Citation
The effects of a cognitive and somatic awareness intervention on competitive golf performance and emotion regulation

Material Information

Title:
The effects of a cognitive and somatic awareness intervention on competitive golf performance and emotion regulation
Creator:
Bouchard, Lester J., 1969-
Publication Date:
Language:
English
Physical Description:
xii, 219 leaves : ill. ; 29 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Academic achievement ( jstor )
Anger ( jstor )
Anxiety ( jstor )
Cognitive psychology ( jstor )
Golf ( jstor )
Psychology ( jstor )
Self esteem ( jstor )
Sports ( jstor )
Sports psychology ( jstor )
Symptomatology ( jstor )
Dissertations, Academic -- Exercise and Sport Sciences -- UF ( lcsh )
Exercise and Sport Sciences thesis, Ph. D ( lcsh )
Genre:
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 2000.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 169-199).
Additional Physical Form:
Also available online.
General Note:
Printout.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Lester J. Bouchard.

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
The University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not claim any copyright interest in this item. This item may be protected by copyright but is made available here under a claim of fair use (17 U.S.C. §107) for non-profit research and educational purposes. Users of this work have responsibility for determining copyright status prior to reusing, publishing or reproducing this item for purposes other than what is allowed by fair use or other copyright exemptions. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder. The Smathers Libraries would like to learn more about this item and invite individuals or organizations to contact the RDS coordinator (ufdissertations@uflib.ufl.edu) with any additional information they can provide.
Resource Identifier:
025790244 ( ALEPH )
46673948 ( OCLC )

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:


Full Text










THE EFFECTS OF A COGNITIVE AND SOMATIC AWARENESS INTERVENTION
ON COMPETITIVE GOLF PERFORMANCE AND EMOTION REGULATION















By

LESTER J. BOUCHARD












A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2000













ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who made this dissertation possible. Sincere gratitude is extended to my committee members, Dr. Milledge Murphey, Dr. Christopher Janelle, Dr. Ronald Siders, and Dr. Harry Daniels, for their support and encouragement throughout the completion of this study. Their wealth of knowledge on the subjects of performance enhancement, research design, and statistical analysis was instrumental in the construction and completion of this project.

I am especially grateful to Dr. Milledge Murphey for all the supervision he

provided for me during the past 5 years. Dr. Murphey has always been there for me to lend his support and guidance during my years as a graduate student. Further, he has been a wonderful friend and mentor and has shown much understanding and concern for me as a person.

I would also like to express my thanks and gratitude to Christopher Christmas, Derek De La Pena, Brian Rockwood, Dr. Christopher Janelle, Dr. Michael Mondello, Elizabeth Fallon, Kelli McKenzie, and Nick Murray for all their help in the procurement of volunteers for this investigation. Additional thanks are extended to the University of Florida golf course staff. Without their assistance, this investigation could have never been realized.






11











Finally, I would like to express deepest and warmest gratitude to my friends and family. Without their constant encouragement and belief in me, I may not have sustained the desire to remain in school and complete a doctorate degree.







































111














TABLE OF CONTENTS
page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................ ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................... iv

LIST OF TABLES ................................................ viii

LIST OF FIGURES ......................... ............... x

ABSTRACT .................... .............. ....... xi

CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION ................. .. ............ 1

Statement of the Problem ..................................... 11
Research Hypotheses ............................................ 11
Definition of Terms .................................. 13
Assumptions ................................... 15
Limitations ....... ............... ................ 18
Significance of the Study .................................. 19

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ......................................... 23

Emotion and Cognition in Sport .......................... 23
Cognitive Appraisal ................ ................... 26
Hardy Personality Theory .............................. 29
Competitive Sport and Emotions ..................... 30
Arousal, Stress, and Anxiety in Sport ..................... 35
Arousal ....................................... .. ... 35
Anxiety ................................... 36
Stress ..................................... 40
Measuring Arousal and Anxiety ....................... 41
Arousal ................ ... ........ ........... 41
Anxiety ................ ....................... 43
Self-Confidence ........... ......... ............ 51
Self-Confidence and Anxiety ............................ 55


iv











A nger ................. ....... ................................. 57
The Expression of Anger .............................. 59
Controlling Anger ...................................... 61
Anxiety-Arousal-Performance Relationship ..................... 64
Drive Theory ........................... ............... 64
Inverted-U Theory ............... .......... ......... 65
Catastrophe Theory ..................................... 66
Optimal Zones ........... ....................... 68
Reversal Theory ....................................... 69
Self-Regulation ......... ......................... 70
Self-Monitoring ...................................... 75
Coping with Sport Related Stress ............................. 75
Self-Awareness ....................................... 81
Cognitive-Behavioral Strategies .................... 83
Multimodal Interventions ........... ..... ...... 86
Golf ......................................... 91
Summary ............... ......... ............ 95

3. METHODS .................................... 99

Participants ....................................... 99
Performance Task and Apparatus .............................. 100
Instruments and Measurements ............................. 101
The Modified Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2
(MCSAI-2) ........................ .............. 101
The Modified Competitive Trait Anxiety Inventory-2
(MCTAI-2) ................................. 103
The Modified State and Trait Anger Scales (MSAS;
MTAS) ............. .. ........... 103
The Self-Awareness Scale ........................... 105
Experimental Groups and Conditions ........................ 106
Emotion Awareness Monitoring Intervention ... 106 Non-Monitoring Emotion Intervention ............ 108
Emotion Awareness Monitoring ................... 109
Comparison ......................... ... ......... 109
Manipulation of Anxiety ...................... 110
Procedures ....................................... 111
Design and Data Analysis ..................... ............ 114
Perform ance ...................... ..... ....... 114
The MCSAI-2, MSAS, and Self-Awareness Scale ... 114




V











4. RESULTS ............................ ................. 116

Performance .............. ............. ........... .......... 116
The MCSAI-2 and M SAS ............... .................... 117
Intensity and Direction of Cognitive Anxiety ... 117 Intensity and Direction of Somatic Anxiety ............ 118
Intensity and Direction of Self-Confidence ............ 118
Intensity and Direction of Anger .................... 120
The Self-Awareness Scale ................................... 123
Anger Awareness ............... ...................... 129
Cognitive Awareness ......................... .......... 132
Somatic Awareness ....................................... 132
Self-Confidence Awareness .......................... 134
The Relationship Betweeen the MCSAI-2, MSAS,
Self-Awareness, and Performance ............................ 136
The MCSAI-2 and Performance ................... 138
The MSAS and Performance ............................ 146
Self-Awareness Scores and Performance ........... 147
Manipulation Check and Social Validation Questionnaire ... 148 Mental Fatigue ....................................... 151
Reliability of the MCSAI-2 and MSAS .................. 151

5. DISCUSSION ................. ......... ............. 154

Hypotheses Related to the Intensity and Direction of Cognitive
and Somatic Anxiety, Self-Confidence, and Anger .......... 154
Hypotheses Related to Performance ............................ 158
Hypotheses Related to the Relationship Among the MCSAI-2,
MSAS, Self-Awareness, and Performance ................... 160
Summary ...................................... 162
Conclusions ........................... 164
Implications for Future Research ........................ 165

REFERENCES ............. .... ................ 169

APPENDIX A DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FORM ............ 200

APPENDIX B MODIFIED COMPETITIVE TRAIT
ANXIETY INVENTORY-2 .............. ........... 201

APPENDIX C MODIFIED TRAIT ANGER SCALE ... 205


VI












APPENDIX D SUMMARY OF TEST STATISTICS ON THE
CSAI-2 FOR THE COLLEGE SAMPLE OF COMPETITIVE
ATHLETES .............. ................... ............ 207

APPENDIX E SUMMARY OF TEST STATISTICS ON THE
STATE AND TRAIT ANGER SUBSCALES OF THE STAXI
FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS ........................ 208

APPENDIX F MODIFIED COMPETITIVE STATE
ANXIETY INVENTORY-2 ..................................... 209

APPENDIX G MODIFIED STATE ANGER SCALE ... 213 APPENDIX H INFORMED CONSENT ................... 215

APPENDIX I SOCIAL VALIDATION AND
MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE ............ 217

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ............................................... 219


























VII














LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Experimental Design and Treatment Groups ......................... 112

2. Performance Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across
Sessions 1-3 ............. ................... ..................... 118

3. Cognitive Anxiety Intensity and Direction Means and Standard
Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions I and 3 ......... 120

4. Somatic Anxiety Intensity and Direction Means and Standard
Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 ......... 123

5. Self-Confidence Intensity and Direction Means and Standard
Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 ......... 126

6. Anger Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations
for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 ......................... 129

7. Anger Self-Awareness Means and Standard Deviations for the
Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 132

8. Cognitive Anxiety Self-Awareness Means and Standard Deviations
for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 134

9. Somatic Anxiety Self-Awareness Means and Standard Deviations
for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 136

10. Self-Confidence Self-Awareness Means and Standard Deviations
for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 138

11. Correlations Among the Intensity Subscales of the MCSAI-2, MSAS,
and Self-Awareness Across Sessions 1 and 3 ............... 140

12. Regression Analyses Predicting Performance with the MCSAI-2,
MSAS, and Self-Awareness Across Sessions I and 3 ......... 141



Viii











13. Social Validation and Manipulation Check Questionnaire Response
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group ................ 149

14. Frequency of Techniques used During Performance by Each Group 152 15. Means and Standard Deviations of Mental Fatigue Experienced by
Each Group Across Sessions 1-3 ................................... 153

16. Overall Means and Standard Deviations on the MCTAI-2 and
MTAS ............................................ 156




































ix














LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Pag

1. Changes in Performance for Each Group Across Sessions 1-3 119

2. Changes in Cognitive Anxiety Intensity for Each Group Across
Sessions I and 3 ......................................... 121

3. Changes in Cognitive Anxiety Direction for Each Group Across
Sessions 1 and 3 ........... ........... .............. 122

4. Changes in Somatic Anxiety Intensity for Each Group Across
Sessions I and 3 ...................................... 124

5. Changes in Somatic Anxiety Direction for Each Group Across
Sessions I and 3 ........................................... 125

6. Changes in Self-Confidence Intensity for Each Group Across
Sessions I and 3 .................................. ........ 127

7. Changes in Self-Confidence Direction for Each Group Across
Sessions 1 and 3 ...................................... 128

8. Changes in Anger Intensity for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 130 9. Changes in Anger Direction for Each Group Across Sessions I and 3 131

10. Changes in Anger Self-Awareness for the Emotional Awareness
Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 ........................... 133

11. Changes in Cognitive Anxiety Self-Awareness for the Emotional
Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 ......... 135

12. Changes in Somatic Anxiety Self-Awareness for the Emotional
Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 ......... 137

13. Changes in Self-Confidence Self-Awareness for the Emotional
Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 ......... 139


X














Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


THE EFFECTS OF A COGNITIVE AND SOMATIC AWARENESS INTERVENTION
ON COMPETITIVE GOLF PERFORMANCE AND EMOTION REGULATION By

Lester J. Bouchard

December 2000

Chairman: Milledge Murphey
Major Department: Exercise and Sport Sciences


The primary purpose of this study was to determine the effectiveness of various emotion regulation interventions for influencing competitive golf performance and emotion interpretations. Second, it was expected that an emotion awareness monitoring technique (i.e., the Self-Awareness Scale) would provide a more accurate assessment of the impact of the emotions of interest (i.e., cognitive and somatic anxiety, selfconfidence, and anger) on golf performance than more traditionally used psychometric measures (i.e., MCSAI-2and MSAS).

Eighty recreational male golfers were randomly assigned to one of four groups: Emotion Awareness Monitoring Intervention (EAMI), Non-Monitoring Emotion Intervention (NEI), Emotion Awareness Monitoring (EAM), or Comparison (C). Participants completed three sessions under different conditions. The first session XI











represented a baseline measurement of participant skill and psychological constructs. Participants were subjected to one of the four treatments in Session 2 and were allowed to practice. During Session 3, participants competed for cash prizes and were reevaluated on the psychological variables.

Data indicated that EAMI, NEI, and EAM groups performed significantly better following treatment with the EAMI group significantly exceeding the C group in Session 3. Alternatively, performance of the NEI and EAM groups was marginally better than the C group during Session 3. Further, the self-awareness scores of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger improved significantly across the three sessions for EAMI and EAM groups. No significant improvements, however, were actualized for cognitive or somatic anxiety, self-confidence, or anger as revealed by the MCSAI-2 and MSAS. Finally, both the Self-Awareness Scale and the MCSAI-2 accounted for a significant portion of performance variance with self-confidence being the sole consistent predictive variable. Anger was a performance predictor one half of the time.

The data are supportive of multimodal interventions as well as the predictive value of the two utilized scales. However, when expediency and intrusiveness are of concern, the MCSAI-2 may be a more convenient instrument. Suggestions and implications for future research are discussed.








xii













CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Emotions pervade the competitive environment. All those who participate in

competitive sports will encounter and must have the ability to deal with anxiety, anger, and other sources of stress. It is very rare to find a single emotion causing trouble on its own. Emotions combine in complicated ways to produce abnormal conditions and reactions. Because individuals experience numerous emotions when something troubling has occurred, to emphasize one emotion and exclude another may simplify the problem, but it restricts our choices (Tavris, 1989).

Not only do people experience clusters of emotion, there are differences in the intensity of experiences as well as in personal reactions. There are also differences in emotion range: some seem to have a limited number of emotions going from happy to sad, and that may be all whereas others exhibit a bevy of emotional symptoms: euphoria, depression, embarrassment, jealousy, hatred, etc. Cognitive differences play an important role in accounting for the variety of emotional experiences and differences, and may play a greater role than physiological ones. "Emotion is the result of cognitive appraisal, that is, it is the subjective appraisal of events (including physical events) and not the events per se that produce emotions" (Vallerand, 1987, p. 162). These emotional blends result from individual appraisals of performance, the importance of the event, the effort exerted, the degree of certainty about how well they would do, and so on. The



1








2


more perceived control the individual has, the more likely he/she will be to experience feelings other than anxiety and/or anger which often have a detrimental effect on performance.

Recently, research activities have shifted toward the control of emotions. When athletes get anxious, their bodies typically, but not always, respond with increased arousal. Being aroused, however, does not mean that the mind will become anxious (Apter, 1976, 1984; Helmers, 1991; Kerr, 1985a, 1989; Murray, 1989; Rotella, Lerner, Allyson, & Bean, 1990). The ability to cope with the pressures of competition often separates good from poor performance and elite from non-elite athletes. A major goal of sport psychologists is to develop effective mental skills programs to assist athletes to develop emotional control, thereby optimizing performance.

Applied sport psychologists attempt to understand the role of individual differences in sport and exercise behavior and recognize the importance of individualizing approaches to match the needs and capabilities of each athlete. Such individual differences are nowhere more apparent than in reactions to competition. Some eager competitors seek out competition, rise to the challenge, and frequently get their best performances in competitive events. Others are apprehensive, avoid competitive challenges, and tend to choke or perform well below expectations. At all levels of competition there is a wide variation in individual reactions to the competitive environment and in the ability to control emotions.








3


Individuals differ in the interpretation of the demands of the task, available resources, consequence of performance, and perceptions of bodily reactions. Under identical conditions, one athlete may appraise a competitive situation as physically and mentally impossible, exhibit high anxiety, and consequently perform poorly. Another may perceive that same situation as challenging and exciting, demonstrate high arousal, but react positively. In a similar light, during the course of a contest, some individuals may view a poor performance as incompetence or failure resulting in high cognitive and/or somatic anxiety and/or anger/frustration, thereby contributing to continued poor performance. Alternatively, others may perceive the same situation as a challenge and step up their game. Increased arousal may also be exhibited; however, in this instance the situation is used to facilitate performance instead of debilitate it.

Further, performance of certain tasks may benefit from a highly aroused state whereas for others it may be costly. For any given task or situation there may be no single optimal level of arousal (Ebbeck & Weiss, 1988; Neiss, 1990). On the other hand, there may be zones of optimal arousal for a particular task and for a given person (Hanin, 1980) as well as varying interpretations and reactions to arousal states (Apter, 1984; Gill, 1994). In short, there are dramatic differences in the way the same circumstance is interpreted, reacted to, and dealt with. These notions are consistent with some of the more recent theories on the arousal-anxiety-performance relationships such as Zones of Optimal Functioning (Hanin, 1980), Reversal Theory (Kerr, 1985a), as well as Martens (1987) Psychic Energy Theory and Hardy Personality Theory (Kobasa, 1979).











Most coaches, athletes, and sport psychologists would agree that mental and

emotional control is imperative for optimal performance. It has become the ambition of every sport psychology practitioner to teach athletes how to regulate arousal to optimize performance. A variety of strategies have been used to either increase or decrease arousal, depending on the specific needs at the time and the nature of the problem. These strategies can be classified into two different types, either cognitive or somatic (Davidson & Schwartz, 1976). Cognitive strategies include techniques such as imagery and selftalk. Methods including progressive relaxation and rhythmic breathing would be considered somatic strategies. Invariably, most athletes use some combination of the two and cognitive strategies are often used to alleviate both somatic and cognitive symptoms.

What is generally neglected in intervention research is the way the athlete

interprets increases and decreases in arousal, anxiety, anger, and so on. As previously stated, many individuals interpret increases in these states as debilitating. Conversely, others use heightened states to signify a challenge and a reason to refocus. Most generalized arousal regulation interventions fail to recognize the difference in how athletes interpret and react to these symptoms, and consequently may be counterproductive to optimal performance.

An alternative way of dealing with anxiety and arousal has been presented by Rotella and Lerner (1993). This approach focuses on changing the cognitive appraisal and the perception of the nervousness in the arousal experience before or during competition to a more natural response to competition. From their viewpoint











nervousness can be appraised as a normal response to the uncertainty of competition, or as something unnatural and dangerous that can interfere with normal functioning. Providing athletes with perceptual alternatives for positively viewing arousal and potential stress may enable athletes to thrive on pressure, and may enhance their sport performance in the face of competitive pressure. They state:

They (athletes) must learn to respond to the feelings resulting from this
uncertainty as exciting, beneficial, and welcome. This honest and natural
response, which fosters more positive and functional perceptions, will
naturally lead to feelings of control, eagerness, and exhilaration rather than
fear, threat, anxiety, and/or dread. (Rotella & Lerner, 1993, p. 536)

The sport of golf presents a unique combination of intrinsic and extrinsic

competitive factors. Whether playing in a group or alone, for fun or for money, the player is essentially playing against the course, the playing conditions for the day, and most importantly, him or herself. Golf may thus be one of the most intrinsically challenging and frustrating sport activities among a long list. In the words of Rotella (1997):

It's an endless challenge and it's play. You will search long and in vain, I
suspect, for an endeavor that combines the challenges and pleasures of
golf. It tests your body, not for brute strength but for strength tempered by
coordination and grace. It tests your mind for the ability to learn, to
strategize, to remain calm under pressure. It tests you for qualities of
character that I greatly admire: persistence, patience, and determination.
Golf challenges you to measure yourself against a universally recognized standard of excellence, par. More than that, it challenges you to better not
just an opponent, but yourself. (pp. 182-183)

Therefore, it can be implied that the intrinsic and extrinsic challenges of golf can lead to a plethora of emotional experiences.











The competitive nature of golf and the special characteristics of each golf course often present unique demands to a performer. In addition to the obvious requirements of executing the movement and skills that have been or are being learned, play typically generates increased arousal, anxiety, and anger levels resulting in better consequences for some and poorer for others. In these types of circumstances, it is very important for an individual to be able to activate an appropriate physiological and mental state, selfregulate, and remain focused on what should be done. Few sports involve such sophisticated control of the mind and emotions. Learning to diagnose playing situations and to self-regulate thoughts and emotions prior to and during each stroke is the ambition of every avid golfer from beginner to pro. Many of the higher level professional athletes have developed this ability. The degree to which and methods by, which less proficient golfers can best learn how to optimally regulate behaviors consistently from stroke to stroke and hole to hole should be determined. Similarly, questions concern whether less proficient athletes have an accurate understanding of the impact of emotions on performance and whether raising emotion awareness is an appropriate step toward emotional control. Further, it is questionable whether less skilled athletes possess the knowledge or techniques to combat detrimental emotions irrespective of being aware? Therefore, these issues were investigated.

According to Carver and Scheier's (1981, 1990) theory of self-regulation, the comparator of a psychological feedback loop is engaged by increases in self-focused attention or self-awareness. Self-focused attention leads to more comparisons with salient








7


standards and enhances behavioral conformity to those standards (Scheier & Carver, 1983). Thus, by increasing self-awareness, ideal behavior should become more likely.

The necessity for scholars to develop, and sport enthusiasts to apply, selfregulation strategies with regard to such sports as golf has been advocated by many coaches, athletes, and researchers (e.g., Bouchard & Singer, 1998; Boutcher & Crews, 1987; Gensemer, 1995; Johnston-O'Connor & Kirschenbaum, 1986; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1984; Nicklaus, 1974; Rotella, 1995; 1996; 1997). Boutcher and Crews (1987) recommended that each golfer should develop consistent patterns of action as well as thought. Likewise, Gensemer (1995) suggested that it would be advantageous to rid one's mind of negative thoughts, think positively, visually picture doing well, be physically and emotionally ready, focus only on what is relevant for performance, and constructively evaluate a mistake when a poor shot is hit.

The images of golf clubs being slammed into the ground or into a golf bag, clubs being thrown through the air, and verbal tirades are commonplace among serious competitors, especially when the results are personally important. It is difficult to deny the reality that excessive levels of anger, arousal, and/or anxiety can escalate into visible and consequently negative reactions that affect a player's performance. Likewise, exorbitant levels of covert self-contained emotion typically have a similar effect. However, these heightened arousal states may be beneficial to some. Little research has focused on the costs/benefits of awareness, determining effective methods for recognizing individual optimal emotion states, and implementing the appropriate











strategies. Further, rarely are the emotional states of frustration and/or anger included and examined. More frequently, these states are concealed within the anxiety phenomenon. Most importantly, very seldom do intervention strategies consider the differential interpretation and effects of heightened arousal states.

Various arousal-anxiety-performance relationship models like the inverted-U hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), catastrophe theory (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991), and zone of optimal functioning (Hanin, 1980) have suggested the negative impact of excessive levels of arousal/anxiety and the various emotions that accompany it. Similarly, sport psychology practitioners essentially agree that high levels of emotions like anger and anxiety can destroy concentration and may diminish performance, particularly in golf (e.g., Gallwey, 1998; Rotella, 1995; 1996). Conversely, in some sports, in certain situations, or with some individuals these emotions may be beneficial. What many researchers fail to consider is that individuals differ in their interpretation of and reaction to these states and that this may either positively or negatively influence performance. Furthermore, this process may also lead to inappropriate conclusions regarding the anxiety-arousal-performance relationship.

In searching for ways to help an athlete control negative emotions, researchers have generally been interested in investigating the effects of generalized stress management interventions. Most developments in this area have emphasized multistrategy approaches that include both cognitive and behavioral components. Successful stress management techniques, such as stress inoculation training (Mace & Carroll, 1985;








9


Mace, Eastman, & Carroll, 1987; Meichenbaum, 1977, 1985; Meichenbaum & Cameron, 1983), cognitive-affective stress management training (Smith, 1980), visuomotor behavior rehearsal (Suinn, 1972a, 1972b), Gauron's (1986) cognitive self-regulation program, and Anshel's COPE model (Anshel, 1990; Anshel, 1991; Anshel, Brown, & Brown, 1993; Anshel, Gregory, & Kaczmarek, 1990) have been described for use by athletes. These various interventions have integrated several strategies that have been established based on their individual merit. Techniques such as relaxation, imagery, selftalk, and cognitive restructuring have been combined to provide effective models for stress management.

Fundamental to all techniques of arousal regulation is awareness on the
part of the athlete of his/her level of arousal (before and during
competition), as reflected in a number of indices. For example, one must
learn to be aware of the amount of anxiety and cognitive load that is present as well as physiological responses such as rate of breathing,
muscle tension, heart response, and sweat. Being aware of these states and of optimal performance states enables an athlete to consistently perform at
the highest level. (Zaichkowski & Takenaka, 1993, p. 520)

Others such as Feldenkrais (1972), Gauron (1984), and Ravizza (1993) concur that learners must pay attention to the details of behavior, emotion, and thought to better understand what is needed to be controlled, and how to control it. But is awareness the most beneficial approach for less than elite athletes? Is it always beneficial to performance or does it sometimes distract the performer from completing the task at hand? Carver and Scheier (1998) have argued that only when subjects are doubtful will self-focus lead to performance impairment or negative rumination.








10

Of additional interest lately is the manner in which arousal/anxiety states are measured. The CSAI-2 has been the primary assessment tool of choice in sport psychology research, generally being administered from days to moments prior to competition (e.g., Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Parfitt & Hardy, 1993; Parfitt, Hardy, and Pates, 1995; Swain & Jones, 1993). As anxiety theory and research have advanced, however, researchers have realized the need for quick, non-intrusive measures of competitive anxiety immediately prior to and throughout a performance to gain a better understanding of the arousal-anxiety-performance relationship (Gould & Krane, 1992; Krane, 1992; Vealey, 1990). This realization has prompted the development of the Mental Readiness Form (MRF; Murphy, Greenspan, Jowdy, & Tammen, 1989) and Anxiety Rating Scale (ARS; Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1994). Although these instruments were constructed with the intention of being administered immediately prior to and during performance, no research has been conducted utilizing them during performance. Anxiety and arousal levels are consistently changing during the course of an event depending on what other competitors are doing and other potential external distractors, and how personal performance outcome is perceived. Therefore, basing anxiety-arousalperformance relationship conclusions only on pre-game measures seems ludicrous. Although often difficult to administer in most sports, self-paced activities like golf provide the ideal setting for more closely examining these relationships in a less intrusive manner.











Statement of the Problem

The primary purpose of this study was to examine how emotionally based

awareness interventions affect the intensity and directional perceptions and performance of male recreational golfers debilitated by cognitive and/or somatic anxiety and/or anger. Specifically, the interventions were directed toward restructuring debilitating interpretations to facilitative ones and/or reducing stress intensity levels.

The secondary purpose centered around the influence of emotional awareness and the time frame of the administration of the instruments utilized to assess individuals levels of anxiety and anger. These measures, which are typically administered before or after competition, do not assess how an athlete feels during a contest or reflect the tendency of these perceptions to change based on performance or other situational variables. An attempt was made to determine if an awareness strategy and more precise method of state emotion measurement will lead to better emotional understanding and control as well as to greater predictability in the anxiety-arousal-performance relationship.

Research Hypotheses

Based on information contained within this chapter and the following one, several hypotheses were posited and examined during this investigation:

1. Following treatment, participants in the groups receiving the interventions

would report more facilitative interpretations of their pre-competitive anxiety and anger, and would experience higher self-confidence. This would be indicated by the various








12


self-report measures. Research with similar strategies supported this hypothesis (e.g., Hanton & Jones, 1999b; Maynard, Hemmings, & Warwick-Evans, 1995; Maynard, Smith, & Warwick-Evans, 1995).

2. Participants in the intervention groups would perform better post-treatment than at pre-treatment. Based on the findings of Jones et al. (1993) and Hanton and Jones (1999b), it is expected that as interpretations of emotional states are shifted toward more facilitative ones, so too will performance be improved.

3. The emotional-awareness monitoring intervention group would demonstrate the greatest improvements in performance and emotion facilitation. By heightening participants' awareness of the impact of state anxiety, anger, and confidence, enhancing their ability to monitor their effects, as well as training them in the techniques to facilitate self-regulation, improvements in these individuals were expected to exceed all others. Although there is a lack of any systematic body of research to support this hypothesis, writers, researchers, and practitioners endorse it (e.g., Feldenkrais, 1972; Gauron, 1984; Ravizza, 1988; Zaichkowski & Takenaka, 1993).

4. The emotional-awareness monitoring group will demonstrate modest

improvements in emotional intensity and control, and performance. By making them aware of the relationship between optimal and detrimental levels of emotion and performance, participants may develop or initiate their own strategies to regulate their levels. However, without direct instruction in appropriate techniques, improvements were expected to be less for those who received formal instruction.








13

5. The comparison group will not display any improvements in

perceptual interpretations of intensity, direction, or control of anger, cognitive or somatic anxiety, confidence or performance. Levels of anxiety, anger, and confidence are expected to remain stable. Without any education on the negative effects of these emotions, the importance of the mental game, or instruction on emotional regulation, participants are expected to respond to these items in a consistent manner throughout the study. Likewise, performance is expected to remain stable.

6. It is posited that the proposed methods of emotional state measurement will be a more precise indicator of the relationships between the psychological constructs of interest and performance. Administering instruments only prior to performance may not reflect changes that occur during performance and therefore may not accurately portray these relationships. Having participants describe emotional levels throughout performance should give us a more exact measure and therefore a better understanding (Feltz, 1988).

7. It is predicted that directional interpretation of emotional symptoms will be a stronger predictor of performance than intensity interpretations. Evidence from Jones and associates (Jones, Hanton, & Swain, 1994; Jones & Swain, 1992; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Swain & Jones, 1993) supported this hypothesis.

Definition of Terms

To understand the terminology used in this investigation, the following terms are defined:








14


Anger: An emotional state marked by subjective feelings that vary in intensity from mild annoyance or irritation to intense fury and rage (Speilberger, 1996).

Awareness: A self-monitoring procedure that leads to a comprehensive understanding of situational reactions to events.

Cognitive Anxiety: Worry or awareness of unpleasant feelings, concerns about performance, and the inability to concentrate (Borkevec, 1976).

Chip Shot: A short, low shot played to the putting green (Nance, Davis, & McMahon, 1998).

Flagstick: A removable straight indicator, with or without bunting or other material attached, centered in the hole to show its position (Gensemer, 1995).

Green: The putting surface; that area of closely cut grass containing the hole, cup, and flagstick (Gensemer, 1995).

Handicap: A universally excepted measure of a golfer's playing ability; the average number of strokes a player scores above par per 18 holes.

Hole Out: To make a stroke that puts the ball into the cup (Gensemer, 1995).

Par: An arbitrary standard of scoring excellence based on the length and difficulty of a hole and allowing two putts on the putting green (Nance, Davis, & McMahon, 1998).

Pitch Shot: A shot that travels in a high trajectory played to the putting green (Nance, Davis, & McMahon, 1998).

Self-Confidence: The general belief that one can successfully execute a specific activity (Feltz, 1988).








15


Self-Efficacy: A situation-specific self-confidence which is related to a person's convictions that he or she can produce a desired outcome at a particular moment (Bandura, 1986).

Self-Regulation: Automatic functioning without the use of external controls (Crews, 1993).

Short Game: The combined strokes of pitching, chipping, and putting (Gensemer, 1995).

Somatic Anxiety: Perceptions of physiological arousal such as shakiness, sweating, increased heart-rate, rapid respiration, and "butterflies" in the stomach (Davidson & Schwartz, 1976; Kauss, 1980; Martens, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 10990; Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981).

State: An immediate emotional state or acute feelings at a particular moment (Speilberger, 1971).

Trait: A disposition to perceive a wide range of situations in a particular manner (Spielberger, 1996).

Assumptions

Several assumptions were made for this research:

1. The directions given prior to questionnaire administration and to participants in the awareness monitoring conditions would be understood. To ensure this, participants were asked if they understood and had any questions. If questions were posed, they were addressed until the student's understanding was clear.








16


2. There would be no differences in skill level between the groups prior to treatment. Randomization procedures were expected to control for playing ability differences. This was later verified by statistical analysis of the pretest performance measure.

3. The demographic data form would adequately assess participant skill level and experience. This was later verified by the pretest measure.

4. There would be no extraneous weather or distraction effects that would affect any group performances more than another. Unfortunately, the weather conditions and number of players and distractions in the surrounding area were uncontrollable. Since all participants were subjected to similar conditions, it is assumed that these factors equally affect the groups.

5. Participants receiving the intervention strategies would use them appropriately in practice and playing. Students were verbally reminded to use the strategies prior to trial blocks 3 and 4.

6. The interventions administered would be strong enough to elicit a treatment

effect. In an analysis and synthesis of psychological intervention research, Greenspan and Feltz (1989) concluded that educational relaxation based and remedial cognitive restructuring interventions are, in general, effective for enhancing performance. Pilot data verified the effectiveness of the treatments.

7. Any psychological and performance improvements by the experimental groups would be due to effective use of the treatment. Participants were urged to follow the








17


treatment plan. Additionally, strategy use was confirmed by a post-experiment questionnaire.

8. The dependent measures used in this study (i.e., the modified CSAI-2, modified State and Trait Anger Scales, and performance) would be appropriate measures to examine the effectiveness of the intervention. Pilot data indicated that the dependent measures to be employed would generate quantitative information sufficient for examining the proposed hypotheses.

9. Participants would not have any physical or psychological limitations that may hinder their performance. They were orally screened prior to testing to verify any potential limitations.

10. Participants would answer all questionnaires honestly. At the beginning of the study, they signed an informed consent form indicating that all information provided would be handled confidentially. Furthermore, before the administration of the questionnaires, they were given anti-social desirability instructions as suggested by Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith (1990). These instructions inform participants that it is normal to have anxious feelings before and during competition. They were also advised that there are no right or wrong answers to the questions and it is important that they respond truthfully.

11. Success in the task would be equally important for all participants and they would perform to the best of their ability. The potential monetary rewards for best performance should have influenced participants to attempt to play their best. Participants








18

were questioned following the experiment about the importance of the event and effort exerted.

12. The modified time-to event paradigm and ego-threatening instructional set would be appropriate methods for manipulating cognitive and/or somatic anxiety, anger, and/or confidence. Previous studies (e.g., Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994; Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981; Orbach, 1998; Spiegler, Morris, & Liebert, 1968) have indicated that these methods are effective.

Limitations

There were several limitations inherent in this study. These include the following: 1. The level of participants' skill and experience was initially determined by selfreport. Equality of skill between groups at pretest, therefore, was a potential limitation. This limitation, however, was later absolved by a pretest measure.

2. Participants in each group may have determine the hypotheses being tested

and/or form expectations. Because some participants were introduced to techniques that may improve their performance, this limitation was unavoidable. This was later examined by a social validation and manipulation check questionnaire.

3. The experimenter was the sole administrator of the interventions. Therefore, there may have been an inherent bias toward the interventions groups.

4. The effectiveness of the interventions is based in part upon the dynamics of the interaction between the participants and the experimenter. Participants in the interventions groups may not respond to the therapeutic style of the experimenter.








19


5. Participants in the intervention conditions may not use the treatment effectively during testing. They may disregard or forget all of the strategies. To increase the probability of strategy use among treatment groups, they were verbally reminded to use the strategies during the practice session.

6. Participants in the comparison group may have, or develop, a strategy or

strategies to enhance performance. To verify this potential limitation, a social validation and manipulation check questionnaire was administered to all participants at the conclusion of testing.

7. The comparison group did not accurately represent a true control condition. This was a potential confound.

8. The nature of conducting research in a real world environment limits experimental control and presents a threat to internal validity. Participants would potentially encounter possible outside influences including auditory and visual distractions (i.e., others playing nearby), weather conditions (e.g., heat, wind, sun glare), and time of day (e.g., temperature, sun position). These factors, however, are uncontrollable due to the nature of the study and were expected to affect groups equally.

9. Because semi-skilled male golfers served as the participants, the results can be generalized only to this population.

Significance of Study

With the considerable interest in sport participation, the continual search for

efficient methods to optimize skill level, and the potential physical, psychological, and








20


potential economic benefits obtained from participation, researchers and educators are challenged to determine effective methods to enhance the learning process and aid performance. How individuals might best increase athletic performance with the productive use of cognitive, behavioral, and affective processes has been of increasing interest to athletes, coaches, and sport psychologists for decades. Leading questions concern the application of emotional awareness approaches to emotional interpretation and perceptual regulation, and performance enhancement. For example: Does becoming aware of emotional states and their effect on performance lead to better control? Is it important to recognize the impact of emotions on performance? Does the control of emotions such as anxiety, anger, and confidence play a significant role in determining performance outcome? Such questions as these will be explored in this study.

It is also commonly accepted that athletes can have very different interpretations of their emotional states. Interventions are currently being structured with this fact in mind. The recent sport psychology literature has advocated the use of multistrategy matched approaches for emotional intensity and interpretation regulation and performance enhancement. The validity for these types of techniques, however, is still in question, particularly for less than expert athletes. It is conceivable the less proficient athletes should be able to adopt and apply many of the techniques that higher level athletes use for personal advantage. Further, questions concerning the ecological validity of cognitive-behavioral interventions have been postulated because many of the past studies supporting their effectiveness have been conducted in a laboratory setting.








21


Intuitively, the treatments should be as productive in a real world setting as in a laboratory, provided extraneous variables are well controlled. This study should help to clarify these issues and provide further evidence for the efficacy of emotion regulation in sport.

Anxiety has long been recognized as an influential variable on performance. Sport psychology researchers, on the other hand, have largely ignored the impact of anger/frustration. To date, few studies exist in which anger was a specific variable of interest. This study essentially chartered an unexplored area by including a direct examination of the impact of anger/frustration.

The introduction of a multidimensional approach to anxiety has been an important step forward in the empirical understanding of the anxiety-arousal-performance relationship. This understanding, however, is still unclear mainly due to the methods by which these relationships were measured and failure on part of researchers to recognize that athletes interpret intensity levels of emotional states differently. Questions have been posed regarding the time frame of the administration of the instruments utilized to assess an individual's levels of anxiety and how indicative pre-performance measures are of these relationships. These measures, which are typically administered from days to moments before or after competition, may not accurately assess how an athlete feels during a contest. It is widely accepted that the anxiety-arousal-performance relationship needs to be more closely examined. The proposed measures should lead to greater understanding of these relationships.








22


The overall significance of this study lies in the continuing effort to establish effective protocol for the learning and performance of high-level sport skills as well as more closely examining the relationship between anxiety, anger, confidence, and performance. The efficacy of emotional awareness approaches for sport performance enhancement of athletes is still unclear, especially for non-elite athletes. So too is our understanding of the relationship between arousal, anxiety, and performance. Considering the anticipated results, the potential of this research is not only in offering an effective method of controlling debilitating emotions and increasing self-efficacy and performance, but also in providing support for ecologically valid awareness approaches as an effective method of behavioral change in sport situations. Further, the proposed methodology should add to this understanding. This study should contribute to this body of knowledge and, therefore, influence subsequent research. The experimental design and the task used in this study represent the first attempt to 1) explore the effects of an emotional awareness intervention during a simulated competitive event, 2) directly investigate the impact of anger on performance, 3) attempt to implement matched emotional control strategies to facilitate the control of debilitating emotions as well as improve performance of moderately skilled athletes, and 4) measure psychological constructs during the course of an event opposed to solely before and/or after.














CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter contains a review of literature relevant to this study. The first section presents information pertinent to the impact of emotion and cognition on behavior. A distinction between arousal, anxiety, and stress is made in the second section. The third section offers methods for the measuring arousal and anxiety. The fourth section examines self-confidence. Perspectives on anger are explored in the fifth section. The sixth section includes a critical overview of various arousal-anxiety-performance relationship theories. The nature of self-regulation and self-regulation models are explained in section seven. Section eight covers methods for coping with sport related stress. And the final section includes suggestions as to the relevance of strategies with regard to performance enhancement in golf as well as the fitting literature. These sections provide research and theoretical perspectives with regard to the purpose of this study.

Emotion and Cognition in Sport

Emotion is one of the most vague, complex concepts in psychology, which

touches all aspects of human behavior (Strongman, 1987). Some see it as a disruptive process (e.g., Duffy, 1962), whereas others believe it enhances behavior (e.g., Young, 1961). Probably most would agree that it is a multidimensional phenomenon that exerts a number of different influences on human functioning. Theories within each of these areas are so vast that they include multiple views of emotion and hundreds of different




23








24


definitions (Strongman, 1987). For example, it has been viewed as adaptation (Plutchik, 1980), conscious experience, (Hillman, 1960), and motivation (Leeper, 1970). Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981), however, have attempted to resolve this issue by putting each of these perspectives into one all encompassing definition:

Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective
factors, mediated by neutral/hormonal systems, which can (a) give the rise
to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual
effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) active widespread physiological
adjustments to the arousal conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal-directed, and adaptive. (p. 58) Thus, emotion can be viewed as a complex process that possesses cognitive, physiological, behavioral, and experiential components.

Emotion has been studied from a number of different perspectives that fall into the general areas of cognition, physiology, and behavior (Buck, 1985). The first refers to the conscious or subjective experience of emotion. This constitutes what is subjectively expected. Thus, individuals may experience feelings of confidence, anger, or happiness during or following an event. This dimension of emotion has been studied primarily by psychologists endorsing a cognitive and/or phenomenological approach (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1966; Schachter, 1964; Weiner 1981).

The second component of emotion, which has been studied experimentally, is that of the physiological changes in the autonomic nervous system which take place during emotion (e.g., increases in heart rate, blood pressure, Galvanic Skin Response, and visceral functioning). According to this view, an individual would be anxious or angry if








25


elevations in heart rate, blood pressure, etc. were found. Psychophysiologists such as Cannon (1968), James (1968), and Tompkins (1981) have been the major proponents of this position.

The third and final component of emotion, which has been studied

experimentally, is observable emotional behavior. Verbal tirades, for instance, or aggressive behavior may be seen as indicative of the emotion of anger. This approach to the study of emotion has been followed chiefly by behaviorists (e.g., Dollard, Dobb, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1984; Millenson, 1967; Watson & Rayner, 1920), although some cognitive-social psychologists (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962) have also made use of this behavioral or expressive component of emotion.

Theories have been formulated in each of these disciplines in order to understand the complex phenomenon of emotion. To discuss all the theories is beyond the scope of this paper. For comprehensive reviews see Izard (1977) and Strongman (1973,1978, 1987). For the purpose of this study, attention will be allocated to the more recently accepted cognitive theories and their relevance to emotion and performance.

Over the last 35 years there has been a general shift in research efforts to examine the role that cognitions play in the experience of emotion (see London & Nesbitt, 1974; Mandler, 1984; Strongman, 1987 for reviews). Due to the theoretical work of Schachter (1964), Lazarus (1966, 1984), Arnold (1960), and more recently Mandler (1975, 1984) and Weiner (1981, 1985a), it is now generally accepted that emotion experienced in a given situation depends upon how the individual appraises the event.








26


Cognitive Appraisal

Expanding on the above theories and recent social psychological research, Vallerand (1987) proposed a cognitive model for self-related affect in achievement situations. Vallerand's model posits that emotion is the result of cognitive appraisal; that is, it is the subjective appraisal of events and not events per se that reduces emotions. Additionally, cognitive appraisals can be intuitive (almost automatic) and reflective (deliberate in nature). The distinction between intuitive and reflective forms of appraisal is well documented (see Buck, 1985) and allows for the meaningful explanation in prediction of self-related affect.

Intuitive appraisal involves minimal cognitive processing. For instance,

knowledge that one has not played well (following or during a match) is often immediate and does not require more elaborate forms of cognition. Although several forms of intuitive appraisals may exist (see Kassin & Baron, 1986), with respect to sport performance, the mere understanding that one has or has not performed well represents the most important form of intuitive appraisal of performance.

Conversely, reflective appraisal processes involve elaborate cognitive processing of information in dealing with the external or internal environment. The reflective appraisal can take several forms: intellectualization (Lazarus, 1966), self, outcome, and social comparison processes (Suls & Mullen, 1983), various information processing functions (Markus & Zajonc, 1985), mastery-related cognitions (Taylor, 1981), and








27

causal attributions (Weiner, 1979, 1985a). Thus, reflective appraisals involve a deeper consideration and search for meaning.

The role of cognitive appraisals is to treat incoming information from the self or environment in a coherent and meaningful way. It is the individual's self-concept structures that enable incoming information to achieve meaning and to be coherently organized (Epstein, 1973). Initially, information is appraised through the intuitive appraisal. If the appraisal reveals that outcomes or goals are consistent with the basic self structures, no further cognitive activity is necessary because there is a match with existing structures and that is sufficient to lead to affective experiences (Fiske, 1981, 1982; Mandler, 1984). In such instances, task importance (Brown & Weiner, 1984; Weiner & Brown, 1984) or meaning (Maehr & Braskamp, 1986) plays an important role in the intensity of the affect experienced.

However, if the incoming information is perceived as being inconsistent with

some important self-structures, then arousal is experienced. This arousal leads to further cognitive activity (the reflective appraisal) in an attempt to assimilate the information into existing structures or to accommodate the information in new structures and thus adjust the arousal. Research has revealed that novelty (Berlyne, 1970), uncertainty (e.g., Schackter & Singer, 1962), unexpected events (i.e., inconsistent with the self) (Wong & Weiner, 1981), the nonattainment of goals (Weiner, 1985b; Wong & Weiner, 1981), and the importance of the task (Brown & Weiner, 1984; McMillan & Spratt, 1983; Weiner,








28


1985b) lead the individual to engage in further cognitive work beyond the intuitive appraisal.

Anshel (1997) suggested that the most important factor that contributes to feeling anxious or worried in a sport situation is cognitive appraisal. Appraisal consists of the athlete's interpretation of a given situation or event which indirectly influences his or her psychological and physiological response. The nature and meaning of the situation are associated with either threat or challenge. The stress appraisal (threat) elicits a different set of mental and somatic responses than an appraisal considered irrelevant or positive (challenge) (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). If a stressful event, such as remarks by others, is interpreted by the athlete as a challenge, arousal may be heightened but anxiety may be reduced and the comment may provide incentive to improve performance. Similarly, the success of an opponent may elicit an appraisal of irrelevance early in the competition but may be interpreted as far more stressful near the end when the score is close. Each of these appraisals usually elicits different types of coping responses. The perception of the demands of the situation as threatening or challenging interacts with the perception of ability or availability of resources required to meet those demands. Personal dispositions, such as trait anxiety, self-confidence, optimism, performance expectations, and the motivation to achieve and strive for success, also influence the individual's appraisal. Skill level is another factor that contributes to an anxiety appraisal. Researchers have shown that elite competitors have more positive interpretations of their anxious feelings about the consequences for immediate future performance (Jones & Swain, 1995).








29


Consequently, Anshel (1997) and others (e.g., Rotella & Lerner, 1993) have suggested that interventions to improve the management of anxiety should include cognitive techniques that create more accurate and productive appraisals of the situation or event for each individual athlete (Anshel, 1997).

After appraisal, most high level athletes make mental and physical adjustments to eliminate, reduce, or prevent the onset of state anxiety. Relaxation techniques, imagery, positive self-statements, and physical removal from the immediate environment are examples of such adjustments, which are collectively referred to as defense mechanisms. These defense mechanisms, combined with the resultant level of state anxiety jointly affect the person's behavior or performance. Once these techniques are learned and mastered, they can be initiated very quickly and automatically. Hardy Personality Theory

The psychological construct of hardiness, as characterized by Kobasa (1979), describes the personalities of individuals who have the tendency to view stressful situations in a positive way. Although the vast majority of past research has focused on the negative effects of stress and anxiety, recent research suggests that many individuals view stress and anxiety as challenging, exciting, and beneficial (Fish, 1983; Folkman, 1984; Folkman, Lazarus, & DeLongis 1986; Helmers, 1991; Jones & Hardy, 1989; Kobasa, 1979; Kobasa & Maddi, 1982; Kobasa, Maddi, & Courington, 1981; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Murray, 1989; Svebak & Stoya, 1980).








30

There are three general characteristics that individuals with hardy personalities are considered to possess: 1) an ability to feel deeply involved in or committed to the activities of their lives, 2) the belief that they can control or influence the events of their experience, and 3) the anticipation of demands or changes as exciting challenges to further development. Through optimistic cognitive appraisals and decisive coping actions, hardy people transform stressful events into less stressful situations (Kobasa, Maddi, Puccetti, & Zola, 1985). This personality style is learned and developed through interactions between people and their interpersonal environment (Kobasa, 1979; Kobasa, Maddi, & Puccetti, 1982). Perceptions and/or cognitive appraisals of events are strongly influenced by early life experiences and social learning (Bandura, 1977a; Rotter, 1954, 1966) and indirect experiences such as modeling (Bandura, 1977a). The hardy personality style, thus, is a combination of cognition, emotion, and action geared towards coping and personal development.

Competitive Sport and Emotions

The high arousal produced by strenuous sport or competition makes

emotion more likely-from exhilaration to anger, depending on what the people around you do, the rules of the game, or the provocation (Tavris, 1989). The specific emotion an athlete feels, then, depends on the circumstances of the sport and the particular situation (Tavris, 1989).

Identical load and identical external conditions of sport, arousal,

performance, and competition result in very different emotional states. In the








31

individual behavior of the athletes, we can recognize optimal stimulation or greatest disturbances. The emotional stress of definite loadings is modified by the time of realization and the environmental conditions.

Emotions can support performance, but in some cases, it might be also necessary to reduced them in order to avoid disturbances (Hahn, 1989). Emotions such as fun, sensation seeking, sympathy, love, empathy, etc. are welcomed qualities, whereas problematic emotions such as pain, tediousness, worry, anger, jealousy, anxiety, blame etc. are often feared (Hahn, 1989).

There has been a significant trend in sport psychology over the past 20 years to move toward the development and use of sport specific models, measures, and methodologies. Martens influential work on competition and competitive anxiety initiated this trend. Martens began his work on competition and competitive anxiety by defining competition as a social process and by emphasizing the importance of sport specific constructs and measures. Specifically, he defined competition as "a process in which the comparison of an individuals performance is made with some standard in the presence of at least one other person who is aware of the criterion for comparison and can evaluate the comparison process" (Martens, 1976a, p. 14).

Martens definition of competition as a social process rather than as a set of

conditions provides a framework for considering the role of individual differences and the interaction of individual differences with situational factors within a dynamic social process. Martens model of the competitive process starts with a set of definite defining








32


conditions that represent the objective competitive situation. Next, individual differences come into play in the subjective competitive situation. Subjective perceptions influence responses, which are the actual behaviors in competition including both performance and non-performance behaviors such as state anxiety or state confidence. Finally, responses have consequences, including the obvious immediate consequences of winning or losing, as well as influences on the individual such as changes in skills or attitudes, and influences on the situation. Martens followed his discussion of competition by developed a line of research on competitive anxiety with the competition model as a framework.

Athletes of all ages and levels of ability are often under great pressure to succeed. The need for approval and to meet self-expectations or those of others, together with their tendency to link self-esteem to positive performance outcomes may cause high anxiety about the possibility of performance failure. Alternatively, anxiety may be experienced due to the pressure and expectations following success. The psychological results of these dilemmas are called "fear of failure" and "fear of success," respectively.

The most common sources of anxiety in athletes are fears of failure and resulting social disapproval or rejection (Smith 1984). One of the less fortunate aspects of sport competition is the pressure that athletes feel to meet the expectations of others, especially persons whose opinions that they value. It seems that the more an athlete succeeds, the more those expectations rise, and the more pressure increases.

Most athletes are afraid to fail (Passer, 1984). This fear, is not from the fact that the potential for losing a contest is inherent in competitive sport, but from the individuals








33


personal history. For example, when an athlete fails or loses in a competitive situation, others may respond in ways that have negative emotional and psychological consequences. Following failure, the athlete may begin to expect a negative evaluation. The individual then associates failure with more intense feelings of shame, guilt, and other unpleasant emotions. Passer concluded that fear of failure is one primary cause of the competitive trait anxiety. Even elite athletes have this trait to some extent. Most, however, are able to control it. Less successful performers generally do not, often resulting in withdrawal from the activity.

Cratty (1983) has hypothesized that in some cases athletes may be afraid to

succeed because they fear the loss of attention and support. For them, mediocrity is a safer less risky approach. There is, however, little support for this hypothesis in the sport psychology literature (McElroy & Willis, 1979; Orlick & Partington, 1986).

Performance failure under high expectancies of success may be at least partly explained by the research on choking in sport. Choking is defined as performance decrements under pressure circumstances, where pressure is defined as "any factor or combination of factors that increases the importance of performing well on a particular occasion" (Baumeister, 1984, p. 610). The causes of choking are both internal and external. Internal causes of choking include over-arousal, appraising situations as highly stressful, the loss of self-control, and expectations of failure. External causes include crowd pressure, fear of success, expectation and actions of coaches, and peer pressure.








34


Choking may result in heightened narrowing of attention and slower processing of information. A narrow focus of attention, similar to high state anxiety, is undesirable when task demands require the athlete to scan the competitive environment, looking for locations of opponents and teammates and planning strategy. Slower information processing is manifested by being easily distracted from the task at hand, poor attentional shifting between internal and external directions, slower and less accurate decisions making, more thinking and less reliance on automatic responses, and making performance errors (Boutcher, 1992). Choking can also be accompanied by physiological changes such as increased muscle tension, sweating, higher heart rate, nausea, and stomach cramps, any of which can directly influence performing sport skills.

Through his extensive research, Baumeister has found that two factors, pressure to succeed and self-consciousness (i.e., the tendency to focus attention on oneself), strongly contribute to the choking response. Individual's who are habitually selfconscious find it easier to cope with situations that promote self-consciousness (i.e., pressure situations) because they are accustomed to performing while self-conscious (Baumeister, 1984). Low self-conscious individuals choke more easily in pressure situations because going from low to high pressure is more extensive for low selfconscious individuals, who do not cope well with pressure (Baumeister, 1984). This outcome was further exacerbated when the subjects disposition of self-consciousness was low (Baumeister, 1984). Subjects with low self-conscious dispositions placed in selfconscious situations brought on by the expectations of the observers, cope least well








35


under pressure (Baumeister, 1984). Therefore, pressure creates high self-consciousness. To overcome the high self-conscious choking phenomenon, Anshel (1997) has suggested seven strategies: 1) Practice under game-like conditions, 2) improve the athletes selfconfidence, 3) keep expectations realistic, 4) put the game and sport into perspective, 5) avoid pressure statements, 6) focus externally, and 7) develop performance routines.

Arousal, Anxiety, and Stress in Sport

Arousal

Arousal has been described by a proliferation of terms. Sage (1984) and Magill (1989) discuss arousal within the construct of motivation. Cox (1990) suggests that arousal is synonymous with alertness. Martens (1987) described it as "psychic energy." Ursin (1978) and Sage (1984) contend that arousal is the same as activation. In addition to the previously mentioned, other terms such as energy, excitation, vigilance, and mental readiness have also been used to convey similar ideas (Zaichkowsky & Takenaka, 1993). The fact the so many terms have been used has led to total confusion concerning the actual construct being examined. Consequently, Neiss (1988) suggested that the arousal construct should be conceptualized into discrete "psychobiological states".

Arousal is a requisite for optimal sport performance. Reacting, thinking, and moving in sport at efficient speeds can be achieved only if the performer has established an appropriate level of physical and psychological readiness. Based on his observations and interactions with competitors, Oxedine (1970) has intuitively speculated about the level of arousal that is optimal for various sports. In short,








36


sports that require more relaxed fine motor skills such as a golf swing need markedly less arousal than relatively more powerful gross motor behaviors like those of a defensive lineman in football (Oxedine, 1970). This viewpoint, however, neglects the current understanding of individual differences as well as the multidimensional nature of arousal and anxiety. The key issues concerning arousal for athletes are determining the level of arousal that is optimal in a given situation and for a given person, establish the point of diminishing returns, and learning the proper techniques for controlling it. Anxiety

Probably all emotions are involved in sport, but perhaps the most

frequently studied dimension is anxiety. In sport, anxiety reflects the performer's feelings that something may go wrong, that the outcome may not be successful, or that performance failure may be experienced. Perhaps the performer views an opponent as superior or knows that someone is evaluating the quality of his or her performance. This can be threatening, particularly for individuals with relatively low self-confidence, low self-esteem, or a lack of previous success. Such individuals are sometimes referred to as "practice players" or "chokers." They have a tendency to "freeze-up" and perform more poorly during the contest, especially in pressure situations, then in practice.

Because anxiety results in increased central and autonomic nervous

system activity, it has been sometimes been used interchangeably with arousal








37

(e.g., Iso-Ahola & Hatfield, 1986; Klavora, 1979; Landers & Boutcher, 1993; Sage & Bennett, 1973; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982). Although anxiety results in increased physiological activity like arousal, anxiety refers to states that produce feelings of discomfort and worry, a psychological state (Spielberger, 1966). Whereas anxiety is traditionally defined as an unpleasant emotion, arousal is not automatically associated with either pleasant or unpleasant events (Weinberg & Gould, 1995).

Some authors, however, consider state anxiety an extension of high arousal (e.g., Landers & Boutcher, 1993). These authors state "When arousal levels become extremely high, you experience unpleasant emotional reactions... This maladaptive condition is often referred to as stress or state anxiety" (p. 165). Gould and Krane (1992) contend that anxiety is the emotional impact or cognitive dimension of arousal. Although both anxiety and arousal contain psychological and physiological components and manifestations, writers and researchers in sport psychology have recently recognized that the terms are not the same. The are measured differently and, in fact, require different techniques to regulate them.

An important advancement in research on the measurement of

psychological constructs was the state-trait distinction. Applying the state-trait distinction to research on psychological constructs requires clarification of whether they refer to transitory emotional states and or relatively stable individual differences in personality traits.








38

Cattell and Scheier (1961) and Spielberger (1966) were the first to categorize anxiety as having either state or trait qualities. State anxiety can be described as subjective, consciously experienced feelings of tension, apprehension, nervousness and worry, and heightened arousal or activation of the autonomic nervous system that varies in intensity and fluctuates over time. Conversely, trait anxiety is a relatively stable acquired behavioral disposition, often depicted as a personality trait. Trait anxiety predisposes an individual to perceive a wide range of nondangerous circumstances as threatening or dangerous. Individual's with high trait anxiety tends to demonstrate high levels of state anxiety. Thus, high trait anxiety athletes will likely become more anxious before a competitive event than low trait performers. State and trait anxiety tend to be moderately to highly correlated, usually about .60 or above (Gould & Krane 1992).

Over the last 30 years, researchers have focused on the multidimensional nature of anxiety contending that it has separate components that are elicited differently. Sarason (1960) identified these different dimensions of anxiety as cognitive worry and emotional arousal. Liebert and Morris (1967) labeled the two anxiety components as cognitive worry and somatic anxiety. Davidson and Schwartz (1976) and Borkevec (1976) later categorized them as cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety where cognitive anxiety is conceptualized as worry, awareness of unpleasant feelings, concerns about performance, and inability to concentrate. Somatic anxiety is the perceived physiological arousal which is reflected by physiological responses such is increased heart rate, shortness of breath, clammy hands, and butterflies and the stomach.








39


Liebert and Morris (1967) postulated that whereas somatic anxiety

increases prior to evaluation or competition, cognitive worry (anxiety) does not changed unless the individual's performance changes during this time. Sport psychology researchers concur that cognitive and somatic anxiety states followed different temporal patterns (e.g., Martens et al., 1990). Somatic anxiety is suggested to be a condition response to competitive situations, increasing rapidly close to the start of the event and decreasing significantly as competition progresses. Cognitive anxiety states result from worry about negative expectations. Therefore, cognitive anxiety before or during the competition varies only when expectations of success change (Smith & Morris, 1976). It generally remains relatively stable prior to competition. Although a considerable amount of research has been conducted, no consistent pattern of results has emerged.

Similarly, Liebert and Morris (1967) found evidence that cognitive worry and

somatic anxiety have different effects on performance. Specifically, they suggested that there has been a strong inverse relationship between cognitive worry and performance (Deffenbacher, 1977; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Spiegler, Morris, & Liebert, 1968), and that somatic anxiety is related to performance only when cognitive worry is low (Doctor & Altman, 1969; Morris & Liebert, 1970). Furthermore, cognitive anxiety has been more consistently and strongly related to performance than somatic anxiety (see Deffenbacher, 1980; Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981, for reviews).








40

Sport psychology researchers (e.g., Burton, 1988; Gould & Petrickoff, 1985; Karteroliotis & Gill, 1987; Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1983) concur that cognitive and somatic anxiety are differently related to performance. Investigations based on this concept have shown a negative link between worry and motor task performance (Adam & Van Wieringen, 1988; Lehrer & Woolfolk, 1982; Morris, Smith, Andrews, & Morris, 1975), and worry and actual or expected competitive athletic performance (Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, & Plaki, 1986; Crocker, 1989; Crocker, Alderman, & Smith, 1988; Furst & Tenebaum, 1986; Gould, Weiss, & Weinberg, 1981; Mahoney & Avener, 1977). The relationship between somatic anxiety and performance, however, has been inconsistent. Adam and Van Wieringen (1988) and Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, and Plaki (1986) found no relationship between somatic anxiety and motor task performance. Conversely, others have shown facilitative effects (actual or perceived) on simple gross motor performance (Helmers, 1991; Taylor, 1987) and fine complex motor tasks (Morris, Smith, Andrews, & Morris, 1975; Murray, 1989; Starkes & Allard, 1983). Thus, due to inconsistencies, there is a need to further examine these relationships in the sport context. Stress

There is no clear-cut distinction between stress and anxiety (Hackfort &

Schwenkmezger, 1993; Martens, 1977). Levitt (1980) cited some of the most frequently reported meanings of stress: 1). A combination of stimuli or a situation which comprises








41

the circumstances a person subjectively experiences as threatening and which can cause anxiety; 2). The process which is triggered if a person is no longer able to cope with the demands of a situation and negative consequences are to be expected in the case of failure; 3). Responses to threatening stimuli. Spielberger (1972) defined stress as closely related to state and trait anxiety.

In general, it is assumed that the stress response is directly connected with

physical, psychological, or social stimuli called stressors. The individuals subjective appraisal of these stimuli as physically or psychologically threatening results in an anxiety response. In sport, stressors include environmental and situational conditions (e.g., playing conditions), performance expectations, reactions of spectators, etc.

The Measurement of Arousal and Anxiety Arousal

Arousal has traditionally been interpreted and measured strictly as a physiological process on a continuum ranging from deep sleep to high expectations (Duffy, 1957). Arousal is often determined by changes in heart and respiratory rate, extent of sweating, and other physiological measures (Duffy, 1957). Neiss (1990), however, stated: "By focusing on the elevated physiology and ignoring its psychological context, the construct of arousal lumps together grossly disparate states (e.g., joy, grief, anger) resulting in a breadth that explains nothing". (p. 102) Therefore, it is now also being measured by its emotional aspects, such as positive feelings (excitement, and happiness) and negative








42


feelings (fear, embarrassment, and depression) (Anshel, 1985; Oxedine, 1970) as well as its physiological characteristics.

Arousal results in numerous physiological and psychological changes. Sport psychology researchers have attempted to assess levels of arousal by physiological indicators such as heart rate, blood pressure, and Galvanic Skin Response, as well as selfreport inventories like the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), Sport Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT; Martens, 1977), and Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1983). The general shift among researchers has been toward using multidimensional instruments like the CSAI-2, which assesses cognitive and somatic state anxiety along with state confidence, and to take both physiological and psychological measurements. However, one of the frustrations that researcher's experience is that there are typically low correlations between self-report scales and physiological/biological measures.

Lacey and Lacey (1958) suggest that there a number of reasons for these low

intercorrelations. First, individuals differ vastly in how the reflect arousal symptoms. One athlete may demonstrate elevated arousal with increases in heart rate or muscle tension, whereas another may experience it entirely cognitively or any combination of the above. Secondly, there is always potential for measurement errors. Physiological instruments may need to be periodically calibrated, and in the case or questionnaires, social








43

desirability (i.e., under or overestimation) may override the scale's ability to discriminate between different arousal levels.

Anxiety

Anxiety is not usually measured physiologically for several reasons. First, there is no single physiological response to the anxiety state (Sonstroem, 1984). Second, anxiety is typically viewed as a feeling; a person's perception or the appraisal of the situation. Individual's somatic response to appraisals of exhilaration may be similar to appraisals of threat, harm, or challenge. As Hackfort and Schwenkmetzger (1989) point out, "An increase in heart rate can occur both in the context of the emotion anxiety and in reactions of joy or anger" (p. 59). Further, the relationship between two physiological measures of anxiety, for example heart rate and sweating, is quite low about 10 (Hackfort & Schwenkmetzger 1989). Fourth, the nervous system response to anxiety differs among individuals. While some person's sweat profusely when nervous, others don't sweat at all. Finally, and individual may experience feelings of stress without experiencing the harmful physiological effects often associated with stress. This is important because an athlete, coach, or sport psychologist may incorrectly assume the athlete is anxious if the conclusion is based on the performer's heart rate rather than the persons self-reported feelings.

A person's subjective feelings about how well he or she views the competitive situation is the single of most important issue in measuring and in experiencing anxiety.








44


Based on the notion that athletes react to situational demands, Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith (1983) developed a sport specific, multidimensional state anxiety inventory known as the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2). The CSAI-2 is a 27-item scale that measures both state cognitive and somatic anxiety and selfconfidence. Competitive state anxiety is defined as conscious feelings of apprehension and tension due mainly to the individual's perception of the present or upcoming situation as threatening (Martens et al., 1990). Since its induction, the CSAI-2 has been the most commonly utilized multidimensional measure of competitive state anxiety in sport (Krane, 1994).

Martens and colleagues (1983) have argued that somatic anxiety should influence performance less than cognitive anxiety because it reaches its peak at the onset of a competition and dissipates over the course of the event. Conversely, cognitive state anxiety may increases during competition because of social and self-evaluation that occur during the event. The increase in cognitive state anxiety causes stronger and more consistent performance decrements. However, many studies have generally failed to find a strong relationship between sport performance and the CSAI-2 subcomponents (e.g., Caruso, Dzewaltowski, Gill, & McElroy, 1990; Krane & Williams, 1987; Martens et al., 1983; Maynard & Howe, 1987; McAuley, 1985).

In their initial study, Martens and his associates (1983) found no relationship between the precompetitive CSAI-2 subscale assessments and initial golf performance score on the first nine holes, but found significant relationships between precompetitive








45


cognitive and somatic CSAI-2 subscale scores and performance score on the last nine holes. McAuley (1985) found no relationship between precompetitive CSAI-2 scores and golf performance over 10-18 hole tournament rounds.

In another series of investigations, Gould, Petlichkoff, and Weinberg (1984) and Gould and Petlichkoff (1985) found significant relationships between precompetitive CSAI-2 cognitive and somatic anxiety scores and wrestling performance in some matches, but not in others. The findings of Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, and Vevera (1987) suggested that cognitive anxiety was not related to pistol shooting performance, that somatic anxiety was related to performance in a curvilinear inverted-U fashion, and that confidence was negatively related to performance.

In a different line of study, Karteroliotis and Gill (1987) used to CSAI-2 to examine temporal changes in psychological and physiological components of state anxiety. The results of their study confirmed the multidimensional nature of state anxiety and provided further evidence for the independence of cognitive worry and somatic anxiety. However, both dimensions followed similar temporal patterns prior to and during competition. Finally, the results confirmed the nonsignificant relationship between psychological and physiological measures of anxiety. In summary, then, research examining the relationship between CSAI-2 subscale scores and performance has been inconsistent suggesting further investigation and/or alternative methods.

Some explanations have been reported to account for the inconsistent CSAI-2 performance relationship findings. First, the CSAI-2 may not be a consistent and








46


powerful predictor of athletic performance (Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987). Second, it is possible that the predicted CSAI-2 performance relationships were not demonstrated because of the way in which CSAI-2 data were examined and/or the way performance was assessed (Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987).

Problems in previous investigations include a lack of standardized performance measures, the use of between group as opposed to intraindividual analyses, the failure to employing statistical analyses that detect curvilinear relationships, and the failure to create or assess at least three distinct levels of anxiety. With regard to between subject analyses, Sonstroem and Bernardo (1982) found that absolute levels of state anxiety show little relationship to performance. In contrast, they demonstrate consistent relationship around the subjects when individual optimal levels of state anxiety are examined. Thus, based on the Sonstroem and Bernardo (1982) findings, it may be more appropriate to examine intraindividual relationships between CSAI-2 levels of state anxiety and performance. Finally, it is important to recognize that to statistically examine whether linear relationships exist, researchers must make at least three different anxiety assessments (Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987).

Another factor that decreases the predictability of anxiety measures is be athlete ability to adapt to potential anxiety provoking situations in sport. Identifying anxiety levels and predicting performance based on a single measure apparently has its limitations. In fact, some psychologists contend that merely labeling a person's feelings or behaviors as anxious and communicating this observation to the competitor might








47


actually provoke additional, more intense feelings of anxiety and possibly erode performance further.

Of particular interest for this study is that in the Martens et al. (1983) and

McAuley (1985) studies, task demands changed as a function of the characteristics of the front and back nine holes, golf course, and/or the course the tournament itself was played on. That is, in these studies changing task demands may have confounded or masked any relationship between state anxiety and performance. Similarly, emotional states may have changed from shot to shot depending on the results of the last shot, a player's confidence with a particular club or type of shot, and performance of competitors. A better test of this relationship must be made where the task demands are held constant from one CSAI2 assessment to another (Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987).

One of the major reasons for the contradictory results in the anxiety research is it is generally measured from days to moments prior to and/or after an event. This obviously does not take into any consideration any changes in affect due to performance fluctuations or other situational variables or changes during the event. Another is that it is generally believe to have a detrimental affect on performance. Jones (1991), and Jones and Swain (1995), however, have recently argued that anxiety may have a positive influence on performance. They suggest that to gain a better understanding of the anxiety performance relationship researchers should consider athlete's interpretation of their anxiety symptoms in addition to intensity. A series of studies have supported the distinction between the intensity and direction of anxiety (e.g., Jones, Hanton, & Swain,








48


1994; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Swain & Jones, 1996). A major finding in these studies was that although the intensity of the anxiety may be the same, it was the individual's interpretation of the anxiety symptoms that ultimately influenced performance.

As anxiety theory and research have advanced, this notion of "direction" has been forwarded in the measurement of competitive anxiety. The focus of this research challenged the traditional assumption that elevated anxiety is debilitating toward performance (see Jones, 1995, for a review). Consequently, recent empirical studies have incorporated a modified version of the CSAI-2, which includes a direction scale developed by Jones and Swain (1992) to measure facilitative and debilitating interpretations of anxiety symptoms (e.g., Hanton & Jones, 1999b; Jones, Hanton, & Swain, 1994; Jones & Swain, 1992, 1995; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Maynard, Hemmings, & Warwick-Evans, 1995; Maynard, Smith, & Warwick-Evans, 1995). Results from the Jones and colleagues studies (Jones, Hanton, & Swain, 1994; Jones & Swain, 1995; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993) suggest that more elite, more competitive, and better performers in competition interpret the intensity of their anxiety symptoms as more facilitative compared to less elite, less competitive, or poorer performers, despite no differences in anxiety intensity levels between them.

Jones's (1995) approach to measuring facilitative/debilitative competitive anxiety is based on Carver and Scheier's (1988) control theory model of anxiety. Carver and Scheier's model focuses on perceived control over coping and goal attainment as an








49


important mediator of how anxiety is interpreted, with positive expectations of control leading to facilitative anxiety and negative control expectations promoting more debilitating anxiety responses. Hardy has presented a similar model based on processing efficiency theory (Eysenck, 1982, 1992; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), which focuses on selfconfidence as a key mediator of the facilitative/debilitating effects of cognitive anxiety on performance. Interestingly, both models are closely related to Lazarus' (1991) model of emotion, with one small difference. Lazarus has suggested that negative expectations of goal attainment and coping should lead to negative emotions such as cognitive anxiety, whereas positive goal attainment and coping expectations should prompt the development of more positive emotions, such as challenge, excitement and self-confidence.

Lately, researchers have also realized the need for expedient measures of

competitive anxiety. To accurately assess the anxiety-performance relationship, it is necessary to obtain anxiety measures prior to competition and also throughout a performance (Gould & Krane, 1992; Krane, 1992; Vealey, 1990). Realizing the necessity for a less intrusive measure of competitive anxiety, Murphy, Greenspan, Jowdy, and Tammen (1989) developed the Mental Readiness Form (MRF). The MRF contains three items that were designed to correlate with the three subscales of the CSAI-2. This scale was developed as an alternative to the CSAI-2 when expediency is an important concern. The three items are rated on bipolar continuous scales with anchorings of calm/worried (cognitive anxiety), relaxed/tense (somatic anxiety), and confident/scared (confidence). A 10-centimeter line on which respondents mark a spot corresponding to how they feel








5o


separates the anchor terms. Scores can range from 0 to 100. The three items can be completed in a few seconds, compared to 3 to 10 minutes needed to complete the CSAI2. Correlations between the MRF items and CSAI-2 subscales were found to be between .58 and .63 (Murphy, Greenspan, Jowdy, & Tammen, 1989).

Krane (1992) later modified the scale into an 11-point Likert format to invoke fewer respondent mistakes during completion. Correlations between the MRF-Likert items and CSAI-2 subscales have ranged between .52 and .79 (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1996; Krane, 1992; Krane, 1994; Krane & Finch, 1992). Krane (1994) again adjusted the scale due to concerns that the anchor terms were not bipolar opposites. Therefore, the MRF-3 incorporated the following anchor terms: "worried-not worried", "tense-not tense", and "confident-not confident." Correlations between the MRF-3 and CSAI-2 ranged from .58 to .77.

Similarly, Cox, Russell, and Robb (1994) have developed a quick and

nonintrusive assessment of competitive state anxiety to correlate with the CSAI-2 named the Anxiety Rating Scale (ARS). The ARS also contains three items in the form of statements which the respondents rate using a 7-point ordinal scale ranging from I (not at all) to 7 (intensely so). The statements include "I feel concerned about performing poorly and that others will be disappointed with my performance" (cognitive anxiety), "I feel nervous, my body feels tight and/or my stomach tense" (somatic anxiety), and "I feel secure, mentally relaxed, and confident of coming through under pressure" (selfconfidence). Responses to the ARS have been shown to be positively correlated with the








51


responses to the three subscales of the CSAI-2 (cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence) .60, .72, and .59, respectively (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1996). Furthermore, they found no correlational differences between the ARS and MRF-Likert when compared to the CSAI-2 (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1996). Therefore, both appear to be valid measures of competitive state anxiety. To date, however, there have been no investigations utilizing these measures during performance.

Self-confidence

The relationship between self-confidence and sport performance has received increased attention in recent years. Sport psychologists, coaches, and researchers agree that self-confidence is one of the most important psychological constructs for success in sport competition (e.g., Bandura, 1991 Feltz, 1988; Martens et al., 1990; McAuley & Tammen, 1989). Some confusion, however, has emerged due to the proliferation of terms and definitions used to describe it. For instance, Feltz (1988) defines self-confidence as "to believe that one can successfully execute a specific activity rather than a global trait that account for overall performance optimism. For example, one may have a high degree of self-confidence in one's driving ability in golf and low degree of selfconfidence in putting" (p. 423). Self-confidence, as defined by Feltz, is essentially the same as self-efficacy, a construct defined by Bandura (1977b). Others have used the terms sport-confidence (Vealey, 1986a), perceived competence (Harter, 1978, 1981, 1982; Nicholls, 1980, 1984), outcome expectancies (Rotter, 1954) and movement confidence (Griffin & Keough, 1982) in their research.








52


Sport Psychologists have traditionally adopted three approaches in studying selfconfidence and sport: self-efficacy theory, models of perceived competence, and performance expectancies. Perhaps the most documented and theoretically sound theory of self-confidence is Bandura's (1977b) self-efficacy theory (e.g., Feltz, 1982; Feltz, Landers, & Raeder, 1979; Gould, Hodge, Peterson, & Giannini, 1989; McAuley & Gill, 1983a; Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979; Weinberg, Gould, Yukelson, & Jackson, 1981; Weinberg, Yukelson, & Jackson, 1980). As evident in the title, Bandura uses the phrase self-efficacy to describe individual's perception of self-confidence or competence.

According to Bandura, self-efficacy is enhanced through successful performance, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and emotional arousal. Numerous studies have been conducted in which the relationship between self-efficacy and performance have been examined. In general, results have shown positive correlations between selfefficacy and performance in both sport settings (e.g., Gayton, Matthews, & Burchstead, 1986; Weiss, Wiese, & Klint, 1989) and in a laboratory (e.g., Feltz & Riessinger, 1990; Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979).

Similarly, conceptual models of perceived competence (e.g., Harter, 1978;

Nicholls, 1984) have been adapted to sport in an attempt to predict achievement behavior (Feltz & Brown, 1984; Roberts, Klieber, & Duda, 1981; Spink & Roberts, 1980). Harter's competence motivational theory (1978, 1981) proposes that individuals possess an inherent desire to feel and express personal competence and control in the various achievement situations they encounter. Harter maintains that the positive self-related








53


affective feelings that accompany successful mastery experiences serve to further enhance the competence motive. Conversely, the perception that one lacks the requisite competence needed to achieve mastery, or that one does not possess adequate situational control, tends to be accompanied by negative affect in the form of anxiety, which attenuates the competence motive. Several sport related studies have supported Harter's concept of self-competence (e.g., Klint & Weiss, 1987; Ulrich, 1987). Her instrumentation, however, was developed solely for children.

Other researchers have used performance expectancies to operationalize selfconfidence in an attempt to predict behavior in sport (Corbin, 1981; Corbin, Landers, Feltz, & Senior, 1983; Corbin & Nix, 1979; Nelson & Furst, 1972; Scanlon & Passer, 1979). Bandura (1986), however, contends that self-efficacy beliefs predict performance better than expected outcomes.

A more recent approach to studying the relationship between athletic performance and self-confidence was proposed by Vealey (1986a). Based on the self-efficacy, perceived competence, and performance expectancy literature, Vealey conceptualized a more sport specific form of confidence she termed "sport-confidence." Sport confidence is defined as "the belief or degree of certainty individuals possessed about their ability to be successful in sport" (Vealey 1986a p. 222). In line with Spielberger's trait-state distinction, sport-confidence was operationalized into state and trait sport-confidence. Trait sport-confidence is defined as "the belief or degree of certainty individuals usually possessed about their ability to be successful in sport", whereas state sport-confidence is








54


defined as "the degree or believe of certainty individuals possess at a particular moment about their ability to be successful in sport" (Vealey, 1986a, p. 223).

Vealey's model suggests that sport-confidence is a function of an athlete's

personality trait of confidence, the situation, and their competitive orientation. These three factors interact to produce the psychological state of sport confidence. State sportconfidence in turn influences the quality of an athlete's behavioral response or athletic performance. Successful athletic performance results in feelings of self-confidence and satisfaction. Overall, researchers have demonstrated that self-confidence is a result of successful experiences and athletes high in self-confidence are more likely to experience success (McAuley & Tammen, 1989).

Psychologists and researchers concur that cognitive change is not determined by behavior per se, but how well individuals perceive their behavior (Bandura, 1977b; Bandura, Reese, & Adams, 1982; Harter, 1978; Martens, 1975). Positive subjective outcomes such as perceptions of success and feelings of competence, pride, and satisfaction seem likely to enhance self-confidence. These outcomes should increase the degree of certainty concerning successful in sport. On the other hand, negative subjective outcomes or perceptions of failure, feelings of inadequacy, disdain, and dissatisfaction are predicted to undermine self-confidence by facilitating uncertainty about the ability to succeed. Also, depending on how well behavior is perceived, achievement motivation may become more performance or outcome orientated.








55


Self-confidence and Anxiety

Researchers have proposed that self-confidence is an important variable in

determining the anxiety-performance relationship (e.g., Hardy, 1990; Hardy & Jones, 1990; Jones, 1995). Evidence exists showing that both self-confidence and anxiety influence performance. Some have suggested that self-confidence enhances performance whereas cognitive anxiety impairs it (Feltz, 1988; Martens et al., 1990). Others have argued that cognitive anxiety may be beneficial (e.g., Hardy, 1990). Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith (1990) and Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg (1984) suggested that cognitive anxiety (i.e., worry) is negatively related to self-confidence. It is possible that athletes who have low self-confidence in their ability to perform might interpret anxiety symptoms as debilitating (Eysenyk, 1992; Jones & Hardy, 1996). Preliminary results by Jones, Swain, and Hardy (1993) have revealed that self-confidence intensity correlates more strongly with athlete's directional interpretation of their cognitive and somatic anxiety symptoms than with the intensity of the symptoms.

The majority of the work on determining the relationship between self-confidence in anxiety has involved the use of the CSAI-2. The CSAI-2 was originally intended to measure cognitive and somatic anxiety. During the validation of the measure, however, the factor analysis split cognitive anxiety into two factors. One that included negatively phrased items and the other that comprised of positive phrased items. They proposed that it is possible that self-confidence may be a part of cognitive anxiety that represents the positive aspect of anxiety and therefore, chose to label the second factor self-confidence.








56


This suggestion is questionable since cognitive anxiety and self-confidence factors were derived from factor analyses with the purpose of identifying orthogonal factors.

Many athletes have suggested that they can be confident but also have self-doubts regarding their performance at the same time (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). A few studies have supported the independence of self-confidence from cognitive anxiety (e.g., Hardy, 1996a; Jones, Swain, & Cale, 1990, 1991). Hardy (1996a) demonstrated that selfconfidence can account for a significant portion of the variance of golf performance, over and above the variance accounted for by cognitive and somatic anxiety. Jones and colleagues (1990, 1991) suggested that the two factors are independent after examining the precompetitive temporal patterns and antecedents of cognitive anxiety and selfconfidence. In addition, correlational studies have shown that the two factors share less than 40% common variance (Gould et al., 1984; Jones & Cale, 1989; Martens et al., 1990).

Although many researchers have investigated the anxiety and the self-confidence constructs, there is no clear understanding regarding the relationship between the two. Bandura (1986) has proposed that self-efficacy should lead to reduced anxiety. Borkovek (1976) and Eysenyck (1984) however, have disagreed. The confusion may stem from the failure of past researchers to examine athlete's interpretation of their symptoms. The arrival of the modified CSAI-2 may help to resolve this issue.








57


Anger

Like most other psychological constructs, the construct of anger, as

conceptualized by Spielberger (1996), has two major components: state and trait anger. State anger is defined as an emotional state marked by subjective feelings that vary in intensity from mild annoyance or irritation to intense fury and rage, which is accompanied by muscular tension and arousal of the autonomic nervous system (Spielberger, 1996). The intensity of anger varies over time as a function of the perceived injustice, attack or unfair treatment by others, and frustration resulting from barriers to goal-directed behavior (Spielberger, 1996). Thus, the experience of anger incorporates high levels or arousal, one's perception of frustration, and one's subsequent reaction to the frustration (Novaco, 1975). Conversely, trait anger is described as the disposition to perceive a wide range of situations as annoying or frustrating and the tendency to experience state anger more frequently and with great intensity.

Symptoms of anger may include any of the following: changes in muscle tension, elevated heart-rate, respiratory rate, and blood pressure, flushing, twitching, sweating, losing self-control, feeling hot, and so on. What prompts individuals to get angry and how they react afterwards differs. There is great physical variation in the experiences of anger. Some say that anger makes them feel good. Others say it makes them feel sick and still others have a wide range of symptoms. The array of physical reactions to anger is also match by the array of








58


causes of anger. One provocation may have an impact on a certain individual but no affect on others. Emotions may emerge and differ primarily because of the situations in which they occur and because of the interpretations that are given to body states, both psychologically and physiologically.

According to Tavris (1989), anger depends on whether your physiological arousal occurs before or after a specific provocation. Anger depends on some things you are aware of, such as performance outcome, and others that you may not be aware of, such as heart rate and epinephrine level (Tavris, 1989). Frustration, noise, crowds, alcohol, and sport do not instinctively generate or 'release' anger; they generate physiological arousal, which, when coupled with a psychological provocation, can become the feeling of anger (Tavris, 1989). Meichenbaum and Cameron (1983) concurred, describing anger as an affective response to stressful situations, during which a person experiences high levels of physiological and psychological arousal.

The failure to understand the connection between arousal, perception, attitude, and aggression can lead to anxious feelings and the expression of frustration. Frustration causes many reactions, including annoyance, and potentially aggression. Frustration is often infuriating. The blocking of a goal (frustration) may activate an aggressive drive (anger) which in turn may cause aggressive behavior. Between frustration and anger, as between anger and aggression, lie the mind and culture. Whether or not frustration makes one angry








59


depends on several intermediate, learned conditions: How has one learned to cope with things that have not gone desirably? Are there extenuating circumstances that make the frustration seem legitimate, or at least tolerable? Is there an element of perfectionism involved ? Frustration, therefore, may never surface if the task at hand is unimportant or if one accepts a certain degree or incompetence. Frustration more often occurs when expectations are high and results do not meet expectations. Among the list of things that make most people feel angry, frustration has to take its place right after attacks to self-esteem (e.g., criticism, direct insults, or unfair treatment). When one feels unfairly deprived of something that is deserved, then frustration is likely to lead to feelings of anger.

The high arousal that is generally produced by competition makes emotion more likely, from exhilaration to anger, depending on performance outcome, what spectators or competitors do, the rules of the game, or the provocation. The extent to which arousal increases the likelihood of anger depends on the ambiguity or certainty of the cause of the arousal. The specific emotion an athlete feels, then, depends on circumstances of the sport. Temper tantrums may energize some individuals in sports that require high arousal, but high arousal in sports like golf is generally a prescription for destruction. The Expression of Anger

The anger reaction is often a combination of the individual's appraisal, perception, importance of the event, effort, outcome uncertainty, and so on.








60


People who experience emotions intensely have typical ways of thinking; they events are personalized; selective attention is paid to the emotion provoking aspects of events; overgeneralization often occurs where a single event is taken as a sign of the general state of the world. Further, there is both positive and negative exaggeration.

Emotion cannot be separated from the physical and mental rigors of life. The psychological factors involved in anger range from immediate perceptions of an event to one's basic philosophy of life. Anger and its expression are therefore a result of biology, culture, mind, and body.

Suppressed and repressed anger are two terms that are often used

interchangeable to mean any of the following: Anger that is felt but not expressed openly and directly; anger that should be felt toward someone else, but instead is direct inward; and unconscious anger that is blocked from awareness because it is to threatening to the ego. The prevailing belief that it would ""hurt" to suppress anger and that it is "instinctive" and "healthy" to ventilate it confuses two things: The physical state of high energy and excitement generated by many competitive games, and what players do with that energy. Expressing anger has no effect on the reduction of anger (Berkowitz, 1970). However, some expressions of anger work for athletes, it energizes them making them focus and concentrate on subsequent attempts (Kiester, 1984; Tavris, 1989). These circumstances, however, pale in comparison to the destructive influences of anger.








61


Controlling Anger

The direction of anger is not related to the ability to master stress. The ability to adjust to stress is related to a person's emotional style. There is one anger strategy that seems to produce the lowest blood pressure of all, and it is neither exclusively to suppress anger nor to ventilate it. Controlling stress involves developing habitual reactions to stress that allows one to cope successfully, restoring the sense of control over a challenging but difficult situation, and reducing bodily arousal. Suppressed anger is unlikely to have consequences if the situation that is causing the anger is perceived as controllable, if the anger is interpreted as the sign of a grievance to be corrected instead of as an emotion to be sullenly protected, and if a more productive reaction is committed to. The only way in to get at the real sources of stress is to be organized and systematic in the approach.

Modern anger intervention strategists recognize that simply ventilating anger is not enough to solve the immediate problem or change habitual patterns. Successful therapies attack the mind (teaching the person to identify the perceptions and interpretations that generate anger), the body (teaching relaxation and cooling off techniques to help the person calm down), and behavior (teaching new habits and skills). Novaco (1975, 1985) who developed a "stress inoculation program", believes the first step in anger management is for the individual to become an expert on his or her anger. For example, recognizing what triggers the








62


anger; the frequency of anger; the intensity of anger; the duration of the anger; the mode of expression; and the consequences of the expression.

What happens, as Novaco observes, is that people begin to see a pattern to their anger that occurs in particular situations, or with particular people, or under particular provocations. The person then begins to see that anger is not entirely in the self but in the situation, and the focus of the solution changes. Recognizing the pattern demystifies the emotion, showing the individual that anger is not an uncontrollable force. Next, because anger is evoked, maintained, and inflamed by statements made to ourselves and others when provoked, Novaco teaches people how to control anger the same way, by reinterpreting the supposed provocation. For example "it's only a game, it's not a life or death situation". This is what people who are slow to anger do naturally. They rationalize the situation or empathize with the other person's behavior and try to find justification for it.

In one of the few sport-related studies on anger control, Jones (1993) used a modified stress inoculation intervention to reduce the competitive anger of an elite racket sport player. The player had a problem with temperament on the court, becoming angry and frustrated in pressure situations. At 3 and 6-month intervals following the intervention, the player demonstrated improvements in ability to cope with pressure situations. In a more recent study, Brunelle, Janelle, and Tennant (1999) employed role-playing and anger awareness interventions to facilitate anger control in competitive soccer players.








63


What all successful therapeutic programs share is the ability to teach

individuals to recognize the perceptions of anger, to communicate them without threatening others, and to solve the conflicts that produce the problem. They teach people that anger is only one tactic, and usually not a very productive one in solving problems. They recognize that anger can be destructive, but can also be a useful symptom that can lead to constructive changes (Tavris, 1989). Anger does not disappear when people learn these skills. It teaches them how to cope with it. The less they need to be angry, and the more control they have over their anger, the less often the feel the emotion in the first place. (Tavris, 1989).

Many coaches, athletes, and sport psychology practitioners' emphasis anger control. Jim Loehr, former director of sport psychology at The Nick Bollettieri Tennis Academy, stated:

In sports competition, players tend to respond to challenge in one of four ways. Some withdraw emotion and energy, giving up. Some struggle on
with so much negative emotion that they become enraged and ineffective.
Some become nervous, which may spur them to try harder. The ideal reaction... is the "challenge response," which is putting yourself 100
percent back into the game, using emotions in a focused way. The result
of the ability to control anger is that people feel less angry, not more. They
become better players, not so impulsive. (as cited in Tavris, 1989, p. 189) More experienced athletes may have developed this ability. Less proficient athletes, however, generally have not. Actually, the best evidence to show that the expression of anger makes individuals angrier, riles them up rather than cooling them off, comes from the sports in which the expression of anger would be








64


detrimental to players, where it would break the concentration and cause poor performance instead of recharged efforts. Temper tantrums are infrequent during play in golf, bowling, and chess. Golfers who allow themselves to become upset when they miss a shot do not do well on the next one. For example, at the 2000 PGA Championship, David Duval lost his temper on the final few holes on the tournament and lost the match. It's the players with the best self-discipline that succeeded. Sandy Lyle once said that the secret of his success at golf was the refrain that his father taught him to say: "Tempo, not temper." Knowledge is power--in this case, to decide act on the provocation and let it affect you, or to calm oneself down and refocus (Tavris, 1989).

The Anxiety-Arousal-Performance Relationship Drive Theory

Drive theory was originally developed by Hull (1943, 1951) and later modified by Spence and Spence (1966). Drive theory represents a complex stimulus response theory of motivation and learning. According to drive theory, performance (P) is a function of habit (H) times drive (D), where P = H x D. In sport and motor performance, habit is equivalent to the dominant response (skill or lack there of) and drive is equivalent to physiological arousal. A basic premise of drive theory is that increases in drive or arousal result in a linear increase or decrease in performance. In early stages of learning or when a task is very complex, increased arousal will increase the execution of the dominant or best learned skill. Unfortunately for beginners, the dominant response is likely to be the








65


incorrect one thereby resulting in poor execution. Conversely, later in learning when the dominant response is more likely to be correct, increased arousal leads to better performance.

The original appeal of drive theory was that it helped to explain the relationship between learning and arousal, not just performance and arousal. Martens (1974), however, pointed out that studies on drive theory have yielded inconsistent results. Subsequently, many other researchers have criticized drive theory for a multitude of reasons. Gill criticized it because it predicts a linear as opposed to curvilinear relationship between sport performance and arousal (1986) and for its failure to consider thought or appraisal (1994). Others have argued that the linear relationship between arousal and performance exist only for gross motor activities such as strength, endurance, and speed tasks (Oxedine, 1984), and that it does not adequately explain the arousal-performance relationship for complex motor tasks (Weinberg, 1979) or sport situations (Landers & Boutcher, 1993). Consequently, early proponents of drive theory have given way to more widely accepted theories such as the inverted-U. The Inverted-U Theory

One of the most widely excepted views of the relationship between performance and arousal is Yerkes and Dodson's (1908) inverted-U theory. The premise of this theory is that the relationship between performance and arousal is curvilinear as opposed a linear and takes the form of an inverted-U. Simply stated, as arousal increases there is a corresponding increase in performance until an optimal level is reached. Further








66


increases beyond the optimal level results in performance decrement. This curvilinear relationship between performance and arousal is well documented in the literature for such tasks as reaction time (Lansing, Schwartz, & Lindsay, 1956; Levitt & Gutin, 1971), auditory tracking (Stennet, 1957), hand steadiness (Martens & Landers, 1970), and in athletic performance (Klavora, 1978; Burton, 1988; Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons & Vevera, 1987; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982; Weinberg & Ragan, 1978).

Like drive theory, however, the inverted-U theory has also been criticized. One of the major limitations of the inverted-U theory is that it assumes.the relationship between performance and arousal is symmetrical and orderly, and in sport, performance decrements rarely occur in an orderly or smooth manner (Cox, Qiu, & Liu, 1993). Further, the hypothesis fails to recognize the multidimensional nature of arousal (Jones, 1990) and anxiety (Hardy & Fazey, 1987). Further, the hypothesis does not take into consideration the perceptions and interpretations of the athlete regarding the arousal or anxiety symptoms (Apter, 1984; Gill, 1994). Catastrophe Theory

Recently, several alternatives to the inverted-U hypothesis have been proposed. One of them, the catastrophe theory (Thom, 1975), proposes that changes and performance associated with increases in arousal may be drastic and catastrophic in nature rather than gradual or orderly. Hardy (1990) has contended that the inverted-U hypothesis describes the relationship between stress and performance but does not reflect anecdotal evidence in sport that the relationship should not be symmetrical. Thus,








67


contrary to the inverted-U hypothesis, overexcited athletes suffer a rapid, not a gradual, drop in their performance and are not able to quickly return to desirable levels. Although originally proposed by Thom (1975) as a mathematical model to explain physical world phenomenon, it has since been adapted by the Zeeman (1976) and Hardy and associates (Fazey & Hardy, 1988; Hardy, 1990) for application in the social sciences and sport respectively. Regarding sport, catastrophe theory predicts that when an athlete experiences excessive levels of arousal, there will be a large and dramatic decline in performance (Gould & Krane, 1992).

The inverted-U hypothesis and catastrophe theory share the prediction that higher state anxiety will improve performance up toward optimal level. However, where as the inverted-U predicts that further increased arousal or anxiety will impair performance in a curvilinear manner, catastrophe theory predicts that further physiological arousal and cognitive anxiety will result in a large and dramatic decline in performance. Thus, the relationship between physiological arousal and performance depends on the performance level of cognitive anxiety; only when cognitive anxiety is high in combination with high physiological arousal will there be catastrophic changes in performance and a choking response may result. Hardy (1996a,b) also suggests that athletes should most benefit (perform best) when cognitive anxiety is high and somatic anxiety is low.

The strengths of this theory, according to Gould and Krane (1992), are that it addresses the effects of both physiological and cognitive dimensions of arousal on performance, and that it reflects actual sport conditions more realistically. Rarely in sport








68


is the relationship between anxiety and performance perfectly symmetrical and predictable. Conversely, Gould and Krane suggest that catastrophe theory is overly complex and requires numerous assessments of the same athletes over time to test it. And unfortunately, this is not often feasible and is rarely done. At present, there is little empirical support for this theory. Therefore, the validity of catastrophe theory awaits further review by researchers.

Optimal Arousal Zones

Several researchers have expanded on the notion of the inverted-U to include a zone or range of optimal arousal. Through his extensive work with Russian athletes, Hanin (1980, 1989) developed what he termed the "zone of optimal functioning". In the zone theory, each athlete has a range of arousal within which maximum performance may result. Like Hanin, Martens (1987) used the concept of zones in what he called optimal psychic energy. The notion of a zone of optimal functioning is intuitively appealing because it allows for individual differences as well as intra-athlete differences in optimal arousal levels (Zaichkowsky & Takenaka, 1993).

Several investigators have experimented with this approach and have reported success. For example, Loehr (1991, as cited in Zaichkowski & Takenaka, 1993) used heart-rate monitors to aid elite tennis players in becoming aware of heart rate values that correspond to optimal performance. Similarly, Davis (1991) used heart rate monitors in his work with professional hockey players in attempting to help them become aware of their optimal zone. Further, Zaichkowski (1991) has collected extensive data on elite and








69


youth athletes from various sports examining optimal zones. Finally, Annesi (1998) recently used the optimal zone model to implement a multimodal treatment to alleviate pre-competitive anxiety.

Reversal Theory

Based on the work of Apter (1982, 1984), Kerr (1985a,b, 1989) proposed an

alternative explanation for the relationship between arousal and performance which he termed "reversal". Reversal theory attempts to explain the inconsistencies associated with human motivation, emotion, and cognition. Originally, Apter (1982) proposed that metamotivational states determine how arousal is interpreted. Metamotivation states are conceptualized as alternative states in which the individual can experience different motives at any moment. These changes are called "reversals." Hence, the theory's title. According to Kerr (1989), high and low levels of arousal can be interpreted by the individual in two different ways. High arousal can be experience by the individual as either anxiety or excitement. Similarly, low arousal can be perceived as either boredom or relaxation. The concept of psychological reversals stems from the individual's shift in interpreting his or her feelings. For example, engaging in dangerous, risk-taking tasks such as sky diving induces heightened arousal, call anxiety in this theory. However, when the dangerous task becomes mastered than the same arousal state becomes excitement. These psychological reversals alter a person's emotional state significantly. The athlete's interpretation of arousal states is viewed as central to the ability to explain and predict the








70


effect of emotion on sport performance. This theory is relatively new and at present has received little empirical support.

Self-Regulation

Self-regulation has been long recognized as an important construct for

understanding achievement in sport participation (Ferrari, Pinard, Reid, & BouffardBouchard, 1991; Hardy & Nelson, 1988; Kirschenbaum, 1984, 1987). Zimmerman (1989) suggested that self-regulation during learning is not developed naturally; therefore, there is a necessity to teach self-regulation strategies to most learners. Self-regulated learning refers to the process by which individuals exercise control over their thinking, affect, and behavior as they acquire knowledge and skills (Zimmerman, 1989). Ferrari et al. (1991) defined self-regulation as "actions occurring during the actual performance of a cognitive task that allows an individual to control, or direct his own activity through self-imposed rules or regulations that better adapt his performance to different circumstances or surroundings" (p. 139). Researchers have discussed the importance of developing cognitive and mental skills and have described limiting emotional factors such as anxiety and aggression. Subsequently, they have attempted to originate complex theories of psychoregulation where all components of performance abilities and skills are represented, brought into relevant relation to each other, and can be controlled for optimal realization in competition.








71


Self-regulation is based in part on cybernetic theory and control theory.

Cybernetics theory presents conceptual mechanisms to explain the process of selfregulation, while control theory offers a behavioral approach to guide selfregulation (Crews, 1993).

Cybernetics is the science of human control systems that deals with the

comparative study of the various systems in the body (Crews, 1993). Cybernetic theory addresses "how" a system becomes self-regulatory (Schwartz, 1979). Cybernetic theory is based on a negative feedback or closed loop system in which the behavior (or output) of a system is used to modify the input (Crews, 1993). Essentially, the output is used to increase the likelihood of the correct response occurring repeatedly (Schwartz, 1979). Errors detected during output serve to correct subsequent procedures.

Within cybernetics theory, Kirschenbaum (1984) proposed a five stage-working model to fully explain the process of self-regulation for the athlete or exercisers. This model is based on complex interactions between cognitions (e.g., goal setting, evaluating), affect (emotional states), physiology (e.g., strength, physical condition), and environmental constraints (Chen & Singer, 1992). The five stages include: 1) problem identification, 2) commitment, 3) execution, 4) environmental management, and 5) generalization.

The process starts with problem identification. Here, the individual identifies the areas of performance that need to be corrected or maximized. Once the problem has been identified, a plan is formulated and a commitment is made to rectify the problem. Next,








72


performance modifications are made based on self-monitoring, self-evaluation, generating likely expectancies, and employing self-reinforcement or self-punishment depending on expectations and self-evaluation. The fourth stage requires healthy and successful social and physical environmental management. The final stage suggests the generalization of constructive behavioral changes made in earlier stages to future situations.

Both cybernetic theory and Kirschenbaum's model of self-regulation encompass all aspects of the individual (e.g. behavior, cognitions, affect, and physiology) at the conscious and subconscious level (Crews, 1993). In contrast, control theory focuses on changing only behavior and cognitions at the conscious level to direct one's actions (Crews, 1993). It has been speculated that by changing behaviors and cognitions, ultimately, affect (i.e., emotional state) and physiological functioning will also be changed (Crews, 1993). Consequently, control theory has received criticism for its failure to address the feedback an individual receives in the form of affect and physiology (Crew, 1993).

According to Carver and Scheier (1981), principles from both cybernetic and control theory have significant implications for the regulation of human behavior. In Carver and Scheier's (1998) theory of behavioral self-regulation, behavior is goaldirected, providing form and structure to a person's life. It also offers a framework within which action takes place. In their model, self-regulation is again considered a discrepancy reducing feedback loop system. This loop has four basic interconnected functions: 1)








73


input function (perception), 2) comparator (reference test), 3) output function (operate), and 4) behavioral impact (Chen & Singer, 1992). In short, present behaviors or qualities are determined, assess as to whether they are the ones intended or desired, and if not, adjustments are attempted that serve to bring one into line with the other (Carver, 1998).

Carver and Scheier (1981, 1990, 1998) have argued that the comparator of a psychological feedback loop is engaged by increases in self-focused attention or selfawareness. Self-focused attention leads to more comparisons with salient standards and enhances behavioral conformity to those standards (Scheier & Carver, 1983). Thus, by increasing self-awareness, behavior and outcome expectancies should be more congruent. In the words of Carver and Scheier (1998)

... a link appears to exist between valuing an aspect of the self and
thinking about or attending to it. Recall the self-focused attention produces
effects on behavior that appear to reflect the engagement of feedback
processes regulating behavior with respect to desired goals. If focus on the
self causes the engagement of self-regulatory activity, it follows that
focusing on different aspects of the self may cause the engagement of selfregulatory activity of potentially different sorts. This does not mean
different in the sense of different regulatory functions, but different in
terms of the goals or reference values underlying the activities. (p. 113)

Recently, Carver and Scheier (1998) have expanded this line of thought to

consider affect as well as behavior. They propose that not only is behavior goal-directed; affect is also goal-related and arises out of a feedback process. They proffer that this process operates simultaneously with the behavior-guided function and in parallel to it, whenever it is operating.








74


They further suggest that affect is information about how progress is being made in moving toward a goal.

... the outcome of the comparison process at the heart of this loop (the
error signal generated by the comparator) is manifest phenomenologically in two forms. One is hazy and nonverbal sense of expectancy--confidence
or doubt. The other is affect, feeling, a sense of positiveness or
negativeness. (Carver & Scheier, 1999, p. 20)

If progress is being made at a rate equal to the standard, then no affect results (Carver & Scheier, 1998). When progress is at rate higher than the standard, the product is positive affect (Carver & Scheier, 1998). However, if no progress is being made, the rate is lower than the standard, or movement is away from the goal, then the result is negative affect (Carver & Scheier, 1998).

In attempting to realize a goal, obstacles and impediments are typically

encountered. What happens then generally depends on the confidence of overcoming them, as well as the development and implementation of a meaningful plan or strategy. "Self-regulation and cognitive strategies complement each other and both types are necessary for the process of learning and in a performance situation" (Chen & Singer, 1992, p. 287). According to McCombs (1988), one of the most important functions of a learning strategies program is to promote self-regulated learning. Furthermore, Zimmerman (1989) suggested that self-regulation during learning is not developed naturally; therefore, there is a necessity to teach self-regulation strategies to most learners.








75


Self-Monitoring

Zimmerman (1989) has further suggested that the strategic learning process of self-monitoring has a substantial self-regulatory impact. Kirschenbaum (1984) defines self-monitoring as the process of discriminating target behaviors and related events while Shunk (1983) describes it as deliberate attention to some aspect of one's behavior. Basically, self-monitoring requires learners to attend selectively to specific actions and cognitive processes, to distinguish them from others, and to discriminate their outcomes (Zimmerman & Kitsanta, 1996). From a social cognitive perspective (Bandura, 1986; Zimmerman, 1989), self-monitoring of form and process elements is essential for both acquiring and maintaining mastery of a skill. Researchers have confirmed that elite athletes use self-monitoring to improve their skill and several studies have found that self-monitoring enhanced performance of non-elite sport participants (e.g., Whelan, Mahoney, & Meyers, 1991; Kirschenbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, & Holtzbauer, 1982; Kingery, 1990).

Coping with Sport Related Stress

All those who participate in competitive sports must have the ability to deal with criticism, losing, physical and mental errors, anxiety, anger, and other sources of stress. Most elite athletes have the ability to quickly recover from, or ignore, these particular aspects of competitive sports. Instead of maintaining a hostile, frustrated disposition, winners are capable of redirecting your energies in the productive manner. Failure to quickly adapt to unpleasant experiences often results in performance failure. For








76


example, Krohne and Hindle (1988) found that "vigilant coping strategies" (e.g., focusing attention on threat relevant information), are significantly more harmful to athletes emotional and performance responses to acute stress then "cognitive avoidance strategies" (e.g.., avoiding threat relevant information). Thus, successful elite competitors put unpleasant experiences behind them and go on.

Unlike unskilled performers, elite competitors plan each aspect of their

performance, whether it will occur before or during the event, and have at least one alternative behavior for every play and action (Orlick 1986; Rushall 1979). For example, a golfer may anticipate hitting a few poor shots during his upcoming round and preplan how he is going to react to that situation. Orlick (1986) refers to these mental plans as "focusing" and to the anticipation of change as "refocusing". Anger responses are either inhibited or expressed and then quickly extinguished. Orlick (1980, 1986) suggests that the best way to prevent panic situations and anxiety is to begin thinking about and implementing solutions before problems get out on hand. Thus, in order to institute elaborate alternative techniques rapidly, elite competitors have planned and performed secondary or coping strategies during less demanding events such as practice or under less stressful game situations.

One of the most publicized stress management programs with application to sport is Meichenbaum's (1977, 1985) stress inoculation training. Stress inoculation training (SIT) explores the antecedents, behaviors, and consequences of the stress reaction. It employs relaxation training, develops affective self-instructional statements that serve as








77


coping skills, and uses desensitization to induce and facilitate the control of anxiety reactions. Essentially, participants discuss their relevant problems and learn the effects of psychological stress on performance. They are then taught coping skills such as relaxation, imagery, and self-talk. And then practice these techniques in simulated situations. The research evidence regarding the effectiveness of SIT in sport is quite promising.

For example, Harrison and Feltz (1981) demonstrated that SIT facilitated the resurgence of confidence and form in a basketball player. Ziegler, Klinzing, and Williamson (1982) used SIT to decrease submaximal oxygen uptake and submaximal heart rate of 8 male college cross-country runners. Performance data, however, was not collected. Mace and Carroll (1985) investigated the effects of SIT for controlling anxiety in abseiling (i.e., descending the face of a building in this case). Forty participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: SIT and practical training, SIT training alone, practical training alone, and a no training control group. Although no performance data were collected, participants in the SIT plus practical training group reported significantly lower stress and anxiety levels than the other groups.

Mace, Eastman, and Carroll (1986) applied SIT to a gymnast who reported

experiencing negative self-statements and disturbing images of falling. Following the eight-session intervention, the gymnast indicated improved focus and concentration. Mace and Carroll (1986a) investigated the effects of SIT with squash players reporting debilitating performance anxiety. After eight training sessions, those who received SIT








78


indicated significantly lower state anxiety levels in comparison to a matched control group. Performance data in these two investigations, however, were again unavailable.

To address the question of possible performance effects, Meyers, Schleser, and Okwumabua (1982) applied SIT to two female collegiate basketball players who had concentration and anxiety problems. Free throw and field goal shooting performance improved significantly during SIT but dropped below baseline levels upon withdrawal from the SIT program. Similarly, Hamilton and Fremouw (1985) evaluated the effectiveness of SIT on cognitions and free throw performance of 3 male collegiate basketball players. Following 10 hours of treatment, free throw performance improved between 50% and 88% and self-statements changed from 86% negative prior to training to 71% positive after SIT.

Further, Mace and Carroll (1986b) examined the impact of SIT on performance of gymnast under high and low stress conditions. Gymnasts receiving SIT were able to maintain performance during the high stress condition and had less distress than the control group which had a significant performance decrement. More recently, Kerr and Leith (1993) investigated the effects of a modified SIT program on performance, mental rehearsal, attentional skills, and competitive anxiety among 24 male and female, international-caliber gymnasts. After eight months of biweekly training, the stress management group demonstrated superior performance, mental rehearsal, and attentional skills in comparison to the control group. Competitive anxiety levels, however, were








79


significantly higher. The authors speculate that this may have been due to an increase in facilitative rather than debilitating anxiety.

Other stress management programs that have been described include cognitive affective stress management training (Smith, 1980), Gauron's (1986) cognitive selfregulation program and Anshel's (1990) COPE model. The cognitive-affective stress management training program is similar to stress inoculation training in the initial analysis of the stress reaction, the relaxation training, and in the development of cognitive coping skills. This program differs from stress inoculation training, however, in two important areas. First, the athletes not only imagine the stress while relaxed but also focus in on the emotions and feelings that develop as a result on the stress or performance. The subject then gains control of these emotions and images positive selfstatements and relaxation responses. Secondly, in the cognitive-affective program athletes must cope with images and feelings far more difficult than he or she would normally encounter.

Gauron's (1986) cognitive self-regulation program is based on the athlete's ability to control attitudes, perceptions, thoughts, and self-talk; the potential agents that may interfere with performing at optimal levels. The COPE model (Anshel, 1990) employs cognitive-behavioral strategies to handle acute forms of stress caused mainly by negative input from others. COPE is an acronym that stands for control emotions, organize input, plan response, and execute. Athletes implement these techniques immediately upon receiving the undesirable input. The COPE model has assisted athletes to overcome








80


unpleasant verbal feedback on performance in tennis (Anshel, 1990), baseball, (Anshel, Gregory, & Kaczmarek, 1990), gymnastics (Anshel, 1991), and dart throwing (Anshel, 1993).

Another possible approach to determining optimal arousal and facilitate the

control of emotions, the difference between feeling up as opposed to feeling up-tight, is to pose questions that help the performer to identify certain feelings. Athletes can use these questions to 1) self-monitoring feelings and physiological responses prior to and during competition, 2) to identify their feelings accurately, and 3) to remind them to use appropriate physical the mental strategies that can favorably affect mental status. Counseling Sport Psychologist typically have athletes identify the time or game in which they felt they perform at their best and worst, to describe these performances as accurately as possible, and to describe their feelings and mental attitudes during this time. Specific questions include: What were you thinking about during this event if anything? How did it make you feel? How did you react? Based on the athlete's responses to these questions, coaches or sport psychology consultants suggest mental strategies that the performer can use to alter levels of arousal or anxiety and to improve his or her mental preparation for competition. The consultants or coaches objective for asking these questions is to identify the feelings associated with desirable and undesirable performance and to recall the athlete's perceptions of his or her physiological response at the time of competition.








81


For example, in his respected and popular mental plan model, Orlick (1986) asks athletes to identify certain feelings (e.g., self-confidence, anxiety and arousal) on a scale from one (very low) to ten (very high). This self-monitoring technique encourages athletes to become more aware of their mental status in any given time. But perhaps more importantly, this increased awareness allows athletes to compare the kinds and levels of feelings emotions that accompany good performance outcomes. In this way, when conducted over several contests, the athlete's best (optimal) arousal state can be identified. Although there are some differences in each of the previously mentioned stress management programs, these, as well as a number of other training programs utilize emotional awareness to facilitate behavioral changes. Self-Awareness

When describing the most successful athletes, coaches often use characteristics such as mentally strong, extremely self-confident, persistent, perseverant, and unshakable. Goldman (1997; 1998) has described these intangible characteristics as "emotional intelligence." Emotionally intelligent athletes are quite familiar with anxiety, fear, and anger, but they use that anxiety and arousal to increase productive focus, compartmentalize fear so it does not prevent action and turn anger into motivation, intensity, and controlled energy, something that Kobasa (1979) termed "hardiness."

In his best selling books titled "Emotional Intelligence" and "Working with Emotional Intelligence," Goldman stressed self-awareness, self-regulation, and motivation to facilitate emotional intelligence. According to him, self-awareness is the








82


vital foundation skill for three emotional competencies, emotional awareness, accurate self-assessment, and self-confidence. Here, he defines emotional awareness as the recognition of how our emotions affect our performance, and the ability to use our values to guide decision-making. Accurate self-assessment involves a candid sense of ones personal strengths and limits, a clear vision of where one needs to improve, and the ability to learn from experience. Finally, self-confidence is described as the courage that comes from certainty about our capabilities, values, and goals.

As described earlier, a number of stress management interventions incorporate some type of self-awareness into their programs. Further, numerous writers and researchers have advocated awareness as a critical step in the intervention process. The research literature on the direct impact of self-awareness, however, is scant.

In one of the few direct studies on the impact of awareness, Singer, Lidor, and Cauraugh (1993) investigated the effectiveness of three learning strategies on achievement of a novel motor task. Seventy-two participants were randomly assigned to an awareness strategy (to consciously attend to the act and to what one is doing during execution); a nonawareness strategy (to prepalan the movement and perform the task without conscious attention to it), the Five Step Approach (to systematically ready oneself, image the act, focus attention on a cue, execute without thought, and evaluate the act and previous steps), or a control. Results indicated the all three strategies resulted in less radial error in comparison to the control with the Five Step Approach and nonawareness strategies leading to highest achievement. The awareness approach here,








83


however, was directed toward movement and environmental awareness. More specifically, it was geared toward vague feelings of movement or the noise of the ball impacting the wall. This awareness strategy may have distracted learners and diverted attention away from key components of the proper throwing motion.

In a more recent study, Brunelle, Janelle, and Tennant (1999) investigate the impact of anger awareness training (self-monitoring) and role-playing (modeling and behavioral rehearsal) for reducing angry feelings and behavior of competitive soccer players. Following five-one hour weekly interventions, both the awareness and roleplaying groups demonstrated significantly less angry behavior than a control group. Further, the role-playing group continued to reduce angry behavior through a subsequent retention test. Angry feelings, however, were unchanged for all groups. The authors conclude that both anger awareness and role-playing are effective methods for reducing angry behavior.

Cognitive-Behavioral Strategies

The majority of sport psychologists, coaches, and athletes in sport currently

practice what are known as cognitive-behavioral techniques (Butt, 1987; Kirschenbaum, 1987). Many different types of these strategies have been shown to facilitate the execution of motor skills, including attentional focus (Nideffer, 1976; Ravizza & Rotella, 1982), self-talk (Bunker & Owens, 1985; Bunker & Rotella, 1982; Rotella, Gansneder, Ojala, & Billing, 1980), relaxation (Bennett, 1978; Harris & Harris, 1984; Smith, 1980), imagery (Epstein, 1980; Feltz & Landers, 1983; Mahoney & Avener, 1977; Shelton &








84


Mahoney, 1978; Weinberg, Seabourne, & Jackson, 1981), thought control or cognitive restructuring (Bunker & Owens, 1985: Bunker & Rotella, 1982), self-monitoring (Johnston-O'Connor & Kirschenbaum, 1986; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980, 1984; Kirschenbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, & Holtzbauer, 1982), and preparatory arousal (Gould, Weinberg, & Jackson, 1980; Weinberg, Gould & Jackson, 1979). A multitude of techniques are available, and they share a common focus on helping athletes manage their thoughts and emotions so they can perform optimally (Boucher & Crews, 1987; Crew & Boutcher, 1986a; Gould, Weiss, & Weinberg, 1981).

In a meta-analytic review of the sport literature, Whelan, Myers, Berman, Bryant, and Mellon (1988) and Greenspan and Feltz (1989) concluded that cognitive-behavioral approaches are effective means for performance enhancement. Several studies have recently documented the benefits of cognitive-behavioral programs on sport performance (e.g., Beauchamp, Halliwell, Fournier, & Koestner, 1996; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990; Crews & Boutcher, 1986a; Gray, 1990; Gray & Fernandez, 1989; Hall & Erffmeyer, 1983; Hamilton & Fremouw, 1985; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980; Meyers & Schleser, 1980; Meyers, Schleser, & Okwunabua, 1982; Weinberg, Seabourne, & Jackson, 1981). For example, Kirschenbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, and Holtzbauer (1982) found that positive self-monitoring instructions substantially improved the performance of novice bowlers compared to a no-treatment group. Alternatively, Lobermeyer and Wasserman (1986) showed that training in the use of preperformance routines resulted in a 7% increase in free-throw accuracy among novice basketball players.








85


A combination of cognitive and behavioral strategies used prior to execution of motor skills is often called preperformance routines (Cohn, 1990; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990). They incorporate both cognitive (covert) and behavioral (overt) processes that help to prepare for the execution of motor skills (Boutcher, 1990; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990). Although the use of preperformance routines are more readily implemented with closed skills, they are also with some open skill sports. Examples of preperformance routines used to facilitate performance in open and closed skill sports include golf (Bouchard & Singer, 1998; Boutcher & Crews, 1987; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990; Crews & Boutcher, 1986a; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980; Rotella & Bunker, 1981; Yancey, 1977), tennis (Moore, 1986), basketball (Lobermeyer & Wasserman, 1986), soccer (Vealey, 1986b), bowling (Kirschenbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, & Holtzbauer, 1982), gymnastics (Mahoney & Avener, 1977), wrestling (Gould, Weiss, & Weinberg, 1981), skiing and skating (Orlick, 1986), and diving (Highlen & Bennett, 1983).

Although these programs have shown great promise in a variety of different

sports, it has been suggested that golf is a sport in which participants might particularly benefit from adopting a cognitive-behavioral orientation (Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980; Rotella & Bunker, 1981). In order to achieve optimal performance, closed skill sports like golf require the synchronization of overt and covert routines (Beauchamp, Halliwell, Fournier, and Koestner, 1996). That is, attentional focus and arousal must be appropriately matched to the performance demands of a particular shot (Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990; Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987; Krane & Williams, 1987).








86


Consider, for example, the precision and steadiness that are required for executing a putt on the 18th hole of the Master's to win the tournament and how that might be affected by arousal and attentional focus. Golfers can tolerate little distraction, anxiety, or loss of attentional focus without risking a decrease in performance (Krane, Williams, & Feltz, 1992; Murphy & Wolfolk, 1987).

Multimodal Interventions

Several years ago, Davies and West (1991) advocated a theoretical paradigm for sport performance enhancement based on Lazarus' (1976, 1981) Multimodal Therapy. The crux of this approach is to help athletes become aware of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that may be causing them performance decrements and to teach them a variety of proven techniques (e.g., progressive relaxation, rhythmic breathing, imagery, self-talk, goal setting, etc.) to facilitate improvements. In the psychological literature, Multimodal Therapy has been successful in the treatment of alcoholism (Freedberg & Johnson, 1979), psychosomatic disorders (Budzynski, Stoyva, & Peffer, 1980), sexual dysfunction (Lazarus, 1981), depression (Lazarus, 1974), parental effectiveness (Judah, 1978), childhood problems (Keat, 1979), and in providing a model for counselor supervision (Pontorotto & Zander, 1984). Perna, Neyer, Murphy, Ogilvie, and Murphy (1995) have advocated the use of Lazarus' BASIC ID format to assess behavioral, affective, sensation, imagery, cognitive, interpersonal, or dietary/substance issues an athlete may have that may be causing sub-par performance. They suggest that this information can be used to determine the most effective intervention plan for each particular athlete relative








87


to his/her problem(s). The rationale here is that this model might provide a more comprehensive approach to help athletes to improve their performance if they have symptoms such as cognitive or somatic anxiety, low confidence, and counterproductive pre-performance and performance behaviors (Davies & West, 1991).

Congruent with this thought, Boutcher and Rotella (1987) have developed a fourstage psychological skills education program that should contribute to closed-skill performance. Closed-skills are those in which performance outcome is determined solely by the athlete with little, if any, outside interference. Examples include bowling, target shooting, and any golf stroke.

The four phases of the program are sport analysis, individual assessment,

conceptualization/motivation, and mental skill development (Boutcher & Rotella, 1987). The structure and major objectives of the program borrow heavily from Meichenbaum's (1985) Stress Inoculation Training Program and Lazarus' (1981) Multimodal Therapy (Boutcher & Rotella, 1987). This particular program has been shown to be effective for enhancing motivation, preparation, and putting performance of novice golfers in a laboratory setting (Beauchamp, Halliwell, Fournier, & Koestner, 1996). The efficacy of this approach in an ecologically valid setting, however, is still in question.

With the recent advent of multidimensional approach to anxiety and the

construction of the modified CSAI-2, researchers have begun structuring multimodal intervention programs based on the matching hypothesis (e.g., Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1984; Maynard & Cotton, 1993). The matching hypothesis (Martens, et al,








88


1990) suggests that treatments might be more effective if they are directed at the type of symptoms experienced by the individual. For example, a cognitive procedure would be have its primary effect on reducing cognitive anxiety, and a somatic procedure would have its primary effect on somatic symptoms. Although there has been some reported success in this research (e.g., Maynard & Cotton, 1993), there has been general neglect to consider athlete's perceptions and interpretations of those symptoms. As Feltz, (1988) suggests, some individuals may interpret increases in the physiology as fear whereas others may interpret this state as being "psyched-up" and ready to perform. Therefore, traditional stress management interventions may actual be detrimental to some individuals performance if perceptions are not considered.

The recent development of the modified CSAI-2 (Jones & Swain, 1992), which includes both a directional and intensity scale, now allows researchers to consider both aspects of anxiety (intensity and perception) rather than relying on intuitive assessments, thereby eliminating potential misconceptions. Through this measure, intervention researchers have attempted to show more detailed support for the matching hypothesis. And in general, there has been some partial support and inconclusive findings. For example, Maynard, Hemmings, and Warwick-Evans (1995) implemented a somatic anxiety intervention towards competitive soccer players who interpreted the intensity of both somatic and cognitive anxiety as debilitating. The intervention was beneficial for reducing the intensity and facilitating the direction of both anxiety symptoms at post-test although the reduction in the intensity of somatic anxiety was dramatically greater than




Full Text
xml version 1.0 encoding UTF-8
REPORT xmlns http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitss xmlns:xsi http:www.w3.org2001XMLSchema-instance xsi:schemaLocation http:www.fcla.edudlsmddaitssdaitssReport.xsd
INGEST IEID ELS84EY3V_44N28R INGEST_TIME 2014-12-15T20:11:28Z PACKAGE AA00026514_00001
AGREEMENT_INFO ACCOUNT UF PROJECT UFDC
FILES



PAGE 1

THE EFFECTS OF A COGNITIVE AND SOMATIC AWARENESS INTERVENTION ON COMPETITIVE GOLF PERFORMANCE AND EMOTION REGULATION By LESTER J. BOUCHARD A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2000

PAGE 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who made this dissertation possible. Sincere gratitude is extended to my committee members. Dr. Milledge Murphey, Dr. Christopher Janelle, Dr. Ronald Siders, and Dr. Harry Daniels, for their support and encouragement throughout the completion of this study. Their wealth of knowledge on the subjects of performance enhancement, research design, and statistical analysis was instrumental in the construction and completion of this project. I am especially grateful to Dr. Milledge Murphey for all the supervision he provided for me during the past 5 years. Dr. Murphey has always been there for me to lend his support and guidance during my years as a graduate student. Further, he has been a wonderful friend and mentor and has shown much understanding and concern for me as a person. I would also like to express my thanks and gratitude to Christopher Christmas, Derek De La Pena, Brian Rockwood, Dr. Christopher Janelle, Dr. Michael Mondello, Elizabeth Fallon, Kelli McKenzie, and Nick Murray for all their help in the procurement of volunteers for this investigation. Additional thanks are extended to the University of Florida golf course staff. Without their assistance, this investigation could have never been realized. ii

PAGE 3

Finally, I would like to express deepest and warmest gratitude to my friends and family. Without their constant encouragement and belief in me, I may not have sustained the desire to remain in school and complete a doctorate degree. iii

PAGE 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv LIST OF TABLES viii LIST OF FIGURES x ABSTRACT xi CHAPTERS 1. INTRODUCTION 1 Statement of the Problem 11 Research Hypotheses 11 Definition of Terms 13 Assumptions 15 Limitations 18 Significance of the Study 19 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 23 Emotion and Cognition in Sport 23 Cognitive Appraisal 26 Hardy Personality Theory 29 Competitive Sport and Emotions 30 Arousal, Stress, and Anxiety in Sport 35 Arousal 35 Anxiety 36 Stress 40 Measuring Arousal and Anxiety 41 Arousal 41 Anxiety 43 Self-Confidence 51 Self-Confidence and Anxiety 55 iv

PAGE 5

Anger 57 The Expression of Anger 59 Controlling Anger 61 Anxiety-Arousal-Performance Relationship 64 Drive Theory 64 Inverted-U Theory 65 Catastrophe Theory 66 Optimal Zones 68 Reversal Theory 69 Self-Regulation 70 Self-Monitoring 75 Coping with Sport Related Stress 75 SelfAwareness 81 Cognitive-Behavioral Strategies 83 Multimodal Interventions 86 Golf 91 Summary 95 3. METHODS 99 Participants 99 Performance Task and Apparatus 100 Instruments and Measurements 101 The Modified Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (MCSAI-2) 101 The Modified Competitive Trait Anxiety Inventory-2 (MCTAI-2) 103 The Modified State and Trait Anger Scales (MSAS; MTAS) 103 The SelfAwareness Scale 105 Experimental Groups and Conditions 1 06 Emotion Awareness Monitoring Intervention ... 1 06 Non-Monitoring Emotion Intervention 108 Emotion Awareness Monitoring 109 Comparison 109 Manipulation of Anxiety 110 Procedures 1 1 1 Design and Data Analysis 1 14 Performance 1 14 The MCSAI-2, MSAS, and SelfAwareness Scale ... 114 V

PAGE 6

4. RESULTS 116 Performance 116 The MCSAI-2 and MSAS 117 Intensity and Direction of Cognitive Anxiety ... 117 Intensity and Direction of Somatic Anxiety 118 Intensity and Direction of Self-Confidence 118 Intensity and Direction of Anger 120 The Self-Awareness Scale 123 Anger Awareness 129 Cognitive Awareness 132 Somatic Awareness 132 Self-Confidence Awareness 134 The Relationship Betweeen the MCSAI-2, MSAS, SelfAwareness, and Performance 136 The MCSAI-2 and Performance 138 The MSAS and Performance 146 Self-Awareness Scores and Performance 147 Manipulation Check and Social Validation Questionnaire ... 148 Mental Fatigue 151 Reliability ofthe MCSAI-2 and MSAS 151 5. DISCUSSION 154 Hypotheses Related to the Intensity and Direction of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety, Self-Confidence, and Anger 1 54 Hypotheses Related to Performance 158 Hypotheses Related to the Relationship Among the MCSAI-2, MSAS, Self-Awareness, and Performance 160 Summary 162 Conclusions 164 Implications for Future Research 165 REFERENCES 169 APPENDIX A DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FORM 200 APPENDIX B MODIFIED COMPETITIVE TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTOR Y-2 201 APPENDIX C MODIFIED TRAIT ANGER SCALE ... 205 vi

PAGE 7

APPENDIX D SUMMARY OF TEST STATISTICS ON THE CSAI-2 FOR THE COLLEGE SAMPLE OF COMPETITIVE ATHLETES 207 APPENDIX E SUMMARY OF TEST STATISTICS ON THE STATE AND TRAIT ANGER SUBSCALES OF THE STAXI FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS 208 APPENDIX F MODIFIED COMPETITIVE STATE ANXIETY INVENTOR Y-2 209 APPENDIX G MODIFIED STATE ANGER SCALE ... 213 APPENDIX H INFORMED CONSENT 215 APPENDIX I SOCIAL VALIDATION AND MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 217 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 219 vii

PAGE 8

LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Experimental Design and Treatment Groups 112 2. Performance Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1-3 118 3. Cognitive Anxiety Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 120 4. Somatic Aiuciety Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 123 5. Self-Confidence Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 126 6. Anger Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 129 7. Anger Self-Awareness Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 132 8. Cognitive Anxiety SelfAwareness Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 134 9. Somatic Anxiety SelfAwareness Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 136 10. Self-Confidence SelfAwareness Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 138 1 1 Correlations Among the Intensity Subscales of the MCSAI-2, MSAS, and SelfAwareness Across Sessions 1 and 3 140 12. Regression Analyses Predicting Performance with the MCSAI-2, MSAS, and SelfAwareness Across Sessions 1 and 3 141 viii

PAGE 9

13. Social Validation and Manipulation Check Questionnaire Response Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group 149 14. Frequency of Techniques used During Performance by Each Group 1 52 15. Means and Standard Deviations of Mental Fatigue Experienced by EachGroup Across Sessions 1-3 153 16. Overall Means and Standard Deviations on the MCTAI-2 and MTAS 156 ix

PAGE 10

LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1 Changes in Performance for Each Group Across Sessions 1-3 119 2. Changes in Cognitive Anxiety Intensity for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 121 3 Changes in Cognitive Anxiety Direction for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 122 4. Changes in Somatic Anxiety Intensity for Each Group Across • Sessions 1 and 3 124 5. Changes in Somatic Anxiety Direction for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 125 6. Changes in Self-Confidence Intensity for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 127 7. Changes in Self-Confidence Direction for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 128 8. Changes in Anger Intensity for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 130 9. Changes in Anger Direction for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 131 10. Changes in Anger Self-Awareness for the Emotional Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 133 1 1 Changes in Cognitive Anxiety SelfAwareness for the Emotional Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 135 12. Changes in Somatic Anxiety SelfAwareness for the Emotional *• Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 137 13. Changes in Self-Confidence Self-Awareness for the Emotional Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 139 X

PAGE 11

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE EFFECTS OF A COGNITIVE AND SOMATIC AWARENESS INTERVENTION ON COMPETITIVE GOLF PERFORMANCE AND EMOTION REGULATION By Lester J. Bouchard December 2000 Chairman: Milledge Murphey > Major Department: Exercise and Sport Sciences The primary purpose of this study was to determine the effectiveness of various emotion regulation interventions for influencing competitive golf performance and emotion interpretations. Second, it was expected that an emotion awareness monitoring technique (i.e., the Self-Awareness Scale) would provide a more accurate assessment of the impact of the emotions of interest (i.e., cognitive and somatic anxiety, selfconfidence, and anger) on golf performance than more traditionally used psychometric measures (i.e., MCSAI-2and MSAS). Eighty recreational male golfers were randomly assigned to one of four groups: Emotion Awareness Monitoring Intervention (EAMI), Non-Monitoring Emotion Intervention (NEI), Emotion Awareness Monitoring (EAM), or Comparison (C). Participants completed three sessions under different conditions. The first session xi

PAGE 12

represented a baseline measurement of participant skill and psychological constructs. Participants were subjected to one of the four treatments in Session 2 and were allowed to practice. During Session 3, participants competed for cash prizes and were reevaluated on the psychological variables. Data indicated that EAMI, NEI, and EAM groups performed significantly better following treatment with the EAMI group significantly exceeding the C group in Session 3. Alternatively, performance of the NEI and EAM groups was marginally better than the C group during Session 3. Further, the self-awareness scores of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger improved significantly across the three sessions for EAMI and EAM groups. No significant improvements, however, were actualized for cognitive or somatic anxiety, self-confidence, or anger as revealed by the MCSAI-2 and MSAS. Finally, both the Self-Awareness Scale and the MCSAI-2 accounted for a significant portion of performance variance with self-confidence being the sole consistent predictive variable. Anger was a performance predictor one half of the time. The data are supportive of multimodal interventions as well as the predictive value of the two utilized scales. However, when expediency and intrusiveness are of concern, the MCSAI-2 may be a more convenient instrument. Suggestions and implications for future research are discussed. xii

PAGE 13

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Emotions pervade the competitive enviroranent. All those who participate in competitive sports will encounter and must have the ability to deal with anxiety, anger, and other sources of stress. It is very rare to find a single emotion causing trouble on its own. Emotions combine in complicated ways to produce abnormal conditions and reactions. Because individuals experience numerous emotions when something troubling has occurred, to emphasize one emotion and exclude another may simplify the problem, but it restricts our choices (Tavris, 1989). Not only do people experience clusters of emotion, there are differences in the intensity of experiences as well as in personal reactions. There are also differences in emotion range: some seem to have a limited number of emotions going from happy to sad, and that may be all whereas others exhibit a bevy of emotional symptoms: euphoria, depression, embarrassment, jealousy, hatred, etc. Cognitive differences play an important role in accounting for the variety of emotional experiences and differences, and may play a greater role than physiological ones. "Emotion is the result of cognitive appraisal, that is, it is the subjective appraisal of events (including physical events) and not the events per se that produce emotions" (Vallerand, 1987, p. 162). These emotional blends result from individual appraisals of performance, the importance of the event, the effort exerted, the degree of certainty about how well they would do, and so on. The 1

PAGE 14

2 more perceived control the individual has, the more likely he/she will be to experience feelings other than anxiety and/or anger which often have a detrimental effect on performance. ^ Recently, research activities have shifted toward the control of emotions. When athletes get anxious, their bodies typically, but not always, respond with increased arousal. Being aroused, however, does not mean that the mind will become anxious (Apter, 1976, 1984; Helmers, 1991; Kerr, 1985a, 1989; Murray, 1989; Rotella, Lemer, Allyson, & Bean, 1990). The ability to cope with the pressures of competition often separates good from poor performance and elite from non-elite athletes. A major goal of sport psychologists is to develop effective mental skills programs to assist athletes to develop emotional control, thereby optimizing performance. Applied sport psychologists attempt to understand the role of individual differences in sport and exercise behavior and recognize the importance of individualizing approaches to match the needs and capabilities of each athlete. Such individual differences are nowhere more apparent than in reactions to competition. Some eager competitors seek out competition, rise to the challenge, and frequently get their best performances in competitive events. Others are apprehensive, avoid competitive challenges, and tend to choke or perform well below expectations. At all levels of competition there is a wide variation in individual reactions to the competitive environment and in the ability to control emotions.

PAGE 15

Individuals differ in the interpretation of the demands of the task, available resources, consequence of performance, and perceptions of bodily reactions. Under identical conditions, one athlete may appraise a competitive situation as physically and mentally impossible, exhibit high anxiety, and consequently perform poorly. Another may perceive that same situation as challenging and exciting, demonstrate high arousal, but react positively. In a similar light, during the course of a contest, some individuals may view a poor performance as incompetence or failure resulting in high cognitive and/or somatic anxiety and/or anger/frustration, thereby contributing to continued poor performance. Alternatively, others may perceive the same situation as a challenge and step up their game. Increased arousal may also be exhibited; however, in this instance the situation is used to facilitate performance instead of debilitate it. Further, performance of certain tasks may benefit from a highly aroused state whereas for others it may be costly. For any given task or situation there may be no single optimal level of arousal (Ebbeck & Weiss, 1988; Neiss, 1990). On the other hand, there may be zones of optimal arousal for a particular task and for a given person (Hanin, 1980) as well as varying interpretations and reactions to arousal states (Apter, 1984; Gill, 1994). In short, there are dramatic differences in the way the same circumstance is interpreted, reacted to, and dealt with. These notions are consistent with some of the more recent theories on the arousal-anxiety-performance relationships such as Zones of Optimal Functioning (Hanin, 1980), Reversal Theory (Kerr, 1985a), as well as Martens (1987) Psychic Energy Theory and Hardy Personality Theory (Kobasa, 1979).

PAGE 16

4 Most coaches, athletes, and sport psychologists would agree that mental and emotional control is imperative for optimal performance. It has become the ambition of every sport psychology practitioner to teach athletes how to regulate arousal to optimize performance. A variety of strategies have been used to either increase or decrease arousal, depending on the specific needs at the time and the nature of the problem. These strategies can be classified into two different types, either cognitive or somatic (Davidson & Schwartz, 1976). Cognitive strategies include techniques such as imagery and selftalk. Methods including progressive relaxation and rhythmic breathing would be considered somatic strategies. Invariably, most athletes use some combination of the two and cognitive strategies are often used to alleviate both somatic and cognitive symptoms. What is generally neglected in intervention research is the way the athlete interprets increases and decreases in arousal, anxiety, anger, and so on. As previously stated, many individuals interpret increases in these states as debilitating. Conversely, others use heightened states to signify a challenge and a reason to refocus. Most generalized arousal regulation interventions fail to recognize the difference in how athletes interpret and react to these symptoms, and consequently may be counterproductive to optimal performance. An alternative way of dealing with anxiety and arousal has been presented by Rotella and Lemer (1993). This approach focuses on changing the cognitive appraisal and the perception of the nervousness in the arousal experience before or during competition to a more natural response to competition. From their viewpoint

PAGE 17

5 nervousness can be appraised as a normal response to the uncertainty of competition, or as something unnatural and dangerous that can interfere with normal functioning. Providing athletes with perceptual alternatives for positively viewing arousal and potential stress may enable athletes to thrive on pressure, and may enhance their sport performance in the face of competitive pressure. They state: They (athletes) must learn to respond to the feelings resulting from this uncertainty as exciting, beneficial, and welcome. This honest and natural response, which fosters more positive and functional perceptions, will naturally lead to feelings of control, eagerness, and exhilaration rather than fear, threat, anxiety, and/or dread. (Rotella & Lemer, 1993, p. 536) The sport of golf presents a unique combination of intrinsic and extrinsic competitive factors. Whether playing in a group or alone, for fim or for money, the player is essentially playing against the course, the playing conditions for the day, and most importantly, him or herself Golf may thus be one of the most intrinsically challenging and frustrating sport activities among a long list. In the words of Rotella (1997): It's an endless challenge and it's play. You will search long and in vain, I suspect, for an endeavor that combines the challenges and pleasures of golf It tests your body, not for brute strength but for strength tempered by coordination and grace. It tests your mind for the ability to learn, to strategize, to remain calm under pressure. It tests you for qualities of character that I greatly admire: persistence, patience, and determination. Golf challenges you to measure yourself against a universally recognized standard of excellence, par. More than that, it challenges you to better not just an opponent, but yourself (pp. 182-183) Therefore, it can be implied that the intrinsic and extrinsic challenges of golf can lead to a plethora of emotional experiences.

PAGE 18

6 The competitive nature of golf and the special characteristics of each golf course often present unique demands to a performer. In addition to the obvious requirements of executing the movement and skills that have been or are being learned, play typically generates increased arousal, anxiety, and anger levels resulting in better consequences for some and poorer for others. In these types of circumstances, it is very important for an individual to be able to activate an appropriate physiological and mental state, selfregulate, and remain focused on what should be done. Few sports involve such sophisticated control of the mind and emotions. Learning to diagnose playing situations and to self-regulate thoughts and emotions prior to and during each stroke is the ambition of every avid golfer from beginner to pro. Many of the higher level professional athletes have developed this ability. The degree to which and methods by, which less proficient golfers can best learn how to optimally regulate behaviors consistently from stroke to stroke and hole to hole should be determined. Similarly, questions concern whether less proficient athletes have an accurate understanding of the impact of emotions on performance and whether raising emotion awareness is an appropriate step toward emotional control. Further, it is questionable whether less skilled athletes possess the knowledge or techniques to combat detrimental emotions irrespective of being aware? Therefore, these issues were investigated. According to Carver and Scheier's (1981, 1990) theory of self-regulation, the comparator of a psychological feedback loop is engaged by increases in self-focused attention or self-awareness. Self-focused attention leads to more comparisons with salient

PAGE 19

7 Standards and enhances behavioral conformity to those standards (Scheier & Carver, 1983). Thus, by increasing self-awareness, ideal behavior should become more likely. The necessity for scholars to develop, and sport enthusiasts to apply, selfregulation strategies with regard to such sports as golf has been advocated by many coaches, athletes, and researchers (e.g., Bouchard & Singer, 1998; Boutcher & Crews, 1987; Gensemer, 1995; Johnston-O'Connor & Kirschenbaum, 1986; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1984; Nicklaus, 1974; Rotella, 1995; 1996; 1997). Boutcher and Crews (1987) recommended that each golfer should develop consistent patterns of action as well as thought. Likewise, Gensemer (1995) suggested that it would be advantageous to rid one's mind of negative thoughts, think positively, visually picture doing well, be physically and emotionally ready, focus only on what is relevant for performance, and constructively evaluate a mistake when a poor shot is hit. The images of golf clubs being slammed into the ground or into a golf bag, clubs being thrown through the air, and verbal tirades are commonplace among serious competitors, especially when the results are personally important. It is difficult to deny the reality that excessive levels of anger, arousal, and/or anxiety can escalate into visible and consequently negative reactions that affect a player's performance. Likewise, exorbitant levels of covert self-contained emotion typically have a similar effect. However, these heightened arousal states may be beneficial to some. Little research has focused on the costs/benefits of awareness, determining effective methods for recognizing individual optimal emotion states, and implementing the appropriate

PAGE 20

8 strategies. Further, rarely are the emotional states of frustration and/or anger included and examined. More frequently, these states are concealed within the anxiety phenomenon. Most importantly, very seldom do intervention strategies consider the differential interpretation and effects of heightened arousal states. Various arousal-anxiety-performance relationship models like the inverted-U hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), catastrophe theory (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991), and zone of optimal functioning (Hanin, 1980) have suggested the negative impact of excessive levels of arousal/anxiety and the various emotions that accompany it. Similarly, sport psychology practitioners essentially agree that high levels of emotions like anger and anxiety can destroy concentration and may diminish performance, particularly in golf (e.g., Gallwey, 1998; Rotella, 1995; 1996). Conversely, in some sports, in certain situations, or with some individuals these emotions may be beneficial. What many researchers fail to consider is that individuals differ in their interpretation of and reaction to these states and that this may either positively or negatively influence performance. Furthermore, this process may also lead to inappropriate conclusions regarding the anxiety-arousal-performance relationship. In searching for ways to help an athlete control negative emotions, researchers have generally been interested in investigating the effects of generalized stress management interventions. Most developments in this area have emphasized multistrategy approaches that include both cognitive and behavioral components. Successful sfress management techniques, such as stress inoculation training (Mace & Carroll, 1985;

PAGE 21

9 Mace, Eastman, & Carroll, 1987; Meichenbaum, 1977, 1985; Meichenbaum & Cameron, 1983), cognitive-affective stress management training (Smith, 1980), visuomotor behavior rehearsal (Suinn, 1972a, 1972b), Gauron's (1986) cognitive self-regulation program, and Anshel's COPE model (Anshel, 1990; Anshel, 1991; Anshel, Brown, & Brown, 1993; Anshel, Gregory, & Kaczmarek, 1990) have been described for use by athletes. These various interventions have integrated several strategies that have been established based on their individual merit. Techniques such as relaxation, imagery, selftalk, and cognitive restructuring have been combined to provide effective models for stress management. Fundamental to all techniques of arousal regulation is awareness on the part of the athlete of his/her level of arousal (before and during competition), as reflected in a number of indices. For example, one must learn to be aware of the amount of anxiety and cognitive load that is present as well as physiological responses such as rate of breathing, muscle tension, heart response, and sweat. Being aware of these states and of optimal performance states enables an athlete to consistently perform at the highest level. (Zaichkowski & Takenaka, 1993, p. 520) Others such as Feldenkrais (1972), Gauron (1984), and Ravizza (1993) concur that learners must pay attention to the details of behavior, emotion, and thought to better understand what is needed to be controlled, and how to control it. But is awareness the most beneficial approach for less than elite athletes? Is it always beneficial to performance or does it sometimes distract the performer from completing the task at hand? Carver and Scheier (1998) have argued that only when subjects are doubtful will self-focus lead to performance impairment or negative rumination.

PAGE 22

10 Of additional interest lately is the manner in which arousal/anxiety states are measured. The CSAI-2 has been the primary assessment tool of choice in sport psychology research, generally being administered from days to moments prior to competition (e.g., Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Parfitt & Hardy, 1993; Parfitt, Hardy, and Pates, 1995; Swain & Jones, 1993). As anxiety theory and research have advanced, however, researchers have realized the need for quick, non-intrusive measures of competitive anxiety immediately prior to and throughout a performance to gain a better understanding of the arousal-anxiety-performance relationship (Gould & Krane, 1992; Krane, 1992; Vealey, 1990). This realization has prompted the development of the Mental Readiness Form (MRF; Murphy, Greenspan, Jowdy, & Tammen, 1989) and Anxiety Rating Scale (ARS; Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1994). Although these instruments were constructed with the intention of being administered immediately prior to and during performance, no research has been conducted utilizing them during performance. Anxiety and arousal levels are consistently changing during the course of an event depending on what other competitors are doing and other potential external distractors, and how personal performance outcome is perceived. Therefore, basing anxiety-arousalperformance relationship conclusions only on pre-game measures seems ludicrous. Although often difficult to administer in most sports, self-paced activities like golf provide the ideal setting for more closely examining these relationships in a less intrusive manner.

PAGE 23

11 Statement of the Problem The primary purpose of this study was to examine how emotionally based awareness interventions affect the intensity and directional perceptions and performance of male recreational golfers debilitated by cognitive and/or somatic anxiety and/or anger. Specifically, the interventions were directed toward restructuring debilitating interpretations to facilitative ones and/or reducing stress intensity levels. The secondary purpose centered around the influence of emotional awareness and the time frame of the administration of the instruments utilized to assess individuals levels of anxiety and anger. These measures, which are typically administered before or after competition, do not assess how an athlete feels during a contest or reflect the tendency of these perceptions to change based on performance or other situational variables. An attempt was made to determine if an awareness strategy and more precise method of state emotion measurement will lead to better emotional understanding and control as well as to greater predictability in the anxiety-arousal-performance relationship. Research Hypotheses ^ Based on information contained within this chapter and the following one, several hypotheses were posited and examined during this investigation: 1 Following treatment, participants in the groups receiving the interventions would report more facilitative interpretations of their pre-competitive anxiety and anger, and would experience higher self-confidence. This would be indicated by the various

PAGE 24

12 self-report measures. Research with similar strategies supported this hypothesis (e.g., Hanton & Jones, 1999b; Maynard, Hemmings, & Warwick-Evans, 1995; Maynard, Smith, & Warwick-Evans, 1995). 2. Participants in the intervention groups would perform better post-treatment than at pre-treatment. Based on the findings of Jones et al. (1993) and Hanton and Jones (1999b), it is expected that as interpretations of emotional states are shifted toward more facilitative ones, so too will performance be improved. 3. The emotional-awareness monitoring intervention group would demonstrate the greatest improvements in performance and emotion facilitation. By heightening participants' awareness of the impact of state anxiety, anger, and confidence, enhancing their ability to monitor their effects, as well as training them in the techniques to facilitate self-regulation, improvements in these individuals were expected to exceed all others. Although there is a lack of any systematic body of research to support this hypothesis, writers, researchers, and practitioners endorse it (e.g., Feldenkrais, 1972; Gauron, 1984; Ravizza, 1988; Zaichkowski & Takenaka, 1993). 4. The emotional-awareness monitoring group will demonstrate modest improvements in emotional intensity and control, and performance. By making them aware of the relationship between optimal and detrimental levels of emotion and performance, participants may develop or initiate their own strategies to regulate their levels. However, without direct instruction in appropriate techniques, improvements were expected to be less for those who received formal instruction.

PAGE 25

13 5. The comparison group will not display any improvements in perceptual interpretations of intensity, direction, or control of anger, cognitive or somatic anxiety, confidence or performance. Levels of anxiety, anger, and confidence are expected to remain stable. Without any education on the negative effects of these emotions, the importance of the mental game, or instruction on emotional regulation, participants are expected to respond to these items in a consistent manner throughout the study. Likewise, performance is expected to remain stable. 6. It is posited that the proposed methods of emotional state measurement will be a more precise indicator of the relationships between the psychological constructs of interest and performance. Administering instruments only prior to performance may not reflect changes that occur during performance and therefore may not accurately portray these relationships. Having participants describe emotional levels throughout performance should give us a more exact measure and therefore a better understanding (Feltz, 1988). 7. It is predicted that directional interpretation of emotional symptoms will be a stronger predictor of performance than intensity interpretations. Evidence from Jones and associates (Jones, Hanton, & Swain, 1994; Jones & Swain, 1992; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Swain & Jones, 1993) supported this hypothesis. Definition of Terms To understand the terminology used in this investigation, the following terms are defined:

PAGE 26

14 Anger : An emotional state marked by subjective feelings that vary in intensity from mild annoyance or irritation to intense fury and rage (Speilberger, 1 996). Awareness : A self-monitoring procedure that leads to a comprehensive understanding of situational reactions to events. Cognitive Anxiety : Worry or awareness of unpleasant feelings, concerns about performance, and the inability to concentrate (Borkevec, 1976). Chip Shot : A short, low shot played to the putting green (Nance, Davis, & McMahon, 1998). Flagstick : A removable straight indicator, with or without bunting or other ; material attached, centered in the hole to show its position (Gensemer, 1995). Green : The putting surface; that area of closely cut grass containing the hole, cup, and flagstick (Gensemer, 1995). Handicap : A universally excepted measure of a golfer's playing ability; the average number of strokes a player scores above par per 1 8 holes. Hole Out : To make a stroke that puts the ball into the cup (Gensemer, 1995). Par : An arbitrary standard of scoring excellence based on the length and difficulty of a hole and allovsing two putts on the putting green (Nance, Davis, & McMahon, 1998). Pitch Shot : A shot that travels in a high trajectory played to the putting green (Nance, Davis, & McMahon, 1 998). Self-Confidence : The general belief that one can successfully execute a specific activity (Feltz, 1988).

PAGE 27

15 Self-Efficacy : A situation-specific self-confidence which is related to a person's convictions that he or she can produce a desired outcome at a particular moment (Bandura, 1986). Self-Regulation Automatic functioning without the use of external controls (Crews, 1993). Short Game : The combined strokes of pitching, chipping, and putting (Gensemer, 1995). Somatic Anxiety : Perceptions of physiological arousal such as shakiness, sweating, increased heart-rate, rapid respiration, and "butterflies" in the stomach (Davidson & Schwartz, 1976; Kauss, 1980; Martens, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 10990; Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981). ;' State: An immediate emotional state or acute feelings at a particular moment (Speilberger, 1971). Trait: A disposition to perceive a wide range of situations in a particular manner (Spielberger, 1996). Assumptions Several assumptions were made for this research: 1. The directions given prior to questionnaire administration and to participants in the awareness monitoring conditions would be understood. To ensure this, participants were asked if they understood and had any questions. If questions were posed, they were addressed until the student's understanding was clear.

PAGE 28

2. There would be no differences in skill level between the groups prior to treatment. Randomization procedures were expected to control for playing ability differences. This was later verified by statistical analysis of the pretest performance measure. 3. The demographic data form would adequately assess participant skill level and experience. This was later verified by the pretest measure. 4. There would be no extraneous weather or distraction effects that would affect any group performances more than another. Unfortunately, the weather conditions and number of players and distractions in the surrounding area were uncontrollable. Since all participants were subjected to similar conditions, it is assumed that these factors equally affect the groups. 5. Participants receiving the intervention strategies would use them appropriately in practice and playing. Students were verbally reminded to use the strategies prior to trial blocks 3 and 4. 6. The interventions administered would be strong enough to elicit a treatment effect. In an analysis and synthesis of psychological intervention research, Greenspan and Feltz (1989) concluded that educational relaxation based and remedial cognitive restructuring interventions are, in general, effective for enhancing performance. Pilot data verified the effectiveness of the treatments. 7. Any psychological and performance improvements by the experimental groups would be due to effective use of the treatment. Participants were urged to follow the

PAGE 29

17 treatment plan. Additionally, strategy use was confirmed by a post-experiment questionnaire. 8. The dependent measures used in this study (i.e., the modified CSAI-2, modified State and Trait Anger Scales, and performance) would be appropriate measures to examine the effectiveness of the intervention. Pilot data indicated that the dependent measures to be employed would generate quantitative information sufficient for examining the proposed hypotheses. 9. Participants would not have any physical or psychological limitations that may hinder their performance. They were orally screened prior to testing to verify any potential limitations. 10. Participants would answer all questionnaires honestly. At the beginning of the study, they signed an informed consent form indicating that all information provided would be handled confidentially. Furthermore, before the administration of the questionnaires, they were given anti-social desirability instructions as suggested by Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith ( 1 990). These instructions inform participants that it is normal to have anxious feelings before and during competition. They were also advised that there are no right or wrong answers to the questions and it is important that they respond truthfully. 11. Success in the task would be equally important for all participants and they would perform to the best of their ability. The potential monetary rewards for best performance should have influenced participants to attempt to play their best. Participants

PAGE 30

18 were questioned following the experiment about the importance of the event and effort exerted. 12. The modified time-to event paradigm and ego-threatening instructional set would be appropriate methods for manipulating cognitive and/or somatic anxiety, anger, and/or confidence. Previous studies (e.g.. Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994; Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981; Orbach, 1998; Spiegler, Morris, & Liebert, 1968) have indicated that these methods are effective. Limitations There were several limitations inherent in this study. These include the following: 1 The level of participants' skill and experience was initially determined by selfreport. Equality of skill between groups at pretest, therefore, was a potential limitation. This limitation, however, was later absolved by a pretest measure. 2. Participants in each group may have determine the hypotheses being tested and/or form expectations. Because some participants were introduced to techniques that may improve their performance, this limitation was unavoidable. This was later examined by a social validation and manipulation check questionnaire. 3. The experimenter was the sole administrator of the interventions. Therefore, there may have been an inherent bias toward the interventions groups. 4. The effectiveness of the interventions is based in part upon the dynamics of the interaction between the participants and the experimenter. Participants in the interventions groups may not respond to the therapeutic style of the experimenter.

PAGE 31

5. Participants in the intervention conditions may not use the treatment effectively during testing. They may disregard or forget all of the strategies. To increase the probability of strategy use among treatment groups, they were verbally reminded to use the strategies during the practice session. 6. Participants in the comparison group may have, or develop, a strategy or strategies to enhance performance. To verify this potential limitation, a social validation and manipulation check questionnaire was administered to all participants at the conclusion of testing. 7. The comparison group did not accurately represent a true control condition, f This was a potential confound. 8. The nature of conducting research in a real world environment limits experimental control and presents a threat to internal validity. Participants would potentially encounter possible outside influences including auditory and visual distractions (i.e., others playing nearby), weather conditions (e.g., heat, wind, sun glare), and time of day (e.g., temperature, sun position). These factors, however, are uncontrollable due to the nature of the study and were expected to affect groups equally. 9. Because semi-skilled male golfers served as the participants, the results can be generalized only to this population. Significance of Study With the considerable interest in sport participation, the continual search for efficient methods to optimize skill level, and the potential physical, psychological, and

PAGE 32

20 potential economic benefits obtained from participation, researchers and educators are challenged to determine effective methods to enhance the learning process and aid performance. How individuals might best increase athletic performance with the productive use of cognitive, behavioral, and affective processes has been of increasing interest to athletes, coaches, and sport psychologists for decades. Leading questions concern the application of emotional awareness approaches to emotional interpretation and perceptual regulation, and performance enhancement. For example: Does becoming aware of emotional states and their effect on performance lead to better control? Is it important to recognize the impact of emotions on performance? Does the control of emotions such as anxiety, anger, and confidence play a significant role in determining performance outcome? Such questions as these will be explored in this study. It is also commonly accepted that athletes can have very different interpretations of their emotional states. Interventions are currently being structured with this fact in mind. The recent sport psychology literature has advocated the use of multistrategy matched approaches for emotional intensity and interpretation regulation and performance enhancement. The validity for these types of techniques, however, is still in question, particularly for less than expert athletes. It is conceivable the less proficient athletes should be able to adopt and apply many of the techniques that higher level athletes use for personal advantage. Further, questions concerning the ecological validity of cognitive-behavioral interventions have been postulated because many of the past studies supporting their effectiveness have been conducted in a laboratory setting.

PAGE 33

21 Intuitively, the treatments should be as productive in a real world setting as in a laboratory, provided extraneous variables are well controlled. This study should help to clarify these issues and provide further evidence for the efficacy of emotion regulation in sport. • ,. i Anxiety has long been recognized as an influential variable on performance. Sport psychology researchers, on the other hand, have largely ignored the impact of anger/frustration. To date, few studies exist in which anger was a specific variable of interest. This study essentially chartered an unexplored area by including a direct examination of the impact of anger/frustration. The introduction of a multidimensional approach to anxiety has been an important step forward in the empirical understanding of the anxiety-arousal-performance relationship. This understanding, however, is still unclear mainly due to the methods by which these relationships were measured and failure on part of researchers to recognize that athletes interpret intensity levels of emotional states differently. Questions have been posed regarding the time frame of the administration of the instruments utilized to assess an individual's levels of anxiety and how indicative pre-performance measures are of these relationships. These measures, which are typically administered from days to moments before or after competition, may not accurately assess how an athlete feels during a contest. It is widely accepted that the anxiety-arousal-performance relationship needs to be more closely examined. The proposed measures should lead to greater understanding of these relationships.

PAGE 34

22 The overall significance of this study lies in the continuing effort to establish effective protocol for the learning and performance of high-level sport skills as well as more closely examining the relationship between anxiety, anger, confidence, and performance. The efficacy of emotional awareness approaches for sport performance enhancement of athletes is still unclear, especially for non-elite athletes. So too is our understanding of the relationship between arousal, anxiety, and performance. Considering the anticipated results, the potential of this research is not only in offering an effective method of controlling debilitating emotions and increasing self-efficacy and performance, but also in providing support for ecologically valid awareness approaches as an effective method of behavioral change in sport situations. Further, the proposed methodology should add to this understanding. This study should contribute to this body of knowledge and, therefore, influence subsequent research. The experimental design and the task used in this study represent the first attempt to 1 ) explore the effects of an emotional awareness intervention during a simulated competitive event, 2) directly investigate the impact of anger on performance, 3) attempt to implement matched emotional control strategies to facilitate the control of debilitating emotions as well as improve performance of moderately skilled athletes, and 4) measure psychological constructs during the course of an event opposed to solely before and/or after.

PAGE 35

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE This chapter contains a review of literature relevant to this study. The first section presents information pertinent to the impact of emotion and cognition on behavior. A distinction between arousal, anxiety, and stress is made in the second section. The third section offers methods for the measuring arousal and anxiety. The fourth section examines self-confidence. Perspectives on anger are explored in the fifth section. The sixth section includes a critical overview of various arousal-anxiety-performance relationship theories. The nature of self-regulation and self-regulation models are explained in section seven. Section eight covers methods for coping with sport related stress. And the final section includes suggestions as to the relevance of strategies with regard to performance enhancement in golf as well as the fitting literature. These sections provide research and theoretical perspectives with regard to the purpose of this study. Emotion and Cognition in Sport Emotion is one of the most vague, complex concepts in psychology, which touches all aspects of human behavior (Strongman, 1987). Some see it as a disruptive process (e.g., Duffy, 1962), whereas others believe it enhances behavior (e.g.. Young, 1961). Probably most would agree that it is a multidimensional phenomenon that exerts a number of different influences on human functioning. Theories within each of these areas are so vast that they include multiple views of emotion and hundreds of different 23

PAGE 36

definitions (Strongman, 1987). For example, it has been viewed as adaptation (Plutchik, 1980), conscious experience, (Hillman, 1960), and motivation (Leeper, 1970). Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981), however, have attempted to resolve this issue by putting each of these perspectives into one all encompassing definition: Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated by neutral/hormonal systems, which can (a) give the rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) active widespread physiological adjustments to the arousal conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal -directed, and adaptive, (p. 58) Thus, emotion can be viewed as a complex process that possesses cognitive, physiological, behavioral, and experiential components. Emotion has been studied from a number of different perspectives that fall into the general areas of cognition, physiology, and behavior (Buck, 1985). The first refers to the conscious or subjective experience of emotion. This constitutes what is subjectively expected. Thus, individuals may experience feelings of confidence, anger, or happiness during or following an event. This dimension of emotion has been studied primarily by psychologists endorsing a cognitive and/or phenomenological approach (e.g., Arnold, 1 960; Lazarus, 1 966; Schachter, 1 964; Weiner 1981). The second component of emotion, which has been studied experimentally, is that of the physiological changes in the autonomic nervous system which take place during emotion (e.g., increases in heart rate, blood pressure. Galvanic Skin Response, and visceral functioning). According to this view, an individual would be anxious or angry if

PAGE 37

elevations in heart rate, blood pressure, etc. were found. Psychophysiologists such as Cannon (1968), James (1968), and Tompkins (1981) have been the major proponents of this position. j The third and final component of emotion, which has been studied experimentally, is observable emotional behavior. Verbal tirades, for instance, or aggressive behavior may be seen as indicative of the emotion of anger. This approach to the study of emotion has been followed chiefly by behaviorists (e.g., DoUard, Dobb, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1984; Millenson, 1967; Watson & Rayner, 1920), although some cognitive-social psychologists (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962) have also made use of this behavioral or expressive component of emotion. Theories have been formulated in each of these disciplines in order to understand the complex phenomenon of emotion. To discuss all the theories is beyond the scope of this paper. For comprehensive reviews see Izard (1977) and Strongman (1973,1978, 1987). For the purpose of this study, attention will be allocated to the more recently accepted cognitive theories and their relevance to emotion and performance. Over the last 35 years there has been a general shift in research efforts to examine the role that cognitions play in the experience of emotion (see London & Nesbitt, 1974; Mandler, 1984; Strongman, 1987 for reviews). Due to the theoretical work of Schachter (1964), Lazarus (1966, 1984), Arnold (1960), and more recently Mandler (1975, 1984) and Weiner (1981, 1985a), it is now generally accepted that emotion experienced in a given situation depends upon how the individual appraises the event.

PAGE 38

26 Cognitive Appraisal Expanding on the above theories and recent social psychological research, Vallerand (1987) proposed a cognitive model for self-related affect in achievement situations. Vallerand' s model posits that emotion is the result of cognitive appraisal; that is, it is the subjective appraisal of events and not events per se that reduces emotions. Additionally, cognitive appraisals can be intuitive (almost automatic) and reflective (deliberate in nature). The distinction between intuitive and reflective forms of appraisal is well documented (see Buck, 1985) and allows for the meaningful explanation in prediction of self-related affect. Intuitive appraisal involves minima! cognitive processing. For instance, knowledge that one has not played well (following or during a match) is often immediate and does not require more elaborate forms of cognition. Although several forms of intuitive appraisals may exist (see Kassin & Baron, 1986), with respect to sport performance, the mere understanding that one has or has not performed well represents the most important form of intuitive appraisal of performance. Conversely, reflective appraisal processes involve elaborate cognitive processing of information in dealing with the external or internal environment. The reflective appraisal can take several forms; intellectualization (Lazarus, 1966), self, outcome, and social comparison processes (Suls & Mullen, 1983), various information processing functions (Markus & Zajonc, 1 985), mastery-related cognitions (Taylor, 1981), and

PAGE 39

causal attributions (Weiner, 1979, 1985a). Thus, reflective appraisals involve a deeper consideration and search for meaning. The role of cognitive appraisals is to treat incoming information from the self or environment in a coherent and meaningful way. It is the individual's self-concept structures that enable incoming information to achieve meaning and to be coherently organized (Epstein, 1973). Initially, information is appraised through the intuitive appraisal. If the appraisal reveals that outcomes or goals are consistent with the basic self structures, no further cognitive activity is necessary because there is a match with existing structures and that is sufficient to lead to affective experiences (Fiske, 1981, 1982; Mandler, 1984). In such instances, task importance (Brown & Weiner, 1984; Weiner & Brown, 1984) or meaning (Maehr & Braskamp, 1986) plays an important role in the intensity of the affect experienced. However, if the incoming information is perceived as being inconsistent with some important self-structures, then arousal is experienced. This arousal leads to further cognitive activity (the reflective appraisal) in an attempt to assimilate the information into existing structures or to accommodate the information in new structures and thus adjust the arousal. Research has revealed that novelty (Beriyne, 1970), uncertainty (e.g., Schackter & Singer, 1962), unexpected events (i.e., inconsistent with the self) (Wong & Weiner, 1981), the nonattainment of goals (Weiner, 1985b; Wong & Weiner, 1981), and the importance of the task (Brown &, Weiner, 1984; McMillan & Spratt, 1983; Weiner,

PAGE 40

28 1985b) lead the individual to engage in further cognitive work beyond the intuitive appraisal. Anshel (1997) suggested that the most important factor that contributes to feeling anxious or worried in a sport situation is cognitive appraisal. Appraisal consists of the athlete's interpretation of a given situation or event which indirectly influences his or her psychological and physiological response. The nature and meaning of the situation are associated with either threat or challenge. The stress appraisal (threat) elicits a different set of mental and somatic responses than an appraisal considered irrelevant or positive (challenge) (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). If a stressful event, such as remarks by others, is interpreted by the athlete as a challenge, arousal may be heightened but anxiety may be reduced and the comment may provide incentive to improve performance. Similarly, the success of an opponent may elicit an appraisal of irrelevance early in the competition but may be interpreted as far more stressful near the end when the score is close. Each of these appraisals usually elicits different types of coping responses. The perception of the demands of the situation as threatening or challenging interacts with the perception of ability or availability of resources required to meet those demands. Personal dispositions, such as trait anxiety, self-confidence, optimism, performance expectations, and the motivation to achieve and strive for success, also influence the individual's appraisal. Skill level is another factor that contributes to an anxiety appraisal. Researchers have shown that elite competitors have more positive interpretations of their anxious feelings about the consequences for immediate future performance (Jones & Swain, 1995).

PAGE 41

29 Consequently, Anshel (1997) and others (e.g., Rotella & Lemer, 1993) have suggested that interventions to improve the management of anxiety should include cognitive techniques that create more accurate and productive appraisals of the situation or event for each individual athlete (Anshel, 1997). After appraisal, most high level athletes make mental and physical adjustments to eliminate, reduce, or prevent the onset of state anxiety. Relaxation techniques, imagery, positive self-statements, and physical removal from the immediate environment are examples of such adjustments, which are collectively referred to as defense mechanisms. These defense mechanisms, combined with the resultant level of state anxiety jointly affect the person's behavior or performance. Once these techniques are learned and mastered, they can be initiated very quickly and automatically. Hardy Personality Theorv The psychological construct of hardiness, as characterized by Kobasa (1979), describes the personalities of individuals who have the tendency to view stressfiil situations in a positive way. Although the vast majority of past research has focused on the negative effects of stress and anxiety, recent research suggests that many individuals view stress and anxiety as challenging, exciting, and beneficial (Fish, 1983; Folkman, 1984; Folkman, Lazarus, & DeLongis 1986; Helmers, 1991; Jones & Hardy, 1989; Kobasa, 1979; Kobasa & Maddi, 1982; Kobasa, Maddi, & Courington, 1981; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Murray, 1989; Svebak & Stoya, 1980).

PAGE 42

There are three general characteristics that individuals with hardy personalities are considered to possess: 1 ) an ability to feel deeply involved in or committed to the activities of their lives, 2) the belief that they can control or influence the events of their experience, and 3) the anticipation of demands or changes as exciting challenges to further development. Through optimistic cognitive appraisals and decisive coping actions, hardy people transform stressful events into less stressful situations (Kobasa, Maddi, Puccetti, & Zola, 1985). This personality style is learned and developed through interactions between people and their interpersonal environment (Kobasa, 1979; Kobasa, Maddi, & Puccetti, 1982). Perceptions and/or cognitive appraisals of events are strongly influenced by early life experiences and social learning (Bandura, 1977a; Rotter, 1954, 1966) and indirect experiences such as modeling (Bandura, 1977a). The hardy personality style, thus, is a combination of cognition, emotion, and action geared towards coping and personal development. Competitive Sport and Emotions The high arousal produced by strenuous sport or competition makes emotion more likely — from exhilaration to anger, depending on what the people around you do, the rules of the game, or the provocation (Tavris, 1989). The specific emotion an athlete feels, then, depends on the circumstances of the sport and the particular situation (Tavris, 1989). Identical load and identical external conditions of sport, arousal, performance, and competition result in very different emotional states. In the

PAGE 43

31 individual behavior of the athletes, we can recognize optimal stimulation or greatest disturbances. The emotional stress of definite loadings is modified by the time of realization and the environmental conditions. Emotions can support performance, but in some cases, it might be also necessary to reduced them in order to avoid disturbances (Hahn, 1989). Emotions such as fim, sensation seeking, sympathy, love, empathy, etc. are welcomed qualities, whereas problematic emotions such as pain, tediousness, worry, anger, jealousy, anxiety, blame etc. are often feared (Hahn, 1989). There has been a significant trend in sport psychology over the past 20 years to move toward the development and use of sport specific models, measures, and methodologies. Martens influential work on competition and competitive anxiety initiated this trend. Martens began his work on competition and competitive anxiety by defining competition as a social process and by emphasizing the importance of sport specific constructs and measures. Specifically, he defined competition as "a process in which the comparison of an individuals performance is made with some standard in the presence of at least one other person who is aware of the criterion for comparison and can evaluate the comparison process" (Martens, 1976a, p. 14). Martens definition of competition as a social process rather than as a set of conditions provides a framework for considering the role of individual differences and the interaction of individual differences with situational factors within a dynamic social process. Martens model of the competitive process starts with a set of definite defining

PAGE 44

32 conditions that represent the objective competitive situation. Next, individual differences come into play in the subjective competitive situation. Subjective perceptions influence responses, which are the actual behaviors in competition including both performance and non-performance behaviors such as state anxiety or state confidence. Finally, responses have consequences, including the obvious immediate consequences of winning or losing, as well as influences on the individual such as changes in skills or attitudes, and influences on the situation. Martens followed his discussion of competition by developed a line of research on competitive anxiety with the competition model as a framework. Athletes of all ages and levels of ability are often imder great pressure to succeed. The need for approval and to meet self-expectations or those of others, together with their tendency to link self-esteem to positive performance outcomes may cause high anxiety about the possibility of performance failure. Alternatively, anxiety may be experienced due to the pressure and expectations following success. The psychological results of these dilemmas are called "fear of failure" and "fear of success," respectively. The most common sources of anxiety in athletes are fears of failure and resulting social disapproval or rejection (Smith 1984). One of the less fortunate aspects of sport competition is the pressure that athletes feel to meet the expectations of others, especially persons whose opinions that they value. It seems that the more an athlete succeeds, the more those expectations rise, and the more pressure increases. Most athletes are afraid to fail (Passer, 1984). This fear, is not fi^om the fact that the potential for losing a contest is inherent in competitive sport, but from the individuals

PAGE 45

33 personal history. For example, when an athlete fails or loses in a competitive situation, others may respond in ways that have negative emotional and psychological consequences. Following failure, the athlete may begin to expect a negative evaluation. The individual then associates failure with more intense feelings of shame, guilt, and other unpleasant emotions. Passer concluded that fear of failure is one primary cause of the competitive trait anxiety. Even elite athletes have this trait to some extent. Most, however, are able to control it. Less successful performers generally do not, often resulting in withdrawal from the activity. Cratty (1983) has hypothesized that in some cases athletes may be afraid to succeed because they fear the loss of attention and support. For them, mediocrity is a safer less risky approach. There is, however, little support for this hypothesis in the sport psychology literature (McElroy & Willis, 1979; Orlick & Partington, 1986). Performance failure under high expectancies of success may be at least partly explained by the research on choking in sport. Choking is defined as performance decrements under pressure circumstances, where pressure is defined as "any factor or combination of factors that increases the importance of performing well on a particular occasion" (Baumeister, 1984, p. 610). The causes of choking are both internal and external. Internal causes of choking include over-arousal, appraising situations as highly stressful, the loss of self-control, and expectations of failure. External causes include crowd pressure, fear of success, expectation and actions of coaches, and peer pressure.

PAGE 46

34 Choking may result in heightened narrowing of attention and slower processing of information. A narrow focus of attention, similar to high state anxiety, is undesirable when task demands require the athlete to scan the competitive environment, looking for locations of opponents and teammates and plaiming strategy. Slower information processing is manifested by being easily distracted from the task at hand, poor attentional shifting between internal and external directions, slower and less accurate decisions making, more thinking and less reliance on automatic responses, and making performance errors (Boutcher, 1992). Choking can also be accompanied by physiological changes such as increased muscle tension, sweating, higher heart rate, nausea, and stomach cramps, any of which can directly influence performing sport skills. Through his extensive research, Baumeister has found that two factors, pressure to succeed and self-consciousness (i.e., the tendency to focus attention on oneself), strongly contribute to the choking response. Individual's who are habitually selfconscious find it easier to cope with situations that promote self-consciousness (i.e., pressure situations) because they are accustomed to performing while self-conscious (Baumeister, 1984). Low self-conscious individuals choke more easily in pressure situations because going from low to high pressure is more extensive for low selfconscious individuals, who do not cope well with pressure (Baumeister, 1984). This outcome was further exacerbated when the subjects disposition of self-consciousness was low (Baumeister, 1984). Subjects with low self-conscious dispositions placed in selfconscious situations brought on by the expectations of the observers, cope least well

PAGE 47

under pressure (Baumeister, 1984). Therefore, pressure creates high self-consciousness. To overcome the high self-conscious choking phenomenon, Anshel (1997) has suggested seven strategies: 1) Practice under game-like conditions, 2) improve the athletes selfconfidence, 3) keep expectations realistic, 4) put the game and sport into perspective, 5) avoid pressure statements, 6) focus externally, and 7) develop performance routines. Arousal, Anxiety, and Stress in Sport Arousal Arousal has been described by a proliferation of terms. Sage (1984) and Magill (1989) discuss arousal within the construct of motivation. Cox (1990) suggests that arousal is synonymous with alertness. Martens (1987) described it as "psychic energy." Ursin (1978) and Sage (1984) contend that arousal is the same as activation. In addition to the previously mentioned, other terms such as energy, excitation, vigilance, and mental readiness have also been used to convey similar ideas (Zaichkowsky & Takenaka, 1993). The fact the so many terms have been used has led to total confusion concerning the actual construct being examined. Consequently, Neiss (1988) suggested that the arousal construct should be conceptualized into discrete "psychobiological states". Arousal is a requisite for optimal sport performance. Reacting, thinking, and moving in sport at efficient speeds can be achieved only if the performer has established an appropriate level of physical and psychological readiness. Based on his observations and interactions with competitors, Oxedine (1970) has intuitively speculated about the level of arousal that is optimal for various sports. In short.

PAGE 48

sports that require more relaxed fine motor skills such as a golf swing need markedly less arousal than relatively more powerful gross motor behaviors like those of a defensive lineman in football (Oxedine, 1970). This viewpoint, however, neglects the current understanding of individual differences as well as the multidimensional nature of arousal and anxiety. The key issues concerning arousal for athletes are determining the level of arousal that is optimal in a given situation and for a given person, establish the point of diminishing returns, and learning the proper techniques for controlling it. Anxiety Probably all emotions are involved in sport, but perhaps the most frequently studied dimension is anxiety. In sport, anxiety reflects the performer's feelings that something may go wrong, that the outcome may not be successful, or that performance failure may be experienced. Perhaps the performer views an opponent as superior or knows that someone is evaluating the quality of his or her performance. This can be threatening, particularly for individuals with relatively low self-confidence, low self-esteem, or a lack of previous success. Such individuals are sometimes referred to as "practice players" or "chokers." They have a tendency to "freeze-up" and perform more poorly during the contest, especially in pressure situations, then in practice. Because anxiety results in increased central and autonomic nervous system activity, it has been sometimes been used interchangeably with arousal

PAGE 49

(e.g., Iso-Ahola & Hatfield, 1986; Klavora, 1979; Landers & Boutcher, 1993; Sage & Bennett, 1973; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982). Although anxiety results in increased physiological activity like arousal, anxiety refers to states that produce feelings of discomfort and worry, a psychological state (Spielberger, 1966). Whereas anxiety is traditionally defined as an unpleasant emotion, arousal is not automatically associated with either pleasant or unpleasant events (Weinberg & Gould, 1995). Some authors, however, consider state anxiety an extension of high arousal (e.g.. Landers fe Boutcher, 1993). These authors state "When arousal levels become extremely high, you experience unpleasant emotional reactions... This maladaptive condition is often referred to as stress or state anxiety" (p. 165). Gould and Krane (1992) contend that anxiety is the emotional impact or cognitive dimension of arousal. Although both anxiety and arousal contain psychological and physiological components and manifestations, writers and researchers in sport psychology have recently recognized that the terms are not the same. The are measured differently and, in fact, require different techniques to regulate them. An important advancement in research on the measurement of psychological constructs was the state-trait distinction. Applying the state-trait distinction to research on psychological constructs requires clarification of whether they refer to transitory emotional states and or relatively stable individual differences in personality traits.

PAGE 50

38 Cattell and Scheier (1961) and Spielberger (1966) were the first to categorize anxiety as having either state or trait qualities. State anxiety can be described as subjective, consciously experienced feelings of tension, apprehension, nervousness and worry, and heightened arousal or activation of the autonomic nervous system that varies in intensity and fluctuates over time. Conversely, trait anxiety is a relatively stable acquired behavioral disposition, often depicted as a personality trait. Trait anxiety predisposes an individual to perceive a wide range of nondangerous circumstances as threatening or dangerous. Individual's with high trait anxiety tends to demonstrate high levels of state anxiety. Thus, high trait anxiety athletes will likely become more anxious before a competitive event than low trait performers. State and trait anxiety tend to be moderately to highly correlated, usually about .60 or above (Gould & Krane 1992). Over the last 30 years, researchers have focused on the multidimensional nature of anxiety contending that it has separate components that are elicited differently. Sarason (1960) identified these different dimensions of anxiety as cognitive worry and emotional arousal. Liebert and Morris (1967) labeled the two anxiety components as cognitive worry and somatic anxiety. Davidson and Schwartz (1976) and Borkevec (1976) later categorized them as cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety where cognitive anxiety is conceptualized as worry, awareness of unpleasant feelings, concerns about performance, and inability to concentrate. Somatic anxiety is the perceived physiological arousal which is reflected by physiological responses such is increased heart rate, shortness of breath, clammy hands, and butterflies and the stomach.

PAGE 51

, : 39 Liebert and Morris ( 1 967) postulated that whereas somatic anxiety increases prior to evaluation or competition, cognitive worry (anxiety) does not changed unless the individual's performance changes during this time. Sport psychology researchers concur that cognitive and somatic anxiety states followed different temporal patterns (e.g.. Martens et al., 1990). Somatic anxiety is suggested to be a condition response to competitive situations, increasing rapidly close to the start of the event and decreasing significantly as competition progresses. Cognitive anxiety states result from worry about negative expectations. Therefore, cognitive anxiety before or during the competition varies only when expectations of success change (Smith & Morris, 1976). It generally remains relatively stable prior to competition. Although a considerable amount of research has been conducted, no consistent pattern of results has emerged. Similarly, Liebert and Morris (1967) found evidence that cognitive worry and somatic anxiety have different effects on performance. Specifically, they suggested that there has been a strong inverse relationship between cognitive worry and performance (Deffenbacher, 1977; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Spiegler, Morris, & Liebert, 1968), and that somatic anxiety is related to performance only when cognitive worry is low (Doctor & Altman, 1969; Morris & Liebert, 1970). Furthermore, cognitive anxiety has been more consistently and strongly related to performance than somatic anxiety (see Deffenbacher, 1980; Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981, for reviews).

PAGE 52

Sport psychology researchers (e.g.. Burton, 1988; Gould & Petrickoff, 1985; Karteroliotis & Gill, 1987, Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1983) concur that cognitive and somatic anxiety are differently related to performance. Investigations based on this concept have shown a negative link between worry and motor task performance (Adam & Van Wieringen, 1988; Lehrer & Woolfolk, 1982; Morris, Smith, Andrews, & Morris, 1975), and worry and actual or expected competitive athletic performance (Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, & Plaki, 1986; Crocker, 1989; Crocker, Alderman, & Smith, 1988; Furst & Tenebaum, 1986; Gould, Weiss, & Weinberg, 1981; Mahoney & Avener, 1977). The relationship between somatic anxiety and performance, however, has been inconsistent. Adam and Van Wieringen (1988) and Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, and Plaki (1986) found no relationship between somatic anxiety and motor task performance. Conversely, others have shown facilitative effects (actual or perceived) on simple gross motor performance (Helmers, 1991; Taylor, 1987) and fine complex motor tasks (Morris, Smith, Andrews, & Morris, 1975; Murray, 1989; Starkes & Allard, 1983). Thus, due to inconsistencies, there is a need to further examine these relationships in the sport context. Stress There is no clear-cut distinction between stress and anxiety (Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1993; Martens, 1977). Levitt (1980) cited some of the most fi-equently reported meanings of stress: 1). A combination of stimuli or a situation which comprises

PAGE 53

41 the circumstances a person subjectively experiences as threatening and which can cause anxiety; 2). The process which is triggered if a person is no longer able to cope with the demands of a situation and negative consequences are to be expected in the case of failure; 3). Responses to threatening stimuli. Spielberger (1972) defined stress as closely related to state and trait anxiety. In general, it is assumed that the stress response is directly connected with physical, psychological, or social stimuli called stressors. The individuals subjective appraisal of these stimuli as physically or psychologically threatening results in an anxiety response. In sport, stressors include environmental and situational conditions (e.g., playing conditions), performance expectations, reactions of spectators, etc. The Measurement of Arousal and Anxiety Arousal Arousal has traditionally been interpreted and measured strictly as a physiological process on a continuum ranging from deep sleep to high expectations (Duffy, 1957). Arousal is often determined by changes in heart and respiratory rate, extent of sweating, and other physiological measures (Duffy, 1957). Neiss (1990), however, stated: "By focusing on the elevated physiology and ignoring its psychological context, the construct of arousal lumps together grossly disparate states (e.g., joy, grief, anger) resulting in a breadth that explains nothing", (p. 102) Therefore, it is now also being measured by its emotional aspects, such as positive feelings (excitement, and happiness) and negative

PAGE 54

feelings (fear, embarrassment, and depression) (Anshel, 1985; Oxedine, 1970) as well as its physiological characteristics. Arousal results in numerous physiological and psychological changes. Sport psychology researchers have attempted to assess levels of arousal by physiological indicators such as heart rate, blood pressure, and Galvanic Skin Response, as well as selfreport inventories like the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), Sport Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT; Martens, 1977), and Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1983). The general shift among researchers has been toward using muhidimensional instruments like the CSAI-2, which assesses cognitive and somatic state anxiety along with state confidence, and to take both physiological and psychological measurements. However, one of the frustrations that researcher's • experience is that there are typically low correlations between self-report scales and ..," if. physiological/biological measures. Lacey and Lacey (1958) suggest that there a number of reasons for these low intercorrelations. First, individuals differ vastly in how the reflect arousal symptoms. One athlete may demonstrate elevated arousal with increases in heart rate or muscle tension, whereas another may experience it entirely cognitively or any combination of the above. Secondly, there is always potential for measurement errors. Physiological instruments may need to be periodically calibrated, and in the case or questionnaires, social

PAGE 55

43 desirability (i.e., under or overestimation) may override the scale's ability to discriminate between different arousal levels. Anxiety Anxiety is not usually measured physiologically for several reasons. First, there is no single physiological response to the anxiety state (Sonstroem, 1984). Second, anxiety is typically viewed as a feeling; a person's perception or the appraisal of the situation. Individual's somatic response to appraisals of exhilaration may be similar to appraisals of threat, harm, or challenge. As Hackfort and Schwenkmetzger (1989) point out, "An increase in heart rate can occur both in the context of the emotion anxiety and in reactions of joy or anger" (p. 59). Further, the relationship between two physiological measures of anxiety, for example heart rate and sweating, is quite low about 10 (Hackfort & Schwenkmetzger 1989). Fourth, the nervous system response to anxiety differs among individuals. While some person's sweat profusely when nervous, others don't sweat at all. Finally, and individual may experience feelings of stress without experiencing the harmful physiological effects often associated with stress. This is important because an athlete, coach, or sport psychologist may incorrectly assume the athlete is anxious if the conclusion is based on the performer's heart rate rather than the persons self-reported feelings. A person's subjective feelings about how well he or she views the competitive situation is the single of most important issue in measuring and in experiencing anxiety.

PAGE 56

Based on the notion that athletes react to situational demands. Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith (1983) developed a sport specific, multidimensional state anxiety inventory known as the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2). The CSAI-2 is a 27-item scale that measures both state cognitive and somatic anxiety and selfconfidence. Competitive state anxiety is defined as conscious feelings of apprehension and tension due mainly to the individual's perception of the present or upcoming situation as threatening (Martens et al., 1990). Since its induction, the CSAI-2 has been the most commonly utilized multidimensional measure of competitive state anxiety in sport (Krane, 1994). Martens and colleagues (1983) have argued that somatic anxiety should influence performance less than cognitive anxiety because it reaches its peak at the onset of a competition and dissipates over the course of the event. Conversely, cognitive state anxiety may increases during competition because of social and self-evaluation that occur during the event. The increase in cognitive state anxiety causes stronger and more consistent performance decrements. However, many studies have generally failed to find a strong relationship between sport performance and the CSAI-2 subcomponents (e.g., Caruso, Dzewaltowski, Gill, & McElroy, 1990; Krane & Williams, 1987; Martens et al., 1983; Maynard & Howe, 1987; McAuley, 1985). In their initial study. Martens and his associates (1983) found no relationship between the precompetitive CSAI-2 subscale assessments and initial golf performance score on the first nine holes, but found significant relationships between precompetitive

PAGE 57

45 cognitive and somatic CSAI-2 subscale scores and performance score on the last nine holes. McAuley (1985) found no relationship between precompetitive CSAI-2 scores and golf performance over 10-18 hole tournament rounds. In another series of investigations, Gould, Petlichkoff, and Weinberg (1984) and Gould and Petlichkoff (1985) found significant relationships between precompetitive CSAI-2 cognitive and somatic anxiety scores and wrestling performance in some matches, but not in others. The findings of Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, and Vevera (1987) suggested that cognitive anxiety was not related to pistol shooting performance, that somatic anxiety was related to performance in a curvilinear inverted-U fashion, and that confidence was negatively related to performance. In a different hne of study, Karteroliotis and Gill (1987) used to CSAI-2 to examine temporal changes in psychological and physiological components of state anxiety. The results of their study confirmed the multidimensional nature of state anxiety and provided further evidence for the independence of cognitive worry and somatic anxiety. However, both dimensions followed similar temporal patterns prior to and during competition. Finally, the results confirmed the nonsignificant relationship between psychological and physiological measures of anxiety. In summary, then, research examining the relationship between CSAI-2 subscale scores and performance has been inconsistent suggesting further investigation and/or alternative methods. Some explanations have been reported to account for the inconsistent CSAI-2 performance relationship findings. First, the CSAI-2 may not be a consistent and

PAGE 58

46 powerful predictor of athletic performance (Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987). Second, it is possible that the predicted CSAI-2 performance relationships were not demonstrated because of the way in which CSAI-2 data were examined and/or the way performance was assessed (Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987). Problems in previous investigations include a lack of standardized performance measures, the use of between group as opposed to intraindividual analyses, the failure to employing statistical analyses that detect curvilinear relationships, and the failure to create or assess at least three distinct levels of anxiety. With regard to between subject analyses, Sonstroem and Bernardo (1982) found that absolute levels of state anxiety show little relationship to performance. In contrast, they demonstrate consistent relationship around the subjects when individual optimal levels of state anxiety are examined. Thus, based on the Sonstroem and Bernardo (1982) findings, it may be more appropriate to examine intraindividual relationships between CSAI-2 levels of state anxiety and performance. Finally, it is important to recognize that to statistically examine whether linear relationships exist, researchers must make at least three different anxiety assessments (Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987). Another factor that decreases the predictability of anxiety measures is be athlete ability to adapt to potential anxiety provoking situations in sport. Identifying anxiety levels and predicting performance based on a single measure apparently has its limitations. In fact, some psychologists contend that merely labeling a person's feelings or behaviors as anxious and communicating this observation to the competitor might

PAGE 59

47 actually provoke additional, more intense feelings of anxiety and possibly erode performance further. Of particular interest for this study is that in the Martens et al. (1983) and McAuley (1985) studies, task demands changed as a function of the characteristics of the front and back nine holes, golf course, and/or the course the tournament itself was played on. That is, in these studies changing task demands may have confounded or masked any relationship between state anxiety and performance. Similarly, emotional states may have changed from shot to shot depending on the results of the last shot, a player's confidence with a particular club or type of shot, and performance of competitors. A better test of this relationship must be made where the task demands are held constant from one CSAI2 assessment to another (Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, &. Vevera, 1987). One of the major reasons for the contradictory results in the anxiety research is it is generally measured from days to moments prior to and/or after an event. This obviously does not take into any consideration any changes in affect due to performance fluctuations or other situational variables or changes during the event. Another is that it is generally believe to have a detrimental affect on performance. Jones (1991), and Jones and Swain (1995), however, have recently argued that anxiety may have a positive influence on performance. They suggest that to gain a better understanding of the anxiety performance relationship researchers should consider athlete's interpretation of their anxiety symptoms in addition to intensity. A series of studies have supported the distinction between the intensity and direction of anxiety (e.g., Jones, Hanton, & Swain,

PAGE 60

48 1994; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Swain & Jones, 1996). A major finding in these studies was that although the intensity of the anxiety may be the same, it was the individual's interpretation of the anxiety symptoms that ultimately influenced performance. As anxiety theory and research have advanced, this notion of "direction" has been forwarded in the measurement of competitive anxiety. The focus of this research challenged the traditional assumption that elevated anxiety is debilitating toward performance (see Jones, 1995, for a review). Consequently, recent empirical studies have incorporated a modified version of the CSAI-2, which includes a direction scale developed by Jones and Swain (1992) to measure facilitative and debilitating interpretations of anxiety symptoms (e.g., Hanton & Jones, 1999b; Jones, Hanton, &, Swain, 1994; Jones & Swain, 1992, 1995; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Maynard, Hemmings, & Warwick-Evans, 1995; Maynard, Smith, & Warwick-Evans, 1995). Results from the Jones and colleagues studies (Jones, Hanton, & Swain, 1994; Jones & Swain, 1995; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993) suggest that more elite, more competitive, and better performers in competition interpret the intensity of their anxiety symptoms as more facilitative compared to less elite, less competitive, or poorer performers, despite no differences in anxiety intensity levels between them. Jones's (1995) approach to measuring facilitative/debilitative competitive anxiety is based on Carver and Scheier's (1988) control theory model of anxiety. Carver and Scheier's model focuses on perceived control over coping and goal attainment as an

PAGE 61

49 important mediator of how anxiety is interpreted, with positive expectations of control leading to facilitative anxiety and negative control expectations promoting more debilitating anxiety responses. Hardy has presented a similar model based on processing efficiency theory (Eysenck, 1982, 1992; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), which focuses on selfconfidence as a key mediator of the facilitative/debilitating effects of cognitive anxiety on performance. Interestingly, both models are closely related to Lazarus' (1991) model of emotion, with one small difference. Lazarus has suggested that negative expectations of goal attainment and coping should lead to negative emotions such as cognitive anxiety, whereas positive goal attainment and coping expectations should prompt the development of more positive emotions, such as challenge, excitement and self-confidence. Lately, researchers have also realized the need for expedient measures of competitive anxiety. To accurately assess the anxiety-performance relationship, it is necessary to obtain anxiety measures prior to competition and also throughout a performance (Gould & Krane, 1992; Krane, 1992; Vealey, 1990). Realizing the necessity for a less intrusive measure of competitive anxiety. Murphy, Greenspan, Jowdy, and Tammen (1989) developed the Mental Readiness Form (MRF). The MRF contains three items that were designed to correlate with the three subscales of the CSAI-2. This scale was developed as an alternative to the CSAI-2 when expediency is an important concern. The three items are rated on bipolar continuous scales with anchorings of calm/worried (cognitive anxiety), relaxed/tense (somatic anxiety), and confident/scared (confidence). A 10-centimeter line on which respondents mark a spot corresponding to how they feel

PAGE 62

50 separates the anchor terms. Scores can range from 0 to 1 00. The three items can be completed in a few seconds, compared to 3 to 10 minutes needed to complete the CSAI2. Correlations between the MRF items and CSAI-2 subscales were found to be between .58 and .63 (Murphy, Greenspan, Jowdy, & Tammen, 1989). Krane (1992) later modified the scale into an 1 1 -point Likert format to invoke fewer respondent mistakes during completion. Correlations between the MRF-Likert items and CSAI-2 subscales have ranged between .52 and .79 (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1996; Krane, 1992; Krane, 1994; Krane & Finch, 1992). Krane (1994) again adjusted the scale due to concerns that the anchor terms were not bipolar opposites. Therefore, the MRF-3 incorporated the following anchor terms: "worried-not worried", "tense-not tense", and "confident-not confident." Correlations between the MRF-3 and CSAI-2 ranged from .58 to .77. Similarly, Cox, Russell, and Robb (1994) have developed a quick and nonintrusive assessment of competitive state anxiety to correlate with the CSAI-2 named the Anxiety Rating Scale (ARS). The ARS also contains three items in the form of statements which the respondents rate using a 7-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (intensely so). The statements include "I feel concerned about performing poorly and that others will be disappointed with my performance" (cognitive anxiety), "I feel nervous, my body feels tight and/or my stomach tense" (somatic anxiety), and "I feel secure, mentally relaxed, and confident of coming through under pressure" (selfconfidence). Responses to the ARS have been shown to be positively correlated with the

PAGE 63

51 responses to the three subscales of the CSAI-2 (cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence) .60, .72, and .59, respectively (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1996). Furthermore, they found no correlational differences between the ARS and MRF-Likert when compared to the CSAI-2 (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1996). Therefore, both appear to be valid measures of competitive state anxiety. To date, however, there have been no investigations utilizing these measures during performance. Self-confidence The relationship between self-confidence and sport performance has received increased attention in recent years. Sport psychologists, coaches, and researchers agree that self-confidence is one of the most important psychological constructs for success in sport competition (e.g., Bandura, 1991 Feltz, 1988; Martens et al., 1990; McAuley & Tammen, 1989). Some confusion, however, has emerged due to the proliferation of terms and definitions used to describe it. For instance, Feltz (1988) defines self-confidence as "to believe that one can successfiiUy execute a specific activity rather than a global trait that account for overall performance optimism. For example, one may have a high degree of self-confidence in one's driving ability in golf and low degree of selfconfidence in putting" (p. 423). Self-confidence, as defined by Feltz, is essentially the same as self-efficacy, a construct defined by Bandura ( 1 977b). Others have used the terms sport-confidence (Vealey, 1986a), perceived competence (Harter, 1978, 1981, 1982; Nicholls, 1980, 1984), outcome expectancies (Rotter, 1954) and movement confidence (Griffin & Keough, 1982) in their research.

PAGE 64

52 Sport Psychologists have traditionally adopted three approaches in studying selfconfidence and sport: self-efficacy theory, models of perceived competence, and performance expectancies. Perhaps the most documented and theoretically sound theory of self-confidence is Bandura's (1977b) self-efficacy theory (e.g., Feltz, 1982; Feltz, Landers, & Raeder, 1979; Gould, Hodge, Peterson, & Giannini, 1989; McAuley & Gill, 1983a; Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979; Weinberg, Gould, Yukelson, & Jackson, 1981; Weinberg, Yukelson, & Jackson, 1980). As evident in the title, Bandura uses the phrase self-efficacy to describe individual's perception of self-confidence or competence. According to Bandura, self-efficacy is enhanced through successful performance, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and emotional arousal. Numerous studies have been conducted in which the relationship between self-efficacy and performance have been examined. In general, results have shown positive correlations between selfefficacy and performance in both sport settings (e.g., Gayton, Matthews, & Burchstead, 1986; Weiss, Wiese, & Klint, 1989) and in a laboratory (e.g., Feltz & Riessinger, 1990; Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979). Similarly, conceptual models of perceived competence (e.g., Harter, 1978; NichoUs, 1984) have been adapted to sport in an attempt to predict achievement behavior (Feltz & Brown, 1984; Roberts, Klieber, & Duda, 1981; Spink & Roberts, 1980). Harter's competence motivational theory (1978, 1981) proposes that individuals possess an inherent desire to feel and express personal competence and control in the various achievement situations they encounter. Harter maintains that the positive self-related

PAGE 65

53 affective feelings that accompany successful mastery experiences serve to further enhance the competence motive. Conversely, the perception that one lacks the requisite competence needed to achieve mastery, or that one does not possess adequate situational control, tends to be accompanied by negative affect in the form of anxiety, which attenuates the competence motive. Several sport related studies have supported Barter's concept of self-competence (e.g., Klint & Weiss, 1987; Ulrich, 1987). Her instrumentation, however, was developed solely for children. Other researchers have used performance expectancies to operationalize selfconfidence in an attempt to predict behavior in sport (Corbin, 1981; Corbin, Landers, Feltz, & Senior, 1983; Corbin & Nix, 1979; Nelson & Furst, 1972; Scanlon &. Passer, 1979). Bandura (1986), however, contends that self-efficacy beliefs predict performance better than expected outcomes. A more recent approach to studying the relationship between athletic performance and self-confidence was proposed by Vealey (1986a). Based on the self-efficacy, perceived competence, and performance expectancy literature, Vealey conceptualized a more sport specific form of confidence she termed "sport-confidence." Sport confidence is defined as "the belief or degree of certainty individuals possessed about their ability to be successful in sport" (Vealey 1986a p. 222). In line with Spielberger's trait-state distinction, sport-confidence was operationalized into state and trait sport-confidence. Trait sport-confidence is defined as "the belief or degree of certainty individuals usually possessed about their ability to be successful in sport", whereas state sport-confidence is

PAGE 66

54 defined as "the degree or believe of certainty individuals possess at a particular moment about their ability to be successful in sport" (Vealey, 1986a, p. 223). Vealey's model suggests that sport-confidence is a function of an athlete's personality trait of confidence, the situation, and their competitive orientation. These three factors interact to produce the psychological state of sport confidence. State sportconfidence in turn influences the quality of an athlete's behavioral response or athletic performance. Successfiil athletic performance results in feelings of self-confidence and satisfaction. Overall, researchers have demonstrated that self-confidence is a result of successful experiences and athletes high in self-confidence are more likely to experience success (McAuley & Tammen, 1989). Psychologists and researchers concur that cognitive change is not determined by behavior per se, but how well individuals perceive their behavior (Bandura, 1977b; Bandura, Reese, & Adams, 1982; Harter, 1978, Martens, 1975). Positive subjective outcomes such as perceptions of success and feelings of competence, pride, and satisfaction seem likely to enhance self-confidence. These outcomes should increase the degree of certainty concerning successful in sport. On the other hand, negative subjective outcomes or perceptions of failure, feelings of inadequacy, disdain, and dissatisfaction are predicted to undermine self-confidence by facilitating uncertainty about the ability to succeed. Also, depending on how well behavior is perceived, achievement motivation may become more performance or outcome orientated.

PAGE 67

Self-confidence and Anxiety Researchers have proposed that self-confidence is an important variable in determining the anxiety-performance relationship (e.g.. Hardy, 1990; Hardy & Jones, 1990; Jones, 1995). Evidence exists showing that both self-confidence and anxiety influence performance. Some have suggested that self-confidence enhances performance whereas cognitive anxiety impairs it (Feltz, 1988; Martens et al., 1990). Others have argued that cognitive anxiety may be beneficial (e.g.. Hardy, 1990). Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith (1990) and Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg (1984) suggested that cognitive anxiety (i.e., worry) is negatively related to self-confidence. It is possible that athletes who have low self-confidence in their ability to perform might interpret anxiety symptoms as debilitating (Eysenyk, 1992; Jones & Hardy, 1996). Preliminary results by Jones, Swain, and Hardy (1993) have revealed that self-confidence intensity correlates more strongly with athlete's directional interpretation of their cognitive and somatic anxiety symptoms than with the intensity of the symptoms. The majority of the work on determining the relationship between self-confidence in anxiety has involved the use of the CSAI-2. The CSAI-2 was originally intended to measure cognitive and somatic anxiety. During the validation of the measure, however, the factor analysis split cognitive anxiety into two factors. One that included negatively phrased items and the other that comprised of positive phrased items. They proposed that it is possible that self-confidence may be a part of cognitive anxiety that represents the positive aspect of anxiety and therefore, chose to label the second factor self-confidence.

PAGE 68

56 This suggestion is questionable since cognitive anxiety and self-confidence factors were derived from factor analyses with the purpose of identifying orthogonal factors. Many athletes have suggested that they can be confident but also have self-doubts regarding their performance at the same time (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). A few studies have supported the independence of self-confidence from cognitive anxiety (e.g.. Hardy, 1996a; Jones, Swain, & Cale, 1990, 1991). Hardy (1996a) demonstrated that selfconfidence can account for a significant portion of the variance of golf performance, over and above the variance accounted for by cognitive and somatic anxiety. Jones and colleagues (1990, 1991) suggested that the two factors are independent after examining the precompetitive temporal patterns and antecedents of cognitive anxiety and selfconfidence. In addition, correlational studies have shown that the two factors share less than 40% common variance (Gould et al., 1984; Jones & Cale, 1989; Martens et al., 1990). Although many researchers have investigated the anxiety and the self-confidence constructs, there is no clear understanding regarding the relationship between the two. Bandura (1986) has proposed that self-efficacy should lead to reduced anxiety. Borkovek (1976) and Eysenyck (1984) however, have disagreed. The confusion may stem from the failure of past researchers to examine athlete's interpretation of their symptoms. The arrival of the modified CSAI-2 may help to resolve this issue.

PAGE 69

Anger Like most other psychological constructs, the construct of anger, as conceptualized by Spielberger (1996), has two major components: state and trait anger. State anger is defined as an emotional state marked by subjective feelings that vary in intensity from mild annoyance or irritation to intense fury and rage, which is accompanied by muscular tension and arousal of the autonomic nervous system (Spielberger, 1996). The intensity of anger varies over time as a function of the perceived injustice, attack or unfair treatment by others, and frustration resulting from barriers to goal-directed behavior (Spielberger, 1996). Thus, the experience of anger incorporates high levels or arousal, one's perception of frustration, and one's subsequent reaction to the frustration (Novaco, 1975). Conversely, trait anger is described as the disposition to perceive a wide range of situations as annoying or frustrating and the tendency to experience state anger more frequently and with great intensity. Symptoms of anger may include any of the following: changes in muscle tension, elevated heart-rate, respiratory rate, and blood pressure, flushing, twitching, sweating, losing self-control, feeling hot, and so on. What prompts individuals to get angry and how they react afterwards differs. There is great physical variation in the experiences of anger. Some say that anger makes them feel good. Others say it makes them feel sick and still others have a wide range of symptoms. The array of physical reactions to anger is also match by the array of

PAGE 70

causes of anger. One provocation may have an impact on a certain individual but no affect on others. Emotions may emerge and differ primarily because of the situations in which they occur and because of the interpretations that are given to body states, both psychologically and physiologically. According to Tavris (1989), anger depends on whether your physiological arousal occurs before or after a specific provocation. Anger depends on some things you are aware of, such as performance outcome, and others that you may not be aware of, such as heart rate and epinephrine level (Tavris, 1989). Frustration, noise, crowds, alcohol, and sport do not instinctively generate or 'release' anger; they generate physiological arousal, which, when coupled with a psychological provocation, can become the feeling of anger (Tavris, 1989). Meichenbaum and Cameron (1983) concurred, describing anger as an affective response to stressful situations, during which a person experiences high levels of physiological and psychological arousal. The failure to understand the connection between arousal, perception, attitude, and aggression can lead to anxious feelings and the expression of frustration. Frustration causes many reactions, including annoyance, and potentially aggression. Frustration is often infuriating. The blocking of a goal (frustration) may activate an aggressive drive (anger) which in turn may cause aggressive behavior. Between frustration and anger, as between anger and aggression, lie the mind and culture. Whether or not frustration makes one angry

PAGE 71

depends on several intermediate, learned conditions: How has one learned to cope with things that have not gone desirably? Are there extenuating circumstances that make the frustration seem legitimate, or at least tolerable? Is there an element of perfectionism involved ? Frustration, therefore, may never surface if the task at hand is unimportant or if one accepts a certain degree or incompetence. Frustration more often occurs when expectations are high and results do not meet expectations. Among the list of things that make most people feel angry, frustration has to take its place right after attacks to self-esteem (e.g., criticism, direct insults, or unfair treatment). When one feels unfairly deprived of something that is deserved, then frustration is likely to lead to feelings of anger. The high arousal that is generally produced by competition makes emotion more likely, from exhilaration to anger, depending on performance outcome, what spectators or competitors do, the rules of the game, or the provocation. The extent to which arousal increases the likelihood of anger depends on the ambiguity or certainty of the cause of the arousal. The specific emotion an athlete feels, then, depends on circumstances of the sport. Temper tantrums may energize some individuals in sports that require high arousal, but high arousal in sports like golf is generally a prescription for destruction. The Expression of Anger The anger reaction is often a combination of the individual's appraisal, perception, importance of the event, effort, outcome uncertainty, and so on.

PAGE 72

People who experience emotions intensely have typical ways of thinking; they events are personalized; selective attention is paid to the emotion provoking aspects of events; overgeneralization often occurs where a single event is taken as a sign of the general state of the world. Further, there is both positive and negative exaggeration. Emotion cannot be separated from the physical and mental rigors of life. The psychological factors involved in anger range from immediate perceptions of an event to one's basic philosophy of life. Anger and its expression are therefore a result of biology, culture, mind, and body. Suppressed and repressed anger are two terms that are often used interchangeable to mean any of the following: Anger that is felt but not expressed openly and directly; anger that should be felt toward someone else, but instead is direct inward; and unconscious anger that is blocked from awareness because it is to threatening to the ego. The prevailing belief that it would ""hurt" to suppress anger and that it is "instinctive" and "heahhy" to ventilate it confuses two things: The physical state of high energy and excitement generated by many competitive games, and what players do with that energy. Expressing anger has no effect on the reduction of anger (Berkowitz, 1970). However, some expressions of anger work for athletes, it energizes them making them focus and concentrate on subsequent attempts (Kiester, 1984; Tavris, 1989). These circumstances, however, pale in comparison to the destructive influences of anger.

PAGE 73

Controlling Anger The direction of anger is not related to the abihty to master stress. The ability to adjust to stress is related to a person's emotional style. There is one anger strategy that seems to produce the lowest blood pressure of all, and it is neither exclusively to suppress anger nor to ventilate it. Controlling stress involves developing habitual reactions to stress that allows one to cope successfully, restoring the sense of control over a challenging but difficult situation, and reducing bodily arousal. Suppressed anger is unlikely to have consequences if the situation that is causing the anger is perceived as controllable, if the anger is interpreted as the sign of a grievance to be corrected instead of as an emotion to be sullenly protected, and if a more productive reaction is committed to. The only way in to get at the real sources of stress is to be organized and systematic in the approach. Modem anger intervention strategists recognize that simply ventilating anger is not enough to solve the immediate problem or change habitual patterns. Successful therapies attack the mind (teaching the person to identify the perceptions and interpretations that generate anger), the body (teaching relaxation and cooling off techniques to help the person calm down), and behavior (teaching new habits and skills). Novaco (1975, 1985) who developed a "stress inoculation program", believes the first step in anger management is for the individual to become an expert on his or her anger. For example, recognizing what triggers the

PAGE 74

anger; the frequency of anger; the intensity of anger; the duration of the anger; the mode of expression, and the consequences of the expression. What happens, as Novaco observes, is that people begin to see a pattern to their anger that occurs in particular situations, or with particular people, or under particular provocations. The person then begins to see that anger is not entirely in the self but in the situation, and the focus of the solution changes. Recognizing the pattern demystifies the emotion, showing the individual that anger is not an uncontrollable force. Next, because anger is evoked, maintained, and inflamed by statements made to ourselves and others when provoked, Novaco teaches people how to control anger the same way, by reinterpreting the supposed provocation. For example "it's only a game, it's not a life or death situation". This is what people who are slow to anger do naturally. They rationalize the situation or empathize with the other person's behavior and try to find justification for it. In one of the few sport-related studies on anger control, Jones (1993) used a modified stress inoculation intervention to reduce the competitive anger of an elite racket sport player. The player had a problem with temperament on the court, becoming angry and frustrated in pressure situations. At 3 and 6-month intervals following the intervention, the player demonstrated improvements in ability to cope with pressure situations. In a more recent study, Brunelle, Janelle, and Tennant (1999) employed role-playing and anger awareness interventions to facilitate anger control in competitive soccer players.

PAGE 75

What all successful therapeutic programs share is the ability to teach individuals to recognize the perceptions of anger, to communicate them without threatening others, and to solve the conflicts that produce the problem. They teach people that anger is only one tactic, and usually not a very productive one in solving problems. They recognize that anger can be destructive, but can also be a useful symptom that can lead to constructive changes (Tavris, 1989). Anger does not disappear when people learn these skills. It teaches them how to cope with it. The less they need to be angry, and the more control they have over their anger, the less often the feel the emotion in the first place. (Tavris, 1989). Many coaches, athletes, and sport psychology practitioners' emphasis anger control. Jim Loehr, former director of sport psychology at The Nick Bollettieri Tennis Academy, stated: In sports competition, players tend to respond to challenge in one of four ways. Some withdraw emotion and energy, giving up. Some struggle on with so much negative emotion that they become enraged and ineffective. Some become nervous, which may spur them to try harder. The ideal reaction. is the "challenge response," which is putting yourself 100 percent back into the game, using emotions in a focused way. The result of the ability to control anger is that people feel less angry, not more. They become better players, not so impulsive, (as cited in Tavris, 1989, p. 189) More experienced athletes may have developed this ability. Less proficient athletes, however, generally have not. Actually, the best evidence to show that the expression of anger makes individuals angrier, riles them up rather than cooling them off, comes fi-om the sports in which the expression of anger would be

PAGE 76

64 detrimental to players, where it would break the concentration and cause poor performance instead of recharged efforts. Temper tantrums are infrequent during play in golf, bowling, and chess. Golfers who allow themselves to become upset when they miss a shot do not do well on the next one. For example, at the 2000 PGA Championship, David Duval lost his temper on the final few holes on the tournament and lost the match. It's the players with the best self-discipline that succeeded. Sandy Lyle once said that the secret of his success at golf was the refrain that his father taught him to say: "Tempo, not temper." Knowledge is power~in this case, to decide act on the provocation and let it affect you, or to calm oneself down and refocus (Tavris, 1989). The Anxiety-Arousal-Performance Relationship Drive Theory Drive theory was originally developed by Hull (1943, 195 1) and later modified by Spence and Spence (1966). Drive theory represents a complex stimulus response theory of motivation and learning. According to drive theory, performance (P) is a function of habit (H) times drive (D), where P = H x D. In sport and motor performance, habit is equivalent to the dominant response (skill or lack there of) and drive is equivalent to physiological arousal. A basic premise of drive theory is that increases in drive or arousal result in a linear increase or decrease in performance. In early stages of learning or when a task is very complex, increased arousal will increase the execution of the dominant or best learned skill. Unfortunately for beginners, the dominant response is likely to be the

PAGE 77

65 incorrect one thereby resulting in poor execution. Conversely, later in learning when the dominant response is more likely to be correct, increased arousal leads to better performance. The original appeal of drive theory was that it helped to explain the relationship between learning and arousal, not just performance and arousal. Martens (1974), however, pointed out that studies on drive theory have yielded inconsistent results. Subsequently, many other researchers have criticized drive theory for a multitude of reasons. Gill criticized it because it predicts a linear as opposed to curvilinear relationship between sport performance and arousal (1986) and for its failure to consider thought or appraisal (1994). Others have argued that the linear relationship between arousal and performance exist only for gross motor activities such as strength, endurance, and speed tasks (Oxedine, 1984), and that it does not adequately explain the arousal-performance relationship for complex motor tasks (Weinberg, 1979) or sport situations (Landers & Boutcher, 1993). Consequently, early proponents of drive theory have given way to more widely accepted theories such as the inverted-U. The Inverted-U Theory One of the most widely excepted views of the relationship between performance and arousal is Yerkes and Dodson's (1908) inverted-U theory. The premise of this theory is that the relationship between performance and arousal is curvilinear as opposed a linear and takes the form of an inverted-U. Simply stated, as arousal increases there is a corresponding increase in performance until an optimal level is reached. Further

PAGE 78

66 increases beyond the optimal level results in performance decrement. This curvilinear relationship between performance and arousal is well documented in the literature for such tasks as reaction time (Lansing, Schwartz, & Lindsay, 1956; Levitt & Gutin, 1971), auditory tracking (Stennet, 1957), hand steadiness (Martens & Landers, 1970), and in athletic performance (Klavora, 1978; Burton, 1988; Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons & Vevera, 1987; Sonstroem & Bernardo, 1982; Weinberg &. Ragan, 1978). Like drive theory, however, the inverted-U theory has also been criticized. One of the major limitations of the inverted-U theory is that it assumes the relationship between performance and arousal is symmetrical and orderly, and in sport, performance decrements rarely occur in an orderly or smooth manner (Cox, Qiu, & Liu, 1993). Further, the hypothesis fails to recognize the multidimensional nature of arousal (Jones, 1990) and anxiety (Hardy & Fazey, 1987). Further, the hypothesis does not take into consideration the perceptions and interpretations of the athlete regarding the arousal or anxiety symptoms (Apter, 1984; Gill, 1994). Catastrophe Theory Recently, several alternatives to the inverted-U hypothesis have been proposed. One of them, the catastrophe theory (Thom, 1975), proposes that changes and performance associated with increases in arousal may be drastic and catastrophic in nature rather than gradual or orderly. Hardy (1990) has contended that the inverted-U hypothesis describes the relationship between stress and performance but does not reflect anecdotal evidence in sport that the relationship should not be symmetrical. Thus,

PAGE 79

67 contrary to the inverted-U hypothesis, overexcited athletes suffer a rapid, not a gradual, drop in their performance and are not able to quickly return to desirable levels. Although originally proposed by Thorn (1975) as a mathematical model to explain physical world phenomenon, it has since been adapted by the Zeeman (1976) and Hardy and associates (Fazey & Hardy, 1988; Hardy, 1990) for application in the social sciences and sport respectively. Regarding sport, catastrophe theory predicts that when an athlete experiences excessive levels of arousal, there will be a large and dramatic decline in performance (Gould & Krane, 1992). The inverted-U hypothesis and catastrophe theory share the prediction that higher state anxiety will improve performance up toward optimal level. However, where as the inverted-U predicts that further increased arousal or anxiety will impair performance in a curvilinear manner, catastrophe theory predicts that further physiological arousal and cognitive anxiety will result in a large and dramatic decline in performance. Thus, the relationship between physiological arousal and performance depends on the performance level of cognitive anxiety; only when cognitive anxiety is high in combination with high physiological arousal will there be catastrophic changes in performance and a choking response may result. Hardy (1996a,b) also suggests that athletes should most benefit (perform best) when cognitive anxiety is high and somatic anxiety is low. The strengths of this theory, according to Gould and Krane (1992), are that it addresses the effects of both physiological and cognitive dimensions of arousal on performance, and that it reflects actual sport conditions more realistically. Rarely in sport

PAGE 80

68 is the relationship between anxiety and performance perfectly symmetrical and predictable. Conversely, Gould and Krane suggest that catastrophe theory is overly complex and requires numerous assessments of the same athletes over time to test it. And unfortunately, this is not often feasible and is rarely done. At present, there is little empirical support for this theory. Therefore, the validity of catastrophe theory awaits ftirther review by researchers. Optimal Arousal Zones Several researchers have expanded on the notion of the inverted-U to include a zone or range of optimal arousal. Through his extensive work with Russian athletes, Hanin (1980, 1989) developed what he termed the "zone of optimal ftmctioning". In the zone theory, each athlete has a range of arousal within which maximum performance may result. Like Hanin, Martens (1987) used the concept of zones in what he called optimal psychic energy. The notion of a zone of optimal ftmctioning is intuitively appealing because it allows for individual differences as well as intra-athlete differences in optimal arousal levels (Zaichkowsky & Takenaka, 1993). Several investigators have experimented with this approach and have reported success. For example, Loehr (1991, as cited in Zaichkowski & Takenaka, 1993) used heart-rate monitors to aid elite tennis players in becoming aware of heart rate values that correspond to optimal performance. Similarly, Davis (1991) used heart rate monitors in his work with professional hockey players in attempting to help them become aware of their optimal zone. Further, Zaichkowski (1991) has collected extensive data on elite and

PAGE 81

69 youth athletes from various sports examining optimal zones. Finally, Annesi (1998) recently used the optimal zone model to implement a multimodal treatment to alleviate pre-competitive anxiety. Reversal Theory Based on the work of Apter (1982, 1984), Kerr (1985a,b, 1989) proposed an alternative explanation for the relationship between arousal and performance which he termed "reversal". Reversal theory attempts to explain the inconsistencies associated with human motivation, emotion, and cognition. Originally, Apter (1982) proposed that metamotivational states determine how arousal is interpreted. Metamotivation states are conceptualized as alternative states in which the individual can experience different motives at any moment. These changes are called "reversals." Hence, the theory's title. According to Kerr (1989), high and low levels of arousal can be interpreted by the individual in two different ways. High arousal can be experience by the individual as either anxiety or excitement. Similarly, low arousal can be perceived as either boredom or relaxation. The concept of psychological reversals stems from the individual's shift in interpreting his or her feelings. For example, engaging in dangerous, risk-taking tasks such as sky diving induces heightened arousal, call anxiety in this theory. However, when the dangerous task becomes mastered than the same arousal state becomes excitement. These psychological reversals alter a person's emotional state significantly. The athlete's interpretation of arousal states is viewed as central to the ability to explain and predict the

PAGE 82

70 effect of emotion on sport performance. This theory is relatively new and at present has received little empirical support. Self-Regulation Self-regulation has been long recognized as an important construct for understanding achievement in sport participation (Ferrari, Pinard, Reid, & BouffardBouchard, 1991; Hardy & Nelson, 1988; Kirschenbaum, 1984, 1987). Zimmerman (1989) suggested that self-regulation during learning is not developed naturally; therefore, there is a necessity to teach self-regulation strategies to most learners. Self-regulated learning refers to the process by which individuals exercise control over their thinking, affect, and behavior as they acquire knowledge and skills (Zimmerman, 1989). Ferrari et al. (1991) defined self-regulation as "actions occurring during the actual performance of a cognitive task that allows an individual to control, or direct his own activity through self-imposed rules or regulations that better adapt his performance to different circumstances or surroundings" (p. 139). Researchers have discussed the importance of developing cognitive and mental skills and have described limiting emotional factors such as anxiety and aggression. Subsequently, they have attempted to originate complex theories of psychoregulation where all components of performance abilities and skills are represented, brought into relevant relation to each other, and can be controlled for optimal realization in competition.

PAGE 83

71 Self-regulation is based in part on cybernetic theory and control theory. Cybernetics theory presents conceptual mechanisms to explain the process of selfregulation, while control theory offers a behavioral approach to guide selfregulation (Crews, 1993). Cybernetics is the science of human control systems that deals with the comparative study of the various systems in the body (Crews, 1993). Cybernetic theory addresses "how" a system becomes self-regulatory (Schwartz, 1979). Cybernetic theory is based on a negative feedback or closed loop system in which the behavior (or output) of a system is used to modify the input (Crews, 1993). Essentially, the output is used to increase the likelihood of the correct response occurring repeatedly (Schwartz, 1979). Errors detected during output serve to correct subsequent procedures. Within cybernetics theory, Kirschenbaum (1984) proposed a five stage-working model to fully explain the process of self-regulation for the athlete or exercisers. This model is based on complex interactions between cognitions (e.g., goal setting, evaluating), affect (emotional states), physiology (e.g., strength, physical condition), and environmental constraints (Chen & Singer, 1992). The five stages include: 1) problem identification, 2) commitment, 3) execution, 4) envirormiental management, and 5) generalization. The process starts with problem identification. Here, the individual identifies the areas of performance that need to be corrected or maximized. Once the problem has been identified, a plan is formulated and a commitment is made to rectify the problem. Next,

PAGE 84

72 performance modifications are made based on self-monitoring, self-evaluation, generating likely expectancies, and employing self-reinforcement or self-punishment depending on expectations and self-evaluation. The fourth stage requires healthy and successful social and physical environmental management. The final stage suggests the generalization of constructive behavioral changes made in earlier stages to future situations. Both cybernetic theory and Kirschenbaum's model of self-regulation encompass all aspects of the individual (e.g. behavior, cognitions, affect, and physiology) at the conscious and subconscious level (Crews, 1993). In contrast, control theory focuses on changing only behavior and cognitions at the conscious level to direct one's actions (Crews, 1993). It has been speculated that by changing behaviors and cognitions, ultimately, affect (i.e., emotional state) and physiological functioning will also be changed (Crews, 1993). Consequently, control theory has received criticism for its failure to address the feedback an individual receives in the form of affect and physiology (Crew, 1993). According to Carver and Scheier (1981), principles from both cybernetic and control theory have significant implications for the regulation of human behavior. In Carver and Scheier' s (1998) theory of behavioral self-regulation, behavior is goaldirected, providing form and structure to a person's life. It also offers a framework within which action takes place. In their model, self-regulation is again considered a discrepancy reducing feedback loop system. This loop has four basic interconnected functions: 1)

PAGE 85

73 input function (perception), 2) comparator (reference test), 3) output function (operate), and 4) behavioral impact (Chen & Singer, 1992). In short, present behaviors or qualities are determined, assess as to whether they are the ones intended or desired, and if not, adjustments are attempted that serve to bring one into line with the other (Carver, 1998). Carver and Scheier (1981, 1990, 1998) have argued that the comparator of a psychological feedback loop is engaged by increases in self-focused attention or selfawareness. Self-focused attention leads to more comparisons with salient standards and enhances behavioral conformity to those standards (Scheier & Carver, 1983). Thus, by increasing self-awareness, behavior and outcome expectancies should be more congruent. In the words of Carver and Scheier (1998) ... a link appears to exist between valuing an aspect of the self and thinking about or attending to it. Recall the self-focused attention produces effects on behavior that appear to reflect the engagement of feedback processes regulating behavior with respect to desired goals. If focus on the self causes the engagement of self-regulatory activity, it follows that focusing on different aspects of the self may cause the engagement of selfregulatory activity of potentially different sorts. This does not mean different in the sense of different regulatory functions, but different in terms of the goals or reference values underlying the activities, (p. 113) Recently, Carver and Scheier (1998) have expanded this line of thought to consider affect as well as behavior. They propose that not only is behavior goal-directed; affect is also goal-related and arises out of a feedback process. They proffer that this process operates simultaneously with the behavior-guided function and in parallel to it, whenever it is operating.

PAGE 86

74 They further suggest that affect is information about how progress is being made in moving toward a goal. ... the outcome of the comparison process at the heart of this loop (the error signal generated by the comparator) is manifest phenomenologically in two forms. One is hazy and nonverbal sense of expectancy-confidence or doubt. The other is affect, feeling, a sense of positiveness or negativeness. (Carver & Scheier, 1999, p. 20) If progress is being made at a rate equal to the standard, then no affect results (Carver & Scheier, 1998). When progress is at rate higher than the standard, the product is positive affect (Carver & Scheier, 1998). However, if no progress is being made, the rate is lower than the standard, or movement is away from the goal, then the result is negative affect (Carver & Scheier, 1998). In attempting to realize a goal, obstacles and impediments are typically encountered. What happens then generally depends on the confidence of overcoming them, as well as the development and implementation of a meaningful plan or strategy. "Self-regulation and cognitive strategies complement each other and both types are necessary for the process of learning and in a performance situation" (Chen & Singer, 1992, p. 287). According to McCombs (1988), one of the most important functions of a learning strategies program is to promote self-regulated learning. Furthermore, Zimmerman (1989) suggested that self-regulation during learning is not developed naturally; therefore, there is a necessity to teach self-regulation strategies to most learners.

PAGE 87

75 Self-Monitoring Zimmemian (1989) has further suggested that the strategic learning process of self-monitoring has a substantial self-regulatory impact. Kirschenbaum (1984) defines self-monitoring as the process of discriminating target behaviors and related events while Shunk (1983) describes it as deliberate attention to some aspect of one's behavior. Basically, self-monitoring requires learners to attend selectively to specific actions and cognitive processes, to distinguish them from others, and to discriminate their outcomes (Zimmerman & Kitsanta, 1996). From a social cognitive perspective (Bandura, 1986; Zimmerman, 1989), self-monitoring of form and process elements is essential for both acquiring and maintaining mastery of a skill. Researchers have confirmed that elite athletes use self-monitoring to improve their skill and several studies have found that self-monitoring enhanced performance of non-elite sport participants (e.g., Whelan, Mahoney, & Meyers, 1991; Kirschenbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, & Holtzbauer, 1982; Kingery, 1990). Coping with Sport Related Stress All those who participate in competitive sports must have the ability to deal with criticism, losing, physical and mental errors, anxiety, anger, and other sources of stress. Most elite athletes have the ability to quickly recover from, or ignore, these particular aspects of competitive sports. Instead of maintaining a hostile, fiiistrated disposition, winners are capable of redirecting your energies in the productive manner. Failure to quickly adapt to unpleasant experiences often results in performance failure. For

PAGE 88

76 example, Krohne and Hindle (1988) found that "vigilant coping strategies" (e.g., focusing attention on threat relevant information), are significantly more harmfiil to athletes emotional and performance responses to acute stress then "cognitive avoidance strategies" (e.g.., avoiding threat relevant information). Thus, successful ehte competitors put unpleasant experiences behind them and go on. Unlike unskilled performers, elite competitors plan each aspect of their performance, whether it will occur before or during the event, and have at least one alternative behavior for every play and action (Orlick 1986; Rushall 1979). For example, a golfer may anticipate hitting a few poor shots during his upcoming round and preplan how he is going to react to that situation. Orlick (1986) refers to these mental plans as "focusing" and to the anticipation of change as "refocusing". Anger responses are either inhibited or expressed and then quickly extinguished. Orlick (1980, 1986) suggests that the best way to prevent panic situations and anxiety is to begin thinking about and implementing solutions before problems get out on hand. Thus, in order to institute elaborate alternative techniques rapidly, elite competitors have planned and performed secondary or coping strategies during less demanding events such as practice or under less stressful game situations. One of the most publicized stress management programs with application to sport is Meichenbaum's (1977, 1985) stress inoculation training. Stress inoculation training (SIT) explores the antecedents, behaviors, and consequences of the stress reaction. It employs relaxation training, develops affective self-instructional statements that serve as

PAGE 89

77 coping skills, and uses desensitization to induce and facilitate the control of anxiety reactions. Essentially, participants discuss their relevant problems and learn the effects of psychological stress on performance. They are then taught coping skills such as relaxation, imagery, and self-talk. And then practice these techniques in simulated situations. The research evidence regarding the effectiveness of SIT in sport is quite promising. For example, Harrison and Feltz (1981) demonstrated that SIT facilitated the resurgence of confidence and form in a basketball player. Ziegler, Klinzing, and Williamson (1982) used SIT to decrease submaximal oxygen uptake and submaximal heart rate of 8 male college cross-country runners. Performance data, however, was not collected. Mace and Carroll (1985) investigated the effects of SIT for controlling anxiety in abseiling (i.e., descending the face of a building in this case). Forty participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: SIT and practical training, SIT training alone, practical training alone, and a no training control group. Although no performance data were collected, participants in the SIT plus practical training group reported significantly lower stress and anxiety levels than the other groups. Mace, Eastman, and Carroll (1986) applied SIT to a gymnast who reported experiencing negative self-statements and disturbing images of falling. Following the eight-session intervention, the gymnast indicated improved focus and concentration. Mace and Carroll (1986a) investigated the effects of SIT with squash players reporting debilitating performance anxiety. After eight training sessions, those who received SIT

PAGE 90

indicated significantly lower state anxiety levels in comparison to a matched control group. Performance data in these two investigations, however, were again unavailable. To address the question of possible performance effects, Meyers, Schleser, and Okwumabua (1982) applied SIT to two female collegiate basketball players who had concentration and anxiety problems. Free throw and field goal shooting performance improved significantly during SIT but dropped below baseline levels upon withdrawal from the SIT program. Similarly, Hamilton and Fremouw (1985) evaluated the effectiveness of SIT on cognitions and free throw performance of 3 male collegiate basketball players. Following 10 hours of treatment, fi^ee throw performance improved between 50% and 88% and self-statements changed fi-om 86% negative prior to training to 71% positive after SIT. Further, Mace and Carroll (1986b) examined the impact of SIT on performance of gymnast under high and low stress conditions. Gymnasts receiving SIT were able to maintain performance during the high stress condition and had less distress than the control group which had a significant performance decrement. More recently, Kerr and Leith (1993) investigated the effects of a modified SIT program on performance, mental rehearsal, attentional skills, and competitive anxiety among 24 male and female, international-caliber gymnasts. After eight months of biweekly training, the stress management group demonstrated superior performance, mental rehearsal, and attentional skills in comparison to the control group. Competitive anxiety levels, however, were

PAGE 91

79 significantly higher. The authors speculate that this may have been due to an increase in facilitative rather than debilitating anxiety. Other stress management programs that have been described include cognitive affective stress management training (Smith, 1980), Gauron's (1986) cognitive selfregulation program and Anshel's (1990) COPE model. The cognitive-affective stress management training program is similar to stress inoculation training in the initial analysis of the stress reaction, the relaxation training, and in the development of cognitive coping skills. This program differs from stress inoculation training, however, in two important areas. First, the athletes not only imagine the stress while relaxed but also focus in on the emotions and feelings that develop as a result on the stress or performance. The subject then gains control of these emotions and images positive selfstatements and relaxation responses. Secondly, in the cognitive-affective program athletes must cope with images and feelings far more difficult than he or she would normally encounter. Gauron's (1986) cognitive self-regulation program is based on the athlete's ability to control attitudes, perceptions, thoughts, and self-talk; the potential agents that may interfere with performing at optimal levels. The COPE model (Anshel, 1990) employs cognitive-behavioral strategies to handle acute forms of stress caused mainly by negative input from others. COPE is an acronym that stands for control emotions, organize input, plan response, and execute. Athletes implement these techniques immediately upon receiving the undesirable input. The COPE model has assisted athletes to overcome

PAGE 92

80 unpleasant verbal feedback on performance in tennis (Anshel, 1990), baseball, (Anshel, Gregory, & Kaczmarek, 1990), gymnastics (Anshel, 1991), and dart throwing (Anshel, 1993). Another possible approach to determining optimal arousal and facilitate the control of emotions, the difference between feeling up as opposed to feeling up-tight, is to pose questions that help the performer to identify certain feelings. Athletes can use these questions to I) self-monitoring feelings and physiological responses prior to and during competition, 2) to identify their feelings accurately, and 3) to remind them to use appropriate physical the mental strategies that can favorably affect mental status. Counseling Sport Psychologist typically have athletes identify the time or game in which they felt they perform at their best and worst, to describe these performances as accurately as possible, and to describe their feelings and mental attitudes during this time. Specific questions include: What were you thinking about during this event if anything? How did it make you feel? How did you react? Based on the athlete's responses to these questions, coaches or sport psychology consultants suggest mental strategies that the performer can use to alter levels of arousal or anxiety and to improve his or her mental preparation for competition. The consultants or coaches objective for asking these questions is to identify the feelings associated with desirable and undesirable performance and to recall the athlete's perceptions of his or her physiological response at the time of competition.

PAGE 93

81 For example, in his respected and popular mental plan model, Orlick (1986) asks athletes to identify certain feelings (e.g., self-confidence, anxiety and arousal) on a scale from one (very low) to ten (very high). This self-monitoring technique encourages athletes to become more aware of their mental status in any given time. But perhaps more importantly, this increased awareness allows athletes to compare the kinds and levels of feelings emotions that accompany good performance outcomes. In this way, when conducted over several contests, the athlete's best (optimal) arousal state can be identified. Although there are some differences in each of the previously mentioned stress management programs, these, as well as a number of other training programs utilize emotional awareness to facilitate behavioral changes. Self-Awareness When describing the most successful athletes, coaches often use characteristics such as mentally strong, extremely self-confident, persistent, perseverant, and unshakable. Goldman (1997; 1998) has described these intangible characteristics as "emotional intelligence." Emotionally intelligent athletes are quite familiar with anxiety, fear, and anger, but they use that anxiety and arousal to increase productive focus, compartmentalize fear so it does not prevent action and turn anger into motivation, intensity, and controlled energy, something that Kobasa (1979) termed "hardiness." In his best selling books titled "Emotional Intelligence" and "Working with Emotional Intelligence," Goldman stressed self-awareness, self-regulation, and motivation to facilitate emotional intelligence. According to him, self-awareness is the

PAGE 94

vital foundation skill for three emotional competencies, emotional awareness, accurate self-assessment, and self-confidence. Here, he defines emotional awareness as the recognition of how our emotions affect our performance, and the ability to use our values to guide decision-making. Accurate self-assessment involves a candid sense of ones personal strengths and limits, a clear vision of where one needs to improve, and the ability to learn from experience. Finally, self-confidence is described as the courage that comes from certainty about our capabilities, values, and goals. As described earlier, a number of stress management interventions incorporate some type of self-awareness into their programs. Further, numerous writers and researchers have advocated awareness as a critical step in the intervention process. The research literature on the direct impact of self-awareness, however, is scant. In one of the few direct studies on the impact of awareness. Singer, Lidor, and Cauraugh (1993) investigated the effectiveness of three learning strategies on achievement of a novel motor task. Seventy-two participants were randomly assigned to an awareness strategy (to consciously attend to the act and to what one is doing during execution); a nonawareness strategy (to prepalan the movement and perform the task without conscious attention to it), the Five Step Approach (to systematically ready oneself, image the act, focus attention on a cue, execute without thought, and evaluate the act and previous steps), or a control. Results indicated the all three strategies resulted in less radial error in comparison to the control with the Five Step Approach and nonawareness strategies leading to highest achievement. The awareness approach here.

PAGE 95

83 however, was directed toward movement and environmental awareness. More specifically, it was geared toward vague feelings of movement or the noise of the ball impacting the wall. This awareness strategy may have distracted learners and diverted attention away from key components of the proper throwing motion. In a more recent study, Brunelle, Janelle, and Tennant (1999) investigate the impact of anger awareness training (self-monitoring) and role-playing (modeling and behavioral rehearsal) for reducing angry feelings and behavior of competitive soccer players. Following five-one hour weekly interventions, both the awareness and roleplaying groups demonstrated significantly less angry behavior than a control group. Further, the role-playing group continued to reduce angry behavior through a subsequent retention test. Angry feelings, however, were unchanged for all groups. The authors conclude that both anger awareness and role-playing are effective methods for reducing angry behavior. Cognitive-Behavioral Strategies The majority of sport psychologists, coaches, and athletes in sport currently practice what are known as cognitive-behavioral techniques (Butt, 1987; Kirschenbaum, 1987). Many different types of these strategies have been shown to facilitate the execution of motor skills, including attentional focus (Nideffer, 1976; Ravizza & Rotella, 1982), self-talk (Bunker & Owens, 1985; Bunker & Rotella, 1982; Rotella, Gansneder, Ojala, 8c Billing, 1980), relaxation (Bennett, 1978; Harris & Harris, 1984; Smith, 1980), imagery (Epstein, 1980; Feltz fe Landers, 1983; Mahoney & Avener, 1977; Shelton &

PAGE 96

84 Mahoney, 1978; Weinberg, Seaboume, & Jackson, 1981), thought control or cognitive restructuring (Bunker & Owens, 1985: Bunker & Rotella, 1982), self-monitoring (Johnston-O'Connor &. Kirschenbaum, 1986; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980, 1984; Kirschenbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, & Holtzbauer, 1982), and preparatory arousal (Gould, Weinberg, & Jackson, 1980; Weinberg, Gould & Jackson, 1979). A multitude of techniques are available, and they share a common focus on helping athletes manage their thoughts and emotions so they can perform optimally (Boucher & Crews, 1987; Crew & Boutcher, 1986a; Gould, Weiss, & Weinberg, 1981). In a meta-analytic review of the sport literature, Whelan, Myers, Berman, Bryant, and Mellon (1988) and Greenspan and Feltz (1989) concluded that cognitive-behavioral approaches are effective means for performance enhancement. Several studies have recently documented the benefits of cognitive-behavioral programs on sport performance (e.g., Beauchamp, Halliwell, Foumier, & Koestner, 1996; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990; Crews & Boutcher, 1986a; Gray, 1990; Gray & Fernandez, 1989; Hall & Erffmeyer, 1983; Hamilton & Fremouw, 1985; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980; Meyers & Schleser, 1980; Meyers, Schleser, & Okwunabua, 1982; Weinberg, Seaboume, & Jackson, 1981). For example, Kirschenbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, and Holtzbauer (1982) found that positive self-monitoring instructions substantially improved the performance of novice bowlers compared to a no-treatment group. Alternatively, Lobermeyer and Wasserman (1986) showed that training in the use of preperformance routines resulted in a 7% increase in free-throw accuracy among novice basketball players.

PAGE 97

85 A combination of cognitive and behavioral strategies used prior to execution of motor skills is often called preperformance routines (Cohn, 1990; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990). They incorporate both cognitive (covert) and behavioral (overt) processes that help to prepare for the execution of motor skills (Boutcher, 1990; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990). Although the use of preperformance routines are more readily implemented with closed skills, they are also with some open skill sports. Examples of preperformance routines used to facilitate performance in open and closed skill sports include golf (Bouchard & Singer, 1998; Boutcher & Crews, 1987; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990; Crews & Boutcher, 1986a; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980; Rotella & Bunker, 1981; Yancey, 1977), tennis (Moore, 1986), basketball (Lobermeyer & Wasserman, 1986), soccer (Vealey, 1986b), bowling (Kirschenbaum, Ordman, Tomarken, & Holtzbauer, 1982), gymnastics (Mahoney & Avener, 1977), wrestling (Gould, Weiss, & Weinberg, 1981), skiing and skating (Orlick, 1986), and diving (Highlen & Bennett, 1983). Although these programs have shown great promise in a variety of different sports, it has been suggested that golf is a sport in which participants might particularly benefit fi^om adopting a cognitive-behavioral orientation (Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980; Rotella & Bunker, 1981). In order to achieve optimal performance, closed skill sports like golf require the synchronization of overt and covert routines (Beauchamp, Halliwell, Foumier, and Koestner, 1996). That is, attentional focus and arousal must be appropriately matched to the performance demands of a particular shot (Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990; Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & Vevera, 1987; Krane & Williams, 1987).

PAGE 98

86 Consider, for example, the precision and steadiness that are required for executing a putt on the 18* hole of the Master's to win the tournament and how that might be affected by arousal and attentional focus. Golfers can tolerate little distraction, anxiety, or loss of attentional focus without risking a decrease in performance (Krane, Williams, & Feltz, 1992; Murphy & Wolfolk, 1987). Multimodal Interventions Several years ago, Davies and West (1991) advocated a theoretical paradigm for sport performance enhancement based on Lazarus' (1976, 1981) Multimodal Therapy. The crux of this approach is to help athletes become aware of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that may be causing them performance decrements and to teach them a variety of proven techniques (e.g., progressive relaxation, rhythmic breathing, imagery, self-talk, goal setting, etc.) to facilitate improvements. In the psychological literature, Multimodal Therapy has been successful in the treatment of alcoholism (Freedberg & Johnson, 1979), psychosomatic disorders (Budzynski, Stoyva, & Peffer, 1980), sexual dysftmction (Lazarus, 1981), depression (Lazarus, 1974), parental effectiveness (Judah, 1978), childhood problems (Keat, 1979), and in providing a model for counselor supervision (Pontorotto & Zander, 1984). Pema, Neyer, Murphy, Ogilvie, and Murphy (1995) have advocated the use of Lazarus' BASIC ID format to assess behavioral, affective, sensation, imagery, cognitive, interpersonal, or dietary/substance issues an athlete may have that may be causing sub-par performance. They suggest that this information can be used to determine the most effective intervention plan for each particular athlete relative

PAGE 99

87 to his/her problem(s). The rationale here is that this model might provide a more comprehensive approach to help athletes to improve their performance if they have symptoms such as cognitive or somatic anxiety, low confidence, and counterproductive pre-performance and performance behaviors (Davies & West, 1991). Congruent with this thought, Boutcher and Rotella (1987) have developed a fourstage psychological skills education program that should contribute to closed-skill performance. Closed-skills are those in which performance outcome is determined solely by the athlete with little, if any, outside interference. Examples include bowling, target shooting, and any golf stroke. The four phases of the program are sport analysis, individual assessment, conceptualization/motivation, and mental skill development (Boutcher & Rotella, 1987). The structure and major objectives of the program borrow heavily from Meichenbaum's (1985) Stress Inoculation Training Program and Lazarus' (1981) Multimodal Therapy (Boutcher & Rotella, 1987). This particular program has been shown to be effective for enhancing motivation, preparation, and putting performance of novice golfers in a laboratory setting (Beauchamp, Halliwell, Foumier, & Koestner, 1996). The efficacy of this approach in an ecologically valid setting, however, is still in question. With the recent advent of multidimensional approach to anxiety and the construction of the modified CSAI-2, researchers have begun structuring multimodal intervention programs based on the matching hypothesis (e.g., Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1984; Maynard & Cotton, 1993). The matching hypothesis (Martens, et al.

PAGE 100

8S 1990) suggests that treatments might be more effective if they are directed at the type of symptoms experienced by the individual. For example, a cognitive procedure would be have its primary effect on reducing cognitive anxiety, and a somatic procedure would have its primary effect on somatic symptoms. Although there has been some reported success in this research (e.g., Maynard & Cotton, 1993), there has been general neglect to consider athlete's perceptions and interpretations of those symptoms. As Feltz, (1988) suggests, some individuals may interpret increases in the physiology as fear whereas others may interpret this state as being "psyched-up" and ready to perform. Therefore, traditional stress management interventions may actual be detrimental to some individuals performance if perceptions are not considered. The recent development of the modified CSAI-2 (Jones & Swain, 1992), which includes both a directional and intensity scale, now allows researchers to consider both aspects of anxiety (intensity and perception) rather than relying on intuitive assessments, thereby eliminating potential misconceptions. Through this measure, intervention researchers have attempted to show more detailed support for the matching hypothesis. And in general, there has been some partial support and inconclusive findings. For example, Maynard, Hemmings, and Warwick-Evans (1995) implemented a somatic anxiety intervention towards competitive soccer players who interpreted the intensity of both somatic and cognitive anxiety as debilitating. The intervention was beneficial for reducing the intensity and facilitating the direction of both anxiety symptoms at post-test although the reduction in the intensity of somatic anxiety was dramatically greater than

PAGE 101

89 that of cognitive anxiety. However, it should be noted that the experimental group consisted of individuals who interpreted the intensity and direction of both cognitive and somatic anxiety very similarly (i.e., low variance). Furthermore, performance differences were not reported. In a similar study, Maynard, Smith, and Warwick-Evans (1995) implemented a cognitive intervention to separate groups debilitated from cognitive and/or somatic anxiety. Participants suffering form debilitating cognitive anxiety were categorized as a cognitive group. Individuals suffering from debilitating somatic anxiety were classified as the somatic group and individuals hindered by both were allocated to the group in which the particular symptom (i.e., cognitive or somatic anxiety) was more severe. Finally, participants who interpreted both symptoms as facilitative were assigned to a control group. In short, the results indicated significant pre-to-post reductions in the intensity of both cognitive and somatic anxiety for both the cognitive and somatic groups with slightly bigger reductions for the cognitive group in cognitive anxiety and slightly greater reductions in somatic anxiety for the somatic group. There were also significant increases in the direction of each symptom for both groups with the cognitive group having more dramatic changes in cognitive anxiety interpretation and the somatic group having dramatically greater changes in somatic anxiety. There were performance improvements as well for both groups with the cognitive group showing more; however, these pre-to-post differences were not statistically significant.

PAGE 102

90 Although there were no significant performance differences in either of these two studies, there were dramatic shifts in the way the athletes interpreted their symptoms as well as increases in confidence. Regarding the lack of performance effects, several points should be mentioned. First, performance was evaluated qualitatively and subjectively in both studies. Second, the participants were all elite performers thereby making significant performance improvements difficult. Third, the number of participants in both studies was extremely small. Thus, the lack of performance differences may have been a result of the measures utilized, the number of participants, and/or a ceiling effect. More recently, Hanton and Jones (1999a) examined the methods by which successfiil elite swimmers acquired facilitative interpretations of anxiety symptoms and how the maintain them. They found that the performers developed this skill through natural learning experiences associated with competition and via educational methods such as taking advice fi"om more experience individuals, and maintain them through various performance enhancement techniques. The key points of this study were that these individuals did not always interpret anxiety as facilitative but rather developed this ability, and that this shift has facilitated their success. Based on that study, Hanton and Jones (1999b) examined the effects of a multimodal intervention consisting of the techniques reported in the earlier study (i.e., positive thinking and self-talk, mental imagery, self-talk and cue reminders, and physical warm-up) on cognitive and somatic anxiety interpretations and performance of swinmiers debilitated by these symptoms. Similar to the Maynard and associates (1995) studies.

PAGE 103

91 there were improvements in the interpretations of cognitive and somatic anxiety at posttest as well as increased confidence. The authors also reported improvements in performance; however, there is no mention of statistical significance for any of these measures laying question to the strength and significance of their findings. Golf In terms of psychomotor requirements, golf as a sport places low demands on reaction time, speed of limb movement, extent flexibility, dynamic flexibility, and stamina, but requires a high level of control precision, multi-limb coordination, rate control (timing), arm-hand steadiness, aiming, explosive strength, fine body coordination, and gross body coordination. (Schultz & Cumow, 1988). From a psychological standpoint, however, golf may be much more demanding. In open-ended interviews with 1 0 touring golf professionals, 2 club professionals, and 7 collegiate golfers examining aspects of peak performance, Cohn's (1991) respondents claimed their attentional focus while playing golf typically was narrow, taskdirected, and orientated towards the present situation rather than past or future events. Further, the execution of a skill during peak performance was perceived as effortless and automatic, requiring little if any conscious thought to control movement. At the same time respondents had the feeling of being in control of their performance and being able to regulate their emotions, thoughts, and level of arousal. Heightened arousal was generally perceived as an indicator of preparedness. Periods of peak performance were characterized by high self-confidence, with the golfers typically experiencing limited

PAGE 104

92 concern for the negative consequences of a poor shot. Physical and mental relaxation were also evident at time of peak performance, as was the experience of enjoyment in playing well and achieving goals. As evidenced by this extensive list, Cohn (1991) concluded that peak performance in golf is associated with positive psychological states. Similarly, McCaffrey and Orlick (1989) used a series of open-ended questions to explore psychological and situational factors related to excellence in golf They found substantial differences between touring golf professionals and club professionals. They highly skilled tour players were totally committed to golf, particularly during periods of peak performance. They set clearly defined goals, and they were more systematic in planning practice sessions and tournament play, as well as in self-evaluation after each round. Touring professionals used imagery techniques more frequently and for more facets of the game than club professionals did. Both groups developed plans for focusing attention during a round, but the touring professionals were more hkely to execute their strategies throughout a tournament. In addition, they attained greater depth of concentration. Both groups acknowledged the effect of distractions on the course, particularly slow play, but the touring professionals were better able to cope with these distractions and regain a task focus. McCaffrey and Orlick (1989) concluded that maintaining commitment, focusing, and refocusing were the skills most needed for excellence in golf Alternatively, in an examination of psychological and psychomotor skill associated with performance of lesser skilled golfers, Thomas and Over (1994) found that

PAGE 105

93 skilled golfers (those with lower handicaps) reported greater mental preparation, a higher level of concentration when playing, fewer negative emotions and cognitions, greater psychomotor automaticity, and more commitment to golf The two groups did not differ, however, on conservative approach, striving for maximum distance, seeking improvement, or putting skill. These findings v^th amateur golfers are not unexpected in terms of the research undertaken v^th professional golfers (Cohn, 1991; McCaffrey & Orlick, 1989). Successful amateurs, as well as professionals, demonstrate substantial commitment and mental preparation. In addition to giving greater thought to how best to play the course, skilled golfers report having a more consistent preshot routine that includes planning and mental rehearsal, particularly visualization (Cohn, 1991; McCaffrey & Orlick, 1989; Thomas & Over, 1994). In an observational analysis of professional golfers Crews and Boutcher (1986b) revealed that they employ well-defined, consistent preshot behaviors for both putts and full swings. Preperformance routines have been one of the most readily used techniques to facilitate performance with closed skills such as golf (Bouchard & Singer, 1998; Boutcher, 1990; Boutcher & Crews, 1987; Cohn, 1990; Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990; Crews & Boutcher, 1986a; Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1980; Rotella & Bunker, 1981; Yancey, 1977). For example, golfers in a beginning class significantiy improved their performance after a preshot routine training program, but only for more advanced beginning male golfers (Crews & Boutcher, 1986a). In a similar study with collegiate

PAGE 106

94 golfers by Boucher and Crews (1987), both males and females improved the consistency of preshot routine behaviors after a 6-week training program, but only females improved in task performance. Similarly, Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd (1990) showed that a cognitive-behavioral intervention improved adherence to preshot routines, while a follow-up measure revealed that performance improved in actual competition. Beauchamp, Halliwell, Foamier, and Koestner (1996) examined the effects of a 14-week cognitive-behavioral teaching program on the motivation, preparation, and putting performance of novice golfers. The results showed that participants in the cognitive-behavioral program displayed enhanced intrinsic motivation, more consistent use of preputt routines, and improved putting performance relative to participants in a physical skill and control group. They also demonstrated a significantly reduced use of introjection, which reflects a harsh, selfevaluative form of self-regulation similar to ego involvement. Alternatively, other self-regulation and self-monitoring approaches have also proven to be effective performance enhancement interventions in golf Kirschenbaum and Bale's (1980) "Brain Power Golf included training in deep muscle relaxation, plaiming, imagery, positive self-monitoring, and positive self-statements. In two separate studies with members of the University of Cincinnati men's golf team (1977 and 1978), this program received high evaluations and proved to be effective for facilitating performance. Positive self-monitoring was also effective for improving performance and

PAGE 107

95 concomitant attitudes toward golf of unskilled golfers compared to neutral selfmonitoring and those who did not monitor (Johnston-O'Connor & Kirschenbaum, 1987). More recently, Kirschenbaum, Owens, and O'Connor (1998) instructed a 4-week "Smart Golf program to five experienced golfers, which included preparation, positive focusing (positive self-monitoring), plarming, applying, and reacting. Participants reported substantial improvements in emotional control, positive self-talk, and relaxation. Golf scores and handicaps also improved during the 3-month follow-up interval. Finally, Kirschenbaum, O'Cormor, and Owens (1999) demonstrated that a more realistic and conservative club selection plan was beneficial to producing better shots for golfers. Summary The importance of recognizing the impact that cognitions, emotions, and behaviors have on performance has been a topic of interest for decades. Emotions are an integral part of being a competitive athlete. What happens if one fails? What emotion(s) does one feel? What are the reactions? How does that impact performance? If the event has personal meaning or you take responsibility, your dominant feelings may be guilt, regret, resignation, anxiety, anger and/or frustration. Humans not always at the mercy of unconscious emotional forces, because the ability to think, symbolize, and select among interpretations itself shapes are emotional experiences. It is this cognitive capacity that may account for one of the most exasperating problems in the physiology of emotion: the sheer variety and complexity of emotional experience in people's lives.

PAGE 108

It's common in sport for athletes to experience emotions like anxiety prior to or during a competitive event. Until recently the concept of anxiety was largely viewed as negative and detrimental to performance. Much research supports the negative affects of anxiety on competitive performance (e.g., Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, & Plaki, 1986; Crocker, 1989; Crocker, Alderman, & Smith, 1988; Furst & Tenebaum, 1986; Gould, Weiss, & Weinberg, 19871; Mahoney & Avener, 1977 ). However, researchers have now shown that competitive anxiety does not necessarily have negative implications (e.g., Jones & Cale, 1889; Mahoney & Avener, 1977; Orbach, 1998; Parfitt & Hardy, 1987). The same may be forwarded regarding anger and/or frustration (Kiester, 1984). Research evidence, however, is lacking. There has been a general neglect by researchers to consider the role that anger/frustration may play in the arousal-performance relationship. More often it is conceal within the anxiety phenomenon or ignored altogether. There is also evidence that suggests the positive emotional and performance influence of heightened arousal (e.g., Apter, 1976, 1984; Helmers, 1991; Kerr, 1989, 1990; Lazarus, Deese, & Osier, 1952; Lazarus & Opton, 1966; Smith, Morris, Andrews, 8c Morris, 1975; Murray, 1989; Schachter, 1966; Starkes & Allard, 1983; Svebak & Stoyva, 1980). However, the research findings have been equivocal. The same emotional state can be interpreted differently by individuals and have different influences on performance (Apter, 1984; Gill, 1994). High arousal can be interpreted as anxiety or excitement. Low arousal can be interpreted as relaxation or boredom. Some athletes perform better when they are highly excited or anxious whereas

PAGE 109

others may benefit from low levels of arousal (Neiss, 1990). How an athlete interprets emotions affects their reactions to them. The role of cognitive appraisals in affecting athletic performance has been largely ignored. Mahoney and Myers (1989) stated: "Our review of the arousal and attention research (and the social learning literature in general) suggests that it is not the arousal that is central to performance but the athlete's expectations, efficacy beliefs, and strategy for managing and using that arousal" (p. 83). Although the newer multidimensional and interactional anxiety theories have provided further insight, the ideas espoused in the cognitive appraisal, perception, hardy personality style, and reversal theory literature offer explanations for the inconsistencies observed in athletic performance which are attributed to individual differences. Athletes have the option of viewing a competitive situation as well as the arousal and nervousness that usually accompanies those situations either negatively, as debilitating to their performance, or positively, as enhancing their performance. Athletes must understand that it is natural be nervous and accept that being nervous is okay. Stress management strategies and performance enhancement approaches have utilized various techniques to combat the negative impact of certain emotional states. Rarely, however, are there attempts to alter perceptions and appraisal. Human beings have free will and are capable of self-discipline and responsibility. There is a tendency in the scientific community to view human beings as objects that are acted upon by internal and external forces over which they have no control. They infer that people cannot exercise self-control because

PAGE 110

they do not exercise self-control. The idea that you can't help yourself only convinces the person that their problem is hopeless and they might as well give up. Successful therapy depends on breaking down individual's self-deceptive, self-protective excuses, and making them face the link between themselves and their actions. Individuals should not be taught to think of themselves as helpless victims of life or biology, confidence in their abilities of self-control and selfdetermination should be restored and reinforced. In the words of Rotella and Lemer (1993): It is vital to emphasize that the greatest cognitive skill of all is to learn to control one's perceptions and appraisals and the way one thinks. This mental discipline is what "willpower" truly means. Training trust, perception, and appraisal are the skills performance enhancement specialists need to teach athletes. Competitors must learn the ability to let go and trust during performance what has been trained in practice in order to be free of expectations and fears. Thus, helping athletes to effectively respond to competitive pressure entails teaching them to believe in the human mind and body and reminding them that they have the choice to enjoy and even thrive on the uncertainty of athletic competition, (p. 538)

PAGE 111

CHAPTER 3 METHOD Participants Eighty males (mean age = 22.25 years) were recruited to participate from two local golf clubs and Sport and Fitness classes and/or professional courses within the University of Florida Department of Exercise and Sport Sciences. Males were selected mainly because there is a dramatic difference in the number of men that play golf in comparison to women, men have a propensity to be more aggressive and express anger (Tavris, 1989), and may conform differently to the time-to-event paradigm than females (Jones & Cale, 1989; Jones, Swain, & Cale, 1991). Golfing experience or lack thereof was evaluated with a demographic questionnaire (see Appendix A). Skill level was later confirmed through baseline measurements. Only those who have had formal instruction or at least one year of playing experience, who consistently scored between 10 and 40 strokes above par, and who reported being debilitated by cognitive and/or somatic anxiety and/or anger as indicated by the Modified Competitive Trait Anxiety Inventory-2 (MCTAI-2; see Appendix B) and Modified Trait Anger Scale (MTAS) of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (see Appendix C) were selected to 99

PAGE 112

100 participate. Participants had to have scored higher than the norm standards in intensity for at least one of the symptoms (see Appendix' D and E), and rate that particular symptom as at least -1 (debilitating) on the directional scale of the respective measure. Those failing to meet these qualifications were eliminated from selection. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups: 1) Emotional-Awareness Monitoring Intervention (EAMI), 2) Non-Monitoring Emotional Intervention (NEI), 3) Emotional-Awareness Monitoring (EAM), or 4) Comparison (C). Performance Task and Apparatus Of relevance for this study is the realization that approximately 60 percent of all shots attempted during a typical round of golf are on or around the green. Consequently, most golf instructors and players will agree that the easiest and most effective way to lower scores is to improve the "short game." Therefore, participants were asked to chip or pitch a regulation golf ball toward an official size (4 1/4 in (10.8 cm)) hole cut into an outdoor practice green located approximately 25 yards away (22.88m). The island shaped green was be approximately 25 ft in width (7.63m) and 50 ft in length (15.25m) with the hole, cup, and flagstick located more or less in the center. Two concentric circles were painted onto the surface at 5 foot (1.53m) and 10 foot (3.05m) increments from the hole. Balls stroked within 5 ft of the hole were scored as a birdie (2). Those within 10 ft equated to a par (3). All other balls that safely reach the green outside of these areas were scored as a bogey (4). Any ball off the green in any direction was score as a double bogey

PAGE 113

101 (5). A hole-in-one received a score of 1 Balls resting on any part of a line were awarded the better of the two scores. Participants were allowed to use any club of their choosing to stroke the ball since individuals play these types of shots differently. Observational analysis indicated that the majority of participant selected a pitching wedge. Total strokes to complete the specified number of holes played served as the performance measure. Instruments and Measurements The Modified Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (MCSAI-2. Jones & Swain, 1992) The original CSAI-2 (Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990) is a sport specific, self-report test designed to measure three relatively independent competitive states: cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and confidence. The CSAI-2 consists of 27items, nine per subscale. Participants' respond to each item using a 4-point Likert scale. Thus, scores can range from 9 to 36 on each subscale. The higher the score the greater the cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and confidence, respectively. Cognitive anxiety scores are derived from totaling items 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, and 25. Adding the responses to items 2, 5, 8, 1 1, 14R, 17, 20, 23, and 26 scores somatic anxiety. Finally, self-confidence is determined by summing items 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, and 27. Examples of cognitive anxiety items include 'I am concerned about losing' and T am concerned about this competition'. Examples of somatic anxiety items are 'I feel jittery' and 'My hands are clammy'. Self-confidence items included I feel secure' and T am confident about playing well'.

PAGE 114

Psychometric data were cited for 593 male and female high school athletes, 378 male and female college athletes, and 263 male and female elite athletes. The test statistics from the norm sample of college students are presented in Appendix D. Across three samples, Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients ranged from .79 to .83 for cognitive anxiety, fi-om .82 to .83 for somatic anxiety, and fi-om .87 to .90 for selfconfidence. Concurrent validity was demonstrated by showing that the responses of the three independent samples of athletes to the CSAI-2 correlated with the responses to the state and trait anxiety scales of the Sport Competition Anxiety Test Rotter's InternalExternal Locus of Control Scale, the Zuckerman Affective Adjective Checklist, and Alpert and Haber's Achievement Anxiety Test. The modified scale (Jones & Swain, 1992) includes a direction component in which participants rate the degree to which the intensity of each item is perceived as either facilitative or debilitating to subsequent performance (see Appendix F). The directional scale is measured on a 7-point Likert format ranging from -3 (very debilitating) to 3 (very facilitative). Thus, possible directional score can range from -27 to 27, where a negative score indicates a state of debilitation and a positive one facilitation. Split half reliability coefficients for the three direction subscales were reported by Swain and Jones (1996) with R values of .83 (cognitive anxiety), .72 (somatic anxiety), and .90 (self-confidence).

PAGE 115

103 The Modified Competitive Trait Anxiety Inventory-2 (MCTAI-2, Hanton & Jones, 1999) The Competitive Trait Anxiety Inventory-2 (Albrecht & Feltz, 1987) was developed as a trait version of the CSAI-2. The CTAI-2 assesses how participants generally feel before and during competition instead of how they feel at the moment. The CTAI-2 is assumed to be a general or trait measure of competitive anxiety since the procedures used to modify it have been used by a number of other developers of statetrait measures (e.g.. Martens, 1977; McNair, Lorr, & Doppleman, 1971; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Vealey, 1986a). The MCTAI-2 (Hanton & Jones, 1999) is a trait version of the MCSAI-2, which includes a directional scale (see Appendix B). This scale was administered to stratify participants during selection and for consistency between state and trait measures. The Modified State and Trait Anger Scales of the STAXI The State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI, Spielberger, 1996) provides concise measures of the experience and expression of anger (Spielberger, 1996). The STAXI consists of 44 items that form six scales and two subscales. In responding to each of the 44 STAXI items, individuals rate themselves on 4-point scales that assess either the intensity of their angry feelings or the frequency that anger is experienced, expressed, suppressed, or controlled. The names, the number of items, and the component of anger assessed by each scale are described as follows: State Anger (S-anger): A 10-item scale that measures the intensity of angry feelings at a particular time. Trait Anger (T-Anger): A 10-item scale

PAGE 116

that measures individual differences in the disposition to experience anger. The T-Anger scale has two subscales: Angry Temperament (T-Anger/T): A 4-item T-Anger subscale that measures a general propensity to experience and express anger without specific provocation. Angry Reaction (T-Anger/R): A 4-item T-Anger subscale that measures individual differences in the disposition to express anger when criticized or treated unfairly by other individuals. Anger-in (AX/In): An 8-item anger expression scale that measures the frequency with which angry feelings are held in or suppressed. Anger-out (AX/Out): An 8-item anger expression scale that measures how often an individual expresses anger toward other people or objects in the environment. Anger Control (AX/Con): An 8-item anger expression scale that measures the frequency with which an individual attempts to control the expression of anger. Anger Expression (AX/Ex): A scale, based on the responses to the 24 items of the AX/In, AX/Out, and AX/Con scales, that provides a general index of the frequency with which anger is expressed, regardless of the direction of the expression. Normative data for the STAXI was based on the responses of more that 9,000 subjects from three populations; adults, adolescents, and college students. Of the 2,762 undergraduate college students in the normative sample, 2,122 (777 males, 1,345 females) were enrolled in introductory psychology courses at a large urban university in the southeastern United States, and 640 students (600 males, 40 females) were cadets at the United States Military Academy (West Point). The mean ages for males and females were 19.95 and 19.65 years, respectively. The median age for both sexes was 19 years.

PAGE 117

105 The test statistics for the college norm sample on the trait and state subscales of the STAXI are presented in Appendix E. For the purposes of this study, the trait and state anger subscales of the STAXI were modified to include a directional scale similar to the modified CSAI-2 and CTAI-2 (see Appendix' C and G, respectively). Furthermore, the directions for each inventory were altered to reflect impressions relative to competitive sport. These adjustments were made because there are currently no sport specific measures of competitive anger. The Self-Awareness Scale In golf, as in many self-paced activities, cognitive and somatic anxiety, anger, and confidence are transient and fleeting, varying from shot to shot depending on the outcome of the previous shot(s) and other external events. Further, there is generally a considerable amount of time in between shots. It has been previous argued that anxiety research will benefit fi^om scales that enable the measurement of anxiety as close as possible to, as well as during performance (Gould & Krane, 1992; Krane, 1992; Murphy et al., 1989; Vealey; 1990). However, no research has been conducted where these scales have been administered during performance. Therefore, in this study, state cognitive and somatic anxiety, anger, and confidence were measured by asking participants in the awareness monitoring conditions to verbally report their current levels of cognitive and somatic anxiety, anger, and confidence immediately prior to each shot. The same anchors as the CSAI-2 and SAS were utilized (i.e., "not at all" (1) to "very much so" (4)). The

PAGE 118

score for each symptom was then summed after every trial block (9 shots) to derive a score similar to that of the of CSAI-2 and S AS. Experimental Groups Emotional-Awareness Monitoring Intervention Participants in the emotional-awareness monitoring intervention group were asked to verbally report their current levels of cognitive and somatic anxiety, anger, and confidence immediately prior to each shot throughout testing. Individual interventions varied slightly depending on the results of the MCTAI-2, MTAS, and Trial Blocks 1 and 2 awareness scores. Participants debilitated by only one symptom were primarily treated for that feature. Those exhausted by multiple symptoms received a combination of methods. It should also be noted that the intervention applied both cognitive and somatic techniques. The intervention was based on programs such as Novaco's (1975, 1985) and Meichenbaum's (1985) Stress Inoculation Therapy, and Ellis' ABC model of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy for controlling anxiety (Ellis, 1998) and anger (Ellis & Tafrate, 1997). During the intervention phase, participants were asked to functionally define cognitive and somatic anxiety, anger, and confidence, and to give their impressions of whether they feel these states are facilitative or debilitating to performance. Next, participants were asked to describe playing moments when they experienced cognitive and/or somatic anxiety, and/or anger, and confidence. They were then asked to describe

PAGE 119

107 the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that are normally experienced prior to and afterwards. Additionally, they were asked to report the fi-equency, as well as the intensity and duration of the syniptom(s). Next, they were shown their scores from the previous two trial blocks and their corresponding reported levels of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger. The purpose of all these procedures is to bring about awareness of potential thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that are be conducive to poor play. They were then challenged to dispute the rationality of any negative reactions. Next, they were given a general description on the importance of controlling thoughts, emotions, and behaviors prior to and during play, how expectations influence emotions, and how they should interpret competition, the feelings that result, and particularly bad shots as a challenge to intensely focus and perform at their best. Ensuing, participants were taught to recognize the situations that create or trigger the negative thoughts, feelings, or behaviors, to preplan their reaction if the symptom(s) should arise again in the future, and to implement any one or a combination of the following techniques to combat counterproductive symptoms. Individuals debilitated by cognitive anxiety were taught techniques including thought stopping, cognitive restructuring, and positive self-talk (Bunker, Williams, & Zinsser, 1993). To alleviate somatic anxiety principles of applied relaxation were employed with techniques including deep breathing (Benson, 1975), progressive relaxation (Jacobson, 1938), as well as relaxing and positive imagery (Suinn, 1980; Vealey & Walter, 1993). Those debilitated by anger received a combination of the above mention techniques. Techniques taught

PAGE 120

108 were implemented into a functional routine for each player. Further, the recognition and reporting of elevated debilitating symptoms prior to each shot acted as a cue to implement the appropriate technique(s) and trigger the challenge response. Interventions consisted of approximately 20 min of training prior to trial block 3 and were reinforced throughout trial blocks 3 and 4. Non-Monitoring Emotion Intervention Non-monitoring emotional-awareness intervention participants were taught the importance of controlling cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger. During the intervention phase, participants were asked to functionally define cognitive and somatic anxiety, anger, and confidence, and to give their impressions of whether they feel these states are facilitative or debilitating to performance. Next, participants were asked to describe playing moments when they experienced cognitive and/or somatic anxiety, and/or anger, and confidence. They were then asked to describe the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that are normally experienced prior to and afterwards. Additionally, they were asked to report the frequency, as well as the intensity and duration of the symptom(s). Individuals debilitated by cognitive anxiety were instructed in thought stopping, cognitive restructuring, and positive self-talk (Bunker, Williams, & Zinsser, 1993). To alleviate somatic anxiety deep breathing (Benson, 1975), progressive relaxation (Jacobson, 1938), as well as relaxing and positive imagery (Suinn, 1980; Vealey & Walter, 1993) were employed. Techniques were implemented into a functional routine

PAGE 121

109 that participants executed prior to every shot attempt. Participants in the non-monitoring emotional intervention group received their respective treatment and nothing else. More specifically, they did not report current levels of each emotion prior to each shot. The intervention consisted of approximately 20 min of training prior to trial block 3 and was reinforced throughout trial blocks 3 and 4. Emotional-Awareness Monitoring Participants in the emotional-awareness-monitoring group were asked to verbally report their current levels of cognitive and somatic anxiety, anger, and confidence immediately prior to each hole throughout testing. During the intervention phase, they were asked to reflect back on and describe situations when they may have experienced some of the debilitating symptom. Next, they were be shown a listing of their scores from the previous two trial blocks, their corresponding reported levels of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger, and be given a detailed description on the importance of controlling theses emotions prior to and during play. The purpose of all these procedures is to bring about awareness of potential thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that may be conducive to good or poor play. Additionally, for remainder of testing they were asked to monitor and attempt to regulate current levels within a range of their best performances. The intervention phase lasted approximately 20 min. Comparison The comparison group listened to a section of an audiocassette series by Dr. P.J. Cohn titled "Think to win." The audiocassette described keys to effective practice and

PAGE 122

110 stresses the importance of picking out a target. It was predicted that the audiocassette would not influence competitive performance on the experimental task or have an impact on interpretations of emotional intensity or direction. Manipulation of Anxiety Anxiety was manipulated during each session through the use of a modified contrived time-to-event paradigm (Spiegler, Morris, & Liebert, 1968) and egothreatening instructional set (Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994). In a time-to event paradigm there are a series of sessions that lead up to a competitive event. The time-to eventparadigm has proven to be a reliable means of investigating temporal changes in anxiety associated with impending competitions (Hardy et al., 1994). An ego-threatening instructional set is used to manipulate cognitive and somatic anxiety independent of each other (Hardy et al., 1994). In an ego-threatening instructional set, participants are generally told that their performance was poorer than individuals of approximately the same skill level. Ego-threatening instructional sets have been shown to be a valid way to manipulate cognitive anxiety independently of somatic anxiety in both a sport specific (Hardy, et al., 1994; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976) and evaluative situations (Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981). For example, Weinberg and Hunt (1976) created psychological stress in all participants by informing them that their performance was below average based on fake information feedback. Anxiety will be manipulated in this study in an attempt to simulate competitive pressure as well as to desensitize treatment groups to the upcoming competition.

PAGE 123

Ill Prior to the start of the study, participants were told that in order to quahfy for the study and play for the money, they would have to demonstrate a minimum level of skill on the first 1 8 holes (first two trial blocks) or they would be eliminated fi"om further testing. Following block 1, if scores were poor, they were told that performance was going to have to improve in order to qualify. Individual's whose scores were adequate were told that they would have to continue to perform well in order to qualify. Preceding trial blocks 3 and 4, participants were told that it was their last chance to practice before the competition and that so far their performance was below the average of other competitors of relatively the same skill. Further, it was emphasized that in order to have a chance of winning during the competitive phase, they would have to do much better. Before trial blocks 5 and 6, participants were again told that performance would have to improve to win one of the prizes. These instructions were intended to influence cognitive anxiety to be relatively high. It was expected that somatic anxiety would be elevated in the competitive session. Studies have shown competitive situations often produce higher than normal levels of somatic anxiety (Burton, 1988; Parfitt & Hardy, 1993). See Table 1 for a representation of the experimental design and treatment groups. Procedures During the recruiting process, participants were given a general description of the protocol for the study and were asked to complete a demographic data sheet, the Modified Competitive Trait Anxiety Inventory-2, and Modified Trait Anger subsection of

PAGE 124

112 Table 1 Experimental Design and Treatment Groups Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Intervention/Practice Comnetition Group Manipulation Manipulation Manipulation EAMI Monitor Aware/Intervention/Monitor Monitor NEI None Intervention None BAM Monitor Aware/Monitor Monitor C None Audiocassette None the STAXI. As an incentive to participate, instructors were asked to grant extra course credit to those who volunteer and complete the study. Additionally, students were told that they would have an opportunity to compete for cash prizes of $100, $50, and $25. The testing was conducted at an isolated section of the University of Florida Golf Course practice range. Upon arrival, all participants read and sign an informed consent form (see Appendix H). They were then brought to the hitting area, given a detailed explanation of objective of the task, the protocol for the study, as well as the scoring system. Additionally, participants in the emotional-awareness monitoring conditions were

PAGE 125

113 provided functional definitions of cognitive and somatic anxiety, confidence, and anger, and how they would be assessed. Participants were permitted to hit 5 balls as warm-up before the first trial block. There were 6 trial blocks and 3 sessions in total, two blocks per session. Each trial block consisted of playing nine shots. Before each shot, participants in the awareness conditions were asked to report their current levels of cognitive and somatic anxiety, anger, and confidence. Following each trial block, all participants were asked to estimate on a 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so) scale the degree to which the may be experiencing mental fatigue. Session 1 served as a task familiarization, qualifying, and baseline phase. Prior to the start, participants were told that in order to qualify for the study and go on to the money competition they must demonstrate a minimum level of skill on the first two rounds (trial blocks). They were then administered the MCSAI-2 and perform trial block 1 Prior to trial block 2, players were told that they either need to play better or continue to play well in order to qualify and then were administered the MSAS. In session two, participants were administered their respective treatments. The anxiety manipulation was reinforced prior to trial blocks 3 and 4. During both trial blocks, the intervention groups were reminded and encouraged to implement their strategy into their routine. Subsequently, during trial blocks 5 and 6 participants perform under competitive conditions. Prior to trial block 5, they were advised that they were now playing for the

PAGE 126

114 cash and that performance would need to improve to win a prize. Additionally, the were advised that the better of the two scores on the next two trial blocks would be one that counted toward the prizes and that if they had two outstanding performances then they had an opportunity to receive multiple prizes. The MCSAI-2 and MSAS were administered a second time prior to trial blocks 5 and 6 respectively. Following testing, all participants were administered a social validation and manipulation check questionnaire to assess how participants interpreted the aims of the study; any significant behavioral changes; whether procedures used in the study were acceptable, as well as their perceptions on the importance of the event and effort exerted, (see Appendix I). Design and Data Analysis The research design for this investigation was a randomized group design with repeated measures on the last two factors. The three independent variables were the experimental groups, sessions, and trial blocks. The dependent measures were the MCSAI-2, the MSAS, self-awareness scores, and performance. Alpha was set at p<.05 for all statistical analyses. Performance For the initial analyses, a 4 x 2 (Groups x Trial Blocks) factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted to determine any mean differences in performance that may exist between groups at baseline. Next, a 4 x 3 x 2 (Groups x Sessions x Trial Blocks) factorial

PAGE 127

115 multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measure on the last two factors was conducted to determine any group differences in performance. The MCSAI-2. MSAS and Self-Awareness Scale Two separate multivariate analyses of variances (MANOVA' s) were used to detect potential group differences in intensity and direction of cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger at baseline as measured by the MSCAI-2 and MSAS. Next, pre-to-post differences in the intensity and directional scales of the MCSAI-2 and MSAS were determined by separate 4x2 (Groups x Sessions) factorial multivariate analyses of variances (MANOVA's) with repeated measures on the last factor. Baseline measurements of self-awareness scores were compared with a 2 x 2 (Groups x Trail Blocks) factorial multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measures on the last factor. Pre-to-post differences in self-awareness scores were analyzed with a 2 X 3 X 2 (Groups x Sessions x Trail Blocks) factorial multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measure on the last two factors. A univariate analysis and a Tukey's honestly significant difference test per each dependent variable, as appropriate followed any significant F value. Multiple regression analyses were used to determine whether results from the MCSAI-2 and MSAS were more predictive of performance than result from selfawareness scores. The MCSAI-2, MSAS, and self-awareness scores were regressed against performance results. Furthermore, correlations between results from both scales were calculated to determine variance in common.

PAGE 128

CHAPTER 4 RESULTS For all statistical analyses, alpha was set at g < .05. MANOVAs were conducted on the MCSAI-2, MSAS, self-awareness scores, and performance. Simple main effects and Tukey's honestly significant difference (HSD) procedure were used as follow-up comparisons when significant differences were revealed. Additionally, for each repeated measures MANOVA, violations of the assumption of sphericity were assessed. If assumptions were violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted pvalue was used as the level of significance. The four treatment groups were Emotional-Awareness Monitoring Intervention (EAMI), Non-monitoring Emotional Intervention (NEI), EmotionalAwareness Monitoring (EAM), and Comparison (C). Performance The initial 4x2 (Groups x Trial Blocks) analysis revealed no significant group differences in performance at baseline. The results of the 4 x 3 x 2 (Groups x Sessions x Trial Blocks) MANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors indicated a significant main effect for sessions, Wilks' lambda = .874, F (2, 75) = 5.394, p = .006 and Trial Blocks Wilks' lambda = 941, F (1, 76) = 4.754, p = .032. Overall, participants performed better during Session 3 (M = 63.33, SD = 8.61) than during Sessions 2 (M = 65.30, SD = 7.76) and 1 (M = 66.13, SD = 7.62), and during Trial Block 2 (M = 32.15, SD = 4.76) in comparison to 1 (M = 32.79, SD = 4.35). Additionally, a significant Group 116

PAGE 129

117 X Session interaction was revealed, Wilks' lambda = .845, F (6, 150) = 2.204, p = .046 (see Table 2 and Figure 1). The Tukey follow-up procedure indicated that performance of the EAMI group was significantly better than the Comparison in Session 3. Performance scores of the NEI and EAM groups, however, were only marginally better than the Comparison group in session 3. Further, only the Comparison group failed to demonstrate significant performance improvements across Sessions 1-3. The MCSAI-2 and MSAS The initial analysis revealed no significant group differences in cognitive or somatic anxiety, self-confidence, or anger intensity or direction at baseline. Pre-to post differences in intensity and direction were determined by separate 4x2 (Groups x Sessions) factorial multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measures on the last factor. The first MANOVA was conducted to assess whether intensity perceptions were altered from pre-to post intervention. The results of the analysis revealed no significant changes. The second MANOVA was performed to determine any pre-to post differences in directional interpretations. Again, the analysis indicated no significant changes. Intensity and Direction of Cognitive Anxiety Means and standard deviations for cognitive anxiety intensity and direction among the four groups are presented in Table 3. Figures 2 and 3 depict the changes in cognitive anxiety intensity and direction respectively for the four groups across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 130

118 Table 2 Performance Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across the Three Sessions Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Group M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD EAMI 32.45 3.63 33.00 3.95 32.05 4.12 31.8 4.21 30.45 3.71 30.60 4.76 NEl 33.40 4.35 33.55 3.38 33.85 3.36 31.75 4.06 32.15 3.86 30.40 4.06 BAM 33.05 4.76 32.30 5.61 32.75 4.42 32.95 5.24 31.45 5.22 31.65 5.00 C 34.65 5.78 31.70 4.38 33.50 3.59 32.20 6.14 33.70 4.66 33.85 5.62 Intensity and Direction of Somatic Anxiety Somatic anxiety intensity and directional means and standard deviations among the four groups are conferred in Table 4. Changes in somatic anxiety intensity and direction are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. Intensity and Direction of Self-Confidence Means and standard deviations for self-confidence intensity and direction among the four groups are displayed in Table 5. Figures 6 and 7 depict the changes in self-

PAGE 131

119 Trial Trial Trial Trial Trial Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 Seesion 1 Session 2 Session 3 Figure 1. Changes in Performance for Each Group Across Sessions 1-3.

PAGE 132

120 Table 3 Cognitive Anxiety Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 Session 1 Session 3 Intensity Direction Intensity Direction Group M SD M SD M SD M SD EAMI 17.05 4.81 -.65 8.51 15.20 3.17 1.40 10.56 NEI 17.15 5.32 -.40 6.60 16.85 4.91 -2.65 6.69 EAM 17.05 4.16 -.75 5.72 16.85 3.88 1.45 7.46 C 16.15 4.90 -.20 8.65 14.45 5.08 -.55 9.80 confidence intensity and direction respectively for the four groups across Sessions 1 and 3. Intensity and Direction of Anger Anger intensity and directional means and standard deviations among the four groups are conferred in Table 6. Changes in somatic anxiety intensity and direction are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.

PAGE 133

121 ^ 18 n 1 3 Session Figure 2. Changes in Cognitive Anxiety Intensity for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 134

122 1 Session Figure 3. Changes in Cognitive Anxiety Direction for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 135

123 Table 4 Somatic Anxiety Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 Session 1 Session 3 Intensity Direction Intensity Direction Group MSDMSD M^MSD EAMI 13.60 2.60 3.90 8.52 12.75 2.63 5.95 8.69 EAI 12.65 2.01 1.80 5.32 14.10 3.37 .55 5.61 EAM 13.80 3.93 2.30 7.51 13.90 4.38 4.60 9.47 C 13.95 4.27 2.60 11.61 13.40 4.03 1.10 10.99 Self-Awareness Scale Baseline measurements of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger self-awareness scores were compared with 2x2 (Groups x Trail Blocks) factorial multivariate analyses of variances (MANOVAs) with repeated measures on the last factor. The analysis indicated no significant differences for cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, self-confidence, or anger between the emotional awareness monitoring groups. Pre-to-post differences in self-awareness scores were analyzed with a 2 x 3 x 2 (Groups x

PAGE 136

124 Figure 4. Changes in Somatic Anxiety Intensity for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 137

125 1 3 Session Figure 5. Changes in Somatic Anxiety Direction for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 138

126 Table 5 Self-Confidence Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 Session 1 Session 3 Intensity Direction Intensity Direction Group M SD M SD M SD M SD EAMI 23.25 5.50 10.40 5.85 24.65 6.35 13.00 7.52 NEI 22.90 5.57 10.30 7.17 21.60 4.60 10.40 6.95 EAM 23.90 4.95 12.20 6.82 25.05 5.36 12.80 8.35 C 21.55 5.43 9.35 6.94 21.45 5.07 9.20 9.82 Sessions x Trail Blocks) factorial multivariate analyses of variances (MANOVAs) mth repeated measure on the last two factors for each dependent measure. Resuhs of the MANOVAs indicated significant main effects for Sessions, Wilks' lambda = .398, F (8, 31) = 5.853, p = .000, and Trial Blocks, Wilks' lambda = .742, F (4, 35) = 3.050, E = .029. Therefore, follow-up ANOVAs were calculated on each of the dependent variables.

PAGE 139

127 Figure 6. Changes in Self-Confidence Intensity for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 140

128 Figure 7. Changes in Self-Confidence Direction for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 141

129 Table 6 Anger Intensity and Direction Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3 Session 1 Session 3 Intensity Direction Intensity Direction Group M SD M SD M SD M SD EAMI 13.00 3.84 7.65 13.06 11.85 3.86 10.90 13.80 NEAI 13.60 3.52 2.15 11.14 13.70 4.51 1.20 10.86 EAM 12.45 2.84 4.80 13.69 11.75 2.36 6.10 14.73 C 13.60 4.81 3.05 14.52 14.30 5.97 3.35 15.23 Anger Awareness The analysis for the anger variable revealed a significant main effect for Sessions, F (2, 76) = 17.094, p = .000, and Trial Blocks F (1,88) = 12.296, p = .001. Overall, the emotional awareness monitoring groups were less angry during Sessions 2 (M_= 21.60, SD = 4.71) and 3 (M_= 20.65, SD = 4.47) compared to Session 1 (M = 26.03, SD = 8.81). Further, anger was higher in Trial Block 2 (M = 1 1.79, SD = 3.38) in comparison to Trial Block 1 (M = 1 1.01, SD = 3.37) (see Table 7 and Figure 10).

PAGE 142

130 Figure 8. Changes in Anger Intensity for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 143

131 Figure 9. Changes in Anger Direction for Each Group Across Sessions 1 and 3.

PAGE 144

132 Table 7 Anger SelfAwareness Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotional Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trials Trial 6 Group MSDMSDM SDM SDM SDM SD EAMI 12.75 5.05 15.30 6.44 11.00 2.85 11.00 3.23 10.15 4.30 10.85 2.08 EAM 11.70 2.98 12.40 4.13 10.35 1.84 10.85 2.32 10.10 2.86 10.35 1.53 Cognitive Anxiety Awareness The ANOVA analysis for the cognitive anxiety awareness variable suggested a significant main effect for Sessions, F (2, 76) = 18.307, p = .000. Overall, the emotional awareness monitoring groups were less cognitively anxious during Sessions 2 (M = 24.65, SD = 9.10) and 3 (M = 23.93, SD = 8.78) compared to Session 1 (M = 31.38, SD = 13.48) (see Tables 8 and Figure 1 1). Somatic Anxietv Awareness The analysis for the somatic anxiety variable revealed a significant main effect for Sessions, F (2, 76) = 10.931, p = .000. Emotional awareness monitoring participants

PAGE 145

133 EAMI EAM Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Figure 10. Changes in Anger SelfAwareness for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3.

PAGE 146

134 Table 8 Cognitive Anxiety Self-Awareness Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Group M SDM SDM SDM SDM SDM SD EAMI 15.60 6.38 17.45 8.66 12.65 4.36 11.90 4.39 11.95 3.99 12.15 4.30 EAM 14.60 5.83 14.30 5.27 12.55 5.05 12.20 4.93 12.05 5.21 11.70 5.06 reported less somatic anxiety during Sessions 2 (M_= 25.60, SD = 7.53) and 3 QAf= 25. 1 8, SD = 8.30) in comparison to Session 1 (M = 30.38, SD = 1 1 .78) (see Tables 9 and Figure 12). Self-Confidence Awareness The ANOVA analysis for the self-confidence data indicated a significant main effect for Sessions, F (2, 76) = 23.536, p = .000. Self-confidence was significantly higher in Sessions 2 (M = 54.00, SD = 12.24) and 3 (M = 57.23, SD = 10.35) in comparison to Session 1 (M_= 48.85, SD = 13.83). Further, it was also higher in Session 3 compared to Session 2 (see Tables 10 and Figure 13).

PAGE 147

135 Figure 11. Changes in Cognitive Anxiety Self-Awareness for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3.

PAGE 148

136 Table 9 Somatic Anxiety SelfAwareness Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Group MSDMSDMSDM SDM SDM SD EAMI 14.80 5.92 16.90 7.28 12.70 3.84 12.65 3.95 12.15 3.88 12.30 4.69 EAM 14.70 5.88 14.25 5.38 13.00 3.95 12.85 4.78 13.20 4.98 12.70 3.88 The Relationship Between the MCSAI-2, MSAS. Self-Awareness, and Performance Correlations among the three intensity subscales of the MCSAI-2 (i.e., cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence), the intensity scale of the MSAS, and selfawareness were calculated for sessions 1 and 3 (see Table 11). Results revealed that all correlations were significant at the .01 level. Furthermore, regression analyses were conducted to compare the scales and subscales predictive value of performance across the three sessions (see Table 12).

PAGE 149

137 Figure 12. Changes in Somatic Anxiety Self-Awareness for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3.

PAGE 150

138 Table 10 Self-Confidence Self-Awareness Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Group M SDM SDM SDM SDM SDM SD EAMI 25.60 7.08 22.50 8.76 26.75 6.64 26.95 6.08 28.00 5.30 28.70 5.24 HAM 24.95 6.74 24.65 6.78 27.95 5.84 27.60 6.14 28.70 5.49 29.05 5.57 The MCSAI-2 and Performance The MCSAI-2 was administered twice, once prior to Session 1 Trial Block 1 and once prior to Session 3 Trial Block 1. In Session 1 Trial block 1, the intensity scale of the MCSAI-2 explained a significant portion of the performance variance. Among the three MCSAI-2 subscales, only self-confidence intensity and direction were significant predictors of performance. In Session 1 Trial Block 2, again the intensity scale of the MCSAI-2 explained a significant portion of the performance variance. Only selfconfidence intensity was a significant predictor of performance. During Session 3 Trial Block 1, both the intensity and directional scales of the MCSAI-2 explained a significant

PAGE 151

139 Figure 13. Changes in Self-Confidence Self-Awareness for the Emotion Awareness Monitoring Groups Across Sessions 1-3.

PAGE 152

140 Table 11 Correlations Among the Intensity Scales of the MCSAI-2, MSAS, and Self-Awareness CAl SAl SCI ANGl CA3 SA3 SC3 ANG3 CASAl .701** SASAl .648** SCSAl .753** ANGSAl .724** CASA3 .612** SASA3 .624** SCSA3 .712** ANGSA3 .680** **Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). Note. Variable names: CAl or CA3-cognitive anxiety (CSAI-2) in sessions 1 or 3; SAl or SA3-somatic anxiety (CSAI-2) in session 1 or 3; SCI or SC3 -self-confidence (CSAI2) in session 1 or 3; ANGl or ANG3-anger (SAS) in session 1 or 3; CASAl or CASA3cognitive anxiety (Self-Awareness) in sessions 1 or 3; SASAl or SAS A3 -somatic anxiety (Self-Awareness) in session 1 or 3; SCSAl or SCSA3-self-confidence (SelfAwareness) in session 1 or 3; ANGSAl or ANGSA3-anger (Self-Awareness) in session 1 or 3.

PAGE 153

141 Table 12 Regression Analyses Predicting Performance with the MCSAI-2. SAS. and SelfAwareness Subscales Variable 1^ Beta t e Session 1 Trial Block 1 MCSAI-2 Intensity .103 Cognitive Anxiety Intensity .072 .572 .569 Somatic Anxiety Intensity -.040 -.300 .765 Self-Confidence Intensity -.307 -2.465 .016 MCSAI-2 Direction .080 Cognitive Anxiety Direction -.101 -.677 .501 Somatic Anxiety Direction .022 .149 .882 Self-Confidence Direction -.252 -2.221 .029 MSAS Intensity .133 Anger Intensity .364 3.456 .001 MSAS Direction .096 Anger Direction -.310 -2.875 .005 Self-Awareness .323 Cognitive Anxiety .011 .034 .973

PAGE 154

142 Table 12 -continued Variable Beta t C Somatic Anxiety .183 .586 .561 Self-Confidence -.439 -2.377 .023 Anger -.057 -.381 .706 Session 1 Trial Block 2 MCSAI-2 Intensity .104 Cognitive Anxiety Intensity .036 .285 .776 Somatic Anxiety Intensity -.182 -1.368 .175 Self-Confidence Intensity -.355 -2.852 .006 MCSAI-2 Direction .024 Cognitive Anxiety Direction .088 .574 .568 Somatic Anxiety Direction -.023 -.150 .881 Self-Confidence Direction -.150 -1.285 .203 MSAS Intensity .017 Anger Intensity .129 1.151 .253 MSAS Direction .000 Anger Direction .000 .000 1.000

PAGE 155

Table 12 -continued Variable Beta t g SelfAwareness .226 Cognitive Anxiety Somatic Anxiety Self-Confidence Anger Session 2 Trial Block 1 Self-Awareness .212 Cognitive Anxiety Somatic Anxiety Self-Confidence Anger Session 2 Trial Block 2 SelfAwareness .256 Cognitive Anxiety Somatic Anxiety Self-Confidence Anger .362 .988 .330 -.387 -1.082 .287 -.432 -2.131 .040 .061 .360 .721 .107 .436 .665 .149 .593 .557 -.230 -1.273 .212 .117 .751 .458 .331 1.313 .198 .002 .011 .992 -.252 -1.451 .156 -.196 -1.271 .212

PAGE 156

144 Table 12 -continued Variable Beta Session 3 Trial Block 1 MCSAI-2 (Intensity) .110 Cognitive Anxiety Intensity Somatic Anxiety Intensity Self-Confidence Intensity MCSAI-2 (Direction) 1 30 Cognitive Anxiety Direction Somatic Anxiety Direction Self-Confidence Direction MSAS (Intensity) .188 Anger Intensity MSAS (Direction) .107 Anger Direction Self-Awareness .290 Cognitive Anxiety Somatic Anxiety Self-Confidence .105 .794 .430 -.031 -.237 .813 -.305 -2.739 .008 -.001 -.008 .994 .010 .051 .959 -.365 -2.872 .005 .434 4.255 .000 -.327 -3.055 .003 -.227 -.919 .365 .080 .332 .742 -.556 -3.479 .001

PAGE 157

145 Table 12-continued Variable Beta t E Anger .074 .465 .645 Session 3 Trial Block 2 MCSAI-2 (Intensity) .203 Cognitive Anxiety Intensity .112 .898 .372 Somatic Anxiety Intensity .055 .440 .661 Self-Confidence Intensity -.392 -3.719 .000 MCSAI-2 (Direction) .137 Cognitive Anxiety Direction -.321 -1.816 .073 Somatic Anxiety Direction -.403 -2.060 .043 Self-Confidence Direction -.399 -3.155 .002 MSAS (Intensity) .010 Anger Intensity .102 .909 .366 MSAS (Direction) .000 Anger Direction .005 .048 .962 Self-Awareness .263 Cognitive Anxiety .291 1.346 .187 Somatic Anxiety -.185 -.909 .370

PAGE 158

146 Table 12~continued Variable Beta Self-Confidence -.379 -2.168 .037 Anger -.039 -.253 .802 portion of the performance variance. Among the three MCSAI-2 subscales, only selfconfidence intensity and direction were significant predictors of performance. In Session 3 Trial Block 2, both the intensity and directional scales of the MCSAI-2 explained a significant portion of the performance variance. Self-confidence intensity and direction, and somatic anxiety direction were significant predictors of performance. Cognitive anxiety direction was a marginal predictor. The MSAS and Performance The MSAS was administered following Session 1 Trial Block 1 and Session 3 Trial Block 1. Both the intensity and directional scales of the MSAS explained a significant portion of performance variance in Session 1 Trial Block 1 indicating that anger intensity and direction were significant predictors of performance. Neither the intensity or directional scales of the MSAS explained performance variance in Session 1 Trial Block 2. During Session 3 Trial Block 1, both the intensity and directional scales of

PAGE 159

147 the MSAS explained a significant portion of the performance variance. Anger intensity and direction were again significant predictors of performance. Neither the intensity or directional scales of the MSAS accounted for a significant portion of performance variance in Session 3 Trial block 2. SelfAwareness Scale and Performance Self-awareness scores were recorded during each session and trial block. During Session 1 Trial Block 1, self-awareness scores explained a significant portion of performance variance. Self-confidence, however, was the only significant predictor of performance. In Session 1 Trial Block 2, self-awareness scores explained a marginally significant portion of performance variance again with self-confidence as the predictor. During Session2 Trial Block 1, self-awareness scores explained a marginally significant portion of performance variance with no one variable being a significant predictor. In Session 2 Trial Block 2, self-awareness scores explained a significant portion of performance variance. No one variable, however, was a significant predictor of performance. During Session 3 Trial Block 1, self-awareness scores again accounted for a significant portion of performance variance with self-confidence being the sole predictor. In Session 3 Trial Block 2, self-awareness scores explained a significant portion of the performance variance. Among self-awareness scores, again only self-confidence was a significant predictor of performance.

PAGE 160

148 Manipulation Check and Social Validation Questionnaire A manipulation check and social validation questionnaire was administered at the end of testing to confirm participants interpretation of the aims of the study; the use of particular strategies; perception of performance changes and significance; whether procedures used in the study were acceptable; importance of performing well; and effort exerted. Participants were asked to rank on a 7-point Likert scale (l=not at all to 7=very much so) the degree to which the believed the following statements: 1 ). Did you understand what was expected of you? 2). Did you adhere rigidly to the assessment procedures? 3). Did you adhere rigidly to the recommended strategy? 4). Did you perceive any changes in performance? 5). If, so, do you feel the perceived changed were significant? 6). Were the procedures appropriate and acceptable? 7). How important was it to you to perform well? 8). Did you try to the best of your ability? Table 13 presents the means and standard deviations to the responses of each question for each group. They were also asked to respond to the following open-ended questions: To the best of your knowledge, what was the purpose of this study? Why do you think you were asked to participate? Briefly describe any strategy you used in attempting to perform well. Regarding the purpose of the study, virtually everyone indicated that the intent was to study the impact of emotions, stress, or mental aspects on performance. There were however, a few exceptions. Two individuals from the NET group, two from the EAMI group, and one from the C group thought it was to test the effectiveness of their respective interventions. Further, one participant in the EAMI condition postulated that it

PAGE 161

149 Table 13 Social Validation and Manipulation Check Questionnaire Response Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group Group EAMI NEAI EAM C Ql Mean Standard Deviation Q2 Q3 Q4 Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 6.65 .67 6.35 1.35 5.65 1.31 5.80 1.15 6.65 .67 6.45 .76 6.05 1.05 5.15 1.50 6.60 .60 6.55 .76 6.10 .97 5.10 2.02 6.60 .75 6.75 .64 5.40 1.05 4.55 1.76

PAGE 162

150 Table 14 — continued Group EAMI NEAI EAM C Q5 Mean 5.75 5.05 4.75 3.85 Standard Deviation 1.33 1.50 2.07 1.50 Q6 Mean 6.60 6.35 6.35 5.70 Standard Deviation .60 .75 1.09 1.42 Q7 Mean 6.13 4.94 5.38 3.69 Standard Deviation 1.15 1.44 1.31 1.70 Q8 Mean 6.69 6.75 6.81 6.44 Standard Deviation .60 .45 .40 .89 was to examine how previous attempts affected current and future ones. Finally, one participant in the EAMI group left the response blank.

PAGE 163

151 Concerning why they were asked to participate, 43 individuals stated that it was because they had golfing experience or were in a golf class, 1 8 said because they volunteered, 13 (1 EAMI, 3 NEI, 6 EAM, and 2 C) thought that they met the qualifications as indicated by the pre-study questionnaires, two from the NEI group believed that it was to test their individual reactions to stress, two participants from the NEI group thoughts it was to test their individual reactions to stress, and two individuals from the EAMI group didn't know. For a summary of techniques utilized by each group during performance see Table 14. Mental Fatigue Following each trial block, participants were asked to report the degree to which they may be experiencing mental fatigue. Participants rated their perceptions on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). Data were analyzed with a 4 x 3 x 2 (Groups x Sessions X Trial Blocks) factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Results of the analysis indicated no significant differences. Means and standard deviations of mental fatigue experienced by each group across Sessions 1-3 are presented in Table 15. # Reliability of the MCSAI-2 and MSAS Reliability coefficients were calculated on the intensity and directional scales and subscales of the MCSAI-2 and MSAS between the two sessions. Cronbach's alpha for the MCSAI-2 and MSAS between Sessions 1 and 3 were as follows: cognitive anxiety intensity (.8147), cognitive anxiety direction (.8042), somatic anxiety intensity (.7310),

PAGE 164

152 Table 14 Frequency of Techniques used During Performance by Each Group Group EAMI NEI EAM C Technique Relaxation techniques 9 8 9 1 Routine 4 8 2 0 Visualization 7 6 4 3 Stay Positive/Positive Self-talk 2 4 4 0 Establish Feel and Target 2 2 0 7 Stay Focused/Try Best 1 2 3 0 Relax and Have Fun 0 0 1 3 Clear Mind/Control Stress 0 2 0 1 Focus on Money 0 0 0 1 Good Lie/ Angle 0 0 1 0 Different Clubs/Types of Shots 1 0 0 0 Just Do It 0 0 0 4 Practice Swings 0 0 1 0 Focus on Ball 1 0 0 0

PAGE 165

153 Table 15 Means and Standard Deviations of Mental Fatigue Experienced by Each Group Across Sessions 1-3 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Group M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD EAMI 1.13 .34 1.31 .60 1.13 .34 1.25 .68 1.50 1.03 1.50 .89 NEI 1.06 .25 1.13 .34 1.13 .34 1.25 .45 1.19 .40 1.06 .25 EAM 1.06 .25 1.25 .45 1.31 .79 1.31 .60 1.31 .60 1.31 .79 C 1.31 .60 1.25 .45 1.06 .25 1.25 .58 1.25 .45 1.31 .70 somatic anxiety direction (.7986), self-confidence intensity (.8431), self-confidence direction (.7737), anger intensity (.6582), and anger direction (.8340).

PAGE 166

CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH This study was designed to test hypotheses related to the impact of various emotion awareness interventions on perceptual interpretations of emotions, emotion regulation, and competitive golf performance. Second, an attempt was made to further advance the understanding of how the psychological variables of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger influence that performance. Initially, each of the hypotheses posited in Chapter 1 will be discussed in relation to the data collected and analyzed as well as relevant theory and previous research. Next, a summary and conclusion will be presented. Finally, implications will be forwarded regarding the potential direction of future research. Hypotheses Related to the Intensity and Direction of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety. Self-Confidence, and Anger Several hypotheses were posited regarding the influence of the interventions on the intensity and directional interpretations of cognitive and somatic anxiety, selfconfidence, and anger. Based on the findings of Hanton and Jones (1999b) and Maynard and colleagues (1995, 1995), it was hypothesized that following the interventions, the EAMI, NEI, and EAM groups would report less intense feelings of cognitive and somatic anxiety and anger, more self-confidence intensity, and more facilitative interpretations of each. 154

PAGE 167

155 Conversely, the comparison group interpretations were expected to remain imchanged. These hypotheses were partially supported. Although multivariate analysis revealed no significant changes in any of the psychological variables as measured by the MCSAI-2 and MSAS, an argument could be made that at minimum, the EAMI and EAM treatments did influence the intensity of these variables. Inspection of self-awareness data indicated significant pre-to post improvements in cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger for both awareness conditions. Although the scales were highly correlated, the inconsistencies in these two findings may suggest that MCSAI-2 and MSAS may not account for fluctuations that occur in these psychological constructs throughout performance. This notion is somewhat supported since both scales were administered solely as precompetitive state measures. Alternatively, participants were selected based on higher than normal levels of anxiety and/or anger and debilitating interpretations of at least one of the symptoms as indicated by the MCTAI-2 and MTAS. Although trait measures indicated appropriate selection (see Table 15 for trait intensity and directional means and standard deviations), overall, the baseline state intensity levels of each of the symptoms were less than the norm standards of college male athletes and college males respectively as reported by Martens and colleagues (1990). The norm standard for both cognitive and somatic anxiety as measured by the CSAI-2 is 17.68 (Martens et al., 1990). In this study, participants initially reported intensity levels of 16.85 for cognitive anxiety and 13.5 for somatic anxiety. A similar argument could be forwarded for anger. The norm intensity

PAGE 168

156 Table 15 Overall Means and Standard Deviations for the MCTAI-2 and MTAS Subscale TCAI TCAD TSAI TSAD TSCI TSCD TANGI TANGD Mean 20.46 -3.41 16.92 -2.05 23.00 11.27 18.28 -3.99 SD 4.81 5.20 3.99 5.30 4.99 8.52 4.68 8.99 Note. Variable names: TCAI-trait cognitive anxiety intensity (CTAI-2); TCAD-trait cognitive anxiety direction (MCTAI-2); TSAI-train somatic anxiety intensity (CTAI-2); TSAD-trait somatic anxiety direction (MCTAI-2); TSCI-trait self-confidence intensity (CTAI-2); TSCD-trait self-confidence intensity (CTAI-2); TANGI trait anger inetnsity (TAS); TANGD-trait anger direction (MTAS). level of state anger for college males is 15.89. In this study, participants reported an overall initial intensity level of 13. 16. Therefore, as a vi'hole, the participants were not cognitively or somatically anxious or angry. The lack of anxious and angry feelings can be explained in two ways: 1). The MCTAI-2 and MTAS may not accurately determine how individuals will respond in state situations, or 2). the contrived qualifying phase may

PAGE 169

157 not have been powerful enough to elicit the desired effects whereas the competition phase actually did. Session 1 state scores were 3.61 and 2.91 points lower for cognitive anxiety intensity and direction, and 3.42 and 4.7 points lower for somatic anxiety and direction than trait scores. Similarly, state anger intensity and directional scores were 5.12 and 8.4 points lower than trait scores. Moreover, since the somatic anxiety and anger levels were so far below the norm, attaining a statistically significant pre-to post reduction would have been difficult (i.e., potential "floor effect"). The more likely of the two explanations is that the baseline qualifying stage of the study failed to elicit the desired anxious or angry responses. Pilot study, with two differences in protocol, was able to achieve the desired affects. The changes in protocol may have contributed to the disparity in numbers between trait and state measures. More specifically, the initial selection criterion for a debilitating symptom was a score of -5 or greater on the directional scales. That number was later reduced to -1, a number more commonly used in previous research. This change was made due to difficulty in finding a selection pool. Further, during baseline, participants were originally given a high standard score that must be achieved in order to qualify. They were later allowed to continue regardless of performance. To reduce any potential impressions of deception and increase investigator believability, this procedure was altered to advising them that in order to qualify they would have to exhibit a minimal skill level without any direct indication of what that level was.

PAGE 170

158 Hypotheses Related to Performance The most important finding in this study was the significant performance effect. Numerous authors and researchers (e.g., Feldenkrais, 1972; Gauron, 1984; Ravizza, 1988; Zaichkowski & Takenaka, 1993) have proposed that awareness based interventions enhance and increase physical performance. Furthermore, Carver and Scheier (1981, 1990, 1998) have suggested that awareness is a critical component in the comparator stage of their self-regulatory model, and that by increasing awareness, the self regulating process is facilitated, thereby bringing behavior more in line with intended goals. Based on these previous writings, as well as research evidence from similar strategies including stress inoculation training, it was hypothesized that the EAMI, NEI, and EAM groups would perform significantly better post treatment while the comparison group would show no gain. It was also expected that the EAMI group would demonstrate the best achievement followed by the NEI and EAM groups respectively and that each would accomplish significantly more than the comparison group. The first hypothesis was supported with the second being only partially supported. The EAMI, NEI, and EAM groups achieved significant pre-to post improvements while the performance of the C group slightly deteriorated. The EAMI group demonstrated most improvement followed by the NEI, EAM, and C groups respectively, however, group differences were only evident between the EAMI and C groups. Performance differences between the NEI and C group as well as EAM and C condition were only marginally significant.

PAGE 171

159 The results of the present study coincide with the reported sport performance enhancement success of various other cognitive-behavioral interventions. The direct and active involvement in the practice of emotion regulation and cognitive-behavioral strategies has proven essential for optimal performance. The EAMI group actively monitored and applied appropriate techniques to counteract potential debilitating symptoms and facilitate achievement. To accomplish performance excellence, NEI group members implemented various well-established performance enhancement techniques into a functional routine. Finally, EAM participants monitored and were able to selfregulate based on raising conscious awareness of the detrimental effects of particular variables and merely suggesting that they be arduously controlled. It is possible of course, that participant's improvements were the result of expectancy effects. However, with the large body of literature that exists demonstrating the effectiveness of similar interventions, that conclusion seems unwarranted. The research literature with regard to the effectiveness of particular cognitivebehavioral strategies such as cognitive restructuring, positive self-talk, visualization, and relaxation is voluminous. The support for emotionally based awareness interventions has become equally advocated recently. Although it could not be determined which particular aspects of the interventions lead to the performance success, this study provides continued support for multimodal interventions. Based on these findings, it is therefore concluded that various emotionally based combinatorial strategies are effective for facilitating performance of moderately skilled

PAGE 172

160 golfers. Conversely, without active regulation in emotion provoking situations, performance improvements are unlikely. Whether or not the same interventions would be productive for lesser skilled athletes or in different environments remains a question for further exploration. Hypotheses Related to the Relationship Among the MCSAI-2, MSAS, Self-Awareness and Performance Two hypotheses were predicted regarding the relationship between the MCSAI-2, self-awareness scores, and performance. First, it was hypothesized that the self-awareness scale would be a stronger predictor of performance than the MCSAI-2. Second, it was proposed that the directional scale of the MCSAI-2 would be a stronger predictor of performance than its intensity scale. The first hypothesis was only partially supported. The self-awareness scale accounted for a significant portion of performance variance in four of the six trial blocks (Trial Blocks 1, 4, 5, and 6). The predictive values of selfawareness during Trial Blocks 2 and 3 were only marginally significant. The intensity scale of the MCSAI-2 accounted for a significant portion of performance variance in Trial Blocks 1,2, 5, and 6. During Trial Blocks 1 and 5, the self-awareness scale was a stronger predictor than the intensity scale of the MCSAI-2. Conversely, the intensity scale of the MCSAI-2 was stronger during Trial Blocks 3 and 6. Therefore, conclusive evidence does not exist in support or rejection of the first hypothesis. It should also be noted that the scales were shown to be highly correlated.

PAGE 173

161 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the only variable to consistently contribute to the significant results obtained from the MCSAI-2 and self-awareness data was self-confidence. Neither cognitive nor somatic anxiety predicted performance significantly, contrasting previous research (e.g., Gould et al., 1984; Burton, 1988; Parfitt et al., 1995). It has been previously suggested that only when the intensity levels of these variables are high will performance be influenced (Hardy, 1996; Martens et al., 1990; Morris et al., 1981). In this study, both cognitive and somatic anxiety were below the norm. It is possible that higher cognitive or somatic anxiety levels would predict performance better. However, this issue should receive further investigated. Based on these results, it can be concluded that both the MCSAI-2 and the selfawareness scale are effective for measuring anxiety components and self-confidence. The high correlations between the MCSAI-2 and self-awareness scores would suggest that when intrusiveness is a concern the MCSAI-2 may be the more appropriate alternative. Regarding anger, both the intensity and directional scales of the MSAS accounted for a significant portion of performance variance in Trial Blocks 1 and 5. Significance was not achieved, however, during Trial Blocks 2 and 6 for either scale. These results indicate that anger levels can be a significant predictor of performance. However, since anger was related only one half of the time, this issue should be further investigated. With regard to the second hypothesis, the intensity scale of the MCSAI-2 was a stronger predictor of performance than the directional scale in each instance. In fact, the only time the predictive value of the directional scale of the MCSAI-2 was statistically

PAGE 174

162 significant was in Trial block 5. During Trial Block] it was marginally significant. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported. Previous research by Jones and colleagues (Jones, Hanton, & Swain, 1994; Jones & Swain, 1992; Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Swain & Jones, 1993) had indicated that the directional scale was a stronger performance predictor than the intensity scale. These findings contrast those of Jones and associates thereby suggesting future investigation. Summary This study had two primary purposes. First, an attempt was made to determine the effectiveness of various emotion awareness interventions on competitive golf performance and emotion regulation of recreational players. The rationale behind this approach was based in part on Carver and Scheier's (1998) theory of behavioral selfregulation, numerous well-established stress management programs, and authors and researchers suggestions. Second, it was expected that the continuous monitoring and reporting of emotions throughout play would provide a more accurate measure of how these variables impact performance than pre-performance measures alone. Eighty male recreational golfers were recruited from two local golf clubs as well as Sport and Fitness and professional classes within the Department of Exercise and Sport Sciences at the University of Florida. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups: Emotional Awareness Monitoring Intervention (EAMI), Non-Monitoring Emotional Intervention (NEI), Emotional Awareness Monitoring (EAM), or Comparison (C). The first session served as a baseline measurement of participant skill as well as the

PAGE 175

163 intensity and directional interpretations of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger. During the second session, participants received their respective interventions and were allowed to practice with their individual treatments. During the third session, participants competed for cash prizes of $100, $50, and $25 and were administered posttreatment evaluations of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger. As expected, the three intervention groups performed better than a comparison condition. However, group differences were only significant between the EAMI and C groups. Differences between the NEI and EAM groups, and the C condition were modest. These findings suggest that by raising golfer's awareness of psychological variables that impact their performance, achievement can be facilitated. This study provides support for the general concept of self-focused attention in behavioral self-regulation. By increasing awareness, conformity to salient standards was accomplished. Further, these results strengthen the existing body of literature regarding the effectiveness of cognitivebehavioral and multimodal interventions for athletic performance enhancement. Additionally, analysis of the psychological data revealed that self-confidence was the only consistent predictor of performance. This result fortifies the standing body of knowledge, which maintains that self-confidence is a critical variable in influencing sport performance (Feltz, 1988; Orbach, 1998; Williams & Krane, 1998). Further, evidence suggests that anger can be a significant predictor of performance and therefore should be investigated outside of the anxiety performance relationship. Finally, monitoring techniques provide an accurate assessment of the relationship between psychological

PAGE 176

constructs and performance, however, when expediency and intrusiveness are a concern, traditional psychometric measures may be equally as effective. Conclusions Based on the results of this study, the following conclusions seem warranted: 1 The emotionally based awareness interventions facilitated competitive performance of male recreational golfers reportedly debilitated by cognitive and/or somatic anxiety and/or anger. 2. Raising semi-skilled male golfers awareness of the impact of cognitive and somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and anger on personal performance can prompt the initiation of developed performance enhancement strategies. 3. Without adequate knowledge or training in the control of debilitating emotions, moderately skilled golfers hampered by those symptoms will not perform at peak levels in competitive situations. 4. Both the MCSAI-2 and self-awareness scales were effective instruments for predicting golf performance of intermediate male performers. 5. Self-confidence is an important variable for determining competitive golf performance of average skilled male players. 6. Outside and separate from anxiety, anger can have a significant impact on the performance of reasonably skilled male golfers.

PAGE 177

Implications For Future Research The present study represents an attempt to further understand the impact of various emotions, emotion awareness, and emotion regulation on competitive golf performance. Based on the results obtained, several implications for future research are offered. 1 This study was the first in which the direct impact of emotional awareness interventions were investigated on sport performance of intermediate level male golfers debilitated by cognitive and/or somatic anxiety and/or anger. It was also the first study in which the testing and interventions were conducted in an ecologically valid setting with an applicable task. It would be interesting to see how these same interventions would affect women, lesser skilled athletes, and those from other sport venues. Therefore, replications of this study with different populations as well as various sport skills would strengthen the conclusions. 2. Apparently, moderately skilled golfers have developed techniques through knowledge or experience that can be used to alleviate debilitating symptoms and that by merely raising their awareness of potential debilitating effects of those symptoms in a realistic setting and suggesting regulation, those strategies are initiated. Whether or not the same holds true for lesser skilled athletes and those involved in different sports and from different populations should be determined. 3. The results support the notion that semi-skilled athlete can be taught to

PAGE 178

166 recognize and cope with potential debilitating symptoms through high level combinatorial type strategies. What could not be determined was which aspects of the multiple component interventions were responsible for the performance effects. Hence, a dissection of the individual techniques would clarify this issue. 4. The task utilized in this study represents only one aspect of golf performance. Intuitively, the procedures and techniques applied should generalize to all aspects of golf Without direct evidence of this, however, it is merely speculation. Accordingly, global performance effects should be examined. 5. Participants performed under contrived competitive conditions, that may not have accurately represented or have had the same impact as actual competition. Therefore, the effectiveness of the interventions might be better understood during more meaningful conditions. 6. Individuals were chosen on the merit of higher than normal levels of intensity of at least one psychological variable and perceiving it as debilitating. They were then randomly assigned to one of the four treatments groups without consideration of the particular debilitating symptom. Consequently, group intensity levels of each of these variables were low overall. Whether the treatments would be effective for more cognitively or somatically anxious or angry populations should be resolved. 7. Additionally, there was no segregation with regard to the particular

PAGE 179

167 debilitating symptom. It would be interesting to see if the interventions would have similar performance and psychological variable effects if participants were grouped according to the debilitating characteristic. 8. Participants did not show the expected treatment effects with regard to their interpretations and perceptions of the psychological variables as measured by the MCSAI-2. This may have been due to relatively low group levels at baseline or perhaps it was due to the strength or length of the treatments for influencing these perceptions. Other studies with similar but more extensive treatments have reported significant changes in these variables. Therefore, the minimal amount of treatment time necessary to achieve these effects should be determined. 9. Immediately following the intervention, performance of EAMI, NEI, and EAM groups improved dramatically. What was not investigated was the longitudinal effect of the interventions. Hence, future studies might consider the addition of subsequent retention tests as well as optimal treatment time to achieve substantial retention. 10. There is a need to further investigate the impact of the various psychological variables within individuals and within different sports. Self-confidence was the one consistent predictor of golf performance in this population. It was evident, however, that at different times, cognitive and/or somatic anxiety and/or anger came into play for certain players. The notion that individuals are affected differently and may have personal zones of optimal performance is quite appealing and deserves further validation.

PAGE 180

168 1 1. As mentioned previously, participants were chosen based on symptom perceptions. The accuracy of those perceptions as to whether the variables were truly debilitating or facilitative to their individual performances was not assessed. However, it became apparent at times that perceptions were not accurate. Future researchers may want to consider creating situations whereby the intensity of the facilitating and debilitating symptoms are intensified or dramatically reduce and determine the actual affect of each variable on individual's performances.

PAGE 181

REFERENCES Adam, R.J., & Van Wieringen, P. (1988). Worry and emotionality: Its influence on performance of a throwing task. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 19, 211225. Albrecht, R.R., & Feltz, D.L, (1987). Generality and specificity of attention to competitive anxiety and sports performance. Journal of Sport Psychology, 9, 231-248. Aimesi, J.J. (1998). Applications of the individual zones of optimal functioning model for the multimodal treatment of precompetitive anxiety. The Sport Psychologist. 12,300-316. Anshel, M.H. (1985). Effect of arousal on warm-up decrement. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 56, 1-9. Anshel, M.H. (1990). Toward the development of a model for coping with acute stress in sport. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 21. 58-83. Anshel, M.H. (1991). Effectiveness of selected coping strategies in responding to acute stress in gymnastics. Journal of Physical Education & Sport Sciences. 3. 21-38. Anshel, M.H. (1997). Sport psychology: From theory to practice (3''' ed.). Scottsdale, AR: Gorsuch Scarisbrick. Anshel M.H., Brown, M., & Brown, D. (1993). Effects of a program for coping with acute stress on motor performance, muscular tension and affect. Australian Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport, 25. 7-16. Anshel, M.H., Gregory, W.L., & Kaczmarek, M. (1990). Effectiveness of a technique for coping with criticism in sport. Journal of Sport Behavior. 13. 194-218. Apter, M.J. (1976). Some data inconsistent with the optimal arousal theory of motivation. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 43. 1209-1210. Apter, M.J. (1982). The experience of motivation: The theory of psychological reversal London: Academic Press. Apter, M.J. (1984). Reversal theory and personality: A review. Journal of Research in Personality. 18. 265-288. 169

PAGE 182

170 Arnold, M B. (1960). Emotion and personality (2 vols.). New York: Columbia. Bandura, A. (1977a). Social learning theory Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Bandura, A. (1977b). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological Review, 84, 191-215. Bandura, A. (1986a). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Bandura, A. (1986b). The explanatory and predictive scope of self-efFicacy theory. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology. 4. 359-373. Bandura, A. (1991). Perceived self-efficacy in the exercise of personal agency. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 2, 128-163. Bandura, A., Reese, L., & Adams, N.E. (1962). Microanalysis of action and fear arousal as a function of different levels of perceived self-efficacy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 43. 5-21. Barnes, M., Sime, W., Dienstbier, R., & Plaki, B. (1986). A test of construct validity of the CSAI-2 questionnaire on male elite swimmers. International Journal of Sport Psychology. 17. 364-374 Baumeister, R.F. (1984). Choking under pressure: Self-consciousness and paradoxical effects on incentives on skillful performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 46. 610-620. Beauchamp, P.H., Halliwell, W.R., Foumier, J.F., & Koestner, R. (1996). Effects of cognitive-behavioral psychological skills training on the motivation, preparation, and putting performance of novice golfers. The Sport Psychologist. 10. 157-170. Bennett, B. (1978, April). Psych-up or psych-out. International Gymnast. 65-67. Benson, H. (1975). The relaxation response New York: Avon. Berlyne, D.E. (1970). Novelty, Complexity, and hedonic value. Perception and Psvchophvsics. 8. 279-286.

PAGE 183

171 Borkovec, T.D. (1976). Physiological and cognitive processes in the regulation of anxiety. In G.E. Schwartz & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation: Advances in research (pp. 188-199). New York: Plenum. Bouchard, L.J., & Singer, R.N. (1998). The influence of a five-step strategy routine on performance in a competitive simulated golf situation (Unpublished manuscript). Boutcher, S.H. (1990). The role of performance routines in sport. In J.G. Jones & L. Hardy (Eds.), Stress and performance in sport (pp. 231-245). Chichester, England: Wiley. Boutcher, S.H. (1992). Attention and athletic performance: An integrated approach. In T.S. Horn (Ed.), Advances in sport psychology (pp. 251-266). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Boutcher, S.H., & Crews, D.J. (1987). The effects of a preshot attentional routine on a well-learned skill. International Journal of Sport Psychology. 1 8, 30-39. Boutcher, S.H., & Rotella, R. J. (1987). A psychological skills education program for closed skill performance enhancement. The Sport Psychologist, 1 127-137. Brown, J., & Weiner, B. (1984). Affective consequences of ability versus effort ascriptions: Controversies, resolutions, and quandaries. Journal of Educational Psychology. 76. 146-158. Buck, R. (1985). Prime theory: An integrated view of motivation and emotion. Psychological Bulletin. 92. 389-413. Budzynski, T.H., Stoyva, J.M., & Peffer, K.E. (1980). Biofeedback techniques in psychosomatic disorders. In A. Goldstein & E.B. Foa (Eds.), Handbook of behavioral interventions: A clinical guide (pp. 186-265). New York: Wiley. Bunker, L.K., & Owens, N.D. (1985). Golf Better practice for better play. West Point, NY: Leisure Press Bunker, L.K., & Rotella, R.J. (1982). Mind, set, match Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

PAGE 184

172 Bunker, L., Williams, J.M., & Zinsser, N. (1993). Cognitive techniques for improving performance and building confidence. In J.M Williams (Ed.), A pplied sport psychology: Personal growth to peak performance (pp. 225-242). Mountain View, CA; Mayfield. Burton, D. (1988). Do anxious swimmers swim slower? Reexamining the elusive anxiety-performance relationship. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 10, 45-61. Butt, D.S. (1987). The psychology of sport: The behavior, personality and performance of athletes New York: Van Nostrand. Cannon, A.V. (1968). Motor performance under stress. The Research Quarterly, 39, 463-469. Caruso, CM., Dzewaltowski, D.A., Gill, D.L., & McElroy, M.A. (1990). Psychological and physiological changes in competitive anxiety during noncompetitive and competitive success and failure. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 12. 6-20. Carver, C.S. (1998). Themes and issues in the self-regulation of behavior. ESPNews. 12 (3). 11-12. Carver, C.S., & Scheier, M.F. (1981). Attention and self-regulation: A control theory approach to human behavior New York: SpringerVerlag. Carver, C.S., & Scheier, M.F. (1990). Principles of self-regulation: Action and emotion. In E.T. Higgins, R.M. Sorentino (Eds.), Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 3-52). New York: Guilford. Carver, C.S., & Scheier, M.F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior New York: Cambridge University Press. Carver, C.S., & Scheier, M.F. (1999). Themes and issues in the self-regulation of behavior. In R.S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), Perspectives on behavioral self-regulation: Advances in social cognition (Vol. XII, pp. 1-105). Mahwah, NJ: Erbaum. Cattell, R.B., & Scheier, J.H. (1961). The meaning and measurement of neuroticism and anxiety New York: Ronald. Chen, D., & Singer, R.N. (1992). Self-regulation and cognitive strategies in sport participation. International Journal of Sport Psychology. 23. 277-300.

PAGE 185

173 Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Cohn, P.J. (1990). Preperformance routines in sport: Theoretical support and practical applications. The Sport Psychologist, 4, 301-312. Cohn, P.J. (1991). An exploratory study on peak performance in golf The Sport Psychologist, 5, 1-14. Cohn, P.J., Rotella, R.J., & Lloyd, J.W. (1990). Effects of a cognitive-behayioral intervention on the preshot routine and performance in golf International Journal of Sport Psychology, 18, 30-39. Corbin, C.B. (1981). Sex of object, sex of opponent, and opponent ability as factors affecting self-confidence in a competitive situation. Journal of Sport Psychology. 1 265-270. Corbin, C.B., Landers, D.M., Feltz, D.L., & Senior, K. (1983). Sex differences in performance estimates: Females lack of confidence vs. male boastfulness. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 54, 407-410. Corbin, C.B., & Nix, C. (1979). Sex-typing of physical activities and success predictions of children before and after cross-sex competition. Journal of Sport Psychology. 1. 43-52. Cox, R.H., Russell, W.D., & Robb, M. (1994, October). Phase one in the development of an instrument for assessing competitive state anxiety during or prior to competition Proceedings from the atmual conference of the Association for the Advancement of Applied Sport Psychology, Lake Tahoe, NV. Cox, R.H., Russell, W.D., & Robb, M. (1996). Validity of the MRF and ARS competitive state anxiety rating scales for volleyball and basketball. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport. 67 (Suppl.), A-98. Cox, R.H., Qiu, Y., & Liu, Z. (1993). Overview of sport psychology. In R.N. Singer, M. Murphey, & L.K. Tennant (Eds.). Handbook of research on sport psychology (pp. 3-31). New York: MacMillan. Cratty, B.J. (1983). Psychology in contemporary sport: Guidelines for coaches and athletes Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

PAGE 186

174 Crews D.J. (1993). Self-regulation strategies in sport and exercise. In R.N. Singer, M. Murphey, & L.K. Tennant (Eds.), Handbook of research on sport psychology (pp. 557-568). New York: Macmillan. Crews, D.J., & Boucher, S.H. (1986a). Effects of structured preshot behaviors on beginning golf performance. Perceptual and Motor skills, 62, 291-294. Crews, D.J., & Boucher, S.H. (1986b). An exploratory observational analysis of professional golfers during competition. Journal of Sport Behavior. 9 (2). 51-58. Crocker, P. ( 1989). A follow-up of cognitive-affective stress management training. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. 11. 236-242. Crocker, P., Alderman, R., & Smith, F. (1988). Cognitive-affective stress management training with high performance youth volleyball players: Effects on affect, cognition, and performance. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. 10. 448-460. Davidson, R.J., & Schwartz, G.E. (1976). The psychobiology of relaxation and related states: A multi-process theory. In D.I. Mostofsky (Ed.), Behavioral control and modification of physiological activity (pp. 237-252). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Davies, S., & West, J.D. (1991). A theoretical paradigm for performance enhancement: The multimodal approach. The Sport Psychologist. 5. 167-174. Davis, H. (1991). Passive recovery and optimal arousal in ice hockey. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 72. 1-2. Deffenbacher, J.L. (1977). Relationship of worry and emotionality to performance on the Miller Analogies Test. Journal of Educational Psychology. 69. 191-195. Deffenbacher, J.L. (1980). Worry and emotionality in test anxiety. In I.G. Sarason (Ed.), Test anxiety: Theory, research, and applications (pp. 1 1 1-128). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Doctor, R.M., & Altman, F. (1969). Worry and emotionality as components of test anxiety: Replication and further data. Psychological Reports. 24. 563-568. Dollard, J., Doob, L.W., Miller, N.E., Mowrer, O.H., & Sears, R.R. (1939). Frustration and aggression New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

PAGE 187

175 Duffy, E. (1957). The psychological significance of the concept of arousal on activation. Psychological Review. 64. 265-275. Duffy, E. (1962). Activation and behavior New York: John Wiley. Ebbeck, V., & Weiss, M.R. (1988). The arousal-performance relationship: Task characteristics and performance measures in track and field athletics. The Sport Psychologist. 2. 13-27. Ellis, A. (1998). How to control your anxiety before it controls you Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing. Ellis, A., & Tafrate, R.C. (1997). How to control your anger before it controls you Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing. Epstein, M.L. (1980). The relationship of mental imagery and mental rehearsal to performance. Journal of Sport Psychology. 2. 21 1-220. Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited, or a theory of a theory. American Psychologist. 28. 404-416. Eysenck, M.W. (1982). Attention and arousal: Cognition and performance Berlin: Springer. Eysenck, M.W. (1992). Anxiety: The cognitive perspective Hove, England: Erlbaum. Eysenck, M.W., & Calvo, M.G. (1992). Anxiety and performance: The processing efficiency theory. Cognition and Emotion. 6. 409-434. Fazey, J. A., & Hardy, L. (1988). The inverted-U hypothesis. A catastrophe for sport psychology. British Association of Sport Sciences Monograph No. 1 Leeds: The National Coaching Foundation. Feldenkrais, M. (1972). Awareness through movement New York: Harper & Row. Feltz, D. (1982). Path analysis of the causal elements of Bandura's theory of selfefficacy and an anxiety based model of avoidance behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 42. 764-781.

PAGE 188

176 Feltz, D.L. (1988). Self-confidence and sports performance. In K.B. Pandolf (Ed.), Exercise and sport science reviews (vol. 16) (pp. 423-457). New York: Macmillan. Feltz, D.L., & Brown, E.W. (1984). Perceived competence in soccer skills among young soccer players. Journal of Sport Psychology, 6, 385-394. Feltz, D.L., & Landers, D.M. (1983). The effects of mental practice on motor skill learning and performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Sport Psychology. 5. 25-57. Feltz, D.L., Landers, D.M., & Raeder, U. (1979). Enhancing self-efficacy in highavoidance motor tasks: A comparison of modeling techniques. Journal of Sport Psychology. 1. 112-122. Feltz, D., & Reissinger, C.A. (1990). Effects of in vivo emotive imagery and performance feedback on self-efficacy and muscular endurance. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. 12. 132-143. Ferrari, M., Pinard, A, Reid, L., & Bouffard-Bouchard, T. (1991). The relationship between expertise and self-regulation in movement performance: Some theoretical issues. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 72. 139-150. Fish, T.A. (1983). The relationship among cognitive appraisals and performance in a naturalistic, public speaking situation. Unpublished dissertation, University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Fiske, S.T. (1981). Social cognition and affect. In J. Harvey (Ed.), Cognition, social behavior and the environment (pp. 227-268). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Fiske, S.T. (1982). Schema-triggered affect: Applications to social perception. In M.S. Clark & S.T. Fiske (Eds.), Affect and cognition: The 17*^ Annual Carneg ie Symposium on Cognition (pp. 227-268). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Folkman, S. (1984). Personal control and stress and coping processes: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 46. 839-852. Folkman, S., Lazarus, R.S., & DeLongis, A. (1986). Appraisals, coping, health status, and psychological symptoms. Journal of Personality and Social P sychology 50 571-579. — Freedberg, E. J. & Johnson, W.E. ( 1 979). Behavioral change in short-term, intensive multimodal alcoholism treatment program. Psychological Reports. 44. 791-797.

PAGE 189

177 Furst, D.M., & Tenebaum, G. (1986). The relationship between worry, emotionality, and sport performance. In D.M. Landers (Ed.), Sport and elite performers (pp. 89-96). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Gallwey, W.T. (1998). The irmer game of golf New York: Random House. Gauron, E.F. (1986). The art of cognitive self-regulation. Clinics in Sport Medicine. 5. 91-101. Gayton, W.F., Matthews, G.R., &, Burchstead, G.N. (1986). An investigation of the validity of the Physical Self-Efficacy Scale in predicting marathon performance. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 63. 752-754. Gensemer, R. (1995). Beginning golf (2nd ed.). Englewood, CO: Morton Publishing Company. Gill, D.L (1986). Psychological dvnamics of sport Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Gill, D.L. (1994). A sport and exercise psychology perspective on stress. Quest. 46, 20-27. Gould, D., Hodge, K., Peterson, K., & Giannini, J. (1989). An exploratory examination of strategies used by elite coaches to enhance self-efficacy in athletes. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. 11. 128-140. Gould, D., & Krane, V. (1992). The arousal-athletic performance relationship: Current status and future directions. In T.S. Horn (Ed.), Advances in sport psychology (pp. 1 19-142). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Gould, D., & Petlichkoff, L. (1985, April). Interrelationships between pre and midmatch state anxiety measures Paper presented at the AAHPERD National Conference. Gould, D., Petlichkoff, L., Simons, J., & Vevera, M. (1987). Relationship between Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 subscale scores and pistol shooting performance. Journal of Sport Psychology. 9 (\). 33-42. Gould, D., Petlichkoff, L., & Weinberg, R.S. (1984). Antecedents of temporal changes in, and relationships between, CSAI-2 subcomponents. Journal of Sport Psychology. 6. 289-304.

PAGE 190

178 Gould, D., Weinberg, R.S., & Jackson, A. (1980). Effect of mental preparation strategies on a muscular endurance task. Journal of Sport Psychology, 2, 329-339. Gould, D., Weiss, M., & Weinberg, R.S. (1981). Psychological characteristics of successful and nonsuccessful Big Ten wrestlers. Journal of Sport Psychology, 3, 69-81 Gray, S.W. (1990). Effects of visuomotor rehearsal with videotaped modeling on racquetball performance of beginning players. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 70. 379-385. Gray, S.W & Fernandez, S. (1989). Effects of visuo-motor behavior rehearsal with videotaped modeling on basketball shooting performance. Psychology: A Journal of Human Behavior, 26, 4 1 -47. Greenspan, M.J., & Feltz, D.L. (1989). Psychological interventions with athletes in competitive situations: A review. The Sport Psychologist, 3, 219-236. Griffm, N.S., &. Keogh, J.F. (1982). A model for movement confidence. In J.A. S. Kelso, & J. Clark (Eds.), The development for movement control and coordination (pp. 213-236). New York: Wiley. Hackfort, D., & Schwenkmezger, P. (1989). Measuring anxiety in sports. In D. Hackfort & CD. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in sport (pp. 55-74). New York: Hemisphere. Hackfort, D., & Schwenkmezger, P. (1993). Anxiety. In R.N. Singer, M. Murphey, &. L.K. Tennant (Eds.), Handbook of research on sport psychology (pp. 328364). New York: Macmillan. Hahn, E. (1989). Emotions in sports. In D. Hackfort fe CD. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in sports: An international perspective (pp. 153-162). New York; Hemisphere. Hall, E.G., & Erffmeyer, E.S. (1983). The effect of visuo-motor behavior rehearsal with videotaped modeling on free throw accuracy of intercollegiate female basketball players. Journal of Sport Psychology. 5. 343-346. Hamilton, S., & Fremouw, W. (1985). Cognitive-behavior training for college free-throw performance. Cognitive Therapy and Research. 9. 479-483. Hanin, Y.L. (1980). A study of anxiety in sports. In W.F. Straub (Ed.), Sport psychology: An analysis of athlete behavior Ithaca, NY: Mouvement Publications.

PAGE 191

179 Hanin, Y.L. (1989). Interpersonal and intragroup anxiety in sports. In D. Hackfort & C. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in sports: An international perspective (pp. 19-28). New York: Hemisphere. Hanton, S., & Jones, G. (1999a). The acquisition and development of cognitive skills and strategies in elite swimmers: I. Making the butterflies fly in formation. The Sport Psychologist, 13. 1-21. Hanton, S., & Jones, G. (1999b). The effects of a multimodal intervention program on performers: II. Training the butterflies to fly in formation. The Sport Psychologist, 13. 27-41. Hardy, L. (1990). A catastrophe model of performance in sport. In J.G. Jones & L. Hardy (Eds.), Stress and performance in sport (pp. 81-106). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. Hardy, L. (1996a). Testing the predictions of the cusp catastrophe model of anxiety and performance. The Sport Psychologist. 10. 140-156. Hardy, L. (1996b). A test of catastrophe models of anxiety and sports performance against multidimensional anxiety theory models using a method of dynamic differences. Anxiety. Stress and Coping: An International Journal. 9. 69-86. Hardy, L., & Fazey, J. (1987, June). The inverted-U hypothesis: A catastrophe for sport psychology Paper presented at the annual conference of the North American Society for the Psychology of Sport and Physical Activity, Vancouver, Canada. Hardy, L., & Jones, J.G. (1990). Future directions for performance related research in sport psychology. In J.G. Jones & L. Hardy (Eds.), Stress and performance in sport (pp. 281-296). Chichester, England: Wiley. Hardy, L., Jones, J.G., & Gould, D. (1996). Understanding psychological preparation for sport Chichester, England: Wiley. Hardy, L., & Nelson, D. (1988). Self-regulation training in sport and work. Ergonomics. 31. 1673-1583. Hardy, L., & Parfitt, G. (1991). A catastrophic model of anxiety and performance. British Journal of Psychology. 82. 163-178.

PAGE 192

180 Hardy, L., Parfitt, G., & Pates, J. (1994). Performance catastrophes in sport: A test of the hysteresis hypothesis. Journal of Sport Sciences. 12. 327-334. Harris, D.V., & Harris, B.L. (1984). The athlete's guide to sport psychology: Mental skills for physical people New York: Leisure Press. Harrison, R.P., & Feltz, D. (1981). Stress inoculation for athletes: Description and case example. Motor Skills: Theory and Practice. 5. 53-61. Harter, S. (1978). Effectance motiyation reconsidered: Toward a developmental model. Human Deyelopment. 21. 34-64. Harter, S. (1981). The deyelopment of competence motivation in the mastery of cognitive and physical skills: Is there still a place for joy? In G.C. Roberts & D M Landers (Eds.), Psychology of motor behavior and sport1980 (pp. 3-29). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Harter, S. (1982). The perceived competence scale for children. Child Development. 53. 87-97. Helmers, A.M. (1991). Positive anxiety in sport: Recreational volleyball athletes Unpublished master's thesis. University of Virginia, Charlottesville. Highlen, P.S., & Bennett, B.L. (1983). Elite divers and wrestlers: A comparison between open and closed-skill athletes. Journal of Sport Psychology. 5. 390-809. Hillman, J. (1960). Emotion London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hull, C.L. (1943). Principles of behavior New York: Appleton. Hull, C.L. (1951). Essentials of behavior New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Iso-Ahola, S.E., & Hatfield B. (1986). Psychology of sport: A social psychological approach Dubuque, lA: Wm. C. Brown. Izard, C.E. (1977). Human emotions New York: Plenum. Jacobson, E. (1938). You must relax New York: McGraw-Hill. James, W. (1968). What is an emotion? In M.B. Arnold (Ed.), The nature of emotion. Baltimore: Penguin. (Published for the first time in Mind. 9. 188-205).

PAGE 193

181 Johnson-O'Connor, E.J., & Kirschenbaum, D.S. (1986). Something succeeds Hke success: Positive self-monitoring for unskilled golfers. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10(1), 123-136. Jones, G. (1990). A cognitive perspective on the process underlying the relationship between stress and performance in sport. In G. Jones & L. Hardy (Eds.), Stress and performance in sport (pp. 17-42). Chichester, England: Wiley. Jones, G. (1991). Recent developments and current issues in competitive state anxiety research. The Sport Psychologist, 4, 152-155. Jones, G. (1995). More than just a game: research developments and issues in competitive anxiety in sport. British Journal of Psychology, 86. 449-478. Jones, G., & Cale, A. (1989). Relationships between muhidimensional competitive state anxiety and cognitive and motor subcomponents of performance. Journal of Sport Sciences, 7, 229-240. Jones, G., Hanton, S. & Swain, A.B.J. (1994). Intensity and interpretation of anxiety symptoms in elite and non-elite sport performers. Personality and Individual Differences. 17. 657-663. Jones, G., & Hardy, L. (1989). Stress and cognitive functioning in sport. Journal of Sport Sciences. 7. 41-63. Jones, G., & Swain, A.B.J. (1992). Intensity and direction dimensions of competitive state anxiety and relationships with competitiveness. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 74. 467-472. Jones, G., & Swain, A.B.J. (1995). Predispositions to experience debilitating and facilitative anxiety in elite and non-elite performers. The Sport Psychologist. 9. 201-21 1. Jones, G., Swain, A.B.J. & Cale, A. (1990). Antecedents of multidimensional competitive state anxiety and self-confidence in elite intercollegiate middle-distance runners. The Sport Psychologist. 4. 107-1 18. Jones, G., Swain, A.B.J., &. Cale, A. (1991). Gender differences in precompetition temporal patterning and antecedents of anxiety and confidence. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. 13. 1-15.

PAGE 194

182 Jones, G., Swain, A.B.J., & Hardy, L. (1993). Intensity and direction dimensions of competitive state anxiety and relationships with performance. Journal of Sports Sciences, 11, 525-532. Judah, R.D. (1978). Multimodal parent training. Elementary School Guidance and Coimseling. 13, 46-54. Karteroliotis, C, & Gill, D.L. (1987). Temporal changes in psychological and physiological components of state anxiety. Journal of Sport Psychology, 9, 261-274. Kassin, S.M., & Baron, R.M. (1986). On the basicity of social perception cues: Developmental evidence for adult processes? Social Cognition, 4, 1 80-200. Kauss, D.R. (1980). Peak performance: Mental game plans for maximizing your athletic potential. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Keat, D.B. (1979). Multimodal therapy with children Elmsford, NY: Pergamon. Kiester, E. (July, 1984). The uses of anger. Psychology Today, 26. Kerr, J.H. (1985a). The experience of arousal: A new basis for studying arousal effects in sport. Journal of Sport Sciences. 3. 169-179. Kerr, J.H. (1985b). A new perspective for sport psychology. In M.J. Apter, D. Fontana, & S. Murgaroyd (Eds.), Reversal theory: Applications and developments (pp. 89-102). Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press. Kerr, J.H. (1989). Anxiety, arousal, and sport performance. In D. Hackfort & CD. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in sports: An international perspective (pp. 137-151). New York: Hemisphere. Kerr, G., & Leith, L. (1993). Stress management and performance. The Sport Psychologist. 7. 221-231. Kerr, J.H. (1990). Stress and sport: In G. Jones & L. Hardy (Eds.), Stress and performance in sport (pp. 107-134). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. Kiester, E. (July, 1984). The uses of anger: Winning athletes turn rage into motivation and concentration. Psychology Today. 17. pp. 19-24.

PAGE 195

183 Kingery, P.M. (1990). Self-efficacy and the self-monitoring of selected exercise and eating behaviors of college students. Health Education. 21, 26-29. Kirschenbaum, D.S. (1984). Self-regulation and sport psychology: Nurturing an emerging symbiosis. Journal of Sport Psychology, 6. 59-183. Kirschenbaum, D.S. (1987). Self-regulation and sport performance. Medicine and Science in Sport and Exercise, 19 (5), 106-113. Kirschenbaum, D.S., & Bale, R.M. (1980). Cognitive-behavioral skills in golf Brain power in golf In R.M. Suinn (Ed.), Psychology in sports: Methods and applications (pp. 334-343). Minneapolis: Burgess. Kirschenbaum, D.S., & Bale, R.M. (1984). Cognitive-behavioral skills in sports: Applications to golf and speculations about soccer. In W.F. Straub & J.M. Williams (Eds.), Cognitive sport psychology (pp. 275-288). Lansing, NY: Sport Science Associates. Kirschenbaum, D.S., Ordman, A.M., Tomarken, A. J., & Holtzbauer, R. (1982). Effects of differential self-monitoring and level of mastery on sports performance: Brain power bowling. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 6 (3). 335-342. Kirschenbaum, D.S., Owens, D.D., & O'Connor, E.A. (1998). Smart Golf Preliminary evaluation of a simple yet comprehensive approach to improving and scoring the mental game. The Sport Psychologist. 12. 271-283. Kirschenbaum, D.S., O'Connor, E.A., & Owens, D.D. (1999). Positive illusions in golf Empirical and conceptual analyses. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology. 11. 127. Klavora, P. (1978). An attempt to derive inverted-U curves based on the relationship between anxiety and athletic performance. In D.M Landers & R.W. Christina (Eds.), Psychology of motor behavior and sport (Vol I and II, pp. 369-377). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Klavora, P. (1979). Customary arousal for peak athletic performance. In P. Klavora & J.V. Daniel (Eds.), Coach, athlete, and the sport psychologist (pp. 155-163). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

PAGE 196

184 Kleinginna, P.R., & Kleinginna, A.M. (1981). A categorized list of emotional definitions, with suggestions for a consensual definition. Motivation and Emotion. 5. 345-379. Klint, K.A., & Weiss, MR. (1987). Perceived competence and motives for participating in youth sports: A test of Harter's competence motivation theory. Journal of Sport Psvchology, 9, 55-65. Kobasa, S.C. (1979). Stressful life events, personality and health: An inquiry into hardiness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1-11. Kobasa, S.C, & Maddi, S.R. (1982). Hardiness and health: A prospective study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 168-177. Kobasa, S.C, Maddi, S R., & Courington, S. (1981). Personality and constitutions as mediators in the stress-illness relationship. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 22, 368-378. Kobasa, S.C, Maddi, R.S., & Puccetti, M.C (1982). Personality and exercise as buffers in the stress-illness relationship. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 5, 391-404. Kobasa, S.C, Maddi, R.S., Puccetti, M.C, & Zola, M.A. (1985). Effectiveness of hardiness, exercise and social support as resources against illness. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 29. 525-533. Krane, V. (1992). Testing the validity of the Mental Readiness Form as a potential alternative to the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 Paper presented at the annual conference of the North American Society for the Psychology of Sport and Physical Activity, Pittsburgh. Krane, V. (1994). The mental readiness form as a measure of competitive state anxiety. The Sport Psychologist. 8. 189-202. Krane, V., & Finch, L. (1992). A test of the validity of the Mental Readiness Form. Paper presented at the annual conference of the American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation, and Dance, Indianapolis. Krane, V., & Williams, J. (1987). Performance and somatic anxiety, cognitive anxiety, and confidence changes prior to competition. Jotmial of Sport Behavior. 10 (1). 47-56.

PAGE 197

185 Krane, V., Williams, J., & Feltz, D. (1992). Path analysis examining relationships among cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, state confidence, performance expectations, and golf performance. Journal of Sport Behavior, 15 (4), 279-295. Krohne, H.W., & Hindel, C. (1988). Trait anxiety, state anxiety, and coping behavior as predictors of athletic performance. Anxiety Research, 1, 234-255. Lacey, J.I., & Lacey, B. (1958). Verification and extension of the principle of autonomic response-stereotypy. American Journal of Psychology, 71, 50-73. Landers D., & Boutcher, S.H. (1993). Arousal -performance relationships. In J.M. Williams (Ed.), A pplied sport psychology (2"*^ ed.) (pp. 170-184). Mountain View, CA: Mayfield. Lansing, R.W., Schwartz, E., & Lindsley, D.B. (1956). Reaction time and EEG activation. American Psychologist, 1 1 433. Lazarus, A. A. (1974). Multimodal treatment of depression. Behavior Therapy, 5, 549-554. Lazarus, A.A. (1976). Multimodal behavior therapy New York: Springer. Lazarus, A.A. (1981). The practice of multimodal therapy: Systematic, comprehensive, and effective psychotherapy New York: McGraw-Hill. Lazarus, R.S. (1966). Psychological stress and coping process New York: McGraw Hill. Lazarus, R.S. (1984). On the primacy of cognition. American Psychologist, 39. 124-139. Lazarus, R.S., Deese, J. & Osier, S.F. (1952). The effects of psychological stress on performance. Psychological Bulletin. 49. 293-317. Lazarus, R.S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal and coping New York: Springer. Lazarus, R.S., & Opton, E.M. (1966). The study of psychological stress: A summary of theoretical formulations and experimental findings. In CD. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety and behavior (pp. 225-263). New York: Academic Press.

PAGE 198

186 Leeper, R.W. (1970). Feelings and emotions. In M.D. Arnold (Ed.), Feelings and emotions: The Loyola Symposium (pp. 151-168). New York: Academy Press. Lehrer, P.M., & Woolfolk, R.L. (1982). Self-report assessment of anxiety: Physiological cognitive, and behavioral modalities. Behavioral Assessment, 4, 167-177. Levitt, E.E. (1980). The psychology of anxiety Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Levitt, S., & Gutlin, B. (1971). Multiple choice reaction time and movement time during physical exertion. The Research Quarterly, 42, 405-410. Liebert, R.M, & Morris, L.W. (1967). Cognitive and emotional components of test anxiety: A distinction and some initial data. Psychological Reports, 20, 975-978. Lobermeyer, D.L., & Wasserman, E.A. (1986). Preliminaries to free throw shooting: Superstitious behavior? Journal of Sport Behavior, 9, 70-78. London, H., & Nisbett, R.E. (Eds.). (1974). Cognitive alterations of feeling states Chicago: Aldine. Mace, R.D., & Carroll, D. (1985). The control of anxiety in sport: Stress inoculation training prior to abseiling. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 16. 165175. Mace, R.D., & Carroll, D. (1986a). Stress inoculation training to control anxiety in sport: Two case studies in squash. British Journal of Sports Medicine. 20. 115-117. Mace, R.D., & Carroll, D. (1986b, September). Effects of stress inoculation training on self-reported stress, observer's ratings of stress, heart rate and gymnastics performance Paper presented at the annual conference of the British Association of Sport Sciences, Birmingham, University. Mace, R., Eastman, C, & Carroll, D. (1987). The effects of stress-inoculation training on gymnastic performance on the pommelled horse: A case study. Behavioral Psychotherapy. 15. 272-279. Maehr, M L., & Braskamp, L A. (1986). The motivational factor: A theory of personal investment Lexington, MA: Heath & Co.

PAGE 199

187 Magill, R.A. (1989). Critical periods: Retaliation to youth sports. In R.A. Magill, M.J. Ash, & F.L. Smoll (Eds.), Children in sport (2"'' ed.) (pp.44 1-452). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Mahoney, M.J., & Avener, M. (1977). Psychology of the elite athlete: An exploratory study. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 1, 135-141. Mahoney, M.J., & Myers, (1989). Anxiety and athletic performance: Traditional and cognitive development perspectives. In D. Hackfort & CD. Spielberger (Eds.), Anxiety in sports (pp. 77-94). New York: Hemisphere. Mandler, G. (1975). Mind and emotion New York: Wiley. Mandler, G. (1984). Mind and body: Psychology of emotion and stress New York: W.W. Norton. Markus, H., & Zajonc, R. (1985). The cognitive perspective in social psychology. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (3"^ ed.. Vol. 1, pp. 137-230). New York: Random House. Martens, R. (1974). Arousal and motor performance. In J. Wilmore (Ed.), Exercise and sport science review (pp. 155-188). New York: Wiley. Martens, R. (1975). Social psychology and physical activity New York: Harper &Row. Martens, R. (1976). Competition: In need of a theory. In D M. Landers (Ed.), Social problems in athletics Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Martens, R. (1977). Sport competition anxiety test Champaign IL: Human Kinetics. Martens, R. (1987). Coaches guide to sport psychology Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Martens, R., Burton, D., Vealey, R., Bump, L., & Smith, D. (1983). The development of the Competitive State Anxiety Inyentory-2 (CSAI-2) Unpublished manuscript.

PAGE 200

188 Martens, R., Burton, D., Vealey, R., Bump, L., & Smith, D. (1990). Development and validation of the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2). In R. Martens, R. Vealey, & D. Burton (Eds.), Competitive anxiety in sport (pp. 1 17-190). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Martens, R., & Landers, D.M. (1970). Motor performance under stress: A test of the inverted-U hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 29-37. Martens, R. Vealey, R.S., 8c Burton, D. (1990). Competitive anxiety in sport Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Maynard, I.W., & Cotton, P.C.J. (1993). An investigation of two stress management techniques in field setting. The Sport Psychologist, 7, 375-387. Maynard, I.W., Hemmings, B., & Warwick-Evans, L. (1995). The effects of a somatic intervention strategy on competitive state anxiety and performance in semiprofessional soccer players. The Sport Psychologist, 9, 51-64. Maynard, I.W., & Howe, B.L. (1987). Interrelations of trait and state anxiety with game performance of rugby players. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 64, 599-602. Maynard, I.W., Smith, M.J., & Warwick-Evans, L. (1995). The effects of a cognitive intervention strategy on competitive state anxiety and performance in semiprofessional soccer players. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 17, 428-446. McAuley, E. (1985). State anxiety: Antecedents or results of sport performance? Journal of Sport Behavior, 8, 71-77. McAuley, E., &. Gill, D. (1983). Reliability and validity of the physical selfefficacy scale in a competitive sport setting. Journal of Sport Psychology. 5. 410-418. McAuley, E., & Tammen, V.V. (1989). The effects of subjective and objective competitive outcomes on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. IL 84-93. McCaffrey, N., & Orlick, T. (1989). Mental factors related to excellence among top professional golfers. International Journal of Sport Psychology. 20. 256-278.

PAGE 201

189 McCombs, M.L. (1988). Motivational skills training: Combining metacognitive, cognitive, and affective learning strategies. In C.E. Weinstein, E.T. Goetz, & P.A. Alexander (Eds.), Learning and study strategies: Issues in assessment and evaluation (pp. 141-169). New York: Academic Press. McElroy, M.A., & Willis, J.D. (1979). Women and achievement conflict in sport. Journal of Sport Psychology. 1. 24 1 -247. McMillan, J.H., & Spratt, K.F. (1983). Achievement outcome, task importance, and effort as determinants of student affect. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 5124-31. McNair, D.M., Lorr, M., & Doppleman, L.F. (1971). Manual for the profile of mood states San Diego: Educational & Industrial Testing Service. Meichenbaum, D. (1977). Cognitive behavior modification: An integrated a pproach. New York: Plenum. Meichenbaum, D. (1985). Stress inoculation training New York: Pergamon Press. Meichenbaum, D., & Cameron, R. (1983). Stress inoculation training. In D. Meichenbaum & M. Jaremko (Eds.), Stress education and prevention (pp. 1 15-154). New York: Plenum Press. Meyers, A., & Schleser, R. (1980). A cognitive behavioral intervention for improving basketball performance. Journal of Sport Psychology. 2. 69-73. Meyers, A., Schleser, R., & Okwunabua, T. (1982). A cognitive behavioral intervention for improving basketball performance. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport. 53. 344-347. Millenson, J.R. (1967). Principles and behavior analysis New York: MacMillan. Morris, L.W., Davis, D., & Hutchings, C. (1981). Cognitive and emotional components of anxiety: Literature review and revised worry-emotionality scale. Journal of Educational Psychology. 73. 541-555. Morris, L.W., & Liebert, R.M. (1970). Relationship of cognitive and emotional components of test anxiety to physiological arousal and academic performance. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 35. 332-337.

PAGE 202

190 Morris, L., Smith, L., Andrews, E., & Morris, N. (1975). The relationship between emotionality and worry components of anxiety to motor skill performance. Journal of Motor Behavior, 7, 121-130. Murray, J. (1989). An investigation of competitive anxiety vs. positive affect Unpublished master's thesis. University of Virginia, Chariottesville. Murphy, S. Greenspan, M., Jowdy, D., & Tammen, V. (1989, September). Development of a brief rating instrument of competitive anxietv: Comparison with the CSAl-2 Paper presented at the annual conference of the Association for the Advancement of Applied Sport Psychology, Seattle. Murphy, S.M., & Woolfolk, R.L. (1987). The effects of cognitive intervention on competitive anxiety and performance on a fine motor skill accuracy test. International Journal of Sport Psvchology, 1 8, 152-156. Nance, V.L., Davis, E.G., & McMahon, K.E. (1998). Golf (8* ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. Neiss, R. (1988). Reconceptualizing arousal: Psychobiological states in motor performance. Psvchological Bulletin, 103, 345-366. Neiss, R. (1990). Ending arousal' s reign of error: A reply to Anderson. Psvchological Bulletin. 107. 101-105. Nelson, L., & Furst, M. (1972). An objective study of the effects of expectations on competitive performance. Journal of Psychology, 81. 69-72. Nicholls, J.G. (1980, July). Striving to demonstrate and develop ability: A theory of achievement motivation. In W.U. Meyer & B. Weiner (Chair), Attributional approaches to human motivation Symposium conducted at the center for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, West Germany. Nicholls, J.G. (1984). Achievement motivation: Conceptions of ability, subjective experience, task choice and experience. Psvchological Review. 91. 328-346. Nicklaus, J. (1974). Golf my way New York: Simon and Schuster. Nideffer, R.M. (1976). The inner athlete: Mind plus muscle for vyinning. San Diego: Enhanced Performance Associates.

PAGE 203

191 Novaco, R.W. (1975). Anger control Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Novaco, R.W. (1985). Anger and its therapeutic regulation. In M. Chesney & R. Rosenman (Eds.), Anger and hostility in cardiovascular and behavioral disorders Washington D.C.: Hemisphere. Orbach, I. (1998). The relationship between self-confidence and competitive anxiety in influencing sport performance. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Florida, Gainesville. Orlick, T. (1980). In pursuit of excellence Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Orlick, T. (1986). Psyching for sport: Mental training for athletes. Champaign, IL: Leisure Press. Orlick, T., & Partington, J. (1986). Psyched: Inner views of winning Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Coaching Association of Canada. Oxedine, J.G. (1970). Emotional arousal and motor performance. Quest, 13, 2332. Oxedine, J.G. (1984). Psychological of motor learning Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Parfitt, G., & Hardy, L. (1993). The effects of competitive anxiety on memory span and rebound shooting tasks in basketball players. Journal of Sport Sciences. 1 1. 517524. Parfitt, G., Hardy, L., & Pates, J. (1995). Somatic anxiety and physiological arousal: Their effects upon a high anaerobic, low memory demand task. International Journal of Sport Psychology. 26. 196-213. Passer, M.W. (1984). Competitive trait anxiety in children and adolescents. In J.M. Silva & R.S. Weinberg (Eds.), Psychological foundations of sport (pp. 452-461). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Pema, F., Neyer, M., Murphy, S.M., Ogilvie, B.C., & Murphy, A. (1995). Consultations with sport organizations: A cognitive-behavioral model. In S.M. Murphy (Ed.) Sport psychology interventions (pp. 235-252). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

PAGE 204

192 Plutchik, R. (1980). Emotion: Psvchoevolutionary synthesis New York: Harper &Row. Ponterotto, J.G., & Zander, T.A. (1984). A multimodal approach to counselor supervision. Counselor Education & Supervision, 2 1 40-54. Ravizza, K., & Rotella, R.J. (1982). Cognitive somatic behavioral intervention in gymnastics. In L. Zaichkowsky & W. Sime (Eds.), Stress management for sport (pp. 2535). Reston, VA: AAHPERD. Roberts, G.C., Keiber, D.A., & Duda, J.L. (1981). An analysis of motivation in children's sport: The role of perceived competence in participation. Journal of Sport Psvchology. 3. 206-216. Rotella, R.J. (1995). Golf is not a game of perfect New York: Simon & Schuster Rotella, R.J. (1996). Golf is a game of confidence New York: Simon & Schuster Rotella, R.J. (1997). The golf of your dreams New York: Simon & Schuster Rotella, R.J., & Bunker, L.K. (1981). Mind mastery for winning golf Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Rotella, R.J., Gansneder, B., Ojala, D., & Billing, J. (1980). Cognitions and coping strategies of elite skiers: An exploratory study of young developing athletes. Journal of Sport Psychology. 1. 350-354. Rotella, R.J., & Lemer, J.D. (1993). Responding to competitive pressure. In R.N. Singer, M. Murphey, & L.K. Tennant (Eds.), Handbook of research on sport psychology (pp. 528-541). New York: MacMillan. Rotella, R.J., Lemer, J.D., Allyson, B., & Bean, J.J. (1990). Arousal as arousing to athletes Presentation made at the Fifth Annual conference of the Association for the Advancement of Applied Sport Psychology, San Antonio, TX. Rotter, J.B. (1954). Social learning and clinical psychology Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Rotter, J.B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs. 80. (1, whole No. 609).

PAGE 205

193 Rushall, B.S. (1979). Psyching for sport London: Pelham. Sage, G.H. (1984). Motor learning and control: A neurophvsiological approach Dubuque, lA: Brown. Sage, G.H., & Bennett, B. (1973). The effects of induced arousal on learning and performance of a pursuit motor skill. The Research Quarterly, 44, 140-149. Sarason, I.G. (1960). Empirical findings and theoretical problems in the use of anxiety scales. Psychological Bulletin, 57. 403-415. Scanlon, T.K., & Passer, M.W. (1979). Sources of competitive stress in young female athletes. Journal of Sport Psychology, 1, 151-159. Schachter, S. (1964). The interaction of cognitive and physiological determinants of the emotional state. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 54-87). New York: Academic Press. Schachter, S. (1966). The interaction of cognitive and physiological determinants of emotional state. In CD. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety and behavior (pp. 193-224). New York: academic. Press. Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of emotional state. Psychological Review. 69. 379-399. Schulz, R., & Cumow, C. (1988). Peak performance and age among superathletes: Track and field, swimming, baseball, tennis, and golf Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences. 43. 113-120. Schunk, D.H. (1983). Progress self-monitoring: Effects on children's self-efficacy and achievement. Journal of Experimental Education. 51. 89-93. Schwartz, G.E. (1979). Disregulation and systems theory: A biobehavioral framework for biofeedback and behavioral medicine. In N. Birbaumer & H.D. Kimmel (Eds.), Biofeedback and self-regulation (pp. 19-48). New York: Erlbaum. Scheier, M.F., & Carver, C.S. (1983). Self-directed attention and the comparison of self with standards. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 19. 205-222. Shelton, T.O., & Mahoney, M.J. (1978). The content and the effect of "psychingup" strategies in weight lifters. Cognitive Therapy and Research. 2. 275-284.

PAGE 206

194 Smith, C.A., & Morris, L.W. (1976). Effects of stimulative and sedative music on two components of test anxiety. Psychological Reports, 38, 1 187-1 193. Smith, R.E. (1980). A cognitive-affective approach to stress management training for athletes. In C.H. Nadeau, W.R. Halliwell, K.M. Newell, & G.C. Roberts (Eds.), Psychology of motor behavior and sport1979 (pp. 54-72). Champaign, XL: Human Kinetics. Smith, R.E. (1984). Theoretical and treatment approaches to anxiety reduction. In J.M. Silva & R.S. Weinberg (Eds.), Psychological foundations of sport (pp. 157-170). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Sonstroem, R.J. (1984). An overview of anxiety in sport. In J.M. Silva & R.S. Weinberg (Eds ), Psychological foundations of sport (pp. 104-1 17). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Sonstroem, R.J., & Bernardo, P. (1982). Intrindividual pregame state anxiety and basketball performance; A re-examination of the inverted-U curve. Journal of Sport Psychology. 4. 235-245. Spence, J., & Spence, K.W. (1966). The motivational components of manifest anxiety: Drive and drive stimuli. In CD. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety and behavior (pp. 292-326). New York: Academic Press. Spiegler, M.D., Morris, L.W., & Liebert, R.M. (1968). Cognitive and emotional components of test anxiety: Temporal factors. Psychological Reports. 22. 451-456. Spielberger, CD. (1966). Theory and research on anxiety. In CD. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety and behavior (pp. 3-20). New York: Academic Press. Spielberger, CD. (1972). Anxiety: Current trends in theory and research (vol. 1). New York: Academic Press. Spielberger, CD. (1996). State-trait anger expression inventory: Professional manual Tampa: Psychological Assessment Resources. Spielberger, CD., Gorsuch, R.L., & Luschene, R.E., (19700. Manual for the statetrait anxiety inventory (self-evaluation questionnaire). Palo alto, CA: Counseling Psychologists Press.

PAGE 207

195 Spink, K.S., & Roberts, G.C. (1980). Ambiguity of outcome and causal attributions. Journal of Sport Psychology, 2, 237-244. Starkes, J.L., & Allard, F. (1983). Perception in volleyball: The effects of competitive stress. Journal of Sport Psychology, 5, 439-445. Stennett, R.C. (1957). The relationship of performance level to level of arousal. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54. 54-61. Strongman, K.T. (1973). The psychology of emotion New York: Wiley. Strongman, K.T. (1978). The psychology of emotion (2'^ ed.). New York: Wiley. Strongman, K.T. (1987). The psychology of emotion (3"^ ed.). New York: Wiley. Suinn, R. (1972a). Behavior rehearsal training for ski racers: Brief report. Behavior Therapy. 3. 210-212. Suinn, R. (1972b). Removing obstacles to learning and performance by visuomotor behavior rehearsal. Behavior Therapy. 3. 308-310. Suinn, R.M. (1980). Body thinking: Psychology for Olympic champs. In R.M. Suinn (Ed.), Psychology in sports: Methods and applications (pp. 306-315). Minneapolis, MN Burgess. Suinn, R. (1986). Seven steps to peak performance: The mental training manual for athletes Toronto: Hans Huber Publishers. Suinn, R. (1987). Behavioral approaches to stress management in sport. In J.R. May & M.J. Asken (Eds.), Sport psychology (pp. 59-75), New York: PMA. Suls, J., & Mullen, B. (1983). From the cradle to the grave: Comparison and selfevaluation across the life-span. In J. Suls (Ed ), Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 1, pp. 97-128). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Svebak, S., & Stoya, J. (1980). High arousal can be pleasant and exciting: The theory of psychological reversals. Biofeedback and Self-regulation. 5. 439-444. Swain, A., & Jones, G. (1993). Intensity and frequency dimensions of competitive state anxiety. Journal of Sport Sciences. 11. 533-542.

PAGE 208

196 Swain, A., & Jones, G. (1996). Explaining performance variance. The relative contribution of intensity and direction dimensions of competitive state anxiety. Anxiety. Stress and Coping: An International Journal. 9. 1-18. Tavris, C. (1989). Anger: The misunderstood emotion New York: Simon & Schuster. Taylor, J. (1987). Predicting athletic performance with self-confidence and somatic and cognitive anxiety as a function of motor and physiological requirements in six reports. Journal of Personality. 55. 139-153. Taylor, S.E. (1981). The interface of cognitive and social psychology. In J. Harvey (Ed.), Cognition, social behavior, and the environment Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Thom, R. (1975). Structural stability and morphogenesis, transcribed by D.H. Fowler New York: BenjaminAddison Wesley. Thomas, P.R., & Over, R. (1994). Psychological and psychomotor skills associated with performance in golf The Sport Psychologists. 8. 73-86. Tomkins, S.S. (1981). The quest for primary motives: Biography and autobiography of an idea. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 41. 306-329. Ulrich, B.D. (1987). Conceptualization of sport competence, and organized sport: Their interrelationships in young children. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport. 58. 57-67. Ursin, H. (1978). Activation, coping, and psychosomatics. In H. Ursin, E. Baade, & S. Levine (Eds.), Psvchobiology of stress: A study of coping men (pp. 201-228). New York: Academic Press. Vallerand, R.J. (1987). Antecedents of self-related affects in sport: Preliminary evidence on the intuitive reflective appraisal model. Journal of Applied Spo rt Psychology 9(2), 161-182. Vealey, R. S. ( 1 986). Conceptualization of sport-confidence and competitive orientation: Preliminary investigation and instrument development. Journal of Sport Psychology. 8. 221-246. Vealey, R.S. (1988). Future directions in psychological skills training. The Sport Psychologist. 2. 3 1 8-226.

PAGE 209

197 Vealey, R.S. (1990). Advancements in competitive anxiety research: Use of the Sport Anxiety Test and Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2. Anxiety Research, 2. 243-261. Vealey, R.S., & Walter, S.M. (1993). Imagery training for performance enhancement and personal development. In J.M. Williams (Ed.), A pplied sport psychology: Personal growth to peak performance (pp. 200-224). Mountain View, CA: Mayfield. Watson, J.B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 3. 1-14. Weinberg, R.S. (1979). Anxiety and motor performance: Drive theory versus cognitive theory. International Journal of Sport Psychology. 10. 112-121. Weinberg, R.S., & Gould, D. (1995). Foundations of sport and exercise Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Weinberg, R.S., Gould, D., & Jackson, A. (1979). Expectations and performance: An empirical test of Bandura's self-efficacy theory. Journal of Sport Psychology. 1. 320331. Weinberg, RS., Gould, D., Yukelson, D., & Jackson, A. (1981). The effect of preexisting and manipulated self-efficacy on a competitive muscular endurance task. Journal of Sport Psychology. 4. 345-354. Weinberg, R. S. & Hunt, V. V. ( 1 976). The interrelationships between anxiety, motor performance, and electromyography. Journal of Motor Behavior. 8. 219-244. Weinberg, R., & Ragan, J. (1978). Motor performance under three levels of stress and trait anxiety. Journal of Motor Behavior. 10. 169-176. Weinberg, R., Seaboume, T., 8c Jackson, A. (1981). Effects of visuo-motor behavior rehearsal, relaxation, and imagery on karate performance. Journal of Sport Psychology. 3. 228-238. Weinberg, R.S., Yukelson, D., & Jackson, A. (1980). Effect of public and private efficacy expectations on competitive performance. Journal of Sport Psychology. 2. 340-

PAGE 210

198 Weiner, B. (1981). The role of affect in sport psychology. In G. Roberts (Ed.), Psychology of motor behavior and sport1980 (pp. 37-48). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Weiner, B. (1985a). An attribution theory of achievement motivation and emotion. Psychological Review, 92. 548-573. Weiner, B. (1985b). Spontaneous casual thinking. Psychological Bulletin. 97. 7484. Weiner, B., & Brown, J. (1984). All's well that ends. Journal of Educational Psychology. 76. 169-171. Weiss, MR., Wiese, D.M., & Klint, K.A. (1989). Head over heels with success: The relationship between self-efficacy and performance in competitive youth gymnastics. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. 11. 444-45 1 Whelan, J., Myers, A., Berman, J., Bryant, V., & Mellon, M. (1988, October). Meta-analysis of cognitive-behavioral interventions for performance enhancement in sports. Paper presented at the 4 annual conference for the Association for the Advancement of Applied Sport Psychology, Nashua, NH. Wong, P.T.P., & Weiner, B. (1981). When people ask "why" questions and the heuristics of attributional search. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 40. 650663. Yancey, R. (1977, November). Develop a preshot routine and play better. Golf Digest, pp. 115-117. Yerkes, R.M., & Dodson, J.D. (!908). The relationship of strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit formation. Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology. 18. 459482. Young, P.T. (1961). Motivation and emotion New York: Wiley. Zaichkowsky, L.D. (1991). Heart rate as an indicator of optimal performance states Unpublished manuscript, Boston University. Zaichkowsky, L., & Takenaka, K. (1993). Optimizing arousal level. In R.N. Singer, M. Murphey, &, L.K. Tennant (Eds.). Handbook of research on sport psychology (pp. 511527). New York: MacMillan.

PAGE 211

199 Zeeman, E.C. (1976). Catastrophe theory. Scientific American, 234, 65-82. Ziegler, S., Klinzing, J., & Williamson, K. (1982). The effects of two stress management training programs on cardiovascular efficiency. Journal of Sport Psychology. 4. 280-289. Zimmerman, B.J. (1989). Models of self-regulated learning and academic achievement. In B.J. Zimmerman & D.H. Schunk (Eds.), Self-regulated learning and academic achievement theory, research, and practice: Progress in cognitive development research (pp. 1-26). New York: SpringerVerlag. Zimmerman, B.J., & Kitsantas, A. (1996). Self-regulated learning of a motoric skill: The role of goal setting and self-monitoring. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 8, 60-75.

PAGE 212

APPENDIX A DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION Name: Phone Number: Course Instructor: Period (Time): Best days and times to be reached: Current Handicap: Lowest-ever Handicap: Average Score if You Do Not Have an Established Handicap: Years of Playing Golf Lowest-ever 18 Hole Score: Average Range of Scores (circle one): 75-85 80-90 85-95 90-100 95-105 100-110 105-115 110-120 Average Number of Rounds Played Per Month: Year: Average Hours of Range Practice Per Month: Year: Have You Ever Taken a Golf Class or Lessons (circle one): Yes No Are You Currently Taking a Class or Lessons (circle one): Yes No 200

PAGE 213

APPENDIX B MODIFIED COMPETITIVE TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTOR Y-2 (CTAI-2) I.D. # Date DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which athletes have been used to describe their feehngs before a competition are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement, but choose the answer which describes your general feelings before a competition. Not At Moderately Very Much All Somewhat So 1. 1 am concerned about competition 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 2. 1 feel nervous 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 3. 1 feel at ease 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 4. 1 have self-doubts 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 5. 1 feel jittery 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 6. 1 feel comfortable 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance'^ -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 201

PAGE 214

202 7. 1 am concerned that I may not do as well in competition as I could 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 8. My body feels tense 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative 9. 1 feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 10. 1 am concerned about losing 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 1 1. 1 feel tense in my stomach 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 12. 1 feel secure 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 13. 1 am concerned about choking underpressure 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance'? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 14. My body feels relaxed 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance'? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative 15. I'm confident I can meet the challenge 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance'? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative

PAGE 215

203 16. I'm concerned about performing poorly 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative 17. My heart is racing 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 18. I'm confident about performing well 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 19. I'm worried about reaching my goal 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 20. 1 feel my stomach sinking 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 21. 1 feel mentally relaxed 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 22. I'm concerned that others will be disappointed with my performance. 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 23. My hands are clammy 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 24. I'm confident because I mentally picture myself reaching my goal... 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative

PAGE 216

204 25. I'm concerned I won't be able to concentrate 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 26. My body feels tight 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 27. I'm confident of coming through underpressure 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative

PAGE 217

APPENDIX C MODIFffiD TRAIT ANGER SCALE A number of statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then circle the number which indicates how often you generally feel during competition. Remember that the are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement. Almost Almost Never Sometimes Often Always 1 I am quick tempered 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 2. I have a fiery temper 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 3. I am a hothead person 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 4. I get angry when I'm slowed down by others mistakes 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 5. I feel annoyed when I am not given recognition for doing good work 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 6. I fly off the handle 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 205

PAGE 218

206 7. When I get mad, I say nasty things. 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 8. It makes me fiirious when I am criticized in front of others ... 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 9. When I get frustrated, I feel like hitting someone 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative 10. 1 feel infuriated when I do a good Job and get a poor evaluation ... 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative

PAGE 219

APPENDIX D SUMMARY OF TEST STATISTICS ON THE CSAI-2 FOR THE COLLEGE SAMPLE OF COMPETITIVE ATHLETES College Students Scale Male (N-1 58) Female (N =220) Cognitive Anxiety M 17.68 18.40 SD 4.84 5.99 a .79 83 Somatic Anxiety M 17.68 16.85 SD 4.86 4.94 a .82 .83 Self-confidence M 25.37 24.67 SD 5.15 5.90 a .87 .90 207

PAGE 220

APPENDIX E SUMMARY OF TEST STATISTICS ON THE STATE AND TRAIT SUBSCALES OF THE STAXI FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS College Students Scale Male Female SAnger M 15.89 SD 7.28 N 1,377 a .93 T-Anger M 20.08 20.35 SD 5.24 5.27 N 1,377 1,385 a .82 .83 12.30 4.45 1,385 .90 208

PAGE 221

APPENDIX F MODIFffiD COMPETITIVE STATE ANXIETY INVENTORY-2 (CSAI-2) ID. # Date DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which athletes have been used to describe their feelings before competition are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how you feel right now-sA this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement, but choose the answer which describes your feelings right now. Not At Moderately Very Much All Somewhat So 1. 1 am concerned about this 12 3 4 competition Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 2. 1 feel nervous 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative 3. 1 feel at ease 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 4. 1 have self-doubts 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 5. 1 feel jittery 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 6. 1 feel comfortable 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 209

PAGE 222

210 7. 1 am concerned that I may not do as well in this competition as I could. 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 8. My body feels tense 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 9. 1 feel self-confident 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative 10. 1 am concerned about losing 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 11. 1 feel tense in my stomach 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 12. 1 feel secure 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 13. 1 am concerned about choking underpressure 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 14. My body feels relaxed 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative 15. I'm confident I can meet the challenge 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative

PAGE 223

211 16. I'm concerned about performing poorly 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 17. My heart is racing 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 18. I'm confident about performing well 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 19. I'm worried about reaching my goal 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 20. 1 feel my stomach sinking 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 21. 1 feel mentally relaxed 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 22. I'm concerned that others will be disappointed with my performance. 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 23. My hands are clammy 1 2 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 24. I'm confident because I mentally picture myselfreaching my goal... 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10 1 2 3 Very debilitating Very facilitative

PAGE 224

212 25. I'm concerned I won't be able to concentrate 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 26. My body feels tight 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 27. I'm confident of coming through underpressure 12 3 4 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative

PAGE 225

APPENDIX G MODIFIED STATE ANGER SCALE A number of statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then circle the number which indicates how often you feel right now. Remember that the are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement. Not At Moderately Very Much All Somewhat So So 21. 1 am furious 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 22. 1 feel intimidated 12 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 23. 1 feel angry 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 24. 1 feel like yelling at somebody 12 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 25. 1 feel like breaking things 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 26. 1 am mad 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 213

PAGE 226

214 27. 1 feel like banging on the table 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 28. 1 feel like hitting someone 1 2 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 29. 1 am burned up 12 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative 30. 1 feel like swearing 12 3 Is this symptom facilitative or debilitating to your subsequent performance? -3-2-10123 Very debilitating Very facilitative

PAGE 227

APPENDIX H INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT Project Title: The relationship between anxiety, anger, confidence, and performance in golf. Purpose and Testing Procedures: The purpose of this project is to determine the relationship between anxiety, confidence, anger, and performance in golf What you will do in the study: You will be asked to complete questionnaires plus attempt several chip or pitch shots from around the green. The target hole will be located approximately 25 yards away. Therefore, completion of the task will require minimal effort. Time required: Total time requested is approximately 1 and 1/4 hours. Risk: There are no risks associated with participation. Benefits/Com pensation : There is potential monetary compensation available. However, this is based on performance results. The player with the best score on either of the final two rounds during a competition phase will receive $100. Second and third places will be awarded $50 and $25 respectively. Prizes will be awarded after all players have completed the project. Confidentiality: The information you give and the data collected will be handled confidentially. Your information will be assigned a code number. The list cormecting your name to this number will be kept in a locked file. When the study is completed and the data analyzed, the list will be destroyed. Your name will not be used in any report. Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. Right to Withdraw from the Study: You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. Whom to contact if you have questions about the study: Milledge Murphey, Ph.D., Department of Exercise and Sport Sciences, 142 FLG (353) 392-0584. 215

PAGE 228

Whom to contact about your rights in the study: UFIRB Office, Box 1 12250, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 3261 12250. Agreement: I have read the procedures described above. I voluntarily agree to participate the procedure and 1 have received a copy of this description. Participant: Age: ID # Date: Principal Investigator:

PAGE 229

APPENDIX I SOCIAL VALIDATION AND MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 1 To the best of your knowledge, what was the purpose of this study? 2. Why do you think that you were asked to participate? 3. Did you understand what was expected of you? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (not at all) (very much so) 4. Did you adhere rigidly to the assessment procedures? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (not at all) (very much so) 5. Did you adhere rigidly to the recommended strategy? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (not at all) (very much so) 6. Briefly describe any strategy you used in attempting to perform well. 7. Did you perceive any changes in performance? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (not at all) (very much so) 217

PAGE 230

8. If so, do you feel that the perceived changes were significant? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (not at all) (very much so) 9. Were the procedures appropriate and acceptable? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (not at all) (very much so) 10. How important was it to you to perform well? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (not at all) (very much so) 1 1 Did you try to the best of your ability? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (not at all) (very much so)

PAGE 231

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Lester J. Bouchard Jr. was bom on March 14, 1969, in Meriden, Connecticut. He was awarded an Associate of Science degree in business management and administration and an Associate of Arts degree from Daytona Beach Community College in 1993 and 1994, respectively. He attended Florida State University and was awarded a Bachelor of Science degree in psychology in 1995. In the fall of 1995, Lester entered the graduate program in sport psychology at the University of Florida to pursue a Master of Science in Exercise and Sport Sciences and was awarded a M.S.E.S.S. in 1997. Upon graduation, he continued his studies at the University of Florida in order to pursue a Doctor of Philosophy degree specializing in sport and exercise psychology. He completed his dissertation and was awarded the Ph.D. degree in December 2000. 219

PAGE 232

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Milledge Murphey, Associate Professor of Exercise and Sport Sciences I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fiilly adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Christopher Janelle Assistant Professor of Exercise and Sport Sciences I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Ronald Siders Associate Professor of Exercise and Sport Sciences I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Harry Daniels Professor of Couiiselor Education

PAGE 233

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Facuhy of the College of Health and Human Performance and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfilhnent of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. December 2000 Human Performance >ean. College of Health and Dean, Graduate School