in on the city. (Three of the galleys were com-
city. The men of this small town were armed and manded by none other than Juan de Leon Fandino
equipped as militiamen. They even had their own offi- himself.)
cers and a small fort for their protection, Fort Mose. The English invasion began with probing attacks
The English were enraged over this flagrant violation of against outlying Spanish outposts south of the St. Johns
property rights and were appalled by the existence of River in December of 1739. One English force of militia
armed blacks so close to their own settlements and plan- and Indians, under Lieutenant Dunbar of the Georgia
stations, the nearest a mere 35 miles away. Militia, beseiged the small Spanish fort at Picolata on
Colonel John Palmer of the Carolina Militia, in the river. The seven defending Spanish soldiers held out
1728, accompanied by a small force of militia and In- until nightfall and then slipped away to rejoin the prin-


-23.







FLORIDA'S ARMY


. 'fiI/:r or t TOW'V ,,,,ai C'AS Ti or STtAU GTSINE,
SLand tl' EN LI SI C( P boereit June 2o 1740. b7710 'SILVER.







le.



7. .0B 4v-'.-'j
..: r _'- :: .... - ." <- -




.. -_. ,


.. I .












^ u.* h,- n ./,/.. ..^. t ,,," -" .--


T-%-














TA f.,M ;.,n,/'. n i ,t..,,. f 'ho D f. .- "... w ..

n/ ln.s.Au.<. ,/.4', 4 I.w,;,w C4.. rpS. OM l
S( ./A.P. / .'A*A,/.f 'JA/.Ts A U./J 'dti?' tL- a dr.6AF 1 ;.4,,* i. M Ii!d
K (./ '. , arre a r .,,, 1-, ;; /,. ,. 4.. .
S t .' ,,., ,,,,,,,,, ,'' : ,, -. ,ugustin His.orca So. .'ciety



AI .. t,',, d r: l l/,7;.,r /. ," d,. A. S, d/ 1,3 / ,t ,* 2-4". .
.4 .. L t a.n' ,/* ,' */ ./f *.,a e., ..'# ...-.. .......-'.. -,.'..' ,"" '' ...
/h, CA.,f,'A. P 't,/Pp /2 .A,,,I...I,.4//;'."..c, ,., ." ,,.,,t -, -,.i ,,,..,

.. !,, /,-/,' j/ r/, s, *. A .-- '' '





18th-cntury map depicting the Eng ish/ attack and siege against St. Augus.tine, 1740. (Courtesy of the

St. Augustine Historical Society.)
24"
//,ff.*!*^.,.'I/*'l-.~J,/,'W.in ^ i ./-<>, .w fx!^/ ^/W'*-"**
1. /?*.:f,,-~i-//.r.7/',-r^- /iii ~ .^-.^M^ ./ ,*--*" <** '* ""
( //lil/ nvi,. l~ tr u '/<*./ '/ 5'/////./ <^- ..-,-..-/ //^ .<.. A/














L' 1c odrl~lrr ~~;,~1.Y. ~ b~l r,~. 24.L '''T' ,mg cn






SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1700-1763

ders, English Regulars, and Indians was sent to occupy
the undefended black fort at Mose. just north of the city.
Once his men were in position and his batteries
Ft Mse sited, Oglethorpe ordered the bombardment to com-
Smence. The bombardment had little effect on the city
and none at all on the fort. The fort's coquina stone
walls absorbed the initial shock of the shot which then
merely rolled down into the moat. The defenders re-
CAROLINIANS trieved the shot at night and fired them back at the Eng-
] "_ ) lish the following day. The Spanish cannon were much
Castillo de more effective, displacing several English batteries and
San Marco\ \ -;- enormously slowing their rate of fire.
S( ---- -- \ S/ / ,tt; OGELTHORPE \ r
( \ "'-"Chane plies sufficient only for a few more weeks. Believing the
S" \[ best defense is a good offense, the Spanish fought back.
S Noting that the English positions were separated from
each other by bodies of water and could not be mutually
Reinforced easily or quickly, the Spanish decided to chop
o off one appendage of the English Army. In the early
hours of June 26, 1740, a force of Spanish Regulars,
dragoons, and black, Indian, convict, and urban militia
Slipped out of the fort and successfully assaulted the
English garrison at Fort Mose. Of the approximately

THE SIEGE OF 1740
Ft George
Siege of St. Augustine, 1740. (Drawn by Robert Hall of
St. Augustine.)
Ft Caroline
cipal Spanish garrison. Another contingent of English
soldiers and colonial militia attacked and siezed Fort
Diego, an outpost some fifteen miles north of St. Au-
gustine. The main English forces, under Georgia's gov-
ernor and founder, James Oglethorpe, waited the
arrival of the English ships to support his attack and,
when they arrived, then moved rapidly upon the city Ft Diego
and its defenses.
When Oglethorpe's army closed in on the Spanish
defenses, it numbered approximately 1400 men, exclud-
ing sailors in the supporting fleet. His land force in-
cluded English Regulars, Georgia and Carolina militia,
Scots Highlanders, and representatives of several In- Ft San Francisco FtMose
dian tribes hostile to the Spanish. It wasn't until early e Pup Pt Castillo de
June, 1740, that the English ships arrived carrying can- Ft icolaa San Marcos
non and supplies. Oglethorpe had hoped to rush the ST AUGUSTINE
Spanish defenses, but the ships could not get over the
bar which lay at the entrance to the harbor of St. Au-
gustine. It would be another siege. The cannon were
landed and the ships took up positions at Matanzas
Inlet, as well as at the St. Augustine bar, to prevent sup-
plies or reinforcements from reaching the Spanish Flor-
ida garrison. The English cannon were established on Ft Matanzas
the tips of Anastasia Island and today's Vilano Point,
immediately across the harbor from the Castillo de San
Marcos. Both batteries were sited to bombard the city Spanish East Florida, 1738. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine
and the fort. A contingent of colonial militia, Highlan- Historical Society.)


-25.





FLORIDA'S ARMY






























































FLORIDA MILITIA, 1740: By the early 18th century, most European armies had adopted standard uniform and weapons for each nation In
Spanish Florida, Regulars and Militia were uniformed, equipped and armed identically. The Militia was even armed with the newest "French
Lock" mushets and bayonets. This proved crucial in the Battle of Fort Mose where the bayonet emerged the determinant weapon and secured the
Spanish victory. (From a painting by Robert Hall of St. Augustine.)






.26-
.,,,- ..... : ."























































"26"






SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1700-1763




























Castillo de San Marcos, St. Augustine.


135 men in the English Mose garrison, only about two fered a defeat in an English ambush. After a period of
dozen were not killed or captured by the Spanish assault planning and contemplation, and after accepting as
force. The Spanish admitted losing ten men. It was a true false intelligence planted by the English-that they
devastating defeat for the English. were converging on the Spanish camp with overwhelm-
The English bombardment continued. Oglethorpe ing forces-Montiano withdrew his invasion force to
even asked for the Spanish to surrender, which request, Florida.
considering their victory at Mose, they refused. Morale In 1743, Oglethorpe tried again. With a sizable
in the English camp plummeted. Nature added its army, he reinvaded Florida, hoping to rush the Spanish
quota of problems for the besiegers. The Florida cli- defenses at St. Augustine. Alert Spanish sentries spotted
mate, insect life, and befouled water caused widespread him, gave the alarm and later refused to be enticed into
sickness in the English camps. The desertion rate a trap outside the city walls. Oglethorpe gave it up once
among the English colonials skyrocketed. And then more, returned to Georgia, and, eventually, England.
Spanish ships evaded the English blockade bringing During the two decades following the invasion of
fresh supplies and reinforcements to the beleaguered 1743, the Spanish authorities provided funds to
garrison. The captain of the English support fleet an- strengthen the defenses of Florida. The city walls were
nounced to Oglethorpe he was withdrawing his ships to improved, as were the outworks of the great fort. Stone
avoid being caught on a lee shore during the approach- forts were constructed at Matanzas Inlet and at Picolata
ing hurricane season. That did it. Oglethorpe had no on the St. Johns River. Even the garrison at St. Augus-
choice. Abandoning much of his equipment and all his tine was increased. But all these improvements were
cannon, he crossed to the mainland and, with what re- completed just one year before the Spanish, in 1763,
mained of the invasion force, walked back to Georgia. were forced to cede Florida to the English in return for
But the best defense is not always a good offense as Havana, which the English had captured in 1761. Flor-
the Spanish were soon to learn. In the early summer of ida finally fell, not to the sword of conquest but to the
1742, having received substantial reinforcements, Gov- pen of a treaty. A new era, that of British East Florida,
ernor Montiano invaded Georgia. After landing his reg- was about to begin. It would be a short, but violent pe-
ular and militia forces on St. Simon's Island on the coast riod and the Spanish would be back. The military his-
of that English colony, a portion of his small army suf- tory of Florida had hardly begun.


.27-






















FLORIDA'S BLACK

MILITIA





Blacks, free and slave, had been resident in Spanish paid for the rebuilding of two bastions il the city de-
East Florida since the first years of its settlement. While fense wall.
details are lacking, it is probable they served as individ- Black Floridians would serve prominently in the
ual members of the local militia during periods of ex- East Florida Rangers, Florida's British militia during
treme crisis, as during the Drake attack of 1585 and the the American Revolution and would, once more, have
Guale Indian Revolt of 1598-1599. However, it is not their own local militia company during the Second Pe-
until 1683 that documentary evidence identifies a spe- riod of Spanish Occupation in Florida, 1783-1821. Dur-
cific local militia unit as the company of pardesy morenos ing the early period of American occupation in Florida,
(free men of color). 1821-1865. there would be no organized black Florida
It is fairly certain that the black militia company of militia; most blacks were slaves, and the less than 1000
Spanish Florida enjoyed virtually continuous existence free blacks in Florida were prohibited from bearing
from 1683 to 1763. Prior to 1720, it is probable that the arms. Between 1865 and 1901 there were black units of
black militia unit's officers and sergeants were white the enrolled state militia but they received no state sup-
Spaniards. After 1726, and through the period of the port and no encouragement to become active units.
English invasion of Florida in 1740, probably until the Until the mid-1960s, blacks were not allowed to join
British occupied Florida after 1763, the unit's officers the organized volunteer militia, later the Florida Na-
and sergeants were almost certainly black. The com- tional Guard. Since that time. black Floridians have
mander of the black militia company from 1726 until been encouraged to join and serve in the Guard and.
sometime after 1742 was a local "free man of color," now, many serve. Those black Floridians who serve
Francisco Menendez. He was its commander during the today honor a long and worthy tradition. They have
successful assault on English-held Fort Mose in 1740. served Florida for more than 400 years.
Menendez was also a man of property, having personally












28.















Chapter Five



THE SPANISH RETURN-TEMPORARILY 1784-1821







The end of the 18th century and the first quarter of the Germans, and one Pole. This was all that was left of the
19th was not a propitious time for Spain or its overseas nearly twenty thousand residents of Florida at the end
imperial possessions, including the Floridas. Ineffective of the British Period.
and corrupt government in Spain, poorly supported co- I
grn a r ic in t In addition to the population problem, there were
onial governments, and radical changes in the world other difficulties facing the Spanish government of Flor-
,. other difficulties facing the Spanish government of Flor-
consequent to the French Revolution would result in the ida throughout the few decades of their second occu-
ida throughout the few decades of their second occu-
virtual elimination of Spain's once great overseas em- atio of the r e the sale to the Uite
pire. Within the period of a long generation following States of the vast Louisiana Territor, the Americans oc-
ere o o S. A n ad Et Flooia i States of the vast Louisiana Territory, the Americans oc-
the reoccupation of St. Augustine and East Florida in
4, nc re s i L A ri a t cupied a large part of Spanish West Florida, claiming it
11 -8, nationalistic revolutions in Latin America and the r i .
to be a part of their new purchase. Not only were the
French invasion of Spain reduced Spain's ability to sup- goeo of parish loria unale to e the
/governors of Spanish Florida unable to challenge the
port its few loyal colonies, including Florida. From the American action, the were unable to control the ban-
., American action, they were unable to control the ban-
beginning, Spain's hold on East Florida was tenuous. dits slave raiders, r
dits, slave raiders, wandering bands of migrating Indi-
The local government was plagued by lack of funds, few
S ans, and runaway black slaves from the north who
soldiers, and frequent cattle and slave raids into Florida an d runaway black sves fromhe nor o
from the southern states of the new America. To com- infested the interior of the province. Finally, as more
and more Americans settled in Florida, there was an
plicate matters, in the early years of this second period eerroin clamor Florida t the
f S s o o o l g rs ever-growing clamor for annexation of Florida to the
of Spanish occupation of Florida, local governors en- United States.
courage American immigration. That this was not a
wise policy had been demonstrated in the past, and The government in Spain was as powerless as that
would be demonstrated many more times in the future in Florida. Shortly after the turn of the century, the wars
in such places as Texas, California, and, of course, of Napoleon extended into Spain and were to embroil
Florida. the country in warfare for more than a decade. The
In 1785, Emmanuel Zespedes, the Spanish gover- ideas and values of the American and French Revolu-
nor of Florida, caused a census to be taken. This showed tions spread helping spark revolutionary wars of inde-
a total population in East Florida of a little more than pendence in many of Spain's New World provinces. The
two thousand people. They were a mixed lot. Many of troubles of Florida received low priority from officials
those Floridians who had gone to Cuba in 1763 had re- in Spain. Generally, the government of Florida was on its
turned. There were a considerable number of English own. For almost three decades a precarious and near
merchants and artisans who had elected to remain after chaotic situation persisted in Spanish Florida. Finally, in
the British government pulled out. There were the Mi- 1812, there began a series of military and political events
norcan and Greek survivors of the New Smyrna settle- that would lead Spain to call it quits, allowing the Amer-
ment, a few former British Loyalists, a fair number of icans to purchase and occupy what was left of the
free blacks from several periods, a few French, some Floridas.


-39.














































tz, "'t ~ :i

























i r It


In--











EE-































L TF- ......





0r
















;AP.

bl
wor









AVIV,






THE SPANISH RETURN TEMPORARILY 1784-1821



Under the banner of the new French Republic, an
unusual, almost comical, coalition of present and
former residents ofFlorida and Georgia free-
booters planned to invade and conquer Florida.
Their goal was to declare it a French colony and
then have it annexed to the United States.

Governor Zespedes and. his successors were in a in training. However, the erratic nature of the provincial
perpetual tight spot. During most of the years, 1785- income made it difficult for the governor to pay the Reg-
1821, the situado which supported Florida, its govern- ulars, let alone the militia. And, as the Regular garrison
ment, garrison, and many of its citizens, arrived late,, was almost never up to strength nor properly reinforced
not at all, or in fragments. The assigned regular garri- on time, local militiamen, as in the past, were "signed
sons were rarely anywhere near full authorized into" the Regular regiments on a frequent and contin-
strength. Should the Americans have ever made a seri- ual basis. Still, for all its problems, the militia was em-
ous and well-supported grab for Spanish Florida, the played to good effect on many occasions. Even when not
means of resistance simply were not there. Fortunately used actively, just its existence acted as a significant de-
for Spain, the enemies both within and without Florida terrent to would-be invaders from the north.
were never able to muster the men and support neces- The first major challenge to the government of
sarv to launch and adequately sustain a major invasion. Spanish Florida during this period occurred in the
Eventually Florida was to pass to the Americans by years 1794-1795. Under the banner of the new French
treaty and for cash. That was the best solution all Republic, an unusual, almost comical, coalition of pres-
around. ent and former residents of Florida and Georgia free-
Spanish Florida was not totally defenseless. In ad- booters, planned to invade and conquer Florida. Their
edition to the regular garrison of several hundred Span- goal was to declare it a French colony and then have it
'ish and New World regiments, Florida had its militia, annexed to the United States. In 1794, several of the co-
These diverse military formations were of variable alition's leaders were arrested and jailed in Florida and
quality and degrees of reliability. There were always in Havana. Following their release in 1795, they reacti-
three or four companies of St. Augustine urban militia. vated their invasion plans, assembled their small army
Most members of these companies were of Spanish de- and quietly invaded Florida. At first they were success-
scent, free blacks, or mulattoes. They were reliably well ful. capturing the Spanish posts at Guana, a few miles
trained and armed, including specialist training as ar- north of St. Augustine, and of San Nicholas, near the St.
tillerists, but all their units had a high proportion of the Johns River and northwest of the city. Colonel Howard
very young and very old. of the Spanish Florida militia, leading Regular soldiers,
The rural militia of Florida was another matter. It militia units, and individual volunteers, swiftly reoccu-
was composed largely of Anglo-American settlers and, pied Guana and reconquered San Nicholas, sending the
for good reasons, not entirely trusted by the govern- would-be revolutionaries scurrying back north of the
ment of Florida. During the border troubles of the mid- Georgia border. Later, when the invaders occupied
1790s, many individuals from the rural militia deserted Spanish 'positions on Amelia Island, Colonel Howard
to the Americans. There were reliable companies of once more sent them flying and, incidentally, obtained
rural militia and they, often accompanied by Indians, the release of all the Spanish captives from earlier
provided the scouting patrols along Florida's northern actions.
border and helped chase and chastise the cattle and However, in the long run, the Spanish had not the
slave thieves who plagued the region. men nor the money to patrol the border properly or to
The urban militia helped man the city defenses garrison the many strategic harbors or river crossings
and supplement regular garrison troops at the fortified into Florida. Occasional excursions by Spanish regular
outposts scattered around northeast Florida. They also and militia forces were sufficient to chase cattle and
provided men for the patrols in the settled areas adja- slave rustlers back northward, but insufficient to stop
cent to the city of St. Augustine. Until 1803, the militia them from coming in the first place. Often, the only re-
had its own officers, under the general direction and course of Florida's Spanish governors was to send a writ-
control of the governor. They received the same pay as ten protest to the local and state authorities in Georgia,
Regular soldiers when on active duty and, often, while usually without result.


S41








FLORIDA'S ARMY














A ;




















L -'s^ -






-" J *-
-*"r^ -- -' -" ;:t
S0 -










,.




Citr ,gates of St. Augustine, earia 19th centizn. (Courtesv of the St. Augustine Historical Society.)


After 1811. the incredible international chaos at- The decline of remaining Spanish control of Flor-
tendant to the wars of Napoleon in Europe meant little ida accelerated after 1811. It began with vet another in-
monev and fewer European troops could be sent to such vasion, this time under the command of General George
a fringe outpost as Spanish Florida. Local governors. Mathews of Georgia. Believing he would be supported
overwhelmed by lack of support and the realities of by the full power of the U.S. government, (he did have
Spanish control, or. more properly. non-control of the the covert support of President Madison)., Mathews
situation in Florida. began a policy of trying to give the raised a "patriot" army of several dozen men. Announ-
colonv to the Americans. This policy didnin't work as the cing the rebellion in eariN 1812. he and his small army,.
various governors of Florida wouid not act under threat augmented by two companies of American Regulars. in-
of violence or invasion. It was necessary to play out the vaded Florida and moved to capture St. Augustine and
last years of Spanish Florida almost as in a theatrical its fort.
prod auction.



42







THE SPANISH RETURN TEMPORARILY 1784-1821


*,




w:CONCISI NARRIAT1V






; GENERAL JACKSON'S


FIRST N O FLORID ,



o ms= zn







WITH. REM ARKS
-J "














I sprak of a great Mlan and a just Man ..
.. .',..,












stoical Socity


SuA-r F.W. lu






Title page of time-approximate narrative describing Generaljackson's invasion of Spanish Florida. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine
Historical Society.)
Titl paeo ie poiaenraiedsribn Genera Jako' nao fSaihFoid.(oreyo h uutn
Hisorca Society.)
'"" ~ ~ ~ 43" ,,.






FLORIDA'S ARMY







F. p"
























From Spain to America-the changing of the flags, 1821. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Historical Society.)

When the patriot army approached the city and its against Indians and renegade Negroes living there. In
fort, they realized that the fortifications were too strong early 1813, another invasion, into the same area, by
to carry by storm, even though there were very few a band of Georgians bent on forced colonization, ac-
Spanish defenders. The small invading army set up complished nothing. Their leader, Buchman Harris,
camp on the site of the old Negro fort at Mose, just was killed along with many of his followers when local
north of the city, and from there sent a demand for the Indians and renegade blacks stormed, captured, and
city's surrender to the governor. Instead of surrending, burned their fort, Fort Mitchell, in what is today's
newly arrived Governor Kidelan, having brought more Alachua County.
than 100 black colonial militia troops with him rom Even the long-gone British managed to add to the
Havana, moved out against the Americans at Mose. chaos that was early 19th-century Spanish Florida. In
Mathew's army of invasion hastily withdrew north of the 1814 and 1815, British Admiral Cochran. in between his
St. Johns River. Governor Kidelan then offered cash re- destructive incursions into American coastal waters to
wards for American scalps. That did it. The army of in- the north, occupied, looted, and burned properties on
vision disintegrated and its remnants were harassed Amelia Island. During this same period British agents
and chivied into the northeastern part of the province, entered Florida, armed and gave money to Indians and
suffering considerable losses in a series of small skir- Negroes, encouraging them to raid American territories
mishes along the way. The American Congress repu- to the north.
diated President Madison's actions and he found it A Negro-manned, British-armed fort was established
necessary to disown General Mathews. Very soon after- on Prospect Bluff at the mouth of the Apalachicola
ward Mathews died; what remained of his "army" River on the Gulf Coast of Florida. The Spanish could,
wandered back into Georgia. The invasion had accom- or would, do nothing. This was too much for the Amer-
plished nothing. icans. They sent a force of several hundred soldiers,
Again nothing but chaos was the result of a foray into commanded by Colonel Duncan Clinch, deep into Span-
the central part of the Florida peninsula by a regiment ish Florida to remove this threat to American frontier
of Tennessee volunteer militia bent on a spoiling raid security.


.44.
nothofth it, ndfrmthreset emndfo he Inias n rnead baksstrmdcptre, n






THE SPANISH RETURN TEMPORARILY 1784-1821














After suffering some loses to ambuscade along the potential threat by sending an army of slightly less than
river as he and his small army moved south, Clinch at- a thousand men to chastise the Indians. Led by General
tacked the Negro fort from boats on the river. A lucky Edmund Gaines, the Americans defeated and dispersed
ranging shot at the very beginning of the bombardment the assembled Indians. In return, small bands of Indi-
put a "hot shot" into the fort's powder magazine. The ans retaliated with terror raids against isolated home-
fort blew up, killing 270 of the 344 occupants. (Only steads in Georgia. That did it. Andrew Jackson, hero of
three of the defenders emerged unhurt.) Clinch, victo- New Orleans, now arrived to set the entire matter of
rious, withdrew over the Georgia border. Florida and its Indians to rest forever, or so he thought.
Constant American pressure to annex Florida and Jackson put together an army of 800 regulars and
Spain's inability to defend it-indeed even to police the 900 militia soldiers, accompanied by 300 Indians
interior of the province-ultimately led to the near friendly to the American cause. With his army, he
Comic opera events of 1817-1819. The era began when crossed the Georgia border into Florida at Fort Scott.
one Gregor McGregor, veteran of the British Army in He proceeded all the way to the Gulf of Mexico and
the Spanish Peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars and built a fort on the site of the ill-fated Negro fort of 1815.
of the Latin-American wars of national liberation under His army then moved eastward, capturing the garrison
Miranda and Simon Bolivar. recruited an invasion force at St. Marks and scattering Indian bands in all direc-
of War-of-1812 veterans. With great display and gran- tions. He also captured two English Indian agents,
diose public pronouncements, he and his army moved Arbuthnot and Ambrister, whom the Americans consid-
on Fernandina Island. The Spanish garrison there sur- ered largely responsible for the Indian outrages on the
rendered without a shot. McGregor declared Florida an Florida-Georgia border. After a quick trial in the field.
independent nation and raised its new flag, a green he shot one and hanged the other. Having pacified the
cross of St. George on a white field. Expected help from interior all the way to the Suwannee River, Jackson drew
the north failed to arrive and, even though the Spanish off into West Florida to attend problems there. Later. his
botched an attempt to expel his army, McGregor re- actions were repudiated by President Monroe. No mat-
turned to Georgia, a disillusioned leader. ter. Negotiations were already under way to have Spain
Two days after he left, the strangest of all invaders of sell Florida to the United States.
Florida arrived, Luis Aury, pirate. Aury landed, raised With the Spanish government actually controlling
the flag of the Mexican Republic, and opened the area only the area immediately around the city of St. Augus-
to business, in this case, the importation and sale of sto- tine, Spain bowed to the inevitable. What they couldn't
len goods and illegally imported Negro slaves. He didn't keep or successfully defend, they would sell before they
last long; an American naval force soon arrived at Fer- lost it for nothing. The Adams-Onis Treaty officially
nandina. Aury departed in haste and the Americans transferred East Florida. and what remained of West
stayed; they stayed throughout the remainder of the Florida, to the United States as of February 22, 1821. Be-
Spanish occupation. Meanwhile, Indian problems in the tween March and July of that year various settlements,
western part of the province engaged American atten- cities, and forts were passed to the Americans. On the
tion and action. This once more demonstrated the in- 10th ofJuly, 1821, following a double flag and cannon sa-
ability of Florida's Spanish government to do much lute, Spain left Florida forever. Yet another flag was
about anything. raised over Castillo de San Marcos, renamed Fort Mar-
During the summer of 1817, a large gathering of as- ion: the Stars and Stripes of the American Republic. Yet
sociated Indian tribes came to the central part of the again, by the pen rather than by the sword, Florida
peninsula, the area of today's Tallahassee. They hoped passed to a new owner. However, the wars of Florida
to coordinate efforts against the Americans beyond the were not here ended. There would be more flag cere-
Georgia border. The Americans responded to this monies in the future.


-45.





















SPAIN'S YANKEE

MILITIA 1812




By 1812, the majority of Florida's residents were An-
glos: former British Loyalists, recent British immi-
grants, or new settlers from the American states to the
north. Spanish laws were strict. To have property or any
other type of resident rights, one had to serve in the mi-
litia. Many of the men listed below were active in various
schemes designed to divest Spain of its Florida territory;
many others faithfully served to protect Spain's right to
Florida. With a bit of historical license and, given
"Americanization" of Florida only nine years later, all
can be considered "Yankee Militia." (The few Spanish
surnames are of Spanish residents living outside of the
city.)
The names are listed as. and in the order, recorded
by the Spanish; the names in parentheses are as the
names were written in English a few years later. (Only
those that could be confirmed are in parentheses; oth-
ers obviously have a different English spelling but later
spelling remains conjectural.) Most of the men resided
north of St. Augustine; most along the St. Johns or St.
Marvs rivers or their tributaries or in the rural areas be-
tween them. Some lived in or near St. Augustine.

















Ist Company of Urban

Militia and Dragoons

(Rural)




Officers Issac Bowden Moises Bowden (Moses)
Juan Jashau Guillermo Gardner
Nathaniel Hall Captain Juan jashau G
Nathaniel Hall Captain Luis Gardner Guillermo Molpuss
Guillermo Craig Lieutenant Roer Gailert Guillermo MFoxp
Roberto Gilbert Guillermo Fox
Archibald Atkinson Sub-Lieutenant e l
Miguel Sloan Juan Sloan
Jamie Hollingsworth Sergeant gue S J S
Jamie Hollingsworth Sergeant Roman Sanchez Jorge Flores
Guillermo Hall Sergeant
JGu o Hl S t uan O. Jones Juan B. Jones
Jorge Morrison Corporal -T -r
Jorge Morrison Corporal Juan Loftin Juan Bardin
Issac Hendrick Corporal Guillermo Bardin Guillermo Loftin
Guillermo Henry Corporal Absolern Bardin Silbv Tavlor
Daniel Pritchard Corporal Jose Haydin Carios Hogan
Privates Thomas Jones Enrique Sueny (Sweeney)
Ruebin Sueny (Sweeney) Solomon Miller
Guillermo Hollingsworth Levin Gunby Abner Williams Timothy Hollingsworth
Arbanca Fallut Euphary Summerland Jose Summerland Francisco Veir
(Summerlin) (Summerlin)
Eduardo Forrester Juan Faulk Daniel Barton Guillermo P. Birch
Juan E. Jate (Tate) Eduardo Uanton Luis Joc Francisco Richard
Joseph McCullock Andres McLean Ezra Bushnal Samuel Miles
Zephiniah Kingsley Jose Hogan Farquar Bathune Jorge Cook
Juan Creighton Jorge Petty Guillermo Hogans Juan Beal
Fredrico Hartly Jorge Hartly Daniel Swiny Vernal Taylor
Enrico Hartly Guillermo Hartly Guillermo Williams Samuel Toms



















2nd Company of Urban

Militia and Dragoons

(Rural)




Officers Andres Tucker Gilbert Magroan
ndres Atkinson C Guillermo Jilcock Juan Summerlin
Andres Atkinson Captain
i Captain Daniel Barton Eduardo Turner
Guillermo Lawrence Lieutenant D T
David Turner Jesse Turner
Ruben Hogans Sub-Lieutenant r
Issn Hga S lieutenant Juan Edwards Guillermo Surret
ssac Care Sergeant Daniel Delany Richard Proctor
Daniel Hogans Sergeant Guillermo Hart Guillermo Hart (the
Pedro Maxey Corporal
younger)
JacoboWorley Corporal Daniel Hart Eseal Hart
Carlos Breward Corporal .
Carlos Breward Corporal Lindsy Tod (Todd) Guillermo Gray
(Broward)
(Broward) Guillermo Deweese Carlos Armstrong
Guillermo Carter Corporal .
rrJaime Armstrong Jose Fenwick
Privates Antonio Mestre Juan Fraser
Privates
Antonio Juaneda Juan Barclay
Juan McIntosh Guillermo Fitzpatrick Garret Ledwith Jose Hull
Juan Hall Cornelio Greffis (Griffis) Spicer Christopher Juan Atkinson
Jon. Jillet Benjamin Armstrong Roberto Burnett Stephen Ubanks
Elizer Carter Hezekiah Tucker (Eubanks)
Willoby Tucker Tandy Dicks Guillermo Herrett Carlos Hogans
Reden Blunt Guillermo Ubanks Thomas Ulin Jaime Smith
(Eubanks) Guillermo Smith Thomas Lamb
Juan O. Houston Juan Houston Pierce Lane Thomas Durrel



















St. Augustine's Military Society, 1700-1820

Juan Marchena Ferndndez
Translated and adapted by Luis Rafael Arana

The studies on Florida in the 18th Century, especially those
of the social type, cannot be complete or exhaustive unless they
include the military population. Florida is one of the clearest
examples of the duality, "military population equals total
population," over a territory. Once a strategically located
geographic area, with weak economic resources, becomes a
military presidio with a sufficient contingent of soldiers, the
land becomes characterized by that action. An urban nucleus
may be established later within the original presidio, but the
nucleus is exclusively the consequence of the previous
condition. This was indubitably the case of Florida during the
first Spanish period.

I. The Military and Demography

St. Augustine was founded as a military presidio. A number
of dwellings was erected around the fortification, and they
indeed originated the urban core. To organize and administer
life in this urban community, there came several officials and a
number of priests, the latter to take care of the spiritual needs
of the faithful. To provide for material needs, a general traffic in
products was naturally initiated, either by persons in the city
itself or by traders in the nearest economic centers. Security
depended on the state of relations with Indian groups. Because
the hinterland offered little security, the edge of farming did
not get too far away from the urban core. The farm products
supplied the city at a minimal rate, and the importation of large

Juan Marchena Fernandez is a professor of Hispanic American history at the UnL\ erk-
ity of Sevilla (Spain). This article is part 2 of a larger one ~ee El Escribano 19'4 ior
part 1). entitled "Guarniciones y poblaci6n military en Florida Oriental 11700-18201."
published in Revisto de Indias (Madrid). Nos. 163-164 (January-June 1981). We
thank Dr. Francisco Solano. the Reuista's director. for permission to adapt it to the
English language. Luis Rafael Arana. translator and adaptor of the article, is the his.
torian of Castillo de San Marcos and Fort Matanzas National Monuments. -


















44 El Escribano

quantities of merchandise foodstuffs as well as utensils and
clothing became necessary.
The financing of all activities in the city was entirely
external.* The population lived from the annual situado
(troop pay fund) from which the garrison was paid. These funds
came from Cuba, and served to activate the necessary
mechanisms of internal exchange which provided for the
survival of the inhabitants. There was not a transient
population, but had there been one, it could not have exceeded
the number which could be supported by the situado.
This external financing is a clear factor in demographic
development. Despite the fact that the situado was a military
mechanism exclusively, there was a very close connection
between the army and demography. The degree of this
connection in East Florida, a marginal area of the empire, is
shown in the ensuing comparison of data pertaining to the first
and second Spanish periods.

A. Situation in 1763, end of first Spanish period.2

Military population

Staff officers .......................... 5
Infantry (officers and enlisted men) .......388
Artillery (officers and enlisted men) ....... 45
Dragoons (officers and enlisted men) ...... 94
Engineers (officers) ..................... 3
Total ............535

Rest of the population

White men .......................... 94
White women ................. ........575
White male children ....................569
White female children ................... 494
Male slaves .......................... 118

fEditor's Note: Besides the situado, Florida's income came also from tribute, customs
duties, tithes, fines, half.annates, sale of public offices, and other revenue sources.
C.H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Oxford University Press,
1947), 274.312.]
1. The situado paid also for the entire civil and ecclesiastical organization, public works.
and other things related to the presence and activity of the troops in Florida.
2. Florida was ceded to England, and the population left. This date is used due to the
wealth of date contained in the documentation related to the evacuation (Archivo
General de Indias (AGII, Santo Domingo, 2660), which, together with military data
available, permits the reconstruction of the social picture.
















St. Augustine's Military Society 45

Female slaves ....................... 99
Male slave children .................... 67
Female slave children ................... 56
Canary Islands settlers .................. 236
German settlers ........................ 24
Ecclesiastics.. ........................ 16
Blacks and mulattoes .................. 93
Exiles ... ............................. 38
Em ployees ............................ 16
Seam en ................ ... .......... 11
Indian servants ........................ 83
Total .......... 2589
Total population 3124

The population categories above can be distributed among
four groups, based on the degree of dependence on the situado:

(1) The military: unit commanders, officers,
and enlisted men;

(2) Direct dependents: wives, children, ser-
vants, and slaves of the military;

(3) Indirect dependents: employees in military
warehouses and the treasury, storekeepers.
physicians, chaplains, artisans of military
equipment, masons, blacksmiths and car-
penters, wage laborers, convicts, and exiles
at hard labor in royal construction; and

(4) Non-dependents: merchants, farmers,
artisans, and professionals.3

The composition and structure of each group above comprise
the categories and number of people shown below:

(1) The military ....... .. 535...... (17.12%)

3. This group is not absolutely non-dependent because its components furnished men for
the militia. However, since the militia troops are not treated separately in this work.
the group will be considered as non-dependent.
There is complete agreement between the data of the 1763 embarkation and the data
on officers and enlisted men. Departure lists also agree with the data about the struc.
ture of military families.














46 El Escribano

(2) Direct dependents:

women ............................ 465
male and female children ................ 866
slaves ............. ...... ......... 272
Indian servants ................ ........ 64
Total... 1667 (53.36%)

(3) Indirect dependents:

employees ............................16
seamen ................................11
women ............................. 23
male and female children ................. 43
slaves .................................13
ecclesiastics ................ ...........16
servants .............................. 3
exiles ................................. 38
Total ..... 163 (5.20%)

(4) Non-dependents:

" militiamen ........................ 94
women ................... .......... 81
male and female children ................ 152
slaves ................................ 68
servants .............................. 11
Canary Islands settlers ................. 236
German settlers ......................... 24
blacks anl mulattoes .................... 93
Total .... 759 (24.29%)
Grand Total .....3124

Thus about 75.68% of the entire population of Florida
toward the end of first Spanish period was dependent on the
presence of troops in the area, which was true too in other
isolated strongholds or marginal zones. And the remaining
24.29% was not absolutely independent for two reasons. In the
first place, Spanish settlers were not allowed to inhabit isolated
land with a relatively large native population and close to the

5. See note 3.














St. Augustine's Military Society 47





XLIV.

Habana.














i2,.
S. .. I










istoria Orgnia deas Armas ... Volum XI. Clonard. Madrid 1857

Coat of Arms
Infantry Regiment of Habana
Activated as a battalion in 1719, it became a regiment in 1753. Habana was
the first of several units raised in the 18th century for permanent station and
service in Hispanic America. Thus, Dr. Marchena has justly called it 'the
very first stone" of the collective Hispanic American army. Detachments
from the regiment served in St. Augustine in 1736-38, 1741-49, 1764-61, and
1784-90.



















48 El Escribano

English, unless a security infrastructure was provided. In the
second place, the largest portion of the small harvests of the
settlers, which showed the productiveness of the settlement,
was used to feed the military (the only category with the
financial resources necessary for commercial enterprise). To
consider the militiamen, who were also the settlers, as
dependent or non-dependent is a relative proposition. Florida
was indeed a military presidio.

B. Situation in 1814, in the second Spanish period.

Commerce, or rather the exchange of products between the
United States and Florida, was a most important activator in
the Florida peninsula from 1783 to 1820.6 The demographic
composition of the area changed from a total population of
3,124 inhabitants (including the military population) in 1763 to
3,315 inhabitants (including the military) in 1814.7
The increase between the first and the second second Spanish
period was small,8 but other factors distinguished the second
period quite clearly. From 1700 to 1763, practically 100%/of the
population was urban, given the problems with the Indians and
the English. The latter reduced the usable area to within a
"cannon shot of San Marcos." But in 1783-1820, European and
North American immigration and the development of areas
suitable for agriculture and cattle-raising changed the
situation. For instance,

S Population in 1814

Military .......................... 234 (07.05%)
Urban ............................ 1307 (39.42
Rural ....................... .......1774 (53.51
Total ...........3315

An important phenomenon was the decrease of the military
population from 535 officers and enlisted men in 1763 to only

6. Pablo Tornero Tinajero. Relociones de dependencia entire Florida y Estados Unidos
(Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1979) combines the study of economic
activity with the treatment of demographic analysis, both of which are fundamental
to understand Floridin reality during the second Spanish period.
7. "Padr6n General...." AGI, Papeles de Cuba, 1971.
8. But from 1787 to 1814 the population increased 35.9%. Nevertheless, economics rather
than demography caused the upsurge of f loridian development during the second
nwriod.
















St. Augustine's Military Society 49

234 in 1814. No less a fundamental innovation was the fact
that, since the first period, the rural population became more
numerous than the urban.
The military decrease registered was 43.73%. Theoretically,
the population depending directly on the military also
decreased by the same percentile rate. This impacted on the
urban population mainly because the troops were situated in
St. Augustine and other principal urban cores. The impact was:

Urban population in 1814

(1) Military

Staff officers .......................... 10
3rd Battalion, Infantry Regiment of
Cuba .............................187
Artillery ........................... 24
Dragoons ............................. 13
Total....234 (15.18%)

(2) Direct dependents

women ............................ 120
children ............................ 223
slaves ............................ .. 70
Total......413 (26.80)

(3) Indirect dependents

employees, women, children, slaves,
and exiles .......................180 (11.68)

(4) Non-dependents

merchants, artisans, farmers, women,
children, and slaves .............. 714 (46.27)
Grand Total .....1541

Using the data above under the light of a total population of
3315, the percentages of the first three groups decrease to 7.06,

9. AGI. Papeles de Cuba. 2339 aid East Florida Papers (EFP). 175F14.

















50 El Escribano

12.45, and 5.42 respectively. The percentage of the non-
dependents in the fourth group rises to 75.05.

DECREASE OF NUMBER OF PEOPLE
DEPENDENT ON THE MILITARY
1763 1814

Urban population Total population

Number Number % Number %

Military population 535 234 -43.7 234 -43.7
Direct dependents 1,667 413 -75.2 413 -75.2
Indirect dependents 163 180 -10.9 180 -10.9
Non dependents 759 714 5.9 2,488 -69.4
Total 3,124 1,541 3,315

Since 1763, the non-dependent population had increased
69.49% and the indirectly dependent 10.92 % which lowered the
numbers of the military and the directly dependent
conspicuously. The features of a military presidio began
diminishing between 1783 and 1821, as a result of the success of
Floridian commercial development during those years. By the
end of the second Spanish period, Florida had ceased to a large
extent being a military post.

II. Officers and Enlisted Men

Nevertheless the military establishment in Florida continued
having economic, political, and social repercussions during the
second Spanish period. Economy-wise, the situado, vitally
important to the development of Florida, kept coming
irregularly most of the time. Previously it had been the sole
external means of finance, but now it was only one of the
factors of capital.
The variations in the situado were due, almost exclusively, to
the increase or decrease of the number of troops assigned
permanently as well as for reinforcement only.10 The amounts

10. See the chapter on financing defense in Juan Marchena Fernandez, La instituci6n
military en Cartagena de Indias en el siglo XVIII (Seville: Escuela de Estudios His-
panoamericanos. 1982). Notice these few examples of variations: in 1740 the situado
amounted to 74.300pesos; irrJ759, 62,855 pesos; in 1797, 119,973 pesos: and in 1806,
97.501 pesos (AGI. Santo Domingo. 2658 and 2112. and Cuba. 413).
















St. Augustine's Military Society 51

received, however, were sufficiently large to have an important
impact on the area, especially in the city of St. Augustine
proper. The situado represented exactly 84.9% of the total in-
come of the King's Coffer of Florida during the second Spanish
period," and almost 100% during the first period. Thus, the
permanency of troops was a very important financing element
in Floridian economic play during the colonial stage.
The financing of the troops brought about the appearance of
money lenders among the merchants. Given the irregular
arrival of the situados, the lenders advanced the money, natur-
ally at high interest, to sustain the officers and enlisted men.
The high interest became acceptable by those affected because
it was the only way the military could survive. The system
prevailed in East and West Florida during the last 15 years of
the second Spanish period, but it was common in all Hispanic
America during the 18th century.
The lenders in Pensacola in 1817 paid 12 silver pesos for 100
paper pesos, a discount rate of 88% .2 The lenders doubled as
the principal merchants of the area, and were the only ones with
sufficient capital enabling them to perform enterprises of this
scope. Thus, the situado was an investment which served to re-
capitalize these economically powerful businessmen. And this
benefitted commerce later.13
Politically, the permanency of troops in Florida exhibited a
military mien. All the governors, the King's lieutenants, the
garrison sergeants major, and the station and troop staffs in
the 18th century were military men. The administration
contained a large percentage of army men.14 Civil works were
carried out by engineer officers of His Majesty's army, and this

11. Percentages obtained from the data contributed by Tornero. op. cit., 181.
12. AGI. Cuba, 1987.
13. The act of provisioning a military garrison post from abroad was sufficiently complex
to warrant handling by a commercial company, regardless of the implications which
the action might bring about. In answer to protests of the military population in
Florida, which saw their supplies become scarcer year after year (AGI, Santo
Domingo, 840), a contract was awarded to the Companiia de La Habana pursuant to a
cedula in 1741 to take charge of supply (AGI. Ultramar. 1804). The Compaiia
replaced several small companies from New York. which had provided the presidio
with foodstuffs and ready-made goods (AGI, Santo Domingo. 2109) during the first
half of the 18th Century, at lower prices than those the company charged. But the
contract was discontinued pursuant to a cedula in 1758 because many Floridians
purchased extra merchandise for resale to Cuba as contraband.
14. The outlying governments such as Amelia Island (Fernandina), a true commercial
center of important reputation, were also in charge of army officers (in the case of
Amelia, the chief adjutant of the 3d Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Cuba |AGI.
Santo Domingo. 2571]).


















52 El Escribano

subordinated the growth of St. Augustine to defense needs.
Patently, civil government in Florida depended on military
government, and the direction of local government seemed to
be far from adapting to the true reality of the land, especially
during the second Spanish period.
The social order is more complex. Proof of this are the 22
sociological variables or factors suggested by the liberates de
vita et moribus (service records) of the officers'5 and the
filiaciones (enlistment records) of the enlisted men16 of those
serving in Florida between 1700 and 1820. Only three of those
variables are used here: geographic origin, social origin, and
age and years of service. They provide a limited, though
enlightening, view of the military component of the population
of Florida.

A. Geographic origin

The military man was an element from a geographic site who
went to situate himself in another one and become sociologically
an integral part of the army, with all the involvement called for
by the act. This was more interesting in an area like Florida,
where the migration phenomenon fundamentally determined all
social and demographic characteristics. The exceedingly simple
concept of merely classifying the officers and enlisted men
according to their geographic origin must give way to

15. All the service records of officers of the units mentioned below have been used. The
omissions in the sequence of said records indicate that only %4 of 1 % of them had not
been found. Excepting officers contained in the records not found.all the others who
were part, one way or another, of the East Florida garrison during the period of this
work have been studied here. Hojas (records) de la guarnicibn del presidio de San
Agustin de la Florida, 1730-1763 (AGI, Cuba. 476); compaflas de dotacion de infan.
teria de San Agustin, 1749 (AG 1. Santo Domingo. 2659); destacamento de montados
de San Agustln. 1749 ibidd.): destacamento de artilleria de San Agustin. 1749 ibidd.):
ocho piquetes de infanteria destacados en San Agustin. 1749 (AGI. Santo Domingo.
2108); compaiia de fusileros de montafa de America, 1763 (Archivo General de
Simancas [AGS1. Guerra Moderna, 7259); destacamento de dragones de AmBrica,
1789 (AGI. Santo Domingo. 2100); destacamento del Regimiento de Infanteria de
Cuba. 1789 (AGS, Guerra Moderna, 7260); tercer batall6n del Regimiento de Cuba,
1790 (EFP, 175F14); destacamento de artilleria de la Habana. 1792 (AGS, Guerra
Modern. 7260): compaiias de infanteria de Catalufa. 1794 (AGS. Guerra Moderna.
7259); and tercer batall6n del Regimiento de Cuba, 1800, 1810 (EFP. 175F14).
16. Given the large number of enlistment records, one sample of 453 enlisted men of the
first Spanish period and another one of 791 men of the second period were made. The
number of elements of each sample appear in the total of enlistment records located
in the archives. Filiaciones (enlistment records) de la tropa de guarnici6n de Florida de
1700 a 1763 (AGI. Cuba, 478); compaftia de fusileros de montafa, 1761 (AGI, Santo
Domingo. 2660); and tercer batall6n de infanteria de Cuba, 1791. 1801. 1814 (EFP.
175F14).

















St. Augustine's Military Society 53

determining the close interrelationship of geographic origin and
social origin lying behind a peninsular (Spanish-born) and a
criollo (Spanish American-born).
Within the entire army of Hispanic America, that of Florida
is special because the phenomena here are completely
anomalous from those found in the rest of the continent. The
study of so-called "marginal zones of the Empire" reveal that
the phenomena therein did not have the homogeneity exhibited
in the central zones. In this subchapter, the results for Florida
are compared with the general data on the entire army of
Hispanic America in order to point out the particularities of the
former.

A.1. Geographic origin of officers

During the first Spanish period, specifically 1700-1763, the
general data about the geographic origin of the officers are as
follows:

TABLE 1
Spanish-born ...................5S 74.36 %
Criollo ..........................18 23.08
Foreign-born .................... 2 2.06
Total ...........78

Considering that in the entire army of Hispanic America in
1750 the criollo officers comprised more than 40% ,17 the 23%
in Florida is a clear symptom of lagging behind the norm. The
indications are that reinforcement units sent to the area went
from Spain, rather than from other Hispanic American areas,
and that the Floridian demographic structure was insufficient
to provide candidates for officer grades. Since only the socially
highly-placed criollos were permitted access to a military career,
their presence among the officer ranks tells us about the limited
importance of the Floridian elite in this first Spanish period.
The breakdown of the 23 % criollo officers shows:

TABLE 2
Florida-born .....................13 72.7%

17. See the chapter devoted to this theme in Juan Marchena Fernandez, Oficiales y
soldados en el ejdrcito de Amdrica (Svilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos,
1983).















54 El Escribano

Cuba-born........................ 4 22.2
Nueva Granada-born (Columbia
and Venezuela) ................. 1 6.6
Total........18

There was no important presence from other Hispanic
American areas in the composition of the Florida officer corps.
It was the Floridian presence which was in sharper relief. The
72.2 % of Floridians among the criollos does not represent more
than 23% of the entire officer corps, and this rate was low
compared with that in other places in the continent. There the
numbers of officers native to the city where they were on
garrison sometimes reached more than 75% of all the officers.
The criollo officers were few in Florida, which means that the
economic and social elites were in effect unimportant.
The breakdown of Spanish- and foreign-born officers follows:

TABLE
Spanish-born:
Castilla ......................... 16 27.5 %
Andalucia .......................12 20.6
Cataluia ......................... 8 13.7
Levante .......................... 7 12.0
Galicia .............. ........... 4 6.8
Vascongadas.................... 4 6.8
Extremadura ..................... 3 5.1
Arag6n ........................... 1 1.7
Navarra .......................... 1 1.7
Canarias ......................... 1 1.7
Asturias......................... 1 1.7
Total ........58

Foreigners:
Flanders ......................... 1
France .............................1
Total ........ 2

The high percentages of Castilians, Andalusians, and
Catalonians are in similar proportion to those in the rest of the
army of Hispanic America. This is proof that the officers of the
Florida garrison were essentially Spanish-born. Those three















St. Augustine's Military Society 55

Spanish regions furnished practically all the officers of the
King's armies from Naples to the Phillippines. Demograph-
ically they were the most populated, and had a good number of
middle and lower nobility, which regarded service to the King
practically as the only way of life. The limited number of for-
eigners renders them practically non-representative.
Despite their origin, the Spanish-born officers spent their
lives in Florida. They kept their families there, and their
children were Floridians. Had they not been compelled to leave
in 1763, the social and geographic composition of the last third
of the 18th century would have been indubitably very different,
and probably rates similar to those of the rest of Hispanic
America would have been reached. In this respect too, 1763
signified an absolute break.
During the second Spanish period, specifically 1789-1820, the
general data about the geographic origin of the officers are as
follows:

TABLE 4
Spanish-born .................. ..46 70.7 %
Criollo ...........................15 23.0
Foreign-born ...................... 3 4.6
Undetermined ..................... 1 1.5
Total ........65

The data are practically identical to that of the first perici
(Table 1), and thus variations between origins are not worthy
mention. Already the difference from what was happening
the rest of Hispanic America was very substantial. Toward t,.
close of the century, the criollo officers in the army of America
were 60%, more than twice the Spanish-born. In Floridu,
however, the native born were only a third of the Spanish-born.
The breakdown of the data pertaining to the criollo officers
show:

TABLE 5
Florida-born .................... 1 6.6%
Cuba-born ........................13 86.6
Nueva Granada-born ............... 1 6.6
Total ........15














56 El Escribano

Compared with the first Spanish period, (Table 2), the
diminution of the Floridians was huge in the face of the
spectacular increase of the Cubans. The latter progressed
from 22.2% to 86.6%, palpable proof of the dependence of
Florida on that large Antillean island in defense matters.
This is the best evidence that the forced departure of the
garrison in 1763 made impossible the creation and survival of a
Floridian military population of importance in social and
economic spheres. This survival had indeed emerged in the rest
of Hispanic America. After 1789, military men were detached
temporarily to Florida, which was not conducive to the
previously characteristic permanent stay.
The breakdown of the data pertaining to the Spanish- and
foreign-born officers follows:

TABLE 6
Spanish-born:
Catalufia .........................16 34.7%
Andalucia ........................13 28.2
Galicia ........................... 3 6.5
Levante ......................... 3 6.5
Arag6n .......................... 2 4.3
Navarra .......................... 1 2.1
North Africa .................... 1 2.1
Vascongadas..................... 1 2.1
[Omitted]....................... 6 13.0
Total .......46

Foreign-born:
France .......................... 1
Ireland .......................... 2
Total ....... 3

Catalufia and Andalucia kept furnishing the highest
precentages as they had done during the first period (Table 3).
The increase in the percentage of Catalonians was due to the
arrival of the officers and men of light infantry companies from
that region. The Castilians decreased in Florida as well as in the
rest of Hispanic America, due in part to the evident
depopulation suffered by the region toward the end of the 18th
century. The number of foreigners continued to be irrevelant.














St. Augustine's Military Society 57

Finally, a comparison of the highest total percentages of
certain origins of officers during both Spanish periods:

TABLE 7
First Second
Catalufa. ...................... 13.7 34.7 %
Andalucia .......................20.6 28.2
Castilla......................... 27.5 9.0
Levante ....................... 12.0 6.5
Florida .........................72.2 6.5
Cuba ...........................22.2 86.6

Clearly the Catalonians, Andalusians, and Cubans increased
during the second period,' while Castilians, Levantines, and
Floridians, above all, decreased.

A.2. Geographic origin of enlisted men

The aggregate figures on the geographic origin of the enlisted
men during the first Spanish period, specifically 1700-1763,
shows:

TABLE
Spanish-born ................. 232 51.20%
Criollos ........................195 43.4
Foreign-born .................... 17 3.70
Undetermined................... 9 1.90
Total......453

On this occasion the percentage of criollos was high, but it
was still below the 60 % reached in the rest of the Hispanic
American army at mid-century. The breakdown of the data
applicable to the criollos follows:

TABLE 9
Florida.......................147 75.40%
Cuba.......................... 13 6.60
Nueva Espafia (Mexico) .......... 28 14.30
Central America ................. 2 1.02
Nueva Granada ................. 5 2.50
Total ......195















58 El Escribano

This time the percentages were closer to those of other
Hispanic American cities, where it was common indeed for the
natives to be the enlisted men of the garrison. The social
structure of Florida did not allow the existence of too many
people with possibilities for opting to grades in the army. But it
was indeed possible that there were sufficient people to enter
the enlisted ranks; indeed, most times, given the economic
characteristics of the first Spanish period, enlistment was the
sole possibility for survival in the absence of extensive
cultivation which might demand an abundance of labor. It is
interesting likewise that the Mexicans were more numerous
than the Cubans, but in percentage still well below that of the
Floridians. This was due to constant recruiting in Nueva
Espafia, whereas Cuba was not excessively fond of giving up
the enlisted men needed for its own defense.
The following is the breakdown of the Spanish- and foreign-
born enlisted men:

TABLE 10
Spanish-born:
Catalua ......................... 93 40.0 %
Andalucia .......................67 28.8
Castilla ......................... 25 11.0
Canarias ...................... 10 4.3
Galicia ....................... 10 4.3
Extremadura .................... 8 3.4
Arag6n......................... 7 3.01
Levante ......................... 7 3.01
Vascongadas.................... 3 1.2
Navarra ......................... 2 0.8
Total........232

Foreign-born:
France .................... ..... .5 29.4 %
British North America colonies ....... 4 23.5
Portugal ........................ 3 17.6
Ireland ......................... 2 11.7
Scotland ......................... 1 5.8
Italy ............................. 1 5.8
Germany ........................ 5.8
Total ....... 17















St. Augustine's Military Society 59

There was a repetition of the absolute primacy of the
Catalonians, Andalusians, and Castilians among the
Spanish-born. Almost all the Catalonians were those included
in the 1761 arrival of the Mountain Fusilier Company of
America, recruited exclusively in Catalufia. Andalusians anj
Castilians were forced to emigrate or enlist in the royal armies
by the high population density of their regions and their:
pauperized economy.18
The foreigners have the same nationalities found in othe:
garrisons. An interesting element is the limited presence o.
enlisted men from British North America. This is the beginning
of the great immigration from the United States during the
second Spanish period.
For the second Spanish period, specifically 1789-1820, the
data on the geographic origin of the enlisted men offer the
following:

TABLE 11
Spanish-born ....................579 73.2%
Criollos .........................148 18.7
Foreigners ....................... 62 7.8
Undetermined ................... 2 0.2
Total .......791

The outcome is absolutely anomalous. While in the rest of
Hispanic America the percentages of criollos increased con-
stantly through the 18th century to more than 90% at the end
of the century, in Florida the criollos decreased well below the
percentage of the first Spanish period (Table 8). Therefore, the
percentage of the Spanish-born increased, a unique instance in
all of the 18th century, but a logical consequence of the arrival
in Florida of remnants of peninsular units and of recruiting
activity. The criollo enlisted men came from:

TABLE 12
Florida ......................... 16 10.8%
Cuba........................... 73 49.3
Nueva Espaia ....................50 33.7
Nueva Granada ..................._9 6.0
Total ....... 148

18. Ibid.














60 El Escribano

The recession of the Floridians is notable while the increase of
Cubans and Mexicans is conspicuous (Table 9). The presence of
the 3rd Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Cuba character-
ized the dependence on that island. The location of the regi-
mental recruiting stations made the Cubans, Mexicans and
later the Canary Islanders the predominant groups.
The beginning of cultivation beyond the environs of St.
Augustine provided greater economic incentives for the
Floridian population during the second Spanish period and did
away with enlistment in the army as a means of support. The
Floridians in effect dropped from 76.4% among the criollos of
the first Spanish period (Table 9) to 10.8 % in the second period.
The number and percentage of the Spanish- and foreign-born
enlisted men break down thus:

TABLE 13
Spanish-born:
Andalucia ....................... 175 30.2 %
Canarias ........................ 98 16.9
Castilla ......................... 98 16.9
Levante ....................... 53 9.1
Galicia ............. ............. 44 7.5
Catalufia ........................ 41 7.0
Extremadura .................... 22 3.7
Arag6n........................ 22 3.7
Navarra ......................... 11 1.8
Vascon'gadas..................... 8 1.3
Asturias ...................... _7 1.2
Total .......579

Foreign-born:
France ...........................20 32.2%
Portugal ......................... 19 30.6
United States ............... ..... 10 16.1
Germany ........................ 6 9.6
Italy ............................ 4 6.4
Ireland............ ................ 1 1.6
[Omitted] ................. .... 2 3.2
Total ........62
Here is an extraordinary decrease of Catalonians in
comparison with an important increase of Canary Islanders














St. Augustine's Military Society 61

(Table 10). The establishment of recruiting depots for the
Regiment of Cuba in the Canaries influences this change
heavily.
Finally, a comparison of the highest total percentages on the
origin of enlisted men in both Spanish periods shows:

TABLE 14
First Second
Andalucia .. .................. 28.80 30.20
Catalufia ......................40.00 7.00
Florida .......................75.40 10.80
Castilla....................... 11.00 ,6.90
Canarias...................... 4.30 16.90
Levante ...................... 3.10 9.10
Cuba ...................... 6.60 49.30
Nueva Espaia ................. 14.30 33.70

The difference of percentages on the geographic origin of
officers and enlisted men between the two Spanish periods
signifies that 1763 brought total disruption to the natural social
evolution of Florida's population.
While the military constituted a large share of the population
of the area,"1 there appeared a very pronounced dichotomy
between army and population during the second period, a fact
almost unnoticed in the first period. The dichotomy had social
implications because it did not provide for the formation of
powerful and profoundly-rooted elites, but those extant were
always surrounded by impermanency and dependent on
interests in other areas. Although the army itself did not
created these elites, indications of them always emerged
clearly.
To the enlisted men of the first Spanish period, the bonds
that bound them to the land of birth and of family were
important. But those bonds diminished during the second
period and the enlisted men were a kind of semi-transient
population.

B. Social origin

The Hispanic American army was a conglomerate of ti

19. "The Military and Demography." supra.














62 El Escribano

elements of the colonial social spectrum. But between the
highest economic and social elites and the lowest stratum, there
were entirely different ends and interests.
The classifications prepared on the social origin of officers
and enlisted men were derived from data obtained in service and
troop enlistment records, and consist of six classes. These
classes are (1) sons of the military; (2) career soldiers, those
individuals who, beginning as privates, climbed the entire
grade scale, grade by grade, until they became officers through
their military ability; (3) noblemen, the aristocrats who invoked
titles of nobility; (4) well-born, those from high untitled social
levels, generally merchants and criollo landlords; (5) sons of
farmers; and (6) those from the humblest social levels
recognized as honest men. Based on these classes, the social
composition of the Florida-born officers and enlisted men
follows.

B.1. Social origin of officers

During the first Spanish period, the social stations of officers
were that shown in the table.

TABLE 15
Career soldiers ....................27 34.6 %
W ell-born ........................ 14 17.9
Sons of the military ................ 12 15.3
Noblemen ........................ 3 3.5
Sons of farmers .................... 3 3.8
Humble men ...................... 1 1.2
Undetermined.....................18 23.0

Total ........78

This is characteristic of the Hapsburg-era armies. The career
soldier prevailed during the 17th century, filling the majority of
the officer slots. A good soldier, knowledgeable and brave on
the battlefield, could very well reach the highest grades by
reenlisting continually. But in Hispanic America this type did
not exist in the 18th century: they constituted only 15 % by
1740, and had come down to 1% by 1760. They were the sur-
vivors of the old army who, on the disbandment of the large
European old-style regiments, passed on to Hispanic America














St. Augustine's Military Society 63

to continue their service. In Florida, given the presence of an
obsolete presidial garrison, this class of officer would logically
be found.
From the standpoint of geographic origin, the social class of
officers breaks down thus:

TABLE 16
Criollos % Floridians2 % Spanish- %
and
foreign-
born
Son of the military ... 7 63.6 6 60 5 10.2
Career soldiers ..... 27 55.1
Well-born .......... 4 36.3 4 40 10 20.4
Noblemen .......... 3 6.1
Sons of farmers ...... 3 6.1
Humble men ..... ... 1 2.0
Undetermined...... 7 3 11
Total .......... 18 13 60


The sons of the military made up more than half of the
Florida-born officers during the first Spanish period. Next to
them were the well-born, descendants of the first families who
settled the area. This was definitely a classical social origin,
without external accretion and without the appearance of
noblemen. This condition was a strange phenomenon in
mid-18th century in comparison with the rest of Hispanic
America.
Among the Spanish- and foreign-born, there appeared a high
percentage of career soldiers and a minimum of noblemen,
which was an abnormal and atypical situation. There was also a
very scarce participation (2%) by the humble men. The entire
social situation was much more representative of the 17th thar,
of the 18th century, which explains the homogeneity of the firs;
Spanish period, from the 16th to the 18th century. Even
homogeneity did not evolve in Florida.
For the second Spanish period, the general data on the social
class of officers show:


20. Data already included in criolloss" column.














64 El Escribano

TABLE 17
Noblemen .......................26 40.0%
Humble men ....................22 33.8
Sons of the military ................ 6 9.2
Sons of farmers................... 5 7.6
W ell-born ........................ 5 7.6
Sons of artisans ................... 1 1.5
Total .........65

The results resemble those obtained for the entire Hispanic
American army, with absolute supremacy of the noblemen over
all the other classes. In the rest of Hispanic America, this
phenomenon developed slowly from 1740 to 1780, thanks to
provisions contained in successive military reform decrees of
the 18th century.21 Proof of blood purity and titles of nobility
became required for entry into the officer corps of the army. In
consequence, individuals were realigned from. one class to
another, the well-born and the sons of the military specially
passing into the noblemen. And the career soldiers, who could
reach only the grade of sergeant," became assimilated into the
33.8 % of the humble men, who also could not enter the officer
corps due to lack of a title.
The comparison between the first and the second Spanish
periods shows that the transformation was complete (Table 15).
An antiquated, 17th-century army, from the standpoint of
social origin, the military garrison of Florida becomes,
beginning in 1789, a typical garrison of the 18th century,
thanks to the dependency on Cuba. There were more noblemen
and humble men. The latter made up the noncommissioned
officer grades. The complete disappearance of the career soldier
and the passing of the well-born and the sons of the military
into the nobility are amply demonstrated by the decrease, of the
former and the increase of the latter.
Unfortunately, discontinuity between the officers of the first
and second Spanish period makes it impossible to see how their
service records changed. It is known, however, that in a
majority of cases, an officer whose service record read "son of
the military" in 1740 would read "nobleman" 10 years later.

21. See note 17.
22. The appearance of the position of cadet as the exclusive way to become an officer
closed the access to the officer corps to the career soldier, who thereafter reached the
grade of sergeant only.













St. Augustine's Military Society 65

The army was thus a channel for social promotion,
mechanism wanted by driollo oligarchical classes to obtain nor ,
inal equality with Spanish-born nobility. Spanish admini' tr
tion provided sufficient legal means for promotion but at tif
same time it pretended that the powerful Hispanic AmericL
classes take up Hispanic American defense as their own,
incidentally elevating the social prestige of the army.
According to geographic origin, the social class of officers
follows:2

TABLE 18
Criollos % Spanish- and %
foreign-born
Noblemen ...............11 73.3 15 30.0
Humble men ............. 22 44.0
Sons of the military ....... 3 20.0 3 6.0
Sons of farmers ........... 5 10.0
W ell-born ............... I 6.6 4 8.0
Sons of artisians .......... 1 2.0
Total ............ 15 50

The transformation into nobility took place among criollos
(Table 16). In the first and second Spanish period, this group
incorporated only noblemen, sons of the military, and
well-born, meaning that persons of the lower strata did not
enter the officer corps. This is evident proof that social
differences were a determinant in the grade structure of the
Hispanic American army. Among the criollos, the sons of the
military decreased from 63.6% to 20 %, while the noblemen rose
from 0% to 73.3% Clearly the sons of the military passed over
into the noblemen class.
Among the Spanish-born, the career soldier disappeared.
passing into the humble men class. The latter made up the
entirety of the sergeants since they, lacking nobility, could not
become officers. The noblemen increased from 6.1% to 30%.
while the sons of the military and the well-born decreased.
The definite conclusion is that there were no important soci
changes in the Florida military of the 18th century until 17bl.
when there appeared a clear dependency on Cuba. The garrison

23. The Floridians are not mentioned separately because they are a minimal part of the
criollos.














66 El Escribano

of the first Spanish period did not evolve since it was a closed
society, subject to slow change within its midst, eschewing
external factors of change. In this sense, the 18th century in
Florida began in 1789.
B.2. Social origin of enlisted men

There were no service records for enlisted men so knowledge
of their social origin is not first-hand. But there are three ways
which lead indirectly to deducting this important character-
istic. One is by examining the deep social chasm between
enlisted men and officers, based on the obviously different level
of one and the other. Besides, there were legal provisions to
prevent the promotion of sergeants to officer grade which, in
turn, prevented the private soldier from reaching that non-
commissioned grade. The other two ways are ascertaining the
occupation and the literacy of the men.
The enlisted man had a low social condition coming, as he
did, from the most inferior classes of Spanish and criollo soci-
ety. The. Hispanic American army had many problems in
recruiting, because very few men wanted to enlist for six, eight,
or more years, given the financial difficulties besetting the
military institution in the Indies, which meant paying the
soldiers scanty salaries most times rather late.
The chasm was the reason why only those forsaken by
fortune in Hispanic America and deserters from Spain and
Europe were in the Indies. Joining them were those recruited
by the press gang, punished by the courts, fleeing justice, or
bereft of work or profession.24 Compared to the officers, such a
mix possessed as a common trait only the absence of titles and
social prestige. Previously, the career soldier had at least the
hope, through good performance, of becoming an officer. This
road was closed to the enlisted men of the 18th century, and
they became a social element separated from their class to be at
the service of and defend the interests of the controlling groups,
the same groups to which the officers belonged.
The enlisted man of the Hispanic American army was
regarded by the officer as miserable, vice-ridden, unlearned,
and illiterate,.useless for everything, and whose only mission
consisted in performing mechanical service."

24. See note 17.
25. Night patrols, guard duty. watchtower duty, etc.













St. Augustine's Military Society 67





7 VIT .















Coat of Arms
Infantry Regiment of Cuba




















fitona Org6..ica deja., Armo ... Volume XII Clooard, Madrid 19S,7

Coat of Arms
Infantry Regiment of Cuba
Activated in 1789. Detachments from it served in St. Augustine in
1790-1821.














68 El Escribano

In the first Spanish period, specifically 1700-1763, the closed
character of the garrison allowed certain toleration never
permitted in open cities. There were officers in Florida who
married the widows of enlisted men,2 and enlisted men's
daughters who married officers. Generally, the enlisted men
were treated as poor people with almost no salary and were
forced to live by other jobs (for instance, on vegetable gardens
and as servants).2
All this changed during the second Spanish period,
specifically 1789-1820, and the social situation of the enlisted
men became the same as in the rest of Hispanic America. There
appeared Spanish convicts, the rejects of other units, and the
unwanted of Cuba sent to Florida. This people formed the 3rd
Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Cuba, which gathered all
the troublemakers and vagrants extant on that island, and was
assigned entirely to Florida." Obviously the troops were of
very bad quality, full of vicious habits, and they
inconvenienced the small garrison by other defects." The
truism that "the worse the quality of the soldiers, the higher
the rate of desertion" explains the constant attrition visited
upon this unit during the years it was charged with the defense
of Florida.
The second factor is the occupations of 186 (41%) of 453
enlisted men in the first Spanish period yielding indications of
their social origin:

TABLE 19
Men who had always been soldiers.... 82 44.0%
Men who had practiced a trade....... 96 51.6
Men who were sons of privates or
noncommissioned officers ......... 8 4.3


The breakdown of those who had not practiced a trade is as
follows:

26. AGI, Santo Domingo, 840 and 2669. This situation was severely criticized in Cuba
and in Spain, because it was understood as contempt toward the "natural quality
expected in an officer of H.M." In fact, these officers have a note on their service
records reading "this officer is mismated in marriage." The military dossiers against
priests and friars who wanted to marry officers with mestizas (mixed-blood women)
and "local women" were abundant (November 12, 1707. AGI, Santo Domingo, 840).
27. Report by Governor Zifiiga. AGI, Santo Domingo, 840.
28. Report by Governor Morales, April 1. 1801, EFP, 175F14.
29. Report by Governor Quesada. March 1791, EFP. 176F14.














St. Augustine's Military Society 69

TABLE 20
Men who served in other units
before arriving in Florida ......... 65 79.2 %
Men who began to serve for the
first time in Florida ..............17 20.7
82

Now the breakdown of those who indeed had practiced a trade
shows:

TABLE 21
Men who did farming trades ......... 93 96.8%
Men who did maritime trades ........ 1 1.0
Men who did artisan trades.......... 2 2.0
96

The majority of the enlisted men were rural laborers and wage
earners, occupations associated with the lower social level.
They had undergone financial difficulties, enlisted in the army
in Hispanic America, and wound up in Florida. Those who had
practiced trades were 92.3% Spanish-born, while those who
first served in Florida (17 men) and the sons of privates and
noncommissioned officers (8 men) were all Floridian.
The third factor which indicated the social level of the
enlisted men in the first period was the literacy index. Of the
453 soldiers studied, only 81 or 17.8% are represented below:

TABLE 22
Men who can read and write ......... 8 9.8 %
Men who can sin only ............. 10 12.3
Men who cannot read or write........ 63 77.7

The lack of schooling was rather common in the lower class.
In the second Spanish period, specifically 1789-1820, only
110 out of 791 enlisted men, or only 13.9 were studied for
social origin. The result:

TABLE 23
Men who had practiced a trade....... 90 81.8 %
Men who had not practised a
trade.......................... 20 18.1














70 El Escribano

The trades of the 90 men above were as follows:

TABLE 24
Farming..........................65 72.2%
Artisan ........................ 12 13.3
Other ........... .............. 13 14.4

Regarding literacy, only 100 out of the 791 enlisted men, or
12.6 %, make the sample:

TABLE 25
Men who can sign their names ....... 12 12.0%
Illiterates ................... .... .88 88.0

In comparison with the first Spanish period, enlisted men
who performed trades before enlisting increased. Since
almost 100% of these men were Spanish-born, a factor in the
decision to enter the army must have been economic bad times
in Spain toward the end of the century. Those who had not had
a trade were criollos almost entirely.
The study of the social origin of enlisted men is important
because it is the study of the lower strata of colonial society.
That Spanish-born rural workers became soldiers in the Indies
by force of need is a sociological fact of the first magnitude.
This, in Florida specifically, is a clear determinant of the social
and economic reality of the second Spanish period. Almost all
the rural workers practiced a "double profession" of soldier-
settler, if not legally indeed in fact.30 In closed garrisons this
has an extraordinary importance because it explains the rise of
a labor class which is no way reflected in the documents.

C. Age and years of service

Age is an important factor in the analysis of every human
group, and especially in the study of the component personnel
of an army. Age is precisely one of several factors which can
suggest a pattern of conduct.

30. This "Double-profession" was a phenomenon detected in all of Hispanic America. It
consisted, given the economic need besetting a married enlisted man with children,
in the man's performance of another trade or renting his labor in off-duty hours.
According to the opinion of his supervisors, this diminished the potential yield of a
soldier.
















St. Augustine's Military Society

C.1. Age of officers

The data for the first Spanish period are as follows:

TABLE 26
Number of officers studied .............. 78.0 %
No information on age available ..... 13 or 16.6
Median age ......................37.9 years

The 65 officers above providing age data broken down by age
groups:

TABLE 27
Criollos Floridians 31 Spanish-and Total
foreign-born
5 to 15 .....
16 to 25 ..... 8 5 2 10
26 to 35 ..... 2 10 12
36 to 45 ..... 1 1 21 22
46 to 55 .... 15 15
56 to 65 ..... 5 5
Over 65 ..... 1 1

The median age above broken down by
geographic origin:

TABLE 28
Criollos Floridians32 Spanish- and
foreign-borrn
Total sample...... 18.0 13 60
No data available 7.0 7 6
Median age ....... 24.2 22 51.6

Due to the advantages provided for their entry into services, t..
criollo officers were much younger than the Spanish-born ibu
naturally less experienced. The median age of the sons of Lh
military was even less than that of the well-born. 'iTh'
Floridians were younger than the other criollos.
Among the Spanish-born officers, the oldest were the career

31. Included in criollos column.
32. Ibid.












72 El Escribano

soldiers, with a median age of 37.3 years, and the youngest the
sons of the military-with 36.3 years. These results are after all
perfectly logical.
The data for the second Spanish period show:

TABLE 29
Number of officers studied .......... 65
No data on age or geographic origin .. 1
Median age.......................38.2 years

The 64 officers above providing age data broken down by
geographic origin:

TABLE 30
Criollos Spanish- and
foreign-born
Number of officers ....... 15 49
Median age ............ 26.2 50.2

The median age of the officers in general does not change
(Tables 26,29). This is one aspect with no essential variation
between the two Spanish periods. In the rest of Hispanic
America, the median age of the officers evolved from 46.6 years
in 1740 to 35.5 years in 1800. Florida therefore kept a more or
less uniform median corresponding approximately with the
median of the army of Hispanic America.
The median ages of criollos and Spanish-born officers also do
not show great variation (Tables 28, 30), only an increase in the
median age of the criollos, caused by their formal admission
into the army at a more advanced age (Tables 31, 32). They
made up almost 60% of the entire Hispanic American army
toward 1790, and so it was in Florida, considering the
dependency on units from Cuba manned by criollos from there.
Among the Spanish-born too, the median age decreased
slightly. Entire line units of the army arrived these years
directly from Spain as reinforcements. The noblemen officers
were younger than those already in Hispanic America, and they
exerted strong influence over that entire army.
Florida remained an anomalous case in comparison with the
rest of the Hispanic American army. In the latter, age
decreased due basically to changed social qualifications for
officers (years of service being less important for promotion),














St. Augustine's Military Society 73

but in Florida the median age increased during the second
Spanish period. This was attributable to the impact on Cuba of
external phenomena, such as the arrival these years of the new
units combat-tested in Europe. From Cuba some of these units
went on temporarily to Florida.

C.2. Age of enlisted men 33

For the first Spanish period the data are as follows:

TABLE 31
Number of soldiers studied .............. 453
Number of soldiers with unstated age...... 28 or 6.1 %
Median age upon entering the army ....... 29.7

The data for the second Spanish period are as follows:

TABLE 32
Number of soldiers studied .............. 791
Number of soldiers with unstated age..... 183 or 23.1%
Median age upon entering the army ....... 36.4

There is here a noticeable increase in the median age of the
enlisted men in comparison with the first Spanish period. Again
Florida was different from Hispanic America, where the age of
the enlisted man joining the army kept decreasing. But the
influencing factor is the geographic origin of the enlisted men.
While in all Hispanic America the men tended to be mainly
criollos, in Florida they tended to be Spanish-born. The latter
were older because they generally were drafted, rather thar
volunteering, as was the case with the Hispanic Americar,
soldiers. The factors of geographic and social origin are the key
to understanding the difference between the two periods.
The age of the enlisted men on entering the army must be
coupled with years of service to ascertain the true median age oL
the men.

C.3. Years of service of officers

The data for the first Spanish period follow:

33. There is awareness that, unfortunately, the enlistment records furnish only the age
of the men joining the army.















74 El Escribano

TABLE 33
Number of officers studied .............. 78
No data ............. .... ........ 19
Median years of service ................. 19.4

The breakdown of the above according to geographic origin:

TABLE 34
Criollos Floridians" Spanish- and
foreign-born
Number of men ........... 18 13 60
No data ................. 11 6 8
Median years of service..... 36.2 36.2 18.1

The Spanish-born had half the years of service of the criollos
and the Floridians. During the first period the Spanish-born
came in as reinforcements. The Floridians had many years of
service because the garrison did not rotate to other places.
The data for the second Spanish period show:

TABLE 35
Number of officers studied ............... 65
No data ............................. 1 or 1.5%
Median years of service ................ 19.7

The breakdown of the above according to geographic origin:

TABLE 36
Criollos Spanish- and
foreign-born
Number of individuals .... 15 49
No data ................. 1
Median years of service.... 11 22.3

The variation between the first and second Spanish periods
(Tables 33, 35) regarding median years of service is minimal
compared with the rest of the army of Hispanic America. There
the median decreased progressively through the 18th century,
due to the selection of criollo officers. Even in Florida, the
median years of service of a criollo decreased from 36.2 years in

34. Included in criollos column.















St. Augustine's Military Society 75

the first period (Table 34) to 11 years in the second (Table 36), a
decrease of more than two-thirds. The general reduction was
due to the emergence of a practically all-criollo officer corps,
which was characteristic of the Hispanic American army in the
second half of the 18th century. In Florida, where the presence
of criollo officers could barely be detected in the second period,
the median years of service were determined by those
accumulated by the Spanish-born. The median here increased,
instead of decreasing, from 18.1 to 22.3 (Tables 34, 36) years.
The existence of an officer corps in Florida came into being by
the arrival of the reinforcement units with extensive service in
Europe. The large differences between the first and second
Spanish periods become evident by the reversal of the
percentages from the data relative to criollos and Spanish-born.

C.4. Years of service of enlisted men

The data for the first Spanish period are:

TABLE 37
Number of soldiers studied ............ 453
No data ................ .......... .. 110or24.2%
Median years of service................ 23.4

The data from the standpoint of geographic origin:

TABLE 38
Criollos FloridiansS Spanish. and
foreign-born
Number of men ......... 204 147 249
No data ................ 35 28 75
Median years of service... 27.2 28 19.8

The criollos, particularly the Floridians, have more years of
service than the Spanish-born. The Floridians reenlisted
repeatedly since the army was almost their only means of
support. All the Spanish-born belonged to reinforcement units
which came directly from Spain to serve in the Indies, and thus
their years of service were less.
The data for the Second Spanish period:

35. Ibid.















St. Augustine's Military Society 77

The following is an analysis of the causes for termination of
service in the first Spanish period: 3

TABLE 42
Number of enlisted men studied ...... 453
Size of sample used ................ 136 or 30%

The sample broken down by causes for termination of service:

TABLE 43
Died in service ................. 69 or 50.7%
Discharged.................... 47 34.5
Deserted ................. ..... 20 14.7
136

A breakdown of the sample according to geographic origin:

TABLE 44
Criollos Floridians Spanish- and
foreign-born
Died............1 42 18
Discharged..... 10 8 37
Deserted ....... 7 1 13

The latter data greatly clarify the previous conclusions. The
Florida-born soldier remained in the service longer because it
was his sole occupation. Only 15.6% of the Floridian soldiers
applied for discharges and only 1.9% became deserters. On
the other hand, the largest percentages of discharged men and
deserters occurred among the Spanish-born. The men were
discharged usually at the end of their second enlistment, and
those who deserted were compelled to do so by the financial
difficulties besetting the troops.




36. Only the first period is analyzed because the enlistment records of these years provide
sufficient data to obtain a representative sample (30% ).
37. Included in criollos column.
38. Unable to devote themselves to another activity forced them not to apply for dis-
charge. Almost all the Florida-born soldiers are retired forcibly because they are
"old," "infirm," "ill," or "useless due to advanced age."














76 El Escribano

TABLE 39
Number of soldiers studied ............. 791
Nodata .......................... .349 or44.1%
Median years of service................. 18.5

The data according to geographic origin:

TABLE 40
Criollos Spanish- and
foreign-born
Number of individuals ..150 641
Nodata ............... 62 287
Median years of service.. 15.3 20.4

Just as it happened in the officer corps, the median years of
service are reversed. Most of the criollos, recruited in Cuba or
Nueva Espafa, saw their first service in Florida, while the
Spanish-born belonged to reinforcement units which had
participated in European military campaigns.
A comparison of age and years of service among the enlisted
men in both Spanish periods:

TABLE 41
First Second
Number of soldiers studied.... 453 791
No data......................... 118 (26.04%) 414 (52.3%)
Age on entering army ........ 29.7 36.4
Median years of service....... 23.4 18.5
Median age on leaving army .. 53.1 54.9


Although the age of the enlisted men on retirement is almost
identical in both periods, military service in the first period was
longer than in the second. In 1700-1763 the years of service
increased because Floridian criollo soldiers were settled on the
land, whereas in 1789-1820 the years of service decreased
because the Floridians had left and been substituted by
Spanish-born troops. The latter were older than the soldiers of
the first period, not settled on the land, and more prone to
desertion.















The Defense Structure of East Florida, 1700-1820
Juan Marchena Fernandez

Any attempt at social, political or economic analysis of the
territory called East Florida during Spanish colonial times
must put special emphasis on the part that the geographical
location of Florida had on its subsequent development within
the communications system and the geostrategic significance of
the Caribbean. East Florida was a territory which the Spanish
Crown had to hold, populate, and use as a launching ramp for
the return traffic to Europe, and as a defense barrier against the
expansion of the British colonies to the north. These
requirements set the reality of the area during the period
covered in this paper. The Florida of the 16th, 17th, and, in
good part, 18th centuries was a military presidio above
anything else, a bastion sufficiently strong to withstand the
pressure exerted on it by those forces which attempted, in the
course of the entire Spanish period, to cut off the routes and
channels of commercial traffic. This is why St. Augustine and
the corpuscle of San Marcos de Apalache, at the west side of the
peninsula, embody in themselves all the colonial history of East
Florida.
The situation changed during the second Spanish period
(1783-1821). Florida became additionally an important center
for the exchange of products between the Hispanic American
colonies and the great nation to the north, the United States.
And at that time when only the so-called "commerce with
neutrals" was permitted, it even was one of the most important
focal points of this traffic.2
The latter situation existed only in the last thirty years of the
Spanish period, but Florida was a military presidio from the
very founding of St. Augustine in 1565, all the way to 1820. It
was regarded as such within the Hispanic system, and its
social, political, and economic development resembled, in a
lesser degree, the development ot the other component parts of
Hispanic American defense. When the latter became stronger
by the creation of the Hispanic American army by Philip V,
Florida began a slow but effective recuperation. The first fifty
years of the 18th century were harsh for the territory. The
English harassed the area constantly from the north as well as
from the west, attempting to break down the weak defense

37

















38 El Escribano

system. But the fact is that Florida held on because either St.
Augustine was close to the large manpower and supply base at
Habana, or the statesmen of Philip V, conscious of the strategic
importance of the area, defended the territory for Spain in each
peace negotiation with the British. 3 This need to keep East
Florida for the Crown meant precisely the potentiation of St.
Augustine as a military presidio, by the increase in troops,
fortifications, and situados (troop-pay funds). This, therefore,
conditioned the entire area in economic as well as demographic
matters.
Hispanic American defense was a conditioner of Hispanic
colonial reality in the New World. On many occasions,
economic and political considerations were encroached upon by
the need to carry on defense with maximum effectiveness
against the external attacks inflicted on the entire system.
Thus, military considerations modified substantially the
sociological reality of some colonial social levels, because they
posited a whole new political and administrative situation, a
new review of the financial and sometimes commercial
question, and an important channel of social promotion for
criollos (those born in America of Spanish parents) and
peninsulares (Spanish-born).'
The study of military institutions in the great Hispanic
American strongholds, echeloned along both the Atlantic and
Pacific coasts, reveals the fact, on one hand, that an important
military garrison generated an important ingress of capital
(situado) to support itself together with the implications that
this brought along. At the same time, security from external
danger motivated commercial and economic play positively, by
the exportation and importation of products between the
garrison (and its environs) and Spain, as well as between the
garrison and the other Hispanic American commercial centers.
Besides, military inhabitation increased the economic capacity
of the entire population inasmuch as there was an increase in
consumption in the city.
In the political and administrative fields, on the other hand,
the activation and retention of large military units in cities
entailed change in the structure and functioning of the
government. There was, for instance, subordination in many
ways of civil to military power, exemptions granted by military
privilege, and the presence of new, high-level officials (many of

















The Defense Structure 39

them military men). Cities like Cartagena de Indias, Habana,
Veracruz, Callao, Valparaiso,. etc., were important because
they were centers of commerce and communications, but they
became still more important administratively when large,
permanent military installations were based in them. When this
happened, the control of the Crown became more obvious.
These garrisons also originated important social changes.
Spanish-born officers entered the highest levels of colonial
society, backed by hierarchy, more or less substantial salaries,
colorful uniforms, knowledge of and experience in European
wars, and above all, titles of nobility in a few cases. This
breached the traditional, hierarchically social systems of the
colonial cities, inasmuch as holding royal appointment as an
army officer made social advancement possible. Until then,
such advancement had been obtained only through land
holding or by engaging in high-level commercial activities.
Soon, and in successive generations, this nucleus of peninsular
officers connected itself through matrimonial ties with the
landholding and commercial oligarchies of the cities, and it
became impossible on occasions well in the 18th century to
separate one group from the other.
For the criollo group, which played an extraordinary role in
Hispanic American economic development in the same century,
the army meant a vital channel for social advancement. To be
an officer in His Majesty's army implied a levelling with the
Spanish-born, who traditionally had occupied said offices. In a
process that began about 1740, the criollo oligarchy flooded the
military hierarchy, and the trend grew until 1810, when they
made up more than three-fourths of all officers in the Hispanic
American army. Thus, if generalizations are permitted, the
Hispanic American army in the large colonial centers consisted
of criollo officers of high economic, social, and perhaps political
power, who were natives of the same location where they were
garrisoned (there was almost absolute non-rotation of Hispanic
American military units due to defense functions), and of rank
and file from the lower classes, of whom more than 90 percent
were criollos about 1800. To study the Hispanic American army
in the large colonial cities is a magnificent opportunity to study
an ample range of social and economic situations in the 18th
century.
But in these studies there are two difficulties which are hard



















40 El Escribano

to evade. One is the tendency to exclude the so-called
"marginal or border zones," which were also essential to the
functioning of the entire Spanish colonial system. The proper
contexture of the empire in America was not limited exclusively
to the great cities. The functioning of the system necessitated
the erection of a structure (communications, administration,
defense, etc.) which ensured that all the Spanish possessions
were connected with one another by bonds of varying nature.
The other problem in the study of the large Spanish cores in
the Indies is that important economic, social, and political
situations are sometimes unclear, excessively complex, and
difficult to unravel and classify. In this case. the study of a
"marginal zone" suggests more positive and less problematic
solutions, considering that the zone has the advantage of
sharing the same circumstances present in larger areas.
Without any doubt. Florida was an essential part of the
colonial system and its study is less difficult. Its paramount
geostrategical importance does not admit discussion. In
contraposition. Florida's scanty population, abundance of
historic sources, and the interesting nature of the events which
took place there, make the peninsula an area definitely qualified
for the type of desired study.
The analysis of the structure on which Florida defense was
organized is an indispensable requirement to study the military
population. The structure had two fundamental aspects: legal
and actual, which here shall be treated parallelly.6
The legal structure was generally identical to that in the rest
of Hispanic America. But given Florida's fundamental
importance in the Antillean defense system, the defense
dispositions and the legal norms for the purpose took effect in
Florida in a very evident manner. Thus, the legal structure of
defense was very much like that provided for the rest of the
Antillean nuclei, except the special provisions. But it was the
special (actual) provisions which really organized and made up
Florida's own legal defense structure. The special legislation
(that is, organic regulations) underwent variations which
ushered in interesting changes in the situados and in
demography.
The legal and actual structures can be divided into five
stages, to wit:


















The Defense Structure 41

(1) The presidial organization
It was in effect practically from the city's founding and
lasted until 1749. This stage maintained an old defense
structure, such as was provided for Hispanic American defense
during the times of the Hapsburgs. The structure gave good,
valid results in the presence of isolated and uncoordinated
Indian attacks on the one hand, and of freebooters and pirates
on the other. But it was fully outdated in the presence of
systematized attacks by large European armies and navies in
the 18th century. This obsoleteness motivated the wide
restructuring which resulted in the creation of the army of
Hispanic America. These changes did not take place in Florida
until 1749 .
The presidial organization supported a dotaci6n (a number of
authorized man-spaces) distributed among presidial companies
without a specific organic table, but covered by the generic
legislation provided through the entire period, applicable
generally in all the fortified places supported by the Crown.
In 1701 there were in Florida 355 salaried man-spaces, which
in turn supported 1,400 other persons.7 These man-spaces
were filled by 323 soldiers and the balance was distributed
among widows and orphans, according to criteria not
completely clear. As Governor Jos6 de ZGfiiga indicated.
"should the plazas muertas (dead pays) keep increasing, 8 there
will be no man-spaces for the soldiers."9
At the time, the garrison consisted of the governor, the
sergeant major, three infantry companies with 223 officers and
soldiers, an artillery company with 20 men, 17 assistants and
administrators, and 16 seamen. The 223 soldiers were
distributed as follows: 31 in Apalache, 13 in Guale, three in
Timucua, two in Salamototo, 25 as guards and sentries of the
port and inlets, who were changed monthly, and 137 as the
general presidio guard (40 soldiers each day). Listed separately
were eight old and infirm men with more than 50 years' service,
four soldiers abroad on leave, and 13 deadpays, ten of which
were widows. 10
In theory, the man-spaces were kept filled by the arrival of
settlers and soldier replacements, considering that the scanty
population was one of the most notable characteristics of the
area. The soldiers were recruited in Spain during the 17th


















42 El Escribano

century, although no new soldiers arrived between 1688 and
1701.1 It was from this moment on that the sending of
individuals ceased, and there began the sending of complete
units, which became the usual policy in the 18th century.
Actually, it had always been pretended, and the governors of
Florida had thus repeatedly asked for it, that the garrison
needed to keep the presidio and auxiliary forts in a medium
state of defense should not be less than five hundred soldiers, a
number reached only much later.
The scanty population in the area prompted the provision of
remedial measures. In 1701 it was ordered that families of
thread makers and weavers be sent from Campeche "so that
some commerce and some communication may go on," 12 but
this was never complied with. Then, it was petitioned that the
viceroy of Nueva Espafa send one hundred men to fill existing
vacancies and discharge disabled soldiers, 13 but again without
any success. In 1702 the Council of the Indies ordered allied
French Admiral Du Casse to leave in Habana one hundred of
the two thousand Galicians he was taking to Spanish garrisons
in the Caribbean, for further remittance to Florida, 1 but few of
them reached their destination.*
No other armed contingent came until 1706 but then it
consisted of only 43 soldiers from Habana. 15 And up to 1732,
only a master gunner and four qualified gunners were sent as
reinforcements. 16
In 1737, by reason of the war with England and possible
expeditions against Georgia and Carolina, larger troop
contingents were sent. Eight infantry companies, dispatched
from Habana as reinforcements, arrived in St. Augustine. 17
These companies from Spain had become noticeably weakened
in Cuba, but were nevertheless an important addition to the
already battered garrison. At the same time, it was ordered
that two hundred Galician families be sent for repopulation, but
in the end this number was much less. 18



* (Editor's Note: 70 of the 100gallegos to be left in Florida arrived on Dec. 28.
1702. together with the force sent out from Habana to relieve St. Augustine
from the English siege of that year. Autos. gobernador Jose de ZUniga. San
Agustin. 30 diciembre 1702 y enero 1703. in "Demanda....." 1707. AGI
58-2.8. Stetson.

















The Defense Structure 43

Toward 1740 the entire garrison of Florida consisted of
17 staff positions
191 able-bodied soldiers
71 invalids
15 detached at San Marcos de Apalache
43 imprisoned by the enemy
337 total of old presidial troops
24 officers in the eight reinforcement companies
400 soldiers in the eight reinforcement companies
235 additional men in
2 companies of infantry and
2 companies of dragoons 19
996 grand total of officers and men. 20
Ten years later, in 1749, the garrison suffered considerable
loss because the Habana reinforcement was withdrawn and
there remained solely:
166 men of the old presidial garrison (3 companies)
51 men in an artillery company
50 men in a cavalry company
34 seamen
5 militia officers
23 staff positions
329 total number of man-spaces. 21
The eight reinforcement companies withdrew to Spain after a
stay of eleven years and eight months. Only 221 men returned.
The rest had died or decided to remain in Florida.22
Thus, between 1700 and 1749. when the presidial organization
prevailed, the garrison endured considerable gains and losses
due to the availability of the reinforcement troops on account of
the war with England. The practice of sending reinforcement
troops only, setting aside the strengthening of the presidial
companies, meant the end of the companies, and the beginning
of a new stage in the development of the Florida garrison. At
the same time, the survival of archaic structures until mid- 18th
century shows the unconcern of the Spanish colonial
administration for this territory up to the time.

(2) The arreglamento of 1749
This arrangement, drafted by Viceroy Juan Francisco de
Giiemes y Horcasitas and signed in M6xico on February 9,

















4 El Escribano

-49, is, to a certain extent, a forerunner of the subsequent
'gulation of 1753. and also an intermediate step between the
residial garrison and the permanent dotaci6n of the second
alf of the century.
Military authorities were conscious of the sad state of affairs
i Florida: "Should the old garrison of the presidio of St.
\ugustine in Florida be allowed to remain on the footing it has
ad, it would be a continued evil and abuse, and there would be
o one to perform the service with the proper regularity, care,
nd order."23
The arreglamento cancelled whatever previous dispositions
iad been given concerning command and discipline of the
roops and internal functioning of the garrison, and subjected
everything to the 1719 regulations for the Battalion of Habana,
he very first stone in the construction of the army of Hispanic
\merica.24
Under the arrangement, the garrison consisted of three
)mpanies. each composed of six officers and sergeants
Id 96 corporals and privates; an artillery company
armed by five officers, ten auxiliaries, and 40 corporals and
:unners; a calvary company consisting of four officers and 51
roopers; and lastly five regular officers to train a militia
company. All this made up a total of 421 men, who would cover
,. Augustine, San Marcos de Apalache, and Forts Matanzas,
'upo and Picolata, both on the San Mateo (St. Johns) River, at
:i annual cost of 80,697 pesos and seven reales.
These troops would be. under command of the senior infantry
captain, who would also be the second in command to the
:overnor.5
This 1749 plan, which modernized the garrison by giving it a
ructure similar to that in the rest of Hispanic America, was
hort-lived since Giiemes himself reorganized the garrison
Lgain in 1753.

(3) The reglamento of 1753
The Regulation for the garrison of Habana. castles, and forts
inder its jurisdiction. Santiago de Cuba, San Agustin en la
'lorida. and its dependency, San Marcos de Apalache," 26
drafted by Viceroy Count Revillagigedo of Nueva Espafia in
1753, changed completely the concept of the defense structure
)f the peninsula. Florida lost its autonomy in defense matters
,o become simply an advanced fort of Habana, an outpost.

















The Defense Structure 45

Detachments would be rotated from that city. Florida would no
longer have a garrison of its own, but its defense would be in
charge of Cuban-based troops. To this effect, three companies
from the infantry Regiment of Habana with 310 men. a
detachment of 40 gunners from the Habana artillery, and a
detachment of 50 troopers from the dragoons in Cuba were
assigned to St. Augustine. 2 Half of these troops would be
relieved every year in the months of April or May, 2 so that
everyone would be rotated every two years.
The situado as well as the supply of provisions and stores
would come from Cuba, the latter by the Company of Habana.
Thus, the subordination is complete. Every aspect of internal
administration and garrison operation (leaves, pay, retirement,
replacement, etc.) was covered in the Regulation of Habana. In
1754 Revillagigedo drafted a supplement to the Regulation,
which also dealt with Florida, reaffirming again the
subordination already referred to. 2
(4) The Instrucci6n of 1761
Before Florida passed into British hands in 1763, the
garrison was again reorganized by virtue of "Instruction to
arrange, in consequence of the King's resolution of March 2,
1761, the garrison of the presidio of St. Augustine and
dependent forts, and implement other dispositions covered in
the same resolution."30
This instruction gave back to Florida its lost military
independence. From the three companies detached from the
Habana Regiment, two companies were created for permanent
assignment in St. Augustine. The garrison would consist of
four hundred soldiers: two permanent infantry companies of
one hundred men each; an artillery company, also permanently
stationed, of forty gunners; and a fifty-trooper cavalry
company. These numbers added up to 290 officers and soldiers.
The balance of 110 would be sent from Habana as reinforcement
troops or temporary detachments from the infantry regiment of
Habana and rotated every year. This was an intermediate
solution. Florida defense was fundamental to Habana since the
possible conquest of the peninsula by the English meant a
constant check on the entire defensive, logistical, and
communications system of the Caribbean. But to keep Florida
with no other garrison than the one assigned from Habana,
according to the 1753 plan, would impact St. Augustine
















16 El Escribano

unfavorablyy, because the doors would be closed to Floridians to
become part of the garrison, and make worse the already bad
economic situation of St. Augustine. The Instrucci6n stated
that "if a few persons residing in the presidio of Florida, of the
proper height, health, and other required qualifications for
service could be gotten to enlist...they would serve in the two
-ompanies assigned."3'
This could have been a good solution but the events of 1763
.iid not afford the time to work out the system positively.
Besides, a formula was decreed in 1761 which had been tried in
-ther places in Hispanic America: the soldier-settler. For this
purpose, a veteran company was reorganized as the Mountain
'usiliers Company, levied entirely in Catalonia, and sent to
'lorida with wives and children. But again there was no time to
.vork out this system, because the company was compelled to
evacuatee the peninsula in 1763.32

(5) The dependence on Cuba

Following the devolution of Florida to Spain (1784), there
.vas a return to the disposition of 1753, that is, a total depend-
!nce on Habana on defense matters. The dotaci6n disappeared
.ind troops were sent from the island, subject to rotation.
Specifically, the 3d Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Cuba
.vas sent, 3 consisting of the staff, a grenadier company, and
:our fusilier companies, with a total of 378 men. 3 Besides,
:here was a detachment of 36 men from the artillery in
iabana, 35 and another 20-man detachment from the Dragoons
:Af America, also of Habana. 3 Occasionally reinforcement
units were sent from Cuba; such was the case of the three
2atalonian light infantry companies in 1793. 3 This type of
dependencyy meant that the possibilities for Florida defense
rested on the timely arrival of contingents, but not on keeping
:hem there. Habana was the distribution center because of the
arge number of troops available on the island. But the practice
.vas dangerous should an invasion, as the one launched from
:he north in 1817, take place before the arrival of
-einforcements.
From 1789 to 1820 the garrison lolled in a phase of constant
Decrease. There was no incorporation of new troops, and
.ogically the effective strength became progressively less,
-eaching lows under those of the worst years of the first
-panish period.



















The Defense Structure 47

For example, the 3d Battalion of Cuba changed as follows:
1790 .......................371 men
1800 ....................... 253 men
1810 ....................... 256 men
1814 ........................ 187 m en
These were losses of 50 percent in 25 years without
replacement of the soldiers who died, deserted, or were
discharged. This applied also to the high number of years of
service of the soldiers, to their age, and to the lengthy stay of
these troops in the same location. Florida breathed airs of
commercial development during the second Spanish period, but
it also fell into open decadence on defense matters.39
The last structuration of Hispanic American defense followed
the loss of most of the continental colonial possessions, and it
was limited practically to the Antilles (Cuba and Puerto Rico).
Under it, Florida continued to depend with extraordinary
paucity on Habana. There were no veteran troops to send to the
area, since the best men had succumbed on the European
continent. The latest fresh reinforcements from Spain were
billeted on the islands to prevent their loss. Very few regular
units were detached to Florida, but its defense was entrusted to
Cuban militia units. The composition of the garrison in 1820
was:
5th company, Infantry Regiment of Cuba ..... 58
6th company, Infantry Regiment of Cuba ..... 50 40
Detachment from the Dragoons of America .... 12
Detachment of officers from the Infantry
Regiments of Louisiana, Tarragona, and
Habana, to command the Florida militia ..... 10
1st company, Free Blacks of Habana (militia) .59
2nd company, Free Blacks of Habana (militia) .59
a company, Battalion of Mulattoes of Habana
(militia) ............... ..................34

Total....283 4

That Florida defense was absolutely insufficient was shown
by the successful campaign of General Andrew Jackson and his
Tennessee militiamen, who managed to enter almost unopposed
into St. Augustine, Apalache, and Pensacola.42 It was the


















48 El Escribano

final calamity in three centuries of penury in military
expenditures. The brilliant defense actions of the 18th century
are more attributable to the temerity and courage of the
defenders than to Spain's military policy for Florida and the
weak structure that it had erected in the peninsula.*


* Editor's Note: Gen. Jackson did not enter St. Augustine at any time.
Charlton W. Teneau. A History of Florida (Coral Gables: University of
Miami Press 1971). 113-114.1
























The Defense Structure 49






>O



20











O to
I a
I "0

















































o o a 0 o
/ 0










.. S.















EE
0



C',
= f00









z 0 o 0
j O

5k s "










m o
^~ Z ; o < ~ > n ~

The qatttv ih n oso arsni



















50 El Escribano

Notes


1. A minimum bibliography consists of Fernando Armas Medina. "Luisiana y
Florida en el reinado de Carlos III," Anuario de Estudios Americanos,
XVII (1960). 160; William S. Coker and Jack D.L. Holmes, "Sources for
the History of the Spanish Borderlands." Florida Historical Quarterly,
XLIX (1970-71). 380-393; Theodore Corbett. "Migration to a Spanish
Imperial Frontier in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: St.
Augustine," Hispanic American Historical Review, LIV (1974), 418-430;
Michael J. Curley, Church and State in the Spanish Floridas (1783-1822)
(Washington: 1940); Verne E. Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida
1565 to 1763 (Washington: 1941): Joyce E. Harmon. Trade and
Privateering in Spanish Florida, 1732-1763 (St. Augustine: 1969): Paul E.
Hoffman, "A Study of Florida Defense Costs 1565-1585: A Quantification
of Florida History," Florida Historical Quarterly, LI (1972-73). 401-422:
Samuel Proctor. "Research Opportunities in the Spanish Borderlands:
East Florida," Latin American Research Review, VII(1972); Charlton W.
Tebeau. A History of Florida (Miami: 1971); John J. TePaske. "Economic
Problems of the Florida Governors." Florida Historical Quarterly,
XXXVII (1958-59). 42-52. and The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-
1763 (Durham: 1964); and Arthur P. Whitaker. The Spanish American
Frontier: 1783-1795 (Gloucester: 1962).
2. Pablo Tornero Tinajero. Relaciones de dependencia entire Florida y Estados
Unidos (Madrid: 1979).
3. Antonio de Betancourt. "Filipe V y la Florida." Anuario de Estudios
Americanos. VII(1950).
4. Juan Marchena Fernandez. La institucidn military en Cartagena de Indias
en el siglo XVIII (Sevilla: 1980) and Oficiales y soldados en el ejercito de
America (Sevilla: 1983). Both these works are studies of the characteristics
of the Hispanic American army from 1700 to 1800. The first is a structural
study about how the Spanish colonial military institution in an American
stronghold. Cartagena de Indias in this instance, is created, transformed.
financed, works, and disappears. The latter is a sociological study of the
human component of these troops, officers as well as enlisted men. Thus,
the study covers geographical and social origins, promotions, social
composition of these troops, age levels, marriages, effectiveness, sanitary
conditions, health, etc., through the data furnished by service records and
filiaciones (enlistment records). Service records of 12,000 officers in all
Hispanic American units of the 18th Century, and several thousand
filiaciones of enlisted men were consulted. The service records and
filiaciones pertaining to East Florida are naturally included in the study.
5. Marchena in the first work cited in note 4. In the second book mentioned,
see the chapter on the army and society.
6. Although fortifications and other royal defense works should be studied in
connection with the actual aspect, they were not examined as they are not
the main purpose in this research. Besides, the works on fortifications are
sufficiently exhaustive, ranging from that by Verne Chatelain to the
research being performed by Luis R. Arana. Albert Manucy. and the
[Historic) St. Augustine Preservation Board.
7. Informe [del gobernador Jose) de Zufiiga. 24 de octubre 1701. Archivo
General de Indias(AGI), Santo Domingo 840.




















The Defense Structure 51

8. Dead pays were those man-spaces not occupied by soldiers, the salaries of
which were used to pay orphan children, widows, and disabled retirees.
9. Carta de Zifiiga, 15 de noviembre 1701, AGI, Santo Domingo 840.
10. "Estado de la guarnici6n de Florida al 15 de marzo de 1702." ibid.
11. Informe de Znfiiga, 30 de octubre 1701, ibid.
12. Informe de Zifiiga, 24 de octubre 1701, ibid.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. Minuta del Consejo [de Indias] anexa al estado de la guarnici6n de 1702,
AGI, Santo Domingo 840.
15. Informe del gobernador Francisco de C6rcoles y Martinez, 29 de marzo
1706, ibid.
16. Real orden de 22 de febrero de 1722. AGI. Guatemala 872-A.
17. AGI, Santo Domingo 2658.
18. Informe [del.gobernador Juan Francisco] de Giiemes y Horcasitas. de La
Habana], 24 de marzo 1738. AGI, Santo Domingo 2593.
19. Sent from Habana in 1739.
20. Estado de la guarnici6n, AGI, Santo Domingo 2658.
21. Ibid.
22. Informe sobre la guarnici6n. AGI. Santo Domingo 2659. -
23. "Papel del arreglamento en que debe quedar la guarnici6n del presidio de
San Agustin de la Florida." AGI. Santo Domingo 2109. p. 1.
24. See this regulation in Conde de Clonard. Historia orgdnica de las armas de
Infanteria y Caballeria, 16 vols. (Madrid: 1851). VII, 170. and in AGI,
Santa Fe 938.
25. "Papel del arreglamento..."
26. AGI, Santo Domingo 2110.
27. Ibid., article 107.
28. Ibid., article 88.
29. "Suplemento al Reglamento para las plazas de la Habana. Santiago de
Cuba y Florida," AGI, Santo Domingo 2110.
30. AGI. Santo Domingo 2660. Signed in Aranjuez. May 21, 1761.
31. See point 14 of the "Instrucci6n."
32. See the complete dossier in AGI, Santo Domingo 2660.
33. The activation of this battalion as well as its assignment to Florida was not
free from difficulties (see the entire bundle in AGI. Papeles de Cuba 1377).
34. East Florida Papers (EFP) 8457, Revista de comisario, 1789.
35. Ibid., idem, 1790.
36. Ibid.
37. Archivo General de Simancas. Guerra Moderna. 7259.
38. Musters obtained for 1790 (EFP 86H7), 1800 (EFP 175F14), 1810 (EFP
90LT), and 1814 (EFP 175F14).
39. This paper does not cover the organization of the Florida militia, which
existed only on paper. During this period, the three companies of urban
militia, respectively known as the Mahonese. Spanish, and Irish companies
comprising 190 men, were theoretically reorganized. However, according to
the governor, "these companies lack military discipline, and most of them
[the men] have lived many years under English dominion, and others [men]
from Anglo America have been accepted (for service], which makes the
proper conduct in case of attack doubtful. "May 18, 1806 (AGI. Santo
Domingo 2571).
40. These two companies rotated with others from the same regiment
(resolution of the Consejo 1817 [AGI. Ultramar 3041).





























52 El Escribano

41. Musters in EFP 85D8. The 3d Battalion, Regiment of Cuba, was
disbanded by the Regulation of March 20. 1815. drafted for [the garrison
of] Habana. However, almost 150 soldiers were left over from that unit.
and the Royal Treasury owed them 69,193 pesos in pay in arrears (AGI.
Papeles de Cuba 2339).
42. These events and the useless Spanish defensive response can be studied in
AGI, Papeles de Cuba 1784. 1875, 1876, and AGI, Ultramar 304.
43. AGI. Santo Domingo 840; Guatemala 872-A; Santo Domingo 2593, 2658.
2659: EFP 84F7, 175F14, 90LT, and 95D8. For the year-by-year
reconstruction of the garrison, see bundles AGI, Santo Domingo 2563
through 2360, and AGI, Papeles de Cuba 336 through 358. since they
contain all the reports from 1700 to 1820 pertaining to it as well as the
monthly muster master's reports.

















FLORIDA IN THE LATE FIRST SPANISH PERIOD:
THE 1756 GRINAN REPORT

by Michael C. Scardaville
and
Jesus Maria Belmonte

Students of Florida's colonial history know too well the
difficulty in locating comprehensive, unbiased reports on St.
Augustine and provinces in the last half century before Spain
ceded Florida to Great Britain. The detailed Solana report of
1759, written by the parish priest Juan Jose Solana, is to date
the best known 18th century account of the colony, although its
virulent attack on Governor Lucas Fernando de Palacio lessens
the value of this document as an impartial analysis of the
colonial bureaucracy.1 The heretofore untranslated and
unpublished 1756 Grinan report offers scholars for the first time
a dispassionate summary account of Florida during the
turbulent years of the late First Spanish Period.2
Information on the author and on the origin of his report is
sketchy and to some extent speculative. Don Julian de Arriaga y
Rivera, the new secretary of State for the Navy and the Indies,
requested a comprehensive report on Florida in order to
familiarize himself with Spain's beleaguered frontier colony.
As chief minister for the New World territories, Arriaga was
principally concerned with military and defense matters: fort-
ifications, troop strength, problems with the vexatious English
and Indians, and descriptions of the coastline. Aware that
Florida was "the first line of defense for New Spain," Arriaga
wanted to make certain that Spain's foothold on the peninsula
was in no immediate danger of falling into English hands.4
To secure a report posthaste, Arriaga turned to Don Pedro
Sanchez Grinan, a minor royal official then stationed in Madrid
but who had previously resided in St. Augustine for a decade.
Arriaga's urgency for information is underscored by the fact
that Grinan had left the colony fourteen years before, although
he indicated that he kept informed of events there through
frequent correspondence with friends and officials.
Grinan lived in St. Augustine from 1731 to 1742 where he was
employed in different unspecified occupations. Because of his

1
















Grilin Report 3

thorough knowledge of trade, commerce, and the nature and
problems of the colonial bureaucracy, it can be assumed that he
was one of the minor treasury officials or perhaps even a
prominent merchant. In 1742, a breakdown in the provisioning
of the colony forced him to accept a new position. As a result of
the tardy arrival of the annual situado (subsidy) and
subsequent shortage of supplies and money, the Junta de
Guerra (Council of War) appointed him temporary situador to
procure food and specie in Mexico.5 No situado had arrived in
Florida since 1738, and conditions in the colony had become
intolerable. Although Grinan "did not return with one
maravedi" of currency, he succeeded in securing over 10,000
arrobas of flour, corn, and ham in addition to such
indispensable items as tallow, wicks, thread, and cloth.6
Grin"an departed Florida after returning from Mexico,
perhaps as a result of a promotion in recognition of his success
in acquiring supplies for St. Augustine at such a critical time.7
No record has been found on him between 1742 and 1756, but his
report had obviously made a favorable impression on the king,
for in 1757 Ferdinand VI appointed him as one of the royal
treasury officials in Santiago, Cuba. Grinan received another
promotion nine years later when he became royal auditor of the
treasury of the important mining city of Pachuca in Mexico,
with a comfortable annual salary of 2,000 pesos. He remained in
this position until his death in early 1771.
As evident in his career in the service of the king, Grinan was
an able and competent royal servant. Yet his report does suffer
from poor organization and several inaccurate dates and place
names. Such problems, however, can be attributed to a hastily
written report that was composed many years after the author
left the colony. Grlian himself states that he quickly responded
to Arriaga's request and that he relied primarily on reflection
and memory to recall the conditions in Florida.
These deficiencies in the report are far outweighed by the
information and insight imparted about the 1730s and early
1740s, a period characterized by substantial population growth,
extensive trade with the English, Indian unrest, and war with
the Georgians. Directed to compose an account about military
matters "and other details relative to the subject," Grinan
proceeded to write a more comprehensive account of St.
Augustine and the provinces. Despite the absence of pasan -
on religious controversies and military defeats. '


















El Escribano

:eals a wealth of data about a wide range of topics, from
.itudes towards Indians and criollos, to abortive efforts to
:tle the hinterland, to problems with periodic floods in the
v. Sections dealing with diet, drinking water, and medicinal
rbs are quite illuminating, particularly because of the dearth
such data for this period. Moreover, the author has the ability
discuss not only the major issues facing the colony, such as
fense and subsidy systems, but also such minor matters as
- excessive number of mosquitoes on Anastasia Island in the
mmer.
Grin ln wrote a document that is both informative and
tertaining. Historians of colonial Florida applaud his effort.

Most Excellent Lord

Don Pedro Sanchez Grinan submits to Your Excellency
the brief account he has written on the presidio of Florida
and Apalache in response to the questions Your Excellency
condescended to ask him in the matter.

My Lord:
Your Excellency, having seen fit to ask me some
questions about the situation of the presidio of St.
Augustine, Florida, and Apalache, their fortifications,
garrison. Christian and heathen Indians, the quality of the
country, the English establishments of the vicinity, the
bars and ports of that coast, and other details relative to
the subject, I responded promptly with what came to
memory. After reflecting on these matters, and believing
myself worthy of my obligation to inform Your Excellency
of everything that has happened to me afterwards, I have
written a brief report based on what I have seen, heard,
and understood in the ten years from 1731 until 1741 (sic)
that I supported myself in that town with different
employment, and based on what I later have learned
through frequent letters that I have received. I wish to
please Your Excellency.
1. Florida: Its Location and Quality of the Country
The presidio and city of St. Augustine, Florida (in North
America) is located at almost thirty degrees latitude on
the banks of a sizeable river that runs from north to south.
The territory of the provinces of this country extends

















Grfiin Report 5

northward to the boundary of Canada; eastward it ends at
the North Sea and Carolina or New England; westward to
Louisiana; and southward to the Gulf of Mexico.0 It is a
flat, highly fertile land, with many rivers, swamps, and
lakes. It has large forests of cedars, laurels, evergreen
oaks, live oaks, pines, and other species. It produces
numerous deer, bear, buffalo, and many fowl. The air is
very healthful, and the people lead robust lives without
experiencing the number of illnesses that are suffered in
Europe.
2. The City and its Plan
The city is a settlement of about five hundred houses that
are built of wood, tabby, and a few of hewn stone and
mortar.11 Its inhabitants consist of the officers, soldiers,
and artillerymen of the garrison, some merchants,
mestizos, and free mulattoes. The town is located on the
bank of the river. The ground is sandy and water is found
at a depth of one and one-half varas.12 The pattern of its
streets and houses differs very little from other towns in
America, and since the houses are widely separated from
each other, the people customarily plant some corn,
legumes, or vegetables on their lots. They drink well
water, somewhat nitrous but healthy. The natives of the
city, who are of Spanish descent, are called criollos. They
are brave, very upright in their behavior, ingenious, and
inclined to war.

3. Parish Church
The only parish church in the city is built of tabby and
wood and is poorly equipped. It is served by a priest, an
elder sexton, an organist, and two acolytes who are paid a
total of about one thousand pesos from the Real Hacienda
(Royal Treasury) 13
4. Saint Francis Convent
The Convent of Saint Francis, which until the last war was
chapter headquarters, ordinarily contains five or six friars
who, with others, are employed in teaching the natives of
the five villages in the vicinity.4 [The friars] and the
chaplain from Apalache constitute the number of
instructors that His Majesty supports, giving each one
suitable sustenance of about two hundred pesos from t,-
annual subsidy.15

















El Escribano


5. Chapel of the Fortress
The accouterments of the chapel of the principal fortress
as well as the chaplain's annual salary of three hundred
pesos are defrayed by the Real Hacienda.
6. Offering for Bread and Wine
The offering for bread and wine in all the churches and the
oil for the sacramental lamps also are paid out of the Real
Hacienda.
7. Hospital
The hospital consists of one narrow room of hewn stone
and mortar which holds only eight to ten beds. Since it
receives no funds other than those deducted from the pay
of the few unmarried soldiers, convict laborers, and royal
slaves who are treated there, it lacks clothing and other
indispensable items for the aid and comfort of the
patients.16
8. Barracks
The presidio had no barracks other than those of the
fortress and principal guardhouse until the arrival of
reinforcements from Havana in 1740. Four spacious
wooden galleries were then constructed, two of them near
the guardhouse and the other two within the defense line
facing the north.7
9. Commerce of Florida
The commerce of Florida, supplied by two or three sloops
which arrive from Havana twice a year, is dispensed in ten
or twelve stores that sell rum, wine, vinegar, sugar,
tobacco, spices, lard, soap, tallow candles, and other
provisions, with a few kinds of silk, wool, linen goods,
ribbons, and other trifles. The delay [in the arrival of] the
annual subsidies compels the soldiers of the garrison to go
into debt with the merchants who furnish them with the
goods and money necessary for their survival. And since it
frequently happens that the soldier receives no cash from
his pay because of the many deductions, the merchants
suffer just as much from this deficiency as the troops.
10. Need for Justices and an Attorney
Field Marshal Don Manuel de Montiano, aware of how the
civil litigations among the populace in Florida burdened
the governor, proposed to His Majesty that two justices,
chosen annually, be installed to administer justice at the
lower level.8 I do not recall if he also indicated, as did Lt.
















Grfnan Report

General Don Antonio de Benavides, the pressing need for a
lawyer who could discharge the duties (as in other places
in America) of Auditor de Guerra (military legal advisor)
and civil legal adviser.19 Since a lawyer is not available, it
is necessary to forward the legal documents to Havana,
causing much injury to the parties and considerable delay
in the processing of the cases. At the time of the last war
with England, this need became evident because of
questions that arose over the depositions concerning some
prizes that were brought into port by Spanish privateers.20
11. Garrison of the Presidio and State of its Pay
The three hundred and fifty positions in the garrison's
allotment consist of a governor, appointed by His Majesty,
who holds the rank of captain general of the presidio and
province, three infantry companies, one cavalry and one
artillery company, ministers of the Real Hacienda and
officials of its accountancy, two harbor pilots, some sailors
and cabin-boys to man the launches, a surgeon, a barber,
interpreters of Indian languages, and an armorer. Their
salaries and allowances amount to one hundred and
twenty or one hundred and thirty thousand pesos annually,
subsidies paid from receipts of the alcabalas (sales tax) in
Puebla de los Angeles. When such receipts fail to cover the
amount needed, the balance is drawn from the treasury of
Mexico, along with the two reales daily subsidy that is
appropriated for the widows and orphans of officials and
soldiers, funds assigned by His Majesty since 1731. A
military official used to be sent out from Florida every
year to collect the subsidy, but this procedure is no longer
followed since the Royal Havana Company has assumed
responsibility for supplying the presidio. When the subsidy
(along with the others from the Windward Islands) arrives
in Havana, the Company deducts the cost of the supplies
and forwards the balance to the treasury of Florida.
However, this payment is more than three years overdue,
and thus, the presidio's claim against the Real Hacienda
amounts to more than four hundred thousand pesos.
Although representations and petitions about this delay
have been sent to the viceroy, asking him to release some
of the funds annually and to continue doing so until the
payment is completed, exigencies of war and other
necessities of the crown have not permitted the implemen-
















El Escribano
station of what His Majesty has arranged. For the troops it
is most regrettable that, in addition to the serious delay
that results from the mentioned deficit, it sometimes
happens that a portion of the cash on hand is borrowed in
order to defray the expenses caused by the indispensable
repairs of fortifications, for the daily rations of the
reinforcements, and for other [expenses] which were not
reimbursed in Mexico because of some question about the
reliability of the certificates or because of not having funds
in the treasury. As a result, the account, remaining
unsettled from one subsidy to another, is delivered too late
or is added to the former arrears. Because of this the
salaries which were not collected in Mexico are made up
from the salary of the poor soldier, resulting in such pitiful
outcries in the garrison as to arouse the greatest
compassion.21


12. Provision of Supplies in Florida
Formerly provisions for the presidio were supplied from
the Kingdom of New Spain on one or two vessels which also
transported uniforms and the balance of the money for the
payment of the garrison. Having experienced onr many
occasions that the delay [in the arrival] of the subsidies
due to shipwreck and other contingencies caused the
greatest necessity in the town, Lieutenant General Don
Antonio de Benavides described [to the king] the total
misfortune that had subjugated the troops and inhabitants,
and, because of the exigencies that occurred, asked
permission to transport provisions from the nearest
English ports. This His majesty conceded in a royal order
communicated by the Most Excellent Lord, Don Joseph
Patifno2 This measure brought much relief to the garrison
because it facilitated the supply of provisions. Since the
English provisions were at least half as expensive, the
soldiers were able to use the rest of their annual salary, 50,
60 or 70 pesos, to clothe their families and repair some of
the damages to their homes. On the contrary, they were
left with nothing when the provisions were transported
from New Spain, and as in the contract recently made with
the Havana Company, they lack the advantages that they
had before. I understand they are quite unhappy [with the
new arrangement] ?2


















Grfian Report 9

13. Reserve of Provisions
Considering the importance of Florida having a reserve of
provisions sufficient for its garrison, His Majesty ordered
the viceroy of New Spain to advance to the presidio the
sum of twelve thousand pesos which was considered
necessary for this supply. When the Havana Company was
in charge of assisting in the subsidy, it agreed, whenever
necessary, to advance the provisions for one year, but in
spite of these precautions, I understand that the populace
has suffered some scarcity.24
14. Urban Militia of Spaniards
Merchants, craftsmen, and other inhabitants form a
company of about 120 men, the officers of which are
appointed by the governor. Although they serve on many
occasions, suffering as much hardship as the regular
troops, they do not receive any salary, expense money, or
weapons.
15. Mestizos and Free Mulattoes
The mestizos and free mulattoes form a separate corps of
80 men. They are appointed when needed and are provided
with arms and ammunitions at the expense of the Real
Hacienda.
16. Christian Indians
There are 50 to 60 armed men in the Indian villages around
the town who serve on frequent expeditions, by regularly
accompanying the cavalry squads on patrols in the
vicinity.
17. Fortress of the Town
The main fortress, situated on the northern side of the
settlement, is built of mortar and hewn stone and is rather
strong, especially after the repairs which have been made,
including the vaulting of the storerooms and barracks
within the enclosure. The shape is square with four
bastions at the four angles. On [the bastions] and on the
four curtains are mounted almost forty cannon, most of
them iron, a few bronze, but some with less than half of
their expected serviceability. It has a good moat, a
covered way, and salients.25
18. Line that Faces the Northern Field
A line constructed of stakes, yuccas, and sod (very
sufficient as a parapet for the infantry) extends westward
from the fortress for almost one mile. It reaches as far as a


















10 El Escribano

creek, where at its shore is a small wooden bastion, named
the Cubo, [surrounded] by yuccas and [mounted] with
three falconets.26 In the middle of the line is another simi-
lar bastion which is called Medio Cubo. Each bastion has a
garrison composed of a corporal and three soldiers.27
19. Line of Circumvallation
Another line, made of the same materials as the one
mentioned above, extends from the Medio Cubo to encircle
the settlement, and has three other bastions of the same
type as those already referred to.2
20. Fort Saint Francis
At the southern end of the settlement where the line of
circumvallation ends, there is a mortar and hewn stone
fort which mounts five cannon and is garrisoned by a
corporal, three soldiers, and an artilleryman.29
21. The River: Its Floods and Abundance of Fish
The river is of sufficient depth to serve as a port for the
vessels. It washes against the eastern portion of the main
fortress and against Fort Saint Francis, making a beach to
the city which has been inundated many times by its rising
waters, especially when a northeaster agitates the sea?0
The river is abundant in fish, and along with corn, supports
many people of the city cheaply.
22. Bar of the Port
The bar of the port, situated four fifths of a league
southeast of the main fortress, ranges between 12 and 16
palmos of wafer at high tide. It changes with any small
storm because its bottom consists of loose sand.31
23. Scarcity of Fresh Meat in Florida and Method of
Supplying Some Cows and Horses
Raids of heathen Indians destroyed the many plantations
formerly in the provinces and ran off many of the cattle.
Despite the resulting scarcity of fresh beef, numerous
herds of cattle and wild and ferocious horses remained in
the region, some of which were caught annually in spring
by two or three mulattoes whose equipment expenses were
defrayed by some merchants of the city. These cattle, as
well as others that are slaughtered and sold by two or three
residents who maintain small ranches, supply the city on
several days of the year.
24. Quality of the Meat and Horses
The beef is very tasty and nutritious. The fat horses [reach
















Grfian Report 11


a height] of seven or more hand spans and are broken with
little effort. They are used in the cavalry company of the
presidio as pack horses and for other purposes.
25. Asses, Mules, Sheep, and Goats
There are no species of asses, mules, sheep, or goats, nor
do I have knowledge that there have ever been any in these
regions.
26. Inclinations, Vices, and Villages of the
Christian Indians
In the environs of Florida32 (but outside of the circum-
vallation line and under the cannon of the fortresses),
there are five small villages of Christian Indians from the
Yamasee Nation that are inhabited by up to one hundred
families.33 Their dwellings are small palm houses, much
distant from one another, and they plant corn and legumes
on their respective plots. But because of their limited
efforts at farming, for they do not put much effort into this
work, they produce only a very small harvest. They use
most of their time to hunt, for which they have more
inclination, and also to wage war. They are brave, but
greatly inclined to inebriety, consuming in this vice
whatever they earn from their hunting and even from the
fruits of their sowing.
27. Negro Village at Mose
A village one league north of Florida was formed by 45 or
50 Negroes who, anxious to embrace and follow the
Catholic Religion, came from the plantations of St.
George.34 There also was a small wooden and yucca fort
[mounted] with two or three stone-firing mortars which
the English overpowered in 1740 when they laid seige to the
presidio. They were beaten back and defeated by the
troops of the garrison, but the fortification and huts were
entirely destroyed.35
28. Picolata River and its Former Watchtower
A small wooden fort [mounted] with two or three
stone-firing mortars [and manned by] a sergeant and
eight garrison soldiers formerly was located five leagues
north of Florida on the edge of the Picolata River. Its
purpose was to guard against possible war parties of
infidel Indian troops and to allow the passage of couriers
and some small parties of people who were traveling to
Apalache. This fort and its garrison were tikn h', the

















12 El Escribano


English in 1740, who, upon retreating, completely
destroyed it along with two nearby cattle ranches
belonging to Don Antonio Regidor and Diego Espinosa.36
29. Small Forts in the Indian Villages
In the five Christian Indian villages there are several very
small wooden forts, each with three or four small cannon.
They are under the care of an artilleryman and provide
refuge and defense for the families in case of enemy
assault.
30. Matanzas Bar and Fortress
Matanzas Bar, located five leagues to the south of the bar
of the port, only permits the passage of such small vessels
as schooners and sloops, although provisions were brought
through here from Havana when [the English] laid siege
to Florida. To defend this entrance, a small mortar and
hewn stone fort was recently constructed, mounted with
some medium caliber cannon and garrisoned by a junior
officer or sergeant, six or eight soldiers, an artilleryman,
and two Indians who serve as couriers.37
31. St. Anastasia Island: Its Land and Watchtower
The Island of St. Anastasia lies to the east of the city and is
bounded on the north by the bar of the port, on the south by
the Matanzas Bar, on the east by the coast or mouth of the
Bahama Channel, and on the west by the river. This island
(which is five leagues long) produces many veins of good
quality stone, especially useful for fortifications since it
hardens when bound together with mortar. It has been
discovered that bullets striking these walls remain
embedded in them. occupying the same hole that made the
damage. A mortar and hewn stone watchtower is
maintained on the northern part of the island, from which
the coast can be surveyed from north to south for more
than three leagues in each direction. It always is
garrisoned by a corporal and three soldiers who are on
duty to sight vessels at a distance and to put the respective
signal over the tower to inform the presidio. A pilot boat is
immediately dispatched [from the town] to the bar for the
purpose of conducting the vessel into port. The land is not
suitable for sowing nor for the planting of trees. However,
in the western part of the island along the shore of the
river, some corn of good quality and different vegetables
are produced on a small plantation farmed by a resident of

















Grinan Report 13

the town with his slaves. [This farmer] also keeps several
cows for the production of his own milk and meat.38 All the
country of Florida suffers the plague of mosquitoes in the
summer, but there is an excessive abundance of these
insects on St. Anastasia Island. Near the watchtower is a
small spring of tasty water that is used for drinking by
some families of the city.
32. Presidio of Apalache
The wooden fort of San Marcos de Apalache, located about
eighty leagues west of Florida, [was armed] with ten or
twelve cannon and was garrisoned by a commanding
captain, 50 infantry soldiers, several artillerymen, and a
few Christian Indians who served as couriers. A discussion
about making this fortification stronger and more durable
led to the decision to construct it out of a type of stone that
is found in that vicinity at a depth of one or one and
one-half varas. When this stone is cut, it is pulled out soft
like recently made adobe, but when exposed to the sun and
air, it quickly assumes the consistency of good brick. Upon
completing the necessary survey, which I believe [was
done] by the Engineer of Havana Don Antonio de
Arredondo, the structure was planned, and construction
commenced and continued with fervor, but I do not know
whether it was continued after 1740.39 From correspon-
dence I know for certain that the presidio was destroyed
completely and the troops perished when a flood from the
sea dashed it to pieces. I have no news that it has been
rebuilt, but I suppose it is indispensable,
33. Country from Florida to Apalache Inspected by Two
Engineers and Project for Settlements
All the land from Florida to Apalache is flat, with many
rivers, swamps, and lakes. Although the surface is sandy,
it is extremely fertile, and when cultivated, produces the
same crops as the most fertile region in Spain. Formerly
there were many plantations in this territory which were
so abundant in products that wheat, barley, vegetables,
and other goods were exported to the Island of Havana. In
some places one still finds traces of buildings, fields and
plantings of fruit trees [as well as] numerous cows and
fierce, wild horses. Today all this land is abandoned and is
in the same condition as it was when, at the order of the
king, it was inspected in 1731 by two engineers and













14 El Escribano

Lieutenant General Don Antonio de Benavides, then
governor of these provinces. Upon their return they
prepared and sent to the crown a plan which proposed to
establish settlements and construct garrisoned forti-
fications for their defense. However, difficulties and
increasing costs made it impossible to put this plan into
practice.
34. Project of Don Manuel de Montiano
I understand that Field Marshal Don Manuel de Montiano,
former governor of the presidio, considered it possible,
and not costly to the Real Hacienda, to establish villages
from the St. Johns River (twelve leagues north of Florida)
to the town. I am convinced that his reports to the crown
resulted in His Majesty agreeing to permit the Havana
Company of Commerce to transport 500 families to form
ten towns, I do not know in what places, but I would deduce
that the royal order was in conformity with the proposal of
the cited Don Manuel de Montiano. Since the war with
England intervened at nearly the same time as the
establishment of the company, this obligation was
temporarily suspended, and I have not heard whether it
since has been fulfilled.
35. Project of a Resident of Florida
One long-time resident with considerable practical
knowledge in the country prepared and sent to the crown a
project that would facilitate the means of establishing
several settlements in the above area. [He suggested] that
His Majesty confer four or six Titles of Castile on wealthy
residents of New Spain who would obligate themselves to
pay the cost of [transporting] the families and establishing
the villages according to the prescribed regulations. This
idea has the support of many.40
36. Gratuity to the Indians
The Christian Indians and the heathen [Indians] who offer
friendship are rewarded annually with six thousand pesos
of goods which the natives esteem and use. The
merchandise, consigned by His Majesty, is distributed by
an administrator appointed by the governor and royal
officials41
37. Convict Laborers Employed on the Work of the
Fortifications of the Town
Fifty or sixty convict laborers are sent from the Kingdom


















Griian Report 15

of New Spain to work continually on the fortifications and
other tasks in the town. The two reales daily that His
Majesty ordered for their sustenance are claimed in the
subsidy as one of its supplemental accounts.
38. Junta de Guerra of the Town
The Junta de Guerra (Council of War) of the presidio is
composed of the governor, royal officials, the sergeant
major, captains, and junior officers of the garrison. When
the Junta discusses matters relative to the garrison
subsidy, contracts for provisions and other subjects which
are not purely military, they meet with the Auxiliary
Bishop of Havana who resides there or, in his absence,
with the parish priest and the guardian of the Saint
Francis Convent. All Junta de Guerra decisions on fiscal
matters are presented to the governor and royal officials
who, in their resolutions, determine the appropriate
action.42 Until 1754, the treasury was in the charge of two
royal officials, a contador (accountant) and a tesorero
(treasurer), but with the new regulations recently enacted
in the town, only the tesorero remains. [This official],
along with a senior and an assistant official and a supply
clerk, administers the office.
39. Heathen Indians: Regions They Inhabit
and Their Customs
The villages of the heathen Indians who inhabit the interior
provinces extend a hundred or more leagues from
Apalache, and from the west-northwest to the south, are
bordered by the provinces of the Chichimecas, Guastela,
and New Mexico. The lands they possess are like those of
Apalache and Florida, abundant in forests, livestock,
game and fowl, and with many rivers and lakes. No one
knows the number of villages and tribes that it comprises.
Several parties of Indians have come to the presidio to
ratify the friendship they had promised, including the
Uchizes, Yamasees, Talapuses, and Chickasaws. These
four, among others, are the most important and numerous
tribes in the region. The Indians are tall, somewhat brown
in color, brave, inclined to war, but cruel and prone to
drunkeness. Most of the time they live in the field either
warring or hunting. They dress in pelts, but all their
clothing consists only of a sleeveless hide that reaches
midway to the thigh, a strip of cloth or leather one tercia


















16 El Escribano

wide which covers the pubic parts, and boots and chamois
sandals for walking.43 They feed on bear, buffalo, deer
meat and corn cake, and when they lack these on their
journeys, they fill up on hearts of palm and different
nutritious roots. They paint their faces and bodies with
various subtle colors which they extract from plants. They
wage war in parties of 50, 70, 100 or more men, always by
ambush and never in the open. Some of them ask for
baptism, not out of religious conviction, but for the receipt
of the present the godparents customarily give. They have
an aversion to cultivating the fields, and they plant only a
little corn and some vegetables. Because of limited
cultivation, the production is not in proportion to the fertile
land. Many medicinal herbs are grown here, and among
them are some with marvelous efficacy for curing fever,
wounds, and spasms.44
40. Failure of the Friendship Pacts and
Frequent Unrest in Florida
Despite the gratuities given to them, the Florida Indians
(especially the Chickasaws) break the friendship pacts
they had contracted, making frequent incursions to within
view of the fortifications of the town. [On such raids] they
have taken and killed many men whom they found
hunting, fishing, or cutting firewood, and they have done
the same in the villages in the vicinity. To contain and
force them to keep their word, it was once thought possible
to wage a war on them in their own territories, using the
Indians from Canada or New France to assist the Florida
troops for this purpose. Upon hearing of this proposal by
the governor, His Majesty resolved not to change the
intercourse and friendship that existed with the [Indians].
41. St. Johns River
The St. Johns River, twelve leagues to the north of the
presidio, is a sizeable body of water which flows deeply
into the country. It is abundant in fish, and at certain times
of the year Florida fishermen go there to catch roe mullet.
On some occasions a concealed guard in a canoe has been
posted at those places where enemy Indians customarily
pass for the purpose of ascertaining if they are destined for
the town. I have heard that this land could be guarded and
defended with the construction of three or four small
fortifications on the shore of the river and with the
















Grirfif Report 17

increase of 50 horses in the garrison cavalry company.
42. Gualquini Bar
The Gualquini Bar,45 situated thirty leagues north of
Florida, is where, in 1741, the English constructed a
wooden fort to defend the port and where, I believe, at a
distance of two and one-half leagues, they established the
town they named Frederica. [The town] was inhabited by
60 or 80 families, although its size later increased
according to what they have written me. Although an
armed expedition that left from Havana and Florida in
1742 succeeded in overwhelming the port, destroying the
fortress and forcing its abandonment, the mentioned town
remained fortified and garrisoned. Some of its families
left, seeking better land for their crops, and made their
farms at places more suitable to them. They soon were
forced to return, however, when a party of our Indians
overtook and destroyed the blockhouse they had built on
the place named St. Simon, killing or taking prisoner 14
men, 3 women, and four children.6
This, Excellent Lord, to the best of my memory and with
some thought, is all I have been able to gather on the
matter. If I may humbly hope that this small work will
please Your Excellency, I will have the greatest
satisfaction that one can imagine. And if in some papers
that I am awaiting from Cadiz I can find the annotations I
made in Florida on the bars, rivers, and other places along
the northern coast, I will communicate immediately to
Your Excellency the information I can infer from them.
May God guard the Most Excellent Person of Your
Excellency as many years as I desire and need.
Madrid, July 7, 1756
At the Feet of Your Excellency
Pedro Sanchez Grinan
[Rubric]















El Escribano







/(




7- ~ /7r" /





























Last page of 1756 Grifin Report.

















Grfiian Report 19




NOTES

1. Juan Jose' Solana to Julian de Arriaga, St. Augustine, April 9, 1760,
Archivo General de Indias, Seville (hereafter cited as AGI) 86-7-21/41,
John B. Stetson Collection, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History,
University of Florida, Gainesville (hereafter cited as SC).
2. The original manuscript is in the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid,
MS 11.265 19. A microfilm copy can be found in the P.K. Yonge Library
of Florida History, Reel 141-P, Madrid. Biblioteca Nacional. Departamento
de Manuscritos. Dr. Scardaville and Mr. Belmonte collaborated on the
translation, although Dr. Scardaville is solely responsible for the intro-
ductory and editorial comments. The editors would like to thank Luis
R. Arana, Historian at the Castillo de San Marcos, for his assistance in
translating several key passages.
3. Ferdinand VI appointed Arriaga Secretary of State on July 22, 1754.
4. Junta de Guerra to Crown, Madrid, May 23, 1709, AGI 58-1-20/116,
Spanish Records Collection, North Carolina Department of Archives and
History, Raleigh.
5. Governor Manuel de Montiano and Royal Officials to Crown, St.
Augustine, May 22, 1742, AGI 58-2-13/5 (SC). Griia'n does not appear in
the military rosters of the period, although the above document describes
him as an alferez or ensign. Perhaps he was a reformado, a former soldier
who was called back to active duty by the governor to perform a particular
task for the crown. It is significant to note that the Junta selected Griinai
as a replacement for the original situador who had died before departing
for Mexico. Consequently circumstances forced the Council to hastily
accept a person-who was not currently a soldier, but who was familiar with
the needs of the colony and the workings of the subsidy system.
6. Governor Manuel de Montiano and Royal Officials to Cron, St.
Augustine, March 26, 1743, AGI 58-1-34/71 (SC); AGI, Contadura 962A,
No. 3. Grinan was in Veracruz during the month of August, 1742. One
arroba is equivalent to twenty-five pounds.
7. In addition to the crisis caused by the non-arrival of the subsidy, Governor
Montiano was planning to invade Georgia during the summer of 1742.
The English victory at Bloody Marsh coincided with Gri-aln's arrival in
Mexico. John Jay TePaske, The Governorship of Spanish Florida,
1700-1763 (Durham, N.C., 1964), pp. 146-152.
8. Mark Frederick Boyd and Jose Navarro Latorre, "The Presidio of San
Augustine (sic) de la Florida: Remote Outpost of the Viceroyalty of New
Spain," 2 vols., Unpublished MS in P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History
(Tallahassee, 1967), II: 245.
9. A presidio, one of the principal frontier institutions, is generally defined as
a fortified settlement designed to secure travel routes, protect lines of


















20 El Escribano

communications, and impede invasions of hostile Indians and enemy
European powers. Numerous presidios were scattered along Spain's
frontier in North America, and, as with St. Augustine, permanent towns
frequently developed around these settlements.
10. Grin-an describes the 16th century boundaries of Florida, overlooking the
English settlements along the eastern seaboard of the continent. He
chooses to ignore both the 1670 Treaty of Madrid in which Spain and
England established boundaries in the southeast and the subsequent
English incursions and settlements into Spanish Guale or Georgia. See
Herbert E. Bolton and Mary Ross, The Debatable Land (Berkeley, 1925)
for an elaboration on the English preemption of the southeast.
11. In 1740, an English spy calculated that there were about 300 houses in the
city, a more realistic estimate in my opinion. Albert Manucy, The Houses
of St. Augustine, 1565-1821 (St. Augustine, 1962), p. 28. Grinan's
comments on the "few" coquina houses perhaps indicates that most of the
construction in stone took place between the War of Jenkins' Ear
(1740-42) and the evacuation of St. Augustine in 1764 when 36 percent
of the houses were built of this material. Juan Joseph Elixio de la Puente,
"Plano de la Real Fuerza, Baluartes, y Linea de la Plaza de San Agustin
de la Florida ...." St. Augustine, January 22, 1764. Copy in Historic St.
Augustine Preservation Board, St. Augustine, Florida.
12. One Spanish vara is approximately 2.75 English feet or 33 inches.
13. The site of the parish church, Nuestra Se ora de la Soledad, is on a vacant
lot across from St. Joseph's Academy on St. George St.
14. Throughout this report the "last war" refers to the 1740-42 War of
Jenkins' Ear.
15. The report has comparatively little information on religious matters, and
justifiably so, since Arriaga at this time was not as concerned with this
topic. Grinan, for example, does not mention the arrival of the Auxiliary
Bishop of Cuba which sparked a religious revival in the colony nor does he
discuss the criollo-Spanish rift within the Franciscan Order which
ultimately undermined the regular clergy in Florida. See Michael V.
Gannon, The Cross in the Sand (Gainesville. 1965), pp. 78-82.
16. The hospital was attached to the dilapidated La Soledad parish church.
William M. Straight, "Medicine in St. Augustine During the Spanish
Period," Journal of Florida Medical History 55 (August 1968): p. 737.
17. The 400 reinforcements actually arrived in 1738. Cuban Governor Giemes
also sent 6,000 pesos which Governor Montiano used to construct the
new barracks. TePaske, pp. 138-139. The defense line Grinian refers to is
the Cubo line.
18. Montiano was governor from 1737-1749.
19. Benavides was governor from 1718-1734.
20. The inherent weakness in the judicial system in Florida was the lack of an
experienced legal advisor to assist the governor in the administration of
justice. The governors were without exception men with a long military
background who were unable to handle the complexities of legal

















Griiian Report 21

procedures in the civilian courts. See TePaske, pp. 58-76.
21. The failure to establish an adequate annual supply system was the most
critical problem facing all Florida governors. Reform of the system in
1702 (when the subsidy was thenceforth financed by the alcabalas of
Puebla in Mexico) and again in 1740 (when the newly-created Havana
Company was obligated to supply Florida with its annual quota of supplies
and money) failed to correct the chronic problems of delays, high prices
and poor quality of goods, and the occasional disappearance or seizures of
the subsidy ships. Moreover, as Grinin states, the specie, most of which
went to pay the soldiers, often was consumed by non-authorized expenses.
Mexican treasury officials frequently refused to reimburse these
expenditures since they either complained of a lack of money themselves
or disallowed on legal technicalities the certificados (certified statements)
which the Florida governors submitted to justify the reimbursement. For
an excellent summary of the situado system, see TePaske, pp. 77-91 and
97-103.
22. Patifo was Philip V's Secretary of State for the Navy and the Indies from
1726-1736. This royal order temporarily overrode the existing laws
prohibiting trade with the English colonies.
23. Grina'n neglects to mention here, as in other places, the controversial
Francisco del Moral Sanchez, governor of Florida from 1734-37. Illegal
trade with Charleston and New York merchants reached unprecedented
levels during his administration, although all governors in the late First
Spanish Period relied upon the English goods. See Joyce Elizabeth
Harman, Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida, 1732-1763 (St.
Augustine, 1969).
24. The contingency fund of 12,000 pesos first was established in 1731 and
reiterated in the ordinances of the Havana Company nine years later.
Usually the emergency fund was either quickly exhausted or never was
sent to the colony. TePaske, pp. 95-97.
25. The Castillo de San Marcos was constructed between 1672 and 1695,
although major alterations took place in 1739 and 1755-56. Grinman
describes the vaulting of the east side of the fortress. Luis Rafael Arana
and Albert Manucy, The Building of Castillo de San Marcos (Philadelphia,
1977), pp. 25-36, 43-46, and 51-52.
26. A falconet is a type of a small cannon,
27. The Cube line, built to supplement the defenses of the Castillo, was
constructed within two years after Governor James Moore of Carolina laid
siege to and leveled the city in 1702. This east-west palisade, with its
three bastions, ran along present-day Orange St. for a distance of less
than one-half mile, not one mile as Grinan states. The Medio Cubo was
located in the vicinity of the current Ketterlinus Junior High School.
28. Griftan's memory fails him to a greater extent in this section. The line
of circumvallation, or the Rosario line, commenced not at the Medio Cubo,
but at the Santo Domingo bastion which was located at the current inter-
section of Orange and Cordova Streets. Moreover, there were twice


















22 El Escribano

as many redoubts along the southern extension of the Rosario line than
Gri-an enumerated. Antonio de Arredondo, "Plan de la Ciudad de San
Agustin de la Florida ...," Havana, May 15, 1737 in Verne E. Chatelain,
The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565 to 1763 (Washington, D.C., 1941),
Map 10. With the completion of the Rosario line in 1719, defense lines
surrounded St. Augustine on its three landed sides.
29. Technically, Fort St. Francis was not a fort, but the southeasternmost
bastion along the Rosario line. It was located to the east of the present-
day intersection of Marine and San Salvadore Streets.
30. Floods plagued the city throughout the colonial period, despite the flimsy
wall built by Governor Canzo in the late 16th century. On an inspection of
Florida in 1674, Bishop Calderon of Cuba commented that the river
"buffets" the town, "leaving it half submerged from hurricanes as it lies at
sea level." A coquina seawall was to be built in the 1690s which was to
extend the entire length of the settlement. Insufficient funds, however,
permitted the construction of the new barrier only from the Castillo to
the plaza, and consequently, the southern portion of the town remained
exposed to the storm tides during Grinan's tenure in St. Augustine.
Chatelain, pp. 79, 157-158 note 4, and 161 note 25. Also see the cited
1737 Arredondo and 1764 Puente maps.
31. One league is approximately 2.6 miles, and one palmo is the equivalent of
8.23 inches. The port bar historically has posed a danger to vessels
entering and leaving the shallow inlet leading into the harbor. One method
of reducing the risk of shipwreck was to unload the supply ships at the
-mouth of the bar and transport the cargo to the wharves on small
launches. TePaske, p. 101.
32. In this and succeeding sections, Florida refers to St. Augustine.
33. The number of Indian villages around St. Augustine, most of them
inhabited by the displaced Yamasee tribe of Carolina and Georgia, steadily
decreased in the late First Spanish Period. From a high of ten villages
with 1,000 Indians in 1726, the number of neighboring settlements
dropped to two, Tolomato and La Punta, in the 1750s and early 1760s, and
the number of inhabitants dipped below 100. Nothing shows the failure of
Spain's Indian policy in the southeast in the mid-18th century more
dramatically than the declining number of Indian villages "under the
cannon of the fortresses." Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier,
1670-1732 (Ann Arbor, 1956), pp. 267-268; "Reglamento para el
Presidio de San Augustin de la Florida .. .," Mexico City, April 8, 1753,
AGI, Cuba 372, fols. 10-11; Puente to Governor of Cuba, Havana, May 8,
1770, AGI, Santo Domingo 2595.
34. In an effort to undermine the English at St. George (Charleston), the
Spanish crown in 1733 offered freedom to all slaves who escaped the
English settlements and adopted Roman Catholicism in Florida. As more
slaves fled to the Spanish colony, Governor Montiano in 1739 settled them
in the fortified village known as Santa Teresa de la Gracia Real de Mose.
"The Mose Site," El Escribano 10 (April 1973): pp. 52-53.




Full Text

PAGE 1

Digitized with the permission of the FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD SOURCE DOCUMENT ADVISORY Digital images were created from printed source documents that , in many cases , were photocopies of original materials held elsewhere . The quality of these copies was often poor . Digital images reflect the poor quality of the source documents. Where possible images have been manipulated to make them as readable as possible . In many cases such manipulation was not possible . Where available, the originals photocopied for publication have been digitized and have been added, separately , to this collection. Searchable text generated from the digital images, subsequently, is also poor . The researcher is advised not to rely solely upon text-search in this collection. RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS Items collected here were originally published by the Florida National Guard, many as part of its SPECIAL ARCHIVES PUBLICATION series. Contact the Florida National Guard for additional information . The Florida National Guard reserves all rights to content originating with the Guard. DIGITIZATION Titles from the SPECIAL ARCHIVES PUBLICATION series were digitized by the University of Florida in recognition of those serving in Florida's National Guard, many of whom have given their lives in defense of the State and the Nation.

PAGE 2

I Department of Military Affairs Florida National Guard f'"".' 1~, =' ' 1 1 i I J The Military and Militia in Colonial Spanish America St. Augustine, Florida

PAGE 3

POST OFFICE BOX 1008 STATE ARSENAL, ST. AUGUSTINE 32085-1008 While selecting the articles of Luis Arana from previous issues of El Escribano, several other articles by different authors surfaced which seemed especially appropriate readings for this conference and are included in this second booklet. To provide an overview of Florida's Spanish history, three chapters were excerpted and are inc l uded from "Florida's Army: Mi I itia, State Troops, National Guard 1565-1985." As the activities of Florida's living history and re-enactment groups are so i mportant to the ongoing celebration of our Spanish Heritage, informa l reports or guides for I iving history activists on two periods of Spanish Florida history is also included. ' I, Chapters Two, Three and Five from "Florida's Army: Mi I itia, State Troops, Nationa l Guard 1565-1985'' Robert Hawk (Englewood: Pineapple Press, 1986) 2. St. Augustine's Mi I itary Society 1700-1820 (Juan Marchena Fernandez: translated and adapted by Luis Arana) 3. The Defense Structure of East Florida 1700-1820 (Juan Marchena Fernandez) 4. Florida in the Late First Spanish Period: The 1756 Grlnan Report (Michael Scardavi I le and Jesus Maria Belmonte) 5. Spanish Troops of 15651586 (Robert Hal I) (Out I ine guide for I iving history participants of Spanish 1 565 period) 6. E l Vestuario de los Soldados del Presidio de San Agust i n en 1740 (A guide for -uniforms and equipment associated with I iving history re-enactors, Spanish Florida 1740 period. (National Park Service)

PAGE 4

Chapter Two SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1565-1700 Florida: the warm and sunny recreational capital of the United States, with Disney \Vorld and nearly two thou sand miles of beaches and hotels. Florida: home to mil lions of all ages and nationalities, and the second fastest growing state in the American republic. It hasn't always been this way. For much of its history since Columbus opened the New World, Florida was a desolate, unheal thy and isolated place. It was inhabited by Indian tribes. myriads of dangerous insects and beasts of the forest and swamp. The soil was poor. It had debilitating weather and was colonized by a handful of Spanish sol diers, priests, civilians, slaves, and convicts entrusted with the task of holding this vast and unpleasant pen insula for Spain and the Empire. Florida is a long and generally flat peninsula hang ing off the southeastern corner of the North American continent. Florida is slightly larger in area than England and Wales combined. Its long coastline is indented with many bays and river outlets, the interior heavily forested with dense subtropical vegetation. Large areas are, or were, covered by great swamps. With its poor soil, and the absence of precious metals or anything else of real natural value, it might have remained an unoccupied fringe territory within Spain's great American empire. But it had significant strategic value for the protection of the empire that would lead to its settlement and to the many wars for its protection. Huge fleets of Spanish ships, filled with the incre dible wealth of Mexico and Peru, formed in Havana and 13 sailed for home through the Bahamian Channel be tween Florida's east coast and the Bahama Island chain to the east. As the principal source of Spanish power, these ships and their wealth had to be protected. Should any hostile power control the Channel, Spain would suf fer catastrophic consequences. For the first fifty years following its discovery, Florida's potential remained unexploited by Spain or her many enemies. While it was the transit point for several continental exploration ex peditions, and did receive the usual attentions of sol diers and missionary priests, nothing permanent resulted. It was not until the French established a settle ment near today's Port Royal, South Carolina, that Spanish fears and interest were aroused. Although the settlem~nt at Port Royal quickly failed, rumors of a more substantial settlement to be established by the French near the mouth of the St. Johns River (today's Jackson ville) finally galvanized the Spanish court into effective action. A military settlement of hostile and heretic French Huguenots, virtually at the mouth of the Ba hamian Channel, could not be ignored. Phillip II of Spain authorized and partially paid for the creation of a substantial fleet to carry both colonists and soldiers under the command of Spain's most prom inent admiral, Pedro Menendez de Aviles. He was to proceed to Florida, eject the French, and establish a permanent military colony on the east coast of the pen insula to ensure the future protection of this vital flank of Spain's New-World empire.

PAGE 5

FLORIDA'S ., .,-RMY ~. i1 Ptdro Mr111,.,uil': de .-.. -/ __ .,_ . , J::iUiH.•ttttti r.1 1 1 e.1. (C iu= ..... ..,..-" ,ourtesy of the St .\ ' ,,-ug-ust' , . me H1stori .. l S . ca , oc1ety.) 14

PAGE 6

SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1565-1700 '::.<• . : ~ \ \. _: ?, ' _ . : ~:: . < : , ,:. ; ~ ' ' < < <, ..,,_ ',, FLORIDA MILITIA, 1565: As there were no standard military unifonns in 16th-century Florida, Regulars and Militia alike dressed to individual taste and preference . Each man was armed according to circumstances and mission . General(v, the Regulars had the best arms and equipment. For the frontier warfare of the period, the crossbow, arque&us and sword w(th minimum armor were considered most suitable. (From a painting by Robert HaHof St. Augustine.) The French won the race. Under the command of the very capable Jean Ribault, the French established Fort Caroline near the mouth of the St. Johns River. When Menendez arrived, his forces much reduced by storms and bureaucratic delays, he found himself out manned and outgunned. He took his ships and men to a small inlet and harbor some thirty-five miles south of the French settlement. This location's main advantage was a sandbar which protected the harbor entrance and would prevent, or delay, the entrance of all but the smallest of hostile ships. On the eighth of September, 1565, Menendez went ashore and formally established St. Augustine, now the oldest permanent European set tlement on the North American continent. However, at the moment of its foundation, St. Au gustine's longevity as a settlement was certainly not ap parent to anyone. The French were knownto be on their way with a large fleet and more than enough soldiers to overwhelm the Spanish force. A huge tropical storm moved into the area. Knowing the storm would delay the French and also conceal his own movements, Menendez decided to move at once against the French fort. On the 16th of September, 1565, Menendez and nearly all of his 500 soldiers began a rain-d_renched march northward.

PAGE 7

FLORIDA'S ARMY ROUTES OF SPAIN'S ARMADAS To Spain ........ I I . . . .. ............. -~ .. .. -~ . . . . ........... .: ,.-_.,...... •. . 1 . . Santiago .. •. r:e---_f"-Santo Domingo \ "---'"'> '3/ ~SanJgan 0,i11- •. ":.. II f'l"Ot'l\ ~:. . . . . . . . . . ... b ..•.••..... . . \ 8 () Ji th-century map depicting the trade routes of Spanish-America. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Historical Society.) This was also the "birth date" of North America's oldest militia tradition. Since he took almost all of his regular soldiers with him, the "useless" civilian settlers left be hind were, by law, designated milicia and made respon sible for protecting the new settlement. This first of Florida's militia forces numbered less than fifty men and, as they were not challenged militarily, they would prove sufficient. The Spanish assault on the poorly garrisoned French fort, unexpected because of the storm, was en tirely successful. Most of the resident women and chil dren were spared but nearly all of the garrison was killed. Leaving the majority of his soldiers behind to oc cupy his newly conquered and named Fort San Mateo, l\lenendez returned to St. Augustine. The storm had done the Spanish another favor. It had wrecked all the French ships on the barrier islands south of the new settlement of St. Augustine. The survivors were reported by friendly local Indians to be coming northward up the island beaches. With only 50 soldiers and very few supplies to sustain the tiny outpost of empire, Menendez was faced with a momentous de cision. He did what he considered necessary to insure the survival of his new colony. The trapped and desti tute Frenchmen, blocked in their northward advance by an unfordable ocean inlet, surrendered and were brought to the Spanish side of the water where, except for the professed Catholics among them, they were all slain. 200 the first day and another 150 the second, in cluding Jean Ribault himself. A later expedition to the wreck sites netted the few remaining Frenchmen. They were allowed to live, being transported to prison in Ha vana. To this day the inlet across which the doomed Frenchmen were carried is called Matanzas. which means "slaughter" in Spanish. The new settlement's existence was to remain ten

PAGE 8

SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1565-li00 16th-century map depicting the Drake attack on St. Augustine, 1586. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Historical Society.) uous for much of the next two centuries. Being on the edge of the empire, it remained one of the last places in Spanish America to receive supplies, money, or rein forcements. Officially stretching from today's Miami to the Chesapeake Bay, Florida was protected by a military force that rarely numbered more than three hundred regular soldiers and a few dozen militia. This miniscule force had to man coastal watchtowers, aid shipwreck victims, put down Indian insurrections, and fight the pirates of several nations. Always threatened, several times invaded in force, even twice burned to the ground, St. Augustine and Florida survived for two cen turies as a bastion of Spanish power only to fall to the pen of a treaty rather than the sword of an invader. Administratively Florida was a military province with St. Augustine as its presidia or headquarters. It was a form of military province where the governor was both head of the military garrison and of the local civil government. As a colony Florida wasn't terribiy popular, or successful, in attracting new colonises. Its relative iso lation, unattractive climate, and general poverty re pelled ,nost potential settlers. Still, enough came, or were sent, to maintain the province in its precarious ex istence. Even so, Florida wasn't close to being economi callv self-sufficient. It survived on the annual situado, cash and kind subsidy provided by the Imperial Spanish government. The size of the situado was based on the number of soldiers in the garrison, roughly 300 men on average. The local militia was not counted even though it was essential for the overall defence of the province. The small regular garrison in Florida was rarely up to full authorized strength. There was, however, always the militia or milicia. In Spanish military provinces all able-bodied men were automatically considered pare of the local militia, a form of enrolled militia. The govern ment also encouraged formation of volunteer militia

PAGE 9

FLORIDA'S ARMY Detail from a 16/h-centur)' map depicti11g the Drake attack 011 St. Augustine. 1586. Spanish Militia and Regular s fight a reguard action against Drake's pirates. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Historical Societv . ) companies. For most of the first 200 years of settlement of Florida, which meant St. Augustine, the near con stant threats posed by the Indians, pirates, and heretic colonies to the north created a permenant need for all the military force that could be mustered. Volunteer mi litia companies existed from at least 1671; because of the frequent need to employ the volunteer and enrolled militia. little distinction was made between the two. There were several volunteer militia companies. One was composed of those men born in Spain or of Spanish parents. From the earliest days there was also a rnlunteer company composed of free black residents and also, one of Christianized Indians. Even sla,es. con ,icts, and stranded sailors or shipwreck victims could legally be impressed into the militia. Militiamen re cei\'ed regular pay for active service and for most train ing and drill days. The white militia companies normally provided their own weapons and such uniforms as they chose to wear. Unless they had priYate means . Indians, blacks , and all other enrolled or im pressed militiamen received their weapons from the government. Due to the general unattractiveness of duty in Flor ida. recruits and replacements for the regular garrison rarely arrived on time or in full strength . In result. the best of the local militiamen were taken into the regular garrison companies. In spite of an Imperial Spanish law which prohibited more than IO to 15 percent of a gar rison to be from local families, the garrison at St. Au gustine generally drew 30 to 40 percent ofits strength from local sources . This was illegal, but necessarv. In spite of this constant drain of its best men imo the reg ulars. the local militia survived and saw considerable service throughout the first period of Spanish occupa tion in Florida. The first major test of the Spanish Florida garrison .

PAGE 10

SPANISH FLORIDA COi'\:QCEST . -\ND DHENSE 1565-liOO As the English were to discover, cannonballs could not split or crack the coquina stone of Castillo de San Marcos. regular and militia. was a disaster. The small settle ment, containing approximately 300 persons in total. was attacked by an English pirate fleet commanded by Francis Drake in 1586. Drake had more than 2000 men. After a brief skirmish, during which the Spanish regu lars and militia managed co kill twenty of Drake's men. the Spanish were forced co withdraw to the woods west of St. Augustine. Drake proceeded co loot and burn the tiny settlement and then reembarked co continue his de predations elsewhere. At the very end of the 16th century, in 1597, there was a major Indian rebellion in the lands to the north of St. Augustine. To quell the disturbance required the services of all of Florida's soldiers, regular and militia. During the first half of the 17th century, the Spanish es tablished an extensive system of Indian missions and garrison settlements in Florida's interior from St. Au gustine to today's Tallahassee. Howe\'er, from the mid dle of that century onwards, a ruinous backcountry war promoted by the English colonists in the Carolinas gradually destroyed this colonizing and missionary ef fort. Virtually all of Florida's indigenous Indian popu lation was killed, died of European diseases, or were taken north as slaves. Florida's interior would remain largely unpopulated for most of the next century. Between 1565 and 1672, St. Augustine was pro tected by a series of nine wooden forts. These were es sential to help Florida's soldiers assigned to protect the fragile colony. The first fort was destroyed by Drake; the others, in their turn, succumbed co the insects and trop ical rot associated with Florida ' s climate. Other wooden stockades were located at numerous locations through out the province. Each of these, in turn, was captured or rotted away. In 1668, the ninth wooden fort, a much repaired and inadequate structure, was all that was available co protect St. Augustine and its people when a large band of English pirates landed in the cit\ late one May evening. Sixty city residents. men. women and chil dren, were slaughtered, more than two dozen kid napped. The remainder of the settlemems residents repaired to the old wooden fort. The pirates looted and burned the city and demanded ransom for their cap tives. With difficulty, the ransom was paid. the captives rescued. The pirates sailed away. This pirate raid, and the establishment of an Eng lish settlement at Charleston in 1670. finallv convinced the government in Spain of the need to finance the con struction of a stone fortress to protect its Florida colony. Work on Castillo de San Marcos began in 1672. It was built of local coquina scone , quarried on the island across the bay from the city. Coquina stone is a material composed of an accretion of tiny seashells: compacted and waterlogged it's and easy to quarry. When dried. coquina becomes a stone of incredible durability. It is al most like some kind of stone sponge. As the English were to 9iscover, cannonballs could not split or crack the stone; they merely caused small dents and rolled into the moat. Except for the gradual disappearence of the original plaster coating to protect it from moisture damage, Castillo de San Marcos sun-ives even the tour ists of today. Work on the fort continued slowly. There was a dearth of skilled labor and monev. which. if it ar rived at all from Mexico, was always lat~. The principal exterior walls, much as they appear today, however, were in place by 1696. Additional outworks, interior bomb proofs, and other improvements were added over the next few decades. The important work on the walls was completed none too soon. The European War of the Spanish Succession in 1700 spread to the New World and co one of its most isolated outposts, Spanish Florida. 19

PAGE 11

Chapter Three SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1700-1763 The rapid growth and spread of the English colonies to the north had been a source of concern and occasional conflict to the Spanish in Florida since the middle of the seventeenth century. The English sponsored raids on Spanish settlements, and the Spanish retaliated with raids of their own. This backcouncry war, as previously noted, had led to the virtual depopulation of interior Florida. By 1700, Spanish authority extended no fur ther northward than today's Florida-Georgia border. In reality, Spanish power extended only a cannon shot's distance from its new fort at St. Augustine. In 1702, the English launched a major invasion of Spanish Florida. This force was commanded by James Moore, colonial governor of the Carolinas. He had six hundred soldiers and militia plus about three hundred Indians. A part of this invasion force, under Captain James Daniel, came down the St. Johns River. It landed west of St. Augustine and marched overland to provide the forces necessary to besiege the fort from the land side and also to capture and occupy the city itself. Gov ernor Moore, with the rest of the troops, arrived by sea and anchored his eight schooners inside the bar, today's Salt Run. He set up his camp and the siege cannon on Anastasia Island, directly across the bay from the Cas tillo San Marcos. As the city had no separate defense works of its own, all the inhabitants joined the soldiers and militia within the walls of the fort. Fifteen hundred men, women, and children were crammed within the confines of the coquina walls. Included in this total were 230 reg ular and militia soldiers and approximately one hundred Indian militia. These 330-odd soldiers, mili tia, and Indians represented the entire defense force of Spanish East Florida. Still, they had the new fort and they were able to send word of their plight by a small, fast ship to Havana. It would be enough to ensure their . survival. The English had badly underestimated the strength of the fort and overestimated their ability to successfully lay siege to and capture it. Their numbers were too few and their cannon inadequate. They settled down to a long siege and awaited the arrival of larger cannon from Jamaica. There were several sharp skir mishes when the Spanish soldiers and militia sallied forth from the fort to destroy nearby homes which of fered protection to the English. The siege became a waiting game, the English waiting for the big cannon and the Spanish for help from Cuba. The Spanish pa tience was rewarded first. A Spanish battle force arrived from Havana bringing troops and supplies. The Eng lish ships were trapped in the bar inlet. Governor Moore had no choice; he burned his ships, abandoned his cannon and larger stores, and fled cross-country back to the Carolinas. Before they departed, the Eng lish totally destroyed the small city, burning every house and pulling down the walls of the few stone structures in town. The first great invasion of Florida from the north was over, but everyone presumed there would be more.

PAGE 12

FLORIDA'S A~MY ~~/~~i\f:,: . ~ . ' __ , .

PAGE 13

i Sl~i\NISH FLORIDA CONQUEST ,\ND Dr:FE'.'JSE liOO-lit>,1 Handing Jenkins his ear, Fandino remarked, "Take this to your king and tell him if he were here, I would do the same to him. H The Spanish had learned several lessons from this northern invasion. Although their new fort had done well, the English bombardments did point up the desir ability of adding additional bombproofs within the walls and of higher exterior walls to minimize the dam age caused by cannon and musket fire at short range. Also, unless they were willing to have the city burned down every time an invading army laid siege to the fort, the city needed defensive walls and bastions of its own. During the next few decades all of these necessary changes and additions were made to the city's defenses. It would be a far stronger position to take the next time the . English ventured south. There were many causes for the sporadic conflict between Spanish Florida and the English colonies to the north , especially after the settlement of Georgia under the leadership of James Oglethorpe. There were rival land claims, conflicting Indian and overseas trade poli cies, occasional problems with piracy and with Indian revolts and raids. Of course, there were the age-old re ligious differences , but they lacked the power to moti vate hatred now as they had in years past. The most annoying point of conflict between the two cuhures con cerned slaves. A great many black slaves ran from the English colonies to Spanish Florida. Once there, most disappeared into the interior to live alone or with the Indians. But some, accepting Catholic baptism, settled in and around St. Augustine itself. Slave-owners, or their agents, would come to Florida and demand the re turn of these runaways. The Spanish authorities re fused to recognize their demands. They agreed to pay some compensation but argued that the converted blacks were now considered free citizens under Spanish law, no longer subject to the laws of the English. A large number of these former slaves even had their own town, Santa Teresa de la Gracia Real de Mose.just north of the city. The men of this small town were armed and equipped as militiamen. They even had their own offi cers and a small fort for their protection, Fort Mose. The English were enraged over this flagrant violation of property rights and were appalled by the existence of armed blacks so close to their own settlements and plan tations, the nearest a mere 35 miles away. Colonel John Palmer of the Carolina Militia, in 1728, accompanied by a small force of militia and Indians. invaded Florida. After killing a number of local Spanish Christian Indians, and stealing as many cattle and horses as he could locate. he returned to the Car olinas. The Spanish were unable to stop him and could only respond bv launching several raids of their own into Georgia and the Carolinas. By the lace 1730s. it was apparent that open warfare couldn't be far awav: oniy an appropriate spark was needed to sec it off. The necessary spark was provided by a Spanish sea captain. Juan de Leon Fandino. During the course of his privateering activities against English shipping which was operating in violation of Spanish trade laws and Spanish-English treaty provisions , Fandino stopped the English brig Rebecca of Glasgow. The ship was way off its stated course and the manifest was wildly inac curate. Some back talk by the brig's master , a Captain Jenkins, prompted Fandino to slice off one of Jenkins ears. Handing it to Jenkins Fandino remarked, "Take this to your king and tell him if he were here, I would do the same to him . " Eventually, Jenkins, and his ear, ap peared before the English Parliament and war against Spain was duly declared. To the English, it was to be, what else, the "War of Jenkins' Ear." To the Spanish, it was "la Guerra del A.siento de los Negros," the war over the contract for the Negroes. (The English had been fla grantly violating their treaty with Spain concerning the importation of blacks into Spanish America.) This new war would provide an excuse for another English colon ial invasion of Spanish Florida. Anticipating an invasion by the English and having barely ~even hundred regular soldiers and militia with which to defend Florida , Governor Manuel de Montiano asked for and received some reinforcements from Ha vana. Six half-galleys manned by 120 sailors and filled with supplies, arrived from Cuba just before the Eng lish closed in on the city. (Three of the galleys were com manded by none other than Juan de Leon Fandino himself.) The English invasion began with probing attacks against outlying Spanish outposts south of the St. Johns River in December of 1739. One English force of militia and Indians, under Lieutenant Dunbar of the Georgia Militia, beseiged the small Spanish fort at Picolata on the river. The seven defending Spanish soldiers held out until nightfall and then slipped away to rejoin the prin

PAGE 14

FLORIDA'S ARMY 18th-century ma/> def>icti11g tlw English allack and siege against St. Augu.stine, 1740. (Courtesy of lhe St. Augusline Historical Society.)

PAGE 15

SP.<\NISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE 1700-1763 CAROLINIANS nm SIEGE OF 1740 Siege of St. Augustint , Ii40. (Drawn by Robert Hall of St. Augustine.) cipal Spanish garrison. Another contingent of English soldiers and colonial militia attacked and siezed Fort Diego, an outpost some fifteen miles north of St. Au gustine. The main English forces, under Georgia's gov ernor and founder, James Oglethorpe, waited the arrival of the English ships to support his attack and, when they arrived, then moved rapidly upon the city and its defenses. When Oglethorpe's army closed in on the Spanish defenses, it numbered approximately 1400 men, exclud ing sailors in the supporting fleet. His land force in cluded English Regulars, Georgia and Carolina militia, Scots Highlanders, and representatives of several In dian tribes hostile to the Spanish. It wasn't until early June, 1740, that the English ships arrived carrying can non and supplies. Oglethorpe had hoped to rush the Spanish defenses, but the ships could noc get over the bar which lay at the entrance to the harbor of St. Au gustine. It would be another siege. The cannon were landed and the ships took up positions at Matanzas Inlet, as well as at the St. Augustine bar, to prevent sup plies or reinforcements from reaching the Spanish Flor ida garrison. The English cannon were established on the tips of Anastasia Island and today's Vilano Point, immediately across the harbor from the Castillo de San Marcos. Both batteries were sited co bombard the city and the fort. A contingent of colonial militia, Highlanders, English Regulars, and Indians was sent to occupy the undetended black fort at Mose.just north of the city. Once his men were in position and his batteries sited, Oglethorpe ordered the bombardment to com mence. The bombardment had little effect on the city and none at all on the fort. The fort's coquina stone walls absorbed the initial shock of the shot which then merely rolled down into the moat. The defenders re trieved the shot at night and fired them back at the Eng lish the following day. The Spanish cannon were much more effective, displacing several English batteries and enormously slowing their rate offire. Still, the Spanish were in trouble. They had sup plies sufficient only for a few more weeks. Believing the best defense is a good offense, the Spanish fought back. Noting that the English positions were separated from each other by bodies of water and could not be mutually reinforced easily or quickly,the Spanish decided to chop off one appendage of the English Army. In the early hours of June 26, 1740, a force of Spanish Regulars, dragoons, and black, Indian, convict, and urban militia slipped out of the fort and successfully assaulted the English garrison at Fort Mose . Of the approximately Ft Diego Castillo de San Marcos Spanish East Florida, 17 38. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Hiscorical Society.) 25

PAGE 16

i FLORIDA'S ARMY .. ,. . ,.:. --'---...:_.--';c._ ___ ...,__:__ ~,. , ~ ... . "": " _. ...,..--FLORIDA Ml LIT/A, 1740: Ry the e
PAGE 17

SPANISH FLORIDA CONQUEST AND DEFENSE li00-lifi3 135 men in the English Mose garrison, only about two dozen were not killed or captured by the Spanish assault force. The Spanish admitted losing ten men. It was a devastating defeat for the English. The English bombardment continued. Oglethorpe even asked for the Spanish to surrender, which request, considering their victory at Mose, they refused. Morale in the English camp plummeted. Nature added its quota of problems for the besiegers. The Florida cli mate, insect life, and befouled water caused widespread sickness in the English camps. The desertion rate among the English colonials skyrocketed. And then Spanish ships evaded the English blockade bringing fresh supplies and reinforcements to the beleagured garrison. The captain of the English support fleet an nounced to Oglethorpe he was withdrawing his ships to avoid being caught on a lee shore during the approach ing hurricane season. That did it. Oglethorpe had no choice. Abandoning much of his equipment and all his cannon, he crossed to the mainland and, with what re mained of the invasion force, walked back to Georgia. But the best defense is not always a good offense as the Spanish were soon to learn. In the early summer of 1742, having received substantial reinforcements, Gov ernor Montiano invaded Georgia. After landing his reg ular and militia forces on St. Simon's Island on the coast of that English colony, a portion of his small army sufCastillo de San Marcos, St. Augustine. fered a defeat in an English ambush. After a period of planning and contemplation, and after accepting as true false intelligence planted by the English-that they were converging on the Spanish camp with overwhelm ing forces-Montiano withdrew his invasion force to Florida. In 1743, Oglethorpe tried again. With a sizable army, he reinvaded Florida, hoping to rush the Spanish defenses at St. Augustine. Alert Spanish sentries spotted him, gave the alarm and later refused to be enticed into a trap outside the city walls. Oglethorpe gave it up once more, returned to Georgia, and, eventually, England. During the two decades following the invasion of 1743, the Spanish authorities provided funds to strengthen the defenses of Florida. The city walls were improved, as were the outworks of the great fort. Stone forts were constructed at Matanzas Inlet and at Picolata on the St. Johns River. Even the garrison at St. Augus tine was increased. But all these improvements were completed just one year before the Spanish, in 1763, were forced to cede Florida to the English in return for Havana, which the English had captured in 1761. Flor ida finally fell, not to the sword of conquest but to the pen of a treaty. A new era, that of British East Florida, was about to begin. It would be a short, but violent pe riod and the Spanish would be back. The military his tory of Florida had hardly begun. 27

PAGE 18

FLORIDA'S BLACK MILITIA Blacks, free and slave, had been resident in Spanish East Florida since the first years of its settlemem. While details are lacking, it is probable they served as individ ual members of the local militia during periods of ex treme crisis, as during the Drake attack of 1585 and the Guale Indian Revolt of 1598-1599. However, it is not until 1683 that documentary eYidence identifies a spe cific local militia unit as the company of pardes y rnorenos (free men of color). It is fairly certain that the black militia company of Spanish Florida enjoyed Yirtually cominuous existence from 1683 to 1763. Prior to 1720, it is probable that the black militia unit's officers and sergeants were white Spaniards. After 1726, and through the period of the English inYasion of Florida in 1740, probably until the British occupied Florida after 1763 , the unit's officers and sergeants were almost certainly black. The com mander of the black militia company from 1726 until sometime after 1742 was a local "free man of color," Francisco Menendez. He was its commander during the successful assault on English-held Fort Mose in 1740. l\lenendez was also a man of property. ha\'ing personally paid for rhe rebuilding of two bastions ip the city de fense wall. Black Floridians would serve prominently in the East Florida Rangers, Florida's British militia during the American Revolution and would, once more, have their owri local militia company during the Second Pe riod of Spanish Occupation in Florida, 1783-1821. Dur ing the early period of American occupation in . Florida, 1821-1865 . there would be no organized black Florida militia: most blacks were slaves, and the less than 1000 free blacks in Florida were prohibited from bearing arms. Between 1865 and 1901 there were black units of the enrolled state militia but they received no state sup port and no encouragement to become active units. until the mid-1960s, blacks were not allowed to join the organized volunteer militia, later the Florida Na tional Guard. Since that time. black Floridians have been encouraged to join and serve in the Guard and. now, many serve. Those black Floridians who serve today honor a long and worthy tradition . They have served Florida for more than 400 vears.

PAGE 19

Chapter nve THE SPANISH RETURN-TEMPORARILY 1784-1821 The end of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th was not a propitious time for Spain or its overseas imperial possessions, including the Floridas. Ineffective and corrupt government in Spain, poorly supported co Jia:p. : i'!l governments , and radical changes in the world consequent to the French Revolution would result in the -virtual elimination of Spain's once great overseas em pire . Within the period of a long generation following the reoccupation of St. Augustine and East Florida in L i 84, nationalistic revolutions in Latin America and the French invasion of Spain reduced Spain's ability to sup port its few loyal colonies, including Florida . From the beginning , Spain ' s hold on East Florida was tenuous. The local government was plagued by lack of funds, few soldiers, and frequent cattle and slave raids into Florida from the southern states of the new America. To com plicate matters , in the earl y y ears of this second period of Spanish occupation of Florida, local governors en couraged American immigration. That this was not a wise policy had been demonstrated in the past, and would be demonstrated many more times in the future in such places as Texas, California, and, of course, Florida. In 1785, Emmanuel Zespedes, the Spanish gover nor of Florida, caused a census to be taken. This showed a total population in East Florida of a little more than two thousand people. They were a mixed lot . Many of those Floridians who had gone to Cuba in 1763 had re turned. There were a considerable number of English merchants and artisans who had elected to remain after the British government pulled out. There were the Mi norcan and Greek survivors of the l\ew Smyrna settle ment, a few former British Loyalists , a fair number of free blacks from several periods, a few French, some Germans , and one Pole . This was all that was left of the nearly twenty thousand residents of Florida at the end of the British Period. In addition to the population problem , there were other difficulties facing the Spanish government of Flor ida throughout the few decades of their second occu pation of the province. After the sale to the United States of the vast Louisiana Territory, the Americans oc cupied a large part of Spanish \Vest Florida , claiming it to be a part of their new purchase. Not only were the governors of Spanish Florida unable to challenge the American action. they were unable co control the ban dits, slave raiders, wandering bands of migrating Indi ans, and runaway black slaves from the north who infested the interior of the province. Finally, as more and more Americans settled in Florida , there was an ever-growing clamor for annexation of Florida to the United States . The government in Spain was as powerless as that in Florida. Shortly after the turn of the century, the wars of Napoleon extended into Spain and were to embroil the country in warfare for more than a decade. The ideas and values of the American and French Revolu tions spread helping spark revolutionary wars of inde pendence in many of Spain's ::--:ew World provinces. The troubles of Florida received low priority from officials in Spain. Generally, the government of Florida was on its own. For almost three decades a precarious and near chaotic situation persisted in Spanish Florida. Finally, in 1812, there began a series of military and political events that would lead Spain to call it quits , allowing the Amer icans to purchase and occupy what was left of the Floridas.

PAGE 20

FLORIDA'S AXvfY (;1wnil (;rl'gor ,\/r(;rl'go1; 1 rslll'hi!tr01111111ror o(Florida. (C:cn1r1cs, of tht St. . ..\u~ustim Histori c al Socicr, . , 40

PAGE 21

THE SPANISH RETURN TDlPORARILY 1784-1821 Under the banner of the new French Republic, an unusual, almost comical, coalition of present and former residents of Florida and Georgia free booters planned to invade and conquer Florida. Their goal was to declare it a French colony and then have it annexed to the United States. Governor Zespedes anq his successors were in a perpetual tight spot. During most of the years, 17851821, the situado which supported Florida, its govern ment, garrison, and many of its citizens, arrived late,. not at all, or in fragments. The assigned regular garri sons were rarely anywhere near full authorized strength. Should the Americans have ever made a seri ous and well-supported grab for Spanish Florida, the means of resistance simply were not there. Fortunately for Spain, the enemies both within and without Florida were never able to muster the men and support necesc/; ~ary to launch and adequately sustain a major invasion. / \Eventually Florida was to pass to the Americans by treaty and for cash. That was the best solution all around. Spanish Florida was not totally defenseless. In ad . dition to the regular garrison of several hundred Span ish and New World regiments, Florida had its militia. These diverse military formations were of variable . quality and degrees of reliability. There were always three or four companies of St. Augustine urban militia. tvfost members of these companies were of Spanish de scent, free blacks , or mulattoes. They were reliably well trained and armed, including specialist training as ar tillerists, but all their units had a high proportion of the very young and very old. The rural militia of Florida was another matter. It was composed largely of Anglo-American settlers and, for good reasons, not entirely trusted by the govern ment of Florida. During the border troubles of the mid1790s, many individuals from the rural militia deserted to the Americans. There were reliable companies of rural militia and they, often accompanied by Indians, provided the scouting patrols along Florida's northern border and helped chase and chastise the cattle and slave thieves who plagued the region. The urban militia helped man the city defenses and supplement regular garrison troops at the fortified outposts scattered around northeast Florida. They also provided men for the patrols in the settled areas adja cent to the city of St. Augustine. Until 1803, the militia had its own officers, under the general direction and control of the governor. They received the same pay as Regular soldiers when on active duty and, often, while in training. However, the erratic nature of the provincial income made it difficult for the governor to pay the Reg ulars, let alone the militia. And, as the Regular garrison was almost never up to strength nor properly reinforced on time, local militiamen, as in the past, were "signed into" the Regular regiments on a frequent and contin ual basis. Still, for all its problems. the militia was em ployed to good effect on many occasions. Even when not used actively, just its existence acted as a significant de terrent to would-be invaders from the north. The first major challenge to the government of Spanish Florida during this period occurred in the years 1794-1795. Under the banner of the new French Republic, an unusual, almost comical, coalition of pres ent and former residents of Florida and Georgia free booters, planned to invade and conquer Florida. Their goal was to declare it a French colony and then have it annexed to the United States. In 1794, several of the co alition's leaders were arrested and jailed in Florida and in Havana. Following their release in 1795, they reacti vated their invasion plans, assembled their small army and quietly invaded Florida. At first they were success ful, capturing the Spanish posts at Guana, a few miles north of St. Augustine, and of San Nicholas, near the St. Johns River and northwest of the city. Colonel Howard of the Spanish Florida militia, leading Regular soldiers, militia units, and individual volunteers, swiftly reoccu pied Guana and reconquered San Nicholas, sending the would-be revolutionaries scurrying back north of the Georgia. border. Later, when the invaders occupied Spanish 'positions on Amelia Island, Colonel Howard once more sent them flying and , incidentally, obtained the release of all the Spanish captives from earlier actions. However, in the long run, the Spanish had not the men nor the money to patrol the border properly or to garrison the many strategic harbors or river crossings into Florida. Occasional excursions by Spanish regular and militia forces were sufficient to chase cattle and slave rustlers back northward, but insufficient to stop them from coming in the first place. Often, the only re course of Florida's Spanish governors was to send a writ ten protest to the local and state authorities in Gecrgia, usuallv without result.

PAGE 22

L FLORIDA'S AR~IY ,. ' ! .. . . ~~ . ..--::"':. :l 1': . \: City gates o(St . Augustiuc, t'tlr(l 19th cr111ur. . (CounesY of the St. Augustine Historical Sociel\ .j After 1811, the incredible international chaos at tendant to the wars of !\apoleon in Europe meant iittle money and fewer European troops could be sent to such a fringe outpost as Spanish Florida . Local governors. O\'erwhelmed hy lack of supporr and the realities of' Spanish control. or. more properh . non-control of the si1uatio11 in Florida. began a polic, of tr\'ing w g-ive the colony to th(' Americans . This polic\' didn ' t work as the \'arious governors of Florida \\'ouid nm an unde:threat of \'iolc.:11cc or itl\'asion. It \\'as necessan to pia\' out the last years of Spanish Florida almost a~ in a theatrical production. The decline of' remaining Spanish control of Fior ida accelerated after 1811. It began with yet another in \ asion. this time under the command of General George l\fathews of Georgia. Believing he wouid be supported h;; the full power of the L .S. l,!'overnmem. (he did have the covert su ppor: of' Pres idem ~.ladison ) . Mathews raised a "patrio:• arm1 o r severai dozen men. Announ cing the reheliion in earh 181~. he and his small arm, . au)!memed In two companies oi' American Ret!ulars. in \ ' ,Hled Fiorida and moved to capture St. Augustine and its fort.

PAGE 23

THE SPANISH RETURN TEMPORARILY 17841821 t -\. .7 <{ .1 r~: .~ . ':le . .... .... , . L !tf {f:f 1!;, 1 ' 8 0 .;ii , ;:~, . .. . ~ ::c •: . . . . . •::_ . ; . . ~ . -_. .• . #' ,., . .. .~-':. ' , .. : . . .. ~~. .;. ': _ , . ~ . . . .. ~.. ' . . _~.~ . "" . : . ... :: . •. .•. . . i~r .; :~ 1 : : J i; J.:tf; ;: ::"' ~\: irs,~J~t , ~\. . ~ . 10 . E / ' ". . _: ; : , , J ~/Jf:~j ~i : ~ 3 . 111i -.._~ :r -: F Hl . .. ORT it ii ; iJ? : bi t [;,,i:~•SF ' :F l\TB-BAl\TS: : ~ ~ . . . < . _; ;, . Jir ,~-- •i: : i~ lVI TH RE.1\iIARKS .. . J~/i.tt '::'~~:.I{~ . . ~: : }~. , . ..'. .~. •.~-.•i~ .. ": ... : ... _" . . , ~.' .: . ••.:tf ~ j }~~ {( ; , i ~. /.::.~.: __ . :.: .r_~ .. ~.: . :_ . . ~.:;._._ _ _~._•_t _ .. :. _ : _ •_:_. . .. ~ . --_ ~ \ ._ _ _ . _ _ _ : . "' _ .__ / ; \ : ~, \ --f ( ~~ ~ 1 ; ;;: ~ if~\.•; c,-. . . . .. . . . _ .. !~ l pe. ' 7 / a great l\fan ?lld aJ , -. ., I;,;, 1 ' ( _ , -;_. '. . :: , :: J / :: :. ~:_::t ~ t... : _ . >?J -~ -fMl. : :, __.,; ' . ~" } . '. ~ _. {el . 1 ~:''. .., . ' . ' I ; > _ ~ _ ~ r::., . o,_ ' . . ,. 'N : r ~, r : :: , . ... .. l I, , . . ,.; ,<. ' ': . . . . , _: ~:!!:' :'" ' t Title pag e of time-approximate narrative describing General Jackson ' s invasion of Spanish Flcrida. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Historical Society.)

PAGE 24

FLORIDA'S ARMY From Spain to America-the changing of the flags, 1821. (Courtesy of the St. Augustine Historical Society.) When the patriot army approached the city and its . fort, they realized that the fortifications were too strong to carry by storm, even though there were very few Spanish defenders. The small invading army set up camp on the site of the old Negro fort at Mose, just north of the city, and from there sent a demand for the city's surrender to the governor. Instead of surrending, newly arrived Governor Kidelan, having brought more than 100 black colonial militia troops with him from Havana, moved out against the Americans at Mose. Mathew's army of invasion hastily withdrew north of the St. Johns River. Governor Kidelan then offered cash re wards for American scalps. That did it. The army of in vasion disintegrated and its remnants were harassed and chivied into the northeastern part of the province, suffering considerable losses in a series of small skir mishes along the way. The American Congress repu diated President Madison's actions and he found it necessary to disown General Mathews. Very soon after ward Mathews died; what remained of his "army" wandered back into Georgia. The invasion had accom plished nothing. Again nothing but chaos was the result of a foray into the central part of the Florida peninsula by a regiment of Tennessee volunteer militia bent on a spoiling raid against Indians and renegade Negroes living there. In early 1813, another invasion, into the same area, by a band of Georgians bent on forced colonization, ac complished nothing. Their leader, Buchman Harris, was killed along with many of his followers when local Indians and renegade blacks stormed, captured, and burned their fort, Fort Mitchell, in what is today's Alachua County. Even the long-gone British managed to add to the chaos that was early 19th-century Spanish Florida. In 1814 and 1815, British Admiral Cochran, in between his destructive incursions into American coastal waters to the north, occupied. looted, and burned properties on Amelia Island. During this same period British agents entered Florida, armed and gave money to Indians and Negroes, encouraging them to raid American territories to the north. A Negro-manned, British-armed fort was established on Prospect Bluff at the mouth of the Apalachicola River on the Gulf Coast of Florida. The Spanish could, or would, do nothing . This was too much for the Amer icans. They sent a force of several hundred soldiers, commanded by Colonel Duncan Clinch, deep into Span ish Florida to remove this threat to American frontier security.

PAGE 25

THE SP,-\N ISH RETL'RN TEMPORARILY 1784-1821 After suffering some loses to ambuscade along the river as he and his small army moved south, Clinch at tacked the Negro fort from boats on the river. A lucky ranging shot at the very beginning of the bombardment put a "hot shot" into the fort's powder magazine. The fort blew up, killing 270 of the 344 occupants. (Only three of the defenders emerged unhurt.) Clinch, victo rious, withdrew over the Georgia border. Constant American pressure to annex Florida and Spain's inability to defend it-indeed even to police the interior of the province-ultimately led to the near !ii! comic opera events of 1817 -1819. The era began when one Gregor McGregor, veteran of the British Army in the Spanish Peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars and of the Latin-American wars of national liberation under Miranda and Simon Bolivar. recruited an invasion force of War-of-1812 veterans. With great display and gran diose public pronouncements, he and his army moved ' on Fernandina Island. The Spanish garrison there sur rendered without a shot. McGregor declared Florida an independent nation and raised its new flag, a green cross of Sc. George on a white field. Expected help from the north failed to arrive and, even though the Spanish botched an attempt to expel his army, McGregor re turned to Georgia, a disillusioned leader. "Rvo days after he left, the strangest of all invaders of Florida arrived, Luis Aury, pirate. Aury landed, raised the flag of the Mexican Republic, and opened the area to business, in this case, the importation and sale of sto len goods and illegally imported Negro slaves. He didn't last long; an American naval force soon arrived at Fer nandina. Aury departed in haste and the Americans stayed; they stayed throughout the remainder of the Spanish occupation. Meanwhile, Indian problems in the western part of the province engaged American atten tion and action. This once more demonstrated the in ability of Florida's Spanish government to do much about anything. During the summer of 1817, a large gathering of as sociated Indian tribes came to the central part of the peninsula, the area of today's Tallahassee. They hoped to coordinate efforts against the Americans beyond the Georgia border. The Americans responded to this potential threat by sending an army of slightly less than a thousand men to chastise the Indians. Led by General Edmund Gaines, the .-\mericans defeated and dispersed the assembled Indians. In return, small bands of Indi ans retaliated with terror raids against isolated home steads in Georgia. That did it. Andrew Jackson, hero of New Orleans, now arrived to set the entire matter of Florida and its Indians to rest forever. or so he thought. Jackson put together an army of 800 regulars and 900 militia soldiers , accompanied by 300 Indians friendly to the American cause. With his army. he crossed the Georgia border into Florida at Fort Scott. He proceeded all the way to the Gulf of Mexico and built a fort on the site of the ill-fated Negro fort of 1815. His army then moved eastward, capturing the garrison at St. Marks and scattering Indian bands in all direc tions. He also captured two English Indian agents, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, whom the Americans consid ered largely responsible for the Indian outrages on the Florida-Georgia border. After a quick trial in the field, he shot one and hanged the other. Having pacified the interior all the way to the Suwannee River.Jackson drew off into West Florida to attend problems there. Lacer. his actions were repudiated by President ;\,fonroe. No mat ter. Negotiations were already under way to have Spain sell Florida to the United Scates. With the Spanish government actually controlling only the area immediately around the city of St. Augus tine, Spain bowed to the inevitable. What they couldn"t keep ot successfully defend. they would sell before they lost it for nothing. The .-\dams-Onis Treaty officially transferred East Florida. and what remained of West Florida, co the United Scates as of February 22, 1821. Be tween March and July of that year various settlements. cities, and forts were passed to the Americans. On the 10th of July, 1821, following a double flag and cannon sa lute, Spain left Florida forever. Yet another flag was raised over Castillo de San ;\,larcos, renamed Fort >-iar ion: the Stars and Stripes of the American Republic. 'rec again, by the pen rather than by the sword, Florida passed to a new owner. However, the wars of Florida were not here ended. There would be more flag cere monies in the future.

PAGE 26

SPAIN'S YANKEE MILITIA 1812 By 1812, the majority of Florida ' s residents were An glos: former British Loyalists, recent British immi grants, or new settlers from the American states to the north. Spanish laws were strict. To have property or any other type of resident rights, one had to serve in the mi litia. Many of the men listed below were active in various schemes designed to divest Spain of its Florida territory; many others faithfully served to protect Spain s right to Florida . 'With a bit of historical license and, given "Americanization" of Florida only nine years later , all can be considered "Yankee Militia. " (The few Spanish surnames are of Spanish residents living outside of the city.) The names are listed as. and in the order, recorded by the Spanish; the names in parentheses are as the names were written in English a few years later . (Only those that could be confirmed are in parentheses; oth ers obviously have a different English spelling but later spelling remains conjectural.) Most of the men resided north of St. Augustine; most along the St. Johns or St. Marys rivers or their tributaries or in the rural areas be tween them. Some lived in or near St . Augustine.

PAGE 27

Nathaniel Hall Guillermo Craig Archibald Atkinson Jamie Hollingsworth Guillermo Hall Jorge Morrison Issac Hendrick Guillermo Henry Daniel Pritchard Isl Company of Urban Militia and Dragoons (Rural) Officers Issac Bowden Captain JuanJashau Luis Gardner Lieutenant Roberto Gilbert Sub-Lieu tenant Miguel Sloan Sergeant Roman Sanchez Sergeant Juan 0. Jones Corporal Juan Loftin Corporal Guillermo Bardin Corporal Absolern Bardin Corporal Jose Haydin Privates Thomas Jones Ruebin Sueny (Sweeney) Guillermo Hollingsworth Levin Gunby Abner Williams Arbanca Fallut Euphary Summerland Jose Summerland (Summerlin) (Summerlin) Eduardo Forrester Juan Faulk Daniel Barton Juan E. Jate (Tate) Eduardo Uanton LuisJoc Joseph McCullock Andres McLean Ezra Bushnal Zephiniah Kingsley Jose Hogan Farquar Bathune Juan Creighton Jorge Petty Guillermo Hogans Fredrico Hartly Jorge Hartly Daniel Swiny Enrico Hartly Guillermo Hartly Guillermo Williams :\[oises Bowden (Moses) Guillermo Gardner Guillermo ~folpuss Guillermo Fox Juan Sloan Jorge Flores Juan B. Jones Juan Bardin Guillermo Loftin Silbv Tavlor Carlos Hogan Enrique Sueny (Sweeney) Solomon Miller Timothy Hollingsworth Francisco Veir Guillermo P. Birch Francisco Richard Samuel Miles Jorge Cook Juan Beal Vernal Taylor Samuel Toms

PAGE 28

; Andres Atkinson . ., ,;r._ Guillermo Lawrence Ruben Hogans Issac Carter Daniel Hogans Pedro Maxey Jacobo Worley Carlos Breward (Broward) Guillermo Carter Juan McIntosh Juan Hall Jon. Jillet Elizer Carter Willoby Tucker Reden Blunt Juan 0. Houston 2nd Company of Urban Militia and Dragoons (Rural) Officers Andres Tucker Captain Guillermo Jilcock Lieutenant Daniel Barton Sub-Lieutenant David Turner Sergeant Juan Edwards Sergeant Daniel Delany Guillermo Hart Corporal Corporal Daniel Hart Corporal Lindsy Tod (Todd) Corporal Guillermo Deweese Jaime Armstrong Privates Antonio Mestre Antonio Juaneda Guillermo Fitzpatrick Garret Ledwith Cornelio Greffis (Griffis) Spicer Christopher Benjamin Armstrong Roberto Burnett Hezekiah Tucker Tandy Dicks Guillermo Herrett Guillermo Ubanks Thomas Ulin (Eubanks) Guillermo Smith Juan Houston Pierce Lane Gilbert Magroan Juan Summerlin Eduardo Turner Jesse Turner Guillermo Surret Richard Proctor Guillermo Hart (the younger) seal Hart Guillermo Gray Carlos Armstrong Jose Fenwick Juan Fraser Juan Barclay Jose Hull Juan Atkinson Stephen Ubanks (Eubanks) Carlos Hogans Jaime Smith Thomas Lamb Thomas Durre!

PAGE 29

St. Augustine's Military Society, 1700-1820 Juan Marchena Fernandez Translated and adapted by Luis Rafael Arana The studies on Florida in the 18th Century, especially those of the social type, cannot be complete or exhaustive unless they include the military population. Florida is one of the clearest examples of the duality, "military population equals total population," over a territory. Once a strategically located geographic area, with weak economic resources. becomes a military presidio with a sufficient contingent of soldiers. the land becomes characterized by that action. An urban nucleus may be established later within the original presidio. but the nucleus is exclusively the consequence of the previous condition. This was indubitably the case of Florida during the first Spanish period. I. The-Military and Demography St. Augustine was founded as a military presidio. A number of dwellings was erected around the fortification, and they indeed originated the urban core. To organize and administer life in this urban community, there came several officials and a number of priests, the latter to take care of the spiritual needs of the faithful. To provide for material needs, a general traffic in products was naturally initiated, either by persons in the city itself or by traders in the nearest economic centers. Security depended on the state of relations with Indian groups. Because the hinterland offered little security, the edge of farming did not get too far away from the urban core. The farm products supplied the city at a minimal rate, and the importation of large Juan Marchena Fernandez is a profes90r of Hispanic American h1stnry al th" Unin•,. ity of Se,illa (Spain). This article is part 2 of a largl'r one ,,..., ,cril.Ja110 )'./"14 fr,r part II. entitled "Guamiciones y poblacion militar en F'lorids Oriental 11 iOO 18201 ." published in Reuista de /ndias (Madrid). Nos. 163-164 1,lanuary-June 19~1 I. We thank Dr . Francisco Solano. the Reuista's director . for permission to adapt it to the English lanl(Uage. Luis Rafael Arana, translator and adaptor of the artirle. is the his• torian of Castillo de San Marcos and Fort Matanzas National Monuments . "

PAGE 30

< 44 El Escribano quantities of merchandise foodstuffs as well as utensils and clothing became necessary. The financing of all activities in the city was entirely external.• The population lived from the annual situado 1 (troop pay fund) from which the garrison was paid. These funds came from Cuba, and served to activate the necessary mechanisms of internal exchange which provided for the survival of the inhabitants. There was not a transient population, but had there been one, it could not have exceeded the number which could be supported by the situado. This external financing is a clear factor in demographic development. Despite the fact that the situado was a military mechanism exclusively, there was a very close connection between the army and demography. The degree of this connection in East Florida, a marginal area of the empire, is shown in the ensuing comparison of data pertaining to the first and second Spanish periods. A. Situation in 1763, end of first Spanish period. 2 Military population Staff officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Infantry (officers and enlisted men) ....... 388 Artillery (officers and enlisted men) . . . . . . . 45 Dragoons (officers and enlisted men) . . . . . . 94 Engineers (officers) ............ , . . . . . . . . 3 Total ............ 635 Rest of the population White men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 White women ........... , .............. 575 White male children .................... 569 White female children ................... 494 Male slaves ............................ 118 [Editor's Note: Besides the situado, Florida's income came alao from tribute, customs duties, tithes, fines, half-annates, sale of public offices, and other revenue sources. C.H. Haring , The Spaniah Empi,.. in Amuico (New York: Oxford Unlvenlty Pres,, 1947). 274-312.] 1. The situodo paid also for the entire civil and ecclesiastical organization, public work,, and other things related to the presence and activity of the troop• in Florida. 2. Florida was ceded to England, and the population left. This date is used due to the wealth of data contained in the documentation related to the evacuation tArchivo General de lndias (AGIJ; Santo Domingo, 2660), which, together with military data available, permits the reconstruction of the social picture.

PAGE 31

St. Augustine's Military Society Female slaves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Male slave children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Female slave children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Canary Islands settlers .................. 236 German settlers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Ecclesiastics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Blacks and mulattoes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Exiles .... ............................ 38 Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Seamen .......................... . . . .. 11 Indian servants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Total ........... 2589 Total population .. 3124 45 The population categories above can be distributed among four groups, based on the degree of dependence on the situado: (1) The military: unit commanders, officers, and enlisted men; (2) Direct dependents: wives, children, ser vants, and slaves of the military; (3) Indirect dependents: employees in military warehouses and the treasury. storekeepers. physicians, chaplains, artisans of military equipment, masons, blacksmiths and car. penters, wage laborers, convicts, and exiles at hard labor in royal construction; and (4) Non-dependents: merchants, farmers, artisans, and professionals. 3 The composition and structure of each group above comprise the categories and number of people shown below: 4 (1) The military .......... 535 ...... (17.12 %) <,.his group is not absolutely non-dependent because ,ts components 1urni~lwa men for ' the militia . However, since the militia troops are not treated separately in this work. the group will be considered a,, non-dependent . l There is complete agreement between the data of the 1763 embarkation and the data on officers and enlisted men. Departure lists also agree with the data about the struc, ture of military families.

PAGE 32

46 El Escribano (2) Direct depenaents: women ................................ 465 male and female children ................ 866 slaves ................................ 272 Indian servants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Total ... 1667 (53.36%) (3) Indirect dependents: employees .............................. 16 seamen ................................ 11 women ................................. 23 male and female children ................. 43 slaves ................................. 13 ecclesiastics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 servants ............................... 3 exiles .................................. 38 Total ..... 163 (5.20% ) (4) Non-dependents: militiamen 5 94 women ................. _ ..... . ........... 81 male and female children ................ 152 slaves ................................. 68 servants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 11 Canary Islands settlers .................. 236 German settlers ......................... 24 blacks and mulattoes .................... 93 Total .... 759 (24.29 % ) Grand Total ..... 3124 Thus about 75.68% of the entire population of Florida toward the end of first Spanish period was dependent on the presence of troops in the area, which was true too in other isolated strongholds or marginal zones. And the remaining 24.29% was not absolutely independent for two reasons. In the first place, Spanish settlers were not allowed to inhabit isolated land with a relatively large native population and close to the 6. See note 3.

PAGE 33

St. Augustine's Military Society XLIV . Habana _ ,1 ~ . , ,..,.;:: l~,~< , 47 t I, ' J I Hi,toria o,, ;.. Mrd. Madrid JIJ57 Coat of Arms Infantry Regiment of Habana Activated as a battalion in 1719 , it became a regiment in 1763. Habana was the first of several units raised in the 18th century for permanent station and service in Hispanic America. Thus, Dr. Marchena has justly called it "the very first stone" of the collective Hispanic American army . Detachments from the regiment served in St . Augustine in 1736-38 , 1741-49, 1764-61 , and 1784-90.

PAGE 34

48 El Escribano English, unless a security infrastructure was provided. In the second place, the largest portion of the small harvests of the settlers, which showed the productiveness of the settlement, was used to feed the military (the only category with the financial . resources necessary for commercial enterprise). To consider the militiamen, who were also the settlers, as dependent or non-dependent is a relative proposition. Florida was indeed a military presidio. B. Situation in 1814, in the second Spanish period. Commerce, or rather the exchange of products between the United States and Florida, was a most important activator in the Florida peninsula from 1783 to 1820. 15 The demographic composition of the area changed from a total population of 3,124 inhabitants (including the military population) in 1763 to 3,315 inhabitants (including the military) in 1814. 7 The increase between the first and the second second Spanish period was small, 8 but other factors distinguished the second period quite clearly. From 1700 to 1763, practically 1O0%of the population was urban, given the problems with the Indians and the English. The latter reduced the usable area to within a "cannon shot of San Marcos." But in 1783-1820, European and North American immigration and the development of areas suitable for agriculture and cattle-raising changed the situation. For instance, Population in 1814 Military. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 (07 .05 % ) Urban ............................... 1307 (39.42 ) Rural .........................••..•.. 1774 (53.51 ) Total ........... 3315 An important phenomenon was the decrease of the military population from 535 officers and enlisted men in 1763 to only 6. Pablo Tomero Tinajero, Re/aciones de dependencia entn Florida y Estado& Unido, (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 19791 combines the 11tudy of economic activity with the treatment of demographic analysis, both of which are fundamental to undel'!ltand Flori~.reality during the second Spanish period. 7. "Padron General. .. , " AG 1, Papeles de Cuba, 1971. 8. But from 1787 to 1814 the population increaRP.d 35. 9 % Neverthelet1s, economics rather than demography caused the upsurge of f loridian development during the eecond ""riod.

PAGE 35

St. Augustine's Military Society 49 234 in 1814. No less a fundamental innovation was the fact that, since the first period, the rural population became more numerous than the urban. The military decrease registered was 43. 73 % Theoretically, the population depending directly on the military also decreased by the same percentile rate. This impacted on the urban population mainly because the troops were situated in St. Augustine and other principal urban cores. The impact was: Urban population in 1814 (1) Military 9 Staff officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3rd Battalion, Infantry Regiment of Cuba . . .. . .. . ...... . ..... . .' .... .. ... 187 Artillery ........................ : . . . . . 24 Dragoons ....... . ............ .. ....... 13 Total .. . . 234 (15.18 % ) (2) Direct dependents women ...... . ......... . ............... 120 children ..• ..... . ..... .. .... .... ..... .. 223 slaves ............................. : . . 70 Total ...... 413 (26.80) (3) Indirect dependents employees, women, children, slaves, and exiles .................. . . . .. 180 (11.68) (4) Non-dependents merchants, artisans, farmers, women, children, and slaves ............ . . 714 (46.27) Grand Total . .... 1541 Using the data above under the light of a total population of 3315, the percentages of the first three groups decrease to 7 .06, 9. AGI, PapelesdeCuba , 2339 a~ I::ast Florida Papers IEFPJ, 17$Fl4.

PAGE 36

50 El Escribano 12.45, and 5.42 respectively. The percentage of the non• dependents in the fourth group rises to 75.05. DECREASE OF NUMBER OF PEOPLE DEPENDENT ON THE MILITARY 1763 1814 Urban population Total population Number Number % Number % Military population 535 234 -43.7 234 -43 . 7 Direct dependents 1,667 413 -75.2 413 -75.2 Indirect dependents 163 180 -10.9 180 -10.9 Non dependents 759 714 5.9 2,488 -69.4 Total 3,124 1,541 3,315 Since 1763, the non-dependent population had increased 69.49% and the indirectly dependent 10.92% which lowered the numbers of the military and the directly dependent conspicuously. The features of a military presidio began diminishing between 1783 and 1821, as a result of the success of Floridian commercial development during those years. By the end of the second Spanish period, Florida had ceased to a large extent being a military post. II. Officers and Enlisted Men I Nevertheless the military establishment in Florida continued having economic, political, and social repercussions during the second Spanish period. Economy-wise, the situado, vitally important to the development of Florida, kept coming irregularly most of the time . Previously it had been the sole external means of finance, but now it was only one of the factors of capital. The variations in the situado were due, almost exclusively, to the increase or decrease of the number of troops assigned permanently as well as for reinforcement only. 10 The amounts 10 . See the chapter on financing defense in Juan Marchena Fernandez, La in1tituci6n militar en Cartagena dtt Jndias en el siglo XVIII (Sevilla: Eacuela de Eatudio• His, panoamericanos. 1982) . Notice these few examples of variations : in 1740 the ,ituado amounted to 74,300 peaoa ; brJ759, 62 , 855 pesos ; in 1797, 119 , 973 pt>ao,; and in 1806, 97,50lpHoa (AGI, Santo Domingo. 2668and 2112 , and Cuba, 4131 ,

PAGE 37

St. Augustine's Military Society 51 received, however, were sufficiently large to have an important impact on the area, especially in the city of St. Augustine proper. The situado represented exactly 84.9% of the total in come of the King's Coffer of Florida during the second Spanish period, 11 and almost 100% during the first period. Thus, the permanency of troops was a very important financing element in Floridian economic play during the .colonial stage. The financing of the troops brought about the appearance of money lenders among the merchants. Given the irregular arrival of the situados, the lenders advanced the money, natur ally at high interest, to sustain the officers and enlisted men. The high interest became acceptable by those affected because it was the only way the military could survive. The system prevailed in East and West Florida during the last 15 years of the second Spanish period, but it was common in all Hispanic America during the 18th century. The lenders in Pensacola in 1817 paid 12 silver pesos for 100 paper pesos, a discount rate of 88 % . 12 The lenders doubled as the principal merchants of the area, and were the only ones with sufficient capital enabling them to perform enterprises of this scope. Thus, the situado was an investment which served to re capitalize these economically powerful businessmen. And this benefitted commerce later . 13 Politically, the permanency of troops in Florida exhibited a military mien. All the governors, the King's lieutenants, the garrison sergeants major, and the station and troop staffs in the 18th century were military men. The administration contained a large percentage of army men; 14 Civil works were carried out by engineer officers of His Majesty's army, and this 11. Percentages obtained from the data contributed by Tomero, op. cit., 181. 12. AG!. Cuba, 1987. 13. The act of provisioning a military garrison post from abroad was sufficiently complex to warrant handling by a commercial company, regardless of the implication• which the action might bring about. In answer to protests of the military population in Florida, which saw their supplies become scarcer year aft.er year (AG I, Santo Domingo, 840), a contract was awarded to the Compar\ia de La Habano pursuant to a cedula in 1741 to take charge of supply (AGI. Ultramar, 1804). The Compania replaced several small companies from New York, which had provided the presidio with foodstuffs and ready-made goods (AGI. Santo Domingo, 2109) during the first half of the 18th Century, at lower prices than those the company charged. But the contract was discontinued pursuant to a cedula in 1758 because many Floridians purchased extra merchandise for resale to Cuba as contraband. 14. The outlying governments such as Amelia Island (Fernandina), a true commercial center of important reputation, were also in charge of army officers (in the case of Amelia, the chief adjutant of the 3d Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Cuba (AGI. Santo Domingo. 25711).

PAGE 38

I , :,, 52 El Escribano subordinated the growth of St. Augustine to defense needs. Patently, civil government in Florida depended on military government, and the direction of local government seemed to be far from adapting to the true reality of the land , especially during the second Spanish period. The social order is more complex. Proof of this are the 22 sociological variables or factors suggested by the liberates de uita et moribus (service records) of the officers 15 and the filiaciones (enlistment records) of the enlisted men 16 of those serving in Florida between 1700 and 1820. Only three of those variables are used here: geographic origin, social origin, and age and years of service. They provide a limited, though enlightening, view of the military component of the population of Florida. A. Geographic origin The military man was an element from a geographic site who went to situate himself in another one and become sociologically an integral part of the army, with all the involvement called for by the act. This was more interesting in an area like Florida, where the migration phenomenon fundamentally determined all social and demographic characteristics. The exceedingly simple concept of merely classifying the officers and enlisted men according to their geo~phic origin must give way to 16. All the service records of officers of the units mentioned below have been used. The omissions in the sequence of said records indicate that only of I ~. of them had not been found. Excepting officers contained in the records not found.all the othera who were part, one way or another, of the EHt Florida garrison during the period of this work have been studied here . Ho/a$ (records! de la guamicion del presidia de San Agustin de la Florida. 1730 1763 (AG!, Cuba, 4761: compafilas de dotacion de infan teria de San Agustin, 1749 (AGI, Santo Domingo, 2659): destacamento de montados de San Agustin, 1749 (ibid,I: destacamento de artUlerla de San Agustin, 1749 (ibid,I: ocho piquetes de infanterla destacados en San Agustin, 1749 (AG I. Santo Domingo, 21081; compailla de fusileros de montana de America, 1763 (Archivo General de Simancas (AGSJ, Guerra Modema, 72591 : destacamento de dragonee de Amer i ca, 1789 (AG!, Santo Domingo, 21001: destacamento del Regimlento de lnfanterla de Cuba, 1789 (AGS , Guerra Moderna, 7260): tercer batallon del Regimiento de Cuba , 1790 IEFP, 175F14) : destacemento de artillerla de la Habana. 1792 IAGS, Guerra Modema, 7260): companies de infanterla de Catalufia, 1794 IAGS, Guerra Moderna, 72591; end tercer batellon del Regimientode Cuba, 1800, 1810 IEFP, 16 . Given the large number or enlistment records, one sample or enlisted men of the first Spanish period and another one of 791 men of the second period were made . The number of elements of each sample appear in the total of enlistment records located in the archives . Filiacion•• (enlistment records I de la tropa de guamicion de Florida de 1700 a 1763 (AGI, Cuba, 4781: compaflia de fusileros de montafia, 1761 IAGI, Santo Domingo, 2660); and tercer batallon de infanterla de Cuba, 1791, 1801, 1814 (EFP, 175Fl41, -.

PAGE 39

St. Augustine's Military Society 53 determining the close interrelationship of geographic origin and social origin lying behind a peninsular (Spanish-born) and a criollo (Spanish American-born). Within the entire army of Hispanic America, that of Florida is special because the phenomena here are completely anomalous from those found in the rest of the continent. The study of so-called "marginal zones of the Em~ire" reveal that the phenomena therein did not have the homogeneity exh:bited in the central zones. In this subchapter, the results for Florida are compared with the general data on the entire army of Hispanic America in order to point out the particularities of the former. A.l. Geographic origin of officers During the first Spanish period, specifically 1700-1763, the general data about the geographic origin of the officers are as follows: TABLEl Spanish-born .......... . ......... 5S Criollo .......................... 18 Foreign-born ..................... 2 Total ........... 78 74.3G % 23.08 2.06 Considering that in the entire army of Hispanic America in 1750 the criollo officers comprised more than 40% , 17 tho 23 % in Florida is a clear symptom of lagging behind the norm. The indications are that reinforcement units sent to the area went from Spain, rather than from other Hispanic American areas, and that the Floridian demographic structure was insufficient to provide candidates for officer grades. Since only the socially highly-placed criollos were permitted access to a military career, their presence among the officer ranks tells us about the limited importance of the Floridian elite in this first Spanish period. The breakdown of the 23 % criollo officers shows: TABLE2 Florida-born ....•................. 13 72. 7 % 17. See the chapter devoted to this tbeme in Juan Marchena Fernandez. 0/iciak, y ,oldodo, ,n el ,j,rcito th Amlrico (Sevilla : Eacuela de Estudioe Hispanoamericanos, 1983).

PAGE 40

54 El Escribano Cuba-born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 22.2 N ueva Granada-born (Columbia and Venezuela) .................. 1 5.5 Total ........ 18 There was no important presence from other Hispanic American areas in the composition of the Florida officer corps. It was the Floridian presence which was in sharper relief. The 72.2 % of Floridians among the criollos does not represent more than 23 % of the entire officer corps, and this rate was low compared with that in other places in the continent. There the numbers of officers native to the city where they were on garrison sometimes reached more than 75% of all the officers. The criollo officers were few in Florida, which means that the economic and social elites were in effect unimportant. The breakdown of Spanishand foreign-born officers follows: TARLE8 Spanish-born: Castilla .......................... 16 Andalucia ........................ 12 Cataluiia ................. : . . . . . . . 8 Levante .......................... 7 Galicia ........................... 4 Vascongadas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Extremadura ..................... 3 Arago~ ........................... 1 Navarra .......................... 1 Canarias ......................... 1 Asturias .......................... 1 Total ........ 58 Foreigners: Flanders ......................... 1 France ............................ 1 Total ........ 2 27.5 . 20.6 13.7 12.0 6.8 6.8 5.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 The high percentages of Castilians, Andalusians, and Catalonians are in similar proportion to those in the rest of the army of Hispanic America. This is proof that the officers of the Florida garrison we_!e essentially Spanish-born. Those three

PAGE 41

I~---St. Augustine's Military Society Spanish regions furnished practically all the officers of the King's armies from Naples to the Phillippines. Demograph ically they were the most populated, and had a good number of middle and lower nobility, which regarded service to the King practically as the only way of life. The limited number of for eigners renders them practically non-representative. Despite their origin, the Spanish-born officers spent their lives in Florida. They kept their families there, and their children were Floridians. Had they not been compelled to leave in 1763, the social and geographic composition of the last third of the 18th century would have been indubitably very different, and probably rates similar to those of the rest of Hispanic America would have been reached. In this respect too, 1763 signified an absolute break. During the second Spanish period, specifically 1789-1820, the general data about the geographic origin of the officers are as follows: TABLE4 Spanish-born ..................... 46 Criollo ............................ 15 Foreign-born ...................... 3 Undetermined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Total ........ 65 70.7% 23.0 4.6 1.5 The data are practically identical to that of the first perio1 (Table 1), and thus variations between origins are not worthy , mention. Already the difference from what was happenillg , the rest of Hispanic America was very substantial. Toward t.. close of the century, the criollo officers in the army of Americ,, were 60% , more than twice the Spanish-born. In Floridu, however, the native born were only a third of the Spanish-born. The breakdown of the data pertaining to the criollo officers show: TABLES Florida-born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Cuba-born ........................ 13 Nueva Granada-born. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Total ........ 15 6.6% 86.6 6.6

PAGE 42

i I _ _ _ 56 El Escribano Compared with the first Spanish period, (Table 2), the diminution of the Floridians was huge in the face of the spectacular increase of the Cubans. The latter progressed from 22.2 % to 86.6 % , palpable proof of the dependence of Florida on that large Antillean island in defense matters. This is the best evidence that the forced departure of the garrison in 1763 made impossible the creation and survival of a Floridian military population of importance in social and economic spheres. This survival had indeed emerged in the rest of Hispanic America. After 1789, military men were detached temporarily to Florida, which was not conducive to the previously characteristic permanent stay. The breakdown of the data pertaining to the Spanishand foreign-born officers follows: TABLE6 Spanish-born: Cataluiia ......................... 16 Andalucia ........................ 13 Galicia ........................... 3 Levante .......................... 3 Aragon ........................... 2 Navarra ...................... .... 1 North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Vascongadas ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l [Omitted]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Total ........ 46 Foreign-born: France ............................ 1 Ireland .......................... 2 Total ....... 3 34.7% 28.2 6.5 6.5 4.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 13.0 Cataluiia and Andalucia kept furnishing the highest precentages as they had done during the first period (Table 3). The increase in the percentage of Catalonians was due to the arrival of the officers and men of light infantry companies from that region. The Castilians decreased in Florida as well as in the rest of Hispanic America, due in part to the evident depopulation suffered by the region toward the end of the 18th century. The number of foreigners continued to be irrevelant.

PAGE 43

St. Augustine's Military Society 57 Finally. a comparison of the highest total percentages of certain origins of officers during both Spanish periods: TABLE7 First Second Cataluna ........................ 13. 7 Andalucia ....................... 20.6 Castilla ......................... 27 .5 Levante ........................ 12.0 Florida ......................... 72.2 Cuba ............... , ............ 22.2 34.7% 28.2 9.0 6.5 6.5 86.6 Clearly the Catalonians, Andalusians, and Cubans increased during the second period; while Castilians, Levantines, and Floridians, above all, decreased. A.2. Geographic origin of enlisted men The aggregate figures on the geographic origin of the enlisted men during the first Spanish period, specifically 1700-1763, shows: TABLES Spanish-born ................... 232 Criollos ........................ 195 Foreign-born. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Undetermined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Total. ..... 453 51.20 % 43.4 3.70 1.90 On this occasion the percentage of criollos was high, but it was still below the 60 % reached in the rest of the Hispanic American army at mid-century. The breakdown of the data applicable to the criollos follows: TABLE9 Florida ......................... 147 Cuba ........................... 13 Nueva Espana (Mexico) .......... 28 Central America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Nueva Granada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Total ...... 195 75.40% 6.60 14.~o 1.02 2.50

PAGE 44

58 El Escribano This time the percentages were closer to those of other Hispanic American cities, where it was common indeed for the natives to be the enlisted men of the garrison. The social structure of Florida did not allow the existence of too many people with possibilities for opting to grades in the army. But it was indeed possible that there were sufficient people to enter the enlisted ranks; indeed, most times, given the economic characteristics of the first Spanish period, enlistment was the sole possibility for survival in the absence of extensive cultivation which might demand an abundance of labor. It is interesting likewise that the Mexicans were more numerous than the Cubans, but in percentage still well below that of the Floridians. This was due to constant recruiting in Nueva Espana, whereas Cuba was not excessively fond of giving up the enlisted men needed for its own defense. The following is the breakdown of the Spanishand foreign born enlisted men: TABLElO Spanish-born: Catalufia .. . ..................... 93 Andalucia ................. ,. ..... 67 Castilla ..... . .................... 25 Canal'ias ........................ 10 Galicia .................. . ....... 10 Extremadura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Aragon ..................... . ..... 7 Levante' ......................... 7 Vascongadas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Navarra ......................... __g_ Total ........ 232 Foreign-born: France .................... 1. 5 British North America colonies ....... 4 Portugal .......................... 3 Ireland ............................ 2 Scotland .......................... 1 Italy .............................. 1 Germany .........•..... . ......... J Total ....... 17 40.0% 28.8 11.0 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.01 3.01 1.2 0.8 29.4% 23.5 17.6 11.7 5.8 6.8 6.8

PAGE 45

St. Augustine's Military Society 59 There was a repetition of the absolute primacy of the Catalonians, Andalusians, and Castilians among the Spanish-born. Almost all the Catalonians were those included in the 1761 arrival of the Mountain Fusilier Company of America, recruited exclusively in Cataluna. Andalusians and Castilians were forced to emigrate or enlist in the royal armim ; by the high population density of their regions and thei; pauperized economy . 18 The foreigners have the same nationalities found in othe garrisons. An interesting element is the limited presence o : enlisted men from British North America. This is the begi..,nin1~ of the great immigration from the United States during th~ second Spanish period. For the second Spanish period, specifically 1789-1820, the data on the geographic origin of the enlisted men offer the following: TABL . E 11 Spanish-born .................... 579 Criollos ......................... 148 Foreigners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Undetermined .................... _2 Total ....... 791 73.2% 18.7 7.8 0.2 The outcome is absolutely anomalous. While in the rest of Hispanic America the percentages of criollos increased con stantly through the 18th century to more than 90 % at the end of the century, in Florida the criollos decreased well below the percentage of the first Spanish period (Table 8). Therefore, the percentage of the Spanish-born increased, a unique instance in all of the 18th century, but a logical consequence of the arrival in Florida of remnants of peninsular units and of recruiting activity. The criollo enlisted men came from: TABLE 12 Florida ........................... 16 Cuba ............................. 73 Nueva Espana ..... . .............. 50 Nueva Granada .................. -~ Total ....... 148 18. Ibid . 10.8% 49.3 33.7 6.0

PAGE 46

60 El Escribano The recession of the Floridians is notable while the increase of Cubans and Mexicans is conspicuous (Table 9). The presence of the 3rd Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Cuba character ized the dependence on that island. The location of the regi mental recruiting stations made the Cubans, Mexicans and later the Canary Islanders the predominant groups. The beginning of cultivation beyond the environs of St. Augustine provided greater economic incentives for the Floridian population during the second Spanish period and did away with enlistment in the army as a means of support. The Floridians in effect dropped from 75.4 % among the criollos of the first Spanish period (Table 9) to 10.8 % in the second period. The number and percentage of the Spanishand foreign-born enlisted men break down thus: TABLE13 Spanish-born: Andalucia ....................... 175 Canarias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Castilla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Levante ......................... 53 Galicia . . ................. . . . . . . . 44 Catalufia ........................ 41 Extremadura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Aragon .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Navarra ...................•..... 11 Vascon'gadas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Asturias ......................... _j Total ....... 579 Foreign-born: France ........................... 20 Portugal ......................... 19 United States ..................... 10 Germany ......................... 6 Italy ............................. 4 Ireland ............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 [Omitted] ........................ Total ........ 62 30.2% 16.9 16.9 9.1 7.5 7.0 3.7 3.7 1.8 1.3 1.2 32.2 /4 30.6 16.1 9.6 6.4 1.6 3.2 Here is an extraordinary decrease of Catalonians in comparison with . an important increase of Canary Islanders

PAGE 47

St. Augustine's Military Society 61 (Table 10). The establishment of recruiting depots for the Regiment of Cuba in the Canaries influences this change heavily. Finally, a comparison of the highest total percentages on the origin of enlisted men in both Spanish periods shows: TABLE14 First SllCond Andalucia ..................... 28.80 30.20 Catalufia ..................... .40.00 7 .00 Florida ....................... 75.40 10.80 Castilla ....................... 11.00 lG.90 Canarias ...................... 4.30 16.90 Levante .............. . ....... 3.10 9.10 Cuba ......................... 6.60 <;9.S0 Nueva Espana ................. 14.30 33. 70 The difference of percentages on the geographic origin of officers and enlisted men between the two Spr.nish periods signifies that 1763 brought total disruption to the natural social evolution of Florida's population. While the military constituted a large share of the population of the area, 19 there appeared a very pronounced dichotomy between army and population during the second period, a fact almost unnoticed in the first period. The dichotomy had social implications because it did not provide for the formation of powerful and profoundly-rooted elites, but those extant were always surrounded by impermanency and dependent on interests in other areas. Although the army itself did not created these elites, indications of them always emerged clearly. To the enlisted men of the first Spanish period, the bonds that bound them to the land of birth and of family were important. But those bonds diminished during the second period and the enlisted men were a kind of semi-transie;1t population. B. Social origin The Hispanic American army was a conglomerote o:. v 1: 19. '"The Military and Demography: •upra.

PAGE 48

62 El Escribano elements of the colonial social spectrum. But between the highest economic and social elites and the lowest stratum, there were entirely different ends and interests. The classifications prepared on the social origin of officers and enlisted men were derived from data obtained in service and troop enlistment records, and consist of six classes. These classes are (1) sons of the military; (2) career soldiers, those individuals who, beginning as privates, climbed the entire grade scale, grade by grade, until they became officers through their military ability; (3) noblemen, the aristocrats who invoked titles of nobility; (4) well-born, those from high untitled social levels, generally merchants and criollo landlords; (5) sons of farmers; and (6) those from the humblest social levels recognized as honest men. Based on these classes, the social composition of the Florida-born officers and enlisted men follows. B .1. Social origin of officers During the first Spanish period, the social stations of officers were that shown in the table. TABLE 15 Career soldiers .................... 27 Well-born .. . ..................... 14 Sons of the military ................ 12 Noblemen ........................ 3 Sons of f~nners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Humble men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Undetermined ..................... 18 Total ........ 78 34.6% 17.9 15.3 3.5 3.8 1.2 23.0 This is characteristic of the Hapsburg-era armies. The career soldier prevailed during the 17th century, filling the majority of the officer slots. A good soldier, knowledgeable and brave on the battlefield, could very well reach the highest grades by reenlisting continually. But in Hispanic America this type did not exist in the 18th century: they constituted only 15 % by 1740, and had come down to 1 % by 1760. They were the sur vivors of the old army who, on the disbandment of the large European old-style regiments, passed on to Hispanic America

PAGE 49

St. Augustine's Military Society 63 to continue their service. In Florida, given the presence of an obsolete presidial garrison, this class of officer would logically be found. From the standpoint of geographic origin, the social class of officers breaks down thus: TABLE16 Criollos % Floridians 20 % Son of the military . . . 7 Career soldiers . . . . . . Well-born .......... 4 Noblemen ...... . Sons of farmers . . . . .. Humble men ........• Undetermined . . . . . . 7 Total ........... 18 63.6 36.3 6 4 3 13 60 40 Spanish% and. foreign born 5 27 10 3 3 1 11 60 10.2 55.1 20.4 6.1 6.1 2.0 The sons of the military made up more than half of the Florida-born officers during the first Spanish period. Next to them were the well-born, descendants of the first families who settled the area. This was definitely a classical social origin, without external accretion and without the appearance of noblemen. This condition was a strange phenomenon in mid-18th century in comparison with the rest of Hispanic America. Among the Spanishand foreign-born, there appeared a high percentage of career soldiers and a minimum of noblemen, which was an abnormal and atypical situation. There was also a very scarce participation (2 % ) by the humble men. The entirE: social situation was much more representative of the 17th thar . of the 18th century, which explains the homogeneity of the firs t. Spanish period, from the 16th to the 18th century. Even homogeneity did not evolve in Florida. For the second Spanish period, the general data on the socinl class of officers show: 20 . Data already included in "criollos" column.

PAGE 50

' I 64 El Escribano TABLE17 Noblemen ........................ 26 Humble men ...................... 22 Sons of the military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Sons of farmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Well-born ........................ 5 Sons of artisans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Total ......... 65 40.0% 33.8 9.2 7.6 7.6 1.5 The results resemble those obtained for the entire Hispanic American army, with absolute supremacy of the noblemen over all the other classes. In the rest of Hispanic America, this phenomenon developed slowly from 1740 to 1780, thanks to provisions contained in successive military reform decrees of the 18th century. 21 Proof of blood purity and titles of nobility became required for entry into the officer corps of the army. In consequence, individuals were realigned from . one class to another, the well-born and the sons of the military specially passing into the noblemen. And the career soldiers, who could reach only the grade of sergeant, 22 became assimilated into the 33.8 % of the humble men, who also could not enter the officer corps due to lack of a title. The comparison between the first and the second Spanish periods shows that the transformation was complete (Table 15). An antiquated, 17th-century ariny; from the standpoint of social origin, the military garrison of Florida becomes, beginning in 1789, a typical garrison of the 18th century, I thanks to the dependency on Cuba. There were more noblemen and humble men. The latter made up the noncommissioned officer grades. The complete disappearance of the career soldier and the passing of the well-born and the sons of the military into the nobility are amply demonstrated by the decrease , of the former and the increase of the latter. Unfortunately, discontinuity between the officers of the first and second Spanish period makes it impossible to see how their service records changed. It is known, however, that in a majority of cases, an officer whose service record read "son of the military" in 1740 would read "nobleman" 10 years later. 21. See note 17. 22. The appearance of the 1><>9ition of cadet u the exclusive way to become officer closed the acceee to the officer c:orpa to the career aoldier. who thereaft.er r.c:hed the grade or sergeant only.

PAGE 51

St. Augustine's Military Society 65 The army was thus a channel for social promotion, mechanism wanted by criollo oligarchical classes to obtain no ; inal equality with Spanish-born nobility. Spanish admini < t r tion provided sufficient legal means for promotion but at fr . same time it pretended that the powerful Hispanic Americ, classes take up Hispanic American defense as their ow.-1 . incidentally elevating the social prestige of the army. According to geographic origin, the social class of officen ; follows: 23 TABLE 18 Criollos Noblemen . .............. 11 Humble men . ... . ... . .... . % Spanishand foreign-born 73.3 15 22 Sons of the military . . . . . . . 3 Sons of farmers . . . . . . . . . . . Well-born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sons of artisians . . . . . . . . . . . 20.0 3 5 6.6 4 1 Total .............. 15 50 % 30.0 44 . 0 6.0 10 . 0 8.0 2.0 The transformation into nobility took place among criollos (Table 16). In the first and second Spanish period, this group incorporated only noblemen, sons of the military, and well-born, meaning that persons of the lower strata did not enter the officer corps. This is evident proof that social differences were a determinant in the grade structure of the Hispanic American army. Among the criollos, the sons of the military decreased from 63. 6 % to 20 % , while the noblemen rose from 0% to 73.3%. Clearly the sons of the military passed over into the noblemen class. Among the Spanish-born, the career soldier disappeared . passing into the humble men class. The latter made up th e entirety of the sergeants since they, lacking nobility, could no t. become officers. The noblemen increased from 6.1 % to 30% , while the sons of the military and the well-born decreased. The definite conclusion is that there were no important soci changes in the Florida military of the 18th century until l '/b '. ;. when there appeared a clear dependency on Cuba. The garrison 23. The Florid i ans are not mentioned eeparately becauee they are minimal part of the crjollos .

PAGE 52

66 El Escribano of the first Spanisli period did not evolve since it was a closed society, subject to slow change within its midst, eschewing external factors of change. In this sense, the 18th century in Florida began in 1789. B.2. Social origin of enlisted men There were no service records for enlisted men so knowledge of their social origin is not first-hand. But there are three ways which lead indirectly to deducting this important character istic. One is by examining the deep social chasm between enlisted men and officers, based on the obviously different level of one and the other . Besides, there were legal provisions to prevent the promotion of sergeants to officer grade which, in turn, prevented the private soldier from reaching that non commissioned grade. The other two ways are ascertaining the occupation and the literacy of the men. The enlisted man had a low social condition coming , as he did, from the most inferior classes of Spanish and criollo soci• ety. The . Hispanic American army had many problems in recruiting, because very few men wanted to enlist for six, eight, or more years, given the financial difficulties besetting the military institution in the Indies, which meant paying the soldiers scanty salaries most times rather late. The chasm was the reason why only those forsaken by fortune in Hispanic America and deserters from Spain and Europe were in the Indies. Joining them were those recruited by the press gang, punished by the courts, fleeing justice, or bereft of work or profession. 24 Compared to the officers, such a mix possessed as a common trait only the absence of titles and social prestige. Previously, the career soldier had at least the hope, through good performance, of becoming an officer. This road was closed to the enlisted men of the 18th century, and they became a social element separated from their class to be at the service of and defend the interests of the controlling groups, the same groups to which the officers belonged. The enlisted man of the Hispanic American army was regarded by the officer as miserable, vice-ridden, unlearned, and illiterate,.useless for everything, and whose only mission consisted in performing mechanical service. 25 24 . See note 17. 25. Night patrols, guard duty, watchtower duty, etc .

PAGE 53

St. Augustine's Military Society Xl ,.,, .. IV J l. n 7 G UD a.. 67 Hi•torio Or.rdniro d~ UU Arma, . . . Voluml' XII CtP"""" Madrid 19,'"+i' Coat of Arms Infantry Regiment of Cuba Activated in 1789. Detachments from it served in St. Augustine in 1790-1821. ... :.

PAGE 54

I i 68 El Escribano . In the first Spanish period, specifically 1700-1763, the closed character of the gardson allowed certain toleration never permitted in open cities. There were officers in Florida who married the widows of enlisted men, 26 and enlisted men's daughters who married officers. Generally, the enlisted men were treated as poor people with almost no salary and were forced to live by other jobs (for instance, on vegetable gardens and as servants) .-rr All this changed during the second Spanish period, specifically 1789-1820, and the social situation of the enlisted men became the same as in the rest of Hispanic America. There appeared Spanish convicts, the rejects of other units, and the unwanted of Cuba sent to Florida. This people formed the 3rd Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Cuba, which gathered all the troublemakers and vagrants extant on that island, and was assigned entirely to Florida. 28 Obviously the troops were of very bad quality, full of v1c1ous habits, and they inconvenienced the small garrison by other defects . 29 The truism that "the worse the quality of the soldiers, the higher the rate of desertion" explains the constant attrition visited upon this unit during the years it was charged with the defense of Florida. The second factor is the occupations of 186 (41 % ) of 453 enlisted men in the first Spanish period yielding indications of their social origin: TABLE19 Men who had always been soldiers .... 82 44.0 % Men who had practiced a trade ....... 96 51.6 Men who were sons of privates or noncommissioned officers ......... 8 4.3 The breakdown of those who had not practiced a tradeis as follows: 26. AGI, Santo Domingo, 840 and 2669. This aituation W88 severely critici2ed in Cuba and in Spain, because it wu understood as contempt toward the "natural quality expected in an officer of H.M . " In fact. theae officers have a note on their service records reading "this officer is mismate
PAGE 55

St. Augustine's Military Society TABLE20 Men who served in other units before arriving in Florida ......... 65 79.2 % Men who began to serve for the first time in F.lorida . . . . . . . . . ..... 11.. 20. 7 82 69 Now the breakdown of those who indeed had practiced a trade shows: TABLE21 Men who did farming trades ......... 93 Men who did maritime trades . . . . . . . . 1 Men who did artisan trades. . . . . . . . . . 2 96 96.8% 1.0 2.0 The majority of the enlisted men were rural laborers and wage earners, occupations associated with the lower social level. They had undergone financial difficulties, enlisted in the army in Hispanic America, and wound up in Florida. Those who had practiced trades were 92.3% Spanish-born, while those who first served in Florida ( 17 men) and the sons of privates and noncommissioned officers (8 men) were all Floridian. The third factor which indicated the social level of the enlisted men in the first period was the literacy index. Of the 453 soldiers studied, only 81 or 17 .8 % are represented below: TABLE22 Men who can read and write . . . . . . . . . 8 Men who can si&"Il only ............. 10 Men who cannot read or write ........ 63 9.8% 12.3 77.7 The lack of schooling was rather common in the lower class. In the second Spanish period, specifically 1789-1820, only 110 out of 791 enlisted men, or only 13.9 , were studied for social origin. The result: TABLE23 Men who had practiced a trade ....... 90 81.8 % Men who had not practised a trade ...•....................... 20 18.1

PAGE 56

70 El Escribano The trades of the 90 men above were as follows: TABLE24 Farming .......................... 65 72 .2 % Artisan .......................... 12 13.3 Other ............................ 13 14.4 Regarding literacy, only 100 out of the 791 enlisted men, or 12.6 % make the sample: TABLE25 Men who can sign their names ....... 12 12.0% Illiterates ......................... 88 88.0 In comparison with the first Spanish period, enlisted men who performed trades before enlisting increased. Since almost 100 % of these men were Spanish-born, a factor in the decision to enter the army must have been economic bad times in Spain toward the end of the century. Those who had not had a trade were criollos almost entirely. The study of the social origin of enlisted men is important because it is the study of the lower strata of colonial society. That Spanish-born rural workers became soldiers in the Indies by force of need is a sociological fact of the first magnitude. This, in Florida specifically, is a clear determinant of the social and economic reality of the second Spanish period. Almost all the rural workers practiced a "double profession" of soldier settler, if not legally indeed in fact. 30 In closed garrisons this has an extraordinary importance because it explains the rise of a labor class which is no way reflected in the documents. C. Age and years of service Age is an important factor in the analysis of every human group, and especially in the study of the component personnel of an army. Age is precisely one of several factors which can suggest a pattern of conduct. 30. This "Double-profesaion" was a phenomenon detected in all of Hispanic America. It consisted. given the economic need besetting a married enlisted man with children, in the man's performance of another trade or renting hie labor in off-duty hours. According to the opinion of hi• 1upervi1ora, thie the potential yield of soldier.

PAGE 57

St. Au~stines Military Society C.1. Age ofofficers The data for the first Spanish period are as follows: TABLE26 Number of officers studied .. . ......... .. 78 . 0 % No information on age available ..... la or 16.(i Median age ...................... 3 7. 9 years The 65 officers above providing age data broken down by age groups: TABLE27 Criollos Floridians 31 Spanish-and Total foreign-born 5 to 15 ..... 16 to 25 ..... 8 5 2 10 26 to 35 ..... 2 10 12 36 to 45 ..... 1 1 21 22 46 to 55 15 1 i) 56 to 65 5 5 Over 65 1 1 The median age above broken down by geographic origin: TABLE28 Criollos Floridians 32 Total sample ...... 18.0 13 No data available .. 7.0 7 Median age ....... 24.2 22 Spanishand foreign~J)Orr '. _ _ 60 6 51.6 Due to the advantages provided for their entry into scrv ices. t.l . criollo officers were much younger than the Spanish-born b u ; naturally less experienced. The median age of the sons of clw military was even less than that of the well-born. T!.t Floridians were younger than the other criollos. Among the Spanish-born officers, the oldest were the career 31. Included in criollos column. 32. Ibid.

PAGE 58

i 72 El Escribano soldiers, with a median age of 37 .3 years, and the youngest the sons of the military 4Vith 36.3 years. These results are after all perfectly logical. The data for the second Spanish period show: TABLE29 Number of officers studied ......... . 65 No data on age or geographic origin .. 1 Median age ....................... 38.2 years The 64 officers above providing age data broken down by geographic origin: TABLE30 Criollos Number of officers . . ..... 15 Median age ... . ... . .... ,26.2 Spanishand foreign-born 49 50.2 The median age of the officers in general does not change (Tables 26,29). This is one aspect with no essential variation between the two Spanish periods. In the rest of Hispanic America, the median age of the officers evolved from 46.6 years in 1740 to 35.5 years in 1800. Florida therefore kept a more or less uniform median corresponding approximately with the median of the army of Hispanic America. The median ages of criollos and Spanish-born officers also do not show great variation (Tables 28, 30), only an increase in the median age of the criollos, caused by their formal admission into the army at a more advanced age (Tables 31, 32). They made up almost 60 % of the entire Hispanic American army toward 1790, and so it was in Florida, considering . the dependency on units from Cuba manned by criollos from there . Among the Spanish-born too, the median age decreased slightly. Entire line units of the army arrived these years directly from Spain as reinforcements. The noblemen officers were younger than those already in Hispanic America, and they exerted strong influence over that entire army. Florida remained an anomalous case in comparison with the rest of the Hispanic American army. In the latter, age decreased due basically to changed social qualifications for officers (years of service being less important for promotion),

PAGE 59

St. Augustine's Military Society 73 but in Florida the median age increased during the second Spanish period. This was attributable to the impact on Cuba of external phenomena, such as the arrival these years of the new units combat-tested in Europe. From Cuba some of these units went on temporarily to Florida. C.2. Age of enlisted men 33 For the first Spanish period the data are as follows: TABLE31 Number of soldiers studied .............. 453 Number of soldiers with unstated age ...... 28 or 6.1 % Median age upon entering the army ....... 29. 7 The data for the second Spanish period are as foliows: TABLE32 Number of soldiers studied .............. 791 Number of soldiers with unstated age ..... 183 or 23.1 % Median age upon entering the army ....... 36.4 There is here a noticeable increase in the median age of the enlisted men in comparison with the first Spanish period. Again Florida was different from Hispanic America, where the age of the enlisted man joining the army kept decreasing. But the influencing factor is the geographic origin of the enlisted men. While in all Hispanic America the men tended to be mainly criollos, in Florida they tended to be Spanish-born. ?i-1e latter were older because they generally were drafted, rather thar volunteering, as was the case with the Hispanic Americar. soldiers. The factors of geographic and social origin art:! tht:! key to understanding the difference between the two periods. The age of the enlisted men on entering the army must b(' coupled with years of service to ascertain the true median age oi the men. C.3. Years of service of officers The data for the first Spanish period follow: 33. There is awareness that, unfortunately, the enlistment records furnish only the age of ,he men joining the army.

PAGE 60

I : : 74 El Escribano TABLE33 Number of officers studied ....... . ...... 78 No data ................... . .......... 19 Median years of service ................. 19.4 The breakdown of the above according to geographic origin: TABLE34 Criollos Floridians 34 Spanishand foreign-born Number of men ........... 18 13 60 No data ........... ....... 11 Median years of service ..... 36.2 6 36.2 8 18.l The Spanish-born had half the years of service of the criollos and the Floridians. During the first period the Spanish-born came in as reinforcements. The Floridians had many years of service because the garrison did not rotate to other places. The data for the second Spanish period show: TABLE86 Number of officers studied ... ; ........... 65 No data ............................... 1 or 1.5% Median years of .service ............... . .. 19. 7 The breakdown of the above according to geographic origin: TABLE86 Criollos Spanishand foreign-born Number of individuals .... 16 49 No data ................. 1 Median years of service .... 11 22.3 The variation between the first and second Spanish periods (Tables 33, 35) regarding median years of service is minimal compared with the rest of the army of Hispanic America. There the median decreased progressively through the 18th century. due to the selection of criollo officers. Even in Florida, the median years of service of a criollo decreased from 36.2 years in 34. Included in criollos column.

PAGE 61

St. Augustine's Military Society 75 the first period (Table 34) to 11 years in the second (Table 36), a decrease of more than two-thirds. The general reduction was due to the emergence of a practically all-criollo officer corps, which was characteristic of the Hispanic American army in the second half of the 18th century. In Florida, where the presence of criollo officers could barely be detected in the second period, the median years of service were determined by those accumulated by the Spanish-born. The median here increased, instead of decreasing, from 18.1 to 22.3 (Tables 34, 36) years. The existence of an officer corps in Florida came into being by the arrival of the reinforcement units with extensive service in Europe. The large differences between the first and second Spanish periods become evident by the reversal of t h e percentages from the data relative to criollos and Spanish-born. C.4. Years of service of enlisted men The data for the first Spanish period are: TABLE37 Number of soldiers studied .. . . . ........ 453 No data .. . .......... . .... . .. . ....... 110or24.2% Median years ofservice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.4 The data from the standpoint of geographic origin: TABLE38 Criollos Number of men ........ . 204 No data. . ............ . . 35 Median years of service ... 27.2 Floridians 35 Spanishand forei,;n-Lorn 147 249 28 75 28 19 . 8 The criollos, particularly the Floridians, have more years of service than the Spanish-born. The Floridians reenlisted repeatedly since the army was almost their only means of support. All the Spanish-born belonged to reinforcement units which came directly from Spain to serve in the Indies, and thus their years of service were less. The data for the Second Spanish period: 35. Ibid.

PAGE 62

St. Augustine's Military Society 77 The following is an analysis of the causes for termination of service in the first Spanish period: 36 TABLE42 Number of enlisted men studied . .. . .. 453 Size of sample used ................ 136 or 30 % The sample broken down by causes for termination of service: TABLE43 Died in service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 or 50. 7 % Discharged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 34. 5 Deserted .. ..... ....... ......... 20 14.7 136 A breakdown of the sample according to geographic origin: TABLE44 Criollos Floridians 'St Died ........... 61 42 Discharged ..... 10 8 Deserted .. .. . .. 7 1 Spanishand foreign-born 18 37 13 The latter data greatly clarify the previous conclusions. The Florida-born soldier remained in the service longer because it was his sole occupation. Only 15.6 % of the Floridian soldiers applied for discharge, 38 and only 1.9 % became deserters. On the other hand, the largest percentages of dischutgetl men and deserters occured among the Spanish-born. The men were discharged usually at the end of their second enlistment, and those who deserted were compelled to do so by the financial difficulties besetting the troops. 36 . Only the first period is analyzed because the enliatment record• of theee years provide sufficient data to obtain a repreaentative sample (30% I, 37 . Included in criollo• column . 38. Unable to devote themselves to another activity forced them not to apply for dia• charge. Almost all the Florida,bom soldiers are retired forcibly becauee they are old. '' .. infirm.'' .. ill, '' or ••ueeleaa due to advanced age.''

PAGE 63

i . i . 76 El Escribano TABLE89 Number ofsoldiers studied ... . ......... 791 No data ............................. 349 or 44.1 % Median years of service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.5 The data according to geographic origin: TABLE40 Criollos Number of individuals .. 150 No data ............... 62 Median years of service .. 15.3 Spanishand foreign-born 641 287 20.4 Just as it happened in the officer corps, the median years of service are reversed. Most of the criollos, recruited in Cuba or Nueva Espana, saw their first service in Florida, while the Spanish-born belonged to reinforcement units which had participated in European military campaigns. A comparison of age and years of service among the enlisted men in both Spanish periods: TABLE41 First Number of soldiers studied .... 453 No data .................... 118 (26.04 %) Age on entering army . . . . . . . . 29. 7 Median years of service. . . . . . . 23.4 Medianage onleavingarmy .. 53.1 Second 791 414 (52.3%) 36.4 18.5 54.9 Although the age of the enlisted men on retirement is almost identical in both periods, military service in the first period was longer than in the second. In 1700-1763 the years of service increased because Floridian criollo soldiers were settled on the land, whereas in 1789-1820 the years of service decreased because the Floridians had left and been substituted by Spanish-born troops. The latter were older than the soldiers of the first period, not settled on the land, and more prone to desertion.

PAGE 64

The Defense Structure of East Florida, 1700-1820 .Juan Marchena Fernandez Any attempt al social. political or economic analysis of the territory called East Florida during Spanish colonial times must put special emphasis on the part that the geographical location of Florida had on its subsequent development within the communications system and the geostrategic significance of the Caribbean. East Florida was a territory which the Spanish Crown had to hold, populate, and use as a launching ramp for the return traffic to Europe, and as a defense barrier against the expansion of the British colonies to the north. These requirements set the reality of the area during the period covered in this paper. The Florida of the 16th, 17th, and, in good part, 18th centuries was a military presidio above anything else, a bastion sufficiently strong to withstand the pressure exert _ edon i . t by those forces which attempted, in the course of the entire Spanish period. to cut off the routes and channels of commercial traffic. 1 This is why St. Augustine and the corpuscle of San Marcos de Apalache. at the west side of the peninsula. embody in themselves all the colonial history of East Florida. The situation changed during the second Spanish period (1783-1821). Florida became additionally an important center for the exchange of products between the Hispanic American colonies and the great nation to the north, the United States. And at that time when only the so-called "commerce with neutrals" was permitted. it even was one of the most important focal points of this traffic . 2 The latter situation existed only in the last thirty years of the Spanish period, but Florida was a military presidio from the very founding of St . Augustine in 1565. all the way to 1820. It was regarded as such within the Hispanic system, and its social, political. and economic development resembled, in a lesser degree, the development ot the other component parts of Hispanic American defense. When the latter became stronger by the creation of the Hispanic American army by Philip V, Florida began a slow but effective recuperation. The first fifty years of the 18th century were harsh for the territory. The English harassed the area constantly from the north as well as from the west. attempting to break down the weak defense 37

PAGE 65

38 El Escribano system. But the fact is that Florida held on because either St. Augustine was close to the large manpower and . supply base at Habana, or the statesmen of Philip V, conscious of the strategic importance of the area, defended the territory for Spain in each peace negotiation with the British. 3 This need to keep East Florida for the Crown meant precisely the potentiation of St. Augustine as a military presidio, by the increase in troops, fortifications, and situados (troop-pay funds). This, therefore, conditioned the entire area in economic as well as demographic matters. Hispanic American defense was a conditioner of Hispanic colonial reality in the New World. On many occasions, economic and political considerations were encroached upon by the need to carry on defense with _ maximum effectiveness against the external attacks inflicted on the entire system. Thus, military considerations modified substantially the sociological reality of some colonial social levels, because they posited a whole new political and administrative situation, a new review of the financial and sometimes commercial question, and an important channel of social promotion for criollos (those born in America of Spanish parents) and peninsulares (Spanish-born). 4 The stuay of military institutions in the great Hispanic American strongholds, echeloned along both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, reveals the fact, on one hand, that an important military garrison generated an important ingress of capital (situado) to support itself together with the implications that this brought along. At the same time, security from external danger motivated commercial and economic play positively, by the exportation and importation of products between the garrison (and its environs) and Spain, as well as between the garrison and the other Hispanic American commercial centers. Besides, military inhabitation increased the economic capacity of the entire population inasmuch as there was an increase in consumption in the city. In the political and administrative fields, on the other hand, the activation and retention of large military units in cities entailed change in the structure and functioning of the government. There was, for instance, subordination in many ways of civil to military power, exemptions granted by military privilege, and the presence of new. high-level officials (many of

PAGE 66

The Defense Structure 39 them military men) . Cities like Cartagena de Indias, Habana, Veracruz, Callao, Valparaiso,. etc., were important because they were centers of commerce and communications, but they became still more important administratively when large, permanent military installations were based in them. When this happened, the control of the Crown became more obvious . These garrisons also originated important social changes. Spanish-born officers entered the highest levels of colonial society, backed by hierarchy, more or less substantial salaries, colorful uniforms, knowledge of and experience in European wars, and above all, titles of nobility in a few cases. This breached the traditional, hierarchically social systems of the colonial cities, inasmuch as holding royal appointment as an army officer made social advancement possible. Until then. such advancement had been obtained only through land holding or by engaging in high-level commercial activities. Soon, and in successive generations, this nucleus of peninsular officers connected itself through matrimonial ties with the landholding and commercial oligarchies of the cities. and it became impossible on occasions well in the 18th century to separate one group from the other. 5 For the criollo group. which played an extraordinary role in Hispanic American economic development in the same century, the army meant a vital channel for social advancement. To be an officer in His Majesty's army implied a levelling with the Spanis _ h-bom, who traditionally had occupied said offices. In a process that began about 1740, the criollo oligarchy flooded the military hierarchy, and the trend grew until 1810, when they made up more than three-fourths of all officers in the Hispanic American army. Thus, if generalizations are permitted, the Hispanic American army in the large colonial centers consisted of criollo officers cf high economic; social, and perhaps political power, who were natives of the same location where they were garrisoned (there was almost absolute non-rotation of Hispanic American military units due to defense functions), and of rank and file from the lower classes, of whom more than 90 percent were criollos about 1800 . To study the Hispanic American army in the large colonial cities is a magnificent opportunity to study an ample range of social and economic situations in the 18th century. But in these studies there are two difficulties which are hard

PAGE 67

40 El Escribano to evade. One is the tendency to exclude the so-called "marginal or border zones." which were also essential to the functioning of the entire Spanish colonial system. The proper contexture of the empire in America was not limited exclusively to the great cities. The functioning of the system necessitated the erection of a structure (communications. administration, defense. etc.) which ensured that all the Spanish possessions were connected with one another by bonds of varying nature. The other problem in the study of the large Spanish cores in the Indies is that important economic, social. and political situations are sometimes unclear, excessively complex. and difficult to unr-avel and classify . In this case. the study of a marginal zone" suggests more positive arid less problematic solutions. considering that the zone has the advantage of sharing the same circumstances present in larger areas. Without any doubt. Florida was an essential part of the colonial system and its study is less difficult . Its paramount geostrategical importance does not admit discussion. In contraposition. Florida ' s scanty population. abundance of historic sources. and the interesting nature of the events which took place there. make the peninsula an area definitely qualified for the type of desired study. The analysis of the structure on which Florida defense was organized is an indispensable requirement to study the military population. The structure had two fundamental aspects: legal and actual, whic}:1 here shall be treated parallelly. 6 The legal structure was generally identical to that in the rest of Hispanic America . But given Florida's fundamental importance in the Antillean defense system, the defense dispositions and the legal norms for the purpose took effect in Florida in a very evident manner. Thus, the legal structure of defense was very much like that provided for the rest of the Antillean nuclei, except the special provisions . But it was the special (actual) provisions which really organized and made up Florida's own legal defense structure. The special legislation (that is. organic regulations) underwent variations which ushered in interesting changes in the situados and in demography . The legal and actual structures can be divided into five stages. to wit:

PAGE 68

The Defense Structure 41 ( 1) The presidia} organization It was in effect practically from the city's founding and lasted until 17 49. This stage maintained an old defense structure, such as was provided for Hispanic American defense during the times of the Haps burgs. The structure gave good. valid results in the presence of isolated and uncoordinated Indian attacks on the one hand, and of freebooters and pirates on the other. But it was fully outdated in the presence of systematized attacks by large European armies and navies in the 18th century. This obsoleteness motivated the wide restructuring which resulted in the creation of the army of Hispanic America . These changes did not take place in Florida until 1749 . .. The presidia! organization supported a dotaci6n (a number of authorized man-spaces) distributed among presidia! companies without a specific organic table . but c?.vered by the generic legislation provided through the entire period, applicabl e generally in all the fortified places supported by the Crown . In l 701'there were in Florida 355 salaried man-spaces. which in turn supported 1,400 other persons . 7 These man-spaces were filled by 323 soldiers and the balance was distributed among widows and orphans. according to . criteria not completely clear. As Governor Jose de Zuniga indicated. "should the plazas muertas (dead pays) keep increasing, 8 there will be no man-spaces for the soldiers.' 9 At the time, the garrison consisted of the governor, the sergeant major, three infantry companies with 223 officers and soldiers, an artillery company with 20 men, 17 assistants and administrators, and 16 seamen . The 223 soldiers were distributed as follows: 31 in Apalache, 13 in Guale, three in Timucua, two in Salamototo, 25 as guards and sentries of the port and inlets, who were changed monthly, and 137 as the general presidio guard (40 soldiers each day). Listed separately were eight old and infirm men with more than 50 years' service, four soldiers abroad on leave, and 13 deadpays, ten of which were widows . 10 In theory. the man-spaces were kept filled by the arrival of settlers and soldier replacements, considering that the scanty population was one of the most notable characteristics of the area. The soldiers were recruited in Spain during the 17th

PAGE 69

42 El Escribano century, although no new soldiers arrived between 1688 and 1701. 11 It was from this moment on that the sending of individuals ceased, and there began the sending of complete units, which became the usual policy in the 18th century. Actually, it had always been pretended, and the governors of Florida had thus repeatedly asked for it, that the garrison needed to keep the presidio and auxiliary forts in a medium state of defense should not be less than five hundred soldiers, a number reached only much later. The scanty population in the area prompted the provision of remedial measures. In 1701 it was ordered that families of thread makers and weavers be sent from Campeche "so that some commerce and some communication may go on," 12 but this was never complied with. Then, it was petitioned that the viceroy of Nueva Espana send one hundred men to fill existing vacancies and discharge disabled soldiers, 13 but again without any success. In 1702 the Council of the Indies ordered allied French Admiral Du Casse to leave in Habana one hundred of the two thousand Galicians he was taking to Spanish garrisons in the Caribbean, for further remittance to Florida, 14 but few of them reached their destination.* No other armed contingent came until 1706 ,but then it consisted of only 43 soldiers from Habana. 15 And up to 1732, only a master gunner and four qualified gunners were sent as reinforcements. 16 In 1737. by reason of the war with England and possible . expeditions against Georgia and Carolina, larger troop contingents were sent. Eight infantry companies, dispatched from Habana as reinforcements, arrived in St. Augustine. 17 These companies from Spain had become noticeably weakened in Cuba, but were nevertheless an important addition to the already battered garrison. At the same time, it was ordered that two hundred Galician families be sent for repopulation, but in the end this number was much less. 18 [ Editor's Note: 70 of the 100 gallegos to be left in Florida arrived on Dec. 28. 1702. together with the force sent out from Habana to relieve St. Augustine from the English siege of that year. Autos, gobernador Jose de Zuniga, San Agustin, 30 diciembre 1702 y enero 1703, in "Demanda .... ," 1707, AGI 58-2-8, Stetson.)

PAGE 70

The Defense Structure Toward 17 40 the entire garrison of Florida consisted of 17 staff positions 191 able-bodied soldiers 71 invalids 15 detached at San Marcos de Apalache 43 imprisoned by the enemy 337 total of old presidia! troops 24 officers in the eight reinforcement companies 400 soldiers in the eight reinforcement companies 235 additional men in 2 companies of infantry and 2 companies of dragoons 19 996 grand total of officers and men. 2 0 Ten years later . in 17 49 . the garrison suffered considerable loss because the Habana reinforcement was withdrawn and there remained solely: 166 men of the old presidia! garrison (3 companies) 51 men in an artillery company 50 men in a cavalry company 34 seamen 5 militia officers 23 staff positions 329 total number of man-spaces . 2 1 The eight reinforcement companies withdrew to Spain after a stay of eleven years and eight months . Only 221 men returned . The rest had died or decided to remain in Florida . 22 Thus, between 1700 and 1749. when the presidia! organization prevailed, the garrison endured considerable gains and losses due to the availability of the reinforcement troops on account of the war with England. The practice of sending reinforcement troops only, setting aside the strengthening of the presidia! companies, meant the end of the companies. and the beginning of a new stage in the development of the Florida garrison. At the same time, the survival of archaic structures until mid-18th century shows the unconcern of the Spanish colonial administration for this territory up to the time. (2) The arreglamento of 17 49 This arrangement, drafted by Viceroy Juan Francisco de Giiemes y Horcasitas and signed in Mexico on February 9,

PAGE 71

El Escribano 749. is, to a certain extent, a forerunner of the subsequent 1 gulation of 1753. and also an intermediate step between the residial garrison and the permanent dotacion of the second : ilf of the century . Military authorities were conscious of the sad state of affairs 1 Florida: "Should the old garrison of the presidio of St. , ugustine in Florida be allowed to remain on the footing it has ad. it would be a continued evil and abuse. and there would be o one to perform the service with the proper regularity. care, ndorder." 23 The arreglamento cancelled whatever previous dispositions 1ad been given concerning command and discipline of the roops and internal functioning of the garrison, and subjected \erything to the 1719 regulations for the Battalion of Habana, he very first stone in the construction of the army of Hispanic \merica. 2 ~ Under the arrangement, the garrison consisted of three irnpanies. each composed of six officers and sergeants nd 96 corporals and privates; an artillery company irrned by five officers, ten auxiliaries, and 40 corporals and : unners: a calvary company consisting of four officers and 51 roopers: and lastly five regular officers to train a militia ompany. All this made up a total of 421 men, who would cover •L. Augustine. San Marcos de Apalache, and Forts Matanzas. 'upo and Picolata. both on the San Mateo (St. Johns) River. at :1 annual cost of 80.697 pesos and seven reales. These troops would be. under command of the senior infantry aptain. who would also be the second in command to the ;overnor . :is This 1749 plan. which modernized the garrison by giving it a lructure similiar to that in the rest of Hispanic America, was hort-lived since Gtiemes himself reorganized the garrison , gain in 1753. (3) The reglamento of 1753 The Regulation for the garrison of Habana. castles. and forts mder its jurisdiction. Santiago de Cuba, San Agustin en la ~'lorida. and its dependency, San Marcos de Apalache," 26 !rafted by Viceroy Count Revillagigedo of Nueva Espana in l 753, changed completely the concept of the defense structure ">f the peninsula. Florida lost its autonomy in defense matters o become simply an advanced fort of Habana. an outpost.

PAGE 72

I The Defense Structure 45 Detachments would be rotated from that city . Florida would no longer have a garrison of its own, but its defense would be in charge of Cuban-based troops. To this effect. three companies from the infantry Regiment of Habana with 310 men . a detachment of 40 gunners from the Habana artillery. and a detachment of 50 troopers from the dragoons in Cuba were assigned to St. Augustine. Z7 Half of these troops would be relieved every year in the months of April or May. 28 so that everyone would be rotated every two years. The situado as well as the supply of provisions and stores would come from Cuba, the latter by the Company of Habana . Thus, the subordination is complete. Every aspect of internal administration and garrison operation (leaves, pay, retirement. replacement, etc.) was covered in the Regulation of Habana . In 1754 Revillagigedo drafted a supplement to the Regulation . which also dealt with Florida, reaffirming again the subordination already referred to. 29 (4) The lnstrucci6n on 761 Before Florida passed into British hands in 1763. the garrison was again reorganized by virtue of "Instruction to arrange, in consequence of the Kings resolution of March 2. 1761, the garrison of the presidia of St. Augustine and dependent forts, and implement other dispositions covered in the same resolution . " 30 This instruction gave back to Florida its lost military independence. From the three companies detached from the Habana Regiment, two companies were created for permanent assignment in St. Augustine . The garrison would consist of four hundred soldiers: two permanent infantry companies of one hundred men each; an artillery company. also permanently stationed, of forty gunners: and a fifty-trooper cavalry company. These numbers added up to 290 officers and soldiers. The balance of 110 would be sent fromHabana as reinforcement troops or temporary detachments from the infantry regiment of Habana and rotated every year. This was an intermediate solution. Florida defense was fundamental to Habana since the possible conquest of the peninsula by the English meant a constant check on the entire defensive, logistical. and communications system of the Caribbean. But to keep Florida with no other garrison than the one assigned from Habana. according to the 1753 plan, would impact St. Augustine

PAGE 73

16 El Escribano .mfavorably, because the doors would be closed to Floridians to become part of the garrison, and make worse the already bad :!Conomic situation of St. Augustine. The Instrucci6n stated :hat "if a few persons residing in the presidio of Florida, of the ;>roper height, health, and other required qualifications for ,ervice could be gotten to enlist. .. they would serve in the two ..:ompanies assigned." 31 This could have been a good solution but the events of 1763 Jid not afford the time to work out the system positively. desides, a formula was decreed in 1761 which had been tried in -ither places in Hispanic America: the soldier-settler. For this mrpose, a veteran company was reorganized as the Mountain ~'usiliers Company. levied entirely in Catalonia, and sent to ~'lorida with wives and children. But again there was no time to .vork out this system. because the company was compelled to :vacuate the peninsula in 1763. 32 (5) The dependence on Cuba Following the devolution of Florida to Spain (1784), there .vas a return to the disposition of 1753, that is, a total depend .-nce on Habana on defense matters. The dotaci6n disapp,eared md _ troops were sent from the island, subject to rotation. Specifically, the 3d Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Cuba ,vas sent, 33 consisting of the staff, a grenadier company, and four fusilier companies, with a total of 378 men. 34 Besides, :here was a detachment of 36 men from the artillery in Habana, 35 and another 20-man detachment from the Dragoons :if America, also of Habana. 36 Occasionally reinforcement mits were sent from Cuba; such was the case of the three Catalonian light infantry companies in 1793. 37 This type of Jependency meant that the possibilities for Florida defense :-ested on the timely arrival of contingents, but not on keeping :hem there. Habana was the distribution center because of the arge number of troops available on the island. But the practice .vas dangerous should an invasion, as the one launched from :he north in 1817, take place before the arrival of einforcements. From 1789 to 1820 the garrison lolled in a phase of constant :lecrease. There was no incorporation of new troops, and .ogically the effective strength became progressively less, :-eaching lows under those of the worst years of the first -,panish oerioci.

PAGE 74

The Defense Structure 47 For example, the 3d Battalion of Cuba changed as follows: 38 1790 ........................ 371 men 1800 ................ . ....... 253 men 1810 ...... . ......... . ... . ... 256 men 1814 ........................ 187 men These were losses of 50 percent in 25 years without replacement of the soldiers who died, deserted, or were discharged. This applied also to the high number of years of service of the soldiers, to their age. and to the lengthy stay of these troops in the same location. Florida breathed airs of commercial development during the second Spanish period. but it also fell into open decadence on defense matters. 39 The last structuration of Hispanic Amerlcan defense followed the loss of most of the continental colonial possessions, and it was limited practically to the Antilles (Cuba and Puerto Rico). Under it, Florida continued to depend with extraordinary paucity on Habana. There were no veteran troops to send to the area, since the best men had succumbed on the European continent. The latest fresh reinforcements from Spain were billeted on the islands to prevent their loss. Very few regular units were detached to Florida, but its defense was entrusted to Cuban militia units. The composition of the garrison in 1820 was: 5th company, Infantry Regiment of Cuba ..... 58 . 6th company, Infantry Regiment of Cuba ..... 50 40 Detachment from the Dragoons of America .... 12 Detachment of officers from the Infantry Regiments of Louisiana, Tarragona. and Habana, to command the Florida militia ..... 10 1st company. Free Blacks of Habana (militia) .. 59 2nd company, Free Blacks of Habana (militia) . 59 a company, Battalion of Mulattoes of Habana (militia) ................................. 34 Total .... 283 4 1 That Florida defense was absolutely insufficient was shown by the successful campaign of General Andrew Jackson and his Tennessee militiamen, who managed to enter almost unopposed into St. Augustine, Apalache, and Pensacola. 42 It was the

PAGE 75

-t8 El Escribano final calamity in three centuries of penury in military expenditures. The brilliant defense actions of the 18th century are more attributable to the temerity and courage of the defenders than to Spain's military policy for Florida and the weak structure that it had erected in the peninsula.* (Editor ' s Note: Gen. Jackson did not enter St. Augustine at any time. Charlton W . Teneau. A History of Florida (Coral Gables : University of Miami Press 19ilt. 113-114 . J

PAGE 76

---------------------The Defense Structure 49 "' Ill >0 g N !:! 0 0 '!o ct h UJ . 8 0.. .. 0 0 Cl) 0 z 0 (.) ,, ... : ::: .. 0 a, .... 0 ; .... .... ;;; 0 .., !::: ... "' 0 0 %: .. "' .. ; .. .. i !::: Cl 0 1c OUJ MO.. !::: ,(/) a: .. 0 u: .... N ,... !::: ; .. 0 ,, .. .. 0 0 .., 0 C: 0 Ill !::: E "O C: 0"' Q) .0 Ill E . !::! 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 g 0 0 :,0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Zo 0, CD ,... "' "' .. M .... The quantitative highs and lows of the garrison tn consequence of the policy applied. ~ 3

PAGE 77

50 El Escribano Notes 1. A minimum bibliography consists of Fernando Armas Medina, "Luisiana y Florida en el reinado de Carlos III," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XVII (1960), 160; William S. Coker and Jack D.L. Holmes, "Sources for the History of the Spanish Borderlands." Florida Historical Quarterly, XLIX (1970-71). 380-393; Theodore Corbett, "Migration to a Spanish Imperial Frontier in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: St. Augustine," Hispanic American Historical Review, LIV (19741, 418-430; Michael J . Curley, Church and State in the Spanish Floridas (1783-1822) (Washington: 1940); Verne E. Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida 1565 to Ji6.'3 f\\'ashington: 1941); Joyce E. Harmon. Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida, 1732 176.'3 (St . Augustine: 1969); Paul E . Hoffman. " A Study of Florida Defense Costs 1565-1585: A Quantification of Florida History , " Florida Histoncal Quarterly, LI (1972-73), 401-422: Samuel Proctor ... Research Opportunities in the Spanish Borderlands: East Florida," Latin American Research Review, VIl(l972); Charlton W . Tebeau. A HistO')' of Flon'da !Miami: 1971 ); John J. Te Paske, "Economic Problems of the Florida Governors ." Flon da Historical Q~~rt~rly . XXXVII ( 1958-591. 42 52 . and The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700 1763 (Durham: 1964); and Arthur P. Whitaker, The Spanish American Frontier : 1783-1795 !Gloucester: 1962). 2. Pablo Tornero Tinajero. Relaciones de dependencia entre Florida y Estados Unidos (Madrid: 19791. 3 . Antonio de Betancourt. "Filipe V y la Florida, " Anuario de studios Americanos, VII I 19501 . 4. Juan Marchena Fernandez. La institucion militar en Cartagena de lndias en el siglo XVIII (Sevilla : 1980) and Oficiales y so/dados en el ejercito de America (Sevilla : 1983) . Both these works are studies of the characteristics of the Hispanic American army from 1700 to 1800. The first is a structural study about how the Spanish colonial military institution in an American stronghold . Cartagena de lndias in this instance, is created, transformed , financed. works. ind disappears. The latter is a sociological study of the human component of these troops, officers as well as enlisted men. Thus, the study covers geographical and social origins, promotions, social composition of these troops, age levels, marriages. effectiveness, sanitary conditions. health. etc., through the data furnished by service records and filiaciones (enlistment records). Service records of 12,000 officers in all Hispanic American units of the 18th Century, and several thousand filiaciones of enlisted men were consulted. The service records. and filiaciones pertaining to East Florida al'J! naturally included in the study. 5 . Marchena in the first work cited in note 4 . In the second book mentioned, see the chapter on the army and society . 6. Although fortifications and other royal defense works should be studied in connection with the actual aspect, they were not examined as they are not the main purpose in this research. Besides. the works on fortifications are sufficiently exhaustive, ranging from that by Verne Chatelain to the research being performed by Luis R. Arana. Albert Manucy, and the (Historic) St. Augustine Preservation Board . 7. lnforme (del gobernador Jose] de Zuniga. 24 de octubre 1701. Archivo General de Indias(AG I) . Santo Domingo 840 .

PAGE 78

The Defense Structure 51 8. Dead pays were those man-spaces not occupied by soldiers, the salaries of which were used to pay orphan children. widows, and disabled retirees. 9. Carta de Zuniga, 15 de noviembre 1701. AGI, Santo Domingo 840. 10. "Estado de la guamici6n de Florida al 15 de marzo de 1702," ibid. 11. Informe de Zuniga, 30 de octubre 1701, ibid . 12. Informe de Zuniga, 24 de octubre 1701, ibid. 13. See note 11 supra. 14. Minuta de! Consejo (de Indias) anexa al estado de la guarnici6n de 1702, AGI, Santo Domingo 840. . 15. Informe de! gobemador Francisco de Corcoles y Martinez, 29 de marzo 1706, ibid. 16. Real orden de 22 de febrero de 1722. AG!. Guatemala 872-A. 17. AGI. Santo Domingo 2658. 18. lnforme (del.gobernador Juan Francisco) de Giiemes y Horcasitas. de La Habana), 24 de marzo 1738, AG I. Santo Domingo 2593 . 19. Sent from Habana in 1739. 20. Estado de la guamici6n, AGI. Santo Domingo 2658. 21 . Ibid. 22. I nforme sob re la guarnici6n. AGL Santo Domingo 2659 , --23. "Pape! del arreglamento en que debe quedar la guarnicion de! presidia de San Agustin de la Florida," AG!. Santo Domingo 2109. p. I. 24. See this regulation in Conde de Clonard. Historia organica de las armas de Infanteria y Caballeria, 16 vols. (Madrid: 18511, VII. 170. and in AG!. Santa Fe 938. 25. "Pape! de! arreglarnento . . . " 26. AGI.SantoDomingo2110. 27, Ibid .. article 107. 28. Ibid., article 88. 29. "Suplemento al Reglamento para las plazas de la Habana. Santiago de Cuba y Florida." AG I, Santo Domingo 21 IO . 30. AG I. Santo Domingo 2660 . Signed in Aranjuez, May 21. 1761. 31. See point 14 of the "Instrucci6n." 32: See the complete dossier in AG I. Santo Domingo 2660. 33. The activation of this battalion as well as its assignment to Florida was not free from difficulties (see the entire bundle in AG I. Papeles de Cuba 13771. 34. East Florida Papers (EFP) 8457, Revista de comisario, 1789. 35. Ibid., idem. 1790. 36. Ibid . 37. Archivo General de Simancas, Guerra Moderna, 7259. 38. Musters obtained for 1790 (EFP 86H7). 1800 lEFP 175Fl4), 1810 (EFP 90LT). and 1814 (EFP 175Fl4). 39. This paper does not cover the organization of the Florida militia, which existed only on paper. During this period, the three companies of urban militia, respectively known as the Mahonese. Spanish, and Irish companies comprising 190 men, were theoretically reorganized. However, according to the governor, "these companies lack military discipline. and most of them (the men) have lived many years under English dominion, and others (men! from Anglo America have been accepted [for service), which makes the proper conduct in case of attack doubtful. "May 18, 1806 (AG!. Santo Domingo 257 ll. 40. These two companies rotated with others from the same regiment (resolution of the Consejo 1817 (AG I. Ultramar 304)).

PAGE 79

52 El Escribano 41. Musters in EFP 85D8. The 3d Battalion. Regiment of Cuba. was disbanded by the Regulation of March 20. 1815. drafted for fthe garrison of] Habana . However. almost 150 soldiers were left over from that unit, and the Royal Treasury owed them 69 , 193 pesos in pay in arrears (AG!. Papeles de Cuba 2339) . 42. These events and the useless Spanish defensive response can be studied in AG I, Papeles de Cuba 1784, 1875, 1876, and AG!. Ultramar 304. 43. AG!. Santo Domingo 840: Guatemala 872 A: Santo Domingo 2593, 2658. 2659; EFP 84F7, 175Fl4, 90LT. and 95D8 . For the year-by-year reconstruction of .the garrison, see bu . ndles AG!. Santo Domingo 2563 through 2360, and AGI. Papeles de Cuba 336 through 358. since they contain all the reports from 1700 to 1820 pertaining to it as well as the monthly muster master's reports.

PAGE 80

FLORIDA IN THE LATE FIRST SPANISH PERIOD: ~,, THE 1756 GRINAN REPORT by Michael C. Scardaville and ,, .Jesus Maria Belmonte Students of Florida's colonial history know too well the difficulty in locating comprehensive, unbiased reports on St. Augustine and provinces in the last half century before Spain ceded Florida to Great Britain. The detailed Solana report of , 1759, written by the parish priest Juan Jose Solana, is to date the best known 18th century account of the colony, although its virulent attack on Governor Lucas Fernando de Palacio lessens the value of this document as an impartial analysis of the colonial bureaucracy.I The heretofore untranslated and ~/ unpublished 1756 Grinan report offers scholars for the first time a dispassionate summary account of Florida during the turbulent years of the late First Spanish Period. 2 Information on the author and on the origin of his report is / sketchy and to some extent speculative. Don Julian de Arriaga y Rivera, the new secretary of State for the Navy and the Indies, requested a comprehensive report on Florida in order to familiarize himself with Spain's beleaguered frontier colony . 3 As chief minister for the New World territories, Arriaga was principally concerned with military and defense matters: fort ifications, troop strength, problems with the vexatious English and Indians. and descriptions of the coastline. Aware that Florida was "the first line of defense for New Spain," Arriaga wanted to make certain that Spain's foothold on the peninsula was in no immediate danger of falling into English hands. 4 To secure a report posthaste, Arriaga turned to Don Pedro , ,.., " Sanchez Grinan, a minor royal official then stationed in Madrid but who had previously resided in St. Augustine for a decade. Arriaga's urgency for information is underscored by the fact ,..,., that Grinan had left the colony fourteen years before, although he indicated that he kept informed of events there through frequent correspondence with friends and officials. . rI Grinan lived in St. Augustine from 1731 to 1742 where he was employed in different unspecified occupations. Because of his 1

PAGE 81

Grinan Report 3 thorough knowledge of trade, commerce, and the nature and problems of the colonial bureaucracy, it can be assumed that he was one of the minor treasury officials or perhaps even a prominent merchant. In 1742, a breakdown in the provisioning of the colony forced him to accept a new position. As a result of the tardy arrival of the annual situado (subsidy) and subsequent shortage of supplies and money, the Junta de Guerra (Council of War) appointed him temporary situador to procure food and specie in Mexico. 5 No situado had arrived in Florida since 1738, and conditions in the colony had become intolerable. Although Grtna'n "did not return with one / maravedi" of currency, he succeeded in securing over 10,000 arrobas of flour, corn, and ham in addition to such indispensable items as tallow, wicks, thread, and cloth.6 Grina'n departed Florida after returning from Mexico, perhaps as a result of a promotion in recognition of his success in acquiring supplies for St. Augustine at such a critical time. 7 No record has been found on him between 1742 and 1756, but his report had obviously made a favorable impression on the king, for in 1757 Ferdinand VI appointed him as one of the royal treasury officials in Santiago, Cuba. Grinan received another promotion nine years later when he became royal auditor of the treasury of the important mining city of Pachuca in Mexico, with a comfortable annual salary of 2,000 pesos . He remained in .. this position until his death in early 1771 . 8 As evident in his career in the service of the king, Grina'n was an able and competent royal servant. Yet his report does suffer from poor organization and several inaccurate dates and place names. Such problems, however, can be attributed to a hastily written report that was composed many years after the author left the colony. Grina'n himself states that he quickly responded to Arriaga's request and that he re . lied primarily on reflection and memory to recall the conditions in Florida. These deficiencies in the report are far outweighed by the information and insight imparted about the 1730s and early 1740s, a period characterized by substantial population growth, extensive trade with the English, Indian unrest, and war with the Georgians. Directed to compose an account about military matters "and other details relative to the subject," Grinan proceeded to write a more comprehensive account of St. Augustine and the provinces. Despite the absence of paRcin on religious controversies and military defeat.ci . ,.

PAGE 82

-~ ---El Escribano :eals a wealth of data about a wide range of topics, from .i tudes towards Indians and criollos, to abortive efforts to :tle the hinterland, to problems with periodic floods in the v. Sections dealing with diet, drinking water, and medicinal rbs are quite illuminating, particularly because of the dearth such data for this period. Moreover, the author has the ability discuss not only the major issues facing the colony, such as fense and subsidy systems, but also such minor matters as excessive number of mosquitoes on Anastasia Island in the mmer. Gri.n'an wrote a document that is both informative and tertaining. Historians of colonial Florida applaud his effort. Most Excellent Lord / ,v,, Don Pedro Sanchez Griii.an submits to Your Excellency the brief account he has written on the presidia of Florida and Apala_C?he in response to the questions Your Excellency condescended to ask him in the matter. MyLord: .. Your Excellency, having seen fit to ask me some questions about the situation of the presidia of St. Augustine, Florida, and Apalache, their fortifications, garrison. Christian and heathen Indians, the quality of the country, the Engl,ish establishments of the vicinity, the bars and ports of that coast, and other details relative to the subject, I responded promptly with what came to memory. After reflecting on these matters, and believing myself worthy of my obligation to inform Your Excellency of everything that has happened to me afterwards, I have written a brief report based on what I have seen, heard, and understood in the ten years from 1731 until 1741 (sic) that I supported myself in that town with different employments, and based on what I later have learned through frequent letters that I have received. I wish to please Your Excellency. 1. Florida: Its Location and Quality of the Country The presidia and city of St. Augustine, Florida (in North America) is located at almost thirty degrees latitude on the banks of a sizeable river that runs from north to south. 9 The territory of the provinces of this country extends

PAGE 83

Grma.n Report 5 northward to the boundary of Canada; eastward it ends at the North Sea and Carolina or New England; westward to Louisiana; and southward to the Gulf of Mexico. 10 It is a flat. highly fertile land, with many rivers, swamps, and lakes. It has large forests of cedars, laurels, evergreen oaks, live oaks, pines, and other species. It produces numerous deer, bear, buffalo, and many fowl. The air is very healthful, and the people lead robust lives without experiencing the number of illnesses that are suffered in Europe. 2. The City and its Plan The city is a settlement of about five hundred houses that are built of wood. tabby, and a few of hewn stone and mortar.1 1 Its inhabitants consist of the officers, soldiers, and artillerymen of the garrison, some merchants, mestizos, and free mulattoes. The town is located on the bank of the river. The ground is sandy and water is found at a depth of one and one-half varas. 12 The pattern of its streets and houses differs very little from other towns in America. and since the houses are widely separated from each other. the people customarily plant some corn, legumes, or vegetables on their lots. They drink well water, somewhat nitrous but healthy. The natives of the city, who are of Spanish descent, are called criollos. They are brave, very upright in their behavior. ingenious, and inclined to war. 3. Parish Church The only parish church in the city is built of tabby and wood and is poorly equipped. It is served by a priest, an elder sexton, an organist, and two acolytes who are paid a total of about one thousand pesos from the Real Hacienda (Royal Treasury).13 4. Saint Francis Convent The Convent of Saint Francis, which until the last war was chapter headquarters. ordinarily contains five or six friars who, with others, are employed in teaching the natives of the five villages in the vicinity.1 4 [The friars] and the chaplain from Apalache constitute the number of instructors that His Majesty supports, giving each one suitable sustenance of about two hundred pesos from t-i. annual subsidy.15

PAGE 84

El Escribano 5. Chapel of the Fortress The accouterments of the chapel of the principal fortress as well as the chaplain's annual salary of three hundred pesos are defrayed by the Real Hacienda. 6. Offering for Bread and Wine The offering for bread and wine in all the churches and the oil for the sacramental lamps also are paid out of the Real Hacienda. 7 . Hospital The hospital consists of one narrow room of hewn stone and mortar which holds only eight to ten beds. Since it receives no funds other than those deducted from the pay of the few unmarried soldiers, convict laborers, and royal slaves who are treated there, it lacks clothing and other indispensable items for the aid and comfort of the patients. 1 6 8. Barracks The presidia had no barracks other than those of the fortress and principal guardhouse until the arrival of reinforcements from Havana in 1740. Four spacious wooden galleries were then constructed, two of them near the guardhouse and the other two within the def~nse line facing the north . 17 9. Commerce of Florida The commerce of Florida, supplied by two or three sloops which arrive from Havana twice a year, is dispensed in ten or twelve stores that sell rum, wine, vinegar, sugar, tobacco, spices, lard, soap, tallow candles, and other provisions, with a few kinds of silk, wool, linen goods, ribbons, and other trifles. The delay [in the arrival of] the annual subsidies compels the soldiers of the garrison to go into debt with the merchants who furnish them with the goods and money necessary for their survival. And since it frequently happens that the soldier receives no cash from his pay because of the many deductions, the merchants suffer just as much from this deficiency as the troops. 10. Need for Justices and an Attorney Field Marshal Don Manuel de Montiano, aware of how the civil litigations among the populace in Florida burdened the governor, proposed to His Majesty that two justices, chosen annually, be installed to . administer justice at the lower level: 8 I do not recall if he also indicated, as did Lt.

PAGE 85

.. Grlnan Report 7 General Don Antonio de Benavides, the pressing need for a lawyer who could discharge the duties ( as in other places in America) of Auditor de Guerra (military legal advisor) and civil legaladviser.19 Since a lawyer is not available, it is necessary to forward the legal documents to Havana, causing much injury to the parties and considerable delay in the processing of the cases. At the time of the last war with England, this need became evident because of questions that arose over the depositions concerning some prizes that were brought into port by Spanish privateers.20 11. Garrison of the Presidio and State of its Pay The three hundred and fifty positions in the garrison's allotment consist of a governor, appointed by His Majesty, who holds the rank of captain general of the presidio and province, three infantry companies, one cavalry and one artillery company, ministers of the Real Hacienda and officials of its accountancy, two harbor pilots, some sailors and cabin-boys to man the launches, a surgeon, a barber, interpreters of Indian languages, and an armorer. Their salaries and allowances amount to one hundred and twenty or one hundred and thirty thousand pesos annually, subsidies paid from receipts of the alcabalas (sales tax) in Puebla de los Angeles. When such receipts fall to cover the amount needed, the balance is drawn from the treasury of Mexico, along with the two reales daily subsidy that is appropriated for the widows and orphans of officials and soldiers . funds assigned by His Majesty since 1731. A military official used to be sent out from Florida every year to collect the subsidy, but this procedure is no longer followed since the Royal Havana Company has assumed responsibility for supplying the presidio . When the subsidy ( along with the others from the Windward Islands) arrives in Havana, the Company deducts the cost of the supplies and . forwards the balance to the treasury of Florida. However, this payment is more than three years overdue, and thus, the presidio's claim against the Real Hacienda amounts to more than four hundred thousand pesos. Although representations and petitions about this delay have been sent to the viceroy, asking him to release some of the funds annually and to continue doing so until the payment is completed, exigencies of war and other necessities of the crown have not permitted the implemen

PAGE 86

. -\ .. -El Escribano tation of what His Majesty has arranged. For the troops it is most regrettable that , in addition to the serious delay that results from the mentioned deficit , it sometimes happens that a portion of the cash on hand is borrowed in order to defray the expenses caused by the indispensable repairs of fortifications, for the daily rations of the reinforcements, and for other [ expenses] which were not reimbursed in Mexico because of some question about the reliability of the certificates or because of not having funds in the treasury. As a result, the account, remaining unsettled from one subsidy to another, is delivered too late or is added to the former arrears. Because of this the salaries which were not collected in Mexico are made up from the salary of the poor soldier, resulting in such pitiful outcries in the garrison as to arouse the greatest compassion . 21 12. Provision of Supplies in Florida Formerly provisions for the presidio were supplied from the Kingdom of New Spain on one or two vessels which also transported uniforms and the balance of the money for the payment of the garrison. Having experienced on many occasions that the delay [in the arrh i al] of the subsidies due to shipwreck and other contingencies caused the greatest necessity in the town, Lieutenant General Don Antonio de Benavides described [to the king] the total misfortune that had subjugated the troops and inhabitants , and, because of the exigencies that occurred, asked permission to transport provisions from the nearest English ports . This His majesty conceded in a royal order communicated by the Most Excellent Lord, Don Joseph Patiifo~ 2 This measure brought much relief to the garrison because it facilitated the supply of provisions. Since the English provisions were at least half as expensive, the soldiers were able to use the rest of their annual salary, 50, 60 or 70 pesos, to clothe their families and repair some of the damages to their homes . On the contrary, they were left with nothing when the provisions were transported from New Spain. and as in the contract recently made with the Havana Company. they lack the advantages that they had before . I understand they are quite unhappy [with the new arrangement] ~3

PAGE 87

Grffian Report 9 13 . Reserve of Provisions Considering the importance of Florida having a reserve of provisions sufficient for its garrison, His Majesty ordered the viceroy of New Spain to advance to the presidia the sum of twelve thousand pesos which was considered necessary for this supply. When the Havana Company was in charge of assisting in the subsidy, it agreed, whenever necessary, to advance the provisions for one year, but in spite of these precautions, I understand that the populace has suffered some scarcity _2 4 14. Urban Militia of Spaniards Merchants , craftsmen , and other inhabitants form a company of about 120 men , the officers of which are appointed by the governor. Although they serve on many occasions, suffering as much hardship as the regular troops, they do not receive any salary, expense money, or weapons. 15. Mestizos and Free Mulattoes The mestizos aria free mulattoes form a separate corps of 80 men. They are appointed when needed and are provided with arms and ammunitions at the expense of the Real Bacienda. 16. Christian Indians There are 50 to 60 armed men in the Indian villages around the town who serve on frequent expeditions, by regularly accompanying the cavalry squads on patrols in the vicinity. 17. Fortress of the Town The main fortress. situated on the northern side of the settlement, is built of mortar and hewn stone and is rather strong, especially after the repairs which have been made, including the vaulting of the storerooms and barracks within the enclosure. The shape is square with four bastions at the four angles. On [the bastions) and on the four curtains are mounted almost forty cannon, most of them iron. a few bronze, but some with less than half of their expected serviceability. It has a good moat, a covered way, and salients.25 18 . Line that Faces the Northern Field A line constructed of stakes, yuccas, and sod (very sufficient as a parapet for the infantry) extends westward from the fortress for almost one mile. It reaches as far as a

PAGE 88

10 El Escribano creek, where at its shore is a small wooden bastion, named the Oubo, [surrounded] by yuccas and [mounted] with three falconets . 26 In the middle of the line is another simi lar bastion which is called M edio Oubo. Each bastion has a garrison composed of a corporal and three solcliers.27 19 . Line of Circumvallation Another line, made of the same materials as the one mentioned above, extends from the Medio Oubo to encircle the settlement. and has three other bastions of the same type as those already referred to. 28 20. Fort Saint Francis At the southern end of the settlement where the line of circumvallation ends, there is a mortar and hewn stone fort which mounts five cannon and is garrisoned by a corporal. three soldiers, and an artilleryman. 29 21. The River: Its Floods and Abundance of Fish The river is of sufficient depth to serve as a port for the vessels . It washes against the eastern portion of the main fortress and against Fort Saint Francis, making a beach to the city which has been inundated many times by its rising waters, especially when a northeaster agitates the sea~o The river is abundant in fish, and along with corn, supports many people of the city cheaply. 22. Bar of the Port The bar of the port, situated four fifths of a league southeast of the main fortress, ranges between 12 and 16 palmos of water at high tide. It changes with any small storm because its bottom consists of loose sand. 31 23. Scarcity of Fresh Meat in Florida and Method of Supplying Some Cows and Horses Raids of heathen Indians destroyed the many plantations formerly in the provinces and ran off many of the cattle. Despite the resulting scarcity of fresh beef, numerous herds of cattle and wild and ferocious horses remained in the region. some of which were caught annually in spring by two or three mulattoes whose equipment expenses were defrayed by some merchants of the city. These cattle, as well as others that are slaughtered and sold by two or three residents who maintain small ranches, supply the city on several days of the year. 24 . Quality of the Meat and Horses The beef is very tasty and nutritious . The fat horses [reach

PAGE 89

Grffian Report 11 a height] of seven or more hand spans and are broken with little effort. They are used in the cavalry company of the presidia as pack horses and for other purposes. 25. Asses, Mules, Sheep, and Goats There are no species of asses, mules, sheep, or goats, nor do I have knowledge that there have ever been any in these regions. 26. Inclinations, Vices, and Villages of the Christian Indians In the environs of Florida 32 (but outside of the circum vallation line and under the cannon of the fortresses), there are five small villages of Christian Indians from the Yamasee Nation that are inhabited by up to one hundred families. 33 Their dwellings are small palm houses, much distant from one another, and they plant corn and legumes on their respective plots. But because of their limited efforts at farming, for they do not put much effort into this work, they produce only a very small harvest. They use most of their time to hunt, for which they have more inclination, and also to wage war. They are brave, but greatly inclined to inebriety, consuming in this vice whatever they earn from their hunting and even from the fruits oftheir sowing. 27. Negro Village at Mose A village one league north of Florida was formed by 45 or 50 Negroes who, anxious to embrace and follow the Catholic Religion, came from the plantations of St. George. 34 There also was a small wooden and yucca fort [mounted] with two or three stone-firing mortars which the English overpowered in 1740 when they laid seige to the presidia. They were beaten back and defeated by the troops of the garrison, but the fortification and huts were entirely destroyed.35 28. Picolata River and its Former Watchtower A small wooden fort [mounted] with two or three stone-firing mortars [and manned by] a sergeant and eight garrison soldiers formerly was located five leagues north of Florida on the edge of the Picolata River. Its purpose was to guard against possible war parties of infidel Indian troops and to allow the passage of couriers and some small parties of people who were traveling to Apalache. This fort and its garrison were tSl.luin h" the

PAGE 90

12 El Escribano English in 1740, who, upon retreating, completely destroyed it along with two nearby cattle ranches belonging to Don Antonio Regidor and Diego Espinosa. 36 29. Small Forts in the Indian Villages In the five Christian Indian villages there are several very small wooden forts, each with three or four small cannon. They are under the care of an artilleryman and provide refuge and defense for the families in case of enemy assault. 30. Matanzas Bar and Fortress Matanzas Bar, located five leagues to the south of the bar of the port, only permits the passage of such small vessels as schooners and sloops, although provisions were brought through here from Havana when [the English] laid siege to Florida. To defend this entrance, a small mortar and hewn stone fort was recently constructed, mounted with some medium caliber cannon and garrisoned by a junior officer or sergeant, six or eight soldiers, an artilleryman, and two Indians who serve as couriers.3 7 31. St. Anastasia Island: Its Land and Watchtower The Island of St. Anastasia lies to the east of the city and is bounded on the north by the bar of the port, on the south by the Matanzas Bar, on the east by the coast or mouth of the Bahama Channel, and on the west by the river. This island (which is five leagues long) produces many veins of good quality stone, especially useful for fortifications since it hardens when bound together with mortar. It has been discovered that bullets striking these walls remain embedded in them; occupying the same hole that made the damage. A mortar and hewn stone watchtower is maintained on the northern part of the island, from which the coast can be surveyed from north to south for more than three leagues in each direction. It always ls garrisoned by a corporal and three soldiers who are on duty to sight vessels at a distance and to put the respective signal over the tower to inform the presidio. A pilot boat is immediately dispatched [from the town] to the bar for the purpose of conducting the vessel into port. The land is not suitable for sowing nor for the planting of trees. However, in the western part of the island along the shore of the river, some corn of good quality and different vegetables are produced on a small plantation farmed by a resident of

PAGE 91

Grinan Report 13 the town with his slaves. [This farmer] also keeps several cows for the production of his own milk and meat. 38 All the country of Florida suffers the plague of mosquitoes in the summer. but there is an excessive abundance of these insects on St. Anastasia Island. Near the watchtower is a small spring of tasty water that is used for drinking by some families of the city. 32. Presidio of Apalache The wooden fort of San Marcos de Apalache, located about eighty leagues west of Florida, [was armed] with ten or twelve cannon and was garrisoned by a commanding captain, 50 infantry soldiers, several artillerymen, and a few Christian Indians who served as couriers. A discussion about making this fortification stronger and more durable led to the decision to construct it out of a type of stone that is found in that vicinity at a depth of one or one and one-half varas. When this stone is cut. it is pulled out soft like recently made adobe, but when exposed to the sun and air, it quickly assumes the consistency of good brick. Upon completing the necessary survey, which I believe [was done] by the Engineer of Havana Don Antonio de Arredondo, the structure was planned, and constru~tion commenced and continued with fervor, but I do not know whether it was continued after 1740. 39 From correspon dence I know for certain that the presidia was destroyed cornpletely and the troops perished when a flood from the sea dashed it to pieces. I have no news that it has been rebuilt, but I suppose it is indispensable. 33. Country from Florida to Apalache Inspected by Two Engineers and Project for Settlements All the land from Florida to Apalache is flat, with many rivers, swamps, and lakes. Although the surface is sandy, it is extremely fertile, and when cultivated, produces the same crops as the most fertile region in Spain. Formerly there were many plantations in this territory which were so abundant in products that wheat, barley, vegetables, and other goods were exported to the Island of Havana. In some places one still finds traces of buildings, fields and plantings of fruit trees [as well as] numerous cows and fierce, wild horses. Today all this land is abandoned and is in the same condition as it was when, at the order of the king, it was inspected in 1731 by two engineers and

PAGE 92

14 El Escribano Lieutenant General Don Antonio de Benavides, then governor of these provinces. Upon their return they prepared and sent to the crown a plan which proposed to establish settlements and construct garrisoned forti fications for their defense. However, difficulties and increasing costs made it impossible to put this plan into practice. 34. Project of Don Manuel de Montiano I understand that Field Marshal Don Manuel de Montiano, former governor of the presidio, considered it possible, and not costly to the Real Hacienda, to establish villages from the St. Johns River (twelve leagues north of Florida) to the town. I am convinced that his reports to the crown resulted in His Maj~sty agreeing to permit the Havana Company of Commerce to transport 500 families to form ten towns, I do not know in what places, but I would deduce that the royal order was in conformity with the proposal of the cited Don Manuel de Montiano. Since the war with England intervened at nearly the same time as the establishment of the company, this obligation was temporarily suspended, and I have not heard whether it since has been fulfilled. 35. Project of a Resident of Florida One long-time resident with considerable practical knowledge in the country prepared and sent to the crown a project that would facilitate the means of establishing several settlements in the above area. [He suggested] that His Majesty confer four or six Titles of Castile on wealthy residents of New Spain who would obligate themselves to pay the cost of [transporting] the familles and establishing the villages according to the prescribed regulations; This idea has the support of many . 40 36. Gratuity to the Indians The Christian Indians and the heathen [IndiansJ who offer friendship are rewarded annually with six thousand pesos of goods which the natives esteem and use. The merchandise, consigned by His Majesty, is distributed by an administrator appointed by the governor and royal officials.41 37. Convict Laborers Employed on th~ Work of the Fortifications of the Town Fiftv or sixtv convict laborers are sent from the Kingdom

PAGE 93

Grinan Report 15 of New Spain to work continually on the fortifications and other tasks in the town. The two reales dally that His Majesty ordered for their sustenance are claimed in the subsidy as one of its supplemental accounts. 38. Junta de Guerra of the Town The Junta de Guerra (Council of War) of the presidio is composed of the governor, royal officials, the sergeant major, captains, and junior officers of the garrison. When the Junta discusses matters relative to the garrison subsidy, contracts for provisions and other subjects which are not purely military, they meet with the Auxiliary Bishop of Havana who resides there or, in his absence, with the parish priest and the guardian of the Saint Francis Convent. All Junta de Guerra decisions on fiscal matters are presented to the governor and royal officials who, in their resolutions, determine the appropriate action. 42 Until 1754, the treasury was in the charge of two royal officials, a contador (accountant) and a tesorero (treasurer), but with the new regulations recently enacted in the town, only the tesorero remains. [This official], along with a senior and an assistant official and a supply clerk, admin1sters the office. 39. Heathen Indians: Regions They Inhabit and Their Customs The villages of the heathen Indians who inhabit the interior provinces extend a hundred or more leagues from Apalache, and from the west-northwest to the south, are bordered by the provinces of the Chichimecas, Guastela, and New Mexico. The lands they possess are like those of Apalache and Florida, abundant in forests, livestock, game and fowl, and with many rivers and lakes. No one knows the number of villages and tribes that it comprises. Several parties of Indians have come to the presidia to ratify the friendship they had promised, including the Uchizes, Yamasees, Talapuses, and Chickasaws. These four, among others, are the most important and numerous tribes in the region. The Indians are tall, somewhat brown in color, brave, inclined to war, but cruel and prone to drunkeness. Most of the time they live in the field either warring or hunting. They dress in pelts, but all their clothing consists only of a sleeveless hide that reaches midway to the thigh, a strip of cloth or leather one tercia

PAGE 94

16 El Escribano wide which covers the pubic parts, and boots and chamois sandals for walking.43 They feed on bear, buffalo, deer meat and corn cake, and when they lack these on their journeys, they fill up on hearts of palm and different nutritious roots. They paint their faces and bodies with various subtle colors which they extract from plants. They wage war in parties of 50, 70, 100 or more men, always by ambush and never in the open. Some of them ask for baptism. not out of religious conviction, but for the receipt of the present the godparents customarily give. They have an aversion to cultivating the fields, and they plant only a little corn and some vegetables. Because of limited cultivation, the production is not in proportion to the fertile land. Many medicinal herbs are grown here, and among them are some with marvelous efficacy for curing fever, wounds, and spasms.44 40. Failure of the Friendship Pacts and __ Frequent Unrest in Florida Despite the gratuities given to them, the Florida Indians ( especially the Chickasaws) break the friendship pacts they had contracted, making frequent incursions to within view ofthe fortifications ofthe town. [On such raids] they have taken and killed many men whom they found hunting, fishing, or cutting firewood, and they have done the same in the villages in the vicinity. To contain and force them to keep their word, it was once thought possible to wage a war on them in their own territories, using the Indians from Canada or New France to assist the Florida troops for this purpose. Upon hearing of this proposal by the governor, His Majesty resolved not to change the intercourse and friendship that existed with the [Indians]. 41. St. Johns River The St. Johns River, twelve leagues to the north of the presidio, is a sizeable body of water which flows deeply into the country. It is abundant in fish, and at certain times of the year Florida fishermen go there to catch roe mullet. On some occasions a concealed guard in a canoe has been posted at those places where enemy Indians customarily pass for the purpose of ascertaining if they are destined for the town. I have heard that this land could be guarded and defended with the c_onstruction of three or four small fortifications on the shore of. the river and with the

PAGE 95

Grina.n Report 17 increase of 50 horses in the garrison cavalry company. 42. Gualquini Bar The Gualquini Bar ,45 situated thirty leagues north of Florida, is where, in 1741, the English constructed a wooden fort to defend the port and where, I believe, at a distance of two and one-half leagues, they established the town they named Frederica. [The town] was inhabited by 60 or 80 families, although its size later increased according to what they have written me. Although an armed expedition that left from Havana and Florida in 1742 succeeded in overwhelming the port, destroying the fortress and forcing its abandonment, the mentioned town remained fortified and garrisoned. Some of its families left, seeking better land for their crops, and made their farms at places more suitable to them. They soon were forced to return, however, when a party of our Indians overtook and destroyed the blockhouse they had built on the place named St. Simon, killing or taking prisoner 14 men, 3 women, and four children.46 This. Excellent Lord, to the best of my memory and with some thought. is all I have been able to gather on the matter. If I may humbly hope that this small work will please Your Excell~ncy, I wm have _ _ the greatest__ satisfaction that one can imagine. And if in some papers that I am awaiting from Cadiz I can find the annotations I made in Florida on the bars, rivers, and other places along the northern coast, I will communicate immediately to Your Excellency the information I can infer from them. May God guard the Most Excellent Person of Your Excellency as many years as I desire and need. Madrid, July 7, 1756 At the Feet of Your Excellency Pedro Sanchez Grinan [Rubric]

PAGE 96

El Escribano a Ji, l.o7u-e./'.....,J-.:6ea~ ae. ~v. 7 /2~ _,,,,,_.,., __ c4,/'4',u2-:7 c7....JJ..o 7d1~17>1/, Last page of 1756 Griffan Report.

PAGE 97

! ] . Grfiian Report 19 NOTES 1. Juan Jos{ Solana to Julia'n de Arriaga, St. Augustine, April 9, 1760, Archivo General de lndias, Seville (hereafter cited as AGI) 86-7-21/41, John B. Stetson Collection, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville (hereafter cited as SC). 2. The original manuscript is in the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, MS 11.265 19. A microfilm copy can be found in the P.K . Yonge Library of Florida History, Reel 141-P, Madrid. Biblioteca Nacional. Departamento de Manuscritos. Dr. Scardaville and Mr . Belmonte collaborated on the translation, although Dr. Scardaville is solely responsible for the intro ductory and editorial comments. The editors would like to thank Luis R. Arana, Historian at the Castillo de San Marcos, for his assistance in translating several key passages. 3. Ferdinand VI appointed Arriaga Secretary of State on July 22, 1754. 4. Junta de Guerra to Crown, Madrid, May 23, 1709, AGI 58-1-20/116, Spanish Records Collection, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh. 5. Governor Manuel de Montiano and Royal Officials to Crown, St. Augustine, May 22, 1742, AGI 58-2-13/5 (SC). Grina'n does not appear in the military rosters of the period, although the above document describes him as an a/,ferez or ensign. Perhaps he was a reforrnad-0, a former soldier who was called back to active-duty by the governor to perform a particular task for the crown. It is significant to note that the Junta selected Griii'an as a replacement for the original situador who had died before departing for Mexico. Consequently circumstances forced the Council to hastily accept a person who was not currently a soldier, but who was familiar with the needs of the colony and the workings of the subsidy system. 6. Governor Manuel de Montiano and Royal Officials to Cro~, St. Augustine, March 26, 1743, AGI 58-1-34/71 (SC): AGI, Contadur1a 962A, No. 3. Grihan was in Veracruz during the month of August, 1742. One arroba is equivalent to twenty-five pounds. 7. In addition to the crisis caused by the non-arrival of the subsidy, Governor Montiano was planning to invade Georgia during the summer of 1742. The English victory at Bloody Marsh coincided with Grinan's arrival in Mexico. John Jay TePaske, The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763 (Durham, N.C., 1964), pp. 146-152. 8. Mark Frederick Boyd and Jose Navarro Latorre, "The Presidio of San Augustine (sic) de la Florida: Remote Outpost of the Viceroyalty of New Spain," 2 vols., Unpublished MS in P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History (Tallahassee, 1967), II: 245. 9. A presidio, one of the principal frontier institutions, is generally defmed as a fortified settlement designed to secure travel routes, protect lines of

PAGE 98

20 El Escribano communications, and impede invasions of hostile Indians and enemy European powers. Numerous presidios were scattered along Spain's frontier in North America, and, as with St. Augustine, permanent towns frequently developed around these settlements. 10. Grinan describes the 16th century boundaries of Florida, overlooking the English settlements along the eastern seaboard of the continent. He chooses to ignore both the 1670 Treaty of Madrid in which Spain and England established boundaries in the southeast and the subsequent English incursions and settlements into Spanish Guale or Georgia. See Herbert E. Bolton and Mary Ross, The Debatable Land {Berkeley, 1925) for an elaboration on the English preemption of the southeast. 11. In 1740, an English spy calculated that there were about 300 houses in the city, a more realistic estimate in my opinion. Albert Manucy, The Hou,es of St. Augustine, 1565-1821 (St. Augustine, 1962), p. 28. Grinan's comments on the "few" coquina houses perhaps indicates that most of the construction in stone took place between the War of Jenkins' Ear (1740-42) and the evacuation of St. Augustine in 1764 when 36 percent of the houses were built of this material. Juan Joseph Elixio de la Puente, "Plano de la Real Fuerza, Baluartes, y Linea de la Plaza de San Agustfu de la Florida ... ," St. Augustine, January 22, 1764. Copy in Historic St. Augustine Preservation Board, St. Augustine, Florida. 12. One Spanish vara is approximately 2.75 English feet or 33 inches. 13. The site of the parish church, Nuestra Senora de la Soledad, is on a vacant lot across from St . . Joseph's Academy on St. George St. 14, Throughout this report the "last war " refers to the 1740-42 War of Jenkins' Ear. 15. The report has comparatively little information on religious matters, and justifiably so, since Arriaga at this time was not as concerned with this topic. Grinan, for example, does not mention the arrival of the Auxiliary Bishop of Cuba which sparked a religious revival in the colony nor does he discuss the criollo-Spanish rift within the Franciscan Order which ultimately undermined the regular clergy in Florida. See Michael V. Gannon, The Crou in the Sand (Gainesville, 1965), pp. 78-82. 16. The hospital was attached to the dilapidated La Soledad parish church, William M. Straight, "Medicine in St. Augustine During the Spanish Period," Journal, of Florida. Medical History 55 (August 1968): p. 737. 17. The 400 reinforcements actually arrived in 1738. Cuban Governor Gtiemes also sent 6,000 pesos which Governor Montiano used to construct the new barracks. TePaske, pp. 138-139. The defense line Grinan refers to is the Cubo line. 18. Montiano was governor from 1737-1749. 19. Benavides was governor from 1718-1734. 20. The inherent weakness in the judicial system in Florida was the lack of an experienced legal advisor to assist the governor in the administration of justice. The governors were without exception men with a long military background who were unable to handle the complexities of legal

PAGE 99

Grma.n Report 21 procedures in the civilian courts. See TePaske, pp. 58-76. 21. The failure to establish an adequate annual supply system was the most critical problem facing all Florida governors. Reform of the system in 1702 (when the subsidy was thenceforth financed by the alcabal.as of Puebla in Mexico) and again in 1740 (when the newly-created Havana Company was obligated to supply Florida with its annual quota of supplies and money) failed to correct the chronic problems of delays, high prices and poor quality of goods, and the occasional disappearance or seizures of the subsidy ships. Moreover, as Grinan states, the specie, most of which went to pay the soldiers, often was consumed by non-authorized expenses. Mexican treasury officials frequently refused to reimburse these expenditures since they either complained of a lack of money themselves or disallowed on legal technicalities the certificados (certified statements) which the Florida governors submitted to justify the reimbursement. For an excellent summary of the situ.ado system, see TePaske, pp. 77-91 and 97-103. 22. Patino was Philip V's Secr~tary of State for the Navy and the Indies from 1726-1736. This royal order temporarily overrode the existing laws prohibiting trade with the English colonies. 23. Grinan neglects to mention here, as in other places, the controversial Francisco de! Moral Sanchez. governor of Florida from 1734-37. Illegal trade with Charleston and New York merchants reached unprecedented levels during his administration, although all governors in the late First Spanish Period relied upon the English goods. See Joyce Elizabeth Harman, Trade and Privateering in Spanish Fw,rida. 1732-1?63 .(St, Augustine, 1969). 24. The contingency fund of 12,000 pesos first was established in 1731 and reiterated in the ordinances of the Havana Company nine years later. Usually the emergency fund was either quickly exhausted or never was sent to the colony. Te Paske, pp. 95-97. 25. The Castillo de San Marcos was constructed between 1672 and 1695, although major alterations took place in 1739 and 1755-56. Grinan describes the vaulting of the east side of the fortress. Luis Rafael Arana and Albert Manucy, T/a.e Buuding of Castille de San Marcos (Philadelphia, 1977), pp. 25-36, 43-46, and 51-52. 26, A falconet is a type of a small cannon, 27. The Cubo line, built to supplement the defenses of the Castillo, was constructed within two years after Governor James Moore of Carolina laid siege to and leveled the city in 1702. This east-west palisade, with its three bastions, ran along present-day Orange St, for a distance of less than one-half mile, not one mile as Grinan states. The Medio Cubo was located in the vicinity of the current Ketterlinus Junior High School. 28. Grinan's memory fails him to a greater extent in this section. The line of circumvallation, or the Rosario line, commenced not at the Medio Cubo, but at the Santo Domingo bastion which was located at the current inter section of Orange and Cordova Streets. Moreover, there were twice

PAGE 100

22 El Escribano as many redoubts along the southern extension of the Rosario line than Grinan enumerated. Antonio de Arredondo, "Plan de la Ciudad de San Agustin de la Florida ... ," Havana, May 15, 1737 in Verne E. Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Flbrida, 1565 to 1763 (Washington, D.C., 1941), Map 10. With the completion of the Rosario line in 1719, defense lines surrounded St. Augustine on its three landed sides . 29. Technically, Fort St. Francis was not a fort, but the southeasternmost bastion along the Rosario line. It was located to the east of the present day intersection of Marine and San Salvadore Streets. 30. Floods plagued the city throughout the colonial period, despite the flimsy wall built by Governor Canzo in the late 16th century. On an inspection of Florida in 1674, Bishop Calderon of Cuba commented that the river "buffets" the town, "leaving it half submerged from hurricanes as it lies at sea level." A coquina seawall was to be built in the 1690s which was to extend the entire length of the settlement. Insufficient funds, however, permitted the construction of the new barrier only from the Castillo to the plaza, and consequently, the southern portion of the town remained exposed to the storm tides during Grinan's tenure in St. Augustine. Chatelain, pp. 79, 157-158 note 4, and 161 note 25. Also see the cited 1737 Arredondo and 1764 Puente maps. 31. One league is . approximately 2.6 miles, and one palmo is the equivalent of 8.23 inches. The port bar historically has posed a danger to vessels entering and leaving the shallow inlet leading into the harbor. One method of reducing the risk of shipwreck was to unload the supply ships at the . .. . mouth of the bar and transport the cargo to the wharves on small launches. TePaske, p. 101. 32. In this and succeeding sections, Florida refers to St. Augustine. 33. The number of Indian villages around St. Augustine, most of them inhabited by the displaced Yamasee tribe of Carolina and Georgia, steadily decreased in the late First Spanish Period. From a high of ten villages with 1,000 Indians in 1726, the number of neighboring settlements dropped to two, Tolomato and La Punta, in the 1750s and early 1760s, and the number of inhabitants dipped below 100. Nothing shows the failure of Spain's Indian policy in the southeast in the mid-18th century more dramatically than the declining number of Indian villages "under the cannon of the fortresses." Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor, 1956), pp. 267-268; "Reglamento para ... el Presidio de San Augustin de la Florida ... ," Mexico City, April 8, 1753, AGI, Cuba 372, fols. 10-11; Puente to Governor of Cuba, Havana, May 8, 1770, AGI, Santo Domingo 2595. 34. In an effort to undermine the English at St. George (Charleston), the Spanish crown in 1733 offered . freedom to all slaves who escaped the English settlements and adopted Roman Catholicism in Florida. As more slaves fled to the Spanish colony, Governor Montiano in 1789 settled them in the fortified village known as Santa Teresa de la Gracia Real de Mose. "The Mose Site," El.Escribano 10 (April 1973): pp. 52-53.

PAGE 101

.., ,. Grfuan Report 23 35. Mose was again fortified twelve years after James Oglethorpe's troops leveled the settlement. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 36. Grinan is confused about his geography in this section. Fort Picolata, built in the late l 730s, was located west of the presidio and the cattle ranches of the two prominent land owners were situated north of St. Augustine in the Diego Plains vicinity. Fort Picolata was rebuilt in the late 1750s. Albert Manucy, "Outline of the History of the Fort Picolata Area (1735-1938)," Unpublished MS in St. Augustine Historical Society Library (St. Augustine, 1938). 37. Fort Matanzas was constructed in 1742. Arana and Manucy, pp. 50-51. 38. Grihan is referring to a plantation located midway between St. Augustine and Fort Mantanzas near the edge of the Matanzas River. Puente identifies the plantation as the "Farm of San Julian," and two British Period maps refer to the site as "A Settlement gone to decay" and "Plantations Abandoned." This farm preceded Jesse Fish's development of "El Verge!" on the northern end of Anastasia Islan9 by at least several decades. Puente, "Plano de! Presidio de San Agustin de la Florida ... ," Havana, March 13, 1779; Anon., "Scetch (sic) of the City and Environs of St. Augustine," 1765; Anon., "A Plan of the City, Harbor, Fortifications and Environs of Saint Augustine," no date. Copies in the St. Augustine Historical Society Library. 39. Antonio de Arredondo was a talented and ambitious royal engineer who was sent from Cuba to St. Augustine in the mid-1730s to survey and upgradethe1iefenses ofthe colony and to conduct diplomatic negotiations with Governor Oglethorpe of Georgia concerning the boundary dispute between the two colonies. 40. The preceding three sections represent just three plans to settle the vastly underpopulated interior of the colony. Realizing that this expansive stretch of territory could not be kept from the aggressive Carolinians and Georgians, almost all governors after 1702 proposed some scheme to populate and thus retain control of this area. TePaske, pp. 86-89. 41. The cornerstone of Spain's Indian policy in the 18th century was not the mission, but the bribe. The Florida governors hoped to win the friendship of the Indians through the 6,000 peso gratuity in merchandise, but they were unable to compete with the massive quantity of goods the Carolinians and Georgians heaped upon the natives in critical times. TePaske, pp. 205-226. 42. The Junta de Guerra was not a permanent advisory body to the governor. It met at the whim of the governor who often convoked the Junta merely to share the decision-making responsibility on major non-military issues. TePaske, pp. 24-26. 43. A tercia is one-third of a vara or about 11 inches. 44. Although Grilla'n does not specify any medicinal herb, a travel account of the 1790s lists some of the medicines used by the Lower Creeks and related southeastern tribes: White Walnut, Black Poplar, Sassafras,

PAGE 102

24 El Escribano Juniper, Lobelia, Serpentaria, and Valerian. John Pope, A Tour Through the Southern . . . United State, ... and the Flt>ridas . . . , Bicentennial Floridiana, Gainesville, 1978 (Richmond, 1792), pp. 94-98. 45. St. Simons Island. 46. Grinan's information about the settlements on St. Simons Island and about the Spanish invasion of Georgia in 17 42 is inaccurate and incomplete. The English built Fort Frederica on the west side of the island in 1736 to defend the new Georgia colony against the Spanish, and Fort St. Simons was constructed in the following year on the southern end. The Spanish expedition under Governor Montiano never forced the abandon ment of Fort Frederica, although, as Grinan mentions, Fort St. Simons was destroyed. Moreover, he neglects to mention the debacle at Bloody Marsh where Montiano lost over 200 men. TePaske, pp. 146-152.

PAGE 103

Spanish Troops_?f 1565-1586 The time frame chosen is in direct response to the interest in re creating that period in St. Augustine.* _ It is a time of great change as is the entire century but never-the-less so~e generalizatfons can be made regarding uniform, weapons and tactics. The Uniform Uniform would normally be se1:m as the least important of the three areas of interest. My thought is to begin close to the sense of the man of the period, seeing then the arms as extensions of ' him and tactics as a development of their deployment. The late medieval period is characterized by the professional soldif;r, hired out under his own captain in troops or bands. These mercenaries are still the rule in the 16th century, but a new phenomena is the national soldier recruited by the King to his own service. Spanish troops of our period are a mixture.of German, Scot, and Swiss mer. cenaries and Spanish Nationaln. These soldiers are proud, not only of their professionalism, but oT their service to the Spanish King. Clothing reflects a strange combination of personal poverty, as he is from the peasant class, possible booty pecause that is a common manner of pay for the period** and the richness of the Spanish monarch who has, through the wealth of the America 1 s raised the finest army in the world. This is an important factor as St. Augustine is founded at the height of that power. The Conquestador of this time is well supplied compared with the sporadic support he receives in later per iods., It is imperative that the crown protect the vital treasure fleets and the garrison of St. Augustine must guard the North American con tinent from French or English pirate settlements. Most of the Spanish troop~ in St. Augustine in this earli settlement are professional adventurers. They have a tough task before them but they are equal to it. Their rough and pea1:>ant quality seems strange to us today because we se0 it dressed _ in fii:iery. The colors and laces of the period soldier do not seem appropriate to a mas culine image to 20th century eyes. We must remember' though that tl1e explorations of the day had produced these silks and riches. A "man of the world" was the image intended and tales of great exploits and adventures went hand, in hand with the new rich materials. We must also remember that c "' thing was a mans only display. His entire fortune was in his clothing and weapons. One set of clothing was the rule, except for officers and gentlemen of the colony. Your guess is a.s good as mine regarding a comparison with todays standards of "hygiene", but we do know that bathing was generally considered to be unhealthy, therefore it might be clearer why a gentleman might wear perfume as well as silks and laces. * It begins with the founding of the settlement and ends with Drakes attack. ** Some of our men have been in the wars ~gainst the French in Italy.

PAGE 104

! This costumed display of world travel and riches was not only stuffed and padded to build up . the _ mans figure and accent his masculine fea tu.res (e.g. shoulder and c_odpiece) put to provide protection. Padded clothing was a protection again$t sword and indeed the slash decoration, . so popular originated with actual sla.shes in outer _ clothing ( allowing the inner• to show through) _ from fighting, orig inated during the campaigns in the low countries.* Padded clothing was also a protection against b9:ing rubbed raw by ones own a.rmour and there is a strong correlation between armour shape and that of the jacketi collar, etc. Armour, since the medieval period, has _ been reduced to helm and breastplate, sheaves, mail and baclcplate but the weight has increased as defense against the new project, ile weapons. In the Americas padded armour soon replaced steel, especially in sot.tnern, climates. It was found to be not only easier to wea.r and maintain but better protection against the types of missels used by the Indians. Uniform in the strict sense has rarely been known at this time except on some household guards. We would represent the soldier of this period dressed as individualo in civilian clothing. "Good Tastc"e.g. harmonized colors & shapes would be characteri.stic of a Gentlemans clothing but the comm9n soldier might have some stran~e ' Combinations of cast-off, stolen, and home made materials. Some tercios 11 (regiments) were known to have been especia l ly gay in their color and show of feathers and sashes while another was all dressed in black. Our mans style is civilian and usually only arms, irmour, and training distinguished him as a soldier. THE ARMS Spain had excelled at sword & buckler when most of the armies of Europe had emulated the Swiss with phalanges of pike men. Our period ot interest stil~ finds some dependence on thesci tools but musketry and pike have replaced them as offensive weapons. Actually the first lncursian was the arqebus. This was a light match . lock (though the flintlock had been just invented, it ~ould not find universal favor until a century later). This arqebus was of surprisingly modern configuration though some ha.d 'fully curved stocks and were intended to be fired from the chest rather than the shoulder. The straight stock may prevail in our period, but both could be found. The round fired was simply too light to have effect on armour and the musket, a much heavier gun needing a rest, was supplanting it. This weapon could flatten a man or horse regardless _ of what they. wore. All this, and at 200 yards from a smooth borel / Although rifling (1474) is known, straight groves are also as ways of retaining the same bore diameter with succeeding Loads. The powder residue building up between the Lands. Regarding ~he twisted ~ifling used, it was not until 1747 that the greater accuracy of such was noted. It was thought to be that no devil could stay astride such a spinning projectile as he could the one from a smooth bore~ * or according to some sources in ma.king booty clothiin~ fit after the battle between Burgundians a.nd swiss at Granson (1476).

PAGE 105

This match lock. musket required a firing drill of 56 movements and so the musketeer required the protection of pikes. Gonzalvo de Cordova provided the model for the ."modern" army and thout,1h its tactical lessons were probably nbt followed in 1565 by the untrained Spanish with Menendez they most certaln~ _ Y were by 1580. The Swedes under Gustavus eventually were to dE!\;elop a l:i.ghtcr ~us~et (with better powder) and the paper cartridge.* Less and less pikes were needed with more efficient and faster firings. Our period in question, though, was typlified by heavy musketry. ~he powder charge still pre-measured into little tubes hung from a cross bplt. A finer ground powder was carried in a flask for prime. A sword would protect tre musketeer as would his service knife. Frequently his .only armour was a helmet. Incidently, a . wheelock could occasionally be seen but they were expensive and delicate compared to the matchlock. Wheelocks (1514) did, however, find great favor amongst cavalrymen for pistols. Pikemen would be more likely to wear steel armour. Their pikes have been shbrtened from 18 feet to about 12 and they needed the strictest dicipline. Helmet, Sword and Knife and possibly target or buckler completed his equipage. TACTICS . As must now be clear the game would be played thus. Long lines of pikemen** 10 deep, would form a moving wall. Musketeers would work from the flanks or in front from where they could retreat to behind the pikes (or within .. to a hollow square) for reloading. The pikes must be highly diciplined and tightly packed. En~my cav alry might advance, fire pistols at them and circle bacl<:. to re-load. The best defense against this wall was, of course, cannon. Spain led the way at the beginning of the 16th century with the cooperation of pike and arqebus to the battlefield by Gonsalvo of Cordova, "El Uran Capitan.". His "!as the first Army to properly ba.1anc e the use of these arms on the field making Spanish troops un: defeatable. They were 1 .the first with good field use of cannon. Gustavus would maim cannon lighter and more flexible. He even introduced cannon at the regiment level whsre they were capable of being moved by 2!l horse and had a rate-of-fire better than the musket. *-l<* These tactics were fully justified by the Otttcome of the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631. * Originally a suggestion of Leonardo da Vinci's ** The Spanish "tercio" was 3000 men. A division contained 400 or 500 and a company 100 or 200. 2 shots every 3 _ minutes considered very good by 1570.

PAGE 106

In 1565 it had _ been 70 yea.rs sincetne Barbarous French under Charles VIII invaded Italy and shocked the world bY actually kill-' ing their enemies. The age of strategic maneuver alone as d~cisive factor in war was over and the 16th century was characterized by religious and nationalistic fanatasicm~ Death was not only on the scene but so was dismemberment. Tactics of the day aimed at the total destruction of the enemy. THE NEW WORLD We must now try to extrapolate from what we know of these new tacttcs and weapons to see their possible opplication to conditions here. Our period of concentration, 1565 1580, has a.lreody wi tness•::!d the grea.t heroic feats of the first Conquistadors. The spi . ri t of ad venture had driven them as much as the desire for gold or souls to convert. Pedro Menendez, one of the la . st of this illustrious breed, had also given up his own chance at a life of ease and peace to again and again sink his family into debt; to launch. his expeditions and to risk his life to colonize land for his King. This was lond he knew did not hold the riches that Mexico and Peru did. It is important to understand this sensi:~ of self-sacrifice because it is a characteristic of the new National Spirit iri the Spanish Army. It was considered honorable to serve even in the ranks. A gentlemen might serve alongside a peasant (albiet bring his , servants with him) with sword and pike. As you see this complicates our depiction of clothing and equipment. What differences would his personal wealth mean? What changes are made because of new combat conditions? What changes are made for climate? Although the Indian bow was not as powerful n.s the English longbow of the period, like it, it was capable of a rate-of-fire superior to the Spanish Crossbow or firestick. The Conquistadors had learned that padded armor, the Escupile, was sufficient protection and sometimes the men looked ll _ k.e porcupines a.fter an engagement wi'th Indian archers. Padded and stuffed breeches and shoulder roll~ aided in this defense. The skin is also protected from steel armour, when worn, by cloth or leather linings because steel could become searingly hot under the Florida Sun. Steel armor has been such a mark of wealth and position for so long in Europe it is hard to believe it does not affect the New World fashions. Let us see the padded armor as more common . among the rank and file and steel more common with its leadership. Arqubusiers had traditionally cinly had need of the steel Cabasset but they will not have the protection of Pike formations in America and therefore will be in protective clothing too. The massed formation of Pikes as an offensive tactic would not have been effecti\Te in wooded areas with a.n ellusive enemy yet they are listed in the armory and men may have still have been trained with them •. They may have been seem to still have a defensive role in village or Fort entrance. Though the Pike may still be-the primary

PAGE 107

weapon of the.day; I believe the Spanish r~verted to sword and buck ler ( in conjunction with Arquebus, Musket and Crossbow) rather th6n Pike. An emphasis on misnles backed up with sword. The firearms would find increased favor in the New World for their tremendous psychological value over the Indian and even in Europe are more and more equal in proportion with Pil"es by the end of the century. (Incidently a Pikeman was paid 3 escudos per month, an Arqubusier twice that.)* So tactics did change for the New World, they would have to. We now see a man in Florida armed thus: padded clothing, wool, linen, velvets, silks** very fine quality for the upper class with upper trunk hose of cloth or leather with a fine lining showing thr-ough the panes or slashes. Lower stocks (canons) of embro:i.dcred or pla.in fabric with silk or doeskin stockings (hose) tied to them with ribbons. Shoe~ are shown to be light (like our slippers) for the period but we know that boots were pretty modern looking and so a sturdier more 18th century shoe must have found favor here. Common soldiers wore longer hose or "slops" coming to the knee and tied there to stockings. The mortality_ rate on stockings and light footwear must have been terrific so we might envision some men bare legged and wearing homemade rough shoes or SD.ndals. The detachable slr1cve of his jerkin or doublet may have -been left off also in the summer. A soft hat or steel helmet (cascos) covers his head. Padded ":: ,, or steel armor may or may not be worn O\".er the Doublet ( or peas cod jackGt). A man would always carry a knife of a practical shape to eat and work with but soldiers would also carry a dagger for self protection. A sword was also customary and then pike, arqebus or crossbow depending on his training. I would think men with Pikes or juat swords would carry targets or shields, steel or leather over-wood, of round or "heart II shape, ( a.ctuall;y like a cut apple}. Now our Florida Soldier-settler finds clarification. His background and training modified for new conditions and with his type of cloth ing facing its toughest test he defeats his enemies and survives the climate. Uniform, weapons and tactics have stood the trial and his settlement survives. * The escudo was equal to 2 pieces 6f eight {silver) or 1/8 of a doubloon (gold). (That is about two pre-wa.r American dollars. ** Red was a popular color and red and yello~ are mentioned by Clonard for New World soldiers in 1555.

PAGE 108

( JV'\~..,c. h lo c. \< n"V\~ \(e\ W• '"eSI I . c.anon 5 -. Lo1,.1e"' stoc.. <.. .

PAGE 109

EL VESTUARIO DE LOS SOLDADOS DEL PRESIDIO DE SAN AGUSTIN EN 1740 THE ORDERS OF DRESS [n reveiw1ng what informition could b• found, the Research and k~~aurce Committee found time and time again that the experts consider the 1730's-1740's to be a "transition period" in which patterns and u::,.Jg<-:~s were. in a transition from the early 18th c:entLtry seen in the 1700 " MarlboroLgh Wars" or the War of Spanish Suc:cesion < 0Lteen Anne's War in some of our literature> and those styles that were in use 1n the middle of the 18th century such as the Seven Years War < c61led 1n North America the French and Indian War). Considering the role and status of San Agustin in the period, the Research and Re~uurce Committee recommends that whenever there is a possi~il1ty that an article or weapon might b• of one (earlier) pattern or another one, it is more log1c~l to assume that the earlier pattern was tu be found in this presidia. San Agustin was not the kind of place that received the newest equiptment or the latest fashions. I Most of the surviving artwork of Spanish troops in the 18th century I was made of men in their formal, garrison duty dress; the best, the I~it[Q ~ililiC ~YCQQi by the Marquis Alfonso Taccoli, Duke of Phlm~ (1760), was a collection of watercolors done of the various troops ct the thn::e 80L1rbon monar-ch i es of 18th century ELtrope: Spain, F,,::1nce, and the Kingdom of Two Sicil1es. It was supposed to show the king thE troops at their best. In recent correspondence with Ulrich Koch of Gennany who did the original research into "reconstructing" the uniform of the presidial troops of Florida in 1969, Mr. Koch recummended to Garrison members to give greater reliance on 1 r,-f c::inn,i\t ion from artwork than on the limited docL1mentary source.s relating to San Agustin before the Reglamento de 1753. He particularly recommended the Teatro Militar de EuroQa for guidance, as well a~ a p~i nt1 ng of troops in the "Plaza Mayor de la Ci Ltdad de Mexico'', a painting done in our period here in the New World. An effort is underway to obtain a slide of this painting, now hanging in the Museo Nacional. de la Historia in Mexico City. For the purposes of Living History in San Agustin, the formal, garrison duty order of dress should be followed by troops on duty in Castillo de San Marcos, or at the City Gate, or on guar~~t the Governor's House. In these places, the soldado was under ~he eye of his superior officers and undergoing periodic: inspections. He was gQ ~Ytt 1n a formal sense and his dress and posture should reflect that.

PAGE 110

THE ORDER OF DRESS FOR GARRISON SERVICE: Military Tricorn with Red Cockade Cravat Shirt Breeches Greatcoat _ ,,,,., .___..,--Wai stl':oat ** In consideration of our hot sL1mmers and recoqn 1 : : 1 r, 1 J tt1e +act th .. ~t most members c.'\re not accL1stomed to i.-iec:11 t.l,1 .,-; dress 7 days week it will continue to be acceptabl~ for members to NOT wear waistcoats under the greatcGat in extreme conditions. However, wearing correct a~C~!.~• if at all possible, if there is a choice between a greatcoat ang wearing Just a waistcoat, a more impression is given by the greatcoat in sCCia9Q Deep Red Stockings 18th century shoes with buckles Waistbelt, plain natural brown leather well-oiled Side arms: A man does not look -"complete 11 without sidearms. Bayonet ** ALWAYS, often even "off-duty" ** Swore, of the infantry hangar type, if owned Note: It is perfectly acceptable for a soldier to turn out for duty with just his bayonet ** Machetes are NOT appropriate for formal duty Musket, iron and brass well-cleaned and oiled Cartridge box, either the later over-the-shoulder model or the earlier bellybox model is acceptable. "F'olvorin" Priming Flask, carried on a flat 1/2 inch plain natural leather, well-oiled over the right shoulder. For guidance, see Brinckerhoff's book on Spanish arms in colonial America 1700-1821. ~ : ,,:;1r q E!n t ~, s .. ~rgents bc1:-:es. Ordinary po~der horns of the Anglo-American pattern are not encouraged. Note: A separate powder flask will do ti,&~ pr .. 01.Hn ,nusl ,,~t. dr111 of 1728. tfr 1 l l 1 i , I : . , I l /'.::',~:_; .' 1 n t . ,:\ gt2. b . e necessary to The pr esent s hould carry th&1r wearing sashes in H, : dbercls. No C::(rt show5 r)~• .. 1 1,1 ,1, this period or wearing ammun1t1on

PAGE 111

Haversack Knapsacks Canteens CLtps haversack, rather t~an the practice that has developed of wearing them on garrison duty. NO HAVERSACKS ARE SEEN IN ART OF SPANISH TROOPS ON FORMAL DUTY. This is an article of marching dress, and would not be needed on formal duty in the fort. Haversacks were used in the 18th century to carry the eating utensils and issued rations, such as three days worth of bread. If a Garrison member is h~ving clothing made, make sure tH~re ~l " R functional pockf:?ts to hold c.;:.ff" keys, ligt1t, 1 c:1ge~rettt:::c;;, etc. Tt 1s recommended that i..111.:'..:.1.. Anachronisms. not be . carried in haversack~ wher~ . the public ~iQht see them and the impression of the 18th century soldado be compromised. It is perfectly fine to wear a haversack from the old auto up to the _Castillo, but it is not logical to wear it on guard duty throughout the day. Again, not much hard information. The . few art examples show a square sack with a wida leather strap worn over the shoulder like the haversack, and leather closures with brass buckles. Knapsacks are for spare clothing, blanket,etc. Again, this is not something that a soldier on duty Just down the street from his home would be wearing at the Castillo. More research is needed before a recommendation can be made. The Research and Resource Committee did agree that wooden canteen seen in the Revolutionary War in the American army was not appropriate. Small keg-style water containers and leather cuver glass flasks are acceptable in the meantime. Another exc~llent possibility is the traditional Spanish "bota" or 1:?ather wine~~kin, (wi-t.houl modern plastic, of course.) Inquiries have been sent to Spain to find out the history of "botas". Some examples of tin cups have been found in 18th century sites, but not ~very soldado would have tinware. Wooden <:Lips and pottery cups are knciwn to have b~?en in Lise, but tt1e brea~::c:1b1 lit, '.!1 pottery limits its use in a haversack. The Committee could find no evidence that dr1nf tng

PAGE 112

Utensils cups were worn on any"part of the visible uniform. Cups should hence~orth be only in the haversack. The Committee recommends horn cups as more accurate in the early 18th century. Forks are not recommended. Forks were not found even in high status families in New England until 1720; although there is evidence that the use of forks was earlier and more widespread in the Medi terranean cultures of Italy and Spain than Northern Europe, in San Agustin we think it is more accL1rate to QQ!;, !.:!a'. iQ!:.la• If it is necessary to •pear a chunk of food and lift it to the .mouth, U1e way to do ilt is with the point of your knife which was conii~ered a perfectly acceptable personal eating utensil. The availability of pewter for spoons 1n ~dn Agustin 1s unknown. Wooden or horn spoons ~ra another option. Realistically, for your health it is easier to kill germs on a pewter spoon. In the place of tin plates or ~lates in general a better choice is the wooden trencher. Keep in mind that the "modern style" of menu planning where a meal should have three components such as meat, potatoes, and vegetable separate on the plate was not 'yet in fashion in the early 18th century. The majority of meals were one-pot affairs more reminscient of a medieval peasant's dinner; all you need is a spoon and a trencher, your knife, and a crust of daily bread. For more information~ read: lo ~m~ll Ib1D9! EgcggttiO• * * * * * * * Just as soldados had to march in this province, clearly there were times of duty in which wqod had to be chopp~d, food prepared, tentage put ~P, etc., in which all of the above, equipage would be a massive hindrance. ORDERS OF DRESS, FATIGUE SERVICE: Tr1corn Waistcoat, sleeved Shir-t Note: It is important for new members to "un-learn" OLtr

PAGE 113

t.Lh,'.i 8: ORDERS CrC::~V
PAGE 114

Invalid company off active duty. have no artwork, yet. About troops in the New World, we 1~ recognition of the fact that all of us have to live in the 20th ce~tury at least 5 days a week, and that there may be some incredibly ugly faces hidden out there under those beards, the Research and f,esource Committee recommends that if a Garri aon member haa QQ g_~~t::.QJ.. QQ abQ~lg u2t gi::::.2~ 20~ a2l@i~ t2i::::. tb~ i::::.@~a2a gf :oiat2i::::.i~ai a~~Yi::::.e~~:For the highest level of historical accuracy on the matter of hair, a soldado should wear his natural hair long enbugh so tnat with a cueing ribbon < la coletilla, of which hundreds of varas (yards) are found on the shipping lists>, a pigtail of a length to the middle of his back could be worn. Powdered hair or .white wigs seem to be later than 1740. If a member wants to wear a wig, it should be his natural hair c olor, and cued with black grosgrai~ ribbori. Thf: ~~e.ar i ng of your 20th century style hair is sti 11, at the present time acceptable. JE~.JELRY One of the greatest sources of visible anachronisms is personal jewelry. The Committee recommends that soldados wear only such jewelry as can be matched to archeological finds in this city. See: Spanish St.Augustine. The Archeolog~ of a colonial Creole communit~. 1983. Kathleen Deagan. Plain gold wedding bands are fine. Any other items should be thoroughly checked out first. 1 I The Committee was unanimous in its opinion that modern glasse s loo~ bad, even to the most ignorant byst~nder. The recommendation is to NOT wear glasses if you can possibly avoid it, even 18th century glasses. Soldados in San Agustin would have not been literate to start with, and in Living History ~rograms, you should have a minimum of reading to do while in full kit. The common soldier was not taking aim, a-la-Dan'l Boone, in 18th century infantry tactics. If not wudring your glasses makes you a health hazard to yourself and others, then wear 18th century types. PERSON,~L HABIT . Tobacco was a widely enJcyed vice in the 18th century. Although the Spanish invented the cigarette, its present form is 19th century and later. Good evidence exists for cigars in the Spanish Caribbean from the time of Colombus on. It was much less common for Spanish Criollos to make use of pipes than the othe~ Europeans, although broken pipe fragments are archeologically found in this city. There have been several companies to manufacture and market small, crude~y rolled "cigarillos" in foil packets; these are closer to the ideal than Tiparillos or White Owls.

PAGE 115

I The Committee does not feel that soldados wo~ld have smoked while on formal duties. If you have this habit, it would be admirable if yqu could master the fine art of striking fire with flint and steel, since whipping out a match while in 18th century dress destroys your entire credibility. Most of our members •nJcy reading. 18th century troops did net hav~ the ability to so even whil• rel&xinQ in camp or th• guardroom, books are net appropriata entertainment, except to offic:ers and non-coms. \ \

PAGE 116

NOMENClATURE OF 18th C~TURY SPANISH UNIFORM BAYONE'l'A CAMISA BarONES CARTUCHERA ( CACERINA A LA CINTURA) CHUPA CALiON PORTAFUSIL ------(i;:;o~) .,,.MEDIA . ZAPATCS ESCARAPELA ROJA SOMBHEHO TRICORNIO CORBA'rA DE LAZADA PORTA FRASCO CASACA BUELTAS VUEL'I'AS BRIDECU CINTURON CARTERAS BOTINES ALTCS DE LIENZO "POLAINAS" , ---TRABILLA FUSIL DE 1728 . . \....I ::

PAGE 117

GUIDELINES FOR UNIFORMS, ARMS, AND ACCOUTREMENTS Details Reve1wed by the Research and Resource Committee 198~ For the Three Presidial Companies of San Agustin 1730-1745 HATS black felt military tricorns, style 1710-1750 "Sombr ero tricornio" with white linen liner HhT TF:IM Gold braid, 1 1/4 " "gal on de sombrero" or "gal on mosquetero" \ HAT BUTTON Brass, set high on the hat HAT THONGS Black, not conspicous COCKADE Red wool 1n a butterfly shape, worn high on the hat brim "Escarapela roja" CRAVAT White shirt q1.1ality linen, 66" long with square ends. When correctly worn, the cravat will completely hide the shirt collar. "Corbata de l az ada 11 SHIRT "Camisa" There are two ityles of knot~ seen in artwork. Bowtie styles have small bows. Plain up~and-under looks more conservative. 18th century undergarment, nightshirt. properly made long like a During the Bicentennial, it was customary in St Augustine to make the linen shirts with a wide 4 11 collar that was worn over the stock; this style continued when interest shifted to the earlier interpretation of Spanish troops in this city. Looi , r,q _. t. e: 1 ~,, t l r,q _;;;r t1<1or I 1 : t"le Comm1 t. tee recommends that shirt t :u l 1 ar~; l:H,t cut bac:k to 1" at tl,e most. Thev are not folded aver the cravat in this period. , GRE~TCOAT Blue wool, with full, earlier style tailoring, no turnbacks Lining of white linen, sleeves may be left unlined. CUFFS Red Wool, very full, with 3 brass buttons "BL1elta or Vuelta" RUTTONS Brass, flat disk under 3/4" diameter/ 17-19 mm -:

PAGE 118

. . , .. . . . -,_.,_., . , . .. . .. , ..... j , _,., "8otonadLlra" BUTTON INTERVA~ Inconclusive evidence here. Most units depicted show intervals of 3" center-to-center. A fair number also show more buttons, spaced closer together, but these would appear to be elite units. Some coat fronts have 12-14 buttons~ while a number of other$ have 19-20. COLU~RS 11 CL1ello" The tendency bf the Committee on this ~uestion is to recommend continuing with the same spacing as before since the more closely spaced buttons tend to be shown on units that are elite or p~ivately financed~ such as the Merchant"s Guild Regiment of Me>:ico City. Not recommended for San Agustin 1740 SHOULDER. STRAPS No shoulder straps were found in artwork of the period. SHOULDER KNOTS "Dra.gona.s" Various knots and braids are seen in the art of Clonard and Jimenez collections as WAISTCOAT "Cl"lup ;; \ 11 BREECHES insignia of cabos and sargentos. E•rly 18th century were There coat found in art by 18tl , CC! l'1tu1' y . waistcoats~ according to all sources, were no examples of sleeveless waist thi s Com,nittee for this earl v in the Buttons should ~l s o be pl a in flat brass disks of a sm~Ll~r diameter than the greatcoat. The interval should be clo s er than the greatcoat. The sleeves could be unlined, which is to say one layer of fabric, and of a tighter tailoring than greatcoat sleeve. There are no cuffs, the sleeve ending in a square~ almost naval style. **Waistcoats had full skirts iri the early 18th century. _ Blue wool, in the same style as the present breeches Brass buttons, or possibly plain horn buttons. There has been much consternation about wearing wool l,rr: , ; 1, , . ,:. i . n ~ ,; emi .. tr op1 c: al FL,r 1da. In tt-.e: 1 7'. Y>' . ; 1 .. . . pru:.,11J1a.L troops :i.n t\d!.l.1'.. 1.C.S!b!.1.S.~!. F'L1erto Rico, Hc.1.t.idna, ' .' er . .,._ . l:: o n" Cruz ( coastal Me:-: i co) and Cartegena de las Indi as (coastal present-day Colombia) all w~re wearing blL1e wool breeches. Fer those ~embers who have not done much sewing, it should be mentioned that there ii hea~y weight wool such as one

PAGE 119

would make a winter c oat or a n 18th century cloak out of, and there is light weight wool, say cf 5 czs. class which LS no thicker than the present linen fabric. The United States Army was st i 11 issuing "tropical weight wool II shirts for LISE 1n Panama as late as 1964. STOCKINGS Deep Red knitted wool would be . t~e best. Although the French in Canada o ften worn their stockings outsidt? an,j u . er the knee during the French and Indian War, t~1er e : " 110 "l"led1 as II support for this in Spani st, areas. "Calc::etas Artillery troops are cons.istently shown in white <:.; t. ot:..f111f;J'=>; d:::tnlo" regulations call for whi1::e stockings for art1lleros. SHOES HOWEVER, Mr. Koch argues that presidia! troops in Caribbean garrisons had regulations saying that the artilleros were to be considered as a company of the question and were clothed in the same manner fusileros. other local unit in as the There are two styles of shoes presently seen in St AugLtstine: "Zapatos" Handmade shoes by Holiday Leather in the early 18th century style of the Spanish match the illustrations reveiwed. They have the narrow heel, the tapering toe~ and the very high tongue seen in pictures of troops and in Historia de Traje. One also sees numerous veterans of the RevWar still in use in this city, most having been manufactured by the Ffye Boot Company and sold by G.Gedney Godwin; with their short British tongues and sturdy, square toes, they look very different from the artwork of ~panish shoes. As a practical note their track record in terms of service life has not been as good as the handmade."Spanish" shoes. The practice of pafnting .the heel red is documented in the Historia de TraJe as high fashion in the court of Louis XIV, and it is known to have been adopted by nobles in Spain in the early 18th century, but for as late as 1740, and in an impoverished presidia, it is not recommended. 18th centl.1ry brass buckle. shoes can be closed with either thongs or a The anch6r l a chet should be the one Oij the ,Jt.d :~, :i d e, u -f ti"\:? +o c, t (.J11 c l1u1 u ,t . l the bucklt'-.?), and thP l,:\o:::ht:•:1t t.t1 c. 'I L , : : r i1 J \ :,; up sl, , . . 11. , q t', , 1 _ 1 ,. . 1 , o r-l( j ~j h CJ Ltl c l b E: the one th i 1t or y11 ,.,d . ct,, 1n t1 1 1 :! 1.n s l:t ?1., . . . nu c rosse ~;, over, throLtqh the bucl.l.1 .:' t.u the ou t ~ , ,1t:.l1:: ~ u+ t t1f: : : i u ot.. Shoe buckles should be a b~t smaller than the ones commo n ly in use in this presidia, a nri the illustrations often show square brass buckles. There does not have to be uniformity in bt.tckles. I'.

PAGE 120

, 111 ILl- •:: 3 . White coarse linen or canvas with black horn 5/8" bL1ttons; spaced closely along the outeide of the leg~ 20 or more. "t ,l. ;::11 no.~s A very practical and L.1sef ul garment. Al so a cheap way to hide a modern pair of shoes. See Orders of Oresi as regards &uit~bility for g~rrison service. MU~ :i KET Gaiters are small square to the rear. * secured with a 1/2" black leather strap with a brass buckle worn Just under the knee~ buckle * * * RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ARMS First Choice: !::i1:-1cond Choice: Third Choice: Fourth Choice: Spanish Fusil, Model 1728 .69 caliber differs from Castillo guns primarily in that it has a wooden ramrod. ! : :ipan1sh "ei,,copeta" witt1 old style MigL1elet or "llave espanola", the , ;;; to c t being the Catalan style shown in La~1n's ~it9CY cf Sganish Firearms; not available commercially at present. A lo~g-standing favorite in colonial presidios~ and a visually v e rv distinctive firskrm . . ' French 11 fL.1si l de ch a se"~ av , :11 l .,, d I , .. from Allegany or custom gunsmith s . Br.own Bess The greatest problem with recommending Brown Bess is that the Bess's that can be purchased from commercial suppliers are RevWar models. The barrels are too short~ the furniture is different~ an~ they have the more advanced steel r~mrod so they would be the same as arms captured from the British during the 1730's-1740's. The Drown Bess has the advantage of being a very versatile arm which can be used by garriso~ members to participate in RevWar events or in t~e.Living History activities of San Agustin 1740's. It can be purchased used from former RevWar people~ and it would p~bbably be easier to selJ at a later

PAGE 121

DhY0NET date. From the spectator who knows guns and gun collecting, yow will get some negative feedback carrying a 1775-85 British gun in a 1740 Spanish program. The Spanish bayonet that goes with the Fusil.1728 is almost identical to the commercial Char 1 evi 11 e bayonets. 13" The older style "cL1chillo de monte" which was e::tremely popular as a hunting knife for civilian and military alike is appropriate for Ltse with the "escopetafl. Recent contact with Sidney Brinkerhoff who wrote the standard reference book on SQanish Arms in Colonial Ametica 1700-1821 updates opinion on whether troops here had fusils and socket bayonets or escopetas with plug bayonets: by 1740 in u n1~ s accessible by sea, it's fusils and the socket bayonet. Additionally, documentation reports that 400 fusile s we re = distributed to the white and black miliciasL and v a rious !n~i~O~ in Sept 1740, along with the socket bayonets. That means they were in the hands of just about everyone. S WORD Refer to Brinkerhoff: e~Dib Militar~ Wea.eons in gglgni~l America 1700-1.1972. The "Epee du Soldat" sold by Godwin will continue to be acceptable; if anyone finds an infantr~ hanger-st~le sword for~ better price that matches Brinkerhoff or the artwork, please notify this committee. Again, this is an area desirable. As stated in an absolutely essential sargentos, officers, and where perfect uniformity may the Orders of Dress, a sword arm for a fusilero, although elite types should have one. not be is not cabos, The common "hunting . sword" of the 18th century or the "espada ancha 11 of Spar.1ish America is also acceptable •. BLUNDERBUSS Called "trabuco" in Spanisl;l, it is represented on the inventories of Castillo de San Marcos but should not be carried by a spldier except in the case that he is guarding a gate or bridge. Not a pewsonal arm for troops on formal duty. Ideally, as a trabuco, it should have a Spanish style lock and stock~ most pr-ob a lby "migulet-catalan". PIST0LAS Reference sources agree that pistols were used in the 18th century armies by cavalry un~ts, pirates, a~d naval types. In the wear-1nq artwork, ,. 1 pl ~,; t C) l , there is not one Spanish infantry o~ficer r1nr ,:,i ?c,c.> n ts nor cabo s . Person .:" ! i;:l st o ls

PAGE 122

were L1ndoL1btedl y owned, but even in terms of duel l H 1 1 ; U, . sword was still the weapon of preference. It is recommended that pistols not be worn when portraying troops on formal, daytime garrison duties. See: Brown: Firearms in Colonial Americ:a.1980 Brinkerhoff: QsDi~b ~i!i1~C~ ~~sQ903 iD . ~Q!9Disl am~cl~~ 1100-1021. 1972 HALBERD Universal in artwork f6r sargents in this period. "Alabarda" 'Refer to: Brinkerhcf'f fer visual details. SPONTOON Uni~ersal in artwork for Spanish gffl~@C~ in this period. "Esponton" Refer to: Brinkerhoff or Tac:coli for detail. * * * * RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACCOUTREMENTS DocL1mentation for the details of the following articles is very scant. Available artwork is not particularly conclusive, either. WAISTBELT 11 BridecL1 11 or "Ci ntL1ron 11 Smooth, plain natLtral leather strap of 1 3/4" width with an 18th century brass buckle such as the Godwin No. 62, which is rounded in configuration; some square buckles are also seen suc:h as the Godwin No. 10, but more of the rounded profile are in evidence. Sword frogs hang from the left side of the belt. The bayonet mount is anchored perpendiculjr to the belt. The l ea ther s h oLlld be drowned 1n neatsfoot oil until d dr f: 1: , i r ,c d . 80L D RIC STYLE SWORDBELT \O v er the shoLllder) Not recommended for San Agustin 1740. This style ~-.,as popular in the 1600 = .a'lnd became in fashion again in the closing decades of the 18th centL1ry, but the art work of Spanish troops from 1700-1780 jUSt does not sypport the use of this style of accoutrement. CARTRIDGE BOXES "Cart1.1chera" Two types are seen in use; both are acceptable. The later style of mid~18t~ century with a le~ther b~g body suspended by br6ad natural leather straps over the left shoLllder and hanging to the right hip. Wooden block for cartridge~ sh~uld be . worn inserted. -:.

PAGE 123

PRIMING FLASK "Frasco" It is recommended that personal possesions not be carried in the ammuntion box. The older belly-box style is better represented in available artwork. It is less e: :pensive to produce; a leather flap is attached to a wooden block drilled out for the 9-12 cartuchos. The best wo~ld be a trapezoidal flask finished in brass or copper as seen in the artwork and in reference books. "F'ortafrasco" This is suspended on a narrow leather over-the-shoulder strap worn over the left shoulder. "Morr-al" KNAPSACK 11 Moch1la 11 WATERBOTTLE Other styles are seen in Brinkerhoff. Refer-ence is also fo~md to a small wooden or leather priming bottle attached to the "cartuchera" style over the shoulder style cartridge box. No representation in artwork found. Recommended that acceptability of present RevWar style linen with broad linen strap continue. It is recommended that the periodically so that they unmilitary. straps be ironed flat do not appear twisted and A larger linen or canvas square body, with leathG~ strap and bu c kle closur-es~ suspended on QQ~ l~itb~C tC~Q ~QCQ over the right shoulder-. See: Kemp: Weagons and Egu1gtmept gf tb~ Marlborough ~~!::a• 1 900 . i I No r-ecommendation until further research is complet e . See notes on Order-s of Dress. t9

PAGE 124

WHAT SHOULD A NEW MAN-:BUY FIRST? In past years in St Augustine, Living History enthusiasts have generally sta~ted their acquisition of a ~niform with smal~ clcthas, such as shirt, breeches, waistcoat, leaving the major it~ms until later. It is the recommendation of this Committee that an enthu5iast glvethcught to getting his uniform together in a different order s inc8 it is pos&ible to borrow tho5e ~rticles of dress that ~re nut !,><:;)<~n. ,as muc:h -from tha Li vi ng Hi tory cache at Castillo de San Marcos~ This is not the case with most other communities •. The visual quality of Living Histpry programs would be better enhanced if the major articles were.in greater abundance. SUGGESTED ORDER OF EQUIPTMENT PURCHASE: J t., .. Od t Tl1 : i . i: ;; , . , : , l.1, e ;nc, " ,t v :t : . , :il:ilc:: ,:;1ncl di. ~ ~tinct:Lvr) a1"t.:iclf.~ n+ art1clt2 o+ mililc:ll' " Y clr .. c:•i c ; '.;:; 111 tlh :i l8tl1 C:E : ntu1• .. y. A proper pres~ntaticn of a 18th century solder begins with th&:! greatcoc:~t. The lack of grec::~tco,a . ts hi:\S don+,? more damage to the quality of Living History in this Lity than any other factor. Waistbelt/Sword and .aycnet Belt A soldier is incomplete ~ithout this item. E
PAGE 125

l h 1 ITI EvEit'"Y milit.ary m.M,, in-f.:..:mt e 1-y, ,: 1rtill(~r -y, or -militi,::~ had to know the ba s ic manual of arms with the f 1 i n t 1 ClC: k. kn a p ':;d c: k r: , r ic, un, :: d Items such as eating L1tensils, knives, etc. CJL1 , u 1' " F' , , :11 aphen,al i "'' for Marching Order of Dress 1 ,--1/'. 1C1 Swor-d or HL1nting Sword Machete \ Hand.a: : Articles Needecl if Sargent or Officer such as Gorget, Halberd or Spontoon.

PAGE 126

I . ! ' ,,-,_ COL LAT I UN OF MERCHAI\JD I SE SH I p f'ED TO SAN hGUb TIN :l 709 1757 ~ 1531 VARAS PANO AZUL CATORCLNO "" 232 VARAS PANO CATORCENO ~083 VARAS BAYETA AZUL 60 LIBRAS HILO BLANCO 60 LIBRAS HILO DE COLOR c•-:,o CUhDOBANES I \ :L 50 C:UEROS DE SUELA IJ l E1n k c>t. /pclnc:ho coarse blue wool blue baize/flannel I . l "F~CJL\f?n '' sl-i:i ,,. .. t. quality 1 :i. r .. ,;, white linen thread col c:wed tt-wead hats calcetas= hose or stockings in Spanish dictionaries; white? linen stockings tanned goatskins for shoes shoe sole leather 500 MEDIAS DE LANA DE INGLATERRA COLORADAS red Engll•h wool st odd nc;;i1ii 1581 VARAS COLETILLA 350 BOTONADURAS DE METAL The Spanish measure VARA= 33 INCHES US. Source: Letter, Ar~na: Chartrand. 1978. hair c:1.1e ribbon set of metal buttons * "metal" is listed , in Spanish dictionary as brass as asecondary meaning Documents on which merchandise list appear: . . i:3C AG I :'.:i8-'. 3/ 43 12-2<..1-1709 SC AGI 58~2-3/58

PAGE 127

SC 1-~G I 58-2-14/17 4-4-1716 ~Jc: AGI 58-2-4/25 7-24-1719 HC hGI !:iB-2-4/58 7-6-1732 !'. '.) (: ('. )(:'-)1 ~m-2-4162 6-18-1735 ! :~C {.)QI 5!3-1-34 / 64 9-6-1739 SC Stetson Collection AGI = Archive General de las Indias; (Sevilla, Spain)