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Accelerated time among the aged

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Accelerated time among the aged a memory hypothesis
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Kelley, Norman Larry, 1945-
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Bibliography: leaf 79.
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by Norman L. Kelley.

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ACCELERATED TIME AMONG THE AGED: A MEMORY HYPOTHESIS


By

NORMAN L. KELLEY














A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY





UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


1980















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the members of my supervisory committee: Hugh C. Davis, Jr., Chairman, Wilse B. Webb, Nathan W. Perry, Jr., Harry A. Grater, Jr., and Lowell C. Hammer.

I am also greatly indebted to my wonderful parents for their encouragement and emotional support during my graduate training.















TABLE OF CONTENTS


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..........

ABSTRACT ..........

INTRODUCTION ........

Time .................
Learning ... ........
Hypothesis of Present Inv


METHOD


Apparatus and Stimuli
Subjects ............
Procedure .......

RESULTS .... ............

DISCUSSION .........

APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL DATA APPENDIX B: SUBJECT AUTHORIZAT APPENDIX C: INITIAL INSTRUCTIO APPENDIX D: RELATIVE DURATION APPENDIX E: INTERNAL REPRODUCT APPENDIX F: RECALL TASK . . . APPENDIX G: WAIS INFORMATION S APPENDIX H: WAIS VOCABULARY SU APPENDIX I: WAIS COMPREHENSION APPENDIX J: DEBRIEFING QUESTIO


Page


. . . . . . . . . . . . .



25
estigation ......... .. 36

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

. . . .. . . . . . . . . . 52

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

ION FORM . ........ .. 64

NS ... ........... 65

TASK .. .......... . 66

ION TASK . ........ .. 67

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

UBTEST .. ......... . 69

BTEST ... .......... . 71

SUBTEST ...... ..... 73

NNAIRE .. ......... . 75


iii










Page

APPENDIX K: EXPLANATION OF PURPOSE ... ........... . 76

APPENDIX L: DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE DATA . ....... . 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........ ...................... . 78

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ....... .................. 79














Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate
Council of the University of Florida in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


ACCELERATED TIME AMONG THE AGED: A MEMORY HYPOTHESIS By

Norman L. Kelley

June 1980

Chairman: Hugh C. Davis, Jr. Major Department: Psychology

Judgments of temporal duration were compared between young and older adults. The young group consisted of 77 university students between 18 and 25 while the older group was comprised of 53 non-institutionalized individuals at least 65 years of age. Two 100 second film segments were shown successively. A line estimation task was used to compare the relative durations of the two films and an interval reproduction task was used to recreate the experience of the duration of the second film segment. Recall of objects in the second film was measured. Significant differences in interval reproduction were found between the young and old group, the mean of the old group being 1/3 shorter than that of the young. Although the older group recalled significantly less than the young group, the hypothesis that recall is a significant determinant of









duration experience received only weak support, resulting from a significant correlation between recall and reproduced interval in the young group.














INTRODUCTION


Time

Time has long been the subject of man's curiosity,

Since the beginning of recorded history, poets and philosophers have attempted to unravel the mystique of temporal experience. The great philosopher Emmanuel Kant conceived time to be an "a priori" construction of the mind (Kant, 1788, in Ornstein, 1969), whereas John Locke hypothesized that time was derived from external occurrences and the succession of ideas (Locke, 1869, in Ornstein, 1969). Henri Bergson utilized Einstein's general relativity theory and derived a subjective relational schema (Bergson, 1920, in Ornstein, 1969).

With the birth of psychology in the late nineteenth century, the incipient concern with conscious experience led to speculation as to the nature of temporal phenomena. However, most of the empirical and theoretical work during this period lacked coherence. William James attempted to relate time to the decay of "brain traces" and to the "multitudinousness of memories" (James, 1890, in Ornstein, 1969). Titchener emphasized an introspective approach to time (Titchener, 1905, in Ornstein, 1969), whereas Wundt and several others devised various empirical experiments in










an attempt to uncover whether quantitative relationships such as Weber's Law were applicable to temporal experience. In 1891, Nichols wrote a scathing review of psychology's inadequate attempts to come to grips with the mystery of time, noting a plethora of ideas and speculation and a paucity of substance. "It has been declared a priori, innate, intuitive, empirical, mechanical. It has been deduced from within and without, from heaven and from earth and from several things difficult to imagine as of either" (Nichols, 1891, in Ornstein, 1969, pp. 16-17). It should be mentioned that one of the exceptions to the rather scattered efforts during this period was the work of Guyau (1890, in Ornstein, 1969), who pursuied a relationship between time and human information processing. However, the literature on temporal phenomena began to lose popularity with the mainstream of psychological pursuits, largely because of the broad but rather shallow conglomeration of ideas without much direction (Ornstein, 1969).

With Watson's (1924, in Ornstein, 1969) attack on
"mentalism" and the ensuing trend toward objectivity within psychology, research on perception as a whole and interest in time in particular waned significantly. It is, of course, understandable that this era of objectivity-oriented psychology lost interest in temporal phenomena, as there really is no immediate point from which a scientific analysis of time experience can begin. Nothing inherent within ourselves was










discovered which could apprehend "temporal stimuli." One cannot point to an organ of perception, such as the ear, or to physical parameters, as in the case with the continuum of wave-length and frequency associated with sound and light. Nor can a process in the external world be uncovered that gives rise to time experience. As Ornstein (1969, p. 17) succinctly points out: "It is, therefore, not too surprising that work on the experience of time would be so diverse, incoherent, and easily forgotten."

Research during the period from 1920-1950 continued to be scattered, lacking substance and direction. Investigations continued to be characterized by each researcher attempting to relate his speciality to the area of time, resulting in fragmentary one-shot efforts. Hence, Harton (1939, in Ornstein, 1969) studied the effects of "successful" and "failure" situations on time experience; Blakey (1934, in Ornstein, 1969), the "time-order" phenomenon; Benussi, the differences in coding stimuli series (Benussi, 1907, in Ornstein, 1969); Gardner investigated the time experience among hyper- and hypo-thyroid cases (Gardner, 1935, in Ornstein, 1969); and the list goes on. Woodrow (1951, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 18) summarized his work and others during this period: "The data that have accumulated in the illusive field of time perception show two outstanding characteristics. One is the conflicting nature of the findings of the different experimenters, the other is the mentalistic nature of the data."









Fortunately, there has been an increased concern with consciousness and experience within psychology during the past two decades. A rekindling of interest in research into the enigmatic area of time experience has been included in this trend. Impetus for this rebirth seems to have partly arisen out of Paul Fraisse's thorough review of research on time published in 1963, entitled The Psychology of Time. Covering the entire period of research in the preceding seventy-five years, Fraisse's historical review provided a foundation on which direction and analysis of temporal phenomena could be reborn. Following this, two additional volumes appeared which contained a collection of discussions on time dimensions in a variety of areas from biology to religion. These were Fischer's Interdisciplinary Perspectives of Time (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) and Fraser's The Voices of Time (1966, in Ornstein, 1969). More systematic research also began during this era, as exemplified by both Triesman (1963, in Ornstein, 1969) and Michon (1967, in Ornstein, 1969), who began in-depth analyses of the experience of brief intervals of time.

In 1969, Robert Ornstein published a work which reviewed previous time research and undertook an in-depth study of the specific area of temporal duration, including the presentation of several experiments within a theoretical framework involving information processing. This work pointed out con.ion errors in previous experimentation analyzing the experience of time and integrated research findings relevant




5



to temporal duration. In addition, Ornstein proceeded to a theoretical and empirical analysis of duration experience involving a cognitive information-processing approach which yielded strong evidence for a new model of duration based on memory storage. This excellent work is the primary source and motivation for the present research effort.

Ornstein believes that a primary reason for the abovementioned historical confusion and scattering of investigative efforts in time research has been a lack of demarcation of the variety of times of experience. The concept of time refers to many sorts of things, of which the whole dimension of experiential time is but one general form. Experiential time as a whole has been repeatedly confused with biological time and clock time in psychological research efforts, as has been the case in the past with physical, mathematical, and clock time confusion causing difficulties in the physical sciences. Psychological research has often attempted to determine how accurately "real" time is perceived. Reference is often made that someone has a "good sense of time" if they tend to be accurate with respect to the clock. However, such an approach implies that time involves a sensory process, and as a scientific concept it has been a major barrier to an adequate understanding of temporal experience. "Calling the clock of hours, minutes, and seconds 'real' time is like calling American money 'real' money. An analysis should be concerned with experiential time per se, not as it might relate to hours, days, burning rope or to some









other time definition. . . . As we ought to be careful not to confuse experiential time with other time, we ought not confuse the different modes of time experience with one another" (Ornstein, 1969, p. 20). This point cannot be over-emphasized.

Accordingly, Ornstein categorized four major varieties of time experience:

1. Short Time--the "immediate present"

a. Rhythm or "timing"

b. The perception of short intervals

2. Simultaneity and Succession

3. Temporal Perspective--philosophical, social,

and cultural constructions of the world and their effects on the interpretation of time

experience; the future

4. Duration--the past, long-term memory

Ornstein's (1969, p. 20) first category includes the present and short-term time. He describes the "immediate present" as "the time that is always now (or just then was now). This is the time of our most immediate contact with the world, very short, continually changing, fading away, forever being replaced by a new now." Research seems to have shown that such a conception of fleeting immediate present has conceptual validity. A fleeting and quickly decaying immediate memory process which is distinct from permanent memory has been demonstrated (Peterson and Peterson, 1959, in Ornstein, 1969). It has also been shown that such an









immediate memory has a rather low and fixed amount of information-processing capacity which is almost unaffected by training (Miller, 1956, in Ornstein, 1969). The length of this memory in terms of clock time seems to vary somewhat, but several investigators make the distinction of short-term time being three to five seconds whereas duration or long-term time is somewhere above ten seconds (Ornstein, 1969).

Two separate processes have been distinguished in the research on short time. "Timing" refers to the rhythmic motor aspect of time and has frequently been studied using sequential stimuli and a key-tapping response. Bell (1965, in Ornstein, 1969), for example, studied the effects of elevated body temperature on time estimation. His results indicated that body temperature increased preferred keytapping rate but had an insignificant effect on counting or verbal time judgments, and he concluded that "it may be that the rhythmic activity of time estimation methods has a greater susceptibility to changes in body temperature than the perceptual or intellectual aspects" (1969, p. 21). This illustrates the point that variables which seem to affect one aspect of time experience may not affect others, even within the same temporal subcategory. The "immediate apprehension" of brief intervals is the other process within the category of short time. This is usually studied by the presentation of short intervals with the response task being interval reproduction by various estimation methods (Ornstein, 1969).










A second category of time experience is that of simultaneity and succession. Somewhat akin to the "two-point threshold" of tactile stimulation, this category concerns the experience of whether or not two events are perceived to occur at the same time. Similar to the concept of resolution within physical optics, it is dependant on how fine the "grain" of experience is and is related to frame of reference. The concept of a "perceptual moment" is relevant here. It has been discovered that it takes approximately one-tenth of a second for the processing of input information, and it is suggested that this interval could form a potential neurophysiological foundation for the experience of the "present" and simultaneity. Other than that, this area has not been the subject of frequent empirical investigations and has tended to be a discussion topic of the psychologically minded philosophers such as Bergson (Ornstein, 1969).
Ornstein's third category is that of temporal perspective. This mode of time experience is largely culturally determined as different world views result in various temporal interpretations. Cultures less technologically advanced than ours often do not define precisely small time units (Nakamura, 1966, in Ornstein, 1969). For example, an Indian culture uses the time to boil rice as its basic unit of time. Thus, various cultures and their subgroups may be studied for differing conceptions of time which affects how their









members experience time. The future and "becoming" are included in this category (Ornstein, 1969).

Ornstein's last category is duration and is that aspect of time which he considers in depth. He describes it as "the continuing, persevering, time in which we live our lives." It is "our normal experience of time passing, of hours lengthening or shortening, of a recent event seeming 'a long time ago,' of one interval passing more quickly for one person than another or more quickly for one person at one instance than another" (Ornstein, 1969, pp. 21-22). Although short time is continuing, it is always evanescent whereas duration has some permanence and often entails the memory of things past through retrospection. Ornstein suggests that temporal experience may be classified according to memory: the present being a function of the short-term storage of primary memory and the past, duration, related to the long-term storage of secondary memory. Although each involves memory, the experiences of present and past will differ because not all that is in short-term storage constitutes what gets into long-term memory (Ornstein, 1969).

It is hoped that Ornstein's classifications of four major varieties of time experience as separate from other temporal categories will serve to clear up some of the confusion so frequent in the literature on time. In the past, seeming contradictions in the research may have partially resulted from a lack of specificity in terms of conditions and a "lumping together" of various temporal categories and processes. Hence,









some variables which affect one category or subcategory of time may affect others differently or not at all.

There are two basic approaches that have historically

been applied to the analysis of direct time experience. One has considered time as. a sensory process and the other has consisted of a cognitive information-processing approach.

The sensory process model considers time experience as if it were a sensory process similar to others such as hearing. This approach necessarily presupposes external time stimuli to be apprehended by an organ of sensation and the existence of "real" time independant of us. A number of biological and physiological theories have been put forth within this model and can be identified by their postulation of some type of "time base" which supposedly engenders internal time signals via some sort of repetitive pulse-dispensing mechanism. This "time base" is hypothetically linked with either a specific periodicity, usually termed a "time quantum," or a specific physiological, neurological, or chemical process, usually referred to as a biological clock or chronometer. The appeal of this approach lies in the simplification of the analysis of temporal experience to the perception of external stimuli. However, the confusion of the experience of time with clock or "real" time inherent in this sensory process model has seriously hampered the understanding of temporal experience (Ornstein, 1969).

Most of the "time base" theories associated with a

specific time interval deal with the "indifference interval" or the "perceptual moment" concept.











The "indifference interval" deals directly with the

accuracy of time estimation with clock time. Individuals are usually asked to estimate the duration of an interval by-reproduction, verbal, or magnitude estimation methods. A phenomenon frequently uncovered in this type of experimentation is the tendency to overestimate the duration below a certain interval and to underestimate above the interval. If time stimuli did exist and were perceived by a sensory process, the relationship between objective time and experiiential time would be important. Many theorists have felt that the direct correspondence accuracy of the "indifference interval" might represent a basic time quantum of experience. Although the interval was originally found to be approximately seven-tenths of a second, several subsequent studies found a great degree of variation (Fraisse, 1963). The various discrepant results seriously questioned the existence of such an interval, and the phenomenon seemed more likely to be an artifact resulting from various stimulus situations and measurement methodologies. Woodrow (1951, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 26) points out in his review that some investigators have " . . attempted to identify the indifference interval with the duration of some physiological event, such as the duration of the swing of the leg in walking or the time between two pulse beats . . . ," but Michon (1967, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 27) makes the point that









It remains less than evident, how processes which
have intrinsic periodicities close to the indifference point could serve as a "time base" unless we assume . . that they combine with all other
periodic and quasiperiodic processes in the organism into a general "clock form." This view
� may be philosophically valid, but it is
hardly a suitable point of departure for a quantitative analysis of the time sense.

But Ornstein (1969, p. 27) addresses the important underlying

issue:

The idea that a certain interval is important for
time experience merely because it is sometimes,
under certain conditions, estimated "accurately"
seems tobe fostered by the confusion of our arbitrary clock time of hours, minutes, and seconds,
with "real" time. An attempt to find a "time
basis" for duration experience in the period of
the indifference interval is based on the same
kind of confusion of our clock with a "real" time
which led farmers in the American midwest recently
to oppose daylight savings time because they felt
that the extra hour of sunlight would burn the grass.
The other specific interval frequency suggested as being

a "time base" is that of the "perceptual moment." Stroud

(1956, 1967, in Ornstein, 1969) and White (1963, in Ornstein,

1969) have suggested that all input information is integrated

and processed as a unit during a one-tenth second interval.

Even if the perceptual moment hypothesis is valid there

seems no clear logic on how this time base would relate to

duration experience, which involves memory of the entire
interval. However, it is possible that the 0.1 second interval could be relevant for the experience of simultaneity and

succession (Ornstein, 1969).

There are also several sensory process theories that

suggest a physiological, neurological, or chemical process









as the underlying mechanism providing a "time base" for an internal clock. Often termed "biological clocks," the concept is partly derived from studies of timing of lower organisms which appears largely environmentally independent. Within humans, there are circadian rhythms of sleep, body temperature, blood pressure, urine production, and so on. From the variety of internal periodic processes and rhythms, many theoreticians have attempted to force a link between these biological times and our experience of time. One example is the alpha rhythm of the EEG. Since the wavelength of the alpha happens to approximate the 0,1 second perceptual moment interval, Weiner (1948, in Ornstein, 1969) suggested that the alpha waves might serve as ticks of a biological clock. If a relationship between alpha waves and time experience could be found, it certainly would provide empirical evidence for the biological clock hypothesis. Conceptually, however, certain obstacles exist for the alpha wave theory. Since alpha activity is not always present, what could happen to time experience in its absence? And other than the fact that its wavelength approximates the "perceptual moment," there seems to be little other basis for its postulation as a "time base" (Ornstein, 1969).

In addition, just about every process which changes

during environmental manipulation has been called a "chronometer." Several investigators have attempted to manipulate the internal clock or chronometer and correlate the changes to time experience. This is often done physiologically by









changing body temperature or administering drugs, Fischer (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) administered psilocybin to experimental subjects and observed its effects on four physiological "chronometers." He found that while the drug lengthened duration experience, it decreased the Weber fraction for the taste sense, increased the preferred rate of finger tapping, increased handwriting size, and increased optical nystagmus. He concluded that "these clocks evidently do not run at the same rate . . " (Fischer, 1967, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 30). Of course, this and similar experiments raise several conceptual questions. It is important to clearly define the criteria in designated a process as a "chronometer," otherwise one must question the utility of the designation. If every physiological process is termed a chronometer, the concept is vitually useless (Ornstein, 1969).

Another "biological clock" theory was put forth by

Hoagland (1935, in Ornstein, 1969). He discovered that his wife's rate of counting seconds changed during a fever. After recording her estimates of subjective time and her body temperature, he maintained that time judgments are temperature dependent, and concluded that "a unitary chemical mechanism is probably basically determining these judgments" (Hoagland, 1935, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 32). Since then, several other investigators have attempted to study the effect of body temperature on time estimation. Although Beddeley (1966, in Ornstein, 1969) found a shortening of









duration experience within subjects whose body temperature had been lowered by cold water, other investigations yielded negative or inconclusive results (Fox et al., 1967; Kleber et al., 1953; Provins, 1963; Bell, 1965; all in Ornstein, 1969). Although the inconsistencies are attributed to methodological inadequacy or too weak a manipulation of the independent variable of temperature by some investigators, Ornstein (1969, p. 34) once again lends perspective to the confusion by addressing the underlying issue:

The argument is not that increases in body
temperature (or the speeding up of a "biological
clock" with a drug) do not lengthen time experience, but rather that these manipulations
are more parsimoniously considered as affecting
cognitive processing rather than altering one of the maze of possible "chronometers," heart
rate, tapping rate, body temperature, cell
metabolism, breath rate, etc.

In sum, therefore, the sensory process model has not provided any useful explanation of time experience. In fact, it has partially precluded a clearer understanding of temporal experience by its treatment of time as a sensory process with the inherent assumption of the existence of a "real time" to be apprehended by an internal time keeper within an organ or rooted in a periodic biological process., Although various aspects of this approach may be useful for other dimensions of temporal analysis, the confusion of time experience with clock time or biological time has remained a severe hindrance. Other research has indicated that a cognitive information-processing model for time experience is much more useful and parsimonious (Ornstein, 1969).









A variety of cognitive factors has been suggested as
influencing time experience, and a line of thinking involving information processing has gradually begun to emerge within time research. One of the first investigators to utilize a cognitive approach to the analysis of time experience was Guyau (1890, in Ornstein, 1969). He did not believe in the existence of time per se, but rather considered time to be a mental construction produced by various stimulus parameters from the occurrence of events taking place. Fraisse's (1963) review of time research found several studies which suggested that the "number of changes" in an interval is related to time experience. Hall and Jastrow (1886, in Ornstein, 1969) showed that an interval with many sounds was experienced as being longer than one with fewer. Roelofs and Zeaman's (1951, in Ornstein, 1969) data revealed that an increase in the number of stimuli presented within an interval lengthens the experience of duration. Frankenhauser's (1959, in Ornstein, 1969) analysis led him to suggest that the "mental content" within an interval is a primary determinant of duration experience, as his investigation showed that duration experience lengthened with more metronomic beats presented in an interval. Matsuda (1966, in Ornstein, 1969) showed that an increase in the number of 0.1 second clicks in an interval also lengthened duration. In the area of short time, Michon (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) developed a very sophisticated quantitative analysis of temporal experience.









His results indicated that changes in rhythmic activity are related only to information processing.

The general result of many of these investigations

utilizing a cognitive approach has been that an increase in "mental content" or stimuli within an interval lengthens the subjective experience of duration. Therefore, the essence of a cognitive model is that the quantity of information registered in consciousness is the primary determinant of duration experience. Ornstein characterizes this approach by calling it the "input register" theory, as it is a variety of a short-term storage theory in which an "input register" would monitor and measure cognitive informational input which would serve as the primary basis of duration (Ornstein, 1969).

Such an "input register" approach seems to integrate

the "biological clock" and cognitive models of time experience by dealing with the data more parsimoniously. It can account for the data such as Frankenhauser's (1959, in Ornstein, 1969) which involve the lengthening of duration experience with the presentation of an increased quantity of stimuli in an interval. It can also explain experimental results which involve an increased experience of duration with the administration of various drugs, such as Fischer's investigation involving psilocybin. Previously interpreted as speeding up a clock or chonometer, the "input register" approachwould hold that such drugs increase perceptual










awareness which effectively increases input quantity, resulting in lengthened duration (Ornstein, 1969).

Although the input register model adequately accounts for most of the research results involving duration experience, there is one phenomenon for which it cannot offer an adequate explanation. Often referred to as the "time-order error" in psychophysics, it involves the presentation of two successive and equal intervals of stimuli. The estimation of the length of the first interval is frequently judged relatively shorter than the second interval. The input register approach cannot account for this body of data as the short-term storage content of the "register" would theoretically be identical for each interval. The importance of relative subjective duration apparently shortening over time is underscored by Frankenhauser (1959, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 39):

In respect of subjective time, . . . the discrepancy between the immediate perception and
retention of time is not an error caused by
methodological inadequacies which we want to
eliminate, but rather a typical expression of
the phenomenon we want to study.

Since duration is an experience which involves the memory of an entire interval, a short-term storage model such as the input-register approach would not have the capacity for preserving the input of many intervals, thus requiring the input to be stored somewhere for later retrieval. Although Frankenhauser apparently was the first to suggest a definite connection between duration experience and retention, it









remained for Ornstein to develop a definitive long-term storage model of duration experience. Termed the "storage" approach, it differs from the input register model in that it is explicitly a long-term memory theory. Therefore, it can account for all the data explained by the input register approach as well as those of time-order (Ornstein, 1969).

Essentially an information-processing cognitive model

of duration experience involving long-term memory, Ornstein's storage approach assumes that duration is a mental concept constructed out of the contents of memory storage. Furthermore, Ornstein believes that in addition to the actual information in storage being important, how that information is stored is equally significant. His theory utilizes general information-processing computer concepts and terminology to relate the experience of duration of a given interval to the size and nature of the storage space for that interval:

In the storage of a given interval, either increasing the number of stored events or the complexity of those events will increase the size of storage,
and as storage size increases the experience of
duration lengthens. . . . The same amount of
information or "mental content" can, stored differently, subtend different storage sizes depending upon the way in which it was "chunked" and
laid down. (Ornstein, 1969, pp. 41-42)

This "storage" approach essentially differs from the "input register" approach in that it considers duration to be a function of the nature of the information remaining in memory storage rather than simply the informational input registered during the interval. Since memory retention is









more like a sieve than a safe as is thoroughly chronicled by classical "memory retention curves," the content of memory tends to decay over time. Thus, in the time-order phenomenon, it can be assumed that the information in storage of the first interval decays somewhat, resulting in a reduction of stored information and a shortening of time experience in relation to the second interval. In addition to explaining the data from time-order research, the storage theory also predicts that factors relating to memory and not input would influence duration experience (Ornstein, 1969).

In his theory, Ornstein (1969, p. 40) repeatedly

stresses the following points relevant to an analysis of duration experience:

We replace the "time sense" metaphor with a
"concept of time" similar to our concepts of
order and chaos, one formed out of the immediate
data of experience. Duration may then be studied
without reference to any sort of external clock,
"biological," "chemical" or the ordinary mechanical clock. The experience of duration of a
given interval may be meaningfully compared only
with other experiences.

The storage approach to duration experience seems to be able to deal with the body of research data in a more adequate and parsimonious manner than previous models. A brief look at research on duration from the perspective of the storage information-processing follows.

Previously mentioned research has led to a general finding that an increase in perceived stimuli within an interval leads to lengthened duration experience. Conversely, it is interesting to look at the results of studies involving









sensory deprivation. Both Banks and Cappon (1962, in Ornstein, 1969) and Vernon and McGill (1963, in Ornstein, 1969) concluded that time experience is shortened in sensory deprivation and reduced input conditions, although methodologies involving clock time comparisons weaken the validity of the results.

In a similar fashion, the storage approach would predict that various drugs which increase awareness and sensitivity to stimuli would result in more input reaching consciousness and a concomitant increase in storage size. Therefore, stimulant and psychedelic drugs should lengthen duration experience while sedative drugs should presumably shorten experienced time. Research by Goldstone et al. (1958, in Ornstein, 1969) and Frankenhauser (1959, in Ornstein, 1969) support this contention. Experimentation by the former found that duration experience lengthened with the administration of an amphetamine relative to a placebo. Frankenhauser found a statistically insignificant increase in duration experience with an amphetamine relative to a control and a significant increase in relation to the sedative pentobarbital. Additionally, he discovered that the stimulant caffein significantly lengthened duration experience.

The results of numerous studies on the effects of

psychedelic drugs all indicate a lengthening of time relative to ordinary drug-free experience. Subjects in Bromberg's (1934, in Ornstein, 1969) experiment allexperienced expanded duration under the influence of marijuana. More striking









cognitive effects have been reDorted with the major psychedelics such as psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide, LSD. Fischer's (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) previously mentioned study involving the administration of psilocybin found duration experience to be lengthened. Similarly, Ostfeld (1961, in Ornstein, 1969), Fischer et al. (1962, in Ornstein, 1969), and Masters and Houston (1966, in Ornstein, 1969) report increased duration under the influence of LSD. Purpura (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) believes that the reticular activating system (RAS) is influenced by the LSD. The RAS is often conceived as an "input filter" which selects sensory input. Hypothetically, the action of LSD on the RAS may serve to reduce the filtration by opening normally closed neuronal "gates." Fischer (1966, in Ornstein, 1969) presents physiological data involving increased rates of neuronal transmission and cortical neuronal firing under the influence of psychedelic drugs.

Therefore, the research in the area of the effects of

drugs on duration experience is consistent with an informationprocessing storage model. In general, then, whether the input stimuli are manipulated per se, such as in sensory deprivation, or the perception of it modified by awarenessincreasing chemical agents, the changes in duration experience can be accounted for by the cognitive storage model. This is especially true when duration experience is shortened with the passage of time as evidenced in the time-order phenomenon.








Ornstein proceeded to significantly bolster the storage

approach by carrying out several rather ingenious experiments, published in his book On the Experience of Time (1969). Some of the experiments demonstrated that stimulus complexity is positively related to duration experience. This is predicted by the storage approach theory as it presumably takes more "storage space" to store increasingly complex events as they involve more stimulus information. Conversely, Ornstein also demonstrated that increasingly efficient coding of a stimulus situation leads to shortened duration experience, as storage size is a function of an active coding process as well as the input stimulus array. Additional experiments have unequivocably demonstrated that the crucial factor determining duration experience is the amount of cognitive storage occurring during an interval. First, Ornstein was able to arrange stimulus conditions so that some individuals forget more than others, with the results indicating that duration experience co-varied with the amount recalled. Finally, with identical stimulus input situations, he manipulated the way in which the information in the interval was coded and stored after the interval was over. Once again, the results demonstrated that duration experience co-varies with storage size. Since no manipulations were carried out during the interval, the altered storage size is the only conceivable explanation for the effect on duration experience (Ornstein, 1969).









The storage information-processing model is an interesting and convincing approach to duration experience that lends a greater understanding of the phenomena and leads to future exploration in several areas, Of particular interest to this author is the possibility of an interrelationship between age, memory, and the experience of temporal duration, and especially the effects of old age on duration experience. It is hoped that this investigation will yield data that will increase knowledge in this area, possibly suggesting a relationship bemteen hypothesized changes in temporal experience among the aged and concomitant memory decrement, and whether or not any relationship between age and duration experience can be adequately explained by the storage model.

Although there has been a lot of discussion involving the apparent acceleration of time among the aged, the research investigating the phenomenon has failed to yield conclusive results. Surwillo (1964) rejected the hypothesis that time is "perceived" to move at a faster rate among the aged. However, Goldstone et al. (1958) found that an older group with a median age of 69.5 years reported significantly shorter time intervals than did a younger group whose median age was 24.0 years when asked to estimate thirty seconds by counting. Likewise, Feifel (1957) found that the mean estimates of intervals ranging from thirty to three hundred seconds were significantly shorter among a group of aged individuals when compared to a much younger group, These disparate results may, in part, be a function of the various









assumptions and experimental methodologies utilized by the researchers. More importantly, most previous research has dealt with comparisons to "real" or clock time. As previously mentioned, this is a serious methodological flaw when studying experiential time, as more meaningful data regarding duration lengthening or shortening requires direct comparisons between the relative experiences of two intervals. However, it is important to recognize that some of the existing research does lend support to the concept of shortened duration experience among the aged,

Learning, Memory, and Aging

The issue of memory decrement is subsumed under the more general deterioration of cognitive processes frequently observed among the aged. Unfortunately, cognitive abilities such as memory are very complicated topics, especially when the effects of age are considered. Such complexities are illustrated by the difficulty in differentiating learning and memory. If memory is poor, there is little indication that learning has taken place. Conversely, if learning is poor, there will be little memory. In fact, this interdependence makes it impossible to operationally distinguish learning and memory other than by convention (Botwinick, 1978). According to Craik (1977, in Botwinick, 1978, p. 261), this difficulty is because "'learning' and 'memory' must rely on the same underlying mechanism....

Nevertheless, a distinction between learning and memory is made for convenience, and it is based on the degree of









organization involved in the processing of input information, Two conceptual categories of memory have been suggested, one of which may be considered learning. Episodic memory is based on the memory of specific aspects of episodes or events, and is often considered rote learning. Remembering whether or not you witnessed a double play in the last baseball game you watched would be an example of episodic memory. However, the conceptual meaning of a "double play" and related items is well understood by a baseball fan, and is an example of the meaningful organization of information involved in semantic memory. Semantic memory tends to be long-term memory whereas episodic memory does not, primarily because of the active processing and meaningful organization that semantic memory requires (Botwinick, 1978).

Historically, learning research in psychology primarily entailed rote or stimulus-response paradigms throughout the 1940s and 1950s. An emphasis on memory in the 1960s was an outgrowth of the previous learning data and primarily consisted of studies involving episodic memory. Not until the late 1960s and 1970s did the trend of research move toward cognitive information processing and semantic memory. This trend saw a change in emphasis of the role of the individual from a passive responder to environmental stimulation to an active processor of stimuli involving selection, organization, and integration. Research involving the aged has followed this general trend and studies involving information processing and semantic memory have only recently









begun. Interestingly, many commonly held assumptions involving learning and memory among the aged are being openly challenged and several basic issues are being rethought as a result (Botwinick, 1978).

In the past, it was largely accepted that learning

ability declined with advancing age. Currently, however, this topic is very controversial and remains unsettled. The controversy focuses around the distinction that is made between learning as an internal process and performance as an external act. It is often inferred that learning ability is poor if there is little improvement in performance. However, such a conclusion may be inaccurate because performance may be affected by various non-cognitive factors. Poor conditions, little motivation, or poor perceptual sensitivity are examples of elements that may result in poor performance independent of learning ability. As Botwinick (1978, p. 263) emphasizes ". . much of what had been thought of as a deficiency in the internal cognitive process is now seen as a difficulty older people have in adapting to the task and demonstrating what they know."

Although the issue of learning decrement with advancing age remains unsettled, there is little disagreement regarding deficits in performance in later life. In fact, the role of age in performance is so significant that the whole concept and measurement of intelligence has necessitated a built-in age compensation factor. For example, if a twenty-five year old and seventy-five year old make identical









scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the actual performance of the older person is significantly poorer than the younger individual, so that a conversion of scaled scores entails offsetting an approximate difference of forty-two full-scaled points (Wechsler, 1955, in Botwinick, 1978). A "classic aging pattern" is commonly observed in which verbal abilities show relatively little deficit with advancing age whereas psychomotor abilities decline significantly. On the Wechsler intelligence test, this pattern is demonstrated by scores on the verbal subtests being generally maintained with increasing age while the performance subtest scores decline significantly. The ability of such tests to discriminate among age groups is termed "age-sensitive" measures, whereas those tests which are not sensitive to the aging process are labeled "age-insensitive." "This classic aging pattern of Verbal insensitive and Performance sensitive test scores has been demonstrated many times and now constitutes one of the best replicated results in the aging literature" (Botwinick, 1978, p. 213).

It is very intresting in this regard that a deviation in this "classic aging pattern" in the form of an added decrement in verbal abilities among the aged may well be an indication of organic brain disease. This raises the important and controversial issue of normal versus abnormal aging. There are basically two opposing views regarding cognitive deterioration in the aging process. One holds that senile psychosis is the inevitable result of the normal










aging process if one lives long enough, whereas the opposing view is that senile psychosis is a degenerative state distinct from normal aging. While the former was most generally accepted in the past, the latter view is currently gaining favor. However, a lack of sufficient data at this time precludes definitive conclusions (Botwinick, 1978).

The important role of verbal abilities in psychosis

has been demonstrated in several studies and it is apparent that verbal skills tend to decline with organic psychosis in later life.

From the view that normal and abnormal aging
are two different phenomena, it could be concluded
that disruption of verbal skills reflects damage
to crucial sections of the brain that in themselves, apart from problems of perceptualintegrative functions, constitute the main basis
of psychosis. (Botwinick, 1978, p. 218)

In regard to intelligence, the mathematical methods of factor analysis and principal component analysis have been utilized to organize the data in aging studies in order to describe the constellations of intelligence that characterize older people and to determine whether or not such constellations change with age. A sunmary of the results from a variety of studies indicates that general overall ability, rather than any specific ability, is what primarily distinguishes one person from another, whether they are young or old. In addition to general ability, many studies have identified constellations of verbal and perceptual factors, with the perceptual factors clearly being affected by sensory










decrement concomitant with advancing age. A most interesting finding, however, is that

.hen differences in intellectual organization
are found in people of different age, the
differences tend to center around memory. In
advanced age . . . individual differences in
memory ability account for the degree of success on a variety of tasks. (Botwinick, 1978, p. 221)

Younger people tend to be more similar to each other in memory function. Therefore, memory function seems to be an important factor which tends to distinguish the young and aged (Botwinick, 1978).
An important point uncovered by Birren and Morrison

(1961, in Botwinick, 1978) in research on the organization of intelligence in relation to age is the role of education in intelligence. Their results indicate that the amount of education an individual has had is more important than his age in regard to mental ability. And since older people tend to have fewer years of schooling, failure to control for the effects of education in aging research may artifactually exaggerate the decremental effects of aging on intelligence (Botwinick, 1978).
Human memory is an extremely complicated and enigmatic area. A variety of theories and models have been postulated in an attempt to better understand the process. A controversy began in in the early 1960s concerning whether or not there was more than one mechanism involved in memory. Basically, proponents of the one-mechanism approach believe that both short- and longer-term memory operate by the same









mechanisms; hence short- and long-term recall are on the same qualitative continuum with distinctions made only for convenience. Although this general view is still held by some theoreticians, the majority of investigators have abandoned the single mechanism concept and currently favor the "dual process" position. This approach states that two distinct memory mechanisms exist which qualitatively differentiate short- and long-term memory and recall. Primary memory is considered to be an evanescent short-term memory, while more durable long-term memory is labeled secondary memory, Waugh and Norman (1965, in Botwinick, 1978) were the first major proponents of this "dual process" approach, Subsequently, some investiagors have even espoused multimechanism approaches involving more than two basic processes. Often, these approaches involve what has been labeled "sensory memory," a process which is considered more akin to perception than memory by many researchers (Botwinick, 1978).

Primary memory is considered to be a relatively temporary memory of what has just occurred in the immediate present. The span of primary memory is of limited capacity and is usually measured by digit span or similar methods, The number of digits an individual can accurately repeat is considered the extent of primary memory, and the material is usually not available for recall even a few seconds later, unless it gets stored in secondary memory. Of course, a short string of digits can be in both primary-and secondary memory









at the same time, but a long string of digits, say more than fifteen, can only be in secondary memory. Research has demonstrated that old and young people differ very little in primary memory if they differ at all (Botwinick, 1978).

Secondary memory is much more important thanprimary memory in our daily lives. Secondary memory is a more durable and longer-lasting memory. What characterizes secondary memory is that it involves meaningful cognitive processing, often referred to as semantic elaboration. It is generally considered that

The very process of organizing information is thought synonymous with placing it in memory;
the greater the processing the longer term
the recall. Another way of saying this is that how accurate a memory is, and how long it lasts, depends on how much cognitive work is performed
on the information when first experienced.
Apparently, cognitive work even without intention
to learn makes for relatively good memory,
(Botwinick, 1978, p. 323)
The information-processing approach previously discussed is clearly present.
Some investigators believe that what is referred to as secondary memory is characterized-by the nature of the processing and not the length of the memory which, according to Craik (1977, in Botwinick, 1978), may last for thirty seconds to years. It is this active processing, organization, and integration with previously learned material that makes the information meaningful, and is the reason secondary memory is often referred to as a semantic memory (Botwinick, 1978).









It is interesting that research has shown that secondary memory is much poorer among older people when compared to younger people (Botwinick, 1978). Apparently, the various processing and organizing skills which characterize secondary memory either deteriorate with age or are not spontaneously available to the aged. The general approach of research in this area has been to compare recall performances of various groups of both young and aged individuals who have been given different instructions. Some groups, called intentional learners, are given directions to study and remember the presented information. Other groups, called incidental learners, are not specifically told to learn and remember the information but are given directions that would vary the amount of cognitive processing to be performed, The general results of these studies have shown that recall improves in both age groups as the extent of processing increases, but that the amount of improvement is greater in the young. The groups of intentional learners performed best in regard to recall and also reflected the greatest age differences. Eysenck (1974, in Botwinick, 1978) interpreted these results as demonstrating that the aged are less able to utilize increased opportunities for semantic processing, which he referred to as a processing-deficit hypothesis. The research also suggests that the role of education is an important factor in this regard. Although most aged people do not seem to use cognitive organization skills spontaneously, the









highly educated elderly tend to utilize such strategies without assistance (Botwinick, 1978).

It should be mentioned that some researchers believe

that there is a longer-term memory which involves different processes than secondary memory. Clinical and laboratory observations have indicated that the aged retain old memories better than new ones. Some investigators claim this is due to different abilities being involved in a long-term memory. Currently, however, most researchers believe this observation is due to the old memories having been processed better, and it is the extent and depth of the processing in secondary memory that determines the length of memory duration. Of course, there are many difficulties involved in scientifically studying memory that is of many years duration. This is especially true when comparing the young and the aged, as the age of the subject and age of the memory become confounded (Botwinick, 1978).
Most people suffer memory impairments in later life. A major question in aging research is whether memory deficits primarily result from problems of storage or impairment of retrieval mechanisms. If the problem is storage the information is simply no longer available. If there is a retrieval problem, the information is available but not accessible, as retrieval is the access mechanism. This issue is studied in part by different methods of measuring memory. Recall measurement is thought to involve both the search and retrieval of information in storage,









whereas recognition memory is thought to bypass retrieval as it only requires matching information in storage with that presented to the individual. A related method involves aiding memory by cues or hints. If the cue is successful, then it is clear that the information exists in storage but that the retrieval mechanisms are not adequate (Botwinick, 1978).

The general results in this area of aging research

suggest that both retrieval and storage mechanisms may be responsible for memory loss among the aged, although recall performance is more age-related than recognition performance Ingenious experiments have been devised which demonstrate that aged subjects take significantly longer to search their memory than do younger subjects. This single factor, which may be both symptom and partial cause of the "classic aging pattern," serves to illustrate the nature of the complexities involved in such research. The longer search time required by older people not only affects results of timed tasks, it also becomes a progressive disadvantage when there is more information to serach, resulting in more opportunities for interference and distraction. And much of the literature involving interference phenomena seems to indicate greater interference effects on the elderly, especially when it occurs soon after learning (Botwinick, 1978).
The preceding discussion of some of the more salient

issues involved in research pertaining to time, memory, and










the aged serves to indicate the complexities and wide range of problems that are frequently encountered. The methodology employed in the following research is a direct outgrowth of many of these issues.

Hypothesis of Present Investigation

Specifically, the present study is designed to determine whether there are significant differences in the experience of temporal duration between young and aged people. Previous research done in the area of time and age has led to conflicting results. This lack of consistency seems to have partly arisen out of conceptual and methodological inadequacies which frequently confused experienced time with "clock" time and which often failed to precisely specify the particular category of time being studied.

Secondly, if differences inthe experience of time are

found to exist between the young and aged, the present study will ascertain whether or not such differences can be at least partially attributed to differences in memory. Although memory has recently been indicated as an important factor in the experience of duration (Kelley, 1975; Ornstein, 1969), it has not been investigated in relation to duration experience among an aged population.














METHOD


Apparatus and Stimuli
The stimuli for the experiment were two super 8 film segments of 100 seconds each. The first film segment consisted of 40 faces, each shown for 45 frames and having a duration of 2.5 seconds. Following the first film segment of faces, the words "End 1st Flim" followed by "Begin 2nd Film" were presented on the film and totaled 6 seconds in duration. The second film segment followed immediately and contained 40 easily recognizable objects, consisting of eight objects from each of five different categories: animals, transportation vehicles, fruit, tools, and clothing articles. One object was shown for each of the five different groups in succession. Again, each object was shown for 45 frames and a duration of 2.5 seconds each.

A Kodak 477 Moviedeck was utilized to project the film. A Panasonic RQ-309AS cassette audio tape recorder was used to name the objects shown in the second film segment. A Sensor digital chronograph watch was used to measure the subjects' reproduction of their experienced duration of the second film segment.









Subjects
Two differently aged groups of subjects were utilized.

The young group consisted of 77 University of Florida students ranging in age from 18 to 25 who participated in the experiment to fulfill a partial requirement for various introductory psychology courses. The older group consisted of 53 individuals at least 65 years of age and were obtained from various housing projects and organizations in both Gainesville and Dunedin, Florida. They were each given two dollars compensation for their participation. Both groups were told that the investigation involved individual differences in memory recall but were unaware that time judgments were also involved.


Procedure
Both the young and aged groups were involved in the same experimental procedure. Subjects were run in agesegregated groups of up to 10 people at a time. Individuals were given a 10-page response booklet and began their participation by signing a research consent form on the first page. The form gave a general description of the experiment: "The purpose of this experiment is to ascertain individual differences regarding memory. The general procedural involves watching two short films, measuring recall, completing three subtests and a questionnaire" (Appendix B).

After signing the consent form, subjects filled out the demographic heading on page 2. They then read the









following instructions: "You are going to be shown two short but separate film segments in succession. The first segment consists of several faces. There will be a short blank period separating the first film segment from the second. The second film segment consists of easily recognizable things, and each object will be named as it is shown. At a later point, you will be asked to remember as many of the objects from the second film as you can. Are there any questions?" All questions were answered at this point. The instructions continued: "After both film segments are shown and the lights are turned on, please turn the page and begin the next task" (Appendix C). The lights were then turend out and the film shown. The tape recorder was manually synchronized with the second film segment and labeled the objects shown. Immediately after the film ended, the lights were turned on and the subjects were told to turn the page and read the instructions for the duration estimation task.
The instructions read as follows: "Read the following instructions carefully. If necessary, read them a second time. Let Line A represent the length of time duration which you experienced the first film segment of faces to be. Draw a Line B to represent the length of time duration which you experienced the second film segment of labeled objects to be in comparison to the first film segment. For example, if you experienced the duration of the second film segment to be half as long as the first, draw Line B half









as long as Line A. If you experienced the second film segment to be equivalent in duration, draw Line B equal in length to Line A. If you experienced the second film segment twice as long as the first, draw Line B twice the length of Line A. Measurement points have been marked to help you accurately report your experience anywhere within the range. Most importantly, I am solely concerned with your EXPERIENCE of the relative durations of the two film segments, and NOT how accurate you can be to the actual relative durations. If there are any questions, ask the experimenter before competing the task. Do not turn the page until instructed to do so. Please look up when you are finished" (Appendix D).

When all were finished with the line drawing task, they were instructed to turn the page and read the following instructions: "For the next task, you will be blindfolded. I want you to recreate your experience of the length of the second film segment. After I say "Begin," let time pass, and when you feel that an interval of time has passed that is equal to the length you experienced the second film segment, raise your hand, lower it, and wait for instructions to remove your blindfold. Once again, I'm not interested in how accurate you are, what I am interested in how accurately you can recreate your experience of the length of the second film segment. Are there any questions?" (Appendix E). Questions were answered, and the following verbal instructions were read before the task









began: "Do this for the second film segment of the labeled objects only, NOT the faces film. Hold your hand up at least five seconds." The digital chronograph was started upon the word "BEGIN" after all subjects were blindfolded. The times were recorded as each subject raised his hand. After all subjects in the group had raised their hand, they were instructed to remove their blindfolds and turn to the next page.
Before reading the instructions on the following page

for the recall task, the experimenter read these directions: "Starting with this page, take as much time as you like and when you finish with each page, go on to the next. Ignore the printed instructions not to turn the page until told to do so. However, once you have turned a page you are not permitted to go back to it. Take as much time as you like to finish the booklet. When you have completely finished the booklet, you are free to leave. If you have any questions at any time, please ask me."
The subjects then began reading the instructions on page 5: "Please list as many objects that were shown in the second film segment as you can remember. Try to use the name that was presented with the object if possible, although a similar term which accurately describes the object will be OK. Take your time and don't stop until you feel you absolutely cannot remember any more items" (Appendix F). Subjects then completed the recall task, the Information, Vocabulary, and Comprehension WAIS verbal









subtests, and the debriefing questionnaire at their own pace (Appendices G-J). The three WAIS subtests yielded a verbal I.Q. estimate which was utilized to assess general verbal functioning primarily among older subjects and, among all subjects, to ascertain if any correlation existed between estimated I.Q. and time estimation. The debriefing questionnaire served to determine if subjects had any difficulties during the procedure, to check for medical problems or medications that might affect their responses, and to obtain additional information within subjects in regard to personal strategies regarding memory and time judgments.

The final page of the response booklet consisted of

a brief explanation of purpose (Appendix K). I-Then subjects finished and turned in the booklet, the experimental procedure was completed.














RESULTS


The basic data derived from the subjects involved in the experiment are presented in Appendix A. The young group consisted of 77 subjects ranging in age from 18 to 25, the average age being 19.23 years. The old group was comprised of 53 individuals between 65 and 85 years of age with a mean of 72.15 years.

First, the mean amounts of recall were calculated for each group. The young group recalled an average of 22.5 items while the old group recalled an average of 14.8. An F-test was then performed to test for homogeneity of variance. This assumption having been satisfied, a t-test yielded a t-value of 7.5 with 128 df, indicating the recall means differed at an .0005 level of significance. These results are presented in Table I. In addition, a frequency distribution of the amount recalled in each group is shown in Figure 1.
Next, the mean duration estimates of each group were calculated. The younger group's reproduction of their experience of the duration of the second film segment averaged 79.3 seconds, while the average interval reproduced by the older group was 50.0 seconds. An F-test was then used to test for the homogeneity of variance. This








TABLE I
BETWEEN-GROUP COMPARISONS OF EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES


Pooled Variance Estimate Separate Variance Estimate
Standard Two-Tail Two-Tail Two-Tail Variable Group Mean Deviation F-Value Prob. T-Value D.F. Prob. T-Value D.F. Prob.


Young 22.4935 5.668
Recall. 1.10 0.6990 7.50 128 0.0005 7.44 108.43 0.0005
Old 14.7547 5.942

Interval Young 79.2597 33.691 Time rva Y 9.297.691 1.51 '0.i160 5.251 128 0.0005 5.45 124.36 0.0005
Old 49.9623 27.411


Line Young 10.2610 2.819
1.78 0.0220 -1.28 128 0.2040 -1.21 90.80 0.2280 Length Old 10.9981 3.756


Young 13.0260 1.076
Education 7.85 0.0005 2.09 128 0.0380 1.81 61.21 0.0750
Old 12.2453 3.012

Estimated Young 111.2727 8.693 Verbal 4.95 0.0005 -1.44 128 0.1510 -1.27 66.60 0.2070 I.Q. Old 114.8868 19.335

















F7 F


~1


1 2 3 4 5 I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40


recall----+


YOUNG GROUP N = 77


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 recall---+ OLD GROUP N = 53


Figure 1. Frequency distribution of recall









criterion having been fulfilled, a t-test was performed which resulted in a t-value of 5.25 with 128 df, indicating the intervals reproduced by the young and old groups differed at the .0005 level of significance (Table I).

The data from the line length response were tabulated next. In this task, individuals compared their experience of the duration of the second film segment to their experience of the length of the first film, which was represented by a 10-cm line. The average length of the lines drawn by the young subjects was 10.3 cm, while the average among the older group was 11.0 cm. An F-test performed on the variances indicated the homogeneity of variance assumption could not be met. Therefore, a separate variance estimate was calculated and a t-test performed. A t-value of -1.21 with 90.8 df indicated that the mean line lengths of the young and old group did not differ significantly (Table I). In addition, t-tests were performed to ascertain whether the mean line lengths of each group differed significantly from the standard 10 cm line used to represent the length of the first film segment. T-values of .8071 with 76 df for the young group and 1.916 with 52 df indicated that the mean line lengths of both groups were not significantly different from the standard line.

With regard to educational levels, the average grade completed by the younger group was 13.0 whereas the older group averaged 12.2. An F-test for homogeneity of variance indicated homogeneity could not be assumed. A separate








variance estimate was then calculated and a t-test performed. This yielded a t-value of 1.81 with 61.2 df, indicating that the educational levels between the two groups did not differ significantly (Table I).

Likewise, the results indicated that the groups did not differ significantly on the variable of estimated verbal IQ. The mean verbal IQ estimate was 111.3 for the younger group and 114.9 for the older group. An F-test for the homogeneity of variance indicated the assumption could not be met. Therefore, a separate variance estimate was calculated and a t-test performed. The result of this computation yielded a t-value of -1.27 with 66.6 df which is not statistically significant (Table I).

The next stage of the analysis consisted of computing Pearson correlations between the five variables of recall, interval time, line length, education and estimated verbal IQ. These correlations were computed within each group and for all subjects combined, and are presented in Table II. Two-tailed tests of significance were used for these correlations as the directional nature that the correlations would take was generally unknown beforehand. The only exception was that one-tailed tests of significance were used for the correlations between recall and interval time, as previous research has indicated the positive direction of the relationship between these two variables (Kelley, 1975).










TABLE II
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES


Variables Correlation Significance


Recall/ITa Recall/LLb Recall/EDc Recall/IQd IT/LL IT/IQ IT/ED ED/IQ ED/LL IQ/LL


Recall/IT Recall/LL Recall/ED Recall/IQ IT/LL IT/IQ IT/ED ED/IQ ED/LL IQ/LL


Young Group

.2029

- .0036

.1856 .2256 .0075 .2847 .1225 .1723 .0064

-.0559


(N = 77)


.0384 f NSg NS

.0490 NS .0120 NS NS NS NS


Old Group (N = 53)

.!0225

.70265 .4665 .4353 .1135 .2171 .2211 .5962

-.0001 -.0341


NSf NS

.0005 .0010 NS

NS NS .0005 NS NS










TABLE II--Continued


Variables Correlation Significance


Both Groups Combined (N = 130)

Recall/IT .3348 .00005f Recall/LL -.0528 NS Recall/ED .3760 .00050 Recall/IQ .2045 .02000 IT/LL -.0012 NS IT/IQ .1441 NS IT/ED .2135 .01500 ED/IQ .4779 .00050 ED/LL -.0188 NS IQ/LL -.0254 NS IT/IDe -.4206 .00050 alT = Interval time

bLL = Line length

CED = Education

dIQ = Estimated verbal IQ

e ID = Age defined by group membership fOne-tailed significance test gNS = not significant









Of primary interest for this investigation are the

correlations between recall and the two duration experience response measures of line length (LL) and interval time

(IT). These results indicate insignificant correlations between recall and line length in the young group, the old group and for all subjects combined. The correlations between recall and interval time were statistically significant in the young group (r=.203) and for all subjects combined (r=.335), but not for the old group (r=.023). However, after correlations were computed between age and the variables of recall and interval time for all subjects, the age factor was then partialled out of the correlation between recall and interval time. This reduced the correlation between recall and interval time to r=.135 for all subjects, which is statistically insignificant.

There was also a significant correlation between IQ

and interval time in the young group (r=.284). The factor of recall was then partialled out leaving a significant correlation of r=.251. The correlation between IQ and interval time was r=.217 in the old group and r=.144 for all subjects combined, both insignificant. When the effect of recall was partialled out of this correlation for all subjects, the resultant correlation was reduced to r=.082.

Finally, scatter plots were constructed for all correlations in each group and all subjects combined to look more closely at the relationships between the abovementioned variables. This was done to assess whether a





51


non-linear relationship might exist in some cases in spite of the absence of a linear correlation. Close inspection of these scattergrams did not yield evidence suggesting the existence of any non-linear relationships.














DISCUSSION


The most significant finding of this study is the difference in experienced time duration that was found to exist between young and old adults. More specifically, reproduced intervals by individuals over 65 years of age were significantly shorter than the intervals reproduced by adults between 18 and 25. The magnitude of this difference between the mean intervals, nearly one-third or 30 seconds shorter, was most interesting. This result seems to support the contention that time is experienced as passing more quickly among aged adults.

Significant differences between groups in the amount of recall were also found, the mean of the old group being approximately one-third that of the young. However, the hypothesis that recall is one of the significant factors determining duration experience achieved only very weak support from the data. No significant correlations were found between recall and the line length measure in either group or when all subjects were combined. Although a significant correlation was found between recall and the reproduced interval in the young group and for all subjects combined, when the effect of age was partialled out of the r=.335 correlation for all subjects, the remaining r=.135 correlation









was not significant. And the r=.203 correlation found between recall and time interval in the young group accounts for only 4 percent of the variance. This is a much weaker correlation than the r=.747 correlation that was found between recall and reproduced interval in previous research of similar design involving equivalently aged young subjects (Kelley, 1975).

With regard to memory, the procedure was designed utilizing the results of research involving differences in mnemonic abilities between the young and aged. Various studies have indicated that aged indivdiuals have disproportionately more difficulty with recall as opposed to recognition tasks, when recall is intentional instead of incidental, when tasks involve secondary memory rather than primary memory, and when organization and categorization skills are required (Botwinick, 1978). Therefore, the research deisgn incorporated an intentional recall task involving secondary memory, with the objects in the second film being divided into five categories of eight objects each. The intent of the design was not to artifically create less recall among the aged but to approximate skills required of adults in everyday experience.
The fact that there was a large significant difference in mean reproduced intervals between groups and no significant differences in the length of duration lines is interesting. This might be explained to some extent by the relative nature of the line length task. Whereas the









reproduced interval task is designed for the subject to recreate the experienced duration of the second film segment, the line length task measures a different aspect of time experience by attempting to measure the relative duration experience of the second film segment compared to the duration of the first film segment. Two different individuals could experience both film segment intervals as equal in relative duration but could differ on their experience of the length of the films. Thus the line length task is a relative measure within subjects for comparing the duration of two intervals, whereas the reproduced interval task is a more absolute measure of time experience on which subjects can be compared.

It is also interesting to note that the mean line length of each group was longer than the standard line. Although neither was significantly longer, this trend is in the direction that would be predicted by the time-order phenomenon, which states that the second of two equal intervals will usually be perceived as being longer. The memory storage hypothesis suggests that this effect is probably the result of more of the content of the first interval dropping out of memory storage because of the greater decay over time (Ornstein, 1969). In this research design, memory would be assumed to be greater in the second film because the instructions called for intentional recall. However, other factors created by the instructions








may have differentially affected the temporal experience of the second film. For example, both concentration and anxiety may have been greater for subjects during the second film interval. These and other factors need to be examined more closely for possible effects on memory and time experience.

The results of this study call for further exploration in this area. The significant differences between young and aged adults in reproduced duration experience need to be replicated. Although previous research by Feifel (1957) and Goldstone et- al. (1958) both reported that older persons produced shorter intervals than did younger adults, the results of both studies are of limited utility with regard to experienced time as they both required the production of specific quantities of clock time.

Although the results suggest that memory may be involved in experienced duration differences between the young and old, other factors must be considered as likely contributors. For example, the experimenter noticed that the older people seemed to possess a higher degree of performance anxiety and tended to perceive the various tasks to be more of a test than the young. The role of anxiety among aging people may be related to feelings of inadequacy associated with deteriorating abilities and cultural stereotypes (Botwinick, 1978). Situational anxiety might well affect reproduced intervals, and it would be interesting to measure this in future studies to








see if there is any such relationship that could be affecting time judgment. In addition, the debriefing questionnaire suggests other factors worthy of examination. The aged clearly had more difficulty answering the questions in this section. This raises the issue of their ability to understand the tasks and follow the directions required of the experiment. The aged were clearly taking more medication and had more perceptual deficits. As expected, they were also less able to functionally categorize the recall items.

The particular problems associated with research among the aged and the inherent complexities involved in research on time experience render this area of investigation especially frustrating and resistant to yielding clearly defined results. It will remain for future investigations to help clarify the issues and questions raised by the present study.














. APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL DATA These are the raw data from the old group and from the young group, respectively.


Old Group: N = 53

Estimated Line Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time


154 152

126 126

132 144 86 74

122 118 110

114 69 92 90


6.0 14.2 14.2 17.3 19.2 9.1 10.1

20.0 10.7 13.2 8.0 8.0 14.4 6.3 12.4









Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time


16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39


116 73 132 96 82 132 146 115 100

124 122

106 116 134 128 118

120 136 112 100

122 106 98 114


17

4 30

15 10

15 18 23 10

19 13

6

14 16

5

10

18 16 14 15 14 25

9

24


15.3 8.0 10.0 7.1 4.0 10.0 10.1 10.1

12.4 13.2 12.1 7.1 9.0 11.1

6.0 10.3 20.0 4.2 13.8 15.1 10.1 10.1

7.4 10.1


62 35 44 53 23 41 123 26 69 45 18 12 22 56 54 152 62 88 35 42 20 28 103 27










Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time


100

96 120

106 100

114 110

118 143 124 130 112 139 110


12.2 10.8 10.1

10.3 10.0 20.0 13.0 10.1

12.1 7.5 7.0 10.0 10.1

10.0


Young Group: N = 77


Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time


99 128 105 122 ill


10.0 7.5 7.0 11.0

7.0


91

74 78 105 53











Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time


126 116 111



105 108 112 134 126 104 118 123 Iil 107

116 105 120 118 120 93 ill

103 113


11.5 7.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 7.3 13.0 7.7 18.0 8.5 10.0 13.0 12.0 10.1

19.0 9.4 15.2 6.6 16.0 15.0 10.0 10.1 10.0


255

106 128 120 73 97 74 71 35 117

108 104 73 69 74 20 89 98 89 85

127 52 118











Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. . Recall Length Time


13 12 12 12 13 12 12 12 13 13 12 14 12 15 14 15 14 13 14 12 12 12 14


il

114 116 128 118 105 101 101

126 126 101

113 116

106 124 108 116 118 106 109 109 109 118


7.0 6.0 10.1

10.0

10.0 8.0 15.0 11.0

10.5 6.0 10.0 10.0

10.0 8.1 10.0 8.0 7.1

10.0 9.8

10.0 12.2

13.0 15.0


76 85

127 86

145 99 31 65 86 44 113 79 59 73 114 79 26 79 39 66 47 49 78










Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q .. Recall Length Time


107 109 99 93 ill 101

104 103 97 118 113 108 114 103 118 114 122 107 103 116 105 114 103


5.0 8.5 8.0 14.0 7.0 10.0 10.1

10.0 12.1 6.0 8.0 9.5 12.0 15.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 10.0 12.0 14.1

10.0 10.0


56 80

46 39 42 48 86

67 59 66 56 33 86

66 52 79 127 82 70 45 53 88 84










Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time

75 19 13 109 25 10.0 95 76 18 12 99 22 10.1 81 77 19 12 103 29 10.0 88














APPENDIX B
SUBJECT AUTHORIZATION FORM

The purpose of this experiment is to ascertain individual differences regarding memory. The general procedure involves watching two short films, measuring recall, completing three subtests and a questionnaire. No known discomfort or risk is involved. No particular benefits for the subjects are expected except that psychology students will receive one hour experimental credit. Any person is free to discontinue participation in the experiment at any time if so desired. After completion of all tasks, any inquiries concerning the experiment will be answered.

I have read and understand the general outline of

the procedure as described above. I agree to participate in the procedure and I have received a copy of this description.


Project Investigator Signatures

Norm Kelley Subject 2220-264 SW 34th St.
Gainesville, Fla. 32608 Witness (904) 375-0805
Date














APPENDIX C
INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS


First Name Last Initial Date Age _ Date of Birth Sex: M F Occupation Circle Highest School Grade Completed: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16+


CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You are going to be shown two short but separate film segments in succession. The first segment consists of several faces. There will be a short blank period separating the first film segment from the second. The second film segment consists of easily recognizable things, and each object will be named as it is shown. At a later point, you will be asked to remember as many of the objects from the second film as you can. Are there any questions?


After both film segments are shown and the lights are turned on, please turn to page 2 and begin the next task.







APPENDIX D
RELATIVE DURATION TASK

Read the following instructions carefully. If necessary, read them a second time. Let
Line A represent the length of time duration which you experienced the first film segment of faces to be. Draw a Line B to represent the length of time duration which you experienced the second film segment of labeled objects to be in comparison to the first film segment. For example, if you experienced the duration of the second film segment to be half as long as the first, draw Line B half as long as Line A. If you experienced the
second film segment to be equivalent in duration, draw Line B equal in length to Line A.
If you experienced the second film segment twice as long as the first, draw Line B twice the length of Line A. Measurement points havebeen marked to help you accurately report your experience anywhere within the range. Most importantly, I am solely concerned with your EXPERIENCE of the relative durations of the two film segments, and NOT how accurate you can be to the actual relative durations. If there are any questions, ask the experimenter before completing the task. Do not turn the page until instructed to do so. Please al look up when you are finished.




Line A I


Line B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16 17 18 19 20














APPENDIX E
INTERVAL REPRODUCTION TASK

For the next task, you will be blindfolded. I want you to recreate your experience of the length of the second film segment. After I say "Begin," let time pass, and when you feel that an interval of time has passed that is equal to the length you experienced the second film segment, raise your hand, lower it, and wait for instructions to remove your blindfold. Once again, I'm not interested in how accurate you are, what I am interested in is how accurately you can recreate your experience of the length of the second film segment. Are there any questions?














APPENDIX F
RECALL TASK

Please list as many objects that were shown in the second film segment as you can remember. Try to use the name that was presented with the object if possible, although a similar term which accurately describes the object will be OK. Take your time and don't stop until you feel you absolutely cannot remember any more items.

1 21 2 22 3 23 4 24 5 25 6 26 7 27 8 28 9 29 10 30 11 31 12 32 13 33 14 34 15 35 16 36 17 37 18 38 19 39 20 40


Continue to the next page when you have finished.

68














APPENDIX G
WAIS INFORATION SUBTEST

Answer as many of the following questions as possible. You are not penalized for wrong answers so feel free to guess if you are unsure. 1) What are the colors in the American Flag? 2) What is the shape of a ball? 3) How many months are there in a year? 4) What is a thermometer? 5) What does rubber come from? 6) Name four men who have been presidents of the United

States since 1900.

7) Longfellow was a famous man; what was he? 8) How many weeks are there in a year? 9) In what direction would you travel if you went from

Chicago to Panama? 10) Where is Brazil? 11) How tall is the average American woman? 12) What is the capital of Italy? 13) Why are dark clothes warmer than light-colored clothes? 14) When is Washington's birthday? 15) Who wrote Hamlet? 16) What is the Vatican? 17) How far is it from Paris to New York?










18) Where is Egypt?

19) How does yeast cause dough to rise? 20) What is the population of the United States? 21) How many senators are there in the United States Senate? 22) What is the main theme of the Book of Genesis? 23) At what temperature does water boil? 24) Who wrote the Iliad? 25) Name three kinds of blood vessels in the human body. 26) What is the Koran? 27) Who wrote Faust? 28) What is ethnology? 29) What is the Apocrypha? Continue to the next page when you have finished.














APPENDIX H WAIS VOCABULARY SUBTEST

Please write the meanings of as many of the following words as possible. Give as short and clear a definition as possible. Go through the list in order and feel free to guess. Take as much time as you want and when you have finished turn the page and begin the next task.


1. Bed 2. Ship
3. Penny 4. Winter 5. Repair
6. Breakfast
7. Fabric
8. Slice
9. Assemble 10. Conceal 11. Enormous 12. Hasten 13. Sentence. 14. Regulate 15. Commence 16. Ponder 17. Cavern 18. Designate 19. Domestic 20. Consume
21. Terminate 22. Obstruct 23. Remorse 24. Sanctuary 25. Matchless 26. Reluctant 27. Calamity 28. Fortitude 29. Tranquil 30. Edifice 31. Compassion 32. Tangible 33. Perimeter 34. Audacious




72






35. Ominous 36. Tirade 37. Encumber 38. Plagiarize 39. Impale 40. Travesty














APPENDIX I
WAIS COMPREHENSION SUBTEST

Answer all of the following questions to the best of

your ability. Please make all answers as clear as possible. When you have finished, turn to the next and last page. 1) Why do we wash clothes? 2) Why does a train have an engine? 3) What is the thing to do if you find an envelope in the
street that is sealed, and addressed, and has a new
stamp?

4) Why should we keep away from bad company? 5) What should you do if while in the movies you were the
first person to see smoke and fire? 6) Why should people pay taxes? 7) What does this saying mean? "Strike while the iron is
hot."

8) Why are child labor laws needed? 9) If you were lost in the forest in the daytime, how
would you go about finding your way out?

10) Why are people who are born deaf usually unable to talk? 11) Why does land in the city cost more than land in the
country?

73





74




12) Why does the state require people to get a license
in order to be married?

13) What does this saying mean? "Shallow brooks are noisy." 14) What does this saying mean? "One swallow doesn't make
a summer.it














APPENDIX J
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE

Debriefing Questionnaire

1) Do you have any hearing or vision problems? Yes No
I yes, please explain:
2) Do you have any medical problems? Yes__ No
If yes, please list:
3) Are you currently taking any prescription medication?
Yes No
If yes, please list the name and purpose of thmedication to the best of your knowledge:
4) Did you have any difficulty recognizing the objects
in the second film segment or hearing their names?
Yes__ No_If yes, please explain:
5) Did you have any difficulty understanding any of the
instructions in this experiment? Yes No
If yes, please explain:

6) When trying to recall the objects in the second film
segment, were you aware that there were five main
categories of objects? Yes No
If yes, did this categorization hTe- you recall the objects? Yes No Please name as many of the
five main categories as you can: 1) 2)
3) 4) 5)
7) Did you use any techniques or special strategies to
help you remember the objects in the second film
segment? Yes No
If yes, please explain
8) Did you have any difficulties in trying to reproduce
an interval equivalent to your experience of the second
film segment when blindfolded? Yes No
If yes, please explain:


YOUR COOPERATION AND PATIENCE IS GREATLY APPRECIATED!













APPENDIX K
EXPLANATION OF PURPOSE


Explanation of Purpose

The purpose of this experiment is to determine whether differences in experienced time duration exist between young and older adults. If so, this research will also attempt to ascertain whether such differences can be at least partially accounted for by differences in memory between young and older adults.

Because prior knowledge that time estimates would be utilized would seriously contaminate the results, this aspect of the experiment could not be divulged until after the time judgments were made.















APPENDIX L
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE DATA


These are the quantified results from the debriefing questionnaire. Numbers do not necessarily add up to total group membership as some questions were not answered.


Young Group (N = 77)

Question # 1) Yes: 29
No: 48 2) Yes: 5
No: 72 3) Yes: 13
No: 64 4) Yes: 5
No: 72 5) Yes: 1
No: 75

6a) Yes: 63 6b) Yes: 57
No: 14 No: 3 7) Yes: 44
No: 33 8) Yes: 26
No: 51


Old Group (N = 53)

Question # 1) Yes: 35
No: 16 2) .Yes: 26
No: 22 3) Yes: 28
No: 21 4) Yes: 5
No: 46 5) Yes: 5
No: 45

6a) Yes: 22 6b) Yes: 19
No: 20 No: 0 7) Yes: 20
No: 24 8) Yes: 8
No: 34














BIBLIOGRAPHY

Botwinick, J. Aging and Behavior. New York: Springer,
1978.
Feifel, H. "Judgment of time in younger and older persons,"
Journal of Gerontology, 1957, Vol. 12, pp. 71-74.

Fraisse, P. The Psychology of Time. New York: Harper and
Row, 1963.

Goldstone, S., W. K. Boardman, and W. T. Lhamon. "Kinesthetic cues in the development of time concepts,"
Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1958, Vol. 93, pp. 185190.
Kelley, N. "Two models of time: A confrontation." Master's
thesis, University of Florida, 1975.
LeBlanc, A. "Time orientation and time estimation: A function of age," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1969,
Vol. 115, pp. 187-194.

Ornstein, R. On the Experience of Time. Baltimore: Penguin
Books, Ltd., 1969.

Surwillo, W. "Age and the perception of short intervals
of time," Journal of Gerontology, 1964, Vol. 19,
pp. 322-324.














BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH


Norman Larry Kelley was born in Utica, New York, on

July 6, 1945. He attended New Hartford schools and graduated in 1963. He received his B.A. degree in psychology with high honors from Michigan State University in 1970. He began graduate studies at the University of Florida in 1972, receiving his M.A. degree in 1975 and his Ph.D. in clinical psychology in 1980.












I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Profes 6r of Clinical Psychology






I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Wise B. Webb
Graduate Research Professor of Psychology






I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Nathan W. Perry, Jr. Professor of Clinical Psycology












I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of'Doctor of Philosophy.



ljrry A. Graer, Jr.
Professor Psychology






I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



IIell C. Harn dr
Professor of Speech






This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Psychology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 1980


Dean, Graduate School




Full Text

PAGE 1

ACCELERATED TIME AMONG THE AGED: A MEMORY HYPOTHESIS By NORMAN L. KELLEY O A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1980

PAGE 2

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the members of my supervisory committee: Hugh C. Davis, Jr., Chairman, Wilse B. Webb, Nathan W. Perry, Jr., Harry A. Grater, Jr., and Lowell C. Hammer. I am also greatly indebted to my wonderful parents for their encouragement and emotional support during my graduate training. n

PAGE 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii ABSTRACT v INTRODUCTION 1 Tine 1 Learning 25 Hypothesis of Present Investigation 36 METHOD 37 Apparatus and Stimuli 37 Subjects 38 Procedure 38 RESULTS 43 DISCUSSION 52 APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL DATA 57 APPENDIX B: SUBJECT AUTHORIZATION FORM 64 APPENDIX C: INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS 65 APPENDIX D: RELATIVE DURATION TASK 66 APPENDIX E: INTERNAL REPRODUCTION TASK 67 APPENDIX F: RECALL TASK 68 APPENDIX G: WAIS INFORMATION SUBTEST 69 APPENDIX H: WAIS VOCABULARY SUBTEST 71 APPENDIX I: WAIS COMPREHENSION SUBTEST . . 73 APPENDIX J: DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE 75 iii

PAGE 4

Pa S e APPENDIX K: EXPLANATION OF PURPOSE 76 APPENDIX L: DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY 78 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 79 iv

PAGE 5

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ACCELERATED TIME AMONG THE AGED: A MEMORY HYPOTHESIS By Norman L. Kelley June 1980 Chairman: Hugh C. Davis, Jr. Major Department: Psychology Judgments of temporal duration were compared between young and older adults. The young group consisted of 77 university students between 18 and 25 while the older group was comprised of 53 non-institutionalized individuals at least 65 years of age. Two 100 second film segments were shown successively. A line estimation task was used to compare the relative durations of the two films and an interval reproduction task was used to recreate the experience of the duration of the second film segment. Recall of objects in the second film was measured. Significant differences in interval reproduction were found between the young and old group, the mean of the old group being 1/3 shorter than that of the young. Although the older group recalled significantly less than the young group, the hypothesis that recall is a significant determinant of v

PAGE 6

duration experience received only weak support, resulting from a significant correlation between recall and reproduced interval in the young group . vi

PAGE 7

INTRODUCTION Time Time has long been the subject of man's curiosity. Since the beginning of recorded history, poets and philosophers have attempted to unravel the mystique of temporal experience. The great philosopher Emmanuel Kant conceived time to be an "a priori" construction of the mind (Kant, 1788, in Ornstein, 1969), whereas John Locke hypothesized that time was derived from external occurrences and the succession of ideas (Locke, 1869, in Ornstein, 1969). Henri Bergson utilized Einstein's general relativity theory and derived a subjective relational schema (Bergson, 1920, in Ornstein, 1969) . With the birth of psychology in the late nineteenth century, the incipient concern with conscious experience led to speculation as to the nature of temporal phenomena. However, most of the empirical and theoretical work during this period lacked coherence. William James attempted to relate time to the decay of "brain traces" and to the "multitudinousness of memories” (James, 1890, in Ornstein, 1969) . Titchener emphasized an introspective approach to time (Titchener, 1905, in Ornstein, 1969), whereas Wundt and several others devised various empirical experiments in 1

PAGE 8

2 an attempt to uncover whether quantitative relationships such as Weber's Law were applicable to temporal experience. In 1891, Nichols wrote a scathing review of psychology's inadequate attempts to come to grips with the mystery of time, noting a plethora of ideas and speculation and a paucity of substance. "It has been declared a priori, innate, intuitive, empirical, mechanical. It has been deduced from within and without, from heaven and from earth and from several things difficult to imagine as of either" (Nichols, 1891, in Ornstein, 1969, pp . 16-17). It should be mentioned that one of the exceptions to the rather scattered efforts during this period was the work of Guyau (1890, in Ornstein, 1969) , who pursuied a relationship between time and human information processing. However, the literature on temporal phenomena began to lose popularity with the mainstream of psychological pursuits, largely because of the broad but rather shallow conglomeration of ideas without much direction (Ornstein, 1969) . With Watson's (1924, in Ornstein, 1969) attack on "mentalism" and the ensuing trend toward objectivity within psychology, research on perception as a whole and interest in time in particular waned significantly. It is, of course, understandable that this era of objectivity-oriented psychology lost interest in temporal phenomena, as there really is no immediate point from which a scientific analysis of time experience can begin. Nothing inherent within ourselves was

PAGE 9

3 discovered which could apprehend "temporal stimuli." One cannot point to an organ of perception, such as the ear, or to physical parameters, as in the case with the continuum of wave-length and frequency associated with sound and light. Nor can a process in the external world be uncovered that gives rise to time experience. As Ornstein (1969, p. 17) succinctly points out: "It is, therefore, not too surprising that work on the experience of time would be so diverse, incoherent, and easily forgotten." Research during the period from 1920-1950 continued to be scattered, lacking substance and direction. Investigations continued to be characterized by each researcher attempting to relate his speciality to the area of time, resulting in fragmentary one-shot efforts. Hence, Harton (1939, in Ornstein, 1969) studied the effects of "successful" and "failure" situations on time experience; Blakey (1934, in Ornstein, 1969), the "time-order" phenomenon; Benussi, the differences in coding stimuli series (Benussi, 1907, in Ornstein, 1969); Gardner investigated the time experience among hyperand hypo-thyroid cases (Gardner, 1935, in Ornstein, 1969); and the list goes on. Woodrow (1951, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 18) summarized his work and others during this period: "The data that have accumulated in the illusive field of time perception show two outstanding characteristics. One is the conflicting nature of the findings of the different experimenters , the other is the raentalistic nature of the data."

PAGE 10

4 Fortunately, there has been an increased concern with consciousness and experience within psychology during the past two decades. A rekindling of interest in research into the enigmatic area of time experience has been included in this trend. Impetus for this rebirth seems to have partly arisen out of Paul Fraisse's thorough review of research on time published in 1963, entitled The Psychology of Time . Covering the entire period of research in the preceding seventy-five years, Fraisse's historical review provided a foundation on which direction and analysis of temporal phenomena could be reborn. Following this, two additional volumes appeared which contained a collection of discussions on time dimensions in a variety of areas from biology to religion. These were Fischer's Interdisciplinary Perspec tives of Time (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) and Fraser's The Voices of Time (1966, in Ornstein, 1969). More systematic research also began during this era, as exemplified by both Triesman (1963, in Ornstein, 1969) and Michon (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) , who began in-depth analyses of the experience of brief intervals of time. In 1969, Robert Ornstein published a work which reviewed previous time research and undertook an in-depth study of the specific area of temporal duration, including the presentation of several experiments within a theoretical framework involving information processing. This work pointed out common errors in previous experimentation analyzing the experience of time and integrated research findings relevant

PAGE 11

5 to temporal duration. In addition, Ornstein proceeded to a theoretical and empirical analysis of duration experience involving a cognitive information-processing approach which yielded strong evidence for a new model of duration based on memory storage. This excellent work is the primary source and motivation for the present research effort. Ornstein believes that a primary reason for the abovementioned historical confusion and scattering of investigative efforts in time research has been a lack of demarcation of the variety of times of experience. The concept of time refers to many sorts of things, of which the whole dimension of experiential time is but one general form. Experiential time as a whole has been repeatedly confused with biological time and clock time in psychological research efforts, as has been the case in the past with physical, mathematical, and clock time confusion causing difficulties in the physical sciences. Psychological research has often attempted to determine how accurately "real" time is perceived. Reference is often made that someone has a "good sense of time" if they tend to be accurate with respect to the clock. However, such an approach implies that time involves a sensory process, and as a scientific concept it has been a major barrier to an adequate understanding of temporal experience. "Calling the clock of hours, minutes, and seconds 'real' time is like calling American money 'real' money. An analysis should be concerned with experiential time per se , not as it might relate to hours , days , burning rope or to some

PAGE 12

6 other time definition. ... As we ought to be careful not to confuse experiential time with other time, we ought not confuse the different modes of time experience with one another" (Ornstein, 1969, p. 20). This point cannot be over-emphasized. Accordingly, Ornstein categorized four major varieties of time experience : 1. Short Time--the "immediate present" a. Rhythm or "timing" b. The perception of short intervals 2. Simultaneity and Succession 3. Temporal Perspective--philosophical , social, and cultural constructions of the world and their effects on the interpretation of time experience; the future 4. Durationthe past, long-term memory Ornstein' s (1969, p. 20) first category includes the present and short-term time. He describes the "immediate present" as "the time that is always now (or just then was now) . This is the time of our most immediate contact with the world, very short, continually changing, fading away, forever being replaced by a new now." Research seems to have shown that such a conception of fleeting immediate present has conceptual validity. A fleeting and quickly decaying immediate memory process which is distinct from permanent memory has been demonstrated (Peterson and Peterson, 1959, in Ornstein, 1969). It has also been shown that such an

PAGE 13

7 immediate memory has a rather low and fixed amount of information-processing capacity which is almost unaffected by training (Miller, 1956, in Ornstein, 1969). The length of this memory in terms of clock time seems to vary somewhat, but several investigators make the distinction of short-term time being three to five seconds whereas duration or long-term time is somewhere above ten seconds (Ornstein, 1969) . Two separate processes have been distinguished in the research on short time. "Timing" refers to the rhythmic motor aspect of time and has frequently been studied using sequential stimuli and a key-tapping response. Bell (1965, in Ornstein, 1969), for example, studied the effects of elevated body temperature on time estimation. His results indicated that body temperature increased preferred keytapping rate but had an insignificant effect on counting or verbal time judgments, and he concluded that "it may be that the rhythmic activity of time estimation methods has a greater susceptibility to changes in body temperature than the perceptual or intellectual aspects" (1969, p. 21). This illustrates the point that variables which seem to affect one aspect of time experience may not affect others, even within the same temporal subcategory. The "immediate apprehension" of brief intervals is the other process within the category of short time. This is usually studied by the presentation of short intervals with the response task being interval reproduction by various estimation methods (Ornstein, 1969) .

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8 A second category of time experience is that of simultaneity and succession. Somewhat akin to the "two-point threshold" of tactile stimulation, this category concerns the experience of whether or not two events are perceived to occur at the same time. Similar to the concept of resolution within physical optics , it is dependant on how fine the "grain" of experience is and is related to frame of reference. The concept of a "perceptual moment" is relevant here. It has been discovered that it takes approximately one-tenth of a second for the processing of input information, and it is suggested that this interval could form a potential neurophysiological foundation for the experience of the "present" and simultaneity. Other than that, this area has not been the subject of frequent empirical investigations and has tended to be a discussion topic of the psychologically minded philosophers such as Bergson (Ornstein, 1969) . Ornstein' s third category is that of temporal perspective. This mode of time experience is largely culturally determined as different world views result in various temporal interpretations. Cultures less technologically advanced than ours often do not define precisely small time units (Nakamura, 1966, in Ornstein, 1969). For example, an Indian culture uses the time to boil rice as its basic unit of time. Thus, various cultures and their subgroups may be studied for differing conceptions of time which affects how their

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9 members experience time. The future and "becoming” are included in this category (Ornstein, 1969) . Ornstein's last category is duration and is that aspect of time which he considers in depth. He describes it as "the continuing, persevering, time in which we live our lives." It is "our normal experience of time passing, of hours lengthening or shortening, of a recent event seeming 'a long time ago, ' of one interval passing more quickly for one person than another or more quickly for one person at one instance than another" (Ornstein, 1969, pp. 21-22). Although short time is continuing, it is always evanescent whereas duration has some permanence and often entails the memory of things past through retrospection. Ornstein suggests that temporal experience may be classified according to memory: the present being a function of the short-term storage of primary memory and the past, duration, related to the long-term storage of secondary memory. Although each involves memory, the experiences of present and past will differ because not all that is in short-term storage constitutes what gets into long-term memory (Ornstein, 1969) . It is hoped that Ornstein's classifications of four major varieties of time experience as separate from other temporal categories will serve to clear up some of the confusion so frequent in the literature on time. In the past, seeming contradictions in the research may have partially resulted from a lack of specificity in terms of conditions and a "lumping together" of various temporal categories and processes. Hence,

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10 some variables which affect one category or subcategory of tine may affect others differently or not at all. There are two basic approaches that have historically been applied to the analysis of direct time experience. One has considered time as a sensory process and the other has consisted of a cognitive information-processing approach. The sensory process model considers tine experience as if it were a sensory process similar to others such as hearing. This approach necessarily presupposes external time stimuli to be apprehended by an organ of sensation and the existence of "real" time independant of us . A number of biological and physiological theories have been put forth within this model and can be identified by their postulation of some type of "time base" which supposedly engenders internal time signals via some sort of repetitive pulse-dispensing mechanism. This "time base" is hypothetically linked with either a specific periodicity, usually termed a "time quantum," or a specific physiological, neurological, or chemical process, usually referred to as a biological clock or chronometer. The appeal of this approach lies in the simplification of the analysis of temporal experience to the perception of external stimuli. However, the confusion of the experience of time with clock or "real" time inherent in this sensory process model has seriously hampered the understanding of temporal experience (Ornstein, 1969) . Most of the "time base" theories associated with a specific time interval deal with the "indifference interval" or the "perceptual moment" concept.

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11 The "indifference interval" deals directly with the accuracy of time estimation with clock time. Individuals are usually asked to estimate the duration of an interval by reproduction, verbal, or magnitude estimation methods. A phenomenon frequently uncovered in this type of experimentation is the tendency to overestimate the duration below a certain interval and to underestimate above the interval. If time stimuli did exist and were perceived by a sensory process, the relationship between objective time and experiiential time would be important. Many theorists have felt that the direct correspondence accuracy of the "indifference interval" might represent a basic time quantum of experience. Although the interval was originally found to be approximately seventenths of a second, several subsequent studies found a great degree of variation (Fraisse, 1963). The various discrepant results seriously questioned the existence of such an interval, and the phenomenon seemed more likely to be an artifact resulting from various stimulus situations and measurement methodologies. Woodrow (1951, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 26) points out in his review that some investigators have ". . . attempted to identify the indifference interval with the duration of some physiological event, such as the duration of the swing of the leg in walking or the time between two pulse beats . . . ," but Michon (1967, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 27) makes the point that

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12 It remains less than evident, how processes which have intrinsic periodicities close to the indifference point could serve as a "time base" unless we assume . . . that they combine with all other periodic and quasiperiodic processes in the organism into a general "clock form." This view . . . may be philosophically valid, but it is hardly a suitable point of departure for a quantitative analysis of the time sense. But Ornstein (1969, p. 27) addresses the important underlying issue : The idea that a certain interval is important for time experience merely because it is sometimes, under certain conditions, estimated "accurately" seems to be fostered by the confusion of our arbitrary clock time of hours, minutes, and seconds, with "real" time. An attenrot to find a "time x. basis" for duration experience in the period of the indifference interval is based on the same kind of confusion of our clock with a "real" time which led farmers in the American midwest recently to oppose daylight savings time because they felt that the extra hour of sunlight would burn the grass. The other specific interval frequency suggested as being a "time base" is that of the "perceptual moment." Stroud (1956, 1967, in Ornstein, 1969) and White (1963, in Ornstein, 1969) have suggested that all input information is integrated and processed as a unit during a one-tenth second interval. Even if the perceptual moment hypothesis is valid there seems no clear logic on how this time base would relate to duration experience, which involves memory of the entire interval. However, it is possible that the 0.1 second interval could be relevant for the experience of simultaneity and succession (Ornstein, 1969). There are also several sensory process theories that suggest a physiological, neurological, or chemical process

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13 as the underlying mechanism providing a "time base" for an internal clock. Often termed "biological clocks," the concept is partly derived from studies of timing of lower organisms which appears largely environmentally independent. Within humans, there are circadian rhythms of sleep, body temperature, blood pressure, urine production, and so on. From the variety of internal periodic processes and rhythms, many theoreticians have attempted to force a link between these biological times and our experience of time. One example is the alpha rhythm of the EEG. Since the wavelength of the alpha happens to approximate the 0.1 second perceptual moment interval, Weiner (1948, in Ornstein, 1969) suggested that the alpha waves might serve as ticks of a biological clock. If a relationship between alpha waves and time experience could be found, it certainly would provide empirical evidence for the biological clock hypothesis. Conceptually, however, certain obstacles exist for the alpha wave theory. Since alpha activity is not always present, what could happen to time experience in its absence? And other than the fact that its wavelength approximates the "perceptual moment," there seems to be little other basis for its postulation as a "time base" (Ornstein, 1969) . In addition, just about every process which changes during environmental manipulation has been called a "chronometer." Several investigators have attempted to manipulate the internal clock or chronometer and correlate the changes to time experience. This is often done physiologically by

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14 changing body temperature or administering drugs, Fischer (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) administered psilocybin to experimental subjects and observed its effects on four physiological "chronometers . " He found that while the drug lengthened duration experience, it decreased the Weber fraction for the taste sense, increased the preferred rate of finger tapping, increased handwriting size, and increased optical nystagmus. He concluded that "these clocks evidently do not run at the same rate ..." (Fischer, 1967, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 30). Of course, this and similar experiments raise several conceptual questions. It is important to clearly define the criteria in designated a process as a "chronometer," otherwise one must question the utility of the designation. If every physiological process is termed a chronometer, the concept is vitually useless (Ornstein, 1969) . Another "biological clock" theory was put forth by Hoagland (1935, in Ornstein, 1969). He discovered that his wife's rate of counting seconds changed during a fever. After recording her estimates of subjective time and her body temperature, he maintained that time judgments are temperature dependent, and concluded that "a unitary chemical mechanism is probably basically determining these judgments" (Hoagland, 1935, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 32), Since then, several other investigators have attempted to study the effect of body temperature on time estimation. Although Beddeley (1966, in Ornstein, 1969) found a shortening of

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15 duration experience within subjects whose body temperature had been lowered by cold water, other investigations yielded negative or inconclusive results (Fox et al., 1967; Kleber et al . , 1953; Provins , 1963; Bell, 1965; all in Ornstein, 1969). Although the inconsistencies are attributed to methodological inadequacy or too weak a manipulation of the independent variable of temperature by some investigators, Ornstein (1969, p. 34) once again lends perspective to the confusion by addressing the underlying issue: The argument is not that increases in body temperature (or the speeding up of a "biological clock" with a drug) do not lengthen time experience, but rather that these manipulations are more parsimoniously considered as affecting cognitive processing rather than altering one of the maze of possible "chronometers," heart rate, tapping rate, body temperature, cell metabolism, breath rate, etc. In sum, therefore, the sensory process model has not provided any useful explanation of time experience. In fact, it has partially precluded a clearer understanding of temporal experience by its treatment of time as a sensory process with the inherent assumption of the existence of a "real time" to be apprehended by an internal time keeper within an organ or rooted in a periodic biological process , Although various aspects of this approach may be useful for other dimensions of temporal analysis, the confusion of time experience with clock time or biological time has remained a severe hindrance. Other research has indicated that a cognitive information-processing model for time experience is much more useful and parsimonious (Ornstein, 1969) .

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16 A variety of cognitive factors has been suggested as influencing time experience, and a line of thinking involving information processing has gradually begun to emerge within time research. One of the first investigators to utilize a cognitive approach to the analysis of time experience was Guyau (1890, in Ornstein, 1969). He did not believe in the existence of time per se, but rather considered time to be a mental construction produced by various stimulus parameters from the occurrence of events taking place. Fraisse's (1963) review of time research found several studies which suggested that the "number of changes" in an interval is related to time experience. Hall and Jastrow (1886, in Ornstein, 1969) showed that an interval with many sounds was experienced as being longer than one with fewer. Roelofs and Zeaman's (1951, in Ornstein, 1969) data revealed that an increase in the number of stimuli presented within an interval lengthens the experience of duration. Frankenhauser * s (1959, in Ornstein, 1969) analysis led him to suggest that the "mental content" within an interval is a primary determinant of duration experience, as his investigation showed that duration experience lengthened with more metronomic beats presented in an interval. Matsuda (1966, in Ornstein, 1969) showed that an increase in the number of 0.1 second clicks in an interval also lengthened duration. In the area of short time, Michon (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) developed a very sophisticated quantitative analysis of temporal experience.

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17 His results indicated that changes in rhythmic activity are related only to information processing. The general result of many of these investigations utilizing a cognitive approach has been that an increase in "mental content" or stimuli within an interval lengthens the subjective experience of duration. Therefore, the essence of a cognitive model is that the quantity of information registered in consciousness is the primary determinant of duration experience. Ornstein characterizes this approach by calling it the "input register" theory, as it is a variety of a short-term storage theory in which an "input register" would monitor and measure cognitive informational input which would serve as the primary basis of duration (Ornstein, 1969) . Such an "input register" approach seems to integrate the "biological clock" and cognitive models of time experience by dealing with the data more parsimoniously. It can account for the data such as Frankenhauser ' s (1959, in Ornstein, 1969) which involve the lengthening of duration experience with the presentation of an increased quantity of stimuli in an interval. It can also explain experimental results which involve an increased experience of duration with the administration of various drugs, such as Fischer's investigation involving psilocybin. Previously interpreted as speeding up a clock or chonometer, the "input register" approach would hold that such drugs increase perceptual

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18 awareness which effectively increases input quantity, resulting in lengthened duration (Ornstein, 1969). Although the input register model adequately accounts for most of the research results involving duration experience, there is one phenomenon for which it cannot offer an adequate explanation. Often referred to as the "time-order error" in psychophysics, it involves the presentation of two successive and equal intervals of stimuli. The estimation of the length of the first interval is frequently judged relatively shorter than the second interval . The input register approach cannot account for this body of data as the short-term storage content of the "register" would theoretically be identical for each interval. The importance of relative subjective duration apparently shortening over time is underscored by Frankenhauser (1959, in Ornstein, 1969, p. 39) : In respect of subjective time, . . . the discrepancy between the immediate perception and retention of time is not an error caused by methodological inadequacies which we want to eliminate, but rather a typical expression of the phenomenon we want to study. Since duration is an experience which involves the memory of an entire interval, a short-term storage model such as the input-register approach would not have the capacity for preserving the input of many intervals , thus requiring the input to be stored somewhere for later retrieval. Although Frankenhauser apparently was the first to suggest a definite connection between duration experience and retention, it

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19 remained for Ornstein to develop a definitive long-term storage model of duration experience. Termed the "storage" approach, it differs from the input register model in that it is explicitly a long-term memory theory. Therefore, it can account for all the data explained by the input register approach as well as those of time-order (Ornstein, 1969), Essentially an information-processing cognitive model of duration experience involving long-term memory, Ornstein 's storage approach assumes that duration is a mental concept constructed out of the contents of memory storage. Furthermore, Ornstein believes that in addition to the actual information in storage being important, how that information is stored is equally significant. His theory utilizes general information-processing computer concepts and terminology to relate the experience of duration of a given interval to the size and nature of the storage space for that interval : In the storage of a given interval, either increasing the number of stored events or the complexity of those events will increase the size of storage, and as storage size increases the experience of duration lengthens. . . . The same amount of information or "mental content" can, stored differently, subtend different storage sizes depending upon the way in which it was "chunked" and laid down. (Ornstein, 1969, pp . 41-42) This "storage" approach essentially differs from the "input register" approach in that it considers duration to be a function of the nature of the information remaining in memory storage rather than simply the informational input registered during the interval. Since memory retention is

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20 more like a sieve than a safe as is thoroughly chronicled by classical "memory retention curves," the content of memory tends to decay over time. Thus, in the time-order phenomenon, it can be assumed that the information in storage of the first interval decays somewhat, resulting in a reduction of stored information and a shortening of time experience in relation to the second interval. In addition to explaining the data from time-order research, the storage theory also predicts that factors relating to memory and not input would influence duration experience (Ornstein, 1969) . In his theory, Ornstein (1969, p. 40) repeatedly stresses the following points relevant to an analysis of duration experience: We replace the "time sense" metaphor with a "concept of time" similar to our concepts of order and chaos, one formed out of the immediate data of experience. Duration may then be studied without reference to any sort of external clock, "biological," "chemical" or the ordinary mechanical clock. The experience of duration of a given interval may be meaningfully compared only with other experiences. The storage approach to duration experience seems to be able to deal with the body of research data in a more adequate and parsimonious manner than previous models. A brief look at research on duration from the perspective of the storage information-processing follows. Previously mentioned research has led to a general finding that an increase in perceived stimuli within an interval leads to lengthened duration experience. Conversely, it is interesting to look at the results of studies involving

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21 sensory deprivation. Both Banks and Cappon (1962, in Ornstein, 1969) and Vernon and McGill (1963, in Ornstein, 1969) concluded that time experience is shortened in sensory deprivation and reduced input conditions, although methodologies involving clock time comparisons weaken the validity of the results . In a similar fashion, the storage approach would predict that various drugs which increase awareness and sensitivity to stimuli would result in more input reaching consciousness and a concomitant increase in storage size. Therefore, stimulant and psychedelic drugs should lengthen duration experience while sedative drugs should presumably shorten experienced time. Research by Goldstone et al. (1958, in Ornstein, 1969) and Frankenhauser (1959, in Ornstein, 1969) support this contention. Experimentation by the former found that duration experience lengthened with the administration of an amphetamine relative to a placebo. Frankenhauser found a statistically insignificant increase in duration experience with an amphetamine relative to a control and a significant increase in relation to the sedative pentobarbital. Additionally, he discovered that the stimulant caffein significantly lengthened duration experience. The results of numerous studies on the effects of psychedelic drugs all indicate a lengthening of time relative to ordinary drug-free experience. Subjects in Bromberg's (1934, in Ornstein, 1969) experiment all experienced expanded duration under the influence of marijuana. More striking

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22 cognitive effects have been reported with the major psychedelics such as psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide, LSD. Fischer's (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) previously mentioned study involving the administration of psilocybin found duration experience to be lengthened. Similarly, Ostfeld (1961, in Ornstein, 1969), Fischer et al . (1962, in Ornstein, 1969), and Masters and Houston (1966, in Ornstein, 1969) report increased duration under the influence of LSD. Purpura (1967, in Ornstein, 1969) believes that the reticular activating system (RAS) is influenced by the LSD, The RAS is often conceived as an "input filter" which selects sensory input. Hypothetically, the action of LSD on the RAS may serve to reduce the filtration by opening normally closed neuronal "gates." Fischer (1966, in Ornstein, 1969) presents physiological data involving increased rates of neuronal transmission and cortical neuronal firing under the influence of psychedelic drugs. Therefore, the research in the area of the effects of drugs on duration experience is consistent with an informationprocessing storage model. In general, then, whether the input stimuli are manipulated per se, such as in sensory deprivation, or the perception of it modified by awarenessincreasing chemical agents, the changes in duration experience can be accounted for by the cognitive storage model. This is especially true when duration experience is shortened with the passage of time as evidenced in the time-order phenomenon .

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23 Ornstein proceeded to significantly bolster the storage approach by carrying out several rather ingenious experiments, published in his book On the Experience of Time (1969) . Some of the experiments demonstrated that stimulus complexity is positively related to duration experience. This is predicted by the storage approach theory as it presumably takes more "storage space" to store increasingly complex events as they involve more stimulus information. Conversely, Ornstein also demonstrated that increasingly efficient coding of a stimulus situation leads to shortened duration experience, as storage size is a function of an active coding process as well as the input stimulus array. Additional experiments have unequivocably demonstrated that the crucial factor determining duration experience is the amount of cognitive storage occurring during an interval. First, Ornstein was able to arrange stimulus conditions so that some individuals forget more than others, with the results indicating that duration experience co-varied with the amount recalled. Finally, with identical stimulus input situations, he manipulated the way in which the information in the interval was coded and stored after the interval was over. Once again, the results demonstrated that duration experience co -varies with storage size. Since no manipulations were carried out during the interval, the altered storage size is the only conceivable explanation for the effect on duration experience (Ornstein, 1969) .

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24 The storage information-processing model is an interesting and convincing approach to duration experience that lends a greater understanding of the phenomena and leads to future exploration in several areas. Of particular interest to this author is the possibility of an interrelationship between age, memory, and the experience of temporal duration, and especially the effects of old age on duration experience. It is hoped that this investigation will yield data that will increase knowledge in this area, possibly suggesting a relationship between hypothesized changes in temporal experience among the aged and concomitant memory decrement, and whether or not any relationship between age and duration experience can be adequately explained by the storage model. Although there has been a lot of discussion involving the apparent acceleration of time among the aged, the research investigating the phenomenon has failed to yield conclusive results. Surwillo (1964) rejected the hypothesis that time is "perceived” to move at a faster rate among the aged. However, Golds tone et al. (1958) found that an older group with a median age of 69.5 years reported significantly shorter time intervals than did a younger group whose median age was 24.0 years when asked to estimate thirty seconds by counting. Likewise, Feifel (1957) found that the mean estimates of intervals ranging from thirty to three hundred seconds were significantly shorter among a group of aged individuals when compared to a much younger group. These disparate results may, in part, be a function of the various

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25 assumptions and experimental methodologies utilized by the researchers. More importantly, most previous research has dealt with comparisons to "real" or clock time. As previous ly mentioned, this is a serious methodological flaw when studying experiential time, as more meaningful data regarding duration lengthening or shortening requires direct comparisons between the relative experiences of two intervals. However, it is important to recognize that some of the existing research does lend support to the concept of shortened duration experience among the aged. Learning, Memory, and Aging The issue of memory decrement is subsumed under the more general deterioration of cognitive processes frequently observed among the aged. Unfortunately, cognitive abilities such as memory are very complicated topics , especially when the effects of age are considered. Such complexities are illustrated by the difficulty in differentiating learning and memory. If memory is poor, there is little indication that learning has taken place. Conversely, if learning is poor, there will be little memory. In fact, this interdependence makes it impossible to operationally distinguish learning and memory other than by convention (Botwinick, 1978). According to Craik (1977, in Botwinick, 1978, p. 261), this difficulty is because "'learning' and 'memory' must rely on the same underlying mechanism. . . Nevertheless, a distinction between learning and memory is made for convenience, and it is based on the degree of

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26 organization involved in the processing of input information. Two conceptual categories of memory have been suggested, one of which may be considered learning. Episodic memory is based on the memory of specific aspects of episodes or events, and is often considered rote learning. Remembering whether or not you witnessed a double play in the last baseball game you watched would be an example of episodic memory. However, the conceptual meaning of a "double play" and related items is well understood by a baseball fan, and is an example of the meaningful organization of information involved in semantic memory. Semantic memory tends to be long-term memory whereas episodic memory does not, primarily because of the active processing and meaningful organization that semantic memory requires (Botwinick, 1978) . Historically, learning research in psychology primarily entailed rote or stimulus-response paradigms throughout the 1940s and 1950s. An emphasis on memory in the 1960s was an outgrowth of the previous learning data and primarily consisted of studies involving episodic memory. Not until the late 1960s and 1970s did the trend of research move toward cognitive information processing and semantic memory. This trend saw a change in emphasis of the role of the individual from a passive responder to environmental stimulation to an active processor of stimuli involving selection, organization, and integration. Research involving the aged has followed this general trend and studies involving information processing and semantic memory have only recently

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27 begun. Interestingly, many commonly held assumptions involving learning and memory among the aged are being openly challenged and several basic issues are being rethought as a result (Botwinick, 1978) . In the past, it was largely accepted that learning ability declined with advancing age. Currently, however, this topic is very controversial and remains unsettled. The controversy focuses around the distinction that is made between learning as an internal process and performance as an external act. It is often inferred that learning ability is poor if there is little improvement in performance. However, such a conclusion may be inaccurate because performance may be affected by various non-cognitive factors. Poor conditions, little motivation, or poor perceptual sensitivity are examples of elements that may result in poor performance independent of learning ability. As Botwinick (1978, p. 263) emphasizes "... much of what had been thought of as a deficiency in the internal cognitive process is now seen as a difficulty older people have in adapting to the task and demonstrating what they know." Although the issue of learning decrement with advancing age remains unsettled, there is little disagreement regarding deficits in performance in later life. In fact, the role of age in performance is so significant that the whole concept and measurement of intelligence has necessitated a built-in age compensation factor. For example, if a twenty-five year old and seventy-five year old make identical

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28 scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the actual performance of the older person is significantly poorer than the younger individual, so that a conversion of scaled scores entails offsetting an approximate difference of forty-two full-scaled points (Wechsler, 1955, in Botwinick, 1978) . A "classic aging pattern" is commonly observed in which verbal abilities show relatively little deficit with advancing age whereas psychonotor abilities decline significantly. On the Wechsler intelligence test, this pattern is demonstrated by scores on the verbal subtests being generally maintained with increasing age while the performance subtest scores decline significantly. The ability of such tests to discriminate among age groups is termed "age-sensitive" measures, whereas those tests which are not sensitive to the aging process are labeled "age-insensitive." "This classic aging pattern of Verbal insensitive and Performance sensitive test scores has been demonstrated many times and now constitutes one of the best replicated results in the aging literature" (Botwinick, 1978, p. 213), It is very intresting in this regard that a deviation in this "classic aging pattern" in the form of an added decrement in verbal abilities among the aged may well be an indication of organic brain disease. This raises the important and controversial issue of normal versus abnormal aging. There are basically two opposing views regarding cognitive deterioration in the aging process. One holds that senile psychosis is the inevitable result of the normal

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29 aging process if one lives long enough, whereas the opposing view is that senile psychosis is a degenerative state distinct from normal aging. While the former was most generally accepted in the past, the latter view is currently gaining favor. However, a lack of sufficient data at this time precludes definitive conclusions (Botwinick, 1978) . The important role of verbal abilities in psychosis has been demonstrated in several studies and it is apparent that verbal skills tend to decline with organic psychosis in later life. From the view that normal and abnormal aging are two different phenomena, it could be concluded that disruption of verbal skills reflects damage to crucial sections of the brain that in themselves, apart from problems of perceptualintegrative functions, constitute the main basis of psychosis. (Botwinick, 1978, p. 218) In regard to intelligence, the mathematical methods of factor analysis and principal component analysis have been utilized to organize the data in aging studies in order to describe the constellations of intelligence that characterize older people and to determine whether or not such constellations change with age. A summary of the results from a variety of studies indicates that general overall ability, rather than any specific ability, is what primarily distinguishes one person from another, whether they are young or old. In addition to general ability, many studies have identified constellations of verbal and perceptual factors, with the perceptual factors clearly being affected by sensory

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30 decrement concomitant with advancing age. A most interesting finding, however, is that When differences in intellectual organization are found in people of different age, the differences tend to center around memory. In advanced age . . . individual differences in memory ability account for the degree of success on a variety of tasks. (Botwinick, 1978, p. 221) Younger people tend to be more similar to each other in memory function. Therefore, memory function seems to be an important factor which tends to distinguish the young and aged (Botwinick, 1978) . An important point uncovered by Birren and Morrison (1961, in Botwinick, 1978) in research on the organization of intelligence in relation to age is the role of education in intelligence. Their results indicate that the amount of education an individual has had is more important than his age in regard to mental ability. And since older people tend to have fewer years of schooling, failure to control for the effects of education in aging research may artifactually exaggerate the decremental effects of aging on intelligence (Botwinick, 1978) . Human memory is an extremely complicated and enigmatic area. A variety of theories and models have been postulated in an attempt to better understand the process. A controversy began in in the early 1960s concerning whether or not there was more than one mechanism involved in memory. Basically, proponents of the one-mechanism approach believe that both shortand longer-term memory operate by the same

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31 mechanisms ; hence shortand long-term recall are on the same qualitative continuum with distinctions made only for convenience. Although this general view is still held by some theoreticians, the majority of investigators have abandoned the single mechanism concept and currently favor the "dual process" position. This approach states that two distinct memory mechanisms exist which qualitatively differentiate shortand long-term memory and recall. Primary memory is considered to be an evanescent short-term memory, while more durable long-term memory is labeled secondary memory. Waugh and Norman (1965, in Botwinick, 1978) were the first major proponents of this "dual process" approach. Subsequently, some investiagors have even espoused multimechanism approaches involving more than two basic processes. Often, these approaches involve what has been labeled "sensory memory," a process which is considered more akin to perception than memory by many researchers (Botwinick, 1978) . Primary memory is considered to be a relatively temporary memory of what has just occurred in the immediate present. The span of primary memory is of limited capacity and is usually measured by digit span or similar methods. The number of digits an individual can accurately repeat is considered the extent of primary memory, and the material is usually not available for recall even a few seconds later, unless it gets stored in secondary memory. Of course, a short string of digits can be in both primary and secondary memory

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32 at the same time, but a long string of digits, say more than fifteen, can only be in secondary memory. Research has demonstrated that old and young people differ very little in primary memory if they differ at all (Botwinick, 1978) . Secondary memory is much more important than primary memory in our daily lives. Secondary memory is a more durable and longer-lasting memory. What characterizes secondary memory is that it involves meaningful cognitive processing, often referred to as semantic elaboration. It is generally considered that The very process of organizing information is thought synonymous with placing it in memory; the greater the processing the longer term the recall. Another way of saying this is that how accurate a memory is, and how long it lasts, depends on how much cognitive work is performed on the information when first experienced. Apparently, cognitive work even without intention to learn makes for relatively good memory.. (Botwinick, 1978, p. 323) The information-processing approach previously discussed is clearly present. Some investigators believe that what is referred to as secondary memory is characterized by the nature of the processing and not the length of the memory which, according to Craik (1977, in Botwinick, 1978), may last for thirty seconds to years. It is this active processing, organization, and integration with previously learned material that makes the information meaningful, and is the reason secondary memory is often referred to as a semantic memory (Botwinick, 1978) .

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33 It is interesting that research has shown that secondary memory is much poorer among older people when compared to younger people (Botwinick, 1978). Apparently, the various processing and organizing skills which characterize secondary memory either deteriorate with age or are not spontane-. ously available to the aged. The general approach of research in this area has been to compare recall performances of various groups of both young and aged individuals who have been given different instructions. Some groups, called intentional learners, are given directions to study and remember the presented information. Other groups, called incidental learners, are not specifically told to learn and remember the information but are given directions that would vary the amount of cognitive processing to be performed. The general results of these studies have shown that recall improves in both age groups as the extent of processing increases, but that the amount of improvement is greater in the young. The groups of intentional learners performed best in regard to recall and also reflected the greatest age differences. Eysenck (1974, in Botwinick, 1978) interpreted these results as demonstrating that the aged are less able to utilize increased opportunities for semantic processing, which he referred to as a processing-deficit hypothesis. The research also suggests that the role of education is an important factor in this regard. Although most aged people do not seem to use cognitive organization skills spontaneously, the

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34 highly educated elderly tend to utilize such strategies without assistance (Botwinick, 1978) , It should be mentioned that some researchers believe that there is a longer-term memory which involves different processes than secondary memory. Clinical and laboratory observations have indicated that the aged retain old memories better than new ones. Some investigators claim this is due to different abilities being involved in a long-term memory. Currently, however, most researchers believe this observation is due to the old memories having been processed better, and it is the extent and depth of the processing in secondary memory that determines the length of memory duration. Of course, there are many difficulties involved in scientifically studying memory that is of many years duration. This is especially true when comparing the young and the aged, as the age of the subject and age of the memory become confounded (Botwinick, 1978) . Most people suffer memory impairments in later life. A major question in aging research is whether memory deficits primarily result from problems of storage or impairment of retrieval mechanisms. If the problem is storage the information is simply no longer available. If there is a retrieval problem, the information is available but not accessible, as retrieval is the access mechanism. This issue is studied in part by different methods of measuring memory. Recall measurement is thought to involve both the search and retrieval of information in storage.

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35 whereas recognition memory is thought to bypass retrieval as it only requires matching information in storage with that presented to the individual. A related method involves aiding memory by cues or hints. If the cue is successful, then it is clear that the information exists in storage but that the retrieval mechanisms are not adequate (Botwinick, 1978 ) . The general results in this area of aging research suggest that both retrieval and storage mechanisms may be responsible for memory loss among the aged, although recall performance is more age-related than recognition performance. Ingenious experiments have been devised which demonstrate that aged subjects take significantly longer to search their memory than do younger subjects. This single factor, which may be both symptom and partial cause of the "classic aging pattern," serves to illustrate the nature of the complexities involved in such research. The longer search time required by older people not only affects results of timed tasks, it also becomes a progressive disadvantage when there is more information to serach, resulting in more opportunities for interference and distraction. And much of the literature involving interference phenomena seems to indicate greater interference effects on the elderly, especially when it occurs soon after learning (Botwinick, 1978 ) . The preceding discussion of some of the more salient issues involved in research pertaining to time, memory, and

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36 the aged serves to indicate the complexities and wide range of problems that are frequently encountered. The methodology employed in the following research is a direct outgrowth of many of these issues. Hypothesis of Present Investigation Specifically, the present study is designed to determine whether there are significant differences in the experience of temporal duration between young and aged people. Previous research done in the area of time and age has led to conflicting results. This lack of consistency seems to have partly arisen out of conceptual and methodological inadequacies which frequently confused experienced time with "clock" time and which often failed to precisely specify the particular category of time being studied. Secondly, if differences in the experience of time are found to exist between the young and aged, the present study will ascertain whether or not such differences can be at least partially attributed to differences in memory. Although memory has recently been indicated as an important, factor in the experience of duration (Kelley, 1975; Ornstein, 1969) , it has not been investigated in relation to duration experience among an aged population.

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METHOD Apparatus and Stimuli The stimuli for the experiment were two super 8 film segments of 100 seconds each. The first film segment consisted of 40 faces, each shown for 45 frames and having a duration of 2.5 seconds. Following the first film segment of faces, the words "End 1st Flim" followed by "Begin 2nd Film" were presented on the film and totaled 6 seconds in duration. The second film segment followed immediately and contained 40 easily recognizable objects, consisting of eight objects from each of five different categories: animals, transportation vehicles, fruit, tools, and clothing articles. One object was shown for each of the five different groups in succession. Again, each object was shown for 45 frames and a duration of 2.5 seconds each. A Kodak 477 Moviedeck was utilized to project the film. A Panasonic RQ-309AS cassette audio tape recorder was used to name the objects shown in the second film segment. A Sensor digital chronograph watch was used to measure the subjects' reproduction of their experienced duration of the second film segment. 37

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38 Subj ects Two differently aged groups of subjects were utilized. The young group consisted of 77 University of Florida students ranging in age from 18 to 25 who participated in the experiment to fulfill a partial requirement for various introductory psychology courses. The older group consisted of 53 individuals at least 65 years of age and were obtained from various housing projects and organizations in both Gainesville and Dunedin, Florida. They were each given two dollars compensation for their participation. Both groups were told that the investigation involved individual differences in memory recall but were unaware that time judgments were also involved. Procedure Both the young and aged groups were involved in the same experimental procedure. Subjects were run in agesegregated groups of up to 10 people at a time. Individuals were given a 10-page response booklet and began their participation by signing a research consent form on the first page. The form gave a general description of the experiment: "The purpose of this experiment is to ascertain individual differences regarding memory. The general procedural involves watching two short films, measuring recall, completing three subtests and a questionnaire" (Appendix B) . After signing the consent form, subjects filled out the demographic heading on page 2 . They then read the

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39 following instructions : "You are going to be shown two short but separate film segments in succession. The first segment consists of several faces. There will be a short blank period separating the first film segment from the second. The second film segment consists of easily recognizable things, and each object will be named as it is shown. At a later point, you will be asked to remember as many of the objects from the second film as you can. Are there any questions?" All questions were answered at this point. The instructions continued: "After both film segments are shown and the lights are turned on, please turn the page and begin the next task" (Appendix C) . The lights were then turend out and the film shown. The tape recorder was manually synchronized with the second film segment and labeled the objects shown. Immediately after the film ended, the lights were turned on and the subjects were told to turn the page and read the instructions for the duration estimation task. The instructions read as follows : "Read the following instructions carefully. If necessary, read them a second time. Let Line A represent the length of time duration which you experienced the first film segment of faces to be. Draw a Line B to represent the length of time duration which you experienced the second film segment of labeled objects to be in comparison to the first film segment. For example, if you experienced the duration of the second film segment to be half as long as the first, draw Line B half

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40 as long as Line A. If you experienced the second film segment to be equivalent in duration, draw Line B equal in length to Line A. If you experienced the second film segment twice as long as the first, draw Line B twice the length of Line A. Measurement points have been marked to help you accurately report your experience anywhere within the range. Most importantly, I am solely concerned with your EXPERIENCE of the relative durations of the two film segments, and NOT how accurate you can be to the actual relative durations. If there are any questions, ask the experimenter before competing the task. Do not turn the page until instructed to do so. Please look up when you are finished" (Appendix D) . When all were finished with the line drawing task, they were instructed to turn the page and read the following instructions: "For the next task, you will be blindfolded. I want you to recreate your experience of the length of the second film segment. After I say " Begin , " let time pass, and when you feel that an interval of time has passed that is equal to the length you experienced the second film segment, raise your hand, lower it, and \7ait for instructions to remove your blindfold. Once again, I'm not interested in how accurate you are, what I am interested in how accurately you can recreate your experience of the length of the second film segment. Are there any questions?" (Appendix E) . Questions were answered, and the following verbal instructions were read beforethe task

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41 began: "Do this for the second film segment of the labeled objects only, NOT the faces film. Hold your hand up at least five seconds . " The digital chronograph was started upon the word " BEGIN " after all subjects were blindfolded. The times were recorded as each subject raised his hand. After all subjects in the group had raised their hand, they were instructed to remove their blindfolds and turn to the next page. Before reading the instructions on the following page for the recall task, the experimenter read these directions: "Starting with this page, take as much time as you like and when you finish with each page, go on to the next. Ignore the printed instructions not to turn the page until told to do so. However, once you have turned a page you are not permitted to go back to it. Take as much time as you like to finish the booklet. When you have completely finished the booklet, you are free to leave. If you have any questions at any time, please ask me." The subjects then began reading the instructions on page 5: "Please list as many objects that were shown in the second film segment as you can remember. Try to use the name that was presented with the object if possible, although a similar term which accurately describes the object will be OK. Take your time and don't stop until you feel you absolutely cannot remember any more items" (Appendix F) . Subjects then completed the recall task, the Information, Vocabulary, and Comprehension WAIS verbal

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42 subtests, and the debriefing questionnaire at their own pace (Appendices G-J) . The three WATS subtests yielded a verbal I.Q. estimate which was utilized to assess general verbal functioning primarily among older subjects and, among all subjects, to ascertain if any correlation existed between estimated I.Q. and time estimation. The debriefing questionnaire served to determine if subjects had any difficulties during the procedure, to check for medical problems or medications that might affect their responses, and to obtain additional information within subjects in regard to personal strategies regarding memory and time judgments. The final page of the response booklet consisted of a brief explanation of purpose (Appendix K) . When subjects finished and turned in the booklet, the experimental procedure was completed.

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RESULTS The basic data derived from the subjects involved in the experiment are presented in Appendix A. The young group consisted of 77 subjects ranging in age from 18 to 25, the average age being 19.23 years. The old group was comprised of 53 individuals between 65 and 85 years of age with a mean of 72.15 years. First, the mean amounts of recall were calculated for each group. The young group recalled an average of 22.5 items while the old group recalled an average of 14.8. An F-test was then performed to test for homogeneity of variance. This assumption having been satisfied, a t-test yielded a t-value of 7.5 with 128 df, indicating the recall means differed at an .0005 level of significance. These results are presented in Table I. In addition, a frequency distribution of the amount recalled in each group is shown in Figure 1. Next, the mean duration estimates of each group were calculated. The younger group's reproduction of their experience of the duration of the second film segment averaged 79.3 seconds, while the average interval reproduced by the older group was 50.0 seconds. An F-test was then used to test for the homogeneity of variance. This 43

PAGE 50

TABLE I BETWEEN rGROUP COMPARISONS OF EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES 44 a) •p 03 e *rl -U w w CL o c CO •H CO > O P CO U CL QCU CO i — I •H cO H I O S H O U P-. pH o 03 v — I CO > I H C cO QJ a 3 o u o -tH rO cO •H M cO > m m O o o o o 00 m o o CN n* o o o CN o CN • • • • • o o O o O CO vO o rH o CO 00 CN vO • • • • • 00 o i — 1 vO o CN cn vO vO I — 1 rH m rH «H -O' CN CO CN • • • • • m i — 1 1 tH rH 1 m m o o o o o CO tH o o O CO m o o CN o tH • • • • • o o O o O 00 00 00 00 00 CN CN CN CN CN i — 1 i — 1 rH rH tH o in 00 cn nT m CN CN o • • • • • in rH CN tH i o o o m m CT\ vO CN o o cn i — 1 CN o o vO rH O o o • • • • • o O o o o tr o i — 1 co in m tH m 00 cn • • • • • rH rH rH -i o |H O >H O tH O tH O c rH o a) CO •H 4-1 tH > X H 03 rH rH CL) H <3 E 3 CO e e C 60 O •H r& • o h E •h e 0 H H O' a; C ‘H ,-j aj T3 w M

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45 O CTn CO 00 co co vD co in ro CM 00 CM r^ CM vO CM in CM <} CM CO CM CM CM r— I CM O CM o> rH 00 « — I m T— I i — i co i — I CM PH tD o pd o o $3 o o I — 1 ON 00 v£> t m l i — 1 rH co CO a CM a) oooor^v£>inoor^vom*vrcocMH rH s^oeCqns jo *o^ Figure 1. Frequency distribution of recall

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46 criterion having been fulfilled, a t-test was performed which resulted in a t-value of 5.25 with 128 df, indicating the intervals reproduced by the young and old groups differed at the .0005 level of significance (Table I). The data from the line length response were tabulated next. In this task, individuals compared their experience of the duration of the second film segment to their experience of the length of the first film, which was represented by a 10-cra line. The average length of the lines drawn by the young subjects was 10.3 cm, while the average among the older group was 11.0 cm. An F-test performed on the variances indicated the homogeneity of variance assumption could not be met. Therefore, a separate variance estimate was calculated and a t-test performed. A t-value of -1.21 with 90.8 df indicated that the mean line lengths of the young and old group did not differ significantly (Table I) . In addition, ttests were performed to ascertain whether the mean line lengths of each group differed significantly from the standard 10 cm line used to represent the length of the first film segment. T-values of .8071 with 76 df for the young group and 1.916 with 52 df indicated that the mean line lengths of both groups were not significantly different from the standard line. With regard to educational levels , the average grade completed by the younger group was 13.0 whereas the older group averaged 12.2. An F-test for homogeneity of variance indicated homogeneity could not be assumed. A separate

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47 variance estimate was then calculated and a t-test performed. This yielded a t-value of 1.81 with 61.2 df, indicating that the educational levels between the two groups did not differ significantly (Table I) . Likewise, the results indicated that the groups did not differ significantly on the variable of estimated verbal IQ. The mean verbal IQ estimate was 111.3 for the younger group and 114.9 for the older group. An F-test for the homogeneity of variance indicated the assumption could not be met. Therefore, a separate variance estimate was calculated and a t-test performed. The result of this computation yielded a t-value of -1.27 with 66.6 df which is not statistically significant (Table I). The next stage of the analysis consisted of computing Pearson correlations between the five variables of recall, interval time, line length, education and estimated verbal IQ. These correlations were computed within each group and for all subjects combined, and are presented in Table II, Two-tailed tests of significance were used for these correlations as the directional nature that the correlations would take was generally unknown beforehand. The only exception was that one-tailed tests of significance were used for the correlations between recall and interval time, as previous research has indicated the positive direction of the relationship between these two variables (Kelley, 1975) .

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48 TABLE II CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES Variables Correlation Significance Young Group (N = 77) Recall/IT a .2029 Recall/LL b -.0036 Recall/ED C .1856 Recall/IQ d .2256 IT/LL .0075 IT/IQ .2847 IT/ED .1225 ED/IQ .1723 ED/LL .0064 IO/LL -.0559 . 0384 f NS g NS .0490 NS .0120 NS NS NS NS Recall/IT Recall/LL Recall/ED Recall/IQ IT/LL IT/IQ IT/ED ED/IQ ED/LL IQ/LL Old Group (N = 53) .0225 .0265 . ,4665 .4353 .1135 .2171 .2211 .5962 -.0001 -.0341 NS f NS .0005 .0010 NS NS NS .0005 NS NS

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49 TABLE II-Continued Variables Correlation Significance Recall/IT Both Groups Combined (N = 130) .3348 . 00005 f Recall/LL -.0528 NS Recall/ED .3760 .00050 Recall/IQ .2045 .02000 IT/LL -.0012 NS IT/IQ .1441 NS IT/ED .2135 .01500 ED/ IQ .4779 .00050 ED/LL -.0188 NS IQ/LL -.0254 NS IT/ID 6 -.4206 .00050 a IT = Interval time ^LL = Line length C ED = Education ^IQ = Estimated verbal IQ 0 ID = Age defined by group membership ^One-tailed significance test g NS = not significant

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50 Of primary interest for this investigation are the correlations between recall and the two duration experience response measures of line length (LL) and interval time (IT) . These results indicate insignificant correlations between recall and line length in the young group, the old group and for all subjects combined. The correlations between recall and interval time were statistically significant in the young group (r=.203) and for all subjects combined (r=.335), but not for the old group (r=.023). However, after correlations were computed between age and the variables of recall and interval time for all subjects, the age factor was then partialled out of the correlation between recall and interval time. This reduced the correlation between recall and interval time to r=.135 for all subjects, which is statistically insignificant. There was also a significant correlation between IQ and interval time in the young group (r=.284). The factor of recall was then partialled out leaving a significant correlation of r=.251. The correlation between IQ and interval time was r=.217 in the old group and r=.144 for all subjects combined, both insignificant. When the effect of recall was partialled out of this correlation for all subjects, the resultant correlation was reduced to r=.082. Finally, scatter plots were constructed for all correlations in each group and all subjects combined to look more closely at the relationships between the abovementioned variables. This was done to assess whether a

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51 non-linear relationship might exist in some cases in spite of the absence of a linear correlation. Close inspection of these scattergrams did not yield evidence suggesting the existence of any non-linear relationships.

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DISCUSSION The most significant finding of this study is the difference in experienced time duration that was found to exist between young and old adults. More specifically, reproduced intervals by individuals over 65 years of age were significantly shorter than the intervals reproduced by adults between 18 and 25 . The magnitude of this difference between the mean intervals, nearly one-third or 30 seconds shorter, was most interesting. This result seems to support the contention that time is experienced as passing more quickly among aged adults. Significant differences between groups in the amount of recall were also found, the mean of the old group being approximately one-third that of the young. However, the hypothesis that recall is one of the significant factors determining duration experience achieved only very weak support from the data. No significant correlations were found between recall and the line length measure in either group or when all subjects were combined. Although a significant correlation was found between recall and the reproduced interval in the young group and for all subjects combined, when the effect of age was partialled out of the r=.335 correlation for all subjects, the remaining r=.135 correlation 52

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53 was not significant. And the r=.203 correlation found between recall and time interval in the young group accounts for only 4 percent of the variance. This is a much weaker correlation than the r=.747 correlation that was found between recall and reproduced interval in previous research of similar design involving equivalently aged young subjects (Kelley, 1975). With regard to memory, the procedure was designed utilizing the results of research involving differences in mnemonic abilities between the young and aged. Various studies have indicated that aged indivdiuals have disproportionately more difficulty with recall as opposed to recognition tasks, when recall is intentional instead of incidental, when tasks involve secondary memory rather than primary memory, and when organization and categorization skills are required (Botwinick, 1978). Therefore, the research deisgn incorporated an intentional recall task involving secondary memory, with the objects in the second film being divided into five categories of eight objects each. The intent of the design was not to artifically create less recall among the aged but to approximate skills required of adults in everyday experience. The fact that there was a large significant difference in mean reproduced intervals between groups and no significant differences in the length of duration lines is interesting. This might be explained to some extent by the relative nature of the line length task. Whereas the

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54 reproduced interval task is designed for the subject to recreate the experienced duration of the second film segment, the line length task measures a different aspect of time experience by attempting to measure the relative duration experience of the second film segment compared to the duration of the first film segment. Two different individuals could experience both film segment intervals as equal in relative duration but could differ on their experience of the length of the films . Thus the line length task is a relative measure within subjects for comparing the duration of two intervals , whereas the reproduced interval task is a more absolute measure of time experience on which subjects can be compared. It is also interesting to note that the mean line length of each group was longer than the standard line. Although neither was significantly longer, this trend is in the direction that would be predicted by the time-order phenomenon, which states that the second of two equal intervals will usually be perceived as being longer. The memory storage hypothesis suggests that this effect is probably the result of more of the content of the first interval dropping out of memory storage because of the greater decay over time (Ornstein, 1969) . In this research design, memory would be assumed to be greater in the second film because the instructions called for intentional recall. However, other factors created by the instructions

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55 may have differentially affected the temporal experience of the second film. For example, both concentration and anxiety may have been greater for subjects during the second film interval. These and other factors need to be examined more closely for possible effects on memory and time experience. The results of this study call for further exploration in this area. The significant differences between young and aged adults in reproduced duration experience need to be replicated. Although previous research by Feifel (1957) and Goldstone et al. (1958) both reported that older persons produced shorter intervals than did younger adults, the results of both studies are of limited utility with regard to experienced time as they both required the production of specific quantities of clock time. Although the results suggest that memory may be involved in experienced duration differences between the young and old, other factors must be considered as likely contributors. For example, the experimenter noticed that the older people seemed to possess a higher degree of performance anxiety and tended to perceive the various tasks to be more of a test than the young. The role of anxiety among aging people may be related to feelings of inadequacy associated with deteriorating abilities and cultural stereotypes (Botwinick, 1978). Situational anxiety might well affect reproduced intervals, and it would be interesting to measure this in future studies to

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56 see if there is any such relationship that could be affecting time judgment. In addition, the debriefing questionnaire suggests other factors worthy of examination. The aged clearly had more difficulty answering the questions in this section. This raises the issue of their ability to understand the tasks and follow the directions required of the experiment. The aged were clearly taking more medication and had more perceptual deficits. As expected, they were also less able to functionally categorize the recall items. The particular problems associated with research among the aged and the inherent complexities involved in research on time experience render this area of investigation especially frustrating and resistant to yielding clearly defined results. It will remain for future investigations to help clarify the issues and questions raised by the present study.

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APPENDIX A EXPERIMENTAL DATA These are the raw data from the old group and from the young group, respectively. Old Group: N = 53 Subj ect Age Education Estimated V.I.Q. Recall Line Length Interval Time 1 71 16 154 17 6.0 38 2 72 16 152 20 14.2 73 3 -8 126 11 14.2 41 4 82 8 126 13 17.3 47 5 70 16 132 21 19.2 21 6 68 16 144 19 9.1 51 7 68 12 86 8 10.1 35 8 78 8 74 3 20.0 54 9 85 16 122 15 10.7 60 10 73 15 118 22 13.2 81 11 84 8 110 9 8.0 39 12 75 12 114 17 8.0 37 13 73 6 69 9 14.4 56 14 78 12 92 11 6.3 16 15 65 12 90 16 12.4 51 57

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58 Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 65 66 70 71 76 83 67 69 65 67 75 72 70 70 75 73 61 72 71 77 67 74 73 69 7 9 14 9 3 12 15 12 12 12 11 8 12 16 12 12 16 16 12 15 16 13 12 12 116 17 73 4 132 30 96 15 82 10 132 15 146 18 115 23 100 10 124 19 122 13 106 6 116 14 134 16 128 5 118 10 120 18 136 16 112 14 100 15 122 14 106 25 98 9 114 24 15.3 62 8.0 35 10.0 44 7.1 53 4.0 23 10.0 41 10.1 123 10.1 26 12.4 69 13.2 45 12.1 18 7.1 12 9.0 22 11.1 56 6.0 54 10.3 152 20.0 62 4.2 88 13.8 35 15.1 42 10.1 20 10.1 28 7.4 103 10.1 27 39

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59 Subj ect Age Education Estimated V.I.Q. Recall Length Interval Time 40 66 12 100 21 12.2 75 41 71 12 96 13 10.8 21 42 71 16 120 16 10.1 65 43 70 12 106 19 10.3 34 44 70 12 100 11 10.0 41 45 68 12 114 7 20.0 93 46 72 9 110 5 13.0 13 47 67 15 118 22 10.1 45 48 78 12 143 13 12.1 62 49 70 16 124 6 7.5 35 50 83 12 130 16 7.0 50 51 74 14 112 21 10.0 79 52 78 14 139 19 10.1 61 53 66 12 110 22 10.0 34 Young Group : N = 77 Subj ect Age Estimated Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Interval Time 1 18 12 99 23 10.0 91 2 18 12 128 27 7.5 74 3 19 13 105 25 7.0 78 4 21 15 122 32 11.0 105 5 18 12 111 19 7.0 53

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60 Subj ect 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Estimated Interval Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time 24 15 126 29 11.5 255 21 14 116 30 7.0 106 19 13 111 23 15.0 128 18 12 111 28 10.0 120 19 13 105 26 10.0 73 21 15 108 25 7.3 97 20 14 112 21 13.0 74 19 13 134 22 7.7 71 24 15 126 35 18.0 35 20 14 104 20 8.5 117 18 12 118 20 10.0 108 25 16 123 10 13.0 104 20 14 111 18 12.0 73 18 12 10727 10.1 69 18 12 116 21 19.0 74 18 12 105 22 9.4 20 18 12 120 16 15.2 89 19 13 118 19 6 . 6 98 18 12 120 19 16.0 89 19 14 93 24 15.0 85 19 13 111 20 10.0 127 18 12 103 17 10.1 52 18 12 113 20 10.0 118 28

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61 Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 19 13 18 12 18 12 18 12 19 13 18 12 18 12 18 12 19 13 19 13 19 12 19 14 18 12 22 15 19 14 21 15 20 14 19 13 20 14 19 12 18 12 19 12 20 14 111 22 7.0 76 114 18 6.0 85 116 26 10.1 127 128 16 10.0 86 118 23 10.0 145 105 20 8.0 99 101 30 15.0 31 101 20 11.0 65 126 22 10.5 86 126 25 6.0 44 101 18 10.0 113 113 26 10.0 79 116 13 10.0 59 106 23 8.1 73 124 26 10.0 114 108 25 8.0 79 116 18 7.1 26 118 21 10.0 79 106 17 9.8 39 109 13 10.0 66 109 13 12.2 47 109 13 13.0 49 118 30 15.0 78 51

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62 Estimated Interval Subject Age Education V.I.Q. Recall Length Time 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 19 12 19 13 20 14 20 14 18 12 20 14 20 13 18 12 19 14 19 13 18 13 21 14 19 13 18 12 21 15 21 14 20 14 18 12 19 12 20 14 18 12 18 12 20 13 107 109 99 93 111 101 104 103 97 118 113 108 114 103 118 114 122 107 103 116 105 114 103 16 5.0 56 23 8.5 80 12 8.0 46 13 14.0 39 28 7.0 42 20 10.0 48 31 10.1 86 18 10.0 67 17 12.1 59 31 6.0 66 20 8.0 56 19 9.5 33 28 12.0 86 16 15.0 66 28 8.0 52 26 8.0 79 31 9.0 127 30 10.0 82 17 10.0 70 27 12.0 45 32 14.1 53 21 10.0 88 26 10.0 84 74

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63 Subject Age Education Estimated V.I.Q. Recall Length Interval Time 75 19 13 109 25 10.0 95 76 18 12 99 22 10.1 81 77 19 12 103 29 10.0 88

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APPENDIX B SUBJECT AUTHORIZATION FORM The purpose of this experiment is to ascertain individual differences regarding memory. The general procedure involves watching two short films, measuring recall, completing three subtests and a questionnaire. No known discomfort or risk is involved. No particular benefits for the subjects are expected except that psychology students will receive one hour experimental credit. Any person is free to discontinue participation in the experiment at any time if so desired. After completion of all tasks , any inquiries concerning the experiment will be answered . I have read and understand the general outline of the procedure as described above. I agree to participate in the procedure and I have received a copy of this description . Project Investigator Signatures Norm Kelley 2220-264 SW 34th St. Gainesville, Fla. 32608 (904) 375-0805 Subject" Witness Date

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APPENDIX C INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS First Name Last Initial Date Age Date of Birth Sex: M F Occupation Circle Highest School Grade Completed: 123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16+ CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS : You are going to be shown two short but separate film segments in succession. The first segment consists of several faces. There will be a short blank period separating the first film segment from the second. The second film segment consists of easily recognizable things, and each object will be named as it is shown. At a later point, you will be asked to remember as many of the objects from the second film as you can. Are there any questions? After both film segments are shown and the lights are turned on, please turn to page 2 and begin the next task. 65

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APPENDIX E INTERVAL REPRODUCTION TASK For the next task, you will be blindfolded. I want you to recreate your experience of the length of the second film segment. After I say " Begin , " let time pass, and when you feel that an interval of time has passed that is equal to the length you experienced the second film segment, raise your hand, lower it, and wait for instructions to remove your blindfold. Once again, I'm not interested in how accurate you are, what I am interested in is how accurately you can recreate your experience of the length of the second film segment. Are there any questions? 67

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APPENDIX F RECALL TASK Please list as many objects that were shown in the second film segment as you can remember. Try to use the name that was presented with the object if possible, although a similar term which accurately describes the object will be OK. Take your time and don't stop until you feel you absolutely cannot remember any more items. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Continue to the next page when you have finished. 68

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APPENDIX G WAIS INFORMATION SUBTEST Answer as many of the following questions as possible. You are not penalized for wrong answers so feel free to guess if you are unsure. 1) What are the colors in the American Flag? 2) What is the shape of a ball? 3) How many months are there in a year? 4) What is a thermometer? 5) What does rubber come from? 6) Name four men who have been presidents of the United States since 1900. 7) Longfellow was a famous man; what was he? 8) How many weeks are there in a year? 9) In what direction would you travel if you went from Chicago to Panama? 10) Where is Brazil? 11) How tall is the average American woman? 12) What is the capital of Italy? 13) Why are dark clothes warmer than light-colored clothes? 14) When is Washington's birthday? 15) Who wrote Hamlet ? 16) What is the Vatican? 17) How far is it from Paris to New York? 69

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70 18) Where is Egypt? 19) How does yeast cause dough to rise? 20) What is the population of the United States? /-N t-H CNj How many senators are there in the United States Senate? 22) What is the main theme of the Book of Genesis? 23) At what temperature does water boil? 24) Who wrote the Iliad? 25) Name three kinds of blood vessels in the human body. 26) What is the Koran? 27) Who wrote Faust? 28) What is ethnology? 29) What is the Apocrypha? Continue to the next page when you have finished.

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APPENDIX H WAIS VOCABULARY SUBTEST Please write the meanings of as many of the following words as possible. Give as short and clear a definition as possible. Go through the list in order and feel free to guess. Take as much time as you want and when you have finished turn the page and begin the next task. 1 . Bed 2. Ship 3. Penny 4. Winter 5. Repair 6. Breakfast 7. Fabric 8. Slice 9. Assemble 10. Conceal 11. Enormous 12. Hasten 13. Sentence 14. Regulate 15. Commence 16. Ponder 17. Cavern 18. Designate 19. Domestic 20. Consume 21. Terminate 22. Obstruct 23. Remorse 24. Sanctuary 25. Matchless 26. Reluctant 27. Calamity 28. Fortitude 29. Tranquil 30. Edifice 31. Compassion 32. Tangible 33. Perimeter 34. Audacious 71

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72 35. Ominous 36. Tirade 37. Encumber 38. Plagiarize 39. Impale 40. Travesty

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APPENDIX I VJAIS COMPREHENSION SUBTEST Answer all of the following questions to the best of your ability. Please make all answers as clear as possible. When you have finished, turn to the next and last page. 1) Why do we wash clothes? 2) Why does a train have an engine? 3) What is the thing to do if you find an envelope in the street that is sealed, and addressed, and has a new stamp? 4) Why should we keep away from bad company? 5) What should you do if while in the movies you were the first person to see smoke and fire? 6) Why should people pay taxes? 7) What does this saying mean? "Strike while the iron is hot." 8) Why are child labor laws needed? 9) If you were lost in the forest in the daytime, how would you go about finding your way out? 10) Why are people who are born deaf usually unable to talk? 11) Why does land in the city cost more than land in the country? 73

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74 12) Why does the state require people to get a license in order to be married? 13) What does this saying mean? "Shallow brooks are noisy." What does this saying mean? "One swallow doesn't make a summer." 14 )

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APPENDIX J DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE Debriefing Questionnaire 1) Do you have any hearing or vision problems? Yes No 1^ yes, please explain: 2) Do you have any medical problems? Yes No If yes, please list: 3) Are you currently taking any prescription medication? Yes No If yes, please list the name and purpose of the medication to the best of your knowledge: 4) Did you have any difficulty recognizing the objects in the second film segment or hearing their names? Yes No If yes, please explain: 5) Did you have any difficulty understanding any of the instructions in this experiment? Yes No If yes, please explain: 6) When trying to recall the objects in the second film segment, were you aware that there were five main categories of objects? Yes No If yes, did this categorization help you recall the objects? Yes No Please name as many of the five main categories as you can: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 7) Did you use any techniques or special strategies to help you remember the objects in the second film segment? Yes No If yes, please explain: 8) Did you have any difficulties in trying to reproduce an interval equivalent to your experience of the second film segment when blindfolded? Yes No If yes, please explain: YOUR COOPERATION AND PATIENCE IS GREATLY APPRECIATED! 75

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APPENDIX K EXPLANATION OF PURPOSE Explanation of Purpose The purpose of this experiment is to determine whether differences in experienced time duration exist between young and older adults. If so, this research will also attempt to ascertain whether such differences can be at least partially accounted for by differences in memory between young and older adults. Because prior knowledge that time estimates would be utilized would seriously contaminate the results, this aspect of the experiment could not be divulged until after the time judgments were made. 7.6

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APPENDIX L DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE DATA These are the quantified results from the debriefing questionnaire. Numbers do not necessarily add up to total group membership as some questions were not answered. Young Group (N = 77) Old Group (N = 53) Que; s tion # Que: s tion # 1) Yes : 29 1) Yes : 35 No: 48 No: 16 2) Yes : 5 2) .Yes : 26 No: 72 No: 22 3) Yes : 13 3) Yes : 28 No: 64 No: 21 4) Yes : 5 4) Yes : 5 No: 72 No: 46 5) Yes : 1 5) Yes : 5 No: 75 No: 45 6a) Yes: 63 6b) Yes: 57 6a) Yes : 22 No.14 No: 3 No: 20 7) Yes : 44 7) Yes : 20 No: 33 No: 24 8) Yes : 26 8) Yes : 8 No: 51 No: 34 6b) Yes : 19 No: 0 77

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Botwinick, J. Aging and Behavior. New York; Springer, 1978. Feifel, H. "Judgment of time in younger and older persons," Journal of Gerontology , 1957, Vol. 12, pp . 71-74. Fraisse, P. The Psychology of Time . New York; Harper and Row, 19 6T! Goldstone, S., W. K. Boardman, and W. T. Lhamon. "Kinesthetic cues in the development of time concepts," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1958, Vol. 93, pp . 185Kelley, N. "Two models of time: A confrontation." Master's thesis, University of Florida, 1975. LeBlanc, A. "Time orientation and time estimation: A function of age," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1969, Vol. 115, pp. 187 194 . Ornstein, R. On the Experience of Time . Baltimore: Penguin Books , Lt374 1969 . Surwillo, W. "Age and the perception of short intervals of time," Journal of Gerontology, 1964, Vol. 19, pp. 322-324“ 78

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Norman Larry Kelley was born in Utica, New York, on July 6, 1945. He attended New Hartford schools and graduated in 1963. He received his B.A. degree in psychology with high honors from Michigan State University in 1970. He began graduate studies at the University of Florida in 1972, receiving his M.A. degree in 1975 and his Ph.D. in clinical psychology in 1980. 79

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ;avis , Jr., Chairman ir of Clinical Psychology I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Psychology I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. i 7%***~<6 C~ • Nathan W. Perry, Jr. / Professor of Clinical Psychology

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of' Doctor of Philosophy. l^drry Professor er , Jr . Psychology I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Professor of Speech This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Psychology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. June 1980 Dean, Graduate School