Sunshine 1 A Temporal Evaluation of the Robustness of the Democratic Peace Theory Across Regions Honors Thesis Benjamin Sunshine POS 4970 April 1 st 20111
Sunshine 2 Part I: Introduction The democratic peace theory states that democracies rarel y, or even never, go to war with 988, 661). scholars have test ed the robustness of the democratic peace theory both qualitatively and q uantitatively. Scholars who have tested the robustness of the democratic peace theory qualitatively have done it through case studies by comparing democracies that actually went to war (Holsti, 1996; Ganguly, 1997; Kacowicz, 1998; Kivimaki, 2001). The studies that have tested the robustness of the democratic peace th eory quantitatively have focused mainly on seeing if this theory holds for less economically developed democracies ( Hegre, 2000; Mousseau, 2000, 2002, 2003; Mousseau et al., 2003). This literature has presented two studies that have test ed the robustness of the democratic peace theory within various regions of the world (Goldsmith, 2006; Henderson, 2008). These two studies have huge differences in their data and methodology, whic h has caused them to produce very different results. Benjamin Goldsmith in hi democratic peace theory does not hold in Latin America. In the Peace: African Warfare, Political Inversi on and the Universality of the Democratic Peace Thesis Eroll Henderson show s that the democratic peace theory does not hold in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Where the two studies differ is whether or not the democratic peace theory holds in Africa and Asia. The Goldsmith study used the time period of 1921 1991 and used a
Sunshine 3 logit regression while the Henderson study used the time period of 1950 2001 and used a rare event logit regression. Thus, the goal of this study is to try to reconcile the differences between the Henderson and Goldsmith study as well as examine the robustness of the democratic peace theory across regions on a temporal perspective. In order to do this I will take both a quantitatively and qualitatively approach. In part II I discus the literature regarding the democratic peace theory. Next in part II I state and describe my hypotheses I intend to test and examine. Then in part IV and part VI describes the data used the methodology used in the quantitative and qualitative aspect of this s tudy. Then in part VII I examine the results of the quantitative and qualitative aspect of this study in order to assess regional patterns of the democratic peace theory. Finally in part VIII I draw conclusions on the robustness of the democratic peace the ory across regions. Part II: Literature Review: Democratic Peace Theory At the most fundamental level the democratic peace theory was first hypothesized by th as Kant explains that the checks and balances that are inherent in a constitutional republic can prevent constitutional republics in engaging in war with each other (Kant, 1795). The reasoning behind this as Kant explains is that consent of the citizens is requited to engage in war and citizens will be very cautious about going to war because they will be the ones who will be paying for the war and fighting in the war (Kant, 1795). The second lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an internationa l state,
Sunshine 4 ature also unites nations which the concept of cosmopolitan right would not have protected from violence and war, and does so by means of their mutual self interest. For the spirit of commerce sooner or later takes scholars have translated these three factors into democracy, international organization membership/alliance membership and economic interdependence, which is known as the Kantian peace triangle (Cederman and Rao 2001). Other explanations have been proposed since Kant, however, moder n literature about the democratic peace theory started in 1983 when Rudolph J. Rummel published his study entitled democracies (Rummel, 1983). Michael Doyle in 1986 theory, Doyle inserte d a normative aspect to the Kantian triangle, which is different than what between the scholars of the democrat ic peace theory: institution versus normative explana tions. The normative explanation outlined by Doyle explains that democracies treat other democracies with trust and respect, and therefore they do not get involved in military disputes (Doyle, 1986). The institutional explanation explains that democracies do not go to war with each other because of institutional factors in the Kantian peace triangle and other institutional factors. The pionee rs of the institutional camp are Bruce Russert and John O neal who Democracy, Interdep in 2001 which statistically showed that all parts of the Kantian triangle lead to genuine peace between democracies (Russert and
Sunshine 5 Oneal 2001). been many stu dies that have tried to test different concepts both quantitatively and qualitatively surrounding the democratic peace theory but only two studies (Goldsmith, 2006; Henderson, 2008) have tried to test the robustness of the democratic peace theory acro ss regions. The Goldsmith study analyzed the time period of 1886 1991 by using a logit regression test and found that the democratic peace theory does not hold in democracies in La tin America (Goldsmith, 2006). The Henderson study analyzed the time period of 1950 2001 and used a rare event logit regression test and found that the democratic peace theory does not hold in the democracies in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Henderson, 2008). Part III: Theories and Hypotheses stopped scholars in testing the validity of the theory. As mentioned earlier two studies (Goldsmith, 2006; Henderson, 20 08) have tried to test the robustness of the democratic peace theory across regions. T he purpose of this study is to try to reconcile the differences between the Henderson and Goldsmith study as well as the universality of the democratic peace theory. I believe that region matters when testing the robustness of the democratic peace theory across regions. A simple examination of Russert and Oneal reveals that distance between countries is the biggest determinate as to wh y countries engage in militarized interstate disputes (Russert and Oneal, 2001). The different regions of the wo rld all have shared experiences that influence their histories. Examples of such experiences exist in Latin America The first being colonial ti es to Span or Portugal and second being the dominance
Sunshine 6 of the United States for much of the 20 th century. A similar story can be told about the experience of Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Such experiences seem quite likely to affect subsequent behavior in a regionally unique way (Mahoney, 2003) With that said I believe that I will see more intraregional militarized interstate disputes compared to interregional militarized interstates disputes. Given that t he Henderson and Goldsmith studies have very different data, methodology and results I do not state any specific hypotheses about the regional effect regarding the democratic peace theory. Instead as stated in the last paragraph I will start with the notion that regional differences should exist. Part IV: Data: Quantitative Analysis The source of my data for the quantitati ve aspect of this study is the data from the studies done by Goldsmith and Henderson. Both of these studies use the list of dyad states published by the Correlates of War (COW) project with the unit of analyses being the dyadic year. As stated before the Goldsmith study analyz es the time period between 1886 1992 while the Henderson study analyz es the time period between 19 50 2001. The dependent variable used by both studies is Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) whi ch the Correlates of War (COW) p a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of nt variables used by both studies are democracy (DemocracyLO), economic development (TradeLO), major power status (MinorPower), capability ratio (PowerRatio), alliance membership (Allies), geographic continuity (NonContiguity), distance (Distance), trade i nterdependence (DepenLO) and internationa l organization membership (IGO).
Sunshine 7 democracy for the dyad by focusing on the regime score of the least democratic state in the ssert and Oneal, 2001, 99). Both studies use the P olity data set, which is coded in values from 10 (highest autocracy) to +10 (highest democracy). The Goldsmith study uses an older version of this data set (Polity III) while the Henderson study uses an up dated version of this data set (Polity IV). I will use the Polity III data set to stay true to the original findings of Russert and Oneal. The second independent variable is economic development, which both studies measure as gross domestic product (GDP) p er capita. (Goldsmith, 2006, 539; Henderson, 2008, 42). Both studies retrieved their data for economic development from Kristian S. Glesditch who published a data set on gross domestic product (GDP) and trade in the Journal of Conflict resolution in 2001. The third independent variable is a major power status that is coded as either 1 or 0 to indicate if the dyad contains a major power (Goldsmith, 2006, 540; Henderson, 2008, 42). The fourth independent variable is the capability ratio, which is a statistica l measure of population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower and military expenditures. Capability ratio is me asured as the log of the ratio of the larger to the smaller value for a given dyad (Henderson, 2008, 42). Both studies u se the Correlates of War (COW) p roject composite capabilities index to measure this variable. The fifth independent variable is alliance membership, meaning the allegiance between dyads, which is coded 1 (allies) and 0 (non allies). Both studies u se the Correlates of War (COW) p roject alliance membership index to measure this variable. The sixth independent variable is geographic continuit y, which measures if the dyads in question s hare a border or are separated by less than 150 miles of water and is coded as 0 (border) or 1 (separated by less than 150 miles of water) (Goldsmith, 2006, 539; Henderson, 2008, 42). Both studies u se the Correla tes of War (COW) p roject direct
Sunshine 8 contiguity index to measure this variable. The seventh independent variable is distance, which is meant for all dyads and is measured by the natural log of the distance in miles between capital cities (Goldsmith, 2006, 539; Henderson, 2008, 42). Both studies use the data set on gross domestic product (GDP) and trade compiled by Gleditsch to measure this variable. The eighth independent variable is trade interdependence, which is measured as exports plus imports divided by GDP (Goldsmith, 2006, 539; Henderson, 2008, 42). Both studies use the data set on gross domestic product (GDP) and trade compiled by Gleditsch to measure this variable. The last independent variable is international organization membership, which is simply th e number of organizations of which both dyad states were members in a given year (Goldsmith, 2006, 540). 1 Goldsmith us ed the Correlates of War (COW) p roject international organization index. I also created five intraregional variables, which is coded 1 i f the dyad includes two countries in the same region and a 0 if not. 2 The variables are IntraWest (North America and Europe), AfricaIntra (Africa), AsiaIntra (Asia), LatinAm (Latin America) and MidEastIntra (Middle East). Part IV: Data: Qualitative Analys is The source of data for the qualitative aspect of this study is from the Correlates of War (COW) project and the Polity IV project. I used version 3.10 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data collection fr om the Correlates of War (COW) p roject in or der to see which countries were involved in a militarized interstate dispute and in what year. From the Polity IV project I used the Polity IV Country Report, which monitors the Polity score and other key variables for all major independent states from 180 0 to 2009. 1 The international organization membership variable was only added in the Goldsmith study. 2 France and Spain is a intraregional variable while Kenya and Spain is a interregional variable.
Sunshine 9 Part V: Methodology: Quantitative Analysis As discussed earlier there are differences in the data and method used in the Goldsmith and Henderson studies. I plan on bridging the differences between these two studies to see how robust the dem ocratic peace theory is across regions. In order to do this, I will first recreate the Goldsmith and Henderson test s to establish a baseline. Next, I will recreate the Goldsmith test but I will use the rare event logit test instead of a regular logit regre ssion. Next, I will recreate the Henderson test but I will use a regular logit regression instead of a rare event logit test. With four different tests, I will able to compare them to see if there are any major differences between them to see if time perio d or the type of statistical test matters in testing the robustness of the democratic peace theory. Part V: Methodology: Qualitative Analysis As discussed earlier I have take n not only a quantitative approach, but also a qualitative approach in examini ng the robustness of the democratic peace theory across regions. In order to do this, I first compile d a list of countries within the five different regions. 3 Next using th e Polity IV Country Report I wro te down the years when each of the countries had a P olity score of 6 or more. 4 Using the Militarized Interstate Dispute data and my list of democratic countries I figured out when each democratic country has engaged in a Militarized Interstate Dispute with other democratic countries. I also create d a ta xonomy in order to analyze the type s of militarized interstate dispute s The first set of militarized interstate disputes are border or territory conflicts between countries. 3 West, Latin America, Middl e East, Asia and Africa are the five different regions. For a detailed list of what countries went into which region refer to list 1 in the appendix. 4 A country with a polity scores between 10 and with a score between
Sunshine 10 The second set of militarized interstate disputes are conflicts regarding non sta te actors such as rebel forces or drug cartels. The third set of militarized interstate disputes are conflicts that involve the fortification of borders. The fourth set of militarized interstate disputes are conflicts that involve the violation of airspace or waterways. The fifth set of militarized interstate disputes are other conflicts that are not categorized in the other four. Part VI: Findings: Quantitative Analysis Table 1 shows a logit regression from 1921 1992, table 2 shows a rare event logit fr om 1921 1992, table 3 shows a logit regression from 1950 1992 and table 4 shows a rare event logit from 1950 1992. T able s 1,2,3 and 4 show that all of the key independent variables of the Kantian peace triangle (DemocracyLO, DepenLO) are negative [an incr ease in democracy and dependency decreases the chances of militarized interstate disputes (MID)] and significant except for the IGO variable, which is negative [an increase in the number of international organizations decrease the chances of militarized in terstate disputes ( MID)] but not significant. The fact that IGO is not significant is not surprising as the measure treats all international organizations as equal in their effects on ent variables (TradeLO, Allies, Distace, PowerRation, MinorPower and Noncontiguity) are negative [an increase in the variable decreases the chances of militarized interstate disputes ( MID)]. These results confirm that the democratic peace theory holds no m atter what time period or statistical test is being tested. These results show how robust the democratic peace theory from a holistic approach. The intraregional perspective findings paint another picture. Table s 1,2,3 and 4 show that dyads in Africa (Afr icaIntra) are negative [being a dyad in Africa decrease the chances of
Sunshine 11 militarized interstate disputes ( MID)] but the results are not statistically significant at the .05 alpha level. These results seem to contradict the findings by both Goldsmith and Hend erson. Table 1,2,3 and 4 show that dyads in Asia (AsiaIntra) are positive [being a dyad in Asia increased the chances of militarized interstate disputes ( MID)] and significant at the .05 alpha level. These results also confirm the results of the Henderson study, which showed that the democratic peace theory does not hold in Asia. Table 1,2,3 and 4 show that dyads in the Middle East (MidEastIntra) are positive [being a dyad in the Middle East increased the chances of militarized interstate disputes (MID)] and significant at the .05 alpha level. These results are interesting as it is the opposite of what both Henderson and Goldsmith found in their respective studies. Table 1,2,3 and 4 show that dyads in Latin America (LatinAmIntra) are positive [being a dya d in Latin America increased the chances of militarized interstate disputes (MID)] and significant at the .05 alpha level. The results confirm the results of both the Henderson and the Goldsmith study. Table 1,2,3 and 4 show that dyads in North America an d Europe (WestIntra) are negative [being a dyad in North America and Europe decreases the chances of militarized interstate disputes (MID)] and significant at the .05 alpha level. The results confirm the results of both the Henderson and the Goldsmith stud y. Part VI: Findings: Qualitative Analysis The data shows that four militarized interstate disputes between democracies occurred in Africa. The first occurred between Botswana and Namibia in 1997 and can be categorized as a border dispute along the Chobe River. The second occurred between Mali and Niger in 1993 and
Sunshine 12 can be categorized as a dispute with non state actors. 5 The third and fourth occurred between Lesotho and South Africa in 1997. Lesotho fortified its border when South Africa took escalatory act ion in order to send a signal to Lesotho to reinstate ousted Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhekle. The data shows that 25 militarized interstate disputes occurred between democracies in Latin America. The first four disputes occurred between Venezuela and Colo mbia from 1982 and 1988. This set of disputes can be categorized as territory disputes over the ownership of the Gulf of Venezuela. 6 The next four disputes occurred between Venezuela and Colombia from 1994 and 2000. These disputes can be categorized as dis putes with non state actors. 7 The next three disputes occurred between Ecuador and Peru from 1981 and 1991. These three disputes revolve around the Paquisha War that took place in 1981. The Paquisha War and the subsequent militarized interstate disputes re volve around disputed territory between the two countries that go back to the 1800s. The twelfth dispute occurred in 1999 between Guyana and Venezuela. This dispute can be categorized as a border/territory dispute over the Esequibo region The next two dis putes occurred between Costa Rica and Nicaragua from 1995 and 1998. These disputes can be categorized as a border/territory dispute over the ownership of the San Juan River. The next three disputes occurred between El Salvador and Honduras from 1989 and 19 93. These disputes can be categorized as a border/territory dispute over the ownership of the Gulf of Fonseca that traces its roots to 1969 and the Football War. The last set of disputes occurred between Honduras and Nicaragua from 1991 and 2001. These dis putes can be categorized as a border/territory dispute over the ownership of the Gulf of Fronseca. 5 Nigerian rebel forces. 6 Caldes frigate incident. 7 Colombian armed conflict or the Colombian Civil War.
Sunshine 13 The data reveals that 16 militarized interstate dispute occurred between democracies in Asia. The first dispute occurred in 1999 between Indonesia and Austr alia. This dispute revolves around the 1999 East Timorese Crisis when Australian troops faced aggressive probing from Indonesian troops. The next three disputes occurred from 1995 and 2001 betwee n Bangladesh and India. In 1995 Bengali troops fired upon Ind ian repair workers on the embankment of the Muahri River so Indian troops fire back. In 1996, fearing a possible coup in Bangladesh, Indian puts its border on high alert. In 2001, India increased its border fortification because Bengali refuges attempted t o enter India. The next dispute occurred in 1957 between Myanmar and India. This militarized interstate dispute can be categorized as a dispute with a non state actor. The next set of disputes occurred between 1990 and 1999 between India and Pakistan. Thes e militarized interstate disputes can be categorized as a border/territory dispute over the ownership of the Kashmir area. The next dispute occurred in 1999 between New Zealand and Indonesia. This dispute revolved around peacekeeping operation in East Timo r when an Indonesian soldier was shot dead by a New Zealand soldier. The next set of disputes occurred between Japan and Taiwan in 1995 and 1996. In 1995 a Taiwanese patrol boat entered Japanese waters while chasing smugglers. In 1996 Japan fortified its t erritory surrounding Senkaku Islands and did not allow Taiwanese nationals to enter the islands. The next two disputes occurred in 1996 and 1999 between Japan and South Korea. The 1996 dispute revolves around a border/territory dispute over the ownership o f the Takeshima Islands The 1999 dispute can be categorized as a violation of waterways as Japan seized a South Korean fishing boat because the boat entered Japanese waters. The last dispute occurred in 1994 between the Philippines and Taiwan. This disput e can be categorized as a border/territory dispute over the ownership of the Spratly Islands. The data reveals that no militarized interstate disputes occurred between democracies in the
Sunshine 14 Middle East. While some scholars classify Lebanon as a democracy du ring the 1967 Six Day War, the Polity data set does not classify Lebanon as a democracy in 1967. Lebanon has been considered a democracy since 2005, which means that the 2006 Lebanon War between Lebanon and Israel should be considered a war between democra cies. On the contrary, this is not classified as a war between democracies because the war involved Israel and Hezbollah, a known terrorist group. 8 The data reveals that 42 militarized interstate disputes occurred between democracies in the West. Unfor tunately I was not able to find any sort of explanation for the first eight interstate disputes between democracies. The first dispute occurred in 1961 between Denmark and the United Kingdom. The second dispute occurred in 1981 between Denmark and Norway. The third dispute occurred in 1984 between Spain and France. The fourth dispute occurred in 1984 between Spain and Ireland. The fifth dispute occurred in 1985 between Spain and Ireland. The sixth dispute occurred in 1986 between Spain and the United Kingd om. The seventh dispute occurred in 1960 between United States and Austria. The eighth dispute occurred in 1960 between Italy and Austria. The ninth dispute occurred in 2001 between Russia and Norway and can be categorized as a violation of airspace as Rus sian planes entered Norwegian airspace. The tenth occurred in 1997 between Ukraine and Romania and can be categorized as a fortification of borders because Ukraine was put on high alert when the country saw a movement of Romanian warships. The eleventh di spute occurred in 1993 between Italy and Slovenia and can be categorized as a fortification of borders as the Italian military was trying to prevent arms smuggling through the border. The twelfth dispute occurred in 2000 between Croatia and Yugoslavia when Yugoslavia seized a Croatian fighter. The thirteenth dispute occurred in 2000 8 Hezbollah exerted control over the southern part of Lebanon and not the Lebanese army.
Sunshine 15 between Canada and Yugoslavia when Yugoslavia seized Canadian police officers who were in Kosovo training regional police officers. The fourteenth dispute occurred in 2000 betwe en Canada and Russia when Canadian forces were put on high alert when they saw that Russia deployed seven bombers in the Artic. The fifteenth dispute occurred in 1995 between Canada and Spain and can be categorized as a border/territory dispute over the fi shing rights in the Grand Banks. The next seven disputes occurred from 1974 and 1998 between the United States and Canada. These disputes can be categorized as a border/territory and waterway violation dispute over fishing rights. The twenty second dispute occurred in 2000 between the United States and Yugoslavia when the United States and Croatia participated in a joint naval exercise that Yugoslavia found threatening. The twenty third dispute occurred in 2000 between the United States and Russia when on two separate occasions two Russian jets fly over the USS Kitty Hawk, which was in the Korean Straits. The United States responded by sending F 18s. The next 19 disputes between occurred between Greece and Turkey/Cyprus from 1974 to 2001. These disputes all stem from the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and subsequent occupation. For a sense of completeness I will briefly discuss the 15 interregional militarized interstate disputes between democratic countries. The first dispute occurred between Argentina and Japan in 1987 but no information could be found about this dispute. The second dispute occurred between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1983. This dispute can be categorized as a territory dispute over the Falkland Islands. 9 The third dispute occur red in 1985 between Colombia and Italy but no information about the dispute could be found. The fourth dispute occurred in 1980 between Ecuador and the United States but no information about the dispute could be found. The fifth dispute occurred in 2000 be tween Venezuela and the United States. 9 Even thought the Falklands War occurred in 1982, minor disputes between Argentina and the United Kingdom occurred in 1983 when Argentina was considered a democracy.
Sunshine 16 This dispute can be categorized as a violation of waterways dispute as a United States Coast Guard boat was seized by a Venezuelan patrol boat because the Coast Guard boat entered Venezuelan waters. The sixth dispute occurred in 1976 between Israel and Greece but no information about the dispute could be found. The seventh dispute occurred in 1967 between Israel and the United States. This dispute is known as the USS Liberty incident when Israel accidentally attacked t he USS L iberty during the Six Day War. The eighth dispute occurred in 2001 between Australia and Norway. This dispute can be categorized as a violation of waterways as a Norwegian motor vessel entered Australian waters, which caused the Australian military to board the ship. The ninth dispute occurred in 1985 between New Zealand and France in 1985 but no information about the dispute could be found. The tenth and eleventh dispute occurred in 2000 and 2001 between Japan and Russia. The 2000 dispute can be ca tegorized as a border/territory dispute over the ownership of the South Kur ile Islands. T he 2001 dispute can be categorized as a violation of airspace when Russian bombers violated Japanese airspace, which caused Japan to send fighters to intercept the Rus sian, planes. The twelfth dispute occurred in 1996 between Chile and the United Kingdom. This dispute can be categorized as a territory dispute over the ownership of the South Georgia Islands. The last three disputes occurred between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago between 1996 and 1999. These disputes can be categorized as a border/territory dispute over the ownership of the Gulf of Paria. As I stated in the theories and hypotheses section, I thought I would see more intraregional militarized interstate disputes compared to interregional militarized interstate disputes. This hypothesis can be confirmed which shows that distance is a key determinate as to why countries engage in militarized interstate disputes. Part VII: Discussion : Quantitative Analysi s
Sunshine 17 The fours tests I conducted reveal ed many important ideas. On a macro level, these tests showed that there is no difference in the results when using different time periods and statistical tests in testing the robustness of the democratic peace theory. This shows how robust the democratic peace theory is. An important question arises from these results: why would the Goldsmith study use one time period and the Henderson study use another time period in testing the universality of the democratic peace the ory within region if my results show that this does not matter? On a micro perspective, when we incorporate a regional dimension into the equation other important ideas are revealed. The fact that my results show that the results in Africa are not signifi cant is important because instead of bridging the differences between the two studies these results still leaves the question if the democratic peace theory holds in Africa unanswered Another important finding is the fact that I found a positive relations hip in Asia, which seems to the bridge the difference between the two studies and confirms the findings in the Henderson study. Another important finding is the fact that I found a positive relationship in the Middle East while both t he Henderson and Golds mith studies found negative relationships. These results further complicate the question if the democratic peace theory holds in the Middle East. Part VII: Discussion: Qualitative Analysis Even though the quantitative aspect of this study left several qu estions unanswered the qualitative aspect of this study will illuminate some answers and will be the basis of my conclusions. List 1 reveals some important issues about the nature of democracies in the different regions of the world. As of 2009, when the Polity IV Country Report was published Africa had 19 democracies
Sunshine 18 (6+ on the Polity scale) out of the 47 countries in Africa for which I have data. 10 Ou t of the 19 democracies in 2009 only one country in Africa (Botswana) was considered a democracy before 1 990. 11 This means that the number of democratic dyads to choose from was zero until the 1990s. 12 This fact limits the ability to test the democratic peace theory in Africa. It was not until the 1990s that Africa increased the number of democracies to seven w hen the following countries became democracies in their respective years: Namibia in 1990, Mali and Madagascar in 1992, South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 199 6 and Lesotho from 1993 to 1997 D uring the 1990s all four of the militarized interstate disputes between democracies occurred in Africa. Then in the 2000s Africa gained another 13 democracies to increase the number to 19. 13 This number can be very misleading because most of these newly formed democracies are still very young democracies. Some internati onal relations scholars believe that peacefulness only applies to democratic countries older than three years (Doyle, 1986; Russert, 1993). Rummel thinks otherwise and argues that three years is not enough time for the democratic procedures to be accepted and the democratic culture to settle in (Rummel, 1997). What Doyle, Russert and Rummel and other international relations scholars agree upon is that the data on newly formed democratic countries in Africa should be viewed with a sense of caution. It is als o important to note that three of these newly formed democracies are still recovering from civil war. 14 Paul 10 Africa has 53 countries but Egypt was added to the Middle East Region and five countries I did not have data for; Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles. 11 Botswana has been considered a democracy since 1966. 12 There were other democracies in Africa during this time but none of them can be classifies as stable democracies. 13 Benin in 2007, Burundi in 2005, Comoros in 2004, Ghana in 2001, Guinea Bissau in 2005, Kenya in 2002, Lesotho in 2002, Malawi in 2004, Lib eria in 2006, Niger in 2005, Senegal in 2000, Zambia in 2008 and Sierra Leone in 2007. 14 The Burundi Civil War lasted from 1993 2005. The Sierra Leone Civil War lasted from 1991 2002. The Liberian Civil War lasted two periods from 1986 1996 and 1997 2003.
Sunshine 19 after a country come out of a civil war is crucial as the chances of going back into civil war is the year after the first Liberian Civil War ended in 1996 when Liberia went back into civil war in 1997. Even though Afr ica only experienced four militarized interstate disputes between democratic countries and Africa has 19 democratic countries as of 2009, I think that it is too early t o make any sort of conclusion if the democratic peace theory can be applied to Africa. T here is simply not enough data and the data that we do have should be viewed with some caution to make any sort of con clusion As of 2009, which was when the Polity Country Report was published the Middle East had only two democracies, which are Lebanon and Israel. 15 This means that that the number of democratic dyads in the Middle East has been one for only five years. This fact clearly limits the ability to test the democratic pe ace theory in the Middle East since we only have data for five years. Simil arly to the data for Africa, this data should also be viewed with a sense of caution, as Lebanon is a newly formed democracy. 16 Also the history of the Arab Israeli conflict shows us that any war between a democratic Arab country and Israel should be viewed as marginal exceptions. Thus, I think that no logical conclusion can be made about the applicability o f the democratic peace theory to the Middle East since there is simply not enough data available. Latin America is an interesti ng region because my quan titative analysis and the Henderson and Goldsmith studies all found positive relations hips, thus implying that the democ ratic peace theory does not apply in Latin America. Before I jump to any sort of conclusion and say that the 15 Lebanon has been a democracy since 2005. Israel has been a democracy since its independence in 1948. 16 Lebanon has been a democracy since 2005.
Sunshine 20 democratic peace theory doe s not apply to Latin America an analysis of the democratic dyads in Latin America is needed. Only three countries were democratic prior to 1960 and did not succumb to authoritarianism during the 1960s and 1970s. These countries include d Costa Rica, Venezu ela and Colombia which became democracies respectively, in 1875, 1958 2006 and 1957 This means that only three democratic dyads existed in Latin America until the end of the 1970s. The number of democratic countries eventually increased to 19 in 2005 and back down to 17 in 2009 out of the 20 countries in Latin America. 17 This period of democratization did have certain conflicts between democratic dyads including three between Ecuador and Peru, two between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, three between Honduras an d El Salvador and eight between Honduras and Nicaragua. These disp utes should be viewed with caution since they occurred when these democracies were young. For example Peru had been a democracy for only a year and Ecuador for only two when the Paquisha Wa r broke out in 1981. Also according to Spencer nor Ecuador had control of its military during the 1980s (Weart, 1998). A similar story can be said about Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras, whic h were all democracies for less tha n five years when they engaged in a militarized interstate dispute with another democracy. Overall, the data on Latin America needs to taken with a grain of salt because more time needs to pa ss before any conclusion s are made about the applicability of the democratic peace theory to Latin America. Asia is an interesting region because it provides an obvious disconnect between the Henderson and Goldsmith studies as well as my quantitative ana lysis. Henderson and I found a positive relationship implying the democratic peace theory does not hold in Asia while 17 Ecuador was a democracy from 1979 2007. Venezuela was a democracy from 1958 2005.
Sunshine 21 Goldsmith found a negative relationship implying the democratic peace does hold in Asia. Asia is interesting because the militarized inter state disputes between democratic dyads in this region include the most hostile conflicts and many low level conflicts. The most hostile conflicts include the conflicts involving India and Pakistan like the ones that occurred in 1990, 1991 and 1993. The 19 93 conflict evolved into major fighting that continued though 1999. The joint democratic dyad of India and Bangladesh of 1996 and 2001 did not incur casualties and none of their disputes involved armed conflict. Joint democratic disputes that had low level conflicts include the Republic of Korea and Japan in 1996 and 1999, Taiwan and Japan in 1995 and 1996, Indonesia and Australia in 1999, Indonesia and New Zealand in 2001 and Taiwan and the Philippines in 1994 Even though it seems that I can simply concl ude that the democratic peace theory does not hold in Asia an analysis of the temporal aspect of the region in needed. Other tha n Australia which became a democracy in 1901, India in 1950, Japan in 1952, New Zealand in 1877 South Korea in 1988 and the P hilippines in 1987 the other democracies in Asia did not become democracies until the 1990s and 2000s. It is also important to note that the previously mentioned democracies are the only democracies for which I regard as reliable data. Bangladesh, Fiji, P akistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Solomon Island can be considered unstable democracies because they were a democracy for only a brief period of time 18 The other democracies in the regions are newly formed democracies which I argued earlier should be viewed with a sense of caution. These democracies include East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, 18 Bangladesh was a democ racy from 1991 2006. Fiji was a democracy from 2004 2005. Pakistan was a democracy from 1988 1998. Nepal was a democracy from 1999 200 and 2006 present. Sri Lanka was a democracy from 2001 2002 and 2006 present. Thailand was a democracy from 1992 2006. Sol omon Island was a democracy from 1978 1994 and 2004 present.
Sunshine 22 Mongolia and Taiwan. 19 Even if we can view this data as reliable I still do not believe enough time has passed to produce to make any sort of conclusion on if the d emocratic peace theory can be applied in Asia. The Goldsmith and Henderson studies as well as my quantitative analysis found that the democratic peace theory holds in the West. This should not be a surprise as Raymond Cohen wrote in his 1994 study ent Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory That the soundest conclusion to draw from the evidence is that democratic states in the North Atlantic/Western European area, sharing a particular set of hi storical circumstances and a common cultural heritage, have avoided going to an evaluation of the democratic dyads is needed. Not having enough democratic dyads to choose fro m is not a problem as the West had 39 democratic countries in 2009. From a temporal perspective it is important to note that the West has some the oldest and newest democracies. 20 21 The fact that the West has 20 democratic countries that became democracies in the 1990s and 2000s limits the amount of data between democratic dyads in the West. This issue raises some red flags on if the democratic peace theory can be applied to the newer Western democratic countries. Even though there are some militarized inte rstate disputes between the older Western democratic dyads I 19 East Timor became a democracy in 2002. Indonesia became a democracy in 1999. Malaysia became a democracy in 2008. Mongolia became a democracy in 1992. Taiwan became a democracy in 1992. 20 The o lder democracies are the United States (1809), Canada (1888), the United Kingdom (1880), Ireland (1921), Netherlands (1945), Belgium (1944), France (1969), Switzerland (1848), Spain (1978), Portugal (1976), Austria (1946), Italy (1948), Greece (1975), Cypr us (1968), Finland (1948), Sweden (1917), Norway (1945), Denmark (1945) and Turkey (1983). 21 The newer democracies are Germany (1990), Poland (1991), Hungary (1990), Czech Republic (1993), Slovakia (1993), Albania (2002), Montenegro (2006), Macedonia (1991 ), Croatia (2000), Yugoslavia (2000), Kosovo (2008), Slovenia (1991), Bulgaria (1990), Moldova (1993), Romania (1996), Estonia (1991), Latvia (1991), Lithuania (1991), Ukraine (1991), Georgia (2004)
Sunshine 23 think its reasonable to say that these democratic countries ar e relatively more peaceful than warlike. Seventeen of these disputes occurred between Turkey and Greece/Cyprus, which some scholars call a marginal exception to the democratic peace theory (Fortna, 2004). The other disputes can be categorized as only minor conflicts that involved e ither a violation of airspace or waterways. Overall, I believe that the democratic peace theory can be app lied only to the older Western democratic countries and not the newer Western democratic countries. Part VIII: Conclusion The preceding discussion has allowed me to answer the following question: can we make logical conclusions about the regional dimensi on of the democratic peace theory? The abridged answer to this question is no. My conclusions provide the unabridged answers to this question: Africa C1: No logical conclusion can be made regarding if the democratic peace theory can be applied to Africa Middle East C2: No logical conclusion can be made regarding if the democratic peace theory can be applied to the Middle East. Latin America C3: No logical conclusion can be made regarding if the democratic peace theory can be applied to Latin Ameri ca. Asia C4: No logical conclusion can be made regarding if the democratic peace theory can be applied to Asia. West
Sunshine 24 C5: The democratic peace theory can be applied to the old er democracies of the West. C6: No logical conclusion can be regarding on i f the democratic peace theory can be applied to the newer democracies of the West. This article has identified that time is a problem associated with testing the robustness of the democratic peace theory across regions. Other scholars including David Sp iro and Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa presented this critic quantitatively. Spiro shows that in most years with the exception of the World War II years (1939 45) the number of militarized interstate disputes between democracies is not significantly differen t from the expected number of wars. He argues that the low frequency of war between democracies is a result of the extremely low proportion of liberal dyads in the entire population of possible dyads in the interstate system (Spiro, 1994). Farber and Gowa break down the 1816 1900 period into five subperiods: 1816 1913, World War I (1914 18), the interwar period (1919 38), World War II (1939 45) and the post World War II period (1946 80) and found that the relationship between joint democracy and peaces appl ies only to the post World War II period (Farber and Gowa, 1995). This study takes another perspective on the temporal critic laid out by the studies done by Spiro and Farber and Gowa. I present these conclusions not to put down the studies done by Hend erson, Goldsmith and other international relations scholars but simply to add a caveat on testing the robustness of the democratic peace theory across regions. Signs do look very promising that the democratic peace theory can be applied on a regional leve l ; however, I believe that more time needs to pass in order to produce more reliable data before future studies test these hypotheses again.
Sunshine 25 Works Cited Cederman, Lars Erik, and Mohan P. Rao. "Exploring the Dynamics of the Democratic Peace." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45.6 (2001): 818 33. Print. Cohen, Raymond. Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory That Democracies Do Not Go to War with Each Other. Review of International Studies 20.3 (1994): 207 233. Print Collier B, Paul. "Post Conflict Economic Recovery." Thesis. Oxford University, 2006. 23 Apr. 2009. The American Political Science Review 88.1 (1994): 14 32. Print. Doyle, Michael. Kant, Liberal Legacie s and Foreign Affairs." Philosophy and Public Affairs 12.3 (1983): 205 235. Print. Doyle, Michael. "Liberalism and World Politics." The American Political Science Review 80.4 (1986): 1151 169. Print. International Security 20.2 (Summer 1995): 123 146. Print Fortna, Virginia P. Peace Time: Cease fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004. Print. Ganguly, Sumit. of Democracy." Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? By Miriam Fendius. Elman. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997. 267 300. Print. Gartzke, Erik. "The Capitalist Peace." American Journal of Political Science 51.1 (2007): 166 91. Print. Goldsmith, Benjamin E. "A Universal Proposition? Region, Conflict, War and the Robustness of
Sunshine 26 the Kantian Peace." European Journal of International Relations 12.4 (2006): 533 63. Print. Goldsmith, Benjamin Journal of Peace Research 44.1 (2007): 5 27. Print Hegre, Havard. "Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does It Take to Be a Trading State?" Journal of Peace Research 37.1 (2000): 5 30. Print. Henderson, Errol A. "Disturb ing the Peace: African Warfare, Political Inversion and the Universality of the Democratic Peace Thesis." British Journal of Political Science 39.01 (2008): 25 58. Print. Holsti, Kalevi J. The State, War, and the State of War Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 199 6. Print. Kacowicz, Arie M. Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1998. Print. Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace [Whitefish, Mt.]: Kessinger, 2007. Print. Ki nsella, David, and Bruce Russett. "Conflict Emergence and Escalation in Interactive International Dyads." The Journal of Politics 64.04 (2002): 1045 068. Print. Kivimaki, Timo. "The Long Peace of ASEAN." Journal of Peace Research 38.1 (2001): 5 25. Print. Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Politics and War." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18.4 (1988): 653 73. Print. American Journal of Sociology 109.1 (2003): 50 206 Mousse au, Michael. "An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation." International Interactions 28.2 (2002): 137 64. Print.
Sunshine 27 Mousseau, Michael, Hvard Hegre, and John R. Oneal. "How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace." Eur opean Journal of International Relations 9.2 (2003): 277 314. Print. Mousseau, Michael. "Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace." Journal of Conflict Resolution 44.4 (2000): 472 507. Print. Mousseau, Michael. "The Nexus of Mark et Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence." International Studies Quarterly 47.4 (2003): 483 510. Print. Rummel, Randolph J. "Libertarianism and International Violence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 27. 1 (1983): 27 71. Print. Rummel, Randolph J. Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997. Print. Russett, Bruce M., and John R. Oneal. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations New York: Norton, 2001. Print. Russett, Bruce M. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post Cold War World Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993. Print. International Security 19.2 (Summe r 1994): 50 86. Print. Weart, Spencer R. Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another. New Haven: Yale UP, 1998. Print. Appendix Table 1: Logit regression from 1921 1992 MID Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] DemocracyLO .04674 .0061 259 7.63 0.000 .0587465 .0347335 DepenLO 27.44032 6.593183 4.16 0.000 40.36272 14.51792
Sunshine 28 IGO .0028559 .0022011 1.30 0.194 .00717 .0014581 TradeLO 1.513119 .2756186 5.49 0.000 2.053321 .9729161 Allies .2822657 .0888848 3.18 0.001 .456476 8 .1080547 Distance .4268798 .0401728 10.63 0.000 .505617 .3481426 PowerRatio .246687 .0257663 9.57 0.000 .2971879 .196186 MinorPower .8975294 .1078745 8.32 0.000 1.10896 .6860992 NonContiguity .8927348 .0897786 9.94 0.000 1.068698 .71 67719 AfricaIntra .27109 .1577979 1.72 0.086 .5803683 .0381882 AsiaIntra .9757538 .1198347 8.14 0.000 .7408821 1.210626 WestIntra .5278255 .0897769 5.88 0.000 .7037849 .351866 LatinAmIntra .5025127 .1642524 3.06 0.002 .1805839 .8244415 MidEastI ntra .919338 .1706034 5.39 0.000 .5849614 1.253715 _cons .0974051 .3443565 0.28 0.777 .7723314 .5775212 Table 2: Rare event logit regression from 1921 1992 MID Roust Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] DemocracyLO .0466853 .0059839 7.80 0.0 00 .0584136 .034957 DepenLO 26.91271 7.86475 3.42 0.001 42.32734 11.49808 IGO .0028417 .0023028 1.23 0.217 .0073551 .0016716 TradeLO 1.504462 .3331731 4.52 0.000 2.157469 .851455 Allies .2808353 .0949511 2.96 0.003 .466936 .0947347 Di stance .4260901 .0413055 10.32 0.000 .5070474 .3451327 PowerRatio .2459353 .0279997 8.78 0.000 .3008137 .1910569 MinorPower .8950123 .1040124 8.60 0.000 1.098873 .6911517 NonContigu~y .8923036 .0919831 9.70 0.000 1.072587 .71202 AfricaI ntra .2699005 .1682622 1.60 0.109 .5996885 .0598874 AsiaIntra .9765109 .119273 8.19 0.000 .74274 1.210282 WestIntra .5276349 .0963211 5.48 0.000 .7164208 .3388489 LatinAmIntra .5046412 .1693443 2.98 0.003 .1727325 .8365499 MidEastIntra .9211668 .1733869 5.31 0.000 .5813347 1.260999 _cons .1006041 .3627128 0.28 0.781 .811508 .6102999 Table 3: Logit regression from 1950 1992 MID Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] DemocracyLO .0479196 .0080159 5.98 0.000 .0636305 .0322088 Depen LO 34.55297 10.67407 3.24 0.001 55.47376 13.63219 IGO .0049778 .0034294 1.45 0.147 .0116993 .0017437
Sunshine 29 TradeLO 1.289512 .3038566 4.24 0.000 1.88506 .6939641 Allies .4171413 .1121819 3.72 0.000 .6370138 .1972688 Distance .3853706 .051126 7.54 0.000 .4855756 .2851655 PowerRatio .1662522 .0326236 5.10 0.000 .2301933 .1023112 MinorPower .7643518 .1522743 5.02 0.000 1.062804 .4658997 NonContiguity 1.115234 .1314517 8.48 0.000 1.372875 .8575936 AfricaIntra .2596317 .1826263 1.42 0.155 .6175728 .0983093 AsiaIntra .8196569 .1423904 5.76 0.000 .5405768 1.098737 WestIntra .3702095 .1295544 2.86 0.004 .6241316 .1162875 LatinAmIntra .4500431 .2128266 2.11 0.034 .0329106 .8671755 MidEastIntra .8579002 .19012 4.51 0.000 .485 2718 1.230529 _cons .5089346 .4463832 1.14 0.254 1.38383 .3659604 Table 4: Rare event logit regression from 1950 1992 MID Robust Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] DemocracyLO .047756 .0076258 6.26 0.000 .0627024 .0328097 DepenLO 33.00 477 15.75908 2.09 0.036 63.89201 2.117537 IGO .0050506 .0037109 1.36 0.174 .0123239 .0022227 TradeLO 1.277397 .3638758 3.51 0.000 1.99058 .5642134 Allies .4155655 .1226263 3.39 0.001 .6559087 .1752223 Distance .3847509 .0526511 7.31 0.0 00 .4879451 .2815566 PowerRatio .165192 .0347915 4.75 0.000 .2333821 .097002 MinorPower .7644247 .1448942 5.28 0.000 1.048412 .4804372 NonContiguity 1.116095 .1392679 8.01 0.000 1.389055 .8431345 AfricaIntra .2588702 .1944039 1.33 0.183 .6398949 .1221545 AsiaIntra .8201572 .1435519 5.71 0.000 .5388007 1.101514 WestIntra .370375 .1421951 2.60 0.009 .6490723 .0916776 LatinAmIntra .4549623 .2247187 2.02 0.043 .0145217 .8954028 MidEastIntra .8586084 .1917533 4.48 0.000 .4827789 1.23 4438 _cons .5093558 .4669903 1.09 0.275 1.42464 .4059284
Sunshine 30 List 1: Intra regional Polity Scores (6 or more=democracy) Africa Mauritania: Sudan: 1956 1957 1965 1968 1986 1988 Libya: Tunisia: Algeria: Morocco: Angola: Benin: 2007 Botswana: 1966 Bu rkina Faso: Burundi: 2005 Chad: Cameroon: Central African Rep: Comoros: 2004 Congo: Djibouti: Equatorial Guinea: Eritrea: Ethiopia: Gabon: Gambia: 1979 1980 Ghana: 1979 1980 2001 Guinea Bissau: 2005 Ivory Cost Kenya: 2002 Lesotho: 1966 1969 1993 19 97 2002 Madagascar: 1992 Malawi: 1994 2000 2004 Mali: 1992 Liberia: 2006 Mauritius: 1996 Mozambique: Namibia: 1990 Niger: 1993 1995 and 2005 Nigeria: 1960 1965 1979 1983 Rwanda: Senegal: 2000 Sierra Leone: 1961 1966 2007 Somalia: 1960 1968 South Africa: 1994 Swaziland: Tanzania:
Sunshine 31 Togo: Uganda: 1962 1965 Zambia: 1991 1995 2008 Zimbabwe: Latin America Argentina: 1983 Bolivia: 1985 Brazil: 1946 1947 1987 Chile: 1964 1972 1989 Colombia: 1867 1885 1957 Ecuador: 1979 2007 Guyana: 1992 Paraguay: 1992 Peru: 1980 1991 2001 Uruguay: 1952 1970 1985 Venezuela: 1958 2005 Cuba: Dominican Republic: 1978 Costa Rica: 1875 El Salvador: 1984 Guatemala: 1996 Honduras: 1982 1984 1989 Mexico: 1997 Nicaragua: 1990 Panama: 1989 Asia Afghanistan: Australia: 1901 Banglade sh: 1972 1973 1991 2006 Bhutan: Cambodia: China: East Timor: 2002 Fiji: 1970 1986 2004 2005 India: 1950 Indonesia: 1999 Japan: 1952 Kazakhstan: North Korea: South Korea: 1988 Kyrgyzstan: Laos: 1958 1959 Malaysia: 1957 1968 2008 Mongolia: 1992
Sunshine 32 Myanmar: 1948 1961 Nepal: 1999 2001 2006 New Zealand: 1857 1875 1877 Pakistan: 1973 1976 1988 1998 Papa New Guinea: Philippines: 1987 Singapore: 1959 1962 Solomon Island: 1978 1999 2004 Sri Lanka: 1948 1981 2001 2002 2006 Taiwan: 1992 Tajikistan: Thailand: 1992 2006 Turkmenistan: Uzbekistan: Vietnam: Republic of Vietnam: Fiji: 1970 1986 1999 2004 2005 Middle East Iran: Iraq: Egypt: Syria: Lebanon: Jordan: Israel: 1948 Saudi Arabia: Yemen: Kuwait: Bahrain: Qatar: UAE: Oman: West United States: 1809 Canada: 1888 United Kingdom: 1880 Ireland: 1921 Netherlands: 1917 1939 1945 Belgium: 1853 1913 1915 1938 1944 France: 1848 1850 1877 1939 1946 1957 1969 Switzerland: 1848 Spain: 1900 1922 1931 1938 1978 Portugal: 1911 1925 1976 East Germany:
Sunshine 33 West Ge rmany: 1949 1990 Germany: 1919 1932 1990 Baden: Saxony: Wuertternberg: Poland: 1918 1925 1991 Austria: 1920 1932 1946 Hungary: 1990 Czechoslovakia: 1918 1938 1945 1946 1990 Czech Republic: 1993 Slovakia: 1993 2009 Italy: 1948 Papal State: Two Sicilies: Modena: Parma: Tuscany: Albania: 2002 Montenegro: 2006 Macedonia: 1991 Croatia: 2000 Yugoslavia: 2000 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Kosovo: 2008 Slovenia: 1991 Greece: 1864 1914 1926 1933 1944 1948 1975 Cyprus: 1960 1962 1968 Bulgaria: 1990 Moldova: 1993 Roman ia: 1996 USSR: Russia: 2000 2006 Estonia: 1917 1919 1932 1991 Latvia: 1920 1933 1991 Lithuania: 1991 Ukraine: 1991 Belarus: 1991 1994 Armenia: 1991 1994 Georgia: 2004 Azerbaijan: Finland: 1917 1929 1944 Sweden: 1917 Norway: 1898 1939 1945 Denmark: 1 915 1939 1945 Turkey: 1946 1953 1961 1970 1973 1979 1983 Jamaica: 1959
Sunshine 34 Trinidad and Tobago: 1962 Haiti:
Sunshine 35 List 2: Intraregional Militarized Interstate Disputes Between Democracies Africa 1. Botswana and Namibia 1997 2. Mali and Niger 1993 3. Lesotho a nd South Africa: 1994 4. Lesotho and South Africa: 1994 Latin America 1. Colombia and Venezuela: 1982 2. Colombia and Venezuela: 1986 3. Colombia and Venezuela: 1987 4. Colombia and Venezuela: 1988 5. Colombia and Venezuela: 1994 6. Colombia and Venezuel a: 1995 7. Colombia and Venezuela: 1997 8. Colombia and Venezuela: 2000 9. Ecuador and Peru: 1981 10. Ecuador and Peru: 1984 11. Ecuador and Peru: 1991 12. Guyana and Venezuela: 1999 13. Costa Rica and Nicaragua: 1995 14. Costa Rica and Nicaragua: 1998 15. El Salvador and Honduras: 1989 16. El Salvador and Honduras: 1993 17. El Salvador and Nicaragua: 1993
Sunshine 36 18. Honduras and Nicaragua: 1991 19. Honduras and Nicaragua: 1995 20. Honduras and Nicaragua: 1995 21. Honduras and Nicaragua: 1997 22. Honduras and Nica ragua: 1999 2000 23. Honduras and Nicaragua: 2000 24. Honduras and Nicaragua: 2001 25. Honduras and Nicaragua: 20001 Asia 1. Australia and Indonesia: 1999 2. Bangladesh and India: 1995 3. Bangladesh and India: 1996 4. Bangladesh and India: 2001 5. Ind ia and Myanmar: 1957 6. India and Pakistan: 1990 7. India and Pakistan: 1991 8. India and Pakistan: 1993 1999 9. Indonesia and New Zealand: 2001 10. Japan and Taiwan: 1995 11. Japan and Taiwan: 1996 12. Japan and South Korea: 1996 13. Japan and So uth Korea: 1999 14. Philippines and Taiwan: 1994 Middle East
Sunshine 37 None West 1. Denmark and United Kingdom: 1961 2. Denmark and Norway: 1981 3. Spain and France: 1984 4. Spain and Ireland: 1984 5. Spain and Ireland: 1985 6. Spain and United Kingdom: 19 86 7. United States and Austria: 1960 8. Italy and Austria: 1960 9. Norway and Russia: 2001 10. Ukraine and Romania: 1997 11. Slovenia and Italy: 1993 12 Croatia and Yugoslavia: 2000 13. Canada and Yugoslavia: 2000 14. Canada and Russia: 2000 15. Canada and Spain: 1995 16. Canada and United States: 1974 17. Canada and United States: 1975 18. Canada and United States: 1979 19. Canada and United States: 1989 20. Canada and United States: 1991 21. Canada and United States: 1997
Sunshine 38 22. United State s and Yugoslavia: 2000 23. United States and Russia: 2000 24. Turkey and Russia: 2000 25. Cyprus and Greece: 1974 26. Turkey and Cyprus: 1986 27. Turkey and Cyprus: 1988 28. Turkey and Cyprus: 1993 29. Turkey and Cyprus: 1993 30. Turkey and Cyprus: 1994 1995 31. Turkey and Cyprus: 1996 2001 32. Turkey and Greece: 1975 33. Turkey and Greece: 1976 34. Turkey and Greece: 1984 35. Turkey and Greece: 1986 36. Turkey and Greece: 1989 37. Turkey and Greece: 1994 1995 38. Turkey and Greece: 1995 39 Turkey and Greece: 1997 40. Turkey and Greece: 1997 1998 41. Turkey and Greece: 1999 42. Turkey and Greece: 2001
Sunshine 39 List 3: Interregional Militarized Interstate Dispute Between Democracies Latin America and Asia 1. Argentina and Japan: 1987 Latin A merica and the West 1. Argentina and United Kingdom: 1983 2. Colombia and Italy: 1985 3. Ecuador and United States: 1980 4. Venezuela and United States: 2000 5. Chile and United Kingdom: 1996 6. Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago: 1996 7. Colombia and T rinidad and Tobago: 1997 8. Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago: 1999 West and the Middle East 1. Israel and Greece: 1976 2. Israel and United States: 1967 Asia and the West 1. Australia and Norway: 2001 2. New Zealand and France: 1985 3. Japan and Russia : 2000 4. Japan and Russia: 2001