Citation
Government agricultural resettlement policy and the responses of farmers in Zimbabwe

Material Information

Title:
Government agricultural resettlement policy and the responses of farmers in Zimbabwe
Creator:
Akwabi-Ameyaw, Kofi, 1946-
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
xxii, 494 leaves : ill. ; 28 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Agricultural land ( jstor )
Agriculture ( jstor )
Corn ( jstor )
Cotton ( jstor )
Crops ( jstor )
Farmers ( jstor )
Farming systems ( jstor )
Farms ( jstor )
Public policy ( jstor )
Rural development ( jstor )
Agriculture and state -- Zimbabwe ( lcsh )
Anthropology thesis Ph. D
Dissertations, Academic -- Anthropology -- UF
Farmers -- Zimbabwe ( lcsh )
Land settlement -- Zimbabwe ( lcsh )
Rural conditions -- Zimbabwe ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1989.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 437-493).
Additional Physical Form:
Also available online.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
Copyright Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Resource Identifier:
22172859 ( OCLC )
21163351 ( ALEPH )

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:


Full Text















GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE
RESPONSES OF FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE











By

KOF I AKWAB I-AMEYAW


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1988


























Copyright 1988

by

Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw

















To


Naana Afia Apomasu (Asantewaa) who lies permanently at peace interred on December 19, 1986, at Sawua, Asante Region of Ghana, West Africa, among her royal Oyoko ancestors.


"Apomasu damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe!"


Wo nana Kofi Kwabi, mebaa asuogya se mere bepe biribiri aba fie de abehye wo anuonyam naanso owuo koronfoo aama maanhu wo bio. Ei! Eye nokware, Nananom kaa se,

"Owuo kura ade a Nkwa entumme ngye."

Owuo busuoni waye me ade; wama meedi awerehoo wo asuogya ha. Apomasu! Wo nananom ne abusua nyinaa yekae wo dabiara. Yenim se wogyina yakyi akyinapa.

"Apomasu damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe!"
















ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


The major funding for the field research for this dissertation was

provided by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, New York, under a Developing Country Fellowship (Number 4500-4201). I am forever indebted to the Foundation for this support which enabled me to collect data

in Zimbabwe in 1985.

In Zimbabwe I was affiliated to the University as a Research Associate. I am grateful to Professor Gordon Chavunduka who chairs the Department of Sociology for making this possible. My friend and Shona teacher Dr. Norris

Dembetembe, Chairman, Department of African Languages and Literatures was quite helpful in arranging permission for my stay and research. I am equally thankful also to Dr. Langford Chitsike, then the Principal Secretary Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, and his staff for the invaluable assistance and cooperation without which the research would not have been possible. Here, I have to mention the Director, Department of Rural Development, the Chief Resettlement Officer and the Regional Rural Development Officer, Mashonaland Region. The Provincial Agricultural and Technical Extension Officer, Mashonaland Central Province and his field staff in Bindura, Mount Darwin and Shamva Districts were all immensely helpful.

Special thanks are due my senior investigator Mr. Gerald Mlambo, an ex-guerrilla combatant during the country's liberation war and former Resettlement Assistant in charge of the Karoi District. Research Assistants Jabulani, Chazungwiza and Nicholas Kanokanza were indeed "real comrades" to


iv










me. I will remain ever grateful for their friendship, the diligence and the dedication with which they assisted in this research. Through these

individuals I experienced rural Zimbabwe in ways that would not have been possible otherwise.

Still in Zimbabwe, many individuals were extremely supportive of my research with their time and other resources. The list is endless. I would like to single out my old time friend Mr. Victor Kwasi Nartey and his family. Sincere thanks also go to Dr. Kwasi Agyepong-Boateng and his wife Akosua, Dr. Kwame Asumadu, Messrs. Ayensu, Bonsi, Mate-Korle and Ambaah for according me the traditional Ghanaian hospitality anytime I called on them. As the saying goes: "Me daase a ensa!" I am most particularly indebted also to my two Tanzanian friends Mr. Suleimani Hashim Alli and Ms. Maryam Omar for their company and providing me with various forms of assistance during the

fieldwork. The numerous Zimbabwean friends and colleagues, deserve special thanks. Among them are Dr. Mandivamba Rukuni, Department of Land Management, and Dr. Florence Chanakira, Department of Biology, both at the University of Zimbabwe, Messrs. C.P. Maziofa, Chinyuke and J.P. Ngorima and all his colleagues the Resettlement Officers, DERUDE, Mashonaland Region and Messrs. Mashayamombe and Muzhuzha, AGRITEX, Mount Darwin and "Mwanangu" Cosmas Nyadzayo. To Philip Kofi Amoah and family, University of Swaziland, Manzini, I say thank you also.

I lack the appropriate words to convey my deepest gratitude to the many

farmers, rural dwellers, public servants and research informants who willingly

accepted me into their homes, farms and meetings. I appreciate the assistance of Mr. Matiza, Chirume Secondary School, Mr. achokoto, Chindunduma Primary School, and the Principals and teachers of Magadzi, Mudzinge, Mukwari and Muringamombe schools in Mufurudzi. To Messrs. Ennias Mutyambizi and Peter


V










Kanyandura of Gatu village, Garikai Sigauke of Chitepo, India Dyariwa of Nehanda, Kenneth Gadaga of Sanye village 9, Godfred Dimba of Simba Youth, Lukson Chihuri of Goora, David Matope of Kandeya, the respective Chairmen of Development Committees in the villages and the Sabuku or the chiefs and headmen of the villages and homesteads where I worked I respectfully ask that my heartfelt salute be traditionally accepted on behalf of all the farmers of Zimbabwe: Pamberi ne Kurima!. To Amai Getrude Mukoka of Mupedzanhamo village, Mufurudzi Scheme and all the Vanamai who always so kindly cooked sadza ne muriwo for us I say: Tatenda chaiso!.

Here at the University of Florida I am most especially thankful to

Professor Brian M. du Toit my committee chairman, graduate advisor, teacher

and friend for his interest in my work and well-being, patient guidance and personal and professional support. His office and home were always open to me and there is no way that I would have survived the frustrations and ordeals of the course work and dissertation phases of my graduate work without his encouragement which prods me on to "hang in there." The wise direction and deep involvement of all the remaining members of my committee in the preparation of this dissertation also merit appreciation. I wish to thank Dean Madelyn M. Lockhart, Dr. Paul L. Doughty, Dr. Robert Lawless and Dr. Peter J. van Blokland for their individual and collective assistance in this regard. To Dr. R. Hunt Davis, Center for African Studies, and Dr. Ronald Cohen, Department of Anthropology, I owe a debt of gratitude in all respects.

Many colleagues and friends at the University of Florida have in various ways also facilitated my studies, the analysis of the field data and the writing of the dissertation. Julian Arturo, Jim McKay and Jon Benjamin were

very helpful with aspects of my data analysis especially the computer programs. Gary and Nancy Gullic, Dr. David Suggs, Dr. Geeta Chowdhry, Sara


vi










Norton and Carol Lauriault also deserve many thanks for their intellectual support and assistance.

The following individuals and families have contributed so generously to my stay and education in this country in such important ways that I can hardly forget about them. First and foremost I deeply appreciate the intellectual guidance of Dr. Barry L. Isaac a dear friend and teacher, who first opened my eyes to the exciting field of cultural anthropology when I studied under him for the M.A. at the University of Cincinnati. To Mr. and Mrs. Huie Proffit as

well as my friends Dennis and Debbie Harrington, Barbara Huels and Tim Jackering all of Cincinnati, Ohio, I say thank you. Ken Terrell, Dr. Aletta Biersack, Dr. Michael Yaw Boateng, Dr. Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, Frank Yeboah, Kwabena Okrah, J. P. Owusu-Ansah, Arnold and Pat Fergus, James Ansoanuur and Elizabeth Essel and their children Freida, Mwitse and George have all been of immense support. Similarly, I acknowledge Kwasi Yamoah, Ernest Yaw Kwarteng, Isaac Nketiah, Kofi and Akosua Akumanyi, Kwadwo Agyeman, Kwame Akosah and Herman Kofi Duh respectively, for their invaluable assistance both in Ghana and here in the United States.

I wish to thank also Dr. Kwaku Twumasi-Ankrah who helped to arrange for my graduate education in this country and also contributed in many ways to my upkeep and that of my family. It has been a rather long and hard road and Kwaku and his wife Comfort and children Kwasi, Kwadwo and Amma deserve my heartfelt appreciation for everything. The same gratitude goes to my in-laws Mama Joana Osei Bemma, St. Croix, Virgin Islands and her children and Mr. and

Mrs. Anane Sekyere, Tema, Ghana. Professor S. K. B. Asante, United Nations Institute for Namibia, Lusaka, is indeed a nana to whom I owe so much for

making it possible for me to travel to Zimbabwe and, more importantly, for the immeasurable benefits that I derive from our association, his intellectual


vii










acumen, worldly experience and traditional wisdom.

My own family, the immediate and the extended, is worthy of mention for

the "sacrifice" which has made it possible for me to travel all this long way. My wife Amma provided much of the financial support for my graduate studies and part of the dissertation fieldwork. I am most exceptionally indebted to her forever for her love, understanding and support. Similar thanks go to our children Adwoa Asantewaa, Adwoa Durowaa, Amma Kyerewaa, Kwasi Twumasi-Ankrah and Kwadwo Awua. Finally, to my parents Francis Kojo Yinkah and Akua Manu, my brothers and sisters I convey my sincere and heartfelt appreciation for the prayers and encouragement which have seen me through graduate studies.







































viii


t,
















TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF FIGURES. . . . . . . . . . . .


ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . .


iv

xiii

xx


xxi


CHAPTERS


I INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . .


I


The Background to the Research Problem. . .
The Research Problem. . . . . . . .
Analytical and Conceptual Frameworks. . . .
Scope of the Study. . . . . . . .
Notes . . .. . . . . . . .

II BACKGROUND TO ZIMBABWE.. . . . . . .


Geographic and Agro-ecological Setting.
Historical Setting. . . . . . .
The Evolution of the Land Problem . Legislative Acts and the Impacts of Settler
Land Expropriation Policies . . . Postindependence Development Challenges
and Prospects . . . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . . .


III THE LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . .

Introduction. . . . . . . . .
The State and Agricultural Development Policy
State Ideology, Public Choice and the
Individual in Development . . . . .
Smallholder Agriculture and Development . .
Cooperatives and Agricultural Development . .
Rural Development . . . . . . . .
Poverty-Focused Development Strategies. . .
Land Reform . . . . . . . . .
Land Resettlement . . . . . . . .
Household Dynamics and Developmental Cycle. .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . .
Note. . . . . . . . . . .


ix


1
5
13 18 21

24

24 32 35


38

52 58

62

62 63

67
72 75
82 87 95 97
101 107 109


. . .


.
.
.
.
.


. .


.
.
.


.
.
.


.
.
.


.
.
.


.
.
.


. . .

. . .
. . .


. .

. .
. .










IV FIELDWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. . . . . .


Background Developments Towards Fieldwork . The Extended "Sondeo": Initial Months
of Fieldwork. . . . . . . . .
Getting a Closer Look at Resettlement
Policy and Devevelopment Implementation .
Ethnographic Survey and Observations. . . .
Data Collection Techniques. . . . . .
Study Variables . . . . . . . .
Sampling Techniques . . . . . . .
Data Handling and Analysis. . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . . . .


V AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT POLICY. . . . . . .


Introduction. . . . . . . . . . .
Resettlement Policy Objectives. . . . . . .
The Pivotal Role of Cooperatives in the
Government's Development Policy . . . . .
The Structure and Organization of Resettlement. . .
The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture
and Rural Resettlement. . . . . . . .
The Ministry of Local Government, Rural
and Urban Development . . . . . . .
Other Ministries. . . . . . . . . .
Land Acquisition and Tenure . . . . . . .
Resettlement Planning . . . . . . . .
Resettlement Scheme Models. . . . . . . .
Model A Resettlement Program. . . . . . .
Model B Resettlement Program. . . . . . .
Model C Resettlement Program. . . . . . .
Model D Resettlement Program. . . . . . .
Selection Criteria and Procedures and
Allocation of Holdings to Farmers: The
Case of Model A Schemes . . . . . . .
Implementation Structures and Process: The
Case of a Model A Normal Intensive Scheme . . .
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . .

VI CONTINUITY IN CHANGE: THE PRESERVATION OF THE OLD
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW FARMING SYSTEMS. . .


Introduction. . . . . . . . .
The Large-Scale (European Commercial)
Farm Sector . . . . . . . .
The Small-Scale (African Commercial)
Farm Sector . . . . . .,.....
The Communal Area (Peasant) Farm Sector . Resettlement Program Farms. . . . . Conclusion. . . . . . . . . .
Note. . . . . . . . . . .


x


, .


. . 185

. 186


190 193
199 203 203


.
.
.
.
.
.
.


.
.
.
.
.
.
.


110

110

111

117
122 126 128 128 137
140


145

145 146

149 151

154

156 157 163 166 167 167 169 171 172


173

175 179 180


185


. . . .


.
.
.
.
.


.
.
.
.
.










VII CASE STUDY OF FARMERS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAMS: MASHONALAND
CENTRAL PROVINCE. . . . . . . . . . 204

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . 204
Farmers: Responses to Some Background Issues From
the Commercial and Communal Areas- Farmers. . . 205
The Large-Scale Commercial Farmers of Bindura
Intensive Cultivation Area. . . . . . 205
The Small-Scale Commercial Farmers of Chesa
Nyajenje and Karuyana . . . . . . . 207
The Communal Area Farmers of Bushu, Madziwa
and Kandeya . . . . . . . . . 209
Farmers: Their Social and Demographic
Characteristics . . . . . . . . . 210
Farmers: Their General Responses and Evaluation
of the Government's Resettlement Policies and
Programs . . . . . . . .. . . . 223
The Farmers of Mufurudzi Model A Normal and
Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated Schemes. . 223
The Farmers of Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira,
Kushingirira and Simba Youth Model B Producer
Cooperative Schemes . . . . . . . 225
Farmers: Their Attitudes and Perceptions About
Life Situation. . . . . . . . . . 246
Farmers: Their Material Resources and
Capital Assets. . . . . . . . . . 254
Farmers: Their Farm-Level Constraints . . . . 264
Farmers: Household Developmental Cycle,
Micro-Level Agricultural Characteristics
and Economic Performance . . . . . . 275
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . 285
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

VIII THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESETTLEMENT . o . . 295

Evaluating Change and Development . . .. ,... 295
Macro-Level Costs, Development Inputs and
Economic Projections. . . . . . . . 298
Assessing the Socio-Economic and Political
Performance of Resettlement Schemes . . . . 309
Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model A Schemes. 310
Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model B
Cooperative Schemes . . . . . . . 317
Mufurudzi Scheme as an Illustrative Case of
Model A Resettlement. . . . . . . . 338
Mufurudzi: The Foundations of a Successful
Agricultural Resettlement Scheme . . . . 348
Simba Youth Scheme as an Illustrative Case of
Model B Resettlement. . . ,. . . . . 365
Simba Youth: Economic Performance and the
Genesis of a Problematic Agricultural
Resettlement . . . o . . . . . . 375
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . o. 378
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . 380


xi










IX CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . 383

Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . 383
Macro-Level Impacts of Resettlement ..........386
Micro-Level Impacts of Resettlement . . . . 390 Policy Implications for Development . . . . 394 Recommendations and a Discussion. . . . . . 397
The Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes. . . 397 The Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes. . . 399 The Non-Governmental Organizations. . . . . 402 The Agricultural Finance Corporation. . . . 404
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . 409
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . 410

APPENDICES

A Developmental Cycle Typology . . . . . . 412
B Evaluation Study Variables . . . . . . 1 413
C Model B Producer Cooperatives Management Survey. . 416 D Case Study Variables . . . . . . . . 417
E List of Resettlement Models and Schemes in Zimbabwe. 426 F Resettlement Application Form. . . . . . . 428
G Resettlement Permits . . . . . . . . 431


REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . 437

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. . . . . . . . . . . 494


xii













LIST OF TABLES


TABLES


2-1 Distribution of Natural Regions, Rainfall
and Related Farming Systems in Rhodesia. . . . . 2-2 Proportion of Total Land Under Various
Ownership Categories in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. . . . . 2-3 Proportion of Land Ownership in Zimbabwe by Natural Regions, Race and Farming System. 2-4 Population Pressure in Relation to Carrying
Capacity in the Communal Areas of Rhodesia . . . 2-5 Distribution of Personal Income in Rhodesia. . . . 2-6 Distribution of African Cash Wages in Rhodesia . . .


4-1 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: List of
Villages, Maize Productivity and the Villages
Selected for Case Study. . . . . . . . . . 130

4-2 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Villages,
Households and the Number Selected and
Interviewed for Case Study . . . . . . . . 132

4-3 Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated Schemes:
Villages, Households and the Number Selected
and Interviewed for Case Study . . . . . . . 133

4-4 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes:
Reported Membership and the Number of
Members/Households Interviewed . . . . . . . 134

4-5 Communal Area (Peasant) Sector: Areas,
Subdivisions, Households Selected and Interviewed. . . 136

4-6 Small-Scale Commercial Farmers Sector:
Area, Households Selected and Interviewed. . . . . 138

4-7 Large-Scale Commercial Farmers Sector: Area,
Farmers Identified, Sampled and Surveyed . . . . . 138

5-1 Zimbabwe: Provincial Distribution of Resettlement
Models and Schemes, September 1985 . . . . . . 148

5-2 Government Agencies and Their Respective
Duties in the Area of Resettlement. . . . . . 159


xiii


Page


. 31 41 43 43


46 46


.










7-1 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Home Country. 7-2 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Home Province 7-3 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Communal Area 7-4 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Age . . . 7-5 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Gender. . . 7-6 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Marital Status. 7-7 Mashonaland Central Province: Marriage Structures of
Male Farmers . . . . . . . . . .

7-8 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Wives Married


by Male Farmers Since 1980 .


7-9 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Living Children of Farmers. . . . . . . . . .

7-10 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Children
Born to Farmers in 1980-1985 . . . . . . . .

7-11 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Level of
School Completed . . . . . . . . . . .

7-12 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' NonAgricultural Skills. . . . . . . . . .

7-13 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers Household Size . 7-14 Mashonaland Central Province: Distribution of
Household Developmental Cycle Types. . . . . . .

7-15 Model A Schemes: Farmers' First Source of
Information About Resettlement Program . . . . . 7-16 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Reasons for Resettlement . . 7-17 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Recommendation to Improve
the Effectiveness of Resettlement Team . . . . . 7-18 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers'
Occupations Prior to Joining the Cooperative . . . 7-19 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers'
Residence Prior to Joining the Cooperative . . . . 7-20 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers'
First Sources of Information About the Cooperative . . 7-21 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members
Reasons for Joining the Cooperative. . . . . .


. . 212 . 212 . 213 . 213 . 215

* . 215


* . 216


. . . . I . . . 216


. 218 218 219 219 221 222 224 224 226 228 228 229 229


xiv









7-22 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Some General
Responses to Resettlement and Organizational Issues
Relating to Their Cooperative. . . . . . . . 231

7-23 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members'
Duration of Stay in Their Cooperatives . . . . . 234

7-24 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members'
Expected Incomes for Work Done in 1984-85 Season . . . 234

7-25 Communal Area: Farmers' Responses to Issues Relating
to the Communal Land Problem and Resettlement. . . . 236

7-26 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' If Relatives
Have Been Resettled and in Which Model . . . . . 238

7-27 Mashonaland Central Province: Commercial Farmers'
Ratings of Issues About Government's Agricultural
and Resettlement Policies. . . . . . . . . 240

7-28 Mashonaland Central Province: Commercial Farmers'
Responses to Other Questions About the Resettlement
Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

7-29 Resettlement and Small-Scale Commercial. Farmers'
Responses as to Where Lands are Available for
Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

7-30 Mashonaland Central Province: Resettlement and
Area Communal Farmers' Responses Towards Common
Access to Resettlement Resources . . . . . . . 243

7-31 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Rating of
Government's Policy to Socialize the Country's
Agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

7-32 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers'
Recommendation for Better Agriculture for
the Country . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

7-33 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Conception
of Attributes of a "Good Life" (Upenyu Hwakanaka).. . . 248

7-34 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Response
as to Whether or not Good Life is Possible in this
Area/Farming System for Farmer and Children. . . . . 248

7-35 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preference
for Job Location if Wage Employment is the Only
Option for Achievement of a Good Life. . . . . . 250

7-36 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preference
for Farming System if Agriculture is the Only
Option for Achievement of a Good Life. . . . . . 250


xv










7-37 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Choice of
Likely Items in Which to Invest $1,000 . . .

7-38 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers- Choice of
Post-School Profession for Their Children
Compared With Self-Choice By Graduating Students From Mufurudzi Model A Scheme Elementary Schools

7-39 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preceptions
of Life Situations . . . . . . . .

7-40 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Ownership
of Household Items . . . . . . . .

7-41 Mashonaland Central Province: When Household
Material Items Acquired. . . . . . .

7-42 Mashonaland Central Province: Whether Farmers'
Purchased Clothing Items in 1985 . . . .

7-43 Hashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Ownership
of Production/Capital Assets . . . . . .

7-44 Mashonaland Central Province: When Production/
Capital Assets Acquired. . . . . . .

7-45 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Cattle
Owned by Farmers . . . . . . . .

7-46 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Donkeys
Owned by Farmers . . . . . . . . .

7-47 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Goats
Owned by Farmers . . . . . . . .

7-48 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Sheep
Owned by Farmers . . . . . . . . .

7-49 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Faced in the Initial Years of
Resettlement . . . . . . . . .

7-50 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Faced at the Beginning of the
1985-86 Season . . . . . . . . .

7-51 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Sources of Problems They Faced at the Beginning
of the 1985-86 Season. . . . . . . .

7-52 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Encounter With the Agricultural
Finance Corporation. . . . . . . . .


. . . 252





. 252


. . . 255 . . 257 . . 258 . . 259 . 260 . . 261 . . 263 . . 263 . . 265 . . 265 . . 267 . . 269 . . 269


. 270


xvi


. .









7-53 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Encounter With the Grain
Marketing Board. . . . . . . . . . . 271

7-54 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Encounter With the Cotton
Marketing Board. . . . . . . . . . . 271

7-55 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Their Resettlement Scheme Needs. . . . . . . . 273

7-56 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Who to Provide Resettlement Scheme Needs . . . . . 273

7-57 Communal Area: Farmers' Identification of
Problems Affecting Their Agricultural Performance. . . 274

7-58 Communal Area: Farmers' Proposed Solutions to
the Problems Affecting Their Agricultural
Performance. . . . . . . . . . . . 276

7-59 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Producer Units. . . . . . 278

7-60 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Consumer Units. . . . . . 278

7-61 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Head of Cattle Owned. . . . 280

7-62 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Hectares Cultivated . . . . 280

7-63 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household (91 Kilograms) Bags of
Maize Retained for Consumption . . . . . . . .284

7-64 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Net Farm cash Flow. . . . . 284

7-65 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Producer and
Consumer Units Ratio, Mean Hectares Cultivated
and Mean Net Farm Cash Flow. . . . . . . . . 287

7-66 Model A Schemes: Producer Units and Mean Per Capita
Net Cash Income. . . . . . . . . . . . 288

8-1 Zimbabwe: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development Budget Expenditure 1981-82/1985-86 . . . 299

8-2 Zimbabwe: Sources of Funding, Costs and Rates of
Return Selected Model A Normal Intensive Schemes . . . 302


x-v iLI










8-3 Zimbabwe: Sources of Funding, Costs and Rates of Return for Selected Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

8-4 Zimbabwe: Budget Allocation, Summary of Capital Expenditure and Balance for Model A and Model B
Normal Intensive Schemes as at July 31, 1985 . . . . 305

8-5 Mashonaland Region: List of Resettlement Models and Schemes December 1985 . o. . . . . . . . 311

8-6 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers' Evaluation of Attitudinal and Activity Profiles
in Model A Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 314

8-7 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers' Evaluation of Implementation Agencies and Related
Services in Model A Normal Intensive Schemes . . . . 316

8-8 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers' Evaluation of Attitudinal and Activity Profiles
in Model B Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 319

8-9 Mashonaland Region: Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes' Management Committees Identification of
Problems and Their Suggested Solutions . . . . . 321

8-10 Mashonaland Region: Government's Grants, Expenditures
and Balance on Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes
From 1980 to July 31, 1985 . . . . . . . . 323

8-11 Mashonaland Region: Agricultural Finance Corporation
(AFC) Loans to Selected Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

8-12 Mashonaland Region: NonGovernmental Organizations
(NGOs) Aid and Financial Assistance to Selected
Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes . . . . . . 326

8-13 Mashonaland Region: Target Membership and Trends
in Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes, 1983-1985 . . 336

8-14 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Number of
Households, Arable and Livestock Capacities. . . . . 340

8-15 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Project Costs,
Expenditure and Balance as at July 31, 1985. . . . . 347

8-16 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Crop Build-Up
to Target Income Levels. . . . . . . . . 349

8-17 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Livestock
Build-Up to Target Income Levels . . . . . . . 350


xviii










8-18 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Summary of Crop
and Livestock Build-Up to Target Income Levels . . . 350

8-19 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in
Households' Land Use Intensity, 1982-83/1984-85. . . . 355

8-20 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Households'
Land Use Characteristics, 1984-85 Season . . . . . 356

8-21 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in
Households Maize Productivity . . . . . . .. 358

8-22 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in
Households Cotton Productivity . . . . . . 359

8-23 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in Maize
Production, Household Retention and Sale . . . . . 361

8-24 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in Mean
Household Maize Retentions for Domestic Use. . . . . 362

8-25 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in the
Build-Up of Cattle Herds . . . . . . . . 363

8-26 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Crop Costs and
Returns, 1984-85 Season . . o. . . . . . . 364

8-27 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme:
Budget Allocation, Summary of Capital Expenditure
and Balance as at July 31, 1985. . . . . . . 367

8-28 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme:
Cropping Budget . . . . . . . . . . . 370

8-29 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme:
Membership and Cropping Management Problems,
1984-85 Season . . . . . . . . . . . 373


xix














LIST OF FIGURES


FIGURES

1-1 Zimbabwe: Resettlement and Rural Development
Model. . . . . . . . . . . .

2-1 Zimbabwe: Admninistrative Provinces. . . . .

2-2 Zimbabwe: Regional Distribution of
Cultural Groups .. . . . . . . . . .

2-3 Zimbabwe: Distribution of Natural Regions. . . 4-1 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Schemes and Areas Visited During Various Phases of the
Field Research . . . . . . . . .

5-1 Zimbabwe: Organizational Structure of Resettlement
Administration and Implementation. . . . .

7-1 Mashonaland Central Province: Case Study Areas .

7-2 Good Life-Difficult Life Continuum . . . .

8-1 Mashonaland Region: Distribution of Resettlement
Models and Schemes . . . . . . . .

8-2 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Resettlement
Villages and Adjoining Farming Systems . . .


3-3 Mount Darwin and Bindura: Probability of Rainfall
in Excess of 15 millimeter Occurring Within a Pentad
Versus The Possibility of a Dry Spell in Excess
of Twenty Days . . . . . . . . . .

8-4 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme:
Projected Build-Up to Target Membership Compared
With Trends in Actual Membership, 1981-1985. . .


Pages


.

.


.

.




.


.

.

.


.


.


xx


. . 16 . . 25 . . 27 . . 30




* . 114


* . .152

* . .206 . .253


* . 312


* . 341





* . 343 I . 376












Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of
the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE RESPONSES OF FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE

By

KOFI AKWABI-AMEYAW

April 1988

Chairman: Professor Brian M. du Toit Major Department: Anthropology


This dissertation is based on fieldwork carried out in the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and also among farmers in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa. It examines (1) the resettlement policy formulated and implemented by the government since independence in 1980 and (2) employs Fortes' concept of developmental cycle in domestic groups to study aspects of the responses of the country's farmers towards the policy and its programs.

The on-going project seeks to resettle 162,000 landless African families on European-owned lands which were either abandoned or are currently underutilized. In the government's view the program is necessary to redress years of forced removals of Africans from their ancestral lands onto marginal agricultural areas by Rhodesian settler administrations, a problem that resulted in nearly a decade of a bitterly fought liberation war. The government hopes also to ensure a broad based economic growth by integrating the existing dualistic African subsistence-oriented and the European commercialized sectors of the country's political economy. Critics of the program cite a dialetical contradiction between greater equity on the one hand and sustained economic growth on the other to argue that Zimbabwe may lose on both the growth and the equity fronts.


xxi










The research examined the program implementation through (1) the study of official records of development inputs and outcomes, (2) direct observation and (3) regional case study survey interviews of 630 farmers across the existing farming systems, namely, the (i) Large-Scale (European) Commercial,

(ii) Small-Scale (elite African) Commercial, (iii) Communal Area (African peasant), (iv) resettlement Model A individual households and (v) the

resettlement Model B Producer Cooperatives sectors.

The study found that (1) the government is making tremendous progress with the provision of the basic needs of these rural people; (2) the great majority of peasant farmers especially the Model A resettled families are

agriculturally quite productive; (3) there are macro-level problems, however, such as low membership in the Model B cooperative schemes which seriously

affect their performance and productivity; (4) contrary to the critics' predictions resettlement has not impacted negatively on commercial agriculture

and economic growth; and (5) contrary to the government's developmental assumptions resettlement is not reducing but rather it is accentuating, at the micro-level, the already existing socioeconomic differentiation within and between these rural societies.


xxii














CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION


The Background to the Research Problem


Rural and agricultural development in Zimbabwe, the most recent of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa to attain political independence, is an epitome of the variety of problems, the challenges and the strategies of

nation-building and economic development that confront the continent. The mobilization by African countries of their predominantly rural-based human, institutional, material and other resources for economic growth and development is a monumental task. Of crucial concern presently and in the long-run is the ability of these countries to successfully motivate and sustain the capacity of the rural sector to produce adequate quantities of agricultural and other materials to meet both their subsistence and market demands.

The period since the late 1960s has been particularly devastating for the political economies of many the countries. Generally, progress has been made in various fields of endeavors such as the provision of basic human needs including health facilities and educational opportunities. However, most countries continue to experience declining per capita food production, low agricultural output and negligible economic growth. The major consequences of this state of affairs include severe hunger, starvation, malnutrition and deaths in some places.

Indeed, countries of widely differing political and developmental

ideologies, historical backgrounds, geographic sizes and economic resource bases are all equally afflicted with one or the other dimension of this


1









2


problem. The African food crisis, as the problem has come to be conceptualized in the international community, is real. It relates in the broadest contexts to questions of development policy, strategies and outcomes.

The seriousness and the global implications of the crisis are emphasized succinctly by John Lewis who writes:


For several years now, much of the international
community's time for the discussion of development has been preempted by Sub-Saharan Africa. The news
there is nearly all bad. In a region where independent
governments have been pursuing explicit, often formally
planned, development efforts for a quarter-century,
where dozens of aid donors have been at work for much
of that time, and where both investment and aid per
capita have been fairly high by Third World standards
for many years, average per capita incomes are actually
lower than they were fifteen years ago . By and large, the continent has become one great composite
case of development not working. (Lewis 1986:17)


Students and analysts of African development and underdevelopment offer various explanations to account for the lack of economic growth and the consequent developmental crisis that engulf the continent.I

One major area of criticism, which is very well articulated in the literature, concerns the development policies pursued by these countries. Recently, for instance, Robert Bates (1984a) has charged that many African governments follow policies that foster agricultural decline. The World Bank's (1981) policy paper Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Agenda for Action, echoes a similar view that blames Africa's "overextended public sector" for the crisis. Benno Ndulu (1986), writing about governance and economic management in Africa, takes up this point. He argues that too much preoccupation by these governments to participate in every area of development endeavor has created situations where the available expertise and









3


resources are spread thin thus making it difficult to set their priorities right.

There is also the other school of thought which, while recognizing the primacy of the state, however, dwells on the forces and relations of production. Goran Hyden (1983) argues its case when he suggests that several economies in Africa are grinding to a halt because it is both risky and costly to operate a modern state on precapitalist modes of production and organization.

Yet other critics perceive the problem at the micro-level. Uma Lele

(1975), for instance, attributes the lack of success in African development to inadequate knowledge of local technical possibilities, small-farmer constraints and local institutions.

At any rate, the state has become a hypertrophic institution in Africa. Given its developmental apparatus, policies and particular ideological bent, it has increasingly assumed the controlling role over every aspect of development. Therefore, in any attempt to evaluate the climate and environment for agricultural and related development or the lack of it in Africa one needs to approach the state, perhaps, as the most important of all the phenomena to understand.

Equally significant is the role that farmers' institutions play in the overall process of change and development. Since these institutions, especially the social organization of the forces and relations of production, are primarily expressed through household dynamics, one needs also to understand the structures, processes and variations within and between households.

Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, became independent in April 1980 after a decade of liberation war. This fact is important for at least two reasons.








4


First, the birth of the country coincided with the most grim period when all of Africa faced a severe economic development crisis. Second, as the literature reviewed in Chapter III below indicates the documented experiences with specific policies and of countries which have trod the development path much longer are voluminous. Zimbabwe can therefore learn and draw important lessons from these cases in the process of formulating or adapting appropriate and workable policies to suit its needs and aspirations.

In summary then Zimbabwe represents both a challenge and an opportunity especially in terms of development choice and practice in Africa.3 The question arises, however, as to what outcome observers of the country's contemporary development scenario must expect in the future. Nevertheless, the policies that are being formulated and implemented today will shape at least the results which are likely to be realized principally in the short-term and perhaps in the long-run.

At independence, the government set out to tackle its problems of

nation-building and economic development through the use, among others, of a rural development strategy that centers on planned resettlement schemes. This is part of the Lancaster House agreement which worked out an independence constitution for African majority rule in the country. In line with the agreement the government of the United Kingdom partly financed the initial purchase by the Zimbabwean government of 1.1 million hectares of abandoned or underutilized European-owned lands to resettle 18,000 African farm families (Harbeson 1980). It was projected then that by 1985 a total of 162,000 such families would be resettled at the cost of about $400 million.

Bill Kinsey (1982:92) points out that the resettlement is the major

rural development activity and the only sustained public sector program in Zimbabwe that has the potential to affect fairly immediately and








5


significantly the economic welfare of large numbers of rural dwellers.

This dissertation seeks therefore to examine the policy dimensions and the socioeconomic aspects of the implementation of the resettlement. It will also discuss how Zimbabwean farmers view the entire resettlement exercise in the general context of the country's agriculture along with their opinions about the problems and prospects associated with it.



The Research Problem



The on-going resettlement of 162,000 farm families on new agricultural

lands is a massive egalitarian commitment on the part of the government. Like all other public sector development programs in the country the parameters of resettlement are set in the ideological context of socialism. As numerous other experiences bear out this fact has significant implications for the nature of state policies and involvement relating to the means and the ends of development (see for instance, Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Kenya 1965; Nyerere 1968; Samoff 1981; Weaver and Kronemer 1981; Ellman 1981; Munslow 1983).

Specifically, the government of Zimbabwe seeks through policy changes to effect structural and other needed transformations in the distribution of the country's agricultural land resources. This is to achieve stated policy objectives. Among them is the rehabilitation of the landless and the unemployed on abandoned and underutilized land as a way of ensuring full economic production and improving rural living standards (Zimbabwe 1981a:2).

Part of the government's rationale for embarking on a resettlement-based rural development policy is also provided by the then Prime Minister and now President Robert Mugabe. In his address to nations and international aid











organizations at the 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development he reiterated that his


Government clearly cannot accept a state of affairs in which millions of our people are condemned to a
life, nay a mere existence, characterised by stagnation, hopelessness and desperation. Our struggle for national
liberation--protracted, incalculably costly and herculean
as it was--would lose meaning were we, in the moment of
victory and the era of peace, to allow millions of our people to wallow in poverty and degradation as victims
of forces beyond their control. (Zimbabwe 1981c:31)


Given the historical background of the political economy of previous land distribution policies in the country, the postindependence agrarian reforms and resettlement have met with popular support from the great majority of the people. This support emanates largely from the populace which clamors for social or redistributive justice. There are others, however, who are disappointed with resettlement for various reasons. These fall into two different social classes.

In the first category are a number of effectively landless, prospective applicants and others who are on waiting lists for resettlement. Many of these people lament the slow pace of current resettlement. Some in particular are even shocked at the inaction of the government to expropriate all European farms. As one informant quipped, "the government owes us a duty to confisticate and distribute the vast hectares of our ancestral lands which were previously stolen and are currently being held by so-called European owners." Such critics either impatiently or justifiably accuse the government of softness, breach of promises made during the liberation war and even for condoning the status quo in so far as racial inequities in land distribution are concerned.

The disappointments of these critics were first articulated by Andre









7


Astrow (1983) and more recently in a publication edited by Ibbo Mandaza (1986). In the latter Sam Moyo (1986) argues that contrary to state propaganda and widespread publicity abroad less than 20 percent of the peasantry have profited from the so-called success story of Zimbabwe's agriculture, particularly in terms of the land redistribution program.

On the other hand there are some European and African commercial farmers who oppose resettlement. Their argument is that resettlement is likely to be detrimental to the conservation of the fragile natural resource base of the country. They charge that overstocking, uncontrolled land use and poor agricultural practices are a characteristic of "inexperience" farmers such as the resettled. Thus, they predict resettlement will surely lead to the underdevelopment of the country's agriculture. In their view resettlement is nothing more or less than the mere extension of the pitiful human and

ecological conditions that are found in the so-called communal or African rural areas into the Intensive Cultivation Areas (ICAs) or the commercial farm lands.

These views were re-echoed in June 27, 1985, by a former leading

opposition politician in the country, Joshua Nkomo now Zimbabwe's Second Vice-President. In response to questions about resettlement in a Face to Face interview on Zimbabwe television, Nkomo, then President of the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe All Peoples Union (PF-ZAPU), had this to say: (1) The ZANU-PF government's resettlement program was destructive; (2) it was turning rich fertile farm land into deserts; (3) it was washing millions of acres; (4) taking two thousand people from the communal [African rural] areas

and settling them on a farm which used to be managed by one man was turning the resettlement areas into communal areas and (5) that the whole country needed resettlement and not only a few.4









8


The central focus of the anti-resettlement criticism has also been related to a series of substantive issues that, in summary, question the efficacy of resettlement as the correct strategy to achieve stated developmental objectives. This criticism is built upon the theoretical and conceptual arguments in the rural development literature. It asserts that there is a dialectical contradiction between greater political and social equity on one hand and sustained economic growth on the other.

Bill Kinsey (1982:93), articulates this viewpoint cogently with a prediction that the Zimbabwean "society may lose on both the growth and equity fronts." Specifically, he (Kinsey 1982) raises the following additional concerns, arguing that



1. resettlement as an instrument for the implementation of
a policy of egalitarianism cannot be operated consistently
in terms of its own objectives without at the same time
reducing to unacceptable levels commercial agriculture's
important contribution to the national economy;

2. resettlement on the scale now envisaged may do severe
damage in the short run to the economic growth potential of the agricultural sector as a whole, thereby reducing
the resources available to the government for future
investment in promotion of development;

3. resettlement on an individual basis will create powerful
class interests that will be more difficult to reform in
the future than is the conflict between black and white
interests at present.


Some of these views are shared, for instance, by other critics including Malcolm Blackie (1982) and the Whitsun Foundation (Whitsun 1983).

These matters contested by the various observers have important

ramifications for evaluation research. Of particular interest are (1) the issues that governmental policy about agriculture, resettlement and rural development seeks to address, (2) the outcomes of such policy, in terms of









9


its intended and unintended consequences and (3) the attitudes and responses that the implementation of such policy is likely to generate among the supposed beneficiaries.

The research problem then is essentially an evaluative one. It is

organized around the state on the one hand and individual rural households on the other. This study is mindful of the nature and levels of the interactional network which links the two major actors in the development arena. The choice of actors reflects the reality which obtains in Africa. It also accords active rather than passive roles to the state and households. The respective and mutual capacities of both the state and households to create innovative opportunities and to provide the necessary and sufficient supportive or participatory conditions for development are immense.

The state in Africa is the principal, if not the exclusive initiator and executor of development policy. Even where private or voluntary and non-governmental organizations are an important agency for development it so happens that the framework for their operations are set and are closely monitored also by respective governments. More importantly, the state is the provider of most of the public or collective goods which are used Eor rural development. That is the case in Zimbabwe where in undertaking resettlement and rural development the state makes available, free of charge or at below market prices, resources that range from land through social and physical infrastructures to production incentives.

Similarly, the cumulative socioeconomic activities of African farm

households often make a lot of difference between the success and failure of government's induced rural development programs such as resettlement.5 rural Zimbabwe co-residing composite households living in homesteads which dot the spatial scene of the African and Communal Areas are recognizable








10


decision-making, production, consumption and reproduction units that development planners and executors have to deal with.

On the basis of the foregoing facts one can deduce from the agricultural resettlement policy of the government that it is being implemented in the national interest and for the benefit of the rural people. By providing land and other basic needs to the rural poor the government hopes to facilitate equity and justice as a way of ensuring productivity, economic growth and development.

Farm households and rural dwellers in general are hardly consulted and they do not participate in the formulation of policy nor in the identification of projects that may be essential to their welfare. Surprisingly however, they are often openly supportive of the rural development objectives of governments. They welcome whatever production resources and incentives which are made available to them. This does not mean that these individuals behave and act according to development planning projections. As individuals or even groups of like-minded persons they have their respective and different development agendas or goals. Indeed, in the case of households these are individually differentiated as it is most often the case by such factors as (1) demographic characteristics, (2) risk averseness, innovativeness and attitudinal profiles and (3) access to production assets. Their decision-making calculi, expectations and behaviors within the government created developmental environment are also guided by differential altruism and self interests. These concerns are in many cases not necessarily congruent with the somewhat ideal projections which are made by government planners.

Thus, it is theoretically possible for the state to use incentive or

reward systems such as the provision of basic human needs and public goods to











positively influence rural households and thereby achieve stated developmental goals. It is important to recognize, however, that since different households perceive such influence differently and invariably even respond differently to the same stimuli there is always the possibility of the occurence of other scenarios in developmental expectation. For example, the internal dynamics within and between households as well as any disagreements in the agendas of households and that of the government may change the outcomes of policy goals and result in diverse and differential impacts among the beneficiaries.

This hypothesis will be elucidated and empirically examined in rural

Zimbabwe. The study will therefore be concerned with the gathering, analysis and use of relevant qualitative and quantitative information to facilitate the following:



1. assessment of the means and ends of the agricultural
resettlement policy, articulated by the government since
1980, against the backdrop of the historical evolution
and the political economy impacts of the country's racial
patterns of land distribution;

2. examination of how the resettlement policy is being
implemented, both at the national, provincial and selected
individual scheme levels;

3. eliciting the respective responses of farmers, in terms
both of their attitudes and perceptions as well as the
constraints and the performance outcomes that characterize
their farming systems;

4. evaluation of the discernible socioeconomic and political
impacts of aspects of the resettlement which have been
implemented so far in terms of any differences in opportunity
or incentive systems, access and control over development
assets as well as in quality of life.

Eight years into Zimbabwe's independence and egalitarian resettlement and rural development it will be interesting to observe how different household structures and organizations are faring in terms of the following








12


proxy indices of social formation: (1) ownership of i.) cattle, which is a major attribute of a "good life" ( upenvu hwakanaka ), ii.) selected household items such as radios, watches and beds and iii.) selected capital assets such as ox-carts, plows, sprayers and cultivators; (2) intensity of land use; (3) household labor productivity for the two major crops, namely, maize and cotton; (4) farm net cash flow; and (5) the quantity of maize retained for household consumption.

Following the lines used in the pioneer work by Hadley Cantril (1963) about peoples' concerns and aspirations in the context of socioeconomic gratification and quality of life this study will also examine the Shona concept of "upenyu hwakanaka" (good life) in much detail. Similar studies in Africa done, for instance, by Jean Due (1980) in rural Kenya show that an individual's estimation of his or her present situation on the basis of

recollection of the past and perception of the future has significant implications for development. Equally important for this study is the work done by Robbins and Thompson (1974) on gratification orientations and individual modernization in rural Buganda in Uganda (see also Thompson 1975).

Using a "self-anchoring" scale in the form of a three step stairway representing upenyu hwakanaka-upenyu hwakaoma (good life-bad life) continuum Zimbabwe farmers will be asked to objectify their life situations for the periods before independence in 1980, then 1985 and for 1990. In addition, they will be asked to (1) define what to them is the essence of development or the attributes of a good life and (2) to specify what they will do with an amount of $1,000.

A systematic field study along these lines may generate the needed

relevant data to shed light on some of the questions that at least bear on the short term dimensions of the research problem.









13


Analytical and Conceptual Frameworks



The Zimbabwean resettlement experience provides an almost ideal

substantive environment to isolate and study the critical variables that relate to the performance of policy programs and social theories in real situations of change. It is reflected in the chapter on literature review below that far too little attention is paid by anthropologists to how development policy decisions initiated by governments get or fail to get transformed into impacts. This problem is underscored by Fernea and Kennedy (1966:349) who point out that very few studies have been made of processes of change as they happen. Consequently, theories of development are yet to fully benefit from all dimensions of the intriguing grassroots dynamics that characterize the behavior and actions of individuals and their institutional relationships with forces of change and development.

An important aspect of social theory bearing on the research problem which is vital for anthropological enquiry into development is the link between policy, the environment for its implementation and the kinds of responses that are generated in development programs. This issue is particularly germane, for instance, in studying agricultural resettlement or any development programs which involve human relocations. That is so because

the anthropological literature on relocation, in general, is critical of such programs viewing them as being disruptive of peoples lives.

Notwithstanding the fact that such a view may be true, it raises serious methodological problems as to what dynamics of change lead to which outcomes and in what situations. It is legitimate to assume here that only some and not all relocations or resettlements worsen the quality of life of the









14


affected people. If this is true, then anthropological research design for evaluating such programs has to do more by specifying what determinants and relationships facilitate or inhibit particular processes of development in given circumstances or situations. An analytical model or a conceptual formulation that addresses such methodological deficiencies in evaluation studies will aid in a better understanding of the issues at play.

For example, Cleveland (1971) states that under favorable conditions

there is high achievement rate for implementing expressed policy. Similarly, it is argued by others that value-based actions of policy makers may be most determinative of ultimate policy and that articulated goals exert significant influence upon behavior (Dolbeare and Hammond 1971; Brewer and Brunner 1975). In the same vein, Ronald Havelock (1979) demonstrates that awareness and interest are important correlates of acceptance and adoption of particular innovations by individuals as well as groups.

Granting that these assumptions hold there is no reason why the rather informative anthropological and other studies of resettlement should not be able to utilize them to provide the kinds of useful theoretical insights and concepts that explain success or failure of grassroots development.

Development as a concept may either be an end in itself or a process to an end. This study, being an anthropological evaluation of an on-going development program, approaches resettlement as a special kind of a social organization process that seeks to achieve desirable ends for rural Zimbabweans. The process is viewed as multifaceted in nature. Its end or policy objectives may only materialize given a particular constellation of factors and environments. In order for the resettlement to achieve any identifiable impacts or outcomes it is necessary that the clearly distinct components or clusters of variables which characterize it have to be








15


manipulated, harmoniously integrated and mutually sustained. These components are (I) policy, (2) implementation, (3) intervening conditions and (4) the beneficiaries.

A simplified analytical framework is introduced here in the form of a

resettlement and rural development model. This framework uses the four independent or determining variables to provide the broad parameters of the organizational structures and relationships that initially conceptualize the nature of the development process under study (Figure 1-1). The model provides for the following: (1) program inputs in the form of the government's policy

objectives, resources and implementing structures which are considered here to be a necessary condition for development; (2) policy beneficiaries who respond to program incentives or inputs in the context of their own respective interpretations or conceptions of what development objectives are; (3) the effects and reactions to intervening political, social and economic conditions both by the government and the policy beneficiaries alike; and (4) the

creation of intended or unintended impacts or development outcomes. These compartimentalized entities may be seen as constituting program inputs, the bridging outputs or the proximate and ultimate goals of development. The analytical specifications of this model conform to those recognised by many policy and evaluation studies.6

Ideally, development theory should provide sufficient explanation of how a rural development process based on resettlement programs of this nature is able to transform policy objectives and resources into desirable ends. But there is a paucity of pertinent information on that in the development literature.7 One therefore has to look elsewhere beyond the abstract into substantive areas of empirical reality or the contextual rural situation for

conceptual guidance.



















Implementing Agencies and Structures





Objectives IV

Beneficiaries Impacts

Resources 4





Intervening Conditions


Program Inputs


Bridging Outputs


Proximate/Ultimate
Goals


FIGURE: 1 1


ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL


16


Policy









17


Given our research problem and the analytical framework proposed for this study, it will be heuristically fruitful to evaluate aspects of the resettlement program in terms of the concept of developmental cycle in domestic groups (Fortes:1971). According to Meyer Fortes (1970:7), domestic groups have no permanent existence through time, in that each group comes into being, grows and expands and finally dissolves (see also Goody 1971).

As already indicated, demographic and social differentiation as well as the structural dynamics within and between households are crucially important in accounting for the success or failure of the formulation, planning, implementation and outcomes of development policy and programs. Household economic performance is the crucially determinant variable in the overall prospects for a successful rural development and resettlement outcome in Zimbabwe. The application of Fortes' paradigm to evaluate such performance will immensely improve our understanding of the role of social organization in development and change. As argued by its proponent, Meyer Fortes (1971:3), che "developmental factor is intrinsic to domestic organization and to ignore it leads to serious misinterpretation of the descriptive facts."

This study conceptualizes the household developmental cycle in rural Zimbabwe into four structurally distinct but sequential phases. These are

(1) establishment, (2) expansion, (3) consolidation and (4) decline. Two special "phases," namely, Single and Other are added (see Appendix A). The application of such dynamic variables as age, conjugal form and gender of the household head, the presence or absence of extended-kinship relations and the structural state of fission of the household makes it possible to duplicate other sub-types of the major phases.9 This added flexibility to the framework may facilitate a more comprehensive analysis of the data and a









18


better understanding of any patterns or variations than would otherwise be the case.10



Scope of the Study



This introductory chapter defines the research problem, the analytical and conceptual frameworks and the scope of the study. Chapter II reviews the background material on the geography and history of Zimbabwe. It traces the peopling of the country and emphasises the political economy dimensions of the evolution of racial dichotomy in land ownership and land use during the settler period of colonial Rhodesia. It then examines the impacts of various colonial land policies on rural Africans. Finally, it reviews the post-independence development challenges and prospects that confront Zimbabwe.

Chapter III is the review of the literature. It covers (1) the state and agricultural development, (2) state ideology, public choice and the individual, (3) the smallholder and cooperative modes of production, (4) rural development, (5) poverty-focused strategies, (6) land reform, (7) resettlement programs and (8) household dynamics and organization. The emphasis here is to draw out the lessons that these issues raise in either effecting or stifling change and development in Africa and other developing areas. The purpose of such a review also is to provide the theoretical and the substantive contexts for describing the on-going development experimentation within Zimbabwe.

Chapter IV outlines specific aspects of the fieldwork and research

methodology. It covers the initial experiences and the kinds of environments

within which the study was done. It describes the data sources and collection








19


techniques, study variables, sample units and analysis.

Chapter V deals with the main dimensions of the government's

resettlement policy in terms of its structural and organizational components. These are the objectives of resettlement, land acquisition, planning and implementation models, farmer selection and land allocation and the implementation and administrative set ups for the program. Chapter VI provides contextual background notes about (1) the old farming systems of the country, namely, the large and the small-scale commercial as well as the communal sectors and (2) the newly introduced systems made up of the resettlement sector farms. Of the latter only the two important models, that is, the Model A Normal individual household schemes and the Model B collective schemes are examined. The Chapter provides the prelude to the presentation of farmers' interview responses to the resettlement program.

In Chapter VII the analysis and description of a case study of the

responses of Zimbabwean farmers towards the resettlement policy and programs initiated and being implemented by the government are offered. Based on

survey interviews, key informants interviews and observations in the Mashonaland Central Province this case study covers farmers in the six major farming systems in the country. The chapter is divided into seven parts to cover (1) the background responses of the so-called commercial farmers, (2) the social and demographic characteristics of farmers and their households,

(3) farmers' attitudes and perceptions about their life situations, (4) farmers' assessment of resettlement and aspects of the government's policies on agriculture and rural development, (5) household material resources and capital assets that farmers possess, (6) farm-level problems encountered by farmers and (7) household developmental cycle, micro-level agricultural characteristics and economic performance.









20


Chapter VIII returns to the resettlement schemes. It presents the economic feasibility or pre-implementation performance expectations of selected schemes and models of the resettlement. A preliminary and general evaluation of the actual performance and the problems associated with the schemes implemented in the three provinces in the Mahonaland Region are given. The achievements and the disappointing outcomes of a contrasting Model A scheme and a Model B scheme chosen from a case study in the Mashonaland Central Province are also presented in this chapter.

Chapter IX is a summary and discussion of the research findings,

recommendations and conclusion. Its looks at the political economy and social dimensions of macro and micro-level impacts of resettlement in Zimbabwe and also the policy and theoretical implications of the findings for rural development planning and evaluation studies.









21


Notes


1.) The causes of agricultural underdevelopment in Africa have over the years been an issue of a long shifting debate. It used to be fashionable in the past to cite social attitudes and cultural barriers to efficient and productive resource allocation and utilization by traditional farmers as an impediment to growth. Latter critics then blamed the problem on one or more of these institutional deficiencies: (1) land tenure systems and practices;
(2) lack of credit and savings; (3) non-availability of production and marketing incentives; (4) policy bias for state-controlled, large-scale and mechanized production units; (5) urban food subsidies and changing consumer tastes; and (6) industrialization and the consequent neglect of the small-holder rural producer. The current thinking on the issue, apparently is not about the failure of African farmers anymore or the lack of institutions per se but rather the failure of ineffective and perverse agricultural policies formulated and implemented by African governments.

2.) For additional overview of the food problem, an elaboration of the various policy and substantive aspects of it, as well as its impacts on the general economic crisis facing the continent see Bates and Lofchie (1980), USDA (1981), Hyden (1983), Dharam and Radwan (1983), Lofchie and Commins (1984), Delgado and Mellor (1984), Barker (1984), Berry (1984), Gusten (1984), Christensen (1984), Rose (1985), Brown and Wolf (1985), Due (1986), Eicher (1986a, 1986b), Hansen and McMillan (1986), Ravenhill (1986), Berg and Whitaker (1986), Mellor (1986), Baker (1987).

3.) Gordon (1984) is right in pointing out that Zimbabwe is a dialectician's dream. Both the Left and the Right, respectively, see the future of the country in antithetical terms. Consequently, the role of Zimbabwe in shaping the particular kind of development ideology that will eventually emerge in Africa is being closely watched. For instance John Iliffe (1983:43) argues that, "[t]he future of Zimbabwe will be a fascinating test of the relative strength in modern Africa of state policy as against inherited objective reality. And the future of Zimbabwe is absolutely vital to the future of capitalism in Africa." To this Rafael Suarez (1984:12) adds that the postindependence record of the country is a mixed one and that if Prime Minister Mugabe continues to talk like Marx and act like Keynes, the country could turn out to be a strong, wealthy and stable place indeed. For other perspectives on this debate see, for example, Bratton (1977, 1978, 1981), Yates (1980), Munslow (1980a, 1983), Ballance (1981), Libby (1984).

4.) in June 1985, prior to Zimbabwe's second general elections, leaders of all the political parties in the country were respectively interviewed about domestic and international issues. Resettlement was an important question that came up among many others. On June 28, 1985, Nathan Shamuyarira, Minister of Information appeared on national television as the spokesman for the ruling ZANU-PF party. He responded to the assertions made by Nkomo the previous day by saying that Nkomo was not in agreement with land reform and resettlement at the Lancaster House negotiations [in London where an independence constitution for Zimbabwe was worked out] and that he, Nkomo, did not support the policy while serving as a Cabinet Minister in the ZANU-PF government.








22


5.) Both the colonial and postcolonial state in Africa have used various methods including legislation and even coercive measures to penetrate and manipulate traditional or indigenous systems and institutions. In many instances these systems have been eliminated or altered substantially into becoming mere carbon copies of what they used to be in pre-colonial times. We can mention authority and power structures such as chieftaincy, certain lineage and family rights and obligations in respect of bethrothal, marriage, divorce, property transfers, and collective ownership or access to particular resources. Yet, as Goran Hyden (1983) convincingly demonstrates for Tanzania and it is common place throughout Africa, the state is unable successfully to "capture," intrude, coerce, or even bribe the rural people to either eliminate, modify, or "modernize" the indigenous agricultural systems and their related institutions.

6.) For example, Hunter et al. (1976:10) suggest at least four criteria to analyse rural development. These are (1) the technical, ecological and economic situation of the farming community concerned; (2) the attitudes, capacities and needs of the farmers themselves; (3) the nature of the marketing and processing channels; and (4) the administrative resources of the government as the directing agency of change.

7.) Economics has played a dominant role in every attempt at constructing development theories. In this context macroeconomic problems have almost always consLiLuted the key issue in the discipline. In microeconomic thinking development implies some definite change either in the rate of growth, the structure of the economy, or both. But as Lancaster (1973:710-711) points out, "historically, economic development was not the product of conscious economic policy. Modern economics, which grew up with the development of European industrialization over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was on the sidelines explaining what was happening rather than causing it to happen." Subsequently, distinct thoughts in economic history, namely, classical, neo-classical, Keynesian, Marxist, structuralism, modernization and dependency have all been overtly macro-dimensional. As a result they have not been able to successfully account for what causes or does not cause development to occur at the grassroots or at the micro-level in such specific locations as households. (See, for example, Hill's (1986) criticism. For another penetrating assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of micro-economic policy analysis in the area of development see Adelman 1975b; Hirschman 1981; Rhoads 1985; and Hill 1986).

8.) Low (1982a:144) elaborates upon Fortes developmental cycle classifying domestic groups into establishment, expansion, consolidation, fission, decline, and female-headed (see also du Toit 1974:290fn).

9.) Using essentially Low's (1982a) classification derived from Fortes' framework the developmental cycle in rural Zimbabwe is conceptualized to comprise the following phases: (1) single; (2) establishment; (3) expansion;
(4) consolidation; (5) decline; and (6) other. Unlike Low I do not see fission and female-headedness as distinct phases because both are conditions that may be associated with any of the six phases delineated here, particularly consolidation and decline. The operational definition of each of my phases are based on the age composition and structural state of the household. For instance, a young adult who is never married and is not a








23

dependent qualifies as single. A young couple with an only/or without a child is categorised to be in establishment. Spouses still in the prime of reproduction with the last child not more than 4 years of age are in expansion. Spouses with older children the last of which is 5 or more years qualify to be in consolidation.
The decline phase is made up of older people with households where sons and
daughters, now grown, have fissioned out. The category "Other" contains all cases that do not fit neatly into any of the five preceeding phases. These phases are conceptual states derived from household structure and organization. They reflect the socio-demographic realities of rural Zimbabwe to which they are applied here. The utility of the model is enhanced by building into it additional flexibility using the following information: (1) the gender and marital state of the de facto household head; (2) whether marriage is monogamous or polygynous; (3) the presence or absence of kins and affines; and (4) whether the household is pre-fission, fissioning, or post-fission. See Appendix A for the resultant typology.

10.) Fortes (1949:63-77) first used the developmental cycle frame of analysis among the Tallensi to account for variations in the synchronic constitution of what he called the agnatic joint family. It is apparent that he did not fully utilize the concept as much as he should to elucidate the emergence, growth and decline of Tale households. Indeed, he concentrated on the constant fissioning of homesteads which he blamed on intra-sibling conflicts. Elsewhere (Fortes 1970:vii), he was unable to apply the concept to the Ashanti situation because he found that culture to be "much more complex." Similarly, a recent application of the concept by Sanjek (1983:330-343) to an urban African situation only succeeds in the designation of household residence roles without yielding any insights into how these roles impact on specific developmental processes.
The inability on the part of these and other researchers to successfully
apply the concept to situations of change and development stems from the fact that they have essentially conceived it in static terms and consequently impose it on functional structures. They are thus unable to grasp and utilize the essential dynamics of gender, age, conjugal form, and other internal features which are in constant interaction within and between different households at different phases of the cycle. Yet, it is these dynamics rather than the cycle per se which render the concept hueristically useful. A similar criticism applies to many development-oriented and applied studies, particularly in Farming Systems Research and Extension, which use the household as units of analysis. Cases in point include Shaner et al. (1982), Norman (1982), and McMillan (1986).














CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND TO ZIMBABWE


Geographic and Agro-ecological Setting


Zimbabwe, with a total area of 390,759 square kilometers, is a landlocked

country that is situated in the southern African region. It lies approximately between Latitude 150 30' south and Latitude 220 30' south and Longitude 250 00' east and 330 00' east.

The Zambezi river forms a major portion of the northern and western boundaries of the country while the Limpopo river constitutes the southern boundary. In the east and northeast the country shares a border with Mozambique, in the northwest with Zambia, southwest with Botswana and in the south with South Africa. Politically, Zimbabwe is divided into eight administrative provinces. These are Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Midlands, Masvingo, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South (Figure 2-1).

The most recent population census conducted in 1982 gives a preliminary total population figure of 7,546,071, of whom less than 200,000 were whites. Harare, the capital city, has an estimated population of 656,011. It is followed by Bulawayo, 413,814 and Chitungwiza, a dormitory suburb of Harare, with 172,556 people. The annual population growth rate averages about 3.1 percent. The corresponding figure for the urban population is about 7.2 percent or more, including rural in-migration (Zimbabwe 1982a). Currently, 80

percent of the entire population live in the rural areas and the majority of these people earn their livelihood directly from agriculture.


24









25


ANZANIA



ANGOLA ZAMS A LaALAWIka


AFR C AR WSAEWESOTSN MCZAM ElUE


-,c~ ~' SWAZLANO

S THL=STHO )6uangurz Aount aIrqa(
A~iICA n*




^A~II MSHd L
sar A




(ra
Hwanqe cm



M A T AEE A E
M 0, AN4 S
NORTH .A- /L


TSWANA sa



-Gw -'*




Zim ba bwe

.-- emconva o U r M I ;LELAN
- Provrnce councary
4 alonnz o"*' MOz.AELCUE
'I7
RaGdrnoa




mabTSWANA



SOUTHH AFRlOA





FIGURE 2 1 ZIMBABWE: ADMINISTRATIVE PROVINCES








26


Most Zimbabweans, nearly 80 percent of the African population, belong to one or the other Shona or Mashona ethno-linguistic group (Bullock 1928; Gelfand 1965; Bourdillon 1976). The Ndebele or Matabele is the other major cultural group. The rest are the Sena, Tonga, Sotho, Venda and the Hlengwe (Kay 1970:28). All these various societies in Zimbabwe are patrilineally organized. They also inhabit geographically distinct home regions some of which are cut by the country's international boundaries (Figure 2-2). The European population, though numerically less significant, constitutes a distinct economic power in the country.

The topography of Zimbabwe is dominated by the Highveld. This is a large plateau occupying 20 percent of the land area which runs through the center of the country from the southwest to the north. Its general altitude is about 1,200 meters above sea level though it occasionally rises to over 1,700 meters. In the east, along the border with Mozambique, the plateau develops into a ridge of escarpments where the Inyangani reaches a height of almost 2,600 meters above sea level. Of the remaining area of the country, 60 percent has an altitude of between 600 meters and 1,200 meters above sea level and it is termed the Midveld. The third physiographic region of the country is the Lowveld formed by the valleys of the Zambezi in the north and west, the Limpopo in the south and the Sabi-Lundi basin in the south-east. These valleys range in altitudes from between 300 meters to 900 meters above sea level (Fair 1964; Andrews 1964; Kay 1970:13; ',fitlow 1982). The geological base of Zimbabwe consists mostly of granites and other igneous and schistose rocks. The soils are predominantly sandy with heavier loams and clays occuring in relatively small local areas (Miller 1982:10).













26


I o
0 160 200
laometres


__________/
F S EN A
/7o 7yi


Korekore


iSHONA ( \







TGWNGA Zezuru






-,SHON SHONAdau



KalannaKaranga_s0 THO 0=- /

\HLENGWE', 22-1V E ND A

2iiU 25?


FIGURE 2 2 ZIMBABWE: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CULTURAL GROUPS



Source: Kay 1970:27


-161


27


Is,-


N A
1i--


2e









2f-








28

Although Zimbabwe lies entirely within the tropics most of the country experiences sub-tropical climate. Rainfall is seasonal and extremely variable (Ngara 1983). It ranges on the average from over 1,500 millimeters annually in limited areas of the eastern Manicaland Province to below 300 millimeters in the Lowveld. Tie rainy season is unimodal and occurs between the summer months of November and April. Generally, the rains are more reliable in the north and less so in the south. Likewise, the seasonal total is also more reliable than the monthly total.

Generally, July is the coolest month and October the warmest. Temperature intensity corresponds closely with altitude. For instance, Harare on the Highveld at a height of about 1,500 meters above sea level has a mean temperature of 14 0C in July and 22 0C in October. In the low-lying Zambezi valley, however, the respective means are 200C in July and 300C in October. A wide diurnal range characterizes the winter months. Night frosts.that can occasionally be very destructive are not uncommon on the high plateaus (Kay 1983:945; McNaughton 1983). Most of the Midveld and Lowveld areas carry wooded savanna vegetation. The Highveld, on the other hand, consists of savanna grassland with patches of montane forests particularly in the eastern Manicaland Province.

On the whole, the topography, soils and climate of Zimbabwe do not favor intensive agricultural production (Miller 1982:10). More than 75 percent of the country is subject to conditions that make dryland crop production a risky venture. Drought is a persistent problem (Denny 1983; Gammon 1983). Poorer sandy soils predominate over most of the land thus severely limiting their use for cropping. Only 37 percent of all areas in the country receive more than 700 millimeters annual average of rainfall considered adequate for intensive and semi-intensive farming (Miller 1982:10).








29


Even then, when soil quality and land capability are taken into

consideration, only about 7 to 8 percent of the entire country is suitable for intensive dryland cultivation (Whitsun 1983:12). In sum, Zimbabwe is not as well endowed with inherent agricultural resources as it is often claimed. It is rather its agricultural expertise which has led to past agricultural surpluses, not the resource base (Whitsun 1983:13).

The authoritative survey of the agricultural potential of the country, published by Vincent and Thomas (1960), attests to this fact. Their agro-ecological survey, updated by the Department of Agricultural and Technical Extension (AGRITEX), uses the rainy pentad criteria to delineate Zimbabwe into five Natural Regions (Figure 2-3).1 These are Region I covering 2 percent of the country, Region II 15 percent, Region III 19 percent, Region IV 38 percent and Region V 27 percent. The regions correlate with potential crop yields and livestock carrying capacities of the land. The regions and associated features are shown in Table 2-1.

Agricultural output patterns also show a spatial distribution that

corresponds with enterprise specialization in the various provinces. Thus, among other commodities, Manicaland is noted commercially for tea and deciduous or tropical fruits, Masvingo for sugar and beef, Matabeleland North and South for beef, Midlands for dairy and other livestock products and the three Mashonaland Provinces for maize, tobacco, cotton, soya beans and other crops. For instance, in 1980 Mashonaland produced 90 percent of all maize, 92 percent of the tobacco, 73 percent of the cotton, 63 percent of the wheat, 87 percent of the soya beans, 94 percent of all peanuts and 87 percent of the sorghum making the region Zimbabwe's primary bread basket and source of agricultural exports (Whitsun 1983:51-53).








30


FIGURE 2 3
ZIMBABWE: DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL REGIONS













TABLE 2 1
DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL REGIONS, RAINFALL
FARMING SYSTEMS IN RHODESIA


AND RELATED


NATURAL AREA OF REGION COUNTRY
(%)


RAINFALL INTENSITY
(mm/year)


RELATED FARMING
SYSTEM


I


2


Ila & b 15


High
(1,000 or more)


Moderate (750-1,000)


Specialized and Diversified Cropping


Intensive Cultivation


19 Moderate but Erratic
(650-800)

38 Low
(450-650)

27 Low and Erratic
(Below 650)


Semi-Intensive Cultivation

Semi-Extensive
(Ranching)

Extensive
(Only Ranching)


Sources: Whitsun (1983:6-7); Billing (1985:6-7).


31


III


IV


V










Historical Setting



The past of Zimbabwe is one of large immigrations and settlement shifts. David Beach (1980:4) speculates that from about 30,000 B.C., Late Stone Age hunter and gathering people who spoke one of the Khoisan group of languages had lived on and around the plateau or Highveld. Relying on the available archaelogical records Beach (1980:12) identifies that the Early Iron Age which is associated with immigrant Bantu-speakers existed round about A.D. 180. Later Iron Age people who probably included a great many of the Early Iron Age groups first appeared circa A.D. 900. By about 1500 they had become well established as the Shona speakers with dialect clusters such as the Zezuru, Karanga, Yalanga, Korekore, Manyika, Nyanga, Ndau or Shanga (Beach 1980:14-18).

State formation has also been a feature of Shona polity since the Late Iron Age. Four major precolonial states are delineated by David Beach (1980:36). These are (1) Zimbabwe which flourished in the south of the plateau before about 1500; (2) Torwa which existed around Khami in the southwest from the late fifteenth to the late seventeenth centuries; (3) its successor, the Changamire state, which lasted until the 1840s; and (4) the northern state of Mutapa which survived in one form or another from at least the fifteenth to the late nineteenth century. Stanlake Samkange (1969:5) argues, therefore, that the Mashona up to the mid-nineteenth century had occupied undisturbed all the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo rivers stretching eastwards as far as the sea.2

From about 1850 onwards the dominance of the Shona, at least

politically, started undergoing profound transformations with the influx of other groups who now form part of the wider Zimbabwean society. For instance,








33


the Nguni-speaking Ndebele immigrants under Mzilikazi established themselves in the southern part of the plateau north of the Limpopo in 1839-40 (Beach 1980:226). This development was followed almost immediately by the arrival of European settlers. The first of these to make any lasting contacts with the Ndebele were the missionaries of the South African based London Missionary Society who opened a station at Inyati in 1859 (Nelson 1975:16).

In 1888 John Moffat, son of one of the missionaries and the

representative of the British government in South Africa to the Ndebele throne, extracted a treaty from King Lobengula. The import of the treaty was to the effect that the Ndebele would not enter into any foreign correspondence, treaties or land alienation without prior consultation with and approval from the British High Commissoner for South Africa. Shortly after this treaty, C. D. Rudd, an agent of Cecil Rhodes a British concession seeker who saw himself as the champion of British values and interests in Africa obtained a concession from Lobengula for metal and mineral rights (Nelson 1975:19).

On the basis of the Rudd Concession the British government in 1889

granted a royal charter to Rhodes and his British South Africa Company. The charter, according to Percy Hone (1909:1), authorised the company "to take over the vast tract of country extending from the Transvaal to Lake Tanganyika. . The whole territory was named after the conceiver and founder of this great project, Mr. Cecil Rhodes." In early 1890, Rhodes sent a party of 200 pioneers and 500 mounted mercenaries to claim Ndebele territory as a private estate of the company. The following year the Pioneer Column entered Mashonaland.

The British Order in Council of 1891 also placed the company's territory under the protection of the queen and authorised her high commissioner in








34

South Africa to "administer justice, collect taxes and promote law and order; but in practice these functions continued to be carried out by the charter company." (Nelson 1975:20). The entry of the Pioneer Column to Mashonaland,

Hone points out,


was followed by an influx of white people from the
southern colonies and from Great Britain. Some entered this unknown country for the love of adventure, others
in the hope of gaining wealth, and a few with the intention of settling permanently on the land and turning their attention to farming. (Hone 1909:13)


In 1893 the Column, under Jameson, the then Company administrator of Mashonaland, entered Bulawayo and militarily occupied Matabeleland. Three years later there was the Matabele uprising which was followed by the more protracted Mashona rebellion of 1896-7 (Tsomondo 1977; Beach 1979).

Both of these early indigenous revolts against settler rule, widely

referred to as the first chimurenga or liberation war by Zimbabweans, were ruthlessly quelled and the alleged perpetrators severely punished. In 1898, "regulations for the good government of the natives" were proclaimed by the Company on behalf of the British Crown. As Terrence Ranger (1967:311) asserts, "in many ways [the rebellion] was a watershed; after the risings few things were the same as they had been before. . Southern Rhodesia moved steadily towards settler supremacy."

It was not until 1923 that Southern Rhodesia made a direct transition from chartered company rule to a Crown colony status with "responsible self-government" still under the control of European settlers (see Gann 1965). According to Windrich (1975:xvi), union with South Africa was rejected as an alternative and a financial settlement with the British South Africa Company brought an end to nearly thirty-five years of Company rule.








35


The grant of a self-governing status apart, the next major political

development in the history of the colony did not occur until 1954. That year Britain amalgamated Southern Rhodesia with the neighboring colonies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, also referred to in some of the literature as the Central African Federation. The Federation, strongly opposed by the burgeoning African nationalists of the three colonies, was short-lived and broke up in 1963.

The following year both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved

political independence becoming Zambia and Malawi respectively. The colony was also now known simply as Rhodesia. Two years after the dissolution of the Federation, in November 1965, Rhodesia made a "Unilateral Declaration of Independence." This development occured because its minority white settler regime under the leadership of Prime Minister Ian Smith failed to get Britain to agree to its conditions for independence.

Rhodesia's independence, illegal in the eyes of Britain and the

international community, invited worldwide condemnation, non-recognition and the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions. For fourteen years, until the birth of a new Zimbabwe, Rhodesia held on amidst the bitter liberation war waged by the African nationalist armies.



The Evolution of the Land Problem



The annexation of Southern Rhodesia and the grant of self government to the colony by Britain in 1923 turned out to provide the settlers with the carte blanche that enabled them to legislate segregation as the bedrock of minority white supremacy in the country. This act unleashed far-reaching








36


consequences on later developments in the country. George Kay, in looking at the human geography of the impacts of this colonial policy, indicates that

segregation gave


rise to a racial division of land and natural resources
which places most of the natural assets of the country in European hands. It has led to geographically separate and
distinctive residential zones and social facilities in
areas where, for economic reasons, both Europeans and
Africans must live in close proximity to common work-places.
It has divided employment into African and European jobs.
(Kay 1970:330)


Specifically in terms of agriculture and incidentally African interests and livelihood in Southern Rhodesia land was the crucial issue and still remains so. During the colonial period two significant pieces of legislation were promulgated that permanently and differentially altered access to land along racial lines. These were the Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the Land Tenure Act (1969). (See Jordan 1979).

Indeed, even before the enactment of these Acts land apportionment had already began with the Pioneer Column in the early 1390s. Writing about his impressions of the agricultural potentialities of the country around the same period, Knight, though rather ethnocentric, was quite poetic in his report that


[W]hen one has travelled day after day across the flowerly
veldt . when one beholds the magnificent crops which reward the lazy Kaffir for a mere scratching of the soil, but a soil inexhaustibly rich . one realises that the
title of the Promised Land was not altogether wrongly
bestowed on this fair region. (Knight 1895:29)


Consequently, with the pioneers' occupation of this apparently fertile territory the rewards of free or cheap lands, that they had been promised,








37


began in earnest. In the Matabeleland highveld for example, according to Knight's observation,


a large number of farms have already been pegged out. Of these some 700 are 'volunteer farms,' which were granted
free to the men who took part in the late expedition. Each volunteer farm is 3,000 morgen (6,000 acres), carrying with
it a nominal annual quit rent of ten shillings. . Farming rights, entitling the holder to peg out 3,000 acres, can also be bought directly from the Company at eighteenpence an acre.
(Knight 1895:30)


Elsewhere in Matabeleland, Knight (1895:34) indicates that "one syndicate alone [possessed] a magnificient estate of 80,000 acres." Similar rewards obtained in Mashonaland where he gives the following account:


Special farming rights were granted to members of the
old Pioneer Force. . These, like the volunteer rights in Matabeleland, entitle the owner to peg out a farm free
of any conditions as to bona fide occupation. These pioneer farms are of 3,000 acres each. (Knight 1895:35)


From the beginning of the 1890s the settlers started creating the

"reserves." These consisted of blocks of land set aside under the supervision of traditional or community elders for the use of indigenous Africans. The first of these was demarcated in Matabeleland. By 1902 most of the Reserves in Mashonaland had also been allocated and the African population had been moved into them (Riddell 1978a:7). George Kay (1970:49) notes that a decade later in 1913, there were "no less than 104 Native Reserves . established and they ranged from 5,000 acres to 1,500,000 acres." In 1923 the new Southern Rhodesian Constitution which transferred the country from Company rule to a self-governing colony also confirmed the Reserves as a separate socio-economic and political entity.3

The consolidation of settler land holdings was one major activity facilitated by the creation of the Reserves. By 1396, the settlers had








38


managed to expropriate 15 million acres (Riddell 1978b:5). Five years later they had 19 million acres which they increased to 31 million by 1925. This included "nearly all land over 3000 feet within 25 miles of the railways." (Kay 1970:50). To place this fact in context it should be kept in mind that the total land size of Southern Rhodesia at this time was 96.4 million acres (38.6 million hectares).



Legislative Acts and the Impacts of Settler Land Expropriation Policies


The Land Apportionment Act was introduced in 1929 but enacted the following year and made effective in 1931. The Act did more than merely formalize the on-going institutionalization of the division of land along racial lines as a legal fact (Bannerman 1982). In addition, it implicitly, if

not directly, prescribed the concept of "parallel or separate development" as official policy. It also intensified the forced removal of many Africans from their original homes, then declared European areas and their settlement in the Reserves. Elsewhere, Roger Riddell has shown vividly the quantitative dimensions of subsequent removals by stating that


[Bletween 1931 and 1941, 50,000 people were moved [and] between 1945 and 1959 another 85,000 were moved. Since
1964 at least another 88,000 people have been resettled,
most being evicted from European land where they were
classified as 'squatters. . The most recent policy
of settlement has come about as a consequence of the
present war and it is estimated that 500,000 people have been moved into 'protected' and 'consolidated' villages.
(Riddell 1978a:8-9)


Another major development emanating from the Land Apportionment Act was the creation of the so-called Native Purchase Areas. The purchase areas

originally covered 3.2 million hectares or nearly 8 percent of the total land








39

size of the country (Kay 1970:93). For the first time these areas offered the right to freehold tenure to Africans. However, this offer was only to a cream of progressive farmers who, in the words of Roger Riddell (1978a:8), had "proved their farming abilities by obtaining Master Farmer certificates and who have the money to buy the land." (Riddell's emphasis). (The current production levels and aspects of the socio-demographic and agricultural

situation of farmers in two former Purchase Areas are dealt with in the case study of farmers- responses which is reported in Chapter VII below. These are Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale Commercial Areas in the ashonaland Central Province).

The segregationist provisions of the Land Apportionment Act were implemented for twenty years without much thought about the negative consequences that increasingly became manifest in the Reserves. The consequences, many of which still persist, included overcrowding,

overstocking, deterioration of natural resources, landlessness, unemployment, declining or stagnant per capita incomes and general underdevelopment (Hamilton 1964; Sutcliffe 1971; Mswaka 1974; Phimister 1974; Clarke 1974, 1975, 1977b; Whitlow 1980; Mashiringwani 1983). Though these problems were associated initially with the Reserves, their cumulative repercussions were national in the sense that the "excess" influx of the African population into the urban areas threatened European urban lifestyles and privileges.

To stem this trend, the Native Land Husbandry Act was passed in 1951. It provided, among other things, regulations for enforcing (1) conservation measures, (2) good farming practices, (3) appropriate stocking rates, (4) allocation of grazing rights and (5) the consolidation of arable plots in the Reserves into compact holdings (Pendered and von Memerty 1955; Garbett 1963; Riddell 1978a; Duggan 1980). The Act, however, cannot be said to have








40


achieved any of its objectives. By 1962 it had already been abandoned. Seven years later, in 1969, as part of the introduction of the Republican Constitution, the forty year old Land Apportionment Act was also updated with the enactment of the Land Tenure Act. The new Act set aside 2.6 million hectares of the total 38.6 million hectare land area of the country as National Land and divided the remaining 36 million hectares equally into African Areas (18 million hectares) and European Areas (18 million hectares).

This in effect generally meant that in absolute terms each African

communal area or peasant cultivator held 24 hectares as against 185 hectares owned by each African elite or freehold farmer in the Purchase Area. In further contrast, every European farmer owned nearly 2,300 hectares. On the average therefore Europeans cultivated farms that were about 100 times larger than their counterparts in the peasant sector (Riddell 1980:3). Table 2-2 presents an indication of the distributional pattern of land ownership over the fifty year period up to 1981.

The magnitude of the inequities in the land distribution was not

lessened but was rather perpetuated by the Land Tenure Act. The Act also maintained the status quo in respect of the pattern which ensured the better endowed agro-ecological regions for the European settlers (Table 2-3). As Billing (1985:36) points out, 74 percent of the African or Communal Areas lie in the Natural Regions IV and V which are considered unsuitable for crop production. This means that only one-fourth of these Areas are located in the better Natural Regions I, II and III. In contrast, 52 percent of the European or Large-Scale Commercial Farming areas are in the Natural Regions I, II and III. The remaining 48 percent which are found in the poorly endowed Natural Regions IV and V are used mainly as either ranching or irrigation enterprises.








41


TABLE 2 2
PROPORTION OF TOTAL LAND UNDER VARIOUS OWNERSHIP
CATEGORIES IN RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE

1931 1950 1969 1981 NUMBER
HOUSEHOLDS
1981



Communal Area 22.4 25.5 41.3 43.9 716,500

Small-Scale Commercial 7.7 5.9 3.8 3.8 8,519

Large-Scale Commercial 50.8 49.6 40.1 36.8 4,926

The State 19.1 18.9 14.7 15.5 0


Sources: Data for the respective years comes from the the following

sources: 1931 (Kay 1970:51); 1950 (Dunlop 1972:1); 1969
(Dunlop 1972:1); 1981 (Zimbabwe 1982a:64). The number of
households comprising each category is given by the Whitsun
Foundation (1983:28).

Note: Communal refers to the African peasant or smallholder unit
formerly known as the Reserve or Tribal Trust Land. The
Small-Scale Commercial is what used to be called the Native
or African Purchase Area. The Large-Scale Commercial is
mainly the White or European Area. The State-owned land was
previously referred to as National Land and it comprises areas designated as Forest, Undetermined, or Unassigned.
In 1981, there were a total of 6,034 Large Commercial Farms
some of which were owned and operated as agricultural or
ranching estates by local and multi-national companies
rather than by farm households (see Chapter VI below for a
review of these farming systems).








42


Notwithstanding the ecological poverty of the lands in the Communal

Areas, the size of farm households increased rather than decreased over time doubling about every thirteen years. Given the physical restrictions imposed by the land the coping mechanism applied to accomodate the additional household members was the gradual turn over of the land designated as suitable only for grazing purposes into arable cultivation. This rather extensive land use system had the cyclical effect of accentuating the pasture problems of the African areas (Cleghorn 1950; Floyd 1959; Jordan 1964).

According to Roger Riddell (1978b:9) 50 percent of the grazing land in the Communal Areas in 1965 was classified as either bare or heavily over-grazed, and by 1977 seventeen times as much land in those Areas was being cultivated as was ecologically desirable. Indeed, by 1970 the annual population growth rate in the Communal Areas was 3.4 per cent on the average. At the time over 47 percent of all the men resident there were landless and in the age group under 30 years the percentage was as high as 31 (Weinrich 1975a:3). Male absenteeism was generally high and in many households farming was typically carried out by the older men, the women and the children (Johnson 1971:32).

The state of environmental constraints and population pressure which

currently faces the Communal Areas has been calculated by Whitlow (1980) and it is reproduced here in Table 2-4. He shows that two-thirds of these African lands experienced pressure which ranged from "some" to "desperate." The pressure intensity he reports for these areas also varied from a low of 2 to a high of 5 times.

The human dimensions that are manifest in this state of ecological

crisis are also brought out starkly in the government commissioned Chavunduka Report. The Commission, which conducted a comprehensive enquiry into







43


TABLE 2 3
PROPORTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN ZIMBABWE BY NATURAL REGIONS, RACE AND FARMING SYSTEM


NATURAL REGION


PROPORTION OF AREA IN REGION


AFRICAN/ AFRICAN/
COMMUNAL COMMERCIAL


EUROPEAN/
COMMERCIAL


1 1.0 1.0 2.0

II 8.0 18.0 27.0

III 17.0 38.0 22.0

IV 45.0 37.0 26.0

V 29.0 7.0 22.0


100.0 100.0 100.0


Sources: Billing (1985:36 Table 10) and Riddell (1978a
:51 Table 17).

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest decimal point
and so may not add up to exactly 100 percent.


TABLE 2 4
POPULATION PRESSURE IN RELATION TO CARRYING
CAPACITY IN THE COMMUNAL AREAS OF RHODESIA

PRESSURE NATURE OF PERCENTAGE OF
INTENSITY PRESSURE COMMUNAL LAND


Balance or none 32.7

2 times some 29.8

3 times great 12.9

4 times extreme 11.7

5 times desperate 12.9


Source: Whitlow (1980:178 Table 2).








44


Zimbabwe's agricultural industry, examined the pitiful conditions which obtain in many of the Communal Areas. It states:


Some 57 percent of the communal and small scale farming
areas, with 83 percent of their population, had densities
in excess of the critical level. Taken over the country as a whole, the 1969 population was 40 percent in excess of the critical level; by 1972 it was estimated to be 85 percent in excess and was projected to be 210 percent by
1984. (Zimbabwe 1982a:23)


It is not only in the area of land distribution that the negative effects of segregation impacted on Africans. The pricing and marketing policies of the government also limited the entry and full participation of African farmers in the commercial agriculture sector. For instance, legislation notably the Maize Control Act (1931) and the Tobacco Marketing Act (1936) prevented Africans from growing crops that competed in the market with European farm produce (Nelson 1975:283). In the specific case of maize, the major crop cultivated by Africans, the European farmers at various times put pressure on the government to discourage its surplus production on the African farms (Dunlop 1970:11). In the Native Purchase Areas the government imposed a 10 percent levy on all commercial produce (Clarke 1976).

As a consequence of these policies the cash earnings of farmers in the Reserves were low, averaging only $153 per year (Nicolle 1971:1). The more active males migrated out of these Reserves to provide cheap wage labor on European-owned farms, particularly in flue-cured tobacco production which is notably labor intensive (Duncan 1973:1). In 1971, only 7 percent of the laborers on the tobacco farms earned as much as $21 a month which constituted

the highest wages paid. It needs to be pointed out though that some of these laborers received additional subsidies in the form of maize meal and other rations from their European employers (Chavunduka 1972).








45


According to Weinrich (1975a:8) per capita income from African lands fell by 50 percent between 1958 and 1970. By 1977 the estimated monthly household income in the Reserves was $12 as compared with farm workers on European-owned farms who earned $19, other African employees $67 and European employees $513. Thus, the ratio between European earnings and those of

African rural households was in the range of 43:1 (Brand 1981:46). In a comparative analysis which examined the distribution of personal income in Rhodesia, Sutcliffe concludes:


The rough indications are that the wealthiest 4 to 6 per cent of the population of Rhodesia have received between 50 and 60 per cent of total personal income. On the face of it, if this is compared with what similar evidence is
available for other countries, then personal income seems
to be distributed more unequally at least at the top end
of the distribution than in any any other country for
which data are available. (Sutcliffe 1971:38)


The nature of the distribution of personal earnings within Rhodesia over the years is illustrated by Table 2-5 below. For example, in 1968 the Africans who constituted 95.2 percent of the population earned only 43.5 percent of the total personal income. Elsewhere, Good (1974:18) reports that "the overwhelming majority of the population is in a state of increasing poverty and is in no position to contribute to what might otherwise be the development of Rhodesia." He quotes the following statistics reproduced here in Table 2-6 and showing the distribution of cash wages paid to Africans in June 1972 to support his assessment. Writing about the same issue Roger Riddell (1978a:10) also demonstrates that in 1976, when the poverty datum line for a rural family of five was estimated to be $43.73, some 85 percent of all Africans employed in European agriculture received cash wages of less than $20 a month.







46


TABLE 2 5
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN RHODESIA

EUROPEAN, ASIAN AND COLORED

AS PERCENTAGE AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL OF TOTAL
POPULATION PERSONAL INCOME


1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1968


3.8

4.8 5.4 6.2 5.1

4.8


49.4 58.2 59.5 61.2

58.1 56.5


Source: Sutcliffe (1971:38 Table 4).


TABLE 2 6
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN CASH WAGES
IN RHODESIA

MONTHLY CASH WAGE NUMBER OF WAGE
($) EARNERS


Under 10 20 50 90

Over


10

20 50 90 150 150


245,410 172,610 251,270 63,170 9,270 3,800


Source: Good (1974:18).








47


Detailed elaboration of the extent of these inequities as well as their

short and long-term policy implications for the country are given by Duncan

Clarke (1977a). His study of income and wealth distribution in Rhodesia for

the period 1965-1974 indicates that


[E]uropean income sources have remained very diverse despite
reliance on some notable areas of income earning. . (They)
earn around 62 percent of all cash wages . about 44.6
percent of income from unincorporated enterprise and probably in excess of 90 percent of dividend and profits from companies and abroad. Europeans are on average 'well covered'in terms of
pensions, medical aid, life assurance and compensation for
workmens' accidents. These elements help provide income,
stability and security. 'European society' has thus
developed as an affluent stratum of the Rhodesian social
formation, becoming steadily richer in material terms over
time. (Clarke 1977a:15, his emphasis)


Given the substantial irregularities in data sources and from his analysis of

African incomes Clarke (1977a:46) arrives at the conclusion that a comparison

of average European and African incomes was not a very meaningful exercise.

He (Clarke 1977a:46-47) asserts, however, that "Africans have received a

diminishing share of disposable incomes since 1967," indicating that in the

period 1965-75, the African/European income gap widened substantially.

The problems of the Reserves are synthesized by Cross in the following

words:


In recent years the situation in the Tribal Trust Lands has become increasingly serious. While incomes from sales have
risen from $13 per capita in 1965 to $29 per capita in 1976,
the estimated availability of food has deteriorated
significantly. The overall result is that standards of
nutrition . today are well below those for the nation as a whole, and the Tribal Trust Lands have become net importers
of food. In addition . population pressure in tribal areas
have reached a point where a breakdown of society in some areas
has begun to take place. Traditional social security systems can no longer meet the requirements of the population simply because the natural resources that are the foundation of the
system are no longer adequate to the task. (Cross 1976:185)








48


While per capita African incomes in the Reserves more than doubled from $13 to $29 between 1965 and 1976 (Cross 1976:185) there was only a 40.5 percent rise in the consumer prices for the period 1965 to 1974 (Clarke 1977a:42). Under the normal circumstances this situation should translate into improved standards of consumption and living for rural Africans. All the available evidence, however, indicates the contrary. The most probable conclusion from the information about nutrition is that the increase in Communal Area market sales did not reflect the achievement of surplus output above household subsistence requirements by the Africans.

Many observers note in summary that the African population was cast for the most part in the role of poorly paid laborers, often as migrants, on the white farms or mines or as domestic workers and work-seekers. In that situation they rather precariously lived in "locations" on the edge of the "white" towns or else remained as the family residue eking out a partial living in increasingly overcrowded reserves (Duncan 1973; Harris 1974; Clarke 1974, 1977c). It is this "appalling economic and ecological conditions of the African rural areas," in the words of Dunlop (1974:177), which "undoubtedly [was] the most critical economic problem facing the Rhodesian Government." (An account of the socio-demographic and economic situation relating to the

current farming system and agricultural production levels in three Communal Areas are given as part of the case study of farmers' responses in Chapter VII below. These cover a total of eleven subdivisions within Madziwa, Bushu and Kandeya, all in the Mashonaland Central Province).

In contrast to the plight of Africans, particularly those in the rural areas, the following benefits enumerated by Lionel Cliffe (1981:9-10), among others, were all available and preserved predominantly, some exclusively, for whites. These are (1) vast stretches of the best land; (2) mineral








49


concessions; (3) ownership of the industry that had grown up in the last fifty years; (4) freehold rights in the urban areas; (5) professional, managerial and skilled jobs; and (6) the advantages of a sound basic education.

The case is always made to the effect that the European sector is the goose that lays the golden eggs. While there appears to be no major debate about that fact, there are critics, however, who have viewed that contribution differently. Roger Riddell, for instance, argues that the impressive overall figures for European farm production disguise serious misuse and non-use of large areas of land in the European areas, He (Riddell 1978b:11-13) cites evidence relating to the 1975-76 growing season to show that (1) only 15 percent of approximately 3.6 million hectares of potential arable land in the European areas were being cultivated, (2) 60 percent of the total of 6,682 European-owned farms were not profitable enough to qualify for income tax payments, (3) in the most productive area of the country, the Mazoe Valley area, approximately over a quarter of the land was not being cultivated, (4) in the beef producing areas of the Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces between 40 and 60 percent of the farms were non-viable and they were characterized by serious mismanagement and overstocking leading to serious veld destruction and (5) in 1977 a study by the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union reported 30 percent of all the European-owned farms to be insolvent.

Inspite of these, as Riddell observed, inefficient white-owned farms were


able to survive because of a wide range of assistance
given, both directly and indirectly, to European agriculture in the form of loans, price supports,
capital grants, the low wage structure and 'artificial'
land prices. (Riddell 1978b:12)








50


Elsewhere, Riddell (1978c:16) elaborates this point in specific terms by stating that between 1973 and 1975 the government paid out $55.2 million for subsidies, losses and assistance in the European agricultural sector, an average of $8,000 per farming unit.

Good (1974, 1976), in evaluating the economics of settler colonialism in Rhodesia, supports Riddell's (1978a, 1978b) low estimation of most European-owned farms characterizing them as inefficient because the white farmers were mostly propped up by state policy in the form of elaborate subsidies, protections and restraints from competition and reliance on cheap African labor. This issue is very strongly pursued by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) who points out that settler colonialism rather than being economic is excessively wasteful of human and material capital.4 (Aspects of Large-Scale Commercial Farming as well as the responses of European farmers in the Bindura Intensive Cultivation Area in the Mashonaland Central Province

are reported as part of the case study in Chapter VII below).

The African discontent against white minority rule in the country was nurtured in the context .-f this background of increasing human and other problems in the Reserves (Stanning 1967; Wrathal 1968), racial conflicts (Kinloch 1978), the "deterioration of Rhodesia's white society," (Clements 1969), the impoverishment and proletarianization of the African population (Arrighi 1967:32, 1970; Palmer 1977:241; Palmer and Parsons 1977), the myths about the inherent efficiency of white farmers (Emmanuel 1972; Good 1974,

1976; Riddell 1978b) and the impacts generated by the various settler policies and Legislative Acts relating to the land (Pollack 1975; Rennie 1978) and the politics and general problems of development (Barker and Hume

1977).








51


Richard Brown, in a summary paper on Zimbabwe's recent history, puts the problem in perspective by arguing it this way:


[L]and shortage and overcrowding, compulsory destocking,
and the forcible removal of Africans . struck at
the roots of both rural and urban life [and] acted as
a catalyst for mass nationalism. (Brown 1983:948)


Elsewhere, Barry Munslow makes a similar point asserting that


[T]he land issue was and still remains the central political
issue in the country. . The long nationalist guerrilla
struggle from 1966 to 1980 relied on mobilizing peasant
grievances about the land to gain support, and Robert
Mugabe's ZANU (PE) party--the Zimbabwe African National Union
Patriotic Front--swept to power in the 1980 independence
elections because the electorate trusted that his party would
get back the land. (Munslow 1985:41)


This view is also shared by Terrence Ranger (1985:14) who attributes the deep consciousness and the mass participation of Zimbabwean peasants in the guerrilla war to their "demands for their lost lands."

Beginning with the apparently ineffectual April 1966 "Battle of

Chinoyi", waged by guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), wnat the African population prefer to call the second chimurenga or

liberation war started (Kapungu 1974). In an account given by Richard Brown (1983:949), well-attested acts of brutality by the security forces of the white minority settler regime increased internal discontent and ensured a

ready and at times overwhelming supply of new recruits for the guerrillas. He argues further that this rather antagonistic situation was exacerbated by (1) the imposition of collective fines, (2) the ill-organized and drastic removal of several thousand rural Africans from their homes into "protected villages" or "strategic resettlements" on suspicion of helping the guerrillas and (3) the shooting of many curfew-breakers.










Anna Weinrich (1977), also looking at the same problem, provides a

comprehensive account of the difficulties unleashed by the protected villages policy and mentiones (1) the deterioration of health conditions, education and other social services, (2) the imposition of physical hardships especially on women and (3) the disruption of agriculture and family life.

The intensification of the war, amidst mounting civilian casualties and increasing international isolation of Rhodesia, continued until about December 1979. At that time a cease-fire and transitional arrangements for

African majority rule were agreed upon at the British-sponsored Lancaster House Conference in London leading to a democratic election in February 1980 and the birth of independent Zimbabwe in April 1980 (Morris-Jones 1980; Dayal 1984).



Post-independence Development Challenges and Prospects



With the formal achievement of independence Zimbabwe entered into a decisive period of social, economic and political transition. The country faced both short-term and long-term challenges. The immediate or short-term concern was the rehabilitation of the war-torn countryside. In the view of the government there was no doubt that "compared to the rest of the country, the rural community experienced the highest degree of human suffering as well as property and physical infrastructure destruction" (Zimbabwe 1981c:50).

Shortly after independence the government solicited for international

assistance to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during the war. This was at the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development organized in Harare in March 1981. There the government listed the following physical damages: (1) 1,830 boreholes; (2) 425 dams and weirs; (3) 1,200 diptanks;








53


(4) thousands of kilometers of fencing that used to confine infected cattle to limited areas; (5) 70 out of the 120 stock marketing or sale pens; (6) some 2,000 of the approximately 2,500 primary schools; (7) 180 of the 243 rural clinics; and (8) much of the telecommunication equipment in the rural areas (Zimbabwe 1981d:29-33).

Coenraad Brand (1981:49), in turn, documented the human aspects of the destruction. According to him (1) more than 7,000 African civilians were killed, (2) agricultural production was disrupted through harrassment and uncertainty, (3) an estimated third of the 3 million head of cattle in the Communal Areas was lost through disease, theft and forced sales or slaughter,

(4) half a million people were herded by the government into some 230

fortified "protected" or consolidated villages, (5) thousands fled into the towns and between 100,000 and 150,000 across the borders into neighboring countries, (6) more than 1,600 schools were closed down affecting some 433,000 children, or nearly half of the total normal African enrolment, (7)

by mid-1979 36 percent of the rural clinics were no longer operating and there were only three doctors left in the fifty or so mission hospitals across the country, half of which had been closed or had greatly reduced their services, (8) thirteen bus companies operating in rural areas had abandoned 57 percent of their routes and services had been substantially reduced on many others after they had lost a fifth of their fleet in landmine or other incidents and (9) a considerable proportion of small rural business enterprises were boarded up or had been burnt down.

Touching on the long-term the major problem that Zimbabwe faced at

independence was the need to redress the socioeconomic imbalances caused by years of separate development along racial lines.5 This task called for appropriate development policies and strategies (see Munslow 1980a).








54


In this, policy makers and planners were presented by interested

analysts with what appeared to be mutually exclusive options. Even before independence the lines had been drawn in debates emerging between advocates of evolutionary or reformist policies and those of radical or transformation alternatives (Muvingi et al. 1981; Bratton 1981; Bush and Cliffe 1984; Gordon 1984).6 The central premise of the debates focussed on the structures of the political economy created and maintained by the Rhodesian state and inherited by Zimbabwe (Stoneman 1981).

At any rate, while the debate still goes on Zimbabwe appears to have

pursued policies that are pragmatic and, at least in the economic sphere, are paying dividends. For instance, the period since independence can be

divided into three phases.

The first phase is the high growth period of 1980 and 1981 when the economic growth rate was 12 percent. The period coincided with good rains,

unusually favorable conditions arising from independence, the lifting of international economic sanctions as well as buoyant world demand for the country's exports.

The second phase is the period from 1982 to early 1984 which was

characterised by severe drought conditions, the world recession and poor economic performance. During the period the economy registered an annual average decline of almost 3 percent in real terms. There was substantial reduction in agricultural output which necessitated the import of 340,000 tonnes of maize and 120,000 tonnes of wheat in 1984. Between 1982 and 1984

per capita income, in real terms, fell by a total of 4 percent from its 1980 level. There was a balance of payments problem, high rates of inflation which hovered around 15 percent, low investment and high unemployment.








55


Phase three of Zimbabwe's economic life, starting from 1984-85 to the present, shows the beginnings of a recovery. The period has been characterised by good agriculture, higher agricultural incomes that are boosting domestic demand and by favorable export demand conditions (see Novicki 1983; Zimbabwe 1984a, 1985a, 1986a; The Economist 1986; Green and

Kadhani 1986).

The rather impressive economic performance recorded by Zimbabwe is

discussed by van Buren (1986:1123-1124) whose account is summarized here. For the first time since 1981 the country's economy started registering positive real growth in 1985 with an estimated real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growing about 7 percent that year. In nominal terms Zimbabwe's GDP grew from $3,226 million in 1980 to a projected $7,770 million in 1986. Surpluses

in the trade, current-account and overall balance of payments were registered by the economy in 1985. Exports also rose steadily in value from $999 million in 1982 to an estimate $1,750 million in 1985. In contrast, the value of imports increased but more slowly from $1,087 million in 1983 to a projected $1,450 million in 1985. The country's trade balance also rose from a deficit

of $115 million in 1982 to a surplus which by September 1985 was $290.4 million. Inflation was less than 10 percent by the middle of 1985 having dropped from a high of 25 percent in 1983.

This is significant because over most of Africa today even the least

minimal economic growth is a welcome exception rather than the rule. Of more significance though is the diverse base of this growth. For instance, the non-material production sector grew by almost 3 percent, the material production sector by about 13 percent, distribution by over 12 percent, transport and communications by 6 percent, construction by 6 percent, the

value of mineral production by 15 percent and manufacturing by 12 percent.








56


Of the most specific importance, in the wider African context, is

agriculture which contributed the largest share to growth. It recorded in real terms almost 30 percent increase in 1985. In terms of value total crop deliveries to marketing authorities increased by 53 percent during that year compared with 1984 (Zimbabwe 1986a).

It is important to note also that in May 1985 Zimbabwe became the first and only African state to join the international community to provide its own food aid to the famine victims of Ethiopia by sending 25,000 tons of maize. From mid-1985 to early 1986 the following purchases of Zimbabwe grain were made: (1) the European Economic Community (EEC) purchased 25,000 tons of maize for delivery as food aid to Mozambique and Zambia; (2) the United Nations World Food Program purchased and distributed large quantities of maize for drought hit countries of southern Africa; (3) Japan bought 9,000 tons of maize which were supplied to Zambia; (4) the government of the United Kingdom purchased 14,500 tons as donation to Mozambique; (5) Australia bought 30,000 of maize for distribution as food aid in Africa and (6) South Africa also obtained a sizeable portion of its maize requirement from Zimbabwe (van Buren 1986:1124).

According to The Economist (1986:15), 1985 saw a 118 percent rise over 1984 in sales from Communal and Resettlement Areas as compared with 48 percent increase from the commercial farming sector. The relative share of

the Communal and Resettlement Areas of the total national marketed output of $1,077 in 1985 was 21 percent. This is in stark contrast to a share of between 4 and 8 percent until independence. For instance, in maize production the Communal and Resettlement or the so-called subsistence sector sold almost half of the 1.82 million tonnes delivered to the marketing organizations and








57


performed almost as well in terms of cotton production (The Courier 1986:30).

The African Business has placed this success story in perspective stating:


The ingredients for success are well-known: generous and
prompt payment for farmers, rapid expansion of collection
and storage facilities, more credit and agricultural advice
for peasant farmers. (The African Business 1986:13-17)


Zimbabwe's tremendous success in stimulating small-holder or peasant

farmers to grow more food has created massive agricultural surpluses. At the end of 1985 the Grain Marketing Board was sitting on 1.4 million tonnes of

maize with the experts estimating that that stockpile could grow to more than

2 million tonnes at the end of the 1986-87 marketing year. That represents over 5 years of domestic consumption needs.

In looking at Zimbabwe's success story and in presenting this rather

optimistic assessment of its current situation we need reminding that on the whole the country is not favored for sustained agricultural output. This point and the fact that cyclical drought is a major constraint are clear indication that a much longer-term outlook is called for to evaluate the permanence of the country's apparently impressive agricultural performance so far.

This perspective provides the substantive background for evaluating the literature on land reform and resettlement, poverty and equity, rural development, agriculture and economic growth, the state, household dynamics and organizational forms in terms of their relevance to the government's

policies and on-going programs of change in postindependence Zimbabwe.








58


Notes


1.) A rainy pentad is defined as the center of three 5-day periods (pentads) which together receive more than 40 millimeters of rainfall, and two of which receive at least 8 millimeters (Whitsun 1983:6).

2.) The history of the early and continuous settlement of Zimbabwe by indigenous Shona populations is very important to many Zimbabwean historians and intellectuals for two main reasons. Firstly, they fastidiously assert that claim of nativism to counteract rival claims by some European settlers
and historians of Southern Africa that much of the region was not occupied prior to early European expeditions there in the sixteenth century. Secondly and central to this assertion, is the controversy that used to surround the question as to who the original builders of the Great Zimbabwe acropolis are.
As the noted historian Peter Garlake (1973:12) argues "probably no other prehistoric site has given rise to such strong widespread and often bizzare emotional response." The official policy of the Rhodesian government in respect of the origin of the ruins was that it could have been the work of any builders be they Phonecians, Arabians, or some central African group. The
majority Zimbabweans found the ambiguity created by this policy thinking irksome. Great Zimbabwe is a structure and symbol of immense pride among the Mashona. Consequently, they feel insulted by the "settlers" refusal to acknowledge the genius, heroism and past glory of what they regard as the dominant state-level culture in the region centuries before the advent of the Europeans. (See also Garlake 1974, 1982).

3.) From that time until today the Reserves or Tribal Trust Lands have remained physically intact. Though the Communal Land Act of 1982 repealed all the enactments which established the Reserves it legally reconstituted and renamed them as the "Communal Areas." The Act also vested the general
administration of all the areas so designated in the newly created District Councils rather than in the chiefs or traditional authorities. The government, through the National Agricultural and Rural Development Coordination Committee (NARDCC), is currently working on an elaborate Communal Lands Development Plan. The objective of the Plan is to rehabilitate the Communal Areas and integrate them fully into the productive and market
sector of the country's political economy.

4.) This view is shared by Riddell (1978b:12) who supports the argument with figures showing that 72 percent of all European farmers cover only 23 percent of the European land area and produce 21 percent of the total output of that sector, while 5 percent of farms account for 50 percent of the land and produce 48 percent of the output. (See in addition Biermann and Kossler 1980). However, Paul Mosley (1983), in his study of the settler economies of Kenya and Zimbabwe challenges this characterization as stereotypic and overgeneralized. He (Mosley 1983:177) admits, however, apparently in contradiction to his challenge, that "what is truly distinctive of the settler agricultural economy is not so much its low average efficiency as the very wide range of efficiency levels which it managed to contain and the skewness of the distribution within this range, with a minority of highly efficient, frequently foreign-owned concerns counter balancing a majority of inefficient, amateur, farmers who obtained low yields."








59


5.) in the socio-political sphere the notorious animosities between the majority Shona cultural group, most of whom subscribe to the ruling ZANU-PF party and the minority Ndebele among whom the PF-ZAPU is dominant are the obvious opprobrium which mars the peaceful co-existence of all Zimbabweans and the development of the country. This problem goes back to at least a century with the arrival, conquest and apparent brutal subjugation of the Shona by the Matabele. There is an apparent mutual distrust and suspicions of each other by the leaders of these two societies and their respective political parties.
Joshua Nkomo used to be referred to undisputedly as the "Father of the
Nation," for his role in the country's liberation struggle. He teamed up with Robert Mugabe in the final years of the liberation war to present a common "patriotic front," against the forces of the European settlers (see Mugabe et al. 1978). After independence Mugabe appointed Nkomo, though a leader of the opposition party in the National Assembly, to a cabinet position in the
government. However, when security forces discovered catches of arms and ammunitions on PF-ZAPU property Mugabe sacked Nkomo and accused him of planning the violent overthrow of the government.
Thereafter the destructive activities such as killings, rape and burnings commited by bands of so-called Ndebele dissidents in parts of the country started. Many Shonas then saw Nkomo as the "Father of Dissidents." Nkomo, himself a Kalanga (an offshoot of the Karanga sub-division of the Shona) identifies more with the Ndebele from his base in their traditional capital
Buiawayo. The activities of the bandits have always been ruthlessly punished by the government's security forces. In both cases many innocent civilians have suffered including a group of foreign tourists allegedly murdered by the dissidents in 1983 and missionaries also killed in late 1987. In the early 1980s the international community focussed its attention on Zimbabwe. The western media highlighted the alleged human rights abuses and atrocities indiscriminately meted out to the Ndebele by the so-called North Korean trained and Shona constituted Fifth Brigade. For a period, Nkomo fled the country in a brief self-imposed exile in Britain accusing the government of attempts to kill him.
From 1985 serious efforts were made by Mugabe and Nkomo and their
respective party leaders to strike a reconciliation towards the healing of old wounds. These efforts which were prolonged and broke down many times eventually bore fruit on December 31, 1987 when a settlement was publicly celebrated. That day Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as the first Executive President of the Republic of Zimbabwe while he appointed his old-time opponent Joshua Nkomo as one of the two Vice-Presidents of the country. The country became a one-party state with the absorption of the opposition PF-ZAPU by the ruling ZANU-PF.
Whether or not this second attempt at national reconciliation will last and promote the genuine integration of the interests and aspirations of both the
Mashona, the Matabele and the other cultural groups as well as Zimbabweans of European ancestry is an issue which cannot be easily and seriously conjectured upon in this dissertation

6.) In the search for an appropriate development policy or strategy the government has been treading a tightrope of differential trade-offs. Since independence the major preoccupation of most observers appears to be with questions in respect of maintaining the production levels of large-scale commercial agriculture, one of the main sources of foreign exchange. This








60


invariably means, both in the short-term and the long-run, leaving the European-owned lands more or less untouched.
Such a situation poses immense ethical and ideological dilemmas to the government in view of its explicit commitment to eqalitarianism, social justice, and a Marxist-Leninist brand of socialism (see ZANU-PF Election Manifesto 1985, 1980). Even within the government itself, as well as in the ruling ZANU-PF party, there are veiled factional squabbles. One faction, the radicals would want the government to live up to its expectations by ridding the country of such age-old European privileges as land and access to other
means of production. The opposing group of pragmatists would rather want a gradual transformation which recognizes and uses the available European expertise and capital stock to generate economic growth (see Libby 1984).
In the midst of all this the postindependence relationships between
Africans and Europeans, surprisingly, does not exhibit the kinds of open
confrontations that many pessimists predicted. In the urban areas some African workers serve both the European and elite Africans as domestic servants. In the rural areas many Africans continue to work as laborers in European-owned farms. Some Europeans who emigrated before or at independence are said to be returning. So far it appears that the government has succeeded
in fostering the workable multi-racial society that it promised to establish. This does not mean that the Africans are content with their living conditions and incomes which are still comparatively minimal by the standards of the
European population.
Except perhaps in the classic case of some landless Africans squatting on European-owned lands the general feeling, especially in industrial establishments and other spheres, is that Zimbabwe Africans look to the government to promote egalitarian policies that seek to redress past
injustices that they suffered under previous settler administrations.

7.) Obviously not everybody would agree with this seemingly optimistic compliment. For instance, Roger Riddell (1984:463) in an apparently well-balanced analysis of the performance of the economy since independence has come to the following conclusions: (1) that the economy has performed far better than that of Zimbabwe's neighbors but a large part of the reasons for this was due to unique circumstances that no longer exist; (2) many of the gains of equity and the reduction of poverty achieved in the 1980-82 have now been reversed; (3) the prospects for medium to long-term growth are not as good as the economic planners of the country have had us believe although far
better than the pessimists would lead us to think; and (4) the transformation of the economy desired by the government has been far slower than expected.
Andre Astrow (1983:1) on the other hand offers a more radical assessment in observing that "after several years of independence, little meaningful change has actually taken place, while significant tensions have emerged
between the Mugabe government and the African people. Today the state apparatus has remained virtually intact and the basic economic structure of the country unchanged. While the white settlers have seen most of their privileges preserved, African workers who have gone on strike, and landless African peasants squatting on "white" land, have been repeatedly faced with severe repression by the government. Moreover, not only has the government
failed to promote socialism in Zimbabwe, but on the contrary, has successfully worked to strengthen its economic ties with imperialist countries, placing Zimbabwe firmly in the Western camp." (See Ibbo Mandaza (1986) for an additional leftist criticism of the government's performance in the area of resettlement and agrarian reform).








61

Yet another issue which may be of major concern, apart from the land question and the ethnic conflicts, relates to trends in public expenditure. According to van Buren (1986:1123), there was a decline in the private sector's share of this from 63 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 1982 and that
the country's Five-Year Development Plan, introduced in April 1986 and covering the period 1986-90, forecasts a further decline to an average of 43 percent annually over the Plan period. At least to advocates of minimal government intervention in economic matters this development is undesirable.












CHAPTER III
TRE LITERATURE REVIEW


Introduction


The research problem is to evaluate how agricultural resettlement policy, initiated by the government since independence in 1980, is affecting household

performance responses and the quality of life in rural Zimbabwe. The government's policy is explicitly expressed in official publications and pronouncements about (1) the redistribution of the country's agricultural land resources, (2) the rehabilitation of the country's poor on these lands and (3) the provision of facilitative services and basic needs to the resettled. The broad objective of this policy is to achieve growth and development and to ensure equity.

The literature that is reviewed here is varied, though it is restricted to the broad parameters of the substantive and theoretical matters which form part of the agricultural dimensions of development. 4t the macro-level, the issues that the discussion covers relate to aspects of the role that the state plays in development. Specifically, it explores Che areas of agricultural policy and implementation, the promotion of the smallholder and the cooperative modes of production and the consequences of these developments so far for the African condition. For the micro-level, the discussion examines household dynamics and organizational forms in the context of change. The systemic linkage between the two levels are reviewed here by examining the literature on rural development, poverty-focused development, land reform and resettlement programs.

Thus the purpose of the review is to provide a general framework within

which to assess some of both the macro-interests and the micro-concerns that


62








63


dominate on-going debates about agricultural development. This is meant to serve the following objectives: (1) facilitate the selection of background materials about the research problem; (2) guide the placement of the selected materials in the wider developmental and African perspective; and (3) assist in defining and refining the research variables as well as the analytical concepts that are used in the study.



The State and Agricultural Development Policy



Today, economic development places an even more onerous burden on the

state as a political institution than in the past. This responsibility ranges from the selection of the most efficacious bundle of economic policies to ensuring a conducive political and administrative framework for development irrespective of particular policies (Sandbrook 1985, 1986). John Lewis (1986:29) extends this observation further by pointing out that governments are essential to (1) establish policy environments, (2) develop the physical and human infrastructure for development and (3) carry out the functions that would never for reasons of scale or externality be adequately initiated by the private sector. In the view of Lewis there is no substitute for the continuing lead that governments must supply to development-promotion effort.

Support for this assessment of the central role of the state in

development is given by many experts including John Mellor. Mellor (1986:84) sees such a role as critical to agricultural and employment-oriented strategy of development in the developing world. He argues that because agriculture is organized on a small-scale basis, substantial public sector investment in that sector is needed in the form of transportation, power, communication, research, education and input supplies systems.








64


Some of the cogent socio-economic rationales that justify government

intervention in agriculture are suggested by Joseph Stiglitz (1987:43-44). He lists the following reasons: (1) incomplete markets in insurance futures and credit, (2) public goods and increasing returns, (3) imperfect information,

(4) externalities and (5) income distribution. Stiglitz argues the point further that in the real situations of most developing countries the free market's own allocation within this framework is either inefficient or otherwise unacceptable to policy makers thus necessitating the intervention of the state.

Other important policy issues about the agriculture of the developing

countries include, for instance, the need to sustain the ecological balance in the natural resources exploitation of these fragile tropical and subtropical environments. Throughout these countries the current major policy concern, however, relates to the possibilities for production increases. Increased farm output is achieved through (1) the expansion of area cultivated, (2) increased yield per unit area, (3) shifts in cropping patterns toward higher-yielding crops and (4) increase of the number of annual harvests. This growth calls for increased inputs of labor, land, water and capital, as well as the introduction of technical innovations (Ruthenberg 1985:1). The issue of how to relate any or all of these investments to possibilities for production increases come under the rubric of agricultural policies.

These and other policy matters continue to dominate the on-going analysis to rethink African agricultural development strategies, particularly the role that the state must play in this endeavor. The dilemma posed for a consensual resolution of the contradictions posed by Africa's policy effort is very well recognized. For instance, Jennifer Whitaker offers a commentary on this paradox by stating:











As usual, the Westerners are drawing sweeping conclusions
about what Africa ought to do. And, as usual, the Africans have neither the flexibility nor the wherewithal to either
reject the advice totally or follow through on it fully.
(Whitaker 1986:1)


Akroyd (1985) recognizes that there is no one best set of policies for agricultural development and that any such policies must reflect the political, economic and socio-cultural aspirations of each nation. He laments (Akroyd 1985:102), however, that there "are countries in Africa where policy guidelines are vague and diffuse, and some where clear policy guidelines and objectives seem not to exist." Other writers appear to be suggesting that policy per se might not be the answer but rather as constituting the problem itself. Heyer et al. (1981), for instance, argue that attempts to develop African agriculture through a network of sophisticated policy instruments implying a manipulable and predictable environment have backfired in virtually all instances.

African governments, by necessity, have to address specific agricultural objectives if they are to move from a state of stagnation or decline into one of growth and development. Currently, some of the most common of the agricultural policy agendas recommended for various countries include such issues as: (1) national and regional food self-sufficiency and food security (OAU 1981; Norman 1984; Asante 1986); (2) combating hunger (Eicher 1986a); (3) diversification of agricultural output and the raising of rural incomes and living standards (Hinderink and Sterkenberg 1983); (4) whether to promote or de-emphasize export-led growth (World Bank 1981; Berg 1986; Green and Allison 1986); (5) conservation of natural resources, equitable distribution of real and money income, and equitable regional development (Akroyd 1985); and (6) the transformation and acceleration of agricultural-based growth into a


65








00


cumulative employment generation and industrial-oriented growth (Mellor 1986).

Such policies as these are made within broad frameworks to support, for instance, (1) a smallholder-led farming strategy (Johnston 1986), or (2) socialist agriculture (Munslow 1985), through (3) institution building (Leonard 1986), or (4) the use of a particular problem diagnosis and extension approach such as farming systems (Fresco and Poats 1986) and (5) which may be targeted for a special or neglected group such as women (Spring 1986; Guyer 1986a).

These policy-initiated development activities entail heavy financial,

logistical and administrative burdens. This is even more so in such areas as project planning and implementation (Gaitskell 1968). Critics of the state's role in development therefore caution governments to constantly seek ways of transferring such activities as marketing and input distribution to the private sector. From this perspective some adversaries and analysts of the postindependence state in Africa have blamed too much public sector involvement in agricultural pricing, marketing and distribution for the woes of the continent (see World Bank 1981; Bates 1984a; Due 1986; Ndulu 1986).

Other critics, mainly the political scientists on the other hand, have looked at the relationships between the poor performance of African countries and such themes as (1) the dominant ideology of the state (Young 1982), particularly socialism (Isaacman 1979; Munslow 1984); (2) personal rulership (Jackson and Rosberg 1982); (3) clientelist politics (Ravenhill 1986); (4) affection and patronage (Hyden 1986); (5) the "overdeveloped" state (Leys 1976; Saul 1979); and (6) ethnic loyalties (Smock and Bentsi-Enchill 1976).

An articulation of these criticisms of Africa's bad economic policies, political vanity and patronage, premature bureaucratization as well as bureaucratic sclerosis convinces Sandbrook (1986:319) to perceive the state as








67


"part of the problem of economic stagnation" in much of the continent.

The autopsy of the African state conducted by these critics, however informative as it may be still leaves at least two questions unanswered. If the state is "part" of the problem, what constitutes the other part?. Does it mean then that doing away with the involvement of the state will result in the realization of the development dreams of Africa?. These are important matters that only a holistic perspective on the macro and microdynamics of the development process can help to elucidate.



State Ideology, Public Choice and the Individual in Development



Ever since the colonial days social justice and equality have remained a major issue of concern in the policy agendas concretized in the political manifestos and the pronouncements of African leaders. With political

independence -most countries flirted with concepts that promoted various brands of egalitarian ideals. These ideals were shaped into Twhat was articulated to be African socialism (Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Kopytoff 1964; Kenya 1965; Babu 1981). Supposedly founded on the customary norms and practices and the ethical principles of traditional Africa this kind of socialism only proved to be theoretically attractive. In practice, it turned out to be woefully inadequate and contextually unsuited to the capitalistic demands of the modern state in so far as economic growth and development were concerned.

Given the essentially precapitalist nature of this

tradition-circumscribed socialism and the realization that it is unworkable in Africa's changed socioeconomic and political circumstance some leaders abandoned the pursuit of that normative or nativistic ideal quite early. Yet, others pursued it by importing Marxist-Leninist ideology and conveniently








68


equating it with African communalism (see for instance, Nkrumah 1965).

Contrary to the belief underlying this thinking the political and economic methods, such as collective production systems associated with imported socialism, are not congruent with the humanistic and social ideals of Africa. For example, there is no empirical support for the view that communal forms of living, consumption and even resource exploitation in traditional Africa are synonymous with the imperatives of collective ownership, accumulation, management and production of goods which characterize arxism-Lenninism. The inability of Tanzanian policy makers to appreciate this fact explains the costly failure of their ujamaa or collective villagization experiment (Hatmann 1981).

Elsewhere in Africa, the promotion by governments of collective and state farms in the 1960s and 1970s, to the complete neglect of individually-owned and managed farms, was based on this erroneous notion that the prevailing

social organization of production is collective. The costs of the crises that this wrong policy initiated are documented for such countries as Ghana (Miracle and Siedman 1968a, 1968b) and classically for Tanzania (Coulson 1969; von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980; Samoff 1981; Ergas 1982). The case of these failed experiments have raised serious developmental questions as to the relevance and applicability of the Soviet model (Miller 1977) or the Chinese experience (Shillinglaw 1971) and even generally agrarian socialism (Ellman 1981) to the African condition. This does not suggest, however, that the solution is automatically found in capitalist agriculture which system is also

frought with obstacles (see Dickinson and Mann 1978).

Another pertinent issue that is brought up in the context of the

foregoing discussion in the area of development has to do with individual effort and rewards as opposed to collective responsibility and welfare. Amity








69


or kinship communalism persists in contemporary African societies to the extent that it provides a necessary defence machanism in the external relations of its members to others outside it (see Elias 1962). In such a situation, as the noted ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski (1939:954) rightly points out, "the individual obviously has to become cognizant of [the group] charter [and] to develop the social attitude and personal sentiments in which the bonds of organization consist." However, this fact and the apparent placidity and solidarity, that is internal to group or kinship organization, do not relegate the individual to the status of an unknown quantity when it comes to the question of distribution of rewards and resources.

It is in this perspective that additional conceptual issues such as

incentive systems for individual effort and productivity, access to private ownership, popular participation and public choice assume paramount roles in current thinking about development. For instance, advocates of public choice are generally. suspicious of interventionist or government-sponsored welfare and redistribution programs. In their view development is facilitated by less government, more market and privately-organized collective initiative. In effect, by conditions where public choice or the spontaneous and voluntary arrangements of the ends and means of development ultimately prevail (see Buchanan 1986).

Public choice proponents recognize the need for equality of access to economic and political resources, that is, to open franchise and full participation in the development process by everybody. But as Buchanan and Tullock show (1962:64) "participation in collective activity is costly to the individual" in terms of externalities and constitutional decision-making. Thus the rational utility-maximizing individual seeking to minimize the imposition of external cost on him, as a consequence of the behavior of others, "may find








70


it advantageous either to enter into voluntary contracts aimed at eliminating externality or to support constitutional provisions that allow private decisions to be replaced by collective decisions" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962:71).

It needs to be noted though that much as public choice holds promise for sustained and democratic effort at development it "has little relevance for a society that is characterized by a sharp cleavage of the population into distinguishable social classes or separate social, religious, or ethnic groupings sufficient to encourage the formation of predictable political coalitions and in which one of these coalitions has a clearly advantageous position at the constitutional stage" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962:80).

Secondly, the logic of collective action, which is basic to the operation of public choice, by its very nature always results in differential benefits or rewards in terms of whether we are dealing with small as opposed to large groups or in market as contrasted with non-market situations. According to Mancur Olson (1965:33) this is so because of the economic facts of suboptimality or inefficiency and the fixidity or limited nature of the benefits of group goals (see Olson 1965:37; Hardin 1982).

These issues about group actions and individual participation and

benefits in societal governance and development reflect the same conceptual analysis of organizations by anthropologists who perceive such matters in terms of the "image of limited good." The respective predictions arrived at by public choice analysts and those of limited good, however, appear to be fundamentally at variance.

Public good is limited. In the view of students of public choice the

individual would reap the maximum benefit if he or she engages in collective action. On the other hand, George Foster (1965) the originator of the concept









71

of limited good suggests that the fixed and limited nature of public resources in traditional, peasant societies or static economic systems is an effective check on group mobilization and collective action. Consequently, there is a fear in such societies that if some individual gets more of the limited resources then others will get less ipso facto. Under such circumstance voluntary cooperation is inhibited and extreme individualism becomes preferable to collectivism.

The extent to which effective administrative mechanisms can turn around these problems of development is discussed by various analysts. There are suggestions, for example, that call for emphasis on (1) citizen or community or popular participation (Cook and Frederickson 1977; Cernea 1983; Gould 1985), (2) administrative experimentation (Mosher 1967) or administrative coordination (Leach 1982) and (3) the increased involvement of private voluntary organizations (Gorman 1984) in the planning and management (Garcia-Zamor 1985) of client-centered development (Thomas 1985). These issues

cannot be evaluted outside the important on-going policy debate about Africa's appropriate mode of agricultural production, that is, the forces and relations which govern the organization of farm activities and outputs (see Lemarchand 1986).

African governments are concerned about which kinds of agricultural

organizations are ideologically or politically preferrable to tackle their socio-economic developments. In this context the facts raised in this discussion so far have wider implications for reviewing the two most important arrangements covered extensively in the literature about African agriculture,

namely, the smallholder and cooperative farming.








7 2


Smallholder Agriculture and Development



Smallholder agriculture, usually also referred to as traditional,

peasant, low-resource, family farm, or subsistence production predominates over all of Africa. The literature which deals with the various dimensions of it has been so copiously referenced that it does not require any extensive review here. In the last two decades, however, a number of studies have explicated the dynamism of small farmers and challenged many of the conventional orthodoxies, such as the laziness and irrationality of the farmers who engage in smallholder production.

Today there is an increasing realization among researchers that small farm units are the most feasible and cost-effective means of attaining the multiple objectives of development (Johnston 1986:160). It is now accepted that traditional farmers with access to strategic services and infrastructure such as credit tend to accept risks and adopt extension recommendations such as high yielding technology.

The seminal work on transforming traditional agriculture, published by Theodore Schultz (1964), sets the stage for the theoretical modelling of smallholder farming. Other publications following it take a substantially closer look at aspects of the economics of traditional agriculture such as technological and institutional constraints (Mellor 1966; Hayami and Ruttan 1971; Johnston and Kilby 1975).

Broader analytical perspectives specifically on the African materials are provided by other researchers such as Ruthenberg (1968) and Cleave (1974), just to mention a few. Over the same period, extended empirical studies with the aim to obtaining detailed understanding of present production processes and decision behavior in traditional agriculture were conducted in various








73


countries. These, for instance, include farm management studies in Northern Nigeria (Norman 1973, 1982; Norman et al. 1979), Sierra Leone (Dunstan 1972; Dunstan and Byerlee 1976, 1977), in colonial Rhodesia (Johnson 1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1970, 1971; Massell and Johnson 1968) and Montague Yudelmann's (1964) monumental study covering south central Africa, mainly Rhodesia.

Recent policy interests in the problems and prospects for the

transformation of smallholder agriculture have also benefitted from two publications, the first edited by Robert Stevens (1977) and the other written by Hans Ruthenberg (1985). The authors synthesize various micro-level hypotheses generated by earlier studies and have tested and refined them in the light of current developments occurring within agricultural growth of developing countries.

The work by Stevens (1977) comprises a collection of regional field

studies which (1) illustrates in depth the nature of the low-income trap of small farmers., (2) provides detailed examples of development strategies that have led to major increases in production and employment on small farms and

(3) outlines major thrusts for government policies and programs that will accelerate small-farm income growth.

The theoretical path adopted in Ruthenberg's study places the highest

priority on the role of technological and other innovations in the process of agricultural growth. That idea is an apparent incorporation of a paradigm about change which goes back to Homer Barnett's (1956) original proposition that innovation is the basis of culture change. Ruthenberg conveys the optimism that with effort, patience, understanding and care, innovations to improve the incomes of millions of small farmers can be identified, appraised and implemented in ways that are attractive both to farmers and to the wider economy.








74


Given the corpus of recently assembled empirical evidence in support of the high performance of many traditional farmers around the world, the relative efficiency of smallholder agriculture is no longer questioned. This fact notwithstanding, an agricultural economy which is wholly dependent upon a smallholder system has certain limitations.

Dorner and Kanel (1977:5) discuss at least two of them. First, a highly productive smallholder system requires an elaborate service structure which is both expensive and time-consuming to develop. Consequently, a government cannot deal effectively with such a system until all the necessary infrastructure is in place and markets have begun to function more or less competitively. The second problem is that the smallholder system, dependent upon individuals rather than the collective, can allow great inequalities to develop. Such inequalities may be a function of variations in individual entrepreneurial abilities. Whatever their cause, they can accumulate over time and present serious obstacles to achieving a resolution of problems such as equity and even economic growth.

Yet one other issue that is raised in the literature which has important implications for development is the relationship between smallholder producers and the state. According to Gavin Williams (1976:149), peasants tend to suffer under almost all forms of externally designed strategies of change undertaken in Africa. His contention is that because of the nature of the peasant mode of production in the political economy of the continent (1) the underdevelopment of peasant production is a condition for the development of capitalist and state production and that (2) this condition serves the interests of the state and its beneficiaries rather than promotes the livelihood of the people.

This view of the parasitic and exploitative nature of states' domination over their seemingly helpless smallholder farmers contrasts sharply with Goran








75


Hyden's (1980) characterization of African peasantries as uncaptured and consequently resistant to the intrusions of the forces and pressures of the state.



Cooperatives and Agricultural Development



Production cooperatives are an option to individually owned and operated smallholder or family farms. The modern cooperative institution denotes a wide range of organizational forms which involve varying activities. In the agricultural sector these include, among others, the more common situations where individual farmers cultivate their own farms while banding together to take advantage of services such as input and credit procurement and marketing. More rarely, and usually at the encouragement or even the coercion of the state, there is also the producer cooperative. At the very advanced phase of this continuum, the ownership of land and other resources as well as the organization of production calls for a substantial element of collectivization as it is found in socialist communes (Galeski 1971, 1977; Francisco et al. 1979).

The role of cooperatives in the development of the developing countries first engaged the attention of the United Nations Organization in the 1950s. Subsequently, towards the end of the 1960s, it commissioned various analytical and case studies into rural cooperative movements (see Carroll et al. 1969; UNRISD 1975), and also covered Africa (see Apthorpe 1972a, 1972b), Asia (see Inayatullah 1972) and Latin America (see Borda 1971). Throughout Africa the colonial administrations in many but not in all cases encouraged the formation of cooperatives as part of the promotion of community development (Widstrand 1970).








76

To the agricultural societies of rural Africa the idea of cooperation has never been a novel concept. In most places traditional and informal cooperation and reciprocal exchanges, some of which are still performed today, were practiced in the past. These involved the pooling of such scarce resources as labor power oftentimes for the mutual benefit of participants. Subsidiarily also, cooperation on a larger scale was part of festive or competitive community display in various traditional societies (Erasmus 1956; Dore 1971).

Many researchers have studied aspects of this system of customary values exhibited in traditional cooperation. For instance, Moore (1975) has a typology of such cooperation and he has also looked at the economic importance and other advantages that it generates in rural areas. In Africa mention can be made, among others, of Migot-Adholla's (1970) study of traditional society and cooperation and Gulliver's (1971) work about such cooperation among the Ndendeuli of. Tanzania.

A major feature of traditional cooperation in rural Africa manifests

itself in the form of group participation in various farm tasks. Every peasant society in Africa has a name for such cooperation, which for example is referred to as nnoboa among the Akan of Ghana and nhimbe among the Mashona of Zimbabwe. Moise Mensah (1970) reports about group farming in Dahomey, now Benin while Anthony Ellman (1970) also observes it in Tanzania.

In another setting, Brian du Toit (1969) examines the functioning of informal grassroots cooperation among the Bantu-speaking groups of South Africa. His study traces the problems associated with the transformation of traditional cooperation through rural-urban migrations and networks into the modern cooperative system. He shows also that such revitalized institutions are major avenues for culture change in African urban settings.








77


The stated objectives and the recognized economic and social advantages of the modern cooperative are quite obvious. Agarwal (1976) discusses many of them and Joy (1971) takes a look at the existing social factors which are favorable to successful cooperatives. Under the capitalist system of production cooperatives render valuable services which range from the economies of scale, enhancement of private property, market competition and the profit motive to the maximization and utilization of scarce resources (Roy 1981:29).

Elsewhere, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS 1982:1) has cited

the following advantages that are often sought by socialist countries through the establishment of cooperatives: (1) economically, it speeds the growth of output and incomes by allowing more rational use of land and labor, providing an essential underpinning for the accumulation process, both local and national; (2) socially, collectivization eliminates exploitative class relationships and prevents their reemergence, alleviates absolute poverty by delivering basic welfare services and reduces unacceptably high levels of inequality between households, villages and regions; and (3) politically, it allows the integration of rural producers as active subjects rather than passive victims of the national development process with the collective as both an instrument of state-led mobilization and a framework for democratic

participation and grassroots initiative.

In the view of Texier (1974:1) the cooperative still appears to be the

most appropriate organization for mobilizing the efforts of the community for agricultural development. The voluminous study by Robert Bideleux (1985) provides additional insights into the successful achievement of many of these goals by various communist countries. Nigel Swain (1985) also documents the success story of cooperative agriculture in Hungary.








78


In countries such as Israel, with its kibbutz and moshav collective

systems of rural settlement and production (Weintraub 1971; Don 1977), and for most of rural Europe and North America cooperatives have been of immense benefit to small farmers. These benefits include, among others, access to extension, credit and input services at substantially reduced costs to the individual members of these cooperatives. Other instances of successful cooperatives are documented for Latin America (Carroll 1971). By and large, however, the modern cooperative, as Schaffer and Lamb (1981) indicate, does well only in economically advanced countries.

Given the foregoing facts one can appreciate the near-dogmatic acceptance of cooperatives and their promotion in the agricultural policy agendas of independent African countries (Widstrand 1970; Bardeleben 1973; King 1981; Ladipo 1981; Okafor 1983; Ahwireng-Obeng 1986). For most African countries, particularly those which have an affinity for agrarian socialism, the modern cooperative seem to have the answers to such pressing problems as the eradication of absolute poverty (Lele 1975) and the promotion of equity (Putterman 1983).

Yet, the literature indicates the overwhelming failure of modern cooperatives and other public sponsored agricultural production schemes throughout the continent. For example, Carl Eicher (1986a) states: "After 25 years of independence, there are no models of agrarian socialism . that have produced a reliable agricultural surplus." Earlier, Eicher and Baker (1982:205) alluded to the theoretical and policy implications of the problems of cooperatives by emphasising that failure "has been a common denominator under civilian, military, capitalist, and socialist governments."

Two issue are pertinent to putting this failure in the context of

agricultural policy. The first is about the nature of the failure itself. The




Full Text
378
Grant (see Table 8-25) to the cooperative. This enabled Simba Youth to
purchase 10 more head of cattle from Shiloh Development, a private Large-Scale
Commercial farm in the area.
With the kind of performance that has characterized Simba Youth from its
very establishment in 1980 until now there is no way that the cooperative can
make it without increased and dedicated membership. Equally, there is no way
that the economically sound projections that justified the government's
commitment to invest public funds in that particular producer cooperative, as
well as many others, can be realized in the present circumstance. As at the
end of July 1985 an amount of $105,678 had been spent by the government on the
Scheme. That represented 66 percent of the total project cost (see Table
8-24). The fact is that two-thirds of all the project money had gone into the
resettlement of less than one-fourth of the target membership. In effect, by
the raid-1985 the actual project cost per member stood at $3,774.21 rather than
the $1,790 (see Table 8-3) originally projected by the planners in the Scheme
report which obviously is no more tenable.
Any further expenditures without corresponding increase in membership, or
worse still with declining membership, will translate into increasing cost per
member. Thus serious policy efforts need to be directed at breaking the
vicious cycle of low membership, underutilization of resources, low
productivity and no surplus output for the market, indebtedness and lack of
personal income and rewards to labour which in turn precipitates high turnover
and also keeps membership low.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the government of
Zimbabwe as well as other foreign governments and donor agencies have been


164
So far this requirement has been scruplously honored by the government,
though much to the chagrin and the disappointment of many landless Zimbabweans
and radical intellectuals alike (see Chapter II above). There is no doubt,
however, that the government's resettlement effort is frustrated to some
extent by the operation of this mode of land acquisition. The government
points out that the system
has proved unsatisfactory because, on the one hand the
majority of offers have been of poor quality land and,
on the other hand such offers have been fragmented and
scattered across the country. (Zimbabwe 1985c:11)
In November 1985, as a consequence of and in response to this
frustration, the government introduced a new Land Acquisition Bill in the
National Assembly. The Bill sought to encourage land owners to sell to the
government first. It also sought to empower the President to acquire land that
had been declared underutilized or derelict by the Derelict Lands Board. As
expected the Bill was emotionally debated along racial lines. For instance,
the acting Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the
Honorable Herbert Ushewokunze who tabled the Bill charged the European members
of the Assembly who opposed it to be "digging in their heels against change."
(The Herald, November 20, 1985:1).
Also contributing to the debate the ZANU-PF Member of Parliament for
Mufakose, the Honorable John Zhakata, argued that the Bill was meant to get
back the lands "which [the whites] grabbed away from us." (The Herald,
November 27, 1985:8). From the perspective of the European members the
controversy about the Bill centered on the definition of two crucial words.
These were "underutilized," and "derelict" as they applied to land. For
example, the Honorable Mark Patridge, the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
member for Mazowe-Mutoko and the Honorable Bill Irvine, an Independent


214
The headship of these rural households reflected the expected, that is,
the predominance of males. This was even more so in the Small-Scale Commercial
Area. A large proportion of the Cooperative farm families, making up 38
percent of the total, and about 23 percent of families in the Communal Area
were female headed (Table 7-5).
All Small-Scale Commercial farmers were married. In the Communal, Model A
Normal and Accelerated sectors every 9 of 10 farmers were married. In the
Cooperative one out of every 4 farmers had never been married. Also within
this latter sector the proportion of divorcees was higher. There were more
widowed farmers in the Communal Area and none in the Small-Scale Commercial
Area (Table 7-6). The norm among all the married men was monogamous unions.
However, a few farmers had taken additional wives. One out of every 10 married
men in the Cooperative had a second wife. The corresponding figures were
higher elsewhere with 1 in 8 in the Model A Accelerated Scheme, 1 in 5 in the
Small-Scale Commercial, 1 out of 4 in the Model A Normal Scheme as well as 1
in 3 in the Communal Area (Table 7-7).
Still among the married male farmers all those in the Small-Scale
Commercial sector married their wives at one time or another before 1980. But
that was not so among the others. In the Communal Area 12.5 percent of the
married men either entered into their first marriage since 1980 or had taken
another wife between then and 1985. This was true of 15 percent of the
Cooperative farmers, 16 percent of the Model A Accelerated and 24 percent of
Model A Normal Schemes' farmers. In the latter group two farmers had each
married three and four women respectively since being resettled in 1980 (Table
7-8).
All farmers in the Small-Scale Commercial as well as the Communal Areas
respectively had one or more living children. With a negligible exception this
was the case also in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes. However, in


466
Khan, A. R.
1977b Productive Planning for Basic-Needs. Tn The Basic-Needs Approach
to Development: Some Issues Regarding Concepts and Methodology. D. P.
Ghai, T. Alfthan, E. L. H. Lee and A. R. Khan. Pp. 96-113. Geneva:
International Labour Organization.
King, Roger
1975 Experiences in the Administration of Cooperative Credit
and Marketing Societies in Northern Nigeria. Agricultural
Administration, 2(3):195-208.
King, Russell
1977 Land Reform: A World Survey. Boulder: Westview Press.
1981 Cooperative Policy and Village Development in Northern
Nigeria. _In Rural Development in Tropical Africa. J. Heyer,
P. Roberts and G. Williams, eds. Pp. 259-280. London: Macmillan.
Kinloch, G.
1978 Racial Conflict in Rhodesia: A Socio-Historical Study.
Washington: University Press of America.
Kinsey, Bill H.
1980 Zimbabwe: Food and Agriculture Sector. Rome: Food
and Agricultural Organization.
1982 Forever Gained: Resettlement and Land Policy in the Context
of National Development in Zimbabwe. Africa, 52(3): 92-113.
1983 Some Emerging Policy Issues in Zimbabwe's Land Resettlement
Programmes. Development Policy Review, 1(2):
1984 Conflicts Between Growth and Equity Objectives in Planning
Rural Projects: The Lilongwe Land Development Programme. Journal
of Social Sciences, 11(1):37 46.
Kirk, J., and M. C. Miller
1986 Reliability and Validity in Quantitative Research.
Beverly Hills. Sage Publications.
Kirkpatrick, C.
1968 The Role of the African Loan and Development Company in the
Field of African Agriculture. Rhodesian Journal of Economics,
2(2):22-27.
Kitching, Gavin
1977 Modes of Production and Kenyan Dependency. Review of
African Political Economy. No.8:56-74.
Knight, E. F.
1895 Rhodesia of Today. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.


CHAPTER VII
CASE STUDY OF FARMERS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAMS:
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE
Introduction
This chapter consists of a description of case study findings about the
characteristics of farmers and their survey responses to various questions
that relate to (1) current agricultural and resettlement policies and (2)
farmers' self assessment of agricultural matters that are important to their
lives, work performance and their community.
The presentation is organized essentially around the Model A Normal
Intensive Resettlement program. As it was pointed out in Chapter IV above the
Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme is the central focus of this study. Many
aspects of the respective responses from farmers in the various farming
systems are analyzed and evaluated from the comparative perspective of
Mufurudzi farmers. The responses are presented in the form of a series of
tables of frequencies, percentages and means. A rather descriptive analysis of
these tables covering various study variables (see Appendix D, Table D-l to
U-5) is offered. Except where warranted the presentation is done without much
attempt to give detailed explanations to the observed patterns. However, some
aspects of the findings which need highlighting are elaborated upon in the
summary.
The responses to what are considered to be issues of specific interest to
particular farming systems are discussed separately as such under the relevant
system. However, the responses to common questions are presented together as a
way to draw on the comparative or contrasting patterns within and between the
systems. The presentation is done under seven themes of as follows: (1)
responses of commercial and communal farmers to some background issues
204


14
affected people. If this is true, then anthropological research design for
evaluating such programs has to do more by specifying what determinants and
relationships facilitate or inhibit particular processes of development in
given circumstances or situations. An analytical model or a conceptual
formulation that addresses such methodological deficiencies in evaluation
studies will aid in a better understanding of the issues at play.
For example, Cleveland (1971) states that under favorable conditions
there is high achievement rate for implementing expressed policy. Similarly,
it is argued by others that value-based actions of policy makers may be most
determinative of ultimate policy and that articulated goals exert significant
influence upon behavior (Dolbeare and Hammond 1971; Brewer and Brunner 1975).
In the same vein, Ronald Havelock (1979) demonstrates that awareness and
interest are important correlates of acceptance and adoption of particular
innovations by individuals as well as groups.
Granting that these assumptions hold there is no reason why the rather
informative anthropological and other studies of resettlement should not be
able to utilize them to provide the kinds of useful theoretical insights and
concepts that explain success or failure of grassroots development.
Development as a concept may either be an end in itself or a process to
an end. This study, being an anthropological evaluation of an on-going
development program, approaches resettlement as a special kind of a social
organization process that seeks to achieve desirable ends for rural
Zimbabweans. The process is viewed as multifaceted in nature. Its end or
policy objectives may only materialize given a particular constellation of
factors and environments. In order for the resettlement to achieve any
identifiable impacts or outcomes it is necessary that the clearly distinct
components or clusters of variables which characterize it have to be


272
Finally these fanners identified the majority need of the schemes to be
resettlement infrastructure particularly a health clinic (Table 7-55). ^
In the medium to long-term projection of the planners these resettlement
schemes were to develop or attract service businesses and industries as they
matured and as their service centers evolved as growth points (see Zimbabwe
1983d) .
The slow development of these essential services was a matter of great
frustration for most farmers. In particular, local transportation was a
problem. Some farmers, for instance, walk 17 kilometers one way from say Gatu
to Chindunduma on the main Shamva-Mount Darwin road to wait for hours to catch
a bus. One out of every three farmers in Mufurudzi therefore mentioned this
transport, grinding mills for maize-meal and other grain, grocery stores and
butcheries as their urgent needs.
As to who should be responsible for the provision of these needs 42
percent looked up to the government or the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and
Rural Resettlement to do so. Another 34 percent suggested a joint effort of
the government or the Ministry and the farmers (Table 7-56).
The Model B and Communal Area Farmers
The constraints mentioned by the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers are
treated separately below in Chapter VIII where the general problems that were
identified with these Schemes are reviewed.
For the Communal Area farmers each was asked to indicate what major
concern faced him or her. The three major responses that were given comprised
(1) lack of agricultural implements and services such as credit and inputs,
which was the problem of 29 percent of the farmers, (2) poor or inadequate
land and (3) lack of water (Table 7-57).


TABLE 8-14
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME:
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS, ARABLE AND LIVESTOCK CAPACITIES
FORMER
FARM
RESETTLEMENT
VILLAGE
NUMBER
OF
HSEHOLDS
TOTAL GROSS
AREA ARABLE
(HECTARES)
LIVESTOCK
UNITS
Gwatera
Gwetera
32
3,100
325
520
Puck Ridge
Tongogara 1
51
2,290
680
344
Lions Lodge
Zvoman yanga
40
1,960
655
290
Mgadzi
Magadzi
51
2,830
680
340
Gatu
Gatu
50
2,438
580
401
Septem
Mukwari
38
1,850
265
234
Glendry
Chitepo
30
2,160
640
228
Kemphaven West Tongogara 2
14
701
153
110
Denda
Denda
38
2,027
380
276
Odenferra
Nehanda
39
1,727
210
243
Darien
Mudzinge
33
2,250
331
261
Forest Down
Takawira
31
1,533
490
239
Drumossie
Chimburukwa
25
1,421
265
184
Wellaway &
Persephone
Muringamombe
28
1,397
395
207
Aberfoil
Mutoramhepo
14
698
237
107
Polycrops
Mupedzanhamo
13
600
221
100
Thyrza
Banana
14
678
206
108
Rataplan
Zv ataida
27
3,067
280
367
Sources: Based on Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX,
(January 1981) and the Quarterly Reports prepared by
DERUDE, Harare.


152
CABINET COMMITTEE ON RESETTLEMENT
INTER MINISTRY COMMITTEE FOR RESETTLEMENT
MIN OF AGRIC
MIN OF LOCAL GOVT
OTHER
LANDS & RURAL
RURAL DEVELOPMENT
MINISTRIES
RESETTLEMENT
& URBAN DEVELOPME
PLANNING
PLANNING
HEALTH
AGRITEX
PHYSICAL DEVEL
EDUCATION
VETERINARY
RESETTLEMENT/
HOUSING
IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION
WATER
COOPS
ARDA
NATURAL RE
AFC
COMMUNITY
AMA
DEVEL
CSC
NON-GOVT
ORGANIZA
FIGURE: 5 1
ZIMBABWE: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF RESETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION


400
cycle of low membership, underutilized and misused resources, failure to
generate income and hence inability to attract serious, hardworking and
skilled farm personnel. Mumbengegwi (1984c:18) aptly sums up the overall
picture of these Producer Cooperatives by saying that the agricultural skills
base of their farmers is very thin and inappropriate to the design of the
Model B Schemes as large scale farming enterprises.
The government has two clear options to confront this problem. The less
politically expedient but economically wise action would be to disband these
Model B Schemes all together. Given the socialist leanings of the government
this recommendation would smack of capitulation. It may thus be ruled out as
unrealistic and unacceptable. The more ideologically palatable solution
therefore would be to continue to sponsor them.
In the circumstance it is imperative that the government focuses its
concerns more on ways and means of ensuring efficiency and productivity. The
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or donor agencies which prop these Model
B Schemes with financial and material assistance have a role to play in
formulating a workable strategy in this regard. As it is now these
Cooperatives are administratively autonomous of public control which in itself
is not a bad idea. Internal and participatory management of members should be
preferred to State controls and coercion.
The anomaly, however, is that these Cooperatives are using or misusing a
public resource in the form of some of the best agricultural lands in the
country which are intact with all the existing and potentially productive
assets. The worse part of this problem is that the abysmal economic
performance, social disorganization and imminent failures of these Producer
Cooperative Schemes are being financed heavily and exclusively with tax monies
and scarce donor assistance.


463
Hyden Goran
1986 African Social Structure and Economic Development, In.
Strategies for African Development. R. J. Berg and J. S. Whitaker,
eds. Pp. 52-80. Berkeley: University of California Press.
IDS (Institute of Development Studies) Bulletin
1982 Crisis of Collectivization. 13(4). Sussex, England:
Institute of Development Studies.
Iliffe, John
1983 The Emergence of African Capitalism. London: Macmillan Press.
Inayatullah
1972 Cooperatives and Development in Asia. Geneva: United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development.
Isaac, Barry L.
1982 Economic Development and Subsistence Farming: The Case of the
Mende of Upper Bambara Chiefdom, Sierra Leone. Central Issues in
Anthropology, 4(1):1-20.
Isaacman, A.
1979 Transforming Mozambique's Rural Economy. Rural Africana
(New Series). Nos.4-5:97-113.
Ivy, Peter
1983 Resettlement Areas: Starvation, Subsistence or Surplus?.
Zimbabwe Science News, 17(9-10):152-153.
Jackson, R. H., and C. G. Rosberg
1982 Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
James, W. E.
1983 Settler Selection and Land Settlement Alternatives: New
Evidence from the Philippines. Economic Development and Culture
Change, 31(3):571-586.
Jansma, J. D.,
1981 Rural Development: A Review of Conceptual and Empirical
Studies. In. A Survey of Agricultural Economics Literature.
L. R. Martin, ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Jegen, M. E., and C. K. Wilber
1979 Growth With Equity: Strategies for Meeting Basic Human
Needs. New York: Paulist Press.
Johnson, Allen W.
1979 Quantification in Cultural Anthropology: An Introduction
to Research Design. Stanford: Stanford University Press.


485
Spencer, Dunstan S. C.
1986 Agricultural Research: Lessons of the Past, Strategies for the
Future. Tn Strategies for African Development. R. J. Berg and J. S.
Whitaker, eds. Pp 215-241. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Spring, Anita
1986 Women Farmers and Food in Africa: Some Considerations and
Suggested Solutions. In Food in Sub-Saharan Africa. A. Hansen and
D. E. McMillan, eds. Pp. 332-348. Boulder: Lynee Reinner Publishers.
Stahl, Michael
1977 New Seeds in Old Soil: A Study of the Land Reform. Process in
Western Wollega, Ethiopia 1975-75. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute
of African Studies.
Stanning T. R.
1967 Some Human Problems Encountered by African Farming Development.
Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 1(1):25-30.
Steele, Murray
1981 The Economic Function of African-Owned Cattle in Colonial
Zimbabwe. Zambezia, 9(1):29-48.
Stevens, R. D., ed.
1977 Tradition and Dynamics in Small-Farm Agriculture. Ames: Iowa
State University Press.
Stewart, Frances
1985 Basic Needs in Developing Countries. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph E.
1987 Some Theoretical Aspects of Agricultural Policies.
Research Observer, 2(l):43-60.
Stoneman, Colin, ed.
1981 Zimbabwe's Inheritance. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Streeten, Paul
1981 First Tnings First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the
Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Suarez, R.
1984 Reality and Rhetoric in a New Nation: The Promise of Zimbabwe.
World View 27(2):9-12.
Sutcliffe, R. B,
1971 Stagnation and Inequality in Rhodesia 1946-1968. Bulletin of the
Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 33(1 ): 3556.
Sutton, K.
1977 Population ResettlementTraumatic Uphevals and the Algerian
Experience. Journal of Modern African Studies, 15(2):279-300.


354
fanner would take the risk of getting into tobacco again so soon.
There was also an increasing tendency among Mufurudzi farmers to fully
utilize their arable lands by expanding the areas cultivated. For instance,
the mean hectares cultivated by each household increased by 35 percent between
1982-83 and 1983-84, that is, from 2.3 to 3.1. Consequently, the mean area
that every household left under fallow decreased by 0.8 hectares between
1982-83 and 1984-85 when the hectares cultivated apparently stabilized at 3.1
per household. If this stabilization is maintained it would be in conformity
with the recommendations made in the Project Report by AGRITEX requiring that
for agronomic and good husbandary reasons these smallholders only cultivate 60
percent of their total arable land each year (Table 8-19).
In 1984-85 slightly more land was devoted to cotton than to maize (Table
8-20). This appears to be the beginnings of a movement away from putting more
resources into maize which is the staple source of subsistence. If this
becomes the trend it would make much economic sense because of the higher
returns to cotton. Infact, for 1984-85 the per hectare costs for maize and
cotton as estimated in AFC figures for creditors in Mufurudzi were $258 and
$320 respectively. At the 1984-85 market prices of $179.78 for a tonne of
maize and $550.00 for cotton the break-even yield for maize was 1.44 tonnes
and 0.58 tonnes for cotton. Given Mufurudzi's mean yield per hectare of 3.48
tonnes for maize and 1.89 tonnes for cotton in 1984-85 the net returns or
incomes were $367.65 for a hectare of maize and $719.40 for a hectare of
cotton.
The mean kilograms per hectare achieved on European-managed or the
Large-Scale Commercial Farms in agro-ecological zone II is reported by AGRITEX
to be 4,000. This means that the average productivity for maize on Mufurudzi
farms, about 70 percent of which lie in the poorer Natural Region III, was
generally very commendable. This is even more so given the fact that the


TABLE 5 2continued
COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY
SPECIFIC DUTIES
PLANNING SECTION
Confirms the location of Rural Service
Centers and approves their layouts
DEPARTMENT OF RURAL
DEVELOPMENT (DERUDE)
Implements resettlement and micro
manages individual schemes
DEVELOPMENT SECTION
Constructs, implements and maintains
all physical infrastructure in
resettlement schemes, eg.
demarcation, clearing, plowing,
dips, access roads, elementary
schools, marketing and supply
depots, clinics and Rural Service
Center
RESETTLEMENT SECTION
Controls the budget for various
aspects of the resettlement program
Selection and allocation of farmers
for resettlement
Adminstration and coordination at the
scheme level
Enforcement of resettlement permits
Squatter control
Promotion of VIDCOs and WARDCOs
Undertakes the collection of data
about scheme progress and problems
MIN. OF ENERGY, WATER
RESOURCES & DEVELOPMENT.
Provision of domestic water to all
resettlement villages and schools
Provision, operation and maintenance
of water supplies at the Rural
Service Center
Provision of irrigation water and
dams in resettlement schemes where
appropriate
MIN. OF EDUCATION
Holds ultimate responsibility for
education in resettlement schools
Provision of secondary schools in
resettlement schemes
Staffing and payment of salaries for
both elementary and secondary
school teachers


TABLE 8 12continued
YEAR NGO NATURE/AMOUNT
OF AID
MASHONALAND WEST
Nyamakate 1983 CHRISTIAN CARE
Plowed 30 hectares and supplied the
following food aid and agricultural
inputs all valued at $4,996:
30 bags maize-meal
8 x 50 kg bags beans
4 x 20 liters cooking oil
90 x 50 kg bags Compound D
99 x 50 kg bags Ammonium Nitrate
60 x 50 kg bags Compound D
10 x 50 kg bags seed maize
Tashinga
1984
CHRISTIAN CARE
Donated $9,000
1985
Donated the following cash amount and
materials:
$2,400 towards the purchase of
cattle
Scotch-cart
Electric grinding mill
Maize sheller
Petrol (10 liters)
Compound D fertilizer (120 bags)
Empty sacks/bags (400)
Miscellaneous tools
Gowe 1983 REDD BARNA (Sponsor)
Source: Compiled from the Monthly and Quarterly Reports, DERUDE, Harare.


219
MASHONALAND CENTRAL
TABLE
PROVINCE:
7-11
FARMERS'
LEVEL
OF
SCHOOL
COMPLETED
NONE
E
SOME
L E
COMPLETED
M E N T
POST
ARY
(N=)
%
Model A Normal
(348)
21.6
46.3
14.7
17.5
Model A Accelerated
(38)
28.9
39.5
10.5
21.1
Model B Cooperative
(151)
43.7
25.2
12.6
18.5
Communal Area
(62)
11.3
67.7
14.5
6.5
Small-Scale Commercial
(20)
5.0
55.0
5.0
35.0
TABLE 7-12
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' NON-AGRICULTURAL SKILLS
(N=)
NONE
ARTISAN
DRIVER/
MECHANIC
%
SALES
TAILOR/
DRESS
MAKER
OTHER
Model A Normal
(348)
51.0
24.1
10.3
1.4
3.7
9.2
Model A Accelerated
(38)
53.8
15.4
10.3
5.1
5.1
7.7
Model B Cooperative
(151)
57.0
10.6
7.9
7.9
6.6
9.9
Communal Area
(62)
50.0
19.4
11.3
3.2
8.1
8. 1
Small-Scale Commercial
(18).
20.0
15.0
20.0
5.0
10.0
20.0


23
dependent qualifies as single. A young couple with an only/or without a child
is categorised to be in establishment. Spouses still in the prime of
reproduction with the last child not more than 4 years of age are in
expansion. Spouses with older children the last of which is 5 or more years
qualify to be in consolidation.
The decline phase is made up of older people with households where sons and
daughters, now grown, have fissioned out. The category "Other" contains all
cases that do not fit neatly into any of the five preceeding phases. These
phases are conceptual states derived from household structure and
organization. They reflect the socio-demographic realities of rural Zimbabwe
to which they are applied here. The utility of the model is enhanced by
building into it additional flexibility using the following information: (1)
the gender and marital state of the de facto household head; (2) whether
marriage is monogamous or polygynous; (3) the presence or absence of kins and
affines; and (4) whether the household is pre-fission, fissioning, or
post-fission. See Appendix A for the resultant typology.
10.) Fortes (1949:63-77) first used the developmental cycle frame of analysis
among the Tallensi to account for variations in the synchronic constitution
of what he called the agnatic joint family. It is apparent that he did not
fully utilize the concept as much as he should to elucidate the emergence,
growth and decline of Tale households. Indeed, he concentrated on the
constant fissioning of homesteads which he blamed on intra-sibling conflicts.
Elsewhere (Fortes 1970:vii), he was unable to apply the concept to the
Ashanti situation because he found that culture to be "much more complex."
Similarly, a recent application of the concept by Sanjek (1983:330-343) to an
urban African situation only succeeds in the designation of household
residence roles without yielding any insights into how these roles impact on
specific developmental processes.
The inability on the part of these and other researchers to successfully
apply the concept to situations of change and development stems from the fact
that they have essentially conceived it in static terms and consequently
impose it on functional structures. They are thus unable to grasp and utilize
the essential dynamics of gender, age, conjugal form, and other internal
features which are in constant interaction within and between different
households at different phases of the cycle. Yet, it is these dynamics rather
than the cycle per se which render the concept hueristically useful. A
similar criticism applies to many development-oriented and applied studies,
particularly in Farming Systems Research and Extension, which use the
household as units of analysis. Cases in point include Shaner et al.
(1982), Norman (1982), and McMillan (1986).


225
emphatically boasted that resettlement had freed him from the serfdom
conditions under which he lived as a laborer in the colonial days sojourning
from one European-owned farm to another.
The farmers were also unanimous in voicing out that the government should
continue with resettlement. Most farmers rather impatiently recommended the
taking over of so-called "European farms" for resettlement (see Table 7-27
below) and the financing of the program from external donor sources. The
majority of farmers, that is 60 percent of all of them, were willing to pay a
resettlement tax, if at all necessary. Some of the remaining 40 percent argued
that they were not yet firmly settled or financially secure enough to be
burdened with such a tax. A few farmers held the opinion that as agricultural
producers they were already taxed enough by the government. Yet another group
just abhored any form of taxation implying that it was a relic of the colonial
past from which they were now permanently liberated.
The farmers complimented highly the assistance and the performance of the
Resettlement Team of scheme-level government staff. They recommended that the
officers found ways and means of solving and providing feedback on farmers''
problems and also visiting them in the fields and villages more regularly
(Table 7-17).
The Farmers of Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kushingirira
and Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes
The questions and responses relating to background issues about the
cooperatives dealt mostly with (1) membership and (2) members' attitudes and
self-evaluation of organizational problems which were unique to this
particular farming system.
Nearly 32 percent of the farmers originally worked as farm laborers on
European or Large-Scale Commercial Farms. In fact, almost all of these


144
because it was illegal to transport gas in any container in a passenger or
public vehicle and not more than 4 liters in a private vehicle. During the
course of the research in 1985 one liter of gas in Harare, Bindura, Shamva and
Mt. Darwin averaged between a low of Z$1.01 to a high of Z$1.07 or around
Z$3.93 (US$2.45) per gallon.
9.) I originally planned to cover only randomly selected farmers in the
survey. In early June 1985, I visited Mufurudzi to pre-test aspects of my
quetionnaire. I decided to do this in Tongogara 1. 1 therefore drew a random
sample of 10 from a list of 50 farmers in the village. On June 6, 1985, I was
accompanied by the Resettlement Assistant to meet the VIDCO Chairman and
farmers. Many of them had already been notified of my research. All the same I
explained it to them and requested to do a pre-test of my questionnaire with
the selected 10 farmers prior to the main survey which was to begin in about 3
months. When I arrived the following morning with a research assistant we
could not obtain farmers' cooperation and participation. Some of the selected
farmers insisted on the coverage of all their neighbors as a condition for
their own participation. Many of those not originally selected also questioned
how "fair" my so-called random sampling was. Though I never understood the
basis of the "suspicions" I was compelled to change the original strategy.
Since these resettlement programs started the government has permitted only
a few field studies in them. The only individuals who have been so lucky all
did their research from the University of Zimbabwe. These are (1) Bill
Kinsey's (1982, 1983) controversial work which generated hysteria by
questioning the wisdom in the government's resettlement policy and (2)
Mumbegwegwi's (1984b) study of the Model B Cooperative resettlements.
The other studies are monitoring activities such as the (1) farm management
studies done by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and
(2) the routine annual census of farm output conducted by the Resettlement
Officers on behalf of the Central Statistical Office. The latter covers all
individual resettled farmers. This fact coupled with the organizational ideals
of the VIDCOs which encourage the participation of everybody rather than a
chosen few militates against partial coverage that random selection entails.
Consequently, I modified the research design to cover selected villages and
the total households in them. Even then, a few individual farmers in some of
the nearby villages which were not selected presented themselves to be
interviewed. Though these were interviewed their questionnaires were never
analyzed for this study.
The foregoing problem which necessitated the use of total rather than
selective coverage of farmers in particular villages is unique to the
resettlement schemes with their nucleated settlements. In the Communal and the
Small-Scale Commercial Areas with dispersed homesteads no such problems were
encountered.


TABLE 7-14
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD
DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
ABCDEFGH
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
HOUSEHOLDS
Model A Norma 11 123
Model A Accel 1 14
Model B Coop -
Communal Area 2 14
Small-Scale CO 7
13 86 49 9 20 26 2
340
1 4 11 2 3 1 0
37
5 9 16 5 4 5 1
61
0 2 8 1 0 2 0
20
Note :
A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase
B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase
C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase
D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase
E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase
F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase
G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase
H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase
I = Household in Decline Phase
The Model Bs have been left out of this presentation


153
Development; (4) Local Government, Rural and Urban Development; (5) Education;
(6) Transport; (7) Health; (8) Public Construction and National Housing; (9)
Community Development and Women's Affairs; and (10) Cooperative Development.
In addition, representatives of donor countries and agencies which fund
various aspects of the resettlement program participate in the deliberations
of this Inter Ministry Committee for Resettlement.
The organizational emphasis at this level is to ensure that the resources
which otherwise are compartmentalized and controlled by each Ministry are
coordinated at the highest echelon of national administration. This
coordination is meant to make these resources readily available for the
integrated development of both the resettlement areas and their neighboring
communal, small-scale farming and the large-scale farming areas.
Specifically, the Inter Ministry Committee is mandated to carry out
functions which include (1) program projects appraisal and recommendations of
amendments, (2) recommendation of projects to donors for funding, (3)
monitoring of program performance and the expenditures incurred on individual
schemes and (4) recommendations on specific aspects of policy. In performing
these functions the Committee is assisted by a Technical Sub-Committee which
undertakes preliminary appraisal of all resettlement projects before
submission to the Inter Ministry Committee.
Two major ministries are much more involved with both the macro and micro
issues of resettlement policy and processes. These are the Ministry of Lands,
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and that of Local Government, Rural and
Urban Development. The specific involvement in the resettlement process of
each of the two primary ministries, their respective agencies and also of the
supporting ministries is set out below in detail.


Sandbrook, Richard
1981 Is Socialism Possible in Africa? Journal of Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics, 19(2):197-207,
1982 The Politics of Basic Needs: Urban Aspects of Assaulting
Poverty in Africa. New York: Heinemann.
1985 The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
1986 The State and Economic Stagnation in Tropical Africa.
World Development, 14(3):319-332.
Sanjek, Roger
1983 Female and Male Domestic Cycles in Urban Africa: The Adabraka
Case. In_ Female and Male in West Africa. C. Oppong, ed. Pp. 330-343.
London: George Allen and Unwin.
Sargent, Malcolm
1982 Agricultural Cooperation. Aldershot, United Kingdom: Gower.
Saul, John
1974 The State in PostColonial SocietiesTanzania. Socialist
Register ,
1979 The State and Revolution in East Africa. New York:
Monthly Review Press.
Schaffer, B., and G. Lamb.
1981 Can Equity Be Organised?. Equity, Development Analysis and
Planning. Paris: United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural
Organization.
Schatzberg, Michael G., ed.
1984 The Political Economy of Zimbabwe. New York: Praeger.
Schwerzel, P. J.
1976 The Effect of Depth of Burial in Soil on the Survival of Some
Common Rhodesian Weed Seeds. Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, 73(4):
97-99.
Schultz, Theodore W.
1964 Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Schtz, Alfred
1954 Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences. The
Journal of Philosophy, 51(9):257-273.
Scudder, T.
1973 The Ecology of Big Projects: River Basin Development
and Resettlement. Annual Review of Anthropology. No.2:45-55.
1982 No Place to Go. Philadelphia: ISHI.


143
and that we should leave them alone. I tried, perhaps successfully, to impress
upon him that I had the permission of the government to do the research and
since Batsiranayi was a public institution it was perfectly alright to do my
work without his input or sanction. Later that day the Chairman apologized to
my senior investigator and subsequently tried to interact more with us on
occasions when we met him at the Madziwa Mine Club House.
7.) Among the Model A resettled farmers there were only three problem
instances that I can recall. The first occurred during the initial public
introduction of the research team subsequent to the interviews of individual
household heads. As it was the case we had visited this particular village the
previous two days to consult with the VIDCO Chairman and his Vice-Chairman
about our impending research. On the morning of the public meeting involving
all the farmers three of them, whom we learned had been brewing and drinking
the illicit kachasu gin all night, apparently did not understand the need
for the research. Matters got worse when my senior investigator in reciting
his slogans mentioned, "Pamberi ne Mushandira Pamwe !" (Forward with the
cooperatives!). Taking that perhaps to mean we were in the village to promote
cooperatives obviously did not sit well with them. It took nearly an hour for
the other farmers to get the situation under control. For the two days that we
visited and interviewed all the farmers in that village no other problems
arose .
The second incident involved a farmer whose questionnaire was incomplete.
The night after our interviews in one village I detected that a page was
originally left out in a filled questionnaire. Our schedule did not allow an
immediate follow up for about a week. Meanwhile, I sent a message to the
Chairman in the village notifying him that we would be back there to complete
the missing section with the farmer. We drove into that village one afternoon,
and in accordance with custom first went to greet the Chairman. Later, we were
told that the farmer in question had left the village that morning and "gone
into hiding to avoid" our meeting him. This was because he did not understand
why he alone of all the people in that village should be interviewed twice.
The third problem was in respect of one of the farmers who is also an
important public servant in the area. Indeed, we became friends in the course
of my visits to the scheme. On two occasions he provided me with
accommodation. During the interview he took a questionnaire which he decided
to fill himself. He kept it for a couple of weeks before filling and leaving
many of the questions unanswered. My senior investigator and I impressed upon
him the need to obtain complete answers. He steadfastly refused to respond to
those questions the answers to which he felt were "obvious" and perhaps too
personal. Among these were those in respect of (1) ownership of household
items and capital assets and (2) about socio-demographic characteristics.
8.) Apart from the major direct expenses such as subsistence and the
development and printing of questionnaire, field transportation was unbearably
expensive. The regional nature of the case study involving interviews in
differently located research sites meant that the team had to move from place
to place. In many instances, some research sites had to be visited three or
more times in order to obtain complete coverage. From our base at Chiruma
school the nearest gas stations were at Mount Darwin 37 kilometers to the
northwest or Shamva 53 kilometers to the south.
Depending upon which village in the scheme that the team was working in we
had to cover distances of at least 50-80 kilometers return trip just to obtain
gas. We could not purchase and store extra quantities for later use. This is


Radajewski, W.
197 9 Economy of Crop Drying. Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal,
76(1):47-50.
Radajewski, W., and J. Drozdowski
1981 Optimum Method of Maize Drying in a Bin Drier. Zimbabwe
Agricultural Journal, 78(4):129-138.
Raikes, Philip.
1978 Rural Differentiation and Class Formation in Tanzania.
Journal of Peasant Studies, 5(3):285-325.
Ranger, Terence 0.
1967 Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97. London: Heinemann
Educational Books.
1970 The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press.
1977 The Absent Priesthood: Another Look at the Rhodesian Rising
of 1896-1897. Journal of African History, 18(1):6184.
1982 The Death of Chaminuka: Spirit Mediums, Nationalism and
Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe. African Affairs, 81(324):349-369.
1985 Peasant Consciuosness and Guerrila War in Zimbabwe.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Raup, P. M.
1967 Land Reform and Agricultural Development. In Agricultural
Development and Economic Growth. H. M. SouthwortK and B. F. Johnston
eds. Pp. 267-314. New York: Cornell University Press.
Ravenhill, John
1986 Africa's Continuing Crises: The Elusiveness of Development.
In Africa in Economic Crisis. J. Ravenhill, ed. Pp. 1-43. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Reed, Edward P.
1977 Introducing Group Farming in Less Developed Countries:
Some Issues. In Cooperative and Commune. P. Dorner, ed.
Pp. 359-379. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Reid, M. G.
1977 The Early Agriculture of Matabeleland and Mashonaland.
Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 74(4):97-102.
Reining, Conrad C.
1966 The Zande Scheme; An Anthropological Case Study of Economic
Development in Africa. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
1932 Resettlement in the Zande Development Scheme. Iri Involuntary
Migration and Resettlement. A. Hansen and A. 01iver-Smith, eds. Pp.
201-224. Boulder: Westview Press.


69
or kinship communalism persists in contemporary African societies to the
extent that it provides a necessary defence machanism in the external
relations of its members to others outside it (see Elias 1962). In such a
situation, as the noted ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski (1939:954) rightly
points out, "the individual obviously has to become cognizant of [the group]
charter [and] to develop the social attitude and personal sentiments in which
the bonds of organization consist." However, this fact and the apparent
placidity and solidarity, that is internal to group or kinship organization,
do not relegate the individual to the status of an unknown quantity when it
comes to the question of distribution of rewards and resources.
It is in this perspective that additional conceptual issues such as
incentive systems for individual effort and productivity, access to private
ownership, popular participation and public choice assume paramount roles in
current thinking about development. For instance, advocates of public choice
are generally, suspicious of interventionist or government-sponsored welfare
and redistribution programs. In their view development is facilitated by less
government, more market and privately-organized collective initiative. In
effect, by conditions where public choice or the spontaneous and voluntary
arrangements of the ends and means of development ultimately prevail (see
Buchanan 1986).
Public choice proponents recognize the need for equality of access to
economic and political resources, that is, to open franchise and full
participation in the development process by everybody. But as Buchanan and
Tullock show (1962:64) "participation in collective activity is costly to the
individual" in terms of externalities and constitutional decision-making. Thus
the rational utility-maximizing individual seeking to minimize the imposition
of external cost on him, as a consequence of the behavior of others, "may find


TABLE 7-15
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' FIRST SOURCE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM
224
SOURCE
FREQUENCY
%
ZANU (PF) Comrades
125
32.2
District Councillors
86
22.2
Government Officers
46
11.9
News Media
44
11.3
Relatives
23
5.9
Friends
23
5.9
Chief/Headman/Farm Master
15
3.9
Other
24
6.2
Not Applicable
2
0.5
388
100.0
MODEL A SCHEMES:
REASON
TABLE 7-16
FARMERS' REASONS
FREQUENCY
FOR RESETTLEMENT
%
Inadequate/Poor Land
215
55.4
Landless
98
25.3
Wanted Own Home
42
10.8
To Improve Life Situation 22
5.7
Unemployed
5
1.3
Other
4
1.0
Inherited Property
2
0.5
388
100.0


106
to our substantive context is an operational definition to cover these rather
primary social objectives of rural households.
This response also returns to the issue of conceptual limitations raised
by Jane Guyer (1981, 1986) in relation to the household and the developmental
cycle concepts. Her criticism about definition is valid to the extent that
many analysts have perceived the units which make up these models as static
entities. In the illustrative case of the cycle for example, the crucial
structural phases have been defined solely in terms of the age of the
household head. Important as the _de jure head may be in the general frame
of reference, such a restrictive definition does not always contribute to a
better understanding of the respective strengths and limitations of the other
dynamic forces within the household. This flaw is quite prevalent in
households which have _de facto female heads.
More significantly, a static conception of developmental cycle cannot be
used to explain change. But models as conceptual and analytical tools are
constructed to reflect the researcher's perception of the reality that is
observed. There is nothing sacrosanct about them.
Low (1986a, 1986b) has recently operationalized Fortes' phases of the
cycle for Swaziland. If additional refinement in two areas of the analytical
model that the concept generates is done, it can provide analysts with a
powerful anthropological tool to explain variations in intra-household
economic performance. The first requirement is to define phases of the
developmental cycle on the basis of multiple criteria rather than only by the
age of a household head. The second is to assign age category weights to all
household members and use these to calculate an index of household (1)
producer unit and (2) consumer unit.


131
all such products. Currently, the products include the following: (1) peanuts
(groundnuts)shelled or unshelled, green, wet or dry; (2) coffee; (3) maize
and maize-meal; (4) sorghum and sorghum-meal; (5) soya beans and soya-beans
meal; (6) sunflower seed and sunflower seed-meal; (7) wheat and wheat-flour;
(3) mhunga and mhunga -meal and (9) rapoko and rapoko -meal. Green maize
on the cob for human consumption is not a controlled product.
Under the Act the country is divided into two classes known as Area 'A' and
Area 'B'. The former comprises nearly all the large-scale commercial farming
areas and a majority of the small-scale commercial farming areas. Area 'B'
consists of all the Communal Areas, the Resettlement Schemes and certain
Small-Scale Commercial Farm Areas which are wholly surrounded by communal
lands, forest and game or wildlife reserves. Certain Large-Scale Commercial
Farms in the Matabeleland Provinces which grow little or no maize also fall
into Area 'B'.
The marketing of the listed products are controlled in Area 'k' and
uncontrolled in Area 'B'. What this means in effect is that only the Grain
Marketing Board or its approved contract buyers may purchase produce and
transport them from Area 'k'. On the other hand, anybody is permitted to
acquire, sell or re-sell controlled products in Area 'B' provided that those
products do not leave the area or, if they do, avoid passing through Area 'A'.
The only exception to the stipulations in this strictly enforced Act in
respect of Area 'B' is when registered Cooperatives, Approved Buyers or
farmers themselves transport the products directly for sale at the Board's
depot. In this case they are allowed to pass through areas designated as 'A'.
5.) The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development was so
constituted in June 1985. Until then it was known as the Ministry of Local
Government and Town Planning. The Rural Development section of the former
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was transferred to this
Ministry. With this reorganization DERUDE became part of Local Government thus
facilitating the integration of the established resettlement schemes into the
District Councils. It is the ardent hope of the government that with the
amalgamation of the schemes into the local government structures two things
will happen. First, there would be a harmonious and integrated resource use
between the schemes and the communal areas. Second, problem activities such as
poach-grazing, indiscriminate tree felling and boundary fence stealing blamed
on residents of Communal Areas would cease.
6.) In the Manicaland Province some of the squatter groups are well
organized. Indeed, they maintain a network of Committees with elected
officers. They are believed to even weild some influence over various
political leaders. This was the case in Mutanda scheme. Schemes such as
Romsley and Rusitu also have sizeable squatter populations. In his monthly
report for February 1985, the Regional Rural Development Officer of Manicaland
wrote: "The general squatter situation continues to deteriorate with
increasing numbers of people reported to be moving onto land, especially,
Nyamakawara, Odzani, Mpudzi II and Chipinge. ... In the whole Province we
are thinking in terms of thousands of families (my emphasis). Eight months
later, in October 1985, he wrote again: "We can't win here! At the moment
there is pressure on us from both the pro-squatter and anti-squatter factions
in the Province."
There were major problems also in the so-called European lands. Affected
properties included Nyanga Downs, Eastern Highlands Tea Estates, farms in the
Nyazura and Tsangwezi areas, Vergnoeg and Daisy Hill Farms in Chipinge and


43
TABLE 2-3
PROPORTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN ZIMBABWE
BY NATURAL REGIONS, RACE AND FARMING SYSTEM
NATURAL REGION PROPORTION OF AREA IN REGION
AFRICAN/ AFRICAN/ EUROPEAN/
COMMUNAL COMMERCIAL COMMERCIAL
%
I
1.0
1.0
2.0
II
8.0
18.0
27.0
III
17.0
38.0
22.0
IV
45.0
37.0
26.0
V
29.0
7.0
22.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sources: Billing (1985:36 Table 10)
: 51 Table 17).
and Riddell (1978a
Note :
: Figures
and so
are rounded to the nearest decimal point
may not add up to exactly 100 percent.
TABLE 2-4
POPULATION PRESSURE IN RELATION TO
CAPACITY IN THE COMMUNAL AREAS OF
CARRYING
RHODESIA
PRESSURE
INTENSITY
NATURE OF
PRESSURE
PERCENTAGE OF
COMMUNAL LAND
Balance or none
-
32.7
2 -
times
some
29.8
3 -
times
great
12.9
4 -
times
extreme
11.7
5 -
times
desperate
12.9
Source: Whitlow (1980:178 Table 2)


288
TABLE 7-66
MODEL A SCHEMES: PRODUCER UNITS AND MEAN PER CAPITA
NET CASH INCOME (MAIZE AND COTTON)
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
PROD
UCER
UNIT
RANK
(N=) MEAN NET RANK
CASH FLOW
PER CAPITA
$
PROD
UCER
UNIT
RANK
(N=) MEAN NET
CASH FLOW
PER CAPITA
$
RANK
1.0
21
' 2
18
20
-
-
-
-
-
1.5
20
3
-29
21
1.5
12
1
314
3
2.0
19
36
612
2
2.0
11
5
204
8
2.5
18
37
486
3
2.5
10
4
328
2
3.0
17
29
462
4
3.0
9
9
268
5
3.5
16
34
393
6
3.5
8
3
197
9
4.0
15
20
379
8
4.0
7
4
194
10
4.5
14
45
253
15
4.5
6
2
442
1
5.0
13
24
227
17
-
-
-
-
-
5.5
12
31
220
16
-
-
-
-
-
6.0
11
21
328
12
6.0
5
2
272
4
6.5
10
11
421
5
6.5
4
4
230
7
7.0
9
13
390
7
-
-
-
-
-
7.5
8
15
360
10
7.5
3
1
181
11
8.0
7
5
345
11
-
-
-
-
-
8.5
6
3
177
18
-
-
-
-
-
9.0
5
5
377
9
9.0
2
1
167
12
9.5
4
2
135
19
9.5
1
1
250
6
10.0
3
2
324
13
-
-
-
-
-
11.0
2
1
719
1
-
-
-
-
-
11.5
1
1
274
14
_
_
_


121
as to whether or not the particular service has been provided and is
operational.
In June 1985, a set of three self-administered evaluation questionnaires
was given to all the Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region. The
officers were asked to rate various indicators or study items relating to the
different resettlement models and schemes that they had managed.^
The study items, chosen to reflect the special characteristics of each of
the three resettlement models, asked for the Resettlement Officers
perceptions' about the following: (1) the attitudes and performance of the
resettled farmers; (2) the input performance of various implementing agencies
and service organizations; and (3) the current problems and the long-term
prospects for the schemes. The questionnaire about the Model A Normal
Intensive Schemes contained 38 items, that on the Model A Accelerated
Intensive Scheme had 19 items, while there was only 9 items on the Model B
Producer Cooperatives (see Appendix B, Tables B-l to B-3).
Finally, in October 1985, a 26 item questionnaire was also mailed to four
selected Model B Producer Cooperatives in the Mashonaland East and three in
the Mashonaland West Provinces to elicit the responses of the respective
Management Committees about issues ranging, among others, from the number of
existing committees to recommendations for solving the problems of the
cooperatives (see Appendix C).
I personally interviewed the management of seven of the eight Model Bs in
the Mashonaland Central Province during the same period. In all then, 15 of
the 21 Model Bs in the Region were covered in this Management Survey. They are
Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Ruenda, Kurima Inhaka, Kushingirira and
Simba Youth in Mashonaland Central; Kumhanya, Marowa, Tabudirira and Tamuka in
Mashonaland East and Ganyangu, Mukuwapasi and Nyamakate in Mashonaland West


328
TABLE 8 12continued
YEAR
NGO NATURE/AMOUNT
OF AID
MASHONALAND EAST
Marowa 1985
ZIMBABWE PROJECTS
Provided diesel engine for water supplies
Mt. St. Mary^s 1983
ZIMBABWE FREEDOM FROM HUNGER CAMPAIGN
Provided inputs (Kohwa Pakura) crop
package for 100 hectares of maize
MASHONALAND CENTRAL
Batsiranayi 1984
ZIMBABWE PROJECT
Donated 150 bags of maize-meal
1984
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
Donated 40 bags beans and provided
assistance to the elementary school
1984
LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION
Provided a resident Agricultural Advicer/
Coordinator
1984
CHRISTIAN CARE
Provided agricultural inputs for two
farming seasons
Kurima Inhaka 1984
ZIMBABWE PROJECTS
Paid electricity bills and sponsored the
chairman to attend a 3 weeks course on
cotton production
1984
CHRISTIAN CARE
Plowed 20 hectares, donated food aid and
provided 140 x 50 bags Compound D fertilizer
1985
Undertook to pay off outstanding loan owed
to the AFC and to pay the monthly running
costs


61
Yet another issue which may be of major concern, apart from the land
question and the ethnic conflicts, relates to trends in public expenditure.
According to van Burn (1986:1123), there was a decline in the private
sector's share of this from 63 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 1982 and that
the country's Five-Year Development Plan, introduced in April 1986 and
covering the period 1986-90, forecasts a further decline to an average of 43
percent annually over the Plan period. At least to advocates of minimal
government intervention in economic matters this development is undesirable.


30
FIGURE 2-3
ZIMBABWE: DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL REGIONS


207
for his needs. He would buy more land to expand. The others found their land
to be adequate and therefore did not contemplate any purchase or expansion.
Fifty-five percent of the farmers intended to pass the property on to a family
member eventually, but the rest had "other" unspecified plans towards the
disposal of their farms.
Four of these farms shared a common boundary with the Madziwa Communal
Area (Figure 7-1). Six out of the nine farmers had their farms trespassed upon
by residents and livestock from the Communal Area. Seven farmers were
approached before and they offered agricultural advice and other farm-related
assistance to farmers in the Communal Area. However, only one was ever
contacted and he gave assistance to a farmer in the government-sponsored
resettlement scheme. The nearby schemes include Mufurudzi and Mount Darwin
Model A Normal, the Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated and Model B Producer
Cooperatives notably Kubudirira, Batsiranayi, and Kushingirira (Figure 7-1).
When asked about how, in their opinion, the smallholder African farmers
in the region could become successful farmers the views of these Bindura TCA
farmers were divided equally. Three of them suggested the increased adoption
of extension advice by the peasants, three others recommended the proper use
of credit facilities while the advice of the remaining three was simply to the
effect that "there was no substitute for hard work."
The Small-Scale Commercial Farmers of Chesa Nyajenje and Karuyana
Chesa and Karuyana are bordered by the Kandeya Communal Area to the north
and the east. Elsewhere, they respectively share boundaries with Mufurudzi,
Mount Darwin and Karuyana Model A Normal Schemes (Figure 7-1).


339
Area. The western boundary of Mufurudzi separates it from the Madziwa Communal
Area (see Figure 8-2).
Originally planned in 1980 to cover 54,712 hectares of the Shamva
Intensive Conservation Area the Scheme is a consolidation of 22 former
Large-Scale European Commercial Farm blocks. These farms measured 35,823
hectares in area. To these were added 18,889 hectares of vacant State Lands.
So far about 80 percent of the total land area is deemed suitable for
resettlement. This has been demarcated, planned and developed into cultivation
and grazing areas centered around 18 nucleated villages.'*' Table 8-14
provides a summary of some aspects of the general features of the villages
which make up the resettlement Scheme.
Of the opened-up area, 14,658 hectares or 32 percent lie in the better
agro-ecological zone to the west of the Scheme which is covered by Natural
Region II, The remaining 31,176 hectares under Natural Region III constitute
the middle and eastern portions of the Scheme. Only about 13.6 percent of the
land covering the Scheme are suitable for cropping, while about 63.6 percent
are good for grazing purposes. The rest which is made up of 22.8 percent of
the land are considered marginal for current resettlement purposes. The
marginal zone consists of blocks of steep and broken country one section of
which lies north of Chirume and Gwetera and the other between Mukwari, Gatu
and Zvataida (see Figure 8-2).
Precipitation and other related physiographical characteristics are
important for successful agriculture in the area occupied by Mufurudzi as in
all parts of Zimbabwe. The mean annual rainfall for the Scheme is around 700
millimeters with a 20 year mean of 784 millimeters and a 25 percent
coefficiency of variation. Severe dry spells are possible and raid-season dry
spells are common. Whenever these occur, as it happened between 1981 and 1984,
crop yields are seriously affected. The Scheme experiences a mean annual


Munslow, Barry
1983 Is Socialism Possible in the Periphery? Monthly Review,
(35):25-39.
1984 State Intervention in Africa: The Mozambique Experience.
Journal of Modern African Studies, 22(2):199-221.
1985 Prospects for the Socialist Transition of Agriculture in
Zimbabwe. World Developement, 13(1):41-58.
Mutambirwa, Jane'
1979 Traditional Shona Concepts on Family Life and How
Systems Planned on the Basis of these Concepts Effectively
Contained the Population Growth of Shona Communities.
Zimbabwe Journal of Economics, 1(2):96-103.
Muvingi, L., L. Cliffe and B. Munslow
1980 Proposed Agrarian Strategies for the Future of Zimbabwe.
Leeds: University of Leeds Conference on Zimbabwe.
Myrdal, Gunnar
1968 Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations.
New York: Twentieth Century Fund and Patheon Books.
Nagel, S. S.
1975 Introduction. In. Public Policy Evaluation. K. M. Dolbeare,
ed. Pp. 9-11. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Ndulu, Benno J.
1986 Governance and Economic Management. Ini Strategies for
African Development. R. J. Berg and J. S. Whitaker, eds.
Pp. 81-107. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nelson H. D.
1975 Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Newiger, Nikolaus
1968 Village Settlement Schemes: The Problem of Co-operative
Farming. In Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development
in TanzaniaTen Case Studies. H. Ruthenberg, ed. Pp. 249-273.
Mnchen, West Germany: Weltforum Verlag.
Ngara, T.
1983 Seasonal Rainfall Fluctuations in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe
Agricultural Journal, 80(4):149-150.
Nicolle, W. H. H.
1971 The Development of the Subsistence Sector: What is Being
Done in Rhodesia. Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 5(4):1-8.


Miracle, M. P., and A. W. Seidman
1968b Agricultural Cooperatives and Quasi-Coops in Ghana, 1951-65.
Land Tenure Center Paper No.51. Madison: University of Wisconsin.
Mitchell, J. Clyde
1961 Wage Labour and African Population Movement in Central Africa.
In Essays on African Population. K. M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero,
"ids. Pp. 193-248. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Moock. Joyce L.
1986 Introduction In Understanding Africa's Rural Households and
Farming Systems. J. L. Moock, ed. Pp. 1-10. Boulder: Westview Press
Moore, M. P.
1975 Cooperative Labor in Peasant Agriculture. Journal of
Peasant Studies, 2(3):270-291.
Morris, L. L., and C. T. Fitz-Gibbon
1983 How To Measure Achievement. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
1984a How To Measure Program Implementation. Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications.
1984b How To Deal With Goals and Objectives. Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications.
Morris-Jones, W. H. ed.
1980 From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster
House. London: Frank Cass.
Mosher, A. T.
1967 Administrative Experimentation as a "Way of Life" for
Development Projects. International Development Review, 9(2): 38-41
Mosley, Paul
1982 Agricultural Development and Government Policy in Settler
Economies: The Case of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900-60.
Economic History Review, 35(3):390-408.
1983 The Settler Economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mo yo, Sam
1986 The Land Question. In. Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of
Transition, 1980-1986. I. Mandaza, ed. Pp. 165-201. Dakar, Senegal:
Codesria Book Series.
Moyona, Henry V.
1984 The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe. Gweru, Zimbabwe:
Mambo Press.
Msipa, C. G.
1975 The African Retail Market: Opportunities and Difficulties.
Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 9(1):15-19.


Kanyandura of Gatu village, Garikai Sigauke of Chitepo, India Dyariwa of
Nehanda, Kenneth Gadaga of Sanye village 9, Godfred Dimba of Simba Youth,
Lukson Chihuri of Goora, David Matope of Kandeya, the respective Chairmen of
Development Committees in the villages and the Sabuku or the chiefs and
headmen of the villages and homesteads where I worked I respectfully ask that
ray heartfelt salute be traditionally accepted on behalf of all the farmers of
Zimbabwe: Pamberi ne Kurima!To Amai Getrude Mukoka of Mupedzanhamo
village, Mufurudzi Scheme and all the Vanamai who always so kindly cooked
sadza ne muriwo for us I say: Tatenda chaiso!.
Here at the University of Florida I am most especially thankful to
Professor Brian M. du Toit my committee chairman, graduate advisor, teacher
and friend for his interest in my work and well-being, patient guidance and
personal and professional support. His office and home were always open to me
and there is no way that I would have survived the frustrations and ordeals of
the course work and dissertation phases of my graduate work without his
encouragement which prods me on to "hang in there." The wise direction and
deep involvement of all the remaining members of my committee in the
preparation of this dissertation also merit appreciation. I wish to thank Dean
Madelyn M. Lockhart, Dr. Paul L. Doughty, Dr. Robert Lawless and Dr. Peter J.
van Blokland for their individual and collective assistance in this regard. To
Dr. R. Hunt Davis, Center for African Studies, and Dr. Ronald Cohen,
Department of Anthropology, I owe a debt of gratitude in all respects.
Many colleagues and friends at the University of Florida have in various
ways also facilitated my studies, the analysis of the field data and the
writing of the dissertation. Julian Arturo, Jim McKay and Jon Benjamin were
very helpful with aspects of my data analysis especially the computer
programs. Gary and Nancy Gullic, Dr. David Suggs, Dr. Geeta Chowdhry, Sara
vi


Whitlow, J. R.
1980 Environmental Constraints and Population Pressures in the Tribal
Areas of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, 77(4):173-181.
1982 Marginality and Remoteness in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Agricultural
Journal, 79(4):139-147.
Whitsun
1978 A Strategy for Rural Development; Data Bank No.2: The Peasant
Sector. Salisbury: The Whitsun Foundation.
1980 Rural Service Centres Development Study. Salisbury:
The Whitsun Foundation.
1983 Land Reform in Zimbabwe. Harare, Zimbabwe: The Whitsun Foundation
Widstrand, Carl G.
1970 Efficiency and Cooperatives. In Cooperatives and Rural
Development in East Africa. C. G. Widstrand, ed. Pp. 230-242.
Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
Widstrand, Carl G., ed.
1972 African Co-operatives and Efficiency. Uppsala: The Scandinavian
Institute of African Studies.
Wilde, R. V.
1975 Financing African Participation in the Rhodesian Economy.
Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 9(1):22-38.
Willcocks, T. J.
1983 Reducing the Energy Required for Mechanized Cultivations in
Developing Countries. Zimbabwe Science News, 17(5-6):107-112.
Williams, Gavin
1982 Equity, Growth and the State (in Zimbabwe). Africa, 52(3):114-120
Wilson, G. J.
1980 Farm Dams for Irrigation Purposes. Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal,
77(6):279-282.
Windrich, E., ed.
1975 The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record, 1923-1973.
Boston: Routledge and Regan Paul.
Wood, Felicity
1984 ExtensionA ICey to Progress in Small-Scale Farming Sector. Iri
Commercial Agriculture in Zimbabwe. M. van Hoffen, ed. Pp. 11-13.
Harare, Zimbabwe: Modern Farming Publications.
World Bank
1975a The Assault on World Poverty. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
1975b Land Reform. Washington. D.C.: The World Bank.


457
Garvin, R. T.
1980 A. Sociological Investigation into the Efficiency of
Adoption and Rejection of Selected Research Recommendations
by Tobacco Growers in the Salisbury South, Norton and
Beatrice ICAs. Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, 77(6):285-288.
1981 Leadership Concepts as Applied to Discussion Groups in
Agricultural Extension in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Agricultural
Journal, 78(3):97-99.
Gelfand, Michael
1965 African Background: The Traditional Culture of the
Shona-Speaking People. Cape Town: Juta and Co.
Ge za, Sam
1986 The Role of Resettlement in Social Development in Zimbabwe.
Journal of Social Development in Africa, 1(1):2431.
Geza, S., and M. Reid
1983 Environmental Conservation in Communal Lands with
Special Reference to Grazing Lands. Zimbabwe Science News,
17(9-10):148-149.
Ghai, D. P.
1977 What is a Basic Needs Approach to Development All About?
In The Basic-Needs Approach to Development: Some Issues
Regarding Concepts and Methodology. D. P. Ghai, T. Alfthan,
E. L. H. Lee, and A. R. Khan. Pp. 19-59. Geneva: International
Labour Organization.
Ghai, D, P., eds.
1979 Agrarian Systems and Rural Development. London: Macmillan.
Ghai, D. P., T. Alfthan, E. L. H. Lee and A. R. Khan
1977 The Basic-Needs Approach to Development: Some Issues
Regarding Concepts and Methodology. Geneva: International
Labour Organization
Ghai, D. P., and S. Radwan, eds.
1983 Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Africa. Geneva:
International Labour Organization.
Ghai, D. P., and L. D. Smith
1987 Agricultural Prices, Policy, and Equity in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Gittinger, J. Price
1972 Economic Analysis of Agricultural Projects. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
1982 Economic Analysis of Agricultural Projects. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.


158
pointed out above the construction of elementary schools is the responsibility
of the Development Section of DERUDE within the Ministry of Local Government,
Rural and Urban Development.
The Ministry of Transport maintains all major or national roads that run
through resettlement schemes. Maintenance of feeder roads, however, lies with
the Development Section of DERUDE. The responsibility for the provision of
health services, the equipping, staffing and operation of clinics lies with
the Ministry of Health. It also undertakes the training of Village Health
Workers and offers technical advice on the siting and construction of "Blair
privies" or latrines in all villages and schools. The maintenance of all
government housing in resettlement schemes is carried out by the Minstry of
Public Construction and National Housing. It is also responsible for the
introduction, promotion and loan financing of improved rural housing for
resettled farm families.
The Natural Resources Board of the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Tourism educates farmers in all resettlement schemes on matters relating to
conservation and proper ecological practices. It also encourages them to
establish woodlots. Resettled farmers are organized and trained to initiate
and participate in community development activities or self-help projects by
the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs.
Finally, since the beginning of the 1985-86 fiscal year responsibility
for the promotion of cooperative enterprises has been vested in a newly
created Ministry of Cooperative Development. The Department of Cooperatives is
the operational arm of the Ministry. Its responsibilities include the
development of cooperative movement among individually resettled farm families
in the Model A schemes and the training of members of such resettlement
schemes as the Model B Producer Cooperatives (see Table 5-2).


362
TABLE 8-24
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEME: TRENDS IN MEAN
HOUSEHOLD MAIZE RETENTIONS FOR DOMESTIC USE
1982
- 83
1983
- 84
1984
- 85
MEAN
HSEHOLD
SIZE
MAIZE
RETAINED
MEAN
HSEHOLD
SIZE
MAIZE
RETAINED
MEAN
HSEHOLD
SIZE
MAIZE
RETAINED
(KGS/
HSEHOLD)
(KGS/
HSEHOLD)
(KGS/
HSEHOLD)
Banana
7.1
260
7.0
1,216
7.2
2,258
Chitepo
7.6
1,092
5.2
1,335
7.1
1,344
Gatu
9.4
439
9.7
1,343
9.4
2,176
Gwetera
7.4
132
5.4
1,949
7.0
1,561
Magadzi
7.8
266
6.2
2,264
7.7
2,269
Mudzinge
7.4
207
7.7
1,078
6.9
1,614
Mupedza
nhamo
6.7
245
6.3
1,062
7.9
1,890
Muringa
mombe
7.6
99
6.7
1,037
7.9
1,432
Mutora
mhepo
9.7
325
6.2
1,183
8.9
1,768
Nehanda
8.0
565
6.0
1,741
7.6
1,533
Takawira
7.2
1,107
4.3
1,518
6.4
1,742
Zvataida
6.9
2,359
5.6
1,586
7.1
1,568
All
Villages
7.7
591
5.8
1,443
7.6
1,763
Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from agricultural
census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE
for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare.


149
These objectives express a strong equity bias in policy. This is because
the overriding aim of the resettlement policy is to use redistribution to
achieve social justice. In addition, it seeks to create opportunities and to
establish the necessary conditions for a broader based agricultural growth.
The government envisages the full participation and the incorporation of the
hitherto neglected majority African smallholders in the market economy as a
major goal of its development effort (Zimbabwe 1981a, 1981c, 1982b, 1983a,
1985c).
The Pivotal Role of Cooperatives in the Government's
Development Policy
At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that the essential thrust
of the agricultural resettlement policy of the government is the
collectivization of the mode of production and the means of capital
accumulation. The central place that the government would want cooperatives to
assume in its development policy is quite apparent. Both in words and in
action the government's commitment to agrarian socialism based largely on the
collective system of production is unequivocal. In June 1985 for example, the
Prime Minister created a special coordination Ministry in his office to
oversee the development of cooperatives, a task previously performed by the
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development.
Secondly, the country's development policy statement document, Growth
With Equity, spells out quite clearly the government's stand about the issue


179
for loans to build three to four roomed brick houses with steel-frame doors
and windows and corrugated roofing. The scheme covers qualified farmers who
have maintained resettlement for at least two years in the Model A schemes.
The repayment plan is liberal and the loan is spread over a maximum of 30
years.
Conclusion
This Chapter has described how Zimbabwe is going about its agricultural
resettlement program. Though the land question is essentially an economic
issue it is nevertheless so emotional a development agenda that the measures
being taken by the government to tackle it are rather political. This fact
notwithstanding the relative smoothness with which the resettlement policy has
been formulated, the planning executed and the implementation carried out so
far is a major accomplishment in the African context.
In magnitude the Zimbabwe program is only surpassed by Tanzania's ujamaa
or villagization program which is variously estimated to have affected
anywhere between 5 to 10 million people. However, in terms of accomplishments
to date the only comparable case might be Kenya in the 1960s. The Kenyan
experiment was less involved as contrasted with Zimbabwe's. For instance, six
years after its inception the Kenya program comprised only 123 resettlements
embracing 31,081 families on 450,076 hectares (von Haugwitz 1972).
Even more importantly in comparative terms Zimbabwe has been able to
avoid such costly policy flaws, planning inadequacies, implementation
deficiencies, the terrible human sufferings and the disappointing results as
those of Tanzania's uj amaa (see for instance, von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980;
11
Hartmann 1981; Weaver and Kronemer 1981; Ergas 1982).


289
Notes
1.) These nine major categories can be subdivided or elaborated further by
incorporating two other criteria specified in Appendix A. These are (1) the
presence or absence of extended kin(s)/affine(s) and (2) the state of fission
of the household structure. These additional categories would have been
necessary if a much larger sample than this study covered was involved.
2.) With independence in 1980 the expansion in the coverage of the peasant
farm sector by the Agricultural Finance Corporation has been extraordinary.
From a mere trickle of $0.6 million given to 2,500 farmers in 1979 the AFC
provided a total of $37.0 million short term or seasonal loans in 1984 to
91,000 Communal Area and Resettlement Scheme farmers (see AFC Annual Reports,
Harare).
In the case of Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme the situation in 1985 with
the AFC was as follows. Of the total 563 resettled farmers 546 or 97 percent
applied for short term or seasonal loans. Nineteen or 3.5 percent of these
applicants were refused. Of the 527 or 93.6 percent of the farmers who were
approved a total of $349,104 were granted. The mean per capita credit received
by these farmers was therefore $662.44. The total loan granted was distributed
as follows: (1) $223,590 for 870 hectares of cotton, (2) $83,850 for 430
hectares of maize, (3) $14,448 for 24 hectares of burley tobacco and (4)
$27,216 for the contract plowing of 432 hectares.
In terms of medium term loans 165 such loans in the total amount of $21,800
were given to Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme farmers in 1985. These were to
be spent on draft-oxen, scotch-carts, cultivators, plows, harrows, a planter
and a rifle.
3.) During 1985 the European Economic Community (EEC) in conjunction with
SADCC and the respective governments of Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe was
carrying out pilot surveys to devise effective means of combating the tsetse
flies and eradicating trypanosomiasis from the entire region through both
ground and aerial spraying.
In the specific case of the Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme a team of
inspectors from the Department of Veterinary Services had by February 1985
inspected 1,916 heads of cattle in the scheme. Of this a total of 395 or 21
percent were smeared. Ninety-two heads tested positive of trypanosomiasis
infection. In October 1985 there were 15 teams of inspectors camping in the
Scheme scouting the movements and studying the ecology and breeding habits of
the flies.
In the nearby Mount Darwin Model A Normal Scheme similar teams were also at
work. As at the end of January 1985 the inspectors had trapped 100 flies which
indicates a fairly high concentration within an area the size of the Scheme.
4.) According to the records the combined total of goats and sheep in the 12
surveyed villages in Mufurudzi rose from 191 heads in 1982-83 to 275 in
1983-84. In 1985 the 349 farmers interviewed reported 439 such small livestock
among themselves.
Though the trend in increasing numbers is commendable many women in the
villages complained that the ruminants were a problem. These women were being
encouraged by Women and Community Development officers to get involved in
backyard and cooperative vegetable gardens to supplement household nutrition


454
Ellraan, Michael
1981Agricultural Productivity Under Socialism. World Development,
9(9-10):97 9-989.
Elwell, H. A.
1983 The Degrading Soil and Water Resources of the
Communal Areas. Zimbabwe Science News, 17(9-10):145-147.
Ely, E. D.
1975 A Background to the Present Labour Shortage.
Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 72(6):137-141.
Emmanuel, Arghiri
1972 White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment
Imperialism. New Left Review, 73: 35-57.
Erasmus, G. J.
1956 Culture, Structure and Process: The Occurence and
Disappearance of Reciprocal Farm Labor. Southwestern Journal of
Anthropology, 12(4):444-469.
Ergas, Zaki
1982 The State and Economic Deterioration: The Tanzanian Case.
The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 20(3):286-308.
Esman, Milton J.
1983 Paraprofessionals in Rural Development. Washington, D. C.:
The World Bank.
Fabiyi, Yakub L.
1983 The Adaptation of Cooperative Structures to the Development
of Nigerian Agriculture: The Problems of Managing Group Farming
Cooperatives. Agricultural Administration, 12(4):219-235.
Fair, T. J. D.
1964 Rhodesian Lowveld: Source of New Economic trength.
Optima (December):191-201.
Farb, Peter and G. Armelagos
1980 Consuming Passions: The Anthropology of Eating.
New York: Pocket Books.
Farrington, J.
1975 A Note on Planned Versus Actual Farmer Performance
Under Uncertainty in Underdeveloped Agriculture. Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 27:257-260.
Faruqee, Rashid
1981 Social Infrastructure and Services in Zimbabwe.
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank.
Feder G., and R. Noronha
1987 Land Rights Systems and Agricultural Development
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Research Observer, 2(20:143-169.


385
The policy goal in this on-going resettlement program is to assist the
resettled farm households to realize domestic food self-sufficiency and also
generate a surplus market income of at least $400 per year. This assistance is
in the form of free land, the provision of a wide range of basic human needs,
liberal credit facilities and extension. Both the public sector and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mainly foreign donor agencies, are
actively involved in the funding of these forms of assistance.
The resettlement program is planned along various models the two most
important of which are the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes on the one
hand and the Model B Schemes on the other. In the former individual households
are resettled in nucleated villages where they are assigned 5 hectare plots of
arable lands and access to communal grazing fields. In the latter the mode of
organization and production follows cooperative or collective lines.
The Model A Schemes dominate the resettlement scene in terms of the
numbers resettled, area covered and the total expenditure to date. However, it
is the explicit intention of the government to eventually transform
resettlement and indeed the country's agriculture into cooperative
enterprises. This is in keeping with the socialist ideals of the country's
only political party the ZANU-PF.
The resettlement program has now entered its eight year. As of now an
estimated total of 50,000 households have been resettled. Up until 1986 when a
new Lands Acquisition Bill was promulagated the government was legally bound
to acquire resettlement land from European owners on a "willing seller-willing
buyer" basis. This was part of the Lancaster House agreement which was
internationnaly negotiated in London in 1979 between Zimbabwe-Rhodesia African
and European leaders to end the liberation war and usher the country into
independence. Now the government is at liberty to declare derelict lands as


11
positively influence rural households and thereby achieve stated
developmental goals. It is important to recognize, however, that since
different households perceive such influence differently and invariably even
respond differently to the same stimuli there is always the possibility of
the occurence of other scenarios in developmental expectation. For example,
the internal dynamics within and between households as well as any
disagreements in the agendas of households and that of the government may
change the outcomes of policy goals and result in diverse and differential
impacts among the beneficiaries.
This hypothesis will be elucidated and empirically examined in rural
Zimbabwe. The study will therefore be concerned with the gathering, analysis
and use of relevant qualitative and quantitative information to facilitate
the following:
1. assessment of the means and ends of the agricultural
resettlement policy, articulated by the government since
1980, against the backdrop of the historical evolution
and the political economy impacts of the country's racial
patterns of land distribution;
2. examination of how the resettlement policy is being
implemented, both at the national, provincial and selected
individual scheme levels;
3. eliciting the respective responses of farmers, in terms
both of their attitudes and perceptions as well as the
constraints and the performance outcomes that characterize
their farming systems;
4. evaluation of the discernible socioeconomic and political
impacts of aspects of the resettlement which have been
implemented so far in terms of any differences in opportunity
or incentive systems, access and control over development
assets as well as in quality of life.
Eight years into Zimbabwe's independence and egalitarian resettlement
and rural development it will be interesting to observe how different
household structures and organizations are faring in terms of the following


296
The recent upsurge in policy evaluation studies within the field of
anthropology as well as in the other social sciences is confounded by
persistent measurement dilemmas that characterize the analysis of change (see
Bereiter 1963; Barth 1967; Cronbach and Furby 1970). Casley and Lury (1982:7)
indicate that the most difficult problem in evaluation is the establishment of
causality between project inputs and their effects and impacts. A widely
shared solution to this methodological problem among policy analysts is the
"movement away from inductive statistics toward more building of deductive
models whereby one can deduce policy effects from empirically validated
premises" (Nagel 1975:10).
Michael Patton, however, criticizes the dominance of evaluation research
by this
largely unquestioned, natural science paradigm of
hypothetico-deductive methodology [which] assumes
quantitative measurement, experimental design and
multivariate, parametric statistical analysis to
be the epitome of "good" science. (Patton 1983:19)
In his view this approach which comes from the tradition of experimentation in
agriculture is no longer so ominous. Patton instead proposes an alternative
paradigm that he derives from the tradition of anthropological field studies.
This ethnographic approach uses
the techniques of in-depth, openended interviewing
and personal observation qualitative data,
holistic analysis, and detailed description derived
from close contact with the targets of study [and it]
aims at understanding of social phenomena.
(Patton 1983:19)
A similar view was suggested much earlier by Fredrik Barth. Barth
(1967:661) is of the opinion that in the endeavor to understand change
processes the contribution of anthropologists lies in two areas. These are
(1) in providing such primary materials as concepts that allow for the


199
Resettlement Program Farms
Farms in this new farming systems category fall into the various models
described above in Chapter V. The two major ones of interest to this study are
the Model A Resettlement and the Model B Producer Cooperative schemes. The
former with its Normal and Accelerated variants consists of individual family
holdings of 5 hectares arable plots. The latter is made up of
collectively-organized and managed properties. These are on-going schemes and
the oldest among them were set up in the latter part of 1980.
As was pointed out earlier in Chapter IV to date only a few papers have
dealt with the resettlement issue and even fewer still have reported what is
going on specifically in resettlement agriculture (see Kinsey 1982, 1985; Ivy
1983; AGRITEX 1984; Zimbabwe 1984c; Mumbengegwi 1984a, 1984b, 1986; Munslow
1985; Weiner _et al. 1985; Geza 1986; Moyo 1986). The unpublished report by
Mumbengegwi (1984b) on the Model B Producer Cooperatives is perhaps the only
one of its kind that benefitted from extended survey interviews and therefore
presents the responses of the farmers concerned. Indeed, virtually nothing
comprehensive has been done thus far to systematically study the responses of
the resettled farmers and more so to compare them across schemes and models.
Farms in the Model A Sector
Weiner _et al. ( 1985), in their paper on land use and agricultural
productivity, contrast developments within the resettlement and the alternate
farming systems in the country. They argue strongly for resettlement and point
out that peasants can and will respond by producing greater marketed surplus


APPENDIX G
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT PERMITS
TABLE G 2
PERMIT TO CULTIVATE
Permit Number
MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PERMIT TO CULTIVATE
Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
(hereafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of
the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155) to .
(hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER").
The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to cultivate on an area of State
Land, approximately. .hectares in area, known as
and as indicated on the sketch plan attached hereto (hereinafter referred
to as "HOLDING").
This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. In the event of there arising any dispute as to the boundaries or
location of the land which may be cultivated in terms of this permit
the decision of the MINISTER shall be final.
2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency
thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with
some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may
determine.
3. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER
decides that the HOLDER has failed to comply with any of its terms
and conditions.
4. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time
and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of
such compensation as the MINISTER may determine.
5. The said HOLDING shall be used solely for agricultural purposes for the
HOLDER'S exclusive benefit.
6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall :-
i) personally, actively and continuously carry on agricultural
activities on the holding to the satisfaction of the MINISTER;
ii) comply in all respects with the provisions of, and regulations
made under, the Natural Resources Act (Chapter 150), the Animal
Health Act (Chapter 121), the Noxious Weeds Act (Chapter 127),
and all other laws relating to soils husbandry, farming practices
and livestock management and shall further comply with all
instructions which the MINISTER may issue for:-
433


26
Most Zimbabweans, nearly 80 percent of the African population, belong to
one or the other Shona or Mashona ethno-linguistic group (Bullock 1928;
Gelfand 1965; Bourdillon 1976). The Ndebele or Matabele is the other major
cultural group. The rest are the Sena, Tonga, Sotho, Venda and the Hlengwe
(Kay 1970:28). All these various societies in Zimbabwe are patrilineally
organized. They also inhabit geographically distinct home regions some of
which are cut by the country's international boundaries (Figure 2-2). The
European population, though numerically less significant, constitutes a
distinct economic power in the country.
The topography of Zimbabwe is dominated by the Highveld. This is a large
plateau occupying 20 percent of the land area which runs through the center of
the country from the southwest to the north. Its general altitude is about
1,200 meters above sea level though it occasionally rises to over 1,700
meters. In the east, along the border with Mozambique, the plateau develops
into a ridge of escarpments where the Inyangani reaches a height of almost
2,600 meters above sea level. Of the remaining area of the country, 60 percent
has an altitude of between 600 meters and 1,200 meters above sea level and it
is termed the Midveld. The third physiographic region of the country is the
Lowveld formed by the valleys of the Zambezi in the north and west, the
Limpopo in the south and the Sabi-Lundi basin in the south-east. These valleys
range in altitudes from between 300 meters to 900 meters above sea level (Fair
1964; Andrews 1964; Kay 1970:13; Whitlow 1982). The geological base of
Zimbabwe consists mostly of granites and other igneous and schistose rocks.
The soils are predominantly sandy with heavier loams and clays occuring in
relatively small local areas (Miller 1982:10).


33
the Nguni-speaking Ndebele immigrants under Mzilikazi established themselves
in the southern part of the plateau north of the Limpopo in 1839-40 (Beach
1980:226). This development was followed almost immediately by the arrival of
European settlers. The first of these to make any lasting contacts with the
Ndebele were the missionaries of the South African based London Missionary
Society who opened a station at Inyati in 1859 (Nelson 1975:16).
In 1888 John Moffat, son of one of the missionaries and the
representative of the British government in South Africa to the Ndebele
throne, extracted a treaty from King Lobengula. The import of the treaty was
to the effect that the Ndebele would not enter into any foreign
correspondence, treaties or land alienation without prior consultation with
and approval from the British High Commissoner for South Africa. Shortly
after this treaty, C. D. Rudd, an agent of Cecil Rhodes a British concession
seeker who saw himself as the champion of British values and interests in
Africa obtained a concession from Lobengula for metal and mineral rights
(Nelson 1975:19).
On the basis of the Rudd Concession the British government in 1889
granted a royal charter to Rhodes and his British South Africa Company. The
charter, according to Percy Hone (1909:1), authorised the company "to take
over the vast tract of country extending from the Transvaal to Lake
Tanganyika. The whole territory was named after the conceiver and
founder of this great project, Mr. Cecil Rhodes." In early 1890, Rhodes sent
a party of 200 pioneers and 500 mounted mercenaries to claim Ndebele
territory as a private estate of the company. The following year the Pioneer
Column entered Mashonaland.
The British Order in Council of 1891 also placed the company's territory
under the protection of the queen and authorised her high commissioner in


57
performed almost as well in terras of cotton production (The Courier 1986:30).
The African Business has placed this success story in perspective
stating:
The ingredients for success are well-known: generous and
prompt payment for farmers, rapid expansion of collection
and storage facilities, more credit and agricultural advice
for peasant farmers. (The African Business 1986:13-17)
Zimbabwe's tremendous success in stimulating small-holder or peasant
farmers to grow more food has created massive agricultural surpluses. At the
end of 1985 the Grain Marketing Board was sitting on 1.4 million tonnes of
maize with the experts estimating that that stockpile could grow to more than
2 million tonnes at the end of the 1986-87 marketing year. That represents
over 5 years of domestic consumption needs.
In looking at Zimbabwe's success story and in presenting this rather
optimistic assessment of its current situation we need reminding that on the
whole the country is not favored for sustained agricultural output. This
point and the fact that cyclical drought is a major constraint are clear
indication that a much longer-term outlook is called for to evaluate the
permanence of the country's apparently impressive agricultural performance so
far.
This perspective provides the substantive background for evaluating the
literature on land reform and resettlement, poverty and equity, rural
development, agriculture and economic growth, the state, household dynamics
and organizational forms in terms of their relevance to the government's
policies and on-going programs of change in postindependence Zimbabwe.


160
TABLE 5 2continued
COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY SPECIFIC DUTIES
AGRITEX
Preliminary assessment of suitability
of land for resettlement
Preparation of resettlement plans
Demarcation of arable lands and
village sites
Provision of extension to resettled
farmers
Conservation works on resettlement
schemes
VETERINARY SERVICES
AGRICULTURAL & RURAL
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(ARDA)
AGRICULTURAL FINANCE
CORPORATION (AFC)
Provision of dipping services
Ensures animal health
Provision of accounting services for
resettlement program
Disbursement of program funds
Preparation of monthly financial
statement on the program
Preparation of reimbursement claims
Management of central estates of the
Model C schemes in the case of
specialized crops
Implementation of the Model D pilot
proj ect
Operation of the Resettlement Credit
and the Small Farm Credit Schemes
Provision of short-term (seasonal)
and medium-term credit to resettled
farmers
Education of resettled farmers on
credit management.
MIN. OF LOCAL GOVT,
RURAL DEVELOPMENT &
URBAN DEVELOPMENT Participates in the approval, planning
and implementation of specific
resettlement schemes
Administers schemes handed over by the
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and
Rural Resettlement


Cross, E. G.
1971 An Economic Appraisal of the Production and Marketing of
Rhodesian Beef. Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 5(2):19-25.
1976 Man Management in Agriculture: Labour Costs and Productivity
in Agriculture. The Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 10(4):184-187.
Dalton, George
1957 Traditional Production in Primitive African Economies.
In Tribal and Peasant Economies. G. Dalton, ed. Pp. 61-80. Austin:
University of Texas Press.
Danckwerts, J. P.
1970 Technology and Economic Development of African Agriculture
in Rhodesia. Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 4(4):17-30.
Daniel, P., R. H. Green and M. Lipton
1985 A Strategy for the Rural Poor. Journal of Development
Planning, (15): 113-136.
Davies, D. H.
1984 Zimbabwe: Resettlement and Rural Change. Africa Insight,
14(4):249-257.
Davis, B., and W. Dopcke
1987 Survival and Accumulation in Gutu: Class Formation and
the Rise of the State in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1900-1939.
Journal of Southern African Studies, 14(l):64-98.
Dayal, R.
1980 Zimbabwe's Long Road to Freedom. Third World Quarterly,
11(3):466-486.
de Janvry, Alain
1983 The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
1984 The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: Policies and
Politics. In Agricultural Development in the Third World. C. Eicher
and J. M. Staaz, eds. Pp. 263-275. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Delgado, C. L., and J. W. Mellor
1984 A Structural View of Policy Issues in African Agricultural
Development. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66(5):
665-670.
Denny, R. P.
1983 Drought and the Veld. Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal,
80(5): 169-174.
Desroche, H.
1976 Cooperative Management. Cooperative Information (3):19-37.


68
equating it with African communalism (see for instance, Nkrumah 1965).
Contrary to the belief underlying this thinking the political and
economic methods, such as collective production systems associated with
imported socialism, are not congruent with the humanistic and social ideals of
Africa. For example, there is no empirical support for the view that communal
forms of living, consumption and even resource exploitation in traditional
Africa are synonymous with the imperatives of collective ownership,
accumulation, management and production of goods which characterize
Marxism-Lenninism. The inability of Tanzanian policy makers to appreciate this
fact explains the costly failure of their ujamaa or collective villagization
experiment (Hatmann 1981).
Elsewhere in Africa, the promotion by governments of collective and state
farms in the 1960s and 1970s, to the complete neglect of individually-owned
and managed farms, was based on this erroneous notion that the prevailing
social organization of production is collective. The costs of the crises that
this wrong policy initiated are documented for such countries as Ghana
(Miracle and Siedman 1968a, 1968b) and classically for Tanzania (Coulson 1969;
von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980; Samoff 1981; Ergas 1982). The case of these
failed experiments have raised serious developmental questions as to the
relevance and applicability of the Soviet model (Miller 1977) or the Chinese
experience (Shillinglaw 1971) and even generally agrarian socialism (Ellman
1981) to the African condition. This does not suggest, however, that the
solution is automatically found in capitalist agriculture which system is also
frought with obstacles (see Dickinson and Mann 1978).
Another pertinent issue that is brought up in the context of the
foregoing discussion in the area of development has to do with individual
effort and rewards as opposed to collective responsibility and welfare. Amity


90
premise he examines the relative efficacy of using three broad strategies to
facilitate this goal. These are (1) the traditional capital-oriented or growth
maximization model, (2) the revolutionary socialist-oriented model and (3) a
reformist growth with equity-oriented model. Based on this framework he
(Weaver 1979:19-20) also argues for the systematic organization of development
thinking and efforts around meeting basic needs of food, safe drinking water,
clothing and shelter, medical care and education.
Hopkins and van der Hoeven (1983) take up the issue of how Basic Needs
should be incorporated in development planning. Ghai and Alfthan (1977) also
examine the conceptual basis of the approach and the empirical work that needs
to be accomplished to make it operational. The normative issues raised by the
approach are discussed by Lee (1977). At the methodological level, Khan (1977)
reviews the problem of production planning for basic needs. He shows why a
simple reliance on conventional multi-sector planning model will be
inadequate. In his view (Khan 1977) a basic needs plan will have to take into
account the close interrelationship among basic needs targets, the production
structure and the distribution of income.
By and large, poverty is conceptualized as being essentially a rural
problem. Policies for its eradication have therefore focused on agriculture.
However, Richard Sandbrook's (1982) treatment of the issue is done purely with
an urban perspective. He defines the goals of the Basic Needs Approach to be
(1) the redistibution of income, (2) reorientation of production systems and
(3) the provision of equitable access to improved public services. Sandbrook
criticizes both the Basic Needs approaches advocated by the World Bank (1975)
and the International Labor Office (Ghai et al. 1977). In his judgement the
former is too conservative to offer any hope for a genuine assault on poverty
and the latter is too radical, utopian and unrealistic. Yet, his prescriptive


TABLE 7-18
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' OCCUPATIONS
PRIOR TO JOINING THE COOPERATIVE
228
OCCUPATION
FREQUENCY
%
Laborer in European/Commercial
Farm
48
31.8
Peasant in Communal Area
33
21.9
Ex-Combatant/Refugee
5
3.3
Mine Worker
3
2.0
Unemployed
11
7.3
Domestic Servant
9
6.0
Other
17
11.3
Student
25
16.6
151
100.0
TABLE 8-19
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' RESIDENCE
TO JOINING THE COOPERATIVE
PRIOR
PLACE
FREQUENCY
%
Communal Area
50
33.1
Other European/Commercial Farm
33
21.9
This Cooperative/Ex-Commerial Farm
16
10.6
Harare City
14
9.3
Other Urban Area
14
9.3
Youth Training/School
13
8.6
Outside Zimbabwe/Refugee Camp
4
2.6
Other
3
2.0
151
100.0


TABLE 4-4
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: REPORTED
MEMBERSHIP AND THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS/HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED
COOP
SCHEME
REPORTED
MEMBERSHIP
(OCT 1985)
SCHEME
SELECTED
FOR STUDY
MEMBERS/
HOUSEHOLDS
INTERVIEWED
1. Batsiranayi
69
Yes
39
2. Chakoma
79
Yes
47
3. Kubudirira
26
Yes
19
4. Kuenda
32
No
0
5. Kurima Inhaka
34
No
0
6. Kushingirira
33
Yes
27
7. Nyakudya
88
No
0
8. Simba Youth
22
Yes
19
(383)
(229)
151
Note: Because of the high turnover in many of the Model B
Schemes there is an apparent discrepancy between the
membership figures that are reported every month to the
Resettlement Section of DERUDE and the actual members
present in the particular scheme. The tendency for
overreporting is significant, In October 1935 the 5
Schemes selected for the case study in the Mashonaland
Central Province reported a total membership of 229.
A complete census that the Research Team carried out
around the same period showed only 151 members present.


86
public servants, (3) a lack of integration and coordination and (4)
inappropriate structures. Some of these criticisms of integrated rural
developments, are echoed by Ruttan (1975) in his skeptical assessment of such
proj ects.
For his part, Lakshmanan (1982) suggests that given the often mutually
inconsistent objectives of rural development any efforts that seek to achieve
the conflicting objectives at the same time can lead to further
disillusionment. Another analyst, John Mellor (1986:73) supports these
findings and argues that (1) almost universally, integrated rural projects
failed as a result of excessive complexity and lack of central support
services, (2) the projects tended to raid the national institutions of
personnel and (3) they were never integrated into the national support
structures for agricultural growth.
At the intellectual level, Cohen (1980a) reports major gaps in the
literature in terms of formulating a coherent theory and guidelines to
facilitate the work of rural development practitioners. This deficiency is
perhaps explained by a fact put forward by Azam (1986) that there is a very
high turnover in rural development thought. He argues that a preoccupation of
the development experts with "new ideas" is prejudicial to the essential
process of learning by experience. He attributes the widening gap between
development theory and achievement in the field to this preoccupation.
In addition, Azam (1986) makes two important points that are relevant to
the future of rural development policy in Africa. He argues that for rural
development to be successful it has to be growth-oriented, egalitarian and
democratic and that rethinking is needed not for building a new development
design but to eliminate faulty thinking accumulated over the years.


493
Zimbabwe, Government of the Republic of
1985d Parliamentary Debates, 10(2). Harare, Zimbabwe: Government Printer.
1985e Parliamentary Debates, 10(3). Harare, Zimbabwe: Government Printer.
1986a Budget Statement 1986. Harare, Zimbabwe: Government Printer.
1986b Estimates of Expenditure for the Year Ending June 30, 1987.
Harare, Zimbabwe: Government Printer.
1986c Quarterly Digest of Statistics (September 1986).
Harare, Zimbabwe: Central Statistical Office.
Zimbalist, Andrew
1981 On the Role of Management in Socialist Development.
World Development, 9(9-10):971-977.
Zuckerman, P. S.
1977 Different Smallholder Types and Their Development Needs.
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 28:119-128.


GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE
RESPONSES OF FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE
By
KOFI{AKWABI-AMEYAW
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


103
post-emancipation European Russia. In this work, the translation of which is
authored by Thorner _et al. 1966, Chayanov goes beyond the demographic facts
of the cycle to articulate the empirical relationships between household
structure and production activity. He states:
Since the labour family's basic stimulus to economic activity
is the necessity to satisfy the demands of its consumers, and
its work hands are the chief means for this, we ought first of
all to expect the family's volume of economic activity to
quantitatively correspond more or less to the basic elements in
family composition. (Thorner 1966:60)
Over the last few years many researchers who are involved with kin-based
or domestic household economies have used or tested Chayanov's paradigm (see
Sahlins 1971, 1974; Hunt 1979; Low 1982a, 1982b, 1986a, 1986b). The major
preoccupation of these studies has been to empirically replicate the
apparently tautological thesis, or Chayanov Rule, which states that:
[T]he smaller the relative number of workers the more they
must work to assure a given state of domestic well-being,
and the greater the proportion the less they work.
(Sahlins 1974:89)
In exploring this thesis many researchers have calculated the household
consumer/worker ratio and used it as proxy for an "index of household economic
strength." This index embodies a fundamental limitation in analysis in that
the ratio is pre-determined, rather incorrectly, by an oversimplified blanket
process. Traditionally, the ratio is calculated by simply categorizing the age
cohorts up to 15 years and above 64 years to comprise the consumers. Likewise,
those in between 15 and 64 years are taken to be the economically active and
thus assumed to be the workers.
Such a dichotomous conception of workers and consumers reflects only the
reality of western industrial societies where child labor and, to some extent,


142
provincial governor should visit and address squatters in the affected areas
for "destroying the natural resources, harbouring dissidents, demoralising
morale of commercial farmers, and not being supportive of the government."
The principal proponent of the view that the government be hard on squatters
is the former cabinent member and old-time party leader from the Manicaland
Province, Edgar Tekere. In some cases this view has prevailed and some
squatter settlements have been destroyed. This has been on the orders of the
government often arising from court actions initiated by affected European
farmers. In almost all cases the squatters return and set up again. This is
what perhaps prompts opponents of this line of tough action to question in the
first place how any rational person can say that poor and landless rural
Zimbabweans are "illegally occupying" their own ancestral lands. They argue
that the so-called European farms were forcefully taken away and since many
individuals and families sacrificed themselves in a bloody war to regain the
lands they have the right now to use them for their subsistence.
The squatters also have problems which are unique. A significant proportion
of them are old laborers and aliens who worked on farms that were later
abandoned or purchased by the government from Europeans. These elderly
squatters may need more than resettlement, perhaps social welfare
rehabilitation. For instance, in a survey at the former Xassimure farm within
Pote 2 a total of 67 of the heads of the squatter households did not
apparently qualify for resettlement. This is because of old age or physical
disability. Of this group 22.4 percent were Zimbabweans, 35.8 percent were
Mozambicans, 23.9 percent were Malawians, 16.4 percent were Zambians and the
remaining 1.5 percent were South Africans. Their mean age was 62.8 years with
a mean household size of 4.6 persons.
5.) In June 1985, as part of the government's reorganization of the
Ministries, DERUDE was transferred from the new Ministry of Lands, Agriculture
and Rural Resettlement to that of Local Government, Rural Development and
Urban Development. Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region were also
rescheduled to different schemes and in some cases to different Provinces in
the Region. The evaluation survey was so timed to enable the officers to
respond to the questionnaires immediately after their detachment from the
respective schemes that they previously managed.
6.) During the course of the Model B Cooperative management survey I visited
Batsiranayi on three occasions but never got hold of the Chairman. I left
written and verbal messages with the Vice Chairman and the Secretary but to no
avail. I had previously visited the scheme in the company of the
Zimbabwe-United Kingdom Evaluation Team. I had also met the Chairman and the
Management Committee on various occasions at DERUDE, Harare. The Chairman was
quite aware of my research. At one point I realized that he did not want to
cooperate in the research. I therefore personally interviewed the Committee
for the management survey in his absence during a scheduled visit to the
scheme.
About a month later on November 21 1985, the research team interviewed
members of the Cooperative for the Model B farmers survey, also during the
absence of the Chairman who had previously been notified of our schedule. The
following day I passed through Kushingirira Cooperative on my way to Mount
Darwin. There, the Batsiranayi Chairman who also happened to be visiting
confronted me in obvious anger warning that I did not have his permission to
interview his members and that he would have prevented them from answering the
questionnaire. In his view all researchers were biased against cooperatives


51
Richard Brown, in a summary paper on Zimbabwe's recent history, puts the
problem in perspective by arguing it this way:
[L]and shortage and overcrowding, compulsory destocking,
and the forcible removal of Africans struck at
the roots of both rural and urban life [and] acted as
a catalyst for mass nationalism. (Brown 1983:948)
Elsewhere, Barry Munslow makes a similar point asserting that
[T]he land issue was and still remains the central political
issue in the country. The long nationalist guerrilla
struggle from 1966 to 1980 relied on mobilizing peasant
grievances about the land to gain support, and Robert
Mugabe's ZANU (PF) partythe Zimbabwe African National Union
Patriotic Frontswept to power in the 1980 independence
elections because the electorate trusted that his party would
get back the land. (Munslow 1985:41)
This view is also shared by Terrence Ranger ( 1985:14) who attribute's the deep
consciousness and the mass participation of Zimbabwean peasants in the
guerrilla war to their "demands for their lost lands."
Beginning with the apparently ineffectual April 1966 "Battle of
Chinoyi", waged by guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU),
what the African population prefer to call the second chimurenga or
liberation war started (Kapungu 1974). In an account given by Richard Brown
(1983:949), well-attested acts of brutality by the security forces of the
white minority settler regime increased internal discontent and ensured a
ready and at times overwhelming supply of new recruits for the guerrillas. He
argues further that this rather antagonistic situation was exacerbated by (1)
the imposition of collective fines, (2) the ill-organized and drastic removal
of several thousand rural Africans from their homes into "protected villages"
or "strategic resettlements" on suspicion of helping the guerrillas and (3)
the shooting of many curfew-breakers.


TABLE 8-21
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN
HOUSEHOLDS MAIZE PRODUCTIVITY
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
(MEAN KILOGRAMS HARVESTED
PER HECTARE)
Banana
128
1,150
3,041
Chitepo
918
1,106
2,829
Gatu
276
1,113
5,176
Gwetera
163
1,972
4,749
Magadzi
172
1,961
5,136
Mud zinge
167
1,183
2,768
Mupedza
nhamo
143
624
3,044
Muringa
mombe
64
943
1,893
Mutora
mhepo
307
899
3,073
Nehanda
867
1,627
3,433
Takawira
754
1,709
3,517
Zvataida
1,517
1,066
3,113
All
Villages
456
1,279
3,481
Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from
agricultural census figures for the resettlement
schemes collected by DERUDE for the Central
Statistical Office (CSO), Harare.


Glantz, Michael H., ed.
1987 Drought and Hunger in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Gobbins, K. E., and Prankerd, H. A.
1983 Communal Agriculture: A Study from Mashonaland West.
Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, 80(4):151-158.
Godart, Albert L.
1966 Social and Cultural Aspects of Integrated Rural
Development in Some West African Countries. International
Labour Review, 94(3):255-273.
Good, Kenneth
1974 Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia. African Affairs,
73(290):597-620.
1976 Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation.
Journal of Modern African Studies, 14(4):597-620.
Goody, Jack
1971 Fission of Domestic Groups Among the LoDagaba. _Tn
Developmental Cycle in Domestic Groups. J. Goody, ed.
Pp. 53-91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gordon, David F,
1984 Development Strategy in Zimbabwe: Assessments and
Prospects. _In The Political Economy of Zimbabwe. M. G.
Schatzberg, ed. Pp. 119-143. New York: Praeger.
Gorman, R. F. ed .
1984 Private Voluntary Organizations As Agents of Development.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Gould, David J.
1985 Popular Participation in African Development Planning and
Management. In Public Participation in Development Planning
and Management. J-C Garcia-Zamor ed. Pp. 31-50 .Boulder:
Westview Press.
Goulet, Denis
1979 Strategies for Meeting Human Needs. In. Growth With Equity:
Strategies for Meeting Human Needs. M. E. Jegen and C. K. Wilber,
eds. Pp. 47-65. New York: Paulist Press.
Grant, P, M.
1981 The Fertilization of Sandy Soils in Peasant Agriculture.
Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, 78(5):169-175.
Green, R. H., and C. Allison
1986 The World Bank's Agenda for Accelerated Development: Dialectics
Doubts and Dialogues. JLn Africa in Economic Crisis. J. Ravenhill, ed
Pp. 60-84. New York: Columbia University Press.


266
In the second, third and fourth years of resettlement in Mufurudzi, that
is, between 1981 and 1984 Zimbabwe experienced what was conceived by many
farmers as the worst drought, shangwe, in living memory. Crop production was
adversely affected, livestock died and most farmers at one point or another
subsisted on food rations from the government and non-governmental
organizations which they supplemented with items gathered from the wild. In
some schemes a few households gave up, abandoned resettlement and left their
new homes for the traditional security of the old Communal Areas.
Many who stayed on and continued to farm were even two years later still
indebted to the AFC for the loans contracted in the drought years. Thus 52
percent of all the resettled farmers cited this environmental or climatic
constraint. Among the farmers in the Model A Accelerated Scheme the lack of
resettlement infrastructure was also seen as a major problem (Table 7-49).
The interviews were done over a period when the farmers were supposed to
be in the final phases of preparing to begin the cropping programs. Yet, the
greatest majority of them had not plowed their lands because the Tillage Team,
then just transferred from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural
Resettlement to the Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development,
had not arrived in the schemes to tractor plow the lands. This delay, perhaps
caused by the ministerial transfer and reorganization, was a matter of great
concern throughout the resettlement schemes and the Communal Areas in the
Masnonaland Central Province as well as other parts of the country. It
appeared also that most farmers having gotten "used" to mechanical tillage
were either complacent or not prepared to get their draft-oxen ready for the
task.
The apparent crisis which faced these Model A Normal and Accelerated
Schemes was made worse by the non-arrival of the season's input packages
consisting of seed maize, cotton and peanut and the top dressing and other


VII CASE STUDY OF FARMERS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO
RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAMS: MASHONALAND
CENTRAL PROVINCE. ........ 204
Introduction ................ 204
Farmers: Responses to Some Background Issues From
the Commercial and Communal Areas' Farmers 205
The Large-Scale Commercial Farmers of Bindura
Intensive Cultivation Area 205
The Small-Scale Commercial Farmers of Chesa
Nyaj enj e and Karuyana 207
The Communal Area Farmers of Bushu, Madziwa
and Kandeya 209
Farmers: Their Social and Demographic
Characteristics ..... 210
Farmers: Their General Responses and Evaluation
of the Government's Resettlement Policies and
Programs 223
The Farmers of Mufurudzi Model A Normal and
Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated Schemes. 223
The Farmers of Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira,
Kushingirira and Simba Youth Model B Producer
Cooperative Schemes ............... 225
Farmers: Their Attitudes and Perceptions About
Life Situation. 246
Farmers: Their Material Resources and
Capital Assets 254
Farmers: Their Farm-Level Constraints ........ 264
Farmers: Household Developmental Cycle,
Micro-Level Agricultural Characteristics
and Economic Performance 275
Conclusion. .......... 285
Notes 289
VIII THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESETTLEMENT ......... 295
Evaluating Change and Development .......... 295
Macro-Level Costs, Development Inputs and
Economic Projections. ... ...... 298
Assessing the Socio-Economic and Political
Performance of Resettlement Schemes ........ 309
Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model A Schemes. 310
Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model B
Cooperative Schemes 317
Mufurudzi Scheme as an Illustrative Case of
Model A Resettlement. 338
Mufurudzi: The Foundations of a Successful
Agricultural Resettlement Scheme. ......... 348
Simba Youth Scheme as an Illustrative Case of
Model B Resettlement 365
Simba Youth: Economic Performance and the
Genesis of a Problematic Agricultural
Resettlement 375
Conclusion 378
Notes 380
xi


191
George Kay states that the establishment of these farms in various areas
of the country was a
compensation for the Africans' loss of the right to purchase
land anywhere in Rhodesia on the same terms as members of
other races. It was intended that holdings in these areas
should be owned or leased by individuals and that they should
be of such size as to be viable and profitable family farms in
the hands of progressive, well trained Africans. (Kay 1970:93)
As Kay points out further the demand for these farms exceeded the
availability of holdings. In 1946 there were over 2,000 outstanding
applications. Of the Africans allocated farms at that time only 20 percent had
freehold titles with the remaining farmers leasing their holdings. In 1953
"all applicants were required to have the Master Farmer's Certificate [issued
by the Department of Agricultural Extension], and shortly afterwards they also
had to have capital assets to the value of at least 300." (Kay 1970:93). Yet,
in some cases "farms were allocated to ex-civil servants and others in reward
for long service, and not necessarily in relation to farming ability" (Whitsun
1978:13).
Inspite of the rather stringent conditions that were introduced to
restrict access to these farms the waiting list for them continued to exceed
allocations leading to the termination of applications in 1956. Consequently,
many residents in the Reserves or Communal Areas never realized their dreams
to benefit from access to relatively large hectares and other preferential
facilities such as extension, guaranteed inputs and produce markets which were
made available to these Small-Scale Commercial farmers throughout the country.
Given all these services at the disposal of these farmers it was thought
that they would be successful commercial producers and role models for their
peasant counterparts in the Communal Areas. In fact, that is the thesis that


173
Selection Criteria and Procedures and Allocation
of Holdings to Farmers: The Case of Model A Schemes
The responsibility for the selection of individual families for
resettlement and the allocation of residential and arable holdings to them is
vested in DERUDE. For an individual to qualify for resettlement he must meet
any of the following conditions: (1) being effectively landless, that is, he
has no land or has land which is too little to support himself and his
dependents; (2) neither he nor the spouse be gainfully employed; (3) being
poor; (4) married or widowed with dependants; and (5) aged 18 to 55 years and
physically fit and potentially able to make productive use of the allocated
9
holdings.
Other than these basic requirements Zimbabweans returning home as
refugees are given special consideration. Widowed and unmarried women with
dependents are also allocated land in resettlement schemes in their own right.
Since about 1984, wage employees, experienced farmers and peasants who possess
"master farmer" certificates of recognition from AGRITEX are also accepted for
resettlement. Like everybody else, however, their allocation of holdings is
predicated on the condition that the particular individual gives up all land
rights in the Communal Area.
The resettlement procedure is initiated through the filling of
application form (see Appendix F) at the office of the Rural District Council
which serves the Communal Area of the applicant. When a particular area is
designated for resettlement a Resettlement Officer from DERUDE travels through
the adjoining Communal Areas and holds meetings to explain resettlement policy
and to assist individuals in filling such forms. A complete application is
then submitted to the Rural District Council through the applicant's Ward
Councillor. In the case of farm-laborers on newly acquired European property


246
for the provision of more credits, inputs and equipment their European
counterparts in the Large-Scale Commercial sector were bothered by the need to
ensure efficient marketing and pricing policies as well as the promotion of
private or individual farm enterprises. This concern for private farms was an
apparent response to the pronouncements about socialist agriculture in
Zimbabwe.
Farmers: Their Attitudes and Perceptions About Life Situation
Farmers were asked general and specific questions seeking to elicit
responses that reflected their perceptions and attitudes towards matters
relating to the special circumstances of their lives.
For instance, to the African farmers in the resettlement schemes and
other rural areas the government's development agenda was meaningless if it
was not targeted to the attainment of what everybody talked about as the "good
life" (upenyu hwakanaka). The farmers were therefore asked to define what each
considered to be the major attribute of this so-called good life. Other
questions relating to this very important concept were also put to the
farmers. Their responses are presented below.
Farmers' conception of what constituted development can be inferred
from their perceptions of what a "good life" was. Zimbabwe African farmers
mentioned various major attributes of a satisfying and desirable life. The six
major attributes mentioned were the ownership of the following: (1) musha,
(home) a concept embracing a physical dwelling, residential plot and wives and
children; (2) minda, (farm) which is also agricultural land and all the
essential implements to make it productive; (3) mombe, (cattle) which
symbolically and in all other respects shows a man's worth; (4) mari,
(money); (5) off-farm business or non-agricultural source of income; and (6)


TABLE 7-57
COMMUNAL AREA: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS AFFECTING
THEIR AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE
PROBLEM
FREQUENCY
%
Credit/Inputs/Implements
18
29.0
Poor/Inadequate Land
16
25.8
Water/Environmental
14
22.6
Transport/Marketing
4
6.5
Clinic/Social Infrastructure
3
4.8
Other
3
4.8
No Problem
4
6.5


TABLE 8 4continued
BUDGET
EXPENDITURE
($ 000)
BALANCE
ITEM/SUB-ITEM
Wood Lots
200
6
194
Equipment
245
1
244
Establishment Grant (Model B
Schemes)
Housing & Farm Buildings
510
47
463
Tractors & Equipment
785
89
695
Other Equipment
126
4
121
Hand Tools & Prot' Clothes
34
28
6
Workshop Tools
17
8
9
Vegetable Garden Tools
7
4
3
Crop Packs
518
376
142
Oxen
61
27
34
Ox-Carts
12
2
10
Ox-Implements
25
6
19
Transport
120
13
108
Vehicles & Cycles
225
55
170
Tobacco Demonstration Unit
201
97
104
British Drilling Team
20
17
3
Planning & Implementation 4
,880
1,346
3,534
Contigencies 7
,292
0
7,292
Recurrent Cost 1
,564
359
1,206
Total 112
,727
63,156
49,571
Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA),
Harare.


f
427
APPENDIX Econtinued
PROVINCE MODEL A
NORMAL
MODEL A
ACCELERATED
MODEL B
COOPERATIVE
MIDLANDS
1 Shurugwi/Tana
1
New Castel
1 Dangarendove
2 Shurugwi
2
Zvishavane
2 Vimbai Rufaro
3 Tokwe 3
3
Takawira
3 Hatineti
4 Tokwe 4
4
Masvori
4 Shungudzevhu
5 Tokwe
5
Lower Gweru
5 Gutsaruzhinji
6 Sessombi 3
6
Ednovean
6 Makwikwi
7 Western
7
Riverbond
7 Zezayi
Sessombi
8
Barkly
8 Sessombi
9
Chikomba
9 Copper Queen
10
Chivu
11
Hastings
12
Wheelerdale
13
Ngezi Poort
14
Ring a
MASVINGO
1 Chizvirizvi
1
Mwenezi
2 Mukorsi
2
Nyangambe
3 Nyahombe
3
Ngomahuru
4 Mushandike
4
Lake Kyle South
5 Chipinda
5
Lake Kyle East
6 Dewure
6
Glen Livet
7 Vimvi
7
Townlands
8 Soti Source
8
Victoria
9 Gutu South
9
Marowa
10
Verlos
11
Thorngrove
12
Velgervonden
13
Thorns
14
Rippling Waters
15
Pastures
16
Good Hope/Shasha
Fountains
MATABELELAND
1 Umguza
1
Sedgewick
NORTH
2 Bembezi
2
Syndicate
Lortondale
MATABELELAND
1 Domboderaa
1
Inyozane
1 Clarks Farm
SOUTH
2 Matopos South
2
Glen Grey
2 Enchuca
3 Insiza
3
Hollins Block
Nyamini
4 Shobi
4
Undza
5 Wanezi
5
Norwood Penge
6
The Range
7
Manyle
8
River Ranch 9 Jopempi
10
Wedza 11 Filabusi/Kentucky
12
Mbala Bala


13
Analytical and Conceptual Frameworks
The Zimbabwean resettlement experience provides an almost ideal
substantive environment to isolate and study the critical variables that
relate to the performance of policy programs and social theories in real
situations of change. It is reflected in the chapter on literature review
below that far too little attention is paid by anthropologists to how
development policy decisions initiated by governments get or fail to get
transformed into impacts. This problem is underscored by Fernea and Kennedy
(1966:349) who point out that very few studies have been made of processes of
change as they happen. Consequently, theories of development are yet to fully
benefit from all dimensions of the intriguing grassroots dynamics that
characterize the behavior and actions of individuals and their institutional
relationships with forces of change and development.
An important aspect of social theory bearing on the research problem
which is vital for anthropological enquiry into development is the link
between policy, the environment for its implementation and the kinds of
responses that are generated in development programs. This issue is
particularly germane, for instance, in studying agricultural resettlement or
any development programs which involve human relocations. That is so because
the anthropological literature on relocation, in general, is critical of such
programs viewing them as being disruptive of peoples lives.
Notwithstanding the fact that such a view may be true, it raises serious
methodological problems as to what dynamics of change lead to which outcomes
and in what situations. It is legitimate to assume here that only some and
not all relocations or resettlements worsen the quality of life of the


CHAPTER VIII
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESETTLEMENT
Evaluating Change and Development
The evaluation of development policy programs entails major
responsibilities. These include (1) measuring attainment of process objectives
or ends-goals, (2) determining achievement of means-goals and (3) describing
program implementation (Morris and Fitz-Gibbon 1984a:7 fnl). However,
evaluation goes beyond the mere quantification of observable indices. It is
concerned with the critical assessment of the part that programs or projects
play in generating particular outcomes.
Many analysts point out that research to measure ends-goals or
means-goals is better conducted by studying policy inputs and program outputs
and the establishment of a relation between them (Coleman 1975:36; Morris and
Fitz-Gibbon 1983, 1984a, 1984b; Fitz-Gibbon and Morris 1984; Henerson _et al.
1984).
Such a task demands that the development process be conceptualized as a
set of linked hypotheses that embodies the concept of causality. The
attainment of development goals then is attributed to the prior achievement of
policy objectives or project purposes which in turn derives from an earlier
production of outputs that is also caused initially by the provision of inputs
(USAID 1980:52-53).
Evaluation therefore is nothing more or less than the systematic study of
innovation and change. It calls for the analysis of variations that are
observed to be occurring in the same units at different points in time and
space and the relationship of such variations to interventions (Tuchfeld
1979:104).
295


79
second relates to possible explanations and the policy ramifications of the
failure. A selective characterization of these aspects of the cooperative
failure in Africa may be made from the existing literature.
Invariably, cooperatives have not only failed in terms of economic output
but they have not measured up to the hopes and expectations held by their
sponsors, and even the majority of the participating members. Goran Hyden
studied the management problems of some African cooperatives. According to him
(Hyden 1970a:12) they "are not only inefficient, but plagued by dishonesty,
misappropriation of funds and favoritism." Similar problems are documented at
length in such places as Nigeria (King 1975; Beer 1980; Fabiyi 1983; Okuneye
1984), Ghana (Miracle and Seidman 1968b), Ghana and Uganda (Young _et al
1981), and in Tanzania (Newiger 1968; Cliffe 1970).
In relation to the important policy question of equity, Hyden (1970a:12)
has this to say about the cooperatives: "they have so far proved unable to
promote the principle of equality." Serious as this finding is it is not
unique to Africa in that Orlando Borda (1971:ix) reports a similar situation
in Latin America where he concludes that the effect of the cooperatives "in
the long run has been to preserve, sometimes even strengthen, the prevailing
system of inequality." For Asia, Gunnar Myrdal (1968:1335), likewise,
observes: "the notion that cooperation will have an equalizing effect is bound
to turn out to be an illusion the net effect is to create more, not less
inequality" (see also Munkner 1977).
In explaining the failings of cooperatives Texier (1974:2) takes the
stand that cooperation itself is not at fault but rather the way it has been
introduced into traditional rural environments. He attributes the problem to
cultural contradictions arguing that:


344
At the time of the purchase of the 22 farms in 1980 there were homesteads
and various building structures on 17 of them. Most of these were generally in
adequate condition but needed urgent maintenance to prevent further
deterioration which had set in as a result of abandonment during the
liberation war. There were 13 dams with various storage capacities also
distributed throughout the farms. Although most of the dams are still intact
and a few need rehabilitative work, they are generally too small in capacities
to supply sufficient water for cropping purposes. The irrigation potential in
the Scheme is therefore limited to the farms in the riparian villages along
the Mufurudzi river. The villages are Muringamombe, Mutoramhepo, Mupedzanhamo
and Banana (see Figure 8-2). The river is fed by the Eben Dam from which
rights for the supply of irrigation water downstream may be negotiated with
the Ministry of Energy and Water Development.
The Madziwa Mine, located within the Scheme, is connected to the national
electricity grid. Power lines from the grid, which served the homesteads, are
still intact and can be made available to the resettlement villages should the
need arise. Similarly, a network of telephone lines that used to link the
homesteads can be restored to service. The perimeter and the internal paddock
fencing on many of the farms were in place in early 1980. However, the entire
section of the boundary with the Madziwa Communal Area and portions of other
places had been stolen at the time of the establishment of the Scheme in
October 1980.
Mufurudzi is served by a network consisting of a 30 kilometer section of
tarred national road which originates from Harare passing through Shamva and
then the Scheme. From there the road continues to Goora in the Madziwa
Communal Area where it joins the Harare-Bindura-Mount Darwin road. In addition
there are about 100 kilometers of feeder roads which were built to access the
farms by the former European Rural Council that served the area (Figure 8-1).


389
has not been realized. Clever Murabengegwi (1985:212) see the impact of
resettlement in that regard as marginal. He is right but only to the extent
that given the high annual birth rate of around 3.5 percent in these Communal
Areas (Zimbabwe 1982a) there is no way that resettlement of any magnitude can
possibly solve the problem of overpopulation in the country. This fact should
have dawned on the policy makers and planners. However, one cannot downplay
the fact that if the 50,000 households resettled so far were still resident in
these Communal Areas the already high levels of pressure and consequent crunch
on the overused resources would have been exceesively exacerbated than they
are now.
A major area where the policy of the government on resettlement is not
working at all as projected relates to the Model B Schemes. These production
collectives are bewildered by problems which are not easily resolved. One such
problem is inadequate membership and high turnover of members. The economic
performance and success of these Model B Producer Cooperatives are predicated
on the achievement of target membership of hardworking and dedicated
cooperators.
The largest proportion of these Schemes, however, have not realized even
50 percent of their respective targets. Given the existing situation of
increased impoverishment of the members of these Cooperatives it is not likely
that they would be able to attract the right kinds of members and be able to
turn themselves around. The continued governmental sponsorship of these
apparent waste conduits is a major policy flaw in the area of resettlement.
Ibbo Mandaza (1985:17) criticizes the government's policies to the extent
that there "is more continuity than change." That observation is essentially
valid. However, it must be argued in defence of the government that this is
the first time in the history of the country that policy guidelines have been


77
The stated objectives and the recognized economic and social advantages
of the modern cooperative are quite obvious. Agarwal (1976) discusses many of
them and Joy (1971) takes a look at the existing social factors which are
favorable to successful cooperatives. Under the capitalist system of
production cooperatives render valuable services which range from the
economies of scale, enhancement of private property, market competition and
the profit motive to the maximization and utilization of scarce resources (Roy
1981:29).
Elsewhere, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS 1982:1) has cited
the following advantages that are often sought by socialist countries through
the establishment of cooperatives: (1) economically, it speeds the growth of
output and incomes by allowing more rational use of land and labor, providing
an essential underpinning for the accumulation process, both local and
national; (2) socially, collectivization eliminates exploitative class
relationships and prevents their reemergence, alleviates absolute poverty by
delivering basic welfare services and reduces unacceptably high levels of
inequality between households, villages and regions; and (3) politically, it
allows the integration of rural producers as active subjects rather than
passive victims of the national development process with the collective as
both an instrument of state-led mobilization and a framework for democratic
participation and grassroots initiative.
In the view of Texier (1974:1) the cooperative still appears to be the
most appropriate organization for mobilizing the efforts of the community for
agricultural development. The voluminous study by Robert Bideleux (1985)
provides additional insights into the successful achievement of many of these
goals by various communist countries. Nigel Swain (1985) also documents the
success story of cooperative agriculture in Hungary.


265
TABLE 7-47
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF GOATS OWNED BY FARMERS
(N=)
NONE
1-4
5-10
%
11-15
16-20
21 OR
MORE
Model A Norm
(349)
84.0
8.9
6.3
0.0
0.6
0.3
Model A Accel
(39)
82.1
15.4
2.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Model B Coop
(151)
-
-
-
-
-
-
Communal Area
(62)
53.2
45.1
1.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale C
'(20)
55.0
10.0
15.0
15.0
5.0
0.0
TABLE 7-48
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF SHEEP OWNED BY FARMERS
(N=)
NONE
1-4
5-10
7,
11-15
t
16-20
21 OR
MORE
Model A Norm
(349)
91.4
4.3
3.2
0.3
0.6
0.3
Model A Accel
(39)
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Model B Coop
(151)
-
-
-
-
-
-
Communal Area
(62)
87.1
12.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale C
(20)
80.0
10.0
5.0
5.0
0.0
0.0


Weigel, Van B.
1986 The Basic Needs Approach: Overcoming the Poverty of Homo
oeconomicus. World Development, 14(12):1423-1434.
Weiner, D., S. Moyo, B. Munslow and P. O'Keefe
1985 Land Use and Agricultural Productivity in Zimbabwe.
Journal of Modern African Studies, 23(2):251-258.
Weinrich, Anna K. H.
1971 Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarchial
to Bureaucratic Power. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
1975a African Farmers in Rhodesia: Old and New Peasant
Communities in Karangaland. New York: Oxford University Press.
1975b Factors Influencing Economic Development in Rural Areas.
Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 9(1):7-13.
1977 Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia. Journal of Southern
African Studies, 3(2):207-229.
Weintraub, Dov
1971 Rural Cooperation, Local Government and Social Structure:
A Comparative Study of Village Organization in Different Types
of Community in Israel. Iii Two Blades of Grass. P. Worsley ed.
Pp. 83-104. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Weiss, C.
1972 Evaluation Research. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
West, J. H.
1957 The Co-operative Movement in the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland. South African Journal of Economics, (1):
Wheeler, D.
1984 Sources of Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa. World
Development, 12(1):1-23.
Whetham, E.
1968 Land Reform and Settlement in Kenya. East African Journal of
Rural Development. 1(1):18-29.
Whitaker, Jennifer S.
1986 The Policy Setting: Crisis and Consensus. In. Strategies
for African Development. R. J. Berg and J. S. Whitaker, eds.
Pp. 1-22. Berkeley: University of California Press.
White-Spunner, D.
1976 Food, Land and People in the Modern World: The Rhodesian
Picture. Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, 73(2):53-57.


262
Since independence the AFC has introduced medium and long-term loan
programs to assist African farmers to acquire these items. These days farmers
in the resettlement villages are being encouraged to team up and obtain
tractor and equipment loans from the AFC for their collective use. In 1985,
there were cases of such successful groups in Gwetera and Chitepo villages in
r 2
Mufurudzi.
In terms of- livestock ownership it is only in the Communal Area that
every farmer had at least one head of cattle. This, however, did not mean that
he or she owned draft-oxen which are an important asset for land preparation
and for farm and household haulage purposes. Unlike all other farmers none of
those in the Communal Area had more than 10 cattle. Among the Small-Scale
Commercial farmers 95 percent were cattle-owners. In this group every nine in
ten farmers had between 11 to 21 or more head of cattle. This contrasted with
the farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes 46 percent of whom did not have
any cattle at all (Table 7-45). The modal number of cattle owned by farmers in
the Model A Normal Scheme and the Communal Area was 3 head.
These days donkeys are becoming an important draft and haulage animals in
rural Zimbabwe. There is an acute problem of trypanosomiasis-carrying
tsetsefly glossina sp., which infests most of the northern portions of the
3
entire Mashonaland Region. Given this problem donkeys, which are not
bothered by tsetse, can be of distinct advantage to farmers in the region.
However, none in the Small-Scale Commercial and the Communal Area and only an
insignificant percentage of farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated
Schemes possessed any donkeys (Table 7-46). This may be explained in turn by
the obvious utilities that cattle have over donkeys in respect of farmers'
subsistence, cash flow and ceremonial or social needs.
Small ruminants, particularly goats and sheep are also important for
meeting some of the more mundane needs of farmers such as ready cash and also


105
decision-making behavior is to maximize a utility function. The fundamental
assumptions of this analytical model are the household's (1) consumption of
Z-goods (non-market commodities produced and consumed by the household), (2)
leisure, (3) own consumption of agricultural output and (4) consumption of
market purchased goods.
Others have used a variety of operational specifications for their
models. But there are several limitations with these so-called traditional
approaches in economics to explaining household performance (see Singh et
al 1986:22-25). Singh _et al. ( 1986), view the models of the traditional
approach as difficult and costly to estimate. They propose instead a solution
that considers households as price takers. In their analysis conceptualizing
households to be price takers enables the researchers to use the "profit
effect" as the convenient proxy motivating household behavior (Singh _et al.
1986:9-10).
The use of sophisticated models which incorporate such legitimate and
important objectives of economic activity as profit illuminates the
decision-making behavior of rural households. There is the strongest
likelihood, however, that such models fail to grasp the totality of the
crucial objectives that characterize household decision matrices. For example,
profit is not necessarily the means nor the end of the "dreams" sought by such
households.
In rural Zimbabwe it is definitely not the observed and reported dominant
behavioral trait; neither is it the overriding objective in the calculations
of the agricultural households studied. Indeed, one can cite normatively
satisfying values such as prestige, status enhancement and the need to fulfil
cultural obligations as important considerations. Profit maximization is
certainly important. Perhaps what is lacking to make it theoretically relevant


429
APPENDIX Fcontinued.
4. Number of wives Uwandu hwe vakadzi vako Abafazi bahko bangaki
Number of your children under the age of 18.....
Uwandu hwe vana vari pasi pemakore gumi neraatsere
Inani labantwana abaleminyika engaphasi kwetshumi lesitshiyangalombili....
Number of other dependants living with you
Uwandu hwe vamwe vaunochengeta
Labanye njalo obagcinileyo
5. Present occupation
Basa rauri kushanda ikozvino
. Umsebenzi owenzayo khathesi
6. What is the size of your land in the Communal Area?
Unenzvimbo yakakura zvakadini mumaruwa?
Ulomhlaba onganani ezabelweni?
In which communal land? Muruwa rupi?.......Kusipi isabelo?
7. How many of these do you own?
Zvingani zveizvi zvipfuyo zvaunazvo?
Zingaki izifuyo olazo?
Cattle Goats Sheep Donkeys Pigs
Mombe Mbudzi Hwai Mbongoro Nguruve
Inkorao Imbudzi Izimvu Obabheni Ingulube
8. Indicate ownership of the following things:
Ndezvipi zvauinazvo pane zvinhu zvinotevera:
Tshengisa ukuthi ulako yini okulandelayo:
Plough..... Scotch-Cart Harrows Cultivator Other implements ....
Gejo Ngoro Hara Karutivheta
Ikhubu Ingola Ihala Isikhofolo
I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I AM ALLOCATED A LAND HOLDING IN A RESETTLEMENT SCHEME
IT MUST BE PERSONALLY OCCUPIED BY ME AND MY FAMILY AND THAT I WILL BE
REQUIRED TO GIVE UP ALL RIGHTS TO LAND IN THE COMMUNAL LAND, AND THAT MERE
COMPLETION OF THIS FORM DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LAND ALLOCATION.
NDINOTSIDZA KUTI KANA NDIKAGOVERNA NZVIMBO KUMINDA MIREFU NDINOZOGARA
PANZVIMBO IYI INI PACHEZVANGU NEMHURI YANGU UYE KUTI NDINBVUMA KUSIYA
NZVIMBO YANGU YOKUMARUWA. NDINOBVUMA ZVAKARE KUTI KUZADZISA GWARO RINO
HAZVIREVI KUTI NDATOBVA NDAWANA MUNDA.
NGIYEZWISISA IKUTHI UMA SENGINIKWE INDAWO KULEZI ZINDAWO EZABELWA ABANTU
NGIZAHLALA KHONA MINA NGOKWAMI LEMWULI YAMI NJALO NGIZA TSHIYA LE INDAWO
EBENGIKUYO EZABELWENI UKUGCWALISA LELI FOMU AKUTSHO UKUTHI INDAWO USULAYO
DATE
SIGNED


41
TABLE 2-2
PROPORTION OF TOTAL LAND UNDER VARIOUS OWNERSHIP
CATEGORIES IN RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE
1931
1950
1969
%
1981
NUMBER
H0USEH0L
1981
Communal Area
22.4
25.5
41.3
43.9
716,500
Small-Scale
Commercial
7.7
5.9
3.8
3.8
8,519
Large-Scale
Commercial
50.8
49.6
40.1
36.8
4,926
The State
19.1
18.9
14.7
15.5
0
Sources: Data for the respective years comes from the the following
sources: 1931 (Kay 1970:51); 1950 (Dunlop 1972:1); 1969
(Dunlop 1972:1); 1981 (Zimbabwe 1982a:64). The number of
households comprising each category is given by the Whitsun
Foundation (1983:28).
Note: Communal refers to the African peasant or smallholder unit
formerly known as the Reserve or Tribal Trust Land. The
Small-Scale Commercial is what used to be called the Native
or African Purchase Area. The Large-Scale Commercial is
mainly the White or European Area. The State-owned land was
previously referred to as National Land and it comprises
areas designated as Forest, Undetermined, or Unassigned.
In 1981, there were a total of 6,034 Large Commercial Farms
some of which were owned and operated as agricultural or
ranching estates by local and multi-national companies
rather than by farm households (see Chapter VI below for a
review of these farming systems).


119
Producer Cooperatives receive from the government and from the
non-governmental organizations.
My other travels with DERUDE officers, respectively, were to the
following resettlements: (1) Pote 2 Accelerated Intensive Scheme, Karoi
District, Mashonaland West Province on May 13; (2) the Copper Queen Normal
Intensive Scheme, Gokwe District, Midlands Province on May 17 and 18; (3)
Muzvezve Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, Kadoma District, Mashonaland West
Province on June 3; and (4) Kubudirira Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme,
Shamva District, in the Mashonaland Central Province on July 10 (see Figure
4-1). The Pote 2 and the Copper Queen trips were undertaken in the midst of
the evacuation of groups of squatters from the former scheme and their
resettlement in Copper Queen. Being one of the most controversial issues in
resettlement implementation the squatter issue presents serious and
politically charged problems to the government. The two trips gave me the rare
opportunity to follow up on my readings of various memoranda about squatting
4
with field observations.
In the course of these travels I took extensive notes and had the
opportunity to deepen my interaction with resettled farmers and government
officers. I gained broader perspectives on the resettlement and better
insights into the problems, the achievements and the challenges within the
individual schemes than would otherwise have been possible. I was able also to
pretest some of my research questions with both the farmers and the officers.
More importantly, these "official" trips gave me the recognition and the
necessary contacts at the national, provincial, district and the scheme
levels. This facilitated an easy establishment of rapport and the acceptance
of my research by the numerous informants and respondents particularly during
the critical phase of the survey research when I operated independently.


TABLE 7-26
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' IF RELATIVES
HAVE BEEN RESETTLED AND IN WHICH MODEL
MODEL A MODEL B
(Minda Mirefu) (Mushandira Pamwe)
(N=)
Yes
%
No
Yes
%
No
Model A Norm (349)
80.2
19.8
12.3
87.7
Model A Accel (39)
71.8
28.2
17.9
82.1
Model B Coop (151)
32.5
67.5
37.1
62.9
Communal Area (62)
78.7
21.3
19.1
80.9
Small-Scale C (20)
45.0
55.0
25.0
75.0


Eckstein, A.
1955 Land Reform and Economic Development. World Politics,
7(4):650-662.
Ed el M.
1969 Economic Analysis in an Anthropological Setting: Some
Methodological Considerations. American Anthropologist, 71(3):
421-433.
Eicher, Carl K.
1984 Facing Up to Africa's Food Crisis. _In Agricultural
Development in the Third World. C. Eicher and J. M. Staatz,
eds. Pp. 453-479. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
1986a Strategic Issues in Combating Hunger and Poverty in Africa.
In Strategies for African Development. R. J. Berg and J. S.
Whitaker, eds. Pp. 242-275. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
1986b Transforming African Agriculture. San Francisco:
The Hunger Project Paper No.4.
Eicher, C. K., T. Zaller., J. Kocher and F. Winch
1970 Employment Generation in African Agriculture .Research
Report. No.9. East Lansing: Michigan State University.
Eicher, C. K., and D. C. Baker
1982 Research on Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Critical Survey. East Lansing: Michigan State
University, International Development Paper No.l.
Eicher, C. K., and J. M. Staatz
1984 Agricultural Development Ideas in Historical Perspective.
In Agricultural Development in the Third World. C. Eicher and
J. M. Staatz, eds. Pp. 3-30. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Elias, 01awale
1962 The Nature of African Customary Law.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Elliot, Charles
1983 Equity and Growth: An Unresolved Conflict in Zambian Rural
Development Policy. In. Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in
Africa. D. P. Ghai and S. Radwan, eds. Pp. 155-189. Geneva: ILO.
Ellman, Anthony
1977 Group Farming Experiences in Tanzania. _In Cooperative and Commune
Group Farming in the Economic Development of Agriculture. P. Dorner,
ed. Pp. 239-275. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.


82
observation among the Sadama of Ethiopia that rivalry and taking kinsmen for
granted, that is, self interest rather than altruism, is a reality of
cooperative organization and management (see also Hamer 1981a, 1981b).
Rural Development
The concept of rural development is now a catch-phrase in contemporary
Africa. This is understandable because Africa is essentially a rural
continent. In terms of population and settlement distribution, location of
natural resources, patterns of economic activity and hence the potential or
prospective sources of growth and development rural Africa presents dynamic
perspectives. The worldwide significance of the need to develop these areas is
stressed by the United Nations, which argues:
[R]ural development can help to smooth the transition between
rural and urban life, and to narrow the gap between them in
living standards, by disseminating urban attitudes, providing
job opportunities and introducing education, health and welfare
services, public utilities and communal facilities. It can also
provide city people with the pleasure of access to the
countryside for recreation. (United Nations 1974:59)
Giving high priority to rural development programs would make a lot of
sense because of these and other concerns such as their high potential to
effect (1) the eradication of poverty (Chambers 1983); (2) improving quality
of life (Thomas and Boyazoglu 1978); (3) stemming the tide of rural-urban
drift (Chambers 1974); (4) improving land tenure systems (Cohen 1980a); and
(5) strengthening the balance of payments, creating mass markets for
non-agricultural goods and services and making food available to the growing
populations (Daniel et al. 1985).


317
For the Model A Accelerated Schemes the Officers reported problems which
emanated from the very nature of those schemes. The most mentioned constraint
was the lack of resettlement infrastructure such as schools, clinics and good
access roads which were available to the Normal Schemes. The problems of
squatters, lack of farmer self-help organization and some farmers' lack of
draft oxen were also cited.
Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model B Cooperative Schemes
Attitudinal and Activity Profiles in the Cooperative Schemes
In all, eight of the 18 Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region
additionally supervise aspects of the activities of the 21 Model B Producer
Cooperatives. These Officers were asked to rate each scheme in terms of the
cooperative members (1) Attitudes(i) cooperative spirit and (ii) motivation;
(2) Performance(i) agriculture, (ii) membership stability and (iii)
management committee leadership and (3) Activity(i) progress in achieving
objectives and (ii) long-term prospects for the success of the scheme (see
Appendix B Table 2 for the list of the study items).
The pattern which emerged from the evaluation is rather mixed. For
example, over half of the schemes rated only average for the spirit of
cooperativeness among the members and a third came out low. A third of the
schemes were low in motivation. In agriculture only 42.8 percent of them rated
high for their performance. The Management Committees in a third of the
schemes were performing lowly.
Given the current prevailing circumstances and in terms of their long-run
prospects ten cooperative schemes or 47.6 percent were given a high chance to
succeed. These are Kumhanya, Shandisai Pfungwa and Tamuka in Mashonaland


420
TABLE D 2 continued
46. When sewing machine acquired
47. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985)
48. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985)
49. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985)
50. Farmer has bicycle
51. Farmer's age
52. Farmer's gender
53. Farmer's marital status
54. Male farmer's number of wives
55. Male farmer's number of wives married since 1980
56. Farmer's country of origin
57. Zimbabwe farmer's home province
58. Zimbabwe farmer's communal area
59. Non-zimbabwe farmer's years of residence
60. Farmer's years of school completed
61. Farmer's non-agricultural skill
62. Farmer's number of living children
63. Farmer's number of children born since 1980
64. Farmer's preferred profession for children
65. Farmer's household size
66. Farmer's resident children/household dependants -
67. Farmer's resident children/household dependants -
68. Farmer's resident children/household dependants -
gender
age
status


Mang he zi A.
1976 Class, Elite and Community in African Development.
Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
Mann, S. A., and J. M. Dickinson
1978 Obstacles to the Development of a Capitalist Agriculture.
Journal of Peasant Studies, 5(4):466-481.
Ma shi ring wan i N. A.
1983 The Present Nutrient Status of the Soils in the Communal
Farming Areas of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, 80 (2 ): 737 5.
Massell, B. F., and Johnson, R. W. M.
1968 Economics of Smallholder Farming in Rhodesia: A Cross-Sectional
Analysis of Two Areas. Food Research Institute Studies, 8:1-74
(Supplementura)
Mayer, R. R., and Greenwood, E.
1980 The Design of Social Policy Research. Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Mazrui Ali
1968 From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization.
World Politics, 21(1):69-83.
Mbithi, P. M., and C. Barnes
1975 The Spontaneous Settlement Problem in Kenya. Nairobi:
East African Literature Bureau.
McClymont, Douglas S.
1982a The Diffusion of Innovation Among Farmers: A Reassessment.
Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, 79(6 ): 187-198.
1982b The Rate of Adoption of Selected Flue-Cured Tobacco Practices.
Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, 79(3):81-84.
1984 Descision-Making Process of Commercial Farmers in Zimbabwe.
Agricultural Administration, 17(3 ): 149-162.
McGranahan, Donald
1972 Development Indicators and Development Models. The Journal of
Development Studies, 8(3):91-102.
McMillan, D. E.
1986 Distribution of Resources and Products in Mossi Households.
In Food in Sub-Saharan Africa. A Hansen and D. E. McMillan.
Pp. 260-273. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
McKee, Katharine
1986 Household Analysis as an Aid to Farming Systems Research:
Methodological Issues. In Understanding Africa's Rural Households
and Farming Systems. J. L. Moock, ed. Pp. 188-198. Boulder:
Westview Press.


444
Bratton, Michael
1986 Farmer Organizations and Food Production in Zimbabwe.
World Development, 14(3):367-384.
1987a The Comrades and the Countryside: The Politics of
Agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe. World Politics,
39(2):174-202.
1987b Drought, Food and the Social Organization of
Small Farmers in Zimbabwe. I_n Drought and Hunger in
Africa. M. H. Glantz, ed. Pp. 213-244. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Brewer, G. D., and R. D. Brunner, eds.
1975 Political Development and Change. New York: The Free
Press.
Brietzke, P. H.
1976 Land Reform in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Journal of
Modern African Studies, 14(4):637-660.
Brokensha, David
1963 Volta Resettlement and Anthropological Research.
Human Organization. 22(2):286-290.
Brokensha, D., and P. Hodge
1969 Community Development: An Interpretation.
San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.
Brown, L. R., and E. C. Wolf
1985 Reversing Africa's Decline. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch
Institute.
Brown, Richard
1983 Zimbabwe Recent History. In. Africa South of the
Sahara 1983-84. Pp. 946-952. London: Europa Publications Ltd.
Buchanan, J. M., and G. Tullock
1962 The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Buchanan, J. M., and R. D. Tollison, eds.
1972 Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of
Economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Buchanan, James M.
1986 Liberty, Market, and State: Political Economy in
the 1980. New York: New York University Press.
Budd, G. D.
1976 The Second Survey of Weeds in Arable Lands in Rhodesia.
Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 73(6):159-160.


351
consolidation phase of its implementation. Major aspects of its administrative
structures and facilities such as schools were formally transferred from the
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to the Ministry of Local
Government, Rural and Urban Development. This put Mufurudzi under the
administrative ambit of the Chaminuka District Council, Madziwa.
In May 1985 at the time of this incorporation Mufurudzi had the following
primary developments in place. Of the total of 22 hand-pumped boreholes
planned to supply water to all villages in the Scheme 20 had been constructed
and were operational. Only two villages, namely, Mukwari and Nehanda did not
have access to good water. Four elementary schools and a secondary school were
also built as part of the project. These are in addition to the Chindunduraa
and the Batsiranayi Model 3 Producer Cooperative primary schools and the
Chiruraa and Madziwa Mine high or secondary schools which are also located
within the Scheme.
The Mufurudzi secondary school in 1985 had only forms one and two.
Located at the rural service center the school had a student population of 120
and 5 teachers on the staff. The four Mufurudzi elementary schools are
distributed in a pattern to cater for children from groups of neighboring
villages within an 8 kilometer radius (see Figure 8-2). The schools are (1)
Muringamombe with 7 teachers and 291 students from Chimburukwa, Mutoramhepo,
Mupedzanhamo, Banana and Muringamombe, (2) Mudzinge which had 10 teachers and
419 students from Mudzinge, Takawira, Nehanda, Denda and the Simba Youth Model
B Producer Cooperative, (3) Mukwari with 5 teachers and 197 students from
Zvataida, Mukwari, Chitepo and Zvomanyanga and (4) Magadzi school where there
were 11 teachers and 447 students. The latter serves students drawn from
Magadzi 1 and 2, Gatu 1 and 2 and Gwetera villages.
In October 1985, there were a total 33 teachers in the four elementary
schools of whom 15 percent were certified or professionals. The student


IX CONCLUSION
383
Summary of Findings ..... 383
Macro-Level Impacts of Resettlement 386
Micro-Level Impacts of Resettlement ......... 390
Policy Implications for Development ......... 394
Recommendations and a Discussion. .......... 397
The Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes. .... 397
The Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes 399
The Non-Governmental Organizations. ........ 402
The Agricultural Finance Corporation. 404
Conclusion 409
Notes 410
APPENDICES
A Developmental Cycle Typology ..... 412
B Evaluation Study Variables ... 413
C Model B Producer Cooperatives Management Survey. 416
D Case Study Variables ..... 417
E List of Resettlement Models and Schemes in Zimbabwe. 426
F Resettlement Application Form 428
G Resettlement Permits ..... 431
REFERENCES ........ 437
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 494
xii


133
TABLE 4-3
SHAMVA-BINDURA MODEL A ACCELERATED SCHEMES: VILLAGES,
HOUSEHOLDS AND THE NUMBER SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED FOR
CASE STUDY
VILLAGES
IN THE
SCHEME
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
HOUSEHOLDS
VILLAGE
SELECTED
FOR STUDY
(TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS)
NUMBER OF
HOUSEHOLDS
INTERVIEWED
SHAMVA
1. Sanye 1
24
Yes
22
2. Sanye 2
33
No
0
3. Sanye 3
28
No
0
BINDURA
4. Chidumbwi
1 33
No
0
5. Chidumbwi
2 20
Yes
17
6. Chavakadzi
34
No
0
172
(44)
39


8-3 Zimbabwe: Sources of Funding, Costs and Rates of
Return for Selected Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes ... ......... 303
8-4 Zimbabwe: Budget Allocation, Summary of Capital
Expenditure and Balance for Model A and Model B
Normal Intensive Schemes as at July 31, 1985 305
8-5 Mashonaland Region: List of Resettlement Models
and Schemes December 1985 311
8-6 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers"
Evaluation of Attitudinal and Activity Profiles
in Model A Schemes ......... 314
8-7 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers'
Evaluation of Implementation Agencies and Related
Services in Model A Normal Intensive Schemes 316
8-8 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers"
Evaluation of Attitudinal and Activity Profiles
in Model B Schemes 319
8-9 Mashonaland Region: Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes" Management Committees Identification of
Problems and Their Suggested Solutions ... 321
3-10 Mashonaland Region: Government's Grants, Expenditures
and Balance on Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes
From 1980 to July 31 1985 323
8-11 Mashonaland Region: Agricultural Finance Corporation
(AFC) Loans to Selected Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes. 325
8-12 Mashonaland Region: NonGovernmental Organizations
(NGOs) Aid and Financial Assistance to Selected
Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes ...... 326
8-13 Mashonaland Region: Target Membership and Trends
in Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes, 1983-1985 336
8-14 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Number of
Households, Arable and Livestock Capacities. ........ 340
8-15 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Project Costs,
Expenditure and Balance as at July 31, 1985. ........ 347
8-16 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Crop Build-Up
to Target Income Levels. ... ....... 349
8-17 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Livestock
Build-Up to Target Income Levels 350
xviii


399
cash flow considerably. It can be hypothesized that these farmers retain large
volumes of the stable food as an insurance against drought which is a
persistent problem in Zimbabwe.
It is plausible to suggest also that such action is a response to the
"stop order" system by which the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC),
through the Grain Marketing Board, deducts farmers loans and credit charges at
source during sales (see below under AFC). By keeping more grain the household
is at least assured of food for the year even if no payments are obtained from
produce sale due to indebtedness to the AFC. Alternatively, if the farmer can
manage to get any side-market buyer then he or she takes the risk and
illegally dispose of the excess grain in exchange for cash.
Whatever the reason is the poor nature of traditional household storage
facilities, which result in losses, and the fact that these farmers are
locking up a potential income demand that the issue be looked into seriously.
This problem needs immediate rectification before farmers' are directly or
indirectly "pushed" into side-marketing.
The Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes
If the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes are allowed to flourish in
their current parasitic state and left to operate as they are doing they will
soon become a canker and eventually bleed the national economy to
incapacitation.
As a group their overall economic performance is negligible and they
waste more public and donor funds than they contribute by way of agricultural
output. Their organization is characterized by inertia, mismanagement, lack of
purpose, petty stealing and internal squabbles, dependancy syndrome and a


264
food. Surprisingly, however, Che majority of farmers did not have either goats
(Table 7-47) or sheep (Table 7-48). This pattern was conspicuously more so in
the resettlement schemes. There, unlike the dispersed settlements of the
Communal and the Small-Scale Commercial Areas, the nucleated village system is
not particularly conducive to the free ranging habits that both cattle and the
small ruminants maintain.
Indeed, the-very few in Mufurudzi were already a nuisance both in the
homes and to the farms closest to the villages. Thus, the socioeconomic
advantages of goats and sheep ownership were increasingly being overshadowed
by the fact that as free rangers they had become a source of social conflicts
4
among some of the farmers and their neighbors.
Farmers: Their Farm-Level Constraints and Scheme Needs
Model A Scheme Farmers
Farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes were asked to
identify what they saw as the problems and the needs associated with their
resettlement. In addition, they were also requested to give what they
perceived to be the cause of each such problem. Specifically, the farmers
responded to three sets of questions relating to (1) the major constraint that
faced them during the initial years of resettlement, (2) the one which was
facing them in the 1985-86 farming season and (3) what they would describe as
being the nature of the major problem encountered in their experiences dealing
with the three parastatal agricultural service agencies. These agencies were
the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB)
and the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB).


began in earnest. In the Matabeleland highveld for example, according to
Knight's observation,
37
a large number of farms have already been pegged out. Of
these some 700 are 'volunteer farms,' which were granted
free to the men who took part in the late expedition. Each
volunteer farm is 3,000 morgen (6,000 acres), carrying with
it a nominal annual quit rent of ten shillings. Farming
rights, entitling the holder to peg out 3,000 acres, can also
be bought directly from the Company at eighteenpence an acre.
(Knight 1895:30)
Elsewhere in Matabeleland, Knight (1895:34) indicates that "one syndicate
alone [possessed] a magnificient estate of 80,000 acres." Similar rewards
obtained in Mashonaland where he gives the following account:
Special farming rights were granted to members of the
old Pioneer Force. These, like the volunteer rights
in Matabeleland, entitle the owner to peg out a farm free
of any conditions as to bona fide occupation. These
pioneer farms are of 3,000 acres each. (Knight 1895:35)
From the beginning of the 1890s the settlers started creating the
"reserves." These consisted of blocks of land set aside under the supervision
of traditional or community elders for the use of indigenous Africans. The
first of these was demarcated in Matabeleland. By 1902 most of the Reserves
in Mashonaland had also been allocated and the African population had been
moved into them (Riddell 1978a:7). George Kay (1970:49) notes that a decade
later in 1913, there were "no less than 104 Native Reserves established
and they ranged from 5,000 acres to 1,500,000 acres." In 1923 the new
Southern Rhodesian Constitution which transferred the country from Company
rule to a self-governing colony also confirmed the Reserves as a separate
3
socio-economic and political entity.
The consolidation of settler land holdings was one major activity
facilitated by the creation of the Reserves. By 1396, the settlers had


131
The four villages from Stratum I and the three from Stratum III, being the
extreme cases, were purposely selected for the study. Using a table of random
numbers, an additional five out of the remaining eleven from stratum II were
also chosen.
The distribution and some characteristics of all the villages in
Mufurudzi, including those which were selected for study, are given in Table
8-14 in Chapter VIII below. These are Banana, Chitepo, Gatu, Gwetera, Magadzi,
Mudzinge, Mupedzanhamo, Muringamombe, Mutoramhepo, Nehanda, Takawira and
Zvataida (see Figure 7-2). For methodological reasons it was decided, once the
sample villages were selected, to cover every resettled household head
9
present. Of the total of 361 households in the 12 selected villages, 349
or 96.7 percent were interviewed (Table 4-2).
Following the same lines one village each was selected among the
respective total of three each in the Shamva and Bindura Model A Accelerated
Intensive Schemes. In Shamva, Sanye 1 was chosen and 22 of the 24 households
were interviewed. Likewise, for Bindura, 17 out of the 20 households in
Chidumbwi 1 were interviewed (Figure 7-1). In all, 39 households amongst the
44 selected for the Model A Accelerated Intensive Scheme were reached, thus
giving an effective coverage rate of 88.6 percent (Table 4-3).
Five of the eight Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes were also selected
for the case study. These are Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kushingirira
and Simba Youth. All the members, numbering 151, actually present in the
schemes during the survey period in October 1985 were interviewed. This
represents 65.9 percent of the members reported to be registered with the
Cooperatives during that month (see Table 4-4).


Billing, K. J.
1985 Zimbabwe and Che CGIAR Centers. Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank.
Blackie, M. J.
1982 A Time to Listen: A Perspective on Agricultural Policy
in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, 79(5):151-156.
Blankson, C.
1983 Food Deficit and Agricultural Policies in Tropical
Africa: A Comment (on Lofchie and Corarains). The Journal
of Modern African Studies, 21(3):551-554.
Blecher, Marc
1985 Inequality and Socialism in Rural China: A Conceptual
Note. World Development, 13(1):115-121.
Bohannan, Paul
1955 Some Principles of Exchange and Investment Among the Tiv.
American Anthropologist, 5(1):60-70.
Borda, Orlando F.
1971 Cooperatives and Rural Development in Latin America:
An Analytical Report. Geneva: United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development.
Boserup, Esther
1965 The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of
Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure. London: Allen and
Unwin.
1970 Woman's Role in Economic Development. New York:
St. Martin's Press.
Bourdilion, Michael F. C.
1976 The Shona People. Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press.
Brand, Coenraad
1981 The Anatomy of an Unequal Society. Ini Zimbabwe's
Inheritance. C. Stoneman, ed. Pp. 36-57. New York:
St. Martin's Press.
Bratton, Michael
1977 Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: Comparative
Notes from the Neocolonization of Kenya. Journal of
Modern African Studies, 15(4):591-611.
1978 Beyond Community Development: The Political Economy
of Rural Administration in Zimbabwe. Gwelo, Rhodesia:
Mambo Press.
1981 Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics.
Journal of Modern African Studies, 19(3):447-476.


249
Farms. Most of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers who were willing to engage
in wage labor chose the Large-Scale Commercial Farms which, incidentally, was
the least preferred by Communal Area farmers. For all the other farmers
working in the Mines was an option that hardly anybody cared for (Table 7-35).
The responses to another similar hypothetical question showed very
interesting pattern. The farmers were asked if their only option to attain a
good life was remaining in agriculture the under which of the four farming
systems associated with African agriculture would they choose. Every 7 in 10
farmers in the Model A Schemes preferred remaining in the resettlement program
while a third opted for the Small-Scale Commercial sector where they would
have access to more land and other resources. Nearly 60 percent of the Model B
Producer Cooperative farmers liked the cooperatives and nearly 40 percent of
the Communal Area farmers also chose to farm in the Communal Area. All the
Small-Scale Commercial farmers also preferred their own farming system and did
not consider any of the other systems as a viable option (Table 7-36).
The responses in Table 7-36 are striking for the fact that (1) every 6 in
10 Communal Area farmers wanted an upgrade into the Model A resettlement
program or better still into the Small-Scale Commercial farming, (2) over 36
percent of the farmers in the Model B Schemes similarly wanted such an upgrade
away from the cooperatives and (3) almost nobody outside the Communal Area or
the Model B Producer Cooperative thought a good life was achievable for them
if they were in any of the two respective farming systems.
The final hypothetical question to the farmers related to what they would
invest in were they to be given $1,000 each. The majority of all Model B
Producer Cooperative farmers chose to use that to provide a home and other
household essentials for themselves and/or their families. Elsewhere, other
farmers would rather invest the money in their farms especially by purchasing
capital or productive assets. Varying percentages of the farmers ranging from


92
policy targets: (1) increase the quantity of assets owned by the poor, for
example, through land reform; (2) increase the volume of their market sales
through generating demand for the output of their labor intensive industries;
and (3) increase the prices of the services that the poor sell especially
through improved terms of trade.
This development model is viewed to be productivity-oriented in that it
aims to raise the incomes of the poor by increasing their productivity and
their access to productivity enhancing assets. The importance of a systemic
and integrated approach to realize the utility of this strategy is clearly
underscored by Adelman who argues that
strategies for poverty alleviation are not compatible with just
any kind of economic growth, The most effective approaches
entail a combination of several elements. The sequence
(being) implementing asset-oriented policies and institutional
changes designed to give the poor access to high productivity
jobs before not after, shifting development strategies.If
that is done, there is no "trade-off" between growth promotion
and poverty alleviation. The same development strategy is then
optimal for both goals. (Adelman 1986:64-65. Her emphasis)
The Redistribution With Growth approach is based on a philosophy which
posits that the objectives of growth and egalitarian income, employment and
assets distribution are not necessarily in conflict. More significantly, it
points out that the incomes and wealth of the affluent do not have to be
reduced as a condition for achieving improved conditions for the poor. It
therefore supports policies that seek equitable distribution in ways that do
not slow down rates of growth within the economy.
Chenery et_ al. (1974), the major spokespersons for this approach,
advocate for a differential allocation of a larger share of the proceeds of
economic growth to assets accumulation by the poor. The rural emphasis of this
approach is argued by Ahluwalia (1974:19). His view is that given the scale of


81
Africa. This truism which is apparently the basis of the policy thinking
shared by many African leaders influences their priority preference for the
cooperative mode of production (see Nyerere 1968). One thing, however, appears
to be amiss here. There is ample evidence from all over Africa showing that
the similarities in the perceived and actual objectives notwithstanding the
modern cooperative, as it is known in the West (Roy 1981; Sargent 1982) or in
the East (Bideleux 1985), does not operate with the same principles as
traditional African cooperation.
A similar thesis about the confusion of African norms with collectivism
is advanced in a volume on African cooperatives and their efficiency, edited
by Carl Widstrand (1972). There the failure of the cooperative movement in
most of the continent is attributed to the inability to appreciate the
difference between African collective values and the requirements for a formal
cooperative.
This same point is poignantly conveyed in another way by Paul Bohannan.
Writing about the different issue of exchange and investment in an African
society, namely, the Tiv of Nigeria, Bohannan (1955:60) nonetheless argues
that "market behavior and kinship behavior are incompatible." George Dalton
(1967:78) provides additional support for this view by arguing that "to retain
indigenous social organization in the new economies of markets and machines is
obviously impossible."
These views reinforce Hyden's (1970a:13) observation that "traditional
communalism has turned out to be more of a liability than an asset to modern
cooperative development." It was Meyer Fortes (1969) who stressed the primacy
of amity to kinship relations, a normative fact which has significant policy
implications for the development of cooperatives. However, many analysts who
have worked with various African societies will agree with Hamer's (1982)


146
At the macro-level this document provides the major source of statements
of intent concerning the objectives, organization, regulations and procedures
that relate to the resettlement. This chapter draws extensively from this
revised document as well as from its previous editions (see Zimbabwe 19Sle,
1983c). Project Reports of some of the individual resettlement schemes
discussed in this chapter also provide additional insights, particularly in
terms of the economic and technical dimensions of resettlement policy at the
micro-level. The reports are important for these vital background information
against which specific outputs or program performance may be measured.
Resettlement Policy Objectives
In 1980, a joint Government of Zimbabwe-Government of the United Kingdom
three-year agreement proposed to resettle 18,000 farm families on 1.1 million
hectares of land at the cost of $60 million (Zimbabwe 1981e:l). These
proposals were revised upward two years later in the Three Year Transitional
National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85 (Zimbabwe 1982b, 1983a). The
Zimbabwe government envisaged then to resettle a total of 162,000 families on
9 million hectares at an estimated cost of $500 million in constant prices
(Zimbabwe 1985c: 1).
By January 1983, a total of 32 resettlement schemes had been established.
These covered 1.2 million hectares and were planned for 22,000 families. Of
this number, 18,400 were already resettled in the schemes (Zimbabwe 1983c:2).
At the end of June 1984, a little over 1.8 million hectares had been purchased
for resettlement at the cost of $50.7 million. As of that time the estimated
number of families that had been resettled was 30,122 representing some
255,000 people (Zimbabwe 1985c:3).


243
TABLE 7-30
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: RESETTLEMENT AND COMMUNAL AREA
FARMERS' RESPONSES TOWARDS COMMON ACCESS TO RESETTLEMENT RESOURCES
MODEL A MODEL A MODEL B COMMUNAL
NORMAL ACCELERATED COOPERATIVE AREA
SCHEME SCHEME SCHEME
(N
=349)
(N=39)
(N=151)
(N=62)
Do Communal Area residents
have the right .to graze
YES
4.3
5.1
0.7
32.3
livestock in resettlement
lands?
NO
95.7
94.9
99.3
67.7
Do Communal Area residents
have the right to use common
YES
2.3
2.6
-
33.9
resources (poles, grass,
etc. in resettlement lands?
NO
97.7
97.4
66.1
Is the Government justified
YES
95.4
97.4
53.2
in erecting a boundary fence
between the resettlement
lands and the Communal Areas?
NO 4.6
2.6
46.8


305
TABLE 8-4
ZIMBABWE: BUDGET ALLOCATION, SUMMARY OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
AND BALANCE FOR MODEL A AND MODEL B NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEMES AS
AT JULY 31, 1985
ITEM/SUB-ITEM
BUDGETED
COST
PROGRESSIVE
EXPENDITURE
($ 000)
BALANCE
Indirect: Costs (Ministry
of Lands,
Resettl. & Rural Dev.)
Land Acquisition
35,385
31,193
4, 192
Development Team
62
58
4
Suspense Account
5,142
5, 148
0
Development Costs (Agricultural &
Rural Dev. Authority)
Demarcation and Survey
1,699
910
789
Land Preparation
3,390
2,279
1,112
Roads
4,449
1,503
2,945
Roads Maintenance
400
31
369
Water Supplies
9,722
4,305
5,417
Fencing
4,563
555
4,008
Dips
1,568
891
677
Staff Housing & Offices
4,897
1,541
3,356
Schools
15,658
9,109
6,549
Clinics
2,640
712
1,928
Other Buildings
1,338
106
1,233
Rural Service Centers
3,336
1,394
1,943
Telephones
98
0
98
Pit Latrines
13
0
13
Crop Packs
1,360
934
427
Transport
156
2
154


TABLE 8 27continued
ITEM/SUB-ITEM
BUDGETED
COST
PROGRESSIVE
EXPENDITURE
($ 000)
BALANCE
Ox-Implements
1,000
0
1,000
Planning & Implementation 5,498
2,741
2,757
Contigencies
6,084
0
6,084
Total
161,097
105,678
55,419
Cost Per Member
1,790
Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (July 1985),
Harare.


481
Roy, Ewell P
1981 Cooperatives: Development, Principles and Management.
Danville: Hie Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc.
Runge, Carlisle Ford
1986 Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development.
World Development, 14(5):623-635.
Rukuni, Mandiv amba
1984 Organization and Management of Smallholder Irrigation: The
Case of Zimbabwe. Agricultural Administration, 17(4):215-229.
Ruthenberg, Hans
1985 Innovation Policy for Small Farmers in the Tropics. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Ruthenberg, Hans, ed.
1968 Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in TanzaniaTen
Case Studies. Mnchen, West Germany: Weltforum Verlag.
Ruttan, Vernon W.
1975 Integrated Rural Development: A Skeptical Perspective.
International Development Review, 17(4):916.
1986 Assistance to Expand Agricultural Production.
World Development, 14(1):39-63.
Rweyemamu, Anthony H.
1966 Managing Planned Development: Tanzania's Experience.
Journal of Modern African Studies, 4(1):1-16.
Sahlins, Marshall
1971 The Intensity of Domestic Production in Primitive Societies:
Social Inflections of the Chayanov Slope. _In Studies in Economic
Anthropology. G. Dalton, ed. Pp. 30-51. Washington, D.C.:
American Anthropological Association.
1974 Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine Publishing.
Samanta, P.
1981 Land Characteristics, Economic Policy, and Rhodesian Dualism.
African Quarterly, 20(l):63-70.
Samkang e, Stanlake.
1969 Origins of Rhodesia. New York: Praeger.
Samoff, J.
1981 Crises and Socialism in Tanzania. Journal of Modern African
Studies, 19(2):279-306.


40
achieved any of its objectives. By 1962 it had already been abandoned. Seven
years later, in 1969, as part of the introduction of the Republican
Constitution, the forty year old Land Apportionment Act was also updated with
the enactment of the Land Tenure Act. The new Act set aside 2.6 million
hectares of the total 38.6 million hectare land area of the country as
National Land and divided the remaining 36 million hectares equally into
African Areas (18 million hectares) and European Areas (18 million hectares).
This in effect generally meant that in absolute terms each African
communal area or peasant cultivator held 24 hectares as against 185 hectares
owned by each African elite or freehold farmer in the Purchase Area. In
further contrast, every European farmer owned nearly 2,300 hectares. On the
average therefore Europeans cultivated farms that were about 100 times larger
than their counterparts in the peasant sector (Riddell 1980:3). Table 2-2
presents an indication of the distributional pattern of land ownership over
the fifty year period up to 1981.
The magnitude of the inequities in the land distribution was not
lessened but was rather perpetuated by the Land Tenure Act. The Act also
maintained the status quo in respect of the pattern which ensured the
better endowed agro-ecological regions for the European settlers (Table 2-3).
As Billing (1985:36) points out, 74 percent of the African or Communal Areas
lie in the Natural Regions IV and V which are considered unsuitable for crop
production. This means that only one-fourth of these Areas are located in the
better Natural Regions I, II and III. In contrast, 52 percent of the European
or Large-Scale Commercial Farming areas are in the Natural Regions I, II and
III. The remaining 48 percent which are found in the poorly endowed Natural
Regions IV and V are used mainly as either ranching or irrigation
enterprises.


74
Given the corpus of recently assembled empirical evidence in support of
the high performance of many traditional farmers around the world, the
relative efficiency of smallholder agriculture is no longer questioned. This
fact notwithstanding, an agricultural economy which is wholly dependent upon a
smallholder system has certain limitations.
Corner and Kanel (1977:5) discuss at least two of them. First, a highly
productive smallholder system requires an elaborate service structure which is
both expensive and time-consuming to develop. Consequently, a government
cannot deal effectively with such a system until all the necessary
infrastructure is in place and markets have begun to function more or less
competitively. The second problem is that the smallholder system, dependent
upon individuals rather than the collective, can allow great inequalities__to
develop. Such inequalities may be a function of variations in individual
entrepreneurial abilities. Whatever their cause, they can accumulate over time
and present serious obstacles to achieving a resolution of problems such as
equity and even economic growth.
Yet one other issue that is raised in the literature which has important
implications for development is the relationship between smallholder producers
and the state. According to Gavin Williams (1976:149), peasants tend to suffer
under almost all forms of externally designed strategies of change undertaken
in Africa. His contention is that because of the nature of the peasant mode of
production in the political economy of the continent (1) the underdevelopment
of peasant production is a condition for the development of capitalist and
state production and that (2) this condition serves the interests of the state
and its beneficiaries rather than promotes the livelihood of the people.
This view of the parasitic and exploitative nature of states' domination
over their seemingly helpless smallholder farmers contrasts sharply with Goran


TABLE 8-15
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: PROJECT COSTS,
EXPENDITURE AND BALANCE AS AT JULY 31 1985
ITEM/SUB-ITEM BUDGET COST PROGRESSIVE BALANCE
EXPENDITURE
($)
Land Acquisition
Development
Demarcation & Survey
Land Preparation/Tillage
Roads (100 Kms)
Telephones
Diptanks (7)
Fencing (244 Kms)
Village Water Supplies
(18 Boreholes)
School Water Supplies
Storage Shed
Rural Service Center
Staff Housing
School (4) & Teacher Housing
Clinic
Planning/Imp/ & Consultancy
426,650
424,085
2,565
16,890
12,369
4,521
18,841
18,841
0
28,000
5,266
22,734
100
0
100
35,000
26,165
8,835
37,600
26,786
10,814
54,000
}
}
60,000
73,966 }
40,034 }
10,000
0
10,000
55,000
53,193
1,807
94,000
79,051
14,949
313,100
302,966
10,134
24,000
19,815
4,185
101,380
29,376
72,004
41,059
0
41,059
Contigencies
Total Cost 1,315,620 1,071,879 243,741
Cost Per Family 2,337
Sources: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981)
and the Summary of Capital Expenditure, ARDA (July 1985)
Harare.


35
The grant of a self-governing status apart, the next major political
development in the history of the colony did not occur until 1954. That year
Britain amalgamated Southern Rhodesia with the neighboring colonies of
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This created the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, also referred to in some of the literature as the Central African
Federation. The Federation, strongly opposed by the burgeoning African
nationalists of the three colonies, was short-lived and broke up in 1963.
The following year both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved
political independence becoming Zambia and Malawi respectively. The colony
was also now known simply as Rhodesia. Two years after the dissolution of the
Federation, in November 1965, Rhodesia made a "Unilateral Declaration of
Independence." This development occured because its minority white settler
regime under the leadership of Prime Minister Ian Smith failed to get Britain
to agree to its conditions for independence.
Rhodesia's independence, illegal in the eyes of Britain and the
international community, invited worldwide condemnation, non-recognition and
the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions. For fourteen years, until the
birth of a new Zimbabwe, Rhodesia held on amidst the bitter liberation war
waged by the African nationalist armies.
The Evolution of the Land Problem
The annexation of Southern Rhodesia and the grant of self government to
the colony by Britain in 1923 turned out to provide the settlers with the
carte blanche that enabled them to legislate segregation as the bedrock of
minority white supremacy in the country. This act unleashed far-reaching


TABLE 7-49
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
THEY FACED IN THE INITIAL YEARS OF RESETTLEMENT
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=346)
%
(N=39)
%
Environmental
52.6
51.3
Resettlement Infrast
15.3
30.8
Credit/Inputs/lmplem
16.8
10.3
Haulage/Crop Transport
& Marketing
7.2
2.6
Service Businesses
6.1
-
Other
1.2
2.6
No Problem
9
2.6


Farmers: Their General Responses and Evaluation of the
Government's Resettlement Policies and Programs
223
Some of the questions that farmers responded to in their evaluation of
the resettlement and agricultural policies and programs of the government were
specific to their respective farming systems. This was especially the case
with farmers in the resettlement schemes, namely, the Model A Normal and
Accelerated as well as the Model B Producer Cooperative sectors. Other general
questions common to these farmers were also asked of their counterparts in the
Large and Small-Scale Commercial and the Communal Areas respectively. The
specific issues are presented first.
The Farmers of Mufurudzi Model A Normal and the Shamva-Bindura
Model A Accelerated Schemes
These farmers first heard about the resettlement program through various
sources (Table 7-15). The most common of these was the ruling ZANU-PF party.
Its leaders and oficiis made the land redistribution issue an important one
in the chimurenga or liberation war years and followed up on it after the
attainment of independence in 1980. The majority of these farmers gave poor or
inadequate lands as their reason for resettlement. This category was followed
by those who were either landless or wanted a place to build a home and raise
families and those who just desired to improve their lives (Table 7-16).
Among these farmers the response to resettlement was overwhelmingly
positive. Infact 99 percent of the 388 Model A resettled farmers said that
they were glad to be part of the program. Comments explaining this response
included that of a farmer who was thrilled to be having, in his own words,
"for the first time in my 'difficult life' such things as my own minda
(farmland), musha (a home) for my family to live in, abundance of food,
government services and, above all, a peace of mind." Another farmer


TABLE 7-40
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' OWNERSHIP OF
HOUSEHOLD ITEMS
257
WATCH/CLOCK RADIO BED/MATRESS SEWING BICYCLE
MACHINE
(N=)
Yes
%
No
Yes
No
i
Yes
No
%
Yes
No
%
Yes
No
%
Model A
Norm (348)
57.5
42.5
32.5
67.5
48.0
52.0
10.9
89.1
30.2
69.8
Model A
Accel (39)
64.1
35.9
30.8
69.2
48.7
51.3
10.3
89.7
17.9
82.1
Model B
Coop (151)
23.8
76.2
11.3
88.7
11.9
88.1
4.6
95.4
3.3
96.7
Communal
Area (62)
55.7
44.3
31.5
68.5
55.7
44.3
21.9
78.1
38.7
61.3
Small-Sc
Commer (20)
75.0
25.0
60.0
40.0
80.0
20.0
15.0
85.0
60.0
40.0


19
techniques, study variables, sample units and analysis.
Chapter V deals with the main dimensions of the government's
resettlement policy in terms of its structural and organizational components.
These are the objectives of resettlement, land acquisition, planning and
implementation models, farmer selection and land allocation and the
implementation and administrative set ups for the program. Chapter VI
provides contextual background notes about (1) the old farming systems of the
country, namely, the large and the small-scale commercial as well as the
communal sectors and (2) the newly introduced systems made up of the
resettlement sector farms. Of the latter only the two important models, that
is, the Model A Normal individual household schemes and the Model B
collective schemes are examined. The Chapter provides the prelude to the
presentation of farmers' interview responses to the resettlement program.
In Chapter VII the analysis and description of a case study of the
responses of Zimbabwean farmers towards the resettlement policy and programs
initiated and being implemented by the government are offered. Based on
survey interviews, key informants interviews and observations in the
Mashonaland Central Province this case study covers farmers in the six major
farming systems in the country. The chapter is divided into seven parts to
cover (1) the background responses of the so-called commercial farmers, (2)
the social and demographic characteristics of farmers and their households,
(3) farmers' attitudes and perceptions about their life situations, (4)
farmers' assessment of resettlement and aspects of the government's policies
on agriculture and rural development, (5) household material resources and
capital assets that farmers possess, (6) farm-level problems encountered by
farmers and (7) household developmental cycle, micro-level agricultural
characteristics and economic performance.


348
time. At the inception of the Scheme AGRITEX anticipated a three year build up
to the full crop program. The assumption has been that the farmers will
initially cultivate 2 hectares of maize, adding 0.5 hectares of cotton in the
second year. In the third year they may either cultivate 0.5 hectares of a
subsidiary crop in addition to the previous year's cropping program or they
may expand the cotton enterprise from half to a full hectare (see Table 8-16).
The livestock budget assumes the farmer's ownership of 5 head of cattle
in the first year and a 50 percent calving rate. This head is expected to
build up through natural increase of 2 calves per year for nine years to
realize the optimal herd composition of 11 head of cattle. Servicing of the
cows is to be done by a communally owned or a hired bull. Every year two head
of cattle is to be sold. The only exception is during the third year when,
with the anticipated stock loss, one instead of two is to be sold (see Table
8-17).
Table 8-18 is a summary of the whole farm budget as it builds up to the
target income level. Essentially, a mixed farming system is recommended for
Mufurudzi. However, nearly two-thirds of farmers' incomes are projected to be
derived from the arable or cropping enterprise. The achievement of the target
income level of $400 per annum for the resettled households is expected to
occur within 3 to 5 years. The assumption is that the average family would
make a total income of $302 in the first year, progressively exceeding the
target income and doubling the initial income within a ten year period.
Mufurudzi: The Foundations of a Successful Agricultural
Resettlement Scheme
Most of the resettled farm households in Mufurudzi appear to be happy and
on the path of success and achievement of their development objectives. In the
1985-86 fiscal year the Scheme entered what may be conceived as the


9
its intended and unintended consequences and (3) the attitudes and responses
that the implementation of such policy is likely to generate among the
supposed beneficiaries.
The research problem then is essentially an evaluative one. It is
organized around the state on the one hand and individual rural households on
the other. This study is mindful of the nature and levels of the
interactional network which links the two major actors in the development
arena. The choice of actors reflects the reality which obtains in Africa. It
also accords active rather than passive roles to the state and households.
The respective and mutual capacities of both the state and households to
create innovative opportunities and to provide the necessary and sufficient
supportive or participatory conditions for development are immense.
The state in Africa is the principal, if not the exclusive initiator and
executor of development policy. Even where private or voluntary and
non-governmental organizations are an important agency for development it so
happens that the framework for their operations are set and are closely
monitored also by respective governments. More importantly, the state is the
provider of most of the public or collective goods which are used for rural
development. That is the case in Zimbabwe where in undertaking resettlement
and rural development the state makes available, free of charge or at below
market prices, resources that range from land through social and physical
infrastructures to production incentives.
Similarly, the cumulative socioeconomic activities of African farm
households often make a lot of difference between the success and failure of
government's induced rural development programs such as resettlement.^ jn
rural Zimbabwe co-residing composite households living in homesteads which
dot the spatial scene of the African and Communal Areas are recognizable


403
particular, they supplemented government's grants by way of direct financial
sponsorship of respective Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes throughout the
country. At one time or another they supplied some of these Cooperatives with
subsistence needs such as salt or cooking oil, offered services such as the
payment of phone and electricity bills and provided such capital assets as
tractors and grinding mills.
Given the relief orientation of these forms of assistance and
particularly the lack of any monitoring controls instituted by the NGOs over
impacts of their aid they have helped to create the kind of dependancy
syndromes in the Model B Producer Cooperative sector that is inimical to
self-help and sustained development.
The problem with these NGOs is that they lack any inter-agency
coordination and they appear to be overcompeting with each other in terms of
what they can do for the respective Schemes. With the possible exception of a
few Schemes such as Gowe, Mashonaland West Province (Figure 8-1), which has
consistently been sponsored by only one agency the Redd Barna, there is too
much duplication of aid by different agencies within the same Schemes.
There is the urgent need therefore for self monitoring on the part of
these NGOs in terras of the nature of assistance that they provide and the
likely consequences that such assistance would impact on the initiative,
self-help and the sustained productivity of the Cooperatives. In terms of the
specifics these Schemes would benefit more from training in agricultural and
related skills, human relations, equipment servicing and maintainance and
simple management and accounting skills. Such skills are initial preconditions
for development.
Just supplying these Model B Producer Cooperatives with tractors, as it
has been the case on many occasions, has not facilitated their economic


TABLE 7-41
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHEN HOUSEHOLD MATERIAL
ITEMS ACQUIRED
WATCH/CLOCK RADIO BED/MATRESS
Before After Before After Before After
1980 1980 1980
(N=)
%
(N=)
%
(N=)
%
Model A
Norm
(200)
5.0
95.0
(113)
35.4
64.6
(167)
48.5
51.5
Model A
Accel
(25)
4.0
96.0
(12)
50.0
50.0
(19)
42.1
57.9
Model B
Coop
(36)
5.6
94.4
(17)
17.6
82.4
(18)
38.9
61.1
Commmunal
Area
(34)
11.8
88.2
(19)
52.6
47.4
(34)
70.6
29.4
Small-Scale
Commmerc (15)
40.0
60.0
(12)
66.7
33.3
(16)
68.8
31.2
SEWING MACHINE BICYCLE
Before After Before After
1980 1980
(N=) (N=)
% %
Model A Norm
(38)
68.4
31.6
(101)
56.4
42.6
Model A Accel
(4)
75.0
25.0
(7)
57.1
42.9
Model B Coop
(7)
57.1
42.9
(5)
60.0
40.0
Communal Area
(13)
53.8
46.2
(24)
66.7
33.3
Small-Scale C
(3)
66.7
33.3
(12)
58.3
41.7


93
the poverty problem and the limited capacity of other sectors to expand
productive employment a viable strategy for raising the incomes of the lowest
40 percent of the population in developing countries must necessarily focus on
the agricultural sector. Yoder (1979) even provides a theological perspective
on Growth With Equity arguing that it is a Christian imperative and moral
obligation to ensure that the poor benefit from growth.
In the African context, Diana Hunt (1975) takes a look at the interplay
between growth and equity as they manifest in the distribution of economic
status and opportunity in the Mbere area of rural Kenya. Gavin Williams (1982)
also reviews the need for the state in Zimbabwe to ensure equity and growth.
This work contrasts with another by Bill Kinsey (1982) in which he critically
examines the contradictions between equity and growth in Zimbabwe. Bill Kinsey
(1984) offers a similar critique of the equity and growth issues in Malawi
while Elliot (1983), earlier, observes that the two issues represent
unresolved conflicts in the development efforts of Zambia.
These and other critics of the PovertyFocused Approaches cite a host of
flaws that detract from their utility. Higgins (1981), for example, in
criticizing Basic Needs mentions the paternalism that it creates and the
culture-relativity that is implied in the definition of its key components as
major weaknesses. Other problems have been associated with it including the
following mentioned by Weigel (1986:1427): (1) the tendency to confuse needs
with preferences; (2) the overdrawn hierarchical distinction between material
and non-material needs; (3) the high priority that is often assigned to the
subjective concept of security in the hierarchy of needs; and (4) the tendency
to identify needs in terms of pathologies associated with deprivation of
particular goods.


370
TABLE 8-28
SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEME:
CROPPING BUDGET
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
& AFTER
MAIZE
Area
(Hectares)
140
155
155
Total
Variable Cost ($)
27,580
30,535
30,535
Total
Income ($)
66,080
73,160
73,160
Total
Gross Margin ($)
38,500
42,625
42,625
COTTON
Area
(Hectares)
20
30
35
Total
Variable Cost ($)
4,620
6,930
8,085
Total
Income ($)
9,100
13,650
15,925
Total
Gross Margin ($)
4,480
6,720
7,840
J J ^ IUIAjL )'
Area
(Hectares)
160
185
190
Total
Variable Cost ($)
32,200
37,465
38,620
Total
Income ($)
75,180
86,810
89,085
Total
Gross Margin ($)
42,980
49,345
50,465
Source: Simba Youth Cooperative (Paridon Farm) Project Report
(Revised November 1981), AGRITEX, Harare.


TABLE 7-52
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=348) (N=39)
% %
Insensitivity to Farmers'
Plight (resulting from
drought)
50.9
64.1
Bad Credit Processing
21.6
2.6
Bad Payment (Stop Order)
13.2
12.8
Other
2.0
-
No Problem
12.4
20.5


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The major funding for the field research for this dissertation was
provided by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, New York,
under a Developing Country Fellowship (Number 4500-4201). I am forever
indebted to the Foundation for this support which enabled me to collect data
in Zimbabwe in 1985.
In Zimbabwe I was affiliated to the University as a Research Associate. I
am grateful to Professor Gordon Chavunduka who chairs the Department of
Sociology for making this possible. My friend and Shona teacher Dr. Norris
Dembetembe, Chairman, Department of African Languages and Literatures was
quite helpful in arranging permission for my stay and research. I am equally
thankful also to Dr. Langford Chitsike, then the Principal Secretary Ministry
of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, and his staff for the invaluable
assistance and cooperation without which the research would not have been
possible. Here, I have to mention the Director, Department of Rural
Development, the Chief Resettlement Officer and the Regional Rural Development
Officer, Mashonaland Region. The Provincial Agricultural and Technical
Extension Officer, Mashonaland Central Province and his field staff in
Bindura, Mount Darwin and Shamva Districts were all immensely helpful.
Special thanks are due my senior investigator Mr. Gerald Mlambo, an
ex-guerrilla combatant during the country's liberation war and former
Resettlement Assistant in charge of the Karoi District. Research Assistants
Jabulani, Chazungwiza and Nicholas Kanokanza were indeed "real comrades" to
iv


247
access to social infrastructure or modern facilities such as schools. These
attributes defined what, in the Shona worldview, ensured upenyu hwakanaka
that is sought by every person for himself and his family (mhuri).
In ranking these attributes of a good life the majority of farmers
selected minda or having a farm as the most important. The only exception was
the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers who, instead, chose money. The second
most mentioned attribute was a home. However, it was ranked third by Model A
Normal Scheme farmers who valued cattle as a second choice (Table 7-33).
The farmers were asked as to whether or not the good life they mentioned
was attainable in the areas or farming systems that they currently farmed.
Almost all Model A Normal and Accelerated Scheme farmers responded in the
affirmative. However, this was not the case among the other farmers 15 percent
of whom respectively said that their systems could not assure them of a good
life (Table 7-34). When the farmers were asked a similar question about their
children the majority still believed that it was possible in the long run for
them to enjoy a good life at where the parents were farming now. Every two in
five Communal Area farmers indicated otherwise (Table 7-34).
A hypothetical question was asked of farmers as to where they would
rather work if wage employment was their only option to achieve a good life.
Four places were suggested to them, namely, (1) Harare or other towns, (2)
Small-Scale (African) Commercial Farms, (3) Large-Scale (European) Commercial
Farms and (4) Mining Areas. Nevertheless, the majority of farmers everywhere
insisted that they would prefer to do nothing at all rather than be employed
in any of the four suggested situations. Of those willing to accomodate that
option more of the Model A Normal Scheme farmers were prepared for an urban
employment and the Model A Accelerated Scheme farmers for work on the
Small-Scale Commercial Farms. The Communal Area farmers were divided between
working in Harare or other towns and working in the Small-Scale Commercial


TABLE 4-2
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: VILLAGES, HOUSEHOLDS,
AND THE NUMBER SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED FOR CASE STUDY
132
VILLAGES
IN THE
SCHEME
TOTAL VILLAGE NUMBER OF
NUMBER OF SELECTED HOUSEHOLDS
HOUSEHOLDS FOR STUDY INTERVIEWED
(TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS)
1. Banana
13
Yes
12
2. Cbitepo
30
Yes
30
3. Chimburukwa
25
No
0
4. Denda
38
No
0
5. Gatu
50
Yes
48
6. Gwetera
32
Yes
32
7. Magadzi
51
Yes
49
8. Mudzinge
33
Yes
30
9. Mukwari
38
No
0
10. Mupedzanhamo
13
Yes
13
11. Muringamombe
28
Yes
28
12. Mutoramhepo
14
Yes
14
13. Nehanda
39
Yes
38
14. Takawira
31
Yes
29
15. Tongogara 1
51
No
0
16. Tongogara 2
14
No
0
17. Zvataida
27
Yes
26
18. Zvoraanyanga
40
No
0
566
(361)
349


345
Tlie nearest major shopping center, hospital as well as the railhead are
all located 60 kilometers from the southern boundary of the Scheme in Bindura,
the provincial capital of Mashonaland Central. The District Administrative
Office, Police, GMB and CMB depots are also at Shamva 23 kilometers away to
the south from the southern edge of the Scheme.
For the villages in the northern half of the Scheme Mount Darwin, 38
kilometers from Tongogara 1 and 2 villages, is the closest service center.
Madziwa Township about 13 kilometers west is a rural growth center where the
Chaminuka District Council and a few other services such as a butchery shop,
market and auto mechanic garages are opening.
The Madziwa Mine also provides services such as retail shops, occasional
entertainment and a beer hall. The latter is heavily patronized by many
resettled farmers from all the nearby villages in the Scheme. This is
especially so of farmers from Mudzinge and Zvataida.
The Chindunduma elementary and Chirume secondary boarding schools are
additional educational institutions located in the Scheme. These two were
established at the time of independence by the ZANU-PF party but they are now
managed by the Ministry of Education. Initially, Chindunduma catered for
orphaned refugee children and other school-age "comrades" returning from
Mozambique as well as the displaced from the near-by and war-torn communal
lands. Though these schools do not form part of the Scheme's infrastructure
their facilities and services are nevertheless available to resettled families
in Mufurudzi. Finally, the Ponesai Vanhu vocational institute, sponsored by
"People to People" a German non-governmental organization also operates from a
piece of land within the Scheme


APPENDIX G
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT PERMITS
TABLE G 1
PERMIT TO RESIDE
Permit Number....
MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PERMIT TO RESIDE
Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
(hereafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of
the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155) to .
(hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER").
The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to reside on the residential site
This permit is subject to the following terras and conditions:
1. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency
thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with
some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may
determine.
2. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER
decides that the holder has failed to comply with any of its terms
and conditions.
3. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time
and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of
such compensation as the MINISTER may determine.
4. The said site shall be used for residential purpose for the accomodation
of the HOLDER and his immediate family only.
5. The HOLDER shall maintain the said site in a clean, sanitary and tidy
condition and shall comply with any instructions that the MINISTER may
issue for the upkeep of the said site and the prevention of nuisance and
the maintenance of sanitary conditions.
6. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges which may be
levied on the said site by competent authority.
7. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person to carry on any
trading, commercial or industrial operations on the the said site.
8. The MINISTER, or any person authorized by him, shall have the right,
free of charge and without compensation, to lay, construct and maintain
roads, boreholes, pipe-lines, electric lines, sewerage, drains and
ancillary works upon or under the said site.
431


165
representing Marlborough, persistently requested for a definition of those
wo rd s.
The Bill which passed as the Land Acquisition Act (1986) took effect on
March 1, 1986. It now provides for a system of designation of certain areas,
in the country, for various public needs purposes such as resettlement and
state farms. It defines properly utilized land as that which has been
"substantially and continously used for the past three years." According to
Linda van Burn (1986:1123), writing on the Economy of Zimbabwe, the passage
of the Bill is based on the fact that prior to independence the colonial
administration did not invariably grant European farmers a freehold title to
commercial land, reserving to itself the right to repossess land for "public
purposes."
Under the new system an inter ministry Land Identification Advisory
Committee has been set up to make the initial selection of blocks of land on
the basis of such criteria as the availability of water and suitable soils and
then give advice to the Land Selection Committee.
Analysts of land tenure systems, particularly in Africa, often cite
insecurity of tenure as a major constraint on investment in improved
technologies, management and husbandry of resources (Feder and Noronha 1987).
An important issue in land tenure is therefore the question of whoever
controls access to the resources of the land and the benefits accruing from
its use (Cohen 1980). This becomes even more significant where productive
resources such as irrigation are involved (Lipton 1985).
In Zimbabwe the government is yet to come out with the desirable system
of tenure for resettlement agriculture. As of now resettled farmers operate
their holdings under temporary leases issued in accordance with Section 6 of
the Rural Land Act. In the Model A schemes with their individual family


GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE
RESPONSES OF FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE
By
KOFI{AKWABI-AMEYAW
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Copyright 1988
by
Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw

To
Naana Afia Apomasu (Asantewaa) who lies permanently at
peace interred on December 19, 1986, at Sawua, Asante Region
of Ghana, West Africa, among her royal Oyoko ancestors.
"Apomasu damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe!"
Wo nana Kofi Kwabi, raebaa asuogya se mere bepe biribiri aba
fie de abehye wo anuonyara naanso owuo koronfoo aama maanhu
wo bio. Ei! Eye nokware, Nananom kaa se,
"Owuo kura ade a Nkwa entrame ngye."
Owuo busuoni wave me ade; wama meedi awerehoo wo asuogya ha.
Apomasu! Wo nananom ne abusua nyinaa yekae wo dabiara. Yenim
se wogyina yakyi akyinapa.
"Apomasu damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe!"

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The major funding for the field research for this dissertation was
provided by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, New York,
under a Developing Country Fellowship (Number 4500-4201). I am forever
indebted to the Foundation for this support which enabled me to collect data
in Zimbabwe in 1985.
In Zimbabwe I was affiliated to the University as a Research Associate. I
am grateful to Professor Gordon Chavunduka who chairs the Department of
Sociology for making this possible. My friend and Shona teacher Dr. Norris
Dembetembe, Chairman, Department of African Languages and Literatures was
quite helpful in arranging permission for my stay and research. I am equally
thankful also to Dr. Langford Chitsike, then the Principal Secretary Ministry
of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, and his staff for the invaluable
assistance and cooperation without which the research would not have been
possible. Here, I have to mention the Director, Department of Rural
Development, the Chief Resettlement Officer and the Regional Rural Development
Officer, Mashonaland Region. The Provincial Agricultural and Technical
Extension Officer, Mashonaland Central Province and his field staff in
Bindura, Mount Darwin and Shamva Districts were all immensely helpful.
Special thanks are due my senior investigator Mr. Gerald Mlambo, an
ex-guerrilla combatant during the country's liberation war and former
Resettlement Assistant in charge of the Karoi District. Research Assistants
Jabulani, Chazungwiza and Nicholas Kanokanza were indeed "real comrades" to
iv

me. I will remain ever grateful for their friendship, the diligence and the
dedication with which they assisted in this research. Through these
individuals I experienced rural Zimbabwe in ways that would not have been
possible otherwise.
Still in Zimbabwe, many individuals were extremely supportive of my
research with their time and other resources. The list is endless. I would
like to single out my old time friend Mr. Victor Kwasi Nartey and his family.
Sincere thanks also go to Dr. Kwasi Agyepong-Boateng and his wife Akosua, Dr.
Kwarae Asumadu, Messrs. Ayensu, Bonsi, Mate-Korle and Ambaah for according me
the traditional Ghanaian hospitality anytime I called on them. As the saying
goes: "Me daase a ensa!" I am most particularly indebted also to my two
Tanzanian friends Mr. Suleimani Hashim Alii and Ms. Maryam Omar for their
company and providing me with various forms of assistance during the
fieldwork. Tine numerous Zimbabwean friends and colleagues, deserve special
thanks. Among them are Dr. Mandivamba Rukuni, Department of Land Management,
and Dr. Florence Chanakira, Department of Biology, both at the University of
Zimbabwe, Messrs. C.P. Maziofa, Chinyuke and J.P. Ngorima and all his
colleagues the Resettlement Officers, DERUDE, Mashonaiand Region and Messrs.
Mashayamombe and Muzhuzha, AGRITEX, Mount Darwin and "Mwanangu" Cosmas
Nyadzayo. To Philip Kofi Amoah and family, University of Swaziland, Manzini, I
say thank you also.
I lack the appropriate words to convey my deepest gratitude to the many
farmers, rural dwellers, public servants and research informants who willingly
accepted me into their homes, farms and meetings. I appreciate the assistance
of Mr. Matiza, Chirume Secondary School, Mr. Machokoto, Chindunduma Primary
School, and the Principals and teachers of Magadzi, Mudzinge, Mukwari and
Muringamombe schools in Mufurudzi. To Messrs. Ennias Mutyambizi and Peter
v

Kanyandura of Gatu village, Garikai Sigauke of Chitepo, India Dyariwa of
Nehanda, Kenneth Gadaga of Sanye village 9, Godfred Dimba of Simba Youth,
Lukson Chihuri of Goora, David Matope of Kandeya, the respective Chairmen of
Development Committees in the villages and the Sabuku or the chiefs and
headmen of the villages and homesteads where I worked I respectfully ask that
ray heartfelt salute be traditionally accepted on behalf of all the farmers of
Zimbabwe: Pamberi ne Kurima!To Amai Getrude Mukoka of Mupedzanhamo
village, Mufurudzi Scheme and all the Vanamai who always so kindly cooked
sadza ne muriwo for us I say: Tatenda chaiso!.
Here at the University of Florida I am most especially thankful to
Professor Brian M. du Toit my committee chairman, graduate advisor, teacher
and friend for his interest in my work and well-being, patient guidance and
personal and professional support. His office and home were always open to me
and there is no way that I would have survived the frustrations and ordeals of
the course work and dissertation phases of my graduate work without his
encouragement which prods me on to "hang in there." The wise direction and
deep involvement of all the remaining members of my committee in the
preparation of this dissertation also merit appreciation. I wish to thank Dean
Madelyn M. Lockhart, Dr. Paul L. Doughty, Dr. Robert Lawless and Dr. Peter J.
van Blokland for their individual and collective assistance in this regard. To
Dr. R. Hunt Davis, Center for African Studies, and Dr. Ronald Cohen,
Department of Anthropology, I owe a debt of gratitude in all respects.
Many colleagues and friends at the University of Florida have in various
ways also facilitated my studies, the analysis of the field data and the
writing of the dissertation. Julian Arturo, Jim McKay and Jon Benjamin were
very helpful with aspects of my data analysis especially the computer
programs. Gary and Nancy Gullic, Dr. David Suggs, Dr. Geeta Chowdhry, Sara
vi

Norton and Carol Lauriault also deserve many thanks for their intellectual
support and assistance.
The following individuals and families have contributed so generously to
my stay and education in this country in such important ways that I can hardly
forget about them. First and foremost I deeply appreciate the intellectual
guidance of Dr. Barry L. Isaac a dear friend and teacher, who first opened my
eyes to the exciting field of cultural anthropology when I studied under him
for the M.A. at the University of Cincinnati. To Mr. and Mrs. Huie Proffit as
well as my friends Dennis and Debbie Harrington, Barbara Huels and Tim
Jackering all of Cincinnati, Ohio, I say thank you. Ken Terrell, Dr. Aletta
Biersack, Dr. Michael Yaw Boateng, Dr. Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, Frank Yeboah,
Kwabena Okrah, J. P. Owusu-Ansah, Arnold and Pat Fergus, James Ansoanuur and
Elizabeth Essel and their children Freida, Mwitse and George have all been of
immense support. Similarly, I acknowledge Kwasi Yamoah, Ernest Yaw Kwarteng,
Isaac Nketiah, Kofi and Akosua Akumanyi, Kwadwo Agyeraan, Kwame Akosah and
Herman Kofi Duh respectively, for their invaluable assistance both in Ghana
and here in the United States.
I wish to thank also Dr. Kwaku Twumasi-Ankrah who helped to arrange for
my graduate education in this country and also contributed in many ways to my
upkeep and that of my family. It has been a rather long and hard road and
Kwaku and his wife Comfort and children Kwasi, Kwadwo and Amma deserve my
heartfelt appreciation for everything. The same gratitude goes to my in-laws
Mama Joana Osei Bemma, St. Croix, Virgin Islands and her children and Mr. and
Mrs. Anane Sekyere, Tema, Ghana. Professor S. K. B. Asante, United Nations
Institute for Namibia, Lusaka, is indeed a nana to whom I owe so much for
making it possible for me to travel to Zimbabwe and, more importantly, for the
immeasurable benefits that I derive from our association, his intellectual
vii

acumen, worldly experience and traditional wisdom.
My own family, the immediate and the extended, is worthy of mention for
the "sacrifice" which has made it possible for me to travel all this long way.
My wife Amma provided much of the financial support for my graduate studies
and part of the dissertation fieldwork. I am most exceptionally indebted to
her forever for her love, understanding and support. Similar thanks go to our
children Adwoa Asantewaa, Adwoa Durowaa, Amma Kyerewaa, Kwasi Twumasi-Ankrah
and Kwadwo Awua. Finally, to my parents Francis Kojo Yinkah and Akua Manu, ray
brothers and sisters I convey my sincere and heartfelt appreciation for the
prayers and encouragement which have seen me through graduate studies.
viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
LIST OF TABLES xiii
LIST OF FIGURES. xx
ABSTRACT xxi
CHAPTERS
IINTRODUCTION 1
The Background to the Research Problem. 1
The Research Problem. 5
Analytical and Conceptual Frameworks. ........ 13
Scope of the Study. 18
Notes 21
IIBACKGROUND TO ZIMBABWE 24
Geographic and Agro-ecological Setting 24
Historical Setting 32
The Evolution of the Land Problem .......... 35
Legislative Acts and the Impacts of Settler
Land Expropriation Policies ............ 38
Postindependence Development Challenges
and Prospects ................... 52
Notes 58
IIITHE LITERATURE REVIEW 62
Introduction. ...... ......... 62
The State and Agricultural Development Policy .... 63
State Ideology, Public Choice and the
Individual in Development ........ 67
Smallholder Agriculture and Development 72
Cooperatives and Agricultural Development ...... 75
Rural Development ..... 82
Poverty-Focused Development Strategies. ....... 87
Land Reform ............. 95
Land Resettlement 97
Household Dynamics and Developmental Cycle. ..... 101
Conclusion 107
Note 109
ix

IVFIELDWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 110
Background Developments Towards Fieldwork ...... 110
The Extended "Sondeo": Initial Months
of Fieldwork. Ill
Getting a Closer Look at Resettlement
Policy and Devevelopment Implementation 117
Ethnographic Survey and Observations. ........ 122
Data Collection Techniques 126
Study Variables ...... 128
Sampling Techniques ..... ...... 128
Data Handling and Analysis. ............. 137
Notes 140
VAGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 145
Introduction. ... ....... 145
Resettlement Policy Objectives. 146
The Pivotal Role of Cooperatives in the
Government's Development Policy .......... 149
The Structure and Organization of Resettlement. 151
The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture
and Rural Resettlement. ... ..... 154
The Ministry of Local Government, Rural
and Urban Development .............. 156
Other Ministries. ........... 157
Land Acquisition and Tenure ....... 163
Resettlement Planning ..... 166
Resettlement Scheme Models. ....... 167
Model A Resettlement Program 167
Model B Resettlement Program 169
Model C Resettlement Program. ........... 171
Model D Resettlement Program 172
Selection Criteria and Procedures and
Allocation of Holdings to Farmers: The
Case of Model A Schemes .............. 173
Implementation Structures and Process: The
Case of a Model A Normal Intensive Scheme ..... 175
Conclusion 179
Notes 180
VICONTINUITY IN CHANGE: THE PRESERVATION OF THE OLD
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW FARMING SYSTEMS 185
Introduction. ....... .... 185
The Large-Scale (European Commercial)
Farm Sector 186
The Small-Scale (African Commercial)
Farm Sector 190
The Communal Area (Peasant) Farm Sector ...... 193
Resettlement Program Farms 199
Conclusion 203
Note. 203
x

VII CASE STUDY OF FARMERS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO
RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAMS: MASHONALAND
CENTRAL PROVINCE. ........ 204
Introduction ................ 204
Farmers: Responses to Some Background Issues From
the Commercial and Communal Areas' Farmers 205
The Large-Scale Commercial Farmers of Bindura
Intensive Cultivation Area 205
The Small-Scale Commercial Farmers of Chesa
Nyaj enj e and Karuyana 207
The Communal Area Farmers of Bushu, Madziwa
and Kandeya 209
Farmers: Their Social and Demographic
Characteristics ..... 210
Farmers: Their General Responses and Evaluation
of the Government's Resettlement Policies and
Programs 223
The Farmers of Mufurudzi Model A Normal and
Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated Schemes. 223
The Farmers of Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira,
Kushingirira and Simba Youth Model B Producer
Cooperative Schemes ............... 225
Farmers: Their Attitudes and Perceptions About
Life Situation. 246
Farmers: Their Material Resources and
Capital Assets 254
Farmers: Their Farm-Level Constraints ........ 264
Farmers: Household Developmental Cycle,
Micro-Level Agricultural Characteristics
and Economic Performance 275
Conclusion. .......... 285
Notes 289
VIII THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESETTLEMENT ......... 295
Evaluating Change and Development .......... 295
Macro-Level Costs, Development Inputs and
Economic Projections. ... ...... 298
Assessing the Socio-Economic and Political
Performance of Resettlement Schemes ........ 309
Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model A Schemes. 310
Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model B
Cooperative Schemes 317
Mufurudzi Scheme as an Illustrative Case of
Model A Resettlement. 338
Mufurudzi: The Foundations of a Successful
Agricultural Resettlement Scheme. ......... 348
Simba Youth Scheme as an Illustrative Case of
Model B Resettlement 365
Simba Youth: Economic Performance and the
Genesis of a Problematic Agricultural
Resettlement 375
Conclusion 378
Notes 380
xi

IX CONCLUSION
383
Summary of Findings ..... 383
Macro-Level Impacts of Resettlement 386
Micro-Level Impacts of Resettlement ......... 390
Policy Implications for Development ......... 394
Recommendations and a Discussion. .......... 397
The Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes. .... 397
The Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes 399
The Non-Governmental Organizations. ........ 402
The Agricultural Finance Corporation. 404
Conclusion 409
Notes 410
APPENDICES
A Developmental Cycle Typology ..... 412
B Evaluation Study Variables ... 413
C Model B Producer Cooperatives Management Survey. 416
D Case Study Variables ..... 417
E List of Resettlement Models and Schemes in Zimbabwe. 426
F Resettlement Application Form 428
G Resettlement Permits ..... 431
REFERENCES ........ 437
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 494
xii

LIST OF TABLES
TABLES Page
2-1 Distribution of Natural Regions, Rainfall
and Related Farming Systems in Rhodesia 31
2-2 Proportion of Total Land Under Various
Ownership Categories in Rhodesia-Zimba'owe 41
2-3 Proportion of Land Ownership in Zimbabwe
by Natural Regions, Race and Farming System. 43
2-4 Population Pressure in Relation to Carrying
Capacity in the Communal Areas of Rhodesia 43
2-5 Distribution of Personal Income in Rhodesia. ........ 46
2-6 Distribution of African Cash Wages in Rhodesia ....... 46
4-1 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: List of
Villages, Maize Productivity and the Villages
Selected for Case Study 130
4-2 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Villages,
Households and the Number Selected and
Interviewed for Case Study 132
4-3 Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated Schemes:
Villages, Households and the Number Selected
and Interviewed for Case Study 133
4-4 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes:
Reported Membership and the Number of
Members/Households Interviewed 134
4-5 Communal Area (Peasant) Sector: Areas,
Subdivisions, Households Selected and Interviewed 136
4-6 Small-Scale Commercial Farmers Sector:
Area, Households Selected and Interviewed. ......... 138
4-7 Large-Scale Commercial Farmers Sector: Area,
Farmers Identified, Sampled and Surveyed .......... 138
5-1 Zimbabwe: Provincial Distribution of Resettlement
Models and Schemes, September 1985 ........ 148
5-2 Government Agencies and Their Respective
Duties in the Area of Resettlement. ...... ...... 159
xiii

7-1 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Home Country 212
7-2 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Home Province .... 212
7-3 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Communal Area .213
7-4 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Age 213
7-5 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Gender. ....... 215
7-6 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Marital Status. 215
7-7 Mashonaland Central Province: Marriage Structures of
Male Farmers 216
7-8 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Wives Married
by Male Farmers Since 1980 216
7-9 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Living
Children of Farmers 218
7-10 Mashonaland Central Province: Number of Children
Born to Farmers in 1980-1985 218
7-11 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Level of
School Completed 219
7-12 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Non-
Agricultural Skills. 219
7-13 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers Household Size ... 221
7-14 Mashonaland Central Province: Distribution of
Household Developmental Cycle Types. 222
7-15 Model A Schemes: Farmers' First Source of
Information About Resettlement Program ... 224
7-16 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Reasons for Resettlement ..... 224
7-17 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Recommendation to Improve
the Effectiveness of Resettlement Team 226
7-18 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers'
Occupations Prior to Joining the Cooperative ........ 228
7-19 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers'
Residence Prior to Joining the Cooperative .... 228
7-20 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Farmers'
First Sources of Information About the Cooperative 229
7-21 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members
Reasons for Joining the Cooperative 229
xiv

7-22 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Some General
Responses to Resettlement and Organizational Issues
Relating to Their Cooperative. 231
7-23 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members'
Duration of Stay in Their Cooperatives 234
7-24 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes: Members'
Expected Incomes for Work Done in 1984-85 Season 234
7-25 Communal Area: Farmers' Responses to Issues Relating
to the Communal Land Problem and Resettlement. 236
7-26 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' If Relatives
Have Been Resettled and in Which Model 238
7-27 Mashonaland Central Province: Commercial Farmers'
Ratings of Issues About Government's Agricultural
and Resettlement Policies 240
7-28 Mashonaland Central Province: Commercial Farmers'
Responses to Other Questions About the Resettlement
Program 240
7-29 Resettlement and Small-Scale Commercial Farmers'
Responses as to Where Lands are Available for
Resettlement 241
7-30 Mashonaland Central Province: Resettlement and
Area Communal Farmers' Responses Towards Common
Access to Resettlement Resources 243
7-31 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Rating of
Government's Policy to Socialize the Country's
Agriculture 245
7-32 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers'
Recommendation for Better Agriculture for
the Country 245
7-33 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Conception
of Attributes of a "Good Life" (Upenyu Hwakanaka)...... 248
7-34 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Response
as to Whether or not Good Life is Possible in this
Area/Farming System for Farmer and Children. 248
7-35 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preference
for Job Location if Wage Employment is the Only
Option for Achievement of a Good Life. ........... 250
7-36 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preference
for Farming System if Agriculture is the Only
Option for Achievement of a Good Life 250
xv

7-37 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Choice of
Likely Items in Which to Invest $1,000 ..... 252
7-38 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Choice of
Post-School Profession for Their Children
Compared With Self-Choice By Graduating Students
From Mufurudzi Model A Scheme Elementary Schools ...... 252
7-39 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Preceptions
of Life Situations 255
7-40 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Ownership
of Household Items ..... ....... 257
7-41 Mashonaland Central Province: When Household
Material Items Acquired. 258
7-42 Mashonaland Central Province: Whether Farmers'
Purchased Clothing Items in 1985 259
7-43 Mashonaland Central Province: Farmers' Ownership
of Production/Capital Assets 260
7-44 Mashonaland Central Province: When Production/
Capital Assets Acquired. ..... 261
7-45 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Cattle
Owned by Farmers 263
7-46 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Donkeys
Owned by Farmers 263
7-47 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Goats
Owned by Farmers 265
7-48 Mashonaland Central Province: Head of Sheep
Owned by Farmers .... ............. 265
7-49 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Faced in the Initial Years of
Resettlement ......... 267
7-50 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Faced at the Beginning of the
1985-86 Season ....... .... 269
7-51 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Sources of Problems They Faced at the Beginning
of the 1985-86 Season 269
7-52 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Encounter With the Agricultural
Finance Corporation 270
xv i

7-53 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Encounter With the Grain
Marketing Board. ... ........... 271
7-54 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Problems They Encounter With the Cotton
Marketing Board. 271
7-55 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Their Resettlement Scheme Needs 273
7-56 Model A Schemes: Farmers' Identification of
Who to Provide Resettlement Scheme Needs 273
7-57 Communal Area: Farmers' Identification of
Problems Affecting Their Agricultural Performance. ..... 274
7-58 Communal Area: Farmers' Proposed Solutions to
the Problems Affecting Their Agricultural
Performance. ........ ..... 276
7-59 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Producer Units. .......... 278
7-60 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Consumer Units. 278
7-61 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Head of Cattle Owned. 280
7-62 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Hectares Cultivated 280
7-63 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household (91 Kilograms) Bags of
Maize Retained for Consumption 284
7-64 Mashonaland Central Province: Developmental Cycle
Types and Mean Household Net Farm cash Flow. ........ 284
7-65 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Producer and
Consumer Units Ratio, Mean Hectares Cultivated
and Mean Net Farm Cash Flow. 287
7-66 Model A Schemes: Producer Units and Mean Per Capita
Net Cash Income. 288
8-1 Zimbabwe: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural
Development Budget Expenditure 1981-82/1985-86 299
8-2 Zimbabwe: Sources of Funding, Costs and Rates of
Return Selected Model A Normal Intensive Schemes 302
xvii

8-3 Zimbabwe: Sources of Funding, Costs and Rates of
Return for Selected Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes ... ......... 303
8-4 Zimbabwe: Budget Allocation, Summary of Capital
Expenditure and Balance for Model A and Model B
Normal Intensive Schemes as at July 31, 1985 305
8-5 Mashonaland Region: List of Resettlement Models
and Schemes December 1985 311
8-6 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers"
Evaluation of Attitudinal and Activity Profiles
in Model A Schemes ......... 314
8-7 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers'
Evaluation of Implementation Agencies and Related
Services in Model A Normal Intensive Schemes 316
8-8 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Officers"
Evaluation of Attitudinal and Activity Profiles
in Model B Schemes 319
8-9 Mashonaland Region: Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes" Management Committees Identification of
Problems and Their Suggested Solutions ... 321
3-10 Mashonaland Region: Government's Grants, Expenditures
and Balance on Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes
From 1980 to July 31 1985 323
8-11 Mashonaland Region: Agricultural Finance Corporation
(AFC) Loans to Selected Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes. 325
8-12 Mashonaland Region: NonGovernmental Organizations
(NGOs) Aid and Financial Assistance to Selected
Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes ...... 326
8-13 Mashonaland Region: Target Membership and Trends
in Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes, 1983-1985 336
8-14 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Number of
Households, Arable and Livestock Capacities. ........ 340
8-15 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Project Costs,
Expenditure and Balance as at July 31, 1985. ........ 347
8-16 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Crop Build-Up
to Target Income Levels. ... ....... 349
8-17 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Livestock
Build-Up to Target Income Levels 350
xviii

8-18 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Summary of Crop
and Livestock Build-Up to Target Income Levels 350
8-19 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in
Households" Land Use Intensity, 1982-83/1984-85 355
8-20 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Households"
Land Use Characteristics, 1984-85 Season 356
8-21 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in
Households Maize Productivity. 358
8-22 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in
Households Cotton Productivity 359
8-23 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in Maize
Production, Household Retention and Sale 361
8-24 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in Mean
Household Maize Retentions for Domestic Use 362
8-25 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Trends in the
Build-Up of Cattle Herds 363
8-26 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Crop Costs and
Returns, 1984-85 Season 364
8-27 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme:
Budget Allocation, Summary of Capital Expenditure
and Balance as at July 31 1985 367
8-28 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme:
Cropping Budget. 370
8-29 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme:
Membership and Cropping Management Problems,
1984-85 Season 373
xix

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURES Pages
1-1 Zimbabwe: Resettlement and Rural Development
Model. 16
2-1 Zimbabwe: Admninistrative Provinces. ............ 25
2-2 Zimbabwe: Regional Distribution of
Cultural Groups. ....... ..... 27
2-3 Zimbabwe: Distribution of Natural Regions 30
4-1 Mashonaland Region: Resettlement Schemes and
Areas Visited During Various Phases of the
Field Research ....... .......... .114
5-1 Zimbabwe: Organizational Structure of Resettlement
Administration and Implementation. ............ .152
7-1 Mashonaland Central Province: Case Study Areas ...... .206
7-2 Good Life-Difficult Life Continuum 253
8-1 Mashonaland Region: Distribution of Resettlement
Models and Schemes .................... 312
8-2 Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme: Resettlement
Villages and Adjoining Farming Systems .... 341
8-3 Mount Darwin and Bindura: Probability of Rainfall
in Excess of 15 millimeter Occurring Within a Pentad
Versus The Possibility of a Dry Spell in Excess
of Twenty Days 343
8-4 Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme:
Projected Build-Up to Target Membership Compared
With Trends in Actual Membership, 1981-1985 376
xx

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of
the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE
RESPONSES OF FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE
By
KOFI AKWABI-AMEYAW
April 1988
Chairman: Professor Brian M. du Toit
Major Department: Anthropology
This dissertation is based on fieldwork carried out in the Ministry of
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and also among farmers in Zimbabwe,
Southern Africa. It examines (1) the resettlement policy formulated and
implemented by the government since independence in 1980 and (2) employs
Fortes' concept of developmental cycle in domestic groups to study aspects of
the responses of the country's farmers towards the policy and its programs.
The on-going project seeks to resettle 162,000 landless African families
on European-owned lands which were either abandoned or are currently
underutilized. In the government's view the program is necessary to redress
years of forced removals of Africans from their ancestral lands onto marginal
agricultural areas by Rhodesian settler administrations, a problem that
resulted in nearly a decade of a bitterly fought liberation war. The
government hopes also to ensure a broad based economic growth by integrating
the existing dualistic African subsistence-oriented and the European
commercialized sectors of the country's political economy. Critics of the
program cite a dialetical contradiction between greater equity on the one hand
and sustained economic growth on the other to argue that Zimbabwe may lose on
both the growth and the equity fronts.
xxi

The research examined the program implementation through (1) the study of
official records of development inputs and outcomes, (2) direct observation
and (3) regional case study survey interviews of 630 farmers across the
existing farming systems, namely, the (i) Large-Scale (European) Commercial,
(ii) Small-Scale (elite African) Commercial, (iii) Communal Area (African
peasant), (iv) resettlement Model A individual households and (v) the
resettlement Model B Producer Cooperatives sectors.
The study found that (1) the government is making tremendous progress
with the provision of the basic needs of these rural people; (2) the great
majority of peasant farmers especially the Model A resettled families are
agriculturally quite productive; (3) there are macro-level problems, however,
such as low membership in the Model B cooperative schemes which seriously
affect their performance and productivity; (4) contrary to the critics'
predictions resettlement has not impacted negatively on commercial agriculture
and economic growth; and (5) contrary to the government's developmental
assumptions resettlement is not reducing but rather it is accentuating, at the
micro-level, the already existing socioeconomic differentiation within and
between these rural societies.
XXII

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Background to the Research Problem
Rural and agricultural development in Zimbabwe, the most recent of the
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa to attain political independence, is an
epitome of the variety of problems, the challenges and the strategies of
nation-building and economic development that confront the continent. The
mobilization by African countries of their predominantly rural-based human,
institutional, material and other resources for economic growth and
development is a monumental task. Of crucial concern presently and in the
long-run is the ability of these countries to successfully motivate and
sustain the capacity of the rural sector to produce adequate quantities of
agricultural and other materials to meet both their subsistence and market
demands.
The period since the late 1960s has been particularly devastating for the
political economies of many the countries. Generally, progress has been made
in various fields of endeavors such as the provision of basic human needs
including health facilities and educational opportunities. However, most
countries continue to experience declining per capita food production, low
agricultural output and negligible economic growth. The major consequences of
this state of affairs include severe hunger, starvation, malnutrition and
deaths in some places.
Indeed, countries of widely differing political and developmental
ideologies, historical backgrounds, geographic sizes and economic resource
bases are all equally afflicted with one or the other dimension of this
1

problem. The African food crisis, as the problem has come to be
conceptualized in the international community, is real. It relates in the
broadest contexts to questions of development policy, strategies and
outcomes.
The seriousness and the global implications of the crisis are emphasized
succinctly by John Lewis who writes:
For several years now, much of the international
community's time for the discussion of development
has been preempted by Sub-Saharan Africa. The news
there is nearly all bad. In a region where independent
governments have been pursuing explicit, often formally
planned, development efforts for a quarter-century,
where dozens of aid donors have been at work for much
of that time, and where both investment and aid per
capita have been fairly high by Third World standards
for many years, average per capita incomes are actually
lower than they were fifteen years ago ... By and
large, the continent has become one great composite
case of development not working. (Lewis 1986:17)
Students and analysts of African development and underdevelopment offer
various explanations to account for the lack of economic growth and the
consequent developmental crisis that engulf the continent.^
One major area of criticism, which is very well articulated in the
literature, concerns the development policies pursued by these countries.
Recently, for instance, Robert Bates (1984a) has charged that many African
governments follow policies that foster agricultural decline. The World
Bank's (1981) policy paper Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Agenda for Action, echoes a similar view that blames Africa's "overextended
public sector" for the crisis. Benno Ndulu (1986), writing about governance
and economic management in Africa, takes up this point. He argues that too
much preoccupation by these governments to participate in every area of
development endeavor has created situations where the available expertise and

resources are spread thin thus making it difficult to set their priorities
right.
There is also the other school of thought which, while recognizing the
primacy of the state, however, dwells on the forces and relations of
production. Goran Hyden (1983) argues its case when he suggests that several
economies in Africa are grinding to a halt because it is both risky and
costly to operate a modern state on precapitalist modes of production and
organization.
Yet other critics perceive the problem at the micro-level. Urna Lele
(1975), for instance, attributes the lack of success in African development
to inadequate knowledge of local technical possibilities, small-farmer
constraints and local institutions.'"
At any rate, the state has become a hypertrophic institution in Africa.
Given its developmental apparatus, policies and particular ideological bent,
it has increasingly assumed the controlling role over every aspect of
development. Therefore, in any attempt to evaluate the climate and
environment for agricultural and related development or the lack of it in
Africa one needs to approach the state, perhaps, as the most important of all
the phenomena to understand.
Equally significant is the role that farmers'' institutions play in the
overall process of change and development. Since these institutions,
especially the social organization of the forces and relations of production,
are primarily expressed through household dynamics, one needs also to
understand the structures, processes and variations within and between
households.
Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, became independent in April 1980 after a
decade of liberation war. This fact is important for at least two reasons.

First, the birth of the country coincided with the most grim period when all
of Africa faced a severe economic development crisis. Second, as the
literature reviewed in Chapter III below indicates the documented experiences
with specific policies and of countries which have trod the development path
much longer are voluminous. Zimbabwe can therefore learn and draw important
lessons from these cases in the process of formulating or adapting
appropriate and workable policies to suit its needs and aspirations.
In summary then Zimbabwe represents both a challenge and an opportunity
especially in terms of development choice and practice in Africa. The
question arises, however, as to what outcome observers of the country's
contemporary development scenario must expect in the future. Nevertheless,
the policies that are being formulated and implemented today will shape at
least the results which are likely to be realized principally in the
short-term and perhaps in the long-run.
At independence, the government set out to tackle its problems of
nation-building and economic development through the use, among others, of a
rural development strategy that centers on planned resettlement schemes. This
is part of the Lancaster House agreement which worked out an independence
constitution for African majority rule in the country. In line with the
agreement the government of the United Kingdom partly financed the initial
purchase by the Zimbabwean government of 1.1 million hectares of abandoned
or underutilized European-owned lands to resettle 18,000 African farm
families (Harbeson 1980). It was projected then that by 1985 a total of
162,000 such families would be resettled at the cost of about $400 million.
Bill Kinsey (1982:92) points out that the resettlement is the major
rural development activity and the only sustained public sector program in
Zimbabwe that has the potential to affect fairly immediately and

5
significantly the economic welfare of large numbers of rural dwellers.
This dissertation seeks therefore to examine the policy dimensions and
the socioeconomic aspects of the implementation of the resettlement. It will
also discuss how Zimbabwean farmers view the entire resettlement exercise in
the general context of the country's agriculture along with their opinions
about the problems and prospects associated with it.
The Research Problem
The on-going resettlement of 162,000 farm families on new agricultural
lands is a massive egalitarian commitment on the part of the government. Like
all other public sector development programs in the country the parameters of
resettlement are set in the ideological context of socialism. As numerous
other experiences bear out this fact has significant implications for the
nature of state policies and involvement relating to the means and the ends
of development (see for instance, Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Kenya 1965;
Nyerere 1968; Samoff 1981; Weaver and Kronemer 1981; Ellman 1981; Munslow
1983).
Specifically, the government of Zimbabwe seeks through policy changes to
effect structural and other needed transformations in the distribution of the
country's agricultural land resources. This is to achieve stated policy
objectives. Among them is the rehabilitation of the landless and the
unemployed on abandoned and underutilized land as a way of ensuring full
economic production and improving rural living standards (Zimbabwe 1981a: 2).
Part of the government's rationale for embarking on a resettlement-based
rural development policy is also provided by the then Prime Minister and now
President Robert Mugabe. In his address to nations and international aid

o
organizations at the 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and
Development he reiterated that his
Government clearly cannot accept a state of affairs
in which millions of our people are condemned to a
life, nay a mere existence, characterised by stagnation,
hopelessness and desperation. Our struggle for national
liberationprotracted, incalculably costly and herculean
as it waswould lose meaning were we, in the moment of
victory and the era of peace, to allow millions of our
people to wallow in poverty and degradation as victims
of forces beyond their control. (Zimbabwe 1981c:31)
Given the historical background of the political economy of previous
land distribution policies in the country, the postindependence agrarian
reforms and resettlement have met with popular support from the great
majority of the people. This support emanates largely from the populace which
clamors for social or redistributive justice. There are others, however, who
are disappointed with resettlement for various reasons. These fall into two
different social classes.
In the first category are a number of effectively landless, prospective
applicants and others who are on waiting lists for resettlement. Many of
these people lament the slow pace of current resettlement. Some in particular
are even shocked at the inaction of the government to expropriate all
European farms. As one informant quipped, "the government owes us a duty to
confisticate and distribute the vast hectares of our ancestral lands which
were previously stolen and are currently being held by so-called European
owners." Such critics either impatiently or justifiably accuse the government
of softness, breach of promises made during the liberation war and even for
condoning the status quo in so far as racial inequities in land
distribution are concerned.
The disappointments of these critics were first articulated by Andre

7
Astrow (1983) and more recently in a publication edited by Ibbo Mandaza
(1986). In the latter Sam Moyo (1986) argues that contrary to state
propaganda and widespread publicity abroad less than 20 percent of the
peasantry have profited from the so-called success story of Zimbabwe's
agriculture, particularly in terms of the land redistribution program.
On the other hand there are some European and African commercial farmers
who oppose resettlement. Their argument is that resettlement is likely to be
detrimental to the conservation of the fragile natural resource base of the
country. They charge that overstocking, uncontrolled land use and poor
agricultural practices are a characteristic of "inexperience" farmers such as
the resettled. Thus, they predict resettlement will surely lead to the
underdevelopment of the country's agriculture. In their view resettlement is
nothing more or less than the mere extension of the pitiful human and
ecological conditions that are found in the so-called communal or African
rural areas into the Intensive Cultivation Areas (ICAs) or the commercial
farm lands.
These views were re-echoed in June 27, 1985, by a former leading
opposition politician in the country, Joshua Nkomo now Zimbabwe's Second
Vice-President. In response to questions about resettlement in a Face to
Face interview on Zimbabwe television, Nkomo, then President of the
Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe All Peoples Union (PF-ZAPU), had this to say: (1)
The ZANU-PF government's resettlement program was destructive; (2) it was
turning rich fertile farm land into deserts; (3) it was wasting millions of
acres; (4) taking two thousand people from the communal [African rural] areas
and settling them on a farm which used to be managed by one man was turning
the resettlement areas into communal areas and (5) that the whole country
needed resettlement and not only a few.4

8
The central focus of the anti-resettlement criticism has also been
related to a series of substantive issues that, in summary, question the
efficacy of resettlement as the correct strategy to achieve stated
developmental objectives. This criticism is built upon the theoretical and
conceptual arguments in the rural development literature. It asserts that
there is a dialectical contradiction between greater political and social
equity on one hand and sustained economic growth on the other.
Bill Kinsey (1982:93), articulates this viewpoint cogently with a
prediction that the Zimbabwean "society may lose on both the growth and
equity fronts." Specifically, he (Kinsey 1982) raises the following
additional concerns, arguing that
1. resettlement as an instrument for the implementation of
a policy of egalitarianism cannot be operated consistently
in terms of its own objectives without at the same time
reducing to unacceptable levels commercial agriculture's
important contribution to the national economy;
2. resettlement on the scale now envisaged may do severe
damage in the short run to the economic growth potential
of the agricultural sector as a whole, thereby reducing
the resources available to the government for future
investment in promotion of development;
3. resettlement on an individual basis will create powerful
class interests that will be more difficult to reform in
the future than is the conflict between black and white
interests at present.
Some of these views are shared, for instance, by other critics including
Malcolm Blackie (1982) and the Whitsun Foundation (Whitsun 1983).
These matters contested by the various observers have important
ramifications for evaluation research. Of particular interest are (1) the
issues that governmental policy about agriculture, resettlement and rural
development seeks to address, (2) the outcomes of such policy, in terms of

9
its intended and unintended consequences and (3) the attitudes and responses
that the implementation of such policy is likely to generate among the
supposed beneficiaries.
The research problem then is essentially an evaluative one. It is
organized around the state on the one hand and individual rural households on
the other. This study is mindful of the nature and levels of the
interactional network which links the two major actors in the development
arena. The choice of actors reflects the reality which obtains in Africa. It
also accords active rather than passive roles to the state and households.
The respective and mutual capacities of both the state and households to
create innovative opportunities and to provide the necessary and sufficient
supportive or participatory conditions for development are immense.
The state in Africa is the principal, if not the exclusive initiator and
executor of development policy. Even where private or voluntary and
non-governmental organizations are an important agency for development it so
happens that the framework for their operations are set and are closely
monitored also by respective governments. More importantly, the state is the
provider of most of the public or collective goods which are used for rural
development. That is the case in Zimbabwe where in undertaking resettlement
and rural development the state makes available, free of charge or at below
market prices, resources that range from land through social and physical
infrastructures to production incentives.
Similarly, the cumulative socioeconomic activities of African farm
households often make a lot of difference between the success and failure of
government's induced rural development programs such as resettlement.^ jn
rural Zimbabwe co-residing composite households living in homesteads which
dot the spatial scene of the African and Communal Areas are recognizable

10
decision-making, production, consumption and reproduction units that
development planners and executors have to deal with.
On the basis of the foregoing facts one can deduce from the agricultural
resettlement policy of the government that it is being implemented in the
national interest and for the benefit of the rural people. By providing land
and other basic needs to the rural poor the government hopes to facilitate
equity and justice as a way of ensuring productivity, economic growth and
development.
Farm households and rural dwellers in general are hardly consulted and
they do not participate in the formulation of policy nor in the
identification of projects that may be essential to their welfare.
Surprisingly however, they are often openly supportive of the rural
development objectives of governments. They welcome whatever production
resources and incentives which are made available to them. This does not mean
that these individuals behave and act according to development planning
projections. As individuals or even groups of like-minded persons they have
their respective and different development agendas or goals. Indeed, in the
case of households these are individually differentiated as it is most often
the case by such factors as (1) demographic characteristics, (2) risk
averseness, innovativeness and attitudinal profiles and (3) access to
production assets. Their decision-making calculi, expectations and behaviors
within the government created developmental environment are also guided by
differential altruism and self interests. These concerns are in many cases
not necessarily congruent with the somewhat ideal projections which are made
by government planners.
Thus, it is theoretically possible for the state to use incentive or
reward systems such as the provision of basic human needs and public goods to

11
positively influence rural households and thereby achieve stated
developmental goals. It is important to recognize, however, that since
different households perceive such influence differently and invariably even
respond differently to the same stimuli there is always the possibility of
the occurence of other scenarios in developmental expectation. For example,
the internal dynamics within and between households as well as any
disagreements in the agendas of households and that of the government may
change the outcomes of policy goals and result in diverse and differential
impacts among the beneficiaries.
This hypothesis will be elucidated and empirically examined in rural
Zimbabwe. The study will therefore be concerned with the gathering, analysis
and use of relevant qualitative and quantitative information to facilitate
the following:
1. assessment of the means and ends of the agricultural
resettlement policy, articulated by the government since
1980, against the backdrop of the historical evolution
and the political economy impacts of the country's racial
patterns of land distribution;
2. examination of how the resettlement policy is being
implemented, both at the national, provincial and selected
individual scheme levels;
3. eliciting the respective responses of farmers, in terms
both of their attitudes and perceptions as well as the
constraints and the performance outcomes that characterize
their farming systems;
4. evaluation of the discernible socioeconomic and political
impacts of aspects of the resettlement which have been
implemented so far in terms of any differences in opportunity
or incentive systems, access and control over development
assets as well as in quality of life.
Eight years into Zimbabwe's independence and egalitarian resettlement
and rural development it will be interesting to observe how different
household structures and organizations are faring in terms of the following

12
proxy indices of social formation: (1) ownership of i.) cattle, which is a
major attribute of a "good life" ( upenyu hwakanaka ), ii.) selected
household items such as radios, watches and beds and iii.) selected capital
assets such as ox-carts, plows, sprayers and cultivators; (2) intensity of
land use; (3) household labor productivity for the two major crops, namely,
maize and cotton; (4) farm net cash flow; and (5) the quantity of maize
retained for household consumption.
Following the lines used in the pioneer work by Hadley Cantril (1963)
about peoples' concerns and aspirations in the context of socioeconomic
gratification and quality of life this study will also examine the Shona
concept of "upenyu hwakanaka" (good life) in much detail. Similar studies in
Africa done, for instance, by Jean Due (1980) in rural Kenya show that an
individual's estimation of his or her present situation on the basis of
recollection of the past and perception of the future has significant
implicationsfor development. Equally important for this study is the work
done by Robbins and Thompson (1974) on gratification orientations and
individual modernization in rural Buganda in Uganda (see also Thompson 1975).
Using a "self-anchoring" scale in the form of a three step stairway
representing upenyu hwakanaka-upenyu hwakaoma (good life-bad life)
continuum Zimbabwe farmers will be asked to objectify their life situations
for the periods before independence in 1980, then 1985 and for 1990. In
addition, they will be asked to (1) define what to them is the essence of
development or the attributes of a good life and (2) to specify what they
will do with an amount of $1,000.
A systematic field study along these lines may generate the needed
relevant data to shed light on some of the questions that at least bear on
the short term dimensions of the research problem.

13
Analytical and Conceptual Frameworks
The Zimbabwean resettlement experience provides an almost ideal
substantive environment to isolate and study the critical variables that
relate to the performance of policy programs and social theories in real
situations of change. It is reflected in the chapter on literature review
below that far too little attention is paid by anthropologists to how
development policy decisions initiated by governments get or fail to get
transformed into impacts. This problem is underscored by Fernea and Kennedy
(1966:349) who point out that very few studies have been made of processes of
change as they happen. Consequently, theories of development are yet to fully
benefit from all dimensions of the intriguing grassroots dynamics that
characterize the behavior and actions of individuals and their institutional
relationships with forces of change and development.
An important aspect of social theory bearing on the research problem
which is vital for anthropological enquiry into development is the link
between policy, the environment for its implementation and the kinds of
responses that are generated in development programs. This issue is
particularly germane, for instance, in studying agricultural resettlement or
any development programs which involve human relocations. That is so because
the anthropological literature on relocation, in general, is critical of such
programs viewing them as being disruptive of peoples lives.
Notwithstanding the fact that such a view may be true, it raises serious
methodological problems as to what dynamics of change lead to which outcomes
and in what situations. It is legitimate to assume here that only some and
not all relocations or resettlements worsen the quality of life of the

14
affected people. If this is true, then anthropological research design for
evaluating such programs has to do more by specifying what determinants and
relationships facilitate or inhibit particular processes of development in
given circumstances or situations. An analytical model or a conceptual
formulation that addresses such methodological deficiencies in evaluation
studies will aid in a better understanding of the issues at play.
For example, Cleveland (1971) states that under favorable conditions
there is high achievement rate for implementing expressed policy. Similarly,
it is argued by others that value-based actions of policy makers may be most
determinative of ultimate policy and that articulated goals exert significant
influence upon behavior (Dolbeare and Hammond 1971; Brewer and Brunner 1975).
In the same vein, Ronald Havelock (1979) demonstrates that awareness and
interest are important correlates of acceptance and adoption of particular
innovations by individuals as well as groups.
Granting that these assumptions hold there is no reason why the rather
informative anthropological and other studies of resettlement should not be
able to utilize them to provide the kinds of useful theoretical insights and
concepts that explain success or failure of grassroots development.
Development as a concept may either be an end in itself or a process to
an end. This study, being an anthropological evaluation of an on-going
development program, approaches resettlement as a special kind of a social
organization process that seeks to achieve desirable ends for rural
Zimbabweans. The process is viewed as multifaceted in nature. Its end or
policy objectives may only materialize given a particular constellation of
factors and environments. In order for the resettlement to achieve any
identifiable impacts or outcomes it is necessary that the clearly distinct
components or clusters of variables which characterize it have to be

15
manipulated, harmoniously integrated and mutually sustained. These components
are (1) policy, (2) implementation, (3) intervening conditions and (4) the
beneficiaries.
A simplified analytical framework is introduced here in the form of a
resettlement and rural development model. This framework uses the four
independent or determining variables to provide the broad parameters of the
organizational structures and relationships that initially conceptualize the
nature of the development process under study (Figure 1-1). The model provides
for the following: (1) program inputs in the form of the government's policy
objectives, resources and implementing structures which are considered here to
be a necessary condition for development; (2) policy beneficiaries who respond
to program incentives or inputs in the context of their own respective
interpretations or conceptions of what development objectives are; (3) the
effects and reactions to intervening political, social and economic conditions
both by the government and the policy beneficiaries alike; and (4) the
creation of intended or unintended impacts or development outcomes. These
compartimentalized entities may be seen as constituting program inputs, the
bridging outputs or the proximate and ultimate goals of development. The
analytical specifications of this model conform to those recognised by many
policy and evaluation studies.^
Ideally, development theory should provide sufficient explanation of how
a rural development process based on resettlement programs of this nature is
able to transform policy objectives and resources into desirable ends. But
there is a paucity of pertinent information on that in the development
literature.7 One therefore has to look elsewhere beyond the abstract into
substantive areas of empirical reality or the contextual rural situation for
conceptual guidance.

16
Program Inputs
Bridging Outputs
Proximate/Ultimate
Goals
FIGURE: 1 1
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL

17
Given our research problem and the analytical framework proposed for this
study, it will be heuristically fruitful to evaluate aspects of the
resettlement program in terms of the concept of developmental cycle in
domestic groups (Fortes:1971). According to Meyer Fortes (1970:7), domestic
groups have no permanent existence through time, in that each group comes into
being, grows and expands and finally dissolves (see also Goody 1971),
As already indicated, demographic and social differentiation as well as
the structural dynamics within and between households are crucially important
in accounting for the success or failure of the formulation, planning,
implementation and outcomes of development policy and programs. Household
economic performance is the crucially determinant variable in the overall
prospects for a successful rural development and resettlement outcome in
Zimbabwe. The application of Fortes' paradigm to evaluate such performance
will immensely improve our understanding of the role of social organization in
development and change. As argued by its proponent, Meyer Fortes (1971:3), the
"developmental factor is intrinsic to domestic organization and to ignore it
leads to serious misinterpretation of the descriptive facts."
This study conceptualizes the household developmental cycle in rural
O
Zimbabwe into four structurally distinct but sequential phases. These are
(1) establishment, (2) expansion, (3) consolidation and (4) decline. Two
special "phases," namely, Single and Other are added (see Appendix A). The
application of such dynamic variables as age, conjugal form and gender of the
household head, the presence or absence of extended-kinship relations and the
structural state of fission of the household makes it possible to duplicate
other sub-types of the major phases.9 This added flexibility to the
framework may facilitate a more comprehensive analysis of the data and a

18
better understanding of any patterns or variations than would otherwise be
10
the case.
Scope of the Study
This introductory chapter defines the research problem, the analytical
and conceptual frameworks and the scope of the study. Chapter II reviews the
background material on the geography and history of Zimbabwe. It traces the
peopling of the country and emphasises the political economy dimensions of
the evolution of racial dichotomy in land ownership and land use during the
settler period of colonial Rhodesia. It then examines the impacts of various
colonial land policies on rural Africans. Finally, it reviews the
post-independence development challenges and prospects that confront
Zimbabwe.
Chapter III is the review of the literature. It covers (1) the state and
agricultural development, (2) state ideology, public choice and the
individual, (3) the smallholder and cooperative modes of production, (4)
rural development, (5) poverty-focused strategies, (6) land reform, (7)
resettlement programs and (8) household dynamics and organization. The
emphasis here is to draw out the lessons that these issues raise in either
effecting or stifling change and development in Africa and other developing
areas. The purpose of such a review also is to provide the theoretical and
the substantive contexts for describing the on-going development
experimentation within Zimbabwe.
Chapter IV outlines specific aspects of the fieldwork and research
methodology. It covers the initial experiences and the kinds of environments
within which the study was done. It describes the data sources and collection

19
techniques, study variables, sample units and analysis.
Chapter V deals with the main dimensions of the government's
resettlement policy in terms of its structural and organizational components.
These are the objectives of resettlement, land acquisition, planning and
implementation models, farmer selection and land allocation and the
implementation and administrative set ups for the program. Chapter VI
provides contextual background notes about (1) the old farming systems of the
country, namely, the large and the small-scale commercial as well as the
communal sectors and (2) the newly introduced systems made up of the
resettlement sector farms. Of the latter only the two important models, that
is, the Model A Normal individual household schemes and the Model B
collective schemes are examined. The Chapter provides the prelude to the
presentation of farmers' interview responses to the resettlement program.
In Chapter VII the analysis and description of a case study of the
responses of Zimbabwean farmers towards the resettlement policy and programs
initiated and being implemented by the government are offered. Based on
survey interviews, key informants interviews and observations in the
Mashonaland Central Province this case study covers farmers in the six major
farming systems in the country. The chapter is divided into seven parts to
cover (1) the background responses of the so-called commercial farmers, (2)
the social and demographic characteristics of farmers and their households,
(3) farmers' attitudes and perceptions about their life situations, (4)
farmers' assessment of resettlement and aspects of the government's policies
on agriculture and rural development, (5) household material resources and
capital assets that farmers possess, (6) farm-level problems encountered by
farmers and (7) household developmental cycle, micro-level agricultural
characteristics and economic performance.

20
Chapter VIII returns to the resettlement schemes. It presents the
economic feasibility or pre-implementation performance expectations of
selected schemes and models of the resettlement. A preliminary and general
evaluation of the actual performance and the problems associated with the
schemes implemented in the three provinces in the Mahonaland Region are
given. The achievements and the disappointing outcomes of a contrasting Model
A scheme and a Model B scheme chosen from a case study in the Mashonaland
Central Province are also presented in this chapter.
Chapter IX is a summary and discussion of the research findings,
recommendations and conclusion. Its looks at the political economy and social
dimensions of macro and micro-level impacts of resettlement in Zimbabwe and
also the policy and theoretical implications of the findings for rural
development planning and evaluation studies.

21
Notes
1.) The causes of agricultural underdevelopment in Africa have over the
years been an issue of a long shifting debate. It used to be fashionable in
the past to cite social attitudes and cultural barriers to efficient and
productive resource allocation and utilization by traditional farmers as an
impediment to growth. Latter critics then blamed the problem on one or more
of these institutional deficiencies: (1) land tenure systems and practices;
(2) lack of credit and savings; (3) non-availability of production and
marketing incentives; (4) policy bias for state-controlled, large-scale and
mechanized production units; (5) urban food subsidies and changing consumer
tastes; and (6) industrialization and the consequent neglect of the
small-holder rural producer. The current thinking on the issue, apparently is
not about the failure of African farmers anymore or the lack of institutions
per se but rather the failure of ineffective and perverse agricultural
policies formulated and implemented by African governments.
2.) For additional overview of the food problem, an elaboration of the
various policy and substantive aspects of it, as well as its impacts on the
general economic crisis facing the continent see Bates and Lofchie (1980),
USDA (1981), Hyden (1983), Dharam and Radwan (1983), Lofchie and Commins
(1984), Delgado and Mellor (1984), Barker (1984), Berry (1984), Gusten
(1984), Christensen (1984), Rose (1985), Brown and Wolf (1985), Due (1986),
Richer (1986a, 1986b), Hansen and McMillan (1986), Ravenhill (1986), Berg and
Whitaker (1986), Mellor (1986), Baker (1987).
3.) Gordon1(1984) is right in pointing out that Zimbabwe is a dialectician's
dream. Both the Left and the Right, respectively, see the future of the
country in antithetical terms. Consequently, the role of Zimbabwe in shaping
the particular kind of development ideology that will eventually emerge in
Africa is being closely watched. For instance John Iliffe (1983:43) argues
that, "[t]he future of Zimbabwe will be a fascinating test of the relative
strength in modern Africa of state policy as against inherited objective
reality. And the future of Zimbabwe is absolutely vital to the future of
capitalism in Africa." To this Rafael Suarez (1984:12) adds that the
postindependence record of the country is a mixed one and that if Prime
Minister Mugabe continues to talk like Marx and act like Keynes, the country
could turn out to be a strong, wealthy and stable place indeed. For other
perspectives on this debate see, for example, Bratton (1977, 1978, 1981),
Yates (1980), Munslow (1980a, 1983), Ballance (1981), Libby (1984).
4.) In June 1985, prior to Zimbabwe's second general elections, leaders of
all the political parties in the country were respectively interviewed about
domestic and international issues. Resettlement was an important question
that came up among many others. On June 28, 1985, Nathan Shamuyarira,
Minister of Information appeared on national television as the spokesman for
the ruling ZANU-PF party. He responded to the assertions made by Nkorao the
previous day by saying that Nkomo was not in agreement with land reform and
resettlement at the Lancaster House negotiations [in London where an
independence constitution for Zimbabwe was worked out] and that he, Nkomo,
did not support the policy while serving as a Cabinet Minister in the ZANU-PF
government.

??
5.) Both the colonial and postcolonial state in Africa have used various
methods including legislation and even coercive measures to penetrate and
manipulate traditional or indigenous systems and institutions. In many
instances these systems have been eliminated or altered substantially into
becoming mere carbon copies of what they used to be in pre-colonial times. We
can mention authority and power structures such as chieftaincy, certain
lineage and family rights and obligations in respect of bethrothal, marriage,
divorce, property transfers, and collective ownership or access to particular
resources. Yet, as Goran Hyden (1983) convincingly demonstrates for Tanzania
and it is common place throughout Africa, the state is unable successfully to
"capture," intrude, coerce, or even bribe the rural people to either
eliminate, modify, or "modernize" the indigenous agricultural systems and
their related institutions.
6.) For example, Hunter ejt al ( 1976:10) suggest at least four criteria
to analyse rural development. These are (1) the technical, ecological and
economic situation of the farming community concerned; (2) the attitudes,
capacities and needs of the farmers themselves; (3) the nature of the
marketing and processing channels; and (4) the administrative resources of
the government as the directing agency of change.
7.) Economics has played a dominant role in every attempt at constructing
development theories. In this context macroeconomic problems have almost
always constituted the key issue in the discipline. In microeconomic thinking
development implies some definite change either in the rate of growth, the
structure of the economy, or both. But as Lancaster (1973:710-711) points
out, "historically, economic development was not the product of conscious
economic policy. Modern economics, which grew up with the development of
European industrialization over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was
on the sidelines explaining what was happening rather than causing it to
happen." Subsequently, distinct thoughts in economic history, namely,
classical, neo-classical, Keynesian, Marxist, structuralism, modernization
and dependency have all been overtly macro-dimensional. As a result they have
not been able to successfully account for what causes or does not cause
development to occur at the grassroots or at the micro-level in such specific
locations as households. (See, for example, Hill's (1986) criticism. For
another penetrating assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
micro-economic policy analysis in the area of development see Adelman 1975b;
Hirschman 1981; Rhoads 1985; and Hill 1986).
8.) Low (1982a: 144) elaborates upon Fortes developmental cycle classifying
domestic groups into establishment, expansion, consolidation, fission,
decline, and female-headed (see also du Toit 1974:290fn).
9.) Using essentially Low's (1982a) classification derived from Fortes'
framework the developmental cycle in rural Zimbabwe is conceptualized to
comprise the following phases: (1) single; (2) establishment; (3) expansion;
(4) consolidation; (5) decline; and (6) other. Unlike Low I do not see
fission and female-headedness as distinct phases because both are conditions
that may be associated with any of the six phases delineated here,
particularly consolidation and decline. The operational definition of each of
my phases are based on the age composition and structural state of the
household. For instance, a young adult who is never married and is not a

23
dependent qualifies as single. A young couple with an only/or without a child
is categorised to be in establishment. Spouses still in the prime of
reproduction with the last child not more than 4 years of age are in
expansion. Spouses with older children the last of which is 5 or more years
qualify to be in consolidation.
The decline phase is made up of older people with households where sons and
daughters, now grown, have fissioned out. The category "Other" contains all
cases that do not fit neatly into any of the five preceeding phases. These
phases are conceptual states derived from household structure and
organization. They reflect the socio-demographic realities of rural Zimbabwe
to which they are applied here. The utility of the model is enhanced by
building into it additional flexibility using the following information: (1)
the gender and marital state of the de facto household head; (2) whether
marriage is monogamous or polygynous; (3) the presence or absence of kins and
affines; and (4) whether the household is pre-fission, fissioning, or
post-fission. See Appendix A for the resultant typology.
10.) Fortes (1949:63-77) first used the developmental cycle frame of analysis
among the Tallensi to account for variations in the synchronic constitution
of what he called the agnatic joint family. It is apparent that he did not
fully utilize the concept as much as he should to elucidate the emergence,
growth and decline of Tale households. Indeed, he concentrated on the
constant fissioning of homesteads which he blamed on intra-sibling conflicts.
Elsewhere (Fortes 1970:vii), he was unable to apply the concept to the
Ashanti situation because he found that culture to be "much more complex."
Similarly, a recent application of the concept by Sanjek (1983:330-343) to an
urban African situation only succeeds in the designation of household
residence roles without yielding any insights into how these roles impact on
specific developmental processes.
The inability on the part of these and other researchers to successfully
apply the concept to situations of change and development stems from the fact
that they have essentially conceived it in static terms and consequently
impose it on functional structures. They are thus unable to grasp and utilize
the essential dynamics of gender, age, conjugal form, and other internal
features which are in constant interaction within and between different
households at different phases of the cycle. Yet, it is these dynamics rather
than the cycle per se which render the concept hueristically useful. A
similar criticism applies to many development-oriented and applied studies,
particularly in Farming Systems Research and Extension, which use the
household as units of analysis. Cases in point include Shaner et al.
(1982), Norman (1982), and McMillan (1986).

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND TO ZIMBABWE
Geographic and Agro-ecological Setting
Zimbabwe, with a total area of 390,759 square kilometers, is a landlocked
country that is situated in the southern African region. It lies approximately
between Latitude 15 30' south and Latitude 22 30' south and
Longitude 25 00' east and 33 00' east.
The Zambezi river forms a major portion of the northern and western
boundaries of the country while the Limpopo river constitutes the southern
boundary. In the east and northeast the country shares a border with
Mozambique, in the northwest with Zambia, southwest with Botswana and in the
south with South Africa. Politically, Zimbabwe is divided into eight
administrative provinces. These are Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central,
Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Midlands, Masvingo, Matabeleland North and
Matabeleland South (Figure 2-1).
The most recent population census conducted in 1982 gives a preliminary
total population figure of 7,546,071, of whom less than 200,000 were whites.
Harare, the capital city, has an estimated population of 656,011. It is
followed by Bulawayo, 413,814 and Ghitungwiza, a dormitory suburb of Harare,
with 172,556 people. The annual population growth rate averages about 3.1
percent. The corresponding figure for the urban population is about 7.2
percent or more, including rural in-migration (Zimbabwe 1982a). Currently, 80
percent of the entire population live in the rural areas and the majority of
these people earn their livelihood directly from agriculture.
24

25
FIGURE 2 I
ZIMBABWE: ADMINISTRATIVE PROVINCES

26
Most Zimbabweans, nearly 80 percent of the African population, belong to
one or the other Shona or Mashona ethno-linguistic group (Bullock 1928;
Gelfand 1965; Bourdillon 1976). The Ndebele or Matabele is the other major
cultural group. The rest are the Sena, Tonga, Sotho, Venda and the Hlengwe
(Kay 1970:28). All these various societies in Zimbabwe are patrilineally
organized. They also inhabit geographically distinct home regions some of
which are cut by the country's international boundaries (Figure 2-2). The
European population, though numerically less significant, constitutes a
distinct economic power in the country.
The topography of Zimbabwe is dominated by the Highveld. This is a large
plateau occupying 20 percent of the land area which runs through the center of
the country from the southwest to the north. Its general altitude is about
1,200 meters above sea level though it occasionally rises to over 1,700
meters. In the east, along the border with Mozambique, the plateau develops
into a ridge of escarpments where the Inyangani reaches a height of almost
2,600 meters above sea level. Of the remaining area of the country, 60 percent
has an altitude of between 600 meters and 1,200 meters above sea level and it
is termed the Midveld. The third physiographic region of the country is the
Lowveld formed by the valleys of the Zambezi in the north and west, the
Limpopo in the south and the Sabi-Lundi basin in the south-east. These valleys
range in altitudes from between 300 meters to 900 meters above sea level (Fair
1964; Andrews 1964; Kay 1970:13; Whitlow 1982). The geological base of
Zimbabwe consists mostly of granites and other igneous and schistose rocks.
The soils are predominantly sandy with heavier loams and clays occuring in
relatively small local areas (Miller 1982:10).

27
FIGURE 2-2
ZIMBABWE: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF
CULTURAL GROUPS
Source: Kay 1970:27

28
Although Zimbabwe lies entirely within the tropics most of the country
experiences sub-tropical climate. Rainfall is seasonal and extremely variable
(Ngara 1983). It ranges on the average from over 1,500 millimeters annually in
limited areas of the eastern Manicaland Province to below 300 millimeters in
k
the Lowveld. The rainy season is unimodal and occurs between the summer months
of November and April. Generally, the rains are more reliable in the north and
less so in the south. Likewise, the seasonal total is also more reliable than
the monthly total.
Generally, July is the coolest month and October the warmest. Temperature
intensity corresponds closely with altitude. For instance, Harare on the
Highveld at a height of about 1,500 meters above sea level has a mean
temperature of 14C in July and 22C in October. In the low-lying
Zambezi valley, however, the respective means are 20C in July and
30C in October. A wide diurnal range characterizes the winter months.
Night frosts.that can occasionally be very destructive are not uncommon on the
high plateaus (Kay 1983:945; McNaughton 1983). Most of the Midveld and Lowveld
areas carry wooded savanna vegetation. The Highveld, on the other hand,
consists of savanna grassland with patches of montane forests particularly in
the eastern Manicaland Province.
On the whole, the topography, soils and climate of Zimbabwe do not favor
intensive agricultural production (Miller 1982:10). More than 75 percent of
the country is subject to conditions that make dryland crop production a risky
venture. Drought is a persistent problem (Denny 1983; Gammon 1983). Poorer
sandy soils predominate over most of the land thus severely limiting their use
for cropping. Only 37 percent of all areas in the country receive more than
700 millimeters annual average of rainfall considered adequate for intensive
and semi-intensive farming (Miller 1982:10).

29
Even then, when soil quality and land capability are taken into
consideration, only about 7 to 8 percent of the entire country is suitable for
intensive dryland cultivation (Whitsun 1983:12). In sura, Zimbabwe is not as
well endowed with inherent agricultural resources as it is often claimed. It
is rather its agricultural expertise which has led to past agricultural
surpluses, not the resource base (Whitsun 1983:13).
The authoritative survey of the agricultural potential of the country,
published by Vincent and Thomas (1960), attests to this fact. Their
agro-ecological survey, updated by the Department of Agricultural and
Technical Extension (AGRITEX), uses the rainy pentad criteria to delineate
Zimbabwe into five Natural Regions (Figure 2-3).^ These are Region I
covering 2 percent of the country, Region II 15 percent, Region III 19
percent, Region IV 38 percent and Region V 27 percent. The regions correlate
with potential crop yields and livestock carrying capacities of the land. The
regions and associated features are shown in Table 2-1.
Agricultural output patterns also show a spatial distribution that
corresponds with enterprise specialization in the various provinces. Thus,
among other commodities, Manicaland is noted commercially for tea and
deciduous or tropical fruits, Masvingo for sugar and beef, Matabeleland North
and South for beef, Midlands for dairy and other livestock products and the
three Mashonaland Provinces for maize, tobacco, cotton, soya beans and other
crops. For instance, in 1980 Mashonaland produced 90 percent of all maize, 92
percent of the tobacco, 73 percent of the cotton, 63 percent of the wheat, 87
percent of the soya beans, 94 percent of all peanuts and 87 percent of the
sorghum making the region Zimbabwe's primary bread basket and source of
agricultural exports (Whitsun 1983:51-53).

30
FIGURE 2-3
ZIMBABWE: DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL REGIONS

31
TABLE 2 1
DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL REGIONS, RAINFALL AND RELATED
FARMING SYSTEMS IN RHODESIA
NATURAL
REGION
AREA OF
COUNTRY
(%)
RAINFALL INTENSITY
(mm/year)
RELATED FARMING
SYSTEM
I
2
High
( 1,000 or more)
Specialized and
Diversified
Cropping
Ha & b
15
Moderate
(750-1,000)
Intensive
Cultivation
III
19
Moderate but Erratic
(650-800)
Semi-Intensive
Cultivation
IV
38
Low
(450-650)
Semi-Extensive
(Ranching)
V
27
Low and Erratic
(Below 650)
Extensive
(Only Ranching)
Sources:
Whitsun
(1983:6-7); Billing (1985:
:6-7).

32
Historical Setting
The past of Zimbabwe is one of large immigrations and settlement shifts.
David Beach (1980:4) speculates that from about 30,000 B.C., Late Stone Age
hunter and gathering people who spoke one of the Khoisan group of languages
had lived on and around the plateau or Highveld. Relying on the available
archaelogical records Beach (1980:12) identifies that the Early Iron Age
which is associated with immigrant Bantu-speakers existed round about A.D.
180. Later Iron Age people who probably included a great many of the Early
Iron Age groups first appeared circa A.D. 900. By about 1500 they had become
well established as the Shona speakers with dialect clusters such as the
Zezuru, Karanga, Kalanga, Korekore, Manyika, Nyanga, Ndau or Shanga (Beach
1980:14-18).
State formation has also been a feature of Shona polity since the Late
Iron Age. Four major precolonial states are delineated by David Beach
(1980:36). These are (1) Zimbabwe which flourished in the south of the
plateau before about 1500; (2) Torwa which existed around Khami in the
southwest from the late fifteenth to the late seventeenth centuries; (3) its
successor, the Changamire state, which lasted until the 1840s; and (4) the
northern state of Mutapa which survived in one form or another from at least
the fifteenth to the late nineteenth century. Stanlake Samkange (1969:5)
argues, therefore, that the Mashona up to the mid-nineteenth century had
occupied undisturbed all the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo rivers
7
stretching eastwards as far as the sea.
From about 1850 onwards the dominance of the Shona, at least
politically, started undergoing profound transformations with the influx of
other groups who now form part of the wider Zimbabwean society. For instance,

33
the Nguni-speaking Ndebele immigrants under Mzilikazi established themselves
in the southern part of the plateau north of the Limpopo in 1839-40 (Beach
1980:226). This development was followed almost immediately by the arrival of
European settlers. The first of these to make any lasting contacts with the
Ndebele were the missionaries of the South African based London Missionary
Society who opened a station at Inyati in 1859 (Nelson 1975:16).
In 1888 John Moffat, son of one of the missionaries and the
representative of the British government in South Africa to the Ndebele
throne, extracted a treaty from King Lobengula. The import of the treaty was
to the effect that the Ndebele would not enter into any foreign
correspondence, treaties or land alienation without prior consultation with
and approval from the British High Commissoner for South Africa. Shortly
after this treaty, C. D. Rudd, an agent of Cecil Rhodes a British concession
seeker who saw himself as the champion of British values and interests in
Africa obtained a concession from Lobengula for metal and mineral rights
(Nelson 1975:19).
On the basis of the Rudd Concession the British government in 1889
granted a royal charter to Rhodes and his British South Africa Company. The
charter, according to Percy Hone (1909:1), authorised the company "to take
over the vast tract of country extending from the Transvaal to Lake
Tanganyika. The whole territory was named after the conceiver and
founder of this great project, Mr. Cecil Rhodes." In early 1890, Rhodes sent
a party of 200 pioneers and 500 mounted mercenaries to claim Ndebele
territory as a private estate of the company. The following year the Pioneer
Column entered Mashonaland.
The British Order in Council of 1891 also placed the company's territory
under the protection of the queen and authorised her high commissioner in

34
South Africa to "administer justice, collect taxes and promote law and order;
but in practice these functions continued to be carried out by the charter
company." (Nelson 1975:20). The entry of the Pioneer Column to Mashonaland,
Hone points out,
was followed by an influx of white people from the
southern colonies and from Great Britain. Some entered
this unknown country for the love of adventure, others
in the hope of gaining wealth, and a few with the
intention of settling permanently on the land and
turning their attention to farming. (Hone 1909:13)
In 1893 the Column, under Jameson, the then Company administrator of
Mashonaland, entered Bulawayo and militarily occupied Matabeleland. Three
years later there was the Matabele uprising which was followed by the more
protracted Mashona rebellion of 1896-7 (Tsomondo 1977; Beach 1979).
Both of these early indigenous revolts against settler rule, widely
referred to as the first chimurenga or liberation war by Zimbabweans, were
ruthlessly quelled and the alleged perpetrators severely punished. In 1898,
"regulations for the good government of the natives" were proclaimed by the
Company on behalf of the British Crown. As Terrence Ranger (1967:311)
asserts, "in many ways [the rebellion] was a watershed; after the risings few
things were the same as they had been before. Southern Rhodesia moved
steadily towards settler supremacy."
It was not until 1923 that Southern Rhodesia made a direct transition
from chartered company rule to a Crown colony status with "responsible
self-government" still under the control of European settlers (see Gann
1965). According to Windrich (1975:xvi), union with South Africa was rejected
as an alternative and a financial settlement with the British South Africa
Company brought an end to nearly thirty-five years of Company rule.

35
The grant of a self-governing status apart, the next major political
development in the history of the colony did not occur until 1954. That year
Britain amalgamated Southern Rhodesia with the neighboring colonies of
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This created the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, also referred to in some of the literature as the Central African
Federation. The Federation, strongly opposed by the burgeoning African
nationalists of the three colonies, was short-lived and broke up in 1963.
The following year both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved
political independence becoming Zambia and Malawi respectively. The colony
was also now known simply as Rhodesia. Two years after the dissolution of the
Federation, in November 1965, Rhodesia made a "Unilateral Declaration of
Independence." This development occured because its minority white settler
regime under the leadership of Prime Minister Ian Smith failed to get Britain
to agree to its conditions for independence.
Rhodesia's independence, illegal in the eyes of Britain and the
international community, invited worldwide condemnation, non-recognition and
the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions. For fourteen years, until the
birth of a new Zimbabwe, Rhodesia held on amidst the bitter liberation war
waged by the African nationalist armies.
The Evolution of the Land Problem
The annexation of Southern Rhodesia and the grant of self government to
the colony by Britain in 1923 turned out to provide the settlers with the
carte blanche that enabled them to legislate segregation as the bedrock of
minority white supremacy in the country. This act unleashed far-reaching

36
consequences on later developments in the country. George Kay, in looking at
the human geography of the impacts of this colonial policy, indicates that
segregation gave
rise to a racial division of land and natural resources
which places most of the natural assets of the country in
European hands. It has led to geographically separate and
distinctive residential zones and social facilities in
areas where, for economic reasons, both Europeans and
Africans must live in close proximity to common work-places.
It has divided employment into African and European jobs.
(Kay 1970:330)
Specifically in terms of agriculture and incidentally African interests and
livelihood in Southern Rhodesia land was the crucial issue and still remains
so. During the colonial period two significant pieces of legislation were
promulgated that permanently and differentially altered access to land along
racial lines. These were the Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the Land
Tenure Act (1969). (See Jordan 1979).
Indeed, even before the enactment of these Acts land apportionment had
already began with the Pioneer Column in the early 1390s. Writing about his
impressions of the agricultural potentialities of the country around the same
period, Knight, though rather ethnocentric, was quite poetic in his report
that
[Wjhen one has travelled day after day across the flowerly
veldt when one beholds the magnificent crops which
reward the lazy Kaffir for a mere scratching of the soil,
but a soil inexhaustibly rich one realises that the
title of the Promised Land was not altogether wrongly
bestowed on this fair region. (Knight 1895:29)
Consequently, with the pioneers' occupation of this apparently fertile
territory the rewards of free or cheap lands, that they had been promised,

began in earnest. In the Matabeleland highveld for example, according to
Knight's observation,
37
a large number of farms have already been pegged out. Of
these some 700 are 'volunteer farms,' which were granted
free to the men who took part in the late expedition. Each
volunteer farm is 3,000 morgen (6,000 acres), carrying with
it a nominal annual quit rent of ten shillings. Farming
rights, entitling the holder to peg out 3,000 acres, can also
be bought directly from the Company at eighteenpence an acre.
(Knight 1895:30)
Elsewhere in Matabeleland, Knight (1895:34) indicates that "one syndicate
alone [possessed] a magnificient estate of 80,000 acres." Similar rewards
obtained in Mashonaland where he gives the following account:
Special farming rights were granted to members of the
old Pioneer Force. These, like the volunteer rights
in Matabeleland, entitle the owner to peg out a farm free
of any conditions as to bona fide occupation. These
pioneer farms are of 3,000 acres each. (Knight 1895:35)
From the beginning of the 1890s the settlers started creating the
"reserves." These consisted of blocks of land set aside under the supervision
of traditional or community elders for the use of indigenous Africans. The
first of these was demarcated in Matabeleland. By 1902 most of the Reserves
in Mashonaland had also been allocated and the African population had been
moved into them (Riddell 1978a:7). George Kay (1970:49) notes that a decade
later in 1913, there were "no less than 104 Native Reserves established
and they ranged from 5,000 acres to 1,500,000 acres." In 1923 the new
Southern Rhodesian Constitution which transferred the country from Company
rule to a self-governing colony also confirmed the Reserves as a separate
3
socio-economic and political entity.
The consolidation of settler land holdings was one major activity
facilitated by the creation of the Reserves. By 1396, the settlers had

managed to expropriate 15 million acres (Riddell 1978b:5). Five years later
they had 19 million acres which they increased to 31 million by 1925 This
included "nearly all land over 3000 feet within 25 miles of the railways."
(Kay 1970:50). To place this fact in context it should be kept in mind that
the total land size of Southern Rhodesia at this time was 96.4 million acres
(38.6 million hectares).
Legislative Acts and the Impacts of Settler
Land Expropriation Policies
The Land Apportionment Act was introduced in 1929 but enacted the
following year and made effective in 1931. The Act did more than merely
formalize the on-going institutionalization of the division of land along
racial lines as a legal fact (Bannerman 1982). In addition, it implicitly, if
not directly, prescribed the concept of "parallel or separate development" as
official policy. It also intensified the forced removal of many Africans from
their original homes, then declared European areas and their settlement in
the Reserves. Elsewhere, Roger Riddell has shown vividly the quantitative
dimensions of subsequent removals by stating that
[B]etween 1931 and 1941, 50,000 people were moved [and]
between 1945 and 1959 another 85,000 were moved. Since
1964 at least another 88,000 people have been resettled,
most being evicted from European land where they were
classified as 'squatters.' The most recent policy
of settlement has come about as a consequence of the
present war and it is estimated that 500,000 people have
been moved into 'protected' and 'consolidated' villages.
(Riddell 1978a:8-9)
Another major development emanating from the Land Apportionment Act was
the creation of the so-called Native Purchase Areas. The purchase areas
originally covered 3.2 million hectares or nearly 8 percent of the total land

39
size of Che country (Kay 1970:93). For the first time these areas offered the
right to freehold tenure to Africans. However, this offer was only to a cream
of progressive farmers who, in the words of Roger Riddell (1978a:8), had
"proved their farming abilities by obtaining Master Farmer certificates and
who have the money to buy the land." (Riddell's emphasis). (The current
production levels and aspects of the socio-demographic and agricultural
situation of farmers in two former Purchase Areas are dealt with in the case
study of farmers' responses which is reported in Chapter VII below. These are
Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale Commercial Areas in the Mashonaland Central
Province).
The segregationist provisions of the Land Apportionment Act were
implemented for twenty years without much thought about the negative
consequences that increasingly became manifest in the Reserves. The
consequences, many of which still persist, included overcrowding,
overstocking, deterioration of natural resources, landlessness, unemployment,
declining or stagnant per capita incomes and general underdevelopment
(Hamilton 1964; Sutcliffe 1971; Mswaka 1974; Phimister 1974; Clarke 1974,
1975, 1977b; Whitlow 1980; Mashiringwani 1983). Though these problems were
associated initially with the Reserves, their cumulative repercussions were
national in the sense that the "excess" influx of the African population into
the urban areas threatened European urban lifestyles and privileges.
To stem this trend, the Native Land Husbandry Act was passed in 1951. It
provided, among other things, regulations for enforcing (1) conservation
measures, (2) good farming practices, (3) appropriate stocking rates, (4)
allocation of grazing rights and (5) the consolidation of arable plots in the
Reserves into compact holdings (Pendered and von Meraerty 1955; Garbett 1963;
Riddell 1978a; Duggan 1980). The Act, however, cannot be said to have

40
achieved any of its objectives. By 1962 it had already been abandoned. Seven
years later, in 1969, as part of the introduction of the Republican
Constitution, the forty year old Land Apportionment Act was also updated with
the enactment of the Land Tenure Act. The new Act set aside 2.6 million
hectares of the total 38.6 million hectare land area of the country as
National Land and divided the remaining 36 million hectares equally into
African Areas (18 million hectares) and European Areas (18 million hectares).
This in effect generally meant that in absolute terms each African
communal area or peasant cultivator held 24 hectares as against 185 hectares
owned by each African elite or freehold farmer in the Purchase Area. In
further contrast, every European farmer owned nearly 2,300 hectares. On the
average therefore Europeans cultivated farms that were about 100 times larger
than their counterparts in the peasant sector (Riddell 1980:3). Table 2-2
presents an indication of the distributional pattern of land ownership over
the fifty year period up to 1981.
The magnitude of the inequities in the land distribution was not
lessened but was rather perpetuated by the Land Tenure Act. The Act also
maintained the status quo in respect of the pattern which ensured the
better endowed agro-ecological regions for the European settlers (Table 2-3).
As Billing (1985:36) points out, 74 percent of the African or Communal Areas
lie in the Natural Regions IV and V which are considered unsuitable for crop
production. This means that only one-fourth of these Areas are located in the
better Natural Regions I, II and III. In contrast, 52 percent of the European
or Large-Scale Commercial Farming areas are in the Natural Regions I, II and
III. The remaining 48 percent which are found in the poorly endowed Natural
Regions IV and V are used mainly as either ranching or irrigation
enterprises.

41
TABLE 2-2
PROPORTION OF TOTAL LAND UNDER VARIOUS OWNERSHIP
CATEGORIES IN RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE
1931
1950
1969
%
1981
NUMBER
H0USEH0L
1981
Communal Area
22.4
25.5
41.3
43.9
716,500
Small-Scale
Commercial
7.7
5.9
3.8
3.8
8,519
Large-Scale
Commercial
50.8
49.6
40.1
36.8
4,926
The State
19.1
18.9
14.7
15.5
0
Sources: Data for the respective years comes from the the following
sources: 1931 (Kay 1970:51); 1950 (Dunlop 1972:1); 1969
(Dunlop 1972:1); 1981 (Zimbabwe 1982a:64). The number of
households comprising each category is given by the Whitsun
Foundation (1983:28).
Note: Communal refers to the African peasant or smallholder unit
formerly known as the Reserve or Tribal Trust Land. The
Small-Scale Commercial is what used to be called the Native
or African Purchase Area. The Large-Scale Commercial is
mainly the White or European Area. The State-owned land was
previously referred to as National Land and it comprises
areas designated as Forest, Undetermined, or Unassigned.
In 1981, there were a total of 6,034 Large Commercial Farms
some of which were owned and operated as agricultural or
ranching estates by local and multi-national companies
rather than by farm households (see Chapter VI below for a
review of these farming systems).

42
Notwithstanding the ecological poverty of the lands in the Communal
Areas, the size of farm households increased rather than decreased over time
doubling about every thirteen years. Given the physical restrictions imposed
by the land the coping mechanism applied to accomodate the additional
household members was the gradual turn over of the land designated as
suitable only for grazing purposes into arable cultivation. This rather
extensive land use system had the cyclical effect of accentuating the pasture
problems of the African areas (Cleghorn 1950; Floyd 1959; Jordan 1964).
According to Roger Riddell (1978b:9) 50 percent of the grazing land in
the Communal Areas in 1965 was classified as either bare or heavily
over-grazed, and by 1977 seventeen times as much land in those Areas was
being cultivated as was ecologically desirable. Indeed, by 1970 the annual
population growth rate in the Communal Areas was 3,4 per cent on the average.
At the time over 47 percent of all the men resident there were landless and
in the age group under 30 years the percentage was as high as 81 (Weinrich
1975a:8). Male absenteeism was generally high and in many households farming
was typically carried out by the older men, the women and the children
(Johnson 1971:32).
The state of environmental constraints and population pressure which
currently faces the Communal Areas has been calculated by Whitlow (1980) and
it is reproduced here in Table 2-4. He shows that two-thirds of these African
lands experienced pressure which ranged from "some" to "desperate." The
pressure intensity he reports for these areas also varied from a low of 2 to
a high of 5 times.
The human dimensions that are manifest in this state of ecological
crisis are also brought out starkly in the government commissioned Chavunduka
Report. The Commission, which conducted a comprehensive enquiry into

43
TABLE 2-3
PROPORTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN ZIMBABWE
BY NATURAL REGIONS, RACE AND FARMING SYSTEM
NATURAL REGION PROPORTION OF AREA IN REGION
AFRICAN/ AFRICAN/ EUROPEAN/
COMMUNAL COMMERCIAL COMMERCIAL
%
I
1.0
1.0
2.0
II
8.0
18.0
27.0
III
17.0
38.0
22.0
IV
45.0
37.0
26.0
V
29.0
7.0
22.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sources: Billing (1985:36 Table 10)
: 51 Table 17).
and Riddell (1978a
Note :
: Figures
and so
are rounded to the nearest decimal point
may not add up to exactly 100 percent.
TABLE 2-4
POPULATION PRESSURE IN RELATION TO
CAPACITY IN THE COMMUNAL AREAS OF
CARRYING
RHODESIA
PRESSURE
INTENSITY
NATURE OF
PRESSURE
PERCENTAGE OF
COMMUNAL LAND
Balance or none
-
32.7
2 -
times
some
29.8
3 -
times
great
12.9
4 -
times
extreme
11.7
5 -
times
desperate
12.9
Source: Whitlow (1980:178 Table 2)

44
Zimbabwe's agricultural industry, examined the pitiful conditions which
obtain in many of the Communal Areas. It states:
Some 57 percent of the communal and small scale farming
areas, with 83 percent of their population, had densities
in excess of the critical level. Taken over the country
as a whole, the 1969 population was 40 percent in excess
of the critical level; by 1972 it was estimated to be 85
percent in excess and was projected to be 210 percent by
1984. (Zimbabwe 1982a:23)
It is not only in the area of land distribution that the negative
effects of segregation impacted on Africans. The pricing and marketing
policies of the government also limited the entry and full participation of
.African farmers in the commercial agriculture sector. For instance,
legislation notably the Maize Control Act (1931) and the Tobacco Marketing
Act (1936) prevented Africans from growing crops that competed in the market
with European farm produce (Nelson 1975:283). In the specific case of maize,
the major crop cultivated by Africans, the European farmers at various times
put pressure on the government to discourage its surplus production on the
African farms (Dunlop 1970:11). In the Native Purchase Areas the government
imposed a 10 percent levy on all commercial produce (Clarke 1976).
As a consequence of these policies the cash earnings of farmers in the
Reserves were low, averaging only $153 per year (Nicolle 1971:1). The more
active males migrated out of these Reserves to provide cheap wage labor on
European-owned farms, particularly in flue-cured tobacco production which is
notably labor intensive (Duncan 1973:1). In 1971, only 7 percent of the
laborers on the tobacco farms earned as much as $21 a month which constituted
the highest wages paid. It needs to be pointed out though that some of these
laborers received additional subsidies in the form of maize meal and other
rations from their European employers (Chavunduka 1972).

45
According to Vie inrich ( 1975a:8) per capita income from African lands
fell by 50 percent between 1958 and 1970. By 1977 the estimated monthly
household income in the Reserves was $12 as compared with farm workers on
European-owned farms who earned $19, other African employees $67 and European
employees $513. Thus, the ratio between European earnings and those of
African rural households was in the range of 43:1 (Brand 1981:46). In a
comparative analysis which examined the distribution of personal income in
Rhodesia, Sutcliffe concludes:
The rough indications are that the wealthiest 4 to 6 per
cent of the population of Rhodesia have received between
50 and 60 per cent of total personal income. On the face
of it, if this is compared with what similar evidence is
available for other countries, then personal income seems
to be distributed more unequally at least at the top end
of the distribution than in any any other country for
which data are available. (Sutcliffe 1971:38)
The nature of the distribution of personal earnings within Rhodesia over
the years is illustrated by Table 2-5 below. For example, in 1968 the
Africans who constituted 95.2 percent of the population earned only 43.5
percent of the total personal income. Elsewhere, Good (1974:18) reports that
"the overwhelming majority of the population is in a state of increasing
poverty and is in no position to contribute to what might otherwise be the
development of Rhodesia." He quotes the following statistics reproduced here
in Table 2-6 and showing the distribution of cash wages paid to Africans in
June 1972 to support his assessment. Writing about the same issue Roger
Riddell (1978a: 10) also demonstrates that in 1976, when the poverty datum
line for a rural family of five was estimated to be $43.73, some 85 percent
of all Africans employed in European agriculture received cash wages of less
than $20 a month.

46
TABLE 2-5
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN RHODESIA
EUROPEAN, ASIAN AND COLORED
AS PERCENTAGE AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL OF TOTAL
POPULATION PERSONAL INCOME
1946
3.8
49.4
1950
4.8
58.2
1955
5.4
59.5
1960
6.2
61.2
1965
5. 1
58.1
1968
4.8
56.5
Source: Sutcliffe (1971:38 Table 4).
TABLE 2-6
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN CASH WAGES
IN RHODESIA
MONTHLY CASH WAGE NUMBER OF WAGE
($)
EARNERS
Under
10
245,410
10 -
20
172,610
20 -
50
251,270
50 -
90
63,170
90 -
150
9,270
Over
150
3,800
Source:
Good (1974:18).

47
Detailed elaboration of the extent of these inequities as well as their
short and long-term policy implications for the country are given by Duncan
Clarke (1977a). His study of income and wealth distribution in Rhodesia for
the period 1965-1974 indicates that
[E]uropean income sources have remained very diverse despite
reliance on some notable areas of income earning. (They)
earn around 62 percent of all cash wages about 44.6
percent of income from unincorporated enterprise and probably
in excess of 90 percent of dividend and profits from companies
and abroad. Europeans are on average 'well covered'in terms of
pensions, medical aid, life assurance and compensation for
workmens' accidents. These elements help provide income,
stability and security. 'European society' has thus
developed as an affluent stratum of the Rhodesian social
formation, becoming steadily richer in material terms over
time. (Clarke 1977a:15, his emphasis)
Given the substantial irregularities in data sources and from his analysis of
African incomes Clarke (1977a:46) arrives at the conclusion that a comparison
of average European and African incomes was not a very meaningful exercise.
He (Clarke 1977a:46-47) asserts, however, that "Africans have received a
diminishing share of disposable incomes since 1967," indicating that in the
period 1965-75, the African/European income gap widened substantially.
The problems of the Reserves are synthesized by Cross in the following
wo rd s:
In recent years the situation in the Tribal Trust Lands has
become increasingly serious. While incomes from sales have
risen from $13 per capita in 1965 to $29 per capita in 1976,
the estimated availability of food has deteriorated
significantly. The overall result is that standards of
nutrition today are well below those for the nation as
a whole, and the Tribal Trust Lands have become net importers
of food. In addition population pressure in tribal areas
have reached a point where a breakdown of society in some areas
has begun to take place. Traditional social security systems
can no longer meet the requirements of the population simply
because the natural resources that are the foundation of the
system are no longer adequate to the task. (Cross 1976:185)

48
While per capita African incomes in the Reserves more than doubled from
$13 to $29 between 1965 and 1976 (Cross 1976:185) there was only a 40.5
percent rise in the consumer prices for the period 1965 to 1974 (Clarke
1977a:42). Under the normal circumstances this situation should translate
into improved standards of consumption and living for rural Africans. All the
available evidence, however, indicates the contrary. The most probable
conclusion from the information about nutrition is that the increase in
Communal Area market sales did not reflect the achievement of surplus output
above household subsistence requirements by the Africans.
Many observers note in summary that the African population was cast for
the most part in the role of poorly paid laborers, often as migrants, on the
white farms or mines or as domestic workers and work-seekers. In that
situation they rather precariously lived in "locations" on the edge of the
"white" towns or else remained as the family residue eking out a partial
living in increasingly overcrowded reserves (Duncan 1973; Harris 1974; Clarke
1974, 1977c). It is this "appalling economic and ecological conditions of the
African rural areas," in the words of Dunlop (1974:177), which "undoubtedly
[was] the most critical economic problem facing the Rhodesian Government."
(An account of the socio-demographic and economic situation relating to the
current farming system and agricultural production levels in three Communal
Areas are given as part of the case study of farmers' responses in Chapter
VII below. These cover a total of eleven subdivisions within Madziwa, Bushu
and Kandeya, all in the Mashonaland Central Province).
In contrast to the plight of Africans, particularly those in the rural
areas, the following benefits enumerated by Lionel Cliffe (1981:9-10), among
others, were all available and preserved predominantly, some exclusively, for
whites. These are (1) vast stretches of the best land; (2) mineral

49
concessions; (3) ownership of the industry that had grown up in the last
fifty years; (4) freehold rights in the urban areas; (5) professional,
managerial and skilled jobs; and (6) the advantages of a sound basic
education.
The case is always made to the effect that the European sector is the
goose that lays the golden eggs. While there appears to be no major debate
about that fact, there are critics, however, who have viewed that
contribution differently. Roger Riddell, for instance, argues that the
impressive overall figures for European farm production disguise serious
misuse and non-use of large areas of land in the European areas. He (Riddell
1978b:11-13) cites evidence relating to the 1975-76 growing season to show
that (1) only 15 percent of approximately 3.6 million hectares of potential
arable land in the European areas were being cultivated, (2) 60 percent of
the total of 6,682 European-owned farms were not profitable enough to qualify
for income tax payments, (3) in the most productive area of the country, the
Mazoe Valley area, approximately over a quarter of the land was not being
cultivated, (4) in the beef producing areas of the Matebeleland and Midlands
Provinces between 40 and 60 percent of the farms were non-viable and they
were characterized by serious mismanagement and overstocking leading to
serious veld destruction and (5) in 1977 a study by the Rhodesian National
Farmers' Union reported 30 percent of all the European-owned farms to be
insolvent.
Tnspite of these, as Riddell observed, inefficient white-owned farms
were
able to survive because of a wide range of assistance
given, both directly and indirectly, to European
agriculture in the form of loans, price supports,
capital grants, the low wage structure and 'artificial'
land prices. (Riddell 1978b:12)

50
Elsewhere, Riddell (1978c:16) elaborates this point in specific terms by
stating that between 1973 and 1975 the government paid out $55.2 million for
subsidies, losses and assistance in the European agricultural sector, an
average of $8,000 per farming unit.
Good (1974, 1976), in evaluating the economics of settler colonialism in
Rhodesia, supports Riddell's (1978a, 1978b) low estimation of most
European-owned farms characterizing them as inefficient because the white
farmers were mostly propped up by state policy in the form of elaborate
subsidies, protections and restraints from competition and reliance on cheap
African labor. This issue is very strongly pursued by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972)
who points out that settler colonialism rather than being economic is
excessively wasteful of human and material capital.^ (Aspects of
Large-Scale Commercial Farming as well as the responses of European farmers
in the Bindura Intensive Cultivation Area in the Mashonaland Central Province
are reported as part of the case study in Chapter VII below).
The African discontent against white minority rule in the country was
nurtured in the context of this background of increasing human and other
problems in the Reserves (Stanning 1967; Wrathal 1968), racial conflicts
(Kinloch 1978), the "deterioration of Rhodesia's white society," (Clements
1969), the impoverishment and proletarianization of the African population
(Arrighi 1967:32, 1970; Palmer 1977:241; Palmer and Parsons 1977), the myths
about the inherent efficiency of white farmers (Emmanuel 1972; Good 1974,
1976; Riddell 1978b) and the impacts generated by the various settler
policies and Legislative Acts relating to the land (Pollack 1975; Rennie
1978) and the politics and general problems of development (Barker and Hume
1977).

51
Richard Brown, in a summary paper on Zimbabwe's recent history, puts the
problem in perspective by arguing it this way:
[L]and shortage and overcrowding, compulsory destocking,
and the forcible removal of Africans struck at
the roots of both rural and urban life [and] acted as
a catalyst for mass nationalism. (Brown 1983:948)
Elsewhere, Barry Munslow makes a similar point asserting that
[T]he land issue was and still remains the central political
issue in the country. The long nationalist guerrilla
struggle from 1966 to 1980 relied on mobilizing peasant
grievances about the land to gain support, and Robert
Mugabe's ZANU (PF) partythe Zimbabwe African National Union
Patriotic Frontswept to power in the 1980 independence
elections because the electorate trusted that his party would
get back the land. (Munslow 1985:41)
This view is also shared by Terrence Ranger ( 1985:14) who attribute's the deep
consciousness and the mass participation of Zimbabwean peasants in the
guerrilla war to their "demands for their lost lands."
Beginning with the apparently ineffectual April 1966 "Battle of
Chinoyi", waged by guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU),
what the African population prefer to call the second chimurenga or
liberation war started (Kapungu 1974). In an account given by Richard Brown
(1983:949), well-attested acts of brutality by the security forces of the
white minority settler regime increased internal discontent and ensured a
ready and at times overwhelming supply of new recruits for the guerrillas. He
argues further that this rather antagonistic situation was exacerbated by (1)
the imposition of collective fines, (2) the ill-organized and drastic removal
of several thousand rural Africans from their homes into "protected villages"
or "strategic resettlements" on suspicion of helping the guerrillas and (3)
the shooting of many curfew-breakers.

52
Anna Weinrich (1977), also looking at the same problem, provides a
comprehensive account of the difficulties unleashed by the protected villages
policy and mentiones (1) the deterioration of health conditions, education
and other social services, (2) the imposition of physical hardships
especially on women and (3) the disruption of agriculture and family life.
The intensification of the war, amidst mounting civilian casualties and
increasing international isolation of Rhodesia, continued until about
December 1979. At that time a cease-fire and transitional arrangements for
African majority rule were agreed upon at the British-sponsored Lancaster
House Conference in London leading to a democratic election in February 1980
and the birth of independent Zimbabwe in April 1980 (Morris-Jones 1980; Dayal
1984).
Post-independence Development Challenges and Prospects
With the formal achievement of independence Zimbabwe entered into a
decisive period of social economic and political transition. The country
faced both short-term and long-term challenges. The immediate or short-term
concern was the rehabilitation of the war-torn countryside. In the view of
the government there was no doubt that "compared to the rest of the country,
the rural community experienced the highest degree of human suffering as well
as property and physical infrastructure destruction" (Zimbabwe 1981c:50).
Shortly after independence the government solicited for international
assistance to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during the war. This was
at the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development organized in
Harare in March 1981. There the government listed the following physical
damages: (1) 1,830 boreholes; (2) 425 dams and weirs; (3) 1,200 diptanks;

53
(4) thousands of kilometers of fencing that used to confine infected cattle
to limited areas; (5) 70 out of the 120 stock marketing or sale pens; (6)
some 2,000 of the approximately 2,500 primary schools; (7) 180 of the 243
rural clinics; and (8) much of the telecommunication equipment in the rural
areas (Zimbabwe 1981d:29-33).
Coenraad Brand (1981:49), in turn, documented the human aspects of the
destruction. According to him (1) more than 7,000 African civilians were
killed, (2) agricultural production was disrupted through harrassment and
uncertainty, (3) an estimated third of the 3 million head of cattle in the
Communal Areas was lost through disease, theft and forced sales or slaughter,
(4) half a million people were herded by the government into some 230
fortified "protected" or consolidated villages, (5) thousands fled into the
towns and between 100,000 and 150,000 across the borders into neighboring
countries, (6) more than 1,600 schools were closed down affecting some
433,000 children, or nearly half of the total normal African enrolment, (7)
by mid-1979 36 percent of the rural clinics were no longer operating and
there were only three doctors left in the fifty or so mission hospitals
across the country, half of which had been closed or had greatly reduced
their services, (8) thirteen bus companies operating in rural areas had
abandoned 57 percent of their routes and services had been substantially
reduced on many others after they had lost a fifth of their fleet in landmine
or other incidents and (9) a considerable proportion of small rural business
enterprises were boarded up or had been burnt down.
Touching on the long-term the major problem that Zimbabwe faced at
independence was the need to redress the socioeconomic imbalances caused by
years of separate development along racial lines. ^ This task called for
appropriate development policies and strategies (see Munslow 1980a).

54
In this, policy makers and planners were presented by interested
analysts with what appeared to be mutually exclusive options. Even before
independence the lines had been drawn in debates emerging between advocates
of evolutionary or reformist policies and those of radical or transformation
alternatives (Muvingi et al. 1981; Bratton 1981; Bush and Cliffe 1984;
6
Gordon 1984). The central premise of the debates focussed on the
structures of the political economy created and maintained by the Rhodesian
state and inherited by Zimbabwe (Stoneman 1981).
At any rate, while the debate still goes on Zimbabwe appears to have
pursued policies that are pragmatic and, at least in the economic sphere, are
paying dividends.'7 For instance, the period since independence can be
divided into three phases.
The first phase is the high growth period of 1980 and 1981 when the
economic growth rate was 12 percent. The period coincided with good rains,
unusually favorable conditions arising from independence, the lifting of
international economic sanctions as well as buoyant world demand for the
country's exports.
The second phase is the period from 1982 to early 1984 which was
characterised by severe drought conditions, the world recession and poor
economic performance. During the period the economy registered an annual
average decline of almost 3 percent in real terms. There was substantial
reduction in agricultural output which necessitated the import of 340,000
tonnes of maize and 120,000 tonnes of wheat in 1984. Between 1982 and 1984
per capita income, in real terms, fell by a total of 4 percent from its 1980
level. There was a balance of payments problem, high rates of inflation which
hovered around 15 percent, low investment and high unemployment.

55
Phase three of Zimbabwe's economic life, starting from 1984-35 to the
present, shows the beginnings of a recovery. The period has been
characterised by good agriculture, higher agricultural incomes that are
boosting domestic demand and by favorable export demand conditions (see
Novicki 1983; Zimbabwe 1984a, 1985a, 1986a; The Economist 1986; Green and
Kadhani 1986).
The rather impressive economic performance recorded by Zimbabwe is
discussed by van Burn (1986:1123-1124) whose account is summarized here.
For the first time since 1981 the country's economy started registering
positive real growth in 1985 with an estimated real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growing about 7 percent that year. In nominal terms Zimbabwe's GDP grew
from $3,226 million in 1980 to a projected $7,770 million in 1986. Surpluses
in the trade, current-account and overall balance of payments were registered
by the economy in 1985. Exports also rose steadily in value from $999 million
in 1982 to an estimate $1,750 million in 1985. In contrast, the value of
imports increased but more slowly from $1,087 million in 1983 to a projected
$1,450 million in 1985. The country's trade balance also rose from a deficit
of $115 million in 1982 to a surplus which by September 1985 was $290.4
million. Inflation was less than 10 percent by the middle of 1985 having
dropped from a high of 25 percent in 1983.
This is significant because over most of Africa today even the least
minimal economic growth is a welcome exception rather than the rule. Of more
significance though is the diverse base of this growth. For instance, the
non-material production sector grew by almost 3 percent, the material
production sector by about 13 percent, distribution by over 12 percent,
transport and communications by 6 percent, construction by 6 percent, the
value of mineral production by 15 percent and manufacturing by 12 percent.

56
Of the most specific importance, in the wider African context, is
agriculture which contributed the largest share to growth. It recorded in
real terms almost 30 percent increase in 1985. In terms of value total crop
deliveries to marketing authorities increased by 53 percent during that year
compared with 1984 (Zimbabwe 1986a).
It is important to note also that in May 1985 Zimbabwe became the first
and only African state to join the international community to provide its own
food aid to the famine victims of Ethiopia by sending 25,000 tons of maize.
From mid-1985 to early 1986 the following purchases of Zimbabwe grain were
made: (1) the European Economic Community (EEC) purchased 25,000 tons of
maize for delivery as food aid to Mozambique and Zambia; (2) the United
Nations World Food Program purchased and distributed large quantities of
maize for drought hit countries of southern Africa; (3) Japan bought 9,000
tons of maize which were supplied to Zambia; (4) the government of the United
Kingdom purchased 14,500 tons as donation to Mozambique; (5) Australia bought
30,000 of maize for distribution as food aid in Africa and (6) South Africa
also obtained a sizeable portion of its maize requirement from Zimbabwe (van
Burn 1986: 1124).
According to The Economist (1986:15), 1985 saw a 118 percent rise over
1984 in sales from Communal and Resettlement Areas as compared with 48
percent increase from the commercial farming sector. The relative share of
the Communal and Resettlement Areas of the total national marketed output of
$1,077 in 1985 was 21 percent. This is in stark contrast to a share of
between 4 and 8 percent until independence. For instance, in maize production
the Communal and Resettlement or the so-called subsistence sector sold almost
half of the 1.82 million tonnes delivered to the marketing organizations and

57
performed almost as well in terras of cotton production (The Courier 1986:30).
The African Business has placed this success story in perspective
stating:
The ingredients for success are well-known: generous and
prompt payment for farmers, rapid expansion of collection
and storage facilities, more credit and agricultural advice
for peasant farmers. (The African Business 1986:13-17)
Zimbabwe's tremendous success in stimulating small-holder or peasant
farmers to grow more food has created massive agricultural surpluses. At the
end of 1985 the Grain Marketing Board was sitting on 1.4 million tonnes of
maize with the experts estimating that that stockpile could grow to more than
2 million tonnes at the end of the 1986-87 marketing year. That represents
over 5 years of domestic consumption needs.
In looking at Zimbabwe's success story and in presenting this rather
optimistic assessment of its current situation we need reminding that on the
whole the country is not favored for sustained agricultural output. This
point and the fact that cyclical drought is a major constraint are clear
indication that a much longer-term outlook is called for to evaluate the
permanence of the country's apparently impressive agricultural performance so
far.
This perspective provides the substantive background for evaluating the
literature on land reform and resettlement, poverty and equity, rural
development, agriculture and economic growth, the state, household dynamics
and organizational forms in terms of their relevance to the government's
policies and on-going programs of change in postindependence Zimbabwe.

58
Notes
1.) A rainy pentad is defined as the center of three 5-day periods (pentads)
which together receive more than 40 millimeters of rainfall, and two of which
receive at least 8 millimeters (Whitsun 1983:6).
2.) The history of the early and continuous settlement of Zimbabwe by
indigenous Shona populations is very important to many Zimbabwean historians
and intellectuals for two main reasons. Firstly, they fastidiously assert
that claim of nativism to counteract rival claims by some European settlers
and historians of Southern Africa that much of the region was not occupied
prior to early European expeditions there in the sixteenth century. Secondly
and central to this assertion, is the controversy that used to surround the
question as to who the original builders of the Great Zimbabwe acropolis are.
As the noted historian Peter Garlake (1973:12) argues "probably no other
prehistoric site has given rise to such strong widespread and often bizzare .
emotional response." The official policy of the Rhodesian government in
respect of the origin of the ruins was that it could have been the work of
any builders be they Phonecians, Arabians, or some central African group. The
majority Zimbabweans found the ambiguity created by this policy thinking
irksome. Great Zimbabwe is a structure and symbol of immense pride among the
Mashona. Consequently, they feel insulted by the "settlers" refusal to
acknowledge the genius, heroism and past glory of what they regard as the
dominant state-level culture in the region centuries before the advent of the
Europeans. (See also Garlake 1974, 1982).
3.) From that time until today the Reserves or Tribal Trust Lands have
remained physically intact. Though the Communal Land Act of 1982 repealed all
the enactments which established the Reserves it legally reconstituted and
renamed them as the "Communal Areas." The Act also vested the general
administration of all the areas so designated in the newly created District
Councils rather than in the chiefs or traditional authorities. The
government, through the National Agricultural and Rural Development
Coordination Committee (NARDCC), is currently working on an elaborate
Communal Lands Development Plan. The objective of the Plan is to rehabilitate
the Communal Areas and integrate them fully into the productive and market
sector of the country's political economy.
4.) This view is shared by Riddell (1978b:12) who supports the argument with
figures showing that 72 percent of all European farmers cover only 23 percent
of the European land area and produce 21 percent of the total output of that
sector, while 5 percent of farms account for 50 percent of the land and
produce 48 percent of the output. (See in addition Biermann and Xossler
1980). However, Paul Mosley (1983), in his study of the settler economies of
Kenya and Zimbabwe challenges this characterization as stereotypic and
overgeneralized. He (Mosley 1983:177) admits, however, apparently in
contradiction to his challenge, that "what is truly distinctive of the
settler agricultural economy is not so much its low average efficiency as the
very wide range of efficiency levels which it managed to contain and the
skewness of the distribution within this range, with a minority of highly
efficient, frequently foreign-owned concerns counter balancing a majority of
inefficient, amateur, farmers who obtained low yields."

59
5.) In the socio-political sphere the notorious animosities between the
majority Shona cultural group, most of whom subscribe to the ruling ZANU-PF
party and the minority Ndebele among whom the PF-ZAPU is dominant are the
obvious opprobrium which mars the peaceful co-existence of all Zimbabweans
and the development of the country. This problem goes back to at least a
century with the arrival, conquest and apparent brutal subjugation of the
Shona by the Matabele. There is an apparent mutual distrust and suspicions of
each other by the leaders of these two societies and their respective
political parties.
Joshua Nkomo used to be referred to undisputedly as the "Father of the
Nation," for his role in the country's liberation struggle. He teamed up with
Robert Mugabe in the final years of the liberation war to present a common
"patriotic front," against the forces of the European settlers (see Mugabe et
al. 1978). After independence Mugabe appointed Nkomo, though a leader of the
opposition party in the National Assembly, to a cabinet position in the
government. However, when security forces discovered catches of arms and
ammunitions on PF-ZAPU property Mugabe sacked Nkomo and accused him of
planning the violent overthrow of the government.
Thereafter the destructive activities such as killings, rape and burnings
commited by bands of so-called Ndebele dissidents in parts of the country
started. Many Shonas then saw Nkomo as the "Father of Dissidents. Nkomo,
himself a Kalanga (an offshoot of the Karanga sub-division of the Shona)
identifies more with the Ndebele from his base in their traditional capital
Bulawayo. The activities of the bandits have always been ruthlessly punished
by the government's security forces. In both cases many innocent civilians
have suffered including a group of foreign tourists allegedly murdered by the
dissidents in 1983 and missionaries also killed in late 1987. In the early
1980s the international community focussed its attention on Zimbabwe. The
western media highlighted the alleged human rights abuses and atrocities
indiscriminately meted out to the Ndebele by the so-called North Korean
trained and Shona constituted Fifth Brigade. For a period, Nkomo fled the
country in a brief self-imposed exile in Britain accusing the government of
attempts to kill him.
From 1985 serious efforts were made by Mugabe and Nkomo and their
respective party leaders to strike a reconciliation towards the healing of
old wounds. These efforts which were prolonged and broke down many times
eventually bore fruit on December 31, 1987 when a settlement was publicly
celebrated. That day Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as the
first Executive President of the Republic of Zimbabwe while he appointed his
old-time opponent Joshua Nkomo as one of the two Vice-Presidents of the
country. The country became a one-party state with the absorption of the
opposition PF-ZAPU by the ruling ZANU-PF.
Whether or not this second attempt at national reconciliation will last and
promote the genuine integration of the interests and aspirations of both the
Mashona, the Matabele and the other cultural groups as well as Zimbabweans of
European ancestry is an issue which cannot be easily and seriously
conjectured upon in this dissertation
6.) In the search for an appropriate development policy or strategy the
government has been treading a tightrope of differential trade-offs. Since
independence the major preoccupation of most observers appears to be with
questions in respect of maintaining the production levels of large-scale
commercial agriculture, one of the main sources of foreign exchange. This

60
invariably means, both in the short-term and the long-run, leaving the
European-owned lands more or less untouched.
Such a situation poses immense ethical and ideological dilemmas to the
government in view of its explicit commitment to eqalitarianism, social
justice, and a Marxist-Leninist brand of socialism (see ZANU-PF Election
Manifesto 1985, 1980). Even within the government itself, as well as in the
ruling ZANU-PF party, there are veiled factional squabbles. One faction, the
radicals would want the government to live up to its expectations by ridding
the country of such age-old European privileges as land and access to other
means of production. The opposing group of pragmatists would rather want a
gradual transformation which recognizes and uses the available European
expertise and capital stock to generate economic growth (see Libby 1984).
In the midst of all this the postindependence relationships between
Africans and Europeans, surprisingly, does not exhibit the kinds of open
confrontations that many pessimists predicted. In the urban areas some
African workers serve both the European and elite Africans as domestic
servants. In the rural areas many Africans continue to work as laborers in
European-owned farms. Some Europeans who emigrated before or at independence
are said to be returning. So far it appears that the government has succeeded
in fostering the workable multi-racial society that it promised to establish.
This does not mean that the Africans are content with their living conditions
and incomes which are still comparatively minimal by the standards of the
European population.
Except perhaps in the classic case of some landless Africans squatting on
European-owned lands the general feeling, especially in industrial
establishments and other spheres, is that Zimbabwe Africans look to the
government to promote egalitarian policies that seek to redress past
injustices that they suffered under previous settler administrations.
7.) Obviously not everybody would agree with this seemingly optimistic
compliment. For instance, Roger Riddell (1984:463) in an apparently
well-balanced analysis of the performance of the economy since independence
has come to the following conclusions: (1) that the economy has performed far
better than that of Zimbabwe's neighbors but a large part of the reasons for
this was due to unique circumstances that no longer exist; (2) many of the
gains of equity and the reduction of poverty achieved in the 1980-82 have now
been reversed; (3) the prospects for medium to long-term growth are not as
good as the economic planners of the country have had us believe although far
better than the pessimists would lead us to think; and (4) the transformation
of the economy desired by the government has been far slower than expected.
Andre Astrow (1983:1) on the other hand offers a more radical assessment in
observing that "after several years of independence, little meaningful
change has actually taken place, while significant tensions have emerged
between the Mugabe government and the African people. Today the state
apparatus has remained virtually intact and the basic economic structure of
the country unchanged. While the white settlers have seen most of their
privileges preserved, African workers who have gone on strike, and landless
African peasants squatting on "white" land, have been repeatedly faced with
severe repression by the government. Moreover, not only has the government
failed to promote socialism in Zimbabwe, but on the contrary, has
successfully worked to strengthen its economic ties with imperialist
countries, placing Zimbabwe firmly in the Western camp." (See Ibbo Mandaza
(1986) for an additional leftist criticism of the government's performance in
the area of resettlement and agrarian reform) .

61
Yet another issue which may be of major concern, apart from the land
question and the ethnic conflicts, relates to trends in public expenditure.
According to van Burn (1986:1123), there was a decline in the private
sector's share of this from 63 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 1982 and that
the country's Five-Year Development Plan, introduced in April 1986 and
covering the period 1986-90, forecasts a further decline to an average of 43
percent annually over the Plan period. At least to advocates of minimal
government intervention in economic matters this development is undesirable.

CHAPTER III
THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The research problem is to evaluate how agricultural resettlement policy,
initiated by the government since independence in 1980, is affecting household
performance responses and the quality of life in rural Zimbabwe. The
government's policy is explicitly expressed in official publications and
pronouncements about (l) the redistribution of the country's agricultural land
resources, (2) the rehabilitation of the country's poor on these lands and (3)
the provision of facilitative services and basic needs to the resettled. The
broad objective of this policy is to achieve growth and development and to
ensure equity.
The literature that is reviewed hare is varied, though ic is restricted
to the broad parameters of the substantive and theoretical matters which form
part of the agricultural dimensions of development. At the macro-level, the
issues that the discussion covers relate to aspects of the role that the state
plays in development. Specifically, it explores the areas of agricultural
policy and implementation, the promotion of the smallholder and the
cooperative modes of production and the consequences of these developments so
far for the African condition. For the micro-level, the discussion examines
household dynamics and organizational forms in the context of change. The
systemic linkage between the two levels are reviewed here by examining the
literature on rural development, poverty-focused development, land reform and
resettlement programs.
Thus the purpose of the review is to provide a general framework within
which to assess some of both the macro-interests and the micro-concerns that
62

63
dominate on-going debates about agricultural development. This is meant to
serve the following objectives: (1) facilitate the selection of background
materials about the research problem; (2) guide the placement of the selected
materials in the wider developmental and African perspective; and (3) assist
in defining and refining the research variables as well as the analytical
concepts that are used in the study.
The State and Agricultural Development Policy
Today, economic development places an even more onerous burden on the
state as a political institution than in the past. This responsibility ranges
from the selection of the most efficacious bundle of economic policies to
ensuring a conducive political and administrative framework for development
irrespective of particular policies (Sandbrook 1985, 1986). John Lewis
(1986:29) extends this observation further by pointing out that governments
are essential to (1) establish policy environments, (2) develop the physical
and human infrastructure for development and (3) carry out the functions that
would never for reasons of scale or externality be adequately initiated by the
private sector. In the view of Lewis there is no substitute for the continuing
lead that governments must supply to development-promotion effort.
Support for this assessment of the central role of the state in
development is given by many experts including John Mellor. Mellor (1986:84)
sees such a role as critical to agricultural and employment-oriented strategy
of development in the developing world. He argues that because agriculture is
organized on a small-scale basis, substantial public sector investment in that
sector is needed in the form of transportation, power, communication,
research, education and input supplies systems.

64
Some of the cogent socio-economic rationales that justify government
intervention in agriculture are suggested by Joseph Stiglitz (1987:43-44). He
lists the following reasons: (1) incomplete markets in insurance futures and
credit, (2) public goods and increasing returns, (3) imperfect information,
(4) externalities and (5) income distribution. Stiglitz argues the point
further that in the real situations of most developing countries the free
market's own allocation within this framework is either inefficient or
otherwise unacceptable to policy makers thus necessitating the intervention of
the state.
Other important policy issues about the agriculture of the developing
countries include, for instance, the need to sustain the ecological balance in
the natural resources exploitation of these fragile tropical and subtropical
environments. Throughout these countries the current major policy concern,
however, relates to the possibilities for production increases. Increased farm
output is achieved through (1) the expansion of area cultivated, (2) increased
yield per unit area, (3) shifts in cropping patterns toward higher-yielding
crops and (4) increase of the number of annual harvests. This growth calls for
increased inputs of labor, land, water and capital, as well as the
introduction of technical innovations (Ruthenberg 1985:1). The issue of how to
relate any or all of these investments to possibilities for production
increases come under the rubric of agricultural policies.
These and other policy matters continue to dominate the on-going analysis
to rethink African agricultural development strategies, particularly the role
that the state must play in this endeavor. The dilemma posed for a consensual
resolution of the contradictions posed by Africa's policy effort is very well
recognized. For instance, Jennifer Whitaker offers a commentary on this
paradox by stating:

65
As usual, the Westerners are drawing sweeping conclusions
about what Africa ought to do. And, as usual, the Africans
have neither the flexibility nor the wherewithal to either
reject the advice totally or follow through on it fully.
(Whitaker 1986:1)
Akroyd (1985) recognizes that there is no one best set of policies for
agricultural development and that any such policies must reflect the
political, economic and socio-cultural aspirations of each nation. He laments
(Akroyd 1985:102), however, that there "are countries in Africa where policy
guidelines are vague and diffuse, and some where clear policy guidelines and
objectives seem not to exist." Other writers appear to be suggesting that
policy per se might not be the answer but rather as constituting the problem
itself. Heyer _et_ al. (1981), for instance, argue that attempts to develop
African agriculture through a network of sophisticated policy instruments
implying a manipulable and predictable environment have backfired in virtually
all instances.
African governments, by necessity, have to address specific agricultural
objectives if they are to move from a state of stagnation or decline into one
of growth and development. Currently, some of the most common of the
agricultural policy agendas recommended for various countries include such
issues as: (1) national and regional food self-sufficiency and food security
(OAU 1981; Norman 1984; Asante 1986); (2) combating hunger (Eicher 1986a); (3)
diversification of agricultural output and the raising of rural incomes and
living standards (Hinderink and Sterkenberg 1983); (4) whether to promote or
de-emphasize export-led growth (World Bank 1981; Berg 1986; Green and Allison
1986); (5) conservation of natural resources, equitable distribution of real
and money income, and equitable regional development (Akroyd 1985); and (6)
the transformation and acceleration of agricultural-based growth into a

66
cumulative employment generation and industrial-oriented growth (Mellor 1986).
Such policies as these are made within broad frameworks to support, for
instance, (1) a smallholder-led farming strategy (Johnston 1986), or (2)
socialist agriculture (Munslow 1985), through (3) institution building
(Leonard 1986), or (4) the use of a particular problem diagnosis and extension
approach such as farming systems (Fresco and Poats 1986) and (5) which may be
targeted for a special or neglected group such as women (Spring 1986; Guyer
1986a) .
These policy-initiated development activities entail heavy financial,
logistical and administrative burdens. This is even more so in such areas as
project planning and implementation (Gaitskell 1968). Critics of the state's
role in development therefore caution governments to constantly seek ways of
transferring such activities as marketing and input distribution to the
private sector. From this perspective some adversaries and analysts of the
postindependence state in Africa have blamed too much public sector
involvement in agricultural pricing, marketing and distribution for the woes
of the continent (see World Bank 1981; Bates 1984a; Due 1986; Ndulu 1986).
Other critics, mainly the political scientists on the other hand, have
looked at the relationships between the poor performance of African countries
and such themes as (1) the dominant ideology of the state (Young 1982),
particularly socialism (Isaacman 1979; Munslow 1984); (2) personal rulership
(Jackson and Rosberg 1982); (3) clientelist politics (Ravenhill 1986); (4)
affection and patronage (Hyden 1986); (5) the "overdeveloped" state (Leys
1976; Saul 1979); and (6) ethnic loyalties (Smock and Bentsi-Enchill 1976).
An articulation of these criticisms of Africa's bad economic policies,
political vanity and patronage, premature bureaucratization as well as
bureaucratic sclerosis convinces Sandbrook (1986:319) to perceive the state as

67
"part of the problem of economic stagnation" in much of the continent.
The autopsy of the African state conducted by these critics, however
informative as it may be still leaves at least two questions unanswered. If
the state is "part" of the problem, what constitutes the other part?. Does it
mean then that doing away with the involvement of the state will result in the
realization of the development dreams of Africa?. These are important matters
that only a holistic perspective on the macro and raicrodynamics of the
development process can help to elucidate.
State Ideology, Public Choice and the Individual in Development
Ever since the colonial days social justice and equality have remained a
major issue of concern in the policy agendas concretized in the political
manifestos and the pronouncements of African leaders. With political
independence most countries flirted with concepts that promoted various brands
of egalitarian ideals. These ideals were shaped into what was articulated to
be African socialism (Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Kopytoff 1964; Kenya 1965;
3abu 1981). Supposedly founded on the customary norms and practices and the
ethical principles of traditional Africa this kind of socialism only proved to
be theoretically attractive. In practice, it turned out to be woefully
inadequate and contextually unsuited to the capitalistic demands of the modern
state in so far as economic growth and development were concerned.
Given the essentially precapitalist nature of this
tradition-circumscribed socialism and the realization that it is unworkable in
Africa's changed socioeconomic and political circumstance some leaders
abandoned the pursuit of that normative or nativistic ideal quite early. Yet,
others pursued it by importing Marxist-Leninist ideology and conveniently

68
equating it with African communalism (see for instance, Nkrumah 1965).
Contrary to the belief underlying this thinking the political and
economic methods, such as collective production systems associated with
imported socialism, are not congruent with the humanistic and social ideals of
Africa. For example, there is no empirical support for the view that communal
forms of living, consumption and even resource exploitation in traditional
Africa are synonymous with the imperatives of collective ownership,
accumulation, management and production of goods which characterize
Marxism-Lenninism. The inability of Tanzanian policy makers to appreciate this
fact explains the costly failure of their ujamaa or collective villagization
experiment (Hatmann 1981).
Elsewhere in Africa, the promotion by governments of collective and state
farms in the 1960s and 1970s, to the complete neglect of individually-owned
and managed farms, was based on this erroneous notion that the prevailing
social organization of production is collective. The costs of the crises that
this wrong policy initiated are documented for such countries as Ghana
(Miracle and Siedman 1968a, 1968b) and classically for Tanzania (Coulson 1969;
von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980; Samoff 1981; Ergas 1982). The case of these
failed experiments have raised serious developmental questions as to the
relevance and applicability of the Soviet model (Miller 1977) or the Chinese
experience (Shillinglaw 1971) and even generally agrarian socialism (Ellman
1981) to the African condition. This does not suggest, however, that the
solution is automatically found in capitalist agriculture which system is also
frought with obstacles (see Dickinson and Mann 1978).
Another pertinent issue that is brought up in the context of the
foregoing discussion in the area of development has to do with individual
effort and rewards as opposed to collective responsibility and welfare. Amity

69
or kinship communalism persists in contemporary African societies to the
extent that it provides a necessary defence machanism in the external
relations of its members to others outside it (see Elias 1962). In such a
situation, as the noted ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski (1939:954) rightly
points out, "the individual obviously has to become cognizant of [the group]
charter [and] to develop the social attitude and personal sentiments in which
the bonds of organization consist." However, this fact and the apparent
placidity and solidarity, that is internal to group or kinship organization,
do not relegate the individual to the status of an unknown quantity when it
comes to the question of distribution of rewards and resources.
It is in this perspective that additional conceptual issues such as
incentive systems for individual effort and productivity, access to private
ownership, popular participation and public choice assume paramount roles in
current thinking about development. For instance, advocates of public choice
are generally, suspicious of interventionist or government-sponsored welfare
and redistribution programs. In their view development is facilitated by less
government, more market and privately-organized collective initiative. In
effect, by conditions where public choice or the spontaneous and voluntary
arrangements of the ends and means of development ultimately prevail (see
Buchanan 1986).
Public choice proponents recognize the need for equality of access to
economic and political resources, that is, to open franchise and full
participation in the development process by everybody. But as Buchanan and
Tullock show (1962:64) "participation in collective activity is costly to the
individual" in terms of externalities and constitutional decision-making. Thus
the rational utility-maximizing individual seeking to minimize the imposition
of external cost on him, as a consequence of the behavior of others, "may find

70
it advantageous either to enter into voluntary contracts aimed at eliminating
externality or to support constitutional provisions that allow private
decisions to be replaced by collective decisions" (Buchanan and Tullock
1962:71).
It needs to be noted though that much as public choice holds promise for
sustained and democratic effort at development it "has little relevance for a
society that is characterized by a sharp cleavage of the population into
distinguishable social classes or separate social, religious, or ethnic
groupings sufficient to encourage the formation of predictable political
coalitions and in which one of these coalitions has a clearly advantageous
position at the constitutional stage" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962:80).
Secondly, the logic of collective action, which is basic to the operation
of public choice, by its very nature always results in differential benefits
or rewards in terms of whether we are dealing with small as opposed to large
groups or in market as contrasted with non-market situations. According to
Mancur Olson (1965:33) this is so because of the economic facts of
suboptimality or inefficiency and the fixidity or limited nature of the
benefits of group goals (see Olson 1965:37; Hardin 1982).
These issues about group actions and individual participation and
benefits in societal governance and development reflect the same conceptual
analysis of organizations by anthropologists who perceive such matters in
terms of the "image of limited good." The respective predictions arrived at by
public choice analysts and those of limited good, however, appear to be
fundamentally at variance.
Public good is limited. In the view of students of public choice the
individual would reap the maximum benefit if he or she engages in collective
action. On the other hand, George Foster (1965) the originator of the concept

71
of limited good suggests that the fixed and limited nature of public resources
in traditional, peasant societies or static economic systems is an effective
check on group mobilization and collective action. Consequently, there is a
fear in such societies that if some individual gets more of the limited
resources then others will get less ipso facto. Under such circumstance
voluntary cooperation is inhibited and extreme individualism becomes
preferable to collectivism.
The extent to which effective administrative mechanisms can turn around
these problems of development is discussed by various analysts. There are
suggestions, for example, that call for emphasis on (1) citizen or community
or popular participation (Cook and Frederickson 1977; Cernea 1983; Gould
1985), (2) administrative experimentation (Mosher 1967) or administrative
coordination (Leach 1982) and (3) the increased involvement of private
voluntary organizations (Gorman 1984) in the planning and management
(Garcia-Zamor 1985) of client-centered development (Thomas 1985). These issues
cannot be evaluted outside the important on-going policy debate about Africa's
appropriate mode of agricultural production, that is, the forces and relations
which govern the organization of farm activities and outputs (see Leraarchand
1986).
African governments are concerned about which kinds of agricultural
organizations are ideologically or politically preferrable to tackle their
socio-economic developments. In this context the facts raised in this
discussion so far have wider implications for reviewing the two most important
arrangements covered extensively in the literature about African agriculture,
namely, the smallholder and cooperative farming.

72
Smallholder Agriculture and Development
Smallholder agriculture, usually also referred to as traditional,
peasant, low-resource, family farm, or subsistence production predominates
over all of Africa. The literature which deals with the various dimensions of
it has been so copiously referenced that it does not require any extensive
review here. In the last two decades, however, a number of studies have
explicated the dynamism of small farmers and challenged many of the
conventional orthodoxies, such as the laziness and irrationality of the
farmers who engage in smallholder production.
Today there is an increasing realization among researchers that small
farm units are the most feasible and cost-effective means of attaining the
multiple objectives of development (Johnston 1986:160). It is now accepted
that traditional farmers with access to strategic services and infrastructure
such as credit tend to accept risks and adopt extension recommendations such
as high yielding technology.
The seminal work on transforming traditional agriculture, published by
Theodore Schultz (1964), sets the stage for the theoretical modelling of
smallholder farming. Other publications following it take a substantially
closer look at aspects of the economics of traditional agriculture such as
technological and institutional constraints (Mellor 1966; Hayami and Ruttan
1971; Johnston and Kilby 1975).
Broader analytical perspectives specifically on the African materials are
provided by other researchers such as Ruthenberg (1968) and Cleave (1974),
just to mention a few. Over the same period, extended empirical studies with
the aim to obtaining detailed understanding of present production processes
and decision behavior in traditional agriculture were conducted in various

73
countries. These, for instance, include farm management studies in Northern
Nigeria (Norman 1973, 1982; Norman e_t al. 1979), Sierra Leone (Dunstan
1972; Dunstan and Byerlee 1976, 1977), in colonial Rhodesia (Johnson 1963,
1964a, 1964b, 1970, 1971; Massell and Johnson 1968) and Montague Yudelmann's
(1964) monumental study covering south central Africa, mainly Rhodesia.
Recent policy interests in the problems and prospects for the
transformation of smallholder agriculture have also benefitted from two
publications, the first edited by Robert Stevens (1977) and the other written
by Hans Ruthenberg (1985). The authors synthesize various micro-level
hypotheses generated by earlier studies and have tested and refined them in
the light of current developments occurring within agricultural growth of
developing countries.
The work by Stevens (1977) comprises a collection of regional field
studies which (1) illustrates in depth the nature of the low-income trap of
small farmers., (2) provides detailed examples of development strategies that
have led to major increases in production and employment on small farms and
(3) outlines major thrusts for government policies and programs that will
accelerate small-farm income growth.
The theoretical path adopted in Ruthenberg's study places the highest
priority on the role of technological and other innovations in the process of
agricultural growth. That idea is an apparent incorporation of a paradigm
about change which goes back to Homer Barnett's (1956) original proposition
that innovation is the basis of culture change. Ruthenberg conveys the
optimism that with effort, patience, understanding and care, innovations to
improve the incomes of millions of small farmers can be identified, appraised
and implemented in ways that are attractive both to farmers and to the wider
economy.

74
Given the corpus of recently assembled empirical evidence in support of
the high performance of many traditional farmers around the world, the
relative efficiency of smallholder agriculture is no longer questioned. This
fact notwithstanding, an agricultural economy which is wholly dependent upon a
smallholder system has certain limitations.
Corner and Kanel (1977:5) discuss at least two of them. First, a highly
productive smallholder system requires an elaborate service structure which is
both expensive and time-consuming to develop. Consequently, a government
cannot deal effectively with such a system until all the necessary
infrastructure is in place and markets have begun to function more or less
competitively. The second problem is that the smallholder system, dependent
upon individuals rather than the collective, can allow great inequalities__to
develop. Such inequalities may be a function of variations in individual
entrepreneurial abilities. Whatever their cause, they can accumulate over time
and present serious obstacles to achieving a resolution of problems such as
equity and even economic growth.
Yet one other issue that is raised in the literature which has important
implications for development is the relationship between smallholder producers
and the state. According to Gavin Williams (1976:149), peasants tend to suffer
under almost all forms of externally designed strategies of change undertaken
in Africa. His contention is that because of the nature of the peasant mode of
production in the political economy of the continent (1) the underdevelopment
of peasant production is a condition for the development of capitalist and
state production and that (2) this condition serves the interests of the state
and its beneficiaries rather than promotes the livelihood of the people.
This view of the parasitic and exploitative nature of states' domination
over their seemingly helpless smallholder farmers contrasts sharply with Goran

75
Hyden's (1980) characterization of African peasantries as uncaptured and
consequently resistant to the intrusions of the forces and pressures of the
state.
Cooperatives and Agricultural Development
Production cooperatives are an option to individually owned and operated
smallholder or family farms. The modern cooperative institution denotes a wide
range of organizational forms which involve varying activities. In the
agricultural sector these include, among others, the more common situations
where individual farmers cultivate their own farms while banding together to
take advantage of services such as input and credit procurement and marketing.
More rarely, and usually at the encouragement or even the coercion of the
state, there is also the producer cooperative. At the very advanced phase of
this continuum, the ownership of land and other resources as well as the
organization of production calls for a substantial element of collectivization
as it is found in socialist communes (Galeski 1971, 1977; Francisco et al.
1979).
The role of cooperatives in the development of the developing countries
first engaged the attention of the United Nations Organization in the 1950s.
Subsequently, towards the end of the 1960s, it commissioned various analytical
and case studies into rural cooperative movements (see Carroll et al. 1969;
UNRISD 1975), and also covered Africa (see Apthorpe 1972a, 1972b), Asia (see
Inayatullah 1972) and Latin America (see Borda 1971). Throughout Africa the
colonial administrations in many but not in all cases encouraged the formation
of cooperatives as part of the promotion of community development (Widstrand
1970).

76
To the agricultural societies of rural Africa the idea of cooperation has
never been a novel concept. In most places traditional and informal
cooperation and reciprocal exchanges, some of which are still performed today,
were practiced in the past. These involved the pooling of such scarce
resources as labor power oftentimes for the mutual benefit of participants.
Subsidiarily also, cooperation on a larger scale was part of festive or
competitive community display in various traditional societies (Erasmus 1956;
Dore 1971).
Many researchers have studied aspects of this system of customary values
exhibited in traditional cooperation. For instance, Moore (1975) has a
typology of such cooperation and he has also looked at the economic importance
and other advantages that it generates in rural areas. In Africa mention can
be made, among others, of Migot-Adhoila's (1970) study of traditional society
and cooperation and Gulliver's (1971) work about such cooperation among the
Ndendeuli of.Tanzania.
A major feature of traditional cooperation in rural Africa manifests
itself in the form of group participation in various farm tasks. Every peasant
society in Africa has a name for such cooperation, which for example is
referred to as nnoboa among the Akan of Ghana and nhimbe among the Mashona
of Zimbabwe. Moise Mensah (1970) reports about group farming in Dahomey, now
Benin while Anthony Ellman (1970) also observes it in Tanzania.
In another setting, Brian du Toit (1969) examines the functioning of
informal grassroots cooperation among the Bantu-speaking groups of South
Africa. His study traces the problems associated with the transformation of
traditional cooperation through rural-urban migrations and networks into the
modern cooperative system. He shows also that such revitalized institutions
are major avenues for culture change in African urban settings.

77
The stated objectives and the recognized economic and social advantages
of the modern cooperative are quite obvious. Agarwal (1976) discusses many of
them and Joy (1971) takes a look at the existing social factors which are
favorable to successful cooperatives. Under the capitalist system of
production cooperatives render valuable services which range from the
economies of scale, enhancement of private property, market competition and
the profit motive to the maximization and utilization of scarce resources (Roy
1981:29).
Elsewhere, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS 1982:1) has cited
the following advantages that are often sought by socialist countries through
the establishment of cooperatives: (1) economically, it speeds the growth of
output and incomes by allowing more rational use of land and labor, providing
an essential underpinning for the accumulation process, both local and
national; (2) socially, collectivization eliminates exploitative class
relationships and prevents their reemergence, alleviates absolute poverty by
delivering basic welfare services and reduces unacceptably high levels of
inequality between households, villages and regions; and (3) politically, it
allows the integration of rural producers as active subjects rather than
passive victims of the national development process with the collective as
both an instrument of state-led mobilization and a framework for democratic
participation and grassroots initiative.
In the view of Texier (1974:1) the cooperative still appears to be the
most appropriate organization for mobilizing the efforts of the community for
agricultural development. The voluminous study by Robert Bideleux (1985)
provides additional insights into the successful achievement of many of these
goals by various communist countries. Nigel Swain (1985) also documents the
success story of cooperative agriculture in Hungary.

78
In countries such as Israel, with its kibbutz and moshav collective
systems of rural settlement and production (Weintraub 1971; Don 1977), and for
most of rural Europe and North America cooperatives have been of immense
benefit to small farmers. These benefits include, among others, access to
extension, credit and input services at substantially reduced costs to the
individual members of these cooperatives. Other instances of successful
cooperatives are documented for Latin America (Carroll 1971). By and large,
however, the modern cooperative, as Schaffer and Lamb (1981) indicate, does
well only in economically advanced countries.
Given the foregoing facts one can appreciate the near-dogmatic acceptance
of cooperatives and their promotion in the agricultural policy agendas of
independent African countries (Widstrand 1970; Bardeleben 1973; King 1981;
Ladipo 1981; Okafor 1983; Ahwireng-Obeng 1986). For most African countries,
particularly those which have an affinity for agrarian socialism, the modern
cooperative seem to have the answers to such pressing problems as the
eradication of absolute poverty (Lele 1975) and the promotion of equity
(Putterman 1983).
Yet, the literature indicates the overwhelming failure of modern
cooperatives and other public sponsored agricultural production schemes
throughout the continent. For example, Carl Eicher (1986a) states: "After 25
years of independence, there are no models of agrarian socialism that
have produced a reliable agricultural surplus." Earlier, Eicher and Baker
(1982:205) alluded to the theoretical and policy implications of the problems
of cooperatives by emphasising that failure "has been a common denominator
under civilian, military, capitalist, and socialist governments."
Two issue are pertinent to putting this failure in the context of
agricultural policy. The first is about the nature of the failure itself. The

79
second relates to possible explanations and the policy ramifications of the
failure. A selective characterization of these aspects of the cooperative
failure in Africa may be made from the existing literature.
Invariably, cooperatives have not only failed in terms of economic output
but they have not measured up to the hopes and expectations held by their
sponsors, and even the majority of the participating members. Goran Hyden
studied the management problems of some African cooperatives. According to him
(Hyden 1970a:12) they "are not only inefficient, but plagued by dishonesty,
misappropriation of funds and favoritism." Similar problems are documented at
length in such places as Nigeria (King 1975; Beer 1980; Fabiyi 1983; Okuneye
1984), Ghana (Miracle and Seidman 1968b), Ghana and Uganda (Young _et al
1981), and in Tanzania (Newiger 1968; Cliffe 1970).
In relation to the important policy question of equity, Hyden (1970a:12)
has this to say about the cooperatives: "they have so far proved unable to
promote the principle of equality." Serious as this finding is it is not
unique to Africa in that Orlando Borda (1971:ix) reports a similar situation
in Latin America where he concludes that the effect of the cooperatives "in
the long run has been to preserve, sometimes even strengthen, the prevailing
system of inequality." For Asia, Gunnar Myrdal (1968:1335), likewise,
observes: "the notion that cooperation will have an equalizing effect is bound
to turn out to be an illusion the net effect is to create more, not less
inequality" (see also Munkner 1977).
In explaining the failings of cooperatives Texier (1974:2) takes the
stand that cooperation itself is not at fault but rather the way it has been
introduced into traditional rural environments. He attributes the problem to
cultural contradictions arguing that:

80
[T]he actual consequences of trying to introduce into a
traditional environment the cooperative system which are
successfully practised in Europe and in North America under
very different circumstances and for the benefit of very
different kinds of communities has in fact been to, consolidate
the traditional system and to encourage further social
stratification by creating new opportunities for class
exploitation by small privileged groups. (Texier 1974:3)
Internal organization and member commitment and morale are problems
mentioned by Dorner and Kanel (1977:8), who argue further: "It is a delusion
to expect that group farms have such obvious benefits to members or such
decisive economic advantages to make it possible to overcome easily the
organizational problems."
The Institute of Development Studies summarizes the forceful criticisms
voiced against producer cooperatives. It states (IDS 1982:1) that (1) the
heavy hand of the state in collectives negates the potential advantages,
wasting valuable economic resources through inefficient planning and
irrational constraints on local autonomy, (2) collectives serve as a mystified
legitimation for higher-level decisions rather than as a vehicle for true
democratic participation and (3) collective forms of agriculture are used as
an instrument for state control of the rural areas and procurement of cheap
agricultural products rather than as a context for speedy and egalitarian
rural development. Obern and Jones (1981) discuss many of these and other
critical factors affecting the cooperatives.
Dealing specifically with the African experiences, Paul Collins
(1980:288) puts the causes of the failure in perspective pointing out that "a
lot of rhetoric about African co-operatives is misleading where it links their
organization to aspects of pre-capitalist or 'traditional'' village life."
In fact, the notion of traditional cooperation, exchange and communal
support systems is a principal feature of social organization throughout

81
Africa. This truism which is apparently the basis of the policy thinking
shared by many African leaders influences their priority preference for the
cooperative mode of production (see Nyerere 1968). One thing, however, appears
to be amiss here. There is ample evidence from all over Africa showing that
the similarities in the perceived and actual objectives notwithstanding the
modern cooperative, as it is known in the West (Roy 1981; Sargent 1982) or in
the East (Bideleux 1985), does not operate with the same principles as
traditional African cooperation.
A similar thesis about the confusion of African norms with collectivism
is advanced in a volume on African cooperatives and their efficiency, edited
by Carl Widstrand (1972). There the failure of the cooperative movement in
most of the continent is attributed to the inability to appreciate the
difference between African collective values and the requirements for a formal
cooperative.
This same point is poignantly conveyed in another way by Paul Bohannan.
Writing about the different issue of exchange and investment in an African
society, namely, the Tiv of Nigeria, Bohannan (1955:60) nonetheless argues
that "market behavior and kinship behavior are incompatible." George Dalton
(1967:78) provides additional support for this view by arguing that "to retain
indigenous social organization in the new economies of markets and machines is
obviously impossible."
These views reinforce Hyden's (1970a:13) observation that "traditional
communalism has turned out to be more of a liability than an asset to modern
cooperative development." It was Meyer Fortes (1969) who stressed the primacy
of amity to kinship relations, a normative fact which has significant policy
implications for the development of cooperatives. However, many analysts who
have worked with various African societies will agree with Hamer's (1982)

82
observation among the Sadama of Ethiopia that rivalry and taking kinsmen for
granted, that is, self interest rather than altruism, is a reality of
cooperative organization and management (see also Hamer 1981a, 1981b).
Rural Development
The concept of rural development is now a catch-phrase in contemporary
Africa. This is understandable because Africa is essentially a rural
continent. In terms of population and settlement distribution, location of
natural resources, patterns of economic activity and hence the potential or
prospective sources of growth and development rural Africa presents dynamic
perspectives. The worldwide significance of the need to develop these areas is
stressed by the United Nations, which argues:
[R]ural development can help to smooth the transition between
rural and urban life, and to narrow the gap between them in
living standards, by disseminating urban attitudes, providing
job opportunities and introducing education, health and welfare
services, public utilities and communal facilities. It can also
provide city people with the pleasure of access to the
countryside for recreation. (United Nations 1974:59)
Giving high priority to rural development programs would make a lot of
sense because of these and other concerns such as their high potential to
effect (1) the eradication of poverty (Chambers 1983); (2) improving quality
of life (Thomas and Boyazoglu 1978); (3) stemming the tide of rural-urban
drift (Chambers 1974); (4) improving land tenure systems (Cohen 1980a); and
(5) strengthening the balance of payments, creating mass markets for
non-agricultural goods and services and making food available to the growing
populations (Daniel et al. 1985).

83
Indeed, Heyer _et_ al. (1981), looking at the nature and the size of the
institutional establishment that services rural development in Africa, suggest
rather sarcastically that rural development has become a big business. For one
thing, it is in the area of rural development that most people ever come face
to face with government officials or experience the benefits that are
controlled and distributed by the state. It is safe to assume on the basis of
this fact that the ability of the state to reach out and win the confidence
and the support of its farm and rural citizens is conditioned largely by the
effectiveness of the rural development policies and programs that the
government implements.
There are as many different definitions of the concept of rural
development as there are interested analysts and practitioners. For example,
the World Bank (1975:3) sees it as a means for reducing poverty, increasing
production or raising productivity. In the Bank's view rural development "is
concerned with the modernisation and monetisation of rural society, and with
its transition from its traditional isolation to integration with the national
economy." For Urna Lele (1975:20) it means improving living standards of the
mass of the low-income population residing in rural areas and making the
process of their development self-sustaining.
Jansma (1981:285) takes rural development to involve an overall
improvement in the economic and social well-being of rural residents and the
institutional and physical environment in which they live. In the view of
Eicher and Baker (1982:59 fn2) the distinguishing characteristics of rural
development programs include increased rural welfare, agricultural
productivity, participation and broadly shared benefits. Robert Chambers
(1983) contends that rural development can be redefined to include enabling
poor rural people to demand and control more of the benefits of development.

84
The history of rural development has passed through different phases.
Consequently, the concept assumes a plethora of aliases such as (1) community
development (Apthorpe 1961; Brokensha and Hodge 1969; Phillips 1969), (2)
modernization (Mazrui 1968; Hunter 1969; Shapiro 1975; Uchendu 1978; Agyeman
1981), (3) rural change (Uchendu 1968), (4) social change (Magubane 1971), (5)
integrated rural development (Godart 1966), (6) agricultural development
(Bates and Lofchie 1980), (7) economic development (Boserup 1970; Due 1980),
(8) agrarian change (Boserup 1965; Bates 1984b; Berry 1984) and (9)
poverty-focused development (Adelman 1986).
Beginning from the 1950s community development was proposed by the
British Colonial Office to help to prepare dependent territories for
independence by improving local government and developing them economically.
The term spread rapidly to various external donor agencies and organizations,
particularly the United Nations. The idea behind it was embraced by
governments s.uch as the United States, which provided funding and personnel to
promote it. Anglophone Africa became one of the major testing grounds for
community development ideals (see Holdcroft 1978). The concept and programs of
community development also caught on in Francophone Africa in the 1960s where
it was known as animation rurale (Charlick 1980). The community development
idea, however, was short-lived.
In his criticism, Manghezi (1976) labelled the strategy of community
development as being suspect. He argued, among other things, that its
underlying theory placed value on order and stability rather than on conflict
and contradiction thus glossing over fundamental class inequalities and
antagonisms in Africa.
The view about the failure of the model, shared by Eicher and Staatz
(1984:8), is that community development grew out of the cold-war atmosphere of

85
the 1950s when western foreign assistance programs were searching for a
non-revolutionary approach to rural change. Its advocates therefore assumed,
rather wrongly, that development can be achieved through the direct transfer
of western agricultural technologies and social institutions such as local
democracy to the rural areas of the Third World.
With the demise of community development in the 1960s-1970s, integrated
rural development became the vogue. Its rise was also in response to such
factors as (1) the failure of the so-called green revolution to make any
impact in Africa and elsewhere (Eicher and Baker 1982:61) and (2) the
realization that isolated or sectoral projects hardly accomplish anything
(Hippel and Fischer 1985:11).
A comprehensive evaluation of integrated rural development projects in
Eastern, Southern, and West Africa was undertaken by Urna Lele (1975). In it
she recommended that because of severe lack of trained manpower it was
appropriate for projects to only begin with a few simple interventions aimed
at removing critical constraints before any attempt was made to phase in other
programs.
Dupriez (1979) conducted a similar review of the European Economic
Community (EEC) funded projects in Africa. He found that there was
overcentralization which denied the farmers the much needed opportunity to
participate in project decision-making. More seriously, he observed that the
project administrators ignored social structures and economic and political
hierarchies by tending to regard rural communities as undifferentiated masses.
There is very little doubt that integrated rural development as a whole
ever measured up to the expectation that it was hoped to generate. According
to Robert Chambers (1974:22) the failure of rural development efforts in
Africa is due to (1) lack of high-level manpower, (2) poor attitudes among

86
public servants, (3) a lack of integration and coordination and (4)
inappropriate structures. Some of these criticisms of integrated rural
developments, are echoed by Ruttan (1975) in his skeptical assessment of such
proj ects.
For his part, Lakshmanan (1982) suggests that given the often mutually
inconsistent objectives of rural development any efforts that seek to achieve
the conflicting objectives at the same time can lead to further
disillusionment. Another analyst, John Mellor (1986:73) supports these
findings and argues that (1) almost universally, integrated rural projects
failed as a result of excessive complexity and lack of central support
services, (2) the projects tended to raid the national institutions of
personnel and (3) they were never integrated into the national support
structures for agricultural growth.
At the intellectual level, Cohen (1980a) reports major gaps in the
literature in terms of formulating a coherent theory and guidelines to
facilitate the work of rural development practitioners. This deficiency is
perhaps explained by a fact put forward by Azam (1986) that there is a very
high turnover in rural development thought. He argues that a preoccupation of
the development experts with "new ideas" is prejudicial to the essential
process of learning by experience. He attributes the widening gap between
development theory and achievement in the field to this preoccupation.
In addition, Azam (1986) makes two important points that are relevant to
the future of rural development policy in Africa. He argues that for rural
development to be successful it has to be growth-oriented, egalitarian and
democratic and that rethinking is needed not for building a new development
design but to eliminate faulty thinking accumulated over the years.

87
Poverty-Focused Development Strategies
The genre of development philosophies which embraces this paradigm
comprises such concepts as the Basic Needs Approach (Ghai et al. 1977;
Streeten 1981, 1986; Stewart 1985), Growth With Equity (Jegen and Wilber
1979), Redistribution With Growth (Chenery et al. 1974) and Redistribution
Before Growth (Adelman 1978, 1986). The central theme underlying this
essentially reformist paradigm is poverty eradication.
The need for a new paradigmatic look at the poverty issue arose out of
the perceived inability of traditional market-oriented development theories to
induce a "trickling-down" of the benefits of growth to the poor (Lele
1984:447).
Poverty is a relative concept that defies any crisp definition.
Operationally, however, it relates to the minimum or basic needs of people and
their ability to meet those needs. Poverty-focused strategies always make a
fundamental distinction between absolute and relative poverty. The extent of
inequality in a given situation is a function either of absolute or relative
poverty.
According to Van Weigel (1986:1424) absolute poverty is characterized by
(1) persistent undernutrition, (2) illiteracy, (3) unsafe drinking water, (4)
inadequate sanitation, (5) parasitic disease, (6) severely limited access to
health care and (7) bleak prospects for productive employment. Relative
poverty on the other hand refers to the extent to which the income share of
groups of individuals or households differs from their population share
(Ahluwalia 1974:6).

88
Strategies with anti-poverty focus essentially seek to attack absolute
poverty. In the words of one believer and proponent of this school of thought,
Irma Adelman (1986:49), the prime objective of economic development assistance
should be the reduction in the number of people living in a state of absolute
deprivation. In the view of Robert Chambers (1983) the nature of poverty is
the result of five interlocking features. These are (1) lack of material
assets; (2) physical weakness; (3) isolation from others and from sources of
communication; (4) vulnerability in the face of uncertainties and risks; and
(5) political powerlessness. Elsewhere, he indicates also that poor rural
people are
typically unorganized, inarticulate, often sick,
seasonally hungry, and quite frequently dependent
on local patrons. They are less educated less
likely to use government services. Further,
they are relatively invisible, especially the women
and children. (Chambers 1978:209)
Leftwich and Sharp (1976:212) contend that poverty is a reality that
needs to be studied, understood and appreciated. In this context poverty
eradication becomes the central issue in the development agenda. Dudley Seers
(1973) who is a champion advocate of this view suggests that the questions to
ask about a country's development are
What has been happening to poverty?. What has been happening
to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all
three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond
doubt this has been a period of development for the country
concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been
growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be
strange to call the result "development," even if per capita
income doubled. (Seers 1969:3)
For Africa, varying estimates of the population that may be categorized as
poor range from 40 to 60 percent (Bequele and van der Hoeven 1980). But this

89
is for the period before 1980. Since then the overall trend has been one of
increasing deterioration (Daniel et. al. 1985).
The Basic Needs Approach was proposed in 1976 as a new development
strategy by the World Employment Conference in conjunction with the
International Labor Office. In development planning the approach emphasizes
social welfare functions as a response to absolute poverty (Hopkins and van
der Hoeven 1983). According to Ghai _et al. (1977) the basic premise of the
approach is that development policies must be formulated to satisfy basic
human needs through the alleviation of poverty and reduction of inequality.
Some of the major features that distinguish Basic Needs from alternative
strategies include its focus on micro-level consumption and the provision for
such consumption in the form of public goods by the state (Weigel 1986).
The underlying theory is that the market system does not traditionally
cater for the critical needs of the poor. Consequently, such areas as health
care, clean water, sanitation and education are better catered for by the
government. The political or ideological foundations of the approach in the
prioritization of development goals are alluded to by one of its major
proponent, Paul Streeten (1981). In his view development projects should be
more concerned with directly improving the welfare of the poor rather than
concentrating on macro-objectives such as increasing aggregate growth rates.
Streeten (1981) goes further to suggest two competing ways of defining a Basic
Needs Approach to development. These are (1) to treat it as an all-embracing
and exclusive development strategy and (2) to pursue it as a strategy which
supplements and complements existing strategies.
Other writers have discussed various dimensions of the issues involved in
the Basic Needs Approach. For instance, Weaver (1979) believes that the
satisfaction of basic human needs must be the goal of development. From this

90
premise he examines the relative efficacy of using three broad strategies to
facilitate this goal. These are (1) the traditional capital-oriented or growth
maximization model, (2) the revolutionary socialist-oriented model and (3) a
reformist growth with equity-oriented model. Based on this framework he
(Weaver 1979:19-20) also argues for the systematic organization of development
thinking and efforts around meeting basic needs of food, safe drinking water,
clothing and shelter, medical care and education.
Hopkins and van der Hoeven (1983) take up the issue of how Basic Needs
should be incorporated in development planning. Ghai and Alfthan (1977) also
examine the conceptual basis of the approach and the empirical work that needs
to be accomplished to make it operational. The normative issues raised by the
approach are discussed by Lee (1977). At the methodological level, Khan (1977)
reviews the problem of production planning for basic needs. He shows why a
simple reliance on conventional multi-sector planning model will be
inadequate. In his view (Khan 1977) a basic needs plan will have to take into
account the close interrelationship among basic needs targets, the production
structure and the distribution of income.
By and large, poverty is conceptualized as being essentially a rural
problem. Policies for its eradication have therefore focused on agriculture.
However, Richard Sandbrook's (1982) treatment of the issue is done purely with
an urban perspective. He defines the goals of the Basic Needs Approach to be
(1) the redistibution of income, (2) reorientation of production systems and
(3) the provision of equitable access to improved public services. Sandbrook
criticizes both the Basic Needs approaches advocated by the World Bank (1975)
and the International Labor Office (Ghai et al. 1977). In his judgement the
former is too conservative to offer any hope for a genuine assault on poverty
and the latter is too radical, utopian and unrealistic. Yet, his prescriptive

91
solution at best is even more controversial. He believes (Sandbrook 1982) that
the development strategy of basic needs can be achieved in Africa only through
a class struggle that generates a progressive political transformation.
Though economic growth is a necessary condition for sustained development
it does not by itself alleviate the problems which afflict the poorest
segments of the population. These problems include, among others, the lack of
access to education, health care, employment, production resources such as
land and equitable income. It is Glower et al. (1966) who did a classic
study of Liberia to illustrate that in most developing countries impressive
economic growth rates are not necessarily accompanied by socioeconomic
development.
Indeed, according to the Kuznets' (1955) divergence-convergence
hypothesis the initial phases of the development process correspond with
substantial increases in the inequality of income distribution. Though the
inequality ultimately improves at later stages of industrialization (see
Kuznet 1955; Adelman and Morris 1973; Ahluwalia 1976) it is empirically
correct to assume that the poor can suffer from growth in both absolute and
relative terms. But whether or not the poor become poorer over time depends
upon the kinds of policies that are implemented. In this context Adelman
(1986:51) argues that if the share of the income accruing to the poor declines
more rapidly than overall income rises, then they are loosing from growth.
Like other poverty-focused strategies of development, a principal thesis
of the Redistribution Before Growth Approach is that the poor benefit more if
policy specifically ensures (1) distribution of assets to cover them, (2)
facilitates the institutionalization of their assets accumulation as well as
(3) their access to the market. In the view of its chief advocate, Adelman
(1986) the approach tackles the poverty problem first to achieve the following

92
policy targets: (1) increase the quantity of assets owned by the poor, for
example, through land reform; (2) increase the volume of their market sales
through generating demand for the output of their labor intensive industries;
and (3) increase the prices of the services that the poor sell especially
through improved terms of trade.
This development model is viewed to be productivity-oriented in that it
aims to raise the incomes of the poor by increasing their productivity and
their access to productivity enhancing assets. The importance of a systemic
and integrated approach to realize the utility of this strategy is clearly
underscored by Adelman who argues that
strategies for poverty alleviation are not compatible with just
any kind of economic growth, The most effective approaches
entail a combination of several elements. The sequence
(being) implementing asset-oriented policies and institutional
changes designed to give the poor access to high productivity
jobs before not after, shifting development strategies.If
that is done, there is no "trade-off" between growth promotion
and poverty alleviation. The same development strategy is then
optimal for both goals. (Adelman 1986:64-65. Her emphasis)
The Redistribution With Growth approach is based on a philosophy which
posits that the objectives of growth and egalitarian income, employment and
assets distribution are not necessarily in conflict. More significantly, it
points out that the incomes and wealth of the affluent do not have to be
reduced as a condition for achieving improved conditions for the poor. It
therefore supports policies that seek equitable distribution in ways that do
not slow down rates of growth within the economy.
Chenery et_ al. (1974), the major spokespersons for this approach,
advocate for a differential allocation of a larger share of the proceeds of
economic growth to assets accumulation by the poor. The rural emphasis of this
approach is argued by Ahluwalia (1974:19). His view is that given the scale of

93
the poverty problem and the limited capacity of other sectors to expand
productive employment a viable strategy for raising the incomes of the lowest
40 percent of the population in developing countries must necessarily focus on
the agricultural sector. Yoder (1979) even provides a theological perspective
on Growth With Equity arguing that it is a Christian imperative and moral
obligation to ensure that the poor benefit from growth.
In the African context, Diana Hunt (1975) takes a look at the interplay
between growth and equity as they manifest in the distribution of economic
status and opportunity in the Mbere area of rural Kenya. Gavin Williams (1982)
also reviews the need for the state in Zimbabwe to ensure equity and growth.
This work contrasts with another by Bill Kinsey (1982) in which he critically
examines the contradictions between equity and growth in Zimbabwe. Bill Kinsey
(1984) offers a similar critique of the equity and growth issues in Malawi
while Elliot (1983), earlier, observes that the two issues represent
unresolved conflicts in the development efforts of Zambia.
These and other critics of the PovertyFocused Approaches cite a host of
flaws that detract from their utility. Higgins (1981), for example, in
criticizing Basic Needs mentions the paternalism that it creates and the
culture-relativity that is implied in the definition of its key components as
major weaknesses. Other problems have been associated with it including the
following mentioned by Weigel (1986:1427): (1) the tendency to confuse needs
with preferences; (2) the overdrawn hierarchical distinction between material
and non-material needs; (3) the high priority that is often assigned to the
subjective concept of security in the hierarchy of needs; and (4) the tendency
to identify needs in terms of pathologies associated with deprivation of
particular goods.

94
Yet, in the thinking of other critics the whole idea of equity or
redistribution which embraces these approaches is bad enough. For instance,
Bauer (1981) professes the view that redistributive and welfare policies are a
hinderance to productivity and that they produce situations in which the poor
might be more equal but worse off than without such policies. For his part
Alain de Janvry (1983:258) sees the Basic Needs Approach as nothing more than
institutionalized charity. In his view all the poverty-focused strategies
address policy issues in an ad hoc way and this is because of their
fundamental limitation of theoretical poverty. Ayres (1983:79) also alludes
the theoretical deficiency which plagues these approaches pointing out in
addition that they give insufficient attention to the factors that generate
poverty and only explain poverty in a causal chain that borders on the
tautological.
At another level, Denis Goulet (1979) takes a rather philosophical look
at the competing theories of needs in relation to the question of values. He
makes an important point that the risk of ethnocentrism and bias is inherent
in any attempt to analyze fundamental human needs. This issue raises a number
of ethical questions which most often do not feature in the calculus of the
agenda of development planners and practitioners.
A more articulate response to the critics of the Basic Needs Approach is
offered by Weigel, whose argument is that
[T]he controversy surrounding the "Basic Needs Approach" (BNA)
to economic development largely stems from the fact that it
introduces several anomalies which cannot be resolved by the
"received" paradigm of neoclassical economy theory. I suggest
that the presence of anomaly is not indicative of the conceptual
infeasibility of the BNA, but instead reflects the profound
inadequacies of our current stock of interpretive paradigms.
Consequently there is an urgent need for us to reexamine some of
the core assumptions underlying the economic, political and
ethical paradigms which inform our understanding of human life.
(Weigel 1986:1423)

With this call Weigel (1986:1423) chides that the issue of Basic Needs in
overcoming poverty is one of the few instances in history where rhetoric has
given rise to thought.
95
Land Reform
Land or agrarian reformism in Africa does not have the comparatively long
history nor even the kind of regional importance that the phenomenon invokes
in the political economy of Latin America. In that part of the world agrarian
reform dates back to at least the 1850s in Mexico and to the 1960s in Cuba (de
Janvry 1983:197-8). Elsewhere, in the Middle East for instance, the specific
impacts of land reform in various countries are elaborated upon by Doreen
Warriner (1969). In Africa, the only substantial land reform attempted
recently have been in Kenya (see Wasserman 1976) and in Ethiopia (Brietzke
1976; Stahl 1977).
Peter Dorner's (1972) publication, based mainly on his extensive Latin
American experience and, to a lesser extent, Asia and Africa provides a major
elaboration on the economics of land reform. In this respect, Dorner's work
builds upon earlier studies such as Eckstein's (1955) review paper on the
subject and Raup's (1967) chapter on the relationship between land reform and
agricultural development. Expanding Warriner's (1969) definition, Dorner sees
land reform
in a narrow sense [to] refer to measures to redistribute
land in favour of peasants and small farmers. More broadly
it may be taken to embrace consolidation and registration
in areas where customary tenure is prevalent and also land
settlement on new lands. (Dorner 1972:11)

96
Many analysts similarly view such reform and its potentials within the
overall requirements of development. Land reform is pursued for its assumed
ability to serve a dual developmental purpose, namely, as both a
redistributive instrument and a vehicle for achieving increased productivity
or growth.
For instance, Dorner (1972:19) believes that "while land reform is not a
sufficient measure and needs to be accompanied by many other programmes, it is
often essential for providing a stable base for a country's future economic
and political development." Likewise, Warriner (1969:50) suggests that
"production can only increase if [land reform] is accompanied by investment in
the social and economic infrastructure." The theory then is that at least for
countries where land issues dominate the rural political economy reform is a
necessary condition for growth and development. But in order to enhance growth
and development reform policies need to be complimented by the kinds of
infrastructure which facilitate productivity (see The World Bank 1975b).
A rather interesting perspective on the long-term prospects of land
reform is offered by de Janvry (1983). His critical evaluation of the
political, economic and social implications of land reforms leaves him with
one conviction. He (de Janvry 1983:221-223) asserts emphatically that once
reform policies have succeeded in eliminating "precapitalist social relations
in the rural agricultural sector" reform as a tool for development loses its
legitmacy and importance. Lehmann who earlier perceived the "death of land
reform" argues a similar view stating:
[I]f the problem is poverty and inequality, landlessness
and the unequal distribution of land are only partial
causes thereof. The strategy for the removal or reduction
of inequality and poverty is not adequately formulated in
terms of the distribution of land, and must be approached
differently. (Lehmann 1978:344)

97
Yet, Vernon Ruttan (1986), reviewing land reform programs in the context
of the Latin American experience, believes that a large number of countries
there have been successful in removing some of the most obvious sources of
inefficiency and exploitation associated with the traditional hacienda system.
At the same time, however, he is skeptical of land reforms arguing that there
appear to be relatively few areas where they have been accompanied by the
policies needed to sustain productivity growth in the small peasant sector. He
(Ruttan 1986:52) adds: "there are even fewer areas where the reforms
have succeeded in resolving the problems of equity in the agrarian structure."
The important point to observe about development is that no particular
program ever succeeds by itself. Bell and Duloy (1974:16) drives home this
message by arguing that "land reform needs to be associated with a rural
development strategy to have a really major impact on rural poverty."
Land Resettlement
Conceptually, resettlement or colonization is an aspect of settlement.
Settlement is defined by the World Bank (1978:5) as the "planned or
spontaneous movement of people to areas of underutilized agricultural
potential, both rainfed and irrigated."
Christodoulou (1965) points out that land settlement as a measure for
tackling land problems has had an almost universal appeal. There is hardly a
country in the world which has not undertaken at one time or another a land
settlement program. Consequently, Roider (1971:14) quoting other sources,
indicates that: "Perhaps in no field of agricultural development do there
exist so many unsatisfactory projects as in the area of resettlement."

98
The objectives of land settlement are many and varied and they include,
for example, one or more of the following listed by Christodoulou (1965:1):
(1) the use of "new" land and water resources; (2) the settlement of
unpopulated or underpopulated or frontier areas; (3) the creation of model or
new type communities; (4) the modernization of agriculture; (5) the increase
or diversification of agricultural production; (6) the employment of
unemployed groups; (7) the provision of greater opportunities for
underemployed farmers; (8) settlement or resettlement of various groups such
as nomads, refugees, war veterans, immigrants, people from depressed or
overcrowded areas; (9) the creation of new institutions such as co-operatives,
or of new forms of land tenure and farm organization, demonstration farms,
training or retraining establishments; and (10) generally a new departure in
farming or development in rural areas or regional development.
Land resettlement as a major rural development strategy has been reported
upon extensively. Numerous studies, particularly in Africa, have observed the
respective experiences of settlers be they refugees or forced or voluntary
relocatees (de Wilde 1967; Shaw 1967; Chambers 1969; Scudder and Colson 1979;
Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982).
The performance of resettlement programs is an issue of immense interest
to anthropologists and other social analysts. What accounts for particular
performance outcomes and levels are described in various reports without any
standardized evaluation criteria (Palmer 1975).
For instance, the following variables are cited among others in the
literature to explain the "success" or the "failure" of respective programs:
(1) settlers willingness to cooperate and modernize as well as the personality
and ideals of program managers (Hutton 1968); (2) the traditional social
structures and customary values of settlers (Cosnow 1968); (3) the complexity

99
of the administrative set up of programs as well as the systematic
relationships among managers and settlers within a given socio-political and
economic environment (Chambers 1969); (4) the nature of the attention paid in
the planning process to local conditions and sensitivities (Lumsden 1973); (5)
the macro-level financial costs and the micro-level benefits and profitability
(Roider 1971); (6) the availability and suitability of service infrastructure
(Lawson 1968) and (7) the stresses experienced by relocatees as well as the
strategies that they utilize in the face of particular problems (Scudder and
Colson 1982).
The resettlement literature on Africa recounts in almost all instances
the failure of such programs, the traumatic experiences of settlers, the
unanticipated consequences and the negative impacts that have resulted from
many planned resettlements.
Cases in point include Sutton's (1977) account of the Algerian trauma as
well as the farm settlements in Nigeria evaluated by Olatunbosun (1967) who
suggests several modifications including, for example, the determination of
the property and degree of indebtedness of each farmer, retrenchment of excess
staff and increased participation in decision-making by farmers.
Similarly, in case studies of smallholder agriculture in Tanzania,
underemployment is regarded by Ruthenberg (1968) as the serious problem on
resettlement farms. He observes also that farmers are very conservative
towards innovations where subsistence crops and livestock are involved. This
unwillingness on the part of most settlers to adopt new technology is also
mentioned by Reining (1982) in his study of the Zande in southern Sudan.
Likewise, the Gezira scheme in Sudan is dubbed as an illusion in
development by Barnett (1977, 1981). He argues further that the organizational
structure of the program led to a decline in the quality of life for the

100
tenants and that the production of cotton, the main crop, offered the tenants
little if any return. Thayer Scudder (1973;51), providing a social
organizational perspective on resettlement, observes that relocated people
behave in their new environment as if society was a closed system.
Arthur Lewis (1964:299-309) also recounts the African experiences with
resettlement and labels them as a failure. He explains that
government-organized and executed programs generally fail because they do not
adequately address issues relating to the choice of suitable land, the right
settlers, infrastructure, capital resources, land tenure and acreage and
organizational structures to cater for settler activities.
Silberfein's (1977) work supports this contention. She similarly argues
that most planned settlements around the continent are a disappointment both
from the economic and social points of view. She (Silberfein 1977:19)
attributes this problem to overcapitalization and insufficient attention to
crops, settlers and equipment.
Elsewhere, James (1983) arrives at the same conclusion stating:
"Project-level studies of new agricultural settlements in developing countries
indicate privately financed settlement has been almost universally more
successful than government-financed schemes in terms of economic efficiency
measures such as benefit cost ratios."
Other studies in various Africa situations report the specific dimensions
of the failure. Evidence from the following two countries are illustrative. In
Kenya, von Haugwitz (1972) recalls the inability of many settlers on
smallholder farms to repay their farm loans and credits. In Ghana, the problem
is one of settlers being caught up in a dependency and complaining syndrome.
This was the case at New Mpamu and other settlement towns built by the
government in the 1960s for over 80,000 families inundated as a result of the

101
Volta River Hydro-electric project (Doodo 1970). At the Damongo Land
Development Scheme, undertaken by the British colonial administration in the
1950s, the few families that agreed to be settled were pampered into becoming
"spoilt children" through government's provision of "free housing, free
medical treatment, free mechanical cultivation of their farm and other baits"
(Quansah 1972:22). In the similar case of the Karnba tsetse fly eradication and
agricultural resettlement scheme, when subsidies and gift incentives were
phased out settlers eventually abandoned and departed from the programs
leading to the termination of resettlement operations by the colonial
government (Hilton 1959).
The general theoretical feeling with resettlement programs therefore is
that they hardly live up to their projected expectation. At best they only
succeed in catering for the welfare needs of the poor condemning them
subsequently to a life of dependency on free dole. At worse, as Thayer Scudder
(1982:12) has forcefully summarized, the "negative costs of relocation, like
ripples, spread far beyond their points of origin by demoralising families,
breaking up kin groups, and dividing whole communities and regions."
Household Dynamics and Developmental Cycle
In most rural societies very few people live by themselves. In the
developing countries, in particular, agricultural households are the main form
of socioeconomic organization (Singh _et al. 1986:3) in terms of production
and consumption (Overholt _et al. 1986:21). This is more so in Africa where
Moock (1986:1) observes that household-based cropping and herding communities
constitute the mainstay of agriculture.

102
Households in rural Africa have been much studied by anthropologists and
other scientists interested in issues such as social structure, development
and change (see for instance, Dorjahn 1977; Isaac 1982). Many analysts utilize
the household concept in most current studies especially in terms of the
dynamics of inter- and intra-household processes. These include (1) Jane Guyer
(1986b) who uses an anthropological perspective to apply the household concept
and analysis to the problems of farming systems research; (2) Katharine McKee
(1986) in a discussion of methodological issues in farming systems research;
and (3) Sara Berry (1986) who also takes up the issue of macro-policy
implications of research on households and farming systems. The concept has
also been used in case study contexts by (1) Christine Jones (1986) in her
examination of bargaining processes as a response to the introduction of new
crops in North Cameroon; (2) Pauline Peters (1986) in her study of the
management of cattle, crops and wage labor in Botswana; and (3) by Della
McMillan (1986) in her analysis of production and exchange relations among the
Mossi of Burkina Faso.
Many economists have also used households to look at the relationships
between social organization and domestic economies (Hill 1975; Shaner et al.
1982; Low 1982a, 1982b, 1986a, 1986b). Of primary concern to these
agricultural economists are a variety of household issues relating to
decision-making, resources allocation and participation and management
strategies.
The household developmental cycle concept, introduced into the analysis
of social structure by Meyer Fortes (1949), provides important heuristic
framework for the socioeconomic analysis of traditional or smallholder
farming. In a seminal investigation, originally published in 1925, the Soviet
economist A. V. Chayanov described peasant agricultural behavior in

103
post-emancipation European Russia. In this work, the translation of which is
authored by Thorner _et al. 1966, Chayanov goes beyond the demographic facts
of the cycle to articulate the empirical relationships between household
structure and production activity. He states:
Since the labour family's basic stimulus to economic activity
is the necessity to satisfy the demands of its consumers, and
its work hands are the chief means for this, we ought first of
all to expect the family's volume of economic activity to
quantitatively correspond more or less to the basic elements in
family composition. (Thorner 1966:60)
Over the last few years many researchers who are involved with kin-based
or domestic household economies have used or tested Chayanov's paradigm (see
Sahlins 1971, 1974; Hunt 1979; Low 1982a, 1982b, 1986a, 1986b). The major
preoccupation of these studies has been to empirically replicate the
apparently tautological thesis, or Chayanov Rule, which states that:
[T]he smaller the relative number of workers the more they
must work to assure a given state of domestic well-being,
and the greater the proportion the less they work.
(Sahlins 1974:89)
In exploring this thesis many researchers have calculated the household
consumer/worker ratio and used it as proxy for an "index of household economic
strength." This index embodies a fundamental limitation in analysis in that
the ratio is pre-determined, rather incorrectly, by an oversimplified blanket
process. Traditionally, the ratio is calculated by simply categorizing the age
cohorts up to 15 years and above 64 years to comprise the consumers. Likewise,
those in between 15 and 64 years are taken to be the economically active and
thus assumed to be the workers.
Such a dichotomous conception of workers and consumers reflects only the
reality of western industrial societies where child labor and, to some extent,

104
old-age labor are not encouraged and economically recognized. It also creates
the erroneous impression that households are divided into a mutually exclusive
dichotomy of workers who do not consume and of consumers who do not work. Such
faulty assumptions are not borne out by the reality of the African situation.
In her classic critiques of the household concept in African studies,
Jane Guyer (1980, 1981, 1986b) discounts the upsurge in treating the household
as the fundamental unit to data collection and analysis. She makes a valid
case by pointing out that
[With] a methodology based on household as a major analytical
concept, one cannot look at three critical factors, all of
which seem to be changing in Africa today, with very important
consequences: the relationship between older and younger men;
the relationship between men and women; and the relationship
amongst domestic groups in situations where wealth or control
of resources vary widely. (Guyer 1981:99)
On the basis of this criticism, Guyer (1981:98) is categorical in her
conclusion that the household "model is inaccurate for Africa." Elsewhere, she
(Guyer 1986b:95) argues further that, a related concept, namely, "the
developmental cycle of domestic groups, also presents problems of definition
and understanding."
This criticism does not appear to bother the micro-economists working in
the area of household studies. Ignoring the apparent definitional semantics of
anthropologists, they have found the household a useful unit the behavior of
which they analyze by applying the "utility-maximizing framework" (see Barnum
and Squire 1979:26-27).
Given the complexity of the activities engaged in by agricultural
households most of the economists who rely on the utility model resort to a
conventional approach that makes a number of simplifying assumptions to
achieve analytical solutions. Their premise is that the purpose of households

105
decision-making behavior is to maximize a utility function. The fundamental
assumptions of this analytical model are the household's (1) consumption of
Z-goods (non-market commodities produced and consumed by the household), (2)
leisure, (3) own consumption of agricultural output and (4) consumption of
market purchased goods.
Others have used a variety of operational specifications for their
models. But there are several limitations with these so-called traditional
approaches in economics to explaining household performance (see Singh et
al 1986:22-25). Singh _et al. ( 1986), view the models of the traditional
approach as difficult and costly to estimate. They propose instead a solution
that considers households as price takers. In their analysis conceptualizing
households to be price takers enables the researchers to use the "profit
effect" as the convenient proxy motivating household behavior (Singh _et al.
1986:9-10).
The use of sophisticated models which incorporate such legitimate and
important objectives of economic activity as profit illuminates the
decision-making behavior of rural households. There is the strongest
likelihood, however, that such models fail to grasp the totality of the
crucial objectives that characterize household decision matrices. For example,
profit is not necessarily the means nor the end of the "dreams" sought by such
households.
In rural Zimbabwe it is definitely not the observed and reported dominant
behavioral trait; neither is it the overriding objective in the calculations
of the agricultural households studied. Indeed, one can cite normatively
satisfying values such as prestige, status enhancement and the need to fulfil
cultural obligations as important considerations. Profit maximization is
certainly important. Perhaps what is lacking to make it theoretically relevant

106
to our substantive context is an operational definition to cover these rather
primary social objectives of rural households.
This response also returns to the issue of conceptual limitations raised
by Jane Guyer (1981, 1986) in relation to the household and the developmental
cycle concepts. Her criticism about definition is valid to the extent that
many analysts have perceived the units which make up these models as static
entities. In the illustrative case of the cycle for example, the crucial
structural phases have been defined solely in terms of the age of the
household head. Important as the _de jure head may be in the general frame
of reference, such a restrictive definition does not always contribute to a
better understanding of the respective strengths and limitations of the other
dynamic forces within the household. This flaw is quite prevalent in
households which have _de facto female heads.
More significantly, a static conception of developmental cycle cannot be
used to explain change. But models as conceptual and analytical tools are
constructed to reflect the researcher's perception of the reality that is
observed. There is nothing sacrosanct about them.
Low (1986a, 1986b) has recently operationalized Fortes' phases of the
cycle for Swaziland. If additional refinement in two areas of the analytical
model that the concept generates is done, it can provide analysts with a
powerful anthropological tool to explain variations in intra-household
economic performance. The first requirement is to define phases of the
developmental cycle on the basis of multiple criteria rather than only by the
age of a household head. The second is to assign age category weights to all
household members and use these to calculate an index of household (1)
producer unit and (2) consumer unit.

107
Indeed, that is what Diana Hunt (1979) does in her study of household
resource allocation in Mbere, Eastern Kenya. An index so calculated has
obvious explanatory power that is more objective and useful than one which
sees each household member exclusively as either a producer or a consumer.
Thus, contrary to Guyer's impression, in rural Africa, as in many other
places, one can delineate households and their respective developmental cycles
and use them to understand the "realities" of development.
Conclusion
Many African states have experimented with a variety of the development
strategies discussed in this review. Most of these countries are now under
intense pressure from the International Monetary Fund and western donor
agencies and countries to shift their development emphasis away from the
poverty-focus.ed and equity models on to so-called growth-oriented programs. To
most economists this is the call for minimal government or public
interventions (Buchannan 1985), or the operation of the free market (Bauer
1981). In Bauer's view the market rewards everybody what he or she deserves.
The arguments proposed in support of this call for radical changes in
policy are summarized by Staatz and Eicher (1986:61). These include (1) the
realization that an economic base has to be put in place before any
investments in basic needs can be financed and sustained and (2) the
increasing evidence which shows that it is impossible to achieve any decent
living standard for the bulk of the rapidly growing populations simply by
redistributing existing assets.
With the publication of the World Bank's (1981) scathing criticism of
Africa's "welfare-oriented development policies," the debate about the

108
appropriate development strategy has shifted from equity issues to economic
growth. Eicher (1986a) has written recently about strategic issues to combat
hunger and poverty on the continent. According to him many economists now
contend that expanded growth and international trade are the key to increasing
food security. It is their conviction that the benefits from faster growth
will "trickle down" to all members of society, thus enabling them to purchase
their food needs (see Eicher 1968a:258).~
The debate about Africa's development proceeds in a circular fashion.
Prior to the 1970s it used to be the vogue to emphasize growth. Welfare issues
became important from then to the early 1980s. This was so because of the
failure of the benefits of growth to improve the living conditions of the
majority rural poor in most of the continent. Now, in the second half of the
1980s, while African governments would prefer to promote both equity and
growth at the same time they are being told, in the words of Whitaker
(1986:1), "about what [they] ought to do." The impression is created that the
African policy makers do not have the answers to their problems; neither do
their external financiers, advisors and directors. Development in Africa has
thus become a gamble or an experimental process without controls.
In the judgement of this study, however, the contradictions generated by
the development literature emphasize a missing link. The question to resolve
is how the structural constitution, the social organization and the internal
management of agricultural household units combine to respond in particular
ways to development incentives that are provided by the state. Anthropology
can explicate and use dynamic micro-level concepts such as the household
developmental cycle in relation to the macro-contexts of government policies
to provide better substantive and theoretical insights into what appears to be
the unexplained "parts" of the causes of Africa's economic stagnation.

109
Note
1.) The argument that growth ever "trickles down" to the poor is discredited
in the evaluation of many skeptics. The evidence from many so-called
developing countries of growth without development (see Clower _et al. 1966)
and of the lack of impact of the green revolution (see Cleaver 1972; Griffin
1974) in respect of the poor is overwhelming.
The debate about trade is equally heated. According to Bauer trade acts as a
channel for the flow of human and financial resources and for new ideas,
methods and crops. For him it also provides a large and diverse source of
imports and opens up markets for exports. He is convinced also that it is
altogether anomalous or even perverse to suggest that external commercial
relations are damaging to development or the living standards of the people of
the Third World (see Bauer 1981).
On this issue many skeptics cite protectionism, high tariffs and import
costs and other policies which discriminate against developing countries
especially African primary exporters in the international market. They see
these as negating any likely benefits that accrue to these countries in their
bilateral relations with the developed world (Arnold 1980; Asante 1981, 1984).
For a balanced and comprehensive critique of the "market myth" and other
pertinent issues that are also raised by the World Bank (1981) in its Agenda
for Accelerated Development in Africa and Africa's responses to them see
Green and Allison (i986).

CHAPTER IV
FIELDWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Background Developments Towards Fieldwork
The decision to undertake dissertation fieldwork in Zimbabwe stems from
my long-standing interest in the southern African region as a whole. Around
the summer of 1982 I stumbled across a rather sketchy report about efforts
underway in that country to resettle returning refugees and the landless. This
immediately aroused my curious interest and set me off in search of more
material about the resettlement program. I got only a few papers published by
Harberson (1980), Bill Kinsey (1982) and a couple of feature articles in the
African Report including one written by Frank Ballance (1981).
Having read these papers I was in a position to synthesize a few ideas
into preliminary research questions. I had the personal experience and
familiarity with West Africa. I felt then that an exposure to another region
of the continent, ideally southern Africa, would add a beneficial perspective
to my experience. I believed also that such an exposure would facilitate my
understanding of the wider regional dimensions of the problems and prospects
for African development better.
The African food crisis engaged international attention at the time and I
was looking for a policy-oriented dissertation problem that would enable me to
observe closely (1) how government policies are implemented in rural Africa
and (2) how African farmers respond to such policies in situations of on-going
change and development. The implementation of a massive agricultural
resettlement and rural development program in Zimbabwe thus offered the
opportunities and the challenges which I was looking for.
11U

Ill
After over a year of arranging and waiting for the necessary permission
to travel and conduct the research I arrived in Zimbabwe in January 1985. The
fieldwork was carried out between the months of February and December 1985.
The Extended "Sondeo": Initial Months of Fieldwork
I used the period from early February to the end of March 1985 for
preliminary and informal study of and familiarization with various issues
relating to resettlement and rural development in the country. The informal or
direct observational approach is increasingly being used in applied settings
such as project evaluation and farming systems research. It is regarded as an
effective initial strategy for the quick probing of research problems within
specific geographic locations or fields of interest. Hilderbrand (1981) terms
it the "sondeo," while others refer to it variously as rapid assessment or
appraisal, diagnostic or exploratory survey and reconnaisance study (see for
instance Chambers 1981).
The informal study is defined by Dillion and Hardaker as involving
generally
familiarizing oneself with the area or problem, talking
to appropriate informants such as farmers, farm workers,
storekeepers, moneylenders, officials, religious or social
leaders, and seeking out and reviewing such other relevant
information as may be available in publications, government
or private records. (Dillion and Hardaker 1980:21)
The activities undertaken during the "sondeo" phase consisted of a
combination of learning experiences. These were in the form of library
research, participation in various workshops, meetings and extensive travels.
In Harare, most of my time was devoted to commuting between the then Ministry
of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, the National Archives and the

112
libraries at the University, the Zimbabwe Institute of Development, the
Central Statistical Office and in the Herald House.
At these places I read materials that specifically dealt with the
evolution of the land question as well as about the country's agriculture. In
the Herald House, where the nation's leading daily newspaper "The Herald" and
the weekly "The Sunday Mail" are published, I was fortunate to be allowed
access to the library. From the press clippings I got inklings into rather
diverse views and concerns about agriculture, the resettlement and rural
development issues from the perspectives of the cross-section of Zimbabweans.
In the course of the "sondeo," I also obtained annual reports and
pertinent statistical information from the head offices of the Agricultural
Finance Corporation (AFC), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the Cotton
Marketing Board (CMB) and some farm management data from the offices of the
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU).
The library research was invaluable for documenting the perspectives that
are conveyed in Chapters I and II above. These are in respect of (1)
resettlement as a substantive issue of research interest and (2) the evolution
of the land problem which necessitated the formulation and implementation of
the resettlement policy in postindependence Zimbabwe. The perspectives gained
from the readings also linger on throughout the dissertation as they are
concretized in various expressions and ideas embodied in the other Chapters.
In early February 1985, I sat in a Farming Systems course organized
jointly by CIMMYT, Nairobi, and the Department of Land Management, University
of Zimbabwe. This was for participants drawn from a number of African and
overseas countries. The course afforded the opportunity for my first exposure
to rural Zimbabwe. I participated in a field team diagnostic survey of
smallholder farm problems in the Mangwende Communal Area, Murewa District,

113
Mashonaland East Province (see Figure 4-1). We visited the homesteads and
farms. We also conducted extensive informal interviews and observed aspects of
the social and economic activities of these rural households. These
experiences directly benefited the redesign of my research especially in terms
of refining the study items.
After the initial familiarization with the administrative set up and work
of the various departments, sections and the staff at the Ministry of Lands,
Resettlement and Rural Development I settled down to utilize the materials in
the Ministry's small library. This contained mainly unpublished reports and
mimeographs relating mostly to the feasibility and planning aspects of
individual resettlement schemes throughout the country. I maintained close
contact with the Ministry during the entire fieldwork and also participated as
an outsider in some of its activities.
For instance, my first visit to a resettlement scheme was made on March
6, 1985. I accompanied a Senior Resettlement Officer in the Department of
Rural Development (DERUDE) to attend an Area Board Meeting at the Mufurudzi
Model A Intensive Resettlement Scheme, Shamva District, Mashonaland Central
Province (see Figure 4-1). This meeting or musangano is held every quarter.
It is a kind of educational get together. At the meetings various provincial
and district heads of government agencies and the non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) dealing with resettlement meet face-to-face with the
resettled farmers. The purpose is to discuss and mutually learn about matters
affecting the schemes from the perspectives of the officers, the farmers and
their chosen representatives who serve on the VIDCOs, WARDCOs and the Area
Board. ^
On this first visit, I had the chance to talk both to resettled farmers
and various officers. I also toured and observed a number of resettlement

114
FIGURE 4 1
MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND AREAS VISITED
DURING VARIOUS PHASES OF THE FIELD RESEARCH

115
villages and farms and saw the set up of the Rural Service Center. Finally, we
stopped at the Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme, that being the
first of a number of study and social visits I later undertook to the
2
scheme (see Figure 4-1).
During March 18 and 19, I attended the preliminary sessions of a one-week
training course that DERUDE organized for all Resettlement Officers from the
Mashonaland Region at the Kentucky Hotel, Harare. The opening address was
delivered by the Mashonaland East Provincial Governor, Senator Rwizi Ziyenge.
This was followed by speeches from the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands,
Resettlement and Rural Development and from the Director, DERUDE.
These respectively dealt with the ideological, bureaucratic and technical
aspects of the government's resettlement and rural development policies. There
were invited lectures from the representatives of such agencies as AGRITEX,
the Natural Resources Board and the Department of Cooperatives (DECODE) which
are involved with implementing these policies. Other speakers also presented
materials touching on the nature and problems of their work in the
resettlement schemes. The contributions from the Chief Resettlement Officer,
the Regional Rural Development Officer and the participating Resettlement
Officers were extremely relevant and informative for my work in their detail
of the grassroots dynamics of development program implementation and impacts.
I left the course to participate in a three-day plenary session on the
Elaboration of the Communal Lands Development Plan. This was organized on
behalf of the government by the National Agricultural and Rural Development
Coordination Committee (NARDCC) at Juliasdale, Nyanga District, Manicaland
Province, from March 20 to 22, 1985.
This national workshop was opened with a policy address by the Minister
for Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, the Honorable Moven Mahachi.

116
This was followed by others, including one from the Principal Secretary of the
Ministry, which elaborated on specific aspects of resettlement policy. The
session also brought together a selection of the country's experts whose
duties cover the communal or African rural areas. Among the participants were
(1) various provincial governors and administrators; (2) invited faculty from
the University and the Zimbabwe Institute of Development; and (3) top
officials from the various Ministries, Parastatals and Public Organizations.
Being a meeting of political leaders, academics, bureaucrats and
technocrats, the forum was provided to evaluate the engaging issues of the
deterioration as well as the possibilities for rehabilitation of the Communal
Areas. Resettlement was an important component of the debates. The emergent
perspectives of the workshop ranged from the practical, ideologically
"down-to-earth," the theoretical to the economically and technically feasible.
It thus proved fruitful for my study in facilitating a better
conceptualization and focus on the pertinent issues in the relationships
between the resettlement programs and the development of the Communal Areas.
By the beginning of April 1985, I had gained substantial amounts of
inside knowledge and background information about various aspects of the
resettlement and rural development all through the readings, meetings,
workshops and travels. I was then in the position to redesign the research to
better deal with the dynamics of policy and the contradictions generated by
their implementation.
At this point I decided to structure the main aspects of the field
research into two parts. The first covered the broad or macro-issues of policy
and its implementation. The second related to the processes of rural
development and the responses to resettlement at the farmers' or micro-level.

117
Getting a Closer Look at Resettlement Policy
and Development Implementation
To tackle the first part of the research project it was necessary for me
to maintain a base in Harare. My objective for this phase was to get a closer
look at resettlement policy and the structures and processes of
implementation. This task was confined to DERUDE and other Sections of the
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development using these as my data
sources. DERUDE coordinates at the national level the implementation of the
resettlement in all the eight administrative Provinces of the country.
Here I applied a combination of ethnographic and quantitative data
gathering techniques within anthropology and policy evaluation frameworks (see
Coleman 1975; Cook and Scioli 1975; Johnson 1975; Patton 1980; Casley and Lury
1982; Agar 1986). Specifically, through the use of participant observation,
formal and informal discussions, interviewing and the review of records and
other documents I was able to obtain the kinds of information which are
pertinent to various aspects of the research questions.
After taking a more general look at the problems, the achievements and
prospects of implementation at this highest level I concentrated on the three
Provinces in the Mashonaland Region. These are Mashonaland East, Central and
West (see Figure 2-1). They are all managed from one central office in Harare
under a Regional Rural Development Officer and three assisting Senior
Resettlement Officers.
In collecting data about these Provinces I continued to use some of the
methods which I applied during the "sondeo" phase. For example, at various
times in April and May 1985 I again participated in travels accompanying
senior officers of DERUDE on their routine visits to individual schemes. In
the process of these rather short trips I was able to monitor aspects of

118
program implementation such as farmers' access to and use of resettlement
infrastructures. I also continued to observe more closely variations in
farmers' responses and problems as they expressed them to government
officials.
One of these trips was on April 3 and 4. In the company of Senator
Mudhomeni Chivende, the Provincial Governor of Mashonaland West, the
respective Administrative Officers for Kadoma and Chegutu Districts, the
Regional Rural Development Officer and a Senior Resettlement Officer I toured
the following resettlements: (1) Jondale/Bumbe, Muzvezve and Jompani Model A
Normal Intensive Schemes; (2) Ngezi, Chegutu 6 and Hamilton Hills Model A
Accelerated Intensive Schemes and (3) Tashinga Model B Producer Cooperative
Scheme (see Figure 4-1). This was another opportunity to learn more about
various issues on development and their elaboration as viewed by national
leaders such as the Governor. Among the many issues that resettled farmers
brought to the attention of the Governor in the various places we visited
3
were, for instance, poach grazing, squatting and the security situation.
Again in the company of the United Kingdom-Zimbabwe Resettlement Review
Team, I travelled through the Mashonaland Central Province. This was on April
22 when the Team inspected the Mount Darwin Model A Normal Intensive Scheme,
Mount Darwin District, and the Batsiranayi Model B Producer Cooperative
Scheme, Shamva District (see Figure 4-1). On this particular trip I observed,
among other things, the following activities: (1) plowing competition among
the Model A resettled farmers and the problems that they face in manually
tilling their land; (2) immediate post-harvest storage techniques for maize;
and (3) the additional responsibilities imposed on women's time in the
production of vegetables for household consumption. In the Model B scheme I
had the chance to ask questions and learn about the kinds of assistance that

119
Producer Cooperatives receive from the government and from the
non-governmental organizations.
My other travels with DERUDE officers, respectively, were to the
following resettlements: (1) Pote 2 Accelerated Intensive Scheme, Karoi
District, Mashonaland West Province on May 13; (2) the Copper Queen Normal
Intensive Scheme, Gokwe District, Midlands Province on May 17 and 18; (3)
Muzvezve Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, Kadoma District, Mashonaland West
Province on June 3; and (4) Kubudirira Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme,
Shamva District, in the Mashonaland Central Province on July 10 (see Figure
4-1). The Pote 2 and the Copper Queen trips were undertaken in the midst of
the evacuation of groups of squatters from the former scheme and their
resettlement in Copper Queen. Being one of the most controversial issues in
resettlement implementation the squatter issue presents serious and
politically charged problems to the government. The two trips gave me the rare
opportunity to follow up on my readings of various memoranda about squatting
4
with field observations.
In the course of these travels I took extensive notes and had the
opportunity to deepen my interaction with resettled farmers and government
officers. I gained broader perspectives on the resettlement and better
insights into the problems, the achievements and the challenges within the
individual schemes than would otherwise have been possible. I was able also to
pretest some of my research questions with both the farmers and the officers.
More importantly, these "official" trips gave me the recognition and the
necessary contacts at the national, provincial, district and the scheme
levels. This facilitated an easy establishment of rapport and the acceptance
of my research by the numerous informants and respondents particularly during
the critical phase of the survey research when I operated independently.

120
Apart from DERUDE and its Resettlement Section the other documentation
used in the preparation of Chapters V and VI was obtained from the Evaluation
and Monitoring Section of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural
Development. Operating within these agencies from a distance I was able to
examine and extract a wide range of information from the monthly, quarterly
and annual reports that are routinely issued by DERUDE.
These reports provide summaries of the progress and problems relating to
all resettlement schemes in each of the eight administrative Provinces in the
country. The reports follow a standard format. They are divided into four main
headings to cover Administration and Finance, Resettlement, Planning and
Statistics, respectively. Under each heading brief but comprehensive summary
accounts of relevant developments are given for various sub-headings or study
items and variables. Among these, for instance, are those which cover
staffing, agricultural developments and social and community development.
The section reporting various statistics provide aggregate data for each
Province. This is broken down into the following categories: (1) resettlement
model; (2) scheme name; (3) district of location; (4) total area of the scheme
and its extent within particular natural regions; (5) number of families that
the scheme is planned for; (6) the month's allocation of families for
resettlement in the scheme; and (7) the total number of families that have
taken up resettlement in the scheme.
In addition, figures about what are termed "primary" and "secondary"
development, respectively, are also given. The former covers such specific
infrastructures as boreholes, wells, cattle dips and roads. Secondary
development refers to schools, classrooms, teachers houses, clinics and staff
houses. The total number of such infrastructures planned for each scheme is
given along with information about the state of their respective development

121
as to whether or not the particular service has been provided and is
operational.
In June 1985, a set of three self-administered evaluation questionnaires
was given to all the Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region. The
officers were asked to rate various indicators or study items relating to the
different resettlement models and schemes that they had managed.^
The study items, chosen to reflect the special characteristics of each of
the three resettlement models, asked for the Resettlement Officers
perceptions' about the following: (1) the attitudes and performance of the
resettled farmers; (2) the input performance of various implementing agencies
and service organizations; and (3) the current problems and the long-term
prospects for the schemes. The questionnaire about the Model A Normal
Intensive Schemes contained 38 items, that on the Model A Accelerated
Intensive Scheme had 19 items, while there was only 9 items on the Model B
Producer Cooperatives (see Appendix B, Tables B-l to B-3).
Finally, in October 1985, a 26 item questionnaire was also mailed to four
selected Model B Producer Cooperatives in the Mashonaland East and three in
the Mashonaland West Provinces to elicit the responses of the respective
Management Committees about issues ranging, among others, from the number of
existing committees to recommendations for solving the problems of the
cooperatives (see Appendix C).
I personally interviewed the management of seven of the eight Model Bs in
the Mashonaland Central Province during the same period. In all then, 15 of
the 21 Model Bs in the Region were covered in this Management Survey. They are
Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Ruenda, Kurima Inhaka, Kushingirira and
Simba Youth in Mashonaland Central; Kumhanya, Marowa, Tabudirira and Tamuka in
Mashonaland East and Ganyangu, Mukuwapasi and Nyamakate in Mashonaland West

122
Provinces, respectively (see Figure 3-1). The data obtained for the first part
of the research is presented in Chapter VIII below.
Ethnographic Survey and Observations
For the second part of the research, I decided to take a detailed
regional look at the outcomes and the responses to resettlement as they are
manifest at the grassroots, that is, at the level of farm households and
villages. The proposal was to do this within the context of the general
agricultural and rural development processes going on in one of the Provinces.
It became clear to me from the very beginning that a case study approach was
the best methodology for looking at the micro-level issues of farmer
responses, attitudes, perceptions and problems.
Consequently, I decided to select the Mashonaland Central Province for a
regional case, study. The choice of this Province was a purposive decision
which was influenced by at least three important considerations.
The Province is certainly the primary agricultural area in the country
(see Chapter II). It offers a unique and contrasting distribution of all the
major farming systems available within close proximity of each other.
Secondly, peasant families from some of its former Tribal Trust Lands are
among the most politically conscious in the country. Areas such as Dande (Lan
1985), on the northern border with Mozambique as well as Chiweshe and Maziwa
(Wienrich 1975) were actively involved in one way or another with the land
question.
Many of the so-called strategic villages or "keeps" were set up in these
areas by the Rhodesian regime. The spirit mediums and the young men and women
in various parts of the Province were among the early converts who committed

124
and Lury strongly argue. In their view
case studies may be the evaluator's most appropriate medium
for investigating causality. They are certainly simpler to
organize than the longitudinal data series with its demands
for an appropriately timed baseline and a continuation beyond
the implementation period. (Casley and Lury 1982:28)
For the case study I felt that its central focus of organization should
be the Model A Normal Intensive variant, obviously the most widespread and
currently the most important of all the resettlement models (see Chapter V
below). There were two Model A Normal Intensive Schemes in the Province in
1985. These are (1) Mufurudzi in the Shamva District and (2) Mount Darwin in
the Mount Darwin District (Figure 8-1). At the time, the Mutungagor
Accelerated Intensive Scheme and the recently acquired adjoining farms, all in
the Centenary District, were in the process of being consolidated and planned
to resettle 298 families. The scheme was also being upgraded to form the third
Normal Intensive Scheme in the Province to be called Karuyana.
Thus, having decided to focus the case study primarily around the Model A
project, Mufurudzi became the obvious choice. The scheme has been in operation
since 1980 and thus is much older than the others. It also has the largest
number of resettled farmers, 566 in all. Moreover, Mufurudzi has proceeded
beyond the "uncertain" to a more "assured" developmental stage. In terms of
Thayer Scudder's (1984) typology of resettlement evolution, the Mufurudzi
scheme has moved from the "conservative, risk averse, closed and transitional
stage" into one of "economic and social development, handing over and
incorporation." I thus found Mufurudzi more amenable than the other schemes to
a systematic study and observation of the policy impacts and responses to
resettlement

123
their resources to the politico-religious and military aspects of the
liberation war during the 1970s. Through the close collaboration of people in
these areas the African nationalist or guerrilla forces inflicted a lot of
casualties, sabotage and destruction on European farms and property in the
region. These acts led to the abandonment or underutilization of many farms.
As a result some of the early acquisitions of land for resettlement by the
government occurred in the province.
Indeed and finally, one of the oldest Model A schemes, Mufurudzi, and the
very first Model B scheme to be opened in the country, the Simba Youth
Cooperative, are all located in the Province (see Figure 8-1).
The decision to use a regional case study approach was also influenced by
various reasons. Coming into anthropology from geography with a regional
development background, I found it much more insightful to see cultural
expressions through spatial perspectives. Moreover, it is common knowledge
that the non-randomness of the empirical populations that anthropologists
often select for study introduces major methodological problems.
The most serious of these are in the area of validity (Carmines and
Zeller 1981; Kirk and Miller 1986). A regional approach to the study of
anthropological problems is one solution that has the potential to mitigate
some of the confounding validity problems in field research. Indeed, Allen
Johnson (1979:55) writing about anthropological quantification in research
design rightly suggests that a "practical solution to this problem [of
non-randomness] is to include a regional survey as a preliminary part of any
research project."
Similarly, a case study methodology also facilitates the effective
execution of ethnographic or anthropological research particularly in applied,
needs assessment or policy evaluation settings. This is a point that Casley

125
In order to place the case study in context and make it much more
meaningful than would otherwise be the case, I decided to compare and contrast
Mufurudzi with the other farming systems in the Province. Thus, in addition to
the Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, the following sectors were also studied:
(1) the Model A Accelerated Intensive Resettlement; (2) the Model B Producer
Cooperative; (3) the Communal Area (Peasant); (4) the Small-Scale (African)
Commercial; and (5) the Large-Scale (European) Commercial. A sample of farmers
representing various units within each of these six farming systems or sectors
was therefore selected and interviewed.
For the Model A Accelerated Schemes two out of a provincial total of
seven were chosen for their close proximity to Mufurudzi. The two schemes are
Shamva and Bindura located in the Shamva and Bindura Districts, respectively.
Of the eight Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes in the Province five
were studied. These are (1) Batsiranayi; (2) Kubudirira; and (3) Simba Youth,
all in the Shamva District; (4) Chakoma; and (5) Kushingirira both in the
Mount Darwin District.
There are three Communal Areas that are adjacent to Mufurudzi. They
comprise (1) Bushu in the Shamva District; (2) Madziwa in the Madziwa District
and (3) Kandeya in the Mount Darwin District. Eleven subdivisions were studied
all drawn from the three Communal Areas.
Two Small-Scale Commercial Areas are also located in the Province and to
the north of Mufurudzi. These are Karuyana and Chesa within the two respective
Intensive Cultivation Areas. The survey covered farmers drawn from the two
areas to represent that sector. Finally, for the study of the Large-Scale
Commercial farmers the Bindura Intensive Conservation Area (ICA) was chosen
(see Figure 4-1 and Figure 7-1).

126
These case study areas are all spatially distributed within a maximum
distance of 70 kilometers from our operational base in the Mufurudzi scheme
where I stayed initially at Chindunduma. For the duration of the interviews,
the research team, made up of one senior investigator, four assistants and
myself, lived at Chiruma Secondary School situated in a block of land in the
northern part of Mufurudzi (see Figure 7-2). In all cases, except for the
Large-Scale Commercial farmers, the research team commuted from Chiruma
travelling from one research site to the other and interviewing farmers
individually in their homes within the villages, or the homestead. On a few
occasions, towards the end of the survey when farmers started their land
preparation and planting, some of them were only reached and interviewed in
their respective farms.
Data Collection Techniques
Given the research problem and the evaluative nature of this study it was
thought appropriate to use survey techniques within our case study
methodology. This is what Alan Rufus Waters, writing about understanding
smallholder agriculture, recommends. In his view the "sample survey ... is
the best available tool for collecting information in rural Africa" (Waters
1974: 56).
But in order to be able to use a sample survey effectively to benefit the
needs and the goals of any research certain guiding principles have to be
accepted and followed. This is even more so under the "African conditions," as
Spencer (1972:19-22) elaborates, where special strategies are called for if
(1) farmer cooperation, (2) enumerators commitment and (3) the ability to
collect "sensitive" information are to be assured.

127
In soliciting for the cooperation of farmers it was found useful to
emphasise two important points always at the initial or introductory meetings
with farmers. The first is that I had read about the efforts underway by the
government of Zimbabwe to distribute lands and improve the country's
agriculture. I was therefore in the country as a research student to learn
more about agricultural programs from the perspective of the farmers
themselves. This was to enable me to write a book which my university required
as a condition for granting me a doctoral certificate. With the second point,
I related an old African maxim to the farmers. This is to the effect that
"since he who is cutting the path through a thicket never turns to observe if
he is charting a straight line, it is always useful for leaders, such as in
government, to be informed about the impacts of and the responses to their
implemented policies." Consequently, the book that I was researching to write
would be of help to the government in its planning and policy formulation
about farmers and the rural areas where they live.
Though some farmers, out of mere curiosity perhaps, often seemed to
wonder about the wisdom in ray travelling away all the way from home in Ghana
to ask of them the kinds of simple questions contained in the survey
instrument, they always appeared pleasantly amazed, proud and elated to be the
focus of a book, very friendly and extremely helpful.
Thus, except in the rather surprising case of the Large-Scale Commercial
or European farmers, the research did not encounter any of the out of the
ordinary problems of fieldwork. It generally received the maximum cooperation
from all the respondents, both farmers and government field officers that we
came into contact with.*7 The major problem experienced in this research
was logistics, mainly prohibitive expenses with typing, xeroxing, printing
g
and, more seriously, travel and excessive fuel costs.

128
Study Variables
A set of different questionnaires embodying issues that
characteristically reflect matters of interest to each farming system was
prepared and administered to the farmers from each system. In the main, the
questions or study variables broadly covered the following categories of
research interests: (1) farmers perceptions about on-going developments in the
areas of resettlement and agriculture; (2) ratings of and attitudes or
responses towards specific services available to farmers; (3) access to and
control over particular resources such as production assets and consumption
items; (4) farm-level needs and farmer constraints; and (5) agricultural
performance. In addition, each such questionnaire, except in the case of the
Large-Scale Commercial or European farmers, also contained a section which
addressed socio-demographic and household composition variables.
The number of study variables that the survey covered ranged from a low
of 35 in the case of the Large-Scale Commercial farmers to a maximum of 96 for
both the Model A and the Small-Scale Commercial farmers (see Appendix D,
Tables D-l to D-5).
Sampling Techniques
The nature of the residence characteristics of the farm households in the
various farming systems covered by the survey necessitated the application of
different sampling techniques to select farmers for the interviews.
Our central case study unit, Mufurudzi Model A Normal Intensive
Resettlement Scheme, contains a total of 566 resettled families or households.

129
These reside in 18 nucleated villages. Being essentially an exploratory and
baseline study I was prepared to take a complete census by interviewing all
households in Mufurudzi. But given the time constraint and the limited
financial resources at my disposal this was obviously not practicable.
Nevertheless, my objective was to achieve a credible and adequate
representation by taking a cue from the evaluation recommendation given by
Fitz-Gibbon and Morris (1984:158-159) to work with a large sample size.
The villages rather than the list of resettled heads of households formed
the basis of the sample frame. I calculated a productivity index for all the
18 villages. This was done using the 1983-84 aggregate output data for maize,
the most important subsistence and the most widely cultivated cash crop in the
scheme (Zimbabwe 1984c).
On the basis of this index all the villages were ranked and assigned to
three strata. Four villages, namely, Magadzi, Gwetera, Takawira and Nehanda
with 27 percent of all households in the scheme, were the most productive for
that particular year recording from 1.6 to 2.0 tons of maize per hectare. The
majority of households, that is, 65 percent of them spread across eleven
villages, obtained a range of 1.1 to 1.3 tons per hectare. These are Tongogara
2, Denda, Mudzinge, Chitepo, Mukwari, Banana, Gatu, Zvomanyanga, Chimburukwa,
Zvataida and Tongogara 1 (see Figure 7-2). The remaining three villages,
namely, Muringaraombe, Mutoramhepo and Mupedzanhamo with 10 percent of the
households, each produced less than 1 ton of maize per hectare (Table 4-1).
The villages are characterized by such spatial and structural variations
as differential proximity to the main tarred road and differences in
population size. Given these differences, the variations in productivity and
the available research resources, a decision was made to cover 12 out of the
18 villages to provide an adequate sample size for the Mufurudzi survey.

TABLE 4 1
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: LIST OF VILLAGES, MAIZE
PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE VILLAGES SELECTED FOR CASE STUDY
LIST OF
VILLAGES
MAIZE YIELD
1983-84
(KGS/HECTARE)
VILLAGE
SELECTED
FOR STUDY
STRATUM I
1. Magadzi
1960.6
Yes
2. Gwetera
1942.3
Yes
3. Takawira
1709.2
Yes
4. Nehanda
1626.9
Yes
STRATUM II
5. Tongogara 2
1319.5
No
6. Denda
1209.8
No
7. Mudzinge
1183.0
Yes
8. Chitepo
1173.3
Yes
9. Mukwari
1157.4
No
10. Banana
1149.8
Yes
11. Gatu
1113.4
Yes
12. Zv ornan yang a
1107.8
Yes
13. Chimburukwa
1105.5
No
14. Zvataida
1065.8
Yes
15. Tongogara 1
1059.8
No
STRATUM III
16. Muringamorabe
942.5
Yes
17. Mutoramhepo
899.4
Yes
18. Mupedzanharao
623.5
Yes

131
The four villages from Stratum I and the three from Stratum III, being the
extreme cases, were purposely selected for the study. Using a table of random
numbers, an additional five out of the remaining eleven from stratum II were
also chosen.
The distribution and some characteristics of all the villages in
Mufurudzi, including those which were selected for study, are given in Table
8-14 in Chapter VIII below. These are Banana, Chitepo, Gatu, Gwetera, Magadzi,
Mudzinge, Mupedzanhamo, Muringamombe, Mutoramhepo, Nehanda, Takawira and
Zvataida (see Figure 7-2). For methodological reasons it was decided, once the
sample villages were selected, to cover every resettled household head
9
present. Of the total of 361 households in the 12 selected villages, 349
or 96.7 percent were interviewed (Table 4-2).
Following the same lines one village each was selected among the
respective total of three each in the Shamva and Bindura Model A Accelerated
Intensive Schemes. In Shamva, Sanye 1 was chosen and 22 of the 24 households
were interviewed. Likewise, for Bindura, 17 out of the 20 households in
Chidumbwi 1 were interviewed (Figure 7-1). In all, 39 households amongst the
44 selected for the Model A Accelerated Intensive Scheme were reached, thus
giving an effective coverage rate of 88.6 percent (Table 4-3).
Five of the eight Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes were also selected
for the case study. These are Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kushingirira
and Simba Youth. All the members, numbering 151, actually present in the
schemes during the survey period in October 1985 were interviewed. This
represents 65.9 percent of the members reported to be registered with the
Cooperatives during that month (see Table 4-4).

TABLE 4-2
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: VILLAGES, HOUSEHOLDS,
AND THE NUMBER SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED FOR CASE STUDY
132
VILLAGES
IN THE
SCHEME
TOTAL VILLAGE NUMBER OF
NUMBER OF SELECTED HOUSEHOLDS
HOUSEHOLDS FOR STUDY INTERVIEWED
(TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS)
1. Banana
13
Yes
12
2. Cbitepo
30
Yes
30
3. Chimburukwa
25
No
0
4. Denda
38
No
0
5. Gatu
50
Yes
48
6. Gwetera
32
Yes
32
7. Magadzi
51
Yes
49
8. Mudzinge
33
Yes
30
9. Mukwari
38
No
0
10. Mupedzanhamo
13
Yes
13
11. Muringamombe
28
Yes
28
12. Mutoramhepo
14
Yes
14
13. Nehanda
39
Yes
38
14. Takawira
31
Yes
29
15. Tongogara 1
51
No
0
16. Tongogara 2
14
No
0
17. Zvataida
27
Yes
26
18. Zvoraanyanga
40
No
0
566
(361)
349

133
TABLE 4-3
SHAMVA-BINDURA MODEL A ACCELERATED SCHEMES: VILLAGES,
HOUSEHOLDS AND THE NUMBER SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED FOR
CASE STUDY
VILLAGES
IN THE
SCHEME
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
HOUSEHOLDS
VILLAGE
SELECTED
FOR STUDY
(TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS)
NUMBER OF
HOUSEHOLDS
INTERVIEWED
SHAMVA
1. Sanye 1
24
Yes
22
2. Sanye 2
33
No
0
3. Sanye 3
28
No
0
BINDURA
4. Chidumbwi
1 33
No
0
5. Chidumbwi
2 20
Yes
17
6. Chavakadzi
34
No
0
172
(44)
39

TABLE 4-4
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: REPORTED
MEMBERSHIP AND THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS/HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED
COOP
SCHEME
REPORTED
MEMBERSHIP
(OCT 1985)
SCHEME
SELECTED
FOR STUDY
MEMBERS/
HOUSEHOLDS
INTERVIEWED
1. Batsiranayi
69
Yes
39
2. Chakoma
79
Yes
47
3. Kubudirira
26
Yes
19
4. Kuenda
32
No
0
5. Kurima Inhaka
34
No
0
6. Kushingirira
33
Yes
27
7. Nyakudya
88
No
0
8. Simba Youth
22
Yes
19
(383)
(229)
151
Note: Because of the high turnover in many of the Model B
Schemes there is an apparent discrepancy between the
membership figures that are reported every month to the
Resettlement Section of DERUDE and the actual members
present in the particular scheme. The tendency for
overreporting is significant, In October 1935 the 5
Schemes selected for the case study in the Mashonaland
Central Province reported a total membership of 229.
A complete census that the Research Team carried out
around the same period showed only 151 members present.

135
The sample selection for the three Communal Areas, namely, Shamva,
Bindura and Kandeya was done in consultation with the officers of AGRITEX in
Shamva, Bindura and Mount Darwin, respectively. The technique used here was
cluster or area sampling. First, the subdivisions surveyed were identified on
airphoto mosaics.
Given the size and the settlement density of the area I decided on the
number of farmers to interview. The names of farmers were then provided by the
Extension Worker in charge of the particular subdivision. Each list supplied
was already divided equally into three strata corresponding to the "more
progressive," the "averagely progressive," and the "less progressive" farmers.
In all, 62 out of a target of 75 households from 11 subdivisions in the three
Communal Areas were surveyed. These are distributed as follows: (1) 31 from
Goora, Makubvu, Nyamaropa and Svesve in Madziwa; (2) 16 from the three Bushu
subdivisions of Chishapa, Gono and Jiti; and (3) the remaining 15 from
Mandeve, Mashanga, Mungando and Matope/Kapfudza in Kandeya (Table 4-5). (See
Figure 7-1.)
The samples from Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale Areas were similarly
drawn with the assistance of the AGRITEX field officers in Mount Darwin. For
its size Chesa, with 623 farms, is made up of six subdivisions. Nyajenje, the
subdivision closest to Mufurudzi was selected and added to Karuyana for the
study (see Figure 7-1). I decided to cover a total of only 9 farmers in
Nyajenje and 12 in the more accessible Karuyana. This was because of
transportation and accessibility problems and the fact that the research team
had not previously visited to get acquainted with farmers in the two areas as
it was the case with most of the other research sites.
Similar to what was done in the case of the Communal Area farmers AGRITEX
supplied me with the list of the names of the 21 Small-Scale Commercial

136
TABLE 4-5
COMMUNAL AREA (PEASANT) SECTOR: AREAS,
SUBDIVISIONS
, HOUSEHOLDS
SELECTED AND
INTERVIEWED
AREAS
SUBDIVISIONS
SAMPLE
HOUSEHODS
SELECTED
HOUSEHOLDS
INTERVIEWED
. Madziwa
Goora
12
10
Mukubvu
6
4
Nyamaropa
6
5
Svesve
12
12
!. Bushu
Chi shapa
6
5
Go no
6
5
Ji ti
6
6
i. Kandeya
Handeve
6
4
Mashanga
3
3
Mungando
6
4
Matope/Kapfudza 6
4
(75)
62

137
farmers divided up equally into the "more progressive," the "averagely
progressive," and the "less progressive." All the selected farmers except one
from the more progressive stratum in Karuyana were interviewed (Table 4-6).
Finally, using the 1934 Telephone Directory of Rural District Councils,
towns and municipalities and a 1:100,000 land use map supplied to me by the
AGRITEX office in Bindura, a list of 78 Large-Scale Commercial Farmers was
prepared for the Bindura Intensive Cultivation Area (ICA). Out of this list a
total of 41 farmers were selected using a table of random numbers. These
farmers were mailed an introductory letter about the study. This was followed
by a self-administered questionnaire, complete with a return address and
stamped envelope. Only 10 of the sample farmers responded, one of them
requesting to be excused from participation for personal reasons thus leaving
nine (Table 4-7).
In all the survey obtained interview responses from a total of 630
farmers distributed across the six sectors or farming systems. These are as
follows: (1) 349 farmers in the Model A Normal Intensive Scheme; (2) 39 in the
Model A Accelerated Intensive Scheme; (3) 151 in the Model B Producer
Cooperative Schemes; (4) 62 in the Communal or Peasant sector; (5) 20 in the
Small-Scale Commercial sector; and (6) 9 in the Large-Scale Commercial sector.
Data Handling and Analysis
The post-fieldwork handling and analysis of the data turned out to be an
overwhelming chore mainly because of the division of the research into two
parts, that is, the macro or policy and implementation aspect on one hand and
the micro or farmers' responses on the other.

TABLE 4-6
SMALL-SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS SECTOR:
AREAS, HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED
138
INTENSIVE
CULTIVATION
AREA
TOTAL
HOUSEHOLDS
SAMPLE
HOUSEHOLDS
SELECTED
HOUSEHOLDS
INTERVIEWED
1, Chesa Nyajenje
96
15
9
2. Karuyana
68
15
11
(164)
30
20
TABLE 4-7
LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS SECTOR:
AREA, FARMERS IDENTIFIED, SAMPLED AND SURVEYED
INTENSIVE
FARMERS
FARMERS SAMPLED/
FARMERS RESPONDING
CULTIVATION
IDENTIFIED
MAILED
TO
AREA
QUESTIONNAIRE
QUESTIONNAIRE
1, Bindura
73
41
9

139
Within each part, additional handling problems came up. This was the
result of the subdivisions into provincial, model type and other geographic
units which the comparative nature of the study imposed on the data. The
breadth of the study items also compounded rather than minimized the
analytical workload. For instance, over 37,300 responses to mostly open-ended
questions were generated by the 388 Model A resettled farmers alone, not
mentioning the other remaining 242 farmers.
Content analysis was applied to study the macro and essentially aggregate
information collected from the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural
Development. This necessitated the organization and coordination of the data
and its indexing into categories of study items and substantive themes.
The primary survey data, involving the questionnaire in respect of (1)
the individual resettlement schemes evaluated during the first part of the
research and (2) the subsequent responses of farmers, required extensive
scrutiny. First, each specific response to all study item in every individual
questionnaires was examined carefully and tabulated to derive patterns of
responses. These were then used in the construction of coding frames and
instructions. Once this was completed, the answers in each questionnaire were
coded into appropriate categories of responses. The codes so tabulated were
put on floppy disks and then analyzed using the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) computer program at the University of Florida North
Eastern Regional Data Center.
Where necessary, simple frequencies of the study items have been
generated and are presented in various tables. The purpose of this is to
establish possible patterns of relationships and variations upon which further
empirical studies can be based and more rigorous statistical analysis derived.

140
Notes
1.) Organization and participation are of major interest to most analysts of
development be they anthropologists, public choice economists or political
scientists. Indeed, writers such as Cernea (1983) and Garcia-Zamor (1985)
discuss this issue in much detail. Bratton (1986) also looks at farmer
organizations and agricultural production in Zimbabwe. Currently, both
development aid donors and recipients alike advocate participation of local
residents in projects as a management technique to increase effectiveness.
In Zimbabwe the encouragement of grassroots organization of farmers is part
of the resettlement and rural development policy. In the thinking of the
government the participation of the povo or the so-called masses in
decisions is in line with its commitment to socialist ideals. Raising the
political consciousness of the povo is a responsibility that the ruling
ZANU-PF party has taken upon itself and is pursuing vigorously. The objective
is to promote effective and beneficial development and implementation of
national policy agendas. It is accepted also that by so doing the constituency
and support base of the party and the government will be enhanced as the
country moves towards the institutionalization of a one party state.
In 1984, the Office of the Prime Minister directed that village-level
organizational structures be set up in all African rural areas. Consequently,
Resettlement Officers together with their teams of extension, cooperative and
community development assistants are charged with the responsibility to
organize farmers in the various schemes. For instance, in Mufurudzi like in
all the other Model A Schemes farmers are organized into a three-tier system
as follows: (1) each of the 18 villages constitutes a Village Development
Committee (VIDCO) under a popularly elected chairman; (2) representatives of
the nearby VIDCOs are also organized at the next level into the Ward
Development Committee (WARDCO) of which there are 4 in the scheme; and (3) at
the highest scheme level of organization is the Area Board of WARDCO
representatives (see Figure 5-1). The Area Board is under an elected chairman.
The Board is the farmers' institution which directly laises with the
"government." The Area Board representatives in Mufurudzi serve on the
Charainuka District Council, Madziwa Township, thus linking the scheme with
the local government system.
It must be mentioned also that in Mashonaland Central, a Province that is
claimed to be "100 percent ZANU-PF," the influence of the ruling party in the
organization of these local-level farmer institutions is quite significant. It
is customary for every speaker at a musangano or important meeting to
precede any speech or contribution by first raising a clinched fist and
reciting important party or national slogans. Some common slogans include, for
example, Pamberi ne (Prime Minister Comrade Robert Mugabe, /Jongwe/,
/Minda Mirefu/, /Vuremende/, /Kurima/, etc). (Forward with the Prime
Minister, /the Cockerelthe party emblem/, /the Government/,
/Resettlement/, /Agriculture/, etc.). All such slogans always end with a
denounciation of the "enemies,": Pasi ne (dissidents, /Muzorewa/,
/ZAPU/, /mbava/, etc). (Down with the dissidents [in Matabeleland],
[former Prime Minister of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, Bishop] /Muzorewa/, [the
opposition party] /ZAPU/, /thieves/, etc).
At the village level the responsibility of the youth in the VIDCOs is to
constitute a vigilant brigade in charge of security.

141
2.) During the stay of the research team at Chiruraa School and in the course
of our daily field trips we depended on the nearby retail shops for most of
our provisions. These shops are located in the Madziwa Mine, the Rural Service
Center, Chitepo Village, Ponesai Vanhu Institute and Simba Youth Cooperative.
Three of these are licensed also to operate beer halls. Simba Youth is one
such hall which serves soft drinks and the locally popular chibuku sorghum
beer. Indeed, after our interviews of the members of Simba Youth we came to
know them well. It became a customary routine for us to stop at the
Cooperative every evening when time permitted to either buy personal needs,
refresh ourselves, eat sadza or just fraternize with friends. Through this
close interaction I gained more insights into the backgrounds of most of the
members and developments within the scheme than were possible otherwise.
3.) All the resettlement schemes around the country encounter certain kinds
of problems. These are reported to DERUDE every month by the Resettlement
Officers. Nationally the most common of these is "poach grazing." The schemes
adjoin Communal Areas. Consequently, farmers in those areas lacking adequate
grazing or pastures allow their cattle and other livestock to stray into the
schemes. In most cases these farmers steal the barb-wire boundary fencing
which physically separates the schemes from the Communal Areas.
In addition to these some of the schemes in the Mashonaland West Province
had problems which may be termed special. During our tour in 1985 the most
serious of these problems was the security situation. Bands of so-called
"South African sponsored ZAPU-PF dissidents," claimed to be operating from
bases within South Africa, Botswana and the Matabeleland Provinces, were
reportedly sighted now and then in or near such schemes as Jompani, Muzvezve
1, Hamilton Hills and Chegutu 6. Other schemes in the Karoi area particularly
Pote 2 was also plagued by "squatters" or illegal occupants of state land.
4.) The problem of illegal occupation of some European farms and state lands
by so-called squatters is particularly acute in such Provinces as Manicaland
and Mashonaland West. As of July 1984, it is estimated that there were about
4,961 squatter family members in the Karoi area, Hurungwe District and about
1,400 in the Chinoyi District all in Mashonaland West. The problem has
necessitated the promulgation by the government of guidelines on ways and
means of controlling it. In every affected area a District Squatter Control
Committee has been formed with the following organizations represented: (1)
the District Administrative Officer as the Chairman; (2) Resettlement Officer;
(3) Resettlement Inspector; (4) the Chairman of the District Council; (5) the
Natural Resources Board's Lands Inspector; (6) officers of the Zimbabwe
Republic Police, the Criminal Investigation Department and the Central
Intelligence Organization; and (7) an official of the ruling ZANU-PF party.
The work of the Committee is hampered in many places by the politically
over-sensitive nature of this issue. Even in official circles the squatting is
viewed with ambivalence. Opinion is divided between some high party officials
and members of the government on one hand and many in the ZANU-PF on the other
as to how to effectively resolve the problem. The former group advocates the
strict adherence to policy. It therefore calls for the forceful removal of
squatters who refuse to follow government's instructions in respect of how to
get registered for resettlement. Squatters are believed to be destroying the
natural resources through their indiscriminate cutting of trees and grass for
houses and fences. They are also accused of cultivating stream banks, an act
which is deemed illegal. In the Mashonaland West Province a meeting of the
squatter committees held in June 21, 1984 at Chinoyi resolved that the

142
provincial governor should visit and address squatters in the affected areas
for "destroying the natural resources, harbouring dissidents, demoralising
morale of commercial farmers, and not being supportive of the government."
The principal proponent of the view that the government be hard on squatters
is the former cabinent member and old-time party leader from the Manicaland
Province, Edgar Tekere. In some cases this view has prevailed and some
squatter settlements have been destroyed. This has been on the orders of the
government often arising from court actions initiated by affected European
farmers. In almost all cases the squatters return and set up again. This is
what perhaps prompts opponents of this line of tough action to question in the
first place how any rational person can say that poor and landless rural
Zimbabweans are "illegally occupying" their own ancestral lands. They argue
that the so-called European farms were forcefully taken away and since many
individuals and families sacrificed themselves in a bloody war to regain the
lands they have the right now to use them for their subsistence.
The squatters also have problems which are unique. A significant proportion
of them are old laborers and aliens who worked on farms that were later
abandoned or purchased by the government from Europeans. These elderly
squatters may need more than resettlement, perhaps social welfare
rehabilitation. For instance, in a survey at the former Xassimure farm within
Pote 2 a total of 67 of the heads of the squatter households did not
apparently qualify for resettlement. This is because of old age or physical
disability. Of this group 22.4 percent were Zimbabweans, 35.8 percent were
Mozambicans, 23.9 percent were Malawians, 16.4 percent were Zambians and the
remaining 1.5 percent were South Africans. Their mean age was 62.8 years with
a mean household size of 4.6 persons.
5.) In June 1985, as part of the government's reorganization of the
Ministries, DERUDE was transferred from the new Ministry of Lands, Agriculture
and Rural Resettlement to that of Local Government, Rural Development and
Urban Development. Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region were also
rescheduled to different schemes and in some cases to different Provinces in
the Region. The evaluation survey was so timed to enable the officers to
respond to the questionnaires immediately after their detachment from the
respective schemes that they previously managed.
6.) During the course of the Model B Cooperative management survey I visited
Batsiranayi on three occasions but never got hold of the Chairman. I left
written and verbal messages with the Vice Chairman and the Secretary but to no
avail. I had previously visited the scheme in the company of the
Zimbabwe-United Kingdom Evaluation Team. I had also met the Chairman and the
Management Committee on various occasions at DERUDE, Harare. The Chairman was
quite aware of my research. At one point I realized that he did not want to
cooperate in the research. I therefore personally interviewed the Committee
for the management survey in his absence during a scheduled visit to the
scheme.
About a month later on November 21 1985, the research team interviewed
members of the Cooperative for the Model B farmers survey, also during the
absence of the Chairman who had previously been notified of our schedule. The
following day I passed through Kushingirira Cooperative on my way to Mount
Darwin. There, the Batsiranayi Chairman who also happened to be visiting
confronted me in obvious anger warning that I did not have his permission to
interview his members and that he would have prevented them from answering the
questionnaire. In his view all researchers were biased against cooperatives

143
and that we should leave them alone. I tried, perhaps successfully, to impress
upon him that I had the permission of the government to do the research and
since Batsiranayi was a public institution it was perfectly alright to do my
work without his input or sanction. Later that day the Chairman apologized to
my senior investigator and subsequently tried to interact more with us on
occasions when we met him at the Madziwa Mine Club House.
7.) Among the Model A resettled farmers there were only three problem
instances that I can recall. The first occurred during the initial public
introduction of the research team subsequent to the interviews of individual
household heads. As it was the case we had visited this particular village the
previous two days to consult with the VIDCO Chairman and his Vice-Chairman
about our impending research. On the morning of the public meeting involving
all the farmers three of them, whom we learned had been brewing and drinking
the illicit kachasu gin all night, apparently did not understand the need
for the research. Matters got worse when my senior investigator in reciting
his slogans mentioned, "Pamberi ne Mushandira Pamwe !" (Forward with the
cooperatives!). Taking that perhaps to mean we were in the village to promote
cooperatives obviously did not sit well with them. It took nearly an hour for
the other farmers to get the situation under control. For the two days that we
visited and interviewed all the farmers in that village no other problems
arose .
The second incident involved a farmer whose questionnaire was incomplete.
The night after our interviews in one village I detected that a page was
originally left out in a filled questionnaire. Our schedule did not allow an
immediate follow up for about a week. Meanwhile, I sent a message to the
Chairman in the village notifying him that we would be back there to complete
the missing section with the farmer. We drove into that village one afternoon,
and in accordance with custom first went to greet the Chairman. Later, we were
told that the farmer in question had left the village that morning and "gone
into hiding to avoid" our meeting him. This was because he did not understand
why he alone of all the people in that village should be interviewed twice.
The third problem was in respect of one of the farmers who is also an
important public servant in the area. Indeed, we became friends in the course
of my visits to the scheme. On two occasions he provided me with
accommodation. During the interview he took a questionnaire which he decided
to fill himself. He kept it for a couple of weeks before filling and leaving
many of the questions unanswered. My senior investigator and I impressed upon
him the need to obtain complete answers. He steadfastly refused to respond to
those questions the answers to which he felt were "obvious" and perhaps too
personal. Among these were those in respect of (1) ownership of household
items and capital assets and (2) about socio-demographic characteristics.
8.) Apart from the major direct expenses such as subsistence and the
development and printing of questionnaire, field transportation was unbearably
expensive. The regional nature of the case study involving interviews in
differently located research sites meant that the team had to move from place
to place. In many instances, some research sites had to be visited three or
more times in order to obtain complete coverage. From our base at Chiruma
school the nearest gas stations were at Mount Darwin 37 kilometers to the
northwest or Shamva 53 kilometers to the south.
Depending upon which village in the scheme that the team was working in we
had to cover distances of at least 50-80 kilometers return trip just to obtain
gas. We could not purchase and store extra quantities for later use. This is

144
because it was illegal to transport gas in any container in a passenger or
public vehicle and not more than 4 liters in a private vehicle. During the
course of the research in 1985 one liter of gas in Harare, Bindura, Shamva and
Mt. Darwin averaged between a low of Z$1.01 to a high of Z$1.07 or around
Z$3.93 (US$2.45) per gallon.
9.) I originally planned to cover only randomly selected farmers in the
survey. In early June 1985, I visited Mufurudzi to pre-test aspects of my
quetionnaire. I decided to do this in Tongogara 1. 1 therefore drew a random
sample of 10 from a list of 50 farmers in the village. On June 6, 1985, I was
accompanied by the Resettlement Assistant to meet the VIDCO Chairman and
farmers. Many of them had already been notified of my research. All the same I
explained it to them and requested to do a pre-test of my questionnaire with
the selected 10 farmers prior to the main survey which was to begin in about 3
months. When I arrived the following morning with a research assistant we
could not obtain farmers' cooperation and participation. Some of the selected
farmers insisted on the coverage of all their neighbors as a condition for
their own participation. Many of those not originally selected also questioned
how "fair" my so-called random sampling was. Though I never understood the
basis of the "suspicions" I was compelled to change the original strategy.
Since these resettlement programs started the government has permitted only
a few field studies in them. The only individuals who have been so lucky all
did their research from the University of Zimbabwe. These are (1) Bill
Kinsey's (1982, 1983) controversial work which generated hysteria by
questioning the wisdom in the government's resettlement policy and (2)
Mumbegwegwi's (1984b) study of the Model B Cooperative resettlements.
The other studies are monitoring activities such as the (1) farm management
studies done by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and
(2) the routine annual census of farm output conducted by the Resettlement
Officers on behalf of the Central Statistical Office. The latter covers all
individual resettled farmers. This fact coupled with the organizational ideals
of the VIDCOs which encourage the participation of everybody rather than a
chosen few militates against partial coverage that random selection entails.
Consequently, I modified the research design to cover selected villages and
the total households in them. Even then, a few individual farmers in some of
the nearby villages which were not selected presented themselves to be
interviewed. Though these were interviewed their questionnaires were never
analyzed for this study.
The foregoing problem which necessitated the use of total rather than
selective coverage of farmers in particular villages is unique to the
resettlement schemes with their nucleated settlements. In the Communal and the
Small-Scale Commercial Areas with dispersed homesteads no such problems were
encountered.

CHAPTER V
AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Introduction
According to Mayer and Greenwood (1980:17) policy is a decision of intent
made on behalf of a collective to influence the behavior of its members
through the use of positive and negative sanctions. Since the attainment of
political independence in 1980 the government of Zimbabwe has formulated an
elaborate agricultural resettlement policy that is now in various stages of
its implementation. In this, the government is collaborating with several
external donor countries, principally the United Kingdom and Kuwait and with
international aid and lending institutions, such as the African Development
Bank and the European Economic Community. Other so-called non-governmental
organizations are also participating in the resettlement program. Among these
are Africare, Redd Barna, Lutheran World Federation and Christian Care.
The major responsibility for the resettlement is in the hands of the
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement which, in addition to
coordinating the participation of the external governments and agencies, also
actively oversees the involvement of numerous Ministries and Departments in
various aspects of the planning and implementation of the program.
The policy dimensions of the entire resettlement program are explicitly
expressed in official publications and pronouncements. These include the
speeches of government members, party leaders and policy makers, official
memoranda and circulars, development plans, budget statements and estimates of
expenditures. The policy blueprint is the Intensive Resettlement Policies and
Procedures (Zimbabwe 1985c).
145

146
At the macro-level this document provides the major source of statements
of intent concerning the objectives, organization, regulations and procedures
that relate to the resettlement. This chapter draws extensively from this
revised document as well as from its previous editions (see Zimbabwe 19Sle,
1983c). Project Reports of some of the individual resettlement schemes
discussed in this chapter also provide additional insights, particularly in
terms of the economic and technical dimensions of resettlement policy at the
micro-level. The reports are important for these vital background information
against which specific outputs or program performance may be measured.
Resettlement Policy Objectives
In 1980, a joint Government of Zimbabwe-Government of the United Kingdom
three-year agreement proposed to resettle 18,000 farm families on 1.1 million
hectares of land at the cost of $60 million (Zimbabwe 1981e:l). These
proposals were revised upward two years later in the Three Year Transitional
National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85 (Zimbabwe 1982b, 1983a). The
Zimbabwe government envisaged then to resettle a total of 162,000 families on
9 million hectares at an estimated cost of $500 million in constant prices
(Zimbabwe 1985c: 1).
By January 1983, a total of 32 resettlement schemes had been established.
These covered 1.2 million hectares and were planned for 22,000 families. Of
this number, 18,400 were already resettled in the schemes (Zimbabwe 1983c:2).
At the end of June 1984, a little over 1.8 million hectares had been purchased
for resettlement at the cost of $50.7 million. As of that time the estimated
number of families that had been resettled was 30,122 representing some
255,000 people (Zimbabwe 1985c:3).

147
In September 1985, of the revised target population of 162,000 families
about 35,000 or 22 percent were already resettled. A total of 171 schemes had
been established for them throughout the country (see Appendix E). Of these,
56 are Model A Normal Intensive Resettlement Projects, 66 are Model A
Accelerated Intensive Resettlement Projects; 48 are Model B Producer
Cooperatives and one is a Model C Resettlement Project (see Table 5-1). (See
below for a description of the Resettlement Scheme Models.)
Currently, the government has no specific time frame as to when
resettlement will be completed. Thus, much as it is proceeding in all earnest
the approach to the program remains flexible. Consequently, all necessary
modifications in policy as well as in implementation will be incorporated into
the program if and when new information and experience warrant such changes.
With the Five Year Development Plan, launched in 1986, a target of 15,000
households is set to be resettled every year (see Zimbabwe 1986d) .
The resettlement is meant to achieve eight specific objectives. These are
(1) to alleviate population pressure in Communal Areas; (2) extend and improve
the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector; through
individual households and cooperatives; (3) improve the standard of living of
the largest and poorest segment of the population; (4) ameliorate the plight
of people who have been adversely affected by war and to rehabilitate them;
(5) provide opportunities for people who have no land and who are without
employment and may therefore be classed as destitute; (6) bring abandoned or
underutilized land into full production as one facet of implementing an
equitable policy of land redistribution; (7) expand or improve services and
infrastructures needed to promote the well-being of people and of economic
production; and (8) achieve national stability and progress in a country that
has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war (Zimbabwe 1985c:4).

148
TABLE 5 1
ZIMBABWE: PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESETTLEMENT MODELS AND SCHEMES,
SEPTEMBER 1985
MODEL A
NORMAL
INTENSIVE
MODEL A
ACCELERATED
INTENSIVE
MODEL B
PRODUCER
COOP
MODEL C
Total
Mashonaland
East
8
4
7
0
19
Mashonaland
Central 2
7
9
0
18
Mashonaland
West
6
6
8
0
20
Midlands
10
13
15
0
38
Manicaland
14
6
7
1
28
Masvingo
9
16
0
0
25
Matabeleland
North
2
2
0
0
4
Matabeleland
South
5
12
2
0
19
Total
56
66
48
1
171
Source: Department of Rural Development (DERUDE), Harare.
Note: Some Schemes, especially in Matabeleland South, are still at the
planning stages and therefore are not fully operational as at
this time. The security situation in most of the Matabele Schemes
are terribly serious because of so-called dissidents who operate
in the region. For instance, as early as 1982 the government
admitted that it was compelled to withdraw Development Teams from
certain schemes in the area because of the disruptive activities
of armed bandits (see The Herald, May 4, 1982). After this news,
bandits attacked one resettlement near Plumtree leaving scores of
families homeless (The Herald, June 17, 1983). DERUDE's Monthly
Reports for Matabeleland also show that (1) in August 1985 bandits
attacked a public bus, burned an elementary school and the entire
Village 4 and part of Village 3 at Hollins Block, Gwanda District,
(2) on three separate occasions they harassed farmers at Pioneer
and Spring Blocks, Mbembesi Scheme, (3) one officer based at Shashi
Irrigation Scheme was murdered in October 1985 and (4) In November
1987 a group of foreign missionaries and their families were also
massacred in a mission farm in Matabeleland South for allegedly
causing the removal of squatters from the farm.

149
These objectives express a strong equity bias in policy. This is because
the overriding aim of the resettlement policy is to use redistribution to
achieve social justice. In addition, it seeks to create opportunities and to
establish the necessary conditions for a broader based agricultural growth.
The government envisages the full participation and the incorporation of the
hitherto neglected majority African smallholders in the market economy as a
major goal of its development effort (Zimbabwe 1981a, 1981c, 1982b, 1983a,
1985c).
The Pivotal Role of Cooperatives in the Government's
Development Policy
At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that the essential thrust
of the agricultural resettlement policy of the government is the
collectivization of the mode of production and the means of capital
accumulation. The central place that the government would want cooperatives to
assume in its development policy is quite apparent. Both in words and in
action the government's commitment to agrarian socialism based largely on the
collective system of production is unequivocal. In June 1985 for example, the
Prime Minister created a special coordination Ministry in his office to
oversee the development of cooperatives, a task previously performed by the
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development.
Secondly, the country's development policy statement document, Growth
With Equity, spells out quite clearly the government's stand about the issue

150
of cooperatives. The document makes it clear that
[The] Government will promote the establishment of communal
and cooperative farms in agriculture, and provide general
assistance to ensure their economic viability. ... In this
area Government will be building upon the traditional
cooperative approach in Zimbabwean culture in facing up to
the technological challenges of tomorrow. (Zimbabwe 1981a :5)
In an undated paper titled Rural Land Policies in Zimbabwe prepared by the
Honorable Moven Mahachi, until January 1988 the Minister of Lands, Agriculture
and Rural Resettlement, he argues the rationale behind the government's
commitment to agrarian socialism stating thus:
It must be stressed that Zimbabwe today has a capitalistically
organised commercial farming sector and the government faces
the task of converting it to a socialist system of agriculture.
It must convert the land ownership and tenure system from
private ownership and uncontrolled land use, permitting a
high degree of exploitation of man by man, to either producer
cooperatives or state farms.
Elsewhere, at an agricultural field day held on April 15, 1985, at the Kwaedza
Model B Producer Cooperative, Mashonaland East Province the Deputy Secretary
of the Ministry read an address on behalf of the Honorable Minister Moven
Mahachi. He argues in the address:
Our government has adopted a policy on Cooperatives which aims
at: Eliminating the exploitation of man by man. ... My
Ministry and indeed the Government of Zimbabwe see. .the
Cooperative movement as the most desirable production system
that must substitute the individual production enterprise
pattern that has dominated the agricultural economy of this
country over the past century or so. While the resettlement
program in general seeks to extend the land resources to and
open up new opportunities for the hitherto disadvantaged,
neglected and landless majority of our African population in
the rural areas, Agricultural Cooperatives as implemented under
Model B of the programme specifically represent a move by
Government to define the mode and direction production should
take in the agricultural endeavours of our people.

151
These statements give ample policy recognition to the cooperatives as the
means to extend "socialist and popular democratic participation in the
ownership and management of the nation's resources" (Zimbabwe 1981a:5).
So far also these Model B Producer Cooperatives have received more
government funding and voluntary donor assistance per capita than any other
resettlement model under implementation. Given this background, which is
discussed fully in Chapter VIII below, it is very difficult to understand how
some observers of the Zimbabwe scene can dismiss the policy thrust of the
cooperatives as "only an aspect of government's overall approach" to
agriculture (Murabengegwi 1984b:2; 1984a) or as merely rhetorical (see for
instance Sylvester 1985:35; Astrow 1983).
The Structure and Organization of Resettlement
The organizational structure for resettlement is three-tier. At the top
is the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement which is chaired by the Minister of
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. At the next level are the various
implementing and servicing agencies. The third level embraces the recipient or
resettled farmer units (Figure 5-1).
All matters relating to policy about resettlement ultimately reside with
the Cabinet Committee. However, resettlement is more than policy formulation.
It involves planning, implementation and administration. Thus, in order to
carry on with these activities and, even more so, to achieve the stated policy
objectives various Ministries and agencies have been brought together.
This coordination is at the inter Ministry level where the following are
represented: The Ministries of (1) Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement;
(2) Natural Resources and Tourism; (3) Energy and Water Resources and

152
CABINET COMMITTEE ON RESETTLEMENT
INTER MINISTRY COMMITTEE FOR RESETTLEMENT
MIN OF AGRIC
MIN OF LOCAL GOVT
OTHER
LANDS & RURAL
RURAL DEVELOPMENT
MINISTRIES
RESETTLEMENT
& URBAN DEVELOPME
PLANNING
PLANNING
HEALTH
AGRITEX
PHYSICAL DEVEL
EDUCATION
VETERINARY
RESETTLEMENT/
HOUSING
IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION
WATER
COOPS
ARDA
NATURAL RE
AFC
COMMUNITY
AMA
DEVEL
CSC
NON-GOVT
ORGANIZA
FIGURE: 5 1
ZIMBABWE: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF RESETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

153
Development; (4) Local Government, Rural and Urban Development; (5) Education;
(6) Transport; (7) Health; (8) Public Construction and National Housing; (9)
Community Development and Women's Affairs; and (10) Cooperative Development.
In addition, representatives of donor countries and agencies which fund
various aspects of the resettlement program participate in the deliberations
of this Inter Ministry Committee for Resettlement.
The organizational emphasis at this level is to ensure that the resources
which otherwise are compartmentalized and controlled by each Ministry are
coordinated at the highest echelon of national administration. This
coordination is meant to make these resources readily available for the
integrated development of both the resettlement areas and their neighboring
communal, small-scale farming and the large-scale farming areas.
Specifically, the Inter Ministry Committee is mandated to carry out
functions which include (1) program projects appraisal and recommendations of
amendments, (2) recommendation of projects to donors for funding, (3)
monitoring of program performance and the expenditures incurred on individual
schemes and (4) recommendations on specific aspects of policy. In performing
these functions the Committee is assisted by a Technical Sub-Committee which
undertakes preliminary appraisal of all resettlement projects before
submission to the Inter Ministry Committee.
Two major ministries are much more involved with both the macro and micro
issues of resettlement policy and processes. These are the Ministry of Lands,
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and that of Local Government, Rural and
Urban Development. The specific involvement in the resettlement process of
each of the two primary ministries, their respective agencies and also of the
supporting ministries is set out below in detail.

154
The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement
The entire resettlement program is the overall responsibility of this
Ministry^ in terms of (1) specific policy matters, (2) inter-agency
coordination, (3) designation and acquisition of land required for
resettlement, (4) financial control, (5) promotion of appropriate technology
and (6) monitoring and evaluation of the program.
Various organs of the Ministry carry out specialized tasks that directly
relate to different aspects of the program. For instance, the Planning Section
in conjunction with AGRITEX and the Land Identification Advisory
2
Committee conducts preliminary assessment of land suitability for
resettlement. It also undertakes technical appraisal of all project reports as
well as the actual physical planning and layouts of various resettlement
schemes including their Administrative or Rural Service Centers. In this, the
Planning Section works closely also with its counterpart in the Ministry of
Local Government, Rural and Urban Development.
AGRITEX, the technical and extension arm of the Ministry has
responsibility in whole or in part for several major aspects of resettlement.
Specifically, these include the (1) preliminary assessment of the suitability
of land for resettlement, (2) preparation of resettlement plans upon the
request of the Ministry, (3) demarcation of village sites, arable, grazing and
residential plots, (4) planning and pegging of conservation works such as
ridge contors and (5) the provision of group and individual extension service
to resettled farmers.
Likewise, the Department of Veterinary Services provides dipping services
and extension on animal health on the resettlement schemes. The newly created

155
Irrigation Section of the Ministry undertakes the technical appraisal and
participates in the planning of all irrigation projects under the resettlement
program.
In addition, there are four parastatals of the Ministry whose statutory
responsibilities bring them in contact with resettlement. These are the
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), the Agricultural Finance
Corporation (AFC), the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) and the Cold
Storage Commission (CSC). ARDA is tasked with the provision of accounting
service, the preparation of monthly financial reports and reimbursement claims
and the disbursement of the program funds. It is also charged with the direct
implementation of the resettlement Model D pilot project and the management of
the resettlement Model C in the case of specialized crops, except in the
3
Zunde variant.
Operating through the Resettlement Credit Scheme the AFC provides both
short, or seasonal and medium term credit to resettled farmers. It also
manages the Small Farm Credit Scheme. The scheme covers successful and
enterprising smallholders in all rural areas including resettlement areas.
Under its mandate the Corporation has the responsibility to educate farmers in
resettlement schemes on credit management,
Two subsidiaries of AMA, namely, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the
Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), by virtue of their statutory mandates,
respectively have to purchase all controlled produce harvested by farmers
except tobacco which is traded by the privately-organized Tobacco Marketing
Association.^ Maize and cotton, being the most important crops in
resettlement schemes, therefore make the two Boards quite important to
resettled farmers

156
Finally, the Cold Storage Commission which handles livestock products has
started to expand its activities into the resettlement areas with the
operation of Grazier Schemes. Under the system resettled farmers are
encouraged to establish paddocks or enclosures after which they are assisted
to purchase cattle for fattening and sale to the Commission. As of now the
system is mostly confined to a few Model B producer cooperatives schemes which
have the necessary infrastructure for such a venture still intact.
The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
The Ministry"* is consulted and it fully participates in the planning,
approval and implementation of the resettlement program. This is so because
the resettlement plans have to be incorporated into the overall plans of the
Rural District Council and the Administrative Province within which the scheme
is located. The incorporation occurs after a final decison on the
implementation of a particular scheme has been taken by the Inter Ministry
Committee on Resettlement.
As from the beginning of the 1985-86 fiscal year, the Department of Rural
Development (DERUDE) became part of this Ministry. DERUDE is
the implementation arm for the resettlement program. Two of its sections,
namely, Development and Resettlement, play specific roles that are crucial to
the establishment and micro-management of the schemes.
The Development Section either directly or through contracting undertakes
the provision of the physical infrastructures that serve resettlement schemes.
These include the demarcation of the scheme boundaries, initial clearing and
plowing of portions of farmers' arable lands. It constructs and maintains
cattle dips, access roads, elementary schools, the Rural Service Centers and

157
their administrative, residential and other facilities such as the clinic,
inputs and marketing depots. The budget for these services is also controlled
by the Ministry.
The Resettlement Section performs the important task of selection and
allocation of individual families for resettlement. This is done with the
participation of the respective District Councils to which the prospective
families originally apply to be resettled. The day-to-day administration of
the schemes is in the hands of the Resettlement Section through the resident
Resettlement Officer and his team of other services personnel.
Since 1984, in compliance with directives from the Office of the Prime
Minister, the Ministry has undertaken the formation of Village Development
Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WARDCOs) in all
resettlement schemes and rural areas. This is to facilitate the grassroots
participation of rural dwellers in rural and national issues, particularly in
the area of development planning and implementation.
Other Ministries
The remaining Ministries which deal with various aspects of resettlement
are charged with the following appropriate responsibilities. The Ministry of
Energy and Water Resources and Development is responsible for the provision
and maintenance of domestic water supply to all villages, schools and Rural
Service Centers in the resettlement schemes. It also provides water for
livestock and irrigation purposes.
The Ministry of Education undertakes the construction of secondary
schools in all schemes, where appropriate and takes care of the staffing and
payment of salaries of both elementary and secondary school teachers. As it is

158
pointed out above the construction of elementary schools is the responsibility
of the Development Section of DERUDE within the Ministry of Local Government,
Rural and Urban Development.
The Ministry of Transport maintains all major or national roads that run
through resettlement schemes. Maintenance of feeder roads, however, lies with
the Development Section of DERUDE. The responsibility for the provision of
health services, the equipping, staffing and operation of clinics lies with
the Ministry of Health. It also undertakes the training of Village Health
Workers and offers technical advice on the siting and construction of "Blair
privies" or latrines in all villages and schools. The maintenance of all
government housing in resettlement schemes is carried out by the Minstry of
Public Construction and National Housing. It is also responsible for the
introduction, promotion and loan financing of improved rural housing for
resettled farm families.
The Natural Resources Board of the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Tourism educates farmers in all resettlement schemes on matters relating to
conservation and proper ecological practices. It also encourages them to
establish woodlots. Resettled farmers are organized and trained to initiate
and participate in community development activities or self-help projects by
the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs.
Finally, since the beginning of the 1985-86 fiscal year responsibility
for the promotion of cooperative enterprises has been vested in a newly
created Ministry of Cooperative Development. The Department of Cooperatives is
the operational arm of the Ministry. Its responsibilities include the
development of cooperative movement among individually resettled farm families
in the Model A schemes and the training of members of such resettlement
schemes as the Model B Producer Cooperatives (see Table 5-2).

TABLE 5-2
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES IN THE
AREA OF RESETTLEMENT
COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY
SPECIFIC DUTIES
INTER CABINET COMMITTEE
Policy formulation and approval of
recommedations about resettlement
INTER MINISTRY COMMITTEE
Project appraisal
Recommendation of projects for funding
Monitoring of program performance and
expenditures
Resettlement policy recommendations
TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE
Assits Inter Ministry Committee
Undertakes preliminary project
appraisal
MIN. OF LANDS, AGRIC. &
RURAL RESETTLEMENT
Policy matters
Inter Agency coordination
Acquisition of land
Financial Control
Appropriate technology
Monitoring and evaluation
LAND IDENTIFICATION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Makes initial selection of land on
block basis and advices on its
acquisition
PLANNING SECTION
Preliminary assessment of suitability
of land for resettlement
Technical appraisal of all project
reports
Planning and appraisal of layout of
Rural Service Center
IRRIGATION SECTION
Technical appraisal and participation
in planning of all irrigation
proj ects

160
TABLE 5 2continued
COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY SPECIFIC DUTIES
AGRITEX
Preliminary assessment of suitability
of land for resettlement
Preparation of resettlement plans
Demarcation of arable lands and
village sites
Provision of extension to resettled
farmers
Conservation works on resettlement
schemes
VETERINARY SERVICES
AGRICULTURAL & RURAL
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(ARDA)
AGRICULTURAL FINANCE
CORPORATION (AFC)
Provision of dipping services
Ensures animal health
Provision of accounting services for
resettlement program
Disbursement of program funds
Preparation of monthly financial
statement on the program
Preparation of reimbursement claims
Management of central estates of the
Model C schemes in the case of
specialized crops
Implementation of the Model D pilot
proj ect
Operation of the Resettlement Credit
and the Small Farm Credit Schemes
Provision of short-term (seasonal)
and medium-term credit to resettled
farmers
Education of resettled farmers on
credit management.
MIN. OF LOCAL GOVT,
RURAL DEVELOPMENT &
URBAN DEVELOPMENT Participates in the approval, planning
and implementation of specific
resettlement schemes
Administers schemes handed over by the
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and
Rural Resettlement

TABLE 5 2continued
COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY
SPECIFIC DUTIES
PLANNING SECTION
Confirms the location of Rural Service
Centers and approves their layouts
DEPARTMENT OF RURAL
DEVELOPMENT (DERUDE)
Implements resettlement and micro
manages individual schemes
DEVELOPMENT SECTION
Constructs, implements and maintains
all physical infrastructure in
resettlement schemes, eg.
demarcation, clearing, plowing,
dips, access roads, elementary
schools, marketing and supply
depots, clinics and Rural Service
Center
RESETTLEMENT SECTION
Controls the budget for various
aspects of the resettlement program
Selection and allocation of farmers
for resettlement
Adminstration and coordination at the
scheme level
Enforcement of resettlement permits
Squatter control
Promotion of VIDCOs and WARDCOs
Undertakes the collection of data
about scheme progress and problems
MIN. OF ENERGY, WATER
RESOURCES & DEVELOPMENT.
Provision of domestic water to all
resettlement villages and schools
Provision, operation and maintenance
of water supplies at the Rural
Service Center
Provision of irrigation water and
dams in resettlement schemes where
appropriate
MIN. OF EDUCATION
Holds ultimate responsibility for
education in resettlement schools
Provision of secondary schools in
resettlement schemes
Staffing and payment of salaries for
both elementary and secondary
school teachers

162
TABLE 5 2continued
COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY
SPECIFIC DUTIES
MIN. OF HEALTH
Responsibility for the provision of
health services in all schemes
Responsible for equipping, staffing
and managing all clinics
Training of Village Health Workers
Provision of technical advice on
the siting and construction of
"Blair" toilets by resettled
farmers in the villages and schools
MIN. OF CONSTRUCTION
& NATIONAL HOUSING
Maintenance of government housing in
the schemes
Introduction, promotion and financing
of improved housing for resettled
farmers
MIN. OF COMMUNITY DEV.
& WOMEN'S AFFAIRS
Organizing and training of farmers in
schemes in self-help and community
development activities
Promotion of pre-cooperative self-
help economic groups
MIN. OF COOPERATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
Processing and registration of
cooperative groups for the program
Identification, selection and
recommendation of suitable
registered cooperative societies
for resettlement
Provision of organizational and
managerial skills necessary for
effective cooperative performance
Coordination of the Management
Advisory Teams that services the
cooperatives
MIN. OF TRANSPORT
Responsible for the major road works
in and the maintenance of national
roads running through resettlement
schemes
NATURAL RESOURCES
BOARD
Education of resettled farmers on
matters relating to the conservation
of natural resources

163
Land Acquisition and Tenure
A major wish of many landless and near-landless Zimbabweans is the
appropriation of the so-called European lands and their distribution to
Africans. This is particularly so in the Communal Areas now as it was before
independence. Indeed, the support of the "masses" for the liberation war was
built on this wish. Many nationalist leaders, either implicitly or explicitly,
alluded to equitable land reform programs in postindependent Zimbabwe. Most
European settlers and adversaries of the nationalist cause in the western
world also entertained the fear that land seizures were going to be the order
of the day if and when African majority rule was achieved.
It is no wonder that the end of the war and the period immediately after
independence in 1980 precipitated the massive and spontaneous squatting or
occupation of some European and state lands. Such a development should have
been anticipated because it happened earlier on in the 1960s in the similar
case of Kenya (see Mbithi and Barnes 1975). The squatter situation is still
particularly serious in Manicaland and to some extent in Mashonaland West. In
these Provinces some returning refugees and landless Communal Area residents
did not wait for official resettlement. The "squatter problem," as this
development is officially known in Zimbabwe, poses a major dilemma to both the
£
government and affected European farmers.
It was to allay the concern of European land owners over possible forced
appropriations that the independence constitution, worked out at the Lancaster
House Conference, stipulated guarantees for the sanctity of privately owned
lands. It was decided and accepted there and then that any land acquisition by
the government of Zimbabwe "has to be on the basis of willing seller-willing
buyer, at the prevailing market prices."

164
So far this requirement has been scruplously honored by the government,
though much to the chagrin and the disappointment of many landless Zimbabweans
and radical intellectuals alike (see Chapter II above). There is no doubt,
however, that the government's resettlement effort is frustrated to some
extent by the operation of this mode of land acquisition. The government
points out that the system
has proved unsatisfactory because, on the one hand the
majority of offers have been of poor quality land and,
on the other hand such offers have been fragmented and
scattered across the country. (Zimbabwe 1985c:11)
In November 1985, as a consequence of and in response to this
frustration, the government introduced a new Land Acquisition Bill in the
National Assembly. The Bill sought to encourage land owners to sell to the
government first. It also sought to empower the President to acquire land that
had been declared underutilized or derelict by the Derelict Lands Board. As
expected the Bill was emotionally debated along racial lines. For instance,
the acting Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the
Honorable Herbert Ushewokunze who tabled the Bill charged the European members
of the Assembly who opposed it to be "digging in their heels against change."
(The Herald, November 20, 1985:1).
Also contributing to the debate the ZANU-PF Member of Parliament for
Mufakose, the Honorable John Zhakata, argued that the Bill was meant to get
back the lands "which [the whites] grabbed away from us." (The Herald,
November 27, 1985:8). From the perspective of the European members the
controversy about the Bill centered on the definition of two crucial words.
These were "underutilized," and "derelict" as they applied to land. For
example, the Honorable Mark Patridge, the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
member for Mazowe-Mutoko and the Honorable Bill Irvine, an Independent

165
representing Marlborough, persistently requested for a definition of those
wo rd s.
The Bill which passed as the Land Acquisition Act (1986) took effect on
March 1, 1986. It now provides for a system of designation of certain areas,
in the country, for various public needs purposes such as resettlement and
state farms. It defines properly utilized land as that which has been
"substantially and continously used for the past three years." According to
Linda van Burn (1986:1123), writing on the Economy of Zimbabwe, the passage
of the Bill is based on the fact that prior to independence the colonial
administration did not invariably grant European farmers a freehold title to
commercial land, reserving to itself the right to repossess land for "public
purposes."
Under the new system an inter ministry Land Identification Advisory
Committee has been set up to make the initial selection of blocks of land on
the basis of such criteria as the availability of water and suitable soils and
then give advice to the Land Selection Committee.
Analysts of land tenure systems, particularly in Africa, often cite
insecurity of tenure as a major constraint on investment in improved
technologies, management and husbandry of resources (Feder and Noronha 1987).
An important issue in land tenure is therefore the question of whoever
controls access to the resources of the land and the benefits accruing from
its use (Cohen 1980). This becomes even more significant where productive
resources such as irrigation are involved (Lipton 1985).
In Zimbabwe the government is yet to come out with the desirable system
of tenure for resettlement agriculture. As of now resettled farmers operate
their holdings under temporary leases issued in accordance with Section 6 of
the Rural Land Act. In the Model A schemes with their individual family

166
operated farms, for instance, the conditions of occupancy or tenure held by
the farmers are in the form of three different permits. These are (1) the
permit to reside, which covers a 2,500 square meter residential plot within
the village; (2) the permit to cultivate a net arable land of 5 hectares and
(3) the permit to destock, covering a right to graze a stated number of
livestock units in the communal grazing area set aside for each village.^
These permits, enforced by the Resettlement Officers of DERUDE, are issued by
the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement on the strict
conditions that a resettled farmer relinguishes all traditional rights, if
any, that were held in the Communal Area (see Appendix F; and Appendix G,
Tables 1 to 3).
Resettlement Planning
Each resettlement scheme is planned before the necessary infrastructures
are constructed or farmers resettled. The scheme's project report embodies the
plan. The report describes the natural environment, the intended agricultural
program, staff requirement, the scheme costs and an economic analysis. In the
planning process physical details and suitable sites for locating proposed
villages and infrastructures are identified on 1:12,500 air photo mosaics.
However, final decisions about the location of these development structures
are made in the field during implementation.
The total number of farm families to be resettled in each scheme is a
crucial planning decision. The determination of this is based on the
agro-ecological resources, the land capability and the livestock carrying
capacity of the land surveyed for the scheme. The arable potential of the land
is calculated from a standard land capability classification of the country.

167
This classification is derived from detailed stereoscopic analysis of
1:25,000 blanket airphotographs cross-checked by ground verification and soil
coding. The livestock carrying capacity or stocking rate of the non-arable
land is also similarly assessed.
The scheme's project report is prepared in consultation with the relevant
District Council which has to approve it. After this the report is submitted
for the consideration of the Inter Ministry Committe for Resettlement and
approval by the Inter Cabinet Committee. This provides authority for ARDA to
open a development expenditure account. Once such an account is set up the
Development Section of DERUDE begins the construction of various
infrastructures.
Resettlement Scheme Models
Currently, there are 4 Models in use in the planning and implementation
of resettlement projects in Zimbabwe. These are Models A, B, C and D. Each of
these has its own structure and internal dynamics as are described below. So
far and in terms of land area, number of resettled families and expenditure of
resources the Model A schemes are the most important (see Table 5-1). However,
in line with its commitment to socialism the government's intention is "to
settle a major proportion [of individual farmers and farm families] under
Model B" schemes (Zimbabwe 1981, 1985c:14).
Model A Resettlement Program
This Model involves the resettlement of individual farm families on
individual residential plots within nucleated villages. It also provides

168
individual arable holdings demarcated as close as is practicable to the
village but usually within 3 kilometer radius. Tied to the arable holding is a
grazing right which varies with the availability of grazing land and the
ecological imperatives of the prevailing natural region.
Consequently, in the better arable zones such as Natural Regions I and II
each resettled family has a permit to keep up to 5 Livestock Units. The
corresponding maximum unit for Natural Region III is 8; Natural Region IV is
10; and 20 for Natural Region V which is only suited for grazing. These
allocations are based on minimum viable herd size, draft requirement and
cropping reliability worked out for each region.
The village sites are carefully selected and the layout planned before
farmers are permitted to build their homes. The ideal size preferred by the
planners ranges between 25 and 50 families depending upon such factors as
water supply and distance to the arable plots. In a few situations farmers
have been resettled in villages with a minimum of 13 families.
From the start, the government through the resident Resettlement Team and
Community Development personnel has encouraged the formation of VIDCOs and the
participation of resettled families in communal and self help activities.
Indeed, it is the expectation of the government that with time and as the
communities develop the individual families will start pooling their
production activities together in line with the traditional Zunde concept
and ultimately consolidate their resources into group or cooperative
enterprises.
There are two variants of the Model A schemes. These are the Normal
Intensive Resettlement Project (NIRP) and the Accelerated Intensive
Resettlement Project (AIRP). Throughout this study the former is referred to
as the Model A Normal and the latter as the Model A Accelerated. The Model A

169
Accelereted is a stop gap program which is launched on emergency basis to get
as many desperately needy people, such as "qualified" squatters, resettled
with the minimum planning. There is no provision of basic infrastructures such
as clinics, schools and dip tanks. Domestic water from boreholes, however, are
provided to the villages. Over the years an Accelerated Project is gradually
upgraded and turned into a Normal Intensive Resettlement Project.
Model B Resettlement Program
The Model B schemes are always set up within the Model A projects where
two or three farm units with well developed infrastructure still intact are
planned for them. The kinds of infrastructure on a farm property that is
usually selected for a Model B scheme include, for instance, irrigation
systems, storage and workshop facilities and specialized enterprises for crops
such as coffee or animal production that can be managed as a unit by
cooperative groups. Thus, the model involves group resettlement with formal
cooperative organization and management operating as a legal entity registered
with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies who is the Director of Cooperative
Development.
In these schemes all adult residents including wives and dependents 16
years or older are required to be registered as full members. A typical Model
B scheme in a cropping resettlement has a target size of between 50 and 200
members. This is determined by the Planning Section of the Ministry of Lands,
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in consultation with relevant agencies such
as AGRITEX. The size is consequently based upon the physical and
infrastructural resources available on the scheme. Like their Model A
counterparts the Model B schemes also have two variants, namely, the Normal

170
Intensive Resettlement Project (NIRP) and the Accelerated Intensive
Resettlement Project (AIRP).
The day-to-day management, purchasing of inputs, production and marketing
of output is controlled by committees of the members. The property, resources,
equipment and livestock on the scheme are held cooperatively. Work
arrangements and the distribution of earnings are also done according to a
formula agreed to by the members. The initial production target is
self-sufficiency, followed by full agricultural production after the build-up
period of four to five years.
Given the newness of the producer cooperatives in Zimbabwe and even more
so because of the special problems that some of the schemes have
g
encountered, the government has recently modified a few aspects of the
policy arrangements governing assets and resource use. Since 1985, individual
members or families are allowed to own a small proportion of livestock for
domestic purposes separate from the cooperatively owned and commercially
oriented stock. Members are now allowed also to cultivate private plots of up
to 0.5 hectares for subsistence during their own free time.
The government does not directly manage these Model B schemes. However,
it arranges and coordinates for them support services in the fields of
organization, farm management, crop and veterinary extension, credit and
administration. This is done through such agencies as the Department of
Cooperative Development (DECODE), DERUDE and AGRITEX. In the case of the
Normal Intensive Resettlement Projects the government also commits major
resources to them. These are in the form of Establishment Grant (see Table 6-3
below) and medium term credit facilities from the AFC. These provisions assist
in the initial acquisition of capital goods and to cover operating costs. They
are in addition to existing assets and the acquisition of livestock,

171
stock watering facilities and domestic water supplies which the government
also provides.
Model C Resettlement Program
In many respects this Model is built upon a synthesis of both the Models
A and the B schemes. The rationale for setting up the Model C is to promote
cooperative effort on a gradual and demonstrable basis. The Model incorporates
a commercial central core estate which is separate from individually allocated
and operated arable entities. The core estate is run by either the committee
of the cooperative with labor provided by cooperative members or hired from
elsewhere during peak operational periods. Alternatively, it may initially be
run by ARDA employing its own labor force.
The cooperative farm or core estate is planned and operated as a single
production unit with access to all essential equipment and inputs. Acting also
as a service provider the estate supplies essential services to the individual
resettled farmers and farm families. These are in the form of mechanical
draft, bulk transportation of inputs and produce, the production of seedlings
for specialized crops and the processing and marketing of specialized crops.
These services are made available to the farmers by the estate at prevailing
economic rates. Proceeds from the cooperatively-run farm are distributed among
the members according to their work contribution after deducting all
investment requirements. In the case of livestock there is individual
ownership and communal grazing facilities in the Model C scheme as it obtains
in the Model A program.

172
In promoting the Model C resettlement it is the hope of the government
that
the small privately-run individual plots would initially serve
to foster individual effort while the cooperative estate would
serve to demonstrate the benefits of cooperative effort. .
As the settlers get knowledgeable and gain experience and
expertise in the major enterprise produced by the scheme's .
central estate they [would] take over the central estate and run
it collectively. (Zimbabwe 1985c:17)
Model D Resettlement Program
The Model D scheme has been formulated as a special response to the
particularly fragile ecology of Natural Regions IV and V and the predominant
role of livestock production in the socioeconomic life of the rural
communities in southern Zimbabwe, particularly Mataoeleland. However, it is
not the intention of the government to restrict the application of this Model
to only the marginal agro-ecological zones. In 1985 the government launched
the pilot scheme of the Model at Doddieburn-Manyoli in Matabeleland South.
The essential features of the Model D scheme are the establishment of
large ranches within which individual farm families paddock or enclose their
own grazing areas and control their stock numbers. Once every three or four
years each community is given access to the ranch. During this time period the
community's own grazing area reverts to fallow to get a chance to rejuvenate.
An important aspect of the operation of this Model is the expectation
that communities participating in it will "undertake an internal resettlement
and reorganization of their arable blocks and villages so that they free as
much of the land for grazing as is possible" (Zimbabwe 1985c: 18).

173
Selection Criteria and Procedures and Allocation
of Holdings to Farmers: The Case of Model A Schemes
The responsibility for the selection of individual families for
resettlement and the allocation of residential and arable holdings to them is
vested in DERUDE. For an individual to qualify for resettlement he must meet
any of the following conditions: (1) being effectively landless, that is, he
has no land or has land which is too little to support himself and his
dependents; (2) neither he nor the spouse be gainfully employed; (3) being
poor; (4) married or widowed with dependants; and (5) aged 18 to 55 years and
physically fit and potentially able to make productive use of the allocated
9
holdings.
Other than these basic requirements Zimbabweans returning home as
refugees are given special consideration. Widowed and unmarried women with
dependents are also allocated land in resettlement schemes in their own right.
Since about 1984, wage employees, experienced farmers and peasants who possess
"master farmer" certificates of recognition from AGRITEX are also accepted for
resettlement. Like everybody else, however, their allocation of holdings is
predicated on the condition that the particular individual gives up all land
rights in the Communal Area.
The resettlement procedure is initiated through the filling of
application form (see Appendix F) at the office of the Rural District Council
which serves the Communal Area of the applicant. When a particular area is
designated for resettlement a Resettlement Officer from DERUDE travels through
the adjoining Communal Areas and holds meetings to explain resettlement policy
and to assist individuals in filling such forms. A complete application is
then submitted to the Rural District Council through the applicant's Ward
Councillor. In the case of farm-laborers on newly acquired European property

174
the Resettlement Officer registers them directly for processing. This is also
true of illegal occupants or squatters provided they have been so prior to
July 1981.
Once the resettlement scheme is implemented in the area and it is ready
for allocation the Resettlement Officer and the Rural District Council
drawing, on a previously prepared list of qualified applicants compose a final
list of the farmers to be resettled. In doing so they are required to pay
regard to drawing equally from different parts of the District or Communal
Areas and also to consider local problems and land pressures.
After this is done the Resettlement Officer arranges a meeting of the
selected farmers in the resettlement scheme. At the meeting the allocation of
residential and arable holdings is done by a random drawing of numbers. The
Resettlement Officer then takes each farmer and physically shows him or her
the (1) village site, (2) residential plot, (3) arable holding and (4)
communal grazing area.
Finally, the Resettlement Officer decides a suitable date by which the
farmer and his or her family of dependents are expected to have moved on to
their new land to commence resettlement. This time period is supposed to be
reasonable enough to ensure that the farmers can wind up their affairs in
their old Communal Areas to enable them to resettle permanently in their new
homes. During the initial period of resettlement, the Officer is required by
DERUDE to carry out a thorough check to verify that the resettled farmer is
actually the very person who originally applied and was selected and that he
or she in practice meets all the stipulated criteria required for
rese ttleraent.

175
Implementation Structures and Process: The
Case of a Model A Normal Intensive Scheme
Once farm households have settled in a Model A Normal Intensive
Resettlement Scheme the planned services as well as those for which
infrastructures have been established already are made operational for their
benefit. A typical scheme consists of 500 families in about 15 villages all
linked by maintained feeder roads.
In addition the following facilities are provided: (1) three or four
elementary schools and a secondary school, all with teachers housing; (2)
diptanks, provided on the basis of 800 to 1,000 head of cattle or
approximately 600 Livestock Units per dip and serving a maximum radius of 6
kilometers; (3) watering dams for cattle; (4) a centrally located Rural
Service Center accomodating a Resettlement Officer and staff of one Clerical
Officer and one Field Orderly; (5) an AGRITEX worker for every 200 families;
(6) a Cooperative Development Worker; (7) an Animal Health Assistant; and (8)
a Clinic and Staff to serve between 300 to 600 families (see Ivy 1983:153).
These service staff are provided with government housing erected at the
Rural Service Center, where a telephone is installed at the resettlement
office. Motor-pumped water supply, reservoir and reticulation are also
provided. Cooperative depots, consisting of a storage shed and office within a
security fenced yard, are built in the Service Center on the basis of 1 per
every 500 resettled farmers.
Under the government's development planning structure, the Rural Service
Center is envisaged to serve as a mini growth point for the outlying area.
Provision is made therefore for the controlled establishment of permitted
businesses such as small general dealers and grinding mills.

176
The Resettlement Officer is the primary representative of the government
in the scheme. He is directly responsible to the Senior Resettlement Officer
and through him to the Regional Rural Development Officer. The Regional Rural
Development Officer in turn is accountable to the Director, DERUDE, through
the Chief Resettlement Officer.
Apart from the additional responsibility for the routine administration
of all Model B schemes within the project area, the Resettlement Officer
performs the following functions: (1) registration and selection of applicants
for resettlement and the allocation of holdings to them; (2) issue of permits
to reside, cultivate and destock; (3) enforcement of the conditions of these
permits; (4) the fostering of community spirit among resettled farmers and the
promotion of community projects such as the establishment of woodlots,
erection of scheme and village fencing, cooperatives, literacy clubs and
schools; (5) ensuring the maintenance of the infrastructure in the
resettlement scheme; (6) collecting and maintaining of detailed and up-to-date
socio-economic records covering all resettled farmers in the scheme; (7)
preparation and submission of reports relating to the scheme as directed by
the Minister; (8) supervision of such communal activities as grazing; (9)
laison between resettled farmers and government agencies, particularly the
District Development Committee and ensuring that these farmers have access to
whatever advice and services they require; (10) promoting and supervising the
formation of VIDCOs and WARDCOs; and (11) ensuring squatter control within the
scheme area.
Resettled farmers on moving to a scheme have to rely on the team of
Resettlement staff for directions and assistance to fully avail themselves of
the government provided services. One major area, for instance, where such
facilities are crucial to the survival of these farmers is in production.

Ill
By the time the farmer has completed moving to the village AGRITEX
workers would have pegged all arable holdings and assisted each farmer with
the construction of conservation works such as contors to check soil erosion.
It is normal for the Tillage Team of the Development Section of DERUDE to
undertake part of the land preparation free of charge for the newly resettled
farmer. This consists usually of the clearing and plowing of 0.5 hectares of
the farmer's 5 hectare holding which is done before the onset of first farming
season. In addition the Resettlement Section of DERUDE supplies each farmer
with a free crop package of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides for the 0.5
hectares. This is seen as a gesture to help the farmers to get established in
their new environment during the initial year of resettlement.
From the very beginning resettled farmers are obligated to comply fully
with all provisions in the permits to reside, cultivate and destock. For
example, it is stipulated in the permit to cultivate that the holder shall
personally, actively and continously carry on agricultural
activities on the holding comply in all respects with
the provisions of, an regulations made under, the Natural
Resources Act, the Animal Health Act, the Noxious Weeds Act
and all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming
practices and livestock management.(See Appendix G, Table
G-2)
The enforcement of these permits is the responsibility of the Resettlement
Officer acting on behalf of DERUDE. In situations where a farmer does not
abide by the stipulations DERUDE can recommend to the Minister of Lands,
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to revoke permits and consequently evict a
resettled household from any of the schemes.^
After the initial years of establishment farmers are expected to produce
enough grain for subsistence, build up crop and livestock surpluses for sale
and eventually achieve target household incomes of $400 or more.

178
Towards the realization of this objective the Resettlement Credit Scheme
a special unit of the AFC has been formed to assist farmers. The assistance is
in the form of both short-term or one agricultural season and medium-terra
loans. The former is available to farmers in their second year of
resettlement. During the third and subsequent years both medium and short-term
loans are available to these farmers. The short-term loans pay directly for
such services as contract plowing by the Tillage Team of DERUDE's Development
Section. It also provides for the delivery of seeds, fertilizers and pesticide
inputs through Cooperative suppliers.
The loan is repayable through a system of stop orders lodged by the AFC
with the appropriate marketing organization, such as the Grains or Cotton
Board, against crop delivery at the depot. The medium term loans on the other
hand cater for the purchase of such items as scotch-carts, draft-oxen, fencing
and other capital assets or implements. These loans are payable over a maximum
period of five years. The loans are secured by the government and interest is
charged at an economic rate.
Every February-March, about six months before the start of the
agricultural season, Area Credit Officers of the AFC visit the resettlement
schemes to hold meetings and explain the loan system to the farmers. From
about May onwards farmers submit their applications to the AFC. Before the
season commences the AFC issues buying orders for the items covered by the
approved loans to registered cooperative suppliers. It then becomes the
responsibility of the respective suppliers to physically arrange the delivery
of those items to the farmers in the villages.
Another area where resettled farmers do benefit from loan facilities is
in rural housing. The Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing has
instituted a housing scheme in the resettlement areas. This scheme provides

179
for loans to build three to four roomed brick houses with steel-frame doors
and windows and corrugated roofing. The scheme covers qualified farmers who
have maintained resettlement for at least two years in the Model A schemes.
The repayment plan is liberal and the loan is spread over a maximum of 30
years.
Conclusion
This Chapter has described how Zimbabwe is going about its agricultural
resettlement program. Though the land question is essentially an economic
issue it is nevertheless so emotional a development agenda that the measures
being taken by the government to tackle it are rather political. This fact
notwithstanding the relative smoothness with which the resettlement policy has
been formulated, the planning executed and the implementation carried out so
far is a major accomplishment in the African context.
In magnitude the Zimbabwe program is only surpassed by Tanzania's ujamaa
or villagization program which is variously estimated to have affected
anywhere between 5 to 10 million people. However, in terms of accomplishments
to date the only comparable case might be Kenya in the 1960s. The Kenyan
experiment was less involved as contrasted with Zimbabwe's. For instance, six
years after its inception the Kenya program comprised only 123 resettlements
embracing 31,081 families on 450,076 hectares (von Haugwitz 1972).
Even more importantly in comparative terms Zimbabwe has been able to
avoid such costly policy flaws, planning inadequacies, implementation
deficiencies, the terrible human sufferings and the disappointing results as
those of Tanzania's uj amaa (see for instance, von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980;
11
Hartmann 1981; Weaver and Kronemer 1981; Ergas 1982).

180
Notes
1.) In June 1985, the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development
was reorganized. It was expanded to incorporate the Ministry of Agriculture
while its Rural Development section was taken away. It was therefore renamed
the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. However, the
primary responsibility for resettlement policy and implementation still
resided in the Ministry.
2.) Under the Land Acquisition Bill (1986) the Inter Ministry Land
Identification Advisory Committee (LIAC) makes the initial selection of
prospective land for resettlement. This is done on block basis rather than by
individual farms. LIAC then advises another body, namely, the Inter Ministry
Land Selection Committee (LSC) about the suitability of the identified land.
The LSC is not bound by the recommendations of the LIAC. Where it accepts
LIAC's recommendations the LSC in turn recommends to the Minister of Lands,
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to approve and accordingly designate such
land for resettlement purposes.
Once such a designation is made the Government Valuation Office is
instructed to negotiate with individual owners of farm properties within the
block with a view to concluding conditional agreements of sale. When the price
of a particular farm has been agreed upon and it is acceptable to the Ministry
it acquires the farm. The status of the farm then changes from a privately
owned freehold into state land managed by the Rural State Land Office of the
Ministry.
Based on specific criteria laid down by the Ministry, AGRITEX evaluates each
farm and makes recommendations about its suitability for a particular
resettlement model. For instance, a fair sized farm with some developed
infrastructure is usually planned for the Model B Producer Cooperative. To
qualify for Model B such a farm, if it is in Agro-ecological or Natural Region
II, has to have in addition 50 percent of its land area arable or potentially
arable. Likewise, In Regions III, IV or V, where the proportion of arable land
may be less, the farm has to have existing irrigation with water rights for
about 50 hectares of supplementary irrigated summer crops. Any fair sized farm
where the arable potential is high but would be very much reduced if developed
as a Model B is planned into a Model C. This is usually the case where
plantations such as coffee are involved, or where large irrigation systems for
200 hectares or more are present. Any farm property which does not meet the
criteria for either a Model B or a Model C is developed into a Model A.
When a particular state land is ready for implementation as a resettlement
scheme the Rural State Land Office instructs DERUDE to commence
infrastructural developments on it.
3.) The Zunde is a traditional concept of production organization based on
the voluntary cooperation of individual farm households to work specific
tasks. In Zimbabwe's resettlement it is associated with the Model C scheme. In
effect, it involves the cooperative management of the "core estate" by the
would-be outgrowers who farm the scheme.
4.) Controlled products are agricultural produce so designated by the Grain
Marketing Act (1966), which is still in force. The Act regulates the sale of

131
all such products. Currently, the products include the following: (1) peanuts
(groundnuts)shelled or unshelled, green, wet or dry; (2) coffee; (3) maize
and maize-meal; (4) sorghum and sorghum-meal; (5) soya beans and soya-beans
meal; (6) sunflower seed and sunflower seed-meal; (7) wheat and wheat-flour;
(3) mhunga and mhunga -meal and (9) rapoko and rapoko -meal. Green maize
on the cob for human consumption is not a controlled product.
Under the Act the country is divided into two classes known as Area 'A' and
Area 'B'. The former comprises nearly all the large-scale commercial farming
areas and a majority of the small-scale commercial farming areas. Area 'B'
consists of all the Communal Areas, the Resettlement Schemes and certain
Small-Scale Commercial Farm Areas which are wholly surrounded by communal
lands, forest and game or wildlife reserves. Certain Large-Scale Commercial
Farms in the Matabeleland Provinces which grow little or no maize also fall
into Area 'B'.
The marketing of the listed products are controlled in Area 'k' and
uncontrolled in Area 'B'. What this means in effect is that only the Grain
Marketing Board or its approved contract buyers may purchase produce and
transport them from Area 'k'. On the other hand, anybody is permitted to
acquire, sell or re-sell controlled products in Area 'B' provided that those
products do not leave the area or, if they do, avoid passing through Area 'A'.
The only exception to the stipulations in this strictly enforced Act in
respect of Area 'B' is when registered Cooperatives, Approved Buyers or
farmers themselves transport the products directly for sale at the Board's
depot. In this case they are allowed to pass through areas designated as 'A'.
5.) The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development was so
constituted in June 1985. Until then it was known as the Ministry of Local
Government and Town Planning. The Rural Development section of the former
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was transferred to this
Ministry. With this reorganization DERUDE became part of Local Government thus
facilitating the integration of the established resettlement schemes into the
District Councils. It is the ardent hope of the government that with the
amalgamation of the schemes into the local government structures two things
will happen. First, there would be a harmonious and integrated resource use
between the schemes and the communal areas. Second, problem activities such as
poach-grazing, indiscriminate tree felling and boundary fence stealing blamed
on residents of Communal Areas would cease.
6.) In the Manicaland Province some of the squatter groups are well
organized. Indeed, they maintain a network of Committees with elected
officers. They are believed to even weild some influence over various
political leaders. This was the case in Mutanda scheme. Schemes such as
Romsley and Rusitu also have sizeable squatter populations. In his monthly
report for February 1985, the Regional Rural Development Officer of Manicaland
wrote: "The general squatter situation continues to deteriorate with
increasing numbers of people reported to be moving onto land, especially,
Nyamakawara, Odzani, Mpudzi II and Chipinge. ... In the whole Province we
are thinking in terms of thousands of families (my emphasis). Eight months
later, in October 1985, he wrote again: "We can't win here! At the moment
there is pressure on us from both the pro-squatter and anti-squatter factions
in the Province."
There were major problems also in the so-called European lands. Affected
properties included Nyanga Downs, Eastern Highlands Tea Estates, farms in the
Nyazura and Tsangwezi areas, Vergnoeg and Daisy Hill Farms in Chipinge and

182
Howth Farm in the Chigadora area, all in the Manicaland Province. One of these
areas Nyanga Downs is the only quarantine area for potatoes within the
Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) region. Consequently, the
powerful Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) expressed concern to the government in
regard to the pests and disease problems that the presence and uncontrolled
activities of the squatters posed to the industry. In December 1984, these
squatters were removed only to return in a matter of weeks. In May 1985,
according to the Manicaland monthly report, "Squatters who were illegally
occupying Nyanga Quarantine Area were [again] physically removed. All huts
have been destroyed. This was a joint exercise by the Ministries of Home
Affairs, Local Government. .and Derude."
The official explicit thinking of the government about this problem is that
squatting is an unlawful act liable for prosecution in the civil courts. Land
owners therefore have the right to institute legal proceedings against illegal
occupants of their land. It is also the responsibility of the Police to assist
land owners and court officials to evict squatters ordered removed by the
courts. In instances in the Manicaland Province farm owners have engaged the
services of attorneys to get the courts to order the removal of squatters from
their properties.
It needs to be mentioned that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural
Resettlement has laid down procedures for resettling "qualified" squatters who
are willing to go through the process as every applicant does (see Selection
Criteria above in this Chapter).
7.) AGRITEX calculates Livestock Units (LU) on the following basis:
1.5 Cattle = 1 LU
1.5 Donkeys = 1 LU
5 Goats = 1 LU
4 Sheep = 1 LU
The livestock carrying capacity of 1 LU is equivalent to 5.2 hectares
3.) Of the problems plaguing the Model B Producer Cooperatives high
membership turnover is quite prevalent or almost universal. The problem that
the policy modification tackles, however, relates to parcelization of
cooperatively owned land and privatization of cultivation. These are against
the cooperative principles and the Bye-Laws of the Model B Schemes. However,
before and during 1985 this problem was occuring in such schemes as
Tabudirira, Xumanhya and Mount Saint Mary in Mashonaland East Province and at
Nyakudya in the Mashonaland Central Province.
Mount Saint Mary was established as a Model B scheme in 1983. Since then the
members have parcelled the arable land among themselves setting aside only
about 25 hectares during the 1985 season as the collectively-cultivated
property. Each household keeps and maintains its own livestock. When it comes
to the application for seasonal loans from the AFC, input procurement and the
marketing of produce then they all come together. This is at variance with
government policy on Model B resettlement. However, a lot of politics
permeates this issue and it has not been easy for the bureaucrats in DERUDE
and the Department of Cooperative Development (DECODE) to enforce the rules.
Nyakudya is another classic case. In 1982, the Chaona Estate was turned over
to a group of residents from the nearby Chiweshe Communal Area. About 80
percent of them used to stay at Benjge Kraal. The farm was registered and
initially operated as a Model B Producer Cooperative. In 1985, the members set
aside about 60 hectares as the collective farm and parcelled out the rest
among themselves. They claim that is exactly the original agreement which they

133
and their Sabuku (chief) entered into in 1982 with the government's District
Administrative Officer, Concession District, Mashonaland Central Province.
There is an increasing tendency among some of these Model B Schemes to
operate along Model C lines. Now that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and
Rural Resettlement has institutionalized a system of regulated individual
holdings to cater for household subsistence needs it is the belief of the
government that the problem of large-scale parcellization of plots and
privatization of cultivation in some of these Model B Producer Cooperatives
would cease.
9.) The selection criteria for the Model B schemes are different from the
other schemes where specific qualifications have to be met (see above in this
Chapter on Selection and Allocation Procedures). In the Model B Producer
Cooperative Schemes membership is open. Individuals, married or unmarried,
have to apply to the Management Committee of the respective cooperative for
membership. If an applicant agrees to subscribe to the cooperative principles,
as laid down by the Registrar of Cooperatives and also abide by the existing
Bye-Laws then he or she is automatically accepted. This acceptance is usually
probational and it is confirmed or rejected within 60 days by the majority of
the membership voting at the general assembly.
10.) In the initial years of resettlement, particularly in 1982 the Minister
of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was reported on many occasions of
warning that loafers or lazy farmers will be evicted (see for instance, The
Herald, October 17, 1982; November 2, 1982; December 2, 1982 and May 25, 1983.
However, the records both nationally and for the Mashonaland Region hardly
show any evictions so far. In the drought years of 1982 and 1983, when there
was widespread hunger in many parts of rural Zimbabwe, a few resettled farmers
who could not cope with the relatively hard life in their new environment
abandoned resettlement for the more socially secure and supportive life in the
Communal Areas, European-owned farms or even the urban areas from where they
originally moved into resettlement.
In Mufurudzi, with 563 resettled households, there were only three cases on
record between 1980 and 1985 to evict farmers who allegedly were not complying
with the terms of the resettlement permits.
In the first case involving a farmer in Banana village he was reported in
1982 of maintaining a permanent home in Harare while employing a laborer to
take care of his home and farm in the resettlement scheme. Secondly, whenever
he visited Banana he engaged in fights with everybody because he always
insisted on using his motorized pump to draw water from the Mufurudzi stream
to irrigate his crops at a time when water was very scarce because of the
drought. As a result of these problems he was given the option to leave the
resettlement program or stay and comply with the conditions in the permits. He
opted out.
In the second case of a farmer in Gatu village it was alleged that he
black-marketed all the inputs that were supplied him in 1982 under the AFC
credit program. He was also accused by his colleagues in the village of being
a drunk, lazy person and a bad example of a resettled farmer. Facing possible
eviction he abandoned the resettlement.
The final case involved an incident in Chitepo village in 1985 when an
attempt by the Resettlement Assistant, acting apparently on the orders of the
Resettlement Officer, visited a farmer and demanded him to surrender his
permits of resettlement for non-compliance. The father of this farmer was also
resettled in the same village where they were viewed by the Resettlement Team

184
as lazy and problem fanners. They were accused of always organizing against
the Team and leading their colleagues to oppose community programs. Indeed,
the two were singled out to be the ring leaders in the Mukwari school
incident. This was when many of the farmers in Chitepo village withdrew their
children from Mukwari, one of the four elementary schools administered as part
of Mufurudzi, and enrolled them at the nearby non-resettlement Chindunduma
school.
However, the reason for wanting to evict this farmer was for his being
effectively single though he always claimed that his wife was joining him. In
the process of the officer's attempt to physically take the farmer's permits
the latter assaulted him. The incident was reported to the police and the
farmer was charged, convicted for assault and fined.
While DERUDE officials in the Mashonaland Regional office agreed that the
farmer was evictable for non-compliance they chided the Resettlement Assistant
for his methods which were completely outside the laid-down administrative
procedures for eviction. The officer was transferred to another resettlement
scheme and as at December 1985, over five months after the incident, the
farmer had not been evicted from Chitepo village.
11.) Nowhere in Africa has any government attempted to resettle so many as in
Tanzania's ujamaa. That fact perhaps explains the legion of problems and
failure that almost every reviewer associates with the program.
Kenya's so-called Million Acre Settlement Scheme comprised the high and low
density and the yeoman resettlements in the White Highlands. It should be
noted though that the Kenya program did not involve the large-scale provision
of such basic needs services and facilities ranging from health care centers,
clean water, schools and better access roads to cattle dipping and veterinary
services as it is the case in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER VI
CONTINUITY IN CHANGE: THE PRESERVATION OF THE OLD AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW FARMING SYSTEMS
Introduction
Writing about decision making processes among the so-called commercial
farmers in Zimbabwe Douglas McClymont characterizes the country as having
two distinct kinds of farmer. There is the commercial
farmer who produces the bulk of the saleable agricultural
produce and the communal farmer, the tribesman, who
basically farms to grow food for his own and his family's
subsistence. (McClymont 1984:150)
Though the structure and organization of agriculture in Zimbabwe is
essentially dualistic the kind of stereotypic portrait, which McClymont paints
here, is too simplistic to reflect the realities of the diverse farming
systems and farmers of a country that is certainly a leader in African
agriculture.
Today, as in 1984 when McClymont reported, the farming systems of
Zimbabwe embrace both the old and the new. The old system comprises the
following: (1) Large-Scale Farms; (2) Small-Scale Farms; and (3) Communal Area
Farms while the new is made up of the Resettlement program Farms and the State
Farms.
These old and new farming systems are described below as a prelude to the
review of the kinds of empirical responses that their respective farmers
generate to aspects of policy on agricultural resettlement formulated and
implemented by the government. The State Farms are left out of this review
because that system does not have "farmers" as such. They are operated as
firms and they employ farm laborers to produce for the State. ^
185

186
The Large-Scale (European Commercial) Farms Sector
In official parlance the large-scale farms are known as the Large-Scale
Commercial Farms. They used to be called the European Commercial Farms and
they date back to the 1890s (see Hunt 1971; Hodder-Williams 1983). By and
large the great majority of these farms are still owned by Europeans under a
system of freehold tenure. Almost invariably all farm owners in this sector
are members of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), a very powerful political
and economic force in the country. McClymont presents us with what he calls a
real picture of the Zimbabwean commercial farmer. According to him
the farmer tends to be a Caucasian of around 45 years old,
married, with three to four children. He has worked on a farm
for most of his life and is either the son or grandson of a
pioneer farmer or has entered farming because it is a
profitable and challenging way of life. Typically, he served
a farming apprenticeship with some well known senior farmer
before borrowing the money from the 'Land Bank'to start on his
own. (McClymont 1984:150)
Having given this background he continues with their work ethics arguing
further that most of these farmers
have either had to open up their farms from virgin bush or
develop established farms for intense commercial production.
Thus, there is an element of pioneering spirit and basic
personal motivation among all of them. (McClymont 1984:150)
The large farms are distributed throughout the country. However, the most
productive of them in terms of crop output are confined to the better Natural
Regions I, II and to some extent III. These cover mainly the Mashonaland and
Manicaland Provinces (see Figure 1-1). In all there are currently about 5,000
large farms and they occupy nearly 15 million hectares (Billing 1985:20).

187
The modal farm size nationally is between 1,500 to 2,000 hectares
(Whitsun 1983:33), Some farms or ranches in Natural Regions III and IV, mostly
in the Midlands, Masvingo and Matabeleland Provinces (see Figure 1-1), are
quite large. For instance, the average size of the 23 holdings European-owned
farms making up the Limpopo Intensive Conservation Area is 35,800 hectares
(Kay 1970:105). In fact, as far back as the late 1960s one particular farm,
Liebigs ranch, in Matabeleland carried some 40,000 cattle on 52,000 hectares
(Kay 1970:105).
The three Mashonaland Provinces are the primary cropping region in the
country. In the region the modal cropped area for maize is about 250 hectares
per farm and between 100 and 125 hectares per farm for tobacco or cotton or
other crops.
There is a lot of regional diversity within Zimbabwe's large farm sector.
But as it is expected these farms exhibit certain common characteristics,
including (1) enterprise specialization, (2) intensive reliance on
capitalization for some activities, (3) the use of scientific inputs and (4)
dependence on African laborers. According to the Whitsun Foundation the
cropping standards on these farms are generally high. The average maize yields
are in the range of 4 6 tonnes per hectare and the value of crops produced
per farm is typically in the range of $125,000 to $250,000 per year (Whitsun
1983:34). Indeed, between 1964 and 1982 the volume of output on these large
farms grew at more than 3.6 percent annually (Hawkins 1984:4).
The Whitsun Foundation argues that
The profile which emerges of the large-scale commercial farmer
in the main cropping regions of the country is one of a
formidable agricultural entrepreneur. He has a large farm, he
runs a big operation, and he sells large volumes of produce.
Although he owns a large holding he is certainly not an idle
landlord, for he is first and foremost a farmer and a very
productive one at that. (Whitsun 1984:35)

188
The high productivity of the large farm sector generally is not a matter
which is questioned. The sector is the backbone of the country's economy being
a source of food self-sufficiency and security, foreign exchange, employment
and raw materials for agro-manufacturing and other businesses. The government
therefore has even explicitly commited itself to encouraging its survival and
growth (Zimbabwe 1981d:55). However, the nature and intensity of land
utilization within the sector is a controversal issue of much interest to many
protagonists who study the political economy of land and race in Zimbabwe.
For instance, the Whitsun Foundation apparently sees a high land use
intensity on these large farms. It (Whitsun 1983:34) cites a survey conducted
in 1982 by the Hawkins Associates for the World Bank which states that in five
of "six selected [Intensive Conservation Areas] in the main cropping regions
of the country the percentage utilization of arable land was over 75
Lacking any additional information on the total land availability and the
proportion of the arable area covered by the ICAs in question it is impossible
to evaluate the land use intensity index quoted here by Whitsun in any
meaningful context.
Figures given by George Kay, though somewhat dated, indicate however that
nowhere in the large farm areas does cropped land constitute a large
proportion of the farm land. Taking intensity of land use to be the area under
crops as a percentage of the total farm land Kay (1970:106-107) comes out with
the following regional variations: (1) Mashonaland Region 8.0 8.6 percent;
(2) Manicaland Province 3.4 percent; (3) Midlands Province 1.8 percent; (4)
Masvingo (formerly Victoria) Province, excluding the high intensity Chiredzi
District, 0.7 percent; and (5) Matabeleland Region 0.5 percent.
These are very low by any standards especially given the facts of land
pressure, ecological degradation and poverty in many of the Communal Areas

189
around the country. As it was reviewed in Chapter II above Roger Riddell
(1978a, 1978b, 1979b, 1980) provides ample evidence to support the thesis that
the European settlers were not intensively using their available farm lands.
This pattern of low intensity is reported to still characterize landuse in
postindependence large-scale European-owned farms in the country. According to
Weiner et al.
[A]lthough the average size of the 2,626 large-scale commercial
farms in Mashonaland was 1,640 hectares, the average area under
crops during 1981-2 was only 168 hectares for each holding.
Also, in that year, as many as 468 farmsor 17.8 per cent of
the total number in Mashonalanddid not grow any crops at all.
(Weiner _et jlU 1985:257)
Since independence in 1980 the government has acquired some of the mostly
inefficient and underutilized farms including many that are apparently managed
by absentee landlords (Whitsun 1983:35). Consequently, there is about 15
percent reduction in the number of the large farms throughout the country
(Hawkins 1984:5). It needs to be borne in mind, however, that of the 1.7
million hectares of land purchased by the government up to July 1984 for all
Model A Intensive resettlement schemes 81 percent were in the marginal Natural
Regions III, IV and V where crop production is constrained (see Weiner et al.
1985:259, Table 2).
The passage of the Lands Acquisition Bill by the government in 1986 to
facilitate the identification and speedy acquisition of "derelict" lands by
the state for public use (see Chapter V above) very clearly reflects this
concern and the frustrations about getting commercial farmers to put their
lands to intensive use.
A number of both short and long term constraints confront the large farm
sector. According to Hawkins (1984:5) there appears to be a "crisis of
confidence [arising from] shortage of foreign exchange and the profitability

190
squeeze linked in turn to escalating input costs." There is no doubt that this
problem is rather a general one which faces the entire agricultural and other
economic sectors. Of specific interest, however, is the labor situation in
most of the large farms. For instance, in 1974 these farms employed at their
peak about 366,000 workers representing 35 percent of the total employment in
the formal economy. However, by 1984 this had declined by almost 30 percent to
about 260,000 workers.
The Small-Scale (African Commercial) Farms Sector
In the past the category of Small-Scale Commercial Farms were referred to
as the Native Purchase Areas and, lately, as the African Purchase Areas.
According to Billing (1985:20) these Areas presently comprise some 1.5 million
hectares and are occupied by some 9,000 African farmers. These farmers were
seen as constituting the cream of enterprising "natives," better motivated
than their "tribal" area cultivators and who had the opportunity to replicate
some of the high management and productivity "miracles" achieved by the
country's white farmers.
Today, the political and other interests of these Small-Scale farmers are
represented by one of the country's three farmers' organizations, namely, the
Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union.
Distributed throughout the country the Small-Scale Commercial farming
system and farmers have been the focus of numerous studies (see Powys-Jones
1955; Hassell and Johnson 1968; Johnson 1970; Bembridge 1974; Cheater 1978,
1981, 1982, 1983, 1984; Mungate 1983). The creation of these Small-Scale
Commercial farms began in 1931 with the passage of the Land Apportionment Act
(see Chapter II above).

191
George Kay states that the establishment of these farms in various areas
of the country was a
compensation for the Africans' loss of the right to purchase
land anywhere in Rhodesia on the same terms as members of
other races. It was intended that holdings in these areas
should be owned or leased by individuals and that they should
be of such size as to be viable and profitable family farms in
the hands of progressive, well trained Africans. (Kay 1970:93)
As Kay points out further the demand for these farms exceeded the
availability of holdings. In 1946 there were over 2,000 outstanding
applications. Of the Africans allocated farms at that time only 20 percent had
freehold titles with the remaining farmers leasing their holdings. In 1953
"all applicants were required to have the Master Farmer's Certificate [issued
by the Department of Agricultural Extension], and shortly afterwards they also
had to have capital assets to the value of at least 300." (Kay 1970:93). Yet,
in some cases "farms were allocated to ex-civil servants and others in reward
for long service, and not necessarily in relation to farming ability" (Whitsun
1978:13).
Inspite of the rather stringent conditions that were introduced to
restrict access to these farms the waiting list for them continued to exceed
allocations leading to the termination of applications in 1956. Consequently,
many residents in the Reserves or Communal Areas never realized their dreams
to benefit from access to relatively large hectares and other preferential
facilities such as extension, guaranteed inputs and produce markets which were
made available to these Small-Scale Commercial farmers throughout the country.
Given all these services at the disposal of these farmers it was thought
that they would be successful commercial producers and role models for their
peasant counterparts in the Communal Areas. In fact, that is the thesis that

192
the Whitsun Foundation presents. In its assessment
[I]n terms of tenure, in terms of productiveness and market
orientation, the Purchase Lands represent a successful (if
relatively small) experiment in the transformation of peasant
farming. While many problems remain with the farmer, and
while his needs for extension, credit, marketing and other
services are as great as that of the tribal farmer, he has
demonstrated that freehold farming is often a viable option
for the rural African and that the Purchase Land experiment
holds important potential as a model for future expansion of
African commercial farming. (Whitsun 1978: 14, emphasis added)
Angela Cheater, who perhaps has closely studied the social and political
economy of these farms in Zimbabwe more than any researcher, agrees with this
assessment (see Cheater 1984:9-13).
This rather glorious evaluation, however, is exceptional. Most studies of
these farms show on the contrary that only a negligible percentage of the
farmers have successfully made it. George Kay (1970:95-97) concludes that "the
general picture that emerges of farming in these [African Purchase] areas is
disappointing." Bembridge (1974:57), in a study of one such area in
Matabeleland, has a similar view stating: "The original aim of creating
prosperous middle-class families in the area has not been successful."
Roger Riddell elaborates these observations as follows:
The creation of the Purchase Areas has done very little to solve
the basic problems of the African rural areas. A large proportion
of the land is not used and the individual tenure system has not
proved to be an adequate base for promoting agricultural
development or for making an efficient use of the land within the
present economic structure. Small farms, low levels of
capitalisation, the minimal use made of credit facilities and a
large number of family-dependants have all contributed to the
maintenance of a subsistence-based system of farming for the
majority of PA cultivators. ... If one is looking for ways of
solving the land and population problems of the TTLs through
constructing a framework for a more efficient use of the land and
an increase in agricultural production then the PA scheme does
not provide the answer. (Riddell 1978c:55)

193
A more recent estimation by the Whitsun Foundation of these Small-Scale
Commercial farms apparently reverses its (Whitsun 1978) earlier position and
now supports the general observations about their poor performance. It
(Whitsun 1983:46-47) contrasts the Small-Scale Commercial with the Large-Scale
Commercial farms and sees little specialization in the former according to
agro-ecological region. In its view the Small-Scale Commercial sector or
"farming system is not intensive or highly productive." Furthermore the
sizes of the small farms are also much the same throughout the country,
averaging in 1977 some 125 hectares. The mean area cultivated then was just 11
hectares and the mean cattle head per farmer was 22. On the average maize
yields on these farms over the years were 1.5 tonnes per hectare (see Whitsun
1983:46-47).
Today, if there have been any change in the situation of these
Small-Scale Commercial farmers it is perhaps in terms of tenancy. The majority
of them now have freehold titles with only a few still leasing their farm land
from the government.
The Communal Area (Peasant) Farms Sector
Farming in the Communal or the African peasant areas is what has been
characterized by many observers as tribal, subsistence or quasi-subsistence
economy. The African rural areas were designated as Communal Areas by a
Legislative Act in 1982. Presently, there are a total of 174 separate Communal
Areas dotted across the country. In all these cover some 16.4 million
hectares. In what obviously is an underestimation Billings (1985:20) states
that these provide homes for 700,000 farming families.

194
It needs to be stressed here that the concept of communalism in this
context does not imply any collective living or production arrangements.
Indeed, these areas are mostly characterized by dispersed homesteads of
individual households. Households, including even urban residents, maintain
usufructuary rights to arable plots which are de jure state property.
However, these lands in the Communal Areas are under the effective control in
many cases of respective individual lineage heads, sabuku or headmen and even
VIDCO chairmen. Households or their individual members who have livestock
enjoy uninterrupted access to community controlled grazing land. As Jordan
(1974:71) sums it: "The producer in African areas is the individual farmer
supported by his immediate family."
Before these areas became Communal Areas they were variously called the
Native Reserves or the Tribal Trust Lands (see Chapter II above). But that was
after the advent of European immigrant-settlers and the consequent forced
removals of African groups from their original homes into territories created
for their settlement.
Available evidence indicates that these idigenous peoples, mostly of
Shona origin, were cultivators and pastoralists who supplemented their food
requirements with resources obtained through hunting, gathering and fishing.
At one point or the other some of them engaged in long-distance commerce as
well as mining.
David Beach (1974) in a classic seminar paper about the various branches
of production within the precapitalist phase of Shona economy reviews the
primacy of the cropping system upon which these cultures depended. He states
(Beach 1974:4-5) that the "Shona communities were all basically agricultural,
in that the most important activity of the greatest number of their people was
the production of food by growing crops."

195
Elaborating this fact further Beach (1974:6) points out that the crops
available to these farmers were limited initially to rukweza or rapoko
(finger millet), mhunga (balrush- or pearl-millet), mapfunde (sorghum).
These were much later expanded to include chibagwe (maize), mupunga (rice),
nzungu (groundnuts/peanuts), nyimo (bambara nuts) and nyemba (cowpeas).
Other crops mentioned elsewhere in association with early indigenous farmers
of Zimbabwe include mwiwa (watermelon), mbambaira (sweet potatoes), ipwa
(sweet cane) and nhanga (pumpkin) (see Reid 1977:101-102). Today, these
crops are traditionally grown by African farmers for subsistence. Most of them
are also cultivated in addition to cotton and, to a minimal extent, tobacco
for the market.
Some studies fault peasant agriculture by evaluating its poor performance
through the myopic perspectives of European farming. For instance, George Kay
characterizes the agricultural problems of the communal lands rather naively
as
[S]imply consist[ing], first, of pressure upon the land by
primitive peoples and their livestock such as to constitute an
immediate and increasing threat to the natural resources of the
land in question and of adjacent areas; and, secondly, of the
dire poverty and limiting ignorance of the tribesmen.
(Kay 1970:33)
Given the general ecological degradation and problems of the Communal
Areas, such as are extensively described in Chapter II above, the farming
system associated with these areas has persistently been highly unproductive.
Recent studies by Gobbins and Prankerd (1983:152) in the Mashonaland West
Province, for example, showed the following variations in yield for maize
during the 1981-82 season. For these respective Communal Areas, which happen
to be in the same Natural Region II, the outputs were (1) Zwimba 28 bags
(2,548 kilograms) per hectare; (2) Chirau 19 bags (1,729 kilograms);

196
(3) Magondi 14 bags (1,274 kilograms); and (4) Urafuli 9 bags (819 kilograms)
per hectare.
The Whitsun Foundation discusses a joint survey in the Chibi District,
Masvingo Province, carried out in 1981 by the Department of Land Management,
University of Zimbabwe and the Department of Research and Specialist Services
(R & SS) in the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.
The Chibi survey essentially replicated findings by other researchers who
looked at the land and capital assets of communal land farmers around the
country. On the average these farmers have about 11 hectares of which only 3
to 4 hectares are arable. The significant paradox of Communal Area farming
system is the paradox is the simultaneous existence of a general lack of draft
and other oxen, on the part of majority of farmers, and the devastatingly high
stocking rates.
For example, the survey found the following crucial distinction among the
Chibi farmers. Those with draft animals cultivated an average area of 3.23
hectares as compared to 2.40 hectares by those without. The grain harvested by
the former averaged 25.7 (x 91 kg.) bags in contrast to only 9.4 (x 91 kg.)
bags produced by the farmers without draft-oxen. Consequently, while the
draft-constrained farmers made a mean cash income of $105.00 those with draft
power made $240.00 (Whitsun 1983:39).
The contradictions which encapsulate the farming system and the farmers
of the Communal Areas are summarized by the Whitsun Foundation thus
The picture which emerges is of an ecologically unsustainable
system of farming and of over-crowded cultivators of whom only
some 10-15% are productive farmers producing good or very good
crops. The others are subsistence cultivators who are not
putting enough into their crops to make them worthwhile, nor
enough into the soil to maintain its fertility. They therefore
face even lower crop yields in the future, with the continued
degradation of the land. (Whitsun 1983:38)

197
At any rate, in evaluating the current performance of peasant or communal
land agriculture one needs to be reminded of its antecedent evolution under
European settler colonialism and also recognize the presently changed
situation in the political economy of the country.
The fact is that these farmers were restrained by past government
policies from fully participating in commercial production. This situation
forced many able-bodied persons into wage employment in European agriculture,
mining and the urban areas. What was left of farmers were mostly the women,
children and the old. In the circumstance once the vicious cycle of selective
rural outmigration, increasing household sizes and dependancy, overutilization
of the limited resources and ecological degradation set in the consequent
poverty and underdevelopment of Communal Area agriculture were inevitable (see
Chapter II above) .
Given this rather depressing perspective many rural dwellers appear to be
taking farming more seriously in postindependent Zimbabwe. This development
may be in response to the government's policy which ensures high producer
prices as well as improved access and delivery of agricultural credits,
services and inputs to this hitherto neglected peasant sector.
The agricultural wage increases which came into effect in mid-1985, the
second since independence in 1980, placed a burden on the ability of European
farmers to employ as many African laborers as they may need. Without the
security of such employment there is virtually no alternative source of income
for many rural households outside their own farm plots. Nevertheless, a number
of Africans do not also even want to work anymore as laborers on European
farms. They desire to be resettled by the government (see Chapter VII below).
A few of them who cannot wait have spontaneously squatted on European and
state lands (see Chapter V above).

198
These trends present a crisis to most people in the Communal Areas. They
also demand a more serious commitment on the part of these people towards
farming, a challenge which is being realized. There is mounting and impressive
evidence which shows that the government's investment in peasant agriculture
is paying dividends. Many of these so-called subsistence farmers are now
increasingly producing a surplus for the market (see Chapter II above).
Felicity Wood, writing about the role of extension in the success story
of Zimbabwe, alludes to the fact mentioned in Chapter II above that Communal
Area farmers and their counterparts in the resettlement and the Small-Scale
Commercial farms have responded remarkably to production incentives.
Before 1981 there was seldom more than 130,000 tonnes of surplus maize
for sale from African producers. In 1981 the surplus generated by this sector
was 324,000 tonnes rising to 400,000 the following year (Wood 1984:11). In
1985 Zimbabwe produced nearly 2.0 million tonnes of maize. The estimation by
The Economist (1986:15) that 58 percent of this total production came from the
African areas contrasts vividly with the situation ten years ago. In 1975-76
these farmers produced just 26.5 percent of the total of 1.64 million tonnes
of the maize output (see Zimbabwe 1982c:40, Table 21).
It is only a little over a decade now that George Kay (1970:33) described
Zimbabwean peasants as "primitive and ignorant" and even much later when the
Whitsun Foundation (Whitsun 1983:38) asserted that these Communal Area farmers
were not putting enough into their crops and land. Yet, there is perhaps no
other country in Africa where smallholder farmers have so quickly and
successfully turned their output and productivity around as in Zimbabwe today.
There, smallholders including the newly resettled households which are mostly
in the Model A Schemes are spearheading a revolution in food self-sufficiency
and regional subsistence security.

199
Resettlement Program Farms
Farms in this new farming systems category fall into the various models
described above in Chapter V. The two major ones of interest to this study are
the Model A Resettlement and the Model B Producer Cooperative schemes. The
former with its Normal and Accelerated variants consists of individual family
holdings of 5 hectares arable plots. The latter is made up of
collectively-organized and managed properties. These are on-going schemes and
the oldest among them were set up in the latter part of 1980.
As was pointed out earlier in Chapter IV to date only a few papers have
dealt with the resettlement issue and even fewer still have reported what is
going on specifically in resettlement agriculture (see Kinsey 1982, 1985; Ivy
1983; AGRITEX 1984; Zimbabwe 1984c; Mumbengegwi 1984a, 1984b, 1986; Munslow
1985; Weiner _et al. 1985; Geza 1986; Moyo 1986). The unpublished report by
Mumbengegwi (1984b) on the Model B Producer Cooperatives is perhaps the only
one of its kind that benefitted from extended survey interviews and therefore
presents the responses of the farmers concerned. Indeed, virtually nothing
comprehensive has been done thus far to systematically study the responses of
the resettled farmers and more so to compare them across schemes and models.
Farms in the Model A Sector
Weiner _et al. ( 1985), in their paper on land use and agricultural
productivity, contrast developments within the resettlement and the alternate
farming systems in the country. They argue strongly for resettlement and point
out that peasants can and will respond by producing greater marketed surplus

200
with significantly less inputs when conditions are right. In their view
(Weiner _et al. 1985:284) there is a strong evidence that yields from the
settlement schemes could become comparable to those achieved on Large-Scale
Commercial Farms.
The Farm Management Research Section of the Ministry of Lands,
Agriculture and Rural Development also collaborated with the Department of
Land Management, University of Zimbabwe, during the 1982-83 farming season to
collate management records kept by some farmers in seven Model A Normal
Schemes throughout the country. These schemes were (1) Mpudzi and Nyagundi in
Manicaland Province, (2) Mukorsi, Soti Source and Chizvirizvi in Masvingo, (3)
Sengezi in Mashonaland East and (4) Mufurudzi in the Mashonaland Central
Province (Figure 1-1).
According to the report (Zimbabwe 1984c: 7) "the very serious drought
experienced during the season adversely affected the economic performance of
small farm producers in the survey." Thus only Mukorsi showed an overall net
farm profit. Even then this was well below the annual target income per farmer
of $400 plus subsistence set by the government for resettled farmers.
For these resettlement schemes most of the area cropped was for dryland
maize which achieved very low yields. In fact, except for Mufurudzi and
Sengezi the average total maize yields were well below households' subsistence
requirements. This was in spite of the fact that a large proportion of the
variable farm expenditure in all the schemes also went into maize. The
expenditure was mainly for fertilizer, seed and land preparation (Zimbabwe
1984c:11).
The report also indicates that all the schemes received credit from the
AFC. Thus, interest and arrears interest charges formed a large proportion of
total overhead expenses. These arrears interest charges arose from the 1981-82

201
season when most schemes experienced severe drought conditions and farmers
were unable to to fully redeem their AFC loans. In a summary conclusion the
report had this to say about the performance and potential of Model A schemes:
[I]t is obvious that the whole farm economic performance of
resettlement farms would have been much better in
conditions of normal rainfall. An increase in livestock
holdings to optimum levels should also improve the economic
viability of resettlement farms and counterbalance the risk
of losses through crop failures by minimizing these in the
drier parts of the country. (Zimbabwe 1984c:12)
Farmers' Characteristics in the Model B Sector
According to Mumbengegwi (1984b:4) at the official or governmental level
the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes are regarded not only as instruments
to promote rural development but as major experiments that will spearhead the
transformation towards socialist agriculture. His (Mumbengegwi 1984b) research
conducted during the 1982-83 farming season covered sample farmers drawn from
(1) Batsiranayi and Simba Youth in Mashonaland Central and (2) Kwaedza,
Shandisai Pfungwa and Mount Saint Mary's in the Mashonaland East Province
(Figure 3-1). The following summary account of developments within the Model B
Schemes draws from his report.
He indicates that the mean age of these pioneer members of the
cooperatives was 38 and the modal age 23. There was a predominance of males
who comprised 64 percent of the membership. In all 78 percent were married and
the average family size was five. In terms of the membership composition 66
percent of all members were former Communal Area peasants followed by former
commercial farm employees 16 percent, former urban unemployed 10 percent and
demobilized guerrillas or former combatants in the liberation war who numbered
only 9 percent. The level of education attained by these cooperative members

202
was low and that 28 percent did not have any formal schooling at all
The areas and levels of skill were low. Although between 57 percent in
Simba Youth and 100 percent in Mount Saint Mary's considered themselves to
possess farming experience this was either as farm laborers, landless peasants
or juvenile dependants of farm households in the Communal Areas. Consequently,
most of the reported skills were "not central to agricultural production
activities of the cooperatives" (Mumbengegwi 1984b:16).
There was a preponderance of the economic motive in joining the
cooperative this being the reason offered by 98 percent of the members with
the remaining 2 percent being motivated by socialist ideological reasons. To
test the degree of commitment of these farmers to the cooperative endeavor
they were asked to respond to three questions relating to the following
alternative modes of gainful employment: (1) commercial farm laborer at the
minimum agricultural wage of $50 per month; (2) urban worker at the minimum
industrial wage of $105; and (3) Model A Normal Scheme or Communal Area farmer
if enough farm land was provided. From the responses Mumbengegwi arrives at a
conclusion which states:
[l]t would be fair to observe that the cooperative members
degree of commitment to producer cooperatives is somewhat
ambivalent in the sense that a substantial to a very high
proportion would leave the cooperative for alternative
employment at a "sufficient" but low rate of remuneration.
Given that our suggested alternative modes of employment are
not highly remunerative, this seems to suggest that members
expectations of the performance of their cooperatives are
also very low. (Mumbengegwi 1984b:29)
In terms of agricultural resources and productivity the five Model B
Producer Cooperatives that Mumbengegwi (1984b) studied all lie in the better
agro-ecologically endowed Natural Region II where, incidentally, many of the
most productive Large-Scale Commercial farms are located. However, the

203
"average land productivity for all the cooperatives combined was 39% and
labour productivity was 53% of that on the large scale commercial farming
sector (Mumbengegwi 1984b:50).
This unimpressive performance coupled with general problems of financial
mismanagement and embezzlements as well as indebtedness translated into
generally low average annual incomes received by the cooperative members. This
ranged from the low of $75 in Simba Youth through $81 in Kwaedza, $118 in
Shandisai Pfungwa, $154 in Batsiranayi to a maximum of $260 in Mount Saint
Mary's. All these were well below the target annual income of $400 per year
set by the government for the resettled households (This issue is pursued in
much more detail in Chapter VIH below) .
Conclusion
The foregoing background notes about the major farming systems from which
farmers were interviewed (see Chapter IV above) have been provided here to
give a contextual framework for the presentation of the case study and
evaluation findings. These are respectively set out below in Chapters VII and
VIII.
Note
1.) In a way the State Farms are not a new farming system as such. In fact,
the white settler-colonial administration operated state-controlled estates
for the production of such major crops as cotton, maize, rice, wheat and sugar
cane throughout the 1960s and 1970s. With independence in 1980 the government
mandated the newly formed Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA)
to take over the management of these large, heavily mechanized and irrigated
estates which now number about 18 (For a brief review of the State Farms
sector see Moyo 1985).

CHAPTER VII
CASE STUDY OF FARMERS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAMS:
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE
Introduction
This chapter consists of a description of case study findings about the
characteristics of farmers and their survey responses to various questions
that relate to (1) current agricultural and resettlement policies and (2)
farmers' self assessment of agricultural matters that are important to their
lives, work performance and their community.
The presentation is organized essentially around the Model A Normal
Intensive Resettlement program. As it was pointed out in Chapter IV above the
Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme is the central focus of this study. Many
aspects of the respective responses from farmers in the various farming
systems are analyzed and evaluated from the comparative perspective of
Mufurudzi farmers. The responses are presented in the form of a series of
tables of frequencies, percentages and means. A rather descriptive analysis of
these tables covering various study variables (see Appendix D, Table D-l to
U-5) is offered. Except where warranted the presentation is done without much
attempt to give detailed explanations to the observed patterns. However, some
aspects of the findings which need highlighting are elaborated upon in the
summary.
The responses to what are considered to be issues of specific interest to
particular farming systems are discussed separately as such under the relevant
system. However, the responses to common questions are presented together as a
way to draw on the comparative or contrasting patterns within and between the
systems. The presentation is done under seven themes of as follows: (1)
responses of commercial and communal farmers to some background issues
204

205
relating to their respective farming systems; (2) social and demographic
characteristics; (3) evaluation of government policies and programs; (4)
attitudes and perceptions about life situation; (5) material resources and
capital assets; (6) farm-level constraints; and (7) household developmental
cycle, micro-level agricultural characteristics and economic performance.
Farmers: Responses to Some Background Issues
From the Commercial and Communal Areas' Farmers
The Large-Scale Commercial Farmers of Bindura Intensive
Cultivation Area
For this study a total of nine large-scale commercial farmers, all of
them Europeans, responded to a questionnaire (see Appendix D, Table D-5)
mailed to them. These farmers owned lands in the Bindura Intensive Cultivation
Area (see Figure 7-1). They were all male and ranged in ages from 39 to 63
years with a mean and median age of 49. The average or typical farmer in the
area had a college education which he completed in about 1967. The farmer with
the most years of farming connection to the area had been farming in Bindura
since 1951 while the one with the least had been there since 1975. About half
of these farmers took to farming straight from college while a third of them
worked in agricultural-related jobs prior to their entry into farming.
All these farmers owned the properties that they farmed on freehold
tenure basis having purchased them at one time or the other between 1964 and
1983. Their total farm sizes ranged from a low of 150 hectares to a high of
1,296 hectares with a mean size of 534. The monetary worth of the farms were
also valued by the owners to be between $65,000 and $300,000 with a mean of
$154,167. Only one farmer reported that the size of his farm was inadequate

Sc.Albert
206
KARUYANA S-SCF
Mandeve
¡CANDEYA COMMUNAL AREA
FIGURE 7 1
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: CASE STUDY AREAS

207
for his needs. He would buy more land to expand. The others found their land
to be adequate and therefore did not contemplate any purchase or expansion.
Fifty-five percent of the farmers intended to pass the property on to a family
member eventually, but the rest had "other" unspecified plans towards the
disposal of their farms.
Four of these farms shared a common boundary with the Madziwa Communal
Area (Figure 7-1). Six out of the nine farmers had their farms trespassed upon
by residents and livestock from the Communal Area. Seven farmers were
approached before and they offered agricultural advice and other farm-related
assistance to farmers in the Communal Area. However, only one was ever
contacted and he gave assistance to a farmer in the government-sponsored
resettlement scheme. The nearby schemes include Mufurudzi and Mount Darwin
Model A Normal, the Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated and Model B Producer
Cooperatives notably Kubudirira, Batsiranayi, and Kushingirira (Figure 7-1).
When asked about how, in their opinion, the smallholder African farmers
in the region could become successful farmers the views of these Bindura TCA
farmers were divided equally. Three of them suggested the increased adoption
of extension advice by the peasants, three others recommended the proper use
of credit facilities while the advice of the remaining three was simply to the
effect that "there was no substitute for hard work."
The Small-Scale Commercial Farmers of Chesa Nyajenje and Karuyana
Chesa and Karuyana are bordered by the Kandeya Communal Area to the north
and the east. Elsewhere, they respectively share boundaries with Mufurudzi,
Mount Darwin and Karuyana Model A Normal Schemes (Figure 7-1).

208
Farm sizes in this sector ranged from 48 to 108 hectares with a mean of
74. Land ownership in the case of 95 percent of the farmers was freehold and
only 5 percent carried a lease. Of the freehold owners 58 percent acquired
full title to their lands between 1955 and 1965, 16 percent between 1966 and
1970 and the remaining 26 percent only as recent as 1979 to 1985. The majority
of the farmers, that is, 58 percent of the original occupants were still
present while the mode of acquisition on the part of the remaining 42 percent
was through inheritance. When asked about how farmers intended to dispose of
these properties eventually when they are unavailable to farm anymore 79
percent indicated that they planned to will them to their sons and another 16
percent to their brothers instead. Five percent preferred to sell the farms
ultimately. Currently, 74 percent of all the farmers found their land sizes
adequate for their cropping and grazing needs. However, every one in four
expressed the intention to buy more land in the future.
Of the 20 farmers studied 16 percent had lands that were adjacent to the
Communal Area. Like some of the Large-Scale farmers of Bindura, 20 percent of
these Small-Scale Commercial farmers reported problems of trespassing from the
Communal Area. Sixty percent of the farmers reported interacting and offering
advice to their counterparts in the Communal Area. As to if these Small-Scale
Commercial farmers had ever been approached or offered advice on good farming
to farmers from the Model A Normal and the Accelerated resettlement schemes 30
percent of them responded to have done so. But this was even less so when it
came to the Cooperatives. The closest Model B Producer Cooperatives in the
area were Chakoma, Kushingirira, Kurima Inhaka and Nyakudya. Only 15 percent
of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers stated that thay had interacted with
farmers from the cooperative sector.

209
The Communal Area Farmers of Bushu, Madziwa and Kandeya
The 62 farmers who were respectively interviewed in this farming system
came from (1) Chishapa, Gono and Jiti subdivisions of Bushu, (2) Nyamaropa,
Svesve, Mukubvu and Goora in Madziwa and (3) Mandeve, Mashanga, Mungando and
Matope/Kapfudza in Kandeya (Figure 7-1). These had all lived in those areas
from between 3 and 92 years. This meant that some of them might have returned
home recently to live and farm permanently while others had spent all their
lives there.
The number of years that these had been farming in their respective areas
ranged from 1 to 50 years with a mean of 18. The size of arable lands
controlled by these farmers also ranged from 0.8 to 6.4 hectares with a mean
of 2.7 and median of 2.4 hectares. Only about a third of all these farmers
considered their land size adequate. In all 68 percent felt that their land
was not sufficient for their farm needs and as many as 82 percent of all
farmers also stated that the grazing land for livestock in their Communal Area
was inadequate.
All the Communal Area farmers had heard about the government's
resettlement program. Seventy-three percent of them had either already applied
or intended to apply for resettlement. Of these farmers, numbering 45, an
overwhelming majority or 93 percent preferred to be resettled in the minda
mirefu or the Model A individual family schemes. This was in contrast to the
mushandira pamwe or the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes for which only
7 percent of those opting for resettlement indicated a preference.

210
Farmers: Their Social and Demographic Characteristics
This sub-section deals only briefly with background characteristics of
the European or Large-Scale Commercial farmers after which aspects of the
socio-demographic profiles of African farmers in the resettlement schemes, the
Communal Area and the Small-Scale Commercial sectors are discussed. For the
African farmers the major items presented include farmers' home or country of
origin, province and communal area, age, gender, marital status, number of
wives and children, level of school completed, non-agricultural skills,
household size and developmental cycle type.
All farmers in the Communal Area, the Small-Scale Commercial sectors as
well as the greatest majority of those in the remaining farming systems were
Zimbabweans. However, with the government-introduced resettlement program some
so-called alien from neighboring countries opted to become farmers in Zimbabwe
(Table 7-1). Indeed, these aliens took advantage of the government's amnesty
in early 1985 which offered citizenship to those of them who had lived
continuously in the country over the previous five years. The majority of
these resettled farmers of non-Zimbabwean origin were farm laborers on the
farms which the government purchased for resettlement. They were mostly
Mozambicans, Malawians and Zambians who reported to have worked in European
farms in Zimbabwe for periods ranging from 14 to 53 years.
The Zimbabwean-born farmers in the Mashonaland Central Province or the
study area came from all parts of the country. In terms of provincial
distribution all the farmers in the Communal as well as 76 percent of those in
the Model A Normal, 41 percent from the Model A Accelerated and 53 percent
from the Cooperative sectors hailed from Mashonaland Central. Only 5 percent
of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers were from that Province. This

211
distribution is shown in Table 7-2 which also indicates that 55 percent of the
African elite farmers who purchased farms in Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale
Commercial Areas did so as farmers whose home province today is Mashonaland
East. A similar situation exists now in the Model A Accelerated Schemes of
Sharava and Bindura where many of the farmers were brought in from the Uzuraba
Communal Area in the Mashonaland East Province rather than from Mashonaland
Central where the schemes were located.
Of all farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes 41 percent listed their
communal area to be in the Mashonaland Central Province. Of these, every one
out of four came from the nearby Bushu Communal Area. On the other hand, every
farmer out of three in the Model A Normal Scheme was from the adjacent Madziwa
Communal Area while one out of five cooperative or Model B farmers was from
Kandeya/Dotito Communal Area (Table 7-3).
The age distribution of the farmers provide interesting contrasts. That
of the Model A Normal and Accelerated schemes' farmers look similar to that
from the Communal Area in terms of the mean and median ages which respectively
were around the mid-40s. In comparison the Cooperative Schemes' farmers were
younger while the Small-Scale Commercial farmers were much older. An
examination of Table 7-4 reveals that 55 percent of the farmers in the
Small-Scale Commercial area were in the 26-60 year age group with 40 percent
of the remaining being older than 60 years. In the case of the Cooperatives 63
percent were in the 26-60 year age group with 34 percent of the remaining
being even younger than 26 years. However, in the Communal Area and in the
Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes the number of farmers in the 26-60 year
age group were 32 percent, 83 percent and 89 percent respectively (Table 7-4).

TABLE 7 1
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOME COUNTRY
212
(N=)
ZIMBAB
BWE
MOZAMB
I QUE
%
MALAWI
ZAMBIA
Model A Normal
(349)
96.3
2.0
1.4
0.3
Model A Accelerated
(39)
84.7
7.7
5.1
2.6
Model B Cooperative
(151)
83.4
11.3
4.6
0.7
Communal Area
(62)
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale Commercial
(20)
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TABLE 7-2
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOME PROVINCE
NON- MASHONALAND MANICA MID MASV MATABELELAND
(N=)
ZIMBA
BWE
EAST
CENT
RAL
WEST
LAND
%
LANDS
INGO
NORTH
SOUTH
Model A
Norm (348)
3.7
10.4
75.9
2.6
2.0
1.4
4.0
0.0
0.0
Model A
Accl (38)
15.4
38.5
41.0
2.6
0.0
0.0
2.6
0.0
0.0
Model B
Coop (151)
16.6
15.9
53.0
3.3
4.6
2.6
3.3
0.0
0.7
Communal
Area (62)
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Small-Sc
Commer (20)
0.0
55.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
5.0
0.0

TABLE 7-3
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOME COMMUNAL AREA
213
NON- MADZI
MASHONALAND WA
CENTRAL
BUSHU CHIWE KANDEYA/ OTHER
SHE DOTITO MASHONALAND
CENTRAL
(N=) %
Model A Norm (349)
24.0
34.7
13.5
16.0
1.7
10.0
Model A Accl (39)
59.0
2.6
25.6
2.6
2.6
7.7
Model B Coop (151)
30.5
5.3
4.6
3.3
21.9
16.6
Communal Area (62)
0.0
50.0
25.8
0.0
24.2
0.0
Small-Scale C (20)
95.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.0
TABLE 7-4
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' AGE
AGE COHORTS
(N=)
16-
20
21-
25
26-
30
31-
35
36-
40
41-
45
%
46-
50
51-
55
56-
60
61-
65
66 OR
MORE
Model A
Norm (344)
0.3
4.1
10.2
15.4
11.9
13.7
11.6
11.6
9.0
6.7
5.5
Model A
Accl (38)
0.0
0.0
7.9
15.8
18.4
10.5
18.4
7.9
10.5
5.3
5.3
Model B
Coop (151)
9.9
24.5
13.2
9.3
10.6
9.3
7.3
6.0
7.3
1.3
1.3
Communal
Area (61)
0.0
3.3
8.2
8.2
14.8
18.0
8.2
18.0
6.6
6.6
8.2
Small-Sc
Commer(20)
0.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
10.0
5.0
10.0
5.0
15.0
15.0
25.0

214
The headship of these rural households reflected the expected, that is,
the predominance of males. This was even more so in the Small-Scale Commercial
Area. A large proportion of the Cooperative farm families, making up 38
percent of the total, and about 23 percent of families in the Communal Area
were female headed (Table 7-5).
All Small-Scale Commercial farmers were married. In the Communal, Model A
Normal and Accelerated sectors every 9 of 10 farmers were married. In the
Cooperative one out of every 4 farmers had never been married. Also within
this latter sector the proportion of divorcees was higher. There were more
widowed farmers in the Communal Area and none in the Small-Scale Commercial
Area (Table 7-6). The norm among all the married men was monogamous unions.
However, a few farmers had taken additional wives. One out of every 10 married
men in the Cooperative had a second wife. The corresponding figures were
higher elsewhere with 1 in 8 in the Model A Accelerated Scheme, 1 in 5 in the
Small-Scale Commercial, 1 out of 4 in the Model A Normal Scheme as well as 1
in 3 in the Communal Area (Table 7-7).
Still among the married male farmers all those in the Small-Scale
Commercial sector married their wives at one time or another before 1980. But
that was not so among the others. In the Communal Area 12.5 percent of the
married men either entered into their first marriage since 1980 or had taken
another wife between then and 1985. This was true of 15 percent of the
Cooperative farmers, 16 percent of the Model A Accelerated and 24 percent of
Model A Normal Schemes' farmers. In the latter group two farmers had each
married three and four women respectively since being resettled in 1980 (Table
7-8).
All farmers in the Small-Scale Commercial as well as the Communal Areas
respectively had one or more living children. With a negligible exception this
was the case also in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes. However, in

TABLE 7-5
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' GENDER
215
(N=)
MALE
FEMALE
%
Model A Normal
(349)
87.1
12.9
Model A Accelerated
(38)
84.2
15.8
Model B Cooperative
(151)
62.3
37.7
Communal Area
(62)
77.4
22.6
Small-Scale Commercial
(20)
95.0
5.0
MASHONALAND CENTRAL :
(N=)
TABLE 7-6
PROVINCE: FARMERS' MARITAL STATUS
NEVER MARRIED DIVORCED WIDOWED
MARRIED
%
Model A Normal
(349)
0.3
93.1
1.1
5.4
Model A Accelerated
(38)
0.0
92.1
2.6
5.3
Model B Cooperative
(151)
24.5
66.9
5.3
3.3
Communal Area
(62)
0.0
91.9
o

o
8.1
Small-Scale Commercial
(20)
o

o
100.0
0.0
0.0

TABLE 7-7
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: MARRIAGE STRUCTURES OF MALE FARMERS
216
NEVER MONO POLYGYNOUS
MARRIED GAMOUS
(NUMBER OF WIVES
(N=)
0
1
2
3
%
4
5)
Model A Normal
(304)
0.3
61.8
25.3
10.2
1.3
1.0
Model A Accelerated
(32)
0.0
84.4
12.5
3.1
0.0
0.0
Model B Cooperative
(94)
39.4
51.1
9.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Communal Area
(48)
0.0
68.8
29.2
2.1
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale Commercial
(19)
0.0
78.9
21.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
MASHONALAND
TABLE 7 -
CENTRAL PROVINCE:
BY MALE FARMERS
8
NUMBER OF
SINCE 1980
WIVES
MARRIED
(NUMBER OF WIVES
0
1
2
3
4)
(N=)
%
Model A Normal
(304)
72.0
24.0
3.3
0.3
0.3
Model A Accelerated
(32)
84.4
15.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Model B Cooperative
(94)
85.1
14.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
Communal Area
(48)
87.5
12.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale Commercial (19)
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

217
the Cooperative sector 29 percent of all farmers did not have any children.
Among the farmers with children the minimum was one child throughout except in
the Small-Scale Commercial Area where it was two. The maximum number of
children born to these farmers ranged between a low of 15 in the Model A
Accelerated to 28 in the Model A Normal Schemes (Table 7-9). The mean number
per farmer was 5 in the Cooperative, 6 each in the Model A Normal and
Accelerated Schemes and 7 each in the Communal and the Small-Scale Commercial
Areas, respectively.
With regards to the number of children born to farmers between 1980 and
1985 the Model A Normal Scheme recorded the highest figures with 57 percent of
all farmers getting two or more children. Correspondingly, within the five
year period 39 percent of the Communal Area and the Model A Accelerated
farmers, 32 percent of the Cooperative and 30 percent of the Small-Scale
Commercial farmers respectively had two or more children. Infact, within the
Model A Normal Scheme and the Communal Area around 3 percent of the farmers
respectively had 5 or more children during the period (Table 7-10).
In relation to the level of education completed 95 percent of all
Small-Scale Commercial farmers had being to school. In contrast, as high as
43.7 percent of the Cooperative farmers had never been to school (Table 7-11).
In respect of non-agricultural skills the majority of Small-Scale Commercial
farmers had an advantage in that 80 percent of them were skilled. Artisans
such as bricklayers and carpenters as well as driver/mechanics formed the
majority of the professionals in these farm communities (Table 7-12).
Household sizes ranged from single-constituted households, which numbered
39.3 percent in the Cooperatives, to multiple ones. The latter type was the
norm throughout the remaining sectors. The largest households, two of them
each with 21 or more people, were confined to the Model A Normal Scheme and
the Communal Area, respectively. In both cases the households were male-headed

TABLE 7-9
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN OF FARMERS
218
(NUMBER OF CHILDREN
(N=)
0
1-5
6-10 1
%
L1-15 16
-20 21 OR
MORE)
Model A Normal
(348)
1.1
44.8
39.1
11.4
2.7
0.9
Model A Accelerated
(38)
2.6
55.2
23.7
18.5
0.0
0.0
Model B Cooperative
(150)
29.3
49.3
19.4
1.3
0.7
0.0
Communal Area
(61)
0.0
36.1
50.8
8.2
3.3
1.6
Small-Scale Commercial
(19)
0.0
35.0
45.0
15.0
5.0
0.0
TABLE 7
- 10
MASHONALAND CENTRAL
PROVINCE: NUMBER OF <
CHILDREN BORN TC
> FARMERS
IN
1980 -
1985
(NUMBER OF CHILDREN
0
1
2
3
4
5 OR
MORE)
(N=)
%
Model A Normal
(349)
22.3
20.9
33.0
15.5
5.4
2.9
Model A Accelerated
(39)
38.5
23.1
30.8
5.1
2.6
0.0
Model B Cooperative
(151)
51.0
16.6
29.1
3.3
0.0
0.0
Communal Area
(62)
43.5
17.7
22.6
11.3
1.6
3.2
Small-Scale Commercial
(20)
45.0
25.0
15.0
15.0
0.0
0.0

219
MASHONALAND CENTRAL
TABLE
PROVINCE:
7-11
FARMERS'
LEVEL
OF
SCHOOL
COMPLETED
NONE
E
SOME
L E
COMPLETED
M E N T
POST
ARY
(N=)
%
Model A Normal
(348)
21.6
46.3
14.7
17.5
Model A Accelerated
(38)
28.9
39.5
10.5
21.1
Model B Cooperative
(151)
43.7
25.2
12.6
18.5
Communal Area
(62)
11.3
67.7
14.5
6.5
Small-Scale Commercial
(20)
5.0
55.0
5.0
35.0
TABLE 7-12
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' NON-AGRICULTURAL SKILLS
(N=)
NONE
ARTISAN
DRIVER/
MECHANIC
%
SALES
TAILOR/
DRESS
MAKER
OTHER
Model A Normal
(348)
51.0
24.1
10.3
1.4
3.7
9.2
Model A Accelerated
(38)
53.8
15.4
10.3
5.1
5.1
7.7
Model B Cooperative
(151)
57.0
10.6
7.9
7.9
6.6
9.9
Communal Area
(62)
50.0
19.4
11.3
3.2
8.1
8. 1
Small-Scale Commercial
(18).
20.0
15.0
20.0
5.0
10.0
20.0

220
and highly polygynous. Apart from the Cooperatives, where the large number of
single households depressed the mean household size to 4 persons, the average
size everywhere was around 7 persons (Table 7-13).
In order to assign the 621 African households interviewed for this case
study I examined the respective ages, gender and conjugal situation of the _de
facto household head as well as other structural forms including the age
characteristics of all household members in the light of the Household
Developmental Cycle Typology that I formulated for this work (see Appendix A).
Very early in the analysis it became quite clear that the complex
organizational and household structures in the Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes were not amenable to the kinds of analytical concerns such as the
socioeconomic performance of the farm households for which the typology was
designed. Consequently, the 151 cooperative farmers were dropped leaving 470.
Of these 458 or 97.4 percent representing the four respective farming systems
possessed the complete and necessary data for them to be fit into the cycle.
The farmers were categorized into the following nine broad types of
developmental cycle: (1) male-headed monogamous household in establishment
phase, (2) male-headed monogamous household in expansion phase, (3)
female-headed household in expansion phase with the spouse temporary away, (4)
male-headed polygynous household in expansion phase, (5) male-headed
monogamous household in consolidation phase, (6) female-headed household in
consolidation phase with spouse temporary away, (7) female-headed household in
consolidation phase without a spouse, (8) male-headed polygynous household in
consolidation phase and (9) household in a decline phase (Table 7-14).^
The agricultural chracteristics and performance of each developmental
type for the various farming systems are described below in this Chapter.

221
TABLE 7-13
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOUSEHOLD SIZE
SING COUP 3-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21 OR
LE LE MORE
(NO DEPENDANTS)
(N=)
Model A Norma('342)
0.3
2.9
25.4
52.6
17.0
1.5
0.3
Model A Accel (38)
0.0
5.3
34.2
42.1
13.2
5.3
0.0
Model B Coop (117)
39.3
4.3
26.5
29.1
0.8
0.0
0.0
Communal Area (62)
1.6
8.1
25.8
48.4
14.5
0.0
1.6
Small-Scale C (20)
0.0
0.0
40.0
60.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

TABLE 7-14
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD
DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
ABCDEFGH
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
HOUSEHOLDS
Model A Norma 11 123
Model A Accel 1 14
Model B Coop -
Communal Area 2 14
Small-Scale CO 7
13 86 49 9 20 26 2
340
1 4 11 2 3 1 0
37
5 9 16 5 4 5 1
61
0 2 8 1 0 2 0
20
Note :
A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase
B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase
C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase
D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase
E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase
F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase
G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase
H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase
I = Household in Decline Phase
The Model Bs have been left out of this presentation

Farmers: Their General Responses and Evaluation of the
Government's Resettlement Policies and Programs
223
Some of the questions that farmers responded to in their evaluation of
the resettlement and agricultural policies and programs of the government were
specific to their respective farming systems. This was especially the case
with farmers in the resettlement schemes, namely, the Model A Normal and
Accelerated as well as the Model B Producer Cooperative sectors. Other general
questions common to these farmers were also asked of their counterparts in the
Large and Small-Scale Commercial and the Communal Areas respectively. The
specific issues are presented first.
The Farmers of Mufurudzi Model A Normal and the Shamva-Bindura
Model A Accelerated Schemes
These farmers first heard about the resettlement program through various
sources (Table 7-15). The most common of these was the ruling ZANU-PF party.
Its leaders and oficiis made the land redistribution issue an important one
in the chimurenga or liberation war years and followed up on it after the
attainment of independence in 1980. The majority of these farmers gave poor or
inadequate lands as their reason for resettlement. This category was followed
by those who were either landless or wanted a place to build a home and raise
families and those who just desired to improve their lives (Table 7-16).
Among these farmers the response to resettlement was overwhelmingly
positive. Infact 99 percent of the 388 Model A resettled farmers said that
they were glad to be part of the program. Comments explaining this response
included that of a farmer who was thrilled to be having, in his own words,
"for the first time in my 'difficult life' such things as my own minda
(farmland), musha (a home) for my family to live in, abundance of food,
government services and, above all, a peace of mind." Another farmer

TABLE 7-15
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' FIRST SOURCE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM
224
SOURCE
FREQUENCY
%
ZANU (PF) Comrades
125
32.2
District Councillors
86
22.2
Government Officers
46
11.9
News Media
44
11.3
Relatives
23
5.9
Friends
23
5.9
Chief/Headman/Farm Master
15
3.9
Other
24
6.2
Not Applicable
2
0.5
388
100.0
MODEL A SCHEMES:
REASON
TABLE 7-16
FARMERS' REASONS
FREQUENCY
FOR RESETTLEMENT
%
Inadequate/Poor Land
215
55.4
Landless
98
25.3
Wanted Own Home
42
10.8
To Improve Life Situation 22
5.7
Unemployed
5
1.3
Other
4
1.0
Inherited Property
2
0.5
388
100.0

225
emphatically boasted that resettlement had freed him from the serfdom
conditions under which he lived as a laborer in the colonial days sojourning
from one European-owned farm to another.
The farmers were also unanimous in voicing out that the government should
continue with resettlement. Most farmers rather impatiently recommended the
taking over of so-called "European farms" for resettlement (see Table 7-27
below) and the financing of the program from external donor sources. The
majority of farmers, that is 60 percent of all of them, were willing to pay a
resettlement tax, if at all necessary. Some of the remaining 40 percent argued
that they were not yet firmly settled or financially secure enough to be
burdened with such a tax. A few farmers held the opinion that as agricultural
producers they were already taxed enough by the government. Yet another group
just abhored any form of taxation implying that it was a relic of the colonial
past from which they were now permanently liberated.
The farmers complimented highly the assistance and the performance of the
Resettlement Team of scheme-level government staff. They recommended that the
officers found ways and means of solving and providing feedback on farmers''
problems and also visiting them in the fields and villages more regularly
(Table 7-17).
The Farmers of Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kushingirira
and Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes
The questions and responses relating to background issues about the
cooperatives dealt mostly with (1) membership and (2) members' attitudes and
self-evaluation of organizational problems which were unique to this
particular farming system.
Nearly 32 percent of the farmers originally worked as farm laborers on
European or Large-Scale Commercial Farms. In fact, almost all of these

TABLE 7-17
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' RECOMMENDATION TO IMPROVE
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RESETTLEMENT TEAM (GOVT. OFFICERS)
226
RECOMMENDATION
Solve Farmers' Problems
Provide Feedback on Complaints
Visit Farmers More Regularly
Other
Don't Know
Nothing/Officers Doing Fine
FREQUENCY %
133
34.3
100
25.8
75
19.3
28
7.2
10
2.6
42
10.8
388
100.0

227
former-laborers stayed on after the government purchased the respective farms
and they were absorbed into the Model B program. The other major category of
farmers in the cooperative were peasants, most of them formerly landless
Communal Area residents (Table 7-18). One Model B Scheme Chakoma was
originally formed by about 50 families from the Dotito sub-division of the
Kandeya Communal Area (see Figure 7-1). These families teamed up and
approached the government which assigned the 1,264 hectare Ruia Ranch located
in Natural Region II in the Mount Darwin area to them in 1981.
Apart from the Communal Area and the commercial farms a number of these
farmers previously lived in the towns working or unemployed. A few others were
also either students or former combatants and war refugees in neighboring
countries (Table 7-19).
As to how these farmers got to know about their cooperatives and became
resettled in them a large proportion said that they were co-founders or
original members. This group made up 48 percent of the members while 14
percent were recruited by friends or through political party and government
channels (Table 7-20).
On why they decided to join the cooperatives and be resettled 60 percent
of these farmers said they wanted a better life. The ideological factor,
namely, the promotion of state policy of socialism was what also influenced 16
percent of the other farmers. Another 15 percent said that as farm laborers,
ostensibly from outside Zimbabwe, they had "nowhere else to go other than
staying on" these farms which had become their homes (Table 7-21).
Of the married members, who numbered 103 and constituted 62.8 percent of
the total interviewed the overwhelming majority, that is, 88 percent also had
their spouses as members of their cooperative. Fifty-nine percent of all the
members also did not have any relative or kinsman as a cooperative member. In
the opinion of 80 percent of the members everyone in their cooperative

TABLE 7-18
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' OCCUPATIONS
PRIOR TO JOINING THE COOPERATIVE
228
OCCUPATION
FREQUENCY
%
Laborer in European/Commercial
Farm
48
31.8
Peasant in Communal Area
33
21.9
Ex-Combatant/Refugee
5
3.3
Mine Worker
3
2.0
Unemployed
11
7.3
Domestic Servant
9
6.0
Other
17
11.3
Student
25
16.6
151
100.0
TABLE 8-19
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' RESIDENCE
TO JOINING THE COOPERATIVE
PRIOR
PLACE
FREQUENCY
%
Communal Area
50
33.1
Other European/Commercial Farm
33
21.9
This Cooperative/Ex-Commerial Farm
16
10.6
Harare City
14
9.3
Other Urban Area
14
9.3
Youth Training/School
13
8.6
Outside Zimbabwe/Refugee Camp
4
2.6
Other
3
2.0
151
100.0

TABLE 7-20
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' FIRST
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE COOPERATIVE
229
SOURCE
FREQUENCY
%
Founding/Initial Member
72
47.7
Friends
21
13.9
ZANU-PF/Government Officials
15
9.9
Relatives/Kinsmen/Affines
13
8.6
News Media
8
5.3
Other
21
13.9
151
100.0
TABLE 7-21
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MEMBERS'
FOR JOINING THE COOPERATIVE
REASONS
REASON
FREQUENCY
%
To obtain better life
90
59.6
To promote socialism (state ideology)
25
16.6
Lived on this farm/Nowhere to go
23
15.2
Other
13
8.6
151
100.0

230
considered himself or herself as belonging to "one family." Even a greater
portion of the members, that is, 87 percent of them asserted that they "got on
well" with each other. Almost everybody joined the cooperative with no capital
assets or agricultural equipment (Table 7-22).
On organizational issues though almost everyone of them had not been a
cooperative member prior to joining these Model B resettlements as much as 48
percent claimed they knew the principles and objectives of the cooperative
movement. A great majority of these farmers claimed also to be satisfied with
the administration of the current Management Committee. The majority did not
favor the idea of paying mambership levy or annual fee to help to run their
schemes. The majority also believed that their respective cooperatives had
adequate membership to undertake the expected production activities and that
everybody was working hard enough. (Table 7-22).
As much as 71 percent of these cooperative farmers preferred the existing
collective tenure and work arrangement while 29 percent favored individual
farms (Table 7-22). The latter or minority group argued that individual would
promote harder work, end the exploitation of the "powerless majority by the
privileged minority" and reward personal initiative. The majority who argued
against parcelization of the collective property were of the opinion that such
action would be inimical to socialism, reduce productivity and that it was
even against the byelaws under which the Model B Schemes were registered.
This fact notwithstanding 69 percent of the members favored individual
cooking and eating arrangements over collective ones (Table 7-22). They cited
personal hygeine, different preferences and taste as justification. Their
minority opponents on the other hand believed that individual arrangements
were anti-collective and in principle and spirit contrary to cooperative
living and work. Both protagonists of individual and communal cooking, to some
extent, also mustered the same reasons to back their arguments.These were

TABLE 7-22
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: SOME GENERAL RESPONSES TO
RESETTLEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO THEIR COOPERATIVE
QUESTION RESPONSE FREQUENCY %
Were you a member of another
Cooperative before joining
this one?
Were you familiar with Coop
erative objectives and
principles?
Is your spouse a member of
this Cooperative?
NO
Is any other relative (kinsman/
affine) of yours a member of
this Cooperative?
Did you bring in any capital
assets/farm implements when
you joined this Cooperative?
Are you satisfied with the
administration of the Manage
ment Committee of this
Cooperative?
NO
Are you willing to pay an
annual levy/tax towards the
running of this Cooperative's
programs?
NO
YES
3
o

CM
NO
148
98.0
YES
73
48.3
NO
78
51.7
YES
91
60.3
NO
12
7.9
SPOUSE
48
31.8
YES
62
41.1
NO
89
58.9
YES
3
2.0
NO
148
98.0
YES
118
78.1
NO
30
19.9
RESPONSE
3
2.0
YES
121
80.1
NO
28
18.5
RESPONSE
2
1.3

TABLE 7 22continued
QUESTION
RESPONSE FREQUENCY
%
Does this Cooperative have
YES
94
62.3
adequate membership/workforce
to carry out its programs?
NO
57
37.8
Are members of this Cooperat-
YES
128
84.7
ive working hard enough to
ensure its success?
NO
17
11.2
DON'T KNOW
6
4.0
Do other members of this Coop-
YES
133
88.1
erative appreciate the effort
you put into your work assign-
NO
11
7.3
ment?
DON'T KNOW
7
4.6
Do you get on well with the
YES
128
84.8
other members of this
Cooperative?
NO
6
4.0
SOME/NOT ALL
13
8.8
DON'T KNOW
4
2.6
Do members of this Cooperative
YES
121
80.1
regard themselves as one
family?
NO
16
10.6
DON'T KNOW
14
9.3
What cooking/eating arrange-
INDIVIDUAL
104
68.9
ment would you recommend for
this Cooperative?
COLLECTIVE
47
31.2
What production arrangement
COLLECTIVE FARM
107
70.9
do you prefer in this Coop
erative?
INDIVIDUAL FARMS
43
28.5
BOTH
1
0.7

233
efficiency, cost-effectiveness, avoiding waste and being convenient.
Of all these cooperative farmers 38 percent had been in the scheme for
between 4 and 5 years, 28 percent for as much as 2 to 3 years while 34 percent
had been members for only a year or less (Table 7-23).
Finally, these Model B Producer Cooperative farmers were questioned about
how much remuneration they thought they deserved for their respective work
effort at the end of the 1984-85 agricultural season. About 20 percent said
they expected nothing apparently because their cooperative did not generate
any income. Nearly 9 percent also did not know how much they deserved to be
paid (Table 7-24).
Communal Area Farmers'' Responses
Two major questions about resettlement were asked of only the Communal
Area farmers. These are the people closer to the practical issues and
developments relating to the land question both in the past and now. They are
also the immediate and direct beneficiaries of the resettlement program.
The first question was whether or not in their judgement the government's
resettlement program was the solution to the land problem, meaning the
racially segregated pattern of ownership, the denudation and overutilization
of the communal resources and the landlessness. The response offered by 82
percent of these farmers was that resettlement was a solution. Those
disagreeing made up 8 percent with the remaining 10 percent not knowing
whether or not resettlement was the answer to the land hunger (Table 7-25).
These Communal Area farmers were then asked to choose between two
options. These were either (1) leaving these traditional homes and being
resettled in a new environment by the government as it was currently occurring
or (2) staying and having access to adjacent new lands to be purchased by the

TABLE 7-23
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MEMBERS" DURATION
OF STAY IN THEIR COOPERATIVES
234
NUMBER OF YEARS
FREQUENCY
%
1 or
Less
51
33.8
Over
1 to 3
42
27.8
Over
3 to 5
58
38.4
51
100.0
MODEL B
TABLE 7
PRODUCER COOPERATIVE
INCOMES FOR WORK DONE
AMOUNT EXPECTED
($)
- 24
SCHEMES: MEMBERS'
IN 1984-85 SEASON
FREQUENCY
EXPECTED
%
Nothing/Coop. Made no Profit
30
19.9
Less than 100
4
2.6
Between 100
and
200
17
11.3
Between 200
and
300
30
19.9
Between 300
and
1,000
29
19.2
Above 1,000
28
18.5
Don"t Know
13
8.6
151
100.0

235
government and added to expand the Communal Areas. Every three in four of
these respondents preferred the second alternative of remaining to farm in an
expanded Communal Area (Table 7-25).
Almost all the 75 percent opting for the expansion of the Communal Areas
were of the opinion that such a development, compared to resettlement
elsewhere, would be less socially disruptive and also ensure continuity of
traditional communal life as well as links with their ancestors. In the case
of the remaining 25 percent whose first preference was for resettlement they
were attracted by the different nature of the program especially ownership of
a new farm and home and being provided with all kinds of government
facilities. Most of them appeared suspicious and doubted that these privileges
would ever be part of any policy program that expanded Communal Areas (Table
7-25).
Finally, the farmers were questioned about one controversial issue
germane to the country's communal lands policy which was been debated and
formulated by the government. This had to do with traditional land rights in
these areas held by urban residents and workers. In the view of 73 percent of
these Communal Area farmers Africans now residing in the cities and towns
should continue to enjoy access to lands in their respective Communal Areas.
The remaining 27 percent disagreed (Table 7-25).
The argument put up by the majority of those who would want their kinsmen
and others working in the urban areas to be allowed to maintain rights was
that those people were sojourners and therefore had to have a "home to return
to." Others pointed out that many urban residents maintained and supported
their respective immediate and extended families in the Communal Areas. Thus
their links by way of land rights were of mutual benefit and crucial to the
prosperity of these Areas especially. The three main misgivings about the
situation offered by the opposing school were (1) the problem of communal

TABLE 7-25
COMMUNAL AREA: FARMER'S RESPONSES TO ISSUES RELATING TO
THE COMMUNAL LAND PROBLEM AND RESETTLEMENT
QUESTION
RESPONSE
FREQUENCY
%
Is the Government's resettlement
YES
51
82.3
program the solution to the
problem of land hunger here?
NO
5
8.1
DON'T KNOW
6
9.7
Would you prefer the Government
RESETTLEMENT
16
24.6
(1) to resettle more people from
here or (2) to add more new land
EXPANSION
46
75.4
to this Communal Area?
Should urban residents continue
YES
45
72.6
to enjoy traditional rights in
lands in the Communal Areas?
NO
17
27.4

237
landlessness, (2) land underutilization by "absentee farmers" who only came in
during the planting and harvesting periods and (3) the inequities entailed in
the "townsmen" enjoying the best of both worlds.
General Responses to Resettlement
In order to get a perspective about the wider dimensions of the impacts
of the on-going resettlement program farmers were asked if any of their
relatives or kinsmen had benefited from it and, specifically, under which
model. Table 7-26 sums up the responses which indicate that while some farmers
in all the five farming systems had kinsmen resettled the major beneficiaries
were those related to farmers in the Model A. Normal and Accelerated Schemes as
well as in the Communal Area. Of those beneficiaries the majority selected the
minda mirefu or Model A individual family farm rather than the mushandira
pamwe or Model B Producer Cooperative.
The criticisms voiced so far by farmers about the wisdom of resettlement
as an agricultural development policy had come from only the so-called
commercial sector. These farmers were therefore asked to rate the performance
of the government on a subjective trichotomized scale from low to high in
regard to an array of policy issues.
The responses are presented in Table 7-27. Among the majority of the
Small-Scale Commercial Farmers the government got high marks in areas of (1)
national food self-sufficiency, (2) support for large-scale farm sector, (3)
support for small-scale farm sector, (4) support for communal lands
agriculture and (5) progress with the resettlement program. In terms of
economic growth, resource conservation and the idea of socialist type of
agriculture for Zimbabwe the majority ratings were only average.

TABLE 7-26
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' IF RELATIVES
HAVE BEEN RESETTLED AND IN WHICH MODEL
MODEL A MODEL B
(Minda Mirefu) (Mushandira Pamwe)
(N=)
Yes
%
No
Yes
%
No
Model A Norm (349)
80.2
19.8
12.3
87.7
Model A Accel (39)
71.8
28.2
17.9
82.1
Model B Coop (151)
32.5
67.5
37.1
62.9
Communal Area (62)
78.7
21.3
19.1
80.9
Small-Scale C (20)
45.0
55.0
25.0
75.0

239
The majority of the Large-Scale Commercial Farmers highly applauded the
government only for promoting and maintaining self-sufficiency in food. The
majority also rated the policy impacts in the following areas as average (1)
economic growth, (2) promotion of large-scale farm sector and (3) support for
the small-scale farm sector. However, for (1) resource conservation, (2)
progress on the resettlement front and (3) plans for socialist agriculture the
majority responses were low or non-complimentary of the government (Table
7-27).
These farmers were asked if in their respective opinions and in the
context of the country's agriculture the government's resettlement policy was
realistic. Every four in five of the farmers in the Small-Scale sector said it
was. The remaining 20 percent were divided equally between a "no" and "don't
know" responses. On the other hand 78 percent of the Large-Scale Commercial
Farmers thought the policy was not realistic. The remaining 22 percent were
also divided equally between a "yes" and "don't know" answers (see Table
7-28).
Farmers from the Model A Schemes and the Small-Scale Commercial Area were
asked if the government should continue with the resettlement of more people.
The response was overwhelmingly positive with 100 percent of the farmers in
both the Model A Normal and the Accelerated Schemes saying yes. The
corresponding percentage was 95 for the Small-Scale Commercial sector.
On the issue of where to obtain land for further resettlement the
majority of these farmers suggested European-owned lands and the state lands
such as wild game reserves as the possible areas for the government to look
(Table 7-29). In an apparent response to that suggestion 44.4 percent of the
Large-Scale Commercial Farmers said that there were no lands available in that
sector for government's purchase for resettlement while 33.3 percent thought
there were (Table 7-28).

TABLE 7-27
MASHONAL AND CENTRAL PROVINCE: COMMERCIAL FARMERS' RATINGS OF
ISSUES ABOUT GOVERNMENT'S AGRICULTURAL AND RESETTLEMENT POLICIES
SMALL-SCALE FARMERS LARGE-SCALE FARMERS
(N = 20) (N = 9)
LOW
AVERAGE
%
HIGH
LOW
AVERAGE
%
HIGH
Food Self-Sufficiency
5.0
25.0
70.0
11.1
22.2
66.7
Economic Growth
15.0
45.0
40.0
33.3
44.4
22.2
Large-Scale Farm Sector
10.0
30.0
60.0
11.1
77.8
11.1
Small-Scale Farm Sector
15.0
30.0
55.0
11.1
55.6
33.3
Communal Area Sector
25.0
30.0
45.0
-
-
-
Resource Conservation
15.0
45.0
40.0
44.4
44.4
11.1
Resettlement Progress
0.0
45.0
55.0
44.4
33.3
22.2
TABLE 7-28
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: COMMERCIAL FARMERS' RESPONSES
TO OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM
SMALL-SCALE LARGE-SCALE
(N=20) FARMERS (N=9)
QUESTION
RESPONSE
FREQUENCY
%
FREQUENCY
%
Are the government's
YES
16
80.0
1
11.1
resettlement policy and
programs realistic?
NO
2
10.0
7
77.8
DON'T KNOW
2
10.0
1
11.1
Are Large-Scale
YES
3
33.3
(European-Owned) Farms
available for purchase
NO
4
44.4
and resettlement?
DON'T KNOW
-
-
2
22.2

TABLE 7-29
RESETTLEMENT AND SMALL SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS RESPONSES
AS TO WHERE LANDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR RESETTLEMENT
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED SMALL-SCALE
SCHEME
SCHEME
COMMERCIAL
(N = 345)
(N = 39)
(N = 20)
European (Large-Scale)
Commercial Farms
61.2
66.7
60.0
Safari/State Lands
16.2
10.3
10.0
Government Knows Where
6.7
-
20.0
Other Areas/Lands
5.2
5.2
5.0
Don't Know Where
10.7
17.9
5.0

242
About relations with Communal Area residents the resettled farmers were almost
unanimous in their disagreement that the former have a right to graze their
livestock or even to enjoy access to the exploitation of such "collective"
resources as housing poles, firewood and thatching grass from the resettlement
areas. Consequently, they agreed with the government's policy of erecting and
maintaining a wired boundary fence to physically divide the two geographic
entities (Table 7-30).
The reasons offered by the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers in
support of their view to keep away "trespassers" were that the resettlement
schemes were private property which resources were for the exclusive benefit
of the resettled members and their households. Some of them also labelled such
Communal Area residents as "poachers" and accused them of often stealing from
the Cooperatives. Given the fact that almost all these resettled farmers not
long ago were Communal Area residents their new attitude towards their kinsmen
and former colleagues in the area of the use of state-controlled resources is
interesting.
While over 60 percent majority of the farmers in the Communal Area also
accepted that they did not have rights as such in the resources of the
resettlement areas 47 percent felt that a physical boundary erected to
separate the two areas and thus communities was not justified (Table 7-30).
This minority opinion argued that (1) both communities were made up of the
same people, (2) such a measure was anti-socialism and (3) smacked of the old
colonial policy of segregated development against which many of them fought in
the liberation struggle. To most of the 53 percent who favored the boundary
the feeling was that it would minimize any social conflicts between
communities in the two different areas and also facilitate resource
conservation in the new resettlements.

243
TABLE 7-30
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: RESETTLEMENT AND COMMUNAL AREA
FARMERS' RESPONSES TOWARDS COMMON ACCESS TO RESETTLEMENT RESOURCES
MODEL A MODEL A MODEL B COMMUNAL
NORMAL ACCELERATED COOPERATIVE AREA
SCHEME SCHEME SCHEME
(N
=349)
(N=39)
(N=151)
(N=62)
Do Communal Area residents
have the right .to graze
YES
4.3
5.1
0.7
32.3
livestock in resettlement
lands?
NO
95.7
94.9
99.3
67.7
Do Communal Area residents
have the right to use common
YES
2.3
2.6
-
33.9
resources (poles, grass,
etc. in resettlement lands?
NO
97.7
97.4
66.1
Is the Government justified
YES
95.4
97.4
53.2
in erecting a boundary fence
between the resettlement
lands and the Communal Areas?
NO 4.6
2.6
46.8

244
Finally, the responses of all the farmers about two pertinent issues were
requested. The first was on the government's pronouncement to "socialize the
country's agriculture" as a means of ending exploitation and to ensure equity.
The second asked the farmers to suggest a recommendation to the government as
to how a better agriculture can be fostered in Zimbabwe.
Except in the Small-Scale Commercial Sector the majority of farmers in
the four farming systems who were questioned about socialist agriculture gave
it a low rating. Infact all the European or Large-Scale Commercial Farmers
were against the idea (Table 7-31).
The recommendations presented here in Table 7-32 reflected some of the
major and diverse concerns within and between farmers in the different systems
(see for instance farm-level constraints below in this Chapter). Thus while
the most important interest expressed by the majority of African farmers was
for the provision of more credits, inputs and equipment their European
counterparts in the Large-Scale Commercial sector were bothered by the need to
ensure efficient marketing and pricing policies as well as the promotion of
private or individual farm enterprises. This concern for private farms was an
apparent response to the pronouncements about socialist agriculture in
Zimbabwe.
Except in the Small-Scale Commercial Sector the majority of farmers in
the four farming systems who were questioned about socialist agriculture gave
it a low rating. Infact all the European or Large-Scale Commercial Farmers
were against the idea (Table 7-31).
The recommendations presented here in Table 7-32 reflected some of the
major and diverse concerns within and between farmers in the different systems
(see for instance farm-level constraints below in this Chapter). Thus while
the most important interest expressed by the majority of African farmers was

245
TABLE 7-31
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' RATING OF GOVERNMENT'S
POLICY TO SOCIALIZE THE COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURE
(N=)
LOW
AVERAGE
%
HIGH
Model A Norm (349)
63.3
28.4
8.3
Model A Accel (39)
53.8
25.6
20.5
Model B Coop ()
-
-
-
Communal Area ()
-
-
-
Small-Scale C (20)
45.0
50.0
5.0
Large-Scale C (9)
100.0
0.0
0.0
TABLE 7-32
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS RECOMMENDATION
FOR BETTER AGRICULTURE FOR THE COUNTRY
(N=)
NONE
CREDIT/
INPUTS/
IMPLEM
ENTS
MARKET
ING/
PRICES
EXTEN RESETT
SION LEMENT
%
PRIVATE 0THEI
FARMS
Model A Norm (347)
0.9
49.3
2.6
14.7
13.3
11.8
7.5
Model A Accel (38)
0.0
63.2
0.0
13.2
2.6
10.5
10.6
Communal Area (62)
1.6
43.5
32.3
0.0
21.0
0.0
1.6
Small-Scale C (20)
5.0
50.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
0.0
15.0
Large-Scale C (9)
0.0
0.0
37.5
0.0
0.0
37.5
25.0

246
for the provision of more credits, inputs and equipment their European
counterparts in the Large-Scale Commercial sector were bothered by the need to
ensure efficient marketing and pricing policies as well as the promotion of
private or individual farm enterprises. This concern for private farms was an
apparent response to the pronouncements about socialist agriculture in
Zimbabwe.
Farmers: Their Attitudes and Perceptions About Life Situation
Farmers were asked general and specific questions seeking to elicit
responses that reflected their perceptions and attitudes towards matters
relating to the special circumstances of their lives.
For instance, to the African farmers in the resettlement schemes and
other rural areas the government's development agenda was meaningless if it
was not targeted to the attainment of what everybody talked about as the "good
life" (upenyu hwakanaka). The farmers were therefore asked to define what each
considered to be the major attribute of this so-called good life. Other
questions relating to this very important concept were also put to the
farmers. Their responses are presented below.
Farmers' conception of what constituted development can be inferred
from their perceptions of what a "good life" was. Zimbabwe African farmers
mentioned various major attributes of a satisfying and desirable life. The six
major attributes mentioned were the ownership of the following: (1) musha,
(home) a concept embracing a physical dwelling, residential plot and wives and
children; (2) minda, (farm) which is also agricultural land and all the
essential implements to make it productive; (3) mombe, (cattle) which
symbolically and in all other respects shows a man's worth; (4) mari,
(money); (5) off-farm business or non-agricultural source of income; and (6)

247
access to social infrastructure or modern facilities such as schools. These
attributes defined what, in the Shona worldview, ensured upenyu hwakanaka
that is sought by every person for himself and his family (mhuri).
In ranking these attributes of a good life the majority of farmers
selected minda or having a farm as the most important. The only exception was
the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers who, instead, chose money. The second
most mentioned attribute was a home. However, it was ranked third by Model A
Normal Scheme farmers who valued cattle as a second choice (Table 7-33).
The farmers were asked as to whether or not the good life they mentioned
was attainable in the areas or farming systems that they currently farmed.
Almost all Model A Normal and Accelerated Scheme farmers responded in the
affirmative. However, this was not the case among the other farmers 15 percent
of whom respectively said that their systems could not assure them of a good
life (Table 7-34). When the farmers were asked a similar question about their
children the majority still believed that it was possible in the long run for
them to enjoy a good life at where the parents were farming now. Every two in
five Communal Area farmers indicated otherwise (Table 7-34).
A hypothetical question was asked of farmers as to where they would
rather work if wage employment was their only option to achieve a good life.
Four places were suggested to them, namely, (1) Harare or other towns, (2)
Small-Scale (African) Commercial Farms, (3) Large-Scale (European) Commercial
Farms and (4) Mining Areas. Nevertheless, the majority of farmers everywhere
insisted that they would prefer to do nothing at all rather than be employed
in any of the four suggested situations. Of those willing to accomodate that
option more of the Model A Normal Scheme farmers were prepared for an urban
employment and the Model A Accelerated Scheme farmers for work on the
Small-Scale Commercial Farms. The Communal Area farmers were divided between
working in Harare or other towns and working in the Small-Scale Commercial

TABLE 7-33
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' CONCEPTION OF
ATTRIBUTES OF A "GOOD LIFE" (UPENYU HWAKANAKA)
FARM/ CATTLE HOME/ MONEY OFF-FARM ACCESS OTHER
(N=)
CAPITAL
ASSETS
MATERIAL
ITEMS
%
BUSINESS
TO SOCIAL
INFRAST
Model A
Norn (349)
34.1
30.1
24.9
4.9
2.9
1.7
1.4
Model A
Accel (39)
41.0
20.5
23.1
7.7
5.1
0.0
2.6
Model B
Coop (151)
26.5
11.3
27.2
28.5
2.0
3.3
1.3
Communal
Area (62)
41.9
14.5
25.8
11.3
1.6
3.2
1.6
Small-Sc
Commer (20)
50.0
10.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
20.0
0.0
TABLE 7-34
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' RESPONSES AS TO WHETHER
OR NOT GOOD LIFE IS POSSIBLE IN THIS AREA/FARMING SYSTEM FOR FARMER
AND CHILDREN
FARMER FARMER'S CHILDREN
(SHORT/MEDIUM TERM) (LONG-TERM)
(n=)
Yes
No
%
Yes
No
%
Don't
Know
Model A Norm (349)
98.9
1.1
65.0
22.1
12.8
Model A Accel (39)
100.0
0.0
82.1
12.8
5.1
Model B Coop (151)
84.8
15.4
76.2
9.3
14.6
Commumal Area (62)
85.5
14.5
53.2
40.3
6.5
Small-Scale C (20)
85.0
15.0
70.0
25.0
5.0

249
Farms. Most of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers who were willing to engage
in wage labor chose the Large-Scale Commercial Farms which, incidentally, was
the least preferred by Communal Area farmers. For all the other farmers
working in the Mines was an option that hardly anybody cared for (Table 7-35).
The responses to another similar hypothetical question showed very
interesting pattern. The farmers were asked if their only option to attain a
good life was remaining in agriculture the under which of the four farming
systems associated with African agriculture would they choose. Every 7 in 10
farmers in the Model A Schemes preferred remaining in the resettlement program
while a third opted for the Small-Scale Commercial sector where they would
have access to more land and other resources. Nearly 60 percent of the Model B
Producer Cooperative farmers liked the cooperatives and nearly 40 percent of
the Communal Area farmers also chose to farm in the Communal Area. All the
Small-Scale Commercial farmers also preferred their own farming system and did
not consider any of the other systems as a viable option (Table 7-36).
The responses in Table 7-36 are striking for the fact that (1) every 6 in
10 Communal Area farmers wanted an upgrade into the Model A resettlement
program or better still into the Small-Scale Commercial farming, (2) over 36
percent of the farmers in the Model B Schemes similarly wanted such an upgrade
away from the cooperatives and (3) almost nobody outside the Communal Area or
the Model B Producer Cooperative thought a good life was achievable for them
if they were in any of the two respective farming systems.
The final hypothetical question to the farmers related to what they would
invest in were they to be given $1,000 each. The majority of all Model B
Producer Cooperative farmers chose to use that to provide a home and other
household essentials for themselves and/or their families. Elsewhere, other
farmers would rather invest the money in their farms especially by purchasing
capital or productive assets. Varying percentages of the farmers ranging from

TABLE 7-35
MASHONALAND CENTRAL: FARMERS' PREFERENCE FOR JOB
LOCATION IF WAGE EMPLOYMENT IS THE ONLY OPTION
FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF A GOOD LIFE
(N=)
HARARE/
OTHER
TOWNS
SMALL-SC
COMMER
FARM
LARGE-SC
COMMER
FARM
%
MINES
NO
PLACE
Model A Norm (348)
10.0
8.0
4.3
1.4
76.2
Model A Accel (39)
2.6
12.8
5.1
2.6
76.9
Model B Coop (151)
13.2
23.2
4.6
2.6
56.3
Communal Area (62)
14.5
14.5
3.2
6.5
61.3
Small-Scale C (20)
5.0
0.0
20.0
0.0
75.0
TABLE 7-36
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' PREFERENCE FOR
FARMING SYSTEM IF AGRICULTURE IS THE ONLY OPTION
FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF A GOOD LIFE
(N=)
COMMUNAL
AREA
MODEL B
(Mushandira
Pamwe)
%
MODEL A
(Minda
Mirefu)
SMALL-
SCALE
COMMERCIAL
Model A Norm
(348)
0.6
0.3
72.1
27.0
Model A Accel
(39)
0.0
0.0
74.4
25.6
Model B Coop
(151)
3.3
58.9
29.8
7.9
Communal Area
(62)
38.7
0.0
35.5
25.8
Small-Scale C
(20)
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

251
20 in the Small-Scale Commercial Area to 33 percent in the Model A Normal
Scheme would buy cattle (Table 7-37).
Still dealing with good life farmers were requested to list the one
profession that they would prefer for their children who completed school.
Those mentioned were put into eight major professional categories as follows:
(1) farming, (2) engineering, (3) teaching, (4) nursing, (5) medicine, (6)
driving (7) clerk or office work and (8) the army/police forces. More farmers
in the Model A Accelerated Schemes chose Nursing followed by teaching. For
farmers in the remaining farming systems teaching was the most cited choice
(Table 7-38).
Since almost all the major preferences entailed additional training it is
likely that these farmers were prepared to invest more of their resources in
the post-elementary education of their children. A rather interesting
observation from the data relates to the comparative perspective offered by a
sample of farmers' children about their own job preferences. Like their
parents most of the students also chose teaching followed by nursing (see
Table 7-38).
Finally, all the farmers both African and European were respectively
asked about their life situation for the period before independence in 1980,
currently in 1985 and as they perceive it would be like five years hence in
1990. Apart from the Europeans each farmer was shown a chart depicting a Good
Life-Difficult Life Continuum simply as three levels on a stairway (Figure
7-2). These farmers were each requested to indicate where he or she stood on
the steps during the three separate periods.
Around 9 in 10 resettled farmers in both the Model A Normal and
Accelerated Schemes as well as the Model B Producer Cooperatives reported as
having experienced hard or difficult life (upenyu hwakaoma) prior to 1980. In
the Communal Area nearly 7 in every 10 also responded likewise. For both the

252
TABLE 7-37
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' CHOICE OF LIKELY
ITEMS IN WHICH TO INVEST $1,000
INVEST
IN FARM/
CAPITAL
ASSETS
BUY PROVIDE SAVE INVEST IN OTHER
CATTLE HOME/ IN BANK OFF-FARM
MATERIAL BUSINESS
ITEMS
(N=)
%
Model A Norma(347) 41
.8
32.6
8.9
8.4
4.0
4.3
Model A Accel (38) 33
.3
30.8
12.8
10.3
5.1
7.7
Model B Coop (150) 8
.7
23.3
34.7
13.3
5.3
14.7
Communal Area (62) 37
.1
29.0
12.
9
9.7
6.5
4.8
Small-Scale C (20) 65
.0
20.0
15.
0
0.0
0.0
0.0
TABLE
7-38
MASHONALAND CENTRAL
PROVINCE: FARMERS'
CHOICE OF
POST-SCHOOL
PROFESSION FOR THEIR CHILDREN
COMPARED WITH SELF-CHOICE BY GRADUATING
STUDENTS FROM MUFURUDZI
MODEL A
. SCHEME ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
FARM
ENGI
TEACH
NURS
MEDI
DRIV
CLERK/
ARMY/
OTHER
ING
NEER
ING
ING
CINE
ING
OFFICE
POLICE
ING
WORK
(N=)
%
Model A Norma(325) 9.8
8.0
30.2
18.8
8.3
3.7
12.6
0.9
7.7
Model A Accel (36) 5.6
8.3
19.4
25.0
5.6
8.3
5.6
5.6
16.7
Model B Coop (90) 12.2
4.4
33.3
17.8
7.8
6.7
12.2
0.0
5.6
Communal Area (54) 7.4
9.3
20.4
13.0
11.1
5.6
6.7
7.4
9.3
Small-Scale C(16) 12.5
18.8
25.0
12.5
18.8
6.3
0.0
0.0
6.3
Mufurudzi
Students (71) 5.6
15.5
28.2
23.9
8.5
5.6
0.0
7.0
5.6
Note: The 71 students represented the total population of graduating
students in October 1985 and they were from the four elementary
schools sponsored by the Mufurudzi Model A resettlement scheme.
They were distributed as follows: (i) Magadzi (26), (ii) Mudzinge
(20), (iii) Mukwari (15) and (iv) Muringamombe (10).

253
5 Years From Now (1990)
(Makore mashanu ari kuuya)
These Days (1985)
(Mazuva ano)
5 Years Before Now (1980)
(Makore mashanu apfuura)
Note: 1Hard Life; 2Some Progress; 3Good Life.
FIGURE 7-2
GOOD LIFE-DIFFICULT LIFE CONTINUUM
(Upenyu hwakanaka-Upenyu hwakaoma./Madanho okubudirira)

254
Small-Scale and the Large-Scale Commercial Farmers the responses were quite
familiar. A third of them reported that they went through a hard life during
the period up to 1980 (Table 7-39).
The majority of all farmers in the various farming systems said they were
either making progress or enjoying a good life five years after independence
in 1985. They also perceived that they were likely to enjoy a good life
(upenyu hwakanaka) by 1990. A close examination of the Small-Scale Commercial
farmers reveals that as much as a fifth of them reported to be going through
hard times in 1985 and, worse still, a third believed that life was going to
be a hard one for them in 1990. This pattern reflected the trend among the
Large-Scale Commercial farmers also. Of these a little over 44 percent
perceived difficult times ahead (Table 7-39).
Farmers: Their Material Resources and Capital Assets
The study sought information about aspects of the quality of life that
these farmers were experiencing in their respective rural communities.
Specifically, responses were elicited to infer if the changed socio-political
and economic scenario brought about by independence in 1980 was altering their
access to various selected household items as well as to farm capital.
The household or material items asked about were watches, radios, beds,
sewing machines and bicycles. Such items might be seen as status symbols,
items of comfort or necessities. Nevertheless, each of them ensured a kind of
convenience to rural living that was not easily measurable in economic terms.
These items were regarded in this study as sources or indices of social
differentiation. The most striking observation from the responses indicating
the distribution of these items across the various farming systems was the
fact that in all cases the greater majority of the Cooperative sector farmers

TABLE 7-39
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' PERCEPTIONS
OF LIFE SITUATIONS
255
19 8 0
HARD SOME GOOD
LIFE PROG LIFE
(N=)
Model A Norm (348)
92.0
7.5
0.6
Model A Accel (38)
89.5
10.5
0.0
Model-B Coop (148)
87.8
6.1
6.1
Communal Area (61)
68.9
31.1
0.0
Small-Scale C (20)
33.3
22.2
44.4
Large-Scale C (9)
44.4
22.2
33.3
1 9
8 5
1 9
9 0
HARD
SOME
GOOD
HARD
SOME
GOOD
LIFE
PROG
%
LIFE
LIFE
PROG
LIFE
5.5
92.0
2.6
0.3
4.3
95.4
5.3
92.1
2.6
0.0
5.3
94.7
10.2
79.6
10.2
4.1
27.2
68.7
6.6
88.5
4.9
0.0
13.1
86.9
22.2
44.4
33.3
33.3
22.2
44.4
33.3
44.4
22.2
44.4
22.2
33.3

256
did not own them. Watches were a common item that most farmers had. In all
more Small-Scale Commercial farmers enjoyed the comfort or prestige of owning
these household items than their counterparts in the other farming systems
(Table 7-40).
The majority of all farmers with watches obtained them after 1980 while
the more durable items, such as sewing machines and bicycles were acquired
before 1980. The majority of the newer or resettlement area farmers had since
1980, that is, after they became resettled acquired in addition to watches
such other items as radios and beds (Table 7-41). Infact, two farmers in Gatu
village owned cars and another two in Magadzi also had acquired lorries.
In response to the question if farmers bought items of clothing for
themselves, their spouses and children during 1985 most farmers said they did.
The exceptional case was still the Cooperative farmers. Among them only 1 of
every 3 managed to afford this "luxury" or to fulfil what might be deemed an
important social obligation in rural Africa (Table 7-42).
Among African farmers in Zimbabwe the productive or capital assets that
are important include scotch-carts, ox-plows, sprayers, wheelbarrows,
cultivators, planters and tractors. In addition to these livestock ownership,
especially mombe or cattle, is very important to these farmers not only for
agricultural purposes but even more so for religious and other social reasons.
Again the Cooperative farmers as individuals did not possess any of these
assets. The majority of farmers from all the farming systems also did not own
Scotch-Carts (Table 7-43).
All farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes as well as every 3 out of
4 in the Model A Normal Scheme who had scotch-carts acquired them since being
resettled in 19S0. The same pattern holds across the board for items such as
sprayers, wheelbarrows, tractors and tractor implements (Table 7-44).

TABLE 7-40
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' OWNERSHIP OF
HOUSEHOLD ITEMS
257
WATCH/CLOCK RADIO BED/MATRESS SEWING BICYCLE
MACHINE
(N=)
Yes
%
No
Yes
No
i
Yes
No
%
Yes
No
%
Yes
No
%
Model A
Norm (348)
57.5
42.5
32.5
67.5
48.0
52.0
10.9
89.1
30.2
69.8
Model A
Accel (39)
64.1
35.9
30.8
69.2
48.7
51.3
10.3
89.7
17.9
82.1
Model B
Coop (151)
23.8
76.2
11.3
88.7
11.9
88.1
4.6
95.4
3.3
96.7
Communal
Area (62)
55.7
44.3
31.5
68.5
55.7
44.3
21.9
78.1
38.7
61.3
Small-Sc
Commer (20)
75.0
25.0
60.0
40.0
80.0
20.0
15.0
85.0
60.0
40.0

TABLE 7-41
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHEN HOUSEHOLD MATERIAL
ITEMS ACQUIRED
WATCH/CLOCK RADIO BED/MATRESS
Before After Before After Before After
1980 1980 1980
(N=)
%
(N=)
%
(N=)
%
Model A
Norm
(200)
5.0
95.0
(113)
35.4
64.6
(167)
48.5
51.5
Model A
Accel
(25)
4.0
96.0
(12)
50.0
50.0
(19)
42.1
57.9
Model B
Coop
(36)
5.6
94.4
(17)
17.6
82.4
(18)
38.9
61.1
Commmunal
Area
(34)
11.8
88.2
(19)
52.6
47.4
(34)
70.6
29.4
Small-Scale
Commmerc (15)
40.0
60.0
(12)
66.7
33.3
(16)
68.8
31.2
SEWING MACHINE BICYCLE
Before After Before After
1980 1980
(N=) (N=)
% %
Model A Norm
(38)
68.4
31.6
(101)
56.4
42.6
Model A Accel
(4)
75.0
25.0
(7)
57.1
42.9
Model B Coop
(7)
57.1
42.9
(5)
60.0
40.0
Communal Area
(13)
53.8
46.2
(24)
66.7
33.3
Small-Scale C
(3)
66.7
33.3
(12)
58.3
41.7

259
TABLE 7 42
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHETHER FARMERS' PURCHASED
CLOTHING ITEMS IN 1985
MEN'S CLOTHES WOMEN'S CLOTHES CHILDREN'S
CLOTHES
(N=)
Yes
No
Yes
l
No
t
Yes
No
Model A Norm
(348)
91.1
8.9
95.4
4.6
95.7
4.3
Model A Accel
(39)
82.1
17.9
94.9
5.1
100.0
0.0
Model B Coop
(151)
35.1
64.9
31.1
68.9
35.1
64.9
Communal Area
(62)
80.6
19.4
91.9
8.1
85.5
14.5
Small-Scale C
(20)
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0

TABLE 7-43
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' OWNERSHIP OF
PRODUCTION/CAPITAL ASSETS
SCOTCH-CART OX-PLOW SPRAYER WHEEL-BARROW
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
(N=)
%
%
%
%
Model A Norma
(348)
39.4
60.6
84.8
15.2
81.3
18.7
24.9
75.1
Model A Accel
(39)
20.5
79.5
71.8
28.2
69.2
30.8
20.5
79.5
Model B Coop
(151)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Communal Area
(62)
40.3
59.7
79.0
21.0
37.1
62.9
29.0
71.0
Small-Scale C
(20)
75.0
25.0
90.0
10.0
80.0
20.0
65.0
35.0
CULTIVATOR
PLANTER
TRACTOR
TRACTOR
IMPLEMENTS
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
(N=)
%
%
?
7
Model A Norma
(348)
49.7
50.3
3.2
96.8
7.8
92.2
7.5
92.5
Model A Accel
(39)
30.8
69.2
2.6
97.4
7.7
92.3
7.7
92.3
Model B Coop
(151)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Communal Area
(62)
50.0
50.0
8.1
91.9
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
Small-Scale C
(20)
80.0
20.0
55.0
45.0
45.0
55.0
45.0
55.0

261
TABLE 7-44
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHEN PRODUCTION/CAPITAL
ASSETS ACQUIRED
SCOTCH-CART OX-PLOW SPRAYER WHEEL BARROW
Before After
1980
Before After
1980
Before After
1980
Before After
1980
(N=)
%
(N=)
%
(N=)
%
(N=)
%
Model A
Norm (137)
25.5
74.5
(295)
31.9
68.1
(283)
7.8
92.2
(84)
29.8
70.2
Model A
Accel (8)
0.0
100.0
(28)
25.0
75.0
(27)
3.7
96.3
(8)
12.5
87.5
Communal
Area (25)
40.0
60.0
(49)
71.4
28.6
(23)
30.4
69.6
(18)
33.3
66.7
Small-Scale
Com (15)
80.0
20.0
(18)
66.7
33.3
(16)
43.7
56.3
(13)
38.5
61.5
CULTIVATOR PLANTER
Before After Before After
TRACTOR
Before After
TRACTOR
IMPLEMENTS
Before After
(N=)
1980
%
(N=)
1980
%
(N=)
1980
%
(N=)
1980
%
Model A
Norm (173)
42.8
57.2
(ID
36.4
63.6
(27)
3.7
96.3
(27)
3.7
96.3
Model A
Accel (12)
16.7
83.3
(1)
100.0
0.0
(3)
0.0
100.0
(3)
0.0
100.0
Communal
Area (31)
64.5
35.5
(5)
40.0
60.0
(0)
0.0
0.0
(0)
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale
Com (16)
68.7
31.3
(ID
90.1
0.9
(9)
45.5
55.5
(9)
45.5
55.5

262
Since independence the AFC has introduced medium and long-term loan
programs to assist African farmers to acquire these items. These days farmers
in the resettlement villages are being encouraged to team up and obtain
tractor and equipment loans from the AFC for their collective use. In 1985,
there were cases of such successful groups in Gwetera and Chitepo villages in
r 2
Mufurudzi.
In terms of- livestock ownership it is only in the Communal Area that
every farmer had at least one head of cattle. This, however, did not mean that
he or she owned draft-oxen which are an important asset for land preparation
and for farm and household haulage purposes. Unlike all other farmers none of
those in the Communal Area had more than 10 cattle. Among the Small-Scale
Commercial farmers 95 percent were cattle-owners. In this group every nine in
ten farmers had between 11 to 21 or more head of cattle. This contrasted with
the farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes 46 percent of whom did not have
any cattle at all (Table 7-45). The modal number of cattle owned by farmers in
the Model A Normal Scheme and the Communal Area was 3 head.
These days donkeys are becoming an important draft and haulage animals in
rural Zimbabwe. There is an acute problem of trypanosomiasis-carrying
tsetsefly glossina sp., which infests most of the northern portions of the
3
entire Mashonaland Region. Given this problem donkeys, which are not
bothered by tsetse, can be of distinct advantage to farmers in the region.
However, none in the Small-Scale Commercial and the Communal Area and only an
insignificant percentage of farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated
Schemes possessed any donkeys (Table 7-46). This may be explained in turn by
the obvious utilities that cattle have over donkeys in respect of farmers'
subsistence, cash flow and ceremonial or social needs.
Small ruminants, particularly goats and sheep are also important for
meeting some of the more mundane needs of farmers such as ready cash and also

TABLE 7-45
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF CATTLE OWNED BY FARMERS
(N=)
NONE
1
2-4
5-10
%
11-15
16-20
21 OR
MORE
Model A Norm
(349)
19.8
8.6
35.5
26.9
7.8
0.9
0.6
Model A Accel
(39)
46.2
5.0
23.0
20.6
2.6
2.6
0.0
Model B Coop
(151)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Communal Area
(62)
0.0
3.2
69.3
27.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale C
(20)
5.0
0.0
5.0
0.0
35.0
20.0
35.0
TABLE 7-46
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF DONKEYS OWNED BY FARMERS
NONE 1
(N=)
%
6 OR
MORE
Model
A
Norm
(349)
96.6
0.9
2.5
0.0
Model
A
Accel
(39)
97.4
0.0
0.0
2.6
Model
B
Coop
(151)
-
-
-
-
Communal Area (62) 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Small-Scale C (20)

264
food. Surprisingly, however, Che majority of farmers did not have either goats
(Table 7-47) or sheep (Table 7-48). This pattern was conspicuously more so in
the resettlement schemes. There, unlike the dispersed settlements of the
Communal and the Small-Scale Commercial Areas, the nucleated village system is
not particularly conducive to the free ranging habits that both cattle and the
small ruminants maintain.
Indeed, the-very few in Mufurudzi were already a nuisance both in the
homes and to the farms closest to the villages. Thus, the socioeconomic
advantages of goats and sheep ownership were increasingly being overshadowed
by the fact that as free rangers they had become a source of social conflicts
4
among some of the farmers and their neighbors.
Farmers: Their Farm-Level Constraints and Scheme Needs
Model A Scheme Farmers
Farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes were asked to
identify what they saw as the problems and the needs associated with their
resettlement. In addition, they were also requested to give what they
perceived to be the cause of each such problem. Specifically, the farmers
responded to three sets of questions relating to (1) the major constraint that
faced them during the initial years of resettlement, (2) the one which was
facing them in the 1985-86 farming season and (3) what they would describe as
being the nature of the major problem encountered in their experiences dealing
with the three parastatal agricultural service agencies. These agencies were
the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB)
and the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB).

265
TABLE 7-47
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF GOATS OWNED BY FARMERS
(N=)
NONE
1-4
5-10
%
11-15
16-20
21 OR
MORE
Model A Norm
(349)
84.0
8.9
6.3
0.0
0.6
0.3
Model A Accel
(39)
82.1
15.4
2.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Model B Coop
(151)
-
-
-
-
-
-
Communal Area
(62)
53.2
45.1
1.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale C
'(20)
55.0
10.0
15.0
15.0
5.0
0.0
TABLE 7-48
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF SHEEP OWNED BY FARMERS
(N=)
NONE
1-4
5-10
7,
11-15
t
16-20
21 OR
MORE
Model A Norm
(349)
91.4
4.3
3.2
0.3
0.6
0.3
Model A Accel
(39)
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Model B Coop
(151)
-
-
-
-
-
-
Communal Area
(62)
87.1
12.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Small-Scale C
(20)
80.0
10.0
5.0
5.0
0.0
0.0

266
In the second, third and fourth years of resettlement in Mufurudzi, that
is, between 1981 and 1984 Zimbabwe experienced what was conceived by many
farmers as the worst drought, shangwe, in living memory. Crop production was
adversely affected, livestock died and most farmers at one point or another
subsisted on food rations from the government and non-governmental
organizations which they supplemented with items gathered from the wild. In
some schemes a few households gave up, abandoned resettlement and left their
new homes for the traditional security of the old Communal Areas.
Many who stayed on and continued to farm were even two years later still
indebted to the AFC for the loans contracted in the drought years. Thus 52
percent of all the resettled farmers cited this environmental or climatic
constraint. Among the farmers in the Model A Accelerated Scheme the lack of
resettlement infrastructure was also seen as a major problem (Table 7-49).
The interviews were done over a period when the farmers were supposed to
be in the final phases of preparing to begin the cropping programs. Yet, the
greatest majority of them had not plowed their lands because the Tillage Team,
then just transferred from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural
Resettlement to the Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development,
had not arrived in the schemes to tractor plow the lands. This delay, perhaps
caused by the ministerial transfer and reorganization, was a matter of great
concern throughout the resettlement schemes and the Communal Areas in the
Masnonaland Central Province as well as other parts of the country. It
appeared also that most farmers having gotten "used" to mechanical tillage
were either complacent or not prepared to get their draft-oxen ready for the
task.
The apparent crisis which faced these Model A Normal and Accelerated
Schemes was made worse by the non-arrival of the season's input packages
consisting of seed maize, cotton and peanut and the top dressing and other

TABLE 7-49
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
THEY FACED IN THE INITIAL YEARS OF RESETTLEMENT
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=346)
%
(N=39)
%
Environmental
52.6
51.3
Resettlement Infrast
15.3
30.8
Credit/Inputs/lmplem
16.8
10.3
Haulage/Crop Transport
& Marketing
7.2
2.6
Service Businesses
6.1
-
Other
1.2
2.6
No Problem
9
2.6

268
fertilizers. The delay was reported to be due to transportation problems that
faced the Bindura-Mount Darwin Cooperative Society which had been commissioned
as the exclusive input delivery agency to Mufurudzi and other nearby farmers
under the AFC's small farmer credit program.'*
For the 1985-86 season the problems mentioned most by the farmers related
to delayed land preparation, cited by 53 percent of them all, and delayed
supply of inputs-which was mentioned by another 40 percent (Table 7-50).
The delay in the delivery of these essential pre-season services by the
agencies were variously blamed in most instances on the AFC, the Ministry of
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR) or the government, the
cooperative supplier and even the Resettlement Team (Table 7-51). Talking to
many farmers one could detect an apparent confusion in their minds in
perceiving these rather distinct institutions as being the same establishment
in terras of their respective abilities to solve the problems of delayed
plowing and inputs delivery.
However, when the farmers were questioned specifically about the AFC 13
percent stated that they had not experienced any problems with the
Corporation. Nevertheless, 52 percent of all the farmers complained bitterly
about its insensitivity to their plight. Other complaints mentioned included
its bad loan repayment and bad credit processing systems (Table 7-52).^
The greater majority of farmers did not complain about the respective
dealings of the Grain and Cotton Marketing Boards with them. Those who had any
problems cited either (1) the delay that they encountered in receiving checks
for payments of produce sold or (2) the lack of haulage vehicles and the long
distances that they had to cover in order to transport produce to the buying
centers or storage depots in Shamva or Mount Darwin (Table 7-53 and Table
7-54).

TABLE 7-50
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
THEY FACED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1985-86 SEASON
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=339) (N=39)
Delayed Land
Preparation
52.2
Delayed Farm
Inputs
38.1
AFC Rejected
No Cash
Loan/
3.8
Other
2.7
No Problem
3.2
46.2
46.2
2.6
2.6
2.6
TABLE 7-51
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES OF
PROBLEMS THEY FACED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1985-86 SEASON
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=328) (N=39)
% %
Agrie. Finance Corp (AFC)
36.0
30.8
Govt./Ministry of Lands
16.8
7.7
Environmental/Climatic
16.8
7.7
Cooperative (Input)
Supplier
7.0
20.5
Resettlement Team
2.4
-
Other
14.0
17.9
Don't Know
7.0
15.4

TABLE 7-52
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=348) (N=39)
% %
Insensitivity to Farmers'
Plight (resulting from
drought)
50.9
64.1
Bad Credit Processing
21.6
2.6
Bad Payment (Stop Order)
13.2
12.8
Other
2.0
-
No Problem
12.4
20.5

TABLE 7-53
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE GRAIN MARKETING BOARD
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=348) (N=39)
% %
Delayed Issue of Checks
26.4
20.5
Poor Marketing/Depot Too
Transportation
Far/
14.9
7.7
Other
0.6
-
No Problem
58.0
71.8
TABLE 7-54
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE COTTON MARKETING BOARD
MODEL A NORMAL
MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=348)
%
(N=39)
%
Delayed Issue of Checks
23.0
30.8
Poor Marketing/Depot Too
Transportation
Far/
18.9
12.8
No Problem
58.0
56.4

272
Finally these fanners identified the majority need of the schemes to be
resettlement infrastructure particularly a health clinic (Table 7-55). ^
In the medium to long-term projection of the planners these resettlement
schemes were to develop or attract service businesses and industries as they
matured and as their service centers evolved as growth points (see Zimbabwe
1983d) .
The slow development of these essential services was a matter of great
frustration for most farmers. In particular, local transportation was a
problem. Some farmers, for instance, walk 17 kilometers one way from say Gatu
to Chindunduma on the main Shamva-Mount Darwin road to wait for hours to catch
a bus. One out of every three farmers in Mufurudzi therefore mentioned this
transport, grinding mills for maize-meal and other grain, grocery stores and
butcheries as their urgent needs.
As to who should be responsible for the provision of these needs 42
percent looked up to the government or the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and
Rural Resettlement to do so. Another 34 percent suggested a joint effort of
the government or the Ministry and the farmers (Table 7-56).
The Model B and Communal Area Farmers
The constraints mentioned by the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers are
treated separately below in Chapter VIII where the general problems that were
identified with these Schemes are reviewed.
For the Communal Area farmers each was asked to indicate what major
concern faced him or her. The three major responses that were given comprised
(1) lack of agricultural implements and services such as credit and inputs,
which was the problem of 29 percent of the farmers, (2) poor or inadequate
land and (3) lack of water (Table 7-57).

273
TABLE 7-55
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF THEIR
RESETTLEMENT SCHEME NEEDS
MODEL A NORMAL MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=348)
%
(N=39)
%
Health Clinic
34.5
25.6
Other Resettlement
Infrastructure
10.6
61.5
Service Businesses
29.3
5.1
Livestock Service (for
Tsetsefly Eradication
12.1
-
Produce Depot/Transport
7.8
-
Other
5.2
5.1
Not Sure/Don't Know
0.6
vO

CM
TABLE 7-56
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF WHO TO
PROVIDE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME NEEDS
MODEL
(N=
A NORMAL
=347)
%
MODEL A ACCELERATED
(N=37)
%
Govt./Ministry of Lands
43.2
29.7
Government & The Farmers
32.0
56.8
NGOs (Foreign Donors)
6.9
2.7
The Farmers Themselves
5.8
2.7
Other
6.6
-
Not Sure/ Don't Know
5.4
8.1

TABLE 7-57
COMMUNAL AREA: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS AFFECTING
THEIR AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE
PROBLEM
FREQUENCY
%
Credit/Inputs/Implements
18
29.0
Poor/Inadequate Land
16
25.8
Water/Environmental
14
22.6
Transport/Marketing
4
6.5
Clinic/Social Infrastructure
3
4.8
Other
3
4.8
No Problem
4
6.5

275
Having been asked to identify their problems these farmers were requested
to propose solutions that they wanted the government to implement as well as
those that they felt they themselves should carry out to improve the situation
of Communal Area agriculture. Almost 44 percent of the farmers called upon the
government to make available to them more credit, inputs and farm implements.
This was followed by the provision of infrastructural services and more lands
or resettlement (Table 7-58). On their part these Communal Area farmers
thought that they would perform better if they utilized more extension advice
and also worked harder (Table 7-58).
Farmers: Household Developmental Cycle, Micro-Level
Agricultural Characteristics and Economic Performance
The respective phases which characterize the developmental cycle of
various households in the different farming systems (see Table 7-14 above in
this Chapter) operating in the Mashonaland Central Province exhibit
q
interesting associational patterns. A few of these discussed below are
the respective producer and consumer units, the head of cattle owned, area of
land cultivated, quantity of maize retained for household use and finally the
net farm cash flow from maize and cotton sales.
Units which are capable and available for production were calculated for
each individual household.^ For all the 458 farmers covered in this
analysis these mean units ranged from a low of 1.5 to a high of 7.9. The
household with the lowest mean unit belonged to one in a decline phase within
the Model A Normal Scheme. The households with the most mean units were
male-headed, polygynous and in expansion phase within the Model A Accelerated
Scheme. However, for the Model A Normal Scheme, the Communal and the
Small-Scale Commercial Areas it was rather the male-headed, polygynous
households in the consolidation phase which commanded most producer units.

276
TABLE 7-58
COMMUNAL AREA: FARMERS' PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
AFFECTING THEIR AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE
QUESTION
RESPONSE
FREQUENCY
%
What should the Government
Provide more credit/
do to solve farmers'
inputs/implements
27
43.5
problems in this Area?
Provide more social
infrastructure and
services
20
32.3
Resettle more people
13
21.0
Other
2
3.2
What should farmers in
this Area do to solve
Utilize AGRITEX advice
their agricultural
and services more fully
29
46.8
problems?
Work harder
20
32.3
Obtain more credit/
input/implements
8
12.9
Other
3
4.8
Nothing/Situation is
hopeless
2
3.2

277
Generally, the households with the most units were all male-headed and
polygynous. Those with the least were either in decline or were female-headed
or monogamous households headed by young men who were just beginning to
establish themselves (Table 7-59).
Similarly, consumer units were calculated for all households.^ The
pattern in many ways replicates that of the producer units in that the
male-headed polygynous households also had more mouths to feed. It is
interesting to note in this regard that the polygynous households in the
consolidation phase in the old farming systems, namely, the Communal and
Small-Scale Commercial Areas, had the most consumer units. In the new farming
systems or the Model A Schemes, however, the polygynous ones in the expansion
phase had the most units (Table 7-60). (The significance of the relationship
between the producer and consumer units for household performance is examined
below in this Chapter).
If mombe or cattle owned was taken to be the tangible measure of
socioeconomic status or the symbolic worth of the household then the evidence
indicates that the male-headed polygynous households in the consolidation
phase constituted the model class in rural Zimbabwe. Among our farmers the
mean head of cattle owned ranged from the low of one beast for each of the
male-headed monogamous households in the expansion phase within the Model A
Accelerated Scheme to a high of 26 for the polygynists in the Model A Normal
Schemes (Table 7-61). It may be mentioned in passing that the transfer of
cattle plays the most crucial role of completing and legalizing traditional
marriages in Zimbabwe. Polygynous households especially with more favorable
ratio of married daughters to sons are in a better position to accumulate more
cattle from in-laws.
When it comes to the size of area cultivated male-headed polygynous
households in the expansion phase had more hectares. In the Communal Area

278
TABLE 7-59
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD PRODUCER UNITS
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
(N=)
Model A Norma(340)
2.2
3.7
2.5
6.0
4.1
3.1
3.6
6.5
1.5
Model A Accel (37)
2.0
3.6
2.0
7.9
3.9
3.0
2.1
7.5
-
Communal Area (61)
2.0
3.9
4.2
5.8
3.8
2.8
2.6
6.3
3.0
Small-Scale C (20)
-
3.8
-
4.8
4.4
2.0
-
5.3
-
TABLE
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD
7-60
: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE '
CONSUMER UNITS
rYPES
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
(N=)
Model A Norma(340)
2.6
4.8
3.2
7.8
4.9
3.8
4.8
7.3
1.5
Model A Accel (37)
2.5
4.1
3.0
11.0
4.5
2.0
2.7
9.0
-
Communal Area (61)
2.3
5.3
5.1
6.9
4.4
3.4
3.4
7.8
3.0
Small-Scale C (20)
-
5.2
-
5.8
4.4
2.0
-
6.5
-
Note:
= Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase
= Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase
= Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase
= Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase
= Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase
= Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase
= Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase
= Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase
= Household in Decline Phase
= Phase not represented

279
their counterparts in the consolidation phase rather cultivated more hectares.
In the isolated case of the Small-Scale Commercial Area a consolidated
female-headed household with the spouse away from the farm had the largest
mean farm size of 18.4 hectares (Table 7-62). This particular farmer had a 26
year old son who assisted her to manage the farm and probably with her spouse
earning off-farm income from another source she was able to put more land into
cultivation. Within this farming system the individual household with the most
area cultivated, that is, 24 hectares was male-headed, monogamous and
expanding.
In terms of maize retained for household use the sole female-headed
household in the Small-Scale Commercial Area was also the leader by keeping 76
X 91 kilograms of maize. The fact that this was far in excess of the
households subsistence needs suggested that the spouse might be engaged in
some piggery or poultry project elsewhere or most probably in a maize-meal
milling project in the nearby Mount Darwin urban center (see Figure 7-1).
Within the remaining farming systems the polygynous households on the whole
retained more maize than other households did (Table 7-63).
In order to assess the economic performance of farm households in
different phases of the developmental cycle it would have been ideal to use
various costs and returns data that are traditionally generated by farm
management studies. These rely on enterprise or whole farm records kept by
farmers or enumerators over periods covering the agricultural season to
calculate various measures of farm economic performance.
Costs are treated as variable or overhead expenditure. Variable
expenditure is the costs that specifically relate to a particular crop or
livestock enterprise. It may include, for instance, such