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Land use politics in Florida communities

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Land use politics in Florida communities a political economy analysis
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Turner, Robyne S
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vii, 269 leaves : ; 28 cm.

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Cities ( jstor )
City politics ( jstor )
Community forestry ( jstor )
Counties ( jstor )
Land development ( jstor )
Land use ( jstor )
Local governments ( jstor )
Political interest groups ( jstor )
Political processes ( jstor )
Public policy ( jstor )
Cities and towns -- Growth ( lcsh )
City planning ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF
Land use, Urban ( lcsh )
Political Science thesis Ph. D
Urban policy ( lcsh )
City of Jacksonville ( local )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1988.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references.
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Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Robyne Stevenson Turner.

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University of Florida
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Copyright Robyne S. Turner. Permission granted to the University of Florida to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
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LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS












By

ROBYNE STEVENSON TURNER












A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY



UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1988









lg OF FLORIDA LIBRARIJ















ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have contributed to my success in

completing this work, but there are two to whom I am most indebted. My professional and intellectual development has been skillfully guided by Dr. Bert Swanson, whith out whose critical attention I would not have achieved this endeavor. His life-long dedication to the pursuit of knowledge has truly been an inspiration. I owe my personal success as a political scientist to my husband Kyle, whose constant faith in my abilities got me through the darkest of moments and across the finish line.























ii















TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ... . . . . . ........ . .. . . ii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . vi

CHAPTERS

ONE INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS . . . . . . 1

The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development. . 1
Political Economy and Policy. . . . . . . . . . . 2
Which Cities Grow and Which Don't--The Role of
Land Use Policy. ......... ....... 6
Classification of Policy . ............ . . 12
Urban Policy Making Process . ........... . 14
Research Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Conclusion . .................. . . 24
Notes ...... . ............... . . . . . . . . . . . 25

TWO POLITICS IN THE LAND USE POLICY PROCESS . . . . . . 26

Interest Groups and the Policy Process. . . . . . . . 26 Policy Process Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Participation and Influence . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process . . 32 Political Economy ............. .. . . 33
Government as Actor in the Policy Process . . . . . . 35
Conservative Growth Politics--Government as
Facilitator . ................. . 36
Liberal Growth Politics--Government as Satificer. 37 Populist Growth Politics--Government as Partner . 38
Progressive Growth Politics--Government as
Manager. . . . . .... ..... . . . . . . . . . 40
Growth Politics in the Sunbelt . .......... . 42
Growth Management--Growth Politics. . . . . . . . . . 44
Implementation of Growth Politics . . . . . . . . . . 46
Actors in the Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Private sector actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Public sector actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Conflict in the Policy Process. . . . . . . . . . 60 Policy Outputs of the Growth Politics Process . . 62
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

iii









THREE THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLITICS . . .. 68

The Rules of the Game in Land Use Planning. . .... 68
Rule #1--Government Parameters Affect Political
Influence. ................. .. . 69
Rule #2--Economics Affects Political Influence. 71
Rule #3--Economic and Political Influences Affect
Policy Making . . . ............... 74
Florida Growth Politics . .............. 76
Conservative Growth Politics. . ......... 76
Problems in paradise. . ............ . 81
Transition to liberal growth politics . ... . 85
Liberal Growth Politics . ... . ........ . 89
Conservative to Liberal Growth Politics--The
Uniformity Dilemma . .............. 99
Progressive Growth Politics . ...... . . . . . 103
Costs and Benefits of Land Use Policy. . ...... . 108 Conclusion. ................... . . . 114
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 115

FOUR PROPOSITION REDUX--HOW TO GET FROM HERE TO THERE . 116

Policy Process Operation. . ............. . 117
Study Method. ................... . . 120
Survey Instrument and Method. . ....... . . . 122
Propositions. . .................. . 128
Proposition One . ............... . 128
Power . ................. . . 130
Ideologies and the role of government . .... . 132 Conflict. . ................. . 135
Propositions Two and Three. . .... .. ..... . 136
Growth profile. . ..... ........... .. . 137
Economic profile. . .............. . 138
Government profile. . ............. . 139
Dependent Variables--Land Use Policy. . ....... . 141
Policy Characteristics. . .... ......... . 143
Supply Policies . ................ 145
Price Policies. .......... ...... . 146
Incentive Policies. . ............... 147
Conclusion. . ........ . . . ..... .. . 150
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... . 151

FIVE URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY. . ............ . 153

Interest Group Politics of Land Use . . ....... 153
Actor Participation. ...... . ...... . 153
Position and conflict . ............ 154
Position and stability. . ........... . 160
Position and influence. . .... ........ . 164
Power--Community Structure. . .......... . 168
Ideology and the Role of Government . ..... . 170 Stages of Growth Politics ......... . . . . 179

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Regional Differences . ........... . . . 181
Conclusion. ...................... . . . . 184
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 186

SIX POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP LINKAGES. . . . . . . . . 187

Land Use Policy Adoption in a Growth Politics
Environment. ............. ...... . 187
Land Use Policies--Dependent Variables. . . . . . . . 187 Multivariate Data Results . ..... ........ . 191
City and County Policy Uses . . . . . . . . . . . 193
City Policy Uses . ............. . . . 198
Discussion . ................... . 203
Use By Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Urban Political Economy . ............ 212
Stages of Growth Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Wrap Up--Have We Made Any Progess . . . . . . . . 216
Notes . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 219

APPENDICES

A INDEPENDENT VARIABLES . ............ . 220

B AVAILABLE OPERATIONALIZED VARIABLES . . . . . . . 224

C QUESTIONNAIRES AND LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION . . . 231

REFERENCES . ............... . . . . . . 258

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . ................. . 269
























v














Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS By

Robyne S. Turner

August 1988

Chairman: Dr. Bert E. Swanson Major Department: Political Science

There are many explanations of the policy process at

the local government level. The most adequate approach is to explore the interrelationships between the political process and economic interests which affect the adoption and use of policies. The richest policy area that exemplifies the intricacies of political and economic interactions is developmental. Policies that affect the development and growth of a community typify the political economy approach to understanding urban politics.

In this research, it is suggested that interest groups such as the business groups and residential interests compete for the attention of government in order to affect local land use and planning policies. The question of growth in urban areas is explored through an aggregate, comparative study of urban cities and counties in the state of Florida.


vi









Data were obtained through a non-random survey (created by the author) of public officials and representatives of major private interests.

The results of this research lead us to conclude that communities most often adopt traditional developmental land use policies, and only in situations of interest group competition do communities adopt more politically risky policies. Interest group competition, influence, and predisposition towards the proper role of government affect the land use policies adopted by a community. Communities dominated by business/pro-growth interests, less conflict, and a desire to have government take a pro-market approach rather than a regulatory approach rely on traditional land use policies and do not use innovative policies which tend to be more restrictive of growth.























vii















CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS

The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development

Land is a commodity that has definable economic value. Its current and future uses are affected by the policies contained in the city comprehensive plan and related ordinances. These policies in turn affect the value of the land. The use of land is an economically motivated process and a government regulated process. Ordinances, land use planning regulations, and long term comprehensive plans affect the economic value of land. Beginning in 1926 in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., local government established the legal right to regulate the use of land.1 Since then, economic and political interests interact and are dependent upon each other. The relationship between these interests is reflected in land use policy. The best method to examine this phenomenon may be through the political economy approach: "the systematic interaction between economic and political processes" (Swanstrom, 1985, p. 12).

The public, individuals and land-based interest groups, have much at stake in the development of land use policies. The way in which land is used affects city population size


1









2

and location, the socio-economic character of the community, and the city's rate of economic growth. These factors influence the demands placed on government and consequently urban policies themselves. Land-based interests affect government's ability to respond to the physical demands of growth.

Political Economy and Policy

The growth of a city in terms of population and economy is significantly affected by economic forces and government intervention. Traditional economic theory suggests that demands from and needs of the population will determine the economic sector's growth and that competition will bring more economic development and another round of population growth. This traditional explanation for economic development is the "central place theory".2 This and similar theories of economic and population growth and city hierarchies, do not include the government sector in their models.3

Economic interests, however, must have certain public resources available in order to affect the local economy. "Boosterism," government actions supporting business, (Molotch, 1976) has been an important feature of urban policy making since the industrial development of the early 1900s (Judd, 1984). The modern experience of urban renewal illustrates how economic interests and government work together in the area of urban growth (Mollenkopf, 1983).








3

Government assistance in developing a good business climate increases the attractiveness of the city to investors and enhances economic development (Molotch and Logan, 1984). Pro-growth coalitions (Mollenkopf, 1983), the growth machine (Molotch, 1976), and the new convergence of power (Salisbury, 1964) have become significant additions to the literature in urban politics.

The urban area as a political economy of place concerns the actions of the growth machine--land-based interest groups "which collude to achieve a common land-enhancement scheme" (Molotch, 1976, p. 311). Molotch's explanation of modern urban places builds on our understanding that the local business coalition is a dominant force in urban politics. From the early urban reform/city efficient movement, Hunter's (1980) economic elite structure of Atlanta, to Friedland's (1983) theory of economic tradeoffs and conflicts we expect to find business interests involved in local decision making.

The business and economic sector actors may be

considered as an interest group in the process, but we must explore the depth of the role which the economic sector plays in the process in order to fully understand the nature of the local political economy and how it may affect land use policy making.

There are a variety of points in the spectrum of

political economy which may be useful in understanding the









4

relationships between the political and economic sector. A pluralist explanation may suggest business interests as one of many interest groups in the process, although, as one with greater access to the process than other groups (Dahl, 1961; 1982). Business interests may be viewed as having a "privileged" position in the process, thus dominating policy making while government responds to its needs (Lindblom, 1977; 1982). This view may be expanded a step further as a neo-Marxist explanation by expecting government to be responsive only to the needs of capital holders and producers (O'Connor, 1973; Friedland, 1983). A more tempered view may be the political economy of the left (Lineberry, 1980) focussing on government's attempts to provide for society through redistributional policies.4

Other explanations of urban politics also integrate the political and economic sectors and suggest that the business sector's contribution to policy making is positive. For example, public choice theories are representative of the "political economy of the right" (Lineberry, 1980). Market solutions are seen as efficient and effective solutions to urban problems (Bish and Ostrom, 1979). Politics should represent the public's interests through policies and options that maximize opportunities for homogeneous communities where similar preferences may be optimized (Tiebout, 1956). Government's role should be as the agent of these preferences, which may include business interests.








5

To make sense of these many views of the integration of politics and economics we return to Lindblom (1982). He suggests that the business sector enjoys a unique position of influence in the policy making process. Other interests will operate within a limited "zone of policy making" (Lindblom, 1982, p. 335). Local government depends on local business interests to create a positive economic condition in the city. Government can provide incentives and regulate business in order to manage their role in the local process. The degree of flexibility within which business operates can be treated as a "market variable" in social science research (Lindblom, 1982, p. 335). In the case of this research, the interests which make up the growth machine are the actors that have business interests that are land based. The anti-growth coalitions are the residential and environmental interests that are also land based but have different expectations of land use than the growth machine. These two groups of political interests affect the parameters of business influence and the pluralistic zone of policy making. Land use policies represent the output of their political influences.

The economic market should be considered as a variable and not a constant (Lindblom, 1982). What we may find is that there are several distinct actors which make up the local "political economy" such as the local government, the business interests, and the non-business/public interests.










This research may reveal any of the combinations of political influence presented above. Ultimately, we want to distinguish between various political interests and identify the patterns of interests that contribute to different policy outputs.

Which Cities Grow and Which Don't--The Role of Land Use Policy

Capital investment is a major factor considered by

scholars when examining the influences of urban growth. The role of the production function is important to our understanding of urban development (O'Connor, 1973; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Friedland, 1983; Whitt, 1982; Swanstrom, 1985). Included in this is the affect of city attractiveness on private urban investment (Molotch and Logan, 1984). Competition among cities for private investment may influence the adoption by government of incentive policies such as industrial revenue bonds, tax increment financing, and enterprise zones (Catanese, 1984; Wasylenko, 1981).

An area that has not received the same attention in the literature is whether patterns of urban influence and needs have a similar affect on the adoption of land use policies for economic development and growth of urban areas. Policies which accommodate increased land use should be expected to be of pivotal interest to those who promote growth. Thus the focus of this research centers on the following questions:









7

1) Can we explain why Florida cities adopt and use different land use policies? 2) Can this explanation be attributed to the distinctions between cities in terms of the political influence of land based interests in the business/economic sector, the individual sector, and the governmental sector (Figure 1-1)?

The development and application of land use policy can be a highly politicized process (Altschuler, 1965; Rabinovitz, 1969; Garkovitch, 1982). Several states, including Florida in 1975, have passed legislation requiring localities to prepare comprehensive plans and follow state directed planning processes. In the case of Florida, localities had five years to implement the state requirements and to prepare several plan elements including a Future Land Use element. The regulations implementing the Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 make it very easy for cities and counties to amend their plans. The frequency with which many Florida cities have amended their plans suggests that comprehensive planning is open to political influence and what Lindblom (1965) refers to as disjointed incrementalism. In addition, localities enact local development and land use ordinances and adopt various development regulations which may be separate from the comprehensive planning process. These tools are used to implement the comprehensive plan, but may not be integrated with the original plan, leaving the process









8





INPUT THRUPUT OUTPUT
Independent Variables Dependent Variables

Participation Policy Process Land Use Policy Survey Data Consensus Traditional Growth Machine --> Conflict --> Flexible Compromise



InnovativeRegulatory Anti-Growth
Coalition



Ecological Profiles

Growth -----I
Economics Government



Systems Model

Figure 1-1








9
vulnerable to special interest influence (Goodman and Freud, 1968). 5

Two policy processes then may exist in the land use

planning policy process. One is the development and adoption of the original plan--the goals. The second process is the development and adoption of implementation policy. Garkovitch (1982) suggests that the stabilizing, no-change forces will dominate the first process, while the development interests will dominate the second. We may find that the comprehensive plan stage may be static and the implementation policy stage may be dynamic, as the influence of the land-based growth coalitions fluctuate.

The investment value and development of land is

primarily tied to the land use designations which government places on property. Interrelationships exist between land value, economic investment, and government land use policy. Thus the following proposition is made. Proposition 1A: the greater the presence in a city of conditions generating growth machine participation, the stronger the presence of the growth machine in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that adopted land use policies will be flexible and accommodating to growth and development.

The alternative to those interested in promoting growth are the actors who are interested in slowing or stopping growth. Once growth has begun, we can expect a point of









10

diminishing returns. Dysfunctions in the environment such as pollution, overcrowding, and congestion will threaten the existing character of the community and will activate interest in removing the dysfunctions as well as the perceived source of those dysfunctions - growth itself. This interest group is the antithesis of the pro-growth coalition. Molotch (1976) appropriately uses the label antigrowth coalition to represent land based interests whose lifestyle is threatened by economic development of and population increase in the urban area.

Homeowners aggregate into neighborhood groups and represent this alternative force (Peterson, 1981; Rich, 1979; Molotch, 1976). Their strategy for action is identical to the pro-growth force, although their motives are different. The anti-growth interests seek to use the local government policy making process to adopt policies which slow or stop growth in order to preserve a lifestyle and personal real estate investment rather than to increase a business/ economic profit potential. Proposition 1B: the greater the presence in a city of conditions generating anti-growth coalition participation, the stronger the presence of the anti-growth coalition in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that more restrictive and regulatory land use policies will be adopted.










The anti-growth forces are expected to rely on

regulatory policy as a means to overcome the market forces which stimulate growth (Logan, 1976b; Mills, 1979; Johnston, 1980). Government regulation is necessary to insure benefits to the public even if regulations create costs for the private sector (Thrall, 1983; Logan, 1976a; Williams, 1961). It is expected that pro-growth forces will prefer flexible land use policies in order to take advantage of dynamic market forces (Dougharty et al., 1975; Mills, 1979; Ervin et al., 1977; Burrows, 1978; Gleeson et al., 1975). Land use policies which are adaptable to current economic conditions will allow the property to be used at its maximum economic potential (Williams, 1961). Pro-growth forces are economically motivated by the potential earning power and value of their land (Molotch, 1976; Molotch and Logan, 1984; Swanstrom, 1985). The adoption of land use policies which allow for market fluctuations will be beneficial to them (Mollenkopf, 1983; Mills, 1979; Lineberry, 1980). Proposition 2A: the greater the investment which the growth machine has in the community the more proclivity they have to participate in the policy making process, and the more likely it is that land use policies will reflect market needs.

Proposition 2B: the greater the investment which the anti-growth forces have in the community the more proclivity they have to participate in the policy making process, and








12

the more likely is it that government will regulate land use and adopt policies which restrict market forces and benefit existing community residents.

Economic investments may be a stimulus for intense participation and pressure on government to respond with particular policies. The more regulatory sources available to local government from broader levels of authority, the greater the opportunity for local government to be an influential participant in the growth process and less subject to policy manipulation. In addition, as alternative revenue sources for local government increase, the financial options available to local government increase, thus reducing dependency on local revenues such as the property tax. This decreasing dependency on local revenues and regulatory assistance from state or regional governments may give local government greater autonomy and/or flexibility in land use policy making affecting growth directions. Proposition 3: the greater the availability of alternative regulatory power and revenue sources, the less dependent local government is on local revenue contributors and the more autonomous local government is, allowing government to be a partner or director in the local growth process.

Classification of Policy

Classification of land use policy should be two-fold: based on the empirical evidence available on the impact of the policy itself (encourages or excludes growth) and based









13

on the permanency of the policy impact (flexible--intended to change over time or regulatory--intended not to change over time) (Scott, 1975).

An American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) report (Gleeson et al., 1975) has developed a continuum for specific land use techniques based on the proclivity of each policy to allow the market to determine land use or rely on government to regulate land use (Gleeson et al., 1975). In addition, various authors have suggested that specific policies have an impact on the rate of growth (Burrows, 1978). Growth can be discouraged from occurring by using exclusionary policies such as restricting lot size, mandated population limits, growth phasing (Johnston, 1980), or manipulated zoning (Logan, 1976b). Cities also may exhibit slow or anti-growth intentions through less flexible policies such as holding caps, planned development, tax options (Molotch, 1976), radial restrictions, and density restrictions (Thrall, 1983).

An analysis of regulatory versus "pricing" (marketdriven) policies as growth management tools concludes that regulatory procedures are a more effective means to minimize growth (Dougharty et al., 1975). Other land use policies such as flexible or regular zoning are conventional practices in most cities and provide more development options and do not necessarily limit growth. Specialized policies such as transfer of development rights (TDR),









14

enterprise zones, and tax increment financing are more oriented to the needs of the land market (Ervin et al., 1977).

Urban Policy Making Process

The land use policy process is influenced by land based interests, market oriented pro-growth coalitions, and public-good-oriented, anti-growth coalitions. Government planners and administrators also affect the process by recommending the adoption of specific land use policies. We must explore the larger policy process in order to understand the important role of land use policy adoption.

Policy making in urban government can take on many

characteristics. Yates (1977) suggests that the process may range from being rational--few actors, low controversy, to incremental, to reactive--many actors, high controversy. The level of consensus or conflict may be stimulated by the nature of the policy itself or by the decision making process such as routine, bureaucratic decision making or non-routine, politicized decision making (Yates, 1977; Lyon and Bonjean, 1981).

Land use regulations distribute benefits. The politics of "who gets what" land use benefits is decided by planning policies. Beatly (1984) suggests four different competing benefit distribution approaches in growth management policy: 1) utilitarian--maximize benefits to the entire community; 2) equal shares--benefits distributed equally to each group









15

without regard to any existing inequalities; 3) egalitarian-benefits distributed to minimize existing inequalities; and 4) Rawlsian--maximize benefits to the least advantaged group. These theories examine policy outcomes and may help us to understand why different land use policies are adopted and which political, social, and/or economic conditions affect policy selection.

If government distributes benefits through policy, then we can improve our understanding of the process by measuring government's role in policy development and policy implementation. We would expect cities in which anti-growth coalitions are very active to favor regulatory policies which increase government's influence on land use. We would expect cities in which a growth machine is very active to favor flexible policies which limit government's influence on land use. Therefore, in order for these expectations to be researched, we must examine who is involved in the policy process and how they are involved, and how much influence they have on policy adoption (Mollenkopf, 1983; Clavel, 1986; Lyon et al., 1981; Molotch, 1976; Judd, 1984).

In addition to the private sector, city administrators are another actor group which deserves attention. Planners and managers may play an active role in conceptualizing the goals and framework of the comprehensive land use plan. We can characterize administrators as neutral technicians, producing one type of policy, and as value-laden









16

administrators, developing other types of policies. The degree to which politics and administration are separate within a city may influence policy decisions.

The role of planners is especially important. Davis and Hua (1978) suggest that supply side and demand side planning roles may be identified. Supply side planners lean more toward controlling growth by affecting supply through regulation. Demand side planners lean more towards controlling growth by relying on market factors to affect demand for land. Determining the position of planners and administrators in each city may shed some light on policy selection and growth politics.

We may gain additional insights into growth politics by examining the strength of presence or influence level of each interest group and local government itself on the policy process (Yates, 1977; Rich, 1979). If any interest group is firmly established as a single or elite policy actor, then we would expect a rational, consensual, low conflict policy making process. However, if no interest group is firmly established as a major policy actor, providing a pluralistic process, then we would expect an incremental, high conflict, policy making process.

We may also find alternative policy adoption scenarios and policy outputs depending on the role that government itself plays. Government may be a filter for influence (growth politics theory (Swanstrom, 1985)), or a compromise









17

or manager role (policy planning city theory (Salamon, 1977)).

Proposition 4A: the more consensus in the policy process, the more rational is the policy development, and thus the more evident the pattern of land use policy in response to growth or anti-growth interests. Proposition 4B: the more conflict in the policy process, the more incremental is the policy development, and thus the less evident the pattern of land use policy in response to growth and anti-growth interests. Proposition 4C: the greater the division of interests in the policy process, the greater the role for government in policy development, and thus the greater the input and direction by government on the intent of land use policy in response to growth and anti-growth interests.

The propositions of growth politics are based on how

the policy process works in response to various actors. The degree of influence on the process by one or more groups and the degree of independence of government are the factors which distinguish growth politics in the local political framework (Figure 1-2).

The consensus process (4A) assumes that there are

dominant interests which will influence the policy process and the output. This may be an elite dominated process (Hunter, 1980; Domhoff, 1978) or it may be a public interest maximization process where common public utilities are









18



Conflict Time Frame Long Term Short Term Low Tension Consensus Compromise (elite) (Government Director)




High Tension Compromise Conflict (Government Director) (Pluralism)



Land Use Policy Process Figure 1-2









19

optimized (Tiebout, 1956). The process is characterized by a commitment to a particular set of policies reflecting a "vision" for the city that suggests a rational process without conflict. The government may act as a facilitator of these interests.

The second process (4B) is pluralistic or dominated by interest group politics (Lowi, 1969). No one group has control of the process and policy outputs are not necessarily consistent in purpose. There may be a lack of consensus among the policy actors as their vision of the community differs. The process would be incremental. Government may act as a satisficer of these interests.

The third process (4C) represents dialectical

alternatives to the first two characterizations. Growth politics or social control theories suggest that the government take some measure of control of the direction of policy as demands on the process are divided. The government is in a position to unite a divided vision of the city. Competing interests may force the process to be reactive, but may also create an opportunity for government to be a partner or manager (Swanstrom, 1985; Boulay, 1979; Clavel, 1986; Lindblom, 1982).

The government can expand its role as a major actor

based on the broad public good. Institutionalized approaches to growth politics will create opportunities for rational, government advocated policy approaches to growth problems.









20

Policies also may be compromises that are directed by the managerial role of government (Nordlinger, 1981; Salamon, 1977).

There may be overlaps between these processes in any given city. But an understanding of the patterns of influence and city policy processes will contribute to our understanding of why land use policies are adopted.

Research Methods

This is a comparative study of urban land use policy

making. The dependent variables are land use policies. This research will attempt to determine why different land use policies are adopted by cities. The independent variables center on actors and their influence, policy approaches of growth politics, and environmental (social and economic) conditions. By using a comparative study approach, we can attempt to isolate various factors which have a relationship to certain land use policies. This information will contribute to our understanding of the impact of land use policies, the significance of the planning process, and whether certain types of growth politics as experienced by cities are likely to promote the adoption of particular land use policies and not others. This information will be of use to policy makers as it will help to identify the potential range of policy options that are most likely to be sought for a particular type of city and what obstacles to policy adoption may be present.









21

Fried (1975, p. 309) provides a useful framework for comparative urban policy study based on "positive theory" (rather than normative theory) of urban policy:

1. identify variations in policy from city to city 2. identify the determinants of variations in urban

policies

3. estimate the direction and magnitude of the consequences of policy diversities

4. formulate the logical (theoretical) basis for the

empirical relations identified or which might be

identified

5. identify and analyze those determinants and consequences of policy diversity which are subject to

stabilization and/or deliberate change

Fried cautions, however, that urban policy studies are bereft of any overall theories. Therefore, the framework should not be mistaken for a theoretical construct and should be used as an analytical framework. Because of the diversity of available political theories, we have selected one substantive area, political economy, to provide theoretical guides for this research.

U.S. Census metropolitan area (MSA) central cities in Florida are used as the research cases. We use data collected over a ten-year period, from 1975 (the year Florida instituted the comprehensive plan process) to 1984 (the year prior to Florida's adoption of the growth









22

management planning process). The comprehensive planning process represents a uniform set of planning rules which all cities were to use. While cities implemented these rules unevenly by degree and time, the rules framework was available and of potential use as a reference in land use policy development. Cities had a five year implementation deadline (by 1980). Central cities were chosen over smaller cities because socio-economic data is more readily available and participation in an ongoing planning process over the case period of time was more likely.

The Available Operationalized Variables section

(Appendix B) lists each proposition and the possible array of relative variables from the systems model in Figure 1-1. Not all of these will be used in the analysis. But the lists represent the use of these variables in the relevant literature as they pertain to these propositions. The variables are arranged in an eclectic pattern (Fried, 1975, p. 328) by broad classifications--government, economic factors, policy actors, and environment. These are classifications which identify rather than indicate the purpose of the variables. One of the objects of this research will be to determine if any greater theoretical understanding can be derived from these variables including a purposive classification or development of political patterns which might be based on need for action, resources









23

affecting action, and disposition to act (Fried, 1975, pp. 325-6).

Aggregate socio-economic data and survey data are used to indicate the major independent variables, actors, influence, conflict, and process approaches in the policy making process. The socio-economic data (readily available) is used to indicate conditions which will affect the probability that any one interest group or pattern of growth politics will dominate the land use process. It also represents the long term economic investments likely to motivate the growth machine and the anti-growth coalitions. This data is used to measure each group's proclivity towards participation.

The survey data are used to verify and measure the presence of the growth actors in the process, their participation, and their influences in the policy making process. Surveys were sent to city and county managers and planning directors, chamber of commerce executives, developer organizations, and environmental and neighborhood groups. Information from planning officials was sought to help identify active neighborhood advisory boards and groups for inclusion on the survey list.

Finally, the role of local government itself as an actor in the process is measured by its ability to be flexible and autonomous from the possible investment driven pressures of each group. The reliance on regional or









24

statewide planning regulations contributes to government autonomy. Also measures of alternative revenue sources, reliance on property tax, and government debt for infrastructure are examined as possible influences on governments' role in the land use process. Survey data was collected concerning the values and concerns of administrators (planners and managers), and their perceptions of political influence on the land use policy process.

The dependent variable is measured by survey response as a substitute for content analysis. Planning directors were asked whether or not a particular land use policy is used in their city to evaluate its importance to the intent of their comprehensive plan goals.

Conclusion

The rest of the chapters expand on the growth issue in the context of urban politics. Chapter two is a discussion of land use politics and the role of interest groups and actors in the process. Chapter three presents these concepts through the case study of land use politics in the state of Florida as a prelude to the research on growth politics in Florida urban areas. Chapter four presents the study method by revisiting the propositions through the operationalizing of the independent and dependent variables. Chapter five presents the data results and Chapter six interprets the









25

data in terms of political economy and makes some conclusions from the research about land use politics.

This research is an attempt to gain some perspective on the issues of interest group politics, local policy making, and the impact of urban growth, all within a framework of political economy. The survey data and socio-economic data provide an environment from which to discuss land use policy making and the impact of growth on local communities. By using a comparative method we can gain crossectional insights that heretofore have not been available on the subject of land use politics.



Notes
1. Village of Euclid v. Amble- Realty Co., 297 Fed. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio, 1924); rev'd 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

2. For a fuller discussion of the theories of A. Losch (1954) and W. Christaller (1966) see L. King, Central Place Theory (1984) and James Heilbrun, Urban Economics and Public Policy (1981), Ch.5.


3. For a discussion of prominent authors in this area such as Alonso, Muth, Wheaton, Burgess, Parks, Philbrick--see Heilbrun (1981), Chapters 5,6. See also K.E. Haynes and A.S. Fotheringham, Gravity and Spatial Interaction Models, (1984).


4. For a discussion of social control theories see Boulay (1979).


5. For a discussion of symbolic and distributional policies see Molotch, 1976, p.313.














CHAPTER TWO

POLITICS IN THE LAND USE POLICY PROCESS

Interest Groups and the Policy Process

What factors affect policy making in urban areas? The policy making process in local government can be influenced by any number of interests such as elected officials, administrators, and interest groups. The degree to which participants are affected by legislation both directly and indirectly influences the role that each interest group plays in local policy making. The desires of individuals and groups affect policy demands made on government. In turn, community needs and desires are reflected in the policies enacted by local government. Influence on government represents a means to success or fulfillment of participant and community interests within the policy process (Truman, 1951).

The groups which represent the various interests in the urban area are a political force within the policy process. This is a form of influence which is potentially more powerful than the public's ability to influence policy making via voting. "The mobilization of bias" is interest groups influencing the policy outputs of the political process (Schattschneider, 1960). The degree of consensus or


26









27

conflict among various interests affects the ability of the policy process to operate. Low conflict and high consensus reflects a homogeneous demand process, whereas high conflict and low consensus reflects a heterogeneous demand process (Yates, 1977).

The variety of demands on the system reflects the

degree of similarity of group interests within a city. This in turn affects the degree to which policy outputs are coherent and thematic. A wide array of interests and demands will force a wide variety of political policy responses.

Policy Process Explanations

Various explanations of the motivations and influences on the policy process are found in the urban process literature. Some attempts to analyze urban policy making processes and outputs suggest that the process is policy dependent. For instance, hyperpluralistic decision making contributes to the ungovernable city (Yates, 1977). Different issues will yield different decision making processes such as rational, incremental, and reactive. Or the city government may exhibit a self-interested behavior patterning a reliance on supportive policies (Peterson, 1981; Tiebout, 1956).

In such cases the influence of different interest

groups will depend on the policy area being considered, for instance, developmental, allocative, and redistributive policies (Peterson, 1979). In development situations, the









28
city may act as a facilitator and/or arbiter in conflicts between the producers (mobile developers) and the workers (immobile citizens) (Fainstein et al., 1983). This tension forces the city to constantly make tradeoffs in policy and the delivery of services to these competing interests. There also may be an institutional bias present in the policy making process which favors the business class interests (Stone, 1980). In such a case, development policies may be even more influential in guiding the local decision making process.

To best understand the influence of actors on local

policies we can examine the variety of interests and demands on the process. Through the identification of the actors and their interests we can estimate the actors' influence, participation, and impact on the process. Then by examining their values, participation levels, and success level we can gain insights on what motivates their level and direction of participation. Finally, we can identify their impact on the process by measuring the level of conflict and consensus in the process and the overall perception by the policy actors of the local political power structure (Allensworth, 1980, p. 229).

Participation and Influence

Interest group (power) structures can array themselves in any number of configurations. Who has influence and who doesn't has been the subject of debate in the community








29

power literature for more than thirty years.1 Elite and pluralistic systems represent opposite explanations of political influence. A close, small number of influentials exhibiting a pyramidal structure reflects the elite perspective (Domhoff, 1978; Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953) and a competitive group structure reflects the pluralistic perspective (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951; Polsby, 1980). From these well-debated classics, other configurations have been developed. Our expectations of the land use policy process will be refined with insights from these later studies of the urban process.

Urban planning and development policy processes have

been described as a four-point continuum distinguishable by the roles of the policy actors (Rabinovitz, 1969). The points identified are 1) the cohesive/ monopolistic elite decision making system, 2) the executive centered/public and private leadership-shared, elite decision making system, 3) the competitive/pluralistic interest group competition for leadership and policy-benefits decision system, and 4) the fragmented/no visible leadership group, perhaps hyperpluralistic decision system. The major distinctions on the continuum are the level of conflict or challenge for policy leadership, and the variety or tension level of competing interests and issues entering the decision process--"integration to fragmentation" (Rabinovitz, 1969, p. 78).








30

According to this policy process analysis, planning

policy is affected by the local distribution of power. More importantly, professional planners can adapt and work within these various decision making processes in their cities. Public actors' ability to "read" the local dispersion of influence is important to the success of policy, within the confines of each city's unique political process. As the administrators increase their understanding of various influences, the chances for the adoption and implementation of effective policies increases. Government will be successful as it learns to satisfice or manage the process in light of the dispersion of influence.

Another important explanation of the policy process

forgoes using a power analysis approach and instead focusses on which issues are under consideration (Yates, 1977). The impact of the issues themselves will influence the operation of the process. Each issue under consideration creates a particular decision making response pattern based on the pattern of support or opposition to it. A "highly unstable" and increasingly reactionary (without focus) policy process is likely to emerge as the number of competing issues increase (Yates, 1977, p. 93). As the number of policy issues competing for policy makers' attention increases, the less likely is it that the process will be rational. It is difficult to achieve and maintain an incremental process though bargaining and equilibrium in the rapidly changing









31

urban environment. Yates suggests that the urban policy process is forced to be disjointed, even isolated, without any overarching control or power structure and thus it is "ungovernable." Public sector actors in an ungovernable (unpredictable) urban system are forced to react to issues and demands which interest groups bring to their attention. This puts government into the role of facilitator.

A final contribution to this discussion on the nature

of the policy process is that there is no single process but a number of stages to the process that evolve over time. Schultze (1985) suggests that a city goes through various stages of policy interests which reflect the demands of a changing population. The process goes through transitions which are modeled after Williams' (1971) conceptions of community image and government roles which are caretaker, amenities, growth, and arbiter. Transitions of image can account for the changing nature of interest group demands. Five transition stages are identified as 1) city as caretaker to growth/private city, 2) amenity seekers and the poor who challenge growth, 3) city as arbiter of conflicts, and either the final stage as 4) bureaucratic/policy city or 5) return to the private development city. By combining the interest group demands as the motivation for the process with the economic underpinnings of the quest for political power, Schultz's transitions facilitate the use of political economy in analyzing the policy process.









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Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process

The majority of the community power literature and policy process analysis is insufficient for a modern explanation of urban politics. The discussions of pluralism, elitism, and the policy process are insufficient for analysis of modern urban policy processes. The community power adherents disagree about the influential power of any one interest group over another.2 Neither contention provides a clear conclusion as to whether or not the process is issue dependant. Dahl (1961) described the process in New Haven as influentials which can be identified as exclusive across issues, but that there is no basis for a priority of issues--leaving us to imagine what the importance of an issue might be as a determining factor in how the process operates. Likewise the elite view suggests that one dominant group of actors will be influential almost regardless of issues by virtue of class and/or business position.

Follow-up studies of urban policy allude to urban power and introduce the importance of economic motives on the competition for influence. Rabinovitz (1969) studied a major developmental policy area, Yates (1977) explains the inability of the local process to cope with economic needs that conflict, and Schultze (1985) combines the recognition of the economic benefits of urban growth with policy influence patterns over time.









33

Urban political economy, however, is an analytical

approach which provides the means to integrate the role of government with an explanation of power and group influence. Political economy has the potential to attribute a more directive role to public actors in the policy process, which will provide a benefit outcome not just a single beneficiary.

Political Economy

The political economy approach to urban politics is used in several different ways but focusses on the motivations and roles of economic interests and the public actors that participate in urban growth issues. Current trends in urban analysis go beyond the classic definition of political economy--"the systematic interaction between economic and political processes" and are moving towards a growth politics framework of analysis (Swanstrom, 1985, p. 12).3 These recent discussions in the literature are extending analysis beyond explanations of urban interaction and are more fully integrating the theories of community power, the importance of economic influences, and the role of government itself in the local political decision making arena.

Current literature contributions identify developmental policies as the dominant issue in local politics and as such reflects the influence and power structures in the policy process. Identification of a key set of issues increases our









34

ability to understand the policy outputs of the political process. For instance, land based interests, such as the developers, bankers, and redevelopment-economic development actors use the political process to further their own interests (Molotch, 1976). By pressing for favorable developmental policies such as transportation, infrastructure, redevelopment or economic development, they increase their opportunities to realize economic benefits. Indeed, the entire local growth industry of services and infrastructure is of vital importance to the economic well being of the "growth machine" (Molotch, 1976). Economic and developmental policies offer the richest policy area in which the dynamics of urban politics are exemplified. The growth and development of the city will influence the rest of the policy making agenda. We must direct our attention to the political treatment of economic issues in order to understand the urban policy process.

Most intriguing about the more recent views of urban political process are the various expectations of the role which government will play in the process. The government as an actor with its own motivations and as the promoter of the collective interest that the market function cannot employ. The different perspectives in the literature vary in their expectation of the degree to which government can act as a facilitator of marketplace demands or a director of the process and its outputs. Quite possibly, these different









35

roles for government may indicate stages of development in the growth of an urban area.4 A review of the literature concentrating on the role of government in urban policy process will increase our insights into the nature of the interaction between market and government in the policy process.

Government as Actor in the Policy Process

An integrated perspective of the new urban political

economy is Peterson's (1979) elaboration on Tiebout's (1956) classic urban location theory. He suggests that financial prosperity is the city's primary goal and this motivates the city to pursue economic development and to satisfy property owners. Therefore, the process and the policies generated will reflect these internal concerns. Tiebout's theory, that the city acts as a firm with identifiable interests, translates into a modern urban theory in which economic interests dominate the political process. But Peterson's assessment of the city process is limited. It is driven by economic theory and has limited power to explain changing political demands and conflicts in the distribution of economic benefits.

Additional studies of cities provide stronger

explanations of the urban process where government may act as a facilitator, satisficer, partner, or manager. There are several stages of growth politics that can be identified, each reflecting the different roles which government can








36

play. After a discussion of these stages, the individual components--actors, the policy process, and individual policy options will be examined. Conservative Growth Politics--Government as Facilitator

Conservative growth politics is a stage which may be characterized by the role of government as facilitator. Molotch (1976) establishes the base point of this role by suggesting that in the policy process the government acts as a booster for the economic development interests of the growth machine. Adopted policies reflect the desires of the economic interests and establish a supportive business climate for economic development. This portrayal of government complements the description of "conservative growth politics" in the 1950s (Swanstrom, 1985). Government actors will facilitate growth and development through selective policy adoption because they assume that the public will benefit from the subsequent expansion of the local economy. In this characterization of the policy process the market forces are the dominant interest group to which government responds.

This basepoint view, however, is two-dimensional and represents a zero-sum game. The more potential for growth, the more government responds to development demands. The expected opposite reaction is that as more growth occurs, the greater is the likelihood that the residential community, the anti-growth coalition will resist additional









37

development. Its members are motivated by their experiences with the dysfunctions of rapid growth which threaten their existing lifestyle. Molotch contends that government is a natural advocate of growth and he leaves little room for any alternate government position. Instead, government's role is reduced to facilitator of interests as they dominate the process.

Liberal Growth Politics--Government as Satisficer

In other stages government may have an expanded role as an actor in the process. Government can be a filter through which growth interests must pass (Swanstrom, 1985). The policy process in this explanation is dominated by growth interests, specifically the political and economic sectors, but concedes a more active rather than reactive role for government. For example, in Cleveland the policy process progressed from conservative growth politics, government as facilitator, to liberal growth politics, what might be portrayed as government as satisficer, though the Kucinich administration (Swanstrom, 1985).

In general, liberal growth politics flourished in the 1960's when federal grants for redevelopment and social programs were politically beneficial to liberal mayors and administrators. Minority and business coalitions were built to expand urban revitalization, especially downtown development. But the good intentions of the liberal approach to economic development were subject to capture by the








38

conservative growth machine for use to their own advantage (Swanstrom, 1985). In addition to Cleveland, Boston and San Francisco had similar experiences with liberal growth politics. The basis of their liberal growth politics was rooted in the interests and influence of post-New Deal coalitions (Mollenkopf, 1983).

In all these cities it is evident that the pressures for growth were accompanied by a decline of the city's middle class population. Without a solid revenue base the only counter-interest to the growth machine were groups and projects dependent on federal funds. Once the federal process was captured by the growth machine for its own purposes or withdrawn as a source of funding, then liberal growth politics lost its momentum as an opportunity for government to actively satisfy interests other than the growth machine. Government would be left to resume its role as policy facilitator.

Populist Growth Politics--Government as Partner

The Kucinich administration in Cleveland managed to extend the city role from facilitator to satisficer to partner. A combination of political interests emerged to support an expanded role for government. Consumer oriented advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965) and Alinsky style community organizing contributed to the public's rejection of market demands for public resources without a return of profits to the residents. This change in the politics of








39

growth altered the balance of political power and forged a populist reform approach. Government planners were especially important to the success of empowering the populist coalition. Government's role in populist politics is one of a partner with the public in promoting communitywide benefit outcomes rather than benefits for individuals or narrow interests.

In Cleveland, "equity planners" promoted the interests of the city's existing residents, instead of the interests of the business or suburban residents (Clavel, 1986). Later, Mayor Kucinich was unable to completely manage the growth machine interests, but he was able to challenge them with a more active and directed role by government (Swanstrom, 1985). The interests of the growth machine had to go through the government. Government with the help of broad based coalitions did not have to acquiesce to demands nor did it automatically adopt growth goals as their own. Although Kucinich lost his position as Mayor at the hands of the formidable developer and business coalition in Cleveland, he succeeded in establishing an alternative role for government in the urban policy process.

Populist growth politics contests the two-dimensional facilitator role common in conservative growth politics and has the potential for greater long-term success than does liberal growth politics. There is, however, another









40

progression of growth politics which provides an even greater degree of independence for government actors. Progressive Growth Politics--Government as Manager

Other cities were able to effectively use a populist political coalition and to enlarge the role of government from partner in growth to manager of growth. This additional dimension suggests that government can constructively manage the interests and active participation of citizens and neighborhood groups as an effective counterbalance to growth machine interests.

Citizens participation, facilitated by government, is the foundation of the populist movement and provides a means to insure that benefits accrue to residents rather than to narrow development interests. In Progressive politics, however, government expands its role to a partner who can challenge the dominance of conservative growth politics in interest group competition, and also advance the role of government to the status of manager of the growth process. In this role government can begin to direct a multidimensional range of community benefits. Hartford and Santa Barbara are examples of the successful use of "progressive growth politics" (Clavel, 1986).

Planners play an important role by directing the attention of citizens to potential benefits and the administrators and elected officials to any excessive benefits (windfalls) of the development interests that can









41

and should be redirected to the benefit of the community. Progressive politics is also a stage where government pursues benefit equity by insuring that the costs of economic development and growth are proportionately borne by the growth machine which will profit from city growth policies. In turn, a range of benefits from growth can be directed, perhaps by regulatory parameters, to the existing and future residents of the city.

A directed policy process is not a zero-sum approach

where the growth machine receives a disproportionate benefit or pluralistic interest group competition biases the outcome. Instead, progressive politics requires a directive role by government and an active role by all the interest groups and the public to direct the benefit outcomes. For example, Hartford was successful in becoming a partner and a director of downtown development. The city directed new development as an equal partner in the process, eventually becoming a co-developer on several major projects. Development continued and profits were shared with existing residents. Santa Barbara successfully implemented rent and development controls to benefit citizens and at the same time was able to negotiate in a positive manner with developers (Clavel, 1986). This process differs from the use of exactions or growth management regulations because government is acting to integrate the citizenry and their interests into the process. Exactions and regulations









42

produce a restricted marketplace while not necessarily directly benefiting the collective good.

Growth Politics in the Sunbelt

Many cities that are experiencing populist and

progressive stages of growth politics also have faced decline in both population and economic activity. They have experienced a change in their population demographics from white middle class to minority lower income class as the dominant resident group. Might we expect a different scenario and policy process in the rapidly growing cities of the southeast and southwest? Their economic and population conditions are very different from the declining frostbelt cities. Evidence suggests that these rapid growth cities are experiencing a different pattern in their evolution of growth politics.

Rapidly developing cities of the southwest have

experienced "progrowth politics" (Mollenkopf, 1983). This rapid growth and stage of growth politics is attributed to a "favorable political climate" characterized by small government size, a private sector orientation, low political conflict, and a conservative political culture (Mollenkopf, 1983, p. 242). Cities in a progrowth political climate enact policies such as low taxes, small budgets, and flexible rather than regulatory development policies. These are policies designed to favor economic interests. A professional government administrator who has the backing of









43

local business also is likely to be found in a progrowth politics city.

Essentially, sunbelt cities may be experiencing the same conservative growth politics that their frostbelt counterparts experienced. (Although, Mollenkopf attributes postwar conservative growth politics of the southwest to the proliferation of federal defense contracts and a conservative national political orientation which filtered down to the local level.) Limited pro-business governments, Mollenkopf suggests, preceded and perhaps preempted a liberal growth politics in southwest cities because there was not a significant blue collar class and minorities were restricted to a minimal political role. Further there was no advent of populism or progressive politics in these cities because the "intercity competition enforced a market discipline ... " that eventually would also spread to the older frostbelt cities, forcing an abandonment of costly progressive politics (Mollenkopf, 1983, pp. 251-253).

The possibility remains that the excesses of the growth machine will be challenged in the south as they were in northern cities. The neighborhood movement, as the forerunner to populism, is dismissed by Mollenkopf (1983, p. 289) as a southern strategy because it is "an incomplete alternative" to the pressures of national political interests that are pervasive in the new growth cities.









44

How can sunbelt cities make the transition form

conservative or pro-growth politics to a form of progressive growth politics? Mollenkopf suggests that the inability of urban sunbelt cities to make the transition to liberal or progressive growth politics can be altered by the development of a "new social contract" where

progressive national political entrepreneurs must take
the risk of mobilizing such constituencies in the
suburbs and newer cities as well as within the old. They must also seek to control the competitive framework that
private institutions have exploited to undermine
redistributive politics in the past. But they must offer
the private sector some quid pro quo if massive,
debilitating conflict is to be avoided (Mollenkopf,
1983, pp. 297)

This call for a new urban political process suggests that another dimension of growth politics is necessary to define in order to understand how rapidly growing cities have been able in some cases to overcome the market's resistance to development regulation, moving them closer to a partner or manager role for government. I suggest that this other dimension to the developmental policy process is growth management.

Growth Management--Growth Politics

Growth management, as a dimension of progressive growth politics or even a stage itself, is based on government's authority to institutionalize city regulatory and planning powers and to encourage citizen participation as in progressive and populist cities. In fact, Clavel (1986) identifies these administrative and participatory components








45

on continuums. He fails to fully explain, however, how the natural tension between government and citizen can be eased in order to produce a long-term community-wide benefit outcome. Through growth management, however, the administrative power of a city can be increased by regional or statewide institutionalized land use requirements. This type of broader authority can help local government to equitably frame the competition of local growth politics and promotes long-term uniformity in government's approach to development and growth. This approach would satisfy the quid pro quo for which Mollenkopf calls. This additional dimension of government influence gives local government a sustaining power to manage the benefits and costs of growth, not just exercise local regulatory power over the growth machine; a regulatory power which eventually would be challenged by the local power structure.

The role of local government can be refined further to director or "traffic cop" (Stone, 1986). Government can use its legislative power to institutionalize their own set of development rules, rather than rely on regulatory development under the normal political process--competitive bargaining and influence group pressure. Government has the option to regulate the process by controlling the economic forces of the market, or government can direct the process by an equitable management of the decision making arena within its own parameters. At the same time, government








46

takes the responsibility of protecting the interests of residents and other disadvantaged actors in the local process.

Government ought to make sure that the process has some equity in its responsiveness to all the major interests that represent a wide range of values. Growth management can be an equitable process without being reduced to short-term political incrementalism. The experience, however, with growth management reveals that is used to both reject and promote growth for single interests. Growth management is more often the result of interest group influence than an approach to the role of government in the process.

Implementation of Growth Politics

Developmental policies are the focus of local policy making in growth cities. And it is the selection and implementation of land use policies that we expect to be specifically affected by the patterns of influence in the community because of the economic basis of these policies (Allensworth, 1980, p. 59). Therefore, we can investigate the implementation of growth politics in urban areas by measuring the overall levels of interest group influence in the process. This can be done by gauging the levels of conflict over policy, community perceptions of the sources of influence, and the levels of participation and success in affecting the local land use policy process.









47

This research will attempt to provide evidence of the

links between community power, the policy process framework, and land use policy selection in the implementation of growth politics. The different scenarios that have been suggested, conservative, liberal, populist, progressive, and growth management are comprised of actors, policy approaches, and specific land use policy outputs. The theoretical basis of these components will be reviewed and in later chapters they will be evaluated empirically as indicators of the several stages of growth politics that Florida cities have experienced. Actors in the Process

The literature suggests that there is a set of actors who are expected to have a greater influence in this policy making area than do any others. This influence is reflected by the relationship between power in these actors' communities and the policy-making process.

We expect that specific growth politics actors, growth machine interests and anti-growth interests, will be highly involved in the policy process. Molotch (1976) contends that "land based interests"--those who have an economic investment tied to land--make up the growth machine. Land use policies in turn, have a major influence on the local economic condition of any city, especially in a growth state such as Florida.









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Private sector actors

The growth machine coalition is expected to exhibit for the most part, characteristics of conservative growth politics in their attempt to dominate the policy making process and secure passage and implementation of economically beneficial growth policies. The political process and the economic sector become integrally linked. For example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit bond project in San Francisco was successful despite an initial split of support by the business elites in that city. (Whitt, 1982) They eventually coalesced to provide solid support for the bond issue and its passage. On this important developmental issue the growth interests directed their attention to its success for long-run benefits. Whitt suggests that the support for the BART project represents a dialectic coalition between the interests of government and business in the growth politics process.

We expect the pro-growth interests to support prodevelopment policies in order to secure economic benefits. But in order to gain insight into this group of actors it is necessary to understand not only their policy preferences but also what their value perspectives are towards land use policies. Specifically, does their support of market principles carry over to support for a particular role for government in the land use development process?









49

In a study of planning board members, support for

various land use policies by board votes were classified as conservative--most frequently supporting rezonings for higher densities, and liberal--least frequently supporting such rezoning requests (Allensworth, 1980). The results showed that the more conservative members "felt that planning should be used to facilitate if not encourage growth and development ... and tended to frown on the concept that planning be used to control or regulate community expansion" (Allensworth, 1980, p. 99). Zoning was expected to serve as a policy mechanism to reflect market demands. Liberals were more likely to expect the planning function to be a restrictive devise providing a "positive role--as an independent force designed to guide, direct, and control" (Allensworth, 1980, p. 99). These results direct our expectations of actors' growth positions which can be determined by examining their opinions on the purposes of land use policies.

A traditional power elite explanation (Hunter, 1953; Domhoff, 1979) of the growth machine would define its membership by reputational or positional power. The results would identify a membership reflecting the makeup of conservative growth politics. But the nature of developmental land use policies is that there are other interest groups who also can benefit from growth. For example, in cities experiencing liberal and progressive








50

growth politics, minority leaders have worked with urban redevelopers in order to direct some of the economic benefits of growth to minorities (Swanstrom, 1985; Clavel, 1986).

This suggests the possibility of a new alignment of growth interests especially in areas other than declining cities. For example, in Montgomery county, Maryland, bluecollar whites and blacks, civil rights groups, farmers, and developers opposed large lot zoning policies which they perceived to be exclusionary and restrictive to growth (although for different reasons). Those in favor of the policies were professional and middle class whites, wealthy property owners, and environmentalists (Allensworth, 1980). These coalitions represent an alteration of sorts of the liberal and progressive growth politics alignments. Previously, white liberals and minorities were united to redirect urban redevelopment which traditionally displaced urban residents. Today, however, the liberal support is split between the economic needs of minorities which may be satisfied with growth, and an environmental sensitivity to the rise of the dysfunctions of growth.

In an Iowa study, skilled blue collar citizens were

unexpectedly found to oppose growth (Albrecht, Bultena, and Hoiberg, 1986). As expected, however, Iowan business respondents were less opposed to growth and upper income groups were very opposed to growth. The critical difference









51

in the Iowa study is in the measurement of "growth." Four questions were asked which focussed on the environment and capacity of the land to withstand growth. Therefore, the lack of blue collar support for growth may be more of an indication of a pro-environment position and does not seem to be conclusive of an anti-growth bias by blue collar persons. The Maryland and Iowa data indicate that as we suspected, the Molotch two-dimensional view of growth politics is not necessarily complete.

Turning to the other end of what should be viewed as a growth politics continuum, the anti-growth coalition is expected to replace the growth machine if the dysfunctions of growth (urban problems) reach a point of severity (Molotch, 1976). This condition will prompt the public to resist additional growth and any policies which promote growth. The coalition is expected to be made up of middleand-upper income, activist types concerned about aesthetic improvements such as environmental protection, single family residential needs, and historic preservation. They are struggling to preserve their image of a quality life.

Their conflict with the growth machine, however, is unlike the opposition to liberal growth politics by the minority and poor residents who opposed urban redevelopment displacement. We would expect this modern coalition to be made up of residential property owners who have an economic investment to protect. This economic incentive motivates









52
them to actively oppose policies which might increase growth problems and which may negatively affect their long-term housing investments. Similar to the pro-growth machine, influence in the land use process by these actors protects their economic position.

The anti-growth coalitions may have more than just an interest in land use regulation. Regulatory reform is the means to a more specific end. Just as the growth machine is not monolithic, but made up of business, developer, minority and other interests, so to is the anti-growth coalition made up of social liberals, environmentalists, exclusionary suburbanites, and statewide environmentalists.

It is a coalition of interests that has different

reasons for political association. They are not necessarily motivated by market forces acting as a unifying stimulus. While there may be a split liberalism within this group of environmentalists, minority supporters, and homeowners, there is a common theme in their expectations about the role that government should play in affecting land use. We expect the anti-growth interests to support government's regulatory function to control the use of land. I would suggest, however, that there are several motivations and subsequent approaches that this support of government regulation may take.

Regulatory support may be based on an exclusionary

interest to protect personal investment (Dye, 1986) and to









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institutionalize this interest through strong development controls over zoning, size, and structure (Allensworth, 1980). Secondly, support may come from an environmentalist interest focussing on limiting the natural and architectural dysfunctions of growth (deHaven-Smith, 1987). Finally, support may be found in a statewide based environmental interest which seeks to institutionalize a long-term, rational land-use process by which developers can abide (DeGrove, 1986).

The exclusionary interests want government to regulate exclusivity into the use of land and in effect who uses the land. Zoning restrictions can be used to restrict the use of land in a way that benefits a select group of land owners despite its affect on non or would-be owners. Minimum lot sizes and architectural criteria can exclude non-affluent homebuyers and renters from a particular market location. In addition, homeowners may fear that the dysfunctions of rapid growth will threaten the suburban quality of life and their residential environment. Restrictive zoning is one way of insulating existing residential areas from change. The intent to exclude certain types of development and in the process certain people, can be institutionalized through zoning and land use policies (Dye, 1986). Regulations can preserve residents social and political interests by preserving the status quo (Allensworth, 1980, p. 128).5









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The other two anti-growth segments are represented by

environmentalists. These groups share a concern for personal quality of life like the exclusionist segment. Their primary motivation, however, may be broader, extending beyond their immediate well-being and to a concern for community wellbeing. Traditionally, environmentalists have been interested in preserving the natural environment. A Florida study, however, suggests that concern over the impacts of growth and development of the physical environment are important as well (deHaven-Smith, 1987). Upper and middle income persons as well as the highly educated show a sensitivity to the impact of development on the natural environment as well as the aesthetic quality of development. This group exhibits a willingness and desire for government to impose land use regulations to remedy negative development impacts.

The other environmental coalition is made up of

interests that are statewide in scope (DeGrove, 1986). In some cases developers and homebuilder organizations have joined the traditional environmentalists in an effort to pressure state government to regulate additions to the built environment. Although it seems contradictory, the developer/builder interests in California, Oregon, and Florida have realized that regulations instituted at the state level are more predictable in their enforcement and parameters. A state process of land use regulation will be less reactionary and politically volatile than when









55

regulation is at the discretion of each local government (DeGrove, 1986, pp. 395-6). We might expect to find progressive growth politics in this situation allowing for a diversity of interests managed by government process.

Once again, we can find different actors at different periods of time, each with a different perspective towards growth. The dominant actors define which type of growth politics is occurring and more importantly, what type of land use policies are being adopted and used in similar cities.

Public sector actors

The final group of actors to consider are from the public sector--the city itself, and its components the planners and administrators. The city may act according to a self-interest by concentrating on the production of a strong revenue base and pursuing a pro-growth strategy through certain policies. It is the planners and administrators, however, who can provide the greatest insight to the public sector interests.

Planners and administrators have a responsibility to pursue a neutral representation of all community interests in their plans and policies. But often they do not. The planner, his plans, and the administration at whose pleasure they serve, can serve a particular interest. For instance, Minneapolis planners played a reactive role in the conservative growth politics of that city (Altschuler,









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1965). The planners tried to integrate community problems, the needs of the economic interests, and the political situation with their professional judgement on what was the best rational, technical planning proposal. This master plan approach was generally resisted by economic interests who influenced government, for the very reason that planners embraced it. Master or rational planning is not susceptible to political pressures, pressures which the local power structure is adept at manipulating and which the citizen participators cannot easily use to their advantage. Growth politics can politicize land use planning even when planners want to be neutral. But it is questionable whether planners desire to act in a neutral capacity.

The results of a national study suggest that planners admit that they are susceptible to bias in their recommendations and planning efforts (Vasu, 1979). Planners may be more likely to embrace the directions of advocacy planning. Advocacy planning exposes the bias and preferences of planners and administrators (Davidoff, 1965). It encourages the planning process to support the least advantaged community interests as expressed during liberal growth politics. This approach puts the planning process on high moral ground but dangerous political ground. Ideally, government is supposed to represent all interests in the community. But advocacy planning is easier to justify









57

because it increases access to the political process instead of restricting it.

Does this justify serving a particular interest through the planners? Altschuller (1965, p. 360) lamented that Minneapolis planners were expected to produce policies which would protect the investment of the property owners and to "make investment less risky." Davidoff (1965) and practitioners such as the equity planners in Cleveland tried to represent the existing residents, not the middle class interests that the pro-growth machine wanted to lure back to the city. These experiences suggest that planners and administrators, similar to the private actors, may develop and recommend different land use policies and behave according to the type of growth politics being experienced in the city.

Similarly, Rabinovitz (1969) outlines four types of

planners, each of which can be effective within a different political climate. She suggests that planners should be flexible and adapt to these planning scenarios in order to maximize their effectiveness in the policy process. The technician role is expected to be most suitable in a cohesive, integrated political climate and the elite dominated executive-centered system. The broker role would be more effective in a competitive political process. The mobilizer may be most successful in a more fragmented,









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power-vacuum system where he can overcome policy paralysis by being a leader.

Planners as a group, however, have similarities in

their approaches to governments' role in planning that seems to cross over the various growth politics. Again, the results of the nationwide study suggest that a majority of planners are neutral (not cynical) in their expectations of the political process, but split evenly as to whether or not a single public interest exists which planners serve. Furthermore, most planners felt that they did not succeed in serving the public interest in a neutral capacity and that citizen participation groups were not neutral in their pursuits.

The results strongly suggest a high political awareness and bias towards a value-laden rather than neutral planning process. This may reinforce a public perception that planners are a tool to be used by either side of increasingly polarized local growth politics.

Just as Mollenkopf (1983) called for a quid pro quo for settling development conflicts between business and residents, Vasu (1979, p. 189) calls for a normative set of planning principles which "would not seek to avoid values, but rather would stipulate them in an a priori fashion." Again, I would suggest that a growth management process would serve as a vehicle to solve the dilemmas of values and demands in the planning process. An organic, flexible form









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of planning can be pragmatic and technically suitable (Mumford, 1961; Altschuller, 1965).6

Planning processes can be biased. Conservative growth politics takes a utilitarian stance, serving the current economic interests and expecting eventual benefits to accrue to all residents. Liberal growth politics, on the other hand, takes a Rawlsian stance, serving the least advantaged first to bring them to equity before addressing the interests of those who are better off (Beatly, 1984). These two approaches contribute to conflict, because neither one is capable of simultaneous satisfaction of competing interests. It is growth management planning and progressive growth politics that come closest to the organic ideal, serving the interests of the residents but with consideration given to economic realities.

We have to keep in mind, however, that progressive planning is not capable of overcoming local political parochialism for extended periods of time, especially in a competitive political system. Again, a state or regional planning directive could ease the tension of the larger public good fighting with the need for economic growth. Florida's comprehensive plan and growth management approaches allow a definition of the public interest through broad goals and the flexibility to accommodate changing conditions through land use policies and local plans. These









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state directives can help to reduce, at least in theory, the tension between competing local interests.


Conflict in the Policy Process

The main hypothesis of this study is that the selection of land use policies is influenced by actor participation which is influenced by the level of conflict (tension) among interests group in the city. This in turn not only affects the policy ends, but also the policy process means. The nature of the conflict within the political process, the number of interests and nature of competition, will affect the policy response.

Cities try to achieve a low conflict status by means of economic prosperity or regulated exclusion of conflicting interests. Cities can preserve their fiscal health and selfinterest using a revenue strategy of limiting property taxes and encouraging economic development (Peterson, 1979). This is a long term approach which seeks to minimize or maintain low conflict in order to enhance the city's prosperity. This would be easy to achieve in a perfect world where homogeneity is sorted by utility curves (Tiebout, 1956). In the real world, however, long-term land use regulations including exclusionary policies may be a necessary addition to maintain and accommodate homogeneity (Schneider and Logan, 1982).









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The result of low conflict may be that government assumes a facilitator role. This insures long-term stability of economic investments and can complement the long run nature of comprehensive planning. However, the neutral focus of comprehensive planning is traded off for the political need to distribute benefits.

Short-term policies may be politically necessary in

cities with greater conflict in order to temporarily satisfy competing demands (Friedland, 1983). Accommodation of longterm interests in a high tension city are politically difficult to achieve. Land use policies will reflect incremental approaches to development (Ryder, 1982). The long-term payoff, however, will eventually reflect the dominant growth politics actor, either the business-producer interests or the underprivileged in society. Policies and outcomes reflect values, even if those values within the community are in conflict. A progressive role for government can help to achieve the elusive middle ground.

Long-range rational planning is a difficult task

because demands change over time. The viable alternative is long-range organic planning and the use of an ecological role for government (Stone, 1986). With an organic approach to planning--flexible but directed, not a rational approach-fixed, or a reactionary approach--political, it is possible to develop a realistic long-term approach in a diverse city experiencing high levels of interest group tension. A









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directed policy process (ecological direction of power and flexible planning) can serve to balance short-term political necessities without abdicating government's responsibility as ecological manager. Thus the technical proficiency of the professional planner can be used to develop plans but not to the point of inflexibility. Flexibility contributes to the durability of plans because they can shift when necessary but not solely at political whim and for political profit. Policy Outputs of the Growth Politics Process

The urban literature suggests that the policies which

are most important to urban areas are developmental policies such as roads, transportation, and utilities among others. All things being equal, urban cities where growth is one of the most important issues are expected to be dominated by economic interests and to adopt land use policies which benefit those interests. But we know this is not always the case. There are differences in land use policy outputs across "growth" cities which result in policies that produce very favorable to very restrictive growth climates. By growth climate we mean the facilitation of development by directing and regulating land use in the city. If a business climate facilitates economic development, then the growth climate facilitators business and population growth.

Policies that facilitate growth may include flexible
development standards that allow developers to take maximum advantage of market forces, lenient environmental standards,









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no moratoriums or limits on construction, willingness by government to amend local plans, and an easy permitting process. These represent policies the city can use to foster a growth climate.

Developmental policies act as more than just an

important economic issue which facilitates the collaboration of business and government. Planning processes have done that for years (Rabinovitz, 1969; Altschuler, 1965; Allensworth, 1980). But land use policies and other development policies also have an impact on allocative policies (Peterson, 1979). These traditional service policies benefit the growth machine because they act as an important support system. They placate the anti-growth forces and facilitate the growth climate. For instance, community amenities such as recreation, public safety, and culture can act to maintain and facilitate demand for residential location and promote development.

Normally, providing amenities through allocational policies contributes to the residential character of the area. This acts as an inducement which increases the population of the area. But it also may lead to the resistance of future growth by the very residents it attracted in the first place. Once a residential character is established, there may be a threshold beyond which further growth is resisted. Restricting our study of growth politics to developmental policies may obscure additional









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political factors. But we can not expect to study every policy, then we would have not established any positive theory. The aim of this study is to establish the importance of developmental policies as tone setters in the city and that options in other policy areas will respond.

Some cities, however, may not need to adopt policies which directly facilitate a growth climate. They may be natural economic centers or have a physical environment that attracts people. But as is the case with development subsidies, cities may be forced to be boosters for growth to symbolically gain political benefits and because developers expect cities to provide supportive policies. Most cities do not want to give the appearance that they do not support growth. If demand to locate in the city is great (measured by strong economic development presence and population increase) we expect that a growth climate and appropriate land use policies will be in evidence.

Therefore, one of the hypothesis in this research is that the city's ability and proclivity to regulate land is of prime importance to the success of the land based interests. Their ability to influence, infiltrate, and direct the policy making process can yield land use policies that support their position.

But the balance of political influence between the growth and anti-growth forces in the political process varies from city to city, yielding a variety of land use policy outputs.









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Different stages of growth politics may yield different privileged positions.

Specifically, this research hypothesizes that certain policies are regulatory in nature such as greenbelts and moratoriums. These policies do not improve the economic position of the land based elites (growth machine), but rather cost them a portion of their potential profit. At the other extreme are policies which are less restrictive and which maximize the market position and the economic benefits of the growth machine. Zoning, transfer of development rights (TDR), enterprise zones, and tax incentives may be indicative of this. Somewhere in between may be performance oriented policy options such as planned unit development (PUD) and flexible zoning. These policies may diminish the externalities (dysfunctions) of growth by making development conditional, but do not necessarily restrict growth.

An examination of the business and residential

investments in the city along with the business climate and the level of dysfunctions associated with growth will give us a picture of the balance of power and the zone of policy making in the area of developmental policy. We expect that policies adopted may reflect these economic and political conditions which make up the stages of growth politics.

Conclusion

What factors affect policy making? That was our

original question. To summarize the points of this chapter,









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the major influence on policy making is the make-up of the

policy process itself. We have suggested that the

components, actors, policy approaches, and policy outputs

vary by the particular stage of growth politics ongoing in a

city. Patterns of components make up these growth politics

stages. There is no one stage of growth politics that

adequately explains all urban political experiences. But the

underlying elements such as economic and political

motivations can be organized in identifiable patterns of

influence, conflict, and policy outputs. These patterns, the

stages of growth politics will provide a better explanation

of urban policy making in the broadest context.



Notes


1. The literature on community power is vast. The most significant pieces develop the various approaches to understanding the subject. Hunter (1953) used the reputational method to define elite systems. Dahl(1961) used the decisional method to define the pluralistic system. Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson (1972) combined methods to establish a relationship between power and policy in a comparative study. Domhoff (1978) continued the elite theory of power to the national level and suggested that power was attributable to position as well as person. Later authors continued the elite--pluralism debate on methods and conclusions. Most notably, Polsby (1980) supported the pluralist contention. Bacharatz and Baratz as well as Crenson challenged the decisional approach to pluralistic conclusions through their works on non-decision making and agenda building. Finally Lyon and Bonjean (1981), among others sought to test and draw conclusions from these debates and to move on to new dimensions of the quest for understanding influence and the urban policy process.

2. Pluralism see Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980; and elites see Domhoff, 1978; and Hunter, 1953, 1980.









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3. See also Stone, 1980, 1986; Mollenkopf, 1983; Swanstrom, 1985; Peterson, 1979, 1981; Clavel, 1986; Molotch, 1976; and Domhoff, 1986.

4. Staniland (1985) suggests that "political economy" is not a theory but an agenda of ideas and approaches to understand the policy process. He contests that "economism" is a deterministic set of theories where politics is an extension of economic competition. "Politicism" is a positive theory that describes the process within which economics is a player. One is not superior to the other, nor can we define empirically which one comes first. Therefore, political economy is an agenda of relationships between the economic and political processes that create the policy environment.

5. Government also can regulate exclusion community-wide. Higher property taxes can ensure that amenities will continue to be provided and at the same time, economically restrict less valuable developments and less affluent residents. (Dye, 1986, pp. 37-8) This type of economic based exclusion affects the metropolitan area as well. By managing growth through exclusion, new growth goes elsewhere, perhaps to cities with fewer resources to cope with growth. (Dye, 1986) This is the same scenario that declining cities face when wealth exits the central cities to suburbs who do not assist in the costs of redevelopment. It is difficult, however, to do much more than speculate on the motives behind tax rates and land use regulation.

6. Medieval towns took advantage of natural contours to organize a development plan. But these plans were mediated by both the needs of the people and the constraints presented by attention to economic (marketplace) necessities. Organic planning means an attention to the needs of the community while retaining professional standards.















CHAPTER THREE

THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLITICS

The Rules of the Game in Land Use Planning

An important activity which is affected by

developmental policy is land use. The use of land, the prime component in urban area development, is crucial to economic interest groups. Their success is tied to their ability to control the use of the land by development, construction, planning and attracting government subsidies.

The type of local land use policies adopted and the regulation process critically affect our understanding of urban influence patterns and decision-making systems. Land use decisions have significant costs and benefits which may alter the local decision-making process. Past efforts to understand either land use issues or decision-making systems have not fully integrated these two phenomena. Planning and economic inquiries have focussed on the technical aspects of land use and the rational approach to planning (Faludi, 1973) as well as the deterministic aspects of location (Alonso, 1964; Wheaton, 1977). Political scientists have studied land-related decisions but only within the broader context of local power (Clark, 1971; Dahl, 1982).




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Molotch's (1976) theory of a growth machine is a

significant interdisciplinary approach which combines the economic motivations of influential actors associated with land development and governments' facilitation of those interests through the policy process. But we need to go beyond government's role as a facilitator of a business climate and examine whether or not government can control the economic pressures for development, the political economy agenda. Land use regulations are the rules of the land use game and are a reflection of community influence and power structures (Long, 1958). Rule #1--Government Parameters Affect Political Influence

We have already suggested several different phases

through which growth politics passes--conservative, liberal, and progressive. Now we need to put them in perspective in terms of practical political experiences in the area of land use. To do this we can use a framework to analyze the political relationship between the decision-making process of government and the development and implementation of the land use regulation process.

Democracies face many dilemmas in defining their scope of political and policy control (Dahl, 1982). Similarly, state governments face the same dilemmas in defining their scope of control or authority over local governments. The development and implementation of local land use regulations may be significantly affected by this scope of control. The









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approaches by each level of government to these authority dilemmas ultimately affect the gains and losses of the growth politics actors.

There are three dilemmas useful to our understanding of the politics of the land use process. They provide a framework for analyzing the possible political impacts of a state centered or a local-centered land use regulation process (Dahl, 1982, pp. 96-107).

1. uniformity versus diversity--the degree of discretion
in the development and implementation process afforded
by the state to local government.

2. centralization versus decentralization--the degree of
control in development and implementation process that
the state maintains.

3. rights versus utility--the distribution of benefits and costs to various interests through the regulation
process.

Florida, for example, has enacted landmark legislation creating a process for land use regulation. Florida's process has evolved in such a way as to present an interesting case study of the transition of local to state power. More importantly, however, is that by tracing the land use process in Florida we also trace the transitions of growth politics in a sunbelt state. Examples of state and local legislation in Florida depict political changes from conservative to liberal to progressive growth politics. Florida's transition may be representative of other fast growing sunbelt states, but is somewhat different from the growth politics experiences of urban frostbelt cities.









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Over a fifteen-year period (1970-85) Florida has moved from a totally unregulated state situation, to the use of state-guided regional input into large development decisions, through state guidelines and requirements for local comprehensive planning, and to state control over growth management by means of a state-regional-local decision-making process. Tracing the evolution of the state's approach to growth politics will contribute to our understanding of various urban approaches to growth politics in Florida cities.

Rule #2--Economics Affect Political Influence

Economic determinants of growth also can contribute to our understanding of growth politics. We need to establish a link between the costs and benefits of growth which accrue to various interest groups and the nature of growth politics in the city. The data may show that the land use policies adopted by a city reflect the combination of these economic and political interests.

The control over land use is critical to Florida and other sunbelt states for several economic reasons. First, population growth is important to the development of a sunbelt state's economy. Population increases allow economic diversification and development of a competitive business environment (Molenkopf, 1983). Statewide, Florida has diversified from agriculture and tourism to high tech and service industries to support continued economic development










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and a stronger state revenue base. Florida continues to lead the nation in most new jobs produced (Koenig, 1987). Over the 1981-86 period Florida added 850,000 new jobs, a 23% increase, and personal income rose over 50% with per capita income over $14,000 (Koenig, 1987, p. 46).

Local areas as well are diversifying their economies. An annual survey of Florida business leaders reveals strong optimism for continued strong economic growth throughout the state (Koenig, 1987). In 1987, trade and service sectors make up over 50% of the total employment in the state (Koenig, 1987, p. 47). This type of continued, strong economic development is expected to reflect a continued interest by a conservative growth machine to dominate the land use process.

Secondly, to be economically successful a population

increase must be diversified and not limited to unskilled or non-working groups. Even though the influx of retirees to Florida in the early years created a strong housing demand, it is not the type of housing industry which will sustain a strong local economy. But as the state's service sector boomed, a migration of families and young professionals stimulated a long-term housing demand. Employment overall rose 23% from 1981-86 in the state. The 24-44 year old age group is 27% of the total state population making it the largest segment of the state population ("Florida Population Climbs to No.5", 1987, p. 54).









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As the population diversifies and the participants in the business community diversify, we also may expect to see more political conflict. This may increase the tendency of the formation of an anti-growth coalition. As we will see, however, in Florida the anti-growth coalition manifested itself in a suburban, residential interest as Molotch (1976) might have predicted and not as liberal growth politics suggested by Molenkopf (1983).

Thirdly, the housing construction and development

industry may be the major economic thrust in Florida urban areas. An abundance of undeveloped land and rapid population growth can sustain a city's revenue base. This type of economic development has been the impetus for many Florida cities to attain greater economic diversification and to create and sustain additional cities. Housing starts increased 34.3% from 1981-86 ("Florida Population Climbs to No.5", 1987, p. 53). The northeast portion of the state has experienced the greatest surge, a 144% increase over five years followed by the central regions with about 85% increase. The southeast coast, long the sight of the greatest growth trailed central Florida in actual housing starts (central 37,774 starts, southeast 32,173 starts), but represents the second highest number of starts in the state ("Florida Population Climbs to No.5", 1987, p. 53). The rate of change in starts, though, was outdistanced by the central and northern areas by 29%. Those regions appear to be









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growing faster. Growth remains a significant issue around the state and impacts local political power and policy. Rule #3--Economic and Political Influences Affect Policy Making

Decision making concerning the use of land is a

politically volatile policy area. Specifically, the type of growth and the purpose for the land affects the distribution of political power. For instance, residential growth may heighten the polItical power of neighborhood groups. Economic development centered growth may produce different political results such as an elite or business dominated power structure. In theoretical terms, Peterson's (1979) unitary explanation of city interests may be more suitable to a residential community and structural, elite power theories (Stone, 1980; Domhoff, 1986) may be more suitable to larger, more diversified urban areas.

Florida and other sunbelt states, however, may consist (as Mollenkopf (1983) alludes to) of multi-nodal urban areas with mixed commercial and residential development. Mollenkopf suggests that this pattern leads to unchallenged conservative growth politics. But some Florida cities check unrestrained growth and restrict it. This leads us to believe that sunbelt cities, especially in Florida, will experience additional stages of growth politics.

Florida land use policy significantly influences economic interests. The state's land use regulations represent more than just an example of a state's regulatory









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authority overcoming the desires of local interests. We know that a broader authority and higher level of government can implement controversial regulations that limit the benefits of powerful interests more successfully than can local governments (Lindblom, 1977; Long, 1980; Swanstrom, 1985). Land use and development regulations certainly fit that description. Florida, however, is an example of how state government can influence not only the direction of the local use of land but also the nature of the benefits which may be available to growth interests.

The level of government that directs the land use

process has a significant impact on the distribution of the benefits of land development and growth. The state, by institutionalizing its presence in this high-stakes policy arena and by centralizing its decision-making authority can guide land development while at the same time maintain a particular growth agenda. In Florida's case we will see how the state's efforts to centralize and create a uniform process influenced the transition at the state level from conservative to liberal to progressive growth politics. Those state actions also improved the opportunity for growth politics transitions to occur at the local level.

Florida's history of transitions in decision-making and growth politics contribute to our understanding of the policy process, and the implications for intergovernmental relations. Most importantly it contributes to our










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understanding of institutional power, its relation to the operation of interest group and community power (in terms of gains and losses), and the policies adopted by governments in each type of political process.

Florida Growth Politics

Conservative Growth Politics

Conservative growth politics as we have discussed

previously, is an unrestrained growth machine approach to development and is most likely to be associated with the government dilemma of uniformity or diversity of the policy process. In Florida this dilemma centers on the land use process that the state makes available to local governments for devising and implementing growth-management policies. Uniformity represents the degree to which growth management is regulated and guided by the state through a decision framework implemented at the local level but required by the state. Diversity represents the degree of local discretion given to local government by the state in interpreting or implementing their own approach to growth management and land use.

State mandates are an example of uniformity. Lovell and Tobin (1981) suggest that state mandates reduce the decision-making discretion of local governments. State demands for uniformity may also increase the fiscal dependency of local governments that cannot afford to implement the state-mandated policies (Lovell, 1981).









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Uniform mandate parameters may be viewed negatively, but Wirt (1985, p. 95) suggests that mandates, by producing an additive effect, can increase local governments' ability to address policy problems. State mandates may act as a "preemption" to shape the local "decision space," but this does not have to produce a burden or negative impact on local government (the zero-sum view). Instead it may simply provide a framework for local decision-making to take advantage of a supportive policy opportunity.

Local conservative growth politics, however, might be more successful in a locally determined land use process that operates independently of the state's influence. Statewide policy uniformity, must compromise over a wider group of interests and may not provide as supportive a pro-growth climate as might locally dominated decision making processes.

Prior to 1972, the state government in Florida played a minor role in regulating local land use and directing urban growth. During this time, the state was supportive and made urban growth easier (Carter, 1974).1 The state began to open development by allowing drainage and dredging in wetlands, especially south of Lake Okeechobee through the Everglades. This opened previously undevelopable land in southeast and southwest Florida near the turn of the century (DeGrove, 1984). The St. Lucie, Hillsborough, and Miami canals made development possible in southeast Florida and drainage in









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the Big Cypress area created development opportunities in the southwest part of the state. By the 1940s, overdrainage for agriculture and over-development forced the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to step in and implement a flood control program which designated 1.3 million acres as a water conservation area and left 800,000 acres for agriculture (DeGrove, 1984).

The state's conservative political climate, however,

continued a strong development environment. In the 1960s the state-federal venture to create the Cross-Florida Barge canal created a heated controversy between legislators and environmentalists. Similarly, there were conflicts over the need for water in the urban areas and in the Everglades Park. The most protracted battle for water occurred over the Big Cypress Jetport site in the Everglades which, if built, would have impeded the water flow necessary to sustain wetlands (DeGrove, 1984).

Florida cities and counties also embraced development and supported wholeheartedly the growth machine interests. The city of Miami was an example of the developer interests dictating city and county land use policy. There was minimal regulation and direction from local government allowing developers to run the growth game. The Dade county real estate explosion in the 1950s and 1960s left both MetroDade and the various cities vulnerable to the influence of the growth machine. Metro-Dade had zoning authority for the









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county and cities, but did not use it (Carter, 1974, p. 154). The 1965 Master Plan encouraged development goals over other goals for agriculture and conservation (Carter, 1974, pp. 155,156). Even into the early 1970s Metro-Dade made its land use decisions on an "ad-hoc case-by-case basis" providing benefits to developers at the cost of long-term planning goals (Carter, 1974, pp. 167).

Many developers in the 1950s and 1960s were

speculators taking advantage of the interest of out-of-state land buyers and retirees who were eager to relocate to Florida. Many new developments were self-contained and did provided only limited infrastructure, instead relying on wells and septic tanks. There was political pressure at the state and local levels for short-term development and very little consistent implementation of long-term planning (Carter, 1974, p. 156). This put Florida cities on a path of politically favoring short-term economic benefits by authorizing quick development and profit. It also marked the beginning of accruing long-term costs to the environment for which government would have to pay later.

The St. Petersburg, Ft. Lauderdale, and Miami areas

experienced the most growth in the post war years (Table 31). This boom period was marked by aggressive development and market driven growth. The state government continued to make policy contributions to spur growth. In 1941 the state designated Nassau county, north of Jacksonville, an









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Table 3-1 Selected Population Growth Rates 1940-80

Location Change in Population (%)
1940-50 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80

Dade county 84.91 88.86 35.58 28.20
Miami 44.78 17.00 14.80 3.53 Hialeah 397.11 240.37 52.97 41.77

Broward
county 110.91 297.87 52.97 41.77 Ft.Lauderdale 101.86 130.25 66.87 9.80

Palm Beach
county 43.37 98.89 52.99 65.26 Boca Raton 37.20 601.71 1223.27 67.39

Orange county 64.00 129.26 30.64 36.75 (Orlando)

Pinellas
county 73.37 135.26 39.41 39.28 (St. Pete)

Hillsborough
county 38.71 59.18 23.24 31.96 (Tampa)

Duval county 44.67 49.79 16.12 7.96 (Jacksonville)

Bay county 106.36 57.25 12.14 30.11 (Panama City)

Source: Figures generated from the Florida Statistical Abstract, 1951, 1961, 1971, and 1981









81

"industrial county." Polluting waterways was allowed as a necessary function for industry (Carter, 1974, p. 46). Industrial paper companies discovered an exceptionally beneficial growth climate available to them. The data suggests the development of a growth profile that potentially benefits the growth machine through conservative growth politics.

Problems in paradise

Growth was encouraged by the lack of development

controls and the state efforts to encourage growth through economic incentives for land development. (Statewide zoning enabling was not established until the constitutional revision of 1969 (O'Connell, 1977).) But this approach had a high cost associated with it.

Natural disasters and reckless care of sensitive lands brought attention to the dysfunctions of growth. Major ecological and environmental problems resulted from the short-sighted approach to develop land through a marketdriven process. The competition for space and water between development interests and environmentalists crystallized the political problems facing Florida legislators as they grappled with land use legislation. These problems forced a change in state-wide growth politics from conservative to a more liberal growth politics. While conservative growth politics at the state level was declining, at the local level growth politics remained relatively unchanged. The









82

state's involvement in the attempt to restrict growth is the first shift towards a more unitary approach to land use development in Florida. Liberal growth politics relies on this type of regulatory assistance from a broader level of government.

From the late 1960s onward, the state instituted a

number of conservation reforms which eventually led to land use reforms. The 1966-70 administration of Governor Kirk paid serious attention to the sensitive environmental problems of the Everglades and other critical areas. Conservation groups were influential within the administration and their concerns were supported by the Governor's staff. Eventually this led to the formation of the Governor's Natural Resources Committee, an influential group which proposed significant environmental legislation. Water quality, beach development, sewer hookup, and development permitting were among the policy areas affected by the state's attention to ecological problems.

The 1970-78 administration of Governor Askew continued the state's conservation efforts and a reliance on land use planning. Severe environmental problems, including a crippling south Florida drought in 1971 brought about a number of significant policy responses. Governor Askew organized the Governor's Conference on Water Management in South Florida in 1971 to address the chronic battle between development and environmental needs. The task force which









83

resulted from that conference recommended that a plan be developed to limit growth in order to conserve water. This signaled a major shift in Florida politics (DeGrove, 1984). The governor called for new legislation to be proposed addressing these conflicts.

A crucial policy dilemma was considered at this

juncture. The Governor's study committee considering the various policy options had a major choice to make. Under consideration were two models for land use regulation. The Hawaii model was a comprehensive, unitary policy model giving most of the directive powers over land use to the state. The alternative was the ALI Model Code (Finnell, 1973). It left decisions about local development directions to local governments and gave directive power to the state only in critical areas or for significant scale developments (Carter, 1974, pp. 130,131). The Hawaii option could have been perceived as a severe constraint on local growth machines. The ALI option left the local political process open to interest group competition. Florida was not ready to assume a fully unitary approach.

There was quite a bit of controversy surrounding the

proposed legislation. Supporting a strong State presence in land use regulation were the environmental groups, the League of Women Voters, the American Institute of Architects, and many local newspapers around the state. Opposed to the legislation were the Homebuilders Association










84

and assorted developers (with the notable exception of the Arvida Corporation) (DeGrove, 1984).

Despite the controversies, in 1972 the state enacted

four significant pieces of land use legislation which would pave the way for a more liberalized, unitary policy approach to land use. The most significant legislation passed was the Land Management Act (F.S. Chapter 380) which contained the provisions to designate Areas of Critical State Concern and the Developments of Regional Impact (DRI). The other significant legislation included the Water Resources Act of 1972, the Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972 (state plan), and the Land Conservation Act of 1972 (DeGrove, 1984).

The state's objective was not to stop growth but to

minimize the problems which resulted from a growth pattern fueled by unrestricted market pressures. The state could not ignore the costs of this type of growth and the state political process had to develop some parameters to curb local conservative growth politics. The legislation had three significant features which aided in its passage. The legislation maintained a primary role for local government in the land use process, the state had limited and defined areas in which it could intervene, and the legislation had significant legal and technical strength which insulated it from challenge (DeGrove, 1984)









85

Transition to liberal growth politics

The Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972 contained several key provisions such as the process to designate areas of critical state concern and methods to direct developments of regional impact.2 These policies indicated that the state was ready to make a change in the costs and benefits of growth politics. Large scale developments and development in environmentally sensitive areas would now be influenced by or controlled by the state government. The state could overrule local conservative growth politics. This reduced the economic benefits available to developers. But in return it provided a way to reduce the high costs of the problems of unchecked development for which government paid.

With the 1972 legislation series, Florida began to

institutionalize land use development policy. The Cabinet, state agencies, and the state's Regional Planning Councils were responsible for deciding and monitoring major developments and environmental concerns. Local governments plugged into a decision making chain of command, altering the business as usual approach to land use which benefitted the local growth machine interests. This new legislation would by no means stop growth or restrict it in all ways, but it did present a significant change in political attitudes toward increased government involvement in the use












of land, a critical factor in the transition of growth politics.

Two political phenomenon were emerging. One was an

increased authority role for the state via 1972 legislation. Secondly, environmentalists were becoming an influential political group, most prominently as a state-wide coalition. Their strength came from both the national ecology movement and the increasingly urban progressive make-up of the Florida legislature which occurred after legislative reapportionment in 1967. Florida's environmentalists were a check force on the previously unrestrained growth machine (DeGrove, 1984).

In Florida, these political factors contributed to a form of liberal growth politics. But unlike this stage of growth politics in northern cities, Florida's initial response to the growth machine was centered on the environmental cause, and less on issues of racial or income equity. As Mollenkopf (1983) points out, there are few inner city areas in the sunbelt. Thus the anti-growth coalition does not exist in the traditional sense of displaced urban residents. Subsequently, he concludes that sunbelt states miss the liberal growth politics experience except through the nationally stimulated community action and neighborhood movement. But Florida eventually would enter a defined liberal growth politics period. The 1972 legislation represented the first major legislative transition.









87

The liberal environmental coalition entered into growth politics, received favorable responses from the governor and other legislative leaders, and began to see a halt to unchecked, unplanned growth in the state. Some developers, most notably the Arvida Corporation, were in agreement with the environmental approach. They had concerns about the long-term impacts of overdevelopment of the land and development in excess of infrastructure capacity. They in fact supported the increased government involvement, favoring a long term strategy, rather than short term political incrementalism (Appgar and Landers, 1987; Carter, 1974, pp. 135,136). The ability to predict land use policy directions in the long-term allows developers to plan for economic investment and forecast profit potential. As long as the state policy was not too economically restrictive, large, multi-city developers could benefit from a unitary state approach.

For all the environmental political victories, however, other groups had different agendas within the new land use legislation framework. People perceived a decline in the quality of life or "a lifestyle as was once known." What Dade county realized as the need for controlled growth, the "sane growth" campaign in late 1950s, became in other areas a campaign to exclude growth (Carter, 1974). Liberal growth politics suggests that rampant growth is resisted because of its insensitivity to existing residents, most notably in the










88

inner city. But liberal growth politics can also be represented by the interests of the anti-growth coalition as described by Molotch. These existing residential interests may want to stop growth because it is changing the style and quality of life to which they have become accustomed.

This approach to growth management is the "last man in the boat" philosophy (Dye, 1986). The "I have mine, go get yours elsewhere" approach. The strategy may be to keep the character of the city predominantly residential and low density. Most notably, in 1972 the upper-income, exclusively developed community of Boca Raton passed a population cap ordinance. St. Petersburg threatened to enact similar legislation, but never followed through. Their cap would have been lower than the existing population, forcing out some residents.

Growth increases political diversity and challenges the status quo. Liberal growth politics tries to protect the diversity of interests by protecting the equity concerns. In Florida, the anti-growth, residential interests were seeking political and policy protection from growth in the same manner as the environmental interests.

The environmentalists and the residential exclusionists used the same political methods, but for different selfinterests. This split within the anti-growth coalition may be part of the underlying explanation for why Florida cities approach growth very differently in some cases. Growth can









89
coexist with the environment if guidelines are set and imposed by the state. But that would require a degree of uniformity for which not all Florida cities and counties were politically ready. An essentially decentralized approach to land use planning and development was maintained, specifically to maintain the political integrity of local residential interests.

This continuing decentralized approach could have left conservative growth politics to dominate local politics. But residential anti-growth coalitions were able to use the political process to their own ends just as the growth machine had done in the conservative growth politics phase. This observation is intended to be explanatory and not judgmental. After all, the decision making arena and its outputs are shaped by political power. But the next segment of significant state legislation had an even greater potential to affect local political power than the 1972 policies.

Liberal Growth Politics

In 1975 Florida enacted its first comprehensive

planning requirement for cities and counties through the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (LGCPA) (F.S. 163.3161). This legislation solidified the unitary approach to the planning process throughout the state. At this time the state was faced with its second major dilemma, whether to centralize or decentralize policy authority.










90

While the LGCPA did not completely centralize land use regulation decision making, it did significantly institutionalize the process and lay the groundwork for centralized implementation at a later time. This increase in state involvement altered the local growth politics process and forced shifts in the benefits available to and costs extracted from land use interest groups. At the same time it provided opportunities for greater participation in the process.

The LGCPA was in part a response to the problems encountered by implementing the 1972 legislation. Adjustments were necessary that the existing legislation could not sustain. The Environmental Land Management (ELMs) committee recommended local planning legislation in order to close the loophole in the DRI process. If no local land use regulations were in place, development could occur without restriction and a DRI could not be denied (DeGrove, 1984).

The LGCPA delineated uniform parameters within which local governments were to develop comprehensive plans for growth. The intent of the act is broad, but deserves our attention in order to appreciate the changes occurring in the approach to land use regulation in the state.









91

It is the intent of this act that its adoption
is necessary so that local governments can
preserve and enhance present advantages;
encourage the most appropriate use of land,
water, and resources, consistent with the
public interest; overcome present handicaps;
and deal effectively with future problems that
may result from the use and development of
land within their jurisdictions. Through the
process of comprehensive planning, it is
intended that units of local government can preserve, promote, protect, and improve the public health, safety, comfort, good order,
appearance, convenience, law enforcement and
fire prevention, and general welfare; prevent
the overcrowding of land and avoid undue
concentration of population; facilitate the
adequate and efficient provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, recreational facilities, housing, and
other requirements and services; and conserve,
develop, utilize, and protect natural
resources within their jurisdictions (F.S.
163.3161 (3)).

State review powers were to be used only to insure

local compliance with comprehensive planning requirements.

The contents of the plan and the specifics of its

implementation were left to local government discretion and

not subject to state approval. Through a conscious decision

to shape uniformly the local decision-making process, the

state began to institutionalize its own land use regulation

process. Every plan was to have a coordinated set of nine

elements addressing the various aspects of growth. The nine

elements in the LGCPA were to be planned in coordination

with each other. The elements were 1) future land use, 2)

traffic circulation 3) sanitary sewer 4) conservation 5)

recreation-open space 6) housing 7) intergovernmental

coordination 8) utilities and 9) coastal zone (if a coastal









92

location) Elements addressing airports and water ports were required for cities with those facilities (F.S. 163.3177).

The future land use element was the central feature of the legislative requirement for local planning. The LGCPA represents a move to the unitary approach to the land use process in order to make a concentrated impact on the increasing dysfunctions of growth. But it remained a "bottom-up" planning process (DeGrove and Jurgensmeyer, 1985). Local governments could use the plan as a growth management tool or they could amend it in reaction to development situations and essentially defuse the impact of the plan.

The major change in growth politics in 1975, however, is the emergence of the planning function as an influential political force. The LGCPA required over 400 city and county plans to be prepared. These plans were developed by local government planners, city and county clerks and managers, and in many cases by consultant contract either with the regional planning councils' staffs or with private planning firms. A rational planning process was mandated by the state. Local governments made the attempt towards at least perfunctory compliance. Local plans were required to be evaluated and updated every five years. But the planning requirements were approached in a variety of ways. Some cities took the responsibility zealously while others









93

ignored it. This became the heart of the change in statewide and local growth politics.

The state was moving in a direction to regulate

development and planning for future growth. The 1975 LGCPA was intended to influence a shift towards liberal and even a populist political stance. Requirements for integrated planning through the nine elements, public hearings, formal amendments process for change, compliance with statewide regulations, and a required evaluation process all contributed to a larger role for state government to define parameters and allow local government the opportunity to engage dynamically in the growth and development of their city and county. But cities, being a variety of political places, used the comprehensive planning process to further the growth politics which suited their own political environment the best. Thus the wide variance in results of the use of the planning process (University of Florida, 1984). It is those results--the different planning policies and approaches used in each city--which this research examines.

Implementing the 1975 LGCPA was not easy. There was confusion and duplication with the 1972 series of legislation (O'Connell, 1976). There was relatively little funding available, a lack of coordination with existing regional bodies such as the Water Management Districts, and




Full Text
86
of land, a critical factor in the transition of growth
politics.
Two political phenomenon were emerging. One was an
increased authority role for the state via 1972 legislation.
Secondly, environmentalists were becoming an influential
political group, most prominently as a state-wide coalition.
Their strength came from both the national ecology movement
and the increasingly urban progressive make-up of the
Florida legislature which occurred after legislative
reapportionment in 1967. Florida's environmentalists were a
check force on the previously unrestrained growth machine
(DeGrove, 1984).
In Florida, these political factors contributed to a
form of liberal growth politics. But unlike this stage of
growth politics in northern cities, Florida's initial
response to the growth machine was centered on the
environmental cause, and less on issues of racial or income
equity. As Mollenkopf (1983) points out, there are few inner
city areas in the sunbelt. Thus the anti-growth coalition
does not exist in the traditional sense of displaced urban
residents. Subsequently, he concludes that sunbelt states
miss the liberal growth politics experience except through
the nationally stimulated community action and neighborhood
movement. But Florida eventually would enter a defined
liberal growth politics period. The 1972 legislation
represented the first major legislative transition.


239
Q-17
Each of the following 1 tesis can be used by looal governments to implement their
future land use eleaent. For each one please indioate your opinion.
(circle /our answer)
STRONGLY
AGREE ACREE
1 Minluua lot size requlreaent
for single faaily residential
subdivisions on the
urban fringe 1 2
2 Land Development Regulations which
liait further residential and eoaaercial
developaent on the urban fringe.... 1 2
3 Prohibit the expansion of key
facilities (a.g. Water and sewer)
so that new developaent cannot
ocour on the urban fringe 1 2
A Develop aost vacant lots within
city Halts before there is
expaniaon to the unincorporated
county areas 1 2
STRONGLY
DISAGREE DISAGREE DK
3 A 5
3 A 5
3 A 5
3 A 5
0-18
What changes have occurred (since adoption of your future land use eleaent) In
the aaount of land available in the following categories?
(circle answer)
Change
1 Residential Single Family
INCREASE
DECREASE
NO CHANGE
DK
2 Residential Multi Faaily
INCREASE
DECREASE
NO CHANGE
DK
3 Coaaercial/Business
INCREASE
DECREASE
NO CHANGE
DK
A Agricultural
INCREASE
DECREASE
NO CHANGE
DK
lext, would you pisase provide us /our peroeptloas of land use politics in /our
ooaaunlty.
0-19
How ouch Influence does the adopted future lemd use element have on other
policy decision areas (such as transportation, crias, schools, taxes) in your
city? (circle nuaber)
1 STRONG INFLUENCE -HOST POLICY AREAS ARE AFFECTED BY THE FUTURE LAND
USE ELEMENT
2 MODERATE INFLUENCE -SOME POLICY AREAS ARE AFFECTED BY THE FUTURE LAND
USE ELEMENT
3 NO INFLUENCE
A DON'T KNOW
7


177
The third set of ideology related questions addresses
ideologies as strategies. We expect government to support
policies that use available land efficiently, e.g., maximize
densities. This policy course will permit development but in
an environment controlled by government. A growth management
course can promote a progressive ideology that uses
management incentives. We also would expect neighborhood and
environmentalist groups to support a progressive ideology.
This final series of ideology questions represents the
progressive orientation. These policies do not limit growth,
only direct its location. These are growth management
strategies that either those who seek to control or promote
growth may support. Government as a director can use these
policies to put parameters on growtha progressive
ideology, or to find a compromise position that satisfies
2
the liberal ideology and the conservative reality.
The variable PROGR is a scale made up of three policy
approaches to growth management (Table 5-12). The mean scale
scores reveal a slightly different pattern of interest group
member response from the other two ideology scales. As
expected, planners support all four policy scenarios. They
have the most supportive mean score of the three response
groups. Citizen group members agree with three of the four
questions while business group respondents strongly disagree
with three of four. The citizen group respondents had a mean
scale score that is .5 different from government actors. The


106
benefits accruing to the public. Local incremental
approaches to solve the problems of growth showed little
concern for the intergovernmental impacts of their planning
decisions, let alone concern for any state-wide impacts. A
transition to progressive growth politics at the state level
increases the participatory role of government.
The approach to the centralization/decentralization
dilemma through the GMA, goes beyond setting uniform rules
of the game. It sets the desired outcome of the game as
well. This fundamentally alters the economic costs and
benefits scenarios established at the local level. This
centralized approach puts the state in a position to
facilitate growth at the local level. The state's own
comprehensive plan firmly establishes growth as a goal. It
states that "Florida must regulate in ways that encourage
enterprise, capital investment, and balanced economic
growth ..." but in an environmentally acceptable manner"
(Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 22).
Growth within the confines of growth-management is the line
of consistency with which local governments must now
comply.^ But through this process, Florida will have a
greater opportunity to overcome the problems of the
uniformity/diversity dilemma while at the same time negating
the excesses of the centralized approach to the
centralization/decentralization dilemma.


185
Swanstrom (1985) suggests that government is a filter
through which the interests in growth politics must pass.
Perhaps this is the closest description of the patterns of
results from this data. Government is not just leaning one
way or the other. The responses suggest a separate position.
The mid-range ideology scores and the underlying responses
to abstract and concrete questions presents evidence of this
position. The perception of stability, community power and
conflict also must be considered as an alternative pattern.
Finally, the agreement with the scale of progressive
planning scenarios is encouraging for this compromise
position. Propositions 4A, 4B, and 4C suggest that such a
position might exist as a compromise or alternative to the
pro-growth anti-growth tensions.
The data provides the beginnings of a pattern of
corroboration that there is a political economy agenda
present in urban areas in Florida. The next chapter presents
the results of the land use policy adoption analysis. Here
we will attempt to link these various land based interests
in the various characterizations provided by the independent
variables, with groups of land use policies that have
political interest overtones. The results may be supportive
of a political economy explanation of land use policy
adoption.


25
data in terms of political economy and makes some
conclusions from the research about land use politics.
This research is an attempt to gain some perspective on
the issues of interest group politics, local policy making,
and the impact of urban growth, all within a framework of
political economy. The survey data and socio-economic data
provide an environment from which to discuss land use policy
making and the impact of growth on local communities. By
using a comparative method we can gain crossectional
insights that heretofore have not been available on the
subject of land use politics.
Notes
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 297 Fed. 307, 316
(N.D. Ohio, 1924); rev'd 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. For a fuller discussion of the theories of A. Losch
(1954) and W. Christaller (1966) see L. King, Central Place
Theory (1984) and James Heilbrun, Urban Economics and Public
Policy (1981), Ch.5.
3.For a discussion of prominent authors in this area such
as Alonso, Muth, Wheaton, Burgess, Parks, Philbricksee
Heilbrun (1981), Chapters 5,6. See also K.E. Haynes and A.S.
Fotheringham, Gravity and Spatial Interaction Models,
(1984).
4.For a discussion of social control theories see Boulay
(1979) .
5.For a discussion of symbolic and distributional policies
see Molotch, 1976, p.313.


261
Faludi, A. (1973) Planning Theory.
Press.
New York, NY: Pergamon
Finnell,G. (1973) Saving Paradise:
Land and Water Management Act of
Number 103. 116-130.
The Florida Environmental
1972. Urban Law Annual.
Fishkind, H. (1980) The Effects of Growth Management
Policies on New Home Prices, in T. Black and J. Hoben
(eds.) Urban Land Markets. Washington, D.C.: Urban Land
Institute.
Florida Atlantic University. (1986) Growth Management
Report. Boca Raton, FL: Institute of Government.
Florida Population Climbs to No.5. (1987) Florida Trend
(Spring). 52-55.
Florida, State
Planning Act
of. (1985)
(Amended).
Local Government Comprehensive
FS 163.3161.
Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee. (1986) Interim
Report to the 1986 Legislature. Tallahassee, FL: State of
Florida.
. (1987) Keys to
Florida's Future Final Report. Tallahassee, FL: State o£
Florida.
Florida Statistical Abstract. (1951) Gainesville, FL:
University of Florida.
. (1961) Gainesville, FL:
University of Florida.
. (1971) Gainesville, FL:
University of Florida.
. (1981) Gainesville, FL:
University of Florida.
Fried, R. (1975) Comparative Urban policy and Performance,
in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.) Policies and
Policymaking. Handbook of Political Science, Volume 6.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Friedland, R. (1983) The Politcs of Profit and the Geography
of Growth. Urban Affairs Quarterly. 19. 41-54.
Garkovich, L. (1982) Land Use Planning As a Response to
Rapid Population Growth and Community Change. Rural
Sociology. 47. 47-67.


I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
iAO~s\aoS*\
Bert~E. Swanson, Chairman
Professor of Political Science
I certify that
opinion if conforms
presentation and is
a dissertation for
I have read this study and that in my
to acceptable standards of scholarly
fully adequate, in sco-pe and quality, as
the degree of Doctor oyphilosophy.
Ken D.
Associate Professor of Political
Science
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Walter A.
Professor
Rosenbaum
of Political
Science
I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


251
ext we would like to uk you about your group's nativities In lead use
polltloa and policy development.
Q-3
The laportance of "growth" aa a political lsaue varies froa group to group.
Select the reaponee which eoat closely reflects the laportance of the growth
issue to your organisation, (circle nuaber)
1 GROWTH IS THE MOST IHPORT/UtT ISSUE PACINC MY ORGANIZATION
2 GROWTH IS ONE OP THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES
3 GROWTH IS SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT
A CROWTH HAS BEEN BUT IS NOT CURRENTLY IMPORTANT
5 CROWTH IS NOT AN IMPORTANT ISSUE TO MY ORGANIZATION
6 DON'T KNOW
Q-A
The position towards which ay group currently leans with regards to the future
developaent of land and growth in this city can be described asi
(circle nuaber)
1 SUPPORT
2 NEUTRAL NO POSITION TAKEN
3 OPPOSE
A MIXED SOME SUPPORT, SOME OPPOSITION
5 DON'T KNOW
Q-5
In your Judgeoent, how auch success has your group had in influencing the
developaent of future land use policy In your city? (circle nuaber)
1 GREAT SUCCESS
2 MODERATE SUCCESS
3 SMALL AMOUNT OP SUCCESS
A NO SUCCESS
5 DON'T KNOW
0-6
How active has your group been In their participation In the developaent of
future land use policy In your city? (circle nuaber)
1 CONSTANTLY
2 ACTIVITY LEVEL VARIES BY ISSUE
3 ACTIVITY LEVEL CHANCES WITH ELECTION OP OFPICIALS
A DON'T KNOW
Q-7
Approximately how often does your group (or Its representative) contact
the city (council, aanager, and/or planning departaent) In an official
capacity to express the group's preferences regarding city land use
policies? (circle nuaber)
1 FREQUENTLY- MORE THAN ONCE A MONTH
2 SOMETIMES- ONCE EVERY PEW MONTHS
3 ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR
A NEVER
5 DON'T KNOW
2


241
Q-25
Please evaluate the level of conflict for
experienced by your elty. (circle answer)
SICNIPICANT
Intergovernmental Relations
with County 1
Environment Protection 1
Location of Mobile Hones 1
Annexation 1
Urban Sprawl in the
Unincorporated Areas 1
Green Space Preservation 1
Agricultural Land Preservation
In the Unincorporated Areas 1
lapact Pees or Other
Development User Charges 1
the following Issue areas as
Conflict Level
MODERATE MINIMAL HONE DK
2 3 4 5
2 3 A 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
Q-26
Politics surrounding the adoption of land use policies in your city can best be
described asi (circle number)
1VERI STABLE- PEW CONTROVERSIES ON POLICY QUESTIONS DIVIDE THE
COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE
1 STABLE- DESPITE A PEW CONTROVERSIES THAT DIVIDE THE COMMUNITY
2 SUBJECT TO CHANGES- AS CROUPS CONTROLLING CITY GOVERNMENT CHANGE (PROM
ONE ELECTION TO ANOTHER)
3 SUBJECT TO CHANGE- AS POLICY DISAGREEMENTS ARISE (PROM ONE ELECTION TO
ANOTHER)
4 OTHER .
5 DON'T KNOW
9


29
power literature for more than thirty years.'*' Elite and
pluralistic systems represent opposite explanations of
political influence. A close, small number of influentials
exhibiting a pyramidal structure reflects the elite
perspective (Domhoff, 1978; Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953) and a
competitive group structure reflects the pluralistic
perspective (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951; Polsby, 1980). From
these well-debated classics, other configurations have been
developed. Our expectations of the land use policy process
will be refined with insights from these later studies of
the urban process.
Urban planning and development policy processes have
been described as a four-point continuum distinguishable by
the roles of the policy actors (Rabinovitz, 1969). The
points identified are 1) the cohesive/ monopolistic elite
decision making system, 2) the executive centered/public and
private leadership-shared, elite decision making system, 3)
the competitive/pluralistic interest group competition for
leadership and policy-benefits decision system, and 4) the
fragmented/no visible leadership group, perhaps
hyperpluralistic decision system. The major distinctions on
the continuum are the level of conflict or challenge for
policy leadership, and the variety or tension level of
competing interests and issues entering the decision
process"integration to fragmentation" (Rabinovitz, 1969,
p. 78).


172
In the first series, four questions represent a liberal
ideology towards planning actions. The variable LIB
represents the cumulative score of each respondent to this
series of questions. An a high score ("strongly agree" and
"agree") represents a belief that the denial of private gain
to promote the public good, e.g., protecting the
environment, development controls, preserving agricultural
lands are acceptable land use approaches. Planners and
citizen group respondents are expected to answer those
questions affirmatively. This expectation is confirmed.
On three out of the four liberal ideology questions the
responses of citizen group members and government
respondents are very similar and the majority agree with the
question scenarios. The mean score on the scale of citizen
group members is 12 (maximum scale score is 16). Business
group members, on the other hand, disagree with these three
questions. Their mean score on the scale is 7.9. The results
of these questions demonstrate that there is an observable
difference between groups in support of the liberal ideology
response. Again, individual respondents may not represent
all members of the relevant interest group, but the results
do suggest a pattern of beliefs (Table 5-10).
There are several variations from the predicted response
pattern, however, which deserve attention. The first
unexpected response concerns a scenario about preserving the
environment at the risk of slowing economic development.


161
more stable than did the non-government actors. Of non
government actors, business group members tended to be
closer in agreement with government actors while citizen
group members perceived a process affected by changes in
issues and groups, reflecting perhaps a more open,
pluralistic process.
Perceptions of political stability in the land use
process reflect the perceived opportunities for change. It
is not surprising then that citizen group respondents
perceive more pluralistic opportunities in the process since
they disagree with the government and business group members
over the issue of growth. Business and government,
representing a potential coalition in support of growth,
perceive this arena of politics as being more stable. This
is the growth machine politics scenario, expected to
dominate and stabilize the local process. The challenge is
expected to come from the anti-growth interests who are
trying to open up the process to political change (Molotch,
1976). The process stability results suggest that the growth
machine political pattern is a possibility.
Greater conflict is perceived on specific land use
issues. For six out of the seven issues listed
intergovernmental relations, environment protection,
annexation, urban (unincorporated) sprawl, green space
preservation, and impact feesall respondents agreed that
conflict surrounding those issues was significant or


179
business members' mean scale score is the least supportive,
a full 3 points from citizen group respondents.^ The
progressive position may represent an alternative position
to the growth anti-growth continuum.
Stages of Growth Politics
A contribution to this discussion on the nature of
regional variations in the policy process is that there is
no single process but a number of stages to the process that
evolve over time. We have already suggested that there are
various stages of growth politicsconservative, liberal and
progressive. Schultze (1985) suggests that a city goes
through various stages of policy interests which reflect the
demands of a changing population. The process goes through
transitions which are modeled after Williams' (1971)
conceptions of community image and government roles which
are caretaker, amenities, growth, and arbiter. The
explanation of these city stages along with an examination
of regional differences may help to exemplify the stages of
growth politics already defined.
Transitions of city images can account for the changing
nature of interest group demands. The five transition stages
are identified as 1) city as caretaker to growth/private
city, 2) amenity seekers and the poor who challenge growth,
3) city as arbiter of conflicts, and either the final stage
as 4) bureaucratic/policy city or 5) return to the private
development city. By combining the interest group demands as


CITY PLANNER
LOCAL GROWTH HANACB1KHT POLICY AND POLITICS
0-1
The importance of growth aa an ieeue varies from city to city. In your opinion
how important an iasue it growth to your city? (circle number)
1 IT IS THE HUMBER ONE ISSUE IN OUR CITY
2 IT IS A PRIORITY ALONO WITH OTHER ISSUES
3 IT IS SOMETIMES A PRIORITY CONCERN IN OUR CITY
4 IT IS OP MINOR IMPORTANCE
5 IT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN OUR CITY
6 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIPY) .
7 DONT KNOW
Q-2
Please indicate your perception of the relationship between the following
conditions and growth as experienced by your city, (circle your answer)
DIRECT means growth la directly associated with the oondltlon
CONTRIBUTES means growth contributes to the presence of the condition
DETRACTS means growth is slowed with the presence of the condition
NONE means no relationship between growth and the presence of the oondltlon
DK means don't know
Relationship
Water Quality
Air Quality
Traffic Congestion
Property Tax
Increase
Lower Quality
Government Services
Elimination of
Government Services
Crime Increases
Loss/Lack of
Natural Areas
Increasing Housing
Prices
Need for
Infrastructure
DIRECT CONTRIBUTES DETRACTS NONE
12 3 4
12 3 4
12 3 4
DK
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5


23
affecting action, and disposition to act (Fried, 1975, pp.
325-6).
Aggregate socio-economic data and survey data are used
to indicate the major independent variables, actors,
influence, conflict, and process approaches in the policy
making process. The socio-economic data (readily available)
is used to indicate conditions which will affect the
probability that any one interest group or pattern of growth
politics will dominate the land use process. It also
represents the long term economic investments likely to
motivate the growth machine and the anti-growth coalitions.
This data is used to measure each group's proclivity towards
participation.
The survey data are used to verify and measure the
presence of the growth actors in the process, their
participation, and their influences in the policy making
process. Surveys were sent to city and county managers and
planning directors, chamber of commerce executives,
developer organizations, and environmental and neighborhood
groups. Information from planning officials was sought to
help identify active neighborhood advisory boards and groups
for inclusion on the survey list.
Finally, the role of local government itself as an
actor in the process is measured by its ability to be
flexible and autonomous from the possible investment driven
pressures of each group. The reliance on regional or


47
This research will attempt to provide evidence of the
links between community power, the policy process framework,
and land use policy selection in the implementation of
growth politics. The different scenarios that have been
suggested, conservative, liberal, populist, progressive, and
growth management are comprised of actors, policy
approaches, and specific land use policy outputs. The
theoretical basis of these components will be reviewed and
in later chapters they will be evaluated empirically as
indicators of the several stages of growth politics that
Florida cities have experienced.
Actors in the Process
The literature suggests that there is a set of actors
who are expected to have a greater influence in this policy
making area than do any others. This influence is reflected
by the relationship between power in these actors'
communities and the policy-making process.
We expect that specific growth politics actors, growth
machine interests and anti-growth interests, will be highly
involved in the policy process. Molotch (1976) contends that
"land based interests"those who have an economic
investment tied to landmake up the growth machine. Land
use policies in turn, have a major influence on the local
economic condition of any city, especially in a growth state
such as Florida.


140
proposition three. The degree of government autonomy or
dependence on any funding source can affect the ability of
participants to use political influence in the policy
process. The greater the dependence on property taxes, the
greater the influence of homeowner interests. The greater
the dependence on user fees, the greater the autonomy from
business interests.
These profiles, like the participant factors,
contribute to the overall policy approach to growth and land
use in cities. Burrows (1978, p. 132) suggests that the
first stage in land use planning is where "market forces
predominate." This potential for "unconstrained growth"
gives way to the next stage which requires a more
constrained "modified growth plan." An "iterative procedure"
would produce the best possible growth management plan out
of compromise between "public and private goals." This
process suggests that a city may experience stages of growth
politics.
Cities may experience different stages in addressing
growth issues depending upon whether they are beginning to
experience growth, feeling growth's full impact, reacting
and reducing dysfunctions of growth, and attempting to slow
5
or halt growth. Therefore, we should examine policies as
dependent variables which are influenced by both the
participant factors and the intervening growth conditions.


15
without regard to any existing inequalities; 3) egalitarian-
-benefits distributed to minimize existing inequalities; and
4) Rawlsianmaximize benefits to the least advantaged
group. These theories examine policy outcomes and may help
us to understand why different land use policies are adopted
and which political, social, and/or economic conditions
affect policy selection.
If government distributes benefits through policy, then
we can improve our understanding of the process by measuring
government's role in policy development and policy
implementation. We would expect cities in which anti-growth
coalitions are very active to favor regulatory policies
which increase government's influence on land use. We would
expect cities in which a growth machine is very active to
favor flexible policies which limit government's influence
on land use. Therefore, in order for these expectations to
be researched, we must examine who is involved in the policy
process and how they are involved, and how much influence
they have on policy adoption (Mollenkopf, 1983; Clavel,
1986; Lyon et al., 1981; Molotch, 1976; Judd, 1984).
In addition to the private sector, city administrators
are another actor group which deserves attention. Planners
and managers may play an active role in conceptualizing the
goals and framework of the comprehensive land use plan. We
can characterize administrators as neutral technicians,
producing one type of policy, and as value-laden


12
the more likely is it that government will regulate land use
and adopt policies which restrict market forces and benefit
existing community residents.
Economic investments may be a stimulus for intense
participation and pressure on government to respond with
particular policies. The more regulatory sources available
to local government from broader levels of authority, the
greater the opportunity for local government to be an
influential participant in the growth process and less
subject to policy manipulation. In addition, as alternative
revenue sources for local government increase, the financial
options available to local government increase, thus
reducing dependency on local revenues such as the property
tax. This decreasing dependency on local revenues and
regulatory assistance from state or regional governments may
give local government greater autonomy and/or flexibility in
land use policy making affecting growth directions.
Proposition 3: the greater the availability of alternative
regulatory power and revenue sources, the less dependent
local government is on local revenue contributors and the
more autonomous local government is, allowing government to
be a partner or director in the local growth process.
Classification of Policy
Classification of land use policy should be two-fold:
based on the empirical evidence available on the impact of
the policy itself (encourages or excludes growth) and based


259
Boca Raton, City of. (1979) Comprehensive Plan. Boca Raton,
FL: City of Boca Raton.
Boulay, H. (1979). Social Control Theories of Urban
Politics. Social Science Quarterly. 59. 605-621.
Bowie, N. (1971) Towards a New Theory of Distributive
Justice. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
Branch, M. (1983). Comprehensive Planning. Palisades, CA:
Palisades Publishers.
Burrows, L.B. (1978). Growth Management. New Brunswick, NJ:
Center for Urban Policy Research at Rutgers.
Carter, L. (1974) The Florida Experience. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins Press.
Catanese, A. (1984). The Politics of Planning and
Development. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Christaller, W. (1966) translation by C. Baskin as Central
Places in Southern Germany. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall (originally published 1930).
Clark, T. (1971) Community Structure, Decision-Making,
Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American
Communities, in F. Wirt (ed.) Future Directions in
Community Power Research. Berkley, CA: University of
California Press.
Clark, T. and L. Ferguson. (1983) City Money. New York, NY:
Columbia Press.
Clavel, P. (1986) The Progressive City. New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press.
Dahl, R. (1961) Who Governs? New Haven, CN: Yale University
Press.
. (1982) Dilemmas in a Pluralistic Democracy. New
Haven, CN: Yale University Press.
Davidoff, P. (1965) Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning.
Journal of the American Planning Association. 31. 331-
jw. ~
Davis, 0. and C. Hua. (1978) Economics in Urban Planning, in
R. Burchell and G. Sternlieb (eds.) Planning Theory in the
1980's. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.


33
Urban political economy, however, is an analytical
approach which provides the means to integrate the role of
government with an explanation of power and group influence.
Political economy has the potential to attribute a more
directive role to public actors in the policy process, which
will provide a benefit outcome not just a single
beneficiary.
Political Economy
The political economy approach to urban politics is
used in several different ways but focusses on the
motivations and roles of economic interests and the public
actors that participate in urban growth issues. Current
trends in urban analysis go beyond the classic definition of
political economy"the systematic interaction between
economic and political processes" and are moving towards a
growth politics framework of analysis (Swanstrom, 1985, p.
12).^ These recent discussions in the literature are
extending analysis beyond explanations of urban interaction
and are more fully integrating the theories of community
power, the importance of economic influences, and the role
of government itself in the local political decision making
arena.
Current literature contributions identify developmental
policies as the dominant issue in local politics and as such
reflects the influence and power structures in the policy
process. Identification of a key set of issues increases our


82
state's involvement in the attempt to restrict growth is the
first shift towards a more unitary approach to land use
development in Florida. Liberal growth politics relies on
this type of regulatory assistance from a broader level of
government.
From the late 1960s onward, the state instituted a
number of conservation reforms which eventually led to land
use reforms. The 1966-70 administration of Governor Kirk
paid serious attention to the sensitive environmental
problems of the Everglades and other critical areas.
Conservation groups were influential within the
administration and their concerns were supported by the
Governor's staff. Eventually this led to the formation of
the Governor's Natural Resources Committee, an influential
group which proposed significant environmental legislation.
Water quality, beach development, sewer hookup, and
development permitting were among the policy areas affected
by the state's attention to ecological problems.
The 1970-78 administration of Governor Askew continued
the state's conservation efforts and a reliance on land use
planning. Severe environmental problems, including a
crippling south Florida drought in 1971 brought about a
number of significant policy responses. Governor Askew
organized the Governor's Conference on Water Management in
South Florida in 1971 to address the chronic battle between
development and environmental needs. The task force which


183
Table 5-13 Regional Variations
Group Position on Growth (Q4GP)
Mean Scores
Region
All NE P
C SW
SE
Business
3.9 3.8 4.0
4.0 4.0
3.8
Citizen
2.8 3.0 3.3
3.0 2.5
2.6
Note: 4=support,
3=neutral, 2=mixed, 1=
oppose
Liberal Ideology
Scale
All
Region
NE PC
SW
SE
Business 7.9
8.6 7.5 8.4
7.1
7.9
Citizen 12.0
11.5 10.3 14.0
12.6
12.6
Government 9.6
11.1 10.4 10.8
11.2
10.7
Note: 4=strongly agree, 3=agree, 2=disagree, l=strongly
disagree
Conservative Ideology Scale
All NE
Region
P
C
SW
SE
Business
9.5 8.8
10.2
9.7
9.8
9.1
Citizen
6.2 6.8
6.6
5.5
7.0
5.1
Government
7.6 8.5
8.5
7.5
7.3
7.3
Note: variables coded as 4=strongly
2=disagree, l=stronglydisagree
agree,
3=agree,
Legend: NE=northeast, P=panhandle, C=central, SW=southwest,
SE=southeast


APPENDIX B
AVAILABLE OPERATIONALIZED VARIABLES
Proposition 1A
The greater the presence in a city of conditions
generating growth machine participation, the stronger the
presence of the growth machine in the policy process, and
thus the greater the likelyhood that adopted land use
policies will be flexible and accomodating to growth and
development.
1. growth machine Aggregate Data
Economic Investment
-increasing dollar level of business activity in city over
time (Molotch, 1976) Retail and wholesale sales and value,
amount and percentage change over time.
-business climate and attractiveness (Molotch,1976;
Logan,1976b; Molotch and Logan,1984) Bond rating, business
rating (Alexander and Grant,1981)
Government
-low business taxes, development tax breaks
(Mollenkopf,1983) Property taxes, tangible property tax;
enterprize zones, tax increment financing districts,
-government expenditures on developmental policies
224


194
CITZl represent the number of nominations received by
business groups and citizen groups respectively.
Variables BUS2 and CITZ2 are the scores which reflect
the perceptions of each respondent of the position of
combinations of business and community groups towards growth
in their community. Each respondent was asked to provide
their opinion of the position held by relevant groups in
their community. The values range from support, mixed,
neutral, to oppose. The higher the score, the greater the
perception that the group supports growth. The variables
BUS2 and CITZ2 represent the combined scores of the relevant
business and citizen groups respectively.
Other variables were CONSV and LIB the conservative and
liberal ideology scores of each respondent. Responses range
from a high of "strongly agree" to a low of "strongly
disagree." The variables CONFL and FEE represent the
cumulative score of respondent perceptions of conflict on
the issue conflict scale and specifically their perceptions
of conflict on the issue of impact fees. Again the highest
score represent "strongly agree" that conflict accompanies
this issue in their community and low scores reflect
"strongly disagree" that conflict surrounds the issues.
The second set of variables represent the growth,
economic and government profiles of the community. For the
city and county combined analysis, only the population
variables were used which are 1985 population and the 1980


43
local business also is likely to be found in a progrowth
politics city.
Essentially, sunbelt cities may be experiencing the
same conservative growth politics that their frostbelt
counterparts experienced. (Although, Mollenkopf attributes
postwar conservative growth politics of the southwest to the
proliferation of federal defense contracts and a
conservative national political orientation which filtered
down to the local level.) Limited pro-business governments,
Mollenkopf suggests, preceded and perhaps preempted a
liberal growth politics in southwest cities because there
was not a significant blue collar class and minorities were
restricted to a minimal political role. Further there was no
advent of populism or progressive politics in these cities
because the "intercity competition enforced a market
discipline ... that eventually would also spread to the
older frostbelt cities, forcing an abandonment of costly
progressive politics (Mollenkopf, 1983, pp. 251-253).
The possibility remains that the excesses of the growth
machine will be challenged in the south as they were in
northern cities. The neighborhood movement, as the
forerunner to populism, is dismissed by Mollenkopf (1983, p.
289) as a southern strategy because it is "an incomplete
alternative" to the pressures of national political
interests that are pervasive in the new growth cities.


96
each category of housing unit density (City of Pompano Beach
Comprehensive Plan Element One: Land Use Plan, 1977).
There is a technical difference between goals and
objectives as to specificity. Goals are supposed to be broad
and objectives more concrete. But for some cities it may not
be politically possible to achieve the level of specificity
which will render their plan as a useful document. Conflict
affects the nature of local power which contributes to the
final plan product. It is the nature of these effects which
the data will explore.
But for the plans themselves, it is evident that some
goals and objectives portray an anti-growth or residential
protection sentiment. For example a goal addressing
residential plans is to
Maintain and encourage the continued existence
and viability of low density single family
areas through the adoption and use of a Land
Use Plan and land use control regulations and
by making improvements in public facilities,
such as streets, parks, and police/fire
protection (The Comprehensive Plan City of
Panama City, 1978).
Another city in its effort to preserve a neighborhood
character coordinated its residential goals with its
economic development goals.
Living Environment: Provide for a range of
residential densities which will blend
together without causing congestion or
disharmony.


132
the responses as the public sector, business sector, and
groups/pluralism. The variable POWER (question 27 in
government respondents' questionnaire) represents the
aggregate responses.
Ideologies and the role of government
The second participant characteristic is the values and
ideologies of the actors. Two series of attitude questions
are designed to identify individual orientations about the
use of land and government's role in that process.
Ideology can be defined as "a cluster of beliefs that
is elaborate, integrated, and relatively coherent and that
connects thought with a program of action" Schultze (1985,
p. 7). Or it can be viewed as "a constellation of beliefs
and preferences about the nature of the constituent elements
in social or community life ... (Agger, Goldrich and
Swanson, 1972, p. 2)." Ideologies also can be a method of
"perceiving and reacting to the political system" and
answers the question "what role should the government play
in allocating the resources produced in the economy, the
society, and the governmental institutions themselves?
(Agger et al., 1972, p. 9-10)" Ideology can be method as
well as belief system (Schultze, 1985).
We can view political ideology in terms of the
preferred role of government as conservative, liberal, or
progressive.^ Then we can view it as a preferred method to
achieve an interest, for example as government regulation


204
Use By Region
We examine the use of these land use policies by region
to add to the picture of different stages of growth
politics. An examination of the use of policies by region
for cities and counties suggests that there is less
variation within group one and more variation by region
within group two (Table 6-4). The more risky land use
policies do not seem to be as acceptable throughout all
regions of the state. This is as expected if we are to
believe that the regions reflect the different stages of
growth experiences.
For cities and counties, the Panhandle region seems to
exhibit lower mean use scores than the other regions in both
group one and two. Communities in this region may not rely
on government intervention in land use as do communities in
the other regions. In this region local governments may be
the most flexible and supportive of growth simply because
they have not experienced excessive growth and do not expect
to experience it in the near future. Other regions with
greater experiences with rapid growth may require a
different explanation for low use scores (Table 6-5).
There is little variation of scores between regions in
the city subset. The generally lower scores in the Panhandle
region aside, the Southeast region exhibits slightly lower
scores on some policies especially on enterprise zones, land


107
One of the long-term impacts of a statewide centralized
process is that Florida may become a captive of mobile
economic land-use interests. The benefit of centralized
development planning may have the effect of increasing the
profit potential of land use. Institutionalizing controls
over the land use process at the state level may benefit
these mobile wealth interests because their investments are
spread across many cities. Large developers, even multi
state developers, will find it more efficient to have one
set of process definitions than one for each of the cities
where they are investing. The arena of growth politics has
the potential to be aggregated at the state level. This
effect may not be detrimental. In fact it may be positive
since it contributes to a focussed land use process and
parameters. The benefits to economic interests may be
incidental and have no affect on the development of
progressive growth politics.
For local growth politics, however, it is important to
realize that a common state-wide land use parameter may
reduce the opportunity for diversity at the local level. The
success of interest groups in affecting local policy
decisions under increased institutionalization of the land
use process is affected by what Stone (1986) refers to as
the difference between government's "power over"power that
is resisted such as regulatory authorityand "power too"a
more subtle less aggressive approach such as a partnership


90
While the LGCPA did not completely centralize land use
regulation decision making, it did significantly
institutionalize the process and lay the groundwork for
centralized implementation at a later time. This increase in
state involvement altered the local growth politics process
and forced shifts in the benefits available to and costs
extracted from land use interest groups. At the same time it
provided opportunities for greater participation in the
process.
The LGCPA was in part a response to the problems
encountered by implementing the 1972 legislation.
Adjustments were necessary that the existing legislation
could not sustain. The Environmental Land Management (ELMs)
committee recommended local planning legislation in order to
close the loophole in the DRI process. If no local land use
regulations were in place, development could occur without
restriction and a DRI could not be denied (DeGrove, 1984).
The LGCPA delineated uniform parameters within which
local governments were to develop comprehensive plans for
growth. The intent of the act is broad, but deserves our
attention in order to appreciate the changes occurring in
the approach to land use regulation in the state.


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61
The result of low conflict may be that government
assumes a facilitator role. This insures long-term
stability of economic investments and can complement the
long run nature of comprehensive planning. However, the
neutral focus of comprehensive planning is traded off for
the political need to distribute benefits.
Short-term policies may be politically necessary in
cities with greater conflict in order to temporarily satisfy
competing demands (Friedland, 1983). Accommodation of long
term interests in a high tension city are politically
difficult to achieve. Land use policies will reflect
incremental approaches to development (Ryder, 1982). The
long-term payoff, however, will eventually reflect the
dominant growth politics actor, either the business-producer
interests or the underprivileged in society. Policies and
outcomes reflect values, even if those values within the
community are in conflict. A progressive role for government
can help to achieve the elusive middle ground.
Long-range rational planning is a difficult task
because demands change over time. The viable alternative is
long-range organic planning and the use of an ecological
role for government (Stone, 1986). With an organic approach
to planningflexible but directed, not a rational approach-
-fixed, or a reactionary approachpolitical, it is possible
to develop a realistic long-term approach in a diverse city
experiencing high levels of interest group tension. A


85
Transition to liberal growth politics
The Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972
contained several key provisions such as the process to
designate areas of critical state concern and methods to
2
direct developments of regional impact. These policies
indicated that the state was ready to make a change in the
costs and benefits of growth politics. Large scale
developments and development in environmentally sensitive
areas would now be influenced by or controlled by the state
government. The state could overrule local conservative
growth politics. This reduced the economic benefits
available to developers. But in return it provided a way to
reduce the high costs of the problems of unchecked
development for which government paid.
With the 1972 legislation series, Florida began to
institutionalize land use development policy. The Cabinet,
state agencies, and the state's Regional Planning Councils
were responsible for deciding and monitoring major
developments and environmental concerns. Local governments
plugged into a decision making chain of command, altering
the business as usual approach to land use which benefitted
the local growth machine interests. This new legislation
would by no means stop growth or restrict it in all ways,
but it did present a significant change in political
attitudes toward increased government involvement in the use


65
Different stages of growth politics may yield different
privileged positions.
Specifically, this research hypothesizes that certain
policies are regulatory in nature such as greenbelts and
moratoriums. These policies do not improve the economic
position of the land based elites (growth machine), but
rather cost them a portion of their potential profit. At the
other extreme are policies which are less restrictive and
which maximize the market position and the economic benefits
of the growth machine. Zoning, transfer of development
rights (TDR), enterprise zones, and tax incentives may be
indicative of this. Somewhere in between may be performance
oriented policy options such as planned unit development
(PUD) and flexible zoning. These policies may diminish the
externalities (dysfunctions) of growth by making development
conditional, but do not necessarily restrict growth.
An examination of the business and residential
investments in the city along with the business climate and
the level of dysfunctions associated with growth will give
us a picture of the balance of power and the zone of policy
making in the area of developmental policy. We expect that
policies adopted may reflect these economic and political
conditions which make up the stages of growth politics.
Conclusion
What factors affect policy making? That was our
original question. To summarize the points of this chapter,


THREE THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLITICS .... 68
The Rules of the Game in Land Use Planning 68
Rule #1Government Parameters Affect Political
Influence 69
Rule #2Economics Affects Political Influence. 71
Rule #3Economic and Political Influences Affect
Policy Making 74
Florida Growth Politics 76
Conservative Growth Politics 76
Problems in paradise 81
Transition to liberal growth politics 85
Liberal Growth Politics 89
Conservative to Liberal Growth PoliticsThe
Uniformity Dilemma 99
Progressive Growth Politics 103
Costs and Benefits of Land Use Policy 108
Conclusion 114
Notes 115
FOUR PROPOSITION REDUXHOW TO GET FROM HERE TO THERE 116
Policy Process Operation 117
Study Method 120
Survey Instrument and Method 122
Propositions 128
Proposition One 128
Power 130
Ideologies and the role of government 132
Conflict 135
Propositions Two and Three 136
Growth profile 137
Economic profile 138
Government profile 139
Dependent VariablesLand Use Policy 141
Policy Characteristics 143
Supply Policies 145
Price Policies 146
Incentive Policies 147
Conclusion 150
Notes 151
FIVE URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 153
Interest Group Politics of Land Use 153
Actor Participation ..... 153
Position and conflict 154
Position and stability 160
Position and influence 164
PowerCommunity Structure 168
Ideology and the Role of Government 170
Stages of Growth Politics 179
IV


83
resulted from that conference recommended that a plan be
developed to limit growth in order to conserve water. This
signaled a major shift in Florida politics (DeGrove, 1984).
The governor called for new legislation to be proposed
addressing these conflicts.
A crucial policy dilemma was considered at this
juncture. The Governor's study committee considering the
various policy options had a major choice to make. Under
consideration were two models for land use regulation. The
Hawaii model was a comprehensive, unitary policy model
giving most of the directive powers over land use to the
state. The alternative was the ALI Model Code (Finnell,
1973). It left decisions about local development directions
to local governments and gave directive power to the state
only in critical areas or for significant scale developments
(Carter, 1974, pp. 130,131). The Hawaii option could have
been perceived as a severe constraint on local growth
machines. The ALI option left the local political process
open to interest group competition. Florida was not ready to
assume a fully unitary approach.
There was quite a bit of controversy surrounding the
proposed legislation. Supporting a strong State presence in
land use regulation were the environmental groups, the
League of Women Voters, the American Institute of
Architects, and many local newspapers around the state.
Opposed to the legislation were the Homebuilders Association


vulnerable to special interest influence (Goodman and Freud,
1968). 5
Two policy processes then may exist in the land use
planning policy process. One is the development and adoption
of the original planthe goals. The second process is the
development and adoption of implementation policy.
Garkovitch (1982) suggests that the stabilizing, no-change
forces will dominate the first process, while the
development interests will dominate the second. We may find
that the comprehensive plan stage may be static and the
implementation policy stage may be dynamic, as the influence
of the land-based growth coalitions fluctuate.
The investment value and development of land is
primarily tied to the land use designations which government
places on property. Interrelationships exist between land
value, economic investment, and government land use policy.
Thus the following proposition is made.
Proposition 1A: the greater the presence in a city of
conditions generating growth machine participation, the
stronger the presence of the growth machine in the policy
process, and thus the greater the likelihood that adopted
land use policies will be flexible and accommodating to
growth and development.
The alternative to those interested in promoting growth
are the actors who are interested in slowing or stopping
growth. Once growth has begun, we can expect a point of


118
contribute to our understanding are the definition of
policy, the policy environment, the actors and their
influence, and the community image or character. Policy may
be defined as "a governing body's 'standing decision' by
which it regulates, controls, promotes, services, and
otherwise influences the community's collective life" (Eulau
and Prewitt, 1973, p. 473). The development of policy,
however, is not necessarily a rational, controlled process
because policy is a product of both the influences in the
community and the purposes to which the community is
committed. This combination of forces that influence policy
development creates the opportunity for policy to be both a
reaction to the environment and an action of purpose (Eulau
and Prewitt, 1973; Banfield, 1961).
We could elect to understand each community policy as
individual outputs of the process. But because policies are
negotiated and shaped within the constraints of the
environment and community purpose, we may gain more insight
by studying policy groups. In this study we have elected to
study land use policies as a set of policies which
represents an approach to the use of land. This method of
policy analysis allows us to use the tendencies that are
common to a set of policies as a means to classify policy
groups. This can be done on the basis of use and quality
which are shaped by the policy environment. Eulau and
Prewitt (1973, p. 486) refer to this as a "holistic" rather


73
As the population diversifies and the participants in
the business community diversify, we also may expect to see
more political conflict. This may increase the tendency of
the formation of an anti-growth coalition. As we will see,
however, in Florida the anti-growth coalition manifested
itself in a suburban, residential interest as Molotch (1976)
might have predicted and not as liberal growth politics
suggested by Molenkopf (1983).
Thirdly, the housing construction and development
industry may be the major economic thrust in Florida urban
areas. An abundance of undeveloped land and rapid population
growth can sustain a city's revenue base. This type of
economic development has been the impetus for many Florida
cities to attain greater economic diversification and to
create and sustain additional cities. Housing starts
increased 34.3% from 1981-86 ("Florida Population Climbs to
No.5", 1987, p. 53). The northeast portion of the state has
experienced the greatest surge, a 144% increase over five
years followed by the central regions with about 85%
increase. The southeast coast, long the sight of the
greatest growth trailed central Florida in actual housing
starts (central 37,774 starts, southeast 32,173 starts), but
represents the second highest number of starts in the state
("Florida Population Climbs to No.5", 1987, p. 53). The rate
of change in starts, though, was outdistanced by the central
and northern areas by 29%. Those regions appear to be


CITY/COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR
LOCAL GROWTH HAMAGBSMT POLICY AJO POLITICS
0-1
The importance of growth as an Issue varies froa city to city. In your opinion
how important an Issue is growth to your city? (circle number)
1 IT IS THE HUMBER ONE ISSUE IN OUR CITY
2 IT IS A PRIORITY ALONG WITH OTHER ISSUES
3 IT IS SOMETIMES A PRIORITY CONCERN IN OUR CITY
A IT IS OP MINOR IMPORTANCE
5 IT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN OUR CITY
6 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIPY) .
7 DON'T KNOW
0-2
Please lndloate your perception of the relationship between the following
conditions and growth as experienced by your city, (eirole your answer)
DIRECT means growth le directly associated with the condition
CONTRIBUTES means growth contributes to the presence of the condition
DETRACTS means growth is slowed with the presence of the condition
NONE means no relationship between growth and the presence of the condition
DK means don't know
: Relationship
DIRECT CONTRIBUTES DETRACTS NONE
Water Quality 1 2 3
Air Quality 1 2 3
Traffic Congestion 123
Property Tax
Increase 123
Lower Quality
Government Services 123
Elimination of
Government Services 123
Crime Increases 123
Loss/Lack of
Natural Areas 1 2 3
Increasing Housing
Prices 123
DK
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
2 3
Need for
Infrastructure
5


6
This research may reveal any of the combinations of
political influence presented above. Ultimately, we want to
distinguish between various political interests and identify
the patterns of interests that contribute to different
policy outputs.
Which Cities Grow and Which Don'tThe Role of Land Use
Policy-
Capital investment is a major factor considered by
scholars when examining the influences of urban growth. The
role of the production function is important to our
understanding of urban development (O'Connor, 1973;
Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Friedland, 1983; Whitt, 1982;
Swanstrom, 1985). Included in this is the affect of city
attractiveness on private urban investment (Molotch and
Logan, 1984). Competition among cities for private
investment may influence the adoption by government of
incentive policies such as industrial revenue bonds, tax
increment financing, and enterprise zones (Catanese, 1984;
Wasylenko, 1981).
An area that has not received the same attention in the
literature is whether patterns of urban influence and needs
have a similar affect on the adoption of land use policies
for economic development and growth of urban areas. Policies
which accommodate increased land use should be expected to
be of pivotal interest to those who promote growth. Thus the
focus of this research centers on the following questions:


101
governments prepare and implement the planning process
(O'Connell, 1977). But why did the process fail to achieve
the state's desired result of uniform growth management? The
explanation, in part, centers on the nature of the
regulations of the process and in part on the regional
nature of growth and development.
The LGCPA had several regulatory shortcomings. One
problem is the lack of clear state guidance on growth
management. Partly, the purpose of the LGCPA was to allow
local governments to design their own individual approaches
to growth management. There was no significant preparation
or implementation of a state-wide comprehensive plan.
Without any state parameters, the local plans did not have a
framework to guide them or to provide any consistency. But
the dysfunctions of growth do not adhere necessarily to
political boundaries of cities and counties. Many problems
are regional and as such require regional direction and
solutions that are integrated (Florida Atlantic University,
1986, p. 5).
A second problem is that plans and practice did not
necessarily match. What local government planned, they were
legally required to implement, but not necessarily in
conjunction with their day-to-day services and operations
(Florida Atlantic University, 1986, p. 6). Political
incrementalism superceded coordinated and consistent plan
implementation.


93
ignored it. This became the heart of the change in statewide
and local growth politics.
The state was moving in a direction to regulate
development and planning for future growth. The 1975 LGCPA
was intended to influence a shift towards liberal and even a
populist political stance. Requirements for integrated
planning through the nine elements, public hearings, formal
amendments process for change, compliance with statewide
regulations, and a required evaluation process all
contributed to a larger role for state government to define
parameters and allow local government the opportunity to
engage dynamically in the growth and development of their
city and county. But cities, being a variety of political
places, used the comprehensive planning process to further
the growth politics which suited their own political
environment the best. Thus the wide variance in results of
the use of the planning process (University of Florida,
1984). It is those resultsthe different planning policies
and approaches used in each citywhich this research
examines.
Implementing the 1975 LGCPA was not easy. There was
confusion and duplication with the 1972 series of
legislation (O'Connell, 1976). There was relatively little
funding available, a lack of coordination with existing
regional bodies such as the Water Management Districts, and


160
towards growth. BUS2 represent the cumulative score of
responses about the position of chambers of commerce and
homebuilders. CITZ2 represents the score of responses about
the position held by neighborhood and environmentalist
groups. Higher scores represent a perception that the groups
support growth and lower scores represent a perceptions that
the groups oppose growth. These scores are used as another
independent predictor of policy adoption in the policy
adoption analysis (Appendix A).
Position and stability
Perceptions about the stability of the overall land use
policy process may provide some additional indications about
the potential for conflict at the local level. Questions
were asked about the level of stability which respondents
perceived within their local land use policy adoption
process. A second series of questions was asked about the
level of conflict perceived around specific land related
issues.
Overall 56% of the respondents felt that the politics
of specific land use policy adoption in their communities is
stable, having few controversies which divide the community
over the issue. A quarter of all respondents felt that the
stability of the land use process is vulnerable the control
exercised by influential groups over government changes
(Table 5-5). The contrast between respondent groups shows
that government actors perceived the land use process to be


201
where homeowners are influential, property taxes will be
kept low in favor of a greater reliance on user fees.
The second analysis is as statistically strong as the
ecological variable function and both are stronger than the
combined city and county analysis functions. But the survey
variables for the city only analysis are weaker than in the
combined analysis. On the city only function the ecological
variables load almost exactly the same as on the first
function.
The participant variables as predictors of policy
scores suggest only three very weak coefficients. Again,
business group success has some ability to predict the low
policy use scores group, but very weakly. Conflict on the
issue of impact fees also loads very weakly. Liberal
ideology loads negatively, as expected, but again very
weakly.
The city only analysis is overshadowed by the powerful
ecological variables which dominate the prediction of lower
land use policy use scores. Ecological variables have the
ability to delineate cities especially on the basis of size.
This lends support to the second and third propositions that
suggest that community conditions will reflect the political
characteristics. There are significant differences between
actor influences and positions. Considering that, we would
expect that ecological indicators would be important


56
1965). The planners tried to integrate community problems,
the needs of the economic interests, and the political
situation with their professional judgement on what was the
best rational, technical planning proposal. This master plan
approach was generally resisted by economic interests who
influenced government, for the very reason that planners
embraced it. Master or rational planning is not susceptible
to political pressures, pressures which the local power
structure is adept at manipulating and which the citizen
participators cannot easily use to their advantage. Growth
politics can politicize land use planning even when planners
want to be neutral. But it is questionable whether planners
desire to act in a neutral capacity.
The results of a national study suggest that planners
admit that they are susceptible to bias in their
recommendations and planning efforts (Vasu, 1979). Planners
may be more likely to embrace the directions of advocacy
planning. Advocacy planning exposes the bias and preferences
of planners and administrators (Davidoff, 1965). It
encourages the planning process to support the least
advantaged community interests as expressed during liberal
growth politics. This approach puts the planning process on
high moral ground but dangerous political ground. Ideally,
government is supposed to represent all interests in the
community. But advocacy planning is easier to justify


228
in the policy making process, and the more likely it is
that land use policies will reflect market needs.
1. investment of growth machine
Economic Growth
- proportion of commercial/business land to residentially
used land; area, value
- local versus mobile wealth as proportion of economic
base (Molotch and Logan,1984; Swanstrom,1985)
Government
-top property tax sources
- growth in commercial space allocated in the
comprehensive plan versus growth in residential space
-change in housing stock type, value (Dowall,1980:
Mills,1977; Mollenkopf,1983; Freidland, 1983;
Lineberry,1980)
2. market directs less regulatory land use policy
(Dougharty et.al.,1975; Mollenkopf,1983; Gleeson et
al. ,1975)
Proposition 2B
The greater the investment which the anti-growth forces
have in the community the more proclivity they have to
participate in the policy making process, and the more
likely is it that government will regulate land use and
adopt policies which
restrict market forces and benefit existing community
residents.


242
Q-27
In your judgement, which of the following describes the political process (In
general) in your city? (elrole number)
1 IT IS THE ELECTED OFFICIALS WHO DOMINATE THE DECISION MAKINC PROCESS.
VERY LITTLE HAPPENS UNLESS THE! SUPPORT IT.
2 BUSINESSES HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT DECISION
MAKING HERE. THEY DOMINATE THE LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THEIR
SUPPORT IS NECESSARY POR POLICY ADOPTIONS.
3 THE PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DEPARTMENT HEADS, ATTORNIES AND
PLANNERS IN GOVERNMENT HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE. THE GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTRATION DOMINATES THE DECISION MAKINC PROCESS.
A IMPORTANT LOCAL DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF
CROUPS, SUCH AS CIVIC, LABOR, BUSINESS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, AND OTHERS.
EACH CROUP CAN USUALLY PREVENT POLICIES THEY DISLIKE FROM BEING
ADOPTED.
Q-28
How many professional planners are in your city's planning department?
Q-29
Are there any advisory board, neighborhood level organizations, or umbrella
homeowner groups in your city that are well organized and active in the
development of land use policies? Please list their names and if possible a
contact person.
Thank you for your participation.
10


5
To make sense of these many views of the integration of
politics and economics we return to Lindblom (1982). He
suggests that the business sector enjoys a unique position
of influence in the policy making process. Other interests
will operate within a limited "zone of policy making"
(Lindblom, 1982, p. 335). Local government depends on local
business interests to create a positive economic condition
in the city. Government can provide incentives and regulate
business in order to manage their role in the local process.
The degree of flexibility within which business operates can
be treated as a "market variable" in social science research
(Lindblom, 1982, p. 335). In the case of this research, the
interests which make up the growth machine are the actors
that have business interests that are land based. The
anti-growth coalitions are the residential and environmental
interests that are also land based but have different
expectations of land use than the growth machine. These two
groups of political interests affect the parameters of
business influence and the pluralistic zone of policy
making. Land use policies represent the output of their
political influences.
The economic market should be considered as a variable
and not a constant (Lindblom, 1982). What we may find is
that there are several distinct actors which make up the
local "political economy" such as the local government, the
business interests, and the non-business/public interests.


225
(Peterson, 1979,1981) Roads, infrastructure, bonded debt
for capital projects
-public financing of increased utility and government
costs (Molotch,1976; Peterson,1981) Users fees versus
property taxes
-local government expenditures on economic development
activities (Judd,1984; Lyon et.al.,1981) Downtown
development, economic development council
-less city government fewer employees,less expenditures
(Mollenkopf,1983) Number of employees/population,
expenditures per capita
-reform government (Mollenkopf,1983) Form of government
Actors
-presence of developers, planners, middle class (#)
(Mollenkopf, 1983)
- support systems (Aiken and Alford,1970), downtown
association (Mollenkopf,1983)
Environment (Molotch,1976; Protash and Baldissare,1983;
Fried, 1975)
- change in population number
-change in incorporated and unincorpoarated population
levels
Survey Data
verification of presence and measurement of presence of
groups in the policy process


45
on continuums. He fails to fully explain, however, how the
natural tension between government and citizen can be eased
in order to produce a long-term community-wide benefit
outcome. Through growth management, however, the
administrative power of a city can be increased by regional
or statewide institutionalized land use requirements. This
type of broader authority can help local government to
equitably frame the competition of local growth politics and
promotes long-term uniformity in government's approach to
development and growth. This approach would satisfy the quid
pro quo for which Mollenkopf calls. This additional
dimension of government influence gives local government a
sustaining power to manage the benefits and costs of growth,
not just exercise local regulatory power over the growth
machine; a regulatory power which eventually would be
challenged by the local power structure.
The role of local government can be refined further to
director or "traffic cop" (Stone, 1986). Government can use
its legislative power to institutionalize their own set of
development rules, rather than rely on regulatory
development under the normal political processcompetitive
bargaining and influence group pressure. Government has the
option to regulate the process by controlling the economic
forces of the market, or government can direct the process
by an equitable management of the decision making arena
within its own parameters. At the same time, government


59
of planning can be pragmatic and technically suitable
(Mumford, 1961; Altschuller, 1965).^
Planning processes can be biased. Conservative growth
politics takes a utilitarian stance, serving the current
economic interests and expecting eventual benefits to accrue
to all residents. Liberal growth politics, on the other
hand, takes a Rawlsian stance, serving the least advantaged
first to bring them to equity before addressing the
interests of those who are better off (Beatly, 1984). These
two approaches contribute to conflict, because neither one
is capable of simultaneous satisfaction of competing
interests. It is growth management planning and progressive
growth politics that come closest to the organic ideal,
serving the interests of the residents but with
consideration given to economic realities.
We have to keep in mind, however, that progressive
planning is not capable of overcoming local political
parochialism for extended periods of time, especially in a
competitive political system. Again, a state or regional
planning directive could ease the tension of the larger
public good fighting with the need for economic growth.
Florida's comprehensive plan and growth management
approaches allow a definition of the public interest through
broad goals and the flexibility to accommodate changing
conditions through land use policies and local plans. These


115
continuity in approaching growth management. But the state
is not a neutral agent. It can have its own interest that
centrally and/or uniformly distributes benefits to
interested groups in the land use politics arena. Other
sunbelt states may benefit from an examination of Florida's
experiences before embarking on their own growth-management
process.
Notes
1. For a full history of land use and development in Florida
see Carter (1974) and DeGrove 1984.
2.See Carter (1974), DeGrove (1984), Starnes (1972) report
for full discussion of this and other significant pieces of
the 1972 legislation series.
3.The 1985 Act centralized the position of the state and
severely constrained the decision-making space of local
governments. Many local governments were understandably
concerned about the centralization of authority over growth
management at the state level. In 1986 a "Glitch Bill" was
enacted which struck a more moderate balance between
centralization and decentralization in the development and
implementation of growth management plans. Specifically, the
level of service standards requirement were modified and the
requirement for local plan compliance with the state-
sponsored regional plan was relaxed.


146
land also can be limited through policies such as common
zoning, requiring agricultural zones, greenspace, and
critical environmental areas (Witte and Long, 1980). Also,
limiting the transportation or special services access to
the land reduces the options for land use, such as control
of utility placement (Whitelaw, 1980).
In this analysis minimum lot size and zoning reflect
traditional policies. Greenspace, utility placement, permit
limits and agriculture zones are more innovative or at least
less accepted by communities. The more regulatory, the less
politically acceptable in growth climates.
Price Policies
The price of land reflects its value as determined by
market forces. Land use policies such as transfers of
development rights, planned unit development, flexible
zoning, and land use performance standards can facilitate
market determined land use. Government can allow market
forces to set the price of land as a response to demands for
land use without relying on artificial supply restrictions
and regulations against certain uses (Witte and Long, 1980).
Land use policies that are price oriented may rely on market
forces to set the pace of consumption and location. Price
rather than supply oriented policies are more adaptable to
changes in the marketplace.
The price policies used in this analysis are planned
unit development, a traditionally accepted policy and land


254
lext, would you please provide us pour peroeptloos of lend use decision asking
in pour ooaaunitp.
0-12
Pleeae evaluate the level of oonfllot for the following issue areas as
experienced bp pour eltp. (eirole pour answer)
| Conflict Level
SIGNIFICANT MODERATE MINIMAL NONE
Intergoveranental Relations
with Countp 1 2 3
Envlronaent Protection 1 23
Location of Mobile Nones 1 23
Annexation 1 23
Urban Sprawl in the
Unincorporated Areas 1 23
Green Space Preservation 1 23
Agricultural Land Preservation
in the Unincorporated Areas 1 23
Inpact fees or Other
Developaent User Charges 1 23
DK
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Q-13
Please select the position which aost closelp reflects pour perception of the
position on growth held bp pour elected eltp government, (circle nuaber)
1 SUPPORTS GROWTH UNCONDITIONALLI
2 SUPPORTS CROVTH WITH CONDITIONS
3 NEUTRAL -DOES NOT SUPPORT OR OPPOSE GROWTH
4 OPPOSES CROWTH UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
5 OPPOSES CROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY
7 DON'T KNOW
Q-14
Politics surrounding the adoption of future land use poliop in pour dtp oan
best be described asi (circle nuaber)
1 VERY STABLE- FEW CONTROVERSIES ON POLICY QUESTIONS DIVIDE THE
COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE
2 STABLE- DESPITE A FEW CONTROVERSIES THAT DIVIDE THE COMMUNITY
3 SUBJECT TO CHANGES- AS GROUPS CONTROLLING CITY GOVERNMENT CHANGE (FROM
ONE ELECTION TO ANOTHER)
4 SUBJECT TO CHANGE- AS POLICY DISAGREEMENTS ARISE (FROM ONE ELECTION TO
ANOTHER)
5 OTHER (speclfp)
6 DON'T KNOW
5


141
Dependent VariablesLand Use Policy
The final phase of the model contains the dependent
variables, the land use policies. For this study,
information about land use policy usage was gathered through
the survey instrument in lieu of content analysis of
comprehensive plans, development regulations and ordinances
of local governments. Only city and county planners were
asked questions about policy usage. In addition they were
asked to indicate the contribution the policy makes to the
achievement of the city's/county's land development goals.
Policy value ranged high to low as integral, necessary, no
effect, or impediment. This response range is an attempt to
understand the relative importance of each policy used by
cities/counties. We expect to find that the degree of policy
relevance may be a more refined output of actor
participation.
An open ended question could have given planners an
opportunity to select their most important or least
important policies, but would have relied on their memory
and attention at the time of the response. Providing a list
of possible policies focusses attention. The list was
designed to be comprehensive in order to capture the most
important policies for each place and generate a pattern of
policy use in each city.
For this research seventeen land use policies were
selected to represent the various approaches which local


212
as well as a pluralistic or business dominated process. They
may be placed between conflict and rational compromise.
Government actors perceive a stable/unstable conflict/no
conflict process dominated by pluralism. That represent
either of the two compromise positions.
The net result of this speculation and cell placement
is that government has many roles to play depending on the
array of interest group influence and positions. Government
is more than a reactor, however, because it can have its own
interest to serve as well. The unique ideological position
of government suggests the compromise role is one of
necessity. This goes together with the intent of policies to
promote, control, or manage growth. Fewer policies promote
growth, more policies control or manage growth. These are
components that we can measure empirically and linkages that
we can make theoretically.
Urban Political Economy
Another step in positive theory development is to
"formulate the logical (theoretical) basis for the empirical
relations identified or which might be identified" (Fried,
1975). The political economy of place is Moltoch's (1976)
explanation for growth machine politics. We identified the
interrelationships between economic and political sectors in
the three rules of the land use game. Those rules are that
government parameters affect political influence, economics
affects political influence, and economic and political


205
Table 6-4 Policy Use by Region
City and County Subsets
Cities by Region
Discriminant
Policy Group 1
NE
P
C
SW
SE
ZONING
5.00
4.00
4.00
4.16
4.12
MIN LOT RESTR
4.66
4.33
3.75
4.00
4.00
CIP
4.66
5.00
5.00
4.83
4.62
PUD
5.00
3.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
UTILITY PLCM
4.33
3.00
4.25
4.00
3.57
IMPACT FEE
4.00
2.33
4.75
3.83
3.87
Discriminant
PolicyGroup 2
ENTERP ZONE
4.66
3.66
3.75
2.83
2.87
LUPS
3.33
3.33
3.66
3.16
2.37
AG ZONE
4.00
5.00
3.25
4.66
4.25
REGULATE PERMITS
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
LAND BANK
4.00
4.30
3.50
3.60
4.25
Counties by Region
Discriminant
Policy Group 1
NE
P
C
SW
SE
ZONING
4.50
1.00
4.00
4.40
5.00
MIN LOT RESTR
4.00
2.50
4.25
4.60
4.75
PUD
4.50
2.50
4.70
4.60
4.50
CIP
5.00
2.50
3.00
4.80
4.00
UTILITY PLCM
3.00
3.00
3.75
3.60
4.00
IMPACT FEE
3.00
1.00
3.75
4.8
4.00
Discriminant
Policy Group 2
ENTERP ZONE
1.00
1.00
1.75
2.80
2.66
LUPS
2.50
1.00
4.50
3.20
2.75
AG ZONE
2.50
1.00
2.50
3.80
3.50
REG PERMITS
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.75
LAND BANK
1.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
1.00
Note: score scale l=not used 5=integral
Legend: NE=northeast P=panhandle C=central SW=southwest
SE=southeast


264
Marion County. (1978) Comprehensive Plan Document. Ocala,
FL: Marion County.
Mclver, J. and E. Carmines. (1981) Unidimensional Scaling.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Melbourne, City of. (1979) Land Use Plan. Melbourne, FL:
City of Melbourne.
Mills, C. (1956) The Power Elite. New York, NY: Oxford
Press.
Mills, E. (1979) Economic Analysis of Urban Land Use
Controls, in P. Mieszkowski and M. Straszheim (eds.)
Current Issues in Urban Economics. Baltimore, MA: Johns
Hopkins.
Mollenkopf, J. (1983) The Contested City. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Molotch, H. (1976) The City as a Growth Machine Political
Economy of Place. American Journal of Sociology. 82. 309-
332.
Molotch, H. and J. Logan. (1984) Tensions in the Growth
Machine: Overcoming Resistence to Value-Free Development.
Social Problems. 31. 483-499.
Mumford, L. (1961) The City in History. New York, NY:
Harcourt, Brace, and World.
Mundie, R. (1980) Public Policy Effects on Land Values, in
T. Black and J. Hoben (eds.) Urban Land Markets.
Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute.
Muth, R. (1969) Cities and Housing. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Neenan, W. and M. Ethridge. (1984) Competition and
Cooperation Among Localities, in R. Bingham and J. Blair
(eds.) Urban Economic Development. Urban Affairs Annual
Reviews Volume 27. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Nordlinger, E. (1981) On the Autonomy of the Democratic
State. Cambridge, MAl Harvard University Press.
O'Connell, D. (1976) Growth With Environmental Awareness.
Florida Environmental and Urban Issues. _3- 11-12.
. (1977) Status Report: Local Government
Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975. Florida Environmental
and Urban Issues. 4. 8-11.


28
city may act as a facilitator and/or arbiter in conflicts
between the producers (mobile developers) and the workers
(immobile citizens) (Fainstein et al., 1983). This tension
forces the city to constantly make tradeoffs in policy and
the delivery of services to these competing interests. There
also may be an institutional bias present in the policy
making process which favors the business class interests
(Stone, 1980). In such a case, development policies may be
even more influential in guiding the local decision making
process.
To best understand the influence of actors on local
policies we can examine the variety of interests and demands
on the process. Through the identification of the actors and
their interests we can estimate the actors' influence,
participation, and impact on the process. Then by examining
their values, participation levels, and success level we can
gain insights on what motivates their level and direction of
participation. Finally, we can identify their impact on the
process by measuring the level of conflict and consensus in
the process and the overall perception by the policy actors
of the local political power structure (Allensworth, 1980,
p. 229).
Participation and Influence
Interest group (power) structures can array themselves
in any number of configurations. Who has influence and who
doesn't has been the subject of debate in the community


134
avenues for power to market interests whose want to promote
growth for self gain. Incentive policies may be a compromise
power positionthe new community power as outlined by Stone
(1986). These may institutionalize growth, but allow
government to retain some regulatory power.
Growth management is sometimes considered to be a
compromise approach to land use, falling within the
innovative category. It should be considered, however, as an
alternative approach. Growth management is not a fallback
position between market growth or restriction of growth.
Instead it can be used to advance a variety of interests. It
can be a means to manage, direct, or accommodate growth,
each of which may have different interest group support and
impact on the use and development of land. Therefore, the
use of growth management should indicate a government
derived parameter to the development of land, but capable of
supporting a variety of land based interests.
In this study we compare the attitudes (as orientations
to the role of government) of individuals to policies within
communities in order to find a relationship between the
presence of particular attitudes and particular policies in
their communities. Additionally, we can compare the
influence of particular interest groups to the presence of
certain policies. While individual attitudes and interest
group influence cannot be accounted for as the same, there


Policies also may be compromises that are directed by the
managerial role of government (Nordlinger, 1981; Salamon,
1977 ) .
20
There may be overlaps between these processes in any
given city. But an understanding of the patterns of
influence and city policy processes will contribute to our
understanding of why land use policies are adopted.
Research Methods
This is a comparative study of urban land use policy
making. The dependent variables are land use policies. This
research will attempt to determine why different land use
policies are adopted by cities. The independent variables
center on actors and their influence, policy approaches of
growth politics, and environmental (social and economic)
conditions. By using a comparative study approach, we can
attempt to isolate various factors which have a relationship
to certain land use policies. This information will
contribute to our understanding of the impact of land use
policies, the significance of the planning process, and
whether certain types of growth politics as experienced by
cities are likely to promote the adoption of particular land
use policies and not others. This information will be of use
to policy makers as it will help to identify the potential
range of policy options that are most likely to be sought
for a particular type of city and what obstacles to policy
adoption may be present.


102
A third problem is that the state had no enforcement
powers under the LGCPA. The state only reviewed for
compliance, not for content quality. Therefore, it is
essential to realize that the contents of comprehensive
plans do not attempt the same objectives for all cities and
counties. Some policies and goals are more necessary than
others depending on local and regional circumstances.
Economic needs and political forces combine to implement
some policies more aggressively than others. These are
patterns which our data analysis will address.
Local problems in comprehensive planning also include
the legality of the plans themselves. For instance, in
Jacksonville the comprehensive plan was adopted by the city
council by resolution and not by ordinance. This led to an
ad-hoc development process in Jacksonville that did not
complement growth management (Jacksonville Community
Council, Inc., 1984, p. 7). Secondly, the broadness of the
goals of the Jacksonville plan contributed to the inability
of the city to effectively direct growth and development
(Jacksonville Community Council, Inc., 1984, p. 17). This
led to a political basis for growth and zoning decisions by
city council superceding the plans. Other local governments
no doubt experienced similar implementation problems.
From 1975-1985, Florida followed a moderate program to
shape local decision-making arenas towards uniformity. The
price that the state paid for allowing local discretion


22
management planning process). The comprehensive planning
process represents a uniform set of planning rules which all
cities were to use. While cities implemented these rules
unevenly by degree and time, the rules framework was
available and of potential use as a reference in land use
policy development. Cities had a five year implementation
deadline (by 1980). Central cities were chosen over smaller
cities because socio-economic data is more readily available
and participation in an ongoing planning process over the
case period of time was more likely.
The Available Operationalized Variables section
(Appendix B) lists each proposition and the possible array
of relative variables from the systems model in Figure 1-1.
Not all of these will be used in the analysis. But the lists
represent the use of these variables in the relevant
literature as they pertain to these propositions. The
variables are arranged in an eclectic pattern (Fried, 1975,
p. 328) by broad classificationsgovernment, economic
factors, policy actors, and environment. These are
classifications which identify rather than indicate the
purpose of the variables. One of the objects of this
research will be to determine if any greater theoretical
understanding can be derived from these variables including
a purposive classification or development of political
patterns which might be based on need for action, resources


APPENDIX A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Survey Variables
BUSl
Value
Frequency
Valid Pe
1
28
45%
2
23
37
3
11
18
numbe r
62
100
CITZl
Value Frequency Valid Percent
1 32 76%
2 10 24
number 42 100
Note: Value is the cumulative score of each government
respondent's nomination of business groups chamber,
developers, influential individuals or citizen groups -
neighborhood and environmental organizations as those
having the greatest degree of success in influencing the
land use policy process. Score of 3 BUSl = all three
business groups were nominated as successful by that
respondent. A score of 2 CITZl = both citizen groups were
nominated.
BUS2
Value
Frequency
Valid Pe
5
1
.7%
6
1
.7
7
1
.7
8
2
1.3
9
3
2.0
10
9
6.0
11
32
21.2
12
102
67.5
missing
2
number
153
100
220


217
When Broward county finally took a stand to restrict growth
where services were lacking, the horse was already out of
the barn. Developers in this urban area are not deterred by
such regulatory behavior. The comprehensive plan and zoning
already favor more development and the developers know it.
Another southeast region example of the inability of
economic determinism to stop government facilitation of
growth is in Palm Beach county. The city of West Palm Beach
negotiated with a developer to completely overhaul their
downtown area. The developers' plans conflict with a
proposed east-west expressway route which has been at least
two years in the making. The highway will ease overcrowded
roads and provide a vital economic transportation link
within the county. The expressway authority balked when
county officials backpeddled on the proposal and suggested
it be shelved. Only when threatened with extinction as an
official body did the expressway authority drop the idea of
the east-west route. This area has a high score on the
Gutman policy use scale. That pattern may be characterized
as reluctant.
Even the most innovative and regulatory of cities may
not be able to say no to developers. Other cities reflect
the changing government attitudes as power and influence
shift and the policy consequences. St. Petersburg is in the
highly regulatory western region. Their use score is
moderately high, but their politics reflect a progressive to


249
Q-16
In your Judgement, whloh of the following describes the political process (In
general) In your city? (elrele nuaber)
1 IT IS THE ELECTED OFFICIALS WHO DOMINATE THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.
VERI LITTLE HAPPENS UNLESS THE! SUPPORT IT.
2 BUSINESSES HAVE THE CREATEST INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT DECISION
MAKING HERE. THEY DOMINATE THE LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THEIR
8UPP0RT IS NECESSARY FOR POLICY ADOPTIONS.
3 THE PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DEPARTMENT HEADS, ATTORNIES AND
PLANNERS IN COVERHMENT HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE. THE GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTRATION DOMINATES THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.
A IMPORTANT LOCAL DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF
CROUPS, SUCH AS CIVIC, LABOR, BUSINESS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, AND OTHERS.
EACH CROUP CAN USUALLY PREVENT POLICIES THEY DISLIKE FROM BEING
ADOPTED.
Thank you for your participation.
7


248
Q-i3
Pirase select the position which Most closely reflects your perception of the
position on growth held by your elected olty government, (circle number)
1 SUPPORTS GROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY
2 SUPPORTS GROWTH WITH CONDITIONS
3 NEUTRAL -DOES NOT SUPPORT OR OPPOSE GROWTH
4 OPPOSES GROWTH UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
5 OPPOSES GROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY
7 DON'T KNOW
Q-14 .
Please evaluate the level of conflict for the following Issue areas as
experienced by your city, (circle answer)
Conflict Level
SIGNIFICANT MODERATE MINIMAL HONE
Intergovernmental Relations
with County 123
Environment Protection 123
Location of Mobile Homes 123
Annexation 123
Urban Sprawl in the
Unincorporated Areas 123
Creen Spaoe Preservation 123
Agricultural land Preservation
In the Unincorporated Areas 123
Impact Pees or Other
Development User Charges 123
DK
5 .
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Q-15
Politics surrounding the adoption of land use policies in your city can best be
.described asi (circle number)
1VERY STABLE- PEW CONTROVERSIES ON POLICY QUESTIONS DIVIDE THE
COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE
1 STABLE- DESPITE A PEW CONTROVERSIES THAT DIVIDE THE COMMUNITY
2 SUBJECT TO CHANGES- AS CROUPS CONTROLLING CITY GOVERNMENT CHANGE (PROM
ONE ELECTION TO ANOTHER)
3 SUBJECT TO CHANGE- AS POLICY DISAGREB1ENTS ARISE (PROM ONE ELECTION TO
ANOTHER)
4 OTHER .
5 DON'T KNOW
6


253
0-11
Por eaoh of the following statements about planning and development please
indioate jrour opinion, (clrole jrour answer)
ISTRONGLY STRONGLY 1
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DK 1
1 Preserving olean air and water
should be high priority issues
even if it means that econoalo
development in the community
may be slowed 1 2 3 A 5
2 Planning is primarily a political
activity 1 2 3 4 5
3 Developers respond to market forces
and are only giving people what
they want 1 2 3 4 5
4 Developers have a legitimate
complaint against imposing unnecessary
and coat increasing requirements
on their developments 1 2 3 4 5
5 Planners should temper their
envlronsental concerns by recognising
that other legitimate objectives
which may conflict with environmental
protection nay be even more
important 1 2 3 4 5
6 There should be tighter controls on
private developswnt to protect the
public Interest 1 2 3 A 5
7 Residents are best at defining the
needs of their eoaaunity 1 2 3 A 5
8 Private developers have little or no
oonoern for the good of the community
as a whole 1 2 3 A 5
9 The benefit to property owners of
Increased land values can legitimately
be llsdted in order to preserve
land in its natural or
agrlcualtural state 1 2 3 A 5
4


144
based on the services rendered (benefits received) and by
whom or how the cost is paid (Ervin et al., 1977, p. 35).
"The political decision-maker in land use is not typically
concerned with the efficiency questions of interest to
economists. He is, rather, constantly involved in disputes
over the distribution of rights and goods." Therefore, first
we must understand the characteristics of the policy, then
the interests and influence of the expected beneficiaries.
Policy Characteristics
Ideology
Role of Govt.
Policy Method
Impact
Conservative
Facilitator
Flexible
Promote
Liberal
Satisficer
Regulation
Control
Progressive
Director/Partner
Incentives
Manage
Table 4-2
To keep the discussion of policies in perspective of
real situations, traditional to innovative accumulations of
land use policies may reflect flexible to regulatory policy
characteristics. Traditional policies represent the well-
known, manageable, low-risk land use approach. It may also
be flexible due to application over time. This type of
manipulation produces the climate to adopt additional
policies which approach land use in new and innovative ways.
These additional policies may be more regulatory in nature
to check the loopholes or inadequacies of the traditional
policies as actors learn to use them for their own purposes
over time.


Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
By
Robyne S. Turner
August 1988
Chairman: Dr. Bert E. Swanson
Major Department: Political Science
There are many explanations of the policy process at
the local government level. The most adequate approach is to
explore the interrelationships between the political process
and economic interests which affect the adoption and use of
policies. The richest policy area that exemplifies the
intricacies of political and economic interactions is
developmental. Policies that affect the development and
growth of a community typify the political economy approach
to understanding urban politics.
In this research, it is suggested that interest groups
such as the business groups and residential interests
compete for the attention of government in order to affect
local land use and planning policies. The question of growth
in urban areas is explored through an aggregate, comparative
study of urban cities and counties in the state of Florida.
vi


94
a clash between regional and local decisional jurisdictions
(Graham, 1976 ) .
It is difficult to portray comprehensive planning in
black and white, either or terms, in the way that some
authors such as Molotch have suggested. In general we can
portray local politics as "tensions" between growth machine
interests and anti-growth interests (Friedland, 1983). The
distinctions are much less clear when we specifically
analyze local politics and the plans which result from that
process. At best we can identify some directions to which
comprehensive plan goals and policies may lean. For example,
goals and policies may indicate economic approaches to
planning which favor growth or a stable neighborhood
approach designed to contain growth. In addition, cities and
counties use a wide variety of strategies to develop growth
plans. Some plans reflect that several scenarios for growth
were considered. In other cases a single growth interest is
reflected by the policy approach selected. More often than
not, plans reflect a very general non-directed approach to
growth. This non-commitment to strategy probably represents
a short-term incremental political and planning process
rather than a long-term strategy and rational political and
planning process.
It may be instructive of the various approaches to land
use planning to convey excerpts from comprehensive plans
from several of the cities included in this study. First,


113
end. The state also has promoted the use of impact fees by
Florida cities to finance the infrastructure needed to
accommodate growth (Stevenson, 1985). Impact fees offer an
alternative to increasing the rate of traditional revenue
sources such as property taxes. They seem to make growth
"pay for itself" by shifting the burden of the cost of new
growth to new residents from existing ones. Impact fees
serve the political purpose of giving government a method to
balance costs and benefits.
A major report prepared by the State Comprehensive Plan
Committee warned the 1987 legislature that impact fees will
not solve all growth problems in the state. The state must
fulfill its responsibility to provide adequate resources
statewide. The report, widely circulated as a major position
paper, outlines the requirements that Florida must "attract
quality growth ... in an increasingly competitive world"
(Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 2).
This will lead to a continued diversification of the
economy. Furthermore, the future of the state's economy is
dependent on the success of the state's growth plan.
Financing growth beyond impact fees will reduce the need for
regulation that "hinders private enterprise, stifles
initiative and incentive, and diminishes our quality of
life" (Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p.
2). While this seems to contradict the impact fee vehicle,
it merely broadens the scope of discussion over how to cope


36
play. After a discussion of these stages, the individual
componentsactors, the policy process, and individual
policy options will be examined.
Conservative Growth PoliticsGovernment as Facilitator
Conservative growth politics is a stage which may be
characterized by the role of government as facilitator.
Molotch (1976) establishes the base point of this role by
suggesting that in the policy process the government acts as
a booster for the economic development interests of the
growth machine. Adopted policies reflect the desires of the
economic interests and establish a supportive business
climate for economic development. This portrayal of
government complements the description of "conservative
growth politics" in the 1950s (Swanstrom, 1985). Government
actors will facilitate growth and development through
selective policy adoption because they assume that the
public will benefit from the subsequent expansion of the
local economy. In this characterization of the policy
process the market forces are the dominant interest group to
which government responds.
This basepoint view, however, is two-dimensional and
represents a zero-sum game. The more potential for growth,
the more government responds to development demands. The
expected opposite reaction is that as more growth occurs,
the greater is the likelihood that the residential
community, the anti-growth coalition will resist additional


186
Notes
1. As with all the survey questions, multiple measures of
concepts were attempted as well as careful placement of
questions within the survey instrument. For instance,
questions about perceptions of groups' position on growth
are separated from the question on government's position on
growth. Similarly, questions on issue conflict are separated
from the question on stability of land use conflict. While
the correlations between similar questions are not high, the
results within groups generate similar results, thus
reducing our concern over reliability of question
equivalence and convergent validation. (Asher, 1984)
2. Administrators were not asked the progressive ideology
series of questions. Subsequently, this variable is not part
of the dependent variable analysis.
3. The PROGR mean scale scores are coded opposite of the
other two ideology scores. A lower score represents stronger
agreement and a higher score represents stronger
dlsagre~iment. Their mean scores are government 5.76,
citizen groups 6.16, and business groups 9.24.


169
(public sector) hands. Business group respondents are
divided on the question of power. About 54% perceive the
government sector to be the most influential policy process
group and 34% perceive a pluralistic character. Citizen
group members are divided as well. Over half perceive a
pluralistic group influence to prevail, but over 36%
perceive business to be the dominant policy actor.
A lack of aggregate consensus on the power question
leaves us to believe that pluralism may be perceived as the
dominant community power profile. This result actually may
reflect disagreement in perceptions between respondent
groups (Table 5-9). The interest group respondents each tend
to perceive a more structured influence pattern of
government. The impact of these differences on the narrower
land use policy process may be that business will attempt to
negotiate with government actors and citizens will attempt
to approach government about the policy influence of a
nongovernmental actorbusinesses.
These different perceptions and the implications for
interest group approaches to the policy process are
especially significant in light of the differences between
groups on issue position and group influence. For example,
business groups support growth, theirs is the most
influential interest group in the land use process, and they
perceive the public sector to be the source of community
power in affecting the policy process. This combination


221
CITZ2
Value
Frequency
Valid Percent
2
39
26.2%
3
17
11.4
4
53
35.6
5
5
3.4
6
31
20.8
7
1
.7
8
3
2.0
missing
4
number
153
TOT)
Note: Value is the cumulative score of each respondent's
perception of the position towards growth taken by
combinations of business and citizen groups in their
communities. Higher scores reflect support or mixed
positions, while lower scores reflect neutral
positions.
or opposing
CONFL
Value
Frequency
Valid Percent
3
1
.7%
4
7
4.7
5
4
2.7
6
8
5.3
7
8
5.3
8
10
6.7
9
16
10.7
10
20
13.3
11
24
16.0
12
11
7.3
13
16
10.7
14
13
8.7
15
5
3.3
16
7
4.7
missing
3
number
T53
TOO
FEE
Value
Frequency
Valid Percent
1
7
4.8%
2
36
24.7
3
53
36.3
4
50
34.2
missing
7
numbe r
T53
TM


11
The anti-growth forces are expected to rely on
regulatory policy as a means to overcome the market forces
which stimulate growth (Logan, 1976b; Mills, 1979; Johnston,
1980). Government regulation is necessary to insure benefits
to the public even if regulations create costs for the
private sector (Thrall, 1983; Logan, 1976a; Williams, 1961).
It is expected that pro-growth forces will prefer flexible
land use policies in order to take advantage of dynamic
market forces (Dougharty et al., 1975; Mills, 1979; Ervin et
al., 1977; Burrows, 1978; Gleeson et al., 1975). Land use
policies which are adaptable to current economic conditions
will allow the property to be used at its maximum economic
potential (Williams, 1961). Pro-growth forces are
economically motivated by the potential earning power and
value of their land (Molotch, 1976; Molotch and Logan, 1984;
Swanstrom, 1985). The adoption of land use policies which
allow for market fluctuations will be beneficial to them
(Mollenkopf, 1983; Mills, 1979; Lineberry, 1980).
Proposition 2A: the greater the investment which the growth
machine has in the community the more proclivity they have
to participate in the policy making process, and the more
likely it is that land use policies will reflect market
needs.
Proposition 2B; the greater the investment which the
anti-growth forces have in the community the more proclivity
they have to participate in the policy making process, and


72
and a stronger state revenue base. Florida continues to lead
the nation in most new jobs produced (Koenig, 1987). Over
the 1981-86 period Florida added 850,000 new jobs, a 23%
increase, and personal income rose over 50% with per capita
income over $14,000 (Koenig, 1987, p. 46).
Local areas as well are diversifying their economies.
An annual survey of Florida business leaders reveals strong
optimism for continued strong economic growth throughout the
state (Koenig, 1987). In 1987, trade and service sectors
make up over 50% of the total employment in the state
(Koenig, 1987, p. 47). This type of continued, strong
economic development is expected to reflect a continued
interest by a conservative growth machine to dominate the
land use process.
Secondly, to be economically successful a population
increase must be diversified and not limited to unskilled or
non-working groups. Even though the influx of retirees to
Florida in the early years created a strong housing demand,
it is not the type of housing industry which will sustain a
strong local economy. But as the state's service sector
boomed, a migration of families and young professionals
stimulated a long-term housing demand. Employment overall
rose 23% from 1981-86 in the state. The 24-44 year old age
group is 27% of the total state population making it the
largest segment of the state population ("Florida Population
Climbs to No.5", 1987, p. 54).


110
diminished capacity to affect the process. Centralization
limits local government's ability react to these pluralistic
forces and ultimately reduces incrementalism by changing the
scope of politics to the state's parameters. Thus,
institutionalization of the land use process increases the
possibility of directing the distribution of system
benefits. The distribution of local system benefits may be
directed by the state.
In Florida, the state is promoting growth as a state
wide benefit. In some cases this is resisted by local
interests. The state's ability to intervene is especially
important in Florida because the environment is a public
good (resource) for the state. Tourism and business
relocation are attracted to expansive beaches, clear
waterways, and lush tropical foliage. The overdevelopment of
the state would damage these resources and the state's
economy. Growth should be well planned and timed so as not
to overload the environment or the service structure
(infrastructure) .
Thus in Florida, "growth management" is a growth
preparation measure rather than a growth restriction measure
designed to enhance a public good. As the land use process
is institutionalized within government on a statewide basis,
growth management is not necessarily a threat to development
but can accommodate it. The state legitimizes the goal of
growth, but in the context of quality growth which has some


CHAPTER SIX
POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP LINKAGES
Land Use Policy Adoption in a Growth Politics Environment
Communities have many options available to regulate the
use of land within their jurisdictions. The individual
policies may not be as important to the growth of a
community as are the patterns or combinations of policy
adoptions. The overall policy approach in a community sets
the tone for degree of flexibility or restraint towards
development. Policies are not adopted in isolation of
policies already in use. Therefore, it is necessary to
examine groups of policies and the community characteristics
associated with that group in order to understand the
implications of land use policy making. The land based
interests in the community and government will influence the
adoption and pattern of land use policies. This chapter
describes the land use policies used in this research and
the analysis of their adoption.
Land Use PoliciesDependent Variables
The land use policies used in this analysis are
represented by the dependent variable POLICY. Eleven land
use policies are combined based on a Gutman scalogram of the
survey data (Mclcver and Carmines, 1981; Weisberg, 1984b).
187


137
influence or power. Whereas proposition one is mainly
concerned with the characteristics of individuals,
propositions two and three use the environmental condition
of the city as the main unit of analysis. Proposition two
centers on the likelihood that differences in the economic
characteristics of the city itself will affect policy
decisions. Proposition three pertains to the impact of
government characteristics.
The policy environment is comprised of input variables
which are expected to be important in shaping land use
policy. These include growth factors, business and economic
indicators, and government factors. The policy environment
can intervene in the policy process by affecting the
potential use of influence exercised by key actors, altering
the selection of land use policy.
Growth profile
The general population indicators of the city comprise
the local growth profile. The growth profile affects the
degree of freedom which is available to the decision makers.
A homogeneous or heterogeneous socio-economic profile
indicates the potential level of conflict in the community
and thus the constraints on decision making. The rate of
overall growth is considered to be the indication of the
potential for policy change. It is supplemented by land
usage figuresresidential, commercial, and undeveloped.
This measure of population diversity may be significant to


257
SAMPLE SECOND MAILOUT LETTER
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
Department of fblitical Science
3324 Turlington Hall
Gctinrsvilk*. Florida 32611
Phone 1904 392-0262
January 6 IVIJ*/
Dr. Hater Hotenthal
t-lorida Wildlife f-ederation
Leon County Chapter
H.U. box IbOb
Tallahassee* HL
Dear Dr. Nosenthal:
Several Meeks ago 1 wrote to you seeking your opinions on
land use policies and politics in your city or county. As of today
Me have not yet received your completed questionnaire.
1 am Mriting to you again because of the significance each
questionnaire has to the usefulness of this study. In order for
the results of this study to be truly representative of the
opinions of all major Honda cities it is essential that each
person respond.
lhe large number of questionnaires returned is very
encouraging. But, whether Me Mill be able to describe accurately
the issues surrounding land use policies in f-lorida depends upon
you and the others Mho have not responded. Our past experiences
suggest that those of you Mho have not yet sent in your
questionnaire may hold quite different opinions than those Mho
have responded. The usefulness of our results depends on hOM
accurately Me are able to describe and understand land use issues
around the state.
In the event that your questionnaire has been misplaced* a
replacement is enclosed. If you Mould like a copy of the results
of this study* please Mrite "copy of results requested" on the
back of the questionnaire.
Your participation and cooperation are greatly appreciated.
Sincerely*
ffobyne S. Turner
Project Director
ITW*NTV<**I


10
diminishing returns. Dysfunctions in the environment such as
pollution, overcrowding, and congestion will threaten the
existing character of the community and will activate
interest in removing the dysfunctions as well as the
perceived source of those dysfunctions growth itself. This
interest group is the antithesis of the pro-growth
coalition. Molotch (1976) appropriately uses the label anti
growth coalition to represent land based interests whose
lifestyle is threatened by economic development of and
population increase in the urban area.
Homeowners aggregate into neighborhood groups and
represent this alternative force (Peterson, 1981; Rich,
1979; Molotch, 1976). Their strategy for action is identical
to the pro-growth force, although their motives are
different. The anti-growth interests seek to use the local
government policy making process to adopt policies which
slow or stop growth in order to preserve a lifestyle and
personal real estate investment rather than to increase a
business/ economic profit potential.
Proposition IB: the greater the presence in a city of
conditions generating anti-growth coalition participation,
the stronger the presence of the anti-growth coalition in
the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that
more restrictive and regulatory land use policies will be
adopted.


34
ability to understand the policy outputs of the political
process. For instance, land based interests, such as the
developers, bankers, and redevelopment-economic development
actors use the political process to further their own
interests (Molotch, 1976). By pressing for favorable
developmental policies such as transportation,
infrastructure, redevelopment or economic development, they
increase their opportunities to realize economic benefits.
Indeed, the entire local growth industry of services and
infrastructure is of vital importance to the economic well
being of the "growth machine" (Molotch, 1976). Economic and
developmental policies offer the richest policy area in
which the dynamics of urban politics are exemplified. The
growth and development of the city will influence the rest
of the policy making agenda. We must direct our attention to
the political treatment of economic issues in order to
understand the urban policy process.
Most intriguing about the more recent views of urban
political process are the various expectations of the role
which government will play in the process. The government as
an actor with its own motivations and as the promoter of the
collective interest that the market function cannot employ.
The different perspectives in the literature vary in their
expectation of the degree to which government can act as a
facilitator of marketplace demands or a director of the
process and its outputs. Quite possibly, these different


164
represent stronger disagreement exists on those issues in
the community.
As expected, there are differences in the responses of
the non-government respondents representing business and
citizen groups. Overall, the mean score for citizen group
members was 11.76 (high score = 16) This group had a greater
perception of conflict on issues than did business
respondents who had a mean score of 10. Government actors
had a mean score of 8.4. These results coincide with the
stability of the land use process responses and suggest that
citizen group members have a perception that there is
greater conflict in the land use process than do government
or business interest respondents. This may indicate that
citizen groups are challengers to the political status quo.
Business and government do not perceive the level of
conflict to be as great.
Position and influence
Understanding the influence and activity levels of the
actors in the policy process will help to put perspective on
the perceptions of conflict in the community. To strategize
or to map the political situation it is necessary to know
not only the issue position of actors (conflict or agreement
on growth) but also their ability to influence the outcomes
of the policy process.
Actors are motivated to exercise their influence if
they think that a net gain in their position will occur


216
regions follow accordingly as they are beginning to
experience excessive growth. We would expect their policy
use scores to increase in the future.
Wrap upHave We Made Any Progress?
In the past the dominant theory concerning city growth
was economic determinism. Economists contend that growth
politics was forced to contend with the eventual economic
growth in an urban area and that it cannot be stopped
because of the laws of economics are at work. Economists
might also presume that as the economy grows stronger,
business interests will dominate the city government that is
only a reactor to forces it cannot hold back.
This is an oversimplification of growth politics in
urban places. There is some evidence that communities
experience various stages of growth and that the role of
government is important to how the political and economic
interactions will occur. For example, the city of Ft.
Lauderdale had no trouble saying no to a multi-million
dollar tourist industryspring-break for college students.
Many small beach hotels have gone bankrupt, beach businesses
are hurting. The city has rebuffed and run the college crowd
out of town, instead focussing on the yuppie upscale family
market. The city and county, however, have had enormous
difficulties saying no to developers. A strong group of key
developers have blocked restrictive land development
measures that nearby counties and cities have instituted.


209
We contend that the role of government is key to the
variation in land use policy adoption. Not all cities will
react in the exact same manner to growth. Government can
take conservative, liberal, or progressive roles. The role
of government is affected by the conflict or tension level
in the community manifested through interest group influence
and participation. The more demands placed on government,
the greater the tension with which government must contend.
Government's approach to these tensions results in policy.
The participation, ideology, and role of government
variables establish the framework which shapes government
action and policy outputs. In chapter one we set out four
propositions. Only three have been significantly addressed
so far. The fourth set of propositions (4A, 4B, 4C) suggest
that the degree of consensus or conflict in the community
will have a direct bearing on the policy development and
adoption. This is a community level proposition that is not
easily addressed by the data. Figure 1-2, however, portrays
the expected outcomes of these propositions. Figure 6-1
portrays the outcomes in terms of policy adoption.
Proposition 4A is represented by the consensus cell where
tension is low, decision making is long term, and fewer
policies are adopted. This cell, represents government as
facilitator and would include cities scoring low on the
policy use scale suggesting conservative growth politics.
Proposition 4B is represented by the conflict cell. Here


27
conflict among various interests affects the ability of the
policy process to operate. Low conflict and high consensus
reflects a homogeneous demand process, whereas high conflict
and low consensus reflects a heterogeneous demand process
(Yates, 1977 ) .
The variety of demands on the system reflects the
degree of similarity of group interests within a city. This
in turn affects the degree to which policy outputs are
coherent and thematic. A wide array of interests and demands
will force a wide variety of political policy responses.
Policy Process Explanations
Various explanations of the motivations and influences
on the policy process are found in the urban process
literature. Some attempts to analyze urban policy making
processes and outputs suggest that the process is policy
dependent. For instance, hyperpluralistic decision making
contributes to the ungovernable city (Yates, 1977).
Different issues will yield different decision making
processes such as rational, incremental, and reactive. Or
the city government may exhibit a self-interested behavior
patterning a reliance on supportive policies (Peterson,
1981; Tiebout, 1956).
In such cases the influence of different interest
groups will depend on the policy area being considered, for
instance, developmental, allocative, and redistributive
policies (Peterson, 1979). In development situations, the


79
county and cities, but did not use it (Carter, 1974, p.
154). The 1965 Master Plan encouraged development goals over
other goals for agriculture and conservation (Carter, 1974,
pp. 155,156). Even into the early 1970s Metro-Dade made its
land use decisions on an "ad-hoc case-by-case basis"
providing benefits to developers at the cost of long-term
planning goals (Carter, 1974, pp. 167).
Many developers in the 1950s and 1960s were
speculators taking advantage of the interest of out-of-state
land buyers and retirees who were eager to relocate to
Florida. Many new developments were self-contained and did
provided only limited infrastructure, instead relying on
wells and septic tanks. There was political pressure at the
state and local levels for short-term development and very
little consistent implementation of long-term planning
(Carter, 1974, p. 156). This put Florida cities on a path of
politically favoring short-term economic benefits by
authorizing quick development and profit. It also marked the
beginning of accruing long-term costs to the environment for
which government would have to pay later.
The St. Petersburg, Ft. Lauderdale, and Miami areas
experienced the most growth in the post war years (Table 3-
1). This boom period was marked by aggressive development
and market driven growth. The state government continued to
make policy contributions to spur growth. In 1941 the state
designated Nassau county, north of Jacksonville, an


40
progression of growth politics which provides an even
greater degree of independence for government actors.
Progressive Growth PoliticsGovernment as Manager
Other cities were able to effectively use a populist
political coalition and to enlarge the role of government
from partner in growth to manager of growth. This additional
dimension suggests that government can constructively manage
the interests and active participation of citizens and
neighborhood groups as an effective counterbalance to growth
machine interests.
Citizens participation, facilitated by government, is
the foundation of the populist movement and provides a means
to insure that benefits accrue to residents rather than to
narrow development interests. In Progressive politics,
however, government expands its role to a partner who can
challenge the dominance of conservative growth politics in
interest group competition, and also advance the role of
government to the status of manager of the growth process.
In this role government can begin to direct a multi
dimensional range of community benefits. Hartford and Santa
Barbara are examples of the successful use of "progressive
growth politics" (Clavel, 1986).
Planners play an important role by directing the
attention of citizens to potential benefits and the
administrators and elected officials to any excessive
benefits (windfalls) of the development interests that can


91
It is the intent of this act that its adoption
is necessary so that local governments can
preserve and enhance present advantages;
encourage the most appropriate use of land,
water, and resources, consistent with the
public interest; overcome present handicaps;
and deal effectively with future problems that
may result from the use and development of
land within their jurisdictions. Through the
process of comprehensive planning, it is
intended that units of local government can
preserve, promote, protect, and improve the
public health, safety, comfort, good order,
appearance, convenience, law enforcement and
fire prevention, and general welfare; prevent
the overcrowding of land and avoid undue
concentration of population; facilitate the
adequate and efficient provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, recreational facilities, housing, and
other requirements and services; and conserve,
develop, utilize, and protect natural
resources within their jurisdictions (F.S.
163.3161 (3)).
State review powers were to be used only to insure
local compliance with comprehensive planning requirements.
The contents of the plan and the specifics of its
implementation were left to local government discretion and
not subject to state approval. Through a conscious decision
to shape uniformly the local decision-making process, the
state began to institutionalize its own land use regulation
process. Every plan was to have a coordinated set of nine
elements addressing the various aspects of growth. The nine
elements in the LGCPA were to be planned in coordination
with each other. The elements were 1) future land use, 2)
traffic circulation 3) sanitary sewer 4) conservation 5)
recreation-open space 6) housing 7) intergovernmental
coordination 8) utilities and 9) coastal zone (if a coastal


81
"industrial county." Polluting waterways was allowed as a
necessary function for industry (Carter, 1974, p. 46).
Industrial paper companies discovered an exceptionally
beneficial growth climate available to them. The data
suggests the development of a growth profile that
potentially benefits the growth machine through conservative
growth politics.
Problems in paradise
Growth was encouraged by the lack of development
controls and the state efforts to encourage growth through
economic incentives for land development. (Statewide zoning
enabling was not established until the constitutional
revision of 1969 (O'Connell, 1977).) But this approach had a
high cost associated with it.
Natural disasters and reckless care of sensitive lands
brought attention to the dysfunctions of growth. Major
ecological and environmental problems resulted from the
short-sighted approach to develop land through a market-
driven process. The competition for space and water between
development interests and environmentalists crystallized the
political problems facing Florida legislators as they
grappled with land use legislation. These problems forced a
change in state-wide growth politics from conservative to a
more liberal growth politics. While conservative growth
politics at the state level was declining, at the local
level growth politics remained relatively unchanged. The


120
purpose. The environment conditions play a secondary role by
constraining or expanding opportunities for the various
actors to affect policy selection.
Study Method
This research employed a non-random survey of policy
actors in 24 cities and 19 counties in the state of Florida.
A total of 151 usable survey responses were obtained out of
a possible 192 valid survey attempts yielding a response
rate of 78.6%. Partial information from two additional cases
are included in the results as well. Table 4-1 shows a
breakdown of attempts, responses and rates by respondent
group.
Central cities of metropolitan statistical areas in
Florida as of the 1980 Census were included in the study
along with the county in which each of these cities are
located. (There were 29 available central cities in the 18
Florida MSAs as of 1983.) Central cities and their counties
were chosen because they would be the communities most
likely to be experiencing the issues surrounding land use
politics. Also they would have a significant population size
for which specific socio-economic census data is available.
Eight respondent groups were selected to build the
mailing list for the survey. These groups are city planners,
county planners, city managers, county administrators,
directors of home builder associations, directors of
chambers of commerce, environmental groups, and neighborhood


188
Scores reflect whether or not the policy was used or not
used by the community based on the survey responses from
each city's planner respondent. The responses from planners
were recoded from a full range of value and use to a
dichotomous response of use (1) or non-use (0) of each
policy.1 The scale reflects a ranking of the cities and
counties by the number of policies that they use.
Communities with the largest score use the most number of
policies (maximum 11) and the lowest scores reflect that few
policies are used (Table 6-1). The policy use scale
represents the willingness of a community to adopt policies
that are outside the realm of being traditional and
politically safe. Communities found on the traditional end
of the scale reflect use of just a few, well-tested policies
while the innovative end of the scale reflects greater
reliance on policies, especially those that are more
politically risky.
The first group of policies are traditional and are
used most often by communities. These policies are capital
improvement plans, conventional zoning, minimum lot size
restrictions, planned unit development, utility placement,
and impact fees. These are the most accepted policies,
established in the largest number of places, and represent
those policies that generally are politically acceptable in
the land use process. They also represent a predictable land


142
government may take in their comprehensive plans and
development regulations. The research by Gleeson et al.
(1975) provided the initial guidance on selecting a variety
of flexible to regulatory policy approaches. Their approach
to ranking or grouping policies consisted of the permanence
of the policy (how easy is it to change) and the impact or
control over the market in determining land usage.
Policies for this survey were selected to represent a
continuum of government options for planning and
development. Policy characteristics represent regulatory or
flexible method of managing land use, effect on land price
or supply, using fiscal incentives, and permanence of the
policy components (as outlined by Gleeson et al., 1975). The
classification of policies ultimately may be refined to
reflect the acceptance of government intervention such as
traditional policies with controlled government involvement
to innovative policies with expanded government involvement.
Policies reflect the various impacts as outlined above,
but carry with them different levels of private and public
tolerance. Policies are not derived in a vacuum, but
represent a cumulative acceptance of government involvement
in the use of land. There may be a tendency to prefer a
regulatory or flexible approach, but the existence of policy
precedence may be a better indicator of the set of policies
which represent a community's approach to land use.


44
How can sunbelt cities make the transition form
conservative or pro-growth politics to a form of progressive
growth politics? Mollenkopf suggests that the inability of
urban sunbelt cities to make the transition to liberal or
progressive growth politics can be altered by the
development of a "new social contract" where
progressive national political entrepreneurs must take
the risk of mobilizing such constituencies in the
suburbs and newer cities as well as within the old. They
must also seek to control the competitive framework that
private institutions have exploited to undermine
redistributive politics in the past. But they must offer
the private sector some quid pro quo if massive,
debilitating conflict is to be avoided (Mollenkopf,
1983, pp. 297)
This call for a new urban political process suggests
that another dimension of growth politics is necessary to
define in order to understand how rapidly growing cities
have been able in some cases to overcome the market's
resistance to development regulation, moving them closer to
a partner or manager role for government. I suggest that
this other dimension to the developmental policy process is
growth management.
Growth ManagementGrowth Politics
Growth management, as a dimension of progressive growth
politics or even a stage itself, is based on government's
authority to institutionalize city regulatory and planning
powers and to encourage citizen participation as in
progressive and populist cities. In fact, Clavel (1986)
identifies these administrative and participatory components


236
lour r naanntn concerning adopted land uae policies and strategies will
contribute to our understanding of this subject.
0-10
Listed below are sooe of the aony land development policies and strategies
which cities aay adopt. Please select the response which reflects the
lsportance, if any, of each policy/strategy towards achieving the olty's land
developaent goals.
(circle your answer)
INTEGRAL aeons is integral to the success
NECESSARY aeons is necessary to the success
NO AFFECT aeons does not contribute to the suocess
IMPED EH ENT aeons lapedes the success
NOT USED aeons Is not used
DK aeons don't know
Contribution to the Achieveaent of the Land Developaent Cools
Policy/Strategy INTEGRAL NECESSARY
NO AFFECT
IMPEDIMENT
NOT USED
DK
Land Bonking 1
2
3
4
5
6
Gresnbelt 1
2
3
4
5
6
Agriculture-
Protective Zone 1
2
3
4
5
6
Controlled
Utility Placeaent 1
2
3
4
5
6
Capitol laproveaent
Plan 1
2
3
4
5
6
Critical Area
Designation 1
2
3
4
5
6
Developaent
Transfer Rights 1
2
3
4
5
6
Conventional
Zoning 1
2
3
4
5
6
PUD 1
2
3
4
5
6
Flexible Zoning 1
2
3
4
5
6
Miniaua Lot/Sixe
Restrictions 1
V
2
3
4
5
6
Iapoct Pees 1
2
3
4
5
6
Enterprise Zones 1
2
3
4
5
6
Tax Increaent
Financing 1
2
3
4
5
6
Regulating the f of
Developaent Permits 1
2
3
4
5
6
Moratoriums on
Land Developaent 1
2
3
4
5
6
Land Use Performance
Standards 1
2
3
4
5
6
A


are some parallels to policy adoption and use that may be
able to be drawn.
Three aggregate variables are created to represent
these ideologies. LIB, CONSV, and PROGR represent scales
created from the ideology survey questions that measure
agreement with liberal and conservative implementation of
the land use process, and progressive roles for government
in the land use process respectively. On each of these
variables, a higher score represents agreement with the
ideology. LIB is made up of qustions 16-1, 16-6, 16-8, and
16-9 in the planners' questionnaires (question 11 in the
groups' questionnaire and question 8 in the administrators'
questionnaire). Likewise, CONSV is made up of questions 16-
3, 16-4, and 16-5. All respondents were asked those
questions. PROGR is made up of questions 17-2, 17-3, and 17
4 in the planner's questionnaire (question 10 in the groups
questionnaire). The question was not asked of
administrators.
Conflict
Conflict, as it pertains to the adoption of local
policy, can be located at the individual levelconflict
between actorsand at the city levelwithin the policy
adoption process. Conflict between various actors is
addressed through survey questions concerning actor groups'
(business and citizen) positions on the growth issue.


use performance standards, an innovative but less accepted
policy.
Incentive Policies
147
Government can impact both the supply of land available
for various uses and the market value of land (and demand)
by influencing financial options to both encourage and
discourage land use. These financial policies allow
government to regulate windfalls, by recouping the cost of
land development for the community through regulation and at
the same time encourage flexibility through financial
incentives to property owners and developers. Policies such
as impact fees, enterprise zones, capital improvement
budget, and tax increment financing may suggest a growth
management approach. (This does not promote or restrict
growth but gives government an opportunity to be a director
and achieve a beneficial position between conservative and
liberal ideology.)
The three incentive policies used in this analysis are
impact fees and enterprise zones, less acceptable policies
and capital improvement budget, a traditional or highly
accepted policy.^
Table 4-3 is a list of the policies used in the survey
instrument, their method of control, expected impact on the
use of land, and the degree of permanence exhibited by the
policy. But as pointed out, the realities of political needs
and actual land use governance does not adapt well to these


230
-property tax as percent of total government revenues
-local property tax rate compared to rates in nearby areas
2. alternative revenue sources
Government
- enterprise revenues (Logan,1976b)
- long term bond debt (Dowall,1980)
- increase in revenues:increase in taxes,
- user fees (Peterson,1979 fiscal capacity)
Survey Data
Administrators' role in the development of land use policy
Proposition 4A 4C
rational, incremental process
consensus (elite), conflict (pluralist), compromise (state
directed)
single, many interests; short, long term
Determinations of these concepts will have to be done by
survey instrument.
-more changes allowed to plan, more incremental
(Yates,1977; Ervin et al.,1977)
-more difficult change process in policy, less erosion by
incremental change (Yates,1977)


202
contributors to understanding the differences in the use of
land use policies.
We should consider too that in the order of the Gutman
scale, cities had higher policy use scores than did
counties. But there are cities at the low end of the scale.
This skew in the data may reflect why survey predictors are
so weak. There is less to predict than in the combined
analysis.
Another important positively correlated variable on the
city only function is the region of the respondents. The
region coefficient loaded positively, ahead of growth rate
on this function. This adds to our contention that there are
political differences around the state and that different
stages of growth may be identified in these regions. Highest
city growth rates are in the central and panhandle regions
followed by the southeast.
Again, however, the positive correlation of growth rate
is troublesome. The southeast and the panhandle regions have
some similar attributes such as growth rate. Yet the two are
very different in terms of their ideologies and politics.
The two may have similar conditions but be experiencing
different stages of growth. The growth rate variable may be
less indicitive of policy and more of conflict present. As
it is related to the traditional policies, we may find that
those policies are found in mature growth communities which
have returned to the private city and in new growth


211
tension is high and the time frame is short and more
policies are adopted. Cities represented in this cell have
government in the role satisficer and portray liberal growth
politics. Proposition 4C is the compromise cell where
tension may run high or low and the time frame may vary as
well. The distinguishing characteristic here is the
dominance of government as a power in the community and the
ability of government to assume a manager/director role. In
the situations where compromise exists with high tensions,
the number of policies would be higha regulatory, populist
environment. In the cell where compromise exists with low
tensions, the number of policies would be fewera more
flexible, progressive environment.
The larger context of community power provides an
additional dimension to predict policy responses. The
different perceptions of community power structure by the
different respondent groups signals the difficulty in
establishing the power structure of a community. But we
suggest that the pattern of policy adoption and the
character of those policies has a relationship to the type
of political climate and influence structure that exists,
including perceptions of community power. Business perceives
greater stability and less conflict as well as a pluralistic
or government dominated process. That represents a space
somewhere between consensus and incremental compromise.
Citizen groups perceive greater conflict and less stability


129
ROLE OF ROLE OF LAND USE
ACTORS GOVERNMENT POLICIES
-Conflict
-Facilitator
-Traditional/
Accepted
-Power
>
-Satisficer
>
-Ideology
-Manage r/
-Innovative/
Di rector
Risky
INTERVENING VARIABLES
-Growth Profile
-Economic Conditions
-Government Finances
/ \
Policy Process
Figure 4-1


174
Citizen group respondents and government respondents
strongly supported the scenario (expected) as did business
groups (unexpected). We might explain the business response
by suggesting that it is easier for business respondents to
agree with this concept in the abstract than if agreement
means a direct loss to them.
The second deviance from expected responses is between
government and citizen group respondents. They significantly
disagreed on the question of the intentions of developers.
Citizen group members were more likely to agree that
developers were not concerned about the public good
(expected) while government respondents disagreed strongly
with that evaluation (unexpected). Government respondents
agreed with three of the four liberal scale questions. Their
mean scale score is 10.9. The question they disagreed with
is one which directly attacks developers' credibility. This
is another indication that government respondents may take a
significant alternative position on land use issues, a
position that resurfaces on the next scale.
In the second set of scenarios, three questions
represent a scale of conservative ideology on planning
issues. The variable CONSV is constructed and measured in
the same way as LIB. Higher scores on CONSV reflect a
positive, supportive attitude (measured by agreement) toward
the role of developers in the land use process. The
scenarios suggest that in their endeavors developers are


157
Table 5-1 Perceptions of Growth as a Community Issue (Ql)
All
Govt.
Business Citizen
No. 1 issue
33%
33
22
40
Priority
60
60
68
51
Sometimes a Priority
5
6
5
5
Minor
.7
1
0
0
Not an issue
0
0
0
0
Table 5-2 Perceptions of
Government's Position Toward
Growth (Q24)
All
Govt.
Business
Citiz<
Support Unconditional
9%
6
0
21
Support Conditional
83
86
84
71
Neutral
1
3
0
0
Oppose Conditional
7
3
16
7
Oppose Unconditional
0
0
0
0


155
interest groups are involved in land use politics and to
what degree in the policy process.
First, to identify the different land based interests
and the potential for conflict between the actors involved,
each respondent representing a private interest group was
asked to state the importance of the growth issue to their
group and all respondents (public and private) were asked to
state the importance of the growth issue to their community
(city or county). In addition all non-public respondents
were asked to state their group's position on the growth
issue and in turn all respondents (public and private) were
asked to state what they felt was their elected government's
position on growth.
Growth is a prominent issue in local communities
according to 93% of all the respondents (Table 5-1). There
is little significant variation between respondents on this
question, although an interesting pattern emerges that is
repeated throughout the survey. Citizen group respondents
perceive growth to be a greater issue to their community
than do business group respondents, and government
respondents's scores fall in the middle. Similarly there
seems to be great consensus between respondents on their
perceptions of their government's position towards growth
with 91% assuming that their government supports growth
(Table 5-2). But there are slight differences between the
scores of the respondents based on their group membership.


63
no moratoriums or limits on construction, willingness by
government to amend local plans, and an easy permitting
process. These represent policies the city can use to foster
a growth climate.
Developmental policies act as more than just an
important economic issue which facilitates the collaboration
of business and government. Planning processes have done
that for years (Rabinovitz, 1969; Altschuler, 1965;
Allensworth, 1980). But land use policies and other
development policies also have an impact on allocative
policies (Peterson, 1979). These traditional service
policies benefit the growth machine because they act as an
important support system. They placate the anti-growth
forces and facilitate the growth climate. For instance,
community amenities such as recreation, public safety, and
culture can act to maintain and facilitate demand for
residential location and promote development.
Normally, providing amenities through allocational
policies contributes to the residential character of the
area. This acts as an inducement which increases the
population of the area. But it also may lead to the
resistance of future growth by the very residents it
attracted in the first place. Once a residential character
is established, there may be a threshold beyond which
further growth is resisted. Restricting our study of growth
politics to developmental policies may obscure additional


41
and should be redirected to the benefit of the community.
Progressive politics is also a stage where government
pursues benefit equity by insuring that the costs of
economic development and growth are proportionately borne by
the growth machine which will profit from city growth
policies. In turn, a range of benefits from growth can be
directed, perhaps by regulatory parameters, to the existing
and future residents of the city.
A directed policy process is not a zero-sum approach
where the growth machine receives a disproportionate benefit
or pluralistic interest group competition biases the
outcome. Instead, progressive politics requires a directive
role by government and an active role by all the interest
groups and the public to direct the benefit outcomes. For
example, Hartford was successful in becoming a partner and a
director of downtown development. The city directed new
development as an equal partner in the process, eventually
becoming a co-developer on several major projects.
Development continued and profits were shared with existing
residents. Santa Barbara successfully implemented rent and
development controls to benefit citizens and at the same
time was able to negotiate in a positive manner with
developers (Clavel, 1986). This process differs from the use
of exactions or growth management regulations because
government is acting to integrate the citizenry and their
interests into the process. Exactions and regulations


158
Table 5-3 Perceptions of Growth as Group Issue (Q3GP)
All Groups
Business
Citizen
No.1 Issue
21.8%
32.4
12.2
Priority
59.0
62.2
56.1
Sometimes a
Priority 11.5
2.7
19.5
00
I'
ll
c
mean 2.1
1.7
2.4
Table 5-4
(Q4GP)
Perceptions of Group
Position Towards
Growth
All Groups
Business
Citizen
Support
53.2
91.9
19.0
Mixed
32.9
8.1
54.8
Oppose
5.1
0
9.5
No Position
8.9
0
16.7
n=79 mean
2.17
1.24
3.0


TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii
ABSTRACT vi
CHAPTERS
ONE INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS 1
The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development. 1
Political Economy and Policy 2
Which Cities Grow and Which Don'tThe Role of
Land Use Policy 6
Classification of Policy 12
Urban Policy Making Process 14
Research Methods 20
Conclusion 24
Notes 25
TWO POLITICS IN THE LAND USE POLICY PROCESS 26
Interest Groups and the Policy Process 26
Policy Process Explanations 27
Participation and Influence 28
Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process . 32
Political Economy 33
Government as Actor in the Policy Process 35
Conservative Growth PoliticsGovernment as
Facilitator 36
Liberal Growth PoliticsGovernment as Satificer. 37
Populist Growth PoliticsGovernment as Partner 38
Progressive Growth PoliticsGovernment as
Manager 40
Growth Politics in the Sunbelt 42
Growth ManagementGrowth Politics 44
Implementation of Growth Politics 46
Actors in the Process 47
Private sector actors 48
Public sector actors 55
Conflict in the Policy Process 60
Policy Outputs of the Growth Politics Process . 62
Conclusion 65
Notes 66
i i i


109
has on them in terms of benefits and costs. This is probably
the most difficult of the dilemmas to confront in the
political arena because the distribution of benefits creates
losers as well as winners. Government is better equipped to
make decisions on the processthe focus of the first two
dilemmas. Distribution choices cannot be made as easily and
are often left to be decided by the outcome of political
bargaining and incrementalism. This dilemma focusses on the
needs of individuals (individual rights) and the greater
public good (utilitarian benefits).
Pluralism and incrementalism, two standard features of
local government politics, usually are effective in altering
the policy rules of the game as needed in order to benefit
(accommodate) different interests. For example, zoning
designations are often amended or excepted through variances
for businesses and developers. Residents and
environmentalists, on the other hand, challenge and resist
individual changes that contribute to continued growth.
Florida local governments, even with the LGCPA, continued to
operate a zoning-driven planning process. Plans were
incrementally amended to reflect zoning changes and
pluralist interests (deHaven-Smith, 1984). Local governments
continued in the role of facilitator and not necessarily as
regulator or progressive partner.
But as the institutionalization of the land use process
increases, pluralism and incrementalism may have a


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Robyne Stevenson Turner was born and spent her
formative years in Chicago, Illinois. A thorough
indoctrination of local politics in the Chicago area created
a life-long fascination with urban politics and the internal
workings of local government. Ms. Turner attended the
University of Florida after receiving a high-school
education in Broward County, Florida. She earned the degrees
of Bachelor of Arts in political science and a Master of
Arts in Political Science with a Certificate in Public
Administration from the University of Florida. Upon
completion of these degrees, she married and relocated to
Jacksonville, Florida where she pursued a career as a social
services grantsperson and planner/advocate in a Community
Action Agency. After experiencing teaching at the junior
college level as a part-time adjunct, she returned to the
University of Florida to pursue and complete a doctorate in
political science focussing on urban studies and urban and
regional planning. Ms. Turner has recently returned to south
Florida as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Florida Atlantic University.
269


49
In a study of planning board members, support for
various land use policies by board votes were classified as
conservativemost frequently supporting rezonings for
higher densities, and liberalleast frequently supporting
such rezoning requests (Allensworth, 1980). The results
showed that the more conservative members "felt that
planning should be used to facilitate if not encourage
growth and development ... and tended to frown on the
concept that planning be used to control or regulate
community expansion" (Allensworth, 1980, p. 99). Zoning was
expected to serve as a policy mechanism to reflect market
demands. Liberals were more likely to expect the planning
function to be a restrictive devise providing a "positive
roleas an independent force designed to guide, direct, and
control" (Allensworth, 1980, p. 99). These results direct
our expectations of actors' growth positions which can be
determined by examining their opinions on the purposes of
land use policies.
A traditional power elite explanation (Hunter, 1953;
Domhoff, 1979) of the growth machine would define its
membership by reputational or positional power. The results
would identify a membership reflecting the makeup of
conservative growth politics. But the nature of
developmental land use policies is that there are other
interest groups who also can benefit from growth. For
example, in cities experiencing liberal and progressive


and citizen groups. They were selected because they
represent the main actor categories identified in growth
politicsgovernment, business/developers, and residents.
Survey Instrument and Method
The survey instrument was constructed by following the
"Total Design Method" (TDM) (Dillman, 1978). Its use is
recommended because of its track record of producing very
high response rates. To do this the method suggests the
construction of questions according to the information
needed, the best structure to elicit that information, and
the choice of words to convey the question. Question design
also was aided by examining other surveys that have been
done in the field of land use politics and community power.
The majority of the survey questions are close-ended to
maximize the efficiency of response information. A variety
of question styles were selected per TDM to make the
instrument less repetitious and to improve the potential
response level. Both multiple and single response questions
were provided. For instance the questions to government
officials concerning interest group and actor activities
allowed for multiple responses instead of limiting responses
to "the most" or "the best." This type of question does not
force arbitrary selection of actors which could provide
false feedback especially concerning influence and success.
Some questions were partially closed and provided an
opportunity for the respondent to fill in his/her own answer


156
Citizen group members perceive their government's support to
be more unconditional than do business group members.
Government officials's scores fall in between these two
groups of respondents.
Each respondent group surveyed, whether business,
citizen group or government may be involved with land use
for different reasons. For instance, developers and the
chamber of commerce have business interests which make it
advantageous for them to participate in this issue area.
Citizen groups may find their members individually affected
by growth as property owners or have a volunteer interest in
issues such as the impact of land use on the environment.
Government officials may take an active or passive role in
developing policies in the land use arena contributing to an
independent or subordinant role to interests and influences
in the community. These different interests and the
conflicts between them contribute to the growth climate of a
community in the policy making process.
Important differences which represent potential
conflict, do exist between business and citizen groups on
the questions of the importance of growth as an issue to
their group and the group's position towards growth (Tables
5-3, 5-4). Business group members representing homebuilders
and chambers of commerce had a greater propensity to respond
that growth is the number one or priority issue to their
organizations. Citizen group members representing


150
provide that stability. Anti-growth actors may favor new
policies added on to the existing traditional list in order
to change the process to suit a more regulatory parameter.
The more policies used, the greater the change in the rules
of the game. The fewer policies used, the greater the
stability in the rules of the game. Who is favored by the
rules as they are is yet to be determined. The dependent
variable POLICY represents the cumulative score of a
community of use of the 11 individual policies that make up
the scale.
Conclusion
The null hypothesis is that policies are randomly or
arbitrarily adopted and that political influence and power,
conflict, and ideology do not affect local governments'
selection of land use policies. The next chapter will
explore the data through statistical manipulation providing
the merits from which conclusions may be drawn.
The expected differences between groups in their
perceptions and as others perceive their activities suggests
that there is an order to the influence and dynamics of the
land use policy process. Combining these indications with
the classification of policies and their ratings leads us to
suspect that there is a connection between interest group
activity and policy relevance.


55
regulation is at the discretion of each local government
(DeGrove, 1986, pp. 395-6). We might expect to find
progressive growth politics in this situation allowing for a
diversity of interests managed by government process.
Once again, we can find different actors at different
periods of time, each with a different perspective towards
growth. The dominant actors define which type of growth
politics is occurring and more importantly, what type of
land use policies are being adopted and used in similar
cities.
Public sector actors
The final group of actors to consider are from the
public sectorthe city itself, and its components the
planners and administrators. The city may act according to a
self-interest by concentrating on the production of a strong
revenue base and pursuing a pro-growth strategy through
certain policies. It is the planners and administrators,
however, who can provide the greatest insight to the public
sector interests.
Planners and administrators have a responsibility to
pursue a neutral representation of all community interests
in their plans and policies. But often they do not. The
planner, his plans, and the administration at whose pleasure
they serve, can serve a particular interest. For instance,
Minneapolis planners played a reactive role in the
conservative growth politics of that city (Altschuler,


a high conservative score reflects an agreement with a
flexible, minimal role for government and a reliance on
market forces to affect land use.
223
POWER
Value
Frequency
Valid Pe
Public Sector
47
33.8%
Business Sector
22
15.8
Mixed Groups
70
50.4
missing
14
numbe r
T53
TM
Note: Community power
is a nominal
variable. Each re
selected the representation of decision making power that
best reflected their community either many groups,
businesses, or elected / administrative government
officials.
Ecological Variables
POP85 City or county population 1985 estimates from the
University of Florida Bureau of Business and Economic
Research.
GROW City or county population
TRESC City level percentage
purposes. Census of Governments
growth rate 1980 to 1985.
of land used for residential
1982 .
HSVAL City level 1980 median value of owner occupied
housing units. City County Data Book 1983.
PCINC City level 1980 per capita personal income. City -
County Data Book 1983.
USERPR PTXPR City level Fiscal year 1983-84 proportion
o£ city government revenues derived from user fees and
property taxes. Florida Local Government Financial Report
FY83-84.
CAPPR City level Fical year 1983-84 proportion of city
government expenditures in category designated capital
outlay. Florida Local Government Financial Report FY83-84.


191
scores and order of policies. The results of the two
scalograms mean that the policies most frequently used are
also the most valued and the policies that are used the
least are the least valuable in attaining land use goals
according to the responses received from planners (Table 6-
1) .
Multivariate Data Results
We want to determine what if any relationship exists
between the selection and use of land use policies and the
independent variables of community participants and
environment. Proposition one suggests that policies are
dependent on actor characteristics and participation in the
process. Propositions two and three suggest that policy
adoption is dependent on ecological factors present in the
community. We expect to find that both sets of independent
variables will contribute to the selection of land use
policies.
We chose to use discriminant analysis as the method to
explore the independentdependent variable relationships.
Because of the Gutman properties of the variance in the land
use policies, traditional parametric measure were
unsuitable. In addition, several of the variables are
dichotomous or nominal in character. Regression analysis
would be unsuitable for much of the data set.
Discriminant analysis is a method which allows
independent variables to be arrayed along the dimensions of


203
communities which are beginning to reflect growth machine
politics.
Discussion
The data results are indications that participant
influence is related to the adoption of land use policies.
It is difficult to measure and statistically prove influence
and community power. But the results do contribute to our
contention that policy is related to an community agenda
framed by interests of urban political economy. We have
presented data which suggests relationships between a
political actadoption and evaluation of policyand the
participation of political actors in the process. This is
more than just a pattern of influence, it is an
interrelationship. The separate position taken by government
on the ideology and conflict questions suggests more than a
zero-sum game.
The environment variables contribute to the climate of
participation by certain groups. While this lends support to
the theories of economic determinism, they also reveal a
pattern that follows the political participant data pattern.
The importance of regional differences should not be
overlooked. This suggests that there are stages to growth
that have ecological and political characteristics.
Government can intervene in the economic trends.


I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as
a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Earl Starnes'^'*
Professor of Urban and Regional
Planning
This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
the Department of Political Science in the College of
Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was
accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
August, 1988


80
Table 3-1
Location
Selected
Population Growth Rates
Change in Population (%)
1940-80
1940-50
1950-60
1960-70
1970-80
Dade county
84.91
88.86
35.58
28.20
Miami
44.78
17.00
14.80
3.53
Hialeah
397.11
240.37
52.97
41.77
Broward
county
110.91
297.87
52.97
41.77
Ft.Lauderdale
101.86
130.25
66.87
9.80
Palm Beach
county
43.37
98.89
52.99
65.26
Boca Raton
37.20
601.71
1223.27
67.39
Orange county
(Orlando)
64.00
129.26
30.64
36.75
Pinellas
county
(St. Pete)
73.37
135.26
39.41
39.28
Hillsborough
county
(Tampa)
38.71
59.18
23.24
31.96
Duval county
(Jacksonville)
44.67
49.79
16.12
7.96
Bay county
106.36
57.25
12.14
30.11
(Panama City)
Source: Figures generated from the Florida Statistical
Abstract, 1951, 1961, 1971, and 1981


8
INPUT THRUPUT OUTPUT
Independent Variables Dependent
Variables
Participation
Survey Data
Growth Machine
Policy Process
Land Use Policy
>
Consensus
Conflict
Compromise
>
Traditional
Flexible
Anti-Growth
Coalition
Innovative-
Regulatory
Ecological Profiles
Growth
Economics
Government
Systems Model
Figure 1-1


240
Q-20
Horn such influence do you expeot the newly required capital improvement eleaent
to have on other policy deciaion areas (such as transportation, criae, taxes,
schools) in your city? (circle nuaber)
1 STRONG INFLUENCE -HOST POLICY AREAS WILL BE AFFECTED BT THE CAPITAL
IMPROVEMENT ELEMENT
2 MODERATE INFLUENCE -SOME POLICY AREAS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE CAPITAL
IMPROVEMENT ELEMENT
3 NO INFLUENCE
A DON'T KNOW
Please evaluate the level of oonflict which accoapanied the adoption of your
city's future land use eleaent and the policies/strategies used in your city to
iapleaent it. (circle nuaber)
Q-21
Future Land Use Eleaent
1 GREAT AMOUNT OP CONFLICT
2 SOME CONFLICT
3 NO CONFLICT
A DON'T KNOW
Q-22
Land Use Policies/Strategies
1 GREAT AMOUNT OF CONFLICT
2 SOME CONFLICT
3 NO CONFLICT
A DON'T KNOW
Q-23
Has the adoption of any one particular land use policy/strategy been
accoapanied by a significant amount of conflict? (circle nuaber)
1 YES
2 NO
3 DON'T KNOW
If yes, please specify which one
Q-2A
Please select the position which aost closely refleots your perception of the
position on growth held by your elected city governaent. (circle nuaber)
1 SUPPORTS GROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY
2 SUPPORTS CROWTH WITH CONDITIONS
3 NEUTRAL -DOES NOT SUPPORT OR OPPOSE GROWTH
A OPPOSES CROWTH UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
5 OPPOSES CROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY
7 DON'T KNOW \
8


76
understanding of institutional power, its relation to the
operation of interest group and community power (in terms of
gains and losses), and the policies adopted by governments
in each type of political process.
Florida Growth Politics
Conservative Growth Politics
Conservative growth politics as we have discussed
previously, is an unrestrained growth machine approach to
development and is most likely to be associated with the
government dilemma of uniformity or diversity of the policy
process. In Florida this dilemma centers on the land use
process that the state makes available to local governments
for devising and implementing growth-management policies.
Uniformity represents the degree to which growth management
is regulated and guided by the state through a decision
framework implemented at the local level but required by the
state. Diversity represents the degree of local discretion
given to local government by the state in interpreting or
implementing their own approach to growth management and
land use.
State mandates are an example of uniformity. Lovell and
Tobin (1981) suggest that state mandates reduce the
decision-making discretion of local governments. State
demands for uniformity may also increase the fiscal
dependency of local governments that cannot afford to
implement the state-mandated policies (Lovell, 1981).


64
political factors. But we can not expect to study every
policy, then we would have not established any positive
theory. The aim of this study is to establish the importance
of developmental policies as tone setters in the city and
that options in other policy areas will respond.
Some cities, however, may not need to adopt policies
which directly facilitate a growth climate. They may be
natural economic centers or have a physical environment that
attracts people. But as is the case with development
subsidies, cities may be forced to be boosters for growth to
symbolically gain political benefits and because developers
expect cities to provide supportive policies. Most cities do
not want to give the appearance that they do not support
growth. If demand to locate in the city is great (measured
by strong economic development presence and population
increase) we expect that a growth climate and appropriate
land use policies will be in evidence.
Therefore, one of the hypothesis in this research is
that the city's ability and proclivity to regulate land is
of prime importance to the success of the land based
interests. Their ability to influence, infiltrate, and
direct the policy making process can yield land use policies
that support their position.
But the balance of political influence between the growth
and anti-growth forces in the political process varies from
city to city, yielding a variety of land use policy outputs.


Regional Differences 181
Conclusion 184
Notes 186
SIX POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP LINKAGES 187
Land Use Policy Adoption in a Growth Politics
Environment 187
Land Use PoliciesDependent Variables 187
Multivariate Data Results 191
City and County Policy Uses 193
City Policy Uses 198
Discussion 203
Use By Region 204
Conclusion 208
Urban Political Economy 212
Stages of Growth Politics 213
Wrap UpHave We Made Any Progess 216
Notes 219
APPENDICES
A INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 220
B AVAILABLE OPERATIONALIZED VARIABLES 224
C QUESTIONNAIRES AND LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION. . 231
REFERENCES 258
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 269
V


178
Table 5-12 Progressive IdeologyPercentage Strongly Agree
and Agree
Question 17
All
Business
Citizen
Govt.
Limit Fringe Dev.
58%
11
79
80
Utility Placement
38
5
36
72
Infill
52
25
52
77
Mean response scores on created scale PROGR (Alpha=.7468)
Citizen group respondents
6.16 *
Business group respondents
9.24 *
Government respondents
5.76 *
significant < .0005
Note: scores on this scale reflect the following reverse
codestrongly agree = 1 strongly disagree = 4.


170
Table 5-9 Community Power (Q27)
All
Govt.
Business
Citiz
Public Sector
30.7%
34.3
51.3
8.7
Business
14.4
5.7
10.8
32.6
Groups
45.8
54.3
32.4
46.5
n=150
n=70
n=37
n=43
could have an unbeatable affect on the land use policy
adoption process. But we know that the growth machine
scenario does not always prevail. We suggest that it is the
role of government that plays a large part in intervening in
interest group tensions and providing an alternative policy
course. When government actors were asked which groups were
the most successful in influencing the land use process, 30%
nominated city and county government. This is not an
overwhelming show of faith in their own ability to affect
policy outcomes. But it does represent that government
actors feel they can make an impact, even if they are not
the "most influential" actor in the land use process. An
examination of how respondents perceive the role of
government will provide additional insights.
Ideology and the Role of Government
The final participant characteristic measured is the
ideologies of the land use process actors. Two series of
attitude questions are designed to identify individual


CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS
The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development
Land is a commodity that has definable economic value. Its
current and future uses are affected by the policies
contained in the city comprehensive plan and related
ordinances. These policies in turn affect the value of the
land. The use of land is an economically motivated process
and a government regulated process. Ordinances, land use
planning regulations, and long term comprehensive plans
affect the economic value of land. Beginning in 1926 in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., local government
established the legal right to regulate the use of land.^
Since then, economic and political interests interact and
are dependent upon each other. The relationship between
these interests is reflected in land use policy. The best
method to examine this phenomenon may be through the
political economy approach: "the systematic interaction
between economic and political processes" (Swanstrom, 1985,
p. 12).
The public, individuals and land-based interest groups,
have much at stake in the development of land use policies.
The way in which land is used affects city population size
1


175
responding to legitimate market demands, that they have a
legitimate complaint against cost increasing regulations on
development activity, and that planners' environmental
concerns sometimes conflict with other legitimate objectives
that should take priority. These questions suggest that
developer interests should not be impeded and that their
interests are a legitimate response to public demand.
Business groups are expected to "agree" or "strongly agree"
with these conservative ideology questions.
The results of this series of questions is not as clear
cut as those constituting the liberal ideology (Table 5-11).
First, as expected the business group members strongly
agreed with all three scenarios. Their mean score on this
scale is 9.5 out of a possible score of 12. For the most
part, as expected, the citizen group members leaned toward
disagreement, though the results are not as divergent as
they were on the liberal series. Their mean score on the
CONSV scale is 6.26.
Government respondents, however, did not follow the
citizen responses. Instead they leaned toward agreement with
the scenarios that represent the direct actions or interests
of developers. Their mean score is 7.67, again placing them
in the middle of the two interest groups. Overall then,
government consistently agreed with questions that are more
abstract about priorities where the winners and losers are
nameless. Planners and administrators are in a position


192
the dependent variable values (Klecka, 1980; Weisberg,
1984a). It is a method similar to linear regression that
allows us to determine which independent variables are the
best predictors of survey cases which will be assigned to
each policy group. The interpretation of the data allows us
to understand which independent variables have what strength
relationship with each group of the dependent variable. We
expect that the business oriented, pro-growth independent
variables would predict the group one policies representing
traditional, permissive land use. We expect that the citizen
oriented, anti-growth independent variables would be
associated with the group two policies representing the more
restrictive and politically risky land use approach.
In this case, the dependent variable groups are 1) the
most used policies and 2) the balance of the policies. The
analysis provides an indication of the distance between the
means of the two dependent variable groups. In addition it
indicates the strength of the independent variables' ability
to predict which of the individual cases (with their local
community's policies assigned to them) belong to each
dependent group. From the results of the discriminant
analysis we can put together a picture of the type of
community and political characteristics which are most
strongly associated with uses of certain land use policies.
Since we know from the scalogram which policies are most
often used and which are least often used, we know which


206
Table 6-5
Population Growth
Rate by Region
1980-85
City
County
Uninco
State mean
9.83
18.98
22.06
Region N
5.3
16.44
28.37
Region SE
9.33
18.90
15.26
Region SW
7.34
17.41
22.33
Region C
12.34
22.98
24.8
Region P
17.3
17.61
23.18
Legend: NE=northeast P=panhandle C=central SW=southwest
SE=southeast
use performance standards, utility placement, and impact
fees. This may be due to a long-standing tradition of
political support and encouragement of growth by governments
in this region. Governments in this region may be more
selective in the policies they are willing to use, choosing
those that are more politically acceptable (traditional).
The Southeast region is also highly dependent on county
activities in land use. For instance, Broward County has
review and approval authority for local comprehensive plans.
Metro-Dade county has authority to oversee land use
activities in cities. Scores in the county subset reflect a
strong presence of government in the Southeast region,
helping to explain the lower than expected scores for that
region in the city subset.
The other region scores in the county subset reflect
the same pattern as the city subset. There is little
variation in use scores between regions except as noted in


98
... facilitate operation of the economic
forces which determine land use ...
(Comprehensive Plan Document Marion County,
1978).
In addition, that same plan specifically states that land
development should not be "unduly hindered by unnecessary
laws, restrictions, or practices" that interfere with market
activities in conjunction with land use (Marion County,
1978 ) .
Several plans give an endorsement of conservative
growth politics in their framework statements. One county
asserts that a growth process should have regulations which
reflect that
An enlightened public policy is required which
recognizes that it is not merely a matter of
limiting growth, but rather developing
policies to rationally accommodate it ....
residents feel threatened at the prospect of
... vanishing open space ... (and) have
congealed into what has been termed a "non
growth" ethic ... Yet not all growth is bad
(Orange County Growth Management Policy,
1981) .
A city within that county exhibited a similar approach when
it stated that
... growth has a good side, while there will
be more people ... there will be more money,
too. In fact, average incomes will increase.
There will be more people and more businesses
the services and facilities which
to the good life ... Growth
follows from the perception that
cause of growth cannot be directly
to sustain
contribute
management
the basic
controlled by local or any other government
... (Growth Management Plan Vol.3 Part 2
Orlando 1980).


218
conservative approach. They may be experiencing the back to
the private city stage after restricting growth for some
time. The dominant senior citizen political coalition has
been ousted from the city council. A new group of younger
business oriented politicians have been elected. Their
agenda is to redevelop the downtown, stimulate the economy,
and facilitate growth. There appears to be a great deal of
conflict in the city over the future course of action. This
city may be a case where strong land use controls cannot
head off more development in the downtown area. Downtown
development is a land use area which may need to be
researched separately from the overall land use politics in
the community.
Cities around the country are experiencing growth
problems and trying to remedy them by traditional interest
group competition methods. The political question should not
be what should we do about growthshould we allow it or
not. The appropriate political question should be what are
the interests in this community and how can government
mediate those interests? Does growth fit into those
interests now or in the future? Can we be flexible enough to
adapt to the changes brought by economic or personal
interests? Perhaps the results of this research will help to
direct those policy questions by shedding some light on the
complex land use process that are framed by the agenda of
urban political economy.


130
and influence government's role in the process of
controlling land use. By understanding the political
influence or power of each of the groups and their
attitudes, we may be able to build insights about why
certain policies are adopted and others are not.
Orientations about the role of government are identified
through attitudes about land use responsibilities. The power
to implement those orientations affects the adoption and use
of policies governing land use and the direction which
government takes in its land use role.
Power
Sources of political power and the use of it in the
land use process can be approached by a number of different
dimensions. These range in order from participation in the
planning processa modest potential for powerto
interactions such as activity level, contact, responsiveness
to groups, requests by groups, and success by influencing
the process to achieve a desired policy outputa reflection
of some power. Each group was asked to answer questions
about their own activities and influence abilities in the
land use planning process. Planners and administrators were
asked to indicate their perceptions of these groups' past
efforts to participate in and influence the land use
process.
Power and influence are concepts which are difficult to
prove because they are often based on perceptions.


18
Conflict Time Frame
Long Term
Short Term
Low Tension
Consensus
Compromise
(elite)
(Government
Director)
High Tension
Compromise
Conflict
(Government Director)
(Pluralism)
Land Use Policy Process
Figure 1-2


24
statewide planning regulations contributes to government
autonomy. Also measures of alternative revenue sources,
reliance on property tax, and government debt for
infrastructure are examined as possible influences on
governments' role in the land use process. Survey data was
collected concerning the values and concerns of
administrators (planners and managers), and their
perceptions of political influence on the land use policy
process.
The dependent variable is measured by survey response
as a substitute for content analysis. Planning directors
were asked whether or not a particular land use policy is
used in their city to evaluate its importance to the intent
of their comprehensive plan goals.
Conclusion
The rest of the chapters expand on the growth issue in
the context of urban politics. Chapter two is a discussion
of land use politics and the role of interest groups and
actors in the process. Chapter three presents these concepts
through the case study of land use politics in the state of
Florida as a prelude to the research on growth politics in
Florida urban areas. Chapter four presents the study method
by revisiting the propositions through the operationalizing
of the independent and dependent variables. Chapter five
presents the data results and Chapter six interprets the


148
analytical confines. Instead, traditional policies exist in
nearly every city regardless of political ideology or
participant power. But a city's decision to add on to that
traditional set of policies is an indication of branching
out or willing to be innovative until that new set of
policies becomes accepted and thus traditional. The more
policies used by a city, the more unpredictable its land use
process and the more likely it is to be struggling to adapt
to various interests. The fewer policies used by a city, the
more manageable and predictable is its land use process and
the less likely is there to be conflict. The presence of
different measures of actor support and success will
indicate their power to move the land use process off
traditional ground or keep it there as the status quo.
A Gutman scale of 11 items was created from the
original list of policies. (A full explanation is included
in the next chapter.) The scale reflects that the most used
policies are somewhat traditional in their characterization.
The least used policies are the innovative, restrictive
policies. Therefore, the greater the number of policies used
by a community, the less traditional and the more
unpredictable their process. That is unpredictable from a
political standpoint in terms of the process parameters.
More predictable in the sense of being more regulatory.
Developers seek a non-changing predictable policy
environment that they can count on. Traditional policies


117
study contributes to theory in the form of "statements of
regularity about the structure, behavior, and interaction of
phenomena" (Eckstein, 1975, p. 88). Case studies are
abundant in the field of community power and urban policy.
Comparative cases, however, are limited. In the area of
developmental policies and land use there are no systematic,
large scale comparative studies addressing policy output.
This research then makes an original contribution to the
field.
This research builds from a systems model of the
interaction of elements of the policy making process and
applies them over the city and county cases.1 At that level,
the unit of analysis is the communitycity or county. The
dependent variable, land use policies, and independent
variables, ecological data, are measured at the community
level and assigned to each case (the survey respondent). To
make a case for the utility of the input variables (in terms
of their impact on the thruput decision making mechanisms
and output policies) the survey data uses the individual
participant (case) as the unit of analysis. The research
then works on two levels. It is a comparative aggregate
study of interest group attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions
with the data relevant at the community case level.
Policy Process Operation
The process of creating and adopting urban policy is
complicated and dynamic. Several aspects of the process that


48
Private sector actors
The growth machine coalition is expected to exhibit for
the most part, characteristics of conservative growth
politics in their attempt to dominate the policy making
process and secure passage and implementation of
economically beneficial growth policies. The political
process and the economic sector become integrally linked.
For example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit bond project in San
Francisco was successful despite an initial split of support
by the business elites in that city. (Whitt, 1982) They
eventually coalesced to provide solid support for the bond
issue and its passage. On this important developmental issue
the growth interests directed their attention to its success
for long-run benefits. Whitt suggests that the support for
the BART project represents a dialectic coalition between
the interests of government and business in the growth
politics process.
We expect the pro-growth interests to support pro
development policies in order to secure economic benefits.
But in order to gain insight into this group of actors it is
necessary to understand not only their policy preferences
but also what their value perspectives are towards land use
policies. Specifically, does their support of market
principles carry over to support for a particular role for
government in the land use development process?


198
ideology, lower scores of citizen success, and less citizen
support for growth.
These results suggest that the growth machine politics
pattern of business interests and less influence of
traditional anti-growth interests is a good predictor of
lower policy use scores. The growth machine has a
relationship with the adoption and use of acceptable,
traditional land use policies. This contributes to our
expectation that pro-growth interests want to have a
predictable policy environment.
The significant ecological variable, higher growth
rates, also is associated with lower policy use scores.
Higher growth rate communities are prevalent in the central
and panhandle regions for cities and central and southeast
for counties. It is difficult to interpret this variable in
the combined analysis. We expect that high growth rates
would yield high levels of conflict and thus would be
associated with more policies not less. Traditional policies
are predicted by business success (expected) and high growth
and conflict (unexpected).
City Policy Uses
Two discriminant analysis were performed, one using the
ecological variables only and the second using both survey
and ecological variables. The ecological variables used,
representing growth, economic, and government indicators,


252
Q-8
Approximately how often does someone from the olty (council, manager,
end/or planning department) contact your group In order to learn the
group's position on land use policy or to obtain Information?
(circle number)
1 FREQUENTLY- MORE THAN ONCE A MONTH
2 SOMETIMES- ONCE EVERY FBW MONTHS
3 ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR
A NEVER
5 DON'T KNOW
0-9
In your Judgement, how often has the city government responded favorably
to the requests or land use policy preferences of your group directly by
land use policy adoption or change?
(droll number)
1 FREQUENTLY- MORE THAN ONCE A MONTH
2 SOMETIMES- ONCE EVERY FEW MONTHS
3 ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR
A NEVER
5 DON'T KNOW
Mow we would appreciate your opinions on none land use issues.
Q-10
Each of the following statements is a policy that can be used by local
governments to implement their land use element plan. For each policy
please indicate your opionlon. (oiris your answer)
! STRONGLY
AGREE
1 Minimum lot size requirement
for single family residential
subdivisions on the
urban fringe 1
2 Land Development Regulations which
limit further residential and commercial
development on the urban fringe.... 1
3 Prohibit the expansion of key
facilities (e.g. water and sewer)
so that new development oannot
occur on the urban fringe 1
A Develop most vacant lots within
city limits before there is
expansion to the unincorporated
urban areaa 1
STRONGLY
AGREE DISAGREE DISACREE DK
2 3 A 5
2 3 A 5
2 3 A 5
2 3 A 5
3


176
where they must be able to communicate with groups which
take different viewpoints. They may agree with the liberal
ideology in principle, but are forced by the reality of
politics to defend or support those who abide by the
conservative ideology.
The ideology scale score results represent the
possibility of another position besides a growth or anti
growth position. The government responses along with the
tentative citizen group responses on conservative ideology
questions suggests the potential for a third position. These
results help to erase the zero-sum contention that Molotch
(1976) makes and contribute to our proposition that a
separate government position exists.
Yates (1977) suggests that government has difficulty
directing policy responses and instead is forced to react in
a pinball fashion. An alternative position for government in
the land use policy arena may be to find a source of
stability by pursuing a growth management course of
policies, and assuming a more directive role. These policies
do not necessarily force support for or opposition to
development, but will allow government to provide some
parameters for land use in a more abstract sense while
leaving a realistic way out when implementing the policies.
This course, representing a progressive ideology, would be
consistent with government responses to the liberal and
conservative ideology questions.


136
BUS2 and CITZ2 represent the cumulative scores of community
actors' position towards growth in the community as rated by
all survey respondents. Higher scores represent a perception
of support of growth by those respondents, lower scores
represent a perception that the groups oppose growth. BUS1
is created from question 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 in the planners'
questionnaire (question 16 in the groups' questionnaire and
question 3 in the administrators' questionnaire).
Another series of questions is asked about actual
conflict within the adoption of land use policy and around
issues that pertain to land use in order to get a sense of
the issue context of conflict. Conflict levels indicate the
ease with which desired land use policies are likely to be
achieved. Conflict, therefore, can be a parameter on the use
of political power. The variable CONFL represents a
cumulative scale of issues where higher scores represent
perceptions of greater conflict. CONFL is constructed from
questions 25-2, 25-5, 25-6, and 25-7 in the planners'
questionnaire (question 12 in the groups' and question 14 in
the administrators' questionnaires). One issue, adoption of
impact fees, is used independently as FEE (question 25
planners' questionnaire).
Propositions Two and Three
Propositions two and three suggest that ecological
factors will directly affect or contribute to the degree to
which policy conflicts erupt and the need to wield political


182
with that phenomenon. The central and now the northeast are
as are the latest areas to experience the growth boom. Even
the panhandle area is beginning to grow in selected cities.
The expansion of population to other parts of the state
represents the changes in growth politics over time as
population growth and size changes. An examination of some
of the survey results by region may help us to understand
the complexities of growth politics in this state.
Growth is an important issue statewide, but only in the
southwest and northeast regions of the state do respondents
significantly perceive government to oppose growth. This may
reflect some restrictive efforts to curb growth in those
areas. Only in the southeast region do more than 10% of the
respondents perceive government to support growth
unconditionally. This may be an indication that the
southeast region is the least restrictive, most facilitative
on land use in the state.
Regional variations suggest that the growth issue is
important to both business and citizen group members in the
southwest and southeast where growth is greatest. In these
areas group members responded that their groups oppose
growth and have less mixed support than do the other areas.
The greatest citizen opposition response is in the southeast
region (Table 5-13).
Other results confirm regional variations where they are
expected, especially on the ideology questions (Table 5-13).


50
growth politics, minority leaders have worked with urban
redevelopers in order to direct some of the economic
benefits of growth to minorities (Swanstrom, 1985; Clavel,
1986) .
This suggests the possibility of a new alignment of
growth interests especially in areas other than declining
cities. For example, in Montgomery county, Maryland, blue-
collar whites and blacks, civil rights groups, farmers, and
developers opposed large lot zoning policies which they
perceived to be exclusionary and restrictive to growth
(although for different reasons). Those in favor of the
policies were professional and middle class whites, wealthy
property owners, and environmentalists (Allensworth, 1980).
These coalitions represent an alteration of sorts of the
liberal and progressive growth politics alignments.
Previously, white liberals and minorities were united to
redirect urban redevelopment which traditionally displaced
urban residents. Today, however, the liberal support is
split between the economic needs of minorities which may be
satisfied with growth, and an environmental sensitivity to
the rise of the dysfunctions of growth.
In an Iowa study, skilled blue collar citizens were
unexpectedly found to oppose growth (Albrecht, Bultena, and
Hoiberg, 1986). As expected, however, Iowan business
respondents were less opposed to growth and upper income
groups were very opposed to growth. The critical difference


71
Over a fifteen-year period (1970-85) Florida has moved
from a totally unregulated state situation, to the use of
state-guided regional input into large development
decisions, through state guidelines and requirements for
local comprehensive planning, and to state control over
growth management by means of a state-regional-local
decision-making process. Tracing the evolution of the
state's approach to growth politics will contribute to our
understanding of various urban approaches to growth politics
in Florida cities.
Rule #2Economics Affect Political Influence
Economic determinants of growth also can contribute to
our understanding of growth politics. We need to establish a
link between the costs and benefits of growth which accrue
to various interest groups and the nature of growth politics
in the city. The data may show that the land use policies
adopted by a city reflect the combination of these economic
and political interests.
The control over land use is critical to Florida and
other sunbelt states for several economic reasons. First,
population growth is important to the development of a
sunbelt state's economy. Population increases allow economic
diversification and development of a competitive business
environment (Molenkopf, 1983). Statewide, Florida has
diversified from agriculture and tourism to high tech and
service industries to support continued economic development


77
Uniform mandate parameters may be viewed negatively, but
Wirt (1985, p. 95) suggests that mandates, by producing an
additive effect, can increase local governments' ability to
address policy problems. State mandates may act as a
"preemption" to shape the local "decision space," but this
does not have to produce a burden or negative impact on
local government (the zero-sum view). Instead it may simply
provide a framework for local decision-making to take
advantage of a supportive policy opportunity.
Local conservative growth politics, however, might be
more successful in a locally determined land use process
that operates independently of the state's influence. State
wide policy uniformity, must compromise over a wider group
of interests and may not provide as supportive a pro-growth
climate as might locally dominated decision making
processes.
Prior to 1972, the state government in Florida played a
minor role in regulating local land use and directing urban
growth. During this time, the state was supportive and made
urban growth easier (Carter, 1974).1 The state began to open
development by allowing drainage and dredging in wetlands,
especially south of Lake Okeechobee through the Everglades.
This opened previously undevelopable land in southeast and
southwest Florida near the turn of the century (DeGrove,
1984). The St. Lucie, Hillsborough, and Miami canals made
development possible in southeast Florida and drainage in


LOCAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT
POLICY AND POLITICS
- QUESTIONNAIRE-
A Study of Land Use Policies and Plans
in Florida Cities and Counties
Sponsored by
University of Florida Institute of Government
Department of Political Science


255
0-15
In jour Judgment, vhleh of the following describes the polltloel prooess (In
general) In jour eltj? (oiris jour newer)
1 IT IS THE ELECTED OFFICIALS WHO DOMINATE THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.
VERT LITTLE HAPPENS UNLESS THE! SUPPORT IT.
2 BUSINESSES HAVE THE CREATES? INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT DECISION
MAKING HERE. THEY DOMINATE THE LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THEIR
8UPP0RT IS NECESSARY FOR POLICY ADOPTIONS.
3 THE PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DEPARTMENT HEADS, ATTORNIES AND
PLANNERS IN GOVERNMENT HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE. THE GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTRATION DOMINATES THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.
A IMPORTANT LOCAL DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OP
GROUPS, SUCH AS CIVIC, LABOR, BUSINESS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, AND OTHERS.
EACH GROUP CAN USUALLY PREVENT POLICIES THEY DISLIKE FROM BEING
ADOPTED.
0-16
In jour opinion, towards which position do each of the following segments of
the eomunltj lean with regards to ths future development of land and growth
in jour oitj? (circle jour answer)
SUPPORT means community segment supports growth
NEUTRAL means communitj segment has no position on growth
OPPOSE means coamunltj segment opposes growth
MIXED means some meabers support growth and some oppose It
DK means don't know
1
8PP0RT
Position on Growth
NEUTRAL OPPOSE MUED
DK
1 Influential Individuals
1
2
3
A
5
2 Chamber of Commerce
1
2
3
A
5
3 Realtors/Developers
1
2
3
A
5
A Environmentalists
1
2
3
A
5
5 Neighborhood Croups
1
2
3
A
5
6 Civic Organisations
1
2
3
A
5
7 Minorltj Croups
1
2
3
A
5
6 Others (specifj)
. 1
2
3
A
5
0-17 How many people are currently meabers of your organisation?

0-18
Are anj of the following multi-business organisations active in promoting
growth and economic development In jour area? (circle the numbers of those
that applj)
1 DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
2 CHAMBER OP COMMERCE
3 GOAL SETTING GROUP .
A MERCHANT'S ASSOCIATION .
5 OTHER ,
Thank jou for jour participation,
6


30
According to this policy process analysis, planning
policy is affected by the local distribution of power. More
importantly, professional planners can adapt and work within
these various decision making processes in their cities.
Public actors' ability to "read" the local dispersion of
influence is important to the success of policy, within the
confines of each city's unique political process. As the
administrators increase their understanding of various
influences, the chances for the adoption and implementation
of effective policies increases. Government will be
successful as it learns to satisfice or manage the process
in light of the dispersion of influence.
Another important explanation of the policy process
forgoes using a power analysis approach and instead focusses
on which issues are under consideration (Yates, 1977). The
impact of the issues themselves will influence the operation
of the process. Each issue under consideration creates a
particular decision making response pattern based on the
pattern of support or opposition to it. A "highly unstable"
and increasingly reactionary (without focus) policy process
is likely to emerge as the number of competing issues
increase (Yates, 1977, p. 93). As the number of policy
issues competing for policy makers' attention increases, the
less likely is it that the process will be rational. It is
difficult to achieve and maintain an incremental process
though bargaining and equilibrium in the rapidly changing


GROUPS
LOCAL CROVTH HANACBfKHT POLICY AND POLITICS
0-1
The Importance of growth aa an Issue varies froa city to olty. In your opinion
how Important an Issue Is growth to your city? (circle lumber)
1 IT IS THE HUMBER ONE ISSUE IN OUR CITY
2 IT IS A PRIORITY ALONG WITH OTHER ISSUES
3 IT IS SOMETIMES A PRIORITY CONCERN IN OUR CITY
4 IT IS OP MINOR IMPORTANCE
5 IT IS HOT AN ISSUE IN OUR CITY
6 OTHER (specify)
7 DON'T KNOW
Q-2
Please Indicate your perception of the relationship between the following
conditions and growth as experienced by your city, (circle your answer)
DIRECT smans growth Is directly associated with the condition
CONTRIBUTES sieane growth contributes to the presence of the condtlon
DETRACTS sieana growth la slowed with the presence of the.condition
NONE aeans no relationship between growth and the presence of the condition
DK aeans don't know
Water Quality
Air Quality
Traffic Congestion
Property Tax
Increase
Lower Quality
Govsraaent Services
Eliaination of
Governaent Services
Crias Inoreases
Loes/Lack of
Natural Areas
Increasing Housing
Prloes
Need for More
Infrastructure
DIRECT
CONTRIBUTES
2
2
2
Relationship
DETRACTS
3
3
3
NONE
DK
5
5
5


CHAPTER THREE
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLITICS
The Rules of the Game in Land Use Planning
An important activity which is affected by
developmental policy is land use. The use of land, the prime
component in urban area development, is crucial to economic
interest groups. Their success is tied to their ability to
control the use of the land by development, construction,
planning and attracting government subsidies.
The type of local land use policies adopted and the
regulation process critically affect our understanding of
urban influence patterns and decision-making systems. Land
use decisions have significant costs and benefits which may
alter the local decision-making process. Past efforts to
understand either land use issues or decision-making systems
have not fully integrated these two phenomena. Planning and
economic inquiries have focussed on the technical aspects of
land use and the rational approach to planning (Faludi,
1973) as well as the deterministic aspects of location
(Alonso, 1964; Wheaton, 1977). Political scientists have
studied land-related decisions but only within the broader
context of local power (Clark, 1971; Dahl, 1982).
68


37
development. Its members are motivated by their experiences
with the dysfunctions of rapid growth which threaten their
existing lifestyle. Molotch contends that government is a
natural advocate of growth and he leaves little room for any
alternate government position. Instead, government's role is
reduced to facilitator of interests as they dominate the
process.
Liberal Growth PoliticsGovernment as Satisficer
In other stages government may have an expanded role as
an actor in the process. Government can be a filter through
which growth interests must pass (Swanstrom, 1985). The
policy process in this explanation is dominated by growth
interests, specifically the political and economic sectors,
but concedes a more active rather than reactive role for
government. For example, in Cleveland the policy process
progressed from conservative growth politics, government as
facilitator, to liberal growth politics, what might be
portrayed as government as satisficer, though the Kucinich
administration (Swanstrom, 1985).
In general, liberal growth politics flourished in the
1960's when federal grants for redevelopment and social
programs were politically beneficial to liberal mayors and
administrators. Minority and business coalitions were built
to expand urban revitalization, especially downtown
development. But the good intentions of the liberal approach
to economic development were subject to capture by the


125
directories of Florida Municipal Officials and County
Officials. The Florida Chamber of Commerce provided the
original state-wide list for selection of Chamber directors.
Either the single Chamber serving the case city or the
largest or most centrally located Chamber serving the case
city area was selected. Builder respondents were selected
from a statewide list provided by the Florida Home Builders
Association in Tallahassee. Builder Association Directors
were selected for participation by the city their
association represented. The first mailing list consisted of
a total of 143 potential respondents.
One month after the initial mailing a second letter and
survey package were sent as part of the second wave. At this
time the mailing list was increased by 56 potential
respondents due to initial difficulties in identifying
neighborhood and environmentalist representatives. The total
number of potential respondents increased to 199.
Originally names of non-business interests,
environmentalists, and neighborhood contact persons were
solicited by an open-ended question on planners' surveys.
The poor response rate to this question required additional
measures be taken to locate citizen groups active in the
area of land use. Environmental groups were sought first,
but not enough organized groups were identified to
adequately cover the case cities. Lists of contacts were
obtained and used, however, from Florida Defenders of the


LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
By
ROBYNE STEVENSON TURNER
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1988
* HPSITY OF FLORIDA LIBRARIA


108
approach to policy decisions. (This was also recognized as a
phenomenon in the Community Action era (Rich, 1979).)
Local governments may be most successful in progressive
growth politics if they can assume an ecological role, one
of manager not regulator (Stone, 1986). This may produce
more satisfactory results in the attempt to manage growth
without eliminating it. Those who direct and control the
rules of the game, are dealing from a position of strength
and are better equipped to affect the outcome and the
distribution of benefits, than those who are simply reacting
to regulations.
Ultimately, institutionalizing the land use process is
important to increasing government's ability to direct the
distribution of benefits of the process. The distribution of
benefits and costs should be considered in the analysis of a
major policy change. The final dilemma addresses this
concern.
Costs and Benefits of Land Use Policy
We started this chapter with a discussion of how
economic influences are related to growth in a general
sense. We have examined the political factors which affect
land use policy. Now we should examine the economic factors
which specifically affect land use policies through costs
and benefits as they relate to the utility/rights dilemma.
This dilemma is concerned with the actors in the land
use process and the impact which the approach to regulation


35
roles for government may indicate stages of development in
4
the growth of an urban area. A review of the literature
concentrating on the role of government in urban policy
process will increase our insights into the nature of the
interaction between market and government in the policy
process.
Government as Actor in the Policy Process
An integrated perspective of the new urban political
economy is Peterson's (1979) elaboration on Tiebout's (1956)
classic urban location theory. He suggests that financial
prosperity is the city's primary goal and this motivates the
city to pursue economic development and to satisfy property
owners. Therefore, the process and the policies generated
will reflect these internal concerns. Tiebout's theory, that
the city acts as a firm with identifiable interests,
translates into a modern urban theory in which economic
interests dominate the political process. But Peterson's
assessment of the city process is limited. It is driven by
economic theory and has limited power to explain changing
political demands and conflicts in the distribution of
economic benefits.
Additional studies of cities provide stronger
explanations of the urban process where government may act
as a facilitator, satisficer, partner, or manager. There are
several stages of growth politics that can be identified,
each reflecting the different roles which government can


193
policies are most likely represented by the discriminant
groups.
Again, the first dependent variable (POLICY) group
represents scores of one to six, representing communities
using only one to six of the available policies. The second
group represents scores of seven to eleven, where the most
policies are used. The data presented here reflects group
onethe most used policies one through sixand group two
the remainder of the policies used.
City and County Policy Uses
To test both the influence of actor participation and
the community level ecological propositions, a series of
independent variables are used in the discriminant analysis.
First, survey respondent variables are used alone. Second a
combination of both sets of variables are used.
The first set of variables used included perceptions of
group success in influencing the land use process,
perceptions of group position toward growth, conflict levels
on land use issues, ideologies, and community power.
Variables BUSl and CITZl are the cumulative nominations
made by government respondents about business and citizen
groups's success in influencing the land use process. Each
public official was asked to nominate all the groups in
their community that they felt had achieved the "greatest
level of success in influencing the development of land use
policies. It was a multiple response question. BUSl and


32
Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process
The majority of the community power literature and
policy process analysis is insufficient for a modern
explanation of urban politics. The discussions of pluralism,
elitism, and the policy process are insufficient for
analysis of modern urban policy processes. The community
power adherents disagree about the influential power of any
2
one interest group over another. Neither contention
provides a clear conclusion as to whether or not the process
is issue dependant. Dahl (1961) described the process in New
Haven as influentials which can be identified as exclusive
across issues, but that there is no basis for a priority of
issuesleaving us to imagine what the importance of an
issue might be as a determining factor in how the process
operates. Likewise the elite view suggests that one dominant
group of actors will be influential almost regardless of
issues by virtue of class and/or business position.
Follow-up studies of urban policy allude to urban power
and introduce the importance of economic motives on the
competition for influence. Rabinovitz (1969) studied a major
developmental policy area, Yates (1977) explains the
inability of the local process to cope with economic needs
that conflict, and Schultze (1985) combines the recognition
of the economic benefits of urban growth with policy
influence patterns over time.


190
Table 6-1 Gutman Scale Scores of Land Use Policies
Land Use Policies Used by Cities and Counties
Policy
Communities
Proportion
of
Policy
Using Policy
Valuing
Minimum Lot Size
.976
.854
Conventional Zoning
.927
.829
Planned Unit Development
.902
.902
Capital Improvement Plan
.902
.902
Utility Placement
.780
.707
Impact Fees
.780
.780
Enterprise Zones
.634
.415
Land Use Performance Standards
.561
.537
Agricultural Zone
.390
.341
Land Banking
. 317
.268
Permit Issuance Limits
.171
.098
Coefficient of Reproducibility
= .924
.922


Data were obtained through a non-random survey (created by
the author) of public officials and representatives of major
private interests.
The results of this research lead us to conclude that
communities most often adopt traditional developmental land
use policies, and only in situations of interest group
competition do communities adopt more politically risky
policies. Interest group competition, influence, and
predisposition towards the proper role of government affect
the land use policies adopted by a community. Communities
dominated by business/pro-growth interests, less conflict,
and a desire to have government take a pro-market approach
rather than a regulatory approach rely on traditional land
use policies and do not use innovative policies which tend
to be more restrictive of growth.
vii


214
and/or deliberate change." There is evidence that suggests
that growth politics is not zero-sum nor is it a two
dimensional political agenda. There are points on a policy
continuum that suggest an evolving approach to growth.
Developmental growth politics is not as simple as pro-growth
equals urban growth and anti-growth equals no growth. The
regional experiences in this state suggest that local
government in Florida may be altering its policy agenda as a
preventative measure in some cases to prepare for the
dysfunctions of growth at least in terms of land use policy.
Again, it is the crucial role of government interacting with
the political influence in the community, the political
economy relationship, which establishes the policy
environment for growth.
Schultze (1985) suggests the stages of growth politics
to be growth city facilitator, tradeoffs satisficer,
government as manager or, back to facilitator and/or back to
private city. These stages may reflect the level of conflict
and the policy approach taken by the community to the growth
issue. The data presented contributes to the idea that there
are patterns of behavior that represent stages of growth
politics.
The Florida experience with growth is a complex
political dynamic. The community by community rank on the
land use policy use scale suggests that Florida communities
are experiencing these growth stages. The mean number of


were much stronger predictors of the discriminant dependent
variable groups than were the survey variables.
The ecological discriminant function derived from the
analysis on the land use variable POLICY confirms
proposition two that the economic, growth, and government
profiles are significantly related to the adoption of
policies. The results suggest that the fewer the policies
that are used by a community, the greater the importance of
housing values and growth rates which both loaded positively
on the function (Table 6-3). Both per capita income and
proportion of revenues derived from property taxes loaded
negatively on the function. Higher housing values are used
in this analysis as a reflection of economic potential for
the business community. Higher house values represent high
demand and growth. The highest housing prices are in the
southern areas of the state where growth rates are leveling
off but the population is large. High home prices reflect
the interest of developers. If prices are high, they will
press for a less restrictive growth climate. Growth may in
fact increase the home value figure due to the demand in the
market.
Reliance on property taxes is a citizen related
interest variable and it is expected to load negatively with
group one as it does. Property tax proportion of the budget
is an attempt to measure the influence of citizen interests
in the community. Peterson (1981) suggests that in cities


245
Q-6
In your judgment, to which of the groupa lieted haa the city government aoet
freequently reaponded favorably to the group'a requesta or land use policy
preferencea by land uae policy adoption or change?
(circle the nuabera of all that apply)
1. Influential Individale
2. Chamber of Coamerce
3. Real tora/Developers
4. Environmentalists
5. Neighborhood Groupa
6. Civic Organisations
7. County Officials
8. City Officials
9. Minority Groups
10.OTHER (specify)
0-7
How active haa each of the groupa Hated been in their participation in the
developaent of future land use policy in your city?
(circle your answer)
Participation in Land Use Policy Developaent
VARIES CHANGES WITH
CONSTANT BT ISSUE ELECTED OPPICIALS DK
1. Influential Individuals
2. Chamber of Commerce
3. Realtors/Developers
4. Environmentalists
5. Neighborhood Groupa
6. Civic Organisations
7. County Offleala
8. City Officials
9. Minority Groupa
10. OTHER (specify)
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
3


139
variables are available at the city level only. They
represent the value of the housing market and the economic
situation of residents in that community.
Government profile
Finally, government finances, specifically revenue and
expenditure sources, indicate the contributors on which
government must depend for fiscal stability, whether a
benefits received or ability to pay principle is in use, the
size of government, and whether it can act as an independent
or dependent participant in the land use policy making
process. A government's dependence on property taxes or
charges for services, and the level of capital outlay (as a
crude indicator of commitment to capital projects and
growth) may reflect a fiscal bias. This is a bias that can
affect the selection of land use policies. Combined with the
information on ideology, government variables may be an
important indicator of policy preference.
The government profile variables are USERPR, the
proportion of total city revenues which are derived from
user fees; PTXPR, the proportion of total city revenues
which are derived from property taxes; and CAPPR, the
proportion of total city expenditures which are allocated
for capital outlay. Proportion of revenue was selected
instead of a per capita formula because proportion of the
budget allocated or relied on provides a measure of
government autonomy or dependence. This is the focus of


100
calls a "good business climate." Uniformity, directed by the
state, can help local government overcome short-term
parochial resistance to growth and achieve the long-term
benefits of economic development (Allensworth, 1980).
The state of Florida realized over time that a
necessarily uniform approach through the LGCPA did not
produce a uniform quality of results. This was due in part
to the different local growth politics approaches and local
resistance by growth interests to planning restrictions on
land use. Several state commissions reported that the
quality of local plans was not adequate in many cases
because they were amended frequently rendering them useless
as long-term planning tools. The plans were often ignored as
a growth management policy. For the most part the various
reports on the LGCPA concurred and concluded that the act's
bottom-up planning process itself was not successful in
preparing local governments for growth or adequately
facilitating growth in terms of land use, environmental
protection, or capital facility development (Growth
Management Advisory Committee, 1986; Florida House of
Representatives, 1982).
There are other reasons why plans were unequal in
quality. Some cities could not afford the time to prepare
in-depth plans, they did not have in-house expertise, and/or
did not have adequate funds to prepare quality plans. There
was a lack of funding from the state to help local


260
DeGrove, J. and J. Jurgensmeyer. (1986) Perspectives on
Florida's Growth Management Act of 1981TI Boston, MA:
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
DeGrove, J. (1984) Land Politics and Planning. Chicago, IL:
American Planning Association.
deHaven-Smith, L. (1984) Regulatory Theory and State Land-
Use Regulation. Public Administration Review. 48. 413-420.
. (1987) Environmental Publics. Boston, MA:
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Dillman, D. (1978) Mail and Telephone Surveys The Total
Design Method. New York, NY: Wiley.
Domhoff, G. (1978) Who Really Rules?. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Books.
. (1986) The Growth Machine and the Power Elite,
in R. Waste (ed.) Community Power. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Dougharty,
Tapella,
Pricing.
L., C. Chew,
J. Webb, and
Santa Monica
I. Kobaski
B. Zycher.
, CA: Rand.
E. Rolph, G. Sumner, S.
1975). Municipal Service
Dowall, D.
Managing
(1980a) An Examination of Population-Growth-
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. (1980b) Methods for Assessing Land Price Effects
of Local Public Policies and Actions, in T. Black and J.
Hoben (eds.) Urban Land Markets. Washington, D.C.: Urban
Land Institute.
Dye, T. (1986) Community Power and Public Policy, in R.
Waste (ed.) Community Power. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Eckstein, H. (1975) Case Study and Theory in Political
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Ervin,D., J. Fitch, R. Godwin, W. Shepard, and H. Stoevener.
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New York, NY: Bobbs-Merrill.
Fainstein,S. and N. Fainstein. (1983) Restructuring the City
Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment. New York, NY:
Longman.


244
Nest we would like to ask you about croupe In your onuni ty and their
involvement In land use polities and policy development.
0-3
In your opinion, towards which position do each of the following segments of
the coeaunity lean with regards to the future developoent of land and growth
In your city? (circle your answer)
SUPPORT means ooaaunlty eegaent supports growth
NEUTRAL acans eoanunlty segment has no position on growth
OPPOSE Beans eoanunlty segment opposes growth
MIXED Beans soae members support growth and soae oppose It
SK means don't know
Position on Growth
SUPPORT NEUTRAL OPPOSE MIXED
DK
Influential Individuals
1 2
3 4
5
Chamber of Cosyaerce
1 2
3 4
5
Realtors/Developers
1 2
3 4
5
Environmentalists
1 2
3 4
5
Neighborhood Croups
1 2
3 4
5
Civic Organisations
1 2
3 4
5
Minority Croups
1 2
3 4
5
OTHERS (specify)

1 2
3 4
5
0-4
Proa the list of organisations provided, please seleot those groups which are
active in the area of land use policy development and growth.
(circle the numbers of all that apply)
1. Influential Individuals
2. Chamber of Commerce
3. Realtors/Developers
4. Environmentalists
5. Neighborhood Croups
6. Civic Organisations
7. County Officials
6. City Officials
9. Minority Croups
10. OTHER (specify)
0-5
For each of the groups listed, in your judgement, which have had the greatest
level of success in influencing the development of land use policy in your
city?
(circle the nuabers of all that apply)
1. Influential Individuals
2. Chamber of Commerce
3. Realtors/Developers
4. Environmentalists
5. Neighborhood Croups
6. Civic Organisations
7. County Officials
8. City Officiale
9. Minority Cropps
10.OTHER (specify)
2


57
because it increases access to the political process instead
of restricting it.
Does this justify serving a particular interest through
the planners? Altschuller (1965, p. 360) lamented that
Minneapolis planners were expected to produce policies which
would protect the investment of the property owners and to
"make investment less risky." Davidoff (1965) and
practitioners such as the equity planners in Cleveland tried
to represent the existing residents, not the middle class
interests that the pro-growth machine wanted to lure back to
the city. These experiences suggest that planners and
administrators, similar to the private actors, may develop
and recommend different land use policies and behave
according to the type of growth politics being experienced
in the city.
Similarly, Rabinovitz (1969) outlines four types of
planners, each of which can be effective within a different
political climate. She suggests that planners should be
flexible and adapt to these planning scenarios in order to
maximize their effectiveness in the policy process. The
technician role is expected to be most suitable in a
cohesive, integrated political climate and the elite
dominated executive-centered system. The broker role would
be more effective in a competitive political process. The
mobilizer may be most successful in a more fragmented,


145
Supply, price, and incentive are important
characteristics of land use policies, but may have limited
practical use in understanding the actual policies in use by
communities. Their potential impact, however, may help us to
understand how policies which are not used now may fare when
considered for adoption in the future.
Supply Policies
The literature confirms that zoning and planning
policies interact with the demand for land and housing,
location, and affect the economic impacts of each (Dowall,
1980b; Bartlett, 1980; Fishkind, 1980; Johnston, 1980;
Mundie, 1980). For instance, land use policies can affect
the demand for land by restricting supply or access to land.
For example, exclusionary zoning restrictions drive up the
price of land, limit the use of the land, and contribute to
a phased or slow-growth approach (Mills, 1979; Johnston,
1980) .
These
options for
environment
meet demand
moderate or
land use po
policies can constrain the availability of
land development and encourage a constrained
(restricting supply and affecting the ability to
) (Witte and Long, 1980). Property owners have a
long-term protection of their property value by
licies which restrict (regulation method) land
use. Examples of growth limiting (by development
restrictions) polices are moratoriums, minimum lot size, and
permit issuance (see Burrows, 1978). The availability of


266
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1983) Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the
Political Economy of Local Government, in G. Zodrow (ed.)
Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model
After Twenty-Five Years. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Salamon, L. (1977) Urban Politics, Urban Policy, Case
Studies and Political Theory. Public Administration
Review. 37. 418-434.
Salisbury, R. (1964). The New Convergence of Power in Urban
Politics. Journal of Politics. 26. 775-797.
Schattschneider, E. (1960) The Semi-Sovereign People. New
York, NY: Holt, Reinhart and Winston.
Schiffman, I. (1977) The Politics of Land Use Planning: A
Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography. Environmental
Quality Series #28. Davis, CA: University of California.
Schneider, M. and J. Logan. (1982) The Effects of Local
Government Finances on Community Growth Rates. Urban
Affairs Quarterly. 18. 91-106.
Schultze, W. (1985) Urban Politics A Political Economy
Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Scott, R. (1975) Management and Control of Growth, in R.
Scott (ed.) Management and Control of Growth Volume 1.
Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute.
Staniland, M. (1985) What Is Political Economy? New Haven,
CN: Yale.
Starnes, E. (1974) Experiences of Florida in Planning for
Land Use. Working Paper No. Gainesville, FL: University
of Florida.
Stevenson, W. (1985) Who Pays Infrastructure Benefit
Charges? in J. Nicholas (ed.) The Changing Structure of
Infrastructure Finance. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy.
Stone, C.
Making.
(1980) Systemic Power in Community Decision
American Political Science Review. 74. 978-990.
. (1986) Power and Social Complexity, in R. Waste
(ed.) Community Power. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Swanstrom, T. (1985) The Crisis of Growth Politics.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.


246
0-8
Por each of the following statements about planning and development
please lndloate your opinion, (eirole your answer)
1 Preserving clean air and water
should be high priority Issues
even if It means that econoaio
development In the community
nay be slowed
2 Planning Is priiaarily a
political activity 1
3 Developers respond to market
foroes and are only giving
people what they want 1
4 Developers have a legitimate
complaint against Imposing unnecessary
and cost Increasing requirements
on their developments 1
5 Planners should temper their
environmental concerns by recognizing
that other legitimate objectives
which may conflict with environmental
protection may be even more
important 1
6 There should be tighter controls on
private development to protect
the public Interest 1
7 Residents are best at defining the
needs of their oommunlty 1
8 Private developers have little or no
concern for the good of the
community as a whole 1
9 The benefit to property owners of
increased land values can legitimately
be Halted in order to preserve
land In Its natural or
agricultural state 1
STRONGLY STRONGLY
AGREE ACREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DK
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3-45
2 3 4 5
4


99
These examples represent the various approaches to
growth and land use planning by cities and counties during
the same time period. Even though the state was shifting
political gears by increasing the uniformity of the
development process, the local level expressed a variety of
political approaches to the process. The process allowed the
manifestation of conservative and liberal growth politics
depending on the local political situation. This period of
time provides a great deal of instructive data about the
operation of local growth politics under a common planning
framework. The state objective was to reduce the
dysfunctions of growth and encourage local governments to
plan for growth and accommodate it in the most resourceful
way possible (University of Florida, 1984).
Conservative to Liberal Growth Politicsthe Uniformity
Dilemma
Uniformity in the land use regulation process and
growth-management may not always be a positive force or be
able to overcome local political conflict. Approaching this
dilemma by mandating uniformity in the planning process may
not necessarily be a negative prospect for local
government's ability to control its own destiny. The uniform
approach to the Florida land use process can produce an
additive or positive result at the local level. Local
government along with local economic interests from all
businesses not just land-based interests, may profit from
state directives which help to create what Molotch (1976)


197
function of group 1. Adding ecological variables slightly
improves the canonical correlation of the function from .322
to .382 and reduces the coefficient strength of the survey
variables.
One strong function was derived from the analysis on the
land use variable POLICY for cities and counties using both
participant and ecological variables to predict policy use
scores. The coefficient of the variable business group
success drops slightly and the variable conflict drops
significantly to a point where it is contributing only
slightly (positively) to the function. Liberal ideology,
citizen group success, and citizen group support of growth
coefficient scores drop slightly but are still useful.
Growth rate is positively correlated to the group one
discriminant function almost as significantly as business
group success. Adding the ecological variables also slightly
improves the distance between the two dependent variable
. 2
groups increasing our ability to distinguish between them.
The contributions of the independent variables to the
discriminant function of the dependent variable tend to
confirm proposition one about the policy impact of
participation of identifiable interests. The results suggest
that the land use policy group which represents lower use
scores is associated with greater scores of business
success, higher growth rates, lower scores on liberalism


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people have contributed to my success in
completing this work, but there are two to whom I am
most indebted. My professional and intellectual
development has been skillfully guided by Dr. Bert
Swanson, whith out whose critical attention I would not
have achieved this endeavor. His life-long dedication to
the pursuit of knowledge has truly been an inspiration.
I owe my personal success as a political scientist to my
husband Kyle, whose constant faith in my abilities got
me through the darkest of moments and across the finish
line.
i i


195
to 1985 growth rate. City and county respondents were each
assigned city or county population figures and not both. For
the city analysis a full range of variables was available
and used. Variables included the city population and growth
rate (GROW), percentage of land designated residential
(RES), housing value (HSVAL), per capita income (PCINC),
proportion of the budget revenues coming from property taxes
(PTXPR), from user fees (USERPR), and expenditure proportion
going to capital outlays (CAPPR). A nominal level variable,
respondent region of the state (REG) was also included
designating the five coded regionssoutheast, southwest,
central, panhandle, and northeast. They are coded from
lowest to highest representing the northern regions to the
southern regions.
Two discriminant analysis were completed for both city
and county cases. One uses only survey participant
variables, the other adds ecological variables to the
analysis. The first analysis reveals some significant
differences from the combined second analysis. When using
only survey variables, business group success and issue
conflict are positively correlated to the largest
discriminant functiongroup 1 the most used, traditional
policies (Table 6-2). The structure coefficients can be
interpreted similarly to a Pearson r correlation. Liberal
ideology, citizen group success, and citizen support of
growth all are negatively correlated to the discriminant


208
Conclusion
This research has attempted to discover why land use
policies differ from community to community. We have offered
a framework identifying the differences in policy and the
variables contributing to the adoptions of those policies.
The result is that we have made a contribution to the
understanding of urban political economy as an explanation
for urban policy making in a developmental policy area.
The identification of the business and community
interest groups represents a characterization of the urban
land use conflict. The planning process is the distribution
of resources according to the dimensions of interest group
politics in the community. We identified differences in
position on the growth issue, perception of stability and
conflict, ideology on the role of government, and influence.
These variables shape the land use policy game and the
conflict that is inherent.
One of the steps needed to identify positive urban
theory is to "identify the determinants of variations in
urban policies" (Fried, 1975). The degree of actor influence
and the role of government in the land use process are the
key factors affecting adoption of land use policies and
distinguish growth politics from other local politics. The
significant differences between the business and citizen
group interests fortify the growth machine scenario as an
explanation of why land use policies are adopted.



PAGE 1

LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS By ROBYNE STEVENSON TURNER A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1988 ? BWVERSITY OF FLORIDA LIBRARY

PAGE 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people have contributed to my success in completing this work, but there are two to whom I am most indebted. My professional and intellectual development has been skillfully guided by Dr. Bert Swanson, whith out whose critical attention I would not have achieved this endeavor. His life-long dedication to the pursuit of knowledge has truly been an inspiration. I owe my personal success as a political scientist to my husband Kyle, whose constant faith in my abilities got me through the darkest of moments and across the finish line . 11

PAGE 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii ABSTRACT vi CHAPTERS ONE INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS 1 The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development. . 1 Political Economy and Policy 2 Which Cities Grow and Which Don't — The Role of Land Use Policy 6 Classification of Policy 12 Urban Policy Making Process 14 Research Methods 20 Conclusion 24 Notes 25 TWO POLITICS IN THE LAND USE POLICY PROCESS 26 Interest Groups and the Policy Process 26 Policy Process Explanations 27 Participation and Influence 28 Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process . . 32 Political Economy 33 Government as Actor in the Policy Process 35 Conservative Growth Politics — Government as Facilitator 36 Liberal Growth Politics — Government as Satificer. 37 Populist Growth Politics — Government as Partner . 38 Progressive Growth Politics — Government as Manager 40 Growth Politics in the Sunbelt 42 Growth Management — Growth Politics 44 Implementation of Growth Politics 46 Actors in the Process 47 Private sector actors 48 Public sector actors 55 Conflict in the Policy Process 60 Policy Outputs of the Growth Politics Process . . 62 Conclusion 65 Notes 66 iii

PAGE 4

THREE THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLITICS .... 68 The Rules of the Game in Land Use Planning 68 Rule #1 — Government Parameters Affect Political Influence 69 Rule #2 — Economics Affects Political Influence. . 71 Rule #3 — Economic and Political Influences Affect Policy Making 74 Florida Growth Politics 76 Conservative Growth Politics 76 Problems in paradise 81 Transition to liberal growth politics 85 Liberal Growth Politics 89 Conservative to Liberal Growth Politics — The Uniformity Dilemma 99 Progressive Growth Politics 103 Costs and Benefits of Land Use Policy 108 Conclusion 114 Notes 115 FOUR PROPOSITION REDUX — HOW TO GET FROM HERE TO THERE . 116 Policy Process Operation 117 Study Method 120 Survey Instrument and Method 122 Propositions 128 Proposition One 128 Power 130 Ideologies and the role of government 132 Conflict 135 Propositions Two and Three 136 Growth profile 137 Economic profile 138 Government profile 139 Dependent Variables — Land Use Policy 141 Policy Characteristics 143 Supply Policies 145 Price Policies 146 Incentive Policies 147 Conclusion 150 Notes 151 FIVE URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 153 Interest Group Politics of Land Use 153 Actor Participation . . . . „ 153 Position and conflict 154 Position and stability 160 Position and influence 164 Power — Community Structure 168 Ideology and the Role of Government 170 Stages of Growth Politics 179 iv

PAGE 5

Regional Differences 181 Conclusion 184 Notes 186 SIX POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP LINKAGES 187 Land Use Policy Adoption in a Growth Politics Environment 187 Land Use Policies — Dependent Variables 187 Multivariate Data Results 191 City and County Policy Uses 193 City Policy Uses 198 Discussion 203 Use By Region 204 Conclusion 208 Urban Political Economy 212 Stages of Growth Politics 213 Wrap Up — Have We Made Any Progess 216 Notes 219 APPENDICES A INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 220 B AVAILABLE OPERATIONAL I ZED VARIABLES 224 C QUESTIONNAIRES AND LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION. . . . 231 REFERENCES 258 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 269 v

PAGE 6

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS By Robyne S. Turner August 1988 Chairman: Dr. Bert E. Swanson Major Department: Political Science There are many explanations of the policy process at the local government level. The most adequate approach is to explore the interrelationships between the political process and economic interests which affect the adoption and use of policies. The richest policy area that exemplifies the intricacies of political and economic interactions is developmental. Policies that affect the development and growth of a community typify the political economy approach to understanding urban politics. In this research, it is suggested that interest groups such as the business groups and residential interests compete for the attention of government in order to affect local land use and planning policies. The question of growth in urban areas is explored through an aggregate, comparative study of urban cities and counties in the state of Florida. vi

PAGE 7

Data were obtained through a non-random survey (created by the author) of public officials and representatives of major private interests. The results of this research lead us to conclude that communities most often adopt traditional developmental land use policies, and only in situations of interest group competition do communities adopt more politically risky policies. Interest group competition, influence, and predisposition towards the proper role of government affect the land use policies adopted by a community. Communities dominated by business/pro-growth interests, less conflict, and a desire to have government take a pro-market approach rather than a regulatory approach rely on traditional land use policies and do not use innovative policies which tend to be more restrictive of growth. vii

PAGE 8

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development Land is a commodity that has definable economic value. Its current and future uses are affected by the policies contained in the city comprehensive plan and related ordinances. These policies in turn affect the value of the land. The use of land is an economically motivated process and a government regulated process. Ordinances, land use planning regulations, and long term comprehensive plans affect the economic value of land. Beginning in 1926 in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. , local government established the legal right to regulate the use of land.* Since then, economic and political interests interact and are dependent upon each other. The relationship between these interests is reflected in land use policy. The best method to examine this phenomenon may be through the political economy approach: "the systematic interaction between economic and political processes" (Swanstrom, 1985, p. 12). The public, individuals and land-based interest groups, have much at stake in the development of land use policies. The way in which land is used affects city population size

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and location, the socio-economic character of the community, and the city's rate of economic growth. These factors influence the demands placed on government and consequently urban policies themselves. Land-based interests affect government's ability to respond to the physical demands of growth . Political Economy and Policy The growth of a city in terms of population and economy is significantly affected by economic forces and government intervention. Traditional economic theory suggests that demands from and needs of the population will determine the economic sector's growth and that competition will bring more economic development and another round of population growth. This traditional explanation for economic 2 development is the "central place theory". This and similar theories of economic and population growth and city hierarchies, do not include the government sector in their models . ^ Economic interests, however, must have certain public resources available in order to affect the local economy. "Boosterism, " government actions supporting business, (Molotch, 1976) has been an important feature of urban policy making since the industrial development of the early 1900s (Judd, 1984). The modern experience of urban renewal illustrates how economic interests and government work together in the area of urban growth (Mollenkopf, 1983).

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3 Government assistance in developing a good business climate increases the attractiveness of the city to investors and enhances economic development (Molotch and Logan, 1984). Pro-growth coalitions (Mollenkopf, 1983), the growth machine (Molotch, 1976), and the new convergence of power (Salisbury, 1964) have become significant additions to the literature in urban politics. The urban area as a political economy of place concerns the actions of the growth machine — land-based interest groups "which collude to achieve a common land-enhancement scheme" (Molotch, 1976, p. 311). Molotch's explanation of modern urban places builds on our understanding that the local business coalition is a dominant force in urban politics. From the early urban reform/city efficient movement, Hunter's (1980) economic elite structure of Atlanta, to Friedland's (1983) theory of economic tradeoffs and conflicts we expect to find business interests involved in local decision making. The business and economic sector actors may be considered as an interest group in the process, but we must explore the depth of the role which the economic sector plays in the process in order to fully understand the nature of the local political economy and how it may affect land use policy making. There are a variety of points in the spectrum of political economy which may be useful in understanding the

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4 relationships between the political and economic sector. A pluralist explanation may suggest business interests as one of many interest groups in the process, although, as one with greater access to the process than other groups (Dahl, 1961; 1982). Business interests may be viewed as having a "privileged" position in the process, thus dominating policy making while government responds to its needs (Lindblom, 1977; 1982). This view may be expanded a step further as a neo-Marxist explanation by expecting government to be responsive only to the needs of capital holders and producers (O'Connor, 1973; Friedland, 1983). A more tempered view may be the political economy of the left (Lineberry, 1980) focussing on government's attempts to provide for 4 society through redistributional policies. Other explanations of urban politics also integrate the political and economic sectors and suggest that the business sector's contribution to policy making is positive. For example, public choice theories are representative of the "political economy of the right" (Lineberry, 1980). Market solutions are seen as efficient and effective solutions to urban problems (Bish and Ostrom, 1979). Politics should represent the public's interests through policies and options that maximize opportunities for homogeneous communities where similar preferences may be optimized (Tiebout, 1956). Government's role should be as the agent of these preferences, which may include business interests.

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5 To make sense of these many views of the integration of politics and economics we return to Lindblom (1982). He suggests that the business sector enjoys a unique position of influence in the policy making process. Other interests will operate within a limited "zone of policy making" (Lindblom, 1982, p. 335). Local government depends on local business interests to create a positive economic condition in the city. Government can provide incentives and regulate business in order to manage their role in the local process. The degree of flexibility within which business operates can be treated as a "market variable" in social science research (Lindblom, 1982, p. 335). In the case of this research, the interests which make up the growth machine are the actors that have business interests that are land based. The anti-growth coalitions are the residential and environmental interests that are also land based but have different expectations of land use than the growth machine. These two groups of political interests affect the parameters of business influence and the pluralistic zone of policy making. Land use policies represent the output of their political influences. The economic market should be considered as a variable and not a constant (Lindblom, 1982). What we may find is that there are several distinct actors which make up the local "political economy" such as the local government, the business interests, and the non-business/public interests.

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6 This research may reveal any of the combinations of political influence presented above. Ultimately, we want to distinguish between various political interests and identify the patterns of interests that contribute to different policy outputs. Which Cities Grow and Which Don't — The Role of Land Use Policy " Capital investment is a major factor considered by scholars when examining the influences of urban growth. The role of the production function is important to our understanding of urban development (O'Connor, 1973; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Friedland, 1983; Whitt, 1982; Swanstrom, 1985). Included in this is the affect of city attractiveness on private urban investment (Molotch and Logan, 1984). Competition among cities for private investment may influence the adoption by government of incentive policies such as industrial revenue bonds, tax increment financing, and enterprise zones (Catanese, 1984; Wasylenko, 1981). An area that has not received the same attention in the literature is whether patterns of urban influence and needs have a similar affect on the adoption of land use policies for economic development and growth of urban areas. Policies which accommodate increased land use should be expected to be of pivotal interest to those who promote growth. Thus the focus of this research centers on the following questions:

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1) Can we explain why Florida cities adopt and use different land use policies? 2) Can this explanation be attributed to the distinctions between cities in terms of the political influence of land based interests in the business/economic sector, the individual sector, and the governmental sector (Figure 1-1)? The development and application of land use policy can be a highly politicized process (Altschuler, 1965; Rabinovitz, 1969; Garkovitch, 1982). Several states, including Florida in 1975, have passed legislation requiring localities to prepare comprehensive plans and follow state directed planning processes. In the case of Florida, localities had five years to implement the state requirements and to prepare several plan elements including a Future Land Use element. The regulations implementing the Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 make it very easy for cities and counties to amend their plans. The frequency with which many Florida cities have amended their plans suggests that comprehensive planning is open to political influence and what Lindblom (1965) refers to as disjointed incrementalism. In addition, localities enact local development and land use ordinances and adopt various development regulations which may be separate from the comprehensive planning process. These tools are used to implement the comprehensive plan, but may not be integrated with the original plan, leaving the process

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8 INPUT Independent Variables Participation Survey Data Growth Machine — Anti-Growth Coalition — > THRUPUT Policy Process OUTPUT Dependent Variables Consensus Conflict Compromise Ecological Profiles Growth Economics Government / \ I — > Land Use Policy -Traditional Flexible InnovativeRegulatory Systems Model Figure 1-1

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9 vulnerable to special interest influence (Goodman and Freud, 1968). 5 Two policy processes then may exist in the land use planning policy process. One is the development and adoption of the original plan — the goals. The second process is the development and adoption of implementation policy. Garkovitch (1982) suggests that the stabilizing, no-change forces will dominate the first process, while the development interests will dominate the second. We may find that the comprehensive plan stage may be static and the implementation policy stage may be dynamic, as the influence of the land-based growth coalitions fluctuate. The investment value and development of land is primarily tied to the land use designations which government places on property. Interrelationships exist between land value, economic investment, and government land use policy. Thus the following proposition is made. Proposition 1A ; the greater the presence in a city of conditions generating growth machine participation, the stronger the presence of the growth machine in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that adopted land use policies will be flexible and accommodating to growth and development. The alternative to those interested in promoting growth are the actors who are interested in slowing or stopping growth. Once growth has begun, we can expect a point of

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diminishing returns. Dysfunctions in the environment such as pollution, overcrowding, and congestion will threaten the existing character of the community and will activate interest in removing the dysfunctions as well as the perceived source of those dysfunctions growth itself. This interest group is the antithesis of the pro-growth coalition. Molotch (1976) appropriately uses the label antigrowth coalition to represent land based interests whose lifestyle is threatened by economic development of and population increase in the urban area. Homeowners aggregate into neighborhood groups and represent this alternative force (Peterson, 1981; Rich, 1979; Molotch, 1976). Their strategy for action is identical to the pro-growth force, although their motives are different. The anti-growth interests seek to use the local government policy making process to adopt policies which slow or stop growth in order to preserve a lifestyle and personal real estate investment rather than to increase a business/ economic profit potential. Proposition IB : the greater the presence in a city of conditions generating anti-growth coalition participation, the stronger the presence of the anti-growth coalition in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that more restrictive and regulatory land use policies will be adopted .

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11 The anti-growth forces are expected to rely on regulatory policy as a means to overcome the market forces which stimulate growth (Logan, 1976b; Mills, 1979; Johnston, 1980). Government regulation is necessary to insure benefits to the public even if regulations create costs for the private sector (Thrall, 1983; Logan, 1976a; Williams, 1961). It is expected that pro-growth forces will prefer flexible land use policies in order to take advantage of dynamic market forces (Dougharty et al., 1975; Mills, 1979; Ervin et al., 1977; Burrows, 1978; Gleeson et al., 1975). Land use policies which are adaptable to current economic conditions will allow the property to be used at its maximum economic potential (Williams, 1961). Pro-growth forces are economically motivated by the potential earning power and value of their land (Molotch, 1976; Molotch and Logan, 1984; Swanstrom, 1985). The adoption of land use policies which allow for market fluctuations will be beneficial to them (Mollenkopf, 1983; Mills, 1979; Lineberry, 1980). Proposition 2A ; the greater the investment which the growth machine has in the community the more proclivity they have to participate in the policy making process, and the more likely it is that land use policies will reflect market needs . Proposition 2B : the greater the investment which the anti-growth forces have in the community the more proclivity they have to participate in the policy making process, and

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12 the more likely is it that government will regulate land use and adopt policies which restrict market forces and benefit existing community residents. Economic investments may be a stimulus for intense participation and pressure on government to respond with particular policies. The more regulatory sources available to local government from broader levels of authority, the greater the opportunity for local government to be an influential participant in the growth process and less subject to policy manipulation. In addition, as alternative revenue sources for local government increase, the financial options available to local government increase, thus reducing dependency on local revenues such as the property tax. This decreasing dependency on local revenues and regulatory assistance from state or regional governments may give local government greater autonomy and/or flexibility in land use policy making affecting growth directions. Proposition 3 : the greater the availability of alternative regulatory power and revenue sources, the less dependent local government is on local revenue contributors and the more autonomous local government is, allowing government to be a partner or director in the local growth process. Classification of Policy Classification of land use policy should be two-fold: based on the empirical evidence available on the impact of the policy itself (encourages or excludes growth) and based

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13 on the permanency of the policy impact (flexible — intended to change over time or regulatory — intended not to change over time) (Scott, 1975). An American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) report (Gleeson et al., 1975) has developed a continuum for specific land use techniques based on the proclivity of each policy to allow the market to determine land use or rely on government to regulate land use (Gleeson et al., 1975). In addition, various authors have suggested that specific policies have an impact on the rate of growth (Burrows, 1978). Growth can be discouraged from occurring by using exclusionary policies such as restricting lot size, mandated population limits, growth phasing (Johnston, 1980), or manipulated zoning (Logan, 1976b). Cities also may exhibit slow or anti-growth intentions through less flexible policies such as holding caps, planned development, tax options (Molotch, 1976), radial restrictions, and density restrictions (Thrall, 1983). An analysis of regulatory versus "pricing" (marketdriven) policies as growth management tools concludes that regulatory procedures are a more effective means to minimize growth (Dougharty et al., 1975). Other land use policies such as flexible or regular zoning are conventional practices in most cities and provide more development options and do not necessarily limit growth. Specialized policies such as transfer of development rights (TDR),

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14 enterprise zones, and tax increment financing are more oriented to the needs of the land market (Ervin et al., 1977) . Urban Policy Making Process The land use policy process is influenced by land based interests, market oriented pro-growth coalitions, and public-good-oriented, anti-growth coalitions. Government planners and administrators also affect the process by recommending the adoption of specific land use policies. We must explore the larger policy process in order to understand the important role of land use policy adoption. Policy making in urban government can take on many characteristics. Yates (1977) suggests that the process may range from being rational — few actors, low controversy, to incremental, to reactive — many actors, high controversy. The level of consensus or conflict may be stimulated by the nature of the policy itself or by the decision making process such as routine, bureaucratic decision making or non-routine, politicized decision making (Yates, 1977; Lyon and Bonjean, 1981 ) . Land use regulations distribute benefits. The politics of "who gets what" land use benefits is decided by planning policies. Beatly (1984) suggests four different competing benefit distribution approaches in growth management policy: 1) utilitarian — maximize benefits to the entire community; 2) equal shares — benefits distributed equally to each group

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15 without regard to any existing inequalities; 3) egalitarian-benefits distributed to minimize existing inequalities; and 4) Rawlsian — maximize benefits to the least advantaged group. These theories examine policy outcomes and may help us to understand why different land use policies are adopted and which political, social, and/or economic conditions affect policy selection. If government distributes benefits through policy, then we can improve our understanding of the process by measuring government's role in policy development and policy implementation. We would expect cities in which anti-growth coalitions are very active to favor regulatory policies which increase government's influence on land use. We would expect cities in which a growth machine is very active to favor flexible policies which limit government's influence on land use. Therefore, in order for these expectations to be researched, we must examine who is involved in the policy process and how they are involved, and how much influence they have on policy adoption (Mollenkopf, 1983; Clavel, 1986; Lyon et al . , 1981; Molotch, 1976; Judd, 1984). In addition to the private sector, city administrators are another actor group which deserves attention. Planners and managers may play an active role in conceptualizing the goals and framework of the comprehensive land use plan. We can characterize administrators as neutral technicians, producing one type of policy, and as value-laden

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16 administrators, developing other types of policies. The degree to which politics and administration are separate within a city may influence policy decisions. The role of planners is especially important. Davis and Hua (1978) suggest that supply side and demand side planning roles may be identified. Supply side planners lean more toward controlling growth by affecting supply through regulation. Demand side planners lean more towards controlling growth by relying on market factors to affect demand for land. Determining the position of planners and administrators in each city may shed some light on policy selection and growth politics. We may gain additional insights into growth politics by examining the strength of presence or influence level of each interest group and local government itself on the policy process (Yates, 1977; Rich, 1979). If any interest group is firmly established as a single or elite policy actor, then we would expect a rational, consensual, low conflict policy making process. However, if no interest group is firmly established as a major policy actor, providing a pluralistic process, then we would expect an incremental, high conflict, policy making process. We may also find alternative policy adoption scenarios and policy outputs depending on the role that government itself plays. Government may be a filter for influence (growth politics theory (Swanstrom, 1985)), or a compromise

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17 or manager role (policy planning city theory (Salamon, 1977) ) . Proposition 4A : the more consensus in the policy process, the more rational is the policy development, and thus the more evident the pattern of land use policy in response to growth or anti-growth interests. Proposition 4B ; the more conflict in the policy process, the more incremental is the policy development, and thus the less evident the pattern of land use policy in response to growth and anti-growth interests. Proposition 4C : the greater the division of interests in the policy process, the greater the role for government in policy development, and thus the greater the input and direction by government on the intent of land use policy in response to growth and anti-growth interests. The propositions of growth politics are based on how the policy process works in response to various actors. The degree of influence on the process by one or more groups and the degree of independence of government are the factors which distinguish growth politics in the local political framework (Figure 1-2). The consensus process (4A) assumes that there are dominant interests which will influence the policy process and the output. This may be an elite dominated process (Hunter, 1980; Domhoff, 1978) or it may be a public interest maximization process where common public utilities are

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18 Conflict Time Frame Long Term Short Term Low Tension Consensus Compromise (elite) ( Government Di rector ) High Tension Compromise Conflict (Government Director) ( Pluralism) Land Use Policy Process Figure 1-2

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19 optimized (Tiebout, 1956). The process is characterized by a commitment to a particular set of policies reflecting a "vision" for the city that suggests a rational process without conflict. The government may act as a facilitator of these interests. The second process (4B) is pluralistic or dominated by interest group politics (Lowi, 1969). No one group has control of the process and policy outputs are not necessarily consistent in purpose. There may be a lack of consensus among the policy actors as their vision of the community differs. The process would be incremental. Government may act as a satisficer of these interests. The third process (4C) represents dialectical alternatives to the first two characterizations. Growth politics or social control theories suggest that the government take some measure of control of the direction of policy as demands on the process are divided. The government is in a position to unite a divided vision of the city. Competing interests may force the process to be reactive, but may also create an opportunity for government to be a partner or manager (Swanstrom, 1985; Boulay, 1979; Clavel, 1986; Lindblom, 1982). The government can expand its role as a major actor based on the broad public good. Institutionalized approaches to growth politics will create opportunities for rational, government advocated policy approaches to growth problems.

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Policies also may be compromises that are directed by the managerial role of government (Nordlinger, 1981; Salamon, 1977) . There may be overlaps between these processes in any given city. But an understanding of the patterns of influence and city policy processes will contribute to our understanding of why land use policies are adopted. Research Methods This is a comparative study of urban land use policy making. The dependent variables are land use policies. This research will attempt to determine why different land use policies are adopted by cities. The independent variables center on actors and their influence, policy approaches of growth politics, and environmental (social and economic) conditions. By using a comparative study approach, we can attempt to isolate various factors which have a relationship to certain land use policies. This information will contribute to our understanding of the impact of land use policies, the significance of the planning process, and whether certain types of growth politics as experienced by cities are likely to promote the adoption of particular land use policies and not others. This information will be of use to policy makers as it will help to identify the potential range of policy options that are most likely to be sought for a particular type of city and what obstacles to policy adoption may be present.

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Fried (1975, p. 309) provides a useful framework for comparative urban policy study based on "positive theory" (rather than normative theory) of urban policy: 1. identify variations in policy from city to city 2. identify the determinants of variations in urban policies 3. estimate the direction and magnitude of the consequences of policy diversities 4. formulate the logical (theoretical) basis for the empirical relations identified or which might be identified 5. identify and analyze those determinants and consequences of policy diversity which are subject to stabilization and/or deliberate change Fried cautions, however, that urban policy studies are bereft of any overall theories. Therefore, the framework should not be mistaken for a theoretical construct and should be used as an analytical framework. Because of the diversity of available political theories, we have selected one substantive area, political economy, to provide theoretical guides for this research. U.S. Census metropolitan area (MSA) central cities in Florida are used as the research cases. We use data collected over a ten-year period, from 1975 (the year Florida instituted the comprehensive plan process) to 1984 (the year prior to Florida's adoption of the growth

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22 management planning process). The comprehensive planning process represents a uniform set of planning rules which all cities were to use. While cities implemented these rules unevenly by degree and time, the rules framework was available and of potential use as a reference in land use policy development. Cities had a five year implementation deadline (by 1980). Central cities were chosen over smaller cities because socio-economic data is more readily available and participation in an ongoing planning process over the case period of time was more likely. The Available Operationalized Variables section (Appendix B) lists each proposition and the possible array of relative variables from the systems model in Figure 1-1. Not all of these will be used in the analysis. But the lists represent the use of these variables in the relevant literature as they pertain to these propositions. The variables are arranged in an eclectic pattern (Fried, 1975, p. 328) by broad classifications — government, economic factors, policy actors, and environment. These are classifications which identify rather than indicate the purpose of the variables. One of the objects of this research will be to determine if any greater theoretical understanding can be derived from these variables including a purposive classification or development of political patterns which might be based on need for action, resources

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23 affecting action, and disposition to act (Fried, 1975, pp. 325-6) . Aggregate socio-economic data and survey data are used to indicate the major independent variables, actors, influence, conflict, and process approaches in the policy making process. The socio-economic data (readily available) is used to indicate conditions which will affect the probability that any one interest group or pattern of growth politics will dominate the land use process. It also represents the long term economic investments likely to motivate the growth machine and the anti-growth coalitions. This data is used to measure each group's proclivity towards participation. The survey data are used to verify and measure the presence of the growth actors in the process, their participation, and their influences in the policy making process. Surveys were sent to city and county managers and planning directors, chamber of commerce executives, developer organizations, and environmental and neighborhood groups. Information from planning officials was sought to help identify active neighborhood advisory boards and groups for inclusion on the survey list. Finally, the role of local government itself as an actor in the process is measured by its ability to be flexible and autonomous from the possible investment driven pressures of each group. The reliance on regional or

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24 statewide planning regulations contributes to government autonomy. Also measures of alternative revenue sources, reliance on property tax, and government debt for infrastructure are examined as possible influences on governments' role in the land use process. Survey data was collected concerning the values and concerns of administrators (planners and managers), and their perceptions of political influence on the land use policy process . The dependent variable is measured by survey response as a substitute for content analysis. Planning directors were asked whether or not a particular land use policy is used in their city to evaluate its importance to the intent of their comprehensive plan goals. Conclusion The rest of the chapters expand on the growth issue in the context of urban politics. Chapter two is a discussion of land use politics and the role of interest groups and actors in the process. Chapter three presents these concepts through the case study of land use politics in the state of Florida as a prelude to the research on growth politics in Florida urban areas. Chapter four presents the study method by revisiting the propositions through the operationalizing of the independent and dependent variables. Chapter five presents the data results and Chapter six interprets the

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25 data in terms of political economy and makes some conclusions from the research about land use politics. This research is an attempt to gain some perspective on the issues of interest group politics, local policy making, and the impact of urban growth, all within a framework of political economy. The survey data and socio-economic data provide an environment from which to discuss land use policy making and the impact of growth on local communities. By using a comparative method we can gain crossectional insights that heretofore have not been available on the subject of land use politics. Notes 1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 297 Fed. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio, 1924); rev'd 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 2. For a fuller discussion of the theories of A. Losch (1954) and W. Christaller (1966) see L. King, Central Place Theory (1984) and James Heilbrun, Urban Economics and PuETTc Policy (1981), Ch.5. 3. For a discussion of prominent authors in this area such as Alonso, Muth, Wheaton, Burgess, Parks, Philbrick — see Heilbrun (1981), Chapters 5,6. See also K.E. Haynes and A.S. Fotheringham, Gravity and Spatial Interaction Models, (1984). 4. For a discussion of social control theories see Boulay (1979). 5. For a discussion of symbolic and distributional policies see Molotch, 1976, p. 313.

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CHAPTER TWO POLITICS IN THE LAND USE POLICY PROCESS Interest Groups and the Policy Process What factors affect policy making in urban areas? The policy making process in local government can be influenced by any number of interests such as elected officials, administrators, and interest groups. The degree to which participants are affected by legislation both directly and indirectly influences the role that each interest group plays in local policy making. The desires of individuals and groups affect policy demands made on government. In turn, community needs and desires are reflected in the policies enacted by local government. Influence on government represents a means to success or fulfillment of participant and community interests within the policy process (Truman, 1951) . The groups which represent the various interests in the urban area are a political force within the policy process. This is a form of influence which is potentially more powerful than the public's ability to influence policy making via voting. "The mobilization of bias" is interest groups influencing the policy outputs of the political process ( Schattschneider , 1960). The degree of consensus or

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27 conflict among various interests affects the ability of the policy process to operate. Low conflict and high consensus reflects a homogeneous demand process, whereas high conflict and low consensus reflects a heterogeneous demand process (Yates, 1977). The variety of demands on the system reflects the degree of similarity of group interests within a city. This in turn affects the degree to which policy outputs are coherent and thematic. A wide array of interests and demands will force a wide variety of political policy responses. Policy Process Explanations Various explanations of the motivations and influences on the policy process are found in the urban process literature. Some attempts to analyze urban policy making processes and outputs suggest that the process is policy dependent. For instance, hyperpluralistic decision making contributes to the ungovernable city (Yates, 1977). Different issues will yield different decision making processes such as rational, incremental, and reactive. Or the city government may exhibit a self-interested behavior patterning a reliance on supportive policies (Peterson, 1981; Tiebout, 1956). In such cases the influence of different interest groups will depend on the policy area being considered, for instance, developmental, allocative, and redistributive policies (Peterson, 1979). In development situations, the

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28 city may act as a facilitator and/or arbiter in conflicts between the producers (mobile developers) and the workers (immobile citizens) (Fainstein et al., 1983). This tension forces the city to constantly make tradeoffs in policy and the delivery of services to these competing interests. There also may be an institutional bias present in the policy making process which favors the business class interests (Stone, 1980). In such a case, development policies may be even more influential in guiding the local decision making process . To best understand the influence of actors on local policies we can examine the variety of interests and demands on the process. Through the identification of the actors and their interests we can estimate the actors' influence, participation, and impact on the process. Then by examining their values, participation levels, and success level we can gain insights on what motivates their level and direction of participation. Finally, we can identify their impact on the process by measuring the level of conflict and consensus in the process and the overall perception by the policy actors of the local political power structure ( Allensworth , 1980, p. 229). Participation and Influence Interest group (power) structures can array themselves in any number of configurations. Who has influence and who doesn't has been the subject of debate in the community

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29 power literature for more than thirty years. 1 Elite and pluralistic systems represent opposite explanations of political influence. A close, small number of influentials exhibiting a pyramidal structure reflects the elite perspective (Domhoff, 1978; Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953) and a competitive group structure reflects the pluralistic perspective (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951; Polsby, 1980). From these well-debated classics, other configurations have been developed. Our expectations of the land use policy process will be refined with insights from these later studies of the urban process. Urban planning and development policy processes have been described as a four-point continuum distinguishable by the roles of the policy actors (Rabinovitz, 1969). The points identified are 1) the cohesive/ monopolistic elite decision making system, 2) the executive centered/public and private leadership-shared, elite decision making system, 3) the competitive/pluralistic interest group competition for leadership and policy-benefits decision system, and 4) the fragmented/no visible leadership group, perhaps hyperpluralistic decision system. The major distinctions on the continuum are the level of conflict or challenge for policy leadership, and the variety or tension level of competing interests and issues entering the decision process — "integration to fragmentation" (Rabinovitz, 1969, p. 78).

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30 According to this policy process analysis, planning policy is affected by the local distribution of power. More importantly, professional planners can adapt and work within these various decision making processes in their cities. Public actors' ability to "read" the local dispersion of influence is important to the success of policy, within the confines of each city's unique political process. As the administrators increase their understanding of various influences, the chances for the adoption and implementation of effective policies increases. Government will be successful as it learns to satisfice or manage the process in light of the dispersion of influence. Another important explanation of the policy process forgoes using a power analysis approach and instead focusses on which issues are under consideration (Yates, 1977). The impact of the issues themselves will influence the operation of the process. Each issue under consideration creates a particular decision making response pattern based on the pattern of support or opposition to it. A "highly unstable" and increasingly reactionary (without focus) policy process is likely to emerge as the number of competing issues increase (Yates, 1977, p. 93). As the number of policy issues competing for policy makers' attention increases, the less likely is it that the process will be rational. It is difficult to achieve and maintain an incremental process though bargaining and equilibrium in the rapidly changing

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31 urban environment. Yates suggests that the urban policy process is forced to be disjointed, even isolated, without any overarching control or power structure and thus it is "ungovernable." Public sector actors in an ungovernable (unpredictable) urban system are forced to react to issues and demands which interest groups bring to their attention. This puts government into the role of facilitator. A final contribution to this discussion on the nature of the policy process is that there is no single process but a number of stages to the process that evolve over time. Schultze (1985) suggests that a city goes through various stages of policy interests which reflect the demands of a changing population. The process goes through transitions which are modeled after Williams' (1971) conceptions of community image and government roles which are caretaker, amenities, growth, and arbiter. Transitions of image can account for the changing nature of interest group demands. Five transition stages are identified as 1) city as caretaker to growth/private city, 2) amenity seekers and the poor who challenge growth, 3) city as arbiter of conflicts, and either the final stage as 4) bureaucratic/policy city or 5) return to the private development city. By combining the interest group demands as the motivation for the process with the economic underpinnings of the quest for political power, Schultz's transitions facilitate the use of political economy in analyzing the policy process.

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32 Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process The majority of the community power literature and policy process analysis is insufficient for a modern explanation of urban politics. The discussions of pluralism, elitism, and the policy process are insufficient for analysis of modern urban policy processes. The community power adherents disagree about the influential power of any 2 one interest group over another. Neither contention provides a clear conclusion as to whether or not the process is issue dependant. Dahl (1961) described the process in New Haven as influentials which can be identified as exclusive across issues, but that there is no basis for a priority of issues — leaving us to imagine what the importance of an issue might be as a determining factor in how the process operates. Likewise the elite view suggests that one dominant group of actors will be influential almost regardless of issues by virtue of class and/or business position. Follow-up studies of urban policy allude to urban power and introduce the importance of economic motives on the competition for influence. Rabinovitz (1969) studied a major developmental policy area, Yates (1977) explains the inability of the local process to cope with economic needs that conflict, and Schultze (1985) combines the recognition of the economic benefits of urban growth with policy influence patterns over time.

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33 Urban political economy, however, is an analytical approach which provides the means to integrate the role of government with an explanation of power and group influence. Political economy has the potential to attribute a more directive role to public actors in the policy process, which will provide a benefit outcome not just a single beneficiary. Political Economy The political economy approach to urban politics is used in several different ways but focusses on the motivations and roles of economic interests and the public actors that participate in urban growth issues. Current trends in urban analysis go beyond the classic definition of political economy — "the systematic interaction between economic and political processes" and are moving towards a growth politics framework of analysis (Swanstrom, 1985, p. 12).^ These recent discussions in the literature are extending analysis beyond explanations of urban interaction and are more fully integrating the theories of community power, the importance of economic influences, and the role of government itself in the local political decision making arena . Current literature contributions identify developmental policies as the dominant issue in local politics and as such reflects the influence and power structures in the policy process. Identification of a key set of issues increases our

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ability to understand the policy outputs of the political process. For instance, land based interests, such as the developers, bankers, and redevelopment-economic development actors use the political process to further their own interests (Molotch, 1976). By pressing for favorable developmental policies such as transportation, infrastructure, redevelopment or economic development, they increase their opportunities to realize economic benefits. Indeed, the entire local growth industry of services and infrastructure is of vital importance to the economic well being of the "growth machine" (Molotch, 1976). Economic and developmental policies offer the richest policy area in which the dynamics of urban politics are exemplified. The growth and development of the city will influence the rest of the policy making agenda. We must direct our attention to the political treatment of economic issues in order to understand the urban policy process. Most intriguing about the more recent views of urban political process are the various expectations of the role which government will play in the process. The government as an actor with its own motivations and as the promoter of the collective interest that the market function cannot employ. The different perspectives in the literature vary in their expectation of the degree to which government can act as a facilitator of marketplace demands or a director of the process and its outputs. Quite possibly, these different

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35 roles for government may indicate stages of development in the growth of an urban area. 4 A review of the literature concentrating on the role of government in urban policy process will increase our insights into the nature of the interaction between market and government in the policy process . Government as Actor in the Policy Process An integrated perspective of the new urban political economy is Peterson's (1979) elaboration on Tiebout's (1956) classic urban location theory. He suggests that financial prosperity is the city's primary goal and this motivates the city to pursue economic development and to satisfy property owners. Therefore, the process and the policies generated will reflect these internal concerns. Tiebout's theory, that the city acts as a firm with identifiable interests, translates into a modern urban theory in which economic interests dominate the political process. But Peterson's assessment of the city process is limited. It is driven by economic theory and has limited power to explain changing political demands and conflicts in the distribution of economic benefits. Additional studies of cities provide stronger explanations of the urban process where government may act as a facilitator, satisficer, partner, or manager. There are several stages of growth politics that can be identified, each reflecting the different roles which government can

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play. After a discussion of these stages, the individual components — actors, the policy process, and individual policy options will be examined. Conservative Growth Politics — Government as Facilitator Conservative growth politics is a stage which may be characterized by the role of government as facilitator . Molotch (1976) establishes the base point of this role by suggesting that in the policy process the government acts as a booster for the economic development interests of the growth machine. Adopted policies reflect the desires of the economic interests and establish a supportive business climate for economic development. This portrayal of government complements the description of "conservative growth politics" in the 1950s (Swanstrom, 1985). Government actors will facilitate growth and development through selective policy adoption because they assume that the public will benefit from the subsequent expansion of the local economy. In this characterization of the policy process the market forces are the dominant interest group to which government responds. This basepoint view, however, is two-dimensional and represents a zero-sum game. The more potential for growth, the more government responds to development demands. The expected opposite reaction is that as more growth occurs, the greater is the likelihood that the residential community, the anti-growth coalition will resist additional

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37 development. Its members are motivated by their experiences with the dysfunctions of rapid growth which threaten their existing lifestyle. Molotch contends that government is a natural advocate of growth and he leaves little room for any alternate government position. Instead, government's role is reduced to facilitator of interests as they dominate the process . Liberal Growth Politics — Government as Satisficer In other stages government may have an expanded role as an actor in the process. Government can be a filter through which growth interests must pass (Swanstrom, 1985). The policy process in this explanation is dominated by growth interests, specifically the political and economic sectors, but concedes a more active rather than reactive role for government. For example, in Cleveland the policy process progressed from conservative growth politics, government as facilitator, to liberal growth politics, what might be portrayed as government as satisficer, though the Kucinich administration (Swanstrom, 1985). In general, liberal growth politics flourished in the 1960's when federal grants for redevelopment and social programs were politically beneficial to liberal mayors and administrators. Minority and business coalitions were built to expand urban revitalization, especially downtown development. But the good intentions of the liberal approach to economic development were subject to capture by the

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conservative growth machine for use to their own advantage (Swanstrom, 1985). In addition to Cleveland, Boston and San Francisco had similar experiences with liberal growth politics. The basis of their liberal growth politics was rooted in the interests and influence of post-New Deal coalitions (Mollenkopf, 1983). In all these cities it is evident that the pressures for growth were accompanied by a decline of the city's middle class population. Without a solid revenue base the only counter-interest to the growth machine were groups and projects dependent on federal funds. Once the federal process was captured by the growth machine for its own purposes or withdrawn as a source of funding, then liberal growth politics lost its momentum as an opportunity for government to actively satisfy interests other than the growth machine. Government would be left to resume its role as policy facilitator. Populist Growth Politics — Government as Partner The Kucinich administration in Cleveland managed to extend the city role from facilitator to satisficer to partner . A combination of political interests emerged to support an expanded role for government. Consumer oriented advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965) and Alinsky style community organizing contributed to the public's rejection of market demands for public resources without a return of profits to the residents. This change in the politics of

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39 growth altered the balance of political power and forged a populist reform approach. Government planners were especially important to the success of empowering the populist coalition. Government's role in populist politics is one of a partner with the public in promoting communitywide benefit outcomes rather than benefits for individuals or narrow interests. In Cleveland, "equity planners" promoted the interests of the city's existing residents, instead of the interests of the business or suburban residents (Clavel, 1986). Later, Mayor Kucinich was unable to completely manage the growth machine interests, but he was able to challenge them with a more active and directed role by government (Swanstrom, 1985). The interests of the growth machine had to go through the government. Government with the help of broad based coalitions did not have to acquiesce to demands nor did it automatically adopt growth goals as their own. Although Kucinich lost his position as Mayor at the hands of the formidable developer and business coalition in Cleveland, he succeeded in establishing an alternative role for government in the urban policy process. Populist growth politics contests the two-dimensional facilitator role common in conservative growth politics and has the potential for greater long-term success than does liberal growth politics. There is, however, another

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40 progression of growth politics which provides an even greater degree of independence for government actors. Progressive Growth Politics — Government as Manager Other cities were able to effectively use a populist political coalition and to enlarge the role of government from partner in growth to manager of growth. This additional dimension suggests that government can constructively manage the interests and active participation of citizens and neighborhood groups as an effective counterbalance to growth machine interests. Citizens participation, facilitated by government, is the foundation of the populist movement and provides a means to insure that benefits accrue to residents rather than to narrow development interests. In Progressive politics, however, government expands its role to a partner who can challenge the dominance of conservative growth politics in interest group competition, and also advance the role of government to the status of manager of the growth process. In this role government can begin to direct a multidimensional range of community benefits. Hartford and Santa Barbara are examples of the successful use of "progressive growth politics" (Clavel, 1986). Planners play an important role by directing the attention of citizens to potential benefits and the administrators and elected officials to any excessive benefits (windfalls) of the development interests that can

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41 and should be redirected to the benefit of the community. Progressive politics is also a stage where government pursues benefit equity by insuring that the costs of economic development and growth are proportionately borne by the growth machine which will profit from city growth policies. In turn, a range of benefits from growth can be directed, perhaps by regulatory parameters, to the existing and future residents of the city. A directed policy process is not a zero-sum approach where the growth machine receives a disproportionate benefit or pluralistic interest group competition biases the outcome. Instead, progressive politics requires a directive role by government and an active role by all the interest groups and the public to direct the benefit outcomes. For example, Hartford was successful in becoming a partner and a director of downtown development. The city directed new development as an equal partner in the process, eventually becoming a co-developer on several major projects. Development continued and profits were shared with existing residents. Santa Barbara successfully implemented rent and development controls to benefit citizens and at the same time was able to negotiate in a positive manner with developers (Clavel, 1986). This process differs from the use of exactions or growth management regulations because government is acting to integrate the citizenry and their interests into the process. Exactions and regulations

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42 produce a restricted marketplace while not necessarily directly benefiting the collective good. Growth Politics in the Sunbelt Many cities that are experiencing populist and progressive stages of growth politics also have faced decline in both population and economic activity. They have experienced a change in their population demographics from white middle class to minority lower income class as the dominant resident group. Might we expect a different scenario and policy process in the rapidly growing cities of the southeast and southwest? Their economic and population conditions are very different from the declining frostbelt cities. Evidence suggests that these rapid growth cities are experiencing a different pattern in their evolution of growth politics. Rapidly developing cities of the southwest have experienced "progrowth politics" (Mollenkopf, 1983). This rapid growth and stage of growth politics is attributed to a "favorable political climate" characterized by small government size, a private sector orientation, low political conflict, and a conservative political culture (Mollenkopf, 1983, p. 242). Cities in a progrowth political climate enact policies such as low taxes, small budgets, and flexible rather than regulatory development policies. These are policies designed to favor economic interests. A professional government administrator who has the backing of

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43 local business also is likely to be found in a progrowth politics city. Essentially, sunbelt cities may be experiencing the same conservative growth politics that their frostbelt counterparts experienced. (Although, Mollenkopf attributes postwar conservative growth politics of the southwest to the proliferation of federal defense contracts and a conservative national political orientation which filtered down to the local level.) Limited pro-business governments, Mollenkopf suggests, preceded and perhaps preempted a liberal growth politics in southwest cities because there was not a significant blue collar class and minorities were restricted to a minimal political role. Further there was no advent of populism or progressive politics in these cities because the "intercity competition enforced a market discipline ... " that eventually would also spread to the older frostbelt cities, forcing an abandonment of costly progressive politics (Mollenkopf, 1983, pp. 251-253). The possibility remains that the excesses of the growth machine will be challenged in the south as they were in northern cities. The neighborhood movement, as the forerunner to populism, is dismissed by Mollenkopf (1983, p. 289) as a southern strategy because it is "an incomplete alternative" to the pressures of national political interests that are pervasive in the new growth cities.

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How can sunbelt cities make the transition form conservative or pro-growth politics to a form of progressive growth politics? Mollenkopf suggests that the inability of urban sunbelt cities to make the transition to liberal or progressive growth politics can be altered by the development of a "new social contract" where progressive national political entrepreneurs must take the risk of mobilizing such constituencies in the suburbs and newer cities as well as within the old. They must also seek to control the competitive framework that private institutions have exploited to undermine redistributive politics in the past. But they must offer the private sector some quid pro quo if massive, debilitating conflict is to be avoided (Mollenkopf, 1983, pp. 297) This call for a new urban political process suggests that another dimension of growth politics is necessary to define in order to understand how rapidly growing cities have been able in some cases to overcome the market's resistance to development regulation, moving them closer to a partner or manager role for government. I suggest that this other dimension to the developmental policy process is growth management. Growth Management — Growth Politics Growth management, as a dimension of progressive growth politics or even a stage itself, is based on government's authority to institutionalize city regulatory and planning powers and to encourage citizen participation as in progressive and populist cities. In fact, Clavel (1986) identifies these administrative and participatory components

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45 on continuums. He fails to fully explain, however, how the natural tension between government and citizen can be eased in order to produce a long-term community-wide benefit outcome. Through growth management, however, the administrative power of a city can be increased by regional or statewide institutionalized land use requirements. This type of broader authority can help local government to equitably frame the competition of local growth politics and promotes long-term uniformity in government's approach to development and growth. This approach would satisfy the quid pro quo for which Mollenkopf calls. This additional dimension of government influence gives local government a sustaining power to manage the benefits and costs of growth, not just exercise local regulatory power over the growth machine; a regulatory power which eventually would be challenged by the local power structure. The role of local government can be refined further to director or "traffic cop" (Stone, 1986). Government can use its legislative power to institutionalize their own set of development rules, rather than rely on regulatory development under the normal political process — competitive bargaining and influence group pressure. Government has the option to regulate the process by controlling the economic forces of the market, or government can direct the process by an equitable management of the decision making arena within its own parameters. At the same time, government

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46 takes the responsibility of protecting the interests of residents and other disadvantaged actors in the local process . Government ought to make sure that the process has some equity in its responsiveness to all the major interests that represent a wide range of values. Growth management can be an equitable process without being reduced to short-term political incrementalism. The experience, however, with growth management reveals that is used to both reject and promote growth for single interests. Growth management is more often the result of interest group influence than an approach to the role of government in the process. Implementation of Growth Politics Developmental policies are the focus of local policy making in growth cities. And it is the selection and implementation of land use policies that we expect to be specifically affected by the patterns of influence in the community because of the economic basis of these policies (Allensworth, 1980, p. 59). Therefore, we can investigate the implementation of growth politics in urban areas by measuring the overall levels of interest group influence in the process. This can be done by gauging the levels of conflict over policy, community perceptions of the sources of influence, and the levels of participation and success in affecting the local land use policy process.

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47 This research will attempt to provide evidence of the links between community power, the policy process framework, and land use policy selection in the implementation of growth politics. The different scenarios that have been suggested, conservative, liberal, populist, progressive, and growth management are comprised of actors, policy approaches, and specific land use policy outputs. The theoretical basis of these components will be reviewed and in later chapters they will be evaluated empirically as indicators of the several stages of growth politics that Florida cities have experienced. Actors in the Process The literature suggests that there is a set of actors who are expected to have a greater influence in this policy making area than do any others. This influence is reflected by the relationship between power in these actors' communities and the policy-making process. We expect that specific growth politics actors, growth machine interests and anti-growth interests, will be highly involved in the policy process. Molotch (1976) contends that "land based interests" — those who have an economic investment tied to land — make up the growth machine. Land use policies in turn, have a major influence on the local economic condition of any city, especially in a growth state such as Florida.

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48 Private sector actors The growth machine coalition is expected to exhibit for the most part, characteristics of conservative growth politics in their attempt to dominate the policy making process and secure passage and implementation of economically beneficial growth policies. The political process and the economic sector become integrally linked. For example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit bond project in San Francisco was successful despite an initial split of support by the business elites in that city. (Whitt, 1982) They eventually coalesced to provide solid support for the bond issue and its passage. On this important developmental issue the growth interests directed their attention to its success for long-run benefits. Whitt suggests that the support for the BART project represents a dialectic coalition between the interests of government and business in the growth politics process. We expect the pro-growth interests to support prodevelopment policies in order to secure economic benefits. But in order to gain insight into this group of actors it is necessary to understand not only their policy preferences but also what their value perspectives are towards land use policies. Specifically, does their support of market principles carry over to support for a particular role for government in the land use development process?

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49 In a study of planning board members, support for various land use policies by board votes were classified as conservative — most frequently supporting rezonings for higher densities, and liberal — least frequently supporting such rezoning requests ( Allensworth , 1980). The results showed that the more conservative members "felt that planning should be used to facilitate if not encourage growth and development . . . and tended to frown on the concept that planning be used to control or regulate community expansion" (Allensworth, 1980, p. 99). Zoning was expected to serve as a policy mechanism to reflect market demands. Liberals were more likely to expect the planning function to be a restrictive devise providing a "positive role — as an independent force designed to guide, direct, and control" (Allensworth, 1980, p. 99). These results direct our expectations of actors' growth positions which can be determined by examining their opinions on the purposes of land use policies. A traditional power elite explanation (Hunter, 1953; Domhoff, 1979) of the growth machine would define its membership by reputational or positional power. The results would identify a membership reflecting the makeup of conservative growth politics. But the nature of developmental land use policies is that there are other interest groups who also can benefit from growth. For example, in cities experiencing liberal and progressive

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growth politics, minority leaders have worked with urban redevelopers in order to direct some of the economic benefits of growth to minorities (Swanstrom, 1985; Clavel, 1986) . This suggests the possibility of a new alignment of growth interests especially in areas other than declining cities. For example, in Montgomery county, Maryland, bluecollar whites and blacks, civil rights groups, farmers, and developers opposed large lot zoning policies which they perceived to be exclusionary and restrictive to growth (although for different reasons). Those in favor of the policies were professional and middle class whites, wealthy property owners, and environmentalists ( Allensworth , 1980). These coalitions represent an alteration of sorts of the liberal and progressive growth politics alignments. Previously, white liberals and minorities were united to redirect urban redevelopment which traditionally displaced urban residents. Today, however, the liberal support is split between the economic needs of minorities which may be satisfied with growth, and an environmental sensitivity to the rise of the dysfunctions of growth. In an Iowa study, skilled blue collar citizens were unexpectedly found to oppose growth (Albrecht, Bultena, and Hoiberg, 1986). As expected, however, Iowan business respondents were less opposed to growth and upper income groups were very opposed to growth. The critical difference

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51 in the Iowa study is in the measurement of "growth." Four questions were asked which focussed on the environment and capacity of the land to withstand growth. Therefore, the lack of blue collar support for growth may be more of an indication of a pro-environment position and does not seem to be conclusive of an anti-growth bias by blue collar persons. The Maryland and Iowa data indicate that as we suspected, the Molotch two-dimensional view of growth politics is not necessarily complete. Turning to the other end of what should be viewed as a growth politics continuum, the anti-growth coalition is expected to replace the growth machine if the dysfunctions of growth (urban problems) reach a point of severity (Molotch, 1976). This condition will prompt the public to resist additional growth and any policies which promote growth. The coalition is expected to be made up of middleand upper income, activist types concerned about aesthetic improvements such as environmental protection, single family residential needs, and historic preservation. They are struggling to preserve their image of a quality life. Their conflict with the growth machine, however, is unlike the opposition to liberal growth politics by the minority and poor residents who opposed urban redevelopment displacement. We would expect this modern coalition to be made up of residential property owners who have an economic investment to protect. This economic incentive motivates

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52 them to actively oppose policies which might increase growth problems and which may negatively affect their long-term housing investments. Similar to the pro-growth machine, influence in the land use process by these actors protects their economic position. The anti-growth coalitions may have more than just an interest in land use regulation. Regulatory reform is the means to a more specific end. Just as the growth machine is not monolithic, but made up of business, developer, minority and other interests, so to is the anti-growth coalition made up of social liberals, environmentalists, exclusionary suburbanites, and statewide environmentalists. It is a coalition of interests that has different reasons for political association. They are not necessarily motivated by market forces acting as a unifying stimulus. While there may be a split liberalism within this group of environmentalists, minority supporters, and homeowners, there is a common theme in their expectations about the role that government should play in affecting land use. We expect the anti-growth interests to support government's regulatory function to control the use of land. I would suggest, however, that there are several motivations and subsequent approaches that this support of government regulation may take . Regulatory support may be based on an exclusionary interest to protect personal investment (Dye, 1986) and to

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53 institutionalize this interest through strong development controls over zoning, size, and structure ( Allensworth , 1980). Secondly, support may come from an environmentalist interest focussing on limiting the natural and architectural dysfunctions of growth ( deHaven-Smi th , 1987). Finally, support may be found in a statewide based environmental interest which seeks to institutionalize a long-term, rational land-use process by which developers can abide ( DeGrove , 1986 ) . The exclusionary interests want government to regulate exclusivity into the use of land and in effect who uses the land. Zoning restrictions can be used to restrict the use of land in a way that benefits a select group of land owners despite its affect on non or would-be owners. Minimum lot sizes and architectural criteria can exclude non-affluent homebuyers and renters from a particular market location. In addition, homeowners may fear that the dysfunctions of rapid growth will threaten the suburban quality of life and their residential environment. Restrictive zoning is one way of insulating existing residential areas from change. The intent to exclude certain types of development and in the process certain people, can be institutionalized through zoning and land use policies (Dye, 1986). Regulations can preserve residents social and political interests by preserving the status quo (Allensworth, 1980, p. 128). 5

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54 The other two anti-growth segments are represented by environmentalists. These groups share a concern for personal quality of life like the exclusionist segment. Their primary motivation, however, may be broader, extending beyond their immediate well-being and to a concern for community wellbeing. Traditionally, environmentalists have been interested in preserving the natural environment. A Florida study, however, suggests that concern over the impacts of growth and development of the physical environment are important as well (deHaven-Smith, 1987). Upper and middle income persons as well as the highly educated show a sensitivity to the impact of development on the natural environment as well as the aesthetic quality of development. This group exhibits a willingness and desire for government to impose land use regulations to remedy negative development impacts. The other environmental coalition is made up of interests that are statewide in scope (DeGrove, 1986). In some cases developers and homebuilder organizations have joined the traditional environmentalists in an effort to pressure state government to regulate additions to the built environment. Although it seems contradictory, the developer/builder interests in California, Oregon, and Florida have realized that regulations instituted at the state level are more predictable in their enforcement and parameters. A state process of land use regulation will be less reactionary and politically volatile than when

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55 regulation is at the discretion of each local government (DeGrove, 1986, pp. 395-6). We might expect to find progressive growth politics in this situation allowing for a diversity of interests managed by government process. Once again, we can find different actors at different periods of time, each with a different perspective towards growth. The dominant actors define which type of growth politics is occurring and more importantly, what type of land use policies are being adopted and used in similar cities . Public sector actors The final group of actors to consider are from the public sector — the city itself, and its components the planners and administrators. The city may act according to a self-interest by concentrating on the production of a strong revenue base and pursuing a pro-growth strategy through certain policies. It is the planners and administrators, however, who can provide the greatest insight to the public sector interests. Planners and administrators have a responsibility to pursue a neutral representation of all community interests in their plans and policies. But often they do not. The planner, his plans, and the administration at whose pleasure they serve, can serve a particular interest. For instance, Minneapolis planners played a reactive role in the conservative growth politics of that city (Altschuler,

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56 1965). The planners tried to integrate community problems, the needs of the economic interests, and the political situation with their professional judgement on what was the best rational, technical planning proposal. This master plan approach was generally resisted by economic interests who influenced government, for the very reason that planners embraced it. Master or rational planning is not susceptible to political pressures, pressures which the local power structure is adept at manipulating and which the citizen participators cannot easily use to their advantage. Growth politics can politicize land use planning even when planners want to be neutral. But it is questionable whether planners desire to act in a neutral capacity. The results of a national study suggest that planners admit that they are susceptible to bias in their recommendations and planning efforts (Vasu, 1979). Planners may be more likely to embrace the directions of advocacy planning. Advocacy planning exposes the bias and preferences of planners and administrators (Davidoff, 1965). It encourages the planning process to support the least advantaged community interests as expressed during liberal growth politics. This approach puts the planning process on high moral ground but dangerous political ground. Ideally, government is supposed to represent all interests in the community. But advocacy planning is easier to justify

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57 because it increases access to the political process instead of restricting it. Does this justify serving a particular interest through the planners? Altschuller (1965, p. 360) lamented that Minneapolis planners were expected to produce policies which would protect the investment of the property owners and to "make investment less risky." Davidoff (1965) and practitioners such as the equity planners in Cleveland tried to represent the existing residents, not the middle class interests that the pro-growth machine wanted to lure back to the city. These experiences suggest that planners and administrators, similar to the private actors, may develop and recommend different land use policies and behave according to the type of growth politics being experienced in the city. Similarly, Rabinovitz (1969) outlines four types of planners, each of which can be effective within a different political climate. She suggests that planners should be flexible and adapt to these planning scenarios in order to maximize their effectiveness in the policy process. The technician role is expected to be most suitable in a cohesive, integrated political climate and the elite dominated executive-centered system. The broker role would be more effective in a competitive political process. The mobilizer may be most successful in a more fragmented,

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58 power-vacuum system where he can overcome policy paralysis by being a leader. Planners as a group, however, have similarities in their approaches to governments' role in planning that seems to cross over the various growth politics. Again, the results of the nationwide study suggest that a majority of planners are neutral (not cynical) in their expectations of the political process, but split evenly as to whether or not a single public interest exists which planners serve. Furthermore, most planners felt that they did not succeed in serving the public interest in a neutral capacity and that citizen participation groups were not neutral in their pursuits . The results strongly suggest a high political awareness and bias towards a value-laden rather than neutral planning process. This may reinforce a public perception that planners are a tool to be used by either side of increasingly polarized local growth politics. Just as Mollenkopf (1983) called for a quid pro quo for settling development conflicts between business and residents, Vasu (1979, p. 189) calls for a normative set of planning principles which "would not seek to avoid values, but rather would stipulate them in an a priori fashion." Again, I would suggest that a growth management process would serve as a vehicle to solve the dilemmas of values and demands in the planning process. An organic, flexible form

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59 of planning can be pragmatic and technically suitable (Mumford, 1961; Altschuller, 1965). 6 Planning processes can be biased. Conservative growth politics takes a utilitarian stance, serving the current economic interests and expecting eventual benefits to accrue to all residents. Liberal growth politics, on the other hand, takes a Rawlsian stance, serving the least advantaged first to bring them to equity before addressing the interests of those who are better off (Beatly, 1984). These two approaches contribute to conflict, because neither one is capable of simultaneous satisfaction of competing interests. It is growth management planning and progressive growth politics that come closest to the organic ideal, serving the interests of the residents but with consideration given to economic realities. We have to keep in mind, however, that progressive planning is not capable of overcoming local political parochialism for extended periods of time, especially in a competitive political system. Again, a state or regional planning directive could ease the tension of the larger public good fighting with the need for economic growth. Florida's comprehensive plan and growth management approaches allow a definition of the public interest through broad goals and the flexibility to accommodate changing conditions through land use policies and local plans. These

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60 state directives can help to reduce, at least in theory, the tension between competing local interests. Conflict in the Policy Process The main hypothesis of this study is that the selection of land use policies is influenced by actor participation which is influenced by the level of conflict (tension) among interests group in the city. This in turn not only affects the policy ends, but also the policy process means. The nature of the conflict within the political process, the number of interests and nature of competition, will affect the policy response. Cities try to achieve a low conflict status by means of economic prosperity or regulated exclusion of conflicting interests. Cities can preserve their fiscal health and selfinterest using a revenue strategy of limiting property taxes and encouraging economic development (Peterson, 1979). This is a long term approach which seeks to minimize or maintain low conflict in order to enhance the city's prosperity. This would be easy to achieve in a perfect world where homogeneity is sorted by utility curves (Tiebout, 1956). In the real world, however, long-term land use regulations including exclusionary policies may be a necessary addition to maintain and accommodate homogeneity (Schneider and Logan, 1982).

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61 The result of low conflict may be that government assumes a facilitator role. This insures long-term stability of economic investments and can complement the long run nature of comprehensive planning. However, the neutral focus of comprehensive planning is traded off for the political need to distribute benefits. Short-term policies may be politically necessary in cities with greater conflict in order to temporarily satisfy competing demands (Friedland, 1983). Accommodation of longterm interests in a high tension city are politically difficult to achieve. Land use policies will reflect incremental approaches to development (Ryder, 1982). The long-term payoff, however, will eventually reflect the dominant growth politics actor, either the business-producer interests or the underprivileged in society. Policies and outcomes reflect values, even if those values within the community are in conflict. A progressive role for government can help to achieve the elusive middle ground. Long-range rational planning is a difficult task because demands change over time. The viable alternative is long-range organic planning and the use of an ecological role for government (Stone, 1986). With an organic approach to planning— flexible but directed, not a rational approach-fixed, or a reactionary approach—political, it is possible to develop a realistic long-term approach in a diverse city experiencing high levels of interest group tension. A

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62 directed policy process (ecological direction of power and flexible planning) can serve to balance short-term political necessities without abdicating government's responsibility as ecological manager. Thus the technical proficiency of the professional planner can be used to develop plans but not to the point of inflexibility. Flexibility contributes to the durability of plans because they can shift when necessary but not solely at political whim and for political profit. Policy Outputs of the Growth Politics Process The urban literature suggests that the policies which are most important to urban areas are developmental policies such as roads, transportation, and utilities among others. All things being equal, urban cities where growth is one of the most important issues are expected to be dominated by economic interests and to adopt land use policies which benefit those interests. But we know this is not always the case. There are differences in land use policy outputs across "growth" cities which result in policies that produce very favorable to very restrictive growth climates. By growth climate we mean the facilitation of development by directing and regulating land use in the city. If a business climate facilitates economic development, then the growth climate facilitators business and population growth. Policies that facilitate growth may include flexible development standards that allow developers to take maximum advantage of market forces, lenient environmental standards,

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no moratoriums or limits on construction, willingness by government to amend local plans, and an easy permitting process. These represent policies the city can use to foster a growth climate. Developmental policies act as more than just an important economic issue which facilitates the collaboration of business and government. Planning processes have done that for years (Rabinovitz, 1969; Altschuler, 1965; Allensworth, 1980). But land use policies and other development policies also have an impact on allocative policies (Peterson, 1979). These traditional service policies benefit the growth machine because they act as an important support system. They placate the anti-growth forces and facilitate the growth climate. For instance, community amenities such as recreation, public safety, and culture can act to maintain and facilitate demand for residential location and promote development. Normally, providing amenities through allocational policies contributes to the residential character of the area. This acts as an inducement which increases the population of the area. But it also may lead to the resistance of future growth by the very residents it attracted in the first place. Once a residential character is established, there may be a threshold beyond which further growth is resisted. Restricting our study of growth politics to developmental policies may obscure additional

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64 political factors. But we can not expect to study every policy, then we would have not established any positive theory. The aim of this study is to establish the importance of developmental policies as tone setters in the city and that options in other policy areas will respond. Some cities, however, may not need to adopt policies which directly facilitate a growth climate. They may be natural economic centers or have a physical environment that attracts people. But as is the case with development subsidies, cities may be forced to be boosters for growth to symbolically gain political benefits and because developers expect cities to provide supportive policies. Most cities do not want to give the appearance that they do not support growth. If demand to locate in the city is great (measured by strong economic development presence and population increase) we expect that a growth climate and appropriate land use policies will be in evidence. Therefore, one of the hypothesis in this research is that the city's ability and proclivity to regulate land is of prime importance to the success of the land based interests. Their ability to influence, infiltrate, and direct the policy making process can yield land use policies that support their position. But the balance of political influence between the growth and anti-growth forces in the political process varies from city to city, yielding a variety of land use policy outputs.

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65 Different stages of growth politics may yield different privileged positions. Specifically, this research hypothesizes that certain policies are regulatory in nature such as greenbelts and moratoriums. These policies do not improve the economic position of the land based elites (growth machine), but rather cost them a portion of their potential profit. At the other extreme are policies which are less restrictive and which maximize the market position and the economic benefits of the growth machine. Zoning, transfer of development rights (TDR), enterprise zones, and tax incentives may be indicative of this. Somewhere in between may be performance oriented policy options such as planned unit development (PUD) and flexible zoning. These policies may diminish the externalities (dysfunctions) of growth by making development conditional, but do not necessarily restrict growth. An examination of the business and residential investments in the city along with the business climate and the level of dysfunctions associated with growth will give us a picture of the balance of power and the zone of policy making in the area of developmental policy. We expect that policies adopted may reflect these economic and political conditions which make up the stages of growth politics. Conclusion What factors affect policy making? That was our original question. To summarize the points of this chapter,

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66 the major influence on policy making is the make-up of the policy process itself. We have suggested that the components, actors, policy approaches, and policy outputs vary by the particular stage of growth politics ongoing in a city. Patterns of components make up these growth politics stages. There is no one stage of growth politics that adequately explains all urban political experiences. But the underlying elements such as economic and political motivations can be organized in identifiable patterns of influence, conflict, and policy outputs. These patterns, the stages of growth politics will provide a better explanation of urban policy making in the broadest context. Notes 1. The literature on community power is vast. The most significant pieces develop the various approaches to understanding the subject. Hunter (1953) used the reputational method to define elite systems. Dahl(1961) used the decisional method to define the pluralistic system. Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson (1972) combined methods to establish a relationship between power and policy in a comparative study. Domhoff (1978) continued the elite theory of power to the national level and suggested that power was attributable to position as well as person. Later authors continued the elite — pluralism debate on methods and conclusions. Most notably, Polsby (1980) supported the pluralist contention. Bacharatz and Baratz as well as Crenson challenged the decisional approach to pluralistic conclusions through their works on non-decision making and agenda building. Finally Lyon and Bonjean (1981), among others sought to test and draw conclusions from these debates and to move on to new dimensions of the quest for understanding influence and the urban policy process. 2. Pluralism see Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980; and elites see Domhoff, 1978; and Hunter, 1953, 1980.

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67 3. See also Stone, 1980, 1986; Mollenkopf, 1983; Swanstrom, 1985; Peterson, 1979, 1981; Clavel, 1986; Molotch, 1976; and Domhoff, 1986. 4. Staniland (1985) suggests that "political economy" is not a theory but an agenda of ideas and approaches to understand the policy process. He contests that "economism" is a deterministic set of theories where politics is an extension of economic competition. "Politicism" is a positive theory that describes the process within which economics is a player. One is not superior to the other, nor can we define empirically which one comes first. Therefore, political economy is an agenda of relationships between the economic and political processes that create the policy environment. 5. Government also can regulate exclusion community-wide. Higher property taxes can ensure that amenities will continue to be provided and at the same time, economically restrict less valuable developments and less affluent residents. (Dye, 1986, pp. 37-8) This type of economic based exclusion affects the metropolitan area as well. By managing growth through exclusion, new growth goes elsewhere, perhaps to cities with fewer resources to cope with growth. (Dye, 1986) This is the same scenario that declining cities face when wealth exits the central cities to suburbs who do not assist in the costs of redevelopment. It is difficult, however, to do much more than speculate on the motives behind tax rates and land use regulation. 6. Medieval towns took advantage of natural contours to organize a development plan. But these plans were mediated by both the needs of the people and the constraints presented by attention to economic (marketplace) necessities. Organic planning means an attention to the needs of the community while retaining professional standards .

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CHAPTER THREE THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLITICS The Rules of the Game in Land Use Planning An important activity which is affected by developmental policy is land use. The use of land, the prime component in urban area development, is crucial to economic interest groups. Their success is tied to their ability to control the use of the land by development, construction, planning and attracting government subsidies. The type of local land use policies adopted and the regulation process critically affect our understanding of urban influence patterns and decision-making systems. Land use decisions have significant costs and benefits which may alter the local decision-making process. Past efforts to understand either land use issues or decision-making systems have not fully integrated these two phenomena. Planning and economic inquiries have focussed on the technical aspects of land use and the rational approach to planning (Faludi, 1973) as well as the deterministic aspects of location (Alonso, 1964; Wheaton, 1977). Political scientists have studied land-related decisions but only within the broader context of local power (Clark, 1971; Dahl, 1982). 68

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69 Molotch's (1976) theory of a growth machine is a significant interdisciplinary approach which combines the economic motivations of influential actors associated with land development and governments' facilitation of those interests through the policy process. But we need to go beyond government's role as a facilitator of a business climate and examine whether or not government can control the economic pressures for development, the political economy agenda. Land use regulations are the rules of the land use game and are a reflection of community influence and power structures (Long, 1958). Rule #1 — Government Parameters Affect Political Influence We have already suggested several different phases through which growth politics passes — conservative, liberal, and progressive. Now we need to put them in perspective in terms of practical political experiences in the area of land use. To do this we can use a framework to analyze the political relationship between the decision-making process of government and the development and implementation of the land use regulation process. Democracies face many dilemmas in defining their scope of political and policy control (Dahl, 1982). Similarly, state governments face the same dilemmas in defining their scope of control or authority over local governments. The development and implementation of local land use regulations may be significantly affected by this scope of control. The

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70 approaches by each level of government to these authority dilemmas ultimately affect the gains and losses of the growth politics actors. There are three dilemmas useful to our understanding of the politics of the land use process. They provide a framework for analyzing the possible political impacts of a state centered or a local-centered land use regulation process (Dahl, 1982, pp. 96-107). 1. uniformity versus diversity — the degree of discretion in the development and implementation process afforded by the state to local government. 2. centralization versus decentralization — the degree of control in development and implementation process that the state maintains. 3. rights versus utility — the distribution of benefits and costs to various interests through the regulation process . Florida, for example, has enacted landmark legislation creating a process for land use regulation. Florida's process has evolved in such a way as to present an interesting case study of the transition of local to state power. More importantly, however, is that by tracing the land use process in Florida we also trace the transitions of growth politics in a sunbelt state. Examples of state and local legislation in Florida depict political changes from conservative to liberal to progressive growth politics. Florida's transition may be representative of other fast growing sunbelt states, but is somewhat different from the growth politics experiences of urban frostbelt cities.

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71 Over a fifteen-year period (1970-85) Florida has moved from a totally unregulated state situation, to the use of state-guided regional input into large development decisions, through state guidelines and requirements for local comprehensive planning, and to state control over growth management by means of a state-regional-local decision-making process. Tracing the evolution of the state's approach to growth politics will contribute to our understanding of various urban approaches to growth politics in Florida cities. Rule #2 — Economics Affect Political Influence Economic determinants of growth also can contribute to our understanding of growth politics. We need to establish a link between the costs and benefits of growth which accrue to various interest groups and the nature of growth politics in the city. The data may show that the land use policies adopted by a city reflect the combination of these economic and political interests. The control over land use is critical to Florida and other sunbelt states for several economic reasons. First, population growth is important to the development of a sunbelt state's economy. Population increases allow economic diversification and development of a competitive business environment (Molenkopf, 1983). Statewide, Florida has diversified from agriculture and tourism to high tech and service industries to support continued economic development

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and a stronger state revenue base. Florida continues to lead the nation in most new jobs produced (Koenig, 1987). Over the 1981-86 period Florida added 850,000 new jobs, a 23% increase, and personal income rose over 50% with per capita income over $14,000 (Koenig, 1987, p. 46). Local areas as well are diversifying their economies. An annual survey of Florida business leaders reveals strong optimism for continued strong economic growth throughout the state (Koenig, 1987). In 1987, trade and service sectors make up over 50% of the total employment in the state (Koenig, 1987, p. 47). This type of continued, strong economic development is expected to reflect a continued interest by a conservative growth machine to dominate the land use process. Secondly, to be economically successful a population increase must be diversified and not limited to unskilled or non-working groups. Even though the influx of retirees to Florida in the early years created a strong housing demand, it is not the type of housing industry which will sustain a strong local economy. But as the state's service sector boomed, a migration of families and young professionals stimulated a long-term housing demand. Employment overall rose 23% from 1981-86 in the state. The 24-44 year old age group is 27% of the total state population making it the largest segment of the state population ("Florida Population Climbs to No. 5", 1987, p. 54).

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73 As the population diversifies and the participants in the business community diversify, we also may expect to see more political conflict. This may increase the tendency of the formation of an anti-growth coalition. As we will see, however, in Florida the anti-growth coalition manifested itself in a suburban, residential interest as Molotch (1976) might have predicted and not as liberal growth politics suggested by Molenkopf (1983). Thirdly, the housing construction and development industry may be the major economic thrust in Florida urban areas. An abundance of undeveloped land and rapid population growth can sustain a city's revenue base. This type of economic development has been the impetus for many Florida cities to attain greater economic diversification and to create and sustain additional cities. Housing starts increased 34.3% from 1981-86 ("Florida Population Climbs to No. 5", 1987, p. 53). The northeast portion of the state has experienced the greatest surge, a 144% increase over five years followed by the central regions with about 85% increase. The southeast coast, long the sight of the greatest growth trailed central Florida in actual housing starts (central 37,774 starts, southeast 32,173 starts), but represents the second highest number of starts in the state ("Florida Population Climbs to No. 5", 1987, p. 53). The rate of change in starts, though, was outdistanced by the central and northern areas by 29%. Those regions appear to be

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74 growing faster. Growth remains a significant issue around the state and impacts local political power and policy. Rule #3 — Economic and Political Influences Affect Po licy Making Decision making concerning the use of land is a politically volatile policy area. Specifically, the type of growth and the purpose for the land affects the distribution of political power. For instance, residential growth may heighten the political power of neighborhood groups. Economic development centered growth may produce different political results such as an elite or business dominated power structure. In theoretical terms, Peterson's (1979) unitary explanation of city interests may be more suitable to a residential community and structural, elite power theories (Stone, 1980; Domhoff, 1986) may be more suitable to larger, more diversified urban areas. Florida and other sunbelt states, however, may consist (as Mollenkopf (1983) alludes to) of multi-nodal urban areas with mixed commercial and residential development. Mollenkopf suggests that this pattern leads to unchallenged conservative growth politics. But some Florida cities check unrestrained growth and restrict it. This leads us to believe that sunbelt cities, especially in Florida, will experience additional stages of growth politics. Florida land use policy significantly influences economic interests. The state's land use regulations represent more than just an example of a state's regulatory

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75 authority overcoming the desires of local interests. We know that a broader authority and higher level of government can implement controversial regulations that limit the benefits of powerful interests more successfully than can local governments (Lindblom, 1977; Long, 1980; Swanstrom, 1985). Land use and development regulations certainly fit that description. Florida, however, is an example of how state government can influence not only the direction of the local use of land but also the nature of the benefits which may be available to growth interests. The level of government that directs the land use process has a significant impact on the distribution of the benefits of land development and growth. The state, by institutionalizing its presence in this high-stakes policy arena and by centralizing its decision-making authority can guide land development while at the same time maintain a particular growth agenda. In Florida's case we will see how the state's efforts to centralize and create a uniform process influenced the transition at the state level from conservative to liberal to progressive growth politics. Those state actions also improved the opportunity for growth politics transitions to occur at the local level. Florida's history of transitions in decision-making and growth politics contribute to our understanding of the policy process, and the implications for intergovernmental relations. Most importantly it contributes to our

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76 understanding of institutional power, its relation to the operation of interest group and community power (in terms of gains and losses), and the policies adopted by governments in each type of political process. Florida Growth Politics Conservative Growth Politics Conservative growth politics as we have discussed previously, is an unrestrained growth machine approach to development and is most likely to be associated with the government dilemma of uniformity or diversity of the policy process. In Florida this dilemma centers on the land use process that the state makes available to local governments for devising and implementing growth-management policies. Uniformity represents the degree to which growth management is regulated and guided by the state through a decision framework implemented at the local level but required by the state. Diversity represents the degree of local discretion given to local government by the state in interpreting or implementing their own approach to growth management and land use. State mandates are an example of uniformity. Lovell and Tobin (1981) suggest that state mandates reduce the decision-making discretion of local governments. State demands for uniformity may also increase the fiscal dependency of local governments that cannot afford to implement the state-mandated policies (Lovell, 1981).

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77 Uniform mandate parameters may be viewed negatively, but Wirt (1985, p. 95) suggests that mandates, by producing an additive effect, can increase local governments' ability to address policy problems. State mandates may act as a "preemption" to shape the local "decision space," but this does not have to produce a burden or negative impact on local government (the zero-sum view). Instead it may simply provide a framework for local decision-making to take advantage of a supportive policy opportunity. Local conservative growth politics, however, might be more successful in a locally determined land use process that operates independently of the state's influence. Statewide policy uniformity, must compromise over a wider group of interests and may not provide as supportive a pro-growth climate as might locally dominated decision making processes . Prior to 1972, the state government in Florida played a minor role in regulating local land use and directing urban growth. During this time, the state was supportive and made urban growth easier (Carter, 1974). 1 The state began to open development by allowing drainage and dredging in wetlands, especially south of Lake Okeechobee through the Everglades. This opened previously undevelopable land in southeast and southwest Florida near the turn of the century (DeGrove, 1984). The St. Lucie, Hillsborough, and Miami canals made development possible in southeast Florida and drainage in

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78 the Big Cypress area created development opportunities in the southwest part of the state. By the 1940s, overdrainage for agriculture and over-development forced the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to step in and implement a flood control program which designated 1.3 million acres as a water conservation area and left 800,000 acres for agriculture (DeGrove, 1984). The state's conservative political climate, however, continued a strong development environment. In the 1960s the state-federal venture to create the Cross-Florida Barge canal created a heated controversy between legislators and environmentalists. Similarly, there were conflicts over the need for water in the urban areas and in the Everglades Park. The most protracted battle for water occurred over the Big Cypress Jetport site in the Everglades which, if built, would have impeded the water flow necessary to sustain wetlands (DeGrove, 1984). Florida cities and counties also embraced development and supported wholeheartedly the growth machine interests. The city of Miami was an example of the developer interests dictating city and county land use policy. There was minimal regulation and direction from local government allowing developers to run the growth game. The Dade county real estate explosion in the 1950s and 1960s left both MetroDade and the various cities vulnerable to the influence of the growth machine. Metro-Dade had zoning authority for the

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79 county and cities, but did not use it (Carter, 1974, p. 154). The 1965 Master Plan encouraged development goals over other goals for agriculture and conservation (Carter, 1974, pp. 155,156). Even into the early 1970s Metro-Dade made its land use decisions on an "ad-hoc case-by-case basis" providing benefits to developers at the cost of long-term planning goals (Carter, 1974, pp. 167). Many developers in the 1950s and 1960s were speculators taking advantage of the interest of out-of-state land buyers and retirees who were eager to relocate to Florida. Many new developments were self-contained and did provided only limited infrastructure, instead relying on wells and septic tanks. There was political pressure at the state and local levels for short-term development and very little consistent implementation of long-term planning (Carter, 1974, p. 156). This put Florida cities on a path of politically favoring short-term economic benefits by authorizing quick development and profit. It also marked the beginning of accruing long-term costs to the environment for which government would have to pay later. The St. Petersburg, Ft. Lauderdale, and Miami areas experienced the most growth in the post war years (Table 31). This boom period was marked by aggressive development and market driven growth. The state government continued to make policy contributions to spur growth. In 1941 the state designated Nassau county, north of Jacksonville, an

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Table 3-1 Selected Population Growth Rates 1940-80 Location Change in Population (%) 1940-50 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 Dade county 84.91 88.86 35.58 28.20 Miami 44.78 17.00 14.80 3.53 Hialeah 397.11 240.37 52.97 41.77 Broward county 110.91 297.87 52.97 41.77 Ft. Lauderdale 101.86 130.25 66.87 9.80 Palm Beach county 43.37 98.89 52.99 65.26 Boca Raton 37.20 601.71 1223.27 67.39 Orange county 64.00 129.26 30.64 36.75 ( Orlando ) Pinellas county 73.37 135.26 39.41 39.28 (St. Pete) Hillsborough county 38.71 59.18 23.24 31.96 ( Tampa ) Duval county 44.67 49.79 16.12 7.96 (Jacksonville ) Bay county 106.36 57.25 12.14 30.11 (Panama City) Source: Figures generated from the Florida Statistical Abstract, 1951, 1961, 1971, and 1981

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81 "industrial county." Polluting waterways was allowed as a necessary function for industry (Carter, 1974, p. 46). Industrial paper companies discovered an exceptionally beneficial growth climate available to them. The data suggests the development of a growth profile that potentially benefits the growth machine through conservative growth politics. Problems in paradise Growth was encouraged by the lack of development controls and the state efforts to encourage growth through economic incentives for land development. (Statewide zoning enabling was not established until the constitutional revision of 1969 (O'Connell, 1977).) But this approach had a high cost associated with it. Natural disasters and reckless care of sensitive lands brought attention to the dysfunctions of growth. Major ecological and environmental problems resulted from the short-sighted approach to develop land through a marketdriven process. The competition for space and water between development interests and environmentalists crystallized the political problems facing Florida legislators as they grappled with land use legislation. These problems forced a change in state-wide growth politics from conservative to a more liberal growth politics. While conservative growth politics at the state level was declining, at the local level growth politics remained relatively unchanged. The

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82 state's involvement in the attempt to restrict growth is the first shift towards a more unitary approach to land use development in Florida. Liberal growth politics relies on this type of regulatory assistance from a broader level of government . From the late 1960s onward, the state instituted a number of conservation reforms which eventually led to land use reforms. The 1966-70 administration of Governor Kirk paid serious attention to the sensitive environmental problems of the Everglades and other critical areas. Conservation groups were influential within the administration and their concerns were supported by the Governor's staff. Eventually this led to the formation of the Governor's Natural Resources Committee, an influential group which proposed significant environmental legislation. Water quality, beach development, sewer hookup, and development permitting were among the policy areas affected by the state's attention to ecological problems. The 1970-78 administration of Governor Askew continued the state's conservation efforts and a reliance on land use planning. Severe environmental problems, including a crippling south Florida drought in 1971 brought about a number of significant policy responses. Governor Askew organized the Governor's Conference on Water Management in South Florida in 1971 to address the chronic battle between development and environmental needs. The task force which

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83 resulted from that conference recommended that a plan be developed to limit growth in order to conserve water. This signaled a major shift in Florida politics (DeGrove, 1984). The governor called for new legislation to be proposed addressing these conflicts. A crucial policy dilemma was considered at this juncture. The Governor's study committee considering the various policy options had a major choice to make. Under consideration were two models for land use regulation. The Hawaii model was a comprehensive, unitary policy model giving most of the directive powers over land use to the state. The alternative was the ALI Model Code (Finnell, 1973). It left decisions about local development directions to local governments and gave directive power to the state only in critical areas or for significant scale developments (Carter, 1974, pp. 130,131). The Hawaii option could have been perceived as a severe constraint on local growth machines. The ALI option left the local political process open to interest group competition. Florida was not ready to assume a fully unitary approach. There was quite a bit of controversy surrounding the proposed legislation. Supporting a strong State presence in land use regulation were the environmental groups, the League of Women Voters, the American Institute of Architects, and many local newspapers around the state. Opposed to the legislation were the Homebuilders Association

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84 and assorted developers (with the notable exception of the Arvida Corporation) (DeGrove, 1984). Despite the controversies, in 1972 the state enacted four significant pieces of land use legislation which would pave the way for a more liberalized, unitary policy approach to land use. The most significant legislation passed was the Land Management Act (F.S. Chapter 380) which contained the provisions to designate Areas of Critical State Concern and the Developments of Regional Impact (DRI). The other significant legislation included the Water Resources Act of 1972, the Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972 (state plan), and the Land Conservation Act of 1972 (DeGrove, 1984). The state's objective was not to stop growth but to minimize the problems which resulted from a growth pattern fueled by unrestricted market pressures. The state could not ignore the costs of this type of growth and the state political process had to develop some parameters to curb local conservative growth politics. The legislation had three significant features which aided in its passage. The legislation maintained a primary role for local government in the land use process, the state had limited and defined areas in which it could intervene, and the legislation had significant legal and technical strength which insulated it from challenge (DeGrove, 1984)

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85 Transition to liberal growth politics The Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972 contained several key provisions such as the process to designate areas of critical state concern and methods to direct developments of regional impact. These policies indicated that the state was ready to make a change in the costs and benefits of growth politics. Large scale developments and development in environmentally sensitive areas would now be influenced by or controlled by the state government. The state could overrule local conservative growth politics. This reduced the economic benefits available to developers. But in return it provided a way to reduce the high costs of the problems of unchecked development for which government paid. With the 1972 legislation series, Florida began to institutionalize land use development policy. The Cabinet, state agencies, and the state's Regional Planning Councils were responsible for deciding and monitoring major developments and environmental concerns. Local governments plugged into a decision making chain of command, altering the business as usual approach to land use which benefitted the local growth machine interests. This new legislation would by no means stop growth or restrict it in all ways, but it did present a significant change in political attitudes toward increased government involvement in the use

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86 of land, a critical factor in the transition of growth politics . Two political phenomenon were emerging. One was an increased authority role for the state via 1972 legislation. Secondly, environmentalists were becoming an influential political group, most prominently as a state-wide coalition. Their strength came from both the national ecology movement and the increasingly urban progressive make-up of the Florida legislature which occurred after legislative reapportionment in 1967. Florida's environmentalists were a check force on the previously unrestrained growth machine (DeGrove, 1984). In Florida, these political factors contributed to a form of liberal growth politics. But unlike this stage of growth politics in northern cities, Florida's initial response to the growth machine was centered on the environmental cause, and less on issues of racial or income equity. As Mollenkopf (1983) points out, there are few inner city areas in the sunbelt. Thus the anti-growth coalition does not exist in the traditional sense of displaced urban residents. Subsequently, he concludes that sunbelt states miss the liberal growth politics experience except through the nationally stimulated community action and neighborhood movement. But Florida eventually would enter a defined liberal growth politics period. The 1972 legislation represented the first major legislative transition.

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87 The liberal environmental coalition entered into growth politics, received favorable responses from the governor and other legislative leaders, and began to see a halt to unchecked, unplanned growth in the state. Some developers, most notably the Arvida Corporation, were in agreement with the environmental approach. They had concerns about the long-term impacts of overdevelopment of the land and development in excess of infrastructure capacity. They in fact supported the increased government involvement, favoring a long term strategy, rather than short term political incrementalism (Appgar and Landers, 1987; Carter, 1974, pp. 135,136). The ability to predict land use policy directions in the long-term allows developers to plan for economic investment and forecast profit potential. As long as the state policy was not too economically restrictive, large, multi-city developers could benefit from a unitary state approach. For all the environmental political victories, however, other groups had different agendas within the new land use legislation framework. People perceived a decline in the quality of life or "a lifestyle as was once known." What Dade county realized as the need for controlled growth, the "sane growth" campaign in late 1950s, became in other areas a campaign to exclude growth (Carter, 1974). Liberal growth politics suggests that rampant growth is resisted because of its insensitivity to existing residents, most notably in the

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88 inner city. But liberal growth politics can also be represented by the interests of the anti-growth coalition as described by Molotch. These existing residential interests may want to stop growth because it is changing the style and quality of life to which they have become accustomed. This approach to growth management is the "last man in the boat" philosophy (Dye, 1986). The "I have mine, go get yours elsewhere" approach. The strategy may be to keep the character of the city predominantly residential and low density. Most notably, in 1972 the upper-income, exclusively developed community of Boca Raton passed a population cap ordinance. St. Petersburg threatened to enact similar legislation, but never followed through. Their cap would have been lower than the existing population, forcing out some residents. Growth increases political diversity and challenges the status quo. Liberal growth politics tries to protect the diversity of interests by protecting the equity concerns. In Florida, the anti-growth, residential interests were seeking political and policy protection from growth in the same manner as the environmental interests. The environmentalists and the residential exclusionists used the same political methods, but for different selfinterests. This split within the anti-growth coalition may be part of the underlying explanation for why Florida cities approach growth very differently in some cases. Growth can

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89 coexist with the environment if guidelines are set and imposed by the state. But that would require a degree of uniformity for which not all Florida cities and counties were politically ready. An essentially decentralized approach to land use planning and development was maintained, specifically to maintain the political integrity of local residential interests. This continuing decentralized approach could have left conservative growth politics to dominate local politics. But residential anti-growth coalitions were able to use the political process to their own ends just as the growth machine had done in the conservative growth politics phase. This observation is intended to be explanatory and not judgmental. After all, the decision making arena and its outputs are shaped by political power. But the next segment of significant state legislation had an -even greater potential to affect local political power than the 1972 policies . Liberal Growth Politics In 1975 Florida enacted its first comprehensive planning requirement for cities and counties through the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (LGCPA) (F.S. 163.3161). This legislation solidified the unitary approach to the planning process throughout the state. At this time the state was faced with its second major dilemma, whether to centralize or decentralize policy authority .

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90 While the LGCPA did not completely centralize land use regulation decision making, it did significantly institutionalize the process and lay the groundwork for centralized implementation at a later time. This increase in state involvement altered the local growth politics process and forced shifts in the benefits available to and costs extracted from land use interest groups. At the same time it provided opportunities for greater participation in the process . The LGCPA was in part a response to the problems encountered by implementing the 1972 legislation. Adjustments were necessary that the existing legislation could not sustain. The Environmental Land Management (ELMs) committee recommended local planning legislation in order to close the loophole in the DRI process. If no local land use regulations were in place, development could occur without restriction and a DRI could not be denied (DeGrove, 1984). The LGCPA delineated uniform parameters within which local governments were to develop comprehensive plans for growth. The intent of the act is broad, but deserves our attention in order to appreciate the changes occurring in the approach to land use regulation in the state.

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It is the intent of this act that its adoption is necessary so that local governments can preserve and enhance present advantages; encourage the most appropriate use of land, water, and resources, consistent with the public interest; overcome present handicaps; and deal effectively with future problems that may result from the use and development of land within their jurisdictions. Through the process of comprehensive planning, it is intended that units of local government can preserve, promote, protect, and improve the public health, safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience, law enforcement and fire prevention, and general welfare; prevent the overcrowding of land and avoid undue concentration of population; facilitate the adequate and efficient provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, recreational facilities, housing, and other requirements and services; and conserve, develop, utilize, and protect natural resources within their jurisdictions (F.S. 163.3161 (3)). State review powers were to be used only to insure local compliance with comprehensive planning requirements. The contents of the plan and the specifics of its implementation were left to local government discretion and not subject to state approval. Through a conscious decision to shape uniformly the local decision-making process, the state began to institutionalize its own land use regulation process. Every plan was to have a coordinated set of nine elements addressing the various aspects of growth. The nine elements in the LGCPA were to be planned in coordination with each other. The elements were 1) future land use, 2) traffic circulation 3) sanitary sewer 4) conservation 5) recreation-open space 6) housing 7) intergovernmental coordination 8) utilities and 9) coastal zone (if a coastal

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92 location) Elements addressing airports and water ports were required for cities with those facilities (F.S. 163.3177). The future land use element was the central feature of the legislative requirement for local planning. The LGCPA represents a move to the unitary approach to the land use process in order to make a concentrated impact on the increasing dysfunctions of growth. But it remained a "bottom-up" planning process (DeGrove and Jurgensmeyer , 1985). Local governments could use the plan as a growth management tool or they could amend it in reaction to development situations and essentially defuse the impact of the plan. The major change in growth politics in 1975, however, is the emergence of the planning function as an influential political force. The LGCPA required over 400 city and county plans to be prepared. These plans were developed by local government planners, city and county clerks and managers, and in many cases by consultant contract either with the regional planning councils' staffs or with private planning firms. A rational planning process was mandated by the state. Local governments made the attempt towards at least perfunctory compliance. Local plans were required to be evaluated and updated every five years. But the planning requirements were approached in a variety of ways. Some cities took the responsibility zealously while others

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93 ignored it. This became the heart of the change in statewide and local growth politics. The state was moving in a direction to regulate development and planning for future growth. The 1975 LGCPA was intended to influence a shift towards liberal and even a populist political stance. Requirements for integrated planning through the nine elements, public hearings, formal amendments process for change, compliance with statewide regulations, and a required evaluation process all contributed to a larger role for state government to define parameters and allow local government the opportunity to engage dynamically in the growth and development of their city and county. But cities, being a variety of political places, used the comprehensive planning process to further the growth politics which suited their own political environment the best. Thus the wide variance in results of the use of the planning process (University of Florida, 1984). it is those results — the different planning policies and approaches used in each city — which this research examines . Implementing the 1975 LGCPA was not easy. There was confusion and duplication with the 1972 series of legislation (O'Connell, 1976). There was relatively little funding available, a lack of coordination with existing regional bodies such as the Water Management Districts, and

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94 a clash between regional and local decisional jurisdictions (Graham, 1976). It is difficult to portray comprehensive planning in black and white, either or terms, in the way that some authors such as Molotch have suggested. In general we can portray local politics as "tensions" between growth machine interests and anti-growth interests (Friedland, 1983). The distinctions are much less clear when we specifically analyze local politics and the plans which result from that process. At best we can identify some directions to which comprehensive plan goals and policies may lean. For example, goals and policies may indicate economic approaches to planning which favor growth or a stable neighborhood approach designed to contain growth. In addition, cities and counties use a wide variety of strategies to develop growth plans. Some plans reflect that several scenarios for growth were considered. In other cases a single growth interest is reflected by the policy approach selected. More often than not, plans reflect a very general non-directed approach to growth. This non-commitment to strategy probably represents a short-term incremental political and planning process rather than a long-term strategy and rational political and planning process. It may be instructive of the various approaches to land use planning to convey excerpts from comprehensive plans from several of the cities included in this study. First,

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95 many plans have very nebulous goals and objectives. The vision of community growth seems to be quite often undefined. For example the first goal in one city's plan is: to establish a land use pattern that will promote the health, safety, and welfare of the residents ... while being in harmony with the natural environment (Land Use Element of the 2005 Comprehensive Plan Jacksonville Area Planning Board, 1978). That type of goal can temper political conflict by its broad scope which can include many positions on land use. A greater specificity in goals reflects a greater consensus around land use politics at least so far as it is an indication of an ability to influence policy decisions. An example of a more specific goal might be A more diversified and intensely developed Core Area comprising the Central Business District (CBD) and the adjacent residential, commercial, and industrial areas (Growth Management Plan Vol.3 Part 2, Orlando, 1980). More specific still are goals and objectives which specify numerical development targets to accommodate projected growth such as the Accommodation of a projected population of 262,900 people within the urban areas. This accommodation will require construction of 35,810 new housing units between 1980 and 2000 ... (Growth Management Plan Vol.3 Part 2, Orlando, 1980). A number of cities project the amount of acreage devoted to each category of use such as residential, commercial, or industrial. The Pompano Beach plan goes so far as to project the percentage of residential land that will be needed for

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96 each category of housing unit density (City of Pompano Beach Comprehensive Plan Element One: Land Use Plan, 1977). There is a technical difference between goals and objectives as to specificity. Goals are supposed to be broad and objectives more concrete. But for some cities it may not be politically possible to achieve the level of specificity which will render their plan as a useful document. Conflict affects the nature of local power which contributes to the final plan product. It is the nature of these effects which the data will explore. But for the plans themselves, it is evident that some goals and objectives portray an anti-growth or residential protection sentiment. For example a goal addressing residential plans is to Maintain and encourage the continued existence and viability of low density single family areas through the adoption and use of a Land Use Plan and land use control regulations and by making improvements in public facilities, such as streets, parks, and police/fire protection (The Comprehensive Plan City of Panama City, 1978 ) . Another city in its effort to preserve a neighborhood character coordinated its residential goals with its economic development goals. Living Environment: Provide for a range of residential densities which will blend together without causing congestion or disharmony.

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97 Economic Development: Encourage the development of financial, professional, and retail services which are conveniently located in order to meet the needs of the residents (Land Use Plan Melbourne, 1979). Finally, a truly comprehensive approach to growth goals is exemplified in the following city's plan which acknowledges growth but within very limited parameters. Growth Control: A growth management system which phases the rate of growth, spatial distribution, and intensity of development through time as a means of enhancing the quality of life. Residential Density: Safe, stable, and attractive residential areas which have adequate amenities, individual character, a generally low density and intensity of development and which provide a variety of housing opportunities. Industrial Development: ... a variety of nonhazardous and relatively quiet lightindustrial and research uses which provide a wide range of employment opportunities and a broadened tax base... Community Appearance: An urban environment having high aesthetic quality and having proper streetscape and landscape maintenance (Comprehensive Plan Boca Raton, 1979). Conversely, there are several examples of comprehensive plans which take a decidedly pro-growth attitude and business climate sentiment. These excerpts portray conservative growth politics through the role of government as facilitator of a good business environment or growth climate. For instance one city states that the intent of the land use plan is to

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98 . . . facilitate operation of the economic forces which determine land use ... (Comprehensive Plan Document Marion County, 1978) . In addition, that same plan specifically states that land development should not be "unduly hindered by unnecessary laws, restrictions, or practices" that interfere with market activities in conjunction with land use (Marion County, 1978) . Several plans give an endorsement of conservative growth politics in their framework statements. One county asserts that a growth process should have regulations which reflect that An enlightened public policy is required which recognizes that it is not merely a matter of limiting growth, but rather developing policies to rationally accommodate it .... residents feel threatened at the prospect of ... vanishing open space ... (and) have congealed into what has been termed a "nongrowth" ethic . . . Yet not all growth is bad (Orange County Growth Management Policy, 1981) . A city within that county exhibited a similar approach when it stated that ... growth has a good side, while there will be more people ... there will be more money, too. In fact, average incomes will increase. There will be more people and more businesses to sustain the services and facilities which contribute to the good life ... Growth management follows from the perception that the basic cause of growth cannot be directly controlled by local or any other government — (Growth Management Plan Vol.3 Part 2 Orlando 1980) .

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99 These examples represent the various approaches to growth and land use planning by cities and counties during the same time period. Even though the state was shifting political gears by increasing the uniformity of the development process, the local level expressed a variety of political approaches to the process. The process allowed the manifestation of conservative and liberal growth politics depending on the local political situation. This period of time provides a great deal of instructive data about the operation of local growth politics under a common planning framework. The state objective was to reduce the dysfunctions of growth and encourage local governments to plan f or growth and accommodate it in the most resourceful way possible (University of Florida, 1984). Conservative to Liberal Growth Politics— t he Uniformity Dilemma " Uniformity in the land use regulation process and growth-management may not always be a positive force or be able to overcome local political conflict. Approaching this dilemma by mandating uniformity in the planning process may not necessarily be a negative prospect for local government's ability to control its own destiny. The uniform approach to the Florida land use process can produce an additive or positive result at the local level. Local government along with local economic interests from all businesses not just land-based interests, may profit from state directives which help to create what Molotch (1976)

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100 calls a "good business climate." Uniformity, directed by the state, can help local government overcome short-term parochial resistance to growth and achieve the long-term benefits of economic development ( Allensworth, 1980). The state of Florida realized over time that a necessarily uniform approach through the LGCPA did not produce a uniform quality of results. This was due in part to the different local growth politics approaches and local resistance by growth interests to planning restrictions on land use. Several state commissions reported that the quality of local plans was not adequate in many cases because they were amended frequently rendering them useless as long-term planning tools. The plans were often ignored as a growth management policy. For the most part the various reports on the LGCPA concurred and concluded that the act's bottom-up planning process itself was not successful in preparing local governments for growth or adequately facilitating growth in terms of land use, environmental protection, or capital facility development (Growth Management Advisory Committee, 1986; Florida House of Representatives, 1982). There are other reasons why plans were unequal in quality. Some cities could not afford the time to prepare in-depth plans, they did not have in-house expertise, and/or did not have adequate funds to prepare quality plans. There was a lack of funding from the state to help local

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101 governments prepare and implement the planning process (O'Connell, 1977). But why did the process fail to achieve the state's desired result of uniform growth management? The explanation, in part, centers on the nature of the regulations of the process and in part on the regional nature of growth and development. The LGCPA had several regulatory shortcomings. One problem is the lack of clear state guidance on growth management. Partly, the purpose of the LGCPA was to allow local governments to design their own individual approaches to growth management. There was no significant preparation or implementation of a state-wide comprehensive plan. Without any state parameters, the local plans did not have a framework to guide them or to provide any consistency. But the dysfunctions of growth do not adhere necessarily to political boundaries of cities and counties. Many problems are regional and as such require regional direction and solutions that are integrated (Florida Atlantic University, 1986, p. 5). A second problem is that plans and practice did not necessarily match. What local government planned, they were legally required to implement, but not necessarily in conjunction with their day-to-day services and operations (Florida Atlantic University, 1986, p. 6). Political incrementalism superceded coordinated and consistent plan implementation .

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102 A third problem is that the state had no enforcement powers under the LGCPA. The state only reviewed for compliance, not for content quality. Therefore, it is essential to realize that the contents of comprehensive plans do not attempt the same objectives for all cities and counties. Some policies and goals are more necessary than others depending on local and regional circumstances. Economic needs and political forces combine to implement some policies more aggressively than others. These are patterns which our data analysis will address. Local problems in comprehensive planning also include the legality of the plans themselves. For instance, in Jacksonville the comprehensive plan was adopted by the city council by resolution and not by ordinance. This led to an ad-hoc development process in Jacksonville that did not complement growth management (Jacksonville Community Council, inc., 1984, p. 7). Secondly, the broadness of the goals of the Jacksonville plan contributed to the inability of the city to effectively direct growth and development (Jacksonville Community Council, Inc., 1984, p. 17). This led to a political basis for growth and zoning decisions by city council superceding the plans. Other local governments no doubt experienced similar implementation problems. From 1975-1985, Florida followed a moderate program to shape local decision-making arenas towards uniformity. The price that the state paid for allowing local discretion

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103 within state guidelines was ten years of inadequate preparation for and dealing with the problems of rapid growth. The state needed to pursue a stronger, more centralized approach in order to overcome the conflicts of local growth politics whether conservative or liberal, that were inhibiting the effectiveness of growth management. Progressive Growth Politics The deficiencies of the LGCPA turned the state's attention to the dilemma of centralization/decentralization of policy authority and direction by posing the question, which level of government should have the authority to make policy decisions? Centralization places the decision-making power over land use regulation at the state level. Decentralization places decision-making at the local level. Centralization infers decision-making control, not just a uniform shaping of the local decision space. By concentrating authority at the state level, there is a greater ability to establish long-term approaches to growth throughout the state. Decentralization, on the other hand, may be a more parochial approach and concerned with the short-term gains rather than long-term solutions to land use problems, similar to the "diversity" dilemma approach. Centralization forces a tradeoff of the possibility of local decision making efficiency for broader long-term compromise solutions. If decisions are made centrally, then many local demands will not be met even through compromise,

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104 thus creating less local decision efficiency. Centralization, however, may make it easier to satisfy larger equity concerns that can only be seen with a statewide view, yet does not insure that this will happen (Neenan and Ethridge, 1984). Narrow interests may be able to dominate the state level policy process and may benefit from centralization at the expense of a broader state-wide benefit . But the broader level of authority in Florida through the transition to a development of liberal growth politics, was steadily bringing different interest groups into the decision making process and reflecting their concerns in legislation. Florida in essence, would attempt to project this process to the local level. A greater role for government, through the extended use of the LGCPA and changes to that legislation, reflects Florida's transition to progressive growth politics. As we discussed earlier, progressive growth politics establishes a more active role for government in the land use/development process. Florida, through gradual institutionalization of the rules of the land use game has improved the potential effectiveness of government as a participant in land use politics . In 1985 after ten years of "bottom-up" land use planning in Florida, the legislature enacted a new policy approach. The Growth Management Act of 1985 ( GMA )

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105 centralized comprehensive planning at the state level which created a "top-down" decision process (DeGrove and Jurgensmeyer , 1986). Although our study is confined to the 1975-85 LGCPA legislative period, it will help our understanding of the results if we briefly examine this replacement land use legislation. Under the GMA all local governments are required to develop new comprehensive plans including a future land use element and capital improvements plan, the contents of which were subject to acceptance by the state. In addition, all local plans are to be prepared under advisement with neighboring jurisdictions. Finally, all local plans are required to be in compliance with (or not present any significant contraries to) the regional and state plans, thus establishing a clear line of required plan consistency from the state to the local levels. The 1985 Act and its subsequent 1986 companion legislation, represent a major change in Florida's approach to growth management and land use regulation. It came as a result of the unsatisfactory results achieved under the previous local comprehensive planning process. The state is taking a stronger pro-active role, through progressive growth politics in order to protect the larger public good. Previous land use regulations were ineffective in overcoming parochial local growth interests. Subsequently, the costs of growth had been borne by government without the proper

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106 benefits accruing to the public. Local incremental approaches to solve the problems of growth showed little concern for the intergovernmental impacts of their planning decisions, let alone concern for any state-wide impacts. A transition to progressive growth politics at the state level increases the participatory role of government. The approach to the centralization/decentralization dilemma through the GMA, goes beyond setting uniform rules of the game. It sets the desired outcome of the game as well. This fundamentally alters the economic costs and benefits scenarios established at the local level. This centralized approach puts the state in a position to facilitate growth at the local level. The state's own comprehensive plan firmly establishes growth as a goal. It states that "Florida must regulate in ways that encourage enterprise, capital investment, and balanced economic growth ..." but in " an environmentally acceptable manner" (Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 22). Growth within the confines of growth-management is the line of consistency with which local governments must now comply. 3 But through this process, Florida will have a greater opportunity to overcome the problems of the uniformity/diversity dilemma while at the same time negating the excesses of the centralized approach to the centralization/decentralization dilemma.

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107 One of the long-term impacts of a statewide centralized process is that Florida may become a captive of mobile economic land-use interests. The benefit of centralized development planning may have the effect of increasing the profit potential of land use. Institutionalizing controls over the land use process at the state level may benefit these mobile wealth interests because their investments are spread across many cities. Large developers, even multistate developers, will find it more efficient to have one set of process definitions than one for each of the cities where they are investing. The arena of growth politics has the potential to be aggregated at the state level. This effect may not be detrimental. In fact it may be positive since it contributes to a focussed land use process and parameters. The benefits to economic interests may be incidental and have no affect on the development of progressive growth politics. For local growth politics, however, it is important to realize that a common state-wide land use parameter may reduce the opportunity for diversity at the local level. The success of interest groups in affecting local policy decisions under increased institutionalization of the land use process is affected by what Stone (1986) refers to as the difference between government's "power over" — power that is resisted such as regulatory authority — and "power too" — a more subtle less aggressive approach such as a partnership

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108 approach to policy decisions. (This was also recognized as a phenomenon in the Community Action era (Rich, 1979).) Local governments may be most successful in progressive growth politics if they can assume an ecological role, one of manager not regulator (Stone, 1986). This may produce more satisfactory results in the attempt to manage growth without eliminating it. Those who direct and control the rules of the game, are dealing from a position of strength and are better equipped to affect the outcome and the distribution of benefits, than those who are simply reacting to regulations. Ultimately, institutionalizing the land use process is important to increasing government's ability to direct the distribution of benefits of the process. The distribution of benefits and costs should be considered in the analysis of a major policy change. The final dilemma addresses this concern. Costs and Benefits of Land Use Policy We started this chapter with a discussion of how economic influences are related to growth in a general sense. We have examined the political factors which affect land use policy. Now we should examine the economic factors which specifically affect land use policies through costs and benefits as they relate to the utility/rights dilemma. This dilemma is concerned with the actors in the land use process and the impact which the approach to regulation

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109 has on them in terms of benefits and costs. This is probably the most difficult of the dilemmas to confront in the political arena because the distribution of benefits creates losers as well as winners. Government is better equipped to make decisions on the process — the focus of the first two dilemmas. Distribution choices cannot be made as easily and are often left to be decided by the outcome of political bargaining and incrementalism. This dilemma focusses on the needs of individuals (individual rights) and the greater public good (utilitarian benefits). Pluralism and incrementalism, two standard features of local government politics, usually are effective in altering the policy rules of the game as needed in order to benefit (accommodate) different interests. For example, zoning designations are often amended or excepted through variances for businesses and developers. Residents and environmentalists, on the other hand, challenge and resist individual changes that contribute to continued growth. Florida local governments, even with the LGCPA, continued to operate a zoning-driven planning process. Plans were incrementally amended to reflect zoning changes and pluralist interests (deHaven-Smith, 1984). Local governments continued in the role of facilitator and not necessarily as regulator or progressive partner. But as the institutionalization of the land use process increases, pluralism and incrementalism may have a

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110 diminished capacity to affect the process. Centralization limits local government's ability react to these pluralistic forces and ultimately reduces incrementalism by changing the scope of politics to the state's parameters. Thus, institutionalization of the land use process increases the possibility of directing the distribution of system benefits. The distribution of local system benefits may be directed by the state. In Florida, the state is promoting growth as a statewide benefit. In some cases this is resisted by local interests. The state's ability to intervene is especially important in Florida because the environment is a public good (resource) for the state. Tourism and business relocation are attracted to expansive beaches, clear waterways, and lush tropical foliage. The overdevelopment of the state would damage these resources and the state's economy. Growth should be well planned and timed so as not to overload the environment or the service structure ( infrastructure ) . Thus in Florida, "growth management" is a growth preparation measure rather than a growth restriction measure designed to enhance a public good. As the land use process is institutionalized within government on a statewide basis, growth management is not necessarily a threat to development but can accommodate it. The state legitimizes the goal of growth, but in the context of quality growth which has some

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Ill concern for quality of life standards. This becomes the new context for bargaining in the pluralistic sense. Any decision conflicts come down to "how managed will growth be?" not "will growth be stopped?" Growth management policies are vehicles by which the state distributes benefits to both individuals and groups. Whose rights should be served, whether homeowners or property developers, and should it be at the expense of the larger good of the entire population? In considering who should (or will) benefit from land use policies, several principles can be applied such as utilitarian, egalitarian, and distributive (Beatly, 1984; Bowie, 1971). These approaches to the distribution of benefits may serve the public good, the pluralistic good, and the individual interests respectively. Which interests represent which benefit may differ by perspective. Land-based interests may justify their desire for benefits on utilitarian grounds. Economic and residential development benefits everyone eventually even though extensive development may yield windfall profits without regard to the future consequences of growth. The economic potential is attractive to local government because it is a source of revenues which will protect the city's ability to survive (Peterson, 1981). Therefore, land use policies which stimulate housing and economic demand could be characterized as a public good. This could go so far as to let the market

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112 drive development in order to maximize the long-term strength of the economy. Anti-growth interests also may believe that they hold a utilitarian position. Protecting the environment and the quality of life represents long-term benefits and the dysfunctions of growth represent long-term costs. Thus they can make the case that their position also benefits the good of the whole. Therefore, land use policies should diminish the dysfunctions of growth and perhaps restrict growth in order to protect the long-term interests of the public. It should be noted that a private rights or individual benefits argument exists for both groups as well. The business/development interests want to make an economic gain from their land investment over the long-term. Similarly, the economic incentive of residential property owners affects their outlook too. Growth problems can affect homeowners' long-term investments and provides incentive to them to maintain their ability to influence the land use process. These viewpoints represent the essence of the conflict of political interest groups and the opposing benefits and costs. Progressive growth politics may be the vehicle by which government can strike a long-term balance of interests. The state can lay the foundation for public acceptance of policy approaches and the distribution of benefits. The LGCPA and the stronger GMA are important steps towards this

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113 end. The state also has promoted the use of impact fees by Florida cities to finance the infrastructure needed to accommodate growth (Stevenson, 1985). Impact fees offer an alternative to increasing the rate of traditional revenue sources such as property taxes. They seem to make growth "pay for itself" by shifting the burden of the cost of new growth to new residents from existing ones. Impact fees serve the political purpose of giving government a method to balance costs and benefits. A major report prepared by the State Comprehensive Plan Committee warned the 1987 legislature that impact fees will not solve all growth problems in the state. The state must fulfill its responsibility to provide adequate resources statewide. The report, widely circulated as a major position paper, outlines the requirements that Florida must "attract quality growth ... in an increasingly competitive world" (Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 2). This will lead to a continued diversification of the economy. Furthermore, the future of the state's economy is dependent on the success of the state's growth plan. Financing growth beyond impact fees will reduce the need for regulation that "hinders private enterprise, stifles initiative and incentive, and diminishes our quality of life" (Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 2). While this seems to contradict the impact fee vehicle, it merely broadens the scope of discussion over how to cope

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114 with growth. It promotes growth as a desirable and necessary to Florida and sets up the long-term strategies for achieving it, strategies that include government as a progressive partner and manager. Conclusion Traditionally the dilemmas facing states in intergovernmental relations with their cities center around the degree to which policies are centralized or decentralized and how that affects the balance of power in a pluralistic society. But in a world of ecological power (Stone, 1986) the degree to which controls or policy parameters are institutionalized may be more crucial. In a sense, if the state determines the parameters then it is essentially a centralized process. In the case of land use controls, if the process is institutionalized then the battle over growth or no-growth is defined by the state. Developers will have a long-term framework within which they can overcome local conflicting interests that do not subscribe to growth. The state can direct land use without the fear that the growth-management mechanism will be used by local government to restrict growth unduly. Government is not just a dupe of interest groups nor is it merely a facilitator of the business climate for the growth machine. Florida has tried to guide development at the local level through the LGCPA. A more centralized control through the GMA ought to provide greater state-wide

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115 continuity in approaching growth management. But the state is not a neutral agent. It can have its own interest that centrally and/or uniformly distributes benefits to interested groups in the land use politics arena. Other sunbelt states may benefit from an examination of Florida's experiences before embarking on their own growth-management process . Notes 1. For a full history of land use and development in Florida see Carter (1974) and DeGrove 1984. 2. See Carter (1974), DeGrove (1984), Starnes (1972) report for full discussion of this and other significant pieces of the 1972 legislation series. 3. The 1985 Act centralized the position of the state and severely constrained the decision-making space of local governments. Many local governments were understandably concerned about the centralization of authority over growth management at the state level. In 1986 a "Glitch Bill" was enacted which struck a more moderate balance between centralization and decentralization in the development and implementation of growth management plans. Specifically, the level of service standards requirement were modified and the requirement for local plan compliance with the statesponsored regional plan was relaxed.

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CHAPTER FOUR PROPOSITION REDUX— HOW TO GET FROM HERE TO THERE Policy adoption is affected by many factors within the local political setting. Personal attitudes, power relationships, and the potential impacts of those issues and policies enter into the policy-maker's decision calculus. Policies reflect the interplay of interests in the political arena. The purpose of this research is to uncover the intricacies of that interplay and whether there is a relationship to the selection of policy. To that end, a survey was used to gather information and insights from local participants in the land use policy making process in Florida cities and counties. This is a comparative analysis of urban areas operating under the same land use regulation conditions. A comparative study is defined as "the study of numerous cases along the same lines, with a view to reporting and interpreting numerous measures on the same variables of different 'individuals'" (Eckstein, 1975, p. 85). The use of a comparative approach allows generalizations across cities that a case study would not afford. Case studies afford a greater richness of data, but a comparative study gives the opportunity for greater breadth of research. A comparative 116

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117 study contributes to theory in the form of "statements of regularity about the structure, behavior, and interaction of phenomena" (Eckstein, 1975, p. 88). Case studies are abundant in the field of community power and urban policy. Comparative cases, however, are limited. In the area of developmental policies and land use there are no systematic, large scale comparative studies addressing policy output. This research then makes an original contribution to the field. This research builds from a systems model of the interaction of elements of the policy making process and applies them over the city and county cases. 1 At that level, the unit of analysis is the community — city or county. The dependent variable, land use policies, and independent variables, ecological data, are measured at the community level and assigned to each case (the survey respondent). To make a case for the utility of the input variables (in terms of their impact on the thruput decision making mechanisms and output policies) the survey data uses the individual participant (case) as the unit of analysis. The research then works on two levels. It is a comparative aggregate study of interest group attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions with the data relevant at the community case level. Policy Process Operation The process of creating and adopting urban policy is complicated and dynamic. Several aspects of the process that

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118 contribute to our understanding are the definition of policy, the policy environment, the actors and their influence, and the community image or character. Policy may be defined as "a governing body's 'standing decision' by which it regulates, controls, promotes, services, and otherwise influences the community's collective life" (Eulau and Prewitt, 1973, p. 473). The development of policy, however, is not necessarily a rational, controlled process because policy is a product of both the influences in the community and the purposes to which the community is committed. This combination of forces that influence policy development creates the opportunity for policy to be both a reaction to the environment and an action of purpose (Eulau and Prewitt, 1973; Banfield, 1961). We could elect to understand each community policy as individual outputs of the process. But because policies are negotiated and shaped within the constraints of the environment and community purpose, we may gain more insight by studying policy groups. In this study we have elected to study land use policies as a set of policies which represents an approach to the use of land. This method of policy analysis allows us to use the tendencies that are common to a set of policies as a means to classify policy groups. This can be done on the basis of use and quality which are shaped by the policy environment. Eulau and Prewitt (1973, p. 486) refer to this as a "holistic" rather

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119 than "itemistic" approach which ought to be "theoretically more rewarding." We expect it to elucidate the impact of the policy environment — conditions and actors — on policy trends which characterize the role of government in addressing land use policy issues. The process of policy development may have a number of components. Eulau and Prewitt (1973) suggest that the process is like a "policy map" made up of the image or character of the city, the diversity of problems recognized within the community, and the consensus of position that is achieved by the policy actors. Banfield (1961) similarly contends that the process is reflected by the distribution of authority between participating groups, the distribution of power and the structure of control, and the private versus public regarding values expressed within the system. For the purposes of this study we take a two track approach within a systems model. Factors considered are 1) the policy process actors — their conflicts, power, and ideologies and 2) the policy environment conditions — growth, economic, and government profiles. The actors are most important to our model. Their interactions are expected to directly affect policy selection. The individual characteristics of policy actors also contribute to the selection of policy as defined by their expectations of the role of government. The role of government is expressed as a normative ideology of actors about policies and their

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120 purpose. The environment conditions play a secondary role by constraining or expanding opportunities for the various actors to affect policy selection. Study Method This research employed a non-random survey of policy actors in 24 cities and 19 counties in the state of Florida. A total of 151 usable survey responses were obtained out of a possible 192 valid survey attempts yielding a response rate of 78.6%. Partial information from two additional cases are included in the results as well. Table 4-1 shows a breakdown of attempts, responses and rates by respondent group . Central cities of metropolitan statistical areas in Florida as of the 1980 Census were included in the study along with the county in which each of these cities are located. (There were 29 available central cities in the 18 Florida MSAs as of 1983.) Central cities and their counties were chosen because they would be the communities most likely to be experiencing the issues surrounding land use politics. Also they would have a significant population size for which specific socio-economic census data is available. Eight respondent groups were selected to build the mailing list for the survey. These groups are city planners, county planners, city managers, county administrators, directors of home builder associations, directors of chambers of commerce, environmental groups, and neighborhood

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121 Table 4-1 Survey Response Respondent Group Attempts Responses Rate City Planner 24 22 91 .6% County Planner 19* (17) 17 100% City Manager 24 17 70 .8% County Administrator 18** 15 83 .3% Home Builders Assoc. 20 16 80 .0% Chamber of Commerce 24 21 87 .5% Envi ronmentali sts 13 10 76 .9% Neighborhood Groups 56 32 57 .1% Notes: * Two counties do their planning jointly through the major city in each of those counties, thereby reducing the universe to 17 possible county planners. ** One county is consolidated with its city and does not have a county administrator.

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122 and citizen groups. They were selected because they represent the main actor categories identified in growth politics — government, business/developers, and residents. Survey Instrument and Method The survey instrument was constructed by following the "Total Design Method" (TDM) (Dillman, 1978). Its use is recommended because of its track record of producing very high response rates. To do this the method suggests the construction of questions according to the information needed, the best structure to elicit that information, and the choice of words to convey the question. Question design also was aided by examining other surveys that have been done in the field of land use politics and community power. 2 The majority of the survey questions are close-ended to maximize the efficiency of response information. A variety of question styles were selected per TDM to make the instrument less repetitious and to improve the potential response level. Both multiple and single response questions were provided. For instance the questions to government officials concerning interest group and actor activities allowed for multiple responses instead of limiting responses to "the most" or "the best." This type of question does not force arbitrary selection of actors which could provide false feedback especially concerning influence and success. Some questions were partially closed and provided an opportunity for the respondent to fill in his/her own answer

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123 if the existing answers did not fit the particular situation. The listing of "other" with a blank to fill, however, generated very few responses. Two series of questions, focussing on ideology and land use policies, requested Likert style responses, i.e., strongly agree to strongly disagree. A "don't know" response was also provided. Wording and length of questions followed the Dillman method's suggestions using simple but accurate phrasing. Attention also was given to bias, technical accuracy, and double queries in questions. Several questions, especially to planners concerning planning activity, follow a series pattern to break out separate activities or events. The pre-tests conducted on practitioners in the field identified ambiguous and biased questions which were revised for the final instrument. Five different versions of the survey instrument were used. Different wording was selected for different respondent groups, eg., the use of "city" for city planners and managers and "county" for county planners and administrators. Only planners were asked technical questions about policies used, intent and meaning of goals and objectives, and size of the planning department. Government respondents were asked a series of questions about their perceptions of interest group activities in the land use process. Interest groups were asked to evaluate only their own activities. All other questions were given to each

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124 respondent group in the same format. The planners were asked the most questions, 28. Interest groups were asked 16 questions . A final format of the survey was pretested among a number of potential respondents. These test respondents included faculty in the urban planning and political science departments at the University of Florida, a Chamber of Commerce staff person in Gainesville, and practicing urban planners in Alachua county and Orlando. Modifications were made based on their written comments and interviews with them . Due to time and resource limitations, only two contacts were scheduled for each potential respondent. Each was sent a letter outlining the study and the need for their participation, a survey and a return self-addressed, stamped envelope. (See Appendix C for examples of letters and surveys.) Each survey was coded with a number to use as a response check system. Only those who had not responded within the first month were sent a follow-up package. All letters and mailing envelopes were individually addressed. Per TDM, no computer labels or generic addresses (e.g., Planning Director) were used. Names and official titles were used to personalize the process. Mailing lists were developed from a number of sources. Planners and administrators in cities and counties were taken from the most recent editions of the statewide

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125 directories of Florida Municipal Officials and County Officials. The Florida Chamber of Commerce provided the original state-wide list for selection of Chamber directors. Either the single Chamber serving the case city or the largest or most centrally located Chamber serving the case city area was selected. Builder respondents were selected from a statewide list provided by the Florida Home Builders Association in Tallahassee. Builder Association Directors were selected for participation by the city their association represented. The first mailing list consisted of a total of 143 potential respondents. One month after the initial mailing a second letter and survey package were sent as part of the second wave. At this time the mailing list was increased by 56 potential respondents due to initial difficulties in identifying neighborhood and environmentalist representatives. The total number of potential respondents increased to 199. Originally names of non-business interests, environmentalists, and neighborhood contact persons were solicited by an open-ended question on planners' surveys. The poor response rate to this question required additional measures be taken to locate citizen groups active in the area of land use. Environmental groups were sought first, but not enough organized groups were identified to adequately cover the case cities. Lists of contacts were obtained and used, however, from Florida Defenders of the

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126 Environment, Inc., the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, the Environmental Information Center of the Florida Conservation Foundation, and telephone listings for environmental groups in selected cities. Lists and addresses were not always complete or correct. Several survey letters were undeliverable . In the second month of the project it was decided to add organized neighborhood groups to the mailing list. Departments of Community Development or similar agency were contacted by phone in each study city. Lists of neighborhood contact persons, officers of homeowner or subdivision groups, and other organized neighborhood groups were obtained and added to the potential respondent mailing list. The lists of neighborhood groups varied in quantity and quality. Some cities had as many as 40 to 50 groups on their lists. Only one group from each zip code was selected. If there was more than one group per zip code then the list was first restricted to those groups with an individual contact name listed and then selected at random. In smaller cities with single or fewer zip codes, no more than a dozen potential respondents were selected at random with alternates selected if a contact person was not listed. The method of selection was not entirely unbiased nor scientific. But we attempted to avoid massive oversampling from highly organized cities.

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127 The limitation of selecting both environmental and neighborhood groups is that some cities did not have a potential respondent. There was no environmental group addressing issues in that city, there was no organized neighborhood program, and no contact persons could be identified. Identification of these groups was very difficult. Without intimate knowledge or contact with a knowledgeable person the quality of information about organized groups was constrained by the city staff persons contacted. Eventually all but five (5) cities were represented by a valid neighborhood and/or environmental group response. There were eleven (11) cities which were represented by only one valid group response. Oversampling occurred for several cities which potentially biases the citizen group responses as a respondent group. The final mailing list contained 199 potential respondents. Response from the initial contact with respondents resulted in 101 valid returns. The second contact resulted in 50 additional valid returns. Phone calls resulted in 2 more partial returns for a total of 153 usable responses. (A total of 8 unusable surveys were returned.) The final usable response was received in the mail four months after the project began. The remainder of this chapter will outline the propositions and the independent variables which are created to test them and a discussion of the dependent variable — the

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land use policies — as system outputs and their classifications. Propositions The systems model diagrams the elements of the local land use process. The stages of the model include input — the environment factors, the support and success of participants, the thruput — which contains the conflict, power, and ideology factors and the output — the dependent land use policies (Figure 4-1). The independent and dependent variables are introduced and discussed briefly under each of the proposition and conceptual headings below. Detailed descriptions of how the variables are operationalized and measured are included in the next chapter . Proposition One The refinement of Proposition One states that there are conditions in a community which generate group or individual participation in the policy process. This participation contributes to participant influence over policy decision making. The final land use policy product is determined, at least in part by the makeup of the participants and the political influence generated by them, conflicts between them, and their attitudes about planning and the role of government . These three factors, power, ideology, and conflict combine not only to affect policy outputs, but also to shape

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129 ROLE OF ACTORS -Conflict -Power -Ideology > INTERVENING VARIABLES -Growth Profile -Economic Conditions -Government Finances ROLE OF GOVERNMENT -Facilitator -Satisf icer -Manager/ Di rector / \ I I LAND USE POLICIES -Traditional/ Accepted -Innovative/ Risky Policy Process Figure 4-1

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130 and influence government's role in the process of controlling land use. By understanding the political influence or power of each of the groups and their attitudes, we may be able to build insights about why certain policies are adopted and others are not. Orientations about the role of government are identified through attitudes about land use responsibilities. The power to implement those orientations affects the adoption and use of policies governing land use and the direction which government takes in its land use role. Power Sources of political power and the use of it in the land use process can be approached by a number of different dimensions. These range in order from participation in the planning process — a modest potential for power — to interactions such as activity level, contact, responsiveness to groups, requests by groups, and success by influencing the process to achieve a desired policy output — a reflection of some power. Each group was asked to answer questions about their own activities and influence abilities in the land use planning process. Planners and administrators were asked to indicate their perceptions of these groups' past efforts to participate in and influence the land use process . Power and influence are concepts which are difficult to prove because they are often based on perceptions.

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131 Information on participant activity and contact as well as perceptions of their success by both the public and the government sectors will build a base of information on community power. This information represents the potential ability to influence the land use process. Several variables are created to represent these concepts. BUSl and CITZl represent the perceptions (as nominations) of government respondents about the success of business and citizen groups respectively in influencing the land use process. These two variables are cumulative scores of the nominations received by groups which are perceived to have the greatest success in influencing the land use process in a particular community. Higher scores reflect a higher number of nominations by respondents. BUSl represents the nominations of inf luentials , chamber of commerce, and realtor/developers. CITZl represents the nominations of environmentalists and neighborhood groups. These variables are constructed from question 5 in the government respondents' questionnaire. A more general question is posed about which actors have influence or power in the broader policy process. Again, this measure of community power is based on perceptions. These perceptions are expected to affect the way in which participants approach the decision making process and thus contributes to the policy selection process. Three nominal categories of power are identified in

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132 the responses as the public sector, business sector, and groups/pluralism. The variable POWER (question 27 in government respondents' questionnaire) represents the aggregate responses. Ideologies and the role of government The second participant characteristic is the values and ideologies of the actors. Two series of attitude questions are designed to identify individual orientations about the use of land and government's role in that process. Ideology can be defined as "a cluster of beliefs that is elaborate, integrated, and relatively coherent and that connects thought with a program of action" Schultze (1985, p. 7). Or it can be viewed as "a constellation of beliefs and preferences about the nature of the constituent elements in social or community life ... (Agger, Goldrich and Swanson, 1972, p. 2)." Ideologies also can be a method of "perceiving and reacting to the political system" and answers the question "what role should the government play in allocating the resources produced in the economy, the society, and the governmental institutions themselves? (Agger et al . , 1972, p. 9-10)" Ideology can be method as well as belief system (Schultze, 1985). We can view political ideology in terms of the preferred role of government as conservative, liberal, or 3 progressive. Then we can view it as a preferred method to achieve an interest, for example as government regulation

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133 determining land use, market forces directing land use, and public benefits directing land use. Policies used by local government can be classified by the role of government as a reflection of ideology of method and arrived at through the influences of interest groups. For instance policies which allow the market to direct land use may indicate a facilitator role for government. Policies which require a regulatory action by government to direct land use may indicate a satisficer role. Finally, innovative policies which try to capture excesses of profit (windfalls) or provide incentives to use the land in a particular fashion may indicate a progressive role for government. Role of Government Ideology Method Role of Govt. Interest Policy Conservative Market Facilitator Self Flexible Liberal Regulation Satisficer Community Regulatory Progressive Growth Mgt Partner/ Government Incentive Management Director community Table 4-1 Different policies reflect the nature of power and avenues for influence in the community. Institutionalizing the role of government via policy produces different avenues for influence. For instance, regulatory policy creates an avenue for government power over land use and those whose interest is to constrain growth. Flexible policies reduce the power of government and institutionalize and open

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134 avenues for power to market interests whose want to promote growth for self gain. Incentive policies may be a compromise power position — the new community power as outlined by Stone (1986). These may institutionalize growth, but allow government to retain some regulatory power. Growth management is sometimes considered to be a compromise approach to land use, falling within the innovative category. It should be considered, however, as an alternative approach. Growth management is not a fallback position between market growth or restriction of growth. Instead it can be used to advance a variety of interests. It can be a means to manage, direct, or accommodate growth, each of which may have different interest group support and impact on the use and development of land. Therefore, the use of growth management should indicate a government derived parameter to the development of land, but capable of supporting a variety of land based interests. In this study we compare the attitudes (as orientations to the role of government) of individuals to policies within communities in order to find a relationship between the presence of particular attitudes and particular policies in their communities. Additionally, we can compare the influence of particular interest groups to the presence of certain policies. While individual attitudes and interest group influence cannot be accounted for as the same, there

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135 are some parallels to policy adoption and use that may be able to be drawn. Three aggregate variables are created to represent these ideologies. LIB, CONSV, and PROGR represent scales created from the ideology survey questions that measure agreement with liberal and conservative implementation of the land use process, and progressive roles for government in the land use process respectively. On each of these variables, a higher score represents agreement with the ideology. LIB is made up of qustions 16-1, 16-6, 16-8, and 16-9 in the planners' questionnaires (question 11 in the groups' questionnaire and question 8 in the administrators' questionnaire). Likewise, CONSV is made up of questions 163, 16-4, and 16-5. All respondents were asked those questions. PROGR is made up of questions 17-2, 17-3, and 174 in the planner's questionnaire (question 10 in the groups' questionnaire). The question was not asked of administrators . Conflict Conflict, as it pertains to the adoption of local policy, can be located at the individual level — conflict between actors— and at the city level— within the policy adoption process. Conflict between various actors is addressed through survey questions concerning actor groups' (business and citizen) positions on the growth issue.

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136 BUS2 and CITZ2 represent the cumulative scores of community actors' position towards growth in the community as rated by all survey respondents. Higher scores represent a perception of support of growth by those respondents, lower scores represent a perception that the groups oppose growth. BUSl is created from question 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 in the planners' questionnaire (question 16 in the groups' questionnaire and question 3 in the administrators' questionnaire). Another series of questions is asked about actual conflict within the adoption of land use policy and around issues that pertain to land use in order to get a sense of the issue context of conflict. Conflict levels indicate the ease with which desired land use policies are likely to be achieved. Conflict, therefore, can be a parameter on the use of political power. The variable CONFL represents a cumulative scale of issues where higher scores represent perceptions of greater conflict. CONFL is constructed from questions 25-2, 25-5, 25-6, and 25-7 in the planners' questionnaire (question 12 in the groups' and question 14 in the administrators' questionnaires). One issue, adoption of impact fees, is used independently as FEE (question 25 — planners' questionnaire). Propositions Two and Three Propositions two and three suggest that ecological factors will directly affect or contribute to the degree to which policy conflicts erupt and the need to wield political

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137 influence or power. Whereas proposition one is mainly concerned with the characteristics of individuals, propositions two and three use the environmental condition of the city as the main unit of analysis. Proposition two centers on the likelihood that differences in the economic characteristics of the city itself will affect policy decisions. Proposition three pertains to the impact of government characteristics. The policy environment is comprised of input variables which are expected to be important in shaping land use policy. These include growth factors, business and economic indicators, and government factors. The policy environment can intervene in the policy process by affecting the potential use of influence exercised by key actors, altering the selection of land use policy. Growth profile The general population indicators of the city comprise the local growth profile. The growth profile affects the degree of freedom which is available to the decision makers. A homogeneous or heterogeneous socio-economic profile indicates the potential level of conflict in the community and thus the constraints on decision making. The rate of overall growth is considered to be the indication of the potential for policy change. It is supplemented by land usage figures — residential, commercial, and undeveloped. This measure of population diversity may be significant to

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138 the specialized land use policy area. In addition, region of the state may make a difference as to the tolerance for growth and the types of policies that are politically 4 acceptable . Several variables represent the population characteristics of the communities. GROW is the population growth rate in the city or county from 1980 to 1985. POP80/POP85 (CPOP, COPOP) represents the actual population for the city or county respectively for 1980 or 1985. RES (TRESC, TRESCO) is the percentage of the total city or county land area that is designated residential. (Only 16 of 24 cities and 17 of 19 counties have this data available.) Economic profile The economic conditions which affect business operations also affect the political involvement of business interests in the land use policy area and affect their attempts to gain and use political power. A number of indicators are available which indicate business growth potential and growth in the different sectors of the economy. These indicators, however, can be affected by many other factors and indicate a number of directions. But the specific indicators that are likely to affect the economic interests in the land use process are not indicators of business, but indicators for business. Indicators of the economic profile used are HSVAL actual housing values and PCINC per capita income. These

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variables are available at the city level only. They represent the value of the housing market and the economic situation of residents in that community. Government profile Finally, government finances, specifically revenue and expenditure sources, indicate the contributors on which government must depend for fiscal stability, whether a benefits received or ability to pay principle is in use, the size of government, and whether it can act as an independent or dependent participant in the land use policy making process. A government's dependence on property taxes or charges for services, and the level of capital outlay (as a crude indicator of commitment to capital projects and growth) may reflect a fiscal bias. This is a bias that can affect the selection of land use policies. Combined with the information on ideology, government variables may be an important indicator of policy preference. The government profile variables are USERPR, the proportion of total city revenues which are derived from user fees; PTXPR, the proportion of total city revenues which are derived from property taxes; and CAPPR, the proportion of total city expenditures which are allocated for capital outlay. Proportion of revenue was selected instead of a per capita formula because proportion of the budget allocated or relied on provides a measure of government autonomy or dependence. This is the focus of

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140 proposition three. The degree of government autonomy or dependence on any funding source can affect the ability of participants to use political influence in the policy process. The greater the dependence on property taxes, the greater the influence of homeowner interests. The greater the dependence on user fees, the greater the autonomy from business interests. These profiles, like the participant factors, contribute to the overall policy approach to growth and land use in cities. Burrows (1978, p. 132) suggests that the first stage in land use planning is where "market forces predominate." This potential for "unconstrained growth" gives way to the next stage which requires a more constrained "modified growth plan." An "iterative procedure" would produce the best possible growth management plan out of compromise between "public and private goals." This process suggests that a city may experience stages of growth politics . Cities may experience different stages in addressing growth issues depending upon whether they are beginning to experience growth, feeling growth's full impact, reacting and reducing dysfunctions of growth, and attempting to slow 5 or halt growth. Therefore, we should examine policies as dependent variables which are influenced by both the participant factors and the intervening growth conditions.

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141 Dependent Variables — Land Use Policy The final phase of the model contains the dependent variables, the land use policies. For this study, information about land use policy usage was gathered through the survey instrument in lieu of content analysis of comprehensive plans, development regulations and ordinances of local governments. Only city and county planners were asked questions about policy usage. In addition they were asked to indicate the contribution the policy makes to the achievement of the city's/county's land development goals. Policy value ranged high to low as integral, necessary, no effect, or impediment. This response range is an attempt to understand the relative importance of each policy used by cities/counties. We expect to find that the degree of policy relevance may be a more refined output of actor participation . An open ended question could have given planners an opportunity to select their most important or least important policies, but would have relied on their memory and attention at the time of the response. Providing a list of possible policies focusses attention. The list was designed to be comprehensive in order to capture the most important policies for each place and generate a pattern of policy use in each city. For this research seventeen land use policies were selected to represent the various approaches which local

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142 government may take in their comprehensive plans and development regulations. The research by Gleeson et al. (1975) provided the initial guidance on selecting a variety of flexible to regulatory policy approaches. Their approach to ranking or grouping policies consisted of the permanence of the policy (how easy is it to change) and the impact or control over the market in determining land usage. Policies for this survey were selected to represent a continuum of government options for planning and development. Policy characteristics represent regulatory or flexible method of managing land use, effect on land price or supply, using fiscal incentives, and permanence of the policy components (as outlined by Gleeson et al., 1975). The classification of policies ultimately may be refined to reflect the acceptance of government intervention such as traditional policies with controlled government involvement to innovative policies with expanded government involvement. Policies reflect the various impacts as outlined above, but carry with them different levels of private and public tolerance. Policies are not derived in a vacuum, but represent a cumulative acceptance of government involvement in the use of land. There may be a tendency to prefer a regulatory or flexible approach, but the existence of policy precedence may be a better indicator of the set of policies which represent a community's approach to land use.

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143 Policy Characteristics There is a connection between the policy used to implement land use plans and the impact of the policy. This connection is a key criterion for classification of policy. For instance, to achieve the impact of promoting growth, the market approach to land use may be the best method. Stopping or slowing growth may be most effectively pursued through regulatory land use policies. These classifications also are related to ideology and the role of government. A limited, traditional or advisory role for government, stressing flexibility or predictability of planning approaches may indicate a reliance on the market to determine the best use of land and a short term focus. An increasingly dominant role for government, stressing regulation and comprehensive planning may indicate a reliance on the interest to preserve land as a determinant of the best use of land. Government involvement and perhaps control of the parameters affecting fiscal windfall and wipe-out of land use may indicate an innovative, progressive role for government or at least a directing role. An example is a reliance on a partnership approach or at least a negotiated approach to the use of land (Clavel, 1986). The policy classification scheme is essentially concerned with the distribution of benefits within the community. To be rational is to select policies based on efficiency criteria. To be political is to select policies

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144 based on the services rendered (benefits received) and by whom or how the cost is paid (Ervin et al., 1977, p. 35). "The political decision-maker in land use is not typically concerned with the efficiency questions of interest to economists. He is, rather, constantly involved in disputes over the distribution of rights and goods." Therefore, first we must understand the characteristics of the policy, then the interests and influence of the expected beneficiaries. Policy Characteristics Ideology Role of Govt. Policy Method Impact Conservative Facilitator Flexible Promote Liberal Satisficer Regulation Control Progressive Director/Partner Incentives Manage Table 4-2 To keep the discussion of policies in perspective of real situations, traditional to innovative accumulations of land use policies may reflect flexible to regulatory policy characteristics. Traditional policies represent the wellknown, manageable, low-risk land use approach. It may also be flexible due to application over time. This type of manipulation produces the climate to adopt additional policies which approach land use in new and innovative ways. These additional policies may be more regulatory in nature to check the loopholes or inadequacies of the traditional policies as actors learn to use them for their own purposes over time.

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145 Supply, price, and incentive are important characteristics of land use policies, but may have limited practical use in understanding the actual policies in use by communities. Their potential impact, however, may help us to understand how policies which are not used now may fare when considered for adoption in the future. Supply Policies The literature confirms that zoning and planning policies interact with the demand for land and housing, location, and affect the economic impacts of each (Dowall, 1980b; Bartlett, 1980; Fishkind, 1980; Johnston, 1980; Mundie, 1980). For instance, land use policies can affect the demand for land by restricting supply or access to land. For example, exclusionary zoning restrictions drive up the price of land, limit the use of the land, and contribute to a phased or slow-growth approach (Mills, 1979; Johnston, 1980) . These policies can constrain the availability of options for land development and encourage a constrained environment (restricting supply and affecting the ability to meet demand) (Witte and Long, 1980). Property owners have a moderate or long-term protection of their property value by land use policies which restrict (regulation method) land use. Examples of growth limiting (by development restrictions) polices are moratoriums, minimum lot size, and permit issuance (see Burrows, 1978). The availability of

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146 land also can be limited through policies such as common zoning, requiring agricultural zones, greenspace, and critical environmental areas (Witte and Long, 1980). Also, limiting the transportation or special services access to the land reduces the options for land use, such as control of utility placement (Whitelaw, 1980). In this analysis minimum lot size and zoning reflect traditional policies. Greenspace, utility placement, permit limits and agriculture zones are more innovative or at least less accepted by communities. The more regulatory, the less politically acceptable in growth climates. Price Policies The price of land reflects its value as determined by market forces. Land use policies such as transfers of development rights, planned unit development, flexible zoning, and land use performance standards can facilitate market determined land use. Government can allow market forces to set the price of land as a response to demands for land use without relying on artificial supply restrictions and regulations against certain uses (Witte and Long, 1980). Land use policies that are price oriented may rely on market forces to set the pace of consumption and location. Price rather than supply oriented policies are more adaptable to changes in the marketplace. The price policies used in this analysis are planned unit development, a traditionally accepted policy and land

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147 use performance standards, an innovative but less accepted policy. Incentive Policies Government can impact both the supply of land available for various uses and the market value of land (and demand) by influencing financial options to both encourage and discourage land use. These financial policies allow government to regulate windfalls, by recouping the cost of land development for the community through regulation and at the same time encourage flexibility through financial incentives to property owners and developers. Policies such as impact fees, enterprise zones, capital improvement budget, and tax increment financing may suggest a growth management approach. (This does not promote or restrict growth but gives government an opportunity to be a director and achieve a beneficial position between conservative and liberal ideology. ) The three incentive policies used in this analysis are impact fees and enterprise zones, less acceptable policies and capital improvement budget, a traditional or highly accepted policy.** Table 4-3 is a list of the policies used in the survey instrument, their method of control, expected impact on the use of land, and the degree of permanence exhibited by the policy. But as pointed out, the realities of political needs and actual land use governance does not adapt well to these

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148 analytical confines. Instead, traditional policies exist in nearly every city regardless of political ideology or participant power. But a city's decision to add on to that traditional set of policies is an indication of branching out or willing to be innovative until that new set of policies becomes accepted and thus traditional. The more policies used by a city, the more unpredictable its land use process and the more likely it is to be struggling to adapt to various interests. The fewer policies used by a city, the more manageable and predictable is its land use process and the less likely is there to be conflict. The presence of different measures of actor support and success will indicate their power to move the land use process off traditional ground or keep it there as the status quo. A Gutman scale of 11 items was created from the original list of policies. (A full explanation is included in the next chapter.) The scale reflects that the most used policies are somewhat traditional in their characterization. The least used policies are the innovative, restrictive policies. Therefore, the greater the number of policies used by a community, the less traditional and the more unpredictable their process. That is unpredictable from a political standpoint in terms of the process parameters. More predictable in the sense of being more regulatory. Developers seek a non-changing predictable policy environment that they can count on. Traditional policies

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149 Table 4-3 Land Use Policies Policy / Method of Control / Impact on Land Use / Permanence Land Banking Greenbelt AgricultureProtective Zone Critical Area Designation Regulating Permit Issuance (#) Minimum Lot/Size Restrictions Moratorium on Land Development Controlled Utility Placement Capital Improvement Plan Conventional Zoning PUD Flexible Zoning Land Use Performance Standards Development Transfer Rights Impact Fees Enterprise Zones Tax Increment Financing regulatory regulatory regulatory regulatory regulatory regulatory regulatory regulatory regulatory regulatory flexible flexible flexible flexible flexible flexible flexible incentive supply supply supply supply supply supply supply incentive supply price price price price incentive incentive incentive perm pe rm perm perm change moder change perm moder perm moder moder change perm change change change Note: Permanence adapted from Gleeson et al. (1975)

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150 provide that stability. Anti-growth actors may favor new policies added on to the existing traditional list in order to change the process to suit a more regulatory parameter. The more policies used, the greater the change in the rules of the game. The fewer policies used, the greater the stability in the rules of the game. Who is favored by the rules as they are is yet to be determined. The dependent variable POLICY represents the cumulative score of a community of use of the 11 individual policies that make up the scale. Conclusion The null hypothesis is that policies are randomly or arbitrarily adopted and that political influence and power, conflict, and ideology do not affect local governments' selection of land use policies. The next chapter will explore the data through statistical manipulation providing the merits from which conclusions may be drawn. The expected differences between groups in their perceptions and as others perceive their activities suggests that there is an order to the influence and dynamics of the land use policy process. Combining these indications with the classification of policies and their ratings leads us to suspect that there is a connection between interest group activity and policy relevance.

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151 Notes 1. See also Fried, 1975 for discussions of survey research methods, theory, and comparative urban research. 2. Some survey questions used in this research were adapted from other survey sources. Sources: Survey Research Center, Florida State University as used in D. O'Connell (1986); "Questionnaire for the Study of City Manager in Florida" University of Florida Institute of Government, Public Administration Program, and FAU/FIU Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems; "1976 Permanent Community Sample Survey" in Clark and Ferguson (1983); "Study of Planner's Ethics" University of Florida, Department of Urban and Regional Planning; Albrecht et al. (1986). 3. This corresponds to Allensworth (1980) categories of conservative and liberal, Schultze (1985) classifications of neoconservative , liberal, and radical, Rich (1980) political economy of the right, the left, and Lineberry (1980), structural, behavioral, and radical. Allensworth (1980) used the labels liberal and conservative in his analysis of actors in the land use policy process. Liberal were those favoring government regulation and control of land development relying on residential participation in the land use process. Conservatives were those favoring government in the role of facilitator of land development, public subsidy and flexible land development policies to serve economic interests. These two groups are distinguished by "the degree to which government as opposed to the market is seen as a proper vehicle by which to make land use decisions and to influence development; and the proper role of government in land use decisions or in influencing development." Allensworth (1980, p. 65). Allensworth compared the voting record of plan board members to their attitudes and found a relationship between the two. 4. For the purposes of these propositions, a difference is made between cities and counties as local communities. For instance population data was collected on two levels. The first level is city only and the second is the county total. Many cities are "built-out" but lie within growing counties. As long as the county area is capable and willing to increase its population there is less pressure for the city to change its policy selection. If the county is unwilling to increase its population through liberal growth policies, there is more pressure for the city to increase its density and grow. In addition, the bulk of available ecological data is gathered at the city level. Less data is available at the county level. City and county are treated equally for the

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152 growth profile. Variations will be encountered for the economic profile and only cities will be considered for the government profile. 5. See Eulau and Prewitt (1973) Chapter 24 for a similar discussion of the stages of policy development over time. They suggest retarded, emergent, transitional, maturing, and advanced stages which change over time. The more mature stages are associated with greater urban diversity and spending on amenities and land use policies while the emergent stages focus on traditional user services. 6. Situations unique to Florida may explain why these seemingly innovative policies are accepted by many communities. The comprehensive planning process required by the state has made it possible for many local governments to implement a capital budget. The state also has been aggressive in promoting enterprise zones (enacted by state law) and impact fees. Other states may have different levels of acceptance of these particular policies.

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CHAPTER FIVE URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Interest Group Politics of Land Use This chapter presents the results of the data analysis which defines the characteristics of the growth politics actors. The relationships that surface are expected to confirm our expectations that the growth machine and antigrowth politics patterns are related to the selection of policies by communities. This pattern will help to explain the nature of urban political economy around this policy issue area. Actor Participation Proposition One states that we expect certain conditions present which are evidence of group or individual participation in the policy process. In turn, this participation contributes to actor influence over policy decision making. The final land use policy product is determined, at least in part by the makeup of the participants and the political influence generated by them, conflicts between them, and their attitudes about planning and the role of government. To confirm this proposition we would expect to find that there would be observable and significant differences between the actor groups — 153

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154 government, business, and citizens — in the areas of their position towards growth representing conflict, attitudes about planning and the role of government, and influence in the land use planning process. We expect business groups to be more conservative in their expectations of government's role in planning, perceived to be influential in the process, to strongly support growth, and to perceive low levels of conflict in the community. The citizen groups would be expected to have opposite characteristics. These findings would confirm our growth machine scenario of politics. Government is expected to take an alternate position on its role in planning, perceive a growth machine influence pattern, and have mixed positions on growth and perceptions of conflict. This would contribute to the notion that government is a somewhat independent force in the political arena and represents the progressive alternative. Position and conflict Positions held by various actors are addressed through survey questions concerning actor groups' similarity or conflict on growth issue positions and their participation in the land use process. Respondents represent four private interest groups which are the chamber of commerce, homebuilder association, neighborhood group, and environmentalist group. In addition the planners and administrators, representing the insiders of the land use policy process, are asked their perceptions of which private

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155 interest groups are involved in land use politics and to what degree in the policy process. First, to identify the different land based interests and the potential for conflict between the actors involved, each respondent representing a private interest group was asked to state the importance of the growth issue to their group and all respondents (public and private) were asked to state the importance of the growth issue to their community (city or county). In addition all non-public respondents were asked to state their group's position on the growth issue and in turn all respondents (public and private) were asked to state what they felt was their elected government's position on growth. Growth is a prominent issue in local communities according to 93% of all the respondents (Table 5-1). There is little significant variation between respondents on this question, although an interesting pattern emerges that is repeated throughout the survey. Citizen group respondents perceive growth to be a greater issue to their community than do business group respondents, and government respondents ' s scores fall in the middle. Similarly there seems to be great consensus between respondents on their perceptions of their government's position towards growth with 91% assuming that their government supports growth (Table 5-2). But there are slight differences between the scores of the respondents based on their group membership.

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156 Citizen group members perceive their government's support to be more unconditional than do business group members. Government officials's scores fall in between these two groups of respondents. Each respondent group surveyed, whether business, citizen group or government may be involved with land use for different reasons. For instance, developers and the chamber of commerce have business interests which make it advantageous for them to participate in this issue area. Citizen groups may find their members individually affected by growth as property owners or have a volunteer interest in issues such as the impact of land use on the environment. Government officials may take an active or passive role in developing policies in the land use arena contributing to an independent or subordinant role to interests and influences in the community. These different interests and the conflicts between them contribute to the growth climate of a community in the policy making process. Important differences which represent potential conflict, do exist between business and citizen groups on the questions of the importance of growth as an issue to their group and the group's position towards growth (Tables 5-3, 5-4). Business group members representing homebuilders and chambers of commerce had a greater propensity to respond that growth is the number one or priority issue to their organizations. Citizen group members representing

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157 Table 5-1 Perceptions of Growth as a Community Issue (Ql) All Govt . Business Citizen No. 1 issue 33% 33 22 40 Priority 60 60 68 51 Sometimes a Priority 5 6 5 5 Minor .7 1 0 0 Not an issue 0 0 0 0 Table 5-2 Perceptions of Growth (Q24) Government's Position Towards All Govt . Business Citizens Support Unconditional 9% 6 0 21 Support Conditional 83 86 84 71 Neutral 1 3 0 0 Oppose Conditional 7 3 16 7 Oppose Unconditional 0 0 0 0

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158 Table 5-3 Perceptions of Growth as Group Issue (Q3GP) All Groups Business Citizen No.l Issue 21.8% 32.4 12.2 Priority 59.0 62.2 56.1 Sometimes a Priority 11.5 2.7 19.5 n=78 mean 2.1 1.7 2.4 Table 5-4 Perceptions of Group Position Towards Growth (Q4GP) All Groups Business Citizen Support 53.2 91.9 19.0 Mixed 32.9 8.1 54.8 Oppose 5.1 0 9.5 No Position 8.9 0 16.7 n=79 mean 2.17 1.24 3.0

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159 neighborhood and environmentalist groups responded that the growth issue was a priority to their group along with other issues as well. The greatest distinction between community groups is their position towards growth. Over 90% of the respondents representing business groups felt that their group supports growth while only 19% of the citizen group respondents registered that their groups support growth. Almost 55% of the citizen group members reported that their group held a mixed position (support and oppose) towards growth and another 10% registered that their group opposed growth. Only 8% of the business group members reported their group holding a mixed position. These responses suggest that conflict exists between interest groups over the growth issue. Not only do the group positions conflict, but their perceptions vary about government's position and reaction to growth. We run the risk of atomistic fallacy, that what the individuals think can be transferred to represent group perceptions, the responses do conform to patterns according to respondent group membership. These responses represent a significant potential conflict over land use policy. * Two additional variables, BUS2 and CITZ2 are created as measures of respondents' perceptions of the position held by various groups on the issue of growth. Each respondent is asked to evaluate the position of various community groups

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160 towards growth. BUS2 represent the cumulative score of responses about the position of chambers of commerce and homebuilders . CITZ2 represents the score of responses about the position held by neighborhood and environmentalist groups. Higher scores represent a perception that the groups support growth and lower scores represent a perceptions that the groups oppose growth. These scores are used as another independent predictor of policy adoption in the policy adoption analysis (Appendix A). Position and stability Perceptions about the stability of the overall land use policy process may provide some additional indications about the potential for conflict at the local level. Questions were asked about the level of stability which respondents perceived within their local land use policy adoption process. A second series of questions was asked about the level of conflict perceived around specific land related issues . Overall 56% of the respondents felt that the politics of specific land use policy adoption in their communities is stable, having few controversies which divide the community over the issue. A quarter of all respondents felt that the stability of the land use process is vulnerable the control exercised by influential groups over government changes (Table 5-5). The contrast between respondent groups shows that government actors perceived the land use process to be

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161 more stable than did the non-government actors. Of nongovernment actors, business group members tended to be closer in agreement with government actors while citizen group members perceived a process affected by changes in issues and groups, reflecting perhaps a more open, pluralistic process. Perceptions of political stability in the land use process reflect the perceived opportunities for change. It is not surprising then that citizen group respondents perceive more pluralistic opportunities in the process since they disagree with the government and business group members over the issue of growth. Business and government, representing a potential coalition in support of growth, perceive this arena of politics as being more stable. This is the growth machine politics scenario, expected to dominate and stabilize the local process. The challenge is expected to come from the anti-growth interests who are trying to open up the process to political change (Molotch, 1976). The process stability results suggest that the growth machine political pattern is a possibility. Greater conflict is perceived on specific land use issues. For six out of the seven issues listed — intergovernmental relations, environment protection, annexation, urban (unincorporated) sprawl, green space preservation, and impact fees — all respondents agreed that conflict surrounding those issues was significant or

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162 moderate (Table 5-6). The greatest conflict was perceived to be on the issue of intergovernmental relations with 75.5% of all respondents indicating the presence of significant and moderate conflicts. Significant disagreement about conflict levels on issues persists across interest groups. The largest consensus between government actors on issue conflict was achieved as 60% "strongly agree" and "agree" that conflict exists on the issues of environmental protection and impact fees. Non-government group members agreed by margins of 73% and 77% that conflict exists on those issues. Overall, government actors again perceived less conflict than their non-government actor counterparts across these specific issues. A 50% consensus of agreement that conflict was present was recorded by government actors on only three (3) issues. Non-government group respondents agreed that conflict existed by the same minimum margin of 50% on six (6) issues. Impact fees, sprawl, and the environment are the issues about which private interest group members perceive the most conflict to exist. The variable CONFL combines the issues of environmental protection, urban sprawl, green space, and agricultural land preservation into a usable scale of land use issue conflict. Higher scores represent stronger agreement that conflict exists on those issues in the community and lower scores

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Table 5-5 Land All Very Stable 10% Stable 46 Change with Groups 28 Change with Policy 12 n=147 mean 2.56 Process Conflict (Q26) Govt. Business Citizen 17 8 0 54 43 36 17 35 41 9 11 19 2.33 2.57 2.93 Table 5-6 Specific Land Use Issues — Conflict Perceived as Significant and Moderate All Govt. Business Citizen Intergovernmental Relations 76% 75 78 75 Environ. Protection 68 62 60 85 Mobile Home Location 43 46 32 48 Annexation 79 49 56 73 Urban Sprawl 62 56 61 71 Green Space Preserve 51 42 46 71 Ag Land Preserve 40 35 39 50 Impact Fees & Charges 69 60 78 76

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164 represent stronger disagreement exists on those issues in the community. As expected, there are differences in the responses of the non-government respondents representing business and citizen groups. Overall, the mean score for citizen group members was 11.76 (high score = 16) This group had a greater perception of conflict on issues than did business respondents who had a mean score of 10. Government actors had a mean score of 8.4. These results coincide with the stability of the land use process responses and suggest that citizen group members have a perception that there is greater conflict in the land use process than do government or business interest respondents. This may indicate that citizen groups are challengers to the political status quo. Business and government do not perceive the level of conflict to be as great. Position and influence Understanding the influence and activity levels of the actors in the policy process will help to put perspective on the perceptions of conflict in the community. To strategize or to map the political situation it is necessary to know not only the issue position of actors (conflict or agreement on growth) but also their ability to influence the outcomes of the policy process. Actors are motivated to exercise their influence if they think that a net gain in their position will occur

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165 ( Oppenheimer , 1975). Their influence is a resource that they can invest in the policy process. Policy may be selected based on "the amount of influence exercised on its behalf" by selected actors (Banfield, 1961, p. 331). To gather information on the influence of the various actors within the land use process, each non-public interest group respondent was asked to rate their own group's level of activity in the land use process and level of success in influencing that process in the community. In turn public sector respondents were asked to give their perceptions about the activity and success and those interest groups in the community. Secondly, all respondents were asked a question concerning their perceptions of overall community power. This larger question about influence provides insights to the broader policy process. These results can be compared to specific investments of influence represented by socio-economic data. Government actors as insiders were asked a series of multiple response questions about their perceptions of interest group activities and influence in the land use policy process in their community. Government respondents (planners and administrators) most frequently named realtor/developer, chamber of commerce, and influentials as the actors that are most active and successful in the land use policy process. Consistently, more than 50% of the government respondents named these business groups as the

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166 most active participants in the process, those that most frequently contact government to voice opinions, and as the most successful actors in influencing land use policy. Conversely, citizen groups (neighborhood groups and environmentalists) are mentioned by only 30% of the government respondents as the groups that are most active, in contact, or successful (Tables 5-7, 5-8). The groups members were asked to rate their own group's participation. The results confirm the government respondents' perceptions. Over 67% of the business group members (representing chambers and homebuilders ) labeled their groups' activity level in the land use process as "constant." They also confirmed their groups' success in influencing the process. Over 70% responded that their business group had "great" and "moderate" levels of success. Citizen group members (representing neighborhood and environmental groups) by 67%, feel that their groups' participation varies with each issue under consideration. Similarly, 80% of them responded that their success in influencing policy was "moderate" and "small" (Tables 5-7, 5-8) . Several variables are created from these responses to measure the impact of the traditional growth and anti-growth interests in the community. The variable measuring perception of success in affecting the land use process has the most variance. We created BUS1 and CITZl to represent

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167 Table 5-7 Activity Level Groups in the Land Use Process (Q6GP) Value Self-evaluation All Groups Business Citizen 3 Constant 45.5% 67.6 25.0 2 Vary by Issue 48.1 29.7 65.0 1 Vary by Election 2.6 2.7 2.5 Mean Score 2.64 2.24 Perceptions of the Public Sector — Groups Most Active (Q4) Nomination Percentage Groups 58.2% Realtor/Developers, Inf luentials , Chamber of Commerce 31.7% Neighborhood Groups, Envi ronmentali sts Table 5-8 Influence Success Groups in the Land Use Policy (Q5GP) Value Self-evaluation All groups Business Citizen 4 Great 13.9 24.3 4.8 3 Moderate 40.5 45.9 35.7 2 Small Amount 40.5 29.7 50.0 1 None 2.5 0 4.8 Mean Score 2.94 2.42 Perceptions of the Public Sector — Groups with Greatest Influence Success (Q5) Nomination percentage Groups 67 2 % Realtor/Developer, Inf luentials , Chamber of Commerce 32.7% Neighborhood groups. Envi ronmentali sts

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168 the nominations given by government respondents to business and citizen groups respectively. Higher scores represent more nominations for the groups ( represented by the variables) based on perceptions of their success in influencing the land use process. Lower scores reflect fewer nominations of those groups by government respondents. These variables are used as an independent predictor in the analysis of policy adoption (Appendix A). The variables can be used simultaneously as they are statistically independent (.46 Pearson r significant at < .0001). Power — Community Structure On the broader question of community power, most respondents perceive the political process in their community to be pluralistic. Almost 46% answered that "different groups which can influence policy selection" best describes their overall local political process. Another 30.7% responded that elected officials and/or planners and administrators have the greatest influence in policy adoption. Only 14% responded that businesses have the greatest influence and that their support is necessary for policy adoption (Table 5-9). Once again, there are significant differences of opinions between respondents representing interest groups on this question. Over half (57%) of the government respondents perceive community power to be in the hands of many different groups and 36% perceive power to be in their own

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169 (public sector) hands. Business group respondents are divided on the question of power. About 54% perceive the government sector to be the most influential policy process group and 34% perceive a pluralistic character. Citizen group members are divided as well. Over half perceive a pluralistic group influence to prevail, but over 36% perceive business to be the dominant policy actor. A lack of aggregate consensus on the power question leaves us to believe that pluralism may be perceived as the dominant community power profile. This result actually may reflect disagreement in perceptions between respondent groups (Table 5-9). The interest group respondents each tend to perceive a more structured influence pattern of government. The impact of these differences on the narrower land use policy process may be that business will attempt to negotiate with government actors and citizens will attempt to approach government about the policy influence of a nongovernmental actor — businesses . These different perceptions and the implications for interest group approaches to the policy process are especially significant in light of the differences between groups on issue position and group influence. For example, business groups support growth, theirs is the most influential interest group in the land use process, and they perceive the public sector to be the source of community power in affecting the policy process. This combination

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Table 5-9 Community Power (Q27) All Govt. Business 170 Citizen Public Sector 30.7% 34.3 51.3 8.7 Business 14.4 5.7 10.8 32.6 Groups 45.8 54.3 32.4 46.5 n=150 n=70 n=37 n-43 could have an unbeatable affect on the land use policy adoption process. But we know that the growth machine scenario does not always prevail. We suggest that it is the role of government that plays a large part in intervening in interest group tensions and providing an alternative policy course. When government actors were asked which groups were the most successful in influencing the land use process, 30% nominated city and county government. This is not an overwhelming show of faith in their own ability to affect policy outcomes. But it does represent that government actors feel they can make an impact, even if they are not the "most influential" actor in the land use process. An examination of how respondents perceive the role of government will provide additional insights. Ideology and the Role of Government The final participant characteristic measured is the ideologies of the land use process actors. Two series of attitude questions are designed to identify individual

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171 orientations about the use of land and government's role in that process. Respondent attitudes about planning and the role of government in the process are probed in two Likert response series of questions which have already been identified as the variables LIB, CONSV, and PROGR (see questions 16 and 17 in the planners' questionnaire. The questions that make up these scale variables portray scenarios of planner and developer actions and motivations. Respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree that these scenarios represent how the land use process operates. The first series of ideology questions (LIB and CONSV) addresses perceptions about the motivations of land use participants, how land ought to be used and controlled, and perceptions of the economic, political, and developmental impacts on land use. (These variables are appropriate for use since they are not measuring the same characteristics. Their Pearson r correlation is -.5035 significant at < .0001.) The second series (PROGR) is more specific and asks whether certain approaches to the control and development of land ought to be used. The two sets of questions probe the respondents' attitudes about the appropriate role for government as well as the motivation of interest groups and how to contain or promote those interests through government action .

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172 In the first series, four questions represent a liberal ideology towards planning actions. The variable LIB represents the cumulative score of each respondent to this series of questions. An a high score ("strongly agree" and "agree") represents a belief that the denial of private gain to promote the public good, e.g., protecting the environment, development controls, preserving agricultural lands are acceptable land use approaches. Planners and citizen group respondents are expected to answer those questions affirmatively. This expectation is confirmed. On three out of the four liberal ideology questions the responses of citizen group members and government respondents are very similar and the majority agree with the question scenarios. The mean score on the scale of citizen group members is 12 (maximum scale score is 16). Business group members, on the other hand, disagree with these three questions. Their mean score on the scale is 7.9. The results of these questions demonstrate that there is an observable difference between groups in support of the liberal ideology response. Again, individual respondents may not represent all members of the relevant interest group, but the results do suggest a pattern of beliefs (Table 5-10). There are several variations from the predicted response pattern, however, which deserve attention. The first unexpected response concerns a scenario about preserving the environment at the risk of slowing economic development.

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173 Table 5-10 Liberal Ideology — Percentage Strongly Agree and Agree Question 16-1 16-6 16-8 16-9 All 92% 75 25 46 Business 70 16 5 13 Ci ti zen 100 81 50 71 Govt . 99 84 20 70 Mean response scores on constructed scale LIB (Alpha. 6758 ) Citizen group respondents 12.02 * Business group respondents 7.89 * Government respondents 10.9 * * significant < .0001 Table 5-11 Conservative Ideology — Percentage Strongly Agree and Agree Business Citizen Govt. Question 16-3 16-4 16-5 All 57% 58 62 78 97 84 37 36 36 Mean response scores on constructed scale CONSV (Alpha=.7648) Citizen group respondents Business group respondents Government respondents * significant < .0001 6.26 * 9.51 * 7.67 * 57 51 66

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174 Citizen group respondents and government respondents strongly supported the scenario (expected) as did business groups (unexpected). We might explain the business response by suggesting that it is easier for business respondents to agree with this concept in the abstract than if agreement means a direct loss to them. The second deviance from expected responses is between government and citizen group respondents. They significantly disagreed on the question of the intentions of developers. Citizen group members were more likely to agree that developers were not concerned about the public good (expected) while government respondents disagreed strongly with that evaluation (unexpected). Government respondents agreed with three of the four liberal scale questions. Their mean scale score is 10.9. The question they disagreed with is one which directly attacks developers' credibility. This is another indication that government respondents may take a significant alternative position on land use issues, a position that resurfaces on the next scale. In the second set of scenarios, three questions represent a scale of conservative ideology on planning issues. The variable CONSV is constructed and measured in the same way as LIB. Higher scores on CONSV reflect a positive, supportive attitude (measured by agreement) toward the role of developers in the land use process. The scenarios suggest that in their endeavors developers are

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175 responding to legitimate market demands, that they have a legitimate complaint against cost increasing regulations on development activity, and that planners' environmental concerns sometimes conflict with other legitimate objectives that should take priority. These questions suggest that developer interests should not be impeded and that their interests are a legitimate response to public demand. Business groups are expected to "agree" or "strongly agree" with these conservative ideology questions. The results of this series of questions is not as clear cut as those constituting the liberal ideology (Table 5-11). First, as expected the business group members strongly agreed with all three scenarios. Their mean score on this scale is 9.5 out of a possible score of 12. For the most part, as expected, the citizen group members leaned toward disagreement, though the results are not as divergent as they were on the liberal series. Their mean score on the CONSV scale is 6.26. Government respondents, however, did not follow the citizen responses. Instead they leaned toward agreement with the scenarios that represent the direct actions or interests of developers. Their mean score is 7.67, again placing them in the middle of the two interest groups. Overall then, government consistently agreed with questions that are more abstract about priorities where the winners and losers are nameless. Planners and administrators are in a position

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where they must be able to communicate with groups which take different viewpoints. They may agree with the liberal ideology in principle, but are forced by the reality of politics to defend or support those who abide by the conservative ideology. The ideology scale score results represent the possibility of another position besides a growth or antigrowth position. The government responses along with the tentative citizen group responses on conservative ideology questions suggests the potential for a third position. These results help to erase the zero-sum contention that Molotch (1976) makes and contribute to our proposition that a separate government position exists. Yates (1977) suggests that government has difficulty directing policy responses and instead is forced to react in a pinball fashion. An alternative position for government in the land use policy arena may be to find a source of stability by pursuing a growth management course of policies, and assuming a more directive role. These policies do not necessarily force support for or opposition to development, but will allow government to provide some parameters for land use in a more abstract sense while leaving a realistic way out when implementing the policies. This course, representing a progressive ideology, would be consistent with government responses to the liberal and conservative ideology questions.

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177 The third set of ideology related questions addresses ideologies as strategies. We expect government to support policies that use available land efficiently, e.g., maximize densities. This policy course will permit development but in an environment controlled by government. A growth management course can promote a progressive ideology that uses management incentives. We also would expect neighborhood and environmentalist groups to support a progressive ideology. This final series of ideology questions represents the progressive orientation. These policies do not limit growth, only direct its location. These are growth management strategies that either those who seek to control or promote growth may support. Government as a director can use these policies to put parameters on growth — a progressive ideology, or to find a compromise position that satisfies the liberal ideology and the conservative reality.^ The variable PROGR is a scale made up of three policy approaches to growth management (Table 5-12). The mean scale scores reveal a slightly different pattern of interest group member response from the other two ideology scales. As expected, planners support all four policy scenarios. They have the most supportive mean score of the three response groups. Citizen group members agree with three of the four questions while business group respondents strongly disagree with three of four. The citizen group respondents had a mean scale score that is .5 different from government actors. The

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Table 5-12 Progressive Ideology — Percentage Strongly Agree and Agree Question 17 All Limit Fringe Dev. 58% Utility Placement 38 Infill 52 Business Citizen Govt 11 79 80 5 36 72 25 52 77 Mean response scores on created scale PROGR ( Alpha= . 7468 ) Citizen group respondents 6.16 * Business group respondents 9.24 * Government respondents 5.76 * * significant < .0005 Note: scores on this scale reflect the following reverse code — strongly agree = 1 strongly disagree = 4.

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179 business members' mean scale score is the least supportive, a full 3 points from citizen group respondents. 3 The progressive position may represent an alternative position to the growth anti-growth continuum. Stages of Growth Politics A contribution to this discussion on the nature of regional variations in the policy process is that there is no single process but a number of stages to the process that evolve over time. We have already suggested that there are various stages of growth politics — conservative, liberal and progressive. Schultze (1985) suggests that a city goes through various stages of policy interests which reflect the demands of a changing population. The process goes through transitions which are modeled after Williams' (1971) conceptions of community image and government roles which are caretaker, amenities, growth, and arbiter. The explanation of these city stages along with an examination of regional differences may help to exemplify the stages of growth politics already defined. Transitions of city images can account for the changing nature of interest group demands. The five transition stages are identified as 1) city as caretaker to growth/private city, 2) amenity seekers and the poor who challenge growth, 3) city as arbiter of conflicts, and either the final stage as 4) bureaucratic/policy city or 5) return to the private development city. By combining the interest group demands as

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180 the motivation for the process with the economic underpinnings of the quest for political power, Schultze's transitions facilitate the use of political economy in analyzing the policy process. The regional variations exposed in the state between respondent groups may suggest that the intensity of support for issues or positions taken may be linked to past experiences. The rapid rate of growth in the southern half of the state is now replaced with high population levels and the emerging and enduring problems associated with that growth pattern. This experience may increase citizen opposition to growth and allow government to be more aggressive in pursuing regulatory policies. The central and northeast regions are experiencing those changes now. The responses of participants in those areas may reflect acquiescence of greater government regulation and less need for citizen opposition or not enough exposure to the downside of growth. The panhandle region, however, is currently experiencing high growth rates, but retains a low overall population. They retain a conservative approach and probably do not see themselves in the same situation as the southern half of the state. Indeed, they may never experience a population explosion, but the dysfunctions of growth could affect them and require closer government attention. The greater opposition to growth and more liberal oriented citizen groups may materialize in other parts of

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181 the state as those regions begin to experience the dysfunctions of rapid growth. The less conservative nature of the business community in the northeast and central regions, however, may suggest that they are primed for government intervention in the land use process. The combination of the south Florida experience and the aggressive state policy towards planning may reduce the conflicts before they ever materialize. Regional Differences State politics and growth patterns have some similar characteristics that suggest regional differences in Florida growth politics. The northern half of the state is characterized as holding very conservative political attitudes and operating within a traditional southern political style. It has extensive rural and agricultural areas and many areas have not experienced the rapid growth common in the southern half of the state. The southeast and southwest areas of the state are more metropolitan in character and perhaps more progressive in their political style. Rapid growth and denser populations are more common than in northern cities. The central area is a combination of fast growth in major urban areas (Orlando) and slower elsewhere . The location of the state's population has been "filling up" the state. The southeast and southwest were the first to experience rapid growth and the problems associated

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182 with that phenomenon. The central and now the northeast are as are the latest areas to experience the growth boom. Even the panhandle area is beginning to grow in selected cities. The expansion of population to other parts of the state represents the changes in growth politics over time as population growth and size changes. An examination of some of the survey results by region may help us to understand the complexities of growth politics in this state. Growth is an important issue statewide, but only in the southwest and northeast regions of the state do respondents significantly perceive government to oppose growth. This may reflect some restrictive efforts to curb growth in those areas. Only in the southeast region do more than 10% of the respondents perceive government to support growth unconditionally. This may be an indication that the southeast region is the least restrictive, most facilitative on land use in the state. Regional variations suggest that the growth issue is important to both business and citizen group members in the southwest and southeast where growth is greatest. In these areas group members responded that their groups oppose growth and have less mixed support than do the other areas. The greatest citizen opposition response is in the southeast region (Table 5-13). Other results confirm regional variations where they are expected, especially on the ideology questions (Table 5-13).

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183 Table 5-13 Regional Variations Group Position on Growth (Q4GP) Mean Scores Region All NE PC SW SE Business 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.8 Citizen 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.6 Note: 4=support, 3=neutral, 2=mixed, l=oppose Liberal Ideology Scale Region All NE P C SW SE Business 7.9 8.6 7.5 8. 4 7.1 7.9 Citizen 12.0 11.5 10.3 14. 0 12.6 12.6 Government 9.6 11.1 10.4 10. 8 11.2 10.7 Note: 4 = strongly agree, 3=agree, 2-=disagree, 1-strongly disagree Conservative Ideology Scale Region All NE P C SW SE Business 9.5 8.8 10.2 9.7 9.8 9.1 Citizen 6.2 6.8 6.6 5.5 7.0 5.1 Government 7.6 8.5 8.5 7.5 7.3 7.3 Note: variables coded as 4=strongly agree, 3=agree, 2=disagree, 1-stronglydi sagree Legend: NE=northeast , P=panhandle, C=central, SW=southwest , SE=southeast

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184 The areas with greater growth, the southern and central regions, have higher liberal scores by citizen group respondents than do the northern regions. The business group and government respondents do not indicate clear patterns in each region, but maintain across regions their comparative patterns on this scale. Business group members did not score as high as expected on the conservative questions in the northern regions where a conservative philosophy towards the role of government runs high. High conservative scores were observed in the panhandle (expected) but not in the northeast (unexpected). The scores in the central and southwest regions were higher than the southeast, perhaps due to business acceptance of a greater presence of government in land use practices in the southeast. Again the intergroup patterns of scores on this scale carried across all regions. Conclusion We began this chapter trying to understand if there is an urban political economy as expressed by the relationships between interest groups and government. Molotch (1976) suggests a bi-polar interest group politics where the relationship of government is booster of growth or arbiter of tension between the two fundamental land based interest groups. The survey data presented in this chapter presents a possible alternative view of growth politics providing government with a more prominent, active role.

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185 Swanstrom (1985) suggests that government is a filter through which the interests in growth politics must pass. Perhaps this is the closest description of the patterns of results from this data. Government is not just leaning one way or the other. The responses suggest a separate position. The mid-range ideology scores and the underlying responses to abstract and concrete questions presents evidence of this position. The perception of stability, community power and conflict also must be considered as an alternative pattern. Finally, the agreement with the scale of progressive planning scenarios is encouraging for this compromise position. Propositions 4A, 4B, and 4C suggest that such a position might exist as a compromise or alternative to the pro-growth anti-growth tensions. The data provides the beginnings of a pattern of corroboration that there is a political economy agenda present in urban areas in Florida. The next chapter presents the results of the land use policy adoption analysis. Here we will attempt to link these various land based interests in the various characterizations provided by the independent variables, with groups of land use policies that have political interest overtones. The results may be supportive of a political economy explanation of land use policy adoption .

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186 Notes 1. As with all the survey questions, multiple measures of concepts were attempted as well as careful placement of questions within the survey instrument. For instance, questions about perceptions of groups' position on growth are separated from the question on government's position on growth. Similarly, questions on issue conflict are separated from the question on stability of land use conflict. While the correlations between similar questions are not high, the results within groups generate similar results, thus reducing our concern over reliability of question equivalence and convergent validation. (Asher, 1984) 2. Administrators were not asked the progressive ideology series of questions. Subsequently, this variable is not part of the dependent variable analysis. 3. The PROGR mean scale scores are coded opposite of the other two ideology scores. A lower score represents stronger agreement and a higher score represents stronger di sagreement . Their mean scores are government 5.76, citizen groups 6.16, and business groups 9.24.

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CHAPTER SIX POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP LINKAGES Land Use Policy Adoption in a Growth Politics Environment Communities have many options available to regulate the use of land within their jurisdictions. The individual policies may not be as important to the growth of a community as are the patterns or combinations of policy adoptions. The overall policy approach in a community sets the tone for degree of flexibility or restraint towards development. Policies are not adopted in isolation of policies already in use. Therefore, it is necessary to examine groups of policies and the community characteristics associated with that group in order to understand the implications of land use policy making. The land based interests in the community and government will influence the adoption and pattern of land use policies. This chapter describes the land use policies used in this research and the analysis of their adoption. Land Use Policies — Dependent Variables The land use policies used in this analysis are represented by the dependent variable POLICY. Eleven land use policies are combined based on a Gutman scalogram of the survey data (Mclcver and Carmines, 1981; Weisberg, 1984b). 187

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188 Scores reflect whether or not the policy was used or not used by the community based on the survey responses from each city's planner respondent. The responses from planners were recoded from a full range of value and use to a dichotomous response of use (1) or non-use (0) of each policy.^" The scale reflects a ranking of the cities and counties by the number of policies that they use. Communities with the largest score use the most number of policies (maximum 11) and the lowest scores reflect that few policies are used (Table 6-1). The policy use scale represents the willingness of a community to adopt policies that are outside the realm of being traditional and politically safe. Communities found on the traditional end of the scale reflect use of just a few, well-tested policies while the innovative end of the scale reflects greater reliance on policies, especially those that are more politically risky. The first group of policies are traditional and are used most often by communities. These policies are capital improvement plans, conventional zoning, minimum lot size restrictions, planned unit development, utility placement, and impact fees. These are the most accepted policies, established in the largest number of places, and represent those policies that generally are politically acceptable in the land use process. They also represent a predictable land

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189 use regulation process that is permissive towards development and understandable to the development actors. The second group of policies represents the balance of policy use scores. The policies in this group are enterprise zones, land use performance standards, land banking, agricultural zones, and regulating the number of development permits. This end of the scale represents more innovative, politically risky policies that are more regulatory in nature. They are used to restrict growth and may be on an ad hoc basis that is less predictable for developers and more restrictive towards growth. We would expect that where the growth machine (business) characteristics dominate, that the more traditional policies of group one would be used. Where the citizen groups and less support for unconditional growth is found, there would be greater use of the innovative, restrictive policies of group two. A second Gutman scalogram was constructed based on the value ratings that planners gave to the policies, from high to low. A higher score means that the policy was perceived to be of greater value in achieving the community's land use goals. Again the planners' responses were recoded from a range of values to a dichotomous response. Responses that the policy was "integral" or "necessary" imply that they are valued (1) and responses of "no effect," "impediment," and "not used" imply that the policy is not positively valued (0). The resulting scale is the same pattern of policy

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Table 6-1 Gutman Scale Scores of Land Use Policies Land Use Policies Used by Cities and Counties Policy Proportion of Communities Using Policy Valuing Policy Minimum Lot Size .976 .854 Conventional Zoning .927 .829 Planned Unit Development .902 .902 Capital Improvement Plan .902 .902 Utility Placement .780 .707 Impact Fees .780 .780 Enterprise Zones .634 .415 Land Use Performance Standards .561 .537 Agricultural Zone .390 .341 Land Banking .317 .268 Permit Issuance Limits .171 .098 Coefficient of Reproducibility =.924 .922

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191 scores and order of policies. The results of the two scalograms mean that the policies most frequently used are also the most valued and the policies that are used the least are the least valuable in attaining land use goals according to the responses received from planners (Table 61) . Multivariate Data Results We want to determine what if any relationship exists between the selection and use of land use policies and the independent variables of community participants and environment. Proposition one suggests that policies are dependent on actor characteristics and participation in the process. Propositions two and three suggest that policy adoption is dependent on ecological factors present in the community. We expect to find that both sets of independent variables will contribute to the selection of land use policies . We chose to use discriminant analysis as the method to explore the independent — dependent variable relationships. Because of the Gutman properties of the variance in the land use policies, traditional parametric measure were unsuitable. In addition, several of the variables are dichotomous or nominal in character. Regression analysis would be unsuitable for much of the data set. Discriminant analysis is a method which allows independent variables to be arrayed along the dimensions of

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192 the dependent variable values (Klecka, 1980; Weisberg, 1984a). It is a method similar to linear regression that allows us to determine which independent variables are the best predictors of survey cases which will be assigned to each policy group. The interpretation of the data allows us to understand which independent variables have what strength relationship with each group of the dependent variable. We expect that the business oriented, pro-growth independent variables would predict the group one policies representing traditional, permissive land use. We expect that the citizen oriented, anti-growth independent variables would be associated with the group two policies representing the more restrictive and politically risky land use approach. In this case, the dependent variable groups are 1) the most used policies and 2) the balance of the policies. The analysis provides an indication of the distance between the means of the two dependent variable groups. In addition it indicates the strength of the independent variables' ability to predict which of the individual cases (with their local community's policies assigned to them) belong to each dependent group. From the results of the discriminant analysis we can put together a picture of the type of community and political characteristics which are most strongly associated with uses of certain land use policies. Since we know from the scalogram which policies are most often used and which are least often used, we know which

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193 policies are most likely represented by the discriminant groups . Again, the first dependent variable (POLICY) group represents scores of one to six, representing communities using only one to six of the available policies. The second group represents scores of seven to eleven, where the most policies are used. The data presented here reflects group one — the most used policies one through six — and group two — the remainder of the policies used. City and County Policy Uses To test both the influence of actor participation and the community level ecological propositions, a series of independent variables are used in the discriminant analysis. First, survey respondent variables are used alone. Second a combination of both sets of variables are used. The first set of variables used included perceptions of group success in influencing the land use process, perceptions of group position toward growth, conflict levels on land use issues, ideologies, and community power. Variables BUSl and CITZl are the cumulative nominations made by government respondents about business and citizen groups's success in influencing the land use process. Each public official was asked to nominate all the groups in their community that they felt had achieved the "greatest level of success in influencing the development of land use policies. It was a multiple response question. BUSl and

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194 CITZl represent the number of nominations received by business groups and citizen groups respectively. Variables BUS2 and CITZ2 are the scores which reflect the perceptions of each respondent of the position of combinations of business and community groups towards growth in their community. Each respondent was asked to provide their opinion of the position held by relevant groups in their community. The values range from support, mixed, neutral, to oppose. The higher the score, the greater the perception that the group supports growth. The variables BUS2 and CITZ2 represent the combined scores of the relevant business and citizen groups respectively. Other variables were CONSV and LIB the conservative and liberal ideology scores of each respondent. Responses range from a high of "strongly agree" to a low of "strongly disagree." The variables CONFL and FEE represent the cumulative score of respondent perceptions of conflict on the issue conflict scale and specifically their perceptions of conflict on the issue of impact fees. Again the highest score represent "strongly agree" that conflict accompanies this issue in their community and low scores reflect "strongly disagree" that conflict surrounds the issues. The second set of variables represent the growth, economic and government profiles of the community. For the city and county combined analysis, only the population variables were used which are 1985 population and the 1980

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195 to 1985 growth rate. City and county respondents were each assigned city or county population figures and not both. For the city analysis a full range of variables was available and used. Variables included the city population and growth rate (GROW), percentage of land designated residential (RES), housing value (HSVAL), per capita income (PCINC), proportion of the budget revenues coming from property taxes (PTXPR), from user fees (USERPR), and expenditure proportion going to capital outlays (CAPPR). A nominal level variable, respondent region of the state (REG) was also included designating the five coded regions — southeast, southwest, central, panhandle, and northeast. They are coded from lowest to highest representing the northern regions to the southern regions. Two discriminant analysis were completed for both city and county cases. One uses only survey participant variables, the other adds ecological variables to the analysis. The first analysis reveals some significant differences from the combined second analysis. When using only survey variables, business group success and issue conflict are positively correlated to the largest discriminant function — group 1 the most used, traditional policies (Table 6-2). The structure coefficients can be interpreted similarly to a Pearson r correlation. Liberal ideology, citizen group success, and citizen support of growth all are negatively correlated to the discriminant

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196 Table 6-2 Discriminant Analysis Variables // Structure Coefficients BUS1 • 63 nnf 1 BUSl . y o CITZl • 3b t m t 1 CITZl BUS 2 a c BUS2 . U4o CITZ2 . 27 CITZ2 CONFL . 09 CONFL .268 FEE A C A . 058 FEE 1 A C . 106 CONSV A Q . 08 CONSV . 15 LIB . 40 LIB 1A A . 588 POWER .46 POWER .56 POP85 .097 REG .04 GROW .587 Group Centroids Group Centroids Group 1 .68 Group 1 .56 Group 2 -.24 Group 2 -.20 Canonical Correlation .382 Canonical Correlation .322 Number of cases 131 Number of cases 131

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197 function of group 1. Adding ecological variables slightly improves the canonical correlation of the function from .322 to .382 and reduces the coefficient strength of the survey variables . One strong function was derived from the analysis on the land use variable POLICY for cities and counties using both participant and ecological variables to predict policy use scores. The coefficient of the variable business group success drops slightly and the variable conflict drops significantly to a point where it is contributing only slightly (positively) to the function. Liberal ideology, citizen group success, and citizen group support of growth coefficient scores drop slightly but are still useful. Growth rate is positively correlated to the group one discriminant function almost as significantly as business group success. Adding the ecological variables also slightly improves the distance between the two dependent variable 2 groups increasing our ability to distinguish between them. The contributions of the independent variables to the discriminant function of the dependent variable tend to confirm proposition one about the policy impact of participation of identifiable interests. The results suggest that the land use policy group which represents lower use scores is associated with greater scores of business success, higher growth rates, lower scores on liberalism

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198 ideology, lower scores of citizen success, and less citizen support for growth. These results suggest that the growth machine politics pattern of business interests and less influence of traditional anti-growth interests is a good predictor of lower policy use scores. The growth machine has a relationship with the adoption and use of acceptable, traditional land use policies. This contributes to our expectation that pro-growth interests want to have a predictable policy environment. The significant ecological variable, higher growth rates, also is associated with lower policy use scores. Higher growth rate communities are prevalent in the central and panhandle regions for cities and central and southeast for counties. It is difficult to interpret this variable in the combined analysis. We expect that high growth rates would yield high levels of conflict and thus would be associated with more policies not less. Traditional policies are predicted by business success (expected) and high growth and conflict (unexpected). City Policy Uses Two discriminant analysis were performed, one using the ecological variables only and the second using both survey and ecological variables. The ecological variables used, representing growth, economic, and government indicators,

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were much stronger predictors of the discriminant dependent variable groups than were the survey variables. The ecological discriminant function derived from the analysis on the land use variable POLICY confirms proposition two that the economic, growth, and government profiles are significantly related to the adoption of policies. The results suggest that the fewer the policies that are used by a community, the greater the importance of housing values and growth rates which both loaded positively on the function (Table 6-3). Both per capita income and proportion of revenues derived from property taxes loaded negatively on the function. Higher housing values are used in this analysis as a reflection of economic potential for the business community. Higher house values represent high demand and growth. The highest housing prices are in the southern areas of the state where growth rates are leveling off but the population is large. High home prices reflect the interest of developers. If prices are high, they will press for a less restrictive growth climate. Growth may in fact increase the home value figure due to the demand in the market . Reliance on property taxes is a citizen related interest variable and it is expected to load negatively with group one as it does. Property tax proportion of the budget is an attempt to measure the influence of citizen interests in the community. Peterson (1981) suggests that in cities

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200 Table 6-3 Discriminant Analysis — City Only Variable // Structure Coefficients IrUrO 3 .23 CPOP85 .25 .549 REG .576 .45 GROW .479 1.71 HSVAL 1.687 PPT MP -.878 PCINC -.88 .125 USERPR .11 PTYPR -.77 PTXPR -.75 .172 .017 BUS2 JJ U U L .047 CITZ2 -.005 CONFL .000 FEE .139 CONSV .02 LIB -.137 Group i Centroids Group Centroids Group 1 1.35 Group 2 -.35 Group 1 1.31 Group 2 -.34 Canonical Correlation .57 Canonical Correlation .56 Number of cases 106 Number of cases 106

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where homeowners are influential, property taxes will be kept low in favor of a greater reliance on user fees. The second analysis is as statistically strong as the ecological variable function and both are stronger than the combined city and county analysis functions. But the survey variables for the city only analysis are weaker than in the combined analysis. On the city only function the ecological variables load almost exactly the same as on the first function. The participant variables as predictors of policy scores suggest only three very weak coefficients. Again, business group success has some ability to predict the low policy use scores group, but very weakly. Conflict on the issue of impact fees also loads very weakly. Liberal ideology loads negatively, as expected, but again very weakly. The city only analysis is overshadowed by the powerful ecological variables which dominate the prediction of lower land use policy use scores. Ecological variables have the ability to delineate cities especially on the basis of size. This lends support to the second and third propositions that suggest that community conditions will reflect the political characteristics. There are significant differences between actor influences and positions. Considering that, we would expect that ecological indicators would be important

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202 contributors to understanding the differences in the use of land use policies. We should consider too that in the order of the Gutman scale, cities had higher policy use scores than did counties. But there are cities at the low end of the scale. This skew in the data may reflect why survey predictors are so weak. There is less to predict than in the combined analysis . Another important positively correlated variable on the city only function is the region of the respondents. The region coefficient loaded positively, ahead of growth rate on this function. This adds to our contention that there are political differences around the state and that different stages of growth may be identified in these regions. Highest city growth rates are in the central and panhandle regions followed by the southeast. Again, however, the positive correlation of growth rate is troublesome. The southeast and the panhandle regions have some similar attributes such as growth rate. Yet the two are very different in terms of their ideologies and politics. The two may have similar conditions but be experiencing different stages of growth. The growth rate variable may be less indicitive of policy and more of conflict present. As it is related to the traditional policies, we may find that those policies are found in mature growth communities which have returned to the private city and in new growth

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203 communities which are beginning to reflect growth machine politics . Discussion The data results "are indications that participant influence is related to the adoption of land use policies. It is difficult to measure and statistically prove influence and community power. But the results do contribute to our contention that policy is related to an community agenda framed by interests of urban political economy. We have presented data which suggests relationships between a political act — adoption and evaluation of policy — and the participation of political actors in the process. This is more than just a pattern of influence, it is an interrelationship. The separate position taken by government on the ideology and conflict questions suggests more than a zero-sum game. The environment variables contribute to the climate of participation by certain groups. While this lends support to the theories of economic determinism, they also reveal a pattern that follows the political participant data pattern. The importance of regional differences should not be overlooked. This suggests that there are stages to growth that have ecological and political characteristics. Government can intervene in the economic trends.

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204 Use By Region We examine the use of these land use policies by region to add to the picture of different stages of growth politics. An examination of the use of policies by region for cities and counties suggests that there is less variation within group one and more variation by region within group two (Table 6-4). The more risky land use policies do not seem to be as acceptable throughout all regions of the state. This is as expected if we are to believe that the regions reflect the different stages of growth experiences. For cities and counties, the Panhandle region seems to exhibit lower mean use scores than the other regions in both group one and two. Communities in this region may not rely on government intervention in land use as do communities in the other regions. In this region local governments may be the most flexible and supportive of growth simply because they have not experienced excessive growth and do not expect to experience it in the near future. Other regions with greater experiences with rapid growth may require a different explanation for low use scores (Table 6-5). There is little variation of scores between regions in the city subset. The generally lower scores in the Panhandle region aside, the Southeast region exhibits slightly lower scores on some policies especially on enterprise zones, land

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205 Table 6-4 Policy Use by Region City and County Subsets Cities by Region Discriminant Policy Group 1 NE ZONING 5.00 MIN LOT RESTR 4.66 CIP 4.66 PUD 5.00 UTILITY PLCM 4.33 IMPACT FEE 4.00 00 33 00 00 00 33 4 3 5 4 4 4 00 75 00 50 25 75 SW 4 4 4 4 4.00 3.83 16 00 83 00 SE 4 4 4 3 3 3 12 00 62 50 57 87 Di scriminant PolicyGroup 2 ENTERP ZONE 4.66 LUPS 3.33 AG ZONE 4.00 REGULATE PERMITS 1.00 LAND BANK 4.00 3 3 5 1 4 66 33 00 00 30 75 66 25 00 50 2.83 3.16 4.66 2.00 3.60 2 2 4 2 4 87 37 25 00 25 Counties by Region Discriminant Policy Group 1 NE ZONING 4.50 MIN LOT RESTR 4.00 PUD 4.50 CIP 5.00 UTILITY PLCM 3.00 IMPACT FEE 3.00 1 2 2 2 3 1 00 50 50 50 00 00 4 4 4 3 3 3 00 25 70 00 75 75 SW 4 4 4 4 3 4 40 60 60 80 60 8 SE 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.00 00 00 Discriminant Policy Group 2 ENTERP ZONE 1.00 LUPS 2.50 AG ZONE 2.50 REG PERMITS 1.00 LAND BANK 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 4 2 1 2 75 50 50 00 00 2.80 3.20 3.80 1.00 3.00 2.66 2.75 3.50 1.75 1.00 Note: score scale l=not used 5=integral Legend: NE=northeast P=panhandle C=central SW=southwest SE=southeast

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206 Table 6-5 Population Growth Rate by Region 1980-85 City County Unincorp. State mean 9.83 18.98 22.06 Region N 5.3 16.44 28.37 Region SE 9.33 18.90 15.26 Region SW 7.34 17.41 22.33 Region C 12.34 22.98 24.8 Region P 17.3 17.61 23.18 Legend: NE=northeast P=panhandle C=central SW=southwest SE=southeast use performance standards, utility placement, and impact fees. This may be due to a long-standing tradition of political support and encouragement of growth by governments in this region. Governments in this region may be more selective in the policies they are willing to use, choosing those that are more politically acceptable (traditional). The Southeast region is also highly dependent on county activities in land use. For instance, Broward County has review and approval authority for local comprehensive plans. Metro-Dade county has authority to oversee land use activities in cities. Scores in the county subset reflect a strong presence of government in the Southeast region, helping to explain the lower than expected scores for that region in the city subset. The other region scores in the county subset reflect the same pattern as the city subset. There is little variation in use scores between regions except as noted in

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207 the Panhandle. Generally the Southeast and Southwest regions are slightly higher in scores than the Central and Northeast, perhaps reflecting more experience with coping with growth. The Northeast region has higher than expected scores in both the city and county subsets. The Northeast traditionally has been a politically conservative area where we would expect low government presence and intervention in land use. The high use scores may reflect a preventative approach to potential growth problems. For instance, while growth is steady and problematic in Jacksonville, at least having these policies on the books and at government's disposal may be a ready solution to dysfunctions of growth that get out of control. Caution must be used in interpreting these policy value scores because they reflect the planners' perceived value of these policies, and do not necessarily reflect the intensity of use in the community. It may be misleading to suggest that a higher use score based on the full range of values is indicative of greater government intervention effort. The score represents value, perhaps potentially and not necessarily the reliance on those policies. Higher mean use scores as presented in these city and county subsets are not as reliable as the use/non-use scores in the Gutman scales.

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208 Conclusion This research has attempted to discover why land use policies differ from community to community. We have offered a framework identifying the differences in policy and the variables contributing to the adoptions of those policies. The result is that we have made a contribution to the understanding of urban political economy as an explanation for urban policy making in a developmental policy area. The identification of the business and community interest groups represents a characterization of the urban land use conflict. The planning process is the distribution of resources according to the dimensions of interest group politics in the community. We identified differences in position on the growth issue, perception of stability and conflict, ideology on the role of government, and influence. These variables shape the land use policy game and the conflict that is inherent. One of the steps needed to identify positive urban theory is to "identify the determinants of variations in urban policies" (Fried, 1975). The degree of actor influence and the role of government in the land use process are the key factors affecting adoption of land use policies and distinguish growth politics from other local politics. The significant differences between the business and citizen group interests fortify the growth machine scenario as an explanation of why land use policies are adopted.

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209 We contend that the role of government is key to the variation in land use policy adoption. Not all cities will react in the exact same manner to growth. Government can take conservative, liberal, or progressive roles. The role of government is affected by the conflict or tension level in the community manifested through interest group influence and participation. The more demands placed on government, the greater the tension with which government must contend. Government's approach to these tensions results in policy. The participation, ideology, and role of government variables establish the framework which shapes government action and policy outputs. In chapter one we set out four propositions. Only three have been significantly addressed so far. The fourth set of propositions (4A, 4B, 4C) suggest that the degree of consensus or conflict in the community will have a direct bearing on the policy development and adoption. This is a community level proposition that is not easily addressed by the data. Figure 1-2, however, portrays the expected outcomes of these propositions. Figure 6-1 portrays the outcomes in terms of policy adoption. Proposition 4A is represented by the consensus cell where tension is low, decision making is long term, and fewer policies are adopted. This cell, represents government as facilitator and would include cities scoring low on the policy use scale suggesting conservative growth politics. Proposition 4B is represented by the conflict cell. Here

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} 210 Conflict Time Frame Long Term Short Term Low Tension Consensus Compromise Luiioc l votive gtowun politics —progressive growtn politics -few policies, flexible -fewer policies, f 1 pyi hi p 11CA1U1U High Tension Compromi se Conflict -populist growth politics -liberal growth politics , -many policies, regulatory -many policies, regulatory Land Use Policy Process Outcomes Figure 6-1

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211 tension is high and the time frame is short and more policies are adopted. Cities represented in this cell have government in the role satisficer and portray liberal growth politics. Proposition 4C is the compromise cell where tension may run high or low and the time frame may vary as well. The distinguishing characteristic here is the dominance of government as a power in the community and the ability of government to assume a manager/director role. In the situations where compromise exists with high tensions, the number of policies would be high — a regulatory, populist environment. In the cell where compromise exists with low tensions, the number of policies would be fewer — a more flexible, progressive environment. The larger context of community power provides an additional dimension to predict policy responses. The different perceptions of community power structure by the different respondent groups signals the difficulty in establishing the power structure of a community. But we suggest that the pattern of policy adoption and the character of those policies has a relationship to the type of political climate and influence structure that exists, including perceptions of community power. Business perceives greater stability and less conflict as well as a pluralistic or government dominated process. That represents a space somewhere between consensus and incremental compromise. Citizen groups perceive greater conflict and less stability

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212 as well as a pluralistic or business dominated process. They may be placed between conflict and rational compromise. Government actors perceive a stable/unstable conflict/no conflict process dominated by pluralism. That represent either of the two compromise positions. The net result of this speculation and cell placement is that government has many roles to play depending on the array of interest group influence and positions. Government is more than a reactor, however, because it can have its own interest to serve as well. The unique ideological position of government suggests the compromise role is one of necessity. This goes together with the intent of policies to promote, control, or manage growth. Fewer policies promote growth, more policies control or manage growth. These are components that we can measure empirically and linkages that we can make theoretically. Urban Political Economy Another step in positive theory development is to "formulate the logical (theoretical) basis for the empirical relations identified or which might be identified" (Fried, 1975). The political economy of place is Moltoch's (1976) explanation for growth machine politics. We identified the interrelationships between economic and political sectors in the three rules of the land use game. Those rules are that government parameters affect political influence, economics affects political influence, and economic and political

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213 influence affect policy outputs. The parameters of the state comprehensive planning regulations affect the local political arenas by mandating certain policy responses. The economic interests that are tied to the land, both in the form of developers and residents, participate in the policy process through the political influence that they can wield. Government also acts as a potent political force. Policy is then dependent on the role government takes or is compromised into taking by political forces. The political economy agenda must combine the interests and influences of interest groups and government to make sense. The political economy of place defines the policy location from which local politics emerges. The role of government may be a changing one in which it acts to moderate the tension between groups. Lindblom (1977) refers to the privileged position and the zone of pluralism in policy making. Government, however, is the agent which sets the parameters on that zone. It can be a wide parameter such as a facilitator role or a narrow parameter such as a manager role. But the political economy of urban places does exist in the political policy making process and land use policy is a useful example. Stages of Growth Politics The final step in developing a positive urban theory is to "identify and analyze those determinants and consequences of policy diversity which are subject to stabilization

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214 and/or deliberate change." There is evidence that suggests that growth politics is not zero-sum nor is it a two dimensional political agenda. There are points on a policy continuum that suggest an evolving approach to growth. Developmental growth politics is not as simple as pro-growth equals urban growth and anti-growth equals no growth. The regional experiences in this state suggest that local government in Florida may be altering its policy agenda as a preventative measure in some cases to prepare for the dysfunctions of growth at least in terms of land use policy. Again, it is the crucial role of government interacting with the political influence in the community, the political economy relationship, which establishes the policy environment for growth. Schultze (1985) suggests the stages of growth politics to be growth city facilitator, tradeoffs satisficer, government as manager or, back to facilitator and/or back to private city. These stages may reflect the level of conflict and the policy approach taken by the community to the growth issue. The data presented contributes to the idea that there are patterns of behavior that represent stages of growth politics . The Florida experience with growth is a complex political dynamic. The community by community rank on the land use policy use scale suggests that Florida communities are experiencing these growth stages. The mean number of

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215 policies used by region (as ranked on the Gutman policy use scale) are as follows: Northeast 7.60 Panhandle 4.60 Central 7.75 West 8.27 Southeast 7.33 The panhandle confirms our expectation that a conservative growth politics with few policies is occurring. This conforms to the ideology question results in that region. Likewise the southeast is using few (although many more than the panhandle) policies and is experiencing a conservative growth politics with few policies. This result appears contradictory in light of the other data, but represents a good example of same conditions at different stages of growth. Large population and high growth rate should yield conflict and greater policy diversity. The southeast, despite these trends, uses few policies and a fairly flexible approach to land use. Apparently the growth machine politics scenario continues there without government intervention. They seem to exhibit the characteristics of stage four — growth and back to the private city. The panhandle exhibits qualities of the initial stages of growth as a facilitator city. The other three regions seem to conform to the normal transitions of growth. The southwest especially seems to have taken a progressive approach in using many policies, exhibiting a regulatory approach as a response to high population and growth rates. The central and northeast

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216 regions follow accordingly as they are beginning to experience excessive growth. We would expect their policy use scores to increase in the future. Wrap up — Have We Made Any Progress? In the past the dominant theory concerning city growth was economic determinism. Economists contend that growth politics was forced to contend with the eventual economic growth in an urban area and that it cannot be stopped because of the laws of economics are at work. Economists might also presume that as the economy grows stronger, business interests will dominate the city government that is only a reactor to forces it cannot hold back. This is an oversimplification of growth politics in urban places. There is some evidence that communities experience various stages of growth and that the role of government is important to how the political and economic interactions will occur. For example, the city of Ft. Lauderdale had no trouble saying no to a multi-million dollar tourist industry — spring-break for college students. Many small beach hotels have gone bankrupt, beach businesses are hurting. The city has rebuffed and run the college crowd out of town, instead focussing on the yuppie upscale family market. The city and county, however, have had enormous difficulties saying no to developers. A strong group of key developers have blocked restrictive land development measures that nearby counties and cities have instituted.

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217 When Broward county finally took a stand to restrict growth where services were lacking, the horse was already out of the barn. Developers in this urban area are not deterred by such regulatory behavior. The comprehensive plan and zoning already favor more development and the developers know it. Another southeast region example of the inability of economic determinism to stop government facilitation of growth is in Palm Beach county. The city of West Palm Beach negotiated with a developer to completely overhaul their downtown area. The developers' plans conflict with a proposed east-west expressway route which has been at least two years in the making. The highway will ease overcrowded roads and provide a vital economic transportation link within the county. The expressway authority balked when county officials backpeddled on the proposal and suggested it be shelved. Only when threatened with extinction as an official body did the expressway authority drop the idea of the east-west route. This area has a high score on the Gutman policy use scale. That pattern may be characterized as reluctant. Even the most innovative and regulatory of cities may not be able to say no to developers. Other cities reflect the changing government attitudes as power and influence shift and the policy consequences. St. Petersburg is in the highly regulatory western region. Their use score is moderately high, but their politics reflect a progressive to

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218 conservative approach. They may be experiencing the back to the private city stage after restricting growth for some time. The dominant senior citizen political coalition has been ousted from the city council. A new group of younger business oriented politicians have been elected. Their agenda is to redevelop the downtown, stimulate the economy, and facilitate growth. There appears to be a great deal of conflict in the city over the future course of action. This city may be a case where strong land use controls cannot head off more development in the downtown area. Downtown development is a land use area which may need to be researched separately from the overall land use politics in the community. Cities around the country are experiencing growth problems and trying to remedy them by traditional interest group competition methods. The political question should not be what should we do about growth — should we allow it or not. The appropriate political question should be what are the interests in this community and how can government mediate those interests? Does growth fit into those interests now or in the future? Can we be flexible enough to adapt to the changes brought by economic or personal interests? Perhaps the results of this research will help to direct those policy questions by shedding some light on the complex land use process that are framed by the agenda of urban political economy.

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219 Notes 1. The land use policy data was gathered from city and county planner survey responses. Policies were designated by planners as not used in the community or used according to the value they are perceived to have in attaining the communities land use goals. 2. The variable RES — percentage of land use for residential purposes in the community — was dropped from the analysis because not all cities and counties had this information available. A significant number of cases were eliminated from the analysis when using this variable. It loaded slightly negatively on the discriminant function where group one — most used policies — was the strongest. This is consistent with the final results that citizen interest variables load negatively with group one policies.

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APPENDIX A INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Survey Variables BUS1 Value Frequency Valid Percent 1 28 45% 2 23 37 3 11 18 number 62 100 CITZl Value Frequency Valid Percent 1 32 76% 2 10 24 number 42 100 Note: Value is the cumulative score of each government respondent's nomination of business groups chamber, developers, influential individuals or citizen groups neighborhood and environmental organizations as those having the greatest degree of success in influencing the land use policy process. Score of 3 BUSl = all three business groups were nominated as successful by that respondent. A score of 2 CITZl = both citizen groups were nominated . BUS2 Value Frequency Valid Percent 5 1 .7% 6 1 .7 7 1 .7 8 2 1.3 9 3 2.0 10 9 6.0 11 32 21.2 12 102 67.5 missing 2 number 153 100 220

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221 CITZ2 Value Frequency Valid Percent 2 39 26.2% 3 17 11.4 4 53 35.6 5 5 3 .4 6 31 20.8 7 1 .7 8 3 2.0 missing 4 number T53 TOT) Note: Value is the cumulative score of each respondent's perception of the position towards growth taken by combinations of business and citizen groups in their communities. Higher scores reflect support or mixed positions, while lower scores reflect neutral or opposing positions . CONFL Value Frequency Valid Percent 3 1 .7% 4 7 4.7 5 4 2.7 6 8 5.3 7 8 5.3 8 10 6.7 9 16 10.7 10 20 13.3 11 24 16.0 12 11 7.3 13 16 10.7 14 13 8.7 15 5 3.3 16 7 4.7 missing 3 number T53 100 FEE Value Frequency Valid Percent 1 7 4.8% 2 36 24.7 3 53 36.3 4 50 34.2 missing 7 number T53 T0~u"

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222 Note: Value of CONFL is the cumulative score of perceived conflict on a scale of four issues related to land use environmental protection, urban sprawl, green space preservation, and agricultural land preservation. The higher the score the greater the conflict perceived in the community. FEE represents the perceived conflict on one specific issue impact fees. Higher scores represent more conflict . CONSV Value Frequency Valid Percent 3 3 2.0% 4 5 3.3 5 11 7.3 6 16 10.7 7 29 19.3 8 33 22.0 9 28 18.7 10 18 12.0 11 4 2.7 12 3 2.0 missing 3 number T53 100 LIB Value Frequency Valid Percent 4 2 1.3% 5 1 .7 6 9 6.0 7 11 7.3 8 10 6.7 9 18 12.0 10 18 12.0 11 25 16.7 12 26 17.3 13 12 8.0 14 12 8.0 15 3 2.0 16 3 2.0 missing 3 number T53 100 Note: These two variables represent the cumulative scores of each respondent on a scale of four questions representing a liberal approach to land use and a scale of three questions representing a conservative approach to land use. A high liberal score reflects an agreement with a regulatory, heightened role for government in affecting land use, while

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223 a high conservative score reflects an agreement with a flexible, minimal role for government and a reliance on market forces to affect land use. POWER Value Frequency Valid Percent Public Sector 47 33.8% Business Sector 22 15.8 Mixed Groups 70 50.4 missing 14 number T5~3 100 Note: Community power is a nominal variable. Each respondent selected the representation of decision making power that best reflected their community either many groups, businesses, or elected / administrative government officials . Ecological Variables POP85 City or county population 1985 estimates from the University of Florida Bureau of Business and Economic Research. GROW City or county population growth rate 1980 to 1985. TRESC City level percentage of land used for residential purposes. Census of Governments 1982. HSVAL City level 1980 median value of owner occupied housing units. City County Data Book 1983. PCINC City level 1980 per capita personal income. City County Data Book 1983. USERPR PTXPR City level Fiscal year 1983-84 proportion of city government revenues derived from user fees and property taxes. Florida Local Government Financial Report FY83-84 . CAPPR City level Fical year 1983-84 proportion of city government expenditures in category designated capital outlay. Florida Local Government Financial Report FY83-84.

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APPENDIX B AVAILABLE OPERATIONAL I ZED VARIABLES Proposition 1A The greater the presence in a city of conditions generating growth machine participation, the stronger the presence of the growth machine in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelyhood that adopted land use policies will be flexible and accomodating to growth and development . 1. growth machine Aggregate Data Economic Investment -increasing dollar level of business activity in city over time (Molotch, 1976) Retail and wholesale sales and value, amount and percentage change over time, -business climate and attractiveness ( Molotch , 1976 ; Logan , 1976b; Molotch and Logan, 1984) Bond rating, business rating (Alexander and Grant, 1981) Government -low business taxes, development tax breaks (Mollenkopf , 1983 ) Property taxes, tangible property tax; enterprize zones, tax increment financing districts, -government expenditures on developmental policies 224

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(Peterson, 1979,1981) Roads, infrastructure, bonded debt for capital projects -public financing of increased utility and government costs (Molotch, 1976 ; Peterson , 1981 ) Users fees versus property taxes -local government expenditures on economic development activities (Judd,1984; Lyon et.al.,1981) Downtown development, economic development council -less city government fewer employees , less expenditures ( Mollenkopf , 1983 ) Number of employees/population, expenditures per capita -reform government ( Mollenkopf , 1983 ) Form of government Actors -presence of developers, planners, middle class (#) (Mollenkopf, 1983) support systems (Aiken and Alf ord , 1970 ) , downtown association (Mollenkopf , 1983 ) Environment ( Molotch , 1976 ; Protash and Baldissare , 1983 ; Fried, 1975) change in population number -change in incorporated and unincorpoarated population levels Survey Data verification of presence and measurement of presence of groups in the policy process

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226 2. adopted policies (Ervin et.al.,1977; Garkovitch, 1982 ; Goodman and Freund,1968) goals in original comprehensive plan -implementation tools in plan and ordinance Survey Data from plannerspolicies used, value to the land use goals 3 . flexible and accomodating flexible implementation tools Gleeson et al.,1975 :8,9; Burrows , 1978 ; Gruen and Gruen,1977; Dougherty et. al.,1975; Scott, 1975; high growth goals survey and content analysis 5. policies (Garkovitch, Goodson) -goals — comprehensive plan policies -implementation techniques — plan policies, development regulations, ordinances Proposition IB The greater the presence in a city of conditions generating anti-growth coalition participation, the stronger the presence of the anti-growth coaltion in the policy process, and thus the greater the likelyhood that more restrictive and regulatory land use policies will be adopted . 1. anti-growth coalition Aggregate Data Economic -non-locally controlled employment base (Molotch, 1976 ) -taxesrvalue ratio ( Dowall , 1980 ; Rose-Ackerman, 1983 )

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227 Actors economically advantaged population (Ervin et.al.,1977; Rich, 1979; Dowall,1980; Molotch, 1976) — middle class income levels — better educated, fewer minorities -active neighborhood groups ( Molotch , 1976 ; Ervin et.al. ,1977) Envi ronment (Quality of Life rating) -increase in pollution, congestion, environmental problems (Molotch, 1976) — increase in population growth rate (Protash and Baldissare, 1983) Government -increase in users fees versus taxes ( Peterson , 1979 ; Molotch, 1976) Survey Data verify presence of anti-growth coalition and measure presence 2 . restrictive, regulatory implemenation tools and comprehensive plan goals (same as 1A) Mills, 1979; Johnston, 1980 ; Logan, 1976b; Molotch, 1976 ; Williams, 1961; Thrall, 1983; Scott, 1975; Proposition 2A The greater the investment which the growth machine has in the community the more proclivity they have to participate

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228 in the policy making process, and the more likely it is that land use policies will reflect market needs. 1 . investment of growth machine Economic Growth proportion of commercial/business land to residentially used land; area, value local versus mobile wealth as proportion of economic base (Molotch and Logan, 1984; Swanstrom, 1985 ) Government -top property tax sources growth in commercial space allocated in the comprehensive plan versus growth in residential space -change in housing stock type, value ( Dowall , 1980 : Mills, 1977; Mollenkopf , 1983 ; Freidland, 1983 ; Lineberry , 1980 ) 2. market directs less regulatory land use policy (Dougharty et.al.,1975; Mollenkopf , 1983 ; Gleeson et al. ,1975) Proposition 2B The greater the investment which the anti-growth forces have in the community the more proclivity they have to participate in the policy making process, and the more likely is it that government will regulate land use and adopt policies which restrict market forces and benefit existing community residents .

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229 1 . investment of anti-growth coalition Economic mobile versus local wealth classification of land amount available, change change in property value (investment value) residential tax rate : property value (capitalization) availability, attractiveness of neighboring locations ( Tiebout , 1956 ) comparison of property taxes and values 2 . government regulates more regulatory land use policies (Dougharty et al.,1975; Gleeson et al.,1975) -more government protection of existing land use (Mills, 1977; Ervin et al.,1977) -more government insurance to protect existing land use -greenbelt ( Thrall , 1983 ; Goodman and Freund,1968) Proposition 3 The greater the availability of alternative regulatory power and revenue sources , the less dependent local government is on local revenue contributors and the more autonomous local government is, allowing government to be a partner or director in the local growth process. 1 • rely on property tax Government increase in property tax (Mills, 1977) per capita property tax ( Dowall , 1980 ) residential, non-residential property tax

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230 -property tax as percent of total government revenues -local property tax rate compared to rates in nearby areas 2 . alternative revenue sources Government enterprise revenues ( Logan , 1976b ) long term bond debt ( Dowall , 1980 ) increase in revenues : increase in taxes, user fees ( Peterson, 1979 fiscal capacity) Survey Data Administrators' role in the development of land use policy Proposition 4A 4C rational, incremental process consensus (elite), conflict (pluralist), compromise (state di rected ) single, many interests; short, long term Determinations of these concepts will have to be done by survey instrument. -more changes allowed to plan, more incremental (Yates, 1977; Ervin et al.,1977) -more difficult change process in policy, less erosion by incremental change (Yates, 1977)

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APPENDIX C QUESTIONNAIRES AND LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION

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LOCAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT POLICY AND POLITICS QUEST IONNAIREA Study of Land Use Policies and Plans in Florida Cities and Counties Sponsored by University of Florida Institute of Government Department of Political Science

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CITY PLANNER LOCAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT POLICY AND POLITICS 0-1 The importance of growth as an issue varies from city to city. In your opinion how important an issue la growth to your city? (circle nuaber) 1 IT IS THE NUMBER ONE ISSUE IN OUR CITY 2 IT IS A PRIORITY ALONG WITH OTHER ISSUES 3 IT IS SOMETIMES A PRIORITY CONCERN IN OUR CITY 4 IT IS OP MINOR IMPORTANCE 5 IT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN OUR CITY 6 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIPY) . 7 DON'T KNOW 0-2 Plaaae Indicate your perception of the relationship between the following conditions and growth as experienced by your oity. (circle your aaawer) DIRECT leans growth is directly associated with the oondltlon CONTRIBUTES means growth contributes to the presence of the condition DETRACTS weans growth Is slowed with the presence of the condition NONE Beans no relationship between growth and the presence of the oondltlon DK means don't know i Relationship DIRECT CONTRIBUTES DETRACTS NONE DK Water Quality 1 2 3 4 5 Air Quality 1 2 3 4 5 Traffic Congestion 1 2 3 4 5 Property Tax Increase 1 2 3 4 5 Lower Quality Covernaent Services 1 2 3 4 5 Elimination of Covernaent Servloee 1 2 3 4 5 Criae Increases 1 2 3 4 5 Loss /Lack of Natural Areas 1 2 3 4 5 Increasing Housing Prices 1 2 3 4 5 Need for Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5

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234 Next we would like to ask you about groups In jour eoaaunity and their involvement in land use politics and policy development. 0-3 In your opinion, towards whioh position do eaoh of the following aegaents of the eoaaunity lean with regards to the future developaent of land and growth in your oity? (circle your answer) SUPPORT aeans eoaaunity aegaent supports growth NEUTRAL aeans eoaaunity aegaent has no position on growth OPPOSE aeans eoaaunity aegaent opposes growth MIXED aeans aoae aeabera support growth and aoae oppose it DK aeans don't know 1 Influential Individuals 2 Chamber of Coaaerce 3 Realtors/Developers 4 Environmentalists 5 Neighborhood Croups 6 Civlo Organizations 7 Minority Croups 6 OTHERS (apeeify) SUPPORT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Position on Growth NEUTRAL OPPOSE MIXES 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 DK 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0-4 Proa the list of organisations provided, please aeleet those groups which are active in the area of land uae policy developaent and growth, (circle the numbers of all that apply) 1. Influential Individuals 6. Civic Organizations 2. Chamber of Coaaerce 7. County Officials 3. Realtors/Developers 8. City Offieiala 4. Environmentalists 9. Minority Groups 5. Neighborhood Croups 10. OTHER (specify) 0-5 For each of the groups Hated, in your Judgement, which have had the greatest level of success in influencing the developaent of land uae policy In your city? (circle the numbers of all that apply) 1. Influential Individuals 6. Civic Organisations 2. Chamber of Coaaerce 7. County Officials 3. Realtors/Developers 8. City Offieiala 4. Environmentalists 9. Minority Croups 5. Neighborhood Croups 10. OTHER (apeeify) 2

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235 0-6 In your Judgment, to which of the group* listed has the city government aost frequently responded favorably to the group's requests or land use policy" preferences by land use policy adoption or change? (circle the nuabers of all that apply) 1. Influential Individuals 6. Civio Organizations 2. Chaaber of Coaaeroe 7. County Officials 3. Realtors/Developers 8. City Officials *« Environaentallsts 9. Minority Croups 5. Neighborhood Croups 10. OTHER (specify) 0-7 Of those listed, which groups (or their representatives) aost frequently contact your departaent in an official capacity to expre ss the group's preferences regarding city land use developaent? (oirole the nuabers of all that apply) 1. Influential Individuals 6. Civic Organisations 2. Chaaber of Coaaerce 7. County Officials 3Realtors/Developere 6. City Officials 2* w^i^"'! 1 ^'* 9 « Minority Croups .. Neighborhood Croups 10. OTHER (specify) . Q-8 Which groups do you or your departaent aost freouently contact in order to S^i. li F J"' T 1 ^ 7 P 081110 "* or ettaininforaetion useful To Jou? (circle the nuabers of all that apply) 1. Influential Individual. 6. Civic Organisations 2. Chaaber of Coaaeroe 7. County Officials 3. Realtors/Developers 8. City Officials k w ,1 < V i^^ l, ! nt ! 1 i" t • 9 ' Minority Croups 5. neighborhood Croupe 10. OTHER (specify). 0-9 How active has each of the groups listed been In their participation in the developaent of future land use policy in your olty» i" lr " cl P*««> « the (circle your answer) 1. Influential Individuals 2. Chaaber of Coaaerce 3Realtors/Developers 1Environmentalists 5. Neighborhood Croups 6. Civic Organisations 7. County Officials 6. City Officials 9. Minority Croups 10. OTHER (specify) Participation in Land Use Policy Developaent VARIES CHANCES WITH • CONSTANT Br ISSUE ELECTED OPPICIALS DK I 3 I 3 I 3 I 3 I 3 I 3 3

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236 tour oo— an f concerning adopted land use policies «ad strategies will contribute to our under* tending of this subject. 0-10 Listsd below are sons of the aany land development policies and strategies which cities say adopt. Please select the response whioh reflects the importance, if any, of each policy /strategy towards achieving the city's land development goals, (circle your answer) INTEGRA! Beans is Integral to the success NECESSARY swans is necessary to the success HO AFFECT means does not contribute to the success IMPEDEMENT aeans iapedes the success NOT USED aeans i s not used DK aeans don't know Policy /Strategy Land Banking 1 Creenbelt 1 AgricultureProtective Zone 1 Controlled Utility Placement 1 Capital Iaproveaent Plan 1 Critical Area Designation 1 Dsvelopaent Transfer Rights 1 Conventional Zoning 1 PUD 1 Flexible Zoning 1 Hinlaua Lot/Size Restrictions 1 Impact Pees 1 Enterprise Zones 1 Tax Increment Financing 1 Regulating the # of Dsvelopaent Permits 1 Moratoriums on Land Dsvelopaent 1 Land Use Performance Standards 1 Contribution to ths Achieveaent of the Land Development Coals INTEGRAL NECESSARY NO AFFECT IMPEDIMENT NOT USED DK \ 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4

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237 Q-11 Have «njr portion, of your future land use eWnt or land development policies been challenged In court aince 1975? (circle nu.be r) 2 NO 3 DON'T KNOW If yea, who brought the challenged ) to court? Q-12 How aanr times per year (under the 1975 LCCPA law) haa your city'a comprehensive plan been permitted to be amended? 7 0-13 |riefli, what has been the process for aa*nd«endlng your future land use eleaent plan? (e.g. planning board, cit y council Vproval.r^bli^earing) 0-14 Select the position which aost closely reflects tl 1 COALS STRONCLY SUPPORT GROWTH 2 COALS MODERATELY SUPPORT CROWTH 3 COALS SUPPORT AND DISCOURAGE CROWTH * COALS HODERATELr DISCOURAGE GROWTH 5 COALS STRONGLY DISCOURAGE CROWTH 6 NO RELATIONSHIP 7 DON'T KNOW ^fo^irss^iia u::^.^ o l:pL„r^li u l you L oI,l ^ oo « city's future land M " « t lid lZl*t adopted to laplmnt your (circle nuaber) fr0 " th ««P«rf«nced In your city. 1 POLICIES STRONGLY SUPPORT CROWTH 2 POLICIES MODERATELY SUPPORT CROWTH 3 POLICIES SUPPORT AND DISCOURAGE CROWTH * POLICIES MODERATELY DISCOURAGE CROWTH 5 POLICIES STRONGLY DISCOURAGE CROWTH 6 NO RELATIONSHIP 7 DON'T KNOW 5

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238 Q-16 for each of the following statements about planning and development please Indicate jrour opinion, (circle your answer) 1 Preserving clean air and water should be high priority lssuea even if it Means that economic development in the community ay be slowed y ? Planning la primarily a political activity i i Developers respond to Market forces and are only giving people what they want i I Developers have a legitimate complaint against imposing unnecessary and cost increasing requirements on their developments 1 Planners should temper their environmental concerns by recognising that other legitimate objectives which amy conflict with environmental protection aay be even aore important i There should be tighter controls on private development to protect the public Interest i Residents are best at defining the needs of their community i Private developers have little or no concern for the good of the community as a whole 1 The benefit to property owners of increased land values can legitimately °* limited in order to preserve land in its natural or agricultural state i STRONCLI STRONGLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DK 6

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239 Q-17 1 STRONGLY ACREE Hiniau. lot site requirement for single family rwid.ntial •ubdi visions on the urban fringe , tand Development Regulation, which Halt further residential and commercial developaent on the urban fringe.... 1 Prohibit the expansion of key facilities (e.g. Water and sewer) •o that new developaent cannot ocour on the urban fringe i Develop aoat vacant lots within city limits before there Is erpanlson to the unincorporated county areas , STRONG!.! AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DK 0-18 safs^ ass Ms — > 1 Residential Single Faaily 2 Residential Hultl Faaily 3 Commercial /Business 4 Agricultural Change INCREASE DECREASE NO CHANGE INCREASE DECREASE HO CHANGE INCREASE DECREASE NO CHANGE INCREASE DECREASE NO CHANGE DK DK DK DK J^ould you pi— provide « your perceptions of land ... politic. ta /our city? (clrol. u.b.r) tr "«Portatlon, oris*, .chool., tax..) in your ' TSJST 0 ' ro »« *»« *" E AFFECTED BY THE PUTURE LAND 2 ™T*zT™ C * M Kl ™ «« *" AFFECTED Bf THE FUTURE LAND 3 HO INFLUENCE « DON'T KNOW 7

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240 0-20 Horn much Influence do you erpeot the newljr required capital improvement element to nave on other policy decielon areas (such as transportation, crime, taxes, eohoole) in your city? (circle number) 1 STRONG INFLUENCE -MOST POLICY AREAS WILL BE AFFECTED BI THE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT ELEMENT 2 MODERATE INPLDENCE -SOME POLICY AREAS WILL BE AFFECTED BI THE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT ELEMENT 3 DO INPLDENCE 4 DON'T KNOW P « le *!" ! v * 1U ' te th * 1,Vel of 80Bfll et "Wch accompanied the adoption of your city • future land use element and the policies/strategies used in your city to implement it. (eircla nuabnr) Implement it. (circle number) 0-21 Future Land Use Element 1 GREAT AMOUNT OP CONPLICT 2 SOME CONFLICT 3 NO CONFLICT 4 DON'T KNOW 0-22 Land Use Policies/Strategies 1 GREAT AMOUNT OP CONPLICT 2 SOME CONPLICT 3 NO CONPLICT 4 DON'T KNOW Q-23 Has the adoption of any one particular land use policy/strategy been accompanied by a significant amount of conflict? (circle number) YES 2 NO 3 DON'T KNOW If yes, please specify which onet Q-2« Please select the position which moat olosely reflects your perception of the position on growth held by your elected city government, (circle number) 1 SUPPORTS CR0WTH UNCONDITIONALLY 2 SUPPORTS CROWTH WITH CONDITIONS 3 NEUTRAL -DOES NOT SUPPORT OR OPPOSE GROWTH 4 OPPOSES GROWTH UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 5 OPPOSES GROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY 7 DON'T KNOW ^ 8

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241 Q-25 Please evaluate the level of eonfllot for the following issue areas as experienced by your olty. (circle anever) Intergovernmental Relations with County Environment Protection Location of Mobile Homes Annexation Urban Sprawl In the Unincorporated Areas Creen Space Preservation Agricultural Land Preservation In the Unincorporated Areas lapaot Pees or Other Developaent Uaer Charges SIGNIFICANT Conflict Level MODERATE HIN 2 2 2 2 2 2 KAL NONE DK 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Q-26 Polities surrounding the adoption of land use policies In your olty can best be described asi (circle nuaber) 1 VERY STABLEPW CONTROVERSIES ON POLICY QUESTIONS DIVIDE THE COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE 1 STABLEDESPITE A PEW CONTROVERSIES THAT DIVIDE THE COMMUNITY 2 0N?ELEm0N H TO G ANOTHER) R0DPS C ° HTR0LLI "° CIT * G0VERNMEKT CHANCE (PROM 3 ?"?£5HL T0 CHAKCK 18 rotICI DISAGREEMENTS ARISE (PROM ONE ELECTION TO ANOTHER) 4 OTHER 5 DON'T KNOW 9

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Q-27 In your judgment, which of the following describes the political process (in general) in your city? (circle number) 1 IT IS THE ELECTED OFFICIALS WHO DOMINATE THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. VERY LITTLE HAPPENS UNLESS THEY SUPPORT IT. 2 BUSINESSES HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING HERE. THEY DOMINATE THE LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THEIR SUPPORT IS NECESSARY FOR POLICY ADOPTIONS. 3 THE PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DEPARTMENT HEADS, ATTORNIES AND PLANNERS IN GOVERNMENT HAVE THE CREATEST INFLUENCE. THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION DOMINATES THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. 4 IMPORTANT LOCAL DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF CROUPS, SUCH AS CIVIC, LABOR, BUSINESS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, AND OTHERS. EACH CROUP CAN USUALLY PREVENT POLICIES THEY DISLIKE FROM BEING ADOPTED. Q-28 How sauiy professional planners are in your city 1 * planning department? Q-29 Are there any advisory board, neighborhood level organisations, or umbrella homeowner groups in your oity that are well organised and active in the development of land use policies? Please list their names and if possible a contact person. Thank you tor your participation. 10

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CITY/COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR LOCAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT FOLIC! AJtD POLITICS 0-1 The Importance of growth as an Issue varies from city to city. In your opinion how iaportant an issue is growth to your city? (circle number) 1 IT IS THE NUMBER ONE ISSUE IN OUR CITY 2 IT IS A PRIORITY ALONG WITH OTHER ISSUES 3 IT IS SOMETIMES A PRIORITY CONCERN IN OUR CITY 4 IT IS OP MINOR IMPORTANCE 5 IT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN OUR CITY 6 OTHER (PLEASE SPBCIPY) • 7 DON'T KNOW Q-2 Please Indicate your perception of the relationship between the following conditions and growth as experienced by your city, (circle your answer) DIRECT weans growth is directly associated with the condition CONTRIBUTES means growth contributes to the presence of the condition DETRACTS weans growth is slowed with the preeenoe of the condition NONE weans no relationship between growth and the presence of the condition DK weans don't know ! Relationship DIRECT CONTRIBUTES DETRACTS NONE DK Water Quality 1 2 3 1 5 Air Quality 1 2 3 4 5 Traffic Congestion 1 2 3 4 5 Property Tax Increase 1 2 3 4 5 Lower Quality Government Services 1 2 3 4 5 Elimination of Government Services 1 2 3 4 5 Crlae Increases 1 2 3 5 Loss /Lack of Natural Areas 1 2 3 4 5 Increasing Housing Prices 1 2 3 4 5 Need for Infrastructure 1 2 3 4 5

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244 He it we would like to ask you about troupe la your nn—iiil tj and their involvement la land us* polities and policy development. 0-3 In your opinion, towards which position do eaoh of the following tegmenta of the community lean with regards to the future developaent of land and growth In your city? (circle your answer) SUPPORT weans ooanunlty eegaent supports growth NEUTRAL jeans community segaent has no position on growth OPPOSE Beans coaaunlty segaent opposes growth MIXED mesne soae aeabers support growth and aoae oppose it OK means don't know 1 Influential Individuals 2 Chamber of Commerce 3 Realtors/Developers 4 Environmentalists 5 Neighborhood Croups 6 Civic Organisations 7 Minority Groups 8 OTHERS (specify) Position on Growth NEUTRAL OPPOSE MIXED DK SUPPORT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0-4 Prom the list of organisations provided, please select those groups which are active in the area of land use policy developaent and growth, (circle the numbers of all that apply) 1. Influential Individuals 2. Chamber of Coaaerce 3. Realtors/Developers 4. Environmentalists) 5. Neighborhood Croups 6. Civic Organisations 7. County Officials 8. City Offloials 9. Minority Groups 10. OTHER (specify) 0-5 Por each of the groups listed, in your Judgement, which have had the greatest level of success in influencing the development of land uee policy in your city? (circle the numbers of all that apply) 1. Influential Individuals 2. Chamber of Commerce 3> Realtors/Developers 4. Environmentalists 5. Neighborhood Croups 6. Civic Organisations 7. County Officials 8. City Officials 9. Minority Croups 10. OTHER (specify) 2

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245 Q-6 In your Judgement, to which of the groups listed has the city governaent most freequently responded favorably to the group 'a requests or land use policy preferences by land use policy adoption or change? (circle the nuabera of all that apply) 1. Influential Indivlduale 6. Civic Organisations 2. Chamber of Commerce 7. County Officials 3. Realtore/Developere 8. City Offlciale 4. Environmentalists 9. Minority Groups 5. Neighborhood Croups 10. OTHER (specify) .. 0-7 How active has each of the groups listed been in their participation in the developaent of future land use policy in your city? (circle your answer) Participation in Land Use Policy Developaent 1. Influential Individuals 2. Chaaber of Commerce 3. Realtors/Developers 4. Environmentalists 5. Neighborhood Groups 6. Civic Organisations 7. County Officials 6. City Officials 9. Minority Croups 10. OTHER (specify) CONSTANT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VARIES BY ISSUE 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 CHANGES WITH ELECTED OFFICIALS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 DK 3

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246 Q-8 Fop each of the following statements about planning and development please indicate your opinion, (circle your anawer) STRONCU STRONGLY , __ . AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DK I Preserving clean air and water should be high priority issues even If it means that economic development in the community ay be slowed 1 2 3 4 5 ! Planning is primarily a political activity i 2 3 , 5 I Developer* respond to aarket foroes and are only giving people what they want 1 2 3 4 5 Developers have a legitimate complaint against imposing unnecessary and coat increasing requirements on their developaents 1 2 3 4 5 Planners should temper their environmental concerns by recognizing that other legitimate objectives Which aay conflict with environmental protection aay be even more important y 2 3 « ' 5 There should be tighter controls on private developaent to protect the public Interest 1 2 3 4 5 Residents are best at defining the needs of their community 1 2 3 45 Private developers have little or no concern for the good of the community as a whole 1 23 45 The benefit to property owners of Increased land valuee can legitimately be limited in order to preserve land in its natural or agricultural state 1 2 3 • a 4

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247 Unit, would you please provide us your peroaptlooa of land use politics In your on— unity. 0-9 How nuoh Influence does the adopted future lend use element have on other policy decision areas (suoh as transportation, erlme, schools , taxes) In your city? (circle auaber) 1 STRONG INFLUENCE -HOST POLICY AREAS ARE AFFECTED BY THE FUTURE LAND USE ELEMENT 2 MODERATE INFLUENCE -SOME POLICY AREAS ARE AFFECTED BY THE FUTURE LAND USE ELEMENT 3 MO INFLUENCE 4 DON'T KNOW 0-10 Hoa SHich influence do you expect the newly required capital laproveaent element to have on other policy decision areas (such as transportation, crime, taxes, schools) In your city? (circle number) 1 STRONG INFLUENCE -HOST POLICY AREAS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT ELEMENT 2 MODERATE INFLUENCE -SOME POLICY AREAS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT ELEMENT 3 NO INFLUENCE 4 DON'T KNOW Please evaluate the level of conflict which accompanied the adoption of your city's future land use element and the policies /strategies used in your city to implement it. (circle number) Q-11 Future Land Uss Element 1 GREAT AMOUNT OF CONFLICT 2 SOME CONFLICT 3 NO CONFLICT 4 DON'T KNOW 0-12 Land Use Policies/Strategies 1 GREAT AMOUNT OP CONFLICT 2 SOME CONFLICT 3 NO. CONFLICT 4 DON'T KNOW 5

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248 0-13 Please select the poaltlon which most closely reflects your perception of the position on growth held bjr your elected city government. (oircirou.D.r) 1 2 3 4 5 7 SUPPORTS CROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY SUPPORTS GROWTH WITH CONDITIONS NEUTRAL -DOES NOT SUPPORT OR OPPOSE CROWTH OPPOSES CROWTH UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES OPPOSES GROWTH UNCONDITIONAUY DON'T KNOW Q-H. Please evaluate the level of conflict for the following ieeue areas as experienced by your city, (circle answer) Conflict level MODERATE MINIMAL RONE Intergovernmental Relations with County Environment Protection Location of Mobile Homes Annexation Urban Sprawl in the Unincorporated Areas Creen Spaoe Preservation Agricultural Land Preservation In the Unincorporated Areas Impact Peee or Other Development User Charges SICNIPICANT 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 DK 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 SLSS THIS S 0VB,SIK °" P ° LICI DIVIDE THE STABLEDESPITE A FEW CONTROVERSIES THAT DIVIDE THE COMMUNITY M^ifiFS^?™* C0Hn ° LLlm Cm 0OTiM »« I «"» cprom SJJBJECT » CHANGEAS POLICY DISAGREEMENTS ARISE (PROM ONE ELECTION TO OTHER DON'T KNOW " " * 6

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0-16 In your Judgement, vhioh of the following describes the political process (In general) In your city? (circle nuaber) 1 IT IS THE ELECTED OFFICIALS WHO DOMINATE THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. VERT LITTLE HAPPENS UNLESS THEY SUPPORT IT. 2 BUSINESSES HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING HERE. THEY DOMINATE THE LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THEIR SUPPORT IS NECESSARY FOR POLICY ADOPTIONS. 3 THE PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DEPARTMENT HEADS, ATTORNIES AND PLANNERS IN GOVERNMENT HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE. THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION DOMINATES THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. 4 IMPORTANT LOCAL DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OP GROUPS, SUCH AS CIVIC, LABOR, BUSINESS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, AND OTHERS. EACH GROUP CAN USUALLY PREVENT POLICIES THEY DISLIKE FROM BEING ADOPTED. Thank you for your participation.

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GROUPS LOCAL GROWTH MAKACBttHT POLICY AND POLITICS 0-1 h!!w [S!^r ° f < growt J' M *" lMU « city to city. In your opinion how important an Issue la growth to your city? (olrcle nu.be r) °P l ~<"> 1 IT IS THE NUMBER ONE ISSUE IN OUR CITY 2 IT IS A PRIORITY ALONG WITH OTHER ISSUES 3 IT IS SOMETIMES A PRIORITY CONCERN IN OUR Cm « IT IS OP MINOR IMPORTANCE 5 IT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN OUR CITT 6 OTHER (specify) 7 DON'T KNOW 1 0-2 indlcate * our Perception of the relationship between the following condition, and growth a, experienced by your olty/ccTrcI. yo£ laSErf* SSLu?S £ J r0Wth 18 * lp#ct1 ^ — ociated with the condition St2j?Er *^ I' 1 ?" Wlth the " rMence ° f the condition 5 ^Ton n ?t r w 10nflhlP b,U '"' gr< " th "» *""" ce ° f **e condition I Water Quality Air Quality Traffic Congestion Property Tax Increase Lower Quality Government Services Elimination of Government Services Cries Increases toes/Lack of natural Areas Increasing Housing Prices Heed for More Infrastructure DIRECT CONTRIBUTES 2 2 2 Relationship DETRACTS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 NONE DK 5 5 5 5 5

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251 Nert we would like to uk you about your group' a activities 1b land uae politics and poller aavalopamt. 0-3 The importance of "growth" aa a political issue varies froa group to group. Select the response whleh aoat closely reflects the laportance of the growth Issue to your organisation, (circle auaber) 1 CROWTH IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE PACING MY ORGANIZATION 2 CROWTH IS ONE OP THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES 3 CROWTH IS SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT 4 CROWTH HAS BEEN BUT IS NOT CURRENTLY IMPORTANT 5 CROWTH IS NOT AN IMPORTANT ISSUE TO MY ORGANIZATION 6 DON'T KNOW Q-4 The position towards which ay group currently leans with regards to the future developaent of land and growth In this city can be described asi (circle nusiber) 1 SUPPORT 2 NEUTRAL HO POSITION TAKEN 3 OPPOSE 4 MIXED SOME SUPPORT, SOME OPPOSITION 5 DON'T KNOW 0-5 In your Judgement, how auch success has your group had In Influencing the developaent of future land use policy in your elty? (elrele auaber) 1 GREAT SUCCESS 2 MODERATE SUCCESS 3 SMALL AMOUNT OP SUCCESS 4 NO SUCCESS 5 DON'T KNOW 0-6 How active has your group been In their participation In the developaent of future land uss policy in your city? (elrele auaber) 1 CONSTANTLY 2 ACTIVITY LEVEL VARIES BY ISSUE 3 ACTIVITY LEVEL CHANGES WITH ELECTION OP OFFICIALS 4 DON'T KNOW 0-7 Approriaately how often does your group (or its representative) contact the city (council, aanager, and/or planning departaent) in an official eapaclty to express the group's preferences regarding city land use policies? (elrele auaber) 1 FREQUENTLYMORE THAN ONCE A MONTH 2 SOMETIMESONCE EVERY FEW MONTHS 3 ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR 4 NEVER 5 DON'T KNOW 2

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252 Q-B Approximately how often Aoea someone from the olty (council, manager, and/or planning department) contact your group in order to learn the group's position on land use policy or to obtain information? (circle number) 1 FREQUENTLYMORE THAN ONCE A MONTH 2 SOMETIMESONCE EVERT PEW MONTHS 3 ONCE OR TWICE A TEAR 4 NEVER 5 DON'T KNOW Q-9 In your Judgement, how often has the city government responded favorably to the requests or land use policy preferences of your group directly by land use policy adoption or change? (circle number) 1 FREQUENTLYMORE THAN ONCE A MONTH 2 SOMETIMESONCE EVERY FEW MONTHS 3 ONCE OR TWICE A TEAR 4 NEVER 5 DON'T KNOW Mow we would appreciate your opinions on some land use Issues. QICSscn of the following statements is a policy that can be used by local governments to Implement their land use element plan. For each policy pleass Indicate your oplonion. (circle your aaswer) 1 Minimum lot size requirement for single family residential subdivisions on the urban fringe 2 Land Development Regulations which limit further residential and commercial development on the urban fringe.. 3 Prohibit the expansion of key facilities (e.g. water and sewer) so that new development oannot occur on ths urban fringe 4 Develop most vacant lots within city limits before there is expansion to the unincorporated urban areas STRONGLY STRONGLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DK 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 3

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253 0-11 For each of the following statements about planning and development please lndloata your opinion, (circle your answer) r STR0H0LT STRONGLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DK 1 Preserving clean air and water ahould be high priority Issues even if it means that economic developaent in the DO— unity ay be slowed 1 2 3 4 5 2 Planning la primarily a political activity 1 2 3 4 5 3 Developers respond to market forces and ars only giving people what they want 1 2 3 4 5 4 Developers have a legitimate complaint against Imposing unnecessary and cost Increasing requirements on their developments 1 2 3 4 5 5 Planners should tempsr their environmental concerns by recognising that other legitimate objectives which may conflict with environmental protection may be even more Important 1 2 3 4 5 6 There should be tighter controls on private development to protect the public interest 1 2 3 4 5 7 Residents are beet at defining the needs of their bo —unity 1 2 3 4 5 8 Private developers have little or no concern for the good of the community as a whole 1 2 3 4 5 9 The benefit to property owners of Increased land values can legitimately be limited in order to preserve land In its natural or agricultural state 1 2 3 4 5 4

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254 Next, would you please provide ua your perceptions of land Me declaloo making la your on— nutty. 0-12 Please evaluate the level of conflict for the following Issue areas as experienced by your elty. (circle your answer) r Intergovernmental Halations with County Environment Protection Location of Mobile Hoses Annexation Urban Sprawl in the Unincorporated Areas Green Space Preservation Agricultural Land Preservation in the Unincorporated Areas Iapact fees or Other Development User Charges 0-13 Please select the position whioh most closely reflects your perception of the position on growth held by your elected city government, (circle number) 1 SUPPORTS GROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY 2 SUPPORTS GROWTH WITH CONDITIONS 3 NEUTRAL -DOES NOT SUPPORT OR OPPOSE GROWTH 4 OPPOSES GROWTH UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 5 OPPOSES CROWTH UNCONDITIONALLY 7 DON'T KNOW Conflict Level SIGNIFICANT MODERATE MINIMAL NONE DK 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 0-14 Politics surrounding the adoption of future land use polioy in your elty can best be described ast (circle number) 1 VERY STABLEPEW CONTROVERSIES ON POLICY QUESTIONS DIVIDE THE COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE 2 STABLEDESPITE A PEW CONTROVERSIES THAT DIVIDE THE COMMUNITY 3 SUBJECT TO CHANGESAS GROUPS CONTROLLING CITY GOVERNMENT CHANCE (PROM ONE ELECTION TO ANOTHER) 4 SUBJECT TO CHANGEAS POLICY DISAGREEMENTS ARISE (PROM ONE ELECTION TO ANOTHER ) 5 OTHER (specify) 6 DON'T KNOW 5

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255 0-15 In your Judgment, which of the following describes the polltloal prooeaa (In general) In your olty? (circle your answer) 1 IT IS THE ELECTED OFFICIALS WHO DOMINATE THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. VERY LITTLE HAPPENS UNLESS THEY SUPPORT IT. 2 BUSINESSES HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT DECISION WAKING HERE. THE! DOMINATE THE LOCAL POLITICAL 8TRUCTURE AND THEIR 8UPP0RT IS NECESSARY FOR POLICY ADOPTIONS. 3 THE PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DEPARTMENT HEADS. ATTORN IBS AND PLANNERS IN GOVERNMENT HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE. THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION DOMINATES THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. » IMPORTANT LOCAL DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OP GROUPS, SUCH AS CIVIC, LABOR, BUSINESS, ELECTED OPFICIALS, AND OTHERS. EACH CROUP CAN USUALLY PREVENT POLICIES THEY DISLIKE FROM BEING ADOPTED. 0-16 In your opinion, towards which position do each of the following segments of the ooasHinlty lean with regards to the future development of land and growth In your olty? (circle your answer) growsn 8UPP0RT swans oosawnlty segaent supports growth NEUTRAL «eane oosawnlty segaent has no position on growth OPPOSE weans ooeaninlty segaent opposes growth MIXED aeana aoae aeabers support growth and soae oppose it DK «ean a don't know na don't know Position on Growth 8UPP0RT NEUTRAL OPPOSE MIXED DK 1 Influential Individuals 1 2 2 Chaaber of Coaaerce 1 3 Realtors/Developers f 4 Environmentalists 1 5 Neighborhood Croups 1 2 3 6 Civic Organisations 1 2 3 7 Minority Croupe 1 8 Others (specify) 3 2 3 2 3 a 3 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0-17 How smny people are currently aeabers of your organisation? 0-18 £L?h"j£ I"* f0 "°ln « ul "-°««i"*" organisation, active In pro-oting thlt ipplj) *«wlopaant in your area? (circle the numbers of those 1 DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 2 CHAMBER OP COMMERCE 3 GOAL SETTING CROUP * MERCHANT'S ASSOCIATION 5 OTHER Thank you for your participation. 6

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SAMPLE FIRST MAI LOUT LETTER UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA Department of rblitical Science 3324 Turlington Hall Gainnvilk Florida 3261 1 Phone (9041 392-0262 Ms. Lucy B. Vogt 3
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257 SAMPLE SECOND MAI LOUT LETTER UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA Department of ftJitical Science 3324 Turlington Hall dinranWr. Fk»«ia 3261 1 Phonr (9041 39J-0262 January fa. 1VUV Or. Heter Hosenthal HoriOl Uildilfe l(»tritlon Leon County Chapter H.u. bo. lbob ral latitMMi n. *i30«; Dear Ur. Rosenthal! Several wtti ago 1 wrote to you seeking your opinions on land use policies and politics in your city or county. As of today mc have not yet received your completed questionnaire. 1 mm writing to you again because of the significance each Questionnaire has to the usefulness of this study. In order for the results of this study to be truly representative of the opinions of all Major Morida cities it is essential that each person respond. lhe large nueber of questionnaires returned is very encouraging. Out, whether we will be able to describe accurately the issues surrounding land use policies in Florida depends upon you and the others Mho have not responded. Uur past experiences suggest that those of you who have not yet sent in your questionnaire My hold quite different opinions than those Mho have responded, lhe usefulness of our results depends on hoM accurately Me are able to describe and understand land use issues around the state. In the event that your questionnaire has been eisplaced. a replacement is enclosed. If you Mould like a copy of the results of this study, please -rite "copy of results requested" on the back of the questionnaire. Your participation and cooperation are greatly appreciated. Sincerely. Mobyne S. Turner Project Director

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259 Boca Raton, City of. (1979) Comprehensive Plan . Boca Raton, FL: City of Boca Raton. Boulay, H. (1979). Social Control Theories of Urban Politics. Social Science Quarterly . 59 . 605-621. Bowie, N. (1971) Towards a New Theory of Distributive Justice . Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. Branch, M. (1983). Comprehensive Planning . Palisades, CA: Palisades Publishers. Burrows, L.B. (1978). Growth Management . New Brunswick, NJ : Center for Urban Policy Research at Rutgers. Carter, L. (1974) The Florida Experience . Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press. Catanese, A. (1984). The Politics of Planning and Development . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage . Christaller, W. (1966) translation by C. Baskin as Central Places in Southern Germany . Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall ( originally published 1930). Clark, T. (1971) Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities, in F. Wirt (ed.) Future Directions in Community Power Research . Berkley, CA: University of California Press. Clark, T. and L. Ferguson. (1983) City Money . New York, NY: Columbia Press. Clavel, P. (1986) The Progressive City . New Brunswick, N J : Rutgers University Press. Dahl, R. (1961) Who Governs? New Haven, CN: Yale University Press . . (1982) Dilemmas in a Pluralistic Democracy . New Haven, CN: Yale University Press. Davidoff, P. (1965) Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning. Journal of the American Planning Association . 31 . 331JW. Davis, 0. and C. Hua. (1978) Economics in Urban Planning, in R. Burchell and G. Sternlieb (eds.) Planning Theory in the 1980 ' s . New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

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260 DeGrove, J. and J. Jurgensmeyer . (1986) Perspectives on Florida's Growth Management Act of 1985 . Boston, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. DeGrove, J. (1984) Land Politics and Planning . Chicago, IL: American Planning Association. deHaven-Smith, L. (1984) Regulatory Theory and State LandUse Regulation. Public Administration Review . 48. 413-420. . (1987) Environmental Publics . Boston, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Dillman, D. (1978) Mail and Telephone Surveys The Total Design Method . New York, NY: Wiley. Domhoff, G. (1978) Who Really Rules? . New Brunswick, NJ : Transaction Books. . (1986) The Growth Machine and the Power Elite, in R. Waste (ed.) Community Power . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage . Dougharty, L., C. Chew, I. Kobaski, E. Rolph, G. Sumner, S. Tapella, J. Webb, and B. Zycher. (1975). Municipal Service Pricing Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Dowall, D. (1980a) An Examination of Population-GrowthManaging Communities. Policy Studies Journal . 9. 414-427. . (1980b) Methods for Assessing Land Price Effects of Local Public Policies and Actions, in T. Black and J. Hoben (eds.) Urban Land Markets . Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute. Dye, T. (1986) Community Power and Public Policy, in R. Waste (ed.) Community Power . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Eckstein, H. (1975) Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.) Strategies of Inquiry . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley . Ervin,D., J. Fitch, R. Godwin, W. Shepard, and H. Stoevener. (1977) Land Use Control . Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. Eulau, H. and K. Prewitt. (1973) Labyrinths of Democracy . New York, NY: Bobbs-Merrill . Fainstein,S. and N. Fainstein. (1983) Restructuring the City Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment . New York, NY: Longman.

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261 Faludi, A. (1973) Planning Theory . New York, NY: Pergaroon Press . Finnell,G. (1973) Saving Paradise: The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972. Urban Law Annual . Number 103. 116-130. Fishkind, H. (1980) The Effects of Growth Management Policies on New Home Prices, in T. Black and J. Hoben (eds.) Urban Land Markets . Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute . Florida Atlantic University. (1986) Growth Management Report . Boca Raton, FL: Institute of Government. Florida Population Climbs to No. 5. (1987) Florida Trend ( Spring ) . 52-55 . Florida, State of. (1985) Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act (Amended) . FS 163.3161. Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee. (1986) Interim Report to the 1986 Legislature . Tallahassee, FL: State of Florida . . (1987) Keys to Florida's Future Final Report . Tallahassee, FL: State of Florida . Florida Statistical Abstract . (1951) Gainesville, FL: University of Florida. _. (1961) Gainesville, FL: _. (1971) Gainesville, FL: . (1981) Gainesville, FL: University of Florida. University of Florida. University of Florida. Fried, R. (1975) Comparative Urban policy and Performance, in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.) Policies and Policymaking . Handbook of Political Science, Volume 6. Reading , MA: Addison-Wesley . Friedland, R. (1983) The Politcs of Profit and the Geography of Growth. Urban Affairs Quarterly . 19. 41-54. Garkovich, L. (1982) Land Use Planning As a Response to Rapid Population Growth and Community Change. Rural Sociology . 47. 47-67.

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262 Gleeson, M . , I. Ball, S. Chinn, R. Einsweiler, R. Freilich, and P. Meagher. (1975) Urban Growth Management Systems . Chicago, IL: American Society of Planning Officials. Goodman, W. and E. Freund. (eds.) (1968) Principles and Practice of Urban Planning . Washington, D.C.: International City Manager's Association. Governor's Growth Management Advisory Committee. (1986) Interim Report. Tallahassee, FL: State of Florida. Graham, R. (1976) Florida's Land Use Restrictions: Are They Serving the Public Interest? Florida Environmental and Urban Issues . 3_. 3,13-14. Gruen & Gruen Associates. (1977) Effects of Regulation on Housing Costs . Urban Land Institute Report #27. Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute. Haynes, K. and A. Fotheringham. (1984) Gravity and Spatial Interaction Models . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Heilbrun, J. Urban Economics and Public Policy . New York, NY: St. Martin's Press. Hunter, F. (1953) Community Power Structure . Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. . (1980) Community Power and Succession . Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Jacksonville Area Planning Board. (1978) Land Use Element of the 2005 Comprehensive Plan . Jacksonville, FL: City of Jacksonville . Jacksonville Community Council, Inc. (1984) Growth Management Study . Jacksonville, FL: Jacksonville Community Council , Inc . Johnston, R. (1980) The Politics of Local Growth Control. Policy Studies Journal . 9. 427-439. Judd, D. (1984) The Politics of American Cities . Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Kasarda, J. and R. Lineberry. (1980) People, Production and Power. American Behavioral Scientist . 24 . 157-175. King, L. (1984) Central Place Theory . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage .

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263 Klecka, W. (1980) Discriminant Analysis . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage . Koenig, J. (1987). The Danger Ahead. Florida Trend (Economic Yearbook). 37-43. Lindblom, C. (1965) The Intelligence of Democracy . New York, NY: Free Press. . ( 1977 ) Politics and Markets . New York, NY: Basic Books. . (1982) The Market as Prison. Journal of Politics ." 44 . 324-336 . Lineberry, R. (1980) From Political Sociology to Political Economy. American Behavioral Scientist . 24. 299-317. Logan, J. (1976a) Notes on the Growth Machine Toward a Comparative Political Economy of Place. American Journal of Sociology . 82 . 349-352. (1976b) Growth, Politics, and the Stratification of Place. American Journal of Sociology . 84 . 404-416. Long, N. (1958) The Local Community as an Ecology of Games. American Journal of Sociology . 64 . 251-61. . (1980) The City as a Local Political Economy. Administration & Society . 12 . 5-35. Losch, A. (1954) translated by W. Woglom and W. Stolper as The Economics of Location . New Haven, CN: Yale University Press (originally published 1941). Lovell, C. and C. Tobin. (1981) The Mandate Issue. Public Administration Review . 41 . 318-331. Lovell, C. (1981) Evolving Local Government Dependency. Public Administration Review . 41 . 197-201. Lowi, T. (1969) The End of Liberalism . New York, NY: W.W. Norton . Lyon, L. and C. Bonjean. (1981) Community Power and Policy Outputs. Urban Affairs Quarterly . 17 . 3-21. Lyon, L., L. Felice, M. Perryman, and E. Parker. (1981) Community Power and Population Increase: An Empirical Test of the Growth Machine Model. American Journal of Sociology . 86. 1387-1400.

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Marion County. (1978) Comprehensive Plan Document . Ocala, FL: Marion County. Mclver, J. and E. Carmines. (1981) Unidimensional Scaling . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Melbourne, City of. (1979) Land Use Plan . Melbourne, FL: City of Melbourne. Mills, C. (1956) The Power Elite . New York, NY: Oxford Press . Mills, E. (1979) Economic Analysis of Urban Land Use Controls, in P. Mieszkowski and M. Straszheim (eds.) Current Issues in Urban Economics . Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins . Mollenkopf, J. (1983) The Contested City . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Molotch, H. (1976) The City as a Growth Machine Political Economy of Place. American Journal of Sociology . 82. 309332. Molotch, H. and J. Logan. (1984) Tensions in the Growth Machine: Overcoming Resistence to Value-Free Development. Social Problems . 31. 483-499. Mumford, L. (1961) The City in History . New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, and World. Mundie, R. (1980) Public Policy Effects on Land Values, in T. Black and J. Hoben (eds.) Urban Land Markets . Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute . Muth, R. (1969) Cities and Housing . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Neenan, W. and M. Ethridge. (1984) Competition and Cooperation Among Localities, in R. Bingham and J. Blair (eds.) Urban Economic Development . Urban Affairs Annual Reviews Volume 27. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Nordlinger, E. (1981) On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. Cambridge, MAl Harvard University Press. O'Connell, D. (1976) Growth With Environmental Awareness. Florida Environmental and Urban Issues . 3. 11-12. . (1977) Status Report: Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975. Florida Environmental and Urban Issues. 4. 8-11.

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265 . (1986) New Directions in State Legislation, in j. DeGrove and J. Jurgensmeyer (eds.) Perspectives on Florida's Growth Management Act of 1985 . Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. O'Connor, J. (1973) The Fiscal Crisis of the State . New York, NY: St. Martin's Press. Oppenheimer, F. (1975) Self Interest and Political Interest. Political Theory . 3. 259-276. Orange County. (1981) Orange County Growth Management Policy . Orlando, FL: Orange County. Orlando, City of. (1980) Growth Management Plan Volume 3 Part 2 . Orlando, FL: City of Orlando. Panama City. (1978) The Comprehensive Plan . Panama City, FL: Panama City. Peterson, P. (1979) A Unitary Model of Local Taxation and Expenditure Policies, in D.R. Marshall (ed.) Urban Policy Making . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. . (1981) City Limits . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago . Polsby, N. (1980) Community Power and Political Theory . New Haven, CN: Yale Press. Pompano Beach, City of. (1977) Comprehensive Plan Element One: Land Use Plan . Pompano Beach, FL: City of Pompano Beach . Protash, W. and M. Baldassare. (1983) Growth Politics and Community Status. Urban Affairs Quarterly . 18. 397-412. Rabinovitz, F. (1969) City Politics and Planning . New York, NY: Atherton. Rich, R. (1979) Distribution of Services: Studying the Products of Urban Policy Making, in D.R. Marshall (ed.) Urban Policy Making . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. . (1980) The Complex Web of Urban Governments. American Behavioral Scientist . 24. 277-298. Ryder, R. (1982) Local Government Planning. Urban Affairs Quarterly . 18. 271-280.

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266 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1983) Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local Government, in G. Zodrow (ed.) Local Provision of Public Services; The Tiebout Model After Twenty-Five Years . New York, NY: Academic Press. Salamon, L. (1977) Urban Politics, Urban Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory. Public Administration Review . 37. 418-434. Salisbury, R. (1964). The New Convergence of Power in Urban Politics. Journal of Politics . 26. 775-797. Schattschneider , E. (1960) The Semi-Sovereign People . New York, NY: Holt, Reinhart and Winston. Schiffman, I. (1977) The Politics of Land Use Planning: A Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography . Environmental Quality Series #28. Davis, CA: University of California. Schneider, M. and J. Logan. (1982) The Effects of Local Government Finances on Community Growth Rates. Urban Affairs Quarterly . 18. 91-106. Schultze, W. (1985) Urban Politics A Political Economy Approach . Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall. Scott, R. (1975) Management and Control of Growth, in R. Scott (ed.) Management and Control of Growth Volume 1 . Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute. Staniland, M. (1985) What Is Political Economy? New Haven, CN: Yale. Starnes, E. (1974) Experiences of Florida in Planning for Land Use . Working Paper No. 6, Gainesville, FL: University of Florida . Stevenson, W. (1985) Who Pays Infrastructure Benefit Charges? in J. Nicholas (ed.) The Changing Structure of Infrastructure Finance . Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Stone, C. (1980) Systemic Power in Community Decision Making. American Political Science Review . 74 . 978-990. . (1986) Power and Social Complexity, in R. Waste (ed.) Community Power . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Swanstrom, T. (1985) The Crisis of Growth Politics . Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

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4 267 Thrall, G. (1983) Three Pure Planning Scenarios and the Consumption Theory of Land Rent. Political Geography Quarterly . 2. 219-231. Tiebout, C. (1956) A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Political Economy . 64. 416-424. Truman, D . (1951) The Governmental Process . New York, NY: Alfred Knopf. University of Florida Department of Urban and Regional Planning. (1984) Guidelines and Standards for the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act . Tallahassee, FL: Florida Institute of Government. Vasu, M. (1979) Politics and Planning . Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Wasylenko, M . (1981) The Location of Firms: The Role of Taxes and Fiscal Incentives, in R. Bahl (ed.) Urban Government Finance . Urban Affairs Annual Review Volume 20. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Weisberg, H. (1984a) The Fundamentals of Data Analysis, in H. Asher, H. Weisberg, J. Kessel, and W. Shively (eds.) Theory-Building and Data Analysis in the Social Sciences . Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press. . (1984b) Scaling Objectives and Procedures, in H. Asher, H. Weisberg, J. Kessel, and W. Shively (eds.) Theory-Building and Data Analysis in the Social Sciences . Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press. Wheaton, W. (1977) Income and Urban Residence. The American Economic Review . 40 . 620-631. Whitelaw, W. (1980) Measuring the Effects of Public Policies on the Price of Urban Land, in T. Black and J. Hoben (eds.) Urban Land Markets . Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute . Whitt, J. (1982) Urban Elites and Mass Transportation . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Williams, 0. (1961) A Typology for Comparative Local Government. Midwest Journal of Political Science . 5. 150164. . (1971) Metropolitan Political Analysis . New York, NY: Free Press.

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Wirt, F. (1985) The Dependent City? Journal of Politics . 83-112. Witte, A and S. Long. (1980) Evaluating the Effects of Public Policies on Land Prices in Metropolitan Areas. T. Black and J. Hoben (eds.) Urban Land Markets . Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute . Yates, D. (1977) The Ungovernable City . Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

PAGE 276

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Robyne Stevenson Turner was born and spent her formative years in Chicago, Illinois. A thorough indoctrination of local politics in the Chicago area created a life-long fascination with urban politics and the internal workings of local government. Ms. Turner attended the University of Florida after receiving a high-school education in Broward County, Florida. She earned the degrees of Bachelor of Arts in political science and a Master of Arts in Political Science with a Certificate in Public Administration from the University of Florida. Upon completion of these degrees, she married and relocated to Jacksonville, Florida where she pursued a career as a social services grantsperson and planner/advocate in a Community Action Agency. After experiencing teaching at the junior college level as a part-time adjunct, she returned to the University of Florida to pursue and complete a doctorate in political science focussing on urban studies and urban and regional planning. Ms. Turner has recently returned to south Florida as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida Atlantic University. 269

PAGE 277

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quali ty , as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Bert'E. Swanson, Chairman Professor of Political Science I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope jnd quality , as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of\^hilosophy . Associate Professor of Political Science I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Walter A. Rosenbaum Professor of Political Science I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. John DeGrove Professor of Political Science

PAGE 278

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion if conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Earl Starnes^-^ Professor of Urban and Regional Planning August, 1988


215
policies used by region (as ranked on the Gutman policy use
scale) are as follows:
Northeast 7.60 Panhandle 4.60
Central 7.75 West 8.27
Southeast 7.33
The panhandle confirms our expectation that a conservative
growth politics with few policies is occurring. This
conforms to the ideology question results in that region.
Likewise the southeast is using few (although many more than
the panhandle) policies and is experiencing a conservative
growth politics with few policies. This result appears
contradictory in light of the other data, but represents a
good example of same conditions at different stages of
growth. Large population and high growth rate should yield
conflict and greater policy diversity. The southeast,
despite these trends, uses few policies and a fairly
flexible approach to land use. Apparently the growth machine
politics scenario continues there without government
intervention. They seem to exhibit the characteristics of
stage fourgrowth and back to the private city. The
panhandle exhibits qualities of the initial stages of growth
as a facilitator city.
The other three regions seem to conform to the normal
transitions of growth. The southwest especially seems to
have taken a progressive approach in using many policies,
exhibiting a regulatory approach as a response to high
population and growth rates. The central and northeast


166
most active participants in the process, those that most
frequently contact government to voice opinions, and as the
most successful actors in influencing land use policy.
Conversely, citizen groups (neighborhood groups and
environmentalists) are mentioned by only 30% of the
government respondents as the groups that are most active,
in contact, or successful (Tables 5-7, 5-8).
The groups members were asked to rate their own group's
participation. The results confirm the government
respondents' perceptions. Over 67% of the business group
members (representing chambers and homebuilders) labeled
their groups' activity level in the land use process as
"constant." They also confirmed their groups' success in
influencing the process. Over 70% responded that their
business group had "great" and "moderate" levels of
success. Citizen group members (representing neighborhood
and environmental groups) by 67%, feel that their groups'
participation varies with each issue under consideration.
Similarly, 80% of them responded that their success in
influencing policy was "moderate" and "small" (Tables 5-7,
5-8) .
Several variables are created from these responses to
measure the impact of the traditional growth and anti-growth
interests in the community. The variable measuring
perception of success in affecting the land use process has
the most variance. We created BUS1 and CITZl to represent


124
respondent group in the same format. The planners were asked
the most questions, 28. Interest groups were asked 16
questions.
A final format of the survey was pretested among a
number of potential respondents. These test respondents
included faculty in the urban planning and political science
departments at the University of Florida, a Chamber of
Commerce staff person in Gainesville, and practicing urban
planners in Alachua county and Orlando. Modifications were
made based on their written comments and interviews with
them.
Due to time and resource limitations, only two contacts
were scheduled for each potential respondent. Each was sent
a letter outlining the study and the need for their
participation, a survey and a return self-addressed, stamped
envelope. (See Appendix C for examples of letters and
surveys.) Each survey was coded with a number to use as a
response check system. Only those who had not responded
within the first month were sent a follow-up package. All
letters and mailing envelopes were individually addressed.
Per TDM, no computer labels or generic addresses (e.g.,
Planning Director) were used. Names and official titles were
used to personalize the process.
Mailing lists were developed from a number of sources.
Planners and administrators in cities and counties were
taken from the most recent editions of the statewide


105
centralized comprehensive planning at the state level which
created a "top-down" decision process (DeGrove and
Jurgensmeyer, 1986). Although our study is confined to the
1975-85 LGCPA legislative period, it will help our
understanding of the results if we briefly examine this
replacement land use legislation.
Under the GMA all local governments are required to
develop new comprehensive plans including a future land use
element and capital improvements plan, the contents of which
were subject to acceptance by the state. In addition, all
local plans are to be prepared under advisement with
neighboring jurisdictions. Finally, all local plans are
required to be in compliance with (or not present any
significant contraries to) the regional and state plans,
thus establishing a clear line of required plan consistency
from the state to the local levels.
The 1985 Act and its subsequent 1986 companion
legislation, represent a major change in Florida's approach
to growth management and land use regulation. It came as a
result of the unsatisfactory results achieved under the
previous local comprehensive planning process. The state is
taking a stronger pro-active role, through progressive
growth politics in order to protect the larger public good.
Previous land use regulations were ineffective in overcoming
parochial local growth interests. Subsequently, the costs of
growth had been borne by government without the proper


REFERENCES
Agger, R., D. Goldrich, and B. Swanson. (1972). The Rulers
and The Ruled. Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press.
Aiken,M. and P. Alford. (1970). Community Structures
Innovation. American Sociological Review. 35. 654-663.
Albrecht, D., G. Bultena, and E. Hoiberg. (1986)
Constituency of the Anti-Growth Movement. Urban Affairs
Quarterly. 21. 607-616.
Allensworth, D. (1980) City Planning Politics. New York, NY:
Praeger.
Alonso, W. (1964) Location and Land Use. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Altschuler, A. (1965). The City Planning Process. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Appgar, R. and H. Landers. (1987) Reflections on the Florida
Experience in Land Use Regulation. Florida Environmental
and Urban Issues. 14. 11-13.
Asher, H. (1984). The Research Process, in H. Asher, H.
Weisberg, J. Kessel, and W. Shively (eds.) Theory-Building
and Data Analysis in the Social Sciences. Knoxville, TN:
University of Tennessee Press.
Banfield, E.
Press.
(1961) Political Influence. Glencoe, IL: Free
Bartlett, R. (1980) Developable Land Supply and Demand
Monitoring System in the portland metropolitan Area, in T.
Black and J. Hoben (eds.) Urban Land Markets. Washington,
D.C.: Urban Land Institute.
Beatly, T. (1984). Applying Moral Principles to Growth
Management. Journal of the American Planning Association.
50. 459-469.
Bish, R. and V. Ostrum. (1979) Understanding Urban
Government. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute.
258


directed policy process (ecological direction of power and
flexible planning) can serve to balance short-term political
62
necessities without abdicating government's responsibility
as ecological manager. Thus the technical proficiency of the
professional planner can be used to develop plans but not to
the point of inflexibility. Flexibility contributes to the
durability of plans because they can shift when necessary
but not solely at political whim and for political profit.
Policy Outputs of the Growth Politics Process
The urban literature suggests that the policies which
are most important to urban areas are developmental policies
such as roads, transportation, and utilities among others.
All things being equal, urban cities where growth is one of
the most important issues are expected to be dominated by
economic interests and to adopt land use policies which
benefit those interests. But we know this is not always the
case. There are differences in land use policy outputs
across "growth" cities which result in policies that produce
very favorable to very restrictive growth climates. By
growth climate we mean the facilitation of development by
directing and regulating land use in the city. If a business
climate facilitates economic development, then the growth
climate facilitators business and population growth.
Policies that facilitate growth may include flexible
development standards that allow developers to take maximum
advantage of market forces, lenient environmental standards,


121
Table 4-1 Survey Response
Respondent Group
Attempts
Responses
Rate
City Planner
24
22
91.6%
County Planner
19* (17)
17
100%
City Manager
24
17
70.8%
County Administrator
18**
15
83.3%
Home Builders Assoc.
20
16
80.0%
Chamber of Commerce
24
21
87.5%
Environmentalists
13
10
76.9%
Neighborhood Groups
56
32
57.1%
Notes: Two counties do their planning jointly through the
major city in each of those counties, thereby reducing the
universe to 17 possible county planners.
** One county is consolidated with its city and does not
have a county administrator.


58
power-vacuum system where he can overcome policy paralysis
by being a leader.
Planners as a group, however, have similarities in
their approaches to governments' role in planning that seems
to cross over the various growth politics. Again, the
results of the nationwide study suggest that a majority of
planners are neutral (not cynical) in their expectations of
the political process, but split evenly as to whether or not
a single public interest exists which planners serve.
Furthermore, most planners felt that they did not succeed in
serving the public interest in a neutral capacity and that
citizen participation groups were not neutral in their
pursuits.
The results strongly suggest a high political awareness
and bias towards a value-laden rather than neutral planning
process. This may reinforce a public perception that
planners are a tool to be used by either side of
increasingly polarized local growth politics.
Just as Mollenkopf (1983) called for a quid pro quo for
settling development conflicts between business and
residents, Vasu (1979, p. 189) calls for a normative set of
planning principles which "would not seek to avoid values,
but rather would stipulate them in an a priori fashion."
Again, I would suggest that a growth management process
would serve as a vehicle to solve the dilemmas of values and
demands in the planning process. An organic, flexible form


69
Molotch's (1976) theory of a growth machine is a
significant interdisciplinary approach which combines the
economic motivations of influential actors associated with
land development and governments' facilitation of those
interests through the policy process. But we need to go
beyond government's role as a facilitator of a business
climate and examine whether or not government can control
the economic pressures for development, the political
economy agenda. Land use regulations are the rules of the
land use game and are a reflection of community influence
and power structures (Long, 1958).
Rule #1Government Parameters Affect Political Influence
We have already suggested several different phases
through which growth politics passesconservative, liberal,
and progressive. Now we need to put them in perspective in
terms of practical political experiences in the area of land
use. To do this we can use a framework to analyze the
political relationship between the decision-making process
of government and the development and implementation of the
land use regulation process.
Democracies face many dilemmas in defining their scope
of political and policy control (Dahl, 1982). Similarly,
state governments face the same dilemmas in defining their
scope of control or authority over local governments. The
development and implementation of local land use regulations
may be significantly affected by this scope of control. The


CHAPTER FOUR
PROPOSITION REDUXHOW TO GET FROM HERE TO THERE
Policy adoption is affected by many factors within the
local political setting. Personal attitudes, power
relationships, and the potential impacts of those issues and
policies enter into the policy-maker's decision calculus.
Policies reflect the interplay of interests in the political
arena. The purpose of this research is to uncover the
intricacies of that interplay and whether there is a
relationship to the selection of policy. To that end, a
survey was used to gather information and insights from
local participants in the land use policy making process in
Florida cities and counties.
This is a comparative analysis of urban areas operating
under the same land use regulation conditions. A comparative
study is defined as "the study of numerous cases along the
same lines, with a view to reporting and interpreting
numerous measures on the same variables of different
'individuals'" (Eckstein, 1975, p. 85). The use of a
comparative approach allows generalizations across cities
that a case study would not afford. Case studies afford a
greater richness of data, but a comparative study gives the
opportunity for greater breadth of research. A comparative
116


52
them to actively oppose policies which might increase growth
problems and which may negatively affect their long-term
housing investments. Similar to the pro-growth machine,
influence in the land use process by these actors protects
their economic position.
The anti-growth coalitions may have more than just an
interest in land use regulation. Regulatory reform is the
means to a more specific end. Just as the growth machine is
not monolithic, but made up of business, developer, minority
and other interests, so to is the anti-growth coalition made
up of social liberals, environmentalists, exclusionary
suburbanites, and statewide environmentalists.
It is a coalition of interests that has different
reasons for political association. They are not necessarily
motivated by market forces acting as a unifying stimulus.
While there may be a split liberalism within this group of
environmentalists, minority supporters, and homeowners,
there is a common theme in their expectations about the role
that government should play in affecting land use. We expect
the anti-growth interests to support government's regulatory
function to control the use of land. I would suggest,
however, that there are several motivations and subsequent
approaches that this support of government regulation may
take.
Regulatory support may be based on an exclusionary
interest to protect personal investment (Dye, 1986) and to


Ill
concern for quality of life standards. This becomes the new
context for bargaining in the pluralistic sense. Any
decision conflicts come down to "how managed will growth
be?" not "will growth be stopped?"
Growth management policies are vehicles by which the
state distributes benefits to both individuals and groups.
Whose rights should be served, whether homeowners or
property developers, and should it be at the expense of the
larger good of the entire population? In considering who
should (or will) benefit from land use policies, several
principles can be applied such as utilitarian, egalitarian,
and distributive (Beatly, 1984; Bowie, 1971). These
approaches to the distribution of benefits may serve the
public good, the pluralistic good, and the individual
interests respectively. Which interests represent which
benefit may differ by perspective.
Land-based interests may justify their desire for
benefits on utilitarian grounds. Economic and residential
development benefits everyone eventually even though
extensive development may yield windfall profits without
regard to the future consequences of growth. The economic
potential is attractive to local government because it is a
source of revenues which will protect the city's ability to
survive (Peterson, 1981). Therefore, land use policies which
stimulate housing and economic demand could be characterized
as a public good. This could go so far as to let the market


60
state directives can help to reduce, at least in theory, the
tension between competing local interests.
Conflict in the Policy Process
The main hypothesis of this study is that the selection
of land use policies is influenced by actor participation
which is influenced by the level of conflict (tension) among
interests group in the city. This in turn not only affects
the policy ends, but also the policy process means. The
nature of the conflict within the political process, the
number of interests and nature of competition, will affect
the policy response.
Cities try to achieve a low conflict status by means of
economic prosperity or regulated exclusion of conflicting
interests. Cities can preserve their fiscal health and self-
interest using a revenue strategy of limiting property taxes
and encouraging economic development (Peterson, 1979). This
is a long term approach which seeks to minimize or maintain
low conflict in order to enhance the city's prosperity. This
would be easy to achieve in a perfect world where
homogeneity is sorted by utility curves (Tiebout, 1956). In
the real world, however, long-term land use regulations
including exclusionary policies may be a necessary addition
to maintain and accommodate homogeneity (Schneider and
Logan, 1982) .


189
use regulation process that is permissive towards
development and understandable to the development actors.
The second group of policies represents the balance of
policy use scores. The policies in this group are enterprise
zones, land use performance standards, land banking,
agricultural zones, and regulating the number of development
permits. This end of the scale represents more innovative,
politically risky policies that are more regulatory in
nature. They are used to restrict growth and may be on an ad
hoc basis that is less predictable for developers and more
restrictive towards growth. We would expect that where the
growth machine (business) characteristics dominate, that the
more traditional policies of group one would be used. Where
the citizen groups and less support for unconditional growth
is found, there would be greater use of the innovative,
restrictive policies of group two.
A second Gutman scalogram was constructed based on the
value ratings that planners gave to the policies, from high
to low. A higher score means that the policy was perceived
to be of greater value in achieving the community's land use
goals. Again the planners' responses were recoded from a
range of values to a dichotomous response. Responses that
the policy was "integral" or "necessary" imply that they are
valued (1) and responses of "no effect," "impediment," and
"not used" imply that the policy is not positively valued
(0). The resulting scale is the same pattern of policy


222
Note: Value of CONFL is the cumulative score of perceived
conflict on a scale of four issues related to land use -
environmental protection, urban sprawl, green space
preservation, and agricultural land preservation. The higher
the score the greater the conflict perceived in the
community. FEE represents the perceived conflict on one
specific issue impact fees. Higher scores represent more
conflict.
CONSV
Value
Frequency
Valid Percent
3
3
2.0%
4
5
3.3
5
11
7.3
6
16
10.7
7
29
19.3
8
33
22.0
9
28
18.7
10
18
12.0
11
4
2.7
12
3
2.0
missing
3
numbe r
T53
TW
LIB
Value
Frequency
Valid Percent
4
2
1.3%
5
1
.7
6
9
6.0
7
11
7.3
8
10
6.7
9
18
12.0
10
18
12.0
11
25
16.7
12
26
17.3
13
12
8.0
14
12
8.0
15
3
2.0
16
3
2.0
missing
3
number
T53
~TT)0
Note: These two variables represent the cumulative scores of
each respondent on a scale of four questions representing a
liberal approach to land use and a scale of three questions
representing a conservative approach to land use. A high
liberal score reflects an agreement with a regulatory,
heightened role for government in affecting land use, while


123
if the existing answers did not fit the particular
situation. The listing of "other" with a blank to fill,
however, generated very few responses.
Two series of questions, focussing on ideology and land
use policies, requested Likert style responses, i.e.,
strongly agree to strongly disagree. A "don't know" response
was also provided. Wording and length of questions followed
the Dillman method's suggestions using simple but accurate
phrasing. Attention also was given to bias, technical
accuracy, and double queries in questions. Several
questions, especially to planners concerning planning
activity, follow a series pattern to break out separate
activities or events. The pre-tests conducted on
practitioners in the field identified ambiguous and biased
questions which were revised for the final instrument.
Five different versions of the survey instrument were
used. Different wording was selected for different
respondent groups, eg., the use of "city" for city planners
and managers and "county" for county planners and
administrators. Only planners were asked technical questions
about policies used, intent and meaning of goals and
objectives, and size of the planning department. Government
respondents were asked a series of questions about their
perceptions of interest group activities in the land use
process. Interest groups were asked to evaluate only their
own activities. All other questions were given to each


SAMPLE FIRST MAILOUT LETTER
UMIVERS1TY OF FLORIDA
Department of fblitical Science
3324 Turlington Hall
Gainesville. Florida 32611
Phone (904) 392-0262
Ms. Lucy B. Vogt
3410 N.U. 6th Street
Gainesville, FL 32609
Dear Ms. Vogt:
Land use and the broad topic of growth Management are critical
issues facing our state and local governments in Florida. The
development and implementation of local land development plans and
regulations reflects the future of our state. Therefore, the better
our understanding of the issues, people, and perceptions involved in
the development of these plans and policies, the better prepared we
mill be for the future.
Your neighborhood organization is one of many Mhich are being
asked for their opinions and insights on the complex issues which
surround the adoption of land use plans and policies in Gainesville.
In order that the results will truly represent the thinking of
the etany people who are interested in land use in Florida, it is
important that each questionnaire be completed and returned. Your
participation in particular is requested in order to obtain reliable,
inforated opinions on this important subject.
You stay be assured of complete confidentiality. The question
naire has an identification number for mailing purposes only. This is
so that we may check your name off of the mailing list when your
questionnaire is returned. Your name Mill never appear on the
questionnaire. The results of this research Mill be made available to
local and state officials and all interested citizens. You may receive
a summary of results by Mriting Mcopy of results requested* on the
back of the questionnaire.
I would be most happy to answer any questions you might have.
Please write or call me at the address and phone on this letterhead.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely*
Robyne S. Turner
Project Director


227
Actors
- economically advantaged population (Ervin et.al.,1977;
Rich, 1979; Dowall,1980; Molotch, 1976)
middle class income levels
better educated, fewer minorities
-active neighborhood groups (Molotch,1976; Ervin
et.al.,1977)
Environment (Quality of Life rating)
-increase in pollution,congestion, environmental problems
(Molotch,1976)
increase in population growth rate (Protash and
Baldissare, 1983)
Government
-increase in users fees versus taxes (Peterson,1979;
Molotch, 1976)
Survey Data
verify presence of anti-growth coalition and measure
presence
2. restrictive, regulatory
implemenation tools and comprehensive plan goals (same as
1A)
Mills,1979; Johnston,1980; Logan,1976b; Molotch,1976;
Williams, 1961; Thrall,1983; Scott,1975;
Proposition 2A
The greater the investment which the growth machine has in
the community the more proclivity they have to participate


78
the Big Cypress area created development opportunities in
the southwest part of the state. By the 1940s, over
drainage for agriculture and over-development forced the
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to step in and implement a flood
control program which designated 1.3 million acres as a
water conservation area and left 800,000 acres for
agriculture (DeGrove, 1984).
The state's conservative political climate, however,
continued a strong development environment. In the 1960s the
state-federal venture to create the Cross-Florida Barge
canal created a heated controversy between legislators and
environmentalists. Similarly, there were conflicts over the
need for water in the urban areas and in the Everglades
Park. The most protracted battle for water occurred over the
Big Cypress Jetport site in the Everglades which, if built,
would have impeded the water flow necessary to sustain
wetlands (DeGrove, 1984).
Florida cities and counties also embraced development
and supported wholeheartedly the growth machine interests.
The city of Miami was an example of the developer interests
dictating city and county land use policy. There was minimal
regulation and direction from local government allowing
developers to run the growth game. The Dade county real
estate explosion in the 1950s and 1960s left both Metro-
Dade and the various cities vulnerable to the influence of
the growth machine. Metro-Dade had zoning authority for the


262
Gleeson, M., I. Ball, S. Chinn, R. Einsweiler, R. Freilich,
and P. Meagher. (1975) Urban Growth Management Systems.
Chicago, IL: American Society of Planning Officials.
Goodman, W. and E. Freund, (eds.) (1968) Principles and
Practice of Urban Planning. Washington, D.C.:
International City Manager's Association.
Governor's Growth Management Advisory Committee. (1986)
Interim Report. Tallahassee, FL: State of Florida.
Graham, R. (1976) Florida's Land Use Restrictions: Are They
Serving the Public Interest? Florida Environmental and
Urban Issues. 3. 3,13-14.
Gruen & Gruen Associates. (1977) Effects of Regulation on
Housing Costs. Urban Land Institute Report #57.
Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute.
Haynes, K. and A. Fotheringham. (1984) Gravity and Spatial
Interaction Models. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Heilbrun, J. Urban Economics and Public Policy. New York,
NY: St. Martin's Press.
Hunter, F. (1953) Community Power Structure. Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press.
. (1980) Community Power and Succession. Chapel
Hill, C: University of North Carolina Press.
Jacksonville Area Planning Board. (1978) Land Use Element of
the 2005 Comprehensive Plan. Jacksonville, FL": City of
Jacksonville.
Jacksonville Community Council, Inc. (1984) Growth
Management Study. Jacksonville, FL: Jacksonville Community
Council, Inc.
Johnston, R. (1980) The Politics of Local Growth Control.
Policy Studies Journal. 9. 427-439.
Judd, D. (1984) The Politics of American Cities. Boston, MA:
Little, Brown.
Kasarda, J. and R. Lineberry. (1980) People, Production and
Power. American Behavioral Scientist. 24. 157-175.
King, L. (1984) Central Place Theory. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.


180
the motivation for the process with the economic
underpinnings of the quest for political power, Schultze's
transitions facilitate the use of political economy in
analyzing the policy process.
The regional variations exposed in the state between
respondent groups may suggest that the intensity of support
for issues or positions taken may be linked to past
experiences. The rapid rate of growth in the southern half
of the state is now replaced with high population levels and
the emerging and enduring problems associated with that
growth pattern. This experience may increase citizen
opposition to growth and allow government to be more
aggressive in pursuing regulatory policies. The central and
northeast regions are experiencing those changes now. The
responses of participants in those areas may reflect
acquiescence of greater government regulation and less need
for citizen opposition or not enough exposure to the down
side of growth. The panhandle region, however, is currently
experiencing high growth rates, but retains a low overall
population. They retain a conservative approach and probably
do not see themselves in the same situation as the southern
half of the state. Indeed, they may never experience a
population explosion, but the dysfunctions of growth could
affect them and require closer government attention.
The greater opposition to growth and more liberal
oriented citizen groups may materialize in other parts of


7
1) Can we explain why Florida cities adopt and use
different land use policies? 2) Can this explanation be
attributed to the distinctions between cities in terms of
the political influence of land based interests in the
business/economic sector, the individual sector, and the
governmental sector (Figure 1-1)?
The development and application of land use policy can
be a highly politicized process (Altschuler, 1965;
Rabinovitz, 1969; Garkovitch, 1982). Several states,
including Florida in 1975, have passed legislation requiring
localities to prepare comprehensive plans and follow state
directed planning processes. In the case of Florida,
localities had five years to implement the state
requirements and to prepare several plan elements including
a Future Land Use element. The regulations implementing the
Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975
make it very easy for cities and counties to amend their
plans. The frequency with which many Florida cities have
amended their plans suggests that comprehensive planning is
open to political influence and what Lindblom (1965) refers
to as disjointed incrementalism. In addition, localities
enact local development and land use ordinances and adopt
various development regulations which may be separate from
the comprehensive planning process. These tools are used to
implement the comprehensive plan, but may not be integrated
with the original plan, leaving the process


89
coexist with the environment if guidelines are set and
imposed by the state. But that would require a degree of
uniformity for which not all Florida cities and counties
were politically ready. An essentially decentralized
approach to land use planning and development was
maintained, specifically to maintain the political integrity
of local residential interests.
This continuing decentralized approach could have left
conservative growth politics to dominate local politics. But
residential anti-growth coalitions were able to use the
political process to their own ends just as the growth
machine had done in the conservative growth politics phase.
This observation is intended to be explanatory and not
judgmental. After all, the decision making arena and its
outputs are shaped by political power. But the next segment
of significant state legislation had an "even greater
potential to affect local political power than the 1972
policies.
Liberal Growth Politics
In 1975 Florida enacted its first comprehensive
planning requirement for cities and counties through the
Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (LGCPA)
(F.S. 163.3161). This legislation solidified the unitary
approach to the planning process throughout the state. At
this time the state was faced with its second major dilemma,
whether to centralize or decentralize policy authority.


127
The limitation of selecting both environmental and
neighborhood groups is that some cities did not have a
potential respondent. There was no environmental group
addressing issues in that city, there was no organized
neighborhood program, and no contact persons could be
identified. Identification of these groups was very
difficult. Without intimate knowledge or contact with a
knowledgeable person the quality of information about
organized groups was constrained by the city staff persons
contacted. Eventually all but five (5) cities were
represented by a valid neighborhood and/or environmental
group response. There were eleven (11) cities which were
represented by only one valid group response. Oversampling
occurred for several cities which potentially biases the
citizen group responses as a respondent group.
The final mailing list contained 199 potential
respondents. Response from the initial contact with
respondents resulted in 101 valid returns. The second
contact resulted in 50 additional valid returns. Phone calls
resulted in 2 more partial returns for a total of 153 usable
responses. (A total of 8 unusable surveys were returned.)
The final usable response was received in the mail four
months after the project began.
The remainder of this chapter will outline the
propositions and the independent variables which are created
to test them and a discussion of the dependent variablethe


LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
By
ROBYNE STEVENSON TURNER
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1988
* HPSITY OF FLORIDA LIBRARIA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people have contributed to my success in
completing this work, but there are two to whom I am
most indebted. My professional and intellectual
development has been skillfully guided by Dr. Bert
Swanson, whith out whose critical attention I would not
have achieved this endeavor. His life-long dedication to
the pursuit of knowledge has truly been an inspiration.
I owe my personal success as a political scientist to my
husband Kyle, whose constant faith in my abilities got
me through the darkest of moments and across the finish
line.
i i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii
ABSTRACT vi
CHAPTERS
ONE INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS 1
The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development. 1
Political Economy and Policy 2
Which Cities Grow and Which Don'tThe Role of
Land Use Policy 6
Classification of Policy 12
Urban Policy Making Process 14
Research Methods 20
Conclusion 24
Notes 25
TWO POLITICS IN THE LAND USE POLICY PROCESS 26
Interest Groups and the Policy Process 26
Policy Process Explanations 27
Participation and Influence 28
Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process . 32
Political Economy 33
Government as Actor in the Policy Process 35
Conservative Growth PoliticsGovernment as
Facilitator 36
Liberal Growth PoliticsGovernment as Satificer. 37
Populist Growth PoliticsGovernment as Partner 38
Progressive Growth PoliticsGovernment as
Manager 40
Growth Politics in the Sunbelt 42
Growth ManagementGrowth Politics 44
Implementation of Growth Politics 46
Actors in the Process 47
Private sector actors 48
Public sector actors 55
Conflict in the Policy Process 60
Policy Outputs of the Growth Politics Process . 62
Conclusion 65
Notes 66
i i i

THREE THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLITICS .... 68
The Rules of the Game in Land Use Planning 68
Rule #1Government Parameters Affect Political
Influence 69
Rule #2Economics Affects Political Influence. 71
Rule #3Economic and Political Influences Affect
Policy Making 74
Florida Growth Politics 76
Conservative Growth Politics 76
Problems in paradise 81
Transition to liberal growth politics 85
Liberal Growth Politics 89
Conservative to Liberal Growth PoliticsThe
Uniformity Dilemma 99
Progressive Growth Politics 103
Costs and Benefits of Land Use Policy 108
Conclusion 114
Notes 115
FOUR PROPOSITION REDUXHOW TO GET FROM HERE TO THERE 116
Policy Process Operation 117
Study Method 120
Survey Instrument and Method 122
Propositions 128
Proposition One 128
Power 130
Ideologies and the role of government 132
Conflict 135
Propositions Two and Three 136
Growth profile 137
Economic profile 138
Government profile 139
Dependent VariablesLand Use Policy 141
Policy Characteristics 143
Supply Policies 145
Price Policies 146
Incentive Policies 147
Conclusion 150
Notes 151
FIVE URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 153
Interest Group Politics of Land Use 153
Actor Participation ..... 153
Position and conflict 154
Position and stability 160
Position and influence 164
PowerCommunity Structure 168
Ideology and the Role of Government 170
Stages of Growth Politics 179
IV

Regional Differences 181
Conclusion 184
Notes 186
SIX POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP LINKAGES 187
Land Use Policy Adoption in a Growth Politics
Environment 187
Land Use PoliciesDependent Variables 187
Multivariate Data Results 191
City and County Policy Uses 193
City Policy Uses 198
Discussion 203
Use By Region 204
Conclusion 208
Urban Political Economy 212
Stages of Growth Politics 213
Wrap UpHave We Made Any Progess 216
Notes 219
APPENDICES
A INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 220
B AVAILABLE OPERATIONALIZED VARIABLES 224
C QUESTIONNAIRES AND LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION. . 231
REFERENCES 258
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 269
V

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
LAND USE POLITICS IN FLORIDA COMMUNITIES:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
By
Robyne S. Turner
August 1988
Chairman: Dr. Bert E. Swanson
Major Department: Political Science
There are many explanations of the policy process at
the local government level. The most adequate approach is to
explore the interrelationships between the political process
and economic interests which affect the adoption and use of
policies. The richest policy area that exemplifies the
intricacies of political and economic interactions is
developmental. Policies that affect the development and
growth of a community typify the political economy approach
to understanding urban politics.
In this research, it is suggested that interest groups
such as the business groups and residential interests
compete for the attention of government in order to affect
local land use and planning policies. The question of growth
in urban areas is explored through an aggregate, comparative
study of urban cities and counties in the state of Florida.
vi

Data were obtained through a non-random survey (created by
the author) of public officials and representatives of major
private interests.
The results of this research lead us to conclude that
communities most often adopt traditional developmental land
use policies, and only in situations of interest group
competition do communities adopt more politically risky
policies. Interest group competition, influence, and
predisposition towards the proper role of government affect
the land use policies adopted by a community. Communities
dominated by business/pro-growth interests, less conflict,
and a desire to have government take a pro-market approach
rather than a regulatory approach rely on traditional land
use policies and do not use innovative policies which tend
to be more restrictive of growth.
vii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND USE POLITICS
The Role of Land in Urban Politics and Development
Land is a commodity that has definable economic value. Its
current and future uses are affected by the policies
contained in the city comprehensive plan and related
ordinances. These policies in turn affect the value of the
land. The use of land is an economically motivated process
and a government regulated process. Ordinances, land use
planning regulations, and long term comprehensive plans
affect the economic value of land. Beginning in 1926 in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., local government
established the legal right to regulate the use of land.^
Since then, economic and political interests interact and
are dependent upon each other. The relationship between
these interests is reflected in land use policy. The best
method to examine this phenomenon may be through the
political economy approach: "the systematic interaction
between economic and political processes" (Swanstrom, 1985,
p. 12).
The public, individuals and land-based interest groups,
have much at stake in the development of land use policies.
The way in which land is used affects city population size
1

2
and location, the socio-economic character of the community,
and the city's rate of economic growth. These factors
influence the demands placed on government and consequently
urban policies themselves. Land-based interests affect
government's ability to respond to the physical demands of
growth.
Political Economy and Policy
The growth of a city in terms of population and economy is
significantly affected by economic forces and government
intervention. Traditional economic theory suggests that
demands from and needs of the population will determine the
economic sector's growth and that competition will bring
more economic development and another round of population
growth. This traditional explanation for economic
development is the "central place theory". This and similar
theories of economic and population growth and city
hierarchies, do not include the government sector in their
models.^
Economic interests, however, must have certain public
resources available in order to affect the local economy.
"Boosterism," government actions supporting business,
(Molotch, 1976) has been an important feature of urban
policy making since the industrial development of the early
1900s (Judd, 1984). The modern experience of urban renewal
illustrates how economic interests and government work
together in the area of urban growth (Mollenkopf, 1983).

3
Government assistance in developing a good business climate
increases the attractiveness of the city to investors and
enhances economic development (Molotch and Logan, 1984).
Pro-growth coalitions (Mollenkopf, 1983), the growth machine
(Molotch, 1976), and the new convergence of power
(Salisbury, 1964) have become significant additions to the
literature in urban politics.
The urban area as a political economy of place concerns
the actions of the growth machineland-based interest
groups "which collude to achieve a common land-enhancement
scheme" (Molotch, 1976, p. 311). Molotch's explanation of
modern urban places builds on our understanding that the
local business coalition is a dominant force in urban
politics. From the early urban reform/city efficient
movement, Hunter's (1980) economic elite structure of
Atlanta, to Friedland's (1983) theory of economic tradeoffs
and conflicts we expect to find business interests involved
in local decision making.
The business and economic sector actors may be
considered as an interest group in the process, but we must
explore the depth of the role which the economic sector
plays in the process in order to fully understand the nature
of the local political economy and how it may affect land
use policy making.
There are a variety of points in the spectrum of
political economy which may be useful in understanding the

4
relationships between the political and economic sector. A
pluralist explanation may suggest business interests as one
of many interest groups in the process, although, as one
with greater access to the process than other groups (Dahl,
1961; 1982). Business interests may be viewed as having a
"privileged" position in the process, thus dominating policy
making while government responds to its needs (Lindblom,
1977; 1982). This view may be expanded a step further as a
neo-Marxist explanation by expecting government to be
responsive only to the needs of capital holders and
producers (O'Connor, 1973; Friedland, 1983). A more tempered
view may be the political economy of the left (Lineberry,
1980) focussing on government's attempts to provide for
4
society through redistributional policies.
Other explanations of urban politics also integrate the
political and economic sectors and suggest that the business
sector's contribution to policy making is positive. For
example, public choice theories are representative of the
"political economy of the right" (Lineberry, 1980). Market
solutions are seen as efficient and effective solutions to
urban problems (Bish and Ostrom, 1979). Politics should
represent the public's interests through policies and
options that maximize opportunities for homogeneous
communities where similar preferences may be optimized
(Tiebout, 1956). Government's role should be as the agent of
these preferences, which may include business interests.

5
To make sense of these many views of the integration of
politics and economics we return to Lindblom (1982). He
suggests that the business sector enjoys a unique position
of influence in the policy making process. Other interests
will operate within a limited "zone of policy making"
(Lindblom, 1982, p. 335). Local government depends on local
business interests to create a positive economic condition
in the city. Government can provide incentives and regulate
business in order to manage their role in the local process.
The degree of flexibility within which business operates can
be treated as a "market variable" in social science research
(Lindblom, 1982, p. 335). In the case of this research, the
interests which make up the growth machine are the actors
that have business interests that are land based. The
anti-growth coalitions are the residential and environmental
interests that are also land based but have different
expectations of land use than the growth machine. These two
groups of political interests affect the parameters of
business influence and the pluralistic zone of policy
making. Land use policies represent the output of their
political influences.
The economic market should be considered as a variable
and not a constant (Lindblom, 1982). What we may find is
that there are several distinct actors which make up the
local "political economy" such as the local government, the
business interests, and the non-business/public interests.

6
This research may reveal any of the combinations of
political influence presented above. Ultimately, we want to
distinguish between various political interests and identify
the patterns of interests that contribute to different
policy outputs.
Which Cities Grow and Which Don'tThe Role of Land Use
Policy-
Capital investment is a major factor considered by
scholars when examining the influences of urban growth. The
role of the production function is important to our
understanding of urban development (O'Connor, 1973;
Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Friedland, 1983; Whitt, 1982;
Swanstrom, 1985). Included in this is the affect of city
attractiveness on private urban investment (Molotch and
Logan, 1984). Competition among cities for private
investment may influence the adoption by government of
incentive policies such as industrial revenue bonds, tax
increment financing, and enterprise zones (Catanese, 1984;
Wasylenko, 1981).
An area that has not received the same attention in the
literature is whether patterns of urban influence and needs
have a similar affect on the adoption of land use policies
for economic development and growth of urban areas. Policies
which accommodate increased land use should be expected to
be of pivotal interest to those who promote growth. Thus the
focus of this research centers on the following questions:

7
1) Can we explain why Florida cities adopt and use
different land use policies? 2) Can this explanation be
attributed to the distinctions between cities in terms of
the political influence of land based interests in the
business/economic sector, the individual sector, and the
governmental sector (Figure 1-1)?
The development and application of land use policy can
be a highly politicized process (Altschuler, 1965;
Rabinovitz, 1969; Garkovitch, 1982). Several states,
including Florida in 1975, have passed legislation requiring
localities to prepare comprehensive plans and follow state
directed planning processes. In the case of Florida,
localities had five years to implement the state
requirements and to prepare several plan elements including
a Future Land Use element. The regulations implementing the
Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975
make it very easy for cities and counties to amend their
plans. The frequency with which many Florida cities have
amended their plans suggests that comprehensive planning is
open to political influence and what Lindblom (1965) refers
to as disjointed incrementalism. In addition, localities
enact local development and land use ordinances and adopt
various development regulations which may be separate from
the comprehensive planning process. These tools are used to
implement the comprehensive plan, but may not be integrated
with the original plan, leaving the process

8
INPUT THRUPUT OUTPUT
Independent Variables Dependent
Variables
Participation
Survey Data
Growth Machine
Policy Process
Land Use Policy
>
Consensus
Conflict
Compromise
>
Traditional
Flexible
Anti-Growth
Coalition
Innovative-
Regulatory
Ecological Profiles
Growth
Economics
Government
Systems Model
Figure 1-1

vulnerable to special interest influence (Goodman and Freud,
1968). 5
Two policy processes then may exist in the land use
planning policy process. One is the development and adoption
of the original planthe goals. The second process is the
development and adoption of implementation policy.
Garkovitch (1982) suggests that the stabilizing, no-change
forces will dominate the first process, while the
development interests will dominate the second. We may find
that the comprehensive plan stage may be static and the
implementation policy stage may be dynamic, as the influence
of the land-based growth coalitions fluctuate.
The investment value and development of land is
primarily tied to the land use designations which government
places on property. Interrelationships exist between land
value, economic investment, and government land use policy.
Thus the following proposition is made.
Proposition 1A: the greater the presence in a city of
conditions generating growth machine participation, the
stronger the presence of the growth machine in the policy
process, and thus the greater the likelihood that adopted
land use policies will be flexible and accommodating to
growth and development.
The alternative to those interested in promoting growth
are the actors who are interested in slowing or stopping
growth. Once growth has begun, we can expect a point of

10
diminishing returns. Dysfunctions in the environment such as
pollution, overcrowding, and congestion will threaten the
existing character of the community and will activate
interest in removing the dysfunctions as well as the
perceived source of those dysfunctions growth itself. This
interest group is the antithesis of the pro-growth
coalition. Molotch (1976) appropriately uses the label anti
growth coalition to represent land based interests whose
lifestyle is threatened by economic development of and
population increase in the urban area.
Homeowners aggregate into neighborhood groups and
represent this alternative force (Peterson, 1981; Rich,
1979; Molotch, 1976). Their strategy for action is identical
to the pro-growth force, although their motives are
different. The anti-growth interests seek to use the local
government policy making process to adopt policies which
slow or stop growth in order to preserve a lifestyle and
personal real estate investment rather than to increase a
business/ economic profit potential.
Proposition IB: the greater the presence in a city of
conditions generating anti-growth coalition participation,
the stronger the presence of the anti-growth coalition in
the policy process, and thus the greater the likelihood that
more restrictive and regulatory land use policies will be
adopted.

11
The anti-growth forces are expected to rely on
regulatory policy as a means to overcome the market forces
which stimulate growth (Logan, 1976b; Mills, 1979; Johnston,
1980). Government regulation is necessary to insure benefits
to the public even if regulations create costs for the
private sector (Thrall, 1983; Logan, 1976a; Williams, 1961).
It is expected that pro-growth forces will prefer flexible
land use policies in order to take advantage of dynamic
market forces (Dougharty et al., 1975; Mills, 1979; Ervin et
al., 1977; Burrows, 1978; Gleeson et al., 1975). Land use
policies which are adaptable to current economic conditions
will allow the property to be used at its maximum economic
potential (Williams, 1961). Pro-growth forces are
economically motivated by the potential earning power and
value of their land (Molotch, 1976; Molotch and Logan, 1984;
Swanstrom, 1985). The adoption of land use policies which
allow for market fluctuations will be beneficial to them
(Mollenkopf, 1983; Mills, 1979; Lineberry, 1980).
Proposition 2A: the greater the investment which the growth
machine has in the community the more proclivity they have
to participate in the policy making process, and the more
likely it is that land use policies will reflect market
needs.
Proposition 2B; the greater the investment which the
anti-growth forces have in the community the more proclivity
they have to participate in the policy making process, and

12
the more likely is it that government will regulate land use
and adopt policies which restrict market forces and benefit
existing community residents.
Economic investments may be a stimulus for intense
participation and pressure on government to respond with
particular policies. The more regulatory sources available
to local government from broader levels of authority, the
greater the opportunity for local government to be an
influential participant in the growth process and less
subject to policy manipulation. In addition, as alternative
revenue sources for local government increase, the financial
options available to local government increase, thus
reducing dependency on local revenues such as the property
tax. This decreasing dependency on local revenues and
regulatory assistance from state or regional governments may
give local government greater autonomy and/or flexibility in
land use policy making affecting growth directions.
Proposition 3: the greater the availability of alternative
regulatory power and revenue sources, the less dependent
local government is on local revenue contributors and the
more autonomous local government is, allowing government to
be a partner or director in the local growth process.
Classification of Policy
Classification of land use policy should be two-fold:
based on the empirical evidence available on the impact of
the policy itself (encourages or excludes growth) and based

13
on the permanency of the policy impact (flexibleintended
to change over time or regulatoryintended not to change
over time) (Scott, 1975).
An American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) report
(Gleeson et al., 1975) has developed a continuum for
specific land use techniques based on the proclivity of each
policy to allow the market to determine land use or rely on
government to regulate land use (Gleeson et al., 1975). In
addition, various authors have suggested that specific
policies have an impact on the rate of growth (Burrows,
1978). Growth can be discouraged from occurring by using
exclusionary policies such as restricting lot size, mandated
population limits, growth phasing (Johnston, 1980), or
manipulated zoning (Logan, 1976b). Cities also may exhibit
slow or anti-growth intentions through less flexible
policies such as holding caps, planned development, tax
options (Molotch, 1976), radial restrictions, and density
restrictions (Thrall, 1983).
An analysis of regulatory versus "pricing" (market-
driven) policies as growth management tools concludes that
regulatory procedures are a more effective means to minimize
growth (Dougharty et al., 1975). Other land use policies
such as flexible or regular zoning are conventional
practices in most cities and provide more development
options and do not necessarily limit growth. Specialized
policies such as transfer of development rights (TDR),

14
enterprise zones, and tax increment financing are more
oriented to the needs of the land market (Ervin et al.,
1977) .
Urban Policy Making Process
The land use policy process is influenced by land based
interests, market oriented pro-growth coalitions, and
public-good-oriented, anti-growth coalitions. Government
planners and administrators also affect the process by
recommending the adoption of specific land use policies. We
must explore the larger policy process in order to
understand the important role of land use policy adoption.
Policy making in urban government can take on many
characteristics. Yates (1977) suggests that the process may
range from being rationalfew actors, low controversy, to
incremental, to reactivemany actors, high controversy. The
level of consensus or conflict may be stimulated by the
nature of the policy itself or by the decision making
process such as routine, bureaucratic decision making or
non-routine, politicized decision making (Yates, 1977; Lyon
and Bonjean, 1981).
Land use regulations distribute benefits. The politics
of "who gets what" land use benefits is decided by planning
policies. Beatly (1984) suggests four different competing
benefit distribution approaches in growth management policy:
1) utilitarianmaximize benefits to the entire community;
2) equal sharesbenefits distributed equally to each group

15
without regard to any existing inequalities; 3) egalitarian-
-benefits distributed to minimize existing inequalities; and
4) Rawlsianmaximize benefits to the least advantaged
group. These theories examine policy outcomes and may help
us to understand why different land use policies are adopted
and which political, social, and/or economic conditions
affect policy selection.
If government distributes benefits through policy, then
we can improve our understanding of the process by measuring
government's role in policy development and policy
implementation. We would expect cities in which anti-growth
coalitions are very active to favor regulatory policies
which increase government's influence on land use. We would
expect cities in which a growth machine is very active to
favor flexible policies which limit government's influence
on land use. Therefore, in order for these expectations to
be researched, we must examine who is involved in the policy
process and how they are involved, and how much influence
they have on policy adoption (Mollenkopf, 1983; Clavel,
1986; Lyon et al., 1981; Molotch, 1976; Judd, 1984).
In addition to the private sector, city administrators
are another actor group which deserves attention. Planners
and managers may play an active role in conceptualizing the
goals and framework of the comprehensive land use plan. We
can characterize administrators as neutral technicians,
producing one type of policy, and as value-laden

16
administrators, developing other types of policies. The
degree to which politics and administration are separate
within a city may influence policy decisions.
The role of planners is especially important. Davis and
Hua (1978) suggest that supply side and demand side planning
roles may be identified. Supply side planners lean more
toward controlling growth by affecting supply through
regulation. Demand side planners lean more towards
controlling growth by relying on market factors to affect
demand for land. Determining the position of planners and
administrators in each city may shed some light on policy
selection and growth politics.
We may gain additional insights into growth politics by
examining the strength of presence or influence level of
each interest group and local government itself on the
policy process (Yates, 1977; Rich, 1979). If any interest
group is firmly established as a single or elite policy
actor, then we would expect a rational, consensual, low
conflict policy making process. However, if no interest
group is firmly established as a major policy actor,
providing a pluralistic process, then we would expect an
incremental, high conflict, policy making process.
We may also find alternative policy adoption scenarios
and policy outputs depending on the role that government
itself plays. Government may be a filter for influence
(growth politics theory (Swanstrom, 1985)), or a compromise

or manager role (policy planning city theory (Salamon,
1977 ) ) .
17
Proposition 4A: the more consensus in the policy process,
the more rational is the policy development, and thus the
more evident the pattern of land use policy in response to
growth or anti-growth interests.
Proposition 4B: the more conflict in the policy process, the
more incremental is the policy development, and thus the
less evident the pattern of land use policy in response to
growth and anti-growth interests.
Proposition 4C: the greater the division of interests in the
policy process, the greater the role for government in
policy development, and thus the greater the input and
direction by government on the intent of land use policy in
response to growth and anti-growth interests.
The propositions of growth politics are based on how
the policy process works in response to various actors. The
degree of influence on the process by one or more groups and
the degree of independence of government are the factors
which distinguish growth politics in the local political
framework (Figure 1-2).
The consensus process (4A) assumes that there are
dominant interests which will influence the policy process
and the output. This may be an elite dominated process
(Hunter, 1980; Domhoff, 1978) or it may be a public interest
maximization process where common public utilities are

18
Conflict Time Frame
Long Term
Short Term
Low Tension
Consensus
Compromise
(elite)
(Government
Director)
High Tension
Compromise
Conflict
(Government Director)
(Pluralism)
Land Use Policy Process
Figure 1-2

19
optimized (Tiebout, 1956). The process is characterized by a
commitment to a particular set of policies reflecting a
"vision" for the city that suggests a rational process
without conflict. The government may act as a facilitator of
these interests.
The second process (4B) is pluralistic or dominated by
interest group politics (Lowi, 1969). No one group has
control of the process and policy outputs are not
necessarily consistent in purpose. There may be a lack of
consensus among the policy actors as their vision of the
community differs. The process would be incremental.
Government may act as a satisficer of these interests.
The third process (4C) represents dialectical
alternatives to the first two characterizations. Growth
politics or social control theories suggest that the
government take some measure of control of the direction of
policy as demands on the process are divided. The government
is in a position to unite a divided vision of the city.
Competing interests may force the process to be reactive,
but may also create an opportunity for government to be a
partner or manager (Swanstrom, 1985; Boulay, 1979; Clavel,
1986; Lindblom, 1982).
The government can expand its role as a major actor
based on the broad public good. Institutionalized approaches
to growth politics will create opportunities for rational,
government advocated policy approaches to growth problems.

Policies also may be compromises that are directed by the
managerial role of government (Nordlinger, 1981; Salamon,
1977 ) .
20
There may be overlaps between these processes in any
given city. But an understanding of the patterns of
influence and city policy processes will contribute to our
understanding of why land use policies are adopted.
Research Methods
This is a comparative study of urban land use policy
making. The dependent variables are land use policies. This
research will attempt to determine why different land use
policies are adopted by cities. The independent variables
center on actors and their influence, policy approaches of
growth politics, and environmental (social and economic)
conditions. By using a comparative study approach, we can
attempt to isolate various factors which have a relationship
to certain land use policies. This information will
contribute to our understanding of the impact of land use
policies, the significance of the planning process, and
whether certain types of growth politics as experienced by
cities are likely to promote the adoption of particular land
use policies and not others. This information will be of use
to policy makers as it will help to identify the potential
range of policy options that are most likely to be sought
for a particular type of city and what obstacles to policy
adoption may be present.

21
Fried (1975, p. 309) provides a useful framework for
comparative urban policy study based on "positive theory"
(rather than normative theory) of urban policy:
1. identify variations in policy from city to city
2. identify the determinants of variations in urban
policies
3. estimate the direction and magnitude of the conse
quences of policy diversities
4. formulate the logical (theoretical) basis for the
empirical relations identified or which might be
identified
5. identify and analyze those determinants and conse
quences of policy diversity which are subject to
stabilization and/or deliberate change
Fried cautions, however, that urban policy studies are
bereft of any overall theories. Therefore, the framework
should not be mistaken for a theoretical construct and
should be used as an analytical framework. Because of the
diversity of available political theories, we have selected
one substantive area, political economy, to provide
theoretical guides for this research.
U.S. Census metropolitan area (MSA) central cities in
Florida are used as the research cases. We use data
collected over a ten-year period, from 1975 (the year
Florida instituted the comprehensive plan process) to 1984
(the year prior to Florida's adoption of the growth

22
management planning process). The comprehensive planning
process represents a uniform set of planning rules which all
cities were to use. While cities implemented these rules
unevenly by degree and time, the rules framework was
available and of potential use as a reference in land use
policy development. Cities had a five year implementation
deadline (by 1980). Central cities were chosen over smaller
cities because socio-economic data is more readily available
and participation in an ongoing planning process over the
case period of time was more likely.
The Available Operationalized Variables section
(Appendix B) lists each proposition and the possible array
of relative variables from the systems model in Figure 1-1.
Not all of these will be used in the analysis. But the lists
represent the use of these variables in the relevant
literature as they pertain to these propositions. The
variables are arranged in an eclectic pattern (Fried, 1975,
p. 328) by broad classificationsgovernment, economic
factors, policy actors, and environment. These are
classifications which identify rather than indicate the
purpose of the variables. One of the objects of this
research will be to determine if any greater theoretical
understanding can be derived from these variables including
a purposive classification or development of political
patterns which might be based on need for action, resources

23
affecting action, and disposition to act (Fried, 1975, pp.
325-6).
Aggregate socio-economic data and survey data are used
to indicate the major independent variables, actors,
influence, conflict, and process approaches in the policy
making process. The socio-economic data (readily available)
is used to indicate conditions which will affect the
probability that any one interest group or pattern of growth
politics will dominate the land use process. It also
represents the long term economic investments likely to
motivate the growth machine and the anti-growth coalitions.
This data is used to measure each group's proclivity towards
participation.
The survey data are used to verify and measure the
presence of the growth actors in the process, their
participation, and their influences in the policy making
process. Surveys were sent to city and county managers and
planning directors, chamber of commerce executives,
developer organizations, and environmental and neighborhood
groups. Information from planning officials was sought to
help identify active neighborhood advisory boards and groups
for inclusion on the survey list.
Finally, the role of local government itself as an
actor in the process is measured by its ability to be
flexible and autonomous from the possible investment driven
pressures of each group. The reliance on regional or

24
statewide planning regulations contributes to government
autonomy. Also measures of alternative revenue sources,
reliance on property tax, and government debt for
infrastructure are examined as possible influences on
governments' role in the land use process. Survey data was
collected concerning the values and concerns of
administrators (planners and managers), and their
perceptions of political influence on the land use policy
process.
The dependent variable is measured by survey response
as a substitute for content analysis. Planning directors
were asked whether or not a particular land use policy is
used in their city to evaluate its importance to the intent
of their comprehensive plan goals.
Conclusion
The rest of the chapters expand on the growth issue in
the context of urban politics. Chapter two is a discussion
of land use politics and the role of interest groups and
actors in the process. Chapter three presents these concepts
through the case study of land use politics in the state of
Florida as a prelude to the research on growth politics in
Florida urban areas. Chapter four presents the study method
by revisiting the propositions through the operationalizing
of the independent and dependent variables. Chapter five
presents the data results and Chapter six interprets the

25
data in terms of political economy and makes some
conclusions from the research about land use politics.
This research is an attempt to gain some perspective on
the issues of interest group politics, local policy making,
and the impact of urban growth, all within a framework of
political economy. The survey data and socio-economic data
provide an environment from which to discuss land use policy
making and the impact of growth on local communities. By
using a comparative method we can gain crossectional
insights that heretofore have not been available on the
subject of land use politics.
Notes
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 297 Fed. 307, 316
(N.D. Ohio, 1924); rev'd 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. For a fuller discussion of the theories of A. Losch
(1954) and W. Christaller (1966) see L. King, Central Place
Theory (1984) and James Heilbrun, Urban Economics and Public
Policy (1981), Ch.5.
3.For a discussion of prominent authors in this area such
as Alonso, Muth, Wheaton, Burgess, Parks, Philbricksee
Heilbrun (1981), Chapters 5,6. See also K.E. Haynes and A.S.
Fotheringham, Gravity and Spatial Interaction Models,
(1984).
4.For a discussion of social control theories see Boulay
(1979) .
5.For a discussion of symbolic and distributional policies
see Molotch, 1976, p.313.

CHAPTER TWO
POLITICS IN THE LAND USE POLICY PROCESS
Interest Groups and the Policy Process
What factors affect policy making in urban areas? The
policy making process in local government can be influenced
by any number of interests such as elected officials,
administrators, and interest groups. The degree to which
participants are affected by legislation both directly and
indirectly influences the role that each interest group
plays in local policy making. The desires of individuals and
groups affect policy demands made on government. In turn,
community needs and desires are reflected in the policies
enacted by local government. Influence on government
represents a means to success or fulfillment of participant
and community interests within the policy process (Truman,
1951) .
The groups which represent the various interests in the
urban area are a political force within the policy process.
This is a form of influence which is potentially more
powerful than the public's ability to influence policy
making via voting. "The mobilization of bias" is interest
groups influencing the policy outputs of the political
process (Schattschneider, 1960). The degree of consensus or
26

27
conflict among various interests affects the ability of the
policy process to operate. Low conflict and high consensus
reflects a homogeneous demand process, whereas high conflict
and low consensus reflects a heterogeneous demand process
(Yates, 1977 ) .
The variety of demands on the system reflects the
degree of similarity of group interests within a city. This
in turn affects the degree to which policy outputs are
coherent and thematic. A wide array of interests and demands
will force a wide variety of political policy responses.
Policy Process Explanations
Various explanations of the motivations and influences
on the policy process are found in the urban process
literature. Some attempts to analyze urban policy making
processes and outputs suggest that the process is policy
dependent. For instance, hyperpluralistic decision making
contributes to the ungovernable city (Yates, 1977).
Different issues will yield different decision making
processes such as rational, incremental, and reactive. Or
the city government may exhibit a self-interested behavior
patterning a reliance on supportive policies (Peterson,
1981; Tiebout, 1956).
In such cases the influence of different interest
groups will depend on the policy area being considered, for
instance, developmental, allocative, and redistributive
policies (Peterson, 1979). In development situations, the

28
city may act as a facilitator and/or arbiter in conflicts
between the producers (mobile developers) and the workers
(immobile citizens) (Fainstein et al., 1983). This tension
forces the city to constantly make tradeoffs in policy and
the delivery of services to these competing interests. There
also may be an institutional bias present in the policy
making process which favors the business class interests
(Stone, 1980). In such a case, development policies may be
even more influential in guiding the local decision making
process.
To best understand the influence of actors on local
policies we can examine the variety of interests and demands
on the process. Through the identification of the actors and
their interests we can estimate the actors' influence,
participation, and impact on the process. Then by examining
their values, participation levels, and success level we can
gain insights on what motivates their level and direction of
participation. Finally, we can identify their impact on the
process by measuring the level of conflict and consensus in
the process and the overall perception by the policy actors
of the local political power structure (Allensworth, 1980,
p. 229).
Participation and Influence
Interest group (power) structures can array themselves
in any number of configurations. Who has influence and who
doesn't has been the subject of debate in the community

29
power literature for more than thirty years.'*' Elite and
pluralistic systems represent opposite explanations of
political influence. A close, small number of influentials
exhibiting a pyramidal structure reflects the elite
perspective (Domhoff, 1978; Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1953) and a
competitive group structure reflects the pluralistic
perspective (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951; Polsby, 1980). From
these well-debated classics, other configurations have been
developed. Our expectations of the land use policy process
will be refined with insights from these later studies of
the urban process.
Urban planning and development policy processes have
been described as a four-point continuum distinguishable by
the roles of the policy actors (Rabinovitz, 1969). The
points identified are 1) the cohesive/ monopolistic elite
decision making system, 2) the executive centered/public and
private leadership-shared, elite decision making system, 3)
the competitive/pluralistic interest group competition for
leadership and policy-benefits decision system, and 4) the
fragmented/no visible leadership group, perhaps
hyperpluralistic decision system. The major distinctions on
the continuum are the level of conflict or challenge for
policy leadership, and the variety or tension level of
competing interests and issues entering the decision
process"integration to fragmentation" (Rabinovitz, 1969,
p. 78).

30
According to this policy process analysis, planning
policy is affected by the local distribution of power. More
importantly, professional planners can adapt and work within
these various decision making processes in their cities.
Public actors' ability to "read" the local dispersion of
influence is important to the success of policy, within the
confines of each city's unique political process. As the
administrators increase their understanding of various
influences, the chances for the adoption and implementation
of effective policies increases. Government will be
successful as it learns to satisfice or manage the process
in light of the dispersion of influence.
Another important explanation of the policy process
forgoes using a power analysis approach and instead focusses
on which issues are under consideration (Yates, 1977). The
impact of the issues themselves will influence the operation
of the process. Each issue under consideration creates a
particular decision making response pattern based on the
pattern of support or opposition to it. A "highly unstable"
and increasingly reactionary (without focus) policy process
is likely to emerge as the number of competing issues
increase (Yates, 1977, p. 93). As the number of policy
issues competing for policy makers' attention increases, the
less likely is it that the process will be rational. It is
difficult to achieve and maintain an incremental process
though bargaining and equilibrium in the rapidly changing

31
urban environment. Yates suggests that the urban policy
process is forced to be disjointed, even isolated, without
any overarching control or power structure and thus it is
"ungovernable." Public sector actors in an ungovernable
(unpredictable) urban system are forced to react to issues
and demands which interest groups bring to their attention.
This puts government into the role of facilitator.
A final contribution to this discussion on the nature
of the policy process is that there is no single process but
a number of stages to the process that evolve over time.
Schultze (1985) suggests that a city goes through various
stages of policy interests which reflect the demands of a
changing population. The process goes through transitions
which are modeled after Williams' (1971) conceptions of
community image and government roles which are caretaker,
amenities, growth, and arbiter. Transitions of image can
account for the changing nature of interest group demands.
Five transition stages are identified as 1) city as
caretaker to growth/private city, 2) amenity seekers and the
poor who challenge growth, 3) city as arbiter of conflicts,
and either the final stage as 4) bureaucratic/policy city or
5) return to the private development city. By combining the
interest group demands as the motivation for the process
with the economic underpinnings of the quest for political
power, Schultz's transitions facilitate the use of political
economy in analyzing the policy process.

32
Alternative Explanation of the Policy Process
The majority of the community power literature and
policy process analysis is insufficient for a modern
explanation of urban politics. The discussions of pluralism,
elitism, and the policy process are insufficient for
analysis of modern urban policy processes. The community
power adherents disagree about the influential power of any
2
one interest group over another. Neither contention
provides a clear conclusion as to whether or not the process
is issue dependant. Dahl (1961) described the process in New
Haven as influentials which can be identified as exclusive
across issues, but that there is no basis for a priority of
issuesleaving us to imagine what the importance of an
issue might be as a determining factor in how the process
operates. Likewise the elite view suggests that one dominant
group of actors will be influential almost regardless of
issues by virtue of class and/or business position.
Follow-up studies of urban policy allude to urban power
and introduce the importance of economic motives on the
competition for influence. Rabinovitz (1969) studied a major
developmental policy area, Yates (1977) explains the
inability of the local process to cope with economic needs
that conflict, and Schultze (1985) combines the recognition
of the economic benefits of urban growth with policy
influence patterns over time.

33
Urban political economy, however, is an analytical
approach which provides the means to integrate the role of
government with an explanation of power and group influence.
Political economy has the potential to attribute a more
directive role to public actors in the policy process, which
will provide a benefit outcome not just a single
beneficiary.
Political Economy
The political economy approach to urban politics is
used in several different ways but focusses on the
motivations and roles of economic interests and the public
actors that participate in urban growth issues. Current
trends in urban analysis go beyond the classic definition of
political economy"the systematic interaction between
economic and political processes" and are moving towards a
growth politics framework of analysis (Swanstrom, 1985, p.
12).^ These recent discussions in the literature are
extending analysis beyond explanations of urban interaction
and are more fully integrating the theories of community
power, the importance of economic influences, and the role
of government itself in the local political decision making
arena.
Current literature contributions identify developmental
policies as the dominant issue in local politics and as such
reflects the influence and power structures in the policy
process. Identification of a key set of issues increases our

34
ability to understand the policy outputs of the political
process. For instance, land based interests, such as the
developers, bankers, and redevelopment-economic development
actors use the political process to further their own
interests (Molotch, 1976). By pressing for favorable
developmental policies such as transportation,
infrastructure, redevelopment or economic development, they
increase their opportunities to realize economic benefits.
Indeed, the entire local growth industry of services and
infrastructure is of vital importance to the economic well
being of the "growth machine" (Molotch, 1976). Economic and
developmental policies offer the richest policy area in
which the dynamics of urban politics are exemplified. The
growth and development of the city will influence the rest
of the policy making agenda. We must direct our attention to
the political treatment of economic issues in order to
understand the urban policy process.
Most intriguing about the more recent views of urban
political process are the various expectations of the role
which government will play in the process. The government as
an actor with its own motivations and as the promoter of the
collective interest that the market function cannot employ.
The different perspectives in the literature vary in their
expectation of the degree to which government can act as a
facilitator of marketplace demands or a director of the
process and its outputs. Quite possibly, these different

35
roles for government may indicate stages of development in
4
the growth of an urban area. A review of the literature
concentrating on the role of government in urban policy
process will increase our insights into the nature of the
interaction between market and government in the policy
process.
Government as Actor in the Policy Process
An integrated perspective of the new urban political
economy is Peterson's (1979) elaboration on Tiebout's (1956)
classic urban location theory. He suggests that financial
prosperity is the city's primary goal and this motivates the
city to pursue economic development and to satisfy property
owners. Therefore, the process and the policies generated
will reflect these internal concerns. Tiebout's theory, that
the city acts as a firm with identifiable interests,
translates into a modern urban theory in which economic
interests dominate the political process. But Peterson's
assessment of the city process is limited. It is driven by
economic theory and has limited power to explain changing
political demands and conflicts in the distribution of
economic benefits.
Additional studies of cities provide stronger
explanations of the urban process where government may act
as a facilitator, satisficer, partner, or manager. There are
several stages of growth politics that can be identified,
each reflecting the different roles which government can

36
play. After a discussion of these stages, the individual
componentsactors, the policy process, and individual
policy options will be examined.
Conservative Growth PoliticsGovernment as Facilitator
Conservative growth politics is a stage which may be
characterized by the role of government as facilitator.
Molotch (1976) establishes the base point of this role by
suggesting that in the policy process the government acts as
a booster for the economic development interests of the
growth machine. Adopted policies reflect the desires of the
economic interests and establish a supportive business
climate for economic development. This portrayal of
government complements the description of "conservative
growth politics" in the 1950s (Swanstrom, 1985). Government
actors will facilitate growth and development through
selective policy adoption because they assume that the
public will benefit from the subsequent expansion of the
local economy. In this characterization of the policy
process the market forces are the dominant interest group to
which government responds.
This basepoint view, however, is two-dimensional and
represents a zero-sum game. The more potential for growth,
the more government responds to development demands. The
expected opposite reaction is that as more growth occurs,
the greater is the likelihood that the residential
community, the anti-growth coalition will resist additional

37
development. Its members are motivated by their experiences
with the dysfunctions of rapid growth which threaten their
existing lifestyle. Molotch contends that government is a
natural advocate of growth and he leaves little room for any
alternate government position. Instead, government's role is
reduced to facilitator of interests as they dominate the
process.
Liberal Growth PoliticsGovernment as Satisficer
In other stages government may have an expanded role as
an actor in the process. Government can be a filter through
which growth interests must pass (Swanstrom, 1985). The
policy process in this explanation is dominated by growth
interests, specifically the political and economic sectors,
but concedes a more active rather than reactive role for
government. For example, in Cleveland the policy process
progressed from conservative growth politics, government as
facilitator, to liberal growth politics, what might be
portrayed as government as satisficer, though the Kucinich
administration (Swanstrom, 1985).
In general, liberal growth politics flourished in the
1960's when federal grants for redevelopment and social
programs were politically beneficial to liberal mayors and
administrators. Minority and business coalitions were built
to expand urban revitalization, especially downtown
development. But the good intentions of the liberal approach
to economic development were subject to capture by the

38
conservative growth machine for use to their own advantage
(Swanstrom, 1985). In addition to Cleveland, Boston and San
Francisco had similar experiences with liberal growth
politics. The basis of their liberal growth politics was
rooted in the interests and influence of post-New Deal
coalitions (Mollenkopf, 1983).
In all these cities it is evident that the pressures
for growth were accompanied by a decline of the city's
middle class population. Without a solid revenue base the
only counter-interest to the growth machine were groups and
projects dependent on federal funds. Once the federal
process was captured by the growth machine for its own
purposes or withdrawn as a source of funding, then liberal
growth politics lost its momentum as an opportunity for
government to actively satisfy interests other than the
growth machine. Government would be left to resume its role
as policy facilitator.
Populist Growth PoliticsGovernment as Partner
The Kucinich administration in Cleveland managed to
extend the city role from facilitator to satisficer to
partner. A combination of political interests emerged to
support an expanded role for government. Consumer oriented
advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965) and Alinsky style
community organizing contributed to the public's rejection
of market demands for public resources without a return of
profits to the residents. This change in the politics of

growth altered the balance of political power and forged a
populist reform approach. Government planners were
especially important to the success of empowering the
populist coalition. Government's role in populist politics
is one of a partner with the public in promoting community
wide benefit outcomes rather than benefits for individuals
or narrow interests.
In Cleveland, "equity planners" promoted the interests
of the city's existing residents, instead of the interests
of the business or suburban residents (Clavel, 1986). Later,
Mayor Kucinich was unable to completely manage the growth
machine interests, but he was able to challenge them with a
more active and directed role by government (Swanstrom,
1985). The interests of the growth machine had to go through
the government. Government with the help of broad based
coalitions did not have to acquiesce to demands nor did it
automatically adopt growth goals as their own. Although
Kucinich lost his position as Mayor at the hands of the
formidable developer and business coalition in Cleveland, he
succeeded in establishing an alternative role for government
in the urban policy process.
Populist growth politics contests the two-dimensional
facilitator role common in conservative growth politics and
has the potential for greater long-term success than does
liberal growth politics. There is, however, another

40
progression of growth politics which provides an even
greater degree of independence for government actors.
Progressive Growth PoliticsGovernment as Manager
Other cities were able to effectively use a populist
political coalition and to enlarge the role of government
from partner in growth to manager of growth. This additional
dimension suggests that government can constructively manage
the interests and active participation of citizens and
neighborhood groups as an effective counterbalance to growth
machine interests.
Citizens participation, facilitated by government, is
the foundation of the populist movement and provides a means
to insure that benefits accrue to residents rather than to
narrow development interests. In Progressive politics,
however, government expands its role to a partner who can
challenge the dominance of conservative growth politics in
interest group competition, and also advance the role of
government to the status of manager of the growth process.
In this role government can begin to direct a multi
dimensional range of community benefits. Hartford and Santa
Barbara are examples of the successful use of "progressive
growth politics" (Clavel, 1986).
Planners play an important role by directing the
attention of citizens to potential benefits and the
administrators and elected officials to any excessive
benefits (windfalls) of the development interests that can

41
and should be redirected to the benefit of the community.
Progressive politics is also a stage where government
pursues benefit equity by insuring that the costs of
economic development and growth are proportionately borne by
the growth machine which will profit from city growth
policies. In turn, a range of benefits from growth can be
directed, perhaps by regulatory parameters, to the existing
and future residents of the city.
A directed policy process is not a zero-sum approach
where the growth machine receives a disproportionate benefit
or pluralistic interest group competition biases the
outcome. Instead, progressive politics requires a directive
role by government and an active role by all the interest
groups and the public to direct the benefit outcomes. For
example, Hartford was successful in becoming a partner and a
director of downtown development. The city directed new
development as an equal partner in the process, eventually
becoming a co-developer on several major projects.
Development continued and profits were shared with existing
residents. Santa Barbara successfully implemented rent and
development controls to benefit citizens and at the same
time was able to negotiate in a positive manner with
developers (Clavel, 1986). This process differs from the use
of exactions or growth management regulations because
government is acting to integrate the citizenry and their
interests into the process. Exactions and regulations

42
produce a restricted marketplace while not necessarily
directly benefiting the collective good.
Growth Politics in the Sunbelt
Many cities that are experiencing populist and
progressive stages of growth politics also have faced
decline in both population and economic activity. They have
experienced a change in their population demographics from
white middle class to minority lower income class as the
dominant resident group. Might we expect a different
scenario and policy process in the rapidly growing cities of
the southeast and southwest? Their economic and population
conditions are very different from the declining frostbelt
cities. Evidence suggests that these rapid growth cities are
experiencing a different pattern in their evolution of
growth politics.
Rapidly developing cities of the southwest have
experienced "progrowth politics" (Mollenkopf, 1983). This
rapid growth and stage of growth politics is attributed to
a "favorable political climate" characterized by small
government size, a private sector orientation, low political
conflict, and a conservative political culture (Mollenkopf,
1983, p. 242). Cities in a progrowth political climate enact
policies such as low taxes, small budgets, and flexible
rather than regulatory development policies. These are
policies designed to favor economic interests. A
professional government administrator who has the backing of

43
local business also is likely to be found in a progrowth
politics city.
Essentially, sunbelt cities may be experiencing the
same conservative growth politics that their frostbelt
counterparts experienced. (Although, Mollenkopf attributes
postwar conservative growth politics of the southwest to the
proliferation of federal defense contracts and a
conservative national political orientation which filtered
down to the local level.) Limited pro-business governments,
Mollenkopf suggests, preceded and perhaps preempted a
liberal growth politics in southwest cities because there
was not a significant blue collar class and minorities were
restricted to a minimal political role. Further there was no
advent of populism or progressive politics in these cities
because the "intercity competition enforced a market
discipline ... that eventually would also spread to the
older frostbelt cities, forcing an abandonment of costly
progressive politics (Mollenkopf, 1983, pp. 251-253).
The possibility remains that the excesses of the growth
machine will be challenged in the south as they were in
northern cities. The neighborhood movement, as the
forerunner to populism, is dismissed by Mollenkopf (1983, p.
289) as a southern strategy because it is "an incomplete
alternative" to the pressures of national political
interests that are pervasive in the new growth cities.

44
How can sunbelt cities make the transition form
conservative or pro-growth politics to a form of progressive
growth politics? Mollenkopf suggests that the inability of
urban sunbelt cities to make the transition to liberal or
progressive growth politics can be altered by the
development of a "new social contract" where
progressive national political entrepreneurs must take
the risk of mobilizing such constituencies in the
suburbs and newer cities as well as within the old. They
must also seek to control the competitive framework that
private institutions have exploited to undermine
redistributive politics in the past. But they must offer
the private sector some quid pro quo if massive,
debilitating conflict is to be avoided (Mollenkopf,
1983, pp. 297)
This call for a new urban political process suggests
that another dimension of growth politics is necessary to
define in order to understand how rapidly growing cities
have been able in some cases to overcome the market's
resistance to development regulation, moving them closer to
a partner or manager role for government. I suggest that
this other dimension to the developmental policy process is
growth management.
Growth ManagementGrowth Politics
Growth management, as a dimension of progressive growth
politics or even a stage itself, is based on government's
authority to institutionalize city regulatory and planning
powers and to encourage citizen participation as in
progressive and populist cities. In fact, Clavel (1986)
identifies these administrative and participatory components

45
on continuums. He fails to fully explain, however, how the
natural tension between government and citizen can be eased
in order to produce a long-term community-wide benefit
outcome. Through growth management, however, the
administrative power of a city can be increased by regional
or statewide institutionalized land use requirements. This
type of broader authority can help local government to
equitably frame the competition of local growth politics and
promotes long-term uniformity in government's approach to
development and growth. This approach would satisfy the quid
pro quo for which Mollenkopf calls. This additional
dimension of government influence gives local government a
sustaining power to manage the benefits and costs of growth,
not just exercise local regulatory power over the growth
machine; a regulatory power which eventually would be
challenged by the local power structure.
The role of local government can be refined further to
director or "traffic cop" (Stone, 1986). Government can use
its legislative power to institutionalize their own set of
development rules, rather than rely on regulatory
development under the normal political processcompetitive
bargaining and influence group pressure. Government has the
option to regulate the process by controlling the economic
forces of the market, or government can direct the process
by an equitable management of the decision making arena
within its own parameters. At the same time, government

takes the responsibility of protecting the interests of
residents and other disadvantaged actors in the local
process.
46
Government ought to make sure that the process has some
equity in its responsiveness to all the major interests that
represent a wide range of values. Growth management can be
an equitable process without being reduced to short-term
political incrementalism. The experience, however, with
growth management reveals that is used to both reject and
promote growth for single interests. Growth management is
more often the result of interest group influence than an
approach to the role of government in the process.
Implementation of Growth Politics
Developmental policies are the focus of local policy
making in growth cities. And it is the selection and
implementation of land use policies that we expect to be
specifically affected by the patterns of influence in the
community because of the economic basis of these policies
(Allensworth, 1980, p. 59). Therefore, we can investigate
the implementation of growth politics in urban areas by
measuring the overall levels of interest group influence in
the process. This can be done by gauging the levels of
conflict over policy, community perceptions of the sources
of influence, and the levels of participation and success in
affecting the local land use policy process.

47
This research will attempt to provide evidence of the
links between community power, the policy process framework,
and land use policy selection in the implementation of
growth politics. The different scenarios that have been
suggested, conservative, liberal, populist, progressive, and
growth management are comprised of actors, policy
approaches, and specific land use policy outputs. The
theoretical basis of these components will be reviewed and
in later chapters they will be evaluated empirically as
indicators of the several stages of growth politics that
Florida cities have experienced.
Actors in the Process
The literature suggests that there is a set of actors
who are expected to have a greater influence in this policy
making area than do any others. This influence is reflected
by the relationship between power in these actors'
communities and the policy-making process.
We expect that specific growth politics actors, growth
machine interests and anti-growth interests, will be highly
involved in the policy process. Molotch (1976) contends that
"land based interests"those who have an economic
investment tied to landmake up the growth machine. Land
use policies in turn, have a major influence on the local
economic condition of any city, especially in a growth state
such as Florida.

48
Private sector actors
The growth machine coalition is expected to exhibit for
the most part, characteristics of conservative growth
politics in their attempt to dominate the policy making
process and secure passage and implementation of
economically beneficial growth policies. The political
process and the economic sector become integrally linked.
For example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit bond project in San
Francisco was successful despite an initial split of support
by the business elites in that city. (Whitt, 1982) They
eventually coalesced to provide solid support for the bond
issue and its passage. On this important developmental issue
the growth interests directed their attention to its success
for long-run benefits. Whitt suggests that the support for
the BART project represents a dialectic coalition between
the interests of government and business in the growth
politics process.
We expect the pro-growth interests to support pro
development policies in order to secure economic benefits.
But in order to gain insight into this group of actors it is
necessary to understand not only their policy preferences
but also what their value perspectives are towards land use
policies. Specifically, does their support of market
principles carry over to support for a particular role for
government in the land use development process?

49
In a study of planning board members, support for
various land use policies by board votes were classified as
conservativemost frequently supporting rezonings for
higher densities, and liberalleast frequently supporting
such rezoning requests (Allensworth, 1980). The results
showed that the more conservative members "felt that
planning should be used to facilitate if not encourage
growth and development ... and tended to frown on the
concept that planning be used to control or regulate
community expansion" (Allensworth, 1980, p. 99). Zoning was
expected to serve as a policy mechanism to reflect market
demands. Liberals were more likely to expect the planning
function to be a restrictive devise providing a "positive
roleas an independent force designed to guide, direct, and
control" (Allensworth, 1980, p. 99). These results direct
our expectations of actors' growth positions which can be
determined by examining their opinions on the purposes of
land use policies.
A traditional power elite explanation (Hunter, 1953;
Domhoff, 1979) of the growth machine would define its
membership by reputational or positional power. The results
would identify a membership reflecting the makeup of
conservative growth politics. But the nature of
developmental land use policies is that there are other
interest groups who also can benefit from growth. For
example, in cities experiencing liberal and progressive

50
growth politics, minority leaders have worked with urban
redevelopers in order to direct some of the economic
benefits of growth to minorities (Swanstrom, 1985; Clavel,
1986) .
This suggests the possibility of a new alignment of
growth interests especially in areas other than declining
cities. For example, in Montgomery county, Maryland, blue-
collar whites and blacks, civil rights groups, farmers, and
developers opposed large lot zoning policies which they
perceived to be exclusionary and restrictive to growth
(although for different reasons). Those in favor of the
policies were professional and middle class whites, wealthy
property owners, and environmentalists (Allensworth, 1980).
These coalitions represent an alteration of sorts of the
liberal and progressive growth politics alignments.
Previously, white liberals and minorities were united to
redirect urban redevelopment which traditionally displaced
urban residents. Today, however, the liberal support is
split between the economic needs of minorities which may be
satisfied with growth, and an environmental sensitivity to
the rise of the dysfunctions of growth.
In an Iowa study, skilled blue collar citizens were
unexpectedly found to oppose growth (Albrecht, Bultena, and
Hoiberg, 1986). As expected, however, Iowan business
respondents were less opposed to growth and upper income
groups were very opposed to growth. The critical difference

51
in the Iowa study is in the measurement of "growth." Four
questions were asked which focussed on the environment and
capacity of the land to withstand growth. Therefore, the
lack of blue collar support for growth may be more of an
indication of a pro-environment position and does not seem
to be conclusive of an anti-growth bias by blue collar
persons. The Maryland and Iowa data indicate that as we
suspected, the Molotch two-dimensional view of growth
politics is not necessarily complete.
Turning to the other end of what should be viewed as a
growth politics continuum, the anti-growth coalition is
expected to replace the growth machine if the dysfunctions
of growth (urban problems) reach a point of severity
(Molotch, 1976). This condition will prompt the public to
resist additional growth and any policies which promote
growth. The coalition is expected to be made up of middle-
and upper income, activist types concerned about aesthetic
improvements such as environmental protection, single family
residential needs, and historic preservation. They are
struggling to preserve their image of a quality life.
Their conflict with the growth machine, however, is
unlike the opposition to liberal growth politics by the
minority and poor residents who opposed urban redevelopment
displacement. We would expect this modern coalition to be
made up of residential property owners who have an economic
investment to protect. This economic incentive motivates

52
them to actively oppose policies which might increase growth
problems and which may negatively affect their long-term
housing investments. Similar to the pro-growth machine,
influence in the land use process by these actors protects
their economic position.
The anti-growth coalitions may have more than just an
interest in land use regulation. Regulatory reform is the
means to a more specific end. Just as the growth machine is
not monolithic, but made up of business, developer, minority
and other interests, so to is the anti-growth coalition made
up of social liberals, environmentalists, exclusionary
suburbanites, and statewide environmentalists.
It is a coalition of interests that has different
reasons for political association. They are not necessarily
motivated by market forces acting as a unifying stimulus.
While there may be a split liberalism within this group of
environmentalists, minority supporters, and homeowners,
there is a common theme in their expectations about the role
that government should play in affecting land use. We expect
the anti-growth interests to support government's regulatory
function to control the use of land. I would suggest,
however, that there are several motivations and subsequent
approaches that this support of government regulation may
take.
Regulatory support may be based on an exclusionary
interest to protect personal investment (Dye, 1986) and to

53
institutionalize this interest through strong development
controls over zoning, size, and structure (Allensworth,
1980). Secondly, support may come from an environmentalist
interest focussing on limiting the natural and architectural
dysfunctions of growth (deHaven-Smith, 1987). Finally,
support may be found in a statewide based environmental
interest which seeks to institutionalize a long-term,
rational land-use process by which developers can abide
(DeGrove, 1986 ) .
The exclusionary interests want government to regulate
exclusivity into the use of land and in effect who uses the
land. Zoning restrictions can be used to restrict the use of
land in a way that benefits a select group of land owners
despite its affect on non or would-be owners. Minimum lot
sizes and architectural criteria can exclude non-affluent
homebuyers and renters from a particular market location. In
addition, homeowners may fear that the dysfunctions of rapid
growth will threaten the suburban quality of life and their
residential environment. Restrictive zoning is one way of
insulating existing residential areas from change. The
intent to exclude certain types of development and in the
process certain people, can be institutionalized through
zoning and land use policies (Dye, 1986). Regulations can
preserve residents social and political interests by
preserving the status quo (Allensworth, 1980, p. 128).5

54
The other two anti-growth segments are represented by
environmentalists. These groups share a concern for personal
quality of life like the exclusionist segment. Their primary
motivation, however, may be broader, extending beyond their
immediate well-being and to a concern for community well
being. Traditionally, environmentalists have been interested
in preserving the natural environment. A Florida study,
however, suggests that concern over the impacts of growth
and development of the physical environment are important as
well (deHaven-Smith, 1987). Upper and middle income persons
as well as the highly educated show a sensitivity to the
impact of development on the natural environment as well as
the aesthetic quality of development. This group exhibits a
willingness and desire for government to impose land use
regulations to remedy negative development impacts.
The other environmental coalition is made up of
interests that are statewide in scope (DeGrove, 1986). In
some cases developers and homebuilder organizations have
joined the traditional environmentalists in an effort to
pressure state government to regulate additions to the built
environment. Although it seems contradictory, the
developer/builder interests in California, Oregon, and
Florida have realized that regulations instituted at the
state level are more predictable in their enforcement and
parameters. A state process of land use regulation will be
less reactionary and politically volatile than when

55
regulation is at the discretion of each local government
(DeGrove, 1986, pp. 395-6). We might expect to find
progressive growth politics in this situation allowing for a
diversity of interests managed by government process.
Once again, we can find different actors at different
periods of time, each with a different perspective towards
growth. The dominant actors define which type of growth
politics is occurring and more importantly, what type of
land use policies are being adopted and used in similar
cities.
Public sector actors
The final group of actors to consider are from the
public sectorthe city itself, and its components the
planners and administrators. The city may act according to a
self-interest by concentrating on the production of a strong
revenue base and pursuing a pro-growth strategy through
certain policies. It is the planners and administrators,
however, who can provide the greatest insight to the public
sector interests.
Planners and administrators have a responsibility to
pursue a neutral representation of all community interests
in their plans and policies. But often they do not. The
planner, his plans, and the administration at whose pleasure
they serve, can serve a particular interest. For instance,
Minneapolis planners played a reactive role in the
conservative growth politics of that city (Altschuler,

56
1965). The planners tried to integrate community problems,
the needs of the economic interests, and the political
situation with their professional judgement on what was the
best rational, technical planning proposal. This master plan
approach was generally resisted by economic interests who
influenced government, for the very reason that planners
embraced it. Master or rational planning is not susceptible
to political pressures, pressures which the local power
structure is adept at manipulating and which the citizen
participators cannot easily use to their advantage. Growth
politics can politicize land use planning even when planners
want to be neutral. But it is questionable whether planners
desire to act in a neutral capacity.
The results of a national study suggest that planners
admit that they are susceptible to bias in their
recommendations and planning efforts (Vasu, 1979). Planners
may be more likely to embrace the directions of advocacy
planning. Advocacy planning exposes the bias and preferences
of planners and administrators (Davidoff, 1965). It
encourages the planning process to support the least
advantaged community interests as expressed during liberal
growth politics. This approach puts the planning process on
high moral ground but dangerous political ground. Ideally,
government is supposed to represent all interests in the
community. But advocacy planning is easier to justify

57
because it increases access to the political process instead
of restricting it.
Does this justify serving a particular interest through
the planners? Altschuller (1965, p. 360) lamented that
Minneapolis planners were expected to produce policies which
would protect the investment of the property owners and to
"make investment less risky." Davidoff (1965) and
practitioners such as the equity planners in Cleveland tried
to represent the existing residents, not the middle class
interests that the pro-growth machine wanted to lure back to
the city. These experiences suggest that planners and
administrators, similar to the private actors, may develop
and recommend different land use policies and behave
according to the type of growth politics being experienced
in the city.
Similarly, Rabinovitz (1969) outlines four types of
planners, each of which can be effective within a different
political climate. She suggests that planners should be
flexible and adapt to these planning scenarios in order to
maximize their effectiveness in the policy process. The
technician role is expected to be most suitable in a
cohesive, integrated political climate and the elite
dominated executive-centered system. The broker role would
be more effective in a competitive political process. The
mobilizer may be most successful in a more fragmented,

58
power-vacuum system where he can overcome policy paralysis
by being a leader.
Planners as a group, however, have similarities in
their approaches to governments' role in planning that seems
to cross over the various growth politics. Again, the
results of the nationwide study suggest that a majority of
planners are neutral (not cynical) in their expectations of
the political process, but split evenly as to whether or not
a single public interest exists which planners serve.
Furthermore, most planners felt that they did not succeed in
serving the public interest in a neutral capacity and that
citizen participation groups were not neutral in their
pursuits.
The results strongly suggest a high political awareness
and bias towards a value-laden rather than neutral planning
process. This may reinforce a public perception that
planners are a tool to be used by either side of
increasingly polarized local growth politics.
Just as Mollenkopf (1983) called for a quid pro quo for
settling development conflicts between business and
residents, Vasu (1979, p. 189) calls for a normative set of
planning principles which "would not seek to avoid values,
but rather would stipulate them in an a priori fashion."
Again, I would suggest that a growth management process
would serve as a vehicle to solve the dilemmas of values and
demands in the planning process. An organic, flexible form

59
of planning can be pragmatic and technically suitable
(Mumford, 1961; Altschuller, 1965).^
Planning processes can be biased. Conservative growth
politics takes a utilitarian stance, serving the current
economic interests and expecting eventual benefits to accrue
to all residents. Liberal growth politics, on the other
hand, takes a Rawlsian stance, serving the least advantaged
first to bring them to equity before addressing the
interests of those who are better off (Beatly, 1984). These
two approaches contribute to conflict, because neither one
is capable of simultaneous satisfaction of competing
interests. It is growth management planning and progressive
growth politics that come closest to the organic ideal,
serving the interests of the residents but with
consideration given to economic realities.
We have to keep in mind, however, that progressive
planning is not capable of overcoming local political
parochialism for extended periods of time, especially in a
competitive political system. Again, a state or regional
planning directive could ease the tension of the larger
public good fighting with the need for economic growth.
Florida's comprehensive plan and growth management
approaches allow a definition of the public interest through
broad goals and the flexibility to accommodate changing
conditions through land use policies and local plans. These

60
state directives can help to reduce, at least in theory, the
tension between competing local interests.
Conflict in the Policy Process
The main hypothesis of this study is that the selection
of land use policies is influenced by actor participation
which is influenced by the level of conflict (tension) among
interests group in the city. This in turn not only affects
the policy ends, but also the policy process means. The
nature of the conflict within the political process, the
number of interests and nature of competition, will affect
the policy response.
Cities try to achieve a low conflict status by means of
economic prosperity or regulated exclusion of conflicting
interests. Cities can preserve their fiscal health and self-
interest using a revenue strategy of limiting property taxes
and encouraging economic development (Peterson, 1979). This
is a long term approach which seeks to minimize or maintain
low conflict in order to enhance the city's prosperity. This
would be easy to achieve in a perfect world where
homogeneity is sorted by utility curves (Tiebout, 1956). In
the real world, however, long-term land use regulations
including exclusionary policies may be a necessary addition
to maintain and accommodate homogeneity (Schneider and
Logan, 1982) .

61
The result of low conflict may be that government
assumes a facilitator role. This insures long-term
stability of economic investments and can complement the
long run nature of comprehensive planning. However, the
neutral focus of comprehensive planning is traded off for
the political need to distribute benefits.
Short-term policies may be politically necessary in
cities with greater conflict in order to temporarily satisfy
competing demands (Friedland, 1983). Accommodation of long
term interests in a high tension city are politically
difficult to achieve. Land use policies will reflect
incremental approaches to development (Ryder, 1982). The
long-term payoff, however, will eventually reflect the
dominant growth politics actor, either the business-producer
interests or the underprivileged in society. Policies and
outcomes reflect values, even if those values within the
community are in conflict. A progressive role for government
can help to achieve the elusive middle ground.
Long-range rational planning is a difficult task
because demands change over time. The viable alternative is
long-range organic planning and the use of an ecological
role for government (Stone, 1986). With an organic approach
to planningflexible but directed, not a rational approach-
-fixed, or a reactionary approachpolitical, it is possible
to develop a realistic long-term approach in a diverse city
experiencing high levels of interest group tension. A

directed policy process (ecological direction of power and
flexible planning) can serve to balance short-term political
62
necessities without abdicating government's responsibility
as ecological manager. Thus the technical proficiency of the
professional planner can be used to develop plans but not to
the point of inflexibility. Flexibility contributes to the
durability of plans because they can shift when necessary
but not solely at political whim and for political profit.
Policy Outputs of the Growth Politics Process
The urban literature suggests that the policies which
are most important to urban areas are developmental policies
such as roads, transportation, and utilities among others.
All things being equal, urban cities where growth is one of
the most important issues are expected to be dominated by
economic interests and to adopt land use policies which
benefit those interests. But we know this is not always the
case. There are differences in land use policy outputs
across "growth" cities which result in policies that produce
very favorable to very restrictive growth climates. By
growth climate we mean the facilitation of development by
directing and regulating land use in the city. If a business
climate facilitates economic development, then the growth
climate facilitators business and population growth.
Policies that facilitate growth may include flexible
development standards that allow developers to take maximum
advantage of market forces, lenient environmental standards,

63
no moratoriums or limits on construction, willingness by
government to amend local plans, and an easy permitting
process. These represent policies the city can use to foster
a growth climate.
Developmental policies act as more than just an
important economic issue which facilitates the collaboration
of business and government. Planning processes have done
that for years (Rabinovitz, 1969; Altschuler, 1965;
Allensworth, 1980). But land use policies and other
development policies also have an impact on allocative
policies (Peterson, 1979). These traditional service
policies benefit the growth machine because they act as an
important support system. They placate the anti-growth
forces and facilitate the growth climate. For instance,
community amenities such as recreation, public safety, and
culture can act to maintain and facilitate demand for
residential location and promote development.
Normally, providing amenities through allocational
policies contributes to the residential character of the
area. This acts as an inducement which increases the
population of the area. But it also may lead to the
resistance of future growth by the very residents it
attracted in the first place. Once a residential character
is established, there may be a threshold beyond which
further growth is resisted. Restricting our study of growth
politics to developmental policies may obscure additional

64
political factors. But we can not expect to study every
policy, then we would have not established any positive
theory. The aim of this study is to establish the importance
of developmental policies as tone setters in the city and
that options in other policy areas will respond.
Some cities, however, may not need to adopt policies
which directly facilitate a growth climate. They may be
natural economic centers or have a physical environment that
attracts people. But as is the case with development
subsidies, cities may be forced to be boosters for growth to
symbolically gain political benefits and because developers
expect cities to provide supportive policies. Most cities do
not want to give the appearance that they do not support
growth. If demand to locate in the city is great (measured
by strong economic development presence and population
increase) we expect that a growth climate and appropriate
land use policies will be in evidence.
Therefore, one of the hypothesis in this research is
that the city's ability and proclivity to regulate land is
of prime importance to the success of the land based
interests. Their ability to influence, infiltrate, and
direct the policy making process can yield land use policies
that support their position.
But the balance of political influence between the growth
and anti-growth forces in the political process varies from
city to city, yielding a variety of land use policy outputs.

65
Different stages of growth politics may yield different
privileged positions.
Specifically, this research hypothesizes that certain
policies are regulatory in nature such as greenbelts and
moratoriums. These policies do not improve the economic
position of the land based elites (growth machine), but
rather cost them a portion of their potential profit. At the
other extreme are policies which are less restrictive and
which maximize the market position and the economic benefits
of the growth machine. Zoning, transfer of development
rights (TDR), enterprise zones, and tax incentives may be
indicative of this. Somewhere in between may be performance
oriented policy options such as planned unit development
(PUD) and flexible zoning. These policies may diminish the
externalities (dysfunctions) of growth by making development
conditional, but do not necessarily restrict growth.
An examination of the business and residential
investments in the city along with the business climate and
the level of dysfunctions associated with growth will give
us a picture of the balance of power and the zone of policy
making in the area of developmental policy. We expect that
policies adopted may reflect these economic and political
conditions which make up the stages of growth politics.
Conclusion
What factors affect policy making? That was our
original question. To summarize the points of this chapter,

66
the major influence on policy making is the make-up of the
policy process itself. We have suggested that the
components, actors, policy approaches, and policy outputs
vary by the particular stage of growth politics ongoing in a
city. Patterns of components make up these growth politics
stages. There is no one stage of growth politics that
adequately explains all urban political experiences. But the
underlying elements such as economic and political
motivations can be organized in identifiable patterns of
influence, conflict, and policy outputs. These patterns, the
stages of growth politics will provide a better explanation
of urban policy making in the broadest context.
Notes
1. The literature on community power is vast. The most
significant pieces develop the various approaches to
understanding the subject. Hunter (1953) used the
reputational method to define elite systems. Dahl(1961) used
the decisional method to define the pluralistic system.
Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson (1972) combined methods to
establish a relationship between power and policy in a
comparative study. Domhoff (1978) continued the elite theory
of power to the national level and suggested that power was
attributable to position as well as person. Later authors
continued the elitepluralism debate on methods and
conclusions. Most notably, Polsby (1980) supported the
pluralist contention. Bacharatz and Baratz as well as
Crenson challenged the decisional approach to pluralistic
conclusions through their works on non-decision making and
agenda building. Finally Lyon and Bonjean (1981), among
others sought to test and draw conclusions from these
debates and to move on to new dimensions of the quest for
understanding influence and the urban policy process.
2. Pluralism see Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980; and elites see
Domhoff, 1978; and Hunter, 1953, 1980.

67
3. See also Stone, 1980, 1986; Mollenkopf, 1983; Swanstrom,
1985; Peterson, 1979, 1981; Clavel, 1986; Molotch, 1976; and
Domhoff, 1986.
4. Staniland (1985) suggests that "political economy" is not
a theory but an agenda of ideas and approaches to understand
the policy process. He contests that "economism" is a
deterministic set of theories where politics is an extension
of economic competition. "Politicism" is a positive theory
that describes the process within which economics is a
player. One is not superior to the other, nor can we define
empirically which one comes first. Therefore, political
economy is an agenda of relationships between the economic
and political processes that create the policy environment.
5. Government also can regulate exclusion community-wide.
Higher property taxes can ensure that amenities will
continue to be provided and at the same time, economically
restrict less valuable developments and less affluent
residents. (Dye, 1986, pp. 37-8) This type of economic based
exclusion affects the metropolitan area as well. By managing
growth through exclusion, new growth goes elsewhere, perhaps
to cities with fewer resources to cope with growth. (Dye,
1986) This is the same scenario that declining cities face
when wealth exits the central cities to suburbs who do not
assist in the costs of redevelopment. It is difficult,
however, to do much more than speculate on the motives
behind tax rates and land use regulation.
6. Medieval towns took advantage of natural contours to
organize a development plan. But these plans were mediated
by both the needs of the people and the constraints
presented by attention to economic (marketplace)
necessities. Organic planning means an attention to the
needs of the community while retaining professional
standards.

CHAPTER THREE
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN GROWTH POLITICS
The Rules of the Game in Land Use Planning
An important activity which is affected by
developmental policy is land use. The use of land, the prime
component in urban area development, is crucial to economic
interest groups. Their success is tied to their ability to
control the use of the land by development, construction,
planning and attracting government subsidies.
The type of local land use policies adopted and the
regulation process critically affect our understanding of
urban influence patterns and decision-making systems. Land
use decisions have significant costs and benefits which may
alter the local decision-making process. Past efforts to
understand either land use issues or decision-making systems
have not fully integrated these two phenomena. Planning and
economic inquiries have focussed on the technical aspects of
land use and the rational approach to planning (Faludi,
1973) as well as the deterministic aspects of location
(Alonso, 1964; Wheaton, 1977). Political scientists have
studied land-related decisions but only within the broader
context of local power (Clark, 1971; Dahl, 1982).
68

69
Molotch's (1976) theory of a growth machine is a
significant interdisciplinary approach which combines the
economic motivations of influential actors associated with
land development and governments' facilitation of those
interests through the policy process. But we need to go
beyond government's role as a facilitator of a business
climate and examine whether or not government can control
the economic pressures for development, the political
economy agenda. Land use regulations are the rules of the
land use game and are a reflection of community influence
and power structures (Long, 1958).
Rule #1Government Parameters Affect Political Influence
We have already suggested several different phases
through which growth politics passesconservative, liberal,
and progressive. Now we need to put them in perspective in
terms of practical political experiences in the area of land
use. To do this we can use a framework to analyze the
political relationship between the decision-making process
of government and the development and implementation of the
land use regulation process.
Democracies face many dilemmas in defining their scope
of political and policy control (Dahl, 1982). Similarly,
state governments face the same dilemmas in defining their
scope of control or authority over local governments. The
development and implementation of local land use regulations
may be significantly affected by this scope of control. The

70
approaches by each level of government to these authority
dilemmas ultimately affect the gains and losses of the
growth politics actors.
There are three dilemmas useful to our understanding of
the politics of the land use process. They provide a
framework for analyzing the possible political impacts of a
state centered or a local-centered land use regulation
process (Dahl, 1982, pp. 96-107).
1. uniformity versus diversitythe degree of discretion
in the development and implementation process afforded
by the state to local government.
2. centralization versus decentralizationthe degree of
control in development and implementation process that
the state maintains.
3. rights versus utilitythe distribution of benefits
and costs to various interests through the regulation
process.
Florida, for example, has enacted landmark legislation
creating a process for land use regulation. Florida's
process has evolved in such a way as to present an
interesting case study of the transition of local to state
power. More importantly, however, is that by tracing the
land use process in Florida we also trace the transitions of
growth politics in a sunbelt state. Examples of state and
local legislation in Florida depict political changes from
conservative to liberal to progressive growth politics.
Florida's transition may be representative of other fast
growing sunbelt states, but is somewhat different from the
growth politics experiences of urban frostbelt cities.

71
Over a fifteen-year period (1970-85) Florida has moved
from a totally unregulated state situation, to the use of
state-guided regional input into large development
decisions, through state guidelines and requirements for
local comprehensive planning, and to state control over
growth management by means of a state-regional-local
decision-making process. Tracing the evolution of the
state's approach to growth politics will contribute to our
understanding of various urban approaches to growth politics
in Florida cities.
Rule #2Economics Affect Political Influence
Economic determinants of growth also can contribute to
our understanding of growth politics. We need to establish a
link between the costs and benefits of growth which accrue
to various interest groups and the nature of growth politics
in the city. The data may show that the land use policies
adopted by a city reflect the combination of these economic
and political interests.
The control over land use is critical to Florida and
other sunbelt states for several economic reasons. First,
population growth is important to the development of a
sunbelt state's economy. Population increases allow economic
diversification and development of a competitive business
environment (Molenkopf, 1983). Statewide, Florida has
diversified from agriculture and tourism to high tech and
service industries to support continued economic development

72
and a stronger state revenue base. Florida continues to lead
the nation in most new jobs produced (Koenig, 1987). Over
the 1981-86 period Florida added 850,000 new jobs, a 23%
increase, and personal income rose over 50% with per capita
income over $14,000 (Koenig, 1987, p. 46).
Local areas as well are diversifying their economies.
An annual survey of Florida business leaders reveals strong
optimism for continued strong economic growth throughout the
state (Koenig, 1987). In 1987, trade and service sectors
make up over 50% of the total employment in the state
(Koenig, 1987, p. 47). This type of continued, strong
economic development is expected to reflect a continued
interest by a conservative growth machine to dominate the
land use process.
Secondly, to be economically successful a population
increase must be diversified and not limited to unskilled or
non-working groups. Even though the influx of retirees to
Florida in the early years created a strong housing demand,
it is not the type of housing industry which will sustain a
strong local economy. But as the state's service sector
boomed, a migration of families and young professionals
stimulated a long-term housing demand. Employment overall
rose 23% from 1981-86 in the state. The 24-44 year old age
group is 27% of the total state population making it the
largest segment of the state population ("Florida Population
Climbs to No.5", 1987, p. 54).

73
As the population diversifies and the participants in
the business community diversify, we also may expect to see
more political conflict. This may increase the tendency of
the formation of an anti-growth coalition. As we will see,
however, in Florida the anti-growth coalition manifested
itself in a suburban, residential interest as Molotch (1976)
might have predicted and not as liberal growth politics
suggested by Molenkopf (1983).
Thirdly, the housing construction and development
industry may be the major economic thrust in Florida urban
areas. An abundance of undeveloped land and rapid population
growth can sustain a city's revenue base. This type of
economic development has been the impetus for many Florida
cities to attain greater economic diversification and to
create and sustain additional cities. Housing starts
increased 34.3% from 1981-86 ("Florida Population Climbs to
No.5", 1987, p. 53). The northeast portion of the state has
experienced the greatest surge, a 144% increase over five
years followed by the central regions with about 85%
increase. The southeast coast, long the sight of the
greatest growth trailed central Florida in actual housing
starts (central 37,774 starts, southeast 32,173 starts), but
represents the second highest number of starts in the state
("Florida Population Climbs to No.5", 1987, p. 53). The rate
of change in starts, though, was outdistanced by the central
and northern areas by 29%. Those regions appear to be

74
growing faster. Growth remains a significant issue around
the state and impacts local political power and policy.
Rule #3Economic and Political Influences Affect Policy
Making-
Decision making concerning the use of land is a
politically volatile policy area. Specifically, the type of
growth and the purpose for the land affects the distribution
of political power. For instance, residential growth may
heighten the political power of neighborhood groups.
Economic development centered growth may produce different
political results such as an elite or business dominated
power structure. In theoretical terms, Peterson's (1979)
unitary explanation of city interests may be more suitable
to a residential community and structural, elite power
theories (Stone, 1980; Domhoff, 1986) may be more suitable
to larger, more diversified urban areas.
Florida and other sunbelt states, however, may consist
(as Mollenkopf (1983) alludes to) of multi-nodal urban areas
with mixed commercial and residential development.
Mollenkopf suggests that this pattern leads to unchallenged
conservative growth politics. But some Florida cities check
unrestrained growth and restrict it. This leads us to
believe that sunbelt cities, especially in Florida, will
experience additional stages of growth politics.
Florida land use policy significantly influences
economic interests. The state's land use regulations
represent more than just an example of a state's regulatory

75
authority overcoming the desires of local interests. We know
that a broader authority and higher level of government can
implement controversial regulations that limit the benefits
of powerful interests more successfully than can local
governments (Lindblom, 1977; Long, 1980; Swanstrom, 1985).
Land use and development regulations certainly fit that
description. Florida, however, is an example of how state
government can influence not only the direction of the local
use of land but also the nature of the benefits which may be
available to growth interests.
The level of government that directs the land use
process has a significant impact on the distribution of the
benefits of land development and growth. The state, by
institutionalizing its presence in this high-stakes policy
arena and by centralizing its decision-making authority can
guide land development while at the same time maintain a
particular growth agenda. In Florida's case we will see how
the state's efforts to centralize and create a uniform
process influenced the transition at the state level from
conservative to liberal to progressive growth politics.
Those state actions also improved the opportunity for growth
politics transitions to occur at the local level.
Florida's history of transitions in decision-making and
growth politics contribute to our understanding of the
policy process, and the implications for intergovernmental
relations. Most importantly it contributes to our

76
understanding of institutional power, its relation to the
operation of interest group and community power (in terms of
gains and losses), and the policies adopted by governments
in each type of political process.
Florida Growth Politics
Conservative Growth Politics
Conservative growth politics as we have discussed
previously, is an unrestrained growth machine approach to
development and is most likely to be associated with the
government dilemma of uniformity or diversity of the policy
process. In Florida this dilemma centers on the land use
process that the state makes available to local governments
for devising and implementing growth-management policies.
Uniformity represents the degree to which growth management
is regulated and guided by the state through a decision
framework implemented at the local level but required by the
state. Diversity represents the degree of local discretion
given to local government by the state in interpreting or
implementing their own approach to growth management and
land use.
State mandates are an example of uniformity. Lovell and
Tobin (1981) suggest that state mandates reduce the
decision-making discretion of local governments. State
demands for uniformity may also increase the fiscal
dependency of local governments that cannot afford to
implement the state-mandated policies (Lovell, 1981).

77
Uniform mandate parameters may be viewed negatively, but
Wirt (1985, p. 95) suggests that mandates, by producing an
additive effect, can increase local governments' ability to
address policy problems. State mandates may act as a
"preemption" to shape the local "decision space," but this
does not have to produce a burden or negative impact on
local government (the zero-sum view). Instead it may simply
provide a framework for local decision-making to take
advantage of a supportive policy opportunity.
Local conservative growth politics, however, might be
more successful in a locally determined land use process
that operates independently of the state's influence. State
wide policy uniformity, must compromise over a wider group
of interests and may not provide as supportive a pro-growth
climate as might locally dominated decision making
processes.
Prior to 1972, the state government in Florida played a
minor role in regulating local land use and directing urban
growth. During this time, the state was supportive and made
urban growth easier (Carter, 1974).1 The state began to open
development by allowing drainage and dredging in wetlands,
especially south of Lake Okeechobee through the Everglades.
This opened previously undevelopable land in southeast and
southwest Florida near the turn of the century (DeGrove,
1984). The St. Lucie, Hillsborough, and Miami canals made
development possible in southeast Florida and drainage in

78
the Big Cypress area created development opportunities in
the southwest part of the state. By the 1940s, over
drainage for agriculture and over-development forced the
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to step in and implement a flood
control program which designated 1.3 million acres as a
water conservation area and left 800,000 acres for
agriculture (DeGrove, 1984).
The state's conservative political climate, however,
continued a strong development environment. In the 1960s the
state-federal venture to create the Cross-Florida Barge
canal created a heated controversy between legislators and
environmentalists. Similarly, there were conflicts over the
need for water in the urban areas and in the Everglades
Park. The most protracted battle for water occurred over the
Big Cypress Jetport site in the Everglades which, if built,
would have impeded the water flow necessary to sustain
wetlands (DeGrove, 1984).
Florida cities and counties also embraced development
and supported wholeheartedly the growth machine interests.
The city of Miami was an example of the developer interests
dictating city and county land use policy. There was minimal
regulation and direction from local government allowing
developers to run the growth game. The Dade county real
estate explosion in the 1950s and 1960s left both Metro-
Dade and the various cities vulnerable to the influence of
the growth machine. Metro-Dade had zoning authority for the

79
county and cities, but did not use it (Carter, 1974, p.
154). The 1965 Master Plan encouraged development goals over
other goals for agriculture and conservation (Carter, 1974,
pp. 155,156). Even into the early 1970s Metro-Dade made its
land use decisions on an "ad-hoc case-by-case basis"
providing benefits to developers at the cost of long-term
planning goals (Carter, 1974, pp. 167).
Many developers in the 1950s and 1960s were
speculators taking advantage of the interest of out-of-state
land buyers and retirees who were eager to relocate to
Florida. Many new developments were self-contained and did
provided only limited infrastructure, instead relying on
wells and septic tanks. There was political pressure at the
state and local levels for short-term development and very
little consistent implementation of long-term planning
(Carter, 1974, p. 156). This put Florida cities on a path of
politically favoring short-term economic benefits by
authorizing quick development and profit. It also marked the
beginning of accruing long-term costs to the environment for
which government would have to pay later.
The St. Petersburg, Ft. Lauderdale, and Miami areas
experienced the most growth in the post war years (Table 3-
1). This boom period was marked by aggressive development
and market driven growth. The state government continued to
make policy contributions to spur growth. In 1941 the state
designated Nassau county, north of Jacksonville, an

80
Table 3-1
Location
Selected
Population Growth Rates
Change in Population (%)
1940-80
1940-50
1950-60
1960-70
1970-80
Dade county
84.91
88.86
35.58
28.20
Miami
44.78
17.00
14.80
3.53
Hialeah
397.11
240.37
52.97
41.77
Broward
county
110.91
297.87
52.97
41.77
Ft.Lauderdale
101.86
130.25
66.87
9.80
Palm Beach
county
43.37
98.89
52.99
65.26
Boca Raton
37.20
601.71
1223.27
67.39
Orange county
(Orlando)
64.00
129.26
30.64
36.75
Pinellas
county
(St. Pete)
73.37
135.26
39.41
39.28
Hillsborough
county
(Tampa)
38.71
59.18
23.24
31.96
Duval county
(Jacksonville)
44.67
49.79
16.12
7.96
Bay county
106.36
57.25
12.14
30.11
(Panama City)
Source: Figures generated from the Florida Statistical
Abstract, 1951, 1961, 1971, and 1981

81
"industrial county." Polluting waterways was allowed as a
necessary function for industry (Carter, 1974, p. 46).
Industrial paper companies discovered an exceptionally
beneficial growth climate available to them. The data
suggests the development of a growth profile that
potentially benefits the growth machine through conservative
growth politics.
Problems in paradise
Growth was encouraged by the lack of development
controls and the state efforts to encourage growth through
economic incentives for land development. (Statewide zoning
enabling was not established until the constitutional
revision of 1969 (O'Connell, 1977).) But this approach had a
high cost associated with it.
Natural disasters and reckless care of sensitive lands
brought attention to the dysfunctions of growth. Major
ecological and environmental problems resulted from the
short-sighted approach to develop land through a market-
driven process. The competition for space and water between
development interests and environmentalists crystallized the
political problems facing Florida legislators as they
grappled with land use legislation. These problems forced a
change in state-wide growth politics from conservative to a
more liberal growth politics. While conservative growth
politics at the state level was declining, at the local
level growth politics remained relatively unchanged. The

82
state's involvement in the attempt to restrict growth is the
first shift towards a more unitary approach to land use
development in Florida. Liberal growth politics relies on
this type of regulatory assistance from a broader level of
government.
From the late 1960s onward, the state instituted a
number of conservation reforms which eventually led to land
use reforms. The 1966-70 administration of Governor Kirk
paid serious attention to the sensitive environmental
problems of the Everglades and other critical areas.
Conservation groups were influential within the
administration and their concerns were supported by the
Governor's staff. Eventually this led to the formation of
the Governor's Natural Resources Committee, an influential
group which proposed significant environmental legislation.
Water quality, beach development, sewer hookup, and
development permitting were among the policy areas affected
by the state's attention to ecological problems.
The 1970-78 administration of Governor Askew continued
the state's conservation efforts and a reliance on land use
planning. Severe environmental problems, including a
crippling south Florida drought in 1971 brought about a
number of significant policy responses. Governor Askew
organized the Governor's Conference on Water Management in
South Florida in 1971 to address the chronic battle between
development and environmental needs. The task force which

83
resulted from that conference recommended that a plan be
developed to limit growth in order to conserve water. This
signaled a major shift in Florida politics (DeGrove, 1984).
The governor called for new legislation to be proposed
addressing these conflicts.
A crucial policy dilemma was considered at this
juncture. The Governor's study committee considering the
various policy options had a major choice to make. Under
consideration were two models for land use regulation. The
Hawaii model was a comprehensive, unitary policy model
giving most of the directive powers over land use to the
state. The alternative was the ALI Model Code (Finnell,
1973). It left decisions about local development directions
to local governments and gave directive power to the state
only in critical areas or for significant scale developments
(Carter, 1974, pp. 130,131). The Hawaii option could have
been perceived as a severe constraint on local growth
machines. The ALI option left the local political process
open to interest group competition. Florida was not ready to
assume a fully unitary approach.
There was quite a bit of controversy surrounding the
proposed legislation. Supporting a strong State presence in
land use regulation were the environmental groups, the
League of Women Voters, the American Institute of
Architects, and many local newspapers around the state.
Opposed to the legislation were the Homebuilders Association

84
and assorted developers (with the notable exception of the
Arvida Corporation) (DeGrove, 1984).
Despite the controversies, in 1972 the state enacted
four significant pieces of land use legislation which would
pave the way for a more liberalized, unitary policy approach
to land use. The most significant legislation passed was the
Land Management Act (F.S. Chapter 380) which contained the
provisions to designate Areas of Critical State Concern and
the Developments of Regional Impact (DRI). The other
significant legislation included the Water Resources Act of
1972, the Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972 (state plan),
and the Land Conservation Act of 1972 (DeGrove, 1984).
The state's objective was not to stop growth but to
minimize the problems which resulted from a growth pattern
fueled by unrestricted market pressures. The state could not
ignore the costs of this type of growth and the state
political process had to develop some parameters to curb
local conservative growth politics. The legislation had
three significant features which aided in its passage. The
legislation maintained a primary role for local government
in the land use process, the state had limited and defined
areas in which it could intervene, and the legislation had
significant legal and technical strength which insulated it
from challenge (DeGrove, 1984)

85
Transition to liberal growth politics
The Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972
contained several key provisions such as the process to
designate areas of critical state concern and methods to
2
direct developments of regional impact. These policies
indicated that the state was ready to make a change in the
costs and benefits of growth politics. Large scale
developments and development in environmentally sensitive
areas would now be influenced by or controlled by the state
government. The state could overrule local conservative
growth politics. This reduced the economic benefits
available to developers. But in return it provided a way to
reduce the high costs of the problems of unchecked
development for which government paid.
With the 1972 legislation series, Florida began to
institutionalize land use development policy. The Cabinet,
state agencies, and the state's Regional Planning Councils
were responsible for deciding and monitoring major
developments and environmental concerns. Local governments
plugged into a decision making chain of command, altering
the business as usual approach to land use which benefitted
the local growth machine interests. This new legislation
would by no means stop growth or restrict it in all ways,
but it did present a significant change in political
attitudes toward increased government involvement in the use

86
of land, a critical factor in the transition of growth
politics.
Two political phenomenon were emerging. One was an
increased authority role for the state via 1972 legislation.
Secondly, environmentalists were becoming an influential
political group, most prominently as a state-wide coalition.
Their strength came from both the national ecology movement
and the increasingly urban progressive make-up of the
Florida legislature which occurred after legislative
reapportionment in 1967. Florida's environmentalists were a
check force on the previously unrestrained growth machine
(DeGrove, 1984).
In Florida, these political factors contributed to a
form of liberal growth politics. But unlike this stage of
growth politics in northern cities, Florida's initial
response to the growth machine was centered on the
environmental cause, and less on issues of racial or income
equity. As Mollenkopf (1983) points out, there are few inner
city areas in the sunbelt. Thus the anti-growth coalition
does not exist in the traditional sense of displaced urban
residents. Subsequently, he concludes that sunbelt states
miss the liberal growth politics experience except through
the nationally stimulated community action and neighborhood
movement. But Florida eventually would enter a defined
liberal growth politics period. The 1972 legislation
represented the first major legislative transition.

87
The liberal environmental coalition entered into growth
politics, received favorable responses from the governor and
other legislative leaders, and began to see a halt to
unchecked, unplanned growth in the state. Some developers,
most notably the Arvida Corporation, were in agreement with
the environmental approach. They had concerns about the
long-term impacts of overdevelopment of the land and
development in excess of infrastructure capacity. They in
fact supported the increased government involvement,
favoring a long term strategy, rather than short term
political incrementalism (Appgar and Landers, 1987; Carter,
1974, pp. 135,136). The ability to predict land use policy
directions in the long-term allows developers to plan for
economic investment and forecast profit potential. As long
as the state policy was not too economically restrictive,
large, multi-city developers could benefit from a unitary
state approach.
For all the environmental political victories, however,
other groups had different agendas within the new land use
legislation framework. People perceived a decline in the
quality of life or "a lifestyle as was once known." What
Dade county realized as the need for controlled growth, the
"sane growth" campaign in late 1950s, became in other areas
a campaign to exclude growth (Carter, 1974). Liberal growth
politics suggests that rampant growth is resisted because of
its insensitivity to existing residents, most notably in the

88
inner city. But liberal growth politics can also be
represented by the interests of the anti-growth coalition as
described by Molotch. These existing residential interests
may want to stop growth because it is changing the style and
quality of life to which they have become accustomed.
This approach to growth management is the "last man in
the boat" philosophy (Dye, 1986). The "I have mine, go get
yours elsewhere" approach. The strategy may be to keep the
character of the city predominantly residential and low
density. Most notably, in 1972 the upper-income, exclusively
developed community of Boca Raton passed a population cap
ordinance. St. Petersburg threatened to enact similar
legislation, but never followed through. Their cap would
have been lower than the existing population, forcing out
some residents.
Growth increases political diversity and challenges the
status quo. Liberal growth politics tries to protect the
diversity of interests by protecting the equity concerns. In
Florida, the anti-growth, residential interests were seeking
political and policy protection from growth in the same
manner as the environmental interests.
The environmentalists and the residential exclusionists
used the same political methods, but for different self-
interests. This split within the anti-growth coalition may
be part of the underlying explanation for why Florida cities
approach growth very differently in some cases. Growth can

89
coexist with the environment if guidelines are set and
imposed by the state. But that would require a degree of
uniformity for which not all Florida cities and counties
were politically ready. An essentially decentralized
approach to land use planning and development was
maintained, specifically to maintain the political integrity
of local residential interests.
This continuing decentralized approach could have left
conservative growth politics to dominate local politics. But
residential anti-growth coalitions were able to use the
political process to their own ends just as the growth
machine had done in the conservative growth politics phase.
This observation is intended to be explanatory and not
judgmental. After all, the decision making arena and its
outputs are shaped by political power. But the next segment
of significant state legislation had an "even greater
potential to affect local political power than the 1972
policies.
Liberal Growth Politics
In 1975 Florida enacted its first comprehensive
planning requirement for cities and counties through the
Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (LGCPA)
(F.S. 163.3161). This legislation solidified the unitary
approach to the planning process throughout the state. At
this time the state was faced with its second major dilemma,
whether to centralize or decentralize policy authority.

90
While the LGCPA did not completely centralize land use
regulation decision making, it did significantly
institutionalize the process and lay the groundwork for
centralized implementation at a later time. This increase in
state involvement altered the local growth politics process
and forced shifts in the benefits available to and costs
extracted from land use interest groups. At the same time it
provided opportunities for greater participation in the
process.
The LGCPA was in part a response to the problems
encountered by implementing the 1972 legislation.
Adjustments were necessary that the existing legislation
could not sustain. The Environmental Land Management (ELMs)
committee recommended local planning legislation in order to
close the loophole in the DRI process. If no local land use
regulations were in place, development could occur without
restriction and a DRI could not be denied (DeGrove, 1984).
The LGCPA delineated uniform parameters within which
local governments were to develop comprehensive plans for
growth. The intent of the act is broad, but deserves our
attention in order to appreciate the changes occurring in
the approach to land use regulation in the state.

91
It is the intent of this act that its adoption
is necessary so that local governments can
preserve and enhance present advantages;
encourage the most appropriate use of land,
water, and resources, consistent with the
public interest; overcome present handicaps;
and deal effectively with future problems that
may result from the use and development of
land within their jurisdictions. Through the
process of comprehensive planning, it is
intended that units of local government can
preserve, promote, protect, and improve the
public health, safety, comfort, good order,
appearance, convenience, law enforcement and
fire prevention, and general welfare; prevent
the overcrowding of land and avoid undue
concentration of population; facilitate the
adequate and efficient provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, recreational facilities, housing, and
other requirements and services; and conserve,
develop, utilize, and protect natural
resources within their jurisdictions (F.S.
163.3161 (3)).
State review powers were to be used only to insure
local compliance with comprehensive planning requirements.
The contents of the plan and the specifics of its
implementation were left to local government discretion and
not subject to state approval. Through a conscious decision
to shape uniformly the local decision-making process, the
state began to institutionalize its own land use regulation
process. Every plan was to have a coordinated set of nine
elements addressing the various aspects of growth. The nine
elements in the LGCPA were to be planned in coordination
with each other. The elements were 1) future land use, 2)
traffic circulation 3) sanitary sewer 4) conservation 5)
recreation-open space 6) housing 7) intergovernmental
coordination 8) utilities and 9) coastal zone (if a coastal

92
location) Elements addressing airports and water ports were
required for cities with those facilities (F.S. 163.3177).
The future land use element was the central feature of
the legislative requirement for local planning. The LGCPA
represents a move to the unitary approach to the land use
process in order to make a concentrated impact on the
increasing dysfunctions of growth. But it remained a
"bottom-up" planning process (DeGrove and Jurgensmeyer,
1985). Local governments could use the plan as a growth
management tool or they could amend it in reaction to
development situations and essentially defuse the impact of
the plan.
The major change in growth politics in 1975, however,
is the emergence of the planning function as an influential
political force. The LGCPA required over 400 city and county
plans to be prepared. These plans were developed by local
government planners, city and county clerks and managers,
and in many cases by consultant contract either with the
regional planning councils' staffs or with private planning
firms. A rational planning process was mandated by the
state. Local governments made the attempt towards at least
perfunctory compliance. Local plans were required to be
evaluated and updated every five years. But the planning
requirements were approached in a variety of ways. Some
cities took the responsibility zealously while others

93
ignored it. This became the heart of the change in statewide
and local growth politics.
The state was moving in a direction to regulate
development and planning for future growth. The 1975 LGCPA
was intended to influence a shift towards liberal and even a
populist political stance. Requirements for integrated
planning through the nine elements, public hearings, formal
amendments process for change, compliance with statewide
regulations, and a required evaluation process all
contributed to a larger role for state government to define
parameters and allow local government the opportunity to
engage dynamically in the growth and development of their
city and county. But cities, being a variety of political
places, used the comprehensive planning process to further
the growth politics which suited their own political
environment the best. Thus the wide variance in results of
the use of the planning process (University of Florida,
1984). It is those resultsthe different planning policies
and approaches used in each citywhich this research
examines.
Implementing the 1975 LGCPA was not easy. There was
confusion and duplication with the 1972 series of
legislation (O'Connell, 1976). There was relatively little
funding available, a lack of coordination with existing
regional bodies such as the Water Management Districts, and

94
a clash between regional and local decisional jurisdictions
(Graham, 1976 ) .
It is difficult to portray comprehensive planning in
black and white, either or terms, in the way that some
authors such as Molotch have suggested. In general we can
portray local politics as "tensions" between growth machine
interests and anti-growth interests (Friedland, 1983). The
distinctions are much less clear when we specifically
analyze local politics and the plans which result from that
process. At best we can identify some directions to which
comprehensive plan goals and policies may lean. For example,
goals and policies may indicate economic approaches to
planning which favor growth or a stable neighborhood
approach designed to contain growth. In addition, cities and
counties use a wide variety of strategies to develop growth
plans. Some plans reflect that several scenarios for growth
were considered. In other cases a single growth interest is
reflected by the policy approach selected. More often than
not, plans reflect a very general non-directed approach to
growth. This non-commitment to strategy probably represents
a short-term incremental political and planning process
rather than a long-term strategy and rational political and
planning process.
It may be instructive of the various approaches to land
use planning to convey excerpts from comprehensive plans
from several of the cities included in this study. First,

95
many plans have very nebulous goals and objectives. The
vision of community growth seems to be quite often
undefined. For example the first goal in one city's plan is:
to establish a land use pattern that will
promote the health, safety, and welfare of the
residents ... while being in harmony with the
natural environment (Land Use Element of the
2005 Comprehensive Plan Jacksonville Area
Planning Board, 1978).
That type of goal can temper political conflict by its broad
scope which can include many positions on land use.
A greater specificity in goals reflects a greater
consensus around land use politics at least so far as it is
an indication of an ability to influence policy decisions.
An example of a more specific goal might be
A more diversified and intensely developed
Core Area comprising the Central Business
District (CBD) and the adjacent residential,
commercial, and industrial areas (Growth
Management Plan Vol.3 Part 2, Orlando, 1980).
More specific still are goals and objectives which specify
numerical development targets to accommodate projected
growth such as the
Accommodation of a projected population of
262,900 people within the urban areas. This
accommodation will require construction of
35,810 new housing units between 1980 and 2000
... (Growth Management Plan Vol.3 Part 2,
Orlando, 1980) .
A number of cities project the amount of acreage devoted to
each category of use such as residential, commercial, or
industrial. The Pompano Beach plan goes so far as to project
the percentage of residential land that will be needed for

96
each category of housing unit density (City of Pompano Beach
Comprehensive Plan Element One: Land Use Plan, 1977).
There is a technical difference between goals and
objectives as to specificity. Goals are supposed to be broad
and objectives more concrete. But for some cities it may not
be politically possible to achieve the level of specificity
which will render their plan as a useful document. Conflict
affects the nature of local power which contributes to the
final plan product. It is the nature of these effects which
the data will explore.
But for the plans themselves, it is evident that some
goals and objectives portray an anti-growth or residential
protection sentiment. For example a goal addressing
residential plans is to
Maintain and encourage the continued existence
and viability of low density single family
areas through the adoption and use of a Land
Use Plan and land use control regulations and
by making improvements in public facilities,
such as streets, parks, and police/fire
protection (The Comprehensive Plan City of
Panama City, 1978).
Another city in its effort to preserve a neighborhood
character coordinated its residential goals with its
economic development goals.
Living Environment: Provide for a range of
residential densities which will blend
together without causing congestion or
disharmony.

97
Economic Development: Encourage the
development of financial, professional, and
retail services which are conveniently located
in order to meet the needs of the residents
(Land Use Plan Melbourne, 1979).
Finally, a truly comprehensive approach to growth goals is
exemplified in the following city's plan which acknowledges
growth but within very limited parameters.
Growth Control: A growth management system
which phases the rate of growth, spatial
distribution, and intensity of development
through time as a means of enhancing the
quality of life.
Residential Density: Safe, stable, and
attractive residential areas which have
adequate amenities, individual character, a
generally low density and intensity of
development and which provide a variety of
housing opportunities.
Industrial Development: ... a variety of non-
hazardous and relatively quiet light-
industrial and research uses which provide a
wide range of employment opportunities and a
broadened tax base...
Community Appearance: An urban environment
having high aesthetic quality and having
proper streetscape and landscape maintenance
(Comprehensive Plan Boca Raton, 1979).
Conversely, there are several examples of comprehensive
plans which take a decidedly pro-growth attitude and
business climate sentiment. These excerpts portray
conservative growth politics through the role of government
as facilitator of a good business environment or growth
climate. For instance one city states that the intent of the
land use plan is to

98
... facilitate operation of the economic
forces which determine land use ...
(Comprehensive Plan Document Marion County,
1978).
In addition, that same plan specifically states that land
development should not be "unduly hindered by unnecessary
laws, restrictions, or practices" that interfere with market
activities in conjunction with land use (Marion County,
1978 ) .
Several plans give an endorsement of conservative
growth politics in their framework statements. One county
asserts that a growth process should have regulations which
reflect that
An enlightened public policy is required which
recognizes that it is not merely a matter of
limiting growth, but rather developing
policies to rationally accommodate it ....
residents feel threatened at the prospect of
... vanishing open space ... (and) have
congealed into what has been termed a "non
growth" ethic ... Yet not all growth is bad
(Orange County Growth Management Policy,
1981) .
A city within that county exhibited a similar approach when
it stated that
... growth has a good side, while there will
be more people ... there will be more money,
too. In fact, average incomes will increase.
There will be more people and more businesses
the services and facilities which
to the good life ... Growth
follows from the perception that
cause of growth cannot be directly
to sustain
contribute
management
the basic
controlled by local or any other government
... (Growth Management Plan Vol.3 Part 2
Orlando 1980).

99
These examples represent the various approaches to
growth and land use planning by cities and counties during
the same time period. Even though the state was shifting
political gears by increasing the uniformity of the
development process, the local level expressed a variety of
political approaches to the process. The process allowed the
manifestation of conservative and liberal growth politics
depending on the local political situation. This period of
time provides a great deal of instructive data about the
operation of local growth politics under a common planning
framework. The state objective was to reduce the
dysfunctions of growth and encourage local governments to
plan for growth and accommodate it in the most resourceful
way possible (University of Florida, 1984).
Conservative to Liberal Growth Politicsthe Uniformity
Dilemma
Uniformity in the land use regulation process and
growth-management may not always be a positive force or be
able to overcome local political conflict. Approaching this
dilemma by mandating uniformity in the planning process may
not necessarily be a negative prospect for local
government's ability to control its own destiny. The uniform
approach to the Florida land use process can produce an
additive or positive result at the local level. Local
government along with local economic interests from all
businesses not just land-based interests, may profit from
state directives which help to create what Molotch (1976)

100
calls a "good business climate." Uniformity, directed by the
state, can help local government overcome short-term
parochial resistance to growth and achieve the long-term
benefits of economic development (Allensworth, 1980).
The state of Florida realized over time that a
necessarily uniform approach through the LGCPA did not
produce a uniform quality of results. This was due in part
to the different local growth politics approaches and local
resistance by growth interests to planning restrictions on
land use. Several state commissions reported that the
quality of local plans was not adequate in many cases
because they were amended frequently rendering them useless
as long-term planning tools. The plans were often ignored as
a growth management policy. For the most part the various
reports on the LGCPA concurred and concluded that the act's
bottom-up planning process itself was not successful in
preparing local governments for growth or adequately
facilitating growth in terms of land use, environmental
protection, or capital facility development (Growth
Management Advisory Committee, 1986; Florida House of
Representatives, 1982).
There are other reasons why plans were unequal in
quality. Some cities could not afford the time to prepare
in-depth plans, they did not have in-house expertise, and/or
did not have adequate funds to prepare quality plans. There
was a lack of funding from the state to help local

101
governments prepare and implement the planning process
(O'Connell, 1977). But why did the process fail to achieve
the state's desired result of uniform growth management? The
explanation, in part, centers on the nature of the
regulations of the process and in part on the regional
nature of growth and development.
The LGCPA had several regulatory shortcomings. One
problem is the lack of clear state guidance on growth
management. Partly, the purpose of the LGCPA was to allow
local governments to design their own individual approaches
to growth management. There was no significant preparation
or implementation of a state-wide comprehensive plan.
Without any state parameters, the local plans did not have a
framework to guide them or to provide any consistency. But
the dysfunctions of growth do not adhere necessarily to
political boundaries of cities and counties. Many problems
are regional and as such require regional direction and
solutions that are integrated (Florida Atlantic University,
1986, p. 5).
A second problem is that plans and practice did not
necessarily match. What local government planned, they were
legally required to implement, but not necessarily in
conjunction with their day-to-day services and operations
(Florida Atlantic University, 1986, p. 6). Political
incrementalism superceded coordinated and consistent plan
implementation.

102
A third problem is that the state had no enforcement
powers under the LGCPA. The state only reviewed for
compliance, not for content quality. Therefore, it is
essential to realize that the contents of comprehensive
plans do not attempt the same objectives for all cities and
counties. Some policies and goals are more necessary than
others depending on local and regional circumstances.
Economic needs and political forces combine to implement
some policies more aggressively than others. These are
patterns which our data analysis will address.
Local problems in comprehensive planning also include
the legality of the plans themselves. For instance, in
Jacksonville the comprehensive plan was adopted by the city
council by resolution and not by ordinance. This led to an
ad-hoc development process in Jacksonville that did not
complement growth management (Jacksonville Community
Council, Inc., 1984, p. 7). Secondly, the broadness of the
goals of the Jacksonville plan contributed to the inability
of the city to effectively direct growth and development
(Jacksonville Community Council, Inc., 1984, p. 17). This
led to a political basis for growth and zoning decisions by
city council superceding the plans. Other local governments
no doubt experienced similar implementation problems.
From 1975-1985, Florida followed a moderate program to
shape local decision-making arenas towards uniformity. The
price that the state paid for allowing local discretion

103
within state guidelines was ten years of inadequate
preparation for and dealing with the problems of rapid
growth. The state needed to pursue a stronger, more
centralized approach in order to overcome the conflicts of
local growth politics whether conservative or liberal, that
were inhibiting the effectiveness of growth management.
Progressive Growth Politics
The deficiencies of the LGCPA turned the state's
attention to the dilemma of centralization/decentralization
of policy authority and direction by posing the question,
which level of government should have the authority to make
policy decisions? Centralization places the decision-making
power over land use regulation at the state level.
Decentralization places decision-making at the local level.
Centralization infers decision-making control, not just a
uniform shaping of the local decision space. By
concentrating authority at the state level, there is a
greater ability to establish long-term approaches to growth
throughout the state. Decentralization, on the other hand,
may be a more parochial approach and concerned with the
short-term gains rather than long-term solutions to land use
problems, similar to the "diversity" dilemma approach.
Centralization forces a tradeoff of the possibility of
local decision making efficiency for broader long-term
compromise solutions. If decisions are made centrally, then
many local demands will not be met even through compromise,

104
thus creating less local decision efficiency.
Centralization, however, may make it easier to satisfy
larger equity concerns that can only be seen with a state
wide view, yet does not insure that this will happen (Neenan
and Ethridge, 1984). Narrow interests may be able to
dominate the state level policy process and may benefit from
centralization at the expense of a broader state-wide
benefit.
But the broader level of authority in Florida through
the transition to a development of liberal growth politics,
was steadily bringing different interest groups into the
decision making process and reflecting their concerns in
legislation. Florida in essence, would attempt to project
this process to the local level.
A greater role for government, through the extended use
of the LGCPA and changes to that legislation, reflects
Florida's transition to progressive growth politics. As we
discussed earlier, progressive growth politics establishes a
more active role for government in the land use/development
process. Florida, through gradual institutionalization of
the rules of the land use game has improved the potential
effectiveness of government as a participant in land use
politics.
In 1985 after ten years of "bottom-up" land use
planning in Florida, the legislature enacted a new policy
approach. The Growth Management Act of 1985 (GMA)

105
centralized comprehensive planning at the state level which
created a "top-down" decision process (DeGrove and
Jurgensmeyer, 1986). Although our study is confined to the
1975-85 LGCPA legislative period, it will help our
understanding of the results if we briefly examine this
replacement land use legislation.
Under the GMA all local governments are required to
develop new comprehensive plans including a future land use
element and capital improvements plan, the contents of which
were subject to acceptance by the state. In addition, all
local plans are to be prepared under advisement with
neighboring jurisdictions. Finally, all local plans are
required to be in compliance with (or not present any
significant contraries to) the regional and state plans,
thus establishing a clear line of required plan consistency
from the state to the local levels.
The 1985 Act and its subsequent 1986 companion
legislation, represent a major change in Florida's approach
to growth management and land use regulation. It came as a
result of the unsatisfactory results achieved under the
previous local comprehensive planning process. The state is
taking a stronger pro-active role, through progressive
growth politics in order to protect the larger public good.
Previous land use regulations were ineffective in overcoming
parochial local growth interests. Subsequently, the costs of
growth had been borne by government without the proper

106
benefits accruing to the public. Local incremental
approaches to solve the problems of growth showed little
concern for the intergovernmental impacts of their planning
decisions, let alone concern for any state-wide impacts. A
transition to progressive growth politics at the state level
increases the participatory role of government.
The approach to the centralization/decentralization
dilemma through the GMA, goes beyond setting uniform rules
of the game. It sets the desired outcome of the game as
well. This fundamentally alters the economic costs and
benefits scenarios established at the local level. This
centralized approach puts the state in a position to
facilitate growth at the local level. The state's own
comprehensive plan firmly establishes growth as a goal. It
states that "Florida must regulate in ways that encourage
enterprise, capital investment, and balanced economic
growth ..." but in an environmentally acceptable manner"
(Florida State Comprehensive Plan Committee, 1987, p. 22).
Growth within the confines of growth-management is the line
of consistency with which local governments must now
comply.^ But through this process, Florida will have a
greater opportunity to overcome the problems of the
uniformity/diversity dilemma while at the same time negating
the excesses of the centralized approach to the
centralization/decentralization dilemma.

107
One of the long-term impacts of a statewide centralized
process is that Florida may become a captive of mobile
economic land-use interests. The benefit of centralized
development planning may have the effect of increasing the
profit potential of land use. Institutionalizing controls
over the land use process at the state level may benefit
these mobile wealth interests because their investments are
spread across many cities. Large developers, even multi
state developers, will find it more efficient to have one
set of process definitions than one for each of the cities
where they are investing. The arena of growth politics has
the potential to be aggregated at the state level. This
effect may not be detrimental. In fact it may be positive
since it contributes to a focussed land use process and
parameters. The benefits to economic interests may be
incidental and have no affect on the development of
progressive growth politics.
For local growth politics, however, it is important to
realize that a common state-wide land use parameter may
reduce the opportunity for diversity at the local level. The
success of interest groups in affecting local policy
decisions under increased institutionalization of the land
use process is affected by what Stone (1986) refers to as
the difference between government's "power over"power that
is resisted such as regulatory authorityand "power too"a
more subtle less aggressive approach such as a partnership

108
approach to policy decisions. (This was also recognized as a
phenomenon in the Community Action era (Rich, 1979).)
Local governments may be most successful in progressive
growth politics if t