Citation
Fazenda Cambuhy

Material Information

Title:
Fazenda Cambuhy a case history of social and economic development in the interior of Sao Paulo, Brazil
Creator:
Little, George Ferguson Gold, 1935-
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
x, 372, [1] leaves.,c 28 cm. : ;

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Dissertations, Academic -- Inter-American Studies -- UF
Economic condition -- Sao Paulo (Brazil : State) ( lcsh )
Inter-American Studies thesis Ph. D
Coffee industry ( jstor )
Cotton ( jstor )
Quarterly reports ( jstor )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis--University of Florida, 1960.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 364-371.
General Note:
Manuscript copy.
General Note:
Vita.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
The University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not claim any copyright interest in this item. This item may be protected by copyright but is made available here under a claim of fair use (17 U.S.C. §107) for non-profit research and educational purposes. Users of this work have responsibility for determining copyright status prior to reusing, publishing or reproducing this item for purposes other than what is allowed by fair use or other copyright exemptions. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder. The Smathers Libraries would like to learn more about this item and invite individuals or organizations to contact the RDS coordinator (ufdissertations@uflib.ufl.edu) with any additional information they can provide.
Resource Identifier:
022284431 ( ALEPH )
13638615 ( OCLC )

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Full Text













FAZENDA CAMBUHY

A CASE HISTORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THE INTERIOR OF SAO PAULO, BRAZIL












By

GEORGE F. G. LITTLE


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY










UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
August, 1960




























Copyright by

George F. G. Little

1960














PREFACE


The dominant field of production in Brazil is agriculture, whether judged by the number of people employed in it or by the export value of farm products. Agriculture may count for only a fraction of Brazilian Gross National Product, but there are also vast non-monetized components in agriculture which rule the economy of the country and social life of the majority of the people.

Brazilian agriculture on the whole is characterized by primitive farm practices and bad transportation systems. Sgo Paulo is the only state to have a relatively adequate railroad system and a good highway network. In that state large-scale coffee, sugar, and cotton production is more progressive and modern than elsewhere. Large fazendas are usually managed by men with technical experience who reach out for new information and new methods. Farmers in other regions of the country will some day follow the Paulistas on the road to greater prosperity and will profit from their experience and mistakes.

The prosperity of S~o Paulo has grown up on the foundation of coffee, which has been the economic backbone of all Brazil since the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Coffee helped Brazil win the Paraguayan War and has been a major factor in her foreign and monetary policies ever since.










Brazil's coffee revolution in the late nineteenth century, when coffee cultivation greatly increased, meant a definite move towards the west. It created a middle class of merchants, bankers, and small traders. Coffee, an adopted birthright of Brazil, was linked to the development of transportation, industry, finance, and commerce. It has had intimate connections with the fostering of other crops, currency exchange rates, taxes, defense, and Brazilian civilization as a whole. Coffee has, for example, accounted for more than half of Brazil's foreign earnings in the last thirty years and created in Brazil a national economic consciousness.

In S~o Paulo coffee wrought a socio-economic revolution, one of the consequences of which is today's industrialization. Coffee valorizd the paulista soil economically and agriculturally. Allied to the ambition of the planters, coffee drove all before it. Sugar, cereals, and forest made way for what has been termed "the green wave," unchecked by frost, governmental ineptitude, export duties, or prohibitions of planting.

This present study is a case history of the above socioeconomic revolution in miniature, a history not of sudden and dramatic change as is seen from a general view of coffee in Brazil but of gradual development on one great coffee estate, Fazendas do Cambuhy. Fazendas do Cambuhy was outstanding in two ways. In its prime it was the largest unitary coffee fazenda in the world, boasting of close to six iii










million coffee trees. Secondly, there was kept on the estate a uniquely detailed record of its daily economic life from the days of its great period in the early years of this century until its subdivision in 1956. An estate as large in area and as wide in interest as Cambuhy could not avoid touching the coffee business of S2o Paulo at many points, mirroring the general developments of coffee in the state.

Every plant cultivated by man on a scale such as that

of coffee in Slo Paulo in the last hundred years engenders a complex of social, agricultural, and economic techniques peculiarly its own. Coffee imposed a regime on the paulista terrain and a way of agricultural life with its particular human relationships. Cambuhy's archive in this respect offers much information to the sociologist, the cultural anthropologist, and the geographer, while for the social historian it holds a detailed chronicle of change and development brought about by the advance of coffee.

Cambuhy's position in time and mode of coffee cultivation lies in between the older, traditionalistic coffee fazendas of the Paratba Valley and the Mogiana region and the small pioneer properties which have characterized coffee in the western regions of the state. Cambuhy's origins were in the best colonial traditions, but when the time came for development the spirit of the era was that of the pioneer western expansion.

It might be objected that such a large property in the west of Slo Paulo is atypical. In the present day this is iv










so, but the small property which characterizes julista agriculture today is of comparatively recent origin. Previously the large property held sway. Cambuhy's origin, like many another latifundia, was in one of the large sesmarias given by the Portuguese throne in the capitanias of Sao Vicente and Santo Amaro. Yet in the nineteenth century era of great coffee estates worked by servile labor, Cambuhy lay dormant and undeveloped. Its great period of expansion came with the boom period of its zone when great advances even in the west were made by great fazendt'os, not by the small proprietor. That Cambuhy did not disappear with many other large estates during the Depression and consequent troubled times was due to its particularly careful and efficient administration. Canibuhy, then, survived well into the era of minifundia in Sgo Paulo.

Coffee, which is the State of Rio de Janeiro rose and

fell with remarkable speed, has proved particularly unstable in the comparatively recently populated western plateau of S~o Paulo, where races, techniques, and mentalities constantly mix and react. Moreover, a fazenda is a particularly unstable form of agricultural organization with a short life cycle. Extensive and exhaustive use of the soil, together with plagues and economic crises, has caused many a fazenda to be broken into lots or to lie abandoned with a small farm or sitio here and there upon it. While Cambuhy's future still lies in the balance, its existence as an institution is over. Its history then can be taken as a chapter in the
v










story of coffee, but a chapter that has unfolded and will unfold itself in many another place and time in the economic and social history of coffee in Brazil.














AC~OWLEDGE14EUTS


At this time I would like to Thank the many people who

gave their interest, advice, and encouragement during the writing of this dissertation. Professor D. B. Worcester, as chairman of my supervisory committee, has been a constant source of wise counsel, while the other members of the committee h-ave given freely of their time, namely Dr. R. W. Bradbury, Dr. L. N. McAlister, Dr. A. M. Sievers, and Dr. 0. Svarl�en. In particular, Professor Mc.Alister, as I-lead of the Department of History, was helpful in ma'ing my research in Brazil possible. The Director of the School of Inter-American Sudies, Dr. A. C. Wilgus, inspired the idea of studying a Brazilian plantation. Lastly, Dr. 117. A. Payne has continued as an interested mentor over my studies jfn the United States.

On Cambuhy, my thanks o chiefly to Mr. A. H. Grossman,

who during my stay there was not only a patient source of information on all things great and small, but a steady Zont oencouragement. Many other people -ranted me interviews on the estate, Mr. C. C. Landers, Mr. B. R. Pheysey, Mr. J. C. Scott, and Mr. F. t. Seddon. One local fazendeiro, Sr. A. Benassi proved very helpful.










In Sao Paulo, Sr. Jose Carlos R4is de Magalhies not only gave me access to his father's voluminous papers but also personally supplied much information. His brother, Sr. Carlos R~is de Magalhies, granted an interview, as did Dr. Carlos Gavilo Nonteiro, grandson of Bernardo Avelino Gavilo Peixoto. Professors Alice Fiffer Canabrava and Sergio Buarque de Holanda of the University of So Paulo gave useful bibliographical information. The staffs of the Municipal Library of So Paulo, the Municipal Library of Araraquara, and the State Archives were very kind and helpful. In Santos, Mr. R. E. Barham provided much information about the coffee industry. Lastly, I wish to thank Sr. Agenor Camargo and the staff of the Companhia Santo Anselmo for such services as they rendered. Many members of the staff of the IBEC Research Institute showed a kindly interest, while the Institute provided vital transportation.

To my typist*, in Brazil, Sr. Ernesto Rozario and, in Florida, Mrs. Shirley Simpson, I owe my thanks.

My greatest debt of gratitude is to His Excellency, Walther Moreira Salles, who not only suggested the project in particular, but made the whole thing possible.


viii














TABLE OF CONTENTS


PREFACE* ... . . . . . .......... 0
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS * o ## o . o. oo............0 #

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Chapter
I. THE SESMARPA OF CAMBUHY ...........

II. THE PERIOD OF BERNARDO AVELINO GAVIKO PEIXOTO

III. THE TRANSPOMATION . ... . . ... .

IV. IN PURSUIT OF FORTUNE ....... . .

V. THE PIONERSo . . . . ...........- . .

VI. A STRONGER FOUNDATION ............

VII. THE DEPRESSION. . ..............

VIII. THE GREEN YEARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

IX. THE POSTWAR ERA ........ . .....

X. THE FINAL YEARS . . . . . . .......

XI. A NEW ERA IN PAULISTA SOCIETY . . . . . . .. CONCLUSION .......................

A P P E N D IX I o. * .o.#. ..*.o. . . . . . . . . . .

A P P E N D IX 1 1 o. . . . . . . . . ..o.o.o.o. . . . .



BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . . . . . . . . w . . . . . . . .


Page

ii vii

x


1

18

47 74 102 129 158 183

220 258

299 337

347 349 357

364 372













LIST OF TABLES


Table Page

1. Coffee Statistics, 1911-1924 . . . . . . . . . . 358

2. Coffee Statistics, 1924-1956 . . . . . . . . . . 359

3. Population Statistics, 1914-1924 . . . . . . . . 360 4. Population Statistics, 1940-1955 . . . . . . . . 361 5. The Co-relation of Coffee Crops and Rainfall . . 362 6. Cost of Living Index, 1939-1954 .. .. .. . . 363














CHAPTER I


THE SESMARIA OF CAMBUHY


The Geographical and Historical Background

A traveler crossing the western plateau of the State of Slo Paulo for the first time finds it dull. No outstanding relief features break it into compartments. The great westward rivers all seem to run similar courses. Vegetation, at first sight seems to differ almost only with altitude, and the same type of people live in similar circumstances all over the plateau.

The paulista plateau covers some 470,000 square kilometers of land sloping gently from a line of cuestas overlooking the peripheral depression down to the Paran4 River. It may be considered physiographically as a great transition area between Central Brazil on the one side and Atlantic and Southern Brazil on the other. Climatic conditions, although predominantly tropical, are generally moderate, with lower temperatures in summer and a more even rainfall throughout the year than in the heart of the tropics. During the generally warm and dry winters frost occurs frequently at constantly changing locations, depending on altitude, the










closeness to water, and deforestation. The international classification of the region (I ppen) is Cwa.1

Geologically the occidental plateau is constituted of alternate sandstone layers called botucattl and basic eruptives (basalts and diabases) with a sandstone cap of the baurd and caiul series. In the north region of the plateau around the city of Ribeirgo Preto lies the largest area of terra roxa, a product of decomposed basaltic rock of volcanic origin, suitable in the extreme for coffee production. To the west and southwest of Ribeirgo Preto the occidental plateau exhibits fragmental extensions of an identical eruptive matter to this famed red earth due to erosion along the edges of the rivers. These extensions are usually mixed with elements from the sandstone formations to form a terra roxa. misturada, which supports coffee plantations of high yield. By far the largest area of the plateau, however, consists in sandy soils originating from the baurd sandstone series. These are more fertile than the caiuA series and by lucky incidence are found in high lands suited for coffee culture.2

The paulista plateau is in a privileged position as regards soil and subsoil, geographical situation, and topography.

1Ary Franga, The Coffee Trail and Pioneer Fringe, trans. David M. Lewis and Renata Howard (Rio de Janeiro: International Geographical Union, Brazilian National Committee, 1956), p. 34. For all Portuguese terms and words, please see Appendix No. II.
21bid., pp. 128-135.










The area provided the perfect ecological background for coffee production, and it was there that coffee found its proper Brazilian habitat as to area cultivated, number of producers, and results.

The western region of S2o Paulo is young country where

traditions are weak, competition can be keen, and transformations can take place in a few years. Lands are abandoned after a few decades, and townships thriving in 1900 may be flourishing cities or close to ghost towns in 1960. Areas left to decay in the wake of the coffee boom stand out in contrast to the frontier areas in Northern ParanA with their Wild West atmosphere. Pierre Monbeig has noted how cities less than a hundred years old are considered ancient, while the phrase "the old times" may refer to 1920.3

The divisions of the state are still in their infancy, and for lack of any better nomenclature the areas served by the various railroad companies are used, although these do not always refer to natural regions. Perhaps this is a tacit recognition that man rather than nature has differentiated the regions.

The population of the plateau is not composed of men of the soil but rather seems to be constantly on the move. The

names given to soils, massap6, salmour~o, and tabatinga, are old cab clo names. MassapS, for example, is distinguished by the -y it sticks to one's feet rather than by its

3Pierre Monbeig, Pionniers et planteurs de Slo Paulo (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1952), p. 16.










agricultural properties. The history of most regions is one of instability, with cattle, sugar, cotton, or coffee cycles rising and falling while the only constant is the gradual westward movement of the state's population center of gravity.4

The constant movement of pioneers has invigorated

paulista life. In colonial times the lands of the area that is now SNo Paulo had little value, and so bandeirantes did

not find it hard to move into the interior. Explorer, miner, cattleman, and farmer moved out onto the plateau in that order. Fazendeiro and colono alike felt the call to the frontier and went out to fell virgin forest, burn off the timber, and plant the land only so long as it produced bumper

crops. Then they allowed the soil to leach and be impoverished by erosion while they moved to pastures new.

Today many areas of the plateau are growing more like the desolated coffee areas in the State of Rio de Janeiro. They are lands of pasture, thin coffee plantations, and fields of cotton, in all of which the gashes of erosion are all too visible. The paulista farmer is often accused of being on the lookout for quick riches. Yet the state could not have been so quickly settled but for those venturesome spirits who went into the frontier regions. At the present time the frontier is in the State of Parani, and although it

4pierre Deffontaines, "Regiaes e paisagens do Estado de Sgo Paulo," Bolettm Geogrifico (Rio), Ano II, No. 24 (March, 1945), 1838.










has gone from the paulista soil it still exercises its influence there.5

It is difficult to imagine how different the western plateau of Sao Paulo was in the last days of colonial Brazil some fifty years before it was to be opened by the advent of coffee. The virgin soils were everywhere covered by forests which had large trees rearing high above deeply decomposed loamy soils while small trees grew among dense vegetation in the very sandy soils. Most of the plateau was unknown to the dwellers in the towns along the coast and even to the small populations of the vilas of Jundiaf and Iti. Such was the physical background of the birth of Cambuhy.

On May 20, 1811, in the name of His Most Faithful

Majesty the Prince Regent, a sesmaria was conceded to Colonel Joaquim JosS Pinto de Moraes Leme by the Marquis of Monte Alegre, Governor and Captain-General of the Captaincy of Slo Paulo. The grant was three square leagues of land in a district of the newly created Comarca of Itd. They were to be situated in the forests astride the banks of the stream called Taquirg (today, Itaquerg), out on the Plains (Cam2os) of Araraquara between the Rivers Mogi and Tiet.6


5Benjamin H. Hunnicutt, Brazil. World Frontier (New York: Van Norstrand Company, Inc., 1949), p. 15.
6Repert6rio das sesmarias concedidas Pelos Capites

Generais de Capitania de Slo Paulo, desde 1721 at6 1821, IV (So Paulo: Secretaria da Educaglo e Sadde Pidblica, Departamento do Arquivo do Estado, 1944), 266.










In the following year another sesmaria adjoining the one above was granted by the same noble lord to a Captain Jos6 da Cunha hbreu on July 1, 1012.7 The latter gentleman with his wife, Dona Rosa Eufrosina Mendes e Moraes, transferred this section's great parcel of land to the same Brigadier Joaquim Jos Pinto de Moraes Leme in Juquery on April 20, 1815.8
At a time when paulista forces were fighting in the

Banda Oriental and Brazil was preoccupied with the glory of the court in Rio de Janeiro, grants of such large pieces of land passed by unnoticed. Yet the granting of cartas de sesmaria had long been a vital form of colonization in Brazil. The sesmeiro was supposed to create roads and bridges while

fostering the growth of towns on his land. The crown reserved for itself rights of jurisdiction and over mines and discoveries of metal.

Most cartas de sesmaria followed some wordy formula proclaiming the reasons for the grant. While that of the Brigadier Joaquim JosS contained no such statement, the carta de sesmaria of the Captain JosS Cunha Abreu claimed to be

7Thid., p. 288.

8Cambuhy Papers, Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 1, Carta de Sentenga extrahida dos autos de demarcag~o da Sesmaria do Ca;nbhy e passado a favor de Desembargador Bernardo
Avelino Gaviao Peixoto, September 17, 1894, p. 34. This document of 436 pages of longhand is the basic title deed of the property. It is in itself a work of history, legally stating all the previous legal activities of the property. It will hereafter be referred to as Carta de ser=nga, 1894.










given in order that he might increase his herds of horses. Considering the nature of the terrain at the time, this must have been a platitude.

Altogether the grants were very vague and the cartas provided that when the lands were taken, the recipient was required to register the demarcation with the Juiz das Medigaes of the then vila of Itd, part of whose jurisdiction was the Araraquara zone. This was actually done; and the final carta de sentenga was issued on July 19, 1820, by the proper judge, Pedro Alexandrino Rangel.9

In actual fact the surveyor who measured the estate contented himself with a lesser quantity of land than he was empowered to stake out by the two cartas. Instead of a total area of eighteen square leagues, the estate measured only some sixteen square leagues. The Jacar&Guass' River was taken as the natural southern limit, with the sesmaria stretching away to the north in the form of a great rectangle, the river being the only uneven side.10

There is considerable local controversy as to who first explored the forests of the Plains of Araraquara, which stretched eighty leagues along the right bank of the Tiet until it joined the Parand. Various theories are held as to


9Ibid., p. 72.

10Relatdrio da Directoria da Companhia Industrial Agrfcola e Pastoril d'Oeste de S~o Paulo (S~o Paulo: Escloas Profissionaes Salesianas, 1913), p. 4. A league equaled 6,600 linear meters. For all Brazilian measures and terms, please consult Appendix I.










early explorers at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Some would have a certain Francisco Pedroso de Almeida breeding animals and raising crops as early as that time.11 Others claim that bandeirantes passed through the present site of the city of Araraquara as early as 1723, crediting one Father Frutuoso da Conceigqo Correia as the true explorer of the area.12

It is eminently possible that the Guayana Indians who inhabited the area saw bandeirantes or such early explorers, but concrete evidence is still lacking. Most members of the

unique centrifugal movement in Latin America known as bandeirismo never knew how to or cared to keep records, leaving the effects of the passing of their fertile feet to be surmised. Authorities such as Affonso d1E. Taunay and Alfredo Ellis indicate that the bandeirantes in general in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ignored the Plains of Araraquara. 13

There is also considerable controversy about the origin of the quaint-sounding name Araraquara. Some would have it

mean house of araras, highly-colored tropical birds, and

llJolo Silveira (ed.), Album de Araraquara (Araraquara, 1915), p. xiii. This theory seems disproved by an editorial in 0 ImParcial (Araraquara), February 3, 1952.
12Letter by Jlio da Silva Sudario, 0 Estado de Sfo
Paulo, September 6, 1953.
13Affonso d'E. Taunay, Hist6ria geral das bandeiras paullstas, VIII (Slo Paulo: Imprensa Oicial do Estado,
1949), 31;
Alfredo Ellis, Jr., 0 bandeirismo paulista (Sgo Paulo: Editora Nacional, 1934), pp. 8-9.









others have even more exotic explanations based on interpretations of Indian languages. John Luccock writing in 1820 gave its meaning as morada de dia or the dwelling place of the sun.14

The plains of Araraquara in the eighteenth century were in essence an unknown sertao, visible from the rapids of Banharlo on the Tiet8 to bandeirantes on their way to Cuiabi, Mato Grosso. The Portuguese astronomer, Francisco Joss de Lacerda e Almeida, sailing on the Tiet, saw the hills of Araraquara on December 24, 1788, and spoke of a tradition of there being gold in the hills; but it was inaccessible due

to swamps.15

What is certain is that in 1790 one Pedro Joss Netto, fleeing from Itd, crossed River Piracicaba and took to the woods in the region which is today Sto Carlos and made his way through the forest onto the Plains of Araraquara. Netto, who was born in Rio de Janeiro, opened a fazenda in Itd in 1787 and grew discontented with the iron rule of the Capit~oMor of the Vila of Itd. While the powers of capit~es-mores

as colonial administrators were restricted in law, in

14Notes on Rio de Janeiro and the Southern Parts of
Brazil (London: Samuel Leigh, 1820), p. 630. This view was endorsed by the Emperor Pedro II, and is best defended by Pio Lourenqo Corr~a, Monografia da palavra Araraguara (4th ed. rev.; S~o Paulo: by the author, 1952), pp. 9-10.
15Francisco Joss de Lacerda e Almeida, Di~rio da viaqem do Dr. Francisco Almeida Delas Capitanias de Par, Rio Negro, Matto Grosso, Cuyabg e Sao Paulo nos annos de 1780 a 1790
(Sao Paulo: Costa Silveira, 1841), p. 58.









practice they had arbitrary, judicial, administrative, and military powers.16

Upon insulting an official of the Capitlo-Mor, Netto was exiled to the city of Piracicaba. Perhaps his escape from that city was connived at as, since the time of Pombal, the Capit~o-Mor of Itdi had been accustomed to send disaffected people into the sert~o.17

As a result of the Ordinagqes Philippinas of the Kingdom of Portugal, such men could acquire land by mere occupation. However, for greater security of their rights the occupants usually requested cartas de sesmarias from the king. Influence with the government no doubt helped, and these cartas were not to be had by any sertanelo just for the asking. 18

Pedro JosS Netto, not seeking gold or Indians as did

most explorers of the sertgo, but liberty, explored the area which is now the hinterland of the city of Araraquara. He took possession of several areas including Ouro, Rancho Queimado, Cruzes, Lageado, Bomfim, and Cambuhy while establishing his residence at Monte Alegre. As the word of the excellence of the lands found by Netto spread, many citizens of S~o

16Francisco Oliveira Vianna, Populages meridionaes do Brasil, I (4th ed. rev.1 Rio de Janeiro: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1938), p. 186.
17Silveira, op. cit., pp. viii-ix, xiii-xiv.
"Araraquara," Xnciclop~dia dos municppios Brastleiros, XXVIII (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatfstica, 1957), 71-76.
18Silveira, loc. cit.










Paulo, Parnahyba, and Itd, rich men of prestige in the Captaincy, followed after him to get concessions of land. When these explorers appeared, Netto divided his dominions with them on condition that they protect him from justice. As part of this act he ceded Cambuhy to Colonel Joaquim JosS Pinto de Moraes Leme, later Brigadier and Field Marshal. Netto was later pardoned by the Prince Regent for his valid services in braving the o of Araraquara, and before his accidental death in 1817 he not only received a carta de sesmaria but founded the patrimony around which was to grow the city of Araraquara.19

The sesmaria of Cambuhy created in 1811 was part of a long heritage of territorial expansion in colonial Brazil, the first sesmaria in Itd having been given in 1607. Yet Cambuhy did not belong to the past but to the future. The

Araraquara region itself formed part of the limiting zone of the concession of sesmarias.20

Cambuhy was an enormous block of land situated 500 west of Greenwich and between 210 and 220 latitude south at an average altitude of 1,900 feet above sea level. The waters flowing through the property ran into the Jacar4-Guassd and the S~o Lourenqo, tributaries of the Rio Tiet6, and so formed part of the great hydrographic system of the Rio Parant.

19Nelson Martins de Almeida (ed.), Album de Araraggara, 1948 (Araraquara, 1948), pp. 22-23.
20jo~o Baptista de Campos Aguirra, "Sesmeiros e posseiros," Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geogrnphico do qXo Paulo, OXXIV (1937), 259-261.










The whole Araraquara region enjoyed the typical climate of the plateau with maximum temperature reaching 400 C. in summer and seldom reaching zero in winter. A rainy season from October to March stood out in contrast to dry months of June to September.21

The most noticeable feature of Cambuhy at its birth was the heavy green mantle of forest which rendered the undulating plateau invisible over most of the sesmaria's area. The more fertile soils, red and white earths, were covered by this evergreen forest, while the poorer soils in the center of the property possessed a more degraded vegetation represented by various terms including caos cerrados and campos suJas.

Along the southern boundary of the enormous estate

where the Jacarg-Guassd River had eroded away the sandstone cap were rich terra roxa soils bearing lush evergreen forest, dominated high off the ground by the figueira branca and the pau ddleo, while lower down flourished the palmito. The whole forest carried exotic parasitic plants and housed tribes of monkeys, wildcats, and various tropical birds.

Further away from the river the terra roxa was mixed

with botucatd sandstone; and as the latter grew more predominant the vegetal cover grew thinner, until the countryside presented a savannah aspect with only lesser trees and

21julian Morel, Sesmaria de Cabuhy (So Paulo: by the author, 1914), pp. 50, 128.










bushes, such as barbatimlo. This bleaker area would soon appear even less attractive as cattlemen burned it to use the land for grazing their herds.

Further to the north, over about a third of the property, was another forest cover. There the silico-argillaceous soils of the Baurd series appeared white, yellow, and red; and on these thrived peroba trees while closer to the ground grew species of bamboo and coconut trees. This presented to the explorer a richer and lusher floor than the forest on the terra roxa soils.22 Such was the work of nature which was to be transformed by a century and a half of human action.


The First Half Century . The province of S~o Paulo in the first years after the gaining of Brazil's independence was in a state of decadence and greatly in need of something to give it a new lease on life. Contemporaries noted this and propounded ways and means to bring about the desired development.23 In parallel fashion it was to be several decades until the first agriculturists would carry out the rude conquest of the virgin forests of Cambuhy and in a tiny part of it grow their rice, beans, and corn beside the areas they had to clear to graze their animals.

22Ibid., pp. 130-32; Franga, op, cit., pp. 139-141.

23Ant8nio Rodrigues Vellozo de Oliveira, M em6ria s8bre o melhoramento da 1rovfncia de Sto Paulo (Rio de Janeiro, 1822), passim.










There is no evidence that Colonel Joaquim JosS Pinto de Moraes Leme made use of his great forested holdings. A latifundia had no great social or economic significance on land where everything existed in abundance except men. In actual fact the colonel had little time to do anything with his property. The judicial establishment of Cambuhy was completed only on July 9, 1820; and by November 6, 1823, the colonel's daughter, Dona Brites Maria Pinto Gavilo, was deemed the legitimate owner of Cambuhy by the Jufzo Geral de F8rqa in Sgo Paulo.24

If the development of a virgin swath of land beyond the frontier of civilization was a rugged challenge to a man, it was certainly an impossibility for a woman. Living in the modest colonial town of So Paulo, described as agrarian, patriarchal, and tradition-bound, Dona Brites did little or nothing with Cambuhy.25

Araraquara developed very slowly in relation to other municipios. On August 23, 1817, the Freguesia of Sgo Bento de Araraquara was created by royal conciliar order. This was done upon a petition of the Bishop of Sgo paulo and with the approval of the Parocho of the Freguesia of Piracicaba, of which Araraquara was then officially a bairro. Later, on

24Carts de Sentea, 1894, p. 165 . The exact dates of the deaths of the Colonel and of his wffe, Maria Annunciaq~o Pinto de Moraes Lara avil are not known.
25Richard M. Morse, "Sto Paulo i" the Nineteenth Century: Economic Roots of the Metropolis," Inter-American Economic Affairs, V, No. 3 (Winter, 1951), 4.









July 10, 1832, the frequesia was elevated to a vila by a decree of the Regency and finally made a city (cidade) by a Provincial Decree on February 6, 1889.26

Early in the nineteenth century the first cattle and horses were brought into the area. In 1837, according to statistics sent to the governor of the province, there were 2,764 inhabitants and the value of their produce in the year came to Rs. 91:882$000. Sugar, pinga, rice, beans, corn, tobacco, and cotton were the main products of the population, which was served by several carpenters, smiths, and brickmakers.27

This slow development of the area is said to be due to the division of the land into vast sesmarias. A simple colonizer reaching the deserted forest saw no one and in many cases could find no one from whom to rent land or with whom to sign a contract. Many resorted to squatting on land and opening up in the forest "grilos," that is, properties legalized by false titles. As soon as a lawyer or surveyor appeared, their time was over.28

26Martins de Almeida, op. cit., p. 17.

27Bento A. Sampaio Vidal, Araraquara (SXo Paulo: Revista dos Tribunaes, 1936), pp. 29-31, 37-8. This sum equaled over U.S. $54,600 of the time. See Julian S. Duncan, Public and Private Operation of Railways in Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 183.

28j. B. Monteiro Lobato, A onda verde (S~o Paulo: Monteiro Lobato e Cia., 1920), p. 78






16

The records of the Vila of Araraquara reveal little about Cambuby in these early years. Dona Brites' name merely occurs amid lists of sesmaria proprietors who did not live in the vila.29 She had a person, more an agent than an administrator, who looked after any local business necessary. He made contracts with rileiros, the value of which must have been more for legal completeness than any great profit. Thus, in 1827, one JosS Ant8nio dos Santos was given a place to live and the right to plant crops close to the Jacarg River for an annual rent of four chickens. Several people received usufruct of pockets of land on the enormous estate, and more were prosecuted successfully for trespassing. Cambuhy in the various legal documents was referred to as having some small plots under cultivation and various areas where cows and horses grazed.30

On March 23, 1876, Dona Brites, while seriously ill but still lucid, dictated her last will and testament, a florid and pious document, in which she made generous gifts to her sister and to the Church and nominated her nephew as heir and executor.31

On her death less than a month later, this nephew, the Desembargador Bernardo Avelino Gavigo Peixoto, was confirmed as her heiry and an inventory was begun by the Juiz da Provedoria de S~o Paulo. The goods of Dona Brites were valued at Rs. 5:9425000, but the valuators had difficulty in agreeing on

29Estado de Slo Paulo, Off~cios Diversos de Araraquara, 1836.
30Carta de Sentensa, 1894, pp. 167, 170-75.
31Thid., pp. 10-12.






17
the true value of Cambuhy. In their relat6rio are mentioned 110 cows, some 28 steers, and several bulls, plus a few other animals and pastures. It is not stated exactly how the three worthy valuators made their decisioni and considering the wild nature of the terrain and the difficulty of travel in the forests and camp lands, their conclusions must have been mere estimates.32

Desembargador Gavito Peixoto, having verified that the goods of his aunt would not cover her legacies or pay her

debts, then sought the Juiz do invent~rio in Araraquara to auction the property for the figure finally agreed upon by the valuators, some Rs. 140:000$000. Thrice the property was put up for auction, each time at a reduced price; but on no occasion was there a bidder. On December 1, 1876, after the third failure to sell, Gavilo PeLoto sought the juiz do inventirio to award the fazenda to him in return for his being responsible for a fifth part of the third and last auction price of Rs. 80:000$000. To this suggestion agreed the legal officials in S~o Paulo and an important creditor of Dona Brites, the Barlo de TrOs Rios, on December 19, 1876. Finally, on April 21, 1884, the negotiations and legal technicalities were cleared; and Cambubhy passed into the hands of Bernardo Avelino Gavilo Peixoto for a net value of sixteen contos of r6is. 33

32Ibid., pp. 7, 20. The amount equaled some U.S. $3,060 of the time. Duncan, loc. cit.
33_phd., pp. 24-26. The final value equaled U.S. $6,720 of the time. Duncan, loc. cit.














CHAPTER II


THE PERIOD OF 3ERNARDO AVELINO GAVIAO PEIXOTO

The State of S~o Paulo in the nineteenth century was

changing. The warrior-like, nomadic spirit which had inspired the bandeirantes to tear themselves away from the sea and enter the unknown forests was dying. Latter-day bandeirantes were not to penetrate the paulista forest by cutting their way through but seeking a different goal were to destroy it.1

The keynote of the century was expansion. Slo Paulo,

largely ignored by the pau-brasil, gold, and sugar cycles of colonial days, was to be carried by the advance of coffee to the forefront of the nation. Coffee entered the state via the Valley of the Paraiba, proceeding from the State of Rio de Janeiro approximately in the year 1835 and a little later from Minas Gerais via Atibaia. After halting for a time, remaining in the Paraiba Valley and the littoral of Sgo Paulo, the coffee frontier crossed the Serra de Mantiqueira, spreading around the tributaries of the Piracicaba, taking Campinas as the core of its radiating movement.

From 1840 onwards out from Campinas, the coffee wave was first to take over the upper reaches of the Peixe,


1J. B. Monteiro Lobato, A onda verde, p. 3.







18a


Conchal, and Araras Rivers and thence the areas watered by the tributaries of the Mogf-Guassd, leaving in its wake such cities as AmparA Mogf-Mirim, Limeira, and Rio Claro. Penetration of the Mogiana region past Casa Branca opened up the terra roxa of the Ribeirlo Preto area by 1856. Thereafter it was an easy step to the red and white soils of Rio Claro, Araraquara, and Ribeir~o Preto.2

Coffee not only wrought changes in the lands it conquered, replacing the wild lawless forest with the strict rows of coffee trees, but transformed the economy of the province of Slo Paulo. Coffee and the great profits to be made from it provided the economic motivation for improved transportation. Similarly it brought Negroes and slavery to the province in greater force than had previously existed. It also encouraged planters to think of seeking labor from abroad and so started off the great immigration movement, which was to populate the province and lighten its complexion. 3

On the basis of coffee many cities in the interior began to flourish, emulating the great development of the city

2Sgrgio Milliet, 0 roteiro do cafS (S~o Paulo: BIPA Editora, 1946), pp. 23-26, 51-56.
3Dirceu Lins de Mattos, 'Civilizaq~o do caf&," Digrios Associados, Ediqgo especial dedicada ao caff (S1o Paulo), July 15, 1954, Caderno 32, pp. 8-9. This was a special newspaper edition containing an excellent set of articles on coffee. Hereafter it will be referred to as Digrios Associados.










of Sto Paulo itself. The coffee grown in the Parafba Valley was tributary to Rio de Janeiro until the coming of the railroads. However, thanks to the latter, coffee out on the broad, gently undulating plains of the province created a wealthy agricultural hinterland for the city of Sgo Paulo.4

Only at mid-century did Slo Paulo begin to respond

tentatively to methods and values of a capitalistic progressminded era. The great thing lacking was good transportation. As late as 1860 it was axiomatic that to plant coffee in Rio

Claro, about forty leagues from Santos, was absurd. The cost of shipment would have consumed all profit however fine the yield. Moreover, the trip by donkey down the serra to Santos, following old Indian paths, was no way to transport coffee.5

In fact, communications in the province of S~o Paulo in 1850 did not differ very much from colonial days. There were the old roads to Santos and Rio de Janeiro, a third leading to Goils via Campinas, Mogf-Mirim, Casa Branca, Batatais, and Franca, and a fourth going south to Sorocaba and Itapetininga. The years 1860 to 1880 were to be vital ones in the history of coffee in S~o Paulo. Foreign and national capital were to open up the railroads and there was


4Morse, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

5Affonso d'E. Taunay, Pequena histdria do caf4 no Brasil, 1737-1937 (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Nacional do Cf&, 1945), p. 236.










to be a transformation in social and economic techniques which would make coffee's march to the west possible.

After the opening of the near-miraculous Santos to

Jundiaf railway in 1867, the iron way began to spread out over the province, reaching Campinas in 1872. Thence railroads spread out to the coffee lands, namely the Ituana and Mogiana, while the Sorocabana sought to serve the cattle industry. The Paulista Railroad moved toward Rio Claro in 1876 to serve coffee fazendeiros there, who were heavily invested in it.6

In 1880 two railroad engineers and a capitalist formed the Companhia Rio Claro to take the railroad from there onwards. In 1884 Slo Carlos was reached and after an agreement between the Conde de Pinhal and the fazendeiros of Araraquara, who agreed to take shares to the value of 600 contos of rfis, the railway came to Araraquara in 1885 amid music, fireworks and speeches.7 The climax came in 1886, when the Emperor, Dom Pedro II, visited the city, a sign of "arrival" in the world.8


6Monbeig, Ponniers et planteurs, p. 92.
Odilon Nogueira de Matos, "O desenvolvimento da r@de ferrovigria e a expanslo da cultura do cafr em S~o Paulo," Digrios Associados, Caderno 10, pp. 14-15.

7Adolpho Augusto Pinto, Hist6ria da viaro p2blica de Sgo Paulo (S~o Paulo: Vanorden, 1903), pp. 65-67. This railway company, typically based on foreign and fazendeiro capital, passed into the hands of the Paulista Company in 1892.


8Silveira, Album de Araraquara, p. vii.










The advance of the railroads and the growth of coffee

cultivation were also intimately linked with the immigration to and colonization of the interior of Sto Paulo. Yet if population and communications were linked, the latter only rarely preceded the former. The railway companies were never colonization societies but followed close behind the frontier.9

The railroad terminus for three or four years at a time would be in an important urban center or the boca de sertgo (edge of the backlands). When a population center further in the interior had enough freight and passenger traffic to merit service, the railroad followed. The reaction of the arrival of the railway was like a whipcrack according to one authority. Lands valorized, commerce developed, and people poured in. The old terminus lost some of its activity; and many a pioneer railhead settled down to being a center of business, commerce, administration, and education.10

The Plains of Araraquara were opened up to coffee comparatively late, and this made a great difference to social development there. In the year 1859 the principal agricultural activity in the zone was sugar cane production, with twelve mills in action. There were only four coffee

91n this century the Paulista Railroad has bought old fazendas along its route and sold them in lots in order to assure cargos.

. 10pierre Monbeig, "les voies de communication dans
l'Etat de Saint Paul (Bresil)," Bulletin d'Association de Geographes Frangais, No. 102 (January, 1937), 12-16.










plantations, and those could not transport their produce to other areas. Cattle were bred in a primitive fashion, there being a great need for improvement.11 Twenty years later Araraquara's coffee production, some two million kilos, was worth only a third of its sugar production.12

Altogether Araraquara in the nineteenth century and a

little beyond presented a picture of a typical frontier town. A group of primitive buildings and huts grouped around the Church of Sgo Bento were for a long time the "metropolis* of the zone. There the Ctmara Municipal met to deliberate and the various legal officers did their business. Their annual reports provide a bare history of Araraquara in imperial times.13

The functions of local administration in those days

were slight. Election results were to be recorded and lists of those with the franchise and the right to be elected were revised from time to time.14 As early as 1842 there were provisions for primary education, but a report in 1864 to the inspector-general of education in the province revealed only fifty-one male and fourteen female pupils. The township received in 1865 an agent for several families from the

llAffonso dE. Taunay, Hist6ria do cafS no Brasil, III (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Nacional do Cafg, 1939), 176.
2Ibid.', VI., 346-350.

13Estado de Sgo Paulo, O~ffcios Diversos de Araraquara, 1833-49, 1850-61, 1863-90.
141n 1874 the respective figures were 251 and 120.










south of the U.S.A. and through him invited thirty families to come there. Another chapter in the lives of the inhabitants was the story of the men they sent to the Seventh Battalion of Volunteers of the Nation to fight in the Paraguayan War.

Gradually roads to other cities were planned and prepared, public health measures were taken against smallpox, and a small society developed. The wealthy fazendeiros created the Araraquarense Club in 1881. Yet life remained rugged in these early years. By 1852 eight men had been Jailed, three had done hard labor, and two had been hanged. Disease and occasional violence had left over 200 orphans in the public care. Travelers on the rough roads could fear assault and violence as late as 1884, while the frontier community could be shocked in 1897 by a gory lynching of two prisoners in the local Jail.15

One result of the slow evolution of Araraquara, and the fact that coffee came into the area only in the last days of the Empire, was that slavery was never the dominant institution it was on other older sections of the province of Slo Paulo. Taunay points out that of the coffee-producing areas Araraquara was one of the smallest slave-owning coimunities.16 Araraquara had 7,128 inhabitants in 1874, of which

15A11 information found in the respective annual folders of the Officios Diversos noted above.
16Taunay, op. cit., VI, 338.










5,711 were free and only 1,417 were slave. Yet earlier in 1863, on receiving news of plans of a slave revolt in Campinas, the chief of police of Araraquara wrote to the President of the Province stating that his police force uould be inadequate should an uprising take place in the municipio.17

In character the Araraquara area lay somewhere between the old coffee regions of S~o Paulo with their slave economy and the new regions of the twentieth century which were to give rise to the idea that coffee as opposed to sugar was a democratic plant.

After 1860 coffee very slowly attracted the capital,

land, buildings, and labor which were employed in sugar cane cultivation in the areas of S~o Carlos, Araraquara, and Descalvado. As coffee became consolidated and other forms of agriculture were reduced, the demand for slaves grew. Yet as the slave trade had largely stopped, so slaves from Rio

and Bahia on the block at Casa Branca fetched very high prices.18

Certainly slaves worked in the early coffee lands of Araraquara, tending the trees and milling and grading the crop by hand, while the fazendeiros battled with the problems that slavery brought, namely heavy administration costs

170fficios Diversos de Araraquara, 1863-18741 Eufrizio de Azevedo Marques, Apntamentos hist6ricos, geogrfficos, eatatisticos e noticiosos da Provincia de Sao Paulo (Rio de Janeiro: Universal de Laemmert, 1879), I, 38.
18Taunay, Pequena Hist6ria, pp. 238-39.









and intense fiscalization. On the other hand in Slo Paulo as a whole but in the Araraquara zone in particular, slavery must be looked on as a transition stage. The Negro slave may

have aided at the birth of coffee production in Araraquara, but it was to be the white immigrant who would help in raising it to maturity.19

After a century of poverty and underdevelopment S~o

Paulo in 1870 could look forward to prosperity. In the interior an enormous growth of the foreign element in the population after 1880 was to make great changes, while the provincial town of Sgo Paulo had its character transformed by an ever-increasing group of middle-class foreigners. Even the traditional fazendeiro's outlook had to change and become wider in view of the existence of virgin lands in the west, the expanding coffee market, and the new facilities for farm machinery, marketing, and credit. The railroad network to an extent obviated the planter's need to be selfsufficient. 20

The coffee fazendeiro as the head of a latifundia had

to have creative energy and strength to fight nature. Opening a fazenda was a man's job. To fell, dry, and burn the virgin forest needed brute strength and resourcefulness. The picture of the fazendeiro, whip in hand, wearing his

19Martins de Almeida, Album de Araraquaraj 1948, pp. 27-28.
20Morse, c., pp. 17, 19.










large hat and big boots, busy changing the face of nature, is one of a true pioneer, the antithesis of the custombound nortista sugar baron of colonial days.21 These coffee fazendeiros proved to be the most significant element in the bourgeoisie of the Empire in Brazil. According to Oliveira Vianna, rural leaders such as these had constituted a rude nobility around which all social classes had revolved since the first settlements on the backlands of S~o Vicente. In the nineteenth century they were regaled with titles of nobility and constituted a rich source of political leaders. 22

At first the planters of the Parafba Valley and the

Mogi-Guassd basin, skilled in the complex and costly organization of coffee planting, formed an elite well-equipped with political and administrative talents. However, as the railroads developed and enabled fazendeiros in the west of S~o Paulo to live in the city and keep in close touch with their estates, so they also became political and social leaders. 23

Bernardo Avelino Gavigo Peixoto, who finally acquired Cambuhy in 1884, was not one of these fazandeiros who

21Dacio Aranha de A. Campos, "Tipos de povoamento de So Paulo," Revista do ArSuivo Municipal (Slo Paulo), LIV (February, 1939), 32-33.
22Oliveira Vianna, Poulacbes meridionaes, pp. 40, 118.

23Pierre Denis, Le Br~sil au XXe si4cle (Paris: Armand Colin, 1909), p. 32.










became an aristocrat or politician but a man of politics and law who became a fazendeiro. This was to be the vital influence in his handling of the estate, his outlook on it, and the results he produced.

The name of Gavilo Peixoto was a prominent one in the politics of the second Empire. As an influential leader of the Liberal Party, Gavigo Peixoto displayed talents both in parliament and in administration. From a Raulista patrician background, his father having been twice President of the Province, he first came to prominence when, as a Juiz de directo in Santos, he sternly suppressed the last efforts of the Negro slave trade on the Apulista littoral and as a result became chief of police of Rio Grande do Sul in 1859.24

Entering the federal Chamber of Deputies in this latter year, Gavi~o Peixoto's career was distinguished by his forensic ability and his long friendship with Josh Boniflcio the Younger. His prominence in Liberal circles brought him many positions, such. as President of the Assembly and Chief of Police of Sgo Paulo. In 1878 he returned to the Chamber after ten years of the Liberal exile, but in 1881 he was defeated in the first directly elected legislature. However, in the following year he received the difficult commission

24Luis Gonzaga da Silva Leme, Geneoloqia Paulistana,
IV (SNo Paulo: Duprat e Cia., 1904), 263-64. Gavilo Peixoto was descended from the noble line of Taques Pompeus, a family of Brabant which moved to Brazil via Portugal in the sixteenth century.










of being a Liberal President of the Conservative State of Rio de Janeiro.

Bernardo Avelino Gavilo Peixoto was a typical example

of a politician in imperial Brazil, an age in civilized countries, when the government of the people was done by the better people for the good of the state. However, Bernardo Avelino's career did not complete the usual pattern. Having been given a carta de conselho and made an honorary desembargador, he was expected to go into the Senate, but the downfall of the monarchy cut his political career short. A monarchist, faithful to the past, he gave up politics and put his energy into other fields, looking to his own hitherto neglected business.

As a proprietor of latifundias in various parts of S~o Paulo, he had some areas put into cultivation while others were offered to the government to establish nidcleos coloniais for European immigrants. Cambuhy was to feel the effects of both these fields of his activity.25

At the time when Gavifo Peixoto legally acquired Cambuhy in 1884, the feverish spread of coffee out onto the paulista plateau was gathering momentum until it overshadowed all else. Railroads developed to carry the crops to the sea and transport immigrants, the vital source of cheap

manpower, to the interior. Immigration under the Republic

25Necrology of Gavi~o Peixoto by Affonso d'E. Taunay, Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geogrfico de So Paulo,
XVII (1912), 485-87.










passed to the hands of the various states and in S~o Paulo into the hands of the fazendeiros.26

Coffee was swiftly becoming the basis of state and national wealth and preoccupied Republic's politics as coffeegrowing states held the reins of federal policy. Credit became widely available. C. V. van Delden Laerne, writing in 1885, described how the early coffee planters in S~o Paulo financed their ventures independently using city middlemen as commissioners or selling agents. However, by the time of this late-century boom in planting, the high incomes from agriculture had induced planters to develop luxurious tastes in homes and pleasures. As a result the fazendeiros became indebted to their agents and the latter emerged as bankers.27 Another sign of economic sophistication was the commercialization of coffee. Warehousing companies in Santos in the course of their business began to issue store receipts or warrants against the coffee deposited. These warrants were delivered by fazendeiros as security to the banks for accommodation pending the time when they could be exchanged for steamer bills of lading, which in turn could be converted into cash.20

26Denis, op. cit., p. 108; Celso Furtado, Formaco econ�Mica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundo da Cultura, 1959), p. 205.
27C. F. van Delden Laerne, Brazil and Java: Report on Coffee Culture in America, Asia and Africa (London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1885), p. 183.
28G. C. W. Joel, One Hundred Years of Coffee (London: privately by Edward Johnston and Co., 1942), p. 24.










In comparison with the economic growth which characterized every aspect of the coffee business in Slo Paulo in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Cambuhy's record was a somewhat poor one. Like many a latifundia a very large percentage of its area saw no activity and no development of natural resources.

Bernardo Avelino Gavifo Peixoto brought to Cambuhy the attitudes of a plantation aristocrat rather than those of a

rugged pioneer. On the other hand, a politician with no agricultural experience was hardly the man to open up what was for the largest part virgin territory. Armed with a supply of American agricultural magazines and prepared to invest a considerable amount of capital, Bernardo Avelino set out to develop Cambuhy as best he could.29

With the passing of the years since the first demarcation of the boundaries of the sesmaria, there had arisen some confusion as to the actual limits of the property. As a result, on February 25, 1893, Bernardo Avelino sought to

have the property properly surveyed.30

The vagueness of the original carta de sesmaria of Cambuhy and the primitive methods of the early survey had left many problems which were common to old latifundias in Brazil. Slo Paulo was not free of its Portuguese heritage of medieval

291nterview with Dr. Carlos Gavigo Monteiro, May 3, 1960.
30Carta de Senten9a, 1894, p. 82.










concern with lands and property involving great difficulty in determining boundaries.

In April 1894 the Cambuhy estate was surveyed by a

Dr. Ernesto Abbt, starting from an old marking stone on the

right bank of the ItaquerO stream. It is in some ways remarkable how little difference there was between this and the first demarcation. Cambuhy was found to consist of 30,500 alqueires paulistas of land. The findings were registered by the Juiz de Directo Dr. Adolpho J1lio da Silva Mello in Araraquara on June 23, 1894, and finally settled in Septenber 17 of that year.31

Dr. Abbt in his survey estimated that 7,000 alqueires of Cambuhy were in campos cerrados and suitable for cattle raising and 10,000 were good-quality land suited to cultivation of various crops, while the remaining 13,500 algueires were suitable for coffee and sugar cane production. However, the difference between these generous estimates and what was to prove practical was great.

In fact, the 1894 survey noted in the south of the estate at a place called Niagara a sugar cane fazenda consisting of fields of cane, some dwelling houses, huts for colonists, and a water-driven mill to produce sugar and aguardente. Some coffee had also been planted there. In the center of the property was the Fazenda de Criar do Cambuhy, the cattle-breeding section with the usual huts grouped

31bi____., p. 216.









around a few fenced and more commonly unfenced pastures on which grazed at the most 2,000 head of cattle. Lastly, in the north of the sesmaria was the small sftio de caf4 called Boa Vista, which had houses for the colonists, some pastures, and some 70,000 coffee trees.32

The Fazenda Niagara was watered by a stream, the C6rrego de Agoude da Cachoeira Ronda, which from a naturallyformed dam fell as a waterfall after which the section had

been named. Four other streams, tributary to the River Jacarg-Guassd, watered the southern sections; while a larger

one, the River Itaquer$, wended its way, fed by many streams, through the forest in the middle of the sesmaria. In the north of the estate three streams, the Espfrito Santo, Tamandul, and Cascavel, tributary to the River Sgo Lourengo, watered the lands; and in the eastern area of the property, the river Slo Jobo did likewise. However, such water resources lay undeveloped under canopies of virgin timber. Early photographs of the estate hardly do justice to the immense forests abounding in madeiras de lei such as cabriuva, cedro, Peroba, araub, Jacarandl, and pau d'61ho,

all these intertwined by parasitic plants lush in color and variety.33

Such was the raw material with which Gavilo Peixoto had to work. Considering its wild nature and the circumstances

32Iid., pp. 155-56.

33Ibid.









of the time it is not surprising that the early development of the property was carried out slowly. In the time of Gavigo Peixoto few roads and no railways existed nearer than Araraquara. Thus his headquarters were at Niagara, which was the nearest point to Araraquara.

Gavi~o Peixoto himself lived in the city of Slo Paulo, visiting Cambuhy only when business demanded. He had administrators at Niagara and Boa Vista to carry out the necessary supervision of labor. However, most development in these years was done by contract. Land was also rented or given free to individuals with the proviso that it be returned within a stipulated number of years in an improved

condition.

Needless to say such arrangements without close personal supervision were disastrous in their effects on the land. In 1909, for example, Gavi~o Peixoto rented two fazendas, Nictheroy and Slo Bernardo, to a certain Feliciano de Salles Cunha for a period of three years. In return for paying an annual rent of Rs. 100$000 (U.S. $31.00) per thousand trees per year, the tenant got the profits from the three coffee harvests, the right to interplant corn and beans in the coffee groves, and the right to all the firewood in the area excepting madeira de lei.34

34Magalhes Papers, Dossier 32, contract dated October 1, 1912.










In actual fact the coffee on the area rented had been abandoned and the tenant was to restore the trees and fill the gaps, returning to Gavifo Peixoto in 1912 the coffee lands clean and with the agricultural operations of the year completed. Too much trust was placed in the tenant to get good colonists to work in the area and not to destroy forest or exhaust the land with heavy crops of cereals.35

This agreement was typical of many made by Gavigo Peixoto. Small plantations grew, flourished, and were abandoned here and there over the estate. There was no over-all policy except that of getting profit where possible. On Gavi~o Peixoto's behalf it may be said that he was by 1894 an old man whose full life had left him many interests other than Cambuhy. Moreover, he appeared to have considerable financial troubles and Cambuhy proved an easy solution to those problems.

On March 18, 1903, Gavifo Peixoto was obliged to pledge the expected crop of 3,000 arrobas of coffee from Fazenda Santa Josepha to Francisco Sampaio Moreira Filho e Cia., his agents in S~o Paulo, in payment of a debt. Then again on October 28, 1907, he paid a debt to the Banco do Estado de S~o Paulo by handing over the Fazenda La Plata with some 160 alqgeires of land, 28,000 coffee trees, forests, pastures, and three tile-roofed houses for colonists.36

35T.id36Caimbuhy Papers, Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 6.










This attitude of Gavigo Peixoto toward the fazenda resulted in much alienation of territory. Of the original area of 30,500 alqueires, much land was sold and donated by the conselheiro, particularly in the southwest corner of the property. The largest sale was of some 2,500 alqueires of superior-quality land on the Rio Jacarg, which was made to the State of Slo Paulo on November 16. 1906, to form small holdings for European immigrants. The sale was made on very vague terms allowing the State to choose good lands. On December 21 of the same year Gavigo Peixoto gave a similar amount of land to the state alongside the part sold, making a total of 5,000 alqueires on which to found their nidcleos

coloniais.37

Gavigo Peixoto also sold a number of other properties dotted around the perimeter of the sesmaria, the largest area being near the small town of MatXo, founded in 1892 just to the north of the sesmaria and the Fazenda Santa Cgndida, on the southern boundary. This was sold in 1894 to Firmiano de M4oraes Pinto, an ex-prefeito of Slo Paulo, who was married to a niece of the conselheiro.38

Indeed, Bernardo Avelino also gave quite a lot of land to his children; in 1897 he gave Fazenda SapS, some 500 alqueires, to pay the debts of Dr. Francisco Alves da Silva

371bid.
38
8M~alhaes Papers, Dossier 32, Transference document dated September 20, 1894.










Campos and his wife, Dona Maria da Gi6ria GaviNo Campos, a daughter of the conselheiro. Lastly, on June 11, 1910, Gavilo Peixoto as an old man gave Fazenda Tamandug, some 400 alqueires bearing 30,000 coffee trees, to his daughter, Dona Josephina Gavifo Monteiro, married to a Dr. Jos$ Felix Monteiro, resident in S~o Paulo. On October 14 of the same year another daughter received Fazenda Guanabara with 40,000 coffee trees on 400 alqgueires and a further 400 algueires of forest on Fazenda Santa Rita. This action was part of an advance distribution of rural properties made by Bernardo Avelino among his daughters a few years before his death.39

During the period of Bernardo Avelino Gavigo Peixoto, Cambuhy was more affected by outside factors encouraged by the onselheiro than by the actual work done on the estate at his command. Most important of these were the arrival of the railroad and the colonization of the various fazendas of the sesmaria by immigrants.

As early as 1873 a railroad had been considered from

Rio Claro to Cuiabl, Mato Grosso, via Sfo Carlos and Araraquara. Many prominent men in booming Araraquara were interested in such a line. Finally, in 1895 a group of them acquired from the Companhia Paulista the right to construct and develop a line from Araraquara, where the Paulista Railroad Company's lines ended, to the Vila of Ribeirlozinho (today Taquaritinga). The line had no more pretensions than

39Ibid� Cambuhy Papers, Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 10.









to be a small local feeder line to the Paulista, developed in order to provide these planters with quick transportation for their harvests. The iron horse curving its way through many fazendas was to be a substitute for the ox cart.

In the following year the Companhia Estrada de Ferro

Araraquara was founded and by November 1896 works had begun.

The yellow fever epidemic in the Araraquarense zone in the years 1895 to 1897 and the coffee crises of the latter year greatly retarded the young company. Eventually, thanks to a state subvention, the tracks reached their destination of Ribeirlozinho in 1906 and six years later got to the important city of Sgo Jos- do Rio Preto. From Cambuhy's point of view the most important aspect of the Araraquarense Railroad's development was a small branch line, planned in 1908 to run from Sylvania to Tabatinga, passing across the sesmaria of Cambuhy thanks to the conselheiro's influence as a shareholder. In January 1911 then the sesmaria saw two stations, Toriba and Cambuhy, opened upon its territory.40

The railroads in the Araraquarense zone were in part exceptions to the rule that the railroads never preceded the immigration wave in Slo Paulo. In going from Araraquara to Rio Preto, the Araraquarense actually was developing the great sertgo, there being very few people out there. It was the railroad which took the many Italian and other European

immigrants to populate the semi-abandoned sesmarias on the

40Martins de Almeida, OR. cit., pp. 114-18.









rolling countryside, amongst which Cambuhy could almost be included. 41

The Araraquarense in these early years was a very srmall

railroad, yet in 1900 its five passenger cars and thirty goods wagons carried 36, 711 passengers and 16,289 tons of merchandise and inthe next year a third as much again.42 The railroad reached Mat~o in 1899 and this affected Cambuhy. The headquarters of the great estate under Gavigo Peixoto had been at Niagara close to the southern boundary where he had his at first water and later steam-driven sugar mill. On the arrival of the railway at Mat~o, the headquarters of the estate were moved to Fazenda Santa Josepha (today Col8nia Velha at Boa Vista), the closest point to that city. More important still was the provision of a better outlet for the crops of the coffee sltio of Boa Vista in the north of the estate. Until the coming of the railroad, it had been practical for Gaviao Peixoto to have activity on the Cambuhy estate concentrated on exploiting the terra roxa along the Jacarg River with sugar cane. Yet the great difficulties of transporting sugar and alcohol by ox-drawn wagons to Araraquara made the complete 4evelopment of sugar cultivation impossible. This half-hearted activity and the small-scale cattle breeding and fattening on a mere 1,200

41Nogueira de Matos, loc. cit.; Carlos Pinto Alves, Carlos Baptista de Magalhges (Araraquara: by the author, 1954), p. 6.
42Pinto, op. cit., p. 243.










alcTueires characterized Cambuhy until the coming of the railroad.43

In the same year as the railroad reached Matao there

were planted at Las Palmas, a close-by section, some 170,382 coffee trees. Thereafter, in the first decade of this century more and more coffee groves were opened up, particularly when and where the railroad tracks crossed the Cambuhy estate. The Santa Josepha plantations were extended and new

ones opened at Santa Josephina, Guanabara, Tamandug, and Mato Grosso, all taking advantage of the new outlet for product ion.44

Pierre Denis writing in 1909 could say that coffee

culture in the State of S~o Paulo was linked with big properties, which presupposed a labor force, and he noted how odd it was that this labor force was European.45 Cambuhy in the years of Gavilo Peixoto was an example of the seigniorial advance of coffee along the forested valley of the Tiet@. Inefficient and wasteful, this method was led by administrators of Gavi~o Peixoto, the actual work being done by

immigrant labor.46

43Morel, op. cit., pp. 52, 66.

44Companhia Agrfcola Fazendas Paulistas, Quarterly Report, No. 71, Enclosure No. 4. Hereafter referred to as C.A.F.P., Qurterly Reports.
45Denis, Op. cit., p. 108.

460liveira Vianna estimates that a million hectares of virgin forest went under axe and fire in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Evolugo do povo Brasileiro (4th ed.1 Rio de Janeiro: Jos6 Olgmpio, 1956), p. 114.









The first phase of colonization in Slo Paulo was private when fazendeiros after 1850 sought to fill then depleted slave ranks with white free labor, which was often used to tend the coffee while slaves did the other farm tasks.47 After 1880, however, first under the Empire and later under the Republic, there was considerable official activity in forming centers of population (ndcleos coloniais) on which the fazendeiros could draw in the busy times of the agricultural year. While providing lands for immigrants, these

centers were created with the interests of labor-hungry coffee planters at heart. This type of official colony in the State of Slo Paulo was most common around Campinas and MogfMirim, but three such colonies were founded out on the plateau. All of them were on the sesmaria of Cambuhy, namely Gavilo Peixoto, Nova Paulfcea, and Nova Europa, created by the state government on the lands acquired from the conselheiro.48
These three townships, founded by Dr. Carlos Botelho, the state governor in the years 1905-1908, were soon linked by the Estrada de Ferro Dourado. As in all official colonies lots were sold on installments to immigrants, in this

47Denis, op. cit., pp. 121-25.

48Caio Prado Junior, "Distribuiglo da propriedade
fundiAria rural no Estado de Sfo Paulo, " Boletim Geogrdfico (Rio), Ano III, No. 29 (August, 1945), 696-98.









case mainly Germans, Italians, and Poles.49

Thanks to the good-quality land the three colonies

quickly expanded. Nova Paulfcea, for example, by 1915 had a population of 3,500 of which 3,000 were rural. There were 1,300,000 coffee trees in that colony of which a million belonged to people in the ndcleo colonial and the rest to the fazendas Santa Cfndida and Alabama.50

Each of the three colonies was a little frontier town with rude, wooden buildings facing on to beaten earth streets. All around them the forest was felled and primitive roads led to the new coffee sftios. In 1915 Nova Europa had 167 lot holders and Nova Paulfcea, 165. They boasted two tiny, mixed schools; and their social life was presided over by a Justice of the Peace, a notary, a physician, and the colony director, while several shops, a few smiths and potters, and a pharmacy catered to their needs. Life was not easy in these primitive towns, yet the immigrants who went out there were hardy and in the first years kept in good health, no deaths being attributed to the fevers which existed in the marshy lands along the river.51

49Paul Walle, Au Brdsil: Etat de S~o Paulo (Paris: Orientale et Americaine, 1912), p. 50; Denis, --cit., p. 165.

50Morel, op. cit., pp. 116-18.
51Silveira, Album de Araraquara, pp. 145-52; Magalh~es Papers, Dossier 29, Letter from State Director of Lands, Colonization and Immigration dated October 13, 1910.









Another important form of colonization in which Gaviso Peixoto played a part was the sale of small pieces of land of from three to twenty algueires, not only for profit but

with a view to populating the area. Payment was usually in annual installments, legal transference of the land taking place after the final payment.52

Some of Gavigo Peixoto's larger sales led to the establishment of prosperous small fazendas. Fazenda Santa Chndida, sold to Dr. Firmiano de oraes Pinto in 1894, increased by a purchase of a further 200 alqueires in 1910, was by 1915 a thriving concern. It had on 100 al ueires of land 195,000 coffee trees, producing an average 15,000 arrobas of coffee per year. In sight of the great aboticabeira trees of the forest nestled a typical building to house the coffee mill, a sawmill, and a brickyard. Sixtyfive head of cattle grazed there and 34 working animals gave service. There were a total of 38 families of colonists at

work.53

Cambuhy, which was opened up economically at a time

when abolitionism held sway, never presented the stereotyped aspect of the slave plantation. There never was a big house with slave quarters nearby. The first sede at Niagara and


52Cambuhy papers, Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 6. Exemplars of Contracts were found in MagalhRes Papers, Dossier 32.
53MSalbges Papers, Dossier 32; Silveira, o_._ cit., p. 260.









the second at Santa Josepha were modest homes for administrators, while the urban limit of its population never encircled these houses but extended to the edge of the coffee proves. Colonists arriving from the crooked villages of Italy must have felt strange in the regular lines of wooden or mud and wattle houses that stood to attention beside the various plantations dotted over the estate.54

The spirit of Cambuhy in the time of Gavi~o Peixoto

looked to the past. While it was a very different type of institution to the typical nortista sugar plantation with its big house and slave pen, yet Cambuhy presented some aspect of a medieval barony. Out on the frontier the sense of community was strong, as the fazenda not only produced sugar and coffee but all things necessary for life. Gavilo Peixoto's various administrators were the only guarantee of stability and order to many humble colonists.55

Such a coffee colonist was a paid, free worker with the right to eat when he liked, rest when he wished, and go out at night if he wanted to. Yet with travel conditions as they were and considering the primitive nature of the Cambuhy terrain, the colonist's lot must have been very restricted. Fazenda organization and customs were changing in these post-abolition years; but one thing had not changed,

54Magalhges Papers, Dossier 32, Relat6rio dated
June 27, 1911.

55C Sndido Moto Filho, 1O poder politico do cafr," Digrios Associados, Caderno 20, p. 34.










namely the bell, which had been so vigorously maintained in the colonial times and respected until the end of Negro slavery.56 It still sent strident and resonant orders to distant areas, regulating the lunch and rest of the labor gangs. It was a poignant reminder to many of times gone by and on still nights could inspire fZar or start a tale amid a group on a doorstep. Colonists lived in these groups in an atmosphere of frontier neighborliness. When one family killed a pig, the neighboring families also dined upon it.57

The great problem of a landowner such as the conselheiro was to get good immigrants as colonists. If the old, master-slave relationship had gone from the paulista terrain,

yet fazendeiros such as Gavifo Peixoto showed a concern for good relations with their workers. From a purely economic standpoint good working conditions were expected to produce better results from the laborers. Moreover, a large property such as Cambuhy could very easily be robbed as there was little to prevent colonists from stealing coffee and running away. 58

The greatest lack on the Cambuhy estate in the time of Gavillo Peixoto was manpower. A large number of colonists and contractors to plant and handle coffee could not be


56Aranha Campos, op. cit., p. 34.
57Interview with Mr. Alberto Benassi, April 29, 1960.

58Louis Couty, Le Brsil en 1884 (Rio de Janeiro: Faro e Lino, 1884), pp. 162-170.










brought in without constructing houses. Yet by 1911 even the brickyards on Cambuhy no longer functioned, no new construction was carried out, while the fazenda population suffered the rigors of living in mud and wattle buildings. Gavigo Peixoto was obliged to sharecrop his coffee in order to get some return from his land, and by the end of his tenure had abandoned most of the coffee groves in his adminiatrator's care with a view to diminishing expenses.59

Bernardo Avelino until the end of his life never lost his eagerness to develop Cambuhy. In addition to his encouragement of imigration by land sales, colonists, and contractors' contracts, he gave land to many, many agreqados. These men, often Italian immigrants on Cambuhy, got virgin land to clear and plant. After receiving the profits of several years' crops they were to return the land to be used by the fazenda as pasture.

These men and also the fazenda administratore were in a position where it was easy to cheat and rob the absentee landowner, and on Cambuhy many profited in this way. Bernardo Avelino never got any great return for the money he put into the estate and in his later years counseled his grandchildren that the best way to become poor was to buy a fazenda and live in the city.60


59Morel, op. cit., pp. 64, 69-70.
601nterview with Dr. Carlos Gavigo Monteiro, May 3, 1960.










The conselheiro was a member of a dying class, the

Imperial political aristocracy. The coffee crises of 1893, 1897, and 1906 were changing the nature of the business of coffee production. A fazendeiro in the future had to be more of a shrewd businessman and less of an absentee latifundista. Natural attrition was reducing the numbers of the men who had been the political and social leaders of the Empire, while economic change left not a few with only the tatters of social prestige. Bernardo Avelino died in 1912 as an octogenarian, but by that time Cambuhy had passed into the hands of a new type of fazendeiro. For the sesmaria of Cambuhy a new and creative age had begun. Born in the last days of colonial Brazil, dormant through most of Imperial Brazil, Canbuhy was to reach maturity in the twentieth century republic.













CHAPTER III


THE TRANSFORMATION

Cambuhy in 1911 presented the bleak aspect of an enormous latifundia belonging to an absentee and aged owner who could not for financial reasons take full advantage of the property's possibilities. Such a situation was out of line with the spirit abroad in the Araraquarense zone in the first two decades of this century.

A reporter who traveled by train from Araraquara in a

westerly direction in 1908 was greatly moved by the sight of the coffee frontier. The hegemony of civilization did not seem too secure in the shade of the virgin forest. Twelve years later the same man was to be dazzled by the radical transformation of the area.

By 1921 the journey from Araraquara to SNo Josd do Rio Preto revealed that nothing had resisted the green wave. The tropical aspect of the zone was largely gone. Away to the distant horizon spread the enslaving expanse of coffee groves, cotton fields, and sturdy stands of corn, rice, and sugar cane. Little towns arose full of promise in a land that began to look more European as subdivision of the territory progressed.

Here and there breaking this general picture were one or two latifundias resisting the tentative proposals of 47










division. The old seigniorial Raulista spirit was resisting the new era with a natural tenacity, denying the viability of coffee culture by the small planter.1

The abandoned coffee plantations on Cambuhy and the

general air of decadence, however, were not to continue. A new owner was to transform the estate, changing a decadent sesmaria into one of the largest and most thriving fazendas in the State of S~o Paulo.

In June 1911 a certificate was issued by a registrar in Araraquara listing all the pieces of the sesmaria which had been sold and stating that the property was free of debts and other burdens.2 This being done the Conselheiro Bernardo Avelino Gavigo Peixoto could proceed to sell Cambuhy on November 25, 1911, to a certain Carlos Leoncio Magalhfes, a resident of Araraquara. Two of the conselheiro's daughters, Dona Rita and Dona Josephina, also sold their parts of Cambuhy. As a result, for a total of 1,700 contos of ris Magalh~es acquired some 25,000 algpeires of land in one block, being the major portion of the original sesmaria. Along with the land went some 500,000 coffee trees, the dwelling houses and colonists' shacks, the various benefits

Ijdlio de Mesquito Filho, "Impress~es de um reporter," O Estado de Sgo Paulo, June 1, 1921.

2Cambuhy Papers, Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 6.










of the estate, movable and immovable, and some 2,000 head of cattle.3

Late in December 1911 the octogenarian conselheiro paid his last visit to the estate. His physical resemblance to the Emperor Pedro II made him seem all the more out of place in the new republican era. The latter era was represented by the personality of Carlos Leoncio (or Nhonh8) MagalhXes. If Bernardo Avelino stood for the traditionalism of the imperial aristocracy, Nhonh8 represented the vitality of the new aristocracy, the coffee barons who built their economic empires in the freedom allowed by the capitalist system.

Nhonh8's family originated in northern Portugal, and

his grandfather had been a successful businessman in Rio de Janeiro. A change of fortune had sent NhonhS's father into the interior as a commercial traveler. This gentleman settled in Araraquara in 1874 and by the turn of the century had not only played an important role in the political and social life of the community but had successfully founded a business, a bank, and the Araraquarense railroad.4

With such an inspiring background it was perhaps surprising that in 1890, at the age of sixteen, Nhonh8 with fifteen contos of r~is should open the Fazenda Santa Ernestina

3Cambuhy Papers, Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. e. This document reveals that Gavilo Peixoto in all sold or donated some 7,714 alueires, but all his donations were not taken up and thus the area passing to Magalh~es was close to 25,000 algueires. For this he paid the equivalent of U.S. $544,000. Duncan, loc. cit.

4Pinto Alves, Carlos Baptista de Magalh~es, pp. 3-5.









in the area of the later Municfpio of Mat~o. While a youth, then, he had opened up the forest and created a fazenda in the backlands, planting some 480,000 coffee trees, building houses and a terreiro. Later the properties of Cucuhy and Sao Sebastilo were added until he was master of 1,300,000 trees on a first-class property. NhonhS sold this comparatively small property in 1911 for 1,500 contos, some 200 less than what he was to pay for the enormous estate of Cambuhy.5 On the edge of the sertgo the demands on a fazendeiro were great, and in relation to his ability so his property valorized. Magalhes had well developed his powers of administration and his understanding of the economics of frontier agriculture. In addition to this he had already shown the spirit and devotion to an ideal which were to make his influence on Cambuhy so vital. In 1902 Nhonhe and his father, Carlos Baptista MagalhZes, led a small abortive movement called the "Revoluqlo de Ribeir~ozinho" to restore the monarchy to Brazil, and for his pains Nhonh8 had to take to the forest for some months to avoid the law.6

Araraquara, in spite of its early nineteenth century

origins, was in the early twentieth century still a frontier area. In the year 1905 an expedition of the Geological and Geographical Commission of the State of So Paulo set out to

5Assis Chateaubriand, 0 Jornal (Rio de Janeiro), October 15, 1927.
6Pinto Alves, op. cit., p. 6.









explore the Tiet in a northwesterly direction from the mouth of the Jacarg-Guassg, the southern boundary river of Cambuhy, to where the Tiet joins the Parang.7 Out there fevers along the Tiet and the presence of Indians still provided a picturesque background for the pioneers and railroad engineers roughing it at the end of the line.

The city of Araraquara itself followed the general pattern of interior towns. It never had been a coffee or produce market to any extent and by the turn of the century was a center for the distribution in its agricultural hinterland of imported merchandise and the seat of small local banks, which gave credit to the fazendeiros.8 There was little or no industry apart from a few small workshops, sawmills, corn mills, stills, and the ubiquitous machines to mill coffee and rice. Araraquara was, however, as regards economic and agricultural conditions, one of the most successful cities in the interior.

The coffee production of the region in the first decade of this century was sixth in quantity in the state and it gave place only to such renowned districts as Ribeir~o Preto, Campinas, and Jail. Coffee was the most important factor in

7Exploracto do rio Tiet (Slo Paulo: Conimiss~o Geogr~fica e Geol6gica do Estado de S~o Paulo, 1905), pp. 1-16.

%enis, 2R. cit., pp. 110-11.









Araraquara's economy with sugar cane and corn in second and third place.9

In the year 1904-1905 the Municfpio of Araraquara shipped 895,000 arrobas of coffee, and Matlo shipped 534,350 arrobas. At that time in Araraquara there were some 452 agricultural properties covering some 62,925.75 aLqueires, of which 9,825.5 were cultivated.10

Some 9,777 people worked on these estates, 7,918 of

them being classed as foreign or immigrant. Araraquara was a boom area; and by the time Carlos Leoncio Magalhaes sold Cambuhy in 1924, the area had been transformed. Gradually the old estates and latifundias were broken up into many small agricultural properties. By 1925 some 519 planters and 1,200 small agricultural properties occupied the area's cultivated land.11

That Cambuhy did not go the same way was due to the energy and activity of its new owner. After a century of comparative inactivity, under Magalh~es Cambuhy was to enter into its boom period. To appreciate his work and to review

9julian Morel, Sesmaria de Cambuhy, (Sao Paulo: by the author, 1914), pp. 46-49. This was a relat6rio on the property and the area, prepared by an agricultural engineer of the Banco Frances e Italiano da America do Sul. Printed by the C.I.A.P.
10Silveira, Album de Ararauara, 1915, pp. 59-60; A. Lali4, Le cafA danTi'Tat de Saint Paul, Br~sil (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1909), p. 304.

llSilveira, loc. cit.,; Eug~nio Egas (ed.), Os Municfpios Paulistas, 2 vols. (S~o Paulo: Imprensa Official do Estado, 1925), I, 106.










the total effects of the previous 100 years of private ownership, it is worthwhile making an estimate of Cambuhy in 1911.

With 25,000 alcueires it was one of the most extensive properties in the State of Sgo Paulo, but it was great in possibilities rather than in achievement. Cainbuhy was crossed from northeast to southwest by the River ItaquerS, and the tributaries of this river and those of the JacartGuassd ran through the fazenda fertilizing it and in the south providing waterfalls which could power industries. On the Alabama section there was a waterfall said to be capable of providing 2,000 horsepower, and at Niagara there was a fall of 1,000 horsepower which had powered the original sugar mill of Gavifo Peixoto.12 Moreover, in the last years of the conselheiro the Empreza Forga e Luz do Jahd had built a power station close to the colony of Gavilo Peixoto using the waters of the Jacarg River. Thence the company intended to supply power to the surrounding cities; and as its power lines would have to pass across the fazenda, good rates for power were offered to the fazenda.13

The lands of Cambuhy were situated in a zone of the state which had a reputation for fertility. In the south along the Jacarg there was the famed terra roxa soils and

mixtures; in the center of the estate were the weaker camp

12 agalh~es Papers, Dossier 30. This whole description is based on three unsigned relat6rios made before Magalhaes purchased Cambuhy, dated April 30, May 28, and June 27, 1911.
131bid., Relat6rio (June 27).









lands suited for cattle raising; and in the northern sections there were white, red, and yellow earths of the superior baurd series. These latter were arable, productive, and easily workable. They yielded some 1.2 to 1.5 kilograms of coffee per coffee tree and 45 hectoliters of corn per hectare as compared with the United St tes average at the time of 24 hectoliters per hectare.14

It was reckoned that there were on the fazenda 7,000

al eires of land suited for coffee culture with a possible total of 14,000,000 trees, mostly in the higher lands between the Itaquer$ and S~o Jo~o rivers and in the north of the estate generally.15

Fifty per cent of the fazenda was still covered by forest in which predominated such trees as p2roba, cabriuva, and cedro. There were excellent opportunities for industrializing this raw material into paper, pulp, dyes, railroad sleepers, firewood, and timber for sale. Moreover, whereas when forest had been felled in the time of Gavifto Peixoto, far from anywhere and hence with little commercial value, it had been burned; now Cambuhy timber could be shipped out by the branch line of the Araraquarense in the north or by the Douradense Railroad in the south.16

14Tbid., Relat6rio (April 30).

15Ibid.

16magalhaes Papers, Dossier 30, Relat6rio (June 27).









Lastly, in the center of the old sesmaria were the camp lands suited for breeding and fattening cattle with an area of 8,000 algueires. The pastures were rich and well watered, causing the new owner's mind to range over such ideas as herds of 30,000 head of livestock for meat, leather, milk, and wool production.17

Such then were the physical resources of Cambuhy. What had been lacking until 1911 was human effort to bring to life and develop these resources. Spread over some seven fazendas there had been planted some 656,419 coffee trees, an insignificant number for the size of Cambuhy. The produce of these trees was hauled to the Santa Josepha center and there milled. In this area was also the fazenda sawmill. However, both these mills were in a bad state of disrepair.18

Santa Josepha (later called Boa Vista) boasted some

recently built wooden coffee stores (tulhas). On the section were 84,000 coffee trees, and grouped around the beaten earth drying terrace were houses for a sufficient number of colonists. These houses of a mud and wattle construction were quite dilapidated. A brickyard and kiln, stables for twenty burros, and some fenced pastures were the remainder of the fixtures. All over the estate there was on each section an administrator's house and close by the mud and wattle or wooden huts for the colonists who were needed to work the

17Ibid., Relat6rio (April 30).

18Ibid., Relat6rio (May 28).









coffee. The pasture fences were in most cases broken down. Lastly, at Niagara there were semi-abandoned plantations of sugar cane and a mill to produce sugar and alcohol which, like all the assets of the property, was in a bad state.19

Half of the laborers on Cambuhy had worked on coffee

but because of sharecropping, excessive interplanting due to lack of supervision and general ill organization, the coffee had been ill-treated or abandoned by 1911. Yet the fact that it had resisted such treatment was encouraging, and the coffee promised to be superb in good hands. This resistance of the coffee was also a sign of fertile soils where varied altitudes caused the prospective purchaser of Cambuhy in early 1911 to consider growing tobacco, cotton, alfalfa, rice, corn, beans, and cereals.20

That which made Cambuhy outstanding over other great

blocks of the paulista backlands in 1911, besides its existing cultivation, were two factors of great economic value: facility of transport for its products and proximity to centers of population.

The Araraquarense railroad's main line came very close to the fazenda at Mat~o in the north, while its branch line to Tabatinga had in 1911 three stations on the property, namely Toriba, Teixeira Leite and Cambuhy. This line passed through virgin forest in the Boa Vista, Santa Leopoldina,


19abid.
20Maahe aes Dossier 30, Relat6rio (June 27).










Santa Josephina, and Agua Sumida sections, valorizing coffee lands on either side and making possible future development. The extreme west of the property in 1911 was served by the Douradense railroad, while in the south no less than four stations were close to the estate. Conscious of the value of these railroads in an area which had no roads to speak of, the new owner determined to take full advantage of them, linking all the separate fazendas to the railroad by motor roads.21

Close to the property were the cities of Araraquara,

Mat~o, Boa Esperanga, Ibitinga and It~polis; and within the old sesmaria limit were the three government ncleos coloniais. The development of these townships was a clear indication of the frontier boom in the area. In 1914, after some seven years of existence, Nova Europa was a distrito policial and had some 252 families with a total of 1,920 persons living in the area. All the lots had been sold and some 300,000 coffee trees had been planted, while there were

large crops of corn, rice, and beans. Three sawmills dealt with the felled forest, and three stills and a brewery constituted the non-agricultural activity of the community. A public school and a German school, a pharmacy, and several shops served the basic needs of the pioneers.

21Companhia Industrial Agrfcola e Pastoril d'Oeste de
Sto Paulo, Relat6rio da Directoria, 1913 (Slo Paulo: by the company, 1913), pp. 8-9. Hereafter these annual relat6rios will be designated by the Company's initials C.I.A.P. and the year.










At the same time the colonies of Gavi~o Peixoto and

Nova Paulicea by 1914 formed a distrito de paz and had 185

families with 1,300 people living there. Its development was in a similar state to that of the other colony. Seven years for the transformation from virgin forest to frontier town was a very short period of time. Moreover, lands for sale at from 40$000 to 150$000 an alqueire in 1914 had risen to 200$000 an a by 1924.22

In addition to these centers there existed along the

Jacarg River a considerable area of land still belonging to Canbuhy and alongside the government colonies which could be divided into lots and sold, thus adding to Cambuhy population resources. Cambuhy in 1911 merely awaited the proper treatment.23

When Carlos Leoncio MagalhIes acquired Cambuhy on

November 25, 1911, he had in mind to develop the property and to obtain the capital necessary for this task by founding a limited company. To this end on January 2, 1912, Nhonh8 sold to each of six friends or relations ten algueires of land on the sesmaria at one conto of r4is each.24

These men now co-owners of the property men on January 16, 1912, in Sgo Paulo and resolved to constitute the Companhia Industrial, Agrfcola e Pastoril d'Oeste de Slo Paulo

22Morel, op. cit., pp. 116-18; Egas, pp. cit., I, 108.

23Magalh~es Papers, Dossier 30, Relat6rio (June 27).

24Maqalhges Papers, Dossier 33.










with a capital of 4,000 contos represented by the lands of Cambuhy, its fixtures, goods, and chattels. To fulfill legal requirements three outside valuators studied Cambuhy from January 17 to 21 and confirmed this estimate. Whereupon at a second constitutional meeting on January 23 the condominium was transferred to form a limited company (sociedade andnima), the vast majority of the shares by right going to Carlos Leoncio Magalhbes himself.25

It is interesting to review the great rise in the estimated value of the Cambuhy territory as improvements were made upon it and as coffee, railroads, and colonists transformed the swath of virgin land into a booming agricultural area. In 1884 Gavilo Peixoto valued the property at no more than 16 contos, yet in the next two decades he sold small parts of the fazenda for many times that sum and in 1911 could sell the entire property for 1,700 cantos. Months later the property was valued at 4,000 contos. Taking into account the declining value of the mil-r~is, the advance was still phenomenal. With the labor and foresight of Nhonh8 Magalhes behind Cambuhy the property was destined to be one of the most valuable in the state.

In view of the enormity of the task prudence counseled the development of the existing sources of production as a quick means to surer profit. The President of the new company

25Dilrio Official (S~o Paulo), February 27, 1912, pp. 870-74.










was Nhonh8's father, Carlos Baptista de Magalh~es; but the initiative and control lay with Nhonh8 himself as erente. It was determined to improve the coffee lands, many of which lay semi-abandoned, and to plant new coffee. Secondly, there had to be rounded up all the cattle wandering all over the estate. These were to be contained by large, barbed wire fences to protect the new coffee plantations from invasion by the cattle. Extensive pastures were to be formed to increase the amount of cattle breeding on Cambuhy. And lastly, a large number of houses would have to be built for the colonists needed to tend to the new coffee.26

To obtain working capital the company resolved to issue debentures to a value of 2,000 contos. The emission was handled by the Banco Frances e Italiano da Am~rica do Sul, and the 20,000 debentures were sold at a 7 per cent discount, paying 8 per cent per year for 30 years. The guarantee of the loan was the property itself, and a scheme of gradual repayment of the debentures over the years was devised. The loan was very quickly covered, and a clear sign of confidence in the company and its offered guarantees was manifested.27

Armed thus with this small amount of working capital

considering the magnitude of Cambuhy, Nhonh8 Magalh~es began to transform the estate. As has been noted, the new owner

26C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1913, pp. 9-10.

27Digrio Official (SRo Paulo), March 29, 1912, pp. 134647.










acquired 656,419 coffee trees with the property but in a very bad state. By August 1913, however, 205,000 trees had been cleaned and handled, 59,788 gaps in the coffee lands (covas) had been replanted, and 407 ant-hills amid the coffee had been destroyed. More important, however, regular hoeings had been done amid the coffee.

Despite his expenses in weeding and other costly but

very necessary activities, Magalh~es was gracious enough to respect sharecropping contracts made by Gavigo Peixoto; and so in 1912 he allowed 100,000 trees to be harvested by these people. However, the new company was not content to restore old coffee but mindful of economy determined to plant new trees in areas where the small number of existing trees did not justify the presence of an administrator. As a result of this, by August 1913 there were 1,347,007 trees on Cambuhy. The total had been doubled in the first year of activity of the new owners. Indeed, more trees would have been planted as colonists were available, but the limiting factor was lack of skilled workmen to build houses to shelter the large number of people needed to care for the new plantations. 28

It was highly expensive pioneer work which the new company had to undertake in these years, a sort of latterday seigniorial advance against the backlands. A hundred and twenty-three new houses were built and forty-seven old ones


28C I.A.P.,


Relat6rio da Directoria, 1913, pp. 11-12.










repaired. Wells were dug and cleaned, and 388 alqueires of forest felt the blows of well-paid axes working at speed. Lastly, some 350,000 trees had to be looked after by the company using day labor for lack of colonists. The directors were well aware of the need to make the sesmaria worthy and able to resist the effects of crisis. Coffee prices in 1913 were low but likely to rise because of two small harvests due to irregular atmospheric conditions. Yet Brazil by the second decade of this century was embroiled in problems of overexpansion of credit and consequent tightening up. Periodical monetary crises and uncertain internal policies made it wise for an enterprise such as Cambuhy to make itself as secure as possible.29

In 1914 a heavy program of agricultural tasks amid the coffee was carried out and the trees reacted well to this treatment, presenting a fine appearance despite earlier lack of care and even the drought in the 1913-14 summer. A new coffee plantation of 115,506 trees was planted at Nictheroy to be served by the Cambuhy railroad station. All the new coffee was entrusted to contractors, but thereafter the incapable workers were weeded out and the company took over some of the work itself.30

Nhonh8 Magalh~es was a man of considerable ingenuity in getting things done at no cost to the company in these early

29Ibid., pp. 12-14.

30C.I.A.P., Relatdrio da Directoria, 1914, pp. 4-5.










years. The coffee frontier was characterized by men who would do jobs for a fee or recompense in kind. The Nictheroy coffee plantation was planted on forest which had been felled by a company who were allowed to take the wood they wished from twenty-five alqueires of land. In addition to felling, cutting, and burning the forest, the contractors also made the drives between future blocks of coffee, marked out the plantation, opened the holes, and prepared wood as protective covers for the young plants. Nhonh8 imposed a fine to make sure the work was done in time.31

Plans were also devised whereby the company could have 2,000,000 new coffee trees without cost by contracting formadores. These people would have to fell forest, house themselves, and do everything necessary to create coffee plantations. In return the contractors retained the harvests from the trees from the third year, when the trees began to yield, to the seventh year, at which time they handed over the trees to the company. Prospectuses were issued and advertisements inserted in newspapers.

These latter pointed out the advantages of virgin soil

close by centers of population and the excellence of the climate. Many who had money enough or credit to last them until the first crop of cereals came in showed interest. The virgin soils yielded good crops of cereals, which could be planted between the rows of young coffee, and the contractors

31MagalhSes Paper, Dossier 34.









were usually allowed to keep a few cattle. In 1915 some 348 colonists (coffee workers) and contractors visited Cambuhy, and 242 more sent letters of inquiry.32

As a result of this available labor force, Magalhes

was able to proceed with his program of conservative expansion. By 1915 the number of trees on Cambuhy had risen to 1,476,113, all in a flourishing condition. Magalh~es could also choose good workers and was ruthless in replacing poor ones. Cambuhy's coffee production was steady, and the administration could merely hope that prices remained firm.33

The Araraquara zone even in the boom period never was

given over entirely to coffee, as much of the land was suited to other uses. Magalhles in naming his company showed his desire for diversified activity. Indeed, cattle development was expected to become second only to coffee on Cambuhy, as it was firmly believed by NhonhO that European and American demands for meat would be continually directed more and more to South America.

Soon after the purchase of Cambuhy a round-up of the

cattle wandering over the fazenda was initiated, a total of 1,400 head being found and branded. The era of careless and casual cattle raising on the sesmaria was over. Gradually the ground work was laid for efficient and methodical cattle development. In 1913 there were 1,134 alqueires of pastures

32C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1915, p. 6.

33Ibi., p. 8, 18.









spread over the estate; and it was planned to increase this number to 5,000 algueires, which would hold some 15,000 head of cattle. Ideas of sheep and swine on a large scale, producing wool and leather, butter and cheese, were also considered.34

Magalhles very well appreciated the cattle possibilities of Slo Paulo at the time, particularly as a place to rest and fatten cattle en route to SNo Paulo and exporting frigorlficos from the interior breeding states of Mato Grosso, Goids, and Minas Gerais. While interest was held in the improvement of the race and breeds of cattle on Cambuhy, economy indicated a more advantageous concentration on fattening cattle. Studies on pig breeding at Cambuhy also proved encouraging, and an isolated, well-watered area near the Sgo Jogo River was chosen. Three hundred alqeires of pasture were prepared and plans made to grow corn all around as a prime source of pig food.35

Before Cambuhy could embark on a program of sending responsible men into the interior as buyers of cattle, a considerable amount of pasture preparation was necessary. This was the main preoccupation of the cattle division in these early years. Cambuhy was not to be a backlands latifundia with cattle in an almost wild state but a plantation

34C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1913, pp. 14-16.

35C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1914, pp. 5-8.










with animals fenced and protected from the railroad and hungry neighbors.

Early in 1914 a contract was signed with state officials whereby the company was paid for erecting a sturdy barbed wire fence to keep its cattle from wandering to their death in the government colonies.36 In the first three years of the company's activity, over 100 kilometers of barbed wire fence were raised, more than 17 kilometers of old fences were repaired, and some 5 kilometers of wooden fencing were constructed. Very gradually the old ways were going, and the ranges in the center of the estate saw long, militant lines of posts bearing endless wires stretch across the landscape.37

Behind these fences there was slowly built up good forage pastures with jaraqM9 and catingueira roxa grasses. Forest was felled and cleared, and grass seed sown in the weaker places. By 1915 some 1,800 alqueires of well-formed pastures were ready, and great use of natural pastures with minimum improvements necessary was made. So much so that 10,000 head of thin cattle were being fattened there.

A movement was also begun to improve the quality of the small herd of breeding cattle on Cambuhy. Two good quality bulls were purchased and all other bulls, to be replaced by native caracd stock, were castrated. All the weak cows were

36Magalhges Papers, Dossier 34.

37C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1915, p. 20.










sold at once and the other 400 fattened for sale, to be replaced with hardy native stock. The total breeding herd in 1915 came to 1,779 head, while a small beginning with pigs and goats was under way.38

To MagalhRes the sesmaria of Cambuhy was a miniature of the State of Sgo Paulo, with lands suited not only to coffee but many other profitable pursuits. Unfortunately his efforts were dogged by lack of capital and the effects of world and national events.

At first MagalhXes decided not to restore the sugar plantations at Niagara until new and better machines were installed which would allow the mill to compete with the best in the state. Meanwhile the lands were sharecropped with a few Japanese families while the mill was supervised by a fiscal. Without outlay the company got 40% of the small production.39 It was also found uneconomic to develop the estate's forest resources in these early years.

Sawmills at Boa Vista and Niagara handled the internal needs of the estate. The extraction and exporting of wood were hampered at first by difficulties with transportation even by the railroads crossing the fazenda and in 1914 were rendered inopportune by poor prices on the market in Sgo

38IEbid., pp. 18-22.

391bid., p. 26.









Paulo. It was better to conserve the resources until prices were better.40

One activity that was not limited in these years was the very necessary one of improving the estate itself. Magalh~es was always conscious of the need for good roads to connect up the various fazendas on the estate and to give access to the railroads. By 1915 the sesmaria had over 81 kilometers of roads suitable for automobiles, 112 kilometers of cart roads, and 60 kilometers of cart tracks through the coffee groves. On such roads depended the valorization of the property. Few other properties were so well served by a network of private roads in conjunction with railroad service. During these years the Araraquarense branch line was extended. Two more stations were created within the fazenda, Uparoba in 1914 and Curupi in 1916, before the line came to an end at Tabatinga in the following year. As a result in 1915 Cambuhy had five stations within its boundaries, three at the government colonies and three more in close-by cities .41

As finances permitted old, inefficient methods were

banished from Cambuhy and rational organization instituted. When Magalh~es took over Cambuhy the coffee mill at Santa Josepha was insufficient even for the small production of the estates. Moreover, with the extensive planting done the

40C.I.A.P. Relat6rio da Directoria, 1914, p. 9.

41C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1915, p. 31.









the fazenda production was soon to triple. In 1914 a new milling and grading machine was installed at Santa Josepha with a capacity of 500 arrobas per day, and the drying grounds were improved with water supplies to wash the coffee.42

In 1915 the administration devised a plan to move the

sede or control center to a new site called Boa Vista, quite close to the old one. Plans were made to utilize the cheap source of electricity from the Empreza Forga e Luz do Jahd and have an electrically powered coffee mill and sawmill. Another vital part of this drive for efficiency was the preparation of an official count of the coffee trees. These were marked into blocks and numbered. The aim was to have an exact and minute plan of all coffee trees on the fazenda. Activity on Cambuhy in these years was characterized by the making of gates, the building of houses, the reforming of the two sawmills and one corn grinder, and a general renovation of all buildings on the estate. By 1915 much of the house had been put in order.43

All of this developmental work would have been of little value if there had been a lack of the human element. With such fine lands and good transportation naturally efforts were made to attract colonists. Magalhaes believed less in advertising than in the exemplary success of the first colonists and contractors to come to Cambuhy.

42C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1914, pp. 9-10.

43C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1915, pp. 27-29.










However, some definite efforts were made in the first years. In 1913 negotiations were carried out with the Companhia Oriental Japon~za for the introduction of 500 families. It was planned to sharecrop or rent land to them for the cultivationT of cereals, cotton, and forage crops. As Magalh~es planned a textile mill on Cambuhy one day, he also offered lands without charge to those who would devote themselves exclusively to growing cotton. Furthermore, after the Brazilian government offered to take in exiles from Portugal's revolution in 1912, Cambuhy followed suit and offered homes for a further 500 families.44

Results did not match these colonization plans; yet by 1915 on Cambuhy there were 147 families of colonists and 89 sharecropper families. Fifty families worked as day laborers and 40 more had taken advantage of Magalhffes offer and lived rent free on Cambuhy, working for their own profit but forming a vital labor reservoir at harvest time. In the same year these people harvested 22,880 sacks of corn and 4,813 sacks of beans while they possessed over 4,500 pigs and uncounted horses and cows. Their health was good and there

were no fevers.45

By 1915 Magalhes's original plan of developing existing resources was well ahead. However, just at the time when a fairly good coffee crop was harvested in 1914 and all was

44C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1913, pp. 19-20.

45C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1915, pp. 33-34.









ready for expansion, World War I intervened. The economic situation of Brazil became more and more delicate. Cash became scarce and credit froze. Dis-equilibxium in the public finances was current; and coffee, despite a favorable production situation, failed to get the good prices expected. Furthermore, Italian immigration was stopped and most important European consumer markets closed, while ocean freight and insurance rates vastly increased, hindering the little exportation possible. Prices of imports rocketed. In these circumstances the most important thing that the company did was to keep going in good state, paying its debts and moving ahead where possible.46

With only a small part of the sesmaria in cultivation and so much to do, it was hard to keep expenses down. Payment for colonists rose as high as Rs. 140000 per thousand trees in 1913-14, but the company managed to contract people to do this for Rs. 100$000 in the next year. Yet despite such financial difficulties and in face of the paralyzation of national progress, the Companhia Industria4 Agrfcola e Pastoril d'Oeste de Sgo Paulo in 1915 was solid and prosperous. Its workers were regularly paid and profits made, although none distributed. Moreover, its assets were valorizing all the time. Visitors to Cambuhy in these years (including the current "king of coffee" Colonel Francisco

461bid., p. 4.










Schmidt) were impressed with the transformation which had been wrought there.47

It is worthwhile ascertaining just what Magalhaes had made of Cambuhy by the first years of the Great War. Cambuhy in 1915 was the largest agricultural property in size in the cultivated zone of Sgo Paulo and was about to be the largest coffee-producing fazenda in the world. From a commercial geographical point of view Cambuhy had transportation facilities equal to the major coffee center of the time, Ribeirlo Preto. Moreover, Cambuhy offered topographical and hydrographical conditions highly favorable to cormercial and industrial expansion.48

Another visitor who had known Cainbuhy under Gavifo Peixoto described Cambuhy as clay which had already been shaped by a deft hand, to become fine procelain when baked. Perhaps this was too high-flown a description of 2,000 alqueires of new pastures, 114 kilometers of automobile roads, new fences, destroyed ant-hills, 1,300,000 new coffee trees, and a nascent cattle industry yet when one realized that this had been done by one man in so short a time, the author seemed justified with his simile. Amid a frontier situation, which for many was close to beggary and misery, Carlos Leoncio had shown himself a clear-sighted and sensibly oriented

47C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1914, pp. 4, 15-17.
48Magalh~es Papers, Dossier 30, Relat6rio of one Augusto Ramos, civil engineer, dated Fio, September, 1915.









businessman. This was an era when rural property was quickly valorizing and ilagalhes had kept Cambuhy at the forefront of the movement.49

In place of a group of tiny cultivated areas, separated in some cases by large expanses of forest and scrub land, which had been Cambuhy before 1911, there now stood an institution whose chief pride was its method and its system. The keynote of the latter was the network of roads linking all the fazendas. A reporter who traveled on these roads in 1914 marveled at Nhonh8 who had done for his little "state" what was so necessary for the State as a whole. By 1915 Magalh~es had three Ford cars running on country roads, unique in the area, which were prohibited to ox carts. Noticeably when the same reporter tried to drive to the three government colonies he found himself in a forest path, with ruts and tree stumps blocking the way. Songs of praise for pasture, cattle, and plantations of Cambuhy were an inevitable consequence.50

Canbuhy in 1915 then had a firm administration with a good plan of action. The enterprise was secure and with a well-chosen personnel could hope for great profit from its lands, its coffee trees, its herds, and pastures.

49nji., Relat6rio of one Victor de Lima, dated June, 1916.
50josS Custodio Alves de Lima, "Uma propriedade agrfcola monstro," Jornal do Com~rcio (Rio), July 29, 1914.














CHAPTER IV


IN PURSUIT OF FORTUNE

A restless spirit driven by nervous energy such as Nhonh8 Magalh~es was not at all likely to rest after his transformation of Cambuhy. Adverse economic conditions had by no means made him lose his plans for great agricultural and industrial development on the estate. In 1915 there seemed to be two main ways of securing the necessary funds now that the European money markets were closed: to raise a loan in the United States of America or to increase the capital of the company in Brazil. Neither was to prove feasible.

To clarify the situation a number of studies on the estate were made in 1915 and a relat6rio prepared which surveyed the previous activity of the company and its future possibilities. A stirring r6sumS was made of Cambuhy's natural advantages, the fertility of its soil, and the excellence of the work done so far. Rather interestingly, the fazenda was valued at 9,426 contos. Thereupon a proposal was made for a second issue of debentures to a value of 4,000 contos, half of which would redeem the existing loan. A second demonstration showed that the fazenda would have sufficient profit to service the interest and amortize the debt. Great and involved calculations in tabular form led to the









conclusion that this second debt would be paid off by 1924.1

Despite all the convincing arguments, the time was not right to interest the RAulista money market in such a project. No second issue of debentures was made. The other proposal also was tried and the glowing prospectus was translated into the English language and its figures into dollars and cents. Armed with this and a glowing account in English of the estate, valued at U.S. $1,844,580, Nhonh8 Magalhaes set sail in 1916 for New York to seek the necessary capital from abroad. When this proved impossible, he considered selling a part of Cambuhy to an American company for U.S. $800,000, which company was then to raise a loan of $2,000,000 to develop the estate. All the effort was to no availi and the whole ideas, so characteristic of Magalh~es bandeirante enthusiasm, had to be dropped.2

This financial defeat caused Magalh~es to abandon some of his more visionary schemes and to continue to improve the administration of Cambuhy and develop it as well as he could under the circumstances. Great profits were still to be had from rational and convenient exploitation of cattle, coffee, and timber on a colossal scale, thanks to the exceptional conditions of the property.

Cambuhy's quiet and comparatively isolated life was in the next few years played against a most lively background.

1C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1915, pp. 49-71.

2Magalhges PaPers, Dossier 44, Letter of Magalhaes to Constantine Prado, September 8, 1916.









In 1916 Brazil continued to be affected as all neutrals were by the war; export of coffee was greatly limited, but prices kept up to a regular mean level. In the following year Brazil was dragged into war and as the abnormal became normal, commerce retracted. Prices of prime necessities for the planter soared, and salaries went up as labor became scarcer. Shipping space which had been hard to find came to a halt at times. Stocks of coffee on fazenda and dockside took on voluminous proportions. The price of coffee fell rapidly and the government intervened to maintain it but at a level that gave little profit to the planter. The latter was left with an enormous crop expected and no storage or warehouse space for it. The plethora of production seemed to lead to certain ruin when God, the Brazilian, intervened and by a sharp frost on the night of September 24-25, 1918, wiped out the efforts of several years' work on Cambuhy as on estates all over the coffee zones of S~o Paulo and Minas Gerais.3 As a result of the frost the crops of that year amounted to almost nothing, while the damaged trees of Brazil gave small harvests in the next few years. By cutting the supply of

coffee at a time when the world demand was fairly inelastic, God, as it seemed to many Brazilians, had once more intervened on their behalf. He not only allowed the S~o Paulo authorities to get rid of their large stocks of coffee, but

3C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1918, p. 5. For coffee statistics, please see Appendix III, Table No. 1.










greatly valorized the coffee in storage on fazendas and the small crops which were produced in the next few years.

The pride and vanity of Cambuhy, its fine, well-developed and well-formed trees, had been castigated by the bitter cold. Yet Magalh~es was never the sort of man to despair, and at once began a radical pruning of the affected trees. Forest was felled for a new plantation of 105,000 trees to be called Florida, and other plantations were slightly increased. A solution to the crisis was also sought in cattle and cotton.4

One thing which made Cambuhy outstanding and unusual in these years of Magalh9es was the excellent treatment given to the coffee. Regular hoeings were done in the coffee, which was kept free from weeds; and the trees were constantly kept clear of dead wood while being thinned out where necessary. Whereas in 1912 no less than 59,788 replantings had to be made, this figure fell to as low as 4,938 in 1916 due to the work already done, and settled around 15,660 per year in 1918. One of the greatest plagues to coffee were sadva ants whose great nests rose to spectacular heights amid the coffee groves. In its first six years the new company destroyed some 2,990 of these ant-hills to the great benefit of the coffee lands.5


43bid., p. 6.

5Ibid., pp. 6-7.









Such care needed new administrative arrangements. Consequently, in order to make the coffee lands more compact, improve the fiscalization of the service, and simplify harvesting, Magalh~es in 1916 had cart tracks opened in all the old coffee plantations, which were divided into square blocks. This was done at the sacrifice of several thousand trees; but as a result the administration now knew the exact number of trees in any given block (talhgo). Cambuhy thereafter bore the characteristic aspect of the coffee lands in the west of Sbo Paulo with its great rectangular coffee groves. The orderly hand of man had tailored the unruly cloth of nature.6

By the end of the great war, Cambuhy had 1,729,416 coffee trees on the estate. To keep up with this development the administration gradually improved and increased the number of houses occupied by colonists. In 1918 a total of 245 new houses built by the company was reached, while many of the houses built in Gavibo Peixoto's time had been improved and made habitable again. In these lived 148 families of day laborers, and 62 families developing land for their own benefit. A total of 2,097 souls spread over Cambuhy's vast surface.7

6C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Director&#, 1916, p. 4.

7C.I.A.P., Relatdrio da Directoria0 1918, pp. 7-9. For population statistics, please see Appendix III, Table 2.










Had Magalhfes not been dogged with lack of working capital in these war years, great development in the cattle industry on Cambuhy would have been made. More and more frigor ficos opened in the State of S2o Paulo and cattle were consumed at such a rate that the government had to forbid the slaughtering of cows. Cambuhy with its large natural pasture lands, artificial pastures, and railroad service was in an excellent position to fatten cattle.8

With the resources that were available, preparatory

work was done forming pastures and raising fences. As before, old and weak cattle were gradually purged from the herds; but now new bulls of caracd and zeb strains were introduced. The latter were brought in as an experiment because of their reputation for being resistant to disease and giving better meat quicker with sound financial results.9

Naturally the coffee crisis turned many fazendeiros to cotton or else to ideas of cattle raising or fattening. If Sgo Paulo had not been the land of coffee par excellence, it could have been a cattle center such as Goias and Minas were in Magalhaes' time. Cambuhy's breeding herd in 1918 came to 1,780 all in good condition. There had been prepared some 3,000 alqueires of pasture in jaragul or gordura roxa grass, alongside the 5,000 alqueires of natural pasture on Cambuhy, bound and divided by 182 kilometers of fencing. On

8C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1917, p. 7.

9C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1916, p. 5.










March 20, 1918, there were acquired some 4,000 cows of from 3 to 5 years of age at the small initial price of 400 contos plus 10 annual payments in kind of 1,500 steers. A further purchase of 160 purebred Hereford bulls from Uruguay was made, the necessary cowboys contracted, and a veterinary surgeon brought in. By such financial ingenuity the administration put to work the large amount of capital of the company, already sunk in the format n of pastures.10

Nhonh8 Magalhes displayed during the war great ingenuity. In the circumstances, however, a large part of his efforts brought no results and merely left speculations as to what might have been. Development of sugar at Niagara remained a constant preoccupation of Aagaltes' throughout the war. Yet the latter made the acquisition of the necessary machinery impossible and the Cambuhy administration had to content itself with the yield from the sharecroppers. In March, 1918, however, Magalh~es almost put through a contract with an engineer, Francisco Barreto of Recife, Pernambuco, wht was to rent the Niagara sugar mill and sufficient lands around it for an annual milling of 20,000 tons of cane. Barreto was required at the end of a stipulated period to hand back new machinery, cane grinders, alcohol stills, and new turbines. Unfortunately the negotiation broke down over

10C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1918, pp. 11-16.









technicalities.11 Eventually, when the frost of 1918 further weakened the plantation and no suitable new planting stock was available, the idea of new sugar plantations was abandoned and the land given over to mandioca instead.12

Cambuhy's forest resources were not exploited by Magalhues to any great extent until the war was over. Until then firewood was taken out, some sleepers sold to the Araraquarense Railroad, and timber used for fazenda constructions. However, in 1918 a new sawmill was opened at Boa Vista, fully equipped and electrically powered. At the same time two new brickyards to manufacture bricks and tiles were opened up.13

The great war had ruined many plans of Magalh~es'. Woods sent to Germany for examination as to whether they were suited to the manufacture of cellulose never were reported on. Many other ideas were considered with no result: a cotton gin and cottonseed oil mill, a mill to recover the by-products from coffee husk, an installation to produce charcoal from the forests felled on the estate, and the industrialization of cheese. Yet if Magalhaes was saddened by inactivity in these spheres, the war years were not
wit]h0ii't .......esuIt.14 ...


11Uncompleted contract was found in Mgalhaes Papers, Dossier 34.
12C.I.A.P., op. cir., p. 16.

13Ibid., pp. 16-17.

Ibid., pp. 17-18.










Most valuable of all, Cambuhy emerged from the war

strengthened by a steady program of construction. Abundant natural resources and the driving energy of Nhonh8 had resulted in new houses, wells, corn-cribs, pigsties, dwelling houses, and garages. On the night of September 11-12, 1916, a violent fire destroyed the coffee mill, the sawmill, and the old fazenda house at Santa Josepha. MagalhRes reaction to such a disaster was typical. Thanks to the frontier courtesy of a neighbor, Dr. Valdomar Pinto Alves in Dobrada, Cambuhy's coffee crop was sent there in husk to be milled.15

No time was lost in starting anew. Indeed, advantage was taken to set into action an early plan to move the sede or administrative center from Santa Josepha to Boa Vista, a little further down the valley of the Cascavel stream. By the end of 1917 ten barns (tulhas) with a capacity of 38,000 alqueires of coffee in husk had been raised and work was progressed on buildings to house new coffee benefiting machines.16 An electric substation for transformers and the new electric sawmill were other novelties. The new drying grounds (terreiros) and all surrounding buildings had electric light, and a bridge was built from the drying grounds on which ran little wagons on rails carrying the dried coffee to the barns. Most important of all, large modern machines to mill and grade coffee and a sixty horsepower motor

15C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1917, pp. 11-12.

16Ibid., pp. 8-9.










were installed. Cambuhy had risen from the flames to a position stronger than before.17

Systematically Cambuhy's road system was kept up and

improved. As a result, in 1918 only the newly-opened fazendas had to be brought into the network, over which besides innumerable carts ran five Ford cars and four gasoline-driven trucks, which were local wonders. Many people visited Cambuhy in those years and marveled at what they saw. Yet there was no denying that despite all the intense activity Cambuhy still presented an aspect of latifundias much criticized since. Some 15,000 alqueires of land were uncultivated, of which it was assumed at the time that 9,000 alMueires were suitable for coffee cultivation and the rest of cereals.18

The Companhia Industria4 Agrfcola e Pastoril d'Oeste de S~o Paulo in 1918 was in a good economic and financial state. It was hoped that the cotton crop would make up in part for the effect of the frost on the coffee harvest and the large expenses of the new milling and grinding machinery. Over all its activities the company made a profit, paid its workers regularly, serviced the interest on its debts, and amortized the latter in regular annual installments. Indeed, in 1918 the company began to amortize its debt at an increased rate in order to clear off its burdens before seeking a purchaser for the estate.

17C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1918, p. 19.

18Ibid., pp. 20-21.










In fact ?agalh~es by the end of the war had turned his mind to the possible sale of the property. No one was more conscious than he that without sufficient capital his great dreams for industrial development could not take place. His administration of Cambuhy in the years 1919 to 1924 was as astute as ever. Cambuhy was valorized for sale in much the same way as fine cattle on its pastures were fattened for the market.19

This task was not an easy one. In the first year after the Great War, Cambuhy's coffee trees still showed the effects of the previous year's frost. No less than five times dead wood had to be broken off the trees. An epidemic of 'flu debilitated the Eazenda's labor force at a time when it

was most needed. Thirdly, great clouds of locusts descended on the estate and did considerable damage, while coruquert

(boll weevil) attacked the cotton crop. Insecticides to combat the latter quickly went off the market, and the administrators at Cambuhy had to watch helplessly as their cotton was destroyed.20

From this low point Cambuhy was not only to recover but go on to new heights. One year after the frost, the administration was in a position to assess frost damage to the trees and consequently some 46,033 trees had to be abandoned, largely in old plantations at Niagara and Leopoldina.
19Ibd., p. 32.


20C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1919, p. 4.










Replanting was done when seedlings were available and in 1919 55 alqueires of forest were felled for a new plantation of 105,000 trees named California near the Slo Jo~o stream.21

With great dedication it was sought to restore the coffee lands, hoeing and fertilizing, cleaning out weeds, and replanting gaps. It was hoped that this work and time would bring the trees back to their former flourishing state. Moreover, a plan was devised to increase the number of trees to a limit of 3,000,000. Thus, 14,176 trees were planted at Agua Sumida in 1920 and a new fazenda called Virginia was opened alongside TamanduA, while no less than 100,226 replants were put out amid the frosted coffee trees. All this work was contracted at comparatively little cost to the company.22

By 1921 the coffee trees of Cambuhy had recovered from the frost and presented a fine physical appearance. By the next year in the company's possession were some 1,485,187 trees, while on the estate existed a further 775,360 due to come into the company's hands from the contractors within the next six years. A transformation was wrought in many areas. Old plantations were extended and several new ones created such as Arizona in 1921 with 105,000 trees and Cdrrego Fundo in the following years with 163,000. By the time when Cambuhy was sold in 1924, Magalhles had 1,640,637

21Ibd., p. 5.

22C.I.A.., Relat6rio da Pirectorir 1920, p. 4.










trees yielding crops and 1,148,537 being formed by contractors.23

Conservative expansion was also the keynote in cattle breeding on Cambuhy in these final years. More and more scrub land and forest were cleared and felled to form pastures and the breeding herd was gradually increased. When trees were felled and the land burned over to clean it as well as possible, it was then usually sown with gordura roxa or jaraqu grass seed. Each year pastures were cleaned, new fences raised, and old ones repaired. In 1919 some 304 alSueires of forest became pasture and a further 744 algueires already formed were cleaned, and in 1922 the comparative figures were 911 algueires felled and 1,615 cleaned.24

These facilities brought with them greater care and

attention than had been the case with cattle on Cambuhy before, when in a semi-wild state the animals roamed unchecked over the ranges and often disappeared into the forest. Magalh~es in addition to improving pastures with better and more nutritive grasses, had sheds and stables built with running water, cattle baths, and fenced fields for the cultivation of winter forage crops.25

23C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1921, p. 51 and Relat6rio da Directoria, 1922, p. 4.
24C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1919, p. 8; and Relat6rio da Directoria, 1922, p. 5.
25Ibid., p. 4.










Nhonh8 believed it was better to breed good stock rather than the creole stocks common on the estate in earlier times. He found that crossbreeds proved hardier than either creole or purebred stock. In 1919 the 'flu epidemic affected the railroads, and 160 Hereford bulls were kept on a train en route from Uruguay for close to two months and over half were lost. This was one of many instances from the primitive lack of organization current in the interior of Sgo Paulo in Magalh~es' time. Undaunted, Carlos Leoncio sent for more Herefords.26

As a result of this activity, by 1921 the breeding herd on Cambuhy had risen to 8,689 head of cattle and 264 bulls of which over 95 per cent were purebred zebd, caracd, Limosin, or Hereford. The last breed was gradually replacing the others. Pigs, sheep, and goats were all kept on a minor

scale. Like a gentleman farmer Magalhles had purebred English horses, Duroc-Jersey pigs, and Nubian goats, refinements which typically put him ahead of his time. As many as 15,000 head of cattle were held on Cambuhy at one time, a

remarkable achievement considering the time and the circumstances.27

Carlos Leoncio Magalh~es never abandoned his idea of developing the sugar plantations at Niagara by building a

2_bid., p. 4.

27C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1921, p. 6; Companhia Agrfcola Fazendas Paulistas, Quarterly Report, No. 100, p. 2.










new mill. This was not done and the basic reason was that coffee had driven sugar out of its path and it did so much else in these boom years in the Araraquarense zone. A company with limited capital naturally used it for the crop which gave the greatest return. So a few Japanese families continued to put their labor into the old plantations and mill. Cambuhy, on the border of the old and the new geographically and economically, still had room for both.28

Cambuhy had a number of very valuable minor activities in these years. Equipped with a modern sawmill a great deal of profit was made from the estate's forest resources. Firewood, logs, and the bark of the barbatimlo tree were readily sold. Sawn timber was mostly needed for fazenda construction work. Nhonh8 was a shrewd businessman, and no local business deal (neg6cio) was ignored. Meat and hides were sold and small pastures were rented. Arable lands were rented and cotton was sharecropped, the company getting forty per cent of the yield.29

With a view to greater development of the timber extraction industry, Magalh~es signed a five-year contract on September 30, 1920, with the S~o Paulo firm of Mello, Mattos and Maciel. By this contract the company was to construct a branch line from Toriba Station to a certain stream and got the right to extract the forest resources on a belt six

28C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1920, pp. 5-6.

29Ibid., p. 6.




Full Text

PAGE 1

FAZENDA CAMBUHY A CASE HISTORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERIOR OF SAO PAULO, BRAZIL By GEORGE F. G. LITTLE A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA August, I960

PAGE 2

Copyright by George P. G. Little 1960

PAGE 3

PREFACE l The dominant field of production in Brazil is agriculture, whether judged by the number of people employed in it or by the export value of farm products. Agriculture may count for only a fraction of Brazilian Gross National Product, but there are also vast non-monetized components in agriculture which rule the economy of the country and social life of the majority of the people. i VA' t Y**.'*• IV • Vi ; . Brazilian agriculture on the whole is characterized by primitive farm practices and bad transportation systems. SSo Paulo is the only state to have a relatively adequate railroad system and a good highway network. In that state large-scale coffee, sugar, and cotton production is more progressive and modern than elsewhere. Large fazendas are usually managed by men with technical experience who reach out for new information and new methods. Farmers in other regions of the country will some day follow the paullstas on the road to greater prosperity and will profit from their experience and mistakes. The prosperity of S3o Paulo has grown up on the foundation of coffee, which has been the economic backbone of all Brazil since the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Coffee helped Brazil win the Paraguayan War and has been a major factor in her foreign and monetary policies ever since. ii

PAGE 4

Brazil's coffee revolution in the late nineteenth century, when coffee cultivation greatly increased, meant a definite move towards the west. It created a middle class of merchants, bankers, and small traders. Coffee, an adopted birthright of Brazil, was linked to the development of transportation, industry, finance, and commerce. It has had intimate connections with the fostering of other crops, currency exchange rates, taxes, defense, and Brazilian civilization as a whole. Coffee has, for example, accounted for more than half of Brazil's foreign earnings in the last thir. vi ty years and created in Brazil a national economic consciousness. In S3o Paulo coffee wrought a socio-economic revolution, one of the consequences of which is today's industrialization. Coffee valorized the paulista soil economically and agriculturally. Allied to the ambition of the planters, coffee drove all before it. Sugar, cereals, and forest made way for what has been termed "the green wave, " unchecked by frost, governmental ineptitude, export duties, or prohibitions of planting. This present study is a case history of the above socioeconomic revolution in miniature, a history not of sudden and dramatic change as is seen from a general view of coffee in Brazil but of gradual development on one great coffee estate, Fazendas do Cambuhy. Fazendas do Cambuhy was outstanding in two ways. In its prime it was the largest unitary coffee fazenda in the world, boasting of close to six iii

PAGE 5

million coffee trees. Secondly, there was kept on the estate a uniquely detailed record of its daily economic life from the days of its great period in the early years of this century until its subdivision in 1956. An estate as large in area and as wide in interest as Cambuhy could not avoid touching the coffee business of S3o Paulo at many points, mirroring the general developments of coffee in the state. Every plant cultivated by man on a scale such as that of coffee in S3o Paulo in the last hundred years engenders a complex of social, agricultural, and economic techniques peculiarly its own. Coffee imposed a regime on the paulista terrain and a way of agricultural life with its particular human relationships. Cambuhy' s archive in this respect offers much information to the sociologist, the cultural anthropologist, and the geographer, while for the social historian it holds a detailed chronicle of change and development brought about by the advance of coffee. Cambuhy' s position in time and mode of coffee cultivation lies in between the older, traditionalistic coffee fa ze ndas of the Parafba Valley and the Mogiana region and the small pioneer properties which have characterized coffee in the western regions of the state. Cambuhy 's origins were in the best colonial traditions, but when the time came for development the spirit of the era was that of the pioneer western expansion. It might be objected that such a large property in the west of S3o Paulo is atypical. In the present day this is iv

PAGE 6

so, but the small property which characterizes paulista agriculture today is of comparatively recent origin. Previously the large property held sway. Cambuhy's origin, like many another latifundia, was in one of the large ses marlas given by the Portuguese throne in the capitanias of S3o Vicente and Santo Amaro. Yet in the nineteenth century era of great coffee estates worked by servile labor, Cambuhy lay dormant and undeveloped. Its great period of expansion came with the boom period of its zone when great advances even in the west were made by great faz e ndj^ros , not by the small proprietor. That Cambuhy did not disappear with many other large estates during the Depression and consequent troubled times was due to its particularly careful and efficient administration. Cambuhy, then, survived well into the era of minifundia in S3o Paulo. Coffee, which is the State of Rio de Janeiro rose and fell with remarkable speed, has proved particularly unstable in the comparatively recently populated western plateau of S3o Paulo, where races, techniques, and mentalities constantly mix and react. Moreover, a fazenda is a particularly unstable form of agricultural organization with a short life cycle. Extensive and exhaustive use of the soil, together with plagues and economic crises, has caused many a fazenda to be broken into lots or to lie abandoned with a small farm or sitio here and there upon it. While Cambuhy's future still lies in the balance, its existence as an institution is over. Its history then can be taken as a chapter in the v

PAGE 7

story of coffee, but a chapter that has unfolded and v/ill unfold itself in many another place and time in the economic and social history of coffee in Brazil. I vi

PAGE 8

acknowledgements At this time I would like to thank the many people who gave their interest, advice, and encouragement during the writing of this dissertation. Professor D. E. Worcester, as chairman of my supervisory committee, has been a constant source of wise counsel, while the other members of the committee have given freely of their time, namely Dr. R. W. Bradbury, Dr. L. N. McAlister, Dr. A. M. Sievers, and Dr. 0. Svarlien. In particular, Professor McAlister, as I-Iead of the Department of History, was helpful in making my research in Brazil possible. The Director of the School of Inter-American Studies, Dr. A. C. Wilgus, inspired the idea of studying a Brazilian plantation. Lastly, Dr. W. A. Payne has continued as an interested mentor over my studies in the United States. On Cambuhy, my thanks go chiefly to Mr. A. H. Grossman, who during my stay there was not only a patient source of information on all things great and small, but a steady font of encouragement. Many other people granted me interviews on the estate, Mr. C. C. Landers, Mr. B. R. Pheysey, Mr. J. C. Scott, and Mr. E. J . Seddon. One local fazendeiro , Sr. A. Benassi proved very helpful. vii

PAGE 9

In Sao Paulo, Sr. Jose Carlos r£is de Magalhffes not only gave me access to his father's voluminous papers but also personally supplied much information. His brother, Sr. Carlos Reis de MagalhSes, granted an interview, as did Dr. Carlos Gavxao Monteiro, grandson of Bernardo Avelino GaviSo Peixoto. Professors Alice Fiffer Canabrava and Sergio Buarque de Holanda of the University of SSo Paulo gave useful bibliographical information. The staffs of the Municipal Library of SSo Paulo, the Municipal Library of Araraquara, and the State Archives were very kind and helpful. In Santos, Mr. R. E. Barham provided much information about the coffee industry. Lastly, I wish to thank Sr. Agenor Camargo and the staff of the Companhia Santo Anselmo for such services as they rendered. Many members of the staff of the IBEC Research Institute showed a kindly interest, while the Institute provided vital transportation. To my typists, in Brazil, Sr. Ernesto Rozario and, in Florida, Mrs. Shirley Simpson, I owe my thanks. My greatest debt of gratitude is to His Excellency, Walther Moreira Salles, who not only suggested the project in particular, but made the whole thing possible. viii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii LIST OF TABLES x Chapter I. THE SESMARIA OF CAMBUHY 1 II. THE PERIOD OF BERNARDO AVELIMO GAVIAO PEIXOTO 18 III. THE TRANSFORMAT ION 47 IV. IN PURSUIT OF FORTUNE 74 V. THE PIONEERS 102 VI. A STRONGER FOUNDATION 129 VII. THE DEPRESSION 158 VIII. THE GREEN YEARS 183 IX. THE POSTWAR ERA 220 X. THE FINAL YEARS 258 XI. A NEW ERA IN PAULISTA SOCIETY 299 CONCLUSION APPENDIX I APPENDIX II APPENDIX III BIBLIOGRAPHY 364 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 372 ix

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LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Coffee Statistics, 1911-1924 358 2. Coffee Statistics, 1924-1956 359 3. Population Statistics, 1914-1924 360 4. Population Statistics, 1940-1955 361 5. The Co-relation of Coffee Crops and Rainfall . . 362 6. Cost of Living Index, 1939-1954 363 x

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CHAPTER I THE SESMARIA OF CAMBUHY The Geographical and Historical Background A traveler crossing the western plateau of the State of SSo Paulo for the first time finds it dull. No outstanding relief features break it into compartments. The great westward rivers all seem to run similar courses. Vegetation, at first sight seems to differ almost only with altitude, and the same type of people live in similar circumstances all over the plateau. The paulista plateau covers some 470, 000 square kilometers of land sloping gently from a line of cuestas overlooking the peripheral depression down to the Paran£ River. It may be considered physiographies lly as a great transition area between Central Brazil on the one side and Atlantic and Southern Brazil on the other. Climatic conditions, although predominantly tropical, are generally moderate, with lower temperatures in summer and a more even rainfall throughout the year than in the heart of the tropics. During the generally warm and dry winters frost occurs frequently at constantly changing locations, depending on altitude, the 1

PAGE 13

2 closeness to water, and deforestation. The international classification of the region (KOppen) is Cwa. 1 Geologically the occidental plateau is constituted of alternate sandstone layers called botucatti and basic eruptives (basalts and diabases) with a sandstone cap of the baurti and caiu£ series. In the north region of the plateau around the city of RibeirSo Preto lies the largest area of terra roxa , a product of decomposed basaltic rock of volcanic origin, suitable in the extreme for coffee production. To the west and southwest of Ribeir3o Preto the occidental plateau exhibits fragmental extensions of an identical eruptive matter to this famed red earth due to erosion along the i i ' » \ . i; edges of the rivers. These extensions are usually mixed with elements from the sandstone formations to form a terra roxa misturada , which supports coffee plantations of high yield. By far the largest area of the plateau, however, consists in sandy soils originating from the baurfl sandstone series. These are more fertile than the caiu£ series and by lucky incidence are found in high lands suited for coffee culture. 2 The paulista plateau is in a privileged position as regards soil and subsoil, geographical situation, and topography. ^ry Fran£a, The Coffee Trail and Pioneer Fringe, trans. David M. Lewis and Renata Howard (Rio de Janeiro: International Geographical Union, Brazilian National Committee, 1956) , p. 34. For all Portuguese terms and words, please see Appendix No. II. 2 Ibid ., pp. 128-135.

PAGE 14

3 The area provided the perfect ecological background for coffee production, and it was there that coffee found its proper Brazilian habitat as to area cultivated, number of producers, and results. The western region of SSo Paulo is young country where traditions are weak, competition can be keen, and transformations can take place in a few years. Lands are abandoned after a few decades, and townships thriving in 1900 may be flourishing cities or close to ghost towns in 1960. Areas left to decay in the wake of the coffee boom stand out in contrast to the frontier areas in Northern Parana with their Wild West atmosphere. Pierre Monbeig has noted how cities less than a hundred years old are considered ancient, while the phrase "the old times" may refer to 1920. The divisions of the state are still in their infancy, and for lack of any better nomenclature the areas served by the various railroad companies are used, although these do not always refer to natural regions. Perhaps this is a tacit recognition that man rather than nature has differentiated the regions. The population of the plateau is not composed of men of the soil but rather seems to be constantly on the move. The names given to soils, massapl , salmourSo , and tabatinga , are old c ab^clo names. Massap€ , for example, is distinguished by the way it sticks to one's feet rather than by its 3 Pierre Monbeig, Pionniers et planteurs de S3o Paulo (Paris: Ltbrarie Armand Colin, 1952), p. 16.

PAGE 15

4 agricultural properties. The history of most regions is one of instability, with cattle, sugar, cotton, or coffee cycles rising and falling while the only constant is the gradual westward movement of the state's population center of gravity. 4 The constant movement of pioneers has invigorated Paul is ta life. In colonial times the lands of the area that is now SSo Paulo had little value, and so bandeirantes did not find it hard to move into the interior. Explorer, miner, cattleman, and farmer moved out onto the plateau in that order. Fazendeiro and colono alike felt the call to the frontier and went out to fell virgin forest, burn off the timber, and plant the land only so long as it produced bumper crops. Then they allowed the soil to leach and be impoverished by erosion while they moved to pastures new. Today many areas of the plateau are growing more like the desolated coffee areas in the State of Rio de Janeiro. They are lands of pasture, thin coffee plantations, and fields of cotton, in all of which the gashes of erosion are \ . i... all too visible. The paulista farmer is often accused of being on the lookout for quick riches. Yet the state could not have been so quickly settled but for those venturesome spirits who went into the frontier regions. At the present time the frontier is in the State of Parang, and although it 4 Pierre Deffontaines, "RegiSes e paisagens do Estado de SSo Paulo," Boletfm Geocrr^fico (Rio), Ano II, No. 24 (March, 1945), 1838.

PAGE 16

5 has gone from the paulista soil it still exercises its influence there. 5 It is difficult to imagine how different the western plateau of sSo Paulo was in the last days of colonial Brazil some fifty years before it was to be opened by the advent of coffee. The virgin soils were everywhere covered by forests which had large trees rearing high above deeply decomposed loamy soils while small trees grew among dense vegetation in the very sandy soils. Most of the plateau was unknown to the dwellers in the towns along the coast and even to the small populations of the vilas of Jundiai and Itu. Such was the physical background of the birth of Cambuhy. On May 20, 1811, in the name of His Most Faithful Majesty the Prince Regent, a sesmaria was conceded to Colonel Joaquim Josd Pinto de Moraes Leme by the Marquis of Monte Alegre, Governor and Captain-General of the Captaincy of SSo Paulo. The grant was three square leagues of land in a district of the newly created Comarca of ltd. They were to be situated in the forests astride the banks of the stream called Taquird (today, Itaquer§), out on the Plains (Campos ) of Araraquara between the Rivers Mogi and Tiet§. 6 ^Benjamin H. Hunnicutt, Brazil. World Frontier (New York: Van Norstrand Company, Inc., 1949), p. 15. 6 Repert
PAGE 17

I 6 In the following year another sesmaria adjoining the one above was granted by the same noble lord to a Captain Jos i da Cunha Abreu on July 1, 1812. 7 The latter gentleman with his wife, Dona Rosa Eufrosina Mendes e Moraes, transferred this section’s great parcel of land to the same Brigadier Joaquim Jos4 Pinto de Moraes Leme in Juquery on April 20, 1815. 8 At a time when paulista forces were fighting in the Banda Oriental and Brazil was preoccupied with the glory of the court in Rio de Janeiro, grants of such large pieces of land passed by unnoticed. Yet the granting of cartas de sesmaria had long been a vital form of colonization in Brazil. The sesmeiro was supposed to create roads and bridges while fostering the growth of towns on his land. The crown reserved for itself rights of jurisdiction and over mines and discoveries of metal. Most cartas de sesmaria followed some wordy formula proclaiming the reasons for the grant. While that of the Brigadier Joaquim Jos£ contained no such statement, the car ta de sesmaria of the Captain Jos£ Cunha Abreu claimed to be 7 Ibid ., p. 288. 8 Cambuhy Papers , Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 1, Carta de Senbanya extrahida dos autos de demarcatgSo da Ses maria do Cambuhy e passado a favor de Desembarqador Bernardo Avelino GaviSo Peixoto , September 17, 1894, p. 34. This document of 436 pages of longhand is the basic title deed of the property. It is in itself a work of history, legally stating all the previous legal activities of the property. It will hereafter be referred to as Carta de sonhenya, 1894 .

PAGE 18

7 given in order that he might increase his herds of horses. Considering the nature of the terrain at the time, this must have been a platitude. Altogether the grants were very vague and the cartas provided that when the lands were taken, the recipient was required to register the demarcation with the Juiz das MedigSes of the then Vila of Itu, part of whose jurisdiction was the Araraquara zone. This was actually done; and the final carta de senten^a was issued on July 19, 1820, by the proper judge, Pedro Alexandrino Rangel. 9 In actual fact the surveyor who measured the estate contented himself with a lesser quantity of land than he was empowered to stake out by the two cartas . Instead of a total area of eighteen square leagues, the estate measured only some sixteen square leagues. The Jacare-Guassu River was taken as the natural southern limit, with the sesmaria stretching away to the north in the form of a great rectangle, the river being the only uneven side. 10 There is considerable local controversy as to who first explored the forests of the Plains of Araraquara, which stretched eighty leagues along the right bank of the Tiet§ until it joined the Parang. Various theories are held as to — . 9 Ibid ., p. 72. 1 0 Relat6rio da Directoria da Companhia Industrial Agri cola e Pastor il d'Oeste de S5o Paulo (S3o Paulo: Escloas Profissionaes Salesianas, 1913), p. 4. A league equaled 6,600 linear meters. For all Brazilian measures and terms, please consult Appendix I.

PAGE 19

8 early explorers at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Some would have a certain Francisco Pedroso de Almeida breeding animals and raising crops as early as that time. 11 Others claim that bandeir antes passed through the present site of the city of Araraquara as early as 1723, crediting one Father Frutuoso da Concei
PAGE 20

9 others have even more exotic explanations based on interpretations of Indian languages. John Luccock writing in 1820 gave its meaning as morada de dia or the dwelling place of the sun. 14 The plains of Araraquara in the eighteenth century were in essence an unknown sertSo, visible from the rapids of BanharSo on the Tiet£ to bandeir antes on their way to Cuiaba, Mato Grosso. The Portuguese astronomer, Francisco Josd de Lacerda e Almeida, sailing on the Tiet£, saw the hills of Araraquara on December 24, 1788, and spoke of a tradition of there being gold in the hills; but it was inaccessible due to swamps. 1 5 What is certain is that in 1790 one Pedro Josd Netto, fleeing from ltd, crossed River Piracicaba and took to the woods in the region which is today S3o Carlos and made his way through the forest onto the Plains of Araraquara. Netto, who was born in Rio de Janeiro, opened a fazenda in ltd in 1787 and grew discontented with the iron rule of the CapitSoMor of the Vila of ltd. While the powers of capitSes-mores as colonial administrators were restricted in law, in 1 4 Notes on Rio de Janeiro and the Southern Parts of Brazil (London: Samuel Leigh, 182o), p. 630. This view was endorsed by the Emperor Pedro II, and is best defended by Pio Louren
PAGE 21

10 practice they had arbitrary, judicial, administrative, and military powers. 16 Upon insulting an official of the CapitSo-Mor, Netto was exiled to the city of Piracicaba. Perhaps his escape from that city was connived at as, since the time of Pombal, the Capit3o-Mor of Itu had been accustomed to send disaffected people into the sertSo. 17 As a result of the 0rdina
PAGE 22

11 Paulo, Parnahyba, and ltd, rich men of prestige in the Captaincy, followed after him to get concessions of land. When these explorers appeared, Netto divided his dominions with them on condition that they protect him from justice. As part of this act he ceded Cambuhy to Colonel Joaquim Jos£ Pinto de Moraes Leme, later Brigadier and Field Marshal. Netto was later pardoned by the Prince Regent for his valid services in braving the sert3o of Araraquara, and before his accidental death in 1817 he not only received a carta de sesmaria but founded the patrimony around which was to grow the city of Araraquara . ^ The sesmaria of Cambuhy created in 1811 was part of a long heritage of territorial expansion in colonial Brazil, the first sesmaria in ItiS having been given in 1607. Yet Cambuhy did not belong to the past but to the future. The Araraquara region itself formed part of the limiting zone of the concession of sesmarias . 20 Cambuhy was an enormous block of land situated 50° west of Greenwich and between 21° and 22° latitude south at an average altitude of 1,900 feet above sea level. The waters flowing through the property ran into the Jacar^-Guassu and the S3o Louren^o, tributaries of the Rio TietS, and so formed part of the great hydrographic system of the Rio Parang. l^uelson Martins de Almeida (ed.), Album de Araraquara , 1948 (Araraquara, 1948), pp. 22-23. 2 ®JoSo Baptista de Campos Aguirra, "Sesmeiros e posseiros, " Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geographico de ?3o Paulo . XXXIV (1937), 259-261.

PAGE 23

12 The whole Araraquara region enjoyed the typical climate of the plateau with maximum temperature reaching 40° C. in summer and seldom reaching zero in winter. A rainy season from October to March stood out in contrast to dry months of June to September. The most noticeable feature of Cambuhy at its birth was the heavy green mantle of forest which rendered the undulating plateau invisible over most of the s esmaria * s area. The more fertile soils, red and white earths, were covered by this evergreen forest, while the poorer soils in the center of the property possessed a more degraded vegetation represented by various terms including campos cerrados and campos sulas . Along the southern boundary of the enormous estate where the Jacar^-Guassu River had eroded away the sandstone cap were rich terra roxa soils bearing lush evergreen forest, dominated high off the ground by the fiqueira branca and the pau d'6leo , while lower down flourished the palmito . The whole forest carried exotic parasitic plants and housed tribes of monkeys, wildcats, and various tropical birds. Further away from the river the terra roxa was mixed with botucatti sandstone; and as the latter grew more predominant the vegetal cover grew thinner, until the countryside presented a savannah aspect with only lesser trees and 21 Julian Morel, Sesmaria de Cambuhy (SSo Paulo: by the author, 1914), pp. 50, 128.

PAGE 24

13 bushes, such as barbatimSo . This bleaker area would soon appear even less attractive as cattlemen burned it to use the land for grazing their herds. Further to the north, over about a third of the property, was another forest cover. There the silico-argillaceous soils of the BauriS series appeared white, yellow, and red; and on these thrived peroba trees while closer to the ground grew species of bamboo and coconut trees. This presented to the explorer a richer and lusher floor than the forest on the terra roxa soils. 22 such was the work of nature which was to be transformed by a century and a half of human action. The First Half Century < The province of S3o Paulo in the first years after the gaining of Brazil ' s independence was in a state of decadence and greatly in need of something to give it a new lease on life. Contemporaries noted this and propounded ways and means to bring about the desired development. 23 In parallel fashion it was to be several decades until the first agriculturists would carry out the rude conquest of the virgin forests of Cambuhy and in a tiny part of it grow their rice, beans, and corn beside the areas they had to clear to graze their animals. 2 2 Ibld ., pp. 130-32; Fran
PAGE 25

14 There is no evidence that Colonel Joaquim Jos8 Pinto de Moraes Lerae made use of his great forested holdings. A latifundia had no great social or economic significance on land where everything existed in abundance except men. In actual fact the colonel had little time to do anything with his property. The judicial establishment of Cambuhy was completed only on July 9, 1820; and by November 6, 1823, the colonel ' s daughter, Dona Brites Maria Pinto GaviSo, was • ' <» 1 ~ ^ v.‘,i .'m < . «« »x / i deemed the legitimate owner of Cambuhy by the Julzo Geral de F8r
PAGE 26

15 July 10, 1832, the freguesla was elevated to a Vila by a decree of the Regency and finally made a city (cidade ) by a Provincial Decree on February 6, 1889. 2 ^ Early in the nineteenth century the first cattle and horses were brought into the area. In 1837, according to statistics sent to the governor of the province, there were 2, 764 inhabitants and the value of their produce in the year came to Rs. 91:882$000. Sugar, plnqa , rice, beans, corn, tobacco, and cotton were the main products of the population, which was served by several carpenters, smiths, and brickmakers. 27 This slow development of the area is said to be due to the division of the land into vast sesmarias . A simple colonizer reaching the deserted forest saw no one and in many cases could find no one from whom to rent land or with whom to sign a contract. Many resorted to squatting on land and opening up in the forest "g rilos , " that is, properties legalized by false titles. As soon as a lawyer or surveyor appeared, their time was over. 23 26 Martins de Almeida, op. cit .. p. 17. 27 Bento A. Sampaio Vidal, Araraquara (S3o Paulo: Revista dos Tribunaes, 1936), pp. 29-31, 37-8. This sum equaled over U.S. $54,600 of the time. See Julian S. Duncan, Public and Private Operation of Railways in Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 183. 23 J. B. Monteiro Lobato, A onda verde (S3o Paulo: Monteiro Lobato e Cia., 1920), p. 78

PAGE 27

16 The records of the Vila of Araraquara reveal little about Cambuhy in these early years. Dona Brites' name merely occurs amid lists of se smaria proprietors who did not live in the vila. 2 ^ She had a person, more an agent than an administrator, who looked after any local business necessary. He made contracts with qrilelros . the value of which must have been more for legal completeness than any great profit. Thus, in 1827, one Jose AntSnio dos Santos was given a place to live and the right to plant crops close to the Jacar£ River for an annual rent of four chickens. Several people received usufruct of pockets of land on the enormous estate, and more were prosecuted successfully for trespassing. Cambuhy in the various legal documents was referred to as having some small plots under cultivation and various areas where cows and horses grazed. 3 ^ On March 23, 1876, Dona Brites, while seriously ill but still lucid, dictated her last will and testament, a florid and pious document, in which she made generous gifts to her sister and to the Church and nominated her nephew as heir and executor. 31 On her death less than a month later, this nephew, the Desembargador Bernardo Avelino GaviSo Peixoto, was confirmed as her heir; and an inventory was begun by the Juiz da Provedoria de S3o Paulo. The goods of Dona Brites were valued at Rs. 5:942$000, but the valuators had difficulty in agreeing on 29 Estado de S2o Paulo, Officios Diver sos de Araraquara , 1836. 3 Q Carta de Sentenya , 1894, pp. 167, 170-75. 31 Ibid ., pp. 10-12

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17 the true value of Cambuhy. In their relat6rio are mentioned 110 cows, some 28 steers, and several bulls, plus a few other animals and pastures. It is not stated exactly how the three worthy valuators made their decision; and considering the wild nature of the terrain and the difficulty of travel in the forests and camp lands, their conclusions must have been mere estimates. Desembargador GaviSo Peixoto, having verified that the goods of his aunt would not cover her legacies or pay her debts, then sought the juiz do inventario in Araraquara to auction the property for the figure finally agreed upon by the valuators, some Ps. 140:000$000. Thrice the property was put up for auction, each time at a reduced price; but on no occasion was there a bidder. On December 1, 1876, after the third failure to sell, GaviSo Peixoto sought the juiz do inventario to award the fazenda to him in return for his being responsible for a fifth part of the third and last auction price of Rs. 80:000$000. To this suggestion agreed the legal officials in S3o Paulo and an important creditor of Dona Brites, the BarSo de Tr&s Rios, on December 19, 1876. Finally, on April 21* 1884, the negotiations and legal technicalities were cleared; and Cambuhy passed into the hands of Bernardo Avelino GaviSo Peixoto for a net value of sixteen con to s of r4is . 33 3 ^Ibid ., pp. 7, 20. The amount equaled some U.S. $3,060 of the time. Duncan, loc. cit . 33 Ibid., pp. 24-26. The final value equaled U.S. $6, 720 of the time. Duncan, loc. cit .

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CHAPTER IX THE PERIOD OF BERNARDO AVELINO GAVIAO PEIXOTO The State of SSo Paulo in the nineteenth century was changing. The warrior-like, nomadic spirit which had inspired the bandeirantes to tear themselves away from the sea and enter the unknown forests was dying. Latter-day bandei rantes were not to penetrate the paulista forest by cutting their way through but seeking a different goal were to destroy it.-*The keynote of the century was expansion. SSo Paulo, largely ignored by the pau-brasil , gold, and sugar cycles of colonial days, was to be carried by the advance of coffee to the forefront of the nation. Coffee entered the state via the Valley of the Para£ba, proceeding from the State of Rio de Janeiro approximately in the year 1835 and a little later from Minas Gerais via Atibaia. After halting for a time, remaining in the Para£ba Valley and the littoral of SSo Paulo, the coffee frontier crossed the Serra de Mantiqueira, spreading around the tributaries of the Piracicaba, taking Campinas as the core of its radiating movement. From 1840 onwards out from Campinas, the coffee wave was first to take over the upper reaches of the Peixe, ^J. B. Monteiro Lobato, A onda verde , p. 3. 18

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18a Conchal, and Araras Rivers and thence the areas watered by the tributaries of the Mog£-Guassia, leaving in its wake such cities as Amparc* Mog£-Mirim, Limeira, and Rio Claro. Penetration of the Mogiana region past Casa Branca opened up the terra roxa of the RibeirSo Preto area by 1856Thereafter it was an easy step to the red and white soils of Rio Claro, Araraquara, and RibeirSo Preto. 2 Coffee not only wrought changes in the lands it conquered, replacing the wild lawless forest with the strict rows of coffee trees, but transformed the economy of the province of s3o Paulo. Coffee and the great profits to be made from it provided the economic motivation for improved transportation. Similarly it brought Negroes and slavery to the province in greater force than had previously existed. It also encouraged planters to think of seeking labor from abroad and so started off the great immigration movement, which was to populate the province and lighten its complexion. 3 On the basis of coffee many cities in the interior began to flourish, emulating the great development of the city 2 s4rgio Milliet, 0 roteiro do cafl (S3o Paulo: BIPA Editora, 1946), pp. 23-26, 51-56. 3 Dirceu Lins de Mattos, “Civil izagSo do cafl, " Di^rios Associados, Edi93o especial dedicada ao caf£ (S3o Paulo), July 15, 1954, Caderno 3°, pp. 8-9. This was a special newspaper edition containing an excellent set of articles on coffee. Hereafter it will be referred to as D iarios Asso ciados. ~

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19 of SSo Paulo itself. The coffee grown in the Paralba Valley was tributary to Rio de Janeiro until the coming of the railroads. However, thanks to the latter, coffee out on the broad, gently undulating plains of the province created a wealthy agricultural hinterland for the city of SSo Paulo. 4 Only at mid-century did SSo Paulo begin to respond tentatively to methods and values of a capitalistic progressminded era. The great thing lacking was good transportation. As late as 1860 it was axiomatic that to plant coffee in Rio Claro, about forty leagues from Santos, was absurd. The cost of shipment would have consumed all profit however fine the yield. Moreover, the trip by donkey down the serra to Santos, following old Indian paths, was no way to transport coffee. 5 In fact, communications in the province of SSo Paulo in 1850 did not differ very much from colonial days. There were the old roads to Santos and Rio de Janeiro, a third leading to Goias via Campinas, Mogl-Mirim, Casa Branca, Batata is, and Franca, and a fourth going south to Sorocaba and Itapetininga. The years 1860 to 1880 were to be vital ones in the history of coffee in SSo Paulo. Foreign and national capital were to open up the railroads and there was 4 Morse, op. cit ., pp. 11-12. ^Affonso d'E. Taunay, Pequena histdria do caf£ no Bra sil, 1737-1937 (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Nacional do Cafe, 1945), p. 236.

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20 to be a transformation in social and economic techniques which would make coffee's march to the west possible. After the opening of the near-miraculous Santos to Jundiaf railway in 1867, the iron way began to spread out over the province, reaching Campinas in 1872. Thence railroads spread out to the coffee lands, namely the Ituana and Mogiana, while the Sorocabana sought to serve the cattle industry. The Paul is ta Railroad moved toward Rio Claro in 1876 to serve coffee fazendeiro3 there, who were heavily invested in it. 6 In 1880 two railroad engineers and a capitalist formed the Companhia Rio Claro to take the railroad from there onwards. In 1884 SSo Carlos was reached and after an agreement between the Conde de Pinhal and the fazendeiros of Araraquara, who agreed to take shares to the value of 600 con to s of rj|is, the railway came to Araraquara in 1885 amid music, fireworks and speeches. 7 The climax came in 1886, when the Emperor, Dom Pedro II, visited the city, a sign of "arrival" in the world. 8 6 Monbeig, Pionniers et planteurs , p. 92. Odilon Nogueira de Matos, "O desenvolvimento da r£de ferroviaria e a expansSo da cultura do cafl em SSo Paulo, “ Dlarios Associado3 , Caderno 1 Q , pp. 14-15. 7 Adolpho Augusto Pinto, Kistd>ria da via 9 So piSblica de S3o Paulo (s3o Paulo: Vanorden, 1903), pp. 65-67. This railway company, typically based on foreign and fazendeiro capital, passed into the hands of the Paulista Company in 1892. Q Silveira, Album de Araraquara , p. vii.

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21 The advance of the railroads and the growth of coffee cultivation were also intimately linked with the immigration to and colonization of the interior of SSo Paulo. Yet if population and communications were linked, the latter only rarely preceded the former. The railway companies were never colonization societies but followed close behind the frontier . ® • • .. The railroad terminus for three or four years at a time would be in an important urban center or the boca de sert5o (edge of the backlands) . When a population center further in the interior had enough freight and passenger traffic to merit service, the railroad followed. The reaction of the arrival of the railway was like a whipcrack according to one authority. Lands valorized, commerce developed, and people poured in. The old terminus lost some of its activity; and many a pioneer railhead settled down to being a center of business, commerce, administration, and education. The Plains of Araraquara were opened up to coffee comparatively late, and this made a great difference to social development there. In the year 1859 the principal agricultural activity in the zone was sugar cane production, with twelve mills in action. There were only four coffee Q In this century the Paulista Railroad has bought old fazendas along its route and sold them in lots in order to assure cargos. 0 lOpierre Monbeig, *%es voles de communication dans l'Etat de Saint Paul (Bresil), " Bulletin d* Association de Geoqraphes Franyais , No. 102 (January, 1937), 12-16 .

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22 plantations, and those oould not transport their produce to other areas. Cattle were bred in a primitive fashion, there being a great need for improvement. 11 Twenty years later Araraquara's coffee production, some two million kilos, was worth only a third of its sugar production. 12 Altogether Araraquara in the nineteenth century and a little beyond presented a picture of a typical frontier town. A group of primitive buildings and huts grouped around the Church of SSo Bento were for a long time the "metropolis" of the zone. There the cSmara Municipal met to deliberate and the various legal officers did their business. Their annual reports provide a bare history of Araraquara in imperial times. 13 The functions of local administration in those days were slight. Election results were to be recorded and lists of those with the franchise and the right to be elected were revised from time to time. 14 As early as 1842 there were provisions for primary education, but a report in 1864 to the inspector-general of education in the province revealed only fifty-one male and fourteen female pupils. The township received in 1865 an agent for several families from the ^Affonso d'E. Taunay, Hist
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23 south of the U.S.A. and through him invited thirty families to come there. Another chapter in the lives of the inhabitants was the story of the men they sent to the Seventh Battalion of Volunteers of the Nation to fight in the Paraguayan War. Gradually roads to other cities were planned and prepared, public health measures were taken against smallpox, and a small society developed. The wealthy fazendeiros created the Araraquarense Club in 1881. Yet life remained rugged in these early years. By 1852 eight men had been jailed, three had done hard labor, and two had been hanged. Disease and occasional violence had left over 200 orphans in the public care. Travelers on the rough roads could fear assault and violence as late as 1884, while the frontier community could be shocked in 1897 by a gory lynching of two prisoners in the local jail. 15 .» tv One result of the slow evolution of Araraquara, and the fact that coffee came into the area only in the last days of the Empire, was that slavery was never the dominant institution it was on other older sections of the province of SSo Paulo. Taunay points out that of the coffee-producing areas Araraquara was one of the smallest slave-owning communities. 16 Araraquara had 7,128 inhabitants in 1874, of which 15 A11 information found in the respective annual folders of the Officios Diversos noted above. 16 Taunay, op. cit ., VI, 338.

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24 5,711 were free and only 1,417 were slave. Yet earlier in 1863, on receiving news of plans of a slave revolt in Campinas, the chief of police of Araraquara wrote to the President of the Province stating that his police force would be inadequate should an uprising take place in the municlpio . 1 ? In character the Araraquara area lay somewhere between the old coffee regions of S3o Paulo with their slave economy and the new regions of the twentieth century which were to give rise to the idea that coffee as opposed to sugar was a democratic plant. After 1860 coffee very slowly attracted the capital, land, buildings, and labor which were employed in sugar cane cultivation in the areas of SSo Carlos, Araraquara, and Descalvado. As coffee became consolidated and other forms of agriculture were reduced, the demand for slaves grew. Yet as the slave trade had largely stopped, so slaves from Rio and Bahia on the block at Casa Branca fetched very high prices. 1 ® Certainly slaves worked in the early coffee lands of Araraquara, tending the trees and milling and grading the crop by hand, while the fazendeiros battled with the problems that slavery brought, namely heavy admin is traticfc costs 1 7 Officios Diver sos de Araraquara, 1863-1874 ; EufrSzio de Azevedo Marques, Apontamentos hist6ricos, geograficos , eatatlsticos e noticiosos da Provfncia de S3o Paulo (Rio de Janeiro: Universal de Laemmert, 1879), I, 38. 18 Taunay, Pequena Hist6ria, pp. 238-39.

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25 and intense fiscalization. On the other hand in S3o Paulo as a whole but in the Araraquara zone in particular, slavery must be looked on as a transition stage. The Negro slave may have aided at the birth of coffee production in Araraquara, but it was to be the white immigrant who would help in raising it to maturity. After a century of poverty and underdevelopment S3o Paulo in 1870 could look forward to prosperity. In the interior an enormous growth of the foreign element in the population after 1880 was to make great changes, while the provincial town of Scfo Paulo had its character transformed by an ever-increasing group of middle-class foreigners. Even the traditional fazendeiro ' s outlook had to change and become wider in view of the existence of virgin lands in the west, the expanding coffee market, and the new facilities for farm machinery, marketing, and credit. The railroad network to an extent obviated the planter's need to be selfsufficient. 20 The coffee fazendeiro as the head of a latifundia had to have creative energy and strength to fight nature. Opening a fazenda was a man's job. To fell, dry, and burn the virgin forest needed brute strength and resourcefulness. The picture of the fazendeiro , whip in hand, wearing his 19 Martins de Almeida, &ijaan. de Araraquara, 1948 , pp. 27-28. 20 Morse, op. cit ., pp. 17, 19.

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26 large hat and big boots, busy changing the face of nature, is one of a true pioneer, the antithesis of the custombound nortista sugar baron of colonial days. 21 These coffee fazendeiros proved to be the most significant element in the bourgeoisie of the Empire in Brazil. According to Oliveira Vianna, rural leaders such as these had constituted a rude nobility around which all social classes had revolved since the first settlements on the backlands of S3o Vicente. In the nineteenth century they were regaled with titles of nobility and constituted a rich source of political leaders. 22 At first the planters of the Paratba Valley and the Mogi-Guassu basin, skilled in the complex and costly organization of coffee planting, formed an elite well-equipped with political and administrative talents. However, as the railroads developed and enabled fazendeiros in the west of Scfo Paulo to live in the city and keep in close touch with their estates, so they also became political and social leaders. 22 Bernardo Avelino GaviSo Peixoto, who finally acquired Cambuhy in 1884, was not one of these fazandeiros who 21 A Dacio Aranha de A. Campos, "Tipos de povoamento de S3o Paulo, " Revista do Arcmivo Municipal (S3o Paulo), LIV (February, 1939), 32-33. 22 ^Oliveira Vianna, P opulacSes meridionaes . pp. 40, 118. 22 Pierre Denis, Le Br4sil au XX e si&cle (Paris: Armand Colin, 1909), p. 32.

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27 became an aristocrat or politician but a man of politics and law who became a fazendeiro . This was to be the vital influence in his handling of the estate, his outlook on it, and the results he produced. The name of GaviSo Peixoto was a prominent one in the politics of the second Empire. As an influential leader of the Liberal Party, GaviSo Peixoto displayed talents both in parliament and in administration. From a paulista patrician background, his father having been twice President of the Province, he first came to prominence when, as a juiz de directo in Santos, he sternly suppressed the last efforts of the Negro slave trade on the paulista littoral and as a result became chief of police of Rio Grande do Sul in 1859. 24 Entering the federal Chamber of Deputies in this latter year, GaviSo Peixoto' s career was distinguished by his forensic ability and his long friendship with Josg Bonifacio the Younger. His prominence in Liberal circles brought him many positions, such as President of the Assembly and Chief of Police of S3o Paulo. In 1878 he returned to the Chamber after ten years of the Liberal exile, but in 1881 he was defeated in the first directly elected legislature. However, in the following year he received the difficult commission 24 Luis Gonzaga da Silva Leme, Geneologia Paulistana , IV (S3o Paulo: Duprat e Cia., 1904), 263-64. GaviSo Peixoto was descended from the noble line of Taques Pompeus, a family of Brabant which moved to Brazil via Portugal in the sixteenth century.

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28 of being a Liberal President of the Conservative State of Rio de Janeiro. Bernardo Avelino GaviSo Peixoto was a typical example of a politician in imperial Brazil, an age in civilized countries, when the government of the people was done by the better people for the good of the state. However, Bernardo Avelino' s career did not complete the usual pattern. Having been given a carta de conselho and made an honorary desera bargador , he was expected to go into the Senate, but the downfall of the monarchy cut his political career short. A monarchist, faithful to the past, he gave up politics and put his energy into other fields, looking to his own hitherto neglected business. As a proprietor of latifundias in various parts of SSo Paulo, he had some areas put into cultivation while others were offered to the government to establish nucleos coloniais for European immigrants. Cambuhy was to feel the effects of both these fields of his activity. 25 At the time when GaviSo Peixoto legally acquired Cambuhy in 1884, the feverish spread of coffee out onto the paulista plateau was gathering momentum until it overshadowed all else. Railroads developed to carry the crops to the sea and transport immigrants, the vital source of cheap manpower, to the interior. Immigration under the Republic 25 Necrology of GaviSo Peixoto by Affonso d'E. Taunay, Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geogr^fico de S5o Paulo , XVII (1912), 485-87.

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29 passed to the hands of the various states and in SSo Paulo into the hands of the f azendeiros . 2 ^* Coffee was swiftly becoming the basis of state and national wealth and preoccupied Republic's politics as coffeegrowing states held the reins of federal policy. Credit became widely available. C. V. van Delden La erne, writing in 1885, described how the early coffee planters in SSo Paulo financed their ventures independently using city middlemen as commissioners or selling agents. However, by the time of this latecentury boom in planting, the high incomes from agriculture had induced planters to develop luxurious tastes in homes and pleasures. As a result the fazendeiros became indebted to their agents and the latter emerged as bankers. 27 Another sign of economic sophistication was the commercialization of coffee. Warehousing companies in Santos in the course of their business began to issue store receipts or warrants against the coffee deposited. These warrants were delivered by fazendeiros as security to the banks for accommodation pending the time when they could be exchanged for steamer bills of lading, which in turn could be converted into cash. 2 ^ "^Denis, op. cit ., p. 108; Celso Furtado, FormacSo econ 6mica do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundo da Cultura, 1959), p. 205. 27 C. F. van Delden Laerne, Brazil and Java: Report on Coffee Culture in America. Asia and Africa (London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1885), p. 183. 28 G. C. W. Joel, One Hundred Years of Coffee (London: privately by Edward Johnston and Co., 1942), p. 24.

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30 In comparison with the economic growth which characterized every aspect of the coffee business in SSo Paulo in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Cambuhy's record was a somewhat poor one. Like many a latifundia a very large percentage of its area saw no activity and no development of natural resources. A.... 1 . S&&X*. . :• Bernardo Avelino GaviSo Peixoto brought to Cambuhy the attitudes of a plantation aristocrat rather than those of a rugged pioneer. On the other hand, a politician with no agricultural experience was hardly the man to open up what was for the largest part virgin territory. Armed with a supply of American agricultural magazines and prepared to invest a considerable amount of capital, Bernardo Avelino set out to develop Cambuhy as best he could. 29 With the passing of the years since the first demarcation of the boundaries of the sesmaria , there had arisen some confusion as to the actual limits of the property. As a result, on February 25, 1893, Bernardo Avelino sought to have the property properly surveyed. 30 The vagueness of the original carta de sesmaria of Cambuhy and the primitive methods of the early survey had left many problems which were common to old latifundias in Brazil. SSo Paulo was not free of its Portuguese heritage of medieval 29 Interview with Dr. Carlos GaviSo Monteiro, May 3, 1960. 3 0 Carta de Sentenya , 1894, p. 82.

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31 concern with lands and property involving great difficulty in determining boundaries. In April 1894 the Cambuhy estate was surveyed by a Dr. Ernesto Abbt, starting from an old marking stone on the right bank of the Itaquer£ stream. It is in some ways remarkable how little difference there was between this and the first demarcation. Cambuhy was found to consist of 30, 500 alqueires paulistas of land. The findings were registered by the Juiz de Directo Dr. Adolpho Jtilio da Silva Mello in Araraquara on June 23, 1894, and finally settled in Septenber 17 of that year. 31 Dr. Abbt in his survey estimated that 7,000 alqueires of Cambuhy were in campos cerrados and suitable for cattle raising and 10,000 were good-quality land suited to cultivation of various crops, while the remaining 13, 500 alqueires were suitable for coffee and sugar cane production. However, the difference between these generous estimates and what was to prove practical was great. In fact, the 1894 survey noted in the south of the estate at a place called Niagara a sugar cane fazenda consisting of fields of cane, some dwelling houses, huts for colonists, and a water-driven mill to produce sugar and aguar dente . Some coffee had also been planted there. In the center of the property was the Fazenda de Criar do Cambuhy, the cattle-breeding section with the usual huts grouped 31 Ibid. , p. 216.

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32 around a few fenced and more commonly unfenced pastures on which grazed at the most 2,000 head of cattle. Lastly, in the north of the sesmaria was the small s£tio de cafl called Boa Vista, which had houses for the colonists, some pastures, and some 70,000 coffee trees. 32 The Fazenda Niagara was watered by a stream, the C<5rrego de Agoude da Cachoeira Ronda, which from a naturallyformed dam fell as a waterfall after which the section had been named. Four other streams, tributary to the River Jacar4-Guass\5, watered the southern sections; while a larger one, the River Itaquer§, wended its way, fed by many streams, through the forest in the middle of the sesmaria . In the north of the estate three streams, the Espxrito Santo, Tamandu£, and Cascavel, tributary to the River S3o Lourengo, watered the lands; and in the eastern ax*ea of the property, the river S3o Jo3o did likewise. However, such water resources lay undeveloped under canopies of virgin timber. Early photographs of the estate hardly do justice to the immense forests abounding in madeiras de lei such as cabriuva , cedro , peroba , araubcL jacarandl , and pau d'6lho , all these intertwined by parasitic plants lush in color and variety. 33 Such was the raw material with which GaviSo Peixoto had to work. Considering its wild nature and the circumstances 3 2 Ibid . , pp. 155-56. 33 Ibid.

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33 of the time it is not surprising that the early development of the property was carried out slowly. In the time of GaviSo Peixoto few roads and no railways existed nearer than Araraquara. Thus his headquarters were at Niagara, which was the nearest point to Araraquara. GaviSo Peixoto himself lived in the city of SSo Paulo, visiting Cambuhy only when business demanded. He had administrators at Niagara and Boa Vista to carry out the necessary supervision of labor. However, most development in these years was done by contract. Land was also rented or given free to individuals with the proviso that it be returned within a stipulated number of years in an improved condition. Needless to say such arrangements without close personal supervision were disastrous in their effects on the land. In 1909, for example, GaviSo Peixoto rented two fazendas , Nictheroy and SSo Bernardo, to a certain Feliciano de Salles Cunha for a period of three years. In return for paying an annual rent of Rs. 100$000 (U.S. $31.00) per thousand trees per year, the tenant got the profits from the three coffee harvests, the right to interplant corn and beans in the coffee groves, and the right to all the firewood in the area excepting madeira de lei . 34 • ^MagalhSes Papers , Dossier 32, contract dated October 1, 1912.

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34 In actual fact the coffee on the area rented had been abandoned and the tenant was to restore the trees and fill the gaps, returning to GaviSo Peixoto in 1912 the coffee lands clean and with the agricultural operations of the year completed. Too much trust was placed in the tenant to get good colonists to work in the area and not to destroy forest or exhaust the land with heavy crops of cereals. 35 This agreement was typical of many made by GaviSo Peixoto. Small plantations grew, flourished, and were abandoned here and there over the estate. There was no over-all policy except that of getting profit where possible. On GaviSo PeixotoÂ’ s behalf it may be said that he was by 1894 an old man whose full life had left him many interests other than Cambuhy. Moreover, he appeared to have considerable financial troubles and Cambuhy proved an easy solution to those problems. On March 18, 1903, GaviSo Peixoto was obliged to pledge the expected crop of 3,000 arrobas of coffee from Fazenda Santa Josepha to Francisco Sampaio Moreira Filho e Cia., his agents in S3o Paulo, in payment of a debt. Then again on October 28, 1907, he paid a debt to the Banco do Estado de S3o Paulo by handing over the Fazenda La Plata with some 160 alquelres of land, 28, 000 coffee trees, forests, pastures, and three tileroofed houses for colonists. 35 3 5 Cambuhy Papers . Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 6.

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35 This attitude of GaviSo Peixoto toward the fazenda resulted in much alienation of territory. Of the original area of 30, 500 algueires , much land was sold and donated by the co nselhe iro , particularly in the southwest corner of the property. The largest sale was of some 2,500 algueires of superior-quality land on the Rio Jacarl, which was made to the State of S3o Paulo on November 16, 1906, to form small holdings for European immigrants. The sale was made on very vague terms allowing the State to choose good lands. On December 21 of the same year GaviSo Peixoto gave a similar amount of land to the state alongside the part sold, making a total of 5,000 algueires on which to found their nucleos colonials .3 ' GaviSo Peixoto also sold a number of other properties dotted around the perimeter of the sesmaria . the largest area being near the small town of MatSo, founded in 1892 just to the north of the sesmaria and the Fazenda Santa Candida, on the southern boundary. This was sold in 1894 to Firmiano de Moraes Pinto, an ex-prefeito of SSo Paulo, who was married to a niece of the conselheiro . 38 Indeed, Bernardo Avelino also gave quite a lot of land to his children; in 1897 he gave Fazenda Sap4, some 500 algueires , to pay the debts of Dr. Francisco Alves da Silva 38 Mag alhSes Papers , Dossier 32, Transference document dated September 20, 1894.

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36 Campos and his wife, Dona Maria da Gloria Gavi3o Campos, a daughter of the conselheiro . Lastly, on June 11, 1910, GaviSo Peixoto as an old man gave Fazenda Tamandu£, some 400 algueires bearing 30,000 coffee trees, to his daughter. Dona Josephina GaviSo Monteiro, married to a Dr. Josg Felix Monteiro, resident in SSo Paulo. On October 14 of the same year another daughter received Fazenda Guanabara with 40, 000 coffee trees on 400 algueires and a further 400 algueires of forest on Fazenda Santa Rita. This action was part of an advance distribution of rural properties made by Bernardo Avelino among his daughters a few years before his death. 39 During the period of Bernardo Avelino GaviSo Peixoto, Cambuhy was more affected by outside factors encouraged by the conselheiro than by the actual work done on the estate at his command. Most important of these were the arrival of the railroad and the colonization of the various fazendas of the sesmaria by immigrants. As early as 1873 a railroad had been considered from Rio Claro to Cuiab5, Mato Grosso, via SSo Carlos and Araraquara. Many prominent men in booming Araraquara were interested in such a line. Finally, in 1895 a group of them acquired from the Companhia Paulista the right to construct and develop a line from Araraquara, where the Paulista Railroad Company's lines ended, to the Vila of RibeirSozinho (today Taquar itinga ) . The line had no more pretensions than 39 Ibid.; Cambuhy Papers . Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 10.

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37 to be a small local feeder line to the Paulista, developed in order to provide these planters with quick transportation for their harvests. The iron horse curving its way through many fazendas was to be a substitute for the ox cart. In the following year the Companhia Estrada de Ferro Araraquara was founded and by November 1896 works had begun. The yellow fever epidemic in the Araraquarense zone in the years 1895 to 1897 and the coffee crises of the latter year greatly retarded the young company. Eventually, thanks to a state subvention, the tracks reached their destination of RibeirSozinho in 1906 and six years later got to the important city of SSo Jos§ do Rio Preto. From Cambuhy' s point of view the most important aspect of the Araraquarense Railroad's development was a small branch line, planned in 1908 to run from Sylvania to Tabatinga, passing across the ses maria of Cambuhy thanks to the conselheiro ' s influence as a shareholder. In January 1911 then the sesmaria saw two stations, Toriba and Cambuhy, opened upon its territory. 40 The railroads in the Araraquarense zone were in part exceptions to the rule that the railroads never preceded the immigration wave in S3o Paulo. In going from Araraquara to Rio Preto, the Araraquarense actually was developing the great sertSo , there being very few people out there. It was the railroad which took the many Italian and other European immigrants to populate the semi-abandoned sesmarias on the 40 Martins de Almeida, op. cit ., pp. 114-18.

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38 rolling countryside, amongst which Cambuhy could almost be included. 41 The Araraquarense in these early years was a veiy small railroad, yet in 1900 its five passenger cars and thirty goods wagons carried 36, 711 passengers and 16, 289 tons of merchandise and in the next year a third as much again. 42 The railroad reached Mat3o in 1899 and this affected Cambuhy. The headquarters of the great estate under GaviSo Peixoto had been at Niagara close to the southern boundary where he had his at first water and later steam-driven sugar mill. On the arrival of the railway at MatSo, the headquarters of the estate were moved to Fazenda Santa Josepha (today Coldnia Velha at Boa Vista), the closest point to that city. More important still was the provision of a better outlet for the crops of the coffee sftio of Boa Vista in the north of the estate. Until the coming of the railroad, it had been practical for GaviSo Peixoto to have activity on the Cambuhy estate concentrated on exploiting the terra roxa along the Jacari River with sugar cane. Yet the great difficulties of transporting sugar and alcohol by ox-drawn wagons to Araraquare made the complete development of sugar cultivation impossible. This half-hearted activity and the small-scale cattle breeding and fattening on a mere 1, 200 41 Nogueira de Matos, loc . cit . ; Carlos Pinto Alves, Carlos Baptista de MagalhSes (Araraquara: by the author, 1954), p. 6. 42 Pinto, op. cit .. p. 243.

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39 alqueires characterized Cambuhy until the coming of the railroad.^ 3 In the same year as the railroad reached MatSo there were planted at Las Palmas, a close-by section, some 170, 382 coffee trees. Thereafter, in the first decade of this century more and more coffee groves were opened up, particularly when and where the railroad tracks crossed the Cambuhy estate. The Santa Josepha plantations were extended and new ones opened at Santa Josephina, Guanabara, Tamandu£ , and Mato Grosso, all taking advantage of the new outlet for production. 44 Pierre Denis writing in 1909 could say that coffee culture in the State of S3o Paulo was linked with big properties, which presupposed a labor force, and he noted how odd it was that this labor force was European. 46 Cambuhy in the years of GaviSo Peixoto was an example of the seigniorial advance of coffee along the forested valley of the Tiet£. Inefficient and wasteful, this method was led by administrators of Gavi3o Peixoto, the actual work being done by immigrant labor. 46 43 Morel, op. clt ., pp. 52, 66. 44 Corapanhia Agr£cola Fazendas Paulistas, Quarterly Re port , No. 71, Enclosure No. 4. Hereafter referred to as C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . 45 Denis, op. cit ., p. 108. 46 0liveira Vianna estimates that a million hectares of virgin forest went under axe and fire in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Evolu^o do povo Brasileiro (4th ed.; Rio de Janeiro: Josl Olfmpio, 1956), p. 114.

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40 The first phase of colonization in S3o Paulo was private when fazendeiros after 1850 sought to fill then depleted slave ranks with white free labor, which was often used to tend the coffee while slaves did the other farm tasks. 47 After 1880, however, first under the Empire and later under the Republic, there was considerable official activity in forming centers of population (nticleos coloniais) on which the fazendeiros could draw in the busy times of the agricultural year. While providing lands for immigrants, these centers were created with the interests of labor-hungry coffee planters at heart. This type of official colony in the State of SSo Paulo was most common around Campinas and Mog£Mirim, but three such colonies were founded out on the plateau. All of them were on the sesmaria of Cambuhy, namely GaviSo Peixoto, Nova Paulfcea, and Nova Europa, created by the state government on the lands acquired from the consel heiro . 48 These three townships, founded by Dr. Carlos Botelho, the state governor in the years 1905-1908, were soon linked by the Estrada de Ferro Dourado. As in all official colonies lots were sold on installments to immigrants, in this 47 Denis, op. cit .. pp. 121-25. 4 ®Caio Prado Junior, "Distribuig3o da propriedade fundiaria rural no Estado de SSo Paulo, “ Boletlm Geogr^fico (Rio), Ano III, No. 29 (August, 1945), 696-98.

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41 case mainly Germans, Italians, and Poles. 49 Thanks to the good-quality land the three colonies quickly expanded. Nova Paullcea, for example, by 1915 had a population of 3,500 of which 3,000 were rural. There were 1,300,000 coffee trees in that colony of which a million belonged to people in the nTScleo colonial and the rest to the fazendas Santa Candida and Alabama. 50 Each of the three colonies was a little frontier town with rude, wooden buildings facing on to beaten earth streets. All around them the forest was felled and primitive roads led to the new coffee sftios . In 1915 Nova Europa had 167 lot holders and Nova Paulfcea, 165. They boasted two tiny, mixed schools; and their social life was presided over by a Justice of the Peace, a notary, a physician, and the colony director, while several shops, a few smiths and potters, and a pharmacy catered to their needs. Life was not easy in these primitive towns, yet the immigrants who went out there were hardy and in the first years kept in good health, no deaths being attributed to the fevers which existed in the marshy lands along the river. 5 ^ 4 ^Paul Walle, Au Brlsil: Etat de S3o Paulo (Paris: Orientale et Americaine, 1912), p. 50; Denis, op. cit. . p. 165. 50 Morel, op. cit. , pp. 116-18. 53 Silveira, Album de Araraquara , pp. 145-52; Magalh3es Papers, Dossier 29, Letter from State Director of Lands, Colonization and Immigration dated October 13, 1910.

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42 Another important form of colonization in which GaviSo Peixoto played a part was the sale of small pieces of land of from three to twenty a lqueires , not only for profit but with a view to populating the area. Payment was usually in annual installments, legal transference of the land taking place after the final payment. 52 Some of GaviSo Peixoto* s larger sales led to the establishment of prosperous small fazendas . Fazenda Santa Candida, sold to Dr. Firmiano de Moraes Pinto in 1894, increased by a purchase of a further 200 alqueires in 1910, was by 1915 a thriving concern. It had on 100 alqueires of land 195,000 coffee trees, producing an average 15,000 arrobas of coffee per year. In sight of the great jaboticabeira trees of the forest nestled a typical building to house the coffee mill, a sawmill, and a brickyard. Sixtyfive head of cattle grazed there and 34 working animals gave service. There were a total of 38 families of colonists at work. 53 Cambuhy, which was opened up economically at a time when abolitionism held sway, never presented the stereotyped aspect of the slave plantation. There never was a big house with slave quarters nearby. The first sede at Niagara and 5 3 Cambuhy Papers , Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 6. Exemplars of Contracts were found in MagalhSes Papers . Dossier 32. 53 Magalh3es Papers . Dossier 32; Silveira, op. cit ., p. 260.

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43 the second at Santa Josepha were modest homes for administrators# while the urban limit of its population never encircled these houses but extended to the edge of the coffee proves. Colonists arriving from the crooked villages of Italy must have felt strange in the regular lines of wooden or mud and wattle houses that stood to attention beside the various plantations dotted over the estate. The spirit of Cambuhy in the time of GaviSfo Peixoto looked to the past. While it was a very different type of institution to the typical nortista sugar plantation with its big house and slave pen, yet Cambuhy presented some aspect of a medieval barony. Out on the frontier the sense of community was strong, as the fazenda not only produced sugar and coffee but all things necessary for life. GaviSo Peixoto’s various administrators were the only guarantee of stability and order to many humble colonists. Such a coffee colonist was a paid, free worker with the right to eat when he liked, rest when he wished, and go out at night if he wanted to. Yet with travel conditions as they were and considering the primitive nature of the Cambuhy terrain, the colonist ' s lot must have been very restricted. Fazenda organization and customs were changing in these post-abolition years; but one thing had not changed, 5 4 Magalh3es Papers . Dossier 32, Relat6rio dated June 27, 1911. S^cSndido Moto Filho, "0 poder politico do cafi, " Dictrios Associados . Caderno 2 °, p. 34.

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44 namely the bell, which had been so vigorously maintained in the colonial times and respected until the end of Negro slavery. 56 it still sent strident and resonant orders to distant areas, regulating the lunch and rest of the labor gangs. It was a poignant reminder to many of times gone by and on still nights could inspire fear or start a tale amid a group on a doorstep. Colonists lived in these groups in an atmosphere of frontier neighborliness. When one family killed a pig, the neighboring families also dined upon it. 57 The great problem of a landowner such as the conselheiro was to get good immigrants as colonists. If the old, master-slave relationship had gone from the paulista terrain, yet fazendeiros such as GaviSo Peixoto showed a concern for good relations with their workers. From a purely economic standpoint good working conditions were expected to produce better results from the laborers. Moreover, a large property such as Cambuhy could very easily be robbed as there was little to prevent colonists from stealing coffee and running away. 5® The greatest lack on the Cambuhy estate in the time of GaviSo Peixoto was manpower. A large number of colonists and contractors to plant and handle coffee could not be 5 ®Aranha Campos, op. cit ., p. 34. 57 Interview with Mr. Alberto Benassi, April 29, 1960. 58 Louis Couty, Le Brisil en 1884 (Rio de Janeiro: Faro e Lino, 1884), pp. 162-170.

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45 brought in without constructing houses. Yet by 1911 even the brickyards on Cambuhy no longer functioned, no new construction was carried out, while the fazenda population suffered the rigors of living in mud and wattle buildings. GaviSo Peixoto was obliged to sharecrop his coffee in order to get some return from his land, and by the end of his tenure had abandoned most of the coffee groves in his administrator's care with a view to diminishing expenses. 60 Bernardo Avelino until the end of his life never lost his eagerness to develop Cambuhy. In addition to his encouragement of immigration by land sales, colonists, and contractors' contracts, he gave land to many, many agregados . These men, often Italian immigrants on Cambuhy, got virgin land to clear and plant. After receiving the profits of several years' crops they were to return the land to be used by the fazenda as pasture. These men and also the f azenda administratore were in a position where it was easy to cheat and rob the absentee landowner, and on Cambuhy many profited in this way. Bernardo Avelino never got any great return for the money he put into the estate and in his later years counseled his grandchildren that the best way to become poor was to buy a fazenda and live in the city. 60 59 Morel, op. cit. . pp. 64, 69-70. 60 Interview with Dr. Carlos GaviSo Monteiro, May 3, 1960.

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46 Th e conselheiro was a member of a dying class, the Imperial political aristocracy. The coffee crises of 1893, 1897, and 1906 were changing the nature of the business of coffee production. A fazendeiro in the future had to be more of a shrewd businessman and less of an absentee lati fundista . Natural attrition was reducing the numbers of the men who had been the political and social leaders of the Empire, while economic change left not a few with only the tatters of social prestige. Bernardo Avelino died in 1912 as an octogenarian, but by that time Cambuhy had passed into the hands of a new type of fazendeiro . For the sesmaria of Cambuhy a new and creative age had begun. Born in the last days of colonial Brazil, dormant through most of Imperial Brazil, Cambuhy was to reach maturity in the twentieth century republic.

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CHAPTER III THE TRANSFORMATION Cambuhy in 1911 presented the bleak aspect of an enormous latifundia belonging to an absentee and aged owner who could not for financial reasons take full advantage of the property's possibilities. Such a situation was out of line with the spirit abroad in the Araraquarense zone in the first two decades of this century. A reporter who traveled by train from Araraquara in a westerly direction in 1908 was greatly moved by the sight of the coffee frontier. The hegemony of civilization did not seem too secure in the shade of the virgin forest. Twelve years later the same man was to be dazzled by the radical transformation of the area. By 1921 the journey from Araraquara to S3o Josl do Rio Preto revealed that nothing had resisted the green wave. The tropical aspect of the zone was largely gone. Away to the distant horizon spread the enslaving expanse of coffee groves, cotton fields, and sturdy stands of corn, rice, and sugar cane. Little towns arose full of promise in a land that began to look more European as subdivision of the territory progressed. Here and there breaking this general picture were one or two latifundias resisting the tentative proposals of 47

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48 division. The old seigniorial paulista spirit was resisting the new era with a natural tenacity, denying the viability of coffee culture by the small planter. 1 The abandoned coffee plantations on Cambuhy and the general air of decadence, however, were not to continue. A new owner was to transform the estate, changing a decadent sesroaria into one of the largest and most thriving fazendas in the State of S3o Paulo. In June 1911 a certificate was issued by a registrar in Araraquara listing all the pieces of the sesmaria which had been sold and stating that the property was free of debts and other burdens.^ This being done the Conselheiro Bernardo Avelino Gavi3o Peixoto could proceed to sell Cambuhy on November 25, 1911, to a certain Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes, a resident of Araraquara. Two of the conselheiro ' s daughters. Dona Rita and Dona Josephina, also sold their parts of Cambuhy. As a result, for a total of 1,700 contos of reis MagalhSes acquired some 25,000 alqueires of land in one block, being the major portion of the original sesmaria . Along with the land went some 500,000 coffee trees, the dwelling houses and colonists' shacks, the various benefits 1 Julio de Mesquito Filho, "ImpressSes de um reporter, " O Estado de S5o Paulo . June 1, 1921. 2 Cambuhy Papers . Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 6.

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49 of the estate, movable and immovable, and some 2, 000 head of cattle. ^ Late in December 1911 the octogenarian conselheiro paid his last visit to the estate. His physical resemblance to the Emperor Pedro II made him seem all the more out of place in the new republican era. The latter era was represented by the personality of Carlos Leoncio (or Nhonhd) MagalhSes. If Bernardo Avelino stood for the traditionalism of the imperial aristocracy, NhonhS represented the vitality of the new aristocracy, the coffee barons who built their economic empires in the freedom allowed by the capitalist system. NhonhS's family originated in northern Portugal, and his grandfather had been a successful businessman in Rio de Janeiro. A change of fortune had sent Nhonhfi's father into the interior as a commercial traveler. This gentleman settled in Araraquara in 1874 and by the turn of the century had not only played an important role in the political and social life of the community but had successfully founded a business, a bank, and the Araraquarense railroad. 4 With such an inspiring background it was perhaps surprising that in 1890, at the age of sixteen, Nhonh6 with fifteen contos of r£is should open the Fazenda Santa Ernestina 3 Cambuhy Papers , Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. e. This document reveals that GaviSo Peixoto in all sold or donated some 7, 714 alqueires , but all his donations were not taken up and thus the area passing to MagalhSes was close to 25,000 alqueires . For this he paid the equivalent of U.S. $544,000. Duncan, loc. cit . 4 Pinto Alves, Carlos Baptlsta de MagalhSes , pp. 3-5.

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50 in the area of the later Municfpio of MatSo. While a youth, then, he had opened up the forest and created a fazenda in the backlands, planting some 480,000 coffee trees, building houses and a terreiro . Later the properties of Cucuhy and SSo SebastiSo were added until he was master of 1,300,000 trees on a first-class property. Nhonho sold this comparatively small property in 1911 for 1, 500 con to s , some 200 less than what he was to pay for the enormous estate of Cambuhy . 6 On the edge of the sert3o the demands on a fazendeiro were great, and in relation to his ability so his property valorized. MagalhSes had well developed his powers of administration and his understanding of the economics of frontier agriculture. In addition to this he had already shown the spirit and devotion to an ideal which were to make his influence on Cambuhy so vital. In 1902 NhonhO and his father, Carlos Baptista MagalhSes, led a small abortive movement called the "Revolu
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51 explore the TietS in a northwesterly direction from the mouth of the Jacar4-Guass£, the southern boundary river of Cambuhy, to where the Tiet# joins the Parana. 7 Out there fevers along the TietS and the presence of Indians still provided a picturesque background for the pioneers and railroad engineers roughing it at the end of the line. The city of Araraquara itself followed the general pattern of interior towns. It never had been a coffee or produce market to any extent and by the turn of the century was a center for the distribution in its agricultural hinterland of imported merchandise and the seat of small local banks, which gave credit to the fazendeiros . 8 There was little or no industry apart from a few small workshops, sawmills, corn mills, stills, and the ubiquitous machines to mill coffee and rice. Araraquara was, however, as regards economic and agricultural conditions, one of the most successful cities in the interior. The coffee production of the region in the first decade of this century was sixth in quantity in the state and it gave place only to such renowned districts as RibeirSo Preto, Campinas, and JarS. Coffee was the most important factor in 7 Explorac5o do rio Tietg (s3o Paulo: CommissSo Geogr^fica e GeolSgica do Estado de s3o Paulo, 1905), pp. 1-16. O Denis, op. cit .. pp. 110-11.

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52 Araraquara* s economy with sugar cane and corn in second and third place. 9 In the year 1904-1905 the Municfpio of Araraquara shipped 895/ 000 arrobas of coffee, and MatSo shipped 534, 350 ja rrobas . At that time in Araraquara there were some 452 agricultural properties covering some 62,925.75 algueires . of which 9,825.5 were cultivated. 10 Some 9, 777 people worked on these estates, 7, 918 of them being classed as foreign or immigrant. Araraquara was a boom area; and by the time Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes sold Cambuhy in 1924, the area had been transformed. Gradually the old estates and latifundias were broken up into many small agricultural properties. By 1925 some 519 planters and 1,200 small agricultural properties occupied the area's cultivated land. 11 That Cambuhy did not go the same way was due to the energy and activity of its new owner . After a century of comparative inactivity, under MagalhSes Cambuhy was to enter into its boom period. To appreciate his work and to review Q Julian Morel, Sesmaria de Cambuhv . (SSo Paulo: by the author, 1914), pp. 46-49. This was a relat6rio on the property and the area, prepared by an agricultural engineer of the Banco Frances e Italiano da America do Sul. Printed bv the C.I.A.P. 10 Silveira, Album de Araraquara . 1915, pp. 59-60; A. Lalie ' Le caffe dan l'etat de Saint Paul, Brasil (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1909), p. 304. 11 Silveira, loc. cit.,; Euglnio Egas (ed.), Os Municl l>ips Paulistas , 2 vols. (SSo Paulo: Imprensa Official do Estado, 1925), I, 106.

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53 the total effects of the previous 100 years of private ownership, it is worthwhile making an estimate of Cambuhy in 1911. With 25,000 alqueires it was one of the most extensive properties in the State of SSo Paulo, but it was great in possibilities rather than in achievement. Cambuhy was crossed from northeast to southwest by the River ItaquerS, and the tributaries of this river and those of the Jacar4Guassfi ran through the fazenda fertilizing it and in the south providing waterfalls which could power industries. On the Alabama section there was a waterfall said to be capable of providing 2,000 horsepower, and at Niagara there was a fall of 1,000 horsepower which had powered the original sugar mill of GaviSo Peixoto.^ Moreover, in the last years of the cons el heiro the Empreza For
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54 lands suited fox cattle raising? and in the northern sections there were white, red, and yellow earths of the superior kauju series. These latter were arable, productive, and easily workable. They yielded some 1.2 to 1.5 kilograms of coffee per coffee tree and 45 hectoliters of corn per hectare as compared with the United States average at the time of 24 hectoliters per hectare. 14 It was reckoned that there were on the fazenda 7,000 al.g u ai r es of land suited for coffee culture with a possible total of 14,000,000 trees, mostly in the higher lands between the Itaquer£ and SSo Jo3o rivers and in the north of the estate generally. 16 fifty per cent of the fazenda was still covered by forest in which predominated such trees as peroba , cabriuva , and cedro . There were excellent opportunities for industrializing this raw material into paper, pulp, dyes, railroad sleepers, firewood, and timber for sale. Moreover, whereas when forest had been felled in the time of GaviSo Peixoto, far from anywhere and hence with little commercial value, it had been burned? now Cambuhy timber could be shipped out by the branch line of the Araraquarense in the north or by the Douradense Railroad in the south. 16 1 4 Ibid ., Relat6rio (April 30). 15 Ibid. • L %agalh5es Papers . Dossier 30, Relat
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55 Lastly, in the center of the old sesmaria were the camp lands suited for breeding and fattening cattle with an area of 8,000 alqueires . The pastures were rich and well watered, causing the new owner's mind to range over such ideas as herds of 30,000 head of livestock for meat, leather, milk, and wool production. ^ Such then were the physical resources of Cambuhy. What had been lacking until 1911 was human effort to bring to life and develop these resources. Spread over some seven fazendas there had been planted some 656, 419 coffee trees, an insignificant number for the size of Cambuhy. The produce of these trees was hauled to the Santa Josephs center and there milled. In this area was also the fazenda sawmill. However, both these mills were in a bad state of disrepair. 18 Santa Josephs (later called 3oa Vista) boasted some recently built wooden coffee stores (tulhas ) . On the section were 84, 000 coffee trees, and grouped around the beaten earth drying terrace were houses for a sufficient number of colonists. These houses of a mud and wattle construction were quite dilapidated. A brickyard and kiln, stables for twenty burros, and some fenced pastures were the remainder of the fixtures. All over the estate there was on each section an administrator's house and close by the mud and wattle or wooden huts for the colonists who were needed to work the 1 7 Ibid ., Pelat6rio (April 30) . 1 8 Ibid . , RelattSrio (May 28) .

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56 coffee. The pasture fences were in most cases broken down. Lastly, at Niagara there were semi-abandoned plantations of sugar cane and a mill to produce sugar and alcohol which, like all the assets of the property, was in a bad state. 19 Half of the laborers on Cambuhy had worked on coffee? but because of sharecropping, excessive interplanting due to lack of supervision and general ill organization, the coffee had been ill-treated or abandoned by 1911. Yet the fact that it had resisted such treatment was encouraging, and the coffee promised to be superb in good hands. This resistance of the coffee was also a sign of fertile soils where varied altitudes caused the prospective purchaser of Cambuhy in early 1911 to consider growing tobacco, cotton, alfalfa, rice, corn, beans, and cereals. 20 That which made Cambuhy outstanding over other great blocks of the paulista backlands in 1911, besides its existing cultivation, were two factors of great economic value* facility of transport for its products and proximity to centers of population. The Araraquarense railroad's main line came very close to the fazenda at MatSo in the north, while its branch line to Tabatinga had in 1911 three stations on the property, namely Toriba, Teixeira Leite and Cambuhy. This line passed through virgin forest in the Boa Vista, Santa Leopoldina, 1 9 Ibid . 2 0 MagalhSes Papers . Dossier 30, Relat6rio (June 27) .

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57 Santa Josephina, and Agua Sumida sections, valorizing coffee lands on either side and making possible future development. The extreme west of the property in 1911 was served by the Douradense railroad, while in the south no less than four stations were close to the estate. Conscious of the value of these railroads in an area which had no roads to speak of, the new owner determined to take full advantage of them, linking all the separate fazendas to the railroad by motor roads. 2 1 Close to the property were the cities of Araraquara, MatSo, Boa Esperanga, Ibitinga and It^polis? and within the sesmaria limit were the three government nucleos colonjjais. The development of these townships was a clear indication of the frontier boom in the area. In 1914, after some seven years of existence. Nova Europa was a distrito policial and had some 252 families with a total of 1,920 persons living in the area. All the lots had been sold and some 300,000 coffee trees had been planted, while there were large crops of corn, rice, and beans. Three sawmills dealt with the felled forest, and three stills and a brewery constituted the non-agricultural activity of the community. A public school and a German school, a pharmacy, and several shops served the basic needs of the pioneers. 21 Companliia Industrial Agrfcola e Pastoril d'Oeste de SSo Paulo, Relat6rio da Dlrectoria, 1913 (s3o Paulo: by the company, 1913) , pp. 8-9. Hereafter these annual relatdrios will be designated by the Company's initials C.I.A.P. and the year.

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58 At the same time the colonies of GaviSo Peixoto and Nova Paulicea by 1914 formed a distrlto de paz and had 185 families with 1,300 people living there. Its development was in a similar state to that of the other colony. Seven years for the transformation from virgin forest to frontier town was a very short period of time. Moreover, lands for sale at from 40$000 to 150$000 an algueire in 1914 had risen to 200$000 an algueire by 1924. 22 In addition to these centers there existed along the Jacarl River a considerable area of land still belonging to Cambuhy and alongside the government colonies which could be divided into lots and sold, thus adding to Cambuhy population resources. Cambuhy in 1911 merely awaited the proper treatment. 23 When Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes acquired Cambuhy on November 25, 1911, he had in mind to develop the property and to obtain the capital necessary for this task by founding a limited company. To this end on January 2, 1912, Nhonhd sold to each of six friends or relations ten alqueires of land on the sesmaria at one conto of reis each. 24 These men now co-owners of the property men on January 16, 1912, in S3o Paulo and resolved to constitute the Companhia Industrial, Agrfcola e Pastoril dÂ’Oeste de SSo Paulo 22 Morel, op. clt . , pp. 116-18; Egas, op. clt. . I, 108. 2 3 Magalh3es Papers . Dossier 30, Relat6rio (June 27). 2 4 Maqalh3es Papers . Dossier 33 .

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59 with a capital of 4, 000 c on to s represented by the lands of Cambuhy, its fixtures, goods, and chattels. To fulfill legal requirements three outside valuators studied Cambuhy from January 17 to 21 and confirmed this estimate. Whereupon at a second constitutional meeting on January 23 the condominium was transferred to form a limited company (s ociedade andnima), the vast majority of the shares by right going to Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes himself. 25 It is interesting to review the great rise in the estimated value of the Cambuhy territory as improvements were made upon it and as coffee, railroads, and colonists transformed the swath of virgin land into a booming agricultural area. In 1884 GaviSo Peixoto valued the property at no more than 16 contos , yet in the next two decades he sold small parts of the fazend a for many times that sum and in 1911 could sell the entire property for 1, 700 cantos. Months later the property was valued at 4,000 contos . Taking into account the declining value of the mil-r^is , the advance was still phenomenal. With the labor and foresight of NhonhS MagalhSes behind Cambuhy the property was destined to be one of the most valuable in the state. In view of the enormity of the task prudence counseled the development of the existing sources of production as a quick means to surer profit. The President of the new company 25 Di£rio Official (S3o Paulo), February 27, 1912, pp. 870-74.

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60 was NhonhS's father, Carlos Baptista de MagalhSes? but the initiative and control lay with Nhonhfc himself as gerente . It was determined to improve the coffee lands, many of which lay semiabandoned, and to plant new coffee. Secondly, there had to be rounded up all the cattle wandering all over the estate. These were to be contained by large, barbed wire fences to protect the new coffee plantations from invasion by the cattle. Extensive pastures were to be formed to increase the amount of cattle breeding on Cambuhy. And lastly, a large number of houses would have to be built for the colonists needed to tend to the new coffee. 2 ^ To obtain working capital the company resolved to issue debentures to a value of 2,000 contos . The emission was handled by the Banco Frances e Italiano da America do Sul, and the 20,000 debentures were sold at a 7 per cent discount, paying 8 per cent per year for 30 years. The guarantee of the loan was the property itself, and a scheme of gradual repayment of the debentures over the years was devised. The loan was very quickly covered, and a clear sign of confidence in the company and its offered guarantees was manifested. 27 Armed thus with this small amount of working capital considering the magnitude of Cambuhy, NhonhS MagalhSes began to transform the estate. As has been noted, the new owner 2 ®C.I.A.P., Relat
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61 acquired 656,419 coffee trees with the property but in a very bad state. By August 1913, however, 205,000 trees had been cleaned and handled, 59,788 gaps in the coffee lands (covas) had been replanted, and 407 ant-hills amid the coffee had been destroyed. More important, however, regular hoeings had been done amid the coffee. Despite his expenses in weeding and other costly but very necessary activities, Magalh3es was gracious enough to respect sharecropping contracts made by GaviSo Peixoto; and so in 1912 he allowed 100,000 trees to be harvested by these people. However, the new company was not content to restore old coffee but mindful of economy determined to plant new trees in areas where the small number of existing trees did not justify the presence of an administrator. As a result of this, by August 1913 there were 1,347,007 trees on Cambuhy. The total had been doubled in the first year of activity of the new owners. Indeed, more trees would have been planted as colonists were available, but the limiting factor was lack of skilled workmen to build houses to shelter the large number of people needed to care for the new plantations . 28 It was highly expensive pioneer work which the new company had to undertake in these years, a sort of latterday seigniorial advance against the backlands. A hundred and twenty-three new houses were built and forty-seven old ones 28 C.I.A.P., Relat<5rio da Dlrectoria, 1913 . pp. 11-12.

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62 repaired. Wells were dug and cleaned, and 388 algueires of forest felt the blows of well-paid axes working at speed. Lastly, some 350, 000 trees had to be looked after by the company using day labor for lack of colonists. The directors were well aware of the need to make the sesmaria worthy and able to resist the effects of crisis. Coffee prices in 1913 were low but likely to rise because of two small harvests due to irregular atmospheric conditions. Yet Brazil by the second decade of this century was embroiled in problems of overexpansion of credit and consequent tightening up. Periodical monetary crises and uncertain internal policies made it wise for an enterprise such as Cambuhy to make itself as secure as possible. 29 In 1914 a heavy program of agricultural tasks amid the coffee was carried out and the trees reacted well to this treatment, presenting a fine appearance despite earlier lack of care and even the drought in the 1913-14 slimmer. A new coffee plantation of 115, 506 trees was planted at Nictheroy to be served by the Cambuhy railroad station. All the new coffee was entrusted to contractors, but thereafter the incapable workers were weeded out and the company took over some of the work itself.** 0 NhonhS MagalhSes was a man of considerable ingenuity in getting things done at no cost to the company in these early 2 9 Ibld . , pp. 12-14. 30 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1914 . pp. 4-5.

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63 years. The coffee frontier was characterized by men who would do jobs for a fee or recompense in kind. The Nictheroy coffee plantation was planted on forest which had been felled by a company who were allowed to take the wood they wished from twentyfive algueires of land. In addition to felling, cutting, and burning the forest, the contractors also made the drives between future blocks of coffee, marked out the plantation, opened the holes, and prepared wood as protective covers for the young plants. NhonhS imposed a fine to make sure the work was done in time. 3 1 Plans were also devised whereby the company could have 2,000,000 new coffee trees without cost by contracting for raadores. These people would have to fell forest, house themselves, and do everything necessary to create coffee plantations. In return the contractors retained the harvests from the trees from the third year, when the trees began to yield, to the seventh year, at which time they handed over the trees to the company. Prospectuses were issued and advertisements inserted in newspapers. These latter pointed out the advantages of virgin soil close by centers of population and the excellence of the climate. Many who had money enough or credit to last them until the first crop of cereals came in showed interest. The virgin soils yielded good crops of cereals, which could be planted between the rows of young coffee, and the contractors 3 1 MagalhSes Papers , Dossier 34.

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64 were usually allowed to keep a few cattle. In 1915 some 348 colonists (coffee workers) and contractors visited Cambuhy, and 242 more sent letters of inquiry. 32 As a result of this available labor force, MagalhSes was able to proceed with his program of conservative expansion. By 1915 the number of trees on Cambuhy had risen to 1,476,113, all in a flourishing condition. MagalhSes could also choose good workers and was ruthless in replacing poor ones. Cambuhy' s coffee production was steady, and the administration could merely hope that prices remained firm. 33 The Araraquara zone even in the boom period never was given over entirely to coffee, as much of the land was suited to other uses. MagalhSes in naming his company showed his desire for diversified activity. Indeed, cattle development was expected to become second only to coffee on Cambuhy, as it was firmly believed by NhonhS that European and American demands for meat would be continually directed more and more to South America. Soon after the purchase of Cambuhy a round-up of the cattle wandering over the fazenda was initiated, a total of 1,400 head being found and branded. The era of careless and casual cattle raising on the sesmaria was over. Gradually the ground work was laid for efficient and methodical cattle development. In 1913 there were 1, 134 alqueires of pastures 32 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Dlrectoria , 1915, p. 6. 33 Ibid.. p. 8, 18.

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65 spread over the estate; and it was planned to increase this number to 5,000 alqueires , which would hold some 15,000 head of cattle. Ideas of sheep and swine on a large scale, producing wool and leather, butter and cheese, were also considered. 34 MagalhSes very well appreciated the cattle possibilities of S3o Paulo at the time, particularly as a place to rest and fatten cattle en route to S3o Paulo and exporting > • 'I '' frigorfficos from the interior breeding states of Mato Grosso, Goi^s, and Minas Gerais. While interest was held in the improvement of the race and breeds of cattle on Cambuhy, economy indicated a more advantageous concentration on fattening cattle. Studies on pig breeding at Cambuhy also proved encouraging, and an isolated, well-watered area near the S3o Jo3o River was chosen. Three hundred alqueires of pasture were prepared and plans made to grow corn all around as a prime source of pig food. 35 Before Cambuhy could embark on a program of sending responsible men into the interior as buyers of cattle, a considerable amount of pasture preparation was necessary. This was the main preoccupation of the cattle division in these early years. Cambuhy was not to be a backlands latifundia with cattle in an almost wild state but a plantation 34 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria. 1913 . pp. 14-16. 35 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1914 . pp. 5-8.

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66 with animals fenced and protected from the railroad and hungry neighbors. Early in 1914 a contract was signed with state officials whereby the company was paid for erecting a sturdy barbed wire fence to keep its cattle from wandering to their death in the government colonies. In the first three years of the company 1 s activity, over 100 kilometers of barbed wire fence were raised, more than 17 kilometers of old fences were repaired, and some 5 kilometers of wooden fencing were constructed. Very gradually the old ways were going, and the ranges in the center of the estate saw long, militant lines of posts bearing endless wires stretch across the landscape. 37 Behind these fences there was slowly built up good forage pastures with jaraguc? and catingueira roxa grasses. Forest was felled and cleared, and grass seed sown in the weaker places. By 1915 some 1,800 algueires of well-formed pastures were ready, and great use of natural pastures with minimum improvements necessary was made. So much so that 10,000 head of thin cattle were being fattened there. A movement was also begun to improve the quality of the small herd of breeding cattle on Cambuhy. Two good quality bulls were purchased and all other bulls, to be replaced by native caracvl stock, were castrated. All the weak cows were 36 MagalhSes Papers . Dossier 34. 3 7 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria , 1915, p. 20.

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67 sold at once and the other 400 fattened for sale, to be replaced with hardy native stock. The total breeding herd in 1915 came to 1, 779 head, while a small beginning with pigs and goats was under way. 38 To MagalhSes the sesmaria of Cambuhy was a miniature of the State of SSo Paulo, with lands suited not only to coffee but many other profitable pursuits. Unfortunately his efforts were dogged by lack of capital and the effects of world and national events. At first MagalhSes decided not to restore the sugar plantations at Niagara until new and better machines were installed which would allow the mill to compete with the best in the state. Meanwhile the lands were sharecropped with a few Japanese families while the mill was supervised by a fiscal . Without outlay the company got 40% of the small production. 39 it was also found uneconomic to develop the estate's forest resources in these early years. Sawmills at Boa Vista and Niagara handled the internal needs of the estate. The extraction and exporting of wood were hampered at first by difficulties with transportation even by the railroads crossing the fazenda and in 1914 were rendered inopportune by poor prices on the market in S3o 38 Ibid., pp. 18-22. 3 9 Ibid ., p. 26.

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68 Paulo. It was better to conserve the resources until prices were better. 40 One activity that was not limited in these years was the very necessary one of improving the estate itself. MagalhSes was always conscious of the need for good roads to connect up the various fazendas on the estate and to give access to the railroads. By 1915 the sesmaria had over 81 kilometers of roads suitable for automobiles, 112 kilometers of cart roads, and 60 kilometers of cart tracks through the coffee groves. On such roads depended the valorization of the property. Few other properties were so well served by a network of private roads in conjunction with railroad service. During these years the Araraquarense branch line was extended. Two more stations were created within the fazenda , Uparoba in 1914 and Curupa in 1916, before the line came to an end at Tabatinga in the following year. As a result in 1915 Cambuhy had five stations within its boundaries, three at the government colonies and three more in close-by cities. 41 As finances permitted old, inefficient methods were banished from Cambuhy and rational organization instituted. When MagalhSes took over Cambuhy the coffee mill at Santa Josepha was insufficient even for the small production of the estates. Moreover, with the extensive planting done the 40 c.i.a.p. Relat6rio da Directoria, 1914, p. 9. 41 c.i.a.p., Relat<5rio da Directoria, 1915, p. 31.

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69 the fa zenda production was soon to triple. In 1914 a new milling and grading machine was installed at Santa Josepha with a capacity of 500 arrobas per day, and the drying grounds were improved with water supplies to wash the coffee. 4:2 In 1915 the administration devised a plan to move the sede or control center to a new site called Boa Vista, quite close to the old one. Plans were made to utilize the cheap source of electricity from the Empreza For^a e Luz do JahiS and have an electrically powered coffee mill and sawmill. Another vital part of this drive for efficiency was the preparation of an official count of the coffee trees. These were marked into blocks and numbered. The aim was to have an exact and minute plan of all coffee trees on the fazenda . Activity on Cambuhy in these years was characterized by the making of gates, the building of houses, the reforming of the two sawmills and one corn grinder, and a general renovation of all buildings on the estate. By 1915 much of the house had been put in order. 43 All of this developmental work would have been of little value if there had been a lack of the human element. With such fine lands and good transportation naturally efforts were made to attract colonists. MagalhSes believed less in advertising than in the exemplary success of the first colonists and contractors to come to Cambuhy. 42 C.I.A*P., RelatiSrio da Directoria, 1914 . pp. 9-10. 43 C. I.A.P. , Relat6rio da Directoria, 1915, pp. 27-29.

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70 However, some definite efforts were made in the first years, in 1913 negotiations were carried out with the Companhia Oriental JaponSza for the introduction of 500 families. It was planned to sharecrop or rent land to them for the cultivation of cereals, cotton, and forage crops. As MagalhSes planned a textile mill on Cambuhy one day, he also offered lands without charge to those who would devote themselves exclusively to growing cotton. Furthermore, after the Brazilian government offered to take in exiles from PortugalÂ’s revolution in 1912, Cambuhy ;:*v* followed suit and offered homes for a further 500 families. 44 Results did not match these colonization plans; yet by 1915 on Cambuhy there were 147 families of colonists and 89 sharecropper families. Fifty families worked as day laborers and 40 more had taken advantage of MagalhSes offer and lived rent free on Cambuhy, working for their own profit but forming a vital labor reservoir at harvest time. In the same year these people harvested 22, 880 sacks of corn and 4, 813 sacks of beans while they possessed over 4, 500 pigs and uncounted horses and cows. Their health was good and there were no fevers. 4 ^ By 1915 MagalhSes' s original plan of developing existing resources was well ahead. However, just at the time when a fairly good coffee crop was harvested in 1914 and all was ^C.I.A.P., Relatgrio da Directoria, 1913 . pp. 19-20. 45 C.I.A.P., Belatgrio da Directoria . 1915, pp. 33-34.

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71 ready for expansion, World War I intervened. The economic situation of Brazil became more and more delicate. Cash became scarce and credit froze. Dis-equilibr ium in the public finances was current; and coffee, despite a favorable pro— duct ion situation, failed to get the good prices expected. Furthermore, Italian immigration was stopped and most important European consumer markets closed, while ocean freight and insurance rates vastly increased, hindering the little exportation possible. Prices of imports rocketed. In these circumstances the most important thing that the company did was to keep going in good state, paying its debts and moving ahead where possible. 46 With only a small part of the sesmaria in cultivation and so much to do, it was hard to keep expenses down. Payment for colonists rose as high as Rs. 140$000 per thousand trees in 1913-14, but the company managed to contract people to do this for Rs. 100$000 in the next year. Yet despite such financial difficulties and in face of the paralyzation of national progress, the Companhia Industrial, Agrfcola e Pastor il d'Oeste de S3o Paulo in 1915 was solid and prosperous. Its workers were regularly paid and profits made, although none distributed. Moreover, its assets were valorizing all the time. Visitors to Cambuhy in these years (including the current "king of coffee" Colonel Francisco 4 6 Ibid ., p. 4.

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72 Schmidt) were impressed with the transformation which had been wrought there. 47 It is worthwhile ascertaining just what Magalh3es had made of Carabuhy by the first years of the Great War. Cambuhy in 1915 was the largest agricultural property in size in the cultivated zone of S3o Paulo and was about to be the largest coffee-producing fazenda in the world. From a commercial geographical point of view Cambuhy had transportation facilities equal to the major coffee center of the time, Ribeir3o Preto. Moreover, Cambuhy offered topographical and hydrographical conditions highly favorable to commercial and industrial expansion. 48 Another visitor who had known Cambuhy under Gavi3o Peixoto described Carribuhy as clay which had already been shaped by a deft hand, to become fine procelain when baked. Perhaps this was too high-flown a description of 2,000 al gueires of new pastures, 114 kilometers of automobile roads, new fences, destroyed ant-hills, 1,300,000 new coffee trees, and a nascent cattle industry; yet when one realized that this had been done by one man in so short a time, the author seemed justified with his simile. Amid a frontier situation, which for many was close to beggary and misery, Carlos Leoncio had shown himself a clear-sighted and sensibly oriented 47 C.I.A.P., Relat
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73 businessman. This was an era when rural property was quickly valorising and IlagalhSes had kept Cambuhy at the forefront of the movement .49 In place of a group of tiny cultivated areas, separated in some cases by large expanses of forest and scrub land, which had been Cambuhy before 1911, there now stood an institution whose chief pride was its method and its system. The keynote of the latter was the network of roads linking all the fazendas . A reporter who traveled on these roads in 1914 marveled at NhonhS who had done for his little "state" what was so necessary for the state as a whole. By 1915 MagalhSes had three Ford cars running on country roads, unique in the area, which were prohibited to ox carts. Noticeably when the same reporter tried to drive to the three government colonies he found himself in a forest path, with ruts and tree stumps blocking the way. Songs of praise for pasture, cattle, and plantations of Cambuhy were an inevitable consequence. 99 Cambuhy in 1915 then had a firm administration with a good plan of action. The enterprise was secure and with a well-chosen personnel could hope for great profit from its lands, its coffee trees, its herds, and pastures. 4 ^Ibid ., KelatiSrio of one Victor de Lima, dated June, 1916. 50 * Jose Custodio Alves de Lima, “Uma propriedade agricola monstro, *' Jornal do Coragrcio (Kio) , July 29, 1914.

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CHAPTER IV IN PURSUIT OF FORTUNE A restless spirit driven by nervous energy such as NhonhS MagalhSes was not at all likely to rest after his i transformation of Cambuhy. Adverse economic conditions had by no means made him lose his plans for great agricultural and industrial development on the estate. In 1915 there seemed to be two main ways of securing the necessary funds now that the European money markets were closed: to raise a loan in the United States of America or to increase the capital of the company in Brazil. Neither was to prove feasible. To clarify the situation a number of studies on the estate were made in 1915 and a relat6rio prepared which surveyed the previous activity of the company and its future possibilities. A stirring rlsuml was made of Cambuhy' s natural advantages, the fertility of its soil, and the excellence of the work done so far. Rather interestingly, the fa .zenda was valued at 9,426 contos . Thereupon a proposal was made for a second issue of debentures to a value of 4, 000 contos , half of which would redeem the existing loan. A second demonstration showed that the fazenda would have sufficient profit to service the interest and amortize the debt. Great and involved calculations in tabular form led to the 74

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75 conclusion that this second debt would be paid off by 1924. 1 Despite all the convincing arguments/ the time was not right to interest the paulista money market in such a project. No second issue of debentures was made. The other proposal also was tried and the glowing prospectus was translated into the English language and its figures into dollars and cents. Armed with this and a glowing account in English of the estate, valued at U.S. $1,844,580, NhonhS MagalhSes set sail in 1916 for New York to seek the necessary capital from abroad. When this proved impossible, he considered selling a part of Cambuhy to an American company for U.S. $800,000, which company was then to raise a loan of $2,000,000 to develop the estate. All the effort was to no avail; and the whole ideas, so characteristic of MagalhSes bandeirante enthusiasm, had to be dropped. 2 This financial defeat caused MagalhSes to abandon some of his more visionary schemes and to continue to improve the administration of Cambuhy and develop it as well as he could under the circumstances. Great profits were still to be had from rational and convenient exploitation of cattle, coffee, and timber on a colossal scale, thanks to the exceptional conditions of the property. Cambuhy 's quiet and comparatively isolated life was in the next few years played against a most lively background. •^C.I.A.P., Relatorio da Directoria, 1915 , pp. 49-71. 2 MagalhSes Papers , Dossier 44, Letter of MagalhSes to Constantine Prado, September 8, 1916.

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76 In 1916 Brazil continued to be affected as all neutrals were by the war? export of coffee was greatly limited, but prices kept up to a regular mean level. In the following year Brazil was dragged into war and as the abnormal became normal, commerce retracted. Prices of prime necessities for the planter soared, and salaries went up as labor became scarcer. Shipping space which had been hard to find came to a halt at times. Stocks of coffee on fazenda and dockside took on voluminous proportions. The price of coffee fell rapidly and the government intervened to maintain it but at a level that gave little profit to the planter. The latter was left with an enormous crop expected and no storage or warehouse space for it. The plethora of production seemed to lead to certain ruin when God, the Brazilian, intervened and by a sharp frost on the night of September 24-25, 1918, wiped out the efforts of several years' work on Cambuhy as on estates all over the coffee zones of S3o Paulo and Minas Gerais. 3 As a result of the frost the crops of that year amounted to almost nothing, while the damaged trees of Brazil gave small harvests in the next few years. By cutting the supply of coffee at a time when the world demand was fairly inelastic, God, as it seemed to many Brazilians, had once more intervened on their behalf. He not only allowed the sSo Paulo authorities to get rid of their large stocks of coffee, but 3 C. I.A.P., Relat6rio da Dlrectoria, 1918 , p. 5. For coffee statistics, please see Appendix III, Table No. 1.

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77 greatly valorized the coffee in storage on fazendas and the small crops which were produced in the next few years. The pride and vanity of Cambuhy, its fine, well-developed and well-formed trees, had been castigated by the bitter cold. Yet Magalh3es was never the sort of man to despair, and at once began a radical pruning of the affected trees. Forest was felled for a new plantation of 105,000 trees to be called Florida, and other plantations were slightly increased. A solution to the crisis was also sought in cattle and cotton. 4 One thing which made Cambuhy outstanding and unusual in these years of Magalh3es was the excellent treatment given to the coffee. Regular hoeings were done in the coffee, which was kept free from weeds; and the trees were constantly kept clear of dead wood while being thinned out where necessary. Whereas in 1912 no less than 59,788 replantings had to be made, this figure fell to as low as 4,938 in 1916 due to the work already done, and settled around 15,660 per year in 1918. One of the greatest plagues to coffee were sauva ants whose great nests rose to spectacular heights amid the coffee groves. In its first six years the new company destroyed some 2,990 of these ant-hills to the great benefit of the coffee lands. 5 4 Ibid ., p. 6. 5 Ibid . . pp. 6-7.

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78 Such care needed new administrative arrangements. Consequently, in order to make the coffee lands more compact, improve the f iscalization of the service, and simplify harvesting, MagalhSes in 1916 had cart tracks opened in all the old coffee plantations, which were divided into square blocks. This was done at the sacrifice of several thousand trees; but as a result the administration now knew the exact number of trees in any given block (talhSo ) . Cambuhy thereafter bore the characteristic aspect of the coffee lands in the west of SSo Paulo with its great rectangular coffee groves. The orderly hand of man had tailored the unruly cloth of nature . 6 By the end of the great war, Cambuhy had 1,729,416 coffee trees on the estate. To keep up with this development the administration gradually improved and increased the number of houses occupied by colonists. In 1918 a total of 245 new houses built by the company was reached, while many of the houses built in Gavi3o Peixoto * s time had been improved and made habitable again. In these lived 148 families of day laborers, and 62 families developing land for their own benefit. A total of 2,097 souls spread over Cambuhy' s vast surface.^ 6 C.I.A.P., Relatdrio da Directoria, 1916 . p. 4. ? C.I.A.P., Relatdrio da Directoria. 1918 . pp. 7-9. For population statistics, please see Appendix III, Table 2.

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79 Had MagalhSes not been dogged with lack of working capital in these war years, great development in the cattle industry on Cambuhy would have been made. More and more fri gor£flcos opened in the State of S3o Paulo and cattle were consumed at such a rate that the government had to forbid the slaughtering of cows. Cambuhy with its large natural pasture lands, artificial pastures, and railroad service was in an excellent position to fatten cattle. 8 With the resources that were available, preparatory work was done forming pastures and raising fences. As before, old and weak cattle were gradually purged from the herds; but now new bulls of caractS and zebfi strains were introduced. The latter were brought in as an experiment because of their reputation for being resistant to disease and giving better meat quicker with sound financial results. 9 Naturally the coffee crisis turned many fazendeiros to cotton or else to ideas of cattle raising or fattening. If S3o Paulo had not been the land of coffee par excellence, it could have been a cattle center such as Goias and Minas were in MagalhSes' time. Cambuhy' s breeding herd in 1918 came to 1,780 all in good condition. There had been prepared some 3,000 algueires of pasture in jaraguct or gordura roxa grass, alongside the 5,000 alqueires of natural pasture on Cambuhy, bound and divided by 182 kilometers of fencing. On 8 C.I.A.P., Relatdrio da Director ia, 1917 , p. 7. ^C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1916 , p. 5.

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80 March 20, 1918, there were acquired some 4, 000 cows of from 3 to 5 years of age at the small initial price of 400 contos plus 10 annual payments in kind of 1,500 steers. A further purchase of 160 purebred Hereford bulls from Uruguay was made, the necessary cowboys contracted, and a veterinary surgeon brought in. By such financial ingenuity the administration put to work the large amount of capital of the company, already sunk in the formation of pastures.^ NhonhS MagalhSes displayed during the war great ingenuity. In the circumstances, however, a large part of his efforts brought no results and merely left speculations as to what might have been. Development of sugar at Niagara remained a constant preoccupation of MagalhSes' throughout the war. Yet the latter made the acquisition of the necessary machinery impossible and the Cambuhy administration had to content itself with the yield from the sharecroppers. In March, 1918, however, MagalhSes almost put through a contract with an engineer, Francisco Barreto of Recife, Pernambuco, whc was to rent the Niagara sugar mill and sufficient lands around it for an annual milling of 20,000 tons of cane. Barreto was required at the end of a stipulated period to hand back new machinery, cane grinders, alcohol stills, and new turbines. Unfortunately the negotiation broke down over 1 ®C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1918 , pp. 11-16.

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81 technicalities. 11 Eventually, when the frost of 1918 further weakened the plantation and no suitable new planting stock was available, the idea of new sugar plantations was abandoned and the land given over to mandioca instead. 12 Cambuhy's forest resources were not exploited by MagalhSes to any great extent until the war was over. Until then firewood was taken out, some sleepers sold to the Araraquarense Railroad, and timber used for fazenda constructions. However, in 1918 a new sawmill was opened at Boa Vista, fully equipped and electrically powered. At the same time two new brickyards to manufacture bricks and tiles were opened up. 1 -^ The great war had ruined many plans of MagalhSes ' . Woods sent to Germany for examination as to whether they were suited to the manufacture of cellulose never were reported on. Many other ideas were considered with no result: a cotton gin and cottonseed oil mill, a mill to recover the by-products from coffee husk, an installation to produce charcoal from the forests felled on the estate, and the industrialization of cheese. Yet if MagalhSes was saddened by inactivity in these spheres, the war years were not without' result . 14 1 -^Uncompleted contract was found in MagalhSes Papers . Dossier 34. 12 c.i.a. P., cit., p. 16. 13 Ibid. , PP. 16-17. 14 Ibid., pp. 17• 03 •

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82 Most valuable of all, Cambuhy emerged from the war strengthened by a steady program of construction. Abundant natural resources and the driving energy of NhonhS had resulted in new houses, wells, corn-cribs, pigsties, dwelling houses, and garages. On the night of September 11-12, 1916, a violent fire destroyed the coffee mill, the sawmill, and the old fazenda house at Santa Josephs. MagalhSes reaction to such a disaster was typical. Thanks to the frontier courtesy of a neighbor. Dr. Valdomar Pinto Alves in Dobrada, Cambuhy' s coffee crop was sent there in husk to be milled. 15 No time was lost in starting anew. Indeed, advantage was taken to set into action an early plan to move the sede or administrative center from Santa Josephs to 3oa Vista, a little further down the valley of the Cascavel stream. By the end of 1917 ten barns (tulhas ) with a capacity of 38, 000 alqueires of coffee in husk had been raised and work was progressed on buildings to house new coffee benefiting machines. 16 An electric substation for transformers and the new electric sawmill were other novelties. The new drying grounds (terreiros) and all surrounding buildings had electric light, and a bridge was built from the drying grounds on which ran little wagons on rails carrying the dried coffee to the barns. Most important of all, large modern machines to mill and grade coffee and a sixty horsepower motor 15 C. I.A.P. , Relat6rio da Directoria, 1917 , pp. 11-12. 16 Ib id. , pp. 8-9.

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83 were installed. Cambuhy had risen from the flames to a position stronger than before. 17 • i Systematically Cambuhy's road system was kept up and improved. As a result, in 1918 only the newly-opened fazendas had to be brought into the network, over which besides i innumerable carts ran five Ford cars and four gasoline-driven trucks, which were local wonders. Many people visited Cambuhy in those years and marveled at what they saw. Yet there v/as no denying that despite all the intense activity Cambuhy still presented an aspect of latifundias much criticized since. Some 15,000 alqueires of land were uncultivated, of which it was assumed at the time that 9, 000 al gueires were suitable for coffee cultivation and the rest of cereals. 1 ® The Companhia Industrial, Agricola e Pastor il d'Oeste de SSo Paulo in 1918 was in a good economic and financial state. It was hoped that the cotton crop would make up in part for the effect of the frost on the coffee harvest and the large expenses of the new milling and grinding machinery. Over all its activities the company made a profit, paid its workers regularly, serviced the interest on its debts, and amortised the latter in regular annual installments. Indeed, in 1918 the company began to amortize its debt at an increased rate in order to clear off its burdens before seeking a purchaser for the estate. 17 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1918 , p. 19. 1 8 Ibid ., pp. 20-21.

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84 In fact Magalh3es by the end of the war had turned his mind to the possible sale of the property. No one was more conscious than he that without sufficient capital his great dreams for industrial development could not take place. His administration of Cambuhy in the years 1919 to 1924 was as astute as ever. Cambuhy was valorized for sale in much the same way as fine cattle on its pastures v/ere fattened for the market. 9 This task was not an easy one. In the first year after the Great War, Cambuhy' s coffee trees still showed the effects of the previous year's frost. No less than five times dead wood had to be broken off the trees. An epidemic of 'flu debilitated the fazenda ' s labor force at a time when it was most needed. Thirdly, great clouds of locusts descended on the estate and did considerable damage, while coruguer§ (boll weevil) attacked the cotton crop. Insecticides to combat the latter quickly went off the market, and the administrators at Cambuhy had to watch helplessly as their cotton was destroyed. 20 From this low point Cambuhy was not only to recover but go on to new heights. One year after the frost, the administration was in a position to assess frost damage to the trees and consequently s«rae 46, 033 trees had to be abandoned, largely in old plantations at Niagara and Leopoldina. 1 9 Ibld . , p. 32. 20 C.I.A.P., Relatdrio da Directoria, 1919 , p. 4.

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85 Replanting was done when seedlings were available and in 1919 55 alqueires of forest were felled for a new plantation of 105,000 trees named California near the S3o Jo2o stream. 21 With great dedication it was sought to restore the coffee lands, hoeing and fertilizing, cleaning out weeds, and replanting gaps. It was hoped that this work and time would bring the trees back to their former flourishing state. Moreover, a plan was devised to increase the number of trees to a limit of 3,000,000. Thus, 14,176 trees were planted at Xgua Sumida in 1920 and a new fazenda called Virginia was opened alongside Tamandui, while no less than 100, 226 replants were put out amid the frosted coffee trees. All this work was contracted at comparatively little cost to the company. 22 By 1921 the coffee trees of Cambuhy had recovered from the frost and presented a fine physical appearance. By the next year in the company's possession were some 1,485,187 trees, while on the estate existed a further 775, 360 due to come into the company's hands from the contractors within the next six years. A transformation was wrought in many areas. Old plantations were extended and several new ones created such as Arizona in 1921 with 105,000 trees and C<5rrego Fundo in the following years with 163,000. By the time when Cambuhy was sold in 1924, Magalh2es had 1,640,637 2 1 Ibid. , p. 5. 22 C.I.A.P., Relat^rio da Directoria, 1920 , p. 4.

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86 trees yielding crops and 1, 148, 537 being formed by contractors. 23 Conservative expansion was also the keynote in cattle breeding on Cambuhy in these final years. More and more scrub land and forest were cleared and felled to form pastures and the breeding herd was gradually increased. When trees were felled and the land burned over to clean it as well as possible, it was then usually sown with gordura roxa or jaraguct grass seed. Each year pastures were cleaned, new fences raised, and old ones repaired. In 1919 some 304 al quelres of forest became pasture and a further 744 alqueires already formed were cleaned, and in 1922 the comparative figures were 911 alqueires felled and 1,615 cleaned. 24 These facilities brought with them greater care and attention than had been the case with cattle on Cambuhy before, when in a semi-wild state the animals roamed unchecked over the ranges and often disappeared into the forest. MagalhSes in addition to improving pastures with better and more nutritive grasses, had sheds and stables built with running water, cattle baths, and fenced fields for the cultivation of winter forage crops. 23 C.I.A.P., Relat
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87 NhonhS believed it was better to breed good stock rather than the creole stocks common on the estate in earlier times. He found that crossbreeds proved hardier than either creole or purebred stock. In 1919 the 'flu epidemic affected the railroads, and 160 Hereford bulls were kept on, a train en route from Uruguay for close to two months and over half were lost. This was one of many instances from the primitive lack of organization current in the interior of SSo Paulo in MagalhSes' time. Undaunted, Carlos Leoncio sent for more Herefords. 2 ^ As a result of this activity, by 1921 the breeding herd on Cambuhy had risen to 8,689 head of cattle and 264 bulls of which over 95 per cent were purebred zebu , caracu , Limosin, or Hereford. The last breed was gradually replacing the others. Pigs, sheep, and goats were all kept on a minor scale. Like a gentleman farmer MagalhSes had purebred English horses, Duroc-Jersey pigs, and Nubian goats, refinements which typically put him ahead of his time. As many as 15, 000 head of cattle were held on Cambuhy at one time, a remarkable achievement considering the time and the circumstances. 27 Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes never abandoned his idea of developing the sugar plantations at Niagara by building a 2 6 Ibid ., p. 4. 27 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1921 , p. 6; Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas, Quarterly Report , No. 100, p. 2.

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88 new mill. This was not done and the basic reason was that coffee had driven sugar out of its path and it did so much else in these boom years in the Araraquarense zone. A company with limited capital naturally used it for the crop which gave the greatest return. So a few Japanese families continued to put their labor into the old plantations and mill. Cambuhy, on the border of the old and the new geographically and economically, still had room for both. 28 Cambuhy had a number of very valuable minor activities in these years. Equipped with a modern sawmill a great deal of profit was made from the estate's forest resources. Firewood, logs, and the bark of the barbatlrngo tree were readily sold. Sawn timber was mostly needed for fazenda construction work. NhonhS was a shrewd businessman, and no local business deal (neq
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89 kilometers wide astride the track. They were to take out a minimum of 100,000 cubic feet per year and pay for the logs, ties, and firewood at fixed rates. This was a typical frontier contract of the time. The landowner got profit from his land which capital and transportation facilities did not allow him to gain for himself, while the contractor got a share of the wealth of the land with no responsibility for the future results of his actions. 30 One field in which no economies were made by Magalh3es was that of developing the number and quality of the buildings on his estate. New houses for administrators, the replacement of wooden and mud houses for colonists with groups of brick construction, and a new rice mill all gave Value to the property. Pences, gates, and mata-burros changed the landscape, while motor roads, cart tracks, and drives in the coffee were extended. In 1920 a Ford tractor was introduced on Cambuhy. Such novelties along with the steady increase in the number of such common accessories as stores, barns, pigpens, well, garages all made for a well-equipped estate so much in contrast with Cambuhy in 191 1.' 3 * The reporter, JiSlio Mesquita, who traveled out onto the plains of Araraquara in 1908 and noted how close to virgin territory it was with primitive agriculture barely conquering the forest, had the chance to travel by train from 30 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1921 , p. 7. 31 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1920 , pp. 6-8.

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90 Araraquara to Rio Preto in 1921. This time he saw some 140,000,000 coffee trees in the zone, of which one-quarter was already producing crops. Apart from the dread effects of the frost of 1918 which reduced the zone's exported coffee production from 760,000 sacks in 1916 to some 350,000 sacks in 1920, all promised well. Corn production had reached 20,000 tons per year, rice made similar advance, and beans harvested in 1920 came to 28,000 tons. 32 In this era most of the planters in the Araraquara zone had from 10,000 to 30,000 coffee trees on moderatesized properties. There was no fear of progressive depopulation of the land as elsewhere in the state until the land should be reduced to absolute sterility. Many small cities flourished and were joined by red earth roads, dusty and dry in winter and great sheets of mud in summer. These towns so full of hope presented a violent contrast to the dying towns spread out along the Mogiana and Sorocabana railroads. The plains of Araraquara were on the crest of the green wave which was soon to move further west. 33 Paulista agriculture was in a period of radical change in the first years after the 1918 frost. Old retrograde processes of empirical agriculture were being abandoned and teachings of scientific agronomists heeded. As always the 3 2 Julio de Mesquita Filho, "A produgSo da zona, " O Estado de SSo Paulo , June 3, 1921. 33 Julio de Mesquita Filho, "ImpressSes de um rep6rter, “ O Estado de S5o Paulo , JUne 1, 1921.

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91 aim of these men was rational use of the land, not ruinous exploitation of it. Fazendas in the Araraquarense zone began to lose their desolate aspect which intense preoccupation with coffee had given them. The benefits of a fazenda consisted no longer merely in drying grounds and coffee milling and grading machines but began to include cart sheds, stables, corn cribs, and sawmills, all of which gave an appearance of more intelligent and prosperous activity. The planter was no more to be a parasite on the land, seeking from it a yield out of proportion to the effort and treatment given to it. With an equilibrium re-established after the frost of 1918, yields and consequently profits were expected to grow. Such were the optimistic theories of the enthusiasts, but seldom did the pioneering colonists put them into practice; still less had they the power to reason along such lines. Rather it was the big men and companies such as MagalhSes and Cambuhy and great fazendas such as S3o Martinho and Guatapara which showed no hesitation in applying amounts of capital to transform old coffee fazendas into polycultural farms. Crises and adverse circumstances might ruin industrial and commercial houses, but these well-developed fazendas with their roots in the rich red and white earth took from it a resistance and power to recover. To Mesquita, Cambuhy was a prime example of such a concern in 1921. Challenged by the advance of the small proprietor, Cambuhy went on proudly with its 2,000,000 coffee

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92 trees and its flocks of 9,000 head of cattle on 5,000 al queires of pasture, a latifundia divested of the usual wasteful sins of latifundismo . The key of Cambuhy' s greatness then and thereafter was its order and its method. From the coffee groves, like sentinels standing guard, strategically placed to take advantage of the railroads, to the centralization of the general command at Boa Vista whence orders flowed, all was a credit to constructive ability of Nhonhfi MagalhSes. It was truly hard for a visitor to believe that all the development had been done in ten years. MagalhSes could not only walk between rows of vigorous coffee trees whose lush green stature dwarfed him, but could look out on herds which promised that Cambuhy would have an important role in the paulista cattle business. 34 The vast amount of documents and records on Cambuhy in the tjj.e of MagalhSes leave one vivid impression of the man himself. Like all empire builders, he had a phenomenal capacity for work. A large proportion of the papers of the time are in his own sure hand, but unlike many other an executive MagalhSes could trust and give power to subordinates. Like many a fazendeiro he lived in the city busied with social, economic, and public affairs; but unlike many he not only visited Cambuhy once a month and stayed there at harvest time but kept in close and minute correspondence with his 34 Julio de Mesquita Filho, "A Fazenda do Cambuhy, " O Estado de SSo Paulo , June 8, 1921.

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93 administrators. He was ever ready to busy himself with minor matters such as seeds, insecticides, automobile parts, giving counsel and advice to his general administrator on Cambuhy, Guido Traballi. 35 The records of the Coropanhia Industrial, Agr£cola e Pastoril d'Oeste de SSo Paulo covering the years 1920 to 1924 reveal the great complications involved in the administration of a fazenda such as Cambuhy and provoke wonder at how anything was achieved before the era of orderly activity. MagalhSes revealed himself to be a genius at the organization of company records. Until this time few fazendas kept minute accounts of their activities, prepared economic surj veys, or indulged in other luxuries of administrative completeness . When MagalhSes prepared his relat
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94 company. Studies were made on the profits from cotton growing accruing to the company and those going to the sharecroppers. Cotton harvest statistics were kept separately by fazenda and by sharecropper as well as by amount and value. Comparative tables allowed Nhonh© as manager to know exactly how much it cost to fell forest or clear scrub land. In addition to details on the coffee belonging to the company, watchful eyes noted and recorded the treatment of coffee by the contractors so that it could be adapted to the company's accounting methods as soon as it was taken over. Most complicated of all, however, were the records of ih® financial relations between employer and employee. These began with the lists of prospective colonists and contractors who put up guarantees early in the year that they would commence work with the agricultural year beginning in October or November. Most of these monetary pledges would be reclaimed at the stipulated time, while the others were forfeited. Thereafter followed on the company's books a complicated mass of debts and credits for each colonist or contractor broken down by fazenda , by crop, or by the work done by the individual. In addition to this general information which was available to him, MagalhSes sent to his chief administrator an annual questionnaire seeking highly detailed information on particular matters, r^sum^s of which were incorporated into the annual relat6rios of the company directors . These

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95 annual questionnaires, some of which survive in MagalhSes' own handwriting, reveal that no detail escaped his attention. Exact details of plantings, hoeings, and fertilizings of coffee were sought and given. Sales of wood, the renting of pastures and arable land, local sales of meal, corn meal, rice, and extensive information on the breeding and fattening herds were all treated. In matters of administrative efficiency Nhonhd MagalhSes belonged to the modern scientific farmer school of thought and certainly put his ideas in practice as far as circumstances allowed. 37 In the last years of his management of Cambuhy, MagalhSes not only showed himself to be a fine administrator but also an excellent salesman. The annual relat6rios of the directorate of his company, chronicling as they did the financial stability of the concern, were the best advertisement possible to attract likely purchasers of Cambuhy. Even when the calamitous frost of 1918 destroyed for a time the largest source of Cambuhy 's profits, the company was so securely founded as to be able in 1919 to service its debts, although prudence counseled against distributing a dividend. 38 In fact, no further dividends were paid to the shareholders of the company, despite profits made. Rather, these ( profits were ploughed back into developing and so valorizing 37 A11 the records referred to were found in MagalhSes Papers , Dossier 29. 38 C.I.A.P., Relat
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96 the assets of the company and into reducing the debt of the company to nothing. The company's only debtor apart from the remaining debenture holders in these last years was MagalhSes himself. The final sale price of the estate was to endorse many times over the protestations made in the annual relat6rios about the valorization of the company shares. 9 MagalhSes had a very large and a very expensive item to sell; and due to the economic conditions ruling in Brazil, Europeans were much more likely than national financiers to be interested in Cambuhy. In addition to his attractive company reports, MagalhSes was always eager to show his estate to visitors. Cambuhy' s fame spread and many a notable person came to visit there. The governor of SSo Paulo, Dr. Washington Luiz, visited Cambuhy in 1920. The American and Japanese Consul Generals, paulista coffee barons, distinguished educators, and English noblemen were amid the many guests in these final years. 40 It has already been stressed that during MagalhSes' time at Cambuhy many properties in the Araraquarense zone, particularly those toward the west on the frontier, were broken up to form small holdings. In the years 1921 to 1923 Cambuhy almost went in the same direction to become the scene of an Italian colonization experiment. In February, 39 C.I.A.P., RelatSrlo da Directoria, 1922 , pp. 11-12. 4 0 Ibid .. p. 8.

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97 1921, MagalhSes began tentative negotiations with the Italian government for the sale of Cambuhy, seeking that an agent with full powers to negotiate be sent to him. After the visit of a commission from the Director General of Emigration in Rome, one DeMichelis, MagalhSes granted the Banco Francis e Italiano da America do Sul, as agents for the Italian government, a sixty-day option on the shares of his company and his private property of Itaquer©, close by, for a total of 15,000 contos of r4is. 41 Actually the negotiations moved very slowly. MagalhSes had constantly to extend the option; and in May, 1922, another commission led by the Commendador Uniberto Tomezoli visited Cambuhy. As the situation was still not clear at the end of the year, MagalhSes sought that Benito Mussolini himself consider his offer and the plans for Italian colonization of Cambuhy. 42 Owing to constantly expensive development on Cambuhy, MagalhSes price by this time was 20,000 contos . in March, 1923, one Italian negotiator, Buscaglione, felt this to be acceptable as the forthcoming harvest was to be included. In October, 1923, MagalhSes sought a definite answer and the Italians broke off the negotiation. II Piccolo , an Italian 41 MagalhSes Papers , Dossier 35, Telegrams from MagalhSes to DeMichelis, February 5, 1921; Letter Banco Frances e Italiano to MagalhSes, March 21, 1921. 4 2 Magalh3es Papers, Dossier 35, Telegram from MagalhSes to Frontini, November 18, 1922.

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98 language newspaper in SSo Paulo, denounced the commission, and the same Buscaglione in apologizing for the leak of information to the press noted that owing to the bumper coffee crop of over 170, 000 arrobas , his government had made a great mistake in not taking up the option. 43 Early in 1924 there was an exchange of telegrams between Mussolini himself and MagalhSes over a commission to investigate why the negotiations had broken down. In effect, slow business methods and a tendency to quibble and bargain lost Cambuhy for Italy. This loss was to be all the more galling in view of the subsequent sale to an English concern . 44 As early as October, 1923, MagalhSes had been approached by the Earl of Bessborough, the chairman of the Brazilian Warrant Company, which was interested in expanding its business in Brazil by the acquisition of estate and plantation companies. At first the negotiations considered Cambuhy and its cattle but not the private estate ItaquerS. MagalhSes price had risen to 25,000 contos of r€is . However, on February 18, 1924, MagalhSes' company sold their fine herds of cattle elsewhere; and so the negotiations which continued throughout 1924 concerned Cambuhy alone. In September a Mr. Edward Greene, the power behind Brazilian Warrant, visited 4 3 Magalh3es Papers, Dossier 35, Letters from Buscaglione to MagalhSes, March 23, November 24, 1923. 44 Magalh3es Papers, loc. clt .. Telegram MagalhSes to Mussolini, January 12, 1924.

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99 Cambuhy y and soon thereafter a final price of 20, 000 contos was settled upon. 45 On October 18, 1924, the remaining debentures from the loan of 1912 were paid off, and two days later the shareholders of the Companhia Industrial Agricola e Pastoril d'Oeste de SSo Paulo approved the sale of the movable and immovable goods of the company. 46 After all the proper certificates asserting that no burden or onus was existing on the property, that no state or federal taxes were outstanding, and no possessory actions were pending, on November 4, 1924, the bill of sale was signed by representatives of MagalhSes' company and the Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas, a subsidiary of the Brazilian Warrant Company, Limited. For the sum of 20,000 con tos these new owners received some 23,000 alqueires of land, 5, 000 of which were in pasture, a total of 2, 780, 000 coffee trees of various ages, and all the many buildings and fixtures on the Cambuhy estates. MagalhSes also was paid the outstanding balance of the debts of colonists, contractors, and laborers and received the coffee harvest of 1924. 47 J Joel, "One Hundred Years of Coffee, " p. 30; 0 Estado de S5o Paulo , February 5, 1926. 4 ^Plario Official (do Estado de SSo Paulo) , October 18, 1924, p. 6186; October 25, 1924, p. 6393. 4 7 Cambuhy Papers , Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 23. In effect, MagalhSes received the equivalent of U.S. $2,200,000 for his property. Duncan, l oc. cit .

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100 When MagalhSes company was finally liquidated in 1925, one of the shareholders expressed his admiration for MagalhSes, whose great work had attracted foreign capital so confidently to buy it. 4 ® The reaction of the press was much more enthusiastic. Some papers carried reproductions of the check, drawn on the British Bank of South America, Limited, as it was the largest individual check written in Brazil until that time. 4 ® The Italian language newspapers were indignant and spoke volubly of the shame of Italy in allowing Cambuhy to go to an English syndicate at double the price offered to Italy. Mussolini himself, in replying to a certain Delcroix in the Italian Camara on December 8, 1924, noted that Italy had had the chance to acquire the magnificent estate of Cambuhy and turn it into small farms for Italians. He went on to deplore the loss of Cambuhy which he blamed on Italian capitalists, the government, and the lack of courage of the Commissario Generale dell ' Emigrazione.^® When Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes acquired Cambuhy, he was presented with the basic problems which dominated the economic development of all Brazil at that time and since then. He had a great deal of land with ample natural resources but 4 8 Dl£rlo Official , January 28, 1925, p. 785. 4 ® Jornal do Comlrclo (Rio), November 11, 1924. 50 I1 Piccolo (S3o Paulo), October 23 and December 9, 1924.

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101 was faced with a shortage of the labor and the capital necessary to take advantage of these resources. By 1924 a large proportion of Cambuhy still lay undeveloped due to the difficulty in meeting these latter shortages. Yet by great effort MagalhSes had partly solved the labor problems; but without money to build more houses, he faced a stumbling block in his effort to attract more laborers. Yet the history of NhonhS MagalhSes career on Cambuhy was an amazing one. Using borrowed capital he transformed an abandoned latifundia into one of the most profitable coffee estates in SSo Paulo at the time. He had had planted 2,500,000 coffee trees, made 150 kilometers of roads, and pastured 15,000 head of cattle. In adversity MagalhSes had sought money to develop the estate according to his vast plans but had to capitulate on these when only enough money could be found to permit conservative expansion. The frost of 1918 almost ruined Cambuhy, but MagalhSes had audaciously restored it and finally sold it for an unheard-of stun. In November, 1924, MagalhSes could not bear to see the estate pass from his hand, but took himself off to Itaquer§ leaving his son Carlos to hand over to the English. He was no mere business executive but also a man of spirit. 51 Assis Chateaubriand, "O faiscador de ouro verde, * 0 Jornal (Rio), October 15, 1927; Interview with Carlos R5is de MagalhSes, February 18, 1960.

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CHAPTER V THE PIONEERS The depression of 1929 and its aftermath wrought changes on the plains of Araraquara that make it hard to appreciate conditions before that time. Despite the large number of small properties around the city of Araraquar^ by 1924, the spirit prevailing was not one of rugged individualism of frontier days but one of patriarchal ism on the part of big landowners. The crash of coffee prices which was to put an end to much of resistance to division of land was a thing of the future. Assis de Chatev^briand once described Nhonhd MagalhSes as a Par West figure, a Yankee on the plains of Araraquara. 1 Yet this gives a totally mistaken view of the life and times of those plains. The Far West of the United States was conquered by human waves of considerable solidarity, while the great railroad development of the West allowed political and administrative organization, giViflf law and order, to follow fairly close behind the march of the people. In Brazil the expansion was slow, weak, and intermittent, pm viding 1 0 Jornal (Rio), October 24, 1924. 102

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103 conditions, where might was right, from which strong men rose to power. ^ In such circumstances the great landowner became the ideal protector for humble people. While in early days the rural clan grew up to give protection against Indians, in later times the patrSo or latifundia owner was to be the shield for the poor, ignorant immigrant against the buffets of the new world. The large fazenda for a time was an institution of social solidarity. ^ The key to MagalhSes' personality is to look upon him not as a Far West character, but as a bandeirante , a paulista . a Brazilian patriot, whose ability in administration and economy was allied with courtesy and perceptive sympathy. Magalh3es was a man of strong character, well educated, frank even to the point of rudeness, but with a good heart and a steadfastness in friendship, qualities which are summed up by Brazilians in the words simp^tico and certo His great energy allied with a rugged humor, shown in his agricultural work, made him well worthy of the name pioneer. MagalhSes defined himself as an unconditional defender of the class to which he had the honor to belong. 4 If few coffee planters equaled him in ability, none matched him in enthusiasm and activity on behalf of the big plantation 2 Oliveira Vianna, Populates meridionais do Brasil , I, 254-55. 3 Ibid ., p. 194. 4 0 Estado de S5o Paulo . March 3, 1924.

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104 owners. This class formed the backbone of organizations such as the Sociedade Rural Brasileira at whose weekly meetings the leaders of the paulista agricultural world would meet amid Victorian splendor to discuss economics, current events, and all matters that affected their interests. In this congenial forum NhonhS MagalhSes frequently expressed in sound terms the tenets of the agricultural oligarchy of the day. On one occasion in 1924 he severely criticized the railroads of SSo Paulo which he felt had been adequate only until 1910. Thereafter, there had not been enough rolling stock or engines to carry the increased agricultural produce of corn and beans, to say nothing of the great cattle development. It is a sign of the times that only in 1919 there were introduced freight cars in which animals could stand in transit. In September, 1923, there came into action in the state of SSo Paulo the first coffee-regulating warehouses administered by the railroads to regulating coffee shipments as part of the official defense of coffee. MagalhSes spoke out on behalf of the paulista coffee producer, lamenting the vicissitudes of life he had to suffer and protesting against notorious injustices of unfair preferences. Limitation and sacrifice ought to fall on all equally, and Nhonhd and his sympathizers were ready to lobby in favor of more material and moral uplift for the railroads, which were creating disorder instead of regulating coffee shipments. ^ 5 Ibid .,

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105 Carlos Leoncio was no mere noisesome propagandist but a well read and careful advocate of his beliefs. In 1922 he led a serious campaign against the plan of the governor of the state, Washington Luis, for a single tax in S3o Paulo. MagalhSes organized committees of resistance and gave several lectures refuting the theories of Henry George. In these lectures MagalhSes revealed an acquaintance with the works of economic theorists from Adam Smith to his own day and showed great skill in using their words in his defense of latifundismo and his attack on the single tax theory. To him it was the duty of the rural leaders to protect all landowners from a single land tax. 6 Nhonhd MagalhSes always showed paullsta sympathies, maintaining that SSo Paulo was no burden to the Republic. SSo Paulo produced and only wanted to be free to go its own economic way. Coffee, which to Nhonhfi was at times synonymous with SSo Paulo, was Brazil's coal, steel, and petroleum, and should not be sold cheaply but at the maximum price the consumer market would bear. The intimate relation between the price of coffee on the New York market and the stability of the mil-r4is was well known to Carlos Leoncio. While he appreciated the various official measures to keep coffee prices high, he, unlike many others, even as early as 1923 was conscious of probable Colombian, Central American, and 6 Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes, Refuta 9 ao das doutrinas de Henry George (SSo Paulo: Sociedade Rural Brasileira, 1922), pp. 12-13, 85-87. vi,.

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106 other competition with Brazil in the production of coffee due to inflated prices. 7 This picture of MagalhSes as the intellectual defender of his class and the agricultural community as a whole was only one facet of his activities. As a member of the rural "aristocracy" he was interested in the development of scientific farming and an enrichment of the paulista heritage. The Paulista Railway Company's experimental reforestation program greatly interested him. Far from treating it as an extravagent idea, he followed the example and began reforestation on his property at Itaquerg. 8 The good fazendeiro not only concerned himself with development but as a patriarch took a vital interest in his people. NhonhS MagalhSes as a great active force in Brazilian rural work in his day excelled also in this sphere of activity. Generous, sympathetic, and altruistic he distributed 2, 000 contos among his old workers when he sold Cambuhy. 9 In the nearby town of MatSo, MagalhSes was one of the original benefactors of the Hospital de Caridade and frequently gave donations to it and to charitable foundations in Araraquara.* 0 7 Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes, C&nbio e cafl (S3o Paulo: Sociedade Rural Brasileira, 1923), pp. 5-6? 11; 15-17. 8 0 Estado de S3o Paulo , June 16, 1927. 9 0 Jornal (Rio), December 30, 1924. 1 0 A Comarca (MatSo), August 29, 1926.

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107 Carlos Leoncio de MagalhSes if benevolent was also exacting and strict in his relations with his employees. One of his major tasks on Cambuhy was the colonization of it with adequate and able laborers, to whom he gave good treatment and from whom he expected much. Cambuhy 's population resources in 1911 and MagalhSes* first efforts at increasing the numbers have already been discussed. The estate which under GaviSo Peixoto had witnessed official colonies and private sales of small pieces of land under MagalhSes experienced a third type of colonization. This was the establishment of private colonies, the more famous examples of which are Nova Helvetia and Vila Amlrica. On December 23, 1914, MagalhSes signed a contract with an engineer, Franz Sappelt, to make a detailed survey of the Cambuhy estate. This was part of MagalhSes* transformation of Cambuhy into an orderly concern, and for this reason he wanted to know exact details about the railroads, roads, fences, contours, and cultivations on Cambuhy, information never known to GaviSo Peixoto.^2 He took advantage of this survey to divide into lots an area of 700 alqueires called Meia L^gua on the Jacarl River which was already almost surrounded by the three government colonies. This area was far ^See Chapter III, pp. 63-64. 12 Contract lies in MagalhSes Papers , Dossier 34. Survey and report on it are in Cambuhy Papers , Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 8.

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108 from the administrative headquarters of the company and could be sold in lots of a few algueires without breaking the unity of the estate. Moreover, by this action MagalhSes not only gained some valuable capital but provided his estate with a new source of labor. 13 The lots of nine or ten algueires were sold for two Sontos of each, usually with 600$ 000 as a down payment and the rest in ten annual installments. Throughout 1915 the Italian and Spanish language newspapers of SSo Paulo carried full-page advertisements of the lots at Meia Legua. These sang the glories of landownership and the fact that ten years' hard work could create a family heritage. The cost of the annual installments could be covered by fattening and selling pigs, while the timber on the lots was worth more than the down payments. These announcements clearly show the value of human effort on the frontier. 14 A goodly number of people decided to seek this "fortune in health and money." By August, 1917, fifty-six of the seventy-two lots were sold and the installments came in regularly. After a few installments many lot holders were able to pay off their debts. Some were able to sell their land after a short time for two or three times what they had paid for it. MagalhStes experiment had made its contribution 13 C.I.A.P., Reiatflrio da Directoria. 1915 . p. 33. 14 Di£rio Espafiol (S3o Paulo), April 23 to October 22, 1915. Fanful la (SSo Paulo), April 7 to August 28, 1915.

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109 to the colonization of the zone. 15 Despite these early creations of small properties, Cambuhy, like all the state of S3o Paulo, was still under the regime of the great domain with its vast stretches of land, its unexploited forests, and its pastures. MagalhSes, like many a fazendeiro , was faced with the problem of finding a vital, cheap labor force to work as colonists in the coffee lands; and, like the others, his solution was found in immigration. Coffee, in effect, populated the southeast of Brazil with immigrants. These immigrants came not only from Europe but also from the northeast of Brazil. In 1920 MagalhSes had some 80 families sent from the State of Cear^ to work on Cambuhy. Great landowners such as the Condo de Prates, the Conselheiro Antdnio Prado, and MagalhSes usually negotiated for labor with chiefs of police in nortista cities. These officials were supposed to choose good workers, but considering the state of misery, poverty, and dejection so current in the drought-plagued backwoods, the quality of the workers sent was often doubtful. For example, one group of 45 families sent in 1920 contained 235 people but only 88 men and boys able to work. MagalhSes paid their sea passages to Santos and railroad fares into the interior and, considering their condition, had to provide the basic essentials of 15 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Director ia, 1917 , p. 10; MagalhSes Papers . Dossier 44.

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110 living for the first months of their stay. All this the colonists were expected to pay back from their earnings. 16 The predominant nationality of colonists who came to live on Cambuhy was Italian. This was the case in the whole of the State of S3o Paulo, where particularly on big fazendas but also in State and Federal colonies Italians were most numerous as agricultural laborers. Although these people lacked education and culture, yet they were apt to living life with tenacity and energy. Providing some seven-tenths of the total numbers of immigrants, the Italians had made possible the late nineteenth and early twentieth century expansion of coffee production in SSo Paulo. 17 Italian language newspapers in SSo Paulo frequently spoke out against the miserable condition of Italians living in the interior of Brazil; and the Italian government, particularly under Mussolini, constantly promised to take action on their behalf. 18 MagalhSes usually acquired his Italian immigrant colonists by negotiations with the Italian emigration authorities and various immigration companies. 1 6 Magalh3es Papers , Dossier 35. Letter from Chief of Police of Fortaleza, Cear5, to MagalhSes, dated February 28, 1920. 17 Walle, Au Br4sil , p. 30; Alfredo Ellis Junior, A Evolu 9 So da economia paulista e suas causas (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1937) , PP . 180-81 . 1 8 Il Piccolo (SSo Paulo), August 10, 1923.

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Ill These bodies were supposed to regulate the flow of immigrants and assure their well-being. A typical contract approved by the Italian authorities for immigrants proceeding to Cambuhy was that offered by the Companhia Commercial de SSo Paulo. The immigrant received free transportation for himself, his family, and their baggage from Italy to Brazil, free accommodation in SSo Paulo and transportation to the fazenda , where working conditions would be agreed upon by the fazendeiro , the company, and a representative of the Italian Consul. The future colonist was guaranteed a certain monthly wage per 1, 000 trees he cared for and assured the right to interplant corn and beans amid these coffee trees which would be alloted to him in proportion to his working capacity. The fazenda was expected to provide schools in which the instruction of Italian language, history, and geography were to be obligatory. Free medical treatment would be given and medicines sold at prevailing prices. There was to be no forced buying in the fazenda store and the house provided for the colonist was to be considered inviolable except in cases of criminal or sanitary inspection. In the first days after arrival the colonist would be given victuals and also the tools necessary for his labor. These contracts were usually for three years, during which time the colonist was expected to pay off his debts. The colonist was to be fined up to Rs. 25$000 (U.S. $5.25) for disobedience in his work, the fines forming a benefit fund for all. Consular agents had

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112 the right to inspect the living conditions of the workers and to see that the contracts were being carried out* If at the end of three years the colonist was free of debt, he could return home if he wished. 19 Such arrangements put a great deal of trust on the individual fazendeiro , as no amount of inspection could assure that the details of the contracts were carried out. On an estate as large as Cambuhy no agent could hope to exercise any detailed supervision over the many Italian families who arrived at various railroad stations in the neighborhood. The immigrants knew no more than the name of the station they were going to and the name of the administrator who would set them to work. To the administrator they were merely lists of surnames, of the numbers in each family, and the number of coffee trees each family would look after. What happened thereafter depended on the patrSo in the big house. 20 It was not only Italians who journeyed from Europe to Cambuhy in the time of NhonhS MagalhSes. Portuguese and Spaniards also suffered the rigors of a third-class passage from Lisbon or Gibraltar to Santos and then after a week's stay at the Hotel d ' IramigragSo journeyed out on to the plateau to a new life. Announced by a list of their names and 19 Many exemplars of such contracts were found in MagalhSes Papers. Dossier 35. 20 Ibid . Letter from Inspettorato dell 'Emigrazione I ta liana al Brasile, to MagalhSes, December 28, 1921.

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113 ages, these people arrived with such possessions as they could carry to start their new life on Cambuhy. 21 These immigrants usually came in family groups and the contract signed with the father of the family considered him as the head of a group of workers. Compared with many a person living in the interior of SSo Paulo at the time, the coffee colonist was in a favored position. He was a free man and received a free house, often of brick or wooden construction on the brow of a hill . Moreover, he received free water and on Cambuhy, in many cases, free electricity also. 22 Each family on Cambuhy cared for from 6, 000 to as many as 18,000 trees at a rate of some 2,000 trees per adult worker. The round of agricultural tasks never ended and the colonist was required to look after the coffee in a proper fashion, replant any gaps and weed the trees in such a way and at such a time as the fazendeiro w ould indicate. If any extra labor were needed to keep up with the needs of the coffee, it was to be hired at the colonist's expense. 22 In return for all his labor the colonist was paid a fixed annual sum per 1,000 trees which he cared for aid a fixed amount per sack of 100 liters of coffee in husk harvested. These sums were determined by the contract, as was 21 Ibid. Letter from Antunes dos Santos e Companhia to agents in Spain, March 28, 1923. 2 2 Magalh3es Papers , Dossier 29. Contracto para o anno acrrlcola de 1924-25 . 23 Ibid.

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114 the rate of a daily wage to be paid to the colonist for any work outside contractual obligations which he might do for the fazenda, when summoned by the administrator. The colonist also had the right to plant two rows of beans amid a fourth part of the coffee trees he treated and received good lands elsewhere on which to grow corn and rice. His animals were given pasture and large communal pigpens were provided for his use. 24 The immigrant colonist frequently got into debt, particularly in his first years, but many of these early pioneers on Cambuhy showed themselves to be hardworking, hardy, and thrifty. By economy, many cleared their debts in from two to three years and profited from the yields of young coffee trees on good land to save a few contos of r£is to buy a small plot of land. Of such origins were many of the lot holders at Meia L§gua. 25 The colonist's life on the paulista plateau in the early decades of this century was a complex mixture of liberty and responsibility. For some seven months of the year he worked as he liked within the limits of general supervision from his fazenda administrator. The colonist had the sense of being an employee really only during the harvest season, when he helped to pick, to dry, and to transport the crop. His expenses were small and he needed to buy only 2 4 Ibid . 2 5 Macralh5es Papers, Dossier 44.

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115 sugar, salt, and other inexpensive basic essentials in order to live. These he could purchase from whatever source he chose and indeed the administration of Cambuhy loaned carts to colonists to transport their goods bought in nearby towns. On the other hand the coffee colonist, the original substitute for the slave, in the early twentieth as in the late nineteenth century enjoyed a liberty which was more apparent than real. In actual fact he was bound to the land by contract and by debts. On Cambuhy the colonist was given money advances only for food or in case of illness, but in a bad harvest year these debts could mount up to a considerable sum. On November 1, 1924, the total of colonists' debts on Cambuhy came to Rs. 142:557$400, close to U.S. $15,700. The The colonist's animals and cereal crops were the guarantee of his debts to the fazendeiro . This coffee worker had to give thirty days' notice to terminate his contract, and the alternative to paying his debts and receiving his due, was to run away, a solution to which not a few resorted. 27 Colonists were the bulk of the labor force on Cambuhy in the time of MagalhSes but there were by no means the only type of labor there. Like several other very large fazendas Cambuhy, which continually needed varied tasks done, kept a 2 6 Magalh5es Papers . Dossier 29. Contracto para o anno agricola de 1924-25 . 27 Ibid ., Resumo Geral dos Devedores das Fazendas da C.I.A.P

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116 force of salaried agricultural workers or labor gangs to perform these odd services. As many as 100 families were used in this work living in conditions similar to the coffee colonists and receiving monthly payments for their labor. 29 Nhonhd MagalhSes also continued the practice of giving land to agregados , which had been begun in the time of the Conselheiro GaviSo Peixoto. Faced with large swaths of untouched land, it was worthwhile giving small sections of it to these small farmers, who would clear it, plant their crops for a stipulated number of years, usually three, and then hand back the land to be used as pasture. In 1918 there were some sixty-two families enjoying this privilege. 29 Another practice from the conselheiro 1 s time, that of sharecropping, was also maintained by MagalhSes, although not in coffee cultivation but in the growing of cotton. Uhonh6 both sharecropped cotton and rented land on which tenants could grow cotton and cereals. This was done particularly with Japanese immigrants. This flow of Japanese labor was deeply resented by many in the state of SSo Paulo and opposed volubly by others. MagalhSes, on the other hand, at a heated session of the Sociedade Rural Brasileira eloquently defended the Japanese immigrants. 2 ^C.I.A.P., Relat
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117 Nhonhfi, described as the "Catullus of the Coffee Grove, " felt that Brazil as a young country ought not to refuse any inmigrants of value and noted pointedly that the evil spoken of Japanese was their habit of making money quickly. While planters lamented the Japanese habit of exhausting the land they rented, yet the state benefited when the Japanese farmer set up on his own small farm. 30 On Cambuhy MagalhSes found no other immigrants to show such productive capacity, continence, order, and obedience. Typically the Japanese farmers on Cambuhy did not like to sharecrop but wanted to rent land and paid well for it. An average price of Rs. 500$000 to Rs. 600$000 per annum per algueire was paid, but some six to eight contos of r£is were taken out of it. To MagalhSes the Japanese were eclipsing the Italians and Portuguese immigrants in agriculture and the Syrians in business. 3 The Japanese laborers were the only ones on Cambuhy to have gardens around their houses. They displayed a considerably higher percentage of literacy and generally were ideal members of the community. MagalhSes felt it premature to hold their non-assimilation against them. Rather he noted they were the only immigrants to bring their national flag to Cambuhy. These hung side by side with yellow and green of Brazil on the Independence Day of Brazil and on the 3 0 Jornal do Brasil (Rio), November 20, 1924. 31 Gazeta de Noticias (Rio), November 23, 1924.

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118 Birthday of the Mikado in September, 1924. This was done in almost all the 300 houses occupied by Japanese families on Cambuhy at the time. 32 To MagalhSes, Cambuhy was like many another vast rural property with fertile soil and a great future, only in need of a strong, well-oriented labor force. He was intolerant of economically useless or socially pernicious persons and made clear that on Cambuhy in this epoch of struggle and superactivity to sow, produce, and transform, malingerers and parasites would not stay long. Needless to say the Companhia Industrial, Agrfcola e Pastoril d'Oeste de s3o Paulo could not house and employ all the labor it needed and the answer was found in contracting outside help. 33 All types of work were contracted out in MagalhSes' time from the building of houses to the clearing of forest, but the most important from the point of view of economic development were the contracts for the formation of new coffee plantations. In the years after the Great War, MagalhSes relied heavily on coffee contractors to fell and clear the forest, align and plant the new coffee bushes. By 1924 close to a million and a quarter trees had been set out by these contractors . 34 3 2 Ibid . 3 3 Trfbuna (Santos), December 20, 1917. A C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 100, Enclosure No. 2.

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119 This was a system used by MagalhSes for increasing the number of coffee trees at a very low cost. The contractor received a piece of land and bore the expenses of clearing the forest and planting the coffee. At the end of a period of six years he was required to hand back a young plantation fully formed without any indemnification whatever. These laborers and their families during the period of the contract were like small proprietors. They had the use of the land between the rows of coffee for the first four years, while their real profit came from the fruit produced by the young coffee trees from the fourth to the sixth year. It was in the contractor's interest to cultivate the trees to the best of his ability in order to have them produce the maximum amount of fruit before he handed them over. 36 The coffee contractor enjoyed a social prestige higher than that of the colonist, but his living conditions were similar to or worse than those of the colonist. The contractor had to build his own makeshift house but received the privileges of a colonist as regards pastures for his animals and the use of the communal pigpens. 36 From the status of a laborer one might rise to be a colonist; thence, when one had saved money a contract to plant and raise coffee might be made. The profits from the latter work frequently made the purchase of a small plot of land possible. 3 5 The Times (London), May 10, 1928. Company Meeting of C.A.F.P. 36 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 1, Enclosure No. 3.

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120 Cambuhy in the time of Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes was what was described as the typical Brazilian unit of population, which was not the village but the large estate, the fazenda with its colonies or groups of workmen's houses spread out over the estate, Cambuhy's labor force like Brazil's entire rural population was essentially dispersed. 37 The Brazilian or immigrant colonist lived in a world bound by the horizon of his own particular area close to the coffee plantations. This world was served by Calabrian or Syrian peddlers who arrived with their stock of cheap goods and by the itinerant doctors, dentists, and even notaries who came to sell their services. 3 ® Fazendas all over the plateau bore a common aspect. They were highly picturesque, with the vivid green of the coffee trees rising from the red earth outlined against the vivid blues and greys of the sky. The peasants in their red-stained clothes lived in monotonously regular little rows of houses. These afforded only moderate comfort, but the climate and the smallness of the houses made for outdoor living around the confines of the colony. 39 Each fazenda was a little closed world which the colonists and other laborers seldom left during the year. 37 'Pierre Deffontaines, "The Origin and Growth of the Brazilian Network of Towns, " Geographic Review . XXVIII (July, 1938), 379. 38 Interview with Mr. Alberto Benassi, April 29, 1960. 39 Denis, Le Br4sil au XX g si£cle . pp. 136-37.

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121 Rather, life was a constant fight against the weeds, as many as six hoeings in the coffee being needed in wet years. Harvesting was done in troops with the age-old bell announcing the start of work, the hour of rest, and the end of the day. Like an old plantation of colonial days, the fazenda supplied itself with pork, jerked beef, bacon, manioc and corn flour, sugar, aguardente , coffee, and various common medicines, and so there was little dependence on nearby towns. Only on Sundays did the laborers enjoy an illusion of independence, when they might play games or cards and visit the local towns to spend their earnings or the money they made from neg6cios concerning their produce and animals. 40 Internal order on a large estate was a great problem i and a landowner had to assure peaceful conditions to make work possible. There was no police force to assure respect of law, person, or property. A severe fazendeiro was often the best assurance of safety, and in MagalhSes' case he received a great deal of respect from his workers. The campo n&s or peasant wanted the protection of a rich man and in return gave support to him, creating a type of manorial relationship. On the whole the workers on Cambuhy were quiet and well-behaved or else they were dismissed. The idea of a union or worker's society amid ignorant people of diverse tongues and nationalities was unthinkable. Moreover, coffee 4 0 Ibid ., pp. 138-39.

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122 colonists in particular were a nomadic people, who stayed a few years then accepted free transportation from another fazendeiro to move elsewhere. 4 ^ The laborers on Cambuhy in the early years of this century enjoyed comparatively good health in relation to the state as a whole. Originally the marshy lands along the Jacare River had been a great cause of fevers; but as the forest was felled and the land drained, these had disappeared by the time of NhonhS MagalhSes' purchase of the estate. 42 Of a total population in 1916 of 1, 720 souls, there were only 9 deaths on the property, 4 being adults and none being due to fevers. In the next year, however, there were reported several cases of malaria. In 1919 there was a 'flu epidemic on the fazenda , which claimed some 11 lives; and in the following years some Japanese immigrants brought paratyphoid fever to the estate which also caused a few deaths. These illnesses were, however, passing phases. By far the largest percentage of the estate's small death rate was due to such causes as gastroenteritis, pneumonia, and meningitis. Deaths in childbirth in isolated areas were also not unknown. Such was the price paid by many a pioneer in search of fortune. 43 41 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1918 , p. 22. 4 2 Maqalh3es Papers . Dossier 30, Relat6rio of June 27, 1911. 43 C.I.A.P. , Relat6rlo da Directoria, 1916 , p. 8; Rela t6rio da Directoria, 1917 , p. 10; Relat6rio da Directoria .

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123 Even during the wartime shortage of manpower, MagalhSes never had any great trouble in finding colonists and contractors. By mid-1917 no less than 329 colonists had visited Cambuhy and 228 others had sent inquiry letters, many with financial guarantees on their coming to work the next year. Several of the main reasons for this state of affairs were the easy transportation by railroad and then by company highways to the fazenda and the profits to be reaped from working young coffee in its prime. There were, it was said, no poor people on Cambuhy; and in that same year of 1917, the cereals and other crops harvested by the colonists had a value of over 300 contos of rlis (U.S. $75,000) while the contractors had some 50, 000 arrobas of coffee to sell worth a further 300 contos. 44 Colonists in general were unstable people, always moving in search of success in the form of having enough money to buy a piece of land. Not a few of the many Europeans and Brazilians who worked on Cambuhy achieved this success. In 1918 after two years' work on the estate, five Italian immigrants had accumulated savings to a value of over 150 contos of r|is. Also spectacular was a Japanese named Miasaki Matagoro, who by his own efforts in one year achieved a net profit of eight contos . At that time the laborers, contractors, and colonists had grazing on Cambuhy no less than Relatdrio da Directoria, 1919 , p. 10? Pelat6rio da Dlrec toria, 1920 , pp. 8-9. See Appendix III, Table 3, for population statistics. 44 C.I.A.P., Relat6rio da Directoria, 1917 , p. 10.

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124 1, 899 pigs, 683 cows, 321 goats, 476 working animals, and 28 sheep safely valued at some 250 c ontos of rlis. Circumstances certainly existed whereby the pioneer could make his way in the new world if he worked hard enough. 4 ^ NhonhS MagalhSes was not only outstanding as a businessman and gentleman farmer but played the role of the patriarch on his estate with characteristic vigor. In days when immigrants were considered as little more than cattle, he was already thinking of the economic and social advantages of raising their standard of living. He had ideas of an infirmary on Cambuhy with two pharmacies, a first-aid post, and a maternity division all at the fazenda 's cost. Schools and creches were to be built to educate and feed the young, while a small church was needed. His plans for better houses for colonists of brick and tile construction with tile floors raised off the ground and bigger rooms were put into action. Old mud and wattle and wooden buildings with beaten earth floors were gradually replaced on Cambuhy after 1920. 46 In addition to these improvements to the workers' homes, giving some of them electric light and better kitchens, MagalhSes set about to improve their financial status. In 1924 he raised his colonist rates to Rs. 200$000 per 1,000 trees per year and Rs. 600$000 per sack of 100 liters of coffee picked. This was double the rate paid in 1915. 4 ~*C. I.A.P. , Relat
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125 NhonhS also raised the rates paid to daily workers and stopped the system of fines, leaving it up to each gang foreman to find better ways to maintain discipline. 47 The need for a good labor force caused benefits to be given to agricultural workers throughout the State of S3o Paulo. MagalhSes ' care and interest for his work people is perhaps best revealed in the curious pamphlets in Italian and Spanish he had written for them to help them after their arrival on Cambuhy. Many an immigrant in the hostel in s3o Paulo must have read Cambuhy' s propaganda, which asked if he wanted to live happily, be healthy, have plenty, and make his fortune. Many took the advice to visit and then settle somewhere on the Fazendas do Cambuhy. A few made their fortunes, others suffered; but the majority found a hardy existence somewhere between these two extremes. Cambuhy must have seemed to many to be a strange new world where the language spoken, although akin to their own, sounded odd to their uneducated minds. These immigrants found houses, various tools, and the necessities of life for the first few weeks awaiting them on their arrival and in addition small pamphlets containing advice. These ranged from counseling good housekeeping, culinary cleanliness, and personal hygiene to such matters as not drinking unboiled water in the hot season or eating strange fruit. Lastly • ^MagalhSes Papers . Dossier 35. Letter from MagalhSes to one Frontini of the Italian Emigration Authorities, February 10, 1923. i

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126 they were advised to be thrifty and resist the temptations of alcohol ism. 4® Certainly the most novel scheme devised by MagalhSes and the one which best reveals his advanced thinking was that of life insurance for colonists. In his own hand Nhonhd wrote out the original draft of the scheme and then had it translated into Spanish and Italian. These prospectuses encouraged the heads of families on Cambuhy to consider their situation and what would happen to their wives and children should they die. Thereupon they were exhorted to think of their health and give up the "accursed " pin ga or sugar brandy to which too many were addicted. As a reward for this sacrifice MagalhSes would put one conto of r£is per 1,000 trees, with a minimum of three con tos and a maximum of five contos , into a life insurance fund for each head of a family. A bonus of Rs. 50$000 per 1,000 trees was to be added for each year of good work completed, and in addition to this Pr&nio de Est^gio, MagalhSes offered a Pr@mio de Trabalho of a 20% addition to the colonist's accumulated fund at the end of three years' service. An averagesized family whose father died after three years in the scheme would receive some Rs. 7:500$000, which as was pointed out, was the basis of a fortune.^® ^ ®Magalh3es Papers , Packet 14. Arrivo al Brasile , Consign al Colon! . 4 9 MagalhSes Papers . Packet 15. Indicazioni per 1 Colon!.

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127 All this effort to improve the lot of workers on Cambuhy was very expensive, and on November 1, 1923, MagalhSes set aside some 200 con to s to cover the cost of these funds by reinsuring with a company in SSo Paulo. In return MagalhSes sought that each family should have at least three adult workers aside from the parents. Moreover, these insurance schemes were not to apply to new workers over fifty years of age or to those who were alcoholics or invalids. While insurance was to be paid regardless if the colonist was in debt to the company, it would not be paid if the insured head of the family was murdered by a member of it. Altogether this whole scheme was quite remarkable for its time. In fact it was too advanced for the colonists. The heads of the families proved to be afraid of insurance, feeling it suggested an abbreviation of life, and almost none took advantage of it in the last year of MagalhSes' control of Cambuhy. ^ In the years after he sold Cambuhy, Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes went on to carry out on ItaquerS, the neighboring fazenda which he had acquired in 1916, many of the plans he devised for Cambuhy. By 1927 Itaquer§ was a model fazenda with 780, 000 coffee trees, great stands of sugar cane and many of the amenities worthy of such an estate — a sumptuous big house, fine stables, swimming pool, and for the 5 Q Magalh5es Papers , Dossier 44. Drafts in MagalhSes hand dated July 10, 1923. 5] -Dl£rio da Nolte (SSo Paulo), April 28, 1926.

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128 colonists a hospital, a church, and several hundred electrically lighted brick houses. 52 On Cambuhy Magalh3es with a working capital which was small for such a stupendous enterprise had shown himself a man of dauntless courage, untiring energy, and a resourcefulness in finance which did him credit. He had developed Cambuhy and devised plans for it which his English successors were to implement. In its greatness it was as much a monument to his vision and energies and to their administrative prowess. 55 The droves of immigrant and native workers who worked on Cambuhy under MagalhSes had as their leader one of the great laborers of the state at the time, a creator of riches, who had all the fine qualities of the race which had dominated the old Vicentine plateau. With indefatigable energy and great powers of organization, NhonhS MagalhSes had shown true pioneer spirit, while his desire for personal gain had been tempered by his sense of duty as a leader. 5 2 P Jornal (Rio), October 21, 1927. 53 The Times . August 5, 1926

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CHAPTER VI A STRONGER FOUNDATION By the third decade of this century the region originally served by the Araraquarense railroad could no longer be described as the frontier or the pioneer fringe. The area was still somewhat untamed and immigrants continued to arrive in large numbers to populate the fazendas there. Yet the area was now definitely surpassed by the region around Piratininga and Aracatuba and by that, close to Catanduva and Rio Preto on the Alta Araraquarense Zone.* Araraquara was a bustling town of some 11, 000 souls, a local center of education, banking, and petty commerce. The businessmen concentrated on retail trade, the milling and grading of coffee and rice, and the transportation of these products to the coast. The city boasted some 2,000 buildings along its tree-lined streets, and the aspect of the frontier railhead town had gone. 2 Closer to the Cambuhy estate, the village of MatSo had grown from its humble origins as a patrimony, founded by seven fazendeiros in 1892, into a thriving pioneer town. *Moribeig, Pionniers et planteurs , pp. 174-75. 2 Picclonario chorocrraphico e aqrfcola do Estado de S5o Paulo (SSo Paulo: Secretaria da Agricultura, 1925), pp. 18-20. 129

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130 Some of its roads were paved and its several thousand inhabitants enjoyed improved education and medical facilities and such city conveniences as electric light, water, drainage, and telephone systems. Another and perhaps more important change had begun in the old Araraquarense zone. Many old territories and latifundias had been subdivided at least in part in smaller prosperous fazendas , making the zone one of the most advanced and richest in the state. There were some 429 properties in the Municlpio (county) of Araraquara with less than 41 hectares and only 2 with more than 5, 000 hectares out of a total of 748. 4 As compared with the other properties in the region, the lands belonging to the new English company certainly seemed monstrous in size. Indeed the Companhia Agrfcola Fazendas Paulistas possessed in 1925 the third largest number of coffee trees in the state and the largest number on one single property. 5 On the other hand the era of the small property had not yet come to S3o Paulo. In 1931 almost 50 % of all the coffee trees in the state were on larger properties.® 3 Eug§nio Egas (ed.). Os municlpios paulistas (SSo Paulo: Imprensa Official, 1925), pp. 1091-99. 4 Plccionario choro
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131 Moreover, although the fact that the twentieth century was an era of chronic overproduction of coffee seemed to number the days of the large fazendas , they were in a position to resist. All the official protection of coffee from the state valorization scheme in 1906 to the Permanent Defense of Coffee in 1921 to 1924, were in the last analysis a defense of the large property. These schemes encouraged planters to grow more coffee with the typical paulista lack of concern for future consequences of such an action. In the five years after the English acquisition of Cambuhy, the state coffee production almost doubled, an increase which Cambuhy mirrored on a small scale. 7 NhonhS MagalhSes had already started Cambuhy in the direction of scientific efficiency which would be a solid base for large scale agriculture. Moreover, the coffee production of an estate such as Cambuhy was large enough to permit the use of specialized techniques and expensive machinery which could be achieved by smaller planters only if they devoted themselves to coffee alone. Cambuhy could have these and experiment with policulture also. Such were the plans of the new owners. The Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas, which acquired Cambuhy in 1924, was a Brazilian subsidiary company formed in 1920 by the Brazilian Warrant Company, Limited, for the purpose of acquiring an estate known as Santa 7 Celso Furtado, Forma^ao econSmico do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Fundo de Cultura, 1959), pp. 205-10.

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132 Fudoxia, an old fazenda belonging to Senator Alfredo Ellis. Brazilian Warrant, which was engaged in the warehousing and marketing of coffee in Santos and elsewhere, was taking a logical step of acquiring interests in plantations, whose production it would handle. 8 To better develop the Estate of Cambuhy there was formed in London in February, 1925, a new company, Cambuhy Cotton and Coffee Estates, which acquired from the Brazilian Warrant Company the whole of the existing share capital of the Corapanhia Agrfcola Fazendas Paulistas. Cambuhy then had passed into the hands of the latter company with its legal domicile in Santos, held in turn by Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates in London. 9 Both of these entities were enthusiastic about the future and possibilities of Cambuhy. They estimated that a further 8, 000, 000 coffee trees could be planted on the estate, still leaving a very large area suitable for cotton, sugar cane, and cereals on what was the largest self-contained j block of good land in the State of SSo Paulo. Moreover, the fazendaÂ’s products could easily be shipped out by the railroads, which also permitted the exploitation of the timber resources on Cambuhy. By 1924 the Araraquarense branch line had five stations on the estate and two main line stations g Cambuhy Cotton and Coffee Estates, Limited, Prospectus (February, 1925), pp. 1-2. Several exemplars of this are archived on Cambuhy. 9 Ibid.

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133 close to it, while the Douradense railroad served the south of the estate with these stations close to but outside its boundary. The Paulista railroad had a private siding of eleven kilometers connecting with the Araraquarense for the transport of firewood and timber, obtained on the Estate. 10 i The new company anticipated immediate profit from coffee, cotton, and timber, with sugar and cattle to follow, when the necessary agricultural and technical arrangements had been made. The bulk of the coffee trees on Cambuhy dated from the time of MagalhSes and so were young and soon to be in their prime. Even the thirty-five year old trees looked splendid, when visited in early 1924, having recovered from the frost of 1918 as well as the heavy crop of 1923. On all of the Cambuhy estate in 1924 there was only one coffee mill, the coffee drying grounds were of earth only, and there were no arrangements for washing the coffee. It was therefore deemed as necessary to erect two or more coffee mills at convenient places on the estate in order to save transportation and to facilitate the distribution of coffee husk as fertilizer. Moreover, the new owners planned to build brick drying terraces and many other constructions and houses to make possible their long term development plans. 11 1 0 Ibid ., p. 3. 11 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

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134 The Companhla Agricola Fazendas Paulistas did not, however, intend to rely merely on profits to be had during the boom of planting coffee in the 1920's. An English cotton expert who examined the estate for the company noted that the quality of Cambuhy's terra branca was rich and fertile. He estimated that some 2,000 alqueires were suitable for cotton cultivation. One Japanese tenant, despite the bad practice of planting cotton on the same land for four consecutive years, had harvested more than 400 pounds of lint per acre on each year. This was compared to yields of 132 pounds in the United States in 1923. This expert felt that Cambuhy could undercut the price of Texas cotton on the London market.*2 Coffee in the late nineteenth century had changed the Araraquarense zone from one of sugar production to coffee cultivation. As a result there was a local shortage of sugar and alcohol, as consumption had risen by 1924 to six times the amount produced. The English company, therefore, planned when capital permitted to plant cane fields on virgin soil and erect a sugar mill and distillery to take advantage of the demand. *-3 Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes had left to his English successors a notable example of development. During his thirteen years of ownership he had planted 2,079,000 coffee trees, 12 Ibid ., pp. 5-6. 13 Ibid ., p. 6.

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135 built roads, installed telephones, and fenced large areas of pasture. Cambuhy had already become an estate of superlatives with sixty kilometers of railroad track, seven tons of telegraph wire and 3,200 residents on it. Its coffee production amounted to 75,000 bags yearly. 14 On the other hand Carlos Leoncio was chronically short of capital, or rather he was consistently overinvested. His coffee planting program had by 1924 badly outstripped the construction of the vast rudimentary necessities for handling coffee and storing the fazenda products. This situation was much aggravated by forest fires which swept the fazenda from July to October in 1924 and which burnt virgin forests, pastures, camps, fences, corrals, brickyards, and even railroad ties on the firewood siding, twisting the rails and destroying over 50, 000 cubic meters of cut firewood. Even young coffee trees at Cambuhy and California were destroyed. ^5 It was this bleak and disorganized property with more than 1, 000 cattle wandering over it with no fences to hold them and little green food to live on that was taken over on November 7, 1924, by a small group of English administrators. They had journeyed out to the fazenda from S3o Paulo by a circuitous route to avoid the fighting between the state and 14 Arthur Bennett, "Historic Cambuhy — Scene of Modern Experiments, " Brazilian Business , XXXVII (July, 1958), 19-20. 15 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 100, p. 2.

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136 federal governments close to the capital in that winter. Their orders were to plant unlimited areas in coffee and cotton and to make preparations to handle the crops of the 2,500,000 coffee trees on the estate, soon to be in bearing. This task was to be made no easier by a lack of working capital and only a microscopic staff, which at best had everything to learn. Altogether this type of challenge was likely to bring out the best qualities and abilities of the new administrators. Here was the chance to build, to colonize, to create an economic empire. The condition of the estate in 1924 and the recent disaster fixed in the minds of the newcomers the power of nature aid the dependence of even the strongest agricultural enterprise on basic realities. The first managing-director of the estate was a Mr. J. A. Davy, who for many years had been manager for the Dumont Coffee Company, Limited, on their great estates near RiberSo Preto. As assistant manager there came to Cambuhy in 1924 a Mr. Daniel A. Haggard, who had considerable experience in sugar estate management in Brazil. In fact, Mr. Davy remained on Cambuhy only during its first transitional years, leaving to Mr. Haggard in June 1927, full control of the estate. In the next quarter of a century Cambuhy was to owe its progress, achievements, and fame to the efforts of this enlightened, able, and just administrator. 1 6 Ibid ., pp. 2-3.

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137 Mr. Daniel Haggard came from an eminent English family, many members of which had careers in public service. His personality was exactly that demanded by the English tradition of a colonial administrator. These qualities, such as probity, justness, and attention to detail, were in some ways those most desired in an old style Brazilian fazendeiro . Yet Brazil and the world were changing and the history of the English ownership of Cambuhy can be seen not only as one of development and awakening in the interior of s3o Paulo but also as a latterday flowering of the best in English administration overseas. Cambuhy until the depression was still in a pioneer phase and this strong administration was to act as final cement to the foundations of the enterprise. The records and reports of these years are sharp and to the point, meticulously noting all plans and developments. These years were hard ones of long days of labor and small physical results. Yet Haggard's honesty and fair-mindedness seems to have inspired Englishman and Brazilian alike, giving a heartening aspect to an otherwise bleak scene. With true British rigor Mr. Haggard and his small band of administrators worked six days a week from seven in the morning until six in the afternoon and still felt the need to work on Sunday mornings, when pay was distributed to the 17 This description of conditions and attitudes is based on interviews with Messrs. A. H. Grossman, C. C. Landers, B. R. Pheysey, and J. c. Scott. The interpretation is the author ' s .

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138 workers. Out in the coffee lands the colonists and laborers worked from sunup to sundown. In these years before Vargas, working conditions in the interior of s3o Paulo differed little from the days when coffee first came to the region. To the young men who filled the minor echelons of the Cambuhy administration in these early years life resembled I that of colonial service, from which several had come. They were usually contracted in England to proceed to Brazil and after three years of continuous service with good conduct were entitled to four months home leave. These young men were also usually required not to marry before the age of twentyseven and so occupied bachelors' quarters constructed in the old fazenda house at Boa Vista. Since night fell before their day was over, their only free daylight time was on Sunday afternoons. It is not surprising that only a few men were willing to submit to these conditions, but those who did displayed remarkable energy and loyalty in their work . 18 Beneath this administrative superstructure there continued on Cambuhy the former varied administration-worker "> relationships. The system of working coffee by yearly contracts to colonists was maintained as the best assurance of a regular labor supply throughout the year, particularly at harvest time. In 1925 only some 80,000 coffee trees were 18 Ibid.

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139 uncolonized and worked for the company by day laborers . The contracts used by the new company in its first years were basically similar to those issued by NhonhS MagalhSes, yet there was a difference in spirit. MagalhSes had run the estate with all the license a private owner may exercise, granting extensions of contracts here and allowing extra advances of money to workers there, without the benefit of any extensive bookkeeping system. On the other hand, Mr. Haggard and the new administration were responsible to shareholders in England and as a result workers' debts were now more strictly controlled. The administrator in the big house still acted as the patron of the worker, but sympathetic interest was now tempered by bureaucratic efficiency. Typically the contracts were more specific about the exact amount of land, some 3,600 square meters per 1,000 trees, which the coffee colonist received on which to grow his cereals. The company also held first option to buy his crops at current rates. Contracts from 1924 onwards took into account the age of the coffee trees to be tended, as young trees were harder to care for, and also the locale and terrain of the block of trees (talhSo ) . Coffee cultivation in the sticky red terra roxa , where weeds grew abundantly, was more toilsome than in the sandy terra branca soils. In return for payment for looking after the trees throughout the year and harvesting the coffee and all the 19 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 1, pp. 5-8.

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140 material benefits he received the colonist was required to work hard, behave well and pick his coffee at harvest time. If help was needed to harvest his coffee, he was required to pick up coffee stripped on to the ground at half his usual rate for picking. The colonist had to pay for the transportation of his firewood, corn, beans, rice, and other produce by company transport. He was required to help with the upkeep of all estate's roads, keep his pastures and pens clean, and fight against locusts or other pests, should they appear. The only major innovation by the new company was provision of medical service, in part paid for by the colonist in the form of a minimum monthly contribution. 20 The rates paid to colonists varied with the labor market and the expected harvest and in these first years rose due to the coffee boom. The minimum rate per 1,000 trees in 1924 was Rs. 250$000 and it reached as high as Rs. 400$000 before the depression. 21 Generally it is true to say that the English paid only the going rate in the region, but it is hard to assess the actual value of a colonist's reimbursement because of the differences in material benefits from fazenda to fazenda . The Cambuhy contracts sang the praises of the pasture lands given, the houses, the drinking water and much else, but perhaps their most attractive assets were order, stability and the fact that the company paid its workers regularly. 2 0 Ibid .. Enclosure No. 5, Colonist Contract 1925-26. 21 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 98, Enclosure No. 5.

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141 The coffee contractor remained a familiar figure on the Carabuhy estate in these years. Indeed, many remained to fulfill contracts for the formation of coffee groves, which had been signed with MagalhSes.^ 2 Moreover, the new company with its extensive planting program made many new contracts. Some of these were for four years only, and in this case the contractor received land already cleared and planted with young trees. This arrangement gave the contractor time to develop the seedlings into fully bearing trees, meanwhile having the profits from interplanted cereals and the coffee crops on the third and fourth years. The contractor also received pastures on which to keep a few cattle, a temporary house, and the medical facilities available to colonists. In return for these and a small annual payment per 1, 000 trees, the contractor had to tend the young plants faithfully and was liable to a fine for each cova or hole which did not have the correct number of seedlings in it. The company reserved the right to buy his cereals and mill his coffee at market prices and required him to put up a financial guarantee of some Fs. 200$000 per 1,000 trees, which was to be forfeited if the contractor did not live up to the agreement.^ 2 2 Cambuhy Papers , Banco Moreira Salles, Document No. 23. 23 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report . No. 1, Enclosure, No. 4, Contracto para a forma c3ode cafdzaes novos (Quatro Anos) .

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142 More common than this fouryear contract was a six-year agreement similar to that used in MagalhSes time. It this case the contracted party was presented with an area of virgin forest which he was required to fell and clean. Thereafter he aligned, marked, and opened up the covas , and after planting the seedlings, protected them from the sun's rays with small pieces of wood. The contractor in this case was required to construct his own dwelling. This six-year contractor by the end of two years was expected to be up to the point at which the four year contractor began. The longer term contractor received the same benefits as the shorter, and he too was governed by a series of rules and fines set up to assure proper planting, spacing, and treatment of the coffee trees. The contractor usually made a good profit from the agreement, while the company after a few years had coffee groves where once there stood virgin forest. 24 In 1924 the Cambuhy estate was divided for administrative purposes into nine sections. Eight of these produced coffee, which was dried on the sections and then sent to Boa Vista for milling. These sections were each managed by an administrator, who as a farm manager carried out the agricultural policy determined at the Boa Vista headquarters. The administrators were usually Brazilian, but several young Englishmen were trained for management by acting as chiefs of sections. Below the administrator, who usually rode on 24 Ibid ., Enclosure No. 3, Contracto para a forma^gp caf&zaes novos (Seis Anos) .

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143 horseback, were some three flscaes or gang foremen who normally were literate and whose job it was to lead the laborers (camaradas ) in the fields. 25 Such was the administrative and labor force which set out in 1924 to develop coffee cultivation in Cambuhy. By the end of their first year they had set out nurseries for coffee seedlings on seven administrative sections, some 330,600 trees had been planted there, and plans were made to plant a similar number each year. All hardwood logs and firewood were removed from the sites of the new plantations and hauled to convenient deposits, whence they could be used for fazenda construction work or sold. Three new coffee mills were projected with stores, water installations, and great brick drying grounds, while for immediate needs a refitting of the existing Boa Vista mill was carried out. 26 Most of the coffee on Cambuhy in these early years was coffea arabica of the Bourbon strain, the most common in Brazil. This type of tree could grow to some ten meters in height, but on the estate, as in all Brazil, seldom reached five meters. Four seedlings were planted in each hold, thus affording themselves a certain amount of selfshading. Their roots ran to a depth of some two to three meters and soil conditions gave regular harvests for thirty or more years, depending on their fertility, richness in minerals and humus, 25 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report, No. 1, p. 3. 2 6 Ibld ., Enclosure No. 1, p. 1.

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144 and their capacity to retain water. 27 The agricultural year of the fazenda began in November when usually the hoeing of weeds in the coffee lands and the distribution of manure was under way from the previous September. November to January was the time of the year for replanting empty spaces in the ranks of the coffee trees. The first quarter of the calendar year, the hot wet summer was the season, when nature put up its most energetic opposition in the form of weeds to the development of man-made plantings. Thereafter, from April to September took place the long and complicated process of harvesting the crop. 2 ^ An early termination of harvesting the coffee crop and getting it into a store was the measure of success as regards quantity and, above all, quality. Generally speaking, coffee in the field deteriorated from July onwards and at an increasing rate as time went on. Weeds grew in the fields as the weeks went by making a full recovery of fallen coffee impossible. In those countries where cheap indigenous labor is available and coffee is grown under shade in rainy climates the berries when cherry red are gathered by hand one by one directly into baskets. In Brazil in general and on Cambuhy, on the other hand, the coffee was stripped on to the ground and then picked up. The preparatory operation to harvesting 27 Franga, The Coffee Trail , p. 23. 28 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 80, p. 1.

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145 was the me la coroa or scraping and mounting up of surface soil and trash into ridges running parallel along the rows of coffee trees. This was done some time in the first quarter of the year, depending on when the rains ended. Then there was carried out the coroa93o . when another set of ridges were created at right angles to the first, creating a checkerboard effect in the coffee lands. This operation was harmful to the trees as it presented exposed surface around them soon to be baked hard by the sun which could remain for as much as six consecutive months and thereby do great damage to the tender capillary roots of the trees. 29 While these two operations were done a certain amount of low quality coffee was usually recovered. However, the main picking came after the coroaySo when colonists and their wives and children went into the fields with their ladders to strip the trees while the fiscal watched to see that the work was well done and that no more than a few berries per tree were left either on the tree or on the ground. The colonists put their coffee into sacks provided by the company, each sack containing fiftyfive liters, and surrendered these to a company truck driver or carter v/ho came to collect the coffee and who gave them a ficha or receipt for each sack taken. 29 29 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report . No. 89, p. 5. 30 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 101, Enclosure No. 2, pp. 5, 9-10.

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146 The coffee, mainly dark red or brown, but with cherry red (cereja ) and green unripe berries mixed in also, remained in sacks only overnight before being taken to drying grounds. In these early days, Cambuhy had not yet facilities for washing coffee, which would separate cereja and greens from the boia or ripe coffee, and would get rid of stones and earth before the coffee went on to the drying grounds. Once there the coffee was spread out and laborers from time to time stirred it to aid the sun in drying it. Thence the coffee went into great stores or barns called tulhas where it “rested" for some twenty days before milling. 3i Milling in these early years was also a comparatively primitive process. At first the machinery acquired for the time of MagalhSes was used to remove the hard black husk and the straw-colored parchment which covered each coffee "cherry, " releasing the two beans within. When this was done and all the chaff blown away, the beans were graded by machine according to size, all broken beans being removed. Milling in these first years was at times complicated by the presence of sticks and sand amid the coffee or the sticky condition of the coffee husk. Thereafter, the clean coffee was stored until such time as it could be shipped by rail to the Brazilian Warrant Company in Santos. 32 3 ^ Ibid ., pp. 12-15. 32 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report . No. 5, pp. 1-3.

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147 This agricultural round was chronicled each year by the English administrators in the quarterly reports which they sent to London and Santos. This early period was one of trial, error, and reform, all of which led to greater efficiency. In late 1928 there was organized a recount of all the coffee trees on the estate, and it was decided to abandon a certain amount of coffee in low-lying, marshy areas, particularly on the S3o Bernardo section, where production was not profitable. Administrative efficiency in the next year led to a redrafting of MagalhSes master plan showing the correct number of trees in each talhSo on the estate. 33 The best example of improvement in these years was on Contribui
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148 center and a new mill constructed at Tamandu^. In the next year a third mill was in production at Alabama, serving the coffee plantations in the south of the fazenda . Lastly, in 1929 a fourth set of brick drying grounds and another mill were set up on the section called Cambuhy. All four of these milling centers were provided with coffee-washing facilities and in effect by the time of the depression Cambuhy was served with adequate equipment to process its coffee production. 35 These facilities and particularly the great brick drying terraces were given a full testing in these years before the great depression. Two bumper crops were handled and Cambuhy 's plant resources were fully utilized. The 1927-28 crop, which was more than three times the size of the previous year's small crop, had to be dried on temporary drying grounds and football fields; while the two existing mills worked around the clock. In 1929 in some areas of the estate the very high yield of 212 arrobas per 1,000 trees was harvested, but by this time facilities on Cambuhy were better prepared to cope with the crop. The tulha , or storage space available, was increased by constructing galvanized iron sheds, and drying machines were used at Boa Vista to speed up the handling of the crop. Contractors were hired to help with picking some 70% of the enormous crop that year, and 35 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports, No. 9, p. 5; No. 17, pp. 4-5.

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149 other emergency measures taken to assure a smooth and efficient handling of it. 3 ® The English administrators were in effect solving many of the problems which had beset NhonhS MagalhSes, but some difficulties were beyond their solution. At the time of the 1927 bumper crop the Araraquarense Railroad restricted the shipping of coffee from the estate and at no time gave Cambuhy sufficient freight cars to haul the amount of coffee allowed by the government quota. Moreover, Mr. Haggard, like many another fazendeiro , had to plead with the Instituto Brasileiro de Caf4, the state regulating authority, to adjust the quota granted to Cambuhy in view of its increased production. 37 Yet these problems were in themselves signs that Cambuhy like the rest of the state was riding along with the coffee boom. There was a growing sense of confidence in Cambuhy and one is struck by the accuracy of the new administrator's crop estimates. Company officials from Santos and London and distinguished members of the English communities in Rio de Janeiro and SSo Paulo began to visit Cambuhy and admire the activity there. The average age of the trees bought with the estate was 15.5 years by 1929, and this figure was reduced to 10.5 years if the newly planted trees were taken into account. 3 ®C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports, No. 10, p. 4? No. 18, pp. 5-7. 37 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 9, p. 6.

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150 Cambuhy was an estate in its prime. 38 These first years were busy ones when there was a constant expenditure of men and energy on coffee planting and development work. Because of the big crops, difficulty in getting reasonably priced labor, and the fact that the sections of the estate were too big, such agricultural operations as the removal of parasitic plants or suckers from the coffee, the pruning away of dry wood, and the removal of sap4 grass from the coffee groves had been neglected. In 1929, however, this situation changed? labor became more readily available and on Cambuhy an administrative reform led to the creation of four new sections. The English administration slowly began to build up its technical knowledge. As regards fertilizing the coffee trees, they rejected chemical and artificial fertilizers as too expensive for the results they gave. Instead they kept to the so-called scientific practices used by fazendeiros such as MagalhSes, but did so more efficiently. By using the forest mold available, setting up a distribution system for stable manure, and coupling these with the use of green manures such as Crotelaria , Pig, and Velvet beans, which had the added advantage of stopping wash in the coffee, the new administration settled on an effective and economical way of assurl ing longevity in the plantations. As these operations were noted in detail in the fazenda offices, the foundations for 38 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 19, p. 3.

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151 Cambuhy's later great stock of statistical information were laid. 39 All this effort on coffee cultivation in these first years did not prevent a start on the greater development of cotton on the Cambuhy estate. The recommendations of the English cotton expert, Mr. Arno Pearse, who visited Cambuhy in 1924, had been for a great extension of cotton planting on the estate, concentrating on one variety and for the construction of a cotton gin to handle the expected crops and attract supplies from the surrounding area. 49 Earlier in Cambuhy's history, MagalhSes had sharecropped cotton, handing over the land free of charge to the laborer and receiving in return 40% of his crop. However, when the English took over, most cotton was grown by Japanese on land which they rented at Rs. 150$000 per alqueire per annum, clearing the land and selling their cotton where they wished. 41 For one year the new administration sharecropped cotton on Cambuhy, giving land to the sharecropper to be planted half in cotton and half in cereals. The company also gave him seed, insecticides, a house, and some pasture land, receiving in return half the crop and the right to gin all of 3 9 Ibid ., pp. 5-8. 40 Cambuhy Cotton and Coffee Estates, Limited, Prospectus , p. 6. 41 Ibid.

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152 it. 42 After August, 1926, however, the contracts issued by the company were for arrendatarios or tenants. These men paid a nominal rental for their land and received from the company on credit insecticides to combat insect pests. Each year in June they left a deposit with the company which was returned to them when they started plowing in August. Thereafter they received credit for their living expenses, all of which was expected to be paid off by their profits on the cotton crop to be picked in the second quarter of the next year. 43 The story of cotton on the Cambuhy estate in the years before the depression was a disappointing one. There was much toilsome destumping and cleaning of lands by tenants to plant cotton bushes, which after yielding their crop were uprooted and the ground was prepared for the next year's planting. The administration proceeded with its plans for a cotton gin, the building work starting in early 1925 and the completed gin being handed over by an American machinery company on June 14, 1926. The gin was electrically powered and ready to work late in 1926. 44 Unfortunately, cotton prices in SSo Paulo in 1924 fell and there was no recovery before the end of the decade. As a result there were very few tenants on Cambuhy who wanted 42 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 1, Enclosure No. 2. 43 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 6, Enclosure No. 1. 44 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 5, pp. 3-4.

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153 to plant cotton. Insect pests and damage done by wild cattle were further deterrents. Few were willing to gamble against these uncontrollable factors . 45 The new administration set up a small experimental station on the Leopoldina section to conduct research with various cotton strains and to study agricultural methods. Moreover, arrangements were made for two years to plant an area of cotton in cooperation with the Bolsa de Mercadorias de SSo Paulo, the latter body sharing expenses and reserving the right to buy the cotton seed ginned from the cotton. Cooperative plantings were also done with the Secretaria de Agricultura, which also was eager to encourage cotton cultivation and the production of good seed. By 1928 some 130 algueires of land on Carabuhy were planted in cotton and in the next year a sliding scale for the purchase of cotton from tenants was introduced, the price for cotton in seed being 25% of that quoted on the sSo Paulo cotton exchange for the medium type five of lint cotton. This was to be the basis of the latter development of cotton on the estate . 46 The new administrators on Cambuhy did not share Nhonhfi MagalhSes* enthusiasm for cattle and in the first two years spent money only on pastures that were fairly well formed, the weaker ones being allowed to go back into scrub. Fences were kept in repair by several permanent small gangs of 45 C.A.F. P. , Quarterly Report , No. 10, pp. 7-8. 46 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 7, p. 15; No. 11, pp. 10-11; No. 17, p. 8.

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154 laborers and small numbers of thin cattle were bought for fattening. The herds of Hereford cattle bought with the estate were eventually rounded up, were sold off, and unneeded pasture was rented to local cattle dealers. 47 From 1927 onwards, however, there was more activity in the cattle department on Cambuhy. More fencing was done and areas were cleared of brush-wood and weeds. The last wild | steers were caught and branded, only the untamable being slaughtered. Cattle butchering realized a small profit, but it was done to supply the colonists and laborers with cheap meat, using cattle otherwise difficult to market. By 1929 the cattle department had 541 alquelres of good grazing paddocks and a further 2, 000 alqueires of weaker camp land at its disposal. Its activity had settled down to buying thin cattle from Mato Grosso and Goias either at Barretos in SSo Paulo or out in the interior itself, fattening them and selling them to the Armour Company's meat packing station in SSo Paulo. This fattening herd on the fazenda averaged about 7,000 head, of which 3,000 were sold each year. 48 The English company acquired from MagalhSes a good sawmill at Boa Vista and soon constructed another at Tamandua. However, the demands of constructional work on the estate were such that no sawn timber could be sold. The company disposed of logs felled to make way for n ew coffee planta47 C.F.A.P., Quarterly Report , No. 8, pp. 2-3. 48 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 15, Cattle Annex, pp. 1-3; No. 17, p. 10? No. 19, pp. 15-18.

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155 tions to contractors and sold concessions to various people to provide firewood from particular areas to the railroads. In 1926 the company purchased the private siding of the Paulista Railroad on Cambuhy and in the same year another firewood siding was constructed by the Araraquarense railroad. Yet the railroads in these years did not pay good rates and it was difficult to keep contractors up to date with their work. 49 Notable on Cambuhy in these years was the feverish activity to build houses on all sections of the estate. Each quarterly report carried news of a new colony here or there. Houses of brick construction were under way close to every coffee plantation, while wooden or mud and wattle houses sufficed as temporary dwellings for contractors. By the first quarter of 1926 there were 588 houses on Cambuhy with room for 846 families. 50 This provision of houses was intimately connected with economic development of the estate as without more houses there could be no increased labor force. Despite rising rates on Cambuhy, labor was often tempted away in these early years by greater interplanting concessions in coffee elsewhere. Moreover, many colonists felt a nomadic urge to 49 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 2, pp. 8-10; No. 14, p. 13; No. 19, p. 20. 50 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 4, p. 10.

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156 move closer to the ever moving coffee frontier. 51 The 5, 000 inhabitants on the Cambuhy estate in 1929 were predominantly of the same mixed European origin as those in MagalhSes' time, the Italians being the most numerous. The only great difference from the situation before 1924 was the disappearance of Japanese families as coffee colonists. The new administration did not share MagalhSes idealist view of these people, but found them unsuited to work with coffee. Most of the Japanese, although hard working, seemed to use the fazenda as a school of acclimatization, from which they soon hoped to graduate to proprietorship. 52 By the time of the depression there were 460 colonist families on Cambuhy who, on the average, looked after 7,400 trees per family. Life for many remained a hard battle with the elements, despite the fact that the new administration brought in a few of the refinements usually associated with English rule overseas. The medical services made available have already been noted. In 1926 a school was built and opened at Boa Vista with one classroom which could handle forty pupils. Unofficial schools organized by administrators functioned on two other sections and plans were made to 51 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 13, p. 10. 52 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 1, pp. 32-34; No. 23, p. 11.

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157 create more to fill an obvious need. 53 Altogether these early years had seen many foundations laid. The road network on the fazenda had been increased, and an extensive building program carried out which embraced bridges, drains, culverts, and the new coffee and cotton installations. Tractors, road-scrapers and plows all worked to improve the fazenda roads, while many a fine stand of forest provided the beams and supports of the new constructions. 54 All this had cost a great deal of money and the new company had severely strained its budget. A rise in the Brazilian exchange rate in 1926 and the fall in the price of cotton further complicated the situation. Yet the new enterprise was not financially disheartened. A few small land sales on Cambuhy and the breakup and sale of the Fazenda Santa Eudoxia helped to provide amounts of working capital. 55 Cambuhy 's coffee plantations were young and vigorous and the main essentials of constructional work were complete. The company had dabbled in cotton planting and built the gin, which was at least an imposing monument to English efficiency. Despite a lack of senior staff an accounting system had been evolved based on that of Fazenda Dumont. From such a base, great strides in social and economic development on Cambuhy could be expected. 53 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 5, p. 10. 54 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 11, pp. 16-18. 55 The Times . December 11, 1929.

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CHAPTER VII THE DEPRESSION The four years 1929 to 1933, whose aftermath changed the life of the world, were years of tragedy for Brazil. The economy of the republic was tightly interwoven with that of her overseas customers. As stock markets crashed in New York, London, and Paris, the coffee lands in Brazil soon felt the pinching effects of the world crisis as severely as the English stockholders of Cambuhy. Fazendeiros who had been riding on the crest of the green wave found themselves beached on their own sandy soil as the value of their produce came close to nothing. Coffee in Brazil is a spectacular crop, dependent on the urban population of industrialized countries and their purchasing power. Hence, in the last half century both coffee and Brazil have been greatly affected by changes wrought on the world market by two World Wars, the Korean War, and the depression. Each crisis on the world consumer market or fall in coffee prices has caused coffee planters in S3o Paulo to take radical steps, cutting down coffee bushes and giving the land over to pasture or some cash crop. In these times of weakness other crops favored on the world scene have flourished, such as mint, castor, peanuts, and above all 158

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159 cotton, the most common substitute for coffee on the p aulista land. At other times, particularly during the two great wars, there has been considerable speculation in cattle. Yet once the crisis is over, the new fads go and the old coffee regions are restored by the newer agricultural techniques, and the coffee frontier advances again. ^ Prom a long-term point of view the coffee slump during the depression was only a momentary setback to the advance by 1934 into new areas on the paulista plateau. Meanwhile, however, the situation gradually deteriorated. Heavy planting had been made all over the state right up to 1929, and thus the heaviest crop year was to be 1933, when the last of the trees came into bearing. No credit was available from abroad by which the government could retain more coffee in its attempt to keep prices high. Soon the government's credit was gone and coffee fell from U.S. 22.5$ per pound in September 1929 to U.S. 8$ exactly two years later. Destruction of coffee crops appeared to be the logical outcome of continually harvesting more coffee than could be sold. This excess of supply over demand kept coffee prices at a low point until late in the decade, indifferent to the recuperation elsewhere in industrialized countries after 1934. The answer to this situation for many a fazendeiro was to plant 1 Fran 9 a, op. cit .. pp. 18-19.

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160 cotton, sell his forests and, if necessary, parts of his land. 2 With the slump in coffee and official prohibition of new planting, all available lands on Cambuhy were put under cotton and the cotton gin there came into its own. No firstclass forest suited for eventual coffee planting was used, but good grasslands and second-class forest were utilized until as much as 2, 500 alqueires were under cultivation in one year. During the depression constructional work was carried on and coffee was maintained in a normal manner with regular fertilizing, replanting, and pruning. The administrators kept up and improved coffee standards on the estate and even in the hardest years did not allow colonists to plant beans amid more than the traditional 25% of the coffee they tended. Wages in these years were low, and labor was plentiful and hardworking. The cattle department also was expanding at this time and more work was done to improve the grazing grounds. Cambuhy* s strength was to be its method, which kept it growing when others failed. With care in harvesting and handling coffee in these bad years, the administrators created for Cambuhy a name on the European and American markets for quality. From the same soil as its neighbors Cambuhy yielded superior products which were the basis of its recovery from these years. o Monbeig, Pionniers et planteurs , pp. 103-104; Furtado, op. cit., pp. 224-26.

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161 A crisis struck the coffee market on October 5, 1929, when there began a headlong decline in prices, and the first effect of this on Cambuhy was a doubt in December as to whether low grades of coffee (escolhas ) would pay for the cost of freight and other expenses. In the first days of the new year the Instituto de Caf$ of SSo Paulo solved this problem by prohibiting the shipment of all coffees nominally inferior to type nine. This affected 3% of the Cambuhy production, and at once like many fazendeiros the administrators hoped that by remilling and handpicking, a certain amount could be improved and so shipped, while the lower grade coffees could be utilized for local consumption." 5 In March, 1930, the English administrators on Cambuhy found themselves with 4,649,948 coffee trees on some 2,423.5 alqueires of land. The trees were in good condition, ideal weather prevailed, and the production outlook was favorable. It was this production, or rather over production, which first state and later federal authorities were out to curtail. Early in 1930 the Instituto de Caf S of SSo Paulo stopped shipments of coffee to Santos for a time as their regulating warehouses along the railroads were absolutely full, causing long delays. Cambuhy thus tried to ship coffee to PSrto Esperan
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162 shipped to various ports, only 2, 731 bags had arrived at Santos to be sold. 4 From the fazendeiro * s point of view these years were greatly complicated by official regulations and difficulties with the railroads. The latter quickly became congested and fell far behind in the delivery of coffee. This fact further complicated the government regulations to a point that on one occasion, in order not to lose its place in the various series of shipment which the government permitted, Cambuhy allowed over 5,000 bags of coffee to be locked in a warehouse close to the railroad on the estate. The keys to this warehouse were surrendered to the Araraquarense railroad and a bill of lading for the coffee received in return. ^ In these years the classification, first by the Conselho Nacional do Caf £ and later the Departamento Nacional do Caf4, of coffees acceptable for shipment to Santos was both arbitrary and rigorous. Early in 1933, for example, an order came out allowing the shipment of coffee with an unlimited number of broken beans and shells, provided the sample was free of foreign matter and black beans. A little later this order was reversed, limiting the broken beans and shells to 33% of the sample by weight. All this was very disheartening to fazendeiros , as it was to the English administrators of Cambuhy. It was impossible to know when to do the right 4 Ibid ., pp. 8-9. 5 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 26, pp. 5-6.

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163 thing, particularly when laws were brought in with retrospective effect and rulings by official departments were not upheld by subsequent officials. 6 Not only did the interior of S3o Paulo face the effects of economic dislocation, but also those of political unrest. The coffee producer's fate in 1932 was made harder when the Constitutionalist Revolution engulfed much of the paullsta land in war. The revolution brought coffee shipments from Cambuhy to a halt for a time as both the Paulista and Araraquarense railroads ceased service entirely for the duration of the fighting.^ In these troubled times the keynotes of the Cambuhy administrators were regression, the effecting of economies, and the putting of the estate in order so that when the storm was over progress could ensue. The world and national situations caused a great deal of soul searching in the interior of SSo Paulo in these years. As a result a cautious policy of abandoning coffee trees of low productivity was followed on Cambuhy.® The depression also brought about changes in the methods of picking and drying coffee on Cambuhy. World crises and the limiting of production made fazendeiros more conscious of quality than they had been before. Previously coffee £ C.A.F .P. , Quarterly Report , No. 32, p. 3. 7 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 30, p. 3. ®C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 23, p. 3.

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164 picking on Cambuhy had begun at one place and proceeded right through the estate, a great, cumbrous operation in which overripe and green berries, big and small, those on the tree and those already discolored by lying on the ground were all taken together. Such a method did not make for a high-grade product. Starting in 1931 a new and more efficient harvesting method was followed. In the first place during the meiacoroa or raising of the first set of parallel ridges between the rows of coffee trees, the ground around the trees was swept and cleaned up to and in between the trunks. Any old coffee lying on the ground was thus buried. A varr^go . or sweeping up of all coffee on the ground, was also done throughout the plantations after the second operation, or the cor^go . This coffee was recovered and sent to the drying grounds.® Thereafter, a modified form of a system known at the time as colheita natural was put in practice. In each case picking was started on a block only after personal inspection by an administrator, with the object of always picking the ripest coffee. All the trees of the maragogype type, a different species from ar£bica , characterized by large beans, were left unpicked as they ripened late. When ready all the maragogype 9 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 25, pp. 2-3.

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165 coffee was picked at the same time and washed, dried, and milled separately. Everything was done to hurry the picking to eliminate as much as possible the risk of damage by rain. Where the coffee was dry enough, picking was done by shaking the branches with corn stocks. When done properly and not abused, the damage to the trees in comparison to stripping by hand was far less and naturally the operation was much more rapid. As in previous years no coffee was allowed to remain on the drying ground for more than a week if weather conditions allowed, and to maintain control a system of progress charts for all operations was devised and checked each morning to ascertain that which was done by touch by an old master drier. Finally, what small proportion of green or unripe coffee appeared in the cere i a on the drying grounds was handpicked by small boys at a rate of 100 rlis per liter of greens recovered. 10 These new methods proved highly successful. Not only did they bring about an almost complete elimination of greens from the finer qualities of coffee and the separation of the maragogype type, but also the harvest period was diminished by as least a month. A quick picking resulted in cheaper transportation and drying and assured better-quality coffee. 11 10 Ibid. 1;l C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 26, pp. 2-3.

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166 In 1931 there was also introduced a new system of separating coffee in husk at the various mills. By this system parchment coffee was separated from normal coffee early in the milling process. Parchment coffee was that in which the outer husk had been removed or damaged by birds, insects, or by being tramped on in the fields or on the drying terraces. Through lack of this husk, parchment coffee was more subject to dampness when on the ground, and it dried unequally on the terrace so that a large proportion of beans were defective in coloring if not actually fermented. By separating parchment from normal coffee, not only was the resultant coffee more equal in appearance, but handpicking of the beans after milling to remove defective ones was facilitated by the concentration of defects in the parchment coffee which was milled, handpicked, and shipped separately. The aim of the company by 1931 was to handpick 100% of the crop. 12 In these changes can be seen not only a typical Cambuhy move toward greater efficiency but the pressure of the depression on all fazendas when quality not quantity counted. Economy was the rule of the day and the ox cart returned to its traditionally strong position, while trucks lay idle. Drying machines were also allowed to rest as they affected quality, and more effort was put on the drying terraces, which were increased in size in these years. The great, tarred brick expanses were very different from those which 12 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

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167 MagalhSes had known. In the new ones coffee was dumped into water tanks at a receiving station, thence ripe (boia ) and cherry coffee were separated by specific gravity before being received and spread out in different sections of the drying grounds. 3 The lowest ebb in the Cambuhy coffee economy came in 1932. While better quality of coffee was being produced, yet there was a mounting store of low grades or escolhas on the estate. One of the coffee mills was shut down for a time because of the small crop and some 3,000 bags of lowgrade coffee were burnt on the estate. It is, however, perhaps typical of the coffee planter in SSo Paulo that, while the ashes of burnt coffee were used as potash manure, Cambuhy got government approval to replant some 72,000 gaps in the coffee plantations. The paulista spirit was by no means dead . 14 From the production point of view the depression years were more successful than the first four years of English rule on Cambuhy, the respective yields in arrobas per 1, 000 trees being 85.8 and 69.5. The 1933-34 crop proved to be the greatest of all on Cambuhy when 616,131 algueires of coffee were picked. Notwithstanding the depression this ninth year of activity proved the best until then, both 13 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 25, p. 3. 14 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 29, p. 3. 15 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 31, Annex 1. This represented an increase of 16.3 arrobas (each is kilos) of clean coffee per 1,000 trees.

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163 agriculturally and financially speaking. Increased land utilization and skillful development were paying off. Yet the bumper crops of coffee and cotton picked in the ideal ! weather conditions of 1934 provided a sad contrast to the man-made complications in the use of this natural bounty of the paulista soil. Cambuhy always abided by the law and as a result practices on the estate were constantly tailored to suit official regulation in these depression years. The hazards of nature, pests, and weeds proved much less formidable than those of governmental rules. Too frequently time, care, space, and labor were spent on handpicking the lower grades of crop to conform with official standards only to have the standards changed and the shipment rendered unacceptable. ^ Official regulations caused normal economic tenets to be abandoned at times and planters produced coffee with perverted aims and abortive results. In 1933 the Departamento Nacional do Caf£ required that 40% of the exportable crop be handed over at a fixed price of Rs. 29$000 per bag, such coffee to be better than type eight. With typical paulista ingenuity, the Cambuhy administrators had prepared for the national authority parchment coffee, with a large proportion of blacks, shells, and other defects removed and very low^C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 32, p. 3. 17 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 24, pp. 3-4. An al queire of coffee is a measure of volume, being 55 liters for picking purposes and 50 liters officially. See Appendix I.

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169 grade escolhas , chosen not so much for the coffee ' s good qualities as its bad ones. On the other hand in the same year the coffees from the remaining 60% which were sent by the fazenda and reached The Brazilian Warrant Company in Santos had been handpicked with the proper aim in view and gained the highest prices. This was sold under the name Cambuhy and helped to restore selfrespect to company officials. The situation actually grew more unbalanced. It was necessary to ship coffee to the Departamento Nacional do Cafl in order to obtain the right to load proportional amounts in the other two series, one retained and the other direct. However, frequently a fazenda such as Cambuhy had no coffee of a low enough grade to meet the national authority ' s minimum, so better coffee was shipped para tr
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170 This percentage of low-grade coffee, or the sacrifice quota as it was called, yielded no profit to the planter. As a result, in the hope that a small-crop year in 1934—35 after the bumper one of the year before would cause the quota de sacriftcio to be discontinued, Cambuhy like most planters in the zone stopped shipping coffee early in 1934, hoping later to sell at market prices what they held back. They were right in their prediction, but the new regulations of 1934 reserved 70% of crop for the retained series while only the 30% went direct. Moreover, if shipments were free in name, new tables of defects acceptable in coffee kept fazen deiros constantly changing blends of various grades. 19 Cambuhy weathered the storm of the depression better than most fazendas in the interior. Backed by sound resources, Cambuhy was able most successfully to diversify its activity in these years. Yet this was not the secret of its success but rather the stern regime of economy and efficiency which was maintained when many a small fazendeiro simply gave up. During the depression fertilizing, pruning, handling, and even replanting of coffee trees continued with the meticulous care and notation which was gradually becoming characteristic of the English administration on Cambuhy. The system of classification of coffee grades in the four mills on the estate was standardized early in the: period. Moreover, 19 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 36, p. 2; No. 37, p. 3.

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171 there being no need to force the pace of the mills in these years the quality of the coffee when produced for the market continued to be excellent. 2 ® Members of the Segunda Confer£ncia Cafeeira Internacional i who visited Caitibuhy in 1931 did not merely marvel at its size but at the new methods and processes being tried out there in picking and drying. Out in the coffee lands, the constant removal of sap£ grass from the plantations and the plowings done in the coffee after harvesting, according to the custom of the time, were never abandoned even in the hardest times. 21 A typical example of Cambuhy care in these years was the installation of a coffee roaster in 1931. This machine made use of a grade of coffee known as "grinders, " that was broken coffee or shells which though pure coffee were defective for the purpose of classification. In the first nine months of 1933, this machine yielded 22,282 kilos of roasted and ground coffee, which sold for 800 rlls a kilo. 22 It also reduced the incentive for fazenda workers to steal coffee from the trees and roast it at home. Greater efficiency was achieved in these years by reducing the size of various sections on the estate and creating new and smaller ones. It was found that the administrator on a smaller section gave greater attention to the coffee 20 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 21, pp. 3-4. 21 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 25, p. 2. 22 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 34, p. 6.

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172 trees, thereby increasing their productivity, in 1934 the last coffee fgrroa<;3o contracts ran out and all the coffee on the f azenda thereafter belonged to the company and so care of the trees was now its sole responsibility. The 1934-35 crop turned out to be exactly what the administrators had estimated, and was about double per tree the amount harvested elsewhere in the zone. Agricultural policy and methods on Carabuhy seemed to be in order. Moreover, care and trouble in picking, drying, and milling coffee paid off. A small lot of niaragogype coffee from Cairibuhy sold in Santos in late 1934 at Rs. 265$ 3 12 per bag, which was a record at the time on the Brazilian coffee market. 23 Coffee at Carabuhy was rescued from the dire effects of the depression by this great care and attention, but the great prop of the fazenda 1 s economy in these years was cotton. This plant was a godsend to the state of sSo Paulo in the coffee crises as it provided a cash crop for coffee growers with some extra land. Various cash crops were experimented with on Cambuhy. The most successful were several financially good stands of corn; but many other plants including castor, tung, and soya were also tried out. Cotton, however, was the real answer to the need for a cash crop and Cambuhy moved into cotton i cultivation quicker than most fazendas . 23 C.A.P.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 38, pp. 1-3; No. 39, p. 2.

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173 Very little cotton was grown by the fazenda itself, but each year some 140 alguelres of land were usually sown in cotton in cooperation with the Secretaria da Agricultura, which from 1930 was out to improve the cotton crop of the state both in quantity and quality. However, by far the great majority of cotton on Cambuhy was grown by tenants. In 1930-31 no less than 89 families rented tin average 4.76 algueires per family for an average of Rs. 20 7$ 34 8 per al gueire . By 1932 a total of 1, 115 algueires were planted in cotton by tenants. 24 The land where cotton was planted was freed of pests, such as sap£ grass and ants, while tree stumps were uprooted. This land was eventually to be first-class pasture. Plantings were also made in second-rate land, where firewood had or was being taken off. This planned expansion in cotton by the fazenda also included administrative arrangements to store cotton under cover at points over the estate and a series of experiments in manuring cotton fields. Scientific rotation of crops was felt to be beyond the administration's capacity at the time and even so it would not eliminate the need for fertilization in the long run. 25 The cotton gin at Toriba began to experience an activity unknown before the depression, ginning not only fazenda 24 C.A.P.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 21, pp. 5-8* No. 31, p. 7. 25 p. 6. C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 24, pp. 304? No. 25,

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174 cotton but also cotton bought outside the property for the joint account of the company and the Brazilian Warrant Agency and Finance Company. The gin also began to show better results, producing as much as 40 bales of 200 kilos each per day. The total bales produced in 1931 was 1,432, as compared with 811 in 1930. The gin was modified and modernized, safety and fire precautions being taken and storage space being increased. Each year the ginning statistics revealed a longer ginning period and a gradual increase in the number of bales per day. Moreover, the quality of cotton produced was high, some 85.83% of the 1931-32 crop being classified on the S3o Paulo exchange as type three or better. 26 The Cambuhy administrators faced considerable complexities in the harvesting of the increased cotton crops. Apart from the annual problem of harvesting at the right time and in good weather, the administration not only had storage problems but also had to adopt a system of fines or discounts to stop bad picking, which prejudiced the quality of the whole crop. 27 By 1934 there were over 2,000 algueires of land on Cambuhy under cotton. Such a large area meant constant renovation and renewal of the ginning machinery and made practical a plan to build a cottonseed oil mill, which was fulfilled by September of that year. All of the State of SSo Paulo 2 CL C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 25, p. 7? No. 30, p. 6. 27 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 32, p. 5.

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175 seemed to be turning to cotton and quality began to be important. Cambuhy' s cotton production, although only some 4.5% of that of the state in 1933, yet consisted of a very high proportion of types one and two in the state. This had real economic value at a time when the difference per arro ba of lint cotton per type was great, type one earning Rs. 6$000 per arroba more than type five. 28 The greater the area planted, the greater became the difficulty of effective inspection of the cotton plantations. The fact that Cambuhy maintained an output of clean lint cotton of good quality was proof of effective inspection of picking, well-adjusted machinery, and careful separation of qualities at the receiving points on the estate and more important on the spilling floor of the gin. There was also a notable refinement and sophistication in the bookkeeping and records kept of cotton both agriculturally and industrially. Each process from planting cotton seeds to pressing bales of lint was ably documented. The agriculturalists who survived the lean years of the depression had to be highly businesslike in their work. 29 The 3a nd-use pattern at Cambuhy in these years was constantly changing. Cotton was abandoned in a particular area when it proved uneconomic, and the land having been sown with grass passed over to the cattle department. The latter 28 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 33, p. 6y No. 35, p. 6; No. 38, pp. 7-9. 29 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 35, p. 6.

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176 sometimes saw parts of their grazing grounds fenced off, cleared, burnt, cleaned, destumped, and plowed. The construction of laborers' houses, stores, and a corral for working animals announced the creation of a new cotton plantation. 30 The history of the cattle department during the depression was one of unexciting but steady expansion. A new cattle manager who took over in August, 1931 vigorously weeded out old and degenerate female stock on Cambuhy, fattening them off for sale. Thereafter, only quality steers were purchased. Moreover, advantage was taken of plentiful cheap labor in the first years of the crises to improve and clean pastures, extend and repair fences, and guard them against fire. Smaller cattle stocks were kept through the winter months to insure better feeding, earlier fattening, and better prices on the spring market. Yet in general the depression was not an outstanding period for the cattle business on Cambuhy as throughout the state. 31 The depression brought a great decrease in the value of timber. As a result less and less forest was felled on Cambuhy, and the TamanducI sawmill was closed down when construction work ended in that area. The main use of the forest resources on the estate became to supply the Araraquarense railroad with firewood but even this was reduced to less 30 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 38, p. 6. 31 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 26, Cattle Annex, pp. 1-2? No. 29, Cattle Annex, pp. 1-2.

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177 than 10,000 cubic meters per month. The financial estate of the railroads did not allow them for a time to buy the firewood they were contracted to take. Cambuhy provided gratis the ties for a new siding at the oil factory and used timber for its program of constructional work. 32 In the first months after the coffee crash of 1929, constructional work on Cambuhy was greatly decreased. In the colonies stress was put upon repairs and the completion of workmen's houses already begun. Yet the building of and increase to such fixtures as drying grounds, stables, dams, and culverts never ceased. Moreover, these depression years saw the construction of new stores and appendages to the cotton gin and the large building project of the cottonseed oil factory, which was the most extensive and most complex group of buildings ever constructed on Cambuhy. 33 One of the greatest difficulties faced by the Cambuhy administration in these years was finding adequate transportation. Economy dictated that the fazenda 1 s trucks and motor vehicles be left idle as much as possible. Moreover, an exciting touch of the romantic came into Cambuhy' s sober existence when, in 1932, the Constitutionalist troops tried to commandeer Cambuhy' s best trucks for troop transportation. The Cambuhy authorities bought off the state troops with the offer of an airfield within the estate, and later the local 32 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report. No. 20, pp. 12-14. 3 3 Ibid . . pp. 15-18? No. 32, pp. 7-8.

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178 chief of police helped prevent federal troops from raiding the property. Workshops on the estate provided most sections with an adequate supply of carts and wagons in these difficult times. 34 Any hardship suffered by fazendeiros and companies during the depression was more than equaled by the suffering of many work people on the paullsta plateau. When coffee prices took their headlong plunge in October, 1929, fazendeiros almost immediately stopped new plantations and other work. Salaries were reduced all round and the coffee colonist's rates dropped. Everything in the neighborhood of Cambuhy was at a standstill; and as labor was in excess of requirements, it was possible for Cambuhy to select its employees carefully. Laborer's rates fell on Cambuhy, and the total of the laborer's paysheet in September, 1929, of 94 conto s of rlis fell in one year to 50 contos of r£is . The rates of coffee colonists on the estate were also steadily reduced during the depression. By 1931 the daily laborer's wage had fallen 43% from its pre-depression peak, while the coffee colonist earned 64% less than he once had. 35 The lot of the coffee colonist grew particularly bad. Early in 1931 many small families left Cambuhy as they had taken on more trees than they could care for. Health 34 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 30, p. 7. 35 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 22, p. 12; No. 26, p . 13 »

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179 conditions deteriorated, and the fazenda administration had to carry out a program of issuing preventive mediums against typhoid. The English administration recognized that wages were at starvation level. Their solution was not that of many plantation owners, who paid their workers almost nothing but permitted them to grow cereals and beans in the coffee groves; rather on Cambuhy there was a slight increase in rates for the year 1931-32. This combined with well-treated and wellfertilized coffee trees, it was hoped, would give colonists a living wage. 36 Laborers by 1932 were disinclined to work for a daily rate and wanted to be paid for each field operation separately. It seemed as if there might be a marked flight from the traditional colonist system. Laborers and colonists tended to look after themselves in new ways. Those who had any money sought to rent land to plant cotton and cereals, which on Cambuhy yielded profits. Others went elsewhere to look after coffee on long-term sharecropping contracts, while a few bought land by installments on schemes such as that elaborated at S3o Martinho. 37 The Cambuhy administrators were conscious that too great a reduction in coffee colonist ' s rates would make these people change their mode of employment to become laborers, contractors, sharecroppers, or tenants. Thus, the 36 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 24, pp. 7-8; No. 33, pp. 10-11. 37 Ibid.

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180 old system of treating coffee by colonists, felt to be one of the best that could be devised, would break down. Yet Cambuhy had to keep coffee cultivation economical and so the 1933-34 colonist contract saw a slight reduction from that of the previous year. \ • ..... .... The 1933-34 contract reveals how much more exact the Engdish administrators were in their contractual arrangements with their workers than had been the case before 1924. New refinements included special extra rates for planting and kuryiig green manure, plowing the coffee lands, and harvesting m aragogype coffee separately. Moreover, agricultural developments gave the colonist new work such as maintaining ridges to control wash in the coffee during the rainy season. In return the colonist still got all the various fees for work done and the traditional material benefits of the right to plant beans amid one-quarter of the coffee he tended, 2,000 square meters of land for cereals per 1, 000 trees worked, and pasture for a number of animals also in relation to the trees he cultivated. 38 Mr. Haggard and his assistants feared that Cambuhy would be heavily undercolonized in 1934, especially in the center of the fazenda far away from any shopping center. One man, who when he applied for land as a tenant was invited instead to remain as a colonist, replied that he preferred to die of hunger than be a colonist. The cost of the prime factors of 3 o Ibid ., No. 33, Enclosure No. 1.

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181 a laborer's diet, rice and beans, were constantly rising and many must have known hunger at the time. A rise in infant mortality in late 1933 was probably in part due to malnutrition. 39 The labor situation on Cambuhy had reached a very low point by 1934. During the previous two or three years, there had been a tremendous development in agricultural produce other than coffee in the state; and the labor for this, as the government had closed down almost all immigration, could be obtained only from coffee fazendas . Coffee colonists, contractors, and tenants who had made money were leaving the older areas such as Araraquara and buying land in the new zones beyond the railhead in such areas as Marflia, while some labor drifted to the towns in search of work. For the year 1934-35 the Cambuhy administrators took the only step open to them. Coffee prices were improving and, therefore, a 50% increase in the contract rate for hoeing and a 25% increase in the rate for picking were made. The day laborer's wage was also suitably adjusted. The effect of the increases was favorable and by the end of 1934 some 90% of the 4,579,473 trees on Cambuhy had been colonized. 40 [ 39 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 34, p. 14; No. 35, p. 11. 40 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 37, pp. 12-13; No. 38, p. 13.

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182 All problems were by no means solved, and as the flow of immigrants had stopped it proved difficult to find unmarried, casual laborers. Yet the hurdle of the depression had been passed by Cambuhy. Its administration and organization had been galvanized into a solid construction by the experience and it could look forward to better things to come. The paulista plateau still had all its natural gifts which made it the ideal place for coffee cultivation, and it had learned to wait until the world would buy its produce again.

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CHAPTER VIII THE GREEN YEARS The decade, 1934-1944, which followed the years of the great world depression saw a great increase in agricultural production in the State of SSo Paulo. There was much extractive cultivation, felling of the forests, and erosion of the soils by constant and unwise use. Young men went to open new lands along the upper extensions of such railroads as the Paulista, the Sorocabana, the Noreste, and the Araraguarense, and to use up the humus which had been accumulating for centuries. Not only were new lands brought into cultivation but in the old and new regions alike there was a considerable move towards crop diversification. Fazendeiros . who had previously allowed colonists to grow corn, rice, and other foodstuffs, began to exploit cotton and cereal crops themselves. Others turned to cattle or citrus as an answer to their weak economic situation due to excessive dependence on coffee. As coffee continued to remain at a low economic value during this decade, the Cambuhy administration continued to show zest for cotton and cereal cultivation, which by 1934 were well established on the estate. Moreover, the cottonf seed oil factory which was built in 1934 brought in its train a field of commercial and industrial activities which added 183

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184 to the scope of the English company and served to dilute its growing fixed overhead expenses. Prom 1933 onwards the net profits of the company began to climb and it did not show a loss thereafter. This was certainly due to the help given to coffee during these lean years until 1945 by cotton planting, ginning, and cottonseed oil production. 1 Many large coffee estates in this decade were not able to save themselves by economy and diversification and as a result were broken up. These properties were generally weakened by heavy interplanting of cereals in the coffee on the part of their colonists or by barbarous methods of harvesting used by them. Moreover, the presence of pests, particularly broca . and soil exhaustion pointed up a need for scientific restoration and fertilization which few large fazendeiros could afford. Some tried to hold deserting labor by sharecropping, which usually had disastrous results for the coffee trees. 2 By 1934 properties of less than 10 alquelres (sftios ) covered some 56.39% of the state and those with over 1,000,000 coffee trees did not amount to 1 % of its area. 3 Yet the division of land was not a solution to the economic problems of the day. In many cases sitlantes did not have the capital necessary to diversify but rather continued to produce 1 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report . No. 99, pp. 1-2. 2 Deffontaines, "RegiSes e paisagens, “ pp. 22-23. 3 Ellis, A evoluygo da economia paulista , p. 455.

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185 inferior coffee. Lacking proper drying grounds and storage facilities, these small farmers often let coffee dry where it fell. Moreover, they usually had poor agricultural techniques and displayed complete ignorance of soil conservation. 4 Fazendeiros and sitiantes alike had much to suffer in this decade after the depression. In 1933 the Departamento Nacional do Caf£ stepped up the program devised by the earlier Conselho Nacional do Cafl to destroy excess coffee. By 1944 at some 75 centers, 78, 000, 000 bags of coffee had been burnt. As coffee prices stayed at a low level many fazendas were allowed to waste away as money was not available for fertilization or even the common tasks of pruning and handling. Harvests decreased as some 140,000,000 coffee trees in the State of S3o Paulo went out of production. ^ In such a situation the coffee growers did not cease to lament their lot and expose in speech and pamphlet their sufferings. These complaints ranged not only over such passing phenomena as the inclemency of the season, the lack of harvest labor, and the interest rates on loans as high as 24% per annum, but on basic elements such as the life of privation of the coffee planter at the time. Living in isolation without comfort, the fazendeiro found it hard to educate his children or to pay his debts. How much worse was the condition of colonists and laborers, whose lack of good food and • ; ' • > ' • 4 Monbeig, Pionnlers et planteurs , p. 242. 5 Andres Uribe Campuzano, Brown Gold (New York s Random House, 1954), pp. 73-100.

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186 health compromised future generations' well-being.® Coffee yields certainly declined in the old Araraquarense region after the depression and the sages of the area noted that much effort would be needed to maintain regular production. Coffee cultivation gave compensation only on firstclass land where young trees were intensively cultivated. Many planters in the area did not enjoy such conditions. 7 There seemed to be a loss of interest in coffee cultivation in the zone. No longer was coffee the sole topic of conversation upcountry. One was no longer greeted with requests as to how the coffee crop went, but people tended rather to exchange ideas about cotton. Travelers from beyond the railhead who used to bring back stories of the green oceans of new coffee trees stretching beyond the horizon now talked of brown plains of land plowed for cotton planting stretching away in the distance.® The general impression of coffee production on Cambuhy in the difficult decade before the end of World War II was one of quiet, efficient plantation management. The coffee crisis began to pinch less and less, yet memories of recent hardships and the persistence of governmental control were vivid reminders and mentors to caution. Fazenda Cambuhy was not the home of spectacular novelties in coffee cultivation ®Bento A. Sampaio Vidal, A defesa do caf4 (SSo Paulo s Revista dos Tribunaes, 1936) , passim . 7 Vidal, Araraquara, p. 10. 8 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 42, p. 3.

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187 but rather represented the best in Brazilian production methods. It did, however, show standards of administration, record keeping, and general care that must have been equaled in few parts of the state. In 1935 there was another small subdivision of administrative areas on Cambuhy, the situation thereafter being fifteen sections, each with an administrator looking after a total of nineteen coffee plantations. Proper stabling and housing arrangements were made on all sections so each could function as regards agricultural tasks as an independent unit. This decentralization was Cambuhy 's secret. Each of the sectional administrators, the sergeants major of Cambuhy and the core of its system, was largely autonomous. Keeping within the lines of company agricultural policy, he had to get the work done in a manner best suited to his particular area. In addition, throughout the decade after the depression, there was evolved a system by which three revisores or supervisors guided the administrators and acted as a liaison with the general manager. 9 The policy of the administration in these years was that on general principle a maintenance of quality would eventually improve the financial results obtained. Frequently, prevailing conditions made handpicking to insure quality a waste of money, as the difference in price between grade and grade 9 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 41, pp. 3-6.

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188 was so very slight. Yet in general Cambuhy strove for a quality product. Consideration of economy as well as quality dictated the policy that trees which could not pay for their keep be abandoned. Coffee produced by these trees was still picked; but no cultivation, care, or cost was expended upon them. By 1937 abandoned trees numbered 40, 165 and were mostly trees planted in the time of the Conselheiro Gavi3o Peixoto. In the same year, however, experiments were carried out on the land where trees had been abandoned, as a result of which some 5,000 were brought back into cultivation.^ Generally speaking, throughout the decade coffee trees under twenty years of age were in good condition, but older trees began to fall away. This was due to many causes, but one of the most important was the infestation of the plantations with broca or coffee bean borer (Stephanoderes Hampei ) . This was a dreaded pest, which had first appeared in the State of S3o Paulo in 1924 and since had infected many of the older coffee regions. By mid-1936 the pest was found in twelve sections on Cambuhy, three being severely infested; and by the end of the year it had been observed on 230 blocks on 12 seventeen separate plantations. l0 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 40, pp. 3-4. ^C.A.F.P. , Q uarterly Reports , No. 48, p. 5; No. 52, p. 3. 12 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report, No. 47, p. 5.

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189 One notable feature about these insects was the way by which they spread, being carried from tree to tree on implements, machines, workmen's clothes, carts, and animals. Three methods of combat were tried on Cambuhy. An unsuccessful attempt was made to breed Uganda wasps, a known natural enemy of broca. Secondly, fumigating chambers were constructed to fumigate picked coffee for twelve hours as it came to the drying grounds. The third method was to go over the plantations after the harvest clearing up all berries on the trees or on the ground which had been left behind. This operation, known as making a repass, was slow, expensive, and laborconsuming, while it disarranged the normal round of fazenda services. Broca was not the only pest to disrupt these services on Cambuhy. In 1939, particularly in the terra roxa section in the south of the estate, there was noted a severe infestation of snails (Orthallcus Pulchellus and Orthalicus Phlogera ) which fed on the bark of the coffee trees during the night and lay dormant all day. The administration could do no more than pay a premium rate for people to collect and destroy the snails, while measures were taken to prevent the snails spreading . Despite all these complications, the Cambuhy administration still put emphasis on producing quality coffee. 1 3 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 45, pp. 1-2. ^C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 59, pp. 4-5.

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190 Constant renovations and adaptations were made on the machinery of the four coffee mills of the estate to assure as perfect a separation of grades and as complete a removal of defects as possible. Yet, notwithstanding this preparation, the crop harvested and processed in 1939 was disappointing both as to quantity and quality, due largely to broca and unseasonal rains. A prophylactic picking to remove and destroy early matured coffee, on which the broca fed, apparently was not effective. *5 The Cambuhy administration put a great deal of effort into fertilizing and pruning the coffee plantations in these years, while the prohibition of interplanting with cash crops was maintained. Yet the plantations did not respond as hoped. Pests and drought were undoubtedly adverse factors, but the core of the problem was that the coffee trees on Cambuhy were aging. While the average age of all the trees was only twenty years, in old sections such as Boa Vista and Las Palmas the average was some thirtyseven years. This fact allied with adverse climatic conditions at times when the coffee beans were forming caused a drop in the percentages of bold beans and an equivalent increase in the small sizes. The Cambuhy administrators were quick to notice this and to adjust all of their coffee mills to give more efficient separation of the smaller-sized beans. They also 15 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , N 0 . 57, p. 5; No. 58, pp. 2-3. 16 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 59, Enclosure No. 1.

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191 redoubled their efforts to assure quality by renovating and bringing up to date all the milling and grading machinery on the estate. ^ Cambuhy in this post-depression decade had to face not only these problems of nature but was constantly at the mercy of governmental authorities. The latter were not always logical, still less often consistent. Thus at a time when both fumigation and repassing were obligatory by law in order to combat broca, an official publication sent to fazendas pointed out the difficulty and expense of doing an efficient repass and stating that fumigation merely harmed the coffee, killed the Uganda wasp, and possibly did not kill the broca . Still more confusing was the reclassification of coffee on its arrival in Santos so that acceptance of a sample for the preferential shipment series was no guarantee of acceptance of the whole lot which it represented. 1 8 A typical set of shipping regulations were those for the year 1936. In that year 40% of the crop could be shipped in a direct series, while 30% was to be sent to official warehouses in a retained series, the remaining 30% being a sacrifice quota to the Departamento Nacional do Caf4 which paid a price per bag less than the cost of shipping and sacking. One-third of the latter category could be very low-grade coffee, but with no more than 3% of foreign matter. Each 17 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports . No. 50, p. 4; No. 54, pp. 4-5. 18 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 55, pp. 4-7.

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192 year on Cambuhy every effort was made to get all the milling and handpicking of coffee done before the end of the stipulated exporting season. Shipping was complicated by having to distribute coffee into the different series in these fixed proportions for each shipment, coupled with the difficulty of getting sufficient railroad cars to do so.* ® Cambuhy care and efficiency at this time produced a very clean, high-grade coffee, even without handpicking, with the result that a large proportion of the coffee due to be yielded to the national authorities was of much better quality than it need have been. This circumstance helped Cambuhy to get much of its coffee into preferential series, established from time to time. In 1938, for example, this series was to be allowed into Santos within 120 days of shipment, but to get this privilege the coffee had to be of good appearance, equally dried, with perfect separation, and better than type four. Even after constant inspections and reclassifications on changing and complicated standards, Cambuhy did well from this system which emphasized quality. 2 ® In order to obtain these preferential shipments in which 85% of the crop could be sent, if good enough, while only 15% was sacrificed, Cambuhy milled and handpicked coffee to a standard seldom reached anywhere. Everything was done to prepare the finest coffees on the one hand, while blends 19 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 46, pp. 2-3; No. 47, pp. 2-3. 20 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 53, pp. 5-6.

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193 were made for the sacrifice quota to be of as low a type as possible. All this work and the continued need to buy lowquality coffee to release coffee in the retained series ! . proved a considerable burden to the fazendeiro . 21 The outbreak of war in 1939 shook Cambuhy and the coffee world out of the tracks in which they had been recovering slowly from the depression. In the second quarter of 1940 after ten month in progress the war made itself felt on the paulista plateau, although only in a purely commercial sense. The loss of most European markets, lack of shipping, increased freight and insurance rates both on land and sea, greatly increased the cost of all imported goods and had a serious effect on the fazendeiro 1 s margin of profit. The coffee situation remained obscure at first, while the cotton market fluctuated wildly, generally to the procucer's disadvantage. Moreover, the effects of the war coincided with those of some far-reaching social legislation which, although not enforced for the agricultural laborer, did cause a certain amount of unrest. Rumors of drastic action on the part of the Departamento Nacional do Cafl added to the confusion. 22 Commercially Cambuhy was faced with violent fluctuations in the values of its products and a steady rise in the cost of everything it had to buy. It was not easy to keep on the 21 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 56, pp. 2-3. 22 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 61, pp. 1, 8-9.

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194 right side of the market, while black lists, limitation of exports and imports, and loss of markets created problems to be solved. Moreover, the hope of many in the interior of S3o Paulo that Brazil might remain in the state of peace was not fulfilled. A naval incident in August, 1942, took Brazil to war against the Axis and Japan, and many regulations were set to meet the requirements of war conditions. 23 The most serious of these from the point of view of the fazendeiro in the interior of S3o Paulo were the prohibition of the use of private gasoline-driven cars, the rationing and disappearance of gasoline, and the stoppage of supplies of diesel oil and kerosene, thus immobilizing tractors and removing the only illuminant of many houses. Returns were demanded of all mules and horses with a view to possible future requisition for military purposes, while reservists were alerted if not called to duty at once. Such rules as these greatly dislocated work on many fazendas . Luckily for Cambuhy, trucks in the post-depression years had been used as an aid to and not a substitute for animal traction. Yet the loss of use of fourteen heavy trucks on Cambuhy threw a burden on animal traction which could not wholly be made good. The administration set about to slow down the tempo of constructional work on the estate and install producer gas plants in their cars and trucks. 23 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 67, pp. 1-2; No. 70, pp. 1-2.

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195 Lack of transportation was a vital problem in an estate so large as Cambuhy where continual inspection was the essence of its success. The manager, revisores , and various department heads showed great ingenuity in the circumstances, walking, riding, using pony carts or the railroad, but these methods did not overcome the time factor due to which the outlying sections could not be visited in a day. 24 Transportation was by no means the only problem. Increased cost of living, rise in wages, enormous increases in the cost of articles of primary necessity, and price ceilings on fazenda products were all factors, each of which brought about modifications in the mode of working and living on the fazenda . The cost-of-living rise meant wage increases, some 40% for industrial workers at Toriba in the first half of 1943 alon$, but less for agricultural workers. It was a sad fact that directly any article came under control either as to distribution or price, it tended to disappear, only to reappear in the black or dark grey market. By 1943 foodstuff rationing became effective even on fazendas . This proved particularly difficult on Cambuhy, which was located in three different municfpios and hence had three municipal authorities to deal with. Delays in selling Cambuhy products, mainly coffee and cotton, complicated the company's 2 4 Ibid .

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196 cash position, making it more indebted to banks than at any time since its early days. 25 The war years saw on Cambuhy a further period of economy and retrenchment. The laboring class was forced by the rising cost of living to reduce their standard of living, which in most cases meant a reduction in the amount or quality of their food. Cambuhy likewise tightened its belt and effected economies where possible. Every activity was examined and wasteful methods abandoned. It was found to be cheaper to have coffee from the southern section sent by road to Araraquara rather than ship it by rail from the town of Gavi&o Peixoto. The policy of abandoning unprofitable trees was also continued with circumspection. 26 It would on the other hand be wrong to consider the war years to have been a period of decline in the coffee business or of Cambuhy in particular. Rather it was a period of considerable activity. Late in 1941 there was laid out a coffee nursery of some 5, 000 baskets planted with a new strain, Bourbon Vermelho, from the Institute Agron&nico in Campinas. This strain was to become most important late in the decade. Moreover, the Cambuhy administrators maintained a ruthless policy of replanting not only dead but poor and nonproductive coffee trees. Coffee was on the move again, even if within the letter of planting prohibition at first, until in 1944 25 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 73, p. 1 26 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 62, p. 8; No. 70., p. 4.

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197 the way was cleared for a further advance of the coffee 27 frontier when the prohibition was lifted. By 1942 Fazendas do Cambuhy had a well established experimental program as regards coffee. This had been begun in 1938, and the results after four years seemed to argue in favor of closer planting of coffee trees but not single trees as was often advocated. Experiments were also begun with contour planting; and in view of the intense official and private propaganda in favor of shade trees amid the coffee, it was felt to be incumbent on Cambuhy to find out whether shading coffee in Brazil was advantageous or not. Four sections on Cambuhy thus were planted with experimental shade trees. 28 The Cambuhy administration got a further test to its skill and efficiency when on May 21, 1940, there was purchased Fazenda Santa Candida, an area of some 625 alqueires in the terra roxa close to the Jacar4 River, an area which was part of the original sesmaria sold in the time of GaviSo Peixoto. The section was quickly incorporated into the Cambuhy telephone and power line network and an administrator sent to supervise the picking of the 1940 coffee crop. Much of the latter had been heavily interplanted with cotton, corn, and rice, but the care and attention of the administrator in the next four years wrought great changes. Sap€ grass and interplanted crops were eradicated, many blocks of coffee 27 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 68, pp. 3-5. 28 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 71, p. 7; No. 77, pp. 5-6, 9.

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198 at first thought fit only to be abandoned were recovered and the area was brought into line with the rest of the estate. Nature gave the State of SSo Paulo a severe time during the man-made rigors of the Second World War. Broca and snails continued to give trouble from time to time, but these pests did little harm in comparison to that done by droughts and frosts. The summer of 1940-41 brought a drought to the paul 1st a plateau comparable to that of 1924. Cambuhy's coffee plantations became a sad sight with nearly a million trees leafless, while dead wood and bare trees indicated a crop failure. This first disaster did not dishearten the Cambuhy administration, which proceeded to have as many trees as possix ble pruned and handled, while dead wood was removed particularly as wood-eating black ants were found there. Moreover, the drought had removed much of the broca and had done little harm to the coffee nurseries. Thanks to good care and attention during the drought, Cambuhy 's coffee trees recovered remarkably well and only some 15,000 old trees in the terra roxa had to be abandoned. Throughout 1941 the round of agricultural tasks in the coffee was stepped up and by the end of the year the more visible effects of the drought had gone. 3 29 c.a.f.p., Quarterly Reports, No . 61, pp. 1-2? 30 c.a.f.p., Quarterly Report, No. 63, pp. 2-6. 31 c.a.f.p., Quarterly Report, No. 67, S • OJ 1 C\ a No. 72,

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199 In the winter of 1943 another drought fell upon the interior of sSo Paulo leaving the coffee trees on Caitibuhy once more devoid of leaves. Worse still, on the night of September 14-15, just at the time when the trees were about to blossom, came the severest frost ever recorded on the estate. Some 3.62% of the trees were severely affected and in the months to come had to be pruned back to the ground. A further 9.16% of the trees were moderately damaged, particularly the tops and branch ends being killed. The remaining 87.22% of the coffee was only slightly hurt, but these too needed to be pruned. 32 The effect of frost on coffee is a serious one. In the tiny plant cells of the trees the sap freezes when the temperature goes below 32° F., and as ice forms the tissues of the leaves and branches rupture. The older trees resist the cold thanks to their heavy wood, but young ones and seedlings succumb, presenting a picture of curled leaves and ragged bark. 33 Frost wiped out hope for more than a token coffee crop in 1944 from the bedraggled plantation. An even greater source of anxiety at the time concerned the steady drop in the annual rainfall coupled with an increased dryness of the atmosphere in the cold season. For the proper growth and life of the Cambuhy plantations and to guarantee reasonable ^C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 74, pp. 4-5. 33 Uribe Campuzano, Brown Gold , pp. 73-74 •

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200 average crops, the administrators reckoned that an annual rainfall of 60 inches was necessary, and of that at least 12 inches should fall during the 6 dry months of April through September. The weather on Cambuhy seemed to be changing, and observers noted the complete absence of previously customary morning mists and fogs in the cold season. The average rainfall on the estate in its first eleven years under English rule had been 61.13 inches, but the average for the period 1936-43 dropped to 51.32 inches. 34 The lower rainfall in areas of the plateau was supposedly due to the destruction of so much forest in the previous seventy years. One expert conducted experiments which revealed that the winters were becoming drier and longer. If deforestation was not the sole cause, at least the reduction of the height and density of the vegetal cover of the plateau inhibited many local convective rainfalls and hence increased maximum and average temperatures. 3 ^ After this heavy frost of 1943 and a lighter one of the previous year many planters chose not to prune their trees, saying that the removal of dead wood after the frost of 1918 had caused a decrease in; yield. Mr. Haggard and his assistants, however, attrituted this decrease to the heavy 34 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 75, p. 6. See Appendix III, Table 5. Jos 6 Setzer, Os solos do Estado de SSo Paulo (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estastistica, 1949), pp. 356-57.

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201 interplanting of cereals and neglect of correct cultural methods after the 1918 disaster. As a result, in 1944 a great effort was put into pruning and replanting some 40, 000 damaged trees. 36 Troubles for the inhabitants of Cambuhy were not yet over. The weather in 1944 continued adverse and there was a six months' drought which left arable land packed hard, delaying the sowing of cereal crops. The flowering of the coffee trees late in the year again was hindered. Pastures and grazing grounds became dust bowls and many caught fire. Cattle congregated in low-lying swampy areas and many got stuck and died. Springs and wells dried up, illnesses became prevalent, kitchen gardens withered away. The psychological effect on the workers brought about a feeling of defeat, hopelessness, and nervous exhaustion, which manifested itself in many ways, none of which helped the administration to increase output of work. The reduction of water in the big rivers hurt the hydroelectric concerns and caused a reduction of electricity. Abnormally high temperatures in August and September would have been even higher but for the pall of smoke from fires in the camp lands which for days on end obscured the sun. 37 Man-made problems also abounded during the war years. Indeed, the business of shipping coffee from the interior JW C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 75, pp. 8-9. 37 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 78, pp.1-2.

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202 became so complicated that it required persons of good education and understanding to carry out the work. The shipping regulations in 1940 were dominated by the forced purchase of 55% of the crop by the government at a nominal price. Cambuhy and many other fazendas took advantage of such involved schemes as buying bills of lading of the previous year's retained series to sell to the Departamento Nacional do Cafl, thereby liberating coffee to be shipped in the various free series. 38 However, as much coffee as possible was stored on the fazenda , with the result that when the forced sale to the government was reduced to 10% for the 1942-43 crop, Cambuhy was able to ship some 8, 500 bags more than otherwise would have been possible. In fact, in the middle of 1942 there was in store on the estate an estimated total equivalent to 123,287 bags of clean coffee. Because of this small sacrifice quota imposed in 1943-43, much more stored coffee came to light in the interior of S3o Paulo than was expected. On hearing rumors that the railways and regulating warehouses were almost congested, everything was done on Cambuhy to accelerate milling and handpicking. As a result all coffee of shippable quality was on rail by the first four months of 1943, a total of some 112, 797 bags from four different crops in transit. 39 38 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 63, pp. 8-9. 39 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 70, pp. 7-8; No* 71, pp. ll-12y No. 72, pp. 5-7.

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203 One of the great things about agricultural life in the interior of sSo Paulo is that after the blackest forecasts and the loudest grumblings of fazendeiros that they will be ruined, the land always seems to produce and to recuperate. Coffee on Cambuhy came back after frost damage of 1943 much better than was generally expected. The droughts were also overcome, and by the end of 1944 the plantations on Cambuhy were covered with healthy dark green leaves and a fair amount of new growth was noted. Moreover, the experimental program held out hopes of increasing the life expectation and yields of the plantations. After twenty years of English control there were 4,643,538 coffee trees on the Cambuhy estate, of which 1,866,144 had been planted by the company. They constituted 0.3796 of the total number of trees in the State of SSo Paulo and 2.5% of those served by the Araraguarense Railroad, yet their 1942-43 crop came to 1.1% of the state's production and 10% of that along the railroad. Over twenty years they had yielded 1, 500, 000 bags of clean coffee, but it was sad to see how the average production had dropped in the later years due as it was more to frost and drought than to the increasing age of the trees. 40 The hazards of nature, while they reduced production, also sent prices up. By the end of the war, prices of coffee, 40 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports, No. 70, p. 9; No. 79, pp. 6-11.

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204 cotton, and cattle all seemed likely to increase considerably; and Cambuhy stood to benefit when it sold its stocks not only of coffee but of cotton. Coffee seemed to be headed in the direction of economic recuperation and for a resumption of its legitimate role as prop of the paulista economy. Some 18, 000 trees on Cambuhy which had been regarded as uneconomic came back into cultivation. As Mr. Haggard noted at the time one's attitude toward a coffee tree with clean coffee worth some Cr$6,00 a kilo was rather different to what it was when coffee was worth only Cr$l,00 a kilo and the government took away a sacrifice quota from it. 41 If coffee never ceased to be the backbone of the paulis ta economy, it was for many years supported on the crutches of cotton, cereals, and cattle development . In 1931 sSo Paulo was the tenth state in cotton production, but by 1934 it was in first place and in the next year Brazil entered the world market. The paulista vigor and drive had momentarily deserted coffee to turn small and chaotic cotton planting into an organized situation that could produce 1,500,000 bales of cotton of uniform staple length and quality. 42 As soon as cotton ceased to be a dangerous experiment, many laborers were eager to rent land and grow cotton. Cotton was found growing in cereal land, poor pasture, and even 41 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , N 0 . 78, p. 3. 42 Luis Amaral, Hist6ria geral da agricultura Brasileira . (2nd ed. rev., SSo Paulo* Companhia Editora Nacional, 1958) II, 51.

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205 amid coffee plantations. Here was a cycle of nomadic, exhaustive, agriculture giving the tenant a good profit during his stay but leaving the land, as was said locally, unable to produce grass. Such was not the situation on Cambuhy where great care was taken with the soil. There the difference between coffee and cotton production on the estate, particularly in the prewar years, was remarkable. While the former lay around in storage sheds and the smoke of burning low grades rose up to the blue paulista sky, cotton was sold on a rising market as soon as it could be shipped. 43 Cotton was the obvious outlet for Cambuhy' s energies while coffee production was restricted from 3930 to the end of the war. Land for cotton was found by utilizing areas previously used for cereals, overgrown pastures taken chiefly from the cattle section, and finally by clearing scrub or second-class forests from which in the majority of cases firewood had been removed. Only a very small percentage of the total area under cotton was planted on newly felled first-class forest. The Cambuhy administration took in its stride the complicated operations of receiving and storing cotton in seed from the tenants who grew it. The former process involved weighing, bookkeeping, and meticulous examination and classification. As more and more land went under cotton, the storage problem increased. In 1938 some 377,382 arrobas were 43 C.A.P.P., Quarterly Report . No. 38, p. 6.

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206 harvested and a further 166, 231 purchased from outside. By that time twenty storehouses had been built and two open-air deposits covered with tarpaulins established. The fazend a *s aim was always to increase storage capacity. 44 The types of cotton grown on Cambuhy were first Express and later Texas, the two most commonly produced in the state of sSo Paulo. Yet the Cambuhy administration conducted many experiments with other types, mainly long staple cotton. The estate also had experimental patches for research in fertilization and spacing of cotton in cooperation with the Institute AgronSmico of Campinas. To the latter body, which was the only organization in the state where standardized seed of good quality could be obtained in quantity, Cambuhy constantly sold seed produced from its regular and experimental plantations . 45 In its first few years of cotton planting Cambuhy enjoyed both good yields per alqueire and good quality cotton. However, cotton is a crop which very rapidly exhausts the soil, and although second-class virgin forest land while it is still rich in humus will produce good yields of cotton, these soon fall off after repeated plantings. When this began to happen on Cambuhy, cotton tenants demanded other areas of new land or else moved off the fazenda , following the 44 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 40, p. 8; No. 53, pp. 7-10. 45 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 41, pp. 6-7? No. 62, pp. 8-9.

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207 trend of cotton planting to move further into the interior. 46 t From a peak area of cotton planted on Cambuhy of some 2,525 alqueires , the decline was fairly rapid until by 1945 there were only 1,091 alqueires under cotton on the estate. Many factors contributed to this decline, the most commonly blamed at the time being soil exhuastion and degeneration of the seed used. The real problem, however, was the attack of insect pests, fungi, and pathological diseases of cotton whose existence in some cases was not known at the time. Pink boll worms, green caterpillers, and various types of ants all infested the Cambuhy stands of cotton with increasing destructiveness until by 1938, after the cotton plants had been pulled up, land was hoed, weeded, and all the refuse burnt with the old cotton plants in an attempt to stop reinfection. 47 As time went by, to maintain a normal fertility of the soil it became necessary to let land lie fallow and to rotate it with corn, beans, or other crops. This could be done only at the expense of the area under cotton. Some lands which proved unreproductive and others which were too hilly for normal agricultural operations or for reasons of their location were best under grass and, therefore, were absorbed by the cattle section. 46 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , Ho. 52, pp. 4-5. 47 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 53, pp. 7-9.

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208 After fertilising land, it was necessary to prevent that the expensive elements applied to the soil and the humus carrying top soil layer were not washed away by the first rain, and so a program of soil erosion control was evolved on Cambuhy. This had further repercussions on the system of renting land to tenants. The latter were useful on rough land full of tree stumps and casual wood, but they did not fit in where rotation, manuring, and care and maintenance of anti-erosion terx-acao were demanded. The use of tenants thus gave way to work by daily paid laborers who demanded comfortable brick houses and good wages. Their numbers could only in part be reduced by introducing mechanical means of treating cotton. Lack of farm machinery in wartime conditions put another limit on the areas under cotton. 4® The unfavorable weather conditions during the war, droughts causing heavy shedding of the cotton bolls, and unseasonal rains ruining cotton picking were the final indication that the cotton boom on Cambuhy was over. Cereals began to take its place. In the first years after the depression the estate had produced little corn and no rice, but by the end of the war there were some 300 alqueires under such crops. Corn, if not a great source of profit, was an essential to the labor force's continued existence, and rice in a good year yielded more profit than cotton during the war. Cambuhy 1 s interest in cereals progressed from the traditional 48 C.A.F.P., General Letter , Ho. 51/45, dated November 17, 1945.

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209 situation in 1935, where all corn grown, some 629 carros , was consumed by the fazenda population, to a point in 1941 when the fazenda 's surplus for sale came to 650 carros. On the fazenda corn was used to feed working animals, given to senior employees as concessions, milled into cornmeal, fed to pigs, and sold to outside purchasers. 49 The cattle department at Cambuhy in the years after the depression was of much less importance than either coffee or cotton. Yet it represented a vital factor in the estate's diversified activity. This cattle section aimed at getting the pastures reasonably clear of undergrowth, taming the cattle, improving the quality of thin steers purchased for fattening, and through careful selection achieving betterquality breeding stock. On the whole by the coming of the war this had been achieved. Cattle managing was a shrewd business of watching the market prices offered by the frigor £flcos for fat cattle and selling than at the right time of the year when the cattle were at the proper weight to give maximum profits. 50 Poor-quality cattle were usually culled out of the herds purchased, then slaughtered, and sold on the estate. During the winter months cattle were often fed cottonseed meal from the fazenda 's oil factory and everything was done to make 49 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports . No. 42, p. 16? No. 65, pp. 9-12. A carro equals 58 jacks' or baskets, representing 12 sacks of 60 kilos of clean corn. 50 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 42, Cattle Annex, pp. 1-2.

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210 the business as economical as possible. Despite this the i adverse weather conditions during the war greatly weakened the 5, 000 alguelres of pasture on Cambuhy, and governmentcontrolled prices for fat cattle put Cambuhy out of the ' ' t . . • market. Despite this, the year 1942 saw a considerable increase in the area of land on the estate occupied by grazing grounds to a total of 8^444 alguelres . Thereafter, the policy of the company was to increase the carrying capacity of the pastures by planting better grasses. Lastly the cattle section itself practiced diversification by expanding its small pigbreeding establishment until an annual output of 1, 000 head was reached. 5 1 Cambuhy* s most novel experiment in diversification in the years after the depression was the construction of the cottonseed oil mill in 1934. As Cambuhy planted and ginned more and more cotton, so there accumulated a large amount of seed to be disposed of. At that time only two large oil mills existed in the State of SSo Paulo, both close to the c capital, and it was a common sight in 1932 to see piles of seed rotting outside cotton gins. Not long after Cambuhy constructed its mill, two larger ones were built close to Araraquara . The Cambuhy mill's products were sold locally, in SSo Paulo, and abroad. Cottonseed meal was shipped to England, 51 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 71, p. 1; No. 73, pp. 3-4.

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211 various by-products such as foots and stearine went to soap and margarine factories near s3o Paulo, and there was built up a distribution network for Cambuhy Oil, a deodorized edible oil. 52 i n 1940 a further development was made when work began on the construction of an essential oil still, condenser, and separator. At first these produced citronella oil from lemongrass or erva-cidreira , and experiments were carried out with many other plants and trees, using leaves, bark, and roots. By mid-1942 the essential oil distillery was on a full-production basis, enjoying unnaturally high wartime prices for its lemongrass oil, oil of vetiver, and some fourteen others in various experimental stages. 53 Symptomatic of the growing complexity and sophistication of the Cambuhy administration in these years was the creation in 1937 of the Commercial Department which dealt with the purchase of raw materials for the industrial activities of the estate, administered its stores, purchased, supplied and handled all legal and insurance work. The new constitution of 1937, creating as it did pension funds for industrial workers and mapping the outlines of future social legislation, marked the beginning of a new era. The Cambuhy administration, standing as it did in the position of a patriarchal fazendeiro , was soon to find his relations with its employees 52 C.A.P.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 40, p. 87 No. 41, pp. 10 12 . 53 C.A.F. P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 61, Oil Mill Annex, pp. 2-67 No. 69, Oil Mill Annex, pp. 1-5.

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212 regulated by outside authorities to a point inconceivable before the depression. 54 The war affected the industrial life of Canibuhy even more than its agricultural life. Exports of cottonseed cake and meal came to an end and prices became unbalanced, at times crude and semi-refined oil having more value than the finished product. Moreover, Canibuhy as an institution tried always to obey the law, and the effort to do so, with conflicting governmental regulations particularly as regards price ceilings, proved to be titanic. The war conditions made replacement and renovation of machinery an impossibility, adding further to the difficulties of the period. 55 The Second World War marked the end of an era for paulista agriculture. Until then in calculating agricultural costs no account had usually been taken of natural losses such as soil erosion by water, wind, and fire, and the exhaustion of the soil itself. It was largely politicians who warmed to this subject of loss of the national patrimony. Much began to be said about extractive cultivation depopulating the countryside and making it a desert, while criticism was leveled against those agriculturists who were said to be beggaring their descendents. 54 c.a.f.p., Quarterly Report, No. 55, Commercial Annex, pp. 1-5. 55 c.a.f.p., Quarterly Reports, NO . 61, Commercial Annex, pp. 5-6; No. 74, Commercial Annex, pp. 1-4.

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213 The best way to prevent many areas from following Mogiana and Paulista regions into weak pasture ; and market gardening was rational agriculture. Yet this meant mechanization, anti-erosion measure?, reforestation, seed selection, and crop rotation, all of which were beyond the budget of most paulista small farmers. Rural credit schemes or cooperatives were a partial answer, but in general these did not exist. Cambuhy, however, was a latifundia with sufficient resources to experiment and much interesting pioneer work in rational agriculture was done by the administrators in these years. ^6 Cambuhy in the hands of the English was never a latifundia where land was wastefully used. At the beginning of the depression, its administrators were proud that there was almost complete utilization of the land where forests had been felled. All unproductive areas were either camp land or untouched forest, and this by 1942 was only 28.8% of the total area of the property. The remainder was in productive cultivation with 10% of the land occupied by roads, colonies, buildings, railways, and the lands of colonists and administrator s.^ Notwithstanding Cambuhy' s considerable forest resources, for some time before the second war the question of reforestation had occurred in company correspondence. Until then 5 6 Paulo Pinto de Carvalho, Aspectos de Nossa Economia Rural (s3o Paulo: Livraria Martins, 1943), pp. 38-39, 48-52. 57 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 23, p. 11; No. 71, Enclosure No. 1.

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214 this had been done on a large scale only by the railroads, particularly the Companhia Paulista. Moreover, various governmental authorities seemed to be feeling their way toward a policy of forest conservation. On Cambuhy serious consideration was given to future fuel requirements for domestic purposes. Moreover the war created a fuel famine in the south of Brazil as railways and factories which had always depended on coal had to switch over to firewood or charcoal. As a result forests existing close to towns and railways were severely attacked, and even on the serra above Santos, a place which had always been sacrosanct to wood cutters, bald and denuded sections were to be seen in daily increasing area. It was felt that this wood famine would continue long after the war; and given Cambuhy 's privileged position as regards railroads, it was considered good business to plant eucalyptus trees close to existing lines and sidings. The plan was to plant some 50 alquelres of land each year for seven years until a total of 2, 000, 000 trees was reached. At that time cutting could begin on the first year's trees which would be easily sold to and shipped by the Araraquarense railroad.® 8 In addition to these eucalyptus trees to be eventually used as firewood, the Cambuhy administration planted small stands of soft wood trees to give small lengths of shade wood for coffee replants. As far as possible the felling of trees CO ^ C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 68, pp. 12-13.

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215 for logs was confined to land which was being cleared for cultivation. Finally, with a view to supplying colonists and laborers with materials to make garden fences and sheds, there were planted many stands of bamboo in different areas of the estate. Previously bamboo had been planted only for ornamental purposes, but now it was hoped that it would stop the fazenda population from raiding good forest resources. 59 The various governmental regulations at the time about reforestation were expected through lack of enforcement to be effective only close to big towns or in the national parks. Outlying lands elsewhere when no longer capable of bearing coffee or raising annual crops were normally converted into grazing land or went back to scrub. Cambuhy was exceptional not only in planting trees but in the conservation work which was done on the estate despite wartime difficulties. The expansion of the land area under cereals and cotton and the felling of forest for this was done with a new efficiency in the last years before the war. Once logs, poles, posts, and firewood had been removed from the felled timber, all useless wood and stumps were still burnt in traditional fashion. Thereafter, however, by partly mechanical and partly manual means, all big tree stumps were dug up, great pits being opened to cut long taproots, and then filled in. 59 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 61, pp. 12-13.

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216 Thereupon, the land was deep-plowed by tractors.®® Once the forest was cut down, the soft, spongy soil, rich in humus, was exposed to the elements. As the earth packed tight, a hard subsoil layer was formed below the depth to which the plow turned the earth, and as a result there was erosion, varying in relation to the nature of the land, length of the slope, and density of rainfall. Erosion on Cambuhy was of two types, sheet erosion, whs re the surface earth was removed more or less regularly, and gully erosion, by which wide and deep canyons were formed. The new system of clearing land increased erosion danger and made some form of erosion control a logical step. It became a necessity to terrace all land within twelve months of clearing it. These terraces were leveled and made mechanically by tractors and caterpillar terracers, being spaced according to the nature of the soil, its power of absorption, and the slope of the land. They led into surplus water channels which were carefully located, designed, and protected by grasses and other vegetation against erosion. 6 1 Destumping and clearing of an area removed all obstructions and permitted the use of mechanically drawn plows, a revolution in itself. The useful area of land for agricultural purposes was considerably increased and easier to keep ®°C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 65, pp. 13-14. 61 C.A.F.P., Q uarterly Report , No. 66, pp. 12-13.

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217 free of weeds and insects which always tended to concentrate around the stumps of trees and fallen logs. The Cambuhy administrators had a great deal of worry over their anti-erosion control scheme. Deep plowing was hampered by the continued breakdown of tractors or breakage of plows due to hidden roots. Terraces proved a jigsaw puzzle of fitting engineers' plans in with the estate's requirements. Moreover, a large labor force had to be housed when working on clearing land or terracing it. As a result the need for wartime economy greatly threatened the program. The fazenda found that it had to keep most of the construction gangs to look after the harvest of crops planted on the newly prepared lands, while tractors lay idle due to breakdowns and lack of spare parts. Needless to say voices were raised against all the heavy expense of the program. The administration, however, remained absolutely convinced of the correctness of its antierosion policy. Profits which could be made in a good year from cotton and rice gave a margin which taken by itself put the matter beyond argument. The main advantage to Mr. Haggard lay in the creation of a state permanency in the utilization of Cambuhy 's lands. Fazendas do Cambuhy as an institution it was hoped was not going to be a typically short chapter in the passage of coffee cultivation in SSo Paulo. The last strong reason for soil conservation was the tremendous increase in land values which had taken place. Whereas in the early years of the company land could be had

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218 easily and so could be abandoned with impunity, by 1943 this was impossible. The salvage left from some big estates such as Agua Santa and Dumont when they broke up during the war left little or nothing over after paying debts to buy and build up a new property. 62 Canfouhy was accepting the new era with vitality and resourcefulness while being provident for the future. On the other hand, however, very little work was done by the average paul is ta farmer to stop erosion or conserve his forest resources. To the Cambuhy administrators, if the government and landowners did not begin to do more, it seemed that a profound change would take place in the prosperity and agricultural production of the State of S3o Paulo. 63 Cambuhy in the years that followed the depression and during the second war was founded on a firm and solid basis. Even in the difficult times of a war-ridden world profits were maintained. On the completion of twenty years' activity, the Cambuhy administration was well aware that it had come to the parting of the ways and that times were changing. The war was making profounder differences in Brazil than the earlier world conflagration. Moreover, climatic changes were taking their toll, affecting crops and water supply over the whole state. Cambuhy by the end of the war still 62 C.A.F.P. Quarterly Report . No. 73, pp. 2-3. 63 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report . No. 75, p. 1.

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219 made profits, but these were assisted in part by liquidation of stocks produced in previous years.® 4 In the circumstances the administration succeeded in giving the estate a new look of efficiency. A new, up-todate telephone system was installed as upon it depended smooth, rapid, and efficient organization. Roads were improved, new houses were built, and all old ones were repaired or replaced. In 1943 came the first word of a proposed state road from SSo Paulo, which was to be extended from SSo Carlos to Rio Preto, passing across the Cambuhy estate for a distance of some 16,500 meters. This was a symbol of things to come. Cambuhy 's privacy was to be lost; and when gasoline became plentiful after the war, the railroads, long the prop of the interior of SSo Paulo, would meet severe competition.® 5 No more would Cantouhy be a brightly shined jewel amid a backland of small unpolished farms. The outside world was overtaking it and soon would dictate its will. ® 4 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 79, p. 1. 65 C.A.F.P., Q uarterly Report , No. 72, p. 16.

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CHAPTER IX THE POSTWAR ERA In 1945 with typical restraint the Cambuhy administration addressed a message to London expressing its profound admiration of the manner in which those in England, whether in the armed forces or occupied in their normal civilian functions, when they doubled up with arduous defense duties, have cheerfully and heroically carried on under conditions of hardship, privation and continuous danger, with the result that the war has been brought to a successful termination to the benefit of the British race as a whole, and in which we who have lived these years in peace, plenty and prosperity will so largely share. The next years were to be years of peace but also a period of considerable change, which, if it brought plenty, did not necessarily mean prosperity. The termination of the v»r and the results which it had on the world conditions greatly affected Cambuhy both commercially and domestically. Soil exhaustion and erosion were to have great influence on agricultural yields. Costs of materials began to soar. Labor demanded higher wages or else it trekked to the flesh poitifyof the cities. Furthermore, social legislation, taxation, and inflation were all to add their stabs to the English company's tortured body politic. Coffee crops from 1941 onwards dropped heavily due mainly to frost, drought, and the passing of years. Needless to say this was a cause ^C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 81, p. 1. 220

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221 for considerable anxiety to the administrators, making them extra careful while seeking possible remunerative outlets for their energies. The period saw the completion of the changeover from rule of thumb farming to a more scientific handling of the estate. In 1941 the first heavy service tractor and bulldozer had arrived on Cambuhy. This heralded an age of mechanization which enabled the administration to fight soil erosion and make a counterattack on the depopulation of the property. It was a defense against the drop in the output of work of the individual laborer, brought about by the ad2 vance of social legislation. It was necessary after the war to fit the administrative staff to altered conditions and modern methods. The Cambuhy estate had always been notable for the extensive statistics and records which it had kept. These not only became more complicated as the agricultural operations on the estate became more involved but the estate was called upon more and more to supply government departments with information. Even during the war regulations of Vargas' New State caused fazen deiros to spend days filling in forms and trying to unravel a multitude of often meaningless questions. In 1940 the first effective census of all Brazil gave some busy weeks to the Cambuhy administration. The federal and state Departamentos da Fazenda also required endless information on population, 2 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report , No. 99, pp. 2-3.

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222 animals, and crops of the fazenda , which had to make separate returns to the three munic£pios in which it lay. 3 After the war when much of the social legislation on the statute books became clearer, fazendeiros found themselves obliged to give their workers annual paid holidays and pay them for arrears of these since 1943. Such provisions as this and the registration of laborers caused untold amounts of paper work. On Cambuhy it was necessary to set up a position in the commercial department to deal with the local needs of social legislation. This was typical of the proliferation of administrative posts set up in these years to cover many aspects of agricultural, industrial, constructional, and experimental work. Moreover, this work grew more complicated with scientific advancement. Whereas in the old rectangular blocks of coffee one counted the number of trees on the two sid® of the block and multiplied one by the other, when coffee was planted on contour, the blocks became irregular, making it necessary to count trees one by one, which on a plantation of 100, 000 trees meant a walk of 200 kilometers. ^ Governmental regulations concerning the shipment of coffee grew easier in 1945, and thanks to the quality of Cambuhy coffee much coffee in store was dispatched. It seemed possible that for the first time in many years the 3 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 63, Commercial Annex, pp. 6-7. 4 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report . No. 97, Enclosure No. 2; No. 98, p. 8.

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223 company would enter a new year with only one crop on its books. From July 1, 1946, shipments of coffee were freed, and at that date Cambuhy had returned to the satisfactory state of having the previous year's crop in transit and only the current one on hand. 5 It seemed as if there had been a return to normality, but in the postwar era the abnormal was normal in Brazil. In the interior of S3o Paulo the best human elements were being lured away from the fazendas by better social, intellectual, and professional advantages in the cities. This fact in addition to soil exhaustion and erosion created a serious problem for farmers. Crop yields throughout the state varied fantastically due to soil conditions and their suitability to the crops which had been planted in boom times. Looking at the state as a whole, it was clear that efforts to produce higher yields would mean cheaper production and economy of manpower, enabling the farmer to pay better wages and give better conditions. However, to say that soil maintenance and improvement was being practiced on a wide scale in S3o Paulo, or that the average farmer knew much about such matters or even cared, was far from the truth. There also was no organized attempt on the part of the government to teach and implant rational agricultural methods in the minds of most sitiantes .^ .5. — C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 81, p. 10; No. 85, p. 10. . . .... .« -4 ^ 6 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 80, p. 1.

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224 Cambuhy, on the other hand, went to great lengths to maintain her production in the postwar years. The problems facing the estate were those faced by all planters. First, the quality of laborers deteriorated, particularly that of coffee colonists. In 1948 some 57.72% of the coffee crop had to be stripped from the trees by contractors, yet 90.37% of the trees had been colonized. This was clear indication of the inefficiency of the postwar colonists. Moreover, the contractors had to be paid per tree, while the coffee stripped was picked up from the ground by the colonists at half their contract rates for picking. As a result the cost of picking rose each year as a larger proportion of contractors had to be used and their rates rose. The cost of picking per tree rose from Cr$0, 19 in 1946 to Cr$0,42 in 1948, a serious increase at a time when coffee values remained comparatively steady. 7 Transportation difficulties abounded in postwar years. Immediately after the war troubles arose on the fazenda from the exhaustion of vehicles powered by producer gas, while the mixture of poor-quality gasoline and worse-quality alcohol ill-suited the already decayed digestion of the fazenda 1 s overworked and undernourished vehicles. Moreover, freight rates to and warehouse charges in Santos increased heavily. In addition there were to be paid commissions on gross value of the coffee sold there, plus sales and consignment taxes. 7 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 90, p. 14; No. 94, , p. 11.

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225 As a result in 1946 a bag of coffee in Santos worth Cr$90, 00 per 10 kilos paid Cr$49, 80 in expenses. 8 More serious than these factors were those resulting from disturbed weather conditions, droughts, and unseasonal rains. There is a vital correlation between the rainfall between October and March and the flowering on the coffee trees in July to October, which in turn affects the crop picked some nine to twelve months later. Mere volume of rainfall, although of great importance to the plateau fazendeiro , is not the only factor, but its distribution throughout the year is vital also. Thus a comparatively small rainfall at the right moment was more valuable than prolonged or many rainfalls in or out of season. Cambuhy did not get the proper amount of rain at the right time in several postwar years and this seemed a strong argument in favor of irrigation. 9 While rains in June could occasionally send coffee to the drying terraces soggy and dirty, 1946 was the eleventh year in succession, with one exception, when the rainfall was less than the average since 1925. The weather in 1949 was an example of adequate rainfall on paper, but a physical form of heavy local storms and long, hot, dry spells which 8 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 82, pp, 7-10? No. 86, p. 11. A bag of coffee contains 60 kilos. Santos coffee prices are always quoted for 10 kilos. 9 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report s, No. 67, p. 8? No. 81, p. 7.

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226 did little or no good for thirsty coffee trees. The tendency first noted in the previous decade for Cambuhy to produce smaller coffee beans continued in this postwar era. This was a cause of disappointment, because the larger the bean the better the price, while larger beans signified a better milling yield, such bold coffee was easier to handpick and it occupied less volume. It was easier to bag up and so offered less danger of loss in transit. Moreover, there was a belief on Cambuhy that bold coffees gave a better drink than smaller beans. The four largest sizes of coffee beans in the years 1925-28 had constituted 67.796 of the crop, but in the year 1947 they accounted for only 23.9% of it. The Cambuhy administrators could not change the weather or make their trees young again. However, they did use erosion ditches and scientific fertilization as a front line of attack on the two soil problems, erosion and exhaustion, which were contributory causes to this reduction in the size of coffee beans. H In 1945 the Cambuhy administrators were pleased to see that broca had almost disappeared from the estate, while snails at Alabama did little harm. However, good rains in 1947 saw broca and other pests return in greater strength. On the fazenda some eighty blocks of coffee were affected at first, but by the end of 1948 a total of 187 blocks were 10 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 87, p. 10; No. 96, p. 5. 1;L C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 92, pp. 9-10.

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227 infected although in some cases only one or two trees in a block of 5,000 trees. Heavily infested areas were small and scattered at considerable distances of from two to five kilometers.^2 What was needed was a concerted effort by all the planters in the region, as reinfestation from a neighbor's plantation was all too easy. However, Cambuhy was the only property in the locality to admit that broca existed there, as the local fazendeiros for ostrichlike reasons and fear of devalorization of their lands would not admit the truth. Cambuhy abandoned many old combat methods such as Uganda wasp breeding and prophylactic picking and concentrated on modern techniques. Trees in an area where broca was located were sprayed with insecticides and dust blowers which had been developed at the Instituto AgronSmico in Campinas. Immediately after dusting, a total picking of coffee in the area was done, even anticipating its ripening. All coffee from suspected areas was fumigated and a repass made where possible. Areas constantly infected with broca were destumped, and elsewhere as labor was available all casual wood and logs in the coffee groves were picked up.-^ Campaigns were also conducted against snails and green cochineal while pruning was done to combat certain fungi and black ants which left trees with much dry wood showing. One 12 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 94, p. 9. 13 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports. No. 91, pp. 11-14; No. 98, pp. 9-10.

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228 cannot escape sensing the decline which characterized coffee production in the Araraquarense zone and on Fazendas do Cambuhy in these postwar years. Colonists who offered themselves to planters were poor types, ill-suited to the hard work of caring for weedinfested coffee or eliminating mar melada de cavalo . a legume which spread over the terra roxa soils. This was the situation which the Cambuhy administrators were out to overcome. In this postwar period Cambuhy' s great need was a remedy for a situation of declining production and hence there was constantly increasing interest in fertilizers, irrigation schemes, and new strains of coffee. Not only was Cambuhy passing into a new phase of more scientific agriculture, but the world was changing in its demands for coffee. S3o Paulo coffee growers had to change their ways if they were to compete with many other coffee-producing countries who sought larger shares of the American and European coffee markets. Particularly the "mild coffee” countries of Central America o and Colombia were dangerous competitors as they had ideal climatic conditions and a plentiful supply of cheap labor which was not protected by any form of social legislation, pn Cambuhy it was not intended to copy all the methods of these countries to produce high-grade coffees, such as pulping it before drying. Many of these were unsuitable for paulista conditions, yet the Cambuhy administration determined 14 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 95, pp. 11-13.

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229 to experiment with pruning methods and the use of shade trees, so common in other Latin American countries. 16 By the end of the war some 2,000 alqueires of land on Cambuhy had been protected from erosion by terraces. However, until then only land under annual crops had been terraced, although ideas of so treating grazing grounds had been held. Lack of tractors, spare parts, fuel oil, and houses had all been obstacles to the work. Yet Cambuhy, the pioneer in many things, had learned much from experience. At first terraces had been graded to carry surplus water into drainage canals which cut across the contours to maintain as flat a gradient as possible. Finally, however, level terraces were adopted, which, if they ran the risk of collapse in prolonged heavy rains, on the other hand assures that all the rain gathered would be absorbed into the soil to the benefit of the plants. 16 For several years the Cambuhy administrators had done what they could to stop erosion in the coffee lands, but what had been done had been of little effect, as the question of contouring was not considered nor was the problem of casual water coming into the plantations from drives, roads, or even adjacent land. The first postwar months brought the extension of erosion control to the coffee plantations. Destumping was impossible in old plantations, but terraces and 15 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 81, pp. 6-7. 16 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 82, p. 4.

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230 ditches could be located. Up to that time so little had been done in the State of SSo Paulo to stop erosion that many plantations had been abandoned in consequence. It was a common sight to see poor# stunted, and dried-up trees standing on pyramidal mounds of earth, the soil between the trees having been carried away by erosion. The Cambuhy administrators determined that this would never happen on their estate. Moreover, the fact that postwar labor was so scarce, so bad, and so expensive meant that costs of production constantly rose. To combat this, the Englishmen sought to maintain or even increase the yield of coffee per tree. Coffee yields had fallen away due to frost and drought. The former could be only lightly restrained by shade trees and windbreaks, but the latter could more successfully be mitigated by guaranteeing that whatever rain fell on the soil stayed there. As a result a five-year plan was evolved in 1945 to dig erosion-control ditches amid all coffee trees on Cambuhy. 17 The function of these ditches was to stop rain water not immediately absorbed by the ground from running off, carrying with it soil and humus. A ditch was undoubtedly a nuisance and the Cambuhy administrators experimented by trial and error to get maximum security with the minimum number of ditches cut at minimum cost. Ditches were obstacles to free movement in the groves and could do damage to the root 17 C.A.F.P. , General Letter , No. 48/45, dated November 5, 1945.

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231 systems of the trees on both sides of them. Nevertheless, the company proceeded with its plan and by the first quarter of 1948 all the old coffee plantations on Cambuhy had their anti-erosion ditches. 18 Agricultural techniques were also adapted to hinder the flow of water in the coffee groves. During the wet season the use of cultivators, flat boards for scraping the earth, was forbidden. After hoeing the trash was left in rows or in a square pattern among the trees and dry grass was spread over the surface of the ground to help keep the ground moist. Most important of all, however, was that all new plantations after 1945 were to be on contour terraces. The changes in the various operations in forming new coffee plantations were a clear indication of the scientific spirit abroad on Cambuhy. The site for a new plantation was based on the nature of the soil, depending on the height of the virgin forest standing on it and the presence of certain trees which indicated fertility. Thereupon the forest was felled, such wood as was wanted was removed and the rest burned. Lastly, the holes (covas ) were marked out in which the coffee seedlings would be planted. Until the end of the Second World War it was the invariable practice in the State of S3o Paulo to plant coffee in parallel rows, either in square or triangular patterns and generally, although not always, at equal distances between rows and holes. This 18 P. 7 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , N 0 . 83, pp. 5-6; No. 92,

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232 distance varied with the fertility of the soil. Thus, trees I on Cambuhy had been planted at sixteen palmos (3.52 meters), while those on the neighboring fazenda . S3o Jo3o, were at eighteen to twenty palmos Every planter took the greatest care to peg out the holes in absolutely straight lines, using rods or knotted wires to do so. Great pride was shown in the results, which became visible when the young trees were well out of the ground. To make straight lines in two directions uphill and down dale on the sides of steep hills encumbered with logs and tree stumps was no easy task, and the symmetry of old plantations in S3o Paulo is a monument to the men who created it without surverying instruments. The plantations were built up in blocks, frequently rectangular, with some 5,000 trees in each. Between adjacent blocks one row of coffee trees was left out to allow for a carredor or lane. These drives followed straight lines quite irrespective of the topography. As these earth drives were packed tight by traffic and rutted by the wooden wheels of ox carts, they rapidly became the channels for all surplus rain water. This water was generally diverted by means of esgStos or ridges made across the drive, whence the water found its way by lines of least resistance to the nearest creek or stream. Sometimes water would cross various drives ^C.A.F.P., General Letter , No. 53/45, dated December 14, 1945.

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233 and blocks, gathering volume as it sped on its destructive journey to Buenos Aires. 20 When Cambuhy had its new plantations laid out on contour, the distance of planting between trees was reduced to half that between the rows, thus setting up a natural barrier to diminish erosion. One obvious advantage of this was that all agricultural operations could be carried out following the contour and not up and down hill, which was the greatest cause of erosion in coffee plantations. Moreover, anti-erosion ditches could very easily be placed amid contoured coffee. Almost as soon as the first ditches and terraces were complete, there occurred in March, 1946, five very heavy rain storms which gave the control measures a severe testing and enabled the administrators to collect empirically technical information. It was a source of joy that the terraces withstood the storms and the ditches, or, if they broke at weak points, at least prevented sheet erosion. When heavy rains occurred in 1948, adaptations to the control measures had made them able to withstand the rains completely. This great effort to stop erosion on Cambuhy land did not cause the administrators to neglect their other experiments with coffee. They continued to collect data from various experimental plantings around the estate. The Instituto 2 0 Ibid . 21 Ibid.

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234 Agrondmico took a great interest in these and frequently sent observers, particularly to watch efforts to form new coffee plantations on old but uneroded land, part of which had borne coffee and part cereals. It also supplied special seed for these experiments, which seemed to hold out hope that the life span of coffee plantations in SSo Paulo need not be so rigorously limited. Interestingly, several large fazendas close to Cambuhy imitated the latter ' s effort to control erosion. However, on one neighbor's plantation the ditches were dug in a direction which would make erosion occur all the quicker. 23 In order to obtain an idea of the difference in quality and appearance of coffee grown under shade as compared with grown in the open, on Cambuhy there was picked coffee shaded and unshaded growing beside each other in one section. All was done to assure identical treatment in picking, drying, and milling . The report on the two consignments sent to Santos showed shaded coffee to be a little darker, inferior in cup quality, and lacking to a certain degree the body and acidity of the other sample. On Cambuhy, as throughout SSo Paulo, the advantage lay with nonshaded coffee. Shade trees gave protection from frost usually for only one night, as their leaves fell off thereafter, while any value they had as windbreaks and anti-erosion protection was offset by the 23 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 85, pp. 8-9; No. 87, pp. 12-13.

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235 competition their roots gave to the extensive root system of the coffee trees. 24 In view of this in 1949 all the Pisqulm shade trees on Cambuhy were cut down, leaving only a small plantation on one section shaded by Ingcl Edulis . One particularly successful series of experiments were those with new strains of coffee, developed in sSo Paulo after the war with a view to increasing yields. By 1949 Cambuhy had an experimental plantation of Bourbon Vermelho coffee on the Araruba section which was a local marvel and which was visited by experts and fazendeiros eager to buy seed. Encouraged by such new strains of high-yielding coffee, the Cambuhy administrators determined to replant entirely their poorest plantations. 2 ^ Apart from all this developmental work, a heavy program of maintenance work amid the coffee had to be carried out in these postwar years. Tasks such as retarring drying terraces, repairing mills, and modernizing all four benefiting machines were carried out. New classifying machines, hullers, new electric motors, and improved transmission systems were needed to assure quality. The new machinery did so efficient a job in 1944 that there were insufficient low grades for local consumption. 26 In the fields themselves a heavy program of agricultural 24 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 87, p. 14. 25 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 96, pp. 6-8. 2 6 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

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236 tasks was carried out. With poor-quality labor it was necessary to put great effort into keeping the coffee land free from the luxuriant growth of weeds which appeared after each heavy rain. In 1948, for example, over 50% of the trees on the fazenda were manured while some 3,039,078 trees were handled and 1,898,442 were pruned. Each second year the company did extensive replanting of weak trees. 27 More important than these activities was the fact that the coffee frontier advanced again soon after the war. In 1946 the administration signed contracts with formadores for 127.000 new trees at Taroandua and in the next year for 200.000 more there. In 1948 a further 220,000 were planted on the Araruba section at a place called Limeira. These new plantations were all laid out on contour lines by the company and the contractors were required to plant the seedlings, mostly of new strains, at 3.52 meters between the rows and 1.76 meters between trees. The old sound of timber being cleared and the sight of temporary mud and wattle contractors' houses returned to the fazenda again. Yet the whole operation was now done with a new efficiency. The contractor was obliged to take off timber in various forms of prescribed length and diameter for logs, poles for power lines, fence posts, firewood, and shade wood, and generally the contract revealed a new spirit of care and attention. When all these new plantations came into 27 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 97, pp. 13-14.

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237 production, the estate would have some 5,380,000 trees to handle, and so plans were made to build a fifth coffee mill, to be located at Araruba, beside the railway. In this way all coffee on the Cambuhy estate would be moving from the fields in the direction of export. 28 As a result of the small coffee crop in 1949, the drought of that year, and heavy shipments of coffee from Brazil, the statistical position of coffee seemed to indicate that a shortage was not far off. Prices reacted violently both in Santos and in the interior, rising phenomenally. With a good deal of the 1948 crop still in transit, which cost the estate some Cr$250,00 per bag to produce and which could be sold for Cr$810,00, the profits to be earned were expected to help planters over the lean years which the ever cautious Cambuhy staff feared might loom ahead. High prices, however, were not a full answer to poor crops. 29 Meanwhile on Cambuhy, streams, wells, and water tunnels were drying up. The long drought and cold winds alternating with great heat not only held up any flowering on the trees but also stripped most trees of their leaves. The most serious problem was the amount of dry wood on the trees and the so-called pruners who set out to get rid of these forests of dry branches, a job which had to be carefully done, were no more than laborers with axes in their hands. Moreover, coffee colonists seemed unable to catch up with the weeds, OO C.A.F.P., Q uarterly Reports . No. 84, Enclosure No. 4; No. 85, p. 11; No. 90, pp. 9-12. Jf ' 29 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 98, pp. 1-2.

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238 necessitating the employment of expensive extra labor which merely put the colonists into debt. 30 Brazil seemed to be on the edge of yet another boom period for coffee and this affected policy on Cambuhy as elsewhere. In the past Cambuhy had hung onto poor coffee until it was certain that it was no longer economic to maintain the trees in cultivation. High prices to a certain extent equalized high cost of production and thereby maintained the economic limit of production at the same low rate of liters of coffee per tree. Yet these high prices were likely to beget more plantations and this would soon foster the recurrent state of overproduction in the Brazilian coffee industry, with consequent low prices. Since Cambuhy had an ample quantity of special Bourbon Vermelho seed produced on the estate, the administration determined to be more ruthless in the abandonment of weak blocks of coffee. These were to be ripped up and the land destumped, deep plowed, and then replanted on contour lines in the modern manner to allow the use of mechanical instruments in agricultural operations. Colonists now seemed an expensive nuisance and new labor methods would have to be devised. It was clear that Cambuhy was entering the new boom period, striving as before for greater efficiency while giving due consideration to economic realities. 31 30 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 99, pp. 14-15. 3 1 Ibid ., pp. 4-5.

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239 By the end of the decade it was clear that all the antierosion measures taken on Carabuhy demanded the natural sequence of correct rotation of crops and addition of fertilizers. As Cambuhy lacked anyone trained in the chemistry of soil analysis, negotiations were made with a Hungarian soil scientist to make a general soil survey of the fazenda and a detailed survey of specific areas including coffee, arable, and pasture land. In 1949 these areas saw experiments with various mixtures of fertilizer and leguminous cover crops. In this new era of scientific method it was hoped to maintain, if not improve, the quality and fertility of the soil by the application of humus, green manures, chemical fertilization and the rotation of crops. Presented with a great deal of technical information, the Caxribuhy administrators prepared to change their ways. It was shown that the expensively produced compost hitherto used on the estate was low in chemical content and it was planned to use chemical fertilizers instead. The administration prepared a system of bookkeeping and statistics so that costs and results of fertilization could be known by all concerned and an accurate history over a period of years for any one area of land could be kept. Fertilizer recommendations were to be modified with the results achieved and economic conditions ruling at the time. It was planned for economic reasons to import, store, mix, and test fertilizer for the estate at Toriba. Mr. Haggard and his staff were always

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240 eager to have Cambuhy operate at a profit and not become a research and experimental farm. Science with economy was the keynote. 32 In line with this expansive policy was the earlier purchase of three small fazendas . On September 19, 1945, there was purchased a small property of some 37 algueires called s£tio Liberdade, with some 36, 000 coffee trees, 25, 000 of which were in good condition. The advantage of the purchase was that it enlarged the existing Guanabara section without incurring any additional overhead charges in management. Secondly, On January 30, 1946, Fazenda Santa Maria, a property of 106 algueires was acquired. This was in the northeast corner of the property and brought to the estate not only 64, 000 coffee trees but had the chief advantage of three springs which would increase the water supply of Cambuhy's industrial section at Toriba. Lastly, on March 21 of the same year, Carrbuhy acquired Fazenda S3o Jo3o, a property of 230 algueires lying outside the original sesmaria boundary but adjacent to it. The latter property bore some 110, 211 coffee trees which had not been fertilized, replanted, or pruned for years. No attempts had been made to stop wash, and annual interplanting with catch crops had further weakened the soil. The previous owners could produce no records or information about their 32 C.A.F.P., General Letter . No. 42/48, dated September 24, 1948; Quarterly Reports . No. 96, p. 5; No. 97, pp. 1518; No. 98, p. 23.

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241 properties. Such was the situation on all three plantations, typical of many farms on the plateau, which had no electric power, no telephones, or no water supply. 33 These conditions contrasted flagrantly with the law, order, regimentation, and documentation of Cambuhy. Needless to say, in the first years after the purchase there were great efforts to prune coffee trees, restore them with fertilizer, and protect them with ditches from erosion. All the administrative advantages of Cambuhy were employed and the properties brought into line as quickly as possible. New houses were built for the colonists, electric power and telephone; lines erected, and the water resources at Santa Maria developed. By September, 1948, there was nothing abnormal about the new properties and they had become an integral part of the estate. 34 This transformation emphasized all the more how atypical Cambuhy was. Only on well run large properties such as Cambuhy was there any approximation to scientific agriculture and only they could afford the facilities which many considered to be essential if Brazil was to hold her place in the world coffee market. Yet the extensive documentation on the new properties revealed that the coffee yields which they gave were never large and they could not be expected to be 33 C.A.F.P., General Letters . No. 28/45, dated August 8, 1945; No. 1/46, dated January 3, 1946; No. 6/46, dated February 6, 1946. 34 C .A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports . No. 91, pp. 5-7; No. 94, p. 6.

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242 so, considering the previous treatment they had been given. The yields from the new properties were always below the fazenda average and were a sad reflection on optimists' hopes of a rejuvenation of tired and neglected paulista land and trees. 35 As coffee began to return after the war to its place as the central interest of the interior of S3o Paulo, there was a consequent decline in activity with the other crops which had taken the plateau over the lean years. The state cotton crop began to fall away rapidly as a result. Moreover, as erosion carried off surface soil, much land was put out of cultivation. Erosion control was still in its infancy and confined to large properties, while in general rotation of crops and adequate manuring were carried out in a haphazard manner or not at all. Cotton planters spread out over the state, seeking new lands, but the further they went from the capital, the greater were the costs of production, which were balanced only for a time by good yields, and the lesser was the net value of the cotton. 36 On Cairibuhy after a crop failure in 1945, progressively less and less land was put under cotton. Tenants preferred to rent land to grow cereals or else enjoy better profits as coffee colonists. In effect, all Cambuhy plantings in arable land after the war depended on mechanization, and the 35 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 98, p. 7. 36 C.A.F.P. , General Letter , No. 51/45, dated November 17, 1945.

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243 difficulty of getting tractors and other machinery plus spare parts was a severely limiting factor. Cambuhy knew, thanks to the Instituto Bioldgico of SSo Paulo, that insects were the main cause of the decline in cotton yields, but machinery was lacking to spray the plants properly. Experimental crop dusting by airplane in 1947 to combat various kinds of fleas proved futile, as root borers had left little for the fleas to live on. The Cambuhy cotton plantations also saw expensive experimentation with insecticides which yielded valuable crops, but these were a poor show in comparison with the great stands of cotton of the previous decade. The cotton planter now had to be chemically minded, treating his seeds to resist disease and fertilizing his land. Properly done these would give the same yields as twenty years before, but few could afford the capital needed to get such returns. 37 Cereals were still produced in great quantity to feed the fazenda's large population, particularly corn, of which enormous harvests were gathered and consumed, in 1946 Carabuhy's workpeople and animals consumed 25,346 sacks of 60 kilos each of clean corn and 752,374 kilos of corn meal. The administration experimented in the production of hybrid corn in cooperation with the Instituto Agron&nico in Campinas, 37 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 83, p. 1; No. 91, p. 2; NO. 92, p. 11; No. 98, pp. 18-19.

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244 getting high yields but only with the most scrupulous attention. 38 The profitable crop on Cambuhy in these postwar year was rice, but at all times it was a problematical one in view of unsettled weather conditions. In the first postwar years rice cultivation on the estate remained primitive, with small stands being cultivated on many sections, and harvesting, threshing, and winnowing being done manually before the rice was sent to the fazenda rice mill to be cleaned and polished. Two combine harvesters introduced in 1947 saved a great deal of labor, but gleaners were still needed. They encouraged larger-sized plantations on a smaller number of areas, creating considerable anxiety in the administration as rice needed intermittent rain and sun at definite stages in its development. 39 Like many other fazendelros , Mr. Haggard tried out various crops, hoping they would yield profit. However, the years showed that castor, tung, soya, and several other crops could not be produced or industrialized effectively on the estate. In view of this, hopes were held out for the introduction of fruit, particularly citrus cultivation. Many of the older fruit areas of s3o Paulo around Limeira suffered a decline due to a disease known as tristeza in these years and Cambuhy hoped to profit from the resultant 30 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports . No. 87, p. 22; No. 89, pp. 19-21. 39 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 80, p. 9; No. 91, pp. 21-22.

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245 local demands for fruit. 40 In these postwar years with the partial eclipse of cotton growing likely to become permanent, the cotton gin and cottonseed oil factory were consequently affected as profitearning assets. Agricultural expansion was limited by lack of labor and machines. As a result there was a considerable development in the cattle section on Cambuhy. Interest was transferred in part from cattle fattening to cattle breeding and milk production, while pig breeding and fattening were expanded into a major business on the estate. The English company had inherited from MagalhSes a good many breeding cows, mostly Herefords, which it had replaced with native Caracu stock and later concentrated on Zebtf as all cattle raisers in SSo Paulo did. After the second war it was hoped at first to crossbreed this Zebfi stock with other breeds and produce good meat and milk in animals, but by 1947 it was decided to establish separate meat and milk herds, v/ith the latter predominating. These milk herds not only were to supply the fazenda population but the surplus was to be sold locally. By 1950 some three large dairy installations had been erected on the estate close to the new state roads, giving easy access to Araraquara and nearby towns, while two more supplied local needs. 41 40 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 98, pp. 4-5. 41 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports . No. 91, pp. 2-3; No. 97, p. 4.

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246 The cattle department, which covered a third of Cambuhy's land area in 1946, also saw a move towards the care and scientific improvement which characterized the estate in the postwar era. A resident veterinary surgeon was retained to handle artificial insemination and vaccinate the cattle against diseases. The aim was to improve the quality and quantity of the dairy sections 's output and the quality and value of the steers bred. Actually conditions on the fazenda , which like most paulista farms consisted of open ranges and a smaller area of improved pasture, did not allow artificial insemination to be successful, but the move to more technical care of the cattle was made. 42 Pasture improvement began to take up much of the cattle department's energies. The traditional paulista method used on the estate had been to fell the forest or scrub, burn it, plant corn or some other crop for one year, and then plant grass. Thereafter, pasture was maintained by annual burnings and an expensive and, therefore, occasional cleaning with foices or billhooks. After the war the administration became concerned with destumping the land, plowing it, rotating pastures with crops, and damming up streams for better water supply. Each year a small area was so treated, while the remainder was dethorned and cleared in the old manner. Despite labor difficulties the fences and fireguards all over the ranges were maintained and all was ready for the great 42 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 99, Cattle Annex, pp. 7-8.

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247 expansion of cattle activity in the company's last years. 4 ^ At Cambuhy the cattle department had rarely been allowed to graze cattle on really good land? and when it had, this was usually on a temporary basis because cattle fattening and breeding did not produce large profits when reduced to a unit-of-area basis. Pig production on the other hand did not require a large area of land nor necessarily first-class land. Pig fattening had begun at the cattle headquarters in 1939 but with little enthusiasm or profit. In 1944 new breeding and fattening installations were begun and the herd of pigs rose from 165 in 1943 to 1,232 in 1945. Two years later a further expansion in pig production took place as it was a financial asset which also provided an outlet for the fazenda ' s corn production. 44 Unfortunately, by 1949 the pig market fell away, a fact which was aggravated by the high price of corn. The cattle department tried to substitute rice, wheat, and mandioca brans which were cheaper. . However, an abundance of lowpriced beef hurt the national sales of pork, while cottonseed, peanut, and vegetable oils helped slacken the hog lard market. Pig farmers were reducing their herds to a minimum all over the state and Cambuhy was left with its pigs, installations, and considerable expense. Such were the trials 43 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 85, pp. 3-4; No. 95, Cattle Annex, pp. 3-8. 44 C.A.F.P., General Letter , No. 26/48, dated July 28, 1948.

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248 of agriculture in postwar S3o Paulo. 45 The commercial department also suffered greatly from this agricultural upheaval. In the postwar years the Araraquara zone rapidly abandoned cotton and went over to the more profitable crops of peanuts, castor, rice, and corn. The Toriba industrial plant thus had to face the twin problems of declining cotton prospects and aging machinery. Confident that Brazil ' s economic future lay in agriculture and the industrialization of such raw material, the oil mill staff investigated the adaptation of the machinery to crushing soybeans and particularly peanuts. With the exception of one period in 1943 when the whole oil mill industry had been threatened with operating at a loss owing to ill-considered price fixing, Cambuhy had usually regretted only the smallness of its oil mill. In good years its profit scope was limited and in bad years a larger f » capacity would have diluted overhead charges. On the other hand even in years of record seed production, the industrial potential of S3o Paulo mills was in excess of seed supplies, and before the industry became controlled by the government, this fact allowed Cambuhy to run nearer to capacity than larger mills. 45 45 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 98, Cattle Annex, p. 8. 46 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 90, Commercial Annex, pp. 5-13.

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249 In addition to the reduction of areas planted in cotton, the cottonseed oil mill at Toriba also had the problems of three crop failures after the war and consequent small government quotas of seed to crush. After a short season semiskilled and skilled men were thereafter left idle at the mill. Progressive rationing of electric power also led to f reduced production and a certain amount of industrial unrest. Lastly, poor quality of seed caused the crude oil produced to have an excessive acidity, this in turn causing an extraordinarily high refining loss. 47 In 1947 Cambuhy was allowed to crush 2, 800 tons of cotton seed, which was equal to less than a third of the capacity of the mill. Consequently in 1948, to compensate for this, a considerable amount of peanuts was purchased and crushed, while the administration wrestled with registering the resultant peanut oil under the name Primavera. The mill got a more generous margin of profit from the latter as government price controls were more lenient. The department's distribution network in local towns carried the new product to retailers. 48 After the war Cambuhy in many ways was at the mercy of factors beyond its control. The days when a fazendeir o could use all his energy to fight nature, a full-time occupation in itself, were gone. The new era was one of state 47 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 82, Commercial Annex, p. 4. 48 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 91, Commercial Annex, p. 2; No. 93, Commercial Annex, pp. 2-5.

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250 interference and regulation. In the process of buying, gining, and exporting cotton, Cambuhy incurred sales taxes and sales commissions three times, which made it hard to compete with large cotton gins which owned and exported the cotton they ginned. International factors also made themselves felt. Thus, in 1949, when the English pound sterling was devaluated, the cotton market came to a standstill for some months, ruining both planters' and ginners' economy. As prices fell, stocks on hand had to be constantly revalued. ^9 A similar occurrence happened in the case of Cambuhy' s essential oil distillery. During the war and in the first postwar months, there was an extremely strong demand for essential oils in Brazil and in the United States. Cambuhy was swamped with orders for oil of vetiver and lemongrass oil. As a result the plantations of essential oil grasses and plants were greatly extended and there was ordered from abroad an expensive steam boiler to power the distillery, which was to be enlarged. In 1946 Cambuhy could not fill its orders, but in the next year the entire activity was at a standstill as prices declined quickly from their inflated wartime level. The new boiler was ready to work by April, ! 1948, having been three years in transit, but by that time essential oil plantations on the estate had almost disappeared and the industrial equipment was deteriorating. Brazil was no longer a country of cheap labor and could not 40 ^C.A.F .P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 97, Commercial Annex, pp. 1-3; No. 100, Commercial Annex, p. 1.

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251 compete with Central America and West Indian producers of lemongrass, While Eastern supplies of oil of vetiver put Cambuhy's other main essential oil out of the market. Industries could rise and fall at a time when the economic climate was as variable as that of the region. 50 In 1950 Mr. Daniel Haggard retired from his position as General Manager on Cambuhy and his departure seemed to set a seal on the old era which was gone. He was able to look back over the many vicissitudes which Cambuhy had suffered with other fazendas on the plateau and yet could note that the company on the whole had prospered. The early years had been particularly difficult ones when the company had gone heavily into debt in order to develop the estate. The slump of 1929 ruined the Brazilian Warrant Company's original hope of great profits from handling the Corapanhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas ' coffee, and their preference shares in Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates, Ltd., were far in arrears in paying dividends. In 1936 the latter company's capital was reconstructed, leaving the Brazilian Warrant Company with only onetenth of the ordinary shares. Yet in the long run their scheme to enjoy profits from handling coffee from Cambuhy worked. 5 *50 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 84, Commercial Annex, p. 1; No. 92, Commercial Annex, pp. 8-12,* No. 95, Commercial Annex, pp. 3-6. 51 Great Britain, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Scheme of Arrangement re Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Es tates Limited and The Companies Act, 1929 . No. 00650 of 1936, November 12, 1936.

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252 Thereafter, however, the constantly devaluating currency of Brazil, difficulties in remitting profits to England, and constant problems of increasing taxation in both countries had added further problems to both the Santos and the London companies, in the postwar era both companies gained a merchant's profit when coffee, cotton, and cottonseed oil stocks were liquidated at prices far above the cost of production. Yet the factor noted above prevented shareholders in England from enjoying such profits. By 1950 times had changed to a point inconceivable when the English company had started out in 1924. The devaluation of the pound sterling on September 18, 1949, caused a profound sensation in Brazil and many suspected that the palavra inglgsa had taken on a different meaning. Moreover, Cambuhy in 1950 was a rapidly altering place where increasing mechanization and scientific treatment were changing traditional mores. Internal changes were upsetting enough, but the most serious factor troubling the Cambuhy administration at the time was the "orgy of wild spending being authorized by various legislative bodies, which consists chiefly in increases of salary to civil servants of all categories . " As far as possible government departments did not pay their debts, and so Cambuhy was due large sums in compensation for the lands expropriated to construct state roads which passed across the fazenda , insurance compensation for hail-damaged cotton, and

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253 payment for sale of pigs to a government institute for making preventive serums against swine fever. 53 In view of steadily increasing federal income tax, state sales tax, and territorial taxes, Mr. Haggard in 1948 voiced opinions which must have echoed in many a fazendeiro ' s throat. To him it seemed that increased taxation, wages and cost of necessary equipment had wrought a more serious effect on agricultural concerns than any other. Utility and industrial companies passed on the difference to their customers with little delay, but the farmer who wanted more money for the beans he had produced was immediately called a thief and a robber. Brazil was essentially an agricultural country. Its economics were still profoundly related to the production and export of coffee. Towns and industrial organizations depended on the production of the fields for their existence. Mr. Haggard rang out the traditional fazendeiro * s plea. If agricultural activities were taxed out of existence and farms left depopulated, then the whole social fabric of S3o Paulo would tend to break up and it would be left to the legislators, if they still existed, to balance the budgets. 54 In 1913 Carlos Leoncio MagalhSes insured his coffee mill and stocks against fire for 25 contos of rlis. It was a far cry from this to 1948 when the English company insured C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 99, p. 3. 54 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 95, p. 1; No. 96, p. 2.

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254 their coffee stocks and fixtures against fire for Cr$667, 000.00. During his tenure of Cambuhy, Nhonho MagalhSes had done all he could to bring laborers there. In the postwar era the English administrators had to make a similar effort to calm labor unrest and prevent men from leaving for the cities. Thirdly, in the time of MagalhSes the Araraquarense Railroad had brought labor to the Cambuhy estate, but by 1950 when it was rebuilding and improving its track the railroad offered wages which drew labor away from many properties in the zone. In the former period the fazendeiro had been a businessman who was expected to show a benign patriarchal interest in his workers' welfare. By 1950 the fazendeiro was a rather harassed businessman, watching world markets and trying to keep up with social legislation which dictated what conditions his workers should enjoy. 55 When Cambuhy became an English property in 1924, the total area of the original sesmaria had been whittled down to 23, 257 alcfuelres . included in which was an island of 500 alqueires bounded by the Jacarl-Guassu River and on the three other sides by the three government colonies. As the company was without working capital in its first years, it was decided to raise money by selling parts of the estate, a method much used by GaviSo Peixoto, while at the same time the other property of the Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas, Santa Eudoxia, was broken up into small holdings. 55 MagalhSes Papers , Dossier 30; C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report, No. 99, pp. 2, 12-13.

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255 Altogether some 1, 371 algueires of virgin land on Cambuhy were sold in the early years at prices per algueire often less than the value of a sack of coffee in 1950. In particular there was founded a small town or patrimony at Curup£ around the railroad station there. The whole area of small holdings, which by 1950 bore many thousands of well developed coffee trees, was sold for less than the cost of a heavyservice tractor in postwar sSo Paulo. 56 In the course of a quarter of a century, 8,000 algueires of forest land had been sacrificed and in its place stood coffee groves, arable land, and other profitable items. In many ways the dreams of MagalhSes had been fulfilled. An aerial view of the property by 1950 revealed not only the patchwork of varied agricultural activity, but the great deal of constructional work done. Indeed, the increase in the number of houses and buildings of all kinds represented the English company's main effort and had followed closely the development of the property, it being essential that sufficient and appropriately designed houses, stores, and deposits be provided for each activity. The fazenda ' s road network had been constantly expanded and improved. All areas of the estate were linked by telephone, while the electric power system had been transformed from two motors of 120 horsepower and eight kilometers of power lines to a situation where eighty-eight kilometers of high-tension lines C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 100, pp. 2-3.

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256 and sixty-nine of low-tension wires carried power to 111 motors with a total of 1,005 horsepower. ® 7 The organization of all the development, the laying out of land and planting it and above all its elaborate statistical and costing systems, had been the creation of Mr. Daniel Haggard. He had directed his team of English officials and Brazilian subordinates with rare ability and inspired respect in all. Before leaving Cambuhy he was presented with the Freedom of the Municipality of Mat3o, a unique honor for a foreigner in the area. It had been Haggard's desire to leave Cambuhy with the coffee plantations as good or better than when he had arrived there in 1924. Had he gone at the end of 1940, this would have been achieved, but climatic changes after 1941 had caused the coffee to suffer. Heavy rains in 1950 emphasized all the more the close relation between the well-being of the coffee tree and ample rain. The problems of declining quantity and reduced percentage of better grades of coffee were to be the preoccupying factors in the last years of Cambuhy.’*® Despite the woes of 1950, Mr. Haggard could reflect on a long period of satisfactory development. Needless to say, looking back he could see things that should have been done and places where greater effort and knowledge would have 57 Ibid ., Enclosure No. 1; No. 89, pp. 21-24. 58 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 100, pp. 5-9.

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257 helped to make the company even stronger and profits greater. However, to hit the market at the right time in any field needed a seeing eye which few possessed. Cambuhy in its isolation, partly self-imposed and partly dictated by its location, could not always be in the midst of things. At least, as he said, Cambuhy was "still a pebble on the British beach and can send home dividends and so I hope not to be swallowed up in the maw of capital realization." 59 The development of state arterial highways and improvement of railroad connections were by 1950 changing Cambuhy from an isolated latifundla to one in the center of things, and governmental regulations both in Brazil and England were soon to bring about just what Mr. Haggard feared. 5 9 Ibid . , p. 2.

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CHAPTER X THE PINAL YEARS By 1950 both Fazendas do Cambuhy and the whole Brazilian coffee business stood at a decisive point. Gone were the days when coffee was a rustic plague-resistant plant which would bear the weight of the paulista civilization on its shoulders almost without any sustenance. Rather coffee now seemed a hungry monster eating away at the goodness of the soil and having a commercial spirit which was plagued by the terrible effects of over-production. This situation made Brazilians think rationally about coffee. The plant was to continue as the base of much of the nation's economy, but life was not to be so simple as it had been before and diversification would be needed to produce economic equilibrium. Soil conservation, the restoration of tired land and research on new and better varieties of coffee were to be essential. Above all, productivity had to be increased in order to reduce the costs of production. Spontaneous and intensive immigration had ended, leaving the problem of finding adequate and able labor. Serious fazendeiros were forced to think of raising their workers' standard of living. The old times were gone and new techniques in coffee and other cultures not only had to make money 258

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259 for the owner but had to help improve the lot of the laborer . ^ For some forty years over-production of coffee had done increasing damage to Brazil's economic stability and her political and social structure. As a producer of raw materials Brazil grew ever more conscious of her weak position, dependent on American and European markets and subject to weather risks and the attacks of pests. Furthermore, increasing outside competition had reduced Brazil's share of the world coffee market from some 67% in the years 1930-34 to 47.8% in the two years before 1950. Worse still, coffee which in 1942 had accounted for 26.21 % of Brazil's export had returned to being 73.71% of it by 1952, that is, the country was back to the old pre-depression dangerous situation of over dependence on coffee. 2 Brazil, thanks to wartime pressures, was by 1950 a semiindustrialized nation, supplying herself with such articles as textiles but greatly in need of machines and other expensive items. By 1952 coffee covered only 40% of the costs of imports. Few markets were so insecure, due not only to possi ble fluctuations in the size of harvests but also to consequent rivalries with other coffeeproducing nations and the social and political accidents which could hurt a luxury ^Lucas Nogueira Garcez, "Fastigio, declinio e recuperat^So, * Diarios Associados , Caderno lo., p. 3. 2 Pierre Monbeig, "Resuma da geogrlfia econfimica do caf£, Diarios Associados , Caderno 6o, pp. 8-9.

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260 item on the world market. Meanwhile, the ill treatment of coffee in the decade after the depression and drought and frost in the next ten-year period, combined with an increase in the postwar world coffee consumption had wrought great changes . In 1949 the old stocks of the Departamento Nacional do Caf€ were exhausted. Two years before, coffee prices had reached the 1929 level and by 1950 were twice that amount. The period from 1950 to 1954 proved a golden age of coffee with prices thirteen times higher in Brazilian currency than those of the last boom, from 1924 to 1929, and 31% better in real values. Again there was a drive to plant coffee in virgin land in the North of Parang, the west of s3o Paulo, and to the north of Esplrito Santo. Frosts in sSo Paulo and Paran£ in 1953, while a national disaster, yet sent coffee prices and planters 1 hopes soaring. Immediatism and improvidence still rode along with the coffee frontier. 3 Coffee then continued to be the greatest of the nomadic destructive cultures in Brazil, but the fact that the last of the virgin soil resources, ideal in every respect for coffee cultivation, had been reached placed a great emphasis on the need for rational work. Coffee could no longer be allowed to go on consuming nutritive elements in the soil, while erosion carried off the humus or oxidation of organic material 3 Ibid ., Ruy Miller Paiva, "A situa
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261 by the sun's rays took place unchecked. Conservation had become all important to Brazil as areas were ruined by exploitation. 4 In this new era the big plantation owner, now highly exceptional in the State of SSo Paulo, was left to try to recuperate the exhausted parts of his land and make money where he could with various catch crops such as tung, ramie, and sugar, and the development of cattle raising. The big fazendeiro was now a banker, an industrialist or a cattle magnate, as coffee alone could no longer provide a fortune. Perhaps this was a basic cause in the downfall of the English company, whose main support was coffee, and of the purchase of Cambuhy by a group of financiers whose chief source of wealth was not in agriculture. 5 Cambuhy in 1950, however, was not looking to the past or brooding on recent difficulties, but focusing its vision on the new plantations. Some 548,022 new trees were in various stages of fonna^ao. Moreover, its experimental plantations of the Bourbon Vermelho strain of coffee were doing very well indeed and yielding at least three liters of coffee beans per tree which were to be used as seen in replanting whole blocks of old and declining coffee trees. 6 4 J. Quint iliano A. Marques, “uma cafecultura em bases conservacionistas, ” Diarios Associados . Caderno 4o, p. 3. 5 Monbeig, Planteurs et pionniers , pp. 254-55. 6 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report . No. 100, pp. 8-11.

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262 This piano do oaf 4 was part of the policy of the new general manager of Fazendas do Cambuhy, Mr. Eric Seddon. He took over Cambuhy as a well run estate and determined in view of the changing prices of coffee to modernize as much as possible coffee cultivation on it. Cambuhy lent itself to intensive agriculture as it already had good installations, houses, roads, and other communications. The coffee trees were to be handled with the best agronomic techniques, conservationist practices were to be used, and intensive chemical and organic fertilizers applied. Irrigation, motor mechanization, and utilization of new varieties of coffee, obtained from Instituto Agronfcmico in Campinas, were all to be developed, while force and vigor were put into a large scale experimental program. Lastly, not only was coffee to be handled on the super or Cambuhy scale, but cattle breeding, milk production, pasture improvement, and citrus cultivation were all to feel the effects of the new energetic hand at the wheel. 7 Cambuhy, which had become known by 1950 as "Fazenda dos Ingleses, " was by world standards a mammoth property, and in SSo Paulo, a rare survival of a colonial sesmaria . After sixteen years of intensive cultivation of cotton, the latter had been abandoned and the estate had returned to being a predominantly coffeeproducing latifundia. interview with Mr. E. J. Seddon, January 10, 1960

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263 In 1950 all effort was concentrated at first on the 5, 000, 000 coffee trees on the estate, of which same 10% had been grown from seed selected in the Campinas Institute. The so-called piano do cafe , or coffee program, was based upon observations made on various blocks of coffee. It consisted in eliminating those blocks with an average yield over four years of less than two liters per tree and replacing them with new plantings grown from Selected seed, supported by intensive fertilization, which, in turn, was to be complemented with irrigation and mechanization. The whole process was to be an economic renewal to assure the best returns from old and new plantations alike. In fact, in 1950 the new Bourbon Vermelho coffee gave extraordinarily high yields, on an average of 8.45 liters per tree, nearly three times the average for the rest of the fazenda. 8 This encouraged the administration in its plan, as it now seemed that all the work which had been put into the Cambuhy coffee plantations in the previous years in the form of terraces and fertilization was at last beginning to pay dividends. Cambuhy' s trees looked far better them those of her neighbors, and even the new coffee areas along the Alta Paulista railroad had no better quality of growth, although their trees were larger. 8 Q C.A.F.P. , Qua rt erly Report . No. 101, pp. 2-3. ^Interview with Sr. Carlos Rfeis de MagalhSes, February 18, 1960.

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264 As always Cambuhy remained in the forefront of the experimental field. In its replanting program the administrators abandoned the old practice of planting seedlings — baskets of four— but now placed in each cova or hole four seedlings planted singly in earthen pots later reinforced with a thin strip of pinewood. This work was carried to a point where in 1954 the fazenda produced from its own seed 821, 556 seedlings in these pots and 5,220 in baskets, making a total of 129, 565 replants in blocks and individually on the estate for the year. 10 Close inspection of the new coffee plantings revealed many things including various pests such as the Red Spider, and methods were devised to kill these. In 1950 fertilization was carried out as soon as materials were available, and studies on possible irrigation schemes were made. In 1951 a block of coffee in the Agua Sumida section, which had been mulched, was picked onto a cloth leaving the soil and mulch undisturbed. The color of the more plentiful leaves on this block as a result was a more healthy dark green than those close by. The aim of the administration was to get away from the old system of coroa^o , which it was now felt undid each winter all the benefit the trees derived from the previous summer. Typical of such progressive ideas of the time was the mechanization of the S3o Jo3o section. In that case all the 10 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 103, p. 8; Cambuhy S.A. RelatQrio Anual 1, Enclosure No. 6.

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265 mules, carts, and wagons were withdrawn from the plantation and replaced by two tractors, one rotary hoe, and two trailers, while fifty milk cows were transferred there. No colonists were engaged. The plan was to keep the cottages full and employ the people living there to produce winter feed for the cows, tend the coffee and lemongrass plantations, pull up old abandoned coffee trees, and boe around the trees in the parts that could not be treated by the rotary hoe. It was anticipated that there would be enough labor to pick the crop, which would be done into cloths. 11 After the harvest in 1951, work went ahead to destump all the uncolonized coffee plantations to facilitate later mechanization. In all, some seventeen rotary hoes were to work in the 1951-52 wet season. Not only did these machines do their work but they gradually changed the shape of the terraces by flattening them out. In fact, the experiment at S£o JoSo went well. The administrator cover-cropped and manured all the trees on the section, harvested onto cloths, cultivated mainly with the rotary hoe, and produced fair quantities of milk. Mechanical manure loading was also done to save labor and accelerate the work. 12 If the need to cut costs and produce more were vital reasons behind the attempted mechanization of sections of Cambuhy, equally important was the factor that the labor 11 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports . No. 106, pp. 7-9; No. 105, p. 8. 12 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 106, p. 6; No. 110, pp. 10-11.

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266 force available was of very low quality by 1950 and quite unreliable as regards roost agricultural tasks. For example, when the new general manager toured the interior of sSo Paulo to inspect the latest installations for drying coffee, as the estate was about to install its fifth coffee mill at Araruba, he concluded that coffee drying must also be mechanized as labor grew more expensive and harder to get. In October, 1950 ^ the drought of that year broke and there was a record amount of rain in the next six months. This steady rain benefited coffee and pastures. However, weeds also flourished amid the coffee trees and the administration faced with the poor standard of colonist available felt the need for a mechanical or chemical form of weeding. 13 Cambuhy as a leader in research suffered many of the setbacks which innovators usually experience. Out on the sections, in addition to poor quality labor, there was a lack of responsible people for minor administrative positions such as head of machine operators. Moreover, although mechanization seemed an answer to some of the problems of the fazendelro , two seasons of use showed that the rotary hoes imported from the U.S.A. and Canada were not robust enough for work in the old coffee plantations, more time being spent in repairs than in work. Basically the weeds presented no problem as long as they could be controlled when necessary. To the experienced 13 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 102, p. 8; No. 104, p. 6.

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267 eye of the seasoned administrator far more harm seemed to be done by over-zealous hoeing whereby the land was exposed to scorching sun and erosive rains, than was ever done by weeds, provided they were not allowed to seed. By churning them in before that time, they formed a sponge far more effective in absorbing rainfall than any terrace ever made. Until rotary hoes of stronger construction and better design were made, hand labor was still indispensable. So the man with the hoe had to be wooed back to the coffee lands. 14 In 1951 and 1952 the replanting of old coffee groves was done largely with the new Novo Mundo strain, particularly in old tired land. From 1953 onwards, however, greater use was made of the Caturra variety. The latter as well as the former were found to be more robust and resistant than Bourbon Vermelho, the first variety developed at Campinas, which marked the rebirth of Brazilian coffee stock. In this new era of progress for coffee in Brazil, Carobuhy had a new air of scientific efficiency. Airplane crop dusting, extensive fertilization, and the first steps in irrigation had by 1952 made the estate into a model to be copied by other forward-looking planters. The figures for agricultural work done throughout the year rose to astronomical heights. Over the calendar year 1952 some 735,695 trees were pruned, while 3,456,378 were handled and 2,765,920 were plowed, all of which constituted a very creditable 14 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. Ill, Annexed Special Report No. 3, pp. 2-4.

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268 record. Moreover , in that year some 50, 270 trees were replanted, in addition to the extensive new plantings. Over 1,280,000 trees in seventeen sections were destumped and 2*769,909, or 56.55%, of the producing trees had been manured. Cambuhy had entered a period of activity to rival that of the days of expansion of Magalh3es. 16 The new general manager found in Cambuhy soils of good quality, dominated as has been noted by the type known as i^ au : r .H superior . This soil in general is sandy, lacking in organic materials, and easily leached. Much of Cambuhy' s territory had been under cultivation for decades, and although well cared for, there had been an impoverishment of the soils. This combined with the age of the trees caused yields to fall off. As a result much serious study was given to the need to fertilize. With 5,000,000 trees to be treated, not only was there a need for extensive financial outlay, but precaution and care in the use of fertilization. 17 By 1950, in addition to mulching, a more scientific manuring of the coffee trees on the plantation had begun using a standard mixture of chemicals per tree, applied along with stable compost, coffee husk, and a cover crop of beans or leguminous plants. A total of 4,900,000 trees were so treated in 1950. Fertilization work moved ahead in the 16 C.A.F.P,, Quarterly Report . No. 107, pp. 5, 8-12. 17 SabastiSo Goncalves da Silva, “Cambuhy. A mayor fazenda de cafg do mundo, " Diarios Associados. Caderno lo. pp. 4-5.

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269 next few years and in late 1952 a great effort was made to put down a covering in all the coffee not used for colonists' interplanting with beans. The ideal was to plant all the trees with a cover crop, apply stable manure to them and double up on chemicals wherever there was Irrigation or when the previous crop had been exceptionally heavy. Coffee husks and any other type of organic matter was used whenever it was available. The actual chemical fertilizer used was based on experimental work which had been done at the government research station at Pindoraraa. A formula was established, and each tree was given one kilo in two applications! one at the beginning of the rains, reinforced as regards potassium to help fructification; and the second a little after the harvest, with a concentration on nitrogen to protect the vegetation. About 5,000 tons of chemical fertilizer per year were absorbed by 5,500,000 trees at an approximate cost of iq 150 million cruzeiros. In 1952 milling showed an improvement in screen percentages as compared with the average since 1945. In other words, better quality coffee was being produced. Moreover, the yield per tree went up and this, too, was attributed to fertilization. In principle the Cambuhy program, feeling that only the quantities and timing of applications would 18 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 101, pp. 4-5? No. 110, p. 10. i^Gon^alves da Silva, loc. clt .

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270 have to be regulated in accordance with the results of the experiments conducted by the estate and by the IBEC Research Institute. In November and December, 1953, for example, an extra application of potash was given to many trees to allow them to form and develop their fruit for 1954 but to leave them in a fit state to put on new wood and prepare themselves for the 1955 crop. This was an effort to get away from the biennial cropping so often associated with coffee trees. 20 The fertilization program continued to grow until in 1953 over 12,000,000 applications of chemicals were made to the estate's coffee trees, while organic manures and cotton seed meal were so satisfactory that it was hoped to increase quantities with reasonable hope of thereby maintaining a steadier production level. Thereafter, lesser amounts were applied according to the dictates of economy and greater sophistication of method. It was decided that it was uneconomic to produce organic material in the field even in leguminous form because these plants competed with the coffee. Thus, this material had to be grown elsewhere and transported to the coffee groves. Right up until the end of Cambuhy in 1956 experiments were made with coloni3o and G uatemala grasses, although there never was enough time for conclusive results in practice. Fertilization which began on a serious scale on Cambuhy in 1950 by the end six years later seemed to have made progress as regards production. on U C.A.F .P., Quarterly Reports . No. 112, pp. 15-16; and Enclosure No. 4; No. 114, pp. 9-10.

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271 The average number of sacks for a three-year period having risen from 34,000 in the years 1949-51 to some 58,000 sacks in the last period from 1954 to 1956. 21 In its final years Cambuhy was an example of highly intensive agriculture as regards its coffee plantations. To provide manure for the production of concentrated and rich compost, cattle were raised in confinement and experiments were made in mixing this manure with sugar cane. Intensive agriculture on such an extensive scale meant a great need for water, in effect, all efforts at increasing the fertility of the soil cane to naught because of inadequate rainfall. The dry seasons could change a great deal. At such times very little pruning was needed as growth was so limited as to give little surplus. New plantations of coffee came to a standstill with the drought even in the terra roxa in the southern sections. This emphasized the fact that large areas of new trees could not be planted on old coffee land unless it had been revitalized by many years of cover cropping. Any new plantings were to be confined to land not previously under coffee and even so, as one increased the size of the plantations, one's ability to farm them fell in inverse proportion. One answer to the problem was to be irrigation. 22 21 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report No. 115, pp. 12-13; Cambuhy S.A. Relatftrlo. Anual No. 1, p. 18 and Enclosure No. 8; Relator io Anual No. 2, pp. 19-21 and Enclosure No. 7. 22 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. Ill, Annexed Special Report, No. 3, pp. 2-4.

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272 Year after year spring droughts caused trees to suffer and fruit to be lost. The trees took the best part of the growing season to recover from the dry weather during the harvesting and flowering periods. Lack of leaf area meant poor root development and the trees barely recovered from one drought when the next hit them. Thus, the healthy looking trees in 1950 were found to have a comparatively small crop of fruit set on them, a reminder of the effect of two severe winter droughts in 1949 and 1950. In 1951 southern Brazil again had a bad dry season. Areas around Barretos and Riber3o Preto had no rain at all for the six dry months. Cambuhy had some August rains, but looking back on twenty-five years rainfall statistics, it was interesting to note that August rains had virtually ceased since 1939 and that most of the big coffee crops previous to that date had been preceded by good August and September rains. Severe dry seasons since 1940 had not only reduced the capacity of the trees to bear but had diminished the results of what should have accrued from the terracing of the old plantations. 23 Such were the bases of arguments in favor of first experimenting with irrigation and later taking advantage of easy loans to install irrigation equipment in high yielding sections such as CurupS and the fine terra roxa land in Alabama. On December 18, 1953, the Chairman of Cambuhy 23 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 103, pp. 5-6; No. 106, p. 4*

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273 Coffee and Cotton Estates In his annual report stated the effects of the reduction in annual rainfall on Cambuhy ' s coffee production giving various statistics. As a consequence the Board of the Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas determined to embark upon the installation of irrigation equipment on a long term basis. In order to cover the vast number of trees on the estate, the expenditure over the next five years was expected to amount to fifty million cruzeiros , which was to be obtained from the Bank of Brazil in a series of advances to be repaid over a period of years. This statement about the relation between rainfall and crops caused considerable press comment all over Brazil and many inquiries were sent to Cambuhy. More complete information was compiled. 24 It was clear that annual precipitations had remained fairly constant but the distribution had deteriorated considerably. Fifteen months without rain during the last period of four years was serious indeed and a definite reason for the installation of irrigation. In fact 1953 was the first year in eighteen years that rain was registered in a worthwhile quantity every month. Therefore, even though the total amount was among the lowest, it could be considered very satisfactory from the point of view of the flowering and the setting of the fruit. 25 24 See Appendix III, Table 5. 25 Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates Limited, Chairman's Statement , 1953, pp. 4-5; C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 115, p. 5.

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274 Irrigation on Cambuhy, as elsewhere in the state, was to be the answer to coffee production, being a lottery, in which the weather was the controlling influence. Supplementary irrigation was expected to increase production, equalize harvests, give better germination of seeds and make crop predictions safer, improve other agricultural products and give better pastures. Because of the high initial cost of installation, only a tiny percentage of the state of S3o Paulo was irrigated. Moreover, irrigation had to be well planned or else it could be an economic disaster. ° Cambuhy began its irrigation program in 1952 with two small dams constructed on the Contribui^ao section and an area served by pumps and aluminum piping. Late that year some 60, 000 trees were given one and a half inches of water, which resulted in remarkable blossoming and new leaf growth. In 1953 two more sections were equipped at a time when bitter frosts on July 4, 5, and 10, once more reminded the administrators of the power of nature. Some 904,727,000 coffee trees were destroyed in the states of S3o Paulo and Parang, while 27% of Brazilian coffee trees went out of production. Frost damage on Cambuhy was comparatively light, only the young trees suffering greatly. None of the damaged 2 ^Guido Cesar Rando, "A defesa da cultura cafeeira: Problemas gerais de irrega
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275 trees had to be abandoned, but all new plantings were to be set out on higher levels in future. The success of Cambuhy with plantings on old cereal land gave an abundance of suitable high land for future plantations, without using new forest areas. Moreover, the production crisis and market boom resultant from this frost scare greatly encouraged coffee planters and irrigation schemes. Again coffee was leading Brazil to greater speculation on that plant. Once the 1954 consumer crisis was over there would still lurk ahead the spectre of over production. 28 1954 proved to be a dry year on Cambuhy and in the fall there was a lack of subterranean water. Wells ran close to dry and rivers had record low water levels. Thanks to the fertilization program the coffee trees bore up well to this and a late winter drought, but as always this bad distribution of rain kept the trees from developing new wood. The irrigated trees on the other land were lusher and carried more fruit and confirmed the faith of the specialists in irrigation. 29 In 1954 a total of 2, 734, 989 coffee trees were irrigated on Cambuhy at a total cost of over Cr$3, 361, 370, or Cr$4, 22, per application per tree. By the time of the break up of the estate in 1956 well over twenty-three million cruz^L ros had been spent on irrigation equipment. Yet Cambuhy even 2 « °C.A.F.P. , Quarte r ly Report . No. 114, p. 7. 29 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 116, pp. 4, 8-9; No. 118, pp. 11-12.

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276 then was only at an experimental stage with its program, testing a reduction in the amount of water given and an increase in the number of trees served. On the negative side, two nights of frost amid a winter drought in 1955 revealed the damage which could be done in humid, irrigated areas. In fact, however, Contribui
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277 As world production grew and Brazil's coffee politics grew weaker, so the coffee market favored the buyer. Every effort was necessary on Cambuhy, as throughout the state to keep up quality. Cambuhy coffee enjoyed a thirty-one year old reputation and was well known and appreciated in Europe as well as the U.S.A. Prime quality and increased productivity were the two main factors which kept Cambuhy in economic production. Fortunately the estate did not continue as an institution into the latest era of super production, sacrifice quotas and government regulation. 32 The new general manager of Cambuhy in 1950 eagerly enlarged the program of experimentation and research which had kept Cambuhy at the forefront of agriculture in s3o Paulo for many years. Starting from the soil survey of the estate by the end of 1950 Cambuhy had its own experimental station with a program which included new industrial plants such as essential oil plants and various fiber plants, new varieties of cereals, a citrus nursery and experiments with new forage and leguminous plants. Needless to say, the long term experiments on the fertilization and irrigation of coffee were carried out there. 33 Later in 1952 this experiment station was moved from its first site at Toriba to a new location on the Cambuhy section, where in addition to work already under way there 3 2 Cambuhy S.A. RelatSrio Anual No. 2, pp. 14-15. 33 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 102, p. 2.

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278 was set up a citrus-variety orchard while pasture fertilization experiments were carried out and revolutionary methods of feeding cattle attempted. Many of these efforts were only likely to produce results in a long term situation, while other such as attempts to grow rice and corn in camp land could entail heavy financial loss. 34 The agricultural problems facing the State of SSo Paulo in the years after the second World War, were not to be easily solved. The statesponsored institutions and large estates such as Cambuhy, which would maintain experimental programs, needed greater resources than they could afford. In 1947 Mr. Haggard and his staff thus welcomed the arrival in sSo Paulo of the International Basic Economy Corporation, which was organized and financed by Nelson Rockefeller. Through several local companies, this organization sought to foster agricultural research, the education and training of farmers, and the development of mechanized agricultural operations. Special interests of the organization were to be pig breeding, hybrid maize production, and the control of broca . There was a certain amount of local opposition in S3o Paulo to this new foreign concern, which it said would bring down prices of farm produce. On Cambuhy, however, it was felt that if the organization, combining philanthropy with good business, could rationalize farming methods in SSo Paulo and so cheapen the cost of production by increasing 34 C.A.F.P., Q uarterly Reports . No. 114, p. 5; No. 115, p. 6.

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279 yields, then it should be encouraged in doing something, which no national concern, public or private had yet attempted.^® In 1951 the Cambuhy estate was visited by experts from another Rockefeller organization, the IBEC Research Institute, which is a branch of the American International Association. The IBEC Research Institute is a private, non-profit, membership corporation of the State of New York, U.S.A., formed to carry out agricultural research in various parts of the world, but principally in the tropics and sub-tropics, in view of Cambuhy' s facilities, its records and its background of experimentation, in 1952 the Institute established its chief research station in S3o Paulo on the estate, with full approval of the English company. Later Cambuhy S.A. ceded to the new organization an area of 2,700 acres and the Institute set to work establishing many new research studies, and continuing operations already under way in other areas of the fazenda . In its Cambuhy program the Institute conducted fundamental agronomic and horticultural studies, while developing practical methods and equipment. Its principal activities related to pasture improvement, cattle range management, and the use of agricultural chemicals. 36 35 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report No. 94, pp. 3-5. 36 Bennett, Brazilian Business XXVIII, No. 7 (July, 1958) p. 19.

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280 The most valuable work done by the Institute from Carabuhy's point of view was its extensive research in coffee. This was concerned with various cultural and fertilization practices with reference to coffee tree growth, composition and yield. By the end of 1952 experiments with cover crops, mulching, chemical fertilizers and irrigation for coffee trees had been established. 37 In the last few years of its existence the Cambuhy estate received much valuable information from the Institute's experts and thej,r findings. The Cambuhy administrators, for example, modified their fertilization formulas in view of the Institute's results. Moreover, they benefited greatly from the intellectual stimulation provided by the presence of a research institute, while the State of S3o Paulo as a whole stood to gain from the published findings of the institute. These have included studies on plant chemistry, climatological studies, coffee processing, brush control in pastures, weed control, soil fertility and many other subjects of value to those in S3o Paulo who aim for bigger and better production. 38 Many fields of production on Cambuhy felt the effects of this stimulating amount of scientific research. Small 37 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 110, p. 3. 38 Cambuhy S.A. RelatSrio Anual No. 2, p. 8; James C. Medcalf et al.. Experimental Programs in Brazil (New York* IBEC Research Institute, 1954) passim .

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281 areas of cotton belonging to the company yielded results thanks to fertilizers and pest control techniques which had not been gained since 1942. As cotton yields improved and better land was used, so tenants also began to dust and spray their cotton, while some fertilized with mixtures bought at favorable rates from the Toriba mixing plant. Yet cotton never recovered much ground as regards the quahtity planted because efforts and expenditures to take advantage of the coffee boom left little for other crops. 39 Cereal crops in 1950 were not what they should have been mainly due to weather conditions. The cost of production was high in some cases and the mechanization of the princi*pal operations, planting, cultivating, and harvest was given serious consideration. The initial plan was to increase t cotton and peanut plantations as these products could be industrialized and to decrease those of corn and rice for which the market was momentarily weak, while forage crops and those for green manure would be maintained. 40 Cambuhy in its last years turned to a policy long associated with latifundias. There seemed to be little reason why Cambuhy should practice intensive cultivation of cereals on the same land each year. Rather it was now planned to abandon the practice of keeping areas of land under cereals for as long as three years with no fertilizer other than 39 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports No. 101, p. 11; No. 107, p. 17. 40 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 101, p. 9.

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282 green manure in the form of interseasonal cover crops. Instead new land would be destumped, terraced, and put under the plow. New land did not mean virgin forest as in the old days but old semi-formed pasture land, second class forest and better quality camp land. As these areas went out of cultivation, they were to be put down to grass and carry cattle until such time as it became expedient to bring them under the plow again. This was the accepted policy on large agricultural concerns all over Brazil. Thus in 1950 some 800 alqueires of land previously under cereals on Canibuhy were put to grass and efforts were made to rent "new" land on one year contracts as this was the easiest and cheapest way to have it cleaned. 41 In fact, however, less land was destumped and prepared for cereals than was given over to pasture. Moreover, large areas of corn were turned over to silage. As a result the Jazenda ceased to be self-supporting in either rice and corn and had to purchase supplies from outside. As mechanization of field work in the coffee plantations progressed, so there was an ever increasing lack of manual labor during the harvesting season. Efforts were made to develop other complementing activities such as mechanized cultivation and industrialization of sisal but with no success. Until there should be enough machinery to clear and handle larger areas 41 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 102, pp. 11-12. ' j fc* #1

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283 of land as labor could no longer be relied upon, Cambuhy in its last period had to be content with trying to produce enough rice and corn to feed its workers. 42 After 1950 there were no new eucalyptus plantings because the prices paid by the railroads for firewood did not make for an economic production, except in the case of plantations close to loading points on the railroad. Cambuhy began to preserve eucalyptus wood for sale as posts and fences, material for which was becoming scarce in the Araraquarense zone as the primeval forest was almost gone. Eu^'^^YPÂ’fc'US cuttings on the estate's million and a half trees dwindled to almost nothing and so another financially rewarding activity for the plantation owner was gone. Cambuhy s efforts to diversify and solve economic problems in its last years (as a result of all these adverse conditions in latest times) were concentrated on activity with citrus and cattle. 43 Fruit production at Cambuhy began in 1950 with small amounts of lemons, pineapples, and bananas. Soon, however, the estate had its own citrus nursery and thereafter was able to expand its orchards without difficulty. Bananas did very well on various sections on the estate and by 1952 were paying their way, allowing the administrators to build up the soil for future and more permanent crops such as coffee. 42 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 109, pp. 11-12; No. 110, p. 19. 43 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report, No. 101, p. 14.

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284 Bananas also proved an important addition to the diet of the fazenda laborers. 44 Citrus also proved well adapted to the soil and climatic conditions prevailing on Cambuhy. The new general manager brought to the estate extensive personal experience in the field. In the first years of the decade, the citrus trees produced small quantities of good quality fruit, which was quickly sold on the fazenda . By 1956 the estate had a total of 120,000 fruit trees giving good yields. The latter included in 1955 over 13,000 pineapples and a similar quantity of bunches of bananas, 247 kilos of apples, 464 boxes of avocados, over 9,000 boxes of oranges and more than 12,000 boxes of lemons. Cambuhy certainly maintained its traditional trust in diversification and before the final breakup the administrators were considering the construction of a fruit packing house at Cambuhy. 45 The new general manager of the Cambuhy estate also had considerable experience with cattle and due to his energetic activity much was done after 1950 to expand milk production and put this activity on a better foundation based on the already decided policy of the company. Cattle fattening was left in a state of suspense until the market became firm, while emphasis was put upon cleaning overgrown pastures and paddocks by mechanical means. Cambuhy had large areas of 44 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 108, p. 14. 45 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 115, p. 16; Cambuhy S.A. RelatQrio Anual No. 2, pp. 29-32.

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285 land which could not be used economically to fatten cattle but which would do admirably to carry breeding stock, it was precisely these areas which the Cambuhy administration tried to develop after 1950. Plans were made to breed and to sell yearling stock, to purchase three-year-old thins, and to fatten them for the market. A chain of dairies was built and by the middle of 1951 a modern milk cooling plant was installed at Toriba. The latter enabled Cambuhy to expo*^ filtered and cool milk to a nearby powdered milk factory. 46 Much camp land was cleaned and cleared in these years to carry breeding stock. At first the scrub was crushed by heavy rollers but later two large caterpillar tractors were used to drag heavy chains between them and so clear sixteen algueires per day as compared with three algueires per day by rollers and much less by the old fashioned method using a cutting hook. While the fazenda now made profits from the clearing of camp land by the sale of firewood, it insisted that contractors leave all palm trees and three large trees per alqueire to improve the appearance of the pastures and provide shade for the cattle. Lakes were made at various places in the large camps by damming up streams with earth embankments, creating a water supply for various paddocks in 46 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 100, p. 4; No. 105, pp. 5-7.

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286 the dry season. Conservation tactics thus accompanied expansion . 47 The large camp areas were gradually divided up by fences into more manageable units for breeding purposes. Moreover, the pastures were improved and sown with coloniSo and bata ta is grasses. The total stock carried on the fazenda increased by approximately 1,000 head 6 ach year from a basis a little over 10,000 in 1950. As before, Cambuhy's cattle fattening had to work between varying prices for thin and fat cattle. When the price of thin cattle grew too high, Cambuhy rented out pastures, on the other hand, fat cattle prices remained firm and at times even local markets were far from fully supplied, while the export of beef from Brazil had become a tale from the distant past. 4 ® In effect in its last years Cambuhy fulfilled MagalhSes' dream of full use of the estate's possibilities in cattle farming. In 1955 the cattle section encompassed a total of almost 18, 000 head of cattle on the estate, with high quality breeding herds, particularly one Nelore herd. The cattle farmer had to move with the market and at the time of the break up of Cambuhy it was a better business to sell calves rather than to fatten them . 49 47 * C.A.P.P., Quarterly Report . No. 107, pp. 5-6. 48 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 109„ p. 67 No. 113, p. 6 . 49 Cambuhy S.A. RelatSrio Anual No. 2, pp. 29-32.

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287 Pig breeding proved to be another business which required more acumen and scientific knowledge than the average fazendelro possessed. The small sitiante might keep a few pigs or the colonist might have one living in his backyard, but the pig farmer had troubles in that the costs of food rose after 1950 out of proportion to the increase in the sale price for pigs. Cambuhy in 1950 was under sentence of death or at least damage due to the incidence of Brucelose or contagious abortion among its pigs. It appeared that the more hygienically pigs were kept in the interior of sSo Paulo, the more likely they were to be smitten with some disease. The fazenda began to breed anew with the healthy pigs remaining and henceforth pigs were bred for bacon and sold to the f rigor if icos . as this was more economical than producing the traditional lard pig. As concentrated feed cost more and more, so the pigs were put in paddocks sown in legumes, grasses, and root crops. In 1952 Cambuhy achieved its best breeding results, yet the pig food bill came to 80% of the total cost of production and was dependent on the price of corn, which rose steadily and much faster than the price of pork. As in much else, Cambuhy' s stupendous numerical results in its last few years proved a hollow victory as its economic bases grew weaker. As a result in 1953 the general manager recommended the closing down of the pig breeding section because (in

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288 future) it could not pay its way. 50 The commercial department for the Cambuhy estate also was highly conscious that after 1950 it was living in a new age. The stores department were faced with shortages and long delays in obtaining necessary materials, while there was a noticeable deterioration in the quality of most manufacture^ goods. Articles, fittings and tools of foreign origin, which fazendeiros had traditionally used were rarely obtainable and in most cases national substitutes were of poor quality besides being more expensive. Delays of up to one year were incurred by tractor companies in getting spare parts imported. 51 On the other hand import licenses for many items such as essential oils created an artificially stimulated market for some of Cambuhy' s products. Cambuhy disposed of all essential stock and continued to produce lemongrass oil. Government interference was not always a healthy sign and overdependence on the government was unwise. In 1950 after twenty-four years, without a word of warning the state government stopped the cotton cooperation camp which it had run with Cambuhy. Price control orders tended to remain in force after costs of production had risen. Such a situation caused an appeal to the government and the hardship, plight, 50 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 110, p. 5; No. 103, pp. 2-3 y No. 110, pp. 6-7; No. 112, p. 7. 51 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report No. 103, Commercial Annex, p. 5.

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289 and claims of the layottra or farming community tended to be exaggerated in the headlines of the press that served farmers. The economics of the question in particular or who was to pay for the help needed were not mentioned and consequently decrees tended to fall short of hopes. For example, new minimum prices for cotton in seed would start a vicious circle of price increases to revolve. 52 In the new decade cotton planters in SSo Paulo waited until the government declared its plans for the next year, because the disparity between local cost of production and the world cotton prices was such that the planter could not make a profit without a subsidy. The fundamental problem was the low productivity of the paulista cotton lands and labor force. By 1953 the folly of raising crops on subsidies when land and labor could be employed in profitable production in other crops seemed at last to be recognized and less and less cotton was planted. In 1955 Cambuhy closed down its cotton gin as there was so little raw material available in its zone. Another chapter of Cambuhy history closed with a record of 179, 000 bales ginned over twentyfour years. 53 The oil mill on Cambuhy also had its shares of difficulties in this final period. Everywhere in the oil mill 52 C.A.F.P., Qu arterly Reports . No. 115, Commercial Annex, pp. 2-4; No. 108, Commercial Annex, p. 2. 53 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. Ill, Commercial Annex, pp. 1-2; Cambuhy S.A. Relat8rio Anual No. 2 . dp. 1314 .

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290 industry workers wanted more money but the industry felt that the prices of their goods ought not to be raised and so refused, oil mill workers as a result tended to join the labor force which was moving in droves to the mecca of the decade, northern Parang. Lastly, power rationing, for example, some eight hours per day in 1953, created havoc in the industrial section of Cambuhy causing chronic congestion in the storage sheds and handicapping the milk cooling plant and tractor repair shops. 5 ^ Difficulties with existing forms of activity encouraged the department to develop new ones. In addition to such novelties as the milk cooling plant and the fertilizer mixer, the commercial department also embarked on a new venture in the form of a gas station on the Araraquare-Rio Preto state road, if good transportation meant loss of the traditional privacy of the fazenda , it also brought potential customers onto the property. On May 1, 1952, the service station was opened and strategically placed at the junction of the Rio Preto-Barretos roads, it immediately went from strength to strength, bringing not only gasoline and restaurant profits, but providing a useful window for such fazenda products as coffee, oils, fruit, and meat. 55 These new ventures did not keep the fazenda administrators from their heavy round of upkeep and repairs on old 54 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 116, Commercial Annex, pp. 1-2; No. 113, Commercial Annex, pp. 1-3. 55 C.A.F.P., Quar terly Report . No. 110, p. 6.

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291 fixtures and buildings and the erection of new ones. More and more electric light was installed, high and low tension lines raised and motors, transformers, and water pumps installed. Constant efforts were made to beautify the fazenda with bamboo avenues and many ornamental trees. In 1956 some 21% of the property's area was still unutilized, most of which was still under forest. Of the remainder some 14.7% was used unproduct ively, while 15.6% was under cultivation and 48.5 % used by the cattle department. Cambuhy was above all an estate of superlatives with some 114 tractors, 270 agricultural machines, and some 65 vehicles. 56 Cambuhy had become a show estate, and one in which not only its administrators but the whole state could take pride. Many people visited Cambuhy in these last years and were amazed to see its 100,000 square meters of drying grounds, its dams, its great flocks and vast coffee groves. Technical experts such as Dr. C. A. Krug and Dr. Silvio Moreira came from Campinas to give advice, while the king of coffee himself, Geremia Lunardelli, came to visit. Celebrities such as Nelson Rockefeller, the Count and Countess of Paris, Louis Bromfield, Brazilian politicians, and foreign agronomists all included Cambuhy in their itineraries. Yet this worldly success was not complete and perhaps many of these people visited Cambuhy with a curiosity towards something that was unnatural, a relic, a latifundia left 56 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 104, pp. 16-17; Cambuhy S.A. RelatSrio Anual No. 2, Enclosure 2.

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292 over from a former era, standing amidst a state famous for its small properties. Much of the outward glory of the fa^enda remained, but props of its greatness were gone. Cotton and ginning belonged to the past. The estate was no longer a self-supporting institution as regards food and the necessities of life. Most of all social relations had changed and the era of the paternalistic fazendeiro had passed away. In 1950 the issue of the annual colonists' contract proved the usual worry and Cambuhy was overwhelmed with reports of very high prices in neighboring zones, in many cases the contract price was increased by giving the colonist two or three sacks of clean rice per 1,000 trees. Cambuhy decided against this but put its rates up to a new high level of from Cr$1.750,00 to Cr$2.000,00 per 1,000 trees and Cr$5,00 per 55 liters picked. The old system of colonization on Cambuhy was definitely out of date. In some sections mechanization was to prove the answer, but in general a new labor system was needed. The tendency of late had been to give the colonist more trees than he could handle properly. When work was heavy the fazenda had to find the labor to help him out; then, when the dry season came around, he was in a position to sit back and take the comparatively large monthly payment for doing little. 57 C.A.P.P., Quarterly Report , No. 101, p. 8.

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293 In 1951 on an experimental basis over 70,000 trees were contracted on a system of price work, by which the "colonist" A r as paid per hoeing, for the coroa
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294 of a substantial monthly payment was entirely eliminated by the new arrangement . 59 After a certain initial reticence and suspicion about the unknown, the new contract was well accepted, in effect, the new contract proved a success, as more trees were "colonized" and "colonists" turned out more work. Many men, who had been working on the fazenda as camarada s or day laborers were anxious to change to coffee. New style "colonists” wanted to work on Sundays and holidays and only those who wanted something for nothing left. 60 This type of basic revolution in the organization of a fazenda, a change which took place all over the state of S3o Paulo, was accompanied by changes in the bases of the English company, which were in effect to put it out of business. First, continuing increase in legislative controls and other restrictions in both Brazil and England after the second World War encumbered the staff in both countries with a mass of detail unthought of several years before. Brazil was becoming like England, where the farmer was more occupied with forms than soil. Thirdly, the coincidence of a ceiling on remittances imposed by the Brazilian authorities and an excess profits tax calculated on the profits of the Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas by the British Treasury appeared to create a situation where the better results in Brazil, the greater the indebtedness of the parent company 59 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 109, p. 8. 60 C.A.F.P., Quarterl y Report , No. 114, pp. 1-7.

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295 to the home tax authorities, thus eliminating the English shareholders from any participation in profits. 61 Thus the excellent results achieved by Cambuhy in the past war years were overshadowed by taxation problems. By 1951 affairs were so complicated that while the parent company in London, Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates Limited, continued to keep its accounts in pounds sterling, those of the Brazilian subsidiary, Companhia Agr£cola Fazendas Paulistas, had to be expressed in cruzeiros . The profits of the latter company became hypothetical rather than real because they were not of immediate value to the English stockholders until actually converted into English currency. In 1952 a new Brazilian law forced the subsidiary company either to pay tax on its reserves, mounting up because of exchange restrictions, or to increase its issued capital. Brazil thus penalized those who conserved their profits, while Britain had a special tax penalty for declared but unremitted profits. In February, 1953, the Brazilian restrictions on remittances were removed, but funds had to be transmitted at a new rate varying between Cr$103,00 and Cr$135,00 per pound sterling, as compared to the previous rate of Cr$52,41 per pound. This loss in exchange resulted in a situation where, when all dividends declared but unremitted by the subsidiary company up to 1950, were sent to England in 1952, the remittances roughly equaled no more than a 61 C.A.F.P., Quar terly Report . No. 90, p. 1.

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296 r e unbur s emen t of the amount paid over by the parent company in taxes to the British Treasury. An excessively depreciated rate of exchange could thus ruin English earnings overseas.® 2 Over the period 1924 to 1953 the English parent company had spent some Cr$145, 110 .000,00 on capital development and had received dividends from its subsidiary company of Cr$85, 176.000, 00. Since 1939 remittance of larger dividends from Brazil had not been possible and so the policy of the two companies had been to plow profits back into the estate. It was clear by 1950 that the days of the English company were numbered. Times had changed and many forms of overseas economic activity could no longer continue. Utility companies, railroads and many other firms had to sell out to nationals because of the nationalism which dominated many Latin American countries. In March, 1951, the Brazilian Warrant Company, largest individual stockholder in the Cambuhy parent company was acquired by Brazilian interests. 63 These latter interests, namely the Grupo Moreira Salles, found themselves owning 10% of the Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates stock and in a position to persuade the English stockholders to sell their shares at a price suitable to them and 62 Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates Limited, Chairman's Stat ement, 1952 , pp. 2-3, 5,* Cha irman's Statement, 1953. pp. 2-3. 63 Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates Limited, Chairman 's Statement, 1951 , p. 9; Chairman's St a tement, 1953 , p. 11.

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297 yet profitable to the Brazilian group. By early 1956 the Brazilian group had 51% control of the company and during that year, Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates, Limited, went into voluntary liquidation giving their shareholders Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas shares in place of their English shares. The Brazilian group went on buying shares until by August, 1954, they were in complete control. A new board was elected, the statutes altered and on August 2 the name of the company was changed to Cambuhy s.A. Agricola e Industrial with its head office in S3o Paulo. The Brazilian owners continued to operate and develop the estate along the same lines as the English had done in the coffee, cattle breeding and edible oil activities, which had made Cambuhy famous. The same local administration carried on with the same plans. On December 1, 1956, however, the new company was also liquidated and the latifundia was divided into smaller rural properties and parts of it were offered for purchase to individual land tillers. 64 1116 a. es m aria of Cambuhy had come to an end; for, while it was not defeated, the struggle to continue to exist had proved to be too demanding. The market price of Cambuhy 's main products kept pace with the increased cost of living; and until the middle of 1953 at least, the books could be balanced. Thereafter, there was a constant need for higher production at lower cost or else sooner or later Cambuhy 64 3ennett, op. clt .. pp. 20-21.

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298 would have found itself unable to compete in the world's markets . Cambuhy ' s position reflected the state of affairs throughout the country and it seemed that unless Brazil changed from a nation of exploiters to one of farmers, who would love the land and return something to it, the country would be doomed to ultimate failure. Happily there was some evidence of change in farming methods and the farmer Â’ s approach to his problems, yet there was still a long way to go. The Cambuhy administrators had been able to play a part in the growth of scientific agriculture in postwar S3o Paulo and it was their hope that the growing realization of the importance of agriculture would mean better legislation from the point of view of the landowner and an improvement in the quality and quantity of labor available for operating 65 farms. 65 C.A.P.P., Quarterly Report . No. 114, p. 1.

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CHAPTER XI A NEW ERA IN PAULISTA SOCIETY One of the most perspicacious observers of paulista rural life, Carlos Borges Schmidt, has noted that beside the bustling material progress which characterizes the metropolis of SSo Paulo, there exists in the agricultural landscape, in the organization of old fazendas and in the daily life of the interior, another SSo Paulo, one that is more traditional and more Brazilian.^In the lives not of industrial magnates or kings of commerce but in the daily round of the humble people of the interior of S3o Paulo lie many of the problems which face Brazil today. It is these humble people who need better hygiene, education, and economic orientation in order that they, too, may enjoy their country's progress. It is too easy to make vague generalizations about Brazil. Just as there is a world of difference between the northeast and the southern parts of the republic so within the State of SSo Paulo, the people of the plateau have little in common with those of the littoral. The population of Cambuhy was typically that of the plateau. The workers still had much pioneer spirit, while even in 1956 many had a 1 Carlos Borges Schmidt, "Rural Life in Brazil, " Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent , ed. T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant (New York: The Dryden Press, 1951), p. 167. 299

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300 pioneer heritage, as second or third generation descendants of immigrants. The inhabitants of Cambuhy and all the country people of the west of SSo Paulo lived in a world which was not that of Gilberto Freyre. Against the background of a dull, regular countryside with duller cities here and there, which even more so followed a pattern, these people live their lives within limited horizons and more limited opportunities. Racially mixed as the people are, it is the Latin immigrant stock which predominates, mixed with the traditional Indianstock of SSo Paulo, while the Negroes in the area form a minority. The Negro spirit does not prevail as in the northeast, and despite laws against discrimination the Negro is looked down upon and intermarriage between black and white takes place only on the lowest social level. 2 While it is true to say that the interior of SSo Paulo has much that is traditional in it and that there as elsewh ere Brazil the biggest problem is to "bring up the peasant" (criar o camponts ) . Yet the interior of SSo Paulo is by no means stagnant. Rather it has been the scene of the greatest advance in the way of life of the agricultural worker in all Brazil, in the west of SSo Paulo the greatest subdivision of properties has taken place and also the greatest approximation to the sociologist's dream of an ideal size of farm, that which considering the type and form of 2 A. Tavares de Almeida, Oeste Pauli sta; a experiencia etnografica e cultural (Rio de Janeiro: Alba, 1943) pp. 9, 13.

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301 bion» penults the maintenance or economic procuress of the rural family. 3 The last twenty years of Cambuhy's existence as an institution saw a process of social change that was almost revolutionary, from the paternalistic fazendeiro-colo no relationship which had existed under Magalh3es and at first under the English to a welfare state in which the protector of the humble man was not his patrSo but labor laws and a department of labor inspector. Yet the physical appearance of life of Fazendas do Cambuhy did not change to any great extent. The Cambuhy workers continued to be a genial and communicative body of people, suspicious of strangers but otherwise enjoying relaxed human relations with little formality. An easy Catholicism infrequently punctuated their lives which still turned on football, romance, and gossip for excitement. Cambuhy ' s green undulating lands provided a little changing backdrop to the workman's life and the climate, if it grew less regular, still remained tropical but agreeable. Hot, sluggish days in the hot season could still make men lazy, while in other seasons brisk, cold winds invigorated the workers. In such open country, exposed to the elements, defiant rain storms could still be frightening experiences to simple people. Lightning could not only damage buildings 3 Carlos Borges Schmidt, O meio rural (S3o Paulo: Secretaria da Agricultura, 1946), p. 75.

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302 but not infrequently killed workmen or set fire to their 4 houses. Tropical rain still proved an exciting experience. Starting with large drops pinpointing the red earth, the latter would grow darker with added moisture until the ground looked wet. Magically, channels would begin to form from growing puddles until channels joined channels to form fastflowing currents of bright red water. The air seemed to have turned to water, objects close at hand became invisible and the drying terraces seemed like enormous natural shower rooms. Despite such displays of nature, Cambuhy's climatic strength lay in the fact that it enjoyed so many medium days, unlike so much of Brazil. Its climate was basically moderate, allowing cattle, for example, to be kept in pasture all the year round and allowing workers to live outside their small houses as much as inside them. The colony remained the distinguishing social unit on Cambuhy as on other large fazendas in the interior of s3o Paulo. It consisted of a number of small houses frequently in duplex or quadruplex form. These were normally of brick construction with tile roofs and had an average of four rooms. Around them enterprising colonists sometimes cultivated gardens, in which lived and played an assortment of children, dogs, chickens, and other animals. Few of these houses had proper washing 4 C.A.F.P., Quar t erly R eport . No. 100, p. 6.

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303 and bathing facilities so sending many to communal bath houses or else to a nearby stream, while behind most houses at a discreet distance stood a line of crude sentry boxes which were the sanitary facilities. Even the industrial workers of Cambuhy lived in such conditions among both plants and animals. The smallness of the rooms in the houses and the moderate climate encouraged people to live around their doorsteps and a group of families living in a row of colonists' houses became conscious of more of less intimate relations with one another. Rising at dawn the colonist would have coffee and bread before a bell called him to work. Lunch was taken out in the field about eleven A.M. and would often consist of the almost proverbial rice and beans or some concoction of fubS. that is. corn meal. At five in the afternoon the colonist would leave his work and return to the evening meal at home to be followed by the seemingly endless doorstep conversations until it was quite dark. 5 Such life naturally made people inquisitive and prone to gossip. They had poor schools and poor churches, few cultural advantages and almost no modern conveniences beyond electric lights and the occasional radio. On the other hand many enjoyed this life of quiet solitude, the clear air, and the natural beauty of the area. It was a life of pleasantly intimate social relations with no psychosocial isolation and little nervous strain. ^Interview with Mr. A. H. Grossman, April 27, 1960.

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304 The .fa zenda even in the modern world remained a highly picturesque place enlivened not only by brightly-colored scenery but also by the vast number of different occupations being pursued on the estate. The English administrators until the very last years of their company continued in their spartan existence of the colonial administrators, set apart from the workers and maintaining their culture merely by their strength of character. Yet they inherited several customs of the traditional administrator of the absentee fa SSidei r o, for example, the right to concessions. In the old days a Brazilian administrator had been allowed to feed himself and his family from the produce of the estate. This was done because if not, the produce would have been stolen anyway, and by allowing these extras, the fazendei ro could pay his agent less. The Cambuhy administrator in the upper echelons thus enjoyed concessions of milk, corn, roasted coffee, firewood and electric light. In a fashion this was similar to the coffee colonist's receipt of land to plant cereals. 6 Another figure which differed greatly from the average Cambuhy peasant worker with his dirty white clothes stained by the red earth was the faz enda cowboy. His clothes showed an influence of the gaucho with much leather in use, and on his horny face was outlined a whole history of economic 6 This whole description of life on Cambuhy is based on field notes made over the period November, 1959, to May, 1960. Other sources will be indicated.

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305 crisis and boom. With wide stretches of rough territory to cover and a thousand tasks to do, these men had to be fine horsemen. Often they could be seen galloping in brilliant sunshine like young boys and on the wet days moving slowly like solemn medieval knights, with enormous broadcloth capes I covering man and beast. No greater contrast could have been provided to these stately riders than by the caboclo tractor drivers on Cambuhy, who in addition to being the world's worst mechanics, seemed when behind the wheel to become demon racers possessed of a noble, if expensive, spirit. On Cambuhy there was almost none of the household industry such as spinning and weaving found in other parts of the State of SSo Paulo. Yet in busy years when it was absolutely necessary, coffee was sometimes handpicked by women in their homes. More common, however, was the scene in the fazenda ' s handpicking rooms. These were large well-lighted sheds with various treadle or power driven belts from which women and girls picked out the defective from the good coffee beans. Children came with their mothers, even babies being taken along into the babble of the room, which was made worse by a continuously playing radio. This domestic scene contrasted violently with the dangerous task of burning newly felled forest land, especially after a drought or if the area was close to pasture or standing forest. Fire had long been a friend to the Brazilian j^zendeiro, but it could also be an enemy. When a strong

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306 wind sprang up or a whirlwind started in an area of some 600 acres or more of furious flame and smoke, the unexpected or the undesired could easily happen. 7 Many other different types of people went to make up the entire labor force, the almost naked workers, many of them Negroes, who toiled in the heat of the oil mill, the skilled craftsmen such as carpenters and smiths or the fence makers and repairers who walked great distances over the ranges, and the swift-footed men who tended the coffee on the drying terraces, turning it over with wooden tools and creating various patternful ridges. On the same terraces worked barefoot boys picking out greens and getting into mischief. Lastly there were the well known and important figures in the community, the respected yet feared medical doctor, the occasional lawyer on horseback, the visiting priest who had not come as a missionary but along with the general drift of immigrants, and another vital personage, the professorinha de sertSo , or the country school "marm. " These last personages were the most important influences on the Cambuhy worker and his conditions of life, advising him on food, health and hygiene, curing his malaria, tracoma and various vermincarried diseases, concerning themselves with his moral life, giving him comfort and shaping his outlook and conquering his c aboclo ignorance. With such a background, the Cambuhy worker carried on his life, searching 7 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 54, p. 8.

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307 for a livelihood, sometimes self-improvement, and usually amusement . The depression saw the beginning of many changes in the social life of Cambuhy. In the years that followed that phenomenon for various reasons there began a movement of the rural population towards the cities. Many large properties broke up and were fragmented into sitios . As cities grew, cotton and sugar cultivation increased and more and more sugar mills, rice mills, corn grinders, and refineries were erected. All the movement toward policulture meant that coffee went on in a diminishing rhythm. Many felt that a better sedimented rural and urban society resulted based not on one crop but on a new and more efficient structure.® Cambuhy played a small role in this movement to the cities, in 1927 a start had been made in selling small holdings of twenty to thirty a lcrueires of agricultural land on the section of CurupcJ. A new form of colonization had come to Cambuhy, the patrimony or village created by a landowner to encourage the inflow of labor. Thus around the Curup<£ railroad station there was planned a small township on the usual pattern of a central square with the main church on it and roads running at right angles to each other. After 1930 these town lots sold well and in 1949 the last of them were sold. 9 8 Fransa, The Coffee Trail , pp. 155-56. g Information supplied by Mr. A. H. Grossman, May 6, 1960.

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308 More important to Cambuhy than these tendencies toward policulture and urban migration was, however, the advent of the Vargas regime and its social philosophy. Many changes were to take place in the period 1934 to 1956. The cost of labor gradually rose, while the yield from the coffee trees on Cambuhy gradually declined. Social laws were constantly to complicate agricultural activities and add to the wage bill. A full circle had been turned when in 1956 the old style colonist tending the coffee, assured of a monthly income and the paternalistic care of his patrSo , was replaced by a piece worker, who was not hounded to work, and was paid only for what he did at legally fixed wages. The fazenda administrators by 1940 found their work affected by social legislation, which while conferring benefits on the employees disturbed them and made them eager to lay claim to untold rights and privileges. The company was affected by the limitation of working hours, the prohibition of work on Sundays and holidays, and the grant of what amounted to nearly three weeks paid holidays per year. While it was not denied that the laws were based on good foundations and probably gave in a peaceable manner what has been obtained elsewhere in Latin America by strife, yet the switch over from one system to another, the complications in correctly classifying labor, and often the impossibility of 10 Interview with Mr. R. E. Barham, February 11, 1960.

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309 interpreting decrees, made the easy operation of the company a thing of the past.-H As coffee slipped into its period of lowest decline in the first half of this century, in the years after the depression, labor fled from coffee to cotton, which held out more remuneration. Many fazendeiros felt a relaxation of immigration restrictions was necessary if coffee was not to remain unharvested on abandoned plantations. The cost of living for agricultural workers tended to increase by 1936 and an undercurrent of unrest was noticeable among the older employees on Cambuhy. Similarly the situation as regards skilled and unskilled labor grew steadily worse and essential works and repairs were held up and delayed. Those were the days of emergency measures, overtime for regular workers, use of men planting cotton to load and unload commercial material at Toriba and the use of a large labor gang of women.-*2 By early 1937 outside labor for handling uncolonized coffee was largely unobtainable and as colonists finished their own work, they were transferred by fazenda transport to work on uncolonized coffee. This lack of labor was not difficult to understand, in view of the fact that men working on a new power line passing across the fazenda in 1937 were paid 12 mil-r^is per day for eight hours work at a time when lj C.A.E.P., Quarterly Report . No. 67, pp. 1-2. 12 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 40, pp. 11-12? No. 44, p. 7? No. 46, pp. 10-11.

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310 the Cambuhy worker got 6-1/2 mll-rlis working from sun to sun. The fact was that agricultural concerns could not move ahead with wages as quickly as city construction companies or boom cotton land. So Cambuhy like many other estates became a happy hunting ground for people in its neighborhood who were in arrears with their work and were ready to pay high wages for a short period. ^ The situation got somewhat better in 1938 and continued so until the outbreak of war. As Brazil recovered from her low economic position, so the coffee fazendas paid better rates. Cambuhy administrators could report that all the houses on the estate were full but noted that few unmarried male laborers were available and so fewer workers could be accommodated per house. World War II, the decline of cotton production, and a general unrest made fazendelros wary. Some men tried to introduce piece workers to replace the coffee colonists but on Cambuhy Mr. Haggard would not hear of it. The whole philosophy of the old time plantation owner lay behind some words of his describing the situation in 1940* "In the end, however, what is most important and whatever be the system adopted is the final cost of treatment of the trees to the planter and what is the least that can be paid to labor to obtain it and having obtained it 13 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 48, p. lly No. 49, p. 11? No. 51, p. 4.

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311 keep body and soul of the laborers together." 14 Thus to one of the most enlightened administrators in the interior of S3o Paulo, the labor situation was mostly one of economics. The administration reduced both the number of laborers and their wages. Coffee colonist rates and day labor rates went down, but not the pay of industrial workers, who were protected by a pension law. However, a number of men in the workshops were tempted away to the city of S3o Paulo and there was a shortage all over the estate of unskilled day laborers. Unskilled men could be replaced but not so such craftsmen as carpenters who were drawn to the high hourly rates paid by S3d Paulo, which had begun its feverish building mania that still continues. Recent social legislation caused an unfortunate attitude between labor and employers. The former group became preoccupied with standing up for their rights and finding grievances. 1 ^ The droughts and crop failures of the war years held the coffee colonists' rates at a fairly low level. This was at a time when very important public works were being constructed in S3o Paulo, such as state arterial highways, reconstruction and prolongation of certain railroads and above all vast building programs in the state capital. As minimum industrial wages rose, so did Carabuhy put up its rates, but there was always a lag. 14 C.A.F.P., Quart e rly Reports . No. 52, p. 11; No. 62, pp. 15-16. 1 5 Ibid . , C.A.F.P, Quarterly Report . No. 64, p. 13.

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312 One result of low contract rates and the high cost of living was the amount of bad debt of the colonists at the end of the year. Some would run away and this debt would be written off, others continued as colonists hoping to amortize their debts in the next year, while a third group would become laborers and hope to pay off their debts in that manner . On the other hand a coffee colonist was far from being the worst paid type of labor, especially so if compared with married laborers with children. A colonist who treated 6,000 trees had a definite monthly income assured him superior to what a laborer could earn. In addition, he could raise valuable edible crops on land set aside for him, he could keep a cow, breed and fatten pigs, and finally, at the end of the year, raise an appreciable sum by picking coffee. Yet colonist families generally had several workers, and by 1$43 there were many inducements to attract good families in other directions, principally cotton growing. A good family could pick and choose and go where conditions were best. On Cambuhy the administrators were all to aware that the houses of 23% of the coffee plantations to be colonized lacked electric light, and as supplies of kerosene ran out, so comfort was reduced. Such a situation would not keep men on the land. 16 16 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 67, pp. 2-3; No. 72, p. 17; No. 73, pp. 11-12.

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313 In 1943 the federal government showed great activity in social legislation, attempting by fixing minimum salaries on a zone basis to keep pace with the increased cost of living. Where nothing was done, however, and where no good solution presented itself was the problem of maintaining a sufficient number of laborers on the land. The towns attracted the best young people, while the stoppage of immigration and a high child mortality slowed up the rate of population increase. Lastly the opening up of new areas previously under forest, huge increases in the area of land under cotton and cereals, vaguely effective social legislation prohibiting child labor, and the closing of shops on Sundays and holidays, all had the effect of reducing the number of individuals available for work and the man hours that could be obtained from the individual. 1 7 Labor conditions continued to get worse in the last years of the war and in practically all grades of work on Cambuhy dilution was necessary, an action which did not add to efficiency. In order to keep men on the fazenda , to catch up with the steadily rising cost of living and to compete with wages paid elsewhere in the state, a general increase was given to all laborers in the form of a monthly bonus to men who had worked twenty days or 200 hours in that time. This type of measure had no effect on those who 17 C.A.F.P., Quar terly Report . No. 75, pp. 1-2.

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314 wanted to leave but at least helped those who remained. The end of the war apparently set ablaze the smoldering discontent of all classes of labor ranging from the higher paid salaried classes down to the unskilled laborers. Higher wages were granted but the cost of living continued to rise. Utility companies raised their rates, the various taxing authorities increased their toll, industrialists put up the price of their products; but the producers of foodstuffs and prime necessities were locked beneath immovable ceilings the only escape from which was the black market. The housing shortage and the high price of foodstuffs did not deter labor from migrating to the city where they received only slightly higher salaries and got no concessions such as those on a fazenda . In the first six months of 1945 laborers' wages on Cambuhy rose some 40%. Yet first many key men left the fazenda , the chief cashier, chief electrician, chief storekeeper, head motor mechanic and several others. Then followed the more ambitious, intelligent type of laborer often with unmarried children who as a family could do well in the city. Agriculture as a result seemed to be left with poor labor, the more diseased, that with a low output capacity and a low ratio of wage earners in each family. For example, on the Toriba section there was an 18 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 79, p. 2.

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315 average of 5.10 occupants per house and 1.54 of wage earners per house . ^ The labor problem began to change in 1945 from being one of shortage of men to that of relations between the employer and employee. A wave of strikes swept Brazil leaving an aftermath of distrust prejudicial to administration and efficiency. One major difficulty was the apparent impossibility of doing something for one person or class without having eventually to do the same for everyone, irrespective of merit, value, or earning capacity. Late in 1945 the Cambuhy administration faced its first strike, actually among the semiindustrial workers and on one agricultural section, Curup5. The administration got full support from the state department of labor and both incidents closed with no change in conditions voluntarily offered by the company, yet this was a sign of the times. The end of the war certainly had not brought peace. Higher wages did not buy more goods as prices kept ahead and as in the interior of SSo Paulo thrift was by no means a virtue, so high wages often led to absenteeism. In 1946 on Cambuhy hours were reduced from ten and a half to ten hours per day; but from the type of laborer on the estate, of poor physique, full of worms and living on an unbalanced, unchanging diet, no increase in effort could be expected. The IQ C.A.F .P. , Quarterly Report . No. 81, pp. 2-3. 20 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 83, p. 1.

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316 administration on Cambuhy constantly tried to improve working conditions, but labor-saving machinery proved scarce. Lastly, experiments with displaced persons as laborers proved highly unsuccessful. 21 All through the post-war period, labor was drained away from Cambuhy to be replaced where possible, but usually with only inferior workers. The basic fact was that there was not enough labor to go around and the towns and industry got first choice. In agriculture an increase in wages was not necessarily followed by an increase in the value of farm products. Hence, the reluctance of the farmer to pay even adequate wages, and thus he lost his labor force and land went out of cultivation. 22 i The Brazilian Constitution of 1946 stated in its article number 152, referring to labor legislation that there was to be no distinction as to rights, guarantees and benefits, between manual or technical labor and intellectual work, nor between those who respectively exercised those callings. This all-embracing law then introduced some seventeen vital points of social welfare from limited working hours to social insurance. It was not clear at first, if this law covered agricultural workers or not. F azendeiros were perplexed and to the Cambuhy administration it seemed that a 20% 21 C.A.F.P, Quarterly Reports . No. 85, pp. 1-2? No. 91, p. 3. 22 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 94, p. 1.

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317 increase in wages was likely and a 20% more labor force would be needed to fulfill the laws. 23 As labor was already sought after so the agricultural worker seemed to be all the more on the move, chasing better salaries and conditions. Similarly he expected the law to be interpreted along the lines of his immediate desires. Most serious of all from the employer's viewpoint, soon laborers were to have free Sundays and public holidays, civil as well as religious, and an annual paid holiday of fifteen consecutive working days. This, added to justifiable abcenses for illness, bereavement, and childbirth meant an estimated 120 ddys per year. The department of labor was firmly on the workers' side, refusing advice and consultation to employers. 24 Although the right to annual paid holidays was conferred upon rural workers by a decree of May 1, 1943, little had been done about it. The employers merely waited, the agricultural workers not being organized into syndicates and not fully conscious of their right, with rare exceptions made no claims, and the authorities, whose work embraced the execution and f iscalization of labor laws acted only when pressed. The habits and traditions of rural workers in Brazil are as different from those of industrial workers as the nature of their respective work. One law for all was not easy 23 C.A.P.P., Quarterly Report , No. 86, pp. 1-2. 24 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 89, pp. 1-2.

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318 to carry out. Apart from aggravating the chronic shortage of labor, the majority of fazendas had not the means to comply with the rather involved paper work set up in the regulations . Cambuhy's administrators believed at first that the Sociedade Rural Brazileiro, the traditional defense of the fazendeiro class would resist the land and request changes. By 1947, however, the company felt that time was running out and so work was begun to pay all arrears since 1943. This proved an enormous task both in office and in the field as administrators of sections had to have substitutes and men had to be taken on to make up deficiencies in the labor force on various sections. Those who got the privilege included day laborers, carters, stablemen, chauffeurs, f iscales , gang foremen, and section clerks. Colonists, contractors, tenants and coffee handpickers were not so covered. These holidays, however, did prove a mixed blessing. On the whole the beneficiaries were too poor to go and enjoy themselves, nor did they know how to do so. Hence, they had little choice but to stay around and wait for their time to pass. Some drifted off to small jobs for neighbors, others tried to find paid work with contractors and not a few sought employment with the company during their "holidays. H 25 25 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 90, pp. 1-4.

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319 Late in 1948 by a new law employers were bound to pay a descango rerounerado or paid rest on Sundays and a minimum of fourteen officially decreed holidays per year. The advantage to the employer was that in effect an absentee clause was introduced since unauthorized loss of time during a week prevented the employee receiving his Sunday pay. However, one of the problems to complicate matters was that the law was to cover only hourly and daily paid men, excluding contractors but not piece workers. Cambuhy was in doubt as regards colonists, while a tremendous cry was already being raised by monthly wage earners. When Sunday, holiday payments were begun under this law, legal opinion excluded these two categories. Worse still the internal administration of this benefit proved highly complicated and section administrators, who on the average were not well educated, soon were close to insanity with all the possible confusions and contradictions. 2 ® The Cambuhy administration soon determined that whereas before this latest law a laborer was supposed to work and be paid for 300 days per year, after the laws he was to work 285 days and be paid for 365, representing an increase in wages of 28%, which had to be expended on unproductive time. Under the new system, it was hard to get essential workers for Sundays even when offered double pay. Lastly there was the difficulty that quite subordinate monthly paid employees 26 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 95, pp. 2-3.

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320 currently had a salary less or only equal to that of hourly men working under them. A general rise in wages was an inevitable result. 27 It was also obvious that the benefits enjoyed by day laborers had to be passed on in some form or other to the colonist, who by 1949 was sufficiently well educated to compare his lot with that of the laborer and noting the benefits enjoyed by the other, cease to sign on as a colonist for a further term. As a result Mr. Haggard included in the 1949-50 contract a catch-all statement to cover Sundays and holidays when the legal situation cleared. 28 Relations with the industrial workers in post-war Cambuhy also grew difficult due to the too rapid progress in social legislation and the Vargas government policy of favoring trie working classes for political ends. The trend was to collective requests which had nothing to do with working conditions or wage levels. The threat of strike became a habit and on two occasions in 1945 the labor department had to convince the men that they had no case. Government action often brought about trouble for the Cambuhy administration in its last years of existence. The incomplete and unfortunate minimum salary law of 1954 produced great discontent on Cambuhy. A second strike in the industrial section took place with no complaints made but a sudden stoppage of work. 27 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 97, pp. 1-2. 2ft °C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Report . No. 96, p. 2.

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321 It appeared that the new law forced up the cost of living, so taking away with one hand what had been given with the other. The economy was strained and Cambuhy had to resort to the full letter of the law and reduce the minimum salary in compensation for the large capital investment in houses, social benefits and the like which city workers had to pay for. 29 Slowly this new code of social legislation while doing immense good for the nation, was breaking down the very core of the fazenda system. The state was becoming the patrSo in place of the man in the ca sa grande . At one time in 1949 it seemed likely that there would be obligatory insurance for fazendas with approved insurance companies against accidents whilst at work in substitution of the system of allowing the employer to pay all expenses and indemnities directly proper execution of the law being guaranteed by a deposit of federal bonds. This new plan seemed to mean enormous annual premiums for the English company and less efficient or rapid cure of injured workmen, if treatment and indemnities were paid for by an outside insurance company. The removal of the direct interference of the fazendeiro in the immediate care, treatment, and payment of indemnities to men injured while at work, however slight, where the benefit of the doubt was 29 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 83, Commercial Annex, p. 3; No. 118, p. 1.

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322 always given to the workmen, would definitely be to the prejudice of the work people. 30 This law was passed but a staying order prevented its execution. The movement toward state interference in employer-employee relations continued, however. Government inspectors on social legislation seemed to act on occasion as if they were agents provocateurs . Moreover, their actions often upset what had been the normal running of an estate. In 1949 the work of handpicking coffee on Cambuhy was considerably hampered by a visit from department of labor inspectors. Their most important ruling was the prohibition of employment of children under fourteen years of age. The Cambuhy administration looked upon the latter as doing no harm. In fact, it was felt to do good, since the children worked what hours they liked, were never allowed to let it interfere with their school lessons and were kept out of mischief in clean, healthful surroundings with the radio to amuse them. Brazil was suffering the typical pangs at the birth of a welfare state. 31 Changes in a fazendeiro 1 s attitude toward his workers were not merely the result of direct state interference but were a reflection of the changing ideas current in the era of social welfare in Brazil after Vargas. Whilst the owners of agricultural properties could, if economically sound, 30 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 96, pp. 1-2. 31 C.A.F.P., Quar terly Report . No. 99, p. 22.

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323 compete with the city industrialist with regard to salaries, when it came to amenities, the agriculturalist was completely out of the picture. While it was impossible to bring to the country the agreeable conditions and wide range of amusements available to those living in towns, yet the Cambuhy administrators became conscious towards the end of World War II that much could be done in a simple way to relieve the monotony of existence on a Brazilian farm. This monotony was accentuated on a big property where the people live far removed from villages and towns, and among a mixed population with little or no tradition of custom or culture to fall back upon in their hours of leisure. There was room not only to improve the standard of living, hygiene, and comfort but also to give the people a certain amount of normal amusement and social intercourse. One of the main difficulties arose from the large number of sectional headquarters located conveniently for agricultural purposes but all widely scattered one from another, so that anything done on one section would be of little or no benefit to a neighboring section. Life in the early days of Cambuhy must have been extremely bleak indeed. By 1944 football (soccer) fields, a psychological must for Brazilians, especially country people, were on all but two sections. Only two of them were fullsized, however, and basketball and tennis courts were available only at Boa Vista. Only three social club houses existed for the workers, where they could dance and play

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324 games. At the inauguration on one of these on St. John's Day, 1944, the festivities were marred by a knifing, a reminder of the strong emotional currents beneath the passive appearance of the populace. 32 During the latter part of the war there was constructed a church on the Cambuhy section and on May 29, 1945, the marble altar and font of the church were set up and consecrated by the local bishop, Don Gast3o Liberal Pinto, who in the process of the eight-hour ceremony confirmed 798 children and some adults. This church offered not only spiritual comfort but was a center for festas such as the various saints' days which occur during the coffee harvesting sea33 son. OJ In the later years the English company proceeded with its policy of increasing and improving these social amenities. In 1948 a new club was opened at Boa Vista, with proper facilities for athletics and a cinema installation in the dance area. The extension of electric light facilities went on until by September, 1948, only a few outlying brick houses and some mud and wattle houses for cotton tenants were without electric light on the whole fazenda . Lastly, by 1950 most of these houses also had electric meters, which saved the company from having to cut power during the day to 32 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 77, pp. 1-2. 33 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 81, p. 1.

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325 the discomfort of the workers. 34 As labor became more scarce after 1950 so more had to be done to keep men on the land. In its final years Cambuhy took a greater share in amusing and caring for its wor— kers as was done on other large estates. Weekly film shows in outlying sections proved a great success and there was begun a religious and social program with the aid of a local priest at first on an experimental basis and later to cover as much of the estate as possible. The sick were visited, the catechism was taught to the children, and social gatherings with lectures and amusements were held. 35 Social care was by no means the only activity of fazen fl g Arps in the post-depression period but a vast amount of educational work had to be done. The great majority of the workers on Cambuhy when the English arrived there were illiterate. This was certainly true for those workers of Brazilian origin. A few of the Germans and many of the Japanese were better equipped, but most other immigrants had become caboclisado , borrowing even folk medicine from their Brazilian neighbors and restricting their interests to the Immediate needs of daily life. 36 34 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 94, p. 21; No. 100, P* 20; General Letter . No. 43/48. dated September 29, 1948, p. 1. j 5 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report . No. 107, pp. 2-3. 36 Emilio Willems, "Immigrants and their Assimilation in Brazil, " Brazil; Portrait of Half a Continent , ed. T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant, p. 214.

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326 By 1943 Mr. Haggard and his administrators noted that the laboring classes were showing a greater interest and desire to see that their children could at least read and write. Rural districts far removed from towns or villages where in the normal course of events government schools existed offered no educational facilities at all and tended to be avoided by the better type of laborer. It therefore devolved on the landowner to supply the necessary accommodation for a school and provided that there were enough children to attend it* then the educational authorities would recognize the school and nominate a teacher. Unfortunately, it was difficult to find suitable living accommodation for young female teachers out on the estate and most of the girls, who came usually from cities, found it hard to adapt to rural life. The only reason that Cambuhy got any teachers in the majority of cases was that when they began their careers they were required to teach for a time in a rural school. As soon as the teacher had proved herself and there was a vacancy in a more attractive locale, she would be off. The teachers, who were of two classes — state and municipal — were well paid and received excellent conditions as regards leave and pensions. This made them most eligible brides for young administrators . Boa Vista, where the company headquarters were, was naturally the most popular section of the fazenda . By 1943 there were four classes functioning there each with a teacher although there was accommodation for only two classes at a

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327 time. Children who wanted to go to nearby Mat3o either for their primary education or gymnasio , the second four years, could do so, the company selling cheap passes on the motor bus to assist their parents. Elsewhere there existed nine schools spread over the estate, mostly having only one room but with electric light and sanitary installations. As classes lasted only four hours, each room capable of holding forty children could be used for "two schools, " if there were sufficient children. 37 In 1944 the school at Boa Vista became a grupo escolar , with the result that the fazenda 1 s nine schools, seven state and two municipal, now had fifteen teachers, holding fourteen classes with a total number of 551 pupils registered. In the post-war years there were always more children wanting to attend school for whom there was no room and not enough teachers. In 1947 night classes for adults became popular, while schools were held in club houses or elsewhere. By 1948 there were 22 teachers with a like number of classes and 838 pupils. 3 ® The building of more adequate facilities went on until in the last year of the English company there were 29 teachers, 28 classes, and 886 pupils. However, the number of pupils attending school had begun to decline and adult pupils seemed less eager to give their time to learning. Workers 37 C.A.F.P., Quart e rly Report , No. 75, pp. 2-3. jo C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 76, p. 15; No. 88, p. 16; No. 92, p. 15.

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328 began to want their children out in the fields with them helping the economic situation of the family, rather them in school. It was also significant that the English company felt obliged to give pupils, where facilities were available, hot soup during a class break and at other times milk or bananas. Like the adults of the interior, the children needed better nourishment as well as better instruction. 39 One of Brazil's most serious rural problems is health and sanitation. Lack of knowledge of the elementary rules of hygiene, food taboos and the absence of regular medical assistance to farm people bring about a high incidence of intestinal ailrre its, vitamin deficiencies, and endemic diseases. it was always a fazendeiro 1 s concern to see to his workers health, as men worn down by sickness had their efficiency reduced. Moreover, a greater interest in the workman's health developed along with the growing general concern for welfare work. In the early years of the English company little more was done than to administer more efficiently what was usual, various government measures against endemic diseases, while providing medical service through the fazenda doctors. For example, in August, 1938, a smallpox epidemic broke out on the fazenda and forty cases were registered. A general vaccination was carried out and the epidemic stopped. Later that year when the rains and the heat came there was an 39 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Report , No. 108, p. 2; Canfouhy S.A., RelatSr io Anual . No. 2, p. 2.

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329 unusually severe epidemic of dysentery with sporadic cases of para-typhoid. Some 1,654 people were vaccinated against the latter, but 6,000 more had to do without because of lack of vaccine at the local government medical post. 4 ® At times in the dry weather when mosquitos became very numerous on the estate, with the possible danger of malaria and yellow fever, squads from the federal yellow fever department would come and spray dangerous areas. In time the Cambuhy administration began to realize that this negative attitude to the workman's health was outdated and began to take positive measures. Early in 1942 the company presented the Mat3o hospital with an X-ray apparatus. It was also recognized that there was a need for a medical post on the estate where mothers could go for advice, where adults and children could be deloused and, above all, deworraed, and where tropical sores and eye diseases could be treated. Worms remained the main cause of illness, loss of time, and the inefficiency of work done on Cambuhy. 4 *In 1947 the company began to run an ambulance service between the estate and the Mat3o hospital. To the latter institution the company subscribed heavily so that a new wing might be built. Two years later a dental surgery was built at Boa Vista to take advantage of the state government's offer to provide a dentist to treat children's teeth 40 C.A.P.P., Quarterly Report . No. 55, p. 17. 41 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 66, p. 16; No. 75, pp. 23-24.

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330 free of charge. The fazenda continued to put its facilities at the disposal of the department of health when they came to treat the workers for worms or try to stamp out the high incidence of tracoma and other eye diseases. By 1952 a children's clinic was begun by an official from the MatSo clinic using a fazenda jeep. Thereafter doctors and nurses regularly visited four sections each week. Many walked long distances to these four centers to be treated. The vast majority of patients needed vitamins, sulphur, powdered milk, and glucose, while less numbers required vermifuges, antibiotics, sedatives and disinfectants. In the middle of 1953 a creche was established for working mothers to leave their babies in the care of two nuns at the Boa Vista workmen's club. The children were taught, fed, and bathed each day. This program of socia 1 welfare was a far cry from the early days of the English company when the only welfare work had been done by the general manager's wife. 42 Life on a fazenda was always filled with possible dangers. Trucks would collide with railroad locomotives, cars would turn over, cranes loading firewood would collapse. Fighting nature in order to produce crops was still a rugged occupation with hazards of fire and accident ever present. In 1949 some 768 workmen's accidents resulted in loseof 2,053 working days. Few of these accidents resulted in 42 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports . No. 99, p. 32? No. 108, p. 2; No. 114, p. 3.

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331 permanent disability and still less in death. Indeed, one of the hardest things for the English administrators to do was to calculate the death rates and illness occurrence figures. All types of agricultural labor is migratory from colonists, who usually stay in one place from one to two years, to the casual laborers. In 1951 over one-sixth of the total Caxribuhy population moved away, and of this 60 % had been on the fazenda less than one year. Since labor was taken on in normal health and stayed a short time, the normal number of deaths did not occur. As old age approached, people seemed to move to nearby towns to live with relatives. Moreover, thanks to the ambulance service, sick people were moved to hospitals quickly and if they died there were not registered as a death on the fazenda . Lastly, there was an ever-present fear on Cambuhy of death by snake bite. From the very beginning the English company had been one of the best suppliers of live snakes to the Instituto Butantan in S3o Paulo, where antidotes and serums were prepared. From the middle of the second war Cambuhy moved into and continued 1 to hold first place, sending snakes, spiders, scorpions, and alligators and receiving in return supplies of serums and prizes for the workers who caught the most reptiles. 4 ^ If in the last twenty years of the English company's existence the lot of the workman progressed as to his legal 43 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 99, p. 11; No. 100, Commercial Annex, p. 10; No. 108, p. 3. See Appendix III, Table 4 for the death rate on Cambuhy.

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332 protection, his comfort and his health, these changes were small when compared to his completely changed cost of living. If anything put the peasant worker on his own feet, and removed him from the traditional protection of a fazendeiro it was economic stress and strain upon both the master and his subordinate. The coffee colonist and cotton tenant from October onwards usually drew credit allowances each month in foodstuffs from the company store at a fixed rate per month per alqueire of land cultivated. This system began in 1931 and grew popular in the years after the depression. In the year 1938 the chief articles purchased from the company store were 329 tons of rice, 242 tons of sugar, 287 tons of wheat flour and 117 tons of beans. Oil, lard, mandioca flour, kerosene, macaroni, soap, salt, caustic soda and jerked beef were also important items. It proved impossible to estimate the average budget for a typical family, but the Cambuhy administrators did calculate that an agricultural laborer in 1938 had to spend about 25% more on foodstuffs of first necessity than in 1933. 'St could readily be assumed that the cost of miscellaneous foodstuffs, clothing, household articles, tools, chemist bills, and amusements had suffered similar increase. 44 During the war fub£ or corn meal became the poor man's wheat flour, especially as the cost of living in SSo Paulo began to rise. Since the main object of the stores 44 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports . No. 55, Commercial Annex, pp. 3-4.

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333 department on Cambuhy was to serve the laborers by supplying good quality articles at low prices the margin of profit was inherently a small one. During the war wages rose, although always behind the rising cost of living, and the standard of living of the agricultural population underwent a remarkable improvement and a larger percentage of their earnings was spent on things previously considered luxuries. The country's social legislation was taking the people forward but perhaps at a rate too rapid to prove an unmixed blessing. 4 ^ At one time during the war the federal government proposed to turn all company stores into workers' cooperatives, but there was too much disinterest and disloyalty among the workers to make this possible. Instead the war brought severe rationing of such items as salt, sugar, and kerosene. Strangely, it also brought a great increase to sales in the company stores. This tendency leveled off in the post-war period with sales staying about the same, but the value of sales greatly increased due to the rampant inflation . As a result, the fazenda ' s cost of living index rose to be in 1948 three times higher than in 1939. Moreover, the per capita consumption of seven principal foodstuffs sold on Cambuhy had risen from 103 kilos to 171 kilos. Part of this increase could be explained by the practical disappearance 45 C.A.F.P. , Quarterly Reports , No. 63, Commercial Annex, pp. 1-9; No. 66, p. 8.

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334 of cotton tenants, who bought less than colonists, and laborers. By 1950 prices rose to such an extent that even the careful colonist could save nothing for a rainy day. This rise in price of clothes and foodstuffs was a constant worry being as high as a 10% increase in the first half of 1951. The Cambuhy administration had to return to its old paternal role and help families in need. The price of foodstuffs continued to be high and despite Cambuhy' s subsidies in the form of cheap rice, meat, and milk it was difficult for workers to make both ends meet. 4 ^ Few properties could rival the social amenities and good housing of Cambuhy, yet the administration after 1950 had constantly to advise higher rates. It was a case of heeding the writing on the wall and taking action before the estate was left with only the poorest of an already mediocre labor force. The casual laborer became more casual, drifting from one neighborhood to another in the hope of earning a little more money. Beginning in 1951 Cambuhy gave fifteen days paid holidays to coffee colonists, but as has been seen the old colonists' system had to be abandoned in 1954. All the tradition that was the backbone of Cambuhy seemed to be being broken up. The clerks in the administrative staff 46 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 75, Commercial Annex, pp. 1-10; No. 83, Commercial Annex, pp. 7-8; No. 95, Commercial Annex, pp. 6-7. 47 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 106, p. lr No. 115, p. 1. See Appendix III, Table 6 for cost of living index.

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335 left and no one applied to be trained as beginners. Early in 1952 female clerks, a startling innovation, had to be used in the accounting section to keep up with routine work. Everyone wanted more money and less work. Few people wanted to work in the rich terra roxa as its sticky quality made the work harder. First class mechanics and carpenters fled the countryside. Labor would drift to neighboring sugar fa zendas to cut cane at harvest time. Cambuhy more and more became an industrial school for MatSo and Araraquara. The only solution the administration had was slowly to increase the rates of technical and administrative men who it was felt could t live more peaceful and economic lives on Cambuhy than in the cities. 48 In fact, however, in the new era of post-war expansion in Brazil few wanted the quiet of the countryside in preference to the fleshpots and the money of the city. Even with all its amenities, Cambuhy was an anachronism. The age when men would work on a latifundia for small wages was over. Although still ignorant, biased, and misled, the paulista peasane worker was now able to look objectively at his lot. In elections he could be swayed by politicians who promised material benefits for his locality. He was out for himself and although much in need of rural extension programs to educate him about agriculture, hygiene, and basic economic realities, 48 C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports , No. 104, p. 1; No. 108, p. 1; No. 117, p. 1? No. 118, pp. 1-2.

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336 he was able to leave behind his former dependence on a patrgo .

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CONCLUSION The attacks on the latifundia in Brazil have been numerous and vicious. St. Hilaire described latifundismo as a major obstacle to increase of population and, therefore, to be considered as a great evil. Others have emphasized its social danger as a discouragement to immigration. It has been maintained that a latifundia leads to extensive cultivation, devastation, and soil exhaustion. Yet Cambuhy as a latifundia could not be accused of these faults. Of the 21% of its land not utilized in 1956, only 4 % was not in forest or water resources. Certainly no fazenda ever did more to conserve its resources. Cambuhy in effect was a glowing example in its last year of a policultural estate with excellent fixtures and good working and housing conditions for its workers. * It must be admitted that Cambuhy was not a typical latifundia. Still less was it a typical paulista coffee plantation. F ew properties could differ more from Olavo Baptista's description of such an institution. Far from being his seventy acre minimum area, rather Cambuhy was 2,000 times that size. ^Amaral, Historia Geral . I, 233-39; c ambuhy S.A., Rela t8rio Anual No. 2, Enclosure No. 2. 337

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338 Coffee has certainly begun to decline on Cambuhy, but it is impossible to imagine the area sinking to the level of some parts of the Vale do Paraiba, where corn and beans are grown in a decadent fashion and cattle graze on secondclass pasture. Cambuhy' s hillsides denuded of forest still present an aspect of human activity thanks to their terraces, coffee groves, and other cultivation. Cambuhy had the topographical conditions, financial resources and mental capacity in its leaders to fight the effects of nature and man's activity. ^ Coffee in its triumphal passage across the State of SSo Paulo has used up a great deal of humus from the paullsta soils. The earth preferred was that which was covered by thick vegetation with a high incidence of organic matter. Only after thirty or forty years with good soils and under good topographical conditions did the barrenness of the earth become apparent. Even then as on Cambuhy corrective measures can counteract this, but such measures are not customary among the small growers. Pioneer, planter, and coffee grower destroyed the tropical forests of SSo Paulo which cannot grow back. On the contrary the campos cerrados , savannahs, which originally occupied only a small part of southeastern Brazil, took over 2 01avo Baptista Filho, A fazenda de caf£ em S3o Paulo (Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio da Agricultura, Servi
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339 the forest soils which had been exhausted by roan. These consist of poor, generally sandy, soils unable to sustain the vigorous tropical forests. Man by annually burning off and using such land for grazing and annual crops has extended this domain. Carabuhy again by terracing cereal lands and even grazing grounds and by watering them did less damage than was usual. 3 The whole structure of the coffee industry has been founded on an advance into new land. This bonanza spirit has ignored land of mediocre value. On the frontier in 1935 only 20% of the land was in coffee and in specialized areas only some 40% of the land. Consumption, not capacity to produce, limits the coffee industry. This spirit accounts for the fact that on its journey through SSo Paulo coffee showed no stability and no signs of new development in used lands, leaving a wake of exhausted fields, unused drying terraces, empty barns, and lines of vacated colonist houses. The good work done by large estates such as Cambuhy, the Secretaria da Agriculture and th e Sociedade Rural Brasileiro was highly exceptions 1.4 The conditions of life of the average rural man in the interbr of SSo Paulo leave much to be desired from economic 3 Fran 9 a, The Coffee Trail , pp. 36, 39-40. ^Robert S. Platt, "Coffee Plantations in Brazil: A comparison of occupance patterns in established and frontier areas, " Geographical Review XXV No. 4 (April, 1935) 239; Ruy Miller Paiva, Restaura^So econ6mica da lavoura cafeeira (SSo Paulo: Secretaria da Agricultura, 1949) p. 3.

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340 and social standpoints. Not only must a crusade back to the land prevent the land becoming a desert but above all the human resources must be developed. Charles Wagley has said, "Brazil is one of the world's richest nations, but it has not yet made use of its greatest resource, its people. The natural disposition of the paulista farm worker is good. There is no rural banditry, few police, and little crime. Foreigners and immigrants from harsher climes seem to be quickly assimilated to the mild character of the native. These peasant people have great economic difficulties and enjoy a low standard of living. Often they have ideas about the ecological necessities of a plant or crop but do not put them into action, somehow believing that past failures do not mean possible success this time. Thus the peasant worker often ill prepares, badly plants, indifferently cares for, and harvests his products. He lacks the necessary means, installations, money, manpower, health, transportation, and organization to put his goods on the market. Frequently he well knows his own mistakes. Yet he goes on being led by his many superstitions, his food taboos, and strange ideas about such things as the depth of the soil.^ ^Charles Wagley, Amazon Town (New Yorks Macmillan, 1953), p. 267. 6 Jos4 Setzer, Os solos do Estado de S5o Paulo , pp. 32527 .

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341 Brazil's economy has a large agricultural base and an inefficient transportation system. The income even of the most advanced State of S3o Paulo is low. Marketing practices are backward, credit for agricultural purposes is poorly organized, and agricultural production methods are certainly not modern. Labor in agriculture is aided by very little capital equipment, and the practice of monoculture and the general misuse of soil have had a marked degenerative influence on land resources. The land-to-man ratio, previously large, has become smaller during the last few decades. Coffee then has been accused first of taking men to the land, keeping them there, and causing demographic disequilibrium a^d then later depopulating the land and keeping many in sickness and poverty. ^ Most landowners do not have the capacity to use their land in a rational and lucrative manner. There is thus a serious need for rural education, a need for better health through curative and preventative medicine and more public health measures, and a need for more credit and rural industries. To these there might be added better communications and transportation, a decrease in the middleman's profit to the benefit of the producer, and a raising of the latter's economic and cultural level. 7 Clarence A. Moore, “Recent Developments in Brazilian Agriculture, B The Journal of Political Economy LX IV No. 4 (August, 1956) 341.

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342 To restore coffee is in the last resort a question of humus, fertilizer, and organic material. Excepting in coffee plantations in virgin soils or in well cared for soils such as those of Cambuhy, the crop production per unit area in SSo Paulo is low. What is needed is organic matter and substances such as pulverized limestone. The former is missing because of the average peasant farmer does not stable his cattle and the latter because the fertilizer dealer will not handle such a loW-priced soil amendment. 8 Cooperatives and rnral credit are answers to present day paulista problems. The former must use the latter to get the equipment to allow the small farmer to produce high grade coffee and must make the producer strong enough to stop middlemen in Santos diluting crops. If Africa and Central America are producing the bulk of the better grade, higher-pp iced coffee on the world market, SSo Paulo must do all it can to get part of this market. Large scale agriculture such as thaK on Cambuhy made possible the purchase of machinery and experiments to improve quality. Economic and social factors as have been seen by 1950 had made it an anachronism as an institution, yet the quality and progress which it exemplified must be copied if the region of Araraquara is to survive and progress. 8 Araraquara today is one of the finest cities in the interior of SSo Paulo, having some 40,000 inhabitants. The loss Q Paiva, op. cit. , p. 4; Setzer, op. cit ., pp. 349-57. Q ^Schmidt, 0 meio rural , pp. 75-76.

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343 of its pioneer spirit has perhaps been compensated by an increase in amenities and sophistication. Some 500 finishing and small industries, plus large sugar mills and cotton seed oil refiners, seem to thrive. Thanks to its public parks and extensive arborization it is truly a garden city, while it can boast libraries, museums and faculties of philosophy, pharmacy, and dentistry. On a lesser scale the town of MatSo has thrived also. While it must be classed as a frontier boom town which never succeeded in growing into a large city it is not a backwater as it is served by one railroad, the Araraquarense, and is close to another, the Paulista. Lastly MatSo and Araraquara are on the new SSo Paulo-Brasilia highway and can expect great things from this. The Araraquara zone has felt the effect of the passage of coffee. Yet coffee was never an all-embracing plant there. The coffee groves rather appeared as a series of blocks here and there, occupying only areas where a high yield was possible, while cotton and pasture land occupied the poorer and lower lands. Sugar also never gave way wholly to coffee, and by 1920 after the end of the first great coffee boom in the area, sugar returned to its former important position. Coffee populated the area and valorized the land, but other crops thrived also. The zone then is a stable, 10 Martins de Almeida, Araraquara , 1948, p. 58; C.A.P.P. General Letter No. 1/46, dated January 3, 1946. The census of 1950 estimated the population of Araraquara at 34, 114 persons.

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344 prosperous region which has overcome both the coffee fever and the slump of 1930. 11 In addition to being an exception to the regime of coffee monoculture, the Araraquarense is also an example of a successful area of comparatively small properties. Policulture was practiced in particular on small properties where the basaltic layers of rock lacked their covering of red earth but had instead sandy, white soils. Carabuhy's role in this area then was that of the exception and the leader not only in quantity but also in quality. 12 The history of Cambuhy is a short one and this is typical of a coffee cycle which will usually last some fifty to sixty years. Indeed, all the development on Cambuhy has taken place almost within one human lifetime and old men still sit in the sun in a park in MatSo, talking of the days of GaviSo Peixoto. Most of these were young children at the time, sons of immigrants who came to make their fortune. A few did this and are now fazendeiros , but most men did not. These men have seen the estate change from a forest into the world's largest unitary coffee plantation, where thousands of people lived and worked. They have seen frontier courtesy and simple economic realities change to a struggle 11 Franqa, op. cit, , pp. 157-60, 174. 12 Deffontaines, Boletfm Geocrrctfico (Rio de Janeiro) Ano III, No. 25 (April, 1945), 24. Some 19,153 properties exist toady in the Araraquara zone. Estado de SSo Paulo , April 1, 1960.

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345 for money, complicated by layers of governmental and legal bureaucracy. Lastly, they have watched the growth of a welfare state in which few are well enough educated to take full advantage of it, but rather wait to be spoon fed. Cambuhy since 1956 has lain in an amorphous state, with large sections of the estate in the process of sale. The axe has been put to a large percentage of the fazenda * s forest resources and weaker areas of the estate have been almost abandoned. All ideas of social amenities have lost what vigor they had and scientific experiment other than that done by the IBEC Research Institute has come to an end. Perhaps Cambuhy as an institution with all its experimentation and intensive cultivation had come close to a point of diminishing returns by 1956 but one must feel that this was better than the present day lapse. On the other hand this break up of so large an estate may well bring economic and social good. If purchasers of sections of the estate have the capital and desire to expand it, then their land may profit and yield more than before due to more intimate care. Lastly, there may be a spread of information and education to help the humble worker, but since no patrSo now exists then it falls on the burdened shoulders of the government to devise better rural extension services with more efficient state agents to instruct workers and farmers and coordinate their efforts. All modern means of communication will be needed to inform the people, if the

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346 paulistas of the interior are to lead more healthy and comfortable lives. Today with the construction of the new capital of the republic, Brasilia, and the continued move to the west remaining as the essence of Brazilianism, everything in the country seems to advance at a heady speed. At the same time the consolidation of achievements already won is necessary. The proposed agricultural law of the State of SSo Paulo to tax unused land which is not forested or which does not fulfill other conditions may be the start of a new and successful move toward greater agricultural activity and development in the interior of SSo Paulo. ^ No area on the plateau could have a better heritage of sound development from which to start than that of Cambuhy. 13 Estado de S5o Paulo . March 23, 1960.

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APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX I Legua Alquexre Arrpba Alqueire Carro EQUIVALENTS OF EIGHTS AND MEASURES Distance 6,600 Linear meters Area Paulista 2.42 hectares (5.9 acres) Weight 15 kilos (33 lbs.) Volume 55 liters (for coffee picking purposes) 50 liters (official) 48 jacas (baskets) , representing 12 sacks of 60 kilos of clean corn 348

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APPENDIX II

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APPENDIX II GLOSSARY OF PORTUGUESE TERMS agregado a tenant who pays no rent but who must develop the land he receives before returning it after a specific time. acjuardente sugar brandy. arara a macaw. araub£ a type of tree. bairro a neighborhood, a part of town. bandeirismo the movement of people from the SSo Paulo area into the interior from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Hence, bandexrante one who was a part of this movement. barbatimap a tree the bark of which has commercial value. batatals a type of grass. bauru a type of soil. boca de sertffo the edge of the backlands. boia ripe coffee. botueatd a type of soil. broca a coffee bean borer. Stephanoderes Hampei . caboclo native. Hence, caboc lisado a person who has gone native. 350

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351 cabriuva a type of tree. caiuS a type of soil. camara da a day laborer. camp on^s a peasant. eampos plains or fields. \ \ eampos cerrados savannahs. eampos suios savannahs. capitania a captaincy, a large unit of Portuguese colonial administration . capit3o-mor a military officer who commanded the local militia and had many administrative duties in colonial Brazil. caracfi a native breed of cattle. carredor a lane between blocks of coffee. carta de conselho the royal document which made a person a member of the Imperial Council. carta de senten^a a legal decision in its proper drafted form. carta de sesmaria a certificate recording a colonial land grant. casa grande "the big house." catingueira ro^a a type of grass. cedro a cedar tree. cere ia cherry red coffee. certo sure.

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352 eidade a city. colonx^o a type of grass. colono a colonist. conselheiro a councillor, or member of the Imperial Council. coruqueffe boll weevil. cova the hole in the ground in which a coffee tree is planted. cruzeiro the basic unit of currency in Brazil since 1942, equivalent to the old mll-r&is . cuesta a bluff. descan^o remunerado paid rest on Sundays and holidays. desembargador a judge of the court of appeals. districto de paz a subdivision of a municlpio , having as its seat a Vila . districto policial a police district within a muni.cipio . erva-cidreira lemongrass. escfoto a drainage ridge. esparramac'&o the smoothing out of the ridges made amid the coffee trees by the coroac?ao . fazenda a large estate. Hence, fazendeiro one who owns such an estate. festas celebrations. ficha a ticket or tally. figuej-ra branca a strangler tree.

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353 fiscal a gang foreman. foice a bill hook. formador -a contractor, who undertakes to clear land and plant coffee trees on it. frequesia a parish. frigorifico a meat freezing plant. gerente a manager. gordura roxa a type of grass. grilo a piece of land held without title. Hence, grileiro a squatter. grupo escolar a set of classes, united into a school with a director. guatemala a type of grass. gymnasio the second four years of the Brazilian educational system. inq% edulis a shade tree. iaboticabeira a tree which bears nuts. jac4 a basket. jacaranda a valuable tree. iaragua a type of grass. Iuiz de directo a district judge. i uiz de inventarlo a judge whose competence was over wills. la t i f undi smo the system of large scale landholdings. Hence, latifundista one who owns a large estate.

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354 madeira de lei hard and valuable wood. mandioca the common or bitter cassava. marmelada de cavalo a legume. mass ape a sticky soil. mata -burro a cattle guard. meia coroa the scraping of the first set of ridges amid the coffee tress before harvesting. morada de dia the dwelling place of the Sun. municxpio a county. negocio a business deal. nortista a person from the northeast of Brazil. nficleo colonial a planned colonising settlement. palavra inglesa the English word of honor. palmito a type of palm tree. patr3o lord or master. pau-brasil brazilwood. pau d'oleo a copal tree. paulista of or belonging to the State of SSo Paulo. peroba a pliant tree characteristic of first class forest. pinga sugar brandy. plsquim a shade tree. piano de cafe coffee program. prefeito a mayor.

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355 t professorinha de serfSo a country school "marm." real the basic unit of currency in Brazil before 1942. One thousand rtxfr were known as a mil-reis , and 1,000 mil-reis known as a conto of r&is . relatQrio a report. re visor a supervisor. salmourclo a type of soil. sauva cutter ants. sede the headquarters, or homestead of a large farm. serra a mountain range. sertcLo the backlands. Hence, sertanelo one who lives there. sesmarxa a land grant in colonxal Brazil. Hence, sesmeiro one who receives such a grant. simp&txco charming. sxtio a small farm. Hence, sitiante a small landowner. sociedade anftnima a limited company. tabatinga a sedimentary clay. talhclo a block of coffee. terra branca white, sandy earth. terra roxa a rich red earth, ideal for coffee cultivation. terra roxa mixturada a mixture of the latter with other soils. terreiro a drying terrace.

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356 tristeza a citrus disease. tulha a barn for storing dried coffee in husk awaiting milling. Vila a town or village. zebu a breed of cattle.

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APPENDIX III

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358 TABLE 1 COFFEE STATISTICS 1911-1924 a Crop Year Total Arrobas (15 kilos) of Clean Coffee Produced Average Net Sales per Bag in Mi 1-R^is 1912/13 26, 523 43$ 16 1913/14 40,836 26$00 1914/15 32, 120 21$96 1915/16 59, 226 22$96 1916/17 37,019 33$44 1917/lb 64, 241 22$76 1918/19 37 , 000 b 70$84 1919/20 6, 594 c 7 5$ 24 1920/21 90, 354 49 $8 4 1921/22 70,925 6 7 $88 1922/23 1923/24 176,976 information taken from Magalhaes Papers . ^Small crop because of frost damage, ccrop failure due to frost.

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359 TABLE 2 COFFEE STATISTICS 19 24-19 56 a *' i.\ * ** Crop Year No. of Bags Produced (60 kilos) Average Net Sales per Bag in Cruzeiros t Profit or Loss in Cruzeiros 1925/26 21, 539 $ 133,53 $ 27,00 1926/27 26,754 135, 36 42, 23 1927/26 72,602 134,05 96, 53 19 Â’ft, ?9 15,037 87,71 -61, 39 1929/30 61,747 67,42 16, 26 1930/31 27, 242 65, 0b 26,08 1931/32 60, 136 61,80 20, 37 1932/33 59,465 44, 23 3,56 1933/34 102, 134 56, 35 15,94 1934/35 55, 100 73,87 6,59 1935/ 36 52, 160 86,66 4,03 1936/37 118 , 236 66, 28 22,96 1937/36 72, 360 57,69 12, 39 1936/39 96,421 84,83 22,83 1939/40 64,442 118 , 68 31,82 1940/41 90,049 114,01 68, 54 1941/42 19*436 231,63 2,04 1942/43 91,763 244, 13 18 3,66 1943/44 56, 261 254,64 141,73 1944/45 21,075 319,61 36,84 1945/46 49, 576 538, 56 360 , 50 1946/47 62,096 466, 19 254,90 1947/46 60,010 513, 28 239,62 1946/49 69,460 751, 29 501,93 1949/50 41, 550 1,091,48 656,90 1950/51 40, 531 1,042,79 507,83 1951/52 21, 290 1,044, 13 129,00 1952/53 57, 170 1, 160, 59 618, 19 1953/54 20,911 2, 153, 50 326,00 1954/55 68,957 2, 211,02 302,66 1955/56 36, 102 information from C.A.F.P. Papers .

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360 TABLE 3 POPULATION STATISTICS 1914-1924 3 Year Recorded Deaths Number of : Families Total Population Colonists Contractors Day Laborers Agregados 1914 • • 106 77 79 • • 1915 2 147 89 50 40 1916 9 121 118 48 47 1,720 1917 9 103 130 63 24 1918 13 188 106 90 62 2,097 1919 31 196 75 67 25 1920 12 179 71 55 22 1921 21 200 71 80 49 1922 28 231 117 87 29 1923 • • • • • • • • • • • • 1924 36 150 149 90 32 3,000 a Information from the MagalhSes Papers.

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36i TABLE 4 POPULATION STATISTICS 1940-I955 3 Deaths Year Still Born _ , „ , Children Children 4 Under 4 Cer is Total girths Deaths Total Population 1940 10 107 68 175 • • • 12, 184 1941 14 108 62 184 • • • 11,287 1942 9 81 53 143 • • • 10,938 1943 • • i * * • • • 152 302 11,461 1944 7 92 58 157 266 11,040 1945 8 66 42 116 151 10,669 1946 7 41 31 79 144 10,939 1947 13 52 25 90 146 10, 398 1948 5 48 36 89 187 10,354 1949 8 37 26 71 229 10, 759 1950 4 48 30 82 335 9,881 1951 4 26 25 55 264 9,252 1952 3 30 12 45 272 9,565 1953 6 24 36 66 220 9,897 1954 8 28 26 62 218 9,846 1955 4 23 22 49 250 10,073 information from C.A.F.P., Quarterly Reports .

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362 TABLE 5 CO-RELATION OF COFFEE CROPS AND RAINFALL 3 Period Number of Years Average Inches per Annum Average Coffee Crops in Bags per 1, 000 trees 1925-39 15 61.54" 17.4 1940-47 8 50.47*’ 12.0 1948-51 4 52.08" 6.7 1952 1 A •' 43.99" 3.9 ^arnbuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates, Limited. Chairman* s Statement , 1953, pp. 4-5.

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363 TABLE 6 COST OF LIVING INDEX 1939-1954 a Year Index 1939 100 1940 113 1941 131 1942 148 1943 183 1944 223 1945 238 1946 308 1947 387 1948 388 1949 420 1950 431 1951 461 1952 589 1953 690 1954 972 information from C.A.F.P. Commercial Department Papers.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Manuscripts Fazenda Cambuhy, Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas Papers . S3o Paulo, The MagalhSes Papers . SSo Paulo, Banco Moreira Salles, Ca mbuhy Legal Papers . Public Documents Estado de S3o Paulo, Arquivo do Estado, Officios Diversos de Araraquara , 1833-1849, 1850-1861, 1863-1890. Great Britain. High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Scheme of Arrangement re Cambuhy Coffee and Cotton Estates Limited and the Companies Act of 1929 . No. 00650 of 1936. November, 1936. Newspapers London Times , 1926, 1928, 1929. MatSo A Comar ca , 1926. Rio de Janeiro Folha da Noite , 1924. Rio de Janeiro Gazeta de Notlcias , 1924. Rio de Janeiro O Jornal , 1924, 1927. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do 3razll , 1924. Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Comerclo , 1924. S3o Paulo Diario da Noite , 1926. S3o Paulo Diario Espaflol , 1915. S3o Paulo Diario Official , 1912, 1924, 1925. S3o Paulo O Estado de S3o Paulo , 1924, 1926, 1927, 1960. S3o Paulo Fanful la, 1915. 364

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365 S3o Paulo II Piccolo , 1923, 1924. Santos T ribune . 1917. Books Almeida, A. Tavares de. Qeste paulista: a experi6ncia etnoqrafica e cultural . Rio de Janeiro: Alba, 1943. Alves, Carlos Pinto. Carlos Baptists de MagalhSes . Araraquara: Privately printed, 1954. Amaral, Luis. Hist6ria geral da agriculture Brasilelr a. 2 Vols. 2d ed., revised. S3o Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1958. Baptista, Olavo. A fazenda de cafi em S3o Paulo . Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio da Agricultura, 1953. Caraargo, Roger io de e Adalberto de Queiroz Telles Jr. O cafi no Brasil t sua aclima^go e industrializacS o. 2 Vols. Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio da Agricultura, Servi$o de InformacjSo Agricola, 1953. Carvalho, Paulo Pinto de. Aspectos de nossa econdraia rural . S3o Paulo: Libraria Martins, 1943. Correa, Pio Lourenco. Monografia da palavra Araraquara . 4th ed., revised. S3o Paulo: Privately printed, 1952. Couty, Louis. Le Brasil en 1884 . Rio de Janeiro: Faro e Lino, 1884. Denis, Pierre. Le Brasil au XX e si&cle . Paris: Armand Colin, 1909. Duncan, Julian S. Public and Private Operation of Railways in Brazil . New York: Columbia University Presp, 1932. Ellis Junior, Alfredo, o Bandeirismo paulista . s3o Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1934. . O caf 4 e a paulistanea . S3o Paulo: Universidade de SSo Paulo, 1951. . A evolu93o da econSmia paulista e suas causas . Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1937. Explora93o do rlo Tietg . S3o Paulo: CommissSo Geogr^fica e Geolbgica do Estado de S3o Paulo, 1905.

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366 Franca, Ary. The Coffee Trail and the Pioneer Fringe . Translated by David M. Lewis and Renata Howard. Rio de Janeiro* International Geographical Union, Brazilian National Committee, 1956 . Furtado, Celso. Formagao econSmica do Brasil . Rio de Janeiro* Editors Fundo da Cultura, 1959. Hunnicutt, Benjamin H. Brazil* World Frontier . New Yorks Van Nor stand Co. Inc., 1949. Joel, G. C. W. One Hundred Years of Coffee . London: Privately printed by Edward Jbhnston and Co., 1942. Lacerda e Almeida, Francisco Jos£ de. Diario da vlagem do Dr. Francisco Jos i de Lacerda e Almeida pelas Capitanias die Par
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367 Medcalf, James C. et al. Experimental Programs in Brazil . New York: IBEC Research Institute, 1954. Milliet, Sergio. O roteiro do caf£ . SSo Paulo: BIPAEditora, 1946. Monbeig, Pierre. Pionnlers et planteurs de SSo Paulo . Paris: Librarie Arrnand Colin, 1952. Monteiro Lobato, J. B. A ouro verde . SSo Paulo: Monteiro Lobato e Cia., 1920. Morel, Julian. Sesmaria de Cambuhv . SSo Paulos Privately printed, 1914. Oliveira, Antonio Rodrigues Velozo de. Memoria sobre o mel horamento da Provincia de SSo Paulo . Rio de Janeiro: 1822. Oliveira Vianna, Francisco. Evolu
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368 Silveira, Jo3o. Alburn de Araraquara . Araraquara: Privately printed, 1915. Smith, T. Lynn. Brazil: People and Institutions . 2nd ed., revised. Baton Rouge, La.* Louisiana State University Press, 1954. . and Alexander Merchant. Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent . New York: The Dryden Press, 1951. Stein, Stanley J. Vassouras, A Brazilian Coffee County . 1850-1900 . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957. Taunay, Affonso d'E. Histdria do cafi no Brasil . 14 Vols. Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Nacional do Caf£, 1939-1943. . Hist6ria geral das bandeiras paulistas . Vol. VIII. S3o Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1949. . Pequeno hist6ria do cafg no Brasil. 1737-1937 . Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Nacional do CafC 1945 . Teixeira de Oliveira, Jose. A vida maravlllosa e burlesca do caf£ . Rio de Janeiro: Pongetti, 1942. Uribe Campuzano, Andres. Brown Gold . New York* Random House, 1954. Walle, Paul. Au Brasil, fitat de S3o Paulo . Paris* Orientale et Americaine, 1912. Wythe, George et al. Brazil: An Expanding Econom y. New York* The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949. Articles and Periodicals Aguirra, Jo3o Baptista de Campos. “Sesmeiros e posseiros, " Revista do Instituto Historico e Geogr^fico de s3o Paulo , XXXIV (1937), 257-61. “Araraquara, " Dlccionario Chorographico e Agricola do Estado de S3o Paulo , S3o Paulo: Secretaria da Agricultura, 1925. pp. 18-20. “Araraquara, “ Enciclopedia dos Municipios Braslleiros , Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatfstica, 1957. pp. 71-76. Bennett, Arthur. "Historic Cambuhy. Scene of Modern Experiments." Brazilian Business (Rio de Janeiro), XXXVIII (July, 1958), 19-24, 57-59.

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369 Campos, Dacio Aranha de A. "Tipos de povoamento de s3o Paulo," Revista do Arquivo Municipal (sSo Paulo), LIV (February^ 1939) , 5-34 . Chateaubriand, Assis de. M 0 faiscador de ouro verde, “ 0 Jornal (Rio de Janeiro), October 15, 1927. Deffontaines, Pierre. "The Origin and Growth of the Brazilian Network of Towns, " Geographic Review , XXVIII No. 3 (July, 1938), 379-99. . "Regides e Paisagens do Estado de s3o Paulo, " Boletlm Geogr^fico (Rio de Janeiro), Ano II No. 24 (March, 1945), 1937-50? Ano III No. 25 (April, 1945), 18-27. Egas, Eugenio. (ed.) "Araraguara, " Os Municipios Paulistas , S3o Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1925. I, 102109. . "Matt&o, " Os Municipios Paulistas , S3o Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1925. I, 1091-99. Garcez, Lucas Nogueiro. "Fastigio, declinio e recuperacSo, " Diarlos Associados , Edi
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370 .”Les voies de communication dans l'Stat de Saint Paul (Brasil), ** B ulletin dissociation de Geographe s Franca is CII (January, 1937), 9-16. Moore, Clarence A. "Recent Developments in Brazilian Agriculture, “ Journal of Political Economy L XIV, No. 4 (August, 1956), 341-46. Morse, Richard M. "S2o Paulo in the Nineteenth Century; Economic Roots of the Metropolis, " In terAmerican Eco nomic Affairs , Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter, 1951), 3-39. Mota Filho, Candido. "O poder politico do caf£, " Diarios Associados , Caderno 2°, p. 5. Paiva, Ruy Miller, “A situag2o do cafl, " Diarios Associados , Caderno 3°, pp. 2-3. Platt, Robert S. "Coffee Plantations in Brazil, “ Geographi cal Review , XXV, No. 2 (April, 1935), 231-40. Prado Junior, Caio. "DistribuigSo da propriedade fundiSria rural no Estado de s2o Paulo, * 3oletim Geogrlfico (Rio de Janeiro), Ano III, No. 29 (August, 1945), 692-700. Rando, Guido Cesar. "A defesa da cultura cafeeira. Problems s gerais de irregag2o, “ Diarios Associados , Caderno 4°, pp. 8-9. Silva, Sebastiao Goncalves da. "Cambuhy. A mayor fazenda de caf€ do raundo, " D iarios Associados , Caderno 1°, pp. 4-5. Simonsen, Roberto. "Aspectos da hist5ria econfimica do caf£, " Revista do Arquivo Municipal (SSo Paulo), LXV, (March, 1940), 149-221. Sudario, Julio da Silva. Letter to the Editor, O Estado de SSo Paulo , September 6, 1953. Taunay, Affonso d'E. Necrology of Gavi3o Peixoto. Revista do Instituto Historico e Geogr^fico de s2o Paulo , XVII (1912), 485-87. Tosello, Rino Natal. "Irregag2o dos cafezaes, " Diarios Associados , Caderno 4°, p. 12. Other Sources Cambuhy. Series of personal interviews with Mr. A. H. Grossman. November 10, 1959 to May 30, 1960.

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371 Cambuhy. Interview with Mr. C. C. Landers. April 7, 1960. Cambuhy. Interview with Mr. B. R. Pheysey. April 8, 1960. Cambuhy. Interview with Mr. J. C. Scott. November 12, 1960. Cambuhy. Interview with Mr. E. J. Seddon. January 10, 1960. ItaquerS. Interview with 3r. Josi Carlos R^is de Magalh3es. November 15, 1959. MatSo. Interview with Sr. Alberto Benassi. April 29, 1960. Santos. Interview with Mr. R. E. Barham. February 11, 1960. SSo Paulo. Interview with Dr. Carlos GaviSo Monteiro. May 3, 1960. S3o Paulo. Interview with Sr. Carlos Rlis de MagalhSes. February 18, 1960 .

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH The author was bora in the City of Glasgow, Scotland, on May 14, 1935. He was educated in the same city at Albert High School, where he tvas both Junior and Senior Dux of the School and in his final year, Captain of the School. In 1953 he entered the University of Glasgow as a University Bursar and graduated from there in June, 1957, with the degree of M.A. with honors. (The four Scottish Universities do not offer bachelor's degrees according to tradition.) In September, 1957, the author commenced his graduate studies at the University of Florida, receiving the degree of M.A. in History and Economics in August, 195t>. Since that time, the author has done research in Mexico and Brazil. He has held fellowships from the College of Arts and Sciences and the Graduate School of the University of Florida. The author is a member of Phi Alpha Theta and Phi Kappa Phi. 372

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This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Director of the School of Inter-American Studies, the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. August, 1960