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A philosophical analysis of Lawrence Kohlberg's developmental stages of moral reasoning

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A philosophical analysis of Lawrence Kohlberg's developmental stages of moral reasoning
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Kincaid, Margaret Evelyn Barge, 1934-
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Ethical instruction ( jstor )
Judgment ( jstor )
Justice ( jstor )
Moral development ( jstor )
Moral judgment ( jstor )
Morality ( jstor )
Paradigms ( jstor )
Philosophical psychology ( jstor )
Schools ( jstor )
Value judgments ( jstor )
Dissertations, Academic -- Foundations of Education -- UF ( lcsh )
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Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 141-146.
General Note:
Typescript.
Statement of Responsibility:
by M. Evelyn B. Kincaid.

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A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S
DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF"MORAL REASONING











By

f. EVELYN B. KINCAID


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TC
THE UNIVERSIT IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF DEGREE OF DOCTOR


THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF OF FLORIDA
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OF PHILOSOPHY


UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


1977















AC KNOWL EDGMENTS


This writer wishes to express her deep appreciation for the direction and helpful suggestions offered during the course of this philosophical analysis. Dr. Hal G. Lewis, chairman of the committee, along with the other members of this writer's committee, Dr. Richard P. Haynes and Dr. Richard R. Renner, have offered inspiration and insights as well as having generously given of their time to aid the writer in formulating this analysis. A special note of appreciation is given to Dr. Vynce A. Hines for his helpful advice. Dr. Hines was forced to resign from the committee because of illness. Useful suggestions and constructive criticisms have been offered by all who participated in the study.

A final note of appreciation is expressed to the writer's husband, George, whose patience provided the encouragement to complete this analysis.















TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... .... .. ........................ ii

ABSTRACT ........................................... v

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION ......... ...................... 1
Organization of Chapters ...... .. ................... 2
Kohlberg's Stages ....... .. ....................... 4
Kohlberg's Empirical Thrust ........................ . 10
References ...... ... ...... .................... ...2

CHAPTER II - MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS ... ........... ...13
Development of Kohlberg's Scheme .... ............... ...13
Values in Kohlberg's Paradigm ..... ................. ...19
Kohlberg's Theory of Justice ..... ................. ...20
Kohlberg's Appeal to Justice as Ultimate lorality .......... 21 Kohlberg's Epistemology ....... ..................... 25
Theoretical Traditions in Morality and the Kohlberg Thesis . 27 Implications of Kohlberg's Theory .... ............... ..34
Significance of Kohlberg's Paradigm .... .............. ...35
Kohlberg's Moral Judgment in Perspective ... ........... ...38
Cognition and Role-Taking at Heart of Kohlberg's
Developmental Judgment ..... .................. ...42
Summary ......... ............................ . 43
References ...... ... .......................... ..45

CHAPTER III - IMPACT OF THE KOHLBERG SCHEME IN THE AREA OF
MORAL DEVELOPMENT ...... .................. ..47
"Moral Maturity" in the Kohlberg Paradigm .............. ...48
The Place of the Hybrid Breeds ..... ................ ...50
Other Phenomena of Importance to the Psychologist and the
Philosopher ....... ....................... ...51
Further Research Aspects of the Kohlberg Scheme ........... 52
-Acceptance by Some Scholars of Kohlberg's Scheme .......... 54
-Criticisms by Philosophers of the Kohlberg Scheme .......... 55
Criticism of Theologians of Kohlberg's Scheme ............ ...63
Criticisri of Educators Concerning the Kohlberg Scheme. .... 64
_,.S umma ry ...... ... ............................ . 70
References ...... ... .......................... .. 72

CHAPTER IV - KOHLBERG'S CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE AND ITS ROLE
IN THE MORAL STAGES ..... .................. ...74
Overview of Chapter ....... ...................... .. 74
Positions on Justice ................................. 77
Justice and Virtue in the Kohlberg Scheme .............. ...79









TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)


Page


CHAPTER IV - (Continued)
Rawls's Theory of Justice .........
Dewey's Conception of Justice .....
Inconsistencies in the Kohlberg View .
Summary ...... ................
References .... ...............


CHAPTER V - THE MORAL JUDGMENT ..... .................
Difficulties in Regard to Kohlberg's Conception of the
Moral Judgment ...... ....................
The Argument for Adopting Piaget's Empirical Methodology Floral and Nonmoral Functions .... ...............
Summary ......... .........................
References ........ .......................


. . . 104

. . . 106
111
. . . 112 . . . 119
* . . 121


-CHAPTER VI - THE IMPLICATIONS OF KOHLBERG'S
EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISE ..
Moral Education and Schooling .....
Kohlberg's Aims of Moral Education . .
The Hidden Curriculum ............
Kohlberg's Prescriptions for Education Relationship of Kohlberg to Dewey...
Summary ...... ................
References .... ...............

CHAPTER VII - SUMMARY AND DESCRIPTION . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... .................

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ... .............


SCHEME FOR THE


122 123 124 125 126 129 135 137


. . . . . . . 138


. . . . . . . . . . . . 141

. . . . . . . . . . . . 147


87 91 93 101
103









Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S

DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF MORAL REASONING By

11. EVELYN B. KINCAID

June, 1977

Chairman: Hal G. Lewis
Major Department: Foundations of Education


Lawrence Kohlberg has proposed a theory of oral progression and

moral education. This dissertation is a critical analysis of Kohlberg's position on moral development. Justice is the overriding moral end in the Kohlberg scheme. Justice is also the core of morality. Kohlberg regards the ideal form of justice to be one with knowledge of the good and the highest reach of virtue. Kohlberg draws from Dewey's position on epistemology. He also leans on Plato and Rawls to explicate what he means by justice, particularly is this true in the case of Rawls. Holding a

Rawlsian theory of justice while simultaneously holding a Deweyan position on epistemology causes difficulties in Kohlberg's position in terms of the progression being universally applicable across cultures. These difficulties lie in the fact that Deweyan epistemology may be depicted as a position in which a person learns by interaction with the environment. It would De impossible to learn principles of Rawlsian justice in preliterate societies. A second problem facinq Kohlberg is that

his use of RawIs's theory of justice to distinguish stage five from stage six causes the distinction between these stages to be blurred.

The identical principles are formulated in the hypothetical









original position of the stage five contract theory orientation as those which are used in the social union or the individually based principles of stage six.

Since the moral judgment as conceived by Kohlberg is used as the

basis to distinguish the stages, Kohlberg is confronted with difficulties if he has a vague account of the judgment. Kohlberg is faced with a gap in the argument in reference to claims he can make about conduct based on the moral judgment as it operates in moral progression. Kohlberg is vague on what constitutes the moral judgment. The moral and nonmoral judgments a person makes as increasingly more complex value differentiations are performed are not clearly articulated by Kohlberq.

Educators are warned that making statements in the context of artificial situations and hypothetical dilemmas are most emphatically not equivalent to making a bona fide moral judgment and lead to a separation of thought and action. Kohlberg's artificial situations are not necessary for the teaching of moral thinking, for what is needed is making judgments in actual life situations. Kohlberg and Dewey are not nearly so close in their pedagogical positions as Kohlberg believes, yet Kohlberg claims a Deweyan perspective for his prescriptions to moral education. The major significance of Kohlberg's work is that he has once again brought educators' attention to the moral domain and to the importance of moral education in the school.















CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1
Lawrence Kohlberg, a noted psychologist, has addressed himself to certain problems in the interdisciplinary area of moral philosophy and developmental psychology. His work has been of such a nature as to have significant impact on theoretical perspectives. This is especially true in education, psychology, and philosophy. Moreover, eminent philosophers have shown interest in themes introduced by Kohlberg. Such themes are in line with traditional interests in moral philosophy. Kohlberg has published in the interdisciplinary fields mentioned, and his work has aroused much comment and criticism in the area of moral development.

In this study we make an explication and critical analysis of Kohlberg's position on moral development. We begin with a description of the developmental stages which are at the heart of his scheme and the research he uses as a basis for making these distinctions. Since the concepts of justice and virtue lie at the heart of Kohlberg's conception of "moral maturity," they will be analyzed. Since Kohlberg's own analysis leads him to deal with themes traditionally associated with philosophy,


Kohlberg received his graduate training at the University of Chicago. After leaving the University of Chicago, he gained his early teaching experience at Yale University. Later he moved to Harvard, where he now teaches. Kohlberg's most basic theoretical position first began to emerge at the University of Toronto, where he served on an interdisciplinary team which studied moral development (Kohlberg, 1971b). In the fifties, Kohlberg began to posit a scheme that moral development moves through stages with advancing age. His scheme has become so well known in psychology and education that one expects much effort will be put forth in the future along the lines originated by Kohlberg.










and since the problem of the "naturalistic fallacy" is emphasized by Kohlberg, we will treat his analysis of the "naturalistic fallacy." A further theme in philosophy on which a position is taken by Kohlberg is the question of knowledge; therefore, his theory of knowledge will be examined. Philosophy traditionally treats different schools of moral thought in a horizontal manner but Kohlberg, on the other hand, conceives of his developmental stages in hierarchical orders of philosophies based on different rationales. Thus, his philosophies are arranged vertically. Since philosophers are not in agreement at this time whether or not one moral philosophy is superior to another, the adequacy of these vertical stages will be examined in this study. Since the artificiality of the situation which Kohlberg presents to test subjects is important to his scheme, the resultant separation of the conscience from conduct will be studied. Since the Kohlberg moral judgment is accompanied by certain philosophical difficulties, we will analyze his theory of moral judgment. Finally, we will draw the implications for education from this study. We will discuss both practice and theory in the drawing out of the implications of the Kohlberg scheme.


Organization of Chapters

The following considerations, listed under the chapter numerals, have determined the organization and format of the various chapters in terms of this philosophical analysis. In chapter I we address the question of what constitutes Kohlberg's stages which utilize varying conceptions of value and morality, and describes the empirical methods upon which he bases his levels.

In chapter II we more closely and completely examine Kohlberg's

moral and philosophical concepts in terms of values and the "naturalistic"









fallacy."2 We study the theory of stages in the context of their counterpart "philosophies" and psychological aspects and examine his theory of justice and knowledge. We discuss his scheme in light of theoretical traditions in morality, note the implications of Kohlberg's theory, and discuss the significance of his concepts.

In chapter III we evaluate the Kohlberg perspective, question certain concepts held by him, describe moral maturity and cite the phenomenon of hybrid breeds. We review other pertinent research and ask the question whether or not Kohlberg needs to incorporate a stage seven into his hierarchy? How adequate are his "philosophies" and the ordering of the "philosophies?" In general, what can be said to be the overriding contributions and criticisms of his approach? We cite problems found by educators, theologians, and philosophers as they evaluate the Kohlberg perspective.

In chapter IV we present Kohlberg's conception of justice and virtue in morality and treat problems and areas of disagreement in positions on justice in relation to Kohlberg's position on justice. We criticize Kohlberg's view of justice and compare it with Dewey's and Rawls's theories of justice.

In chapter V we present Kohlberg's prototype of the moral judgment and analyze this judgment in terms of certain philosophical questions raised about the moral judgment. Kohlberg is shown to be vulnerable to criticism insofar as his moral judgment is concerned. In chapter V we further analyze Kohlberg's conception of the conscience and find discontinuities between moral judgment and conduct which greatly restrict the claims Kohlberg can make for either the construct of conscience and 2The"naturalistic fallacy" is a case of deriving an "ought" from an "is."









conduct. We question the adequacy of these constructs for the social scientist studying the individual in society and evaluate Kohlberg's conception of the moral judgment in light of criteria which Kohlberg himself presents for the moral judgment.

In chapter VI we study Kohlberg's prescriptions for education, draw the implications for Kohlberg's position as it relates to education, and evaluate pertinent findings of this particular theory of moral development insofar as the field of education is concerned. The Deweyan conception of morality is compared to Kohlberg's position on moral development and education.

Chapter VII is the summary. We present over-all criticisms of Kohlberg's position on moral development, evaluate Kohlberg's paradigm, and issue caveats to educators who plan to organize a curriculum based on Kohlberg's stages.

We have briefly outlined the major concerns of this analysis. We

have next to ascertain how Kohlberg states his moral position. Since the stages lie at the heart of the Kohlberg scheme, it is important to point out the distinctions made by Kohlberg in his ordering of the orientations or "philosophies" people use as they make moral judgments.


Kohlberg's Stages

Kohlberg (1968a) uses a "typological" approach in his work. He uses the term "typological" to indicate that his stage theory orders different types of moral thinking, which he calls "philosophies." The Kohlberg approach outlines various "world views" or "philosophies" which are depicted in terms of structures of thinking or types of moral thought which an individual uses in adjudicating questions of value. Rather than analyzing specific content involved in value decision, Kohlberg focusses





5



on the kinds of structuring processes which the individual constructs while engaged in the process of actually making the judgment of value.

It is part of Kohlberg's thesis that individuals operate at different stages of development. Each stage is preceded by a level below.' Persons move through the stages in a lock step manner. The infant, of course, operates at a nonmoral stage. Each stage of Kohlberg's corresponds to an individual's "world view." Kohlberg (1971b) maintains that moral judgments and norms are not "passive states" to be found in the reflection about the judgment, nor are they simply "internal emotions." They are "universal actions" or "mental constructions" involving the human actor operating in his or her social milieu.

A concise statement of Kohlberg's (1963a) sequence of stages is presented in his article, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order: Part I. Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought.' The thinking structures are identified as follows:

Level I Premoral
Type 1. Punishment and obedience orientation.
Type 2. Naive instrumental hedonism.

Level II Morality of Conventional Role Conformity
Type 3. "Good-boy" morality of maintaining good relations,
approval of others.
Type 4. Authority maintaining morality.

Level III Morality of Self-accepted Moral Principles
Type 5. Morality of contract and democratically accepted law.
Type 6. Morality of individual principles of conscience.
(Kohlberg, 1968a, pp. 13-14)

Kohlberg's method of determining a person's position on the moral development hierarchy is to present a person with a hypothetical situation and ask him or her what action the person in the episode should take. Let us examine the beginning stage of Kohlberg's hierarchy which entails an obedience and punishment orientation. A child decides that the









hypothetical person in Kohlberg's situation should act in order to avoid trouble. This first stage is highly egocentric. The child, as in all other stages, decides whether or not the hypothetical person should act or not act in terms of the artificial situation presented to him or her by the Kohlberg methodology which I have previously described. The decision at this level is made in terms of deference to superior power or prestige. This first stage is a common sense stage based on observations of specialists who have studied the young child. Not only is it found in common sense, but it is borne out by Kohlberg's empirical studies. This orientation is similar but not identical to Piaget's (1932) position as to the heteronomy of the young child. While the child is egocentric, he or she is egocentric in the social context and makes moral expressions based on elicitations from significant other adult figures or significant other control figures.

Kohlberg at times refers to stage two as the "instrumental relativist approach" and at other times as "naive instrumental hedonism." Moral judgments are made in terms of satisfying, in an instrumental way, the needs of the individual as well as occasionally the needs of others. Reciprocity is an important aspect of this stage, which is frequently described by Kohlberg in terms of "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine." It goes without saying that Kohlberg's notion of a child who is making a moral judgment, "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine," is not quite in line with the traditional notion of hedonism in philosophy. Kohlberg is taking the notion of egoistic hedonism from philosophy and putting it into a framework similar to Piaget's heteronomy in making early moral decisions or at least in terms of the motives young children do have in making moral decisions. Other actors are not recognized in "egoistic hedonism," yet in Kohlberg's view on this level the individual is not









making the judgment about whether or not to act simply for his or her own sake but is judging in the context of a social milieu recognizing the needs of other actors. It should be repeatedly emphasized that the Kohlberg scheme considers an actor to be one who is taking the role, so to speak, of the person operating in the hypothetical situation which Kohlberg presents to the subject who is making the moral decision.

"IStage three morality is stated as "good boy, good girl" orientation. The individual is other-oriented, and tries to please others, making judgments in terms of what others think about the actor. Conformity to peer stereotypes is prevalent at this stage. Kohlberg's stage three moral judgment approaches Piaget's, particularly in that the notion of heteronomy or other-directedness is more pronounced, and the concept of "intentionality" is included in this stage.

The beginning of a deeper form of thinking is evidenced by the individual operating at stage four. This type of thinking is an "authority and social-order maintaining" orientation. On this stratum, the concept of doing one's duty for its own sake is encountered, along with an orientation toward maintaidng the social order simply for the sake of maintaining a given social organization. Respect for authority is an overriding concern of one who is operating at this stage. Personal or individual values are not as important as before, and now the individual looks to authority as a means for making the moral judgment.

In assessing this and later stages, psychological interpretation of the moral judgment is of more help than ordinary language analysis of the moral judgment. Subjects using the concept of duty as a reason for arriving at a value conclusion may be placed at stage four, five, or six, depending upon whether the duty is viewed by the individual making the judgment as being law and order based, contractual or normguided, or on









the basis of individual principles. Placement according to these differing rationales is important to the psychologist who analyzes and scores the moral judgment. The psychologist must resort at times to interpretations of covert values or principles of a psychological nature which are held by the subject and are immanent in his or her reporting of the moral judgment.

/Stage four moral judgments may also be seen as expressions of moral

judgments similar to those of Ayer's (1946) analysis of the moral judgment. Ayer viewed value expressions as influencing the feelings of someone else. Kohlberg (1963a) offers an example of stage four in which a young man expresses displeasure at having an article stolen from him and told Kohlberg that he too would be angry if a similar incident happened to him.

Kohlberg (1971b) succinctly sums up stage five motivation for moral judgment as analogous to the relationship of the government to the constitution. Stage five thinking involves a social contract system. The orientation of this type of moral judgment is in terms of individual rights which are legalistically conceived in terms of procedures established by a society in which an individual is living. This is the penultimate stage and judgments are conceived in terms of principles in which the individual relates to society in determining the consensual values operating in this relationship.

The ultimate stage involves thinking types which are based upon the individual developing his or her own moral principles. These principles, however, must hold for all others at all times. Such principles are above the relationship of the individual to the government.

Kohlberg (1971b) thinks that the ultimate moral judgment should be based on considerations coming from philosophers of the formalist school, particularly Kant and Hare. The prescriptivist and universal nature of the judgment on this level is emphasized by Kohlberg. As the individual









makes increasingly complex differentiations of the movement from "is to ought," more consistency is found in the judgment. Kohlberg claims that this is what Kant stressed in his work, i.e., the criterion of consistency. In this line, Kohlberg writes, "the claim of principled morality is that it defines the right for anyone in any situation. In contrast, conventional morality defines good behavior for a Democrat, but not a Republican, for an American but not for a Vietnamese, for a father but not for a son" (1971b, p. 46).

The following caveat is issued by Kohlberg (1971b) to those who study and work in his scheme. If a subject says, "I hold the following principle," one cannot, ipso facto, assume that the subject is speaking from a principled framework. To say that such and such is one's principle may simply mean that one likes or dislikes a practice or one might simply be stating that one approves or disapproves of a practice.

What then are legitimate principles? Kohlberg seems to think that one who understands abstract principles of justice will, ergo, arrive at legitimate principles on which to make moral judgments. Certain principles developed by recent philosophers, such as the principle of "reversibility," and "prescriptivity," would be operating at level six. We have previously noted the universalizability of the level six judgment, which indicates that Kohlberg would consider Kant's "categorial imperative" to be at this level. The "categorical imperative" does seem to be in line with Kohlberg's criterion of consistency in the increasingly complex movements of from "is to ought."

As understanding of these six stages is crucial to grasping Kohlberg's position. The stages lie at the heart of the Kohlberg thesis and their significance to his work cannot be overestimated. Kohlberg claims for his stages an empirical basis, because he collected evidence for his stages from many parts of the world.









Kohlberg's Empirical Thrust

It seems accurate to describe Kohlberg's empirical work as a crosscultural study of verbal responses to moral dilemmas. These responses are analyzed as interpretations which depict concepts corresponding to philosophical positions incorporated in the stages which we have previously outlined. To illustrate the Kohlberg methodology, Kohlberg (1968a) offers the example of the Taiwanese village and the Atayal village children being asked the question, "A man's wife is starving to death but the store owner won't give the man any food unless he can pay, which he can't. Should he break in and steal some food and why" (1968a, p. 29). In general, Kohlberg finds the responses similar in form but different in content. In both instances the thinking was at stage two. In cultures in which burials were expensive, the respondent thought that the husband should steal to avoid the prohibitive cost of the funeral. On the other hand, in cultures in which the expense of the funeral was of little consequence, the respondents at stage two level thought that the wife was necessary to cook the food and, therefore, should be kept alive by any means. By these examples, Kohlberg thinks that he was demonstrating the similarity of thought structures at the same levels in differing cultures.

In his article, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," Kohlberg offers a glimpse of his empirical studies. He writes, "in our study of American boys from early adolescence on, these youths were presented with hypothetical moral dilemmas, all deliberately philosophical, some of them found in medieval works of casuistry" (1968a, p. 28).

Kohlberg (1968a) claims that his research could determine the thought structures about dilemmas on 25 basic moral concepts. Moreover, Kohlberg's claim is not only for aspects or concepts apparently held by American youth, but he goes on to make claims that his findings are cross-cultural.









In this same article, Kohlberg makes the claim that the Taiwanese and Atayal (Malaysian aboriginal) go through the same stages of thought as do their American counterparts'.3

We have noted the cross-cultural aspect of the Kohlberg paradigm and the ordering of types of thinking which are implicit in the typological model. This ordering of the forms of thought is in line with the psychosocial developmental processes which Kohlberg has studied empirically, as has been previously noted. In Kohlberg's scheme, a subject is assigned to a position on the moral judgmental hierarchy which Kohlberg posited on the basis of responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas. The rationale for the moral judgmental ladder is that of conceptions of maturity, both common-sense and theoretical. We shall examine the basis of such theoretical conceptions in subsequent chapters.

As evidence of his empirical thrust, Kohlberg offers the reader a

series of graphs which show at which ages the stages are manifested crossculturally.4 While no systematic or complete review of his research is presently available in the literature, numerous examples of responses to the dilemmas can be found.

We have described and discussed the stages and the research undertaken by Kohlberg to support these stages. Since his stages require some justification in terms of certain recurring themes in moral philosophy, we shall investigate his analysis of key moral concepts. Since certain concepts which relate to themes in traditional philosophy are dealt with by Kohlberg, we need next to investigate Kohlberg's philosophical commitments. 3Besides the United States, Kohlberg has "explored moral development in
Great Britain, Canada, Taiwan, Mexico and Turkey" (1968a, p. 25).
4 We see that Kohlberg himself participated in gathering information to help him formulate his scheme. As evidence of his travel Kohlberg used a "Chinese ethnographer" (1963a, p. 23) as a guide in the Atayal and Taiwanese village.









References


Ayer, A. J. Language, truth and logic. London: Gollancz, 1946.

Kohlberg, L. "The development of children's orientations toward a moral
order I. Sequence in the development of moral thought." Vita
Humana, 1963a, 6, 11-33.

Kohlberg, L. "The child as a moral philosopher." Psychology Today,
1968a, 2, 25-30.

Kohlberg, L. "Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education." In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.),
Moral development. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971b.

Piaget, J. The moral judgment of the child. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free
Press, 1932.















CHAPTER II
MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS


Since Kohlberg recognizes the need to explicate concepts, we will

present in this chapter Kohlberg's analysis of concepts and issues which he uses to counter his critics. We will describe the motives for the stages Kohlberg uses in his scheme of moral progression and treat his conception of values, contending that his position as to the absolute ordering of values leaves one unable to account for important philosophical and sociological formulations. We contend further that his position also effects the separation of moral and cultural values. We examine Kohlberg's conceptions of justice and epistemology, and as a tool for analysis, outline the theoretical traditions and his moral and philosophical concepts. We then draw the implications of his position. We shall now consider the development of his scheme noting that Kohlberg's analysis of moral problems illustrates his interest in and recognition of the "naturalistic fallacy."


Development of Kohlberg's Scheme

Kohlberg started his studies in the fifties, Kohlberg (1971b)

claims that it appeared to him that there were universal trends in Western philosophy. In his studies of morality he further observed that moral maturity was not simply a learning of cultural rules and values which are fundamentally irrational. 1

1Kohlberg observes that " . . . there were universal ontogenic trends toward the development of morality as it has been conceived . . . mature









Early in Kohlberg's work he found errors in such formulations as

Durkheim's which embodied notions of cultural relativity. This feature of social science, i.e., cultural relativity, was found to go hald in hand with the error of assuming that "morality and moral are fundamentally emotional and irrational processes based on mechanisms of habit, reward, punishment, identification, and defense (1971a, p. 155)." Kohlberg considers that his research has verified a cognitive-developmental theory of moral developmental processes which is non-relativisit. Thus we see the developing trend toward identifying universal moral values which is implicit in Kohlberg's stages. Kohlberg goes beyond simply identifying universal moral values. He claims that his empirical research has verified the existence of increasingly complex moral values which accompany advancing age and development.

The natural question to raise is, "what are the consequences with

respect to the social scientist who holds the notion of value relativism?" Kohlberg claims (1971a) that value relativism results in the confusion of two ideas; these ideas are (a) "that everyone has his own values" and

(b) "everyone should have his own values." Kohlberg claims that his position does not make the preceding error. Fact and value present problems to the social scientist. In making the claim that his paradigm has developed a consistent position on fact and value, Kohlberg points to the logical relativist's confusing of the two ideas that "there are no standards acceptable to all people" and "there are no standards all people ought to accept." This logical confusion between fact and value according to Kohlberg represents one version of the "naturalistic fallacy." morality is a process different from the learning of various "irrational" or arbitrary cultural rules and values" (1971, p. 155).









Another form of the "naturalistic fallacy" which should be considered by the student of Kohlberg is that when the liberal posits tolerance as an absolute, he or she cannot, in effect, claim all values are relative. Kohlberg maintains that the relativistic position in this instance lies in confusing the notion that there are no valid moral principles with the other notion which the liberal relativist holds that there should be a basic respect for all human beings regardless of moral belief.

A third form of the "naturalistic fallacy" is analyzed by Kohlberg. He claims that those who confuse scientific impartiality with a position of value neutrality commit another form of the "naturalistic fallacy." Kohlberg finds that holding a position of value neutrality underlies much of social scientific thinking.

The final commission of the "naturalistic fallacy" occurs when
"rational" is confused in cases involving value neutrality and the scientific or factual.2 In the social scientist's assumption of value neutrality the social scientist is assuming such neutrality rather than making an attempt to justify it. While there are those who would call Kohlberg to task on the matter of committing a form of the "naturalistic fallacy," this paper is not concerned with this matter. Today, there is no unanimity of opinion concerning the "naturalistic fallacy." In fact, the noted moral philosopher Margolis (1971) has written about the fallacy of the "naturalistic fallacy." In the field of philosophy, one encounters the school of thought that posits the absolute separation of fact and value into two different realms. The school of philosophy which 2Kohlberg writes that the concept of "value neutrality of the social scientist assumes ethical relativity rather than justifies it" (1971a, p. 162).









separates fact questions from value questions charges that those who combine fact and value or "is to ought" are conitting the "naturalistic fallacy." It is important to study Kohlberg's position on the "naturalistic fallacy" because he claims to have committed this fallacy with impunity. In tracing the development of Kohlberg's studies we find that these studies state both what moral development is, as discovered from empirical work, and what moral development ought to be,which he claims to have derived from combining theoretical conceptions of moral maturity with empirical findings. We shall now consider the "is" realm of Kohlberg's paradigm.

Any study of Kohlberg's thesis should address itself to Kohlberg's empirical studies, what they consist of, and how they are undertaken. Kohlberg's sample includes 75 boys in American culture and others in different cultures. These individuals have been studied in terms of their moral judgment and character. Kohlberg's research has been done longitudinally from early adolescence to young manhood. The young men are given hypothetical dilemmas to respond to and their responses are ranked according to levels of maturity which we have outlined briefly. Since the dilemma concerning a person called Heinz is the one most frequently referred to throughout Kohlberg's work, one should become familiar with it in order to grasp the thrust of Kohlberg's paradigm. The dilemma is stated by Kohlberg as follows:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease,
a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a
small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz,
went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could
only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost.
He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him
to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist









said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money
from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's
store to steal the drug for his wife.
Should the-husband have done that? Why? (1971b, p. 33)

Since this dilemma is one frequently asked subjects by the Kohlberg team, we shall cite a response to the dilemma which not only shows how some people respond to Kohlberg's hypothetical situations but points to his attitude toward the relativist as well. Kohlberg shares with us the response of a young teacher when she was presented with this dilemma. Her response was supposed to represent the plight of the relativist. The young woman's reply in part was as follows: "'I think lie should steal it because if there is any such thing as a universal human value, it is the value of life and that would justify stealing it.'" "I then asked her [Kohlberg] 'Is there any such thing as a universal human value?' and she answered, 'No, all values are relative to your culture'" (1971b, pp. 3334).
The preceding dilemma is not the only one used by Kohlberg, A similar dilemma is related by Kohlberg in which Heinz cannot get any food for his dying wife. No food can be grown and no neighbors can help him. Should Heinz steal food from the grocery store? Why?

We briefly considered this dilemma in Chapter I, but we shall go over this ground a little more thoroughly because it does help one to get clear about the main point in Kohlberg's paradigm that on the same stages there is a distinction in thought content, but not in thought form. In relating the responses of children in the Taiwanese village and the Atayal village, Kohlberg finds that children who are stage two-"I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine" level thought that the husband should steal the food. The stage two children in the Taiwanese village expressed the notion that Heinz should steal the food









because the funeral for the wife would be too expensive. On the other hand, children who lived in the Atayal village gave little thought to the expense of the funeral. Evidently the expense of a funeral is not an overriding consideration in this particular culture. Nevertheless the stage two children thought that the husband needed a wife so that he would have someone who could cook for him, and that rationale tended to be most often given in the Atayal village as the basis for saving the wife's life. It is enigmatic as to why Kohlberg does not relate the American children's responses on the level at which he offers this example.

The example of whether or not Heinz should steal the food and the related responses to the Heinz dilemma is used by Kohlberg to make the point that thinking structures in the young child approximately aged 10 are similar from culture to culture in regard to the child's making moral judgments. Kohlberg studies boys, generally, in the context of the response to moral dilemmas in which the content is different from culture to culture. But Kohlberg claims uniformity of thinking structures. Both the Taiwanese and the Atayal child offer a pragmatic, in the pejorative sense of the word, reason for keeping the wife alive, In the instance of the Taiwanese boy, the high cost of funerals is seen to take the same thought structure form by Kohlberg as the Atayal's answer that his father needs a good cook and if the mother dies this service will no longer be provided for the father.

The child progresses through Kohlberg's stages at differing rates. Thought clusters are observed by the psychologist, but these clusters are not the same at each age. However, there is a tendency to move from lower to higher structuring patterns with age. We are told by Kohlberg that since an individual progresses upward on the stages and attains the thought clusters which Kohlberg has claimed are represented in the









"philosophies" encountered in this progression, the claim can be made that all men are moral philosophers.

The model of stages constructed by Kohlberg (1966c) represents a construct which is more than simply a statement of thought structures which are engaged in by people at different ages. Not everyone progresses through the stages at the same speed and it is possible to become "fixated" at any level and not to pass beyond that level. Nevertheless, it is claimed by Kohlberg that the sequence represents an "invariant" order of progression for the person. That his "invariant" sequence is cross-cultural is continually stressed throughout Kohlberg's writing.

No statement of the development of Kohlberg's paradigm would be complete without a position drawn as to the motivation a person has on each distinct stage. It is claimed that when considered cross-culturally, motives for the stages are not consistent. In Psychology Today Kohlberg describes the motivation inherent in his stages with each stage in the Kohlberg scheme corresponding to the number he has used in describing these behavioral characteristics:

1. Obey rules to avoid punishment.
2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned and so on.
3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and
resultant guilt.
5. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator
judging in terms of community welfare.
6. Conform to avoid self-condemnation. (1968a, p. 28)


Values in Kohlberg's Paradigm

Kohlberg (1971b) is arguing for the universalizability of roral values, but not all values. He makes the distinction between basic moral values which he claims are universal, and cultural values which are relative. To illustrate this point, Kohlberg cites the difference









between the Taiwanese young man and the Atayal young man in pointing to their reasons given for the dilemma in which Heinz must decide about saving his wife's life. That is to say that the Taiwanese and Atayal responses exhibit different cultural values, yet their moral values are the same, i.e., they are both instrumental relativist. Of the stage two thinking structures, Kohlberg writes, "both the value of life and a stage of instrumental-pragmatic thinking about this value are culturally universal" (1971b, p. 39). At this point, Kohlberg points to the rejoiner of the relativist, which is that even if one concedes that basic moral values are universal it is still the case that these are idiosyncratic and relative.3

We are not so certain that one can absolutely separate cultural values from moral values in every instance. If one is willing to grant this point, then it appears that in Kohlberg's insistence on a hierarchy of values, his position is incompatible with sociological formulations such as Linton's (1968). In Linton's view the universals which represent those basic ideas held in common by a community are both cultural and moral.


Kohlberg's Theory of Justice

Kohlberg's theory of justice basically involves a Platonic-Rawlsian view of ideal justice in an ideal society. Now the individual who is making moral judgments at the stage six level is using as a basis idealized principles of justice which are at the core of Kohlberg's

3Kohlberg writes concerning this point, "For instance, one might argue that everyone would value both life and property rights in the Heinz dilemma, but argue that which is valued most would depend upon a culturally relative hierarchy of values. In fact, however, basic hierarchies of moral values are primarily reflections of developmental stages in moral thought" (1971b, p. 39).









theory of morality. We shall examine the term "justice" as it is used by Kohlberg in a later chapter. Ideal conceptions of justice bring up the distinction made by Kohlberg between principles, which are exhibiting ideal thought structures, and rules, which are exhibiting a lower level thought structure than is found in the ideal level.

Principles are conceived by Kohlberg to be on a higher stratum than are moral rules. While one who responds to moral rules will be judging at level two, one responding to legitimate moral principles will be responding at level three.

Finally, principles of justice consist of conceptions of equality

in terms of equal rights in an idealized society and the concept of reversibility. Only one who understands abstract principles of justice will attain the intuitions concerning equal rights and reciprocity. Since abstract principles of justice are the apex of the moral judgmental stage, Kohlberg would naturally claim that the core of morality is the value of justice.

Kohlberg's Ap eal to Justice
as Ultimate Moralty
In his appeal to abstract justice as the core of morality, Kohlberg does not adequately address the question of ethical pluralism. There is by no means any agreement in philosophy as to the nature of justice or as to how the word"justicd'should be used. Problems presented by the Utilitarian approach, such as rewarding those who so deserve, are not addressed by Kohlberg.4

Sholl (1971) helps us get clear about the primary conception of

justice which is held by Kohlberg. Kohlberg seens to owe a considerable 4See Beck et al. (1971).









debt to Plato in the development of his notion of justice. It is from Plato that Kohlberg formulated the idea that justice is the absolute good which is basic to principled morality.

Does Kohlberg really think that when an individual is actually

participating in a problematic situation in which a moral decision must be made the person will use abstract principles of justice as a basis? Can a social scientist realistically expect abstract principles of justice to play a prominent role in a moral judgment in instances in which the individual has had no training concerning the nature of justice?5

Should one not only question whether the principle of justice will be present as an individual solves his or her problems, but also whether the principle of justice itself is adequately justified? It should be observed that the highest level of morality includes notions of a just society comprised of individuals who themselves operate with Kohlberg's idea of justice in mind. Kohlberg himself makes moral judgments at level six.

Since Kohlberg claims that Rawls's conception of justice, when its ultimate form emerges, is in alignment with stage six on his judgmental hierarchy, one might well quesion the practicality of adhering to such a concept of abstract justice. Perfect justice just is not a realistic expectation given contemporary social conditions. There exists a scarcity of both food and fuel in the world today. People are faced with the problem of pollution. Such social problems make equal treatment highly impossible and even if eqial treatment were possible, it is improbable that such treatment would ever be implemented.6 5See Peters (1971).

6See the discussion in Morgan (1975).









As an aid in substantiating my claim that justice is the core of

morality in the Kohlberg scheme, consider the position of the philosopher Alston (1971). Alston sees that Kohlberg makes an overriding effort to sell his idea that justice is the core of morality. Alston believes that simply prescribing in accordance with some notion of stages gets one nowhere. One can prescribe either using principles or not using principles and even when one uses principles in the course of issuing a prescription, who is to say which principle is, at bottom, the most cogent?

We have said much about justice, which is at the heart of the stage six response. The stage six judgment contains conceptions of ideal justice as an immanent part of the ultimate moral judgment. Consider a stage six response which will aid in the examination of the reasoning occurring on stage six in the context of the Heinz dilemma.

There are so many cases of cancer today that with any new drug
cure, I'd assume that the drug would be scarce and that there
wouldn't be enough to go around to everybody. The right course
of action can only be the one which is consistentwith Heinz's sense of justice to all people concerned. Heinz ought to act
not according to his particular feelings to his wife, nor
according to what is legal in this case, but according to what he conceives an ideally just person would do in this situation.
(Rest, 1973, p. 93)

Stage six, it should be remembered, relies on principles whereas stage four and three rely on rules. It is easy to see that one might derive a rule to be just from the principle of justice. Kohlberg can be called to task for making an absolute distinction between principles and rules inasmuch as such a distinction ultimately falls down. Consider the example of the categorical imperative which is one instance of deriving a concrete rule from a principle. For example, one can easily arrive at a rule prohibiting lying from the Kantian principle of the categorical









imperative. Thus, there can be found to be a logical link between principles and rules.7

It has been posited that Kohlberg claims that the core of morality is to be found in abstract justice. Arguments which point to dangers inherent in adopting abstract principles as one's guide to moral judgment are pointed to by Keniston (1970), who claims that certain forms of fanaticism, positions which are basically dogmatic, decisions involving a kind of zealotry, and insensitivity can be manifested in a principled moral judgment. It is warned that there are those who will ride "roughshod" over another for the sake of an ideal principle which is not shared by another individual.

Not only can principles of justice be used for less than legitimate reasons, but further criticisms against one who wants to use justice in terms of abstract principles of justice lie in the fact that justice itself may be seen as a habit and thus a character trait. Kohlberg, we discover, claims that there is a contrast between character traits and principled morality. It could be easily argued that being just or being fair are paradigm cases of justice and, therefore, are character traits. It is not entirely clear that principles of justice and character traits 7See Morgan (1975). There is a distinction to be made between a moral principle and a moral rule. A moral principle is a highly complex cannon which prescribes what a person ought to do or what "duty" impels a person to do in accordance with problematic situations which involve genuine alternatives. A principle is more universalizable in terms of its application to the moral domain. As Dewey implies throughout his writing,a principle should relate to a particular situation, it should help one decide on a particular course of moral action in instances in which a person is faced with genuine moral alternatives.
A rule is a somewhat less complex form of moral thought. A rule is generally less applicable in the sense that it can lay claim to prescribing universal morality. A rule is generally of a more restricted nature and is applicable to a smaller class of moral situations. While
the dictates of a rule are easier to understand and to follow, the pre-









8
can be separated into two distinct realms as Kohlberg claims. Not only is Kohlberg's conception of justice important in the Kohlberg paradigm, but his position on epistemology is also pertinent to his scheme.


Kohlberg's Epistemology

It is Kohlberg's (1971b) point that epistemology has been generally neglected by American psychologists. The reason Kohlberg gives for reaching this conclusion is that logical positivism or behaviorism is preeminent on the scene of American psychology. Knowledge is not considered by this school to be important, and behaviorism addresses itself to questions of learning instead of knowing. Kohlberg himself is not too clear on the question of epistemology. In one instance we are given a Platonic paradigm of "reminiscence" in which the knowledge within is "drawn out" from the child. In another instance we are given a more typically experimentalist view depicting an active child cognitively structuring the environment. Kohlberg (1970 and 1971b) does not present an absolutely consistent epistemological position.

One may well ask how knowing in the Kohlberg scheme fits his prescriptions for education. lie advises teachers to present hypothetical situations and analyze these situations in terms of the Kohlberg moral judgmental level. The teacher is advised to appraise the general class level and present raterial either on or slightly above the level, so that the student will develop to attain new levels on Kohlberg's stages. Real problems are not dealt with purposefully, rather the problems involve the


scriptions they offer for moral behavior are less universal , and more concrete than a moral principle. The ten commandments offer an excellent example of rules.
8See R. S. Peters (1969 and 1971).









same hypothetical dilemmas which we found Kohlberg using in the context of deciding at what stage a particular subject was functioning.

Since justice is the core of morality, Kohlberg urges schools to be more just in their organizational practices. Knowing justice in an ideal fashion will help in this matter. Students are exhorted to be part and parcel of the decisional actions which are going on at the school. Faculties are urged to integrate student opinion into all levels of decision making about school organizational matters.

Let us see how the development of Kohlberg's position on epistemology is developed. On the one hand, Kohlberg is Platonic and holds the Platonic view of "reminiscence." 9 On the other hand, Kohlberg is experimentalist and posits knowing as the result of an interaction with the active structuring thought processes and the encountered structures of the environment. Kohlberg must choose one position or the other, he cannot with consistency hold both views. Kuhmerker recognizes that Kohlberg holds these two distinct views:

Like Plato, Kohlberg postulates that knowledge--in this case
moral knowledge--comes from within the individual. Kohlberg's developmental point of view emphasizes the interaction of the individual with his environment and the impossibility of moral
development except as part of a social setting. Yet Kohlberg's
assertion that universal justice is the highest form of moral
development even in an imperfect society, is rooted in the
assumption that an individual has the innate capacity to
recognize justice and seek it. (1972, p. 260)

Since we have recognized the Platonic view and its relationship to Kohlberg's paradigm, let us consider other theoretical traditions in morality and their relationship to the Kohlberg scheme.


9See the discussion in Smith (1973).









Theoretical Traditions in Morality and the Kohlberg Thesis

Apart from the apparent correspondence of the Kohlberg scheme with Platonic notions, when one considers the over-all perspective of Kohlberg's work, one notes the claim made by Kohlberg that his thinking is in the tradition of the theoretical formulations of Dewey, Piaget, and Kant. Especially does Kohlberg claim the tradition of Dewey, Dewey requested the field of psychology to address itself to the question of moral development. One finds the following comment by Dewey in Moral Principles in Education:

. . . conduct may be looked on as expressing the attitudes and
dispositions of an individual, as well as realizing social
results and maintaining the social fabric . . . all corduct
springs ultimately and radically out of native instincts and impulse. We must know what these instincts and impulses are,
and what they are at each particular stage of the child's development . . . We must study the child, in other words, to get our
indications, our symptoms, our suggestions. (1909, pp. 47-48)

Kohlberg assumes that he was responding to Dewey's request that

psychology address itself to questions of moral development by iohlberg's efforts to effect the marriage of moral philosophy and psychology. It is Kohlberg's claim that his experimental work which demonstrates various levels of moral judgments, arrived at by studying the cognitive processes, is in response to Dewey's request and serves to identify intellectual thought patterns typologically as they operate in the making of moral judgments at each specific stage. Kohlberg writes, "I believe that a number of recent research facts offer some guide through the problems of moral education when these facts are considered from Dewey's general

perspective as to the relationship between fact and value in education" (1966c, p. 2). Thus, we see that Kohlberg deems his own research in the Deweyan perspective.









The central point of Kohlberg's position is that the core of the moral judgment is cognitive. Since Kohlberg claims to be writing and researching in a Deweyan tradition, it is of interest to note Dewey's own conception of the moral judgment. Dewey sees the individual operating in a problematic situation confronted with consequences some of which are liked and some of which are disliked, thus, giving an emotive thrust to the Deweyan value judgment. It is only fair to note that Dewey's value judgment is also based on prizing and appraising. In the context of appraising, one has to use the thinking processes in order to arrive at a value judgment. It is not simply a case of the emotive, i.e., whether one likes or dislikes the consequences. The field of psychology considers that one who has used the thought processes in order to reach a conclusion may be said to be engaging in a cognitive aspect of the moral judgment. Kohlberg places more emphasis on the cognitive nature of the value judgment and less emphasis on the emotive nature than does Dewey. In spite of Kohlberg's insistence on the cognitive center of the moral judgment, he does not dismiss such notions as ego-strength as being salient to conceptions of moral development. In the Kohlberg (1967) scheme, the development of morality is to be effected not by the imposition of "fixed truths," but rather by stimulation which encourages the child to restructure his or her own experience. The problem which we shall study later, lies not with the maxim of stimulation, but with the methodology which Kohlberg proposes to bring about this stimulation.

Kohlberg finds that notions of intentionality arise at the conventional level of morality on his moral judgmental hierarchy, The notion of intentionality has been important in moral philosophy and psychology









for some time. Kohlberg claims that the work of Kant was similar to his paradigm of the moral judgment. Kant was another thinker to stress the importance of intentionality in the value judgment. Along the same line, Piaget (1932) claims that intentionality is at work in certain stages of the value judgment. Piaget separates intentionality from the consequences portion of the value judgment. He studied the ages at which children made intentionality based judgments or consequences based judgments. Piaget found that the young child when told of two instances, (one of which a youngster accidentally broke many cups, while another youngster broke a cup on purpose) will place more blame on the consequences judgment on the child who broke many cups than on the intentionality based behavior. On the other hand, as the child matures, the judgment made will be more in terms of intentionality with the consequences being relegated to a lower position. Kohlberg uses these conceptions as a basic consideration to underlie his own moral judgmental hierarchy. One finds that judgments containing intentionality generally arise at the conventional level.

A more sophisticated view of consequences is the one which is held by Dewey (1922), that the individual acting in the moral situation is engaged in the process of weighing the consequences of the action, where some of the consequences are liked and some are disliked. So we see that while Kohlberg's own claim is that his philosophy is Dewey based, in fact Kohlberg's position is more like the position held by Kant or Piaget. Kohlberg's view as to the apex of the moral judgment is similar to Kant's conceptions. Kant viewed the "good will" as being separate from ends or consequences which it may bring about. A parallel between the Kohlberg moral decision construct and Kantian thinking about moral decision may be









observed when one considers the effect of the methodology which is employed by Kohlberg. That is, in using artificial, hypothetical situations as the means of making moral judgments, the ends or the consequences of the judgments are not dealt with by the person actively engaging in the moral judgment. To illustrate this point one need only to look to Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant wrote, "A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition--that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it . . . " (1970, p. 301).

In psychology, the ages at which consequence- based decisions or intentionality-based decisions occur are the important considerations. In philosophy, the important concern is how we know when someone has a good will by what he or she says or does. Kohlberg, by presenting a subject with an artificial dilemma does not help one to get clear about how we know that a person has a good will. Even his conception of the morally mature response does not help us to get clear on the problem of whether or not one has a good will. Kohlberg certainly cannot claim to have worked out this problem by his scheme, which moves toward an ultimate stage comprising the good and which can easily be compared with the Kantian conception of the good will. We are still left with the problem that one does not know from the subject's responses to hypothetical dilemmas whether or not he or she would actually respond either in word or deed in the same manner to the real situation. Not only is there no parallel in verbal response, but one can well imagine a person who conducts himself or herself in a morally acceptable manner for the most immorally conceivable reasons.









We have observed that Kohlberg's moral judgment was closer to Kant's than to Dewey's. Kant was among the first thinkers to develop the concept of the autonomous person. Kohlberg follows Kant's lead inasmuch as his moral judgmental hierarchy follows in general the movement of the individual from a heteronomous attitude toward social norms to an autonomous attitude toward social norms. Piaget makes a similar distinction between heteronomous thinking and autonomous thinking, with heteronomous thinking relegated to a lower position of importance. It should be stressed, however, that Piaget's stages are slightly different from Kohlberg's stages. The study of differences between Kohlberg's stages and

Piaget's stages in so far as comparing the nuances of the likenesses and differences between these two thinkers' stages is outside of the scope of this paper. It is enough to say that both conceive the individual moving from a heteronomous attitude toward social norms to an autonomous attitude toward social norms. We can simply examine the

titles Kohlberg uses in naming the levels for his stages in order to see that one moves from a position with little regard to social norms, to a position which relies on social norms, and finally away from considerations of social norms to develop one's own principles.

Not only do both Piaget and Kohlberg conceive the moral judgment in

terms of a movement from heteronomy to autonomy, and see that active thinking is required in order to reach the judgment, but also both Piaget

and Kohlberg have observed the movement of the maturing moral judgments in terms of the concepts of justice. Sullivan and Quarter (1972) cite the fact that in Piagetian theory the child has some, although a very limited, notion of the concept of justice. His relationship in the adultchild dyad is one of an inferior individual to a superior individual.










Sullivan and Quarter write that Kohlberg, like Piaget, "also suggested a sequence of moral stages that depends on successive acquisitions of or internalizations of the cultural moral standard. He describes the child under seven as 'amoral' in the sense that he does not make a distinction between justice and duty or obedience, but moral in that he conforms to the dictates of the adult authority" (1972, p. 406).

Other important similarities between Kohlberg and Piaget may be observed. These similarities are that both view development in terms of "invariant sequence," and both view the environment as instrumental in effecting the change from stage to stage--Piaget in terms of peer group influence, Kohlberg in terms of environmental stimulation. Moreover, these two view each successive stage as being composed of increasingly complex social structures and view their hierarchy in terms of increased complexity of thought patterns which occur as one travels upwards along the stages.

A different account of rules is given by Piaget from the account given by Kohlberg. For Piaget (1932) rules were motor at the beginning of the child's life and became more complex until they could be codified. Sullivan, McCullough, and Stager (1971) express the notion that Kohlberg gives a somewhat different account of rules. At first the child does not conceive of rules as being pertinent to himself or herself; next the individual is characterized by conformity to rules; and finally, the individual is separated from rules and relies on principles to form the stage six moral judgment.

Perhaps the basic difference between Piaget and Kohlberg is that the child under seven is seen by Kohlberg to be generally "amoral." He or she makes no distinction between "justice," "duty," or "obedience." Whatever the adult's position is, is considered "just." Piaget on the









one hand posits the beginning stage of moral justice to be based on the child's respect for authority rather than an obedience or punishment orientation as held by Kohlberg.10

As we have previously observed, Piaget and Kohlberg both view movement from stage to stage as being "invariant." Kohlberg holds this position throughout his work, even though he concedes that such a view is impossible to substantiate empirically. It would, indeed, be difficult to find an older person who has been sheltered from socialization experiences and trace this person's development to see whether or not stages were skipped. The "invariant" view of human development approaches positions from the school of Hegel or Froebel in respect to their constructs of self more nearly than does the "invariant" view of development approach the position of the Dewey school of thought. Let us restate a cursory conception of Dewey's (1916) notion of growth. In Democracy and Education one is presented an instance of growth in which an individual chooses and moves toward ends which are then attained and subsequently are reshaped and redirected toward new ends.

A difference ray be noted in tracing the evolution of Kohlberg's

thinking as to the focus of his position. He claims that essentially he has moved from the arena of the descriptive to the prescriptive. In his article, "From Is to Ought," Kohlberg (1971a) notes the emergence of his prescriptivist viewpoint.

Earlier, my major philosophic claim was that the stimulation of development is the only ethically acceptable form of moral education. I believe this claim can be upheld regardless of my
more controversial claim (in this article) that I have successfully defined the ethically optimal end point of moral development. (1971a, p. 153)

10See Irwin and Ambron (1961).









Thus, we find that the postulation of abstract principles of justice is the end point of moral excellence. Not only is the change in focus from descriptive to prescriptive to be noted in the Kohlberg scheme, but earlier writings tend to be more typically psychological, later writings more typically philosophical or educational. Certainly Kohlberg has moved into the prescriptive arena of educational theory in his attempts to formulate practices and organizational procedures for schools. We further notice that the concept of justice has more clearly emerged in later work and occupies a foundational place in the formulation of Kohlberg's moral theoretical position.

Notions of justice, particularly from the ethical theory of Plato and Rawls, can be deemed as potent aspects in Kohlberg's recent theoretical position. Current formulations of the place of the judgment of value in the moral domain employ arguments of contemporary moral philosophers. Kohlberg frequently cited Hare as representing the action guiding aspect of the moral judgment and overlooked the notion that Hare has of moral judgments being imperatives.


Implications of Kohlberg's Theory

One of the most obvious implications of Kohlberg's findings is that the current social scientific formulations as to the cultural relativity of morals are patently false. It is Kohlberg's thesis that cultural differences in morals have not taken account of the cultural alikeness in principles and thought clusters which are found in his stages. As an example of similar thinking clusters, Kohlberg (1971b) wants to compare the college rites of pantyraiding of the fifties with the rites of sitins of the sixties. It is at this point that we believe Kohlberg confuses a manifestation of social change with the action of a group of college









students of two different periods. It is hard to see how pantyraiding and previous pranks played by prior generations had the social significance that sit-ins at lunch counters had. One might make the claim that pantyraiding was a harbinger of things to come, reflecting the increasing sexual freedom which was to emerge in the sixties. On the other hand, it was through the actual efforts of the students who participated in the sit-ins to integrate lunch counters that social change occurred. Close examinations of these thought structures do not reveal clearly the thinking of the fifties by college students in general to be so similar to the thinking of the sixties as Kohlberg believes.

Kohlberg claims further that Moslems, Jews, Catholics, atheists,

etc. show no different rate in development along his hierarchy. Kohlberg gives the "Golden Rule" as evidence of stage six thinking. But we cannot be too clear about the "Golden Rule" being on stage six, because if one followed the "Golden Rule" because of the authority of the church then it becomes stage four thinking. Kohlberg has not shown clearly and adequately how a rigorous follower of a religious order can rise above the factor of owing his or her authority to the church and making decisions on that basis. Making decisions based on authority to the church is making a stage four decision.


Significance of Kohlberg's Paradigm

Kohlberg claims much significance and importance for his theory in

the area of moral development. He deems his deductions from his empirical and theoretical formulations concerning the stages of moral development to be of utmost significance to the interdisciplinary fields of social psychology and philosophy. Of his findings, he writes,









This means empirically that the theory which explains cultural
and individual differences in values is also the same general
theory of why children become capable of moral judgment and
action at all. It means normatively that there is a sense in
which we can characterize moral differences between groups and
individuals as being more'or less adequate morally. (1971b, p. 41) Our task in this philosophical analysis is to examine and ascertain the significance of certain psychological aspects of the Kohlberg moral judgment. As we have observed previously, the moral utterances of the individual are given in response to hypothetical dilemmas which are interpreted by psychologists and scored in accordance with criteria regarding appropriate answers on levels at a given stage. Certainly, this interpretive aspect of Kohlberg's moral decision making scheme is more in line with psychological moral judgments than with philosophical judgments. Philosophical judgments are concerned more with logic, syntax of the sentence, and meaning of the words used in response. As we shall argue in a later chapter, it is very important to point out that Kohlberg's use of the terms 'Validatiod'and'Verificatiod'are typically psychological and are not at all in accordance with the meaning of verification and validation when conceived philosophically. At any rate, the task of classifiying the types of answers given by the subject in response is arduous indeed. Apparently, psychologists who have worked in the Kohlberg framework have somewhat of an advantage in using the techniques of scoring answers over an eclectic psychologist. It is generally conceded that the ordinary psychologist scores subjects much higher than does the Kohlberg team.

The mental health of an individual is quite significant in determining the location of that person on Kohlberg's scheme. Kohlberg did study intelligence and found that of the relationship between I.Q. and










moral judgment,the resultant r. = .31.11 However, as I write, Kohlberg has not studied the relationship between mental health and the moral judgment. Other studies on the periphery of this question have been undertaken, but none addressed specifically to the relationship between mental health and the moral judgment.

While intelligence is not significantly related to moral development, it does play a small part in moving up the stages. A major assumption about stage theory is that the complexity of the stages increases from lower to higher levels as one ascends the judgmental hierarchy. If one agrees that Kohlberg's "philosophies" are more logically complex as the judgmental ladder is mounted by the subject who is making the judgments, then it would seem to follow that the increasingly difficult stages would be more difficult to comprehend. When one attains a given level on the Kohlberg moral judgmental hierarchy, then it is presupposed that lower levels are also understood.

In examining the significance of Kohlberg's attitude toward other points of view in psychology one notes that he has adopted a yes-but attitude. His claim is that "ego-strength" is important but it is not as important as his own findings that the overriding features of moral judgment are cognitive-maturational. In essence, Kohlberg's basic position is that moral development is primarily cognitive maturational, yet he relates "ego strength" to moral development.

There is some support for the interpretation of moral character
as ego, rather than superego, strength. This interpretation

llKohlberg wrote, ". . . intellectual development, then, is an important condition for development of moral thought, but level of moral thought can be clearly distinguished from general intellectual level. Level of moral judgment appears to be a quite unitary or consistent personal characteristic distinct from intelligence or specific subcultural background and beliefs"(1963c, p. 405).









implies that the major consistencies in moral conduct represent
decision-making capacities rather than fixed behavior traits.
It is thus consistent with the findings on situational variation, which suggested that moral conduct was the product of a situational decision. The "ego-strength" interpretation also
seems consistent with the'difficulties in distinguishing situational factors stimulating moral obligation in the production
of honest behavior. Both sets of facts appear to appeal to
"ego-strength" dispositions in the personality. (1963c, pp. 391-2)

Throughout Kohlberg's writing, he disparages the use of a trait

theory on which to base research on moral development. The almost total rejection of trait theory is quite significant to a theory of moral development, for as we have previously observed, it is hard to imagine postulating justice as the core of morality without admitting that being a just person can be a paradigm case of justice. At any rate, the pioneering work in trait theory undertaken by Hartshorne and flay (1930) is referred to by Kohlberg in a rather pejorative way. Kohlberg claims that trait theory is concerned with and coming up with a "bag of virtues."


Kohlberg's Moral Judgment in Perspective

The position developed by Kohlberg on moral development not only is one containing psychological aspects, but is replete with concepts derived from a philosophical basis. As opposed to Dewey's conception of the value judgment which describes an individual operating in a moral situation in which consequences are weighed, some of which we like and some of which we do not like, Kohlberg places greater emphasis on impersonality and universality as the basis for the morally mature value judgment. Again, it should be pointed out that Kohlberg does not use the individual operating in an actual moral situation, but in the context of the individual responding to hypothetical moral dilemmas as the paradigm in which the moral judgment occurs.12 12,, Like philosophers from Kant to Hare, Baier, Aiken, etc., we define morality in terms of the formal character of a moral judgment or









Perhaps the most major point of departure of Kohlberg's position from that of Dewey lies in the fact that Kohlberg's subjects are asked to resolve hypothetical dilemmas rather than participate in actual on-going situations. Dewey (1909) emphasizes that the child must continually exercise and test judgments in order to obtain the power of judgment. Moral aspects, in the Dewey scheme, must be selected by the individual and put into execution, the final test being that of action which would serve to help the person in the moral situation evaluate the consequences of the action. Only when an individual has selected moral situations, followed the situation through to the final action, and actually discriminated the moral consequences of the action can the power of moral judgment be developed.

While it is true that the major thrust of Kohlberg's work is in

terms of the artificial situation, Kohlberg does occasionally refer to students making value judgments in the actual existential situation. One example of his recognition of the place of the value judgment in the on-going situation is in his depiction of an episode in which one boy in a school room spit on another and was characterized as being rude by the teacher. Kohlberg (1968c) feels that in that instance the place of the teacher was to work on the problem at hand from the standpoint of the rights of the individual children involved in the problematic situation.

Since Kohlberg continually claims to posit a theory of moral development which is close to Dewey's position, the analysis of Dewey and Kohlberg along salient issues is called for. Somewhat closer to Dewey's a moral point of view, rather than in terms of its content. Impersonality, ideality, universalizability, and preemptiveness are among the formal characteristics of a moral judgment, a moral reason being one which has such properties as these." (Kohlberg, 1971b, p. 35)









(1916) position on the job of education is the statement by Kohlberg that education must address itself to the "stimulation of the development" of the student. Dewey conceived education to be comprised of a method of "sharing the conjoint activity" in which the learner and teacher mutually stimulated each other to the end of achieving richer meaning to the problems confronted by both. This on-going moral situation for Dewey is in contrast to the artificial moral situation for Kohlberg. In the face of this contrast, Kohlberg posits the goals of moral education to be the control of the child's behavior by means of the moral judgment which occurs in the context of the stimulation of the child's own moral development.

It is anathema to both thinkers that "fixed truths" should be

imposed on the developing mental capacities in the name of moral education. Kohlberg (1963a) argues that the job of the teacher lies in helping the child to take the next step rather than imposition of alien thought patterns on him or her. Dewey (1916) repeatedly emphasizes that teachers begin with the individual child relying on his or her plasticity from which to take their cues rather than imposing subject matter which is irrelevant to the student. Kohlberg, in presenting artifical situations to young children, may be imposing subject matter which is irrelevant to children's own moral needs and interests.

A further problem warranting comparison between Dewey and Kohlberg is Kohlberg's insistence that moral development moves upward on his stages in a sequence which is "invariant." This further factor of "invariant" sequence in Kohlberg's paradigm brings to mind a specific school of logic. Developmental theorists who hold the viewpoint that the stages of moral development are invariant may be compared to such schools










of logic as the Hegel and Engels schools. The logic of these schools may be described as absolutistic, as typified by logical systems such as the negation of the negation, i.e., that an absolute is ever unfolding toward preconceived ends. Kohlberg's (1971b) rejoiner is that such an assumption as the invariance of sequence in the developmental processes in no way entails older notions of moral growth being wired into the nervous system. Yet Kohlberg is still faced with the fact that his scheme posits an absolute progression. However, he feels that he is saved from older conceptions of logic by conceiving moral development in terms of at once balanced and then unbalanced systems of equilibrium and disequilibrium.

As a concomitant to the changing equilibrium, Kohlberg, in line with Piagetian notions, claims that social interaction can be a stimulant to the development of the child from one stage to the next. The attitudes which form the "philosophies" indigenous to a specific stage are also a function of an individual's cognitive growth at a specific period in time. Kohlberg (1971b) postulates his stages as being evermoving transformations of attitudes and concepts. Cognitive growth is accompanied by these developing attitudes and conceptions as the child makes sense out of his or her environment the iilieu in which he or she is interacting. It is our thesis, however, that Kohlberg's claim that the developmental paradigm in the moral arena is one of on-going movement of psychosocial forces from disequilibrium to a state of equilibrium does not save his position from the criticism of an absolutistic unfolding toward a pregiven end. Granted that this newer conception of Kohlberg's does

not entail older ideas of a wired-in notion of unfolding, despite this feature, the specter of an absolute unfolding does not vanish. Or at any










rate, it would be difficult to verify the "invariant" sequence aspect of Kohlberg's stages empirically. It is not surprising that Kohlberg himself recognizes the problem of "invariant" sequence. He (1971b) realizes that the child cannot be deprived of psychosocial stimulation in order to discover whether one can move from premoral judgmental levels to principled judgments without proceeding through all the stages.

Cognition and Role-Taking at Heart of

Kohlberg's Developmental Judgment

Cognition lies at the core of the Kohlberg moral judgment paradigm. Kohlberg (1971b) maintains that the place of cognitive development in the moral scheme is salient. Cognitive development involves taking the aspect of another and this taking of another's aspect is of primary importance to moving up Kohlberg's moral hierarchy. Kohlberg's contention is that his theory is in alignment with Dewey, Baldwin, Mead, and Piaget insofar as he posits a basically active individual whose cognitive structures are in interaction with the environmental structures which are encountered in the process of behaving.13

Kohlberg (1971b) is using the word 'ognitive"in a sense which may be said to embody the notion that a person undergoes a process of deliberation, of actual reasoning in making the moral judgment. Kohlberg does


13Kohlberg writes,"I have used the term 'cognitive-developmental' to refer to a set of assumptions common to the moral theories of Dewey (1909), G. H. Mead (1934), J. M. Baldwin (1906), Piaget (1932), and myself. All have postulated stages of moral development representing cognitivestructural transformations in the conception of self and society. All have assumed that these stages represented successive modes of 'taking the role of others' in social situations, and hence that the social-environmental determinants of development are its opportunities for role-taking." (1971b, p. 42)










not want to say that cognitions describe actual states of the world as in the case of the scientific judgment. Neither is he saying that cogniti-ons embody a Durkheimian ethical relativity, or that cognitions are intuitions in which one immediately apprehends the moral aspects of the value domain, or that cognitions simply embody the consequences of the judgment or the general welfare or happiness of the group. How then does Kohlberg use the word "cognitive?" We have noted that a person has to actively reason in Kohlberg's conception of cognition. Moral mental events are also characterized by an interaction which occurs between the intellectual and affective processes operating in the moral context. If one should ask which facet of the psyche is more important in moral situations, Kohlberg would reply that in the moral domain both facets are at work and may be distinguished readily in their corresponding psychological areas.14

The ultimate level to which the cognitive processes can be stimulated is the principled level which is both prescriptive, illustrating the influence of Hare, and universalizable as illustrated by Kohlberg's own example of the Kantian categorial imperative. Kohlberg's claim is that principled morality defines right action for anyone who is confronted with a moral situation.15


Summary
Kohlberg's position on the "naturalistic fallacy" led us to conclude that Kohlberg commits the "naturalistic fallacy" with impunity. Since 14Kohlbergwrites, "all mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects, and that the development of mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives." (1971b, p. 44)
15See Kohlberg (1971b).









agreement in philosophy has not been reached as to the seriousness of committing this fallacy, we have claimed that fact and value can indeed sometimes be merged without detriment to either realm. Kohlberg's paradigm with its invariant sequence of moral stages is very different from Dewey's on-going situations which make up Dewey's moral judgments. In devising a scheme which combines the empirical and theoretical as Kohlberg does, he commits himself to schools of logic which employ absolutistic reasoning, as for example, the negation of the negation. The purpose of this chapter has been to present Kohlberg's moral concepts and point out the pitfalls of his scheme. Kohlberg's paradigm is not in accord with positions in sociology such as Linton's. Linton does not rely on absolute ordering of values as does Kohlberg. Abstract justice was found to comprise Kohlberg's conception of the highest reach of morality. Finally, the chapter pointed to the inconsistency of Kohlberg's positing an experimentalist and Platonic position on the question of knowing.

Since Kohlberg is such an influential thinker in the field of moral discourse, we shall next consider theoretical positions which refer to his writing and research.










References

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Beck, C. M., Crittenden, B. S., and Sullivan, E, V. floral education.
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Dewey, J. Democracy and education. New York: The Free Press. 1916.

Dewey, J. Human nature and conduct. New York: Holt, 1922. Hamilton, E. and Cairns, H. The collected dialogues of Plato. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Hartshorne, H., May, H. A., and Shuttleworth, S. Studies in the nature
of character. New York: Macmillan, 1930, Vol. I-III,

Irwin, D. 1I. and Ambron, S. E. "Moral judgment and role-taking in
children ages three to seven," ERIC, 1961, ED 084 033, 1-58.

Kant, I. "Fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals." In A.
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Kohlberg, L. "The development of children's orientations toward a moral
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Kohlberg, L. "Moral and religious education and the public schools: a
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Kohlberg, L. "The child as a moral philosopher." Psychology Today,
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Linton, R. "Participation in culture." In J. J. Chilcott, U. C. Greenberg, and H. B. Wilson (Eds.), Readings in the socio-cultural foundations of education. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1968.


Margolis, J.


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Morgan, K. P. "Philosophical problems in cognitive-moral-development
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Rest, J. R. "The hierarchical nature of moral judgment: a study of patterns of comprehension and preference of moral stages." Journal of
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CHAPTER III
IMPACT OF THE KOHLBERG SCHEME
IN THE AREA OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT


Since there have been a large number of reactions to Kohlberg's writings in the area of moral development, we shall review in this chapter writings on Kohlberg in this area by pointing to problems and acceptance of Kohlberg's position in order to inform the reader of the influence and significance of Kohlberg's work. Since commentators have found problems in his scheme, i.e., the hybrid breeds, his Moral Judgment Evaluation Scale, and his advocacy that a specific "is" be an "ought," researchers have found difficulties in his work, especially with his failure to unite thought and action. These viewpoints on the Kohlberg perspective will be presented.

Since "moral maturity" represents the optimal development of the

individual in the Kohlberg scheme, certain commentaries on "moral maturity" are viewed in the perspective of problems involved in the criteria of "moral maturity."

We will review research along lines originated by Kohlberg. The

findings of the "hybrid" judgment, along with moral development in delinquents, will be cited. Preference for the moral judgment and research to relate the moral judgment to behavior will be reviewed as a means of illustrating the use of Kohlberg's moral evaluation scale as it relates to research.

Finally, evaluation of Kohlberg's work by a variety of scholars is presented to illustrate the significance of Kohlberg's position.










"Moral Maturity" in the Kohlberg Paradigm

Scholars note that the concept of "moral maturity" emerges as a

person moves from an orientation of concern for self to an interest in the other person. "Moral maturity" is at the apex of the Kohlberg scheme.

In order to sum up the most significant goal of the Kohlberg paradigm, one should note that scholars claim the scheme involves movement from egocentric conceptions of moral judgments to the Kohlberg notions of "moral maturity." Gross (1973) notes two obvious trends which emerge in the process of Kohlberg's ever transforming stages, In the first place, there is a trend away from whatever is expedient to the person or whatever kind of behavior is conforming to group expectations. Secondly, there is the movement toward "moral maturity" which utilizes abstract principles and regards all individuals to be of inestimable worth regardless of proximity to the self.

Kuhmerker (1972) recognized that certainly the concept of "moral maturity" was important to the Kohlberg scheme. The principled level represents Kohlberg's conception of "moral maturity" in terms of a moral developmental hierarchy. Kuhmerker's research study was addressed to the facility of movement from stage to stage in American society. She observed that, according to the present research, it was relatively easy for pre-adolescents to move from the pre-conventional modes of thinking to the conventional level. However, those children who have entered their thirteenth year and have not yet attained the level of the conventional orientation are not likely to reach the principled level on becoming adults. A second finding concerning the likelihood of moving to principled reasoning is that high school students who have not









developed the ability to use principled level thinking at least onefifth of the time are highly unlikely to ever develop the ability to make principled level judgments.

Research studies have shown, according to Kuhmerker (1972), that it is possible for adults to grow from lower to higher stages. Kohlberg

himself, using the medium of longitudinal study, notes the fact that adults both grew in stage emergence and regressed in terms of falling to lower stages than those at which previous moral developmental judgments were made.

Kuhmerker (1972) rightly observes that the focus of the Kohlberg

scheme is not upon the person's moral behavior but on the moral judgment which is assessed in terms of response to hypothetical dilemmas.

Orr (1974) sees that "moral maturity" is embodied in Kohlberg's notion that prevailing conventionality is to be transcended and such behavior criticized by the agent. However, Orr issues a caveat to one who would accept Kohlberg's notion of moral maturity at face value:

S.. moral maturity does not require even an implicit rejection
of man's nature as an animal who is defined by his group loyalties, and by his identification with tangible communities. The
ability even to speak about morality assumes communities that are
able to provide the common language and perspectives necessary
for communication. (1974, p. 271)

The conception of "moral maturity" is equated by Keniston (1970) with Ericson's "ethical stage." One who is engaged in the kind of thinking which is typical at this stage may find himself or herself at odds with conventional notions of morality. Keniston, who characterized Kohlberg's work as brilliant, writes of the principles which are at work on the ultimate level comprising moral maturity:

such principles are apt to be stated in a very high level of
generality; e.g., the concept of justice, the Golden Rule,
the sanctity of life, the categorical imperative, the promotion









of human development. The individual at this stage may find himself in conflict with existing concepts of law and order, or even democratically arrived-at laws unacceptable because
they lead to consequences or enjoin behaviors that violate
his own personal principles. (1970, p. 579)

Indeed, the concept of "moral maturity" is a salient notion in the

Kohlberg paradigm. In both tile realm of the "is and the ought" Kohlberg finds "moral maturity" to be important in any viable conception of the way it is or ought to be in the moral domain. We have stated several conceptions of "moral maturity" which are found in the literature. It is important next to see certain phenomena concerning "moral maturity"

which emerge in tile research relating to the Kohlberg scheme.


The Place of the Hybrid Breeds
A phenomenon for one who would make an unequivocable declaration as to what constitutes "moral maturity" is presented by the emerging conception of the "hybrid breed." The claim to have discovered a new level which is operating perhaps slightly below level five is made by Sullivan and Quarter (1972) in their findings of the "hybrid breeds." The "hybrid breed" response incorporates level one and level three reasoning in such a way that neither level can be clearly distinguished from the other. These two researchers question whether or not a level went unnoticed by Kohlberg, only to emerge under other research conditions. Sullivan

and Quarter write of the "hybrid breed;" "our own hunch is that these two moral types constitute two distinct branches of an initial stage of postconventional morality which antedates a stage five orientation" (1972, p. 160).









Other Phenomena of Importance to the
Psychologist and the Philosopher

Not only do the "hybrid breeds" cause problems which, as I write, Kohlberg has not addressed, but an important consideration for the psychologist as well as the philosopher is whether or not an individual is simply evincing a preference for a moral judgment rather than actually going through the mental process one uses in order to formulate the moral judgment equal to the judger's ability. Rest (1973) recognized that much research over time would be necessary to ascertain the level of the preferred moral judgment by the subject in the study. He designed a study to measure both comprehension and preference of moral statements. His findings were that at least half of the subjects preferred moral

statements one level above the level at which the statements were comprehended. This finding led him to conclude that the cognitive-developmental approach was basically sound.

Turiel and Rothman (1972) find another problem in the separation of thought and action. The separation of thought from action is an important question concerning the moral domain. Can an individual who performs a moral judgment on a certain level maintain that same level in moral behavior? Can one accuse Kohlberg of dualistic thinking in his use of the artificial situation rather than what the person actually does as the aspect of moral judgment which he or she evaluates? Turiel and Rothman designed a research study which would relate thought and action, i.e., response to hypothetical dilemma with opinions of others concerning the actual behavioral decisions made by the subjects. They write,

the findings of this experiment demonstrate the interdependence
of reasoning and action in the development of morality. We
have seen that there is a relation between the subject's stage
of moral judgment, the stage of communications from others
regarding behavioral decision, and the subject's actions.
(1972, p. 754)










Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that finding a relationship still does not function as uniting thought and action. So the problem remains with us that thought and action are still separate entities in the Kohlberg scheme and are not united.

Further Research Aspects of the

Kohlberg Scheme

Let us, for the moment, grant that the Kohlberg method of presenting moral dilemmas outside the immediate concern of the individual who is being evaluated does represent one way of measuring the judgment of the moral domain. In this case, findings such as those by Fodor (1972) who compared delinquent and nondelinquent adolescents, come as no surprise. Fodor found that delinquents score lower on Kohlberg's hierarchy than do nondelinquents. Consider the fact that Kohlberg himself finds adolescents to be mainly at the conventional level which is characterized as the "good boy-good girl" syndrome and duty to authority. fow can it be realistically expected that a delinquent would respond in the same manner as would the good boy or girl? Or does duty to authority mean much to a delinquent? In cases in which delinquents gave "good boy-good girl" responses especially, the researcher should be suspect of the sincerity of the responder.

Given the hypothetical dilemma method, moral values and their corresponding attitudes can be appraised, according to Hogan and Dickstein (1972),who point to the fact that Kohlberg's notion of the moral judgment entails the claim that the judgment can be evaluated. It is found to be the case, however, that the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Scale is quite difficult to administer and takes an inordinate amount of time to use.










Hogan and Dickstein are not the only researchers to notice the difficulty of mastering the Kohlberg scale. Kuhmerker (1972) remarks that the scoring mechanism for Kohlberg's stages is by no means an easy technique in which to gain expertise. One may obtain a mimeographed copy of scoring procedures from Kohlberg himself, but this can in no way be substituted for the workshops on scoring procedures given by Kohlberg.

The Harvard team has a tendency to score responses to dilemmas at lower levels than does the novice scoreraccording to Kuhmerker (1972). She notes three biases that one should be cautioned against in order to avoid scoring errors. These biases are

. that the scorer thinks of the stages as represented by
the content of the responses, rather than by its form and
structure. The scorer must analyze why a subject thinks as he does, not what action he advocates. The subject's stage
motives are cognitively structured. The subject does not
develop new motives, but new ways of ordering alternatives.
A third pitfall is to think of stages as types of personalities rather than ways of reasoning. (1972, pp. 257-8)

Her remarks lead one to question the reliability of the scoring mechanism in view of the biases that are evident in the novice scorer, assuming that the scorer has appropriate expertise in educational psychology and/or psychology.

Perhaps the most incisive statement as to the relationship of the moral domain to Kohlberg's research is issued by Haan, Stroud, and Holstein who researched regular students, activist students, and hippies. Their research placed the hippies at the lowest level of the Kohlberg moral judgment paradigm, the regular students were at a level above the hippies, and the activists were at the ultimate level. They write that, "Whatever the case, it would not ever seem the task of social science to decide which "is" should become the "ought"--the hippies, activists, or the students--but rather to catalog and explicate the nature of various human moral interdependencies" (1973, p. 611).










Acceptance by Some Scholars of
Kohlberg's Scheme

Proponents of Kohlberg's theory, such as Kenneth Keniston (1970), point to the predictive ability of Kohlberg's theory as a positive asset. Keniston cites the case that principled level students at Harvard would not participate in a sit-in because the issues at hand were not thought to be on the principled level. It should be noted that studies had shown that principled leveled students engaged in sit-ins at Berkeley. Kohlberg's findings confirm his predictions. However, one should be aware of the fact that Kohlberg himself was doing the predicting and not someone using his theory to create and design the same research study, which would, indeed, carry more weight, in our opinion.

Lickona (1973) represents the viewpoint of many psychologists and educators that research has adequately demonstrated the efficacy of the Kohlberg model. Concerning his belief in the Kohlberg scheme, he writes:

Present the child with a moral dilemma that precipitates cognitive conflict, and then expose him to the developmental
stage one above his own . . . . You can also expose the child
to his own stage, or one stage below, or two or three above
it won't matter. The research indicates he'll change
only toward the level one above his own. And the changes,
like all cognitive structural changes, are irreversible. The
child never "forgets" them. Pilot testing of the new filmstrip stories, incidentally, shows that even first and second
graders vigorously debate the moral dilemmas and are eager
for more. (1973, p. 23)

Indeed, research findings do tend to provide one with cogent reasons for adopting the Kohlberg view, and the findings which we have cited are convincing, if one believes that response to hypothetical dilemmas can embody genuine moral judgments. On the other hand, one who views the moral judgment in terms of an individual operating in a problematic ongoing situation, will not even be willing to grant that such research is, indeed, applicable to the problem at hand, i.e., what comprises the










moral judgment. The Kohlberg scheme in no way helps one get clearer about what persons actually do when confronted with real life moral problems. Not only does the artificiality of the situation in the Kohlberg scheme present one with problems, but writers in various disciplines relate problems concerning the Kohlberg paradigm and their own particular discipline. We shall first consider problems of the philosopher who critiques the Kohlberg scheme.

Criticism by Philosophers

of the Kohlberg Scheme

Philosophers, however, are not nearly so much in accord as are psychological researchers insofar as acceptance of the Kohlberg scheme is concerned. Kohlberg (1971a) has remarked that it is not without some trepidation that he entered the "den of wolves" inhabited by philosophers. Yet, one should observe that if he is interested in inhabiting this "den of wolves," he should pay more attention to philosophical puzzles which his theory creates. The most important puzzle is what constitutes the moral domain itself and what criteria other than justice serve to delimit this domain. Not too many philosophers are willing to accept the idea that justice, encompassing the idea of the good, is to be taken as that which delimits the realm of morality. One critic of just that notion is Crittenden (1971), who suggests that rather morality should be the concern which one has concerning the ultimate choice of a life style.

Other criticism of Kohlberg's restrictive definition of the moral realm emerge in the area of philosophy. One is that of Baier (1971), who does not think that Kohlberg's stages really help one to get clear about the good life, which should be a concern to one who wishes to delineate what is "truly moral."










Another philosopher who posits that limiting morality to justice

omits much from the arena of moral discourse which is traditionally dealt with in philosophy is Crittenden (1971). He remarks in an informal discussion about Kohlberg that

he cuts out certain reasons as morally relevant simply by his fairly limited definition of morality in terms of justice or something like that. I think that personal ideals enter into morality: in the way we think we ought to act even when the tangible public good is not directly involved, in the way we
treat animals, or in resolving a conflict of values, say between
an aesthetic and an economic value. (1971, p. 317)

Since the restrictive nature of Kohlberg's moral theory has been criticized by Crittenden, it becomes of importance to state the boundaries of the moral judgment for Kohlberg. Beck et al. (1971) spell out the objective and subjective requirements of the moral judgment in terms of the Kohlberg scheme. In order that the judgment be truly moral it must satisfy the objective requirement of justice and the subjective requirement of the individual's having reasoned in order to reach the final decision. Beck et al. (1971) note that in the Kohlberg theory objectively beneficial acts are not enough unless they are conceived in terms of justice. Moreover, moral education is not education apart from the process of reasoning which should be going on in a context of the educative experience.

That the farther one moves along the Kohlberg stages the more typically moral is the judgment is an observation made by Alston (1971). Alston criticizes the view of movement along Kohlberg's stages on the basis that the moral is conceived entirely in terms of Kohlberg's personal preference. Citing the fact that moral philosophers by no means agree as to the delineation of the moral domain, Alston nevertheless implores Kohlberg to go beyond simply recommending justice:










It is notorious that moral philosophers agree no more about
what is distinctive of the moral than about anything else:
and a large number of distinct accounts of what makes a judgment, a reason, an attitude, a rule, or a principle,
moral have been put forward. Kohlberg chooses one of these
. . . but fails to do anything by way of showing that this is
more than a choice of what seems most congenial or interesting
to him . . . If these pronouncements are to carry any weight,
he will have to show that this sense of "moral" which is
functioning as his standard has itself some recommendation
other than congeniality to his predilections. (1971, pp. 276-7)

Not only is the question as to what comprises the moral domain of interest to the philosopher, but also the assumptions which are the underpinnings of the Kohlberg paradigm. The first assumption is that the moral judgment change involves a change in the structure of the response rather than the frequency. Secondly, there is a newness or difference in response in regard to developmental change from one pattern to another. Thirdly, the changes are for the most part vertically mobile. Fourthly, there is tied into the conception a universalizable pattern which is step-wise in terms of sequence and irreversible in general. Fifthly, the stages themselves form a ladder-like paradigm which is functioning within the person. Finally, each stage is a more complete and complex integration of a previous stage and transcends this previous stage.

Having stated the step-wise progression of stages as depicted by Morgan (1975), the question of whether Kohlberg does in fact replace the doctrine of "original sin" with a doctrine of "original virtue" emerges. Scriven claims that he does, in his remarks to the effect that,

I would like to christen a doctrine which runs through Kohlberg's approach and which is described as follows: I shall now present a third conception of moral education. In this
conception the goal of moral education is the stimulation of the "natural" development of the individual child's own moral judgment and of the capacities allowing him to use it to control his behavior. I call this "the doctrine of original virtue." It is nice that a social psychologist should have
replaced the doctrine of original sin. (1971, p. 355)










Although Kohlberg does not agree with Scriven's interpretation of his stages, it does seem that the stages operate to the end of moving upward along Kohlberg's hierarchy in terms of becoming more and more virtuous as one advances in age.

Philosophers not only question the step-wise progression of morality, but, moreover, the matter of cultural relativity and ethical relativity is of concern to this discipline. An analysis of Kohlberg's scheme should address itself to the position of Kohlberg on the question of cultural relativity and ethical relativity which are seen as two distinct notions by Kohlberg. Many scholars have reacted to Kohlberg's notions on cultural relativity. Let us take the example of R. S. Peters (1971) who provides

the student of Kohlberg with a fairly accurate statement as to Kohlberg's position on cultural relativity. Kohlberg sees that cultures are different in terms of customs and moral beliefs when conceived as matters of content, but on the other hand, the form of moral beliefs is universal. Obviously marriage and sexual taboos differ frori culture to culture, yet the rules and forms of these beliefs are seen by Kohlberg to be similar and universal.

As we have observed, the problem of ethical relativity is conceived as being different from the problem of cultural relativity by Kohlberg (1971a). In defense of Kohlberg's separation, Beck et al. (1971) claims that Kohlberg recognizes the existence of the problem of ethical pluralism and believes that his stage hierarchy resolves this problem. Instead of addressing problems of ethical pluralism which the academicians seem to do as they endlessly engage in puzzles about problems relating to ethical pluralism, Kohlberg claims that his research has unearthed the "wisdom of society." In pointing to those who have reached his ultimate stage, he










maintains that he has discovered a universal truth, inasmuch as the elite who operate at the highest level "know" the most adequate ethical position.

To counter the claim made by Kohlberg that his scheme represents the "wisdom of society," one need look no farther than the philosopher John Dewey. Dewey writes much about the separation of thought and action in theoretical conceptions. He offers many examples of dualistic thinking which are to be discovered in the separation of thought and action, means and ends, conscience and conduct, et cetera. The relationship between the thought as embodied in the moral judgment and the action as embodied in moral conduct of a true moral judgment is a relationship characterized by interdependence. Craig (1974) sees that in the arena of thought and action, Kohlberg has not adequately established the relationship in terms of causality between the moral judgment and subsequent moral conduct. Granted that Kohlberg's contention that an individual who knows "the good" will proceed to do it, one is still left with the problem of how responding to hypothetical dilemmas causes certain moral conduct. At this point, we cannot see that this can ever be resolved given Kohlberg's current position on the nature of evaluating the moral judgment.

Philosophers, too, as well as psychologists think that perhaps Kohlberg has overlooked a stage. Rosen (1975), while not faulting Kohlberg for choosing a Kantian-Rawlsian view of morality and converting it into a system of developmental stages, does want to add one stage which is higher than Kohlberg's stage six. Perhaps this stage would be stage seven and is deemed by Rosen to be an act theory:










All moral principles are summary rules, these are no constitutive moral rules. Moral rules are abandoned when they conflict with what we would have decided without the rule. To
arrive at singular moral judgments you need to be clear about
the facts, not to be abnormal, and not use any of the (mistaken) theories which claim moral rules are constitutive and
are thus required to arrive at justified moral judgments.
Moral disagreements and dilemmas are to be handled with the
method of hypothetical agreement. (1975, p. 4)

Philosophers traditionally view theories of morality horizontally

rather than vertically. Morgan (1975) points to Kohlberg's scheme, which posits that philosophies should be viewed in a hierarchical manner with some philosophies being more adequate than others. Her observation is that

when philosophers discuss the relative merits and demerits
of such diverse ethical positions'as Hedonism, Egoism, Utilitarianism, Kantian Formalism and Ideal Spectator Theory, they very often have arrived at the conclusion
that when the fundamental premise(s) of each position
is reached there is no rational way of resolving the differences among various positions. (1975, pp. 3-4)

That Kohlberg has made little attempt to learn the language of philosophers, the controversies, and distinctions characteristic of philosophy is pointed out by Morgan (1975). However, she cites the fact that Kohlberg's paradigm has brought new spirit into the moral arena. One who wishes to be truly intellectual, in her viewshould take problems raised by Kohlberg into full account.

Morgan (19.75) points to the fact that by totally ignoring a venerable tradition in ethics, Kohlberg in his paradigm does away entirely with any viable concept of habit. Morgan notes that nowhere in the Kohlberg scheme can one find a prototype of a "good man" as a person whose character and habits are formed in accordance with good moral virtues.
That Kohlberg does not consider the concept of self-control and ignores the function of habit in morality is noted by R. S. Peters










(1971). Peters further claims that perhaps Kohlberg has in mind the Spartans who might exhibit traits such as courage only in very specific situations. To this example, he replies, that on the other hand, if one decided that a virtue such as moral courage might be a desirable habit to develop, nowhere in the Kohlberg analysis can one find the means whereby this feat is accomplished, i.e., the development of habit.

Craig (1974) also cites the fact that to Kohlberg, any attempt to equate moral education with training in obtaining good habits is misconceived. This point of view is clearly stated in the context of Kohlberg's rejection of a notion that morality involves a "bag of virtues." As we have already seen, the purpose of moral education for Kohlberg is not to instill moral habits, but to facilitate the development of the individual and aid progression on his various stages.

Viewing the Kohlberg value judgment in the context of the problem of habit and how habit is conceived by Dewey, Craig illustrates the limited conception of habit which Kohlberg employs in this part of his thesis.

What Kohlberg incorrectly assumes is that a habit is solely identifiable with a behavior and that the use of punishment and reward is the only basis for acquiring habits . . . John
Dewey, for example, suggests that habits are dispositions
which enable the individual to use his intelligence to mediate a problematic situation. A habit is not merely a response
to a type of stimulus. Kohlberg's concept of habit, then, is
rather limited and neglects the dispositional use of intelligence which Dewey suggests is paramount. (1974, pp. 125-6)

It is worthwhile to examine the Kohlberg scheme in light of Dewey's conception of habit inasmuch as Kohlberg repeatedly claims a Deweyite basis for his philosophy.

Not only does Craig find Kohlberg's account of habit leaving much to

be desired insofar as this conception of habit limits the richness in









meaning that the concept, habit, can be given, but in Craig's (1974) assessment of Kohlberg, Kohlberg is found to be irreconcilably entwined in the horns of a dilemma as well. For having specific "world views" of situations leads one to the point where certain habitual ways of thinking about problems have already been developed. Craig is not convinced in the least that Kohlberg's polemic against the place of habit in the moral domain has in any respect solved the problem of habit in moral philosophy. Certainly, most theoretical positions on moral development do give some consideration to the place of habit in the field of moral philosophy.

Habit formation is a part of the concern of the philosopher. However, society and especially the quality of that society is of considerable interest to the philosopher. Ought a society, assuming that it was possible, try to bring all of its members up to the highest possible form of reasoning? The previous question is raised by Morgan (1975). Would society be disrupted in the process of elevating all moral judgments? Her analysis does point out a puzzle that one who uses the Kohlberg scheme has. For his educational prescriptions do try to elevate the level of moral judgment. Whether or not one believes in the efficacy of the Kohlberg Moral Development Scheme, it still is not clear that Kohlberg's prescriptions even address typically moral problems such as are found in decisions each person must make for himself or herself. One might well claim that the Kohlberg prescription for moral development is supererogatory to the problems of the moral domain, be it disruptive or impotent.

One societal problem which Morgan (1975) has with the Kohlberg

hierarchy is in regard to the ordinary man. She writes, "concerning cognitive development, it seems clear that not all individuals are able to achieve a highly efficient level of formal operations which is a necessary










condition for adopting the ideal spectator view which Kohlberg finds central to operating at stage six" (1975, p. 12).

One who views society in terms of the Platonic archetypes is unnecessarily engaging in social anachronisms. The philosopher Horgan (1975) finds Kohlberg to be very Platonic in viewing "human beings" as equivalent to the Platonic archetype "humanity." She claims that frequently people are treated differently and to posit concern for "humanity" does not present a position which is free from problems. Even the archformalist Kant is unable, in her view, to resolve for Kohlberg the problemi he has of viewing key concepts on stage six in terms of Plato's archetypes.


Criticism of Theologians
of Kohlberg's Scheme

Kohlberg's stages have not only made an impact upon philosophers, but theologians, too, have shown interest in Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Because different religions are quite often engaged in the education of their own constituencies, some theologians address questions which are of mutual concern to the field of theology and education. Bachmeyer (1973) offers the educator and the theologian five warnings concerning the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of moral development to the moral domain. These cautions are, in the first place that an individual's moral worth should not be judged on the basis of a score on Kohlberg's scale. Secondly, the judgments are in reference to moral thought not moral behavior or action. Thirdly, provocation or stimulation by the teacher is not the only reason people attain increasingly complex levels of moral judgment. Fourthly, selfishness should not be equated with self interest, since the two are entirely different notions. Finally, content is not pertinent to the Kohlberg scheme; only thought structures are relevant to the making of the moral judgment.








One who superimposes a Bonhoeffer perspective over the Kohlberg thesis is presented with three salient questions, according to Bergman (1974). These questions are: First, what is it in the nature of our society which limits so many people to pre-conventional and conventional orientations? Secondly, does Kohlberg realize the controversial nature of his claim that the core of morality is justice? Finally, in addressing

the relationship between religious belief and moral judgment, Kohlberg fails to answer the question "What is religion?"

Criticism of Educators Concerning

the Kohlberg Scheme
We have considered criticisms made by philosophers and theologians concerning the Kohlberg scheme. Turning our attention now to the Kohlberg scheme and how it relates to the educator and the educational enterprise, one should notice the growing importance of Kohlberg's theory to educational research, educational practices, and the organizational scheme of the educational enterprise. Orr (1974) points to both Piagetian schemes of moral development and Kohlberg's scheme of moral development as being formulations which will be of considerable influence to the future of the educational arena. Orr claims that both Kohlberg and Piaget should be scrutinized carefully "if only because in the next few years they undoubtedly will provide the basis for a considerable amount of research and institutional experimentalism" (1974, p. 365).

The insistence of Kohlberg and some of those who analyze his work

that the basic thrust of Kohlberg's moral education can be traced back to John Dewey is a problem that is quite significant in the analysis of Kohlberg's theory. Sholl (1971) points to the fact that Kohlberg owes to Dewey the notion that science is of importance in assessing values and








that moral development can best occur in the context of an educational setting. Certainly, the student of Dewey cannot agree with this analysis. But the artificiality of the moral situation immanent in Kohlberg's work makes identification with Dewey inappropriate.

Examining Dewey's perspective in terms of the Kohlberg thesis is particularly important because as writers such as Selman and Lieberman (1972) continue to assert the Dewey background of the Kohlberg theory and much misinformation is given. These authors write that

the theory behind the curriculum described (Kohlberg's) in this paper is basically the cognitive-developmental theory
of value-education of John Dewey. Elaborated by Piaget, it has been developed in research and tested by Kohlberg
and his associates at Harvard University. (1972, p. 2)

The above-mentioned supposedly Dewey-based curriculum uses Kohlberg's stages of moral dilemmas. Selman and Lieberman (1972) report that certain moral issues such as "truth telling" or "keeping promises" are addressed by the teacher and children in the context of artificial dilemmas. The child is stimulated by the teacher to arrive at a higher level judgment than the stage or level at which the child is operating on. Since Dewey stresses the importance of the child's own plasticity and starting from the child's own impulses and inclinations to get cues for the teacher to work with, only the wildest stretch of imagination can deem Selman and Lieberman's notions of the moral curriculum typically Deweyan.

Kohlberg does share the concept with Dewey that the school is at once a social and moral institution. Beck et al. (1971) note that Kohlberg states that the school whether it wants to or not transmits moral values. Simply the process of organization or rule making which of necessity goes on in the school employs techniques and practices on the part of the school which are inherently moral.








What then does Kohlberg consider to be moral education? Beck

et al. (1971) address this question and observe that Kohlberg wants to make a distinction between moral education and moral conditioning or moral training. The sine qa non of moral education according to Kohlberg in the assessment of Beck et al. is that it involves reasoning which sees the student as actively engaged in full participation in moral activity. The student uses a kind of reflective thinking about moral issues which brings into play clearly defined principles in the domain of the moral reasoning process. Certainly reflective thinking is to be encouraged, but in my opinion, Kohlberg's paradigm of the process of reflective thinking is cut off from the individual's own needs and interests. Moreover, the morality obtained as a part of the social interaction involved in school organization is based on Kohlberg's notion of justice in an ideal society rather than the on-going needs of the students as they participate in school organizational procedures.

It goes without saying that opinion as to the value of artificial

situations to get at problems of moral development is by no means unanimous. Proponents of the Kohlberg theory such as Kuhmerker (1972 and 1973) protest loudly and vehemently against those who advocate that children be exposed to realistic situations. Kuhmerker writes

one might think that subjects would respond most enthusiastically to realistic dilemmas; perhaps to dilemmas closest
to real-life situations that they have experienced. The experience of Kohlberg and his colleagues has proved this assumption to be unfounded. As a matter of fact, even when a genuine moral dilemma is currently in the news, discussion groups have tended
to respond with greater involvement--and with greater contrast
of opinion--to the artificially .developed dilemmas. (1972, p. 257)

Let us examine what is assumed by the previous claim. This viewpoint seems to present the idea that all dilemmas in the nevs are of equal interest to children and that the Kohlberg artificial dilemma is always








more interesting to children than any of these lower interest real life dilemmas. Now only the most naive teacher who has little acquaintance with the interests of children will accept such an argument.

Along with the problem of the artificiality of the Kohlberg situation, education is provided with the problem of Kohlberg's notion of justice. R. S. Peters (1971) finds that the abstract principle of justice at the core of morality provides a problem for educators. Young children are often unable to grasp concepts of abstract justice, and considerations such as social sensitivity are relegated to an inferior position in the name of moral education. It is his belief if education fully addresses

itself to questions concerning the plight of others starting with the very young child and making this topic increasingly complex as the child matures, then the proper moral development will ensue. Peters conceives that the Kohlberg scheme does not do justice to moral education. Moreover by Peters' own account, increased social sensitivity will lead to a more comprehensive awareness of the rules of society and how people are affected by these rules.

Thus one notes that by neglecting the organic aspects of society and positing abstract justice at the core, Kohlberg is led to a conception which embodies a dichotomy for moral education. Noting the Beck et al.(1971) view of Kohlberg's prescription to the school, we find that, on the one hand, the social studies program is seen by Kohlberg to be the vehicle through which moral education can be "taught." On the other hand, the "participatory" activities which can be provided for students in the context of educational organization of their educational experiences are also seen to be the means by which moral education can be carried on. These "participatory" experiences are supposed to help the child develop








a deeper conception of the term "injustice." Of course, it is Kohlberg's own notion of justice which is to be developed.

Examination of the social studies program reveals that the Kohlberg model not only serves to effect a dualism between the social studies program and school organization but also is quite Platonic in its aspect. One finds that Orr has made an accurate appraisal of the Kohlberg model in the field of education. Orr claims that Kohlberg becomes an advocate at least in the sphere of moral education, for a school that is
cut off the liberal welfare model. The task ceases to be the
political one of working out compromises and becomes one of moral therapy, with the teacher, who possesses the "secret"
knowledge of developmental stages serving as therapist. (1974,
p. 372)
But the social studies program alone is not enough to encompass

Kohlberg's paradigm of moral education; the "participatory" experiences are to be analyzed also. In respect to the school's providing "participatory" activities, most educators who are sincere in their desire to offer the optimum moral educational experiences for the student would support such a view. The trouble is that when the purpose of the activity is viewed primarily in terms of getting the child to "know" justice, then justice is conceived as an ideal end rather than as a means to an end in the regulation of the educational enterprise. Anyhow, one can think of a whole range of moral activities, not the least of which is Peters's notion of the development of "social sensitivity" which should be encouraged as well as or perhaps in preference to "knowing" justice. In our appraisal of Kohlberg's scheme of "participatory" activities in which to

develop moral education, we believe that Kohlberg has come up with the right practices for the wrong reasons. Certainly every opportunity for moral education in the organization of the school should be encouraged, yet we would hope that moral education would be more broadly conceived








than is the case in the Kohlberg model, 14e would further hope that "justice" would be conceived as a means to the end of enhancing social arrangements rather than as an archetype of the "good" as Kohlberg conceives it to be.

Should we want to examine Kohlberg's prescriptions to the classroom teacher concerning moral education, we need only to refer to his curriculum module entitled "First Things: Values," which was developed in collaboration with Selman and Lickona. This module addresses questions concerning educational activities from kindergarten through high school and is reported by Kuhmerker (1973). The module consists of sound film strips with material for teachers to use with the series. Moral educational programs are carefully organized around such issues as "promise keeping," "truth telling," "fairness and justice,' and "the rights of property."

Teachers are advised to use both small discussion groups and large discussion groups in this moral educational program. Kuhmerker further relates that five instructions are issued to teachers, which are as follows: "() Preserve the moral conflict . .,(2) Keep the arguments balanced .,(3) Encourage role-taking .,(4) Modify the dilemma

.,(5) Shift the focus to new issues" (1972, pp. 259-60).

Even the most uncritical proponent of Kohlberg's scheme insofar as education is concerned must grant that the average teacher is going to have a problem with the match of maturity level and Kohlberg's stages with the themes proposed. The question should be raised as to whether the issues and techniques proposed by the Kohlberg module even perform the task intended for them by the originators of the module. Notwithstanding the fact that the artificial dilemmas are er.ployed, such questions need addressing by Kohlberg proponents.








In our opinion, only when Kohlberg takes some cognizance of the individual resolving his or her own moral dilemmas as an integral part of his conception of the moral judgment can he truly claim to be forwarding the cause of moral education. I cannot see that he has shown in any way that his module is of any help whatsoever to a person in an actual moral dilemma. Whether one feels that his module is actually harmful to the social group or that it is impotent as a force for moral education, the question of Kohlberg's theory is still with the field of education. Much educational effort is being put forth in the Kohlberg framework. Many educators are embracing this new idea without adequately analyzing the consequences of their action in terms of providing children and young people with appropriate moral educational experiences. It is our contention that educators should proceed with caution in terms of their willingness to adopt a scheme of moral education which overly restricts the moral domain and contains inconsistencies in its over-all point of view.


Summary
The review of the literature in this chapter has shown that different scholars have found diverse criteria for identifying the concept of "moral maturity," which is of considerable significance in any consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of Kohlberg's scheme. Analysis of Kohlberg's conception of "moral maturity," in general, finds that this construct involves the individual's moving from ego-centric motivation to principled level, motivation, and that these principles are to hold for all people in the same situation.
Another indication of Kohlberg's influence lies in the research done in the Kohlberg framework. Researchers have found problems in their studies of the "hybrid breeds," they found that judgment preference was








equal to or higher than the stage at which the subject was operating on in terms of moral judgment level, juvenile delinquents score lower than do normal individual on Kohlberg's Moral Developmental Scale, and the attempt to relate thought and action does not function in actually uniting thought and action.

Philosophers, theologians, and educators criticize the Kohlberg

scheme on various accounts. Peters and Craig criticize the absence of the notion of habit from the Kohlberg scheme. Morgan questions whether or not the ramifications of the Kohlberg scheme will disrupt society. Bachmeyer reminds us that a person's moral worth is not to be equated with a moral development score. Using the abstract principle of justice as the sine qua non of morality poses a problem for educators by too narrowly defining the realm of morality.

Nevertheless, Kohlberg has been influential. The aspect of Kohlberg which has perhaps been most influential in developing his concept of principled behavior is the notion of justice. We shall consider justice in the Kohlberg scheme next.








References

Alston, W. P. "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From is to ought.'" In T.
Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. New York:
Academic Press, 1971.

Bachmeyer, T. J. "The golden rule and developing moral judgment."
Religious Education, 1973, 48, 348-365.

Baier, K. Discussion. In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. K. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1971.

Beck, C. M., Crittenden, B. S., and Sullivan, E. V. floral education.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.

Bergman, M. "Moral decision making in the light of Kohlberg and Bonhoffer: a comparison." Religious Education, 1974, 69, 227-243.

Craig, R. "Lawrence Kohlberg and moral development: some reflections."
Educational Theory, 1974, 24, 121-127.

Crittenden, B. S. Discussion. In C. Mi. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V.
Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1971.

Fodor, E. M. "Delinquency and susceptivity to social influence among
adolescents as a function of level of moral development." The
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Gross, 0. W. Comment. Childhood Education, 1973, 50, 54-55.

Haan, N., Stroud, J., and Holstein, C. "floral and ego stages in relationship to ego processes: a study of 'hippies.'" Journal of
Personality, 1973, 41, 596-612.

Hogan, R. and Dickstein, E. "A dimension of maturity: moral judgment."
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Keniston, K. "Student activism, moral development, and morality."
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Kuhmerker, L. "Growth toward principled behavior: Lawrence Kohlberg's
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Kuhmerker, L. "We don't call it moral education: American children
learn about values." Journal of Moral Education, 1973, 3, 359-365.

Lickona, T. "An experimental test of Piaget's theory of moral development." ERIC, 1973, ED 087 523, 1-11.
Morgan, K. P. Philosophical problems in cognitive-moral-development
theory: a critique of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. (Unpublished
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Orr, J. B. "Cognitive-developmental approaches to moral education: a
social ethical analysis." Educational Theory, 1974, 24, 365-373.

Peters, R. S. "Moral developments: a plea for pluralism." In T. rischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. New York:
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Rest, J. R. "The hierarchical nature of moral judgment: a study of patterns of comprehension and preference of moral stages." Journal of
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Selman, R. L. and Lieberman, M. "An evaluation of a curriculum for primary group children based on cognitive-developmental theory of moral
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Sholl, D. "The contributions of Lawrence Kohlberg to religious and moral
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CHAPTER IV
KOHLBERG'S CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE AND ITS ROLE IN THE MORAL STAGES


Since the concept of justice is of utmost importance in his scheme, and since "virtue" is equated with knowledge of justice, we will discuss the operation of "virtue" and "knowledge of the good" in the Kohlberg scheme. We will deal with the justice structures of "rights" and "duties" which function at each stage. Kohlberg's writings have shown that he recognizes the need to explicate concepts. In spite of his recognition to explicate concepts Kohlberg still does not seem to realize that problems emerge. He borrows much from Dewey, Rawls, and Plato, yet does not realize that he is faced with inconsistencies in his over-all moral developmental position.1


Overview of Chapter

It isourthesis that holding a quasi-Deweyan view of epistemology and personality while simultaneously holding a Rawlsian position on justice causes an inconsistent position on moral development. A brief sketch of the thesis shows that Kohlberg attaches much more importance to "justice structures" immanent in the moral judgment than he does to other moral rationales such as happiness, well-being or welfare. Such a view is more in line with Rawls's thinking than Dewey's philosophy.

Moreover, at no position on the Kohlberg hierarchy does he have a place for Dewey's major moral rationale, i.e., learning from and 1For examples of Kohlberg's debt to Dewey, Rawls, and Plato, see Kohlberg (1970 and 1971).









increasing social interests. While Dewey might admit that one could choose and establish justice as his or her moral ideal, Kohlberg makes no allowances for moral ideals other than ideal justice, which he places at the apex of his hierarchy.

In order to substantiate his theoretical alliance with Rawls and Dewey, Kohlberg should explain why he views "virtue" as "knowledge of the good" instead of as a "sentiment" as is held by Rawls or "intellectually exercised habits" as held by Dewey. Of course, he would not view virtue as a habit, since his account of morality ignores habit.

Finally, belief in a quasi-Deweyan theory of epistemology causes

questions about Kohlberg's clair.m that justice structures are the highest equilibrated2 structures to be discovered in the moral judgment, since Kohlberg himself admits that the values of justice are the "major moral values" in our society and does not make a similar claim for all societies.

If Kohlberg is going to give such prominence to the concept of

"justice," then he should pay more attention to philosophical treatments of justice. Kohlberg has not devoted sufficient attention to the "problem of the right" as it relates to the "good." While Rawls and Dewey both spell out with care the relationship between the "good" and the "right," Kohlberg must do more than simply assert that he follows Dewey, Rawls, or both. He has yet to explicate the consequences of the "right."

2Kohlberg claims that an imbalance in thought structures occurs when a person has mastered the concepts at a particular stage of moral development and problems arise which cannot be solved by that moral rationale. New modes of thought which are more complex are gradually mastered. These more highly complex thought structures are identified by Kohlberg as being more equilibrated.









It is my second thesis that using a Rawlsian view to explicate

stage five and six is inconsistent with Kohlberg's own rm1oral stage hierarchy. Kohlberg has not explained why the same principles are more equilibrated at stage five than stage six. If in fact he uses the same principles to explain stage five and stage six rationales, then we have the tautology'h is A"and the distinction between the stages is blurred. We next show that inventing principles to accept as binding is a more complex mental act than following principles one may have previously deduced. This leads us to question the claim that stage six is more adequate than stage five.

Kohlberg cannot say he does not need to justify principles, that he only needs to explicate them. He needs to explain why stage six is more complex and equilibrated than stage five when in fact certain principles are justified at stage five, thus giving more importance to stage five.

Kohlberg cannot adequately account for emotions and intellect in his empirical technique as Rawls does in his accounts of guilt. Guilt felt by a subject in an artificial situation is in no way similar to guilt felt in a real moral situation. Rawls assumes that all people in the social group will judge on a principled orientation, while Kohlberg believes that only those who consistently judge at the most adequate levels can participate in a Rawlsian system of justice, i.e., make judgments based on principles.

Finally, Rawls's system of justice is not limited to capitalist or socialist societies but is applicable to both. Kohlberg's dilemma is a dilemma only in a capitalist society. For example, Kohlberg's Heinz had a dilemma only in a society which does not furnish health care to its members as socialist countries do.








Noting some tasks Kohlberg should undertake in order to explicate his theory more completely, we do make the assumption that Kohlberg needs to hold a consistent view. Since he has felt a need to lean on others and has not taken it upon himself to offer sufficient explanations of seeming inconsistencies, we are presented with the task of pointing them out.

First, we will state what an adequate position on justice should do. We then proceed by pointing to areas of disagreement among moral theoretical philosophers as to positions on justice. We do not hold Kohlberg responsible for articulating a comprehensive position on justice, yet we find that some discontinuities are present in his account of justice.

We will present Kohlberg's account of "virtue" as ideal justice and "knowledge of the good." We present his "justice stages" based on notions of "rights" and "duties" operating at each level. Rawls's theory of justice and Dewey's "ends-means" model of justice are presented to offer the reader an appropriate background for the arguments employed to substantiate the thesis that positing a Deweyan conception of epistemology and the person,while at the same time holding a Rawlsian theory of justice resents Kohlberg with inconsistencies.
Finally, we present the thesis that discontinuity in Kohlberg's paradigm of moral development can be discerned by comparing Rawls's theory of justice with Kohlberg's highest stages. We shall next see what is entailed in a position on justice.


Positions on Justice

First of all, one would expect a position on justice to offer the reader a definition of justice or an analysis of the concept of justice.








The relationship between social institutions, laws, and regulations, and the liberty and equality of a society's citizenry should be specified. Moreover, a method of adjudicating conflicting claims should be an integral part of a theory of justice. A comprehensive position on justice should focus on moral relationships between people, on how people treat animals and their environment, and any combination of foreseeable moral circumstances which might arise. In order to substantiate a stronger claim about a particular position on justice, the means by which a position is to be justified should be specified.

Consideration of different viewpoints on justice leads one inevitably to that which is problematic in positions on justice. Philosophers who do formulate positions on justice generally do make the claim that a specific conception of justice is based on what a rational person considers to be binding duties and obligations. The intuitive notions of justice which the hypothetical rational person would hold are seen by some thinkers to encompass the intuitive notion of justice as fairness on the one hand and such notions as the determination of desert on the other. We are thus left with the issue of which idea concerning the nature of justice we are going to accept.

Another problem for a position on justice is in regard to certain

psychological aspects of the individual's personality such as his or her desires. Does the justice procedure provide for taking into account the intensity or lack of intensity of desire to do an activity, or are we simply dealing with procedures to adjudicate claims which do not take intensity of desire into consideration?

All positions on justice have some conception of the "right" and the good. Now function of the "right" and the "good" in justice is








defined in different ways in positions on justice and injustice. Deontological positions on justice, such as Rawls's (1971) thesis that justice

is fairness, do not identify the "right" and the "good" as being independent conceptions. On the other hand, the teleological viewpoint of the Utilitarian conceptualizes the "right" as "maximizing good."

We next view the Kohlberg scheme in terms of his treatment of justice and virtue. Although it may not be fair to ask a psychologist to present and develop a comprehensive position on justice, we need to make sure that he has an adequate conception of justice by examining his remarks on justice. We should not be misled expecting Kohlberg to relate institutions, laws, and a person's citizenry in a complete way in stating his conception of the highest reach of justice. lore basically, his concern is how justice structures are conceived by individuals making moral judgments at different levels and in enumerating the function of the
"good," "virtue," and "knowledge of the good" at the ultimate level of moral judgment.

The fact that Kohlberg leans on Rawls or Dewey in his conceptual

framework leads one to question why Kohlberg regards "virtue" as knowledge, rather than as "intellectually exercised habits" in the Deweyan tradition or a "striving for excellence" as embodied in Rawls's conception of "virtue."

Justice and Virtue in the Kohlberg Scheme
Since Kohlberg believes that virtue is "knowledge of the good," and knowledge is something that can be taught, it follows that in Kohlberg's view, virtue can be taught. But virtue is not the kind of knowledge which can be imposed on a person's mind, rather it may be taught by means of Plato's doctrine of "reminiscence," i.e., the recollection of a person's








own knowledge of the good by means of a process of stimulation. This stimulation is effected by the teacher, who would intuitively know the "good" and should be like Plato's conception of the philosopher-king. "Knowledge of the good" manifests itself differently at different levels. In spite of the developmental differences Kohlberg has observed in the adequacy of judgments based on "knowledge of the good," i.e., the general movement from simpler notions of the "good" to more complex notions of the "good" and "virtue," they both have one meaning. When "virtue" attains its highest reach, it is the "ideal form of justice." Kohlberg states that the "good" comprises the ideal of "justice" and "virtue." For Kohlberg, "knowledge of the good" in its most complex form is "justice." Moreover, Kohlberg believes that "knowledge of the good" is "philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs" (1970, p. 58).

While Kohlberg does not seem to see the "problem of the good,"

philosophers have had a perennial concern with defining the 'good" and the concept of "virtue." In conceptions of "good," there is difficulty in determining the way "evaluative" and "nonevaluative" terms function. In some instances, philosophers have conceived the "good" as a standard which can be used to measure or evaluate other concepts.

Perhaps the most important analysis of the "problem of the good"

has emerged from the insights of Urmson and von Wright in their analysis of the "problem of the good." Recent analysis of the concept of the "good" by Urmson (1950) has pointed out the function of the word "good" as an adjective which designates order rather than "absolute position." For example, we might grade a set of objects by using grading labels "good," "bad," or "indifferent," while grading another set of objects using the labels "excellent," "good," and "fair." Of course, the positional status of good is higher in the former example than in the latter.








Another contemporary philosopher, von Wright (1973), analyzes the

concept of "good" and concluded that good could be conceived of in terms of the multiplicity of meanings found in language usage. Von Wright arrives at the following categories of goodness: "technical goodness," "medical goodness," the "good of a being" or "welfare," "utilitarian goodness," and "hedonic goodness."

Like the concept of the "good," the concept of "virtue" dates back to ancient philosophy. Certainly, one could study the history of philosophy by examining the differing conceptions of the "good" and "virtue" which were put forth throughout the centuries. This chapter will present the Socratic question, "can virtue be taught?" in the context of presenting Kohlberg's view of "virtue." Kohlberg's position on the "good" and "justice" will be related to "virtue."

Philosophers and philosophers of education have been known to disagree about what constitutes a problem in philosophy. While the question of what constitutes a philosophical problem is outside the scope of this paper, it should be pointed out that concepts such as "good," "virtue," and "justice" are problematic in regard to questions concerning their function and meaning in language. A problematic area for the concept of 'Virtue':is whether or not'Virtud' is a culturally relative value or absolutistic value as Kohlberg believes. The "good" functions in such a variety of ways, that the philosopher or psychologist should be careful to specify precisely how the term is used.

The next question to raise is whether Kohlberg is presenting a claim that we have to be instructed in order to attain more complex conceptions of "knowledge of the good" or do we just develop such knowledge naturally? Kohlberg apparently believes that "natural experience," a manifestation








of which is the individual interacting with the environment, offers the person the environing stimulation which will aid in development. But the process of attaining yet more complex mental operations which are a part of the more adequate conceptions of "knowledge of the good" is greatly speeded up by education.

Kohlberg (1970) equates "virtue" with the "ideal form of justice." He criticizes Freudians and Skinnerians, alleging that they are noreanxious to answer the question of how virtue can be taught, than the question of precisely what it is that is called virtue which they think they are teaching. Kohlberg compares himself with Socrates in the rleno by claiming that he does not even know what virtue is, much less whether it can be taught. Then, he proceeds by a dialectical process to see what virtueu" entails. We are led to the view that Kohlberg considers virtue to be an end, and does not believe that science speaks to problems of ends. He asserts that science can answer only means problems. We are

led by Kohlberg to regard "virtue," the "good," and "justice," as comprising the overriding moral end. In spite of Kohlberg's comments that he does not know what "virtue" is, we find that,like Plato, he considers justice the highest form of virtue.

Kohlberg (1970) classifies "virtue" and the "good" as being "one" rather than "many.''3 The problem of the "one" and the "many" may be traced back to ancient Greek philosophers who regarded these terms as opposites. In the Platonic (1961) dialogue, Meno, Socrates persists in claiming that virtue is a whole, while Meno suggests that virtue is something which can be divided into parts. They finally decide that "virtue" properly belongs to the class of the "one" rather than the "many." 3The English philosopher Austin (1962) has designated "one" as a'trouser" word. That is to say, we get clearer about the concept in regard to what not being one entails.








Besides assigning "virtue" to the class of the "one," we have said that Kohlberg equates "virtue" with "knowledge of the good." At this point, Kohlberg has devised a slightly different relationship between

the "good" and "virtue" from the relationship Socrates and Meno noted in the Meno. For example, Socrates and Meno agree that "virtue" is "something good," yet reach the conclusion that "virtue" is not "knowledge of the good," but is wisdom acquired by "divine dispensation."

We have described Kohlberg's point of view as to "knowledge of the good" and "virtue," and have found him to believe that "knowledge of the good" can be taught. Since "ideal justice" represents the highest reach of "virtue," we shall present Kohlberg's view on justice.

Kohlberg (1970) affirms that the basic moral values which underlie

our society are the "values of justice." He does not make the claim that justice values underlie all societies. We can see evidence of the value of justice operating in our society by means of examining the relationship between the constitution and the government. The rationale of the constitution as it is interpreted either in "strict" or "liberal" modes is to preserve individual rights. In education, we have the example of school desegregation which represents an active as well as a passive recognition of equal rights. Kohlberg believes that the school as a responsible social institution should educate for the active recognition of equal rights. In fostering the active recognition of equal rights, the school must transmit the basic moral values which are prevalent in our society. These are the values of justice.

Kohlberg claims cross-cultural validity for his scheme of moral development. He further claims that principles of justice comprise the highest form of moral judgment to be utilized by a person. Now in the context of









his treatment of justice, Kohlberg qualifies the value of justice in terms of its being the "major moral value" of our society and does not want to claim that the value of justice is the "major moral value" in all societies.
It is Kohlberg's contention that conceptions which posit something other than "justice" as the core of morality do not weaken his claim that justice based rationales are the most highly equilibrated and developed. Claims concerning our major moral interest are not at this time in accord. Rawls, for example, would undoubtedly claim that our overriding moral interest is to follow the dictates of the principles of justice which he has specified. On the other hand, Dewey would claim that our major moral interest is to learn from all the varied social contacts in our experience and to increase these contacts. Kohlberg must mean that it does not matter whether we accept either Rawls's or Dewey's conception of the core of morality, our most highly developed moral judgments will still be those based on principles of justice. We shall examine this particular Kohlberg claim more completely in a latter section of the chapter.

We have found that "justice" is the higest reach of "virtue" and that "knowledge of the good" in its most adequate and equilibrated form comprises "justice," for the "good" is "justice." Since Kohlberg points out that the most adequate moral judgment is "universalizable," it comes as no surprise that he would make a similar claim for "justice." Kohlbergwrites, "justice is not a rule or a set of rules, it is a moral principle. By a moral principle we mean a mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt in all situations" (1970, pp. 69-70). Finally, like Rawls, Kohlberg believes that









justice entails the most equal distribution of rights possible in a social system. Now Rawls believes that the distribution of rights and duties is a function of the operation of justice in a social system. Kohlberg (1973b) describes a person's perceptions of "rights" and "duties" sequentially, in terms of his six stages.4

At stage one, the person confuses having a right with being right. The person at this level conceives of a right in terms of the right to control actions of someone. Duties are perceived in terms of what one should do in accordance with external demands and authority. Stage two rights show the ability to make a distinction between having a right and being right. A person does not need to heed the welfare needs of others as long as there is no detriment to the other person. Rights at this level are also conceived of as the self being able to exercise control over its possessions. Duties are to a certain extent selfish at this stratum; obligation is perceived in terms of a person's own ends.

Stage three rights embody those rights which the "good" person would want to claim. Kohlberg claims that at this stage "rights are earned" (1973b, p. 636). Duties are conceived of in terms of "role-obligation," i.e., what a person in a given role would do for his or her "role-partner." That is to say, what a "good" person would do in a given situation puts him at this stage. That person might be a lawyer, husband, wife, teacher, or member of another occupational group.

Stage four rights are conceived of in two ways by the person at this level. In the first instance, a right is based on freedom which is available to all members of society. Secondly, a right is viewed in terms of the rights which society ascribes to particular roles. 4Kohlberg's remarks on justice may be deduced from Kohlberg (1970, 1971b, and 1973b).








Stage five rights are exemplified in the awareness of "natural

rights" or "rights prior to society." Duties at this stratum are defined in terms of what the welfare of society or contractual fulfillment would be seen to entail. Kohlberg says of obligations at this level, "obligations (are conceived of) as required rational concern for welfare differentiated from fixed responsibilities" (1973b, p. 637).

The ultimate level, stage six, manifests a universalizable rationale, in which claims on other people may be conceived in terms of "universalizable rights." Duties or obligations use the notion of justice. Kohlberg's highest stage is based on the principle of "reversibility." Kohlberg writes, "any right or just claim by an individual gives use to a corresponding duty to another individual" (1971b, p. 637).

Kohlberg (1973b) claims that stage six principles of justice are the most equilibrated and logically complex rationales for making the moral judgment. The adequacy of stage six judgments is thought by Kohlberg to be explained by virtue of the findings of Piaget and his own findings on cognitive development. Kohlberg distinguishes the task of the philosopher from the task of the psychologist by pointing out that it is the philosopher's job to justify a principle, while on the other hand, the psychologist offers an explanation of a cognitive process which devises or uses a principle. flow, since Kohlberg draws the analogy between his two highest stages and Rawls's theory of justice, he could have shown the reader how Rawls justifies his principles of justice; yet Kohlberg chooses not to do so.
Kohlberg (1971b) claims that Ravils does in theory what his experiments have found empirically, i.e., the movement from the social contract orientation to the principled orientation. In Kohlberg's interpretation of









Rawls's principled position, we find that at this level, civil disobedience can be justified. Kohlberg claims that Rawls derived stage six morality from stage five morality through use of argument. The argument which Rawls employs was seen by Kohlberg to coincide with Kohlberg's own findings on the moral development undergone in "natural experience.

Since Rawls analyzes the concept of "justice" much more meticulously than Kohlberg, we should look to Rawls's position on justice to help us get clear about what Kohlberg must mean in his understanding of the workings of "justice." We find that Kohlberg prefers Rawls's arguments concerning the nature of justice. Since the Rawlsian conception is similar to the highest justice structures which Kohlberg found in "natural experience," we need to raise the question, "What is Rawls's position on justice?"


Rawls's Theory of Justice

A thorough, complete analysis of Rawls's (1971) theory of justice lies outside the scope of this analysis of Kohlberg. The interested reader is referred to Rawls's book, A Theory of Justice, which is a complex, complete explication of the workings of justice in a society. Rawls considers justice as it pertains to relationships between individuals, institutions, economies, political groups, and the social union in terms of rational principles which he has derived in his argument.

Rawls asks us to imagine a group of people who accept certain "rules of conduct" as guides for moral action. These "rules of conduct" are binding on a person's moral duties and obligations. The argument runs 5Kohlberg wrote, "in other words, Rawls has used a formal argument to derive stage-6 morality from stage-5, and to systemize stage-6 morality insofar as stage-6 morality is defined by sociopolitical choices . My point is that Rawls is doing by formal argument what 'natural experience does in development" (1970, p. 67).








that it is more agreeable for persons to live in a community than to live a solitary existence. Since people would choose to live together, cooperation is a touchstone of society. Yet, we are to find that conflict arises when questions of adjudicating conflicting claims over rights occur. Rawls advocates that they adopt principles of social justice. Such principles would serve as the means for determining distribution of "benefits" and "burdens" as well as assigning "rights and duties" to the end of securing "social cooperation."

Rawls's next request is that the reader imagine that a "public

conception of justice" regulates this society which we have postulated. When a "public conception of justice" is operating in a social group, people and institutions act in accordance with and are bound by principles of justice which have been accepted by all parties.

Rawls admits that existing societies are not in accord in regard to which particular practices are just or unjust. While it is no doubt true that people will disagree concerning precisely which practices they will accept as binding upon them, they generally hold some conception of justice. But the absence of agreement concerning precisely what is just results in disorganized social arrangements. In light of these diverse views on the role of justice as it operates in a society how are we to know which principles of justice to adopt? Rawls advocates that we adopt those principles of justice-which when conceived in terms of their consequences exhibit consequences which are more desirable and iiire broadly applicable.

Social justice, in Rawls's scheme, refers to the way in which "rights" and "duties" are distributed throughout a social system. A society's social institutions are seen to affect the quality of life a person can









experience. Moreover, these institutions delimit the rights and duties of a person belonging to a specific social group. The determinants of justice in a social system are the allocation of economic opportunities, the kind of social conditions, and the "rights" and "duties" which are allotted the citizenry.

The starting point of Rawls's position on justice is that people

decide in advance which principles they will accept as binding on their conduct as conflicting claims are settled. Practices are judged to be just or unjust prior to forming the social group. In Rawls's view, rational persons will choose as ends of justice conceptions based on equal liberty for all.

People living in a social group are generally stratified according to certain advantages such as social position, birth, intelligence, occupation, and economic assets. In Rawls's theory of justice, people would not know ahead of time what their advantages were to be. So, the principles of justice adopted by the social group would not give advantages to any person prior to membership in the group. No one is advantaged or disadvantaged by the principles chosen. Rawls makes the assumption that the people forming the social group he has constructed are both "rational"

and capable of a "sense of justice."

Rawls does not hesitate to admit that no existing society contains only members who entered the social group voluntarily and who hold principles of justice as binding in the process of adjudicating claims. In natural social groups, people are born into a society, thus the fortunes of birth are at play in determining the social advantages and disadvantages which affect their lives.








The social contract theory of justice which Rawls advocates is

justified by arguments for his principles of justice. It seems reasonable to Rawls that advantages and disadvantages should not be allocated on the basis of principles. Secondly, the principles should not promote a person's particular interests. Finally, a person should not be able to formulate in advance, principles which will benefit himself or herself and work to the detriment of someone else in the society.

Rawls presents his two major principles of justice as follows:

First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,
consistent with the just savings principles, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
(1971, p. 302)
In "Justice as Fairness," Rawls (1972) formulates two principles which were used as a means of developing the concept of justice. The first principle is that in the instance of a practice, the individual who was taking part in the practice or in some way affected by it had the most conceivable liberty. This liberty was in turn compatible with the most extensive liberty for all. The second principle involves the arbitrary nature of inequalities and results in the notion that desired or advantageous offices of society should be open to all. Rawls claims that his two principles formulate a definition of justice which involves liberty, equality, and reward for efforts which contribute to the common good.









Our next consideration concerning Rawils's principles of justice is in regard to the mental operations both rational and emotional that one who follows Rawls's principles will use in developing a "sense of justice." We are to find that the person is developing a "sense of justice" performs more mental acts than a simple rational calculation of rights, working out questions of fairness as if one were solving a problem in logic. Of the multiplicity of feelings involved in the sense of justice, Rawls writes,

the generation of feelings of friendship and mutual trust
tends to reinforce the scheme of cooperation. A greater temptation is required and, should violations occur, the
feelings of guilt, shown in wishing to make reparation and
the like, will tend to restore the broken relations. (1963,
p. 291)

So, we find that a variety of feelings are at play in the mental operations a person uses as he or she develops a Rawlsian "sense of justice." Let us next consider the Deweyite notion of justice.


Dewey's Conception of Justice

Dewey was a thinker who views justice as a means to an end; further, the concept of justice was inextricably entwined with the end, i.e., over-all happiness or social welfare. In conceiving justice as a means to an end, particularly in the case of securing the public welfare, Dewey is criticizing those who would make of a means, an end. Dewey (1936) says of justice when conceived as an end, that it tended to make an idol of the means so that the end which the means serve is slighted. Dewey, in using the term "justice" as a mechanism to regulate society, writes,

justice is not an external means to human welfare but a means which is organically integrated with the end it serves. These are means
which are constituent parts of the consequences they bring into
being, as tones are integral, constituents of music as well as
means to its production, and as food is an indispensable ingredients within the organism which it serves. (1916, p. 273)








In the above statement, Dewey shows that he is opposed to notions which separate the means and ends of justice. Further, he is opposed to those who place abstract conceptions of equal human rights above the consequences of those rights. Questions concerning rights when no thought of the consequences are entailed in the adjudication of the point in dispute often lead nowhere. Dewey (1936) succinctly states this position in his notion that omission of the consequences of the action from the moral standard left one with a mere abstraction, resulting in the treatment of morality as simply conforming to an abstraction, thereby losing its force in moving toward a significant end.

The previous remarks on justice by Dewey lead us to examine precisely what Dewey means by a standard. Dewey argues that standards are different from ends in that they, through the process of social' approbation, are able to become more objectified than are moral ends. It is in this context, that he further examines the standards of justice and benevolence.6 Dewey maintains that some who want to posit justice as the standard in morality are relegating considerations of well-being and the consequences of actions to a position inferior to that of justice. Dewey thinks that individuals who prided themselves for acting on principles are likely to be Pharisaical and self regarding. Dewey maintains

that principles themselves need justification. Principles do not justify activity but principles are synonymous with the continuity inherent in activity.

6Dewey wrote, "When contribution to a shared good is taken to be the standard of approbation, a question comes up as to the relation of justice to the standard . . . At all events, this conception of the nature of the standard has been attacked on the ground that justice is the supreme virtue and that the standard of well-being subordinates justice S. .to something beyond itself in the way of consequences." (1936, pp. 272-3)









The overriding moral interest is, according to Dewey, the interest in learning from all the contacts of life. Dewey (1916) posits that the primary problem of moral education is the problem of the relationship between knowledge and conduct. Dewey regards knowing and conduct to be interdependent. In effect, Dewey is relating the social arena with morality. In Ethics (1910, with Tufts), Dewey states what is meant by "the greatest good for the greatest number." He affirms that the true significance of this slogan lies in the individual living in a social milieu which will reward his or her initiative.

Dewey (and Tufts, 1910) regards "rights" and "obligations" in terms of the social arrangements which should obtain in a given society. Social conditions which are conducive to a person's exercising of "rights" and "duties" will offer each person work which is both socially beneficial and rewarding, institutions will exhibit educative effects which nurture active recognition of "rights" and "obligations," and education will increase a person's own awareness of "rights" and "duties" which pertain to these social arrangements.

Dewey and Tufts (1910) seem to think that justice procedures and conflicts of interest can be resolved by appeal to scientific method. The application of the scientific method will contribute to the greatest amount of shared good in social arrangements. If these two thinkers were asked to justify principles of justice, they would undoubtedly demand that the justification process look to the consequences of the social weal.


Inconsistencies in the Kohlberg View
Kohlberg claims that his view of the person is basically a Deweyan position. On the other hand, he claims a Platonic-Rawlsian position on








justice. It is our thesis that holding these contiguous views causes inconsistencies for Kohlberg.

Consider the moral judgment. Kohlberg, Rawls, and Dewey all seem to think that there is a developmental difference between the different stages as a person makes a moral judgment. Kohlberg and Rawls on the one hand attach much more importance to justice structures present in moral judgments than does Dewey.

We have shown that, for Kohlberg, virtue is "knowledge of the good" and the "ideal form of justice." Virtue to Rawls takes the form of a sentiment. One has a desire to act from the principles of justice. Dewey and Tufts arrive at a two-fold classification of virtue. In the first class, one finds "intellectually exercised habits,' but these habits are never purely intellectual; they are also emotional and practical. In the second class, the part a social custom or institution such as "truth telling" plays in the individual's own habits of valuation are deemed virtues. Since a desire is unlike knowledge, there is a differencein emphasis between Rawls's view and Kohlberg's view of virtue. Now Kohlberg claims that a person who knows the good will do the good, later to posit a position which is less certain than the person who knows the good will do the good. The reader is left with a puzzle as to what Kohlberg's actual position is in regard to this matter.7 Secondly, Rawls's view that virtue is a "sentiment" cannot be related to Kohlberg's view that virtue is "knowledge of the good." Finally, viewing virtue as habit would be anathema to Kohlberg, who approaches the vituperative in his discussion of moral dispositions as character traits or h-abits. Finally, Dewey and Tufts say that the "good" represents a self chosen ideal which a person sets up as 7See Kohlberg (1970) and Kohlberg and Turiel (1971).




Full Text

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A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF' MORAL REASONING By M. EVELYN B. KINCAIU A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1977

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This writer wishes to express her deep appreciation for the direction and helpful suggestions offered during the course of this philosophical analysis. Dr. Hal G. Lewis, chairman of the committee, along with the other members of this writer's committee, Dr. Richard P. Haynes and Dr. Richard R. Renner, have offered inspiration and insights as well as having generously given of their time to aid the writer in formulating this analysis. A special note of appreciation is given to Dr. Vynce A. Hines for his helpful advice. Dr. Hines was forced to resign from the committee because of illness. Useful suggestions and constructive criticisms have been offered by all who participated in the study. A final note of appreciation is expressed to the writer's husband, George, whose patience provided the encouragement to complete this analysis . i i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Pa^e ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii ABSTRACT . . . v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1 Organization of Chapters 2 Kohl berg's Stages 4 Kohlberg's Empirical Thrust 10 References 12 CHAPTER II MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS 13 Development of Kohlberg's Scheme ... 13 Values in Kohlberg's Paradigm 19 Kohlberg's Theory of Justice 20 Kohlberg's Appeal to Justice as Ultimate Morality 21 Kohlberg's Epistemology 25 Theoretical Traditions in Morality and the Kohlberg Thesis . . 27 Implications of Kohlberg's Theory 34 Significance of Kohlberg's Paradigm 35 Kohlberg's Moral Judgment in Perspective 38 Cognition and Role-Taking at Heart of Kohlberg's Developmental Judgment 42 Summary 43 References 45 CHAPTER III IMPACT OF THE KOHLBERG SCHEME IN THE AREA OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 47 "Moral Maturity" in the Kohlberg Paradigm 48 The Place of the Hybrid Breeds 50 Other Phenomena of Importance to the Psychologist and the Philosopher 51 Further Research Aspects of the Kohlberg Scheme 52 "Acceptance by Some Scholars of Kohlberg's Scheme 54 —Criticisms by Philosophers of the Kohlberg Scheme 55 Criticism of Theologians of Kohlberg's Scheme 63 ^.Criticism of Educators Concerning the Kohlberg Scheme 64 -Summary 70 References 72 CHAPTER IV KOHLBERG'S CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE AND ITS ROLE IN THE MORAL STAGES 74 Overview of Chapter 74 Positions on Justice 77 Justice and Virtue in the Kohlberg Scheme 79 i i i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page CHAPTER IV (Continued) Rawls's Theory of Justice 87 Dewey's Conception of Justice 91 Inconsistencies in the Kohlberg View 93 Summary 101 References 103 CHAPTER V THE MORAL JUDGMENT 104 Difficulties in Regard to Kohl berg's Conception of the Moral Judgment 106 The Argument for Adopting Piaget's Empirical Methodology ... Ill floral and Nonmoral Functions 112 Summary 119 References 121 .-CHAPTER VI THE IMPLICATIONS OF KOHLBERG 'S SCHEME FOR THE EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISE 122 Moral Education and Schooling 123 Kohl berg's Aims of Moral Education 124 The Hidden Curriculum 125 ... Kohlberg's Prescriptions for Education 126 •* Relationship of Kohlberg to Dewey 129 Summary 135 References 137 CHAPTER VII SUMMARY AND DESCRIPTION 138 BIBLIOGRAPHY 141 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 147

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF MORAL REASONING By M. EVELYN B. KINCAID June, 1977 Chairman: Hal G. Lewis Major Department: Foundations of Education Lawrence Kohl berg has proposed a theory of moral progression and moral education. This dissertation is a critical analysis of Kohlberg's position on moral development. Justice is the overriding moral end in the Kohlberg scheme. Justice is also the core of morality. Kohl berg regards the ideal form of justice to be one with knowledge of the good and the highest reach of virtue. Kohlberg draws from Dewey's position on epistemology. He also leans on Plato and Rawls to explicate what he means by justice, particularly is this true in the case of Rawls. Holding a Rawlsian theory of justice while simultaneously holding a Deweyan position on epistemology causes difficulties in Kohlberg's position in terms of the progression being universally applicable across cultures. These difficulties lie in the fact that Deweyan epistemology may be depicted as a position in which a person learns by interaction with the environment. It would oe impossible to learn principles of Rawlsian justice in preliterate societies. A second problem facing Kohlberg is that his use of Rawls 's theory of justice to distinguish stage five from stage six causes the distinction between these stages to be blurred. The identical principles are formulated in the hypothetical

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original position of the stage five contract theory orientation as those which are used in the social union or the individually based principles of stage six. Since the moral judgment as conceived by Kohl berg is used as the basis to distinguish the stages, Kohl berg is confronted with difficulties if he has a vague account of the judgment. Kohl berg is faced with a gap in the argument in reference to claims he can make about conduct based on the moral judgment as it operates in moral progression. Kohlberg is vague on what constitutes the moral judgment. The moral and nonmoral judgments a person makes as increasingly more complex value differentiations are performed are not clearly articulated by Kohlberg. Educators are warned that making statements in the context of artificial situations and hypothetical dilemmas are most emphatically not equivalent to making a bona fide moral judgment and lead to a separation of thought and action. Kohlberg's artificial situations are not necessary for the teaching of moral thinking, for what is needed is making judgments in actual life situations. Kohlberg and Dewey are not nearly so close in their pedagogical positions as Kohlberg believes, yet Kohlberg claims a Deweyan perspective for his prescriptions to moral education. The major significance of Kohlberg's work is that he has once again brought educators' attention to the moral domain and to the importance of moral education in the school. vi

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Lawrence Kohlberg, a noted psychologist, has addressed himself to certain problems in the interdisciplinary area of moral philosophy and developmental psychology. His work has been of such a nature as to have significant impact on theoretical perspectives. This is especially true in education, psychology, and philosophy. Moreover, eminent philosophers have shown interest in themes introduced by Kohlberg. Such themes are in line with traditional interests in moral philosophy. Kohlberg has published in the interdisciplinary fields mentioned, and his work has aroused much comment and criticism in the area of moral development. In this study we make an explication and critical analysis of Kohlberg's position on moral development. We begin with a description of the developmental stages which are at the heart of his scheme and the research he uses as a basis for making these distinctions. Since the concepts of justice and virtue lie at the heart of Kohlberg's conception of "moral maturity," they will be analyzed. Since Kohlberg's own analysis leads him to deal with themes traditionally associated with philosophy, Kohlberg received his graduate training at the University of Chicago. After leaving the University of Chicago, he gained his early teaching experience at Yale University. Later he moved to Harvard, where he now teaches. Kohlberg's most basic theoretical position first began to emerge at the University of Toronto, where he served on an interdisciplinary team which studied moral development (Kohlberg, 1971b). In the fifties, Kohlberg began to posit a scheme that moral development moves through stages with advancing age. His scheme has become so well known in psychology and education that one expects much effort will be put forth in the future along the lines originated by Kohlberg. 1

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2 and since the problem of the "naturalistic fallacy" is emphasized by Kohlberg, we will treat his analysis of the "naturalistic fallacy." A further theme in philosophy on which a position is taken by Kohlberg is the question of knowledge; therefore, his theory of knowledge will be examined. Philosophy traditionally treats different schools of moral thought in a horizontal manner but Kohlberg, on the other hand, conceives of his developmental stages in hierarchical orders of philosophies based on different rationales. Thus, his philosophies are arranged vertically. Since philosophers are not in agreement at this time whether or not one moral philosophy is superior to another, the adequacy of these vertical stages will be examined in this study. Since the artificiality of the situation which Kohlberg presents to test subjects is important to his scheme, the resultant separation of the conscience from conduct will be studied. Since the Kohlberg moral judgment is accompanied by certain philosophical difficulties, we will analyze his theory of moral judgment. Finally, we will draw the implications for education from this study. We will discuss both practice and theory in the drawing out of the implications of the Kohlberg scheme. Orga n^za tion of Chapte rs_ The following considerations, listed under the chapter numerals, have determined the organization and format of the various chapters in terms of this philosophical analysis. In chapter I we address the question of what constitutes Kohlberg's stages which utilize varying conceptions of value and morality, and describes the empirical methods upon which he bases his levels. In chapter II we more closely and completely examine Kohlberg's moral and philosophical concepts in terms of values and the "naturalistic"

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3 fallacy.' We study the theory of stages in the context of their counterpart "philosophies" and psychological aspects and examine his theory of justice and knowledge. We discuss his scheme in light of theoretical traditions in morality, note the implications of Kohlberg's theory, and discuss the significance of his concepts. In chapter III we eval uate the Kohlberg perspective, question certain concepts held by him, describe moral maturity and cite the phenomenon of hybrid breeds. We review other pertinent research and ask the question whether or not Kohlberg needs to incorporate a stage seven into his hierarchy? How adequate are his "philosophies" and the ordering of the "philosophies?" In general, what can be said to be the overriding contributions and criticisms of his approach? We cite problems found by educators, theologians, and philosophers as they evaluate the Kohlberg perspective. In chapter IV we present Kohlberg's conception of justice and virtue in morality and treat problems and areas of disagreement in positions on justice in relation to Kohlberg's position on justice. We criticize Kohlberg's view of justice and compare it with Dewey's and Rawls's theories of justice. In chapter V we present Kohlberg's prototype of the moral judgment and analyze this judgment in terms of certain philosophical questions raised about the moral judgment. Kohlberg is shown to be vulnerable to criticism insofar as his moral judgment is concerned. In chapter V we further analyze Kohlberg's conception of the conscience and find discontinuities between moral judgment and conduct which greatly restrict the claims Kohlberg can make for either the construct of conscience and 2 The "naturalistic fallacy" is a case of deriving an "ought" from an "is."

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4 conduct. We question the adequacy of these constructs for the social scientist studying the individual in society and eval uate Kohl berg 1 s conception of the moral judgment in light of criteria which Kohl berg himself presents for the moral judgment. In chapter VI we study Kohlberg's prescriptions for education, draw the implications for Kohlberg's position as it relates to education, and evaluate pertinent findings of this particular theory of moral development insofar as the field of education is concerned. The Deweyan conception of morality is compared to Kohlberg's position on moral development and education. Chapter VII is the summary. He present over-all criticisms of Kohlberg's position on moral development, evaluate Kohlberg's paradigm, and issue caveats to educators who plan to organize a curriculum based on Kohlberg's stages. We have briefly outlined the major concerns of this analysis. We have next to ascertain how Kohlberg states his moral position. Since the stages lie at the heart of the Kohlberg scheme, it is important to point out the distinctions made by Kohlberg in his ordering of the orientations or "philosophies" people use as they make moral judgments. Kohlberg's Stages Kohlberg (1968a) uses a "typological" approach in his work. He uses the term "typological" to indicate that his stage theory orders different types of moral thinking, which he calls "philosophies." The Kohlberg approach outlines various "world views" or "philosophies" which are depicted in terms of structures of thinking or types of moral thought which an individual uses in adjudicating questions of value. Rather than analyzing specific content involved in value decision, Kohlberg focusses

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5 on the kinds of structuring processes which the individual constructs while engaged in the process of actually making the judgment of value. It is part of Kohlberg's thesis that individuals operate at different stages of development. Each stage is preceded by a level below. Persons move through the stages in a lock step manner. The infant, of course, operates at a nonmoral stage. Each stage of Kohlberg's corresponds to an individual's "world view." Kohlberg (1971b) maintains that moral judgments and norms are not "passive states" to be found in the reflection about the judgment, nor are they simply "internal emotions." They are "universal actions" or "mental constructions" involving the human actor operating in his or her social milieu. A concise statement of Kohlberg's (1963a) sequence of stages is presented in his article, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order: Part I. Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought." The thinking structures are identified as follows: Level I Premoral Type 1. Punishment and obedience orientation. Type 2. Naive instrumental hedonism. Level II Morality of Conventional Role Conformity Type 3. "Good-boy" morality of maintaining good relations, approval of others. Type 4. Authority maintaining morality. Level III Morality of Self-accepted Moral Principles Type 5. Morality of contract and democratically accepted law. Type 6. Morality of individual principles of conscience. (Kohlberg, 1968a, pp. 13-14) Kohlberg's method of determining a person's position on the moral development hierarchy is to present a person with a hypothetical situation and ask him or her what action the person in the episode should take. Let us examine the beginning stage of Kohlberg's hierarchy which entails an obedience and punishment orientation. A child decides that the

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6 hypothetical person in Kohlberg's situation should act in order to avoid trouble. This first stage is highly egocentric. The child, as in all other stages, decides whether or not the hypothetical person should act or not act in terms of the artificial situation presented to him or her by the Kohlberg methodology which I have previously described. The decision at this level is made in terms of deference to superior power or prestige. This first stage is a common sense stage based on observations of specialists who have studied the young child. Not only is it found in common sense, but it is borne out by Kohlberg's empirical studies. This orientation is similar but not identical to Piaget's (1932) position as to the heteronomy of the young child. While the child is egocentric, he or she is egocentric in the social context and makes moral expressions based on elicitations from significant other adult figures or significant other control figures. Kohlberg at times refers to stage two as the "instrumental relativist approach" and at other times as "naive instrumental hedonism." Moral judgments are made in terms of satisfying, in an instrumental way, the needs of the individual as well as occasionally the needs of others. Reciprocity is an important aspect of this stage, which is frequently described by Kohlberg in terms of "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine." It goes without saying that Kohlberg's notion of a child who is making a moral judgment, "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine," is not quite in line with the traditional notion of hedonism in philosophy. Kohlberg is taking the notion of egoistic hedonism from philosophy and putting it into a framework similar to Piaget's heteronomy in making early moral decisions or at least in terms of the motives young children do have in making moral decisions. Other actors are not recognized in "egoistic hedonism," yet in Kohlberg's view on this level the individual is not

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7 making the judgment about whether or not to act simply for his or her own sake but is judging in the context of a social milieu recognizing the needs of other actors. It should be repeatedly emphasized that the Kohl berg scheme considers an actor to be one who is taking the role, so to speak, of the person operating in the hypothetical situation which Kohlberg presents to the subject who is making the moral decision. Stage three morality is stated as "good boy, good girl" orientation. The individual is other-oriented, and tries to please others, making judgments in terms of what others think about the actor. Conformity to peer stereotypes is prevalent at this stage. Kohlberg's stage three moral judgment approaches Piaget's, particularly in that the notion of heteronomy or other-directedness is more pronounced, and the concept of "intentional ity" is included in this stage. The beginning of a deeper form of thinking is evidenced by the individual operating at stage four. This type of thinking is an "authority and social-order maintaining" orientation. On this stratum, the concept of doing one's duty for its own sake is encountered, along with an orientation toward maintaining the social order simply for the sake of maintaining a given social organization. Respect for authority is an overriding concern of one who is operating at this stage. Personal or individual values are not as important as before, and now the individual looks to authority as a means for making the moral judgment. In assessing this and later stages, psychological interpretation of the moral judgment is of more help than ordinary language analysis of the. moral judgment. Subjects using the concept of duty as a reason for arriving at a value conclusion may be placed at stage four, five, or six, depending upon whether the duty is viewed by the individual making the judgment as being law and order based, contractual or normguided, or on

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8 the basis of individual principles. Placement according to these differing rationales is important to the psychologist who analyzes and scores the moral judgment. The psychologist must resort at times to interpretations of covert values or principles of a psychological nature which are held by the subject and are immanent in his or her reporting of the moral judgment. / ./Stage four moral judgments may also be seen as expressions of moral judgments similar to those of Ayer's (1946) analysis of the moral judgment. Ayer viewed value expressions as influencing the feelings of someone else. Kohl berg (1963a) offers an example of stage four in which a young man expresses displeasure at having an article stolen from him and told Kohlberg that he too would be angry if a similar incident happened to him. Kohlberg (1971b) succinctly sums up stage five motivation for moral judgment as analogous to the relationship of the government to the constitution. 'Stage five thinking involves a social contract system. The orientation of this type of moral judgment is in terms of individual rights which are 1 egal istically conceived in terms of procedures established by a society in which an individual is living. This is the penultimate stage and judgments are conceived in terms of principles in which the individual relates to society in determining the consensual values operating in this relationship. The ultimate stage involves thinking types which are based upon the individual developing his or her own moral principles. These principles, however, must hold for all others at all times. Such principles are above the relationship of the individual to the government. Kohlberg (1971b) thinks that the ultimate moral judgment should be based on considerations coming from philosophers of the formalist school, particularly Kant and Hare. The prescript!' vist and universal nature of the judgment on this level is emphasized by Kohlberg. As the individual

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9 makes increasingly complex differentiations of the movement from "is to ought," more consistency is found in the judgment. Kohlberg claims that this is what Kant stressed in his work, i.e., the criterion of consistency. In this line, Kohlberg writes, "the claim of principled morality is that it defines the right for anyone in any situation. In contrast, conventional morality defines good behavior for a Democrat, but not a Republican, for an American but not for a Vietnamese, for a father but not for a son" (1971b, p. 46). The following caveat is issued by Kohlberg (1971b) to those who study and work in his scheme. If a subject says, "I hold the following principle," one cannot, ipso facto, assume that the subject is speaking from a principled framework. To say that such and such is one's principle may simply mean that one likes or dislikes a practice or one might simply be stating that one approves or disapproves of a practice. What then are legitimate principles? Kohlberg seems to think that one who understands abstract principles of justice will, ergo, arrive at legitimate principles on which to make moral judgments. Certain principles developed by recent philosophers, such as the principle of "reversibility," and "prescriptivity," would be operating at level six. We have previously noted the universal izabil ity of the level six judgment, which indicates that Kohlberg would consider Kant's "categorial imperative" to be at this level. The "categorical imperative" does seem to be in line with Kohlberg' s criterion of consistency in the increasingly complex movements of from "is to ought." As understanding of these six stages is crucial to grasping Kohlberg's position. The stages lie at the heart of the Kohlberg thesis and their significance to his work cannot be overestimated. Kohlberg claims for his stages an empirical basis, because he collected evidence for his stages from many parts of the world.

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10 Kohl berg's Empirical Thrust It seems accurate to describe Kohl berg's empirical work as a crosscultural study of verbal responses to moral dilemmas. These responses are analyzed as interpretations which depict concepts corresponding to philosophical positions incorporated in the stages which we have previously outlined. To illustrate the Kohlberg methodology, Kohlberg (1968a) offers the example of the Taiwanese village and the Atayal village children being asked the question, "A man's wife is starving to death but the store owner won't give the man any food unless he can pay, which he can't. Should he break in and steal some food and why" (1968a, p. 29). In general, Kohlberg finds the responses similar in form but different in content. In both instances the thinking was at stage two. In cultures in which burials were expensive, the respondent thought that the husband should steal to avoid the prohibitive cost of the funeral. On the other hand, in cultures in which the expense of the funeral was of little consequence, the respondents at stage two level thought that the wife was necessary to cook the food and, therefore, should be kept alive by any means. By these examples, Kohlberg thinks that he was demonstrating the similarity of thought structures at the same levels in differing cultures. In his article, "The Child as a Moral Phi losopher, ". Kohl berg offers a glimpse of his empirical studies. He writes, "in our study of American boys from early adolescence on, these youths were presented with hypothetical moral dilemmas, all deliberately philosophical, some of them found in medieval works of casuistry" (1968a, p. 28). Kohlberg (1968a) claims that his research could determine the thought structures about dilemmas on 25 basic moral concepts. Moreover, Kohlberg's claim is not only for aspects or concepts apparently held by American youth, but he goes on to make claims that his findings are cross-cultural.

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11 In this same article, Kohlberg makes the claim that the Taiwanese and Atayal (Malaysian aboriginal) go through the same stages of thought as do . 3 their American counterparts. We have noted the cross-cultural aspect of the Kohlberg paradigm and the ordering of types of thinking which are implicit in the typological model. This ordering of the forms of thought is in line with the psychosocial developmental processes which Kohlberg has studied empirically, as has been previously noted. In Kohlberg's scheme, a subject is assigned to a position on the moral judgmental hierarchy which Kohlberg posited on the basis of responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas. The rationale for the moral judgmental ladder is that of conceptions of maturity, both common-sense and theoretical. We shall examine the basis of such theoretical conceptions in subsequent chapters. As evidence of his empirical thrust, Kohlberg offers the reader a series of graphs which show at which ages the stages are manifested cross4 culturally. While no systematic or complete review of his research is presently available in the literature, numerous examples of responses to the dilemmas can be found. We have described and discussed the stages and the research undertaken by Kohlberg to support these stages. Since his stages require some justification in terms of certain recurring themes in moral philosophy, we shall investigate his analysis of key moral concepts. Since certain concepts which relate to themes in traditional philosophy are dealt with by Kohlberg, we need next to investigate Kohlberg's philosophical commitments. 3 Besides the United States, Kohlberg has "explored moral development in . . . Great Britain, Canada, Taiwan, Mexico and Turkey" (1968a, p. 25). 4 We see that Kohlberg himself participated in gathering information to help him formulate his scheme. As evidence of his travel Kohlberg used a "Chinese ethnographer" (1963a, p. 23) as a guide in the Atayal and Taiwanese village.

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12 References Ayer, A. J. Language, truth and logic . London: Gollancz, 1946. Kohl berg, L. "The development 'of children's orientations toward a moral order I. Sequence in the development of moral thought." Vita Humana , 1963a, 6, 11-33. Kohlberg, L. "The child as a moral philosopher." Psychology Today , 1968a, 2, 25-30. Kohlberg, L. "Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education." In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral development . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971b. Piaget, J. The moral judgment of the child . Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1932.

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CHAPTER II MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS Since Kohl berg recognizes the need to explicate concepts, we will present in this chapter Kohlberg's analysis of concepts and issues which he uses to counter his critics. We will describe the motives for the stages Kohl berg uses in his scheme of moral progression and treat his conception of values, contending that his position as to the absolute ordering of values leaves one unable to account for important philosophical and sociological formulations. We contend further that his position also effects the separation of moral and cultural values. We examine Kohlberg's conceptions of justice and epistemology , and as a tool for analysis, outline the theoretical traditions and his moral and philosophical concepts. We then draw the implications of his position. We shall now consider the development of his scheme noting that Kohlberg's analysis of moral problems, illustrates his interest in and recognition of the "naturalistic fallacy." Development of Kohlberg's Scheme Kohlberg started his studies in the fifties, Kohlberg (1971b) claims that it appeared to him that there were universal trends in Western philosophy. In his studies of morality he further observed that moral maturity was not simply a learning of cultural rules and values which are fundamentally irrational. 1 kohlberg observes that "... there were universal ontogenic trends toward the development of morality as it has been conceived . . . mature 13

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14 Early in Kohlberg's work he found errors in such formulations as Durkheim's which embodied notions of cultural relativity. This feature of social science, i.e., cultural relativity, was found to cjo hand in hand with the error of assuming that "morality and moral are fundamentally emotional and irrational processes based on mechanisms of habit, reward, punishment, identification, and defense (1971a, p. 155)." Kohlberg considers that his research has verified a cognitive-developmental theory of moral developmental processes which is non-relati visit. Thus we see the developing trend toward identifying universal moral values which is implicit in Kohlberg's stages. Kohlberg goes beyond simply identifying universal moral values. He claims that his empirical research has verified the existence of increasingly complex moral values which accompany advancing age and development. The natural question to raise is, "what are the consequences with respect to the social scientist who holds the notion of value relativism? Kohlberg claims (1971a) that value relativism results in the confusion of two ideas; these ideas are (a) "that everyone has his own values" and (b) "everyone should have his own values." Kohlberg claims thaT his position does not make the preceding error. Fact and value present problems to the social scientist. In making the claim that his paradigm has developed a consistent position on fact and value, Kohlberg points to the logical relativist's confusing of the two ideas that "there are no standards acceptable to all people" and "there are no standards all people ought to accept." This logical confusion between fact and value according to Kohlberg represents one version of the "naturalistic fallacy morality is a process different from the learning of various "irrational" or arbitrary cultural rules and values" (1971b, p. 155).

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15 Another form of the "naturalistic fallacy" which should be considered by the student of Kohl berg is that when the liberal posits tolerance as an absolute, he or she cannot, in effect, claim all values are relative. Kohlberg maintains that the relativistic position in this instance lies in confusing the notion that there are no valid moral principles with the other notion which the liberal relativist holds that there should be a basic respect for all human beings regardless of moral be! i ef . A third form of the "naturalistic fallacy" is analyzed by Kohlberg. He claims that those who confuse scientific impartiality with a position of value neutrality commit another form of the "naturalistic fallacy." Kohlberg finds that holding a position of value neutrality underlies much of social scientific thinking. The final commission of the "naturalistic fallacy" occurs when "rational" is confused in cases involving value neutrality and the scien2 tine or factual. In the social scientist's assumption of value neutrality the social scientist is assuming such neutrality rather than making an attempt to justify it. While there are those who would call Kohlberg to task on the matter of committing a form of the "naturalistic fallacy," this paper is not concerned with this matter. Today, there is no unanimity of opinion concerning the "naturalistic fallacy." In fact, the noted moral philosopher -Margolis (1971) has written about the fallacy of the "naturalistic fallacy." In the field of philosophy, one encounters the school of thought that posits the absolute separation of fact and value into two different realms. The school of philosophy which 2 Kohlberg writes that the concept of "value neutrality of the social scientist assumes ethical relativity rather than justifies it" (1971a p. 162).

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16 separates fact questions from value questions charges that those who combine fact and value or "is to ought" are committing the "naturalistic fallacy." It is important to study Kohlberg's position on the "naturalistic fallacy" because he claims to have committed this fallacy with impunity. In tracing the development of Kohlberg's studies we find that these studies state both what moral development is, as discovered from empirical work, and what moral development ought to be, which he claims to have derived from combining theoretical conceptions of moral maturity with empirical findings. We shall now consider the "is" realm of Kohlberg's paradigm. Any study of Kohlberg's thesis should address itself to Kohlberg's empirical studies, what they consist of, and how they are undertaken. Kohlberg's sample includes 75 boys in American culture and others in different cultures. These individuals have been studied in terms of their moral judgment and character. Kohlberg's research has been done longitudinally from early adolescence to young manhood. The young men are given hypothetical dilemmas to respond to and their responses are ranked according to levels of maturity which we have outlined briefly. Since the dilemma concerning a person called Heinz is the one most frequently referred to throughout Kohlberg's work, one should become familiar with it in order to grasp the thrust of Kohlberg's paradigm. The dilemma is stated by Kohl berg as follows: In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doc-, tors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist

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17 said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done that? Why? (1971b, p. 33) Since this dilemma is one frequently asked subjects by the Kohlberg team, we shall cite a response to the dilemma which not only shows how some people respond to Kohlberg's hypothetical situations but points to his attitude toward the relativist as well. Kohlberg shares with us the response of a young teacher when she was presented with this dilemma. Her response was supposed to represent the plight of the relativist. The young woman's reply in part was as follows: "T think he should steal it because if there is any such thing as a universal human value, it is the value of life and that would justify stealing it.'" "I then asked her [Kohlberg] 'Is there any such thing as a universal human value?' and she answered, 'Ho, all values are relative to your culture"' (1971b, pp. 3334). The preceding dilemma is not the only one used by Kohlberg, A similar dilemma is related by Kohlberg in which Heinz cannot get any food for his dying wife. No food can be grown and no neighbors can help him. Should Heinz steal food from the grocery store? Why? We briefly considered this dilemma in Chapter I, but we shall go over this ground a little more thoroughly because it does help one to get clear about the main point in Kohlberg's paradigm that on the same stages there is a distinction in thought content, but not in thought form. In relating the responses of children in the Taiwanese village and the Atayal village, Kohlberg finds that children who are stage two-"I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine" level thought that the husband should steal the food. The stage two children in the Taiwanese village expressed the notion that Heinz should steal the food

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18 because the funeral for the wife would be too expensive. On the other hand, children who lived in the Atayal village gave little thought to the expense of the funeral. Evidently the expense of a funeral is not an overriding consideration in this particular culture. Nevertheless the stage two children thought that the husband needed a wife so that he would have someone who could cook for him, and that rationale tended to be most often given in the Atayal village as the basis for saving the wife's life. It is enigmatic as to why Kohlberg does not relate the American children's responses on the level at which he offers this example. The example of whether or not Heinz should steal the food and the related responses to the Heinz dilemma is used by Kohlberg to make the point that thinking structures in the young child approximately aged 10 are similar from culture to culture in regard to the child's making moral judgments. Kohlberg studies boys, generally, in the context of the response to moral dilemmas in which the content is different from culture to culture. But Kohlberg claims uniformity of thinking structures. Both the Taiwanese and the Atayal child offer a pragmatic, in the pejorative sense of the word, reason for keeping the wife alive, In the instance of the Taiwanese boy, the high cost of funerals is seen to take the same thought structure form by Kohlberg as the Atayal 's answer that his father needs a good cook and if the mother dies this service will no longer be provided for the father. The child progresses through Kohlberg's stages at differing rates. Thought clusters are observed by the psychologist, but these clusters are not the same at each age. However, there is a tendency to move from lower to higher structuring patterns with age. We are told by Kohlberg that since an individual progresses upward on the stages and attains the thought clusters which Kohlberg has claimed are represented in the

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19 "philosophies" encountered in this progression, the claim can be made that all men are moral philosophers. The model of stages constructed by Kohlberg (1 966c) represents a construct which is more than simply a statement of thought structures which are engaged in by people at different ages. Not everyone progresses through the stages at the same speed and it is possible to become "fixated" at any level and not to pass beyond that level. Nevertheless, it is claimed by Kohlberg that the sequence represents an "invariant" order of progression for the person. That his "invariant" sequence is cross-cultural is continually stressed throughout Kohl berg's writing. No statement of the development of Kohlberg's paradigm would be complete without a position drawn as to the motivation a person has on each distinct stage. It is claimed that when considered cross-culturally, motives for the stages are not consistent. In Psychology Today Kohlberg describes the motivation inherent in his stages with each stage in the Kohlberg scheme corresponding to the number he has used in describing these behavioral characteristics: 1. Obey rules to avoid punishment. 2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned and so on. 3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others. 4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resul tant guil t. 5. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare. 6. Conform to avoid self-condemnation. (1968a, p. 28) Values in Kohlberg's Paradigm Kohlberg (1971b) is arguing for the universalizability of moral values, but not all values. He makes the distinction between basic moral values which he claims are universal, and cultural values which are relative. To illustrate this point, Kohlberg cites the difference

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1 20 between the Taiwanese young man and the Atayal young man in pointing to their reasons given for the dilemma in which Heinz must decide about saving his wife's life. That is to say that the Taiwanese and Atayal responses exhibit different cultural values, yet their moral values are the same, i.e., they are both instrumental relativist. Of the stage two thinking structures, Kohlberg writes, "both the value of life and a stage of instrumental -pragmatic thinking about this value are culturally universal" (1971b, p. 39). At this point, Kohlberg points to the rejoiner of the relativist, which is that even if one concedes that basic moral values are universal it is still the case that these are idiosyncratic and relative. We are not so certain that one can absolutely separate cultural values from moral values in every instance. If one is willing to grant this point, then it appears that in Kohlberg 1 s insistence on a hierarchy of values, his position is incompatible with sociological formulations such as Linton's (1960). In Linton's view the universals which represent those basic ideas held in common by a community are both cultural and moral . Kohl berg's Theory of Justice Kohlberg's theory of justice basically involves a Platonic-Rawlsian view of ideal justice in an ideal society. Now the individual who is making moral judgments at the stage six level is using as a basis idealized principles of justice which are at the core of Kohlberg's 3 Kohlberg writes concerning this point, "For instance, one might argue that everyone would value both life and property rights in the Heinz dilemma, but argue that which is valued most would depend upon a culturally relative hierarchy of values. In fact, however, basic hierarchies of moral values are primarily reflections of developmental staqes in moral thought" (1971b, p. 39).

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21 theory of morality. We shall examine the term "justice" as it is used by Kohlberg in a later chapter. Ideal conceptions of justice bring up the distinction made by Kohlberg between principles, which are exhibiting ideal thought structures, and rules, which are exhibiting a lower level thought structure than is found in the ideal level. Principles are conceived by Kohlberg to be on a higher stratum than are moral rules. While one who responds to moral rules will be judging at level two, one responding to legitimate moral principles will be responding at level three. Finally, principles of justice consist of conceptions of equality in terms of equal rights in an idealized society and the concept of reversibility. Only one who understands abstract principles of justice will attain the intuitions concerning equal rights and reciprocity. Since abstract principles of justice are the apex of the moral judgmental stage, Kohlberg would naturally claim that the core of morality is the value of justice. Kohl berg's Appea l to Justice as Ul t filiate M ora 1 ity_ In his appeal to abstract justice as the core of morality, Kohlberg does not adequately address the question of ethical pluralism. There is by no means any agreement in philosophy as to the nature of justice or as to how the word "justice" should be used. Problems presented by the Utilitarian approach, such as rewarding those who so deserve, are not addressed by Kohlberg. 4 Sholl (1971) helps us get clear about the primary conception of justice which is held by Kohlberg. Kohlberg seems to owe a considerable 4 See Beck et al_. (1971).

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debt to Plato in the development of his notion of justice. It is from Plato that Kohlberg formulated the idea that justice is the absolute good which is basic to principled morality. Does Kohlberg really think that when an individual is actually participating in a problematic situation in which a moral decision must be made the person will use abstract principles of justice as a basis? Can a social scientist realistically expect abstract principles of justice to play a prominent role in a moral judgment in instances in which the individual has had no training concerning the nature of justice? 5 Should one not only question whether the principle of justice will be present as an individual solves his or her problems, but also whether the principle of justice itself is adequately justified? It should be observed that the highest level of morality includes notions of a just society comprised of individuals who themselves operate with Kohlberg's idea of justice in mind. Kohlberg himself makes moral judgments at level six. Since Kohlberg claims that Rawls's conception of justice, when its ultimate form emerges, is in alignment with stage six on his judgmental hierarchy, one might well quesion the practicality of adhering to such a concept of abstract justice. Perfect justice just is not a realistic expectation given contemporary social conditions. There exists a scarcity of both food and fuel in the world today. People are faced with the problem of pollution. Such social problems make equal treatment highly impossible and even if equal treatment were possible, it is improbable that such treatment would ever be implemented. 6 5 See Peters (1971). 6 See the discussion in Morgan (1975).

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23 As an aid in substantiating my claim that justice is the core of morality in the Kohlberg scheme, consider the position of the philosopher Alston (1971). Alston sees that Kohlberg makes an overriding effort to sell his idea that justice is the core of morality. Alston believes that simply prescribing in accordance with some notion of stages gets one nowhere. One can prescribe either using principles or not using principles and even when one uses principles in the course of issuing a prescription, who is to say which principle is, at bottom, the most cogent? We have said much about justice, which is at the heart of the stage six response. The stage six judgment contains conceptions of ideal justice as an immanent part of the ultimate moral judgment. Consider a stage six response which will aid in the examination of the reasoning occurring on stage six in the context of the Heinz dilemma. There are so many cases of cancer today that with any new drug cure, I'd assume that the drug would be scarce and that there wouldn't be enough to go around to everybody. The right course of action can only be the one which is consisten t wi th Heinz's sense of justice to all people concerned. Heinz ought to act not according to his particular feelings to his wife, nor according to what is legal in this case, but according to what he conceives an ideally just person would do in this situation. (Rest, 1973, p. 93) Stage six, it should be remembered, relies on principles whereas stage four and three rely on rules. It is easy to see that one might derive a rule to be just from the principle of justice. Kohlberg can be called to task for making an absolute distinction between principles and rules inasmuch as such a distinction ultimately falls down. Consider the example of the categorical imperative which is one instance of deriving a concrete rule from a principle. For example, one can easily arrive at a rule prohibiting lying from the Kantian principle of the categorical

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24 imperative. Thus, there can be found to be a logical link between principles and rules.'' It has been posited that Kohl berg claims that the core of morality is to be found in abstract justice. Arguments which point to dangers inherent in adopting abstract principles as one's guide to moral judgment are pointed to by Keniston (1970), who claims that certain forms of fanaticism, positions which are basically dogmatic, decisions involving a kind of zealotry, and insensiti vity can be manifested in a principled moral judgment. It is warned that there are those who will ride "roughshod" over another for the sake of an ideal principle which is not shared by another individual. Not only can principles of justice be used for less than legitimate reasons, but further criticisms against one who wants to use justice in terms of abstract principles of justice lie in the fact that justice itself may be seen as a habit and thus a character trait. Kohlberg, we discover, claims that there is a contrast between character traits and principled morality. It could be easily argued that being just or being fair are paradigm cases of justice and, therefore, are character traits. It is not entirely clear that principles of justice and character traits See Morgan (1975). There is a distinction to be made between a moral principle and a moral rule. A moral principle is a highly complex cannon which prescribes what a person ought to do or what "duty" impels a person to do in accordance with problematic situations which involve genuine alternatives. A principle is more universalizable in terms of its application to the moral domain. As Dewey implies throughout his writing, a principle should relate to a particular situation, it should help one decide on a particular course of moral action in instances in which a person is faced with genuine moral alternatives. A rule is a somewhat less complex form of moral thought. A rule is generally less applicable in the sense that it can lay claim to prescribing universal morality. A rule is generally of a more restricted nature and is applicable to a smaller class of moral situations. While the dictates of a rule are easier to understand and to follow, the pre-

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25 can be separated into two distinct realms as Kohlberg claims. Not only is Kohlberg's conception of justice important in the Kohlberg paradigm, but his position on epistemology is also pertinent to his scheme. Kohlberg's Epistemology It is Kohlberg's (1971b) point that epistemology has been generally neglected by American psychologists. The reason Kohlberg gives for reaching this conclusion is that logical positivism or behaviorism is preeminent on the scene of American psychology. Knowledge is not considered by this school to be important, and behaviorism addresses itself to questions of learning instead of knowing. Kohlberg himself is not too clear on the question of epistemology. In one instance we are given a Platonic paradigm of "reminiscence" in which the knowledge within is "drawn out" from the child. In another instance we are given a more typically experimentalist view depicting an active child cognitively structuring the environment. Kohlberg (1970 and 1971b) does not present an absolutely consistent epistemological position. One may well ask how knowing in the Kohlberg scheme fits his prescriptions for education. He advises teachers to present hypothetical situations and analyze these situations in terms of the Kohlberg moral judgmental level. The teacher is advised to appraise the general class level and present material either on or slightly above the level, so that the student will develop to attain new levels on Kohlberg's stages. Real problems are not dealt with purposefully, rather the problems involve the scriptions they offer for moral behavior are less universal, and more concrete than a moral principle. The ten commandments offer an excellent example of rules. See R. S. Peters (1969 and 1971).

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2G same hypothetical dilemmas which we found Kohlberg using in the context of deciding at what stage a particular subject was functioning. Since justice is the core of morality, Kohlberg urges schools to be more just in their organizational practices. Knowing justice in an ideal fashion will help in this matter. Students are exhorted to be part and parcel of the decisional actions which are going on at the school. Faculties are urged to integrate student opinion into all levels of decision making about school organizational matters. Let us see how the development of Kohlberg's position on epistemology is developed. On the one hand, Kohlberg is Platonic and holds the 9 Platonic view of "reminiscence." On the other hand, Kohlberg is experimentalist and posits knowing as the result of an interaction with the active structuring thought processes and the encountered structures of the environment. Kohlberg must choose one position or the other, he cannot with consistency hold both views. Kuhmerker recognizes that Kohlberg holds these two distinct views: Like Plato, Kohlberg postulates that knowledge—in this case moral knowledge--comes from within the individual. Kohlberg's developmental point of view emphasizes the interaction of the individual with his environment and the impossibility of moral development except as part of a social setting. Yet Kohlberg's assertion that universal justice is the highest form of moral development even in an imperfect society, is rooted in the assumption that an individual has the innate capacity to recognize justice and seek it. (1972, p. 260) Since we have recognized the Platonic view and its relationship to Kohlberg's paradigm, let us consider other theoretical traditions in morality and their relationship to the Kohlberg scheme. 9 See the discussion in Smith (1973).

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27 Theoretical Traditions in Morality and the Kohl berg Thesis Apart from the apparent correspondence of the Kohl berg scheme with Platonic notions, when one considers the over-all perspective of Kohlberg's work, one notes the claim made by Kohlberg that his thinking is in the tradition of the theoretical formulations of Dewey, Piaget, and Kant. Especially does Kohlberg claim the tradition of Dewey. Dewey requested the field of psychology to address itself to the question of moral development. One finds the following comment by Dewey in Moral Principle s in Education : . . . conduct may be looked on as expressing the attitudes and dispositions of an individual, as well as realizing social results and maintaining the social fabric . . .all conduct springs ultimately and radically out of native instincts and impulse. We must know what these instincts and impulses are, and what they are at each particular stage of the child's development . . . We must study the child, in other words, to get our indications, our symptoms, our suggestions. (1909, pp. 47-48) Kohlberg assumes that he was responding to Dewey's request that psychology address itself to questions of moral development by Kohl berg's efforts to effect the marriage of moral philosophy and psychology. It is Kohlberg's claim that his experimental work which demonstrates various levels of moral judgments, arrived at by studying the cognitive processes, is in response to Dewey's request and serves to identify intellectual thought patterns typologically as they operate in the making of moral judgments at each specific stage. Kohlberg writes, "I believe that a number of recent research facts offer some guide through the problems of moral education when these facts are considered from Dewey's general perspective as to the relationship between fact and value in education" (1966c, p. 2). Thus, we see that Kohlberg deems his own research in the Deweyan perspective.

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23 The central point of Kohlberg's position is that the core of the moral judgment is cognitive. Since Kohlberg claims to be writing and researching in a Deweyan tradition, it is of interest to note Dewey's own conception of the moral judgment. Dewey sees the individual operating in a problematic situation confronted with consequences some of which are liked and some of which are disliked, thus, giving an emotive thrust to the Deweyan value judgment. It is only fair to note that Dewey's value judgment is also based on prizing and appraising. In the context of appraising, one has to use the thinking processes in order to arrive at a value judgment. It is not simply a case of the emotive, i.e., whether one likes or dislikes the consequences. The field of psychology considers that one who has used the thought processes in order to reach a conclusion may be said to be engaging in a cognitive aspect of the moral judgment. Kohlberg places more emphasis on the cognitive nature of the value judgment and less emphasis on the emotive nature than does Dewey. In spite of Kohlberg's insistence on the cognitive center of the moral judgment, he does not dismiss such notions as ego-strength as being salient to conceptions of moral development. In the Kohlberg (1967) scheme, the development of morality is to be effected not by the imposition of "fixed truths," but rather by stimulation which encourages the child to restructure his or her own experience. The problem which we shall study later, lies not with the maxim of stimulation, but with the methodology which Kohlberg proposes to bring about this stimulation. Kohlberg finds that notions of intentional ity arise at the conventional level of morality on his moral judgmental hierarchy. The notion of intentional ity has been important in moral philosophy and psychology

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29 for some time. Kohlberg claims that the work of Kant was similar to his paradigm of the moral judgment. Kant was another thinker to stress the importance of intentional ity in the value judgment. Along the same line, Piaget (1932) claims that intentional ity is at work in certain stages of the value judgment. Piaget separates intentional ity from the consequences portion of the value judgment. He studied the ages at which children made intentional ity based judgments or consequences based judgments. Piaget found that the young child when told of two instances, (one of which a youngster accidentally broke many cups, while another youngster broke a cup on purpose) will place more blame on the consequences judgment on the child who broke many cups than on the intentionality based behavior. On the other hand, as the child matures, the judgment made will be more in terms of intentional ity with the consequences being relegated to a lower position. Kohlberg uses these conceptions as a basic consideration to underlie his own moral judgmental hierarchy. One finds that judgments containing intentional ity generally arise at the conventional level. A more sophisticated view of consequences is the one which is held by Dewey (1922), that the individual acting in the moral situation is engaged in the process of weighing the consequences of the action, where some of the consequences are liked and some are disliked. So we see that while Kohlberg's own claim is that his philosophy is Dewey based, in fact Kohlberg's position is more like the position held by Kant or Piaget. Kohlberg's view as to the apex of the moral judgment is similar to Kant's i conceptions. Kant viewed the "good will" as being separate from ends or consequences which it may bring about. A parallel between the Kohlberg moral decision construct and Kantian thinking about moral decision may be

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30 observed when one considers the effect of the methodology which is employed by Kohlberg. That is, in using artificial, hypothetical situations as the means of making moral judgments, the ends or the consequences of the judgments are not dealt with by the person actively engaging in the moral judgment. To illustrate this point one need only to look to Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals . Kant wrote, "A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition— that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it . . . " (1970, p. 301). In psychology, the ages at which consequence based decisions or intentional ity-based decisions occur are the important considerations. In philosophy, the important concern is how we know when someone has a good will by what he or she says or does. Kohlberg, by presenting a subject with an artificial dilemma, does not help one to get clear about how we know that a person has a good will. Even his conception of the morally mature response does not help us to get clear on the problem of whether or not one has a good will. Kohlberg certainly cannot claim to have worked out this problem by his scheme, which moves toward an ultimate stage comprising the good and which can easily be compared with the Kantian conception of the good will. We are still left with the problem that one does not know from the subject's responses to hypothetical dilemmas whether or not he or she would actually respond either in word or deed in the same manner to the real situation. Not only is there no parallel in verbal response, but one can well imagine a person who conducts himself or herself in a morally acceptable manner for the most immorally conceivable reasons.

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31 We have observed that Kohlberg's moral judgment was closer to Kant's than to Dewey's. Kant was among the first thinkers to develop the concept of the autonomous person. Kohlberg follows Kant's lead inasmuch as his moral judgmental hierarchy follows in general the movement of the individual from a heteronomous attitude toward social norms to an autonomous attitude toward social norms. Piaget makes a similar distinction between heteronomous thinking and autonomous thinking, with heteronomous thinking relegated to a lower position of importance. It should be stressed, however, that Piaget' s stages are slightly different from Kohlberg's stages. The study of differences between Kohlberg's stages and Piaget's stages in so far as comparing the nuances of the likenesses and differences between these two thinkers' stages is outside of the scope of this paper. It is enough to say that both conceive the individual moving from a heteronomous attitud'e toward social norms to an autonomous attitude toward social norms. We can simply examine the titles Kohlberg uses in naming the levels for his stages in order to see that one moves from a position with little regard to social norms, to a position which relies on social norms, and finally away from considerations of social norms to develop one's own principles. Not only do both Piaget and Kohlberg conceive the moral judgment in terms of a movement from heteronomy to autonomy, and see that active thinking is required in order to reach the judgment, but also both Piaget and Kohlberg have observed the movement of the maturing moral judgments in terms of the concepts of justice. Sullivan and Quarter (1972) cite the fact that in Piagetian theory the child has some, although a very limited, notion of the concept of justice. His relationship in the adultchild dyad is one of an inferior individual to a superior individual.

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32 Sullivan and Quarter write that Kohlberg, like Piaget, "also suggested a sequence of moral stages that depends on successive acquisitions of or internalizations of the cultural moral standard. He describes the child under seven as 'amoral ' in the sense that he does not make a distinction between justice and duty or obedience, but moral in that he conforms to the dictates of the adult authority" (1972, p. 406). Other important similarities between Kohlberg and Piaget may be observed. These similarities are that both view development in terms of "invariant sequence," and both view the environment as instrumental in effecting the change from stage to stage--Piaget in terms of peer group influence, Kohlberg in terms of environmental stimulation. Moreover, these two view each successive stage as being composed of increasingly complex social structures and view their hierarchy in terms of increased complexity of thought patterns which occur as one travels upwards along the stages. A different account of rules is given by Piaget from the account given by Kohlberg. For Piaget (1932) rules were motor at the beginning of the child's life and became more complex until they could be codified. Sullivan, McCullough, and Stager (1971) express the notion that Kohlberg gives a somewhat different account of rules. At first the child does not conceive of rules as being pertinent to himself or herself; next the individual is characterized by conformity to rules; and finally, the individual is separated from rules and relies on principles to form the stage six moral judgment. Perhaps the basic difference between Piaget and Kohlberg is that the child under seven is seen by Kohlberg to be generally "amoral." He or she makes no distinction between "justice," "duty," or "obedience." Whatever the adult's position is, is considered "just." Piaget on the

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33 one hand posits the beginning stage of moral justice to be based on the child's respect for authority rather than an obedience or punishment orientation as held by Kohlberg.^ As we have previously observed, Piaget and Kohlberg both view movement from stage to stage as being "invariant." Kohlberg holds this position throughout his work, even though he concedes that such a view is impossible to substantiate empirically. It would, indeed, be difficult to find an older person who has been sheltered from socialization experiences and trace this person's development to see whether or not stages were skipped. The "invariant" view of human development approaches positions from the school of Hegel or Froebel in respect to their constructs of self more nearly than does the "invariant" view of development approach the position of the Dewey school of thought. Let us restate a cursory conception of Dewey's (1916) notion of growth. In Democracy and Education one is presented an instance of growth in which an individual chooses and moves toward ends which are then attained and subsequently are reshaped and redirected toward new ends. A difference may be noted in tracing the evolution of Kohl berg's thinking as to the focus of his position. He claims that essentially he has moved from the arena of the descriptive to the prescriptive. In his article, "From Is to Ought," Kohlberg (1971a) notes the emergence of his prescripti vist viewpoint. Earlier, my major philosophic claim was that the stimulation of development is the only ethically acceptable form of moral education. I believe this claim can be upheld regardless of my more controversial claim (in this article) that I have successfully defined the ethically optimal end point of moral development. (1971a, p. 153) ^See Irwin and Ambron (1961).

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34 Thus, we find that the postulation of abstract principles of justice is the end point of moral excellence. Not only is the change in focus from descriptive to prescriptive to be noted in the Kohl berg scheme, but earlier writings tend to be more typically psychological, later writings more typically philosophical or educational. Certainly Kohlberg has moved into the prescriptive arena of educational theory in his attempts to formulate practices and organizational procedures for schools. We further notice that the concept of justice has more clearly emerged in later work and occupies a foundational place in the formulation of Kohlberg's moral theoretical position. Notions of justice, particularly from the ethical theory of Plato and Rawls, can be deemed as potent aspects in Kohlberg's recent theoretical position. Current formulations of the place of the judgment of value in the moral domain employ arguments of contemporary moral philosophers. Kohlberg frequently cited Hare as representing the action guiding aspect of the moral judgment and overlooked the notion that Hare has of moral judgments being imperatives. Implications of Kohlberg's Theory One of the most obvious implications of Kohlberg's findings is that the current social scientific formulations as to the cultural relativity of morals are patently false. It is Kohlberg's thesis that cultural differences in morals have not taken account of the cultural alikeness in principles and thought clusters which are found in his stages, As an example of similar thinking clusters, Kohlberg (1971b) wants to compare the college rites of pantyraiding of the fifties with the rites of sitins of the sixties. It is at this point that we believe Kohlberg confuses a manifestation of social change with the action of a group of college

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35 students of two different periods. It is hard to see how pantyraiding and previous pranks played by prior generations had the social significance that sit-ins at lunch counters had. One might make the claim that pantyraiding was a harbinger of things to come, reflecting the increasing sexual freedom which was to emerge in the sixties. On the other hand, it was through the actual efforts of the students who participated in the sit-ins to integrate lunch counters that social change occurred. Close examinations of these thought structures do not reveal clearly the thinking of the fifties by college students in general to be so similar to the thinking of the sixties as Kohlberg believes. Kohl berg claims further that Moslems, Jews, Catholics, atheists, etc. show no different rate in development along his hierarchy. Kohlberg gives the "Golden Rule" as evidence of stage six thinking. But we cannot be too clear about the "Golden Rule" being on stage six, because if one followed the "Golden Rule" because of the authority of the church then it becomes stage four thinking. Kohlberg has not shown clearly and adequately how a rigorous follower of a religious order can rise above the factor of owing his or her authority to the church and making decisions on that basis. Making decisions based on authority to the church is making a stage four decision. Significance of Kohlberg's Paradigm Kohlberg claims much significance and importance for his theory in the area of moral development. He deems his deductions from his empirical and theoretical formulations concerning the stages of moral development to be of utmost significance to the interdisciplinary fields of social psychology and philosophy. Of his findings, he writes,

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36 This means empirically that the theory which explains cultural and individual differences in values is also the same general theory of why children become capable of moral judgment and action at all. It means normatively that there is a sense in which we can characterize moral differences between groups and individuals as being more or less adequate morally. (1971b, p. 41) Our task in this philosophical analysis is to examine and ascertain the significance of certain psychological aspects of the Kohlberg moral judgment. As we have observed previously, the moral utterances of the individual are given in response to hypothetical dilemmas which are interpreted by psychologists and scored in accordance with criteria regarding appropriate answers on levels at a given stage. Certainly, this interpretive aspect of Kohlberg's moral decision making scheme is more in line with psychological moral judgments than with philosophical judgments. Philosophical judgments are concerned more with logic, syntax of the sentence, and meaning of the words used in response. As we shall argue in a later chapter, it is very important to point out that Kohlberg's use of the terms 'val idation" and 'verification" are typically psychological and are not at all in accordance with the meaning of verification and validation when conceived philosophically. At any rate, the task of classifying the types of answers given by the subject in response is arduous indeed. Apparently, psychologists who have worked in the Kohlberg framework have somewhat of an advantage in using the techniques of scoring answers over an eclectic psychologist. It is generally conceded that the ordinary psychologist scores subjects much higher than does the Kohlberg team. The mental health of an individual is quite significant in determining the location of that person on Kohlberg's scheme. Kohlberg did study intelligence and found that of the relationship between I.Q. and

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37 moral judgment, the resultant r. = .31. 11 However, as I write, Kohlberg has not studied the relationship between mental health and the moral judgment. Other studies on the periphery of this question have been undertaken, but none addressed specifically to the relationship between mental health and the moral judgment. While intelligence is not significantly related to moral development, it does play a small part in moving up the stages. A major assumption about stage theory is that the complexity of the stages increases from lower to higher levels as one ascends the judgmental hierarchy. If one agrees that Kohlberg's "philosophies" are more logically complex as the judgmental ladder is mounted by the subject who is making the judgments, then it would seem to follow that the increasingly difficult stages would be more difficult to comprehend. When one attains a given level on the Kohlberg moral judgmental hierarchy, then it is presupposed that lower levels are also understood. In examining the significance of Kohlberg's attitude toward other points of view in psychology one notes that he has adopted a yes-but attitude. His claim is that "ego-strength" is important but it is not as important as his own findings that the overriding features of moral judgment are cogniti ve-maturational . In essence, Kohlberg's basic position is that moral development is primarily cognitive maturational , yet he relates "ego strength" to moral development. There is some support for the interpretation of moral character as ego, rather than superego, strength. This interpretation Kohlberg wrote, ". . . intellectual development, then, is an important condition for development of moral thought, but level of moral thought can be clearly distinguished from general intellectual level. Level of moral judgment appears to be a quite unitary or consistent personal characteristic distinct from intelligence or specific subcultural background and beliefs" (1963c, p. 405).

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38 implies that the major consistencies in moral conduct represent decision-making capacities rather than fixed behavior traits. It is thus consistent with the findings on situational variation, which suggested that moral conduct was the product of a situational decision. The "ego-strength" interpretation also seems consistent with the difficul ties in distinguishing situational factors stimulating moral obligation in the production of honest behavior. Both sets of facts appear to appeal to "ego-strength" dispositions in the personality. (1963c, pp. 391-2) Throughout Kohlberg's writing, he disparages the use of a trait theory on which to base research on moral development. The almost total rejection of trait theory is quite significant to a theory of moral development, for as we have previously observed, it is hard to imagine postulating justice as the core of morality without admitting that being a just person can be a paradigm case of justice. At any rate, the pioneering work in trait theory undertaken by Hartshorne and May (1930) is referred to by Kohl berg in a rather pejorative way. Kohl berg claims that trait theory is concerned with and coming up with a "bag of virtues." Kohlberg's Koral Judgment in Perspective The position developed by Kohlberg on moral development not only is one containing psychological aspects, but is replete with concepts derived from a philosophical basis. As opposed to Dewey's conception of the value judgment which describes an individual operating in a moral situation in which consequences are weighed, some of which we like and some of which we do not like, Kohlberg places greater emphasis on impersonality and universality as the basis for the morally mature value judgment. Again, it should be pointed out that Kohlberg does not use the individual operating in an actual moral situation, but in the context of the individual responding to hypothetical moral dilemmas as the paradigm in which the moral judgment occurs. 12 12 , "... Like philosophers from Kant to Hare, Baier, Aiken, etc., we define morality in terms of the formal character of a moral judgment or

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39 Perhaps the most major point of departure of Kohlberg's position from that of Dewey lies in the fact that Kohlberg's subjects are asked to resolve hypothetical dilemmas rather than participate in actual on-going situations. Dewey (1909) emphasizes that the child must continually exercise and test judgments in order to obtain the power of judgment. Moral aspects, in the Dewey scheme, must be selected by the individual and put into execution, the final test being that of action which would serve to help the person in the moral situation evaluate the consequences of the action. Only when an individual has selected moral situations, followed the situation through to the final action, and actually discriminated the moral consequences of the action can the power of moral judgment be developed. While it is true that the major thrust of Kohlberg's work is in terms of the artificial situation, Kohlberg does occasionally refer to students making value judgments in the actual existential situation. One example of his recognition of the place of the value judgment in the on-going situation is in his depiction of an episode in which one boy in a school room spit on another and was characterized as being rude by the teacher. Kohlberg (1968c) feels that in that instance the place of the teacher was to work on the problem at hand from the standpoint of the rights of the individual children involved in the problematic situation. Since Kohlberg continually claims to posit a theory of moral development which is close to Dewey's position, the analysis of Dewey and Kohlberg along salient issues is called for. Somewhat closer to Dewey's a moral point of view, rather than in terms of its content. Impersonality, ideality, umversalizability, and preempti veness are among the formal characteristics of a moral judgment, a moral reason beinn one which has such properties as these." (Kohlberg, 1971b, p 35)

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40 (1916) position on the job of education is the statement by Kohlberg that education must address itself to the "stimulation of the development" of the student. Dewey conceived education to be comprised of a method of "sharing the conjoint activity" in which the learner and teacher mutually stimulated each other to the end of achieving richer meaning to the problems confronted by both. This on-going moral situation for Dewey is in contrast to the artificial moral situation for Kohlberg. In the face of this contrast, Kohlberg posits the goals of moral education to be the control of the child's behavior by means of the moral judgment which occurs in the context of the stimulation of the child's own moral development. It is anathema to both thinkers that "fixed truths" should be imposed on the developing mental capacities in the name of moral education. Kohlberg (1963a) argues that the job of the teacher lies in helping the child to take the next step rather than imposition of alien thought patterns on him or her. Dewey (1916) repeatedly emphasizes that teachers begin with the individual child relying on his or her plasticity from which to take their cues rather than imposing subject matter which is irrelevant to the student. Kohlberg, in presenting artifical situations to young children, may be imposing subject matter which is irrelevant to children's own moral needs and interests. A further problem warranting comparison between Dewey and Kohlberg is Kohlberg's insistence that moral development moves upward on his stages in a sequence which is "invariant." This further factor of "invariant" sequence in Kohlberg's paradigm brings to mind a specific school of logic. Developmental theorists who hold the viewpoint that the stages of moral development are invariant may be compared to such schools

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41 of logic as the Hegel and Engels schools. The logic of these schools may be described as absolutistic, as typified by logical systems such as the negation of the negation, i.e., that an absolute is ever unfolding toward preconceived ends. Kohlberg's (1971b) rejoiner is that such an assumption as the invariance of sequence in the developmental processes in no way entails older notions of moral growth being wired into the nervous system. Yet Kohlberg is still faced with the fact that his scheme posits an absolute progression. However, he feels that he is saved from older conceptions of logic by conceiving moral development in terms of at once balanced and then unbalanced systems of equilibrium and disequil ibrium. As a concomitant to the changing equilibrium, Kohlberg, in line with Piagetian notions, claims that social interaction can be a stimulant to the development of the child from one stage to the next. The attitudes which form the "philosophies" indigenous to a specific stage are also a function of an individual's cognitive growth at a specific period in time. Kohlberg (1971b) postulates his stages as being evermoving transformations of attitudes and concepts. Cognitive growth is accompanied by these developing attitudes and conceptions as the child makes sense out of his or her environment the milieu in which he or she is interacting. It is our thesis, however, that Kohlberg's claim that the developmental paradigm in the moral arena is one of on-going movement of psychosocial forces from disequilibrium to a state of equilibrium does not save his position from the criticism of an absolutistic unfolding toward a pregiven end. Granted that this newer conception of Kohlberg's does not entail older ideas of a wired-in notion of unfolding, despite this feature, the specter of an absolute unfolding does not vanish. Or at any

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42 rate, it would be difficult to verify the "invariant" sequence aspect of Kohlberg's stages empirically. It is not surprising that Kohlberg himself recognizes the problem of "invariant" sequence. He (1971b) realizes that the child cannot be deprived of psychosocial stimulation in order to discover whether one can move from premoral judgmental levels to principled judgments without proceeding through all the stages. Cognition and Role-Taking at Heart of Kohlberg's Developmental Judgment Cognition lies at the core of the Kohlberg moral judgment paradigm. Kohlberg (1971b) maintains that the place of cognitive development in the moral scheme is salient. Cognitive development involves taking the aspect of another and this taking of another's aspect is of primary importance to moving up Kohlberg's moral hierarchy. Kohlberg's contention is that his theory is in alignment with Dewey, Baldwin, Mead, and Piaget insofar as he posits a basically active individual whose cognitive structures are in interaction with the environmental structures which are encountered in the process of behaving.^ Kohlberg (1971b) is using the word 'cognitive" in a sense which may be said to embody the notion that a person undergoes a process of deliberation, of actual reasoning in making the moral judgment. Kohlberg does 13 Kohlberg writes, "I have used the term 'cognitive-developmental' to refer to a set of assumptions common to the moral theories of Dewey (1909) G. H. Mead (1934), J. M. Baldwin (1906), Piaget (1932), and myself. *A1 1 have postulated stages of moral development representing cognitivestructural transformations in the conception of self and society. All have assumed that these stages represented successive modes of 'takinq the role of others' in social situations, and hence that the social-environmental determinants of development are its opportunities for role-takinq. " (1971b, p. 42)

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43 not want to say that cognitions describe actual states of the world as in the case of the scientific judgment. Neither is he saying that cognitrons embody a Durkheimian ethical relativity, or that cognitions are intuitions in which one immediately apprehends the moral aspects of the value domain, or that cognitions simply embody the consequences of the judgment or the general welfare or happiness of the group. How then does Kohlberg use the word "cognitive?" We have noted that a person has to actively reason in Kohlberg's conception of cognition. Moral mental events are also characterized by an interaction which occurs between the intellectual and affective processes operating in the moral context. If one should ask which facet of the psyche is more important in moral situations, Kohlberg would reply that in the moral domain both facets are at work and may be distinguished readily in their corresponding psychological areas. The ultimate level to which the cognitive processes can be stimulated is the principled level which is both prescriptive, illustrating the influence of Hare, and universal izabl e as illustrated by Kohlberg's own example of the Kantian categorial imperative. Kohlberg's claim is that principled morality defines right action for anyone who is confronted with a moral situation.^ 5 Summary Kohlberg's position on the "naturalistic fallacy" led us to conclude that Kohlberg commits the "naturalistic fallacy" with impunity. Since 14 Kohlberg writes, "all mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects, and that the development of mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives " (1971b, p. 44) 15 See Kohlberg (1971b).

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44 agreement in philosophy has not been reached as to the seriousness of committing this fallacy, we have claimed that fact and value can indeed sometimes be merged without detriment to either realm. Kohlberg's paradigm with its invariant sequence of moral stages is very different from Dewey's on-going situations which make up Dewey's moral judgments. In devising a scheme which combines the empirical and theoretical as Kohlberg does, he commits himself to schools of logic which employ absolutistic reasoning, as for example, the negation of the negation. The purpose of this chapter has been to present Kohlberg's moral concepts and point out the pitfalls of his scheme. Kohlberg's paradigm is not in accord with positions in sociology such as Linton's. Linton does not rely on absolute ordering of values as does Kohlberg. Abstract justice was found to comprise Kohlberg's conception of the highest reach of morality. Finally, the chapter pointed to the inconsistency of Kohlberg's positing an experimental ist and Platonic position on the question of knowing. Since Kohlberg is such an influential thinker in the field of moral discourse, we shall next consider theoretical positions which refer to his writing and research.

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45 References Alston, W. P. "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From is to ought. 1 " In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology . New York: Academic Press, 1971 . Beck, C. M., Crittenden, B. S., and Sullivan, E. V. Horal education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971, Dewey, J. floral principles in education . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909. Dewey, J. Democracy and education . New York: The Free Press. 1916. Dewey, J. Human nature and conduct . New York: Holt, 1922. Hamilton, E. and Cairns, H. The collected dialogues of Plato . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Hartshorne, H. , May, II. A., and Shuttleworth, S. Studies in the nature of characte r. New York: Macmillan, 1930, Vol. I 1 1 1 . Irwin, D. II. and Ambron, S. E. "Moral judgment and role-taking in children ages three to seven," ERIC , 1961, ED 084 033, 1-58. Kant, I. "Fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals." In A. Zweig (Ed.), The essential Kant . New York: Mentor, 1970. Kohlberg, L. "The development of children's orientations toward a moral order: I. Sequence in the development of moral thought." Vita Humana , 1963a, 6, 11-33. Kohlberg, L. "Development of moral cnaracter and moral ideology." In M. Hoffman and L. Hoffman (Eds.), Re view of child development research (Vol. I). New York: Russell Sage, 1963c. Kohlberg, L. "Moral education in the schools: a developmental view." The School Review , 1966c, 74, 1-30. Kohlberg, L. "Moral and religious education and the public schools: a developmental view." In T. Sizer (Ed.), Religion and pub l ic educa tion . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. Kohlberg, L. "The child as a moral philosopher." Psycholoqy Today. 1968a, 2, 25-30. ^ JL Kohlberg, L. "Stages in moral growth." International Journ al of Religious Education , 1968c, 44, 8-11. ~ ~~

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1 ( 4G Kohl berg , L. "Stage and sequence: the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization." In D. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research . New York: Rand McNally, 1969. Kohlberg, L. "Education for justice: a modern statement of the Platonic view." In T. Sizer (Ed. ), Moral education . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Kohlberg, L. "From is to ought." In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemoloq.y . New York: Academic Press, 1971a. Kohlberg, L. "Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education." In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds'.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971b. Kuhmerker, L. "Growth toward principled behavior: Lawrence Kohl berg's studies of moral development." Journal of Moral Education, 1972, 2, 255-262. Linton, R. "Participation in culture." In J. J. Chilcott, N. C. Greenberg, and H. B. Wilson (Eds.), Readings in the socio-cul tural foundations of education . Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1968. Margolis, J. Values and conduct . Oxford: Clarendon, 1971. Morgan, K. P. "Philosophical problems in cognitive-moral -development theory: a critique of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg." (Unpublished paper, 1975, University of Alberta) Peters, R. S. "Moral developments: a plea for pluralism." In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. New YorkAcademic Press, 1971. ~~ Pia g e t, J. The moral .judgment of the ch ild. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1932. Rest, J. R. "The hierarchical nature of moral judgment: a study of patterns of comprehension and preference of moral stages." Journal of Personality , 1973, 41, 86-109. " Sholl, D. "The contributions of Lawrence Kohlberg to religion and moral education." Religious Educatio n, 1971, 66, 364-372. Smith, M. "Kohlberg and McPhail— a comparison." Journal of Moral Education, 1973, 3, 353-359. " Sullivan, E. V McCul lough, G., and Stager, M. "A developmental study of the relationship between conceptual ego and moral development " Child Development , 1971, 41, 401-411. Sullivan, E. V. and Quarter, J. "Psychological correlates of certain post-conventional moral types: a perspective on hybrid tvoes " Journal of Personality , 1972, 40, 151-161 '

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CHAPTER III IMPACT OF THE KOHLBERG SCHEME IN THE AREA OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT Since there have been a large number of reactions to Kohlberg's writings in the area of moral development, we shall review in this chapter writings on Kohlberg in this area by pointing to problems and acceptance of Kohlberg's position in order to inform the reader of the influence and significance of Kohlberg's work. Since commentators have found problems in his scheme, i.e., the hybrid breeds, his Moral Judgment Evaluation Scale, and his advocacy that a specific "is" be an "ought," researchers have found difficulties in his work, especially with his failure to unite thought and action. These viewpoints on the Kohlberg perspective will be presented. Since "moral maturity" represents the optimal development of the individual in the Kohlberg scheme, certain commentaries on "moral maturity" are viewed in the perspective of problems involved in the criteria of "moral maturity." We will review research along lines originated by Kohlberg. The findings of the "hybrid" judgment, along with moral development in delinquents, will be cited. Preference for the moral judgment and research to relate the moral judgment to behavior will be reviewed as a means of illustrating the use of Kohlberg's moral evaluation scale as it relates to research. Finally, evaluation of Kohlberg's work by a variety of scholars is presented to illustrate the significance of Kohlberg's position. 47

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48 "Moral Maturity" in the Kohl berg Paradigm Scholars note that the concept of "moral maturity" emerges as a person moves from an orientation of concern for self to an interest in the other person. "Moral maturity" is at the apex of the Kohlberg scheme. In order to sum up the most significant goal of the Kohlberg paradigm, one should note that scholars claim the scheme involves movement from egocentric conceptions of moral judgments to the Kohlberg notions of "moral maturity." Gross (1973) notes two obvious trends which emerge in the process of Kohlberg's ever transforming stages. In the first place, there is a trend away from whatever is expedient to the person or whatever kind of behavior is conforming to group expectations. Secondly, there is the movement toward "moral maturity" which utilizes abstract principles and regards all individuals to be of inestimable worth regardless of proximity to the self. Kuhmerker (1972) recognized that certainly the concept of "moral maturity" was important to the Kohlberg scheme. The principled level represents Kohlberg's conception of "moral maturity" in terms of a moral developmental hierarchy. Kuhmerker' s research study was addressed to the facility of movement from stage to stage in American society. She observed that, according to the present research, it was relatively easy for pre-adol escents to move from the pre-conventional modes of thinking to the conventional level. However, those children who have entered their thirteenth year and have not yet attained the level of the conventional orientation are not likely to reach the principled level on becoming adults. A second finding concerning the likelihood of moving to principled reasoning is that high school students who have not

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49 developed the ability to use principled level thinking at least onefifth of the time are highly unlikely to ever develop the ability to make principled level judgments. Research studies have shown, according to Kuhmerker (1972), that it is possible for adults to grow from lower to higher stages. Kohlberg himself, using the medium of longitudinal study, notes the fact that adults both grew in stage emergence and regressed in terms of falling to lower stages than those at which previous moral developmental judgments were made. Kuhmerker (1972) rightly observes that the focus of the Kohlberg scheme is not upon the person's moral behavior but on the moral judgment which is assessed in terms of response to hypothetical dilemmas. Orr (1974) sees that "moral maturity" is embodied in Kohlberg's notion that prevailing conventionality is to be transcended and such behavior criticized by the agent. However, Orr issues a caveat to one who would accept Kohlberg's notion of moral maturity at face value: . . . moral maturity does not require even an implicit rejection of man's nature as an animal who is defined by his group loyalties, and by his identification with tangible communities. The ability even to speak about morality assumes communities that are able to provide the common language and perspectives necessary for communication. (1974, p. 271) The conception of "moral maturity" is equated by Keniston (1970) with Ericson's "ethical stage." One who is engaged in the kind of thinking which is typical at this stage may find himself or herself at odds with conventional notions of morality. Keniston, who characterized Kohlberg's work as brilliant, writes of the principles which are at work on the ultimate level comprising moral maturity: such principles are apt to be stated in a very high level of generality; e.g., the concept of justice, the Golden Rule, the sanctity of life, the categorical imperative, the promotion

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50 of human development. The individual at this stage may find himself in conflict with existing concepts of law and order, or even democratically arrived-at laws unacceptable because they lead to consequences or enjoin behaviors that violate his own personal principles. (1970, p. 579) Indeed, the concept of "moral maturity" is a salient notion in the Kohlberg paradigm. In both the realm of the "is and the ought" Kohl berg finds "moral maturity" to be important in any viable conception of the way it is or ought to be in the moral domain. We have stated several conceptions of "moral maturity" which are found in the literature. It is important next to see certain phenomena concerning "moral maturity" which emerge in the research relating to the Kohlberg scheme. The Place of the Hybrid Breeds A phenomenon for one who would make an unequivocable declaration as to what constitutes "moral maturity" is presented by the emerging conception of the "hybrid breed." The claim to have discovered a new level which is operating perhaps slightly below level five is made by Sullivan and Quarter (1972) in their findings of the "hybrid breeds." The "hybrid breed" response incorporates level one and level three reasoning in such a way that neither level can be clearly distinguished from the other. These two researchers question whether or not a level went unnoticed by Kohlberg, only to emerge under other research conditions. Sullivan and Quarter write of the "hybrid breed;" "our own hunch is that these two moral types constitute two distinct branches of an initial stage of postconventional morality which antedates a stage five orientation" (1972, p. 160).

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51 Other Phenomena of Importance to the Psychologist and the Philosopher Not only do the "hybrid breeds" cause problems which, as I write, Kohlberg has not addressed, but an important consideration for the psychologist as well as the philosopher is whether or not an individual is simply evincing a preference for a moral judgment rather than actually going through the mental process one uses in order to formulate the moral judgment equal to the judger's ability. Rest (1973) recognized that much research over time would be necessary to ascertain the level of the preferred moral judgment by the subject in the study. He designed a study to measure both comprehension and preference of moral statements. His findings were that at least half of the subjects preferred moral statements one level above the level at which the statements were comprehended. This finding led him to conclude that the cognitive-developmental approach was basically sound. Turiel and Rothman (1972) find another problem in the separation of thought and action. The separation of thought from action is an important question concerning the moral domain. Can an individual who performs a moral judgment on a certain level maintain that same level in moral behavior? Can one accuse Kohlberg of dualistic thinking in his use of the artificial situation rather than what the person actually does as the aspect of moral judgment which he or she evaluates? Turiel and Rothman designed a research study which would relate thought and action, i.e., response to hypothetical dilemma with opinions of others concerning the actual behavioral decisions made by the subjects. They write, the findings of this experiment demonstrate the interdependence of reasoning and action in the development of morality. We have seen that there is a relation between the subject's stage of moral judgment, the stage of communications from others regarding behavioral decision, and the subiect's actions (1972, p. 754)

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52 Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that finding a relationship still does not function as uniting thought and action. So the problem remains with us that thought and action are still separate entities in the Kohl berg scheme and are not united. Further Research Aspects of the Kohl berg Scheme Let us, for the moment, grant that the Kohlberg method of presenting moral dilemmas outside the immediate concern of the individual who is being evaluated does represent one way of measuring the judgment of the moral domain. In this case, findings such as those by Fodor (1972), who compared delinquent and nondel inquent adolescents, come as no surprise. Fodor found that delinquents score lower on Kohlberg's hierarchy than do nondel inquents. Consider the fact that Kohlberg himself finds adolescents to be mainly at the conventional level which is characterized as the "good boy-good girl" syndrome and duty to authority. Now can it be realistically expected that a delinquent would respond in the same manner as would the good boy or girl? Or does duty to authority mean much to a delinquent? In cases in which delinquents gave "good boy-good girl" responses especially, the researcher should be suspect of the sincerity of the responder. Given the hypothetical dilemma method, moral values and their corresponding attitudes can be appraised, according to Hogan and Dickstein (1972), who point to the fact that Kohlberg's notion of the moral judgment entails the claim that the judgment can be evaluated. It is found to be the case, however, that the Kohlberg floral Judgment Scale is quite difficult to administer and takes an inordinate amount of time to use.

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53 Hogan and Dickstein are not the only researchers to notice the difficulty of mastering the Kohlberg scale. Kuhmerker (1972) remarks that the scoring mechanism for Kohlberg 1 s stages is by no means an easy technique in which to gain expertise. One may obtain a mimeographed copy of scoring procedures from Kohlberg himself, but this can in no way be substituted for the workshops on scoring procedures given by Kohlberg. The Harvard team has a tendency to score responses to dilemmas at lower levels than does the novice scorer, accordi ng to Kuhmerker (1972). She notes three biases that one should be cautioned against in order to avoid scoring errors. These biases are . . . that the scorer thinks of the stages as represented by the content of the responses, rather than by its form and structure. The scorer must analyze why a subject thinks as he does, not what action he advocates. The subject's stage motives are cognitively structured. The subject does not develop new motives, but new ways of ordering alternatives. A third pitfall is to think of stages as types of personalities rather than ways of reasoning. (1972, pp. 257-8) Her remarks lead one to question the reliability of the scoring mechanism in view of the biases that are evident in the novice scorer, assuming that the scorer has appropriate expertise in educational psychology and/or psychology. Perhaps the most incisive statement as to the relationship of the moral domain to Kohlberg's research is issued by Haan, Stroud, and Holstein who researched regular students, activist students, and hippies. Their research placed the hippies at the lowest level of the Kohlberg moral judgment paradigm, the regular students were at a level above the hippies, and the activists were at the ultimate level. They write that, "Whatever the case, it would not ever seem the task of social science to decide which "is" should become the "ought"the hippies, activists, or the students-but rather to catalog and explicate the nature of various human moral interdependences" (1973, p. 611).

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54 Acceptance by Some Scholars of Kohl berg's Scheme Proponents of Kohlberg's theory, such as Kenneth Ken is ton (1970), point to the predictive ability of Kohlberg's theory as a positive asset. Keniston cites the case that principled level students at Harvard would not participate in a sit-in because the issues at hand were not thought to be on the principled level. It should be noted that studies had shown that principled leveled students engaged in sit-ins at Berkeley. Kohlberg's findings confirm his predictions. However, one should be aware of the fact that Kohl berg himself was doing the predicting and not someone using his theory to create and design the same research study, which would, indeed, carry more weight, in our opinion. Lickona (1973) represents the viewpoint of many psychologists and educators that research has adequately demonstrated the efficacy of the Kohlberg model. Concerning his belief in the Kohlberg scheme, he writes: Present the child with a moral dilemma that precipitates cognitive conflict, and then expose him to the developmental stage one above his own ... . You can also expose the child to his own stage, or one stage below, or two or three above . . . it won' t matter. The research indicates he'll change only toward the level one above his own. And the changes, like all cognitive structural changes, are irreversible. The child never "forgets" them. Pilot testing of the new filmstrip stories, incidentally, shows that even first and second graders vigorously debate the moral dilemmas and are eager for more. (1973, p. 23) Indeed, research findings do tend to provide one with cogent reasons for adopting the Kohlberg view, and the findings which we have cited are convincing, if one believes that response to hypothetical dilemmas can embody genuine moral judgments. On the other hand, one who views the moral judgment in terms of an individual operating in a problematic ongoing situation, will not even be willing to grant that such research is, indeed, applicable to the problem at hand, i.e., what comprises the

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55 moral judgment. The Kohl berg scheme in no way helps one get clearer about what persons actually do when confronted with real life moral problems. Not only does the artificiality of the situation in the Kohlberg scheme present one with problems, but writers in various disciplines relate problems concerning the Kohl berg paradigm and their own particular discipline. We shall first consider problems of the philosopher who critiques the Kohlberg scheme. Criticism by Philosophers of the Kohlberg Scheme Philosophers, however, are not nearly so much in accord as are psychological researchers insofar as acceptance of the Kohlberg scheme is concerned. Kohlberg (1971a) has remarked that it is not without some trepidation that he entered the "den of wolves" inhabited by philosophers. Yet, one should observe that if he is interested in inhabiting this "den of wolves," he should pay more attention to philosophical puzzles which his theory creates. The most important puzzle is what constitutes the moral domain itself and what criteria other than justice serve to delimit this domain. Not too many philosophers are willing to accept the idea that justice, encompassing the idea of the good, is to be taken as that which delimits the realm of morality. One critic of just that notion is Crittenden (1971), who suggests that rather morality should be the concern which one has concerning the ultimate choice of a life style. Other criticism of Kohlberg's restrictive definition of the moral realm emerge in the area of philosophy. One is that of Baier (1971), who does not think that Kohlberg's stages really help one to get clear about the good life, which should be a concern to one who wishes to delineate what is "truly moral."

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56 Another philosopher who posits that limiting morality to justice omits much from the arena of moral discourse which is traditionally dealt with in philosophy is Crittenden (1971). He remarks in an informal discussion about Kohlberg that he cuts out certain reasons as morally relevant simply by his fairly limited definition of morality in terms of justice or something like that. I think that personal ideals enter into morality: in the way we think we ought to act even when the tangible public good is not directly involved, in the way we treat animals, or in resolving a conflict of values, say between an aesthetic and an economic value. (1971 , p. 317) Since the restrictive nature of Kohlberg 1 s moral theory has been criticized by Crittenden, it becomes of importance to state the boundaries of the moral judgment for Kohlberg. Beck et al_. (1971) spell out the objective and subjective requirements of the moral judgment in terms of the Kohlberg scheme. In order that the judgment be truly moral it must satisfy the objective requirement of justice and the subjective requirement of the individual's having reasoned in order to reach the final decision. Beck et aJL (1971) note that in the Kohlberg theory objectively beneficial acts are not enough unless they are conceived in terms of justice. Moreover, moral education is not education apart from the process of reasoning which should be going on in a context of the educative experience. That the farther one moves along the Kohlberg stages the more typically moral is the judgment is an observation made by Alston (1971). Alston criticizes the view of movement along Kohlberg 's stages on the basis that the moral is conceived entirely in terms of Kohl berg's personal preference. Citing the fact that moral philosophers by no means agree as to the delineation of the moral domain, Alston nevertheless implores Kohlberg to go beyond simply recommending justice:

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57 It is notorious that moral philosophers agree no more about what is distinctive of the moral than about anything else: and a large number of distinct accounts of what makes a judgment, a reason, an attitude, a rule, or a principle, moral have been put forward. Kohl berg chooses one of these . . . but fails to do anything by way of showing that this is more than a choice of what seems most congenial or interesting to him . ... If these pronouncements are to carry any weight, he will have to show that this sense of "moral" which is functioning as his standard has itself some recommendation other than congeniality to his predilections. (1971, pp. 276-7) Not only is the question as to what comprises the moral domain of interest to the philosopher, but also the assumptions which are the underpinnings of the Kohlberg paradigm. The first assumption is that the moral judgment change involves a change in the structure of the response rather than the frequency. Secondly, there is a newness or difference in response in regard to developmental change from one pattern to another. Thirdly, the changes are for the most part vertically mobile. Fourthly, there is tied into the conception a universal izable pattern which is step-wise in terms of sequence and irreversible in general. Fifthly, the stages themselves form a ladder-like paradigm which is functioning within the person. Finally, each stage is a more complete and complex integration of a previous stage and transcends this previous stage. Having stated the step-wise progression of stages as depicted by Morgan (1975), the question of whether Kohlberg does in fact replace the doctrine of "original sin" with a doctrine of "original virtue" emerges. Scriven claims that he does, in his remarks to the effect that, I would like to christen a doctrine which runs through Kohlberg's approach and which is described as follows: I shall now present a third conception of moral education. In this conception the goal of moral education is the stimulation of the "natural" development of the individual child's own moral judgment and of the capacities allowing him to use it to control's behavior. I call this "the doctrine of original virtue. It is nice that a social psychologist should have replaced the doctrine of original sin. (1971, p. 355)

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58 Although Kohlberg does not agree with Scriven's interpretation of his stages, it does seen that the stages operate to the end of moving upward along Kohlberg's hierarchy in terms of becoming more and more virtuous as one advances in age. Philosophers not only question the step-wise progression of morality, but, moreover, the matter of cultural relativity and ethical relativity is of concern to this discipline. An analysis of Kohlberg's scheme should address itself to the position of Kohlberg on the question of cultural relativity and ethical relativity which are seen as two distinct notions by Kohlberg. Many scholars have reacted to Kohlberg's notions on cultural relativity. Let us take the example of R. S. Peters (1971), who provides the student of Kohlberg with a fairly accurate statement as to Kohlberg's position on cultural relativity. Kohlberg sees that cultures are different in terms of customs and moral beliefs when conceived as matters of content, but on the other hand, the form of moral beliefs is universal. Obviously marriage and sexual taboos differ from culture to culture, yet the rules and forms of these beliefs are seen by Kohlberg to be similar and universal . As we have observed, the problem of ethical relativity is conceived as being different from the problem of cultural relativity by Kohlberg (1971a). In defense of Kohlberg's separation, Beck et ah (1971) claims that Kohlberg recognizes the existence of the problem of ethical pluralism and believes that his stage hierarchy resolves this problem. Instead of addressing problems of ethical pluralism which the academicians seem to do as they endlessly engage in puzzles about problems relating to ethical pluralism, Kohlberg claims that his research has unearthed the "wisdom of society." In pointing to those who have reached his ultimate stage, he

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59 maintains that he has discovered a universal truth, inasmuch as the elite who operate at the highest level "know" the most adequate ethical position. To counter the claim made by Kohlberg that his scheme represents the "wisdom of society," one need look no farther than the philosopher John Dewey. Dewey writes much about the separation of thought and action in theoretical conceptions. He offers many examples of dualistic thinking which are to be discovered in the separation of thought and action, means and ends, conscience and conduct, et cetera. The relationship between the thought as embodied in the moral judgment and the action as embodied in moral conduct of a true moral judgment is a relationship characterized by interdependence. Craig (1974) sees that in the arena of thought and action, Kohlberg has not adequately established the relationship in terms of causality between the moral judgment and subsequent moral conduct. Granted that Kohlberg 1 s contention that an individual who knows "the good" will proceed to do it, one is still left with the problem of how responding to hypothetical dilemmas causes certain moral conduct. At this point, we cannot see that this can ever be resolved given Kohlberg's current position on the nature of evaluating the moral judgment. Philosophers, too, as well as psychologists think that perhaps Kohlberg has overlooked a stage. Rosen (1975), while not faulting Kohlberg for choosing a Kantian-Rawlsian view of morality and converting it into a system of developmental stages, does want to add one stage which is higher than Kohlberg's stage six. Perhaps this stage would be stage seven and is deemed by Rosen to be an act theory:

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60 All moral principles are summary rules, these are no constitutive moral rules. Moral rules are abandoned when they conflict with what we would have decided without the rule. To arrive at singular moral judgments you need to be clear about the facts, not to be abnormal, and not use any of the (mistaken) theories which claim moral rules are constitutive and are thus required to arrive at justified moral judgments. Moral disagreements and dilemmas are to be handled with the method of hypothetical agreement. (1975, p. 4) Philosophers traditionally view theories of morality horizontally rather than vertically. Morgan (1975) points to Kohlberg's scheme, which posits that philosophies should be viewed in a hierarchical manner with some philosophies being more adequate than others. Her observation is that when philosophers discuss the relative merits and demerits of such diverse ethical positions as Hedonism, Egoism, Utilitarianism, Kantian Formalism and Ideal Spectator Theory, they very often have arrived at the conclusion that when the fundamental premise(s) of each position is reached there is no rational way of resolving the differences among various positions. (1975, pp. 3-4) That Kohl berg has made little attempt to learn the language of philosophers, the controversies, and distinctions characteristic of philosophy is pointed out by Morgan (1975). However, she cites the fact that Kohlberg's paradigm has brought new spirit into the moral arena. One who wishes to be truly intellectual, in her view, should take problems raised by Kohl berg into full account. Morgan (1975) points to the fact that by totally ignoring a venerable tradition in ethics, Kohlberg in his paradigm does away entirely with any viable concept of habit. Morgan notes that nowhere in the Kohlberg scheme can one find a prototype of a "good man" as a person whose character and habits are formed in accordance with good moral virtues. That Kohlberg does not consider the concept of self-control and ignores the function of habit in morality is noted by R. S. Peters

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61 (1971). Peters further claims that perhaps Kohlberg has in mind the Spartans who might exhibit traits such as courage only in very specific situations. To this example, he replies, that on the other hand, if one decided that a virtue such as moral courage might be a desirable habit to develop, nowhere in the Kohlberg analysis can one find the means whereby this feat is accomplished, i.e., the development of habit. Craig (1974) also cites the fact that to Kohlberg, any attempt to equate moral education with training in obtaining good habits is misconceived. This point of view is clearly stated in the context of Kohl berg's rejection of a notion that morality involves a "bag of virtues." As we have already seen, the purpose of moral education for Kohlberg is not to instill moral habits, but to facilitate the development of the individual and aid progression on his various stages. Viewing the Kohlberg value judgment in the context of the problem of habit and how habit is conceived by Dewey, Craig illustrates the limited conception of habit which Kohlberg employs in this part of his thesis . What Kohlberg incorrectly assumes is that a habit is solely identifiable with a behavior and that the use of punishment and reward is the only basis for acquiring habits . . . John Dewey, for example, suggests that habits are dispositions which enable the individual to use his intelligence to mediate a problematic situation. A habit is not merely a response to a type of stimulus. Kohlberg' s concept of habit, then, is rather limited and neglects the dispositional use of intelligence which Dewey suggests is paramount. (1974, pp. 125-6) It is worthwhile to examine the Kohlberg scheme in light of Dewey's conception of habit inasmuch as Kohlberg repeatedly claims a Deweyite basis for his philosophy. Not only does Craig find Kohlberg's account of habit leaving much to be desired insofar as this conception of habit limits the richness in

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62 meaning that the concept, habit, can be given, but in Craig's (1974) assessment of Kohlberg, Kohlberg is found to be irreconcilably entwined in the horns of a dilemma as well. For having specific "world views" of situations leads one to the point where certain habitual ways of thinking about problems have already been developed. Craig is not convinced in the least that Kohlberg's polemic against the place of habit in the moral domain has in any respect solved the problem of habit in moral philosophy. Certainly, most theoretical positions on moral development do give some consideration to the place of habit in the field of moral philosophy. Habit formation is a part of the concern of the philosopher. However, society and especially the quality of that society is of considerable interest to the philosopher. Ought a society, assuming that it was possible, try to bring all of its members up to the highest possible form of reasoning? The previous question is raised by Morgan (1975). Would society be disrupted in the process of elevating all moral judgments? Her analysis does point out a puzzle that one who uses the Kohlberg scheme has. For his educational prescriptions do try to elevate the level of moral judgment. Whether or not one believes in the efficacy of the Kohlberg Moral Development Scheme, it still is not clear that Kohlberg's prescriptions even address typically moral problems such as are found in decisions each person must make for himself or herself. One might well claim that the Kohlberg prescription for moral development is supererogatory to the problems of the moral domain, be it disruptive or impotent. One societal problem which Morgan (1975) has with the Kohlberg hierarchy is in regard to the ordinary man. She writes, "concerning cognitive development, it seems clear that not all individuals are able to achieve a highly efficient level of formal operations which is a necessary

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G3 condition for adopting the ideal spectator view which Kohlberg finds central to operating at stage six" (1975, p. 12). One who views society in terms of the Platonic archetypes is unnecessarily engaging in social anachronisms. The philosopher Morgan (1975) finds Kohlberg to be very Platonic in viewing "human beings" as equivalent to the Platonic archetype "humanity." She claims that frequently people are treated differently and to posit concern for "humanity" does not present a position which is free from problems. Even the archformal ist Kant is unable, in her view, to resolve for Kohlberg the problem he has of viewing key concepts on stage six in terms of Plato's archetypes. Criticism of Theologians of Kohl berg's Scheme Kohlberg's stages have not only made an impact upon philosophers, but theologians, too, have shown interest in Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Because different religions are quite often engaged in the education of their own constituencies, some theologians address questions which are of mutual concern to the field of theology and education. Bachmeyer (1973) offers the educator and the theologian five warnings concerning the applicability of Kohlberg's theory of moral development to the moral domain. These cautions are, in the first place that an individual's moral worth should not be judged on the basis of a score on Kohlberg's scale. Secondly, the judgments are in reference to moral thought not moral behavior or action. Thirdly, provocation or stimulation by the teacher is not the only reason people attain increasingly complex levels of moral judgment. Fourthly, selfishness should not be equated with self interest, since the two are entirely different notions. Finally, content is not pertinent to the Kohlberg scheme; only thought structures are relevant to the making of the moral judgment.

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64 One who superimposes a Bonhoeffer perspective over the Kohl berg thesis is presented with three salient questions, according to Bergman (1974). These questions are: First, what is it in the nature of our society which limits so many people to pre-conventional and conventional orientations? Secondly, does Kohlberg realize the controversial nature of his claim that the core of morality is justice? Finally, in addressing the relationship between religious belief and moral judgment, Kohlberg fails to answer the question "What is religion?" Criticism of Educators Concerning the Kohlberg Scheme We have considered criticisms made by philosophers and theologians concerning the Kohlberg scheme. Turning our attention now to the Kohlberg scheme and how it relates to the educator and the educational enterprise, one should notice the growing importance of Kohlberg's theory to educational research, educational practices, and the organizational scheme of the educational enterprise. Orr (1974) points to both Piagetian schemes of moral development and Kohlberg's scheme of moral development as being formulations which will be of considerable influence to the future of the educational arena. Orr claims that both Kohlberg and Piaget should be scrutinized carefully "if only because in the next few years they undoubtedly will provide the basis for a considerable amount of research and institutional experimental ism" (1974, p. 365). The insistence of Kohlberg and some of those who analyze his work that the basic thrust of Kohlberg's moral education can be traced back to John Dewey is a problem that is quite significant in the analysis of Kohlberg's theory. Sholl (1971) points to the fact that Kohlberg owes to Dewey the notion that science is of importance in assessing values and

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65 that moral development can best occur in the context of an educational setting. Certainly, the student of Dewey cannot agree with this analysis. But the artificiality of the moral situation immanent in Kohlberg's work makes identification with Dewey inappropriate. Examining Dewey's perspective in terms of the Kohlberg thesis is particularly important because as writers such as Selman and Lieberman (1972) continue to assert the Dewey background of the Kohlberg theory and much misinformation is given. These authors write that the theory behind the curriculum described (Kohlberg's) in this paper is basically the cognitive-developmental theory of value-education of John Dewey. Elaborated by Piaget, it has been developed in research and tested by Kohlberg and his associates at Harvard University. (1972, p. 2) The above-mentioned supposedly Dewey-based curriculum uses Kohlberg's stages of moral dilemmas. Selman and Lieberman (1972) report that certain moral issues such as "truth telling" or "keeping promises" are addressed by the teacher and children in the context of artificial dilemmas. The child is stimulated by the teacher to arrive at a higher level judgment than the stage or level at which the child is operating on. Since Dewey stresses the importance of the child's own plasticity and starting from the child's own impulses and inclinations to get cues for the teacher to work with, only the wildest stretch of imagination can deem Selman and Lieberman's notions of the moral curriculum typically Deweyan. Kohlberg does share the concept with Dewey that the school is at once a social and moral institution. Beck et al_. (1971) note that Kohlberg states that the school whether it wants to or not transmits moral values. Simply the process of organization or rule making which of necessity goes on in the school employs techniques and practices on the part of the school which are inherently moral.

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66 What then does Kohl berg consider to be moral education? Beck et al_. (1971) address this question and observe that Kohlberg wants to make a distinction between moral education and moral conditioning or moral training. The sine qua non of moral education according to Kohlberg in the assessment of Beck et al_. is that it involves reasoning which sees the student as actively engaged in full participation in moral activity. The student uses a kind of reflective thinking about moral issues which brings into play clearly defined principles in the domain of the moral reasoning process. Certainly reflective thinking is to be encouraged, but in my opinion, Kohlberg' s paradigm of the process of reflective thinking is cut off from the individual's own needs and interests. Moreover, the morality obtained as a part of the social interaction involved in school organization is based on Kohl berg's notion of justice in an ideal society rather than the on-going needs of the students as they participate in school organizational procedures. It goes without saying that opinion as to the value of artificial situations to get at problems of moral development is by no means unanimous. Proponents of the Kohlberg theory such as Kuhmerker (1972 end 1973) protest loudly and vehemently against those who advocate that children be exposed to realistic situations. Kuhmerker writes ... one might think that subjects would respond most enthusiastically to realistic dilemmas; perhaps to dilemmas closest to real-life situations that they have experienced. The experience of Kohlberg and his colleagues has proved this assumption to be unfounded. As a matter of fact, even when a genuine moral dilemma is currently in the news, discussion groups have tended to respond with greater invol vement--and with greater contrast of opinion--to the artificial ly .developed dilemmas. (1972, p. 257) Let us examine what is assumed by the previous claim. This viewpoint seems to present the idea that all dilemmas in the news are of equal interest to children and that the Kohlberg artificial dilemma is always

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67 more interesting to children than any of these lower interest real life dilemmas. Now only the most naive teacher who has little acquaintance with the interests of children will accept such an argument. Along with the problem of the artificiality of the Kohlberg situation, education is provided with the problem of Kohlberg 's notion of justice. R. S. Peters (1971) finds that the abstract principle of justice at the core of morality provides a problem for educators. Young children are often unable to grasp concepts of abstract justice, and considerations such as social sensitivity are relegated to an inferior position in the name of moral education. It is his belief if education fully addresses itself to questions concerning the plight of others starting with the very young child and making this topic increasingly complex as the child matures, then the proper moral development will ensue. Peters conceives that the Kohlberg scheme does not do justice to moral education. Moreover by Peters' own account, increased social sensitivity will lead to a more comprehensive awareness of the rules of society and how people are affected by these rules. Thus one notes that by neglecting the organic aspects of society and positing abstract justice at the core, Kohlberg is led to a conception which embodies a dichotomy for moral education. Noting the Beck et al_. (1971) view of Kohlberg' s prescription to the school, we find that, on the one hand, the social studies program is seen by Kohlberg to be the vehicle through which moral education can be "taught." On the other hand, the "participatory" activities which can be provided for students in the context of educational organization of their educational experiences are also seen to be the means by which moral education can be carried on. These "participatory" experiences are supposed to help the child develop

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61) a deeper conception of the term "injustice." Of course, it is Kohlberg's own notion of justice which is to be developed. Examination of the social studies program reveals that the Kohlberg model not only serves, to effect a dualism between the social studies program and school organization but also is quite Platonic in its aspect. One finds that Orr has made an accurate appraisal of the Kohlberg model in the field of education. Orr claims that Kohlberg becomes an advocate at least in the sphere of moral education, for a school that is cut off the liberal welfare model. The task ceases to be the political one of working out compromises and becomes one of moral therapy, with the teacher, who possesses the "secret" knowledge of developmental stages serving as therapist. (1974, p. 372) But the social studies program alone is not enough to encompass Kohlberg's paradigm of moral education; the "participatory" experiences are to be analyzed also. In respect to the school's providing "participatory" activities, most educators who are sincere in their desire to offer the optimum moral educational experiences for the student would support such a view. The trouble is that when the purpose of the activity is viewed primarily in terms of getting the child to "know" justice, then justice is conceived as an ideal end rather than as a means to an end in the regulation of the educational enterprise. Anyhow, one can think of a whole range of moral activities, not the least of which is Peters's notion of the development of "social sensitivity" which should be encouraged as well as or perhaps in preference to "knowing" justice. In our appraisal of Kohlberg's scheme of "participatory" activities in which to develop moral education, we bel ieve that Kohlberg has come up with the right practices for the wrong reasons. Certainly every opportunity for moral education in the organization of the school should be encouraged, yet we would hope that moral education would be more broadly conceived

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G'J than is the case in the Kohlberg model. We would further hope that "justice" would be conceived as a means to the end of enhancing social arrangements rather than as an archetype of the "good" as Kohlberg conceives it to be. Should we want to examine Kohl berg's prescriptions to the classroom teacher concerning moral education, we need only to refer to his curriculum module entitled "First Things: Values," which was developed in collaboration with Selman and Lickona. This module addresses questions concerning educational activities from kindergarten through high school and is reported by Kuhmerker (1973). The module consists of sound film strips with material for teachers to use with the series. Moral educational programs are carefully organized around such issues as "promise keeping," "truth telling," "fairness and justice," and "the rights of property. " Teachers are advised to use both small discussion groups and large discussion groups in this moral educational program. Kuhmerker further relates that five instructions are issued to teachers, which are as follows: "(1) Preserve the moral conflict . . .,(2) Keep the arguments balanced . . .,(3) Encourage role-taking . . .,(4) Modify the dilemma . . .,(5) Shift the focus to new issues" (1972, pp. 259-60). Even the most uncritical proponent of Kohlberg's scheme insofar as education is concerned must grant that the average teacher is going to have a problem with the match of maturity level and Kohlberg's stages with the themes proposed. The question should be raised as to whether the issues and techniques proposed by the Kohlberg module even perform the task intended for them by the originators of the module. Notwithstanding the fact that the artificial dilemmas are employed, such questions need addressing by Kohlberg proponents.

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70 In our opinion, only when Kohlberg takes some cognizance of the individual resolving his or her own moral dilemmas as an integral part of his conception of the moral judgment can he truly claim to be forwarding the cause of moral education. I cannot see that he has shown in any way that his module is of any help whatsoever to a person in an actual moral dilemma. Whether one feels that his module is actually harmful to the social group or that it is impotent as a force for moral education, the question of Kohlberg's theory is still with the field of education. Much educational effort is being put forth in the Kohlberg framework. Many educators are embracing this new idea without adequately analyzing the consequences of their action in terms of providing children and young people with appropriate moral educational experiences. It is our contention that educators should proceed with caution in terms of their willingness to adopt a scheme of moral education which overly restricts the moral domain and contains inconsistencies in its over-all point of view. Summary The review of the literature in this chapter has shown that different scholars have found diverse criteria for identifying the concept of "moral maturity," which is of considerable significance in any consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of Kohlberg's scheme. Analysis of Kohlberg's conception of "moral maturity," in general, finds that this construct involves the individual's moving from ego-centric motivation to principled level, motivation , and that these principles are to hold for all people in the same situation. Another indication of Kohlberg's influence lies in the research done in the Kohlberg framework. Researchers have found problems in their studies of the "hybrid breeds," they found that judgment preference was

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71 equal to or higher than the stage at which the subject was operating on in terms of moral judgment level, juvenile delinquents score lower than do normal individual on Kohlberg's Moral Developmental Scale, and the attempt to relate thought and action does not function in actually uniting thought and action. Philosophers, theologians, and educators criticize the Kohlberg scheme on various accounts. Peters and Craig criticize the absence of the notion of habit from the Kohlberg scheme. Morgan questions whether or not the ramifications of the Kohlberg scheme will disrupt society. Bachmeyer reminds us that a person's moral worth is not to be equated with a moral development score. Using the abstract principle of justice as the sine qua non of morality poses a problem for educators by too narrowly defining the realm of morality. Nevertheless, Kohlberg has been influential. The aspect of Kohlberg which has perhaps been most influential in developing his concept of principled behavior is the notion of justice. We shall consider justice in the Kohlberg scheme next.

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72 References Alston, H. P. "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From is to ought.'" In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology . New York: Academic Press, 1971 . Bachmeyer, T. J. "The golden rule and developing moral judgment." Religious Education , 1973, 48, 348-365. Baier, K. Discussion. In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. K. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Beck, C. M. , Crittenden, B. S., and Sullivan, E. V. Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Bergman, M. "Moral decision making in the light of Kohlberg and Bonhoffer: a comparison." Religious Education , 1974, 69, 227-243. Craig, R. "Lawrence Kohlberg and moral development: some reflections." Educational Theory , 1974, 24, 121-127. Crittenden, B. S. Discussion. In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Fodor, E. M. "Delinquency and susceptivity to social influence among adolescents as a function of level of moral development." The Journal of Social Psychology , 1972, 86, 257-260. Gross, D. W. Comment. Childhood Education , 1973, 50, 54-55. Haan, N. , Stroud, J., and Holstein, C. "Moral and ego stages in relationship to ego processes: a study of 'hippies.'" Journal of Personality , 1973, 41, 596-612. Hogan, R. and Dickstein, E. "A dimension of maturity: moral judgment." ERIC , 1972, ED 052 498, 1-19. Keniston, K. "Student activism, moral development, and morality." American Journal of Orthopsychiatry , 1970, 40, 577-591. Kohlberg, L. "From is to ought." In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology . New York: Academic Press, 1971a. Kuhmerker, L. "Growth toward principled behavior: Lawrence Kohlberg's studies of moral development." Journal of Moral Education, 1972. 2, 255-262. ~

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73 Kuhmerker, L. "We don't call it moral education: American children learn about values." Journal of Moral Education , 1973, 3, 359-365. Lickona, T. "An experimental test of Piaget's theory of moral development." ERIC , 1973, ED 087 523, 1-11. Morgan, K. P. Philosophical problems in cognitive-moral-development theory: a critique of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. (Unpublished paper, 1975, University of Alberta) Orr, J. B. "Cognitive-developmental approaches to moral education: a social ethical analysis." Educational Theory , 1974, 24, 365-373. Peters, R. S. "Moral developments: a plea for pluralism." In T. flischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology . \\e\i York: Academic Press, 1971 . Rest, J. R. "The hierarchical nature of moral judgment: a study of patterns of comprehension and preference of moral stages." Journal of Personality , 1973, 41, 86-109. Rosen, B. Ethical neutrality and cognitive-developmental theories. (Unpublished paper, 1975, University of Western Ontario) Scriven, M. Discussion. In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Selman, R. L. and Lieberman, M. "An evaluation of a curriculum for primary group children based on cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning." ERIC , 1972, ED 077 565. Sholl , D. "The contributions of Lawrence Kohlberg to religious and moral education." Religious Education , 1971, 66, 364-372. Sullivan, E. V. and Quarter, J. "Psychological correlates of certain post-conventional moral types: a perspective on hvbrid types." Journal of Personality , 1972, 40, 151-161. Turiel, E. and Rothman, R. "The influence of reasoning on behavioral choice at different stages of moral development." Child Development, 1972, 43, 741-756.

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CHAPTER IV KOHLBERG'S CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE AND ITS ROLE IN THE MORAL STAGES Since the concept of justice is of utmost importance in his scheme, and since "virtue" is equated with knowledge of justice, we will discuss the operation of "virtue" and "knowledge of the good" in the Kohl berg scheme. We will deal with the justice structures of "rights" and "duties" which function at each stage. Kohlberg's writings have shown that he recognizes the need to explicate concepts. In spite of his recognition to explicate concepts Kohlberg still does not seem to realize that problems emerge. He borrows much from Dewey, Rawls, and Plato, yet does not realize that he is faced with inconsistencies in his over-all moral developmental position J Overview of Chapter It is our thesis that holding a quasi-Deweyan view of epistemology and personality while simultaneously holding a Rawlsian position on justice causes an inconsistent position on moral development. A brief sketch of the thesis shows that Kohlberg attaches much more importance to "justice structures" immanent in the moral judgment than he does to other moral rationales such as happiness, well-being or welfare. Such a view is more in line with Rawls's thinking than Dewey's philosophy. Moreover, at no position on the Kohlberg hierarchy does he have a place for Dewey's major moral rationale, i.e., learning from and Tor examples of Kohlberg's debt to Dewey, Rawls, and Plato, see Kohlberg (1970 and 1971 ) . 74

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75 increasing social interests. While Dewey might admit that one could choose and establish justice as his or her moral ideal, Kohlberg makes no allowances for moral ideals other than ideal justice, which he places at the apex of his hierarchy. In order to substantiate his theoretical alliance with Rawls and Dewey, Kohlberg should explain why he views "virtue" as "knowledge of the good" instead of as a "sentiment" as is held by Rawls or "intellectually exercised habits" as held by Dewey. Of course, he would not view virtue as a habit, since his account of morality ignores habit. Finally, belief in a quasi-Deweyan theory of epistemology causes questions about Kohlberg's claim that justice structures are the highest equilibrated structures to be discovered in the moral judgment, since Kohlberg himself admits that the values of justice are the "major moral values" in our society and does not make a similar claim for all societies. If Kohlberg is going to give such prominence to the concept of "justice," then he should pay more attention to philosophical treatments of justice. Kohlberg has not devoted sufficient attention to the "problem of the right" as it relates to the "good." While Rawls and Dewey both spell out with care the relationship between the "good" and the "right," Kohlberg must do more than simply assert that he follows Dewey, Rawls, or both. He has yet to explicate the consequences of the "right." 2 Kohlberg claims that an imbalance in thought structures occurs when a person has mastered the concepts at a particular stage of moral development and problems arise which cannot be solved by that moral rationale New modes of thought which are more complex are gradually mastered These more highly complex thought structures are identified by Kohl'berq as being more equilibrated.

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7G It is my second thesis that using a Rawlsian view to explicate stage five and six is inconsistent with Kohl berg's own moral stage hierarchy. Kohlberg has not explained why the same principles are more equilibrated at stage five than stage six. If in fact he uses the same principles to explain stage five and stage six rationales, then we have the tautology 'A is A"and the distinction between the stages is blurred. We next show that inventing principles to accept as binding is a more complex mental act than following principles one may have previously deduced. This leads us to question the claim that stage six is more adequate than stage five. Kohlberg cannot say he does not need to justify principles, that he only needs to explicate them. He needs to explain why stage six is more complex and equilibrated than stage five when in fact certain principles are justified at stage five, thus giving more importance to stage five. Kohlberg cannot adequately account for emotions and intellect in his empirical technique as Rawls does in his accounts of guilt. Guilt felt by a subject in an artificial situation is in no way similar to guilt felt in a real moral situation. Rawls assumes that all people in the social group will judge on a principled orientation, while Kohlberg believes that only those who consistently judge at the most adequate levels can participate in a Rawlsian system of justice, i.e., make judgments based on principles. Finally, Rawls's system of justice is not limited to capitalist or socialist societies but is applicable to both. Kohlberg's dilemma is a dilemma only in a capitalist society. For example, Kohlberg's Heinz had a dilemma only in a society which does not furnish health care to its members as socialist countries do.

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77 Noting some tasks Kohlberg should undertake in order to explicate his theory more completely, we do make the assumption that Kohlberg needs to hold a consistent view. Since he has felt a need to lean on others and has not taken it upon himself to offer sufficient explanations of seeming inconsistencies, we are presented with the task of pointing them oiit. First, we will state what an adequate position on justice should do. We then proceed by pointing to areas of disagreement among moral theoretical philosophers as to positions on justice. We do not hold Kohlberg responsible for articulating a comprehensive position on justice, yet we find that some discontinuities are present in his account of justice. We will present Kohlberg's account of "virtue" as ideal justice and "knowledge of the good." We present his "justice stages" based on notions of "rights" and "duties" operating at each level. Rawls's theory of justice and Dewey's "ends-means" model of justice are presented to offer the reader an appropriate background for the arguments employed to substantiate the thesis that positing a Deweyan conception of epistemology and the person, while at the same time holding a Rawlsian theory of justice p-esents Kohlberg with inconsistencies. Finally, we present the thesis that discontinuity in Kohlberg's paradigm of moral development can be discerned by comparing Rawls's theory of justice with Kohlberg's highest stages. We shall next see what is entailed in a position on justice. Positions on Justice First of all, one would expect a position on justice to offer the reader a definition of justice or an analysis of the concept of, justice.

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78 The relationship between social institutions, laws, and regulations, and the liberty and equality of a society's citizenry should be specified. Moreover, a method of adjudicating conflicting claims should be an integral part of a theory of justice. A comprehensive position on justice should focus on moral relationships between people, on how people treat animals and their environment, and any combination of foreseeable moral circumstances which might arise. In order to substantiate a stronger claim about a particular position on justice, the means by which a position is to be justified should be specified. Consideration of different viewpoints on justice leads one inevitably to that which is problematic in positions on justice. Philosophers who do formulate positions on justice generally do make the claim that a specific conception of justice is based on what a rational person considers to be binding duties and obligations. The intuitive notions of justice which the hypothetical rational person would hold are seen by some thinkers to encompass the intuitive notion of justice as fairness on the one hand and such notions as the determination of desert on the other. We are thus left with the issue of which idea concerning the nature of justice we are going to accept. Another problem for a position on justice is in regard to certain psychological aspects of the individual's personality such as his or her desires. Does the justice procedure provide for taking into account the intensity or lack of intensity of desire to do an activity, or are we simply dealing with procedures to adjudicate claims which do not take intensity of desire into consideration? All positions on justice have some conception of the "right" and the good. Now function of the "right" and the "good" in justice is

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79 defined in different ways in positions on justice and injustice. Ueontological positions on justice, such as Rawls's (1971) thesis that justice is fairness, do not identify the "right" and the "good" as being independent conceptions. On the other hand, the teleological viewpoint of the Utilitarian conceptualizes the "right" as "maximizing good." We next view the Kohlberg scheme in terms of his treatment of justice and virtue. Although it may not be fair to ask a psychologist to present and develop a comprehensive position on justice, we need to make sure that he has an adequate conception of justice by examining his remarks on justice. We should not be misled expecting Kohlberg to relate institutions, laws, and a person's citizenry in a complete way in stating his conception of the highest reach of justice. More basically, his concern is how justice structures are conceived by individuals making moral judgments at different levels and in enumerating the function of the "good," "virtue," and "knowledge of the good" at the ultimate level of moral judgment. The fact that Kohlberg leans on Rawls or Dewey in his conceptual framework leads one to question why Kohlberg regards "virtue" as knowledge, rather than as "intellectually exercised habits" in the Deweyan tradition or a "striving for excellence" as embodied in Rawls's conception of "vi rtue. " Justice and Virtue in the Kohlberg Scheme Since Kohlberg believes that virtue is "knowledge of the good," and knowledge is something that can be taught, it follows that in Kohlberg's view, virtue can be taught. But virtue is not the kind of knowledge which can be imposed on a person's mind, rather it may be taught by means of Plato's doctrine of "reminiscence," i.e., the recollection of a person's

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80 own knowledge of the good by means of a process of stimulation. This stimulation is effected by the teacher, who would intuitively know the "good" and should be like Plato's conception of the philosopher-king. "Knowledge of the good" manifests itself differently at different levels. In spite of the developmental differences Kohlberg has observed in the adequacy of judgments based on "knowledge of the good," i.e., the general movement from simpler notions of the "good" to more complex notions of the "good" and "virtue," they both have one meaning. When "virtue" attains its highest reach, it is the "ideal form of justice." Kohlberg states that the "good" comprises the ideal of "justice" and "virtue." For Kohlberg, "knowledge of the good" in its most complex form is "justice." Moreover, Kohlberg believes that "knowledge of the good" is "philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs" (1970, p. 58). While Kohlberg does not seem to see the "problem of the good," philosophers have had a perennial concern with defining the "good" and the concept of "virtue." In conceptions of "good," there is difficulty in determining the way "evaluative" and "noneval uati ve" terms function. In some instances, philosophers have conceived the "good" as a standard which can be used to measure or evaluate other concepts. Perhaps the most important analysis of the "problem of the good" has emerged from the insights of Urmson and von Wright in their analysis of the "problem of the good." Recent analysis of the concept of the "good" by Urmson (1950) has pointed out the function of the word "good" as an adjective which designates order rather than "absolute position." For example, we might grade a set of objects by using grading labels "good," "bad," or "indifferent," while grading another set of objects using the labels "excellent," "good," and "fair." Of course, the positional status of good is higher in the former example than in the latter.

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81 Another contemporary philosopher, von Wright (1973), analyzes the concept of "good" and concluded that good could be conceived of in terms of the multiplicity of meanings found in language usage. Von Wright arrives at the following categories of goodness: "technical goodness," "medical goodness," the "good of a being" or "welfare," "utilitarian goodness," and "hedonic goodness." Like the concept of the "good," the concept of "virtue" dates back to ancient philosophy. Certainly, one could study the history of philosophy by examining the differing conceptions of the "good" and "virtue" which were put forth throughout the centuries. This chapter will present the Socratic question, "can virtue be taught?" in the context of presenting Kohlberg's view of "virtue." Kohlberg's position on the "good" and "justice" will be related to "virtue." Philosophers and philosophers of education have been known to disagree about what constitutes a problem in philosophy. While the question of what constitutes a philosophical problem is outside the scope of this paper, it should be pointed out that concepts such as "good," "virtue," and "justice" are problematic in regard to questions concerning their function and meaning in language. A problematic area for the concept of 'virtue' : is whether or not 'virtue" is a culturally relative value or absolutists value as Kohlberg believes. The "good" functions in such a variety of ways, that the philosopher or psychologist should be careful to specify precisely how the term is used. The next question to raise is whether Kohlberg is presenting a claim that we have to be instructed in order to attain more complex conceptions of "knowledge of the good" or do we just develop such knowledge naturally? Kohlberg apparently believes that "natural experience," a manifestation

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82 of which is the individual interacting with the environment, offers the person the environing stimulation which will aid in development. But the process of attaining yet more complex mental operations which are a part of the more adequate conceptions of "knowledge of the good" is greatly speeded up by education. Kohlberg (1970) equates "virtue" with the "ideal form of justice." He criticizes Freudians and Skinnerians, alleging that they are more anxious to answer the question of how virtue can be taught, than the question of precisely what it is that is called virtue which they think they are teaching. Kohlberg compares himself with Socrates in the Heno by claiming that he does not even know what virtue is, much less whether it can be taught. Then, he proceeds by a dialectical process to see what "virtue" entails. We are led to the view that Kohlberg considers virtue to be an end, and does not believe that science speaks to problems of ends. He asserts that science can answer only means problems. We are led by Kohlberg to regard "virtue," the "good," and "justice," as comprising the overriding moral end. In spite of Kohl berg's comments that he does not know what "virtue" is, we find that, like Plato, he considers justice the highest form of virtue. Kohlberg (1970) classifies "virtue" and the "good" as being "one" rather than "many." 3 The problem of the "one" and the "many" may be traced back to ancient Greek philosophers who regarded these terms as opposites. In the Platonic (1961) dialogue, Meno , Socrates persists in claiming that virtue is a whole, while Meno suggests that virtue is something which can be divided into parts. They finally decide that "virtue" properly belongs to the class of the "one" rather than the "many." 3 The English philosopher Austin (1962) has designated "one" as a 'trouser" word That is to say, we get clearer about the concept in regard to what not being one entails.

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Besides assigning "virtue" to the class of the "one," we have said that Kohlberg equates "virtue" with "knowledge of the good." At this point, Kohlberg has devised a slightly different relationship between the "good" and "virtue" from the relationship Socrates and Meno noted in the Meno . For example, Socrates and Meno agree that "virtue" is "something good," yet reach the conclusion that "virtue" is not "knowledge of the good," but is wisdom acquired by "divine dispensation." We have described Kohl berg's point of view as to "knowledge of the good" and "virtue," and have found him to believe that "knowledge of the good" can be taught. Since "ideal justice" represents the highest reach of "virtue," we shall present Kohlberg's view on justice. Kohlberg (1970) affirms that the basic moral values which underlie our society are the "values of justice." He does not make the claim that justice values underlie all societies. We can see evidence of the value of justice operating in our society by means of examining the relationship between the constitution and the government. The rationale of the constitution as it is interpreted either in "strict" or "liberal" modes is to preserve individual rights. In education, we have the example of school desegregation which represents an active as well as a passive recognition of equal rights. . Kohlberg believes that the school as a responsible social institution should educate for the active recognition of equal rights. In fostering the active recognition of equal rights, the school must transmit the basic moral values which are prevalent in our society. These are the values of justice. Kohlberg claims cross-cultural validity for his scheme of moral development. He further claims that principles of justice comprise the highest form of moral judgment to be utilized by a person. Now in the context of

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84 his treatment of justice, Kohlberg qualifies the value of justice in terms of its being the "major moral value" of our society and does not want to claim that the value of justice is the "major moral value" in all societies. It is Kohlberg's contention that conceptions which posit something other than "justice" as the core of morality do not weaken his claim that justice based rationales are the most highly equilibrated and developed. Claims concerning our major moral interest are not at this time in accord. Rawls, for example, would undoubtedly claim that our overriding moral interest is to follow the dictates of the principles of justice which he has specified. On the other hand, Dewey would claim that our major moral interest is to learn from all the varied social contacts in our experience and to increase these contacts. Kohlberg must mean that it does not matter whether we accept either Rawls's or Dewey's conception of the core of morality, our most highly developed moral judgments will still be those based on principles of justice. We shall examine this particular Kohlberg claim more completely in a latter section of the chapter. We have found that "justice" is the higest reach of "virtue" and that "knowledge of the good" in its most adequate and equilibrated form comprises "justice," for the "good" is "justice." Since Kohlberg points out that the most adequate moral judgment is "universal izable, " it comes as no surprise that he would make a similar claim for "justice." Kohl berg writes, "justice is not a rule or a set of rules, it is a moral principle. By a moral principle we mean a mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt in all situations" (1970, pp. 69-70). Finally, like Rawls, Kohlberg believes that

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85 justice entails the most equal distribution of rights possible in a social system. Now Rawls believes that the distribution of rights and duties is a function of the operation of justice in a social system. Kohlberg (1973b) describes a person's perceptions of "rights" and "duties" sequentially, in terms of his six stages.^ At stage one, the person confuses having a right with being right. The person at this level conceives of a right in terms of the right to control actions of someone. Duties are perceived in terms of what one should do in accordance with external demands and authority. Stage two rights show the ability to make a distinction between having a right and being right. A person does not need to heed the welfare needs of others as long as there is no detriment to the other person. Rights at this level are also conceived of as the self being able to exercise control over its possessions. Duties are to a certain extent selfish at this stratum; obligation is perceived in terms of a person's own ends. Stage three rights embody those rights which the "good" person would want to claim. Kohlberg claims that at this stage "rights are earned" (1973b, p. 636). Duties are conceived of in terms of "role-obligation," i.e., what a person in a given role would do for his or her "role-partner." That is to say, what a "good" person would do in a given situation puts him at this stage. That person might be a lawyer, husband, wife, teacher, or member of another occupational group. Stage four rights are conceived of in two ways by the person at this level. In the first instance, a right is based on freedom which is available to all members of society. Secondly, a right is viewed in terms of the rights which society ascribes to particular roles. 4 Kohlberg's remarks on justice may be deduced from Kohlberg (1970, 1971b and 1973b).

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86 Stage five rights are exemplified in the awareness of "natural rights" or "rights prior to society." Duties at this stratum are defined in terms of what the welfare of society or contractual fulfillment would be seen to entail. Kohlberg says of obligations at this level, "obligations (are conceived of) as required rational concern for welfare differentiated from fixed responsibilities" (1973b, p. 637). The ultimate level, stage six, manifests a universalizable rationale, in which claims on other people may be conceived in terms of "universalizable rights." Duties or obligations use the notion of justice. Kohlberg's highest stage is based on the principle of "reversibility." Kohlberg writes, "any right or just claim by an individual gives use to a corresponding duty to another individual" (1971b, p. 637). Kohlberg (1973b) claims that stage six principles of justice are the most equilibrated and logically complex rationales for making the moral judgment. The adequacy of stage six judgments is thought by Kohlberg to be explained by virtue of the findings of Piaget and his own findings on cognitive development. Kohlberg distinguishes the task of the philosopher from the task of the psychologist by pointing out that it is the philosopher's job to justify a principle, while on the other hand, the psychologist offers an explanation of a cognitive process which devises or uses a principle. Now, since Kohlberg draws the analogy between his two highest stages and Rawls's theory of justice, he could have shown the reader how Rawls justifies his principles of justice; yet Kohlberg chooses not to do so. Kohlberg (1971b) claims that Rawls does in theory what his experiments have found empirically, i.e., the movement from the social contract orientation to the principled orientation. In Kohlberg's interpretation of

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87 Rawls's principled position, we find that at this level, civil disobedience can be justified. Kohlberg claims that Rawls derived stage six morality from stage five morality through use of argument. The argument which Rawls employs was seen by Kohlberg to coincide with Kohlberg's own find5 ings on the moral development undergone in "natural experience." Since Rawls analyzes the concept of "justice" much more meticulously than Kohlberg, we should look to Rawls's position on justice to help us get clear about what Kohlberg must mean in his understanding of the workings of "justice." We find that Kohlberg prefers Rawls's arguments concerning the nature of justice. Since the Rawlsian conception is similar to the highest justice structures which Kohlberg found in "natural experience," we need to raise the question, "What is Rawls's position on justice?" Rawls's Theory of Justice A thorough, complete analysis of Rawls's (1971) theory of justice lies outside the scope of this analysis of Kohlberg. The interested reader is referred to Rawls's book, A Theory of Justice , which is a complex, complete explication of the workings of justice in a society. Rawls considers justice as it pertains to relationships between individuals, institutions, economies, political groups, and the social union in terms of rational principles which he has derived in his argument. Rawls asks us to imagine a group of people who accept certain "rules of conduct" as guides for moral action. These "rules of conduct" are binding on a person's moral duties and obligations. The argument runs 5 Kohlberg wrote, "in other words, Rawls has used a formal argument to derive stage-6 morality from stage-5, and to systemize stage-6 morality insofar as stage-6 morality is defined by sociopolitical choices My point is that Rawls is doing by formal argument what 'natural experience' does in development" (1970, p. 67).

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88 that it is more agreeable for persons to live in a community than to live a solitary existence. Since people would choose to live together, cooperation is a touchstone of society. Yet, we are to find that conflict arises when questions of adjudicating conflicting claims over rights occur. Rawls advocates that they adopt principles of social justice. Such principles would serve as the means for determining distribution of "benefits" and "burdens" as well as assigning "rights and duties" to the end of securing "social cooperation." Rawls's next request is that the reader imagine that a "public conception of justice" regulates this society which we have postulated. When a "public conception of justice" is operating in a social group, people and institutions act in accordance with and are bound by principles of justice which have been accepted by all parties. Rawls admits that existing societies are not in accord in regard to which particular practices are just or unjust. While it is no doubt true that people will disagree concerning precisely which practices they will accept as binding upon them, they generally hold some conception of justice. But the absence of agreement concerning precisely what is just results in disorganized social arrangements. In light of these diverse views on the role of justice as it operates in a society how are we to know which principles of justice to adopt? Rawls advocates that we adopt those principles of justicewhich when conceived in terms of their consequences exhibit consequences which are more desirable and more broadly applicable. Social justice, in Rawls's scheme, refers to the way in which "rights" and "duties" are distributed throughout a social system. A society's social institutions are seen to affect the quality of life a person can

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G9 experience. Moreover, these institutions delimit the rights and duties of a person belonging to a specific social group. The determinants of justice in a social system are the allocation of economic opportunities, the kind of social conditions, and the "rights" and "duties" which are allotted the citizenry. The starting point of Rawls's position on justice is that people decide in advance which principles they will accept as binding on their conduct as conflicting claims are settled. Practices are judged to be just or unjust prior to forming the social group. In Rawls's view, rational persons will choose as ends of justice conceptions based on equal 1 iberty for all . People living in a social group are generally stratified according to certain advantages such as social position, birth, intelligence, occupation, and economic assets. In Rawls's theory of justice, people would not know ahead of time what their advantages were to be. So, the principles of justice adopted by the social group would not give advantages to any person prior to membership in the group. No one is advantaged or disadvantaged by the principles chosen. Rawls makes the assumption that the people forming the social group he has constructed are both "rational" and capable of a "sense of justice." Rawls does not hesitate to admit that no existing society contains only members who entered the social group voluntarily and who hold principles of justice as binding in the process of adjudicating claims. In natural social groups, people are born into a society, thus the fortunes of birth are at play in determining the social advantages and disadvantages which affect their lives.

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90 The social contract theory of justice which Rawls advocates is justified by arguments for his principles of justice. It seems reasonable to Rawls that advantages and disadvantages should not be allocated on the basis of principles. Secondly, the principles should not promote a person's particular interests. Finally, a person should not be able to formulate in advance, principles which will benefit himself or herself and work to the detriment of someone else in the society. Rawls presents his two major principles of justice as follows: First Principle Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principles, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (1971, p. 302) In "Justice as Fairness," Rawls (1972) formulates two principles which were used as a means of developing the concept of justice. The first principle is that in the instance of a practice, the individual who was taking part in the practice or in some way affected by it had the most conceivable liberty. This liberty was in turn compatible with the most extensive liberty for all. The second principle involves the arbitrary nature of inequalities and results in the notion that desired or advantageous offices of society should be open to all. Rawls claims that his two principles formulate a definition of justice which involves liberty, equality, and reward for efforts which contribute to the common good.

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91 Our next consideration concerning Rawls's principles of justice is in regard to the mental operations both rational and emotional that one who follows Rawls's principles will use in developing a "sense of justice." We are to find that the person is developing a "sense of justice" performs more mental acts than a simple rational calculation of rights, working out questions of fairness as if one were solving a problem in logic. Of the multiplicity of feelings involved in the sense of justice, Rawls writes, the generation of feelings of friendship and mutual trust tends to reinforce the scheme of cooperation. A greater temptation is required and, should violations occur, the feelings of guilt, shown in wishing to make reparation and the like, will tend to restore the broken relations. (1963, P291) So, we find that a variety of feelings are at play in the mental operations a person uses as he or she develops a Rawlsian "sense of justice." Let us next consider the Deweyite notion of justice. Dewey's Conception of Justice Dewey was a thinker who views justice as a means to an end; further, the concept of justice was inextricably entwined with the end, i.e., over-all happiness or social welfare. In conceiving justice as a means to an end, particularly in the case of securing the public welfare, Dewey is criticizing those who would make of a means, an end. Dewey (1936) says of justice when conceived as an end, that it tended to make an idol of the means so that the end which the means serve is slighted. Dewey, in using the term "justice" as a mechanism to regulate society, writes, justice is not an external means to human welfare but a means which is organically integrated with the end it serves. These are means which are constituent parts of the consequences they bring into being, as tones are integral, constituents of music as well as means to its production, and as food is an indispensable ingredients within the organism which it serves. (1916, p. 273)

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92 In the above statement, Dewey shows that he is opposed to notions which separate the means and ends of justice. Further, he is opposed to those who place abstract conceptions of equal human rights above the consequences of those rights. Questions concerning rights when no thought of the consequences are entailed in the adjudication of the point in dispute often lead nowhere. Dewey (1936) succinctly states this position in his notion that omission of the consequences of the action from the moral standard left one with a mere abstraction, resulting in the treatment of morality as simply conforming to an abstraction, thereby losing its force in moving toward a significant end. The previous remarks on justice by Dewey lead us to examine precisely what Dewey means by a standard. Dewey argues that standards are different from ends in that they, through the process of social approbation, are able to become more objectified than are moral ends. It is in this context, that he further examines the standards of justice and benevolence.^ Dewey maintains that some who want to posit justice as the standard in morality are relegating considerations of well-being and the consequences of actions to a position inferior to that of justice. Dewey thinks that individuals who prided themselves for acting on principles are likely to be Pharisaical and self regarding. Dewey maintains that principles themselves need justification. Principles do not justify activity but principles are synonymous with the continuity inherent in acti vi ty. 6 Dewey wrote, "When contribution to a shared good is taken to be the standard of approbation, a question comes up as to the relation of justice to the standard . . . At all events, this conception of the nature of the standard has been attacked on the ground that justice is the supreme virtue and that the standard of well-being subordinates justice . . . to something beyond itself in the way of consequences." (1936, pp. 272-3)

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93 The overriding moral interest is, according to Dewey, the interest in learning from all the contacts of life. Dewey (1916) posits that the primary problem of moral education is the problem of the relationship between knowledge and conduct. Dewey regards knowing and conduct to be interdependent. In effect, Dewey is relating the social arena with morality. In Ethic s (1910, with Tufts), Dewey states what is meant by "the greatest good for the greatest number." He affirms that the true significance of this slogan lies in the individual living in a social milieu which will reward his or her initiative. Dewey (and Tufts, 1910) regards "rights" and "obligations" in terms of the social arrangements which should obtain in a given society. Social conditions which are conducive to a person's exercising of "rights and "duties" will offer each person work which is both socially beneficial and rewarding, institutions will exhibit educative effects which nurture active recognition of "rights" and "obligations," and education will increase a person's own awareness of "rights" and "duties" which pertain to these social arrangements. Dewey and Tufts (1910) seem to think that justice procedures and conflicts of interest can be resolved by appeal to scientific method. The application of the scientific method will contribute to the greatest amount of shared good in social arrangements. If these two thinkers were asked to justify principles of justice, they would undoubtedly demand that the justification process look to the consequences of the social weal. Inconsistencies in the Kohlberg View Kohlberg claims that his view of the person is basically a Deweyan position. On the other hand, he claims a PI atonicRaw! si an position on

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94 justice. It is our thesis that holding these contiguous views causes inconsistencies for Kohlberg. Consider the moral judgment. Kohlberg, Rawls, and Dewey all seem to think that there is a developmental difference between the different stages as a person makes a moral judgment. Kohlberg and Rawls on the one hand attach much more importance to justice structures present in moral judgments than does Dewey. We have shown that, for Kohlberg, virtue is "knowledge of the good" and the "ideal form of justice." Virtue to Rawls takes the form of a sentiment. One has a desire to act from the principles of justice. Dewey and Tufts arrive at a two-fold classification of virtue. In the first class, one finds "intellectually exercised habits," but these habits are never purely intellectual; they are also emotional and practical. In the second class, the part a social custom or institution such as "truth telling" plays in the individual's own habits of valuation are deemed virtues. Since a desire is unlike knowledge, there is a difference in emphasis between Rawls 's view and Kohlberg' s view of virtue. Now Kohlberg claims that a person who knows the good will do the good, later to posit a position which is less certain than the person who knows the good will do the good. The reader is left with a puzzle as to what Kohl berg's actual position is in regard to this matter. 7 Secondly, Rawls's view that virtue is a "sentiment" cannot be related to Kohlberg's view that virtue is "knowledge of the good." Finally, viewing virtue as habit would be anathema to Kohlberg, who approaches the vituperative in his discussion of moral dispositions as character traits or habits. Finally, Dewey and Tufts say that the "good" represents a self chosen ideal which a person sets up as 7 See Kohlberg (1970) and Kohlberg and Turiel (1971).

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a goal. Kohlberg would claim that this ideal which a person at the ultimate level sets up is "justice," while Dewey and Tufts would inevitably leave room for a wider array of ideas which the individual might choose as moral guides. We have found that for Kohlberg, the "good" is justice. Rawls says something similar to Kohlberg's assertions, yet he presents his conception of the "good" in a more complex manner. For Rawls, the "right" precedes the "good." "Something good" is something that fits into the theory of justice as fairness. That is why Rawls refers to his theory of the "good" as the "thin theory of the good." Those advantages in a society which rational people would want are deemed "primary goods." We have shown that Rawls makes distinctions between the "good" and the "right," yet does not define these concepts independently. We are to find that Dewey and Tufts follow suit in this regard. Dewey and Tufts point out that good and right function in language both in moral and nonmoral ways. The right is conceived of by these two as actions which are in accordance with "moral law." The "good" in morality is in relation to a standard which is self chosen. We have remarked on the distinction between this concept and Kohlberg's conception of "virtue" and the "good" previously. A further question concerning the cross-cultural claim 8 made by Kohlberg for his scheme of moral development is that, in the context of his treatment of justice, Kohlberg qualifies the value of justice in terms of its being the "major moral value" of our society and does not claim that the value of justice is the "major moral value" in all societies. We should remember that part of Kohlberg's theory of epistemology 8 For a discussion of cross-cultural claims for morality see Margolis (1971).

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96 is Deweyan based, that is to say that the educative effects of the environment play a part in increasing the complexity of the thought process, both in moral and strictly cognitive judgments. Now does Kohlberg really think that, in cases in which societies do not hold justice values to be foundational, that the environment will offer sufficient stimulation for a person to develop highly complex principles of justice? In the presentation of Kohlberg's remarks on justice, we observed that Kohlberg considers justice to be an end. Yet, Kohlberg's commitment to a Rawlsian conception of justice does entail the view that since justice is used as a method of regulating social arrangements, it is a means as well as an end. The primary difference between Dewey's and Kohlberg's remarks on justice are to be discovered in Dewey's postulating the end of justice and welfare inextricably entwined, while Kohlberg's view of justice posits justice as the overriding moral end. So v/e see that Dewey assigns more importance to social considerations in morality than Kohlberg does. We have seen that Kohlberg claims it does not matter whether one considers the major moral interest to be justice or social, that we still will find that the most complex moral decisions will encompass highly developed principles of justice. Can Kohlberg claim that the best reason for doing a certain action is necessarily the most complex reason which occurs to a person? Consider the Deweyan moral rationale which advocates that one experience a variety of social contacts and learn from them, thus offering a rationale which encompasses a kind of social sensitivity. We cannot find an accurate statement of Dewey's position on the social aspect of morality at any of Kohlberg's stages. Perhaps Kohlberg's reply would be that he has not found evidence that people actually use the Dewey moral-social rationale to make

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97 judgments. To which the obvious reply it seems to me would be that his dilemma restricts the moral rationales people do utilize. Now in terms of "rights" and "obligations," both Dewey and Tufts and Rawls identify these concepts in terms of a total justice structure operating in a society. On the other hand, Kohlberg wants to classify "rights" and "duties" in terms of his developmental stages. Notwithstanding the fact that holding a Deweyan and Rawlsian position causes inconsistencies in his over-all theory, Kohlberg needs to explicate more clearly the differences in his paradigm and Rawls's position. In the first place Kohlberg has equated his stage five orientation with the contract theory of government advocated by Rawls. Kohlberg tells us that the rationale for the stage five moral judgment is based on the relationship between the constitution and the government. Other notions of contract relationships between a group of people and their social group form the basis for stage five thinking. Now, simply using contract theory of government reasons for moral decisions is not enough, according to Kohlberg, the rational person will experience a disequilibrium which will dictate his or her forming more complex rationales to use in making moral judgments. This more complex rationale is provided, in the Kohlberg scheme, by the individual principled orientation in which a person employs principles which are used to make moral judgments. Consider the analogy between Kohlberg's view of development in "natural experience" and Rawls's view of the development of justice from the contract orientation to the principled orientation. Rawls posits that one imagine a hypothetical situation in which a group of people want to bind together to form a just social group. Principles of justice, fairness, and equality which the group of people choose to be binding on their conduct are agreed upon in

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98 advance under conditions which are called by Rawls "the veil of ignorance." After people have begun to live in the contract form of government, they then use the principles previously agreed upon by which to settle moral matters. Now, we shall examine what Rawls' s scheme means for Kohlberg's stage five and six. In the first place, Rawls justifies his principles at stage five by asserting that people would not agree to accept principles which allowed for inequality of inappropriate allocation of advantages prior to agreeing to principles which they will accept as binding. Perhaps the fact that principles are justified in the original position which is at stage five proves to be embarrassing to Kohlberg for he may believe that justification at this level attaches too much importance to stage five. Secondly, the principles of justice are the identical principles at stage five as they are at stage six. Can Kohlberg claim that these principles are more complex at one stage than another? I think not. Thirdly, let us examine the mental operations which are required at stage five. Of primary importance to the group are social skills of cooperation necessary to arrive at the binding principles for conduct. Evaluation, appraisal, and reasoning are used to arrive at those principles of justice which foster equality. In short, those people who are actively thinking to formulate the principles which will serve as a basis for the social group, it seems to me, are performing a task more complex than the stage six task which simply posits an individual following individual moral principles which may have been previously conceptualized. We have assumed that Kohlberg means by 'justice" somewhat the same thing as Rawls does. We need to note certain criticisms of Rawls's position which might also pertain to Kohlberg, since Kohlberg has led us to believe that these two positions are similar. Rawls does not give us

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99 adequate guidelines to work out problems arising when equal rights conflict in an existing society. The ideal of providing the most extensive liberties to all sounds good in theory, but in practice just how we go about implementing the idea is not spelled out sufficiently. Nor can Dewey help us in this respect because he conceptualizes "rights" and "obligations" in terms of a society which allows for maximum satisfaction of the individual. We have at this time no existing society which can meet the specifications of Rawls and Dewey. When we are behind Rawls' s "veil of ignorance," we do not know precisely how the community we are about to enter is to be defined. Mow Kohlberg should address the question of whether or not a rational person will be able to commit himself or herself to a lifestyle which has principles of justice as its basis without considerations of people's happiness, wealth, power, social position, and prestige being decided upon as well. We have shown that Dewey and Tuft's moral ideal can encompass more than simply justice, and certainly it could not be argued that these two were not rational thinkers. Finally, let us consider Kohlberg's and Rawls's viewpoints as they relate to intellect and emotions. Rawls postulates that a person living in his hypothetical social system will have a "sense of justice." In this "sense of justice" guilt operates as a mechanism to control interpersonal relationships. It seems clear that guilt about one's own conduct cannot be comparable with guilt felt about a hypothetical situation which one was judging. Secondly, Rawls and Kohlberg make two different assumptions concerning intellect necessary to consistently judge at the principled level. Rawls assumes that all the people who will enter his hypothetical social group will be able to use the principles of justice

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100 which he has conceived. On the other hand, to Kohlberg, only the people v/ho are capable of extremely complex moral decisions will be able to make moral judgments at the principled level. Finally, Rawls's position does 9 not take into account the intensity of interests which are inherent in social living. For example, it is a very common phenomenon for a congressperson to demand government projects which will benefit the constituency he or she represents. Is it realistic to postulate that social arrangements can operate purely in terms of justice based principles without recourse to the intensity of the individual's own interests? In Rawls's legislature, will this same legislator willingly act always in terms of principles of justice and fairness without requesting benefits for the represented constituency? Dewey (1913) does take the individual's own interests in consideration as interests form a basis for worthwhile enterprise, but Dewey's concern is not with conflict of interest which arises between differing intensity of interests in competing parties. Rawls claims for his theory that he has formulated a position on justice which is applicable to both capitalist and socialist societies. The following observation concerning Kohlberg's scheme should be made. Kohlberg claims that a cross-culturally uniform pattern of moral development has been discovered by his research. So we should be safe in presuming that moral development would follow somewhat the same sequence in socialist countries as in capitalistic countries. Now, consider the Heinz dilemma in which a man must decide whether to steal an expensive drug to save his dying wife's life. This situation may represent a real dilemma in a capitalist country where a man is held responsible for providing resources to secure health care for his wife. But in socialist countries, the government generally provides health care for all its 9 See Barry (1973).

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101 members, so it would seem that the Heinz dilemma could not really be taken too seriously by a person living in a socialist country. Since a person living in a socialist country who was presented the Heinz dilemma would not only have to imagine that he or she were Heinz solving a problem, but one would also have to imagine that one lived in a different society where the situation was in fact a problem. For this reason, Kohlberg's tool cannot be eliciting the same quality of moral response in socialist and capitalist societies. Summary We have offered suggestions concerning what kinds of social arrangements a position on justice should consider. We have pointed to a few areas which are problematic to positions on justice. In this context we have noted Kohlberg's remarks concerning justice and virtue. We found that in Kohlberg's claim that justice was a member of the class of the "one," that it was an "end," a "good," equality, a method of choosing we want everyone to follow, and the developmental sequence of "rights" and "duties" associated with "justice." Since Kohl berg equates his top two stages with Rawls's argument on the nature of justice, we made the assumption that Kohl berg must mean somewhat the same thing by his conception of justice as Rawls means. As a means of getting clearer about the concept of justice, Rawls's position on justice was presented in a brief sketch. We presented the thesis that since Kohlberg posits his scheme as representing a Deweyan, Platonic-.Rawlsian viewpoint, some inconsistencies will emerge in Kohlberg's position, certain inconsistencies which were found in this analysis were noted. We concluded with the notion that Kohlberg has not accounted for Dewey's social rationale of morality

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102 in his stages of moral development, that his scheme cannot claim crosscultural moral uniformity in terms of justice as long as he holds a quasi -Deweyan theory of knowing, and that his dilemma is more appropriate in a capitalist than a communist society. Since the moral judgment is to be discovered at the heart of the Kohlberg progression, our next task is that of analyzing the moral judgment.

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103 References Austin, J. L. Sense and sensibilia . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Barry, B. The liberal theory of justice . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Dewey, J. Interest and effort in education . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913. ~ Dewey, J. Democracy and education . Mew York: The Free Press, 1916. Dewey, J. and Tufts, H. H. Ethics . New York: Holt, 1910. Dewey, J. and Tufts, H. H. Ethics . New York: Holt, 1932. Kohlberg, L. "Education for justice: a modern statement of the Platonic view." In N. F. Sizer and T. R. Sizer (Eds.), Moral education : five lectures . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. Kohlberg, L. "Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education." In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971b. Kohlberg, L. "The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral development." Journal of Philosophy , 1973b, 70, 630-646. Kohlberg, L. and Tun el, E. "Moral development and moral education." In G. Lesser, Psychology and educational practice . Glenview, 111.: Scott Foresman, 1971 . Margolis, J. Values and conduct . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. Rawls, J. "The sense of justice." Philosophical Review, 1963, 72, 281305. Rawls, J. A theory of justice . Harvard: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971. Rawls, J. "Justice as fairness." In Paul Taylor (Ed.), Problems of moral philosophy . Encino, Calif.: Dickinson, 1972. Urmson, J. 0. "On grading." Mind , 1950, 59, 145-159. Von Wright, G. The varieties of goodness . London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1973.

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CHAPTER V THE MORAL JUDGMENT Kohl berg's conception of the moral judgment is undesirably fuzzy in several important respects. In the first place, Kohlberg is culpably vague concerning what counts as a moral judgment. Secondly, Kohlberg equivocates on the meaning of "moral." He develops moral constructs, then fails to provide adequate empirical tools with which to help identify their function. Kohlberg' s failure to articulate completely and comprehensively a conception of the moral judgment places him in a position that is vulnerable to criticism. Since, as we have shown in previous chapters, the moral judgment is of utmost importance in defining the different stages in the Kohlberg progression, 1 Kohlberg is in difficulty if he has a vague account of the judgment. Basically what Kohlberg means is that the way a person makes a moral judgment is by responding to an artificial dilemma. The statements used in the response can then be analyzed and categorized according to level of difficulty and arranged according to the logical complexity of the form of the moral judgment. The moral judgment proceeds through a series of such transformations and progression of stages, generally based upon self-interest at the lower level, to ones which are more formal and of more universal application at the upper level. This movement from selfinterest to more general and universal principles in judgment is considered ^ee Chapter I, p. 5, Chapter II, pp. 39-44. 104

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105 as reflecting "moral maturity." Kohlberg described how persons come to make more adequate judgments as a function both of cognitive and affective domains of the psyche. As a concomitant to progression through the stages, a person moves from an orientation with little regard for social norms to an overriding concern with social norms and finally away from considerations of social norms (Kohlberg, 1971b). Moreover, the progression through the stages is characterized by a movement away from self interest toward a conception of duty and obligation based on what an ideally just person would consider to be binding to another ideally just person. Rules are cited as the basis for judgments at the conventional level, while principles are cited as the rationale for moral judgments at the level considered by Kohlberg to represent "moral maturity." So it is clear that not only is the judgment important in the moral development theory but it also furnishes the criteria he offers for making the distinctions between the stages. We shall now argue that Kohlberg does not give adequate grounds for his claim that in the Moral Judgment Interview situation a person is actually making a judgment . Nor is it clear that the judgments people make under these circumstances constitute moral ones. 3 Kohlberg writes of the role of moral judgment in the progression, "moral judgment is primarily a function of rational operations. Affectional factors such as the ability to empathize and the capacity for guilt necessarily enter in, but moral situations are defined cognitively by the judging individual. Moral development is therefore a result of an increasing ability to perceive social reality or to organize and integrate social experience. One necessary— but not sufficient—condition for principled morality is the ability to reason logical lv (represented by stages for formal operations)" (1972a, p. 15). I am very surprised to note that as steeped in the Dewey tradition as the discipline of education is purported to be, no one has asked whether a person in the Kohlberg Moral Interview is reallv making an actual moral judgment. For example, Kohlberg's experimental methods so completely separate the person's own moral concerns from his or her own moral conduct

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106 Difficulties in Regard to Kohl berg's Conception of the floral Judgment It would seem that Kohlberg has given us a comprehensive enough account of what constitutes the moral judgment. He has certainly deemed to be important factors such as role-taking, affect, cognition, and the transformation of increasingly complex thought structures from one form to another until the person attains the status of "moral maturity." Although it would seem that Kohlberg is relatively clear in what he means by the moral judgment, the moral judgments people actually make do not 4 fit his examples. The moral judgments people actually do make are judgments in terms of an agent's or advisor's concern about which course of action to pursue. Scholars have criticized Kohlberg's account of the moral progression because there are certain social and psychological factors which his scheme fails to take into consideration. The two factors most often mentioned are those of habit and internalization. Since Kohlberg does that any Deweyan account of the moral judgment could not in the wildest stretch of the imagination be considered as a bona fide moral judgment . Nor can the floral Judgment Interview be considered as a judgment in Baier's account of the judgment in which the person is deciding "What shall I do?" or helping someone else decide that question, i.e., to some extent assuming responsibility to guide another person's legitimate personal concern so it can be resolved. Moreover, it is surprising that more attention has not been given to Baier's criticism of Kohlberg, which is that the moral progression was formulated in such a way as to fail to clearly articulate the moral and nonmoral functions of the judgment. 4 To illustrate a case of a person making a moral judgment which is unlike judgments people actually do make, consider the example of Tommy who makes a moral judgment at stage three on Kohlberg's moral stage progression. Tommy's response is to the question of whether a doctor should mercy kill a woman in pain who is fatally ill. He states, "If she requests it, it's really up to her. She is in such terrible pain, just the same as people are always putting animals out of their pain" (Kohlberg, 1971b, p. 89). Now Baier's (1958) conception of the value judgment involves asking the question "What shall I do?" The person who is asking the question or another person who is legitimately interested in helping the agent think

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107 claim an interdisciplinary thrust for his progression, such charges tend to limit the nature of the claim he can make about moral development. Since the moral judgment is categorized according to the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview, which is the tool employed to evaluate judgments according to criteria he has developed, we argue that statements made in the context of the interviews are the only things that can count, as moral considerations. A person's own moral concerns are not relevant. A person's conduct lies outside the scope of the Moral Judgment Interview and actual moral conduct is not evaluated at all by the Moral Judgment Interview. Let us state at this point that our criticism is of Kohlberg's empirical technique rather than his theoretical position on moral judgment. Kohlberg's theoretical conception of the judgment is quite different from the judgment which is to be discovered in the context of the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview. Let us see what Kohlberg's remarks regarding his theoretical conception of the moral judgment are. Kohlberg (1971a) claims to have found a variety of moral categories operating in the moral judgment. Perhaps the most important of these categories is the conscience, which according to Aronfreed (1971) has been very carefully formulated by Kohlberg. Now Kohlberg's (1972a) conception of the conscience presents the conscience as the incubator of the moral judgment. The conscience is in a dormant state, then as a difficulty with a particular moral orientation arises, the conscience helps push the person up to the next stage. Just as creativity needs a process through an actual concern— these are the people who are making the value judgments . I can not see that making statements in response to a question is an adequate representation of a bona fide judgment .

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108 of incubation in order for original ideas to develop, the moral judgment needs a process of incubation in order to proceed through the moral progression. The narrow conception of conscience conceives this category as the process of incubation. In the broad interpretation of conscience as Kohl berg uses the term, it is a synonym for the moral judgment. Aspects such as cognition, affect, role-taking, and increasingly complex thought structures make it appear that Kohl berg gives a comprehensive account of the moral judgment as it operates in the moral progression. Kohlberg also equates moral development with social development. We are, therefore, led to see that Kohlberg in theory unites the individual with his social milieu in his general theoretical framework. However, on the other hand, we have found good reasons for thinking that he separates the moral judgment from a person's own particular moral interests. People are continually asking themselves questions about which course of action to pursue. "What shall I do?" or "What is the best thing for me to do?" are legitimate moral questions. Yet in Kohlberg's empirical framework such questions are never asked. So we see that Kohlberg's empirical techniques provide a severely limited account of the moral judgment which we argue is neither moral nor a judgment . To a certain extent Kohlberg's moral judgment constructs stay true in research to what he has found in theory. That extent is that statements indeed can be categorized in accordance with the increased complexity of content as they are made to the interviewer. To be sure, Kohlberg's conception of the moral judgment is vulnerable to criticism in terms of whether a person who is thinking about an artificial situation and reporting has actually made a bona fide moral judgment. Moreover, statements which have absolutely no bearing on a person's own conduct or

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109 concerns not only separate the person from his or her own interests and behavior, but can not even be conceived of as moral judgments . Particular philosophical schools separate the realm of the "objective" from the "subjective" so completely that these two are actually operating in opposition to one another. Now the subjective domain contains inner forces such as the affective-cognitive factors of personality, while the objective domain contains tangible items such as tables and chairs, i.e., objects which people can actually touch and feel. Moreover, behavior can be identified according to particular criteria and such behavior may be identified as belonging to the realm of the "objective." Now it seems to me that Kohl berg not only separates the inner of the subjective which is to be discovered in the affective-cognitive domain as evidenced in his explanation of the moral judgment, but he leaves us without any account at all of the objective which is actual moral conduct. Now we can charge that Kohl berg separates the "objective" from the "subjective," yet a more serious charge remains. That charge is that Kohlberg completely fails to take the objective or moral conduct into account. But, the Kohl berg team may well argue, that they have provided techniques to identify and categorize statements according to particular criteria. Does not that count as behavior which has been objectively described? To counter this claim we cite Dewey's argument 5 which when interpreted 5 Dewey (1916) argues for the union of "psychical forces" and the "outer" of "moral conduct." In his view moral judgment was the same thing as deliberation. Since deliberation involved a person's own private rehearsal in the imagination of alternative modes of conduct which could be pursued, then the steps of the plan are traced until the consequences which occur to him or her in the context of the moral judgment are evidenced. Dewey further argues that the moral judgment is one with the process of ratiocination, it is organically united with a person's own conduct.

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no leads to the claim that moral statements made to an interviewer in the Kohl berg Moral Judgment Interview do not reflect an actual moral judgment and the consequences of these judgments. Without considering the consequences of the judgment, which is what I take to be the objective domain, then the statements are impotent exercises in conjecturing about moral situations. We have shown that the moral judgment as conceived by Kohl berg is ever-transforming from one distinct form to another in terms of the thought structures of a particular orientation to the stages. In the Kohlberg progression, there is to be noted an unnecessary gap in the argument particularly in regard to whether a person making statements to an interviewer actually represent a person giving an accurate picture of his or her own moral judgment and moral conduct. We noted this gap in Kohl berg's experimental techniques, we further charge Kohlberg with erecting a dualism between judgment and conduct when he gives the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview. The position as to the relationship between moral judgment and conduct is stated conversely in Ethics (Dewey and Tufts, 1932). They argue that persons who judge moral conduct in terms of the agent's own dispositions and inclinations as well as taking into consideration the consequences of the actions are on the right track. Now since Kohlberg's empirical methodology studies conduct only indirectly as we have shown in previous chapters, and since Kohlberg fails to pin down the actual level of the moral judgment by studying what a person actually does, we are able to identify more completely the nature of the gap in Kohlberg's argument between the moral judgment and a person's own moral conduct. Dewey's argument is that what we mean by moral judgment in practice is related to conduct. The problem this analysis finds with Kohlberg's conception of the moral judgment is that he points out a construct without giving us adequate tools to uncover what he has defined in that construct. 6 Dewey succinctly spells out the problem of dualism to be discovered in moral theory as follows: "The first obstruction which meets us is the currency of moral ideas which split the course of activity into two opposed factors, often named respectively the inner and the outer, or the spiritual and the physical. This division is a culmination of the dualism

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in Dewey convincingly argues that the "inner" of psychical processes can be united with the "outer" of "conduct." Dewey's argument is not going to help Kohlberg overcome his experimental difficulties, but it does provide us with the conceptual tools by which to critique Kohlberg's empirical techniques. Piaget develops some experimental research which, if Kohlberg were prepared to incorporate into his research methodology, in my opinion would overcome the problem of erecting a dualism between the "inner" of psychical processes with the "outer" of conduct. The Argument for Adopting Piaget 's Empirical Methodology Piaget's (1932) most famous on-going experimental work was undertaken in connection with the study of children playing a game of marbles. Piaget also studied other play activities of children in order to formulate his conception of the moral judgment. Now, I argue that Kohlberg could incorporate play into his research methodology. Play is certainly a spontaneous activity in which children's own impulses are organically united with conduct. Because play is an on-going activity and since most children do engage in such activities as play, in my opinion Piaget is able to make stronger claims for constructs developed in accordance with his research than claims Kohlberg can make. Because of the fact that Kohlberg's entire scope of experimental methodology employed the use of hypothetical dilemmas to evoke the moral judgment, claims for his of mind and the world, soul and body, ends and means, which we have so frequently noted. In morals it takes the form of a sharp demarcation of the motive of action from its consequences, and of character from conduct. Motive and character are regarded as something purely "inner," existing exclusively in consciousness, while consequences and conduct are regarded as outside of mind, conduct having to do simply with the movements which carry out motives: consequences with what happens as a result" (Dewey, 1916, pp. 346-347).

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112 empirical tools are limited. In observing children at play, Piaget noted a continuum from loosely organized rules in operation to more complex organization of rules for the games. Now if Kohlberg could show that his methods in any way studied people actually pursuing an activity in a natural setting, then a stronger claim could be made for his moral constructs, particularly use of rules and principles. We have shown how it is possible to unite the "inner" and the "outer" forms of morality and study moral judgment in connection with conduct in order to remedy a difficulty which we discovered in Kohl berg's methodology. We noted that present empirical techniques make Kohlberg 's claim for the moral judgment one which is indeed quite limited. Also symptomatic of the fuzziness of Kohlberg' s conception of the moral judgment is the fact that Kohlberg does not clearly articulate the moral and nonmoral functions of the value judgment. This fuzziness is pointed out by Baier. floral and Nonmoral Functions Kohlberg sets forth particular criteria which he claims are met in his conception of the moral judgment and its role in moral progression. Kurt Baier (1974) points out difficulties, inconsistencies, and the failure of Kohlberg's own moral progressions without criticism when considered in the light of criteria Kohlberg himself has established for this progression. Baier analyzes only writings by Kohlberg which he designates as Kohlberg's "considered theory." 7 We present a brief sketch of Baier 's argument in order to make our own claim that the same kinds Kohlberg's two writings which Baier takes to be his "considered theory" are, "From Is to Ought," in T. Hischel (Ed.), Cognitive Development and Ep i s temol ogy , New York: Academic Press, 1971a, and "The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral development," Journal of Philosophy, 1973b, 70, 630-646. ^

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113 of criticism are applicable to Kohlberg's other writings on moral development. Citing the influence of thinkers such as Kant and Hare and further noting that Kohlberg's perspective is in the rationalist tradition, Baier describes a person's progression through the stages as follows: moral development both in the individual and in the group, is a cognitively steered, rational progress through a series of sharply distinct, rigidly sequential stages, each stage superior to the preceding one, each advance brought about by the recognition of some inadequacy of the stage then occupied and constituting an improvement upon it. (1974, p. 603) In Baier's explication of Kohlberg's moral judgment, he points out that "the same thirty basic moral categories, concepts, or principles" (1974, p. 176) are to be discovered in operation at each moral stage structure. Four basic criteria are used by the Kohlberg team to assess each stratum of the structure of moral thinking. These criteria are listed by Baier as "1. a formal advance . . . , 2. a material advance ... ,3. an advance in differentiation . . . , 4. an improvement in the performance of the moral function" (1974, p. 605). In stating that the adequacy of the moral thought structure is assessed by means of the criterion of a formal advance, Kohlberg is claiming that the more "prescriptive" and "universal" a judgment is discovered to be, the more adequate the judgment. By the criterion a "material advance," increasingly more difficult functions can be performed at each stage. By the criterion an "advance in differentiation," the various judgmental functions are more adequately conceptualized and differentiated. The judgments which are more properly deemed moral are increasingly differentiated from other forms of judgments. The final criterion regarding the more adequate performance of the "moral function"

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114 simply means that the performance of the "moral function" becomes better in accordance with progression through Kohlberg's moral stages. Baier (1974) suggests certain difficulties in regard to the claim that particular stages are better than others in terms of the criteria which we have presented. One difficulty Baier identifies is that Kohlberg is unable to accurately define the end point of the nonmoral function of the moral judgment and the point at which judgment actually becomes a bona fide moral judgment. Baier makes an insightful appraisal of a difficulty arising in the Kohlberg scheme. Kohlberg (1971a) presents the very young child as being premoral . He further claims that moral thinking is employed at some point in the thought clusters or structure at stage one. Now Kohlberg (1971a) presents the imbalance in stage five thinking as the point at which the "true" moral judgment may be said to begin. This imbalance causes a striving for a new thought form which will provide the conceptual apparatus for resolving moral questions. It does indeed seem strange that Kohlberg fails to see so blatant an inconsistency in the location of the beginning of moral judgment as Baier uncovered. Baier' s assertion about this inconsistency is that Kohlberg does not take into account the shift in' meaning which occurs in terms used. Baier writes, for example, "that failure to detect such shifts in the meaning of the expression 'not moral' from 'immoral' to 'nonmoral' to 'premoral'" (1974, p. 609) results in difficulties for Kohlberg's stage theory. The person who has not yet developed appropriate intellectual capacity to respond to an artificial dilemma with a moral judgment is different in kind from the person who has learned to distinguish moral questions from prudential questions and may give a

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115 prudential response to an artificial dilemma. Baier relates the different facets of the value questions a person faces as stages are ascended, in regard to the criteria presented by Kohlberg himself. He states that as a person learns to increasingly differentiate the functions, "he learns to distinguish types of questions and the appropriate methods for answering them. But in learning to discriminate the different 'functions' these questions have, he is not ipso facto learning to improve the performance of one and the same function" (1974, p. 609). Kohlberg can resolve the difficulty previously described as well as the further difficulty of the match between his description of the stages and his account of moral development by revising it along lines suggested by Baier (1974). These suggestions include the notion that Kohlberg identify stages one through four as being "nonmoral" and stages five and six as being "moral." Progression through stages one, two, three, and four depends upon a person's increased capacity to differentiate nonmoral judgments. When a person has learned to distinguish moral and nonmoral judgments then stage five thinking has begun. Only at stage five can Kohlberg claim that progression from stage five to stage six involves more adequately performing the ,; moral" function of the judgment. Baier concludes that "moral advance" as it actually occurs does not meet the requirements of the criteria Kohlberg himself sets up for progression through the stages. Baier suggests that Kohlberg retain both models, i.e., the model for practical reasoning and the model for moral reasoning. I think that Baier has accurately appraised difficulties to be discovered in the Kohlberg progression and has pointed to revisions Kohlberg could make in his "considered theory" in order to remedy these difficulties.

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116 In my opinion although Kohl berg has done something in the way of defining the moral realm, he still falls short of providing a consistent statement of the moral domain. Kohlberg certainly has the right to defi the moral domain in any manner he chooses, yet examination of his explan ation of what constitutes the "moral" are not entirely consistent. Let us examine some of his definitions of the "moral domain" taken from "Stages of Moral Development:" We must now clarify in a detailed way the reasons for which we consider higher stages to be more moral than lower stages. Like most philosophers, we are claiming, but on social scientific grounds, first that the terms "moral" refer to moral judgments or decisions based on moral judgments . . . the primary psychological referent of the term "moral" is a judgment, not a behavior or an affect, for example "guilt" .... There is nothing in the social institutionalization of a rule that makes it moral as opposed to technological , aesthetic, etc. for one man, a prohibition of parking is a moral norm, for another a mere administrative regulation. What makes it moral is not the legislation of the rule but the individual's attitude toward it. (Kohlberg, 1971b, p. 55) In the above passage, Kohlberg does not appear to think that value questions can be categorized definitively as prudential, legal, moral, etc., but rather are a function of a person's attitude toward a given situation. Secondly, Kohlberg is giving an example of the "moral" domain by pointing to a "rule" when he asserts in the same text "our major and most controversial claim is that the only "true" (stage 6) moral principle is justice" (Kohlberg, 1971b, pp. 62-63). In our previous statement, we took Kohlberg to be vague on differentiation of the nonmoral and moral functions in the value judgment, yet a later remark about judgments illustrates an awareness of the differentiation : Moral judgments are judgments about the right and the good of action. Not all judgments of "good" or "right" are moral judgments, however: many are judgments of aesthetic, technological, or prudential goodness or rightness. Unlike judgments of prudence or aesthetics, moral judgments tend to be universal,

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117 inclusive, consistent, and grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds. (Kohlberg, 1971b, p. 56) So we see that Kohlberg has an awareness that different kinds of value perspectives are differentiated and classified in accordance with the appropriate perspective. Kohlberg writes, "more generally, the individual whose judgments are at stage six asks 'Is it morally right' and means by morally right something different from punishment (stage one), or prudence (stage two), or conformity to authority (stage three and four), etc." (1971b, p. 57). As Baier (1974) points out in his article, Kohlberg ts vague on the starting point of the "moral" domain in his "considered theory." We find a similar situation throughout the writings. For example in 1968 in "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," Kohlberg considers all the levels and corresponding stages to be moral, "the typology contains three distinct levels of moral thinking, and within each of these levels two related stages. These levels and stages may be considered separate moral philosophies" (1968, p. 26). Two years earlier in "Moral Education in the Schools: A Developmental View" Kohlberg defines the levels as follows, "Level I Premoral . . . Level II Conventional Role Conformity . . . Level III Self-Accepted Moral Principles" (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 7) which we bring up to show an instance in which only the top level is described as being moral. Even as early as 1963 in "The Development of Children's Orientation Toward a Moral Order," Kohlberg considers stages one and two to be "premoral." Now, from 1968 in "The Child as a Moral Philosopher" until 1972 in the "Hidden Curriculum,." the levels are labeled preconventional, conventional, and postconventional and all are said to represent "moral" levels.

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118 We can only speculate as to why Kohlberg changes level one from "premoral" to "preconventional . " Our own assessment leads us to make the following observations. Throughout the literature, Kohlberg claims that there are from twenty-five to thirty moral categories in operation at each stage of the judgment. Now it does seem to be "logically odd" to claim that stage one is premoral yet it contains "moral motives." Now the "moral motives" for premoral stage one are "obey rules to avoid punishment. Danny, age ten: (Should Joe tell on his older brother to his father?) 'In one way it would be right to tell on his brother or his father might get mad at him and spank him. In another way it would be right to keep quiet or his brother might beat him up 1 " (Kohlberg, 1966c, p. 7). Not only do all stages contain judgments with "moral motives," but all stages have certain "moral aspects." It is further "logically odd" to say that premoral stages use moral aspects . The following are deemed by Kohlberg to be stage one and stage two moral aspects : stage one the value of a human life is confused with the value of physical objects and is based on the social status or physical attributes of its possessor [while stage two is depicted as] the value of a human life is seen as instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons. (Kohlberg, 1968a, p. 28) At any rate, in about 1968 Kohlberg decided that stages one and two were not "premoral" but were "preconventional." It is my opinion that Kohlberg changed the labels of the levels in order to preserve his other constructs which he had claimed to be operating at each of the stages, for example, moral motives, moral aspects, moral categories, etc. We have earlier shown that Kohlberg describes these first two stages in a manner that shows even he does not consider such stages to be "moral."

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119 The question to raise in regard to the levels in the progression is whether Kohl berg needs to retain them or not. We can not see that they shed any light on the increased value differentiation a person who is actually progressing through the stage can perform in the value judgment. Baier has shown how Kohl berg can clarify the increased differentiation of the dimensions of value a person actually comes to terms with in the executing of a value judgment as progress is made through the stages. We find ourselves to be in agreement with Baier that Kohlberg should describe stages one through four as being nonmoral and stages five and six as being moral. Our own findings lead us to suggest that Kohlberg should change such categories as moral motivation , moral aspects , moral categories , etc. to value motivation , value aspects , value categories to describe a person before he or she is able to appropriately distinguish moral and nonmoral considerations. Summary We presented a brief sketch of Kohl berg's conception of the moral judgment as it is increasingly transformed through distinct stages in order to remind the reader of the workings of the Kohlberg scheme. An unnecessary gap in the argument between moral judgment and conduct was discovered in the context of Kohlberg's empirical technique and the claim that he can make for his conception of the moral judgment. Now, we show that the same gap is not so pronounced in Kohlberg's own theoretical conceptions. However, if he were prepared to adopt different techniques, a stronger claim could be made for his position on moral development. Dewey's position as to the relationship between "moral judgment" and "conduct" was used as an example to illustrate that thought and action can be organically united in theoretical formulations.

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120 We evaluated the Kohlberg moral judgment by criteria which he himself sets up as defining the moral judgment and moral progression. We found that a more precise and viable construct of the moral judgment would result if Kohlberg were prepared to systematize his moral judgment in terms of the criteria he himself sets up for it. We suggest that Kohlberg present a clearer statement as to what constitutes the moral domain as well as present a clearer conception of the dimensions of value which are present in the moral and nonmoral value judgment.

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121 References Aronfreed, J. "Some problems for a theory of the acquisition of conscience." In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Baier, K. The moral point of view . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. Baier, K. "Moral development." Monist , 1974, 4, 601-615. Dewey, J. Democracy and education . New York: The Free Press, 1916. Dewey, J. and Tufts, J. H. Ethics . New York: Holt, 1932. Kohlberg, L. "The development of children's orientations toward a moral order: I. Sequence in the development of moral thought." Vi ta Humana , 1963a, 6, 11-33. Kohlberg, L. "Moral education in the schools: a developmental view." The School Review , 1966c, 74, 1-30. Kohlberg, L. "The child as a moral philosopher." Psychology Today , 1968a, 2, 25-30. Kohlberg, L. "From is to ought." In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology . New York: Academic Press, 1971a. Kohlberg, L. "Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education." In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971b. Kohlberg, L. "A cognitive-developmental approach to moral education." Humanist , 1972a, 6, 15-18. Kohlberg, L. "The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral development." Journal of Philosophy , 1973b, 70, 630-646. Kohlberg, L. and Whitten, P. "Understanding the hidden curriculum." Learning , 1972, 7, 10-14. Piaget, J. The moral judgment of the child . Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1932.

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CHAPTER VI THE IMPLICATIONS OF KOHLBERG 1 S SCHEME FOR THE EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISE In previous chapters, we were concerned with analysis of concepts and issues which were to be discovered in the Kohlberg progression. In this chapter, we are presenting educational practices and organization which would follow from the use of the Kohlberg scheme as a basis for prescribing policy for the educational enterprise. Our discussion will address questions of educational policies, practices, and organizational procedures to be implemented in accordance with the implications for education which were drawn by the analysis of the Kohlberg scheme. Kohlberg advocates that the teacher stimulate the child in order to speed up progression through the stages. While social interaction aids the child in attaining increasingly more complex moral judgments naturally, instruction facilitates the rapidity of movement through the progression . Since schools, whether they wish to be or not, are basically institutions which teach moral values, Kohlberg uses the expression the "hidden curriculum" in order to identify moral attitudes so developed. These moral attitudes which occur naturally in the process of schooling are developed in the context of procedures used by schools as the basis for organization as well as the actual practices which are used in teaching group values. As one would expect, Kohlberg 1 s prescription in regard to educational practices which stimulate moral progression is based on the 122

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123 teacher's presenting hypothetical moral dilemmas for children to resolve. After presenting an overview of Kohlberg's prescription to education, and noting that Kohlberg deems his educational theory to be in the same perspective with Dewey's educational theory, we shall compare Dewey's position on education with Kohlberg's own prescriptions for moral education. The comparison we shall undertake is along lines suggested by Kohlberg. Since he frequently states that his educational policy is basically Deweyan, we shall examine the Kohlberg claim in terms of the actual correspondence to be discovered between Dewey's position on moral education and Kohlberg's position on moral education. Mor al Education and Schooling Kohlberg (1972b) remarks about the average teacher's lack of a clear understanding concerning the place of moral education in teaching practice. These remarks lead him to conclude that teachers in general do not have a comprehensive awareness of what it is that constitutes moral education. Nor does he believe that teacher training institutions fulfill their obligations which underlie all phases of schooling. In spite of this presumed lack of knowledge of their function as moral educators, Kohlberg (1971b) states that they are continually acting under the guise of moral educators by virtue of the control teachers have over many aspects of students interpersonal relationships. The task of the school is viewed by Kohlberg to be one in which the school sorts and transmits some of the consensual values held by society. In this view, a society's most foundational values are those values which reside in the moral domain, the major moral values in this domain

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124 being the value of justice. Kohl berg assumes that a person who possesses right knowledge will "know" that justice is the core of morality. Kohlberg advocated that the school recognize the "core status of justice." If justice was not recognized by schools to be a major moral value of society, then, in Kohlberg's view, difficulties will be encountered as the school attempts to develop citizens.^ Kohlberg's Aims of Moral Education In the Kohlberg scheme, the core position of justice is a matter of import which needs to be dealt with by educators charged with the growth and development of the immature and he charges them to formulate aims which are conceived of in terms of moral development. Kohlberg (1967) repeatedly stresses that inasmuch as teachers are in actual practice continually moralizing and otherwise engaging in moral activities, that these moral activities should be consciously organized and practices developed which will make for a more organized program of moral development in the school . Kohlberg (1 971b) prescribes specific aims for education. These aims are in the context of the stimulation and development of the moral judgment to the end of arriving at more adequate moral judgments at the stages of the Kohlberg progression. Concerning the aim of moral education as the development of the moral judgment, Kohlberg claims that moral judgments involved considerations of the "right" and the "good" as these related to action. ^Of the eminence of justice as a major moral value, Kohlberg writes, "unless one recognizes the core status of justice, any conscious concern about the school's responsibility for developing the basic values of the society and making citizens as well as scholars will run into difficulties as soon as one tries to define the exact content of these basic values" (1967, p. 165).

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125 As a concomitant of the development of the moral judgment, Kohlberg (1971b) prescribes the stimulation of moral and nonmoral functions of natural development. This stimulation results in upward movement to a more adequate judgmental stage on the Kohlberg hierarchy. In Kohlberg's view, the ultimate test of adequacy of the moral judgment is that it is conceived in terms of individually developed principles. The more distinctively "formal" these principles are discovered to be, the more adequate the judgment. Teachers are urged by Kohlberg (1971b) not to superimpose their own views about moral matters on the young, but to stimulate the child's moral development. How then does development take place in the growing youngster? Kohlberg thinks that development occurs by a natural process of social interaction in the home, school, and peer group associations and not by indoctrination. A process of stimulation may be used by the teacher in order to aid progression through the stages, thus speeding up considerably moral development. Kohlberg thinks that moral development is enhanced by educators who follow his prescriptions for the organization and curriculum of the school. The Hidden Curriculum The use of group attitudes is prevalent as methods of moral education. Kohlberg (1971b) finds evidence of current educational practice which he deems to constitute the "hidden curriculum." This "hidden curriculum" employs group attitudes toward moral ends in a variety of educational situations. A. S. Neill of Summerhill fame is said by Kohlberg to claim a value-free atmosphere for his school, yet he has been known to exhort students to refrain from sexual activities while in school. This sexual restraint is based on a reasoning related to pride

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126 in Summerhin. Russian schools, in Kohlberg's assessment, are seen to utilize a system employing the attitudes of the group to enforce group discipline which has as its means the conformity of the individual to the total group. For both the Russians and Summerhill, Kohlberg claims that the end of moral education appeared to lie in the development of unquestioned loyalty to the school. Kohlberg makes a quite astute point in connection with the school's moral education by asserting that while educators are denying that moral education is going on, even the most cursory examination of the schools reveals that practices and organizational aspects of education are implicitly promoting one conception or 2 another of moral education. Kohlberg's Prescriptions for Education Kohlberg cannot condone a program of moral education which is haphazard in respect to moral development, such as the "hidden curriculum." He formulates an educational program to consciously stimulate moral development. Such a program fills the void he currently finds in the moral aspect of education. Working with Blatt, Kohlberg (1971b) developed a program in moral education which uses the actual moralizing of the child at the stages which Kohlberg outlines. In the context of this program, Kohlberg not only devised a set of practices to be used to stimulate moral development in terms of his scheme, but he used research techniques to test the outcomes of these practices. The procedures developed for moral education were carried on for four weeks and 2 When such an educational program is thoroughly examined and made explicit, it is clear that as Kohlberg puts it, "the implicit teaching of conformity to the school becomes Durkheim's use of loyalty to the school and its rules as a symbol of, and preparation for, loyalty to the national society" (1971b, p. 29).

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127 involved lessons for 11 and 12 year olds. The curriculum was designed by Kohlberg and involved the presentation of hypothetical dilemmas for discussion by children. Since the average stage was stage three, the teacher mainly clarified the arguments used by children at this stage. Lower level arguments were ignored. When stage three arguments appeared to be mastered by the children, stage four rationales were presented by the teacher. Kohlberg found that there was a tendency for many stage three children to move up to stage four as moral discourse at this level 3 was stimulated by the teacher. Kohlberg (1971b)does not end his prescription for moral education with a system of classroom practices, but moves to the pivotal point in his theory of the moral domain, justice, and outlines how the use of justice in the classroom and total organizational scheme of the school can result in more effective moral education. Educators who recognize the ideal of justice, according to Kohlberg, will clearly see that they have no right to impose their own beliefs upon groups who hold differing beliefs. Moreover, both classroom practices and total school organization, which are diffused with justice in their moral atmosphere, will expand the ideal of justice into the wider society. Kohlberg's belief is that environmental stimulation of development will somehow enhance the infiltration of justice throughout the educational process. While peer interaction is important in developing more adequate notions of justice, participation in decision making matters and other organizational aspects of schooling are seen by Kohlberg to be more important in the development of appropriate notions of justice. Concerning the "Fiftyper cent of the children moved up one stage, 10 per cent moved up two stages, and the remainder stayed the same. In contrast, 10 per cent of a control group moved up one stage during this period., and the remainder stayed the same" (1971b, p. 74).

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128 participatory function of the school organized toward attaining the end of increased justice awareness, Kohl berg advocates that a justice structure which was one stage above the child's own be an integral part of the atmosphere of the school. Conversely, schools which offered students justice structures at their own stage or lower had a tendency, in Kohlberg's estimation, to inhibit the moral growth of students. In effect, Kohlberg advises educators who desire schools which provide a comprehensive moral education program to emulate those institutions which allow students to formulate rules, decisions, and policy in democratic manner. However, as one who is familiar with Kohlberg's stages of moral development may well expect, he cautions students at the highest developmental level to differentiate between situations which call for abiding by the majority will and those which demand self-developed principles. In understanding Kohlberg's position, it is quite significant to note that institutions are limited as to the heights of moral development to which they can ascend. Inasmuch as institutions are not individuals, the development of self-accepted principles cannot be attained in the case of an institution. But individuals who are allowed to participate in level five institutional moral judgments can with stimulation attain the apex of the moral judgment that of principled and justice-based moral decisions. Of the union of participation in school affairs and justice, Kohlberg states that student participation in school affairs with the ideal of justice immanent therein was a necessary condition of moral education. Moreover, the individual leading and directing the moral educational activity needs to be operating morally at level six in order for the moral educational program to be successful. ^ 4 Kohlberg writes, "ultimately, then, the issue of participation raises the issue of the social structure of the school and a complete approach to

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129 Relationship of Kohlberg to Dewey Any examination of Kohl berg's prescriptions for moral education should include the rationale he gives as its basis and positions which he cites as being instrumental in the formulation of his educational program of moral development. We have noted Kohl berg's own position in regard to the pivotal position of justice and the importance of developing more adequate moral judgments as comprising practices and organizational matters of import to moral education. It appears both enlightening and somewhat puzzling that Kohlberg cites Dewey's position on moral education as foundational to his own. It is enlightening in that throughout Kohl berg's writing he claims that his ideas derive from Dewey. It is enigmatic that one notes such divergent viewpoints on important issues as appear to emerge on examination of key concepts in the thinking of these two. In a recent address concerning the fusion of moral education with the new social studies curriculum, Kohlberg (1972b) states that his approach had a broad Deweyan aim, that of increased justice in the educational enterprise. This increased social justice is to come about by the development in each student of a sense of justice in the milieu of a just school. We have discussed the major differences in Kohl berg's use of justice conceived in Rawlsian-Platonic terms and Dewey's (1932) conception. For Rawls, justice was the overriding moral end; on the other hand, for Dewey, justice is "organically entwined" with the ideal of happiness or welfare. While there is some indication that part of Kohlberg's prescription for education is in line with Dewey's conception, moral education means full student participation in a school in which justice is a living matter. It is clear that the educator's ability to engage in this type of education is to a considerable extent contingent on the teacher herself reaching a principled level of moral judqment" (1971b, p. 04).

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130 Kohlberg's own model of justice is much closer to Rawls's position on justice. The major thrust of Kohlberg's argument is in terms of justice as an ideal end in the form both of ideal principles of justice operating at stage six moral judgments and the ideal development of the concept of justice which Kohlberg presents as he considers the core of the moral domain. Certainly, Dewey (1916) conceives justice to be important as a means of regulating society and justice integrated with benevolence is a perfectly legitimate moral end to Dewey. But Dewey emphatically states that our primary moral interest is social. The end of moral education in a Deweyite framework would be more in line with increment in social interaction in all parts of society, occurring in terms of enhancing the quality of experience occurring in the context of moral education. The study of justice, as conceived by Kohlberg, cannot properly be placed under the rubric of a Deweyan position. In justifying his stand on moral education as it relates to the new social studies, Kohlberg further cites five postulates which he claims to derive from Dewey and which he claims form the basis of his program of moral education. The first postulate, according to Kohlberg, is to replace rote learning with an active, thinking and reasoning student. Kohlberg claims that this postulate uses scientific method as it applies to social material, as well as emphasizing reflective thought or inquirylearning. The first postulation appears to be an appropriate representation of the over-all point of view with which Dewey's philosophy does agree. The question arises, however, as to the adequacy of the program which Kohlberg has developed for the schools in terms of the extent to which his moral educational practices fulfill the requisites of the first postulate. To be sure, responding to moral dilemmas does involve an

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131 active thinking and reasoning student. But Dewey would not be a party to a process of inquiry which was set apart from the individual's own impulses and inclinations. We find that Kohlberg's prescription for moral education in the context of hypothetical dilemmas does separate a person's own impulses from the question at hand. Secondly, the application of scientific method to social material brings up the point that Kohlberg's so-called scientific judgments make no claim to be in any respect verifiable. It is more difficult, indeed, to see how an unverifiable judgment when addressed to social material uses scientific method. The second postulate, in which Kohlberg claims to erect his moral curriculum on Deweyan concepts, is in making the distinction between the form of thought and the content of thought. There does not seem to be any problem in relating this second postulate to Kohlberg's prescribed classroom practices. On the surface of it, it seems that Dewey in his frequent description of the complete act of thought and the various methods we use to think about both moral and scientific situations does place an emphasis on the form of thought. Now Kohlberg claims to ignore the content of thought in his progression. Dewey, in arguing that moral judgments can be verified, presents us with a somewhat different account of the place of content, namely that they can be verified by conduct. Kohlberg (1967) sees that the third postulate of the new social studies program lies in its interdisciplinary nature. In this particular assertion, Kohlberg has arrived at the juncture in which he and Dewey are in closest agreement. A matter which is not clearly stated for the teacher is how social norms are to be treated in the curriculum when they are thought to be outside the scope of the most adequate moral judgment. We suppose that Kohlberg would have social norms discussed for persons at stages three, four, and five; then the need to discuss social norms in

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132 order to make a value judgment would not be important. It is not entirely clear that Kohlberg's prescription for moral education is really interdisciplinary in light of his apparent disregard for salient positions in the fields of sociology and philosophy which address problems concerning standards in society. Certain sociologists might argue that if one were able to articulate the most basic social norms prevailing in a society, then one would discover that these norms were a kind of moral principle. Philosophers sometimes argue that value judgments can be verified in terms of principles operating in society. Citing the central ity of the problematic case as the fourth postulate which unites Kohlberg's position with Dewey's, Kohlberg overlooks the fact that his own construction of the problematic case involves a person's making statements in response to an artificial dilemma. On the other hand, Dewey regards the problematic case to be one which is chosen by the person and judged in terms of the probable consequences. Granted the problematic case is central to both positions on moral education. It should be noted that this is the point where the resemblance between Kohlberg and Dewey ends. Dewey emphasizes the unity of thought and action and their interdependence, while Kohlberg's empirical methodology pertains only to the cognitive-affective domain. The construction of a problematic case which was foreign to and separated from the individual's own inclinations and tendencies does not reflect a Deweyan framework. Considering the wide range of individual differences in operation in the classroom and the diverse interests at play, any educator's claim that one particular problem presented by the teacher is necessarily merged with all students' own inclinations can be considered as suspect.

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133 Value clarification and developing the ability to think critically about one's own values is Kohlberg's fifth postulate in the attempt to fuse his position with Dewey's. At this juncture, the basic difference between Dewey's and Kohlberg's conceptions of the moral judgment becomes a critical factor. As we observed in our treatment of the value judgment, Dewey posits the individual in a problematic moral situation confronted with consequences of which some are liked and some are disliked. Action is thus taken or decision made in this particular perspective. It does seem clear enough that an individual's ability to clarify values is enhanced by developing critical thinking abilities in the context of one's own moral situation. The argument that the child who decides in a theoretical situation is thereby clarifying his or her own values is somewhat less persuasive. The cogency of this argument is somehow lacking in terms of being the basis of an educational program which has as its end improvement over the old program. Kohl berg does not claim any derivation from Dewey in formulating his sixth and final postulate, that moral education should use the controversial case as the point of departure for moral education. This postulate should be questioned in terms of Kohlberg's own stages of moral development. Consider, for example, the case of the individual operating at the conventional level, i.e., the person who makes judgments in terms of "good-girl or good-boy" or 'deference to authority." If indeed a person makes such judgment, then he or she by Kohlberg's definition is incapable of dealing with controversy. Given Kohlberg's paradigm of moral judgment making, only the people at the highest principled stages would be adequately equipped to handle situations involving controversy, thereby limiting this last postulate to the most mature students

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134 and making its applicability to students at lower stages of the hierarchy decidedly questionable if not impossible. The preceding evidence suggests that there are many more differences between Dewey and Kohl berg than Kohl berg believes. In light of the examples which were pointed out, Kohlberg apparently develops a quite different approach to the problem of moral education from that of Dewey. It is true that Dewey asks psychology to address itself to questions of moral development. Kohlberg is quite correct in his belief that his moral developmental paradigm addresses questions of moral development and is, therefore, in line with Dewey. However, according to the analysis which pervades this paper, Kohlberg incorporates into his theory very little of what can be said to be an adequate representation of the Dewey position. Moreover, one viewing the Kohlberg progression from the moral theory of Dewey might be inclined to assess the Kohlberg moral judgment progression as evidenced in Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview as not even being typically moral. This would be true because an individual's own moral concerns and moral behavior are completely separated from the response given to a hypothetical dilemma. Making statements to an interviewer is most emphatically not the same thing as making a moral judgment. The classroom contains many opportunities for moral education when moral education is conceived in terms of an individual's own particular interests and concerns. Games played during the physical education period, the ways in which children treat their peers during group activities, activities such as children creating dramatic productions or puppet shows all provide on-going situations in which moral development can be stimulated. Artificial situations are not necessary, and whatever functions

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135 Kohl berg claims to be developed through use of his artificial situation, we do not think are even really moral . Children making appropriate statements to teachers according to Kohlberg's hierarchy of thought structures are certainly not comparable to children deciding whether to lie, steal, or cheat. Children making statements about hypothetical situations in the classrooms do not indicate anything about their actual moral conduct. We do not think Kohlberg's conception of the moral judgments are judgments in terms of Baier's or Dewey's version of them, nor are they even moral at all. We believe that the problem is due in part to the maxim held that a "good teacher ignores certain antisocial behaviors." These behaviors are not then, it is thought, reinforced. However, by the same token, by ignoring instances in which children are mistreating other children or other kinds of value-oriented inter-personal relationships, teachers are missing out on identifying value factors in such relationships and are neglecting problems which could indeed aid in moral development as it concerns a person's making an actual moral judgment. By moral judgment , we mean whether or not a person's own concerns are involved in making an action-guiding judgment to help someone else reach a legitimate decision. Summary Kohlberg views the task of education to be one of transmitting the consensual moral values of society. He does not believe that most teachers realize that they are moral educators. Kohlberg exhorts educators to recognize that the core of morality is to be discovered in abstract principles of justice.

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The aim of developing the judgment of value along the lines pointed out by Kohl berg is considered by him to be of utmost importance. The child or young person may move vertically from one level to the next by means of stimulation which may be accomplished by education. Kohl berg cites the use of group attitudes as a means of teaching morality. The use of loyalty or group attitudes to teach morality is dubbed by him the "hidden curriculum." Kohlberg sees the "hidden curriculum" in operation in Russian schools and Summerhill, a private school in England. That his theory of moral development is constructed in a Dewey an framework was one of the major contentions of Kohlberg. These two were compared along lines suggested by Kohlberg, i.e., the five postulates concerning moral education which were formulated by Kohlberg. More differences than Kohlberg believes were found to exist between these two thinkers. We conclude that Kohl berg's work in moral development is to be commended for attracting attention to moral education which has all too long been ignored. However, the caveat was issued that in light of the many apparent shortcomings of Kohlberg's theory of moral development, educators should proceed with caution in implementing the Kohl berg-based curriculum on moral development. Since we want to present a comprehensive account of the findings of this analysis, the next task is that of summarizing our analysis of Kohlberg's position on moral development.

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137 References Dewey, J. Democracy and education . New York: The Free Press, 1916. Dewey, J. and Tufts, J. H. Ethics . New York: Holt, 1932. Kohlberg, L. "Moral education, religious education, and the public schools: a developmental view." In T. R. Sizer (Ed.), Religion and public education . New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. Kohlberg, L. "Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education." In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971b. Kohlberg, L. "Moral development and the new social studies." ERIC , 1972b, ED 073 022, 1-20.

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CHAPTER VII SUMMARY AND DESCRIPTION Kohl berg's scheme may be described as the movement of the evertransforming moral judgment through a series of sharply distinct stages, each stage representing an improvement in thought structures over the stage before. We have seen that Kohl berg's conception of the moral judgment is different at the six different stages. A person moves from a "punishment and obedience" orientation to an "instrumental relativist" orientation at level one. At level two the person progresses from a "good boy good girl" orientation to one of "respect for and/or duty to authority. The ultimate level is the principled level at which a person moves from rationales based on "contract theory of government" to orientations utilizing "formal and universal principles of justice. " Justice is the overriding moral end in the Kohlberg scheme. Kohlberg holds that justice in its ideal form is synonymous with knowledge of the good and ideal virtue. Kohlberg himself does not hold a comprehensive position on justice, but relies on Rawls's theory of justice to explicate his own conception. Kohlberg prefers Rawls's principles that justice is ideal fairness and claims they represent the highest orientation of the stages. However, Kohlberg's conception of justice faces difficulties when the over-all theory' is examined in the context of other philosophical viewpoints Kohlberg holds. There are several 138

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139 difficulties involved in holding a Rawlsian position on justice. For example, Kohlberg claims cross-cultural validity for his moral progression. Yet if a person does learn by means of stimulation of the environment, how are abstract principles of justice learned in prel iterate societies? There is a second problem involved in Kohlberg's dependence on Rawls's theory of justice. The distinction between stages five and six is blurred as a consequence. The same principles are drawn up in the original position as those which are practiced in the social union. Perhaps Kohlberg could clear up this difficulty by placing Rawls's theory of justice entirely at stage six. But since Rawls's theory is based on a contract system of government, Kohlberg is clearly in a dilemma as to where to locate the total Rawlsian scheme on his progression. Kohlberg is faced with difficulties since he has a vague account of the moral judgment. The moral judgment which a person makes in the context of the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview presents Kohlberg with a gap in his argument, for thought is separated from action. He can make little claim for a person's moral conduct based on the interview. For as we have seen, there is little relationship between a person's actual moral judgment and what he or she says in an artificial situation. A further difficulty is in terms of Kohlberg's failure precisely to articulate the increasingly more difficult differentiations a person actually does make accompanying progression through the stages. That is to say, a person learns to distinguish prudential, legal, aesthetic, and moral questions and to respond appropriately to different value questions. Kohlberg is vague on the location of the beginning of the moral judgment

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140 and the points at which other value judgments begin to emerge. He is also inconsistent in defining what constitutes morality. Kohlberg can revise his theory if he is prepared to consider obvious difficulties and more systematically and comprehensively reformulate his considered position. We have seen that research can be conducted using empirical methods which are on-going. Such research can make a stronger claim as to the actual moral judgment a person makes. Further questions should be pursued in terms of the Kohlberg progression. Many theoreticians which Kohlberg leans on to explicate his scheme are referring to social morality while Kohl berg's own research has been undertaken entirely in terms of individual morality. Clarifying social and individual morality and their relationship to Kohlberg's moral progression is a much needed task which will give more precision to the Kohlberg progression. Moral rationales which are not included in Kohlberg's conception of the stages could be more carefully explored. Kohlberg is rather overconfident to claim that he has uncovered the most adequate modes of thinking about morality. He seems to overlook the possibility that contemporary and future scholars may yet arrive at a more adequate moral orientation. Kohlberg recognizes the fact that teachers whether they want to be or not are moral educators. He is on the right track in suggesting that schools organize so that moral education can be taught in the organizational matters of the school. Yet by too narrowly conceiving teaching practices, i.e., in terms of dilemmas for children to resolve, Kohlberg fails to consider children's own personal moral inclinations and impulses. On-going activities probably provide more genuine stimulation for real moral development than the limited dilemmas Kohlberg suggests for use in the classroom.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Alston, W. P. "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From is to ought.'" In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epi stemology . New York: Academic Press, 1971. Aronfreed, J. "Some problems for a theory of the acquisition of conscience." In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971 . Austin, J. L. Sense and sensibil ia . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Ayer, A. J. Language, truth and logic . London: Gollancz, 1946. Backmeyer, T. J. "The golden rule and developing moral judgment." Religious Education , 1973, 48, 348-365. Baier, K. The moral point of view . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. Baier, K. Discussion. In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Baier, K. "Individual moral development and social advance." Journal of Philosophy , 1973, 70, 646-648. Baier, K. "Moral development." Monist , 1974, 4, 601-615. Barry, B. The liberal theory of justice . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Beck, C. M., Crittenden, B. S. , and Sullivan, E. V. Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Bergman, M. "Moral decision making in the light of Kohl berg and Bonhoffer: a comparison." Religious Education , 1974, 69, 227-243. Craig, R. "Lawrence Kohlberg and moral development: some reflections." Educational Theory , 1974, 24, 121-127. Crittenden, B. S. Discussion. In C.' M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Demos, R. The philosophy of Plato . Chicago: Scribner's Sons, 1939. 141

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143 Irwin, D. M. and Ambron, S. E. "Moral judgment and role-taking in children ages three to seven." ERIC , 1961, ED 084 033, 1-58. Kant, I. "Fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals." In A. Zweig (Ed.), The essential Kant . (Jew York: Mentor, 1970. Keniston, K. "Student activism, moral development and morality." American Journal of Orthopsychiatry , 1970, 40, 577-592. Kohlberg, L. "The development of children's orientations toward a moral order: I. Sequence in the development of moral thought." Vita Humana , 1963a, 6, 11-33. Kohlberg, L. "Moral development and identification." In H. Stevenson (Ed.) > Child psychology 62nd yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963b. Kohlberg, L. "Development of moral character and moral ideology." In M. Hoffman and L. Hoffman (Eds.), Review of child development research (Vol. I). New York: Russell Sage, 1963. Kohlberg, L. "A cognitive developmental analysis of children's sex-role concepts and attitudes." In E. Maccoby (Ed.), The development of sex differences . Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966a. Kohlberg, L. "Cognitive stages and preschool education." Human Development , 1966b, 9, 5-17. Kohlberg, L. "Moral education in the schools: a developmental view." The School Review , 1966c, 74, 1-30. Kohlberg, L. "Moral education, religious education, and the public schools: a developmental view." In T. R. Sizer (Ed.), Rel igion and public education . New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. Kohlberg, L. "The child as a moral philosopher." Ps ycholo gy Today, 1968a, 2, 25-30. Kohlberg, L. "Early education: a cognitive-developmental approach." Child Development , 1968b, 39, 1013-1062. Kohlberg, L. "Stages in moral growth." International Journal of Religious Education , 1968c, 44, 8-11. Kohlberg, L. "Stage and sequence: the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization." In D. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research . New York: Rand McNally, 1969. Kohlberg, L. "Education for justice: a modern statement of the Platonic view." In T. Sizer (Ed.), Moral education . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.

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145 McBride, A. "Moral education and the Kohlberg thesis." Momentum , 1973, 4, 23-27. Mitchel, J. J. "Moral growth during adolescence." Journal of Moral Education , 1974, 3, 123-128. Morgan, K. P. Philosophical problems in cognitive-moral-development theory: a critique of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. (Unpublished paper, 1975) Orr, J. B. "Cognitive-developmental approaches to moral education: a social ethical analysis." Educational Theory , 1974, 24, 365-373. Ostwald, M. Nicomachean ethics: Aristotle . Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1962. Peters, R. S. "Moral developments: a plea for pluralism." In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology . New York: Academic Press, 1971. Piaget, J. The moral judgment of the child . Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1932. Rawls, J. "The sense of justice." Philosophical Review , 1963, 72, 281-305. Rawls, J. A theory of justice . Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971. Rawls, J. "Justice as fairness." In P. W. Taylor (Ed.), Problems of moral philosophy . Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1972. Rest, J. R. "The hierarchical nature of moral judgment: a study of patterns of comprehension and preference of moral stages." Journal of Personality , 1973, 41, 86-109. Rosen, B. Ethical neutrality and cognitive-developmental theories. (Unpublished paper, 1975) Scriven, M. Discussion. In C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (Eds.), Moral education . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970. Selman, R. L. and Lieberman, M. "An evaluation of a curriculum for primary group children based on cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning." ERIC , 1972, ED 077 565. Shorey, P. The unity o f Plato's thought . New York: Archon Books, 1968. Sholl, D. "The contributions of Lawrence Kohlberg to religious and moral education." Religious Education , 1971, 66, 364-372. Smith, M. "Kohlberg and McPhail--a comparison." Journa l of Moral Education, 1973, 1, 353-359.

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146 Sullivan, E. V., McCullough, G. , and Stager, M. "A developmental study of the relationship between conceptual ego and moral development." Child Development , 1971, 41, 401-411. Sullivan, E. V. and Quarter, J. "Psychological correlates of certain post-conventional moral types: a perspective on hybrid types." Journal of Personality , 1972, 41, 151-161. Taylor, P. W. Normative discourse . Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1961. Thomson, J. A. K. The ethics of Aristotle . London: Penguin, 1953. Turiel , E. and Rothman, R. "The influence of reasoning on behavioral choice at different stages of moral development." Child Development , 1972, 43, 741-756. Urmson, J. 0. "On grading." Hind , 1950, 59, 145-159. Von Wright, G. The varieties of goodness . London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1973.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH M. Evelyn Barge Kincaid was born in Miami, Florida, November 13, 1934. She attended public schools in Miami until 1953 when she enrolled in Brenau College in Gainesville, Georgia. After attending Brenau for three years she transferred to the University of Miami and received her baccalaureate degree in history and Spanish in 1957. This same year she started her graduate work at the University of Florida and graduated in 1959 with a master's degree in rehabilitation counseling. In 1959, she moved to Bartow, Florida, where she taught in the public school system. In 1962, feeling the need to further develop her interest in education, she again matriculated at the University of Florida where she earned a second master's degree in elementary education. The year this degree was awarded was 1964. From 1964-1967 she served as a public school teacher in the city and county school systems in Asheville, North Carolina. After living in Asheville, she moved to Tampa, Florida, where she does substitute teaching from time to time. In 1968, she resumed her graduate studies on a part-time basis at the University of South Florida. She entered the doctoral program in 1971 at the University of Florida and continued study on a full-time basis . She is married to George Harold Kincaid. They have four children, Kevin, Kerry, Karl, and Keith. Her professional and honorary societies include the John Dewey Society, Kappa Delta Pi, Tau Sigma, Phi Kappa

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Hal G. Lev/is , "Chai rman Distinguished Service Professor of Education I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Richard R. Renner Professor of Education I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 44 1 P.-f/oy Richard P. Haynes f Associate Professor of Phi losophy This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Education and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Phi losophy. Dean, Graduate School