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Economic Sanctions and States' Sense of Self: A Game-Theoretic Model

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Economic Sanctions and States' Sense of Self: A Game-Theoretic Model
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Horowitz, Jeffrey
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English

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Cold wars ( jstor )
Democracy ( jstor )
Economic games ( jstor )
Economic models ( jstor )
Economic sanctions ( jstor )
Game theory ( jstor )
Government securities ( jstor )
Morality ( jstor )
Ontology ( jstor )
Transmitters ( jstor )
Economic sanctions
Economic sanctions, American
Genre:
Undergraduate Honors Thesis

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Abstract:
Economic Sanctions have been a key type of foreign policy for nations dating back centuries. However, most of the scholarly work on the subject come to, at the very least, the agreement that economic sanctions do not historically boast a very good success rate. This paper examines the increase in usage of Economic Sanctions since 1990, and goes on to propose an alternative explanation of why the United States uses economic sanctions specifically. This information is gathered from updating and adding to an already existing catalog of economic sanctions dating from 1914 to the year 2000 originally shown in the book, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. While scholar have historically considered sanctions as a tool towards maintaining (or bettering) a nation's physical security, this paper argues that economic sanctions are currently employed by the United States as an ontological security tool instead, and after examining economic sanctions through this lens, we may find that there are indeed some signs of success that previous works have missed. However, this use of economic sanctions has simultaneously had provided the United State with much negative attention in other nations around the world, and in many cases has damaged its relations with ally nations as well as its image within the international community. Only after examining the costs and benefits of this unique use of economic sanctions over last two decades, can we begin to formulate an opinion of how the United States should proceed. Are economic sanctions a hindrance with a terribly low success rate? Or is there some other reason for their enactment that previous scholars have overlooked, that justifies their usage? ( en )
General Note:
Awarded Bachelor of Arts; Graduated May 8, 2012 magna cum laude Major: Economics
General Note:
Advisor: Laura Sjoberg
General Note:
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences

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Copyright Jeffrey Horowitz. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.

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EconomicSanctionsandStates'SenseofSelf:A Game-TheoreticModel Introduction EconomicSanctionshavehadaroleininternationalrelationsandglobal politicsforcenturies.Datingbackasfarastheyear432BC,theMegariandecree,passedbytheAthenians,wasclearlyaformofsanctioning.Thispieceof ancientlegislationexcludedMegarianmerchantsfrommarketsanywhereinside oftheAthenianempire,andtodayiscitedasoneofthersteconomicsanctions onwrittenrecordHufbauer,Elliot,andSchott;2008.Whilesanctionshave existedforever,itwasnotuntilrecentlythatscholarsbeganexaminingdierentquestions,suchaswhen,how,andwhysanctionssucceedininternational politics.Thesenewquestionsseemtohavebeenpromptedbytherecentincreaseintheusageofeconomicsanctionsthroughoutthegloballandscape.Only duringthelastftyyearsorso,havescholarsbeganexaminingeconomicsanctionsintherealmofinternationalrelationsandhaveattemptedtodetermine themerits,orshortcomingsofthisparticularforeignpolicytool,especiallyin comparisontosomeoftheothertoolsthatstateshaveattheirdisposalinthe 20thand21stcenturies.Howeverthevastmajorityofsanctionsliteratureall operatesunderanassumptionthatsuccessneedbedenedintermsofwhether ornotthesanctioningnationreceiveddesiredconcessionsfromthesanctioned nation.Deningsuccessinthatmannerignoresanimportantvariabletothe 1

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sanctionsparadigm,andasthispaperwilldemonstrate,reducesthenumberof caseswheresanctionscanbesuccessfulforthesendernationasaforeignpolicy tool.Thisadditionalvariableisoneofontologicalsecurity,whereinnations canndinternalbenetfromthedemonstrationofsupportforidealsthatthey holddear,andconverselyfaceontologicalcostsintheformofshameshould theyignoreactionsthatrunperpendiculartotheirnationalvalues.Onceone understandsthisintangiblecauseforaction,itbecomespossibleandprobable thatsanctionscanattimessucceedwithoutconcessionseverbeingmade,ifthe ontologicalbenetoutweighsanytangiblecostsassociatedwiththeenactingof aneconomicsanction. Thisleadstothepurposeofthisstudywhichbuildsuponworkpreviously donemeanttouncoverthesituationsinwhicheconomicsanctionsmayactually work.Hovi,Huseby,andSprinzarguedthatimposedeconomicsanctionscan onlyworkincasesofincompleteinformation,andusedamodelbasedonconceptsfromgametheorytosubstantiatetheirclaimHovi,HusebyandSprinz 2005.Theyproducedinequalitiesrstinagameofcompleteinformation tobedenedlater,thatcouldbesolvedtodeterminethesenderspayoin eachpossiblesituation,andfoundthemalltoeitherbenegative,orincases whereitwaspositivethetargetnationwouldbebetteronotpursuingthe sanctionintherstplace.Furthermore,thestudythenworkedingamesof incompleteinformationtobedenedlater,andfoundonlyonesituationout ofeightwhereeconomicsanctionscanhaveanychanceforsuccess.However, Hovi,Huseby,andSprinzareguilty,asaremanyotherscholars,ofdening successonlyintermsofthetangibleandphysicalgainssuchasconcessions bythetargetnation,andthereforetheir"game"asitisreferredtoingame theoryfailstoconsideramajorfactorthatmustbeaccountedforinorderto determinewhetherornotasanctioncanhaveachanceforsuccess,sincesuccess 2

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cannotbesolelymeasuredintermsoftangible,physicalgains.Specically,any economicmodel,gametheoreticalorotherwise,mustaccountforthesender nation'sontologicalsecuritygainsand/orcostsrelatedtothesanctionifthe modelwantstoaccuratelypredicttheoutcomeofthepolicyinitiativesuchas asanctionforthesenderandtargetnation.Therefore,inthispaperIpresent andexplainanexpandedversionoftheoriginalHovi,Huseby,andSprinzgame, anduseittouncovertherealcircumstancesunderwhicheconomicsanctions canbesuccessful. Thispaperrstexaminesthepriorworkdoneonsanctionsandtheirsuccessfulnessbypresentingtheargumentsandndingsofnumerousotherscholars. Thenthispaperexplainsindetailmytheoryofhowontologicaltheoryplays avitalroleintheenactingofaneconomicsanction,andcertainlymustbe accountedforifwearetoaccuratelyunderstandtheoverallutilityofaneconomicsanctioninagivensituation.Simultaneously,Ipresentadierentwayof deningsuccessandexplainwhythisdenitionisamuchmoreaccuratewayof understandingastate'sactiontosanctionanothernationevenwhenitappears tobeunabletogetdesiredconcessionsfromthesanctionednation.Ithenoutlinemethodologyfordevelopingagametheoreticmodelthatexplainseconomic sanctionswhileaccountingforthisfactorofontologicalsecurity,evaluatethis modeltodeterminewhenifeversanctionshaveachanceforsuccessbased onmynewdenitionofsuccess,discusstheresultsofthemodel,andpresent ahistoricalcasethatsupportsmymodelanddeningofsuccess.Thispaper thenconcludeswithsomeclosingremarksandsuggestssomeareasoffurther research. TheHistoryoftheSanctionsDebate:DotheyWork? WhensanctionsliteraturebegantosurfaceduringtheColdWarera,therst 3

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themethatneededtobeexaminedappearstohavebeenunanimous;doeconomicsanctionswork?Andoncescholarscouldanswerthisquestion,theywould thenbeabletorationallyconcludewhetherornotsanctionswereaworthwhile tooltobeconsideredbypolicymakersinaworldthatwasbecomingincreasingly dependentoninterstaterelations,andforeignmarkets.Whileitisanaccepted factthateconomicsanctionsdonothaveahistoricallyattractivesuccessrate, thereisdierenceofopinionaboutthatsuccessrate,andwhetherornotstates shouldbeoptimisticabouttheuseofsanctions.Onthemoreoptimisticsideof things,studiesargueinfavorofsuccessratesashighas34%Hufbauer,Elliot, andSchott2008,claimingthatundertherightsetofcircumstances,economic sanctionscanbereliedontosucceedintheirforeignpolicyendeavorwitha relativelyhighprobability.Hufbauer,Elliot,andSchottHSEhereafter,in theirbook,EconomicSanctionsReconsidered,wentontoexaminemorethan adozenothervariablesanddeducedwhichonesledtoahigherprobabilityof successwhenpresentinaparticularcaseofEconomicSanctions.However,the denitionofsuccessintheHSEstudiesisextremelybroad,andthislackluster deningofsuccessaswellastheirbroadsenseofhowmuchthepresenceofa giveneconomicsanctioncontributedtothesuccessinagivencase,makesits applicationverylimited.Successhereisgrantedtoanysituationwherethe sendernationthecountryusingeconomicsanctionsachieveditsdesiredoutcome,regardlessofthecircumstancesunderwhichthisoccurredorhowlittlea roletheeconomicsanctionplayedinachievingthisoutcome.Additionally,some optimistsarguethatmostsanctionsliteratureonlyexaminesthecaseswhere sanctionsareactuallyutilized,whileignoringthecaseswherethethreatofsanctionsisenoughtostimulatechangeinthetargetnationthenationhavingan economicsanctionplaceduponit.Byincludingtheseothercaseswherethe threatofsanctionsledtodesiredconcessionsforthesendernation,thesuccess 4

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rateofsanctionsseesasubstantialincreaseDrezner2004,LacyandNiou2004, andParker2000. Ontheothersideofthelate20thandearly21stcenturysanctionsdebate isamorepessimisticopinionofeconomicsanctions.Thisgroupofliterature coincidesmorewiththehistoricalviewthateconomicsanctionsareonlysuccessfulinuniquecircumstances,andthusarenotgenerallyafeasibleoption intherealmofforeignpolicyGaltung1967.Onepiece,writtenbyRobert Pape,contendsthatthesuccessrateofeconomicsanctionsatonly4%,based onareexaminationofthesamedatagatheredbytheHSEstudies.Themajor dierencehoweveristhatthisreexaminationusedamorenarrowdenitionof success.Thisviewalsoarguesthattherearethreedistinctstrategiesofapplying internationaleconomicpressure;economicsanctions,tradewars,andeconomic warfarePape1997.Thesetypesofactionaresodistinct,thatPapebelieves thattheymustbeexaminedindividuallytouncovertheirmerits,andgeneralizationbetweenthemisimpossibleifscholarsdesiretoaccuratelypredicttheir usefulnesstoastate'sforeignpolicyambitions.InsteadPapearguesthatwe muchdierentiatebetweenthethree,andevaluateeachofthemseparately.This lineofthinkingpavesthewayfortheargumentthatsanctionsshouldonlybe consideredasuccessorfailureiftheyplayedavitalroleincreatingtheoutcome thatoccurredinthatparticularcaseandasuccessfulsanctionhastohave playedavitalroleincreatingthedesiredoutcomeforthesendernation. Anotherinterestingquestiontoconsideralludedtoaboveiswhetherornot sanctionscanbesuccessfulunderapreconceivedsetofconditions?Iftheycan beitwouldraisetheinherentutilityofsanctionsasapossibleforeignpolicy initiativeifwecouldisolatethosesituations,insteadofsimplycritiquingthe meritofeconomicsanctionsacrosstheentirespectrumofhistoricalsituations, someofwhichmayhavebeendoomedfromthestart.Ithasbeenarguedthat 5

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sanctionsworkbestifthegoalsofthesenderarelimited;thetarget isalreadyexperiencingeconomicdiculties;therearegenerallyfriendly relationsbetweenthesenderandtargetnationspriortotheinstallationofthe economicsanction;sanctionsareforcefullyimplementedinasinglestep; sanctionsentailsignicantcostsforthetarget;thecostsforsender countriesaremodest;thesanctionsarenotaccompaniedbycovertactionor militaryoperations;andfewcountriesareneededtoimplementthesanctions Hufbauer,Elliot,andSchott2008.However,basingtheutilityofeconomic sanctionsonthepresenceoftheseeightvariablesisn'tentirelyhelpful,since thesuccessrateisstilllowunlessthemajorityofthe8variablesarepresent, andcasesthathaveallormostofthesesituationspresentarenotgoingtobe common. Anotherargumentregardingtheconditionsthatcreateasituationinwhich aneconomicsanctioncanbesuccessfulcamefromthequalitativecasestudy ofBlanchardandRipsman.Theyarguethatwhattheyrefertoas,"thetraditionalsanctionslogicthatthetargetwillbeinducedtoalteritspoliciesonce theeconomicpressureisstrongenough,"isnotspecicenough.Theyspecicallyclaimthattheeectivenessofeconomicsanctionsdependsonaninherent balancebetweenthepoliticalcostsassociatedwiththeoptionsofcompliance andnoncompliance.Ifnoncomplianceislikelytoleadtohighpoliticalcosts, thetargetnationhasafargreaterprobabilityofgivingintothedemandsofthe sendernation,unlesscomplianceisevenmorepoliticallycostlyduetointernal pressuresforexampleBlanchardandRipsman1999.Lastly,agametheoreticargumentpositsthatsanctionscannotworkinthetheoreticallandscape ofcompleteinformation,butsincetherealworldisaplaceofincompleteinformation,sanctionscanworkundercertaincircumstancesHovi,Huseby,and Sprinz2005.AnarticlewrittenbyJonHovi,Huseby,andSprinzexplainsthe 6

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circumstancesunderwhichamisunderstandingofanationstrueambitionsmay leadtoasuccessfuleconomicsanction,buttheyarguethatonlyinthisone situationwillsanctionsproduceasuccessfuloutcomeforthesendernation. SuccessfulSanctions:DeningSuccessandAcknowledging OntologicalSecurity Inlightofallofthesestudies,areasonableconclusiontodrawwouldbethat sanctionscannotbereliedupontoproducesuccesswithanylevelofcertainty. Regardlessofwhetheroneadoptstheoptimisticviewthatsanctionssucceed 34%ofthetime,orthemorepessimisticviewthatsanctionsproduceadesired outcomeameasly4%ofthetime,thesuccessofeconomicsanctionsdoesnot appeartobehighenoughtowarrantthevastincreaseintheusageofeconomic sanctionsthatwehaveseenpostColdWar.Between1914and1983,103differentknowncasesofeconomicsanctionsoccurredabout1.48casesperyear. From1984-1989,17casesabout3.29casesperyearwererecorded.From 1990,whichItreathereastheendoftheColdWar,until200054newcases, about4.82casesofeconomicsanctionsperyear,tookplaceHufbauer,Elliot, andSchott2008.ThispaperignoresafewoftheHSEcasenumbersbecause thesecaseswerecountedmultipletimesonthegroundsthatthereweredistinct dierentreasonsforthesanctions,andtheyevaluatedeachreasonseparately. Thisstudyisonlyinterestedineachseparate,unique,occurrenceofeconomic sanctioning.Thesestatisticshoweverdodemonstrateavastincreaseinusage ofeconomicsanctionscollectivelybynationsacrosstheglobe,andwiththis increaseitbecomesnecessarytodeducewhetherornoteconomicsanctionsare afeasibletoolfornationstousewithintheglobalarena. Whenitcomestothesuccessrateofeconomicsanctionsthispaperargues 7

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thattheassumptionthatsuccessmustequalconcessionsfromthesanctioned nation,whichpriorsanctionsliteraturehasassumedcountlesstimes,istoo narrowofadenitionofsuccess.Whileconcessionsarecertainlyasignofa successfulsanction,theyarenottheonlywayinwhichasanctioncansucceed. Furthermore,whetheronesubscribestothemoreoptimisticoutlookpresented byHSEandothers,orthemorepessimisticstanceoutlinedbyRobertPape, bothsidessharethissimilarshortcoming.Eachofthesepreviousexaminations intothesuccessofeconomicsanctionsassumeasortofzerosumgamewherein onepartymustwinwhiletheotherloses,andvictoryisbasedonwhetheror notthesanctionednationmakesthedesiredconcessionsofthesanctioningnation.However,inagametheoreticsensetheknowledgethateconomicsanctions boastanabysmallylowsuccessratethroughoutglobalhistorywouldbewhat isreferredtoas"commonknowledge"andfromthereitbecomeslogicalwithin thestudiesofeconomicgametheorytoassumethatanyrationalactorwouldn't blindlyuseapolicythattheyexpecttofailwithgreaterlikelihoodthenthey canexpectittosucceed.Thereforethispapercontendsthattheremustoneof twothingstakingplace.Therstpossibilityisthattheremustbeoneormore otherreasonswhynationswoulduseeconomicsanctionsotherthansuccessand failureastraditionallydenedwhetherornotthetargetnationmakesthedesiredconcessions.WhileIconcedethattheconcessionsareadesiredoutcome, theydonotappeartobeanoutcomenecessaryinordertojustifytheuseof economicsanctions,sinceifthatwasthecasepolicymakerswouldrationallynot pursuethemwithoutahighchanceforsuccess.Theotherpossibilityisthat policymakersofnationsaroundtheworldareirrationaldenedasnotacting tomaximizeone'spotentialpayosgivenone'sknowledgeofthesituationin theiractionsHarrington2009.Thispaperwillignorethesecondpossibilityon thegroundsthatexplainingirrationalactorsisnotpossiblebydenitionsince 8

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theydon'tactrationally,andifweweretoassumetheirrationalityofworld leaders,explainingwhytheytakeacertainactionbecomesimpossible. Therefore,ifweassumethatnationalpolicymakerscollectivelypossessrationalitywhenitcomestodecision-making,whichmeansthattheyarelookingto bettertheirnationsortheirowninterestsinsomefashion,thenthenextthing todetermineishowtheimpositionofaneconomicsanctioncanbetterthose interests.Moreoverthisimpositioncannotsimplybebasedontheprobability forsuccessasdenedtraditionally,sincethelikelihoodisatbestlessthan35%. However,itisherethatIputforthanewwayofdeterminingsuccessandfailure whenitcomestothesanctionsgame.Thisisbecausethedeningofsuccess solelyintermsofconcessionsfromthetargetnationscompletelyoverlooksthe intangibledimensionsofsuccesstothesendernationDorussenandMo2001; Lindsay1986.Moreover,inmanycasesthistypeofsuccesscanbefareasier toachieve,sincethesimpleenactingofaneconomicsanctioncanaccomplishit. Theenactingofasanctionormaintainingitprimarilytosatisfyadomestic interestgrouporsimplytodemonstratethatthegovernmentcaresand"isdoingsomething,"inresponsetosomesortoftravestyabroadcouldaccomplish thissortofgoal.Forexample,thesanctionsthathavebeeninplaceagainst BurmaMyanmarsince1988,thatclaimtobeinresponsetoalackofhuman rightswithinthenation,narcoticsmuggling,andalackofdemocracy,aremore aboutshowingtheUnitedStates'disdainwithoccurrenceswithinBurmathan aboutactuallystimulatingchange.WhiletheUnitedStateshastakenthenoble stanceagainstthreethingsthatournationobviouslydisagreeswith,isitreally lookingforsuccessassanctionsliteraturehashistoricallydenedit?This pieceoflegislationhasbeenonthebooksforthirteenyears,and,sincetheir imposition,U.S.sanctionshavenothadanysuccessinfosteringgreaterdemocracyorimprovingthehumanrightssituationinMyanmar.Infact,conditions 9

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haveworsenedBrandon1999.Furthermore,someopinionsofU.S.sanction policyareevenmoreforwardwiththeirassertionthat, Sanctionsaremainlyasymbolicstandforjustice.Buttheyarenot symbolicintheireects.Theyareeconomicallydestructiveandonly occasionallypoliticallyproductive.America'smisguidedsanctions againstMyanmar,forexample,havedonenothing...toresolvethe country'spoliticalandeconomiccrisisSachs2004. BothBrandonandSachs'sargumentssupportmyassertionthatthefailureof manylongtermeconomicsanctionsareobvious,yetpolicymakersaroundthe globecontinuetosupportthemeveninlightofthesefailures.Thereforean alternativereasonforenactingsanctionspolicy,andIcontendthatthisreason isoneofintangiblegains. ThispaperarguesthatthereasonfortherepeatedusedofeconomicsanctionsbytheUnitedStates,andtheincreaseinusageinrecentyears,canbe explainedbyitsneedforontologicalsecurity.Ontologicalsecurityisatypeof nonphysicalsecuritybaseduponthepremisethatpeoplefeelmoresecureby reinforcingbeliefsthattheyholddeartothem.Ontologicalsecurityclaimsthat individualsfeelcompelledtobetternotonlytheirphysicalsecurity,butalsothis sortofnon-physicalsecuritywhichfocusesmoreontheattachmentindividual peoplehavetoroutinebasedactionsduetoacomfortthattheyhavewiththese actionsversustheunknownmuchliketheadversesentimentsmanyhumanbeingsdisplaytowardschangeMitzen2006aand2006b.Moreover,ontological securitycanbeappliedatthestatelevelbecause,sinceindividualstateagents electedocialsrepresentthestateatthepolicymakinglevel,theyinessence arethestateduetothesimplefacttheyholdboththemoralburdenandthe actualcapacitytomakedecisions,andarestillboundbytheirontologicalsecurityfearsMcSweeney1999.Throughthislens,uncertaintyatthestatelevel isinherentlyasecuritythreattotheindividualswhowouldbeaectedbythis 10

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change,andthisthreatcouldbethereasonforastate'suseofaneconomic sanctionthat,througharealistlens,maybeagainstthestatesowninterests sincethechanceofsuccessissolow.Ontologicalsecurityinherentlypromotes orderwithinthestate'swayofoperatingonanationallevelaswellasorder withinitsdealingswithothernations,andthusitbecomesunderstandablethat stateswanttosupportpeopleandgovernmentswholivesimilartotheirown, andpossessesideologiessimilartotheirown.Ifaconceptlikedemocracywere tosuddenlybeusurpedontheglobalscalebyanewwayofgoverningmuch likehowdemocracyreplacedmonarchy,itwouldposeanenormousontological securityrisktothemillionsofpeoplearoundtheworldwhocurrentlyappreciate democraticruleincomparisontoitsalternatives. TheconceptofontologicalsecurityistakenastepfurtherinBrentSteele's book, OntologicalSecurityinInternationalRelations ,anditisfromthiswork thatIformthebasisformyargumentregardingeconomicsanctions.Steele arguedthatstatespursuecertaintypesofactioninordertofulllself-identity needsevenattheexpenseoftheirphysicalexistenceinsomeextremecircumstancesSteele2008.Theargumenthemakesisthatontologicalsecurityisa balancingactbetweenanationsself-identityanditscapabilities,andthatthe entirebalancingactismeanttoeitherpreventorlimittheamountofshamethe nationfeels.Logically,nationswithhighercapabilitiesmilitarily,monetarily, and/orinuentiallyhaveagreaterresponsibilityduetoself-awarenessofits capabilitiesSteele2008.Hegoesontoarguethatstatespursuecertaintypes ofactionsinordertosatisfytheself-identityneedsofthatparticularstate. Therefore,eventhoughstatesarepursuingasenseofinternalsecurityhere,ontologicalsecuritycanhaveramicationsnotonlytoindividualstates,butalso theirinteractionswithotherstates,bothinfriendlyandnon-friendlyterms.Not onlydostatesdesirefarmorethansimplytheirsurvivalastraditionalrealistIR 11

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theoryscholarsclaim,butstatesalsohaveaselfperceptionofthemselvesthat theywishtodefendandpromotewheneverandwhereverpossibleSteele2008. Thisideaofontologicaltheoryhasvastramicationsintherealmofsanctions studies,asitbeginstounravelthemysteryofwhystatessuchastheUnited Stateswhichwillbethefocusofthispiecenotonlycontinuetousewhathas historicallybeenseenasafailingformofforeignpolicy,buthaveactuallybegan tousethemwithgreaterfrequencyinrecentyears.Steelepointsoutthatontologicalsecurityevenseemstotrumpphysicalsecurityinmanyhistoricalcases suchasBelgium'sdefenseagainstGermanyinWorldWar1andthisdisplays that,incertaincases,stateshaveplacedhigherimportanceontheirsenseof self;theirmorals,theirlaws,andtheirwaysofliving,thantheyhaveonthis primitivesurvivalassumptionthatmanyscholarsfeeldrivesstateaction. ThispaperexaminesthebackgroundinformationbehindtheUnitedStates continueduseofeconomicsanctions,andarguesthattheUnitedStates'place asaglobalhegemonintheglobalcommunity,compoundedwithitsadoration forthestatusquogoesalongwaytowardsexplainingitsuseofeconomicsanctionseventhoughtheirchanceofsuccessbasedontraditionaldenitionsof successislow.InsteadtheUnitedStatesuseeconomicsanctionsasawayof explainingtheUnitedStates'sentimentstowardshighlycontestedissuessuch ashumanrightsviolations,democraticgovernment,andnuclearproliferation, andbyunderstandingthiswecanseethatthesimpleuseofthesanctionhasa certainamountofsuccessinarmingtheUnitedStatesstanceonthecontested policyissuerelevanttothatparticularcase.ThereforethispaperwillexaminethelogicbehindtheUnitedStates'increasingusageofeconomicsanctions. Moreover,thispaperthenpresentsagametheoreticmodelofwheneconomic sanctionscanproducesuccessbasedonamoreextensivedenitionofsuccess andfailureaccountingforanewvariableknownasontologicalsecurityex12

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plainedlater,andendswithaconclusionofhowtheUnitedStatescanfulll itsontologicalsecurityneedswhilestillhavingsuccessinitspolicyinitiatives. ThisstudywillfocusprimarilyonthepostColdWareraandonward simplyduetothevastchangeinontologicalsecuritythattheUnitedStates underwentattheconclusionoftheColdWar.TheUnitedStatesexitedthe ColdWarastheworld'ssuperpower,andwiththisnewfoundpositioninthe globalcommunityaroseatremendousresponsibilitytotheglobalcommunity, sinceithadgreatercapabilities,andgreaterriskofshame,thananyother nationontheglobe.Ofthe54casesofeconomicsanctionsbetween1990and 2000SeeTable1,33ofthosecasessawtheUnitedStatesasasendernation %ofcases,12timestheUnitedStatesactedunilaterally%ofcases, and7othertimestheUnitedStateswasinvolvedindirectlythroughaU.N. sanction%HSE2008.Thismaynotseemastoundingatrst,butwhen theUnitedStatesstatedepartmentrecognizes195dierentnationsandthis doesn'tincludeTaiwan,Iran,NorthKorea,Cuba,etc.meaningthetotalis probably200ormore,itissomewhatinformativetounderstandthatonenation useseconomicsanctionsmorethantheother194nationscombined.The54 casesarethenbrokenupbasedonthestatedreasonforthesanctionbythe sendernationsintothreecategories;moralreasonssuchasdemocracyand humanrights,securitythreats,andeconomicreasonsnotethatsomecasesfall intomorethanonecategory.Ofthe33casestheUnitedStateswasdirectly involvedin,24ofthem.7%hadmoralreasons,incomparisontotherestof theglobalcommunitywhichemployedsanctionsformoralreasonsonly52.4% ofthetime.TheseresultsdemonstratetheUnitedStatesisfarmorelikelyto involveitselfintotheaairsofotherstatesformoralreasonsthananyother nationis.Furthermore,referencestotheUnitedStatesasa"GlobalCop"only furtherthisparadigmunderwhichtheUnitedStatesseesitselfasbeingrequired 13

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tointerveneandhelpthosewhocannothelpthemselvesBoot2011.While thegoalhereisnottocritiquetheoverallutilityoftheUnitedStates'recent interventionisttendencies,itisnecessarytoatleastunderstandthistendency inordertoproperlyunderstandtheUnitedStates'ontologicalsecuritythreats. TheUnitedStates,whetheranysinglepersonagreeswithitornotona personallevel,seesitselfastheglobalprotectorofallthingsgoodandproper basedonourdenitionsofgoodandproper.Statementssuchas,"promoting freedomanddemocracyandprotectinghumanrightsaroundtheworldarecentraltoU.S.foreignpolicy,"takenrightotheDepartmentofState'sBureauof Democracy,HumanRights,andLaborwebsiteservesasevidenceforthisclaim. WhilemostifnotallofAmerica'scitizenswouldapplaudrhetoricsuchas this,problemsbegintoarisewhenoneexaminestheramicationsofthesesorts ofstatements,especiallywhentheyarelinkedtoournationalforeignpolicy. Foronething,theobviousramicationcomesiftheUnitedStatesignoresan obviouscaseofhumanrightsviolationsorusurpationofdemocracy.Obviously theUnitedStatescannotreasonablyhopetoghtbackevilbyourdenition everywhereitsurfaces,butbystatingthisasapartofournationalforeign policy,theUnitedStateshasplacedacertainlevelofexpectationsonitself. TheUnitedStatesis...toconstructanarchitectureofvaluesthat spanstheglobeandincludeseveryman,womanandchild.An architecturethatcannotonlycounterrepressionandresistpressure onhumanrights,butalsoextendthosefundamentalfreedomsto placeswheretheyhavebeentoolongdeniedClinton2010. Thisstatement,madebySecretaryofStateHillaryClintonduringaforeign policyspeechinSeptemberof2010,isaprimeexampleofthis.However,the unfortunaterealityisthattheonlycureforthisapparenthypocrisywouldbeto interveneintoeverysinglecircumstancethatdisplayshumanrightsviolations, orthelimitingofdemocraticideals.Realistically,theUnitedStatescannot 14

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holditselftothissortofforeignpolicyinitiativewithoutvasteconomicramications....soitdoesn't.Andmovingforward,theUnitedStateswillremain selectiveabouthumanitarianintervention,becauseitmustbalanceitsgoalof preventingsueringabroadwithotherinterestsandcommitments,andbecause someconicts,suchasanarchicSomalia,aredauntinglycomplexandwouldimposeunacceptableburdensonwellmeaningintervenersPatrick2011.Patrick thengoesontolistreasonsforthislimitationsuchasanationsrightto sovereignty,thesimpletruththatU.S.capacitiesarenotendless,wantingtolimittheamountofarmedintervention,apreferencetomultilateral interventionsoverunilateralones,andtheUnitedStatesshouldonlyenter intoarmedinterventionsifitsleadersarecommittedtomarshalingandsustainingthedomesticsupportrequiredtonishtheobjectiveevenifthingsbecome morecomplicatedthanoriginallyexpected. 1 Soinsteadofuniversalinterventionintoeverysituation,theUnitedStates directlyintervenesselectivelywhenitfeelsthatthethreattoitsownsecurity becomesoverwhelming,orwhenthepublicoutcryisgreatest.Inallothercases, theUnitedStateshasdevelopedthishabitofsortswhereitusesaneconomic sanctiontoexpressitsdispleasewithwhatisoccurringinanothernation.The problemthatissoeasilynoticeablewiththissortofhabitualnature,isthe UnitedStates'inabilitytoenforceitspolicieswhenitisintoomanyplaces atonceand,evenmoreso,itsinabilitytoactually,eectivelyhelpanyone whenitisintoomanyplacesatonce.Moreover,thisultimatelyleadstothe perceptionthatmanyU.S.foreignpolicyinitiativeswithregardstoeconomic sanctionsarefailing.However,inallactually,theUnitedStateisn'tlookingfor successbytraditionalstandardsinthesesituations,andonceoneunderstands theontologicalreasonforthesanctions,onecanbegintounderstandthatthis situationisfarmorecomplicatedthanasimple"success"or"failure." 15

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Whileexaminingthe33casesofeconomicsanctionsthattheUnitedStates involveditselfinbetween1990-2003,24ofthemhadsomesortofmoraljusticationbehindthemSeeTable1.ConsideringtheUnitedStateshasused economicsanctionsexponentiallymorefrequentthananyothernationoverthe last20years,itseemsonlynaturaltoreasonthattheremustbesomethingcausingthisaction.Specically,thereweretworeoccurringthemes:humanrights violations,andthedesiretoprotecttheidealofdemocracy.Throughtheexaminationofthesecases,itbecameapparentthattheUnitedStatesuseseconomic sanctionsasawayofexpressingitsdiscontentwithagivensituationthatitfeels stronglyinoppositionto,butnotstrongenoughtointervenemilitarily.This allowstheUnitedStates'governmenttochoosewhichcasesitwillintervene indirectly,whilestillhavingtheabilitytosymbolicallyexpressitsdiscontent inothersituations.TheUnitedStatesgovernmentandmanyofitscitizens seesitselfastheglobalpoliceofsortsasmentionedearlier,andthiscreatesa desiretorespondtomanyissueswhereitfeelsthatpeoplearebeingwronged basedonAmericandenitionsofrightandwrong,butincertainsituations thegovernmentrealizesthatinterventionisn'tpracticalorwiseforthecountry asawhole.Therefore,weasanationhavedevelopedthismindsetwhere,becauseeconomicsanctionsareperceivedtobelessburdensomeonournationand overallabetteroptiontomilitaryconictwhichattimesisn'talwayscertain, butthatisbeyondthescopeofthispaper;weusethemalmostinsubstitution formilitaryinterventionfromanexpressivestandpoint.Therefore,economic sanctionshaveessentiallybeenslowlyturnedintoawayofrepresentingthe UnitedStatesinterestsinsituationswheremilitaryinvolvement'sconsequences faroutweighthegainsfortheUnitedStates,butsomelevelofinvolvementis stilldeemedasnecessaryandproperfortheworld'sglobalpoliceocer,and theUnitedStatesfeelitnecessarytoatleastmakeitsstancetowardsagiven 16

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situationknowandpublicizedinordertoavoidtheshameofhavingstoodby anddisplayednon]actionwhilethesewrongsoccurred. Therefore,therepeatedattemptbyscholarstotrytoexaminethesuccess orfailureofeconomicsanctionsisawed,becausethecountryemployingthem moreoftenthantherestoftheglobalcommunitycombined,isnotlookingfor successorfailureinatraditionalsense.TheUnitedStates,inthesesituations, useseconomicsanctionsasawaytoexpressitsidealsandprotectitsontological security,whichisgroundedinwordssuchasunalienablerights,anddemocracy. Peopleneednotlookanyfurtherthanthedocumentsonwhichthisnationwas foundedandndmentioningoftheseterms,andastheUnitedStateshasgrown inpoweroverthelasttwocenturiessinceitsindependence;itsclouthasgrownas well.TheUnitedStateshasbegunfrequentlyinitiatinganeconomicsanctionin anysituationinwhichtheseidealsappeartobethreatened,anditisusingthem asawayofdemonstratingitssentimentsaboutagivenissue.Thissymbolic supportforitsownidealsisanontologicalsecuritydecisionmeanttocontinue tocementtheidealsthatarethebasisfortheUnitedStatesexistenceinthe mindsofothernationsaroundtheworld,aswellascontinuingtosooththe mindsoftheAmericanpeoplebyshowingthattheUnitedStatesistakingsome courseofaction.Therefore,theveryexistenceoftheeconomicsanctionhassome successfortheUnitedStatesifexaminedinthatregard,buteventhiswould betodenesuccessveryloosely.Thispaperarguesthat,fortheUnitedStates, economicsanctionsaren'taboutsuccessandfailureinatraditionalsecurity sense.Instead,theyareasymbolicrepresentationofU.S.ideals,andaslongas thegainsfromdisplayingtheseidealsoutweighanyphysicalornon-physical costsassociatedwiththesanction,thanthesanctionisa"success"evenifthe desiredconcessionsfromthetargetnationareneverreceived. 17

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Methods Asiscommonplacewithinsanctionsliterature,thisstudywillrefertothe countryemployingeconomicsanctionsasthesendernationsender,andthenationreceivinganeconomicsanctionasthetargetnationtarget.Themethodologyusedtostudyeconomicsanctionshereisanextensiveformgamefrom gametheoryeconomics."Games"ingametheoryaresituationsthatcanbe workedthroughrationallytoarriveatthepossibleendresultsofagivensituationandfromthereonecanseetheeventualresultsforeachpartyinvolved. Withinthegame,eachplayerpossessesastrategy,denedashowbesttoplaya giveneconomicgame,inordertoprovidethehighestwell-beingfortheplayer. Thismeasurementofwell-beingassociatedwiththeparticularoutcomeofa gameisknownasaplayer'spayoHarrington2009,PageG-4.Anextensive formgameisamodelrepresentedbyadecisiontreewhereinbranchesextend connectingdierentnodesknownasdecisionsnodes,whereactorswithinthe gamecanmakedecisions.Agamebeginsataninitialnode,andhasbranches comingfromittorepresenteachdecisionaplayercanmake.Branchesconnect theinitialnodetothenextdecisionnode,andateachdecisionnodeaplayer inthegamemakesadecision,whichdetermineswhatbranchthegamefollows fromthatnode. Thereasonformyuseofanextensiveformgameisbecauseitbestmodels thereallifeapplicationofeconomicsanctions.Thetwomaintypesofgamesin gametheoryareextensiveformgamesandstrategicformgames.Aninherent assumptioninextensiveformgamesisthatbothplayershavetheabilityto observeandnotethemovesoftheotherplayeraswellasbeingabletorationally deducetheresponsestheotherplayerswillhavetoeachofthepossiblemoves saidplayercanmake.Additionally,itoperatesbyoneplayermakingamove atatime,andassumesasortofcauseandeectrelationshipwhereaplayers 18

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responseissomewhatbasedonthedecisionsmadepreviouslyinthegame.A strategicformgameincontrasthasplayerscreatepredenedstrategiesbasedon preferencesinagivensituation,andtheplayersmovebasedontheseperceived preferenceswithoutbeingabletowatchpreviousactions.Extensiveformgames arelessabstractintheirthoughtprocessHarrington2009.Thisenablesthe actingplayertomakethebestpossibleindividualdecisionbasedonthedecisions theotherplayershavemadeandarelikelytomakeinthefuture,assuming rationality. Inordertoevaluateanextensiveformgame,thereadershouldbeginat theleftmostbottomdecisionnode,comparethepossiblepayosthatplayer receivesbasedonthepossibledecisionsthatplayercanmakeatthatdecision node.Theplayerisawareofthesepayos,andwillmakethedecisionthat leadstothehigherpayo,eectivelyeliminatingtheotherpayosasapossible endpointofthegame.Wecanthenmoveupwardthroughthegametothe nextdecisionnodetheonethathasadecisionthatleadstothenodewewere justatandrepeatthesameprocessandevaluatedierentpossibleterminal nodes.Eachterminalnodecorrespondstoadierentsetofpayosforboth thesenderandtarget,whichrepresent,"themeasurementofaplayer'swellbeingassociatedwithaparticularoutcomeofaneconomicgame."Harrington 2009Afterexaminingthemodelandrepeatingthecomparisonprocess,one candeterminewhichterminalnodesareattainablecanbereachedbyrational playersandthepossiblepayoscanbeevaluatedtodeterminewhetherornot thesendergainsfromtheenactingofaneconomicsanctionbycomparingthe payoslikelytobereceivedwhenthesenderdoesusesanctions,versusthe payoreceivedifthesenderdoesnot.Ifthegameinquestionwasagame of"perfectinformation"Harrington2009,whereallpreferencesandthus decisionsareknowntobothplayers,itwouldbepossibletodetermineone 19

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terminalnodewherethegamewouldalwaysendat.Howeverthetypeofgame beingexaminedinthispaperisoneof"incompleteinformation"Harrington 2009duetothesubconsciousdecisionsofNaturewillbediscussedlaterand thereforewewillhaveafewpossibleendpoints. Howeverfromthissetofendpoints,anexpectedpayoforeachplayercan becalculatedbymultiplyingeachpayobytheprobabilitythatitwilloccur, andthensummingtheseweightedprobabilities.Thisexpectedpayoessentially givesusthepayothattheplayerislikelytogetbybeginningthegamein thiscase,bythesenderenactinganecconoicsanctionandwecancompareto thistothepayotheplayerwouldreceiveifitcommittednoaction.Logically, iftheplayer'spayofromactingishigherthannotactinginanygame,then thatactioncancertainlybedenedasasuccessfulaction.Therefore,this paperwillshowthatsituationsexistwhereinthenationemployinganeconomic sanctionwillexpecttogainfromthesanctionsimpositionbycomparingthis resulttoitspayoifitdidnotuseanyeconomicsanctioninthegivensituation, andthereforeIcontendthatthatanysuchsanctionwiththisqualitywherethe senderexperiencesapayogreaterthanitwouldifitdidnotactcanbedened asasuccess.Thismodelthereforedemonstratesthecasesofsendertypeand typeofinternationalnormbeingviolatedwhereapayofromenactingsanctions canbegreaterthanthecasethatarisesifthesenderdoesnottakeactiongivena setofvariables,andfromthismodelwewilldeterminethateconomicsanctions cansucceedevenwithoutconcessionsfromthetargetnation.Iwillalsocite ahistoricalexampleofsanctionspolicywhereinsuccesscanbedenednotin termsofconcessions,butintermsoftheontologicalimplicationsofthesanctions enactment,theUnitedStatestradeembargoagainstCuba. 20

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ModelingtheOntologicalCostandBenetofEconomic Sanctions Inthisparticulargame,therearetwoplayersmakingchoices,Senderand Target,whichrepresentacountryorcountriesthathas/havesomeglobalnorm whichitvaluesandanothercountrythathassomedesiretoviolatethatnorm respectively.Senderinthismannercouldrepresentmultiplecountriesina collectivemannerwhichholdthesamevalue.Oneofthetwofundamental dierencesbetweenmymodelandthatofHovi,Huseby,andSprinz,isthatin mymodel,beforeeitherplayerbeginstomove,athirdplayer,knowncommonly ingametheoryasNature,thathasalreadymadetwodistinctionsthataect thedirectionofthegame. 2 ItrstdecidesthetypeofplayerSenderwillbe: tough,mediumorweak,andthenitdecideswhattypeofglobalnormisbeing violated,onethatisofprimaryimportancetotheSendernations,oroneof tertiaryimportance.Atoughsenderwillrespondtoanyviolationofglobal normswithpotenteconomicsanctions.Themediumsenderwillrespondto theviolationofprimarynormswithpotentsanctions,butwillonlyuselenient sanctionsinresponsetotheviolationofatertiarynorm.Finally,aweaksender willimposelenientsanctionsinthecaseofaprimarynorm,andwilldonothing inthewakeofatertiarynormbeingviolated. Asinanygametheoreticmodel,playerscannotobserveNature'sdecisions, andthusdonotknowtheresultsofthosedecisions,unlessthedecisionsare aboutthem.Specicallytothisgame,TargetdoesnotknowthetypeofSender, andwillnotbecertainofthisuntiltheyareabletoobserveSender'sresponses duringthecourseofthegame,andsimilarlyTargetdoesnotknowwithcertaintywhetherornotthenorminquestionisaprimaryortertiarynormto theSender.Isetthegameupinthismannertoreplicatethelevelofuncer21

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taintythatispresentwithininternationalpoliticsinreallife.Withoutany nature-baseddecisions,gametheorytraditionallyassumesperfectinformation thateachplayerknowshowtheotherwillrespondgiventhechoicesinfront ofthemandcanrationallydeducethebestcourseofactionforbothplayers. Thisisnotpracticalorapplicabletomanyreallifecircumstances,andthusa gameofincompleteinformationhasmorereal-lifeapplicability. OncethesetwofacetsofthegamehavebeendeterminedbyNature,Target beginsthedecision-makingportionofthegamebydecidingwhetherornot itwillviolatethenorm.Senderobservesthisaction,andthendecidesonan appropriateresponseifTargetchoosestoviolateifTargetdoesnotviolate,the gameends.AssumingTargetviolates,Senderthenhas3options;todonothing, imposelenientsanctions,orimposepotentsanctions.Wealsoassumethatthe TargetisabletoobserveSender'smoveandthatTargetwillultimately standrminthefaceoflenientsanctions,butwillyieldifSenderproceeds withtheimpositionofpotentsanctions.IfSenderchoosestodonothingin responsetotheviolationoftheglobalnorm,thegameendsaswell.Ifitimposes sanctionspotentorlenientTargetmustthendecideonaresponsewhether ornottoyieldandthisstependsthegame.IfTargetyield,Senderwillliftthe sanctions,andifTargetdoesnotyield,weassumethatthesanctionsremainin eectindenitelyintothefuture.Eachpointwhereaplayermakesadecision iscalledanode,andeachnodethatservesasapossibleendpointforthegame isreferredtoasaterminalnode.Ateachterminalnode,payosexistforboth SenderandTargetwhichreecttheirgainsorlossesfromtakingthatpossible pathtowardsaneventualendtothegameinquestion. Therstvariabletounderstandinthismodel,isthebenet,denedasthe violationbenet,gainedbyTargetforusingtheeconomicsanctions.Similarly, themodelassumesthatthereissomecostthatSenderincursbyhavingthenorm 22

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violated,whichSendercanovercomenotincurifitcangetTargettoyield andrevertbacktofollowingtheacceptednorm.Thesevariablesarenecessary because,iftherewasnobenetforTarget,onecouldeasilyarguethatthey wouldneverviolatethenormintherstplace.Thesetwovaluesaredened atBandCrespectivelysuchthatbothB,C>0.WealsoassumethatTarget eventuallyyieldingwillultimatelyresultinareversionbacktothestatusof globalaairspriortotheoriginalviolation,whichinherentlymeansthatTarget onlygainsBifitdoesnotyield.Anotherimplicationofthisassumptionisthat SenderonlyretainsthecostofCifTargetdoesnotyield. Additionally,themodelportrayedhereassumesthattherearecertaincosts inicteduponbothpartiesasaresultofthesanctionsprocess.Therstisthe literalcostoflostcommercialexchangebetweenSenderandTargetasaresult ofthetradesanction.ForcaseswhereTargetdoesnotyield,thesevariablesare setupas S L T lenientsanctions;targetand S P T potentsanctions;targetfor Targetwhere S P T >S L T > 0 ,sincelogicallypotentsanctionswillhaveagreater burdenonthetargetnationthanlenientsanctionswould.IncaseswhereTarget doesyield,thecostsare S L T and S P T respectivelywhere ; aretwoconstants suchthat 0 <;< 1 .Thesecostsaresetupinthismannertoportraythat, eventuallyyieldingallowsTargettoonlyincurapercentageoftherespectivecost since ;< 1 thattheywouldincurinfullhaditnotyielded.Usingsimilar notationforthesakeofsimplicity,Sendercostsarerepresentedby: S L S lenient; sender, S P S potent;sender, S L S ,and S P S denedinthesamemanneras theonesabove.Anothercosttoaccountforistheperceivedaudiencecostthat canbecreatedfrompressuredomesticallytorespondtosomeinternational situation.Forexample,manypoliticallobbyinggroupsthatheavilysupport theuseofpotentsanctionsinresponsetothesesortsofsituationsregardless oftheseverityofthecrisisHovi,Huseby,andSprinz2005.Senderincurs 23

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someaudiencecostinsituationswhereeitherTargetviolatesthenormand doesnotyield,orSenderdoesnotenactpotentsanctions.Theaudiencecost isrepresentedby A dn S ifSenderdoesnothing,and A L S ifSenderimposesonly lenientsanctions.Ialsoassumeherethatlenientsanctionsarepreferabletono actioninthisregard,i.e. A dn S >A L S > 0 .Ideationally,thelogichereisthat thesedomesticgroupsarewillingtoaccept,asuccessfulperceivedoutcome whereTargetyields,oranunsuccessfuloutcomeifSenderimposespotent sanctionsrepresentingtheharshestresponseavailableforSendertouseHovi, Huseby,andSprinz2005. ThesecondfundamentaldierencebetweenHovi,Huseby,andSprinz'model andtheonecreatedhereisthatthismodelincludesadditionalvariablesinthe gametheoreticmodelthatareessentialinordertoaccuratelyexaminethepotentialgainsandcostsofeconomicsanctions,andtheseadditionsalsodierentiate mymodelfromanymodeldoneprior.Thesetwovariablesaccountfortheless visibleandpreviouslyoftenignored,ontologicalsecuritycostsandbenets thatcountriesplaceimportanceonwhenmakingdecisionswithintheinternationalcommunityinallsituations,andsanctionspoliciesarenodierentinthat regard.Whiletheremaybelessroundtablediscussionwithregardstotheontologicalramicationsofacertaindecisionorsituation,thevalues,beliefs,and moralsofanationdeterminetheirontologicalsecuritybeliefs,andthedecisions madebythecountry'sgovernmentreectthesebeliefsalbeitunconsciously. Intherealmofsanctionspolicy,acountryfacescertaincoststoitsinternationalimageshoulditignoretheviolationofinternationalnorms,especially thoseitholdsdeartoitaprimarynorminthismodel,andsimilarlythenationstandstogainontologicallyfromsupportingthesesuchinternationalnorms throughthesymbolicuseofeconomicsanctionstodefendthecountry'sideals andvalues.ThereforeIdenethe O P B and O T B tobetheontologicalbenetthat 24

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Senderstandstogainfromsupportingaprimaryortertiarynormrespectively, andthesebenetscanbegainedthrougheithertheuseofalenientsanctionor apotentonesinceitisbasedonhowthenationrepresentsitself.However, therearealsoontologicalcosts, O P C and O T C denedinthesamemanner,for notenactingsomesortofsanctioninthewakeofviolatinganinternational normbyTarget.Thereforeeveryterminalnodeofthemodelwilleitherhavean ontologicalcostorbenetaddedontoitforSender,withtheexceptionofthe nodeswhereTargetchoosestoneverviolatetheinternationalnormintherst placethusendingthegame.Itisworthnotingandwillbeofrelevancelater thattheTargetalsoincurssomeontologicalbenet,denotedby O BT whenever itviolatestheinternationalnorminquestionwithouteventuallyyielding,but incurssomeontologicalcost,denotedby O CT wheneverityieldstointernational pressure. ByplayingthegameoutbasedonthepredenedpreferencesoftheSender andTargetoutlinedabove,wearriveat6dierentterminalnodes,oneper combinationofsendertypeandtypeofnorm.Atallbutoneoftheseterminal nodes,thesenderreceivesapayointheformofanexpressionincludingsome ontologicalbenet O P B or O T B thatcanbecomparedmathematicallyasan inequalitytothepayotheSenderreceivesbynotemployingsanctions,and byisolatingthebenetvariables,itbecomespossibletodeterminewhetheror notthebenetsfromthesanctionoutweighthecost. Results Thismodelproducesaseriesofinequalitiesthatcanbesimpliedtobe intermsofagivenbenet,andtheinequalities,iftheyholdtobetrueina givensituation,implythattheexpectedpayoofthegiveneconomicgame willbeapositivevalue.SincetheSenderisguaranteedanegativepayoifit 25

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doesnothinginthewakeofaglobalnormbeingviolatedseepayo5,12,17, 24,29,36ofthediagrams,andsinceapositivenumberisguaranteedtobe greaterthananegativevalue,thesenderisinherentlybetteropursuingthe economicsanctionanytimeinwhichitcandeducethatitcanexpectapositive payoregardlessofthemagnitudeofthepositivepayo.Themodelmakes 6dierentterminalnodesreachablebasedonhowthesenderandtargetreact tothedecisionsmadeearlierinthegame,andtheseattainablenodesare1, 8,13,23,28and36inthediagram.Howeverthemodelgivesus5dierent payossincenodes1and13givethesenderidenticalpayosandsothispayo occurs2/6=1/3ofthetime.Theotherfourpossibilitieseachoccur1/6ofthe time.Theseveexpressionseachpayomultipliedbythecorrespondingrate ofoccurrencecanatmostcreateoutcomeswheretheSendernationwillgain frompursuitofaneconomicsanctioninveofthesixpossiblecases.Thesixth caseisthecaseinwhichaWeakSenderseesatertiarynormbeingviolated,and itdoesnothingnode36.Inthiscasethepayoforthesenderisguaranteed tobenegative )]TJ/F11 9.9626 Tf 7.749 0 Td [(C )]TJ/F11 9.9626 Tf 9.962 0 Td [(A d s n )]TJ/F11 9.9626 Tf 9.963 0 Td [(O T C whichwillalwaysbelessthanzero. However,fortheothervenodes,youarriveatvaluesthatcanbesetupas inequalitiesthat,ifgreaterthanthepayoshouldtheSenderdonothing,give uscaseswheretheSenderisbetteroacting,andthusthesanctionshavebeen asuccessfortheSenderifsuccessisdenedintermsofbetteringone'sselfby actingversusnotacting.Therefore,thereare5leastvecasesofsendertypeand typeofnormthatcreateaparadigmwheresanctionscansucceed,howeverthis doesguaranteethattheywill.Themostimportantthingtonoteisthatintwo ofthesecasesmediumsender/tertiarynormandweaksender/primarynorm, thesenderhastheabilitytoreceiveapositivepayoeventhoughthetarget willnotyieldtothelenientsanctionsimposed.Whatthisimpliestherefore, isthatthismodelprovidescaseswherethesendercansucceedwithoutever 26

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persuadingthetargettomakethedesiredconcessionsofthesendernation, whichisfundamentallydierentfromhowscholarspreviouslydenedsuccess. Thesuccessorfailureofthesanctionregimeultimatelydependsonthevaluesofthevariablesleftintheinequalities,whichissomethingthateachstate mustevaluateonanindividuallevelwhentheyareputintothesituationof thesendernation,sincethevaluesofeachvariablewillchangeforeachnationduetodierencesinhowthemagnitudeoftheontologicalbenet/cost, theamountofaudiencecostsomecivilianpopulationsaremorevolatilethan others,etc.Howeverthisdoesconclusivelydemonstratehowgovernmentscan rationallydeterminewhetherornotasanctionhasachanceforsuccesseven iftheexactvaluesofallthevariablesmaynotbeeasilycalculatedwithgreat precision,anddemonstratesthattherearecertainlymultiplesituationswhere thesuccessofaneconomicsanctionisplausiblebasedonhowmuchanation valueseachofthedierentcostsandbenetsinvolvedinthesanctionsprocess, comparedtothestudyperformedbyHovi,Huseby,andSprinzwhichonlyfound onepossiblecasewheresanctionsmightworkHovi,Huseby,andSprinz2005, orthehistoricalexaminationsofeconomicsanctionsthatignoredtheintangible benetsofenactingpolicyaltogether.Sanctionshistoryhasdemonstratedconclusivelythatsituationsliketheonesoutlinedinthismodelcanoccurinthereal worldwherethetangiblegainsofthesanctionappearfoolhardyorimpossible toachieve,yetnationalleaderspressonregardlessbecausetheyarepursuinga formofontologicalsecuritythatmaybemuchmoredicultforanoutsiderto pinpoint.AnexampleofthisistheUnitedStates'economicsanctionsofCuba, betterknownastheCubanEmbargo. CaseStudy:TheUnitedStates'TradeEmbargoofCuba Themostcommonlycitedcaseofafailingeconomicsanctionisthetrade 27

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embargoagainstCubaimplementedbytheUnitedStates,andyetdespitethis commonviewofthesanctionithasremainedonrecordallowingustorecently celebrateits50yearanniversaryonFebruary7th,2012.FollowingtheCuban MissileCrisisin1962,PresidentKennedyimposedatravelbanwhichwouldlater becomeacompletetradeembargothatwasrearmedwiththeestablishment oftheHelms-BurtonActin1992.Theembargowasundoubtedlyafailureas denedhistoricallyofU.S.foreignpolicyneveraccomplishinganyofPresident Kennedy'soriginalgoalssuchastheoustingofFidelCastrofrompower,the betteringofhumanrightsforCubancitizens,andtheremovaloftheCommunist PartytopreventthespreadingofSovietideologyduringtheColdWar.Still, almost50yearslater,thispieceoflegislationremainedonthebooks.Moreover, FidelCastrohaspassedon,theSovietUnionisnomore,theColdWarisathing ofthepast,andthethreatofCommunismisnolongeranywherenearbeingone ofthebiggestsecuritythreatstotheUnitedStates.WhiletheU.S.economic sanctioningofCubahadanegligibleaectoneachofthesethings,theU.S. governmentcontinuestosupportthiseconomicsanctionevenwhenconfronted withinternationaloppositionurgingtheUnitedStatestorevokeitsembargo.In fact,whentheUnitedNationsvotedonthecondenceoftheembargoinOctober of2010,U.N.memberstatesvoted187nationsinfavorofendingthesanctions, 2nationsUnitedStatesandIsraelinfavorofkeepingthem,and3nations TheMarshallIslands,PalauandMicronesiaabstainedfromthevoteSnow 2010.ThecurrentObamaadministrationhasnallydecidedtobeginwhat appearstobetheendingoftheCubanEmbargo,butpreviousadministration's stubbornnesstomaintainwhatisclearlyafailedforeignpolicyonthebooksfor solongisoneofmanyprimeexamplesoftheUnitedStatesactionsbasedon perceivedontologicalsecuritythreatswhethertrueornot. ThephysicalthreatthatledtotheCubanEmbargowastheeventcommonly 28

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referredtoastheCubanMissileCrisis.However,thethreatofanuclearattack bytheSovietUnionthroughCubaasaproxybecamenonexistantbyChristmasin1962,yetnormalrelationswithCubastillhavenotbeenreestablished almost50yearslater.Therefore,onemustrealizethatthetrueunderlying intentionofthiseconomicsanctionwasaboutfarmorethanjustthephysical securitythreatofnuclearwar.AsisthecasewithmostoftheColdWarpolitical moves,theCubanEmbargobecameasymbolicrepresentationofeverythingthe sendernationinthiscasetheUnitedStatessupported,againsteverythingit didnot.U.S.presidentialadministrationssawitasdemocracy,freeelections, andrightsforallagainstcommunism,adictator,humanrightsviolations,and anyothernegativenotionassociatedwiththeircommunistcounterparttothe east.EvenifthesanctionwouldneveractuallyoustFidelCastrofrompower, causefreeandfairelections,orpromotedemocraticchange,theUnitedStates seemedtobecontentsimplyleavingthelegislationinplaceasasymbolicrepresentationoftheUnitedStates'displeasurefortheCubanwayofgoverning andmoreimportantly,theirrelationswiththeSovietUnion.Duringthistime periodtheColdWartheUnitedStates'ontologicalsecuritywasfocusedon beingdemocraticandnotcommunistandhelpingnationswhosupportedits wayofbeingwhiledoingeverythinginitspowertoignorenationswhosided withitsSovietopposition.Cubatherefore,dueitscloseproximitytoU.S.borders,servedasaviableontologicalsecuritythreattotheUnitedStates'wayof governingsinceitwastheclosestcommunismevergottoU.S.bordersatthe national,governmentallevel. Inthiscase,thereasonformaintainingthesanctionwasnotrelatedtothe proximityofnuclearweaponsinrelationtotheUnitedStateseventhoughthat wastheeventthatbegantheconict.Ifthiswerethecase,thesanctionswould havenevermadeitpast1962,letalonealmost50years.Insteadthesesanctions 29

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remainedonthebooksasadisplayoftheU.S.angsttowardsCuba'srelations withtheSovietUnion.TheUnitedStatesfoundontologicalbenetinhaving sanctionsrepresenttheirlackofapproval,eveniftherewerecostsassociated withmaintainingthesesanctions.Theeventsthattookplacewithregardsto U.S.CubanrelationsmakeitabundantlyclearthatU.S.policymakersdecided thattheywerebetterohavingthesanctioninplacethannot,andsincethe onlybenetthatonecanndfromthesanctionswouldbeanontologicalone, theargumentcanbemadethat,intheeyesoftheUnitedStatesgovernment, theontologicalbenetofsanctionsagainstCubaoutweighedthecostsassociatedwiththesanctions.Thisveryoutcomeisthebasisforthemodelpresented above;usinggametheory,nationscanrationallyunravelcomplexrelationswith nationsanddeterminewhetherornotenactinganeconomicsanctionwillbetteranationsoverallutility.Incaseswheresanctionsyieldagreateroverall utilitywellbeing,wecanrationallyconcludethatthesanctionwasasuccess forthesendernation,regardlessofwherethisbenecialresultoriginatesfrom ontological,tangible,orboth. ThiscasestudythereforedisplaysasituationinwhichthereasonsforaU.S. sanctionwerenotsimplyabouttangiblegainsintheformofconcessionsfromthe targetnationCuba,asevidentbythefactthatthesanctionsremainedineect foralmost50yearsbeyondthedatethatthedesiredconcessionsweremadethe removalofSovietmissilesfromCuba.Insteadthesanctionsbecameasymbolic wayfortheUnitedStatestomaintainitslackofappreciationfortheSovietCubanrelations,Cuba'slackofdemocracy,anditshumanrightsviolations.The UnitedStateshaslongsincemovedpastCubaandCommunismasfarasthe focalpointofitsforeignpolicygoes,butthispieceoflegislationwasleftonthe booksforthedurationoftheColdWarasasymbolofAnti-Communismand Pro-Capitalism,andsincethenithasservedasawayofexpressiontheUnited 30

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States'lackofappreciateforthepoliciesoftheCubangovernment.Bothof theseactsofsymbolismareclearlyontologicalsecuritydecisions. Conclusion:ClosingRemarksandSomeAreasofFurther Research Forpracticalapplication,anationwouldneedtobeabletoquantifyeach ofthesevariablesinordertomakethesedeductions.Howeveritisimportant tounderstandthateachofthesevariablesareeasilydistinguishedinareal lifecircumstance,anditshouldbenodiculttaskfortheSenderandTarget nationtomakereasonableestimationsastothevalueofeachofthevariables involvedintheexpressionsrelevanttotheirspecicsituation.Theresultsof thismodeldemonstratethattherearecertainlycaseswherethesendercangain fromtheenactingofaneconomicsanctionevenifthetargetdoesnotyieldto thesanctionsandmakethedesiredconcessions.Moreover,additionalsimple mathematicsprovethatitspossibleforthetargettoviolateglobalnormseven ifitknowsthatitfacesaneconomicsanctionbydoingso,duetotheexpected payoitreceivesbyviolating. Giventhestructureofthiseconomicgame,thetargetnationsdecisionto violateornotviolateaninternationalnormiswhatultimatelytriggersthe enactingofaneconomicsanctionbythesendernation.Howeveranintegral partofthegameisthatthedecisionsNaturemakesbeforetheplayersact withinthegameareunknowntotheTarget.Specically,thetargetdoesnot knowtheexactvalueofthenorminquestiontotheSender,andtheTargetalso cannotbesureoftheSender'stypestrong,medium,orweakasitpertainsto theSender'seventualresponseshouldtheTargetviolate.Therefore,inorder tomakearationaldecisionwithinthecontextofthegame,theTargetwould 31

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examinewhatisknowningametheoryasitsexpectedpayo.Thisisfoundby multiplyingeachofitspossiblepayosbythelikelihoodofthatpayooccurring, andthensummingthosevaluestogether.SincetheTarget'sdecision-making processismoresimpliedityieldstopotentsanctionsanddoesnotyieldto lenientsanctions,thesixpossibleendnodesofthegameonlypossessthree dierentpayosforthetargetnationoneoccursthreetimes,andanother occurstwice. Thetargetsexpectedpayois: B + O BT )]TJ/F11 9.9626 Tf 8.956 0 Td [(S P T )]TJ/F8 9.9626 Tf 8.956 0 Td [(2 = 3 S L T )]TJ/F11 9.9626 Tf 8.956 0 Td [(O CT .Inorderfor thetargettorationallydeducethatviolatingthenorminquestionandthus triggeringtheeconomicsanctionisinitsbestinterest,thisexpectedpayo mustbegreaterthanthepayothetargetwouldreceiveifitsimplydidnothing intherstplace,inwhichcaseitreceivesapayoof0.Thereforearational targetnationwoulddeterminethevaluesofeachofthevariablesinvolved,and seewhichexpressionyieldsagreatervalue.If B + O BT )]TJ/F11 9.9626 Tf 7.927 0 Td [(S P T )]TJ/F8 9.9626 Tf 7.927 0 Td [(2 = 3 S L T )]TJ/F11 9.9626 Tf 7.927 0 Td [(O CT > 0 i.e.if B + O BT >S P T +2 = 3 S L T + O CT ,thetargetshouldviolatethenormeven ifitexpectsthatthesenderwillrespondwithsanctions.Iftheoppositeistrue andtheexpressionislessthantheperceivedontologicalcost,thanthetarget wouldnotviolatethenormassumingitactsrationally.Sincetwooftheterms beingsubtractedaremultipliedbyan x< 1 oneismultipliedby1/3andthe othermultipliedby 0 << 1 ,itsverylikelythattheexpressionwillholdthe targetwillviolateinmanycases.Furtherresearchintothesecasesmightbe abletosimplythisinequalityevenfurther. Giventhesemathematicalinequality,alongwiththeonespresentedinthe modelabove,wecanconcludethattherecanexistcasesiftheontological benetstoeachnationarehighenoughwhereinbothnationswouldsucceedby beginningthiseconomicsanctiongamewhichissomethingthatwasnotpossible underthehistoricaldenitionofsuccessrelatedtowhetherornotconcessions 32

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weremadebythetargetnation.Thisalsoopensupsanctionstothepossibility ofnotalwaysbeingazerosumgame,whichisdierentthanhowsanctionswere previouslyviewed.Instead,thesuccessorfailureofeconomicsanctionsmust bejudgedbasedonthepayoreceivedbyeachofthetwopartiesinvolved,and thiscalculationofpayosmustincludeboththeintangibleandtangiblefactors associatedwithenactingforeignpolicy.Thisintangiblefactoraboutthegains orlossesthatcanresultfromnotactinginresponsetotheviolationofaglobal normhasthepotentialtobeanenormousontologicalsecuritybenetorrisk tothesendernation,andinsomecasescouldbesostrongofafactorthatit outweighsthetangiblecostsorbenetsassociatedwiththatpolicy.Therefore, toaresearcherwhoignorestheseontologicalfactors,thepolicymaynotmake rationalsense.Instead,inordertogetanaccuratedescriptionoftheeconomic sanctionssuccessrate,onemustincludedthesevariablesandreestablishamore encompassingdenitionofsuccessandfailuresuchastheoneproposedhere. Thispaperthereforeuncoverssituationsinwhicheconomicsanctionscan besuccessfulforthesendernationbypresentingadenitionofsuccessthat comparesthenation'spayobyimplementingasanctiontotheoneitwould receiveshoulditcommitnoactioninresponsetotheviolationofaninternational normbythetargetnation.Moreover,thismodelalsoincludesnotonlytangible gainsandlosses,butalsoanintangibleoneintheformofontologicalsecurity, whichdrivesmuchofstate'sactionwithintheglobalcommunity. 33

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Notes 1 paraphrasedfromPatrick,Stewart."LibyaandtheFutureofHumanitarian Intervention."ForeignAairs.August26,2011. 2 Hovi,Huseby,andSprinzdiddiscussagameofincompleteinformationin theirarticlebuttheyonlyconsiderasituationwhereNaturedecidesonthetype ofSendertough,mediumofweak.Theirmodeldoesnotdierentiatebetween thetypeofnormbeingconsideredforviolationinanycapacity. 34

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Sender Nation Sender2 Sender3 Target Nations Dates Reason for Sanction 90 1 United States United Nations Iraq 1990 2003 Security/Moral 90 2 United States El Salvador 1990 1993 Moral 90 3 United States Western Donors Kenya 1990 1993 Moral 90 4 United States Belgium France Zaire 1990 1997 Economic/Moral 90 5 Soviet Union Lithuania 1990 Security 90 6 United States Saudi Arabia Jordan, Yemen 1990 1997 Economic/Moral 91 1 United Nations United States E.C. Yugoslavia 1990 2001 Moral/Security 91 2 United States China 1991 Security/Moral 91 3 United States Thailand 1991 1992 Moral 91 4 Netherlands United States Indonesia 1991 2002 Moral 91 5 United States OAS U.N. Haiti 1991 94 Moral 91 6 United States E.C. USSR 1991 Security 91 7 USSR/Russia Turkmenistan 1991 95 Economic 91 8 United States Peru 1991 95 Moral 92 1 ECOWAS United Nations Liberia 1992 2006 Moral/Security 92 2 EC/EU France Germany Togo 1992 Moral 92 3 United States Western Donors Malawi 1992 93 Moral 92 4 European Union Spain Equatorial Guinea 1992 2000 Moral 92 5 European Union Algeria 1992 94 Moral 92 6 United States Cameroon 1992 98 Moral 92 7 United States Azerbaijan 1992 2002 Economic/Security 92 8 United Nations United States Germany Khmer Rouge, Cambodia 1992 Moral 92 9 USSR/Russia Estonia 1992 99 Moral 92 10 China France 1992 94 Security 92 11 United States Nicaragua 1992 95 Moral 92 12 United Nations Libya 1992 99 Moral/Security 92 13 USSR/Russia Latvia 1992 98 Security 93 1 United States United Nations North Korea 1993 Security/Moral 93 2 United States European Commission Guatemala 1993 Moral 93 3 United Nations Angola 1993 2002 Security/Moral 93 4 United States European Union Nigeria 1993 1998 Moral 93 5 United States Sudan 1993 Security 93 6 USSR/Russia Ukraine 1993 97 Economic 93 7 USSR/Russia Kazakhstan 1993 96 Economic/Moral 94 1 Greece Macedonia 1994 95 Security 94 2 Greece Albania 1994 95 Security 94 3 United Nations Rwanda 1994 95 Security 94 4 United States European Union The Gambia 1994 98 Moral 95 1 United States Peru, Ecuador 1995 98 Security 95 2 European Union Turkey 1995 Moral 96 1 East African members of OAU Burundi 1996 99 Moral 96 2 United States European Union Niger 1996 2000 Moral 96 3 United States Western Donors Zambia 1996 98 Moral 96 4 United States Colombia 1996 98 Moral 96 5 Mercosur United States Paraguay 1996 Security 97 1 United Nations ECOWAS Sierra Leone 1997 2003 Moral 97 2 New York California Swiss Banks 1997 98 Economic 98 1 United States India 1998 2001 Security 98 2 European Union United States Serbia 1998 2001 Security 98 3 Turkey Italy 1998 99 Security 99 1 United States United Nations Afghanistan 1999 2002 Security 99 2 United States European Union France Ivory Coast 1999 2002 Moral 99 3 United States Japan Pakistan 1999 2001 Moral 00 1 United States Ecuador 2000 Security

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Tough Primary Violation P otent Yield (1) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(f S P S + O P B ) NoYield (2) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(S P S + O P B ) Lenien t Yield (3) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf( S L S + O P B ) NoYield (4) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S L S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(A L S + O P B ) No Sanctions (5) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(A dn S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(O P C ) No Violation (6) (0) T eritary No Violation (7) (0) Violation P otent Yield (8) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(f S P S + O T B ) NoYield (9) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S P S + O T B ) Lenien t Yield (10) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf( S L S + O T B ) NoYield (11) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S L S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(A L S + O T B ) No Sanctions (12) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(A dn S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(O T C ) 1

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Medium Primary Violation P otent Yield (13) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(f S P S + O P B ) NoYield (14) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(S P S + O P B ) Lenien t Yield (15) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf( S L S + O P B ) NoYield (16) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S L S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(A L S + O P B ) No Sanctions (17) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(A dn S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(O P C ) No Violation (18) (0) T eritary No Violation (19) (0) Violation P otent Yield (20) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(f S P S + O T B ) NoYield (21) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S P S + O T B ) Lenien t Yield (22) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf( S L S + O T B ) NoYield (23) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S L S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(A L S + O T B ) No Sanctions (24) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(A dn S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(O T C ) 1

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Weak Primary Violation P otent Yield (25) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(f S P S + O P B ) NoYield (26) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(S P S + O P B ) Lenien t Yield (27) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf( S L S + O P B ) NoYield (28) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S L S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(A L S + O P B ) No Sanctions (29) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(A dn S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(O P C ) No Violation (30) (0) T eritary No Violation (31) (0) Violation P otent Yield (32) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(f S P S + O T B ) NoYield (33) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S P S + O T B ) Lenien t Yield (34) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf( S L S + O T B ) NoYield (35) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(S L S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.962 0 Td(A L S + O T B ) No Sanctions (36) ()Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf(C )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(A dn S )Tj/T1_2 9.963 Tf9.963 0 Td(O T C ) 1

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Terminal Node Description Sender Payoff Target Payoff 1 To P Violate Impose Potent Yield 2 To P V IP Do Not Yield 3 To P V Impose Lenient Y 4 To P V IL DNY 5 To P V Do Nothing 6 Tough Primary Do Not Violate 0 0 7 To Tertiary D NV 0 0 8 To Te V IP Y 9 To Te V IP DNY 10 To Te V IL Y 11 To Te V IL DNY 12 To Te V Do Nothing 13 M P V IP Y 14 M P V IP DNY 15 M P V IL Y 16 M P V IL DNY 17 M P V Do Nothing 1 8 Medium P D NV 0 0 19 M Te DNV 0 0 20 M Te V IP Y 21 M Te V IP DNY 22 M Te V IL Y 23 M Te V IL DNY 24 M Te V Do Nothing

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25 W P V IP Y 26 W P V IP DNY 27 W P V IL Y 28 W P V IL DNY 29 W P V Do Nothing 30 Weak P DNV 0 0 31 W Te DNV 0 0 32 W Te V IP Y 33 W Te V IP DNY 34 W Te V IL Y 35 W Te V IL DNY 36 W Te V Do Nothing

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