Citation

Material Information

Title:
Aviation digest
Abbreviated Title:
Aviat. dig.
Place of Publication:
Fort Rucker, AL
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Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence
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regular
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v. : ill. ; 28 cm.

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Aeronautics -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Private flying -- Periodicals ( lcsh )
Aeronautics ( fast )
Private flying ( fast )
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Periodicals. ( fast )
serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )
Periodicals ( fast )

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University of Florida
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University of Florida
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This item is a work of the U.S. federal government and not subject to copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §105.
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12378726 ( OCLC )
85645473 ( LCCN )
0884-4755 ( ISSN )
ocm12378726
Classification:
TL501 .A8145 ( lcc )
629.13/005 ( ddc )

Related Items

Preceded by:
Aviation magazine (Brookfield, Conn.)

UFDC Membership

Aggregations:
Digital Military Collection

Full Text

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Expeditionary Mindset 32 Atlantic Resolve 2017 20 Innovation in Military Helicopters 4 Expeditionary CAB Medical Sustainment Requirements

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Ocial: GERALD B. OKEEFE Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 1734102 MARK A. MILLEY General, United States Army Chief of Sta Commanding General, USAACE MG William K. Gayler DOTD Director: COL Joseph S. Degliuomini https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd Doctrine Division Division Chief: MAJ Charles Johnson https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/389908 The Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE), Fort Rucker, AL 36362 produces the Aviation Digest quarterly for the professional ex change of information related to all issues pertaining to Army Aviation. The articles presented here contain the opinion and experiences of the authors and should not be construed as approved Army policy or doctrine. Aviation Digest is approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. This publication is available through electronic media only by accessing the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) website and is intended for the use of command levels C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve. This and all previous issues of Aviation Digest are available on the DOTD AKO web site at https://www. us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd Submit articles or direct comments pertaining to the Aviation Digest to: usarmy.rucker.avncoe.mbx. aviation-digest@mail.mil. About the Cover: A U.S. Army ight crew member with 1st Air Cav alry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division removes the park ing wedge of a UH-60 Black Hawk prior to departing Chivres Air Base, Belgium, for Germany, Latvia, Romania, and Poland in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, Oct. 26, 2017. (U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Pierre-Etienne Courtejoie) Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 20182

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Photo by Visual Information Specialist Pierre-Etienne Courtejoie Managing Editor Amy Barrett Contributing Editor CW4 Leonard Momeny Art Director Brian White Contributing Artist Russell Nemec Contact usarmy.rucker.avncoe.mbx. aviation-digest@mail.mil Author GuidelinesArticles prepared for Aviation Digest should relate directly to Army aviation or reect a subject that directly relates to the aviation professional. Submit the article to the Aviation Digest mailbox at usarmy.rucker.avncoe.mbx.aviation-digest@mail. mil Please note that Aviation Digest does not accept previously published work or simultaneous submissions. This prevents an overlap of material in like publications with a similar or same audience. Please submit articles via MS Word document format. Articles should not exceed 3500 words. Include a brief biography (50 word maximum) with your article. We invite military authors to include years of military service, signicant previous assignments, and aircraft qualications in their biographies. Aviation Digest editorial style guidelines follow the American Psychological Association Publication Manual, 6th edition; however, Digest sta will incorporate all necessary grammar, syntax, and style corrections to the text to meet publication standards and redesign visual materials for clarity, as necessary. Please limit references to a maximum of 20 per article. These changes may be coordinated with the authors to ensure the content remains accurate and reects the authors original thoughts and intent. Visual materials such as photographs, drawings, charts, or graphs supporting the article should be included as separate enclosures. Please include credits with all photographs. All visual materials should be high-resolution images (preferably set at a resolution of 300 ppi) saved in TIFF or JPEG format. For Ocial Use Only or Classied images will be rejected. Non-military authors should submit authorization for Aviation Digest to print their material. This can be an email stating that Aviation Digest has permission to print the submitted article. Additionally, the author should provide a separate comment indicating that there is no copyright restriction on the use of the submitted material. The Aviation Digest 2018 article deadline and publication schedule is as follows: JanuaryMarch 2018 issue articles due December 1, 2017 (magazine published on or about February 15, 2018) AprilJune 2018 issue articles due March 1, 2018 (magazine published on or about May 15, 2018) JulySeptember 2018 issue articles due June 1, 2018 (magazine published on or about August 15, 2018) OctoberDecember 2018 issue articles due September 1, 2018 (magazine published on or about November 15, 2018) Authors are asked to observe posted deadlines to ensure the Aviation Digest sta has adequate time to receive, edit, and layout materials for publication. 3https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Over the past 10 years as the American military has transitioned from counterin surgency operations to a near-peer focus, the need for an expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) to be completely autonomous in the area of medical sustainment has increased tremendously. With the continued decline of operational deployments in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Theater and increased rotational deployments to United States Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade Medical Sustainment RequirementsBy CPT Shane P. McTighe, CPT Kegan M. Reilly, and SFC Chris A. Valdez Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 20184

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European Command (EUCOM), United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), and United States Pacic Command (PACOM), the Army has transitioned from counterin surgency (COIN) doctrine back to the open warfare phase line doctrine. In the transition, expectations of the CAB have evolved. e emphasis on phase line doctrine is dis played in exercises performed at the Nation al Training Center (NTC) and the Joint and Multinational Rotational Center (JMRC), where ground and aviation units alike are ex pected to ght open territory battles by phase line to prepare for the potential open warfare against a peer threat. is expectation has changed how the CAB needs to be postured to support the ght. During NTC and JMRC, the CAB should expect to occupy its own eld or an abandoned aireld 30 to 100 miles behind the rst phase line. is expectation demands that the CAB have medical sustainment that is self-sucient instead of relying on a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) and other maneuver units as suggested in previous doctrine guidelines. To aid this transition in ghting and aviation support adequately, the CAB Modied Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) will have to change in the area of medical sustain ment with increased manning, rolling stock, and medical equipment to meet mission requirements successfully and suciently.PersonnelCurrent CAB battalion medical sta ing by MTOE is not sucient to pro vide adequate medical support without ancillary supplementation. Current medical manning for the Attack Re connaissance Battalion (ARB), the Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB), and the Attack Reconnaissance Squad ron (ARS) is one Flight Surgeon, one Aeromedical Physician Assistant (APA), one 30-level 68W,* and two 10-level 68Ws.* e ARB, AHB, and ARS have 400 Soldiers, on average. By comparison, a Field Artillery (FA) battalion has 400 Soldiers, on average, with medical stang consisting of 1 PA, 1 medical ocer, and 20 68Ws.* *Note: 68W = Army Health Care Specialist/Combat MedicAn FA battalion medical MTOE calls for 20 medics while the ARB, AHB, and ARS call for three. An FA battalion has the same number of Soldiers in the ARB, AHB, and ARS, yet the FA battalion has almost seven times the num ber of medics than the CAB battalions. e FA battalions MTOE is a result of their expecta tion to be self-sustaining and expeditionary. Given similar demands, the MTOE for the CAB is understaed. Training performed in Acute Cardiac Life Support (ACLS), Advanced Trauma Life Sup port (ATLS), and Tactical Combat Medical Care (TCMC) typically consists of 56 person teams with roles assigned to each individual. Teams may be smaller; however, this requires individuals to focus on multiple roles at one time, potentially decreasing quality of care given to each area due to split priorities. With the current CAB stang of ve medical per sonnel, there are enough Soldiers to provide the optimal number needed for one trauma team in support of one patient. Without out side support from another fully staed Role I medical care facility, this MTOE makes the CAB susceptible to suboptimal care delivered, due to a deciency in personnel during a Mass Casualty (MASCAL) scenario with anything more than one patient. Having ve person nel with limited medical materials also limits the ability of the unit to run split operations, which would be likely to occur in the nearpeer operation environment. An example of this occurred during Atlantic Resolve. Atlantic Resolve is an operation the United States Army Europe Web page de scribes as a demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to collective security through a series of actions designed to reassure North Photo: MSG Mark Olsen U.S. Soldiers with the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade from Fort Hood, Texas conduct a helicopter static display at Storck Barracks, Illesheim Army Aireld in Bavaria, Germany, Dec. 13, 2017. The 1st Air Cavalry Brigade was on a 9-month rotation in support of Atlantic Resolve. (U.S. Army photo by Charles Rosemond)5https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners of Americas dedi cation to enduring peace and stabil ity in the region in light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine (Department of the Army Europe, n.d.). During this operation, it was common for the ARB to have Soldiers spread throughout Po land, Latvia, Germany, and Romania. Based o mission requirements, the 1-501 ARB was tasked with the com mand and control element of Poland while maintaining a majority of the bat talion in Germany. Based on the per sonnel allotted from the ARB medical sustainment MTOE, split operations were unsupportable internally, and the unit was forced to seek external medical support from other units co-located in Poland. is emphasized the ARBs in ability to be medically self-sucient and forced a redistribution of medical assets from already scarce medical resources in the area, causing further burden on surrounding units. We propose an MTOE change of medi cal personnel for the ARB, AHB, and the ARS to one Flight Surgeon, one APA, one 30-level 68W,* two 20-level 68Ws,* and eight 10-level 68Ws.* In a eld set ting, this would allow for two complete trauma teams who could support split operations and increase MASCAL capa bilities. In garrison, this MTOE would allow a section to rotate between clinical support operations and battalion sup port operations. is would also sup port the patient-centered home model in which each provider should be pos tured to have two medics in the clinic to support four total screening and exam rooms.*Note: 68W = Army Health Care Specialist/Com bat MedicRolling Stock and Equipmente current medical sustainment MTOE for the ARB, AHB, and the ARS has no rolling stock assigned for patient evacu ation or transport and no inherent living or working facilities. is decreases the medical sections ability to mitigate fur ther combat and environmental risks to patients who have sustained life-threat ening injuries. e MTOE-authorized listing for the ARB, AHB, and ARS is one TCMC set, one ight surgeon set, one Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) set, and one NBC decontamina tion set. Since the MTOE has no rolling stock and no assigned living or work space, the medical section does not have the ability to expeditiously transport the assigned medical equipment or to house and treat personnel in support of Role I medical operations in an austere envi ronment. At JMRC and NTC, our medical unit was forced to acquire non-MTOE tents and vehicles to sustain our ability to properly treat and evacuate critical medical patients during MASCAL ex ercises. Without designated medical evacuation platforms, we would not be able to support patient movement from casualty collection points to the Role I or from the Role I medical care facility to ambulance exchange points and he -Polish medics carry an injured Soldier on a litter as part of a simulated mass casualty evacuation drill during Exercise Anakonda 2016 (AN16) at Miroslawiec Air Base, Poland, June 11, 2016. AN-16 a Polish-led, multinational training event running from June 7-17, involves approximately 31,000 participants from more than 20 nations and is a premier training event for U.S. Army Europe. (Photo by SGT Hector Rene Membreno-Canales)Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 20186

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licopter landing zones. Since the ARB medical MTOE does not have an area sheltered from environmental hazards for patient care, it is forced to take from other sections, ultimately degrading those sections capabilities. To provide expeditionary medical sup port for an aviation battalion and based on lessons learned from the NTC, JRMC, Atlantic Resolve, and multiple battalionlevel eld training exercises (FTX), the authors recommend increased rolling stock and equipment. e recommend ed listing of rolling stock and equipment that will maximize medical treatment and evacuation eciency with minimal negative impact to the battalions medi cal readiness is as follows: two Field Lit ter Ambulances (FLA), one M1097 cargo High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled References Department of the Army Europe. (n.d.). Retrieved from Vehicle, one M1101 trailer, one power plant 4UPT (engine control unit [ECU]), and three tactical area-frame tents (Aframe). Each FLA will be assigned to the individual medical trauma teams for evaluation and treatment of patients on the battleeld. e M1097 and M1101 trailers will be used as the medical com mand and control vehicle to transport all medical equipment. e ECU and tent will be used to provide power gen eration for the life-sustaining medical equipment, shelter from environmen tal hazards, and environmental con trols such as the heating and cooling of critical hypo or hyperthermic patients. ese additions will allow for increased capabilities when centralizing the medi cal operations or allow for medical sup port during the likely split operations.Soldiers from the 404th Civil Aairs Battalion (Airborne), United States Army Reserve, watch as a 1-150th Assault Helicopter Battalion, New Jersey Army National Guard, Black Hawk helicopter successfully sling loading cargo during joint training at Coyle Drop Zone, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, Feb. 29, 2016. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by MSG Mark C. Olsen/Released)In conclusion, by increasing personnel, rolling stock, and equipment within the medical sections of the ARB, AHB, and the ARS, the medical component of the CAB can and will become a self-sustain ing expeditionary force multiplier that can rapidly respond to worldwide con icts in support of near-peer operations. 7https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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MAXIMIZING TRAININGPost-CTC Rotationby CSM Jason Huff, CSM James Etheridge, and CSM Michael Arceneaux Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 20188

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Photo by LTC Josh Severs My two previous Aviation Digest arti cles, Pre-CTC Rotation Tips for Avia tion Senior NCOs, (JulySeptember 2017) and Senior NCO CTC Mid-Ro tation Success, (OctoberDecember 2017) focused on the employment and the importance of the Senior Noncom missioned ocer (NCO) pre-CTC rota tion and mid-rotation. With help from Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Ja son Hu (Eagle 40, National Training Center), and CSM Michael Arceneaux (A9, Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC]), we complete the nal article in this series focused on what units can do post-CTC to gain and maintain success from lessons learned during a CTC rota tion. ere are plenty of tasks that need to be completed aer a (CTC) rotation. Lead ers and sta ocers are exhausted, and Soldiers are ready to go home. e most important thing to do post-CTC rota tion is to maximize the received training and lessons learned during a rotation. e Army is supposed to be a learning organization. To be a learning organiza tion, units must have a post-CTC train ing plan to capitalize on lessons learned. Leaders know their units best, and they should develop a plan to gain and main tain success aer a CTC rotation. e senior enlisted Aviation trainers from the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMRC) and the National Train ing Center (NTC), and JRTC believe there are ve tasks a unit should com plete post-rotation to gain and maintain success post-CTC rotation. e tasks are: 1) recover equipment and property, 2) update your units tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs), 3) conduct Ocer professional develop ment (OPD/NCOPD) from take-home packages provided by the observer, con troller, and trainers (OC/Ts), 4) develop a unit training plan that validates the updated TACSOP, and 5) continue team building. RecoveryAviation Task Forces (AVN TFs) deploy ing to a CTC rotation in todays Army will operate in an austere environment. e desert environment in California or the rugged terrain in Germany will sig nicantly impact the maintenance and service life of an AVN TFs equipment. If an organization failed to properly recover their property from a previous training event, the likelihood of criti cal equipment failure at the next train ing event increases. As set forth in Field Manual 7-0 Leaders use recovery to ensure the resources and personnel re turn to standard. e recovery process is training (Department of the Army [DA], 2016a, p. H-21, sec. H-92). Placing emphasis on proper recovery techniques is critical to the units readiness before and aer a CTC rotation; therefore, those techniques should be planned and executed deliberately. A proven Tactic, Technique, and Pro cedure (TTP) observed at the NTC re quires subordinate units to develop a detailed list of required items needing repair or to replace items in order to re turn equipment to Army maintenance (10/20) standards. Before redeployment is authorized, leaders provide a backbrief detailing the status of discrepan cies and provide all applicable shortage annexes and document numbers. TACSOP RevisionIn addition to equipment, AVN TFs of ten nd shortfalls in their TACSOPs. Oen, TACSOPs fail to provide a clear procedural series of detailed stepsor subordinate tasks (DA, 2011, p. 2-1, sec. 2-1), in carrying out those steps to achieve a desired result. Validating a TACSOP while at a CTC is important; however, capturing required changes, additions, or deletions from the SOP is critical. Utilizing detailed CTC aer ac tion reviews (AARs) provided in takehome packets provide the necessary ba sis to revising the TACSOP. e TACSOP revision should not be delegated to an individual but rather, portioned out based on Warghting functions (WFFs), the subordinate units functional areas, and then orga nized into specic working groups. e TACSOP updates must be aligned with higher Headquarters SOPs to ensure the AVN TF is properly nested with the Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB). e mission essential task list (METL), com bined Army training strategy (CATS), training and evaluation outline (TEOs), and the Commanders guidance provide To be successful during a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, leaders need to be proactive before, during, and after their units rotation.9https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Photo by Eagle Teamthe direction and resources necessary to rene a complete TACSOP. In particu lar, the Commanders guidance is the cornerstone of the document because it directs the operational environment the unit must be prepared to operate within. is sets the foundation for the execution of the mission command phi losophy. Units should allocate time on their training calendar and make the TACSOP revision a command-direct ed training event. Units should refer ence Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-90.90 for additional information in referencing SOP development, as well as instruction for the use of the milWiki database portal (or milSuite) for SOP examples and collaboration. DevelopmentAt the completion of a CTC rotation, units are provided with a take-home package consisting of the mid-rotation AAR, nal AAR, completed TEOs, ex ercise summaries (EXSUMs), and senior enlisted EXSUMs. Take-home packages are built for battalion-level and compa ny-level leadership. Unfortunately, not every Soldier gets to attend the AARs due to competing requirements, but units can use the provided AARs to conduct an internal AAR back at home stations. Battalion leaders (Commander and CSM) typically dont attend each company AAR at the completion of a CTC rotation. Battalion level leaders can review the company-level AAR to nd areas for improvement or areas that need sustainment. Leaders at all lev els can evaluate the TEOs to nd areas that need improvement. Additionally, leaders are provided with EXSUMs that go into detailed observations about the units CTC rotation. ese details focus on areas to sustain and areas in which to improve. Senior enlisted EXSUMS focus on the employment of the NCOs in an AVN TF, from command post opera tions, force protection, ight company operations, aviation maintenance, ca sualty evacuation/medical evacuation, and forward arming and refueling point operations. Aviation Task Forces should continu ously assess the performance of their or ganization in training, but place specic emphasis on AARs and EXSUMs devel oped by CTCs to develop training plans that correct deciencies in observed task execution (DA, 2016b, p. 3-7, sec. 3-30). e products provided to units af ter their CTC rotation need to be pulled out prior to the next training event. Use the take-home package for extensive OPD/NCOPDs. Have your junior of cers and NCOs review the take-home packages and develop platoon and com pany level OPD/NCOPDs. Too oen, we nd units receive their take-home pack age and never open it to gain insight from the lessons learned. Development of a Unit Training PlanCapturing the performance of the unit during a CTC rotation is critical to the development of a training plan that address shortfalls to the units perfor mance. During a training event, units must plan, prepare, execute, and assess their actions in every training event. ese external evaluations provide sub jective feedback necessary to develop subsequent unit training plans (UTPs). In developing the UTP, the AVN TF should apply the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to ensure the training plan will address the Com mand training guidance (CTG), the units METL, and the individual and Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201810

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Photo by LTC Josh Severs Photo by LTC Reynolds collective tasks necessary to accomplish the units assigned mission. Instrumental to the development of the UTP is the CTG. is is particularly im portant because the guidance will iden tify particular METs to train for spe cic operational environments (DA, 2016c, p. E-2, sec. E-8), to provide specif ic capabilities, and to address shortfalls identied in the AARs from the CTC. e UTP provides the necessary context to develop the training events that will prepare the unit to meet the required missions. Based on the UTP, AVN units should then deliberately develop home-station training events that provide the prac tice of conducting individual and collec tive tasks to enable tactical and techni cal prociency (DA, 2016d, p. A-1, sec. A-1). ese training events should en able leaders to train one level down and evaluate two levels down (DA, 2016e, p. A-2, sec. A-4), in a realistic training environment similar to the operational environment that the unit may be asked to operate within. As set out in Train ing Circular No. 7-101 (2011), the events should be planned for by executing ini tial planning, identifying the tasks that need to be developed, identifying the operational environment, and develop ing orders and plans (p. 2-1, table 2-1). ese training events should be protect ed and resourced. Commanders protect and recourse the training plans during the annual or quarterly training brief provided to their higher command. Train to Win!A CTC rotation will be challenging and dynamic. For some leaders, it will be mind-boggling. e key is to be a learn ing organization open to constructive criticism. Take the lessoned learned, up date your TACSOPs, develop a sustain able UTP, train your future leaders on the take-home packages provided, en sure you recover your equipment so you are ready for the next ght, and continue to build the team. ese are only tips and not the nal answer for success; be creative and adaptive but most impor tantly, be an engaged leader, and your unit will be successful at a CTC rotation or in a real-world combat deployment. th th th References Department of the Army. Retrieved from Retrieved from 11https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Army Aviation and the Aviation Safety OffIcer By CW3 Emilio Natalio e ASO lls a vital role in each echelon of Army Aviation, and as such, the ASO position has the potential to be a gamechanger in every unit. e ASOs initial training should include a block on fun damentals of instruction and increased involvement in rated and non-rated crew member (RCM/NRCM) training. e ASO position should shi from perform ing an occupational safety manager role to performing in an ASO-focused role. e responsibility to ensure the comple tion of required training set forth as per Army Regulation 385-10 (Department of the Army [DA], 2017) falls on the ASO. In most units, the ASO will instruct the safety program training. ese safety classes are conducted in a small group, platoon/company level, or battalion level during a safety stand-down day. Is the ASO equipped to instruct a course that is mandated by an Army Regulation (AR) or per 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1960 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1996)? Instructor pilots (IP) and Aviation Mission Survivability Ocers (AMSO) each receive a block of instruction on fundamentals of instruction (FOI) dur ing their specic track training. Aviation Safety Ocers are expected to instruct classes without this foundation. ere fore, I believe it is vital to incorporate FOI into the ASO Course (ASOC). With out this foundation, the result is a battal ion safety stand-down day with an ASO reading a PowerPoint presentation to a formation. e ASOs involvement in the progres sion and annual training of RCM/NRCM is nonexistent. Aircrew coordination training (ACT) is a requirement for ev ery aviator. Each aviator usually com pletes this training annually within their The role of an Aviation Safety OffIcer (ASO) in Army Aviation should be redefIned for clarity and greater understanding of responsibilities. Photo by CPT Briana McFarland Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201812

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References: Department of the Army. APART window. Per Army Training Circular (TC) 3-04.11, An analysis of accidents revealed that a signicant per centage from one or more aircrew coor dination errors committed during and even before the ight (DA, 2016a). e TC authorizes the standardization per sonnel (SP/IP/IE/FI/IO/SO) to conduct the training as ACT instructors (DA, 2016b, section 6-34, p. 6-5). e aviation accident subject matter expert (SME) in any unit is the ASO. Why would you not tap into the one resource who is the SME in the prevention of accidents? e ASO should be able to instruct RCM/ NRCM ACT. One of the ASOs many responsibilities is to prevent accidents. e ASO should be considered as more than just a pilot-in-command or as just a primary trainer. e ASO is the SME on accident prevention, ight or ground. Exclusion of the ASO in this training is a disservice not only to the ASO, but also to the aircrews. Additionally, the duties of the ASO are not clearly stated. A search for the words ASO in AR 385-10 (DA, 2017) will give you two results. Chapter 1 glosses over appointing and rating the ASO. e glossary is the second location. Army Regulation 95-1 (DA, 2014a) gives a few more results but still not a clear concise description of responsibilities. Army Regulation 95-1 (DA, 2014a) does dene a responsibility of an ASO to monitor all aviation activities for the Commander to ensure proper use of protective cloth ing and aviation life support equipment (ALSE). Without the regulatory guid ance, the ASOs responsibilities appear to Commanders and peers to fall solely into occupational safety manager func tion. Are all ASOs also qualied ALSE technicians? For the execution of an operation (train ing or combat), the Army uses the De partment of Defense (DoD) Form 2977 (DoD, 2014) to document the risk man agement (RM) steps (DA, 2014b). is deliberate risk assessment worksheet (RAW) allows the ocer-in-charge (OIC) identify the risks systematically and logically. e ASOs are the link be tween the preparer and the Command er. e OIC should prepare the form, and the ASO should review the form prior to the Commander review. e ASO is essentially the mission brieng ocer (DA, 2014a). e ASO should never prepare the form unless they are integrated into every facet of the opera tion. e reality is that the ASO is as signed to complete the DD Form 2977 (DoD, 2014). Using this logic, the ASO should complete every aviation RAW for every ight. In a general support Aviation battalion, the safety ocer is a CH-47or UH60-rated aviator. Supporting Operation Enduring Freedom 1213, Task Force (TF) Shadows ASO was an OH-58 avia tor. e Eagle Assault TF was comprised of UH-60, AH-64, and HH-60 aircra during the 2015 deployment to Jalala bad, Afghanistan. e ASO was a UH60 aviator. e safety ocer is expected to provide safety recommendations to the Commander. How is the ASO sup posed to provide this information with out rst-hand knowledge of the aircra? e ASO would be able to advise the Commander more accurately if the ASO participated in an orientation ight (an orientation ight with access to the ight controls). Army Regulation 95-1 (DA, 2014a) reserves this privilege to the battalion Commander and the battalion standardization pilot. e knowledge gained from an orientation ight would allow the ASOs to customize/improve the crew endurance program. Addition ally, incorporating the master gunner course into the ASOC would allow the ASO to be fully integrated into the units gunnery program. e ASO is more than an occupational safety manager. eir duties include ground safety but their responsibili ties should encompass much more. e foundation of the ASO needs to begin during the ASOC and build through experience. e addition of FOI will improve the quality of instruction. In struction from the ASO during ACT is paramount in the prevention of future accidents. Army Regulation 95-1 (DA, 2014a), TC 3-04.11 (DA, 2016a), and AR 385-10 (DA, 2017) should be amended to dene the roles and responsibilities of an ASO. With the employment of the above-mentioned changes, the Com manders safety program would drasti cally improve. Photo by SPC Avery Howard13https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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The recent rotation of the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) in support of Atlantic Resolve addressed a set of unique challenges and lessons learned that prevented ef fectiveness of Signal Soldiers in Aviation Support Battalions (ASBs). In my experience serving as both a Signal Platoon Leader and Battalion S6 for the 277th ASB, the training and equipment challenges of Signal Soldiers within the Army are partly because of unique challenges the Signal Corps face. Challenges with the rapid advancement of technology, gaps in institutional knowledge, and limited cyber training resources aect the readiness of Soldiers to face a near-peer mobile ght in the United States European Command (EUCOM). e technological speed of advance in the commercial sector on information technologies is far more rapid than anything the government acquisitions system is capable of handling. So by the time we even come up with the requirements and start doing prototyping, experiments, and testing these systems are already out of date. (Defense Video Imagery Distribution System [DVIDS], 2017)Gen. Mark Milley, Army Chief of Sta e Army Chief of Stas comments during a congressional testimony (DVIDS, 2017), echoes my personal experience that rapid advances in technology outpace the Armys current speed of development and acquisition of equipment. During EUCOM training exercises, Soldiers prepare for a near-peer mobile ght; however, the 277th ASB continued to operate with a generation-late, static Warghter Information NetworkTactical (WIN-T) telecommunications system to provide voice and data capabilities to the Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC). e Warghter Information Network-Tactical system was developed in a more permissive environment like Afghanistan, without signicant vulnerabilities taken into consideration when dening Warghter requirements. e op erational environment in EUCOM includes peer adversaries, such as Russia, who can block or spoof parts of the spectrum. As a result, these WIN-T systems are out-of-date and do not meet EUCOM defensive cyber-threat theater requirements. During training exercises, such as Saber Guardian 17, the 277th ASB faced multiple occasions of connectivity out ages due to adverse weather conditions. Absorption of ra dio frequency (RF) signal due to atmo spheric rain, known as rain fade, is a well-known vulner ability of Ka-band satellite terminals, a primary compo nent of the WIN-T system. For a CAB to sustain initiative and provide lethal re support in what could be a dynamic de cisive action operation on a highly contested and lethal battle eld, the brigade requires the sustainment capabilities of an ASB. e fact that adverse weather, such as rain, could render a digital mission command system useless is not acceptable, especially if units encounter real-world combat. Utilizing the more robust Ku-band frequency band is a more acceptable so lution to overcome this rain fade vulnerability. Challenges Faced and Lessons Learned from Atlantic Resolve 2.0by CPT Matthew Bronk CHALLENGES with the rapid advancement of technology, GAPS in institutional knowledge, and limited CYBER TRAINING RESOURCES affect the readiness of Soldiers to face a nearUnited States European Command (EUCOM). Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201814

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Photo by SSG Carol LehmanPhoto by William KingRecognizing the rapid obsolescence of technology, I propose a shi to a more agile acquisition model focused on purchasing a limited amount of commercial o-the-shelf (COTS) technology vs. eld ing equipment in a larger capacity based on a Modied Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). For example, the 277th ASB currently transports large, fragile, and vulner able WIN-T systems not designed for expeditionary operations for an ASB reinforcing the ght tonight mindset in EUCOM. Aviation Support Battalions re quiring a more portable high-bandwidth communi cation platform could purchase the GATR antenna system, an inatable and exible dish weighing only 50 pounds (replacing the conventional 4,200-pound WIN-T satellite terminal that requires a trailer, vehi cle, and four people to li the transit cases). Delegating procurement authority for smaller quantities targeted toward deploying units allows a quicker technological acquisition. By considering COTS technologies and open architectures for communications assets, ASBs will move closer toward improving sustainment support capabilities. 15https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Expanding on challenges faced during Atlantic Resolve 2.0, the institutional knowledge in operating and maintain ing the WIN-T network requires years of experience and training. Institu tional knowledge in such a technical eld becomes critically important as rotational units train to ght against a highly competitive and dynamic nearpeer power. Signal Soldiers install, op erate, and maintain complex commu nications equipment. However, when WIN-T equipment stopped function ing, the 277th, ASB requested assistance from the Brigade Network Technician (a Chief Warrant Ocer with institutional knowledge) to assist with troubleshoot ing equipment hardware failures. is is not a problem when co-located with a brigade headquarters; however, it be comes a problem as Aviation Task Forc es disperse across the EUCOM theater, and the accessibility of Brigade Network Technicians is limited. During training exercises, the CAB conducted emergen cy ights to send the Brigade Network Technician to outlying battalion termi nal attack control (TAC) locations to troubleshoot and repair WIN-T equip ment. Furthermore, the idea that everyone is a leader is unfavorable for Soldiers who joined the military with the intent to become a technician. is is especially true with Signal Soldiers, who oen have a high aptitude for technical work but do not have the desire to be a leader. e Army up-or-out promotion system progression has exacerbated this prob lem. Signal Soldiers become less of a technician upon earning stripes as they serve in a supervisory role rather than a technician role. Instead of continuing specialization in Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) skills, Noncommis sioned Ocers (NCOs) lose technical knowledge as they progress to take over new managerial duties. Loss of institutional knowledge leads to an over-reliance of Brigade Signal Warrant Ocers, Department of De fense Civilians, and Field Support Rep resentatives, especially during EUCOM training exercises. e re-adoption of senior specialists answers the need for the Signal Corps to become more agile and technical as Aviation Task Forces disperse across the EUCOM theater. First introduced in 1955, senior spe cialist ranks provided upward mobility to Soldiers without awarding sergeant stripes and burdening troops with NCO leadership responsibilities (Elder, 2017). Unfortunately, the Army discontinued senior specialist ranks because it did not have the capacity to manage a technical and tactical track for enlisted Soldiers. Considering the increasingly techni cal prociency many Signal Soldiers require, reinstituting senior specialist ranks is key to strengthening the Signal Corps, providing career alternatives for troops, and distilling the pool of leaders. e demand for deep, technical exper tise is undeniable in situations where a future conict may involve electrons more than bullets. Aviation Task Forces must prepare to ght in environments where the enemy interrupts supply lines or lines of communication. In such envi ronments, battalions need to operate in dependently and not rely on outsiders to troubleshoot or repair communications equipment. Units could accomplish this goal by providing the technically skilled Soldiers in battalion S6 sections with the best growth opportunities through senior specialist career tracks to develop technical expertise. While the battalion did not face cyberattacks during EUCOM training ex ercises, battalions need cyber security training to meet the emerging threats within the cyberspace domain. e Army WIN-T network is highly de tectable. Rotational units worry about hacking and jamming (hence the use of Frequency-Hopping and Cipher Text during radio communications); howev er, the ASBs communication networks have a very loud electromagnetic sig nature, broadcasting the location of the battalion TOC and becoming vulner able to res and sabotage. Encrypting communications works well to protect interception of messages. Unfortunate ly, the enemy will likely not care about what a unit is saying if it can guarantee that artillery destroyed its key commu nication assets and equipment. Despite obvious need for cyber defense, Signal Soldiers within the ASB do not train on cyber warfare tactics. Signal Soldiers in an ASB do not obtain the knowledge to defend the network beyond creating complex passwords for WIN-T network management laptops. Cyber Soldiers authorized at the bri gade level do not oer the training or resources required for Signal Soldiers at the battalion level to defend the network against cyber attacks. Solutions to meet this shortfall might comprise the inclu sion of trained cyber Soldiers to the Bat talion MTOE, the allocation of funds for annual cyber security training, or the augmentation of battalion S6 sections with cyber teams during EUCOM rota tions. e eectiveness of a rotational units mission in EUCOM directly correlates with its ability to build a continuous im proving Signal force. If given the right time, information, and equipment, a Soldier will do anything asked of him or her. As soon as organizations fail to pro vide Soldiers with resources and knowl edge needed, they will begin to fall short. ere should be a singular vision for the future of the Signal Corps. Plac ing an emphasis on providing the right tools (next-generation equipment), the re-adoption of senior specialist ranks, and the integration of cyber Soldiers at the battalion level will prepare ASBs to win in EUCOMs new domain and changing warfare. th th References: Retrieved from Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201816

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We hope that Aviation Digest provides you with interesting, relevant, and informative material in each issue. If our authors did not take the time to share their thoughts, personal experiences, and advice, Aviation Digest would not exist as Army Aviations Professional Bulletin. To show appreciation for each Aviation Digest contributor sharing his/her professional opinions and ideas with the Army Aviation community, MG William K. Gayler, Commanding General (CG), United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence, acknowledges each contribution with a Certi cate of Appreciation and a printed copy of Aviation Digest containing the authors article. At the end of each year, the Aviation Digest Editorial Review Board reviews all articles from the years four issues and recommends one article to the CG for the Aviation Digest Annual Writing Award. The author of the selected article will receive a coin from the CG and a Certi cate of Appreciation designating his/her article as the Aviation Digest Article of the Year. The Aviation Digest Annual Writing Award for 2017 is presented to CW4 JOE POPE for his contribution in penning TOXIC LEADERSHIP published in Volume 5/Issue 4 (October-December, 2017, pg. 40). Congratulations CW4 JOE POPE!Read it online by clicking the image below, or nd the issue in our archive: http://www.rucker.army.mil/aviationdigest/index.html DIGEST The Aviation Digest Editorial Review Board uses the following criteria to select Aviation Digests Article of the Year. Does the article have a purpose? Has the author identi ed an issue within the Aviation branch requiring command attention/action to improve existing procedures or operations? Has the author recommended revised tactics, techniques, and procedures for commonly accepted operational practices that simplify and increase e ciencies? Has the author presented an article that improves audience knowledge of doctrine or other established operational procedures? Has the author related an experience that others may bene t from professionally or that may potentially prevent an aircraft accident? Does the author present factual and researched information to support the article? Has the author recommended a realistic solution to remedy or improve those conditions causing a perceived de ciency? Has the author presented a discussion based on facts and not suppositions, generalizations, or vague innuendos? Does the author present his/her article as an organized discussionintroduction to the issue, background information, and meaningful presentation of discussion points, summary, and conclusion? Was the article easy to read and did it follow the discussion points? Did you understand the authors message? *Please note: the author is not required to be a professional writer. The Aviation Digest sta extensively collaborates with each author to ensure his or her article is professional and accurately conveyed.17https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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One to Rule them All By CW5 Jason C. WatsonLight signals. Torch. Nightmare. Blind alley. These words all mean something, but they dont mean the same thing to different units. The Army makes use of tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP) so everyone in a unit knows how everyone else in that unit will function. This document enables us to have shared understanding through all phases of a mission or exercise. What about having one TACSOP for multiple units? What about having one TACSOP for the entire aviation enterprise? Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201818

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As the Rotational Aviation Force de ployed to support Atlantic Resolve 2.0 (AR 2.0) during 2017, the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) was comprised of 2-10 Assault Helicopter Battalion, 3-10 General Support Aviation Battalion, and 1-501 Attack Reconnaissance Battalion, from 1st Armored Division CAB. Having a battalion from outside of our footprint integrated into daily missions and multi functional task forces really highlighted the benets that a shared TACSOP would provide. Lets examine those up sides and potential pitfalls. A shared TACSOP across the entirety of Army aviation would be a newcomers dream come true. Aer learning the ba sics of piloting, using brevity words and terminology inherently specic to avia tion while in ight school, it would be great to show up to your unit and have a foundation of tactical knowledge in how that unit operates. If every unit executed basic tasks in the exact same manner and using the same brevity codes, then ight school could indoctrinate students with that knowledge from the beginning. However, Army aviation does not ex ecute in this manner. One unit will pass light signals to signal that they are ready for takeo. Another will pass Readiness Condition (REDCON) calls over the radio to signal that theyre ready. Both achieve the same resultthe ight de parting for its mission. Which is better? Ultimately, it depends on whom you ask and is not germane to this article. How ever, what is germane is that aviators in the same unit will execute both of these methods because they grew up in dier ent units and oen fall back on muscle memory. e ease of a shared TACSOP would eventually remove the diering brevity words and terminology from our lexi con. Movement between units would be much smoother, as incoming crewmem bers would already know exactly how the new unit executes operations, in corporates methods used for take-os, performs in-ight link-ups, and imple ments refueling procedures. Do units use bird names, sports teams, or cities for execution checklists (ex-checks)? Crew members will already know, because ev eryone now uses cities. at is the shiny, golden up side to a shared TACSOP. Is a heavy attack reconnaissance squadron (H-ARS) being carved out of your CAB for a rotation to Korea? e H-ARS will already know what to expect. Now the H-ARS just has to show up, shake some hands, and get a local area orientation to integrate smoothly into operations. A relief in place at the beginning of a rota tion is greatly simplied, as the basics of mission execution are standardized and greater emphasis on the mission area can be the focus. Units would move straight into the local specicities that impact your deployed mission set: visual ight rules arrival/ departure corridors in Ger many to high altitude ying areas and enemy tactics in Afghanistan. Many ground units want to know how aviators perform paradrop operations, overwater operations, and air assault. If it were a common TACSOP across the enterprise, it could be stored online. Ground units need not call and ask for a copy of the aviation TACSOP. e ground force would already know that all avia tion units execute operations. Aer that, mission planning and interoperability is just exchanging names and numbers to open up the larger exchange of capabili ties and possibilities. is allows aviation and ground forces to build, in a joint manner, habitual use re lationships much faster, enabling quicker planning, training, and execution of complex mission sets. Integrating ex-checks is easier when the ground force already knows the for mat aviation uses: city names, A to Z. is minimizes confusing radio clut ter such as, Denver, Stephanie, Giants, Budweiser. e supported unit shows up with their additions in hand, readily made to insert into the ex-check: At lanta, Columbus, Detroit, and Houston. Simple. Ecient. Eective. In an ideal world, this streamlines op erations; however, it is quite possibly universally unachievable. Why is that? Diversity. Specically, diversity of key personalities. Each unit, in its key posi tions, is going to have strong, polarizing personalities rotate through them. ese individuals will want to write their own TACSOP to characterize their vision for the unit. Each unit will adopt an individ ual approach to mission execution based on personal experience and force of per sonality. Someone will like the light sig nal approach to formation takeos better than the in-chalk-order radio call meth od. One Commander might want a sec tion on convoying, while another wants only air mission-specic sections. One unit will favor a refuel checklist with 92 steps, while another uses a streamlined, stripped down version with only 17 steps. e streamlined approach would require a change in our culture. e biggest pitfall that units might face would be complacency. Personnel who reside under a single overriding docu ment usually become very knowledge able about the contents of that document. We learn it, train it, understand it, and execute it until that execution becomes awless, or we mistakenly perceive that execution to be awless. More oen than not, this leads to stagnation. Creativity and innovation are stied because, this is the way weve always done it. Changes would be dicult to enact, as it would af fect the entirety of aviation, and getting a group consensus is dicult at the best of times. Any signicant change would have to be developed; tested; documented; and pitched at the highest level; deliberated; widely distributed for review; and then decided upon by some kind of commit tee. e current process consists of pitch ing the change to a handful of people at the brigade level to make a modication that can be measured in days rather than weeks, months, or even years. As with any hotly contested issue, there are plusses, minuses, and a million viewpoints. What is the result? We cur rently have at least 12 CAB TACSOPs in the active Army. Im sure that the Na tional Guard and Army Reserve, as well as many of our non-brigade units, have TACSOPs of their own to pile further onto that number. Additionally, ight school continues to labor under its own bureaucratic SOPs. If herding Warrant Ocers is akin to herding cats, what phraseology would encompass convinc ing the entire Aviation enterprise to adopt a single TACSOP? (ASDAT). 19https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Imagine you are kayaker stranded off the coast of a Caribbean island. You kayaked into the ocean hoping to watch the sun set on the end of the world, but you became disorient ed and drifted out into the open ocean. Already dehy drated from a day in the sun, you become thirstier and thirstier as the night turns into morning. Just as you begin to give up hope, a steady slapping sound drifts over the ho rizon. The slapping grows louder, and a form begins to take shape. Dark green with red crosses painted on the sides and nose, its a UH-60 Black Hawk, and its here to rescue you (Con dit, 2015). e UH-60 exemplies todays typical helicopter design: it uses two turbosha engines to power a main rotor and a tail rotor (Frenken, Saviotti, & Trommetter, 1999). is design also dominates our formations: 11 out of 12 ight compa nies in the combat aviation brigade are equiped with dual engine, single rotor aircra. e story of how this design came to dominate is one of innovation, ingenuity, and military necessity, and these factors will surely determine what design comes to dominate in the future. Leonardo Da Vinci rst dreamed of a ying machine in the 1400s, but Igor Sikorskys 1931 patent for a Direct Li Aircra described the rst helicop ter (Hager, 2012; Connecticut History, n.d.; Sikorsky, 1935). By 1939, Sikorskys patent had become the VS-300, the rst successful helicopter to y in the United States, (Whitcomb, 2011). Renamed the R-4, both the United States and United Kingdom used this helicopter during WWII. Innovation in Military Helicopters: Past, Present, and Future By 1LT Robert P. Callahan, Jr. Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201820

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Unfortu nately, the R-4 was underpowered, which forced it to y low and made it an easy target for small arms. It was also imsy, which meant even the slightest damage would spell catastrophy for the airframe (Williams, 2005). e R-6, an improved and streamlined R-4[with] a 240-horsepower engine instead of[a] 180-horsepower engine, accompanied its predecessor on search and rescue and evacuation missions at the end of WWII (Sikorsky, 2007). e additional li aorded by the increase in horse power improved the ight prole of the R-6 over the R-4 and suggests an initial theme in helicopter development: more power! While Sikorskys R-4 and R-6 served in Burma, Frank Piasecki introduced a novel rotary-wing method: the tan dem-rotor HRP-1 (Whitcomb, 2011; Williams, 2005; Boeing, 2017). Like all rotary-wing aircra, tandem-rotor heli copters rotate an airfoil to produce li. e dierence lies in how tandem-rotor helicopters compensate for the torque created by the forward rotor. Addition ally, both rotors on tandem-rotor heli copters produce li, meaning that they have higher gross weights than do their single-ro tor coun terparts. ese tandemrotor characteristics proved attractive, and the Marine Corps elded its rst HRP1 unit by 1947 (Boeing, 2017; Williams, 2005). Not one to be le behind, the U.S. Army also investigated additional aircra aer WWII. Unfortunately, when the Army Air Forces split o to form the Air Force, the Army lost much of its avi ation-related institutional knowledge. erefore, the Armys post-war eorts focused on expanding and reestablish ing its aviation-based observation and transportation capabilities. Observation and transportation required dierent capabilities: observa tion helicopters called for maximum loiter time while transporta tion helicopters called for maximum gross weight. In 1946, the Army began testing the H-13 for service as an observation he licopter, and in 1950, it approved ve ex perimental transport helicopter companies elded with H-19 and H-21 transport helicopters (Wil liams, 2005). e onset of the Korean War provided a trial-by-re for military helicopters. e Marine Corps, which had conducted pre-war experiments and training ex ercises, debuted the vertical assault by helicopter (Whitcomb, 2012; Williams, 2005). An 8-minute HRP-1 ride replaced a 9-hour foot march. Additionally, Ma rine Corps helicopters transported more than 60,000 passengers, carried more than 7.5 million pounds of cargo, and evacuated 9815 casualties (Williams, 2005). Bureaucratic inghting with the Air Force delayed the elding of the Armys H-19 transport helicopter until 1952. Initial training and transportation to Korea further delayed the initial service of the H-19 to January 1953. In the 7 months before the July 1953 armistice, Army H-19s transported 500 passengers, carried 5 million pounds of cargo, and evacuated 1400 casualties (Williams, 2005). e Army had to repurpose its H-13 observation helicopters as medi cal evacuation helicopters. Its observa tion helicopter compatriots, the H-12 and H-23, joined the H-13. Together, the References: Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from 21https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Armys H-12, H-13, and H-23 helicopters evacuated more than 17,000 casualties over the course of the Korean War (Wil liams, 2005; Whitcomb, 2011). Based on its training and wartime ex perience with the HRP-1, the Marine Corps acquired the H-37 to advance its concept of vertical assault. e H-37, which had two 4,200 horsepower en gines, gave the Marine Corps a singlerotor helicopter, but it failed to meet the operational requirements placed on it. is failure le the Marine Corps searching for a suitable assault helicop ter (Whitcomb, 2012). Aer the Korean War, the Army rec ognized that observation helicopters made poor ad hoc evacuation platforms. erefore, the Army decided to ensure that future helicopters would be capable of patient transport. A 1950s design competition sought to meet this goal by acquiring a dual-purpose util ity and evacuation helicop ter. e 1955 contract called for a single-ro tor helicopter powered by a then-800 horse power turbine engine. e helicopter was designated the UH-1 in 1962, but it was (and is) bet ter known as the Huey (Whitcomb, 2011; Wil liams, 2005). Turbine engines have a better li per engine pound ratio than piston engines, and this improvement greatly expanded the ight envelope of rotarywing aircra (Whitcomb, 2012). For example, the Army mounted turbine engines on the H-37s transmission and gearbox to create the CH-54, a Sky crane capable of liing 25,000 pounds (Williams, 2005; Whitcomb, 2012). is innovation proved to be the answer to the Marine Corps prayers. In 1962, the Marine Corps issued a contract to Sikorsky for the CH-53, which added a full cabin to a CH-54 (Whitcomb, 2012). Additional 1960s rotary-wing advances enabled by turbine engines included the CH-46 and CH-47, two similar turbinepowered tandem-rotor cargo helicopters (Boeing, 2017; Grina, 1975). e 1960s bore witness to the grow ing conict in Vietnam. In response to the rising casualties, the Army be gan a competition for the Advanced Aerial Fire Support System. Lockheeds AH-56, which added a rear-mounted pusher propeller to a typical single-ro tor helicopter, was selected. e AH-56 was designed to use the main and antitorque rotors during hovering and nonforward directional ight, but use the pusher propeller and stub wings during forward ight. is design required the transmission to vary power delivery be tween the rotors based on ight prole, and the complexity resulted in develop ment delays (Dorr, 2011). Impatient, avi ation crews in Vietnam took advantage of the additional gross weight provided by the UH-1Bs turbine engine upgrade to create a UH-1 gunship. Addition ally, the Army purchased four ACH-47 gunships to supplement the UH-1 gun ship eet. ese ad hoc solutions were replaced by the AH-1, the Armys rst purpose-built helicopter gunship. e AH-1 was a heavily redesigned UH-1, featuring a more ecient rotor system, more powerful engine, and more aero dynamic fuselage (Williams, 2005). By the time the AH-1 saw service in Viet nam, the AH-56 project was canceled (Dorr, 2011). e Army also pursued a References: Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201822

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Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) in the 1960s. At the conclusion of the LOH eort, the Army added the OH-6 and OH-58 single-engine observation heli copters to its inventory (Rankin, 1974). Despite the innovations represented by the UH-1, AH-1, OH-6, CH-46, CH47, CH-53, CH-54, and OH-58 aircra, there were complaints. Helicopter en gines were underpowered (still!), unreli able, burned too much gas, and required too much maintenance (Chait, Lyons, & Long, 2006). e CH-47, which re mains in service today, received regu lar upgrades over the course of its life, and began its F model upgrade in 2007 (Dillard, Hite, & Wilson, 2007). By the time the CH-47 reached its D model, it could li as much as the CH-54 with out requiring modication to transport personnel. is removed the need for multiple cargo helicopters in the Army inventory and led to the re tirement of the CH-54 (Wil liams, 2005). is swap helps explain why we still have one company of Chinooks in each Combat Aviation Bri gade (CAB), but the disposi tion of the UH1, AH-1, OH-6, CH-46, CH-53, and OH-58 air cra were a lit tle more complicated. e Marine Corps acquired References: Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from a dual engine version of the UH1, the N model, in 1971, and a dual engine AH-1 followed its brother into Marine Corps Service shortly thereaer. Both versions of the H-1 remain in Marine Corps service, and they are currently un dergoing a modernization program that includes up grades to the power plant and transmission (Naval Air Sys tems Command, n.d.). e Air Force also acquired the UH-1N in the 1970s (United States Air Force, 2015). ese acquisition projects built on the Armys suc cess by modifying an existing, proven airframe to another Ser vices specic needs. In 1979, the Army Helicopter Im provement Program (AHIP) sought an improved observation helicopter; Bell and Hughes both proposed improved versions of their Vietnam era obser vation helicopters. In 1981, the Army awarded Bell the contract, and Bell be gan producing the OH-58D (Fairweath er & Fossum, 1982). e AHIP decision represented the beginning of the end for the Armys OH-6 eet, but H-6 deriva tives still see limited Army service today (Boeing, 2017). In 1988, Bell modied 11 OH-58Ds to create an ad hoc armed scout, and by 1990, the OH-58D had transformed into the Kiowa Warrior (Bell Helicopter, 2016). e Kiowa War rior served until its recent divestment as part of the Aviation Restructuring Ini tiative (Cleveland, 2017). In the 1970s, the Army developed two brand new helicopters instead of up grading its UHs and AH-1s. e UH-1s replacement grew out of e Improved Lift Ship (TILS) project of 1970. Two weeks aer the 1972 cancellation of the AH-56 project, the Army began its Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) program. e results of TILS and the AAH were the UH-60 and AH-64 helicopters. Each of these helicopters incorporated novel technology to improve their mission eectiveness. e helicopters engines were particularly noteworthy (Trybula, 2012). Like the earlier UH-1 and AH-1, the UH-60 and AH-64 helicopters had a common power plant: the General Electric (GE) T700 (GE Aviation, 2017). e original T700 engines 1500 horse power engine outperformed the UH-1H helicopters T53-L-13 1400 horsepower engine, and both the UH-60 and AH-64 used two T700 engines (Crawford, 1973; Whitcomb, 2011; Chait et al., 2006). is doubled the maximum gross weight of the UH-60 and AH-64 aircra com pared to the earlier UH and AH-1. 23https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Much like the Armys CH-47, the Ma rine Corps CH-53 has been upgraded multiple times since the 1960s, and the current CH-53K has a gross weight of 88,000 pounds (Naval Air Systems Command, n.d.). e Air Force ac quired the CH-53 in 1967 and employed it until 2008 (Whitcomb, 2012). e CH-46 remained in use until 2014 (Boe ing, 2017). Before addressing the CH-46 and CH-53s replacement, an interlude is appropriate to examine the state of the helicopter prior to its introduction. At the end of the 1970s, all of the mili tarys helicopters depended on one in novation: the turbine engine. Turbine engines provided the power plant of the UH-1, AH-1, OH-6, CH-46, CH47, CH-54, CH-53, OH-58, UH-60, and AH-64 aircra. Moving to the present day, as the turbine engine improved, helicopters increased their maximum gross weights (up to 88,000 pounds for a brand new CH-53K), but retreating blade stall limited the maximum speed of single-rotor helicopters. In a similar way, the maximum airspeed of both singleand tandem-rotor helicopters is limited by compressibility eects on the advancing blade (Edi et al., 2008). e 1981 Joint VTOL Experimental (JVX) program called for high-speed rotorcra, which meant overcoming retreating blade stall and compressibil ity eects. A combined Bell/Boeing bid, dubbed the V-22 Osprey, was selected in 1983. Full-scale devel opment began in 1986, the V-22 reached its initial oper ational capabilities in 2008, and the V-22 is projected to reach its Full Operational Capabilities in 2018 (Bray brook, 2014; Naval Air Sys tems Command, n.d.). e V-22 is a tilt-rotor Vertical/ Short Take O and Landing (V/STOL) aircra (Naval Air Systems Command, n.d.). As the name would suggest, tilt-rotor aircra tilt their rotors, which grants access to ight envelopes similar to a helicopter (while the rotors are pointed upward to produce vertical li) and an airplane (while the rotors are pointed forward to produce horizontal thrust) (Braybrook, 2014). e V-22 replaced the CH-46 as the Marine Corps medium-li rotarywing aircra. It also replaced the MH53 as the Air Forces special operations rotary-wing aircra (Naval Air Systems Command, n.d.; Whitcomb, 2012). e tilt-rotor at the heart of the V-22 is not the only method for increasing the speed of rotary-wing aircra. Tilt-wings, compound helicopters, and coaxial ro tor systems have all successfully outper formed the typical sin gle-rotor helicopter (Edi et al., 2008; Chana, 1992). How ever, the question of which technology (tiltrotor, tilt-wing, compound helicopter, or coaxial rotor) will dominate future rotary-wing development is still unan swered. In 2014, the Army issued two contracts for Air Vehicle Demonstrators under its Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR-TD) (Boeing, 2014; Stein, 2017; U. S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center [AMRDEC], 2016). e JMR-TD will inform the Future Vertical Li (FVL) program, which is supposed to replace the militarys entire vertical li eet (AMRDEC, 2016). Boe ing and Sikorsky are partnered on the SB-1, which uses a coaxial rotor system and a rear-mounted pusher prop (Boe ing, 2017). Bell is producing the V-280, which hopes to improve on the tilt-rotor technology of the V-22 (Bell, 2016). e JMR-TD and FVL programs could herald an irreversible change in rotarywing ight. If one technology is chosen for all four categories of FVL (light, me dium, heavy, and ultra), then military aviation will begin converging around that technology (Callon, 1990; Wise, 2014). Of course, the irreversibility will also depend on the military Ser vices successfully acquiring the chosen FVL airframes. e Army canceled its last rotary-wing acquisition eort, the RAH-66, and le the JVX well before any V-22s were produced (DemotesMainard, 2012; Braybrook, 2014). In the case of the RAH-66, there was no antitermination coalition (DeLeon, 1978). e Army decided it no longer needed the capabilities oered by the RAH-66, and the ghting in Iraq and Afghani stan made upgrading the existing eet more important than a new acquisition (Demotes-Mainard, 2012). ere are les sons available based on the current ac -Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201824

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Photo by SSG Kellen Stuart References: Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from quisition of the F-35 and studies of the FVL management structure. e chief lesson? e military Services should cooperate. Unfortunately, each military Service develops operational require ments based on its own understanding of how to wage war, and the conict be tween operational requirements creates unforced design compromises (Drezner, Roshan, & Whitmore, 2017; Lorell, et al., 2013; Law & Callon, 2014). One poten tial x would be for the FVL acquisition to resemble TILS, where one Service developed an airframe (the H-60) and then others adapted it to their needs, more than the F-35, where the services issued their requirements at the same time during the programs initial design (Drezner, Roshan, & Whitmore, 2017). Military helicopters swily followed Igor Sikorsky and Frank Piaseckis groundbreaking innovations in the 1930s and 40s. Engineering improve ments expanded the rotary-wing ight envelope through the 50s, but the in vention of the turbine engine released the potential of both single-rotor and tandem-rotor aircra. Beginning in the 1960s, whole cloth innovation and in cremental improvements took single-ro tor and tandem-rotor helicopters to the physical limit. e JVX, and its resulting V-22, used tilt-rotor technology to over come retreating blade stall and com pressibility eects; however, the Army did not participate in the program. Now, the Army is funding the JMR-TD. One option uses tilt-rotor technology and the other combines a coaxial rotor with a pusher prop. Even with these advances, FVL aircra built based on the JMRTDs will not reach their full potential without an upgraded power plant. is fact oers a road map for innovation: new airframe designs create possibilities in rotary-wing ight, but improved en gines realize those possibilities. U.S. Army Soldiers from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion 77th Armored Regiment, prepare for an attack on the opposing force during Decisive Action Rotation 14-10 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California., Sept. 23, 2014. Decisive action rotations at the NTC ensure brigade combat teams remain versatile, responsive, and consistently available for the current ght and unforeseen future contingencies. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Charles Probst) 25https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Strategic messaging played a pivotal role in Operation Atlantic Resolve. The 10th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) Soldiers have stuck to the script and Partnering with our Host Nation Allies has echoed from the Balkans to the Baltics PARTNERING with HOST NATION ALLIES By CPT Zachary Johnston Photo by Pierre Courtejoie Photo by Charles Rosemond Photo by Pierre Courtejoie Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201826

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Photo by SPC Hubert Delany Photo by Henria CambierThis rotation was unique in the sense that Soldiers had both an operational and a strategic inuence on a daily basis. Specically, Soldiers in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in teract with host nation personnel regularly. While personally stationed in Lielvarde, Latvia from February to October 2017, I can say that partnering with our allies looks far dierent from that of personnel in other locations. Soldiers, part of Task Force Phoenix, Area of Operations North located at Lielvarde, Lat via share the same workspace, dining space, tness facilities, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation facilities with our Latvian counterparts. is lends itself to building lasting relationships and trust, which is the foundation of partnerships. Partnerships with host nations take many forms. Strictly, from an operational perspective, partnerships can vary. is can be incorporated though multinational training, collaborative ef forts to complete a training event, or simply sharing a train ing space utilizing a co-use agreement. However, is this the most important aspect when Partnering? I believe trust and interoperability go hand-in-hand. Building trust and training competence within a multinational formation does not hap pen overnight. is training has to be deliberate, constantly changed, and continuously updated. As a United States Soldier, I felt most unfamiliar with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactics, terms, and graphics compared to other allied countries. Does this really show a strong commitment? Know ing U.S. doctrine suits us well until we nd ourselves within multinational groups and exercises. As a rotational unit constantly changing out, how do we train; build; and sustain readiness and foster interoperability, all without draining our host nation partners? Accomplishing these feats requires deliberate planning and proper resourcing. During each 9-month rotation, units are supporting multiple joint training events. In order to best pre pare for each exercise and attain the most training for rotational units, they must attend planning conferences that may be out side of their rotation. e knowledge attained from the confer ences gives expectation management, shows a units commit ment to the training mission, and gives adjacent participating countries the actual points of contact well in advance. A small gesture of showing up to a planning conference for a few days outside of an actual rotation sets all parties involved up for suc cess and displays a level of commitment owed to the host na tions. e 10th CAB had many goals prior to leaving Wheeler Sack Army Aireld and embarking on Operation Atlantic Resolve. Collaborating with our host nations was at the forefront of that endeavor, alongside getting multifunctional aviation task force footprints in the South, Central, and North regions of Europe. During Atlantic Resolve-Norths beginning stages, our Part nership felt more like a parasite-to-host relationship, with the 10th CAB being the parasite. e rst to arrive in Latvia, we coordinated oen, met many new faces, and started getting our bearings, all while utilizing huge amounts of the host nations support and time. I believe being an emphatic leader and con veying what we can bring to the host nation early on lends well to partnering and balancing out that relationship, making it more symbiotic. One of the most important and easily overlooked aspects of partnering with our host nation allies is simply spending time with them. Working with NATO partners happens daily; how ever, truly building trust requires friendship and an investment in peoples lives. Knowing with whom you are working builds interoperability to a level not attainable unless you know the people next to you. is holds true inside our formation, as well as outside. Attaining that trust takes time and work outside of the training environment. Organizing a cookout, playing shared sporting events, and spending time with our partners is what will take these relationships to a level not otherwise possible. At the end of the day, interoperability does not look like a well-coordinated distinguished visitors day. It looks like a multinational battle group who can operate in any environ ment and trust the people to their le or right, regardless of the patch on their shoulder. 27https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Our rst mission was in April 2017 for an aerial gunnery exercise at FARP East, Grafenwoehr Training Area. It was during our preparation and execution of this mission that we were rst con fronted with many of the challenges we would continue to face working in Ger many. We found the hazardous material (HAZMAT) standards to be far more rigorous, with secondary containment being necessary for every M978A4 fuel servicing truck we had on the FARP even if they were not on the line. Hose connections also needed to be wrapped with absorbent pads at every connec tionsomething many Soldiers had never done before. is exercise was also the rst time many of our heavy expanded mobility tactical truck driv -The distribution platoon successfully served as the backbone of logistics support for the various mis sions and training events completed by task force Phoenix in support of Atlantic Resolve 2.0. Working with fuel and ammunition in the European theater brought a host of logistical challenges, and there were many lessons learned since our mission began in March 2017. Since our arrival, we maintained a steady mission tempo conduct ing 17 ammunition missions, 3 forward arming and refuel ing point (FARP) operations, and 1 jump FARP operation. Our tasks were critical to the success of the task forces mission and we are proud not only of our achievements, but of the progress we made in-country. Reflections of the Distribution Platoon in GermanyBy SPC Haig Yaghoobian, III Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201828

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had signicantly more infrastructure challenges for the distribution platoon. Instead of hard buildings on the FARP and the barracks at night, we construct ed tents both for the FARP and for the living quarters in the battalion assembly area. Additionally, due to the high risk associated with the surrounding exer cise, the aircra fuel handlers had to wear their eld gear while hot-refueling aircra on the FARP. is proved espe cially challenging with the AH-64 heli copters because the improved outer tac tical vest would oen leave little room between the grounding emplacement and the refuel port on the aircra. Our platoon endured all of these chal lenges, just as we had throughout the entirety of Atlantic Resolve 2.0. Each member of the platoon was able to learn new skillsand perfect old onesin an untried environment. I came away from this rotation much more condent in my abilities, as well as those of my peers. I feel supremely condent that should the need to support our NATO allies arise in the future, we will certainly be ready. ers experienced the intricacies and chal lenges associated with driving on nar row German roads and the high-speed nature of autobahna challenge each member of the platoon eventually came to face. Shortly aer conducting aer-action reviews (AARs) for this exercise, we began to plan for our largest mission in Atlantic Resolve 2.0Saber Strike 2017. Our role in this exercise would prove to be the largest and most critical for the success of the task force. Stationed in Kazlu Ruda, Lithuania, we conducted a four-point FARP operation and cold fuel operations as required for the 3-10 task force. One of the biggest challenges we faced was in the terrain itself. e aireld had long been out of use, and it took the distribution platoon an ex tensive amount of time to clear all the debris from thehard surface to mitigate any foreign object damage hazards. Our busiest times on the FARP were during the air assault operations conducted between the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allied forces, with multiple aircra returning for fuel every hour. At times when the FARP was shut down for the day, we fre quently got a chance to meet members of the Lithuanian Army. Although there was oen a slight language barrier with their broken English, they seemed de lighted at any opportunity to converse with usasking about our lives in the U.S. and our jobs in the U.S. Army. ey told me how fascinated they were with all the aircra we brought in and how much they liked watching them y over throughout the day. Outside of solely FARP operations, the distribution platoon remained busy with a multitude of ammunition missions for the battalion. Traveling to Grafenwoehr Training Area regularly, and even as far as Miseau, Germany, the distribution platoon was able to execute 17 dier ent ammunition missions successfully. As opposed to ammunition missions at Fort Drum, New York, each mission in these regions was far from routine. e HAZMAT regulations for transporting ammunition in Germany are far more stringent, and oen frustrated our abili ties to plan for missions as usual. A good standalone issue, even without ammu nition, was simply driving in Germany. e driving distances for these ammu nition missions was extensive (Miseau alone was a 4-hour drive in a military vehicle) and oen involved Soldiers hav ing to drive aer ranges closed and late into the night. Even aer arriving for ammunition turn-ins, if the paperwork under NATO and German regulations was incorrect, personnel were turned away. is exact circumstance hap pened to a group who went on a mission to Miseau. You can well imagine the frustration at having to drive all the way back unsuccessful! Even so, our platoon managed to adapt to this learning curve quickly, and soon became procient in this area of our responsibilities. e platoons most recent exercise at the Grafenwoehr Training Area was the culmination of all the training the distribution platoon had done in Eu ropePhoenix Fury. Here again, the distribution platoon executed a day and night FARP operation, thereby holding a critical role in the success of the battal ions support mission. In contrast to aer ial gunnery on FARP East, FARP West Photo by SGT Shiloh Capers Photo by SPC Kishroy Robinson, E Company, 3-10 GSAB, 10th CAB 29https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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here are many ways we can try to measure the effectiveness of a military organization. It could be the strength of the forces in numbers; it could be the victories or successes of past operations; however, one of the most valuable methods is to see how fast a unit can assemble and operate after moving the organization to a new theater or area of opera tions. We call this the speed of assembly. In Army aviation, we often pose the question, mission after we relocate to where we are going? The three most standout factors that can give aid to a quick and successful speed for op eration and assembly are: the units equipment readi ness, personnel readiness, and the units mission com mand element readiness.e Army has one main mission and intentto ght and win the Nations wars and to secure the peace of the country at all times. e two primary things used to accomplish this are the materials or equipment and the training or people. In the case of speed of assembly, the equipment refers to the rst mate rial things that will reach the new area of operations, and are be expected to be mission capable when they arrive. As an experienced aviation Soldier in a rotational movement to Atlantic Resolve 2.0, an aviation brigades aircra is the most pivotal equipment when it comes to the speed of assembly. Yet, there are readiness-related items that can make moving aircra overseas much easier, and thus quicker to make useable on the other side. e most easily identiable items that can provide aid to the speed of assembly are the scheduled mainte nance and the projection of the work performed with the aircra aer arrival in theater. Special tools, both aircra-specic and general-use tools, are oen overlooked. A good example of this would be turbine engine wash systems that are re quired for engine maintenance; however, due to their size and weight they are oen put in a place that is not accessible when they are needed. I have also observed times when special tools requiring calibration (like torque wrenches) are allowed to have their validation voided, making them useless when they are needed. e usability and readiness of our ground and air support equipment is every bit as important as the aircra themselves. Another consideration is the availability of parts while moving a unit to a new location. Repair parts may not be readily available during the rst part of a movement, so making crucial parts immediately accessible will aid in the speed of assembly. During Atlantic Resolve 2.0, our unit assembled and executed a mission less than 4 days aer arrival due to detailed planning of necessary equipment. is was possible mainly because our unit had senior maintenance personnel who made sure the things we needed most were packed By CW2 Michael Falk and CW3 Ryan Harmer How Fast Can We Fly a Mission After We Relocate?Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201830

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into the aircra. ese necessities would be unloaded and put back together rst on the deployed location. is displays more than ever how experience will sometimes solve a problem faster than a doctrinal approach might. Even more important than the gear the unit uses are the people who use it each day. Usually an aviation brigade will conduct academics and local area ori entation ights to familiarize aircrews with a new area in which they will oper ate. However, much of this training can be made available before the unit ever deploys, translating to a faster speed of assembly on the ground. Most of the in formation we have previously covered explains the people and equipment as separate items, but the next aspect that is important to discuss for speed of as sembly is mission command. Army doctrine denes mission com mand as the conduct of military opera tions through decentralized execution based on mission orders for eective mission accomplishment. What does that really mean? It means using the Commanders intent and working through whatever friction points pres ent themselves in order make the mis sion happen. Units that have operated in those or a similar area of operations can be a very valuable asset in planning. Unfortunately, the lessons learned from the unit that is being replaced are not usually drawn upon until the learning is reactive instead of proactive. It is never a bad idea to communicate and coor dinate early and oen with the subject matter experts of the area to best set the conditions for an incoming unit. Combining that early coordination with the proper training of personnel and care of equipment will aid with the speed of assembly, as well as aid with safer mission accomplishment overall. By empowering our junior leaders and integrating them early and oen to the area of operations ahead of us, our units rotation to Europe was much more suc cessful. It seems like an easy concept, but sometimes in execution, it does not always work out that way. So much of the Army is based on change: change of leaders, changes in training such as tactics and techniques, and changes to equipment, as well. It is important to remember that no matter what changes take place, the Army is always expected to ght and win our great Nations wars. e better we take care of our people, keep our equipment ready, and train our junior leaders, the faster and safer our speed of assembly will be when operat ing in a new environment.Photo by SGT Kalie Jones31https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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The 10th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) learned of its upcoming rotation to Europe 7 months prior to execution. minimal knowledge existed on support requirements. This article explores the Aviation Support Battalion (ASB) distribution companys challenges and the actions taken to overcome obstacles during Atlantic Resolve.(Automated Logistical Specialists) to ll critical shortages. Alpha Company Forward (FWD) implemented an extensive cross-training program focused on Forward Arming and Refuel Point (FARP) operations, water purication, and driver training. Soldiers displayed technical compe tence and gained valuable experience by teaching peers how to execute missions outside their Military Occupation Spe cialty (MOS). All personnel learned the basics of each MOS to create exibility. Soldiers and leaders built trust during four FARPs, one water purication ex ercise, and two comprehensive eldtraining exercises. e training focused on operating military vehicles over long distances in civilian environments, a signicant shi from traveling on the lo cal training area at slow speeds. e cul minating event sent Soldiers more than 8 hours through the Adirondack Moun e ASB immediately began construct ing a task force capable of supporting three ight battalions spread through out Central and Eastern Europe. ere are several key dierences between ex ecuting a rotation instead of a deploy ment. A regionally aligned force (RAF) mission does not authorize fencing personnel, but requires Soldiers to pass stringent Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) stipulations generally experienced during deployments. Several Soldiers were non-deployable due to medical readiness, permanent change of station (PCS), and expiration term of service (ETS). Alpha Company lacked person nel in key positions including 92F (Fuel Supply Specialist), 92W (Water Purica tion Specialist), 88M (Motor Transport Operator), and 89B (Ammunition Sup ply Specialist). Atlantic Resolve did not require Supply Support Activity (SSA) augmentation from Alpha Company, so leadership selected 12 strong 92As tains to establish a four-point FARP at Rome, New York. Several 92Ws, 89Bs, and 92As served as truck commanders (TCs) during the convoy and assisted with all FARP operations. Following the train-up, focus quickly shied to completing U.S. European Command (EUCOM)-specic require ments. All hazardous material vehicles required modications to satisfy the European agreement concerning the Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201832

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Atlantic 2017international transportation of hazard ous goods by road accord (Europen realtif au Transport International des Marchandises dangereus par Route), called an ADR. e ADR vehicles, a tank er (M978A4 HEMTT), mobility tactical truck (M1120 Load Handling System), palletized load system trailer (M1076 TRL), and tractor truck (M1088 Bob tail) shipped 4 months prior to arrival so civilian contractors could install and conduct modications at Maintenance Activities Kaiserslautern (MAK) and Maintenance Activities Vilseck (MAV). All required Soldiers attended a 2-week hazardous material drivers course (HAZ 11) for hazardous vehicle operators. Any hazardous material movement requires accompanying paperwork completed by a HAZ 12and HAZ 15-certied Sol dier. Units can complete these courses with a mobile training team (MTT) at home station or at several sites in Ger many. e battalion coordinated a MTT, but last-minute requirements prevented maximum participation. e certica tions directly feed capability and should be a major priority before leaving home station. I recommend all 92F and 89B personnel attend HAZ 11 to remove the limiting factor entirely. Five HAZ 12 and HAZ15certied Sol diers are su cient to support the high operation al tempo.ResolveBy CPT Monte BaileyAlpha Company travelled to Germany on four separate movements spread out over 1 month. It is critical to manifest support Soldiers on early ights. Com petent leaders and versatile operators greatly increased the overall speed of assembly. Most operations during this phase are reactionary due to civilian assets delivering vehicles from port. Carriers arrive at any time with little predictability due to lack of in-transit visibility. Available operators and mate rial handling equipment (MHE) drive success during reception. A daily syn chronization meeting between company unit movement ocers improved asset visibility and tracked capabilities as they arrived from port. Civilian contractors did not complete any ADR vehicles prior to our arrival, severely diminishing fuel and ammu nition capabilities. e ASB contacted personnel at 21st eater Sustainment Command (TSC) to coordinate stay-be hind equipment (SBE) when it became apparent that many of the vehicles were weeks from completion. e rst ADR equipment began arriving aer 90 days, but the M978 HEMTT fuelers did not pass Aqua-Glo testing (an ultra violet method used to test aviation fuels for un dissolved [free] water) due to a white, milky substance found in each of the tanks. Soldiers re circulated trucks for 3 to 4 consecutive days before the fuel was below 5 parts per million (ppm) and ready for aircra, per the 10th CAB standard operating procedure. e M969 truck had contin uous brake line and chamber issues be cause brakes are altered in order to pass the strict ADR brake test guidelines. e only way to combat both of these issues is to immediately begin recirculating and ensure additional brake systems are on hand for quick repair. Alpha Company utilized the rst month in country to implement a convoy pro gression program that consisted of four convoys, increasing distance with each mission. e progression allowed Soldiers to get comfortable with tight roads, European drivers, trac circles, etc. It also forced company leadership and battalion sta to complete the prop er paperwork and identify key points of contact (POCs) for future operations. Convoys improved in all aspects, with each repetition and operations slowly synchronized amongst operators and sta. Alpha Company travelled more than 10,000 miles through 10 countries dur ing Atlantic Resolve. Extensive convoy operations satised the Commanders intent by displaying a dynamic pres ence throughout EUCOM. ere were several challenges lead ers worked through to ensure 33https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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plans to complete the mission. Alpha Company supported Task Force Falcon with CL I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, and IX (diering classes of supply) for 45 days during Saber Guardian 2017. e exercise challenged every MOS and en compassed several mission essential task list (METL) tasks, and it concluded with a multinational air assault called Swi Response. Alpha Company established and operated a four-point FARP in con junction with four additional points run by FSCs. All the training came to frui tion when Alpha Company pushed over 13,000 gallons of fuel to 30 aircra in less than 6 hours. e Swi Response FARP team included three 89B, two 92W, and two 92A personnel. is exercise was a microcosm of Atlantic Resolve; Alpha Company was successful because every Soldier bought in to our mission vice my mission. Supporting a rotational CAB spread throughout Europe is an extremely challenging and rewarding venture for a distribution company. e unique mis sion set demands strong leadership at all levels. It is an outstanding opportunity to decrease focus on garrison tasks and train during a signicant real world de terrence mission. e high operational tempo, strict HAZMAT regulations, and dicult environments increase the overall risk, but the unit will return to home station at the highest possible state of readiness aer a rotation in the Leadership Factory. training event during Atlantic Resolve. e exercise took place in Hungary, Ro mania, and Bulgaria. It involved more than 25,000 Service members from over 20 allied and partner nations. e ASB conducted a tactical road march that spanned 1,300 miles from Illesheim, Germany to Novo Selo Training Area, Bulgaria. Alpha Company provided a fuel asset to each serial and distrib uted fuel at several refuel on the move (ROM) sites. Exercise planners coordi nated ideal ROM locations, but convoy Commanders oen adjusted based on mission variables such as trac, vehicle maintenance, weather, fatigue, host na tion escorts, and route changes. Each serial stopped at ve convoy support centers (CSCs) to receive fuel, food, and shelter. Most CSCs included mainte nance capabilities and a recovery asset. Task Force Falcon placed a liaison at each CSC to coordinate support, main tenance, transportation movement re quests (TMRs), and host nation escorts for the following day. e liaison expe dited operations by pre-staging CL I (ra tions/health and comfort items), direct ing trac to staging areas, brieng key locations, and reporting information to the Movement Control Team on station. e large-scale ground movement was strenuous and demanding for an avia tion brigade, but the experience gained was invaluable. Senior leaders empow ered junior leaders to react and generate mission success. Each country operated on unique timelines, required dierent information, and utilized particular forms. e extensive work on several formats never decreased, but the ASB sta built relationships with key person nel at higher echelons in order to expe dite requests. e sta routinely sub mitted and received local march credits within 48 hours by the end of Atlantic Resolve. e march credit timeline im proved drastically through constant repetition and captured lessons learned. Alpha Company sent personnel and equipment to augment the Forward Support Companies (FSCs) at nearly every training rotation. e package ranged from a couple of Soldiers to a full four-point FARP capability. e constant training increased competence and enhanced relationships with supported units. e Soldiers learned alternative methods to accomplish sev eral tasks and came back with a better understanding of how to best support that FSC. Alpha Company assumed risk by sending a signicant portion of the formation for weeks at a time but gained valuable eld experience in each case. It is critical for command teams to build a collaborative plan to ensure the exercise meets both intents and properly utilizes augmentation personnel. Saber Guardian 2017 was the largest Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201834

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Lacking Perspective: The Perceived Incompetence of Higher Headquarters By MAJ Michael C. Shaw and Mr. Justin M. Witty ALWAYS SOMEONE ELSES FAULT Its the middle of the week, and your or ganization is a beehive of activity with all operations, requirements, and task ings owing normally. Out of the blue, someone from headquarters walks into your oce and passes along a short no tice, must accomplish, priority tasking, which has your organizations name all over it. You read the order, begin to sort through the specied and implied tasks, and realize that this change will crater the rest of your weeks plans. Simultaneously, you start question ingWhy me? Why my organization, who approved this, why didnt this go through the required 180-day task ing window, and most importantly, where is the support needed to ac complish this task? Its as if my higher headquarters just cut sec tions out of another operations order and threw this together without any critical thought aaaarrrrrgggghhh!!!! At some point, most of us have had these thoughts tumbling through our heads given our asso ciation with the Army, to include the Aviation branch. We internally, and sometimes vocally, place blame for per ceived diculties or perceived lack of coordination upon others, mainly as a self-defense mechanism, but sometimes out of confusion, frustration, or a lack of perspective. Many times, the ill will is directed at our higher headquarters and their perceived lack of competence and respect for our time. However, isnt each organizational body made up of the same general mix and quality of Soldiers, Noncommissioned Ocers (NCO), and Ocers? I would bet those incompetent yahoos at headquarters would suddenly become a bunch of ded icated professionals if we changed jobs and went up an echelon to work with them every day. Is that just how it goes? Do we simply lack empathy, or can we not get over ourselves? Is this gap in per spective related to perceived overcon dence (Shaw & Witty, 2017)? One thing is for sure, it took the authors more than 10 years of service to move beyond the self-focused construct such as my team, my squad, or my company, and move into a wider eld of view that modied the my and incorporated the the team, the squad, the company. us, be ginning the perspective years. A decade of service is too long to wait for a per spective awaking. As we progress through the ranks, vary ing assignments, and units, we realize that not everyone thinks or acts the same way we do. Everyone has dierent priorities and worries, and though we try to align ourselves to a common pur pose, on a day-to-day basis we are oen just not on the same page. For our pro fession to advance, one must synchro nize and de-conict, one must humble themselves to larger organizational ob jectives, and one must possess the will ingness to see beyond their temporary role. We must resist the desire to place blame for mission diculty, confusion, or opposing outcomes upon others and silence, whenever possible, the idea that someone else is always making it harder for us to do our jobs. Gaining and main taining a broad perspective is the nal challenge of this mini-series. CAUSES OF OUR DYSFUNCTION Tom Rieger, a Senior Practice Expert for Gallup, describes the concept and cause of lacking perspective as the fear that lives within... the walls of the organiza tion (Rieger, 2016). While couched from a dierent point of view, his three-level model describes in detail similar strug gles that limit the Armys and Aviations openness, and thus impact our ability to gain and maintain a much broader per spective. Unfortunately, this model is accurate in describing frictions span ning newly formed squads all the way to the halls of the Pentagon. LEVEL ONE: PAROCHIALISM We all get parochial at times; it is human nature. A focus on my platoon, or my unit, or my career dominates everyones de cision-making at some point. Such focus is not inherently bad, but the theory of seless service that we all sub scribed to when we joined the military, requires us to look beyond those selsh desires and take the needs of others into account (especially if we are leaders). ose others mentioned just so happen to include your next higher headquar ters, the next higher-level operation, or even an overall strategy that may or may not take your organizations well-being into consideration. By fullling our nar row focus at the my level, are we meet ing the goals required of us by higher headquarters? ese authors believe that the Army assumes junior ocers or Soldiers will piece together this complex relationship and inherently put seless service ahead of all else. For us, it took a decade of service to identify such a shi was needed and several more years to capture these observations in some form 35https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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on paper. On a daily basis, the damning accusa tions of they, and them, and what they are doing to me can be heard in motorpools, cubicles, and conference rooms across the Army. No assign ment, position, or rank is immune to such thoughts. Since we all have dier ing missions, priorities, and funding, it is dicult to get various echelons to work toward the same goals. We are re minded of Miles Law, where you stand depends on where you sit (Miles, 1978). Now apply this 1978 concept across the coordination and planning happening at dierent speeds and across diering timelines. Look to our own Aviation branch and the complexities that erupt out of seemingly simple coordination across a like-minded aviation brigade, across a pure rotary-wing battalion, and across a training-focused and intimate line company. More oen than not, the intent of the order issued from higher has morphed, and the perspectives changed by the time direction reaches the end user. During our time as assistant plan ners, we used to say to plan early was to plan twice. Such a phrase was half rebuke but also half acknowledgment that rst dras never made it to the nal production and circumstances would inevitably change. Perspective and the ability to fully recognize the intent of or ders may not always eliminate friction, but it can provide understanding, which may stem the tide of incompetence n ger pointing. What is best for a compa ny of 35 Soldiers may not be best for a 450-Soldier battalion or a 2400-Soldier Brigade. Perspective is everything. LEVEL TWO: TERRITORIALISM Territorialism is a result of building si los that not only restrict communica tion and sharing but oen cause open competition for resources and person nel within the unit. In our early days as ocers, we saw and participated in the spending of our organizations remain ing budget at the end of the scal year. is act was founded in the belief that such actions were necessary to ensure you are given the same dollar amount next year, regardless if you used the re maining portion on Morale, Welfare, and Recreation events, unit equipment, or pens and ink. ese actions dene territorialism, which continually gums the gears of our extensive bureaucracy. Instead of units or echelons giving some of that money back, units spend all they can because budgetary expenditure is a measure of success. We selshly and de fensively horde resources, which in turn creates ineciency. ese ineciencies are not limited to warghting units. Budgetary territorialism is mimicked throughout the entire Aviation branch and the entirety of the Army. In the end, the dollar not spent requires justica tion, and if not suciently justied is deemed unneeded or excessive, result ing in reduced funding the next scal cycle. In the Army, the term rice bowl references the organizational territory people protect as if it were their asset; oen to the detriment of larger orga nizational needs. Again, we can apply the idea of perspective and how under standing the larger funding, spending, and requirements model can directly impact the user. Unfortunately, many do not see or know a perspective beyond their territory. Most of the time, leaders think they are protecting their loyal Sol diers from disruption by ghting for all the resources they believe they need to function, and fostering esprit de corps for their subunit. However, by taking such a myopic view, they are hoarding resources. Leaders may view the real location of assets as a rebuke to their individual leadership or loss of territo rial power, which may cause them to feel backed into a corner and ready to ght. Moreover, Soldiers oen only have a specic job for a short time. ere is little continuity and much of the time spent in a position must focus on learn ing ones job and attempting to better that specic organization. e short amount of time spent in each assign ment tends to support the idea of ter ritorialism, as perspective is dicult to garner. e broader ones perspective, the more he can support long-term ob jectives, whereas, newly assigned posi tions respond to immediate and organi zational-focused actions. Relationships that garner perspective continually have to start over, consistency is lost, and trust becomes an aerthought. Without trust and with short-term assignments, one just has to wait people out. While we permanently change stations every 23 years, individuals change jobs almost every year. How do we build and sever relationships every 365 days and still ex pect to maintain perspective and vision sharing? It is of little surprise that one defaults to territorialism. LEVEL THREE: EMPIRE BUILDING With increased scope and responsibility, one must also maintain a matching de gree of perspective. When unable, people become increasingly defensive. We have already discussed how a lack of perspec tive can lead to parochialism, which in turn grows into actions of territorialism. Le unchecked, an individuals reliance on territorialism can morph into empire building, Riegers third level. During empire building, leaders attempt to as sert control over [others] people, func tions, or resources to regain or enhance self-suciency (Rieger, 2016). Here, we see the lack of trust ensuing from a de ciency in perspective begins to consume organizational decisions, and a need to assert greater control out of that fear surfaces. For a practical example, let us look to a specic action within the Avia tion community over the past 3 years. e Aviation Restructure Initiative, a Department of the Army (DA) execu tion order restructuring the entire avia tion branch as a result of Congressional budgetary decisions (sequestration), is a living example what happens when trust goes missing, and fear reigns supreme. Not one Aviation component, com mand, directorate, organization, unit, or individual Soldier was le untouched by this shi. We witnessed parochialism and territorialism jetting forth, build ing momentum into the year of great est turbulence, 2016. Defensive natures, fueled by fear and lack of perspective, mired the branch in a torrent of empire building. Entities sought victory for themselves and their command empires and not the betterment of our branch or Army. Diculties and challenges were, and to some degree still are, viewed as a plot to usurp power and authority. Fear of the unknown, fear of change, and fail ure of trust caused more friction within our community than any reduction in budget ever could. e idea of seless service fell to the background as the bat tle for new Aviation empires within our Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201836

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community waged. As of this edition of Aviation Digest, the branch is less than 1 year away from the scheduled completion of the Avia tion Restructure Initiative, and still, major decisions remain, trust remains inconsistent, and broader perspective is in short supply. e good news is, there is always hope. Mission accomplish ment is taking place slowly, and while every decision is not universally agreed upon, we as a community must begin to acknowledge the decisions not directly beneting ones own unit are not a result of higher level incompetence or lack of understanding, but rather growth and enhancement of the force at large. Over condence in the power and eective ness of parochialism, territorialism, and empire building must cease. Leadership of organizations, such as those within the service, mandate the alignment of multiple purposes toward a singular vision or objective. erefore, it takes a broad aperture and a willingness to humble oneself and ones organizational desires in order to grow and ourish from a position of non-power. A PATH FORWARD Life is a series of hurdles. at fact reigns true regardless of ones profession. How one looks at and describes those obsta cles is what makes the dierence. Are those objects in the way placed there in tentionally for you to trip over, are they in your way for you to learn how to jump higher, are they in your path because someone has to tackle that diculty and your organization was chosen, or are those obstacles there out of sheer dumb luck? Regardless of how they got there, the power/responsibility resides within each leader to accept those challenges and garner as much understanding as possible, while avoiding the temptation to accuse, blame, or smite another for such challenges. Greater understanding of where people are coming from, what their aim is, and the sharing of a vision greater than the organization, is how one can defeat pa rochialism. Our unwillingness to let go of the selsh and embrace the seless is a challenge that we all must face. e sooner we gain a broader perspective surrounding our environment, the bet ter we are able to let go of the blame. Forgetfulness and/or blindness of our purposeseless service is a leading cause of territorialism. We must em brace the inevitability of being replaced, while still maintaining condence in our worth and abilities. We must remain humble servants to the greater organi zation. No individual, sta, director ate, budget, or piece of equipment is the savior of all. We must remind ourselves that there were those who came before us, and there will be those who come aer us. It is not for us to blindly pro tect what we believe we are entitled to. ere may come a time to sacrice a spe cic job, eliminate a sta, or build new structure. It is only with a much larger aperture that one can be in a position to see those possibilities, embrace change when needed, and hold steadfast as re quired. To love ones organization some times requires its sacrice. At our weakest, most afraid, and most vulnerable, one clings tightest to their empire. rough fear and a lack of trust, one continues to build or fortify exist ing walls. A lack of understanding and heightened perspective prevents neigh boring communities from combing re sources to enhance their strength and unity. Instead, we question all decisions and peer cautiously over our walls at de cisions made by others, believing that our own self-suciency reigns supreme. ese limitations and blockades are all internally driven and thus, can be inter nally torn down. Trust, being founda tional to the Army profession and one of its seven values, quickly tarnishes (DA, 2015). Perhaps we need to look at the tarnished areas and begin treatment, an act that requires sacrice and facing in dividual and organizational challenges. Who has the personal courage to take such a look? Perspectives dier depending on the view from ones foxhole, cockpit, or References: cubicle. Additionally, very few perspec tives share the same priority. Even if we all want similar outcomes, our methods and processes are very dierent. One person may focus on Soldier develop ment, while another focuses on xing the logistics. In the end, it matters not on what any one individual chooses to focus. Preferably, the end state is a com mon vision, shared understanding, and eorts supported by resources all mov ing in concert with one another. We all may not agree on the best path forward. However, knowing we all have fruitful concepts that contribute to overall mis sion accomplishment regardless of the challenges placed before us, must cause us to pause and ensure we maintain the correct perspective. 37https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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The evolution of the battalion Aviation sition in 2-10 Assault Helicopter Battal ion (AHB) truly started over a year ago, prior to our deployment to Europe for Atlantic Resolve 2.0. Many AMSOs are utilized in roles outside delegation is key. After a year as battalion AMSO, Ive realized that we have to train or cross-train beyond the single point of failure. There is no reason that an individual should be the only one who knows how to program Com bat Survivor Evader Locator radios (CSELs), update the Aviation Mission Planning Systems (AMPS), print maps on the plotter, or analyze aviation threatsand I havent even really mentioned personnel recovery operations. My effort was to change this mindset and elimi nate the single point of failure by cross-train ing all the way to the platoon level. In addition to this goal of properly training others, our AMSO program also expanded to include the ing Atlantic Resolve 2.0, as well as the master gunner program, and a close developmental relationship with the S2 analysts.Our battalion developed an LNO program to better interface with the multiple, multinational units we worked with during Atlantic Resolve 2.0. Based on my initial experience as an LNO with 4/25 Airborne at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), I set out to de velop a training class for the next rotation. A former in fantry paratrooper, and now current aviator, took those class materials and publications and added the specic information needed to assist an air assault LNO serv ing with ground forces during the air assault planning process. As a battalion, we found it made a world of dif ference in smoothing out the wrinkles. ese results reinforced that just jumping into the liaison environ ment without educational development and a sense of purpose leads to wasted time and only serves to burden the warghter and their Commanders. e master gunner position in an air assault battalion is usually a part of the Standardization Instructor (SI) program. As a master gunner, I was tasked with this new job based on the mindset that since I understood AMSO RolesMultinationalEnvironmentAND CHALLENGES IN ABy CW3 Jason Penn Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201838

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the tactical employment of the aircra, I should ensure that the weapons were being employed correctly. Initially, I started out simply by serving as a range ocer in charge (OIC) because I had never run an aerial gunnery range be fore, let alone have any idea what a mas ter gunner really was. However, aer three aerial gunnery ranges, I now have a better idea what the role of master gunner entails. As I stated earlier in this article, jumping into the assigned task or environment without educational development, will lead to wasted eort. rough this process, I have become a tremendous advocate of gaining an edu cation via the programs made available to us in Army aviation. I believe the best ideas and best of intentions can only be shored up with formal education, if it exists. A personal example is the devel opment of Surface Danger Zones/Weap on Engagement Zones (SDZ/WEZs) for gunnery. Understanding not only the range of the weapon systems, but also the materials of the projectile, the tar get or target area, and the geometry of the SDZ/WEZ in reference to the physi cal range boundaries makes a huge dif ference in the success and safety of the range. My eorts as a budding master gunner were stretched in trying to account for the eect of terrain on mission plan ning, while developing another allied partners range for aerial gunnery at Cincu, Romania, was challenging to say the least. To make it work, our battalion relied on several elements: range OIC, tactical Command post (TAC) OIC, and our maintenance and logistics compa nies, to name a few. Even our S2 analysts (intelligence operations and security) were there to sta the threat simulators. It didnt hurt to have experience as an LNO to better work with allied nations. With a great deal of cooperation and patience, we pushed the range as far as we dared in order to identify what ad vantages and disadvantages this realistic training oered to us through the ter rain and natural and manmade barriers. e challenges facing the crews included operating on a range no one had ever utilized for door gunnery, with aviation survivability equipment (ASE) indica tors and SMOKEY SAMS (surface-toair missiles) going o. With no room for mistakes for the ve aircra crewmem bers, this eort became a challenge for aircrew coordination. To increase the realism for gunnery tables IXII (training and evaluation tables), we conducted live-re coordi nation with SA-8 Gecko RADAR, manportable aircra survivability trainer (MAST), and SMOKEY SAM rocket simulators. e ights included assaults into shoot-house targets with and with out Romanian troops on a range that, in retrospect, we werent sure we were going to be able to fully utilize up to company size live-re air assaults. Yes, being pushed out of your comfort zone can be unnerving; yet, what Army avia tor hasnt been unnerved a bit? Its why we keep coming back for it. Our nal eort involved assimilating the AMSO into the S2 shop. Our aim was to develop an integrated threat analysis technique that surpassed the 3-dimensional realm of ground warfare. We wanted to integrate the S2 analy sis tools and thought processes into our 4-dimensional environment where nothing ever stays the same, and there is no place to pull over or press pause. In this assimilation eort, the S2 shop learned about our aircra, ASE systems, and what the dierent threat systems available mean to aviators. I learned about the dierent techniques utilized in analyzing bestand worst-case sce narios (depending on whose side youre on) of weapon emplacement, speed of those systems through terrain, and how that timing can be utilized to put warf ighters on the ground to destroy those assets or bypass them for another target. I also learned that you might be close to a threat system, but that does not mean the ght is over. I had never really looked at these techniques and ideas through S2 eyes before; however, I was able to take some of those ideas and utilize them during our aerial gunnery aerward. Success of the mutual understanding of capabilities and limitations was evident in the use of Polygone range (PR) assets in Germany, who provided aircrew tac tics evaluation and electronic combat training. In my opinion, the AMSO/S2 integration has been our greatest suc cess. To put it simply, we have been extremely busy in the S2/AMSO/Master Gunner/ LNO/PR shop. While it hasnt been the smoothest or easiest program to try and manage, weve grown the position thanks to numerous members of the battalion who have stepped up to help develop our capabilities. is is their program. We have some educating and some reinforcing we need to do; mostly we need to spread out the education so AMSOs are not the single point of fail ure. All of what we have learned must be shared in order to create a wider knowl edge base for our aviators to utilize.Photo by MSG Mark Olsen 39https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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A PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING Too many times we see doctrine, eld manuals, and the like, all published in a manner that creates a message that is almost impossible to comprehend at the user-level. Leaders, if you do not believe me, just go and ask your people some simple questions. I would start o with trying to determine if they know what doctrine is, and if not, well, we certainly have our work cut out for us. is is especially important as the Army begins to transition toward a focus on expeditionary mindset and large-scale combat operations (LSCO). is article aims to explain the basics of expedition ary mindset and LSCO in such a way as to make the task at hand the very style of operation that our Army is preparing for: realistic, comprehensible, and ex ecutable at the Soldier level. Remember, SOMEONE CANNOT EXECUTE A TASK IF THEY HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE END STATE IS,or the basics of what the task could pos sibly entail. First, we must dene and frame what these types of operations mean, and we must do so in plain lan guage. ere must then follow an expla nation of how to prepare, train, and ul timately execute mission, again, in plain language. is does not mean that we forgo all of the intricate vernacular as sociated military strategic studies; how ever, it does mean we discuss the prob lem plainly rst, then we can build upon that knowledge. EXPEDITIONARY MINDSET War has changed, again. e experi ences of the past decade are void, and once more, the combat experience of the future generation will be very dierent than what was experienced by anyone that fought in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Its not to say that the lessons hard learned in the deserts of Iraq or Its Time to Have the Conversation: the Mountains of Afghanistan will not carry value into the future, on the con trary, we should never forget the les sons of asymmetric warfare. However, deployments into pre-established FOBs (Forward Operating Bases), replete with fully operational MWR (Morale, Wel fare, and Recreation) centers and Post Exchange (PX) facilities are no longer the norm. You will not stay in a fancy chu, the beloved containerized housing unit of Iraq and Afghanistan, you will not be able to shower every dayor 3 daysor week, and I think you get the idea. So, what does all that mean? Well, all that doom and gloom means that the Army is going to an Expeditionary Mindset. e Armys new Field Manual 3-0, en titled Operations, denes expeditionary mindset, or more precise ly, being expedi tion ary, in the follow ing way, deploying on short no tice to austere locations and being capable of immediately con ducting operations facing superior threats in terms of both numbers and capabilitiesrequiring the capa bility to defend themselves while they provide reaction time and maneuver space for follow-on forces (Depart ment of Army [DA], 2017). Wow! at is wonderful Army speak, but what does it mean to the Soldier, to the people that will have to execute? Allow me to translate, being expeditionary means deploying with bare minimums, quick ly, executing operations as soon as pos sible (a.k.a., speed of assembly), being outnumbered, and nally, ghting like Spartans so others can freely move on the battleeld. THIS IS THE NEW TRUTH OF OUR FUTURE FIGHT.It will involve common Soldier tasks, such as camouage, noise and light discipline, and sim ply being better at everything Army. e implications of adapting to the ex peditionary capa bility is that our mindset must change. Ev erything will not be avail able in an unlimited capacity, and we cannot count on Expeditionary Mindset and Large-Scale Combat OperationsBy CW4 Leonard Momeny Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201840

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nior leaders must train in a way that will sharpen and hone the most basic skills. All aspects of aviation maintenance must be second nature to Soldiers. Basic Soldier skills, such as camouage and threat identication, must be stressed and practiced. Finally, there must be an eort to provide collective training events that establish, and ultimately strengthen, this endurance mentality that is associated with expeditionary ca pability. at means that Soldiers must stay agile, ready to move at a moments notice, and yes, have a plan to track and execute operations via an analog me dium. Expeditionary capability implies the potential for a limited digital foot print within the organization. Like I said, its a mindset change. LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONSLarge-scale combat operations (LSCO) represent a shi in focus by the United States Army with regard to the global operational environment. It has been recognized that our future ght will in volve much more than just basic terror ist hunting, or more specically, it has been recognized that we must ensure that we are ready to ght far more than simple pockets of armed resistance. Asymmetric ghts occupy a forces time by providing formations with an invis ible enemy to pursue through consis tent presence-based operations. Most times, the enemy in such a ght is not uniformed, but instead blends with the surrounding environment. e United States Army fought this ght in Viet nam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but those were not instances of true LSCO. Again, war is changing, but are OUR YOUNG LEADERS AND SOLDIERS MENTALLY PREPARED OR EVEN FAMILIAR WITH THE POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF LSCO?What does FM 3-0 say on LSCO, you ask? ese operations are templated to start at positions of disadvantage and be rife with hyperactive periods of chaos. e tempo of operation will be almost unfamiliar to the veterans of both OIF and OEF, as ground force commanders will seek to advance aggressively, toward an actionable objective, actively pushing a division toward forward lines. Every domain will be vulnerable, and no front will be free of conict. How is that you say? Well, the enemy will be a peer-level threat, not simply a tribesman with an AK-47 or a truck leavened with explo sives. e enemy of a LSCO will bring everything to bear that our forces are fully capable of leveraging in a ght. Because of this parody in capability, the lethality factor grows exponentially on both sides, battalions and brigade-size elements become vulnerable to attack, and just like that, our entire perspective on modern warfare has changed again. contracted maintenance. Instead, we must prepare and plan as though we will be responsible for everything. When I think of expeditionary capability and the associated mindset, I think of Sir Edmund Hillary, Robert Peary, and oth er similar brave expeditionary leaders. ey traveled light, in harsh conditions, and depended only on what support they could bring with them, internal to their expedition, and against it all they did persevere. When I think of military examples of expeditionary operations, the rst that comes to mind would be the brave men of the 5307th Composite Unit that fought in World War II, serv ing primarily in the Southeast Asian eater. ey are usually better known as Merrills Marauders, and I promise that no Soldier since has ever been so expeditionary. eir bravery is so re nowned that the 75th Ranger Regiment would go on to adopt their unit insignia as the regiments own (Mortimer, 2013). In order to prepare and embrace for the aspects of expeditionary capability and the necessary associated mindset, ju 41https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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I mean, can you imagine an entire bat talion or brigade succumbing to the en emyhow would we potentially recon stitute such a force? e question I pose to our eld grade leaders, both warrant ocer and ocer, and senior NCOs is thus; are your peo ple ready for this type of ght? Even if your unit is prepositioned for a rotation into one of the already active theaters, have you prepared them for every type of ght? Sometimes, that is not always possible. As leaders, we simply cannot prepare for everything, eectively at least, all the timebelieve me, I know. However, we must still strive to do our best by our organizations, and there are other ways to provide exposure to such topics than training exercises. If we do not expose our Soldiers via training (usually due to things like conict in an upcoming deployment schedule that require we prepare for our primary mis sion), then the remaining solution is a professional discussion via a meaning ful development session. Get creative with a professional development session, sta ride, or the like. is is a total 180-degree change in mindset, and we have to pass this along to our junior leaders. Its not a matter of ensuring all of their doctrinal termi nology is correct regarding the matter, though it is important to be doctrinally correct. Instead, I maintain that it is a matter of ensuring the junior leaders and Soldiers are aware of the implications of such a ght. en perhaps, a good strat egy involves that you simply review the potential preparation involved for such an operation, and see what your Soldiers think they need to do in order to prepare for this type of all-consuming warfare. Remember, the conversation cannot be without focus, and a great way to de velop the professional development ses sion would be to guide the conversation of preparation through the Warghting Functions: mission command, move ment and maneuver, intelligence, res, sustainment, and protection (DA, 2017). CLOSING CONSIDERATIONS e intent of this article was not to somehow insist on gaps in doctrine and doctrine analysis at any level within our branch and Army. Instead, the intent of References: of the Army. this article is to bring attention to the fact that we must ensure our Soldiers, company grade NCOs, warrant ocers, and ocers all understand what these two major areas of concern involve. If we make plain our language concerning expeditionary mindset/capabilities and LSCO, then we had better equip our ju nior leaders to prepare for the inevitable ght. We cannot be satised with keep ing the language of the conversation at the conceptual/strategic level only, but instead, we must proliferate the infor mation across the formation in such a way that every Soldier comprehends the impact of this future ght. THE MORE OUR SOLDIERS UNDERSTAND, THE BETTER PREPARED THEY WILL BE. ey are the ones, the junior leaders, the ones ghting on the front line that must be fully prepared. More than that, they must be capable, lethal, and pre pared to engage in a ght that is more a marathon than sprint. Gone are the days of doctrine and tactics based on Stormin Norman-like standards, and instead we must look to the examples and operational challenges found in World War II. In that same spirit, I think it fair to quote George S. Patton, Jr. Its as Patton said, e Soldier is the Army so lets make sure our Army understands whats ahead with respect to expeditionary mindset and LSCO.Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201842

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War is ChaosServing ones Nation is not easy. Re gardless of how well trained, educated, prepared, or informed one believes they are, new events will surface that will certainly challenge and sometimes even scare us. Lieutenant General Lundy was fond of saying, At night, terrain ight, ve radios, multiple aircra, 3 kilome ters a minute, marginal weather, brown out landing zone, 30 Soldiers in the back, troops in contact we must get it right (Lundy, 2015). And these are just some aviation branch complexities. As operational momentum builds, there is no pause button, no complaining that new operational developments were not included in the pre-mission planning, or option to quit the mission because the enemy was more pre pared than expected and willing to meet you on the eld of battle. Developing a willingness to accept that operations wont go the way you foresaw, and a capacity to rejoice when they turn out just satisfactory, despite all unfore seen challenges, is key. What Soldiers do in the Army, especially within Army Aviation, is inherently dicult and dan gerous. Maintaining operational mo mentum, seizing and exploiting the ini tiative (Department of the Army [DA], 2015), and ensuring this unwieldly orga nizational bureaucracy moves forward takes immense eort. Such eorts in variably come with mistakes, oen not intentional or malicious. Sometimes life is not always fair. The Speed of Life is Accelerating:Mistakes sometime occur because in the current world we operate in, almost everything is accelerating at astonishing speeds. e skills required of a Soldier who enlisted in the 1990s is hundreds of times dierent from those Soldiers raising their right hand this very af ternoon. Today we see $50 improvised explosive devices destroying million dollar vehicles. We see social media en abling crowd sourcing and radicalizing all sorts of marginalized individuals in shorter periods of time. e actions of a Lone Wolf become sensational news in a matter of minutes, and on and on and on (Friedman, 2017). We as indi viduals, as battle buddies, as platoon members, etc., must learn dierently and at an accelerated rate from what we are used to, if By MAJ Michael C. Shaw and Mr. Justin M. Witty LIFE IS HARD, GET ON WITH IT!Photo by CPT. Jaymon Bell, 12th CAB Public AairsYou cannot change the cards you are dealt, we can just play the hand No matter how bad things are, you can always make them worse (Pausch, 2007)43https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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we wish to coun ter such actions across the operational spectrum. We must become the agents of change and help to shape what is around us; the alternative is to wait for change to come and simply react, assuming an even steeper learning curve. Life is getting more complicated and complex due to increased globalization and improved technology, and Army Aviation will face new and dicult chal lenges as a result. Integrated air defense systems, operations in mega-cities, or how we train our Soldiers with next generation technology are very real is sues in front of us today. at is on top of the turbulence found within our daily bureaucratic actions, the general unpre dictability of military action, and our branchs wicked problems.* We must learn to embrace these challenges and opportunities as they are put before us. Over the past 12 months, it was these authors intent to reintroduce a con struct that is vital to the continued de velopment of this profession. We spent seven articles advocating for the renewal of Reading, inking, Speaking, and Writing (RTSW) in an at tempt to bring some calm and clarity to the chaos (Armstrong, 2016). rough such a basic methodology, it was our goal to present some of Army Aviations most wicked problems, in the hopes it would generate a discussion. Of course, this undertaking was not entirely self less. We enjoy problem solving, dis cussing cause and eect, and sometimes making forward progress against some dicult issues. Some of the ideas we pre sented are not original. You may have heard them mentioned by senior lead *General David G. Perkins and Lieutenant General Michael D. Lundy utilize the term wicked problem to describe problems of such complexity that no single answer exists nor may provide the solution. ers or bantered about in small groups of peers, but this was our opportunity to discuss them in a more public setting. We truly believe that these great challenges can be overcome and that opportuni ties still exist. However, one of the largest things in our way is us .Mindset MattersFear can sometimes be a great motiva tor, and conquering a fear is oen one of lifes sublime joys. More oen than not though, it holds us back and causes us to do irrational things. Fear of failure, fear of looking bad in front of a boss, or fear of not knowing as much as others, are all barriers that we must overcome. How we do that oen depends on how we see ourselves. Do we believe that our traits and abilities are xed and we are who we are, or are we a work in progress that can grow and ourish with eort? Dr. Carol Dweck calls these two mindsets either Fixed or Growth and argues that how we interact with the world is largely determined by our mindset (Dweck, 2006). ose with a xed mindset be lieve that their talents and abilities are xed at birth and oen do their best tion you thought you knew the answer to but you didnt say anything for fear of being wrong or sounding foolish. Most feel that way, it is human nature. We believe we have an image to uphold, to ourselves if not for others. Unfortunate ly, in our profession, fear prohibits many from placing themselves in positions of vulnerability through speaking out, oering diverging opinions, or simply recommending untraditional courses of action. While it is simple to point to an individuals mindset as the determin ing factor, we should also point out that leaders at all levels must acknowledge and claim ownership for the fear that exists by unintentionally reinforcing a zero-defect mentality. Leaders must be accepting of divergent thought and re ward those who take a risk utilizing dis ciplined initiative. Too many times, we give comments on how many dierent PowerPoint errors we see regarding font or letter spacing yet, never bring up the intellectual contribution or the actual information provided. We must move beyond a xed mindset, which holds us back, and embrace that which expands our own capacities. The MissionFor seven articles, we have tried to do just that. Expand our own vision and broaden the discussion across the avia tion community. We pointed out in our introductory article Army Aviations Wicked Problems that we like a good challenge and aspire to help others in the process. Some of the topics we see as challenging, another may have a ready solution. What we see as an opportunity for change might be overly optimistic; it all depends on your perspective and mindset. What we do know for sure is that burying our heads in the sand is not an option. If we want to remain the premier Army component that other na tions model and emulate, then we must all contribute. Some of the biggest challenges we have tried dissecting were: 1) Is Army Avia tion Truly a Profession, 2) Overesti mated, Self-Perceived Command Abili ties of Aviation Captains Career Course Graduates, and 3) Lacking Perspec tive: e Perceived Incompetence of to hide any kind of mistake or imper fection. ose with a growth mindset believe that abilities are developed and learning takes place throughout your life. is is similar to the old Army debate of whether leaders are born or made. ose with a xed mindset are more likely to fall into the leaders are born category, whereas those of a growth mindset are more than like ly to believe a leader is made. Which philosophy do you support? ough you may have a growth mindset, every one of us at some point has been in a training en vironment when an in structor asked a ques - some men but make others (Mandela, 1975) Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201844

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Higher Headquarters. We attempted to generate dialogue surrounding what it means to be a profession, something many Soldiers take for granted and per ceive to be preordained. We delved into scholastic research that conrmed that Operations Division Captains Career Course graduates possess a signicantly high level of self-perceived command ability and what some causes could be. Finally, in this edition of Aviation Di gest, we bring forth the belief that many in our branch do not have perspective beyond their current assignment. Such blinders and lack of understanding con tribute to the retention and growth of our three identied challenges and the numerous others not captured through out this mini-series. Yet, with challenge comes opportunity. Some of the untapped opportunities we believe can provide personal and orga nizational growth within the Aviation branch were: 1) Training and Main taining: e Core of Army Aviation, 2) Of Course the Army Understands Leadership!, and 3) What Happened to the Scholar in Warrior Scholar? In our rst foray, we attempted to argue the position that the aviation warrant ocer corps through reorganization of tracks would produce a higher quality product for both the owning organization and for the Army at large. Ones articula tion and willingness to discuss such an opportunity reects directly upon ones mindset and depth of their perspective. Opportunity article two discusses lead ership; something so fundamental with in our Army and yet so underutilized that we felt it could present an oppor tunity for a broad cultural adjustment. Our third and nal opportunity piece focused on the balancing act that each of us should perform between being a warrior and scholar. As References: of the Army. Retrieved from operational and bureaucratic demands increase we tend to default, as a branch, to the path of least resistance: tactical performance. However, the health of our branch and the pace of global demands require a rebalancing of the warrior and the scholar. Last CallIn Army Aviations Wicked Problems, we oered the Aristotelian model of RTSW as a method to engage both chal lenges and opportunities (Armstrong, 2016). It is our belief that this process, one we attempted to model over the past year, is an important entryway to achieving and overcoming much of the unknown that resides ahead of us. How ever, before any model can gain momen tum, we must rst aim to be honest with ourselves. e sooner we accept that everyone struggles and has obstacles to overcome, the sooner we can stop blam ing them for our encountered dicul ties, and we may begin taking owner ship of what we can change. For the Aviation branch, how does our mindset, the increasingly complex world, the chaos of war, and wicked problems come together? How about with a problem set not discussed in any of our past articles but a topic that is on the tip of the branchs tongue, Future Vertical Li (FVL). No single problem set within the branch entwines the di verse challenges and immense opportu nities that exist within FVL. ere are those who anticipate going forward and those who will dig their heels in to avoid it. Which are you? What role will you play in the next chapter of Army Avia tion? Will you see a need to reshape our profession, nd a way to adapt training, or garner a broad enough perspective to see FVL as something other than faster rotorcra? Should our force structure require redesign, what about our training program, does our scenario modeling t FVL, and what sort of warrior and scholarship is required to incorpo rate multiple new plat forms? Love of challenge, belief in eort, and resilience in the face of setbacks is required of all of us. Life is hard and we suggest you acknowl edge that what you do is important, even if you do not feel that way all the time. We suggest you stop judging yourself so harshly, stop judging others so harshly, and adapt a growth mindset that every one can learn and get better if they want to. Humility, care for others, and truly seless service are all qualities, values, or actions that one can aspire to attain, knowing that some of us will fall short. To move forward as an individual and as an organization, sometimes we must give up our personal ghting positions to nd better terrain. is mini-series was just such an act and we hope you too can step forward, take a risk, and join the conversation with your open and honest opinions. Volume 5/Issue 245https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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TURNING PAGES book reviews of interest to the aviation professionalWhere Youth and Laughter Go: With The Cutting Edge in AfghanistanBy LTC Seth Folsom. Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015. Maps, photography, appendices, 368 pp. A book review by 1LT Christopher PoppletonWhere Youth and Laughter Go is a memoir about dif culties faced by a battalion command leader who chose to face the same perils and risks his men experienced during an Afghanistan tour from 2011 2012. LTC Folsom documents time while operating in the Sangin Val ley of the Helmand Province, one of the most dangerous and dicult regions of the country to operate. Meant to demonstrate incredible courage and bravery exemplied by an experienced ghting force serv ing in the Sangin Valley just a year prior, Folsom shows war is person al. Every life, whether lost or sur viving, leaves ripples in the wake of all others, long aer leaving the bat tlespace. Folsom continues the al ready challenging mission of help ing the Afghanistan Security and Police forces, as well as the Afghan istan National Army, to not only meet their nations ever-growing need for improved security, but to battle their own internal struggles. Divided into three sections that merge into one vision, this book documents the timeline and daily interactions of Folsom with e Cutting Edge, (the 3/7th Marines). As Folsom assumes command and feels the weight of taking the 3/7th downrange again, he describes the units rich heritage and its person nel demonstrated as legendary (pg. 5). Hoping he is up to the task of bringing all his men home Fol som realizes, in the preparation and throughout his time overseas, that loss will be inevitable, and his own mission will be in helping bring as many of his men home alive as possible. e books pace reects the danger and constant threat Fol som and his men faced, making the reader feel engaged and in the thick of each author experience. e 3/7ths piece of the Sangin Val ley would prove unruly and ram pant with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and in many cases with enemy interaction, to be only somewhat rewarding. e men who would be lost would be fewer than the previous units, but coupled with the amount of men who would be maimed and crippled, each loss would weigh heavier than the last. In particular, Folsoms Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) attach ment would experience the greatest loss and exhibit the most incredible bravery as e EOD techs were an odd breedbut despite their un conventional appearance, method, and mannerisms, the EOD Marines brought an unmatched value to the battleeld (pg. 150). e only an swer Folsom found aer an IED strike to his men was to keep pa trolling, the very next day, and keep mission success and constant focus on their goals as each days ulti mate motivation and for when they would return home. e 3/7th Ma rines would conduct several aggres sive operations to sustain and push stronger shows of force to cripple the Taliban and insurgent forces throughout the area. However, even the daily and big movements by Folsoms Cutting Edge would meet frustration with an age-old enemy who is no stranger to foreign occupation. is enemy, choosing to hide among innocents (and oen the local population), would prove elusive, tough, and determined against even the overwhelming re power of the U. S. As a result, Fol som developed unexpectedly close bonds to the senior ocers running his operations and his senior en listed advisor, SGM Rodriguez, all experiencing what Folsom believed few could truly understand. Folsom experienced frustration and pushback consistently while attempting to motivate the local populace and oen reminded lo cal leaders that his Marines would eventually leave. Additionally, he faced a potentially devastating set back from within, as a junior o cer showed the inability to accept responsibility for a poorly conduct ed operation. e consequences stressed the relationships the Ma rines were striving to build, not with just the people of Helmand Prov ince or Afghanistan, but the entire watching world. Folsom patrolled with every rie squad (usually con sisting of up to a dozen men) in his battalion each three times (some times two patrols in a day) before the 3/7th Marines completed their 7-month tour in Sangin Valley. By tours end, Folsom was emotionally, physically, and mentally exhausted and strained. An unconventional enemy called for unconventional tactics (using shaving cream to mark safe pathways while patrol ling), and the battalions success was unquestioned. At his memoirs conclusion, Folsom stated To lead a battalion of Marines in combat is the privilege of a lifetime (pg. 331). For involved aviation assets, Medi cal Evacuation UH-60 Black Hawks transported those injured by IED strikes, and CH-53 Sea Stallions supported certain operations and transport to inltrate to the various forward operating bases the 3/7th Marines occupied; this books focus was the ground forces, which avia tion persistently works to support. Unmanned aerial systems played a major role in assisting with artillery and rocket strikes to devastate the enemy, as well as UH-1 Cobras and AH-64D Apache attack helicopters. Readers can practically view the en tire professional side of life for Fol som and the 3/7th in the Sangin Val ley, but not as much of the personal, family side as one might expect. However, this perspective lends credibility that Folsom and e Cutting Edge went to Afghanistan to take an aggressive and unforgiv ing ght to the enemy, which with out a doubt, this book proves was the result of their dedication, espe cially to one another. Book reviews published by Aviation Digest do not imply an endorsement of the authors or publishers by the Aviation Branch, the De partment of the Army, or the Department of Defense.Aviation Digest JanuaryMarch 201850

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DIGEST UNITED STATES ARMY Access the AD Issue Archive Download or Print Current Issue Submit Articles for Publication Select a Free Book to Review Write the Editor and Express your Aviation-Related Thoughts and OpinionsVisit us online!www.rucker.army.mil/aviationdigest51https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd

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Look for the AprilJune, 2018 Issue: Our Featured Focus Will Be onMisson Command... and More Write for Aviation Digest!Scheduled Feature Focus Topics are:July September 2018: Aviation and NEW FM 3-0 OctoberDecember 2018: Tactical Operations and LSCOPrepare your articles now on these themes or any other topic related to our profession that you would like to share with the Army Aviation Community. The Armys Aviation Digest is mobile. Find Us Online! @http://www.rucker.army.mil/aviationdigest/ or the Fort Rucker Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/ftrucker